Vedanta and Bhagavadgita [1 ed.] 1032545887, 9781032545882

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VEDĀNTA AND BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

Kotta Satchidananda Murty (1924–2011), also known as Satchidananda, KSM, Murty, was a vociferous writer and an iconoclast. This volume is a collection of his unpublished writings. It includes Murty’s views on the Veda, its meaning, relevance and study, and shows the significance of the Vedāntic vision to the modern world. Murty elucidates the basic tenets of Advaita Vedānta and expounds the Advaitic doctrine of the relationships between Brahman and God, Brahman and the individual self, as well as God and the world. In his writings, Murty contrasts empirical knowledge with transcendental wisdom and surveys the history of Indian science and scientific views in ancient times. The book also includes Murty’s musings on the scholar Śaṅkarācārya’s philosophy, authorship and religious life. An important contribution to Indian philosophy, the volume will be of great interest to scholars, teachers and students of Hindu philosophy, Bhagavadgītā, Vedāntic philosophy, Advaita Vedānta, comparative philosophy, religious studies, and South Asian studies. Ashok Vohra is Former Professor of Philosophy at Delhi University, India. Kotta Ramesh is Former Professor of Human Resource Management at Andhra University, India.

VEDĀNTA AND BHAGAVADGĪTĀ The Unpublished Writings of K. Satchidananda Murty

Edited by Ashok Vohra and Kotta Ramesh

Designed cover image: © Getty Images First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Ashok Vohra and Kotta Ramesh; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Ashok Vohra and Kotta Ramesh to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-032-54588-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-54594-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-42562-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625 Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

CONTENTS

Editors’ Note

vi

Introduction

1

1 Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study

4

2 The Vedāntic Vision

14

3 Reason in Vedānta

23

4 The Advaitic Vision: Awareness of Self-established Consciousness

31

5 Śaṅkara’s Conception of God: Effects of Superimposition

45

6 Śri Śaṅkarācārya: Some Observations

60

7 Śaṅkara’s Views on Religious Life

70

8 Gītā Bhāṣyatraya Vivecana: Reflections on the Three Bhāṣyas of the Gītā 83 9 “Here” (Iha) and “There” (Amutra): “The Excellent” (Śreya) and “The Pleasant” (Preya) 97 Index

109 

EDITORS’ NOTE

Professor Kotta Satchidananda Murty was a vociferous writer and an iconoclast. In recognition of his contribution in the field of Philosophy, he was awarded the highly coveted BC Roy Award in Philosophy, and Padma Vibhushan by the Government of India. His first major book in Telugu, titled Śrīmad Bhagavadgītā: Navayakhyanamu (in English, it was titled Śrīmad Bhagavadgītā: The Song Celestial), was published in the year 1941. In print, it comprised 500 pages. He started writing it when he was just 14 years of age. His last edited book, Life, Thought and Culture in India (A.D. 300–1000), was published in 2002 when he was 78 years old. In between these years, in addition to 13 books in Telugu, 31 books in English and one book in Hindi, he published a large number of articles and delivered keynote and valedictory addresses in several national and international seminars. In addition, he addressed many convocations. He also addressed a number of public gatherings on philosophical issues. Many of these presentations were not published and remain unavailable to the readers. In his diaries, Prof. Murty has clearly mentioned that he has not given the copyright of his works to any publisher/journal. Considering that the unavailability of these writings hampered a comprehensive understanding and evaluation of Murty’s thoughts, we decided to restore and publish them to bridge the gap crucial to an indepth understanding of Murty’s philosophy. The unpublished writings of Murty in this volume range from the year 1958 to around 2000. These lectures/addresses/research papers or articles were found by his youngest son Kotta Ramesh in different folders left in a bag after Murty’s demise. All these manuscripts were handwritten or typed by K. Satchidananda Murty himself. Some were printed in the form of booklets, which presumably were 

Editors’ Note vii

distributed amongst the audience at different seminars and lectures. Some of these booklets, when found, were either tattered or damaged, and the manuscripts had become very brittle with the passage of time. Parts of these had to be restored to make them coherent and intelligible. Due to this, not all manuscripts available in the folders could be included in these volumes. We also tallied reference numbers in the texts with their corresponding footnotes/endnotes. In most cases, we were able to establish a correspondence between the reference numbers given in the main text of the writing and the citation in the footnotes/endnotes. Wherever there were missing links, we have used some special marks like “*,” “+” and “†” so that the edited version does not disturb the number sequence of the endnotes. To preserve the coherence in a couple of papers, where it was feasible, we have changed the original numbers of the endnotes. We made intensive efforts to trace the date, place or event of the presentation of these papers. Wherever we could trace these details, we have indicated with “*” mark in the title of the paper itself and mentioned it in the begining of the Endnotes. Wherever the diacritical marks in the Sanskrit words were missing in the original copies of the articles, we have inserted these for the sake of uniformity and readability. The idea of publishing these writings was first conceived by Kotta Ramesh. He collected all these papers and got them typed afresh. He checked and rechecked the manuscripts and the typescript several times. In this task, his brothers K. Yasomitra, Dr K. Raghunath and K. Krishna helped him by giving him free access to Professor K. Satchidananda Murty’s papers and books. K. Ramesh’s wife, K. Padma, son, K. Udayana, and daughter, K. Veda, assisted him in preparing the manuscript; his grandson, K. Dhruv, and granddaughter, A. Aarna, helped him sort the papers and keep them in order. Not only he but we as a team are grateful to each of them for their efforts. Without their hard and dedicated preliminary logistic work, the papers would have never seen the light of day, and a large treasure house of wisdom would have been lost. Professor K. Ramesh discussed the matter relating to the publication of these papers with Ashok Vohra. He readily agreed to be the co-editor with Ramesh. Ramesh replied to all queries addressed to him by his co-editor very promptly. Without his deep commitment and hard work, the book would not have seen the light of day. At the request of K. Ramesh and Ashok Vohra, J.S.R.L. Narayana Moorty helped them organize Murty’s writings and prepare the first draft. Ashok Vohra reviewed the manuscript several times, rewrote and reorganized the contents. After a detailed discussion with K. Ramesh, the manuscript was given its final shape. The editors are jointly responsible for the errors and omissions. We are thankful to Dr Pawan Kumar Upadhyay for his help in the transliteration of several passages and rechecking the diacritical marks. We are grateful to Dr Shashank Sinha for his notable suggestions regarding the format and contents of the book. His suggestions helped us reorganize and make the book reader-friendly. Anvitaa Bajaj deserves our thanks for her prompt replies to our queries and for dealing with patience the delays on our part.

viii Editors’ Note

Ashok Vohra is grateful to his wife, Asha, for her editorial and linguistic suggestions. During manuscript preparation, he had to miss out on celebrating the professional achievements of his daughter Aparna and son-in-law Kumud. Thanking them for bearing with and providing him the necessary inspiration and emotional support is not enough. Unfortunately, Professor J.S.R.L. Narayana Moorty suddenly passed away on February 4, 2022. We dedicate this volume to his memory.

INTRODUCTION

Professor K. Satchidananda Murty (1924–2011) was a doyen among philosophers of his times. His contemporaries considered him to be a “unique,” “rare,” “dazzling,” “creative,” “heterodox” and “critical traditionalist” at the same time, and also an “iconoclast” and “bold” philosopher. The vast corpus of his writings, ranging across Indian and Western philosophy, covering ethics, religious studies, social and political thought, culture, peace studies, philosophy of education and Indian foreign policy, reveals his original ideas, logically argued critical observations and insightful comparisons. In his writings, he demonstrated that philosophy does not deal with abstract and abstruse issues; for him, the “problems of philosophy are nothing but the problems of life.” That is why his writings are relevant to our time and needs. Murty’s published works became the subject of critical evaluation by scholars all over the world soon after they were published and continue to be the subject of discussion. Several leading philosophers of India and abroad have been critically and constructively interpreting assumptions—implicit as well as explicit, axioms, starting points, beliefs, arguments, conclusions, underlying theories, undercurrents of thought, normative statements and prescriptions as contained in Murty’s works. Anthologies like The Philosophy of K. Satchidananda Murty published in 1995 when Murty was alive and Reason, Revelation, and Peace published in 2020, about a decade after Murty’s demise, are leading examples of continued research and interest in his philosophical writings. In this volume, we have collected nine of the unpublished papers of Professor K. Satchidananda Murty on the general theme “Vedānta and Bhagavadgītā.” In what follows, we have, based on our understanding, presented a chapter-wise summary of Murty’s views. Ours is just an interpretation; other scholars may have a different, rather radically different one. We take this opportunity to remind the readers of DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625-1

2 

Introduction

Bertrand Russell’s saying, “It is hard to imagine any arguments on either side which do not beg the question; on fundamental issues this is unavoidable.” Murty, too, upheld, “No mortal is omniscient and infallible, and there can be no policies and programs which are perfect and immutably correct. Practical wisdom is often the result of a heated and direct clash of many different viewpoints.” One of the objectives of presenting our understanding and interpretation is to initiate a discussion on the issues raised by Murty. Another is to help the scholars choose the ones which interest them most for their perusal. We will consider our labour well rewarded if Murty’s hitherto unavailable writings help scholars, even in some small measure, to understand Murty’s theories better and develop them in alternative ways. In the first chapter, “Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study,” Murty states that Veda is “what makes known the transcendental means of obtaining the desirable and avoiding the undesirable.” He adds that the Vedas concern themselves with dharma and mokṣa and that they are universal in the sense that studying them and practicing the rituals prescribed in them are not restricted to any particular group. Vedas must be studied with an understanding of their meaning to obtain full benefit from them. While the Vedas deal with dharma and mokṣa, they do not purport to convey any empirical knowledge; hence, they cannot contradict science. Science is outside their purview. That’s what makes the Vedas truly relevant to modern times. In the second chapter, “The Vedāntic Vision,” taking a cue from Śaṅkarācārya, Murty focuses on a passage from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad to elucidate the vision of Vedānta: “So, the self alone is to be meditated upon, for there all become one, this Self alone is to be realized, for one knows all these through it.” This, of course, is an elucidation of the statements of the Upaniṣads like “That thou art” and “I am Brahman.” Murty goes on to show the relevance of the Vedāntic vision to the modern world. For instance, he mentions how the laws of the quantum theory cannot be “formulated with any consistency without reference to consciousness.” Thus, according to Murty, contemporary physics corroborates the Vedāntic vision that reality is of the nature of consciousness. In the third chapter, “Reason in Vedānta,” Murty argues, based on textual passages, that although the Self transcends reason, it is only seen by “subtle and refined” reason. In grasping the Self, reason has to be transcended by its own help. The preparation of brahma vicāra (discussion or reflection on brahman) is necessary for the knowledge of Brahman. In the fourth chapter, “The Advaitic Vision,” Murty elucidates the basic tenets of Advaita Vedānta. For instance, Brahman alone is real, and the world of difference is indefinable. The world is not false but only sublated in Brahman knowledge. Only the Śruti (scripture), especially the mahāvākyas, can be the true means of knowledge of Brahman. Although science is increasingly finding “a unity amidst the diversity of phenomena and forces, there is no unanimity as to the nature of that unity or principle or about the ontological status of that diversity and the relation between the two, either among the scientists or philosophers.” Thus, science neither

Introduction 3

supports nor contradicts the speculations of Vedānta. As Śaṅkarācārya would say, empirical knowledge does not either confirm or negate the Advaitic truth. Finally, Murty argues, based on the Advaita notion, that the same Self resides in all, that all beings are equal, regardless of their caste or stage of life, etc. In the fifth chapter, “Śaṅkarācārya’s Conception of God,” Murty expounds the Advaitic doctrine of the relationships between Brahman and God, Brahman and the individual self, Brahman and the world, as well as between God and the world and between God and the individual self, utilizing the key notions of māyā and avidyā. The upshot of the discussion is that only from the empirical point of view is Brahman viewed as God. Thus, Brahman can be worshipped as God in temples, and one can even obtain benefits from such worship. In the sixth chapter “Śaṅkarācārya—Some Observations,” Murty discusses the authenticity of the claims of authorship of Śaṅkarācārya regarding the many works attributed to him, especially because of the short span of Śaṅkarācārya’s life. It also examines the socio-political circumstances in both South and North India around the times of Śaṅkarācārya. Murty shows that Śaṅkarācārya’s philosophy was not “unprogressive” and that the post-Śaṅkarācārya period was not stagnant. In fact, things were better, but that could not be attributed to Śaṅkarācārya’s philosophy. In the seventh chapter, “Śaṅkarācārya’s views on Religious Life,” Murty discusses how Śaṅkarācārya attempts to reconcile his Advaitic ideas of Brahman alone being real with the various traditional means such as jñāna, bhakti and meditation. He shows how Śaṅkarācārya assimilates bhakti to jñāna and how although Śaṅkarācārya does not undervalue the traditional religious means, he shows the necessity to utilize them to realize one’s identity with Ātman or Brahman and, thus, ultimately to transcend them. The primary means for Brahman realization for Śaṅkarācārya is brahmavicāra or the rational inquiry into Brahman. In the eighth chapter, titled “Reflections on the Three Bhāṣyas of Gītā” Murty compares the commentaries of the three great Vedānta teachers, Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānuja and Madhva, concerning their views on the means of liberation, the three yogas, with special reference to the niṣkāma karma yoga, their views on varnāśrama dharma and different interpretations of the final verse of the Gītā: “Abandoning all dharmas, come to me alone for refuge.” In the ninth chapter, “‘Here’ (Iha) and ‘There’ (Amutra): ‘The Excellent’ (Śreya) and ‘The Pleasant’ (Preya),” Murty contrasts empirical knowledge with transcendental wisdom and surveys the history of Indian science and scientific views in ancient times. While ancient scientists utilized empirical and rational methods in their investigations, Murty asserts, they never ignored the role of spiritual pursuits or the śāstras in human life. Indian philosophy always used rational methods in system-building and argumentation. However, the essence of philosophy is the same as religion. There is no contradiction between empirical and rational methods, either in philosophy or in science and spirituality, which aims at transcendental wisdom.

1 SOME THOUGHTS ON THE VEDA AND ITS STUDY

In recent years, quite a few people, religious as well as secular, interested in the preservation and propagation of the Veda have been talking a good deal about promoting and spreading Vedic studies. So, it is appropriate to give some attention to answering the following questions: What is the Veda? What is its special value and significance? How should it be preserved and disseminated? What is the contemporary relevance of its teachings? Kātyāyana and others defined the Veda as consisting of Mantras1 and Brāhmaṇas2 (“Mantrabrāhmaṇayor vedanāmadheyam”). The great Vedic commentator Sāyaṇa3 mentioned at least three definitions of the Veda: Veda is a heap of words (śabdarāśi) made up of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas. Most of the Mīmāṃsakas, Āpastamba, and Śaṅkarācārya in the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and others have found this definition acceptable. But on the ground that Yāska (Nirukta, V.3.4: “Ityapai nigamobhavati, iti brāhmaṇam”) and Brāhmaṇas, Dayananda Saraswati accepted the Saṁhitās containing Mantras only as the Veda. So did Sri Aurobindo and Kapali Sastri. Even Prabhākara, a great teacher of Mīmāṃsā, as well as Sāyaṇa, has not given any real definition of Mantras. Sāyaṇa said that Mantras are those which are called as such by those who are well informed, while Brāhmaṇas make up that part of the Veda which is not made up of Mantras.4 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in his Advaita Siddhi, defined the Veda as consisting of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas. According to him, while Mantras are those which throw light on the things and deities connected with rituals, Brāhmaṇas are of three types: Vidhis (injunctions), Arthavādas (implicatory or explanatory sentences) and those which are neither Vidhis nor Arthavādas. Vedāntic sentences are examples of the last type because while they form a definite portion of the Veda, they are different from Mantras, Vidhis and Arthavādas. In his commentary on the Ṛgveda, Sāyaṇa mentions another definition of the Veda: That by which the DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625-2

Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study 5

means of obtaining the transcendental goal of man is known. A somewhat different definition is found in his commentary on the Taittirīya Saṃhitā. The Veda, according to Sāyaṇa’s commentary, is that which makes known the transcendental means of obtaining the desirable and avoiding the undesirable.5 For example, it is known empirically that women and sandalwood give pleasure to a man. The Veda is not for giving such knowledge. But through empirical means, we do not know that eating kalañja (a red onion or the meat of an animal killed by a poisoned arrow) is sinful and that performance of a Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice leads to heaven. That which gives such knowledge is Veda. Sāyaṇa also quotes a passage that says, “Dharma6 and Brahman is known from the Veda alone.” In the Prasthānabheda, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī accepts this and formulates the definition of the Veda as the truly authoritative and valid sentences which have no author and which propound Dharma and Brahman. This is a position generally acceptable to most Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins. If this position is accepted, it follows that the Veda is concerned only with Dharma and Brahman, i.e. with virtue or righteousness and God or the Absolute. Dharma is not a thing, so it cannot be known through empirical means. It can be known only through either human intuition or a non-human source of knowledge. Intuitions of men differ, so differing insights apprehend Dharma differently. Thus the intuition of some may inform them that eating beef is sinful, while that of others may inform them that eating pork is sinful. If the good is absolute, ways of achieving it (which may loosely be called virtue or righteousness) cannot be many. There must be only one absolute way of achieving the Absolute, and that cannot be by intuition. So, only an eternal non-human source of knowledge regarding the good and the way of achieving it can be the guide for righteous action. Reason, experience and culture cannot do so. The Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta schools posit that the Veda is an eternal and infallible source of such knowledge regarding Dharma. Similarly, since God or the Absolute is supersensuous, He or It is beyond sense experience. Inferentially also, He or It cannot be grasped, for any kind of inferential act depends on knowledge of the relationship between that which is to be proved and its invariable characteristic (e.g. between fire and smoke). But we do not have any such knowledge in the case of God or Brahman. So, the Vedāntin maintains that the Upaniṣadic portion of the Veda—which is also eternal and infallible—is the one and unique source regarding Brahman. In support of this, he would cite Upaniṣadic passages like “Brahman is the Person known through the Upaniṣads (aupaniṣadaṃ puruṣaṃ)”. It is of great significance that the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta schools do not admit that knowledge of empirical facts can be derived from the Veda. This implies that the Veda does not contain history or science. An eternal book cannot deal with temporal evanescent events nor can a book intended to provide knowledge regarding truths unknowable through sense perception and inference contain empirical facts or scientific generalizations based on them. According to this view, ethics

6  Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study

consists of command statements only, which can neither be proved nor disproved, and knowledge of Brahman is not based upon sense, perception or reason. This Mīmāṃsā–Vedāntic position avoids all possible conflicts between scriptures, on the one hand, and history and science, on the other hand, and it is in accordance with what some schools of contemporary Western philosophy and theology say regarding ethics and knowledge of God: Ethics is non-empirical, non-science; the knowledge of God can only be revelational. It follows from the above that if there are any passages in the Veda which appear to deal with history or empirical facts, they do not form intrinsic parts of it. Also, if there appear to be passages in it that clearly contradict experience or what can be generalized from experience, they cannot constitute an essential portion of it. As Śaṅkarācārya said, a hundred Vedic texts cannot make a pot a cloth. What is known beyond doubt through historical research and what is demonstrated as truth through scientific investigations cannot be contradicted by the Veda. If we consider what the Veda says regarding its own origin, we find at least three kinds of statements: (1) It is the eternal word heard by sages qualified by tapas (askesis).7 (2) It was born out of sacrifices.8 (3) The self-existent God manifested it for the welfare of all.9 (4) The Veda, etc. are the breath of the Great Being.10 (5) God manifested it through Agni, Vāyu and Sūrya and Brahma.11 Today with our knowledge of the history of language and the origin and development of the universe and man, we cannot accept any book—whether the Veda or the Quran—either as eternal or as composed by God. It can only be agreed that there are ideas of perennial value and eternal truths, which have been apprehended by the sages and prophets, and which are embodied in different scriptures. Some may argue that these have been revealed by God, and others that they have been discovered by men with spiritual capacity. In any case, a scripture is valuable only in so far as it makes known truths unknowable through empirical sources of knowledge (ajāntanāpanaṃ śāstram) and which remain uncontradicted by human experience and science.12 It follows from the above that no scripture is unique and complete. God could not have revealed the entire truth to anyone or any race nor could any man or race have discovered the entire truth. As such, no scripture is complete. There are profound truths, for example, in the Bhagavadgītā, Śrīmad Bhāgavata, the Tāntric and other books which are not found in the Veda. No scripture is also unique because, whether it is a revelation or a discovery, human intellect is responsible for its formulation and expression in a language. So it is limited by the finiteness of the human mind, as well as by the culture and time in which the latter functions. We also have to accept that scriptures do contain history mixed with myth and legends, and observations, as well as generalizations based on them, mixed with superstitions and wrong generalizations. But these do not form their core. The historical and scientific facts they contain provide useful material for reconstructing political and social history and the history of ideas, and the insights regarding man and nature, which may be found in them, may serve as valuable hypotheses

Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study 7

in scientific investigations. But it is the ethical intuitions, timeless metaphysical truths and spiritual techniques which constitute the core, the essence, of scriptures. Many people believe that the learning of sacred scripture by rote and its repetition in the approved orthodox way, even without knowing its meaning, is meritorious. We find such a belief in different cultures—Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic and Christian. The chanting of a single appropriate letter, a word or a group of words in the proper way, even without understanding their meanings, combined with a firm faith in the intrinsic efficacy of doing so, may lead to spiritual benefit or even psychological or mundane benefit. But without knowing its meaning and without a deep, steadfast and firm faith in the intrinsic power of its chanting, if the Veda is learned by rote and chanted, what purpose does it serve? It may be delightful to hear it, for there is melody and music in its chanting done according to tradition. Thus, it may produce āhlāda and catharsis and may even rouse the sense of the numinous, just as a kīrtana of Tyāgarāja might in listeners who do not know what it means when sung in a traditional way by a great musician who does not understand its meaning. Even mere Vedic chanting serves to keep alive an immemorial and glorious tradition. By all means, let us encourage the learning of the Veda by rote and chanting it in a proper way by as many people as possible. In addition, let us admit that understanding its meaning is at least equally, if not more, important. Nowadays, the Veda is often chanted by those who do not know its meaning and heard by many who do not understand it, and both those who chant and those who hear it lack a firm faith that the words so chanted and heard have an intrinsic power in them. Yet, both perhaps feel something. But is that enough? Should not this state of affairs be transformed? The Veda itself insists that understanding its meaning is necessary for obtaining the full benefit from it. A Ṛgvedic passage says: “He who does not know that higher region of truth, what will he do with hymns? Only those who know attain the highest bliss.”13 Another text says: “He who does not know the meaning hears but does not really hear, sees but does not really see, says but does not really understand what he says. But to those who know wisdom reveals itself as does a well-dressed wife to her husband.”14 The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (X.5.4) clearly says that only when one knows one can ascend to Heaven. The Nirukta has gone so far as to say that he who has learned the Veda and does not know its meaning is like a pillar that merely carries a burden because only he who knows the meaning attains the auspicious and the holy, having got rid of all his sins through wisdom.15 The Bṛhaddevatā also says: “Only he who knows (not merely recites) the hymns knows the gods; the deity does not accept the oblation offered without knowledge.”16 From this, it is clear that sacrifices performed in a mechanical way and hymns repeated in a parrot-like fashion are not completely efficacious. Most lovers of the Veda today place exclusive emphasis on getting it by heart and repeating it with the proper svara, without understanding its meaning. This is what many Pāṭhaśālās do. While we must admire and salute the Brahmins who have kept alive the chanting of the Veda with svara from immemorial times up

8  Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study

to the present day, and while every possible effort should be made to keep alive this great oral tradition, as I already pleaded, at least equal importance must be given to understanding its meaning. If today the teaching of the Veda is not as widely known as the teachings of the Bible, the Bhagavad gītā and some other scriptures are, it is because it has not been disseminated among the general public, even though since the time of Swami Dayananda Sararasvati some efforts have been made to spread its message among all people. Consequently, this most ancient and great scripture remains for many an inert book. Neither its Western philological translations nor its Indian translations based on Sāyaṇa have succeeded in making a spiritual impact on the modern mind. Significant portions of the Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas have to be separated, translated, reinterpreted and made accessible in a way appealing and intelligible to the modern mind. But the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā, a few Tāntric and Yogic treatises and some other Hindu religious works, through various excellent translations, interpretations and expositions, have become living inspirational scriptures, capable of providing direction to many in the modern world. If the Saṃhitā–Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda is to fulfil a similar role, neither the mere preservation of its chanting with svara nor just its interpretation a la Sāyaṇa or Max Müller will be enough. A critical study, translation and dissemination of its teaching in a way relevant to the present day must be undertaken to make it a living source of spiritual guidance. From ancient times the Veda has been interpreted in many ways. Three of these are considered important. They are: 1. The ritualists (Yājñikas) have taken the Veda as mainly a sourcebook that informs how to perform rituals for obtaining this-worldly and other-worldly goods. They have gone to the extent of maintaining that there are no statements of facts (bhūtārtha vākyas) in it. From this standpoint, the entire Upaniṣadic portion becomes just an arthavāda to the commands enjoining acts of meditation conducive to the production of mundane and heavenly benefits, and the gods mentioned in it become hypothetical, i.e. entities supposed to exist. It may be said that Sāyaṇa’s Bhāṣya is predominantly a ritualistic interpretation. So is Skandaswāmī’s. 2. There have also been Vedic interpreters down the ages who accepted the Vedic gods as realities and rituals as acts of propitiation and worship. This means different gods have to be worshipped in different ways for different purposes, and certain gods are propitiated so that they may not cause harm. This is the polytheistic interpretation of the Veda. It may be argued that Venkaṭa Mādhava’s Bhāṣhya is, on the whole, an example of this kind of interpretation. Most Western interpretations are also of this kind. 3. The Veda has also been interpreted monotheistically. For example, Yāska in the nirukta says that all the gods mentioned in the Veda are the limbs of

Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study 9

the one Great Self (mahān ātmā). Śaunaka in Bṛhaddevatā mentions that the Ātmavādins interpret the Veda in their way. There are Aitihāsic and Paurāṇic texts which assert that the sum and substance of the Veda is the glorification of the One God. According to this view, the various gods who are hymned in it are but functions of the One God. Every hymn in the Veda can be understood as directly referring to the One God if the words are understood in the etymological (yaugika) way. Perhaps the commentary of Madhvācārya on the first 40 hymns of the Ṛgveda is the earliest surviving book that gives a monotheistic interpretation of so many hymns. Later, Jayatīrtha wrote a commentary on this, and based on this, Rāghavendra composed a monotheistic exposition of these hymns. In modern times, Swami Dayananda Sarasvati has revived this tradition through his great commentary on the Ṛgveda. Later, Sri Aurobindo interpreted the Vedic hymns symbolically and mystically. It may be remarked that monotheistic and mystical interpretations are possible only in the case of the Saṃhitās and a few Brāhmaṇa passages. What is important is to recognize that from very early times, the Veda has been interpreted in many ways. Certain Ṛgvedic passages point out that its hymns are mystical prayers (ninyanirahasyāni stotrāṇi) and mystical statements (ninyavacāṃsī) uttered by sages illumined by noble ideas and prayers.17 The composer of hymns, man, is a mystery (ninyaḥ), and so are the gods. (ka imam voninyam aciketa?)18 The Mahābhārata indicates that the Vṛtra legend and sacrificial acts can be understood symbolically.19 Vṛtra is tamas, ignorance. Indra’s Vajra is Viveka, discrimination, as Nīlakaṃṭha explained. This shows there was an awareness of the possibility of understanding Vedic legends and rituals symbolically. So Sri Aurobindo was not unjustified in searching for the inner, symbolic and secret meaning of the Veda. Whether what he claimed to have discovered is implicit in it or not is a matter for discussion. Only by a tortuous etymological interpretation can it be shown that the entire Veda is through and through monotheistic. The view that the Veda is just polytheistic is as untenable as the view that it only consists of magical incantations and descriptions of ritualistic acts to be performed mechanically. As the Veda itself mentions, it contains higher and lower (uccavāca) ideas. Profound and eternal metaphysical and psychological truths and ethical intuitions of unsurpassed and perennial value, as well as baseless beliefs and untenable ideas, are to be found in it. While it describes spiritual techniques of the highest order, it also elaborately deals with practices and performances fit only to be undertaken by credulous, insensitive and undiscriminating persons. A Paurāṇic text says there are three meanings (ritualistic, polytheistic and monotheistic or spiritual) in all Vedas (trayorthaḥ sarva vedeṣu). Let us concentrate on the ādhyātmika meaning of the Veda—its spiritual essence. Let competent scholars attempt to discover it in their ways without depending on Madhva, Dayananda or Sri Aurobindo.

10  Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study

From what has been said, it follows that it is wrong to take Yāska and Sāyaṇa or anyone else as sacrosanct and infallible. Yāska was not the first to interpret Vedic words as he did. He referred to a nighaṅṭu with samanvaya, which he cited and explained. He had predecessors like Śākapūni, Audumbarāyaṇa, Aupamanyava and others. He referred to alternate ways of understanding Vedic words and passages. While this was the nairuktika (etymological-definitional) tradition, he was aware of other traditions of Vedic interpretation such as the aitihāsika (historical, e.g. those who take Indra-Vṛtra battles as real incidents) and the Yājñika (sacrificial). The Bṛhaddevatā pointed out many errors in Yāska. Yāska, for example, interpreted the phrase “pañcajanaḥ” as the four varṇas (castes) and the niṣādas. Śaunaka’s Bṛhaddevatā (67–77) informs us that it is possible to understand it as (1) the five fires, (2) the four chief priests and the Yajamāna (sacrificer), and (3) the eye, ear, mind, speech and breath. It says the spiritualists accept the third meaning.20 Coming to Sāyaṇa, Western and many contemporary Indian scholars accepted his interpretation, as it was complete and accessible. So, for them, the Veda appeared only to be polytheistic and ritualistic, or at least mainly, while such is not its purport (tātparya). They forget that Sāyaṇa’s is just one possible way of interpretation and that he was a Vedāntin who believed that the Saṃhitā-Brāhmaṇa portion was sublated by the Upaniṣads, which taught Advaita (monism). Pursuing Sāyaṇa, Venkaṭa Mādhava and others’ arguments, it is possible to maintain that the purport of the Saṃhitā-Brāhmaṇa portion is also spiritual, monotheistic and mystical. Let students of Vedabhāṣyas in Pāṭhaśālās be exposed to the interpretations of Mādhva, Dayananda and Kapali Sastri also. Let it be also remembered that while the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsās claim to systematize, harmonize and interpret the Veda, the Itihāsas and Purāṇas claim to amplify and supplement the meaning of the Veda.21 It is for scholars to decide how far these claims are justified. A great obstacle to the preservation and propagation of the Veda has been the denial of universal access to it. For several centuries, only the Traivarṇika men (men of the three upper castes) have been generally considered eligible to undertake Vedic study, but in effect, it has been the exclusive privilege and prerogative of male Brāhmins only. Even today, most Brāhmins who have learned the Veda, either with or without meaning, do not teach it to women, Śūdras and others. But the Veda itself does not say that it is meant for any particular sex, caste or race. On the contrary, it declares that it is meant for all. We have the following Yajurvedic text: “Just as I have revealed this auspicious word to all human beings, so must you. I have revealed the Vedic truth to Brāhmins, Kṣatriyas, Śūdras, Āryas, personal servants (Svaya), and to the lowest of Śūdras (Aranaya) also.”22 Then we have the following Atharvavedic text: O Man, I, being of the nature of truth and being unfathomable, have revealed the true Vedic knowledge; so I am he who gave birth to the Veda. I cannot be partial either to a Dāsa (slave) or an Ārya; I save all those who behave like myself (i.e., impartially) and follow my truthful commands.23

Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study 11

The above discussion shows that the Veda is a universal scripture. We find examples of Śūdras and sons of slaves propagating Vedic hymns. Two examples may be given: Kavaṣa Ailūṣa propagated Sūktas 30 to 34 of the Ṛgveda, Maṇḍala, X, Anuvāka III. It is known that he was a Śūdra from the Aitareya and Kauṣīṭaki Brāhmaṇas, the Ṛgveda anukramaṇikā, and Sāyaṇa’s Bhāṣya. Kakṣavān propagated Sūktas 116 to 126 of the Ṛgveda, Maṇḍala I, Anuvāka XVII. He was the son of a female slave of the king of Angadeśa. This is known from the Ṛgveda’s anukramaṇikā, the Bhāṣya of Sāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata. A critical study also shows that Janaśruti was a Śūdra, and Satyakāma Jābāli was the son of a woman who lived with many men. According to the Upaniṣads, both received the highest Vedāntic teaching. According to internal evidence, women also were eligible for Vedic study. The 179th Sūkta of the Ṛgveda, Maṇḍala I, Anuvāka XXIII was propagated by Lopāmudrā, a woman; while the 91st Sūkta of the Ṛgveda, Maṇḍala VIII, Anuvāka I, was propagated by Apālā, another woman. The Ṛgveda anukramaṇikā and Sāyaṇa’s Bhāṣya inform us to this effect. It is well known that Gārgi and Maitreyi were great women sages who knew the highest Upaniṣadic truths. Nowhere in the Saṃhitā-Brāhmaṇa or the Upaniṣadic portions is any caste, sex or race excluded from studying and benefiting from the Veda. The sentence “Women and Śūdras should not be taught the Veda” (na strī śūdro vedam adhiyatām), frequently cited by those who advocate the prohibition of access to the Veda to lower castes and women, is not a Vedic text. However, there are passages in some Smṛitis which lay down such a prohibition. On the contrary, there are passages in other Smṛitis that maintain that Śūdras can receive upanayana and study the Veda.24 There is considerable evidence that Śūdras of good families, endowed with good qualities, were taught all Śāstras, except the Saṃhitās, without upanayana.25 The Vedānta Sūtras, 1.3. 34–38, have been interpreted by almost all the medieval Bhāṣyakāras as prohibiting Śūdras from Vedic study. Of them, Śaṅkarācārya is the most liberal, for he at least admits that some Śūdras may, like Vidura and Dharmavyādha, attain Brahman knowledge due to the result of their actions in past lives and that all four castes are free to attain Brahman Knowledge through Itihāsa-purāṇas. Some Arya Samajist scholars, however, interpreted the relevant Vedānta Sūtras as permitting Śūdras also access to Vedic study. While there is no Vedic text which prohibits Śūdras from studying the Veda, there is an explicit text which says he is not eligible to perform sacrifices. “Tasmāt śūdro yajne anavakluptaḥ.”26 According to Pataňjali, not all Śūdras are prohibited from performing sacrifices: some are (Niravasita Śūdras) and some are not (Aniravasita).27 Commenting on this, Kaiyaṭa says that Śūdras are eligible to perform the five Mahāyajñas (great sacrifices).28 These include the Brahmayajña, which means Vedic study (svādhyāya), sandhyāvandana, japa, etc. So, as Nageśa explained, this Vedic text prohibits Śūdras from performing only sacrifices like Agnihotra and not the five great sacrifices. This makes them eligible for Vedic study. The Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, VI.1.24 to 38, have been interpreted by their

12  Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study

medieval commentators as prohibiting Śūdras from Vedic study and sacrifices. The Arya Samājists, however, do not accept such an interpretation and maintain that, according to Jaiminī, all are eligible to perform Vedic rituals because their reward is desired by all and whoever can undertake and complete them can do so.29 Even the medieval commentators admit that Badari, a great sage, who is cited by Jaiminī, maintained that all, including Śūdras, are eligible to perform Vedic sacrifices. Similarly, sages like Aitiśāyana denied the eligibility of women to Vedic study and to perform sacrifices, while Bādarāyaṇa and Jaiminī asserted the contrary. Some Smṛitis make scriptural study mandatory for women. To summarize, the Veda itself claims to be a universal scripture meant for all human beings. Whoever has the sincere desire (arthitva) and capacity (sāmarthya) is eligible to study it either in the original or in its translations. Some Smṛtis and sages assert that Śūdras and women are not entitled to Vedic study, while other Smṛtis and sages maintain that they, too, are entitled. Good sense, justice and reason demand that the latter view be accepted. Everyone has the right to the highest wisdom from the best source available. Moreover, as Western scholars (who, according to some Smṛti writers, would be Mlecchas), as well as those who are not Traivarṇikas (e.g., Prince Dara Shikoh, Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo), have studied, edited, translated, expounded or published the Vedas and Upaniṣads, it is not only unjust but ridiculous to support anymore the taboo on Vedic study. People of all castes, including the Harijans and Girijans, and all nationalities—irrespective of their sex—should be encouraged to study the Veda. “Kurvantu viśvam āryān” Let us make the entire world Āryan, i.e. noble and enlightened.

Notes 1 Mantras are sacred texts which impart knowledge of things useful in the performance of rituals. Brāhmaṇas are sacred sentences that enjoin something, while Arthavādas are corroborative statements auxiliary to Brāhmaṇas. (Krishna Yajva, Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā). This is the usual Pūrva Mīmāṃsā view, not accepted by other Vedic interpreters. 2 Here, the discussion is about the interpretation of the Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas. All are unanimous in saying that the Upaniṣads are predominantly metaphysical and mystical. 3 Sāyaṇa is the only person whose Bhāṣya on the entire Veda is now available. But the sheer volume of it and the internal contradictions in it make it doubtful whether a single person wrote all of it. A single Vyāsa could not have written all the Purāṇas and Upapurāṇas, nor a single Sāyaṇa the entire Vedabhāṣya. Sāyaṇa was probably the chief of a team of scholars who wrote the Bhāṣyas on the different Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas. 4 Introduction to the Bhāṣya on Ṛgveda. 5 Iṣṭaprāpti aniṣṭa parihārayoralaukikamupāyaḥ vedah.

Some Thoughts on the Veda and Its Study 13

6 Dharma (righteous action) is that which is taught by the Veda as capable of achieving what is beneficial and desirable; Adharma (unrighteous action) is that which is taught by the Veda as capable of bringing on what is harmful and undesirable. These are the usual Pūrva Mīmāṃsā definitions. (Krishna Yajva, Mīmāṃsā Paribhāshā). 7 “Vācā virūpa nityayā,” Ṛgveda, VIII, 75-ḥ. 8 “Yajñāt richa sāmāni jajñire,” Ṛgveda, X.90-9. 9 “Yasmāt richo apatakṣan...devaḥ saḥ,” Atharva Veda, X.23.4.20; “Svayambhūr Yathātathyato arthān vyadadhāt..., Yajurveda, 40-8. 10 “Asya mahato bhūtasya niśvāsitam,” Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II.4.10. 11 “Yo vai vedāṃśca prahiṇoti,” Śvetāśvetara Upaniṣad, VI. “Agne Ṛgveda …” Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, XI, 4.2.3. 12 Nirukta, I.20; II.11. 13 “Yastannavede Kimrica Kariṣyati? ya ittadviduṣṭa ime samasate,” Ṛgveda, I, 164.39. 14 “Utatvaḥ paṣyannadādarśa vāca mutattvah śrṛṇvan naśruṇotyenaṃ; Utotvasmaitanvaṃ viśasre jayeva patyā usati suvasaḥ,” Ṛgveda, X.71.4. 15 “Sthāṇurayaṃ bhārahāraḥ kilabhud adhitya vedam na vijānāti yortham, yorthajña itsakalam bhadramaśnute nākameti jñāna vidhuta pāpmā.” Nirukta, I.18. 16 “Ya richo ha yo veda sa veda… Jñānoradhiṣṭam hi … daivatam,” Bṛhadāraṇyaka 29, 133. 17 Ṛgveda, VII, 61.5; IV. 3.16. 18 Ṛgveda, I.164.37; 1.95.4. 19 Aśvamedha Parva, XI, 7.20; Anuśāsana Parva, 84.47–48. 20 “Cakṣuh śrotram mano vāk ca prāṇaśceti ātmavādinaḥ.” 21 Itihāsapurāṇābhyām vedārtham upabṛmhayet. 22 Yathemām vācaṅgalyānīmavadāni jenebhyaḥ| brahmarājanyābhyām śūdrāya caryāya ca svāya caraṇāya ca|. Yajurveda, 26.2. 23 “Satyamaham gabhirah kāvyena satyam jāte nasmijāta veda, name dāso name āryo mahitvavratam mimāya yadahadhariṣye,” Atharva Veda, VIII.2.11. 24 (1) “Śūdrānām aduṣṭa karmānām upanayanaṃ”. Pāraskara Gṛhya Sūtra, 2.6. Āpastamba prohibited Upanayana for Brhmins with bad qualities. (2) “Śūdrānām brahmacaryatvaṃ munibhiḥ kaiścidisyale,” Ch.2. (3) “Atraca Śūdra vājasaneyinaḥ iti vaśiṣṭha vākyāt.” Saṃskāra Mayūkha, pa.85. (4) “Śūdro vā caritavrataḥ”. Vṛddha Gautama Smṛti, Ch.26. 25 “Śūdram api kulaguṇa sampannaṃ mantravarjaṃ anupānitaṃ adyapayedītyete.” Suśṛta, Sūtrasthāna. 26 Taitiirīya Saṃhitā, VII.1.1.6. 27 Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇinī, II. 4.10. 28 “Śūdrānām pañcamahaya jñanuṣṭhāne adhikāro asti iti bhāvaḥ,” Kaiyaṭa. 29 Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, VI. 1.4–5.

2 THE VEDĀNTIC VISION

Vedānta is a philosophy based on mysticism. Mysticism attempts to acquire experience in its pure form and then uses it to define reality. It asserts that the immediate inexperience is the real. Further, the real is that which is experienced as the absolute value, after experiencing which all thinking and striving stop, having been satisfied. In such an experience one feels that one has found an ineffable something, satisfies all longing and answers all questions. Vedānta is a mystic faith that examines its own foundations, draws out its own implications and clarifies itself. Although there are ten major Upaniṣads, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka is agreed to be perhaps the most ancient and certainly the most profound, and it is also the biggest. Upon its basis, I will attempt to elucidate the Vedāntic vision, closely following Śaṅkarācārya’s explication. Its metaphysical teaching is, according to Śaṅkarācārya, summarized in a passage that I will first take up for consideration: “He who meditates upon each of these things singly does not know, for in that way it is incomplete, being fragmented, each fragment possessing a single characteristic. So, the Self alone is to be meditated upon, for there all become one. Among all these, this Self alone should be realized, for one knows all these through it.” (Sa yo’ta ekaikamupāsate na sa veda. Akṛtsno hyeṣo’ta ekaikena bhavati; ātmatyevopāsīt, atra hyeto sarva ekam bhavanti. Tadetatpadanīyamasya sarvasya yadayamātmā, anena hyetatsarvaṃ veda.) (1.4.7.) This passage teaches that the Self-manifested itself as the world of action, agent and instrumentalities. It has many activities and many qualities; it has entered into all; it is the cause of the world and its foundation; it also indwells all, and everything becomes one in it. It is the end of all. By knowing it, all is known. Through DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625-3

The Vedāntic Vision 15

any one of its manifestations, i.e. through any one thing in the world—it cannot be known in its essence. While by knowing individual things in their separateness, the Self cannot be known in its completeness, by knowing it in its completeness, everything can be known (Cf. Heidegger: “The true nature of Being is revealed by our explicit understanding of it, and not by an investigation and analysis of entities which are symptomatic of it.”) Though the Self has become all, entered into all (Taittirīya, 2.6.1) and is the inner self of all, it is untouched by hunger, thirst, suffering, etc. The ways of knowing grasp only the special characteristics based on the adjuncts of the Self, while it itself is never the object of perception or knowledge (Kaṭha, 2.2.11.). Due to the wrong identification of the body with the Self, the suffering, happiness, etc. of the former are attributed to the latter. The Self is the only perceiver; it is never an object (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 3.4.2; 3.8.11.). When the Self is considered the other due to nescience, things are supposed to be for its sake. But when there is the right knowledge, and the Oneness is seen, there is no delusion (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 4.5.15; Īśa, 7). Even if the eternal Self is inferred, it cannot be considered as associated with suffering, which is an object of perception, as it is forever the Subject, distinct from the object. It has no parts and does not change as it is not associated with anything non-eternal. Vedānta is for removing the mistaken notion that the Self suffers. Avidyāropita duḥkhitvā bhramāpohārthatvāt. The Suffering Self is a fiction that has to be gotten rid of. The Self is present in all things, as the sun’s reflections are contained in the water in rivers, ponds and vessels. The Omnipresent and partless Self cannot really either create or enter into anything. The Upaniṣadic statements about creation, etc. are metaphorical and intended for making their meaning known in gradual steps. The Self is present everywhere, but, as already said, when seen thus in its separateness, it is seen incompletely. The integral Self is not directly known when known as qualified by different activities. So, the Self is truly known when it is known as it is in itself with all adjectives dissolved in it. As a mere Being, it pervades and is the basis of everything. When grasped as pure Being, it is completely grasped. The knowledge of the Self is attained by sentences like “That which is directly immediate Brahman” and “which is the nature of this consciousness.” Yatsākṣādaparokṣādbrahmā; yo’yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ. (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 3.4.1; 4.3.7.) By such knowledge of the Self’s nature, the notion of identity with the nonSelf and the nescience which superimposes on its factors like actions and results are removed. With their removal, there will be no possibility of defects like desire and no possibility of thinking of the not-Self; only thought about the Self will remain. Thus, the Self is intrinsically attained (svataḥprāpta); to meditate on it is to know it. The Upaniṣadic sentences have the sole purpose of stating the nature of the Self and negating the not-Self. Their meaning consists only in the knowledge arising from this and in nothing additional to be done mentally or physically. Sentences propounding the Self as ‘not-this’ cannot intend any human activity. Indeed, the knowledge arising from them stills activity. Indifferent knowledge (udāsīna vijñāna)

16  The Vedāntic Vision

cannot generate any activity, and sentences like “the One without a second” and “That thou art” remove knowledge regarding the not-Self. When it is removed, engagement in an activity is not possible. As asserted by the Upaniṣads, such sentences alone can remove the knowledge of the non-Self. Sentences like “That thou art” which present the real nature of the Self, at the very time of their being heard, bring about the vision of the Self (ātmadarśana). Simultaneously with the hearing of the sentences propounding the Self, knowledge which removes false knowledge is generated. When false knowledge is removed, even the natural memories of the not-Self and difference will not remain. When it is recognized that such memories are inauspicious, as they are associated with impermanence, suffering and impurity, they cannot persist. The successive cognitions of the oneness of the Self remove defects like suffering, delusion, fear and boredom, all of which arise from perverted knowledge (Īśa, 7; Taittirīya 2.9.1). Liberation has nothing else as its means except the knowledge of the one Self. This is the teaching of the Vedānta: tadātmānamevāvet (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 1.4.10). The validity of a sentence lies in generating knowledge with a definite result. Niścitaphalavad vijñānotpādakatvaṃ (pramāṇyakaraṇam). Sentences that establish the nature of the Self do produce certain knowledge with a consequent result, viz. removal of sorrow, delusion and fear, which are the seeds of transmigration. They generate knowledge that destroys the root of all engagement in action. That, according to Śaṅkarācārya, is their beauty. Even after the right knowledge is obtained, the activity of speech, mind and body continues, for it is an activity that has begun producing results. So, with the support of renunciation and dispassion, etc. the stream of the memory of Self-knowledge should be kept up. “Knowing the Self, sustain the notion of it”— vijñāya prajñāṃ kurvīta (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 4.4.21). When the Upaniṣad says, “the Self alone is to be meditated upon,” it indicates the non-objectivity of the reality that is the Self. The Self alone is the eternal subject; speech and mind cannot comprehend it. Though there may be knowledge of things, it does not need another knowledge; for the Self alone is the supreme goal, after knowing which, whatever else is also known. Non-knowledge is the non-attainment of the Self; knowledge is its attainment. Self-attainment is not the attainment of something not already attained, as in the case of the not-Self, because there is no difference between the one who attains and what is attained - Labdhurlabdhāvyayorbhedābhāvāt. When the not-Self is to be attained by the Self, then the former is what is to be attained and the latter what attains it. In that context, the non-attained is separated by action, but not here. The attainment of the not-Self is generated by desire and action, which in turn arise out of false knowledge. It is like getting something in a dream and is impermanent. The Self is the opposite of this and is not separated by productive activity (utpādya kriyā). It is eternally attained; only nescience separates it, and to remove it is to attain the Self. As there is no other sort of Self-attainment, knowledge and attainment have the same meaning.

The Vedāntic Vision 17

This particular passage has been elucidated because Śaṅkarācārya has said that the aphoristic saying “Ātmatyevopāsīta” (“The Self alone is to be meditated upon”) summarizes the whole of Brahma-vidyā (Brahman-science) for which the entire Upaniṣad is intended (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 1.4.9). Elsewhere also he has said that in this, the meaning of the śāstra has been summed up (Ibid.,1:4.11). It may be useful to supplement the above with the elucidation of another passage from the same Upaniṣad, again closely following Śaṅkarācārya: In the beginning, this Self was indeed Brahman; it knew itself only as “I am Brahman.” So it became everything. Even now, whoever knows this as “I am Brahman” becomes everything - “tadidamapyetarhi ya evaṃ veda, aham brahmāsmīti, sa idaṃ sarvam bhavati” (1.4.10). In this passage, it is maintained that not-Brahmanness and not-all-ness superimposed on Brahman are removed by the knowledge of Brahman. This implies that even before Brahman’s knowledge, all beings, being Brahman, have always been identical to all. No eternal thing can assume a different state in any circumstance. So, every being is always identical with all, and knowledge of Brahman does not produce such identity with all. Not-Brahmanness and not all-ness, being products of nescience, are capable of being removed through Brahman knowledge. Brahman knowledge does not produce or destroy anything real; it only removes nescience. Not-Brahman is neither another principle that produces nescience nor is it another conscious principle with nescience. It is to be concluded that nescience is superimposed upon Brahman as the Upaniṣad implies so (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 4.4.19.). True knowledge is useful only for removing nescience, and after it is removed, Upaniṣadic teaching is useless. There is also no duality of Brahman, on the one hand, and removal of nescience, on the other hand, because this is contradicted by what is perceived. As it is perceived that knowledge of oneness removes nescience, it cannot be said to be impossible. What is seen can never be impossible. There being only One Self, in reality, there is no distinction between the individual self which seeks liberation and the Supreme Self which is sought. A transmigrating individual self cannot attain Brahmanness and all-ness by knowing itself to be Brahman and the all. But as the Upaniṣad says, this happens; in reality, there cannot be any transmigratory individual self. “I am Brahman” is not also a form of meditation of Brahman by a transmigrating individual self based on a resemblance between the two of them because many Upaniṣadic passages assert that this Self is Brahman (Ibid. 2.5.19). The words “Brahman” and “Self” are used in coordination, so they are synonymous - Brahmātmaśabdayoḥ samānādhikaraṇyādekārthatvāt. When, as the Upaniṣads assert, there are not two things and there is only one thing, meditation is not possible. There is no question of the Self attaining Brahmanness. It is eternally Brahman. Meditation is different from knowledge.

18  The Vedāntic Vision

The former is only a concept (pratyayamātra), while knowledge only removes false knowledge and does not do anything. A sentence cannot produce any kind of power in anything and the Upaniṣad is only a reminder, not a producer - Jñāpakaṃ hi śāstraṃ na kārakamiti sthitiḥ. A transmigrating self’s knowledge of itself cannot be knowledge of Brahman itself; only Brahman can know itself as Brahman. So, if the individual self becomes Brahman by knowing itself to be Brahman, it clearly shows that it is Brahman. Something cannot become what is eternal and immutable through knowledge unless it already exists. So, there is no individual self; there is only the Self. This passage teaches that Brahman knows itself as the eternal subject, as the direct, immediate and Omnipresent Self devoid of all change, indicated by “not-this, not this.” As soon as the cognition of the Self arises, it destroys nescience. If the very first cannot do so, even the last cognition cannot do so. Of course, the cognition of the Self which arises may not continue, because, as there is life, thoughts of life-preservation, etc. interrupt it. So, once Brahman’s cognition arises, it must be sustained. By the knowledge of the Self, it is seen that nescience, sorrow and delusion are removed. Of course, due to previous actions which have begun to produce results, the body persists even after Brahman knowledge is attained, and it continues to produce false notions and evils like attachment, etc. Knowledge cannot stop that, for it is not contradictory. Then what does it do? It only stops the effects of nescience which are contradictory to it and are about to be produced from the nescience concerning the Self. Rich is the substratum of that knowledge, for they (the effects) have not yet arisen. The other is past. False notions cannot arise in one who has perfect knowledge, for he has no object. Actions that have not yet begun to bring forth results are destroyed, irrespective of whether such actions were done before, after or at the time of the generation of knowledge. For the man who knows the Reality, which has nothing else besides itself, there are no obligations and responsibilities. When there is no delusion of multiplicity, action is impossible. Only a non-knower of Brahman can meditate upon or worship something other than himself. It is for such an ignorant man that castes, stages in life (Varṇāśrama) and religious activity exist. If such a man engages in a religious activity, he progresses from humanity to divinity and, after obtaining knowledge, to liberation. On the other hand, if he engages only in natural activities, he regresses from humanity to inanimate things. An ethical life, faith, spiritual practices and purity of mind enable one to have a vision of Brahman. Faith is the supreme means of knowledge of Brahman Śraddhāca brahmavijñāne paramaṃ sādhanaṃ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 2.1.1.). The dialectician Śrī Harṣa asserted that the Upaniṣad alone is the means of knowing Advaita (non-duality) - Śrutirevādvaite pramāṇamiti brūmaḥ. He exclaimed after having the Brahman experience: In the state of nescience by resorting to the concepts of the indicated (vācya) and the indicator (vācaka) non-duality is understood indirectly in a general

The Vedāntic Vision 19

way, while after investigation of the meaning of the non-dualistic Upaniṣadic sentences and through harmonization of them it becomes directly experienced. (Āptato yadida madvayavādinīnām, advaitamakalitamarthataya śrutīnāṃ; tattvaprakāśa para-mārthacidevabhūtva niśpīḍitāt ahaha nirvahate vicārāt). I want to raise the question of what the relevance of the above kind of metaphysics is in the contemporary world dominated by science. In this connection, it may not be too inappropriate to consider what has been said by two of the greatest scientists of recent times, Erwin Schrödinger and Werner Heisenberg, and the speculations based upon Bell’s theorem and the bootstrap theory. Schrödinger considers that the real difficulty for philosophy arises from the spatial and temporal multiplicity of individuals and that it cannot be resolved by consistent thought within the intellect. He thinks the solution is that the plurality we perceive is not real but only an appearance. Vedānta, he says, clarifies this with several analogies. The Vedāntic vision, he believes, is supported by particular lines in modern thought which converge upon it. He thinks that the Leibnizian doctrine is the only other alternative and that it is less adequate. That “all consciousness is essentially one” and that “the external world and consciousness are one and the something” are “unprovable theses,” he concedes. On the other hand, he states that while this is mystical metaphysics, acceptance of a real material existing world is also mystical and metaphysical. All living beings are aspects of the one single being, so all living beings belong together: Schrödinger summarizes Vedāntic Philosophy thus. Schrödinger readily assented to this hypothesis because he thought it opened up the possibility of a scientific interpretation of ethics, which in turn gave a certain support to the hypothesis itself. The vision of the truth that one is identical with the whole world underlies all morally available activity. It can make a man even sacrifice himself for what he recognizes to be good ends and make one help a suffering stranger without hoping for any reward. When one realizes that the same imperishable Self subsists in every being, one will not inflict any suffering on others but will be merciful and kind towards all. This is the ethical conclusion of the Vedāntic vision, which Schrödinger accepts completely. While he admits that purely rational consideration can produce mutually decent behaviour towards each other among human beings, he thinks that there is greater nobility in the Vedāntic views of “the lovely thought of unity, of belonging unqualifiedly together.” Schrödinger also comments that the Vedāntic Vision was corrupted by bizarre brāhmanical rites and superstitions and that it also led to an eschatological conclusion: “There is no plurality here whatever; he who sees plurality here is ensnared from death to death” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 4.4.19). Belief in the transmigration of souls underlies this. For this scientist, it is bizarre that anyone now living should be atoning for the misdeeds of an evil-doer, now dead, of whom he has absolutely no recollection. The belief in transmigration, according to him, tries to make the world appear just, although it is unjust. Unfortunately, Vedāntic metaphysics

20  The Vedāntic Vision

cannot prove the world to be just, despite its plausibility and probability and its capability to be the foundation for the noblest possible ethics.1 I now come to Heisenberg, who, in his Physics and Philosophy,2 acknowledges that a certain relationship between Western philosophical tradition and the philosophical quantum theory of substance was indicated by Japan’s great contribution to theoretical physics. From the beginning, he was a convinced Platonist. Mathematically refined concepts developed from the sphere of Platonist philosophy led him to a kind of general philosophy of elementary particles. According to this, Democritus’ view that visible matter is composed of smaller units which, when divided long enough, will be resolved into the smallest units (now called elementary particles) is wrong. It is possible that there are no elementary particles and that matter can be divided forever further and further, which means that it is a change from energy into matter and that the parts are not smaller than what has been divided. Heisenberg concludes that what there was at the beginning was “a law of nature, mathematics, symmetry.”3 As for other Platonists, for him, the loss of conservation for energy or electric charge is universal and applies to all spheres of physics, and they come about through the properties of symmetry in the laws of nature. So, symmetries are the determining elements in the plan according to which nature was created.4 The symmetries themselves can be elucidated only with equations.5 Here there is some difference between Platonic Philosophy and modern physics. According to the latter, laws are not geometrical forms. They are more abstract mathematical constructs that apply to space and time.6 This leads to the view that individual particles are various forms of an original substance, which can be termed matter or energy because of Einstein’s principle of equivalency of matter and energy. Thus, Heisenberg rejects Gell–Mann’s theory that elementary particles are compounds of quarks or more elementary particles. Elementary particles are the simplest representations of symmetry; they are its consequences; they are ideas of matter, and they are the representatives of the central order. Thus, for Heisenberg, a universal formula stands behind the elementary particles. If Vedānta believes that consciousness-bliss is the foundation of everything, for Heisenberg, Harmony-Symmetry is the ultimate. I now come to Henry Stapp, J.S. Bell and David Bohm. Quantum Mechanics can be interpreted in more than one way. According to Copenhagen’s interpretation, based on Bohr’s complementarity principle, quantum mechanics can provide a complete description of the substructure underlying experience. But it implies that there is no substantive physical world. It does not say what reality is; it does not also say that it is ideal, but it does say that reality is not like it appears. What we perceive to be the physical reality is actually our cognitive construction of it. While the cognitive construction is substantive, the physical world itself is not. Quantum mechanics itself does not say what reality is like in itself. Such is the conclusion drawn by Stapp.

The Vedāntic Vision 21

In 1964, Bell formulated his theorem, which was hailed by Stapp as “the most profound discovery of science.” This theorem, proved by the 1972 experiments of John Clauser and Stuart Freedman and refined thereafter, tells us that all parts of the universe are connected intimately and immediately. It implies that, at a deep and fundamental level, there are no separate parts of the universe. Quantum mechanics, the theorem shows, explains everything from subatomic particles to transistors and stellar energy; and it further shows that statistical predictions of quantum theory are always correct. From the 1920s, quantum theories began to see the inadequacy of common sense ideas to describe subatomic phenomena and noticed a connectedness among quantum phenomena. Bell provided mathematical proof for this and also showed that common sense ideas are not adequate even to describe macroscopic events of the everyday world. Our rational ideas about the world are deficient; the world is different from what it seems. This is a conclusion that can be drawn from Bell’s theorem. David Bohm has gone further than this: he thinks that quantum theory is based on the perception of a new order because it starts with the whole and not parts. We can arrive at the notion of an Unbroken Wholeness that denies the previously held idea of separate and independent parts into which the world can be analysed. Unbroken wholeness is “‘that-which-is,” of which all things, space, time and matter are forms. That-which-is implied in everything; it is the “implicate order”; everything is the form of it, but it is not apparent. It cannot be described according to the categories of thought of prequantum science. What can be thought of is not reality; ideas cannot capture it. A new instrument of thought which alters our consciousness and reorients us to see the Unbroken wholeness is needed. The ultimate perception does not originate in the brain, though the brain is necessary for it. Such is the conclusion that Bohm draws from the results of contemporary physics. But not all physicists agree that it is the only possible valid conclusion. Bohm’s conclusion that a pure undifferentiated reality is the most fundamental level is in tune with the Vedāntic Vision. Geoffrey Chew’s Bootstrap hypothesis maintains that nature is to be understood entirely through its self-consistency, which is the essence of all laws of nature. Carried to its logical extremes, the hypothesis implies the existence of consciousness along with other aspects of nature necessary for the self-consistency of the whole. It leads to the final rejection of the mechanistic world-view in modern physics. “Every particle consists of all other particles.” As the Upaniṣad says, the Self is in all beings, and all beings are in the Self. This hypothesis is tied up with the picture of hadrons, strongly interacting particles, formulated in terms of reaction probabilities in the S-matrix, which is a collection of probabilities for all possible reactions involving hadrons, as Heisenberg showed. It may also be mentioned that according to E.P. Wigner, the laws of quantum theory cannot be formulated in an entirely consistent way without reference to consciousness. The ultimate reality (Ātman) can be envisioned. It is beyond the reach of the mind and the senses. It cannot be positively described. It can be indicated as “not

22  The Vedāntic Vision

this.” It is of the nature of consciousness. Everything that is a form of it. It is in everything, and everything is in it. What appears as solid reality is not the reality; the real reality, so to say, underlies all this, interpenetrates all this and, yet, is beyond all this. Such is the Vedāntic view. Contemporary physics in some of its latest trends, as found in the philosophical speculations of the scientists mentioned above, corroborates this vision. But at the same time, the various other beliefs and theories with which the Vedāntic vision is enmeshed, such as the belief in Karma and the view that there is no multiplicity at all, find no support from science. But did even Advaita Vedānta reject multiplicity? One of the great dialecticians of this school said: “We do not propound the absolute unreality. We accept its existence due to nescience: na vayam bhedasya sarvādaiva-sattvaṃ abhyupagacchāmaḥ, kiṃ nāma na paramārthikaṃ sattvaṃ; avidyāvidyamānatvaṃ tu.” The Upaniṣads talk about absolute reality, whereas perception grasps empirical reality. So, as there is no common ground between them, there is also no conflict between them. For the former, true non-difference (satya abheda) is the theme, and for the latter, the practical difference (mithyā bheda) is the object. Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6

My View of the World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964. London, 1959. Physics and Beyond, Allen and Unwin, London, 1971. Ibid. Across the Frontiers, Harper and Row, New York, 1974. Ibid.

3 REASON IN VEDĀNTA

The dominant Indian system of philosophy in our universities and among the majority of Hindu intellectuals appears to be, by and large, Vedānta of some type or other. C. Rajagopalachari characterized it as India’s national philosophy. Without subscribing either to this view or supporting the contention that it is the best and greatest philosophy and the only one which could save the world from nuclear holocaust and ecological crisis, one may ascertain the place of reason in it. The Vedānta texts nowhere assert, as some scholars, for example, Constantin Regamey,1 contend that reason only leads to the threshold of the Absolute and then has to disappear, that between the supreme insight of Brahman and the reason there must be a “leap,” as insight is higher than reason2 and that it is discontinuous with the latter. I do not recollect any Sanskrit word used by Vedānta texts corresponding to “leap.” In fact, in many places in the Upaniṣads, prajñā is used interchangeably with medhā (intellect). In a curious passage in the Chāndogya,3 intellect (manas), will (saṅkalpa), mind (citta), meditation (dhyāna), reason (tarka) or consciousness (vijñāna), strength (bala) and food (anna) are each stated to be superior to the previous in that order, food being the highest! Apparently, on this basis, some interpreters might say matter transcends the mind, according to Vedānta. In no Upaniṣadic passage do we find it stated that there is any mode of apprehension or experience higher than the one possible through reason or buddhi. Of course, the ultimate reality or God is higher than it.4 By tarka, or rational speculation alone, the self cannot be attained but by reason guided by the teaching of the ācārya (preceptor) and āgama (scripture).5 When reason has vijñāna (discrimination, viveka), is aided by a concentrated mind (yukta manas) and is pure, its possessor attains the supreme abode of God.6 The supreme truth leading to immortality can be obtained by the mind alone.7 DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625-4

24  Reason in Vedānta

Though the Self is far transcendent to reason, it is seen only by the refined (or pure or penetrating) and subtle reason8 - Dṛśyate agryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā. Although speech, mind and senses cannot grasp the self, the realization (avagati) of the indeterminate world cause is dependent on reason.9 “For reason alone,” says Śaṅkarācārya, “is our means of knowledge regarding the true nature of the real and the unreal.”10 He who has a tranquil and peaceful mind can obtain the self by intelligence (prajñā).11 That is the position of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. In the Kena, it is said: “Only through rational cognitions is Rahman known.”12 The men endowed with reason know Brahman to be in all beings.13 Commenting on a Muṇḍaka passage, Śaṅkarācārya says the mind has to be recollected and concentrated on Brahman.14 The self, he thinks, has to be experienced (manifested?) only by mental modes.15 By vijñāna, i.e. knowledge generated by the teachings of the scriptures, the preceptor and dispassion, the wise see Brahman.16 The subtle Ātman can be known only by the mind - ‘Aṇurātmā cetasā veditavyo.17 The Aitareya Upaniṣad declares that “mind” (manas), “vijñāna,” “prajñāna” and “medhā” mean the same thing.18 Commenting on this, Śaṅkarācārya says that for all kinds of apprehension, i.e. in all cognition, the mind alone is the one instrument. What is called “prajñā” in the Kauṣītakī, or “manas” in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, or “medhā” elsewhere, is the same internal organ that perceives, wills and decides.19 Commenting on the Taittirīya, Śaṅkarācārya equates “prajñā” and “medhā.”20 Some recensions of the Kauṣītakī use “manas” and “dhī,” whereas others use “prajñā.” That by which one thinks or knows is mind, reason, or prajñā (manute anena iti mano, manute jñānakarmaṇāḥ). The reason that decides or determines the meaning of the Veda is, for Śaṅkarācārya, vijñāna, which is an attribute of the inner organ, an apperception (adhyavasāya) of the latter.21 In the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya, Śaṅkarācārya says that waking and dream states are prjñānas, which are the vibrations (or movements) of the mind; when these are frozen (or stilled) that state is sleep.22 These are modes of awareness that are possible only through citta, which is characterized by bodha (knowledge, cognition).23 Thus, in the Upaniṣads, there is no distinction between mind, reason, vijñāna and prajñā. As the Maitreyi Upaniṣad says, vijñāna is the essence of the mind which is the essence of life (6–14). All these are forms or movements of the same thing, i.e. reason, buddhi or antaḥkaraṇa. There is no gap between them. One of the best English translators of the Upaniṣads, R.E. Hume, grasped this when he translated prajñā as intelligence, buddhi as intellect and vijñāna as understanding. It is through them that any apprehension or experience is possible. The Nirguṇa Brahman, too, is known through reason generated by scriptural teaching and ethical training. One need neither jump out of nor leap up from the reason to experience Brahman. Apart from reason or by abandoning it, there is no vision of Brahman. The Upaniṣads and Śaṅkarācārya are clear on this point. The Bhagavadgītā declares that buddhi (reason) is greater than (or beyond) manas (mind), which is greater than the senses. The Supreme is greater than (or beyond) reason, the Gītā continues, but that this is so is apprehended through

Reason in Vedānta 25

reason itself - Buddheḥ paraṃ buddhvā.24 The Supreme delight beyond the senses, the Gītā says, is to be grasped by reason - Sukhaṃ ātyantikaṃ yat tat buddhi grāhyaṃ.25 Through the Yoga of reason (buddhiyoga) God is attained, so one should take refuge in reason.26 Aided by reason, one can cast off the bonds of karma.27 It is the reason which has to remain steadfast in Samādhi (highest awareness, a clear direct intuition of reality, but not trance).28 The reason is that by which one knows what is duty and what is not, what is activity and what is not, and lastly, what is bondage and liberation. It is also the reason which confuses them or completely misunderstands them.29 In the highest state of wisdom also, one is endowed with pure reason.30 The Gītā uses the words prajñā, dhīḥ and manas interchangeably as almost synonyms.31 As already said, it is reason or mind which has to remain steadfast in samādhi, in sāmya or samatva (equality), so that Brahman may be attained; and it is in reason (and senses) that kāma (desire), the enemy of wisdom, has its seat;32 it is the reason which is confused by moha (delusion) and is shaken by happiness and unhappiness;33 it is by reason again one can abandon the fruits of actions, transcend delusion and liberate oneself from karma.34 When reason stands unwavering (niścala), samādhi results and the Supreme Reality is apprehended. In a resolute person, reason is one (i.e. has only one definite fixed goal, a single aim and is concentrated); in the irresolute, there are, so to say, many reasons, endless and with many branches. To sum up, when one knows clearly what one ought to want and wants that, has no doubts and confusion, has practiced virtue and concentration, and has achieved a poised mind (prasannacetas), he attains steadfast reason by which the Supreme Reality and bliss are grasped. Such is the teaching of the Gītā. So, it can be concluded that according to the basic Vedānta texts, reason (­buddhi) does lead to the highest reality, whether it is the impersonal Absolute or the Transcendent Divine person. Śaṅkarācārya naturally agrees with them. There is no question of abandoning reason and making a wild leap. Texts like “By whom can the knower be known?” mean that the Ātman being the subject, never becomes an object. Self-knowledge is always subjective knowledge, as one’s self is never comprehended as another, as objects are.35 Manas, citta, prajñā, vijñāna and buddhi are just the different forms of varying degrees of the luminosity of the same thing—reason, intellect or the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa). It is by reason that the Supreme is attained, and in this very attainment, the reason is transcended. Reason has to be transcended by its help, through it. It is the mind that blinds as well as liberates. It is like a ladder by which one climbs up and finally reaches a stage where one can abide independently of it. Of course, Advaita Vedānta says that all this – the ladder, the climbing, the attainment and the transcendence of reason – is not real from the absolute standpoint. Even the phrase “experience of Brahman” is not fully correct, for there is no experiencing, experiencer and the experienced, from the absolute standpoint. But this is just one school of Vedānta of the many schools, and as the above citations prove, Śaṅkarācārya, too, is emphatic that it is by reason that Brahman is cognized. Immediacy, the saving

26  Reason in Vedānta

vision, sākṣātkāra, occurs through reason alone. To repeat, the Absolute or God is approached through reason, purified by the ethical endeavour, and made steadfast by the cultivation of equanimity and guided by scriptural teaching.36 It is commonplace in Vedānta that Ātman is realized by receiving the Upaniṣadic teaching, then by discussing it through reasoning (tarka), and lastly by steadfastly knowing it.37 The oneness of the Self, says Śaṅkarācārya, is shown clearly as a Bel fruit on one’s palm only when scriptural testimony and argument together demonstrate it; the meaning of scriptural texts should be explained and tested by arguments.38 In fact, in the basic source books of the Vedānta, there are no words exactly corresponding to “experience” and “intuition.” The words used are “knowing” and “seeing.”39 God or the Absolute is seen, known, understood or grasped; one can fix his mind on it (or him), meditate and contemplate upon it (or him), worship it (or him); one can also attain it (or him) and abide or be established in it (or him). Even in the Māṇḍūkya, which is supposed to analyse experience, that word does not occur; the words used being “sthāna” and “pada,” which perhaps mean situation, condition, state, aspect, mode or, as Śaṅkarācārya says, means of activity (karma sādhanā). Waking, dreaming and sleep are the different situations or conditions in which the Atman is, or they are the different situations of its being, in none of which it is exhausted, for no one of them, nor all of them together, are completely identical with its plenitude and perfection. By adding up waking, dream and sleep situations, one does not get the Ātman, for it is what integrates and synthesizes them into a unity while presupposing them. Without being any of them, it possesses all of them and so transcends them.40 Similarly, in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, it is said that while Ātman is mind, speech, action, the senses, etc. it is not identical in its fullness with any one of these, and yet they all come from it and are unified in it. It functions through them and integrates them all.41 The higher Reality does not abrogate these various elements; they are not abolished but preserved and transcended. Thus, there is no radical discontinuity between various types of experience, rational processes or mental functions. Although Ātman is beyond these all, it is through them that it is to be attained; yet they are to be transcended. It is true that in Hindu philosophy, buddhi or manas is not Ātman, but is notself, material. Yet it is through it that Ātman is seen or known. Buddhi may be matter, but it may be used for purposes for which brute matter cannot be used and has a higher value than the latter. A diamond “may just be carbon and a human in its composition may not differ from a pig’s,” but the former can do what the latter cannot and has a higher value. This implies that spiritual realization has to be and can be achieved only through the functioning of matter, although Ātman is beyond reason. As the Sāṃkhya says, prakṛti binds as well as liberates. And since ethical endeavour is also necessary for liberation, and as this can be only through a certain way of living depending on the body, one may also say that spiritual realization has to be achieved not only through psychological but biological processes also. Anyone who admits a connection between the good life and the ultimate end

Reason in Vedānta 27

must also admit in this context the importance of the body and biology. Salvation through works is, in a way, salvation through the body. Lastly, the question of realization or salvation would not arise except for beings that have bodies and minds too. It is because man is a being in space and time with a body, he wants to transcend it and be free from it and become a pure spirit, but he cannot do so as long as he remains a man. Thus, a spiritual tension arises and from it, the drama of the spirit begins. The purely spiritual being is already in a state of liberation, whereas for pure matter there is no question of liberation. Angels are already in communion with God enjoying salvation, and for a log of wood, such communion is irrelevant. For neither of these is there any spiritual quest or attainment. DT Suzuki is reported to have written that in Zen, there could be no continuous progress from vijñāna to prajñā, but there has to be a leap between the two. In such a case, the rational approach would not be continuous and progressive till the Absolute is reached. We have so far argued that this is not so in Vedānta, though it might be so in Hui-neng’s School of Zen. Karl Potter, on the other hand, defined a leap philosophy as a theory that nothing is ever caused, born or created, so when we become free (mukta), nothing happens.42* Since to be free is to realize that there is only Brahman, and that oneself is Brahman, and as this is bliss and peace, there will be, for the Brahman-knower, no fears, doubts or problems. This is the Advaita doctrine accepted by all its followers. Sureśvara, whom Potter takes as a typical leap philosopher, says that the saving statement “That thou art” is meaningful only to him who has distinguished between the self and the not-self and has developed discrimination. After “improving the reasoning process” through negative dialectic, one must develop discrimination, and then when this great Upaniṣadic truth is heard, one gets the liberating insight. I do not understand why Potter calls this a “leap” to complete freedom (p. 243). To repeat what I said elsewhere, a mathematician may read all the relevant literature and struggle with a problem for months and may not solve it, but he may hit upon it in a flash with seeming suddenness when he is bathing or taking an evening walk, or attending a dance. Can we appropriately say he leaped to it and all that he consciously did previously went in vain? Was it really sudden and uncaused? A man formed by long study of the classics may suddenly begin to write poetry different from and even opposed to the classics, and yet it is related to it, for, without such preparation and study, his poetry would not have been what it is. If Hegel *  Precisely for this reason, Advaita cannot be a leap philosophy as leaping is generally understood. What or who leaps and from where to where, or from what to what? When something novel or discontinuous occurs or emerges, there may be a “leap.” Thus, āraṃbhavāda might be a leap philosophy in the sense that something new emerges into existence. How can satkāryavāda support leap? If nothing ever happens, leaping also does not happen.

28  Reason in Vedānta

has not studied Kant as deeply as he did, if Ryle had not taken the Ancient Greats course and studied Aristotle so well, their philosophies would have been different from what they are. The Buddha spent years questing for enlightenment in fasts, austerities, vigil and meditation and following older ascetics, yet he did not succeed. But one day, when he gave up all this consciously, was well-fed and at ease, he had a great insight. Can we, therefore, say all his previous training, effort and struggle was profitless? Is there no relation between this final liberating insight and all that? Adopting the words of Leo Tolstoy, we can say every creative insight or scientific discovery begins from the beginning and is born only of itself but is not unrelated to the past. As Potter says in expounding Prakāśānanda, the man who wakes up has no dream (p. 245) and no sleep too anymore, but can the fact that he previously slept and dreamt be denied? “To wake up” has no meaning unless one was previously dreaming or asleep. Jñāna arises only when there is Jijñāsā, sakṣātkāra is preceded by śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana. These are needed because there is avidyā. Of course, for one who has reached the highest stage, the steps become irrelevant, nay, possibly non-existent; one who has climbed up may kick away the ladder and forget all about it. That is a different story. For the Brahman-knower, nothing but the One exists, neither Veda nor reasoning - Yatra Vedā avedā bhavanti. But that is only from the transcendental standpoint. From the standpoint of philosophy, logic and common sense, the effort and struggle preceding an insight are real. What I think Sureśvara and Prakāśānanda maintain is that there is no progress in the final culminating insight (sākṣātkāra), there is no development of it, and no perfecting it, but there is progress towards such an insight. One who is seated on Everest does not and cannot reclimb it or climb further; he is already on the summit, ārūḍha, but there must be an ascent to reach that point beyond which there is no climbing. The arurukṣu is a reality, albeit empirical. In science, however, it is otherwise. There one never completely and finally solves a problem, and no scientific problem is the ultimate problem; in that sphere, there are and will always be further peaks to be scaled and ravines to be crossed. In Brahmajñāna, one knows that after knowing which, nothing else or more is to be known. Perfect knowledge, no doubt, is produced by hearing the great Vedānta texts, if it is at all produced, but it is not always produced in all as soon as they hear them. Although a mahāvākya may be its principal cause (kāraṇa), it has its own condicio sine qua non, such as purity, dispassion and a burning desire for liberation as well as discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal. In Naiṣkarmya Siddhi, Sureśvara alludes to the case of Janaka, who accidentally, while strolling in his garden, overheard a Brahman discussion conducted by some Brahmavādins, grasped the truth at once and was forthwith liberated. Similarly, he mentions a piśāca (spirit or ghost), which had its abode in Arjuna’s chariot flag, overheard the teaching of the Gītā, and was forthwith liberated - Vākyaśravaṇa mātrāccāpi sacakavad avāpnuyāt. (II.6.) In both cases, it happened because their minds were pure, they were prepared by previous spiritual discipline in their present or past

Reason in Vedānta 29

lives, and they participated in Brahma-vicāra (discussion) by hearing it. Brahmanknowledge-liberation does not come like a bolt from the blue in a spasmodic irrational way, but when it is obtained, it is had in all its perfection. As mokṣa is brahmajṅāna or anubhava and as it is eternal and immutable, there are, it is true, no degrees in the liberating vision. No further progress would then be possible, for the ultimate goal is reached. Whatever may be the ontological differences among the Advaitins, in this matter, they are unanimous. Does the empirical world exist for one who is liberated, or is it just utterly destroyed? If it “exists,” what is its status and relation to the Absolute? That is a different problem, and Advaitins give different answers to it. And here, what Potter says about Sureśvara and Prakāśānanda is correct, but that does not concern us now. I only wish to emphasize there is no brahmajṅāna without brahmavicāra. Maybe in Absolute Reality, neither happens: in fact, nothing happens; only Brahman is. But even that cannot be asserted, for there is no assertor, and there is no assertion. Silence! Notes 1 His paper on “Spirituality in Europe and India” in C.A. Moore (ed), Philosophy and Culture, East and West, Honolulu, 1962, pp. 316–41. 2 I generally use “reason” here in the sense of buddhi and manas not in the sense of tarka or a pramāṇa, viz. anumāna. But if reason means anumāna, as it cannot demonstrate anything about Brahman in Vedānta, the question of its being overridden by intuition does not arise. In Nyāya, it demonstrates God’s existence, and intuition (yogi pratyakṣa) confirms it. If the reason is tarka, some types of it confirm scripture, says Vedānta. 3 Seventh Prapāṭhaka. But the final teaching there is that prāṇa is the highest of things and that it arises from Ātman. The whole world indeed arises from the soul (Op. cit. 26th Khaṇḍa). However, on food as the foundation of the earth and space, and as Brahman, see the Taittirīya, III. Says the Praśna (1.5): “Matter is verily everything.” In all these cases we must seek the purport (tātparya) and not take them literally. 4 Kaṭha 1.3.10–11. 5 Kaṭha, 1.2.9, and Śaṅkarācārya’s commentary on it. 6 Ibid., 1.3.5–9. 7 Ibid., 1.11, Manasaivedaṃ āptavyaṃ. 8 Ibid., 1.3. 12. 9 Kaṭha, 2.3. 12. 10 Commentary on above: Buddhirhinahipramāṇaṃsadasatoryathātmyāvagame. 11 Kaṭha, 1.2.24, Prajñānenainamāpnuyāt. 12 Kena, II.4. Pratibodhaviditaṃ mataṃ. (Bodha = Bauddhaḥ pratyayaḥ— Śaṅkarācārya). 13 Ibid., 11.5 (Dhiraḥ = Dhīmantaḥ -- Śaṅkarācārya). 14 Muṇḍaka, II, 2.2. Tasmin manaḥ samādhānaṃ. 15 Ibid., II. 27. Ātma manovṛittibhirevāvibhayyatā. 16 Op. cit. and Śaṅkarācārya’s Bhāṣya. 17 Ibid., III. 1.9. 18 Ibid., III. 1.2. 19 Bhāṣya on above, Taittirīya Bhāṣya. I.6.1. Manovijñānaṃ; manoantaḥkaraṇaṃ. 20 Taittirīya, I. 4.1. 21 Ibid., II. 4.1.

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22 Commentary on Text 5. Svapnajāgranmanaḥ spandanāni prjañānāni. 23 Op​.ci​t. Śaṅkarācārya in Sūtra Bhāṣya, II. 5.32 identifies manas, buddhi, vijñāna, and citta. 24 III. 42–43. As there is no gap between buddhi and manas (infra) there is no leap from the former to the vision of God. 25 VI. 21. 26 X. 10; XIII. 57; II.49. 27 II. 39. 28 II. 44, 53. 29 XVII. 30–32. 30 XVII. 50–51. 31 II. 54, 67; V. 19. Sthitaprajña = Sthitadhīḥ. 32 III. 39–40. 33 II. 52, 56. 34 II. 50–52. 35 It is significant that whenever the Upaniṣads speak of the self as ungraspable (agrāhyaṃ), Śaṅkarācārya explains it as ungraspable by the organs of action (karmendriyas) (e.g. Muṇḍaka, I. 1.6; Māṇḍūkya, 1.7). Were the self completely unknowable, one would not have self-consciousness at all, but everyone knows that he exists; only about the nature of the self, there is no unanimity. Śaṅkarācārya made this clear in Sūtra Bhāṣya, I.1.1. 36 Dr Bhagavan Das rightly says that the Gītā and the Upaniṣads do not mention any faculty higher than buddhi. It must be refined and perfected to see Ātman. Prajñā and bodhi are, he says, synonyms for perfected and purified buddhi inturned by Vairāgya (Krṣna: A Study in the Theory of Avataras, Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar 1924, p. 274). 37 Śaṅkarācārya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya, II. 4.5; IV. 5–6. 38 Ibid., II. 1.1. 39 It is in Śaṅkarācārya’s writings that “experience” (anubhava, anubhūti) and “bringing to immediacy” or “bringing in conjunction with the eye (akṣa)”—Sākṣātkāra—occur frequently. 40 The Māṇḍūkya not only says ātma catuṣpāt but also nāntaḥ prajñaṃ, etc. 41 I.4.17, 7. The text uses the pronoun “he.” 42 Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies, Prentice Hall, New York, 1963. Pages in brackets refer to this book.

4 THE ADVAITIC VISION: Awareness of Self-Established Consciousness*

I may be permitted to do some Vedāntic thinking for a while in a certain way, depending on classical sources, for it has been laid down that whenever awake until death, one should utilize his time in Vedānta cintanā without giving the least scope for desire, etc. ā supterā mṛteḥ kālaṃ nayedvedāntacintayā dadyānnāvasaraṃ kaścitkāmādīnāṃ manāgapi Vedāntic thinking is what is in accordance with the Upaniṣads. What do they teach? Śrī Bhagavatpāda has said, “the definite conclusion of all the Upaniṣads is that the supreme good results from the perfect knowledge of the ground of the universe.” jagataśca yanmūlaṃ tatpari’ jnānāt paraṃ śreyaṃ iti sarvopaniṣadāṃ niścito’rthaḥ//

(Praśna-bhāṣya, VI. 1.)

And, as he added, “the definite conclusion of the entire Vedānta is that the own self of every knower is Brahman.” sarvasya hi viditaḥ svātmā brahmeti sarvavedāntānāṃ niścito’rthaḥ

(Kena-bhāṣya, II. 1.)

“So all the Vedāntic discussion is always begun for obtaining the knowledge of the unity of the self.” DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625-5

32  The Advaitic Vision

ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattye sarva vedānta ārabhyante.

(Sūtra-bhāṣya, I.I.I.)

According to Śaṅkarācārya, “When scriptures and arguments conjointly engage themselves in revealing the unity of the Self, they are capable of showing it like the Bel fruit in one’s palm.” āgamopapattī hi ātmaikatvaprakāśanāya pravṛtte śaknutaḥ karatalagatabilvamiva darśayitum (Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya, III. 1.1.) As Appayya Dīkṣita pointed out, “The teachers of Vedānta have displayed many styles for establishing the oneness of the self.” Ātmaikyasiddhau … .saraṇayo nānāvidha darśitāḥ// (Siddhāntaleśa Saṅgraha) To begin with I propose to follow mainly Śrī Harṣa, one of our greatest dialecticians and poets, a householder who was jitendriya and a respected courtier who used to enjoy the bliss of Brahman in samādhi. When there is knowledge (vijñāna), no one who has it doubts that he has it or has the valid or invalid notion that he does not know. The very absence of these latter notions proves the validity of the knowledge one has. Therefore, it may be concluded that self-awareness establishes for everyone the nature of the knowledge one has. In what follows I shall explain different kinds of knowledge (vijñāna). A. Svatassidha Vijñāna

sarvajanasvātmasaṃvedanasiddhamevāsya bodhasya svarūpam. What is its nature? It is self-luminous (svaprakāśa) and proven by itself (svataḥ and siddharūpa).1 What is self-proven for all cannot be denied and is, moreover, confirmed by the presumption (arthāpatti) that the validity of knowledge of experience (anubhava) cannot be established in any other way. By accepting the self-luminosity of knowledge, there will be no epistemological defects like infinite regress (anavasthā) and nonrelation. The important point is that as selfluminosity alone can be self-proven or self-evident, no material attribute can be included in it. So it cannot be indeed spoken of, as it has no attribute - ata eva vāgvyavahārāviṣayatvam. How is it then spoken of as self-luminous? Only by imposing attributes on it that it does not have and speaking of it figuratively. As it is not limited by space, time or any specific characteristic, it is secondarily or indirectly spoken of as “eternal,” all-pervading, “self of all” and “non-dual.” Everything said about it is

The Advaitic Vision 33

uparicitam. The acceptance of such usage implies nothing but the absence of any limitation. Such an absence or negation may be either conceived as nothing different from the place where it resides or like the mutual negation, which is nothing different from the things between which it holds. On the other hand, the negation implied in “non-duality” cannot be objected to, although its counter-positive (pratiyogin), viz. duality, has no existence, just as the negation of an object of erroneous cognition (e.g. of shell-silver).2 Śruti is a valid means of knowing as it reveals vijñāna or consciousness, having it as its purport (tātparya) by indicating it indirectly or secondarily—tadetattu śrutyā pramāṇenopalakṣaṇanyāyāttātparyataḥ prakāśyate. Really, Vijñāna is not involved in the relationship between the denoting word and a denoted thing - paramārthato’bhidhānābhidheyabhāvaviraha. Yet, in the state of nescience, it may be said that śruti is a valid means of knowledge by having vijñāna as its purport. In fact, consciousness is established by itself; i.e. it is self-proven - vastutastu svātmasiddhameva cidrūpam.3 Śaṅkara Miśra explains this: When śruti says, “Brahman is eternal, consciousness and bliss,” each one of these words has acquired their capacities in the nescientific sense, on the strength of their being uttered together and on the strength of purport, make Brahman known in the state of nescience. This constitutes the validity of śruti - nitya vijňānānandāpadairāvidyake evārthe, pratyekaṃ gṛhītaśaktibhiḥ saṃbhuyoccāraṇabalāt tātparya balāccāvidhyādaśāyāṃ brahma bodhyata iti tatra śrutīnāṃ prāmāṇyamityarthaḥ. All this discussion becomes necessary only for the sake of making the followers of other philosophical schools comprehend self-luminosity, while for the Advaitins Vjñāna is self-established on the strength of self-awareness alone asmābhistu saṃvedanābalādeva svatassidharūpaṃ vijňānamāsthīyate. The Advaitins contend that all this universe other than vijñāna is neither “real” nor “unreal” in the sense that these terms are commonly understood. It is not real if a thing is considered real in case it is definable, for all definitions are defective (anupapanāni). It is not unreal, for if it were so, it would destroy the entire empirical activity of the thinking men of the world4 All things are “indefinable” does not mean that “indefinability” is definable or that it exists; it is also included in the word “all.” If definability is considered the proof of reality, as it can be shown that no definition stands logical scrutiny, all things are indefinable, hence not real. The indefinability of the world is thus the result of this position. It is not a thesis of the Advaitins who disengage themselves from maintaining the reality or unreality of the entire phenomenal world, taking their stand solely on the absolutely real Brahman about the nature of consciousness, which is self-established. Thus, their purpose is accomplished, and they are happy.

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vayaṃ sarvaprapaňcasattvāsatva vyavasthāpananivṛttāḥ svataḥ siddhacidātmani/ brahmatattve bharamavalambya caritārthāḥ sukhamāsmahe// 5 The conclusion is that the world of difference is indefinable, and Brahman alone is absolutely real and without a second.6 Moreover, as Vimuktātman pointed out, while the world is indefinable, it is not unspeakable (n avācya). The question “What is the proof of Advaita?” is impossible to be asked without admitting Advaita. If one has no conception of Advaita, proof cannot be asked. If one has, it must be either valid or invalid knowledge. In the former case, the basis of that conception is the proof, and in the latter case, it is selfcontradictory to ask for proof of a baseless conception. But granting the question to be legitimate, the Advaitin answers that śruti alone is the means of valid knowledge for Advaita - śrutirevādvaite pramāṇam. According to Advaitic epistemology, (1) śruti is an independent means of valid knowledge, (2) it makes coherent existential statements that are not contradicted by other means of valid knowledge and (3) all knowledge has inherent validity. Further, the validity of the perception of difference can be refuted, and the impossibility of inference, etc., to refute Advaita can be shown. Moreover, the very concept of difference is untenable. It cannot be shown to be either the very nature of an object or its distinct quality. In the former case, for its perception, there should be no need for its contrapositive. In the latter case, because of the same difficulty, it cannot be different (see Iṣṭasiddhi). ko’yaṃ bhedaḥ? kiṃ svarūpameva bhedinaḥ uta dharmaḥ? etc.7—Thus, even empirical difference is denied. As Śrī Harṣa says, without cognition of non-difference, there cannot be cognition of difference, so the first only must be valid, as it is basic (upajīvya).8 The Advaitin, however, does not admit the complete unreality of difference but only its absolute reality. He accepts its presence for nescience, i.e. its being the object of wrong cognition, and it is that alone which is useful for a cause–effect relationship - Na vayaṃ bhedasya sarvayaivāsattvamabhyupagacc hāmaḥ; kiṁ nāma? Pāramārathika sattvam.9 Lastly, it must be noted that Advaita, though known through means of valid knowledge, is not different from self-conscious vijñāna. The absolute real Advaitic knowledge is not generated by śruti but only generated in the state of nescience. Advaita is non-different from Vijñāna, eternal and self-luminous, that is the everpresent knowledge of Brahman. It is invalidly conceived as generated by śruti, but this is not contradicted by the valid conception that it is never generated, and it is the eternal self-luminous Self.10 As Śaṅkarāchārya declared, when there is complete awakening, there is also the non-existence of śruti - śṛuterapyabhāvaḥ prabodhe -Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya I. 1 Advaitic vision, says Śrī Harṣa, has immediate and undoubted results - advaitadṛṣṭidṛṣṭārthādapi.11

The Advaitic Vision 35

This is the claim of the Advaitins. Sarvajñātman says: In this life itself, the experience born out of Vedāntic statements bears its fruit by giving liberation— atraiva janmani bhavedapavargadāyi/ vākyaprasūtamanubhūtiphalāvasā nam//—Saṃkṣepaśārīraka, III. 349 Did not Śaṅkarācārya say Brahman knowledge culminates in experience (anubhavāvasānā brahmavidyā? Further, according to Śrī Harṣa12, the tendencies of Advaita arise from God’s grace. On Brahmasūtra II. 3. 41 purāttu tat śruteḥ, “Śaṅkarācārya views are more or less the same. Knowledge leading to liberation comes from God’s grace. To sum up, in the state of nescience, by accepting the notion of what is designated and what designates, the meaning (i.e. of non-duality) of the śrutivākyas is grasped. Then through their harmonization, i.e. clarification, by reflecting on them, it is experienced astonishingly by becoming the absolutely real self-luminous consciousness itself.13 Sarvajñātman, however, says, reflected in the cognition arising from tarka, also the inner self without a second flash forth. But it becomes more vivid and immediate when it becomes reflected at the level of non-dual reason (buddhi) generated by Vedāntic statements - Saṃkṣepaśārīraka, III. 306. The following comments may be made about the above presentation. In his bhāṣyas, Śaṅkarācārya maintained that no one is ever aware that he is not, but (only) that he is. On the contrary, everyone realizes “I am,” though regarding the nature of “I” there is no unanimity. In the above, the implications of this position are drawn out and developed. Self-awareness, which is self-proven, is undeniable and ineffable. This is Vijñāna or Brahman. Vedāntic statements indicate their nature further through their purport in a secondary or indirect way. Whatever is not Vijñāna may be shown to be indefinable, while it being self-evident and ineffable, Vedānta does not try to prove its existence or nature. But it can demolish any argument or thesis that contradicts the oneness of the Self by reducing it to absurdity. Śruti is the only means for the knowledge of the non-dual self, whose nature is eternal, immutable, indivisible consciousness and bliss. The production of this knowledge by śruti is, of course, from the standpoint of ignorance; for, indeed, that knowledge is itself Brahman, ever-present. Again, from an empirical standpoint, it is said that this knowledge is God’s gift, for the Upaniṣads clearly superimpose Godness on Brahman and then insistently deny it. aiśvaryavarṇanamatisphuṭameva kṛtvā netītyavādi bahuśaḥ śrutibhiḥ prayatnāt

(Saṃkṣepaśārīraka, I. 193)

īśvaraśruti is not tatparā and pramāṇa like the satyabodhakaśrutiḥ

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Falsity of the world

There is a good deal of loose talk about the world being an illusion or false. This should be avoided, and what the Advaita School says should be grasped correctly. It may be remembered that Śaṅkarācārya said, “the falsity of the world is because of its being sublated.” —vaitathyam bādhyamānatvāt (Sūtrabhāṣya III 2.4.). Sublation or suppression (bādha) must be distinguished from the opposition (virodha). Bādha is, says the author of the Vivaraṇa14, the removal of nescience, along with its visibly present or concealed effect - ajňānasya svakāryeṇa vartamānena pralīlena vā saha jňānena nivṛttirbādhaḥ. Virodha is, says the Pañcapādikā, the incapacity of two things to coexist at the same place and time, or to be identical. The perceptual knowledge of multiplicity is sublated by the scriptural knowledge of unity, so the phenomenal world is false. It is mithyā because it is perceptible, material and limited, like the shell-silver, but it is not absolutely unreal like the hare’s horn or the barren woman’s son. The real is what is never sublated. Perceptibility (Dṛśyatva) is knowability by consciousness reflected in the modification of the internal organ. The self-luminous consciousness is imperceptible. My argument may find support in the following: (1) The world lacks the utter absence of absolute reality (always self-luminous) as well as of its absolute unreality (which is nowhere and never perceptible). (2) A superimposition is what is never present in its substratum at any time. Where it is seen, it is really not. In Brahman, the world of difference is not. In other words, the absence of the world is always present and is non-different from Brahman. Its contrapositive, the world, is empirically real. But, in as much as the world and its absence are both perceptible, both are negated. In any case, the perceptible world, by its very nature, never abides in Brahman, the sole substratum of everything. So, the world is mithyā, while the absence of mithyātva is Brahman. (3) As already indicated, because the world of name and form, along with its cause, is removable by the knowledge of the Self (the substratum), it is the contrapositive of the absence coinciding with the intuition of the substratum. Hence, also it is mithyā. (4) Perceptibility of a thing as existing where it does not make it out to be false. The world is the contrapositive of the utter absence of itself in its own basis. Therefore, it is mithyā. (5) The knowledge of the unity taught by the Upaniṣadic statements is through a means of valid knowledge which has no defect, while the knowledge of multiplicity is through a means of knowledge that is not free from defects. The former is absolutely real, while the latter is not, but yet perceptible. In other words, what is different from what is established by a non-defective means of knowledge is mithyā. The world being such is mithyā. In these five ways, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī sought to establish the mithyātva of the world according to the purport of the Upaniṣadic statements like “Here there is no plurality,” and “The knower of the Self goes beyond sorrow.” Certainty of the world’s falsity, he held, helps one to experience non-duality.

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It may be asked, is the falsity of the world false or not? The Advaitins answer thus: In negating the world in Brahman perceptibility is the limiting factor (avacchedaka) of negation (i.e. all that is perceptible is negated). So, the falsity (mithyātva), the world and its existence, which is seen, are all negated because of their perceptibility. So neither the world nor its falsity is absolutely real. The Great Upanis.adic Statements and Brahman Knowing

Śaṅkarāchārya and his authentic followers do not admit anything except the Upaniṣadic statements as the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) regarding Brahman because all other pramāṇas are based on and are concerned with external objects and material things: parāgviṣaya, bahirarthaniṣtha, jadavastuniṣtha. They are useful only for showing that Vedāntic truth is not improbable and for refuting theories and views opposed to the Upaniṣadic teaching—sambhāvāviparītabhavanānirāsa. There can be no independent positive perceptual evidence or demonstration of Advaita or even of the existence of Īśvara. Speculative logic, inference and presumption are only useful in “clarifying, defending and bringing out the implications of Upaniṣadic statements.” Na hi vidhikāṇḍe tarkasamaye vā kenacidadhigatassarvasyātmā(Sūtrabhāṣya, I. 14.) Vinā mahāvākyamato na kaścit pumāṃsamadvaitavaiti jantu/ atrocyate na khalu vedaśirāṃsi muktvā kiňcitpramāṇamiha tattvanivedanāya/ vedāntavākyamiha kāraṇamātmabodhe hetvantarāṇi paripanthinibarhaṇāni/ (Saṃkṣepaśārīraka, III 303, II. 7, III 341) Even when it is said that the Veda or śruti or the Upaniṣads are the pramāṇa for Brahmajñāna, only the mahāvākyas (i.e. the great statements like “That Thou Art”) are meant and not any other contents in these sacred books (op. cit. III 296 ff.). The rest are just secondary, subsidiary or appendices—śeṣapannavacodāta, avāṃtaravacaḥ, aṅgabhūta (loc. cit.). But when the Mahāvākyas are heard, meditated and contemplated upon by those who have the qualifications and the capacity to do so, the experience, anubhava, which results from it, of course, becomes the pramāṇa of Brahman. Anubhava never arises in one who has not done all this in this or a previous life. But as the Itihāsas and Purāṇas elaborate the meaning of the Veda (vedārthopabrimhaṇa), Śaṅkarācārya admits that even from them, Brahmajñāna may be obtained (Sūtrabhāṣya 1.3.38). Thus, for example, the Bhagavadgītā, according to him, is the summary of the essence of the meaning of the entire Veda, and when its

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meaning is known, all human ends are achieved: tadidaṃ gītāśāstraṃ samastave dārthasārasaṅgrahabhūtam/ tadarthevijṇāte samastapuruṣārthasiddhiḥ//. Ultimately the source of Brahmajñāna is śruti, and, to the extent possible, experience, etc., - anubhavādayo’pi yathāsaṃbhavm - are also its sources. How does one know that one has obtained sākṣātkāra (direct, immediate awareness) of Brahman? If an ethical person with a pure and subtle mind who has gone through the Vedāntic discipline is convinced that he has it, he must be right. The testimony for Brahman-knowing is the feeling within one’s own heart - saḥṛdaya pratyayam brahmavedanam. How can others know that one has obtained sākṣātkāra? Through scrutiny of the life of the one who claims so and by examining his behaviour. The Upaniṣads at various places (e.g. Bṛhadāraṇyaka, IV. 4.23) have described the pattern of life and behaviour of such a person. Whosoever is seen to conform to it may be considered to have attained the ultimate Good. Scripture and Empirical Knowledge

According to both Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, there is no conflict between empirical knowledge and śruti. The latter is authoritative only in matters supersensual and spiritual. If it contradicts empirical facts, it must be understood to be speaking figuratively, allegorically or for the sake of inducing one to follow a particular course of action for one’s own good. Śaṅkarācārya has said: A hundred śruti texts do not become a pramāṇa if they say the fire is cold or does not give light; for no one can cognize what is opposed to what is seen—na ca śrutiśatamapi śīto’gniraprakāśo veti bṛvaprāmāṇyamupaiti/ (Gitābhāṣya, XVIII. 67.); na ca dṛṣṭavirodhaḥ kenacidbhyupagamyate/ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya, I. 4. 10.) A scripture may incidentally contain some history or science, but one who depends on it for empirical knowledge is as foolish as Bharadvāja’s son Avakrita who resorted to tapas for obtaining an education (vidyā) and was admonished by Indra thus: “This is not the way to become educated. Why do you ruin yourself? If you want to be educated, go to a teacher and study under him.”— amārga eṣ viprarṣe yena tvaṃ yātumicchasi/ kiṃ vidhātena te vipra gacchādhīhi guronukhāt//-(Mahābhārata, Vanaparva, ch. 135). Recently, several books have appeared which seek to prove that contemporary science supports some form of Eastern philosophy or mysticism or what is believed to be common to all Eastern thought. Some of these books are by scientists, while others are by popularizers of semi-scientific and semi-mystic ideas. First of all, it is not a fact that the fundamental doctrines of all Eastern philosophies are identical or that all Eastern mystics beheld the same truth. Not to speak of the mutual differences between the East Asian, South Asian and West Asian philosophies and mysticisms, do Vedānta, Buddhism and Jainism hold identical doctrines and the same truth? Do at least several Vedāntic systems do so? When some writers assert that contemporary science confirms

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Eastern mystical insights or philosophical doctrines, they are deluded and confusing the naive. Scientists like M.E. Omelyanovsky have sought to establish that contemporary science supports dialectical materialism (vide his Dialectics and Modern Physics, Moscow, 1979). According to Jacques Monod, pure chance, absolutely free but blind, is at the very root of evolution. I. Prigogine differs from him. In a number of his speeches, Abdul Salam declared that the faith of the physicist and a part of the Islamic faith are the same. C. Hartshorne, Bhikshu Nyanaponika, N.P. Jacobson, etc. argue that modern science has come very close to Buddhist philosophy. There are any number of natural (e.g. Yukawa) and social scientists who maintain that contemporary natural science and psychology are in harmony with Kegon or Zen Buddhist insight. Then there are Jaina scientists who feel happy that John von Neumann has stated that a consistent formulation of the Quantum theory requires a reference to the consciousness. Long ago, E. Schrödinger elated some Vedāntins when he pointed out that Mach, Avenarius and Schuppe came very near to the Upaniṣadic thinking and that particular lines in modern thought converge in the Vedāntic vision. But they ignore the fact that he contemptuously rejected the Bṛhadāraṇyaka doctrine that he who sees in It plurality transmigrates15 as an eschatological conclusion and the doctrine of salvation by knowledge16 as unjust. The same sort of people felt gratified when Oppenheimer was reminded of the Gītā verse about “the arising in the sky of the shining brilliance of a thousand suns” when he saw what occurred when an atomic bomb exploded. Some of them probably thought atomic science proved the Gītā to be true. According to Heisenberg, Oppenheimer and Bohr, certain epistemological implications of contemporary physics appeared to corroborate some of the points that Taoists, Buddhists and others taught. Teilhard de Chardin believed that science was leading to the Christian truth as he understood it. This much, however, may be conceded. The Quantum theory, especially the Copenhagen interpretation of it (which is more or less based on Bohr’s Complementarity Principle) and the theories of J.S. Bell, H. Stapp and G. Chew, seem to agree on the following: Reality is not what it appears; common sense ideas are inadequate to describe the findings of subatomic physics. The observer– observed distinction is not a hard and fast objective one. The scientist is a participant, not a detached observer, so his way of looking at things enters into his theories. Opposites (e.g. matter and force, existence and non-existence) are complementary. The world is not substantive as usually thought. It is an interconnected tissue of events or an implicate order of that, which is an undivided whole. There are no elementary particles or fundamental fields. Nature is to be understood entirely through its self-consistency. The above is not the only possible conclusion that can be derived from contemporary scientific developments, and they are not unanimously accepted by all leading scientists. To say that they prove Avataṃsaka (Kegon) Buddhism, Advaita Vedānta or Taoism is unjustified. To say that they prove what is

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common to all of them raises the question: Is there such a common core of these philosophies accepted by most of their authoritative exponents? The answer has to be negative. Indeed, science is increasingly finding unity amidst the diversity of phenomena and forces. Islam, Salam asserts, always believed so. Buddhism, says Anagarika Govinda, finds a self-surpassing Oneness amidst diversity. Uddālaka also thought there is a Single Principle by knowing which all that is becomes known, for all things are but their manifestations. But there is no unanimity about the nature of that unity or principle, the ontological status of diversity, and the relations between the two, either among scientists or philosophers. Some say that it is Matter, others say that it is a Person, some that it is Emptiness and yet others that it is Consciousness. Science neither supports nor contradicts these—whatever they may be, whether they are revelations, intuitions or speculations. In this matter, the standpoint of Śaṅkarācārya’s school is clear. Śruti, it maintains, gives knowledge that does not fall within the scope of other pramāṇas, i.e. of empirical knowledge. So empirical knowledge cannot strengthen or reinforce śruti. It is unique because it does not give knowledge of something known otherwise also. Otherwise, it would become weaker or a non-pramāṇa. There are Upaniṣadic texts which speak about the difference (the bheda śrutis), just reiterating what perception conveys. There are Upaniṣadic texts which teach Oneness (the abheda śrutis), conveying something unique that is not known in any other way. So, the latter is more powerful, and they set aside the former. The śruti, which is not confirmed by other pramāṇas, or which does not confirm what other pramāṇas make known, is stronger than that which is confirmed by other pramāṇas or which just confirms what is made known by other pramāṇas. The śruti, which reveals what is unknowable through perception and inference, is really strong. Differences and multiplicity are seen everywhere in the world. The śruti which propounds them is weak. Non-difference and oneness are nowhere perceived in the world. So the śruti which propounds it is strong. That, according to Mādhava, was Śaṅkarācārya’s view. Mādhava says: prābalyamāpādayati śrutīnāṃ mānāntaraṃ naiva budhāgrayāyin/ gatārthatādānamukhena tāmāṃ dourbalyasampādakameva kintu//

(Mādhava, Śaṅkaradigvijaya, VIII-131)

It is rash, says Sarvajñātman, to hold that the Upaniṣads depend on any other pramāṇas: sāpekṣatoniṣdam yadi sāhisam tat (Op. cit. I. 541) Neither contemporary science nor future science, classical Vedānta maintains, can or needs to confirm the truth that the One Reality of the nature of consciousness and bliss is without a second and that I AM THAT and ALL THIS IS THAT. No science is

The Advaitic Vision 41

or ever can be opposed to that. This truth has been and can be confirmed in one way only: by one’s own experience. Hence it is said of it—svānubhūtyekamān (Bhartṛhari, Nītiśataka, I). Brian Josephson expressed a balanced view when he said that consciousness has not yet been understood, and its understanding lies outside the paradigm of physics. Something more about the nature of reality, he added, may be learned through meditative processes, but its results may not be universally persuasive. Transcendental Knowledge and Secular Activity

The ethical and socio-political implications of Advaita Vedānta are also important. The Gītā has pointed out that those for whom duality has been destroyed (chinnadvaidhaḥ17) and have become equal-minded (samabuddhayaḥ) will be engaged in the welfare of all beings (V. 25, XII. 4). The great men who have won peace, says Śaṅkarācārya, work for the world’s welfare: jňāntā mahānto lokahitaṃ caraṃtaḥ. One who knows that his self is the self of all beings (Sarvabhūtātmabhūtātmā, V.7.) realizes that if he harms others, he harms himself, whereas if he does good to others, he does good to himself. For such a man, there is no enemy, as there is no other. The consequence of the awareness of identity necessarily results in equality. The metaphysics of Advaita can be the foundation only for unselfishness and altruism and is consistent only with an egalitarian society based on social and economic justice, and equality and peace. “Chinnadvaidhaḥ” and “samabuddhayaḥ” cannot accept any socio-political system which gives scope for privileges and monopolies or inequality and injustice, based on any kind of difference due to birth, position and wealth or power. Ṛta and dharma will prevail in a Vedāntic social order. Advaita and samatva in thought and deed go together. On the contrary, to maintain that Advaita should remain only an idea (bhāva) and not be translated into practice (kriyā) is illogical and schizophrenic. Only in a split personality would darśana be different from vartana, not in an integrated person who has realized abheda and samatva. We, therefore, rejoice that Śrī Abhinava Vidyātīrtha Mahāswāmī, the greatest living representative of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya, has “urged people to give up traditions based on injustice and dogma based on blind faith and follow a religion which teaches principles of life.” He “exhorted his devotes to keep in mind that they were Indians first and try to break the barriers of casteism”.18 According to Sureśvara, humility (amānitva) and non-hatred (adveṣitva) are the instruments (sādhanas) for the seeker of brahmajñāna, whereas they constitute the very nature of a brahmajñānī. Neither the former, who would have no attachment to anything, nor the latter, whose actions would be free from the moulding of desire (kāmasaṃkalpavarjitāḥ, Gītā, IV, 19), would indulge in wanton behaviour yatheṣṭacaraṇa. He who seeks Brahmajñāna, as well as he who has it, can be only ethical personalities (Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, IV. 69, 62–67). This disposes of the silly

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notion that as actions do not bind him, a brahmajñānī may behave as he likes. Anyone who does so, says Sureśvara, will not be different from a dog. Interestingly, two eminent direct disciples of Śaṅkarācārya had great regard for the life of a householder. According to Mādhava, Sureśvara is reported to have said: “It is the mind which is the cause of bondage or liberation. Whether one is a householder or a sannyāsin, what is necessary is pure mind” —manoviśuddho gṛhī bhavedvāpyuta maskarī vā (Śaṅkara-Digvijaya, 13.57). The same source attributes the following view to Padmapāda: “The basis of all human ends is the body, which can be sustained by food only. Food is produced only by householders. So all fruits (values) ultimately depend on householders”: Sarva phalaṃ gehapatidrumāśrayam (Ibid. 14.103.) The relationship between action and knowledge in Advaita Vedānta has been much discussed by some modern scholars. The classical position on this has been set forth by Vidyāraṇya in his Pañcadaśī. (1) The following is a summary of the relevant verses in “Triptidīpa” of this treatise: One who seeking Brahman knowledge and is practicing (abhyāsa, anusandhāna) meditation and contemplation (manana and nididhyāsana) should avoid such activities which disturb the notion “I am Brahman” by distracting him and making him forget that truth, but he may do all that is necessary to sustain life as well as whatever does not distract or disturb him much. But one who has firm awareness (dṛḍhabodha) may do anything, e.g. study poetry or history, teach logic, engage in agriculture or rule a kingdom: tarkaṃ paṭha yadvā kṛṣiṃ kuru. While engaged in action according to the prārabdha (previous action which has already begun bearing fruit) to exhaust the momentum of the latter, the wise men do not suffer (akleśyantaḥ) the misery of transmigration (saṃsāra tāpa) caused by delusory cognition (bhrāntijñāna), which they have gotten rid of. But they may feel sorry for themselves because, though they have no attachment, they are obliged to engage in action, as their prārabdha has not come to an end. Thus their sorrow is a result of discrimination (viveka), while the misery of others is saṃsāric. For this reason, wise men, due to their prārabdha, may desire enjoyment but will not delight in it; and having no desire, they will be satisfied with very little enjoyment, while those without discrimination will not be satisfied even with much enjoyment (Triptidīpa, 123–132, 143–146). (2) The relevant verses in “Dhyānadīpa” of the same treatise may be summarized thus: Secular activity (laukika vyavahāra) is not opposed to Brahman knowledge; so one who knows the Truth may very well engage himself in it: tattvavitcavirodhitvālloukikaṃ samyagācaret. How is the awareness that this world is illusory (māyāmayā) and the self is of the nature of consciousness opposed to secular activity? Secular activity does not require that the world be real; it only requires that one is a conscious being (not jaḍa), and that means (sādhanas) are available. Mind, speech, body and external objects are the means which have not been rejected or suppressed by a wise man. So, one who has Brahman knowledge and has the means can very well engage

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himself in secular activity, e.g. ruling a kingdom (Dhyānadīpa, 87–90, 114). As a man with Brahman knowledge does not become oblivious to the world, he may happily engage himself in external activity (pravartataṃ sukhenāyaṃ); there is no harm. When one has intellectually and emotionally abandoned all attachment and involvement (astasarvāsthā) and has pure knowledge, he may or may not perform an action (karmāṇi karotu nā karotu); for his actions have been in any way destroyed by samādhi. When a man’s mind has no impressions (tendencies, nirvāsanā), he has no end to be gained by inaction, action, samādhi or japa— naiṣkarmyena na tasy ārtho’pi na karmabhiḥ (Ibid. 98, 102–103). Reverting to equality which I consider as important as identity, I would like to draw attention to some of the invaluable sayings of Śaṅkarāchārya on it. We learn from his magnum opus that the true self is devoid of distinctions like Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriya etc. Caste, life stage, age, situation, etc. are superimposed on it: ape tabrahmakṣatrādibhedamātmatatvam (Sūtrabhāṣya, III). The Bṛahadāraṇyakabhāṣya (II, 4.5.) has a similar passage. His Ātmabodha teaches: “Just like the differences of taste, color, etc. in water, caste, name, life stage, etc. are superimposed on the self due to limiting adjuncts”—nānopādhivaśādeva jātināmāśramādayaḥ ātmannāropitāstoyaṃ rasavarṇādibhedavat//. His Māniṣapañcaka declares that as the same self is in all and as the bodies of all are made up of the same stuff, even a person of the so-called lowest birth is to be considered a guru if he has an awareness of his identity with the one consciousness that interpenetrates everything. His Daśaślokī affirms: For me, there are no castes or rules of conduct for caste and life stages because of the destruction of the superimposition of “I” and “mine” on the self. So I am absolutely the only one that remains, viz. Bliss—na varṇā na varṇāśramācāradharmāḥ … .śivaḥ kevalo’ham. His Tattvabodha asserts: “It does not matter whether one dies in Varanasi or a dog eaters house. What matters is to know the self, which alone leads to liberation.” (47) Has any other religious teacher simultaneously emphasized identity and equality with greater force? Likewise, Vidyāraṇya affirmed that the wise man is convinced that due to māyā, caste, station in life, etc. have been imagined in the body and not in the “Self which is of the nature of awareness”—varṇāśramādayo dehe māyayā parikalpitāḥ (Pañcadaśī, “Jñānadīpa,” 101). Elsewhere he wrote: “One who has the notion that the brāhmaṇa-caste (viprajāti) is a thing different from consciousness suffers from the delusion “I am a brāhmaṇa.” The vision of the indivisible All (sarvākhaṅḍa-darśana) is possible only for one whose perception of caste, etc. has been removed— āpohitatattadjjātyādidarśanasya—(Anubhūtiprakāśa, Maitreyīvidyāprakāśa, 31–33.36.) I hope everyone who cherishes Advaita will someday be sincerely capable of echoing the rapturous words of the wonderful and extraordinary disciple of Śrī Bhagavatpāda, Hastāmalaka, and practicing what it implies: “I am not a man, a god, or a yakṣa; nor am I a brāhmaṇa, a kṣatriya, a vaiṣya or a śūdra. I am not even

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a celibate, a house holder, a forest dweller or a renunciate. I am the true Awareness Itself”: Nijabodharūpaḥ. Notes * This address was first delivered in the presence of H. H. Jagadguru Śrī Bhāratī Tīrtha Swāmī of Śringeri Śāradā Piṭha on September 16, 1985. 1 Śrī Harṣa, Khaṅḍanakhaṅḍakhādya’, with ‘Śaṅkarī’ and Hanumāndas.’ “Tattvabodhinī,” ed. by N. Jha, Varanasi, 1970, p. 44 2 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 3 Ibid., p.55. 4 Ibid., p. 68. 5 Ibid., p. 72. 6 Ibid., p.75. 7 For an explanation see Ibid. p.103fn. 8 Ibid., p. 104. 9 Ibid., p. 118. 10 Ibid. pp.121fn. 11 Ibid. p. 124 12 Op. Cit. 13 Ibid. 124–125, the verses āpātate, etc. with ‘Śaṅkarī’. 14 Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha of Vidyāraṇya. 15 mṛtyosya mṛtyumāpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati. 16 jňānānmuktiḥ. 17 dvaita = duality, difference, doubt (Macdonnel’s Dictionary). 18 Speech at Nasik, The Hindu, under Dateline, May 4, 1982.

5 ˙ KARA’S CONCEPTION OF GOD ŚAN Effects of Superimposition

The difference between the subject and the object is a matter of experience. The two are as much apart from one another as light and darkness. The subject or percipient is the knower; in fact, he is of the nature of awareness or consciousness. What is cognized by the subject is not of that nature (i.e. awareness). Still, the two are confused with each other. The attributes of objects are erroneously imagined in the subject, the self. Everyone knows that his wife and sons are distinct from himself, yet when they are happy, he becomes happy by identifying them with himself, and when they are suffering, he is aggrieved for a similar reason. The body, the senses, etc. are known to be different from the self; still, the attributes and states of the body are wrongly imagined as belonging to the self. Ideas like “I am stout, I am growing, I am blind” are due to this. Just like that, what belongs to the self is erroneously attributed to the body. Ideas like “I am seeing,” etc., are due to this. This false imposition (adhyāsa) of the attributes of one thing on another is ignorance or nescience (avidyā). By right knowledge, this is destroyed. All the suffering and evil that one seems to experience in this mundane existence is due to the false identification of the self with the body. When this erroneous cognition is dispelled, the bondage of the self within the transmigratory world (saṃsāra) is also destroyed, for the evils of transmigratory existence are the products of nescience. When a man is needlessly frightened by a rope, imagining it to be a snake, his fear can be dispelled when he rightly cognizes the rope. Even so, by right knowledge, one is freed from the imagined bondage of transmigration. Though sorrow and evil are imagined to be in the self, the self is not affected thereby, as the rope does not cease to be a rope even when it is imagined to be a serpent. Just as the cognition of the rope snake, though false, can evoke certain reactions, even so, the false imposition of attributes on the self is causally efficient. Imposition of the DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625-6

46  Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God

attributes of one thing on another is possible only if the imposed thing is previously known. Nacre cannot be mistaken for silver if silver has never been seen previously. The residual impressions of the previously seen silver abide in mind and cause its recollection when the nacre is seen. From eternity, the residuary impressions of the world of objects abide in the mind and confuse the self with material objects. The attributes of the snake are imposed on the rope though the rope is directly evident. Even so, the self is directly cognized by everyone as the content of the concept of “I,” but it is wrongly cognized as subject to limitations, agency, pleasure and pain. The imposed thing need not be real, though there must be something on which it is imposed. But it is necessary that the imposed thing must have been previously seen so that its impressions are present in memory. This condition is met because the world, though false, is beginningless, and the impressions generated by its perception are present in the mind from eternity. The world is false because true knowledge imparted by the Upaniṣads sublated it ( jñānanivartyatvaṃ): and the knowledge contained in the Upaniṣads is true and beyond doubt because they are not the works of any person and are free from all possible defects. The Upaniṣads are also false because they are part of the phenomenal world, yet they can generate the right knowledge, just as a dream object can produce effects that are continued even into the waking experience. A man who dreams that he has been bitten by a cobra may die of shock, and a man who can get the solution to a problem in a dream may find it real after waking (Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, 2.1.14). All material world is superimposed on the one eternal, impartite and immutable Consciousness, as a snake on the rope. Nescience is the constituent cause of this. Brahman is also the efficient cause of this, but as the world is imagined in Brahman, Brahman is its apparent constituent cause (vivartopādāna). The rope is apparently the constituent cause of the snake imagined in it. In reality, the world is non-different from Brahman, for though imagined to be an existent thing, it has no existence apart from Brahman. As regards the individual self, there is unanimity that it is a pure conscious principle. Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, cannot be different from it, for if they are of like nature, what could be the cause of their difference? If it is said that the two, though alike, may yet differ in their attributes, it can be replied that the attributes are due to the limiting adjuncts. A crystal placed near a red flower may appear to be red, but as soon as the flower is removed, it remains as itself. The redness of the crystal is known as a limiting adjunct, for it can be brought to an end, and it does not enter into the very nature of the crystal. On the other hand, the blueness of a blue lotus is a quality that inheres in the lotus and serves to distinguish it. It cannot be terminated as long as the lotus lasts. The difference between the individual self from Brahman is due to the limiting adjunct (the body and the senses). As soon as the adjunct is removed, the individual is realized to be Brahman, and even before it is removed, in reality, the individual soul is the absolute self—Brahman—even as the crystal was always white though it appeared to

Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God 47

be red. The limiting adjuncts—the body and the senses—are false because they are not uncontradicted for all time (trikālabādhā). They are sublated when the true knowledge of the self, which is Brahman, arises. Brahman, God

We may now proceed to give a connected account of Śaṅkarācārya’s conception of God and the individual self. Brahman or pure indivisible Consciousness (viśuddha caitanya) is the one ultimate Reality. The Upaniṣads speak of Brahman from two standpoints: right knowledge and ignorance (or empirical knowledge). In the state of ignorance, Brahman is differentiated as the worshipped and the worshipper.1 Different ways of worship have different results. Though the one God is always worshipped, the results of worship depend on how He is conceived and worshipped. The one Self is present in all beings, animate and inanimate, but due to the differences in the limiting adjuncts, it is spoken of differently. Wherever there is an abundance of glory, it is enjoined to be worshipped (cf. Gītā, X. 41). In the state of right knowledge, there can be no such distinction between the worshipped and the worshipper. Brahman, devoid of all adjuncts, attributes and forms, is to be experienced. Thus the scriptures speak of two forms of Brahman—that which is to be experienced and that which is to be worshipped. God can assume any shape and form through His illusory power to show His grace to the aspirant. In Himself, God has no special characteristics, shape or form. But since He is the cause of all, He is called “the all-doer, the all-wishing, the all-smelling,” etc. Similarly, God may be conceived as present in the sun in a resplendent form with golden moustaches and golden hair and worshipped. Not only this, He may be conceived as present anywhere and, in any form, for He is omnipresent and the constituent cause of everything. There is nothing wrong in conceiving the omnipresent Brahman as present in some particular place, nor is it wrong to worship It as present in some form and as conditioned by some adjunct.2 Anything can be imagined as a symbol of Brahman and worshipped, and one obtains results in accordance with the nature of the conception and the symbol (pratīka). Temporal benefits of various kinds result from such worship. Liberation results when Brahman is known as the self devoid of all special characteristics.3 He who worships the śāligrāma stone as God Viṣṇu is not under the illusion that the very stone is Viṣṇu. It would be a mistake to imagine that Brahman is solely limited to any particular place or shape. But if, while knowing Brahman to be omnipresent, one imagines Brahman to be especially present in a particular object and worships it, there is nothing wrong with that. So it is only for the purposes of worship that Brahman is often spoken of as having attributes, personality, etc.4 Brahman is said to be omniscient, omnipotent, etc. when It is limited by illusory adjuncts. Brahman, associated with name and form produced by nescience, becomes God. The name and form imagined by nescience are, as it were, the very

48  Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God

self of God. They are the seeds of the world, and they are also called the illusory power (māyā-śakti) of God or matter (prakṛti). But the omniscient God is different from them. God as creator depends on the products of nescience—name and form—as space is limited by jars, etc. As space enclosed in a jar is different from space as such, God, limited by the adjuncts of body and senses, produced by name and form founded on nescience, becomes the individual selves. Though these individuals are one with God, they differ from Him as an enclosed space differs from space as such. God’s goodness, omniscience and omnipotence depend on the distinctions made by the limiting adjunct, which is of the nature of nescience. In truth, Brahman has none of these attributes. Only in the empirical world the distinction between God and individuals, Creator and creatures, holds good. From the standpoint of absolute Truth, there are no such distinctions.5 The accounts of creation given in the scriptures are from the empirical standpoint.6 When the knowledge of non-duality arises from realizing the meaning of the Upaniṣadic texts, the transmigration of the individual as well as the creation of Brahman comes to an end, for the true knowledge of Oneness sublates the false cognition of multiplicity. In that stage, there is no question of creation.7 By Himself, Brahman is not a creator or doer, but in association with māyā (His illusory power), He seems to be the creator.8 God has a two-fold nature—(prakṛti) material and spiritual. Both of these are aspects of māyā. The world of material things is the lower nature of God, while the conscious principles, individuals, are His higher nature.9 If there is only one conscious principle—God—that is the controller of all things which if is untouched by any enjoyment, and if there is no other conscious being apart from Him, what is this creation for? This question, as well as its answer, is unintelligible.10 It should, however, be remembered that as the real nature of Brahman is devoid of all limitations and attributes, the Brahman worshipped by men is not another aspect of it, for Brahman is not a totality made up of variety, nor has its multiple aspects.11 There is no distinction between God and the transmigratory self in Brahman. If God is distinguished from Brahman and the individual from God, Brahman, thus distinguished is called God becomes a source of fear (of transmigration). When not even the slightest internal differentiation (antaraṃ bhedaṃ) is made in the one Reality, the Ātman, fearlessness (liberation) is attained.12 So it is wrong to think that Śaṅkarācārya posited two Brahmans, or a Brahman and a God. Though Brahman cannot be worshipped, for what is worshipped cannot be Brahman (because then there is a distinction between the object of worship and the worshipper), yet, as having attributes (saguṇatvena), the same Brahman can be worshipped, for Brahman is God, omniscient and omnipotent, who can be known from scriptures as well as from the order and harmony evident in the world.13 Brahman, the eternal subject, cannot be known, and for him who thinks he knows It, It is unknown (avijñātaṃ vijānataṃ). Though unknown, It is not non-existent, for it is Brahman who rules in every way, who is the supreme God and Lord.

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It is hard to know Brahman’s real nature.14 What Śaṅkarācārya says is this: Brahman, of course, is not known as distinct from the self, and anything so known as distinct cannot be Brahman. It cannot be known because It is Itself knowledge (vijñānaṃ brahma). Though that is the supreme fact, the same Brahman is God, creator and controller of the universe from the empirical standpoint, or when It is viewed as having attributes: but there are no distinctions in Brahman. Only the standpoints differ, but the thing (Reality) is One. A thing does not cease to be itself even though it is associated with adjuncts, and since we recognize it as the same, a thing does not become another thing even though we see in it some special characteristics.15 In appearing as God (creator and controller of the world), Brahman does not undergo any change, just as a rope is unchanged when it appears as a snake. And as the perceived rope snake is not something different from and independent of the rope, God is not distinct from Brahman. God is Brahman. Brahman, who is the object of supreme knowledge, is immutable and devoid of all characteristics, and the same is described in detail by the Upaniṣads as having characteristics.16 Brahman, which is indicated through the via negativa, has to be described as the cause of the world if It is to be positively indicated.17 That by which all the world is controlled, in which all things are grounded and by which they are interpenetrated, that when devoid of adjuncts is to be indicated as “Not this, not this.”18 It is impossible to speak of Brahman, for whenever we begin to speak of Brahman, it ceases to be Brahman. What can be spoken of is Brahman associated with Its illusive power (māyā-śakti), in other words, God. That is why when the Brahma Sūtra tries to define Brahman, it can give only a definition per accident. Brahman is that from which is the origination, etc., of this world. Brahman is God18a (the cause and sustainer of the world). But in Itself (svataḥ-svena rupeṇa), Brahman is not God. It is pure undifferentiated Consciousness. The texts which speak of Brahman as having a shape and form, etc. are not the principal ones.19 Texts which speak of creation and Brahman as the creator are only introductory ones: they are intended to lead up to the final doctrine that though Brahman is the world’s cause, It alone is real, the world being a superimposition on It.20 Brahman is the apparent constitutive cause (vivartopādāna), for It does not become the world either through total or through partial transformation but through māyā, which is indefinable as either real or unreal. The multiplicity of things that Brahman apparently becomes is only a name—empty sound (vācāraṃbhaṇaṃ).21 Brahman and Its effects are non-different (ananya); the one does not exist without the other. What appears as change is unreal.22 To sum up: Brahman by Itself is eternal and immutable, but when associated with māyā It appears to be active as a creator or God.23 The unruffled and inactive pure Consciousness is Brahman, while what appears as efficient—as a creator—is God. As the Gītābhāṣya (15-17) says, that which is beyond the perishable world and māyā, the imperishable root cause of the perishable world (māyāśaktiḥ kṣarākhyasya utpattibījaṃ akṣaram), is the supreme self (Paramātma-Brahman); and the very same is called omniscient and unchangeable (avyaya) God when He

50  Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God

sustains (bibharti) and rules (īśati) the universe, pervading it (āviṣya) through His spiritual strength (caitanyabala). Māyā is nothing but God’s power or potency (bījaśakti) to create the world. It is the prior state of the world that is the world’s cause. But it is not independent of God. It may also be called matter, prakṛti. Without this potential power, God cannot be the creator.24 As in that power the whole world exists in a seed form (potentially), it is called the unmanifested. When manifested, it becomes the world. It is of the nature of nescience, for though Brahman is the One Reality, it projects a diversity of names and forms. It cannot be defined either as real or unreal, for it can neither be identified with Brahman as the absolute and immutable nor said to be distinct (anya) from Him. So, it is called “illusive power” or māyā. Though this power is illusive, it does not delude God, just as the magician is never confused (āvaraṇa doṣa) by his own magic.25 God, no doubt, has the power of projection, but it does not hide from Him the true nature of things. He is omniscient and eternally free. He does not confuse one thing with another. He has no avidyā (nescience).26 The magician is capable of creating an illusion, but he himself has no illusion, nor is he confused by his own creation. God has illusive power (māyā) but has no illusion or nescience (avidyā). That He has illusive power, again, is a notion based on nescience. Brahman, the Individual Self

Brahman differs from the individual self in the same way in which the magician differs from the person he appears to be through his magic, or as space, in general, differs from the space enclosed in a jar.27 There is no difference at all between Brahman and the individual self in their essence. It is nescience to imagine a difference. The sinless eternal light—Brahman—is the individual self in reality.28 When the supreme Self is limited by adjuncts—body and senses—it is called the individual self or the embodied self (śarīrī).29 This distinction is due to nescience, for the body and the transmigratory state are projections of nescience.30 In reality, there is no individual self except in so far as the Self is falsely imagined to be limited by adjuncts.31 Notions of agency or enjoyership are falsely imagined in the Self.32 Though there is no distinction between Brahman and the individual self, due to nescience, the latter is imagined to be mortal and of limited knowledge. As long as it is limited by adjuncts, the individual self will continue to be so thought of.33 The individual self’s individuality lasts only as long as he does not realize himself to be Brahman. The Veda separates him from the body, mind and senses and teaches him, “You are not this aggregate of body, mind, and senses, nor are you a transmigrating being. You are that Self which is the Truth and which is Pure Consciousness.” When the individual is so taught and realizes this, he shakes off his identification with the body, etc., knows the immutable, eternal, and pure Consciousness and becomes That.34 As the distinction between Brahman and the individual self is a projection of nescience, when nescience is dispelled by true

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knowledge, the oneness of Brahman and the individual is realized, and that is liberation.35 Vācaspati Miśra in his Bhāmatī raises an important point on this issue. It is said that due to beginningless nescience, Brahman acquires the character of an individual and appears to be different from itself. On the other hand, there is nescience when Brahman is seen as different from the individual. The nescience can be in the individual only and not in Brahman. But unless there is nescience, there can be no individual, for individuality is said to be a projection (or product) of nescience. Is this not a vicious circle? Vācaspati Miśra resolves the riddle by saying that the relationship between the individual and nescience is like the one between the seed and the sprout. Both are beginningless. There was never a time when either of them was not, though both are never real. There is no question of Brahman being subject to transmigration because transmigration is an illusion.36 When it is said that the individual is Brahman, the individual, as known by us, should not be identified with Brahman. The individual, as known to us in empirical experience, is subject to transmigration, pain and pleasure. But all this is based on mistaken notions. In truth, there is no transmigration, sorrow or pleasure. So, the individual self, which is bereft of all limitations (individuality), is Brahman.37 In reality, there is no individual apart from Brahman the immortal and eternal, and the evident empirical distinction between the two is based on nescience.38 God and the Individual Self

From the above account, it follows that really there is no distinction between God and the individual either. The Scripture says that Brahman Itself entered into the creation and ensouled it.39 So, though many selves are spoken of, it is only from the ordinary standpoint. In fact, except for God, the omniscient, there is no other percipient and knower.40 The conscious principle in everybody is God Himself, but it seems to be subject to birth and death due to nescience.41 The individual is a reflection of God in māyā, as the image of the sun is reflected in the water.42 The two are non-different but not directly identical. For how can a reflection be directly identified with the original? Nor is it another thing (separate) from the original.43 The individual is not a part of Brahman, for Brahman has no parts. If the individual were a part of Brahman, the defects of the former would be in the latter, too. Nor is the individual different from Brahman, for if it is different when it attains liberation, it has to lose its own character, and what loses its character is changeable and destructible.44 As the space enclosed in a jar is neither a part nor a modification of the space as such, the individual is neither a part nor a modification of the supreme Self.45 Agency, enjoyership, etc. do not really belong to the individual because, in that case they can never be removed. What belongs to a thing intrinsically and really can never be separated from that thing. Warmth, for instance, cannot be separated from fire. Unless the self is freed from the agency, etc. there is no freedom, for

52  Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God

as long as there is agency, it is productive of results—good or bad. If it is said that agency can be destroyed by certain means, then it becomes something to be freshly brought forth—something to be achieved; but whatever is dependent on some means is not eternal. Thus, liberation becomes a temporary state. So, since there is unanimity that liberation is possible and that it lies in freedom from pleasure and pain which are due to agency, the agency cannot really belong to the Self. Agency, etc. belong to the adjuncts of the Self, and the attributes of the adjuncts are erroneously superimposed on the Self. The adjuncts are the products of nescience because when true knowledge arises, they are sublated. There is general agreement that knowledge gives liberation, but knowledge cannot give liberation if bondage is real. So, bondage within the transmigratory world is an illusion.46 True knowledge of self can lead to immortality only if the self is already the immortal Brahman.47 The conscious principle that acts and suffers and that which is present in each body and is called the individual, is a projection of nescience (avidyākalpitaśarīra). The individual is different from God, as the magician’s creations are different from the magician, and as the space enclosed in a jar is different from space in general.48 A magician may appear as if he is ascending to the sky using a rope with a sword in hand, but that is not his real state, for he is seated on the floor and has never ascended to the sky. This sort of difference is found between God and the individual. As long as there is no true knowledge, as long as there is an individual with the attributes of agency and enjoyership he cannot be God, for the individual is subject to sorrow and transmigration, while God is ever blissful.49 There are injunctions like “the Ātman must be searched for” and “He obtains bliss when he attains the blissful (God).” These presuppose the distinction between the individual and the blissful God.50 In ordinary experience, God is different from the individual, and when that experience is sublated, there remains no individual. So, it is ridiculous to point out that if God and the individual are identical, God will have to experience all that the individual experiences. In ordinary experience, as long as the notion of the individual who acts and enjoys is not shed, God is transcendent to him. When from the Upaniṣads it is known that agency and enjoyership are superimposed on the self and that the self is, in reality, sinless, there is no more any individual experience, much less Brahman’s experience (of pain and pleasure).51 Development in the Relationship Between God and the Soul

The relationship between God and the individual is something like the relationship between a part and the whole, between a spark and a fire. They cannot be entirely different like a cow and a buffalo, nor are they identical because the individual has to search for God and to know God. But to say that the individual is a part of God is only a figurative way of speaking, for God has no parts. They cannot be different, for both belong to undifferentiated consciousness, just as heat (or warmth)

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is found in the sparks as well as in the fire. God is well known in the world as the ruler and individuals as the ruled. God is the master and helper (swāmī and upakāraka), while the individuals are servants and the helped. That is so, but from scripture, we know that the individuals and God are related as parts and whole, as the ruled and the ruler. God is endowed with super-excellent adjuncts, while the individuals have very inferior adjuncts. So, though they are related as part and whole, God rules over them. Though the individual is a part of God, the misery and evil which the individual suffers do not affect God, for the individual falsely identifies himself with the body and suffers, while God has no such delusion. As has been already said, all suffering is due to the mistaken notion that the body is the self, and to the consequent superimposition. In experience also, we see that when an ordinary man hears that his father or son is dead, he grieves, but a recluse who has renounced the world is not subject to any unhappiness in a similar situation. The sun’s light, when it comes through a round hoop, appears to be round but is not really so. A stick in water appears to be bent but is not so. A reflection of the sun in a sheet of water shakes when the surface of the water is rippled, but the sun does not shake. Even so, though the individual, which is a part of God delimited by the mind and body projected by nescience, suffers, God does not suffer. And, as a matter of fact, even the individual suffers due to nescience, not really.52 All injunctions are based on the distinction between God and the individual as whole and part. In fact, they are identical; for Brahman, the impartite is the conscious principle animating all bodies. Injunctions like “Do not commit adultery” and “Love thy wife” presuppose the identification of the self with the adjuncts. As the adjuncts are many, the individuals also appear to be many till it is realized that the adjuncts are illusions. To him, who knows that the self is like space unaffected by any apparent enclosures, injunctions do not apply. Nor will he behave wantonly, for he does not regard anything as “mine.” So, he will have no incentive to act selfishly or sin fully. Just as, although fire is the same everywhere, the fire in the cremation ground is not regarded as auspicious, even so, though the self is one, due to association with adjuncts, it is spoken of as good and bad. As adjuncts are many and as the adjuncts, in either a subtle or gross form, do not leave the self till the right knowledge dawns, there is no question of the experiences of one individual being shared by and confused with another’s. Individuals are reflections of God. The states of one reflection do not affect another or God. Suppose there are several reflections of the sun in different basins of water. If one basin is shaken, the reflection in it shakes, but this does not affect the other reflections or the sun. As the reflection is caused by nescience, transmigration, which is based on that reflection, is an illusion, it ends with the right knowledge.53 The critic may say that there can be no analogy between the sun, which is a physical object, and Brahman, which is devoid of all attributes and non-different from all things. Śaṅkarācārya replies that no analogy is possible between two objects which are similar in every respect, for, in that case, any analogy would be

54  Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God

useless. And, in fact, the analogy of the reflected sun is not supplied by reason but by scripture. This scriptural analogy is to be understood as it is intended by scripture. The sun’s reflection in the water shakes if the surface of the water shakes, looks dirty if the water is muddy, and its size depends on the size of the surface of the water. Similarly, though Brahman is immutable and ever-abiding in one form, due to Its presence in (antarbhāva) adjuncts like the body, It appears to undergo modifications.54 The application of the analogy is limited to that extent only; there is no further similarity between Brahman and the sun. In the different analogies given to explain the relationship between the individual and God, progress from a lower to a higher conception can be traced. The absolute difference between the individual and God is impossible because both are alike; both are conscious principles. This is the first stage. The individual is not an independent substance apart from God: he is non-different (ananya) from God as a spark is from fire. Apart from God, he has no existence. In fact, whatever is, whether atomic or great, becomes non-existent when divorced from Brahman.55 So the individual made up of agency and finite experience cannot also be a selfsufficient reality. He is contingent on God, that is so to say, a part or a chip of God, as the spark is of fire. Since God is not a material thing and as He is impartite, the individual is not a part of Him in the same sense in which the nib is part of a pen. It is a figurative way of speaking to facilitate our understanding of the intimate relationship between the two. The more advanced stage is marked by the understanding of the nature of the individual as an appearance of God. He is in reality God, but he cannot be directly identified, as he is, with God nor is he a different thing from God.56 Māyā and Avidyā: God and Soul

While the power to project the world—illusion (māyā)—is possessed by God, the illusion (confusion of one thing for another, of reality for unreality and vice versa) caused by superimposition (adhyāsa), the defect of obscuration of the true nature of things (āvaraṇadoṣa) is found in the individual. God has no nescience (avidyā), no ignorance of the real nature of things (āvaraṇadoṣa).57 The individual is affected by nescience,58 which is the cause of the relations between suffering and the sufferer, the enjoyer and the enjoyed.59 When nescience is dispelled by the realization of Truth, the individual finds himself to be Brahman.60 It is to be noted that true knowledge can remove only nescience (avidyā), which envelops (āvṛtaṃ) and conditions (upādhi) the individual and hides from him his real nature.61 That individual whose nescience is dispelled becomes Brahman, just as when a jar is broken, the space enclosed in it becomes one with the space in general. There is no question of māyā (the illusive power) of Brahman being dispelled (apāgama) or removed (nivṛtta), for it is His power (śakti) (Śvetāśvetarabhāṣya, 4.9.10 and Sūtrabhāṣya, 1.4. 34) or His nature (Gītābhāṣya 4.6, 7. 4-6, 13. 1, etc). Māyā, God’s power, which is the root of the world, is imperishable (akṣara) and

Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God 55

endless (ananta) (Gītābhāṣya, 15.16). As God is eternal, His nature (māyā, prakṛti) must also be eternal.62 The māyā power is, as it were, God’s very self.63 Even before the creation of the world of name and form, name and form potentially existed in the Supreme Self as the potential banyan tree in a tiny seed.64 As for the existence of the world, it is well known that in Vedānta, it is conceived as beginningless, and it will never come to an end. It is repeatedly created and destroyed. As foam in water, the world of name and form is located in the center of Brahman (nāmarūpe—brahmano madhye vartate), but Brahman is untouched by them and is altogether of a different nature from them (nāmarūpa vilakṣaṇaṃ), and yet it controls (or maintains) them (tayoḥ nirvyodhri). This is the nature of Brahman.65 The world is Brahman’s effect, and apart from the cause, there can be no effect (na kāryaṃ nāma kāraṇāt vyatiriktaṃ).66 The one thing, due to the difference in the state, is called by various names.67 The form of the effect is also as if it were the very nature of the cause.68 An effect must abide in the cause even prior to its origination, for what is not contained in a thing cannot come out of it, as for instance oil from sand. So even prior to origination, the world existed in the cause (Brahman). What was non-different before origination is non-different after origination also.69 The cause devoid of all special characteristics is known as the effect when it comes to have particular special states,70 as clay is called a jar when it comes to have a certain shape etc. Brahman is in its nature immutable and eternal, and its appearance as the world does not affect its nature. The power of Brahman to appear as the world of multiplicity without undergoing any change is known as māyā (illusory power). It is called illusory because what appears as a result of it is indefinable as either real or unreal (tatva-nyatat-vābhyām anirvacanīya); nor is it possible to say whether what appears is identical with Brahman or is different from it. Analogies like the appearance of a snake in a rope, and silver in a nacre, help us to understand this mystery. The rope snake is not real, for it ceases to exist when the nature of the rope is rightly cognized. Nor is the rope snake absolutely unreal because it is capable of being practically efficient, as one is afraid of it and runs away from it.71 Similar is the ontological status of the world. When there is the right knowledge, the world of multiplicity does not appear anymore as an independent and real thing. Though one continues to see the world as long as the residual impressions of past cognition last, one is convinced of its falsity. As Vācaspati said, it is like a man with a high fever who, tasting a lump of sugar, finds it bitter and spits it out, though he does not believe it to be bitter. Or, as Padmapāda said, it is like the resident of Banaras seeing bunches of green pepper in a shop but not believing them to be real, as they are so unheard of and rare in Banaras. But as long as the right knowledge does not arise, the world is capable of being experienced and evoking activity. So, it is not absolutely unreal like a hare’s horn. While objects like a hare’s horn and a barren woman’s son have no basis (niruṣpāda), no cause at all, things like a mirage and a rope snake have a basis, an underlying ground. The snake is not perceived in nothing but in the rope. In these cases, what is, is perceived as otherwise.72 A barren woman’s son is not born either

56  Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God

really or illusorily. On the other hand, the rope snake is seen; and prior to the right cognition of the thing in question as the rope, “the snake” is existent. Nor can the cognition of a rope snake arise where there is nothing. There must be a long, coiled rope in front to create that illusion.73 The world is similar to these things because it is not baseless. It is grounded in Brahman, and when Brahman’s real nature is known, it ceases to exist, as the ropesnake ceases to exist when the rope is rightly perceived. All things are grounded in Brahman (mat sthāni sarva bhūtāni—Gītā), for there can be no experience unless it has some ground.74 As the underlying ground, Brahman does not ever abandon its nature; even so, the world does not abandon its nature.75 Compared to objects like water in a mirage and the rope-snake, water and snake are relatively more real (āpekṣikaṃ satyaṃ), and compared to the world, Brahman is absolutely real.76 Thus, Brahman is the most real among real things (satyasya satyaṃ).77 But empirically speaking the world is also real, for it is apprehended, unlike the hare’s horn, and what is apprehended cannot be produced from nothing. So the world of name and form is relatively real (āpekṣikaṃ satyam), while that from which it is produced is absolutely real (pāramārthika satya). The body of Upaniṣads itself says that name and form (the world) are real (nāmarūpe satyaṃ). Elsewhere Śaṅkarācārya explains that the world of change (vikāra) is real, not as compared to the Absolute reality but as compared to what is never the object of senses.78 As dreams are unreal compared to waking experiences, from the absolute standpoint, the world and empirical experience are not real.79 It is clear from the above account that māyā is not the individual delusion but the power of Brahman, which is indefinable either as real or unreal, either as identical with Brahman or different from it. When the individual gets rid of his nescience by realizing the truth, namely, that there is nothing non-different (ananya) from and independent of Brahman, which is the one reality, his nescience (āvaraṇadoṣa, defect of obscuration, confusion) is removed. For a man in that state the dictum “I am Brahman” is a realized truth, and for him, there is no distinction between creator and creature. Till that stage comes, God is a reality, and his transcendence is genuine. When true knowledge arises, God is known to be none other than the Supreme Self beyond māyā and its products. There is no question of God and māyā, the cause of the world, being destroyed, for as Śaṅkarācārya said, God is indestructible (avyayaḥ Īśvaraḥ, adhyāsa, 15–17), while his own power, māyā, is imperishable because it has no end (anantyād nakṣarati, Gītābhāṣya, 15.17). Thus, both God and his power, māyā, are beginningless and endless (Īśvarasya prakṛtyoḥ yuktāṃ nityatvena bhavituṃ,—Gītābhāṣya, 13.19). God and the world are not subjective fancies, but the man who knows the intrinsic nature of reality realizes that what is called God as distinct from individuals is nothing but the one undifferentiated consciousness (svagata vigata bhedaśūnya caitanya), while the world, including the individual (kartṛtva bhoktṛtva viśiṣṭa jīva) is only a form in which the ultimate reality appears (ābhāsa eva) due to our natural ignorance (svabhāvaikya

Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God 57

avidyayā). To know that there is nothing whatsoever, even a hair’s end, which is different from Brahman, is liberation.80 As Śaṅkarācārya said, mere man cannot dissolve this existent world (vidyāmāna prapañca) made up of the planetary systems and the countless animate and inanimate beings inhabiting them. Dissolution of the world by knowledge is not like the dissolution or melting of butter by heating it. (This is Śaṅkarācārya’s example.) And if, when liberation comes, the world is dissolved in this sense, why have not the earth and the sky, etc. ceased to exist when someone in the past realized the truth? As the Ratnaprabhā says, so many in the past, like the sage Śuka and others, attained liberation. So, what happens is that when Brahman is known, truth is known, and it displaces or sublates nescience and the whole of this world, which is a superimposition. When one awakes, the dream world disappears, i.e., one comes to know that what was previously experienced is not real.81 Similarly, when we realize Brahman, we come to know that what was previously thought to be real is not so and that Brahman is the one reality. It is a mystery as to why and how the one eternal and immutable Brahman appears in the world of plurality (ko addha veda kuta ajāta kuta iyaṃ vistuṣhtiḥ?). It is enough to know that all this world is the glory of Brahman (etāvānasya mahimā); that Brahman is much greater and more real than all this (ato jyāyānśca); and that apart from it, all this is nothing.82 Ethical injunctions and religious practice are justified and given a place at the empirical stage. For the man who has gone beyond it, virtue becomes his very nature (apagata pāpmā bhavati). When true knowledge comes, the world does not vanish; its previous cognition is sublated. It is now known for its real nature. The superimposition is removed. This can be understood by the frequently cited example: when the rope is rightly cognized, what happens is, the cognition in the form, “This is a snake,” is sublated by the cognition in the form, “This is a rope.” The “this” cannot be negated nor can cognition be negated. The “this,” which was previously cognized as one thing, is now cognized as something else. Similarly, while in empirical experience, the content of the “I” notion—the self—is known as limited by the body and as the doer and experiencer of good and evil, in the state of true knowledge, it is cognized as Pure Consciousness which is untouched by the adjuncts, agency and finite experience. Till that assured conviction (“svahṛdaya pratyayaṃ brahma vedanaṃ,” as Śaṅkarācārya says) arises, the individual will continue to be the doer and enjoyer and will be radically different from, and a creature of, God. The question as to why at all there should be creation—the origination of the world’s appearance—is unanswerable.83 This is candidly admitted by Śaṅkarācārya. Notes 1 Bhāṣya, 1.2.12. 2 Ibid., 1.1.20.

58  Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God

3 Ibid., 2.1.24. 4 Ibid., 1.2.14. 5 Ibid., 2.1.14. 6 Ibid., 2.1.33. 7 Ibid., 2.1.22. 8 Gītābhāṣya Upodghāta and Gītābhāṣya, 4.13. 9 Gītābhāṣya, 7.4-5, 13,1, 13.19. 10 Ibid., 9,10. 11 Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya, 5.1.1. 12 Taittirīyabhāṣya, 2.7. 13 Kenabhāṣya, 3, Vākyabhāṣya. 14 Kenabhāṣya, 3, Padabhāṣya. 15 Sūtra Bhāṣya, 3,2,11, 2.1.18. 16 Muṇḍakabhāṣya, 2.1.3. 17 Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya, 3.1.27. 18 Ibid., 3.9.26. 18a. Gītābhāṣya, 4,10. 19 Sūtra Bhāṣya, 3,2,4. 20 Bhāṣya, 3.2.11, 1.4.11, 2.1.14. 21 Ibid., 2.1.27. 22 Ibid., 2.1.14. 23 Bhāmatī, 1,1,12. 24 Bhāṣya, 1,4,3. 25 Ibid., 2.1.9 Gītābhāṣya, 7, 25. 26 Bhāṣya, 3.2.9 cf.1.1.5. 27 Sūtrabhāṣya, 1.1.12. 28 Ibid., 1.3.19. 29 Ibid., 1.1.17. 30 Ibid., 1.1.11, 1.4.1. 31 Ibid., 2.3.30. 32 Ibid., 2.3.40. 33 Ibid., 1.2.17, 1.3.4. 34 Ibid., 1.3.19. 35 Ibid., 3.2.30. 36 Bhāmatī, 1.1.12. 37 Sūtrabhāṣya, 4.1.3. 38 Ibid., 1.3.19. 39 Ibid., 1.1.15. 40 Ibid., 1.1.17. 41 Gītābhāṣya, 13.2. 42 Ibid., 15.7. 43 Sūtrabhāṣya, 2.3.50. 44 Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya, 2.1.20; Sūtrabhāṣya, 4.3.14. 45 Māṇḍūkyakārikābhāṣya, 3.7. 46 Sūtrabhāṣya, 2.3.40. 47 Ibid., 1.4.22. 48 Ibid., 1.1.17. 49 Ibid., 1.1.16. 50 Ibid., 1.1.17. 51 Ibid., 1.2.8; also 2.1.22 etc. 52 For above Sūtrabhāṣya, 2.3 43-46. 53 For above 2.3. 47-50. 54 Ibid., 3.2.20. 55 Kaṭhabhāṣya, 2.20; Sūtrabhāṣya, 2.1.9; Chāndogyabhāṣya, 6.8.4.

Śan ˙kara’s Conception of God 59

56 Sūtrabhāṣya, 2.3.50. 57 Sūtrabhāṣya, 1.1.5 Gītābhāṣya, 15.17. 58 Ibid., 1.4.1. 59 Ibid., 2.2.10; 2.3.40-41. 60 Ibid., 1.4.6; 3.2.30; 1.1.12; 2.3, 49-50; 1.3.9. 61 Jīva is affected by vidyā, Sūtrabhāṣya, 1.4.1. The veil of avidyā hides the inherent knowledge and power of the individual, 3.2.6. Influenced by avidyā, the individual identifies himself with the body, 2.3.46. To think that the body is the self is avidyā, 1.3.2. The individual’s bondage is due to avidyā, 3.3.11. Avidyā is an adjunct (upādhi) of the individual, 4.2.4, and it follows him even after death, 3.1.1. The body and the senses, name and form are products of avidyā, 1.4.4, 1.4.22, 2.1.33. 62 Gītābhāṣya, 13.19. 63 Sūtrabhāṣya, 2.1.14. 64 Kaṭhabhāṣya, 3.11. 65 Chāndogyabhāṣya, 8.14. 66 Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya, 1.6.1. 67 Sūtrabhāṣya, 2.2.17. 68 Ibid., 2.1.8. 69 Ibid., 2.1.16. 70 Ibid., 2.3.7. 71 Ibid., 2.1.27; 2.1.14. 72 Māṇḍūkyakārikābhāṣya, 1.6; cf Sūtrabhāṣya, 2.1.18. 73 Māṇḍūkyakārikābhāṣya, 1.6; cf Gītābhāṣya, 13.14; Kārikābhāṣya, loc​.ci​t. 74 Gītābhāṣya, 9.4. 75 Sūtrabhāṣya, 2.1.16. 76 Taittirīyabhāṣya, 2.6; cf Praśnabhāṣya, 4.5. 77 Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya, 2.3.6, 1.6.3. #77a. Ibid., 1.6.3. 78 Chāndogyabhāṣya, 7.17. 79 Ibid., 8.5.4 Sūtrabhāṣya, 2.2.29. 80 Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya, 4.2.20, Chāndogyabhāṣya, 2.4.14. Taittirīyabhāṣya, 2.8.5. 81 Sūtrabhāṣya, 3.2.21. 82 Ibid., 3.2.32; 2.1.20; 2.1.14. 83 Gītābhāṣya, 9.20.

6 ˙ KARĀCĀRYA ŚRI ŚAN Some Observations*

Vedānta—Marxism—Christianity … these, Teilhard de Chardin and Sri Aurobindo agrees, are the only possible alternatives before mankind and the three “religions” of modern man. —R.C. Zahner, Evolution in Religion.1 In 1882, K.B. Pathak, a distinguished Indian scholar, who received an honorary Ph.D. from Tübingen, settled Śaṅkarācārya’s year of birth to be in 788 A.D. and year of death as 820 A.D. Analyzing the material which was the basis for this, some Westerners argued that in just 32 years no one could have written and done all that Śaṅkarācārya is credited with.2 So some of them hazarded the guess that 788–820 A.D. was the period of his activity, from the time he became a new person, an enlightened renunciant, “a realized soul,” to the time he passed away. When the texts concerned speak of Śaṅkarodaya’ (birth of Śaṅkarācārya) in 788 A.D., they refer to his having become a renunciant (sannyāsin) in that year, as according to the Śāstras, a renunciant is considered to have entered into an entirely new life. (In fact, one who takes to renunciation formally performs his śraddhā [obsequies] and is then initiated into sannyāsa.) Similarly, when the texts speak of Śaṅkarācārya as “having attained Śivahood” (Śivatamāgat) in 820 A.D., they mean he merged in God, Śiva (i.e. died).3 Others, however, took 788 A.D. as the year of his birth and 820 A.D. as the year in which he realized his identity with Śiva (i.e. enlightened and became liberated while yet living), which means that he must have lived for many years subsequently to have accomplished all that he is believed to have. There is logic in these speculations.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625-7

Śri Śan ˙ karācārya 61

In a paper in 1937, K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, a great Indian historian, identified Śivasoma, a grandson of the maternal uncle of King Jayavarman II (802–809 A.D.) of Cambodia and the guru of King Indravarman (reign 877–889 A.D.), as a direct disciple of Śaṅkarācārya, based on a Cambodian inscription. That inscription says that Śivasoma studied all śāstras under “Bhagavat Śaṅkarācārya, whose feet were worshipped with prostrations by all scholars without exception.” Another great historian of India, R. C. Majumdar, also accepted this Śivasoma to be a direct disciple of Śaṅkarācārya. The authoritative series of volumes on Indian history published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan accepts 788–820 A.D. as the dates for Śaṅkarācārya.4 Radhakrishnan’s Indian Philosophy and Jawaharlal Nehru’s Discovery of India also do so. Śri Śringeri Śāradā Pīṭha, a monastic establishment considered to be established by Śaṅkarācārya, has also accepted 788 A.D. as his year of birth. In his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya (II.2.28), Śaṅkarācārya tried to refute Vijñānavāda similar to that of Dharmakīrti (634–673 A.D.), and quoted Diṅganāga, while in Upadeśasāhasri (xviii, 142) he quoted two verses of the former. Śaṅkarācārya’s disciple Sureśvara referred to Dharmakīrti in his Vārttika on Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya. There is agreement that Kumārila, who quoted Kālidāsa and Bhartṛhari, was Śaṅkarācārya’s elder contemporary; and he is in turn quoted by Śāntarakṣita (680–740 A.D.). Vidyānanda, in his commentary on Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā, quoted from Sureśvara’s Vārttika just mentioned. Jinasena, who wrote Harivaṃśapurāṇa in 783 A.D. and converted King Amoghavarṣa (reign 815 to 877–878 A.D.), referred to Vidyānanda. Moreover, Śaṅkarācārya also quoted in his Sūtrabhāṣya (II.2.22) a sentence from the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā of Guṇamati (600–640 A.D.). Based on all these, Professor Hajime Nakamura sought to establish that “Śaṅkarācārya was active during the early half of the eighth century.”5 Louis Renov and Daniel H. H. Ingalls also admitted Nakamura’s placing Śaṅkarācārya in about 700–750 A. D. as justified. In 1910, Śri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, brought out a Memorial Edition of Śaṅkarācārya’s 110 works in 20 volumes. In the edition brought out in 1952, two more works were added. It is claimed that the 33rd head of the Śringeri Śāradā Pīṭha perused the manuscripts of these works and selected the correct text of each, that they were compiled under his direction and with his approval and that the additional works were included in 1952 by the direction of the 34th head of that Pīṭha.6 But Theodor Aufrecht’s Catalogus Catalogorum contains over 300 works attributed to Śaṅkarācārya. Probably S. K. Belvalkar was the first scholar who attempted to critically determine which works of Śaṅkarācārya were authentic. According to him, the bhāṣyas on the following were “most probably” by Śaṅkarācārya: (1) Brahmasūtras, (2) Nine Upaniṣads: Īṣa, Kena (only Pāda Bhāṣya), Kaṭha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Taittirīya, Aitareya, Chāndogya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, and (3) Bhagavadgītā. The following monographs “have a fairly satisfactory claim to Śaṅkarācārya’s authorship”: 1) Aparokṣānubhūti, (2) Ātmabodha, (3) Upadeśasāhasri (verse portion only), (4) Pañcīkaraṇa and (5) Śataśloki. Yet, he remarked that nothing in (4)

62  Śri Śan ˙ karācārya

warranted its ascription to Śaṅkarācārya, while he considered Vivekacūḍāmaṇi was “usually, but not convincingly, supposed to belong to Śaṅkarācārya’s authorship.” I prefer to include Vivekacūḍāmaṇi (at least most of its anuṣṭup stanzas) under works having “a fairly satisfactory claim” of authenticity and delete Pañcīkaraṇa. Belvalkar also lists eight hymns (stotras) as “very probably genuine,” among which are found the Dvādaśapañjarikā or Mohamudgara and Bhajagovindaṃ. He describes the authenticity of three such others as “plausible, but not altogether certain.” Among these is Māniṣapañcakaṃ. Thus, Belvalkar has identified a total of 24 works (11 bhāṣyas, five prakaraṇas, and eight hymns) as Śaṅkarācārya’s works.7 He has omitted 26 as probably unauthentic and 358 as not genuine out of 408 works listed by Aufrecht and others included in collected editions published from Śriraṅgam, Mysore, Poona (now Pune) and other places. Those in the West who take an extreme view accept only four works as actually by him: three bhāṣyas and the Upadeśasāhasri.8 There is no justification at all to deny Śaṅkarācārya’s authorship to the bhāṣyas on Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya and Taittirīya Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtras. The Bhagavadgītābhāṣya (for the authenticity of which B. Faddegon long ago argued) must also have been written by the great Ācārya. It does not appear that other scholars who discussed this question had a greater scholarship and critical acumen than Belvalkar. One of my friends has informed me that in a seminar last year in Berlin, some learned men expressed the doubt whether Śaṅkarācārya ever existed! A very early passage in which Vedānta in the sense of “the end of the Veda” occurs is in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka: “The sound Om uttered at the beginning of the Veda as well as established at its end.”9 For the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the essence of Vedic hymns is Upaniṣads.10 Similarly, a very early passage that uses Vedānta in the sense of not only the end portion but the purport of the Veda is a Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad passage: The self-disciplined ones who have purified themselves through the path of renunciation and have very well ascertained the meaning of Vedāntic knowledge go to the Brahma-world and dwell there till the end of time, when, as they are already one with the supreme immortal, they will be completely liberated.11 As the Muṇḍaka begins with giving the lineage of “Brahman knowledge, the foundation of all knowledge,”12 and expounds it, and Vedānta knowledge is what leads to liberation, identification of both is implied. Brahma-vidyā is Vedāntavijṅāna. It is the foundation of all knowledge, because (as Śaṅkarācārya explained) it is the knowledge of the one cause, or rather the sole ground, of the world’s multiplicity. Jagadbhedasyaika-kāraṇam. Belvalkar placed this Upaniṣad in the early 900–750 B.C. period, while Nakamura takes it down to the period 466–386 B.C. and yet assigns it to 350–300 B.C. In the Bhagavadgītā (500–400 B.C.) occurs this passage: “I am the author of Vedānta and the knower of Veda as well.”13 The Gītā,

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the philosophy of which is Vedāntic, may be safely dated to 500–400 B.C.14 The Manusmṛti (final edition 2nd centenary A.D.) enjoins that a householder should systematically hear Vedānta.15 Vedānta was thus conceived as the culmination and essence of Veda. The earliest Buddhist works speak of Vedānta with great respect. The Suttanipāta records: After announcing that he would declare the dhamma, the Buddha says: “Oblations should be bestowed on a Brahmin disciplined by truth and endowed with self-control, who has attained Vedānta and is leading a holy life. Let a Brahmin seeking merit offer.”16 Elsewhere (Vinaya, Udāna), in answer to the question, what are the dhammas that make one a Brahmin? It is replied: “A Brahmin who has absolutely no attachment to anything, who is free from sins and conceit, is unstained by passions and is self-controlled, has attained Vedānta and led a holy life, is the one who can expound the Brahman doctrine.”17 I have translated “Vedāntagu” as one who has attained Vedānta (the purport of the Veda), and “Brahmavāda” as Brahman doctrine. This is a clear admission that Vedāntic knowledge, ethics and spiritual practice qualify one to articulate Brahmavāda. The Tathāgata was Vedagu and Vedāntagu, too: he had attained the meaning of both the Veda and Vedānta, as the Sutta-nipāta says. From the Mādhyamaka-hṛdayakārikā of Bhāvaviveka, who belonged to the early 6th century A.D. and was a great Mādhyamika Buddhist, it is known that a Vedānta school existed at that time. Two features mentioned about it are interesting: (1) Whoever sees all beings as the self is liberated, and for him, there is equality (tulyatā) of all: fools and scholars, pariahs and Brahmins, observes Nakamura.18 (2) Bhāvaviveka also noted that, basically, the Vedāntic ātmavāda (self-doctrine) and Buddhist nairātmya (selflessness) were similar, despite some important differences between the two, so he called the former defectless and well reasoned (nirdoṣaḥ sopapattikāḥ).19 In the Gupta Age, some of the minor Upaniṣads and older Purāṇas expressed Vedāntic views tinged with Sāṃkhya of a pantheistic kind. Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahmasūtra (composed sometime before the 4th century A.D.), the only great work on Vedānta, is not referred to at all in classical literature till Śaṅkarācārya’s time.20 Vedānta is also not given the status of a darśana in some of the monographs expounding philosophies (e.g. Haribhadra’s). The Saṃkhya philosophy of the type found in the Mahābhārata and Vaiṣnava and Śaiva doctrines essentially derived from it were dominant till Śaṅkarācārya’s commentaries on the Upaniṣads appeared. After him began what F.W. Thomas called the “Vedānta period.” The formula for the post-Śaṅkarācārya period is “the supremacy of the Vedānta;” and “Vedānta domination arose at a time of South Indian prosperity and prestige.”21 Taking Śaṅkarācārya’s time to be the late 7th to the early 8th century or the late 8th to the early 9th century and that he was born in Kerala, a brief account of the society around that time may be given. For what follows, I depend on K. A. Nilakanta Sastri. In the Deccan, in the 7th century A.D., first, the Chalukyas of Badami rose to power and ruled the country between the two seas, excepting the Telugu country

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along the East coast and the province of Lata in the north-west. Their fight was with Harsha and the Pallavas. Their contributions, among other things, were the rock-cut structural temples at Aihole Badami and Pattadakal and additions to the cave paintings at Ajanta. By the middle of the 8th century, they declined. From among their feudatories, the Rashtrakutas gained ascendance and established an empire with their capital at Manyakheta (Malkheda). One of their most remarkable achievements was the rock-cut Kailāśa temple at Ellora. In the South, the Pallavas and Pandyas shared power. Due to their constant fights, the frontiers between the two often shifted about the line of the Kaveri. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri called c. 600 to 950 A.D. the Pandya–Pallava period in the South. If we take the entire country from south of the Vindhyas, from the middle of the 6th century for 300 years, its political history was dominated by the mutual conflict of three powers: (1) the Chalukyas of Badami till about 750 A.D. and then the Rashtrakutas. The Chalukya ruler Vijayaditya (696–733/4) was a great patron of the arts and was responsible for preventing the Arabs from entering Deccan; (2) the Pallavas of Kanchi and (3) the Pandyas, of whom Dantavarman (645–670) imposed his rule on the Cheras (Keralas) too. The Pandyan king Śri Mara-Sri Vallabha (c. 815–62 A.D.) conquered Ceylon. From the beginning of the 8th century, the Ceras and Pallavas began fighting each other, and from the later part of that century till the end of the 10th century, the Cheras were fighting with the Pandyas, but friendly with the Cholas, who were in decline by the end of the 8th century, but revived by 850 A.D. A brief account of the North may be given, for which I depend on the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan volume of Tripathi and Romila Thapar. From c.720 to 1200, Kanauj was the symbol of imperial power. The Rashtrakutas, the Pratiharas and Palas were struggling for it. The first of these attacked Kanauj in 916 and ended its sway in the North. The second, who were the descendants of the Gurjaras of Rajasthan, were ruling over a large part of Rajasthan and Ujjain and even captured Kanauj. The Palas, who gained control over most of Bengal and Bihar, successfully campaigned against Kanauj towards the end of the 8th century. Kashmir became prominent in the 7th century. King Lalitaditya (c. 724–760 A.D.) entered Punjab and even the Gangetic Plain. He pushed away the Arabs from Punjab, though they conquered Sind in 712 A.D. The Pratihara Nagabhata I (reign 730–756 A.D.), combining forces with Chahmanas and others, flung back the Arab armies under Junaid (c. 725 A. D.) who came up to Ujjain. From then till that of Mahmud of Ghazni, the Pratiharas were a bulwark against foreign aggression. From 725 to 752 A.D., Yasovarman ruled at Kanauj. He and Lalitaditya were responsible for preventing the Arabs and Tibetans from coming into India. When the major powers mentioned above declined, small states arose all over the North—in Nepal, Kamarupa, Kashmir, Utkala, etc. In the 9th and 10th centuries, the Rajputs became important. The following sentences from Śaṅkarācārya’s Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya sum up the politico-social situation: “Now there is no Kṣatriya emperor and the caste-andstation (varṇāśrama dharmas) are almost unsettled”22

Śri Śan ˙ karācārya 65

It may be interesting to mention here that the Pallava ruler Narasimhavarman II– Rajasimha (680–720 A.D.), whose reign gave peace and prosperity to people and who built the exquisite Kailasanatha temple at Kanchi and the magnificent shore temple at Mamallapuram, sent an embassy to China. Similarly, the Kanauj ruler Yasovarman (known to China as the “King of Central India”) sent a minister to China in 731 A.D. There was a flourishing maritime trade between the two countries at that time. There were Brahmin temples and Indian merchants at Canton in 750 A.D. Hsuan-tsang visited South India in 642 A.D., while I-tsing’s itinerary was from 672 to 695 A.D. Nilakanta Sastri mentions the universality of caste, Brahmin superiority, social exclusiveness, emphasis on duties pertaining to one’s station and, notwithstanding all this, social harmony and contentment, as characteristics of the South Indian society of that time.23 Autonomous self-sufficient villages held society together and provided continuity of tradition. The daily life of people was looked after by numerous autonomous groups and associations bound by local, caste and occupational ties. This ensured the rule of custom. There were powerful merchant guilds and extensive maritime trade. The state had no control over peoples’ social, economic and religious concerns, except when disputes arose, and appeals for settlement were made to the rulers. Rulers had the duty of protecting people and upholding the social order. Frequent wars among rulers and dynastic changes did not have much effect on the social structure and civilization. Theoretically, kings were autocratic, but, Sastri informs, in practice, their power was limited.24 India was, at that time, a religious mosaic. In the Tamil area, the 63 Śaiva teachers, Nayanars, arose from the 7th century, and the 12 Vaiṣnava teachers, Ālvārs, from the 5th or 6th century. In Kerala arose the great teacher Prabhākara and in Andhra the greater Kumārila, both of the Mīmāṃsā School. Kumārila was an older contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya, and Prabhākara is now regarded as earlier than him. Jain temples at Aihole were built in Chalukya Pulakesin II’s time, and a great Rashtrakuta King Amoghavarsha retired to a Jaina monastery. Many Western Ganga rulers and some Eastern Chalukyan rulers were Jainas. Jain temples continued to be built till the late 10th century. The wonderful Gommaṭa image belonged to that century. Buddhism continued to linger in Andhra till about the 12th century. About half of Kanchi was known as Buddhist Kanchi till a late date. It was also a great centre of Buddhist learning. In Chola times, there were Buddhist settlements on the east coast at Negapatam, as well as on the West coast at Srimulavasam. On the balustrade of the great temple at Tanjore, completed in 1009, the life of the Buddha is found depicted in decorative panels. Up to the 9th century, new vihāras were built in northwest Deccan (e.g. at Kānherī). Religious disharmony, strife and intolerance among Hindus, Jainas, and Buddhists and among different Hindu sects were not absent. But religious peace and tolerance prevailed most of the time because all people abided by the caste system.25 From this it can be safely concluded that virtually the same pattern of life prevailed everywhere.

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St. Thomas came to India in the 1st century A.D. Already in the 6th century, there was a Nestorian Church at Quilon (Kerala). An 8th-century copper plate inscription mentions grants to Malabar Christians. Soon after 636 A.D., Muslim traders settled on the Malabar Coast and began to marry local women. Their offspring came to be known as Mappilas or Moplahs. There is a story that the Chief of Malabar, Cheraman Perumal, was converted to Islam. From the 10th century onwards, there were Muslim settlements on the west as well as the East coast. The Rashtrakuta Kingdom had a number of ‘Jumma masjids’. Accounts of any religious disputes or struggles among Christians and Muslims, on the one hand, and followers of Indian religions, on the other, of that time are not to be found. Lastly, it has to be remembered that Śaṅkarācārya’s period came after the major smṛtis, artha-kāma śāstras, Itihāsa-Purāṇas (earlier), great literature (Tamilian of the Sangam period and later and the Sanskritic period as represented by Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti and Bāṇa) and the scientific works of Caraka, Suśruta, Āryabhaṭṭa, Varāhamihira and Brahmagupta were produced. I have considered it necessary to say all this to show that Śaṅkarācārya’s philosophy did not arise in a tired nation that was in decay and decadence. The period following that of Śaṅkarācārya (900–1300 A.D.) was also not one of socio-economic stagnation. In fact, Romila Thapar characterizes it as “The South in Ascendant.” It was marked by “innovations in administration, agricultural development, and growth in trade.”26 It was the time when the Chola Empire flourished, and a sense of adventure and exploration prevailed, and much was accomplished in the spiritual and material realms. Another empire of South India, Vijayanagara, established under the direction of a great Advaitic teacher Vidyāraṇya (1296–1386 A.D.), who also headed the Śriṅgeri Pīṭha, lasted for over three centuries. Its political and military achievements and its contributions to art, literature and thought through encouragement and patronage of those engaged in them were not second to those of any other state. All this conclusively shows that Advaita Vedānta did in no way adversely affect intellectual and socio-economic progress. From the beginning of this century, there have been some thoughtful Indians who considered Śaṅkarācārya’s philosophy unprogressive. An early modern Indian scientist, P. C. Ray, observed: “The Vedānta, as modified and expanded by Śaṅkarācārya, which teaches the unreality of the material world, is to a large extent responsible for the study of physical sciences falling into disrepute.”27 M. N. Roy, perhaps the greatest modern Indian materialist thinker, thought that Buddhism was a revolution, as it was a revolt against priestly domination and denial of God’s existence, and Śaṅkarācārya’s philosophy was a counter-revolution against Buddhism. Admitting Śaṅkarācārya to be one of the greatest thinkers of the world, Roy pronounced him to be “a social calamity” whose counter-revolution was “the blackest chapter and the greatest misfortune of Indian history.” Since then, according to Roy, India had “a stunted growth” which prevented the generation of revolutionary forces.” “That effect,” he affirmed, “is in operation even today.28

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Opinions of this sort are based on presuppositions such as: “A philosophy which maintains that the world is unreal or an illusion, if accepted with conviction by the majority of people in a nation, would make them indifferent to worldly welfare and prosperity, inactive and withdrawn inwardly, gradually leading the nation over a long period to stagnation and decay. Śaṅkarācārya’s philosophy was of this sort and most Indians came under its spell.” As a result, it is concluded that India became a subject nation and remained backward in every way. None of these presuppositions is justified. Śaṅkarācārya never held the world to be unreal, but only that it was neither real nor unreal. He gave the greatest importance to perception, the performance of duty and spiritual endeavour. His own intellectual and physical activity was amazing. As already said, an examination of the social and economic conditions in the country after the spread of his philosophy shows that in the post-Śaṅkarācārya period, there was no stagnation. In fact, in many ways, things were better, but this cannot be attributed to his philosophy. The majority of Indians never accepted his philosophy nor lived in accordance with it. Not all those who accepted it have undertaken the cultivation of the sādhana-catuṣṭaya (the four-fold ethico-spiritual endeavour) requisite for Brahman knowledge, mentioned in his bhāṣya on the first Brahmasūtra. All this has been discussed by me elsewhere.29 There is also a misunderstanding in some minds regarding Śaṅkarācārya’s attitude towards ethics. He has emphasized in various places that it is impossible to know Brahman without the mind becoming pure, and the latter requires a moral life. Vedāntic knowledge is not just theoretical Knowledge but the apprehension of Truth by the whole man. It is a conviction engendered by a long, arduous meditation, preceded by an ethical life and altruistic performance of duties. This whole endeavour, if it is to be fruitful, must culminate in immediate experience (sākṣātkāra) of oneself as one consciousness and bliss. The fruit of Brahma-jñāna must actually be seen.30 It is to become merged, so to say, in an infinite ocean of awareness and happiness - Saṃvit sukhasāgare līnatā. Thereafter such a person lives a life of fearlessness and compassion, engaged in furthering the good of all beings—Sarvabhūta hite rataḥ. So, without ethical conduct, one does not become qualified to undertake the quest for Brahman.”31 There is a belief among some followers of Advaita Vedānta that contemporary science is converging in the former or coming closer and closer to confirming the Advaitic truth. Even if all science is a quest for unified knowledge and even if today science is nearer that goal, it would not mean science will end up in Advaita Vedānta. Abdus Salam has expressed the view that science is every day confirming the Quranic Truth, viz., that of “Unity among the seemingly disparate forces of nature.” Some Buddhists in Japan and admirers of Buddhism in other countries have expressed the view that science is daily confirming the Buddhist truth of the interconnectedness of all things. As scientific progress is pointing to a holistic or organicist view, some argue, Vedānta is vindicated.

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Now, Advaita Vedānta is not alone in saying that there is the One which is the Real without a second. Several other philosophies also say so. It further says that the One Real is consciousness and bliss and “That You Are.” There is no evidence that this is the conclusion of any science. In fact, the great classical Advaitins never said that their Truth has been and could be proved by empirical experience or what is based on it, viz. history or science. They claimed that their truth has an independent pramāṇa (means of knowledge) and that what it says is confirmed in only one way, the immediate experience of Brahman—Anubhavāvasānā brahmavidyā.32 Nothing conclusive and final in this matter can come from either quantum physics or molecular biology. If Max Planck said (as he did, in fact)33 that he regarded consciousness as fundamental, matter as derivative from it, and all that exists postulates consciousness, if we had that belief, we could feel glad that such a great scientist also shares our belief. But as what he said is not based on his scientific research, it has no more weight than when a poet or an artist who has such a conviction says so. I agree with John Passmore’s saying: “Like a great many other revolutions, the revolution in physics raised no new philosophical problems and settled no old ones, for the dust and fury.”34 Not science but śraddhā is needed for Advaitic knowledge. Śraddhā (faith) is to have the notion of Existence in a tranquil mind—Cittaprasāde āstikyabuddhiḥ. (Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya). Notes * Lecture delivered during the Nehru Centenary Celebrations under the joint auspices of the School of Studies in Political Science and Nehru Vichar Manch, Vikram University, Ujjain, 1989. 1 Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, p. 15. 2 Yenādhitāni Śāstrāṇi bhagavat-Śaṅkarahvayat, G. Coedes (ed.), Inscription du Combodge, Vol. I, White Lotus Press, Paris, pp. 36–46. 3 K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, “A Note on the Date of Śaṅkara”, Journal of Religion, Vol. XI, 1937, p. 285. 4 The Age of Imperial Kanauj, Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1964, pp. 304, 359; n 156 on p. 365. 5 A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Pt. One, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1983, p. 89. In recent years, one American scholar assigned Śaṅkarācārya to the late 7th or early 8th century, and later, to not later than the mid-7th century. 6 Śaṅkara Jayanti Souvenir, Sringeri Math, T Nagar, Madras, 1988, pp. 97–100. 7 S.K. Belvalkar, Vedānta Philosophy (Gopal Basu Mallik Lectures at Calcutta University of 1925), Pt. I, Bilvakuñja Publishing House, 1929, Poona, 1929, pp. 217–230. 8 Cf. W. Norman Brown, A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Pt. One, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1983. 9 X.10: Yo vedādau svaraḥ prokto vedānte ca pratiṣṭhitaḥ. 10 Śatapatha: Yajuso rasa, evo’opaniṣat. 11 Muṇḍaka Up., III 2.6. Vedānta vijñāna-suniścitārthaḥ. 12 Ibid., I. I. Brahmavidyāṃ sarvavidyā pratiṣṭhitā. 13 XV.15. 14 My book Philosophy in India, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1985, p. 33.

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15 VI. 94. Vedāntam vidhivat śrutvā. On this Kulluka: Upaniṣadādyarthaṃ gṛhasthāvāsthyām śrutvā. For dates see my book, Philosophy in India, New Delhi, 1985. 16 Sutta Nipāta, Sundarika Bharadvāja-sutta, verse 9: Saccena danto damasā upeto, Vedāntagu vusitabrahmacariyo; Kālena taṃhi havyaṃ pavcche, Yo brāhmaṇo punnapekho yajetha. Chalmers translates ‘Veda’ as lore, while Faubǿll gives its equivalent as ‘accomplished’. The commentary explains ‘Vedāntagu’ thus: vedānāṃ antaṃ catutthamagganānām gato. I have used both Chalmers and Faubǿll in the translation I gave. 17 Udāna. I. 4, Vinaya Vol. I, (PTS edn., 1885) p. 3, cp. Mahāvagga, p. 4, Yassussada n’atthi kuhinci loke’ti: Yo brāhmaṇo bahitapāpadhammo nihuhunko nikkasavo ya-tatto vedāntagu vusita-brahmacariyo dhammena so brāhmaṇo brahmavādaṃ vadeyya. 18 Verse 8 on p. 185 in Nakamura, Ibid., p. 185. 19 Verse 87 on p. 203 in op​.cit​., p. 203. 20 F.W. Thomas, Indianism, and Its Expansion, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1942, pp. 28, 43. Belvalkar, Ibid., p. 182 ff. 21 Thomas, Ibid., p. 53. on the basis of Jaina and Buddhist works, Nakamura concluded that right till 600 A.D. no specific school called Vedānta existed. From then on till 900 A.D., Vedānta as a philosophical school began to develop “on the periphery of the philosophical circle”. From the 10th century on, he points out, Śaṅkarācārya’s Vedānta is specifically referred to and severely attacked in Jaina and Buddhist works. See Nakamura, Ibid., pp. 294–295. 22 I. 3.33 Idāniṃ-na sārvabhaumaḥ kṣatriyaḥ asti–Idānīm—ca—avyavasthitaprāyān varṇāaśramadharmān pratijānita. 23 A History of South India, p. 307. 24 Ibid., pp. 156–160. 25 Hsuan-tsang noted that the Buddhists observed caste distinctions. Udayana observed that all people followed Vedic rules from conception to cremation and that there was no moral philosophy free from Vedic injunction. Ātmatattvaviveka (ed. Dhundiraja Sastri). P. 417. 26 G. Parthasarthy’s unpublished paper, “Philosophy and Socio-economic Development in Ancient and Medieval India”, Seminar at Andhra University, Waltair, March 26 to 29, 1983. 27 History of Hindu Chemistry, Vol. I. The Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Limited, Calcutta, 1902-3, p. 195–6. 28 M.N. Roy, Scientific Politics, 2nd ed. Renaissance Publishers, Calcutta, 1947, p. 292. 29 See my book, The Indian Spirit, Andhra University, Waltair, 1965, passim. 30 Brahmavijñānaṃ dṛṣṭaphalatayā īṣyate. Sūtrabhāṣya, II. 1.4. 31 For the nature of life led by a Brahman-Knower, see Sthitaprajña-lakṣaṇas (Characteristics of a steadfast-minded person) in the Bhagavad Gītā, Ch. II, and bhakta lakṣaṇas (characteristics of a devotee). Ibid., Ch.XII. 32 For this whole problem, see my The Advaitic Notion, Sringeri, 1986. 33 In an interview with J.W.N. Sullivan: James Jeans, Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science, Geoge Allen and unwin, London, 1943. 34 A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Gerald Duckworth, London, p. 334.

7 ˙ KARA’S VIEWS ON RELIGIOUS LIFE ŚAN

The initial stage of religious life consists, according to Śaṅkarācārya, in the discharge of daily duties befitting one’s birth and station (varṇa and āśrama) in life. Unless a person properly discharges all his duties in accordance with his station in life, he cannot be fit to receive the knowledge of Brahman. When he attains true knowledge of Brahman, he is no more in need of doing anything, but for its very generation due discharge of one’s duties is necessary.1 But more important than the due discharge of duties is the cultivation of mental purity, serenity and freedom from ambition, jealousy, lust, etc. These mental traits are, so to say, part and parcel (antaraṅga) of wisdom. He who does not have them cannot have wisdom.2 Although the due discharge of duties is not helpful in so intimate a manner for wisdom, without that, there can be no desire for wisdom or generation of wisdom (utpattisādhanā). There are also certain common practices that are to be followed by all men, irrespective of their station in life. These are japa (reverential chanting of a sacred syllable, God’s name or prayer), fasting and worship of the deity.3 These are to be practiced even by those who are unable to participate in the Vedic rituals on account of poverty, widowhood or wandering mendicancy (as in the case of, e.g. Saṃvarta Raikva).4 Such practices vouchsafe wisdom and grace (anugraha), and they are to be followed by everybody. When purity of mind is obtained through all these means, one is fit to enter the next stage of religious life, namely, upāsanā. But it should be remembered that purity of mind is absolutely necessary for this.5 Upāsanā dispels avidyā (nescience),6 destroys sin and indirectly leads to liberation.7 Even after hearing the Upaniṣadic teaching, upāsanā should be repeated till the final realization.8 If, however, final realization does not come in this life, upāsanā should be continued till death, for life hereafter depends on the state of mind immediately preceding DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625-8

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death.9 So, as long as the absolute unity of the self is not realized, upāsanā must continue.10 Upāsanā is usually translated as worship. It is possible that the connotation of the word “worship” in English may not be altogether identical to what Śaṅkarācārya understands by upāsanā. Śaṅkarācārya has clearly indicated what he means by upāsanā. He says that upāsanā is a means of spiritual progress (abhyudaya sādhanā). The fruit of upāsanā is very near liberation or approximates liberation (kaivalya sannikṛṣṭa). The object of upāsanā is Brahman, just a little changed (īṣadvikṛtabrahmanīṣaya); that is, in upāsanā Brahman as such is not the object, but a Brahman conceived as slightly other than what It really is. The knowledge of non-duality is a mental mode, for every cognition is a mental mode (manovṛtti). Even so, upāsanā is a mode (or a state) of the mind. But there is a difference between the knowledge (or cognition) of non-duality and upāsanā. Cognition of non-duality removes the cognition of difference superimposed on the Self, while upāsanā is to have a balanced and continuous mental mode (or fixation) in an object as represented in scripture and to shut out all other cognitions.11 Elsewhere also, Śaṅkarācārya says the same: upāsanā is to get nearer to a thing as described in the scripture, by making it an object of thought to abide for a very long time in a continuous and steadfast mental state.12 Upāsanā manifests the real nature of the thing by making the mind pure. So it helps obtain the knowledge of non-duality and is easier because it has a concrete object.13 This is what emerges from the above account: Upāsanā is nothing but continuous and steadfast meditation on some object as represented in the scripture; for example, we can think of the person in the solar orb (Sāvitrī Puruṣa) as God and meditate on his form. The sun then becomes a pratīka, a symbol of God. As Śaṅkarācārya has reminded us, we do not, for instance, meditate on God as the person in the solar orb; we meditate on the person in the solar orb as God. The Brahma-buddhi is imposed on a particular thing,14 i.e., a particular thing is conceived as Brahman and meditated upon. Brahman is not conceived as the particular thing in question. There are many ways in which Brahman is symbolized, so any one of these symbols (pratīkas) may be taken and meditated upon till what is meditated upon is intuited (sākṣātkāra).15 The worship of a personal God as different from oneself, as residing in heaven or the recess of one’s heart or an image, falls under this head. But there is a higher stage of ahaṃgrahopāsanā. Here Brahman is meditated upon as the self. “Brahman is me; I am Brahman” and “O Deity! You are myself, I am Yourself”— this truth should guide meditation in this advanced stage.16 As in the previous stage, there is no more symbolization. It is literally true that God is the self, for the Upaniṣads say that he who worships (meditates) upon the deity as different from oneself is ignorant (Bṛh. Up. 1.4.10). It cannot be objected that God and the self cannot be non-different because they have contradictory characteristics.17 The contradictory characteristics are false; so the limiting adjuncts are an illusion that there is no difference between God and

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the individual self. This is not atheism īśvarābhāva) because Advaita does not deny God or make Him out to be a transmigratory self; what it does is maintain that the transmigratory self is of the nature of God when its transmigratoriness is removed.18 This being the case, God the holy (apagatapāpmā) is without a second, and the alleged contradictory characteristics of any other self are false. There is no contradiction of this truth by perception, for prior to the realization, there is transmigratoriness on which perception, etc. is dependent. After realization, there is no perceptual experience (prabodhe pratyakṣādi abhāvaḥ). When one shakes off ignorance and awakens, thinking thus, “I am God, so does the Veda say,” he realizes the truth, and for him, there is no more ignorance.19 In this most advanced type of upāsanā, there is no more distinction between the meditated and the meditator, the worshipped and the worshipper. As Śaṅkarācārya says in the Vivekacūḍāmani, those who are fully absorbed (samāhitāḥ) in the meditation of the Brahman become Brahman.20 The example cited by Śaṅkarācārya is that of the insect becoming a large black bee. It is supposed that the large black bee catches hold of a particular kind of insect, stings it continuously, dazes it and hovers around it, making its characteristic sound, and the insect is so filled up with the idea of the bee that it is transformed into a bee. Similarly, the person who is so full of the thought that he is God becomes God. The two stages of upāsanā correspond to the three stages of dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi outlined in the Yoga system. The banishment of all intruding thoughts, the concentration of all thought upon a particular object which symbolizes God, and lastly unceasing meditation on oneself as God or on God as oneself—these are the stages of upāsanā. Śaṅkarācārya says that Yoga means upāsanā derived from the Vedic text.21 And in Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, he says that when the mind ripened (pakva mana) through constant meditation dissolves (or merges—laya) in Brahman, that is nirvikalpaka samādhi.22 Śaṅkarācārya admits that bhakti, faith and dhyāna (upāsanā) are the three ways of attaining liberation.23 In the Sūtrabhāṣhya, he says that the practice of establishing the (idea of) self in the mind through bhakti and meditation leads to intuition.24 By bhakti, it usually means adoration of a personal God. But Śaṅkarācārya understands the term rather differently. He distinguishes between parā and aparā bhakti. In aparā bhakti, there is more emotion than knowledge. When a man is in need on account of some danger (artha) or lack (arthārthi) which he feels, he approaches God, or it may be that he is desirous of knowing the Truth—the real nature of God ( jijñāsu). Devotion-cum-adoration (bhakti), which is motivated by any one of these, is aparā bhakti—lower bhakti.25 There is another bhakti: The steadfast experienced (felt) conviction (niścayarupena avasthānaṃ) of the truth of the oneness of the individual soul and God generated by the teaching of the scriptures and the guru is the supreme wisdom. This is what is called supreme bhakti (parā bhakti) or the fourth kind of bhakti, in addition to the above three kinds. Through this bhakti, God is known in truth, and the idea of the difference between God and the individual soul is annihilated.26 This type of bhakti is also called exclusive bhakti or ananyabhakti, for

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it does not allow one to attain anything other than God through any of the senses, nor does it find the least satisfaction in anything other than God or apart from God.27 He who is endowed with such bhakti is God himself ( jñāni tu ātmaiva). For he believes that God is all.28 The lower bhakti and also the bhakti, which consists in doing one’s duty in the spirit of God’s worship, is fruitful only in qualifying one to be fit for receiving wisdom or the supreme bhakti.29 Supreme bhakti, which is another name for Brahman knowledge, alone can result in liberation. Thus, the highest type of bhakti consists of the firm, unshakeable conviction (samāhita citta) of the form, “I am God alone and not anyone else.”.30 Śaṅkarācārya assimilates bhakti to knowledge entirely when he defines it as the inquiry (anusandhāna) into (or remembrance of) one’s true nature.31 He is unable to conceive of bhakti at its highest as anything other than manana and nididhyāsana, and that, too, the reflection of the identity of the self and God. In its lower manifestations, he is willing to conceive it as loving adoration of a personal God, distinguished from and transcendent to the individual soul. This is only a step in the right direction—a necessary step, he says in Prabodhasudhākara, for without bhakti, for Krishna, the mind cannot be purified, leading to supreme bhakti, or, in other words, true knowledge of Brahman. We may now sum up Śaṅkarācārya’s conception of religious life: Śaṅkarācārya has a high opinion of man and his surpassing superiority to the animal world. Man is a free agent who can discriminate between the good and the bad, the eternal and the fleeting, and choose one of them. As such, he who is a man in the fullest sense would choose between the good and the bad and would duly discharge all duties befitting his birth and station in life. This would make his mind pure and inquisitive.32 At the same time, by exercising his intelligence and power of discrimination, he would get tired of all evanescent goods of this as well as the other world (ihāmutra phalabhoga virāga). Learning from the scripture about God, the eternal God and the End, man would try to enter into communion with Him. Every man cannot have a true conception of God. Each man’s conception would depend on the state of his mental development (satvānurūpa sarvasya śraddhā). The savage cannot conceive of God as spirit nor can the average cultured man conceive Him as the self. Exceedingly rare is the man who knows God in His essence (kaścin mām vetti tattvataḥ). So several graded types of symbolic worship (pratīkopāsanā) are to be found in the scripture. The one God is described as having various forms to suit the needs of men and their mental development. All conceptions and all forms of worship are not of the same value.33 Nor can all men practice all of them. Each has to select what is suitable to him and realize the object of his worship in his own way. Among the various kinds of worship, external ritualistic worship consisting of decorating an image, offering food and burning incense in front of it, etc. is the lowest. Slightly better than this is prayer, the oral utterance of hymns, supplication or chanting God’s name with faith (stutirjapo adhamo bhāvaḥ). Better than this is dhyāna or upāsanā, continuous meditation. And this meditation, too, should be on Brahman and not on some symbol of Brahman. Worship

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of some symbol of Brahman is the worship of Brahman in a secondary way only (pratīkeṣudhyeyeṣu brahmano guṇatvāt na brahma dhyāyitvaṃ—Ratnaprabhā 4.3.15), so it cannot lead one to Brahman (brahmadhyāyina eva brahma gamtāraḥ, Ibid.). Although good, symbolic worship is much less in value than the worship and meditation of Brahman. Upāsanā is two-fold: (1) meditation on Him and communion with Him as the other; and (2) meditation on Him as the self, as not different from the meditator. The worshipper of God must identify himself with God, participate in Divine life and be so filled with the thought of God that he takes on Godliness, i.e. becomes God. Thus, the first type of upāsanā leads to the second. In this state, he must not meditate upon God as someone other than himself but as his very essence—as himself. When this reaches its culmination, there is no more question of meditation, for the distinction between the meditator and the meditated vanishes. One enters Brahmanhood, or rather one realizes oneself to be Brahman. As Vidyāraṇya has said, he who knows the self as Brahman cannot meditate upon It, for he experiences himself as Brahman. For instance, a man cannot meditate upon himself as a human being, for he directly and indubitably experiences himself as human. He who knows Brahman as the self cannot meditate, while he who does not realize this truth can meditate, but he is not yet fully enlightened.34 In the final stage, there is nothing that can appropriately be called God, for God presupposes creatures. As the creatures have vanished since creatureliness is now seen as an illusion, creatorship also vanishes.35 There abides only the consciousness of self (ātmānubhūti). He who has reached that state would never hate any being, would be loving and compassionate to all and would always be happy (“adveṣṭā sarva bhūtānāṃ maitraḥ karuṇa eva ca.. santuṣṭaḥ satataṃ”, Gītā 12.13 ff). This conduct of his is derived from his condition—the Brahmic sthiti—in which he no more retains his ego (ahaṃkāra) and selfishness because he finds himself to be non-different from anything and is unable to entertain any ideas of “mine” and “me” (Gītā, 2.55–72). This is the highest kind of religious life, but few, very few, enter into it. Yet it is the end of all.36 One of the principal elements of religious life is emotional devotion to a personal God. Unless God is set over against the soul and the world, there cannot be any theistic devotion (bhakti). The Śvetāśvetara Upaniṣad and the Bhagavadgītā have expounded the way of bhakti. Thus, from very early times, bhakti, or love of God, has been held to be an important factor in religious life. The Pāñcarātra Āgamas, the Nārāyaṇīya portion of the Mahābhārata (Śānti Parva) and the Bhāgavata are the important scriptures of the Bhakti School devoted to Lord Viṣṇu. Of these, the Bhāgavata occupies a unique place. Theistic schools like that of Chaitanya and Vallabha reckon it to be as important as the Veda. The Bhāgavata is an ancient scripture that has been quoted by Rāmānuja, Abhinavagupta, Māthura (Sāṃkhya commentator) and Gauḍapāda. It has been commented upon by such great scholars as Mādhva, Vallabha, Chitsukha, Śrīdhara, Sudarśanasūri and others.37 Hymns and prayers like Govindāṣṭaka,

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Prabodhasudhākara, etc., which are reputed to be Śaṅkarācārya’s works, refer to the stories of Bhāgavata and quote the very words of the Bhāgavata. The Bhāgavata is one of the 18 Purāṇas, but it excels the others because it is more philosophical and spiritual. Further, it clearly sets forth the idea of God as active in history. The book opens with a conversation between Nārada and Vyāsa. Vyāsa has sought to know and has also realized Brahman, the eternal and timeless;38 but he is restless and dejected. He tells Nārada that though he has attained Brahman as described in the scriptures and as It is in Itself, he still feels an emptiness39 (nyūnatā) and asks why it is so. Nārada tells him that it is true that Vyāsa has studied and understood the Vedas. He has decreed the nature of righteousness and has expounded it in several of his works. But what is the use of all that? He has not been touched by the fervour of devotion toward God, who has incarnated Himself in every age out of love for His devotees and to uphold righteousness. Vyāsa was no doubt a great sage and a great teacher, but he never adored the Lord, never sang His praises, much less propagated the way of devotion (bhakti mārga). That was why he was feeling a void in him. He no doubt has realized the timeless Brahman. But what about the world in time? Has he realized the meaning of the cycles of creation and destruction which are going on? He must now realize that this world is an expression of the Divine and that it is the Divine in as much as its creation, sustenance and dissolution proceed from the Divine.40 But he must remember that the Divine surpasses this world. The world is an act of God (vibhoḥ ceṣṭhitaṃ),41 a progressive experience of the Great One (mahānubhavābhyudaya).42 Nārada exhorts Vyāsa to see the world as God’s work (creation). The rise and fall of civilizations and nations, the cycles of creation and dissolution, are not meaningless and sporadic. They are the purposive unfolding of a Divine plan. History is the working out of God’s purpose—the God who is kind and benevolent, the Lord of all beings, who in His indescribable goodness descends (avatāra) into the world, assumes various forms in every age and allows His devotees to enter into a personal relationship with Him as a friend (e.g. of Arjuna, Sudāma), guide (e.g. of Dharmarāja, Ugrasena), husband (e.g. of Rādhā, Rukmiṇī), lover (e.g., of the Gopikas), teacher (e.g. of Arjuna, Uddhava) and deity (e.g. Akrūra, Śrutadeva and the sages). God incarnated Himself thus in every age (yuga). He actually lived and moved among His disciples. It is such a God, a God who loves and shows His grace to His devotees, that creates, sustains and devours this universe as a meaningful sport (amogha līlā).43 Thus, God expresses Himself through temporal events. It is He who makes history. In other words, the world process is a vehicle for God’s purpose. That does not mean He has any end of His to serve, for He is eternally self-fulfilled (āptakāma). Nārada advises Vyāsa to see God’s hand in the universe and in the rise and fall of dynasties and be filled with devotion towards Him and adore Him by praising and singing His glory and the wonderful deeds of His incarnations like Rama and Krishna, etc.44 There can be no higher thing in life—whether it is austerity, sacrifice, charity, knowledge or scriptural study—than that of the worship of the Lord. This, in short, is the

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message of the Bhāgavata and other Purāṇas, which describe the rise and fall of dynasties, the beginning and end of world epochs and aeons, all the time showing how God directed all this process (viśva prakṛta) and how at significant times He actually came down, was born and lived among his creatures. The Purāṇas are accepted as authoritative by the Hindus: So great an authority as Kumārila accepts their authority, although he says that their stories are to be taken allegorically (Tantravārtika). In addition, there is the Gītā, the authority of which no Vedāntin can deny. And in the Gītā, theism and the way of devotion are clearly expounded. How is the Advaita Vedānta to be reconciled with bhakti and the conception of incarnation? We have seen above how Śaṅkarācārya is forced to admit bhakti and faith as two other ways of reaching liberation in addition to meditation. While commenting on the scriptures, more especially the Gītā, he is confronted with the word bhakti, but he always tends to assimilate it to jñāna. The Gītā texts say that jñāna is the highest type of bhakti and explain a jṅānī as one who has the belief that “God is all” (vāsudevaḥ sarvaṃ) is effectively pressed into service by Śaṅkarācārya, and distinguishing between lower and higher bhakti, he identifies that latter with jñāna niṣṭhā. As for the incarnation (avatāra), Śaṅkarācārya says that while other individuals do not know that they are God, the avatāra, Krishna, for instance, knows himself to be God. This is the difference between an avatāra and the other individuals: the avatāra has unclouded knowledge—omniscience (nirāvaraṇa jñāna), while others are prescient and do not know their real nature. There is also another difference. The avatāra is not really born (Ina tu paramārthato lokavat—Śaṅkarācārya), i.e. not transmigratory like the others; he only appears to be born through his yogamāyā. That does not mean that the avatāra is unreal, for the avatāra is God Himself. The limitations to which the avatāra seems to submit himself in assuming a mortal body are only apparent. Thus, from the empirical standpoint, the avatāra and the other individuals are not at all on par: the former is divine even while leading a life on earth, while the others are limited selves subject to disease, death and transmigration. From the standpoint of absolute truth, there is no transmigratory world and as such no descent of God into the world or God Himself. He who has reached that stage is himself Krishna—God. From the empirical standpoint, it is wrong to think that the incarnation is a phantom, and the incarnation is God Himself. Śaṅkarācārya fully endorses that. As to how the omnipresent, omniscient God can assume the form of a particular person without undergoing even the slightest change, how Divinity can coexist with a human form and how God manages to be omnipresent, creator and sustainer of the world, though he is especially present in a particular body and place, that is a divine mystery ( janma karma ca me divyaṃ). God is able to do that because He is the Lord of Yogamāyā, the mysterious power of His which is the cause of the world. In this sense alone, the form of the avatāra is called māyā vigraha. But as soon as the empirical standpoint is discarded and the individual

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perceives himself to be Brahman, the ideas of God, creator, creature, world and incarnation are automatically sublated (bādhita). None of the later Advaita teachers has been able to give a more satisfactory conception of incarnation. But some later Advaita writers have made valiant efforts to reconcile bhakti and Advaita jñāna in a more satisfactory way than that of Śaṅkarācārya. Among these, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Śrīdhara are important. As Madhusūdana is one of the greatest authorities on Advaita, his effort is especially noteworthy. Śrīdhara is the famous commentator on Bhāgavata and Viṣṇupurāṇa. He is a follower of Advaita, and he interprets the Bhāgavata in that light, and curiously, Chaitanya himself accepted this commentary as the best and most faithful. Another notable effort of the last century is that of Śivaśarma, whose book Vāsudevarasānanda has not won the recognition and vogue it deserves, although its value has been recognized by such great scholars as Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Dr. Ganganatha Jha. We shall now analyse their efforts and see how far they have succeeded in reconciling bhakti with Advaita. To understand this, we must keep in mind the Advaita theory of perception. Perceptual cognition, according to the Advaita School, is the opposition of the object and the mind, which has taken the form of the object. This theory is based on the assumption that if the perceptible object is entirely distinct from the percipient, there can be no knowledge. To imagine any kind of relationship other than non-difference between the two is also difficult, for what relates this relation to the subject and the object? To suppose any such relationship would rob perception of its immediacy and place it on a level with inference. So in perception, the percipient and the perceived object must be present in the same locus—in short, they must become non-different, though not exactly identical.45 In other words, the object has no reality other than that of the percipient.46 When the mind comes in contact with the object through the senses, the mind goes out through the senses, reaches the object and becomes one with it either by pervading it (Vācaspati’s school) or by taking on the same form as that of the object (Vivaraṇa school). Since all objects (according to Advaitins) are consciousness appearing in diverse forms due to ignorance, when any particular object comes into contact with the mind, and thereby with the consciousness underlying the mind, the consciousness in the form of the object comes to have no difference from the consciousness limited by the mind which has assumed the form of the object. Though formless and intangible, the mind can assume the form of the object in the same way light can manifest an object by pervading it and assuming its form.47 Śaṅkarācārya gives another analogy. Melted copper has no form of its own but assumes whatever form into which it is cast; even so, the mind has no definite form of itself but takes on the form of the objects with which it comes into contact.48 All perceptions need not be sense generated, for perception means direct cognition, and there is a direct cognition of pleasure and pain. This is possible because the knowledge of pleasure or pain is a mental mode, and pleasure or pain is also a mental mode. Thus, the two are in apposition, and there arises knowledge of

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pleasure or pain. There can be no direct cognition of past pleasure or pain because they are not the present state of mind and so cannot be in apposition with any present mental mode. The cognition of self is immediate, because it is always directly in contact with the mind, as the self is conditioned by it. The knowledge of Brahman is immediate because Brahman is not different from oneself, and a direct cognition of Brahman is possible because it is the same as the cognition of self; and the erroneous view of self is removed as in the case of the removal of the rope–snake illusion, by correct apprehension. As Vidyāraṇya has said, the intuition of Brahman means a particular mode of the mind which has for its object, Brahman.49 For example, when I stand in a row of persons, and somebody tells me that I am the tenth in the row, I directly apprehend myself as the tenth because the percipient and object of knowledge (“the tenth man”) are identical, and so the mental mode in the form of the object, and the object (here the percipient) are in apposition. Similarly, when the Upaniṣads tell me that I am Brahman, there is an identity between the knower and what is to be known. So direct cognition of the self as Brahman arises. This is immediate knowledge, though not sensuous. Upāsanā is based on this principle. The worshipper or the aspirant repeatedly, and later in the advanced stage, ceaselessly meditates on the object of his worship, and consequently, his mind takes on the form of the object. When this mental state becomes fixed, the worshipper is so full of the idea of the object that he becomes inseparable from what he worships. He, so to say, lives and moves in God, and when he dies, he attains sāyujya or union with God, but his personality is not lost, and as such, he does not become the creator (Sūtrabhāṣya 4.4.17-22). The Brahmasūtras and the Upaniṣads recognize the value of upāsanā and the principle underlying it. Madhusūdana, Śrīdhara and Śivaśarma apply this principle to bhakti also. Constant hearing of the glory of the Lord, his life as an avatāra, and his needs of mercy generate veneration towards Him and faith in Him. This faith in God and knowledge of His glory melt the heart (druta citta) and rouse an intense emotion. Here what is meant by faith is the intense and zealous determination to adore and worship Him alone and no other. When one repeatedly meditates over the attributes of the Lord—such as His mercy, His power, His mysterious deeds, His infinite beauty, etc.—there arises love of Him, which also makes one experience a peculiar happiness. When this mental state becomes steadfast and entirely concerned with God to the exclusion of everything else, it is called bhakti.50 Through bhakti, God’s presence is felt by the devotees. When bhakti is able to manifest the bliss of God’s real presence, it is called jñāna.51 As Madhusūdana says, if with intense emotion, the quickened mind is able to apprehend God, the eternal, the Lord, the self-complete and the blissful, what else is there to be accomplished?52 The Lord, who is of the nature of bliss, when apprehended by the mind by becoming its form, becomes a passion (an abiding state of mind, a fixed sentiment—rasasthāyībhāva).53 To have the bhakti of God is to attain God’s form.54 Hearing the holy stories of God’s life on earth (as avatāra),

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meditating on them, etc., cleanses the mind and makes it fit to see the profound truth. Thus, jñāna is another way in which bhakti acts. Jñāna means the modification of the mind in the form of God, and that happens naturally to one who has bhakti because the mind of one who is constantly thinking of God is engrossed (merged) in God.55 This is how Madhusūdana, Śrīdhara and Śivaśarma have tried to reconcile jñāna with bhakti. That this is not in conflict with Śaṅkarācārya’s view is evident when we compare what these thinkers have said with Śaṅkarācārya’s own words in Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, where he says that he who is solely and intensely meditating on the real becomes the real (sati śakto naro yāti sadbhāvaṃ).56 The mind constantly contemplating Brahman merges in Brahman (i.e. takes the form of Brahman).57 From the above, it is clear that there is no difference between upāsanā and bhakti. The only possible distinction is that in bhakti, there is a strong element of feeling, while in upāsanā, imagination is the dominating element.58 As the mind cannot remain steady on what is formless, Brahman is imagined with some form (brahmano rūpakalpanā) and then meditated upon. Depending upon the competence of the individual concerned, the forms imagined differ. By repeated meditation, the mind is modified into the form of the object meditated upon. If the object is divine and spiritual, by repeated meditation, the mind becomes divine and pure. A man who is repeatedly thinking good thoughts acquires a habitual disposition towards the thinking of such thoughts, and by continued good thought, can transform himself into a good man. As the saying goes, “the soul is formed and doth the body make.” Continued thought and behaviour in tune with that thought transform the whole personality. As he who always thinks good thoughts becomes good, he who always thinks of God becomes God. Insistent effort (asakṛt āvṛtti), as the Brahmasūtra (4.1.11) states, creates a disposition towards the object of interest—God, and in time the greater the intensity of meditation, the greater is the degree of the divinization of the disposition. As upāsanā or bhakti develops, the identification between the worshipper and the worshipped increases. The degree to which this identification can go is illustrated by the life of Gopikas described in the Bhāgavata and by Chaitanya. Transcending the antithesis of subject and object in the intense feeling of loving adoration, the devotee becomes one with God. Similarly, in upāsanā, meditation is carried on to such a pitch that imagination is quickened, and the meditator not only sees the object meditated upon but becomes it because, according to Advaita, perception takes place when the percipient and the perceived become non-different. This process of identification is quickened if the devotee or the worshipper is aware of his essential unity with God from the start. As the Upaniṣads have said, the highest form of worship is to worship the deity as self. “I who have surrendered myself to Krishna am in fact not different from him,” thus should one worship—says Śivaśarma.59 Starting with the idea “I am of God only,” and “God alone is mine,” one should ceaselessly meditate on this, excluding all other thoughts from the mind; and when this notion is firmly implanted, one should meditate thus: “I am

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God, the infinite and immutable.” Through this constant meditation, the idea is realized and gradually the distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped vanishes.60 It may be noted that One’s personality is not lost in sāyujya. There is a difference between this method and the jñāna mārga of Śaṅkarācārya. The difference is this: while in bhakti and upāsanā, feeling and imagination play a dominant role; in jñāna, reason plays that part. But there is also some similarity. Śaṅkarācārya himself admits that upāsanā and nididhyāsana denote the same mental act, which consists of repeated meditation.61 The Upaniṣads use upāsanā and vidyā in the same sense.62 The Upaniṣads declares “Thou art That.” The clearheaded people keen enough to do so can certainly grasp its meaning even if they hear it once, but few indeed are of that type. The others who form the majority may have a vague and general idea of what it means when they first hear it. By repeated meditation on it, they are able to discard all apparent meanings and have the right understanding of it (vākyārtha ābhāsa vyudāsena saṃyak pratipadyamānaḥ). First of all, the two categories “that” and “Thou” must be known without any shadow of ignorance, doubt and wrong notion. To achieve that, one should study and deliberate over the scripture (śāstrayuktyābhyāsaḥ); with the aid of scripture and reasoning, it must be realized that the “Thou” is not the body, mind and senses and that the self is untouched by pain and pleasure, etc. For they do not condition the self in the sleeping state, and if they belong to its essence, the self could not have remained without them even in the sleeping state. Thus, by reasoning based on scripture, one should firmly develop the idea that the self is Brahman, pure, eternal consciousness. When all doubts and contrary notions are at an end, there arises Brahman experience, i.e., the mental mode which results in the intuition of Brahman.63 Thus, rational inquiry about Brahman—Brahma vicāra—constantly practiced is called abhyāsa or āvṛtti, and this results in the intuition of Brahman. The one point to be remembered is that the inquiry should be founded on scripture. It is to be noticed that even in this method of pure jñāna mārga, there is a need for meditation, but the object of meditation is not an object different from the self even from the start, and the meditation consists of the discussion and deliberation of Upaniṣadic texts. As Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has clearly stated, Śaṅkarācārya thinks that this method is in no need of being supplemented by any of the other methods— bhakti, upāsanā or yoga. He is also of the opinion that this method alone results in immediate liberation (sadyomukti) even while living ( jīvanmukta), while the other methods, those of bhakti and upāsanā, also lead the individual to liberation, no doubt, but would not obliterate his individuality, for he would still retain his personality (manas-liṅgadeha) even when united with God. He would in every way be similar to God, except in being the creator (bhogamātra sāmyaingātjagadvyāpāravarjam) and people who have attained this state never again transmigrate. At the end of the aeon, when the world is dissolved and there is no more God standing over the world, God as well as the liberated souls who are united with him dissolve in Brahman.64

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Notes 1 Sūtrabhāṣya, 3.4.26; 3.4.27. 2 Ibid., 3.4.27. 3 Ibid., 3.4.38. 4 Ibid., 3.4 36–37. 5 Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya (Anandasrama Edn), p. 714. 6 Sūtrabhāṣya, 3.2.5. 7 Ibid., 3.2.21; 3.3.1; 3.3.42; 4.1.13 and 16; 1.3.40. 8 Ibid., 4.1.1. 9 Sūtrabhāṣya, 4.1.12. 10 Ibid., 2.1.14. 11 Chāndogyabhaṣya, Introd. 12 Gītābhāṣya, 12, 3. 13 Chāndogyabhāṣya, Introd. 14 Sūtrabhāṣya, 4.1.5. 15 Vivekacūḍāmaṇī, 357 and 359. 16 Ibid., 4.1.3. 17 Ibid., 4.1.3. 18 Ibid., 4.1.3. 19 Ibid. 20 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, 357 and 359. 21 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, 363. 22 Ibid., 48. 23 Ibid., 43. 24 Sūtrabhāṣya, 3.2.24, Also Ratnaprabhā. 25 Gītā, vii, 16. 26 Gītābhāṣya, 18.55. 27 Ibid., 11.54. 28 Gītā, vii, 18.19. 29 Ibid., vii, 18. 30 Ibid., vii, 16. 31 Vivekacūḍāmani, 32. 32 Gītābhāṣya, 18.10 Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya, 4.4.22. 33 Sūtrabhāṣya, 1.1.12; 4.3.15–16. 34 Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha, p. 327. 35 Gītābhāṣya, 12.12. 36 Ibid., 9.10; 18.50. 37 Bhāgavata, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1941. 38 Bhāgavata, 1.5.4. 39 Ibid., 1.5.7. 40 Bhāgavata, 1.5.20.15 41 Ibid., 1.5.13 and 16. 42 Ibid., 1.5.21. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid., 1.5.8–22. 45 Vedānta Paribhāṣā, 43. 46 Sureśvara’s view explained by Madhusūdana, Bhaktirasāyana, K. 22. 47 Taitīriyabhāṣya, Brahmavalli; Madhusūdana, Bhaktirasāyana, 1-21-23. 48 Vivarṇaprameyasaṅgraha, p. 270. 49 Bhāgavata, X, 47, 24, 27. Śrīdhara says, Sarvātmabhāva-ekāntabhakti. 50 Upāsanā, p. 191. 51 Bhaktirasāyana, 1.28. 52 Ibid., 1–10.

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53 54 55 56 57

Śrīdhara’s commentary, Bhāgavata, XI, 14, 26. Śrīdhara on Bhāgavata, XI, 14, 26–27. Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, 359. Ibid., 360–62. In Vivarṇaprameyasaṅgraha, pp. 324–27, it is maintained that dhyāna (upāsana) is based on imagination. 58 Vāsudevarasānanda, p. 241. 59 Loc. cit., p. 244. 60 Sūtrabhāṣya, 4-1-1. 61 Loc. cit. Also, see Notes 45 and 47 above. 62 Bhāṣya, 3-4-2. 63 See Note 57 above. 64 Sūtrabhāṣya, 4-4-17; 4-4, 17-22; 4-3-10 et seq.

8 GĪTĀ BHĀS.YATRAYA VIVECANA Reflections on the Three Bhās.yas of the Gītā*

Gītākalpataruṃ bhaje bhagavatā kṛṣṇena saṃropitaṃ vedavyāsavivardhitaṃ śrutiśirobījaṃ prabodhāṅkuraṃ/ nānāśāstra rahasya śākhāmarati kṣāntipravālāṅkitaṃ kṛṣṇāṅghridvaya bhaktipuṣpasurabhiṃ mokṣapradaṃ jňānīnāṃ//1 The BhagavadGītā is a tree which yields all wishes. It was planted by Śrī Krishna and fostered by Śrī Vedavyāsa. The Upaniṣad is its seed and enlightenment is what it sprouts forth. The secrets of the various sciences are its branches, while ungregariousness1 and forbearance are its shoots. It is fragrant with the flower of devotion to the feet of Śrī Krishna. It gives liberation to the wise. I adore it. An Old Sanskrit verse. The Bhagavadgītā is one of the greatest religio-philosophical poems. It is at once profound and simple: some of its teachings are difficult to be comprehended even by the most intelligent, very learned and highly virtuous, but, at the same time, it shows a path treading which is even the dull, the illiterate and the sinner can reach the highest goal. Much of the Bhagavadgītā is universal and non-temporal, but it is not devoid of the parochial and the ephemeral. Like any other sacred book, it is not free from the baseless beliefs, unjust assumptions and invalid ideas prevalent in the country, society and age in which it was composed. But it is more critical of authority, orthodoxy and religious beliefs and practices than many scriptures. It is not a composite work,2 it is unitary, it is not entirely self-consistent. I can never forget the comment a great Western philosopher made in a personal conversation with me: “There are many contradictions in the Gītā, but because of them it is great.” DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625-9

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Open to spiritual truth and experience from different sources, Brāhmaṇic and Śramaṇic, the Gītā attempted to appropriate whatever it considered valuable in any of them. So, it successfully defied all schools, e.g. monistic or theistic, Vaiṣṇavite or Śaivite, as well as champions of knowledge/action/or a combination of both, and advocates of just wars or pacifism and real politic or non-violent politics, from monopolizing and claiming it to be their exclusive scripture. While it served as a source of inspiration to some of the greatest leaders of the Indian Liberation Movement who fought against colonial rule, as well as to some of the liberal leaders who considered British rule providential and were in favour of cooperation with it, across the centuries, it gave solace and peace to millions who had nothing to do with politics. The Gītā more or less assumed its present form about two centuries after the Buddha and certainly at least two centuries before Jesus Christ. It is an integral part of the Mahābhārata: all the incidents the epic describes were, according to it, those willed by the teacher of the Gītā, in some of which he directly played a role, while all other discussions in the epic regarding the highest good and duty serve to clarify, explain or amplify some of the truths dealt with in the Gītā. In what follows, I first ventures to consider and reflect on the three bhāṣyas3 on the Gītā, which consensus reckons as the greatest: those of the three ācāryas Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānuja and Mādhva. It attempts to determine the purport of the Gītā in the light of the “Naranārāyaṇiyaṃ” and “Anugītā” of the Mahābhārata, the “Māhātmya” of Varāhapurāṇa and the “Karadinyāsa” and concludes with reflections on the Nara–Nārāyaṇa relationship and the mysteriousness of divine birth and action ( janma karma ca me divyam Gītā, IV.9). A beginning may be made with the authors’ introduction to their respective Bhāṣyas. First, Śaṅkarācārya: Two kinds of dharma have been taught by the Veda: one, that of engagement in activity and, another, that of withdrawal from it. Dharma is that which is the cause of the sustenance of the world as well as of the prosperity and the highest good of living beings, and which is practised by Brāhmins and others who follow the pattern of castes and life stages (varaṇāśrama). After a long time, dharma declined and adharma increased because the discriminative knowledge of the practitioners dwindled due to the rise of desire in them. Then, to maintain the stability of the world, the primaeval world-creator Nārāyaṇa–Viṣṇu by a particle (aṃśa) of himself became (i.e. was born as) Krishna, to protect the earth’s Brahman (Brahman in the world), that is, brāhminhood. For only by the protection of brāhminhood, the Vedic dharma, on which the differences of castes and life stages depend, could be protected. Śaṅkarācārya continues: Bhagavān, always endowed with his glory and power, through his domination of his own māyā, primordial nature, through ever unborn, immutable, lord of beings, eternal, pure and free, by his own māyā appears as if embodied, as if born and as if favouring the world. Though he had no purpose of his own, desiring to be compassionate to beings, he taught the same two-fold Vedic dharma to Arjuna, who was overcome by sorrow and delusion because (he

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thought) dharma accepted and practised by the highly virtuous would wax and flourish. The omniscient Bhagavān Vedavyāsa set forth in 700 verses, entitled the Gītā, the dharma as it was taught by Bhagavān. So, this Gītāśāstra is the summary of the essence of the meaning of the entire Veda (Vedārthasārasaṅgraha). According to Śaṅkarācārya, in brief, the purpose of the Gītāśāstra is the supreme good, characterized by the absolute cessation of transmigration along with its cause. That happens through the dharma of the form of steadfastness in the knowledge of the self (atmajña niṣṭhā) preceded by renunciation of all action. To prove that this is the dharma meant by the Gītā, Śaṅkarācārya quotes in support some Anugītā passages and the Gītā verse XVIII.66. Though the purpose of the dharma characterized by engagement in action is prosperity here and attainment of heaven later if practised with the spirit of dedication to God and without having any desire for its fruits, it purifies one’s entire psychic system. A person so purified becomes fit to attain competency for steadfastness in knowledge. First for this and later for generating knowledge, as this activist dharma is the cause, it may be credited with causality for the ultimate good also. Śaṅkarācārya quotes in support of this Gītā verses V. 10-11. Śaṅkarācārya concludes his introduction thus: The Gītāśāstra especially reveals (i) the two-fold dharma, which has the ultimate good for its purpose and (ii) the supreme Brahman called Vāsudeva. When these two things it deals with become known, all human ends will be fulfilled. The foregoing account assumes: (1) that Krishna’s was only a repetition of the Vedic teaching to revive it by making a reputed person of the day accept and follow it to set an example to others. Such an understanding of the Gītā makes it only an echo of the Veda, which it is not, as passages in it forcefully point out the limitations and imperfections of the ancient lore and the necessity of going beyond what has been and is to be “heard” and attaining nirveda (indifference) towards it (11.52). Nirveda could even imply Vedalessness! In many passages, the Gītā itself proclaims wisdom or mysteries never before revealed (IV.3, 9.1-2., 10.1). The Universal Form revealed to Arjuna was not beheld by anyone before him (Xl. 47). The fourth chapter of the Gītā, of course, states that one of the purposes of an avatāra is the protection of dharma; but protection need not be just confined to mere reiteration. An objective and critical study would show that the Gītā advances further than the Veda, though rooted in it; for it has assimilated insights from non-Vedic sources also. It may also be questioned whether Vedic spirituality may be justifiably narrowed down to the so-called twofold dharma. (2) To make much of the pattern of castes and life stages, to identify the Vaidika dharma with it and consider the contents of the Gītā a re-exposition of it, is to assert that the principal purport of the śruti and this great smṛti was to advocate and uphold a particular type of social order which was considered to be the ideal by some in a particular country at a particular period. My thesis is supported by

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the following: (i) There is no evidence that the cāturvarṇya (four-caste) scheme was ever a prevailing reality at any time in Indian history. It was just a norm put forward in law books. (ii) Consequently, at all times, there have been several millions of Indians not belonging to the four castes; and outside India, such a scheme was never held to be an ideal. So the “sacred books,” which are concerned only with the cāturvarṇya dharma (four-caste system), are irrelevant to the vast majority of mankind. But, fortunately, the śruti does not advocate it, and in the Gītā, if terms like “sahaja karma,” “svakarma” and “svadharma” are understood according to the spirit and general tenor of the whole work, even as other terms like “yoga,” “yajña” and “karma” are to be understood, cāturvarṇya dharma is not one of its main concerns. (iii) It is certain that the caturāśrama (four life stages) scheme was not at all a universal practice at any time in India. The śruti did not prescribe it. Moreover, according to many smṛtis, only one life stage was possible for the Śudra, two for the Vaiśya, three for the Kṣatriya and all four only for the Brāhmin. Sannyāsa has been ordained as the last stage only for the Brāhmin. Śaṅkarācārya himself held this view. Accordingly, the caturāśrama scheme is inapplicable even to the cāturvarṇya. If any book is obsessed with it, it must have been intended as a norm-setter only for the Brāhmins and not for others. There is no specific mention of āśramas in the Gītā. Itihāsa-purāṇas show that most of the Brāhmins and Kṣatriyas did not follow the āśrama scheme. (3) While writing about protecting the Brāhman of the earth, or brāhminhood, Śaṅkarācārya was virtually quoting the epic.4 (4) That Bhagavān as Krishna was only an appearance or illusion is not the view of the Gītā. This is evident not only from its text but also from all the passages about Krishna in the epic, of which it is an integral part. So, to write that God appeared as if he was a human being and as if he showed compassion to people may be in accordance with a metaphysical theory but not with this scripture and Itihāsa-purāṇas. The very passage in the bhāṣya in which there are “as if’s” is followed by another in which there are no “as if’s.” It straightaway states that though Bhagavān has no purpose of his own, to show grace, he taught the twofold Vedic dharma to Arjuna. Perhaps to show grace or be compassionate was not God’s purpose! (5) Interestingly, the introductory bhāṣya concludes with the statement that for both kinds of dharma the purpose is the same, viz., the ultimate good, and that the absolute reality is the supreme Brahman called Vāsudeva - Paramārthatattvaṃ ca vāsudevākhyām param brahma. This wonderful reconciling statement shows the vision and catholicity of Śaṅkarācārya who could expatiate on the ChāndogyaBṛhadāraṇyaka Absolutism and, at the same time, rapturously compose and sing “Bhaja Govindam” and “Harimide.” Rāmānujācārya’s introduction to his bhāṣya may be summarized in the following way: The husband of Śrī is endowed with all auspicious qualities, wisdom, beauty, glory and power; his unique nature consists of infinite knowledge and bliss.5 To create, maintain and dissolve the universe is his sport (līlā). He,

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Nārāyaṇa, is the Absolute being as well as the Supreme Person. Having created the whole world, he abides immutably in his own form. He is not within the reach of meditation and worship of gods and men. Still, because of his boundless mercy, goodness, fondness and generosity, without abandoning his own nature, he often descends (avatīrya) into different worlds in forms similar to those of the inhabitants there, receives their worship and bestows on them what they wish. On the pretext of removing the burden of the earth, Rāmānuja continues and to provide refuge to all alike also, Nārāyaṇa descended on the earth, became the cynosure of all human beings, and did the various things which the Itihāsas and Purāṇas describe. Besides many other acts of Nārāyaṇa’s līlā in His different (incarnations) the Itihāsas and Purāṇas give a detailed account of the following: on the pretext of encouraging Arjuna to wage war, he revealed the bhakti yoga, proclaimed in the Vedānta as the means for realizing the highest human value, liberation. The object of Bhakti is to attain Himself as Bhagavān through knowledge and action. There in Kurukshetra, Rāmānuja concludes: when the war began, Bhagavān, the Supreme Person, the Lord of the lords of the universe, who assumed a mortal frame for the good of the world, made Arjuna a chariot-warrior and himself Arjuna’s charioteer, while the whole world witnessed it. Rāmānuja, as the above précis shows, has no qualms in thinking of and describing Bhagavān in, what his critics say, an anthropomorphic way, that is, as the Supreme Person having an abode, a body, raiment, jewellery, weapons, spouse, retinue, etc. but all of them divine and possessing all auspicious attributes, powers, glory and sovereignty over everything, sentient and insentient. His authorities for doing this were the śruti, śāstras, including the Gītā, and the ancient ṛshis and bhaktas, as well as the medieval ālvārs and his gurus, who beheld the Lord so and rapturously described him thus. Rāmānuja holds that God actually came down on earth as Krishna, son of Devakī and Vāsudeva, and friend of the Pāṇḍavas, protected the good, destroyed evil-doers and established dharma. His auto-creation of Himself6 happened, though he is the unborn, imperishable self and the Lord of beings through his own māyā. It thus happened many times before and will happen again whenever dharma declines and adharma is on the rise. Whatever has been pointed out earlier about Śaṅkarācārya’s bhāṣya regarding “the Gītā merely reiterating the Vedāntic truth” and details regarding varṇāśrama dharma is applicable mutatis mutandis to Rāmānuja’s bhāṣya, for he too maintains the teaching of Krishna (bhakti yoga) to have been vedāntodita (proclaimed by Vedānta), and he is no less a champion of varṇāśrama dharma, though he dealt with it later and not in his introduction. Madhvācārya commences his bhāṣya in the following way: when dharma and knowledge disappeared from the world, as the gods, out of compassion for the world, begged Nārāyaṇa to do so, he descended into the world as Bhagavān Vyāsa for publicly revealing knowledge and also dharma. Vyāsa found that in the world, many, especially women and śūdras, were suffering because they could not see the means of attaining the desirable and were ignorant of the meaning of the Veda. Out

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of his mercy, he desired that they should be liberated through dharma and knowledge. So he composed the Mahābhārata, which elaborates the entire meaning of the Veda as well as what is not stated in the Veda but has been the object of the absolute knowledge of Īśvara. As such, the Mahābhārata is both comprehensible as well as incomprehensible to all living beings. This is because the Mahābhārata generally has a two-fold meaning: one meaning is comprehensible to all and the other, being very profound, only to some. Essentially, it propounds the nature of Bhagavān, and, besides that of dharma, etc. The Mahābhārata, the fifth Veda, is superior to the other four Vedas. No one else except Bhagavān Vishnu could have composed the Mahābhārata, hence its greatness and even superiority to the Veda.7 Madhva quotes various Paurāṇic statements in support of all the foregoing. Vyāsa, according to Madhva, inextricably and securely inlaid (upanibandha) the Mahābhārata with the Gītā, which is in the form of a dialogue between Vāsudeva and Arjuna, which is a summary of the meaning of the whole of the Mahābhārata and which is, so to say, the nectar of the Bhārata-pārijāta.8 Madhva quotes, among others, a verse from the Anugītā, which Jayatīrtha explains thus: The dharma propounded in the Gītā is fully adequate for gaining the knowledge of the nature of Brahman, if practised prior to having such knowledge, and is also fully adequate to cause liberation if practised after gaining such knowledge. Madhva is the only great Vedāntic ācārya who recognized and asserted that the Mahābhārata contains, besides Vedic truth, even truth not found in the Veda. He wrote, sarvavedārthopabruṃhitaṃ tadanukta kevaleśvarajñāna dṛṣṭārtham. Jayatīrtha explicated this: The epic’s accordance with the Veda establishes its validity; while this itself makes it equivalent to the Veda because it also propounds what is not found in the Veda, it is actually greater than the Veda. If so, having no basis, does not the latter become invalid? No, because it is the object of the omniscient Īśvara’s knowledge, which, being independent of the senses, is valid. This is the case with the Mahābhārata as a whole and much more so in the case of the Gītā, which is the quintessence of it. The Madhva–Jayatīrtha position is important, for it admits that the four Vedas do not exhaust revelation, as important additional saving truth is to be found in the great epic, the fifth Veda, especially in its crème de la crème, the Gītā. The originality (apūrvatā) of the Gītā, as well as its greater spiritual comprehensiveness, are thereby acknowledged. Madhva’s introductory bhāṣya is important for another reason. It asserts that while the Mahābhārata is meant for all, it is specially meant for women and śūdras who are denied access to Vedic knowledge. Jayatīrtha explicates this further: Liberation is an end for all persons (puruṣārtha); all have a right to it. All who are suffering (kliśyamānāḥ) and are anguished (ārtāḥ) have a right to seek the knowledge to attain what is desirable as well as liberation. So, for those who have no access to such knowledge and to the Veda, something equal to the Veda is needed. By composing the Mahābhārata, Vyāsa more than fulfilled their need. All good people, irrespective of caste and sex, are, Jayatīrtha wrote, entitled to have access to the Mahābhārata (sajjanaścādhikariṇāḥ). A Kalpa quoted by Madhva says that

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the Mahābhārata is adorned with what is not said in the Veda (vedānuktārthabhū ṣitaṃ), and because it teaches pure spiritual knowledge, it also encompasses Vedic meaning (kevalenātmabodhenādṛṣṭaṃ vedārtha-saṃyutaṃ). It may not be out of place to allude here to a reformative innovation of Madhva. He allowed his followers to perform Vedic sacrifices if they so desired but prohibited the slaughter of animals in them and instead prescribed that only animal figures shaped out of flour should be sacrificed. Madhva’s liberal progressive attitude9 is to be contrasted with that of another bhāṣya writer, Bhāskara. The Śūdra, Bhāskara wrote, is entitled to hear only such portions of the Mahābhārata which narrate the story, but not those which embody Vedānta, such as the “sanatsujātīya,” the “mokṣadharma” and the Gītā.10 In refreshing contrast to this and even going beyond Madhva’s is the position of Jñāneśvara. The views of the great saint, who was at the same time a consummate yogi and an eminent scholar, considered the Gītā superior to the Veda because while the latter whispers its doctrines into the ears of the upper castes only, the former proclaims them to all castes and both the sexes, and brought salvation to all.11 Jñāneśvara considers the Gītā to be “the essence of the Vedas and the holiest of all treatises that are regarded as authority,” and “the origin of the Vedas.”12 According to him, it is “the seed” and “the essence” of the Vedas because (1) He from whose breath the Vedas sprang declared it to be true and because (2) the essence of the three sections of the Vedas is contained within the Gītā as the whole tree is within the seed. The Vedas, he admits, are full of knowledge; but he comments they are “miserly,” as only the three upper castes may hear them. This, according to him, is their “defect.” The Vedas, it seems to him, “took the form of the Gītā,” or to put it in other words, “were reborn in the womb of the Gītā,” so that “all people may share in this teaching.” The Vedas “have thereby achieved fame,” and thus Jñāneśvara asserted, “their essence was made available to all.” He further declared: Just as the sky is free to all who live in the air, the earth to all who dwell on it, and in space, all can enjoy the light of the sun, similarly, the Gītā does not take into consideration whether people are of high or low birth. It refreshes the whole world with the gift of heavenly bliss. (Jñāneśwarī, 1453–54, Kṛpānanda’s rendering.) Verse XVIII. 66 of the Gītā is generally known as its caramaśloka, the final verse, containing its innermost essence and deepest secret. A literal translation of it would be: “Abandoning all dharmas, come unto me alone for refuge. I will free you from all sins. Do not grieve.” Now the bhāṣyas on this may be considered. Śaṅkarācārya introduces this verse thus: “Surrender to Īśvara is the supreme secret of steadfastness in the yoga of action (karmayoganiṣṭhā).” Having already

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concluded that in previous verses, in this verse, the fruit of such steadfastness, viz. “integrated intuition (samyagdarśana13) prescribed in all Vedānta” has to be disclosed. After this, Śaṅkarācārya gives his explanation of the verse word-by-word: “All dharmas” means renouncing all actions. “Me alone” means I only verily am the self of all, the same in all beings, Īśvara, the imperishable and immutable. “To come for refuge” means to realize that there is nothing whatsoever other than Me, while “you” means you with the certainty of this. “Will free” that is, by the revelation of my real nature. “All sins” means bondages in the form of dharma and adharma. Rāmānuja’s word-by-word explanation of this verse is as follows: “All dharmas” means all dharmas in the forms of karma yoga, jñāna yoga and bhakti yoga, which are the means of the highest good. Continue to perform them, according to your competence, as worship of me, with extreme love; but, abandoning their fruits and the notion of your being their agent (kartā) pay careful attention (anusandhāna) to Me alone, who am the one and only agent of all action, the only one to be worshipped and attained as well as the only means. This is what śāstras describe as the abandonment of all dharmas (Gītā, XVIII. 4 through 9 to 11). When you conduct yourself thus, I will free you from all sins, which are obstacles to attain me, accumulated from beginningless time, due to not doing what ought to have been done and doing what ought not to have been done. Rāmāanuja gives an alternative explanation of this verse: Bhakti yoga is possible to be practised only by a person who is very dear to Bhagavān, who is free from all sins. But the sins which prevent the commencement of the practice of Bhakti yoga are infinite in number; to atone for all of them, even infinite time is not sufficient. Thinking thus, Arjuna felt he was not competent to start the practice of Bhakti yoga and became sorrowful. To remove his sorrow, Bhagavān spoke, “Abandoning all dharmas, take refuge in Me.” “It is difficult for any human being with a finite life span,” Rāmānuja elucidated, “to atone for all his infinite sins accumulated from beginningless time, which block the beginning of bhakti yoga.” So, Bhagavān exhorted Arjuna to just forsake all dharmas and to accomplish Bhakti yoga resort to Himself because he is most compassionate and has parental love for all who seek shelter with him, and without any reservation, he provides refuge to everyone who approaches him. In such a case, he would free Arjuna from all sins which prevent him from undertaking bhakti yoga. Lastly, here is all that Madhva wrote in his pithy, trenchant way on this verse: “Abandonment of dharmas” means the abandonment of fruits. Otherwise, how is the command to wage war possible? It has been said, “Indeed it is he who abandons the fruit of the action that is called on abandoner (tyāgī)” (XVIII.11).

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The interpretations of the final śloka by the three ācāryas may be tabulated thus: Text

Śaṅkarācārya

Rāmānuja

Mādhva

Abandoning (Parityajya) All Dharmas

Renouncing (Sannyāsya) All Actions

Abandoning

Abandoning

Come to me for refuge Sins

Fruits and agency (kartṛtva) of karmajṅāna– bhakti yogas Realize there is Do anusandhāna on Me, nothing other than the sole Agent, Goal Me, the Oneself and the Way Bondage in the form Accumulated sins through of dharma and innumerable births, adharma which are obstacles to bhakti yoga

Fruits of actions

In III.5 itself, the Gītā stated that no one can remain without action even for a moment, and in XVIII.11 confirmed this by saying that it is impossible for an embodied being to abandon actions altogether. In XVIII.2, a clear distinction was made between sannyāsa and tyāga: the former renounces (nyāsaṃ) actions motivated by desire and the latter abandons (tyāgaṃ) fruits of all actions. Because of these and other statements, it would be difficult to agree that sarva-dharma parityāga means sarva-karma sannyāsa. The word “sannyāsa” does not occur in the final verse; the word that occurs is “parityāga,” which may be taken to mean complete abandonment or utter abandonment. That this is impossible in case of actions has already been asserted by the text. Moreover, Arjuna was instructed to wage war, not abandon it: “Do not get burned up (vigatajvaraḥ = asamtaptaḥ), wage the war (III.30); remember me and wage the war” (V111.7). So, is not parityāga of actions out of question? It may be pointed out that XVIII.49 states that by sannyāsa is got perfection (siddhi) of actionlessness (naiṣkarmya), and the next verse says that one who attains siddhi obtains Brahman and identifies this with utmost steadfastness in knowledge (niṣṭhājñānasyaya parā). From this, it could be argued that from then on, jñāna niṣṭhā is being described and that, therefore, the final verse should be understood as concluding with teaching sannyāsa of all actions and realization of the One Self without a second. But in between the śloka about actionlessness and the one about parityāga of dharmas, the intervening ślokas, which state that the brahmabhūta, same to all beings, obtains supreme devotion, by which Bhagavān is really known; who having so known Him, then “enters” (viśate) Him (XVIII.55). The śloka after that says that one who has taken refuge in Bhagavān, obtains by His grace the eternal imperishable state, even while always performing all actions (sarvakarmāṇi sadākurvāṇo) XVIII.56. This process would be in this sequence: Jñānaniṣṭha-Brahmabhūta obtaining parābhakti through bhakti

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tattvajñāna of Bhagavān and “entering” Him. Whoever has him as his refuge by his grace gets the everlasting imperishable goal, even while always engaged in all actions. In view of this, these questions arise: Does the Gītā demand giving up of all actions or only of fruits of all actions, and, if the latter, when and how? And, why give up actions when the self is non-agent (akartā)? And, what does it mean to “renounce actions in Bhagavān with a spiritual mind” (adhyātma cetasā, III.30., XVIII. 57)? Bhāskara entitled his bhāṣya “Bhagavadāśayānusaraṇa.” It appears to be a presumptuous title, because “āśaya” is an intention or way of thinking, and anusaraṇa” means following, and in full the title would mean “The following of Bhagavān’s intention or way of thinking.” It is difficult for a human being to be certain of the intention of another contemporary human being, even when the latter communicates with the former directly and in person, either through speech or writing. When a text is more than 2000 years old and when it is accepted to be a divine revelation or at least a composition divinely inspired, it is temerarious on the part of a believing human being to claim that he has been able to understand Bhagavān’s intention and has correctly set it forth in writing. Unless, of course, he claims to have received divine grace and mandate to interpret the scripture for mankind’s benefit! Of the Gītā, it has been said, “Vyāsa knows what it says; so does Śuka. It is doubtful whether Sañjaya knows or not” (Vyāsa vettiśukovetti, sanjayovetti vā na vā). Even in the case of a text, not revealed or inspired, it is very difficult to discover the intention of its author, and the more an interpreter or reader is removed from the origin of the text, the more difficult it is to unravel it and less are the chances of being successful in discovering the original intention of the revealer or the author. Some of the greatest spiritual persons endowed with superior intellects have interpreted the Gītā and differ from each other radically. The text is the same, the interpreters belong to the same culture, and they are highly competent and sincere, yet they differ from each other and mutually criticize each other. This phenomenon is not peculiar to the Gītā. Even the interpretations of, say, Plato, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, not to speak of the Bible and the Quran, differ for similar reasons. What is the metaphysics of the Gītā? I have been a student of the Gītā for half a century, have written a commentary on it in Telugu in my unregenerate days, and since then lectured and written on it occasionally. Today, I am puzzled whether its metaphysics is Advaita, ananyatva or something else. While I am convinced the relationship between man and ultimate reality is close, intimate and mysterious, I wonder how to characterize it; I am not also sure it is characterizable. In this connection, I am reminded of these verses: Some want non-duality, others duality. But they do not know the principle of sameness which is free from non-duality and duality. If the Deva is all-­ penetrating14, steadfast, perfect, and contiguous15, strange indeed is this illusion and great infatuation with the postulation of duality-non-duality.

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(Advaitam kecidicchanti dvaitamicchanti cāpare| samatattva na jānanti dvaitādvaita vivarjitaṃ|| yadi sarvagato devaḥ sthiraḥ pūrṇo nirantaraḥ| aho maya mahāmoho dvaitādvaita vikalpanā || (Avadhūta Gītā) Śaṅkarācārya, if the hymns ascribed to him are authentic, must have had visions of the One in more than one form, as Viṣṇu, Śiva and Śakti. Certain passages in his bhāṣyas and prakaraṇa-granthas seem to testify to his sakṣātkāra of Brahman. In the light of his religious experience and the doctrine he inherited from Govinda and Gauḍapāda, he interpreted the Vedāntic texts. From the rapturous way in which Rāmānuja goes on and on describing Śrīman Nārāyaṇa in his bhāṣyas, Vedārthasaṅgraha and the gadyas, it may be inferred that he must have been graced with Bhagavad-darśana many a time. I have no doubt Madhva was blessed with the vision of Viṣṇu often; otherwise, he could not have written with such conviction and force about Viṣṇu-pāramya (Vishnu’s supremacy) in his bhāṣyas on the Ṛgveda, the Gītā, etc. All three must have lived with a non-vanishing continuous awareness of being always in the presence of, and being related to, the divine, the numinous, of the nature of consciousness and delight. Were all of them or anyone or two of them hallucinated? I believe not. I also believe that, for instance, Spinoza, St. John of the Cross, Al-Ghazali, Guru Gobind Singh and others also were not at all subject to hallucinations. As their writings and practical achievements demonstrate, they were perfectly healthy persons with minds of the highest order. I am a little bit more sure about what is, according to the Gītā, and, in fact, in the entire Vedānta literature, the path to freedom, the means of liberation. It is jñāna, knowledge, but regarding its nature, there is no unanimity. For Śaṅkarācārya, it ought to be the knowledge of the oneness of the self and the Absolute. For Rāmānuja, it is jñāna that has taken on the form of bhakti. For him, Īśvara is the self of all souls, their master and controller, as well as the means and goal of the supreme good. The soul is, as it were, his body. Īśvara is really the sole doer of all action. To become aware of this is to develop the spiritual mind (adhyātmacitta). With such a mind, knowing he is the only doer, to renounce all actions in Him, that is to do them as His worship, without any desire for their fruits and egoism, is what is ordained by the Upaniṣads. Īśvara, our indweller and the controller is getting done by us whatever we are doing solely for his worship. So, we are not agents. If we lead our lives realizing this, he frees us. Such are the ethics of Vedānta, according to Rāmānuja (Bhāṣya on II.30, XVIII.57). Even for the third school Vedānta, knowledge alone is the means of liberation. Dharma (virtue, righteousness) performed prior to jñāna purifying the psychic system generates knowledge and thus becomes a means for liberation. After jñāna, if dharma is performed, it becomes the cause of intensifying bliss in liberation. (Jñānameva kevalaṃ mokṣa sādhanaṃ; dharmastu jñānāt prāganuṣṭhitaḥ antaḥkaraṇaśuddhyādidvārā jñānaṃ janayan mokṣasādhanaṃ. Jñānottarastu muktvānandotkarṣa heturiti. Jayatīrṭha on Madhva’s introductory bhāṣya, at the end.) It is well known that the nature of jñāna, according to Madhva–Jayatīrtha, is different from that of the

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older two Vedāntic schools. But in the state of pre-jñāna for all, it is necessary to cultivate the good life and worship Īśvara. Let this be done by the serious aspirant, and Īśvara, in his grace, will bestow saving knowledge upon him. Then he can himself find what jñāna is. The phenomenon of hundreds of bhāṣyas, vyākhyānas, ṭīkās, etc., on Hindu scriptures, with no one of it needing its approval from any single authority and each being considered by thousands as the most authentic, shows that freedom of interpretation always prevailed. It also means a great scripture like the Gītā is too profound to be exhausted by any number of commentaries, and it is too vast and comprehensive to be straitjacketed within the bounds of any one school or sect. Infinite interpretations of it are possible, and, why not, since it speaks about the One who is sarvāścaryamayaṃ devaṃ anantaṃ viśvatomukhaṃ (the marvellous, infinite Deity with faces all round). Venkaṭanātha–Vedāntadeśika, known as the lion among poets and logicians, one of the greatest teachers of Viśiṣṭādvaita, ends his Tātparyacandrikā (XVIII.66) thus: The hundreds of other bhāṣya writers who have their own different doctrines as well as their own teachers like Yāmuna and Rāmānuja have propounded the following as the essential meaning of the Bhagavadgītā: “Bhagavān is the Supreme Reality: the supreme dharma is to have him alone as the sole refuge, in accordance with one’s competence, without having any other shelter.” (Bhagavāneva paramaṃ tattvam; ananya śaraṇaiḥ yathādhikāraṃ tadāṣrayānāṃ paramadharmaḥ.) Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, one of the greatest dialecticians of Advaita, has come to the same conclusion in his Gūḍhārthadīpikā: “The supreme secret of all śāstras is surrender to Īśvara; so in that alone Bhagavān finally ends the Gītāśāstra.” (Sarveṣāṃ śāstrānaṃ īśvaraśaraṇataiva paraṃ rahasyamiti tatraiva śāstraparisamāptir bhāgavata kriyate.) Thus, some traditional interpreters of opposing schools have found unanimity (aikamatya) regarding the purport of the Bhagavadgītā. While it may puzzle some that Śaṅkarācārya considered that “the essential teaching of the entire Gītāśāstra has been encapsulated in verse XI.55, so that it may be practiced for obtaining the supreme good,”16 it does not puzzle me. His interpretation of this verse is as follows: He who works for me, accepts Me alone as the ultimate end, is devoted to me in every way with all his being and complete enthusiasm, and is, moreover, without fondness/affection (prīti/sneha) for wealth, sons, friends, wife or relatives, and is free from inimical feeling towards all beings, including those engaged in harming him—only such a one attains Me. However, the argument of Nīlakanṭha in the Bhāvadīpa as to why this verse is the summary of the whole śāstra is specious. His commentary runs thus: “He who works for me and accepts me alone as the ultimate end,” by this, the entire karmayogadhyānayoga which clarifies the meaning of “Thou” has been stated.

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“He who is devoted to me,” i.e. “He who worships me,” by this upāsanā-kāṇḍa (meditation portion) is summarized: “Without fondness/affection),” by this, his being exclusively fixed in the contemplation of Bhagavān is stated. “Free from inimical feeling” means “to behold the world as of the nature of Bhagavān” otherwise, for one having the notion of difference, freedom from inimical feeling is impossible. Whoever is such a one, the commentary concludes, would, through essential non-difference (pratyagabhedena), attains Me, the indicated meaning (lakṣyārtha) of “That,” the One wholly indivisible bliss through and through (akhaṇḍānandaikaghana). A commentary of this sort, which finds “Tattvamasi” elucidated in a technical Advaitic way in such a simple and elegant verse, smacks of scholasticism. The Bhagavatpāda’s clear and simple bhāṣya on this all-sufficing verse would be more satisfying to mumukṣus (liberation-seekers) as well as scholars. Most of the scholars interested in Krishna are familiar with the Krishna of the Veda who fought with Indra on the banks of Amśumati, the Krishna of the Upaniṣads who was a disciple of the sage Ghora Angirasa, the Krishna of the epic and the Krishna of the Purāṇas and are also aware of the lack of unanimity concerning whether all these refer to the same person or more than one person. But the following Vedic sūkta, which mentions the words “Krishna” and “Arjuna,” which is not widely known, should be interesting to students of the Bhagavadgītā and Krishna lore. The sūkta states that there are two radiances or lights in all men: a black or dark one and a white or bright one, Ahaśca Kṛṣṇaṃ ahar arjunaṃ ca. They are active in many ways. The first, Krishna, is Vaiśvānara (lit., belonging to all men, dwelling or worshipped everywhere) who rules,17 while the second, Arjuna, with his rays, dispels darkness. They are in all men. The former is the primeval sacrifice (hotā) who beckons all men to himself. The sūkta exhorts all to find him and worship him. He is the one true light in all men, the knowledge resplendent in all. He is immortal.18 Elsewhere, the Ṛgveda says Ṛtviks imagine him in various ways. (Yām ṛtvijo bahudhā kalpayantaḥ.) The one fire is kindled in many ways, the one such pervades the whole universe, and the one dawn illumines the whole world. The one verily became all this (Ekam va idam vi babhūva sarvam).19 The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad declares Vaiśvānara is this fire within man that digests the food that is eaten, and the sound of which is heard when one shuts his ears (Ayamagnir vaiśvānaro yo’yamantah puruṣe.)20 The Brahmasūtra states Vaiśvānara is the Supreme Self.21 Thus the word “Kṛṣṇa” first occurs not just in one of the two oldest Upaniṣads but in the Ṛgveda itself. So does the word “Arjuna”: The former is the Divine Indweller in all, he who reveals all spiritual knowledge, and the latter is the man who, awakened by the former, realizes himself to be a friend and companion of the former. This happens when man, nara, goes for shelter with all His being to Him, Nārāyaṇa, who then assures the steadfast nara that he was always his beloved.22 Right from the beginning, tradition has been depicting Krishna and Arjuna, God humanized (Nārāyaṇa) and man divinized (nara) as inseparable

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friends and colleagues. Nārāyaṇa is the primordial form or aspect of the Supreme Person, Puruṣottama, while nara is the other form or aspect of the same reality who, taught and assured by the former, recognizes himself to be not only like the former but non-different (ananya) from the former. This happens through nara’s surrender to Nārāyaṇa. Nara was, is and will always be like and with Nārāyaṇa, but he becomes aware of this through surrendering himself to Nārāyaṇa and getting assured that he is his eternal inseparable beloved and discovering himself to be just like him (sādharmyamāgataḥ) and non-different from him. Notes * Paper presented at Bologna-Nationes Symposium, September 1992. 1 Ref. “aratir janasaṃsadi”, Gītā, XIII.10. 2 While the text available now assumed its present form centuries ago and remained unchanged since then, there could have been interpolations and insertions in it before that. For example, verses that S.K.Belvalkar suspected to be insertions may be so. 3 Bhāṣya = extensive commentary explaining a text. A.A. Macdonell’s Dictionary. 4 “Bhūmasya brāhmāṇo guptyā Vāsudevada jijānāt,” Śānti parva, Mahābhārta, 47–29. 5 After this, Rāmānuja graphically describes his actual form, adornments, weapons, consorts, servants, abode, etc., all divine. 6 ātmanāṃ sṛjāmyahaṃ, Gītā, IV. 7. 7 Madhva writes in a most compressed and extremely terse manner. I have been able to present his position only with the help of Jayatīrtha’s Prameya-dīpikā. 8 Parijāta = coral tree (Erythrina indica); the mythical tree of paradise. A.A. Macdonell’s Dictionary. 9 This does not mean Madhva was a social revolutionary of any sort; he was as staunch an upholder of the varṇāśrama scheme as the other two ācāryas. But none of these three was in any sense a reactionary, although all three were ahead of their milieu. 10 Cited from a manuscript in J.A.B. Van Buitenen, The Bhagavadgītā in the Mahābhārata, Chicago, 1981, p. 10. 11 See K. Satchidananda Murty, Philosophy in India, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1985, p. 71. 12 Jñāneśwar’s Gita, A Rendering of the Jñāneśwarī by Swami Kṛpānanda, 1416–1456, SUNY Press, 1989, pp. 338–339. 13 Integrate = adj, whole, complete; Intuition = immediate insight. Insight = capacity for understanding hidden truths. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1990. 14 Or all-imminent. 15 Close to all, nothing separates Him from anything. Dvaitādvaitavivarjitaṃ|| Yadi sarvagato devaḥ. sthiraḥ pūrno nirantaraḥ| aho maya mahāmoho dvaitādvaitavikalpanā|| (Avadhūtagitā). 16 Sarvasya Gitāśāstrasya sārabhūtaḥ artho niḥśreyasārthaḥ anuṣṭeyatvena samuccitya ucyate. 17 Cp: “Īśvara dwells in the hearts of all beings”, Gītā XVIII. 18 Ṛgveda, VI. 9. 19 Ṛgveda, VIII. 58. 20 Ṛgveda, v.9.1. 21 I 2.25. 22 Iṣṭosi me dṛdhaṃiti. Gītā, XVIII, 64.

9 “HERE” (IHA) AND “THERE” (AMUTRA) “The Excellent” (Śreya) and “The Pleasant” (Preya)

Thinking and behaviour, conducive to individual happiness and prosperity, without harming the interests of other individuals as far as possible, determined according to common sense and individual reason, without any reference to anything extraneous, may be considered rational and secular. The right criterion for this, acceptable to the three classical Indian religions but yet not in any sense “religious,” is ātmaupamya, self-analogy or self-likeness, i.e. a standard that would apply to oneself. It is obvious that at any time, no practice, behaviour or action is likely to be universally beneficial and agreeable. So, the wise man, “the fifth Veda”—the Mahābhārata says, must decisively conduct himself in this world by applying reason for determining what is good and what is bad (or what is right and what is wrong): Na hi sarvahitaḥ kaścit ācāraḥ saṃpravartate Tasmāt Kaunteya viduṣā dharmādharmaviniścaye, Buddhim āsthāya lokesmin vartitavyaṃ kṛtātmanā. To think and act solely for promoting individual pleasure and prosperity, without considering all the interests of others, is not only secular but also selfish and irrational. To rise above individual interests and to pursue always the excellent (śreyas), and not the pleasant (preyas), to the point, if need be, of self-sacrifice, is to be spiritual. Śrīmad Bhāgavata puts it thus: Herein is the perfect fulfilment of life for embodied beings, viz. to practice only excellence with all their lives, possessions, thought, and word: Etavajjanmasāphalyaṃ dehināmiha dehiṣu, Prāṇairardhaiardhiyā vācā śreya evācaret sadā. DOI: 10.4324/9781003425625-10

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Plato had spoken of the “two ruling and guiding principles”: “the innate device of pleasure” and “the acquired judgment which aspires after excellence” (Phaedrus). The Kaṭha Upaniṣad, too, distinguished between śreyas and preyas, which approach and impel men to action, of which the wise choose the former. Whatever is in accordance with truth—empirical, historical and rational—and whatever is meaningful, or at least not meaningless, in the light of the accumulated body of knowledge as found in commonsense and contemporary science may be considered modern. What was modern in the Buddha’s time may not be so now; on the other hand, in the sense defined, something considered modern at that time may still be true, meaningful and relevant now. There may be a truth that ever remains fresh and relevant now. Instances of it may be some of the intuitions found in the Upaniṣads, the sermons of Mahāvīra and the Buddha, and the teachings of Christ. In every culture, in all ages and in all fields, there will be elements of rationality and progressivity, as well as thinking and action capable of taking culture to a higher stage, along with elements, opposed to all these. A history of any culture can be written exclusively, exposing either the positive or the negative elements, or in a balanced way attempting objectivity. For example, Taylor, de Wulf, Gilson and others have shown that the “Medieval Period” in European history was neither so dark nor so bigoted as it was supposed to be. Modernity, in the sense of the general mentality prevailing in a country or a continent in a certain age, or after a particular epochal event (e.g., industrialization), need not necessarily be in all respects rational, progressive or some that have taken culture to a higher stage. The prevalent general mentality and behaviour after a particular epochal event (e.g. discovery of nuclear energy or genetic engineering) need not necessarily be in all respects irrational, regressive or even something alienating and anti-spiritual. It is, for example, simplistic to assume that religion provides a set of coherent answers to existential problems (Daniel Bell), that it has an integrative function (Peter Berger) and that modernization is bad for it. We are all aware of what religion has done in the past and is doing today, not only in Ireland and some countries of West Asia, Central Asia and South Asia but also elsewhere. Truly, the contemporary time seems to be that of ethnicity and religion. Also, neither human brotherhood, peace, altruism and universal goodwill have flourished, nor has material advancement taken place to a greater degree under regimes that have officially declared themselves to be irreligious. Religious faith does not seem to have had any necessary causal connection with either moral behaviour or economic development. It is also impossible—at least it has been so till now—to have a culture of unfaith; there can be only cultures of different faiths, and in quite a number of them, spirituality in the sense defined may rise to great heights. To be modern—to be inquiring, rational and scientific—it is not necessary to be anti-spiritual. To be religious is not to be anti-rational or anti-scientific and, therefore, certainly not anti-modern. It is also not necessary to be a theist in order to be spiritual or even moral. In India, we have had for centuries “desacralized”

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scriptures (an example, par excellence, is the Tirukkural) and “religionless” spiritualities (Sāṃkhya, Jainism and Buddhism)1. In fact, at a very early period, one type of Indian thought abolished the distinction between iha (here, hither, in this world) and amutra (there, thither, in the other world). The Kaṭha Upaniṣad proclaimed: What indeed is here, is there, thither, in the other world; and what is there is here likewise: Yadeveha tadāmutra, yadāmutra tadānviha. We find this truth reiterated in Buddhism, especially in the Mādhyamikā: there is not the slightest difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa; what is saṃsāra is nirvāṇa and vice versa. A great Telugu poet and enlightener of common people, Vemana, expressed this very clearly thus: There are some who constantly talk about paramu, the beyond, or the transcendent. What is there superior in it, for both in it and this (world), it is only perfection that is to be found.2 It is a falsehood to say that surpassing this (world), there is something sublime to be attained in the beyond. Do not you behold the beyond asserting (triumphing) in this (world) itself?3 From this, Vemana concluded: For mastering this, the science of gold and for mastering the beyond, the science of Brahman, are both necessary: Ihamu sādhiṃpaṇga hemavidyā, Paramu sādhiṃpaṇga brahmavidyā. Mystification and esotericism are foreign to the three classical Indian religions in their principal forms. For example, the Upaniṣad says: “The supreme spirit is to be seen only by a keen and fine intellect” (dṛśyate agryayā buddhyā). It is to be attained through the mind alone manasaivedaṃ- āptavyam (Kaṭha Upaniṣad). Therefore, the Gītā says: He who seeks the Spirit, super-sensual but apprehensible by reason, also beyond reason yet to be understood by it, should resort to reason.4 A scripture or guru only removes false notions, does not give one any new knowledge, but only makes one aware of what is obvious.5 How can a scripture throw light on that which is self-luminous? asks the Yogabīja Upaniṣad: Svātmaprakāśarūpam tat kiṃ śāstre prakāśyate? It is well known that Buddhism claims to be ehipassika; it is a “Come and see for yourself religion.” Experience plays a fundamental role in Jainism too. Spiritualities of this sort are affected neither by historical discoveries nor by the advancement of science and technology. They are only in conflict with those types of socio-political order which are not based on justice, egalitarianism and altruism. They are ever modern in the sense defined.

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Transcendental Wisdom and Empirical Knowledge

In what follows, I give reasons and examples from history of Indian history in support of the fact that Indian thinkers gave equal importance to empirical knowledge and techniques, and transcendental or spiritual development. Indian knowledge systems held spiritual and material knowledge and its growth at par. They argued that the two supplement each other. They did not lay emphasis on the growth of one at the cost of another can be seen from the following: A. From the earliest philosophical works, the Upaniṣads, to recent ones, there is no major work of any Indian school which devalues perception and reason and exalts any theory or doctrine that contradicts them. The most ancient Upaniṣad states: “What is Truth?” It is the eye, i.e. what is seen. If someone who is seeing with his eyes is asked, “Have you seen?” and if he replies, “Yes, I have seen,” that is the truth. Śaṅkarācārya commented on this thus: “When something is seen with the eyes, then it is invariably true.”6 In several places, Śaṅkarācārya has asserted the validity of empirical experience in its own sphere. According to him, anything that contradicts perception, science and history cannot be true. These are some of his statements: (1) That which is opposed to what is perceived cannot be attained and posited by anyone. (2) Perception cannot be nullified by inference, as the perceived nature of a thing is undeniable. (3) The authority of scripture cannot be maintained in the case of what falls within the domain of empirical sources of knowledge. (4) Even a hundred scriptural texts cannot be valid if they say the fire is cold and does not give light. (5) Indeed, for us, reason is the criterion for determining what is real and what is not.7 Indeed, Vedāntins of all schools accept this position. As an example, this statement of Madhva will do: “Scripture is not valid when it is opposed to experience.”8 For Indian Realists and logicians, the validity and authority of empirical experience are inviolable. For knowing anything, wrote Vācaspati, immediate cognition alone is our refuge. Jayanta confirmed this: By scriptural or someone’s authority, perceptibility and imperceptibility cannot be established; perceptibility consists in becoming the object of sense cognition.9 The clinching declaration is this: In the case of what has been perceived, Veda has no authority.10 It may be remembered that all these philosophers, like the Vedāntins, accept the authority of the Vedas in transcendental matters and not at all in empirical matters. The more significant thing is that the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, considered to be the sourcebook of the most orthodox Hindu philosophical systems, which is almost solely devoted to Vedic Hermeneutics, has laid it down that “Scripture is meaningful only in the case of what is not cognized otherwise.”11 It follows from this that there is no science or history in the Veda, for scripture has sense only when it teaches what cannot be perceived or inferred alone. This is the position accepted by all Hindu systems of philosophy. The Buddhists and

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Jainas, too, maintain that the teachings of the Buddha and Jainas do not contradict anything empirically or scientifically known. It is for this reason that while in India though there have been disputes among different religions or philosophies regarding metaphysical and salvational Truth and the means of liberation, and among different sects of the same religion on the correct interpretation of a common scripture, there has been no dispute between philosophy and religion, on the one hand, and between them and science, on the other. B. It would be worthwhile to point out what the great Indian scientists of yore thought on this question. Perhaps the oldest available Indian scientific works from which something relevant to this could be got are the Suśruta Saṃhitā of the early pre-Christian era, which came to be well defined by the first centuries of the Christian era, and the Caraka Saṃhitā of the second to first century B.C.12 It is claimed by them that when sages, possessed by the gods of wisdom, intelligence, success, memory, patience, fame, tolerance and pity, engaged themselves in ethical and meditational practices, they discovered not only remedies for diseases but medicines for prolongation of youth, strengthening of mind and body and increasing of intelligence. Nevertheless, the Caraka Saṃhitā gives overriding importance to the evidence of observation. For the Suśruta Saṃhitā, the efficacy of medicine depends on its directly observed action, not on pure logic; and human anatomy is to be known only through the dissection of the corpses.13 Yet, the former accepts the authority of scripture on the ground that what is perceived is little and what is unperceived is vast; but by the unperceived, it means, and this is important, only what pertains to ethics, right conduct, rebirth and liberation.14 Caraka and Suśruta, in due course, came to be accepted as infallible sages who only should be studied by those intending to become physicians and doctors. So, a later medical scientist, Vāgbhaṭṭa, had to say: If one reads only Caraka, even the diseases mentioned by Suśruta remain unknown; and if a fool does not read Caraka even, how can he help a patient? Due to prejudice, a blind believer in the authority of Caraka and Suśruta reads all his life these early medical books only. There are sages other than them; why not read them? What is well-said (i.e. based on experience and reason) by whomsoever should be accepted?15 Āryabhaṭṭa (born 476 A.D.) is our greatest astronomer. He begins his work by saluting the supreme Absolute as well as the four-faced deity Brahmā from whom the Vedāṅga jyotiṣa (astronomy subsidiary to the Veda) emanated, and also all the effects of the Absolute, viz. indwelling deities of the planets. In another invocatory verse in the same work, he offers obeisance to the Supreme Brahman, who is one and also many. The knowledge of planetary motions would, he thought, lead ultimately to Supreme Brahman.16 This great observer,

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calculator and systematizer humbly declared that by the grace of God, as well as by using his intelligence, he was able to rescue the jewel of true knowledge from the ocean of truth and error.17 Our other great astronomer is Varāhamihira, who passed away in the year 587 A.D. He, too, obtained knowledge, he wrote, through study and the Sun-god’s grace.18 Discussing how eclipses occur, he mentions that scholars who enjoy God’s grace have correct knowledge of how they take place, while common people have myths and superstitions regarding them. He also cites the Paurāṇic (mythological) explanation about it. He dismisses all these with the comment: “A reasonable explanation is entirely different from such absurdities.”19 Varāhamihira has a remarkable verse: There is a belief that what is old and composed by sages alone is god (or authoritative), and not what is written by men. When the meaning (i.e. what is said) is the same and only letters (words) differ, what is it that is special in the former, except, of course, in the case of Vedic mantras?20 Thus, for him, in science, what is contained in the old works of sages does not have greater authority; and he also urged that knowledge should be accepted from all, whether Āryans or Mlecchas. Brahmagupta (born 598 A.D.), according to al-Birūni, has a remarkable place in the history of Eastern civilization. The Arabs, before they became acquainted with Ptolemy, learned astronomy from his works in translation. He was a satirical person. After referring to the real cause of eclipses, according to the theory of Āryabhaṭṭa and Varāhamihira, he asked: “Do not Brāhmanical rituals performed at the time of eclipses become meaningless, if this scientific theory is accepted?” and commented, “Those who advance such theories flout accepted dogma.” “So,” he concluded, “if these astronomers are to be reckoned as pious, they should not say what is opposed to what the majority of common people and the Scriptures accept.” After that, Brahmagupta calmly went on to compute eclipses according to the scientific theory accepted by those astronomers,21 floating in his scientific work the dogmas of the pious. The last famous Hindu astronomer and mathematician was Bhāskara (born 1114 A.D.), author of Siddhāntaśiromaṇi, who, according to a manuscript of his work, was a great scholar well-versed in the scriptures, the two Mīmāṃsās, grammar, logic, the science of diamonds, etc. “He proclaimed the immeasurable glory of the true Absolute (sad-Brahmā),” it is said. It was he, if I remember correctly, who laid down the dictum: “Any statement should be accepted if it is in accordance with logic, and not out of respect for the person who makes it.”22 The alchemist Nāgārjuna, author of Rasaratnākara, in a prayer, begged the goddess he had been worshipping for 12 years to grant him the rare knowledge he was eager to acquire. An alchemical work Rasārṇava says that only those

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who are truthful and self-controlled, subsist on a vegetarian diet and are free from temptations, and worship gods and Brāhmins, are qualified to pursue this science. It also makes the curious statement that while the liberation of which the six darśanas speak comes after death, through mercury and mica, liberation may be obtained in this life itself by getting new bodies without leaving the old ones! Some alchemists of the 13th–14th centuries, like Rāmachandra and Yaśodhara, declared that their works dealt only with operations they themselves performed and that they never accepted anything on the authority of the śāstras and scholars without verifying it. We see in this type of work thoroughgoing empiricism mixed with beliefs of different sorts but always with faith in the possibility of acquiring an indestructible body and perpetual longevity on earth. The observations and experiments of their authors paved the way for the emergence of chemistry. The above views of Indian scientists show that their critical minds prized rationality and did not accept anything in empirical matters on authority till they examined and found it to be correct. But in super-sensual matters and ethics, they accepted either scriptural authority or that of some traditions like the alchemical, which promised immortality in life on earth. A leading contemporary Indian scientist, CNR Rao, has described CV Raman as the “greatest experimental scientist India has produced.” Raman may be taken to have exemplified the Indian scientific tradition better than any other Indian scientist. Powerfully influenced by the story of the Buddha’s renunciation, his quest for truth and final enlightenment, Raman came to believe that “the capacity for renunciation in the pursuit of exalted aims is the very essence of human greatness.” Denying that he was an atheist, he claimed that he saw God in Nature and considered the ultimate of scientific research was to “probe into the mysteries of the Universe and by so doing help us to appreciate the transcendent power that guides its activities.”23 Science, according to some paradigmatic Indian scientists, may lead to the “appreciation” of Transcendence. C. India never lacked materialist philosophers and materialist scientists, and they are in plenty today too. There is abundant evidence that in ancient and medieval India, there have been atheists and deniers of scriptural authority, transcendence, the soul, the afterlife and rebirth. Brief accounts of their ideology, known as Lokāyata (Lit. popular philosophy), in manuals on philosophical systems, and references to it in other works, are all that we have. Just as the Greek thinkers, whether idealists, materialists or sceptics, neither criticized the Greek socio-political system nor actively and seriously attempted to either transform it or destroy and replace it with another, the followers of the Lokāyata no doubt had their ideology, but had no action plan and conformed to the usual Indian life pattern.24 We read of Lokāyatika Brāmaṇas in the epics, and they figure in the 10th- to 15th-century inscriptions of Karnataka too.25 They did not believe in anything unseen, but like other Brāhmaṇas received gifts, including agrahāras, from rulers and conformed to the prevalent social order.26 We do

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not have extant works of any prominent ancient or medieval Indian materialist scientists. Indian spiritual history shows that it is not necessary to accept God, the soul or the afterlife to reach heights of morality and achieve transcendence.27 This was perhaps what śiṣṭa Lokāyatas, who were respected and honoured with gifts by kings, maintained. Pure altruistic behaviour—without the hope of a reward from God or happiness in the afterlife (involving a belief in the soul) due to inexorable karma, or fear of His wrath or suffering in the afterlife due to karma (also involving postmortem personal existence)—can be argued to be superior and nobler than that based on religious faith. Some may contend that such pure altruistic behaviour is impossible, or that as it is not always rewarded here with happiness, it must be believed to be so in an afterlife (moral faith), or that irrespective of whether it is possible or not, faith in the soul, God and that afterlife are justified on extra-scientific grounds. Still, the nobility and superiority of pure altruistic behaviour for its own sake cannot be denied. Lastly, from history, biographies, literature and common experience, we know that even sincere theistic faith does not necessarily make its adherents moral persons. D. Indian philosophy is a rigorous and clear rationalization of metaphysics, ontology and ethics, ultimately derived from scripture believed to be eternal or the teachings of beings believed to be omniscient. But these beliefs of theirs are supported by elaborate epistemological structures built up by well-knit rational arguments. Thus, AN Whitehead, who wrote the following, was in a way anticipated: “Philosophy is mystical. For mysticism is direct insight into depths as yet unspoken. But the purpose of philosophy is to rationalize mysticism.”28 Vedānta is nothing but the harmonization or coordination of Upaniṣadic ideas: reconciling them mutually, showing their probability and demolishing opponents’ possible arguments to prove their improbability, as well as drawing out their implications and building a system thereby. Buddhist and Jaina philosophies do the same with the teachings of the Buddha and Jaina. So, in the above, I have used the words “philosophy” and “religion” almost interchangeably and in the sense of darśana as understood by, say, Haribhadra in his Compendium of the Six Philosophies.29 One may remind oneself that thinking of a not-so-dissimilar type has been carried on by some of the best Western philosophers. For Hegel, “the ultimate goal and essence of philosophy is the same as religion. Philosophy itself is ‘worship of God’ (Gottesdienst) or cultivation of the Absolute.”30 Wittgenstein considered the Confessions of St. Augustine “the most serious book ever written,” and Kierkegaard “by far the most profound thinker” of the 19th century. Dārśanika thinking of the best type, Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina, is no less serious and profound and is often more insightful than, say, in Nietzsche’s work, and is as much systematic, rigorous and clear as in the best works of Western philosophers. If some of the modern Indian philosophers go on translating, discussing, interpreting and hair-splitting passages, sentences or expressions or developing the ideas in the works of ancient, medieval or early modern

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Indian thinkers, it is like, e.g., what Heidegger has done with Parmenides, Nietzsche, Hölderlin, etc. Those who are not well acquainted with both Indian and Western philosophy and yet dismiss one of these as inferior philosophy, or non-philosophy display their ignorant provincialism. The Indian logical theists were convinced that God’s existence could be demonstrated, while the way to win liberation and the nature of the good life could be learned from the Veda, the scripture of which God is the author. They did not need science to give them any metaphysics or ethics; even those Vaiśeṣika atomic physicists and Sāṃkhya evolutionists who were theists (not all of them were) kept their science apart from their metaphysics and knowledge of the path of salvation. So was the case with those Vedāntic, Buddhist and Jaina philosophers who were scientists; they did not need scientific help for their metaphysics and ethics. They did not try to inject their transcendental knowledge into their empirical concerns: whether Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina, one did the same mathematics or medicine and followed his life pattern. The scientists reciprocated this compliment: they did not even try to use their medical science, atomic physics, astronomy or mathematics to prove God’s existence or establish ethics. Almost all of them believed in God and considered themselves to be recipients of His grace. Indian history does not bear out Einstein’s statement: “When one views the matter historically, one is inclined to look upon science and religion as irreconcilable antagonists.” This would be so in the case of religions which are tied up with history and have dogmas on empirical matters. Indian philosophy, not popular Indian religion, which is as superstitious as any, sticks to the following position: A scripture which either reiterates or contradicts what can be known from empirical means of knowing is senseless, for in the former case, it is superfluous and redundant, and, in the latter case, false - Aprāpte śāstraṃ arthavat; dṛṣṭārthe vedānāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ nāsti. Its position is the same regarding the teachings of enlightened persons. Indian philosophers and scientists long ago realized what Einstein had said: “In truth, a legitimate conflict between religion and science cannot exist.”31 The inquiring, rational and critical spirit is not the monopoly of any race, nation, culture or time. It has manifested itself in all countries and periods to a greater or lesser extent. When at a particular juncture, beliefs, social systems, ideas (anthropological, cosmological, or metaphysical), ways of life, etc. are questioned, fought against, alternatives formulated and the existing ones are replaced suddenly or gradually, a new outlook, a new age is considered to have begun. Many “new ages,” and innumerable “modernities,” have come and gone; so too have “antiquities” and “medieval” periods. In the above, “modernity” has been taken to mean the inquiring and critical spirit, and modernization is the adoption of it and adherence to it by an individual, group or nation. No one has ever been entirely “modern” but a few manage to lead examined lives and hold conscious beliefs.

106  “Here” (Iha) and “There” (Amutra)

What the Upaniṣadic sages, the Buddha, Mahāvīra, Confucius, Lao Tzu and Socrates said was new for their contemporaries; they were “modern” at one time. Some of it is no more valid or relevant, but some still remain very true and even eminently applicable even now. These are just examples. No one has ever said anything entirely new, complete and perfect and expressed it in an eternally valid form. “Science,” “philosophy,” “religion,” etc. do not wholly contain immutable and certain knowledge. The content of faith, while not certain, is “The Absolute is consciousness (vijñāna) and (ānanda).” “The Ultimate Reality is wisdom (prajñā) and compassion (karuṇā).” “God is love.” These are different expressions of spiritual truth. Blessed is he who appreciates it and lives by it. Notes 1 Consequently, neither E. Gograrten’s talk of desacralizing the Bible nor D. Bonhoeffer’s talk of religionless Christianity surprises us. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā demythologized the Veda centuries before Bultmann and others started the movement of Entmythologisierung. 2 Cp. Īśa Upaniṣad: Oṃ pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidaṃ [That is perfect (or complete), and this is Perfect]. 3 Cp. Op, cit., 9–11. Secular knowledge (avidyā) and spiritual or saving knowledge (vidyā) are both fruitful, each in its realm; exclusive devotion to either leads one into blinding darkness. 4 Buddhigrāhyamatīndriyaṃ; buddheḥ paraṃ buddhvā; buddhauśaraṇamanviccha. 5 Bhramaviśeṣānvṛttirūpa-prayojanatvāt. 6 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV. 1,4. ‘kā satyatā? … sa aha adrakṣam iti; tat sataṃ bhavati’. Śaṅkarācārya: “‘yat tu cakṣusā dṛṣṭaṃ tad avyabhicārād satyaṃ bhavati’.” 7 (1) “na hi dṛṣṭavirodhaḥ kenacidapi abhyupagaṃyate.” Bṛh. Bhā. (2) Bṛh. Bhā., IV.3.6. (3) “na hi śrutiśatamapi śītogniraprakāśva iti bruvān prāmānyupaiti.” Gītā, Bhā. (4) “buddhirhi naḥ pramāṇaṃ sadaśatoḥ.” Kaṭha Bhā., VI. XII. 8 “Na ca anubhavavirodha āgamasya prāmāṇyaṃ,” Viṣṇutattva Vinirṇaya. 9 “Saṃvideva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇaṃ,” Vācaspati. “Na ca vacanena pratyakṣatvaṃ apratyakṣatvaṃ ca vyavasthāpyate,” etc. Jayanta. 10 “Dṛṣṭārthe Vedānāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ nāsti,” Śaṅkara Misra, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, on “samavāya.” 11 “Aprāpte śāstramarthavāt,” Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, VI.2. 18. 12 Filiozat, The Classical Doctrine of Indian Medicine, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1964, pp. 15, 22. 13 Caraka, I.27.3; I.11.21. Suśruta, I.40.12. 14 Caraka, I.11.16-7. “Pratyakṣaṃ hi alpaṃ, analpaṃ apratyakṣaṃ asti,” I.11.27-29. 15 Aṣṭāṅgasaṅgraha: “yadi carakasaṃhitā … abhiniveśavaśād …. Ṛṣipraṇīta.. tasmād grāhyaṃ subhāṣitaṃ.” 16 Āryabhaṭṭiyaṃ, with Nilakaṇṭhasutvan’s bhāṣhya, Trivandrum, 1977, p. 1–4. 17 samuddhṛtaṃ devatāprasādena 18 Bṛhad-Jātaka, XXVI.5. 19 Ibid., Ch. 5 on “Rāhucaraḥ:” Account given in trans. of al-Biruni. 20 Muniracitaṃ iti Yat cirantanaṃ sādhu, na manujāgradhitam; tulye’ṛthe’ kṣarabhedāt āmantrake kā viśeṣoktiḥ’ Ibid., Ch.1. 21 Brahmasphuṭasiddhānta: account as given in trans. of al-Biruni is correct, but his interpretation of Brahmagupta’s attitude to piety and dogmas is not so. 22 Yuktiyuktaṃ vāco grāhyaṃ, na tu puruṣagauravāt.

“Here” (Iha) and “There” (Amutra) 107

23 G. Venkataraman, Journey into Light, Life and Science of C.V. Raman, Indian Academy of Science, Bangalore, 1988, pp. 471. His article “Sir C.V. Raman” in Swagat, Nov. 88, New Delhi, p. 62. 24 Na hi lokāyate kincit kartavyaṃ upadiśyate/ Jayanta, Nyāyamaňjarī. 25 My Philosophy in India, Motilal Banarsidas, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 16–18. 26 Op​.ci​t. 27 On the irrelevance to ethics of theism and belief in the soul, see my Realm of Between, Indian Institute of Advance Study, Simla, 1974. 28 Modes of Thought, Mcmillan, New York, 1938, p.237. 29 Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, trans. with notes by me, Tagore Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986. 30 Philosophy of Religion, I.29, cit, by W. Halbfass, India and Europe, State University of New York Press, New York, 1988, p. 97. 31 From Einstein’s essay in Ken Wilber (ed.), Quantum Questions, Shambhala, Boston and London, 1984, pp. 103–9.

INDEX

“Abandonment of dharmas” 90 Abhidharmakośavyākhyā 61 abhyāsa/āvṛtti 80 abhyudaya sādhanā (spiritual progress) 71 Absolute 5, 23, 26, 27, 87, 106 Absolute Reality 22, 29, 36, 56, 86 ācārya (preceptor) 23, 84, 88 Adharma 13n6 adhyāsa (superimposition) 45, 54 ādhyātmika 9 adhyavasāya (apperception) 24 Advaita 10, 34, 35, 37, 41, 44, 92, 94 Advaita Siddhi 4 Advaita Vedānta 25, 41, 67, 68 Advaitic knowledge 35, 68 Advaitic truth 3, 67 Advaitic vision: falsity of world 36–37; great Upaniṣadic statements and Brahman knowing 37–38; scripture and empirical knowledge 38–41; Svatasidḥa Vijnāna 32–36; transcendental knowledge and secular activity 41–44 Advaitins 29, 33–35, 68 adveṣitva (non-hatred) 42 āgama (scripture) 23 agrahāras 103 ahaṃgrahopāsanā 71 āhlāda 7 Aitareya Upaniṣad 24 aitihāsika 10 Aitiśāyana 12 ajāntanāpanaṃ śāstram 6

amānitva (humility) 42 anavasthā 32 antaḥkaraṇa (internal organ) 25 antaraṃ bhedaṃ 48 anubhava (experience) 32, 38 Anugītā 85, 88 anugraha 70 anukramaṇikā 11 anumāna 29n2 anusandhāna (inquiry) 73 apagatapāpmā 72 aparā bhakti 72 āpekṣikaṃ satyam 56 Āptamīmāṃsā (Samantabhadra) 61 apūrvatā 88 Aristotle 28 Arjuna 84–87, 90, 91, 95 arthāpatti (presumption) 32 arthavādas (implicatory/explanatory sentences) 4, 8, 12n1 arthitva (desire) 12 ārūḍha 28 arurukṣu 28 Āryabhaṭṭa 101, 102 Arya Samājists 12 asakṛt āvṛtti (Insistent effort) 79 āśrama scheme 86 Ātmabodha 43 ātmajña niṣṭhā 85 Ātman 25, 26 ātmānubhūti 74 Ātmatyevopāsīta 17 

110 Index

ātmaupamya 97 Ātmavādins 9 Aufrecht, Theodor 61 Aurobindo, Sri 9 avagati (realization) 24 āvaraṇadoṣa 54 Avataṃsaka (Kegon) Buddhism 40 avatāra 76, 85 avidyā (nescience) 28, 45, 46, 50, 54, 70 avidyākalpitaśarīra 52 avijñātaṃ vijānataṃ 48 Bādarāyaṇa 63 bādha 36 Bell, J.S. 21 Bell’s theorem 19 Belvalkar, S. K. 61, 62 Bhagavadgītābhāṣya 62 Bhagavān 84–92, 94, 95 Bhagavatpāda 95 bhakti (devotion-cum-adoration) 72, 76, 78, 79 bhakti mārga 75 bhakti yoga 87, 90 Bhāmatī 51 Bhārata-pārijāta 88 Bhāskara 89, 92, 102 bhāṣyas 11, 61, 84, 86, 87 Bhāvadīpa 94 bodha (knowledge, cognition) 24 Bohm, David 21 Bohr’s complementarity principle 20, 39 Bootstrap hypothesis 21 bootstrap theory 19 Bṛahadāraṇyakabhāṣya 43 Brahma-buddhi 71 Brahmagupta 102 brahmajñāna 28, 38, 42 Brahman 2, 3, 17, 18, 25, 27, 28, 35, 36, 46, 47, 50, 51, 54–56, 70, 71, 75, 78, 80, 88 Brāhmaṇas 4, 12n1 Brahman knowledge 11, 17, 42, 43, 67, 73 Brahmasūtra 49, 63, 79 Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya 61, 64 Brahmavāda 63 Brahma-vicāra (discussion) 29, 80 Brahma-vidyā 17, 62 Brahmayajña 11 Bṛhadāraṇyaka 14, 24, 39 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2, 95 Bṛhaddevatā (Śaunaka) 7, 9, 10

buddhi (reason) 23–26 Buddhism 40, 65–67, 99 buddhiyoga (Yoga of reason) 25 Caraka Saṃhitā 101 caramaśloka 89 Catalogus Catalogorum (Aufrecht) 61 cāturvarṇya (four-caste) scheme 86 cause–effect relationship 34 Chāndogya 23 Chāndogya-Bṛhadāraṇyaka 86 Cheraman, Perumal 66 Chew, Geoffrey 21 cintana 31 citta (mind) 24 Clauser, John 21 Compendium of the Six Philosophies (Haribhadra) 104 consciousness-bliss 20 conscious principle 52 contemporary physics 21, 22 contradictory characteristics 71 darśana 41 Dārśanika 104 Daśaślokī 43 Dayananda Saraswati 4, 8, 9 definability 34 dharma 5, 13n6, 41, 84, 85, 93 Dharmakīrti 61 dhyāna (meditation) 17, 73 Dhyānadīpa 43 Dīkṣita, Appayya 32 dṛḍhabodha 42 Dṛśyatva (perceptibility) 36 druta citta 78 Einstein’s principle of equivalency of matter and energy 20 elementary particles 20 ethics 5, 6, 67 Freedman, Stuart 21 Gell–Mann’s theory 20 Gītābhāṣya 49 Gottesdienst 104 Govinda, Anagarika 40 Gūḍhārthadīpikā 94 Harmony-Symmetry 20 Heisenberg, Werner 19–21 Hume, R.E. 24

Index 111

“I am Brahman” 17 imperial power 64 indefinability 34 Indian knowledge systems 100 Indian Liberation Movement 84 Indian philosophy 3, 104, 105 Indian spiritual history 104 India’s national philosophy 23 Īśvara 88, 90, 93, 94 Itihāsa-purāṇas 86 Itihāsas 10 Jaiminī 12 japa 70 Jayanta 100 Jayatīrtha 9, 88 jitendriya 32 jīvanmukta (living) 80 jñāna 28, 78, 79, 93 jñāna mārga 80 jñāna niṣṭhā 76, 91 Josephson, Brian 41 Jyotiṣṭoma 5 kaivalya sannikṛṣṭa (liberation) 71 Kaiyaṭa 11 Kakṣavān 11 kalañja 5 Kalpa 88 kāma (desire) 25 Kanauj 64 karma 25 karma sādhanā 26 Kaṭha Upaniṣad 98, 99 Kātyāyana 4 Kavaṣa Ailūṣa 11 Kena 24 Kierkegaard 104 Kṛṣṇa 95 Kṣatriya 86 Kumārila 61, 65, 76 laukika vyavahāra 43 laws of nature 20 leap philosophy 27 Leibnizian doctrine 19 liberation 47, 52, 88 Mādhava 40, 42, 87, 88–90, 100 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 4, 5, 37, 77, 78, 80 Madhva–Jayatīrtha position 88 Mahābhārata 9, 63, 88, 89, 97 mahān ātmā 9

mahāvākyas 28, 38 Mahāyajñas 11 Maitreyi Upaniṣad 24 Majumdar, R. C. 61 manas (mind) 24 manas-liṅgadeha 80 Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad 4, 24, 26 Māniṣapañcaka 43, 62 manovṛtti 71 Mantras 4, 12n1 Manusmṛti 63 māyā 50, 51, 54, 55, 84 māyāmayā (illusory) 43 māyā-śakti (illusory power) 48, 49 māyā vigraha 76 medhā (intellect) 23 Mīmāṃsā 4 Mīmāṃsā Sūtras 11 Mīmāṃsā–Vedāntic position 6 Miśra, Śaṅkara 33 Miśra, Vācaspati 51 mithyā 36, 37 mithyātva (falsity) 37 modern science 39 moha (delusion) 25 mokṣa 29 Monod, Jacques 39 Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 62 mutatis mutandis 87 mysticism 14, 39, 104 nairuktika 10 naiṣkarmya (actionlessness) 91 Naiṣkarmya Siddhi 28 Nakamura, Hajime 61 nāmarūpe satyaṃ 56 nara 95, 96 Nārada 75 Nārāyaṇa 87, 95, 96 Neumann, John von 39 nididhyāsana 80 nighaṅṭu 10 Nīlakaṃṭha 9 Nilakanta Sastri, K. A. 61, 63–65 ninyaḥ (mystery) 9 ninyanirahasyāni stotrāṇi (mystical prayers) 9 ninyavacāṃsi (mystical statements) 9 nirāvaraṇa jñāna 76 Nirguṇa Brahman 24 nirukta 7, 8 niruṣpāda 55 nirveda (indifference) 85

112 Index

nirvikalpaka samādhi 72 niṣādas 10 Niścitaphalavad vijñānotpādakatvaṃ 16 non-duality 18 non-knowledge 16 non-Self 15, 16 not-Brahman 17 Omelyanovsky, M.E. 39 Oppenheimer 39 pada 26 Padmapāda 42, 55 pakva mana 72 Pañcadaśī 42 pañcajanaḥ 10 Pañcapādikā 36 Pāñcarātra Āgamas 74 pāramārthika satya 56 Parmenides 105 Pataňjali 11 Pathak, K.B. 60 Pāṭhaśālās 7, 10 Paurāṇic text 9 The Philosophy of K. Satchidananda Murty 1 Physics and Philosophy (Heisenberg) 20 piśāca (spirit/ghost) 28 Planck, Max 68 Potter, Karl 27–29 Prabhākara 4, 65 Prabodhasudhākara 73 practical wisdom 2 prajñā (intelligence) 23, 24 Prakāśānanda 28, 29 prakṛti 26, 48 pramāṇa 38, 40 prārabdha 42 prasannacetas 25 Prasthānabheda 5 pratīkas 71 pratīkopāsanā 73 pratiyogin 33 pratyagabhedena (non-difference) 95 pratyayamātra 18 Prigogine, I. 39 provincialism 105 Purāṇas 10, 76 puruṣārtha 88 Puruṣottama 96 Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 100

quantum mechanics 20, 21 quantum theory 21, 39 Rāghavendra 9 Rajagopalachari, C. 23 Raman, CV 103 Rāmānujācārya 86, 87, 90, 93 Rasaratnākara 102 Rasārṇava 102 Rashtrakuta Kingdom 66 Ratnaprabhā 57 Ray, P. C. 66 Reality 18, 39 Reason, Revelation, and Peace 1 Regamey, Constantin 23 Ṛgveda 4, 9, 95 Ṛgveda anukramaṇikā 11 Roy, M. N. 66 Ṛta 41 Ṛtviks 95 Russell, Bertrand 2 sādhana-catuṣṭaya 67 sadyomukti (liberation) 80 saguṇatvena 48 sākṣātkāra 26, 28, 67, 71 Salam, Abdul 39 Salam, Abdus 67 śāligrāma 47 salvation 27 samādhi 25, 32, 43 samanvaya 10 sāmarthya (capacity) 12 samatva (equality) 25 Saṃhitā–Brāhmaṇa 8 Saṁhitās 4, 9, 11 Sāṃkhya 26, 63 saṃsāra 45, 99 saṃsāric 42 samyagdarśana 90 Śaṅkarācārya, Ādi 2, 3, 6, 14, 16, 17, 24–26, 32, 35–37, 41, 42, 48, 49, 53, 56, 57, 61, 71, 84, 85, 87, 93, 100 Śaṅkarācārya’s conception of God: Brahman, God 47–50; Brahman, individual self 50–51; development in relationship between God and soul 52–54; God and individual self 51–52; māyā and avidyā 54–57 sannyāsa 86, 91 sannyāsin (renunciant) 42, 60 sarva-dharma parityāga 91 Sarvajñātman 35, 41

Index 113

Śāstras 60 Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 7, 62 Sāvitrī Puruṣa 71 Sāyaṇa 4, 5, 10, 12n3 sāyujya 78, 80 Schrödinger, Erwin 19, 39 Scripture 51 Self 15, 16, 18, 21, 52 Self alone 14, 16 self-attainment 16 self-awareness 35 self-knowledge 25 Siddhāntaśiromaṇi 102 siddhi (perfection) 91 Single Principle 40 śiṣṭa Lokāyatas 104 Śivaśarma 77 ślokas 91 S-matrix 21 smṛtis 12, 66, 86 spiritual tension 27 śraddhā (faith) 60, 68 Śrī Abhinava Vidyātīrtha Mahāswāmī 41 Śrī Harṣa 18, 32, 35 Śrīmad Bhāgavata 97 Śri Śringeri Śāradā Pīṭha 61 Śri Vani Vilas Press 61 śruti (scripture) 2, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 86 sthāna 26 stotras (hymns) 62 sublation 36 śūdras 10–12, 86, 87, 89 sūktas 11, 95 Sureśvara 27–29, 42 Suśruta Saṃhitā 101 Sūtrabhāṣhya 72 Suttanipāta 63 Suzuki, DT 27 svaprakāśa (self-luminous) 32 svara 7 Śvetāśvetara Upaniṣad 74 symmetries 20 tadātmānamevāvet 16 Taittirīya Saṃhitā 5 tamas 9 Tantravārtika 76 Taoism 40 tapas (askesis) 6, 38 tarka (reasoning) 23 Tathāgata 63 tātparya 33 Tattvabodha 43

Teilhard de Chardin 39 Thapar, Romila 66 “That thou art” 16, 27 “that-which-is” 21 Thomas, F.W. 63 Tolstoy, Leo 28 Traivarṇika 10 Triptidīpa 42 true knowledge 17 udāsīna vijñāna (indifferent knowledge) 15 Uddālaka 40 Ultimate Reality 21, 47, 106 Unbroken Wholeness 21 Universal Form 85 Upadeśasāhasri 61 upajīvya 34 Upaniṣadic sentences 15 Upaniṣads 11, 16, 17, 21, 22, 31, 46, 80, 99 uparicitam 33 upāsanā 70, 71, 74, 78, 79 Uttara 10 vācaka (indicator) 18 Vācaspati 55, 100 vācya (indicated) 18 Vāgbhaṭṭa 101 Vaidika dharma 85 Vaiṣṇavite/Śaivite 84 Vaiśvānara 95 Vajra 9 Varāhamihira 102 varṇas (castes) 10 varṇāśrama dharma 87 vartana 41 Vāsudeva 85 Vāsudevarasānanda 77 Vedabhāṣyas 10 Vedāṅga jyotiṣa 101 Vedāntagu 63 Vedānta period 63 Vedānta texts 23, 25, 28 Vedāntic knowledge 67 Vedāntic sentences 4 Vedāntic thinking 31 Vedāntic vision 19, 21 Vedāntin 5 Vedas 2, 4–7, 9 Vedic chanting 7 Vedic Hermeneutics 100 Venkaṭanātha–Vedāntadeśika 94 Vidhis (injunctions) 4

114 Index

Vidyāraṇya 43, 74, 78 Vijayanagara 66 vijñāna (consciousness) 23, 24, 32, 33, 35 Vimuktātman 34 virodha 36 Viśiṣṭādvaita 94 Viṣṇu-pāramya 93 viśuddha caitanya 47 vivartopādāna 49 viveka (discrimination) 42 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 62, 72, 79

Vṛtra 9 Vyāsa 75, 88 Wigner, E.P. 21 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 104 Yājñikas (sacrificial) 8, 10 Yāska 4, 8, 10 yogamāyā 76 yukta manas 23 Zen 27, 39