US Energy-Security Interests in the Indian Ocean 9789814376501

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Established as an autonomous corporation in May, 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modem Southeast Asia. T he Institute's research interests are focussed on the many-faceted problems of Modernization and Development and Political and Social Change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a 24·member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the Government, a~ well as representatives fcom a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is ex officio chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

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The Indian Ocean

U.S.

Bne~y-Security

Interests in the Indian Ocean

by

M. Rajaretnam

Occasional Paper No. 34 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Price:

S$5. 00

Mr . Murugaiah Rajaretnarn's "U.S. Energy-Security Interests in the Indian Ocean" is the thirty-fourth publication in the Institute's Occasional Papers series. This series was inaugurated in 19'0 and for the most part consists of discussion and other papers presented at the Institute's Occasional and In-House seminars. Let's hope that Mr. Rajaretnarn's discussion of United State ' s interests in the Indian Ocean will be of interest to not only specialists but the larger public as well. In the meantime , while wishing Mr. Rajaretnarn and his paper all the best , it is clearly understood that responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in the work that follows rests exclusively with Mr. Rajaretnam and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Institute or its supporters. 29 July 1975

Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

LIST OF ILLUSTRAT I ONS Page MAPS

Fron tispiece

1

The Indian Ocean

2

Worldwide Petroleum Flow

31

U. S. Demand for Energy Resources , by Major Sources , Year 1970 and Estimated Projected Demand in 1975, 1985 , and 2000

22

2

u.s.

23

3

Current Projection and Change from Pre-October 1973 Projection (Base Forecast ) : Energy Requirements o f Non- Communist Countries, 1980 and 1985

24

Estimate of Petroleum Reserves in Principal Producing Countries and Crude Oil Production in 1972

25

1

United States Energy Flow Pattern , 1970

27

2

United States Energy Flow Pattern , 1980

28

3

United States Energy Flow Pattern, 1990

29

4

Worldwide Petroleum Production and Demand in 1972

30

TABLES 1

4

Petroleum Supply Demand Bala nce

CHARTS

U.S , Energy-Security Interests in the Ind1an Ocean

In recent years the Ind1an Ocean has become a subject of considerable 1nterest and debate. It has become an ocean of increasing tension and hos~ilit1es as the two rival superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union - compete with each other for supremacy in the region. Both the American and Soviet navies have 1ncreased their patrols in the Indian Ocean . The increasing thrust of the Soviet Navy into the Indian Ocean has been apparent since the 1968 British announcement of the withdrawal of its f orces from bases east of Suez. Moreover, the modern1zation of the Soviet Navy resulting in improvements in the capabilities of individual un1ts and 1n its peacet1me deployment patternsl have prompted much concern in Western capitals with regard to Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean . On the other hand , American perspectives on the Indian Ocean have also undergone change. Since the outb reak of the Indo- Pakistani Nar of 1971 , the U.S. Navy (USN) has increased its patrols in the Indian Ocean.2 Plans are now underway to improve American naval fac1lities in the Indian Ocean,3 The traumatic defeat of the United States in a land war at its strateg1c front ier in Indochina will inevitably lead to a reappraisal of its strategic policies throughout the world. It is expected that the United States will withdraw from its forward fortresses on the Asian mainland and re - establish them instead on the relative island havens of the oceanic reg1on . The 1ncreasing naval rivalry of the superpowers also seem to suggest that the strategic nature of warfare of the future 1s one that will place great emphasis on the

1

Barry M. Blechman , The ~ang~ng Soviet Navy (Washington , D. C.: Brook1ngs Inst1tution, 1973), pp . 8-11 .

2

The U.S . , however, had maintained a s1gnificant naval presence in the area well betore 1971 . It has only been sinte the late 1960s that a Soviet naval threat to U.S. interests has been perceived by the USN ,

3

Th1s refers to the plan to improve the m1litary fac 1l1ties on the island of Diego Gar c ia . More of this plan will be discussed further .

- 2 -

oceans as bases for the launching of submarine missiles. 4 Today, a number of naval and other facilities exis t in the Indian Ocean area for the use of the United States, Soviet Union , France and Britain.. The existence of such facilities and, in some cases, thei r development, suggest that the Indian Ocean, rather than becoming a zone of peace as the littoral states hope it will be, will instead become the new area of superpower rivalry. These developments are closely related to the importance of the seas in new strategic thinking . S The United States has several base fac i lities which are related to a strategi c nuclear war scenario , It has several communications facilities in Australia. The most important 1s the naval communications stat1on in North West Cape in Western Australia . This 1s des1gned to communicate with Poseidon and Polaris nuclear submar1nes operat1ng in the Indian Ocean. This facility is part of the u. s . global defence communications system which include stations in Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Diego Garcia and Asmara (Ethiopia ) . The jo1nt United StatesAustralia Space Communications Stations at Alice Spr1ngs is able to monitor Soviet land-based missile s1tes and to control s1gnals from an Amer1can satellite stationed over the Indian Ocean. The Communications Station at Woomera, South Australia, c arries out a variety of defence space research functions. Naval -facilities are presently being constructed at Garden Island in Cockburn Sound and these are expected to be completed in 1978. The Asmara stat1o n has been jo1ntly operated with the British since 1942 and is part of the global m1litary communications netwo rk . A naval base in the port of Massawa, Ethiopia, provides facilities for American naval vessels , including submarines. The United States has another communications stat ion in Mahe, Seychelles, in the 4

See Robert E. Wa l te rs , The Nuc~ea1' TI'a:p: An Escape Route (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974). Walters fore ~ asts the resurgence of seapower base d on nuclear -powered submar i ne s o f unli~ted ranges; see also Denzil Peir is , "The Strategy of Brinkmanship," Fal' Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 6 May 1974 . pp . 30- 34 .

5

Admi ral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr . , former Chief of Naval Operatwns, USN , had said that the U.S . is dependent on naval strength for its survival, unlike the USSR which is a land power . Strait6 Times (Singapo r e), 5 May 1975, p . 4.

-

3 -

Indian Ocean, and an important obser vation post with tracking and telemetry faci l1tie s at v a ,c oas , Maur i t1us . Bahrain in the Arabian Peninsula has been used as a limited n aval base fo r the U. S. M1 ddle East Force (M1deastfo r ) Command . The stat1oning agre ement wit h Bah ra1n c o ntains n o m~l1tary o r po litical commitment to the Government o f Bahrain or any o ther state i n the area . It merely provides f o r the cont1nued use of Mideastfor of the logist1c fac il ities made available by the Br1t1sh. 6 Probably the most important development in Indi an Ocean strategic naval politic s is the upgradi ng of the U.S. naval communica ti o ns f acil1ties in the island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipe lago 1nto a maJOr military nav al base which will be able to a ccommodate submarines and aircraft c arr iers. The proposed extension of the existing runway w1 ll enable it t o service the biggest aircrafts in the world. A coral atoll, measuring 13 miles long and 4 miles wide, Diego Garcia is situated almost at the centre of the Indian Ocean. It has n ow become part of the United States communi cations network stretching from Asmara to North West Cape . It has a qood harbour and airstrip. The proposed changes envis aged for D1ego Garci;, wh1ch became the subject of a congress1onal i nqu iry , will turn the island into a strategic base fo r the ope r ation o f the U.S . Navy in the Indian Ocean and the rest of the wo rld . 8

6

U.S. Congress. House .

Sub commi tt ee on the Near Eas t U. S. In~ere sts (Washingt on, D. C. :

in and Po Licy TowardS the Persian GuLf ; Hearings 1972) , pp . 4-5. 7 U. S. Congress. House.

Subcomncittee on the Near Eas t and South Asia.

Proposed Expansion of U. S. Mi Litary Facilities t.n the Indt.an Ocean; Hearings (Washington, D. C. : 1974). 8

Admiral Elmo Russel Zumwalt , Jr . , then Chief of Naval Operatlons, USN, stated at the con gressional hearings 1n i bt.d. , p. 130 : I th ink it is evident . • . that our i nte r ests in the lndtan Ocean are directly linked with our interests in Europe and Asia; and, more broadly, with our fundamental in t erests in maintai ning a stabie worldw1de b a lance of power . In this interdependent world , events 1n the I ndian Ocean cannot be viewed in isolat l on, but must be assessed

- 4 -

The proposal to build a naval base at Diego Garcia i s n ot new but was first raised in 1967 . 9 The e xpansion of the present facilities at Diego Garcia does not, however, "postulate any given level of deployment. " 10 In a statement to the same committee , Rear Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, U.S . Navy (Retired) and Director of the Center for Defence Information, cla1med that future improvements to the facilities in Diego Garcia " will go a long way toward makin g the base at Diego Garcia comparable in function to that of Subic Bay in the Philippines . "ll And in commenting on the probable reason for the intended expansion of facilities , Admiral La Rocque said: It is clear that the u.s ~ Navy is contemplating a naval arms race with the Sov1ets 1n the Indian Ocean and 1t 1s necessary to examine whether the threat warrants the steps which are be1ng p r oposed . . .. The u.s . Navy exaggerates the Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean and U.S. weaknesses.l2 The Subcomm1ttee on the Near East and South Asia of the Hous e of Representatives , which held the hear1ngs on the

Ln terms of their impact Ln other areas of key importance to the United States. In the judgement of many observers , the Indian Ocean has become the area with the potential to produce major shifts in the global balance over the next decade. It follows that we must have the ability to i nfluence events i n that area , and the capabil ity to deploy our military power in the region LS an essentLal element of such influence . That , i n my judgement , is the crux of the rationale for what we are planning to do at Diego Garcia .

9

Ibid.~

10

Ibid. , p. 4. This may be the intention at the present moment but such "restraint" may not continue for long if a continued Soviet naval expansion is consider ed provocative .

11

Ibid. , p. 104.

12

Ibid . ~

p . 82 .

p . 105 .

- 5 -

Diego Garcia expansion plans came to several significant conclusions:l3

(1)

that the expansion plans are justified if the Navy seeks to deploy a carrier task force 1n the Indian Ocean on a more regular bas1s;

(2)

that the expansion plans may have political and strategic implications , 1.e., their impact on the pol1cies and actions of the littoral states , the respo nse of the Soviet Un1on to the Un ited States' plans, and the potential of an escalation of the naval arms race 1n the reg1on;

(3)

that the United States has not reacted favourably to the possibility of arms lim1tation talks w1th the Soviet Union regarding the Indian Ocean , or to the proposal to create the Ind1an Ocean as a zone of peace.

u. s.

It is very clear then that the ava1lability of such facilities constitute an important reminder to u.s. allies of its continuing presence in the area. The Uni ted States is concerned about maintaining the "balance of power" in the Middle East and of protecti ng its accessibility to the oil of the Persian Gulf area. Perhaps the most important and most permanent U.S. interes t in the area lies in the question of the secur1ty o f i ts s upplies of energy . The Indian Ocean becomes therefore a n important l i nk in this energy-security lifeline. The Sov1et Union has none o f the kind of n a val facilit ies possessed by the Un1ted States i n the Indian Ocean area. The Soviet Union, howeve r, has been suspe cted of having a communication station in Berbera, Somalia, which commands a very impressive strategic f oothold at the mouth o f the Red Sea . There are about 2,500 Russian technicians who are assist1ng the Somali armed forces. Besides Somalia, the Russians have signif1cant access to port fac ilit1es at Aden and anchorages off the island of Socotra.l4 On the Persian Gul f side , the USSR 1s

13

Ibid.~

14

Edward Cochran . "Another Afri can Rift 7 •" Guardian Week ~y (London), 1 March 1975, p. 10.

p. vi .

- 6 -

assisting Iraq to develop umm Qasr into a leading port, oil terminal and naval base.lS France, too, has shown considerable interest in the Indian Ocean naval activities of the superpowers. France feels that it can protect its sea-lanes with a "pol itique du pavillon" (show the flag) policy when it despatched an aircraft carrier with escort vessels to the Indian Ocean in October 1974.16 France has also been suspected of having interests in building a major military base on the Comoro Archipelago, and of strengthening its position in the region of the Afars and Issas, the former French Somaliland.l7 There have been fears that, with the further withdrawal of British forces in the area, tension in the Indian Ocean will increase . In November 1974, the British Foreign Secretary announced in Parliament that the Simonstown Naval Agreement with South Africa would be allowed to "wither on the vine."l8 Britain has also shown intentions of withdrawing the Royal Air Force staging post on Gan island in the Maldives. American officials have often expressed the view that when the Suez Canal is reopened the Soviet Navy's peacetime patrols in the Indian Ocean will increase , l9 and that this

15

U.S. Congress~ House . Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf; Hea:rings (\~ashington, D. C.: 1973) , p. 38.

16

Voice of the Nati on (Bangkok), 16 October 1974 , p . 2 .

17

Ibid., 15 November 1974, p. 2 .

18

Guardian Weekly, 9 November 1974, p . 9 . Mr . Callaghan, the Foreign Secretary, had argued then that the ''' diplomat ic embarrassment" caused by the Simonstown Agreement far outweighed its "marginal" military advantages .

19

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs .. Subcommittee on the Near East •. The Middle East in Crisis: Problems and Prospects; Report (Washington , D.C.: 1972), p. 22 . See also P . Smit, "South Africa and the Indian Ocean ," in Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, eds . , The Indian Ocean : Its Political, Economic, and Military Importance (New York: Praeger, 1972), p . 280 . Michael Sterner,

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will pose a potential threat to non-communist shipping . Too much emphasis has obviously been placed on tq~ benefits the Soviet Union will gain from a reopening of the Suez Canal . For the Soviet Union, the canal is a poor alternative route in time of conflict, as it could very easily be blockaded. It could also be argued that the u.s. Navy 6th Fleet which is based in the Mediterranean will also reap some benefits as it could send naval patrols into the Indian Ocean. At present, the u.s . Navy 7th Fleet {Pacific) based in the Subic Bay naval complex in the Philippin es undertake regular patrols in the Indian Ocean. Among the littoral states of the region, Iran and India seem to be the two countries capable of building creditable naval forces. The Shah of Iran has embarked on a most ambitious task of turning the Iranian Navy into one of the most modern and best equipped in the area . It is already the strongest power in the Persian Gulf area and the Shah has expressed the intention of extending Iran's influence to the Indian Ocean as well: Already Iran ' s military power is being taken into account. By 1976, the Iranian Armed Forces will reach such a degree of qualitative progress that they will definitely be taken into account on an international scale.20 The Shah intends to expand Chah Bahar into an army , naval and air base larger than that of any other power on the Indian Ocean . 21 In 1971 , after the British

the Director for Egypt in the Department of State, in the hearings before the U. S. Congress argued that the reopening of the canal is "the natural sequel to a first-phase Egypt-Israe l agreement" and should not therefore be seen i n the context of broad U.S . political objectives in the Mi ddle East whi ch i s "to replace the present conditions of belli gerency in the Middle East with a final and comprehensive peace settlement by which all states in this area can live in security . " u. s. Congrcc;~. House . Committee on Foreign Affairs . Subcommittee on the Ncar East and South Asia. The United States Role in Opening the Suez Canal .(Washington, D. C. : 1974) .

u.s .

Congress • . • New Perspectives, p . 69 .

20

Quoted in

21

Jiirg Meister, " Iran's Naval Buildup ," :i.n ibid_. , p. 22l .

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withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, the Iranians seized three small islands 1n the strategic Stra1ts of Hormoz from the Federat1on of Arab Em i rates . This seizure placed the Iranians 1n a mil1tar1 l y doninant position i n the Straits . Iran has trad1tionally been considered a s an ally of the United States . In March 1975, when ~he Un1ted States lifted 1ts arms embargo on Pakistan, it was rumoured that Pakistan had offered the United States the option of using a naval base in the Arabian sea coast of Pakistan facing the Persian Gulf. While the United States, the Soviet Union and Iran continue to rearm their naval forces and increase their naval capabiliti es , the littoral states of the region have called for the Indian Ocean to be established as a zone of peace.22 The United States ' view on this was expressed by Mr. Seymour Weiss, Director of the Bureau of PoliticoMilitary Affairs in the Department of State: . .. while we sympathize with the principles which motivate some of the nations in the area to promote concepts such as the "Indian Ocean Peace Zone," all major maritime powers , including the United States and the Soviet Union, have been doubtful about this ini tiative because of its implication that littoral states somehow have a special right to limit or control the use of the high seas by others. The United States has long held the view that there must be unimpaired freedom of navigation on the high seas; this is a basic tenet of our position with respect to the forthcoming International Law of the Sea Conference . 23

22

The General Assembly of the Un i ted Nat ions on 16 December 1971 adopted a resolution 2832 (XXVI) wh i ch des i gnated the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace . The Indian pos i tion is analyzed i n Devandra Kaush i k , The Indi an Ocean: Towards a Peace Zone (Delh i : Vikas Publicat i ons , 1972), pp . 105- 125 .

23

U. S. Congress ,., Proposed Expansion, p. 27 .

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This "basic tenet" of freedom of navigation , an American idea which has prevailed all th1s t1me , has worked in the interests of the United States and other great powe r s. The challenge of this tenet from the l ittoral stat es with regards to the Indian Ocean , and f r om Indonesia and Malaysia over the nat ionalization of t he Straits of Malacca is therefore contrary t o American interests and pol1c1es. This 1s why the zone of peace concept 1s unacceptable to the United States. This concept, moreover , will not be real1zed because of two significant r easons, viz. , firstly , the existence i n the I ndian Ocean of naval facil1t1es and communicatio ns network that are features of the new strategy of warfare, and secondly, the nature of euperpower 1nterests in the reg1on . Rather than d1scuss the whole range of Un1ted States interests 1n the Indian Ocean , th1s paper will deal only with o ne cr1t1cal aspect of American interests , i . e., oil and the security of oil suppl1es. The economi c and political implicat1ons of the disruptions caused by the "energy cr1sis" of 1973 have drawn attention to the importance of oi l as a vital energy resource for industrial1z ed nat1ons such as the Uni ted States, Western Europe and Japan . 24 In late 1973 and during 1974 these nations were shocked into the realization of how vulnerable they were to an oil embargo and how dependent they were on the Arab states f or their supplies of oi l and gas. For the United States the shock was even greater because it had never bel1eved that the Arab oil producers would use this ultimate "weapo n" to ach1eve their objectives.2 5

24

U S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Foret gn Economic. Policy· PoLicy ImpL~aatione of the Energy Cr-isis ; He~ngs (Wash ington , D. C. : 19 72).

Fore~gn

25

Lee F. Dinsmore , the former U. S . Consul-Gene r al at Dhaharan , had argued very co gently and with far mor e tnsight than many other offt c ials ab out the need for a r eappratsal of U S. polt c tes 1n the area: "If, in a few years • the United States sho uld f a ce the threat of an oil c rists, th e reas on woul d almost certatnly be a result of the years of our negl e c t to deal squarely with the foretgn affairs questton of the pr es~rvat ton or Israel on terms that are ac ceptable to the countri es of the regton the zionist movement chose for a home. In a few years when , for example , Saudi Arabi an produc tion of o1l wtl l pro v1de mote revenues

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Fo r the United States as well as its all ies , oil i s an issue of securi ty both in terms o f i ts imp act o n t he country's balance of payments and as a n i mpo rtant s our c e of energy.26 This importance was unde r l i ned b y President Ford's warning in late 1974 that great powers have tradit ionally gone to war t o pro tec t t hei r a ccess to v ita l raw materi al s . In recent y ears the Uni t ed Stat e s , Weste r n Europe and Japan have become increasingly re l ian t on oi l from the Arab natio ns and this depend ence is l i kely to persist into the future. Of the three big powe rs , only the Un ited States i s dependent o n the import of oil f o r h er energy requirements . The Indian Ocean i s the transit area of all of t h e s e energy movements. More ove r, othe r raw materials , o n wh ich the i ndust r i al i zed nations rely , a l so move along the strategic r o utes o f the I ndian Ocean .2 7 Thus United States interest i n the Indian Ocean is a l so a re s p o n se t o the fear that v i t al raw mate r ials may be i nterdicted on the high seas b y h er enemi es. u.s. Secre ta ry of De f e n c e, J ames R. Schles i nger, well known f o r his "hawkish " views , s aid that: than the co untry c an use i nternally and g1ve away usefully, the Government of Saudi Arabia may find it pr udent to licrat production 1n the interest of conservation of its oil reserves . Or , indeed, let us fa ce all possibilities , they may stop produc tion for polit1cal reas ons . No country , poss1bly no combination of countries , could make up the loss of oil availabl e internationally a1 a result . lf other oil produc ing countr1es followed suit , even by merely limiting produc tion , a world c risis would develop ove rnigh t . " U.S . Congress .. . U. S . Intere sts , p ll6 . 26

" Oil is s o vital to the funct1on1ng of the economies o f the lndustrialized nat ions that interruption of any large part of the oil supplies of the United St ates and its major allies and trading partners must be regarded as a threat to the national s ecurity," in Jose ph A. Yager and others, Energy and U. S . Foreign. Po Licy (Cambr idge , Mass.: Ballinger , 1974 ) , p. 311.

27

See fo r instance the work of Yuan-li Wu in Raw MateriaL SuppLy Natt onal Strategy Information Center, 1973). Prof. Wu analyses the vulnerability of Western Europe , Japan and the United States as to the1r sources of primary materials and supply routes .

in a Mu LtipoLar WorLd (New Yo rk:

- 11 -

As a maritime nation, dependent upon the sea for the vitality of our economy and for mutual support with our Allies, the sea is more important to us than the Soviet Union . Therefore , a balance at sea implies more than a strict numerical balance, for together with our Allies we would need to protect a minimum essential level of shipping against a sustained interdiction effort by the Soviet Union a n d its allies. 28 For the United States the need to ensure the security of her energy supplies is of paramount importance. It is today a net importer of crude oil and natural gas. Its crude import picture has changed quite substan tially since 1971. Any disruption of oil supplies t herefore will have severe economic and security implications . In the hearings held before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives i n 1972 , all the witnesses were agreed that the United States is going to import large quantities of oil and gas in the short run than at any other time in its It was also agreed that domestic energy alterhistory . natives are unlikely to be available in significant 29 quantities to affect projected rates of impor ts of oil. It is generally estimated that u.s. oil consumption needs will outstrip domestic supplies by 19 80. A Chase Manhattan Bank study reported that by 1985, the United States may well be importing more than half of its petroleum supplies.30 A review of the extensive data available on projected U.S . energy requirements will substantiate this point . 31

28

Report of the Secretary of Defense_, James R. Schlesinger to Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 19?5-79 Defense Program_, March 4_, 19?4 (Washington, D. C. : 1974), p . 11 .

29

U.S. Congress •• • Foreign Policy Implications _, p. 334.

30

John Winger, and others , Outlook for Energy in the United States to 1985 (New York : Chase Manhattan Bank , 1972), p . 45.

31

There has been a proliferation of literature on this subject in recent years. Refer to the bibliography for a list of the literature used in this study.

- 12 -

Table 1 (see Appendix) shows the u . s . demand for various energy resources in 1970, 1975, 1985 and 2000 . Petroleum and natural gas together represen~ the greater ene r gy source - 73.2% in 1975 , 65.1% in 1985 and 60.6 % i n 200o.32 Although their share of the supply of energy will decline, the quantities required will increase - from 6,500 million barrels i n 19 75 to 8 , 600 million barrels in 1985 to 12 , 000 million barrels in 2000 in ~he case of oil; and 27 , 800 billion cubic feet in 1975, 38 , 200 billion cubic feet in 1985 and 49,000 billion cubic feet in 2000 in the case of natural gas. Tab l e 233 (see Appendix} surveys the net u.s . demand for imports of petroleum. In 1985 (for which the survey ended} petroleum imports will constitute 57% of total petroleum supply. The demand for petroleum impo rts seem to be reinforced Charts 1 , ·2 and 3 (see Appendix} are reproduced here to show graphically the pattern of American energy use in the years 1970 , 1980 and 1990.34 Chart 2 (for the year 1980} shows that by that year 50% (10 mi l lion B/DOE)35 of oil requirements will be imported and the rest will come from domestic sources. Th is represents a 6.5 million barrels p er day (b/d) increase by the pattern of e nergy use.

32

The data presented in the text of this paper are all projections based on the growth of the economy. These projections do not take account of policy which can infl uen ce the supply and demand of energy. They also take no account of technological developments and new discoveries . What is important to note, however , is that these data show the increas ing consump t ion trends and the declining domestic supply situation.

33

There is some variation in the petroleum figures for Tables 1 and 2. The National Petroleum Co~ncil ' s figures are higher than those of the U.S. Department of the Interior .

34

U.S. Congress . Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. understanding the ~National Energy Dilemma ' (Washington, D. C. : 1973) , pp . 4- 10; and Charts C, D, E. These projections are based upon the work of the National Petroleum Council and the U. S. Department of the Interior. The energy unit used is in terms of milhon barrels per day of oil equivalent (B/DOE) . A fuel is made "oil equivalent" by finding the number of barrels of oil which has the same heating value as a given quantity of that 1uel.

35

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in importe d oil over that of 1970. Chart 3 shows that the relianc e on imported oil has increase d to 18 . 0 million b/d compare d to the use of domesti c oil (10.5 million b/d) .

An evaluat ion of the energy needs of Western Europe

and Japan will reveal similar trends; in fact the overall picture of increasi ng depende nce is even more startlin g for these countrie s than for the United States. Chart 4 shows clearly that only in the United States, Western Europe and the Far East (mainly Japan ) does the consump tion of petroleu m exceed product ion. Table 3 (see Appendi x) shows the projecti ons of energy requirem ents after the oil crisis of 1973. These projecti ons are based on a reduced consump tion and growth rate pattern . 'T he precedin g tables and charts have establis hed the pattern s of energy consump tion for the United States , Western Europe and Japan at the present and in the future. The followin g charts and figures will show the pattern s of supply, sources of supply and location s of reserve s of gas and oil in the world. In 1972, the total world product ion of crude oil reached 18,531,8 72,000 barrels of which 39 .81% was produce d in the Middle Eastern and Asian regions (China's product ion represen ted l. OL% of world product ion) . The United States product ion constitu ted 18.66%, that of Western Europe a negligi ble l. 42 %, and the :.?SSt( product ion 15.56% of the world 's total crude o i l product ion.36 The Producti on-Dema nd ratio (as of 1972) was 0.68 for the u.s. , 0.02 for Western Europe, o.oo for Japan, 1.05 for China and 1.32 for the USSR . Therefo re, of the major powers, only the USSR and China have favoura ble producti on-dema nd ratios.3 7 Even the present estimat es of world petroleu m reserve s will show that the Middle Eastern region will dominat e the world oil scene in the next two to three decades . Table 4 (see Appendi x) shows that the Arab states {exclud ing those of North Africa) and Iran togethe r possess about 60% of the world's estimate d reserve s of crude oil . Libya's reserve s estimat es represe nt about 5% of world re serves. 36

DeGolyer and MacNaughton , Twentieth Centu~ Petroleum Statistic s , 1973 (Dallas: 1973), pp . 3-4.

37

Ibid. ,

p. 2.

- 14 -

In 1972, u. s. depende nce on crude oil from Africa and the Middle East reached 40% of total imports 1 and this depende nce will certainl y continu e to grow.J8 Al though OECD Europe has been able to reduce its depende nce on Middle Eastern crude oil fr o m a high of 73 % to SO%, its share of i mpo rts from African sources has increase d from 5% in 196 0 to over 35% in 197o.39 More than 85% of Japan ' s imports come from the Middle East area . The rest of her oil needs is largely supplie d by Indones ia and Malaysi a.40 Most of the future oil needs of the United States , Western Europe and Japan will therefo re have to be met by imports from the countrie s of the Persian Gulf area and North Africa . As the OECD report puts it, the United States, after enjoyin g many years of cheap and plentif ul supplie s of oil , "is now enterin g a period where increasi ng demand for energy is paralle led by growing problem s of supply." 41 Nhat are present ly the sources of oil supplie s for the Uni ted States, and how viable will these sources continu e to be , in terms of reliabi lity and security , in the future? This has been the biggest poser for the U. S. Governm ent. To date more than 50% of u.s . imports came from "Wester n Hem1sph ere" sources , i.e., Canada and South America . Table 4 shows the reserve s capacity (as of 1972) Canada has estimat ed reserve s totallin g of these areas. 1.49% of world reserve s and the estimat ed South America n reserve s total 4.69% of world reserves . This represe nts a fraction of world reserve s . Venezue la , the largest oil produce r in South America , remains the single largest s ou rce of u.s. impo r ts of crude

38

Ibid. 1 Chart No. 57 .

39

Organiza tion for Economi c Cooperati on and Developm ent, OiZ - The Present Situation and FutUPe Prospects : A Report of the OECD OiZ Committee (Paris: OECD , 1973), p . 15.

40

Ibid. l pp. 15-16.

41

Ibid., p. 62 .

- 15 -

oil and petroleum products o 42 Half of Venezuela's exports of crude oi l and by-products go to the United States . American officials believe that unless a major effort at the development of these oil resources is made, the prospects of Venezuela i ncreasing its exports to the United States through the 1980s and 1990s remain b l eak. 43 This ant~c~pated shortage in production is further complicat ed by th e high sulphur content of Venezuelan oil, the high prices of crude oil, the government's policy of maximizing revenues per barrel while trying to minimize its dependence on fore~gn oil companies, and the country's uncertain pol~t~cal stability. The Ford Foundation Study on Energy and U S. Fore~gn Policy concludes that by the 1980s the Lat~n Ameri c an region will not be able to increase oil exports to the Un~ted States above 3 million barrels a day (p resent exports are between 2-3 million barrels a day ) . ~4 Canada is the next largest exporter of crude oil to the Un~ted States. There are strong energy links between the two countr1es, and Canada has so far been a reliable supplier. Although 1ts oil potential is generally regarded to be greater than present estimates of reserves would 1nd1 cate, and Canada would theoretically continue to be a stable suppl1er, its reliability as a future suppl~er has been seriously quest~oned because of compel l ~ng domest1c reasons, such as the growing nationalistic assert1 veness of the people, environmental conservation pressures, and fears over the probable impact of u.s. capita l inflows on the Canadian economy.45 The high quality of its crude 011 has made Nigeria an important source of oil for the United States and Western Europe . 46 In 1972, Western Europe 1mported 62% ( 1,103 , 000 barrels da~ly) wh~le the United States 1mported 23 . 7% ( 422,000 barrels da1ly ) of total Nigerian

Energy~

42

See Table 5-4 1n Yager and others,

43

U. S. Congress

Fo~ign

Policy Implications, p . 252 .

44

Yager and others,

Energy~

p. 86 .

45

Ibid . ~

46

Yager and others,

p . 90 .

u.s.

Consress

Energy~

p . 109 .

pp . 72-73.

Fore~gn Pol~cy Implicat ions~

p . 252 .

- 16 -

Production Of 01' 1. 47 Bu t Ni g er i a I s 01' 1 reserves, h owever, are estimated at only 1. 78% of the world's total ~ In spite of these problems, Canada , Venezuela and Nigeria are still considered to be reliable suppliers of crude oil to the United States and Western Europe because of their proximity to these two large markets and also because they are not involved in the Arab - Israel1 conflict . These three countries , although they have been and continue to be reliable suppliers of crude oil to the United States and Western Europe , are not viable alternatives to M1ddle Eastern sources in the long run . It seems very clear therefore that the United Stat es, Western Europe, and Japan will have to continue to depend on the import of oil and natural gas from the Middle East and North Africa over the next two to three decades and more. Since ~he reliance on imported oil 1n the fu~ure will have cr1t1cal national secur1ty implications , 1t has often been suggested that the United States can minimize th1s dependence by increasing its utilizat1on of alternative domestic energy fu elg such as coal, nuclear power , and solar energy. But aside from the costs of product1on of these new fuels, which are prohibitive and may n o t be economical ly compet1tive even with the high oil prices of today , their viab1lity as adequate a l ternatives to 011 is als o questionable. Although there is an abundance of coal in the United States and although nuclear power will be a great potential 1n the future, U ~ S . energy needs "unfortunately . ~ .. do not permit such elast1city of fuel usage . "48 Char~s 1, 2 and 3 shov1 that the pattern of energ.Y use in the United States is of such a nature that it allows for very limited elasticity of fuel usage. The greatest users of energy in terms of barrels per day of 011 equivalent {B/DOE) are the 'transportat1on secto r ( 7.7 million 1n 1970 , 12.0 million in 1980 and 15 . 0 m1llion in I99o r r the 1ndustrial sector (9.9 million in 1970 , 13.0 million in 1980 and 17.5 million 1n 1990 ; and the residential and commercial sectors (7 . 5 million in

47

Ibid. ~

48

Statement of Herbert E; Hansen, Vice President: for Government Agreements, Gulf Oil Corporation , in U. Sc Congress • • . U.S . Intere sts , p . 43 .

see Table 7-i, PP < 110-lll .

- 17 -

1970, 9.9 milli on in 1980 and 14.5 million i n 1990) . and gas provide the largest percentage of the energy requirements.

Oi l

Chart 2 (1980) shows that coal wi ll prov i de a to~ a l of 10.5 million B/DOE of energy (total energy requi rements will be 48 . 5 million B/ DOE), of wh i ch 3 65 mi llion B/ DOE wi ll be used for industrial purposes and 5 . 2 mill i on B/ DOE will be for electrical energy generat i on . In 1990 (Chart 3 ) , the use of coal increases to 14 o0 mil l i on B/ DOE (tot al energy requi rements will be 68 ~ 5 mi llion B/DOE ) . Of this 14 mi llion B/DOE, 3.3 million B/DOE will be used for ~ndustrial purposes while 6.8 mi llion B/DOE will be consumed to provide electrical energy ( although part of the electri cal energy generated from coal is used for industri al, res i dential and commercial purposes. ) Nuclear power becomes a s i gn i f i cant factor i n the energy picture only in 1980 . In that year (Chart 2 ) , nuclear power is expected to provide 3 . 6 mi l lion B/DOE of energy and this will increase to 12 . 0 million B/DOE by 1990 (Chart 3 ) . But the important po i nt to note i n the charts is that nuclear power , unlike oil or natural gas, is only limited to the generation of electrical energy,49 a large part of which is normally wasted due to "convers i on losses". The use of nuclear power, moreover , has become a controversial issue . The fear of environmental polluti on from nuclear power plants has become a bigger obstac l e to t he widespread use of nuclear power than i ts cost of production . Such public fears and apprehens i on were recently demonstrated i n several parts of Europe wh~re people opposed the establishment of nuclear power plants.SO Unless these publ i c fears are allayed with the construc tion and des i gn of safer nuclear power plants, the future of nuclear power as an alternat i ve source of energy remai ns in doubt. Uranium, too, . is a commodi ty which is i n short supply and although the United States is the largest source of enriched uran i um, a large part of European needs will have . to be imported , thereby posing the problem of i nsecure supply centres . 51

u. s .

Energy ~

49

Winger and others, Outlook f or

50

In f ac t , the establishment of t he se nuclear r eactors a nd the propos al t o build mo r e by 1985 as alte rnative s our ce s was due t o t he i mpact felt by Europe by t h e Arab oi l embargo of 19 73 and 19 74 . See Newsweek ~ 5 May 19 75, PP • 39-40 .

51

Yuan-L i Wu, Raw Material

Supp ly~

p . 20 .

p. 48 .

- 18 -

Oil from oi l shale is expected to become ~mporLant only in the 1990s (Chart 3). But even ~n that t~me - frarne oil shale will be an i ns i gn~f icant alte~nat~ve to crude oil and n atural gas. Moreover , the t~me needed for the development of synthetic fuels, and the des~gn and cons truction of plans "to assure the preservat~on o f environmental qual~ty are such thaL synthet~c fuels canneL become 1mportant until well after 1985 . " 52 The product~on of ~yntheS~c gas from c oal 1s also a very expens~ve bus1ness . United States ' assessments of the Sovl.et expansion of naval forces must be perceived within the context of the global competition between these two superpowe rs to secure influence a n d f r iends. Since the Indian Ocean is an important tran sit are a of vital raw mater1als , espec1ally energy sources, the increased capabil1t~es of the Soviet Navy is viewed as a threat to the Uni ted States' own llfeline. Any prolonged interd1 ction of energy suppl1es from the Persian Gulf , a not too improbable scenario that is envisaged by th e United States, would hit at its very economic and mili tary survival as a superpowe r. Freedom o f navigation in the Indian Ocean as well as around t he world becomes i nevit ably an important United States priority. It is this Amer ican perception of the ex~sten ce of a threat or of a potential threat of an interdiction from the Soviet Navy that has polarized, in recent years , the naval politics of the Indian Ocean and turned the oceanic regi on into an aren a of great power rivalry . How real is this "threat" of interdiction? This is the c ritical issue. "Threat", as defined by the editor of Jane's Fighting Sh i ps , is "capabi l ity " ·plus " intention . " 54 While a nat1on ' s m~ litary " capability " can be assessed , its "intention" is more difficult to pred1ct because "this can change ove rnight with changing circumstances and , wh i l st certain countries pursue long- term a1ms , these can be radically al te r ed as the result. of elections ,

u.s .

52

Hansen i n

53

Winger and o thers, Outlook for

54

Capt . John E. Moore, in ' the fo reword to Jane ' s Fighting 1973-74 (London: Low, Marston, 19 73) , p . 78.

Congress • • • U.S.

Interests ~

Energy ~

p , 44 .

p. 41 . Ships ~

- 19 -

assassinations, miscalculations or a hundred other causes."SS And very recently, this "threat" was seen by the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, J . William Middendorf, when he found the increased naval capabilities of the Soviet Navy rather "disturbing."56 This naval threat, when placed in the context of a "nuclear war" scenario involving the two superpowers becomes inconceivable as it would lead to the destruction of a large part of the world. The Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control which reviewed the relationship of oil imports to the national security of the United States considers a nuclear war scenario as unlikely.S7 In a "limited war" scenario such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars, any interruption of oil supplies can be overcome. In a "general non - nuclear war" scenario the risks to interruptions of oil supplies are greater.S8 A naval warfare between the two superpowers must therefore be considered at "a lower level of hostilities." 59 It can however be argued that at this level of hostilities any interdiction of American , European or Japanese oil supplies will not constitute a threat to their security unless the supply interruptions are prolonged beyond three months. These countries are capable of "surviving" any embargo or oil supply interruptions because their oil stocks can last for a period of 2~ to 3 months . It is unlikely that a conventional war between the superpowers will last so long without having major consequences for world peace. 55

Ibid. , p . 78.

56

Victor Zorza, "Full Speed Ahead on Naval Spe ndi ng," Guardian Weekly , 10 May 1975, p . 6 . In this same report, President Ford was quoted as saying that the "Russians built their navy while we permitted ours to shrink . " This was in .response to the worldwide naval exercises of the Soviet Navy held in May 1975 .

57

U. S. Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, The Oil Import Question: A Report on the Relationship of Oil Imports r;o the National Security (Washington, D.C. : 1970), pp . 35-36, paragraphs 22 0-2?.3 .

58

Other possible scenarios whereby oil supplies could be interrupted are listed in ibid., pp . 31- 32, paragraphs 211-212 .

59

Jane ' s Fight i ng Ships, 1973-74, p. 78 .

- 20 -

For the United States, Western Europe and Japan this fear of interdiction is real. For these countries the problem of energy security is not merely a problem of quantity but one of availability and reliability of supply. The most important aspect in the energy outlook of these countries is their growing dependence on oil imports from the Middle East. The bulk of the world ' s oil, especially made available at a low cost of extraction, is found in the Middle East. For the United States and its allies there is simply no viable alternative to the Middle East. And developing alternative sources of energy - oil shale, coal and nuclear power - could not possibly be done in sufficient quant.i ties or at favourable costs within the foreseeable future. Such dependence on one area of the world for the supply of energy increases the vulnerability of the United States and i ts allies to economic and military pressures. The stability of supply of energy is consequently an important national goal for the United States and its allies. The imPlications for the United States, Western Europe and Japan of a prolonged oil embargo or a sustained interdiction of energy and raw material s u pplies are too obvious to bear repetition . The cost of its security is too high for a nation to ignore its own vulnerability.

APPENDIX

- 22 -

Table 1:

U.S. Demand for Energy Resources, by Najor Sources Year 19 70 and Estimated, Projected Demand in 19 75 1 1985 , and 2000 1

Energy Source

19 75

1985

2000

Petroleum (includes natural gas liquids): 3 Million barrels 5 , 36 7 Mil l ion barrels per day 14.7 Tri l lion B.t.u. ' s 29 , 617 Percent of gross energy inputs 43 . 0

6 , 550 17 . 9 36,145 40.8

8,600 23.6 4 7 ,455 35.6

12,000 32.8 66,216 34.6

Natural gas (inclu~ci R gas eous fuels): Billion cubic feet Trillion B.t.u. 's Percent of gross energy inputs

21 , 847 22 , 546 32.8

2 7,800 28,690 32.4

38,200 39 ,422 29 . 5

49 , 000 50,568 26.0

526,650 13,792 20.1

615,000 16 , 106 18 . 2

850,000 22,260 16.7

1 ,000,000 26,188 13.7

Hydropower, utility: 4 Billion kilowatt- hours Trillion B. t.u . 's Percent of gross energy inputs

246 2 ,647 3.8

282 2 , 820 3. 2

363 3 , 448 2. 6

632 5 , 056 2.6

Nuclear power: 5 Billion kilowatt hours Trillion B.t.u. 's Percent of gross energy inputs

. 193 208 0.3

462 4 , 851 5.4

1,982 20 , 811 15 . 6

5 , 441 43,528 22.7

68,810

88,612

133,396

191, 556

Coal (bituminous, anthracite , lignite) : Thousand short tons Trillion B.t.u . ' s Percen t of gross energy inputs

Total gross energy, tril l ion B.t.u. ' s Notes :

1 2

3

4

5

Preliminary estimat es by Bureau of Mines staff. Latest data. Product demand includes net processing gain. Includes pumped storage, internal combustion and gas ~urbine generation . Converted at prevailing and projected central electric stations average heat rates as follows: 10,769 B.t . u . (British thermal unit) per kilowatt-hour in 1970; 10,~00 in 1975~ 9,500 in 1985, and 8,000 in 2000. · Converted at average heat rates of 10,769 B.t.u. per kilowatt-hour in 1970; 10,500 ~n 1975 and 1985 , and 8,000 in 2000.

Source: United States Energy: A Summary Review (Washington. Department of the Interior, 1972) , Table 2.

- 23 -

Table 2:

U. S, Petroleum Supply Demand Balance (Mi1llon Barrels Per Day , Actual

Items

Domestic demand

Projected

1970

1975

1980

1985

14.7

18 . 5

22 . 7

26 4

- (0 , 1)

-(0 . 2)

- (0 . 4) 26.0

Pro cessing gain , transport and stock change, etc , (net) Required supply

14 . 7

18 , 4

22 , 5

U. S. product ion of petrol eum liquids (e xcluding North Slope)

11.3

10 . 5

9.8

0.6

2,0

North Slope cr ude and condensate

2. 0

o, 1

Syncrude from oil shal e Imports Imports as per cent of doti£stic. demand Source:

3. 4

7. 3

10 . 7

14 . 8

23.0

39 .o

47 .o

57 ' 0

National Petroleum Council , Committee on U. S. Energy Outlook,

U.S. Energy

Out~ook:

(Washington, D. C.:

An Initial Apprai sal 19?1- 1985 1971) , Vol . 1, p . 28 ,

- 24 -

Table 3:

Current Pro' ec tion and Chan e from Pre-october 1973 Pro'ecti on Base Forecast Energy Reiu1re~nt s of Non-Commun1 St Countr1es , r 1980 and 1985 (Million B/OOE) Current Pro jection

Change fr om Oct 1973 Projection

1980

1985

1980

1985

United States: 45. 5 Oil 18.6 Gas 13.2 Coal 8.8 Nuclear 3.2 Hydro 1. 5 Geothermal 0 .2 We stern Europe : 32.1 Oil 18.5 Gas 5.0 Coal 5.5 Nuclear 2.1 Hydro 1.0 Japan: 10.8 Oil 7. 7 Gas 0.7 Coal 1.3 Nuclear 0.9 Hydro o. 2 Other Industrial: 7. 4 Oil 2.6 Gas 1.6 Coal 2.4 Nuclear 0.3 Hydro 0.5 Developing Countries: 17.9 Oil - Domestic 8.7 Oil - Bunkers 2.0 Gas 3.1 Coal 3.4 Nuclear o. 3 Hydro 0.4 Total: 113.7 Oil 58.1 23 .6 Gas 21.4 Coal Nuclear 6.8 Hydro, Geothermal 3. 8

52 . 7 15.0 16.4 10.1 9.3 1.6 0.3 38.6 19 .7 7 .o 5.0 5.7 1.2 13 . 9 8.3 1.2 1.5 2 .6 0.3 9.5 2.0 2.2 3. 1 1.4 0.8 25.3 11.0 2. 8 5.0 4. 4 1.4 0.7 140 . 0 58.8 31.8 24.1 20.4 4.9

- 4.4 - 5.9 +1. 0

- 8.1 - 11.7 +2.5

+0.5

+1.1

-3.1 -4.8 +0.5 +0. 7 +0 . 6

-5. 9 -9.0 +1. 0 +0.7 +1.4

- 1.1 - 1.3

-2 . 1 -2 .9

+0.2

+0.8

- 0. 7 -1. 1

- 1.1 -2 .4

+0 . 3 +0 .1

+0.6 +0. 7

-1. 0 -1. 8

- 2.2 - 3. 9

+0.8

+1.1 +0.6

-10.3 -15. 0 +1.5 +1. 8 +1. 4

-19. 4 -29.9 +3.5 +2. 4 +4.6

Country

Source:

Growth Rates 1970-85 (Percent) Pre- Oct 1973 Current Projection Forecast 4 .2 4.5 1.4 3.2 34 . 1 1.4

3. 2 0.6 2. 5 3. 2 35 . 3 1.4

5.1 5. 7 10. 2 -2 .5 22.7 3.7 7. 5 7. 5 18.0 1. 0

4.1 3.1 11. 3 - 1.4 25 . 0 3. 7 6.5 5.3 18 . 0 1.0

2. 7 5.9 5. 8 7 .o 3.5

2.7 5.1 0.3 7 .o 5.0

6.8 8.0 8.0 7. 1 10 . 1 5.0

6.8 7.4 5.8 7.1 10.0 7. 0

8. 7 5.4 5. 9 4. 4 1.7 30.2 4. 1

8.7 4.5 3.0 5.2 2.4 32 . 5 4.1

Yager and others, Energy and U.S. Foreign Policy, Table 13-4, p. 247.

- 25 -

Table 4:

Estimate of Petroleum Reserves in PrinciEal Producing Countries and Crude Oil Production in 1972 (Thousand Barrels )

Continent and Country

Estimated Reserves Jan 1, 1972

Percent World Reserves

Crude Oil Production 1972

North America, Total Canada Cuba* Mexico United States

49,243,106 8,333,087 10, 000 2,837,062 38,062,957

8. 79 1.49 0.00 0 . 51 6. 79

4 ,18 7,89S 544,562 1,281 183,000 3,459 , 052

11.76 15' 30 7. 81 15 . 50 11 . 00

South America, Total Argentina Boliva Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru Trinidad and Tobago Venezuela Other South America

26,237,730 2,000,000 262,000 855,000 120,000 1,6 26 , 000 6,070,545 510,000 1,05 3 ,000 13,740,395 790

4 . 69

1,602 , 771 159 , 085 15,738 61,086 12,550 73 , 162 34,262 23,133 51,399 1,1 72, 356 (1)

16 . 37 12 . 57 16 . 65 14.00 9.56 22 . 22 177 . 18 22.05 20 . 49 11.72

Europe, Total Albania* Austria Bulgaria* Czechoslovakia* Denmark France Germany, East* Germany, West Hungary* Italy (incl. Sicily) Netherlands Norway Poland* Rumania* Spain Un1ted Kingdom USSR Yugoslavia*

69,235,139 90,000 186,500 278,000 12,000 250,000 98,890 11,000 560,000 210,000 271,100 261,212 2,000 ,ooo 48,500 1,481,000 161,937 2,000,000 60,000,000 315 ,000

3 ,153,319 9,150 17 , 619 2,123 988 1,464 10 ,720 439 51 , 311 14 ,6 77 8,176 11,077 12,078 3 ,733 100,650 985 625 2,884,080 23 ,4 24

21. 96 9.84 10.58 130.95 12. 14 170. 76 9 .22 25 . 06 10.91 14 . 31 33.16 23.58 165 . 59 12 . 99 14 .. 71 164 . 40

o. 36

0.05 0.15 0.02 0 . 29 1.08 0 . 09 0.19 2 . 46 0.00 12 . 36 0.02 0 . 03 0 . 05

o.oo

0.04 0.02 0 . 00 0 .10 0 . 04 0 . 05 0 . 05 0. 36 0 . 01 o. 26 0 . 03 0 . 53 10.71 0 . 06

Reserve s Product1on Rat1o

20.80 13 . 45

- 26 -

Table 4 cont' d Continent and Country

Afri ca, Total Algeria Angola ( incl. Cabinda) Egypt Gabon L1bya Nigeria Tunuia Other Afri c a A& la , Middle East, Tota l Abu Dhabi Bahrain Brunei-M&laysi a Burma China* Duba1 Fonnoaa India Iran Iraq larael Japan Kuwai t lndoneaia (incl. Weat New Guinea ) Neut ra 1 Zone Oman

Pakutan Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Thailand Turkey Auatralia-New Zealand Total World Sino-Soviet Countriea To tal Free World Note1: Source:

*

(Thousand Barrels) Estimated Reserves Jan 1, 1972

Percent World Reserves

so, 86 7, 3SO

9.08 1. 76 0.18 0.18 0.11

9,839,600 1, 000 , 000 1,000, 000 602 ,000 28 , 000,000 10,000,000 410 , 000 15,7SO 362 , 661,648 1S' 100 ,000 541 , 321 820,000 39 ' 461 12 , 500 , 000 1 , 500,000 20 , 850 739,636 60, 450 , 000 33 , 100,000 2, 000 24,880 66 , 023 , 000

~eserves Crude Oil Production Production 1972 Ratio

1. 78 0 , 07 0.00

2,084 . 386 390 . 888 so. 889 81 , 989 4 J. . 829 820 , 000 665 ,022 29 , 102 2 '66 7

24 40 25 . 17 19 .65 12.20 13. 74 34 . 15 lS 04 14 . 09 5 . 90

64 .75 2.69 0.10 0. 1S 0 . 01 2 .23 0.27 0 . 00 0.13 10 . 79 5.91 0 . 00 0.00 11 .79

7 , 378,, 69S 384 '300 26 ' 121 106,8 72 6 , 537 186 , 660 5S , 998 732 54 ,9 20 1,8 38 , 451 529 , 236 43 ,9 20 5. 348 1 , 099 . 792

49 . 15 39 . 29 20.72

1.90

2 7. 36 65 . 17 45 87 8 88 27.21 65 . Jt 30.31 4 54

s.oo

7 67

6 .04 66.97 26 . 79 28.48 13 . 4 7 32 88 62 54 4 65 60 03

10 , 673 , 400 13,000,000 4,750 , 000 35,500 4,800 , 000 13 7,040 , 000 1, 320 , 000 500 181 , 100

0.86 24.47 0.24 0.00 0.03

390,132 199,470 103,562 4,000 176 , 412 2,098,423 43 , 554 110 24 ,145

1,875,000

0.33

124 . 806

15 . 02

560 . 119 •9 73

100 . 00

18,531,87 2

30.22

74,955,500

13 38

3,227,205

23 2 3

485 ,164,4 73

86.6 2

15 , 304 , 667

31 70

Communiat controlled count ries

2. 32

0 . 85 0.01

(1) Not available.

OeGo1yer and MacNaughton, Twentieth Century 1973), p . l.

Statistios 1973 (Dallas:

Petro~eum

7 .so

- 27 -

Chart 1 :

United Sta tes Energy Flow Pattern , 1970

~ lmiiCinftTU:- ' o 4 ....;:;.;··:::·· 0.003 SfcmtDIIIAl . ········· · - 0.1 IIUCWR (IMPHTSI ·.·:·:·:.·.·!·:•:·:··:·:r:f:: ~Sttl -l·· · ··· · ······· ·········· · ·······

ElftTU:AL MKY

I

cowvnsa Lossts 41

mil ..

'

:'

, """

14.7

i LOST EMERGY

-

COAl 15.0

OIL (IMPORTS)

OIL (DOMESTIC)

(UMITS: •lLION IlLS/ DAY OIL EQUIYAL.ENI l

Source:

U. S. Congress , Joint Committee on At omi c Energy, Understanding t he "Nati onal Energy Dil.errma~"

(Washington, D.C.:

1973) , Chart C.

USED

-

ENERGY

Chart 2: IIYIIOW tTK IOTIDMA l

IIUCWI

r:::O.I

1.1

3.1 l OST

l3 3

CAS IW.-orTSI

MIIY

It£ SIOEIITIAL

CAS

'

IDOMES TICI

COMMERCIAl 9.9

COAl - --

INDUSTRIAL 13.0

NOII£N£RGY 31

Oil IJMPORlS I

I

I

I

I

TIIANSPO RI Ali ON

Oil

·~ 0

IOOMf STIC

~ i. -

IUIIIlS llltlliOII 88lS OAY Oil (llJIVAU II l l

So urc e:

Ib1·d., Chart D.

199

~ (

l0

USlD (II(~ Y

-

£hart 3:

29

United States,Energy Flow Pattern (1990)

=Til; L:·:~

1_990

t~:,. ii~;::-;E!i.~;,;,,.:i~:.@:,,

1 n.ttTIIICAI.

'

:::·· ·: ;::

1990

:i:~·:;i;:::~.~·~!~::~·mlik.:~!~:!i;:;~~IH!mmmmmmmmmmmmmilf

.:.: _: :!:~ -·

-·

IIUCliAR

LOST

us IIII'OITSI

us IOO.STlCJ

CMI.

usm 01.

EIIEIISY

llllf'ORTSI

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OIL ESTICI IOOM

Source:

..

,"~111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111,..,,,

Ibid.

15.0

- 30 -

Chart 4 :

Worldwide Petroleum Production and Demand in 1972 (million b/d)

~

Production

D

Demand

19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10

9 8

7 6

5 4 3

2 1

North America

Source:

South Ameri ca

Western Europe

Africa

Middle East

Far East and Oceania

DeGolyer and MacNaughton, Twentieth Centuzoy Petrolewn Statistics 1973 (Dallas: 1973), Chart 2 .

Sino-Soviet Countries

- 31 Map 2 :

Wo rldwide Petroleum Fl ow, 19 72

c:i}8

--v"--

COMMUNI ST

-

A REA S

1100 I

'Jff-~>~ ~~

·y-~~ I

J;

,:__ ---1 _/ D

/ L.

Ar r ows s how o rigin and des t ination of pr i ncipa l intern ational oil mo vements (i n thous ands b/d) . Sour ce:

International Petr oleum Encyclopedia 1973, The

P~ troleum

Publishing Co., Tulsa, 1973.

- 32 -

BIBLIOGRAPHY Adie~

W. A.C. Oi~ ~ Po~itics~ and Seapo~er: The Indian Ocean Vortex , National Strategy Information Cente r Strategy Papers (New York:

Beddoes, Leslie

R~ ,

Crane , Russak, 1975 }.

J r . , and Johns . Wonfor , eds .

Proce edings of the Southeast Asia Petro~eum Explo rati on Society , Vo l. 1 (Singapore, 1974). Blechman, Barry M. The Chang i ng Soviet Navy , Staff Paper , Studies in Defense Policy 3 (Washington, D.C.: Brooking s Instituti on , 1973). Cochran, Edward . " Another African Rift?, " Guardian WeekLy (Londo n ) , 1 March 1975 n . 10. Cottrell, Alvin J ., and R.M. Bu rre ll, eds.

The Indian Ocean: Its Po~itical ~ Economi c~ and Mi~itary Importance (New York: Praeger, 19 72).

OeGolyer and MacNaughton.

T~entieth

Statistics, 19?3 (Dallas:

Century Petroleum 1973) .

Economist Intelligence Unit.

Oil and Economic Growth Oil Supply and its Impact on Japan ~ India~ the UK ~ the USA and West Germany , QER Special No. 15 (London: 1974).

Ford Foundation. Exploring Energy Choices - A Pr e liminary Report (New York: 1974). Gupta , Bhabani Sen , T.T. Poulouse and Hemlata Bhatia .

The Malacca St raits and the Indian Ocean - A Study of the St ra tegic and Legal Aspects of a Controve rs ial Sea - lane (New Delh i: Macmillan , 1974 ).

Hill , Peter and Roger Vielvoye.

Energy in Cr isis - A Guide to World Oil Supply and Demand and Alternat i ng Res o urces (London: Robert Yeatman , 1974) .

Holden, David . "The Pe r sian Gulf : After the British Raj , " Foreign Affairs , Vol . 49 , No. 4, July 1971, pp. 72 1-735 .

- 33 -

Hunter , Robert E.

The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East : Oil and the Persian Gulf, Adelphi Paper No . 6 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies , 1969).

Jane's Fight i ng Sh i ps , 1973- 7 4 (London:

Low, Marston, 1973).

Japan Petroleum Consultants , Ltd. "Japan's Energy White Paper," Japan Petroleum We e kly , Vo l. 9, Nos. 14-18, Apr1l 8- May 6 1974. Jukes, Geoffrey .

The Strateg 1:c ! Situation in the 19 80s: An Exercise i n Forecasting) Canberra Paper o n

Strategy and Defence No. 2 (Canberra: National University Press, 1968).

Australi a n

Kaushik , Devandra . The Indi an Ocean : Towar ds a Peace Zon e (Delh i: Vikas Publications , 1972 ) , pp . 105-125 . Kayal , Alawi Darweesh .

The Control of Oil : East - West Rivalry in the Persian Gulf , Ph . D. thesis, Department of Political Science , University of Colorado , 1972 .

Kinney , Gene T. " U.S . at Critical Cross- roads on Energy Policy , " Oil and Gas Journat , Vol. 69 , No . 29 1 19 July 1971 1 pp . 25-30 . Kinney, Gene T . "New Energy Enigma: What Should the Import?" Oil and Gas JournaL , Vol. 70, No. 10, 6 March 1972 , pp. 55-58. Lapp , Ralph E.

"Where wi l l we get the Energy?"

Republic , 11 July 1970, pp . 17- 21.

Levy, Walter J . "Oil Po¥rer 1 " Foreign Affairs No . 4 , July 1971 , pp. 652-668.

1

u. s .

New Vol. 49,

Levy, Walter J . "An Atlantic-Japanese Energy Policy ," in Richard N. Cooper, ed. , A Reordered World: Emerging International Economic Problems (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1973) 1 pp . 214 -2 40. Mahan , A. T.

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History ,

1660- 1783

(Boston:

Little , Brown, 1890).

Hayer , Lawrence A. "Why the U. S. is in an ' Energy Crisis ," Fortune , November 1970 , pp . 74 -77, 159-164.

-

3 '4 -

The Indian and Pacific Oceans : Some Strat egic Considerations , Adelphi Paper No , 57 (London: Institute

Millar, T.B .

for Strategic Studies, 1969}. Millar, T.B. Soviet Policies in the Indian Ocean Area , Canberra Paper on Strategy and Defence No. 7 (Canberra : Australian National Univers i ty Press , 1970} . M.I . T. Energy Laboratory Policy Study Group. Energy SelfSufficiency: An Economic Evaluation , National Energy Study 3 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974) . National Petroleum Council, Committee on

u.s .

Energy Outlook,

U.S. Energy Outlook : Oil Shale Availabi li ty : A Report b y the Oil Shale Task Group of the Other Energy Resour ces Subcommi ttee , 2 vols . (Wash i ngton, D.C.: 1973} • .. Oil Crisis:

It Threatens to Br i.n:;. . Down the West ,.. U. S . Nel;)S and World Report , 14 October 19 74 , pp . 23-24.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development .

Oil - The Present Situation and Future Prospects: A Report of the OECD Oil Committee (Paris: OECD , 1973).

Peiris , Denzil.

11

The Strategy of Brinkmanship, .. Far Easte rn Economic Revi ew (Hong Kong), 6 May 1974, pp . 30-34.

The Politics of the Great Powers in the Indian Ocean (Brussels: Centre d ' Etude du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l ' Extr~me Orient, 1971). Polmar , Norman . Soviet Naval Power : Challenge for the 1970s , National Strategy Information Center Strategy Papers (New York : Crane , Russak , 1974}.

Report of the Secretary of Defense , James R. Schlesinger to the Congr ess on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975 -19 79 De fens e Program, March 4, 1974 (Washington , D. C o : Govt. Print . Off. ,

Schlesinger, James R.

19 7 4) . Schurr , Sam H. , and Paul T. Homan.

and the Western World: York:

Middle Eas t ern Oil Prospects and Problems (New

American Elsevier , 1971).

- 35 -

Seminar on the Indian Ocean, Hyderabad , 1972 . India and t he GeopoLitics of the Indian Oce an (Hyderabad: Institute of Asian Studies, 19 7 4 ) . Swarztrauber, Sayre Ac The Three - Mi le L~m~t of Te rrit oriaL Seas (Annapolis: Nav al Instit ute Press, 1972 ). Thomson, George G. "Problems i n the Indian Oce an , " Paci f ic Commun i ty , Vo l. 3, No. 1, October 1971, pp . 1 26-141 .

ProbLems of Strate gy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans , National Strategy Information Center

Thomson, George G.

Strategy Papers (New York:

Crane , Russak , 19 70 ).

Thomson, George G. a nd K. E. Shaw.

The Straits of Malac ca i n Relation to the ProbZems of the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Singapore: Universi~y Educa~ion Press , 1 973 ).

Toussaint, Auguste. History of the Indian Oce an Un iversity of Chicago Press , 1966 ).

(Ch icago:

U. S. Cabinet Task Force on OJ.l Import Cont.rol.

The OiL Imp ort Quest ion : A Report on the Relationsh i p of Oil Imports to the National Seaurity (Washington, D. C . :

Govt . PrJ.nt . Off., 1970) . U.S . Congress . House c Committee o n ForeJ.gn AffaJ.rs. Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy. Fo re i gn

Policy Imp li cations o f the Energy Crisis ; Hearings (WashJ.ngton , D. C. :

Govt . Print. Off . , 19 72) .

U. S. Congress. House. CommJ.ttee on Foreign Affai rs. Subcommittee on National SecurJ.ty Poli cy and Scientific Developmen t s . The Ind~an Ocean: Political and St rat e gi c Future ; Hear ings ( Washing~on , D. C. : Govt . Print . Off . , 1971) .

u.s.

Congress . House. Committee o n Foreign Affairs . Subcommittee on National Security Po l 1cy and Scientific Developments. National Security Pol i cy and the Changing Wortd Power Al i gnment; Hear in g s (Washington , D.C . : U. S . Govt . Print. Off . , 1972 ).

u.s .

Congress. Ho use. Committee o n ForeJ.gn Affai rs . Subcommi ttee on the Near East . Th e Middle East in Crisis: Problems and Prospects; Report (Washington , D.C.: Govt. Print. Off ., 1971) .

- 36

u.s.

-

Congress. House . Comm~ttee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Near East . u. s . Intere~ts in an d Policy toward the Persian Gulf; Hearings (Wash i ngton , D.C . : Govt ~ Pri nt . Off ., 1972 ) .

U. S . Congress . House . Committee on Foreign Re1at~ons . Subcommittee on the Near East. The United States Role in Opening the Sue z Canal ; Hearings (Washington , D. C.: Govt. Print. Off . , 1974 ).

u.s.

Congress. House . Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee o n the Near Eas t and South Asia. New Persp ectives on the Persian Gulf; Hearings (Washington, D.C . : Govt. Print . Off ., 1973) .

U. S. Congress . House . Committee o n Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia . PropPBed Expansion of U. S . Military Facilities ~n the In dian Ocean ; Hearings (Washi ngton, D. C. : Govt. P rint . Off ., 1974 ) .

u. s.

Congress . House. Committee on Foreign Affairs . Subcommittee on the Near East a nd South Asia .

Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy.

OiL

Negotiat ions , OPEC, and Stability of Supply ; Hearings (Washington , D.C . : Govt . Print . Off ., 1973). U.S. Congress. Joint Comm~ttee on Atorn~c Energy . Understanding the 'Na tional Energy Dilemma ' (Washington , D.C.: Govt . Print . Off. , 1973). U. S. Congress . Joint Economic Comm~ttee . Economi c Impact o f Pe~roleum Shortages ; Hear in gs (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Of f . , 1973 ).

u. s.

Congress. Join t Econorn~ c Committee ~ A Reappraisal of U.S. Ene rgy Policy . Report of the Subcommittee on Consumer Economics , Subcommittee on International Economics , and Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy i n Government {Washington, D. C. : Gov t. Print. Off. , 1974 ).

U.S. Congress . Senate . Commi ttee on Finance . World OiL Developments and U. S . OiL Impo r t P ol~cies ; Hearings (Wash ingto n, D.C . : Govt . Print. Of f . , 1973).

- 37 -

u.s.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Energy Research and Deve Zopment - :ProbZems and Prospects; Hearings(Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print Off ~ , 1973).

U.S. Department of the Interior . United States Energy Through the Year 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print . Off. , 1972). U.S . Department of State . Bureau of Public Affairs. "U.S. Relations with Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf Countries," Current Forei gn Policy , September 1974, p . 3.

United States Energy: A Summary Review (Washington : Department of the Interior, 1972). Walters , Robert E. The Nuclear Trap : An Escape Route (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974). Webb, James H. , .J.r. Mic rones ia and U.S. Paoifio Strategy: A Blueprint for the 1980s (New York: Praeger, 1974). Winge r, John G., and others. Outlook for Energy in the United States to 1985 ~New York: Chase Manhattan Bank, Energy Economics Division, 1972) . Wu, Yuan-Li. Raw Material Supply in a Multipolar World , National Strategy Information Center Strategy Papers (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973). Yager, Joseph A., and others. Energy and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Report to the Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1974). Zorza, Victor. "Full Speed Ahead on Naval Spending ," Guardian Weekly, 10 May 1975, p. 6.

INSnTUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

SINGAPORE

LIST OF PUiliCAnONS

Occasional Papers 1

Harry J. Benda, Research in Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, 1970. lOpp. Gratis (Out-of-print)

2

P. Lim Pui Huen, Newspapers published in the Malaysian Area: W~th a u~io~ list of local holdings, 1970. 42pp. Gratis (Out-of-print).

3

Chan Heng Chee, Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: The Singapore Case, 1971. 19pp. S$2.00 (Out-of-print).

4

Eva Horakova, Problems of Filipino Settlers, 1971 . 24pp. S$2.00 (Out-of-print).

5

Mochtar Nairn, Merantau: Causes and Effects of Minangkabau Volu~tary Migration, 1971. 19pp. S$2.00 (Out-of-print).

6

Paul Pedersen, cornp., Youth in Southeast Asia: A Bibliography. Modified and Expanded by Joseph B. Tamney and others, 1971. 69pp. S$4 .00. (out - of print)

7

J.L.S. Girling, Cambodia and

th~

Sihanouk Myths, 1971.

26pp. S $2.00 (Out-of-print) . 8

R.P. Dore, Japanese Industrialization and the Developing Countries: Model, Warning or Source of Health Doubts? 1971. 18pp. S$3.00. ·

9

Michael Stenson, The l948 Communist Revolt in Malaya: A Note of Historical Sources and Interpretation and A Reply by Gerald de Cruz, 1971. 30pp. S$3.00 (Out-of-print) .

10

Riaz Hassan, Social Status and Bureaucratic Contacts Among the Public Housing Tena .tts in Singapore, 1971. 16pp. S$2.00 (Out-of-print).

11

Youth in Southeast Asia: Edited Proceedings of the Seminar of 5th - 7th March l97l. Edited by Joseph B. TamnPy,

lq7 7 .

75pp.

S$4.00 '

(O u ~- o f-print) .

12

A.W. Stargardt, Problems of Neutrality in South Eas t Asia: The R~lepance of the European Experience, 1972. 29pp. S$3.00.

13

William R. Roff, Autobiography & Biography in Malay Historical Studies , 1972. 2lpp. S$2.00 (Out-of-print).

14

Lau Teik Soon, Indonesia and RegionaL Security: Djakarta Conference on Cambodia , 1972. 20pp. S$3.00

15

Syed Hussein Alatas, The Second MaLays ia PLan 1971 1975: A Critique , 1972. 16pp. S$3.00

16

Harold E. Wilson, EducationaL PoLicy and Performance i " Si"gap ore , 1942 - 1945 , 1973. 28pp. S$3.00

17

Richard L. Schwenk, The PotentiaL for RuraL DeveLopment in the New Seventh Division of Sarawak: A PreLiminary Background Report , 1973. 39pp. S$4.00

18

Kunio Yoshihara, Japanese Direct Investments in Southeast Asia , 1973 . 18pp. S$4.00

19

Richard Stubbs, Counter-insur gency and the Economic Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Prices Boom on the MaLayan Emergency, 1974. 54pp. S$5.00

20

John Wong, The PoLiticaL Economy of MaLaysia's Trade ReLations with China , 1974. 3lpp. S$3.00

21

Riaz Hassan, Interethnic Marriage in Sin gapore: Study of Interethnic ReLations , 1974.

85pp.

The

A

S$6.00

22

Tatsumi Okabe, RevivaL of Japanese MiLitarism? 1974. 26pp. S$3.00

23

Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA: Some Observations on the Nature of an EvoLvi"g Partnership, 1974. 2lpp. S$3.00

24

Peter Carey, The CuLtural Ecology of EarLy Nineteenth Century Java: Pangeran Dipanagara, a Case Study, 1974. 56pp. S$4.00

25

Chandrasekar an Pillay, The 1974 GeneraL .ELections in Malaysia: A Post-Mortem, 1974. 20pp . S$3 . 00

26

I.W . Mabbett, DispLaced Century China, 1975.

lnt eLle r.:iuu. l ~

45pp.

~"

'l'we ni i etlt

S$4.00

27

J. Stephen Hoadley, The Future of Portuguese Timor : Dilemmas and Opportunitie s, 1975. 28pp. S$4 . 00

28

M. Ladd Thomas, PoLitical VioLence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand , 1975. 27pp. S$4 . 00

29

J o seph Cami lleri , Southeast Asia i n China's Foreign Policy, 1975 . 37p p. S$5. 00

30

Wellington K. K. Chan, Politics a n d Industrialisat ion in Late Imperial China , 1975. 19 pp . S$4 .00

31

Leslie E. Bauzon, Philippine Agrar>i an Reform 1880 19 6 5: The Revolution that Never WaG , 1975. 2lpp. S$4.00

32

Paul H. Kra toska, The Chettiar> and the Yeoman: British Cul~ural Catego r ies and Rural Indebtedness in Malaya , 19 75. 29 pp. S$4 . 00

33

Mo rris I. Berkowitz, Th Q Tenacity of Chinese Folk Traditio n - Two Studies of Hong Kong Chinese , 19 75. 32pp . S$4.00

34

M.

Ra jare t n a.P1 1 u. ::: . En e rgy - Secur-z-ty Interests t-n the I n dian Ocean , 1975 . 36pp. S$5. 00

Li brary Bulletins 1

Rosalind Quah, .Li brary Resources in Singapore on Contemporary !1ai nland Chtna , 1971. llpp. S$2 . 00

2

Quah S'!J'1ee Lan, comp . , Oil Dts cove ry and Te c hn i aa l Chan ge in Southe as t As i a: A Prelim-z-nary 8-z-blt-ography , 1971. 23pp. S$2.00 (See Li brary Bu11et1·n ~o. 61

3

P . Lim Pui Huen., comp., Dire c tory of Microfilm Fa c i l iti BB i n So uthBa s t Asia, 1972 . 24 pp . S$2 . 00 (See Library Bulletin No . 7 ) Checkli s t of Curre n t Se r ials in the Librar>y , 19 72. 30pp . S$3. 0 0

5

Tan Sok .loo , The Li b r ary Res our>ces on Burma in Sin gapore , 1972 . 42pp. S$3. 00

6

Quah Swee Lan, comp., Oil Discovery and Techn-z-cal Change in Southeast As i a : A BibZiogr>aphy , 19 73 . 32p p . S$3. 00 (Out-of-p r i nt )

7

P. Lim P"n i Huen, c omp . , Director y of Microf-z-lm Fac il.itt e s in Sout heast Asia , 2d Edition, 19 73. 32pp . S$4 . 00

8

!'1g

9

Saengthong M. Ismail, Libr ary Re s ources on ThaiLand in Sin gapo r e , 1974. 130pp . S$7 .00

Sh ui Meng, c omp., Demograph-z-c Materials on th e Khmer Republic , Laos and Vietnam , 19 74 . 54pp. S$5 , 00

Trends in So utheast Asia 1

Tr ends in Indo nesia: Proceed ings and Backg r o und Pa pe r , 1971. 58pp. S$3 . 00 (Out- o f- print)

2

Trends in Malaysia: Proceedings an d Backgr oun d Pap e r, Edited by Patrick Low, 1971. 12 0pp. S$5. 00 (Out-of-print )

3

Trends in the Philippines , Edite d by Lim Yoon Lin. (Si ngapore University Press ) , 1972 . 140pp . S$7. 00

4

Tr ends in Indonesia. Edited by Yong Mun Cheong . (Singapore University Press), 1972 . 140pp. S $7 . 00

5

Tr ends in Thailand . Edited by M. Rajaretnam and Lim So Jean. (Si ngapor e Uni versity Press) , 1973 . 142pp. S$10. 00

6

Trends in Malaysia II. Edited by Yong Mun Cheong . (Singapore University Press), 1974. 154pp. S $10 . 00

7

Trends in Singapo re. Edited by Seah Chee Meow . (Si ngapore University Press) , 1975 . S$10.00

Field Report Series 1

Yong Mun Cheong, Conflicts within the Prijaji World of the Parahyangan in West Java , 1914 - 192 7, 1973 . 42pp. S$3.00

2

Patrick Low and Yeung Yue-man, The Proposed Kra Canal : A Cr i tical Evaluation and Its Impact on Si ngapor e , 1973. 39pp. S$3.00 (Out- of-print)

3

Robert Fabrikant, Legal Aspects of Production Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry , 2d Edition. 1973. 235pp. S$25.00

4

The Indonesian Petroleum Industry : Miscellane o us Source Materials. Collected by Robert Fabrikant. 1973. 516pp . S $2 5.00 (Out - of -print)

5

C.V. Das and V.P. Pradhan , Some In te rnat ional Law Problems Re garding the Straits o f Malacca , 1973. 95pp. S$10 .00 (Out-of-prin t)

6

M. Rajaretnam, Politics o f Oil in the Ph ilippines , 1973. 8lpp. S$5.00

7

Ng Shui Meng, The Popu l at ion of In do ch i na : Preliminary Observations , 19 74. l26pp .

So me S$7 . 00

8

Ng Shul. Meng , The Oi~ System in S07A.t h ea s t As i a: A Prelim~na~y S u ~v ey , 1974 . 93pp . S$10 . 00

9

Wong SaJ.k Chin, Publ i c Reac &ion &o t he OiL The S ingapo~e Cas e , 1975 . 87pp . S$6 . 00

10

KawJ. n Wi1airat, Singapo~e ' s Foreign P ol~ oy: Fi~st Decade , 1975. l05 pp. S$ 10 . 00

C~isis :

The

Cur r en t Iss ues Sem i na r Se r ies 1

M ~lti na t~o na l

Corpo~ations and Thei~ Impt~oa&ions Sou the ast As i a . Ed i ted by Eileen Li m Poh Ti n, 197 3. 140pp . S$12.00

fo~

2

Economic and Polit ica l Trends i n Southeast Asia , 197 3 . 66pp. S$6 . 00

3

Sou~heast

1 973 ~

As i a Today : P~ o bl e ms and Prosp ects , llOpp. S$10 . 00

4

Japan a s an Economic Pow e ~ and I t s Imp ~i ca ti ons for Southe as t Asia. Edited by Kern i a1 s . Sandhu and Eileen P.T . Tang. {Sin gapore Univers ity Press ) , 19 7 4 . 14 7pp . S$~'l5 ..no'

1

Phl.l l.p Hoal i m, Sen i or, The Malayan Democrat ic Un i on : Singapore's Fi~st Democratic Pol itical Par t y 8 19 7 3. 26 pp . S$3 . 00

2

Andr ew Gi lmou r , My Ro l e in t he Re habil it a ti on o f S i n g apo ~ e : 1916 - 1953 1 19 7 3. lOOpp . S$6 . 00

3

Mamoru Shi noz akJ. , My Wa~t i m e Expe~ienaes in Sin gap o r e , 19 7 3 . 124 pp . S$6. 00 (Out - of - p rint )

Southeas t As i an Pe r spectiy es 1

U. Kh i n Mg . Kyi and Daw Ti n Ti n, Admin i s trative Patte r ns i n Historical Burma , l9 73 c 67pp. S$3 . 00

2

Hars j a w. Bachti a r , The In d onesian Na tion : Some Problems of Inte grati on and D~s inte g~a tio n , 19 7 4 . 62pp. S$ 5 . 00

f1onographs 1

Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements i n RuraZ Java (Oxford University Press), 1973. 229pp. S $18. 00

2

Node~i•ation

in Southe ast Asia. Edited by HansDieter Evers (Oxford University Pres s) , 1973. 249pp. S$18.00

Annual Reviews 1

Southeast Asian Affairs 197 4.

1974 .

350pp.

S$15.00 (Out-of-print) 2

Southeast Asian Affairs 1975. Publishers ) , 1975.

256pp.

(~cGraw-Hill

F.E .

S $30 .00

The above publications ar e available for sale at the Institute of Southeast Asian Cluny Road, Singapore 10 .

Te l:

Studi~s ,

51 4 211

TilE AUTHOR Mr. M. Rajaretnam is a Research Officer at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.