Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa (Sustainable Development Goals Series) 3031129377, 9783031129377

Citation preview

Sustainable Development Goals Series

SDG: 1 No Poverty

Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa Edited by Ezra Chitando Eunice Kamaara

Sustainable Development Goals Series

The Sustainable Development Goals Series is Springer Nature’s inaugural cross-imprint book series that addresses and supports the United Nations’ seventeen Sustainable Development Goals. The series fosters comprehensive research focused on these global targets and endeavours to address some of society’s greatest grand challenges. The SDGs are inherently multidisciplinary, and they bring people working across different fields together and working towards a common goal. In this spirit, the Sustainable Development Goals series is the first at Springer Nature to publish books under both the Springer and Palgrave Macmillan imprints, bringing the strengths of our imprints together. The Sustainable Development Goals Series is organized into eighteen subseries: one subseries based around each of the seventeen respective Sustainable Development Goals, and an eighteenth subseries, “Connecting the Goals,” which serves as a home for volumes addressing multiple goals or studying the SDGs as a whole. Each subseries is guided by an expert Subseries Advisor with years or decades of experience studying and addressing core components of their respective Goal. The SDG Series has a remit as broad as the SDGs themselves, and contributions are welcome from scientists, academics, policymakers, and researchers working in fields related to any of the seventeen goals. If you are interested in contributing a monograph or curated volume to the series, please contact the Publishers: Zachary Romano [Springer; zachary. [email protected]] and Rachael Ballard [Palgrave Macmillan; rachael. [email protected]].

Ezra Chitando  •  Eunice Kamaara Editors

Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa

Editors Ezra Chitando Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics University of Zimbabwe Harare, Zimbabwe

Eunice Kamaara Moi University Eldoret, Kenya

ISSN 2523-3084     ISSN 2523-3092 (electronic) Sustainable Development Goals Series ISBN 978-3-031-12937-7    ISBN 978-3-031-12938-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 Color wheel and icons: From https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/, Copyright © 2020 United Nations. Used with the permission of the United Nations. The content of this publication has not been approved by the United Nations and does not reflect the views of the United Nations or its officials or Member States. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 I ntroduction: Values and Sustainable Development in Africa  1 Ezra Chitando and Eunice Kamaara 2 T  he Ethics and Politics of Conceptualizing Values in Africa 27 David Kaulemu 3 A  frica and the Quest for Sustainable Development: A Critical Review 69 Ezra Chitando 4 R  ace, Colonialism, Ubuntu and Africa’s Development 85 Fainos Mangena, Gaudencia Mudada, Beullah Matinhira, and Tawanda Mbewe 5 A  frican Identity, Morality and Well-Being 99 Peter Olamakinde Olapegba and Olusola Ayandele 6 I dentity, Religion/Spirituality, Character Values, and Development in Youthful Africa115 Eunice Kamaara

v

vi 

Contents

7 S  treet-Level Pan-African Solidarity and Development: Nigerian Netizens and the COVID-19 Drug from Madagascar139 Ayobami Ojebode, Oluwabusolami Oluwajulugbe, and Oluwaseyifunmi Esther Ambrose 8 M  oral Values and Personhood: The Missing Link in International Development Interventions159 Eric R. Masese 9 “  Balancing the Ticket”: Ethnicity and Regional Politics in Ghana’s Fourth Republic (1992–2016)175 Seidu M. Alidu 10 T  olerance and Development in Africa: A Look at Ethnicity, Xenophobia and Religious Conflict201 Reuben Kigame 11 C  orruption and Under-Development in Africa: An Indictment of African Religiosity?217 David Nderitu and Julius Kipkemboi 12 “  Witches” of the Twenty-First Century: Invoking the Relevance and Resilient Character of African Spirituality in Changing Times231 Mary Nyangweso 13 T  owards an Alternative Notion of ‘Hard Work’ for Africa’s Development249 Dennis Masaka 14 S  ocial Development and Leadership in Africa265 Noah Pashapa

 Contents 

vii

15 R  e-conceptualising Womanhood and Development in Post-colonial Zimbabwe: A Social Conflict Perspective285 Esther Mavengano and Tobias Marevesa 16 P  ersonhood in African Philosophy: Beyond Hasty Generalisations301 Ephraim Taurai Gwaravanda 17 I dentity Dispositions, Development and Economic Progress in Africa315 Clive T. Zimunya Index329

List of Contributors

Seidu M. Alidu  Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana Oluwaseyifunmi Esther Ambrose  Communication Studies, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI, USA Olusola Ayandele  University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria Ezra  Chitando Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Ephraim  Taurai  Gwaravanda  Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Eunice Kamaara  Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya David  Kaulemu School of Education and Leadership, Arrupe Jesuit University, Harare, Zimbabwe Reuben Kigame  Theology Department, Africa International University, Nairobi, Kenya Julius Kipkemboi  Egerton University, Nakuru, Kenya Fainos  Mangena Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe

ix

x 

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Tobias Marevesa  Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Department of Philosophy, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa Dennis Masaka  Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Eric R. Masese  Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya Beullah  Matinhira Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Esther Mavengano  Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Tawanda  Mbewe Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Gaudencia  Mudada  Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe David Nderitu  Egerton University, Nakuru, Kenya Mary Nyangweso  East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA Ayobami Ojebode  Department of Communication and Language Arts, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria Peter Olamakinde Olapegba  University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria Oluwabusolami  Oluwajulugbe Department of Communication and Language Arts, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria Noah  Pashapa Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Clive T. Zimunya  National University of Lesotho, Maseru, Lesotho

List of Tables

Table 7.1 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 9.3 Table 9.4 Table 9.5 Table 9.6 Table 9.7 Table 9.8 Table 12.1

A typology of interaction traffic Major ethnic groups in Ghana Presidential ticket for the 1992 National Elections Presidential ticket for the 1996 National Elections Presidential ticket for the 2000 National Elections Presidential ticket for the 2004 National Elections Presidential ticket for the 2008 National Elections Presidential ticket for the 2012 National Elections Presidential ticket for the 2016 National Elections Revitalization movements in the African diaspora (Source: Author)

143 182 184 186 188 190 191 193 195 244

xi

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Values and Sustainable Development in Africa Ezra Chitando and Eunice Kamaara

Introduction Without values, life would be as characterised by Thomas Hobbes: “solitary, poor, nasty, brutal, and short” because at the core of human life are values which guide purposive thoughts and actions. There are personal values (beliefs and principles held by an individual) and there are community values governing all spheres and all aspects of social life: religious, cultural, political, economic, etc. (SATORI 2015: 7–8). While some values are universal, others are contextual and while some values guide thought and action towards achievement of immediate and proximate goals, some values relate to ultimate and transcendental goals. However, these classifications are often cosmetic because in real life, values cut across these classifications. In this volume, we examine the role of values in

E. Chitando (*) Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe E. Kamaara Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_1

1

2 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

Africa’s ongoing struggle for development and overcoming poverty. As Diara and Onah (2014) argue, recovering indigenous values is critical in responding to corruption and promoting a more ethical culture. Although we contextualise the contention in the following citation later on in this chapter, it is helpful in its description of Africa’s current situation: Africa has lagged behind in its development as compared to other continents. Speaking of Africa, means mentioning poverty and underdevelopment. Africa’s current state of under-development and poverty historically has an extended path. It stretches from the period of the slave trade, to the legacy of colonization, through the dictatorship regimes, to neo-colonialism and current challenges of globalisation. (Kakwata 2017: 159–160)

Among others, we ask the following questions: What, if any, is the importance of sound values to Africa’s holistic, socio-economic, political and environmentally sustainable development? How can values contribute towards addressing the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1, namely, “End poverty and all its forms everywhere” with special reference to Africa? Which values are critical for launching Africa on a pedestal and trajectory from which the continent is unlikely to fall, going forward? Are there specific values that are intrinsic to Africa that will be central to discourses on Africa’s development, particularly in relation to overcoming poverty? As the UN SDGs 2030 Agenda unravels inexorably (and beyond), what can African values offer to the process? Equally, as the African Union seeks to bring into being Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (African Union Commission 2015), has there been sufficient attention to the value of values? Is it possible to fulfil the Pan-African vision of, “[A]n integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena” (African Union Commission 2015: 1) without investing in and popularising values? To what extent does the focus on values critique the SDGs (Van Norren 2020) and alert us to the need to have values-based development in Africa? These questions are important, especially as there is an emerging interest in indigenous knowledge and the SDGs (Breidlid and Krøvel 2020), as well as the quest to reflect on the contribution of philosophy to Africa’s development (among others, see e.g., Ayedola 2016; Kanu 2014 and Njoku 2004). Chimakonam (2019) and Mangena (2019) have also contributed to the debate on how to deploy insights from philosophy to promote

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

3

development in Africa. These reflections are taking place in the context of rapid social change, including reconfiguring the meaning of the family in Africa (Odimegwu 2020). Whereas Gabriel E. Idang (2015), for example, provides critical insights into the different types of values found in Africa, there is need for more rigorous reflection on and application of these values in relation to the knotty and abiding question of Africa’s development and struggle against poverty. We seek to do this in the current volume. This close relationship between values and development has been expressed in a convincing way by the African philosopher, David Kaulemu (2021) when writing as follows: Values, both moral and non-moral, inspire members of society to build social systems in certain ways and yet those very systems also help to form their values. Values guide how people measure the worthiness of their lives and the natural and social environments around them. Values inform approaches to national development and shape the form and content of that development. Development itself is a value. People and organisations work to achieve it. (Kaulemu 2021: 22)

At its core, this volume explores the role of values in the quest for development in Africa and overcoming poverty. It examines the importance of values in shaping a robust and successful Africa that has fulfilled SDG 1. Whereas Africa can, and indeed must, embrace values that have facilitated development elsewhere in the world (including in Asia, Europe and the Americas), it remains vital to enhance those values that are inherent to Africa for maximum impact. Contributors to this volume interrogate the imperative of investing in values for meaningful and sustainable development in the African continent. Cognisant of the debates on religion and development in Africa (see e.g., Chitando, Togarasei and Gunda 2020), this volume explores the role of values in Africa’s development and struggle against poverty, including values that are derived from religion (see Chimuka 2020). The central focus is to distil the contribution of values towards Africa’s development and challenging poverty. African philosophers are refusing to write off the continent and highlight the promises that come from prioritising values in the quest for the continent’s development.

4 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

Continuing a Promising Trajectory in African Philosophy Jettisoning the identity of being a late developer, African philosophy has undertaken definite steps to be taken seriously. Within the last five years alone (from the time of writing), there have been significant publications in the discipline. This includes Okyere-Manu’s (2021) African Values, Ethics, and Technology, the Palgrave Handbook of African Social Ethics (Wariboko and Falola 2020), Nimi Wariboko’s (2019) Ethics and Society in Nigeria, Munyaradzi F.  Murove’s (2020) African Politics and Ethics (see also Murove 2016) and Munamato Chemhuru’s (2019), African Environmental Ethics. These publications have served to confirm that African philosophy continues to grapple with pressing ethical issues. Reflections on values and social transformation, such as Philosophy in Culture (Tosam and Takov 2016), have been helpful in illustrating the social significance of the discipline. In addition, publications by John Murungi (2019) on African legal ethics and Uchenna Okeja’s (2019) edited volume, African Philosophy and Global Justice (2019) examining the place of African philosophy in the discourse on global justice, confirm the notable growth of African philosophy. Recognising the systematic silencing and marginalisation of women in African philosophy, Chimakonam and du Toit (2018)’s, African Philosophy and the Epistemic Marginalization of Women, goes some way in challenging the trend (see also, Sesanti 2016). However, there have been limited reflections on the power of values to challenge the “locales” of poverty in Africa (Orobator 2005). Reflections on values, defeating poverty and promoting Africa’s development cannot ignore the critical issue of African identity. Although some earlier studies on Africa’s development have addressed this dimension (Petersen 1987; Keita 2011 and Sanni 2016), much more work needs to be done in this respect. How does the imperative of identity relate to Africa’s quest to deploy values to propel its development and fight poverty? To put it simply: Africans can only have meaningful development when they come to development as Africans and with specific values as a key part of their defining characteristics. There is really no other way! The values that Africans have come to embrace (and must generate), the challenges that they must overcome and the state of development they aspire for are an outcome of who Africans are today, who they have been in the past and who they will be tomorrow. This is not to hanker after some glorified and static African identity, but to propose a firm foundation for

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

5

Africa’s development. It is to awaken to the task of recentring Africa (Mungwini 2016) in the struggle against poverty and the quest to meet the ideal enunciated by SDG 1. Consequently, the volume is based on the argument that African identity is integral to Africa’s development and victory against poverty and inequality. This has been cogently argued by Symphorien Ntibagirwa when writing as follows: My concern is that even though they cannot be taken as the sole factor, cultural values are crucial for economic growth and development. Economic growth and development can occur only if they are a substantiation of a people’s beliefs and values. For alien economic policies to be effective in a cultural system other than that which generated them, they need to be appropriated by such culture. (Ntibagirirwa 2009: 299)

The Context African intellectuals have been insistent that development is not a one-­ size-­fits-all phenomenon. Across disciplines, generations and geographical spaces, they have maintained that there is no single zone in the world that has perfected development and exhausted its nuances. Due to historical and political factors, there is a tendency to associate development with the global North and to categorise the rest of the world, but more particularly sub-Saharan Africa, as the developing world. This developing world is then associated with poverty. However, this trend is problematic in that it assumes that development is to be measured solely on the basis of economic indicators. Further, Africa’s own struggles and constraints must be faced squarely and realistically, without resorting to ultra-defensive posturing. Thus: What Africans and the world at large have come to realize is that Africa cannot and should not continue on the path of fixated underdevelopment. Unfortunately, the road to development is also not clear-cut or easy. While the issue of African development has become a universal demand and the need for positive change has become more urgent and profound, trajectories of development have also become more complex and more dynamic as the stakes of development have been raised and are constantly changing owing to the interface of local and global currents, undercurrents and political economy. While the manifestations of development are easy to identify, the processes and pathways are not. (Akanle and Adésìnà 2018: 2)

6 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

The foregoing citation makes it clear that whatever philosophical gymnastics African scholars can play, they (we) dare not run away from the painful and glaring reality that the Africa we have now is not really the Africa we want. Whereas the continent is incredibly rich in terms of resources, its citizens continue to struggle against multiple forces. Philosopher-Presidents (now all former) such as Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Thabo Mbeki, Robert Mugabe and others have articulated lofty and compelling visions of Africa’s development. In their diverse ways, they have been highly creative, defiant, bombastic and persuasive in their anti-­ colonial and decolonial protestations and declarations. Africa for the Africans. African resources for Africans. Complete and undiminished sovereignty of Africans, deploying African resources for African prosperity. This general trend has found enthusiastic (but critical) support among some African intellectuals, including philosophers. To be fair, one can argue that African intellectuals have explored the intricacies associated with Africanity, demonstrating the internal tensions regarding what it means to be committed to Africa (Nesbitt 2008). However, in all these undertakings there has been a general lack of a more direct focus on the role of values in the realisation of the Africa that Africans want and deserve. Perhaps this is due to the marginalisation of, and contestation within, African philosophy, in African Studies (Hountondji 2009), and the sensitivities of broaching the very issue of values in Africa. Here, some radical intellectuals argue that global powers simply need to interact with Africa justly, not through aid (Moyo 2009) or attributing Africa’s development challenges to the failure to embrace progressive values. This is tantamount to blaming the victim, they contend. This school of thought proposes that a more strategic deployment of African resources will assure Africans of victory against poverty. However, we contend in this volume that such a process requires a more deliberate investment in and deployment of values. Contemporary Africa is characterised by multiple challenges. Again, we would like to reiterate that we seek to avoid Afro-pessimism. However, like Emmanuel Katongole (2017: 22), we are “suspended between pessimism and optimism.” That is, while on the one hand we are supremely confident about Africa’s capacity to exercise its own agency and capabilities (Comim et al. 2008), on the other hand we are painfully aware of the complex challenges that assault the continent. To argue that reflecting on corruption in Africa, for example, serves to intensify negative images of Africa, is to engage in an ultra-defensive and non-honest argument. Granted that there is also greed and rapaciousness in Western capitalism,

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

7

it still remains the responsibility of Africans to implement more humane models of development. It is only through open acknowledgement of the continent’s multiple challenges such as elite connivance with outsiders in the looting of African resources, insensitive leadership, corruption, competitive ethnicity, marginalisation of women and youth, misleading theologies and ideologies and other negative factors that Africa can step forward more confidently. Despite the salutary efforts by African intellectuals, institutions, governments, development practitioners and others, it is fair to say that Africa continues to thirst for holistic and sustainable development. To say this is not to engage in Afro-pessimism. Neither is it to descend into the predictable trend of reserving the most grotesque and uncharitable terms to describe Africa, as many global media networks tend to do. It is simply to acknowledge a rather uncomfortable reality, namely, that the majority of African citizens can and could flourish more than they are experiencing at present. This will not be resolved by declaring Africans, or some African countries, as “the happiest people on earth.” Africa is facing development challenges that require creative solutions and it is critical for African intellectuals to acknowledge these challenges and share new ways of resolving them. One key resource to unlock and propel Africa’s development has to be the continent’s values.

Values We are convinced that there is need to proffer sound arguments when debating the role of values and identity in Africa’s quest for development. Granted that there are other factors that have a bearing on Africa’s development and struggle against poverty, such as overcoming global inequalities and Africa’s marginalisation in the global economic system, enhancing integration, emphasising value addition and others, it remains true that having sound values underlying these processes will lead to Africa’s greater flourishing. In other words, we are arguing that values serve as the bedrock upon which Africa’s development and quest to eliminate poverty can be built. Consequently, while values in and of themselves might not exhaust the question of development in Africa, we contend that they are a prerequisite for Africa’s sustainable growth. Fulfilling SDG 1 in Africa can be best achieved by embracing values, we are proposing. Thus, all categories of values, namely, individual, societal, material, psychological, cultural,

8 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

moral and ethical, spiritual and others, must be harnessed in Africa’s struggle against poverty and quest for sustainable development. The importance of values to Africa’s development is underscored by the Burkinabe musician, Sam’sk Le Jah when extolling the virtues of iconic former President, Thomas Sankara (in power 1983–1987). Sankara, an unflinching revolutionary, sought to transform his country through values such as honesty, frugality and hard work. He was dedicated towards fighting corruption, reforestation, women’s empowerment and promoting Burkina Faso’s/Africa’s self-sufficiency (see e.g., Katongole 2011). Leh Jah articulates his own appreciation of Sankara in the following words, “Sankara is my Bible, my Quran. He’s my Jesus, he’s my Muhammad…he’s the one who taught us some values. To me, Sankara is the light in the darkness.”1 While some critics might cringe at the divinisation of a political leader, our emphasis is on the association of Sankara with values and progress. For us, the most important consideration is not even whether Burkina Faso’s gross domestic product (GDP) shot up phenomenally during his tenure (though there was, in fact, notable growth): the values that he promoted placed the country on a sure footing for holistic development and reducing poverty. Thus, we reiterate that values are critical in Africa’s quest for development. It is values that are the anchor, pivot and motor to propel Africa’s quest to meet the SDGs and Agenda 2063, as well as to ensure that a more holistic approach to development is embraced. Values constitute the firm and durable foundation upon which holistic development can be based. Any drive towards development that is not built upon sound values constitutes de-development. Thus, for example, to have spectacular economic progress that is built on exploitation of humans and the environment is not development, in our opinion. Development is sustainable and meaningful only when it has sound ethical values as its foundation. But, we readily concede, there is no scholarly unanimity when it comes to values. While there are various definitions of values, some of which contradict each other, in this volume contributors have operated with “open” definitions (Comstock 1984). This means that this volume is guided by flexible, non-essentialist and working definitions of values. Unlike substantive definitions that have the aura of finality around them,

1  CGTN Africa, “Faces of Africa – Sankara’s Ghost,” February 17, 2015. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=cobVBgQKdlc, accessed 11 April 2021.

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

9

open definitions make no such pretensions. Instead, they are tentative, temporary and enable discussions to ensue. This volume’s focus on specific values is informed by the contributors’ understanding of the types of challenges that Africa must navigate as part of the continent’s own growth and development. Thus, it is important to acknowledge that the operational definitions of values settled for and the analyses of the role of values in development are all functions of the contexts of the contributors. While global debates on the meaning of values are highly informative, it is equally important to be informed by the different contexts that shape the views of the philosophers who propound ideas. Essentially, we are maintaining that there is no “universal” philosophy (read Western), but that all philosophy is situated, contextual and shaped by the environment or context in which it is developed (see e.g., Etieyibo 2018 and le Grange 2018). This impact of the context is as true of philosophy as it is of theology (see e.g., Bevans 2018) and other disciplines. There is no disembodied knowledge. Knowledge is encountered and developed in definite contexts. Thus, writing from the context of Nigeria, Enu and Esu (2011: 147) argue that the fundamental moral values every responsible nation should teach its citizens include respect for constituted authority and sanctity of life, responsibility, values of honesty, fairness, tolerance, prudence, self-discipline, helpfulness, compassion, cooperation and courage.

From the foregoing citation, it is clear that there are some values that are deemed strategic for the continent’s flourishing, although there will always be contestation. For example, the emphasis on, “respect for constituted authority” is highly problematic in contexts of dictatorships. Some dictators in Africa (like elsewhere) hide behind having been “democratically elected” to brutalise the opposition. However, there can be very few people who will oppose the other values outlined by Enu and Esu in the citation above. Writing in the context of Zimbabwe and deploying indigenous proverbs, Joseph Huber (1984) explores the importance of values such as sincerity, honesty, compassion, reciprocity, responsibility, fidelity and others, for personal, community and national growth. While universal values such as justice, equality of persons, sustainability and others are important, contributors concentrate on the contextualisation of their interpretation and therefore application in the context of addressing poverty and development in Africa (SDG 1).

10 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

Values might be regarded as the bases of judging what attitudes and behaviour are helpful, desirable and to be promoted and what attitudes are not helpful, desirable and must not be promoted. According to Shaheed (2021: 1), “Values are empowering tools that help a society to face the challenges of the contemporary world such as religious extremism, ethnic conflicts, inequality, threats of globalization, and corruption.” Values are a critical compass that guides individuals, communities, nations and continents. For Veugelers and Vedder (2003: 379), “Values are judgements based on a notion of what is good and what is bad; they refer to concepts of a ‘just life’. Values are not personal preferences based on taste; they are judgements based on more or less explicit and systematic ideas about how a person relates to his/her environment.” While this definition sets to limit values to a person (and overlooks cultural and religious values), contributors to this volume extend the sphere of influence of values beyond individuals to groups, communities, nations and the continent. This is confirmed by Asafo when elaborating as follows: Values are either limitations on, or motivations for behavior as they are contributory factor, positively or negatively, in determining human action according to the perceptions of the current situation as against what “ought” to be…. Put simply they are criteria for decision-making either for the individual or for the society. Hence, the value perceptions of a community in part determine rewards and punishments of its members, which help condition people to strive after those things which give psychological and emotional satisfaction and avoid those which do not. (Asafo 1999: 26)

Values have been intrinsic to the African way of life, although attempts to link them to development more decidedly, as we seek to accomplish in this volume, have been fewer. For example, various African political leaders, including Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, Thomas Sankara and others have modelled the values of care, honesty and integrity in their social and political philosophies, as well as in praxis. Similarly, African women leaders such as the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Wangari Maathai, have exhibited values such as responsibility and courage. Indeed, many African women leaders have been guided by the value of Ubuntu, “I am because we are” (see e.g., Ngunjiri 2016). Such an appreciation of the place of indigenous values such as Ubuntu (discussed further below) is only possible when decoloniality is embraced. We turn to an overview of this concept in the next section.

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

11

Decoloniality African think tanks such as the Council for Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) have invested heavily in generating and sustaining a distinctively and unapologetically African intellectual trajectory. They have sought to nurture a cadre of African scholars who appreciate Africa’s history and marginalisation in the current global set up, including in the production and dissemination of knowledge. This spirit has been taken up by scholars such as Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, who have placed emphasis on the urgency of decoloniality (see e.g., Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018 and 2020). This is the systematic and unrelenting commitment towards expunging colonial influences and trends in knowledge production and dissemination. There is a call for scholarship to engage in “unthinking mastery” (Singh 2018) and recovering indigeneity. Thus: Decoloniality denotes ways of thinking, knowing, being, and doing that began with, but also precede, the colonial enterprise and invasion. It implies the recognition and undoing of the hierarchical structures of race, gender, heteropatriarchy, and class that continue to control life, knowledge, spirituality, and thought, structures that are clearly intertwined with and constitutive of global capitalism and Western modernity. Moreover, it is indicative of the ongoing nature of struggles, constructions, and creations that continue to work within coloniality’s margins and fissures to affirm that which coloniality has attempted to negate. (Walsh 2018: 17)

There are advantages that are brought about by decoloniality to a project such as the one envisaged by this volume. To begin with, decoloniality reminds researchers that most of the tools (concepts, ideas, imagination, etc.) we work with in independent African settings remain very much colonial in outlook. Thus, for example, the discourse on the role of values in Africa’s development needs to engage in a rigorous and critical reappraisal of the definition of values and development. In other words, African intellectuals should not approach these concepts as given, but should be willing to interrogate them in order to ensure that they speak to the African context and reality (Nduku and Stückelberger 2013). Second, decoloniality reminds the African philosopher to be on high alert permanently and to look out for condescending concepts and ideas. Calling for a value such as “hard work” as a prerequisite for African development is, in and of itself, a neutral proposal. However, when the colonial declaration that Africans were “lazy” is taken into account, the dynamics

12 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

change completely (see e.g., Chap. 13 by Masaka in this volume). Here, one needs to engage in a deconstruction of the colonial notions. Third, decoloniality grants the African philosopher proposing values for Africa’s development freedom to imagine new possibilities and trajectories in relation to both values and development. In other words, she or he is not bound by inherited notions of what values and development are or ought to be. Fourth, decoloniality facilitates an appreciation (critical) of indigenous values and their role in the continent’s development. We amplify this point through an analysis of Ubuntu in subsequent sections below. Recognising that, “[D]ecolonizing of any form is a long and central component of colonized subjects” (Wane and Todd 2018: 2), contributors to this volume have taken time to explore the impact of colonial constructions of African identity and how this has had a deleterious effect on Africa’s development. In turn, they have sought to expunge these colonial constructions and reformulate a new, decolonial basis for Africa’s development. In order for the continent to succeed in meeting the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and Agenda 2063, it is critical to embrace indigenous values and deploy them for dynamic growth. This is critical, as Africa continues to be missing from the table where key decisions are made. Africa has to work for Africa’s development. Although outsiders have played a major role in holding Africa back, we remain convinced that (we/us the) Africans have the primary responsibility to drive Africa’s development. A continent that has suffered multiple injustices should not expect liberating interventions from those that have concentrated on plundering its wealth. Thus: In the world, then, Africa is that presence which is also an absence. When world power is exercised Africa appears only as an object and not a meaningful subject. The objectification and inconsequentialization of Africa in world affairs and history is the working of the coloniality of power that peripherizes and marginalizes Africa and its peoples. (Mpofu 2018: 87)

Recognising the importance of decoloniality and the role of indigenous values, this volume adopts a decidedly Africa-centred perspective. While the search for a global ethic is a noble one, for Africans the first and most critical step lies in appreciating and embracing the values that are already available within the continent’s cumulative tradition. The values that have been handed over from one generation to another constitute a veritable base upon which Africa can build. Without absolutising, in the following

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

13

section we draw attention to Ubuntu as one example of a decolonial approach to values in Africa. Ubuntu as a Decolonial Value Matrix We are aware of the serious contestations around the meaning, applicability and relevance of the concept of Ubuntu to contemporary Africa’s development and the quest to overcome poverty. While we recognise that separate narratives are required to do justice to the role of Ubuntu in Africa’s development, in this section we shall highlight a few key points. First, there is a growing acceptance that the indigenous African concept of Ubuntu (Ramose 1999) and its variants expresses the African commitment towards individual flourishing in the context of community. Ubuntu captures the idea that one’s being is tied to the survival and well-being of the community. Here, we cite Charles Villa-Vicencio in full when he characterises Ubuntu: The underlying principle of ubuntu is that human existence is interconnected and communal. It emphasizes the virtue and potential contribution of every human being to the well-being of society. Though ubuntu is essentially South African, there is synergy between ubuntu and traditional values in other African countries. It is about the importance of human social cohesion and mutual fulfillment. Captured in the proverb, Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person through other people), ubuntu suggests that the realization of one’s human potential can only be achieved through interaction with other people. To be out of harmony with another is harmful to the well-being and survival of the community as a whole. (Villa-Vicencio 2009: 114)

As indicated above, there are debates over the evolution, application and soundness of the concept in contemporary Africa (see e.g., Gade 2011; Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013; Zimunya et  al. 2015). These debates are helpful, as they assist in avoiding the danger of granting too much authority to one value or concept. However, we are convinced that Ubuntu is very strategically placed to promote holistic and sustainable development in Africa. It offers a very sound platform for rethinking the meaning of development on the continent through its emphasis on development that has a human face (Molefe 2019 and Mangena 2019). Further, Ubuntu has the potential of addressing global challenges. Thus:

14 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

Ubuntu undoubtedly emphasizes responsibilities and obligations towards a collective well-being. On a global scale, greater co-operation and mutual understanding is very necessary to a sustainable future for all with respect to the ecological, moral and social well-being of its global citizens, human and otherwise. Ubuntu provides legitimizing spaces for transcendence of injustice and a more democratic, egalitarian and ethical engagement of human beings in relationship with each other. In this sense, Ubuntu offers hope and possibility in its contribution to human rights, not only in the South African and African contexts, but across the globe. (Swanson 2007: 53)

Second, Ubuntu serves as a decolonial and indigenous resource that encapsulates the importance of values for holistic and sustainable development in Africa. It reaffirms the conviction that Africa is incredibly rich, with diverse resources that include ethical resources. Further, it has the potential to ensure that sustainable development also reflects an African ethos (Church 2012: 531). In this regard, development is not a concept or process imposed from outside, but one that is inspired and sustained by indigenous ideas, aspirations and actions. Ubuntu is strategically placed to propel Africa’s development and confirms the importance of celebrating African identity in pursuit of the agenda of development. Exceptional leaders such as Mandela have modelled Ubuntu (Oppenheim 2012) and highlighted its relevance in addressing contemporary African challenges. For Fagunwa (2019), Ubuntu is a revolutionary ideology that has global relevance in terms of liberating the oppressed from capitalism. Third, Ubuntu serves as an ethic of radical inclusiveness. When it is properly deployed (i.e., having expunged potentially oppressive qualities), Ubuntu has the potential to embrace people on the margins in African communities. These include people with disability (Berghs 2017); particularly women with disability (Chisale 2020), people with albinism (see the challenges in, Imafidon 2019), migrants (Stuit 2016), refugees and internally displaced people (Mhlanga 2020), sexual minorities (Bongmba 2016) and others. Thus, we contend that Ubuntu provides a sound platform for inclusive development that leaves no one behind. This will contribute towards holistic and sustainable development, while overcoming poverty, as articulated in SDG 1. Fourth, Ubuntu promotes peace (Stam 2015) in Africa. Although the African Union (AU) could not meet its aspiration to silence all guns by 2020, it is clear that no development takes place in the absence of peace. Ubuntu is an important resource in society. Violence remains a threat to

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

15

development in Africa. Perpetrated by different actors, including religious extremists and states, violence continues to derail development efforts in diverse African settings. Deploying Ubuntu more strategically to secure peace, reconciliation and conflict transformation in Africa will facilitate greater development. Finally, Ubuntu is concerned about environmental sustainability. Although it seems to be preoccupied with interpersonal relationships, Ubuntu retains a serious interest in the environment (see e.g., Chibvongodze 2016). In this regard, Ubuntu is a significant resource in protecting the environment. It is, therefore, strategic to promote Ubuntu as part of the response to the climate emergency in Africa and beyond. Given Africa’s vulnerability to climate change, it is strategic to popularise Ubuntu in order to mitigate its impact and effects. Having recommended Ubuntu as an effective, holistic decolonial ethic for Africa’s development, we hasten to add that we are painfully aware of the need to acknowledge the call for ongoing interrogation of its applicability to changing national, continental and global contexts. For example, Mbetwa (2018) has drawn attention to how Ubuntu (which he describes as communalism) can be abused to promote corruption. We also acknowledge the limitations of Ubuntu in the face of rampant corruption and abuse of Africa’s massive wealth by ruling elites acting in cahoots with external forces. On his part, Matolino (2014) has highlighted the need for “limited communitarianism” in order to respect individual freedom. These are important critiques and serve to highlight that Ubuntu needs to be refined in order to be more effective. Our central conviction, however, remains unshaken: if Africa actively and deliberately/more intentionally inculcates values such as Ubuntu among citizens, including the leaders, Africa will achieve holistic development.

Development We have already made numerous references to development in this chapter to enable our conversation partners to have an appreciation of our understanding of the concept and process. Therefore, we will not belabour the point in this section. There is a growing body of literature on the complexity of development in Africa in the last few years (see also Chap. 3 by Chitando in this volume). These include The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development (Oruntoba and Falola 2018), The Routledge Handbook of African Development (Binns et  al.

16 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

2020) and The Palgrave Handbook of Agricultural and Rural Development in Africa (Osabuohein 2020) and others. Impressive scholarship has gone into the attempt to unravel Africa’s development conundrum. Some of the major issues relate to Africa’s exploitation by global powers, the impact of colonialism, poor leadership and planning, environmental factors and others. It is not our intention to review these factors or to engage in a detailed analysis of the ongoing challenges of development in Africa beyond our focus on the importance of values to this quest. Our task is a more modest one. We wish to underscore the point that we are convinced that Africa is not yet maximising on its abundant resources. To associate the term “poverty” with such an incredibly rich continent as Africa is a scandal, an anomaly and an indictment of its citizens. This might sound banal, but remains true: Africa is simply too rich to be poor!2 The human and natural resources that Africa is endowed with are truly staggering. What is required, we are contending in this volume, is to embrace those values that will enable the continent’s citizens to derive optimum benefits from them. This would silence, once and for all, the ridiculous talk of whether Africa’s resources are a curse or a blessing (Murshed 2004; Lashitew and Werker 2020). From an ethically informed position, resources are always a blessing and never a curse! As would have become clear by now, we envisage development to be both a process and state where citizens have the opportunity to flourish in an ethically informed and sustainable way. Whereas prosperity, high quality lives and security are key components, we also envision contentment and upholding the highest ethical ideals as integral to development. There can be no development when unethical processes preceding it are unethical. Further, where the ethics of development as a field focuses on the need for development to be ethical (Gasper 2012), our contention is that values must be the foundation of development in Africa. We are convinced that among the key resources to be mobilised for Africa’s development are the values that have the capacity to propel the continent further forward. Values are a strategic investment for ensuring that Africa’s development will be ethical and sustainable. It is values that will galvanise the continent to meet SDG 1 and Agenda 2063. With the right set of values, including the ones that are being proposed and promoted in this volume, Africa will travel on the path of development in an 2  We are indebted to Rev. Dr Charles Mugaviri, a Zimbabwean leadership coach, for this formulation.

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

17

African way. While these values have relevance beyond Africa and can be applied globally (see e.g., Cisneros and Premawardhana 2011), our primary focus in this volume is on their potential contribution to Africa’s development. While some of our more radical African colleagues might protest, we concur with Mkandawire (2011) that there are many areas where Africa must run while others walk. By recovering and reworking African values, the continent will be giving itself a fighting chance to succeed in meeting the targets in its different development agendas. Further, an emphasis on values will ensure that Africa’s development retains a human face. By prioritising personhood, honesty, hard work, tolerance and others, African nations and, by extension, the entire continent, will be better placed to negotiate challenges to development. Values are the life blood of Africa’s development and it is the responsibility of educational institutions, religious organisations, civil society organisations and others to undertake a conscious and deliberate effort to popularise values-based education that privileges African perspectives. A society based on values is developed and better placed to overcome poverty. Development is closely linked to the ideas of capabilities and flourishing. Whereas statistics regarding economic growth are helpful, for us they do not fully express the meaning of development. Development is not a destination, but an ongoing process. In this process, humans and the natural environment are engaged in the quest for flourishing, contentment and have space within which they express themselves. We appreciate the following effort at defining development in Africa (albeit from a theological perspective): An African notion of development…is proposed as the presence of those social, cultural, religious, economic, and political conditions that make human and cosmic flourishing possible by the daily unfolding of the reign of God in African history. (Ilo and Otu 2020: 229. Italics in original)

Although the above definition has a clear theological flavour, we appreciate it for two main reasons. First, it satisfies the criterion of being clear and precise. Its clarity (and breadth) lies in its effort to cover the various dimensions that development covers. Second, its precision is seen in its focus on the key dimensions, without straying into a linguistic maze. We contend that the definition limits itself to Africa in an admirable way and acknowledges the “cosmic” aspect which is particularly significant in

18 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

Africa. As the continent strives to address SDG 1 by addressing poverty in all its forms, its values will make an important contribution to the flourishing of its people and their environment. These values can also deepen local philanthropy, instead of waiting for donations from the global North (Kumi 2019).

Chapters in This Book Chapters in this book are organised thematically. Following this introductory chapter, in Chap. 2, David Kaulemu reflects on the politics and ethics of conceptualising values. In Chap. 3, Ezra Chitando outlines the history of development initiatives in Africa, while in Chap. 4, Fainos Mangena, Gaudencia Mudada, Beullah Matinhira and Tawanda Mbewe argue that Ubuntu can be harnessed for Africa’s development and achieve SDG 1. They challenge the continent to minimise mourning about the impact of colonialism and call for the appropriation of African resources, such as Ubuntu, to galvanise Africa’s development. In Chap. 5, entitled, “African Identity, Morality and Well-Being,” Peter Olapegba and Olusola Ayandele maintain that African identity is rooted in its values, culture and collectivist orientations, all of which are inseparable. Colonial education and religion were used to reconfigure the thinking of Africans into accepting the label of inferiority. They conclude that constructive traditional African values and indigenous knowledge should be used to liberate Africa from poverty, corruption, backwardness, mental inferiority and poor governance. The wrong African identity label by outsiders using individualistic morality must be replaced with African communal morality of Ubuntu/Botho, Ujamaa, Omoluabi, etc. and these should be encouraged to promote the African identity, moral values, as well as physical and spiritual well-being of Africans. In Chap. 6, Eunice Kamaara writes on, “Identity, Religion/Spirituality, Character Values and Development in Youthful Africa.” The chapter explains the paradox of development in Africa by propounding the argument that the current concept, measures and practice of development are too materialistic and too individualistic to facilitate the flourishing of not just human beings but also of the rest of creation. Drawing from the indigenous African understanding of human persons and of the need for healthy relationships among all creation, the chapter proposes that this moment of African youthfulness is the perfect moment to rethink the identity of human persons, African identity and African spirituality for

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

19

Africa’s development. Two lessons from the ongoing COVID-19 crisis resonate with this proposal, as illustrated in the chapter. In Chap. 7, Ayobami Ojebode, Oluwabusolami Oluwajulugbe and Oluwaseyifunmi Esther Ambrose reflect on online debates by Nigerians regarding the COVID-19 drug that Madagascar said it had discovered. They engage in analysis of the dominant responses in the context of what they see as street-level Pan-­African solidarity. For them, it is this type of solidarity that is more promising for the continent’s development than the current preoccupation with governments and institutions. In Chap. 8, Eric R. Masese argues that contemporary international development interventions in Africa have not achieved their full potential because they have not invested in morality and the concept of personhood. According to him, this is the “missing link” that needs to receive the emphasis that it merits. Ethnicity and regionalism have emerged as significant challenges to the quest for sustainable development in Africa. Using a political science perspective, in Chap. 9, Seidu M. Alidu analyses the extent to which political parties and the electorate in Ghana appropriate and deploy ethnicity and regionalism. He reviews the period 1992–2016. Alidu contends that Ghana must transcend ethnicity and regionalism and focus on concrete issues if it is to meet the SDGs. In Chap. 10, Reuben Kigame focuses on, “Tolerance and Development in Africa: A Look at Ethnicity, Xenophobia and Religious Conflict.” The chapter argues that to deal with intolerance is to unchain Africa from poverty and exploitation and usher in a more promising future for Africa’s youth who form the majority of its population. It maintains that Africa must invest in dealing with intolerance in order to meet its aspirations of achieving sustainable development. In Chap. 11, David Nderitu and Julius Kipkemboi address the theme, “Corruption and Under-Development in Africa: An Indictment to African Religiosity?” The chapter charges that the attainment of the SDGs in 2030 will remain a mirage if Africa does not address corruption. It maintains that Africa’s identity as a “notoriously religious” continent does not appear to have an impact when it comes to addressing corruption. It concludes by arguing that, coupled with other pragmatic efforts in fighting corruption including strengthening the capacity of public institutions and ensuring political goodwill, authentic religiosity of Africa has to be assertive in being true agent of achieving holistic human development. Mary Nyangweso draws attention to the need to factor in the tenacity of African spirituality in contemporary development initiatives in Chap. 12. For her, development efforts that do not recognise the resilience of African

20 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

spirituality on the continent and in the Diaspora are not likely to succeed. Chapter 13, by Dennis Masaka has the title, “Towards an Alternative Notion of ‘Hard Work’ for Africa’s Development.” The chapter argues that the colonial notion of hard work is largely ineffectual in positively motivating the continent’s development in present times. As a departure from this deployment of the concept “hard work,” the author defends one which invests in Africans’ creative and innovative competences that they can use in meeting the development agendas of countries in Africa. He argues that this new orientation of hard work ought to be anchored on an appropriate epistemology, one constructed using frameworks that speak to their respective conditions. Noah Pashapa revisits the question of leadership in Chap. 14. The chapter postulates that the practice and promotion of transformational servant-leadership would accelerate and enhance the quality and sustainability of transformational social development in African societies within their public and private institutions. In Chap. 15, Esther Mavengano and Tobias Marevesa argue that the conception of woman as second sex, or second class Other positioned at the periphery of society has impacted on socio-political and economic growth in general and female elevation in particular. It has been realised that monolithic conceptions of “woman” and womanhood that promote gender differentiation in Zimbabwe not only hamper women’s growth but also limit national development in general. The chapter calls upon those in positions of cultural, religious and political authority to recognise women as active agents of socio-economic transformations that bring about national development. Contributors to this volume refuse to close the issue of values and Africa’s struggle against poverty and quest for development by retaining focus on the need for ongoing reflections. This is because the issue of Africa’s development is too important to be settled by such simplistic approaches as, “Ubuntu is the answer, what is the problem?” (for the Christian example, see Asamoah-Gyadu 2005). In Chap. 16, Ephraim Taurai Gwaravanda critiques what he reads as hasty generalisation concerning African personhood. He calls for a more nuanced approach to the issue of personhood and proposes greater contextual analysis to understand specific African cultures. In Chap. 17, the last one in this volume, Clive T. Zimunya critiques the dominant approach to philosophy, identity and development in Africa. He calls upon African intellectuals, development practitioners and others to embrace science and technology in a more pragmatic way. This, he argues, will see the continent achieving sustainable development than the cherished reliance on indigenous

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

21

spirituality. Zimunya adopts a radical position which will no doubt attract robust counter critique from most Afrocentric scholars, including other contributors to this volume.

Conclusion While diverse economic blueprints and development agendas relating to Africa have been generated, we contend that they are most likely doomed to fail/ure if they do not embrace values. Contributors to this volume have highlighted the central role that values play in Africa’s development and the quest to address SDG 1. All the investments in the financial, mechanical, technical and other areas will not yield the desired results if there is no prior creative investment in values. The SDGs and Agenda 2063 have a greater likelihood of success if different players recognise and appreciate the critical role values play in Africa’s development. Allied to this contention is the importance of African identity, also addressed in this volume. African development must be premised on African values as they express African identity. To say this is not to suggest that African identity is frozen: throughout history, Africans have adapted and changed in response to changing circumstances. We are confident that as they seek to fulfil the different development initiatives and deploy African values, they will retain the wisdom of the chameleon, namely, to have one eye looking behind and another looking ahead, at the very same time.

References African Union Commission. 2015. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. Addis Ababa: African Union Commission. Akanle, Olayinka, and Jìmí O. Adésìnà. 2018. Introduction: The Development of Africa: Issues, Diagnoses and Prognoses. In The Development of Africa: Issues, Diagnoses and Prognoses, ed. Olayinka Akanle and Jìmí O.  Adésìnà, 1–8. Cham: Springer. Asafo, Dziedzorm R. 1999. Challenges in the Study of Religious Values. Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis 17 (1): 25–52. https://doi.org/10.30674/ scripta.67242. Asamoah-Gyadu, Kwabena J. 2005. ‘“Christ Is the Answer”: What Is the Question?’ A Ghana Airways Prayer Vigil and Its Implications for Religion, Evil and Public Space. Journal of Religion in Africa 35 (1): 93–117. Ayedola, David A. 2016. The Contribution of Philosophy to Africa’s Development. Inkanyiso: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 8 (1): 9–20.

22 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

Berghs, Maria. 2017. Practices and Discourses of Ubuntu: Implications for an African Model of Disability? African Journal of Disability 6: a292. https://doi. org/10.4102/ajod.v6.292. Bevans, Stephen B. 2018. Essays in Contextual Theology. Boston: Brill. Binns, Tony, Kenneth Lynch, and Etienne Nel, eds. 2020. The Routledge Handbook of African Development. London: Routledge. Bongmba, Elias. 2016. Homosexuality, Ubuntu, and Otherness in the African Church. Journal of Religion and Violence 4 (1): 15–37. Breidlid, Anders, and Roy Krøvel, eds. 2020. Indigenous Knowledges and the Sustainable Development Agenda. London: Routledge. Chemhuru, Munamato, ed. 2019. African Environmental Ethics: A Critical Reader. New York: Palgrave. Chibvongodze, Danford T. 2016. Ubuntu is Not Only about the Human! An Analysis of the Role of African Philosophy and Ethics in Environment Management. Journal of Human Ecology 53 (2): 157–166. Chimakonam, Jonathan O. 2019. Addressing the Problem of Mass Poverty in the Sub-Saharan Africa: Conversational Thinking as a Tool for Inclusive Development. Filosophia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 8 (1): 141–161. Chimakonam, Jonathan, and Louise du Toit, eds. 2018. African Philosophy and the Epistemic Marginalisation of Women. London: Routledge. Chimuka, Tarisayi A. 2020. The Zimbabwe Council of Churches and the Ethical Reconstruction of Zimbabwe. In The Zimbabwe Council of Churches and Development in Zimbabwe, ed. Ezra Chitando, 109–123. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Chisale, Sinenhlanhla S. 2020. Politics of the Body, Fear and Ubuntu: Proposing an African Women’s Theology of Disability. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 76 (3): a5871. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v76i3.5871. Chitando, Ezra, Lovemore Togarasei, and Masiiwa R. Gunda, eds. 2020. Religion and Development in Africa. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Church, Jacqueline. 2012. Sustainable Development and the Culture of uBuntu. De Jure 45 (3): 511–531. Cisneros, Ariane S., and Shanta Premawardhana, eds. 2011. Sharing Values: A Hermeneutics for Global Ethics. Geneva: Globethics.net. Comim, Flavio, Mozaffar Qizilbash, and Sabina Alkire. 2008. The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Comstock, W. Richard. 1984. Toward Open Definitions of Religion. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 52: 499–517. Diara, Benjamin C.D., and Nkechinyere G. Onah. 2014. Corruption and Nigeria’s Underdevelopment: A Religious Approach. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 4 (4): 21–26.

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

23

Enu, Donald B. and A. E. O. Esu. 2011. Re-Engineering Values Education in Nigerian Schools as Catalyst for National Development. International Education Studies 4 (1): 147–153. Etieyibo, Edwin, ed. 2018. Decolonisation, Africanisation and the Philosophy Curriculum. London: Routledge. Fagunwa, Temitope. 2019. Ubuntu: Revisiting an Endangered African Philosophy in Quest of a Pan-Africanist Revolutionary Ideology. Genealogy 3 (3): 45. https://doi.org/10.3390/genealogy3030045. Gade, Christian B.N. 2011. The Historical Development of the Written Discourses on Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 303–329. Gasper, Des. 2012. Development Ethics – Why? What? How? A Formulation of the Field. Journal of Global Ethics 8 (1): 117–135. Hountondji, Paulin J. 2009, September. Knowledge of Africa, Knowledge by Africans: Two Perspectives on African Studies. RCCS Annual Review 1 (1): 121–131. Huber, Joseph. 1984. Clusters of Grapes: Sow a Character and You Reap Destiny. Gweru: Mambo Press. Idang, Gabriel E. 2015. African Culture and Values. Phronim 16 (2): 97–111. Ilo, Stan Chu, and Idara Otu. 2020. Theology and Development in Africa. In The Routledge Handbook of African Theology, ed. Elias K.  Bongmba, 224–246. London: Routledge. Imafidon, Elvis. 2019. African Philosophy and the Otherness of Albinism: White Skin, Black Race. London: Routledge. Kakwata, Frederick. 2017. The Progressive Pentecostal Conception of Development within an African Context of Poverty. Stellenbosch Theological Journal 3 (1): 159–183. Kanu, Ikechukwu A. 2014. African Philosophy and the Issue of Development. PARIPEX: Indian Journal of Research 3 (7): 1–5. Katongole, Emmanuel. 2011. The Sacrifice of Africa: A Political Theology. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans. ———. 2017. Born from Lament: The Theology and Politics of Hope in Africa. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans. Kaulemu, David. 2021. Linking Values, Institutions and Development in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe @ 40: Development, Democracy and Transformation, ed. Lloyd Sachikonye and David Kaulemu, 21–45. Harare: Weaver Press. Keita, Lansana, ed. 2011. Philosophy and African Development: Theory and Practice. Dakar: CODESRIA. Kumi, Emmanuel. 2019. Advancing the Sustainable Development Goals: An Analysis if the Potential Role of Philanthropy in Ghana. Journal of Asian and African Studies 54 (7): 1084–1104.

24 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

Lashitew, Addisu, and Eric Werker. 2020. Do Natural Resources Help or Hinder Development? Resource Abundance, Dependence, and the Role of Institutions. Resource and Energy Economics 61: 101183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. reseneeco.2020.101183. le Grange, Lesley. 2018. Decolonising, Africanising, Indigenising, and Internationalising Curriculum Studies: Opportunities to (Re)Imagine the Field. Journal of Education 74: 4–18. Mangena, Fainos. 2019. Discussing Inclusive Development and Governance In Zimbabwe: Pragmatizing Hunhu/Ubuntu Philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 8 (1): 39–54. Matolino, Bernard. 2014. Personhood in African Philosophy. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Matolino, Bernard, and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi. 2013. The end of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 197–205. Mbetwa, Choolwe. 2018. Why Africa is Poor. Chingola: Merina. Mhlanga, Johanne. 2020. Refugee Protection in the era of Complex Migratory Flows: A Reflection on Ubuntu and Social Work Practice. Africa Journal of Social Work 10 (1): 41–45. Special Issue on Ubuntu and Social Work. Mkandawire, Thandika. 2011. Running While Others Walk: Knowledge and the Challenge of Africa’s Development. Africa Development 36 (2): 1–36. Molefe, Motsamai. 2019. Ubuntu and Development: An African Conception of Development. Africa Today 66 (1): 96–115. Moyo, Dambisa. 2009. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Mpofu, William. 2018. Decoloniality as a Combative Ontology in African Development. In The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development, ed. Samuel O. Oruntoba and Toyin Falola, 83–102. New York: Springer Nature. Mungwini, Pascah. 2016. The Question of Recentering Africa: Thoughts and Issues from the Global South. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 523–536. Murove, Munyaradzi F. 2016. African Moral Consciousness. London: Austin Macauley Publishers Limited. ———. 2020. African Politics and Ethics: Exploring New Dimensions. Cham: Palgrave. Murshed, S. Monsood. 2004. When Does Natural Resource Abundance Lead to a Resource Curse? EEP Discussion Paper 04–01. London: International Institute for Environment and Development. Murungi, John, ed. 2019. Africanizing African Legal Ethics. London: Routledge. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo. 2018. Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization. London: Routledge.

1  INTRODUCTION: VALUES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 

25

———. 2020. Decolonization, Development and Knowledge in Africa: Turning a New Leaf. London: Routledge. Nduku, Elisabeth, and Christoph Stückelberger, eds. 2013. African Contextual Ethics: Hunger, Leadership, Faith and Media. Geneva: Globethics. Nesbitt, Francis N. 2008. Review Article: Post-Colonial Anxieties: (Re)Presenting African Intellectuals. African Affairs 107 (427): 273–282. Ngunjiri, Faith W. 2016. “I Am Because We Are”: Exploring Women’s Leadership Under Ubuntu Worldview. Advances in Developing Human Resources 18 (2): 223–242. Njoku, Francis O. 2004. Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical Reconstruction of African Socio-Political Economy. Lincoln: iUniverse. Ntibagirirwa, Symphorien. 2009. Cultural Values, Economic Growth and Development. Journal of Business Ethics 84: 297–311. Odimegwu, Clifford O., ed. 2020. Family Demography and Post-2015 Development Agenda in Africa. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. Okeja, Uchenna, ed. 2019. African Philosophy and Global Justice: Critical Essays. London: Routledge. Okyere-Manu, Beatrice D., ed. 2021. African Values, Ethics, and Technology: Questions, Issues, and Approaches. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Oppenheim, Claire E. 2012. Nelson Mandela and the Power of Ubuntu. Religions 3: 369–388. Orobator, Agbonkhianmeghe E. 2005. From Crisis to Kairos: The Mission of the Church in the Time of HIV/AIDS, Refugees and Poverty. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa. Oruntoba, Samuel O., and Toyin Falola, eds. 2018. The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development. New York: Palgrave. Osabuohein, Evans, ed. 2020. The Palgrave Handbook of Agricultural and Rural Development in Africa. New York: Palgrave. Petersen, Kirsten H., ed. 1987. Religion, Development and African Identity, Seminar Proceedings 17. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Ramose, Mogobe. 1999. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. SATORI. (2015, September). International Differences in Ethical Standards and in the Interpretations of Legal Frameworks. https://satoriproject.eu/media/ D3.2-­Int-­differences-­in-­ethical-­standards.pdf. Accessed 08 July 2021. Sesanti, Simphiwe. 2016. African Philosophy in Pursuit of an African Renaissance for the True Liberation of African Women. Journal of Black Studies 47 (6): 479–496. Shaheed, Jabaar. 2021. In Search of a New Paradigm of Value-Reorientation through Rational Reconstruction of Indigenous Values. Academia Letters, Article 1169. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1169. Singh, Julietta. 2018. Unthinking Mastery: Dehumanism and Decolonial Entanglements. Durham: Duke University Press.

26 

E. CHITANDO AND E. KAMAARA

Stuit, Hanneke. 2016. Ubuntu Strategies: Constructing Spaces of Belonging in Contemporary South African Culture. New York: Palgrave. Swanson, Dalene M. 2007. Ubuntu: An African Contribution to (Re)Search for/ with a ‘Humble Togetherness.’. Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education 2 (2): 53–67. Tosam, Mbih J., and Peter Takov, eds. 2016. Philosophy in Culture: A Cross-­ Cultural Perspective. Mankon, Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG. Van Norren, Dorine E. 2020. The Sustainable Development Goals Viewed Through Gross National Happiness, Ubuntu, and Buen Vivir. International Environ Agreements 20: 431–458. van Stam, Gertjan. 2015. Ubuntu and Peace: Without a Mother, There is no Home. In Women’s Leadership in Peace Building: Conflict, Community and Care, ed. Mirjam van Reisen, 37–54. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. Veugelers, Wiel, and Paul Vedder. 2003. Values in Teaching. Teachers and Teaching 9 (4): 377–389. Villa-Vicencio, Charles. 2009. Walk with us and Listen: Political Reconciliation in Africa. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press. Walsh, Catherine E. 2018. The Decolonial for: Resurgence, Shifts, and Movements. In On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis, ed. Walter D.  Mignolo and Catherine E. Walsh, 15–32. Durham: Duke University Press. Wane, Njoki N., and Kimberly L.  Todd. 2018. Introduction: The meeting of Decolonial Minds. In Decolonial Pedagogy: Examining Sites of Resistance, Resurgence and renewal, ed. Njoki N. Wane and Kimberly L. Todd. Springer Nature: Cham. Wariboko, Nimi. 2019. Ethics and Society in Nigeria: Identity, History, Political Theory. Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press. Wariboko, Nimi, and Toyin Falola, eds. 2020. The Palgrave handbook of African Social Ethics. New York: Palgrave. Zimunya, Clive Tendai, Joyline Gwara, and Obert Bernard Mlambo. 2015. The Feasibility of an Ubuntu Ethic in a Modernised World. Journal of African Foreign Affairs 2 (1/2): 5–26.

CHAPTER 2

The Ethics and Politics of Conceptualizing Values in Africa David Kaulemu

Introduction Values are the windows or spectacles through which every human being and every human community looks at the world and determines what is worth pursuing and what is worth reviewing and abandoning. Values are the tools we invent, acquire and develop to make decisions about personal lives and relationships, social organization, cultural engagements and political activity. They guide us in what we choose and what we reject and why. For example, Africans generally rejected the values of slavery, slave trade and colonial rule. They were prepared to fight for political and economic freedom as important values. Today, many African communities are gravitating and appropriating the values of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law. But these values are competing with other local community values that are steeped in communalism, patriarchy and many local

D. Kaulemu (*) School of Education and Leadership, Arrupe Jesuit University, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_2

27

28 

D. KAULEMU

religious and cultural backgrounds which guide the choices of their members as individuals and as communities. This guidance through values happens in many different areas of our social lives—the economy, politics, culture, religion, private and public life. The most important of our values are ritualized and institutionalized. When specific values have proved central to our lives, we cultivate and encourage them to the extent that they become part of what we call our culture. Cultural values are the windows through which we want to look at ourselves, the world and our relationships in and with the world. This chapter looks at the role of values and value frameworks in development and social transformation. I take a pluralist approach to values in development and demonstrate that a reconciliation of all values is not assured and yet it is human to fight for some form of values engagement and contestation. The discussion is placed in the context of nation-building and sustainable development in Africa, with special reference to the struggle against poverty, expressed in SDG 1.

Values, Nations and Sustainable Development The postcolonial nation-building experiment is an effort whose success is not assured. Yet the urgency for this process to facilitate sustainable development has never been more critical. In many ways, especially in Africa, the sustainability of development hinges on the sustainability of the national state project accompanied by struggles for democracy. Historically, the nation-state experiment, the democratic project and the development agenda have been intricately linked. This does not mean that development and democracy have to happen only through the institution of the nation state. There should be alternative development paths for Africa. In many ways the African nation state has been an obstacle to both democracy and sustainable development in Africa. There is no doubt, however, that, as Ha-Joon (2014: 402) argues, ‘the state still remains the most powerful organizational technology that humankind has invented and thus big economic (and social) changes are very difficult to achieve without it.’ Kanyenze et al. (2017) and Murisa and Chikweche (2015: xxxix) emphasize the need for a ‘democratic and developmental state’ which can lead in the planning, facilitating, coordinating and stimulating development. There is a general statist approach to development in Africa. Unfortunately, in many African countries we have ended up having incompetent and ‘predatory states’ (Shumba 2018) and the stalling of the

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

29

development and democratic projects (UNDP 2002: 1). But sustainable development itself as a value and as a concept is essentially contested and therefore under endless review and expansion. Hence, postcolonial nationbuilding in Africa involves battles of values and contestations of value frameworks at different levels of political and social engagement. These are informed by the interplay of many competing interests that inform different strategies for development, including the rejection of the whole development discourse. Even if we all had the same interests, there are so many values worthy of pursuing and they do not always confirm each other. As we have discovered in our Peace, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation commissions—the interest of truth does not always confirm the demands of peace and reconciliation. For example, in Zimbabwe and South Africa many people feel that the spirit of reconciliation undermined the requirements of justice—another critical value for sustainable development. For most African countries, the development and democratic project is an experiment whose origin is not necessarily African, but it can be given, and has legitimately been given, African roots. We can benefit from Gayatri Spivak’s concept of catachresis. Catachresis is the moral and political process where the formerly colonized empower themselves by appropriating modern institutional forms and giving them, say, African traditional roots. Africans, Black people and all the subaltern have been excellent in using these strategies to empower themselves and build self-­confidence in their struggles against oppression, exploitation and colonialism. In art, music, dance, sport, clothing, literature, war, trade, education, religion, philosophy and many other human activities, we have, as Africans been appropriating from others as we, in turn have been offering our best to others. Today, people of African origin are emerging as national leaders and critical developmental personnel all over the world. Some have been supportive of African developmental aspirations, but others have been representative of aggressive forces against Africa. African philosophers have identified and debated about the African origins of modern African development and democracy and especially parliamentary democracy, for example. Some have located it in ‘African humanism’ (Wiredu 1992), ‘Ubuntu’ (Samkange and Samkange 1980), Communalist Philosophy, Harambe, Ujamaa, the palaver (UNESCO 1979) and other various forms of ethnophilosophy that are seen as the ‘roots’ of African democracy. Catachresis has been a powerful resource for appropriation and the expansion of the African moral and political imagination. Therefore, to talk about African values, cultures and institutions

30 

D. KAULEMU

inspiring and accompanying Africa development and the democratization processes involves referring to values and institutions that are claimed to be indigenous and autochthonic, as well as values that are borrowed from across African communities and from outside Africa. This is normal for human beings. African energies, interests and peoples are implicated in the African national project for sustainable development. In the past, development has been understood mainly in economic terms. Taking it from modernization theory, to be developed was understood to mean what had happened to countries that were economically strong in terms of the ability to produce infrastructure and material goods and to grow in these activities through the application of modern science and technology. There was relatively little attention paid to other important values like what production did to the environment, to relationships between people, to the kinds of cultures and human beings that were being formed by economic activities and what they produced.

Making Development Sustainable The concept of sustainable development was introduced to pay attention to aspects of life that were being threatened by development understood in narrow economic terms. This marked the beginning of appreciating that if development were to be sustainable, it needed to be integral. Integral development is the idea that economic development must be accompanied by and should not threaten human development and ecological health. It is the idea that development should facilitate the growth and health of all aspects of life—economic, social, intellectual, psychological, emotional and ethical. This kind of development is sustainable because one type of development, say economic, is not undermining another, say ecological well-being. The two need and reinforce and support each other. Economic development which causes pollution and climate change is not sustainable because at some point the problems of pollution and climate change will undermine economic development, as what has happened with the problems of COVID-19, floods, droughts and other extreme events which are disrupting life as we know it all over the world (Brazier 2017: 50). Economic development which results in social inequalities is not sustainable because the social conflicts that emanate from economic inequalities will undermine economic growth. It is in this context that we can understand the importance of values in sustainable development.

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

31

Sustainable development must be economically, ecologically, socially and ethically viable. An economically flourishing society should also be ethically and socially flourishing if it is to be sustainable. It is in this context that we must address the question of sustainable development in Africa. The challenge is to balance economic value with social, political and technological values. To say this is not to suggest that these values will ever completely reconcile with each other. They are, each of them, fundamental and ultimate values which guide human action in their own way. If each is an ultimate value, there needs to be spaces for human beings to negotiate, engage and sometimes struggle to determine which values take priority and which values need to be balanced. The struggle to balance the demands of different ultimate values is human and worthy of pursuit even when we know that the goal will never be fully achieved. As Isiah Berlin (1984: 31) explains in now somewhat archaic language: the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized is demonstrably false. If, as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict—and of tragedy—can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.

The national development project has in the past raised many questions about values, identity and claims to land, property and the right to self-­ fulfilment. Slavery and colonialism had undermined African people’s sense of self, their values systems and their right to own and to access material, intellectual and spiritual resources. The African nation state was seen as a chance to regain what had been lost—humanity, dignity and freedom. And so, Africans appropriated this alien-local national-state project and invented and instituted national symbols like flags, dress, monuments, languages, constitutions and so on to represent them. Africans have since been struggling to adjust its original purposes for existence in a not-so-­ friendly global economic, political and ecological environment. The Europeans who, in 1884, in Berlin, carved up Africa and instituted these ‘territories’, intended them for resource extraction, to provide markets for their industrial products and for diplomatic defence of their respective interests and empires. This became the dominant values framework created for the African nation state by the colonial powers. In many ways, the

32 

D. KAULEMU

intensions of the colonial powers are summarized in Immanuel Wallerstein’s (2004) world system theory which heavily relies on the dependency theory which argues that there is only one world connected by economic relations. This one-world system theory locates Africa in the periphery where it is given a specific economic role of supplying resources, cheap labour and markets for the countries in the core. From the world system many Africans concluded that the only way for Africa to survive and develop was to wriggle itself out of the economic chains of the exploitative world capitalist system. Hence the attempt by some Africans to withdraw into themselves, not only economically, but also culturally, in the name of African authenticity, Afro-centrism and Africanity. The need for economic freedom and the rough treatment by the dominant European and North American forces inspired a cultural and political withdrawal which called into being definitions of African ‘identities based on territoriality’ (Mbembe 2000: 3). This approach to African experiences can be understandable and it is legitimate, but it has also been heavily and legitimately criticized by many Africans, especially the insightful and courageous Cameroonian analyst, Achille Mbembe (2000: 3) when he writes: Today, the need is not to withdraw into ourselves and seek out supposedly authentic voices, but rather to cross frontiers, to set up transverse and diagonal networks, to shape new intellectual coalitions that can lend a universalist perspective to the knowledge produced in and on Africa. Only the polyphony that will result in this kid of mixture will make it possible to extricate Africa from the ghetto in which Africanism and Afro-centrism have so long kept it confined. (Mbembe 2000: 3)

In the context of globalization, Mbembe, pushing a universalist ethic, emphasizes the futility of what he sees as a ‘ghetto ethic’. Identities based on territoriality no longer have much to do with the act of producing knowledge as such. Geography, by itself, does not determine the correctness of moral, intellectual, or ideological positions. The old demand: ‘where are you speaking from?’ is outdated. (Mbembe 2000: 3)

Is it outdated? And yet Mbembe’s insight is profound. When we withdraw into ourselves as Africans, what do we do with all the experiences and memories we have positively gained and even enjoyed in interacting with others who are not African, including those who have been our

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

33

oppressors? What shall we make of Gabriel Okara’s African sensibilities in The Fisherman’s Invocation, when we know that he also had read and was impressed by Keats, Gerard Manley Hopkins, T.S.  Eliot and Dylan Thomas? (Okara 1978). What do we do with the cricket, Mozart, whiskey, football and cheese whose taste we acquired and we still enjoy but is from the colonizers? When Mugabe declares, ‘Blair, keep your Britain and I keep my Zimbabwe’, what should we make of his love for tea, cricket and the English language? What shall we make of the people of African origin who are leaders in the British Government? Shall we be like Dambudzo Marechera and try to burn New College in Oxford University?

Values and Choices in History But the dominance and indeed hegemony of the one world values system was not established without contestation. Gramsci taught us that dominance does not banish contestation and alternative values. Africans, themselves characterized by various political and ethical interests, groups and traditions, have been working since the liberation struggles of the 1960s and 1970s and since the declaration of political independence, to give the African nation state new life and role. They have been working to establish ethical and political frameworks that they saw as being friendlier to the local needs and aspirations. Even then, there are indefinite number of values that can be chosen. The work of Julius Nyerere has been to use the idea of African familyhood to inform the construction of the new African nation state (Nyerere 1974). The work of Steve Bantu Biko was to infuse ‘black consciousness’ into the African democratic project (Biko 2005). Wiredu and Eze (1997) have led the debate on the role of consensus building in African democracy. One of the challenges in these nation-state projects has been the need to grapple with the myriad of values often available for choice and contestation. As Berlin (1984: 32) explains: The extent of a man’s, or a people’s, liberty to choose to live as they desire must be weighed against the claims of many other values, of which equality, or justice, or happiness, or security, or public order are perhaps the most obvious examples.

The other challenge is how to handle the particularities of the different African ethno-cultural communities brought together, sometimes by coercion, negotiation, marriage or by inclusion in colonial boundaries

34 

D. KAULEMU

(Abraham 1992). Mazarire (2009) has helped us to understand the African pre-colonial conditions when he writes: The pre-colonial history of Zimbabwe is usually explained in terms of the rise and fall of empires—the Great Zimbabwe, the Mutapa, the Torwa, the Rozvi and the Ndebele states. These large states are interesting and important and will be discussed in the chapter, but it is misleading to think that nothing of significance before or afterwards, or outside their frontiers. Most autochthons lived in smaller units, and we have come to learn a lot more about life in those societies than we did twenty years ago. Many Zimbabweans feel proud that there were once large ‘empires’ that could fight against external invaders, but the story of the occupation of Zimbabwe’s difficult landscape by many pioneering groups should be just as much a source of pride.

Mazarire describes the complexity, creativity, movements and relationships of the large and small populations in the regions we now call Zimbabwe and demonstrates the misleading dominant stories about pre-colonial Africa. He characterizes the ‘constant movement of people, goods, ideas, and a multitude of different self-identities’ (Mazarire 2009: 2). He summarizes the significance and the politics of interpreting history when he writes: Most of what today we call pre-colonial Zimbabwean history is a product of academic theories, and of ideas popularized during and since the nationalist struggle when it became necessary to debunk existing stereotypes of African identity, and to situate the struggle for independence with the ideals of self-­ determination and self-knowledge. This is true of Zimbabwe as it is of many other African countries. Indeed, it can be argued that in its more recent assertions of sovereignty, reclamation, restitution, the return to tradition, and even anti-imperialism, the Zimbabwean state perceives the pre-colonial period as an important starting point for its own national reconstruction. (Mazarire 2009: 1)

For Zimbabwe, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009a: 39) has been asking very difficult questions about the more negative aspects of people’s reading of pre-­ colonial history and relationships and their use today. He rejects ‘the somewhat simplistic, nationalist-inspired “domination and resistance” paradigm that was popular in the 1960s’ and demonstrates that colonial processes ‘were complex and mediated by contestations and conversations, rejections and acceptances, negotiations and complicity’

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

35

(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a: 39). He asks why some African elites monopolize and subjugate other Africans in the name of African liberation and the African nation state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009b; Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009). Chapters in the book edited by Ezra Chitando (2013) demonstrate how complex the contestation of values and power can be in an African context. They demonstrate ‘how politicians harness religious ideologies and concepts to serve their own interests. But they also demonstrate ‘the role of religious leaders in challenging the ruling elite’ (Chitando 2013: v). Chitando and his colleagues confirm Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s claim that the ‘domination and resistance’ paradigm, which was dominant in the 1960s is too simplistic to understand the African processes of value creation and contestations around it. They also confirm Mazarire’s conclusion that the stories of African history are more than the stories of empires and their fate. This in turn confirms Brian Raftopoulos and Tsuneo Yoshikuni’s (1999: 1–2) illustration that there are many ‘sites of struggle’ in the spaces created for different groups of Africans at different periods in the urbanization process; the contradictory responses of the colonial state to the problem of the stabilization and reproduction of labour; the relationship between ethnicity, the labour process and different relations to rural production processes; the effects of rural-urban linkages on labour organization and on the broader struggles for the imagining of national identity; the effects of the regional labour supplies on urban structures and forms of urban organization ; the struggles over the mapping of the city along racial, class and gender lines; and finally the gendered nature of the colonial city and urban struggles.

Another challenge of giving the nation state in Africa a new life and value has been engaging with the questions of how to deal with modernity and all its institutions, value systems and politics (Gyekye 1997; Eze 1997; Mkandawire 2005). Of particular interest has been how to engage with the values of science and technology that modernity has thrust upon African communities. Modernity, riding on the wave of the confidence of science emanating from the philosophy of the Enlightenment, has pushed for what Pope Francis calls the ‘dominant technocratic paradigm’ (Pope Francis 2015: 59). This approach relies on what it sees as universal scientific principles and technologies to solve social problems. It is not sensitive to culture and context as it is steeped in the philosophy of technological determinism. It usually denigrates local knowledge systems, leading

36 

D. KAULEMU

sometimes into a situation where ‘our immense technological development has not been accompanied by a development in human responsibility, values and conscience’ (Pope Francis 2015: 61). It has led into the problem of ‘technological fix’ where society relies too much in technology in order to solve social problems and pays little attention to ethics, culture and education as possible solutions (https://www.encyclopedia.com/science/encyclopedias-­almanacs-­transcripts-­and-­maps/technological-­fix). Sustainable human societies must be able to rely on all their faculties and capabilities. Any society that relies only on its scientific capabilities and ignores its ethical sensibilities, cultural resources and aesthetic imaginations cannot achieve integral development and for that reason cannot be sustainable. Kwame Nkrumah (1967: 6), in searching for the integral development balance warned that, ‘Our moral and spiritual qualities should not lag behind the progress we are making in the economic field.’ Describing the challenge of developmental imbalances, Jeffrey Sachs (2008: 3) writes: The defining challenge of the twenty-first century will be to face the reality that humanity shares a common fate on a crowded planet. The common fate will require new forms of global cooperation, a fundamental point of blinding simplicity that many world leaders have yet to understand or embrace. For the past two hundred years, technology and demography have consistently run ahead of deeper social understanding. Industrialisation and science have created a pace of change unprecedented in human history. Philosophers, politicians, artists, and economists must scramble constantly to catch up with contemporaneous social conditions. Our social philosophies, as a result, consistently lag behind present realities.

Systems theory has helped us to understand that various areas of life must engage and speak to each other. Our social values, our aesthetics, our political arrangements and social imaginaries need to be appropriate to our economies, sciences, technologies and religions. Contradictions, ambiguities, ambivalences and paradoxes will always be there and will never be banished. But as human beings, we are condemned to dealing with these issues—always juggling between alternative values and their respective implications for our self-identity, welfare and our relationships with others. Again, we can forgive Berlin’s (1984: 33) language to get an important insight when he writes:

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

37

In the end, men choose between ultimate values; they choose as they do, because their life and thought are determined by fundamental moral categories and concepts that are, at any rate over large stretches of time and space, a part of their being and thought and sense of their own identity; part of what makes them human.

The challenge of the world religions like Christianity and Islam has been enormous in Africa. What is the status of African traditional medicine (Chavunduka 1994) and that of endogenous knowledges (Hountondji 1998) in the context of modern Western science and of the world religions? Sometimes, Western science and religion have given hope to the continent through modern institutions including schools, hospitals, research and the values of peace and social transformation. However, these forces have also been implicated in undermining African self-identity and self-confidence, and have paradoxically been responsible for many conflicts. Hence Africans have been ambivalent about the values and institutions of modernity and of world religions. On the one hand these values and institutions promise development, education, health, civilization, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. And they sometimes deliver. Yet it was through the ‘rule of law’ that Africa was carved up into territories and that Africans lost their lands and were treated as second class citizens. We must remember that apartheid was ‘the rule of law’! Slavery was ‘the rule of law’! Colonialism was ‘the rule of law’! Their legacies still continue in the global industrial complexes (Best et al. 2011a, b). Feminism, especially eco-feminism, has widened our understanding of the values of development and has demonstrated that ‘development should mean gender equity, secure livelihoods, ecological sustainability and political participation’ (Arizpe 1994: xiii). Integral development requires that these aspects of development should not be discussed independently of the conditions for their possible realization. The work of the illustrious late Sam Moyo and his colleagues in Zimbabwe and the world over has been concerned with linking African aspirations with African resources, especially with the land (Moyo et  al. 2008; Murisa and Chikweche 2015). Robert Mugabe’s work together with the Zimbabwe war veterans of the liberation struggle (Sadomba 2011) and that of movements like South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) (https:// www.news24.com › city-press › politics › eff-blame) and Black First Land First (BLF) stand in this tradition which, in principle, fights for the ‘expropriation of land without compensation’ from white settlers in Africa. In its

38 

D. KAULEMU

ideal, it is inspired by the need to reverse the injustices and inequities of the colonial and apartheid periods and more importantly to find economic wealth that needs to accompany African self-re-definition. This tradition links to the ideas of the African American Afrocentric and pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey who popularized, if not invented, the phrase ‘Africa for Africans’ (Cronon 1974). It also links to the traditions of the ‘black power’ movement (Black Power movement and African Renaissance (https:// theconversation.com › mbekis-dream-of-africas) which the former president Thabo Mbeki has been pushing for. While many of these Africanist efforts have their serious shortcomings in terms of social analysis, tactics and issues of commitment, they all help to place and keep on the table the critical factor of the need for development in Africa to be supported by sustainable supply of economic resources and productive capabilities. A reading of the major political speeches of African leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Patrice Lumumba, Mobuto Sese Seko, Samora Machel, Robert Mugabe, Amilcar Cabral and Nelson Mandela, Winnie Mandela, Gracia Machel, Joyce Banda, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Wangari Maathai and many others, gives some idea of the many values and principles informing the various aspirations of the new African nation state. Of course, there are many poets, artists, musicians, writers and film makers who have expressed these values and have been generally more committed to them than the African politicians. Without artists, academics and cultural activists of various kinds, African liberation could never have been achieved. The distance between African political leaders and the grassroots struggles was narrowed by artists. In Southern Africa, the names of Miriam Makeba, Dorothy Masuka, Thomas Mapfumo, Hugh Masekela, Ray Phiri and Oliver Mtukudzi (Chitando et al. 2022) loom large. But in the various ‘sites of struggle’, especially in the urban settings, many more cultural players made tremendous contributions to the construction of values and value systems in Africa. Today African national liberation has been reduced to statist politics. Yet even the national politicians know that African liberation is more than state politics and political parties. In many ways, modern postcolonial politicians have, through unhealthy political reductionism, de-valued the richness and depth of African cultural life. This is why many people do not know that Joshua Nkomo at one point sang with The Merry Makers (Jenje-­ Makwenda 2005: 92); that Daniel Madzimbamuto ‘played a crucial role in promoting township music festivals’ (Jenje-Makwenda 2005: 60); that Gibson Mandishona should be seen as an artist, singer, writer and human

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

39

being who is more than just a Zanu PF cadre (Jenje-Makwenda 2005: 184); that the renowned medical doctor, MacLoud Chitiyo ‘played guitar for the De Black Evening Folies’ (Jenje-Makwenda 2005: 94); that Paul and Jeremy Brickhill are bigger than the role of Zapu cadres. Paul, the father, husband, jazz player, book seller, restaurant owner, writer and philosopher did more than many politicians to widen our sense of liberation. It is disheartening to see how we have managed to record Zimbabwe’s liberation without acknowledging the creative role of many ‘sites of struggle’ and different cultural forms. The story of Elizabeth Musodzi illustrates how dominant history is unfair to the real creators of value and how processes of value creation are more complex than is often acknowledged. It is interesting and significant that the story of Elizabeth Musodzi is brought to the public by a Japanese ardent researcher, a white Jesuit priest, a white Maryknoll nun and a white English professor. It is also interesting that while she was married to a Zambian migrant Frank Ayema, she is known in the public by her first name and her baptism name, Elizabeth Musodzi or simply Mai Musodzi. Yoshikuni summarizes the significance of Mai Musodzi and her Harare Women’s Club thus: The growing dynamics of the city life, in the wake of the great upheavals of the turn of the century, gave rise to a group of African women living in the cities who were quite sensitive to the social changes taking place around them. A new era was dawning, they felt, in which women might find richer and more fulfilling life outside the traditional or conventional boundaries of womanhood and family. Members of the Harare Women’s Club, including Musodzi, were among such women. While cherishing family as their strong point, they stepped into the ‘public sphere’. New housekeeping skills were eagerly pursued; various projects were undertaken to improve conditions of women and the community; and women were encouraged to have their own incomes separate from their husbands’. It is not difficult to see how some of these aspirations and activities, though in embryonic forms, became key traits of the ‘self-conscious’ women in modern Zimbabwe. To that extent, this study is an attempt to understand the origins of African feminism in Zimbabwe. (Yoshikuni 2007: vii)

The story of Mai Musodzi’s African feminism demonstrates that right from the start, any effort towards survival, liberation and transformation is a struggle that must think about the material and economic conditions to support the effort. As the members of the Harare Women’s Club

40 

D. KAULEMU

negotiated new values and created new values frameworks, they simultaneously saw the critical importance of developing productive capacities to accumulate ‘their own incomes’. It goes without saying that, in the struggles for liberation and transformation, there are many contradictions, ambivalences, unclarities in the projected values and yet they have directed and inspired many who may interpret them differently. Again, we can learn from wider feminist experiences how pluralism in values is at the centre of sustainable liberation efforts and development: Yet we must understand that the diversity itself which is being proposed as a principle for development will, necessarily, produce a multi-colored pattern of proposals for the future. We no longer believe that all these distinct, valuable alternatives must converge; in following our own critique of abstract, mechanistic, patriarchal thinking we must go forward into a world that articulates diversity yet builds a global commonality that will hold us together. (Yoshikuni 2007: vii)

At the national political level, politicians have not always been able to appreciate the importance of diversity and pluralism in values and many have been monumental disasters in building ‘a global commonality that will hold us together’.

Debating Values and Resources At the continental level, there have been many ‘proposals for the future’. History shows us many debates between individuals, political movements, economic experts, cultural players and African governments. One critical example occurred in the early 1960s. After serious debates between the Casablanca Group led by Kwame Nkrumah and the Monrovia Group led by Leopold Senghor ( ), it was decided in Addis Ababa in May 1963 for African governments to keep the established colonial country boundaries. The Casablanca Group, seen in those days as the more radical progressive group, which was made up of Ghana, Algeria, Guinea, Morocco, Egypt, Mali and Libya, wanted to establish a federation of African states. The Monrovia Group, led by Senegal included most of the former French colonies plus Nigeria, Liberia and Ethiopia, aimed at a voluntary and gradual economic integration without a political federal system. When the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was signed by 32

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

41

independent African states in 1963, it is clear that the values framework debate was not resolved. There have been serious debates, especially during the years of the ‘cold war’ between capitalism and socialism; between African socialism and socialist Africa (Babu 1981). Yet a sense of a common Africa was somehow established even as the debates continued. Maybe this is why the OAU was not able to achieve most of its goals and to implement a lot of its resolutions, thereby necessitating its disbanding in 2002. But there was enough sense of purpose to push African countries to have a second attempt to form a more effective entity called the African Union (AU). The AU, just as its predecessor, the OAU, is riddled with debates on values appropriate for Africa’s development. Many political and economic concepts and policies are essentially contested. There are creative and some not so creative debates on democracy, human rights, education, rule of law, socialism, capitalism, indigenization, national identity, nationalism, patriotism and development. But these should not be seen as merely debates about concepts. They are serious disagreements about how to secure better conditions, how to develop, not only for survival, but also for growth and flourishing sustainably. At local levels, the debates about ‘proposals for the future’ touch on people’s day-to-day lives. It is about evaluating and making choices on who is creating value and has a claim on the world’s resources in terms of land, property, income, jobs, money, roads, dams and institutions such as schools, clinics, churches and government service delivery. The life of Elizabeth Musodzi and the Harare Women’s Club demonstrates contextual, day-to-day, transformational leadership that is usually muzzled and suffocated by the political reductionist national leadership. Do people deserve more resources because they support the ruling party, or because they belong to a particular ethnic group, or because they own the land or because they have worked on the land which they do not own? These are serious questions with no easy answers. But many postcolonial African governments have wasted African resources and they have destroyed African productive capacities because they are blinded by their own self-­ interest to stay in power. This is illustrated by the Zimbabwean Government in what they called ‘Operation Murambatsvina to clean up the country of vendors, flea-market traders and foreign-currency dealers, and to destroy illegally built structures’ (Vambe 2008: 2). It was worse and even more sinister in Operation Gukurahundi where the government claimed that it was fighting national dissidents and went ahead to destroy Zimbabwean

42 

D. KAULEMU

human and natural life as well as Zimbabwean economic and cultural wealth in the name of a national political clean-up. Value frameworks are about guidelines to make decisions on matters of what is of value for society. These questions cannot avoid political questions and contestations. But some political efforts are more mature and more inclusive than others. The conflicting values and strategies can be seen in the debates in African literature, African philosophy, interpretations in African history, African politics and cultural studies. Each individual, each community, each religious and ethnic tradition incorporated into the new African nation state brings with it its own values, which may themselves be riddled with internal conceptual contradictions and problematic political implications around issues of patriarchy, class, gender, ethnicity and ecology. Under normal circumstances, a community, a nation or an ethno-cultural group is seen as such because it develops relatively agreed and consistent values and social guidelines that help the group to negotiate life, survive and sometimes to flourish. In most African countries, the modern African state was established before the modern African nation was built. The modern African state did not have a modern African nation to initiate and establish it using its own resources. The state was an imposition. Nation building was an imposed duty emanating from the state. This is the typical experience of modernity by Africans. We are taught to believe in and be inspired by things we have not directly experienced. And so, we have modern nationalism before modern nations are built. The temptation to resort to traditional nationalisms that are based on particular ethnicities is very high. Most of these ethnicities are political inventions that are expressions of power struggles and hegemonies (Ranger 1983; Vail 1989). This challenge, which affects the prospects of viability of the African nation state is clearly explained by Oswaldo de Rivero (2010). Rivero explains how the viability of African states is threatened by the absence of certain social, political and historical resources that created and supported substantive values frameworks and contexts in the history of Europe and America. These historical resources included the development of middle-classes and middle-class cultures, institutions and laws that pulled material, intellectual and spiritual resources together and created a certain type of material and cultural prosperity necessary for the realization of and characterization of the modern society. This modern society emerged from the coming together in synergies of scientific and technological progress together with capitalist growth facilitated by local national markets and political forms of democratic organization. Ross

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

43

Poole (1991: 3) emphasizes the centrality of the development of a particular form of production that heavily relies on social division of labour, a legal framework of private property and contract and ‘the emergence of a conception of identity and motivation focused on the independent private property-­owning individual’. In the context of Europe and North America, democracy was not initially invented for everyone. It was exclusive to property owning classes. It did not include women, children, the poor and the disabled. The democratic vote was linked to property ownership only available to a few. As Hegel points out, ‘In the states of the modern period, all legislation hinges upon security of property; it is to that most rights of the citizens relate’ (Avineri 1972: 9). But then, for Hegel, there is a distance between the nation, community or the people on the one hand and the state as the public power that works with the constitution and the community of propertied citizens. Yet the state and the people in Europe are intertwined in ways different from Africa. In Europe, even though some people are marginalized, the state can represent the local common good in ways the state in Africa does not. In Africa, the idea of ‘national capital’ in the sense that we understood of ‘French capital’ or ‘British capital’ is difficult to maintain. In Africa, national capital is almost always paradoxically foreign and hence the democratic vote is almost always empty. Citizenship is made universal in Africa only when property and wealth have been de-linked from it. This attempt to create a political democracy with no link to local land, wealth and property is what has been called neocolonialism. It is a sham. Karl Marx helped us to appreciate that all revolutions or social transformations are about access to property, resources or wealth and the use of that property to build a different or better society in terms of agency, freedom, ownership or access to property. This is important for the positive transformation of the nature and quality of the relations between people and between people and the environment. For Rivero (2010), the historical coming together of these various historical productive and institutional factors in Western Europe and North America created the material basis for the sustainability of the European and American nation state. Without this material and historical base, coupled with institutional capacities and processes to produce, distribute and consume the wealth, African ‘quasi nation-state cannot be viable. More so, this base is no longer available for the Africans’ (Avineri 1972: 6). They will have to look for alternative material bases and values frameworks. Much discussion in Africa today has been about alternative ways of

44 

D. KAULEMU

developing African societies. Kanyenze et al. (2011: 4–5) have pushed for how countries like Zimbabwe could move beyond the ‘enclave economy’. Kanyenze (2011) and company’s push is for the development of policies targeted to stimulating development in the neglected side of the economy and stimulate ‘pro-poor inclusive growth’. This, as in other African countries, has not been easy. Various creative and innovative approaches targeted at stimulating ‘small, micro and medium enterprise development and entrepreneurship have been proposed and are being attempted’ (Chikweche and Mugeyi 2015: 287). Efforts emanating from the land reform in Zimbabwe are being monitored and assessed to see what lessons about development can be learned (Scoones et al. 2010). Sachikonye et al. (2018) track the challenges faced by the labour movement under conditions of de-industrialization and the informalization of the economy after the land reform in 2000 and hope that the movement can build from the rubble. It is clear from a sustainable development perspective that the need for the creation of local wealth that can be used to support the transformation of lives locally cannot be overemphasized. To expect the African nation state to exist and develop without either regaining its expropriated material base or without creating an alternative one is to indulge in unproductive dreams. No society can realize its value system without the support of its local material wealth and the development and utilization of its productive capacities. In fact, value systems are about resources and the preferred priorities in the creation, use and consumption of wealth and property. Whether one is talking about the virtues of caring for one’s children or parents or the duties of contributing to the state through taxation to support welfare or the distribution of jobs and positions of power—it is all about how society creates, distributes and consumes its resources for the sake of a better ethical life and sustainable social flourishing. Poole (1991) helps us to appreciate that the ‘market moralities’ of modernity were grappling with these questions. They are questions about the best ethical ways of organizing the production, distribution and consumption of society’s material, intellectual, social and spiritual wealth. Consequentialism, of which utilitarianism is the most developed, looks at the empirical results of the proposed guidelines. Those arrangements that create the ‘greatest happiness for the greatest number’ are the best moral things to aim for. The dominant Kantian morality of duty is not satisfied by basing moral action and moral arrangements on the basis of empirical results especially for the majority. As John Rawls (1971: 27) protests, utilitarianism focuses on the total amount of happiness social

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

45

actions and arrangements accrue to the majority and so ‘Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons. For duty-based value systems, there must be limits to what the majority may want to claim and that there must be moral protection to the individuals especially the minority groups and individuals.’ And so, Rawls (1971: 3–4) declares: Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason, justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore, in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.

Poole and many other philosophers have analysed how modernity marginalizes the traditional moralities of virtue, care and character building that Mai Musodzi represented. These are pushed under to the ‘private sphere’ of the family and community. The people who are pushed into the private sphere—women, children, the disabled, the sick and the unemployed and underemployed are all undervalued and not paid. This is the system that Mai Musodzi defied and fought against by inviting herself and her friends into the public sphere. The moral values system of modernity is the morality of the public sphere of ‘production’, of the market, of law and bureaucratic administration. It is masculine, rational, competitive and aggressive. The significance of Mai Musodzi’s transformational leadership struggles is in defying this system in a productive and creative manner. Modern economists use, or should I say misuse Adam Smith (1972) to characterize the moral expectations and value claims of modern society when they quote the following passage: Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of the good offices that we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but

46 

D. KAULEMU

from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their advantages.

This is the dominant story of modern ethical values. It is a story told to allow a group of people justify why they claim more social resources than others. This modern story that universalizes selfishness and absolves people from caring, loving and being benevolent allows them to sleep peacefully at night after a rough day of aggression, cruelty, violence, slavery and colonialism in the public sphere. It is the story challenged by Mai Musodzi’s life as she and her colleagues struggle to introduced love, care and productive capacities into the public sphere. The public sphere, the market, is for those with property to sell or money to buy property. Those with neither money nor property have no business being on the market. This is the morality of the modern. In Africa, the logic is reversed. In the postcolony, the private sector tries to claim all the wealth and withdraw to enjoy it in private, while the majority of African citizens are left to practice democratic voting every five years— in poverty. In the postcolony, the African is eventually allowed to occupy the public institutions of the state at a time when the African state is bankrupt and cannot support its own activities and support its own budget. Many African states, including the African Union itself, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC) and other regional bodies rely on donations to finance their national budgets and to run their development programmes. This is a lesson that feminism has fully understood and yet our political leaders still have to learn to wean themselves from relying on charity and international handouts. Democracy cannot be produced in poverty. Social and political reconciliation cannot happen in conditions of material lack. In ethics, even those who chose to live frugal lives must make those choices in the presence of wealth. Fasting is a choice made by people with access to food. When there is no food to make a choice to fast, this is called poverty—it cannot be called fasting. It cannot be a choice when there is no wealth to choose not to use. To encourage African societies to go through peace building and reconciliation processes in poverty and while there is massive capital flight from the continent is like trying to extract water out of rocks. The issue of values development frameworks in Africa should not be discussed without taking into account the flight of wealth from the continent.

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

47

Discussions of values frameworks should not be delinked from the context of, as Walter Rodney described it, ‘how Europe underdeveloped Africa’ (Rodney 1973). The Tax Justice Network points out: Capital flight from Africa is a modern-day reincarnation of the colonial stateled plunder of the continent’s natural resources. In this new scramble for Africa, multinational corporations replay the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 and compete for a slice of the African cake. In a world with weak corporate sector regulation, multinational corporations capture Africa’s resources for cheap and repatriating profits, leaving behind an impoverished population and a devastated environment (https://taxjustice.net/2021/03/24/ capital-­flight-­from-­africa-­resource-­plunder-­and-­the-­poisoned-­paradises-­in-­ tax-­havens/).

Continued exploitation of Africa sucks the human energies and material resources that are needed to fuel Africa’s economic, political, cultural and institutional development and the cultivation of its productive and spiritual capacities. The towering African and global figures of Nelson Mandela and the now departed Desmond Tutu are right to say that there is ‘no future without forgiveness’ (Desmond Tutu 2000). This is why President Mandela, then, asked then, Archbishop Tutu to lead the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 1996 (https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/truth-­and-­reconciliation-­commission-­trc). However, as developments are showing in South Africa, and everywhere on the African continent, forgiveness will not be sustainable without transformation of African economies and the various extreme inequalities characterizing the contemporary African nation state. Forgiveness as a moral value, cannot be expected to be sustainable when other negative values like poverty, hunger and resentment are lurking from past and present injustices. Forgiveness and reconciliation will not be sustainable in conditions of economic inequalities, cultural inferiorities and ethical deprivations. Implicated in the need for cultural and moral transformation in the direction of reconciliation and social integration is the need for global economic and political transformation that gives the poor, marginalized and discriminated against access to resources that restore their dignity, agency and welfare. As Best et al. (2011a, b) demonstrate, justice anywhere in the world cannot be realized without interrogating global ‘systems of domination. In that analysis, ideologies and value systems should not be autonomized and

48 

D. KAULEMU

randomized (Wood 1986). They need to be discussed in their historical contexts, especially in their material conditions of possibilities. The attempt to randomize history and politics (Wood 1986: 76)—the attempt to discuss value systems and frameworks as if history and politics do not matter, as if the material conditions that make the values systems possible do not matter—is a clear and present danger in Africa. This encourages the illusion that people can forget who they are and where they have come from and that they can, in a magic moment, come to agreement, reconciliation and social cohesion. This is the myth of the dominant political theory of liberal contractarianism which is based on imagined contracts or agreements. They ignore the real-life realities of inequalities, exploitation and oppression.

Development, Culture and Lessons from History Oswaldo de Rivero (2010) talks about ‘the myth of development’. He demonstrates that historical realities show that under the current global economic and political architecture, the hopes for development that third world countries are given are a myth. He shows that it is a myth that poor countries can develop in the same way that European countries and North America did. History demonstrates this. In Africa, the state, markets, capital and development are discussed without linking them to their history of external imposition, property exploitations, political dominations and capital flight from local African communities. As Chang (2014: 28) demonstrates, the beauty of history is in showing us how things like the state, markets, capital and development have emerged and the conditions surrounding them. Understanding their history helps to demystify them. African countries cannot reproduce the conditions of development available to European countries and North America when these countries developed between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. To begin with, African countries cannot reproduce the benefits from slavery, slave trade, piracy, resource plunder, colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism that Western countries benefited from and are still benefiting from. Secondly, as Chang (2010) points out, Western countries are today actively ‘kicking away the ladder’ by preventing African and other developing countries from using the very economic and political policies that supported their own development such as promoting the ‘infant industry argument’. It is folly of the highest order to separate issues of ideology, value systems and

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

49

politics from issues of wealth and wealth creation, property rights and economic productive capacities and definitions of what is of value. The history of political economy is a history of various ethical and political claims of what creates value and the implications of those claims towards having access to wealth and welfare. Chang (2014: 401) makes a legitimate claim that ‘economics is a political’ and indeed a moral argument. It is clear that in the movement from feudalism to industrial capitalism, the new productive capacities help to redefine the priority source of value from the land to industrial production. In feudalism, it is the land that creates value and the people with land are rewarded by the system. With industrial capitalism, land loses to industrial production as the major creator of value. And so, the people with industrial capital, able to put together capital in order to make products using division and management of labour, machines and other technologies, are the people who make moral and political claims to monopolize value. This is why in the world attributed to Adam Smith, the people pushed to the private sphere— women, children, the sick, the old, the disabled and the unemployed are not paid. In this story, they do not produce nor do they contribute to production and therefore do not deserve to be paid. The more distant they are from the production process, the less they should expect to access social resources. ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker’, that they should expect their dinner! We have since moved to service economies and then to finance capitalism, where the claims to control value have been changing and raging. Until the 1960s, finance was not widely considered a ‘productive’ part of the economy. It was viewed as important for transferring existing wealth, not creating new wealth. Indeed, economists were so convinced about the purely facilitating role of finance that they did not even include most of the services that banks performed, such as taking in deposits and giving out loans, in their calculations of how many goods and services are produced by the economy. (Mazzucato 2018: xiv)

Different economic and political theories tell different stories about the economy in order to propose how social resources are produced, distributed and consumed. Classical economists believed that the capitalist class deserved to be rewarded for their ability to invest. They saw feudal landlords as wasteful and lazy and the working class as too poor to invest. Hence classical economics has stories to justify how it distributes social

50 

D. KAULEMU

wealth. Marxists, through the labour theory of value, argued that it was labour power that was critical to the production of value and therefore has the greatest right to have access to social wealth. For Marxists, socialism was a way of reorganizing society so that those who produced are rewarded more justly. This required the banishing of the institution of private property. Feminism, especially eco-feminism, has been excellent in demonstrating how dominant economic theories have been exploiting women and nature without paying for it. Feminists tell stories to help us appreciate the injustices and unsustainability of established economic and political systems. They interrogate the principles used to reward patriarchal, capitalist and ecologically unsustainable arrangements and relations. As a new democratic or aspiring democratic entity, the postcolonial national state, if it is to be a viable and sustainable political project, must create space and time to interrogate the competing value systems and ethno-communities invited, peacefully or otherwise, to the African nation-­ state project. What stories are brought onto the table to justify the production, distribution and consumption of social wealth? What conversations and engagements are there to try and reconcile these stories and make sure ‘no one is left behind’? This means that in a country like Zimbabwe, there is need, if it is to be a sustainable project, to create spaces and time to recognize all the communo-cultural groups in the country and their respective material and institutional resources, cultural values and frameworks. The idea is to re-direct their material wealth, political energies, cultural structures, economic resources and emotional responses towards the new national project. This is a tall order as most of them have lost most of their human and natural resources to colonialism, corruption and capital flight. But it is not impossible if placed in its global contexts and solidarities. There needs to be heavy material, economic, institutional, cultural and emotional investment into the African democratic project if it is to be able to support and maintain viable nation states. There are those who believe in cultural determinism and ‘the clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 1993). The UNDP global report of 2004 demonstrated how to create cultural viability in national states and in the world. This Report makes a case for respecting diversity and building more inclusive societies by adopting policies that explicitly recognize cultural differences—multicultural policies…Policies recognizing cultural identities and encouraging diversity to flourish do not result in fragmentation, conflict, weak development or authoritarian rule. Such policies are both viable, and

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

51

necessary, for it is often the suppression of culturally identified groups that leads to tensions. (UNDP 2004: 2)

The Report convincingly debunks the following five myths that undermine cultural viability (UNDP 2004: 2–7): Myth 1: People’s ethnic identities compete with their attachment to the state, so there is a trade-off between recognizing diversity and unifying the state. Myth 2: Ethnic groups are prone to violent conflict with each other in clashes of values, so there is a trade-off between respecting diversity and sustaining peace. Myth 3: Cultural liberty requires defending traditional practices, so there could be a trade-off between recognizing cultural diversity and other human development priorities such as progress in development, democracy and human rights. Myth 4: Ethnically diverse countries are less able to develop, so there is a trade-­ off between respecting diversity and promoting development. Myth 5: Some cultures are more likely to make developmental progress than others, and some cultures have inherent democratic values while others do not, so there is a trade-off between accommodating certain cultures and promoting development and democracy. We learn then that there is no culture or cultural group that cannot contribute to the sustainability of society. Hence policies that promote multiculturalism and political participation contribute to the sustainability of the societies cultivated in the postcolony and hence to development in the postcolony. What we also learn from history is that cultures, value frameworks and moralities are sponsored and supported by material wealth, institutional and organizational structures and productive capabilities (Chang 2014). Chang explains ‘productive capabilities’ as involving ‘organized, collective efforts inside and outside productive enterprises’ (Chang 2014: 246) that lead into investment for wealth production, improved technologies, innovative and appropriate work organization and facilitative government policies, guidelines, encouragements and cultural values. All cultures are successful to the extent that they control and are supported by their own productive capacities as part of those cultures and values frameworks. Imperialism and colonialism try to separate people from their productive capabilities so that it is the imperial power or the colonizer who

52 

D. KAULEMU

controls those capacities to produce, distribute and consume. More important for us in this essay, they also control the production of values and values frameworks that guide people’s social and political priorities. To be colonized is mainly to be separated or alienated from productive capabilities and to depend on the colonizer for survival, self-­understanding and value frameworks. This loss of the right to produce one’s own value system is one of the most debilitating losses of the human being. Ngugi wa Thiong’o (2005) has done a lot to help us understand the link between productive capabilities, cultures, language and self-understanding. Fanon (2005) diagnosed the problem of Africa’s value frameworks as being sponsored and supported from outside Africa. The bourgeois phase in the underdeveloped countries is only justified if the national bourgeoisie is sufficiently powerful, economically and technically, to build a bourgeois society, to create the condition for developing a sizable proletariat, to mechanize agriculture, and finally to pave the way for a genuine national culture.

Fanon contrasts the bankruptcy of the middle classes of Africa with the more authentic ones in Europe. The middle classes of Europe are more authentic to Europe in the ways in which they have contributed to the wealth, growth, self-understanding and value systems of Europe. The material contributions of European middle classes can be seen in science, technological developments, philosophy, theology, anthropology, sociology, history and many other aspects of European civilization. The middle classes of Africa contribute more to Europe and to themselves than to Africa. The European bourgeoisie was able to ideologically influence European civilization because of its leadership in the trends that came together in the production of wealth and capabilities to produce wealth. The Cartesian ego (Descartes 1940: 12–124) and Leibnitzian ‘monad’ (Descartes 1940: 294–329) were able to gain ideological influence because they could be appropriated, recycled, mechanized and moralized onto the capitalist market. Adam Smith, who saw himself as a moral philosopher became ideologically important for capitalism as an economist. Adam Smith, the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, wrote his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which was published in 1759. This story is lost to the world because it does not fit well in the dominant neoclassical and neoliberal economics story of Adam Smith, ‘the father of modern

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

53

economics’. In this story, the book he wrote later, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, is re-interpreted as a purely scientific economics text severed from its relationship with ethics and politics. Here, neoliberal economics, masquerading as a hard science, tries to purge from its realm any evidence of political and ethical claims. Using the rhetoric of hard science, it claims the objectivity of hard sciences in order to gain authority to determine how social wealth should be handled. Hence the use of Adam Smith’s neoliberal economics to legitimize free trade, free markets, private property ownership and to disparage the role of the state, socialism and the role of emotions, care and property redistribution in economic development.

Values Are Not Merely About Values Values are about life in all its dimensions. People evaluate in order to determine priorities in life on a day-to-day basis. The value concept of freedom is not just good for conceptual analysis. It is important because its understanding is meant to inform and inspire the determination of social and political priorities in real-life chances. Values should not be discussed independently of the material conditions that make them possible—the conditions that support or are supported by them. Unfortunately for Africans, part of what it means to be colonized or to be formerly colonized is to be sent on a wild goose chase. It is to be expected to learn democracy while being excluded from democratic structures; to learn about power while being prevented from wielding power; to appreciate the importance of capital accumulation while being denied access to capital. African education teaches Africans about institutions, processes and organizations that Africans only encounter in books and films and not in real life. Very few people who study accounting, business administration, development studies and aero-dynamics have opportunities to practise those fields. It is unfortunate that many African postcolonial leaders have not understood the full significance of values and how those values are created from many different angles even in the same communities and nations. They do not fully appreciate that because different theories support different values systems even in the same communities, it is important to create space for conversations between them. Ha-Joon Chang (2014) has demonstrated the limits of economic theory and has declared that there is no one economic theory that can explain everything that we need to understand

54 

D. KAULEMU

about an economic situation. This is not only true of economic theory. There is not one economic, political, social theory or value theory that can explain the human condition. We need insights from all of them. More importantly, we need people, especially ordinary people to engage with them and with each other in order to respond to concrete political, economic and cultural situations. Participation and engagement are key to testing and implementing our value systems. To illustrate the point above, we can look at the debates in value creation in economics. Various value frameworks have demonstrated in history that nature creates value. The physiocrats in France in the mid-eighteenth century used ethical and political arguments to defend farmers’ interests against the interests of merchants. Francois Quesnay (1694–1774), the leading figure in this tradition, argued that ‘land was the source of all value’. As Mazzucato (2018: 29) explains, he believed that Nature actually produced new things: grain out of small seeds for food, trees out of saplings and mineral ores from the earth from which houses and ships and machinery were built. By contrast, humans could not produce value. They could only transform it: bread from seeds, timber from wood, steel from iron. Since agriculture, husbandry, fishing, hunting and mining bring nature’s bounty to society, Quesnay called them the ‘productive class.’ By contrast, he thought that nearly all other sectors of the economy—households, government, services and even industry, … were unproductive. (Mazzucato 2018: 29)

Physiocrats have given us moral and political arguments in support of nature. The physiocrats have a point. Yet the story does not end there. Mercantilism is an alternative economic theory that developed in the time of European imperialism and colonialism when European governments wanted to create resources to sponsor their exploratory expeditions and adventures, bureaucratic structures to protect their trade routes, to buy exotic goods from faraway places and to support their wars of conquering and managing new nations. With the ‘discovery’ of precious minerals like gold and silver in the colonies, the minerals were seen as a critical source of value. ‘As these precious metals represented wealth and prosperity, it seemed to mercantilists that whoever bought, owned and controlled the supply of them and the currencies minted from them was engaged in productive activities’ (Mazzucato 2018: 23). Mercantilism became a theory which took trade and the accumulation of minerals, especially gold, as

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

55

‘productive’ in terms of creating value. Mercantilism helped to create the whole tradition of ‘national wealth’ and the systems of measuring it, culminating in national accounting systems that we use today and that focus on the gross national product (GNP). Whatever the historical origin or the limits of mercantilist theory, no country today can ignore the calculation of GNP. Yet this is not the whole story. As industry developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, industrial labour gained more importance than trade and hence the birth of the classical economics’ labour theory of value. ‘Classical economists believed that the value of a product is determined by supply conditions, that is, the cost of its production’ (Chang 2014: 120). Classical economics and especially Marxism helped to develop this theory which made immense contributions in the development of national and global labour movements. Neoclassical economists, on the other hand, ‘shifted the focus of economics from production to consumption and exchange’ (Chang 2014: 121). This is today the dominant global economic values framework which has facilitated for finance capitalism to begin dominating and even undermining ‘real economies’ of production through nature and industry. All these theories of values have demonstrated important insights. But their respective weaknesses too have been shown in history. Each theory makes empirical claims and ethical and political demands and prescriptions about social realities. Each theory makes claims about what is of value, how that value is created and how it is distributed and consumed. More importantly, each theory goes further to critically assess how what is of value is in fact distributed in order to prescribe how it ought to be distributed. All these activities cannot avoid political contestation. Questions raised in these social realities are not easy to answer. Answers cannot be allowed to come from arbitrary and authoritarian decrees. Answers need to come from constantly and endlessly developing democratic processes.

Grappling with Dominant African Ethical and Political Strategies The questions of values in Africa have been deeply political because they have been asked in the context of colonialism, neocolonialism, liberation struggles for independence, religious influences from ‘world religions’ and many postcolonial struggles. Questions of moral values have been intricately mixed up with questions of what is of value. To begin with, the very

56 

D. KAULEMU

experience of slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism raises questions of the value of Africa, of Africans and of their respective identities. Achille Mbembe summarizes this when he writes: First, the African experience constantly appears in the discourse of our times as an experience that can only be understood through a negative interpretation. Africa is never seen as possessing things and attributes properly part of “human nature.” Or, when it is, its things and attributes are generally of lesser value, little importance, and poor quality. It is this elementariness and primitiveness that makes Africa the world par excellence of all that is incomplete, mutilated, and unfinished, its history reduced to a series of setbacks of nature in its quest for humankind. (Mbembe 2015: 1)

When questions of values in Africa are raised, they immediately conjure up issues of value and especially the value and identity of the African subject. These agonizing questions are deeply political and ethical. The questions of identity have implications for values and of value. The values, moral and cultural, help to choose and determine what is of value, what is worth. But what is identified as of value also helps to share moral and cultural values. This dialectic was identified and expressed by the questions that W.E.B. Dubois asked in the context of the African Americans’ response to oppression. Cornell West constantly summarizes these questions in his public lectures. . What shall integrity do in the face of oppression? 1 2. What shall honesty do in the face of deception? 3. What shall decency do in the face of insult? 4. What shall virtue do in the face of brute force? These are questions that Africans have faced with courage but differently. Integrity, honesty, decency and virtue are values that many Africans have tried to cultivate in the face of oppression, deception, insult and brute force. For many, the very response is an expression of the identity of the African. But the responses, whether ethical or political, have not always been the same. These questions have triggered more questions about how Africans, in their quest for development, could deal with the colonial and postcolonial conditions. Development, like the quest for value, has been essentially contested even among Africans as they appeal to different values and strategies.

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

57

Can the freedom fighter dis-engage from the colonial project? What form does this dis-engagement take? These are very difficult questions to answer. The debate in literature reflected the difficulties of responding to this question. But it is clear that there is no one way of being African. Sharp African voices express themselves differently but all making genuinely African responses. I have demonstrated this point by looking at the debate in African literature between Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Wole Soyinka and Chinua Achebe and found the first steps of an answer in Chimamanda Adichie (Kaulemu 2021). The four demonstrate how African virtue and African values frameworks are always fundamentally ambiguous. We must celebrate that ambiguity and richness of our cultures and never reduce them to one African identity and one political and ethical position. Ngugi wa Thiong’o seemed to declare that, for Africa to create its own value, it has to resort to its own identity and its own resources and dis-­ engage and totally reject the colonial system and its values. For him it was the rejection of the English language and the Christian religion that was the first step. After writing novels in English as James Ngugi, he abandoned both the English language and his Christian name. He became Ngugi wa Thiong’o. Ngugi’s approach has been popular among those Africans who feel strongly that Africans have their values, identities, institutions and resources they can use for their own development. These values and identities have been characterized in terms such as Ubuntu (Ramose 1999), Negritude (https://www.britannica.com/art/ Negritude), indigenization, and in terms of the various ethnicities found on the continent. But the Ngugi project of saying ‘Farewell to English’ seems to be a very difficult, if not impossible, project in the context of globalization. If Wallerstein (2004) is right that there is now only one world which is economically interconnected and Africa has been forcibly given a specific role in the periphery of that world, then the Ngugi project might be impossible. Yet Ngugi makes an important point about what is of value, where to look for it and how to cultivate it. To be genuinely African, one must understand one’s self, one’s language and culture and reject non-African identities, values and non-African languages and evaluations. Africans must create their own value through their own capacities, institutions and authentic values. But there will still be many debates about what this means. But this is not the only African answer. There are other African alternatives. Wole Soyinka’s solution seems, on the surface, to be an act of selling out to imperialism and colonialism. He speaks and writes the English

58 

D. KAULEMU

language and aims and works to outdo the English in both and to demonstrate more of his humanity than his Africanness. Of course, he does not deny that he is African. He achieves his goal by winning the Nobel Prize for Literature. But who can doubt that Wole Soyinka is an African through and through? No matter how convincing Ngugi is, I cannot doubt Soyinka’s commitment to the African causes to the global re-evaluation of the African subject. He has been persecuted for it in Nigeria. He has inspired and supported many young Africans to be what they aspire to be, sometimes even beyond the African skies. Soyinka has created a lot of value for Africa. He has contributed to the expansion of African values. But Ngugi has suffered for the continent too and inspired and enriched many Africans too. I cannot doubt Ngugi’s commitment to the African causes either. Yet Soyinka has a point. He has demonstrated the value that the African can create and contribute on the local and global stages. Africans must show themselves and others that they can perform any task with intelligence and ability. The African has no monopoly over incompetence, inadequacy and stupidity. In development terms, Soyinka’s strategy is consistent with the values of multiculturalism, internationalism, universalism and global citizenship. Who can doubt the value of all these values? Is Chinua Achebe’s strategy of using English to do his work realistic? For Achebe, English is a tool, a technology that anyone can pick and use for their own purposes. I am convinced by Achebe too. He has suffered for his conviction too. He is genuinely African. He reminds us how much we work to acquire the English language. We invest so much in it. Our parents pay school fees for our education. We spend sleepless nights learning the language. Teachers sometimes punish us for failure. This is all investment in learning the language. English in Africa is not merely a colonial imposition. We therefore have a right to claim it. It is ours now. It is part of our cultural wealth. No one has a right to take it away from us. Not even the British. English is our tool and we can use it in the way we want. Who can doubt that Achebe is a true African working for the African cause even as he writes in English? It is his English now! Achebe’s moral and political position was demonstrated by the African leaders in 1963 when they claimed the African state institutions for themselves, despite their colonial origins. His position is of the tradition of abrogation and appropriation. No society develops sustainably without appropriating from other cultures. Then comes Chimamanda Adichie’s ‘The Danger of a Single Story’. Taking a refreshingly feminist position, she shines light on the beauty and

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

59

indeed value that comes out of listening to many stories. She points to the dangers, ugliness and violence that comes out of attempts to banish alternative stories in the name of -isms which Africans and the world have experienced for many years. She stands in the long tradition that interrogates powers that are allergic and afraid of ambiguity and nuance. Adichie’s sensibility is in the tradition of Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. Whatever the answer to these questions, it appears to me to be cruel for one approach, a ‘single story’ to be declared the only one authentic African response. I want to believe that Ngugi, Soyinka, Achebe, Adichie and many more are all genuine fighters for freedom for Africans and for humanity. As Africans we must celebrate all of their efforts. Attempts to banish this rich debate between African responses to colonialism will result in postcolonial oppression that reproduces oppressive colonial cultures. It also appears to me that any of these African responses to colonialism are capable of reproducing the violence of the colonial system. The issue about sustainable development is about how to strike a balance between various productive activities and the competing claims to have access to the value created. More importantly, it is about how the created value can contribute to ecological sustainability and human flourishing. Striking a balance between, and honouring the contributions from nature, from the caring and love economy, the industrial productive sectors and the financial supporting instruments is the challenge of sustainable development. It is worth pursuing though we know it is an endless project.

Values and Sustainable Development A lot has been written on sustainable development. The national and global UNDP reports have over the years clarified and widened our understanding of sustainable development. This chapter contributes to this continuous widening of the meaning of sustainable development by emphasizing the importance of values and their link to understandings of what is valuable in life. Development as a concept can be misleading because of the context within which it emerged. Its history suggests links with things rather than life, relationships and cultural values. The concept’s historical association more with industrial growth than with natural human and ecological connections and relationships has been misleading. The overly modernist and scientistic push towards finding strict mathematical criteria for measuring development in terms of material growth

60 

D. KAULEMU

has contributed to undermining the contribution of other values to sustainable development. As Albert Einstein said, ‘Everything that can be counted does not necessarily count; everything that counts cannot necessarily be counted’ (https://fyi.extension.wisc.edu › eparenting › 2013/09/25). Many things of value that contribute to development can be measured and the UN Development Index has continued to be expanded for this. However, we must allow ourselves to accept that many things of value to development may be difficult to count. Africa’s experience of disruption of cultures, values and relationship between people and between people and the environment should help us to appreciate losses that may not be measurable and yet are critical. The UNDP Development Report 2002 did well to encourage ‘Deepening democracy in a fragmented world’ (UNDP 2002). The challenge, however, is to link and reconcile what different societies and communities regard as of value with the requirements of democracy. The challenge is to motivate societies to make those links. For development to be sustainable, these links need to be made. The UNDP recognized this in their report of 2004 when they declared: Accommodating people’s growing demands for their inclusion in society, for respect of their ethnicity, religion, and language, takes more than democracy and equitable growth. Also needed are multicultural policies that recognize differences, champion diversity and promote cultural freedoms, so that all people can choose to speak their language, practice their religion, and participate in shaping their culture—so that all people can choose to be who they are. (UNDP 2004)

Sustainable development covers more than the sustainability of economic institutions and their development. It demands more than the sustainability of political institutions. It must include the sustainability of the values that societies produce and the sustainability of what they consider to be of value. It is easier to demonstrate through history some values that have proved to be socially and culturally unsustainable such as racism, sexism, tribalism and violence. It is more difficult to identify and to measure the virtues, values and inspirations that have sustained individuals and societies over challenging times. Mills (1959) identified three kinds of questions that the sociological imagination has to ask. He gave the first two sorts of questions that are usually focused on by analysts as follows:

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

61

1. What is the structure of this particular society as a whole? What are its essential components, and how they are related to one another? How does it differ from other varieties of social order? Within it, what is the meaning of any particular feature for its continuance and for its change? 2. Where does this society stand in human history? What are the mechanics by which it is changing? What is its place within and its meaning for the development of humanity as a whole? How does any particular feature we are examining affect, and how is it affected by, the historical period in which it moves? And this period—what are its essential features? How does it differ from other periods? What are its characteristic ways of history-making? The third sorts of questions are usually ignored and yet they are critical to the sustainability of any society. He describes them as follows, 3. What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What kinds of ‘human nature’ are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period? And what is the meaning for ‘human nature’ of each and every feature of the society we are examining? Sustainable development must include the study of how societies identify what is of value and assess if what has been chosen contributes to social and ecological sustainability. One way to do this is to create spaces, times and conditions for individuals and communities to encounter and engage one another. As Jack Appleton (2014: 18) points out, ‘A sustainable development project should start with a Participants’ Values Analysis.’ The analysis is to pave way for robust engagement and authentic collaboration. Appleton’s method applies mainly to development projects at organizational level, but it can be relevant even when the development project is at a national-­ state level. As Appleton (2014: 21) explains: Adam Kahane reminds us that “the complex and vital challenges we face cannot be addressed effectively by any one [participant], and so we need to build our capacity for co- creation”…. In order to move forward together,

62 

D. KAULEMU

“each actor’s interests and needs and power need to be understood, recognized and taken into account”…. The argument is simple: the co-creation of the capacity to understand, respect, and appreciate each other’s interests and needs, and their source, that which we care about (our values), has to be the starting point, not a continuous residual issue that is dealt with when it’s an impediment to the completion of a sustainable development project.

Because most African countries are multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-­ cultural, multi-historical entity with people with different political, economic and traditional interests and persuasions, they have to be co-created through dialogue, engagement and mutual respect. Values and value systems and frameworks are at the centre of this process. This is more so to address the values and legacies of imperialism, colonialism, racial and gender discrimination and oftentimes local patriarchal and ethnic tensions and clashes.

Conclusion: Moral Values, Sustainable Development and Social Transformation Moral values are about what ought to be and not just what is the case. Moral values are essential for sustainable social, economic and political development and transformation. For example, we appeal to our moral values to change the way the world is in order to improve it for all groups of people. Moral values inspire social transformation. This is what welfare and development programmes as well as liberation struggles should be about if they are to be sustainable. Liberation struggles on their own are not adequate. They should not just fight against oppression, exploitation and disrespect, but they should also inspire people to positively build alternative social, political and economic structures, processes and values frameworks. Feminism, for example, is based on dissatisfaction with the ways in which the world is organized for women. Its values inspire people to fight for the aspirations of women and everyone else. It challenges the constructed gender roles for women and the consequent impact on the kinds of men and women those roles churn out in the world. With gender-­ based violence, child abuses and femicide increasing, feminism points out how these realities are not what ought to be. Feminist ethical values are meant to suggest ways of building alternative worlds that make women’s lives better. But if feminist value theories are to be ethical, they will also have to suggest how the lives of men and boys will not be de-valued in a

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

63

feminist world. Young people, migrants, people with disabilities, workers, unemployed and underemployed and many other groups are raising their voices to point out how the established systems are undermining their humanity and sometimes pointing out what value they can bring onto the table. Sustainable social transformation can only succeed when all these groups find space to negotiate their contributions and how no one under the world they envision will be disadvantaged or exploited. Success in these efforts is not assured. But it is worth trying. It is the human thing to do. The major problem with African political values frameworks is that they are not fully ethical. In other words, they do not reflect on the appropriate space for their opponents and enemies. An ethical system is not just self-­ interested. It should reflect on establishing a world in which the lives of the victims are made better without turning the former perpetrators of injustice into victims. An ethical value system tries to establish a world in which all groups of people find space to realize their potential without undermining that of others. In thinking about ethical value systems, it is important that we benefit from all ethical traditions. Egoism reminds us not to forget about ourselves. In thinking ethically our self-interest must count. Yet egoism is not all of morality. African leaders who have only thought of themselves have let us down (Sachikonye 2012). Duty ethics reminds us to cultivate good intentions and to look at the rationality of our intensions. Kant helped us to understand that this involves universalizing our moral intensions and to make sure that in our intensions we include and recognize everyone and all of God’s creation. But in Africa, we have learnt that good intentions, on their own are not enough. Development programmes intended for the greater good, poverty reduction and social welfare have ended up creating dependency, corruption and more poverty (Bolton 2008). Consequentialism, especially utilitarianism, reminds us that ethical action must make a difference in the world in terms of affected people’s overall welfare and happiness. In other words, ethical action must have good overall empirical results. But we know that good results of actions are not, by themselves, all there is to morality. The processes by which those results are achieved are important. As they say, ‘the end does not justify the means.’ Virtue ethics reminds us to cultivate moral qualities to build good characters in human beings. We have to care about the types of people being produced by our respective societies. But history has demonstrated that good character must grapple with the real world. Good character

64 

D. KAULEMU

must try to cultivate, widen and deepen human integrity, honesty, decency and virtue in the face of oppression, deception, insult, brute force and catastrophe. There is no road map to sustainable development and social transformation. While all value systems must contribute to development and transformation if it is to be sustainable, their reconciliation is not assured. Yet we should never give up the noble human endeavour.

References Abraham, W.E. 1992. Crisis in African Cultures. In Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, I, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu and K. Gyekye. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Appleton, Jack. 2014. Including Participants’ Values in the Sustainable Development Process. In Values in Sustainable Development, ed. J. Appleton. London and New York: Routledge. Arizpe, L. 1994. Preface. In Feminist Perspectives on Sustainable Development, ed. W. Harcourt. Rome: London and New Jersey, Zed Books in association with Society for International Development. Avineri, S. 1972. Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Babu, A.M. 1981. African Socialism or Socialist Africa? Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House. Berlin, I. 1984. Two Concepts of Liberty. In Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. M. Sandel. New York: NYU Press. Best, S., et al., eds. 2011a. The Global Industrial Complex: Systems of Domination. Lanham: Lexington Books. Best, S., Richard Kahn, Anthony J. Nocella II, and Peter McLaren. 2011b. The Global Industrial Complex: Systems of Domination. Lanham: Lexington Books. Biko, S. 2005. Biko, Steve, 1946–1977 I Write What I Like. Cambridge: ProQuest LLC, African Writers Series. Bolton, G. 2008. Aid and Other Dirty Business: An Insider Reveals How Good Intentions Have Failed the World’s Poor. London: Ebury Press. Brazier, A. 2017. Climate Change in Zimbabwe: A Guide for Planners and Decision Makers. 2nd ed. Harare: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Chang, H.-J. 2010. Kicking away the ladder: The Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. London: Anthem Press. ———. 2014. Economics: The User’s Guide, A Pelican Introduction. London: Penguin Books. Chavunduka, G. 1994. Traditional Medicine in Modern Zimbabwe. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

65

Chikweche, T., and K.  Mugeyi. 2015. Emerging Models of Inclusive Growth: Revisiting Entrepreneurship and SMMEs in Zimbabwe. In Beyond the Crises: Zimbabwe’s Prospects for Transformation, ed. T.  Murisa and T.  Chikweche. Harare: Weaver Press and Trust Africa. Chitando, E. 2013. Introduction: Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Troubled Times in Zimbabwe. In Prayers and Players: Religion and Politics in Zimbabwe, ed. E. Chitando. Harare: SAPES Books. Chitando, E., et  al., eds. 2022. The Life and Music of Oliver Mtukudzi: Reconstruction and Identity. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. De Rivero, Oswaldo (2010). The Myth of Development: Non-Viable Economies and the Crisis of Civilisation. 2nd edition. Trans. Claudia Encinas and Janet Herrick Encinas. London: Zed Books. Descartes, R. 1940. Selections from Rules for the Direction of the Understanding Meditations on First Philosophy. In Philosophers Speak for themselves: From Descartes to Locke, ed. T.V.  Smith and M.  Greene. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Eze, E.C., ed. 1997. Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Fanon, Fanon. 2005. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. Francis, Pope. 2015. Laudato Si’: Encyclical Letter of the Holy Father Francis on the Care for Our Common Home. Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa. Gyekye, K. 1997. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hountondji, P.J., ed. 1998. Endogenous Knowledge: Research Trails. Dakar: CODESRIA Book Series, The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. https://fyi.extension.wisc.edu › eparenting › 2013/09/25 https://taxjustice.net/2021/03/24/capital-­flight-­from-­africa-­resource-­plunder-­ and-­the-­poisoned-­paradises-­in-­tax-­havens/ https://www.encyclopedia.com/science/encyclopedias-­almanacs-­transcripts-­ and-­maps/technological-­fix https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/truth-­and-­reconciliation-­commission-­trc Huntington, S.P. 1993. Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Touchstone. Jenje-Makwenda, J. 2005. Zimbabwe Township Music. Harare: Storytime Promotions. Kanyenze, G., T. Kondo, P. Chitambara, and J. Martens, eds. 2011. Beyond the Enclave: Towards a Pro-Poor and Inclusive Development Strategy for Zimbabwe. Harare: LEDRIZ, Weaver Press. Kanyenze, G., H.  Jauch, A.D.  Kanengoni, M.  Madzwamuse, and D.  Muchena, eds. 2017. Towards Democratic Developmental States in Southern Africa. Harare: Weaver Press, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA).

66 

D. KAULEMU

Kaulemu, D. 2021. Political Leadership and the Challenges of Democracy in Africa. In African Theology in the 21st Century: A Call to Baraza, ed. E.O.S.J. Opongo and S.J. Paul Bere. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa. Mazarire, G.C. 2009. Reflections on Pre-Colonial Zimbabwe, c.850-1880s. In Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, ed. B. Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo. Harare: Weaver Press. Mazzucato, M. 2018. The Value of Everything: Making and Taking in the Global Economy. UK: Penguin Books. Mbeki’s Dream of Africa’s Renaissance Belied South Africa’s … https://theconversation.com›mbekis-­dream-­of-­africas-­… Mbembe, A. (2000). The End of Monologues. Editorial, CODESRIA Bulletin 1. ———. 2015. On the Postcolony. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Mills, C.W. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press. Mkandawire, T., ed. 2005. African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development. Dakar: CODESRIA Books. Moyo, S., Kirk Helliker, and Tendai Murisa, eds. 2008. Contested Terrain: Land Reform and Civil Society in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Pietermaritzburg: S&S Publishing, Imprint of Nutrend Publishers. Murisa, T., and T. Chikweche. 2015. Beyond the Crises: Zimbabwe’s Prospects for Transformation. Harare: Weaver Press. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2009a. Mapping Cultural and Colonial Encounters, 1880s-1930s. In Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, ed. B. Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo. Harare: Weaver Press. ———. 2009b. Do Zimbabweans Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and the Crisis in Postcolonial State. Oxford: Peter Lang. Nkrumah, K. 1967. Address to the National Assembly, Accra, 12 June 1965, Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah: Freedom Fighters’ Edition. London: Panaf Books. Nyerere, J. 1974. UJAMAA: Essays on Socialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Okara, G. 1978. The Fisherman’s Invocation: The First Collection of His Poetry. African Writer Series. London: Heinemann Educational Books. Poole, R. 1991. Morality and Modernity. London and New York: Routledge. Raftopoulos, B., and A. Mlambo, eds. 2009. Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008. Harare: Weaver Press. Raftopoulos, B., and T. Yoshikuni. 1999. Introduction. In Sites of Struggle: Essays in Zimbabwe’s Urban History, ed. B.  Raftopoulos and T.  Yoshikuni. Harare: Weaver Press. Ramose, M.B. 1999. African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books Publishers. Ranger, T. 1983. The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa. In The Invention of Tradition, ed. E.  Hobsbawm and T.  Ranger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING VALUES IN AFRICA 

67

Rodney, W. 1973. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle-­ L’Ouverture Publications. Sachikonye, L. 2012. Zimbabwe’s Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society. Harare: Weaver Press. Sachikonye, L., B. Raftopoulos, and G. Kanyenze. 2018. Building from the Rubble: The Labour Movement in Zimbabwe since 2000. Harare: Friedrich-Ebert-­ Stiftung, Weaver Press. Sachs, J. 2008. Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet. New  York: Penguin Books. Sadomba, Z.W. 2011. War Veterans in Zimbabwe’s Revolution: Challenging Neo-­ colonialism and Settler and International Capital. Rochester, New York: James Currey Press. Samkange, S., and T.M. Samkange. 1980. Hunhuism or Ubuntuism? A Zimbabwean Indigenous Political Philosophy. Harare: Graham Publishing. Scoones, I., et al. 2010. Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myths and Realities. Harare: Weaver Press. Shumba, J.M. 2018. Zimbabwe’s Predatory State: Party, Military and Business. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal University Press. Smith, Adam. 1972. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. I, book I, ch.ii. edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner. Oxford: Clarendon Press. The Danger of a Single Story | Ombuds. https://ombuds.umich.edu › article › danger-single-story Tutu, D. 2000. No Future without Forgiveness. New York: Image Book, Doubleday. UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2004. Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. New York: UNDP. UNESCO. 1979. Socio-Political Aspects of the Palaver in Some African Countries: Introduction to African Culture. Paris: UNESCO. Universal Negro Improvement Association. Garvey, Marcus, Cronon, Edmund David. Z. 1974. Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Vail, L., ed. 1989. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. California: University of California Press. Vambe, M.T. 2008. Introduction: Rethinking Citizenship & Subject in Zimbabwe. In The Hidden Dimensions of Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe, ed. M.T. Vambe. Harare: Weaver Press. Wa Thiongo, Ngugi. 2005. Europhone or African Memory: The Challenge of the Pan-Africanist Intellectual in the Era of Globalization. In African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development, ed. T.  Mkandawire. Dakar: CODESRIA Books Dakar in association with Zed Books.

68 

D. KAULEMU

Wallerstein, I. 2004. World Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Wiredu, K. 1992. The Moral Foundations of an Africa Culture. In Wiredu K. and Gyekye, K. eds., Person and Community, Ghananian Philosophical Studies, I, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series II, Africa, Vol.1, McLean, G. F. (General Editor). Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Wood, E.M. 1986. The Retreat from Class: A New ‘True’ Socialism. London: Verso. Yoshikuni, T. 2007. Elizabeth Musodzi and the Birth of African Feminism in Early Colonial Zimbabwe. Harare: Weaver Press and Silveira House.

CHAPTER 3

Africa and the Quest for Sustainable Development: A Critical Review Ezra Chitando

Introduction Africa’s development elicits different responses from diverse actors. For those who doubt the continent, putting the two words “Africa” and “development” together is to have two concepts that are unequally yoked. They would insist that Africa can only be associated with under- and de-­ development. Thus, The Economist could brutally summarize Africa as the, “Hopeless Continent” (The Economist 2000). Those who are in this camp appear convinced that Africa has struck some eerie covenant with poverty and nothing short of a miracle would be required to deliver Africa from the spirit of poverty. Some Pentecostal preachers in Africa have reinforced this line of thinking, proposing that Africa is held back by the spirit of poverty (Maxwell 1998), ancestral curses and other confounding and compounding spiritual forces. However, this is a minority position as most

E. Chitando (*) Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_3

69

70 

E. CHITANDO

Africans actively seek to improve their own chances in life, as well as those of their countries, regions and the continent. There are others who are persuaded that Africa is very much on a trajectory that leads to prosperity and development. The narrative of “Africa rising” (McKenzie 2016; Frankema and Van Waijenburg 2018), despite its problematic dimensions, is expressive of this conviction. Scholars and activists who belong to this camp contend that Africa is finally well placed to maximize on its resources and global goodwill to lift as many of its citizens out of poverty and promote human flourishing. They regard initiatives such as the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a strategic platform for Africa to capitalize on (Odusola 2017), although fears abound that Africa will yet again miss on achieving the set targets (Amodu 2020). Akinwumi A. Adesina, writing as the President of the African Development Bank Group, offers a more optimistic view. According to him: African economies have remained broadly resilient in the face of severe global and domestic challenges, with their rapid pace of growth in per capita incomes, an emerging middle class and a young labour force, and improved investment opportunities from local and international sources. This is therefore a brilliant and historic opportunity for the continent, and it should not be spurned. (Adesina 2017: 6)

It is fair to say that Africa has been subjected to multiple theories and practices of development. While detailing these is beyond the scope of this chapter, highlighting some of the major attempts remains valuable. Whereas some African intellectuals demonstrate remarkable creativity in refusing to accept Africa’s compromised position in relation to development, I am convinced that acknowledging this fact is critical if the continent is to make progress. Thus, I am inclined to accept that, “[A]lthough endowed with enormous and almost inexhaustible resources, Africa lags behind the other continents in every facet of life—economically, technically, politically and technologically” (Ojo 2016: 89). For me, the debate should not be about whether or not African citizens are flourishing—the majority clearly are not—but the major investment must be in identifying (potentially) viable strategies to promote or enhance development in Africa. Consequently, this volume seeks to contribute to this quest by reflecting on the possible contribution of values to Africa’s development. It does

3  AFRICA AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL… 

71

this while recognizing the assertion that “[C]ertainly, Africa’s development issues are complex, complicated, evolving, and dynamic” (Akanle and Adésìnà 2018: 3). The volume also builds on the following observation that was made with special reference to the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) in Africa, namely, that, “[A] dominant view among African scholars is that Africans should reenter the debate and assume the leading role in defining the continent’s development agenda” (Mkandawire and Soludo 1998: xii). The call for African voices and African visions (Adesida and Oteh 2001) remains strategic as Africa seeks to counter poverty and promote sustainable prosperity.

Development: Some Notes on a Loaded Concept While there is scholarly unanimity that there will never be unanimity on the meaning of concepts within the Arts and Humanities, it would be accurate to assert that the concept “development” supersedes others, at least in terms of the emotions that it generates. Whereas other popular concepts such as religion, history, literature, violence, nation, and others are contested, perhaps none of these concepts generates the same kind of emotion as development, particularly in the global South in general and Africa in particular. This is mostly because African intellectuals have associated the very concept of development with the ongoing racist, colonial and domineering portrayal of Africa as locked in perpetual childhood, as opposed to Europe and North America who have (supposedly) since reached full maturity and, with that, “development.” Many African intellectuals detect in the term “development” vestiges of the predisposition to contrast Africa with the so-called developed world. The doyen of African literature, Chinua Achebe, put it across lucidly when saying: Quite simply it is the desire—one might indeed say the need—in Western psychology to set Africa up as a foil to Europe, a place of negations at once remote and vaguely familiar in comparison with which Europe’s own state of spiritual grace will be manifest. (Achebe 1978: 2)

There is serious contestation regarding whether anyone has the mandate to classify certain countries as developed, while not using the same label for others (Chitando et al. 2020), as well as the challenge of how to measure development (Willis 2011). In this regard, it often looks arbitrary to deem some countries developed, while condemning Africa to

72 

E. CHITANDO

underdevelopment. Further, a defensive African spirit is quick to highlight that the so-called developed countries cannot do without Africa (due to the abundance of resources in Africa), while Africa can do without them. The question that is then posed is: who then is poor between them? This has been articulated brilliantly by Mallence Bart-Williams in her TEDx talk when she said, “It’s quite evident that the aid is in fact not coming from the West to Africa, but from Africa to the Western world. The Western world depends on Africa in every possible way since alternative resources are scarce out here.”1 In the midst of these ideological contests, it is worthwhile to recognize that the term development has a distinct history (Decker and McMahon 2020). Gilbert Rist’s (2019), The History of Development is particularly informative in tracing the discourse on “development” in the global North and its ideological application in distancing it from the global South. Rist (2019: 5–6) highlights the deployment of the concept from Ancient Greece to contemporary efforts seen in the Millennium (and, later, Sustainable) Development Goals. His description of the elasticity and problematic character of the term is quite illuminating. He writes: The strength of ‘development’ discourse comes of its power to seduce, in every sense of the term: to charm, to please, to fascinate, to set dreaming, but also to abuse, to turn away from the truth, to deceive. (Rist 2019: 1)

Alongside the challenges associated with the historical and ideological factors relating to the concept, some scholars have drawn attention to the painful experiences of Africa/ns in the context of development. They contend that to continue to accuse Africa/ns of not doing enough to achieve higher levels of development is to ignore the massive odds that Africa must surmount. Africa’s experiences of enslavement, exploitation and humiliation in the past and the present feature prominently in such narratives. Mafeje (1998: 118) argues that, “[C]olonialism is an important watershed in African history for it created a number of critical predispositions towards future development on the continent.” Decolonial scholars such as Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni evoke this memory. Thus:

1  Mallence Bart-William, 26 January 2015, “Change your channel,” TEDxBerlinSalon, www.youtube.com/watch, accessed on 28 January 2022.

3  AFRICA AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL… 

73

But the historical experience of Africa in the past 500 years invokes a fundamental question: What does development mean for a people struggling to emerge and free themselves from the inimical legacies of enslavement, colonialism, imperialism, apartheid, neocolonialism and underdevelopment, as well as impositions of the Washington Consensus and neo-liberalism? (Ndlovu-Gathseni 2018: 19)

This fact of Africa’s exploitation by various external actors is central to African intellectuals’ (and sometimes politicians and other citizens’) hermeneutic of suspicion when dealing with the outside world. They often wonder how it is possible for those who have benefitted (and continue to benefit) from Africa’s exploitation to pose as the continent’s benefactors. They evoke the memory of Africa’s painful experiences at the hands of various categories of exploiters to remind various constituencies that Africa’s challenges with development (see below) are mostly due to the violence meted out on Africa/ns by outsiders. Thus: The change in the pattern of relations from mutual trade and diplomatic exchanges to violent encounters permanently transformed Africa’s position in the world….In particular, the trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic slave trade, as well as colonialism, reproduced long-lasting socio-economic and political changes from which Africa is yet to recover…. The end of this series of violent encounters has done significantly [sic] altered the subservient pattern of relations that continue to define Africa’s relations with other parts of the world in our contemporary times. (Oruntoba and Falola 2022: 1)

While acknowledging the emotions generated by the historical and ongoing dehumanization of Africa/ns, it remains important to concede that there is no universally accepted definition of development. Africa’s engagement with development is tied to the continent and its people’s internal activities, as well as their interface with external players. However, explicating the meaning of development within Africa and beyond remains extremely challenging. According to Masiiwa R.  Gunda, drawing from Amartya Sen’s (1999) expansive understanding of development as freedom, it is vital to place human beings at the centre of development. For him, development is not about economic growth or figures, but about people. Thus, “This understanding of development places human beings at the centre of development; development is meaningless unless it improves the livelihoods of citizens in a particular community or society”

74 

E. CHITANDO

(Gunda 2020: 40). Others contend that there are a number of perspectives from which development might be viewed. Thus: We would argue that there are three discernable definitions of ‘development’…. The first is historical and long term and arguably relatively value free—‘development’ as a process of change. The second is policy related and evaluative or indicator led, is based on value judgements, and has short- to medium-term time horizons—development as the MDGs, for example. The third is post-modernist, drawing attention to the ethnocentric and ideologically loaded Western conceptions of ‘development’ and raising the possibilities of alternative conceptions. (Sumner and Tribe 2008: 11)

In response to the difficulties associated with the term development, and drawing on the third dimension referred to in the foregoing citation, some scholars have proposed the abandonment of the term altogether. For example, Ernst Conradie (2016) charges that the term development is a metaphor that has become over-extended and ossified. He proposes that it be replaced by the concept of maturation. Critiquing the cut-throat competition that has come to define contemporary economies, Ajei (2007: 220–223) proposes the adoption of humane economics. Others have called for the adoption of the concept of human flourishing in order to go beyond the measuring of development in terms of cold figures. In my opinion, the following thoughts on human flourishing are helpful: Conceptions of what constitutes flourishing will be numerous and views on the concept will differ. However, I would argue that, regardless of the particulars of different understandings, most would concur that flourishing, however conceived, would, at the very least, require doing or being well in the following five broad domains of human life: (1) happiness and life satisfaction; (2) health, both mental and physical; (3) meaning and purpose; (4) character and virtue; and (5) close social relationships. All are arguably at least a part of what we mean by flourishing. (VanderWeele 2017: 8149)

Space considerations imply that I am unable to reflect on other alternative labels that have been put forward to replace “development.” Maturation and human flourishing must be acknowledged as representing intellectual courage to refuse to uphold a problematic concept. In this regard, there is need to appreciate proponents of alternative concepts for their willingness to challenge the term “development,” despite its popularity. However, jettisoning a concept because it is problematic is itself

3  AFRICA AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL… 

75

problematic on at least two grounds. First, it might be interpreted as a failure to appreciate the role of a definition in the first instance. That is, a definition is not expected to finalize an inquiry, but only to provide a starting point. Second, and related to the first, the proposed alternative concepts, namely, maturation and human flourishing, do not escape the challenges of being open to multiple interpretations that haunt “development.” Therefore, on pragmatic grounds, I propose that we uphold the continued use of the concept “development” in the context of Africa. However, it must be used with the understanding that it is understood differently by different actors.

Africa’s Quest for Development: An Overview Having provided an overview of the challenges associated with the term “development” in the foregoing section, in this section, I endeavour to reflect on Africa’s quest for development. It is not possible to exhaust the numerous theories that have been put forward to account for both poverty and underdevelopment in Africa. Consequently, I seek to highlight some of the major issues that have been raised to try and account for Africa’s struggle with development. In describing the initiatives to promote development in Africa, it is important to recall that these have stemmed from different sources. This is expressed by one scholar as follows: There have been two types of development initiatives in post-independence Africa namely; initiatives by Africa and initiatives for Africa. The former refers to countryowned initiatives that were designed and implemented by African countries after independence. The latter refers to initiatives that are designed for Africa and implemented through international financial institutions. The two initiatives have different characteristics: Africa-owned initiatives were people-centred therefore they succeeded, to some extent, in terms human development. All the initiatives imposed on Africa, particularly since the 1980s, have been based on the “blind” and ruthless free market ideology and, they have all failed miserably. (Baah 2003: 1. Italics in original)

I find Baah’s distinction helpful, although I do not readily agree with his ideological attribution of success to Africa-owned initiatives and classifying all the externally driven initiatives as having failed miserably. I also appreciate Elias’ (2018: 360) attempt at historicizing Africa’s

76 

E. CHITANDO

development initiatives into colonialism, pan-Africanism and globalism. However, as I shall highlight in a subsequent section, there is need to invest in reflecting on the proposals of the pan-Africanists of the past, as well those who are flying the flag today. In this respect, therefore, I differ with Elias when he relegates pan-Africanism to a bygone era. However, the following reflection is quite persuasive: From the perspective of development, Africa’s history since colonization can be broken down into five periods: (1) the period of exploitation by the colonizers; (2) the period of early nation-building (the mid-twentieth century, roughly the 1950s–60s); (3) the period of ‘deepening’ of international aid (the 1970s–80s); (4) the period of post-Cold War globalization (the 1990s–2015); and (5) period of the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2015 onwards). (Park 2019: 16)

When discussing African theories of development, Ikechukwu (2016: 13) refers to “Pan Africanism, Consciencism, Negritude, African socialism, Arab-Islamic socialism, African Humanism, ‘Kagisano’ scientific socialism and Free market economy.” Apart from the Arab-Islamic socialism and free market economy, these were “home grown” theories and approaches to development. Unfortunately, they did not succeed in improving Africa’s quality of life in significant ways. They were mostly ideologically persuasive, but suffered from the notion of African philosopher-­kings, namely, politicians who arrogated the right to define the path of development for everyone else (Murove and Chitando 2018). The personalized development initiatives by some of the founding fathers (they were invariably male) of African nations were not the only ones. There were other initiatives such as the attempts at mimicking the “Soviet model” in countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Congo Brazzaville, Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau, or novel forms of socialism as in Tanzania (“Ujamaa”), Mauritius and Burkina Faso (under Thomas Sankara) (Mafeje 1998: 123–124) that had mixed outcomes. For example, Mauritius was more successful and remains on course for sustainable growth (see Tang et al. 2019). Other countries such as the Ivory Coast, Kenya and Malawi were being touted up to the end of the 1970s as successful examples of capitalist growth in Africa (Mafeje 1998: 124–125). The Lagos Plan of Action, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS), the New Partnership on Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (De Waal 2002), the African Union’s Agenda 2063, the United Nation’s

3  AFRICA AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL… 

77

Millennium Development Goals and the succeeding Sustainable Development Goals (Sparks 2016) are some of the initiatives that have sought or seek to spur development in Africa. There are two critical points to note about all these undertakings, although each one of them has (or has had) peculiar areas of emphasis. First, they have all succeeded in identifying the basic challenges that confront Africa. These factors that frustrate Africa’s quest for development are numerous, have been the focus of many studies and require more in-depth analysis than is possible herein. These include historical experiences such as the slave trade, colonialism and globalization, poor leadership and governance, the negative impact of aid, lack of coordination and integration, corruption and others. Second, the initiatives demonstrate, within limitations, the agency of Africans. Despite the serious stumbling blocks, such as development debts (Ndulu and O’Connell 2021) Africans have not resigned to their fate. They have not accepted poverty and inequality as some unavoidable consequence of curses. Further, they are asserting their presence on the global arena. Researches into and reflections on Africa’s international relations (Murithi 2014), as well as Africa’s place in the changing global order (Oruntoba and Falola 2022) confirm the resilience and commitment of Africans to take their rightful place globally and to stand up and be counted.

Some Strategic Issues for Africa’s Development Africa is not a lost cause when it comes to development. While realism demands that we accept that there are serious challenges that we must face with courage, conviction and creativity, we must appreciate the positive steps that have been undertaken to propel Africa’s development. Succeeding generations of African intellectuals, politicians, policy makers, activists and others have contributed and are working towards a more prosperous continent. Agenda 2063 represents an ambitious, but promising framework for promoting well-being and flourishing of Africa/ns. One of the most consistent Africans in policy framing and implementation at various levels, Carlos Lopez (see e.g., Lopez 2019) rightly calls for assessing what has gone wrong, but also recommends specific areas of engagement. These include industrialization, increasing agricultural productivity, revisiting the social contract, adjusting to climate change and asserting agency in relations with China.

78 

E. CHITANDO

Some have proposed that Africa should follow the development path that has been pursued by the Asian Tigers (see e.g., Lall 1996). The lessons Africa is expected to glean from the Asian Tigers include the role of the state in development and harnessing the power of technology. There should be no major ideological opposition to Africa interacting with the Asian Tigers, as they share much in common. However, it would be simplistic to assume that a cut-and-paste approach to development is possible. It is also important for Africa to pay attention to its unique advantage of having a young, dynamic population. This demographic dividend requires the continent to invest wisely in order to benefit from the energy and creativity of youth. Of course, if these young people face bleak futures, it is legitimate for security experts to raise alarm. However, with adequate investment in contraceptives, improving the health of women and children, quality education, adequate nutrition and other initiatives, Africa can benefit from the demographic dividend (Cilliers 2021: 94). The COVID-19 pandemic and the accompanying lockdowns have had serious implications for Africa’s development. Admittedly, this theme requires separate studies to bring out the extent to which African economies have been impacted negatively by the pandemic (see e.g., Anyanwu and Salami 2021). While the informal sector has been touted as contributing towards addressing Africa’s unemployment challenges, the pandemic laid bare the need to rethink the social security of citizens/workers/investors operating in this sector (see e.g., Mergese 2020). Africa will need to call on its notable resilience to recover from the losses in business, lost educational opportunities, loss of human resources, compromised food security and other challenges (UN 2020). The continent will need to ensure that the capabilities of girls and women are allowed to flourish. Africa’s development will not be development if the health and well-being of girls and women are not prioritized. The quest for the SDGs in Africa must, therefore, take the empowerment of women seriously (Adeola 2020). While African cultures are beautiful and have contributed significantly to the identity of its citizens, there is need to challenge all beliefs and practices that prevent girls and women from fully expressing and achieving their potential. Promoting girls’ and women’s leadership and entrepreneurship, participation in science and women’s financial inclusion are strategic options that must be pursued in an aggressive way. Finally, the reality of climate change needs Africa to be alert and agile. Using indigenous knowledge systems (Leal Filho et al. 2021), Africa must

3  AFRICA AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL… 

79

be creative to thrive in the face of the climate emergency. While it is clear that Africa is the least responsible for the climate emergency but is suffering from its worst effects, mourning will not do the continent any good. Instead, Africa must summon the same spirit that saw the continent wage glorious struggles for liberation to confront climate change. Effective planning and adaptation will be required, including redefining Africa’s agrarian development policies (see e.g., Matondo et al. 2020).

“Look to Yourself for Your Salvation”: Contemporary Pan-African Proposals for Africa’s Development Having provided the complexities surrounding the very concept of development, culled the background to development initiatives in Africa and highlighted some key themes in the discourse, in this section I seek to draw attention to a less studied phenomenon in the field. This is the contribution of contemporary pan-Africanists to reflections on Africa’s development. While there is considerable literature on pan-Africanism and Africa’s development (see, among others, Malisa and Nhengeze 2018; Oloruntoba 2020 and Rabaka 2020), in this section I shall seek to summarize the strategies for Africa’s development articulated by four contemporary pan-Africanists. I will hasten to add three key concessions, namely, first, that I selected these scholar-activists arbitrarily from within the parts of Africa that have adopted English for official business (Anglophone Southern and East Africa); second, that I rely mostly on their speeches as these circulated on social media; and third, that I share many of their ideological standpoints. Indeed, I envisage a fuller engagement with them in due course, time and other resources permitting. The four contemporary pan-Africanists that I have selected for a thematic review are: Patrick Loch Otieno Lumumba (popularly known as PLO Lumumba), Arikana Chihombori-Quao, Julius Malema and Joshua Maponga. While I will provide their operating contexts in order to assist the reader to locate them, I should highlight the fact that they regard themselves as defying/transcending local/national identities. Thus, at the time of writing, Lumumba could be associated with Kenya, Chihombori-­ Quao with the African Diaspora/Zimbabwe, Malema with South Africa and Maponga with Zimbabwe/South Africa. Space considerations imply that I am unable to provide a detailed review of each one of these

80 

E. CHITANDO

personalities, as they each deserve closer analysis. Thus, I must also further concede that the combined thematic treatment that I subject them to means that their individual creativity and emphases will not come out as clearly as would have been the case had I focused directly on them individually. However, for the purposes of concluding this chapter on development discourses in Africa, I shall outline a few central ideas that unite them. First, the contemporary pan-Africanists call for Africans to be champions of their own development. One consistent refrain in their pronouncements is that it is criminal to outsource one’s/the continent’s own development to others. Thus, they would happily endorse studies that question the identities of those who engage in economics experiments in Africa (see e.g., Panin 2020). All four have always reiterated the need for Africans to drive their own development. They have expended considerable energy exhorting Africans to appreciate the abundant resources that the continent has and to use this as the springboard to propel the continent to greater heights. “We are our own economic liberators” would be a slogan they would all be happy to adopt. Second, all the pan-Africanists under consideration are acutely aware of the historical injustices done to Africa/ns by various categories of outsiders. In particular, Chihombori-Quao and Lumumba have called upon Europe and North America to accept culpability on two fronts, namely, the exploitation of African resources in the past, but also in the present (including China for Lumumba). Malema in his South African setting draws attention to the ongoing role of white monopoly capital in deepening poverty among the indigenous people. Joshua Maponga singles out whiteness for dispossessing blacks of their land in Southern Africa. Third, they assert that there is an urgent need for pan-African solidarity. They maintain that it is critical for Africans at home and abroad to join hands in the struggle for Africa’s development. It is absurd for African politicians to insist on “sovereignty” in the face of the global contempt for Blackness/Africans, they argue. Instead, Africans must come together to fight for African causes. This solidarity will ensure a united African voice, a bigger African market and recovery of African dignity. Fourth, they all subscribe to the project of ideological clarity, Black pride and unflinching commitment to Africa. In all their presentations, their zeal for Africa is unmistakable. In a sense, all four are missionaries preaching the gospel of African development that is built on a passionate commitment to the continent. If the Psalmist could proclaim, “If I forget

3  AFRICA AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL… 

81

you, O Jerusalem, let my right hand whither” (Psalm 137: 5; NRSV), all four would freely make a similar declaration in relation to Africa. This has practical consequences, namely, shunning corruption, making a preferential option for the marginalized Africans and always prioritizing Africa’s interests. While the four pan-Africanists whose central points I have outlined above are devoted to the quest for Africa’s development, I seek to raise one main critique in relation to their endeavours. Although they are all proudly African, only Maponga shows some interest in utilizing the African worldview to inform the development agenda. To my mind, it is critical to appropriate and deploy positive insights from the African worldview if development in Africa is to have a decidedly African outlook. Exploring the role of values, including Ubuntu, in Africa’s development is, therefore, quite strategic.

Conclusion The struggle against poverty articulated in SDG 1 is a very appealing call, particularly in an African context. It is a legitimate call and deserves the support of all people of goodwill. However, it is neither the first nor the only initiative that Africa has encountered. In this chapter I have outlined the complexity surrounding the operating principle, namely, development. I have also contextualized development initiatives in Africa, alongside itemizing some strategic issues that need specific attention as Africa continues to search for better lives and opportunities for its citizens and its environment. Being aware of the powerful interventions by some pan-­ Africanists in the age of social media, I have also summarized some major features of the proposals by one of the most visible quartets in the contemporary period. It is envisaged that this chapter confirms that despite the heavy odds and contestations, Africa’s commitment to development remains clear and unambiguous.

References Achebe, Chinua. 1978. An Image of Africa. Research in African Literatures 9 (1): 1–15. Adeola, Egochi, ed. 2020. Empowering African Women for Sustainable Development: Toward Achieving the United Nations’ 2030 Goals. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

82 

E. CHITANDO

Adesida, Olugbenga, and Arunma Oteh, eds. 2001. African Voices, African Visions. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute. Adesina, Akinwumi A. 2017. The State of African Development. Development Finance Agenda 3 (2): 4–6. Ajei, Martin O. 2007. Africa’s Development: The Imperatives of Indigenous Knowledge and Values. Doctor of Philosophy thesis in Philosophy. Pretoria: Unisa. Akanle, Olayinka, and Jìmí O.  Adésìnà, eds. 2018. The Development of Africa: Issues, Diagnoses and Prognoses. Cham: Springer International Publishing AG. Amodu, Nojeem. 2020. Attaining the Sustainable Development Goals in Africa: The New CSR for Multinational Corporations. Journal of Sustainable Law and Policy (The) 11 (1): 86–105. Anyanwu, John C., and Adekele O. Salami. 2021. The Impact of COVID-19 on African Economies: An Introduction. African Development Review 33 (S1): S1–S16. Special Issue on the Impact of COVID-19 on African Economies. Baah, Anthony. 2003. ‘History of African Development Initiatives.’ Africa Labour Research Network Workshop Johannesburg 22–23 May 2003. Available at: https://sarpn.org/documents/d0000407/P373_Baah.pdf. Accessed 25 January 2022. Chitando, Ezra, Masiiwa R. Gunda, and Lovemore Togarasei. 2020. Introduction: Religion and Development in Africa. In Religion and Development in Africa, ed. Ezra Chitando, Masiiwa R.  Gunda, and Lovemore Togarasei, 13–35. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press. Cilliers, Jakkie. 2021. The Future of Africa: Challenges and Opportunities. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Conradie, Ernst M. 2016. Why Cannot the Term Development Just Be Dropped Altogether? Some Reflections on the Concept of Maturation as Alternative to development discourse. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 72 (4): a3415. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v72i4.3415. De Waal, Alex. 2002. What’s New in the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development’? International Affairs 78 (3): 463–475. Decker, Corrie, and Elisabeth McMahon. 2020. The Idea of Development in Africa: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Elias, Peter. 2018. African Development Initiatives. In The Development of Africa: Issues, Diagnoses and Prognoses, ed. Olayinka Akanle and Jìmí O.  Adésìnà, 357–374. Cham: Springer International Publishing AG. Frankema, Ewout, and Marlous Van Waijenburg. 2018. Africa Rising? A Historical Perspective. African Affairs 117 (469): 543–568. Gunda, Masiiwa R. 2020. Rethinking Development in Africa and the Role of Religion. In Religion and Development in Africa, ed. Ezra Chitando, Masiiwa R.  Gunda, and Lovemore Togarasei, 37–57. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press.

3  AFRICA AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL… 

83

Ikechukwu, Ozoigbo B. 2016. African Theories of Development and the Reality of Underdevelopment. International Journal of Development and Economic Sustainability 4 (4): 12–19. Lall, Sanjaya. 1996. Learning from the Asian Tigers: Studies in Technology and Industrial Policy. New York: Palgrave. Lopez, Carlos. 2019. Africa in Transformation: Economic Development in the Age of Doub.t Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Leal Filho, Walter., et al. 2021. Impacts of Climate Change to African Indigenous Communities and Examples of Adaptation Responses. Nature Communications 12: 6224. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-­021-­26540-­0. Mafeje, Archie. 1998. Economic Models and Practice in Africa. Diogenes 46 (184): 117–127. Malisa, Mark, and Phillippa Nhengeze. 2018. Pan-Africanism: A Quest for Liberation and the Pursuit of a United Africa. Genealogy 2 (3): 28. https://doi. org/10.3390/genealogy2030028. Matondo, Jothan I., et al., eds. 2020. Climate Variability and Change in Africa: Perspectives, Experiences and Sustainability. Cham: Springer. Maxwell, David. 1998. ‘Delivered from the Spirit of Poverty’? Pentecostalism, Prosperity and Modernity in Zimbabwe. Journal of Religion in Africa 28 (3): 350–373. McKenzie, Rex. 2016. The Africa Rising Narrative  - Whither development? Economics Discussion Papers 2016–9. London: Kingston University. Mergese, Kelbesa. 2020. The Informal Sector and COVID-19  in Sub-Saharan Africa. K4D Helpdesk Report. Available at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/15725/890_informal_sector_and_ COVID-­19_Final.pdf. Accessed 31 January 2022. Mkandawire, Thandika, and Charles C. Soludo. 1998. Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment. Dakar: CODESRIA. Murithi, Tim, ed. 2014. Handbook of Africa’s International Relations. London: Routledge. Murove, Munyaradzi F., and Ezra Chitando. 2018. Academic Freedom and the Problems of Patriotism and Social Responsibility in Post-colonial Africa. Alternation 23: 326–345. Ndlovu-Gathseni, Sabelo. 2018. The African Idea of Development. In The Routledge Handbook of African Development, ed. Tony Binns, Kenneth Lynch, and Etienne Nel. London: Routledge. Ndulu, Benno J., and Stephen A. O’Connell. 2021. Africa’s Development Debts. Journal of African Economics 30 AERC Supplement 1: i33–i73. Odusola, Oyede. 2017. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals in Africa in the Context of Complex Global Development Cooperation. Ibadan: Centre for Sustainable Development University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

84 

E. CHITANDO

Ojo, Emmanuel O. 2016. Underdevelopment in Africa: Theories and Facts. The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 41 (1): 89–103. Oloruntoba, Samuel O., ed. 2020. Pan-Africanism, Regional Integration and Development in Africa. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Oruntoba, Samuel O., and Toyin Falola. 2022. Africa in the Changing Global Order: The Past, the Present, and the Future. In The Palgrave Handbook of Africa and the Changing Global Order, ed. Samuel O. Oloruntoba and Toyin Falola, 1–22. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Panin, Amma. 2020. Economics Experiments in Africa: How Many and by Whom? CODESRIA Bulletin 4: 23–27. Park, Jong-Dae. 2019. Re-Inventing Africa’s Development: Linking Africa to the Korean Development Mode. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Rabaka, Reiland, ed. 2020. Routledge Handbook of Pan-Africanism. London: Routledge. Rist, Gilbert. 2019. The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith. 5th ed. Translated by Patrick Camiller. London: Zed. Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sparks, Donald L. 2016. The Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063: Implications for Economic Integration in Africa. Research in Applied Economics 8 (4): 45. Sumner, Andy, and Michael Tribe. 2008. International Development Studies: Theories and Methods in Research and Practice. London: SAGE. Tang, Vanessa T., Timothy M. Shaw, and Merle G. Holden, eds. 2019. Development and Sustainable Growth of Mauritius. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. The Economist. 2000. The Hopeless Continent. 13 May. https://www.economist. com/leaders/2000/05/11/hopeless-­africa. Accessed 26 January 2022. UN (United Nations). 2020. Policy Brief: Impact of COVID-19. 20 May. Available at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-­05/Policy-­brief-­ Impact-­of-­COVID-­19-­in-­Africa.pdf. Accessed 31 January 2022. VanderWeele, Tyler J. 2017. On the Promotion of Human Flourishing. PNAS 114 (31): 8148–8156. Willis, Katie. 2011. Theories and Practices of Development. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 4

Race, Colonialism, Ubuntu and Africa’s Development Fainos Mangena, Gaudencia Mudada, Beullah Matinhira, and Tawanda Mbewe

Introduction Africa has had a long struggle against poverty and inequality. This chapter seeks to chronicle the historical narratives of colonization as well as China’s expansionist interests in Africa within the context of Africa’s development, particularly in light of the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1, “Overcoming poverty in all its forms.” The chapter argues that while colonialism as an accident of history has planted seeds of rugged individualism in Africa and thereby negatively altering Africa’s developmental narrative, the transformative values of Ubuntu can actually reverse this history and promote a uniquely African developmental model. The chapter notes that China’s expansionist interest in Africa, while yielding some positive results for Africa because of notable progress in infrastructural development, its tendency to produce cheap products for Africa has resulted in many

F. Mangena • G. Mudada (*) • B. Matinhira • T. Mbewe Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_4

85

86 

F. MANGENA ET AL.

scholars questioning its sincerity regarding Africa’s economic development. It is against this background that only a home-grown Ubuntubacked model can help Africa to develop socially, politically and economically. This will contribute towards achieving SDG 1. We begin the chapter by interrogating the concepts of race and colonialism, before proceeding to look at some of the European perceptions regarding Africa and development. We also reflect on the contribution of China to Africa’s developmental matrix and finally the place Ubuntu as a game changer for Africa’s development.

Race and Colonialization It is important to note that Africa’s destiny has been shaped by many factors, some of which are beyond the continent’s control. One such factor is colonialism.1 While some might see colonization as having contributed to Africa’s development, the reality is that it resulted in Africa losing its ontological, epistemological and axiological status as a continent especially, as the colonizer has sought to assert himself (colonization was mostly by men) by replacing African ways of thinking with Western ways of thinking. In place of African ontology came Western ontology; in place of African epistemology came Western epistemology and in place of African axiology came Western axiology. These pernicious philosophies were pioneered by the Germans, the British and the French. The introduction of these philosophies marked the death of Ubuntu as a philosophy which would later be revived or resuscitated through the works of Samkange and Samkange (1980), Mogobe Ramose (1999, 2003) and others when most countries in Africa became independent. Colonialization also resulted in racial tensions that gave rise to conflict, especially as the Africans traded blows with the colonizers, accusing them of dehumanizing them through exploiting their resources for the benefit of their mother countries. This brought about poverty to the majority of Africans. Thus, the protracted armed struggles in the different parts of Africa were a reaction to the attempts by the colonizers to take control of the African continent with a view to exploiting its resources for the benefit of Europe. These protracted struggles were liberative. The effect of these protracted armed struggles was that Africa became “independent.” Notice 1  Colonization can, generally, be defined as the act of forcefully taking absolute control of another country’s geographical territory through invasion and exploitation of its resources.

4  RACE, COLONIALISM, UBUNTU AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT 

87

that we put the word independent in quotation marks because we believe that the continent has not yet gained genuine or true independence as the West continues to influence and control the continent’s developmental trajectory through dictating the direction that Africa should take if the continent is to benefit from Western developmental aid that is managed by the Bretton Woods institutions and other financial agencies. This behaviour is symptomatic of the West’s perceptions of Africa, as well as their perceptions of what development entails. Although we will use the terms “Europe” and “the West” interchangeably in this chapter, our focus will be on Europe since Africa was, by and large, colonized by Europe. Below, we look at Europe’s perceptions on Africa as well as their ideas and ideals regarding development.

Europe’s Attitude Towards Africa and the Behaviour of African Politicians/Leaders Throughout history, the West has viewed Africa in the way they want to believe. African countries have been perceived and seen as representations of civil wars, droughts and hunger, corruption and poverty among other ills. It might be tempting for some to hold the view that colonial rule was a huge favour to the African countries where the “white man’s burden” was to bring civilization, technology and progress to other parts of the world. Some missionaries portrayed a picture of communities that were primitive, very simplistic and almost useless before the coming of the Europeans. Maseland (2017: 1) indicates that claims have been made where the European is said to have left positive footprints on Africa’s institutions that cannot be erased. Acemoglu et al. (2001: 1371) argue that the different types of colonialism experienced in Africa impacted Africa’s institutions differently. Acemoglu et al. (2001: 1373) further argue that the impact of colonialism in Africa has had a lasting impact, which is even felt today, long after colonization. A case in point is the disparagingly big difference in development among African countries themselves, with countries such as Botswana having “stable economies,” while countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zimbabwe and Somalia are at the other end of the spectrum. They are heavily characterized by poverty, chaos and violence, even as they have abundant natural resources (especially the DRC and Zimbabwe). Could it be the case that these major discrepancies can be

88 

F. MANGENA ET AL.

attributed to the type of colonizer, and colonial history? If so, is there any hope of these negative colonial footprints disappearing with time, especially in those African countries ravaged by poverty, chaos and violence? According to Poncian (2015: 72–73), Europeans have defined Africa in somewhat derogatory terms. Some fellow Africans have also conspired with these Europeans to attack Africa and its people. The perception that Africa is backward has been perpetuated by some Africans who have actively assisted Western nations to continue viewing Africa in negative light because of their actions. The Western projection of Africa has resulted in Africa accepting its “inferiority status” and thereby perfecting the art of begging and dialoguing with the donor community rather than trying to follow its own developmental path. Thus, one of the reasons why Africa has failed to realize its true and full developmental potential has been the desire to adopt the Western model of development. This is, no doubt, the reason why Africa is finding it difficult to succeed, especially because every developmental model is context specific. It has often been argued that the problem with Africans is that they have adopted the view that “to be is to be like the European or the Westerner.” This way of thought derives from the sense that the Western way of doing things is better and superior to the African’s way of doing things. The West has considered itself to be the centre which models everything, especially development, while Africa has become the recipient of the West’s ideas. For example, in 2020, Madagascar an African country made headlines after having said they had found the cure for the novel corona virus that hit the world. The World Health Organization (WHO) and some Western countries fought tooth and nail against the use of this medication citing many reasons among which was that no clinical trials had been done to make sure that the use of the medication would help in the curing of the corona virus. However, when the United States also informed WHO that they had found a cure for the disease, which cure they called Remdesivir, WHO did not come out guns blazing as they had done when Madagascar announced its medicinal herb. Such cases go a long way in showing how the West claims that all are equal and yet indications on the ground point to a master-slave scenario. To say this is not to imply that African claims should not be evaluated. However, this must be understood against the background of bias. The West always acts as the centre from which everything is modelled, while Africa is considered to be on the periphery and as the recipient of products from the West. As Okot p’Bitek quoted by

4  RACE, COLONIALISM, UBUNTU AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT 

89

Wiredu (2004: 366) argues, Western scholars came to Africa with readymade robes from Europe which they intended to fit on Africans. With regard to education, the West brought a type of education that was meant to tame Africa. P’Bitek’s (as cited by Wiredu 2004) main bone of contention with Western education is that it minimized, or rubbished Africa’s value system(s), which for centuries had kept communities in African countries intact. It is our submission in this chapter that African education systems need to be reconfigured to speak to the values, needs and aspirations of the Africans if real development is to be realized. The values of Ubuntu are critical in this regard. From a Southern African perspective, African morality embodies the values of Ubuntu. Ramose (1999) argues thus, “ubuntu is the root of African morality.” All development initiatives in Africa, particularly in Southern Africa, which do not take cognizance of the place of Ubuntu are most likely bound to fail. P’Bitek as cited in Wiredu (2004: 367) hypothesizes that some of the models of development, such as those envisaged by the West, do not apply to Africa because they do not speak meaningfully to African values, needs and aspirations. Ubuntu can overcome this limitation as it emerges from within the African soil. The West’s concept of development is largely individualistic, while Africa’s notion of being is communitarian. This means the West’s model of development can only resemble a square peg in a round hole if applied to Africa uncritically. Our view is that unless and until Africans use models that are situated in and suited to their context, they will struggle to realize their developmental goals and objectives. It is against such a background that the chapter calls for a rethinking of development models in Africa so that Africa realizes its developmental goals as envisaged in Africa’s Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030. For this to come to pass, two things must happen. First, peace and stability must be guaranteed; and second, the values of community or Ubuntu must be harnessed as Africa’s social capital. With regard to the issue of peace and stability, it is important to note that almost half of the countries in Africa have experienced armed conflict since independence. Instead of promoting peace and stability, many African politicians have focused their energies on trying to impress the West in order to remain in power. This has been done at the expense of developing home-grown models of development that speak to the needs and aspirations of Africa. In order to destabilize Africa, the West, particularly Europe, has sometimes sought to sponsor violence in Africa in order

90 

F. MANGENA ET AL.

to maintain a grip on Africa’s resources. Thus, through the promotion of individualism, the West has initiated a deeply entrenched culture of personal self-aggrandizement whereby politicians only think of themselves and not the plight of the poor and the marginalized. Thus, some African politicians are also to blame for their complicity in Africa’s struggles. A lack of distinction between the personal and the public and between the individual and the state has resulted in Africa failing to realize its potential to be one of the most developed continents in the world, given its vast human and natural resources. It is our submission that African politicians must realize that they are there to serve the people, and thus should always seek to promote the common good rather than to promote their own selfish interests. Thus, although the perceptions of the West have resulted in the stagnation of African development, with the behaviour of African politicians/leaders worsening situation, we believe that Ubuntu can provide an antidote to this problem. Before we look at the place of Ubuntu in promoting development in Africa, we look at the Chinese territorial expansionist attitude and its impact on African development.

China in Africa’s Development Matrix Unlike Europe, China has no history of colonial aspirations in Africa. China was not involved in the scramble and colonization of Africa. In fact, many African countries regard China as a trustworthy ally who helped some African countries to gain freedom from the European colonizers. According to this view, the Chinese are regarded as a people who have always respected the Africans. It remains a fact that history favours the Chinese, especially in their efforts to support the liberation of African states. To begin with, it is important to highlight that China was once a socialist republic before it turned to capitalism in the last quarter of the last millennium. The Chinese transformation from socialism to capitalism best explains their current activities in Africa. Whether to regard China as strategic partner for Africa or regard the Chinese as neocolonialists remains an emotively charged issue. Coming to the issue of development, it is important to note that the Chinese economy has been growing at an impressive rate since the late 1970s. When China moved from a closed economy to a more open approach, things started to change. The economic reforms introduced in China during this time were a push to expand exports and attract foreign investment. China’s total GDP overtook that of Germany in 2007, and of

4  RACE, COLONIALISM, UBUNTU AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT 

91

Japan in 2009, and it is now the second largest economy in the world (Jenkins 2019: 1) and on course to becoming the largest economy in the world. The growing presence of China’s economic activities in Africa towards the last part of the twentieth century has raised a lot of interest and concerns amongst scholars. Jenkins (2019: 183) observes that vocal criticisms of China’s involvement in the region concern the social, political and environmental impact. The bone of contention now is whether or not China’s interest in Africa is aiding development in Africa. It is without doubt that the sharp rise in Chinese presence in Africa has posed a threat to Western powers that have had a grip on African economic activities for many years now. As a growing economy, China has seen Africa as a strategic continent in their quest for more growth. Africa has become a source of raw materials for the Chinese industry, as well as a ready market for the Chinese finished products. The Sino-African cooperation, as rightly noted by Maru (2019), is currently being interpreted through two diametrically opposed perceptions. The first being a Sinophobic 2 one, mostly adopted in the West and the second is a pro-China one, a view which is adopted mostly by African leaders. While some scholars feel that China’s scramble for Africa has little to do with the development of Africa but the robbing of African resources and raw materials, which includes human labour, Botha (2006) strongly believes that China’s foreign policy towards Africa is based on mutual cooperation and mutual participation. According to Tukić (2015), this view was clearly presented at the September 2018 forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) by the then African Union chairperson and Rwandan president Paul Kagame when he referred to Chinese investment in Africa as a source of “deep transformation.” Some highlights of the Chinese activities in Africa can help to unpack the real interests of China in Africa.

2   According to Wiktionary (2020), the word “Sinophobic” comes from the word “Sinophobia” which means hostility or aversion towards Chinese people or culture. In much simpler terms, it means the fear or dislike of Chinese-made products or goods.

92 

F. MANGENA ET AL.

China’s Activities and Its Expansionist Interest in Africa The Chinese expansionist interest in Africa has been analysed in terms of some of the products it supplies to Africa. There is nothing sinister in suggesting that some of the products supplied to Africa by China have become a cause for concern. Over the past one and half decades, there has been a global increase in demand for products made in China partly due to the fact that Chinese products are reasonably priced compared to competing products from Europe and America. However, although many Chinese products are cheap, they are often substandard or counterfeits (Falola and Achberger 2013: 219). The quality of some of the goods from China has raised concerns on the Chinese business ethics strategy. The abiding question to ask is: Is ethics an integral component of their business strategy or it is not part of the strategy? But it will be unfair to give the impression that the Chinese expansionist efforts in Africa have only been tilted towards their own interests. There is every reason to suggest that Africa has also benefitted from China. For instance, one major complaint among African countries about aid from the West is that the bulk of the aid to Africa from American and Western European countries is dedicated to humanitarian matters. This contrasts with aid from China, which focuses on improving infrastructure. Chinese projects in Africa range from mega ports to power generation projects (Du Plessis 2016: 3). Projects such as the Lamu Port in South Sudan and Ethiopia, the standard gauge railway between Nairobi and Mombasa, the Dar es Salaam-­ Bagamoyo transport corridor among others highlight great infrastructural investment from China (Du Plessis 2016: 4). Such big projects among others are real game changers in terms of enabling the movement of goods and people across Africa. Africa’s rapidly growing economic ties with China have contributed to Africa’s strong economic growth in recent years (Du Plessis 2016: 3). For example, China is a world leader in renewable energy technologies, which are essential for rural electrification in Africa. As noted above, Chinese investment and consumer goods are also more affordable than the Western products. This means that although China’s presence in Africa is perceived to have negative connotations, it also has positive contributions. Hogwe and Banda (2017: 237) argue that China as the most powerful and largest emerging world power has positioned itself to be a champion

4  RACE, COLONIALISM, UBUNTU AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT 

93

of the interests of developing nations. Moreover, it acts as a mediator between the developing powers and the developed ones (Du Plessis 2016: 5). In as much as China has provided funding of these major projects in Africa, questions have been asked about the conditions that come with Chinese funding. The nature of Chinese funding can also be used to assess whether the Sino-African cooperation is mutually beneficial or not. It has often been argued that the Chinese in Africa have no interest in seeing Africa developing but that they want to get minerals and raw materials to develop their economy back home. To this end, China has been criticized, especially by the West, for supporting what the West perceives to be bad governance in Africa, in its attempt to deplete Africa’s resources and expand its economy. Thus, while the United States and the European Union have sought to impose sanctions against African countries where they think there is bad governance, China has opposed such efforts and rightly so. Although China does not tolerate corruption at home, as they see it as a huge obstacle to development, they are alleged by the West to support corrupt leadership in Africa for as long as it gives them economic mileage. Thus, while politics and good international relations are key enablers for socio-­ economic transformation, China has done very well in its political relations with Africa and has done relatively well in salvaging Africa from its economic malaise. However, more still needs to be done for Africa to realize its economic development. What is required is for Africa to wake up and seek home-grown solutions to its developmental challenges. The continent needs to harness the power of Ubuntu, an African communitarian philosophy, to extricate itself from these economic doldrums, overcome poverty and meet the goal of SDG 1.

Africa’s Development and Ubuntu as Social Capital The philosophy of Ubuntu is one such philosophy which Africa can build on to overcome poverty and undue reliance on the West or the East, if applied systematically. The point we are making here is that Africa is the one continent that has placed a premium on the centrality of the community over and above the individual while much of the world has placed emphasis on the centrality of the individual as defining human progress. This emphasis on the centrality of the community over and above the individual by Africa finds a lot of traction in the works of Mogobe Ramose

94 

F. MANGENA ET AL.

(1999, 2003; 2015), Fainos Mangena (2012a, 2012b, 2015, 2016a and 2016b) and Thaddeus Metz (2007) among others. All these contributions are very important and they demonstrate that Ubuntu has become Africa’s treasure and social capital.3 While there are differences in the way that these scholars have approached the idea of Ubuntu as influenced by their different social, racial and ideological backgrounds, the fact that this philosophy has attracted, and continues to attract so much attention, shows that it is a philosophy that defines the people of the continent of Africa as a people with a unique socio-cultural orientation, and perhaps with a different developmental perspective.4 At this juncture, it is important to define Ubuntu as a philosophy. By definition, Ubuntu refers to that philosophy which puts emphasis on the value of the community or group in defining and characterizing human progress. While a community or group is composed of individual members, it is these individual members put together who can define and characterize human progress. Thus, according to this definition of Ubuntu, no individual can chart the contours of human progress alone. This view finds expression in the Nguni proverb which says umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, or the Shona expression, munhu munhu muvanhu (a person is a person through other persons). By and large, Ubuntu is about communal or group responsibility as well as community or group ownership of social, cultural, material and religious resources. In the context of Africa, particularly Southern Africa, real development cannot be realized without harnessing the philosophy of Ubuntu as social capital. We have seen that colonization altered Africa’s socio-cultural and economic image and so there is need for Africa to embrace what Christian B.N.  Gade (2011) has described as the “narratives of return” or what Mangena (2015) has termed the founding values, referring to these same narratives. What are these “narratives of return” or “founding values” that 3  By social capital is meant shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate cooperation within or among groups. These norms, values and understandings allow individuals in a group to work together effectively to achieve a common purpose. 4  The African notion of development was collective and/or communal, meaning every individual’s contribution to development was only realizable if the contribution was meant to benefit the community or group at large. Everything changed when the colonizer arrived. The colonizer placed the individual at the centre of development and this gave rise to ills such as rugged individualism, corruption and nepotism, actions which are contrary to the spirit and purport of Ubuntu, and thus antithetical to development in the African sense of the word.

4  RACE, COLONIALISM, UBUNTU AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT 

95

should help define Africa’s path to development? Gade (2011: 304) begins by making two observations relating to narratives of return. Firstly, narratives of return for Gade (2011: 304), are normally discussed in the context of social transformation where politicians and academics attempt to mine the values of the past to inspire the present and the future. Secondly, Gade (2011: 304) argues that narratives of return contain the thinking that in order to create a good society, Africa must go back to the past to retrieve something that is really African which is rooted in pre-­colonial times. Gade’s work (2011) on narratives of return has inspired us to argue that in order to right the wrongs of colonialism/globalization and to deal with the deficiencies of the Sino-African mutual cooperation on Africa’s development, it is important that Africa goes back to the drawing board and extract those home-grown values of Ubuntu which have inspired it in the past. We argue that the transformative values of Ubuntu will inspire African politicians to desist from their self-seeking attitudes to more inclusive communo-centric attitudes where what affects one individual, affects the group and vice-versa. In other words, through Ubuntu, politicians or those who govern will seek to build their nations based on inclusivity rather than exclusivity. Ubuntu will ensure that no one is left behind because he or she is poor, disabled or a member of the minority groups. Ubuntu will inspire a sense of unity in diversity. This is very critical for Africa’s development. Defining unity in diversity in South Africa, Martin Prozesky (2003: 5) notes thus: History has given South Africa a diversity of peoples. We come in a range of colours. We speak different languages. We follow different faiths and profess different philosophies. Our cultures and lifestyles vary. We do not all like the same kinds of foods. We do not all support the same football teams. We do not all support the same political parties. Diversity like this is not a problem or a curse. It is a blessing, just as nature’s forests with their diversity of trees are more beautiful than any plantation. Indeed, there is unity in diversity.

Borrowing insights from Prozesky above, we argue that colonialism has come and gone, the Chinese are still with us but what is critical is that as a continent we must harness all the social capital that we have and be inspired by Ubuntu to take Africa to the next level of development. The destiny of Africa is in our hands. We need to tolerate each other in our different ethnic, racial and gender diversities so that we unite so as to develop our continent. It is important that we take what is good from the West and

96 

F. MANGENA ET AL.

globalization and from the Chinese and combine these with our own home-grown models in order to develop our continent. It is also important that as a continent, we remove enemy images so that we embrace those of us who were erstwhile enemies yesterday. This will bring about unity and solidarity which are some of the building blocks of Ubuntu required for Africa’s development. This will ensure the success of the struggle to overcome poverty, as envisaged by SDG 1.

Conclusion In this chapter we reflected on the interplay of race and colonization in Africa, as well as China’s expansionist interests in Africa within the context of Africa’s developmental trajectory. We argued that race and colonialism can be blamed for planting the seeds of rugged individualism in Africa and thereby creating the spirit of selfishness in some African politicians, especially those in positions of authority. We argued that while this was the case, it was not too late to change course because the transformative values of Ubuntu were capable of reversing this history and promote a uniquely African developmental model. This Ubuntu-inspired model is inclusive and will lead to a continent characterized by equality and social justice. We noted that while looking East had yielded some positive results for Africa because of notable progress in infrastructural development, this approach would not produce lasting solutions to Africa’s problems. This is because of China’s tendency to produce cheap products for Africa has resulted in many politicians and academics alike questioning its sincerity regarding Africa’s economic development. It is against this background that we argued that only a home-grown value system can lead to a historical path of socio-economic and political development.

References Acemoglu, D., S.  Johnson, and J.A.  Robinson. 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An empirical investigation. The American Economic Review 91 (5): 1369–1401. Botha, IIana. 2006. China in Africa: A friend or Foe? China’s Contemporary Political and Economic Relations with Africa. Unpublished Masters Assignment (Stellenbosch University). Falola, T., and J. Achberger, eds. 2013. The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment in Africa. New York: Routledge.

4  RACE, COLONIALISM, UBUNTU AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT 

97

Gade, C.B.N. 2011. The Historical Development of Written Discourses on Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 303–329. Hogwe, F., and H. Banda. 2017. The Nature of China’s Role in Development of Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe. Problems and Perspectives in Management 15 (1): 237–247. Jenkins, R. 2019. How China is Reshaping the Global Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mangena, F. 2012a. On Ubuntu and Retributive Punishment in Korekore-Nyombwe Culture: Emerging Ethical Perspectives. Harare: Best Practices Books. ———. 2012b. Towards a Hunhu/Ubuntu Dialogical Moral Theory. Phronimon 13 (2): 1–17. ———. 2015. Moral anchors of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration in Post-Conflict Zimbabwe. In Philosophy in African Traditions and Cultures: Zimbabwean Philosophical Studies II, ed. F.  Mangena, T.A.  Chimuka, and F. Mabiri. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. ———. 2016a. Ramose’s Legacy and the Future of African Philosophy. Philosophia Africana 18 (1): 53–66. ———. 2016b. Hunhu/Ubuntu in the Traditional Thought of Southern Africa. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at http://www.iep. utm.edu/hunu/ Maru, M. T. 2019. Why Africa loves China. Available at https://www.aljazeera. com/indepth/opinion/africa-­loves-­china-­190103121552367.html. Accessed 14 August 2020. Maseland, R. 2017. Is Colonialism History? The Declining Impact of Colonial Legacies on African Institutional and Economic Development. Journal of Institutional Economics 14 (2): 259–287. Metz, T. 2007. Towards an African Moral Theory. Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (3): 321–341. Rudolf Du Plessis. 2016. China’s African Infrastructure Projects: A Tool in Reshaping Global Norms. Available at www.saiia.org.za. Accessed 15 October 2020. Poncian, J. 2015. The Persistence of Western Negative Perceptions About Africa: Factoring in the Role of Africans. Journal of African Studies and Development 7 (3): 72–80. Prozesky, M. 2003. Frontiers of Conscience: Exploring Ethics in a New Millennium. Cascades: Equinym Publishing. Ramose, M.B. 1999. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. ———. 2003. I Doubt Therefore African Philosophy Exists. South African Journal of Philosophy 2 (2): 113–127. ———. 2015. On the Contested Meaning of ‘Philosophy.’. South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (4): 551–558.

98 

F. MANGENA ET AL.

Samkange, Sz, and T.M.  Samkange. 1980. Hunhuism or Ubuntuism: A Zimbabwean Indigenous Political Philosophy. Salisbury: Graham Publishing House. Tukić, N. 2015. FOCAC VI and the Future of Infrastructure in Africa. Centre for Chinese Studies Commentary, University of Stellenbosch. Available at http:// www0.sun.ac.za/ccs/?p=11669. Accessed 20 November 2020. Wiktionary. 2020. Sinophobia. Available at en.m.wiktionary.org. Accessed 15 November 2020. Wiredu, K. 2004. A Companion to African Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

CHAPTER 5

African Identity, Morality and Well-Being Peter Olamakinde Olapegba and Olusola Ayandele

Introduction The conceptualization of African identity has been plagued by two distinct but often related paradigms. On the one hand is the attempt by non-­ Africans (essentially Europe) to define the identity of Africa using Eurocentric prisms. This paradigm has little or no consideration for the values, lifestyles, belief systems and organizational structure of the African people; rather it superimposed European values in arriving at a type of African identity. On the other hand is the African identity definition by Africans who have acquired and accepted the Eurocentric worldview and use this to reconstruct the African identity as it ‘should be known’. These two paradigms have employed the vehicle of globalization to project to the world a kind of identity that has proved to be in conflict with what can be seen as the original identity of the African person. This tension around the question of African identity is an impediment to Africa’s quest to respond to poverty as outlined in Sustainable Development Goal 1 (SDG 1).

P. O. Olapegba • O. Ayandele (*) University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_5

99

100 

P. O. OLAPEGBA AND O. AYANDELE

Identity is a process ‘located in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his (sic) communal culture’ (Erikson 1968: 22). According to Brown (2000), having a coherent view, personality and/or expressions can enhance one’s general sense of self-identity or collective identity expressed through satisfaction, self-esteem, successful participation in the society and intergroup relations. Unfortunately, in Africa, this sense of self-identity is often dictated by the aforementioned paradigms and in the words of Muzenda (2019) by ‘those with inadequate understanding of the continent’s cultures, systems, traditions and ideologies’ and by neo-­ colonial African scholars. In their estimation, Africa is synonymous with poverty, misgovernance, corruption, political instability, human rights abuses, starvation, failed states, underdevelopment, war and violence, and so on. This worldview sees the White colonizers as the preservers of Africa’s rich heritage (Wainana 2005). One of the earliest authors that gave Africans a negative identity was a European naturalist, Linnaeus (1758), who classified the Black race as closest to the lowest animals and considered the White as superior. In this context, ‘Europeanus’ were described as lively and inventive, ‘Ameraicanus’ as tenacious and free, while Africans were labelled using every conceivable negative adjective, for example, slow, lazy, backward and uncivilized. This Eurocentric-influenced identity of Africans led to the occupation, partitioning and exploitation of Africa with the excuse of trying to save the people and continent from savagery and reposition it for ‘modern civilization’. All these were forced on the African people without consideration for the values and cultural nuances that have over the years shaped their identity, social construction and societal engagement. The perceived success in the superimposition of the European values and systems has led to the distortion of the African identity. This superimposition, according to Pawliková-Vilhanová (1998), is a progression of Africa from ‘savagery’, ‘primitive’ and ‘tribal’ to ‘civilization’ through the adoption of European culture.

Africa and the Struggle for Identity The imposed and forced/acquired European identity was an attempt to obliterate the cultural nuances and values that define Africa. In the words of Benjamin (2010), the ‘new order’ systematically eroded the African identity and all that was African and rendered them antithetical to ‘world civilization.’ Interestingly, the Eurocentric contraption foisted on Africa

5  AFRICAN IDENTITY, MORALITY AND WELL-BEING 

101

has led to an identity crisis which appears to be more grievous; the African is not accepted as a European in spite of the acquired European identity and in the process has left behind the original identity. Effectively, we have people on the continent who by identity are neither Europeans nor Africans. This is the bane of the new African society. According to Wane (2019), the devastation of colonialism in Africa can be likened to a nuclear war or a holocaust. Blyden (1974) claimed that the colonialists ruthlessly degraded the African identity by obliterating from history books the achievement and civilization of the African race. It was even posited that Africa is one vast lost continent whose history begins with the entry of White people and Africans had no identity except the one created by them (i.e., Europeans) (William 2003). Two major weapons used to assault the African cultural values and retool the African mind were colonial education and religion. Pheko (2012) avers that these two weapons effectively entangled Africans in mental enslavement; ‘colonized their minds’ (wa Thiong’o 1986), severely alienated them from their communities, cultures, identity and ‘themselves’ (Kamaara 2010) and turned them into Fanon’s ‘Black Skins, White Masks’. The form of education introduced to Africa completely debased and devalued the African orientation and value system. African indigenous languages were relegated and considered inferior, and children no longer took pride in speaking their indigenous languages, while parents took pride in the ability of their children to speak the English, or French, or Portuguese languages fluently. It became an elitist symbol to speak a European language at home such that in many homes the children are fluent in a European language but can barely speak their indigenous language. Dei (cited in Bunyi 1999: 338) asserted that Western education did little to foster self-pride in African students, with African languages banned in schools while the languages of the colonizers became the lingua franca (Oni and Joshua 2014). In a similar development, Falola (2007) and Chitando and Chitando (2004) reported that creative works of art by Africans were labelled ‘primitive’ and African attire was redefined as ‘costumes’, even the curled African hair was devalued and portrayed as ‘ugly’, respectively. The superimposed identity did not only affect language, dressing and ornaments, it also significantly influenced eating patterns and commerce. According to Wengraf (2019), Africans were mandated to grow what they do not eat (cash crop needed in the global North) and eat what they do not produce (e.g. imported flour, rice and sugar). Unfortunately, as attested by Dietler (2007), the shift in diet leads to

102 

P. O. OLAPEGBA AND O. AYANDELE

hunger, poor health, sickness and poverty. Thus, poverty in Africa is not innate, but produced. Investing in the right values will be highly strategic in this regard. The colonialists forcefully usurped traditional governance authority and set up a system that was alien to the African culture and operated as anti-­ people. Traditional rulers were reduced to agents of the government, stripped of their statutory power and authority. This system pitched the people against their traditional rulers who they saw as collaborators with their colonial oppressors. This particular act changed the trajectory of submission to constituted traditional authority and produced an identity of rebellion and agitation in the people. Things that were hitherto considered taboos then became common occurrences. African traditional societies are known for checks and balances within the context of governance; citizens willingly submit to authority while their in-built mechanisms to checkmate the excesses of those in authority such that dictatorial tendencies could be effectively checked. But the superimposition of the Eurocentric governance system weakened the in-built checks and balances inherent in the pre-colonial African states (e.g. Buganda, Ruanda, Benin, Oyo, Ashanti and the emirates). The colonial African rulers were no longer responsible to the traditional institution and their people rather, they became answerable only to the colonial authority (Bangura 2015: 82; Crowder and Ikime 1970: xiv). The divide and rule tactics of the colonial authorities led to deep-seated division among the people; it heightened ethnic and religious divides as seen in Nigeria and other countries (Isumonah 2003: 14; Okpanachi 2010). This division is still evident in most African countries and is a prominent root cause of political instability, civil war and ethnic cleansing. The colonial imposition also led to societal dysfunction, a culture of non-­ accountability, fiscal indiscipline and distrust. According to Chitando and Chitando (2004), the portrayal of African culture, languages and knowledge systems as primitive led to Africans losing confidence in themselves and developing inferiority complex towards the White people. As such ‘the psychological and physical effect of slave trade and colonialism led to mistrust, internalized crime and violence among Africans; the people became demoralized, frustrated and traumatized. They inculcated the culture of victimizing their own people, such that violence, corruption and oppression became a way of life in the colonized countries’ (Zag 2011). The African identity derives from collectivism; it is communal in nature, existing within the concept of kith and kin, linked not just by blood. The

5  AFRICAN IDENTITY, MORALITY AND WELL-BEING 

103

social construction of a community was such that it gives peculiar identity to individuals, with a firm belief that identity will be lost if relationship is severed with the community, people are not expected to be individualistic in outlook and everyone is the other person’s keeper. The collectivist nature of the African identity resulted in the extended family structure. It was akin to a taboo in the traditional African society to keep a nuclear family; people grew up in extended family structures which shaped their identity and worldview to be accommodating and look out for the interest of others. It was given in that society that one does not own him/herself and the family cannot lay exclusive ownership to their children, rather the society claimed ownership, which is why a successful member of the society is referred to by members of that community as ‘our child’. To underscore the similarity in the heterogeneous culture of Africa, Lyons et al. (2011) stated that ‘Africa, continental and diaspora, is and has never been a homogeneous unit, it is made up of multiple, diverse, and dynamic intersection of cultures, languages, religions, and heritages that are interconnected by their worldview’. The collectivist and inclusive nature of the African identity is further seen in the linguistic expression in relating to others, most African languages do not have the equivalents of cousin, nephew, niece, uncle and aunty; someone is either one’s sister or brother (not necessarily of the same parentage), father or mother (not necessarily one’s biological parents). This linguistic expression gives a sense of bonding which enhances familial relationship among Africans not related by blood even in diaspora. The African identity is robust and inclusive given a deep sense of belonging and fostering love and unity. Realistically, African identity, as cited by NACT-PVS (2018), ‘is not defined by race, gender, religion, geo-political boundaries or ethnicity but by philosophies and ideologies rich in morals, ethics and an African culture; in essence, African identity is a state of mind’. Another inherent component of the African identity is religiosity; Africans are deeply religious with a firm belief in the spiritual, the belief system is open and flexible, and the approach is that of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Adherents of the different traditional religions are not competitive nor did they engage in attempts to subjugate other forms of religious expression. It used to be the case that the people would join one another to celebrate and recognize the right of each member of the society to worship as they deem(ed) fit. The advent of the Eurocentric and Eastern religions on the continent of Africa led to contestations, rivalry, expansionist agenda and religious intolerance. By and large, one may be tempted to conclude that the

104 

P. O. OLAPEGBA AND O. AYANDELE

contemporary religious identity has not benefitted Africa in terms of socio-­ economic development and peaceful coexistence. Unfortunately, the trend in many African countries in recent times is to promote religious identity over and above national identity. This development has further deepened the crisis of identity that is experienced in Africa. According to Ekeh (1975), ethnic identity, a colonial creation, with its preference for an ethnic group and primordial configuration, is another major threat to national (continental) identity in Africa. This has become a major impediment to achieving enduring peace on the continent. The phenomenon of ethnic identity has destroyed the fabric of many nations in Africa with unprecedented civil wars, violent eruptions, coup d’état, ethnic cleansing and so on. This situation has been exploited by many politicians for their selfish ends to the detriment of the people and national/ continental identity (Onyibor 2016). Developing or restoring the initial unique African identity is a sine qua non to development on the continent. Many scholars have alluded to this truism. For example, the solution to the marginalization of Africa and impoverishment of its people is for Africans to do away with imperialism and its comprador alliances (wa Thiong’o 1986), become conscious of themselves (Appiah 2003), inculcate African traditional practices (Nyerere 1968) and cultivate an African cultural identity (Falola 2007). The sense of identity goes together with the concept of morality in Africa.

The Concept of Morality Beauchamp and Childress (1994) described morality as a compilation of guidelines of socially approved human conduct. It is also a culturally determined and influenced notions of right or/and wrong, an acceptable way of behaving in any giving situation (Lumen 2020). The pre-colonial Africa societies were guided by strict, though unwritten, moral codes that acted as moral compasses and enforced though formal sanctions and informal frameworks that ensure adherence. Deviants were sanctioned, marginalized or banished as the case may be. In certain instances, the sanctions went beyond the culprit to include the entire family or lineage as the case may be. These rules and ethos of society formed the basis of morality that society rested on and the interaction of individuals with the societal rules and ethoses informed the emerging identity. Oral traditions were mainly the vehicle through which rules were passed from one generation to the other using folklores, proverbs and stories.

5  AFRICAN IDENTITY, MORALITY AND WELL-BEING 

105

Through these media, children were taught morals and societal rules of engagement. A child properly brought up in such clime would likely develop high moral standards and respect for rules, as such the emerging identity is such that upholds high ethical standards representing the African values. Ekeh (1975) argued that upon colonization, Africans were virtually disembodied of their moral contents, of their substratum of implicating ethics, and yet the imported models were never engrafted onto any existing indigenous morality. This obvious disconnect threw up individuals with amoral identity which is at variance with the African value system and high moral standard. Ekeh further stated that the nationalists in their quest for political independence disparaged the colonial government as ‘amoral’ while the indigenous ethnic group, a creation of the colonialist, was tagged as the reservoir of ‘moral’ obligations. Ekeh (1975: 100) also revealed that public service became ‘an amoral civic public from which one seeks to gain…’. He asserted that the emergent bifurcation of publics promoted amoral behaviour among African citizens. It has been said by scholars that the pre-colonial African morality is essentially relational; one’s morality is ‘judged’ on the basis of one’s positive relationship with others in a positive way. Shutte (2001: 30) revealed that our deepest moral obligation is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and more deeply into community with others. The African identity is derived from a deep communal morality; society places a premium on morality such that individuals who had succeeded materially were not reckoned with if they were perceived to have a moral deficit. These expectations were communicated through proverbs and wise sayings which formed part of the socialization processes and shape the emerging identity. For example, among the Yoruba of South West Nigeria is a saying that ‘Iwa rere leso eniyan,’ meaning good character is a form of beauty to be worn and valued above physical beauty. There is also, ‘Ise loogun ise,’ meaning hard work is the antidote of poverty. To communicate that the responsibility of raising/training children is that of the society at large the Yoruba would say, ‘oju meji lo nbimo, igba oju lo nwo’, this translates to mean only a couple gives birth to a child but the whole community is involved in training the child. These sayings are used to train, rebuke, chastise and communicate expected morals within the society and even in intergroup engagements. This morality is centred on character, and the character (deeds, habits and behaviour patterns) of an individual is considered by the society as worthy because of their significances to humankind well-being (Gbadegesin 1991: 79).

106 

P. O. OLAPEGBA AND O. AYANDELE

Although Africa is diverse in terms of ethnic groupings and nationalities, there appears to be a significant level of similarities in values, cultures and way of life which give credence to the notion that there could be an African identity informed by a common moral principle or outlook. According to Hugo and Dominus (2014), the African moral principle of face-to-face reconciliation was critical to the successful peace-making efforts after the genocide in Rwanda and apartheid in South Africa. African morality, for these two authors, is based on the underlying affinities or shared features found across Africa’s pluralistic societies. African morality is largely informal; not written or codified following the Eurocentric morality fashion, it follows the oral tradition but with strong traditional institutions, sanctions and beliefs to drive compliance. In some instances, it also required supernatural forces such as curses, bad omens, and shunned fiat and arbitrariness (Oyugi 1997). In contemporary times, African morality has become compromised due largely to the loss of communal living and values while embracing, according to Zag (2011), the values of individualism and capitalism. Increasingly, the household is replacing the family as it is known in traditional Africa society. Comparing African morality with the Eurocentric imposed morality, it is quite obvious that the Eurocentric morality is completely at variance with the original African values and worldview. In this view, there is need to further consider the submission of Bangura (2015) and Kamaara (2010) which states that African morality and worldview served the communities effectively and sought to ensure that unity, justice and peace within each of the separate groups prevailed. It also sought to ensure that individual rights were respected in the context of community.

African Morality, Collectivism and Development The incursion of the Eurocentric morality seemed to target youth using the medium of Western education; this probably is responsible for the speed of the phenomenon gaining traction on the continent. This factor may also explain why it has been enduring up till now. To complete the circle of the colonization of the mind, African youth were given opportunities to be educated in the countries of the colonialists where they were completely schooled in culture and practices completely alien to Africa. This set of Africans came back to actively pursue the agenda of Europeanizing Africans. Globalization has further deepened this phenomenon; African youth like never before have opportunities of moving

5  AFRICAN IDENTITY, MORALITY AND WELL-BEING 

107

‘in-between’ spaces of cultures, thereby allowing alien cultures to take further root and distort the African identity and morality. To stem this tide, there is the need to educate and create awareness about the African identity, especially among youth and the upwardly mobile. Muzenda (2019) warned that such identity should be carefully constructed, tweaked and altered to serve the purpose of Africa’s sustainable development. In a similar submission, Blyden (1974) admonished Africa to divorce itself philosophically and culturally from the West if it wants to develop in a sustainable manner. As earlier stated, individualism is alien to Africa, it is a Eurocentric practice that has been superimposed on Africa and promoted by Eurocentric Africa and to some extent development partners who use aids and grants to promote the imposition within the African space. African societies have always been known for their collectivism and communalism as moral ethoses. Some of such collectivist ideas are Ubuntu, a southern African (Nguni) concept of being a person through other persons, based on humanity and compassion (Gade 2012: 307); Botho, a southern African (Sesotho) concept of a person who realizes their full potential both as an individual and as part of the community to which they belong (Republic of Botswana 1997: 2); Omoluabi, a Nigerian (Yoruba) phrase for a person thought of as a paragon of excellence in character (Fayemi 2009); and Ujamaa, an Eastern African (Swahili) word for ‘familyhood’ or ‘brotherhood. Likewise, ‘Humwe,’ a Zimbabwean (Shona) word for ‘in this together’ or for ‘us all’(Chigara 2011); and in Ethiopia, ‘Yilugntan’ (Amharic) refers to ‘a good person, willing to assist and suffer with others’ (Battle 1997: 45), and ‘Gada’ (Oromo) is ‘fellow feeling’ or ‘togetherness’ philosophy (Asafa 2012). The aforementioned were not just concepts within the various traditional African societies but cultural values, ethos and ways of life guiding interpersonal and intergroup interactions with often grave consequences when violated. Societies were regulated significantly through these values from which morality was developed and entrenched and consequently identity was formed with the framework. Any manifestation that is at variance with the approved and acknowledged morality is considered a deviance that is frowned at and possibly sanctioned. According to Chigara (2011) and Gade (2012), the African ethos and morality are a ‘social ordering principle’ that predates colonialism, and their importance to Africans is unquestionable (Bangura 2015; Kamaara 2010). These outlooks are central to the societies such that their elimination from the psyche of Africans by Eurocentric imposition through Western education

108 

P. O. OLAPEGBA AND O. AYANDELE

and globalization has caused serious damage (Wane 2019: 171). Recovering these collectivist values is critical for overcoming poverty in Africa, the goal of SDG 1.

Using African Identity and Morality to Promote Well-Being and Sustainable Development From the preceding discussion, it is clear that African identity and morality are completely at variance with the current emphasis on the individual as the focus of development efforts. The imposition of the Eurocentric morality has harmed the African identity and caused serious dysfunction on the continent, destroying peaceful coexistence and African-grown development. The African identity is holistic, communal and unique. One important feature of African identity which significantly promotes well-­ being is social support. Overcoming poverty, therefore, must be undertaken within the context of the larger community to which the individual belongs. African’s communal orientation encourages looking after one another; an individual’s problem is considered the problem of the community and the solution is sought collectively. Individuals within a given community are never allowed to feel alone in times of adversity, a rich network of social support is deployed to act as safety valve for traumatized individuals. It is this community-induced social support that ensures well-being, such that issues of depression, loneliness and suicide were largely considered alien within African societies. The popular dictum ‘a problem shared is half solved’ clearly expresses African morality in promoting well-being. According to William (2003), African identity is known to be empowering and it derives from the socialization of communalism which provides and demonstrates a worldview of togetherness and strength in numbers. Similarly, Lewis et al. (2017) and Neville and Lilly (2000) aver that the African identity promotes better health and well-being. Also, it has been demonstrated that embracing African identity may be an important element in buffering against the deleterious effects of negative media images and stereotypes and in promoting the development of a sense of self-worth and psychological well-being (Utsey et al. 2008). Against this backdrop, it is important to identify and promote those important cultural values unique in the traditional African societies, teach them and mainstream them back into the societal framework of

5  AFRICAN IDENTITY, MORALITY AND WELL-BEING 

109

interpersonal and intergroup engagements. In the process of bringing back those values, the stage will be set to effectively counter what Rodney (1971) called the brainwashing enterprise during the colonial era which was so effective that it convinced ‘many black people of their inferiority’. Going forward, African societies should be encouraged to emphasize commonalities in their identities and values and also develop respect for the uniqueness of their sociocultural uniqueness while deemphasizing real and perceived differences. In this context, the seminal assertion of Mazrui (2001) is significant, thus: ‘emphasizing what is African, nationalizing what is tribal, idealizing what is indigenous, and indigenizing what is foreign’. Consequently, according to Lassiter (2000), reigniting African identity and morality during this capitalistic, individualistic and materialistic era could form the basis for African renaissance and improved well-­ being for the populace. The various societal institutions should be involved in the rebirth of African identity and morality. The family as a unit should use African legends, proverbs, stories and cultural practices to nurture children on African identity, moral values and social obligations to one’s community (Wane 2019: 107–8). There is the need to deconstruct the Eurocentric model of education and curriculum and have it replaced by a robust, culturally relevant educational curriculum. This curriculum would focus on indigenous development, culture, African history, values and morality geared towards developing a functional African identity that will encourage total well-­ being. In essence, our educational institutions and curricular should be completely decolonized in order to give the people a sense of pride and enhance their self-esteem. To drive these initiatives, governments and policy makers should provide policy framework to institutionalize and entrench the rebirth.

Conclusion There is no gainsaying the fact that the European colonization of Africa disrupted the natural developmental order of societies, impacted negatively on the African identity and contaminated significantly the cultural values on the continent. The disruptions and destructions led to societal dysfunction and crisis of identity. Taken together, the factors have badly stunted socio-economic development on the continent while promoting dependence, poverty, violence and other vices. Some scholars (e.g. Bewaji and Ramose 2003; Chigara 2011; Nyerere 1968) have suggested the

110 

P. O. OLAPEGBA AND O. AYANDELE

application of constructive traditional African values and indigenous knowledge to extricate Africa from poverty, corruption, backwardness and poor governance and regain its ‘lost paradise’. The wrong African identity label established by the continent’s detractors and their individualistic morality must be replaced with African communal morality of Ubuntu/ Botho, Ujamaa, Omoluabi and other African normative ethical principles; these should be encouraged to promote the African identity, moral values, as well as physical and spiritual well-being. Achieving this will ensure the achievement of SDG 1 and fulfilling the vision of a united and prosperous Africa.

References Appiah, S.K. 2003. The Quest of African Identity. Exchange 32 (1): 54–65. Asafa, Jalata. 2012. Gadaa (Oromo Democracy): An Example of Classical African Civilization. The Journal of Pan-African Studies 5 (1): 126–152. Bangura, Abdul Karim. 2015. Toyin Falola and African Epistemologies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Battle, Michael J. 1997. Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu. Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press. Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. 1994. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Benjamin, C. 2010. An African Identity. http://www.chicagodefender.com/ article-­8928-­anafrican-­identity.html. Accessed on 17th May 2020. Bewaji, J.A.I., and M.B. Ramose. 2003. The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose Debate on Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (4): 378–414. Blyden, Edward W. 1974. The Negro in Ancient History. In The People of Africa: A Series of Papers on Their Character, ed. M.S. Henry, 6–21. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Brown, R. 2000. Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges. European Journal of Social Psychology 30 (6): 745–778. Bunyi, G. 1999. Rethinking the Place of African Indigenous Languages in African Education. International Journal of Educational Development 19: 337–350. Chigara, B. 2011. The Humwe Principle: A Social Ordering Grundnorm for Zimbabwe and Africa? In Essays in African Land Law, ed. R. Home, 113–133. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press. Chitando, E., and A. Chitando. 2004. Black Female Identities in Harare: The Case of Young Women with Dreadlocks. Zambezia 31 (1 & 2): 1–21. Crowder, M., and Obaro Ikime, eds. 1970. West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status under Colonial Rule and Independence. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press.

5  AFRICAN IDENTITY, MORALITY AND WELL-BEING 

111

Dietler, Michael. 2007. Culinary Encounters: Food, Identity, and Colonialism. In The Archaeology of Food and Identity, ed. Katheryn Twiss, 218–242. Carbondale, Illinois: Center for Archaeological Investigations Press, University of Southern Illinois. Ekeh, Peter. 1975. Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement. Comparative Studies in Society and History 17: 91–112. Erikson, Erik H. 1968. Identity, Youth and Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton. Falola, Toyin. 2007. The Amistad’s Legacy: Reflections on the spaces of Colonization. Africa Update 14 (2): 4–5. Fayemi, Ademola Kazeem. 2009. Human Personality and the Yorùbá Worldview: An Ethico-Sociological Interpretation. The Journal of Pan African Studies 2 (9): 166–176. Gade, Christian B.N. 2012. What is Ubuntu? Different Interpretations among South Africans of African descent. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (3): 484–503. Gbadegesin, S. 1991. African Philosophy. New York: Peter Lang. Hugo, Pieter and Susan Dominus. 2014. Portraits of Reconciliation. The New  York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/06/ magazine/06-­pieter-­hugo-­r wanda-­portraits.html Isumonah, Adefemi V. 2003. Migration, Land Tenure, Citizenship and Communal Conflicts in Africa. Nationalism and ethnic politics 9 (1): 1–19. Kamaara, Eunice. 2010. Towards Christian National Identity in Africa: A Historical Perspective to the Challenge of Ethnicity to the Church in Kenya. Studies in World Christianity 16 (2): 126–144. Lassiter, James E. 2000. African Culture and Personality: Bad Social Science, Effective Social Activism, or a Call to Reinvent Ethnology? African Studies Quarterly 3 (3): 1–20. Lewis, F.B., M.-C. Boutrin, L. Dalrymple, and L.H. McNeill. 2017. The Influence of Black Identity on Wellbeing and Health Behaviors. J.  Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities 5 (3): 671–681. Linnaeus, Carolus. 1758. System of Nature. Stockholm: Laurentius Salvius. Lumen. 2020. https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-­management/ chapter/ethics-­an-­overview/ Lyons, H.Z., D.H. Bike, A. Johnson, and A. Bethea. 2011. Culturally Competent Qualitative Research with People of African Descent. J.  Black Psychol. 20 (10): 1–19. Mazrui, A.A. 2001. Shifting African Identities: The Boundaries of Ethnicity and Religion in Africa’s Experience. In Shifting African Identities, ed. S. Bekker, M. Dodds, and M. Khosa, 153–175. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council. Muzenda, Mako. 2019, February 8. Africa’s Identity Begins at Home. Mail & Guardian. https://mg.co.za/article/2019-­02-­08-­00-­africas-­identity-­begins-­ at-­home. Accessed on 17th May 2020.

112 

P. O. OLAPEGBA AND O. AYANDELE

NACT-PVS. 2018, September 20. What Makes You African? https://nactpvs. wordpress.com/2018/09/20/what-­makes-­you-­african/. Accessed on 17th May 2020. Neville, H.A and Lilly, R.L. 2000. The Relationship between Racial Identity Cluster Profiles and Psychological Distress among African American College Students. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development 28: 194–207. Nyerere, J.K. 1968. Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press. Okpanachi, E. 2010. Ethno-Religious Identity and Conflict in Northern Nigeria: Understanding the Dynamics of sharia in Kaduna and Kebbi States. IFRA-­ Nigeria e-Papers, (07). http://www.ifranigeria.org/publications/ifra-­e-­ papers/article/eyene-­okpanachi-­2010-­ethno? Oni, S. and Joshua, S. 2014. Colonial Africa and its Emerging Cultures. In Osuntokun, Akinjide, Adebileje, Adebola, Oluwaniyi, Oluwatoyin and Fryanka, Bernard B, eds., Peoples, Cultures and Civilization. Ede, Nigeria: The Directorate for General Studies Programme, Redeemers’ University, 99–112. Onyibor, M.I.S. 2016. National Identity and Crisis of Integration in Multi-Ethnic Nigeria: An Existentialist Perspective. Open Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2016.61001 Oyugi, Walter. 1997. Governance in Kenya during Pre-Colonial and Colonial Times. In Traditional and Contemporary Forms of Local Participation and Self-­ Government in Africa, ed. W. Hofmeister and I. Scholz, 89–102. Johannesburg, South Africa: Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Pawliková-Vilhanová, Viera. 1998. The African Personality of the Dilemma of the other and the Self in the Philosophy of Edward W. Blyden, 1832–1912. Asian and African Studies 7 (2): 162–175. Pheko, M. 2012 May 31. Effects of Colonialism on Africa’s Past and Present. Pambazuka News. https://www.pambazuka.org/global-­south/effects-­ colonialismafricas-­past-­and-­present Republic of Botswana. 1997. Long Term Vision for Botswana: Towards Prosperity for All. Gabaorone: Government Printer. Rodney, Walter. 1971. Groundings with My Brothers. New York: Panther House. Shutte, Augustine. 2001. Ubuntu: An Ethic for New South Africa. Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: Cluster. Utsey, S.O., J.N. Hook, N. Fischer, and B. Belvet. 2008. Cultural Orientation, Ego Resilience, and Optimism as Predictors of Subjective Well-Being in African Americans. Journal of Positive Psychology 3: 202–210. Wa Thiong’o, Ngũgı ̃. 1986. Decolonizing the Mind. http://apracticalpolicy. org/2009/04/02/ngugi-­wa-­thiong%E2%80%99o-­decolonising-­the-­mind/. Accessed on 23 June 2009. Wainana, Binyavanga. 2005. How to Write about Africa. https://granta.com/ how-­to-­write-­about-­africa/

5  AFRICAN IDENTITY, MORALITY AND WELL-BEING 

113

Wane, N.N., ed. 2019. Gender, Democracy and Institutional Development in Africa. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Wengraf, Lee. 2019, May 2. Legacies of Colonialism in Africa Imperialism, Dependence, and Development. International Socialist Review 103: 1-18. https://isreview.org/issue/103/legacies-­colonialism-­africa William, Idowu W. 2003. Social History, African Identity and the Memory Theory. The Anthropologist 5 (4): 237–245. Zag, Zig. 2011, March. Colonization and Decolonization: A Manual for Indigenous Liberation in the 21st Century. Canada: Warrior Publications. https://warriorpublications.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/colonization-­decolonization.pdf

CHAPTER 6

Identity, Religion/Spirituality, Character Values, and Development in Youthful Africa Eunice Kamaara

For too long we have convinced ourselves of this bromide: that there is no other way. That somehow the poor deserve what they get because their poverty is their own fault; that there is no other path for humankind to advance except to structure the world so that a few can engorge themselves and the many should just wait for the crumbs. (Bindra, 2020: 36)

This chapter is the outcome of preliminary research conducted within the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence at the University of Bayreuth, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany Excellence Strategy—EXC 2052/1–390713894. E. Kamaara (*) Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_6

115

116 

E. KAMAARA

Introduction More than a hundred years since the First Industrial Revolution, humans continue to struggle to reduce suffering and increase comfort: basically, to improve their productive and reproductive lives through socio-cultural, economic, and political organizations. In this, scientific and technological advancements have been key. A lot has been achieved, what with the conglomeration of all humanity into one international community with tremendously complex and intricate processes of reproduction and production and distribution of huge amounts of material resources! Yet, development continues to be elusive as human suffering remains unabated. Rudimentary issues of food, ignorance, and disease are rife across the globe, even with terms like sustainability and equitable development. Against this global backdrop, Africans seem to suffer the most. Going by the current global development measures, Africa is a paradox in many senses. First, 30% of all earth’s mineral deposits are found in the continent but it accounts for only 2% of the global Gross Domestic Product (Lebert, 2015). Second, it is the most populous continent, after Asia, with an energetic youthful population, but it also has the highest mortality rate. Third, it represents human tragedies and fears, but also human resilience, hope, and promise (Guterres, 2019). Fourth, it is the cradle of humanity and the earliest human civilizations (including writing) were on the continent, and yet, problematically, for some critics, Africa had no history prior to European imperialism and remained at the lowest level of development until European colonization (Manning, 2013; Manning, 2016; Ogot, 1999). Moreover, ‘Africans are aliens in Africa and foreigners are Africans’ (Aginam, 2016). Among the major reasons for this paradox is Africa’s long history of and continued exploitation by outsiders. But there are also internal factors, largely corruption and poor governance. In this chapter, we seek to explain the situation in Africa using the allegory of youthfulness and to advance the position that Africa has the potential to set the pace of global development based on its cultural identity and spirituality. To affirm this position, we (1) analyse a quick history of Africa in global development. In so doing, we question the development trend that has continually ignored the capacity of individual persons and families, to focus on ‘global development’; given premium to material wealth created on the backs of the great majority of human beings and all creation at the expense of spiritual wellbeing; and ultimately ignored African and other indigenous perspectives on human persons to promote greed for a few individuals, and (2) present African perspectives and values on identity

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

117

and spirituality that would support transition of ‘Youthful Africa’ into a global leader. In this, we draw two lessons from the COVID-19 crisis which are in synch with these African perspectives and values, to affirm that there is another path to development. In this, we highlight the need for Africa to exploit its youthful position to address its identity crisis once and for all. This author decries three interrelated limitations in the writing of this chapter: (1) her own identity as a black female African born in Africa at the dawn of political independence, (2) her use of English, a second language, which is heavily limited in communicating some of the experiences including personhood, religion/spirituality, and identity, and (3) use of complex and confusing (for both the author and possibly the reader) key terms, namely, religion/spirituality, identity, and development.

Problematizing the Concept and Practice of Development Defining any of the key terms used in this chapter is problematic, especially with the limitations mentioned in the previous session. Yet, it is worth attempting. In this section, we focus on problematizing the concept and practice of development, by raising questions without answering them. Basically, we present the history of development as a political enterprise within which individual human beings acquire, consume, and hoard material wealth for power at the expense of all creation. If this discussion leaves the reader confused, we will have met our primary objective to ‘disturb’ the reader and trigger alternative thinking around the concept and practice of development. Three key terms emerge: religion/spirituality, identity, and development. Central in the discussion is the concept of personhood which we integrate in the entire discussion. The Concept of Development Development appears to be an easy term to define. But it is not. The United Nations (1997), indisputably the major development agent globally, notes: Development is a multidimensional undertaking to achieve a higher quality of life for all people. Economic development, social development and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing ­ components of sustainable development. (A/RES/51/240)

118 

E. KAMAARA

Every attempt to unpack this definition ends up in a challenge. Let us illustrate this by unpacking some indicators of development. First, these indicators are dynamic but even if we were to create some artificial stability, challenges would remain. The indicators include: (1) public safety, (2) health, (3) infrastructure, (4) education, and (5) economic indicators, among others (Yonk et al. 2017; Soares and Quintella 2008). Any of these indicators would serve our purpose. Let us pick education. Educationists would identify many criteria of quality education. Positive values would be one of those universally agreed upon criteria, but what values? There are social, economic, cultural, academic, character, and all classifications of values that would indicate quality education for quality life. So which category of values take precedence over which? No wonder, education institutions have a hard time deciding on, and worse, practising their core values. For simplicity’s sake (even though real life has no room for simplicity) let us assume consensus with the UN SDGs that the value of sustainability is a prominent indicator of quality education. Real life would relate sustainability with any category of values. In the context of this chapter, we contend that sustainability would most prominently be a character value. But what specific character values would promote sustainability? Equity? But what is equity? The next question would be when, where, for who, and so on. As Diener et al. (2013) would remind us, measures of quality of life are transitory by nature because they vary from one context to another. Quality education, sustainability, and equity are high sounding terms but they are most difficult to implement. An attempt to unpack one criterion of quality education which is in turn only one indicator of quality of life illustrates the challenge of defining, measuring, and practising development. The UN phrase ‘higher quality of life’ encompasses various aspects which are not necessarily positively correlated. This suggests that development is neither here nor there. If a family gets higher income, say from USD ($) 1 to USD 2 per day only to find that due to inflation, they need more than 2 USD to buy what they previously bought for 1 USD, would this be development? The current practice of measuring quality of life for all people is to unrealistically aggregate and average human experiences. No wonder a multitude of meanings of development exist (Abuiyada, 2018). In the following section, we suggest that ‘higher quality of life for all people’ has merely been about competition among a few individual persons for material accumulation and power at the expense of other human

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

119

beings and other creation. In this process, science and technology are exalted while nonmaterial aspects of human life, including religion and spirituality, are either ignored, forced to fit scientific explanations, or presented as if they are the antithesis of development. A quick history of the concept and practice of global development illustrates this. The Practice of Global Development Global development is a history of contestations. To put it most simply, the so-called First Industrial Revolution occurred between 1760 and somewhere between 1820 and 1840 in England, United Kingdom. This marked the rise of the British Empire in which a few individuals wielded economic and political power over the rest of the world. Other individuals, in America for example, sought to wrestle this away from the British. Contestations continue. Responding to a question on what he thinks are the geopolitical consequences once the COVID-19 crisis is contained, the former director of UNAIDS, Peter Piot, put it across this way: I expect China to come out of this crisis stronger, and the United States weaker. …Maybe this is also a historical correction: until around 1800 the world’s economic centre of gravity was in Asia. The rise of the British Empire has changed this. China sees that as an anomaly in history that lasted two hundred years—and is now being rectified.1

History is almost silent about the earliest civilizations (including medical, writing, technological development) recorded in the Nile Valley, Africa (Mokhtar, 1981; Ogot 2016), long before Africa was ‘discovered’, colonized, and named. Technological, socio-economic, and cultural advancements transformed Britain from a small agrarian rural economy to mass industrial urban production, all for material accumulation and, consequently, power. Wealth and power are presented as if they belong to nations but it is basically wealth and power of individual persons. Nations would not own either wealth or power; persons do. The nature of power, as of material accumulation, is that human persons can never have enough. Competition to have higher accumulation of 1  https://www.knack.be/nieuws/gezondheid/vlaamse-topviroloog-peter-piot-is-zelfcoronapatient-eindelijk-heeft-een-virus-me-te-pakken/article-longread-1595731. html?cookie_check=1588877603

120 

E. KAMAARA

wealth and power over the other person is a major (probably the only) driving force. Although (persons who owned) Britain did everything possible to keep the revolution within its borders for obvious reasons, sooner than later, Belgium and France caught the industrialization bug. Germany followed suit much later (1870) but moved so fast as to threaten the dominance of Britain. By the turn of the century, conflict around control of Europe was inevitable. The First World War broke out in 1914 and the Second World War in 1939. And there began the global political history, nay, history of global development. World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) are defining events in the emergence of the concept and practice of development. The names of the wars suggest that both were global and therefore involving the entire world. Yet, both were merely a struggle by individual persons in European nations for dominance over Europe. But indeed, they were global on two fronts. First, both wars enlisted people from various nationalities across different continents. For example, UNESCO documents that 1  million African soldiers were involved and about 150,000 African soldiers and carriers lost their lives in WWI (Crowder, 1985). Another million soldiers with an even higher casualty were involved in WWII (Mazrui, 1985). The majority of these Africans had no idea what they were fighting about. Second, and much more important to this chapter, is that the wars marked the beginning of the continued struggle for international dominance as more and more nations were enlisted. For example, following WWI, the United States, formerly a colony of Britain, recognized that it needed to support European countries against Russia if it was to protect itself from impeding future threat from Russia. Therefore, the USA became a major player in WWII and ultimately in the struggle for global dominance. It is against this background, and in the context of European post-war reconstruction, that the concept of development became synonymous with international development (a country helping another country). Over the 1950s and 1960s, an assortment of theories, approaches, and perspectives on development emerged to explain ‘development’ as shift from traditional to modern societies. These are the so-called modernization theory(ies) (Bader, 2001). According to this theory, societies move in a linear development path from one stage to another. Rostow (1960) is well known for laying out the theory in five stages: (1) traditional, (2) transition, (3) take off, (4) drive to maturity, and (5) age of consumption.

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

121

Various criticisms of the modernization theory have been propounded (Luintel, 2014; Matunhu, 2011; Ntini, 2016). For example, modernization theory is based on faulty assumptions that (1) development is systematically linear with a beginning and an end, (2) there are distinct traditional and distinct modern societies with distinct traditional and modern values, and (3) development is about replacing one stage with the next (Killing, 1984; Redfield, 1965). Such criticisms make sense. Yet, in the context of this chapter, the criticisms perpetuate the erroneous understanding of development as increase in production and consumption of material goods independent of spiritual growth of human persons for healthy relationships. Beyond this, we argue that development is largely contextual, there is no dichotomy between subsistence and commercial production, just like there is no dichotomy between modern and traditional values. Indeed, as we argue here, character values that promote healthy relationships are primary for authentic development, whether development is linear, cyclical, or otherwise. Come the 1960s and 1970s, the dependency theory, first propounded by Raúl Prebisch (1950), emerged, though it did not gain prominence until the late 1960s. This theory too has been criticized (Matunhu, 2011; Friedman & Wayne, 1977). The dependency theory questions global political and economic order (Margulis 2017) and focuses on explaining why countries are underdeveloped by largely looking at external factors. The theory concludes that underdevelopment results from unequal and exploitative relations and the solution primarily lies in negating and resisting these relationships so that individual countries set their own development path. Indeed, some countries have taken the unbeaten path and tremendously succeeded. Yet again, issues of development are not merely about production of material goods for individual consumption independent of healthy relationships among all creation. Besides, the contention that there are rich and poor nations with the rich exploiting poor is itself erroneous. Only human persons can be rich or poor and in fact, there are individual persons within the so-called rich nations living in abject poverty and there are extremely rich persons in the so-called poor countries. Indeed, nations are economically rich because they have rich persons. The Global North and Global South are not geographic spaces. Other theories and approaches have emerged after the dependency theory, for example, the world systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974), neoliberalism, globalization, the Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2015), and the Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2017). All these comprise

122 

E. KAMAARA

postmodernization theory. Postmodernization theories downplay state intervention to propound free (self-regulating) markets to allow for competition and consequently development (Harvey, 2007; Kotz, 2015). To facilitate free markets, globalization (elimination of national barriers and borders to allow for free-flow of goods, ideas, and persons) is propagated. Individualism, materialism, and consumerism are the defining characteristics of this neoliberal capitalism. The emergence of postmodernism in the 1980s saw consistent transfer of huge amounts of dollars to poor countries in form of loans, grants, and aid. Again, countries have no capacity to transfer or receive dollars. Individuals representing countries send and receive dollars. How else would such monies end up in individual pockets, as sometimes happens in Africa (and other parts of the world)? With endemic corruption and exploitation of human beings, such transfer of dollars is a profit-making process for the givers as well as the receivers. In Africa, loans, grants, and aid have resulted in enormous external debt crisis which remains unresolved (Freidman, 1992) and continues to condemn billions of individual humans into abject poverty. The introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the late 1980s and 1990s to control external debts only served to increase human suffering. In Kenya for example, under the corrupt former President Moi government, SAPs were not only associated with inflation, unemployment, and retrenchment leading to poverty in all spheres of family life, but also with huge gap between the rich and the poor (Rono, 2002). With the COVID-19 crisis, Kenya’s external debt continues to accumulate to such scary levels that the possibility of ‘enslavement’ of the country by some Asian tiger is often a trending subject on social media. With the publication of Silent Spring by Rachel Carson (1962) drawing attention to the global environmental crisis, the language of global development shifted to pay attention to the relationship between the environment and human flourishing. In 1972, the first UN Conference on Human Environment was held in Stockholm. In April 1987, at the request of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) formed in 1963, released its report popularly known as ‘Our Common Future’. The report decries materialism, individualism, and consumerism. WCED (1987) introduced the concept of sustainable development thus:

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

123

Sustainable Development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs… A world in which poverty and inequity are endemic will always be prone to ecological and other crises. … Sustainable development requires that societies meet human needs both by increasing productive potential and by ensuring equitable opportunities for all. (1987)

Sustainability emerged as the key value to global development. Central to sustainability is equity and central to equity is concept of personhood and identity of human persons. Seemingly, ‘Our Common Future’ has only received lip service. The world continues to be governed by neoliberal capitalism (individualism, materialism, and consumerism), even with Millennium Development Goals and more lately, Sustainable Development Goals. Postmodernization categorizes the world into four: low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries on the basis of National Gross Income (GNI) per capita, in US dollars. The same model of supporting poor incomes (think SDG Goal 17 with its emphasis on global partnerships), as postulated in the modernization theory remains. Development blueprints through organizations such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization. Fiscal funding, in line with these policies, comes through the World Bank, the IMF, and from individual governments of rich countries through USAID, CIDA, SIDA, and UKAID, while funds continue to flow from one direction to another. A few countries have charted different paths to development but their understanding of development remains that of access to material wealth for successful competition to politically dominate the globe. This brief history of development suggests that development has consistently referred to increase in material production for individual human consumption, but these individuals are rarely the producers. The least productive enterprises, such as the foreign exchange and stock markets, earn the most for individual accumulation of materials for purposes of accessing power. While there is a limit to what an individual can consume, there is no limit to what one can accumulate and no limit to what power an individual can hoard. Competition, the driving force of development, consistently stiffens and as it stiffens, more and more individual persons are relegated to the margins as fewer and fewer persons increase their material possession and power. In the process, the concept and practice of development remains a political contestation among the powerful and rather than

124 

E. KAMAARA

translate to ‘higher quality of life for all people’, development marginalizes more and more human persons. Rethinking development is a worthy cause and course. There must be another way, otherwise, all humanity and all creation is doomed. In the next section, we suggest that a faulty understanding of human persons and the world in which they live is largely responsible for the incomprehensible notion and practice of development that continues to be propounded, practised, and perpetuated against overwhelming evidence to the contrary. We contend that development is contextual and for Africa, a shift of mindset with regard to self-identity, of the human person (as the primary agent of development) and of the world is a prerequisite to authentic development. Further, we contend that African indigenous perspectives on identity and spirituality would provide some insights for the required mindset shift.

Rethinking Identity and Spirituality for Development in Youthful Africa with Lessons from COVID-19 Contrary to insistence by neo-liberal economists and policy makers that self-interest and rationality explain economic growth and development, Ntibagirirwa (2009: 297) cites the economic success of South East Asia and the failure of sub-Saharan Africa to argue that ‘… although they cannot be taken as the sole factor, people’s cultural beliefs and values are crucial for economic development. Economic growth and development need to be a substantiation of a people’s beliefs and values’. We concur with Ntibagirirwa to put a case for rethinking development of Africa, drawing from Africa’s cultural contexts with particular reference to the question of identity of persons and specifically of African people and of African spirituality. There is another path (Bindra, 2020). At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Africa may be described as youthful: the continent is in crisis. It struggles for identity and independence (Afisi, 2008); experiences pressure from across the globe; is spiritually disoriented; and, strongly desires to establish personal norms and priorities. Fortunately, adolescence is a moment of opportunity: a teachable and transformative phase. As we write this, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) continues to spread throughout the world. As with all crises, COVID-19 presents human beings (perhaps the only creatures aware of

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

125

COVID-19) with many profound lessons in all spheres of life—medical, socio-cultural, environmental, economic, and political, among others. In this section, we focus on indigenous African concept of identity and spirituality to claim that this moment is right for rethinking development of Youthful Africa. Subsequently, we tie this with two lessons from COVID-19. Identity of Human Persons, African Identity, and African Spirituality Nations do not develop. As the central agents of development, persons develop and persons develop nations. In spite of the complexity of development with its many dimensions, its subjectivity and fluidity, all concur that human persons are/must be at the centre of development. But the meaning of this statement varies significantly across contexts. The contention lies in the understanding of the identity of a human person. The identity of human persons is complicated because it is multi-­ layered; multifaceted; natural and at the same time nurtured, and also dynamic. In some contexts, all persons are human beings but not all human beings are persons. In other contexts, the opposite applies. From one legal perspective, for example, a person is not any natural being that has human characteristics, but that natural being with human characteristics and is recognized as a person by some human authority. Therefore, a person is one who is granted legal rights and privileges (such as citizenship, ownership of property, and protection), as well as responsibilities (and may therefore be sued in a court of law). But even legal definitions vary across contexts. By some other legal definition, a child or a woman even with all the characteristics of a human person may be regarded as a human being but not a person and therefore may not own property. But even ‘bodies’ which do not have human characteristics like institutions may be legal persons and may own property or be sued. Whatever the law says stands until it is effectively contested. Animals too may be considered as persons (Midgley, 1985). For lack of space, we desist from the debate on these differences. Among the so-called modern and developed contexts, the centrality of human persons in development is largely conceptualized as ‘dominance’ of human beings over all that exists, or to be precise, dominance of a few individual human persons (often interpreted as nations or worlds) over all that exists. Hence, we have different classification of nations, or countries,

126 

E. KAMAARA

or worlds on the basis of what a few individuals in the nations, countries, or worlds hoard. With this, high and ‘higher quality of life for all people’, although measured more complexly every time, is merely about objectively (statistically) summing up the total measures within a political locality and dividing by the number of people within the locality to get the average ‘quality of life for all people’. Dominance is acquired through individual acquisition of material property— even recognition of intellectual property and the consequent practice of patenting ultimately translates to material property. Huge amounts of material property necessarily translate to political power, whether overtly in public management positions or covertly through influence. The billionaires of this world, as much as the president of the United States, have immense public power which they exercise or seek to exercise in management of all that exists, that is, all creation. With materialistic measure of development in postmodernism, science and technology is promoted while the spiritual realm is largely ignored or negated as irrelevant in development. This explains the postmodern indicators of quality of life—infrastructure, life expectancy, mortality rate, GDP, and economic power among other ‘touchable realities’. Not so in African and other indigenous communities. The understanding of human persons as the centre of development relates not so much to material acquisition but to spirituality. Anthropocentrism is understood not in terms of dominance over people and other creation but as responsibility to ensure that all creation exist in healthy relationships. Human beings, while considered in the context of community, were considered in their own rights and provided for at both individual and communal level. Ntibagirirwa (2009: 297) observes: ‘In African value systems this substantiation could lead to what one would call “ubuntu economy” in which the state, the markets and the people are all agents, and not patients, in the process of economic growth and development’. While there were (and still are) some repugnant practices in indigenous African communities which need to be eliminated, every human being recognized as such is counted as an individual and in no situation would an ‘average of aggregate’ be sought. For every human being, basic needs are obvious rights so structurally provided that they would never be confused with privileges provided by some benevolent individuals. Take food, for example, the most basic need. In indigenous Africa, private ownership of land was unknown and food products of the land would not be sold. Food would be shared. To preserve the dignity of persons, there were institutionalized systems of

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

127

sharing food. Among the Kikuyu of Central Kenya, as among many other communities across Africa, any person was free to get into any farm, access some food (say sweet potatoes), make fire, cook, and eat the food right on the farm. This means that food was always accessible and an individual did not have to beg for it. Similarly, as families harvested food from their farms, they were obliged to leave behind some of the harvest. Those who, for one reason or the other did not have a bountiful harvest, would come later after the harvest and collect what was left behind for their families. While growing up (in the 1960s and 1970s), this author witnessed this practice. To maintain this communal system where everybody’s basic needs were met, a certain worldview or spirituality prevailed. This was the basis of recognition of human persons with all the rights and responsibilities associated with this recognition. This chapter is in itself a contestation towards (re)construction of the identity of human persons, in general, and of Africans, in particular, for effective rethinking of the definition, measurement, and practice of development of African peoples. We distinguish between ‘human persons’ and ‘human beings’. Human beings are all living people bearing human physical characteristics regardless of their mental and spiritual capacities. Human beings are recognized by mere fact of being. Human persons are all people with not just human characteristics but, in line with African spirituality, they consciously take responsibility of their centrality in development to mean not dominance over and exploitation of the rest of creation, but stewardship, that is, caring for all. Human persons are responsible for the wellbeing of all creation which includes all human beings and all that exists, both animate and inanimate. This definition is largely guided by indigenous African concept of persons and greatly influenced by this author’s positionality and the limitations thereof. In this context, we presuppose that development is about self-­ empowerment. Nobody empowers or develops another. One would only facilitate another to develop themselves. In the context of Africa’s development, nobody would develop African peoples. One would only facilitate African peoples to develop themselves. Identity is a project of self-definition but also of definition by others. Definitions by self and by others may overlap or conflict. Identity-making therefore involves continuous contestations, negotiations, and reconstructions. Self-definition necessarily precedes development. To empower themselves, Africans would necessarily begin by reclaiming their identity, defining themselves

128 

E. KAMAARA

and their place in development. Rethinking development of Africa necessarily begs the question: who are Africans? As has already been mentioned in the previous section, human identity is a socio-cultural and political construct. But these nurtured constructions are often based on natural attributes like colour, sex, age, and, physical and mental abilities (or lack of). Identity depends on who defines who, where, when, and for what purposes. Therefore, definitions of identity may be inconsistent even in the same context and therefore confusing, especially for individuals living in cultural crossroads like Africans. Blackness and Identity African identity, whether constructed by self or by others, is shaped by various forms of experiences, chief among which is slavery and slave trade, racism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and globalization. For want of space, we discuss black skin as the central feature to African identity, despite the contestations existent on the subject. Black skin would appear to be a natural and therefore an objective construct. But it is not. As Yancy (2008: 3) points out, the meaning of blackness is not intrinsic to my natural pigment, but has become a value-laden ‘given,’ an object presumed untouched and unmediated by various contingent discursive practices, history, time, and context. In spite of many years of campaigns and efforts to affirm that black is beautiful, and in spite of, or perhaps because of, development, many people (black and otherwise) have been unable to shed off the negative connotation of ‘black’. Racism remains rife. Yet, as we will argue in this chapter, development would necessarily eliminate racism and all other -isms. As I write this in June 2020, global attention has temporarily shifted from the COVID-19 crisis to the inhumane murder of George Floyd, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States. On the 25th of May 2020, Derek Chauvin, a white police officer, supposedly arresting George Floyd, a 46-year-old black father of five, for possession and use of a counterfeit bill, knelt on George’s neck for close to nine minutes— well, even after George had died. George, handcuffed and lying with his face on the tarmac, repeatedly begged for his life with the words, ‘I can’t breathe’ through the larger part of the time that Derek had his knee on his neck. Meanwhile, two other white officers, J. Alexander Kueng and Thomas Lane, restrained George from freeing himself while another white officer, Tou Thao, prevented onlookers from intervening. Fortunately, a bystander took a video of the

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

129

scene, and in a short while, it was trending across the globe. This culminated in the worldwide riots—2000 of these in American cities and numerous others in South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, and other African countries reigniting the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement. Surely, this would not be a scene in any developed nation. The extent of damage to black people can never be overestimated. Perhaps the worst implication is that these powerful negative identity markers translate to negative identification of self by black people. There is adequate literature on the burden of being black as on black as ‘white man’s burden’ (Austin, 2004; Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2017; Wright, 2004). However, ‘blackness’ was not always an issue. Rethinking Africa’s development must begin by successfully contesting definition by others to affirm black identity. Prior to interaction with Europeans, Africans like all peoples, faced the ultimate question of human experience, who am I? This relates to three ultimate questions: (1) where did I come from? (2) why am I here?, and (3) whither do I go? Indigenous African spirituality explains indigenous African responses to these questions. Among indigenous African languages, there was no word for religion or culture. Everything was tied in together holistically into ‘a way of life’. Compartmentalization of reality is an intellectual product. It seeks to clarify and simplify reality, thereby dismembering it. Ideally, after understanding reality, reality should be reintegrated into one whole. This rarely happens. According to the African worldview, all reality is one, with everything (both inanimate and animate reality) connected into one by a mysterious spiritual power. This power is at the basis of human origin, purpose, and destiny. Therefore, religion in Africa is synonymous with spirituality and necessarily related to the definition of personhood and therefore of identity and of development. Religion is not a profession to be professed or a set of practices in specific places at specific times. Religion is a way of living out the entire spirituality, the entire worldview. According to African spirituality, human beings are only part of this entire spiritual reality made up of a supernatural other who is conceived as the Creator but is at the same time one with the created. Among the created are animate (humans, all kinds of animals and birds, and all kinds of plants) and inanimate (what modern science calls non-living things). But for Africans, even inanimate realities have spiritual power and are part of one mystical spirit.

130 

E. KAMAARA

Central to the African worldview is the concept and practice of relationships: relationships between Creator and created, and among the created. As designer, author, purpose, and destiny of the created, the Creator determines relationships between the Creator and created, as well as among the created. The will of the Creator, expressed in nature and easily understood by human persons who seek to understand it in humility and truth, is that the Spirit remains one. Healthy relationships between the Creator and the created as well as among the created sustains the One Mystical Spirit. Unhealthy relationships are identified as any activities that work against any of the aspects of the One Spirit because, ultimately, any threat or harm to any of the aspects destroys the unity of the whole. Like other indigenous communities, indigenous Africans do not preoccupy themselves with the questions of origin and destiny of the world and of creation. This is not to say that there are no efforts to answer the ultimate questions. Indeed there are myths, debates, and explanations around these questions but these necessarily end with appreciation that it is not for humans to answer all questions. This is in the realm of the Creator. They preoccupy themselves more with the purpose of life, that is, development. The purpose of life (read development) according to the African worldview is to ensure perpetuation of life through healthy relationships from one generation to another through birth and rebirths of all elements of reality. In the same way that seeds grow into trees which produce more seeds as well as inanimate products like leaves, branches, and eventually the trunk which all serve to enrich the process of nurturing not just a new tree but other elements of creation, humans produce and eventually become fodder for other elements of creation as they perpetuate themselves and other elements of creation. Ultimately, these processes perpetuate the one Spiritual reality, life. Everything in creation relates to everything else. A systematic process of formulating and passing on African spirituality exists basically in the form of rites of passage from pre-birth to ancestor-­ hood. In recognition of the difficulties and yet the centrality of adolescence as a stage in human development that is characterized by identity and spiritual crises, the rite of passage from initiation from childhood to adulthood is most elaborate. It is accompanied by intensive training which when practised makes a human being a person. Within the African worldview, transition from childhood to adulthood over adolescence is the precise moment when human persons are made and subsequently afforded

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

131

the duty and rights of perpetuating the One spirit, that is creation in all forms. The training is basically on character formation with emphasis on responsibility to maintain the right relationships with the Creator, with the self, with other human beings and with all other creation. This explains why we consider this moment of African adolescence to be opportune for rethinking development. Two key lessons from COVID-19 affirm African spirituality. To this we now turn. Lessons from COVID-19 In spite of all advancements in science and technology, an inanimate part of creation that is so minute that it cannot be seen with the naked eye, SARS-CV-2 continues to cause unprecedented human suffering and loss of lives, not to mention the enormous socio-cultural and economic implications of COVID-19. Despite the ‘non-living’ nature of the virus that causes COVID-19, the virus has vital force that has so intensively and extensively destroyed relationships not just among human persons but among all creation, thanks to unhealthy human activities. In an interview after recovering from COVID-19, Peter Piot jocularly says that in infecting him, a virologist who has spent his whole lifetime fighting viruses, SARS-CV-2 was taking revenge.2 This would not be a joke from the perspective of African spirituality. Indigenous Africans have always known that human beings are a vulnerable lot with limited knowledge of themselves and of the world in which they live. The COVID-19 crisis has affirmed this. Seven months after detection, the origin, the nature of, and how to manage or eliminate, the virus remained largely unknown (WHO 2020). Much of what science claim to know as of now is how SARS-CV-2 infection clinically manifests. The rest of the knowledge is belief. COVID-19 is believed to have zoonotic origin; to be a respiratory illness with human-to-human transmission; spread by respiratory droplets (sneezing and coughing), hand-to-hand contact and touching surfaces which are contaminated, and with possibility of airborne transmission (WHO 2020). The pattern of COVID-19 has beaten all scientific predictions, even those based on mathematical modelling. As the disease spread from China to Europe and 2  https://www.knack.be/nieuws/gezondheid/vlaamse-topviroloog-peter-piot-is-zelfcoronapatient-eindelijk-heeft-een-virus-me-te-pakken/article-longread-1595731. html?cookie_check=1588877603

132 

E. KAMAARA

America in causing untold health crisis and death, all experts held their breath waiting to see the effect of COVID-19 in Africa. An apocalyptic catastrophe was expected. Early in April, Melinda Gates, an American philanthropist, predicted that human bodies would soon be lying around in the streets of Africa;3 the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa projected that ‘Anywhere between 300,000 and 3.3 million African people could lose their lives as a direct result of COVID-19’;4 WHO Africa Region predicted that 1 billion Africans would be infected and up to 190,000 lives would be lost to COVID-19 by the end of 2020;5 and scientists from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine predicted that up to 450,000 Africans would test positive for COVID-19 by mid-May 2020.6 None of these beliefs and scientific predictions have come to pass. There are kinds of explanations of this failure but none seems to hold water. Human beings (even aided by science and technology) do not and will never understand everything. Clearly, there is another force at play. Even as they struggle to rationally and scientifically explain and predict reality, indigenous Africans acknowledge human inadequacies to recognize and appeal to mysterious force way beyond them. And it works! Hopefully, human beings will choose healthy relationships over wealth and dominance going forward. Related to this is the second key lesson from COVID-19: Everything in creation has spiritual force and all reality is interconnected into one whole. Humans would underestimate the power of and the need for healthy relationships with every creation at their own peril. First detected in late 2019 when the WHO was alerted to a cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan City in China, in a matter of days, COVID-19 spread to affect virtually all countries worldwide (Neetu et al., 2020). WHO updates on 15 July 2020 indicated more than 13.5 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 and over 580,000 deaths globally. Virologists would tell us that SARS-CV-2 is not a living thing and would never move on its own. It relies on humans to 3  https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/problem-predicting-coronavirus-­ apocalypse-africa-200505103847843.html Accessed on 15th July 2020. 4  https://www.uneca.org/publications/covid-19-africa-protecting-lives-and-economies Accessed on 15th July 2020. 5  https://www.scimex.org/newsfeed/model-predicts-up-to-190,000-deaths-from-­ covid-19-in-africa Accessed on 15th July 2020. 6  https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/450-000-africans-projectedto-­contract-covid-19-by-may-1439572 Accessed on 15th July 2020.

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

133

move it from one person to another. This is only partially true. If it were all the truth, COVID would not have spread across the world, at least not so fast. Like humans, SARS-CV-2 is dependent on other realities. If SARS-CV-2 ‘jumped’ from some animals to humans, it is because SARS-CV-2 and humans relate with animals. From Wuhan, humans would move the virus so effectively because human beings like SARS-CV-2 relate with air and with other inanimate things like cars, clothes, aeroplanes, surfaces, and so on. Everything relates to everything else and everything has spiritual force. This truth resonates with African spirituality. We would ignore this interdependence at our own peril. According to African spirituality, all creation is designed to work together in unity and rhythm: when healthy relationships flourish among all creation, life is promoted for all creation, and all creation rejoices together. When there are unhealthy relationships, life is threatened and all creation suffers together. Life is therefore understood as a unitary whole in which individual elements of creation are understood as interdependent parts of the whole creation, hence the concept of ethical community. This is the Utu ethos. At the onset of COVID-19, human expectation was that humanity would dominate and beat the virus soon. Temporary lockdowns were initiated not without some success but so many months later, emphasis shifted to requiring individual human beings to learn to live with the virus. This confirms that development is not about wealth and dominance. It is about maintaining healthy interrelationships with all reality. This points at the centrality of character values and moral personhood in development. The target of development is therefore not only humans but all that there is, although human beings remain at the centre with the responsibility to maintain the healthy relationships. There is need for a holistic conception and practice of development. ‘… the process of profound and durable positive change in the spiritual, psychological, moral, social, economic, political, institutional, environmental and technological spheres of … society’ (Agbiji & Swart, 2015:2). Such holistic definitions are relevant to a relationally and spiritually wired African worldview.

Conclusions An analysis of the history of global development suggests that while the term ‘development’ is increasingly being defined holistically, measure of development remains largely material and the practice of development

134 

E. KAMAARA

remains limited to accumulation of material wealth for power by a few individuals across nations of the world. The indicators of development of nations as of today largely involve aggregating the total material wealth (gross) within a nation and calculating the average access by human beings in the nation. Yet, the reality is that even in the most developed nations of the world, some human beings sleep hungry. As long as a person in the world is sleeping hungry, there would be no development, no ‘higher quality of life’. Further, development has traditionally flowed from nations in the Global North to nations in Africa. This model of development will never work because nations do not develop. Individual human persons develop themselves within their cultural contexts (Ntibagirirwa, 2001). We argue in this chapter that the starting point to rethinking African development is reclaiming an African understanding of personhood as moral and reclaiming of African identity, cultural values, and African spirituality. Within modernization and postmodernization paradigms, the centrality of human persons in development is understood as dominance and material exploitation of human beings and other creation by individual persons. Two lessons from COVID-19 affirm African spirituality. First, human beings are a vulnerable and ignorant lot and that materialism and science would not be adequate foundation for development. With all the scientific and technological advancements of the twenty-first century, a minute ‘non-living’ thing continues to threaten the human race more than seven months since it was detected and a lot about the virus remains unknown. Second, for as long as one element of creation is unhealthy, as long as one human being is hungry and diseased, the whole creation is hungry and diseased. This calls for rethinking of the definition, measurement, and practice development. This entails contesting popularly accepted categories, including the SDGs. According to African spirituality, the centrality of human persons in development refers to stewardship—where human persons have responsibility to care for all creation by maintaining healthy relationships with the Supernatural Other and among all creation. Development is therefore about moral personhood. From an African perspective, authentic development is driven by character values and is necessarily about identity and religion/spirituality. We propose renewed emphasis on individual persons from an African perspective and emphasis on character values as the foundation of human persons and therefore the foundation of human development.

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

135

References Abuiyada, Reem. 2018. Traditional Development Theories Have Failed to Address the Needs of the Majority of People at Grassroots Levels with Reference to GAD. International Journal of Business and Social Science 9 (9): 115–119. https://doi.org/10.30845/ijbss.v9n9p12115. https://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_9_No_9_September_2018/12.pdf. Afisi, Oseni Taiwo. 2008. Rethinking the African Identity Crisis. Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Philosophy 1: 89–108. Agbiji, O.M., and I. Swart. 2015. Christian Religious Leadership and the Challenge of Sustainable Transformational Development in Post-Military Nigeria: Towards a Reappraisal. Koers: Bulletin for Christian Scholarship 80 (1): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.19108/koers.80.1.2212. Aginam, Obijoofor. 2016. Africa’s Development: The Paradox of Continental Integration and Closed Borders. https://kujenga-­amani.ssrc. org/2016/10/19/africas-­d evelopment-­t he-­p aradox-­o f-­c ontinental-­ integration-­and-­closed-­borders/. Accessed 11 June 2020. Austin, G. 2004. The Burden of Being BLACK. Delta Winds: A Magazine of Student Essays 17: 10–13. Bader, Zaheer. 2001. Modernization Theory and the Cold War. Journal of Contemporary Asia 31 (1): 71–85. Bindra, S. 2020, June 21. My 900th Column: Reflections in the Midst of Global Pandemic. Sunday Nation. 36. Carson, Rachel. 1962. Silent Spring. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Crowder, Michael. 1985. The First World War and Its Consequences. In General History of Africa: Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-1935. Volume VII, ed. A.A. Boahen, 283–311. California: Heinemann. https://unesdoc.unesco. org/ark:/48223/pf0000184296.nameddest=64457. Diener, E., R. Inglehart, and L. Tay. 2013. Theory and Validity of Life Satisfaction Scales. Social Indicators Research 112 (3): 497–527. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11205-­012-­0076-­y. Friedman, John. 1992. Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development. Oxford: Blackwell Press. Friedmann, H., and J.  Wayne. 1977. Dependency Theory: A Critique. The Canadian Journal of Sociology 2 (4): 399–416. Guterres, Antonio. 2019. A Continent of Hope. Africa Renewal. https://www. un.org/africarenewal/web-­features/continent-­hope Harvey, D.A. 2007. Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Killing, J. 1984. The Quest for Economic Stabilization: The IMF and the Third World, 45–56. London: Overseas Development Institute. Kotz, David M. 2015. The Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capitalism. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press.

136 

E. KAMAARA

Lebert, Tom. 2015. Africa: A Continent of Wealth, a Continent of Poverty. https://waronwant.org/media/africa-­continent-­wealth-­continent-­poverty Luintel, Youba. 2014. Modernity and Gender: A Critique of Modernization Theory. Himalayan Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 6: 221–235. https:// doi.org/10.3126/hjsa.v6i0.10732. Manning, Patrick. 2013. African and World Historiography. The Journal of African History 54: 319–330. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853713000753. ———. 2016. Locating Africans on the World Stage: A Problem in World History. Journal of World History 27 (3): 605–663. Mapedzahama, V., and K. Kwansah-Aidoo. 2017. Blackness as Burden? The Lived Experience of Black Africans in Australia. SAGE Open. https://doi. org/10.1177/2158244017720483. Margulis, Matias. 2017. Introduction: The Global Political Economy of Raúl Prebisch. In The Global Political Economy of Raúl Prebisch, ed. Matias E. Margulis. New York: Routledge. Matunhu, J. 2011. A Critique of Modernization and Dependency Theories in Africa: Critical Assessment. African Journal of History and Culture 3 (5): 65–72. Mazrui, A. 1985. Africa and the Legacy of the Second World War. In The General History of Africa: Studies and Documents, ed. UNESCO, 13–26. Paris: UNESCO. Midgley, Mary. 1985. Persons and Non-Persons. In Defense of Animals, ed. Peter Singer, 52–62. London: Basil Blackwell. http://www.animal-­rights-­library. com/texts-­m/midgley01.htm. Mokhtar, G., ed. 1981. Ancient Civilizations of Africa. California: UNESCO. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000184265. Neetu, J.N., S.E.  Casey, G.  Carino, and T.  McGovern. 2020. Lessons Never Learned: Crisis and Gender-Based Violence. Developing World Bioeth 2020 (00): 1–4. https://doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12261. Ntibagirirwa, S. 2001. A Wrong Way: From Being to Having in the African Value System. In South African Philosophical Studies, II, ed. Patrick Giddy. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. ———. 2009. Cultural Values, Economic Growth and Development. J Bus Ethics 84: 297–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-­009-­0203-­0. Ntini, Edmore. 2016. Today’s World: Can Modernisation Theory Still Explain It Convincingly? Journal of Sociology and Social Anthropology 7 (1): 56–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/09766634.2016.11885702. Ogot, Bethwell Allan, ed. 1999. General History of Africa, Vol. V: Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century (abridged edition), 508. Oxford, UK: James Currey. ———. 2016. History of African Civilizations in the Nile Valley. Ayange Press. Prebisch, Raúl. 1950. The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems. New York: United Nations.

6  IDENTITY, RELIGION/SPIRITUALITY, CHARACTER VALUES… 

137

Redfield, R. 1965. Peasant Society and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rono, J.K. 2002. The Impact of the Structural Adjustment Programmes on Kenyan Society. Journal of Social Development in Africa 17: 81–98. Rostow, Walter W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communistic Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Soares, Jair, Jr., and Rogério H.  Quintella. 2008. Development: an Analysis of Concepts, Measurement and Indicators. Brazilian Administrative Review, Curitiba 5 (2.2): 104–124. http://www.anpad.org.br/bar. United Nations. 1997. Agenda for Development. A/RES/51/240 https:// undocs.org/en/A/RES/51/240 ———. 2015. Millennium Development Goals Report. https://www.un.org/ millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20 (July%201).pdf ———. 2017. Sustainable Development Goals. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/ files/report/2017/thesustainabledevelopmentgoalsreport2017.pdf Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press. WCED. 1987. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ content/documents/5987our-­common-­future.pdf WHO. 2020. Rational Use of Personal Protective Equipment for Coronavirus (Covid-19). Geneva: WHO. Wright, M.M. 2004. Becoming Black: Creating Identity in the African Diaspora. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Yancy, G. 2008. Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Ryan M. Yonk, Josh T. Smith and Arthur R. Wardle 2017, August 23. Building a Quality of Life Index, Quality of Life and Quality of Working Life. Ana Alice Vilas Boas: IntechOpen. https://doi.org/10.5772/67821. Available from: https://www.intechopen.com/books/quality-­of-­life-­and-­quality-­of-­working-­ life/building-­a-­quality-­of-­life-­index

CHAPTER 7

Street-Level Pan-African Solidarity and Development: Nigerian Netizens and the COVID-19 Drug from Madagascar Ayobami Ojebode, Oluwabusolami Oluwajulugbe, and Oluwaseyifunmi Esther Ambrose

Background African unity has been generally understood as the integration of the aspirations, programmes, and activities of the different governments and nations on the continent into a dynamic network. African nations exist within imposed artificial borders, and one of the ways of undoing the hazards of such arbitrariness is for the nations to rise beyond these borders into a united entity. One of the ways of promoting this was the formation of the Organisation for African Unity in 1963, which morphed into the

A. Ojebode (*) • O. Oluwajulugbe Department of Communication and Language Arts, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria O. E. Ambrose Communication Studies, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_7

139

140 

A. OJEBODE ET AL.

African Union in 2002. Programmes that cast a common vision for the nations and set a common pathway to that vision, such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), were also ways of promoting and securing African unity. Another suggested way was the formation of a supranational government, the United States of Africa, a suggestion made by the late Muammar Gaddafi, but which has not yet materialized. The fact that the unity of Africa is still being discussed suggests that the continent has not achieved unity. The loyalties, diplomatic ties, and businesses of many nations are still with their former colonizers and with their creditor Asian governments, especially China, rather than with their African neighbours. Efforts continue to be made to promote this rather elusive unity; and studies evaluating these efforts are increasing (Chacha 2002; Adejumobi 2009; Wapmuk 2009; Ibrahim 2016; Kamga 2019). We argue that the standpoint of these studies, discussions, and evaluations has been a little problematic because they have conceptualized unity from a state-focused and elitist perspective. We aver that there is a substantial and potent presence of African unity which the state-focused and elitist spectacles have continued to miss and have, therefore, failed to harness for African development. Focusing on Nigerian netizens’1 reaction to the COVID-19 drug that Madagascar claimed to have discovered, we identify what we call street-level unity and suggest that if well nurtured, it holds a strong potential for contributing significantly to the development of the continent. We begin with a conceptual clarification of the key terms, describe the season of siege and Nigerian netizens’ responses to the COVID-19 drug that Madagascar claimed to have discovered named. We then tease out what the responses say about the unity of Africa and draw implications for the promotion of African development.

African Unity and Integration The quest for unity and integration in Africa has been an ongoing concern, both in academic literature and in political discussions. Since the days of Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, African leaders have continued to pursue unity and integration to foster development and to solve the problems that bedevil the continent. Quests to meet the challenges of a changing  Keen users of the internet.

1

7  STREET-LEVEL PAN-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND DEVELOPMENT: NIGERIAN… 

141

world, to be at par with trends of integration in other regions, and to resist those Western ideas that stand against the interests of Africa continue to be the preoccupation of pan-Africanist leaders (Okhonmina 2009). For Chacha (2002), Maluwa (2003), and Kamga (2019), these concerns for unity are borne out of the need to liberate Africa from poverty, secure economic development, and have an effective voice in global affairs. The results of these pursuits are pan-Africanist initiatives, such as the establishment of organizations like the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the African Union (AU), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Though created with good intentions and marked by substantial achievements, the creation of such organizations would be a false hope for Africa if leaders do not faithfully commit to pursuing the organizations’ objectives (Maluwa 2003; Ilorah 2004). Today, the question is being asked as to whether pan-Africanism is still relevant in the twenty-first century and whether the African nations are indeed united. In attempting to answer these questions, Kamga (2019) explains that in order to achieve unity and integration in Africa, pan-Africanism would need to re-strategize, otherwise, its ideologies would remain “mere slogans”. Many authors have tried to define and redefine what unity and integration mean for the African people. While Chacha (2002) argued that it is embedded in the revitalization of indigenous languages, Wapmuk (2009) believes that African leaders should foremost be concerned about addressing the myriad challenges facing the continent before integration can be actualized. Akinyemi et al. (2019) advocate that integration and the development of Africa have an undeniable interdependence and as such there will be no noticeable development without proper integration. On a different note, Maluwa (2003) acknowledges existing literature on African unity and integration but claims that pertinent questions have gone unanswered which require further clarification. Intense discussions by stakeholders about the political, economic, and social implications of integration for Africans are lacking. He adds that the route to achieving political and economic integration has been marred by lack of “strategic clarity” (Maluwa 2003). Eleven years after Maluwa critiqued the process of achieving political and economic integration in Africa, Kayizzi-Mugerwa et al. (2014) submit that the goal of an economically integrated Africa is still out of reach owing to several impediments. More recently, Akinyemi et  al. (2019) observe that though some progress has been made, efforts on integration

142 

A. OJEBODE ET AL.

have not yielded satisfactory results. Several scholars have equally argued that African unity and integration seem evasive in the face of myriad loopholes. Among other challenges that Africa has faced in achieving the unity and integration it longs for are: lack of good governance and rule of law (Okhonmina 2009); social, political, and economic woes (Chacha 2002); poverty and underdevelopment (Mudimbe 1988); lack of common race, culture and language, inter-state conflicts, and diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS (Wapmuk 2009); African leaders’ disregard for democracy (Maluwa 2003); poverty (Ilorah 2004); and neo-­colonial trappings of globalization (Ilogwe 2018). Despite these setbacks, Kamga (2019) believes that Africa has a right to development and this can only be achieved if African leaders themselves step down from perpetuating the evils that imperialism handed over, become accountable, and have respect for the rule of law and human rights governing their countries. From the foregoing, we argue that African unity has been too narrowly understood. The solidarity of African people has been overlooked in the pursuit of government-level unity (Okhonmina 2009). It is, however, hoped, as Wapmuk (2009) puts it, that the pursuit of African unity will not just focus on the interaction among African leaders but on the unification of the citizens of Africa. This chapter is concerned with citizen-level participation that is geared towards development and, perhaps, African unity. In the next section, we propose a more comprehensive way of understanding African unity.

A Simplified Typology of Interactions Our starting point is to suggest that the way African unity has been conceptualized so far has been inadequate. It focuses mostly on nation-level or official unity, that is unity and integration among the 54 nations of Africa at political and at formal business levels. This has been understood as one of the ways to advance the development of the continent and to harmonize and maximize the collective political weight which it wields in the comity of continents and powers. While this is desirable, at the conceptual level, “unity” can do with less intention and more stretching (Collier et al. 2012). Theoretically, there exist two possible levels of unity among nations: the nation level and the citizen level. We suggest that African unity should be conceptualized along these levels because that is a historically sensitive way of conceiving African

7  STREET-LEVEL PAN-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND DEVELOPMENT: NIGERIAN… 

143

unity, taking into account the arbitrary way in which the nations’ borders were crudely constructed in 1884 at the Berlin Conference. On the one hand, many African nations are in their 50s and have come a long way in evolving into modern nations. This then makes it plausible to reckon with unity among nations at the official diplomatic and policy level. On the other hand, the citizens who, in 1884, were being divided and whose lands were being partitioned had no input into the process and product of the partition and therefore have, largely, mentally and emotionally, not developed a citizens’ consciousness and allegiance to the arbitrary nations, the same way that Europeans might have. To limit analytical activities to the first level (national), which is what the practice has largely been, loses much of the “below the table” citizens’ thoughts, feeling, and allegiance that goes on in Africa. It also weakens the citizen-driven dynamics that should be behind the development of the continent. Taking the two levels of unity and the two dimensions of each level produces a rather roughly hewn expatiation as seen in Table 7.1. The official level of interaction would include diplomatic interactions and collaborations and international and multinational business ventures which may not belong to governments but have structured and official frameworks for operations. Exchange programmes among universities in different countries, and international sports tournaments would, among others, belong to this level. This can be thick, such as exists between Nigeria and Ghana or limited, such as exists between eSwatini and, say,

Table 7.1  A typology of interaction traffic

Citizen level

Official level Light

Thick

Thick

(3) Street-level unity

(4) Potent unity

Light

(1) Complete disunity

(2) Formal unity

144 

A. OJEBODE ET AL.

Liberia. In fact, it is not inconceivable that there would be zero official-­ level interaction. The citizen level covers all forms of interaction and collaboration among citizens of different nations face-to-face or virtually on any subject that they judge important, which is not subject to official sanctions or structures. The widespread presence of new media and mobile devices has made this level more vibrant than had been the case earlier. Thus, it merits more important contemplations than it used to receive. Citizen-level interaction can also be robust or limited if not totally absent. We can thus hypothetically think of four kinds of unity or four unities. The first is Complete Disunity which is a product of limited citizen-level and nation-level interaction. This may be uncommon but it is not impossible to imagine. For reasons of distance and small populations, some nations may have little interaction one with another. For instance, not many nations in Africa have official political or business interactions with the small island nations such as Kiribati or Nauru. It is also conceivable that citizens of these unconnected nations have little interaction among them. Within Africa, this might be difficult to find but it is not unimaginable. Formal unity, the second kind of unity, comes when there is limited interaction and cooperation among citizens of two nations but robust or near-robust interaction among the nations themselves. This official traffic of interaction heavily overshadows citizen-level interaction. The third possibility is what we call street-level unity. This happens among citizens of different nations who have robust cross-border interactions where the nations officially have little to do with each other. This is about citizens dominating the show where the governments or official bodies or businesses are absent. World Cup tournaments present a useful example of this in Africa. During these tournaments, it is very common for citizens of African nations whose teams did not even make it to the finals to deploy emotional and financial resources in support of the nations whose teams made it. Such teams are seen as African teams, rather than Ghanaian, Kenyan, or Nigerian teams. This happens often without any input from the governments of the non-playing nations. But street-level interaction happens at a level that is more ancient and even vital, as is seen among border-split communities. The Tupuri of Chad maintain strong traditional, cultural, and even political ties with the Tupuri of Cameroon. This is the same way the Baruten maintain daily cross-border dynamics across the Benin Republic and Nigerian border; or the Acholi blur the Ugandan and South Sudanese border. Examples are innumerable in Africa

7  STREET-LEVEL PAN-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND DEVELOPMENT: NIGERIAN… 

145

of “blurred borders” (Ojebode and Akingbulu 2012) where a thick traffic of interaction goes on at the citizen level, with little or no government involvement. The fourth type of unity, which is the most desirable, occurs when both the traffic of interactions between two nations and between their citizens are robust. This occurs between nations within the same sub-region such as Kenya and Uganda or Nigeria and Ghana. However, it also does across sub-regions, such as between Nigeria and Kenya where official and citizen-­ level traffic of interaction is remarkably thick. This foregoing typology is not a clean-cut division of nations into cells but a way of problematizing our notion of unity. More nuancing with possible quantification of traffic of interaction should further refine the typology and its application as that should help locate the unities on within-cell continua. Quantification might also help to define what makes a traffic of interaction thick or light. Such measurement should also consider the differences in the appearances, that is, indicators of official and citizen-level unities: one is loud and sometimes helped by the media and may therefore be deceptive; the other is more life-on-life, at times silent; it is indeed, street-level. For this chapter, the purpose of this typology is to help locate and clarify the analytical property of “street-level unity” and to illustrate what it means in a practical sense. This is to guide our case-making for fostering this type of unity and its deployment in a way that supports development efforts on the continent. In the next section, we discuss an event on the continent that brings to life the borderless presence and vitality of street-­ level unity.

The Malagasy Drug and Street-Level Unity The first confirmed COVID-19 case in Africa was reported in Egypt on 14 February 2020. This was about 10  weeks after the first global case was reported in China on 31 December 2019 (WHO 2020). Within two weeks, COVID-19 cases were confirmed in all the African sub-regions. Thus, Africa joined the rest of the world in bearing the burden of a strange infection. What stood Africa apart, however, was its fragile health systems which was the reason for its total unpreparedness for the pandemic. In times of medical emergencies such as a pandemic, a number of factors matter: healthcare manpower, facilities and equipment, and medical supplies. In

146 

A. OJEBODE ET AL.

each of these, Africa was nowhere near being prepared for the COVID-19 pandemic. With reference to manpower, according to WHO (2019), African countries had the lowest physician–patient ratio. While Cuba had over 80 physicians per 10,000 population, and Spain had over 40, many African countries had less than 1 physician per 10,000 population. It has been said that Africa bears 25% of the world’s disease burden but has only 2% of the world’s doctors and that fewer than 50% of Africans have access to modern health facilities (Kumar 2019). The performance of the continent in the aspect of facilities is not more impressive than in manpower. More than one billion people in Africa share only 98,745 health facilities which is the lowest healthcare facilities per capita in the world (Kumar 2019). By the time the pandemic reached Africa in February 2020, there were only six laboratories on the entire continent that could test for COVID-19 (Paquetter et al. 2020). Not only this, some African countries had as few as three ventilators while the United States, for instance, had about 170,000 and described that as grossly inadequate (Wood 2020). Further, Africa depends heavily on importation for its medical supplies and equipment. For instance, during the COVID-19 era, Africa needs 13.1 million gloves every month but produces only about 15% of these though the continent is rich in rubber; it needs half a million litres of disinfectant monthly but produces only about 17% of these (Spies 2020). Poorly equipped hospitals with a large number of obsolete equipment do not also help the fight against COVID-19 in Africa. In Nigeria, for example, the government had to release a huge amount of money in order to support the states in their fight against the virus (Adeyemi and Onyiliofor 2020). Also, the fight against COVID-19 did not gain momentum until the medical supplies from China arrived and were handed over to the Nigerian government (NAN 2020). It was in this state of deficient health systems that COVID-19 met Africa. By the time the first case in Africa was confirmed in Egypt, the virus had begun to wreak massive havoc in China and in some European countries with much better health systems than Africa. As a result, the confirmation of the case in Africa brought much panic. The panic was worsened by the fact that some of the preventive measures being suggested were impracticable or severely challenging for most African people. Regular handwashing was impossible for most people because some estimates state that about half of the population do not have access to safe drinking water (GIZ 2019). In fact, in many African villages,

7  STREET-LEVEL PAN-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND DEVELOPMENT: NIGERIAN… 

147

getting water enough for drinking and cooking is a whole day’s work. If water is this precious, washing hands with it every 20 minutes might be considered a prodigal waste. Social distancing was also impossible for those living in crowded locations, and these account for a large percentage of Africans. The situation for Africa could thus be described as a siege. There was a pandemic, a strong existential threat. There was basically little or no human and infrastructural resources to tackle the disease. Most of the nations are struggling economies and yet must depend on importing the critical supplies needed to survive the pandemic. From all indications, therefore, Africa was expected to be the worst hit continent. And this was loudly announced. Philanthropist Melinda Gates in a CNN interview on 10 April 2020 lamented the ill-preparedness of Africa for the COVID-19 pandemic and foresaw a horrible devastation of the continent by the disease. She, in fact, foresaw dead bodies on the streets of Africa as happened in Ecuador (CNN 2020). Melinda Gates was just one of the innumerable voices that expected an apocalyptic calamity in Africa. Among them was Wood (2020: htm) who advised the world to prepare for a “wave of catastrophe in Africa” worse than what was happening in the United States. When it appeared that the virus was not wreaking havoc in Africa as much and as fast as it was expected, the BBC’s Andrew Harding, in the tone of a confused doomsayer, called it the “lull before the surge” (Harding 2020). The speed and gravity of the COVID-19 destruction of Europe and America made it impossible to dismiss Melinda Gates’s fears. In the same month that she spoke, deaths from Covid-19 reached over 50,000 in the United States and over 24,000 in Italy. It was during the same month that mortuaries were overwhelmed and dozens of decomposing Covid-19 corpses were discovered in abandoned trucks in the United States (Feuer et al. 2020). If the “spectacle of dead New Yorkers left to decay in broad daylight in rental trucks” (Feuer et al. 2020: htm) could happen in the United States, then a catastrophe could be seen impending in Africa. However, in Africa, two significant events occurred. On April 22, Madagascar launched an herbal solution which it claimed could cure COVID-19. The drug, called Covid-Organics, was publicly presented by the president, Andry Rajoelina, who drank some of it and claimed that two people had indeed been cured of the disease through the drug (Africa News 2020). As at that time, Madagascar had not recorded any COVID-19 fatalities. Within the same week, Senegal announced its production of the

148 

A. OJEBODE ET AL.

cheapest test kit in the world: it cost USD 1 and could produce results within minutes (Adebowale 2020; Al Jazeera 2020a). Within weeks, some African countries officially ordered Madagascar’s Covid-Organics and commended Senegal for its inventions (Ojebode 2020). However, the World Health Organization (WHO) warned against the use of the drug, stating that it had not been tested and proven (Ojebode 2020). More relevant to our discussion, however, is the reaction of the ordinary Nigerian citizens to the first of these events. We acknowledge the definition of netizens as those who use the internet habitually. However, for our study, we focus on those who pass comments at the end of online newspaper stories. Their comments, found in the comments sections of Nigerian newspaper reports on the Madagascar drug, Covid-Organics, formed the fodder for our analysis in the section that follows. While some of these comments were made on the websites of the newspapers; others were made on the Facebook pages of the newspapers following the story of interest. A rough count turned out over 3000 of such comments. Since our aim was not quantification, we devoted attention to reading closely and interpreting the posts. Constrained by space, we summed the posts into two basic themes as presented in the section that follows.

Solidarity with/Against: Nigerian Netizens’ Reaction When the WHO raised those strong doubts about Madagascar’s Covid-­ Organics, President Rajoelina countered in words that established the symbolic significance of the drug: “If it were a European country that discovered this remedy, would there be so many doubts?” (Al Jazeera 2020b). In other words, this solution attracted doubts because Africa was never believed to be capable of solving its regular problems, not to talk of solving a problem which has confounded the rest of the world. If President Rajoelina’s response subtly hinted at the ideological and racial signification of Covid-Organics, Nigerian netizens almost went overboard on this. In this section, we present the thematized messages posted by these netizens as reaction to the invention and presentation of the Malagasy Covid-Organics.

7  STREET-LEVEL PAN-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND DEVELOPMENT: NIGERIAN… 

149

Solidarity with Madagascar To the majority of Nigerian netizens that commented on newspaper reports of the Madagascar drug, Covid-Organics is a symbolic representation of Africa’s ingenuity and Madagascar is a symbol of Africa’s ability to develop its own solutions. In fact, Madagascar was presented as the pride of Africa. Responding to the Premium Times (2020a) report of the launch of Covid-Organics, a netizen, Nnaji Obinna stated: Beautiful, absolutely beautiful. Whether d herbal [sic] medicine works or not is not my concern. What I love is d spirit, d believe [sic] and d courage. Africa cannot lock it’s citizens indoor, indefinitely waiting until d Europeans, Americans or Asians finds d vaccine for d virus. We can make a try; especially with our herbal [sic] medicine. I love this news.

In other words, what the drug does (cure or not) was not what mattered; what mattered was what it symbolized—spirit, faith (in ourselves), and courage, as well as independence from Europeans, Americans, and Asians. To make the matter even more convincing, the netizens noted that Madagascar had not recorded any COVID-19 fatality (at that time). For them, this more than proved that Covid-Organics worked. Toba Aribilola stated: I quote “Madagascar has a total of 121 confirmed cases of COVID-19, 59 recoveries, and no death.” That shows that the thing dey work (That shows that the thing works). Although no scientific proof but most time some herbs no get (does not have) scientific proof before then start there (sic) work (before they start working). I know if it is in Asia, Europe, America, WHO would have intensify(sic) effort to see its chemistry. (Commenting on The Guardian’s 2020a report)

This proof of efficacy—and that includes the president’s announcement that two people had been healed of the disease—removed any thoughts of Africa being inferior to the rest of the world. Another user, Mukhtar Tijjani Inuwa, captured it in fewer words: Good African, the black people has a power to overcome any problems, let’s continued [sic] treating our people. (Commenting on The Guardian’s (2020a) report)

150 

A. OJEBODE ET AL.

Stated differently, Covid-Organics is an expression of Africans’ ability to overcome not just COVID-19, but any/all problems, independent of foreign assistance or aid. It is necessary to note that it is “good African” “black people”, rather than a good president and Malagasy people. Many pushed this notion further by asking Madagascar to assert its independence and withdraw its membership from the WHO. If Africa can make its own medicines which cure its own people, then the WHO was no longer necessary. A particular netizen, responding to The Guardian’s (2020a) report of the launch of Covid-Organics, stated: Forget about WHO take the risk; test your drugs if found potent use it, Don’t even send sample to WHO if not they will rubbish it before the world. Very corrupt Organization. (Chief [sic] Clark)

Within a few hours, fake news reports appeared to the effect that Madagascar had pulled out of WHO because WHO had approached President Rajoelina with an offer of USD 20 million and with a toxin to be included in Covid-Organics to poison Malagasies and prove that the drug does/did not work. Warped and twisted as this appears, it gained traction online (Daily Post 2020).

Solidarity Against the “Enemies” Just as Nigerian netizens stood mostly in support of Covid-Organics and Madagascar’s boldness, they also stood solidly against the perceived “enemies” of Madagascar who, in their views, were the enemies of Africa and of its development. Five such enemies were marked out for attack: the WHO, the Gates, the West and China, the Nigerian government, and Nigerian scientists (including professors and professional groups). In short, any person or group that expressed any doubts about or criticism of Madagascar, President Rajoelina, or Covid-Organics was described by most Nigerian netizens in unfriendly terms. The WHO seemed to have attracted the strongest acerbity from Nigerian netizens. The body, which warned against the use of Covid-­ Organics, was described as the devil and its staff as devil incarnates, bent on seeing Africa fail so that it can sell “evil vaccines and put chips on everybody”.

7  STREET-LEVEL PAN-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND DEVELOPMENT: NIGERIAN… 

151

The funny thing is, while most countries and medical organisations are looking into ways to profound [proffer] a solution into medications and clamp down on these [sic] global pandemic, the devil’s incarnates at W.H.O are more interested in Bill Gates vax. (Olatoye Babatunde Purpain commenting on Premium Times (2020a) report)

In the same atmosphere of siege, Ranti Amodu (Guardian 2020a comments) warned: WHO will not approve it, they will look for something to make people believe it can’t cure d virus. WHO is owned & sponsored by Bill Gates, it is only Gates vaccine that will [approved as] cure [for] d virus.

Owoseni Temtope Iyiola, commenting on Premium Times (2020a), ventured a guess as to how WHO would sabotage President Rajoelina’s efforts: Sensible man, but be weary [wary] of WHO; they may introduce another virus to your country.

From these and most other comments, the WHO was lumped up with the Gates and their Foundation; China was merged with Europe and America. As far as commenters were concerned, there was no need separating these “enemies of Africa”. The narrative is woven around the Gates and the West’s interest in vaccines as a way of controlling the African population or China’s interest in developing a drug as a way of milking Africa financially. Either way, the discovery of Covid-Organics is a threat to these foreign interests which would work hard to neutralize significance of the drug. If Nigerians were harsh in their treatment of the WHO, China, and the West, they were not kind on their leaders either. First, they attacked them for being sleepy when their counterpart, President Rajoelina, was working day and night; second, they berated them for buying Rajoelina’s drugs instead of burying their heads in shame, and third, they gave them the flak, later on in July 2020, for declaring that Covid-Organics was no more than a mere antimalarial. “SHAME on the Nigerian so-called leaders since 1960”, screamed Tito Kane in the comments of a Vanguard (2020) report on Covid-Organics. In his/her rather long post, s/he went on to lament the lack of initiative

152 

A. OJEBODE ET AL.

and boldness of many African leaders who were unlike their Malagasy counterpart. Like Kane, other commenters not only came down hard on Nigerian leaders but also linked their poor performance to the overall underdevelopment of the country. When Nigeria ordered Covid-Organics, one would ordinarily expect Nigerian netizens to commend the government for showing solidarity with Madagascar. This was not the case; instead, the netizens berated government for failing to provide leadership for Africa in an important matter as this. “Shame!!! Nigeria is BIG for NOTHING” were the words and emphases of Frank Bassey (Premium Times 2020b comments section). Others interpreted government importation of the drug as a way of syphoning public funds into the private pockets of loyal officials. Among them, Shakiru Sabitu, in the comments section of Premium Times (2020b), says that Nigerian leaders would: bring the medicine from Madagascar to the country telling Nigerians that billions of naira has [sic] been spent to bring the medicine to the country.

It took two months for government laboratories to complete their investigation on Covid-Organics. In July 2020, officials announced the completion of the investigation and informed the public that the main ingredient in Covid-Organics was a plant rich in artemisinin and found in ample quantity in Nigeria. This again attracted severe criticism from Nigerian netizens. Some criticized the government for taking too long to complete the investigation and finding out nothing that was really new: So the findings so far after about 2 months is that the plant used primarily for producing the drug is also grown in Nigeria. This has been in the news since the herb was announced by Madagascar and the picture of the herb has gone viral. So, what has our government found out now that is news? When fund is [sic] granted research will commence, who financed [sic]. (Nadeco, comments on Punch 2020)

Others took the government’s statement to mean an attack on Madagascar and a subtle pandering to the whims of WHO, China, and other “enemies”. They responded to the government in rather acerbic terms.

7  STREET-LEVEL PAN-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND DEVELOPMENT: NIGERIAN… 

153

Useless government. Even if a Nigerian had found the cure for COVID-19, you charlatans would have still disqualified it. Wait for Chinese capsule, ok. (Imoh Okon, Guardian 2020b, comments)

Another, Marcus Ijele, also lambasted government’s response: … Nigerian Government, useless group of people. Give it [Covid-Organics] a damaging criticism. Refuse to accept it because if you accept it, it will do what you cannot do and your stealing opportunities will end. The question is “Is the vaccine working?” Is it taking care of Corona Virus? Criminals called Government of Nigeria. (Marcus Ijele, Guardian 2020b, comments)

Professional groups, such as the Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria (PSN) which cautioned against the use of the drug, were described in derogatory terms (The Guardian 2020c, comments section), and Nigerian scientists and professors were painted as being too lazy or dumb or busy with strikes to conduct the kind of research that would bring solutions like the initiative of Madagascar (Comments sections of Premium Times 2020c; Premium Times 2020d; The Guardian 2020d).

Conclusion: Further Thoughts on Street-Level Unity Our aim in this chapter is not to carry out a comprehensive content analysis of comments of Nigerian readers or netizens on COVID-19-related newspaper reports. Rather, our aim is to take the instance of an Africa-­ based international event to demonstrate the presence and unmistakable intensity of what we call street-level unity. Our brief analysis shows that street-level unity can confront and even subvert official positions in a strong and even uncouth manner. More importantly, it can be harnessed for good. Our analysis clearly implies the great extent to which street-level unity reimagines an Africa without borders, whose citizens actively and proactively rise in support of one another to ward off external and internal threats. This must have been the Africa imagined by the earliest generation of pan-Africanists. The realization of such a dream at the nation-level interaction has eluded the continent so far; unfortunately, the level at which it is happening, that is the street level, has not interested analysts and policymakers to any significant

154 

A. OJEBODE ET AL.

length. Our analysis also implies that street-level unity can become a tool for holding leaders and public officers accountable. Discussions and comments about development have, for decades, emphasized the need to put citizens at the centre, in the driver’s seat, and lead them from behind. In most cases, these expressions have remained just that—rhetorical exercises. Attempts to promote development at the continental level—however that is conceptualized—have always focused on the activities of governments and organizations. An example is the peer-review mechanisms built into NEPAD and the SDGs. Sadly, the role of citizens operating across borders was not recognized and articulated as a veritable accountability and peer-review channel in these development programmes. It is time to nurture, harness, and deploy this widely available resource. We make no assumptions that street-level unity alone would solve the continent’s humongous development problems. However, it clearly mirrors citizen engagement, cross-national peer monitoring, and demand for accountability without which the continent’s development would be a mirage (Ojebode 2019). Events in Nigeria suggest that government’s stances and policies are strongly influenced by online uproars (Aina et al. 2019). While these uproars are sometimes raucous and unruly, they nonetheless symbolize citizen power and a contested civic space which, if expanded, can become a tool for participatory development within and across borders.

References Adebowale, A. 2020. Senegalese Institute Develops $1 Covid-19 Testing Kit That Can Produce Result in 10 Minutes. https://technext.ng/2020/04/27/ senegalese-­institute-­develops-­1-­covid-­19-­testing-­kit-­that-­can-­produce-­result-­ in-­10-­minutes/ Adejumobi, S. 2009. Popular Participation and Africa’s Development Agenda: Projecting a Citizen-Based United States of Africa. PolitiKon: South Africa Journal of Political Studies 36 (3): 403–422. https://doi. org/10.1080/02589341003600213. Adeyemi, O., and Onyiliofor, S. 2020. COVID-19: Overview of Nigeria’s Economic Response to the Pandemic. Andersen Tax Digest https://andersentax.ng/covid-­19-­overview-­of-­nigerias-­economic-­response-­to-­the-­pandemic/ Africa News. 2020. COVID-Organics: Madagascar Launches Africa’s First Cure for Virus https://www.africanews.com/2020/04/22/covid-­organics-­ madagascar-­launches-­africa-­s-­first-­cure-­for-­virus/

7  STREET-LEVEL PAN-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND DEVELOPMENT: NIGERIAN… 

155

Aina, T.A., M. Atela, A. Ojebode, P. Dayil, and F. Aremu. 2019. Beyond Tweets and Screams: Action for Empowerment and Accountability in Nigeria – The Case of the #BBOG Movement, IDS Working Paper 529. Brighton: IDS. Akinyemi, O., U. Efobi, E. Osabuohein, and P. Alege. 2019. Regional Integration and Energy Sustainability in Africa: Exploring the Challenges and Prospects for ECOWAS. African Development Review 31 (4): 517–528. https://doi. org/10.1111/1467-­8268.12406. Al Jazeera. 2020a. Senegal’s $1 COVID-19 Test Kit and the Race for a Vaccine. Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2020/ 04/senegal-­1-­covid-­19-­test-­kit-­race-­vaccine-­200425131112353.html ———. 2020b. Coronavirus: What is Madagascar’s ‘Herbal Remedy’ Covid-­ Organics? https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/coronavirus-­ madagascar-­herbal-­remedy-­covid-­organics-­200505131055598.html Chacha, D.M. 2002. Julius Nyerere: The Intellectual Pan Africanist and the Question of African Unity. African Journal of International Affairs 5 (1&2): 20–39. https://doi.org/10.4314/ajia.v5i1-­2.57195. CNN. 2020. Gates: ‘Covid-19 Will Be Horrible in Developing World’. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSVse07y2O4&feature=youtu.be Collier, D., J.  LaPorte, and J.  Seawright. 2012. Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor. Political Research Quarterly 65 (1): 217–232. Available: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ abs/10.1177/1065912912437162. Daily Post. 2020. Madagascar Cure: We have Been Offered $20m to Poison COVID Organic  – President Rajoelina. Daily Post 17 May, 2020. https:// dailypost.ng/2020/05/17/madagascar-­c ure-­w e-­h ave-­b een-­o f fered-­ 20m-­to-­poison-­covid-­organic-­president-­rajoelina-­video/ Feuer, A., Southall, A., and Gold, M. (2020). Dozens of Decomposing Bodies Found in Trucks at Brooklyn Funeral Home. New York Times. 29 April, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/nyregion/bodies-­b rooklyn-­ funeral-­home-­coronavirus.html Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit. GIZ. 2019. Access to Water and Sanitation in Sub-Saharan Africa. https://www.oecd.org/water/GIZ_2018_ Access_Study_Part%20I_Synthesis_Report.pdf Harding, A. 2020. Coronavirus in South Africa: The Lull Before the Surge? BBC News, 09 April, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­africa-­52228932 Ibrahim, A.A. 2016. African Union and the Challenge of Underdevelopment in Contemporary Africa. British Journal of Education, Society and Behavioural Science 14 (4): 1–10. Ilogwe, D. 2018. Globalization and the Question of African Identity. Sociological Review 6 (10): 794–812. Ilorah, R. 2004. NEPAD: The Need and Obstacles. African Development Review 16 (2): 223–251. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1017-­6772.2004.00090.x.

156 

A. OJEBODE ET AL.

Kamga, S.D. 2019. A Call for a ‘Right to Development’-Informed Pan Africanism in the Twenty-First Century. African Human Rights Law Journal 19 (1): 418–444. https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-­2096/2019/v19n1a20. Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S., J.C. Anyanwu, and P. Conceicao. 2014. Regional Integration in Africa: An Introduction. African Development Review 26 (S1): 1–6. Kumar, V. 2019. Sub-Saharan Africa: Healthcare. https://public.tableau.com/ profile/vinodh#!/vizhome/Africanhealthfacilities/Africa_health_care Maluwa, T. 2003. The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-­ Building in Postcolonial Africa. Leiden Journal of International Law 16: 157–170. Mudimbe, V.Y. 1988. The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. News Agency of Nigeria (NAN). 2020. Covid-19: Chinese Medical Team Will be Bringing Globally “Scarce Medical Supplies” – Minister Says. The Guardian. 06 April, 2020. https://guardian.ng/news/covid-­19-­chinese-­medical-­team-­ will-­be-­bringing-­globally-­scarce-­medical-­supplies-­minister-­says/ Ojebode, A. 2019. In Search of Muted Voices for the Mirage Named Development. 466th Inaugural Lecture of the University of Ibadan. September 5. ———. 2020. Covid-19: African Herbal Solutions and the Question of Scientific Standards. https://idser.org/index.php/2020/05/10/covid-­19-­african-­ herbal-­solutions-­and-­the-­question-­of-­scientific-­standard/ Ojebode, A., and A. Akingbulu. 2012. Contended Listeners in Blurred Borders: The Nigerian-Benin Republic Baruten and their Community Radio. Journal of Environment and Culture 9 (2): 79–96. Okhonmina, S. 2009. The African Union: Pan Africanist Aspirations and the Challenge of African Unity. The Journal of Pan African Studies 3 (4): 85–100. Paquetter, P., Bearak, M., and Bernstein, L. 2020. Africa Has 1.2 Billion People and Only Six Labs that can Test for Coronavirus. How Quickly can They Ramp Up? Washington Post 6 February, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/africa/africa-­has-­12-­billion-­people-­and-­only-­six-­labs-­that-­can-­test-­for-­ coronavirus-­how-­quickly-­can-­they-­ramp-­up/2020/02/05/68af96de-­4758-­1 1ea-­91ab-­ce439aa5c7c1_story.html Premium Times. 2020a. Madagascar Launches Herbal Medicine Against COVID-19. Premium Times; 23 April, 2020. https://www.premiumtimesng. com/coronavirus/389372-­madagascar-­launches-­herbal-­medicine-­against-­ covid-­19.html ———. 2020b. Coronavirus: Nigeria to Receive Madagascar Herbal Medicine. Premium Times; 11 May, 2020 .https://www.premiumtimesng.com/ coronavirus/392324-­c oronavirus-­n igeria-­t o-­r eceive-­m adagascar-­h erbal-­ medicine.html ———. 2020c. Coronavirus: WHO Cautions on Use of African Traditional Medicine. Premium Times. 5 May, 2020. https://www.premiumtimesng.

7  STREET-LEVEL PAN-AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND DEVELOPMENT: NIGERIAN… 

157

com/news/top-­news/391464-­coronavirus-­who-­cautions-­on-­use-­of-­african-­ traditional-­medicine.html ———. 2020d. Nigerian Govt Directs NAFDAC to Assess Herbal Mixture as Possible COVID-19 Treatment. Premium Times. 8 May, 2020. https://www. premiumtimesng.com/coronavirus/391945-­nigerian-­govt-­directs-­nafdac-­to-­ assess-­herbal-­mixture-­as-­possible-­covid-­19-­treatment.html Punch. 2020. FG Announces Initial Findings on Madagascar COVID Organics. Punch 02 July, 2020. https://punchng.com/fg-­announces-­initial-­findings-­ on-­madagascar-­covid-­organics/ Spies, J. 2020. Strengthening African Value Chains in Medical Supplies. https:// www.un.org/africarenewal/news/coronavirus/strengthening-­african-­value-­ chains-­medical-­supplies The Guardian. 2020a. Madagascar President Launches Coronavirus ‘Remedy’. The Guardian 21 April, 2020. www.shorturl.at/GHLM3 ———. 2020b. FG says Madagascar’s COVID-19 Drug Same as ‘Sweet Annie’ Used for Malaria Treatment. The Guardian, 03 July, 2020. https://guardian. ng/news/fg-­s ays-­m adagascars-­c ovid-­1 9-­d rug-­s ame-­a s-­s weet-­a nnie-­u sed-­ for-­malaria-­treatment/ ———. 2020c. Why Nigeria Should Avoid Madagascar’s COVID-19 Drug. 13 May, 2020. https://guardian.ng/news/why-­nigeria-­should-­avoid-­ madagascars-­covid-­19-­drug/ ———. 2020d. Experts fear Madagascar’s Organics Could Accelerate Malaria Resistance. The Guardian, May 17. https://guardian.ng/news/ experts-­fear-­madagascars-­organics-­could-­accelerate-­malaria-­resistance/ Vanguard. 2020. Scores Troop to Receive COVID-Organics, Madagascar’s Cure for Virus. Vanguard Newspaper 23 April, 2020 https://www.vanguardngr. com/2020/04/scores-­t roop-­t o-­r eceive-­c ovid-­o rganics-­m adagascar-­c ure-­ for-­virus/ Wapmuk, S. 2009. In Search of Greater Unity: African States and the Quest for an African Union Government. Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 1 (3): 645–671. WHO. 2019. Global Health Observatory (GHO) Data: Density of Physicians (Total Number per 1000 Population, Latest Available Year) https:// rb.gy/bb5gvo ———. 2020. COVID-19 Cases Top 10 000 in Africa. https://rb.gy/d142ii Wood, G. 2020. Think 168,000 Ventilators Is Too Few? Try Three. The Atlantic. 10 April, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/ why-­covid-­might-­hit-­african-­nations-­hardest/609760/

CHAPTER 8

Moral Values and Personhood: The Missing Link in International Development Interventions Eric R. Masese

Introduction Failure of development intervention strategies in Africa to induce development is typically explained in terms of institutional, organizational and government failures. Whereas these factors are structural, the role of agency and what constitutes this agency on the effectiveness of development intervention is often muted. Development interventions in Africa are to a large extent premised on the modernization paradigm which constructs African values as bottlenecks to development and the adoption of Western values as gateway to development. To a large extent, these development interventions have not succeeded in countering poverty in Africa. Hence, this chapter examines the role of moral values governing sexuality in Africa as a factor affecting the effectiveness of HIV and AIDS prevention interventions. These are premised on Western ethical values which

E. R. Masese (*) Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_8

159

160 

E. R. MASESE

individualize personhood. The chapter observes that moral values have great influence on human behaviour which in turn have direct effect on how people interact with development intervention strategies with the aim of meeting moral personhood which is taken as the ultimate social good. Thus, this chapter argues that it is important to blend both individualistic ethical values of the Western and communitarian sensibilities in some kind of intercultural dialogue where they both supplement each other in implementing development intervention strategies in Africa. This will contribute towards overcoming poverty in Africa, the main focus of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1.

The Insider Versus Outsider Paradigms to Development Interventions The year 1945 marked the end of the Second World War. As the nations grappled with the effect of the war, two events albeit differently were taking place in Europe and Africa. In Europe, the focus was on reconstructing the dilapidated economy due to the war while in Africa focus was on the return of African soldiers who had taken part in the war. Although these events are linked to the aftermath of the war, they lay the ground for understanding international development interventions in Africa as they bring forth the contestations and underlying “taken-for-granted” role of moral values and personhood in development interventions discourses in Africa. As the African soldiers returned to their homes, one community in South Western Kenya, the Abagusii, was facing numerous social and economic problems. Economically, the community was experiencing the worst drought ever which had led to crop failure, strange cattle diseases which killed most of their cattle1 and famine. Related to this, the community was also facing the problem of young people not getting married2 because they could not afford to pay bride wealth as it had gone high (Shadle 2006). Due to this, most men opted to remain bachelors. This also meant that young women remained unmarried as they would not find spouses. 1  Cattle at this time were a symbol of wealth and were the only means of paying bride wealth which solemnized any marriage. The source of bride wealth was what was received from marriage of a daughter or sister. 2  Marriage gave men and women a chance to achieve the status in the society or to be considered as an adult. For women, it also enabled them to access resources. It was thus stigmatizing for young people especially women not to be married once they attained marriage age.

8  MORAL VALUES AND PERSONHOOD: THE MISSING LINK… 

161

In the midst of these problems, a new disease3 comes in and touches the core aspect of young people’s sexuality. Worse still, the carriers of this disease were young men who had served in the Second World War, far away from the community. The young men not only were of marriageable age but also had resources from their military service which enabled them to afford bride wealth, putting a young woman called Nyaboke in a dilemma as narrated in a song which was composed at the time titled Nyaboke. Nyaboke’s dilemma oscillated between meeting the stipulated community’s social and cultural aspects of sexuality as a young woman and being infected by the new disease. The social and cultural aspects of sexuality entailed that she must be married so as to attain “adulthood” (proper identity) and thus avoid being stigmatized. Also, through marriage, she would secure user rights to community resources such as land and meet the cultural role of getting bride wealth to enable her elder brother to marry. All this puts Nyaboke in the dilemma of making a choice between risk of infection of the new disease and meeting the social and cultural aspects of sexuality as illustrated in the song Nyaboke: The Song Nyaboke Nyaboke nkagokania x2 Nyaboke nkagokania aee omoyo Nyaboke nkagokania x2 ndero Omomura o’miritari x2 Omomura o’miritari nare n’oborwaire Nare n’oborwaire arusia Atisababa Omoyo ogankania x2 Omomura o’miritari nare n’oborwaire Nare n’oborwaire arusia Atisababa

Nyaboke I cautioned you x2 Nyaboke I cautioned you, oh my dear Nyaboke I cautioned you x2 now The young military man x2 The young military man has a disease He has a disease he brought from Addis Ababa My dear you warned me x2 The young military man has a disease He has a disease he brought from Addis Ababa

Omoyo omomura o’ miritari ee omoyoMy dear, the young military man, my dear continued 3  The Gusii people had no history of sexually transmitted infection until 1945. The disease was allegedly brought to the community by young men who had taken part in the Second World War in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia).

162 

E. R. MASESE

(continued) The Song Nyaboke Omomura o’moritari nare nenibo Nare nenibo tindokwa ritinge Nyaboke nkagokania x2 Nyaboke nkagokania aee omoyo Nyaboke nkagokania x2 ndero Omomura o’miritari x2 Omomura o’miritari nare n’oborwaire N are n’oborwaire arusia Atisababa Omoyo ogankania x2 Omomura o’miritari nare n’oborwaire Nare n’oborwaire arusia Atisababa Omoyo omomura o’ miritari ee omoyo Enibo ya, omomura o’miritari omoyo x2 Omoyo, negere torutwa omware omoyo

The young military man has wealth He has wealth so that I may not be a concubine Nyaboke I cautioned you x2 Nyaboke I cautioned you, oh my dear Nyaboke I cautioned you x2 now The young military man x2 The young military man has a disease He has a disease he brought from Addis Ababa My dear you warned me x2 The young military man has a disease He has a disease he brought from Addis Ababa My dear, the young military man, my dear Wealth from young military man my dear x2 It will help you get married my dear

A critical examination of this song brings forth the role of human agency in solving everyday problems and what defines this agency. As evidenced from the song, human agency is not passive but active in dealing with everyday problems by drawing from socially learnt repertoires which govern everyday lives. For example, Nyaboke is being warned not to fall in love with a young military man who is labelled as a carrier of a sexually transmitted infection. However, the power of the young military man in terms of helping Nyaboke meet her socially and culturally sanctioned obligations of sexuality such as getting married makes invisible the risk of getting the infection. Although Nyaboke demonstrates that she is aware of the danger of falling in love with the young man, this risk becomes secondary in comparison with meeting socially and culturally stipulated roles. This demonstrates that responses to problem interventions are shaped by culture, society and history. Acknowledging this will equip Africa to overcome poverty, the goal of SDG 1.

8  MORAL VALUES AND PERSONHOOD: THE MISSING LINK… 

163

In the song, a person is understood as being constituted by relations with others, produced through kinship and other forms of substantial relatedness and through a flow of substances that link one person with others and the environment. In the song, Nyaboke values the culturally and socially defined relationship with others as more important than the risk of infection, “The young military man has wealth, he has wealth so that I may not become a concubine …. Wealth from the young military man my dear x2. It will help you get married my dear.” This understanding of personhood tends to value relations between people over boundaries around them and regards the person as composite and overlapping with other persons rather than autonomous and indivisible. This means that problem intervention processes are experienced, anticipated and countered in relation to a network of social relations which are taken as ultimate social good. This is contrary to the dominant Western understanding of personhood which often emphasizes individualism and boundaries. On the global scene, the period after the Second World War ushered in for the first time a new paradigm shift in development which focused on underdeveloped countries. This new paradigm looked at development through the lens of modernization which was influenced by two historical experiences. One, there was the Marshall Plan in which massive amounts of US financial and technical assistance were injected to the dilapidated economies of war-torn countries of Europe to rebuild and modernize their economies. Two, there was the historical experience of Europe to develop their economies from poor agricultural, subsistence societies to modern industrial giants through linear stages which involved change of value systems. This gave impetus for developing Africa, Latin America and Asia through massive injection of capital in form of foreign aid and gradual replacement of the traditional productive structures and value systems of less developed countries with economic and social systems of Western capitalism. Consequently, development was equated with industrialization and adoption of economic and social values of Western countries. Progress and advancement were also seen in this light. There was little appreciation of the social, cultural, economic or political attributes of African societies. Indeed, this led to misrepresentation and suppression of African thought and culture in the development discourse. As a result, African development intervention discourses continue to be interpreted and implemented using categories and conceptual approaches which depend on Western epistemological order (Tosam 2014).

164 

E. R. MASESE

The Western model of development does not put people as core in development. Instead, technology and capital investment take preference over human capital. People are treated and viewed as mere consumers of development, as regulated by technological and capital investment. This is contrary to Africa’s approach to development as adopted by the World Council of Churches in 1975 (Sakupapa 2018). Development is constructed as interconnected with people for the good of the people and must take into account the values that govern their lives. This means development interventions should be people centred and the people should be the means and end of those interventions. This makes people take responsibility for their development. Such an approach equips them to overcome poverty and contribute towards the attainment of SDG 1. The centrality of people in development means that any development intervention as a discourse in Africa should represent the whole gamut of change by which the entire social system meets people’s immediate development needs in a manner that enhances their personhood. This means that development interventions should first and foremost be evaluated on how best they enhance people’s social relationships and belonging than the development need they aim to address. This is different from the predominant Western model of development which is based on utilitarianism and Kantianism in which individual autonomy is emphasized, therefore distancing persons from others, and discouraging solidarity with other members of the community. The failure to appreciate these contradicting perspectives on development by the modernization paradigm has continued to distort the intended outcome of development or destroying the tentacles which are key to prop up development. Falola (1992), for example, observes that before modernization of healthcare systems in Africa, illness management was holistic and a collective responsibility for everyone. The modern healthcare system brought in the curative healthcare system which emphasized the construction of hospitals which were skewed towards urban areas. The holistic and collective approach was thus discarded while individualism and biomedical approaches were emphasized. These changes disempowered people from taking responsibility for their health and created inequality in the healthcare system which still persists to date (Mwenzwa and Amuyunzu-­ Nyamongo 2006). In addition, the individualization of illness management not only eroded the social support system but also laid ground for victimization of the sick by blaming them for their illness. For example, during the colonial period, the high prevalence rate of sexually transmitted

8  MORAL VALUES AND PERSONHOOD: THE MISSING LINK… 

165

infection among Africans in urban settings was attributed to “African character” and not the disruptive nature of colonialism which created vulnerability to infection (Masese 2011). The thesis in the modernization paradigm that less developed countries can only develop through injection of capital in the form of foreign aid has created a dependency syndrome among developing countries (Moyo 2009). The fact is that dependency constitutes unequal power relationships and the receiving countries lose their freedom to determine the nature, type and preferred means of development. Subsequently, development intervention policies are a mere mirror reflection of donor’s interests and not targeted at the beneficiaries’ needs. This goes contrary to Sen’s (1999) observation that development should enhance freedom of choice and promote self-esteem or dignity. It is a fact that every society has standards to guide and regulate behaviour for common good and for its own progress. These values and ideals are deeply rooted in the beliefs, customs, practices and institutions of all societies. They define what is “right” and doing what is “right” and thus influence how people interact with development intervention processes. In the late 1970s, for example, the Abagusii people in Kenya were experiencing the highest population growth. The negative consequences of population growth, like high pressure on existing resources, made the government in conjunction with international donors to intensify family planning programmes. Most of these programmes targeted women with the assumption that once they (women) were educated, they would be able to control their own sexuality and in turn lead to good decision making in planning their families. This approach failed because it did not take into account that moral values governing sexuality and reproduction are taken in community settings, not individual ones (Matsuzono 1997). In Central Kenya, Thomas (2003) notes that people resisted the church and government plans to outlaw clitoridectomy by withdrawing their children from missionary schools. Clitoridectomy was perceived as a rite of passage where moral values of personhood were inculcated. Moral values have great influence on human behaviour, which in turn has a direct effect on development outcomes. Kame and Tshika (2015) note that the teaching of the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformers had the greatest economic advances and prosperity ever experienced in Europe and North America. These reformed teachings came to be known as the Protestant work ethic: a view of life that promotes hard work and self-­ discipline as a means to material prosperity. According to Max Weber

166 

E. R. MASESE

(2001), the Protestant ethical values, especially as taught by Calvinism, influenced large number of people to engage in work in the secular world for profit. Chang (2004) observes that in the nineteenth century, Europe developed because they invested heavily in their moral value system which laid a good environment for prosperity. Similarly, China has also experienced rapid economic development through engendering its own ethical norms on development (Hinafin 2002). However, the role of moral values, especially on the conceptions of what is right or wrong, is not taken into account as a factor influencing the effectiveness of development interventions in developing countries. Yet, these values exert a strong influence on how people interact with development interventions.

Moral Values, Personhood and Development Nexus Achieving development has remained a major goal preoccupying most countries globally. In developing countries, several intervention strategies, albeit externally influenced by developed countries, have been instituted to spur economic growth. The assumption in these intervention strategies is that economic growth is seen as a panacea to development through increased Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Growth in GDP in this case is postulated to lead to the development of other sectors through trickle-­ down effect. Inspired by the modernization paradigm, most development interventions have relied on the injection of capital in form of foreign aid from developed countries to spur economic growth. However, as Moyo (2009) observes, despite most countries in Africa receiving large amounts of foreign aid between 1970 and 1998, poverty across the continent rose from 11 to 60%. Similarly, due to negative economic performance occasioned inter alia the 1970s oil debacle, most governments in developing countries were forced to implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by the Bretton Woods institutions. These programmes demanded fiscal discipline (limiting budget deficits and cutting down on social spending in areas such as health and education), financial liberalization, privatization of state enterprises, trade liberalization, limitation barriers to foreign direct investment and elimination of subsidies on consumer items such as food, fuel and medicines (Rau 1991). In Kenya, the implementation of SAPS led to the reduction of government’s expenditure commitments mainly—but not exclusively—in areas

8  MORAL VALUES AND PERSONHOOD: THE MISSING LINK… 

167

concerned with the provision of basic welfare—that is, health, education and basic sustenance, such as food subsidies. These cuts in government’s expenditure increased the cost of primary education and health care beyond the reach of many rural families. The removal of price controls and the devaluation of the national currency led to the cost of living spiralling. Moreover, rushed privatization resulted in the laying off of tens of thousands of workers. All these combined pushed millions of people, especially in rural areas, to the margins of vulnerability due to increased levels of poverty, forcing people to adopt coping mechanisms which not only affected their social relationships but also exposed them to greater risks of diseases such as HIV/AIDS infection (Thomas et al. 2017; Ogot 2004). All these show that development interventions have focused on economic institutional frameworks while ignoring the socio-economic framework which determines development outcomes in any given society. As from 1990, a new approach to development which aimed at advancing human well-being was introduced. In this approach, expanding the richness of human life rather than simply the richness of the economy is emphasized. Development is constructed as people centred which aims at enhancing people’s freedom to decide who to be, what to do and how to live. This in essence moves development from structure to agency where a person has a sense of control over one’s life and with the feeling of being worthy which is elucidated situationally. This understanding fits into the Kantian perspective where development is autonomous and independent where individuals endeavour to pursue self-good as a right. The conception of development as an individual self-good and a right fits well into predominant Western ethical values which characterize development interventions by developed countries. In Africa, this brings back the perennial contestations around who between the community and the individual takes priority in accounting for people’s actions (Menkiti 1994; Gyekye 2004) towards development. In addition, the conceptualization of development in terms of ethical values equally raises issues on whether development and its attendant interventions can be constructed as “individual goods” or “social goods” and if development is people centred, what makes it “good” or “bad”—“right” or “wrong”. This dualism is in essence based on general expectations that are “evaluative” on what defines a person and his/her actions in relation to development and development interventions contextually. Ideally, every human being is a person but not every person is a person. So, what defines a person? According to Tosam (2014), a person in Africa

168 

E. R. MASESE

is defined in terms of behaviour, conduct and character in relation to others. These three features define what a person is more in terms of his/her actions than what the individual is. Conversely, a person is less important than what he/she does. Therefore, through actions, a person can be judged as either good or bad. This dichotomy in relation to actions is used as a yardstick for “normalizing judgement” (Foucault 1995) on who is a person—the ultimate social good (Faubion 2011; Laidlaw 2014). In Africa, the notion of a person is therefore embedded in contextually expected actions (behaviour) as defined by moral values. Moral values define what is right or wrong. An individual is therefore expected to be ethical in his or her behaviour in relation to others as a social good which is important for social belonging. This desire is therefore postulated to influence how people make reality of development and development interventions especially those introduced from “outside” and how this reality informs their actions. The significance of this can be discerned from HIV/AIDS discourses as discussed below.

Moral Values and Development Intervention Intercourse: The Case of HIV/AIDS Prevention Strategies Globally, since HIV/AIDS was first detected, it has remained a significant developmental issue. In sub-Saharan Africa, the cumulative impact of the disease has been devastating as compared to other parts of the world. This created an impetus for intervention by international development partners in an effort to mitigate its negative consequences on development. From the onset, most of intervention strategies primarily focused on changing “African” sexual behaviour which was constructed as “risky”. This approach was influenced from earlier researches on Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD) and TB in Africa. Most of earlier STD and TB researches were full of racial stereotypes as “risk” was equated with the African race and their alleged sexual behaviour (Packard and Epstein 1990). Consequently, to deal with the problem of HIV and AIDS in Africa, the African ways of practising sexuality were to be “modernized” into safe sex practices. This happened despite the fact that most communities in Africa had moral values which guided sexual practices. Oppong and Kalipeni (2004), for example, note that among the Chewa of Central Malawi and Mozambique, couples in polygamous unions were expected to be faithful

8  MORAL VALUES AND PERSONHOOD: THE MISSING LINK… 

169

to each other. Failure to do so were said to result in tragedies such as the death of the husband or a child. A similar belief is found among Abagusii in Kenya where a woman’s infidelity was believed to lead to the worsening of an illness among her family members, specifically the children and husband, through supernatural forces referred to as amasangia (Masese 2011). Despite the important role of moral values in shaping sexuality in Africa, most intervention strategies adopted the biomedical approach which decontextualized sexuality. The biomedical approach relied on the health belief model to promote safe sex practices through empowering people with information or knowledge about the risk of HIV and AIDS in order for them to make rational decisions in preventing themselves from infection. The assumption in this approach is that information or knowledge will empower people to make rational decisions to adopt safe sex practices, namely, Abstinence, Being Faithful and Condom use (ABC) by taking into account, inter alia, perceived severity of the disease, the level of risk, the cost and benefits of alternative behaviour. The effectiveness of HIV/AIDS intervention programmes depends on the degree to which people’s actions comply with biomedical/scientific strategies for HIV/AIDS prevention such as the ABC approach in their everyday lives. This compliance is, however, problematic as evidenced by high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS infections in sub-Saharan Africa, despite the awareness levels of these prevention strategies. This has led to criticism of this strategy in dealing with HIV and AIDS (Cohen 2004). Central to this criticism is that the strategy focuses on the individual as an agent of sexual behaviour, making it only effective in changing an individual knowledge, attitude and beliefs towards HIV and AIDS but not sexual behaviour (Swanepoel 2005). According to Airhihenbuwa and Obregon (2000), this approach does not address what shapes sexual behaviour in a given context and individualizes risk. Due to the fact that issues of sexuality are widely experienced as private behaviour that displays a personal and private aspect of self, people are socialized to act their sexuality in a particular normative manner in various contexts. This is because sexuality and sexual practices are products of interacting cultures and moral values. As noted by Huber and Gillasp (1998), people are not mere consumers of information given to them. Instead, they synthesize such information into a common shared knowledge as it exists in their institutions, everyday language, shared meaning and understandings. This common shared knowledge is constructed

170 

E. R. MASESE

through socialization as a result of social interaction, negotiation and power. Logically, people will construct their own realities about HIV and AIDS prevention intervention strategies. The constructed realities may or may not be accurate translation of what the specific strategy espouses, though they will guide their action. Of critical importance is the fact that these constructed realities are influenced by both cultural and historical factors (Burr 2003). This in essence means that people’s knowledge which will guide action towards HIV and AIDS prevention strategies will be drawn from cultural values governing sexuality. The youth who interpreted being faithful as commitment to one’s sexual partner practised it by using magico-religious measures or meeting the sexual partner’s needs. Those who used magico-religious relied on the use of charms or performing certain rituals on the partner, albeit discreetly, to ensure he/she remains committed to them. These measures were of two kinds: one, those which aimed at ensuring faithfulness by either making the partner more “loving” to the other partner or losing interest in other sexual partners, and two, those which acted as deterrence for the partner to be unfaithful. These strategies were not meant for HIV and AIDS prevention but meeting the gender values of sexuality. Those who practised being faithful by meeting their sexual partners’ needs believed that sexual partners become unfaithful if their gender-­ specific needs are not met. For example, men believed that their partners would be faithful if they met their “physical needs”. These physical needs were mostly centred on material satisfaction and they included but not limited to food, clothing and shelter. Women also ensured their sexual partners are faithful to them by meeting their emotional needs. This was based on the assumption that men become unfaithful when they are not sexually satisfied, loved and cared for by their partners. In the HIV/AIDS prevention discourse, condom use is mostly promoted as safer sex. Safer sex in this context refers to sexual experience that advocates bodily pleasure sex without exchange of bodily fluids. However, some youth perceived none exchange of bodily fluids during sexual intercourse as not sex. Consequently, the youth used various strategies to protect themselves from HIV without using condoms. These strategies include having “quick sex” and having sex with “clean” sexual partners. Most youth were aware that seminal fluids could transmit HIV. However, vulnerability to HIV and AIDS infection was perceived as requiring “huge quantities of semen” which could only be acquired through long and

8  MORAL VALUES AND PERSONHOOD: THE MISSING LINK… 

171

repeated acts of sexual intercourse. Consequently, some youth preferred to have quick sex with their partner because they believed that it did not entail exchange of “huge quantities of semen”. Having sex only with “clean people” was based on subjective attributes that define a prospective sexual partner as either “moral” or “immoral” in relation to moral values governing the practice of sexuality. The use of these strategies was because of the difficulties in finding appropriate cultural language to negotiate sexual health histories with a sexual partner due to moral inhibitions which define sex as a taboo subject. Emerging from above, it is evident that there is discrepancy between what HIV and AIDS prevention intervention strategies espouse and how the youth interpret and adopt them. As noted from the experience of HIV and AIDS intervention strategies among the youth, people are not mere consumers of development intervention strategies. Instead, they synthesize them into common shared knowledge in their social institutions as mediated by moral value systems to guide their actions towards the intervention strategies. These actions are more motivated to meet the moral expectations of personhood which is taken as the ultimate social good. Consequently, where there is no congruence between what a particular intervention strategy espouses and the socially expected actions, people adopt those interventions in a way that meets the expectation of their moral values. This is because actions are more important in defining a person as either “good” or “bad”, “right” or “wrong” and “moral” or “immoral”, a gateway to social belonging. In sum, moral values which influence behaviour are important in determining the effectiveness of development interventions. Embracing this reality will empower communities to engage in development efforts that are more sustainable and contribute towards the struggle against poverty.

Conclusion It is evident from the analysis that moral values play a critical role in determining the effectiveness of development intervention in Africa. They do so by affecting directly the behaviour responses of targeted beneficiaries towards development interventions. This is because behaviour is central in defining moral personhood in Africa which is important in determining social belonging, the ultimate social good. To reduce poverty (SDG 1), disease, insecurity and ensure sustainable development in Africa, there is need to blend both individualistic ethical values of Western development

172 

E. R. MASESE

partners and communitarian sensibilities in some kind of intercultural dialogue where they both supplement each other in implementing development intervention strategies in Africa.

References Airhihenbuwa, C., and R.  Obregon. 2000. A Critical Assessment of Theories/ Models Used in Health Communication for HIV/AIDS. Journal of Health Communication 5: 5–15. Burr, V. 2003. Social Construction. London: Routledge. Chang, H. 2004. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. EH.NET Cohen, S. 2004. Promoting the “B” in ABC: Its Value and Limitations in Fostering Reproductive Health. Retrieved April 4th 2020: http://www.guttmacher.org/ pubs/tgr/07/4/index.html Falola, T. 1992. @The Crisis of African Healthcare Services. In The Political Economy of Health in Africa, ed. T. Falola and D. Ityaugar, 3–32. Ohio: Athens. Faubion, J. 2011. An Anthropology of Ethics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Foucault, M. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New  York: VINTAGE Books. Gyekye, K. 2004. Person and Community in African Thought. In Person and Community, Ghanaian Philosophical Studies 1, ed. K. Gyekye and K. Wiredu, 101–122. Washington DC: Council for Research Values and Philosophy. Hinafin, J. 2002. Morality and Market in China: Some Contemporary Views. Business ethics Quarterly 12 (1): 1–18. Huber, J., and M. Gillasp. 1998. Social Constructs and Disease: Implications for a Controlled Vocabulary for HIV/AIDS. Library Trends 47 (2): 190–208. Kame, G., and Tshika, R. 2015. Morality and Spirituality: The Missing Link for Economic Development in the 21st Century. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 71(3), Art. #2818, p. 6. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v71i3.2818 Laidlaw, J. 2014. The Subject Virtue. In An Anthropology of Ethics and Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Masese E. 2011. The Social Construction of HIV/AIDS Prevention Strategies Among Abagusii Youth-Kenya. PhD thesis in Anthropology/Etnologie. Universite de Pau et Des Pays De L’adour (UPPA)-France. Matsuzono, M. 1997. Male Involvement in Family Planning in Gusii Society: An Anthropological Overview. African Study Monographs 18 (3 & 4): 175–190. Menkiti, I. 1994. Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In E. Wright, African Philosophy: An Introduction. Lanham: University Press of America: 171-181.

8  MORAL VALUES AND PERSONHOOD: THE MISSING LINK… 

173

Moyo, D. 2009. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa. London: The Penguin Group. Mwenzwa, E., and M.  Amuyunzu-Nyamongo. 2006. Poverty and the Right to HIV/AIDS Information in Kenya. The East African Journal of Human Rights and Democracy 4 (1 and 2): 39–51. Ogot, B. 2004. Politics and the AIDS Epidemic in Kenya 1983–2003. Kisumu-­ Kenya: Ayange Press. Oppong, R., and Kalipeni, E. 2004. Perception and misperception of AIDS in Africa. In HIV and AIDS in Africa: Beyond Epidemiology, eds., E.  Kalipeni, S. Craddock, R. Oppong and J. Gosh (pp. 47–57). Blackwell Publishers. Packard, P., and P.  Epstein. 1990. Epidemiologists, Social Scientists and the Structure of Medical Research on AIDS in Africa. Social Science and Medicine 33 (7): 771–794. Rau, B. 1991. From Feast to Famine. London: Zed Books. Sakupapa, T. 2018. The Ecumenical Movement and Development: The Case of the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), 1963–2000 (Part 1). Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 44(3). Retrieved on 20th July 2020: https://upjournals.co.za/index.php/SHE/index ISSN 2412-­4265 Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shadle, B. 2006. “Girl cases”: Marriage and Colonialism in Gusiiland, Kenya, 1890–1970. Portsmouth: Heinemann. Swanepoel, E. 2005. Exploring the Impact of HIV/AIDS Prevention Messages. New Voices in Psychology 1: 151–158. Thomas, I. 2003. Politics of the Womb: Women Reproduction, and the State in Kenya. Berkeley: University of California. Thomas, M., A.  Kentikelenis, and T.  Stubbs. 2017. Structural Adjustment Programmes Adversely Affect Vulnerable Populations: A Systematic Narrative Review of Their Effect on Child and Maternal Health. Public Health Reviews 38 (1): 13. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40985-­017-­0059-­02. Tosam, J. 2014. The Relevance of Kom Ethics to African Development. International Journal of Philosophy 2 (3): 36–47. Weber, M. 2001. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Transl. P. Baehr, and G.C. Wells. New York: Routledge Classics.

CHAPTER 9

“Balancing the Ticket”: Ethnicity and Regional Politics in Ghana’s Fourth Republic (1992–2016) Seidu M. Alidu

Introduction The essence of democracy is to empower the people in both their ability to choose those who lead them and hold the same to account. This choice that the people have must help in the quest to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. Both the Athenian and Lincoln’s conceptions of direct and representative forms of democracy were respectively geared towards this onerous objective. Participation, in the political sense, is therefore of essence in a democracy. Verba and Nie define political participation as “those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take.” This definition throws wide open the activities that are aimed at influencing the selection of leadership and/or influencing actions of duty bearers. Given that democracy is a government of,

S. M. Alidu (*) Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_9

175

176 

S. M. ALIDU

and by laws, some activities aimed at influencing decisions could be seen as unlawful or illegitimate. Consequently, Verba et al. (1978) refined their earlier definition of participation to include “only those legal acts by private citizens to influence government” and the politics of the act to include “voting, campaign activity and particularised contacts” (pp.  53–55). Rather broadly, Rosenstone and Hansen (1996) define political participation as an “action directed explicitly towards influencing the distribution of social goods and social values” (pp. 22–24). Political participation can also be defined as an activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action either directly by affecting the formulation or by implementation of public policies (Verba et  al. 1995). In other words, political participation is about voice and equality, and is mainly a voluntary activity. Political participation affords citizens in a democracy an opportunity to communicate information to government about their concerns and preferences and to put pressure on them to respond. Further, this participation must empower citizens to overcome poverty (the focus of SDG 1). From these definitions it is obvious that political participation has varied end goals: to influence leadership selection and the actions of the same, to influence policy formulation and implementation, to effect the distribution of social goods and finally to impact on social values of society. Any of these end objectives could be achieved in either legal or illegal forms and using conventional or unconventional means at different levels and influence within democracies (Barnes and Kaase 1971). Among the various forms of political participation, the most common is voting. Voting involves majority of the population and is considered to be a direct method of influencing the political process. Studies on political participation have traditionally been restricted to voting. However, even though voting is an important mode of citizens’ involvement in politics, it is one of the many overt means of political participation. Other political acts which constitute political participation are working in, and contributing to electoral campaigns and organisations, lobbying government officials, attending protest marches or demonstrations, working with others to solve community problems, serving without pay on local elected and appointed committees, being active politically through the intermediation of voluntary associations, and contributing money to political causes (Verba et  al. 1995; Boafo-Authur 2006). An unbroken tradition of democratic theorists, stretching from J. J. Rousseau to John Stuart Mill, is the popular support for active citizens’ participation in politics, not principally because greater participation

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

177

necessarily produce better decision defined in terms of the utilitarian assessment of policy outcomes, but because of developmental value of participation in producing better informed citizenry, enhancing both the meaning of their lives and value of relationship with each other (Boafo-­ Authur 2006: 263). In this sense, political participation enhances democratic governance because the long-held imperative for democratic governance is that those whose lives are affected by decisions made by political leadership should be able to influence such decisions. Active participation does not only exert enormous pressure on decision-makers to comply with citizens’ demands but it also checks the self-serving inclination of politicians. Generally, the different levels of political participation by citizens have an impact on sustaining emerging democracies such as Ghana’s. In the context of these arguments, this chapter conceptualised political participation as series of activities that significantly influence public policy or government actions, including participation in political discourse, election processes and community action. In this chapter, the operationalisation of political participation will be examined within the context of voting and the factors that influence the manner Ghanaians vote. Specific attention will be given, in my analysis, to ethnicity and regional politics and how they shape voter behaviour in Ghana over the long Fourth Republic in which seven national elections have been conducted. This is done with reference to the selection of party leaders for national elections and the ethnic undercurrents that go into this decision to “balance the ticket” for electoral victory. To focus on ethnicity, as this chapter does, is not to suggest that ethnicity is the major or exclusive challenge in Ghana. It is only to highlight a significant variable that needs to be acknowledged in the quest for sustainable development in Ghana and in Africa. As the analysis below will confirm, ethnic mobilisation remains a key factor in Ghanaian politics and must be addressed courageously and creatively.

Theoretical Framework The literature on elections in general and specifically on voter behaviour is quite extensive and keeps expanding over time. The voluminous nature of the literature presents a challenge in determining electorate’s preferences, particularly in a context where exit polls are hardly conducted and pre-­ election surveys are flawed (Alidu 2014). Categorically, the electorate’s decisions in an election may be underpinned by one or more of four

178 

S. M. ALIDU

theoretical models, namely, the sociological, ideological, dominant party and rational choice models (Heywood 2007). The sociological model explains voter preference in reference to identities (ethnic, religious, geographical location, etc.) and appearances (handsome, ugly, tall, short) and other sociological attributes. Identities are assumed to be the dominant determinant of voter behaviour in sub-Saharan Africa (Ichino and Nathan 2013; Ishiyama 2012; Horowitz 1985 and Elischer 2012). While Ishiyama (2012) sees elections in Africa as ethnic-driven, Horowitz (1985) refers to same as “ethnic census” where the electorate vote to register their membership of an ethnic group. Elischer (2012) notes that voting in Africa is mostly confined to “communal boundaries” (p.  643) and also issues related to identity such as ethnicity, religion and geography. Heywood (2007) broadly labels these explanations as the sociological model of voter behaviour. The dominant ideological model associates the electorate’s electoral decisions to their world views about issues. In political science terms, these views are explained within the discourse of political ideology. Ayee (2011) explains political ideology as “coherent sets of ideas that provide the basis for some kind of organized political action” (p. 368). In most democracies, ideology is seen as the “selective incentive” (Ishiyama 2012: 765) for electorate decisions and manifest largely in the policy decisions, statements, actions and programmes of political parties. The electorate may choose to elect political parties that they share similar ideology with or at least political parties that have appealing ideologies. The role of ideology in African elections is quite contentious. Surveys conducted by the Frederich-Ebert Stiftung (FES) in 2012 and 2016 immediately after the national elections in those years find that political ideology is less influential in determining the manner Ghanaians vote in national elections. Similarly, surveys conducted by the Centre for Social Democracy (CSD) in 2017 and the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana in the same year arrived at the same conclusion. The limited influence of political ideology in Ghanaian elections specifically and African elections broadly are variously explained. Elischer (2012: 644) sees the “very weak” relationship between political parties and organised groups such as trade unions being the reason for the poor impact of political ideology in African elections. He explains that the industrial revolution in Europe established this relationship between these two political institutions thereby creating a political nexus that has greater impact on voter choices. The lack of this

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

179

relationship, he concludes, created a convulsed mix of ideologies with limited role in electorate’s decisions. Elischer’s argument misses a very important foundation of the development of political ideology in Africa, regardless of the weight of its contribution to the literature of democracy in the continent. Political ideology in Africa is a mix of African philosophy, culture, folklore and pioneering developmental ideas of the founding fathers of the continent. These ideas, including, Nkrumahism, Ujamaa, Harambee, Ubuntu, etc. shaped and inspired collective action in the continent and became the determinative guide for the forward-march of the African continent. Chazan (1983) agrees that political ideology matters in African elections and notes the contestations in Ghanaian politics between liberalism and socialism since the 1940s. Ayee (2011), Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah note the increasing blurring ideologies between the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and National Patriotic Party (NPP) in national elections in Ghana while Obeng-Odoom (2013) observes the decisive role of political ideologies in shaping the debate on free Secondary High School (SHS) in the 2012 elections. The party identification model explains voter behaviour to its long-­ term association with a political party (Alidu 2018). Voting is largely perceived as a “partisan” affair in which the electorate’s decisions are influenced by a “sense of psychological attachment” to their political parties (Heywood 2007: 266). This attachment shapes supporters’ attitude towards their party’s policies and leadership and influences the interpretation and understanding of everything that happened in the party along these pre-existing attachments (Heywood 2007: 266). Three things may be instrumental in determining people’s association with the party model and these are (a) the kind of policies parties aspire to implement (i.e., the manifesto); (b) the character of the leader of the party, and (c) the track-­ record of the party (Alidu 2018). The impact of political parties’ manifestos to their electoral success has attracted huge debate. While the majority of academics (see Ayee 2011; Gyampo 2012, Konteh 2007, Wayo-Seini 2006 and Gyampo and Debrah 2013) underscore the impact of party manifestos on electoral victories, Dunn (1975; cited in Ayee 2011: 368) and Bob-Milliar (2012) doubt the significance of manifestos in actually deciding a winner of an election in developing countries. Unlike the manifestos, the character of a party’s flagbearer or running mate as well as their skills, experience and track record have inspired political parties to victories and have attracted more voters to it.

180 

S. M. ALIDU

The rational choice model has often been used to explain voter behaviour in many elections around the world. It equates voter decision to an anticipated benefit (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh 2018). Ayee (2011) refers to the seminal work of Downs (1957) which argues that voters in established democracies vote based on the expected benefits they will get from their choice. Also, Bob-Milliar (2012), in explaining factors that influence political activism among the two dominant political traditions in Ghana, states that supporters of the NDC and NPP perceive their support as an “investment” that will yield “selective incentives based on the amount of one’s contribution to the party” (p. 681). Some academics (see Ishiyama 2012; Chandra 2004; Posner 2004, 2005; and Ferree 2006) even clarify other explanations for voter behaviour within the context of rationality. Ishiyama (2012), for example, argues that voters are rational in thinking that leaders “who are members of their own ethnic or tribal community [(and by extension religious or regional area)] are more likely to dispense patronage to them than leaders who are not” (p. 764). According to Bob-­ Milliar (2012) electorate membership of political parties are informed by rational calculation and the incentives that may accrue from that party’s membership. Similarly, Gyampo and Debrah (2013), Ayee (2011) and Obeng-Odoom (2013) all suggest that rationality informs ideological posturing and choice of political parties just as it does for their policies. Therefore, the majority position is that voters elect candidates and political parties based on rational calculations; especially the voter population that is largely undecided, educated, urban, middle class and discerning. The rational choice model is tied with two other equally important explanations of voter behaviour. The first is the functional theory of elections. According to the functional theory of elections, election campaigns are used by candidates that are very certain of losing an election to state a specific point of view; and for those that are certain of winning, election campaign is nothing less than a tool for victory. The functional theory assumes that voting is a comparative act in which the electorate assesses the messages of the competing political parties or candidates and vote for the candidate or party whose message they appear to prefer. Voters usually apportion blame as well as reward achievements for the state of affairs in a country to the incumbent government. Elections in this sense are construed as a referendum on the performance of the incumbent government. They are rewarded for a positive and progressive state of affairs and punished for a negative and retrogressive state of affairs in a country.

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

181

In developing countries, voting is influenced by other factors beyond these theoretical explanations. One of these factors is ethnicity and regional politics and how political parties “balance” their tickets to reflect these realities. Identity politics has been the trademark of Ghana’s electoral democracy and dates back to pre-independence struggles. As a result, all political parties in the country take the issue of identity seriously in the selection of their parliamentary candidates, flagbearers and running mates to flagbearers. They mostly speak of “balancing their tickets” for every election. This means selecting a candidate with qualities that can complement that of the flagbearer or any other person that the selected candidate will be working with. A lot of factors come into play in a “balanced ticket” and they include ethnicity, region, religion, age, gender, experiences and resources. Of all these factors, two (ethnicity and region) are dominant in Ghana and political parties are very conscious about them, followed in more recent times by religion and gender. I will pay more attention to the first two in this chapter. In order to understand this dynamics, one first needs to understand the ethnic structure of Ghana.

Ethnic Structure of Ghana Ghana is a multi-ethnic state and people are very conscious of who they are and where they come from. According to Anebo (2006), Ghanaians are connected to their communities through “blood and belonging” (p.  191). The “blood ties include family and kinship relations and the “belonging” is expressed in ethnicity, religion, region and other “long standing cultural bonds” (p. 191). It is estimated that there are about 90 individual ethnic groups in the country (Frempong 2006) that are often reduced to eight major groups as follows (Table 9.1). The geographical distribution of these groups has broader implication for politicians and elections in Ghana. Each of these broad groups has its traditional home regions. The Akan speaking group spreads across 8 out of the 16 regions in the country, including Western, Western North, Eastern, Ashanti, Central, Brong Ahafo, Bono and Ahafo regions. The Mole-Dagbani group spreads across 5 out of the 16 regions, including the Northern, North East, Savannah, Upper East and Upper West regions. The Ewes are in the Southern Volta region, while the Ga-Adangbe groups are in Greater Accra and Eastern regions. The Guans are dispersed in the Northern, Central, Eastern, Volta and Oti regions of the country. However, as a result of urbanisation and migration, members of these

182 

S. M. ALIDU

Table 9.1  Major ethnic groups in Ghana

Ethnic group

2000 Census

Akan 49.1 Ga-Dangme 8.0 Ewe 12.7 Guan 4.4 Gurma 3.9 Mole-Dagbani 16.5 Grusi 2.8 Mande 1.1 Other 1.5

2010 Census 47.5 7.4 13.9 3.7 5.7 16.6 2.5 1.1 1.4

Source: GSS

groups have also spread across the other regions and over time are changing the electoral dynamics in those regions. According to Frempong (2006: 161) the Ewes formed a significant proportion of the populations of most of the eight Akan regions, while 3 out of every 20 of the population are in Brong Ahafo, Bono and Ahafo regions; 7.7% in Ashanti and 4.7% in Western and Western North regions are of Mole-Dagbani descent. These dynamics keep changing since the last population and housing census in the country ten years from the time of writing. The level of growth is still higher in the dominant Akan and Mole-Dagbani regions as shown in Fig. 9.1 below. In the Ashanti region alone, there has been a 2.7% increment, in the Western region it is 2.0%, in the Central region 3.1% and 2.1% in the Eastern region since the last census in 2010. Similarly, the Ga-Adangbe speaking areas are also growing, with a 3.1% increment. Figure 9.1 below presents the changing dynamics of ethnicity and ethnic groups in the regions of the country and as captured in the 2010 Population and Housing Census. These dynamics continue to impact on the decision to balance an election ticket. In this section, I am going to examine the manner in which all the tickets in the Fourth Republic were balanced and their implication for victory and defeat in those elections.

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

183

5.0 4.5

Number in Millions

4.0

2.7 3.1

3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0

2.0

2.1 2.5

3.1

2.3

2.9

1.5

1.2 1.9

1.0 0.5 0.0 Western Central Greater Volta Accra 2000

Eastern Ashanti Brong Northern Upper Ahafo East

2010

Upper West

Growth Rate

Fig. 9.1  Population size and growth by regions. Source: PHC

Ethnicity and Regional Dimensions in the 1992 National Elections The 1992 elections was a transitioning one that ushered the country into democratic rule after several years of domination by the military. The National Democratic Congress (NDC), an offshoot of the last military regime, formed an alliance with three other political parties, namely, the National Convention Party (NCP) and the Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE). It competed against four other political parties: the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the People’s National Convention (PNP), the National Independence Party (NIP) and the People’s Heritage Party (PNP). Categorically, these political parties could be classified into three major groups according to their ideology: the Nkrumahist parties made up of the PNC, NIP and PHP; the NDC, NCP and EGLE parties are traditionally the remnants of the Jerry John Rawlings-led PNDC military regime, and the former liberalist parties of the Busia-Dankwah-Dombo tradition made up of the NPP. Besides ideology, ethnicity and regional politics influenced the selection of the tickets that contested the 1992 presidential elections. The NDC and its alliance had Jerry John Rawlings,

184 

S. M. ALIDU

an Ewe by ethnicity and also from the Volta region, as its flagbearer. He was paired with a relatively older Kow Nkensen Arkaah, an Akan (Fanti) from the Central region. So the NDC ticket was balanced by ethnicity, region and age. On the NPP’s ticket, Albert Adu Boahene was nominated as the flagbearer. He is an Akan (Ashanti) from the Ashanti region and he also selected Roland I.  Alhassan (a Dagomba) from the Mole-Dagbani group in the Northern region to balance his ticket. The leader of the PNC, Hilla Limann, is a Sissala from the Upper West region and he chose Isaac K. Chinebua an Akan (Fanti) from the Western region to balance the PNC’s ticket. The rest of the tickets and the manner they were balanced is presented in Table 9.2 below. These permutations had implication for the outcome of the elections that year. Jerry John Rawlings’ NDC and his Alliance won the elections with 58.3% of the national vote followed by the NPP (30.4%), the PNP (6.7%), the NIP (2.85%) and the PHP (1.8%). The NDC won nine out of the ten regions at that time, with the majority of the votes won coming from the home region of the flagbearer (Volta region) with 93.2%, followed by the home region of the running mate (Central region) with 66.5%. Rawlings, however, lost in the home region of the NPP flagbearer (Ashanti) which was decisively delivered to their own by 60.5% against 32.9%. The PNC could not win any of the regions but performed so well in the home region of the flagbearer (Upper West) with 30%. His next highest wins were in the hometown of his running mate (Western region) and the other two Northern regions. The PHP candidate did well in his

Table 9.2  Presidential ticket for the 1992 National Elections Party

Presidential candidate

Running mate

Balancing factor(s) Impact/ Outcome

NDC/NCP/ EGLE NPP

Jerry John Rawlings Albert Adu Boahene Hilla Limann

Kow Nkensen Arkah Roland I. Alhassan Isaac K. Chinebua Ibrahim Mahama

Ethnicity, region and age Ethnicity, region

Won

Ethnicity, region

Lost

Ethnicity, region, religion

Lost

PNC PHP

Emmanuel A. Erskine

Source: Electoral Commission

Lost

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

185

home region and that of his running mate and it was the same for the NIP candidates. In summary, three of the five contesting candidates won all the 200 constituencies with the NDC’s ticket winning 152 out of the total, followed by the NPP ticket that won 43 and the PNC ticket winning the remaining 5. The NDC’s 152 victories spanned across all the ten regions. In both the Volta and Central regions where members of the ticket came from, they won all the constituencies in those regions. The NPP’s ticket won 43 constituencies in predominantly six ethnic Akan regions. While the ticket won 26 out of the 33 constituencies in the home region of the flagbearer, the ticket just managed to win a constituency out of the 23 constituencies from the home region of the running mate. The PNC ticket won 5 constituencies in the predominantly Mole-Dagomba ethnic regions of Upper East and Upper West where the flagbearer came from and in the Western region where the running mate came from. Though ethnicity and regional balance played a factor in the NDC’s ticket overall victory, incumbency advantage (having emerged from a military regime that ruled the country for almost 12 years) also played a huge role in the ticket’s success. This result will not be different from the other elections that will follow in the Fourth Republic.

Ethnicity and Regional Dimensions in the 1996 National Elections The 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections also witnessed attempts by political parties to balance their tickets in order to win the elections. Six political parties were involved in the 1996 elections but they contested on three presidential tickets. The first ticket was the Progressive Alliance ticket made up of three political parties: NDC, EGLE and DPP. The flagbearer was Jerry John Rawlings, the incumbent President, an Ewe from the Volta region. His running mate was John Evans Atta Mills, who is an Akan (Fanti) from the Central region of Ghana. The second ticket was the Great Alliance ticket made up of two political parties: NPP and the PCP.  The flagbearer for the Great Alliance was John Agyekum Kufour, who is an Akan (Ashanti) from the Ashanti region and his running mate was Kow Nkensen Arkaah, another Akan (Fanti) from the Central region. It is instructive to note that both the running mate and the flagbearer for the Great Alliance ticket were from the Akan speaking group, though

186 

S. M. ALIDU

from different stocks (one Fanti and the other Ashanti) and also from different regions in the country (Central and Ashanti regions). The last ticket was the PNC’s ticket made up of Edward Nagiri Mahama, who is a MoleDagbani (Mamprusi) from the Northern region. He was being partnered by Adeline Deelo. Instructively, the two dominant alliances had their tickets being all male, all Southerners and all Christians. The PNC ticket was different; it was North-South, gender-­ balanced, non-Akans and all Christian. The full tickets and its balancing factors are presented in Table 9.3 below. The outcome of the 1996 elections was not quite different from the one in 1992. The Progressive Alliance ticket, led by the NDC and incumbent President Jerry John Rawlings won again by 57.4% of the total votes, followed by the Great Alliance with 39.6% and the PNC with 3%. The Great Alliance ticket won in all the nine regions it had won in the 1992 elections and performed very well in the home region of the flagbearer by 94.5%. Interestingly, the ticket did very well in the three Northern regions and the Brong Ahafo region (more than 60% of the total votes) compared to the region that its running mate came from (it got 55.7% in the Central region). The Progressive Alliance ticket won only in the home region of its flagbearer, Ashanti region with 65.8% of the total valid votes cast and won within 40 percentage points in the other Akan-speaking regions. The PNC ticket, though better balanced than all the other tickets, could not win any region. It, however, did well in the home region of the flagbearer. The number of constituencies won by the three tickets also varied at the constituency levels. The Progressive Alliance ticket lost 18 constituencies across seven regions. These regions, mainly ethnic Akan-dominated, included Ashanti (2), Central (3), Eastern (5), Western (2) and Brong Table 9.3  Presidential ticket for the 1996 National Elections Party

Presidential candidate

Running mate

Balancing factor(s)

Impact/ Outcome

NDC/ PA NPP/ GA PNC

Jerry John Rawlings

John Evans Atta Mills Kow Nkensen Arkah Adeline Deelo

Ethnicity, region

Won

Ethnicity, region

Lost

Ethnicity, region, gender

Lost

John Agyekum Kufour Edward Nasigri Mahama

Source: Electoral Commission

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

187

Ahafo (1). Interestingly, the ticket won all the constituencies in the home region of the flagbearer (Volta), just as it did in the 1992 elections, but lost three of its seats in the Central region where its running mate came from. The Great Alliance ticket made some gains by winning 20 additional constituencies across seven regions and also in traditional Akan-dominated regions that the Progressive Alliance had lost. In addition, its flagbearer made some gains in his home region of Ashanti just as its running mate did for the ticket in his home region of Central. Even though the Progressive Alliance’s victory was also bolstered, besides the “balanced” ticket, by its incumbency advantage, it nonetheless recorded a lot of defeats by the infightings within the government. There was a serious war of words and an alleged physical assault that occurred between the President and his Vice-President, prompting the latter to join the opposition party alliance as their running mate in the next election. The balanced ticket dynamics continued in the country’s electoral politics and even gets refined as Ghana’s democracy consolidates. Its manifestation in the 2000 elections was even more pronounced.

Ethnicity and Regional Dimensions in the 2000 National Elections The 2000 general elections marked a watershed moment in the country’s electoral democracy and ushered a “peaceful turnover” (Gyimah-Boadi 2001) in the country’s governance leadership. It represented the first step towards Huntington’s (1991) “two-turn-over-test” in Ghana’s electoral dispensation. Rawlings, who had been in charge of affairs in the country since 1981, was no longer eligible to contest per the 1992 Constitution but he did not just leave the scene quietly as expected. He lobbied for his one time running mate and Vice-President to continue on the ticket of the NDC, prompting disagreements and defections within the once Progressive Alliance ticket, further splitting the tickets for the 2000 elections. Therefore, John Evans Atta Mills, an Akan (Fanti) from the Central region, became the flagbearer of the NDC and chose a Builsa from the Northern region to balance the ticket. The opposition NPP retained their flagbearer, John Agyekum Kufour who is an Akan (Ashanti) from the Ashanti region but changed their running mate to Aliu Mahama, a Dagomba Muslim from the Northern region. All the other tickets had ethnic balance; in addition to the NDC and NPP, the PNC, CPP and NRP

188 

S. M. ALIDU

had regional balances (i.e., one of the candidates coming from a region in the geographical South and the other from geographical North), the NPP and the CPP had religious balances and none of the tickets was gender balanced. Table 9.4 below presents a full list of the tickets and how they were balanced for the 2000 elections. The 2000 elections could not produce a winner in the first round and had to go for a round-off. After the first round of voting, the NPP led by Kufour had 48.2%, the NDC led by Mills had 44.5%, the PNC led by Mahama had 2.9% and the rest of the political parties managed less than 2%. The NPP candidate won five additional regions to his home region of Ashanti, even though four out of the five additional regions were Akan-­ dominated regions. These were Brong Ahafo (50.6%), Central (49.7%), Eastern (55.0%) and Greater Accra (52.5%). It is instructive to note that of the four Akan-dominated regions won, candidate Kufour still got the least vote from the Central region. Though it is an Akan-dominated region, it was also the home region of the NDC flagbearer. The NDC and its ticket won only four regions and lost in the home region of the flagbearer. Out of these four regions, three belonged to the ethnic group (Mole-Dagbani) of the running mate and one was his home region (Upper East). The fourth region that the ticket won has traditionally voted for the NDC because of historical ethnic hatred with the Akan ethnic group.

Table 9.4  Presidential ticket for the 2000 National Elections Party

Presidential candidate Running mate

NDC NPP

John Evans Atta Mills John Agyekum Kufour Edward Nasigri Mahama George P. Hagan

PNC CPP

NRP Goosie Tanoh GCPP Daniel Lartey UGM Charles Wereko-Brobbey Source: Electoral Commission

Balancing factor(s)

Martin Amidu Aliu Mahama

Impact/ Outcome

Ethnicity, region Ethnicity, region, religion Bernard B. Ntim Ethnicity, region

Lost Won

Ibrahim Mahama Cletus J. Kosiba Edward Ladzglah Larry Adotei Addo

Ethnicity, region, religion Ethnicity, region Ethnicity, region

Lost

Ethnicity, region

Lost

Lost

Lost Lost

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

189

The results of the run-off were more decisive. Since none of the candidates was able to secure the 50 + 1 Constitutional requirement, the Electoral Commission had to conduct a run-off for the two leading political parties (i.e., the NDC and the NPP). All the opposition political parties declared their support for the NPP, which was the leading opposition party at the time. The NPP ticket led by John Agyekum Kufour won the run-off with 56.9% and the NDC ticket led by John Evans Atta Mills got 43.1%. The NPP ticket improved in all the ten regions and particularly in the Northern regions where the running mate came from, while the NDC ticket dropped in eight regions, including the home region of the flagbearer of the party. Besides a “balanced ticket” there was a general desire for change among the Ghanaian citizenry after the Rawlings factor in the country’s politics. Also, the significant change of voter pattern in the second round came from the three Northern regions and Muslim voters who endorsed the well-balanced ticket of the NPP compared to the NDC’s.

Ethnicity and Regional Dimensions in the 2004 National Elections The 2004 election was a referendum on the administration of President John Agyekum Kufour and the larger United Party tradition that last governed the country over 20 years previously. As usual, candidate selection for the elections was done in ethnic and regional undertones. The incumbent government retained its flagbearer and running mates who were then the sitting President and the Vice-President of the country. As indicated in the discussion for the 2000 elections, this ticket was balanced by three major factors, ethnicity (President was Akan (Ashanti) and the Vice-­ President a Mole-Dagbani (Dagomba); region (the President was a Southerner from the Ashanti region and the Vice-President a Northerner from the Northern region) and religion (the President was a Christian and the Vice-President a Muslim). The opposition NDC retained their flagbearer: a Christian and an Akan (Fanti) from the Central region, and changed its running mate to Muhammed Mumuni who shared the same qualities as the running mate of the NPP’s ticket. He was also a Mole-­ Dagbani (Dagomba), a Northerner and a Muslim. The PNC also retained its flagbearer; a Northerner, Christian and a Mole-Dagbani (Mamprusi). The PNC, like the other two major political parties, also changed its running mate. It entered into a coalition with the EGLE party and picked

190 

S. M. ALIDU

their leader, Danny Ofori-Atta, as the running mate. Their ticket was therefore balanced on ethnicity and region. The rest of the parties and their ticket permutations are presented in Table 9.5 below. The outcome of the 2004 presidential elections was a repeat of what happened in 2000. The NPP ticket led by John Agyekum Kufour won by 52.5%, followed by the NDC’s ticket that got 44.6% and both Mahama and Aggudey managed less than 4% of the total valid votes cast. The NPP ticket won in the same six Akan-dominated regions the candidate had won in the 2000 elections, including Greater Accra which is largely cosmopolitan and the NDC ticket won the same four regions (Mole-Dagbani dominated) that the candidate had won in the 2000 elections. The NDC votes improved in the six regions that it had lost while the NPP’s votes declined in the six regions it has won. There was therefore no much difference between the outcomes of the 2000 and 2004 elections since the tickets were almost a repetition of what the parties had presented in the 2000 elections.

Ethnicity and Regional Dimensions in the 2008 National Elections The 2008 elections shepherded Ghana’s second turnover after the first one that happened in 2000. For the second time in the Fourth republic, an opposition party won elections and power was peacefully transferred to the party by the incumbent government, an often rare development in African democracies. Like the 2000 elections, the incumbent President Table 9.5  Presidential ticket for the 2004 National Elections Party

Presidential candidate

Running mate

Balancing factor(s)

Impact/ Outcome

NDC

John Evans Atta Mills John Agyekum Kufour Edward Nasigri Mahama George Aggudey

Mohammed Mumuni Aliu Mahama

Ethnicity, region, religion Ethnicity, region, religion Ethnicity, region

Lost

Ethnicity, region

Lost

NPP PNC/ GC CPP

Source: Electoral Commission

Danny Ofori-Atta Bright Kwame Ameyaw

Won Lost

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

191

had served his constitutionally mandated two terms and had to leave the scene, creating a new opportunity for varied and new candidates on the party’s ticket. The opposition NDC retained their flagbearer for the third time in the person of John Evans Atta Mills (who is a Akan (Fanti), and a Christian from the Central region) but changed the running mate for the third time in the person of John Dramani Mahama who is a Christian by faith, a Gonja by ethnicity and a Northerner from the Northern region. The NPP presented an entirely new ticket for the 2008 elections. The party elected Nana Addo Danquah Akufo-Addo who is an Akan (Akyem), and a Christian from the Eastern region. He chose Mahamudu Bawumia who is a Mole-Dagbani (Mamprusi) and a Muslim from the Northern region to balance the ticket. The Convention People’s Party (CPP) elected Papa Kwesi Nduom, an Akan (Fanti) and a Christian from the Central region. He also chose Abu Sakara Forster, a Gonja and a Christian from the Northern region. The rest of the tickets are presented in Table 9.6 below. Like the 2000 elections, there was no clear-cut winner in the first round as none of the candidates was able to garner the 50 + 1 constitutional requirement. The NPP ticket was leading by 49.1% against the NDC ticket that got 47.9%, with the rest of the smaller parties trailing behind. The run-off was therefore between the NDC and NPP’s tickets. The NPP’s ticket under Nana Akufo-Addo managed to win hugely in only two Table 9.6  Presidential ticket for the 2008 National Elections Party Presidential candidate

Running mate

Balancing factor(s)

Impact/ Outcome

NDC John Evans Atta Mills

Ethnicity, region

Won Lost

CPP DPP DFP

Ethnicity, region, religion Ethnicity, region, gender Ethnicity, region Ethnicity, region Ethnicity, region, gender Ethnicity, region, gender Ethnicity, region

John Dramani Mahama NPP Nana Addo Dankwa Mahamadu Akufo-Addo Bawumia PNC Edward Nasigri Mahama Petra Amegashie Papa Kwesi Ndoum Thomas N. Ward-Brew Emmanuel Ansah Antwi

RPD Kwabena Adjei IND. Kwasi Amoafo-Yeboah Source: Electoral Commission

Abu Sakara Foster Peter Dwamena Patience Amesimeku Rosemond Abraham Yaw Gonu

Lost Lost Lost Lost Lost Lost

192 

S. M. ALIDU

Akan-dominated regions of Ashanti and Eastern (his home region), he won narrowly in Brong Ahafo and Western and lost Central and Greater Accra regions that the Kufour ticket managed to win in the previous two national elections. On the other hand, the NDC ticket retained the four regions it had always won and added Central and Greater Accra regions to them and trailed the NPP narrowly in Western and Brong Ahafo regions. The NDC ticket led by Mills won the run-off with 50.2% against the NPP’s ticket under Akufo-Addo who got 49.8%. Candidate Mill’s votes improved in all the ten regions of the country, except in the Ashanti region which is a known NPP stronghold. Besides these dynamics, the NPP had lost its parliamentary majority in the first round making it very difficult to convince Ghanaians that they could govern with minority in parliament. Also, the minority parties threw their weight behind candidate Mills at the expense of Nana Addo that also affected his run-off victory.

Ethnicity and Regional Dimensions in the 2012 National Elections The 2012 elections was a historic one for Ghana. It was contested by a Vice-President who had been elevated to the position of President following the demise of the sitting President in office a few months to elections. Besides the death of the sitting President, other factors also influenced the composition of the tickets for the parties that were contesting that year’s elections. For the ruling NDC, the then Vice-President John Dramani Mahama (a Gonja and a Christian from the Northern region) became the flag bearer of the party. He settled on Kwesi Bekoe Amissah-Arthur who is an Akan (Fanti) and a Christian from the Central region. The NDC’s ticket was therefore balanced by two factors: ethnicity and region. The NPP on the other hand retained both the flag bearer (Nana Akufo-Addo: Akan (Akyem) and a Christian from the Eastern region) and the running mate (Mahamudu Bawumia: a Mole-Dagbani (Mamprusi) and a Muslim from Northern region). The PNC changed its ticket by electing Hassan Ayariga (a Mole-Dagbani (Kusasi) and a Muslim from the Upper East). Hassan Ayariga then selects Helen Matrevi (an Ewe and a Christian from the Volta region) as his running mate. This decision balanced the PNC ticket on four factors (religion, ethnicity, region and gender). The CPP nominated Michael Abu Sakara Forster, its 2008 running mate as its flagbearer. He was a Gonja and a Christian from the Northern region and he

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

193

in turn nominated Nana Akosua Frimpomaa as his running mate. Papa Kwesi Nduom (the 2008 CPP presidential candidate) broke away and formed a new party, the Progess People’s Party and became the flagbearer. He picked Eva Lokko (a Ga and Christian from the Greater Accra region). It is encouraging to note that there were three female running mates nominated for the 2012 elections. There were other two female flagbearers of two political parties (Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings of the NDP and Akua Donkor of the GFP) whose fillings to contest the elections were rejected by the Electoral Commission, denying them the opportunity to contest. The other details of the 2012 ticket are presented below in Table 9.7. The NDC ticket led by President John Dramani Mahama won the elections in one round with 50.7% of the total valid votes cast while his main competitor, Nana Akufo-Addo from the NPP ticket got 47.7% and the rest of the contestants divided the 1.6% that had remained among themselves. The NDC ticket won eight out of the ten regions in the country. He got over 83.7% in the Volta region (the stronghold of the party), 58.2% in his home region and 52.3% in the home region of his running mate. He also did well (averaging 50% plus) in three Akan-dominated regions of Brong Ahafo, Central and Western regions. The NPP ticket won in only two Akan-dominated regions of Ashanti (71.2% the Table 9.7  Presidential ticket for the 2012 National Elections Party

Presidential candidate

Running mate

NDC

John Dramani Mahama Kwesi Bekoe Amissah-Arthur NPP Nana Addo Dankwa Mahamadu Buwumia Akufo-Addo GCPP Henry Lartey John Amekah PPP Papa Kwesi Nduom Eva Lokko UFP PNC

Akwasi Addai Hassan Ayariga

CPP

Michael Abu Sakara Forster Jacob Osei Yeboah

IND.

Source: Electoral Commission

Fred Osei Agyen Helen Dzatugbe Matrevi Nana Akosua Frimponmaa Kelvin Nii Tackie

Balancing factor(s)

Impact/ Outcome

Ethnicity, region

Won

Ethnicity, region, religion Ethnicity, region Ethnicity, region, gender Ethnicity, region Ethnicity, region, gender Ethnicity, region, gender Ethnicity, region

Lost Lost Lost Lost Lost Lost Lost

194 

S. M. ALIDU

stronghold of the party) and Eastern (56.3% the flagbearer’s home region). As indicated in Table 9.1, the Akan group is the dominant ethnic group in Ghana in terms of population and geographical spread. This came out strongly in the 2012 elections and nearly caused the country its peace. By winning in only two Akan-dominated regions of Ashanti and Eastern, the NPP ticket was just 3% votes less than that of the NDC ticket that had won in eight regions out of the ten. The NPP therefore went to court to challenge the NDC’s victory and the presidency of John Dramani Mahama. After almost a year of legal submissions and cross-examinations, the Supreme Court upheld the Electoral Commission’s decision to declare John Dramani Mahama the winner of the 2012 elections.

Ethnicity and Regional Dimensions in the 2016 National Elections The 2016 election was the country’s seventh attempt at consolidating its nascent democracy through the ritual of electoral participation. It was not only unique in terms of its numerical value but also in many respects. First, the NDC was seeking to win an election in Ghana for the third term continuously; since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, political parties only won two terms and got replaced. Second, it was the first time since the beginning of the Fourth Republic that an incumbent President was making a second attempt at winning an election on the ticket of a political party that was making its third attempt. Third, the opposition NPP’s flagbearer and running mate were making a continuous third-term bid to win the 2016 election and govern the country. Fourth, the 2016 election produced Ghana’s third alternation of power where an opposition Candidate (Nana Akufo-Addo) won the Presidency in his third bid (the first candidate to do so was the late President Mills). Finally, it is the only election in the Fourth Republic that produced a first-round alternated government. In the two previous elections where power had alternated, there were run-offs. These dynamics influenced the nature of the tickets for that year’s election. The NDC maintained its ticket for the 2012 elections with John Dramani Mahama (Gonja, Christian and from the Northern region) pairing with Kwesi Bekoe Amissah-Arthur (Fanti, Christian and from the Central region). Its main contenders, the NPP, also maintained its ticket of Nana Akufo-Addo (Akyem, Christian and from the Eastern region)

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

195

with Mahamudu Bawumia (a Mamprusi, Muslim and from the Northern region). The PNC ticket saw the return of Edward Nasigri Mahama, having lost to Hassan Ayariga in the 2012 elections as the running mate. He is a Mamprusi, Christian and from Northern region and his running mate, Emmanuel Anyidoho being an Ewe by ethnicity, a Christian and from Volta region. The PPP ticket was led by Papa Kwesi Nduom (Fanti, Christian and from the Central region) and paired by Brigitte Dzogbenuku (an Ewe, Christian, Female and from the Volta region). Interestingly, Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings, a former first lady of Ghana who was disqualified from contesting the 2012 elections, made her way into the electoral roll. Her party’s (NDP) ticket was balanced with the nomination of a male running mate. She is an Ashanti royal from the Ashanti region and a Christian and selected an Ewe, a male and a Christian from the Volta region. The rest of the tickets are presented in Table 9.8 below. The NPP ticket, led by Nana-Addo and Bawumia, won the 2016 elections in a very decisive manner with 53.9% of the total valid votes cast against the NDC’s 44.4%. The NPP won in six regions, out of which five are Akan-dominated areas. These regions are Ashanti (75.98%), Brong Ahafo (53.87%), Western (52.38%), Eastern (63.30%) and Central (53.22%) but also added Greater Accra (52.42%) region. The ticket did not do well in the three Northern and Volta regions that have traditionally voted for the NDC party. Candidate Akufo-Addo did better in the NPP Table 9.8  Presidential ticket for the 2016 National Elections Party Presidential candidate

Running mate

NDC John Dramani Mahama

Kwesi Bekoe Ethnicity, region Amissah-Arthur Mahamadu Bawumia Ethnicity, region, religion Emmanuel Anyidoho Ethnicity, region

Lost

Brigitte Dzogbenuku Ethnicity, region, gender Gabby Nsiah Nketiah Ethnicity, region Michael K. Mensah Ethnicity, region, Sosu gender Daniel Wilson Torto Ethnicity, region

Lost

NPP

Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo PNC Edward Nasigri Mahama PPP Papa Kwesi Nduom CPP Ivor K. Greenstreet NDP Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings IND. Jacob Osei Yeboah Source: Electoral Commission

Balancing factor(s)

Impact/ Outcome

Won Lost

Lost Lost Lost

196 

S. M. ALIDU

stronghold of Ashanti (75.98%) even more than his hometown region of Eastern where he got (63.30%). In the three Northern regions that the ticket lost, it did better in the Northern region (41.89%) where the running mate of the ticket came from. The NDC’s ticket on the other hand won four regions out of the ten regions that had traditionally voted the party including Northern (55.59%), Upper West (58.37%), Upper East (60.32%) and the Volta region (80.97%). The flagbearer of the NDC won in his home region of Northern (55.59%) and lost in the Central region (43.43%) where the running mate came from. The NPP ticket gained an additional 46 seats in the parliamentary elections while the NDC’s ticket gained 42 seats. The CPP and the PNC also lost their only seats in the Ghanaian legislature, reducing the current parliament to a two-party dominated one. Besides the ticket dynamics, Ghanaians were fed up with the NDC that had governed since 2008 and the numerous allegations of corruption and arrogance that had crept into the John Mahama’s administration.

Conclusion and Implications on Appointments and Governance The reasons that determine voter behaviour continue to leverage on post-­ election period decision-making process, including the appointment of ministers and their deputies as well as the distribution of goods, services and values of the party that so wins the election. It has been demonstrated in the previous section that identity and identity politics—including regional, ethnic and others dimensions of it—influenced the selection of party tickets and the eventual voter behaviour. Chapter Six of the 1992 Constitution, The Directive Principles of State Policy, provides a guide in the formation of government and other critical issues related to governance in the country. The Preamble to this Chapter states, in 34(1), among other things, that “the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in this Chapter shall guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary, the Council of State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and persons in applying or interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing any policy decisions, for the establishment of a just and free society.” Also, in 35(5) it states, “the State shall actively promote the integration of the peoples of Ghana and prohibit discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of place of origin,

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

197

circumstances of birth, ethnic origin, gender or religion, creed or other beliefs.” Further, in 35(6) a–b, it notes: “towards the achievement of the objectives stated in clause, (5) of this article, the State shall take appropriate measures to (a) foster a spirit of loyalty to Ghana that overrides sectional, ethnic and other loyalties; (b) achieve reasonable regional and gender balance in recruitment and appointment to public offices. Yet, these provisions have been ignored because people’s votes are influenced by ethnic identity and not rational, issue-based reasons. Failure to invest in resolving existential challenges pragmatically and concentrating on ethnicity and regionalism will derail Ghana’s quest to achieve the SDGs. There are enough examples in every government in the country since the First Republic to buttress the complete neglect of the provisions of the Constitution. Some examples below will suffice. In the First Republic, the Convention Peoples’ Party government led by Kwame Nkrumah employed most of the people in the President’s Own Guard Regiment and the Presidential Detail Department that provided personal security for the President from his hometown and largely spoke his Nzema language. In the Second Republic, the government of the Progress Party under the leadership of K.A.  Busia (An Akan by ethnicity) had no one appointed from the Volta region (predominantly Ewe by ethnicity) to his government because the party did not win a parliamentary seat from that region. The leader of the People’s National Party government in the Third Republic, Hilla Limann, was from Northern Ghana yet his government was dominated by Southern Akans. This created a feeling of “tribal complexes” rendering that administration inoperative. During the period of the New Patriotic Party government under John Agyekum Kufour (an Akan from the Ashanti group) in the Fourth Republic, his first batch of ministers (19 cabinet and 7 non-­cabinet) included 18 Akans and a third of this number were Ashanti, and eight non-Akans made up of three MoleDagbanis (the ethnic group of his Vice-President), two Ewes and two Gas and there was no appointment from the Upper West region (Frempong 2006: 164). It is evident from the forgoing that identity politics, and specifically ethnic and regional politics, has influenced the manner Ghanaians vote and also the manner in which people are selected into government positions. Where governments overlook competence, qualification and capacity and focus on ethnic politics, it has serious implication to the quality of governance and upholding the rule of law. Ethnic politics leads to “ethnic capture” of the state and the daily governance process. This has the

198 

S. M. ALIDU

tendency of creating ineptitude in the governance process, inducing conflicts and genocides and ultimately creating failed states. While other variables may influence the calibre of electoral democracy being practised in the country, strict adherence to institutions and democratic best practices, including respect for constitutional provisions, could assuage the ethnic-­ driven politics that has become informally incorporated into the formal politics in the name of “balancing the ticket.” That term, in other words, means “be ethnic conscious” in politics. Overcoming this and embracing diversity and pluralism, as well as craft competence, will yield better results and promote sustainable development in Ghana.

References Alidu, S. 2014. A Political Science Analysis of the 2012 Elections. In FES, The 2012 Elections. Accra: FES. ———. 2018. A Political Science Analysis of the 2016 Elections. In FES, The 2016 Elections. Accra: FES. Alidu, S., and E.  Aggrey-Darkoh. 2018. Rational Voting in Ghana’s 2012 and 2016 National Elections in Perspective. Ghana Social Science Journal 15 (1): 98–120. Anebo, F.K.G. 2006. Issue Salience Versus Ethnic Voting in the 2004 Elections. In Voting for Democracy in Ghana (Thematic Studies), ed. K.  Boafo-Authur, 187–210. Accra: Freedom Publications. Ayee, R.A.A. 2011. Manifestos and Elections in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. South African Journal of International Affairs 18 (3): 367–384. Barnes, S., and M.  Kaase. 1971. Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. Boafo-Authur, K. 2006. Voting for Democracy in Ghana (Thematic Studies). Accra: Freedom Publications. Bob-Milliar, G.M. 2012. Political Party Activism in Ghana: Factors Influencing the Decision of the Politically Active to Join a Political Party. Democratization 19 (4): 668–689. Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chazan, N. 1983. An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Recession 1969–1982. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Dunn, J. 1975. Politics in Asunafo. In Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, ed. D. Austin and R. Luckham. London: Frank Cass.

9  “BALANCING THE TICKET”: ETHNICITY AND REGIONAL POLITICS… 

199

Elischer, S. 2012. Measuring and Comparing Party Ideology in Non-industrialized Societies: Taking Party Manifesto Research to Africa. Democratization 19 (4): 642–667. Ferree, Karen. 2006. Explaining South Africa’s Racial Census. Journal of Politics 68: 803–815. Frempong, A.K. 2006. Ethnicity, democracy and Ghana’s election 2004. In Boafo-Authur, K. (2006). Voting for Democracy in Ghana (Thematic Studies). Accra: Freedom Publications, pp. 157–186. Gyampo, R.E.V. 2012. The Youth and Political Ideology in Ghanaian Politics: The Case of the Fourth Republic. Africa Development 37 (2): 137–165. Gyampo, R.E.V., and E.  Debrah. 2013. The Youth and Party Manifestos in Ghanaian Politics: The Case of the 2012 General Elections. Journal of African Elections 12 (2): 96–114. Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2001. A Peaceful Turnover in Ghana. Journal of Democracy 12 (2): 103–117. Heywood, A. 2007. Politics. 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Horowitz, D. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. Huntington, S.P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Ichino, N., and N.L. Nathan. 2013. Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Ghana. American Political Science Review 107 (2): 344–361. Ishiyama, J. 2012. Explaining Ethnic Bloc Voting in Africa. Democratization 19 (4): 761–788. Konteh, R. 2007. The Role of Youth in Ensuring Peaceful Elections. Report on a Conference of West African Political Parties Organised by the IEA-Ghana in Accra, 2 April. Obeng-Odoom, F. 2013. The Nature of Ideology in Ghana’s 2012 Elections. Journal of African Elections 12 (2): 75–95. Posner, Daniel N. 2004. Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa. American Journal of Political Science 48: 849–863. Posner, C. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rosenstone, S., and J. Hansen. 1996. Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America. New York: Longman. Verba, S., N. Nie, and J. Kim. 1978. Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Verba, S., K. Lehman Schlozman, and H. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wayo-Seini, A. 2006. Does Party Philosophy Matter? Report of Conference of Political Parties Organised by the IEA-Ghana at Akosombo, 28 October.

CHAPTER 10

Tolerance and Development in Africa: A Look at Ethnicity, Xenophobia and Religious Conflict Reuben Kigame

Introduction We begin this chapter with a story of an old but wise man1 and his encounters with the villagers whom he often mesmerized with wise answers to the questions they asked him. One time a young boy decided he would make a fool of the man by tricking him with a question. While playing with his friends, the boy caught a butterfly and walked straight to the old, wise man. “Mzee,” the boy began, calling him by the endearing title the villagers had for him. “What do I have in my hand?” Having seen the boy pick up the butterfly, the Mzee gently responded, “I saw you catching a butterfly.” 1  The global patriarchal ideology tends to associate wisdom/philosophy with men (insertion by the editors).

R. Kigame (*) Theology Department, Africa International University, Nairobi, Kenya e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_10

201

202 

R. KIGAME

“That’s correct,” said the boy with a cheeky grin on his face. “Ok, Mzee, tell me, is this butterfly dead or alive?” Having prepared to catch the old man with this question, the boy had decided that, if the man said it was dead, he would release the butterfly and let it go. If he said it was alive, he would squeeze it to death, thereby getting him either way. As the boy and everyone around waited for the man’s answer, he leaned forwards and told the boy in a quiet and soothing voice, “My son! The butterfly is what you want it to be.” Africa is like a beautiful butterfly that is ready to flap its wings into the future. But, is Africa dead or alive? What do we want its future to be? What might kill or keep it alive? Africa is at a crossroads. Every time the continent is discussed, two narratives tend to emerge. First, there is the optimistic discourse championed by pan-African founders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Nelson Mandela, as well as the late Libyan prime minister, Muammar Gaddafi who passionately fought for a United States of Africa. Second, there are pessimistic voices that depict Africa as hopelessly poor and incapable of development. These include, but are not limited to, foreign media outlets such as CNN, Al-Jazeera and BBC. There is also the type of hate speech that tends towards racial prejudice, e.g. former President Donald Trump’s derogatory remarks about the real identity of Barack Obama. In between, there are advocacy voices like Arikana Chihombori2 and P.  L. O.  Lumumba3 who use pan-African rhetoric to bring to the table a mixture of admissions about failed governments and programmes and the portrait of Africa as a rising giant. It could be argued that these two narratives equally represent Africa’s position on the global stage, i.e. a continent with enormous opportunities, but also undeniable obstacles to reaching such a destiny. It could also be contended that Africa’s future hangs in the balance the same way the butterfly’s fate was hanging in the hand of the little boy, but there is also enough cultural wisdom and scholarly research to give guidance in facing the tough challenges that bedevil the people of the continent.

2  Arikana Chihombori is a former African Union Ambassador to the United States (2017–2019). 3  P. L. O. Lumumba served as the Director of Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission from September 2010 to August 2011. He was the director of the Kenya School of Laws at the time of writing.

10  TOLERANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A LOOK AT ETHNICITY… 

203

When discussing the history and future of Africa, it is common to jump to quick ideological, political, socio-economic, cultural and global solutions. These are often crafted in stakeholder conferences mooted by private sector and intergovernmental sittings such as those by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the African Union (AU). Wonderful papers and resolutions have been constructed and proposed for adoption and implementation. Behind all these great meetings and resolutions remains an unanswered question: why is it that pan-African efforts by the founding fathers of the continent as well as all the calls for integration and regional partnerships do not seem to deliver the much-needed unity and socio-economic development of Africa? How come that the more we talk about unity and development, the more we become fragmented and disillusioned? The answer lies beyond all the robust speeches, programmes and overt efforts by Africa’s leaders intended to make Africa great again. It is a problem of the heart or conscience. It is a disease that many in Africa would not mention by name or want to be associated with publicly. This is the problem of intolerance. Like cancerous cells, intolerance sits under Africa’s physical, social, cultural and spiritual skin, systematically destroying existing natural and human resources, thus making it difficult to realize the much-needed development. Conceptually, intolerance has been redefined and made to look acceptable, even justifiable. Terrorism has a new name: religious rights and loyalty. Ethnic violence also has a new name: political power. Poverty has a new name: distribution of resources, or even corruption. The looting of resources has not been left behind. It is known as “peace-­ keeping.” The consequences of intolerance are closely bound up with social injustice and are widespread on the continent. That is why, for instance, years after apartheid and independence, South Africa still grapples with xenophobia. That is why Nigeria and Somalia still struggle with containing crimes against humanity meted to innocent neighbours in the name of religion. That is why countries like Rwanda, Sudan and Kenya have had to deal with ethnic violence. Every time Africa’s leaders stand to talk about Africa’s development, they cite the challenge of poverty, ignorance and disease. It is assumed that if we dealt with these, Africa would immediately be moved from a developing to a developed continent. When these are not in focus, the concentration is on infrastructure and future goals like Vision 2030 or Agenda

204 

R. KIGAME

2063. Intolerance is often ranked among the small or non-existing challenges, yet if we dealt with it, the blessing of our inestimable resources, the great climate of the continent and the resilience of Africa’s people would catapult the continent to a paradise on earth. As an ideological lens, intolerance, simply put, says, “you are different from me in  location, social status, economic and political power or appearance and, unless we see things the same way, we should forget about development.” As Bennett (2017) citing Voltaire would put it, “Believe what I believe—which you cannot believe—or you will perish,” or “Believe, or I detest you; believe, or I will do you all the harm I can” (p. 13). It is easy to see how lack of tolerance has contributed to ethnic and religious tensions, denial of rights, resources and services to some groups, corruption and nepotism in governments, destruction of the environment and the displacement of persons. This chapter concentrates on three major manifestations of intolerance that continue to hamper Africa’s development, namely, competitive ethnicity, xenophobia and religious conflicts.

Competitive Ethnicity Many years after the independence of a majority of African states, the continent continues to grapple with the destructive consequences of competitive ethnicity. Looked at closely, ethnicity is more than skin pigmentation, physical characteristics, the sound of a people’s language, rituals, costumes and other cultural expressions like song or dance. It is “the embodiment of values, institutions and patterns of behavior, a composite whole representing a people’s historical experience, aspirations, and world views” (Deng 1997). According to Isajiw (1992), ethnicity can be perceived and divided into four main phenomena as follows: 1. A primordial phenomenon, where someone’s social status is fixed from birth and kinship; 2. As an epiphenomenon, where one’s status is sealed by “internal colonialism” or cultural division of labor which has some people at the cultural centre and others at the periphery; 3. A situational phenomenon, as derived from the rational choice theory, this is where ethnicity is something relevant in some situations

10  TOLERANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A LOOK AT ETHNICITY… 

205

but not others. Individuals may choose to belong to an ethnic group if they find it advantageous; and 4. As a purely subjective phenomenon, where one’s conception of identity becomes critical, emphasizing the “us” versus “them” aspect. (1992, 2) As a continent, no doubt, the primordial and subjective approaches tend to dominate ethnic perceptions, leading to never-ending political and religious conflicts. For instance, building on the colonial “divide and rule” principle, most of post-colonial elections in Africa are driven by tribal sentiments and rhetoric, leading to what Kenya’s political analyst, Mutahi Ngunyi, called “the tyranny of numbers.” What is even more alarming is that, every ten years Kenya’s national census statistics are given along how many belong to a certain tribe, complete with ranking Kenya’s tribes numerically. The concern about this way of tabulating the results is the census’ linkage to national, continental and global development agenda. The Foreword to Kenya’s 2019 report establishes this point when it states: “The theme for the census was ‘Counting Our People for Sustainable Development and Devolution of Services.’ The theme resonates well with Kenya’s development agenda—Vision 2030 and the Big Four, as well as other regional and international development initiatives including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the African Union Agenda 2063 (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2019). In a sense, the use of statistics in this way tends to combine both the primordial and subjective definitions of ethnicity in that, while the data is read regionally (according to counties), such counties are structured along tribal lines. Subjectively, the same statistics end up as sources of data for ethnic affirmation and identity. Again, as the old man in the story we began with advised, even such statistics are “whatever we want them to be.” Fredrik Barth (1969) helps us to see the subjective nature of this in his definition of ethnicity as something whose identities are created from within and not by virtue of “objective” cultural differences. Barth actually indicated that ethnic phenomena are endemic to humanity and not to any particular kind of society, thus locating the emergence of ethnic distinctions in changes within a society as well as the evolution of divergent standards of evaluation and limitations on interaction. Africa’s development has been badly hampered by racial and ethnic bias. The failure by African nations to criminalize negative identity that emerges from the mixture of primordial and subjective ethnicity has led to

206 

R. KIGAME

untold suffering caused by civil conflicts, genocide, forced migration and outright denial of resources for those who end up being marginalized and stigmatized. While President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has made efforts to criminalize ethnic rhetoric and tendencies, Somalia and Sudan have not been as successful. Somalia’s situation is more saddening because the manifestation of negative ethnic identity is felt down to the clan level. In Sudan, the tension remains between the Nuer and Dinka. The current tension surrounding the Ethiopian unrests lies on another ethnic desire for the Oromo community to secede and form a nation of their own, independent from the mother, Ethiopia. Similarly, although the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria is read as religious, it bears a lot of ethnic overtones which set the Hausa against other Nigerian communities. The conflict ends up being geographical, i.e. between the North and the South. For Africa to develop as a homogenous society that can serve posterity, there is need to replace the racial structures and consequences of both internal and external stratification with a new epistemological understanding, carried best by the Judeo-Christian and Islamic insistence that there is only one human race. There is also need to redefine ethnicity by emptying it of negative primordial and subjective identity. Every community should be proud of who they are while respecting the identities of other communities as co-citizens of the world. Let us briefly cite what Islam and Christianity say about equality. The Quran affirms the equality of all mankind in Surah 49:13: “O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. Lo! The noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Lo! Allah is Knower, Aware.” The biblical principle of “all men one race” is resounded, not just in the imago Dei injunction that we are made in God’s image (Genesis 1:26–27) and one faith regardless of social status (Galatians 3:28), but more so in the beautiful restatement of the principle in Acts 17:26–27: “From one man he made all the nations, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and he marked out their appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands. God did this so that they would seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him, though he is not far from any one of us.” The implication of this passage is that we are to tolerate one another because: 1. all humanity has a common parentage;

10  TOLERANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A LOOK AT ETHNICITY… 

207

2. it is God who appoints where every human being should live, hence racial and ethnic entitlements should be as affirmed as protected in the light of divine purpose; 3. the geographical element in  locating humanity in their places of settlement is salvific or redemptive, meaning that God uses our distinctions to help us find Him; 4. There is the closing reminder in the passage that God is near every ethnic group and individual, as accented by verse 28 which cites a common Athenian saying, “In Him we live and move and have our being.” Competitive ethnicity goes hand in hand with racism. This is both internal and external. Internally racism is visible among different African communities. Externally it is manifested in colonial and post-colonial ideological and socio-economic narratives and actions by Africans against foreigners and vice versa. It has caused untold suffering through such practices as “ethnic cleansing” and domination through beliefs of superiority. Historically, the first manifestations of racism that is of significance to the African society can be traced to the Iberian Peninsula following the Moorish conquest of Andalusia in the eighth century CE. Citing James and Burgos (2008) observe that Iberian Christians may have come to associate black people with being physically and mentally suitable only for menial labour. They were inspired to do so by Arab slave traders who assigned more physically demanding tasks to dark-skinned slaves while assigning and more intellectually demanding tasks to light-skinned. This idea of racial inferiority of Africans was a big incentive in the trans-Atlantic slave trade and Apartheid in South Africa. The Dutch Reformed Church advanced the myth of “the curse of Ham,” levelling it squarely on the black community. It is no wonder that it is apartheid that gave rise to some in South Africa’s detesting of foreigners as shall be seen below.

Xenophobia One manifestation of the combination of the primordial and subjective approaches to ethnicity is the notion of geographical entitlement that views anyone benefiting from a given ethnic space as both enemy and robber of resources. This is what xenophobia is all about. Xenophobia is literally the kind of fear which imagines that foreigners in a country deprive natives of socio-economic opportunities and privileges. David Field (2017) defines xenophobia as an irrational “fear of foreigners or strangers.” It is

208 

R. KIGAME

“related to but is distinct from racism in that it uses ‘putative marks of “foreignness,”’ cultural incompatibility or religion as a basis for exclusion” (Adam and Moodley 2013, p. 21). Perhaps one African country that has experienced the worst public xenophobia is South Africa. Known locally as makwerekwere (Field 2017), foreigners have been attacked and sometimes killed by rioting South Africans who insist that they should leave the country to natives. In 1998 a Mozambican immigrant was thrown from a moving train, and two Senegalese were electrocuted in an attempt to escape the violence unleashed on them by a group of South Africans returning from an “Unemployed Masses of South Africa” rally in Pretoria (Tella 2016, p. 2). In 2008, the attacks began in Johannesburg and spread to Pretoria and Cape Town. Tella further explains that the 2015 attacks were triggered by a speech made by Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini. He is said to have asked foreigners to pack their bags and go back to their countries because they were enjoying South African resources at the expense of locals. This anti-foreigner sentiment is prevalent all over the world, including the rest of Africa. At the end of 2019, a Kenyan member of parliament made a statement wanting foreigners to leave Kenya, thus leading to strained relationships between Kenya and Tanzania. In Eastern Congo, there have been violent eruptions by local Congolese communities who wanted those who have settled in Eastern Congo from Rwanda and Uganda to leave the country. There have also been riots against the U.N. peace-keeping teams which have been accused of taking sides with certain local political elements. But xenophobia is also a global phenomenon as seen in former President Trump’s desire to have foreigners leave America in his political obsession with what he called making “America great again.” Trump had gone as far as wanting a wall erected between the U.S. and Mexico. Tella (2016) aptly observes that xenophobia is not limited to citizen agitation alone. He says it should be noted that xenophobia in South Africa is not limited to its violent manifestation. Many foreigners have been subjected to xenophobic comments and attitudes by South Africans. Intolerance is not limited to ordinary citizens. Government officials, some government departments, the media and the police have adopted similar attitudes. Looking closely at the South African situation will help us see how xenophobia works. According to the 2011 South African census, “there were about 2.2m people living in South Africa who were born outside the

10  TOLERANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A LOOK AT ETHNICITY… 

209

country. This is 4.2% of the population. Of these, about 1.7m had not acquired South African citizenship” (Field 2017, p.  2). Field further observes that this does not include all the migrants. Xenophobia has many different dimensions. Field (2017) gives us five of them. First, there is “personal xenophobia” which views foreigners as socially undesirable. The second is “communal xenophobia” where a group or groups define themselves collectively in contrast to, and exclusion of, foreigners, and may show up in mob violence. Third, there is “institutional xenophobia” which involves government institutions like the police or the Department of Home Affairs showing hostility to or open rejection of foreigners. This is often seen in attitudes which reinforce resistance to foreigners. Fourth, there is “structural xenophobia” where xenophobic concepts are given structural and legal form. It is a subtle form of xenophobia because it camouflages under the obligation of governments to treat their citizens favourably and as a matter of priority over foreigners. The subtlety is in the fact that sometimes it is hard to distinguish between priority and the detest for foreigners, e.g. at immigration counters. Visa and migration documents may be given to those considered desirable and denied to those who may be deemed unwanted by the issuing country. A good example of this is the number of times I travelled to and out of the U.S. following 9/11. Right from the port of entry to simply using an airport to fly to other parts of the States, my African colleagues and I would be subjected to extra screening, sometimes conducted in very embarrassing ways. Last, there is the “social ethos of xenophobia.” This is a psycho-social attitude which may lead to the manifestation of the above four. No matter which dimension is in focus, xenophobia, is always hostile to the immigrant. It may be argued that xenophobia is not open to tolerating other people. It justifies their rejection. What is more, xenophobia abuses patriotism and national identity, often using it as a licence to mistreat foreigners. Thus, when a Kenyan resists a Nigerian or Somali, or a South African desires a Zimbabwean or Malawian to leave the country on the basis of the label of foreignness, this becomes a clear manifestation of intolerance and may eventually destroy the economy of the host nation because such foreigners tend to return home with their skills. It is obvious, for instance, that Zimbabweans, Zambians, Mozambicans, Ghanaians, among others, are part of the reason for South Africa’s economic growth. Coming from a neighbouring country like Zimbabwe which is struggling economically, South Africans have benefited from cheap neighbourhood

210 

R. KIGAME

labour. To send Zimbabweans back home in the name of xenophobia is, therefore, not just unkind but unwise. The Bible is very clear on the need to resist xenophobic tendencies mainly because God is always on the side of the oppressed. The Old Testament is replete with God’s protection laws that proscribe the mistreatment of the “alien,” all pointing to the fact that the Israelites were strangers in a foreign land and hence know what it means to be mistreated. They were to remember that, if they did, God would come to the help of the stranger the same way He did for them as strangers in Egypt (See Deuteronomy 5:15). In his discussion on xenophobia and xenophilia, Louis Rivera-Pagan (2013) refers to the recitation every Jew needed to make in remembrance that their forefathers were “wandering Arameans” who were enslaved in Egypt but God brought them out with a mighty hand (Deuteronomy 26:5) but goes ahead to ask: “Who today might be the wandering Arameans and what nation might represent Egypt these days, a strong but fearful empire?” (Rivera-Pagan 2013: 32). He partly answers this question when he writes: “The perennial temptation is xenophobia. The divine command enshrined in the Torah is xenophilia—the love for those whom we usually find very difficult to love: the strangers, the aliens, and the foreign sojourners” (Ibid. p. 39). We could say a lot about the New Testament approach to xenophobia, but suffice it to just highlight the fact that, the same way Jesus talked about fulfilling the Mosaic Law, so did he perfect the importance of loving strangers as well as enemies. With the Jewish hatred of the Samaritans, Jesus went out of his way to demonstrate that Samaritans were precious in the eyes of God. He spends quality time with the Samaritan woman to introduce her to the love of God. In illustrating love for neighbour, he gives the parable of the Samaritan who was beaten and wounded along the Jericho Road and the importance of taking care of such. In the healing of the ten lepers, there is an emphasis on the fact that only the one who came to say “thank you” was a Samaritan, meaning that Samaritans may actually be more grateful people than the people of the covenant. Whatever the portrait of this question in the New Testament, the position of Jesus prevails and serves as a paradigm for our treatment of strangers. When read through xenophobic eyes, intolerance of others is not just an economic issue. Sadly, if not addressed, xenophobia almost always leads to sporadic forms of violence which result in injury of persons and the destruction of property but may also trigger genocide. African governments should do more to tame this kind of intolerance because, as has

10  TOLERANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A LOOK AT ETHNICITY… 

211

been witnessed in the xenophobic culture of the U.S., if not attended to, the marginalized tends to fight back, thus committing the same crimes against humanity as the system has meted on them.

Religious Intolerance Of all the obstacles that manifest intolerance, perhaps the greatest expression has been prejudice in the name of religion. In a bid to ostensibly please God, devout Christians, Muslims and Hindus, to name just a few, have killed people of other religions, believing such killings were acts of righteousness. We could certainly spend time discussing the Crusades and inquisitions of the Early Church and Hindutva as operationalized by the BJP in India, but this would not deliver our interest in the current African context. For that reason, we shall read the problem by briefly looking at the relationship between religion and terror, concentrating on the last decade or so. We shall begin in Kenya and terminate our focus in Nigeria. On 2 April 2015, at 5:30  in the morning, heavily armed Al-shabaab militants stormed into Garissa University in North-Eastern Kenya and killed two security guards before raining bullets on students who were preparing for their exams in the classrooms as well as several who were still asleep in their dormitories. The attackers then proceeded to a room where Christian students had gathered for Morning Prayer and killed all of them. By the end of the siege, 148 students were left dead and, according to a BBC report on 3 April, a day after the attack, “more than 500 students managed to escape, 79 of whom were injured” (BBC 2015). The report added that four of the gunmen were “eventually surrounded in a dormitory and died when their suicide vests detonated.” The report quoted a student, Eric Wekesa, as saying, “What I managed to hear from them is ‘we came to kill or finally be killed.’” This report shows the extreme manifestation of religious intolerance and tends to give Islam a bad name. When Boko Haram has attacked non-­ Muslims in Nigeria, however, some Christians have been known to engage in counterattacks. These acts of violence conceal the fact that in many sub-­ Saharan countries Christians and Muslims have co-existed side by side from the seventh century CE. In some cases, as in ancient Nubia, when there were Muslim incursions, the non-Muslims retaliated, leading to the signing of peace agreements. In the account narrated above, one could trace part of the motivation for the attacks to Kenya’s sending of troops to Somalia to help pacify and forestall attacks from the country. Both

212 

R. KIGAME

religions have co-existed with each other for many centuries and, while each of them would have wanted a theocracy based on either the Bible or the Quran, this has been held back considerably because of the tolerance observed by each group. The 2010 Pew Research findings on Christian-Muslim tolerance may shed more light on where the continent currently is on this matter: • People who say violence against civilians in defence of one’s religion is rarely or never justified vastly outnumber those who say it is sometimes or often justified. But substantial minorities (20% or more) in many countries say violence against civilians in defence of one’s religion is sometimes or often justified. • The research also established that many Christians and Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa described members of the other faith as tolerant and honest. Most of those interviewed commended their governments for treating both religions fairly. About 40% of Christians interviewed in 12 countries said they considered Muslims as violent and that Muslims were more positive about Christians than the other way around. (Pew Research 2010) The Pew Research Forum conducted this survey by interviewing 25,000 people face to face in 60 languages/dialects in 19 sub-Saharan countries between December 2008 to April 2009, and what is evident with regard to religious conflicts in Africa can be summed up in three main observations. First, that there is so much ignorance of each other’s religions in Africa primarily because of prevailing fear, disinterest and suspicion of people in the various faiths. This ignorance is costly because it is very easily taken advantage of both ethnic and religious selfish ends. Second, failure by most members of the religions of Africa to read their holy books for themselves contributes to their inability to see the mediating, peace and unity messages within their religions. Many Muslims and Christians surveyed by the Pew Research Forum admitted this fact but also indicated a desire to remain at peace with those who believe differently from them. Third and most important, governments can play a significant role in ensuring greater religious and ethnic tolerance by use of constitutional provisions and the promotion of human rights and national values. Indeed, most sub-Saharan countries’ constitutions include a chapter on the bill of rights and the provision that there is not to be a state religion. However, countries like Kenya which inherited agreements made

10  TOLERANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A LOOK AT ETHNICITY… 

213

between the country and religious leaders have ended up in a quagmire due to the difficulty of undoing such agreements. For instance, at independence, Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, made some compromise with the Sultan of Zanzibar to allow the Kadhis’ Courts to be established at the Kenyan coast, which “led to the 10 mile coastal strip being incorporated into the Republic of Kenya at independence” (Yobera 2018, p. 90). Sadly, most of the religious tensions are often closely linked to political power struggles. In Islam, more than Christianity, politics and faith are inseparable. For this reason, it is easier to read political intensions in any conflict involving Muslims. This has also led to unnecessary tensions because some of the resolutions Muslims make in the propagation of Islam tend to be hegemonic and excluding of non-Muslims. For instance, the 1989 outcome of the conference of the African countries of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) which came to be known as the “Abuja Declaration,” had in its goals and strategies the Islamization of the whole of Africa. The methodology of achieving this included the following: To ensure only Muslims are elected to all political posts of member nations. To eradicate in all its forms and ramifications all non-Muslim religions in member nations (such religions shall include Christianity, Ahmadiyya and other tribal modes of worship unacceptable to Muslim)… To ensure the ultimate replacement of all western forms of legal and judicial systems with the sharia in all member nations before then next “Islam in Africa conference.” (Loimeier 2011, p. 318)

Before rushing to the common conclusion of sectarian interests on the part of the Muslims, it must be pointed out that Christians have held similar conferences from time immemorial to promote either universal Christianity or denominational subjugations of territories or continents. The Edinburgh Conference of 1910 included among other things the desire to evangelize Africa. In the nineteenth century, one of the most active Christian propagation organizations that set up camp in Africa was the Church Missionary Society. In recent years we have witnessed such huge proselytization gatherings as the Lambeth Conferences, as well as denominational sessions to discuss how to have more Christians ascend to government offices or become heads of parastatals and multinationals. The recent winning of elections by Church leaders across Africa has been hailed as God’s victory. Hence there is need for balance when discussing inter-religious campaigns for dominance in Africa.

214 

R. KIGAME

Conclusion It is not debatable that the founding fathers of many African states envisaged an easy walk towards the unity of their nations and that of the continent. Organizations such as the Organisation of African Union (OUA) and the more recent AU are living evidence of this aspiration. There have also been ongoing efforts towards religious unity envisaged in efforts by groups like Christian Muslim Unity foundation which is committed to fostering religious tolerance between Christians and Muslims within Nigeria, Africa and the rest of the world. The group aims to “douse current resentments and tensions between these two peaceful religions by creating, organizing and implementing activities that would promote love, peace and unity” (www.christianmuslimunity.org). Efforts are not lacking. What seems deficient is the lack of resolute leaders of integrity who can equally prioritize Africa-based values such as truthfulness, peaceful coexistence, love of neighbour, industry, etc., which are taught by all of Africa’s religions and for every community primarily for the fear of incurring curses from God and elders. The fact that racial and ethnic prejudice, xenophobia and religious conflicts show up regularly all over the continent is demonstration enough that Africa is an intolerant continent in many ways. Amid this challenge, however, there are a few voices that are intellectually and morally endowed enough to carry the continent to her destiny. The choice lies in our hands the same way the butterfly lay in the little boy’s hand. As the old man advised, we advise here: Africa will be “what you want it to be.”

References Adam, H., & Moodley, K. (2013). Imagined Liberation: Xenophobia, Citizenship and Identity in South Africa, Germany and Canada. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media. Barth, F. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. BBC. 2015. “Kenya Attack: 147 Dead in Garissa University Assault.” 3 April. Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080. Bennett, Jonathan. 2017. Treatise on Tolerance. https://www.earlymoderntexts. com/assets/pdfs/voltaire1763.pdf. Deng, Francis M. 1997. Ethnicity: An African Predicament. Brookings Review 15 (3): 28–31. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ethnicity-­an-­african-­ predicament/.

10  TOLERANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A LOOK AT ETHNICITY… 

215

Field, D.N. 2017. God’s Makwerekwere: Re-imagining the Church in the Context of Migration and Xenophobia. Verbum et Ecclesia 38 (1): a1676. https://doi. org/10.4102/ve.v38i1.1676. Isajiw, W.  W. 1992. Definition and Dimensions of Ethnicity: A Theoretical Framework. Paper presented at “Joint Canada-United States Conference on the Measurement of Ethnicity”, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, April 2. https:// tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/68/2/Def_DimofEthnicity.pdf. James, Michael, and Adam Burgos. 2008. Race. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. https:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/race/. Kenya Population and Housing Census. 2019. Volume I. Population by County and Sub-County. http://www.knbs.or.ke. Loimeier, Roman. 2011. Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Pew Research Centre. 2010. Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-­ Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: Pew Research Centre. https://www.pewforum.org/2010/04/15/executive-­summary-­islam-­and-­christianity-­in-­sub-­ saharan-­africa/. Rivera-Pagan, L. N. 2013. Xenophilia or Xenophobia: Toward a Theology of Migration. In E. Padilla and P. C. Phan (eds.), Contemporary Issues of Migration and Theology (pp. 31–51). New York: Palgrave. Tella, Oluwaseun. 2016. Understanding Xenophobia in South Africa: The Individual, the State and the International System. Sage Journal 8 (2): 142–158. https://doi.org/10.1177/0975087816655014. Yobera, Jayne Njeri, ed. 2018. Reuben Kigame: The Raw Reflections. Nairobi: Arba Publications.

CHAPTER 11

Corruption and Under-Development in Africa: An Indictment of African Religiosity? David Nderitu and Julius Kipkemboi

Introduction Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It also has been described as the act of offering, giving, receiving or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions or sometimes as the fraudulent appropriation of money or other property by one entrusted with it (Compton’s Interactive Encyclopaedia CD 1996). The formal understanding of corruption, therefore, portrays an action that constitutes the abuse of public or private office for personal gain. Corruption can also be understood as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. It is often associated with and reinforced by other illegal practices, such as bid rigging, fraud or money laundering. Acts of bribery, embezzlement and nepotism have all been included as part of corruption.

D. Nderitu • J. Kipkemboi (*) Egerton University, Nakuru, Kenya e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_11

217

218 

D. NDERITU AND J. KIPKEMBOI

In essence, corruption is a form of behaviour that departs from ethics, morality, tradition, law, and civic virtue (Mills 2012) which are at the centre of religious teaching. Corruption is global, although racism leads to the ongoing portrayals of Africa as the reference point of corruption. As some critics have observed, there are some countries in the global North that receive billions of stolen funds from across the world. However, such countries are never referenced when lists of the ‘most corrupt countries in the world’ are drawn. Nonetheless, there is still merit in reviewing corruption in Africa as this has implications for the struggle against poverty, as articulated in the Sustainable Development Goal 1 (SDG 1). Corruption is a two-way process requiring a deliberate effort from either party involved and occurs in different forms and at different scales. According to Kingsley (2015), corruption can be at individual level when it takes place primarily in relations between individual citizens and public officials and authorities. It can occur at business level that takes place primarily in relations between enterprises/companies and public officials and authorities. Corruption also occurs at political level when it takes place in the higher echelons of public administration and on a political level. The former are mostly quiet but the latter often hits headlines and is also known as ‘grand corruption’. Both forms of corruption are lethal and undermine development in the world (World Bank 2010). In the context of public welfare in Africa, corruption would comprise any illegal, illegitimate and unethical action that diminishes a country’s economic prospects and degrades its social and political institutions. This chapter contends that in addition to the formal conceptualization of corruption, the act of corruption is beyond the behaviour of the people entrusted with public offices or power and it also involves a violation of what is acceptable to ‘all of us’ for the benefit of ‘I’ or a small group of ‘We’. Africans are described as being ‘notoriously religious’ owing to the fact that religion permeates all aspects of life and as such there is no formal distinction between the sacred and the secular, the religious and the non-­ religious, the spiritual and the material areas of life (Mbiti 1969:1–2). The African is said to carry his or her religion wherever she/he goes, from long before birth to long after physical death. Ideally, this creates the expectation that an African will interpret every aspect of life using religious spectacles. This description is not just a reality characterizing traditional Africa; the same can be said of modern Africa which is infused by new religions. Africans have immersed themselves into the new faiths like Christianity and Islam with the same zeal with which they hold their cultural beliefs

11  CORRUPTION AND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: AN INDICTMENT… 

219

and which they still adhere to. According to a survey carried out by Afrobarometer1 among 34 countries in Africa between September 2016 and September 2018, it was discovered that more than nine in ten Africans (95%) identify with a religion. A majority say they are Christians (56%), while one in three (34%) self-identify as Muslim. Only 4% say they are atheists or agnostics or have no religion (Howard 2020). This affirms maintenance of religious notoriety of the African people to date. Religion has been touted as a source of morality given its fundamental role in guiding and regulating human conduct. Therefore, it is expected that a community that has embraced religion, as most Africans do, would have less integrity issues. However, this is not reflected in majority of the African countries where a myriad of socio-economic ills are evident, corruption having been identified to be the core. The existence of modern global blueprints like the SDGs is aimed at a better and more sustainable future for all. These strategies can only bring meaningful outcomes if integrity becomes part of the equation and the complementary role of religion in intervening against corruption in Africa is expedient. However, this seems not to be the case; the situation of deep entrenchment of corruption in a highly religious society comes up as quite a contradiction. This chapter analyses the irony of the existence of corruption in deeply religious African society and maintains that integrity in Africa can only be restored if individuals take the initiative to promote personal morality as their religious nature expects of them.

The Situation of Corruption in Africa Corruption is not a preserve of Africa; the mega corruption in Africa is perpetuated by a network of local and global individuals. However, the levels of corruption in Africa have been at an all time high, especially in the last few decades. A survey carried out between September 2016 and September 2018 by Transparency International in partnership with 1  Afrobarometer directs a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions and related issues in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are implemented by about 35 national partners in surveyed countries, with regional coordination by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-­ Ghana), the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa, and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi in Kenya. Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of Cape Town (UCT) provide technical support to the network.

220 

D. NDERITU AND J. KIPKEMBOI

Afrobarometer on the public opinion on corruption in 35 African countries revealed that more than half (55%) of all citizens think corruption is getting worse in their country and that their government is doing a bad job at tackling corruption (Pring and Vrushi 2019). The survey, which focused mainly on bribery as a form of corruption, revealed that in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 85% of all citizens see corruption as being on the rise, while in Sudan 55% and Gabon, too, eight out of ten citizens think corruption has increased (83% and 80%, respectively). Other African countries with indices of high increase in corruption (60 and above) in descending order according to the survey include: Namibia, Madagascar, Malawi, Cameroon, Uganda, Tunisia, Kenya, Zambia, South Africa, Guinea, Niger, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Mali. The survey, however, indicated that 23% of the countries in Africa had their citizens feel that there was decrease in corruption and 16% thought that corruption stayed the same during the same period. Notably, the majority of citizens in the Gambia (54%) and Burkina Faso (46%) expressed the idea that there was a decrease in corruption and credit is given to change in political leadership after many years of authoritarian presidency, particularly in the Gambia. Despite there being a ray of hope in the few countries whose citizens felt that there was decreasing corruption, Africa needs to do much more to fight against the social evil because Africa continues to lag behind other continents in terms of development due to impunity, corruption and bad governance (Lumumba 2014). In specific countries like Kenya, a direct co-relation between corruption and interference with development has been drawn. Kenya has been characterized by high profile corruption scandals involving influential individuals in government and also in petty corruption cases involving the common citizen. The most prominent form of corruption involves cases where government officers embezzle funds entrusted to them, influencing tenders and government contracts to their advantage. Private investors have also been highly mentioned in corrupt deals such as bribing public officers to secure lucrative public contracts, tax evasions among many others. Two grand corruption sagas prominent in the history of Kenya which have directly affected development in the country include the Goldenberg and the Anglo Leasing scandals. In 1990 a firm called Goldenberg International Limited offered the Government of Kenya an alternative source of foreign exchange involving gold and diamond jewellery exports at the time that Kenya was experiencing a serious foreign exchange crisis for many reasons,

11  CORRUPTION AND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: AN INDICTMENT… 

221

including sanctions by international community for bad governance (Warutere 2005). But this turned out to be a grand money laundering scheme involving influential individuals in the government and the country’s Central Bank as well as other commercial banks, given that Kenya does not have a robust gold and diamond industry. In the long run ‘Goldenberg’, is estimated to have cost Kenya some US $600 million in just less than three years (Warutere 2005). The Anglo-Leasing scandal involved a fake private company, supposedly from the UK, known as Anglo-Leasing that was awarded a US$35 million government contract in December 2003 to produce tamper-proof passports (Bachelard 2010). It was discovered that powerful people in the ruling regime were involved in the scheme. Even though some fees paid to different fake companies had been refunded as a result of the whistleblower’s investigation, it was confirmed that US$2.8 million was allocated to Anglo-Leasing as payment for one of the security sector contracts (Bachelard 2010) in addition to sanctions from the international donors. Other corruption cases that have been recorded in Kenya include the Chicken Gate and the maize scandal in addition to a series of more petty scandals in the public limelight. Occasioning corruption in most contexts in Africa is the situation where many people, often the poor who visit public offices, are forced to pay bribes for services they are entitled to and are considered a constitutional right. Kenya’s situation is reflective of entrenched corruption in Africa. The systemic lack of control, supervision and auditing in many institutions in Africa has created an ideal environment for corruption to prevail. In some instances bureaucracy also creates avenues for corruption especially developing countries such as in African context. From the foregoing it is apparent that lack of commitment by the national leadership in various African countries to promote responsible governance catalyses corruption. Due to bad governance, the entrenchment of wrongdoing in society has become the norm. The institutionalization of corruption in public and private sectors has eroded human and by extension African integrity. However, the ultimate driver of corruption is greed; the high level of corruption characterizing majority of African countries boils down to lack of integrity by individual persons in society. Religion, which has traditionally been an agent of imparting moral values to individuals, seems to have made little impact in influencing people to resist corruption. Africa has high rate of corruption despite the continent being regarded as being ‘notoriously religious’.

222 

D. NDERITU AND J. KIPKEMBOI

Corruption as an Anti-Development Factor in Africa Although corruption has negatively impacted the entire globe, its effects are particularly devastating in Africa. The effects of corruption cut across the length and breadth of human existence. Corruption is hindering Africa’s economic, political and social development (Pring and Vrushi 2019). It has resulted in social inequality and widened disparity between the rich and poor, and caused civil strife, as well as increased poverty and lack of basic needs for majority of the people like food, water and drugs and insecurity—all of which characterize reality in Africa. Corruption creates dysfunction and uncertainty in institutions. A corrupt act can cause grievous effects, for example, corruption in the healthcare sector can mean the difference between life and death. The health sector in some countries in Africa, including Ghana, Uganda, Egypt and Morocco (Transparency International 2006a, 2006b; Maryse 2012) has been associated with corruption. Some of the cited forms of corruption in the health sector include charging unofficial fees to attend to patients or demanding bribes for medication which should be free, selling fake or adulterated medications to health services, nepotism and misappropriation of funds and theft of equipment. When such kinds of acts happen it means that patients have their lives put on the line literally. Mega corruption cases in Kenya, as aforementioned, undoubtably reduce government revenue due to diversion of tax payers’ money into private pockets. Cases of tax evasion may result in high taxation of the public and reduce a country’s competitiveness at the international level, particularly, with regard to trade, currency stability and investment (Lumumba 2014). The large amount of revenue lost by governments through corruption is meant to translate into equitable benefits but since they are lost, it means interference with development and therefore denying citizens essential amenities and services.

Multi-Pronged Strategies in Combating Corruption The preceding discussion rightfully places more blame and therefore responsibility of mitigating corruption on leaders and the governments in African countries. Most recommendations to fighting corruption have included promoting community responsibility. These include application of law, use of international frameworks and populist strategies, value based systems and creation of institution. All these require political will, resources

11  CORRUPTION AND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: AN INDICTMENT… 

223

and solid social support (Gong and Yang 2019; Mulinge and Lesetedi 2002). International bodies have also been involved in the fight against corruption. The international community has actually aided in tackling corruption in Africa in most cases. For example, some European and North American countries have occasionally halted their financial aid and grants and also they have often instituted travel bans for corrupt individuals in Africa. This measure has to some extent helped in the reduction of corruption in Africa. By and large, the United Nations has been in the forefront in ensuring that there is good governance and reduction in corruption in the world. Through its reports and declarations, the United Nations has been able to charter way forward towards the eradication of corruption in Africa. For example, the establishment of the United Nations Convention against Corruption by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is a show of commitment by the international community in addressing the challenges of corruption. According to United Nations (2014), the purposes of this Convention are as follows: (a) To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively (b) To promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery (c) To promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property The United Nations has further shown commitment to eradicate corruption in the world by developing the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 16 aimed at promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development as well as provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. The main goal of SDG 16 is to advance good governance and advocate anticorruption. Among the 12 specific targets set in it, target number 5 specifically sets to substantially reduce corruption and bribery.2 To enhance the fight against corruption a number of other targets in SDG 16 are seeking to promote the rule of law, accountable and transparent 2  https://www.transparency.org/en/our-priorities/sustainable-development-goals accessed 22/06/2020.

224 

D. NDERITU AND J. KIPKEMBOI

institutions and good g ­ overnance. If African countries adhere to the tenets of SDG 16, then the fight against corruption would be a reality. Africa has indeed shown its effort in combating corruption; the African Union Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption is a sign that the continent is not left behind in contributing towards eradication of this vice. In a manner similar to the United Nations, the African Union (2003) established the African Union Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption whose objectives include the following: 1. Promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each State Party, of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors. 2. Promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the State Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in Africa. 3. Coordinate and harmonize the policies and legislation between State Parties for the purposes of prevention, detection, punishment and eradication of corruption on the continent. 4. Promote socio-economic development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. 5. Establish the necessary conditions to foster transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs. Other efforts by the international bodies to address corruption include the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. This Convention was the first multilateral agreement among governments to combat the bribery of foreign officials. An appeal was made to member nations to initiate efforts and appropriate legislation designed to curtail bribery of public officials in foreign countries (Ryan 2000). These have been able to assist in identification and convicting corrupt individuals all over the world, including Africa.

11  CORRUPTION AND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: AN INDICTMENT… 

225

Addressing Corruption Through Enhancement of Personal Integrity The ultimate role of fighting against corruption is responsibility of each and every individual in Africa. Suffice to say that corruption is not a preserve of national leaders and government officials, as is the popular impression. It is a vice that has spread its tentacles to the very core of all human activities in many parts of Africa. Individual citizens, both rich and poor, are equally guilty of corruption; many people in Africa have at least at one point in life taken part in corruption or have been a conduit through which corrupt deals have thrived. This is ironical, given the nature of Africa where people ‘overwhelmingly identify with a religious faith’ (Howard 2020: 1). The reason why corruption has permeated all aspects of life in Africa is fundamentally because there lacks integrity among individuals. Corruption is a moral issue and morality lies within individuals’ intellectual and volitional faculties. These human faculties are fed and enhanced by the situation and social environment surrounding an individual person. Religion as one of the foundations of morality is expected to significantly influence the development of human intellect and volition. Any human action proceeds from personal decision and choices because basically human beings are autonomous but religion is supposed to guide individual choice by influencing on the right choice. The choice to do what is against the expectation of the society is personal choice as is the decision to do what is deemed right in many religious teachings. Corruption is an unethical activity that is prohibited by the majority of religious doctrines and whoever engages in it does so with full knowledge of its consequences but goes ahead to make such a choice as a free moral agent. At all times, the consequence of corruption is evil. This is the kind of knowledge that is enhanced by religion as a fundamental source of morality. The majority of people in Africa being nurtured under deep religious foundations should be better placed to avert the establishment of corruption in society. The begging question remains: why is corruption rampant in Africa despite the influence of religion? Perhaps an ethical egoist would argue that after all, corruption may not be absolutely evil since it serves the greatest good for the individual advancing a corrupt deal. Ethical egoism maintains that one always ought to do only what is beneficial to oneself (Oruka 1990; Frankena 1978). This could be the mindset of those people who pursue corruption in Africa. Particularly

226 

D. NDERITU AND J. KIPKEMBOI

psychological egoism seems to be a justification for those who perpetuate corruption. This theory maintains that it is within human nature to pursue self-interest or, as Butlers put it, self-love. Psychological egoism argues that human beings are so constituted that one always seeks one’s own advantage or welfare and that this is the basic ‘principle’ in human nature (Frankena 1978). This kind of thinking can be critiqued from various angles. First, it is a contradiction to the ideals espoused in utilitarianism and as such harm caused to others from corrupt deeds would have negative consequences to the individual performing it in the long run. For example, the individual who grabs land meant to buffer excess water during floods would not think that she/he is harming others. But when floods come, the waters overflow and destroy every other person’s house including his/her own. A basic question in this context is whether this was a right and beneficial decision? Secondly, as Kant would put it, one cannot will the egoistic maxim to be a universal law (Frankena 1978). Even the corrupt person would not wish that corruption be a universal law because at one point in time he/she would be a victim of corruption, which is not a pleasant experience. Frankena (1978) further makes a critique to ethical egoism by terming it self-contradictory since it cannot be to one individual’s advantage that all others should pursue their own advantage so assiduously. In order to overcome corruption each individual person ought to be virtuous. Virtue ethics is about being guided by positive moral character that each person cultivates and this influences one’s choices in life. A virtue is a disposition, habit, quality or trait of the person or soul, which an individual either has or seeks to have (Frankena 1978). Religious traditions have been at the fore advocating for virtuous living. In that case the situation of endemic corruption only means that Africans have strayed away from their fundamental nature of being religious or that religiosity of Africa is superficial, that is, convenient to propagating specific interest but not the ultimate common good. When each individual in any society identifies positive values and strives to live according to them, then their choices will be good and the result is that people will always do what is right all the time no matter if they are being watched nor whether there are laws to govern them or not. This is the meaning of integrity and any kind of civilization will thrive if they cultivate this culture. Further, the religious nature of Africans’ living should be driven, not by ethical egoism, but by the divine command theory as is the case with all

11  CORRUPTION AND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: AN INDICTMENT… 

227

communities drawing their inspiration from religious beliefs. The divine command theory of ethics holds that the standard of rightness and wrongness is the will or law of God. ‘Right’ and ‘wrong’ means commanded or forbidden by God, respectively. An action is right or wrong if and because it is commanded and forbidden by God. With so many religious institutions that have emerged all over Africa preaching the supremacy of God in authoring morality, it would be expected that God-fearing people should always be moral. This is because, the majority of the religions in Africa hold that God, being the goodness itself, would always will what is good and following that counsel as a religious duty would result in morally upright people. This is the opposite in modern Africa as corruption is getting deeper in society. Lack of integrity, both individual and collective, in Africa puts the claim for religiosity of the continent in doubt. This means that religion in Africa, both traditional and modern, has to re-configure to have genuine influence on believers in order to shape their morality. This is due to the fact that developing culture of integrity is personal choice but religion plays a great role in shaping individual personalities. Corruption has yielded under-development on the continent. Therefore, it is imperative that if Africa aspires to develop, individuals have no choice but to embrace the culture of integrity that has been the hallmark of religious doctrines as the ultimate solution to the problem of corruption. The success in the fight against corruption in Africa is dependent on, first and foremost, individual integrity and moral accountability supported by collective responsibility.

Conclusion Corruption remains a very significant barrier to development in Africa. Even with the established religious culture in traditional and modern Africa, corruption persists. This casts doubt on the authenticity of religion as the custodian of morality. The persistent corruption leaves one asking whether African religiosity is real or superficial. Religion needs to reclaim its rightful role as a source of morality by harnessing its priority towards influencing the moral character of people in society. The fight against corruption should be a concerted effort between social-political and religious leaders in ensuring strengthening of institutions and political goodwill, coupled with integration of role of international community in the promotion of integrity as a way of ensuring sustainable development in Africa. It begins with individual integrity and responsibility. To be the agent of

228 

D. NDERITU AND J. KIPKEMBOI

effective influence against corruption, religions in Africa would have to persistently align their doctrines with anti-corruption campaigns and inculcate integrity attitude in their followers.

References Africa Union. 2003. The African Union Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption. Maputo: Africa Union. Bachelard, Jérôme Y. 2010. The Anglo-Leasing Corruption Scandal in Kenya: The Politics of International and Domestic Pressures and Counter-pressures. Review of African Political Economy 37 (124): 187–200. https://doi.org/10.108 0/03056244.2010.48390. Compton’s Interactive Encyclopaedia CD, 1996. Frankena, William K. 1978. Ethics. 2nd ed. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Gong, T., and S.L. Yang. 2019. Controlling Bureaucratic Corruption. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. https:// doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1463. Howard, Brian. 2020. Religion in Africa: Tolerance and Trust in Leaders are High, But Many Would Allow Regulation of Religious Speech. Afrobarometer, 28 January 2020. Dispatch No. 339. Kingsley, K.M. 2015. Fraud and Corruption Practices in Public Sector: The Cameroon Experience. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting 6 (4). Lumumba, P.L.O. 2014. Corruption: The Bane of Africa. In Corruption in Africa. A Threat to Justice and Sustainable Peace, ed. Elizabeth Nduku and John Tenamwenye. Geneva: Globethics.net. Maryse, Bouchard. 2012. Corruption in the Health Care Sector: A Barrier to Access of Orthopedic Care and Medical Devices in Uganda. Published online 2012 May 3. https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-­698X-­12-­5. Mbiti, J.S. 1969. African Religions and Philosophy. Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books. Mills, A. 2012. Causes of Corruption in Public Sector Institutions and its Impact on Development. New York: UNPAN. Mulinge, M.M., and G.N.  Lesetedi. 2002. Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a More Holistic Approach. African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique 7 (1): 51–77. Oruka, Odera H. 1990. Ethics. Nairobi: Nairobi University Press. Pring, Coralie, and Jon Vrushi. 2019. Global Corruption Barometer Africa 2019: Citizens’ Views and Experiences of Corruption. Transparency International and Afrobarometer. Ryan, Leo V. 2000. Combating Corruption: The 21st-Century Ethical Challenge. Business Ethics Quarterly 10 (1): 331–338.

11  CORRUPTION AND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: AN INDICTMENT… 

229

Transparency International. 2006a. The Global Coalition against Corruption. Berlin: TI 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index. ———. 2006b. Global Corruption Report. London: University Pluto Press. United Nations. 2014. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Vienna United Nations Convention Against Corruption. New York: United Nations. Warutere, Peter. 2005. The Goldenberg Conspiracy: The Game of Paper, Gold, Money and Power. Institute for Security Studies Paper 117. September. World Bank. 2010. Africa Development Indicators 2010, The Little Data Book on Africa 2010, http://publications.worldbank.org/ADI

CHAPTER 12

“Witches” of the Twenty-First Century: Invoking the Relevance and Resilient Character of African Spirituality in Changing Times Mary Nyangweso

Introduction On November 12, 2018, a story in the Global BBC: The Atlantic news claimed that young black women were leaving Christianity and embracing African witchcraft (Samuel 2018). The story depicts the invocation of African spirituality, song and identity by musicians such as Beyonce Knowles, Azelia Banks and Princess Nokia. Beyonce references the African goddess Osun in her song “Lemonade” and Banks declares that she practices Brujeria (a Spanish term for witchcraft) and Nokia references white witches in her famous hit “Brujas.” Besides, young women are depicted in a picture consulting with a “witch” (a shaman or diviner) and engaging in goddess worship. These seemingly isolated incidents are more popular

M. Nyangweso (*) East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_12

231

232 

M. NYANGWESO

amongst the millennials than is often acknowledged. As Segal Samuel (2018) explains, modern black “witches,” as he chooses to call them, practise a form of Yoruba-based religion. The indigenous religion of the Yoruba in West Africa, specifically Nigeria, is one of the most influential religions of Africa, both in Africa and in the African diaspora. Participants often build altars to their ancestors so they can seek their advice on everything from romance to professional advancement. They engage in spell casting using emojis to help banish depression, and they surround themselves with crystals in the hope that they will relieve stress. They often burn sage to cleanse their apartments of negative energy, a practice that is not unique to African indigenous religions, as Native Americans have also engaged in sage burning for the same reasons. The trend transcends ethnic and racial lines as white millennials have also embraced this spirituality. It is often claimed that they do this because they are also disillusioned with hierarchal religious institutions. The internet, which has become the harbour for these “witches,” has enabled them to meet online and to speak freely than they can do in person for fear that they will be shamed by their devout Christian parents or guardians. One of the practitioners, Tamara Young, a 32-year government program analyst, explains how these African traditions empower women. The experience, as described in Samuel’s article, illustrates how indigenous African spirituality has persisted in modern times. The resilient vestiges of African spirituality are core to African values that are irreplaceable and un-erasable despite social changes they may encounter because they are central to African identity. In this chapter, I argue that the resurgence of “witches” in the twenty-first century is a demonstration of the resilient, revitalization and adaptation of African spirituality. I argue that sustainable development can only be effective among Africans if they take their spirituality seriously. I shall outline the resilience, revitalization and adaptation of African spirituality in diverse context in order to highlight its ongoing relevance to the struggle against poverty, as articulated in Sustainable Development Goal 1.

A Note on Social Change It is difficult to discuss the evolution of African spirituality without engaging social theories of change, especially theories about socio-evolutionism and secularism that have predicted the evolution of society, culture and religion and the general assumption that the eventual demise of religion is

12  “WITCHES” OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: INVOKING… 

233

to occur as society progresses towards civilization. This position, which is held by social evolutionists and secularists like Edward Taylor, James Frazer, Peter Berger, and, Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, to mention a few (Stark and Finke 2000: 57–79; Berger 1990: 127–153), is responsible for the position of African spirituality in modern society. At the inception of the scientific study of religion, the broad consensus regarding the decline of religion was based on the assumption that technological improvement and modern advancement would lead to a “Secular City” (Cox 1965). The secularization thesis that was generally accepted in the 1950s and 1960s as empirically valid argued that modernity will inevitably produce secularity and the constriction of the role of religion, especially indigenous religious practices would result in the decline. Twenty years later, this validity was questioned as scholars such as Peter Berger began to doubt the validity of the secularization theory. Instead of declining, religion demonstrated its resilience and ability to coexist with powerful secular realities including science. Assumptions about religion as disappearing or suffering a significant loss in the context of modernity were critiqued as being wrong. In his book, The Desecularization of the World (1999), Berger explains how the global resurgence in religious adherents contests the secularization theory as it “does fit some parts of the world better than others.” The mistake of this theory, he argues, was “the fallacy of Pars Proto toto,” which means it mistook the part for the whole (Berger 2015). Instead of declining, religion demonstrated its resilience and coexistence with the powerful secular discourses. Soon, Berger would acknowledge that the world is as furiously religious as it ever was, which led him to coin the word de-secularization to describe the increasing presence and impact of religion in the public sphere. Jose Casanova (1994) who recognized the role of religion in modern society argued that religion would still assume a public role as de-privatization of religion takes place. He explains: By de-privatization, I mean the fact that religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity, as well as theories of secularization, had reserved for them. (Casanova 1994: 5)

The death of the secularization theory demonstrated the significant role of religion in society and its resilience and adaptability to modernity. The persistence of indigenous religions, which were perceived as “savage,” “primitive” and “uncivilized,” is spectacular since their lack of a

234 

M. NYANGWESO

proselytizing instinct that the monotheistic religions such as Christianity and Islam possess goes contrary to secularization expectations. Hence the ability of African spirituality to adapt was questioned because it falls within the category of what was perceived to be “primitive,” “savage” and “archaic.” It is for this reason that Samuel’s article on millennials turning to “witchcraft” is revealing since it presents a contestation of general assumptions on indigenous and especially African spirituality. What is attracting these millennials to indigenous African spirituality might be much more than religion. As it is argued by postcolonial theory, assumptions that rendered the indigenous beliefs and practices from which African spirituality is drawn are also about power and how to promote the dominance and suppression of the other. Why is this spirituality a point of interest to many? In which way do they defy expectations? Why are they disillusioned with hierarchical religious institutions? Why do they fear to claim this spirituality in public? In this chapter, I explore the persistence and resilience demonstrated by African spirituality in the face of modernity. I describe how African spirituality evolved through adaptation, assimilation, resistance and syncretism both in Africa and in the African diaspora. I argue that central to this evolution is the assertion of Afrocentricity, the African way as experienced both in Africa and in the African diaspora.

Evolution of African Spirituality: An Overview Africa and the African diaspora have a long and rich history which is central to understanding African spirituality. To understand the evolution of African spirituality, it suffices to reflect upon the history of spirituality in Africa with specific highlights on the interaction of African indigenous religions with foreign religions. The history of African spirituality dates back to the remote past, way before the Arabs, the Portuguese and the Dutch had contact with Africa and before the Europeans occupation in the 1800s. When Arabs and the Portuguese explorers ventured into sub-­ Saharan Africa, indigenous beliefs and practices of African people thrived as an expression of the rich heritage of a variety of ethnic communities, such as when the pastoral groups such as the Beja, Fulani, Maasai, Tuareg and Somali excelled in their nomadic lifestyle. The Arab contact with the Africans around the eighth century and especially the presence of the Oman Arabs on the East Coast of Africa around the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is painful to recollect due to descriptions of how Arabs enslaved Africans and fuelled ethnic wars in African villages by supplying them with

12  “WITCHES” OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: INVOKING… 

235

firearms that led to massive loss of life. The arrival of Islam, which condemned indigenous practices as pagan, while sanctioning slavery escalated imperialist attitudes. By the time the Portuguese conquered the coast for trade in gold and slaves in 1400, Africans were not new to imperialistic challenges. Africa was known to the West as the “Dark Continent” because little was known about African rich heritage, despite the extensive transSaharan trade they had engaged in for millennia (Richard et  al. 1990: 803). Later in this history, African trade points, including Kumbi, Saleh, Timbuktu, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde and Elmina, would become centres of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, which set massive movements of Africans to the New World as slaves. A Word on Witchcraft Before examining the evolution of African spirituality, it suffices to unpack the word “witch” and “witchcraft” used to describe practitioners of indigenous religions. The words witchcraft and witch, derived from Old English wiccecraeft (which is a combination of wicca (masculine) and wicce (feminine)), which generally refers to the exercise or invocation of supernatural power whose manifestation as feminine and masculine force and with the “witch” referring to someone who can do so.1 Historically, however, the word witchcraft has acquired a variety of connotations with resulting stereotypes that emerged in Europe during witch-hunts of the fourteenth to the eighteenth century that led to a distortion of the original meaning, resulting in the association of witchcraft with evil, cannibalism, orgiastic rites of the Devil or Satan. Since then, witchcraft is viewed as the work of crones who meet secretly at night to indulge in performing black magic, sorcery. This is because misunderstandings of the West often confused witchcraft with evil doings associated with vampire practices they were used to. It should be noted that while the word witchcraft varies from the indigenous community to community and from ethnic communities, witchcraft is simply about the possession of supernatural powers. Witches are not sorcerers who use these powers for evil. It must be understood, therefore, that the word “witch” is used in this chapter about indigenous spirituality skills that seek to commune with African spiritual powers.

1  Jeffrey Burton Russell. 2020. “Witchcraft” Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/witchcraft

236 

M. NYANGWESO

The Impact of Christianity The arrival of Christianity in Africa initiated a significant change in indigenous African spirituality. The evangelization of Christian missions in sub-­ Saharan Africa by the fifteenth century became catalysts in how Africans would respond to a new reality. There was the alignment of missionary Christianity with European interests of empire-building, and civilization, with hospitals serving as centres of attraction to the natives to Western ways/medicine, schools as centres of confinement and imparting of Western education and culture and the churches serving as centres of conversion of the pagan soul (Mbiti 1989; Ray 2000). Soon these centres became s of suppression of indigenous spirituality as African values, worldviews and rituals were denounced as pagan. Core values of African spirituality—the belief in ancestors, witchcraft, African songs and dance—were rendered primitive as the spread of consumerism and technology led to the destruction of indigenous sacred land and shrines. This intentionally designed systemic oppression led to the colonization and marginalization of Africans, both mentally and physically. As Africans were colonized and evangelized, those who were brought to Europe and Americas as slaves carried along with them their religion. Even though the land they were brought to was dominated by Christianity, African spirituality persisted as it continued to speak to the spiritual needs of Africans in the diaspora. This is even though indigenous African religions lack the proselytizing qualities that Christianity possesses. What is common about African and African diaspora religious histories is the fact that they demonstrate the evolution ability of African spirituality in the face of social change. Whenever an encounter of different beliefs occurs, humans have responded in a variety of ways. They have either embraced the new values or rejected them, or sought to embrace both values with the hope of finding enrichment in both old and new values. Margaret Archer (1988) explains how humans as social agents respond to social change differently. As social agents, they reinforce or resist values and their influence when they are perceived to inhibit individual convictions (Archer 1988: 77–78, 143). One characteristic of social change is social assimilation, a social process through which generational transition occurs, leading to distinct ethnocultural characteristics to fade in strength over time (Gordon 1964; Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1987; Abbas-­ Shavazi and McDonald 2000). During this process, values can be either abandoned or reinforced. The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre describes

12  “WITCHES” OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: INVOKING… 

237

values that are abandoned as “dead” tradition since these are then discarded while those that are reinforced and retained are the “living” tradition (MacIntyre 2007: 222). When Africans encountered foreign religions, they responded in a general typical way, namely assimilation, adaptation or syncretism. By the time Europeans brought Western culture, and Christianity to Africa in the nineteenth century, Africans’ adaptation skills such as assimilation (adoption of some or all aspects of a value system), substitution (replacement of values by new ones) and syncretism had been sharpened to accommodate new changes they encountered daily. Those who converted assimilated by embracing the new religions and sought to abandon what they were convinced to be “uncivilized” indigenous values. They opted for a “better way of worship” as they understood it. Most of these Africans who are mostly found in mission churches have sometimes participated in the critique and condemnation of African ways of life and its spirituality reiterating the earlier missionaries’ perception that considered them as ‘primitive” “uncivilized” and “archaic.” In essence, social changes in Africa motivated by imperialistic instincts sought to destroy African cultural lifestyle and spirituality that significantly affected Africans’ self-perceptions about social origins, ethnic identities. Those who resisted the new religions out of scepticism preferred to retain their traditional ways of worship, as in the case of the Kinjikitile of Tanzania. They rejected the new religions in preference of their own. A good example is Dini ya Musambwa (religion of the ancestors) of Kenya and nationalist movements such as the Maji Maji Rebellion of Tanzania. As a resistance movement, Dini ya Musambwa, founded by Elijah Masinde, was formed as an African anti-colonial religion whose mission was to assert the legitimacy of the African religion at a time when missionary Christianity was condemning indigenous culture, spirituality and traditional elderly authority (Ward and House 1998).2 The Maji Maji Rebellion which was led by Kinjikitile, an indigenous diviner, sought to resist the German colonial rule in Tanzania in 1905/1906. Kinjikitile, who believed that God (Bokero) had sent divination spirits—Lilungu and Hongo—to possess him for this mission, mobilized 8000 people to resist the Germans and promised them protection using the maji maji Dawa—sacred water medicine. Although the uprising led to the slaughter of 75,000, Kinjikitile’s

2   Kustenbauder, Matthew. 2008. “Prophetic movements: Eastern Africa.” In New Encyclopedia of Africa 4, ed. John Middleton and Joseph C. Miller, 261–270.

238 

M. NYANGWESO

efforts inspired a nationalist movement that led to the creation of TANU— the political organization that led to independence (Ray 2000). Other Africans preferred a syncretic approach which allowed them to seek reconciliation of disparate or contradictory beliefs by blending indigenous values and those of foreign religion to come up with a combo religion that satisfies both African spirituality and those needs that the foreign religions met. Syncretism (the blending together of elements from two or more religions) is manifest in the rise of new religious movements (NRMs) such as African-initiated churches (AIC’s) that date back to the second half of the nineteenth century. Although motivated by an African need for cultural, spiritual and political autonomy, NRMs seek a compromise between Christian and indigenous beliefs such as beliefs in spirits, witchcraft and cultural practices. By promoting reciprocal spiritual reconciliation, syncretism acknowledges and legitimizes that which would otherwise be unacceptable. African NRMs include Kimbanguism (1921), Tembu Church of South Africa (1884), The Ethiopia Church of James Mata Dwane in South Africa (1892) and The Mumbo Cult of Kenya (1913) to name but a few. Where NRMs took on national agenda, as in the case of the Mau Mau in Kenya, indigenous spirituality was merged with the political pursuit of liberty from physical imperialism. African Independent/Initiated Churches African independent churches, otherwise known as African-initiated churches (AICs), are good examples of syncretic religions. These religious groups that comprise about 13% of the African population emerged as sects of mission-based religions with an attempt to indigenize foreign religions to make them practical and relevant to the needs of Africans. They sought to incorporate core African values such as healing, belief in spirits and exorcism, witchcraft and dance to capture the African spirituality. Amongst other reasons, these churches sought to escape missionary control that was tainted by colonialism to assert their authentic identity as Africans. Members sought leadership positions in their churches so they could make independent decisions regarding organization, finance and direction. They believed that God could speak directly to them and that they did not need permission to exert their vocation from mission churches. The blending of indigenous African and foreign values affirmed African spirituality and also created an environment where national and social movements formed.

12  “WITCHES” OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: INVOKING… 

239

A good example here is Kimbanguism and the Aladura Church of Nigeria. Kimbanguism, also known as the Church of Jesus Christ on earth through Prophet Simon Kimbangu, is not only an example of syncretic enterprise; it exemplifies the resilient character of African spirituality amid the condemnation of Christian missionaries. It embodies efforts to hold on what is traditionally African as well as making African spirituality relevant to African needs. As one of the many African initiated churches, its founder believed he was a prophet who had been sent by God to continue the mission Jesus began. Kimbangu, who was born in Kamba, Kinshasa, claimed that he heard God’s voice telling him to witness for Jesus because his servants were unfaithful. Some have argued that Simon was motivated by his people’s suffering, the epidemic and oppression they were experiencing: suffering that the church had ignored because it considered it superstitious or unimportant (Ray 2000). Although he was educated in a Baptist mission school in 1889 and had been faithful as a Christian, his message was rejected at his mission centre. So he began to preach in his home. He healed sick people through the power of Christ. He raised a child from the dead by the power of the Holy Spirit. His home was known as “the New Jerusalem.” Simon began to preach the word of God and soon he got many followers. He was not only revered as a prophet, but he was also viewed as a nationalist revolutionary, an African Messiah, an agent of Christ and the bearer of the Holy Spirit. During his sermons, he healed the sick, drove out demons and condemned beliefs in witchcraft. He soon inspired many, with about 200 other prophets arising in his movement. Although he and his followers received resistance for his message, and many were arrested with some including him dying in prison in 1951, his movement was granted official recognition as “Church of Jesus Christ on Earth” in 1959. Like Kimbanguism, the Aladura Church spoke to African spirituality. The Aladura Church, which was founded in southwest Nigeria among the Yoruba, was founded by Josiah O. Oshitelu, a catechist in the missionary church in Nigeria. Aladura means—“those who pray.” Oshitelu claimed to have received visions of a great “eye” at a time Yoruba people were experiencing a cultural crisis in the 1920s. The social conflict was explained by the destruction of pagan Orisha. His mission was devoted to healing personal problems such as infertility, economic affairs, health and security problems. It engages a holistic worldview that perceives every aspect of life as interconnected. By recognizing health and healing as a central component of African spirituality, the Aladura Church engaged the African core

240 

M. NYANGWESO

beliefs which is often manifest in misfortunes, curses, witchcraft and spirits and that social-economic conditions of Africans are a reflection of disturbed spiritual equilibrium that deserves sacrifice and exorcism to bring about social harmony and spiritual fulfilment. Realizing the centrality of AICs in the fulfilment of African spirituality, the World Council of Churches embraced Kimbangusim as a member and recognized faithful healing as a significant part of worship for Africans. Members often recite prayers from the book of Psalms which they direct to God and practise fasting as a healing strategy. Some of these movements have sought to purify or reawaken indigenous spirituality by riding them of foreign influences, as in the case of Mungiki sect of Kenya which began as a local militia group claiming to be inspired by the Mau Mau movement that decried colonialism and the trappings of Western culture. As a sect, the movement advocated a return to indigenous practices, including an embrace of practices such as female circumcision that had been banned by the government. The movement was later on rendered a terrorist group (Ray 2000). It has been argued that the missionaries failed the Africans by dismissing and condemning their spirituality whose focus was on personal health issues such as misfortunes, witchcraft and spirits. By ignoring the social-­ economic conditions of Africans, specifically poverty and suffering, and rejecting African prophets like Kimbangu who performed miracles like Jesus, Christianity ignored the central spirituality of the Africans. Thus, Christianity was alien to their spiritual needs. The Case of Islam While foreign to Africa, Islam had a similar but different approach to African spirituality. On arrival to Africa in the seventh century, Islam took root in one-third of the continent by accommodating itself to African spirituality, which included tolerance of cultural and religious form and an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of indigenous spirits, systems of divination maintained, techniques of witchcraft and sorcery. Practices such as healing rites were allowed to continue in a syncretic manner as nature spirits and deities became Muslim jinns or devils; ancestors became Muslim saints, angels or jinns; witchcraft, oracles and divination became Sahir— mystical techniques. Islam did not condemn or seek to replace them. For instance, Somali Islam is marked by the importance of the cult of the saints who, as Nelson observes, “are often, in fact, simply ancestors of Somali lineages” (Nelson 1984: 118).

12  “WITCHES” OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: INVOKING… 

241

A good example of Islamic syncretic practices is experienced in the rituals surrounding Zar and Bori Spirits as found in Northern Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, and parts of North Africa and near East. Bori spirits are the indigenous deities of the region and believers are initiated in the cult as the “son” or “daughter” of the Bori. The ritual involves spirit possession and public dances that exhibit the personality and behaviour of spirits. Although orthodox Muslims recognize these spirits, they categorize them as jinn spirits or as shaitan (evil spirits) that are recognized in the Qur’an. They pray to Allah to stop the suffering caused by these evil spirits. Some Muslim clerics allow the practice of divination and spirit possession as the belief in spirit mediums—Zima and singers (Sorko) continue and the performance of drought offerings to spirits in private and recitation of Islamic prayer in public continues. The Zar and Bori cult, almost exclusively a cult of women, is often performed to promote fertility, and prevent miscarriage (Ray 2000). The diverse responses of Africans to these foreign religions illustrate the dynamic forms of evolution of African spirituality and how these different approaches led to the decline of indigenous African spirituality.

African Spirituality in the Diaspora The history of African spirituality in African diaspora also dates back to the era that saw the beginning of the European slave trade to the New World. Millions of Africans were captured and removed from the continent between 1480 and 1900. It is estimated that some 12 million Africans were subjected to foreign slavery and shipped to new spaces. Over time, these African religions, which developed around the nineteenth and twentieth centuries acquired names such as Santeria, Vodou, Candomble, Macumba, Umbanda, Pocomania, Revival Zion, Bedwardism, Covince, Shango, Spiritual Baptists and Rastafarianism. Popularly found in the United Kingdom, the Americas, and Australia, and in the United States, even in large metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, Miami and New York, they represent African spirituality in the sense that they embody African heritage that defines African identity. They are not only a reminder of slaves’ heritage, but they also served as a medium for communicating with subsequent generations about their origin. Like the AICs in Africa, they acquired resistant and syncretic characteristics including spirit possession, song and dance, folklore and myth, healing and charismatic worship. Spirit possession is a central element to African spirituality which is manifest in

242 

M. NYANGWESO

this neo-African and syncretic cults of Brazil and elsewhere. Among those who practise religions like Santeria, and Vodou is the worship of ancestors which continues to be observed as the Day of the Dead. The adaptability of African spirituality in these religions speaks to the dynamic, variable and flexible character of these religions. Even as some elements of indigenous practices are condemned, such as the use of magic, there is a common belief in the efficacy of magic. Syncretic behaviour is further manifest in the annual festival such as Egungun that has been transformed into the November 2nd celebration of the dead. For instance, Santeria, which translates as “the way of the saints,” is derived from the Spanish word, “Santos,” a dominant religion in Cuba and is often practised as a way to pay homage to African spirituality that draws from West African worship of Yoruba orisha. Also known as Regla de Ocha, Santarem became not only a way to sustain the relationship with African Yoruba gods, especially the Old Oyo Empire whose towns include Egba, Ijesha, Dahomey, Asanti and Bini, all located in modern West African communities neighbouring Nigeria, it was also a way to maintain an Afrocentric culture and identity as Africans. As they congregated themselves in Cabildos (Africans’ enclaves from one nation), they provided support for each other during hard times of slavery. The cabildo spaces provided them a forum for entertainment and spiritual uplifting. As cabildos evolved, into Ile/Casa—meeting houses, they turned into charitable organizations that provided mutual aid, fundraising opportunities and healthcare centres. They became a place where members would turn to for support with identity issues, ranging from racism, classicism and other forms of social conflict. Santeria leadership, known as Santera/Santero, is designed on the African babaluaye model with the requirement of initiation—kariocha—and spiritual growth that grants one the ability to commune and consecrate the gods. As a leader in Santeria, Santera or Santero is granted “new eyes to see the presence of the spirits.” Members are initiated by crowning them with an Orisha, a symbol of renewal. During the worship, members of Santeria not only enjoy Bamba drum dance, but they also use Bata drums to invoke gods and goddesses like Shango, Yemaya, Oshun, Eleggua (Eshu) to whom they pray and practise healing rituals while calling upon Babaluaye, the spirit of sickness and health. Babaluaye is the spirit that is associated with St Lazarus. The role of spirit possession in the healing process is synonymous with the Pentecostal experience of the Holy Spirit.

12  “WITCHES” OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: INVOKING… 

243

African spirituality is also manifest in the Black Church in the United States. This spirituality that is often expressed in the ecstatic dance ritual that is known as “shout,” or “ring shout” which involves worshipping in a moving circular manner while shuffling their feet and the clapping of their hands. The word “shout” is said to have been derived from an Arabic word sha’wt, meaning a single circumambulation of the Kaaba. Despite the name, shouting aloud is not an essential part of the ritual. “Shout” is associated with the Gullah survival of the Afro-Arabic word saut, and describes the name of a ritual dance around the Kaaba, an Islamic sacred site that is located in Mecca. “Shout” is an example of syncretism that involves African dance, and Islamic roots that go back to enslaved African Muslims from West Africa. It is an imitation of tawaf—the mass procession that often takes place around the Kaaba as an essential part of the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca. Stylistic elements observed during the ring shout not only laid the foundations of African spirituality in the diaspora communities, but it also influenced a variety of black music styles that developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Elements of black music that are present in the ring shout include calls, cries and hollers; blue notes, call and response; and various rhythmic aspects.

Revitalization Movements in African Diaspora The centrality of African spirituality in the Americas is evident in American cities such as Detroit and Michigan where it is common to see an African American woman visiting a babalawo (diviner) who reads Nigerian ikin (oil-palm nuts) in advising her on marriage prospects (Table 12.1). It is evident in Miami where a crowd of Cuban-Americans dance for the goddess Yemaya to the animating rhythms of a bata (drum) ceremony at the Church of the Lukumi Babaluaye. It can also be found in Brooklyn where a Puerto Rican cab driver makes his sunrise ebo (sacrificial) offerings at the shrine of Ogun in his apartment before another day’s work. It is also evident in Trinidad, where local men draped in red scarves sacrifice a goat for Sango to protect their homes and crops as a hurricane approaches (Bryan 2012).3 Central to renewed African spirituality is an African struggle for liberation, a factor that has motivated the formulation of ideas among 3  Dan Bryan, 2012 “‘Little Havana’ Cuban Culture in Miami Since Castor,” American History USA, https://www.americanhistoryusa.com/little-havana-cuban-culture-inmiami-since-castro/

244 

M. NYANGWESO

Table 12.1  Revitalization movements in the African diaspora (Source: Author) Candomble Catimbo Santana Macumba Vodou/ Voodoo Umbanda Black Church Spirituality

Brazilian synthesis of African traditional religions and Christian beliefs Brazilian integration of African, native and Christian beliefs Cuban religion that integrates Yoruba religion with Christian beliefs Brazilian synthesis of African, Christian and Native American religion Haitian synthesis of African traditional religion and Christianity Popular Brazilian religion, synthesis of African, Native American and Christian religions African American Christian worship that incorporates African traditional religion in their liturgy

Africans in the diaspora in response to racism that is experienced in the United States and elsewhere in Europe. The continued dynamism of African religion, both in Africa and in the New World can be partially attributed to discrimination as much as the religious inclination of Africans living in the diaspora. While it is a revitalization of a cultural heritage that transcends boundaries even as the values informing these new religious movements are assimilated, adapted and syncretized as described in the table above, it is also an assertion of Afrocentricity as an identity that is real, it is a reclaim of the African heritage wherever it may be and it is an assertion of its legitimate contribution to global cultural reality. It is a cry for recognition, liberation, demand for basic human rights and social justice. The central question regarding the resurgence of African spirituality in the millennial is whether indigenous cosmological models can survive the impact of modern civilizations? In other words, is current manifestation of African spirituality a contestation of misconceptions that have rendered indigenous beliefs and practices “archaic”, “primitive” “unchanging” and therefore unadaptable? In exploring this very topic amongst the Karamojong of Sudan, Ben Knighton has argued that the persistence of African beliefs and practices continues to shatter Eurocentric theories that sought to confine African religious values to a pre-modern sphere. He illustrates how dynamic and enduring African religious lifestyles are. Drawing examples from the Karamojong community, he underscores how the Karamojong have resisted foreign ideologies despite the colonial experiment, and new

12  “WITCHES” OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: INVOKING… 

245

attractions. As he argues, tradition emerges or dies primarily through collective choice (2005: 1–3). In other words, traditions die only if humans let them. He utilizes the ethnographic approach to demonstrate how African cosmologies evolve as well and how they adapt to changing situations. According to Knighton (2005), the challenge that Western cultures and religions face lies in their attempts to circumscribe the other. He illustrates how Western-based ideologies and theories that separate the sacred from the profane fail to understand the centrality of African spirituality in African lifestyles as expressed amongst the Karamojong. The encounter of the West with indigenous spirituality has led to appropriation, adoption, adaptation and rejection of what did not fit their worldview even when it was as authentic as can be (2005: 6). The general assumption that indigenous societies have no history just because their history is often oral is misleading because what is often forgotten is the fact that undocumented history does not mean nonexistent. Indigenous religions possess a long complex history that is changing: a history that has always revolved around cultural values that continue to define their perception. The persistence of indigenous religious values in modern society lies in the simple fact that these values remain central to the realities of people in modern society. Western ideologies have yielded a superficial social transformation of realities since Christianity was perceived to be “under the social control of largely uncomprehending aliens who do not share in a pastoralist livelihood” (Knighton 2005: 5). While this is often perceived as a resistance to Christianity as a foreign religion, it is about inappropriateness and the desire by indigenous people as the Karamojong to remain independent, connected to their heritage which is the source of their identity and history. Knighton’s work is comparable to Christine Ayorinde’s (2004) argument that the centrality of African spirituality as experienced in Afro-Cuban religiosity is the reason for revitalization and persistence. Both Knighton and Ayorinde seek to discount Western theories about African religion to highlight the enduring spirit in African spirituality. The dynamism in African culture and religiosity is embedded in its central character to predict, explain and control events: a characteristic that is fundamental to African experience and one that mission-based churches often overlook (Ayorinde 2004: 8). To coexist effectively with indigenous religions, Christianity must embrace the African reality.

246 

M. NYANGWESO

Conclusion What is it about African spirituality that makes it persistent in modern society? This is the fundamental question that this chapter addresses. Revitalization of what Samuel (2018) calls the “witch” practices in modern society is contrary to perceived assumptions and indeed theories of secularization as argued by secularists such as Peter Berger. In the face of these cultural and religious challenges, Africans have demonstrated an ability to adapt, as they have embraced new ideals in Africa and beyond Africa. They have adjusted to expectations and practices that acknowledge their authentic reality that is embedded in their worldview. Many traditional African healers, for example, have adjusted to meet contemporary challenges by adopting the use of modern medical instruments, while still claiming proficiency in palmistry, astrology and herbal medicines. In an attempt to stress the “scientific” nature of their practices and gain credibility in modern society, many have also taken on titles like “Doctor,” “Professor,” and “Sheikh.” Thus, on the one hand, their healing practices continue to rely on rituals that interpret dreams and propitiate spirits. On the other hand, however, many contemporary Africans, including Christians and Muslims, visit traditional healers, especially when Western medicine proves inadequate to certain ailments. In numerous cases, healers even work side-by-side with physicians and registered nurses in hospitals and clinics. Some leaders in African traditional religions have also found ways of adopting major theological principles from Christianity and Islam into their indigenous systems. These include the belief in a bodily resurrection and existence in the afterlife and teachings about final rewards and punishments in a literal heaven and hell. Christian and Islamic understandings of monotheism have been particularly influential among traditional African theologians, stimulating a reinterpretation of their concept of the Supreme Being. Especially where Christianity and Islam are practised, the Supreme Being has taken on the characteristics of the monotheistic God and is sometimes worshipped as though the Christian or Muslim God and the indigenous Supreme Being were the same. African theologians like Mbiti and Idowu have even described the Supreme Being and the invisible world of the spirits as a sort of “diffused monotheism.” The persistence of African spirituality demonstrates its dynamism to evolve, revitalize and adapt to a new reality. It is for these reasons that Africans in Africa have adapted by developing African-initiated churches while those in the diaspora have adapted by maintaining Afrocentric beliefs

12  “WITCHES” OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: INVOKING… 

247

and practices as in lyrics of African women like Beyonce, Azelia and Princess Nokia. According to Ayorinde (2004), African religion is not only dynamic, but it is also central to the people’s African identity as it offers unique meaning to the African experience. It is this resilience that is manifest in the Afrocentric practices of “the Witches of Baltimore” as African spirituality continuous to remain relevant in modern society. As Ayorinde reminds us, African heritage is central to African communities’ identity. As long as Africans’ experiential realities are real, they will demand African answers to these needs. Modern “witchcraft” is a testament to this fact.

References Abbas-Shavazi, M.J., and P.  McDonald. 2000. Fertility and Multiculturalism: Immigrant Fertility in Australia: 1977–91. International Migration Review 34 (1): 215–242. Archer, M.S. 1988. Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ayorinde, Christine. 2004. Afro-Cuban Religiosity, Revolution, and National Identity. Gainsville: University of Florida. Bryan, Dan. 2012. “‘Little Havana’ Cuban Culture in Miami Since Castor,” American History USA, https://www.americabhistoryusa.com/ little-­havana-­cuban-­culture-­in-­miami-­since-­castro/ Berger, Peter. 1990. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor Books. Berger, L. Peter. 2015. De-secularization. The American Interest, https://www. the-­american-­interest.com/2015/05/13/desecularization/ Casanova, Jose. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Cox, Harvey. 1965. The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective. New York: The Macmillan Company. Goldscheider, C., and F. Goldscheider. 1987. Moving out of Marriage: What do Young Adults Expect? American Sociological Review 52: 278–285. Gordon, D.A. 1964/1991. Female Circumcision and Genital Operations in Egypt and Sudan: a Dilemma for Medical Anthropology. Medical Anthropology Quarterly N.S 5 (1): 3–14. Knighton, Ben. 2005. The Vitality of Karamojong Religion: Dying Tradition or Living Faith? Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company. Kustenbauder, Matthew. 2008. Prophetic Movements: Eastern Africa. In New Encyclopedia of Africa 4, ed. John Middleton and Joseph C. Miller, 261–270. Detroit: Thomson/Gale.

248 

M. NYANGWESO

MacIntyre, A. 2007. After Virtue, Third Edition. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Mbiti, John S. 1989. African Religions and Philosophy. revised version Oxford: Heinemann. Nelson, H. D. ed. 1984. Kenya: A Country Study. Washington DC: The American University. Ray, Benjamin. 2000. African Religions: Symbol, Ritual, and Community. (2nd edn.). Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall. Richard, Greaves, Robert Zailer, Philip Cannistraro, and Rhoads Murphy. 1990. Civilizations for the World: The Human Adventure. New York: Harper and Row. Samuel, Segal. 2018. The Witches of Baltimore: Young black women are leaving Christianity and embracing African witchcraft in digital covens” Global, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/11/ black-­millennials-­african-­witchcraft-­christianity/574393/ Stark, Rodney, and Roger Finke. 2000. Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. California: University of California Press. Ward, M. D., and House, L. L. 1998. A Theory of Behavioral Power of Nations: The Theory of Behavior.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution (1986–1998), 32(1) retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/236097972

CHAPTER 13

Towards an Alternative Notion of ‘Hard Work’ for Africa’s Development Dennis Masaka Introduction That countries in Africa1 continue to experience lethargic development even after the attainment of ‘independence’2 from colonial rule is a cause for concern, especially given the generally shared belief that indigenous 1  Use of ‘countries in Africa’ and not ‘African countries’ in the present work is deliberate because they are still significantly imprisoned in the logic of colonialism. They are yet to attain the envisioned status of being ‘African countries’ reflected by effective control of their own affairs in areas such as knowledge production, development paradigms and systems of governance. At the same time, reference to ‘countries in Africa’ is not intended to imply that these countries are homogenous and have had same colonial experiences (Rathbone 1981: 2). Nevertheless, these countries share commonalities of colonially induced stunted development that warrant a generalised but informed comment on their development trajectories. 2  I enclose ‘independence’ in quotations marks because I do not believe that countries in Africa have totally attained it (Ramose 2016: 548–549; Serequeberhan 2003: 47–48).

D. Masaka (*) Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Department of Philosophy, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_13

249

250 

D. MASAKA

people of Africa  cherish and practice the value of hard work (Dolamo 2013: 2; Malunga 2014: 628; Idang 2015: 106; Molefe 2016). The question I specifically intend to answer in this chapter is: ‘in light of the prevailing stunted economic development in some countries in Africa, how could the value of hard work, that is generally acclaimed to be an attribute of the indigenous people of Africa be used to place these countries on a positive development trajectory?’ In response to this question, I first show that during the colonial era, colonialists confined the indigenous people of Africa to being employees and not independent creators of wealth, and this has continued into the ‘postcolonial’3 period. This has made hard work so conceived largely ineffectual in positively motivating the continent’s development in present times. As a departure from this deployment of the concept ‘hard work’, I explicitly defend one which invests in them creative and innovative competences that could help in meeting the development agendas of countries in Africa (see Makhulu et al. 2010: 6). I argue that this orientation of hard work ought to be anchored on an appropriate epistemology: one that imparts competences that are useful in improving the human condition in countries in Africa. This stands out to be an area that has not been sufficiently explored in the literature on ‘post-colonial’ development of countries in Africa. Attending to this area will, so I argue, place Africa more strategically to achieve sustainable development.

Defining Key Terms: An Overview Since the concepts ‘development’ and ‘hard work’ are central in this discussion, it is necessary to be explicit about the senses in which they are understood in this chapter. By ‘development’, I refer to many-sided efforts to progressively and continuously improve the human condition (UNDA 2007: 5). In understanding it thus, I agree with Kwame Gyekye (2013: 29–30) that it is unhelpful to reduce the gamut of development to one of its specific components, economic development and pretend that it captures its essence. Development transcends economic development and ought to be properly conceived as much broader and multi-faceted in its scope and intentions. For this reason, Gyekye (2013: 47) urges that ‘development be perceived in terms of adequate responses to the entire 3  Similarly, one cannot legitimately talk of the ‘postcolonial’ concerning countries in Africa because there are plausible claims that colonialism still exist in covert form in Africa (Nkrumah 1965: x).

13  TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE NOTION OF ‘HARD WORK’ FOR AFRICA’S… 

251

existential conditions in which, or through which, human beings function. These include economic, political, social, cultural, moral, intellectual and other conditions.’ For reasons of space, I will specifically pick the ‘economic’ and ‘intellectual’ conditions for a nuanced focus in this present chapter. These two conditions connect well with my understanding of the concept ‘hard work’ that I think could lead countries in Africa to work towards generating more internal remedies to some of the challenges that confront them, going into the future. It is important to note that effort is important in motivating development (Gyekye 2013: 33). In this light, I explicitly defend a certain understanding of hard work which is different from the way it is commonly deployed, especially in employee-employer parlance, that is, commitment and efforts of workers to solely and efficiently discharge a service as required by employers. The understanding of hard work that I defend in this chapter, and which I believe would offer useful remedies to countries in Africa’s existential challenges, is pre-eminently one that enables indigenous people of Africa to use requisite competences which they acquire through an appropriate educational paradigm to devise solutions to some of the problems that their countries face going into the future (see Jonck et al. 2017: 2). This dimension of hard work is largely underexplored in development literature and is a departure from the one imposed during colonialism which is currently predominant across Africa. As such, it constitutes a fresh direction to the notion of hard work underpinned by an appropriate educational paradigm that could offer a way out of stunted development or what Simon Gikandi (2010: xii) has termed ‘enclosures of despair’. In the first section, I briefly present the general nature of development in Africa during the colonial era. Of specific interest here is the colonialists’ deployment of the value of hard work upheld and practised by the indigenous people of Africa to mere ancillary roles in the colonial extractive ‘development’4 scheme. I note that this conception of hard work that I oppose in the present work has continued into the ‘post-colonial’ period and will not help much in overturning Africa’s stunted development. In the second section, I defend an alternative notion of hard work that implores the indigenous people of Africa to invest their efforts in acquiring competences that could help in finding requisite solutions to their respective countries’ development goals. In the last section, I argue that 4  I enclose in quotation marks ‘development’ of a colonial nature in this work because of its pre-eminent status as largely a transitory instrument to the colonial extractive agenda.

252 

D. MASAKA

this new orientation of hard work is attainable when it is informed by an appropriate epistemology, that is, one that educates learners to be creative and innovative in ways that answer to their respective countries’ development goals.

Development During Colonial Times In speaking of colonial times, the intention is not to say that countries in Africa have gone past these times as it is reasonably believed that colonialism in covert form is still subsisting in many countries in Africa. In this section, I refer to it specifically to designate the period from inception of colonial rule to the time countries in Africa attained ‘independence’ without necessarily accepting that the latter has successfully expunged the former. First, I briefly discuss the general nature of development during the colonial era in Africa, showing that it was predominantly extractive and meant to benefit the colonising nations than the colonies (see Sharkey 2013: 4–5). This had implications on the kind of roles that the indigenous people of Africa played in facilitating this colonial extractive agenda. Thereafter, I show that the indigenous people of Africa were confined to being ancillary employees in colonial governments’ extractive development agenda (see Schler et al. 2009: 287) and not innovators and creators of wealth and employment for their countries. This has continued into the ‘post-colonial’ period and going forward there is need to transform the value of hard work so that it is used in meaningfully overturning the countries in Africa’s stunted development and motivate their sustainable development. It is important to assess the nature of colonial economic activities in order to establish their impact on development in countries in Africa. One narrative that is  predominant in colonial literature is that colonial conquest of Africa was well-meaning as it sought to bring modernity and development to the indigenous people of Africa (Sharkey 2013: 4). Such a claim is contestable because modernity has never been a preserve of one geopolitical centre as is often claimed. It existed in Africa prior to colonial conquest (Táíwò 2010: 8). In fact, there are modernities and not just one originating from the Euro-Western world, as Euro-Western colonisers asserted. However, such self-serving claim to sole authorship of modernity lent justification to their self-ascribed mandate to share it with other geopolitical centres such as Africa on the understanding that they were bereft of it. This was attained through use of force and coercion (Dussel and

13  TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE NOTION OF ‘HARD WORK’ FOR AFRICA’S… 

253

Ibarra-Colado 2006: 496). Countries in Africa were considered beneficiaries of colonial ‘development’. However, reality points to the contrary. The envisaged development seems to have been largely negative in nature in pretty much of what defined the indigenous people of Africa that is, in the terrains of development (Taiwo 1993: 891) as  exemplified by their flourishing and adaptive cultures, knowledges and religions. There were concerted attempts at destroying indigenous people of Africa’s knowledges and religions and replacing them with those of the Euro-Western world (see Ramose 2016: 548; Masaka and Mukungurutse 2017: 210–213). Knowledges and religions of the Euro-Western world continue to dominate the lives of the indigenous people of Africa while theirs remain largely anecdotes in the educational curricula and in human practice. For this reason, it is not debatable that the imposition of the Euro-Western development paradigm in Africa negatively affected the flourishing and pride of place of indigenous knowledges and religions in the lives of the indigenous people of Africa. This has continued to the present day. However, a similar and largely uncontentious conclusion concerning effects of the economic aspect of Euro-Western development paradigm on countries in Africa may not, on the face it, be easily reached, as I will show below. The impact of the economic aspect of the Euro-Western ‘development’ agenda on countries in Africa’s pre-existing economic development paradigms has often divided opinion with some seeing it as having brought positive development, while others cite its extractive nature as indicative of pillaging in order to impoverish them (see Sharkey 2013: 5). I will start by analysing the former. This position is mostly favoured by those who imposed colonial rule in Africa. The narrative that justified the imposition of the colonial ‘development’ paradigm in countries in Africa is that they had none of it and if they had any, it was less sophisticated compared to that of the Euro-Western world. One often cited positive contribution of colonial ‘development’ is that it made tremendous improvements to the standards of living of the indigenous people of Africa spanning education, infrastructure and life expectancy (Sharkey 2013: 2–4). Colonial ‘development’ was thus seen positively by its defenders and even by some among the colonised who might have wrongly perceived instrumental and transitory ‘development’ as an end in itself. However, it would be naïve to think that such assumed successes of colonial ‘development’ were pursued expressly for their own sake. They were unintended consequences of the extractive agenda of the colonial ‘development’ paradigm. As Kenneth

254 

D. MASAKA

W.  Grundy  argues, ‘all colonial policies notwithstanding philanthropic and altruistic justifications and rationalizations, were instituted on the basis of just one criterion: did it benefit the metropolitan interests?’ (1966: 64). This then places the extractive agenda as the primary reason behind the Euro-Western colonisation of Africa. As Walter Rodney rightly notes, ‘by its very nature, colonialism was prejudiced against the establishment of industries in Africa, outside of agriculture and the extractive spheres of mining and timber felling’ (1989: 217). The pillaging of wealth from countries in Africa obviously left them glaringly poorer and the colonising countries richer. Valuables taken from Africa such as minerals, ivory, timber and agricultural produce were exported in raw form and the proceeds from such sales were largely channelled to the capitals of the colonising groups. Value addition in the colonising countries meant that they derived more spinoffs from wealth exported in its raw form from Africa. As a result, countries in Africa did not benefit much from the infrastructure development and possible downstream benefits had those valuables been added value in Africa and proceeds from exports used to improve the human condition within them. The mere fact that colonising groups did not commit themselves to establish requisite infrastructure to add value to what was extracted from African lands meant that the whole enterprise was not meant to benefit the colonies. If indeed it is true that colonisation was meant to benefit countries in Africa as some of its defenders tend to argue, processing and marketing of raw wealth extracted from countries in Africa were supposed to be largely done in Africa and returns from exports invested within it for the benefit of its indigenous people. But this was not the case. The contention that colonial ‘development’ was an impoverishing experience becomes a more compelling one. Even if it is granted that colonial ‘development’ improved the human condition in Africa in some nominal and transitory manner, it still fundamentally fails the moral test because of force and violence used to effect it. Whatever improvements that proceeded from  colonial ‘development’ were outcomes of ethically unjust acts and unworthy of celebrating and thus ethically condemnable. They count for less, given that they were attained at the expense of the humanity of the colonised indigenous people of Africa. This then means that when the nominal and transitory benefits that accrued from the economistic colonial ‘development’ are weighed against what Gyekye (2013: 47) refers to as a ‘cultural whole’, they are found to be significantly inconsequential and could not justify the damage

13  TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE NOTION OF ‘HARD WORK’ FOR AFRICA’S… 

255

it inflicted on the political, social, cultural, moral and intellectual fronts in Africa. This is an ethical issue on account of the suppression of indigenous people of Africa’s development paradigms on a number of fronts in favour of imposed alien extractive development paradigm. Connected to the ethically unjust colonial extractive ‘development’ paradigm is the manner in which the labour of the indigenous people of Africa was deployed in its pursuit. That the indigenous people of Africa cherished and lived by the value of hard work has been well defended elsewhere (Dolamo 2013: 2; Idang 2015: 106; Neelam and Tanksale 2014: 102) and I need not labour over it here. However, it is important to highlight that it is one of the key human values that is considered important to the development agenda of one’s community or nation and is cherished and upheld by the indigenous people of Africa. This is necessary, given some indications in colonial narratives that portray indigenous people of Africa to be by nature lazy, thereby justifying the ethically questionable use of force and coercion in soliciting their labour. This is not meant to dispute that there might have been some among Africans who exhibited the vice of laziness, just like in any other human community in other geopolitical centres (Awoniyi 2015: 7). The fact that it was considered a vice means that it was not something positively upheld and cannot be legitimately considered as their defining character as implied in this literature. Development of whatever nature that proceeds from unjust labour practice is ethically deficient and condemnable. More importantly, once it is accepted that progressive improvement of the human condition in the pre-colonial development agenda was partly anchored of the value of hard work upheld by the indigenous people of Africa, it is necessary to take serious note of the significant changes concerning their place in the colonial ‘development’ agenda. Consistent with the extractive and transitory nature of the colonial ‘development’ agenda in Africa, indigenous labour was assigned marginal roles in colonial economies. They were never considered good enough to assume same roles occupied by people of colonial extraction who received education that enabled them to be the key drivers of the extractive economies. The education that they received prepared them for such ancillary roles as it did not impart in them useful ‘certificated competences’ that enabled them to be at par with the colonisers (Peck 1966: 55, 67; Rodney 1989: 243). By ‘certificated competences’, I mean those skills ratified by colonial governments through issuance of confirmations of attainment. This clarification is important because it has implications for the

256 

D. MASAKA

competences that the indigenous people of Africa have always had even prior to the colonial system of education and skills ratification but which colonisers did not recognise and tried to suppress. These competences underpinned their development agendas (Rodney 1989: 14). However, during colonial rule, they were confined to inferior ancillary work in the economy. The colonial educational curriculum for indigenous people of Africa was designed to impart skills commensurate with their newly defined roles in the extractive development paradigm. This colonially induced change from being key players at the centre of the development agendas of their respective countries to mere ancillary workers for the colonial system has had implications that are being felt even in present times. The idea of hard work that was imposed by colonial governments is unhelpful for a new ‘future’ where the indigenous people of Africa have to revert to being key motivators of their development agenda. I explore this new direction in the next section.

Towards a New Notion of Hard Work In this section, I defend an alternative notion of hard work that uses requisite competences of indigenous people of Africa to find solutions to their respective countries’ development goals. It can hardly be contested that countries in Africa have not significantly deviated from the colonial mode of ‘development’. Similarly, the value of hard work cherished and upheld by the indigenous people of Africa (Ndee 2010: 794; Neelam and Tanksale 2014: 97) largely continues to be confined to being mere workers in economies and less in investing it to innovate solutions to their respective countries’ development agendas. There is need to depart from this colonial mode of utilising this value to one that employs it to offer concrete solutions to challenges and aspirations of countries in Africa. This could be a viable option out of the countries in Africa’s continued stunted development even after attainment of independence from overt colonial rule. I will first show that countries in Africa are still largely mired in colonial mode of ‘development’ despite their widely acclaimed ‘independence’. The same is true of the value of hard work upheld by the indigenous people of Africa. Thereafter, I argue that a plausible notion of hard work devoted to creativity and innovations that answer to Africa’s development aspirations is a necessary way out of stunted development in countries in Africa.

13  TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE NOTION OF ‘HARD WORK’ FOR AFRICA’S… 

257

The attainment of independence by countries in Africa from the mid-­ twentieth century to the end of the twentieth century generally brought hope that they will take a decisive turn from the colonial ‘development’ paradigm that predominantly focused on extraction of raw wealth for exports to other geopolitical centres and in turn focus on transforming it into finished products locally so as to retain within them benefits that accrue from doing so (Sharkey 2013: 2). The quest for the indigenous people of Africa to manage and control the development agenda of their respective countries has been the rallying point of struggles for independence. However, this has not been fulfilled. Countries in Africa continue to seek capital investments through direct foreign investment and expertise to extract minerals and other forms of raw wealth from their lands. Marginal value addition is done for limited extracted wealth. Substantive processing and value addition often take place outside the continent for the benefit of those geopolitical centres. Even though some governments in Africa plead for value addition to be done within their countries, they seem to lack the power or will to insist on that policy direction or seem to fear that persisting with it may drive the investors to other countries within the continent that do not insist on these conditions. While some countries in Africa take this viable position, ‘the obvious recourse of value-­ added production is persistently blocked by tariffs and regulations designed to protect industries in developed countries’ (Dorward 1996: 5). More substantively, the extractive colonial ‘development’ paradigm continues to thrive, albeit under the impression of non-constraining trade and investment between the Euro-Western world and countries in Africa. The institutional structures that have sustained this development paradigm remain largely in place (Tadei 2017: 2). For instance, the extractive development agenda still remains in place and in this way investors from other geopolitical centres especially from ‘former’ colonial powers are entrusted with helping in driving the development agendas of countries in Africa. Not much is being done to ensure that the indigenous people of Africa are its prime drivers through devising innovative solutions to their respective challenges and aspirations. The educational paradigms that have been used since colonial times have educated indigenous people of Africa to be workers in the colonial extractive ‘development’ agenda largely remain in place and continue to prepare indigenous workers to be of service to potential investors. The current situation is an anathema to realistic development that weans countries in Africa from excessive dependency on other geopolitical centres for their own development agendas.

258 

D. MASAKA

This calls for attention to do things differently if countries in Africa are to have sustainable development driven largely by their own respective innovative solutions to their own development goals. Focus ought to be on ensuring the value of hard work is transformed so that it is refocused to devising solutions to challenges and aspirations of countries in Africa. It ought to be put to good use. The indigenous people of Africa ought to refocus their energies towards devising indigenous solutions to their own development challenges. The hard work that they live by can usefully be invested in thinking through the challenges and aspirations of countries in Africa and attempt to offer concrete and sustainable answers to them. This could be the only way that countries in Africa can overturn their dependency on other geopolitical centres and place responsibilities in doing so in their own people. Dependency on foreign investors can only bring fleeting development as they are pre-eminently focused of extracting raw wealth for use usually outside of Africa (Lauer 2017: 4). The idea is to refocus the energies of indigenous people of Africa so that they innovatively exploit raw wealth for the benefit of their respective countries. This involves investing in infrastructure that enables value addition and processing of raw wealth into finished products before export. When this development trajectory is indigenously driven, its proceeds will largely benefit countries in Africa. This might prove to a difficult and daunting path to development in Africa, especially when one considers that the dominant narrative seems to point to countries in Africa’s inability to chart and sustain their own development agendas without the involvement of capital and expertise from other geopolitical centres. This can be equated to what Gikandi (2010: xii) calls ‘Afro-pessimism’. Such pessimism misses the fact that the indigenous people of Africa have always had their own ways of improving their conditions (Gikandi 2010: xii) through their own innovativeness and creativity. These skills were, however, supressed by the colonial regimes who contentiously considered indigenous people of Africa good enough for marginal roles in the colonial extractive economy. Such pessimism about their abilities to exploit their own resources for their own benefit was grounded on a contestable colonial narrative that was meant to justify as virtue the acts of plunder of African resources under the guise of improving the condition of life of Africans. The indigenous people of Africa ought to overturn this pessimism by focusing attention on using the hard work they uphold in order to improve conditions of life in their own countries. It might be a difficult path, especially in light of the fact that the pessimism

13  TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE NOTION OF ‘HARD WORK’ FOR AFRICA’S… 

259

might have been internalised by some indigenous people of Africa such that it is taken as a true gospel. Nevertheless, this could be the only way that may bring enduring development to countries in Africa that are facing stunted development. As I will show in the next section, such a transformation of hard work cannot be assured if the epistemological paradigm informing the educational curriculum in countries in Africa retains a colonial mode.

The Need for an Appropriate Epistemology In this section, I argue that a new orientation of hard work that I defended in the previous section ought to be devouted to the attainment of  an indigenous-inspired development trajectory. This is only possible when the colonial educational curriculum that is still used in many countries in Africa is transformed so that it imparts necessary competences that are necessary for an indigenous-inspired development paradigm. I note that others have made submissions on the need for knowledge imparted in Africa to be useful to its development agenda, that is, knowledge that imparts useful competences that can be used to improve various aspects of the human condition (Nabudere 2006: 7–10; Balogun 2008: 103–110; Metz 2009: 518; Oppong 2013: 34–35; Ugwuanyi 2013: 43–50). However, I realise that they have not explicitly invoked this idea to foreground the value of hard work that promises an indigenous-inspired development trajectory as I do in this chapter. My task is to ensure that the value of hard work engenders these competences which are useful for the sustainable development of countries in Africa. Production of new forms of knowledge that refocus hard work to the arenas of creativity and innovation is a necessary prerequisite to sustainable development that countries in Africa yearn. This means that the value of hard work that has been corrupted by the colonial extractive development paradigm ought to be transformed so that it is pre-eminently directed at acquiring creative and innovative skills that practically answer to the challenges and aspirations of the indigenous people of Africa. Can the colonial epistemology enable such a fundamental change? My answer is a resounding, ‘No’. There has been scepticism about the pedigree of knowledge of a colonial extraction to motivate an indigenous-inspired development agenda in countries in Africa. This scepticism is justified, especially when one notices that it was imposed with a purpose to conquer indigenous people of Africa and offer them marginal competences to facilitate colonial plunder of

260 

D. MASAKA

African wealth (Ugwuanyi 2013: 54). Knowledge that cannot be put in service of the development agenda of the indigenous people of Africa is not fit for purpose (Balogun 2008: 106). It is a source of worry that such knowledge remains generally predominant in the educational curricula of countries in Africa (Masaka 2018: 289) at a time when voices are growing louder for knowledge to be a source and a primary instigator of their own development. In order to make this a reality, knowledge consumed in educational terrains expectedly becomes subject of intense focus. As a result, there is consensus among those sympathetic to the cause of indigenous-­inspired development that there is need for an appropriate epistemology that engenders necessary skills to initiate and sustain such development (Oppong 2013: 35; Ugwuanyi 2013: 54). This is a necessary turn because any knowledge paradigm is useful to those who produce and impart it. This is true of colonial knowledge imposed on countries in Africa whose purpose was basically to advance the colonial agenda (Nabudere 2006: 8; see also Balogun 2008: 109). Its imperial and outward focus cannot be useful to a new trajectory of development that is indigenous-­inspired and meant to empower countries in Africa. The focus then is to construct knowledge using indigenous terms and frameworks: knowledge that inspires a new focus on how development ought to be conceived and approached in ways that are different from the deceptive colonial ‘development’ paradigm. For this reason, Messay Kebede (2011: 107) is right to say that ‘a serious and forceful will to develop cannot arise while the internalized Eurocentric stereotypes keep telling Africans that they are not equipped for human progress.’ The imposed knowledge that demoralizes indigenous people of Africa’s capacity to institute viable development within their own respective countries and using their own paradigms ought to be expunged and replaced with one that imparts qualities that resonate with their development agendas. This knowledge ought to impart innovative and creative potentials to learners. As Seth Oppong (2013: 34) simply states, ‘knowledge that is useful for development is one that can help solve societal problems.’ Such knowledge can effectively serve its purpose if it is created on terms and epistemological frameworks of those who aspire to be in control of their own development agendas. Such a transformed knowledge is necessary in transforming the value of hard work that is upheld by the indigenous people of Africa in ways that speak to the need for indigenous-inspired development agenda similar to

13  TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE NOTION OF ‘HARD WORK’ FOR AFRICA’S… 

261

how it was deployed prior to colonial conquest. In light of this focus, hard work will primarily be focused on finding answers to problems and aspirations of countries in Africa. It is time for them to stop appropriating responsibilities to experts from elsewhere to offer answers to their own problems and aspirations if they are to sustainably and realistically attain their development goals. This is a necessary remedy to ‘the self-­promotional rhetoric generated by Western scientific research cartels [that] sustain the pretence that Africans require foreign technical wherewithal and initiative to meet their development goals’ (Lauer 2017: 3). There is need to link hard work to requisite creative and innovative skills that are useful in grounding indigenous-inspired development in countries in Africa. This is important, especially in light of the demeaning status ascribed to hard work of indigenous people of Africa in the colonial extractive development agenda. Hard work in Africa ought to take this necessary decolonial turn and be refocused to using innovative and creative skills imparted through an appropriate epistemology to motivate indigenous development. In so doing, hard work ought to cease being considered as good enough for offering ancillary roles to development experts from elsewhere. Countries in Africa ought to educate their own experts who can work hard to create and innovate solutions suited to the development goals of their respective countries. This will assure them more authentic and sustainable development that speak to their challenges and aspirations. However, a rejoinder to the thesis defended in this work could be that political corruption or rent-seeking behaviour and general bad governance by some governments in Africa can impede efforts to motivate indigenous-­ inspired development. There is credence to this view. These vices are common in some countries in Africa and as Morris Szeftel (1998: 223) notes, ‘it is in Africa that corruption (along with ethnic conflict) is seen as “the political disease” by indigenous and foreign observers alike.’ The argument might be that these vices could jeopardise their prospects of charting their own success stories. Indeed, there is reason to believe that countries in Africa have not developed as much as they wished not because of the persistence of the colonial extractive economy and its accompanying epistemologies of conquest only. Bad practices mentioned above have significantly contributed to their stunted development. As a result, these vices ought to be expunged if the indigenous-driven development that I have defended in this work is to be realistically attained.

262 

D. MASAKA

Conclusion In this work, I have defended an alternative notion of hard work that the indigenous people of Africa could ideally adopt if they are to help their countries to successfully emerge from stunted development. This is necessary because the value of hard work that motivated the development agendas of African countries prior to colonisation was given a new meaning and role during the colonial era. It was largely confined to ancillary roles in the colonial extractive economy. This has not changed much even after the purported attainment of independence by countries in Africa. The point is, if countries in Africa are to motivate their own development in an authentic and sustainable way, there is an urgent need to refocus the value of hard work so that it is development oriented. However, for this to be successfully done, an appropriate epistemology that imparts competences that speak to the challenges and aspirations of the indigenous people of Africa ought to be constructed and imparted to learners.

References Awoniyi, S. 2015. African Cultural Values: The Past, Present and Future. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 17 (1): 1–13. Balogun, O.A. 2008. Philosophy: What Social Relevance? Philosophia Africana 11 (2): 103–116. Dolamo, R. 2013. Botho/Ubuntu: The Heart of African ethics. Scriptura 112 (1): 1–10. Dorward, D. 1996. Africa and Development in the 21st Century. Development Bulletin 37: 4–7. Dussel, E., and E.  Ibarra-Colado. 2006. Globalization, Organization and the Ethics of Liberation. Organization 13 (4): 489–508. Gikandi, S. 2010. Foreword; In Praise of Afro-Optimism: Toward a Poetics of Survival. In Hard Work, Hard Times: Global Volatility and African Subjectivities, ed. A.M. Makhulu, B.A. Buggenhagen, and S. Jackson, xi–xvi. UC Berkeley: GAIA Books. Grundy, K.W. 1966. African Explanations of Underdevelopment: The Theoretical Basis for Political Action. The Review of Politics 22 (1): 62–75. Gyekye, K. 2013. Philosophy, Culture and Vision: African Perspectives, Selected Essays. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers. Idang, G.E. 2015. African Culture and Values. Phronimon 16 (2): 97–111. Jonck, P., F. Van der Walt, and N. Sobayeni. 2017. Investigating the Relationship between Work Values and Work Ethics: A South African Perspective.

13  TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE NOTION OF ‘HARD WORK’ FOR AFRICA’S… 

263

SA Journal of Human Resource Management/SA Tydskrif vir Menslikehulpbronbestuur 15: 1–11. Kebede, M. 2011. African Development and the Primacy of Mental Decolonisation. In Philosophy and African Development: Theory and Practice, ed. L.  Keita, 97–114. Dakar: CODESRIA. Lauer, H. 2017. Reasserting African Critical Authority in the National Development Picture. Tanzania Journal of Sociology 2 & 3: 1–17. Malunga, C. 2014. Identifying and Understanding African Norms and Values that Support Endogenous Development in Africa. Development in Practice 24 (5–6): 623–636. Makhulu, A.M., B.A. Buggenhagen, and S. Jackson. 2010. Introduction. In Hard Work, Hard Times: Global Volatility and African Subjectivities, ed. A.M.  Makhulu, B.A.  Buggenhagen, and S.  Jackson, 1–27. UC Berkeley: GAIA Books. Masaka, D., and S.Y. Mukungurutse. 2017. Confronting the Exclusive Dominance of Christianity in Zimbabwe’s Advanced Level Divinity Syllabus through Africanisation. Alternation 19: 206–231. Masaka, D. 2018. The Prospects of Ending Epistemicide in Africa: Some Thoughts. Journal of Black Studies 49 (3): 284–301. Metz, T. 2009. Higher Education, Knowledge for Its Own Sake, and an African Moral Theory. Studies in Philosophy and Education 28: 517–536. Molefe, M. 2016. African Ethics and Partiality. Phronimon 17 (1): 104–122. Nabudere, D.W. 2006. Towards an Afrokology of Knowledge Production and African Regeneration. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies 1 (1): 7–32. Neelam, N., and D. Tanksale. 2014. A Critical Assessment of South African Work Values for Constructive Corporate Partnerships. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 157: 91–102. Ndee, H.S. 2010. Pre-Colonial East Africa: History, Culture and Physical Activity. The International Journal of the History of Sport 27 (5): 780–797. Nkrumah, K. 1965. Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. New  York: International Publishers. Oppong, S. 2013. Indigenizing Knowledge for Development: Epistemological and Pedagogical Approaches. Africa 43 (2): 34–50. Peck, A.J.A. 1966. Rhodesia Accuses. Salisbury: The Three Sisters. The United Nations Development Agenda: Development for All. 2007. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. New  York: United Nations Publications. Ramose, M.B. 2016. Teacher and Student with a Critical pan-epistemic Orientation: An Ethical Necessity for Africanising the Educational Curriculum in Africa. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 546–555.

264 

D. MASAKA

Rathbone, R. 1981. The Legacy of Empire. In Europe and Africa: Issues in Post-­ colonial Relations, ed. M.  Cornell, 1–20. London: Overseas Development Institute. Rodney, W. 1989. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers. Schler, L., L. Bethlehem, and G. Sabar. 2009. Rethinking Labour in Africa, Past and Present. African Identities 7 (3): 287–298. Serequeberhan, T. 2003. The African Anti-Colonial Struggle: An Effort at Reclaiming History. Philosophia Africana 6 (1): 47–58. Sharkey, H.J. 2013. African Colonial States. In The Oxford Handbook of Modern African history, ed. J.  Parker and R.  Reid, 151–170. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Szeftel, M. 1998. Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption & the Governance Agenda. Review of African Political Economy 25 (76): 221–240. Tadei, F. 2017. Measuring Extractive Institutions: Colonial Trade and Price Gaps in French Africa. EHES Working Papers in Economic History 109: 1–49. Taiwo, O. 1993. Colonialism and Its Aftermath: The Crisis of Knowledge Production. Callaloo 16 (4): 891–908. Táíwò, O. 2010. How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ugwuanyi, L.O. 2013. Advancing Human Science in Africa through Fresh Theoretical Insight. St Augustine Papers 14 (2): 43–63.

CHAPTER 14

Social Development and Leadership in Africa Noah Pashapa

Introduction Discussion of the role of servant leadership in Africa’s quest to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has been introduced by outlining (a) the gap in development discourse that this chapter sought to address, (b) a hypothesis that it sought to validate, (c) a methodology that it adopted and (d) a definition of development that it preferred. This has been done in order to introduce a theoretical framework that informed the research and writing of this chapter and its overall objective. Problem Statement: Research and publications by African scholars who have investigated the conceptualization, articulation, and evaluation of social development on the African continent have generally not paid adequate attention to the interrogation of the co-relation between leadership and social development. This chapter seeks to contribute to this discourse by arguing for the significant impact that transformational servant leadership would bring to transformational social development in Africa.

N. Pashapa (*) Department of Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_14

265

266 

N. PASHAPA

Hypothesis: Cultivating and inculcating the adoption and practice of transformational servant leadership culture, at general functional (emergent) and official positional (appointed) levels of leadership, in African societies with their public and private institutions would enhance transformational social development. This would be the case given the high likelihood that leadership, whether bad or good, is the most significant determining factor, among other factors, that hinders or enhances sustainable social development. Methodology: A method that combines the desk-top and participant observation-based analysis was deemed most appropriate to this study and applied throughout. The chapter employed an evaluative study of views proffered by selected scholars on development in Africa in light of this writer’s proposition that the practice of transformational servant leadership culture at general functional and positional official levels of leadership within society with its public and private institutions is a critical factor to the success and sustainability of transformational social development on the African continent. Scholars on development in Africa whose views were selected for evaluation are Dambisa Moyo, Sally Mathews and Achille Mbembe, all with perspectives on the subject matter that have significantly influenced African development researchers and authors over the past 10 years. Definition of Key Terms Social Development: This chapter’s working definition of development is informed by a definition proffered by the United Nations Research Institute on Social Development (www.unrisd.org/flaship 2016) which focuses on transformational social development. It is a comprehensive definition of social development which was coined 20 years after the decade of United Nations Summits, on various global social development issues, held at, Rio-de-Janeiro in 1992, at Cairo in 1994, at Beijing in 1995 and at Copenhagen in 2009. This definition of transformational social development as a process that results in improvements in human well-being and social relations that are equitable and consistent with principles of participatory governance is poignantly applicable to a discussion on the correlation between leadership and social development on the African continent. The comprehensiveness of the UNRISD’s definition of transformational social development is identifiable in that it includes (i) promotion of

14  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA 

267

material achievements such as good health and education as well as access to goods and services that are necessary for decent living, (ii) promotion of social-cultural values such as security, dignity and the ability of individuals to be recognized as part of a community, (iii) promotion of political achievements such as participation, representation and agency, (iv) promotion of people-empowering and liberating changes in social structures, institutions and relations, (v) transition to sustainable production and consumption patterns, (vi) changes in economic structures and relations in order to increase productivity and equitable distribution of its benefits and (vii) pursuit of developmental outcomes through just and participatory processes that leave no one behind. Such transformational social development is both people-centred and planet-sensitive while it is guided by values of equal rights and social justice (www.unrisd.org/flaship 2016). Transformational social development: Transformational social development entails sustainable poverty reduction and development growth through inclusive participation by most citizens at all levels of social strata in transformational development actions. Such inclusive participation in transformational development actions by transformational servant leaders and most citizens would have the effect of preventing social development notions, actions and institutions from being counter-productively captured by sectarian interests of Western-sponsored NGO commercialized development industry functionaries or those of corrupt indigenous African government officials and their counterparts in the private sectors. Such inclusive participation by most citizens in transformational development actions would also have the effect of promoting locally driven and selective customization, contextualization and adaptation of value adding aspects of Western and or Eastern foreign development aid to African concrete historical, socio-cultural and political-economic conditions. As has already been noted, the intersectional nature of local African historical-political and social-economic conditions, whereby development needs and development potential vary, may not validate the adoption of a totalitarian or fundamentalist rejection of Western development aid models as proposed by post-development theory. Transformational servant leadership: It is important to note that leadership is a complex concept which continues to have different meanings for different scholars who cannot come up with a common definition of what it is. It is generally defined as a process that entails an individual, who influences a group of followers to pursue and accomplish common goals. Leadership operates at both general functional (emergent) and positional

268 

N. PASHAPA

official (appointed) levels in society with its public and private institutions. Most community-based leaders are examples of general functional (emergent) leaders by virtue of their earned levels of influence within those communities, yet they do not occupy any formal position or office of leadership authority by appointment or election. Government ministers, parliamentarians and councillors, on the other hand, are examples of positional official (appointed) leaders who may be selected, elected or appointed. This chapter preferred a definition of transformational servant leadership that is distinct from alternative models of leadership such as adaptive leadership, spiritual leadership, servant leadership, authentic leadership, ethical leadership, and trans-cultural leadership by its distinctive biases. These biases include (i) generating high levels of trust and credibility from followers towards leaders’ development visions inspired by the leaders as they exemplify and model high standards of morality, responsibility, competency, meritocracy and quality (excellence), (ii) serving, liberating and empowering followers for responsible agency through interactive leader-­ follower processes, (iii) managing socio-cultural and political-economic changes that are related to transformational social development innovatively, productively and sustainably, (iv) serving and influencing followers to internalize commitment to a shared compelling social development vision, assumptions, meanings and values in pursuit of common interests, (v) serving and motivating followers to transcend selfish self-interest (in contrast to enlightened self-interest) in order to serve the common good and shared developmental vision, (vi) stimulating followers to be innovative, global-local (glocal) thinkers who are able to strategically engage with and customize both Western and Eastern development aid to local African conditions and challenges, and (vii) giving particularized attention to followers’ aspirations and needs in order to inspire them to self-­actualize through expression of higher levels of morality, quality, responsibility, competency and meritocracy. Pseudo-transformational leadership: Pseudo-transformational leadership is an aberration of transformational servant leadership that could easily be confused with it. Though it expresses high levels of charisma that influences followers to pursue a shared compelling vision, that vision often serves the leader’s personal or empire-building interests. Though it inculcates trust and collaboration in followers, such impulses are directed towards the leader’s personal, cabal or sectarian interests. Though it motivates followers to transcend self-interest, such enthusiasm is directed towards serving the interests of a personality cult-like leader and his/her

14  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA 

269

elitist inner circle. Though it accords particularized attention to followers, it is not with a view to inspiring self-actualization in them through expression of higher levels of competency, meritocracy, responsibility, morality and quality but rather to re-enforce in them allegiance to the person and personal interests of the leader with his/her lackeys.

African Scholars and the Correlation Between Development and Leadership Dambisa Moyo (2009) has argued that development aid has harmed Africa and that it should be stopped, thus echoing the rallying cry of the ‘post-development’ theory of development. She says, ‘in the past fifty years more than $1 trillion in development related aid has been transferred from rich countries to Africa’ (p. xviii) and goes on to argue that ‘in spite of this aid, Africa’s situation has not improved but rather regressed’. The central thesis of her book titled Dead Aid focuses on aid itself as the cause of an unending vicious cycle of economic, political and social problems that keep Africa in a perpetual state of poverty. However, no reference is made at to the correlation between leadership and social development, especially for the African continent, where most political and economic problems have been linked to the need for ‘good leadership’ though understood in multiple ways. Moyo observes that long-term global effects of aid are contrary to their intended goals, resulting in the reduction of economic growth, increase in poverty and resultant demand for more aid. In her view, the adoption of private sector-based market-driven tools in the form of concessional loans and grants to African governments, as alternatives to conventional foreign aid, can enable poor countries to finance social development efficiently, resulting in poverty reduction and sustainable growth through opening up of economic opportunities to ordinary Africans, beyond elite advantaged population groups (Moyo 2009: 76). Though she does not interrogate the correlation between leadership and social development, it is my view that Moyo implies its relevance by focusing on government-to-government aid as opposed to humanitarian aid and by arguing that such aid is easy money that fosters corruption and distorts economies, thus creating a culture of dependency and economic laziness. These factors that she raises are in my view essential manifestations of the role of bad or good leadership in social, political and economic development. Her appeal for change in the culture of development from

270 

N. PASHAPA

conventional aid to private sector-driven development aid tools implies the role of development culture change agents at the level of political or business lead-leaders in society, given the essential role of such leaders as creators and changers of a group’s defining assumptions, beliefs, ideas and values (zeit-geist) in society, in general, and corporate organizations, in particular. Schein (1997: 5) has highlighted this role of leadership by saying, ‘…leadership and culture (i.e. dominant ideas, beliefs, values and assumptions) are conceptually intertwined’. I describe leaders who are founders or birthers of new movements or organizations based on new or renewed visions, core values and strategies as founder-lead-leaders around whom support leaders soon gather and coalesce in pursuit of the same vision and core values. Commenting on the role of founding leaders in providing new solutions to problems and influencing followers’ cultures in the context of corporate organization communities, Schein goes on to say: Because they had the original idea, they will typically have their own notion, based on their own cultural history and personality of how to fulfil the idea. Founder-lead-leaders not only have a high level of self-confidence and determination but they will typically have strong assumptions about the nature of the world, the role that the organisations play in that world, the nature of human nature and relationships, how truth is arrived at and how to manage time and space. (Schein 1997: 212–213)

Moyo’s argument for social development models to transition from conventional foreign aid to private sector market-driven ones reflects the need for significant change in development culture, itself a process that requires a key role that leadership plays, yet she omits to interrogate this factor throughout her captivating book. It is likely that she omits mention of the correlation between leadership and development due to lack of exposure to studies in leadership theory and practice, given her focus on the correlation between development and economics. Her omission of this critical leadership factor in her analysis may also be due to the fact that at the time of her writing China had not emerged in the public domain as the second largest global economy offering alternative Eastern development aid to African countries, hitherto beholden to Western development aid. Consideration of this emergent role of China as a sponsor of alternative Eastern development aid based on different bilateral or multi-lateral terms from those associated with Western development aid brings to the

14  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA 

271

fore the significant role of leadership in promoting innovative, global-local thinking, which meaningfully customizes either Western or Eastern development aid to local African conditions and challenges. Sally Matthews (2018) in a chapter titled ‘Alternatives to Development in Africa’ in a book titled Recentering Africa in International Relations (pp. 167–186) helpfully interrogates theoretical discourse on alternative conceptualizations of development in Africa in a way that, I want to argue, implies an underlying correlation between leadership and development though the explicit mention of the leadership factor is missing from it. It is most likely that she omits mention of the correlation between development and leadership due to lack of exposure to studies in leadership theory and practice given her focus on development discourse. She flags pro-­ capitalist modernization theories of development in Africa that were dominant in the 1950s, 1960s, 1980s and 1990s which perceived the world dualistically in terms of developed advanced countries contrasted with underdeveloped backward countries requiring to be assisted towards modernization through capitalist models of development. Matthews also highlights counteracting dependency conceptualizations of development by left-wing Latin American and African development theorists who argued that the underdevelopment of poor former colonies was the effect of capitalist imperialism which could be efficiently addressed only by socialist programmes. It is my submission that such capitalist development theories were reflective of and assumed cultural heritages loaded with ideas, beliefs, values and assumptions promoted by general functional and positional official leaders who were influenced by imperialist capitalist white supremacist notions such as ‘the white man’s burden’ and ‘manifest-destiny’. It follows that the efficient and effective correction of the negative effects of such development models that are loaded with imperialism capitalism, notions through the adoption of corrective socialist programmes, presumes the role of leaders as creators and changers of socio-cultural and politico-economic development cultures. Such leaders, at general functional and positional official levels on the African continent, would guarantee that such socialist development policies and programmes did not degenerate into cover ups for contra-development actions of leaders who act like corrupt elitist oligarchs and kleptocrats. This observation argues for the correlation between leadership and development which I am arguing to be an essential aspect of development discourse that has been largely omitted, as evidenced in Matthews’ narration of its history. She observes that neo-liberal approaches which regard

272 

N. PASHAPA

Western-type economic growth as the fulcrum of development have dominated development discourse beyond the post-Cold War era development theories such as basic needs approaches, human development approaches, sustainable development approaches and participatory or autonomous development approaches. Matthews then rounds off her overview of the history of development discourse by highlighting the ‘post-development’ theory of the late 1980s which instead of proposing newer approaches to development, pronounced it to be harmful to developing countries, as it brought new incomparable problems to African countries and therefore to be rejected (Rahnema 2010: 378). Though post-development theory was initially largely championed by Latin American scholars, its applicability to the African continent soon became apparent to African scholars and development planners and practitioners. Post-development theory posited that what were really required are alternatives to development rather than merely other alternative ways to development. It promoted alternative ways of understanding the African experience outside of the capitalist development stereotypical narrative of Africa as a problem site. It highlighted the harm done to African developing countries by neo-liberal capitalist conceptualizations of development which presented the Euro-Anglo-American world as the quintessential model of development which resulted in African countries not being defined on their own terms, as spaces of meaningful social and political development, but rather in terms of their deviation from, and their poverty in light of that model and as sites of failure. It is equally likely that Matthews, as is the case with Moyo, omits mention of the correlation between leadership and development due to lack of exposure to studies in leadership theory and practice. This omission is also likely due to the fact that at the time of her writing China had not emerged on the global scene as the second largest global economy that offers alternative Eastern development aid to African countries hitherto beholden to Western development aid. Consideration of this emergent role of China as a sponsor of development aid that is based on different bilateral or multi-lateral terms from those associated with Western development aid brings to the fore the significant role of leadership in promoting innovative, global-local thinking that meaningfully customizes either Western or Eastern development aid to local African conditions and challenges. Mbembe (2001: 8) summarized this scenario when he said, ‘African politics and economics have been condemned to appear in social theory only as the sign of a lack’. In my view, Mbembe’s comments refer to the

14  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA 

273

retrogressive effect on the development of cultural arts in South Africa. His pre-occupation with the dominance of Western neo-liberal capitalist donor-sponsorship of development and their retrogressive effect on the development of cultural arts in South Africa strongly implies the correlation between leadership and development even though he does not flag it. To this effect, Mbembe said, ‘we can keep dressing up the unlimited power of the donors and their money and the material poverty of the recipients in the fancy language of “partnerships”, “empowerment” or even “friendship”’. All these words will not mask the brutality of the encounter between those who have the money and those who have some good ideas but no money. South Africa has the means to develop a powerful cultural policy. But the country profoundly lacks imagination. It could fund by itself a major Biennale in the global South (Mbembe 2009). In my view, the lack of imagination that Mbembe decries is essentially a function of leadership, that is, influencing groups to pursue liberative and transformative shared visions and common objectives in society or institutions, yet Mbembe’s interrogation of development models characteristically omits factoring in this correlation between development and leadership. Matthews, whose ideas I outlined above, further observes post-­ development theorists’ wariness of how such capitalist-imperialist-oriented discourse on development tends to downplay the negative impact of the slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism in creating the problems of hunger, conflict, poverty and inequality that development seeks to address. She observes key concerns of post-development theorists with Western neo-liberal development theories, that is, (i) blaming developing countries for their under-development due to intrinsic flaws, (ii) obscuring the international power relations between rich and poor nations that perpetuate global inequalities, (iii) holding up Western countries as models of what it means to be developed (Ziai 2016: 32), (iv) unfavourably comparing Africa with the West rather than seeking to understand African experiences on their own terms, and (v) reducing Africa’s role in international affairs to that of receiving advice and assistance. This post-colonial thrust of post-development theory, which calls out these colonial elements of capitalist development, led its proponents to focus on the failure of the very concept of development itself, which they described as dead, rather than the failure of mere development policies and practices. It adopted a characteristic pre-occupation with the endorsement of local, traditional, indigenous heritage-based knowledge systems, as sources of knowledge that should inform development designs for

274 

N. PASHAPA

Africa, while rejecting ‘the desirability of a western way of life (as a standard for development objectives)…describing the West as an impersonal machine devoid of spirit’ (Latouche 1993: 11). Hence post-development theory argued against neo-liberal capitalist development policies and processes with preference to anchoring alternative development designs and models with indigenous-based knowledge systems and traditions of those societies that had hitherto been stereotypically framed as ‘underdeveloped’. I contend that these post-colonial concerns of post-development theory imply the significance of the role of leadership that would drive the culture transition and the innovation necessary to change from neo-liberal capitalist development culture and models to alternative development cultures and models that would be customized and adapted so as to be underpinned by local African indigenous knowledge-based systems and traditions. Post-development theory discourse omits this key factor, that is, the correlation between leadership and development in its critique of capitalist development. The importance of this correlation to post-­ development theory is further brought to the fore by the failure by post-­ development theorists, either by design or by default, to posit positive practical models that such alternatives to conventional development practices would take. Though some Latin American proponents of post-development theory such as Escobar (1995: 222) argued that it would be inappropriate to proscribe abstract macro-models and grand alternatives to development for variegated geo-spatial, politico-economic and socio-cultural contexts, this failure resulted in post-development theory failing to proceed beyond its critique. I would argue that if post-development theory had factored into its discourse the correlation between leadership and development, which recognizes the role of leadership in conceptualizing, analysing, customizing, adapting, mobilizing for and applying development alternatives to specific African concrete historical, cultural, political and economic situations beyond capitalist development policies and practices, then there would not have been such an ‘impasse’ or ‘failure’. My main argument in this chapter is that the correlation between leadership and development that has largely been omitted by scholars in development discourse and post-development theory would have, if factored in, supplied a significant determinative factor both towards efforts to innovate, adapt, customize and contextualize both Western capitalist and Eastern socialist development models to the African context and towards

14  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA 

275

the search for positive, practical models with which to implement alternatives to development. Leadership, especially transformational servant leadership, can supply the significant determinative factor that facilitates transitioning from one set of development assumptions, beliefs, values and models to another.

Leadership as a Key Factor in Development George B. Ayittey (2005, 2006) is an African scholar whose critique of major pitfalls in current leadership practices in Africa pertinently reflects on the correlation between leadership and development, though it is not one of his focus variables. Ayittey reads more like an African scholar given to valorizing and pandering to Western development benchmarks and development aid while fault-finding towards Africa and Africans. Such fault-finding is based on an a-historical analysis that overlooks counterproductive effects of over 500 years of Western slavery and colonialism and of Western development aid that have been brought to the fore by post-development theorists. Rather than blame development failure in Africa on Western capitalist development models, as is done by development theorists, Ayittey correctly blames Western donors for complicity with bad or pseudo-­ transformational African leaders as the predominant contributory factor to development failure in Africa. He also highlights additional contributory internal factors which will be highlighted later. He correctly highlights bad leadership as a significant factor contributing to ‘development-stagnation’ in Africa during the first 50 years of independence in African States despite the development aid made available by former colonizing Western nations. Compared to post-development theorists, who argued that Western capitalist development aid in fact reinforced the problems that it claimed to solve on the African continent, Ayittey lets the West off with a mere ‘telling-off’. He does this by describing the West’s various anti-development policies and actions as being ‘blinded by its own interests, racial hyper-sensitivity and guilt over the iniquities of the slave trade and colonialism’ and that they ‘will be tempted once again to oblige’ to the demands for more development aid from corrupt African positional official government leaders. In a helpful way that inadvertently reflects the correlation between leadership and development, Ayittey posits two schools of thought characteristic of attempts by African opinion leaders to explain the apparent

276 

N. PASHAPA

failure of Western development aid in Africa. One such school of thought is what he describes as the ‘externalists’, comprising African political leaders, intellectuals and radical thinkers while the other school are the ‘externalists’ comprising scholars who focused on external factors and blamed everyone else for Africa’s development failure except Africans themselves. He portrays Ali Mazrui’s (1987) perspective that everything that has gone wrong in Africa should be blamed on Western colonialism and imperialism as an example of an African scholar and radical intellectual subscribing to this ‘externalists’ account. Ayittey (1992) cites African political leaders such as Mobutu se Seseko of Zaire, Moi of Kenya, Rawlings of Ghana and Mugabe of Zimbabwe as examples of influential African politicians falling into the same externalists’ school of thought. Ayittey’s ‘internalists’ are a new generation of angry Africans who emphasized internal factors as having been more determinative in shaping Africa’s development failure than were the external factors. What is instructive for this chapter is the essential link to the role of leadership and its impact on development in Africa that is evident in the nature of the internal factors leading to Africa’s development failure that are associated with the ‘internalists’. The list includes (i) misguided leadership, (ii) misgovernance, (iii) systemic corruption, (iv) capital flight, (v) economic mismanagement, (vi) declining investment, (vii) collapsed infrastructure, (viii) decayed institutions, (ix) senseless civil wars, (x) political tyranny, (xi) violation of human rights and (xii) military vandalism. It is important to observe that all of these development failure factors are effects of leadership within the development matrix, thus validating Ayittey’s assertion that the question of leadership is at the heart of development failure in Africa. To buttress his emphasis on the significant determinative impact of leadership on development in African independent states, Ayittey quotes the famous Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe, who subscribed to a similar view while commenting on Nigeria’s development failure. Chinua Achebe said: The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or water or climate or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which is the hallmark of true leadership. We have lost the 20th century; are we bent on our children losing the 21st century? (Achebe 1985: 3)

14  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA 

277

This resonates fittingly with the argument advanced in this chapter on the significant determinative impact of leadership on development and how that this critical correlation has been largely omitted or overlooked by African scholars on social development. However, the trend among many Africans today, as evident on social media, is that most Africans blame development failure in African states on bad and corrupt leadership, which they cite as the major determinative factor for this condition. Bad leadership is at the centre of internal factors which modern Africans decry as the most determinative of development failure in Africa. Such factors include (i) defective political and economic systems with power centred in one leader, ostensibly to effectively resist foreign exploitation, (ii) reduction of governments to mafia-like syndicates, with government officials and their lackeys pillaging the national treasury and the country’s natural resources with impunity rather than serve the people, (iii) capture and subversion by rich and ruling African elites of government institutions such as banks, media houses, the justice systems, the security establishment and the civil service, (iv) fatal duelling for political power and control, (v) undermining of meritocracy, rule of law, property rights, accountability, transparency and administrative capacity, (vi) parcelling out of key government positions to presidents’ and prime ministers’ tribes people, cronies and loyal supporters, and (vii) emergence of underground economies and black markets that are often fuelled by the rich and ruling syndicates and their runners. It can be argued that the aforementioned development failure factors are often synonymous with bad or pseudo-transformational leadership characterized as it is by (i) despotic, egomaniacal personality-cult-type leaders in whose person the destiny and fortunes of the nation depend, (ii) entrepreneurship-type acquisitive kleptocratic political leaders who prioritize building personal fortunes through extraction and personal ownership of national resources and (iii) for-life leaders who seek to cling to power at any cost for fear of reprisals for their misdeeds whilst in office if they ventured to step down. The significant determinative impact of leadership in both development failure and development success on the African continent can further be illustrated by the impact of pre- and post-­independence African leaders in influencing African societies to shun participatory direct or representative democratic governance of Western countries in preference to ‘undemocratic, centralized and hierarchical styles of leadership’ that favoured undemocratic rule (Pashapa 2006: 51). Elsewhere, I have suggested models of leadership that were preferred by African nationalist

278 

N. PASHAPA

founding lead-leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Kwame Nkurumah (Ghana), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Joshua Nkomo (Zimbabwe) and Leopold Sengor (Senegal), due to their prior bias towards African traditional, authoritarian, centralized and hierarchical leadership culture, which assumed severe hierarchical and authoritarian distance between leaders and followers (Pashapa 2006: 54). These founding leadership models may be classified as ‘The Father-Figure-Leader’, ‘The Wise-Leader’, ‘The Liberator-Fighter-Leader’, ‘The Charismatic-­ Personality-­Leader’ and ‘The Sacerdotal-Leader’ which share in common a view of leadership as a system of values beyond criticism or revision (Busia 1967: 30). Pashapa (2006: 31–34) highlighted how such authoritarian traditional African leadership that often takes the form of benevolent authoritarianism and pseudo-transformational leadership, is prone to fostering and promoting development failure factors highlighted earlier. It expects followers to surrender to its decision making by denying followers the ability to judge for themselves between what is good or bad and demanding them to just comply without any questioning. It exploits followers, even though they may derive some psychological or material benefits from interaction between the two. It prescribes that followers only obey it because it does not tolerate rational judgement or criticism. It thrives on subjugation of followers and precludes criticism, unlike rational-legal authority which rides on voluntary acceptance and recognition. It makes use of coercion and manipulation as it promotes slave-like dependency in its followers. It also enforces itself through intimidation and the threat of excessive discipline. The correlation between such bad or pseudo-transformational leadership and the development failure factors that have been flagged earlier does not require much effort to validate. Solutions to these development failure factors that have generally been proffered by African citizens through advocacy platforms, such as opposition political parties, civic society organizations, political think tanks and churches, do emphasize the significance of leadership to development by virtue of its centrality to the implementation of the solutions proffered. This focus on the role of leadership as a significant determinative factor in development does not in any way intend to downplay other factors contributing to development failure in Africa. Such factors include (i) the crafting of aid programmes in Western capitals without due regard for African concrete contextual historical, social, cultural, political and economic realities and (ii) looting of aid funds and misdirection of aid to

14  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA 

279

finance grandiose projects with no economic value by African positional official leaders. Rather, the intention is to emphasize the significant role that transformational servant leadership would play in reforming or turning around development failure factors in Africa, yet it has been largely omitted in the development discourse. Such reform or turn-around solutions that require a transformational servant leadership culture if they are to succeed include (i) removing power from the hands of the ruling and rich elite, by way of political and economic reforms, in order to put it in the hands of the people where it belongs, (ii) replacing politics of exclusion with politics of inclusion, (iii) promoting socio-political conditions of peace and protection of human rights in order to attract both domestic and external investment which are critical elements in driving economic growth and reducing poverty and (iv) innovative crafting and responsible implementation of economic and social policies and institutions that respond most commensurately to the historical and concrete development requirements of local African spaces. Such innovativeness and implementation are recommended as alternatives to regurgitation of Western capitalist or Eastern socialist economic models that may have worked well in the western or eastern hemisphere with their peculiar historical development requirements.

Transformational Servant Leadership and Transformational Social Development It is my contention that good leadership and in this case transformational servant leadership should be regarded as a critical component of development models or alternatives to development models that should turn around the development scenario on the African continent from one of development failure to that of development success. When one looks at the situation from the perspectives of Ntibagirirwa (2009) who insisted that values must be placed at the centre of Africa’s development and that of Falade and Falade (2013) who opined that there is need in Africa to develop national values for development, the significant impact of good leadership, that is transformational servant leadership, on processes of values and culture formation becomes self-evident. The stated objectives of the book project that this chapter contributes towards, that is, (i) to interrogate the critical role of religion, identity and character values in Africa’s development and (ii) to define, redefine, distil

280 

N. PASHAPA

values and illustrate their place in the African continent’s development imply the correlation between leadership and development, given the key role of leadership in religious constructions, identity constructions, and character values formation. The significant impact of leadership on development may also be illustrated from the perspective of its key determinative function in the innovation and implementation of policies, institutions and programmes that promote transformational and sustainable social development. The promotion of transformational servant leadership as defined in the introductory segment of this chapter, with its distinctive biases, could effectively mitigate development failure factors and enhance development success factors on the African continent to the extent that development discourse has not yet envisaged. This is because development theory, especially, as articulated by African development theorists, has tended to omit from its purview investigation of this correlation between leadership and development. The proposition of this chapter is that transformational servant (Bass and Riggio 2006) could be a key determinant in enhancing development success factors and mitigating development failure factors in Africa. It may be further validated by noting the commensurate congruence between distinctive skills and competencies of transformational servant leadership noted earlier as well as transformational social development indicators, obstacles to transformative social development and necessary social development innovations that were highlighted by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 2016 report. These social development indicators, hindrances and necessary innovations were proposed 20 years after the decade of United Nations Summits that were held on various global social development issues at, Rio de Janeiro in 1992, at Cairo in 1994, at Beijing in 1995 and at Copenhagen in 2009 (www.unrisd.org/ flaship 2016). Such indicators, obstacles and necessary innovations include some of the following: • Social innovation, that is, transformative social developmental change occurs when organizations and networks adopt new ideas, strategies and practices that aim to better meet social needs and build relationships that are conducive to social and environmental improvements • Social innovation, that is, transformative social developmental change often occurs at the local level where community organizations and social enterprises organize to mobilize resources and to

14  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA 

281

defend their rights as they are enabled by civic society and faith-­ based organizations • Transformative social developmental change, that is, social innovation involves changes in social structures and relations including overcoming patterns of stratification related to class, gender, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation or location that can lock people into disadvantage and constrain their choices and agency • Social innovation, that is, transformative social developmental change also entails changing formal and informal norms and institutions that shape the attitudes and behaviour of people and organizations in the social, economic, environmental and political spheres • Transformative social developmental change, that is, social innovation means application of social and economic policies that foster change in economic structures and to promote employment-­ intensive growth patterns • Achievement of transformative social developmental change outcomes through just, participatory, democratic processes is essentially a political project characterized by power configurations at household, local, national, regional and global levels which inevitably entail contestation of ideas and interests between different groups and actors • Transformative economic change whereby economic change is also sustainable in environmental terms requires adoption of sustainable production and consumption patterns through legislation, regulation and public policies empower actors engaging with sustainable production, consumption and trading systems • Transformative social policy rather than be add-ons to economic policy or only promote social safety nets must be premised on its integrated nature and multiple functions, that is, (i) universal coverage of protection systems against a variety of risks and inadequacy of benefits, that is, social protection, (ii) tackling vertical and horizontal inequalities, that is, redistribution, (iii) enhancing gender equality and redistributing the burden of care, that is, social redistribution, and (iv) promoting growth, structural change and employment, that is, production all of which are key in fostering inclusive and equitable social development • Transformative social development is a long process that requires both individual agency and collective action by societies in pursuit of (i) visible and measurable economic and political empowerment of

282 

N. PASHAPA

disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, (ii) greater gender equality in all spheres, (iii) more equal re-distribution of income and wealth and (iv) active citizenship with greater agency of civil society organizations and social movements • Transformative social development also requires deep-seated changes in regulations and in economic, social and power relations that entail (i) changes in North-South power relations and global governance institutions, (ii) empowerment of small enterprises, rural producers and informal workers and (iii) a reversal of the hierarchies of norms and values that subordinate social and environmental goals to economic objectives • Transformative social development processes and outcomes are more likely to succeed when social development obstacles are identified and addressed (www.unrisd.org/flaship 2016) The commensurate congruence between these social development indicators, hindrances and innovations and the skills and competencies associated with transformational servant leadership validate the argument that leadership is a key determinant of social development success. This draws attention to the significance of the correlation of leadership and development which should be mainstreamed by development discourse, especially that focusing on the African context.

Conclusion: Thinking Through the Idea of African Alternatives to Development As post-development theorists make clear, development discourse positions Africa as a site of failure and reinforces the dominance of hegemonic powers. It seems, then to follow that we ought to reject development and find other ways of understanding the African experience. While the post-­ development critique of development was rarely focused particularly on Africa, its critique of development is easily applied to Africa and its call for alternatives to development could potentially be related to the many calls for Afrocentric alternatives in Africa or for an African Renaissance. Radical scholars within this paradigm often suggest that we must drop the term ‘development’ (and its practice) altogether. I want to argue now that this idea of rejecting development and proposing in its place something radically other is not as easy as is often assumed. Instead, I am convinced that

14  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA 

283

African development can be actualized by selfless, dedicated, citizen-­loving leaders who will deploy all their competencies towards improving the well-­ being of all. Leaders with values will value fellow citizens. They will not engage in corruption or other unethical behaviour. They will prioritize the contributions of their fellow citizens. Transformational servant leaders will generate and sustain economic development that will facilitate better lives for everyone. African leaders of integrity will grow wealth, protect citizens’ rights, shun personality cults and promote holistic human development. They will lay the foundation for, and mobilize their communities and nations towards, ‘The Africa We Want’, as articulated in the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

References Achebe, C. 1985. Things Fall Apart. New York: Fawcett Publishers. Ayittey, B.G. 1992. Africa Betrayed. New York: St Martin’s Press. ———. 2005. Africa Unchained. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2006. Indigenous African Institutions (2nd edn.). New York: Transnational Publishers. Bass, M.B., and E.R.  Riggio. 2006. Transformational Leadership. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. Busia, K.A. 1967. The Political Heritage of Africa In Search of Democracy. New York: Praeger. Escobar, A. 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Falade, D.A., and M.  Falade. 2013. Development of Core Values for National Integration in Nigeria. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention 2 (7): 57–63z. Latouche, S. 1993. In the Wake of the Affluent Society: An Exploration of Post-­ Development. London: Zed Books. Matthews, S. 2018. Alternatives to Development in Africa. In Recentering Africa in International Relations: Beyond Lack, Peripherality and Failure, ed. M. Iniguez de Heredia and Z. Wai, 167–186. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Mazrui, A. 1987. The Africans: A Triple Heritage. London: Little Brown and Company. Mbembe, A.J. 2001. On The Post-Colony. California, Berkeley: University of California Press. Mbembe, A. J. 2009. Donors have a Simple Notion of Development. www.powerofculture.nl. Moyo, D. 2009. ‘Dead Aid’: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

284 

N. PASHAPA

Ntibagirirwa, S. 2009. Cultural Values, Economic Growth and Development. Journal of Business Ethics 84 (3): 297–311. Pashapa, N. 2006. Ideas of Authority among Zimbabwean Evangelical-Pentecostals. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Harare: University of Zimbabwe. Rahnema, M. 2010. Global Poverty. In The Development Dictionary, ed. W. Sachs. London: Zed Books. Schein, E. 1997. Organisational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-­ Bass Publishers. United Nations Research Institute on Social Development. 2016. www.unrisd. org/flaship Ziai, A. 2016. Development Discourse and Global History: From Colonialism to the Sustainable Development Goals. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 15

Re-conceptualising Womanhood and Development in Post-colonial Zimbabwe: A Social Conflict Perspective Esther Mavengano and Tobias Marevesa

Introduction The debate over gender politics and women position in society has been a topical subject within academia for quite some time. The marginalisation of women is encoded in discourses of the ‘Other’ and has been part of many societies for time immemorial. The monolithic definitions of womanhood where women have occupied positions of liminality and subalternity which do not support their growth and development are contested and troubled in contemporary times. This chapter is informed by social conflict `theory as proposed by Karl Marx. His ideas are relevant to the analysis and understanding of gender relations in Zimbabwe. Butler (2006) notes that male-female dichotomies and binarisms are instrumental for the discrimination against women who are pushed to the peripheral sites of the society where their potential for growth is hampered. However,

E. Mavengano (*) • T. Marevesa Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_15

285

286 

E. MAVENGANO AND T. MAREVESA

such treatment of women in any society has negative effects on the national development since gender complementarity is critical for the general welfare of any nation. This chapter makes a fundamental effort to draw scholarly attention to the need for alternative positive conceptions of womanhood that will bring about national development in Zimbabwe. In other words, the narratives of women empowerment become fundamental in the discourse of national development. The chapter contends that the values of justice and equality are central to the struggle to lift women out of poverty (Sustainable Development Goal 1) and promote women’s equality (Sustainable Development Goal 5). Although the chapter utilises the Zimbabwean context to make its case, the basis of the conclusion is applicable to other African and global contexts.

Theoretical Perspective: Social Conflict Theory Social conflict theory will be utilised in this chapter in order to examine and interrogate the social phenomenon wedged on gender disparities through the lens that there is a normal human intuition towards conflict. Karl Marx is perceived  as the father of social conflict theory (Bratton, 1997: 135). Social conflict theory originated from the rich oppressing the poor. In this theory, Marx argues that individuals in groups compete for resources, power and equality. Conflict theorists perceive society as an area where inequality generates social conflict and change (Dahrendorf, 1958: 175). Social conflict takes place where the two social groups through interaction with the other group try to gain or take social power at the same time trying to prevent the other group from attaining their own. Marx’s views paved way for a full description of the tenets of a capitalist society which is characterised by exploitation and injustice. It motivated the socialist thought of the world’s economies and societies today, the contradictions and competition in social relationships and the natural instability and conflict emanating from the world of the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’. Conflict is inevitable where there are social inequalities and power wrangles. Similarly, the competition between men and women in Zimbabwe over land, political power, property rights and legal practices, among others, has resulted in social conflict and gender imbalances. These imbalances compromise the quest to overcome poverty and promote justice and equality for Zimbabwean women, in particular, and African women, in general.

15  RE-CONCEPTUALISING WOMANHOOD AND DEVELOPMENT… 

287

Women in Zimbabwe: A Summary In this section, we trace the position of women from colonial to post-­ colonial era in Zimbabwe and discuss how their positioning in society has impacted on national development. In the post-colonial era, women activists’ iron resolve to interrogate and critique long-held notions about womanhood is more visible in activism narratives. Contemporary Zimbabwean women claim space for recognition, growth and development by troubling and challenging the traditional location of women in the domestic domain figuratively inscribed in the Shona proverb Musha mukadzi, that is, a woman makes up a home. The Colonial Period The colonial period in Zimbabwe can be traced from 1890 to 1980. During the colonial period many factors external to traditional society influenced the indigenous women, for instance, education, rural-urban migration, urbanisation and religious conversion from African Traditional Religion (ATR) to either Christianity or Islam. The external factors affected the position of women in Zimbabwe, paving way for new identity trajectories for womanhood. In the colonial era, women were largely not facilitated to contribute meaningfully towards the development of the nation because they were incapacitated by separatist colonial ideologies and culture. In this context, the separatists were the oppressors who dictated and exploited the indigenous people, especially the African man on the farms and mines. Women were mainly heading their families in the absence of their husbands who were labourers on farms and mines. Women who acquired Western education worked in the civil service and contributed to the development of their families and the nation, although this was limited due to oppressive labour laws and gender discriminatory practices. The fact that some women took up formal employment created social classes (the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’), which ultimately marked another shift from the treatment of women as a homogeneous group. Women need to be understood as heterogeneous and multi-dimensional social subjects. The working class could not live up to the roles assigned to women in the traditional society, thereby causing social conflict. Cheater (1985) observes that in the colonial period women could not have access to the land, bank accounts, had no voting rights and could not own any form of business. As a result, many women became poor and were

288 

E. MAVENGANO AND T. MAREVESA

oppressed by those in power and who controlled the resources. Despite the fact that some women received Western education, preference was given to the boy child in many families, resulting in a high illiteracy rate among women in the colonial period. The Post-colonial Period: Alternative Conceptions of Womanhood Zimbabwean women have made profound contributions to the gender politics in the post-colonial society in Zimbabwe. Although the post-­ colonial era witnessed a paradigm shift in terms of legal framework to promote women’s active participation in politics, their numbers are still low. The gender dynamics of culture and political forces have shaped women’s identities, ambitions, interests and self-determination among the Zimbabweans. The attainment of independence in Zimbabwe ushered in some radical changes with regard to the position of women and their role towards national development. Shumba (2011) observes that in 1980, when Zimbabwe got its independence, women were legally considered minors. In 1982, the Legal Age of Majority Act was instituted by the government of Zimbabwe. It granted women full adult status. After this legal milestone towards women’s achievement, there followed the 1985 Matrimonial Causes Act where women were granted rights to own property autonomously from their fathers or husbands. However, there are ambivalence and grey areas in relation to women’s land ownership, namely, whether this was part of the rights encoded in the Act. These changes in gender relations were championed by women’s organisations which pointed out some areas of gender imbalances carried forward into the post-colonial era. Women’s organisations registered their displeasure at the oppressive colonial vestiges victimising women and lobbied for gender equity and social justice. In 1985, there was a United Nations Women’s Conference in Nairobi Kenya which led women in Zimbabwe to form different representational groups. These affirmative groups advanced and expanded their different concerns and authorised women’s voices. In 1990, women’s organisations combined with their recently appointed Members of Parliament and ministers in government to challenge the existing gender policies such as inheritance, land and property ownership between men and women. They made a very strong voice, forcing former President Robert Mugabe to accuse them of making transgressive behaviour and ‘culturally unacceptable demands’ (Thomas, 2010: 2). Yet, the women activists were not deterred by what the former president said.

15  RE-CONCEPTUALISING WOMANHOOD AND DEVELOPMENT… 

289

They went on to attend the United Nations Women’s Conference in Beijing, China, in 1995. The Zimbabwean women’s organisations formed a formidable voice with other activists from African countries. The actions by Zimbabwean women were significant because they contributed to the adoption of the 1995 ‘Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa’ within the African Human Rights Charter and other human rights initiatives at the global level. Zimbabwean women championed their rights to land, inheritance and property ownership, voting rights, rights to education, politics and labour rights, among others. With women being recognised, they contributed immensely towards national development. This included making contributions in the following sectors, namely, agricultural, education, mining, manufacturing and politics. However, the representative percentage of women in the above-mentioned areas is still low, probably because of the cultural and marital obligations. Hence, the social conflict that emanates from gender disparities still persists in Zimbabwe. In support of women’s struggle, former US President Barak Obama used the adage that because ‘God could not be everywhere he created mothers as mothers of the nation’. Much akin to Obama’s postulation, Bhat (2015: 189) states, ‘If you educate a man you educate an individual, however, if you educate a woman you educate a whole family’. This implies that if a woman is empowered it means Mother Zimbabwe is empowered. Drawing from these observations, it is therefore not surprising that Zimbabwean women activists are continuing in fighting against obstacles to women’s progress in their quest to promote national development. Women are marginally represented in various spheres of the society. Yet, there are incidents where opportunities arise for women’s growth and development but they are not forthcoming. For instance, women are found wanting in political participation; there are very few female legislators, cabinet ministers and senators despite the availability of a policy framework in favour of women’s equal involvement in politics. Therefore, creating social inequalities in political participation. It also appears that there is reluctance and lack of political will by the elite to implement what is enshrined in the national policy documents vis-à-vis gender equity and social justice. The government policies become hollow and meaningless since concrete evidence of implementation is lacking. This is most visible in the lack of effective implementation of the 50–50 policy which is now a mere lip service by those in power, contradicting the reality on the ground. Women who participated in the liberation struggle are entangled in gendered political transformations. Although there is a formidable number of

290 

E. MAVENGANO AND T. MAREVESA

women who are actively participating in the new national political trajectories which is evident in the figures of the former vice president of the republic of Zimbabwe, Joice Mujuru (all the following applied at the time of writing): Oppah Muchinguri-Kashiri, the minister of defence, Monica Mutsvangwa, the minister of information, and Thokhozani Khupe, the president of the MDC-T, among others. However, the visibility of women in the political domain requires re-evaluation and serious commitment. The following section reviews some of the initiatives that have been undertaken in an effort to enhance women’s contribution to national development.

Initiatives Towards Women Contributing to Development in Zimbabwe This section focuses on initiatives and interventions that took place in the post-colonial era which include transformative trajectories in the academic and agricultural sectors in Zimbabwe. These interventions brought relative gender equity and national development. The Academic Sector Women’s education in Zimbabwe is of critical significance for both the government and civil society since educated women can play a pivotal role in national development. Education is a landmark for women’s empowerment because it permits them to react to the socio-economic challenges, confront their traditionally assigned roles and change their existential circumstances. Bhat (2015: 188) is of the view that the importance of education in reference to women’s empowerment cannot be ignored. He adds, ‘Education of women is the most powerful tool to change their position in society’. The education of women is the most powerful tool for social mobility. Education is a foundation stone for the empowerment of women in Zimbabwe. It also brings a decrease in socio-economic inequalities and functions as a means of improving women’s status within the family and the nation at large. Empowerment can be observed as means of crafting a social setting in which one can make decisions and make choices, either individually or collectively, for social change. The empowerment reinforces the innate capacity by way of obtaining knowledge, power and experience (Hashemi et al. 1996).

15  RE-CONCEPTUALISING WOMANHOOD AND DEVELOPMENT… 

291

Education has become a vital means of empowering women to bring about positive gender outlook. According to Suguna (2011), education significantly transforms women’s lives in profound ways. Women’s activism in the period after independence emphasises the need to mobilise and maximise the potential and skills of the entire population, including women in all spheres of the society to ensure that inclusive national development is attained. Even though Zimbabwe has made great strides and sustainable gains in the field of education, the girl child’s education still lags behind. For instance, women make up two-thirds of the world’s illiterates, and in Zimbabwe, women are poorly represented in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). Yet it must be noted that education paved way for the Zimbabwean women in crafting new identities and acquiring consciousness of entitlement, resulting in transformed gender relations. Zimbabwean women are arguably the most educated female population in the southern African region, if not across Africa. Women have an imperative position in making a national socio-economic and political progress. Thus, access to education becomes a critical wedge in the fight for women’s rights and national development. The Agricultural Sector Another area where women have achieved some significant social mobility is in the agricultural sector. Women have made some essential pathways in this sector, although they lack skills and required expertise, as well as financial management know-how that leads to the generation of more income. In Zimbabwe there are so many non-governmental organisations which fund agricultural projects. These non-governmental organisations include Oxfam, Christian Care, Care International and World Vision. Such organisations fund projects like nutritional gardens which were established in rural and urban centres. According to some respondents, farming projects could be a solution to artisanal miners who live in Kezi illegally doing mining activities for a living. This will put an end to poverty, starvation and illegal activities. Some respondents were of the opinion that there are many women who have embarked on agriculture who can contribute to the national development. These women include Mary Thandiwe Mliswa, the member of parliament for Mashonaland West province (at the time of writing) who is also a successful farmer. She specialises in both livestock and crop farming in her constituency. Another successful female horticulture farmer is Vanesia Mukarati. Women have made some

292 

E. MAVENGANO AND T. MAREVESA

initiatives to form a group which is called Women in Agriculture Zimbabwe (WIAZ) that enhances networking and creates opportunities for women to interact with other women in agriculture. The WIAZ members benefit from conferences, seminars, workshops, WIAZ magazines, marketing and loan links (Gaidzanwa 1981). This helps in making their farming more successful. However, it is claimed that the WIAZ membership leaves out a significant section of the female population that resides in the rural areas in Zimbabwe. The values of justice and equality demand that these women be included so that they can contribute towards the achievement of SDGs 1 (poverty) and 5 (gender equality). In addition, rural women lack collateral security in accessing credit in agricultural activities. According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development of 2018 report with the title ‘Rural Women and Agriculture in Zimbabwe’, there are challenges faced by Domboshava women which are lack of access to market, business development skills and labour services. Domboshava is an exemplary rural community that was used to highlight the general concerns of rural women farmers. Women in Zimbabwe produce the bulk of the food, but they have limited access to land ownership, and this negatively affects national development. Women have struggled to gain full equal rights and control over land (Shumba 2011 and Gaidzanwa 1981). It is, therefore, important to distribute land equally in order to achieve sustainable development in Zimbabwe.

Challenges Encountered by Women in Achieving Gender Equity Despite the fact that women in Zimbabwe have success stories in the academic, agriculture and political domains, they are still facing numerous challenges emanating from culture and marriage. It is the main thrust of this section to interrogate culture and marriage as hindrance to women’s emancipation in Zimbabwe. Patriarchal Interpretations of Culture The question of culture and its entanglement with gender politics calls for attention in the discourses on women empowerment and national development. Culture can function as an impediment and usually it collaborates with phallocentric views in defining the position of women in society. For

15  RE-CONCEPTUALISING WOMANHOOD AND DEVELOPMENT… 

293

De Beauvoir (1953), patriarchy means ‘rule by the father’, homeland of males and a profoundly anti female society (Daly, 1985). This is whereby men hold more social, economic and political power over women. Male domination manifests in men’s control of resources and authority. Women’s positions in both home and public sphere are prescribed by men in cultural authority. The Zimbabwean culture today is based on a patriarchal system. The patriarchal attitudes and practices continue to dominate in the marriage institution and public spaces. Even in culture, those in authority, and in the Zimbabwean context, these are predominantly men, prescribing who in society has access to resources and political power. Culture and patriarchy assign a set of social rules which can be used to ensure conformity between men and women to their defined gender roles. As we have highlighted earlier, from 1980 to date, women gender activists in Zimbabwe have engaged in resisting male domination and the cultural oppression of women. These women believe in Zimbabwean culture but interrogate inequalities that arise in the interpretations of certain cultural practices. It is, therefore, a misconception to assume that where women challenge discriminatory practices within culture they are interpreted as going against the values and norms of the society. Again, gender equality and culture are not mutually exclusive. Osirim (2003: 157) posits that culturally, wife bashing was not considered a major offence in the Shona communities. Therefore, the husband could not receive any retribution or social sanction because culture positions men in authority. For instance, if a Shona wife resists her husband’s authority by not cooking or denying him his conjugal rights, she could have committed a very serious offence, thereby violating the essential element of the marriage contract (Osirim, 2001). Similarly, Schmidt’s (1992: 76) research findings on the Shona customary law revealed that ‘a husband can moderately punish/hit his wife if she refuses to cook for him, clean the house, and care for the children or having a sexual relations with him’. Apparently, in traditional Shona culture, women had no expressive voice and individual autonomy since the husband was the head and in control of the marriage institution. In the traditional setting in Zimbabwe, culture and marriage functioned as sites of male domination where women’s rights were not considered important. However, this claim is debatable. Husbands who abused their wives could be forced to appear before their elders, where they would be censured. If a woman died while angry because of the violence she would have endured, she could become a vicious avenging spirit. Nonetheless, the cultural suppression of women in

294 

E. MAVENGANO AND T. MAREVESA

the Shona culture hampered women’s contributions towards national development in Zimbabwe. In the post-colonial era, gender politics seek(s) to liberate women from both culture and patriarchy which have collaborated towards women domination and oppression. Cultural and patriarchal practices inscribe monolithic views about womanhood, thereby confining women to the limiting socially constructed roles. However, no society can prosper without the full recognition of the full potential of women. Women’s activism lobbies for the shift in gender narratives in order to fully maximise the potential of women, thereby allowing them to develop their families, communities and the nation at large. In spite of the fact that culture is usually perceived as a rigid phenomenon, it can in fact be flexible and dynamic to suit the changing social, economic and political contexts. In other words, the adaptability of culture to new circumstances and new demands should be emphasised for the sake of achieving national development in contemporary Zimbabwe. Marriage Women occupy a precarious position in a patriarchal society in which they assume the definition of ‘Other’. Patriarchy exercises its power over women in multiple and complex ways, especially in the marriage institution. The articulation of the otherness of women takes place in the marriage where culture and tradition come together to construct and to project certain socially preferred meanings of womanhood. Women are regarded as ‘second sex’ or second-class citizens and such views are enforced by even women themselves who readily accept male domination and female subjectivity through the process of socialisation (De Beauvoir 1953). Society inscribes the obscurity of women and denies them opportunities to contribute meaningfully towards national development. It constructs gendered narratives that create identity categories of women which are not in favour of development. Such gendered discourses are contested in the post-colonial era where women seek their empowerment and social justice from the powerful elite. Gender activists highlight obstacles faced by women and authorise different success stories of women meant to refute binary gender constructions of femininity and masculinity. Women’s organisations fight against persistent gender inequalities and social injustice. They also call to attention the mismatch between the national policy

15  RE-CONCEPTUALISING WOMANHOOD AND DEVELOPMENT… 

295

and the challenges of implementing tangible improvements in women’s lives. The present Zimbabwean Constitution of 2013 accords women legal rights but only a few women from the elite social classes benefit, leaving the lower classes at the margin of society, thereby hampering socio-­ economic and national development. In many cases marriage is perceived as a hindrance to women’s empowerment precisely because of the controversial issue of lobola (bride price) (Togarasei and Chitando 2021). The question of bride price or lobola is contentious since there is no consensus about its function in the marriage setting. Schmidt (1992) argues that although the payment of lobola is considered as a valued part of Zimbabwean culture, it can be also viewed as commercialisation of women by men since some exorbitant amounts of money are paid. The payment of lobola is thus linked to women’s control over their bodies by men, either sexually or in terms of their labour (Batezat et al. 1988). Ansell (2001) posits that payment of bride wealth is a significant element of marriage among the Basotho of Lesotho and the Shona people of Zimbabwe. However, the functions and meaning attached to the practice are constantly changing. The meanings and interpretations of lobola payment are interrogated and sometimes contested. For some, the payment of bride price by men to the in-laws is comparable to the acquisition of property resulting in women’s objectification and oppression of their rights. The lobola issue is regarded as contradicting the empowerment of women. The debate over lobola requires vigorous re-thinking and re-evaluation since it has been a subject of much discussion in gender politics. The payment of bride price has been utilised against women’s search for social equity, emancipation and articulative voice from the patriarchal dominance. Religion We acknowledge the idea that religion and culture are an inseparable complex as there is a great deal of overlap. Traditional cultural practices are usually found in religious practices while religious belief systems are related to the way of life of communities. Religion is one of the major institutions in society where human civilisation creates a system of religious and social beliefs. Dube (2001) observes that religions could include a belief in a Supreme Being/God but all could be transcendental, spiritual and with aspects of life which are beyond the physical world. Religion and tradition are usually used to justify women’s domination and their subordination in

296 

E. MAVENGANO AND T. MAREVESA

many societies, including Zimbabwe. In all the religions of the world, sacred texts have been interpreted to render power to men in society. In contemporary times, there has been a rise in fundamentalist religious movements usually related to conservative nationalisms or ring-wing politics. These movements are in a way opposed to the idea of gender equality and women’s empowerment. The attitudes of these movements towards gender politics include positioning of women in the domestic domain, opposition to reproductive rights, viewing women as a source of immorality in society and vilifying or demonising women who go against traditionally assigned roles. Dube (2001) postulates that in several religions, women are the majority of believers but men are in positions of authority and have rights to interpret sacred texts rendering women powerless and muted. Historically, women have not been taking leadership positions in religious spheres, a scenario that replicates itself in the present times where women are mostly prevented from holding positions of authority. According to Dube (2001: 18), ‘the male (or phallocentric) model that pervades heaven is used to reinforce and maintain the gendered relations of our world. Thus, when examining the first book of Timothy in the New Testament, we find that it draws directly from the story Eden to justify the subordination of women in the church’ (1 Timothy 2:12–16). Dube (2001: 18) also referred to Genesis 1:27–31 which states: So God created human beings, making them to be like himself. He created the male and female, blessed them and said have many children so that your descendants will live all over the earth and bring it under control. I am putting you in charge of the fish, the birds and all the wild animals. I have provided every kind of grain and all kinds of fruit for you…

Dube (2001) believes that this story provides us with windows of hope in reconceptualisation of gender. This text suggests that gender justice is biblical. This is because both man and woman were created in the image of God and both were given dominion over the earth. Women are increasingly reclaiming their visibility and presence in religion. In light of the foregoing discussion, women in religious circles do not contribute significantly towards the national development in Zimbabwe as it should be the case. Therefore, more space should be created for women in religious leadership. In Zimbabwe there are faith-based organisations which help to empower the local communities through community-building and other

15  RE-CONCEPTUALISING WOMANHOOD AND DEVELOPMENT… 

297

participatory activities. According to Hoffstaedter (2011), there are a number of different types of faith-based organisations globally which include faith-based representative organisations or apex bodies, faith-­ based charitable or development organisations, faith-based socio-political organisations, faith-based missionary organisations and faith-based illegal or terrorist organisations, just to mention a few. These faith-based charitable or development organisations that are actively participating in Zimbabwe include Christian Care, Care International, World Vision and Oxfam. These faith-based organisations mobilise support for the poor, powerless and other social groups. They fund and manage developmental projects which seek to alleviate poverty and social exclusions. They promote the values of justice and equality in the search for sustainable development.

Conclusion This chapter has focused on the debate on reconceptualisation of womanhood in contemporary Zimbabwe with regard to the narratives of national development. The chapter argued for the reconsideration of gender discriminatory practices that could be embedded in culture, patriarchy and religion which isolate and prevent women from meaningful participation in economic activities. Such relegation of women, who are clearly an indispensable section of the society, reduces the pace of national development. Furthermore, gender inequalities were historically created, particularly during the colonial period when the narrative of white supremacy was reinforced through economic exploitation and disempowerment of the indigenous people. This needs to be addressed in the present Zimbabwean society in order to minimise competition for resources, as well as reducing social conflict. Women’s organisations in Zimbabwe continue to call the attention of those in positions of cultural, religious and political authority so that they recognise women as active agents of socio-economic transformation who bring about national development.

Recommendations From the foregoing discussion in this chapter, we conclude by making the following recommendations:

298 

E. MAVENGANO AND T. MAREVESA

• There is need for massive awareness campaigns on gender equality. Zimbabwean society should adopt an inclusive approach that considers both male and female communities. For example, gender justice organisations such as Msasa Project (women) and Padare (men) should have branches across the nation. • In women’s organisations, representation should include women from diverse backgrounds and social classes. • The gender contexts are evolving, therefore, there is need to continuously assess and review gender policies for them to be relevant and effective. • Gender equity should be priority in the current National Vision 2030 in line with the socio-economic national development, as well as the 2030 SDGs. • The government and women’s organisations should monitor the effectiveness of women empowerment measures to avoid divergence from the gender policies. • The national constitutional provisions should be in tandem with international policy framework so that the nation will not lag behind the global models of development.

References Ansell, A. 2001. Because it’s Our Culture! (Re) negotiating the Lobola in Southern African Secondary Schools. Journal of Southern African Studies 27 (4): 697–716. Batezat, E., M. Mwalo, and K. Truscott. 1988. Women and Independence: The Heritage and the Struggle. In Zimbabwe’s Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State and Capital in Southern Africa, ed. C. Stoneman. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Beauvoir, de S. 1953. The Second Sex Knopf. New York. Bhat, A.R. 2015. Role of Education in the Empowerment of Women in India. Journal of Education and Practice 6 (10): 188–191. Bratton, L.B. 1997. Themes of Conflict Theory: An Integrative Model for Practitioners. Journal of Teaching in Social Work 15 (1–2): 131–146. Butler, J. 2006. The Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York and London: Routledge. Cheater, A.P. 1985. The role and position of women in pre-colonial and colonial Zimbabwe, Paper presented at the workshop on the Role of Women in National Rehabilitation and Development, sponsored and organised by UNESCO and the Zimbabwean Ministry of Community Development and Women’s Affairs. Harare, November 1985.

15  RE-CONCEPTUALISING WOMANHOOD AND DEVELOPMENT… 

299

Dahrendorf, R. 1958. Towards a Theory of Social Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (2): 170–183. Daly, M. 1985. Beyond GOD the Father; Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation. Boston: Beacon Press. Dube, M. W. 2001. The Impact of Religion and Culture on Gender: Christianity, AIR and Gender. Paper Presented at the Inter Press Service Training Workshop for Journalists on How to Report on Culture, Religion and Gender, Harare. Gaidzanwa, R. 1981. Women’s Land Rights in Zimbabwe: An Overview, Department of Rural and Urban Planning University of Zimbabwe. Occasional Paper, No 13. Hashemi, Syed M., S.R. Schuler, and Riley, A.P. 1996. Rural credit programs and women’s empowerment in Bangladesh. World Development, 24 (4): 635–653. Elsevier. Hoffstaedter, G. 2011. Religion and Development: Australian Faith-Based Organisations, Report No. 3, La Trobe University. International Fund for Agricultural Development. 2018. Rural Women and Agriculture. Report. Osirim, M.J. 2001. Making Good on Commitments to Grassroots Women: NGOs and Empowerment for Women in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Women’s Studies International Forum 24 (2): 167–180. ———. 2003. Crisis in the State and the Family: Violence against Women in Zimbabwe. African Studies Quarterly 7 (2–3): 153–169. Schmidt, E. 1992. Peasants, Traders and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe 1870–1939. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Shumba, D. 2011. Women and Land: A Study on Zimbabwe. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 13 (7): 236–244. Suguna, M. 2011. Education and Women Empowerment in India. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research 1 (8): 196–204. Thomas, B. 2010. The Other Half of the African Sky: Women’s struggle in Zimbabwe. Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspectives 3 (11): 1–6. Togarasei, L., and Chitando, E. (eds.) 2021. Lobola (Bridewealth) in contemporary Southern Africa: Implications for Gender Equality. Springer Nature, Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 16

Personhood in African Philosophy: Beyond Hasty Generalisations Ephraim Taurai Gwaravanda

Introduction Trends on the African philosophy of personhood tend to take two directions. The first, and most common trend, is to draw from similarities among African cultures and draw conclusions about a homogenous conception of personhood. This trend assumes that philosophy is a universal, scientific, objective and transcultural enterprise. Defenders of this view of personhood include Menkiti (1984), Metz (2010), Matolino (2018) and Molefe (2019). For these thinkers, African culture is understood as the totality of unifying traits. The second trend with it is less common and focuses on the diversity of African cultures. This approach allows for specific cultural conceptions of personhood. This means that one can legitimately defend Akan, Zulu, Yoruba, Luo and Shona conceptions of personhood, among others. This trend takes a particularistic view of philosophy, and it argues that since no culture is universal, philosophy is rooted in specific cultural standpoints. This trend is defended by Gyekye

E. T. Gwaravanda (*) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_16

301

302 

E. T. GWARAVANDA

(1992, 1995) and Wiredu (1996, 2009) who both root their philosophy of personhood in the Akan culture. While both approaches are legitimate and complementary ways of understanding the philosophy of personhood, a logical evaluation shows that the generalised approach to personhood tends to commit the fallacy of hasty generalisation. This runs the danger of conceptualising development initiatives, such as those seeking to address poverty (Sustainable Development Goal 1), in a less effective way. My contribution is to provide a critique of the hasty generalisation fallacy that is committed in a generalised conception of personhood in African philosophy. The problem of the fallacious reasoning is that ‘African’ conception of personhood is understood in opposition to ‘Western’ yet such descriptors require philosophical interrogation. To avoid the fallacy of hasty generalisation, I defend an approach that avoids any general claims by using premises that relate to the Shona philosophical view of personhood and then drawing conclusions and implications about personhood in a Shona conceptual framework. Such a refined framework offers a firmer conceptual base for effective development initiatives in Africa. They will be tailored to address specific philosophical and religio-­ cultural issues, instead of more general initiatives. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines the logical reasoning employed in African personhood philosophical arguments to show that the premises fail to justify the conclusions of such arguments. The second section shows how the generalised arguments on personhood commit the fallacy of hasty generalisation. It is shown that although the premises are relevant for the conclusion, the evidence is insufficient thereby giving a weak inductive argument. The third section defends a cultural standpoint philosophy of personhood by analysing three proverbs from Shona culture and concluding that the Shona concept of personhood applies to the specific Shona culture. This leaves it open for other African cultural groups to draw comparisons about personhood.

Personhood in African Philosophy Personhood can be defined as a set of attributes that define a human being. These attributes could be physical, social and psychological or a combination of two or more of such attributes. Generalised philosophical accounts of personhood in Africa fall into broad categories; metaphysical and normative. Metaphysical accounts draw premises from human nature, and

16  PERSONHOOD IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: BEYOND HASTY… 

303

they attempt to justify them in the African context. Mbiti (1969) argues that personhood is understood in social ontology. According to Mbiti (1969: 108–109), Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say: ‘I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am’. This is a cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man.

For Mbiti, the individual is understood as a person through the community. Conversely, the community understanding of the individual shapes the individual person. There is a mutual interdependence between the individual and the community. Menkiti (1984) maintains that the African view of the human denies that persons can be defined by focusing on this or that physical or psychological characteristic of the lone individual. Rather, the human is defined by reference to the environing community. The exclusion of bodily or psychological traits is an attempt by Menkiti to avoid Western accounts that locate personal identity in terms of bodily processes or consciousness. The environing community is made up of individuals that are external to the individual person. For both Mbiti and Menkiti, the being of the individual is embedded in the community and one acquires personhood via the community. The accounts of personal identity by both thinkers are supposed to apply to African culture in the general sense of the term. The second broad category of personhood defines a person normatively. The normative dimension has two categories. The first normative approach claims that one can assign moral value to some entity in virtue of possessing certain ontological properties that render it morally significant. The moral significance is understood in the context of the broad African culture. Possession of virtues that are judged by the community as appropriate defines personhood. These virtues include sympathy, hospitality, forgiveness and respect, among others. To be called a ‘person’, in this sense, is to be specified as a moral patient, i.e. a being towards which we owe direct duties of respect (Behrens 2013). Another term used to capture this idea of personhood is that of moral status, which specifies things towards which we have direct duties of respect. What is crucial to note with regard to this notion of personhood is that it invites respect to the entity in question merely because it possesses the relevant ontological properties such as rationality, consciousness or sentience (Metz 2013).

304 

E. T. GWARAVANDA

The second normative approach explains personhood in terms of moral evaluation of the conduct of the individual in the context of some norms or values of a given society. The reasoning makes claims about the African communal view of morality in the first premise. The second premise links to African communal morality. A conclusion is then drawn about moral evaluation. If one performs well according to the community standards, then one is considered as a person, and if one does poorly, then one is assigned the status of a non-person. In some crucial sense, the ontological status of the humanity of the individual, on this view, is not under scrutiny at all. These evaluations of personhood are done in the context of African culture as broadly conceived. What is under scrutiny, in this discourse of personhood, is how the agent uses her ontological abilities, to either perfect or defect her humanity. To be called a person is to acknowledge that she has added dimensions of moral virtue to her humanity. And, to be called a non-person is to acknowledge that she has lived below the abilities of her humanity, without denying her humanity and the basic respect due to her merely as a human being. Behrens (2013) aptly distinguishes the two normative notions discussed above. He distinguishes between them in terms of one being patient-centred and the other agent-centred. The patient-centred notion grounds respect on the basis of certain ontological properties; and the agent-centred notion identifies beings that have lived up to the standards of excellence prescribed in their societies. Recent work on generalised accounts of African personhood have focused on rights (Metz 2013; Chemhuru 2018; Chimakonam 2018; Horsthemke 2018), dignity (Metz 2010), gender (Manzini 2018) and politics (Eze 2018; Matolino 2018). These works appear to follow the same logic that sees African views of personhood as fundamentally the same and the concern is more on the application of the concept rather than interrogating its logical implications.

The Fallacy of Hasty Generalisation in African Philosophy of Personhood An inductive generalisation is an argument that draws a conclusion about all members of a group from evidence that pertains to a selected sample. The fallacy of hasty generalisation occurs when there is a reasonable likelihood that the sample is not representative of the group (Hurley 2012; Copi et  al. 2014; Hawthorne 2018). Such a likelihood may arise if the

16  PERSONHOOD IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: BEYOND HASTY… 

305

sample is either too small or not randomly selected. Both the metaphysical and normative arguments analysed above are based on the assumption that there is uniformity in African culture. While philosophers took several decades trying to defend African philosophy against sceptics, they took the term Africa for granted after silencing the sceptics of African philosophy. However, one problem has remained unattended in African philosophy, the definition of Africa. African personhood has been defined without problematising the concept ‘African’. Conceptions of ‘Africa’ are often advanced along the following directions: (1) indigenous people of the African Continent; (2) anybody who is committed to Africa, those who want to see the United States of Africa (3) Black Africans; (4) those living in sub-Saharan Africa and having citizenship in Africa; (5) those who share the same history of slavery and colonialism; and (6) a combination of these traits. These varied definitions of ‘Africa’ show that the term is complex. If Africa is difficult to pin down due to geographical, historical, racial, citizenship factors, then it may be equally difficult to pin down ‘African culture’. Coming back to the point of uniformity, then it appears that complexities make African culture far from uniform. General claims about African philosophy of personhood, although critical in reasoning, must be carefully scrutinised. The universality of African conceptions of personhood ought never be accepted or assumed without justification. Hasty generalisation is the fallacy that philosophers commit when they draw conclusions about all particular African cultures through the use of the general term ‘African culture’. While philosophy is one of the armchair disciplines, speculation about culture may contradict reality on the ground. A careful approach to philosophy of personhood should accommodate facts from particular African cultures such as Akan, Yoruba, Luo, Masai, Shona, Ndebele, Zulu, etc. (Gwaravanda 2019). A single instance from a particular cultural grouping in Africa may indeed be relevant support for a general view of personhood; but when it is treated as proof of that theory, the generalisation is unfounded and the induction is defective. The fallacy of hasty generalisation consists of a situation where the premises cite a few cases and the conclusion says something about the whole group. The generalisation may create the misconception that there is a homogenous concept of personhood yet there are variations and diversities. Giving equivalent notions from cognitive languages gives a rich scenario where research can unearth specific notions of personhood that are immune to generalisations.

306 

E. T. GWARAVANDA

There are three levels of inductive generalisations that can be done in African philosophy of personhood. First, there are continental generalisations about personhood that attempt to extract elements that are applicable to the whole of Africa through some kind of inductive reasoning. This reasoning builds some degree of probability that is established when one builds from particular to the general. When one draws elements of personhood from Akan, Zulu, Yoruba or Ndebele culture, for instance, these elements are generalised to the entire continent. The advantage of this type of generalisation is that it makes it possible to examine issues in the context of ‘African personhood’. Second order or sub-regional generalisation allows scholars to pick elements from one or a few cultures and then apply them across the sub-region. The idea of Ubuntu personhood as advanced by a number of scholars takes this route. The advantage of this approach is that it yields a higher level of probability when one compares the content of the premises and the conclusion in the inductive argument. Third order generalisation that occurs within a cultural grouping is more focused, and it yields fruitful results since there is no room for a mismatch between the content of the premises and the content of the conclusion. The exactness obtained in the conclusion allows the researcher to generalise more accurately within the culture under investigation. The Zulu philosophy of personhood, for example, fits very well for Zulu culture without any danger of going beyond the content of the findings. However, there is a danger in that conclusions drawn from the inductive generalisations may give rise to ‘lies, illusions and mystifications about Africa’ (Ajei 2007: 227). Generalisations about personhood in Africa tend to give a false impression of homogeneity in African personhood. These cultural differences make it very difficult to defend generalised arguments about African personhood. Africa is talked about as if its parts are interchangeable and this problem is also seen in thinking about personhood. Although one must concede that generalisations sometimes have to be made, neither the standards of language nor the need to summarise and be brief can be used to defend the sweeping generalisations about Africa. The need to bring about similarities in African personhood, though acceptable, may not justify the extent of the generalisations made. Europeans saw sameness in Africa yet Africans saw it as all difference. If the concept of Africa is not dissolved into smaller parts, it will be difficult to encounter culture in Africa. Generalisations are to the extent that ‘one African is all Africans’.

16  PERSONHOOD IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: BEYOND HASTY… 

307

Hasty generalisation is associated with unanimism. Unanimism, as coined by Hountondji (1996: 60) is ‘the illusion that all men and women in [African] societies speak with one voice and share the same opinion about all fundamental issues’. The myth holds that African persons are fundamentally united in their views about the most important matters in life. This kind of thinking has been applied to personhood as well. This idea originated in colonial discourse about Africa, and Hountondji (1996) argues that it is not enough simply to put a positive spin on the traits that define African identity. The very idea of a global African mentality or worldview distorts the richness and cultural diversity of African peoples. Hountondji (1996) sees unanimism as a distinct liability, since it fails to take into account real differences among Africans in addressing the complex phenomenon of personhood within different cultural groupings in the African continent. Unanimism is hegemonic in tendency because it falsely represents cultural groupings that may have a different view of personhood. To cross the boundaries of one’s culture without realising that the other person may have a radically different approach to reality today is no longer admissible. It threatens the freedom that the SDGs seek to promote. If still consciously done, it would be ‘philosophically naïve, politically outrageous and religiously sinful’ (Panikkar 1997: 9) All philosophy is local (and even individual) before it can be universal and nothing can be genuinely universally valid unless it was first authentically personal and inserted within a given culture. If this is the case for philosophy, it is likely to be the case for human knowledge, ‘since every form of human knowledge must be situated or generated from within a culture or bounded by presuppositions, prejudgments, interests etc.’ (Okere 2005: 21). While unanimity of opinion may be fitting for a church, for frightened victims of some (ancient, or modern) myth, for the weak and willing followers of some tyrant; ‘variety of opinion is a feature necessary for objective knowledge; and a method that encourages variety is also the only method that is compatible with a humanitarian outlook’ (Oberheim 2011: x). So the African view of personhood should be democratic in approach by carrying out serious investigations of what each cultural grouping offers. This may then provide room for comparisons before making generalisations about personhood. The root causes of generalisations are, first, the attempt to seek essential features. Generalisations are used in order to pick up essential features that are common in African personhood. These essential features are used as the foundation and building blocks of a uniquely African view of

308 

E. T. GWARAVANDA

personhood. Second, the attempt to make a distinction with Western or Eurocentric approaches results in the tendency to contrast with ‘Western personhood’ is one reason why generalisations are made in African personhood. African personhood is informed by the African epistemological paradigm as opposed to the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm (Gyekye 1995). The third reason is colonial mentality, as shown in Tempels (1969) who is the father of generalisations in African philosophy. Writing from Central Africa, Tempels generalised his philosophy across the continent without taking appropriate care. To overcome the problem of generalisations, I am going to argue for a specific cultural philosophy of personhood as shown in the next section.

Cultural Standpoint Philosophy of Personhood In this section, I defend a cultural standpoint philosophy as seen in Gyekye (1995) and Wiredu (1996). This approach opens up for critiques and diversified approaches that are consistent with philosophy. Using a similar direction of thought, I argue for a Shona conception of personhood. The advantage of my approach is that it avoids hasty generalisation and locates the philosophy of personhood within a given culture. To buttress my point, I examine three proverbs that provide evidence of the philosophy of personhood among the Shona of Zimbabwe. For Wiredu (1996), the Akan word onipa (person) is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to a member of a biological species and sometimes referring instead to a human who has attained a special kind of social status. According to Wiredu (1996), this dual meaning reflects an important conceptual distinction between a human as a biological entity and a person as an entity with special moral and metaphysical qualities. Status as a human is not susceptible to degrees nor is such status conferred on an individual as a ‘reward’ for his or her efforts. One is either a human or one is not; there is no such thing as ‘becoming’ a human. In contrast, personhood is something for a human to become to different degrees through individual achievement. An individual’s human status, then, is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for personhood. This means that personhood is conferred on biological beings. Gyekye (1995) objects to the role that social status plays in Wiredu’s view of personhood, arguing that that is inconsistent with the natural or innate moral equality of persons derived from their common humanity.

16  PERSONHOOD IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: BEYOND HASTY… 

309

What a person [human being] acquires are status, habits, and personality or character traits: he, qua person acquires and thus becomes the subject of acquisition, and being thus prior to acquisition process, he cannot be defined by what he acquires. One is a person because of what he is, not because of what he acquires. (Gyekye 1992: 105)

Three issues can be raised from Gyekye’s analysis. First, we are human persons before we are anything else, and it is the human person that matters from the moral point of view. Second, human persons are, as members of the ‘kingdom of ends’, equal—independent of their empirical or accidental characteristics. Third, for Gyekye, it is essentially human capacity for reason not accidental predicates that serves as the basis for moral worth. In this respect, one cannot point to such accidental characteristics as height, gender, age, marital status or social class as basis for personhood. The debate between Gyekye (1995) and Wiredu (1996) and provides insights regarding not just the structure and content of philosophical arguments on personhood but also the role played by empirical evidence in supporting philosophical analysis. For a philosophical argument to gain credibility, it should be consistent with facts on the ground. In this particular case, the Akan view of personhood has, like many other metaphysical and moral conceptions, significant practical implications. Using facts about these practices and institutions to reconstruct a conception of personhood underscores another important general theme in African philosophy: the practical implications of philosophical principles on everyday life. For the Akan, judgements about personhood are not a matter of merely academic interest, but play an important role in shaping and supporting their highly communal social structure. To the extent that the Akan notion accommodates a common humanity as an innate source of value, it supports moral equality. At the same time, its emphasis on the social bases of personhood helps firmly to embed trust, cooperation and responsibility to the community in cultural practices. The Akan philosophy of persons thus represents an attempt to resolve questions of identity, freedom and morality in favour of a communalistic way of life that has evolved as a rational adaptation to the exigencies of survival under harsh conditions. The Shona philosophy of personhood, on the other hand, accords the status of personhood independently of the economic, physical or social status of an individual. Accordingly, personhood is taken as an intrinsic property that has a metaphysical and moral basis. As such, the Shona philosophy of personhood accommodates the poor, the disabled and those

310 

E. T. GWARAVANDA

who may be judged as social misfits. The reason why personhood is granted to the marginalised is that there is a belief that such individuals have room for improvement to uplift their sorry status. In order to provide evidence for the Shona philosophy of personhood, three proverbs are going to be used. For Bhebhe and Viriri (2012), Shona proverbs represent the wisdom of the past in a new situation to justify current behaviour, condition or thinking. The wisdom contained in Shona proverbs can be extended to personhood. Nyambezi (1990) maintains that proverbs show how observant people are: for the habits of birds and animals, and the behaviour of nature in general, do not go unobserved, they reveal what it is that a people adore, what it is that they hate, what they respect and what they despise. The aspect of respect becomes very critical in the context of personhood since proverbs on personhood tend to emphasise respect for the physically and mentally handicapped, the poor and the marginalised. This means that the Shona people’s wisdom as shown by proverbs represents moral lessons, science, philosophy, art, history, religion and social vision—in short, truth that is derived from experience (Bhebhe and Viriri 2012). Moral lessons, social vision and truth derived from experience are elements applicable to proverbs on personhood as shown in the next paragraph. Shona philosophy of personhood accords personhood to individuals who may be under disadvantaged economic situations. The proverb that goes murombo munhu (a poor person is a human being) shows this point (Hamutyinei and Plannger 2013). The personhood of persons is considered as an intrinsic value that arises from the sacredness of the human being due to the metaphysical belief in Mwari who is seen as the creator of human beings. The Shona also believe that the poor person can one day come out of his or her poverty if he or she makes a genuine appeal to vadzimu (the living dead). Vadzimu may sympathise with the poor person and help can come through living persons within the community such as friends or relatives. As a result, economic thinking should respect the ontological status and significance of the individual. A human being, among the Shona, should always be taken as a subject and never as an object. Poverty is considered as a phase of history that affects individuals, but it has no capacity to diminish intrinsic value that is seen in personhood. The proverb munhu munhu, chirema chinotungamira nzira (a human being is a human being, even the disabled person can provide directions for the path) (Hamutyinei and Plannger 2013) is relevant for personhood. In the context of the proverb, the disabled person must be allowed to

16  PERSONHOOD IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: BEYOND HASTY… 

311

participate in everyday activities. Participation is a form of inclusion that gives the disabled person a sense of worth and a feeling of belonging. Munhu munhu (a person is a person) may appear to be a tautological truism but it serves the purpose of emphasising on the personhood of a disabled person. According to the proverb, a person has intrinsic value that cannot be negated or reduced by disability. As a result, the proverb advocates for the respect of disabled persons. Disabled persons must be treated as equally human. Humanity lies in the intrinsic personhood of an individual and not in the extrinsic physical disability. Personhood is therefore prior to disability, and as such disability cannot eliminate or reduce personhood. This ontological foundation of personhood provides grounding for the ethical dimension of personhood. The disabled persons are given the same status as the able bodied within the community. The values of togetherness, unity, solidarity and belonging that bind communities together irrespective of personhood are important. While criminal activities are legally and morally unacceptable among the Shona, the personhood of those accused of wrongdoing is respected within the Shona conceptual scheme. In the Shona philosophy of personhood, there is an ontological distinction between the person who has committed an offence and the offence. Because of this essential distinction, there is a possibility of hating the offence and not the offender. The proverb, dare harizvondi munhu, rinozvonda mhosva (the court does not despise the person but the offence) (Hamutyinei and Plannger 2013) serves to show the said ontological distinction. In its literal meaning, the first part of the proverb assumes this ontological distinction because a human being is seen as having intrinsic value owing to his or her possession of mweya (soul). Shona practices that show that even the accused person is respected before the law. This respect accords fair hearing to the accused so that the law can be used to determine the offence, if any. The protection of individuals is done on the basis of personhood also helps to handle false accusations. Even if the accused is found guilty, there is still respect for that person since the person still possesses the potential to do well. When one is found guilty, a team of elders explains the nature of the offence in the context of the law with the aim of rehabilitating the individual. Shona philosophy of law places personhood first. The law is established to serve individuals by virtue of their intrinsic value and dignity (personhood) and not the other way round. Even if human beings are found on the wrong side of the law, their personhood is recognised since the Shona thought system of law makes an important distinction between

312 

E. T. GWARAVANDA

a crime (mhosva) and an individual (munhu). The law addresses the crime while attempting to maintain individual personhood as much as possible for the purpose of rehabilitating the individual in future. Among the Shona, law must be subordinated to personhood, and as a result, law is used to protect the dignity of persons. Even if one is accused of wrongdoing, the personhood of the individual must be protected under the trial processes. The three proverbs analysed above provide evidence that in Shona culture, personhood is an intrinsic value that belong to human beings prior to external circumstances and experiences. The consequence of this approach is that personhood is also granted, rather than denied, to marginalised and disadvantaged members of the community. This conception of personhood protects every member of the community against stigma and discrimination. It is the individual, with prior intrinsic value and dignity who can become an economic, social, religious, political and legal being. As a result, one is not granted personhood because one is rich or politically powerful since one acquires economic and political status when one already possesses personhood. In addition, whatever happens to the individual in the field of economics, law or social standing, for example, does not diminish or negate personhood within the Shona philosophy of personhood. This provides a valuable basis for developmental initiatives that are inclusive, as the rights of very member are prioritised.

Conclusion The chapter has shown that generalised accounts of personhood in African philosophy fail to justify their conclusions with sufficient evidence due to a mismatch between premises and conclusions in the inductive arguments advanced. The fallacy of hasty generalisation is a weakness faced by the generalised approach to personhood in African philosophy. It has been shown that taking African culture as homogenous is problematic. To gain credibility, generalised metaphysical and normative dimensions of personhood in African philosophy need to draw from factual content as depicted by particular African cultures. It has been argued that a more careful approach to the philosophy of personhood is based on specific or particular cultures such as Akan, Yoruba, Luo, Shona and Venda, among others. Following this line of thinking, I defended a Shona conception of personhood that is informed by three Shona proverbs. It has been shown that Shona philosophy of personhood grants personhood on the basis of

16  PERSONHOOD IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: BEYOND HASTY… 

313

intrinsic value of individuals rather than extrinsic circumstances such as economic, political or social status. Similar studies on personhood in African thought can still be done from a particular cultural standpoint so as to provide a rich and diversified approach to personhood in African philosophy. This would facilitate the implementation of more sustainable development initiatives in Africa.

References Ajei, M. 2007. African Development, The Imperatives of Indigenous Knowledge and Values. Pretoria: UNISA. Unpublished Phd Thesis. Behrens, K. 2013. Two ‘Normative’ Conceptions of Personhood. Quest 25: 103–119. Bhebhe, N.M., and A. Viriri. 2012. Shona Proverbs: Palm Oil with Which African Words are Eaten. Gweru: Booklove Publishers. Chemhuru, M. 2018. African Communitarianism and Human Rights: Towards a Compatibilist View. Theoria 65: 37–56. Chimakonam, J. 2018. Can Individual Autonomy and Rights Be Defended in Afro-Communitarianism? Filosofia Theoretica 7: 122–141. Copi, I.M., C. Cohen, and K. McMahon. 2014. Introduction to Logic. 14th ed. London: Pearson. Eze, O.M. 2018. Menkiti, Gyekye, and Beyond: Towards a Decolonisation of African Political Philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica 7: 1–17. Gwaravanda, E. 2019. Ubuntu Environmental Ethics: Conceptions and Misconceptions. In African Environmental Ethics: A Critical Reader, ed. M. Chemhuru, 79–91. Cham: Springer. Gyekye, K. 1992. Person and Community in African Thought. In Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, vol. 1, 101–122. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. ———. 1995. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Hamutyinei, M., and A. Plannger. 2013. Tsumo-Shumo: Shona Proverbial Lore and Wisdom. Gweru: Mambo Press. Hawthorne, J. 2018. Inductive Logic. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/logic-­inductive/). Horsthemke, K. 2018. African Communalism, Persons, and Animals. Theoretica Filosofia 7: 60–79. Hountondji, P. 1996. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Hurley, P.J. 2012. A Concise Introduction to Logic. New York: Wardsworth.

314 

E. T. GWARAVANDA

Manzini, N. 2018. Menkiti’s Normative Communitarian Conception of Personhood as Gendered, Ableist and Anti-Queer. South African Journal of Philosophy 37: 18–33. Matolino, B. 2018. The Politics of Limited Communitarianism. Filosofia Theoretica 7: 101–122. Mbiti, J. 1969. African Religions and Philosophy. London: Heinemann. Menkiti, I. 1984. Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. R. A. Wright, 171–181. Lanham: University Press of America. Metz, T. 2010. Human Dignity, Capital Punishment and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights. Journal of Human Rights 9: 81–99. ———. 2013. The Western Ethic of Care or an Afro-Communitarian Ethic? Specifying the Right Relational Morality. Journal of Global Ethics 9: 77–92. Molefe, M. 2019. An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality and Politics. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Nyambezi, C.L.S. 1990. Zulu Proverbs. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Oberheim, E. 2011. Editor’s Introduction. In The Tyranny of Science, ed. P. Feyerabend, vii–xii. Cambridge: Polity Press. Okere, T. 2005. Is There One Science, Western Science? Africa Development 30 (3): 20–34. Panikkar, R. 1997. Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. New York: Paulist Press. Tempels, P. 1969. Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine. Wiredu, K. 1996. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indiana: Indiana University Press. ———. 2009. An Oral Philosophy of Personhood: Comments on Philosophy and Orality. Research in African Literatures 40: 8–18.

CHAPTER 17

Identity Dispositions, Development and Economic Progress in Africa Clive T. Zimunya

Introduction The mass adoption and use of technology is the identifying characteristic of the twenty-first century. Much of the developed world has gone past the industrialisation phase into the digital era where information technology has taken centre stage. Africa appears to be lagging behind in most spheres of technological advancement, with much of what is called industrialised Africa being mostly remnants of what colonisers built, and later destroyed or underutilised mostly by corrupt African politicians. While developed countries are known for their cutting-edge technology, a look at modern-day television news channels reveals that Africa still remains recognised worldwide mostly for its rich cultures, arts and crafts, which are all in some way linked to religion. A lot of research, such as that by Naaman (2015), shows that Africans are keen on keeping/maintaining their identity in the form of such cultural/religious values and putting them forth as springboards to Africa’s development. However, Africa is yet to make a

C. T. Zimunya (*) National University of Lesotho, Maseru, Lesotho © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4_17

315

316 

C. T. ZIMUNYA

significant mark on the technological playing field. In this chapter, my aim is to investigate why this is the case. I intend to reveal that there is a correlation between countries that are highly cultural/traditional, and lack of scientific development. I intend again to show that there is also a direct correlation between scientific development and economic development.

The World Cultural Conceptual Map Studies of the world’s societies by Inglehart and Welzel from about 1981 to 2015 revealed that the world can be divided into societies that are traditional and those that are secular (Inglehart and Welzel 2015). A characteristic feature of traditional societies is that they place emphasis on religion, tradition and cultural values over and above any other values. In traditional societies, members believe that they are linked together and share common values and identities grounded in religion and culture. The societies are typically communitarian in orientation and members are expected to follow various traditions and norms which are considered to be sacred. All these are meant to maintain some kind of identity which persists through the ages. Traditional societies also tend to follow an authoritarian kind of governance style, typically a one-party state or something similar, since most traditions and cultures were born out of authoritarian styles of governance where kings claimed to have the divine right to rule. As such, democracy is not a usual feature of traditional societies, with a few exceptions. Secular societies, on the other hand, are based more on humanism or belief in the power of the human being to shape their future. Although many secular states remain religious, it is important to note that religion, traditions and culture do not play as significant a role as they do in traditional societies, to the point of controlling the social lives of the members of such societies. In secular societies, members are allowed the freedom to explore ideas that may not be in line with, or even contradictory to, cultural or religious values. Such a divergence usually finds an applauding audience since it is usually backed by evidence. Because members are given the freedom to pursue their own version of happiness, democratic and capitalistic values seem to be characteristic of most secular societies, as these give individual members the optimum freedoms to pursue their own conception of the good life. Although some societies have an overlap of both religious and traditional values, such as South Korea, which is at the same time a traditional

17  IDENTITY DISPOSITIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS… 

317

society and a secular one at that (Inglehart and Welzel 2015), it is a general observation that societies which tend to be secular also tend to be more economically developed than those that are traditional in orientation. Most Western countries score high on the secular index while most African countries are more on the traditional extreme.

Africa, Religion and Traditional Values John Mbiti (1969: 1) states: Africans are notoriously religious. Whenever the African is, there is religion. He carries it to the fields where he is sowing seeds or harvesting a new crop; he takes it with him to the beer party, or to attend a funeral ceremony; and if he is educated, he takes religion with him to the examination room at school or in the university; if he is a politician, he takes it to the house of parliament.

Judging by the evidence, this seems to be an accurate depiction. A survey of the world’s cultures reveals that Africans are among the most religious people on the planet, linking every aspect of their lives (from family values to politics) to religion. Many African societies are communitarian in orientation. A lot of literature exists to support this point, mainly by people such as Menkiti (1984) and others. These writers argue that the African way of life is somehow linked to an embeddedness (in various degrees) within group structures. Strong communitarians such as Menkiti suggest that the individual has absolutely no freedoms in such a group, whereas moderate communitarians argue that the individual has some degree of freedom within the group. In either case, the group takes precedence over the individual as expressed in such dictums as “I am because we are…” (Mbiti 1969: 141). This means that the individual is ontologically secondary to the group. What this translates to is a situation where the individual is either completely or partially at the mercy of the dictates of the group’s ways of doing things. The group dictates to the individual the entirety of their way of life from moral codes to political ideologies. Any deviation from such norms is considered a taboo, and elaborate rituals exist to ensure that the individual does not offend those who reside in the spiritual realm/the living dead. The phrase “living dead” might appear to be a contradiction to the non-African mind, but to the Africans, these spirits of deceased ancestors are a real force that exist to ensure that these customs and norms are followed by those in the living world (Ukwamedua, 2018).

318 

C. T. ZIMUNYA

Although moral codes are not written anywhere in African societies, they exist as common expectations of each member of society, passed down from generation to generation through oral means in a family setup. The coming of Christianity has also not made things any better since evidence suggests that Africa is the most Christianised place on earth. New churches continue to sprout, led by the ever increasing young charismatic leaders who continue to surface in Africa and add onto, or build upon, the religious nature of Africans in general. Although Christianity is the publicly declared choice of religion for most Africans South of the Sahara, many, including the Christians themselves, still hold on to some aspects of traditional African religion. For instance, it is common to find many African Christians engaging in traditional rituals, such as those to honour the ancestors, or the payment of lobola (bridewealth) custom. This just goes to show that African traditional customs permeate the very fabric of what it means to be an African in this region. Even Africans who have migrated to first-world countries still believe that the world is filled with spiritual forces, most of them evil and out to harm them, hence they should seek protection in one religion or the other, especially the African traditional religion. From this, it is important to note that the African person takes great care to follow their cultural dictates lest they attract an assortment of punishments from members of the living dead. This leaves little room for independence of thought and decision making. Many of the African person’s actions are informed by their cultural dictates and deviating from such norms is not a celebrated option by both the living and the living dead. However, it is curious to note that the world’s developed societies or first-world countries became what they are today in a series of revolutionary changes to their cultural ways of thinking.

Religion, Culture and Revolutionary Thinking Traditional societies generally follow cultural norms without much questioning of them. This was the state of affairs in Ancient Greece, where members of the city states were informed by culture and religion as promulgated by people such as Homer and Hesiod, in their depiction of the activities of the gods and their expectations. This all changed with the emergence of the first scientists/philosophers around the turn of the sixth century BC, who dared to question such cultural claims and seek a naturalistic understanding or explanation of the universe around them. In

17  IDENTITY DISPOSITIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS… 

319

other words, they wanted to discover where the world came from and its operations from a naturalistic perspective rather than basing their understanding on non-changing sacred cultural dictates. Although this kind of thinking was not welcome at the time, it was revolutionary in the sense that it marked the beginning of new fields of enterprise that were previously unimagined, such as astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, zoology, botany and later on other scientific fields such as taxonomy and palaeontology. Although such thinkers faced great criticism, with some like Socrates being put to death and later, others such as Galileo being publicly tried for challenging the authoritative status of the religio-cultural beliefs of their time, this kind of revolutionary thinking shaped the modern world and the way it has become. Such revolutionary thinking put religion and culture as secondary to humanistic and naturalistic explanations of the world. This also had other direct and indirect consequences which shaped values in first-world countries today. For instance, where previously kings were thought to be divinely ordained by a god/gods, and hence could not be removed from power, secular values challenged the veracity of such claims, reducing kings to mere mortals whose authority could be challenged, leading to opening up of democratic space and the abandonment of hereditary rule. Where ethical norms were once controlled by culture for fear of reprimand from the gods, secular values promoted free thinking and justification of moral norms on the basis of their efficacy. For instance, the abolishment of slavery which is clearly condoned in the Bible in Exodus 21 (see also, among others, Ephesians 6: 5). This removed much of the power of the future of the human race from the hands of deities to the minds of capable human beings. It is this movement away from culture and religion as a controlling social force that the predominantly secular first world has come to be what it is. Power no longer resides in deities but in the human beings themselves. A look at the industrialised world is evidence of this claim. Had people kept clinging on to their traditional values, industrialisation would not have taken place through inventions of the steam engine by Thomas Savery in 1698, the electric motor by Michael Faraday in 1831, as well as other developments in physics by people such as Newton’s laws of motion in 1666 and Einstein’s theories of relativity in 1905. These inventions and discoveries have shaped the modern world as they paved the way for the technology that we have come to cherish today to be derived through a process of continually revising and refining ideas and technology that came before them.

320 

C. T. ZIMUNYA

This means the adoption of critical thinking leads naturally to innovation and invention, since the mind is allowed to think outside the box. This is not to say that secular societies are permissive and without their own culture, not at all. But what this means is that secular cultures give more room to the individual to think outside the cultural box by providing an environment that permits freedom of thought without strict cultural impediments. It is not surprising, therefore that secular societies tend to be more economically developed than countries that are not. Psychological studies have revealed that the more an environment enables free thought, the more creative individuals become. An individual who is born in a society that does not frown upon difference and upholds values of critical and creative thinking, tends to be more analytical and less gullible than individuals who are born in societies without such values. Critical thinking skills, acquired through a process of education, can equip learners with the ability to analyse and solve problems and to make better decisions. Societal problems such as crime, poverty and pollution are sometimes the result of the decisions made at a policy level in government and business which were not subjected to critical scrutiny aided by research. In such instances, for problems to be solved, adequate and relevant knowledge, an open-­ minded disposition and critical thinking skills are required. Scientific thinking is based on the assumption that everything in the world is premised on constant and predictable patterns and it is up to human beings to figure out these patterns and manipulate them to their own use. Scientific thinking is based on at least three interconnected features: 1. there are no absolute truths as these can be falsifiable with further experimentation; 2. second, that all positive claims need to be supported by evidence; and 3. third, that all positive claims need to be subjected to intense public scrutiny. The first proposition suggests that all information that is proclaimed as true must be subjected to rational scrutiny. There is no information that is immune to rational analysis. In fact, the more sacred something is made to appear, the more it should arouse people’s curiosity to determine if it is true. Curiosity on almost all aspects of life becomes central to this kind of thinking. On the second aspect, it is important to note that whenever someone makes a claim that something is the case, the claim needs to be supported by evidence and according to Hitchens razor, extraordinary

17  IDENTITY DISPOSITIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS… 

321

claims require extraordinary evidence, meaning that the bolder and controversial the claim, the more evidence that is needed to justify the claim. If I make the claim that the world will end in 20  years’ time, then this needs to be substantiated by evidence. Claims made without any evidence can also be dismissed without any evidence since they do not give people any reason to believe in them. The third feature suggests that if I make the claim that something is the case then I need to make the evidence for my claim available for public scrutiny, either through repeatable public demonstrations and an outline of methodologies and findings such that other people can also verify that my claims are true. This is what is generally called the process of review, where peers in a certain field get to look at someone’s claims, analyse their evidence and determine if their methodologies were appropriate and in concordance with the results. This also allows others to point out flaws in the evidence of the claim and build upon that point of view and thereby creating new knowledge. All the technological advancements in various complicated spheres such as medicine, biology and physics are all a product of these three features of scientific thinking. More and better technological advancements arise out of this ever-continuous process of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. A look at Africa and other parts of the world that are traditional in orientation reveals the reverse situation. In a typical traditional African society, cultural claims are taken to be sacrosanct and not to be questioned nor challenged and everything is taken to be cast in stone, with one way of doing things, depending on the culture to which one belongs. Evidence of this can be seen in the continuous observance of cultural norms such as burial rituals or marriage rites from which all members of society are expected never to diverge. Beliefs in empirically unsubstantiated phenomena abound, with the majority of the members believing in the agency of unseen spirits and other supernatural  agents as witches and wizards, though evidence of such things/entities have not been collected or publicly examined. It is taken for granted that such things exist and have a bearing of sorts on human life. This extends to moral codes of the society, where there seems to be unchanging moral codes embedded in the traditional society. Although the influence of Western cultures on younger members of the African societies is taking its toll, older generations in African societies seem to be informed by these unseen and unchanging traditional moral codes. No justification is required for these moral codes; the only justification required being that this is the way we have always

322 

C. T. ZIMUNYA

done things in our society. Such a conformist approach to reality is what is perceived to give the Africans their identity.

Identity and Identity Dispositions Tajfel (1978) defined social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-­ concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups), together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership”. What this means is that a person’s identity is intricately bound to the group from which they come and its values. To further refine this definition of identity, it is important to add that a person’s identity can be summed up as the totality of knowledge that gives them a default position/disposition when approaching certain fundamental questions of life. Identity in this sense is knowledge-based dispositions that are inculcated into the individual from an early age. They form part of the shortcut mechanisms that the individual uses to process information. This is what I call identity dispositions. An example to illustrate what this means will be appropriate. Two individuals who witness a house being struck by lightning will interpret this event differently depending on their default heuristic dispositions. If one’s dispositional orientation is spiritual and fixed, then they would interpret this as having a spiritual cause and having no other probable cause. On the other hand, if one’s disposition is more open with a scientific inclination, their default inclination is to attribute the event to a naturalistic cause. Two distinct identity dispositions emerge from this example: one that is spiritual (religious) in orientation and one that is scientific (naturalistic) in orientation. For purposes of this analysis, it is important to highlight that although a third disposition, which is a combination of the religious and scientific, can be formulated, traditional and secular societies are usually characterised by these two polar identity dispositions, with the traditional being more religious and the secular being more naturalistic in their dispositions.

Challenges of Religious Identity Dispositions Although naturalistic identity dispositions carry problems of their own, my focus is largely on the problems caused by a religious identity disposition. The most significant challenge with a religious identity disposition is that it is typically based on, and in part celebrates, ignorance. By ignorance

17  IDENTITY DISPOSITIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS… 

323

here is meant an attitude of not being motivated enough to seek alternative explanations of events that happen in the universe, the nature of the universe itself and its operations. People of a religious identity disposition typically have a singular and closed approach to reality. As long as something does not conform to their fundamental beliefs, then, regardless of any evidence to the contrary, they would still hold on to their beliefs. It can be sustained that the most devout members of a group are, on average, least willing to accept the evidence of reality. Most members of a religious identity disposition are not willing to challenge their beliefs, whether these be cultural or religious. Their only reason for accepting something as true is simply that “my culture says so” or that “my religion says so”, regardless of any evidence to the contrary. For example, if one’s belief system tells them that it is angels who cause a rainbow to appear or it is God who causes the seasons to change, or that it is demons and evil spirits that cause illness, it would be difficult to make such a person believe anything to the contrary, let alone allow the person to look for evidence contrary to their beliefs. To tell them that rainbows are caused by a reflection and refraction of light permeating through water molecules that act as prisms, thereby creating a spectrum from which the colours that we perceive as a rainbow are created; or that seasons change because of the earth’s orbit around the sun; or that diseases are caused by microbial organisms that can be seen under an appropriate microscope, will not entice them enough to change their mind. Instead, they will cling on to their beliefs or seek only information that conforms to and/or confirms their pre-existing beliefs, a phenomenon known in psychology as confirmation bias. This closes any avenues to any knowledge that contradicts their beliefs and a suspicion towards any new knowledge. Once new information is closed out this way, such kinds of ignorance make it difficult for critical thinking to thrive. In the history of knowledge that has culminated in the vast body of knowledge that we have today, practical and scientific knowledge has proceeded through testing ideas through experiment and observation, building on those ideas that pass such rigorous tests and rejecting the ones that fail such testing. Researchers have always followed the evidence wherever it leads and questioned everything, including things that are considered sacred. For me to be typing this document on this computer, to be able to visit a doctor and get accurate diagnosis and medication for an ailment, to be able to fly across the globe to virtually anywhere, to be able to access information on advanced technological devices such as smartphones, is a product of following such

324 

C. T. ZIMUNYA

rigorous scientific processes and following the evidence. This is characteristic of the secular/scientific identity dispositions. Morality can even be explained from the point of view that as social animals, humans realised naturally that getting along well with other members of one’s pack generally promotes overall well-being and that fighting with members of the group may not be in one’s best survival interests as they can be ostracised, banished or even killed if they offend others. The secular identity disposition allows for a multiplicity of angles from which a problem can be looked at thereby subjecting it to scrutiny and following the best explanation or solution to that problem. In essence, the secular/scientific identity disposition promotes creativity and innovation. The industrialised world is a good example of the practical application of the secular identity disposition. In the pre-industrialised era, roughly the years before 1750, work was done manually, which usually involved a lot of human labour, which was both time-consuming and less productive (Littek, 2001). As work could not be done on a large scale, subsistence agriculture was the main mode of the economy and many more people lived in villages rather than in cities. The dominant identity disposition at this time was the traditional/religious identity disposition. But, as the old saying goes, necessity is the mother of invention. Certain individuals within such societies began to be uncomfortable with the status quo and an enabling environment (which may have been hostile to such thinking at first) allowed them to make inventions that revolutionised the world. The electric motor, the steam engine, electricity itself, aeroplanes, automobiles and other inventions and discoveries paved way for the modern world to come into existence. Without such individuals who dared come out of the box in terms of their thinking, the world would not be the way it is today. A look at first-world countries today reveals that they are largely where they are because of people who have secular identity dispositions; people who are curious and in constant pursuit of developing new knowledge, either based on what predecessors have done or even their own novel and ground-breaking findings. Their economies are based on the inventions and discoveries of many items that we find in the world today and their widespread use across the world. Before looking at other factors that have been highlighted in many studies as having a significant impact on economies across the world, such as the political situation of the land or the corruption levels of government officials, it is important to highlight here that it is this inward looking aspect that is most significant. In my analysis,

17  IDENTITY DISPOSITIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS… 

325

a country’s success or failure in terms of its economy is largely dependent on the amount of goods and services that are produced locally and for local consumption rather than those that are imported from other places. This means that the more a country/region produces its own technology that is widely used for the benefit of its members, and then subsequently sold to other parts of the world, the more that country’s economy becomes stable. But for a country to be able to do this, it must provide an environment that enables free thought, critical thinking and creativity. A look at most sub-Saharan African countries reveals that they are largely on the side of a traditional/religious identity disposition. Most of these countries can safely be identified as being stuck in the pre-­ industrialisation period, with the vast majority of people in such places living in rural areas rather than the cities. The few industries that exist in such places are ones that came with outsiders through historical episodes, such as colonialism and coalitions with Asian countries, and not a product of innovative individuals within the societies themselves. For example, in Zimbabwe today, the vast majority of large industries that can sustain the economy are remnants of the colonialists. This is a symptom that the society largely celebrates the traditional/religious identity dispositions and does not promote the secular identity disposition in its members. Religion claims to have all the answers figured out and people generally leave everything in the hands of their favourite deities rather than take responsibility as individuals and realise that the power to shape the future is in their hands. The large number of churches in Africa, as highlighted earlier, is evidence of this fact.

Observations and Recommendations It is important to note that the whole world celebrates their various identities and each is identified with their own society’s identity dispositions. Nowhere is this depicted more than in Hollywood films, albeit it being exaggerated, where the Westerner is seen as engaging in complex scientific escapades while the African still resides in traditional settings in a jungle with lions and elephants. African movies, typically from Nigeria, do not make matters any simpler, for they depict the African religious/traditional identity disposition by showing the African as highly spiritual and in a constant battle with spiritual forces. Science and technology is an uncommon theme in these African films. Very few African films have been made of an African person who dreams of going to the moon and to this day

326 

C. T. ZIMUNYA

some people think that going to the moon is actually impossible, yet this has been done several times in history. This, however, is an almost correct rendition of the differences between the two worlds and their identities; whereas the Westerner is disposed to think in secular terms, the African is disposed to think more in religious terms. This, in my analysis, has slowed down progress in terms of development of the growth of African economies. Technology does not necessarily need to be imported, but has to be derived from within by the people of that society for the benefit of that society. In the same fashion that African people today are clamouring for the recognition of universal human rights by their governments, it is high time that Africa makes a paradigm shift from often-times obsolete religious/ traditional identity dispositions, to more secular identities which allow for more freedom of thought and subsequent space for thinking creatively. By seeking human rights recognition in their various constituencies, Africans are declaring that they recognise that, together with the rest of the world, we are but one people, with common interests and differences that lie only in our identity dispositions. In Shona they say, “kugara nhaka kuona dzevamwe” (one learns from observing what others do), whose metaphorical meaning translates to “do what works based on what you have seen others doing”. It is high time Africa adopts strategies of economic survival that work, based on observation of countries that have made it, rather than stick to the preservation of age-old traditional identities that keep us locked in an unproductive past. Children ought to be taught to question their beliefs, follow the evidence and be creative, and African governments must create environments that foster these identity dispositions.

Conclusion From the foregoing analysis, I have highlighted that there are basically two identity dispositions across the world, that is, the traditional/religious and the secular/scientific identity dispositions. Much of the world can be categorised into either of these two classes depending on whether the default disposition of their members at explaining the world is scientific or religious. I demonstrated above that much of the developed world seems to have a scientific/secular identity disposition and argued that this explains why their economies are stable and functional since their beliefs are based on pragmatic testing of information and settling for that kind of information that works.

17  IDENTITY DISPOSITIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS… 

327

Enabling conditions in such places exist which allow for values such as freedom of thought and thinking outside the box, which have resulted in numerous ideological and technological advancements that have benefitted other societies as well. Africa, on the other hand, seems to be stuck in a religious/traditional identity disposition, which is characterised by an environment that encourages an unquestioned conformity to norms, which in turn creates an environment that does not allow critical thinking and creativity. I argued that for African economies to become more stable, there is need for a paradigm shift from this traditional identity disposition to identity dispositions that encourage critical thinking, which is necessary for innovation and creativity.

References Inglehart, R., and Welzel, C. 2015. World Values Survey. https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings. Littek, W. 2001. Labor, Division of, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-­sciences/ pre-­industrial-­society. Mbiti, J. 1969. African Religions and Philosophy. Nairobi: Heinemann. Menkiti, I. 1984. Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In African Philosophy, An Introduction, ed. R. Wright. Lanham: University Press of America. Naaman, R.P. 2015. African traditional religion a sub-structure for sustainable development in Africa: A Kenyan perspective. IISTE. Tajfel, H. 1978. The achievement of inter-group differentiation. In Differentiation between social groups, ed. H. Tajfel, 77–100. London: Academic Press. Ukwamedua, N.U. 2018. The Ontological Status of ‘The Living Dead’ in Post Modern African: A Discourse in Existential Metaphysics. Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities 19 (1): 24–40. https://doi.org/10.4314/ujah.v19i1.2.

Websites https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/faith-­and-­foolishness/ Identity: Personal and Social. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316790231_Identity_Personal_AND_Social Accessed 24 April 2020.

Index1

A African culture, 20, 78, 102, 103, 245, 301, 303–305, 312 African philosophy, 4–5, 42, 179, 301–313 Afro-pessimism, 6, 7, 258 AIDS, 159, 167–171 Anthropocentrism, 126 Apartheid, 37, 38, 73, 106, 203, 207 C Climate change, 15, 30, 77–79 CODESRIA, 11 Colonialism, 16, 18, 29, 31, 37, 46, 48, 50, 51, 54–57, 59, 62, 73, 76, 77, 85–96, 101, 102, 107, 128, 165, 204, 238, 240, 249n1, 250n3, 251, 252, 254, 275, 276, 305, 325

Colonial rule, 27, 87, 237, 249, 252, 253, 256 Conglomeration, 116 Corruption, 2, 6–8, 10, 15, 18, 19, 50, 63, 77, 81, 87, 93, 94n4, 100, 102, 110, 116, 122, 196, 203, 204, 217–228, 261, 269, 276, 283, 324 Council for Social Research in Africa, see CODESRIA COVID-19, 19, 30, 78, 117, 119, 122, 124–134, 139–154 D Decoloniality, 10–13 Diaspora, 20, 79, 103, 232, 234, 236, 241–244, 246

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 E. Chitando, E. Kamaara (eds.), Values, Identity, and Sustainable Development in Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12938-4

329

330 

INDEX

E EAC, see East African Community East African Community (EAC), 203 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 203 ECOWAS, see Economic Community of West African States Elizabeth Musodzi, 39, 41 F Feudalism, 49 Frank Ayema, 39 G Gates, Melinda, 132, 147 GDP, see Gross Domestic Product Gender discriminatory practices, 287, 297 Globalization, 10, 32, 57, 76, 77, 95, 96, 99, 106, 108, 121, 122, 128, 142 Global powers, 6, 16 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 8, 90, 126, 166 Gukurahundi, 41 I Inequality, 5, 7, 10, 30, 47, 48, 77, 85, 164, 222, 273, 281, 286, 289, 290, 293, 294, 297 J Jettisoning, 4, 74 K Kaunda, Kenneth, 6

L Liberation, 33, 35, 37–40, 55, 62, 79, 90, 243, 244, 289 M Marriage, 33, 160n1, 160n2, 161, 243, 292–295, 321 Marx, Karl, 43, 285, 286 Mbeki, Thabo, 6, 38 Mosaic Law, 210 Mtukudzi, Oliver, 38 Mugabe, Robert, 6, 33, 37, 38, 276, 278, 288 Muslim, 189, 191, 192, 195, 211–214, 219, 240, 241, 246 N National Democratic Congress (NDC), 179, 180, 183–196 National Patriotic Party (NPP), 179, 180, 183–185, 187–196 NEPAD, see New Partnership for African Development New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), 140, 141 Ngugi, see Ngugi wa Thiong’o Ngugi wa Thiong’o, 57–59 Nyerere, Julius, 6, 10, 33, 38, 104, 109, 278 O Operation Murambatsvina, 41 P Pan-Africanism, 76, 79, 141 Pan-Africanists, 38, 76, 79–81, 141, 153

 INDEX 

Philanthropy, 18 Philosophy, 2, 4–6, 9, 10, 20, 29, 35, 36, 42, 52, 86, 93–95, 103, 107, 179, 201n1, 301–313 Poverty, 2–9, 13, 14, 16–20, 28, 46, 47, 63, 69–71, 75, 77, 80, 81, 85–88, 93, 96, 99, 100, 102, 105, 108–110, 121–123, 141, 142, 159, 160, 162, 164, 166, 167, 171, 176, 203, 218, 222, 232, 240, 267, 269, 272, 273, 279, 286, 291, 292, 297, 302, 310, 320 Prosperity, 6, 16, 42, 54, 70, 71, 165, 166 R Religion, 3, 18, 28, 29, 36, 37, 55, 57, 60, 71, 101, 103, 116–134, 178, 181, 189, 192, 197, 203, 208, 211–214, 218, 219, 221, 225, 227, 228, 232–238, 241, 242, 244–247, 253, 279, 281, 295–297, 310, 315–323, 325 S SADC, see Southern African Development Community (SADC) Samaritan, 210 Sankara, Thomas, 8, 10, 76 SARS-CV-2, 131–133 SDG, see Sustainable Development Goal Slavery, 27, 31, 37, 46, 48, 56, 128, 235, 241, 242, 275, 305, 319 Slave trade, 2, 27, 48, 73, 77, 102, 128, 207, 235, 241, 273, 275

331

Sorcery, 235, 240 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 203 Sustainable development, 1–21, 28–31, 44, 59–64, 69–81, 107–109, 117, 122, 123, 171, 177, 198, 223, 227, 232, 250, 252, 258, 259, 261, 272, 292, 297, 313 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG), 2, 3, 5, 7–9, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 28, 70, 77, 78, 81, 85, 86, 89, 93, 96, 99, 108, 110, 118, 121, 123, 134, 154, 160, 162, 164, 171, 175, 176, 197, 205, 218, 219, 223, 224, 232, 265, 286, 292, 298, 302, 307 T Transformational social development, 20, 265–268, 279–282 U Ubuntu, 10, 12–15, 18, 20, 29, 57, 81, 85–96, 107, 110, 179, 306 UNDP, 29, 50, 51, 59, 60 United States of America (USA), 88, 93, 119, 120, 123, 126, 128, 146, 147, 163, 202n2, 221, 241, 243, 244 USA, see United States of America (USA) Utilitarianism, 44, 45, 63, 164, 226 V Vision, 2, 6, 71, 110, 140, 203, 205, 239, 268, 270, 273, 310 Voting in Africa, 178

332 

INDEX

W Western capitalism, 6, 163 Witchcraft, 231, 234–236, 238–240, 247 Women’s empowerment, 8, 290, 295, 296 World Cup, 144 World Health Organization (WHO), 88, 123, 131, 132, 145, 146, 148–152 World War, 120, 160, 161, 161n3, 163

WWI, see World War WWII, see World War X Xenophobia, 19, 201–214 Y Yoruba, 105, 107, 232, 239, 242, 301, 305, 306, 312