Universality in Islamic Thought: Rationalism, Science and Religious Belief 9780755608799, 9781780769431

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Notes on the Contributors

Carl W. Ernst is the Kenan Distinguished Professor of Islamic Studies in the Department of Religious Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His focus is on West and South Asia, and his published research, based on the use of Arabic, Persian, and Urdu, has been devoted to three areas: general and critical issues in Islamic studies; pre-modern and contemporary Sufism; and Indo-Muslim culture. Baber Johansen is Professor of Islamic Religious Studies at Harvard Divinity School. The focus of his work is on the relationship between religion and law in Muslim history and particularly in the role that religious and legal systems assign to the practices of lay people. Wilferd Madelung is currently Emeritus Laudian Professor of Arabic at Oxford and a senior research fellow with The Institute of Ismaili Studies in London. He has made major contributions to scholarship on early and sectarian forms of Islam. Michael G. Morony is a professor in the History Department at the University of California, Los Angeles. His main interests are Islamic historiography and the social and economic history of western Asia from Late Antiquity into the early Islamic period. He is the author of Iraq after the Muslim Conquest. Ismail K. Poonawala is a recently retired professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has published important works on Ismaili intellectual history, especially the role of the Qadi al-Nuʿman, and is known for his Biobibliography of Ismaʿili Literature. vii

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Emilie Savage-Smith is a recently retired professor of the History of Islamic Science at the Oriental Institute, Oxford. She was also a senior research fellow of St Cross College, where she currently acts as Archivist. Her research interests include Islamic science, medicine and magic and she has recently published A New Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, volume 1: Medicine.

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s Acknowledgments

Dr Farhad Daftary and The Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, are thanked for their kind support for this project. Dr Emilie Savage-Smith and Nahla Nassar, curator of the Khalili Collection, are also thanked for their assistance in identifying the cover illustration of a thirteenth-century celestial globe made in northern Iran. The photo on the front cover shows the area of the summer solstice with Orion and Gemini visible in the middle. The detailed photo on the back cover shows the seated figure of the constellation Auriga with the constellation of Perseus holding an ogre’s head to the left. The Khalili Collection generously provided the image permissions gratis.

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Biography of Wilferd Madelung

Professor Wilferd Ferdinand Madelung, who identified universality as a topic for discussion, was born in Stuttgart on 26 December 1930. He received his early education there at Eberhard Ludwig Gymnasium, and then, after World War II, accompanied his parents to the United States where his father, Georg, continued to be employed as an expert in aeronautics. Soon afterwards, Madelung enrolled at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, before going to Egypt in 1950. He studied at Cairo University for three years and received his Bachelor’s degree in Arabic literature and Islamic history in 1953. He acquired a solid grounding in classical Arabic in Cairo, where he studied under the eminent Egyptian scholar Muh. ammad Kāmil H . usayn. The latter edited numerous Ismaili texts of the Fāt.imid period, and it was he who initially aroused Madelung’s interest in Fāt.imid history and Ismaili studies. These subjects were the focus of Madelung’s doctoral thesis that was supervised by Professor Bertold Spuler at the University of Hamburg, where he received his D. Phil. in Islamic history in 1957. After brief diplomatic service as the Cultural Attaché at the West German Embassy in Baghdad (1958– 60), Madelung embarked on his long and distinguished career in Islamic studies. He began as Visiting Professor at the University of Texas at Austin in 1963 and then went to the University of Chicago, where he taught for 14 years as Assistant Professor (1964–5), Associate Professor (1966–8) and Professor of Islamic History from 1969 until 1978 when he became the Laudian Professor of Arabic at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of St John’s College. He held this position until he retired from Oxford in 1998; he is currently Emeritus Laudian Professor of Arabic at xi

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Oxford and a senior research fellow with The Institute of Ismaili Studies in London. In 2003 he was honored by a Festschrift, Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam, edited by Farhad Daftary and Josef W. Meri. In 2007 he received the Giorgio Levi Della Vida award from the University of California, Los Angeles, for his outstanding contributions to the field of Islamic studies. Professsor Madelung has made major contributions to modern scholarship on sectarian forms of Islam in the pre-modern period. His most important publications include Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (London, 1985), Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran (Albany, NY, 1988), Religious and Ethnic Movements in Medieval Islam (Aldershot, 1992), The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate (Cambridge, 1997) and, with Paul E. Walker, An Ismaili Heresiography (Leiden, 1998). He has contributed extensively to the Encyclopaedia of Islam and the Encyclopaedia Iranica.

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List of Publications since 2001

A bibliography of the works of Wilferd Madelung up to 2002 has been published by Farhad Daftary in Daftary and Joseph W. Meri, eds., Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam: Essays in Honour of Wilferd Madelung (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2003), pp. 8–40. What follows here is a list of Professor Madelung’s published books and articles since 2001. He has also published various book reviews and encyclopaedia articles.

Books Struggling with the Philosopher: A Refutation of Avicenna’s Metaphysics: a new Arabic edition with English translation of Muh. ammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Ah. mad al-Shahrastānī’s Kitāb al-Mus. āraʿan, by Wilferd Madelung and Toby Mayer (London: I.B.Tauris in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2001). Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, vol. 2. ed. Wilferd Madelung (Beirut, 2003). Book of the Explanation of the Symbols: Kitāb H . all al-Rumūz by Muh. ammad ibn Umail, ed. Theodor Abt, Wilferd Madelung and Thomas Hofmeier, trans. Salwa Fuad and Theodor Abt (Corpus Alchemicum Arabicum, volume 1) (Zurich, 2003). Abu l-Qāsim al-Bustī, Kitāb al-bah. th ʿan adillat al-takfīr wa l-tafsīq, ed. and introd. Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke (Tehran, 2003). Nas. īr al-Dīn al-Ţūsī, Mas. āriʿ al-mus. āriʿ, ed. Wilferd Madelung (Tehran, 2004). Abu l-H. usayn al-Bas. rī, Tas. affuh. al-adilla, ed. and introd. Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006). Rational Theology in Interfaith Communication: Abu l-H . usayn al-Bas. rī’s Muʿtazilī Theology among the Karaites in the Fāt. imid Age, by Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke (Leiden: Brill, 2006). xiii

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Kitāb al-Fā’iq fī us. ūl al-dīn, by Rukn al-Dīn b. al-Malāh. imī alKhwārazmī (d. 536/1141), ed. and introd. Wilferd Madelung and Martin McDermott (Tehran, 2007). Tuh. fat al-mutakallimīn fī l-radd ʿalā l-falāsifa, by Rukn al-Dīn b. alMalāh. imī al-Khwārazmī (d. 536/1141), ed. and introd. Hassan Ansari and Wilferd Madelung (Tehran, 2008). Bas. ran Muʿtazilite Theology: Abū Muh. ammad b. Khallād’s Kitāb al-Us. ūl and its Reception, by Camilla Adang, Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2011). Encyclopaedia Islamica. editors-in-chief Wilferd Madelung and Farhad Daftary. (English edition of the original Persian ed. K. M. Bojnurdi, Editor-in-Chief). Vol. 1 (London, 2008), Vol. 2 (London, 2009), Vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2011). Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī us. ūl al-dīn, Mah. mūd b. Muh. ammad al-Malāh. imī al-Khwārazmī (d. 536 /1141), by Wilferd Madelung,, rev. and enlarged edition (Tehran, 2012). Studies in Medieval Shiʿism, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Farnham: Ashgate Variorum, 2012).

Articles “Shiʿism in the Age of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs,” in Shiʿite Heritage: Essays on Classical and Modern Traditions, ed. and trans. L. Clarke (Binghamton, New York, 2001), pp. 9–18. “Was the Caliph al-Ma’mūn a Grandson of the Sectarian Leader Ustādhsīs?,” in Studies in Arabic and Islam: Proceedings of the 19th Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, Halle 1998. S. Leder with H. Kilpatrick, B. Martel-Thoumian, H. Schönig (eds.) (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), pp. 485–90. “Maslama b. Muh. ārib: Umayyad Ḥistorian,” in Proceedings of the 20th Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, ed. K. Dévényi (The Arabist, Budapest Studies in Arabic 24–25) (Budapest, 2002), pp. 203–14. “The Westward Migration of H. anafī Scholars from Central Asia in the 11th to 13th Centuries,” in Ankara Üniversitesi Ilâhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 43/2 (2002), pp. 41–55. “A Treatise on the Imamate of the Fatimid Caliph al-Mans. ūr bi-Allāh,” in Texts, Documents and Artifacts: Islamic Studies in Honour of D.S. Richards, ed. Chase F. Robinson (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 69–77. “Rabīʿa in the Jāhiliyya and in early Islam,” in Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 28 (2003), pp. 153–70.

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“The Four Sisters are Believers,” in Mağāz: Culture e contatti nell’ area del Mediterraneo. Il ruolo dell’ Islam, ed. Antonino Pellitteri. Atti 21o Congresso UEAI Palermo, 2002 (Palermo, 2003), pp. 63–71. “An Ismaili Interpretation of Ibn Sīnā’s Qas. īdat al-Nafs,” in Reason and Inspiration in Islam: Essays in Honour of Hermann Landolt, ed. Todd Lawson (London: I.B.Tauris in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2005), pp. 157–68. “At-Taftāzānī und die Philosophie,” in Logik und Theologie: Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter, ed. Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 227–36. “ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Ibād. and the Origins of the Ibād. iyya,” in Authority, Privacy and Public Order in Islam. Proceedings of the 22nd Congress of L’Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, ed. B. MichalakPikulska and A. Pikulski (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), pp. 51–7. “ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ibād. ’s ‘Second Letter to ʿAbd al-Malik’,” in Community, State, History and Changes: Festschrift for Ridwan Al-Sayyid on His Sixtieth Birthday (Beirut: al-Shabakah al-ʿArabīyah wa-al-Nashr, 2011), pp. 7–17. “Abū l-H. usayn al-Bas. rī’s Proof for the Existence of God,” in Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy: From the Many to the One. Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank, ed. James E. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), pp. 273–80. “Ibn Malāh. imī’s Refutation of the Philosophers,” in A Common Rationality: Muʿtazilism in Islam and Judaism, ed. Camilla Adang, Sabine Schmidtke and David Sklare (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag in Kommission, 2007), pp. 331–6. “Yūsuf al-Bas. īr’s First Refutation (Naqd. ) of Abu l-H. usayn al-Bas. rī’s Theology,” by Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke, in A Common Rationality: Muʿtazilism in Islam and Judaism, ed. Camilla Adang, Sabine Schmidtke and David Sklare (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag in Kommission, 2007), pp. 229–96. “Sayf b. ʿUmar: Akhbārī and ideological fiction writer,” in Le Shīʿisme Imāmite quarante ans après: Hommage à Etan Kohlberg, ed. Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, Meir M. Bar-Asher and Simon Hopkins (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), pp. 325–37. “Kawn al-ʿālam: The Cosmology of the Ismāʿīlī dāʿī Muh. ammad b. Ah. mad al-Nasafī,” in Ismaili and Fatimid Studies in Honor of Paul E. Walker, ed. Bruce D. Craig (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2010), pp. 23–31. “Shahriyār b. al-H. asan: A Persian Ismā’īlī dā’ī of the Fatimid age,” in The Necklace of the Pleiades: Studies in Persian Literature Presented to

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Heshmat Moayyad on his 80th Birthday, ed. Franklin Lewis and Sunil Sharma (Amsterdam: Leiden University Press, 2010), pp. 121–30. “The Kitāb al-Rusūm wa’l-izdiwāj wa’l-tartīb Attributed to ʿAbdān (d. 286/899): Edition of the Arabic Text and Translation,” by Wilferd Madelung and Paul E. Walker, in Fortresses of the Intellect: Ismaili and other Islamic Studies in Honour of Farhad Daftary, ed. Omar Alide-Unzaga (London: I.B.Tauris & Co in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2011), pp. 103–65. “Al-Haytham b. ʿAdī on the Offences of the caliph ʿUthmān,” in Centre and Periphery within the Borders of Islam: Proceedings of the 23rd Congress of L’Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, ed. Giuseppe Contu (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), pp. 47–51. “Al-Mahdī al-H. aqq, al-Ḫalīfa ar-Rašīd und die Bekehrung der Dailamiten zum Islam,” in Differenz und Dynamik im Islam: Festschrift für Heinz Halm zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Hinrich Biesterfeldt and Verena Klemm (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2012), pp. 115–23. “Ibn Malāh. imī on the Human Soul,” in The Ontology of the Soul in Medieval Arabic Thought, ed. Ayman Shihadeh, in The Muslim World, 102 (2012), pp. 426–32. “Īsā b. ʿUmayr’s Ibād. ī Theology and Donatist Christian Thought,” in Medieval Arabic Thought: Essays in Honour of Fritz Zimmermann (London: The Warburg Institute, 2012), pp. 99–103. “The Authenticity of the Letter of ʿAbd Allāh b. Ibād. to ʿAbd al-Malik,” in REMMM 132 (2012), pp. 37–43.

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Michael G. Morony

To focus on universality in Muslim thought is a unique and original way to approach Islamic intellectual history. There does not appear to be a single monograph on this subject to date. The purpose of this volume is to investigate and to demonstrate the existence of universality as a theme in Muslim thought and some of the different ways it has been expressed. The aim is also to show the role of rationalism as a vehicle for universality. The six papers in this collection approach the subject of universality in Islamic thought from different perspectives, but they are unified by the underlying theme of rationalism that runs through them. Among different kinds of Muslims and between Muslims and non-Muslims, in one way or another rationalism has been a vehicle for universality. Rationalism was shared across religious boundaries and arguments based on reason were the only ones that could be convincing between people with differences of religious belief. For instance, in the ninth century, Ibn al-Munajjim resorted to an Aristotelian syllogism in his correspondence with the Christian Qusţā ibn Lūqā to prove that Muh. ammad was a prophet.1 According to Dimitri Gutas, the primacy of reason is evident in numerous interfaith philosophical debates and correspondence of the early ʿAbbāsī period. Logic was considered to be superior to grammar because it was universal and supralingual; the universality of reason made it superior to religion because each people had their own religion.2 Philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā held that the universe itself could be understood by reason.3 For Muslim 1

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Aristotelians the perception of individual instances was the occasion for universal concepts to occur in the rational mind; humans learned about universal concepts through contact with the mind of God that was mediated through the descent of the intelligibles.4 Universality also applied to the sources of knowledge. The ninth-century philosopher al-Kindī (died shortly after CE 870), vindicated the teaching of the ancients because it served universal reason and led the way toward knowledge. He argued that “we ought not to be ashamed of appreciating the truth and of acquiring it wherever it comes from, even if it comes from races distant and nations different from us.”5 It was Wilferd Madelung, however, who identified universality as a subject for discussion, and this collection begins with his “Universality in Muʿtazilī Thought.” Here universality in Islam is presented in terms of the potential applicability of Islam to all humans and of human submission to the single universal deity. For early Muslims, Islam was grounded in universal human nature; human ability to recognize the universal God was located in human reason. A rational theology was developed from the seventh to the thirteenth century CE by a group of Muslim theologians who called themselves the People of Justice and Unity (called the Muʿtazila by others) who emphasized God’s unicity, God’s justice and human responsibility and who believed that good and evil could be recognized by human reason. Madelung compares and contrasts their ideas with those of Christians and Jews and with the rationalism of the philosophers. An example of how rationalism can transcend religious boundaries (a kind of universality) is provided by the impact of Muʿtazilī thought on Jews, especially Karaites, from the tenth to the twelfth centuries CE. This is followed by Baber Johansen’s contribution, “Capacity, Legal Personality and the Concept of Obligation in Transoxanian H . anafī Law.” Because certain Muslim ritual acts such as worship and fasting are supposed to occur at particular times, certain H . anafī scholars of Central Asia from the eleventh to the sixteenth

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centuries discussed whether or not time could be a cause of ritual acts, and developed a doctrine of the apparent causes for cultic acts with a claim to universal validity. Using a cosmic cause, such as time, gave these obligations a universal character, and they discussed whether times for observance even applied to nonMuslims before they converted. Johansen notes that they answered this in the negative, and argued that the requirement did not apply to irrational Muslim actors who were mentally ill, sleeping or had fainted. It only applied to those with full capacity to perform legal acts and to choose between obedience and disobedience. There is thus an implied rationalism in that believers were seen to be rational actors. Next is an analysis by Ismail K. Poonawala, “Humanism in Ismāʿīlī Thought: The Case of the Rasā’il Ikhwān al-S. afā’ (The Epistles of the Sincere Brethren and Faithful Friends).” Here Poonawala presents some of the most prominent universal human characteristics advocated by the tenth-century CE Ismāʿīlī Ikhwān al-S. afā’ that are scattered throughout their Rasā’il. This theme in the Rasā’il has never been explored. The universalistic humanistic morality advocated there is based on the commonality of human nature, the pursuit of knowledge and the cosmopolitan values of tolerance and understanding among different races and religions. This material is organized topically by Poonawala according to (1) the origin of humans and their place in the universe, (2) rationalism and its limits, (3) religious tolerance and the spirit of inclusiveness, (4) a well-rounded education and (5) a provisional resolution to the ethical issues raised by an anthropocentric view. Poonawala sees this last theme as unique to the history of religious thought in general and to Islamic thought in particular. After this is a piece by Michael G. Morony on universality in Islamic historiography that analyzes universal chronicles in Arabic and Persian with regard to their chronological and geographical scope. Special attention is paid to the works of Masʿūdī and his cultural heritage approach to history, those of Maqdisī and his rationalist Muʿtazilī project to show how peoples who had not received a revelation developed a natural religion

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based on reason, the works of S. āʿid al-Andalusī and those of Rashīd al-Dīn. It is argued that there was a direct connection between geography, cultural legacies and universality in Islamic historiography. Following this, Emilie Savage-Smith discusses the universality and neutrality of science. Science is defined as the attempt to measure and understand the physical universe and the structure and function of the human body. Savage-Smith points out that the subjects that were investigated by scientists in the pre-modern Islamic world as well as their methods of analysis were and are universal. Because of this it was possible for people of divergent backgrounds to cooperate and to participate in joint scientific enterprises. Scientific methods included observation, experience and analogy, and from the early ninth century CE through to the fifteenth century scholars continued to test, verify and challenge the inherited Greek authorities, such as Galen and Ptolemy, as well as Islamic authorities, when their own experience and reasoning did not support the texts they were reading. The need to justify science as increasing one’s belief in God through the study of the natural world (God’s creation) is discussed, as is the shared body of knowledge that circulated and was accepted by all communities and religious confessions. Even in the transformation of humoral medicine into Prophetic medicine, the concept of the four humors was universally accepted. Savage-Smith also shows that science was sufficiently neutral that people of different religions could cooperate and that science did not decline in the later period but that there continued to be innovation and new mathematical sciences. The final contribution by Carl W. Ernst provides a perfect capstone to this collection by discussing the limits of universalism in Islamic thought, in particular in relation to the case of Indian religions. Here Ernst argues that from the eleventh century CE well into the Mughal period Muslim intellectuals proposed varying degrees of positive recognition of the religions of India. The extent to which they were able to apply universalist

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understandings and validity to Indian religions was based on categories (such as Sufism, monotheism, political ethics, magic) that were the common currency of pre-modern Islamic thought. Al-Bīrūnī’s recognition of philosophical doctrines in Sanskrit texts that required a comparative treatment is seen as rationalistic. From the fifteenth century into the Mughal period the Sufi metaphysics of Illuminationist philosophy provided an important framework for understanding Indian religions. Illuminationist vocabulary and ideas were used in Arabic versions of Sanskrit texts, in particular the hatha yoga text called The Pool of Nectar. Indian philosophers were seen as Unitarians rather than idolaters. At a practical level the meditative practices of hatha yoga were adopted by Sufis, and there was an appreciation of Indian asceticism and magic based on underlying similarities. In these cases the recognition of the other as valid by Muslims was accomplished by redefining the other in familiar terms. The limit to positive universalism for Muslims was idolatry. The Chishtī Sufi master Chirāgh-i Dihlī (d. CE 1356), is given as an example of how the disapproval of idolatry could prevent extending universalist recognition to Indian religions. Thus, the universality of reason has existed as a theme among Muslims, but not all Muslims have thought in rational or universalizing terms. The grammarian Sīrafī, in his famous debate with the Christian logician Mattā ibn Yūnis, in the tenth century, argued that there were no useful universal laws of thought; in order to reason correctly one needed to know the principles of the different sciences.6 Notes 1

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Paul Nwyia, “Introduction Générale,” in K. Samir and P. Nwyia, Une Correspondence islamo-chrétienne entre Ibn al-Munağğim, H . unayn ibn Ish. āq et Qusţā ibn Lūqā [Patrologia Orientalis, vol. 40, fasc. 4, no. 185] (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), p. 549. Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early ʿAbbāsid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th century) (London and New York: Routledge,

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Universality in Islamic Thought 1998), pp. 103–4. See also Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke, Rational Theology in Interfaith Communication. Abu l-H . usayn al-Bas. rī’s Muʿtazilī Theology among the Karaites in the Fāt. imid Age (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006). John Walbridge, God and Logic in Islam: The Caliphate of Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 76–7. Ibid., p. 79. G. Endress, “The Defense of Reason: The Plea for Philosophy in the Religious Community,” Zeitschrift für Geschichte der ArabischIslamischen Wissenschaften 6 (1990), p. 7. Walbridge, God and Logic in Islam, p. 108.

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Universality in Muʿtazilī Thought Wilferd Madelung

Aspiration to universality has marked Islam from an early date. The Prophet Muh. ammad preached initially to his own people, the Quraysh, in his home town of Makka and called them to submit to the one and universal God. When he met opposition and persecution, he appealed to other Arab tribes and sought refuge in Medina. He saw himself now as God’s Messenger to the Arabs, in a line of prophets who had earlier been sent to the Banū Isrā’īl and other peoples. When his claim to prophethood was rejected by the Jewish tribes in Medina, he came to recognize his mission as universal to mankind. His message now superseded the messages of the earlier prophets, although these had been valid in their era and all prophets had been Muslims in their submission to the universal God. The rulers of mankind, whether they had before accepted a divine message or not, were now invited to convert to Islam. The great expansion after the death of Muh. ammad took place under the banner of Islam. The Arabs, to be sure, were its tool and army. Those who followed the call to join Islam had to be integrated into Arab society, becoming clients or confederates of the conquering tribes. From the perspective of nineteenth-century Western ethnic nationalism, the Umayyad caliphate could with some justification be seen as an Arab kingdom. Its fall and replacement by an ethnically more broadly based caliphate revealed its underlying universal aspiration. Even when the territories of the caliphate later fell apart, sometimes along ethnic boundaries, the Dār al-Islām with its claim to submission to the universal God remained intact. 7

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From a different angle, a claim to the universality of Islam was put forward in the much debated h. adīth attributed to Muh. ammad: “Every child is born with the innate sound disposition (ʿala l-fit. ra); then his parents make him a Jew or a Christian or a Magian.” The natural disposition with which every human is born is toward Islam. Other religions rather estrange him from his inborn constitution. This dictum of the Prophet was generally understood as addressing the question of the status in the hereafter of the children of unbelievers, who were in this world mostly treated by the law as following the status of their parents. For the theologians it raised problems. Strict predestinarians, who held that unbelievers were created from a different clay than the believers, could not envisage that the innate disposition of all children was equally sound. The statement could refer only to those children who were predestined for Islam and were in fact created as Muslims, as the unbelievers were created as unbelievers. Those theologians who accepted the universality of the fit. ra as an innate predisposition to Islam faced the question as to what distinguished it from Islam. If Islam in the full sense was defined as acceptance and practice of the divine law, the sharī ʿa, at the age of discretion, was not the fit. ra itself already a phase of Islam? There was no conversion necessary at the time of the submission to the obligations of the law of Islam as there would have been if a non-Muslim accepted the sharī ca. Acceptance and practice of the law required knowledge of it and of the revelation, Qurʾān and Sunna of the Prophet, insofar as it was based on them. Yet revelation was obviously not innate in human nature; Qurʾān and Sunna were a unique gift to Muh. ammad. Children born in Islam had to learn them from their parents or teachers, just as children of other religions were taught by their parents. Islam then was grounded in universal human nature, not in the particular revelation received by the Prophet Muh. ammad, which Islam embraced as it had earlier embraced the revelation of other prophets. Islam was not brought by Muh. ammad; rather, it sanctioned his prophethood.

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Where then in the human fit. ra was the basis of Islam, recognition of the universal God, located? For most Muslims in the early centuries it was in reason, in the human intellect. The Qurʾān itself, of course, often appealed to simple reason, to common sense, in order to convey its message. And rationality, ʿaql or nut. q, was since ancient times seen as defining the human constitution. There were alternatives, however. The more mystically inclined might recognize the trace of God with their senses in perfect beauty, experience His majesty in states of ecstasy, or witness it manifested in the saintly life of an Imām or a Friend of God. For them knowledge might be “a dot that is multiplied by the ignorant,” as a Sufi aphorism stated. Yet it was rational theology, the search for knowledge, which flourished first, and its leading school was constituted from the second half of the seventh to the thirteenth century CE by the Muʿtazila. Rational theology has in modern times become a stranger in religious thought. Not long ago Pope Benedict XVI noted that there is indeed a legitimate theology that is called rational with which presumably all reasonable people can agree. For most moderns in East and West, however, religion rather consists in revelation, in particular in relation to sacred scripture, and theology, both academic and popular, is interpretation of it. To study Judaism and Christianity essentially implies to investigate their respective forms of the Bible, and to study Islam means to examine the Qur’ān. Reason and rationalism have taken a distinctly anti-religious turn in the West. Religion is commonly seen as requiring an initial leap out of common-sense rationality into belief or faith which in principle cannot constitute knowledge. From the point of view of the intellect, religion is located in the irrational psyche and at best deserves a sceptical approach. For many of those who view our modern age as post-Christian it ought to be eliminated from school and society in the interest of the advancement of science. For the Muʿtazila, religion was based on common-sense rational knowledge. It did not imply a leap into some irrational belief. Faith consisted in recognition of a few basic simple truths readily accessible to any human with a sound mind and in acting

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in accordance with them. The existence of God, the Creator of the universe, was known, not by spontaneous intuition nor by revelation, but by common-sense inference from the perceivable world. His essential attributes, His being all-powerful, omniscient and ever-living, could be easily demonstrated, as could His being neither a physical body in space nor an accident inhering in a body. These basic truths of the Muʿtazilī principle of the Unicity of God (tawh. īd) were also commonly upheld by other monotheist theologians, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, except for the literalist exegetes of Scripture. Rival theological schools employed substantially the same proofs for the existence of God and His transcendence of the material world. The difference was that they generally denied that there could be a moral obligation to acquire this knowledge before prophetic revelation and that in fact few humans would ever pursue it without listening to the warnings of the prophets. The Muʿtazila denied that the purpose of the mission of prophets was to convey, or to summon mankind to the pursuit of such rational truths. The desire of their pursuit rather arose in childhood, long before the age of actual obligation, from a sense of fear of failing the obligation of thanking the universal Benefactor. More controversial were the views of the Muʿtazila on their second principle, that of God’s Justice (ʿadl). The principle of God’s Justice soon became the hallmark of Muʿtazilī theological thought. Its discussion eventually took up the largest section in their books, and the remaining three of their five principles – God’s promise and threat, the intermediate status of the unrepentant grave sinner between faith and unbelief and the universal duty of commanding right and forbidding wrong – were merely elaborations of it. All monotheist theologians, to be sure, held that God must be just, not wronging any creature, as they held that He must be perfectly good, doing no evil. The Muʿtazilī principle of justice, however, comprised three separate, yet interrelated rational theses, each of which was disputed by at least some other schools of thought. The first dealt with the question commonly described in modern western thought as that

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of human free will, but in early Islam more often called that of khalq al-af cāl, God’s creation of (apparently human) acts. The Muʿtazila held that God’s justice was incompatible with His creating the acts of human beings for which He held them responsible and rewarded or punished them. This common-sense judgment agreed with the position of contemporary Jewish and Christian theologians, but was widely and vigorously contested among Muslims. The motive behind this opposition is generally traced back to the strong element of fatalism in pre-Islamic Arab thought and to the numerous passages of the Qur’ān which suggest, if understood literally, that God misguides unbelievers as well as He guides the faithful. The Muʿtazila maintained that all such passages must be interpreted as referring to God’s secondary judgment of the unbelievers’ acts rather than to His own primary action. Their view of human free will has been traced back to the influence of Christian theology as represented especially by John of Damascus, mediated by their predecessors, the Qadariyya of the first century of the Hijra. The second thesis was that the human intellect is able on its own, without the aid of revelation, to recognize good and evil and judge individual acts to be good or evil by the way in which they occurred. God’s command and prohibition did not make acts good or evil, but rather God commanded what is good and forbade what is evil. There were, however, so the Muʿtazila maintained, some beneficial acts, especially acts of worship, which reason could not recognize and some which it would even forbid on its own. These God was obliged to announce to mankind as an incentive (lut. f) to do what is good. This obligation was the primary motive for the mission of prophets. The main opponents of the Muʿtazila in this question were the Ash‘ariyya, who asserted that good and evil were what God commanded or forbade and that they could be known only by prophetic revelation. The Ash‘arī position, however, was generally viewed as extreme even among Muslims. It was not shared by the H . anafī Māturīdī school or even by the H . anbalī traditionalist theologian Ibn Taymiyya, who held that good and evil were

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basically known by reason. Were good and evil indeed not universally acknowledged even in non-prophetic religions and by atheists? The third thesis of the Muʿtazila under their principle of justice was that God never does evil or injustice, even though He must have the power to do so. This could be inferred from His wisdom, the certainty that He is omniscient and knows that He is selfsufficient and needless. A freely choosing agent, the Muʿtazila asserted, will choose wrong-doing only out of ignorance of its being evil or out of need, be it real or imaginary. God as the Creator of the universe was a freely choosing agent. His essential omnipotence would have allowed Him not to create the universe or create a different one, perhaps one full of evil and oppression. He could then, however, not be described as good or just. To be good and just necessarily entailed a relationship; God created the world in order to be good to His creatures. For this reason the Muʿtazila defined goodness and justice as attributes of God’s action, not of God’s essence. God was by His essence eternally almighty and all-knowing, but He was good only by His good acts. Before His acts, His creation, He could not have been either good or evil, just or unjust. The distinction between essential attributes and attributes of act emerged in Muʿtazilī thought in the ninth century. No antecedents for it are at present known. The motive behind it was no doubt anti-dualist. If God was an eternal being and as such good, from where did evil come? Pure being had no real opposite, for nonexistence was negation without reality. In contrast, evil, like goodness, was a palpable, undeniable reality in this world, not merely a negation of goodness. Those who defined God in His essence as pure goodness were inevitably faced with the problem of theodicy: how can evil and injustice occur in a world brought forth by a single universal God, whether by creation or by emanation? In Islam, Abū l-H . asan al-Ashʿarī and his theological school adopted the Muʿtazilī distinction and viewed goodness as an attribute of God’s action. They affirmed, however, that the divine attributes of essence were not merely descriptive of His essence,

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but additional to the essence, though not independent of it; they commonly accused the Muʿtazila of in fact denying the divine attributes. The question of whether God could do evil did not arise for them. God’s acts were determined not by His wisdom, but by His eternal and immutable will. God’s will, for the Muʿtazila an attribute of acts subordinate to His wisdom, was raised by al-Ashʿarī to the rank of an attribute of essence. Good and evil, as noted, were for the Ashʿariyya what God commanded and prohibited in time; yet whatever occurred in the world was determined by His will. What the Ashʿariyya defended in the name of God’s unrestricted might was in reality His absolute arbitrariness. Humans, al-Ashʿarī explained, as God’s creatures were His slaves. God could do whatever He pleased with them. If He were to punish them for their good deeds and reward them for their evil deeds, it would be equally good and just for Him. Only by revelation could it be known to us that He will not do so. The source of evil and injustice in the world for them was not mankind’s ignorance and neediness but God’s overpowering will. He created the unbelievers evil as He created the faithful good, and He created the world so that all of them would acquire the goodness and evil He created in them. Finally He would justly judge them on their acquisition in a final judgment preordained from eternity. The Muʿtazila found it easy to uncover the absurdity of the Ashʿarī position. If God created the good and evil acts of humans, they could obviously not become responsible for whatever they acquired by these acts and the Final Judgment was a meaningless show-trial. If God was good and just no matter what He did with mankind, since they were his slaves, His goodness and justice were mere labels without significance. That God would in fact reward the righteous and punish the wicked could then indeed not be known by reason, but only by revelation. Yet could it really be known by revelation? If God could justly do with His slaves whatever He pleased, might He not also justly lie to them in His revelation? The question was soon raised by the Muʿtazila. If reason was unable to prove that God’s revelation

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must be truthful, how could the Qurʾān, God’s own speech, be relied upon? The Ashʿariyya sought to parry the question by their thesis of God’s inner speech (kalām nafsī). While the Muʿtazila viewed speech as an attribute of God’s action and the Qurʾān as created like everything else apart from God, the Ashʿariyya defined God’s inner speech as an attribute of God’s essence, coeternal with Him, like the divine will, but not subordinate to the will. Since God’s inner speech obviously cannot be heard by human beings on earth, the Qurʾān, God’s speech heard and recited by them in time, must be merely an expression (ʿibāra) of it. The Muʿtazila could not but agree that if there was an inner speech of God, it must necessarily be known to be truthful. Yet its expression on earth, the Qurʾān, was obviously subject to God’s will which, according to the voluntarist view of the Ashʿariyya, was the source of good and evil, justice and oppression, truth and lies. The truthfulness of the Qurʾān itself could no longer be guaranteed by reason, but could only be accepted by the leap of faith. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī among the Ashʿariyya admitted the cogency of the Muʿtazilī argument. Rational knowledge became more and more irrelevant in religion. As far as reason was concerned, the Qurʾān might well be lying in order to misguide mankind, and God would punish the faithful and reward the unbelievers. Yet what meaning was now left in the Prophet’s word that every child is born with the innate good disposition, if God created the unbeliever as an unbeliever unable to accept faith? Outside Islam, the third Muʿtazilī thesis on justice was on the whole well received as there was but little sympathy for the denial of human freedom and the Ashʿarī defense of strict predestination and divine arbitrary omnipotence. In Christianity, similar voluntarist and predestinarian views came to the fore only much later among Protestant reformers and theologians, although they were hardly influenced by Ashʿarī theology. For medieval Christians, however, God’s justice often aroused ambiguous feelings and predestination loomed as a dark mystery. For Christians in the Western Church, which followed closely the

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teaching of St Augustine, the dogma of original sin meant that mankind ever since the Fall of Adam and Eve was in a state of corruption and sin on earth, and none of their descendants could regain the state of righteousness by his or her own efforts. Jesus Christ alone had been able by His divine nature to wipe out original sin through His own sacrifice and obtain God’s grace and salvation for those who loved Him in the Church. Grace, however, was an act of love, God’s gift to man by God’s choice, not justice that man deserved. The justice of God thus meant in general for Christians eternal damnation and punishment, the wrath of the Lord. It inspired fear, while hope was for God’s grace. When Pope Paschal II in the late eleventh or early twelfth century was asked by a novice about justice, he is quoted to have replied: “My son, Justice there is only in Hell. In Heaven there is the grace and on earth is the cross. The Church is but there that she bless those who bear it.” Western Christians thus could be excused if they did not long for divine justice, but rather for His love and grace. In the Eastern churches, views on the significance of the Fall were more tempered and allowed for some human responsibility. God’s justice certainly was not only threatening and was appreciated in theological discourse. Christian theologians, however, generally were disturbed by the proposition of the Muʿtazila that God might owe mankind measurable compensation for the undeserved hardship and pain they suffered in the world created by Him in His love. The question remained whether there really could be love without justice. The situation was different for the Jews. Their relationship with God was based on the covenant they had concluded with Him. The covenant had given them freedom after their slavery in Egypt and it gave them a right to divine justice forever if they kept the law God imposed on them. They would be protected and rewarded as long as they observed and obeyed it and be punished only if they broke it. Through the covenant they were God’s chosen people. God, to be sure, would treat all human beings and even His other creatures justly, but without the covenant and the Mosaic law the Gentiles had no right to it. The Talmud stated that

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monotheist Gentiles who obeyed the seven laws given to Noah would be among “the pious of all nations of the world who have a share in the world to come.” Only heathens and idolaters deserved nothing but condemnation and death. Jews thus were longing for the justice of God their covenant guaranteed them, and the Muʿtazilī discussion of divine justice struck a chord with them, especially those inclined to rationalism. For wisdom also ranked high in Jewish religious thought and the Torah was indeed testimony to God’s wisdom. The impact of Muʿtazilī thought appeared early in the Arabic writings—theological, legal and exegetical—of Jewish scholars beginning with Sa‘ādiya al-Fayyūmī (Sa‘adiya Gaon, CE 882–942) and David Muqammis. in the early tenth century. It continued with scholars, both Rabbanite and Karaite, such as Ya‘qūb Qirqisānī and Samuel ben Hofnī Gaon (d. 1013), but reached its peak among the Karaite community in the Fāt.imid Empire during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Among the Muʿtazila, the Bas. ran theological school of Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī and his son Abū Hāshim had gained ascendancy in Baghdad in the tenth century. The Būyid vizier al-S. āh. ib b. ‘Abbād in 977 appointed the prominent Muʿtazilī theologian ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Asadābādī (d. 1022) chief judge in Rayy in western Persia with the aim of promoting and spreading Muʿtazilī doctrine among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The Karaite Yūsuf al-Bas. īr (d. ca. 1040) adopted ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s theological teaching and brought it from Iraq to Fāt.imid Jerusalem, then the center of Karaite scholarship. He openly identified with the views of the Muʿtazila, whom he simply called the mutakallimūn, in general and with those of ʿAbd al-Jabbār and his disciple ʿAbd Allāh al-Labbād in particular; to the Ashʿariyya he referred with their nickname as mujbira, compulsionists. The major part of his two main theological works, the Kitāb al-Tamyīz and the Kitāb al-Muh. tawī, represent contemporaneous Muʿtazilī doctrine, and he wrote a commentary on al-Labbād’s Kitāb al-Us. ūl that has not been recovered. In several treatises he denounced the position of Abū l-H . usayn alBas. rī, the pupil and major critic of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s views.

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Evidently there were already some Karaites, most likely in Egypt, who were attracted to al-Bas. rī’s views, although their identity is not yet clear. A generation later Sahl b. Fad. l (Yashar b. H. esed) alTustarī, a member of the most prominent Karaite family in Fāt.imid Cairo, actively promoted al-Bas. rī’s teachings in his writings. He gained the support of Abū l-H . asan ‘Alī b. Sulaymān al-Muqaddasī, a prolific Karaite scholar from Jerusalem. This was at a time when Abū l-H . usayn al-Bas. rī’s theological works were virtually ignored by the predominant Muʿtazilī school of ʿAbd alJabbār and were transmitted by a handful of individual scholars. Only after the death of Sahl al-Tustarī, the Khwārazmian Muʿtazilī scholar Rukn al-Dīn Mah. mūd b. al-Malāh. imī (d. 1141) took up his teaching and on its basis founded the last widely recognized school of the Muʿtazila. By that time, however, the Karaites had lost their close contact with the Muʿtazila, and Ibn al-Malāh. imī’s works seem to have remained unknown to them. The thesis of the Muʿtazila that God, because of His wisdom, inevitably does not will or do evil, did not entirely resolve for them the problem of theodicy and perhaps made it more acute. If God created the world in order to do good through it, all evil and injustice in the world must be the work of His creatures, mankind in particular. God evidently had to give them freedom of action, as the Muʿtazila saw it, while ordering them to do good and be just, in order that they would deserve His reward. He would, so they claimed, have to punish those who failed to obey His orders and who sowed evil and corruption on earth unless they repented, for this was a necessary incentive (lut. f) for mankind to do good. Yet was it really necessary? Was not the promise of reward for humans of good will sufficient incentive? Why would God not simply prevent evil and injustice on earth? Why would He create human beings that He knew by His omniscience would disobey His orders? Why would He not create only those He knew would obey? The Muʿtazila struggled for answers to these questions. Their critics clad the problem into the well-known dilemma of the three brothers, which was widely quoted in numerous variants and sometimes ascribed to Abū l-H . asan al-Ashʿarī as the reason for

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his break with his Muʿtazilī teacher Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī. The three brothers, born of a single womb, face their final judgment by their Lord. The first one has led a long virtuous life in obedience to God and is given great reward in accordance with his merits. The second one has led a long life full of offense and disobedience and is condemned to eternal punishment as he deserved. The third one, who died as a child before reaching the age of discretion and thus had earned neither reward nor punishment, is granted a limited reward out of the kindness of His Lord. He asks: “O my Lord, why did you not give me a long life so that I would have earned the same reward as my first brother?” The Lord tells him: “Because I knew that you would have done great evil like your second brother.” Now the second brother protests: “O my Lord, why did you not let me die as a child like my brother since you knew that I would do great evil?” The Muʿtazila worked out some answers to the dilemma but none offered a full solution. Like any good dilemma, it concealed more than one problem, and if an answer is found to one problem, the other becomes more glaring. The Muʿtazila could evidently be certain that their Lord must have the right and just answer to the brothers and could adduce the succinct wisdom of the Qurʾān: “Above every one knowing there is one who knows.” Nor did their critics have a reasonable answer and so they were compelled to have recourse to the inscrutable will of God. They could put their trust into His infinite mercy for the faithful, even the unrepentant offenders among them, proclaimed by the Qurʾān; but where remained the universal justice of God to mankind? Perhaps the Muʿtazila eventually would have found the solution to the dilemma, but time was now quickly running out for them, at least as a living school tradition. Their opponents more and more loudly condemned them as heretics and usually had government on their side. The flourishing Muʿtazilī school of Qād. ī ʿAbd al-Jabbār in Rayy was ravaged, their books burned, by Mah. mūd of Ghazna when he sacked the town in 1027, as he proudly reported to the caliph in Baghdad. The school never quite recovered from the blow.

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There was now also increased competition from a different rationalist tradition. Ibn al-Malāh. imī felt the need to devote substantial sections of his theological works to dealing with the teaching of the falāsifa, the Muslim philosophers representing the school tradition of Plato and Aristotle, and composed a comprehensive refutation of their views, naming it The Gift to the Theologians in Reply to the Philosophers. The philosophers claimed to be the only true champions of pure reason independent of revelation. Alfarabi (d. 950) in particular had accused the speculative theologians, including the Muʿtazila, of mixing their rational discourse with notions derived from religion. The early Muʿtazila had occasionally clashed with the philosophers and criticized some of their metaphysical views, though in general they did not pay much attention to them. This changed after Avicenna (d. 1037) put forward his claim that philosophy in fact represented the true Islam and that the Islamic revelation, the Qurʾān, merely conveyed the philosophical truths to the masses in pictures they could understand. The Ashʿarī theologian al-Ghazālī now charged the philosophers in his Tahāfut al-falāsifa with unbelief on three points and with heretical innovation in 17 others. In his Maqās. id al-falāsifa, however, al-Ghazālī offered a neutral comprehensive exposition of the doctrine of Avicenna which was widely read among Muslim scholars, and in his later works he often adopted philosophical thought. Altogether he did more to promote Avicenna’s teaching in Islam than to curtail it. Ibn al-Malāh. imī, writing four decades after the publication of the Tahāfut, complained that many students of jurisprudence, both Shāfi‘īs and H . anafīs, were now studying philosophy in the erroneous belief that it would be useful in their study of Islamic law. In contrast to al-Ghazālī, Ibn al-Malāh. imī presented a comprehensive refutation of the relevant teaching of Avicenna and his school, systematically comparing it with that of the Muʿtazila. The elitist rationalism of the philosophers was at variance with the common-sense Muʿtazilī rationalism. Its truths were supposedly based on apodictic demonstration (burhān) which could be grasped only by the few, the philosophers, and

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were beyond the reach of the masses. The common-sense arguments of the Muʿtazila were, in the view of the philosophers, based mostly on mashhūrāt, widely held beliefs without sound foundation in Aristotelian logic. For Ibn al-Malāh. imī these mashhūrāt were self-evident facts, and he keeps scoffing at the odd truths of the philosophers allegedly founded on burhān, such as that from the One only a single one can issue, that the one who emanated good without a purpose must be superior to the one who does good with the purpose of benefiting others, and that existence is good in itself. On the question of ethics and justice, the concepts of the philosophers differed radically from those of the Muʿtazila so that a fruitful comparison was hardly possible. Ibn al-Malāh. imī’s Gift to the Theologians remained, like his other works, virtually unknown among Sunnīs. Among them, elitist philosophical rationalism prevailed. Princes often liked to have their court philosopher to assure them of the wisdom of their governance over the ignorant masses, and Avicenna’s view of the world agreed on the whole more with the Ashʿarī view than with that of the Muʿtazila. Avicenna held that the preponderant goodness of the universe was assured by the providence of God, though not by His will or purpose, and he adopted the Ashʿarī maxim: “Man is compelled in the guise of a freely choosing agent,” against the Muʿtazilī assertion of universal human freedom. If the First One from whom the universe emanated was indeed not truly free, how could humans expect to be so? They were all duped, except for the wise elite. Ibn al-Malāh. imī’s works did spread among Shī‘īs, both Twelvers and Zaydīs, and a good part of them has been preserved in Zaydī manuscripts in the Yemen. As the Muʿtazila, however, became extinct as a living theological school even in Khwārazm, and speculative theology in Islam more and more gave way to exuberant Sufism, Muʿtazilī thought remained alive only in creeds among the Shī‘a and the Karaites. Among the Jews in general, the verdict of Moses Maimonides (d. 1204) secured the unquestionable authority of philosophy as against kalām theology, which he

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denounced. Muʿtazilī thought did not reach Western Europe in the Middle Ages. In the modern age, Muslims have at times felt a need to revive Muʿtazilī thought, especially on justice and human freedom of the will, and some have even called themselves, or were considered by others, Neo-Muʿtazila. Among modern Jews, scholars eager to study Jewish history including that of their Karaite brethren cannot fail to become familiar with Muʿtazilī kalām as they examine the fragments of Karaite and Muʿtazilī works preserved through centuries in the genizas of synagogues. We other moderns—Christians, post-Christians and whatever else—have more freedom in deciding whether we want to meet the Muʿtazila. We may not care much about universal justice and may even wish the three brothers and most of humanity to hell. If we are, however, concerned about universal justice, whether on earth or in the hereafter or both, we, too, cannot help revisiting the Muʿtazila and ponder with them about the destiny of our three brothers.

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3 Capacity, Legal Personality and the Concept of Obligation in Transoxanian H . anafī Law

s Baber Johansen*

Between the tenth and the twelfth centuries CE, H . anafī scholars from Central Asia and Iran built within the discipline of the methodology of jurisprudence (us. ūl al-fiqh) an original and much debated doctrine of cultic obligation. This chapter tries to reconstruct the reasoning used in this process. Early H . anafī authors of us. ūl al-fiqh Early H . anafī efforts to develop a coherent methodology of Islamic jurisprudence (us. ūl al-fiqh) are linked to Baghdad and the names 1 of Abū l-H . usayn al-Karkhī (d. Baghdad, 340/952) and Niz. ām alDīn Abū ‘Alī Ah. mad b. Muh. ammad b. Ish. āq al-Shāshī2 (d. Baghdad, 344/955–56), but I am in particular interested in the works by Abū Zayd ‘Ubaidallāh b. ‘Umar al-Dabūsī3 (d. in Bukhara 1030), Abū Bakr b. Muh. ammad. b. Ah. mad b. Abū Sahl al-Sarakhsī4 (d. 1090 in Central Asia), ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Masʿūd al-Kāsānī5 (d. 1189 in Aleppo) and Abū l-H . asan ‘Alī b. Muh. ammad al-Bazdawī6 (d. 1089 in Samarqand). I will cite other us. ūlī authorities only for specific points of comparison. The tasks of a new discipline: “the roots of the jurisprudence” H . anafī literature on “the branches of the jurisprudence” (furūʿ alfiqh) has been written—even if not under this name—from the eighth century on. It produces and discusses the legal norms that 23

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are to be applied in different fields of the law, such as cult, commercial exchange, social exchange and fiscal law. It attempts to provide the legal actors with the norms that lead them toward an ethically, religiously and legally correct behavior in the various fields of the law. To do this, the scholars of this discipline organize the law according to different social practices and fields of action. They in fact develop categories and norms that are peculiar to these different fields and thus help the legal actors to adapt their behavior to the particular requirements of each field. In their literature, books carry the names of fields of practice, such as the books on “purity,” “prayer,” ‘‘fasting,” “alms-tax,” and “pilgrimage” as far as the cult is concerned, and books on, for example, “marriage,” “sale,” “rent,” and “money change” for other fields. The books or texts in the H. anafī literature on the “roots of jurisprudence” (us. ūl al-fiqh) come into existence during the tenth century. They are organized according to the sources of obligations. These sources of obligations and the way in which their obligatory character is established do not belong to particular fields of the law. In principle, they have to be applicable to all fields of law. The discipline thus helps to unify the concept of law. The books or chapters of this discipline do not refer to particular fields of legal action but to the sources of the law, God’s commands (amr), the discourse (khit. āb) addressed by God to the subjects of the law (al-mukhāt. abūn), the sunna of the Prophet, the way in which analogy (qiyās) can be used in order to derive new rules from the norms contained in the authoritative sources and the consensus of legal scholars (ijmāʿ) that can neither be abrogated nor contradicted. These are the topics treated in the literature of this discipline. But they also discuss the limits of these sources and the role that other factors may play in complementing them. The methodical interpretation of the language used in such sources, presented under rubrics such as “polysemous” (mujmal), “clearly explained” (mubayyan), “general” (‘amm) or “specific and particular” (khās. s. ), opens a wide range of interpretation of legal sources. In other words, this discipline does not focus on specific

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fields of activity but on the discussion concerning the range of the divine discourse, of the human language and its influence on the understanding of the normative reasoning, the constraints of language and the effect of social and cosmic causes as obligating human behavior. It focuses on the way in which jurists can derive arguments from these various sources and causes for the construction or justification of legal norms in the field of the applied law. Therefore, the categories that are constructed in this discipline must be suitable for the legal analysis of all norms in the discipline of the “branches of jurisprudence.” The correct use of the categories established in the “roots of the jurisprudence” must allow the scholars of that discipline to establish the reasons that led the scholars of the “branches of the jurisprudence” to formulate the norms of the applied law in the way they did. It should also allow the specialists of the “roots of the jurisprudence” to understand why different schools and different individual jurists reached different conclusions about these reasons. This general description of the tasks assigned to the “foundations of the jurisprudence” is not restricted to H . anafī us. ūl al-fiqh. H . anbalī and Shāfiʿī authors from the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth century share this outlook. They clearly define this discipline as a legal methodology for all fields in the “branches of the jurisprudence.” The Baghdadi H . anbalī Ibn ‘Aqīl (1039–1119) writes in a section “On the Explanation of the Meaning of the Term Foundations of the Jurisprudence”: The foundations (us. ūl) are the indicants in their different ranks and genera on [the basis of which] the legal norms are constructed, such as the Book and the [different] ranks of its indicants, such as revealed texts (nas. s. ), apparent meaning (z. āhir), general meaning (‘umūm), the indication of God’s discourse (dalīl al-khit. āb)7, the conclusion a fortiori (fah. wā al-khit. āb), the normative practice of the Prophet (sunna) and its different degrees, the analogy (qiyās), the principle of the presumption of continuity (istis. h. āb al-h. āl) in all its different parts. And on these [fundamental] elements the legal norms are constructed.8

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In a similar way, the important mystic, theologian, Shāfiʿī jurist and authority in the field of “the foundations of the Jurisprudence,” Abū H . āmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), states in his Mustas. fā: In the us. ūl al-fiqh one does not focus on particular, individual problems, not even in the way of presenting an exemplary case. Rather, one focuses on the foundation of Qurʾān, Sunna, and consensus, on the conditions of their validity and their being firmly established. From there [one approaches] the aspects of their signification for everything (dalāla jumaliyya), either through their linguistic forms (s. īghātiha), or the meaning of their term, or the way in which this term is inflected (aw majrā lafz. iha), or through that which can rationally be deduced from their term (maʿqūli lafz. iha)—and that is the conclusion by analogy—all this without focusing on any particular and specific [legal] problem. This is the way in which the foundations of jurisprudence differ from its branches. You know from this that the indicants of the norms are the Book, the normative practice of the Prophet, and the consensus. The knowledge of these three foundations, the conditions of their validity, and the aspects under which they serve as signs indicating the legal qualifications (wa-wujūhi dalālātiha ‘alā l-ah. kām) [constitute] the knowledge that is termed “foundations of jurisprudence.”9

In the H . anafī tradition, more than in others, this discipline has been very closely connected to the analysis of dissent (ikhtilāf) among different schools of law and within the H . anafī school of law. Dabūsī (see note 3) is, in fact, seen by many authors as the founder of the “discipline of dissent (among legal scholars)” (‘ilm al-ikhtilāf).10 Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1405 in Cairo) is the first author to have pointed out the particular role that the H . anafī authors have played in defining the task of the “roots of jurisprudence” as the provider of the tools for the analysis of the norms of the applied law, thus defining it as a legal not a theological discipline. He takes as an example the work of the H . anafī us. ūl author, Abū Zayd ‘Ubaidallāh b. ʿUmar al-Dabūsī, who wrote in Transoxania at the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century.11 In his

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translation of and commentary upon the us. ūl work of the eleventhcentury Shāfiʿī scholar Abū Ish. āq al-Shīrāzī, Eric Chaumont refers to Ibn Khaldūn’s distinction between the H . anafī us. ūl scholars and those of other schools. He describes in detail the complex relationship between theologians and jurists who confront each other in their efforts to control the discipline of the “roots of the jurisprudence”12 and holds that the us. ūl al-fiqh situated between theology and law were “a preparatory discipline for the ensemble of religious sciences that were cultivated in classical Islam.”13 But he also points out that Shīrāzī does not allow his theological affiliation to determine his outlook on legal methodology.14 That theologians should not interfere with the law’s methodology and its efforts to integrate the revealed texts into the law is a 15 widely held tenet among H . anafī us. ūl authorities. Also the famous Muʿtazilī theologian and authority in the discipline of the “roots of the jurisprudence,” Abū l-H . usain Muh. ammad b. ʿAlī b. al-T. ayyib al-Bas. rī (d. 1044 in Baghdad),16 clearly distinguishes between theology and us. ūl al-fiqh. So do also the Ashʿarī theologian and Shāfiʿī jurist al-Ghazālī, the H . anbalī jurist and ex-Muʿtazilī Ibn ‘Aqīl and the Shāfiʿī us. ūlī Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī.17 The concept of obligation in the “roots of jurisprudence” The us. ūl terminology for the concept of obligation was developed between the tenth and the twelfth century. It is obvious that the authors of that period found most of their terminology already in the legal literature of the eighth and the ninth centuries. One of the questions that remains is whether certain concepts that are not very evident in H . anafī texts of the ninth and even the tenth century owe their growing importance to the tenth- and eleventh-century texts of the new us. ūl discipline. Another question is whether existing concepts change their significance and meaning. As far as the concept of obligation is concerned, the discipline of “the roots of jurisprudence” faces three fundamental questions:

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1. What is the relation between the legal actors’ capacity to perform valid legal acts, the ahliyyat al-adā’, and their capacity to acquire rights and incur obligations, the ahliyyat al-wujūb? How is this last capacity related to the legal personality of the law’s subjects? 2. Under what circumstances can one of these two capacities lack in human beings? And does the lack of such capacities lead to the exclusion from the cult community? 3. As this community is defined by its adherence to the obligations resulting from the divine discourse (khit. āb), and the cosmic causes of time and space that serve as signs of this obligation, what is the relation between God’s discourse (khit. āb) and commands (amr) on the one hand, and the cosmic causes of time and space (sabab) that signal the obligation, on the other? If God is the obligating instance (mūjib), what is the function of the “causes” of time and space for the cultic obligation?

Two capacities or one? A brief reference to the terminology employed in this debate is necessary in order to understand better the relation between the “roots of the jurisprudence” and the “branches of the jurisprudence.” The terminology of the two disciplines certainly overlaps. The wealth of questions and explanations to be found in the “branches of the jurisprudence” is expressed in a rich terminology and the “roots of the jurisprudence” have coined their own debates mostly in this common terminology of the law. The question remains whether categories, such as “capacity” (ahliyya) that do not seem to have played a major role in H . anafī law before the eleventh century, are given greater importance through the debates conducted in the us. ūl al-fiqh and whether other terms, such as “legal personality” that are well developed in the “branches of the jurisprudence,” the latest since the early ninth

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century, receive a new status in the us. ūl debates of the tenth and eleventh centuries. As to the first question, Chafik Chehata has drawn our attention to the fact that major H . anafī authors from the end of the eighth to the beginning of the eleventh century do not seem to pay special attention to this term.18 During the second half of the eleventh century the term dominates the discussion on capacity in the Transoxanian H . anafī literature. I cannot, for the time being, answer the question of whether the earlier Transoxanian literature contains additional information on this terminological development. Chafik Chehata develops a radical criticism of the notion of the capacity to acquire rights and incur obligations (ahliyyat alwujūb) that he finds in the H . anafī literature. He acknowledges that this notion corresponds to the Rechtsfaehigkeit of the German law and the capacité de jouissance of French law and that it may have to the ahliyyat al-adā’ (the capacity to perform valid legal acts) the same relation as the capacité de jouissance to the capacité d’exercice in French law or between Rechtsfaehigkeit and Handlungsfaehigkeit in German law. But he insists that this distinction should not be considered as a valid category of legal science. He suggests that it should be replaced by the notion of personality, because, he says, it is useful only if applied to persons who do not have the capacity to possess certain rights. But that, according to Chehata, is the sign of a “diminished personality.” He concludes: “Therefore, he could not be considered as a subject of the law.”19 Chehata is persuaded that Sarakhsī (see note 4) restricts the notion of ahliyya to the capacity to perform legal acts and never has recourse to the notion of a capacity to incur obligations.20 This argument is certainly wrong. Sarakhsī, probably the most influential H. anafī scholar in eleventh-century Transoxania, clearly integrates the notion of a capacity to incur obligations in his construction of the law of obligations. He talks about it in terms of a capacity to be liable (ahliyyat al-d. amān), a capacity to incur obligations (ahliyyat iltizām), he talks about being able to incur

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obligations (ahl li l-wujūb) and he uses “the capacity to incur the legal effects of obligations” (ahliyya li-h. ukmi l-wujūb). Other synonyms will be quoted below.21 Chehata, providing us with a detailed analysis of the relevant texts by ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Kāsānī (d. 1144 in Aleppo, see note 4), the most systematic jurist of the H . anafī school, suggests that this scholar also accepted and used only one concept of capacity and used it exclusively in the context of the formation of the legal act22 and as a condition of any valid legal act.23 He did not see that Kāsānī speaks about the “lack of a capacity to oblige themselves to pray” (li-‘admi ahliyyati wujūbi ls. alāt) that frees children from the obligation to perform the obligatory prayers, and that he holds that every believer is obliged to pray “if he had the capacity to be obliged to pray.”24 Chehata was a very precise reader and committed to the study of terminology as a key to concepts. He may not have found the examples of Sarakhsī’s and Kāsānī’s use of the term and the concept of the “capacity to be obliged,” because he was not looking into the legal rules governing the cult. In the discussion on the legal obligations resulting from the practice of the cult this is an important part of the human capacity and it is very closely related to a second concept, dhimma, the seat of obligation in the human person, a term that has acquired in Muslim law the meaning of “legal personality.” The seat of the obligation as “the legal personality” In the early ninth century, the term dhimma is widely used in the literature on “the branches of the jurisprudence.” Muh. ammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820 in Egypt), the founder of the Shāfiʿī doctrine and law school, gives an impressively clear example of its use in his Kitāb al-Umm. He talks about a man who wants to marry, has enough means to pay the current expenses for the maintenance of his future wife, but is unable to pay for the dowry. This man, Shāfiʿī says, may make up for the missing dowry by an obligation, supported by his legal personality, to pay the dowry at an unspecified later date:

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If he does not have the means to pay the dowry, but is not too poor to pay the [the future wife’s] maintenance, and if she is given the choice and chooses to stay with him, she has given up her right to separate from him [because he did not yet pay his dowry]. As long as he pays her maintenance, there is no bodily harm for her in his delaying the dowry payment. She has given up on [her right] to separate from him. [Her case is analogous] to the case of the contract partner [in a sale contract] who [has sold an asset to the man who became insolvent and has thus become the creditor of] a bankrupt partner (al-muflis) and is given the choice between [recovering from among the assets of his bankrupt partner] the specific thing that was his [the creditor’s] property or to [uphold his claims] against the legal personality (dhimma) of his partner. If he chooses [to uphold his claims against] the legal personality of his partner, he will no longer be entitled to take the specific thing that was his property [from among the assets of his bankrupt partner]. [In the case of the wife and her insolvent husband] the dower remains a debt on the husband unless she gives up her claims on it. If he had married her and had become insolvent for the dowry she would be entitled not to enter his house until he pays the dowry and she would be entitled to maintenance if she said: once you will pay the dowry I will make myself accessible for you. But if [after marriage] she entered his house and he has not enough money to pay the dowry, she has no choice [regarding her accessibility] because she agreed to enter [his house] without [receiving] a dowry and so she cannot withhold herself from him. The fact that she entered with him without [his] payment of the bridal money shows that she consented to uphold her claims against his legal personality (rid. an bidhimmatihi) [instead of requesting the money in cash].25

The bride could have made the cash payment of the bridal money a condition for her entry into his house. The fact that she consented to give him credit on the basis of his legal personality deprives her of any present action. The husband owes her the bridal money but does not have to determine any specific date at which he will be paying her. He has accepted a personal debt, a

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personal obligation to pay (dayn fī l-dhimma). Such debts can very well exist without a precise date of their execution. This notion of personal obligation or personal debt is also present in the oldest H . anafī text on the us. ūl al-fiqh, Karkhī’s Risāla (see note 1). The author uses the term twice, first in the third principle, pointing out that the “seats of the obligation” (dhimam) are in principle created free of any charge (barī’a) and that, therefore, anyone who raises claims against the legal personality of another person has to bring proofs for his claim. Principle 16 describes under which conditions the legal personality (dhimma) becomes liable. The cultic obligations are in their overwhelming majority obligations to perform acts, such as prayers, fasting and pilgrimage. Before they are performed, they have their existence as obligations only in the legal personality of the actors. They are either defined, in “the roots of the jurisprudence” as well as in the “branches of the jurisprudence” as “personal obligation” (wājib fīl-dhimma) or as “personal debt” (dayn fī l-dhimma). The personal obligation (wājib fi l-dhimma) implies the obligation to pray, fast or to perform the pilgrimage at the time and in the form prescribed by the law.26 The personal debt (dayn fī l-dhimma) is due when the obligors fail to perform the required ritual obligation during the time set for it.27 The way in which such a personal debt is acquitted is the qad. ā’, the performance of the missed ritual act in the prescribed form at a later time.28 The date at which this substitute action has to be performed is not fixed. It is no sin to perform the acts of substitution with much delay. The date becomes obligatory only through the “debtor’s” declaration of intent (niyya) to perform the missed ritual act at a specific date.29 It is only when the “debtor” dies without having acquitted his legal personality of his personal debt that s/he becomes a sinner.30 The capacity to incur obligations and acquire rights (ahliyyat al-wujūb) is not in itself a sufficient condition for the performance of the cultic act. But it is a condition sine qua non for acquiring the capacity to do so (ahliyyat al-adā’). In the chapter of his Us. ūl

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that treats “the capacity of the human person to enjoy rights and obligations,” Sarakhsī explains the relation between the two forms of capacity. He comes, indeed, quite close to Chehata’s analysis of the first form as an attribute of the legal personality. Sarakhsī states: He [ . . . ] said: this capacity consists of two types: the capacity to have obligations (ahliyyat al-wujūb) and the capacity to execute one’s obligations (ahliyyat al-adā’). As far as the capacity to incur obligations is concerned, even if it is subject to a division of its branches, the source is one: the suitability for the legal effect of the obligation. Whoever enjoys this suitability is capable of accepting obligations (ahlan li l-wujūb), those who do not qualify in this way are not [capable to accept obligations]. The capacity to execute [an obligation] (ahliyyat al-adā’) consists of two types: complete and restricted. The complete one brings responsibility (‘uhda) and consequences (?) (tabaʿiyya). The restricted one is not followed by these consequences. We begin with the explanation of the capacity to enjoy obligations. We say: the source of this capacity exists only once a legal personality exists that is suitable to serve as a site for obligations. This site is the legal personality (As. lu hādhihī l-ahliyyati lā yakūn illā baʿda dhimmatin s. ālih. atin li-kawniha mah. allan li l-wujūb. fa’inna l-mah. alla huwa ldhimma). Therefore, [the capacity to incur obligations] is attached to it [the legal personality] and to nothing else. For the same reason, it is particular to the human being (alādamī) alone—to the exclusion of all other animated beings that [all] do not have appropriated legal personality (dhimma).

The legal personality is thus defined as the capacity to incur rights and obligations. This legal personality, in turn, is defined as the conditio sine qua non for the development of the capacity to perform valid legal acts. Sarakhsī names a second dimension of the legal personality. In the Arabic language, he says, it denotes the pact. Referring to Sura 9, verse 8 and to Sura 7, verse 172, he defines it as a pact concluded between God and all future human

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beings, irrespective of religion, ethnicity and gender, through which all human beings have recognized God as their Lord. All human beings, according to Sarakhsī, acquire a legal personality at the moment of their birth. The fetuses are capable to acquire rights, such as gifts given to them by adult humans of sound mind. If the fetus is born alive, these gifts will become the property of the newly born child. But the fetus cannot accept any obligation (lā yakūnu ahlan li-wujūbi l-haqqi ‘alayhi). But once [the child] is born it has a suitable legal personality (dhimma s. ālih. a). For that reason, if the baby turns around and [falls] on the property of a human being and destroys it, the baby is liable for it [i.e. for the damage done to another person’s property]. If his guardian concludes a marriage contract for the [newly born] boy, the boy is obliged to pay the bridal money for his wife. These are obligations established by law.31

H . anafī jurists in Transoxania share the conception of the dhimma as a quality that is born with every human being, but from that common assumption they draw different conclusions concerning the obligations of children, adolescents and other groups of human beings that result from their legal personality. To these different conclusions I will return later. What is evident from Sarakhsī’s text is that the legal personality, that is, the capacity to acquire rights and obligations, is born with every child and that its existence is the condition sine qua non for the development of a full capacity to perform valid legal acts. This full capacity is characterized by two qualities: the ability (qudra) to understand the discourse that God addresses to the human beings and the ability to act accordingly through one’s body.32 The understanding of God’s discourse requires a sound mind; the performance of his orders requires the control over one’s body. This definition excludes many categories of humans from the capacity to perform valid legal acts. Those who fail to qualify for the two abilities that are indispensable for the capacity to perform valid legal acts are subject to obligations but not able to execute them. The principle

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of obligation (as. l al-wujūb), also called “the obligation in and by itself” (nafs al-wujūb)33 applies to them, but the obligors in this category are not qualified to perform their obligations. They can only look forward to a future substitute act (qad. ā’) once they will have acquired the “capacity to perform” their obligations. This act of substitution (qad. ā’), if ever they will be able to perform it, will free their legal personality from its obligations through their execution. No precise date can be set for that substitute action as it is dependent on a valid declaration of their intent to perform this obligation at a time that the obligor fixes, once he has become a fully capacitated legal actor (mukallaf).34 Non-Muslims, even those living under Muslim rule (dhimmi-s) who are fully capacitated subjects of the law in the field of commercial exchange and in parts of the penal law, cannot, according to Sarakhsī, be obligated by law in the field of cultic duties. God’s discourse is addressed to them requesting them to accept belief in Islam. If they fail to do so, they will be punished in the hereafter and, according to the H . anafī doctrine of the Iraqi (but not the Transoxanian) scholars, also in this base world. Sarakhsī denies sound legal foundations to this Iraqi doctrine. He restricts the punishment to the hereafter. As the non-Muslims are fully capacitated persons they are able to believe in Islam and, consequently, be obliged by the rules of the Islamic cult. And so [the non-Muslim] is able to perform the obligatory prayer. The legal discourse (khitāb) to do so is addressed to him, while [at the same time] his incapacity to perform [this cultic act] is due to his insistence on his unbelief and he is committing a crime through it. So, his capacity is treated [by a legal fiction] as if it were legally existent as its nonexistence is caused by a crime.35

God withholds the divine reward from non-Muslims for their performance of acts of Islamic worship that they might perform, because of their unbelief. Therefore, the non-Muslims’ capacity to perform (ahliyyat al-adā’) Islamic acts of worship remains a bodily exercise without any spiritual meaning. Their capacity to perform acts of Muslim worship is, in fact, non-existent:

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Universality in Islamic Thought If it is established that the unbeliever’s capacity to search the purpose that is requested through the performance [of acts of worship] does not exist, it becomes evident that his capacity to perform [his obligation to pray] does not exist. Without this capacity the obligation to perform [it] is not established and through this fact he is separated from God’s discourse on belief [addressed to him].36

The consequences are dramatic: Through his stubborn insistence on unbelief [the nonMuslim] legally destroys his self [in the field of the ritual] as far as the purpose of the acts of worship is concerned, so that he is like the man who kills himself really. The man who in reality commits suicide is legally not treated as if he were a living person in the way the divine discourse applies to him in requesting that he perform the acts of worship. This is not to ease his burden. In the same way the non-Muslim is legally not considered to be capable of performing ritual acts as long as he insists on his unbelief. This is not a way to alleviate [his burden] for him. Rather, his legal personality is treated as if it were non-existent (wa-lākin tujʿalu dhimmatahu ka l-maʿdūma) as far as its suitability to incur the obligation to perform ritual acts is concerned. This is done in order to realize their insignificance. It means that [God] attaches them to the cattle that have no legal personality concerning this matter (wa-huwa an yulh. iqahum bi lbahā’im allati la dhimmata laha fī hādha l-h. ukm).37

This argument is clearly a legal fiction. It is “as if” the legal personality of the non-Muslim is destroyed in acts of worship. But it is important to remember that Sarakhsī is a strong and eloquent defender of the equal punishment of Muslims and protected nonMuslims for intentional homicide, and for equal blood money for Muslims and protected non-Muslims.38 He refers to an impressive number of arguments for this partial equality. It is also evident that he, like most Muslim jurists, holds that Muslims and nonMuslims should be treated as equal in the field of commercial transactions. But in the field of the Islamic cult he sees no better way to explain the incapacity of non-Muslims to perform acts of worship

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than to refer to the absence of their legal personality in this field. His choice of argument underlines the central importance of the notion of obligation and the legal personality in H . anafī legal thought. It also seems to imply that the legal personality can exist in some fields and not in others.39 The causes of the obligation: 1. The divine command From the capacity of human beings to incur obligations and rights I will now turn to the causes of obligations and to God’s commands. The cause of obligations that is most closely related to God is the divine discourse (khitāb) addressed to its “addressees” (al-mukhatabūn), the human beings. The commands of God and his Prophet are identified as one discourse that constitutes a complex form of divine command theory. But the question of how to define divine commands gives rise, in the texts on the “roots of the jurisprudence,” to another classification. While all Sunni law schools agree that it is of fundamental importance to establish a clear understanding of what a divine command (amr) is, to whom it is addressed and what its consequences are for the addressees and for the norms of the law, they did not agree on a definition shared by all. While they would all accept that coercion and compulsion could be seen as effects of divine commands, they come up with different lists of the content of divine commands. The lists comprise recommendations (nadb), guidance to better solutions (irshād), permissibility (ibāh. a), censure (taqrīʿ), request (su’āl) and other categories. The H . anafīs seem to be more decided to keep a narrow definition of divine command (amr) than other Sunni law schools in the tenth and eleventh centuries. They try to restrict the notion of divine command to a single category, command (amr), and to develop their arguments for a divine command theory in the light of this approach.40 Shāshī, who studied with Karkhī during the first half of the tenth century in Baghdad, strongly insists on the non-identity of the divine command and the linguistic form of the imperative. When God spoke in eternity, he says, the imperative form would

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not have found an addressee before human beings and their languages existed. The function of the imperative form could also not have existed in eternity before human beings existed, because this function consists of the lawgiver’s imposing on the human being an obligation to act. It serves to put to the test the human being.41 It existed, therefore, without this [speech-]form. It is only when the discourse is addressed to human beings concerning legal norms that this speech-form is particular to the meaning of the command.42 The Transoxanian jurists unequivocally request the speechform of the imperative for the divine command.43 They exclude the acts of the Prophet from the range of divine commands.44 On this point, they differ from the Mālikī school of Sunni law,45 from at least a group of Shāfiʿī46 scholars and also from the positions of 47 the H . anbalī school. Once the imperative and the imposition of obligations are admitted and defined as the speech form and the effect of the divine command, the range of texts suitable as the expression of divine commands is strongly reduced, if one compares the H . anafī with the other schools of Sunni law. The debate among and within Sunni law schools about the categories of meanings, utterances and other speech forms that should enter into the discussion of command obviously has this result. An important part of this discussion focuses on the question of whether the acts of the Prophet should be considered commands. The answer to this question clearly exerts an important influence on the meaning assigned to the Sunna of the Prophet in the doctrine of these schools and on the extent to which its texts enter into the obligatory rules of the different forms of Sunni law. H . anafī doctrine on us. ūl al-fiqh not only holds that commands can be expressed exclusively in speech forms, it also restricts the range of speech forms and meanings that are acceptable as commands to the imperative. In addition, it strongly limits the range of effects that can be brought about by commands. As in the “roots of the jurisprudence,” arguments have to be developed for the whole range of law and not only for specific fields, the jurists

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try to define the command in ways that are applicable to all fields of the law. They argue that in the common discourse of Arabic speakers the imperative does not obligate the receiver of the command to regularly or at different intervals repeat the execution of the order. If a man orders his agent to buy a house for him or to inform his wife that she has been repudiated by her husband, the agent is not obligated to buy one house after another or—should the man remarry his wife after her divorce—to divorce her again.48 The command, as understood in everyday life by Arabic speakers, is restricted to the one-time execution of the order received. As the divine command is addressed to Arabic speakers, and as they have to understand it and act accordingly, the reference to their way of speaking is a licit interpretation of its form and content. H . anafī discussion on the meaning of the divine command covers the two forms of commands that are recognized by all Sunni schools of law: unspecified and unconditional commands (amr mut. laq) on the one hand, and commands that oblige the receivers to perform acts at a specified time or under specified conditions (amr muqayyad) on the other. The H . anafī scholars hold that both kinds of commands do not produce the obligation to repeat regularly performances of the required acts.49 The H . anbalīs hold that both types of command create the obligation to perform regularly the cultic acts required by the divine command.50 The Mālikīs deny such a link between the divine command and the regular repetition of the acts of worship.51 The Shāfiʿī school, at least in the writings on “the roots of jurisprudence” of its most representative scholar during the eleventh century, Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī, distinguishes clearly between the legal effects of the absolute command (amr mut. laq or amr mujarrad) and of the command that refers to acts confined to certain prescribed times (amr muqayyad). As to the absolute command, like the H . anafīs and the Mālikīs, they prefer a onetime performance as its legal effect. But Shīrāzī informs his readers that a minority of Shāfiʿī scholars ascribe even to the absolute command the effect of bringing about a regularly

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recurring performance of the act ordered by the command. Shīrāzī holds the opinion that even a conditional command does not oblige the recipient to repeat the required performance when the condition under which it was obligatory is repeated. Again, he alerts his readers to the fact that a minority of Shāfiʿī scholars hold that the repetition of the condition would make the repetition of the commanded act obligatory. The same author, in a different context, seems to uphold that a command that confines the commanded act to certain times, in a way that suggests repetition, brings about the obligation to repeat the commanded act regularly.52 The four Sunni law schools thus position each other in a contiguous way: the H . anafīs interpret the obligation stemming from these commands as the one-time performance of the required act. The Mālikīs do the same. The Shāfiʿīs draw a clear line between the unspecified and unconditional commands on the one hand, and the commands whose effects are confined to certain specific times on the other. They hold that an obligation to repeat regularly the acts that formed the content of the command may come into force if the command refers to it. But it is a very cautiously worded middle-of-the-road solution. The H. anbalīs position themselves at the other side of the field, assigning to both types of command the effect to obligate the subjects of the law to the recurrent performance of the acts required by the command. The H. anafīs and most of the Mālikīs, the two most ancient schools of Sunni law, do not integrate into their doctrines the divine commands as a cause of the recurrent obligations to repeat their execution. The Shāfiʿīs accept them in principle but do not use the same vocabulary to define the commands nor do they say what, exactly, the obligations are that the believer has to accept. Only the H . anbalīs give to the divine commands the power to obligate the believers in a constant and recurrent way. The causes of the obligation: 2. The cause of time It is evident that if the divine command is restricted to speech acts that are imperatives and whose effects are restricted to one-time

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performances, the law has to adduce other obligatory factors in order to guarantee the regular and recurrent performance of the acts of worship. For reasons of space I will restrict the following text to the answers developed by the H . anafī school to three questions: 1. What are the factors that guarantee the recurrent performance in specified times of the five obligatory daily prayers and the fasting of the month of Ramad. ān? 2. How do these factors relate to the divine commands? 3. What is the relation between these factors and the divine commands to God as the lawgiver? In tenth-century Baghdad, Shāshī formulates some of the main answers to these questions. He points out that acts of worship are not reiterated in response to divine command, but through the reiteration of their causes through which the obligation is established (fa’inna dhālika lam yathbut bi lamr bal bitakrār asbābiha allati yathbutu biha l-wujūb). The [divine] command [serves] to demand the execution of what is [already] due in the legal personality (mā wajaba fī ldhimma) due to a cause that preceded it, not [to demand] the obligation in itself (lā li-’ithbati as. li l-wujūb). It is analogous to the statement of a man: “pay the price for the thing sold [to you],” or “pay the maintenance of the wife.” Once the obligation to worship has been established through its cause, the command applies to the execution of the obligation to the extent he [i.e. the believer] is charged with it.53

This text exemplifies the two-stage model that the H . anafīs apply throughout the period here treated to the relation between the obligation in and by itself and the command to execute it. Shāshī states the elements of this model succinctly: (1) the reiteration of the acts of worship are not due to the divine command but to the renewal of their [cosmic] causes (asbāb). The term sabab, that I translate as “cause,” is less strong than ‘illa, the ratio legis,54 but in the unfolding of the legal argument by the jurists it indicates a

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strong causal relation between the norm and the “reason” or “cause” to which it is attributed. The attribution of a norm to a “cause” or “reason” is constantly invoked by Transoxanian H . anafī scholars in order to prove that the obligation to pray or fast is caused by the “causes” or “reasons” to which they are attributed;55 (2) The divine command demands the execution of an obligation that is already established as a personal obligation through the cause of time (sabab) or other causes. The divine command does not establish this obligation, it demands the execution of an already existing obligation. The examples from the law of transactions quoted above explain this point. In the chapter in which Shāshī discusses “the dependence of the legal norms on their causes,” he returns to the same model. Norms, he informs his readers, are attributed to their causes. God’s command to pray cannot, before the prayer time has come, be effective for those to whom it is addressed. God himself has chosen this time as imposing the cause of the obligation: “The [divine] discourse establishes the obligation to execute [the prayer] and informs (muʿarrif) the human being on the cause of the obligation that preceded it.” He uses the same analogies to the contract law as in the preceding quotation (see note 53) to explain the relation between the divine command and the preceding obligation. He concludes: Thus it is clear that the obligation is established through the coming of the time [prescribed for the act of worship] and [also] because the obligation is established for those to whom the divine command is not addressed, such as the sleeper and the fainted person. There is no obligation before the [prescribed] time, so that it is established through the coming of the [prescribed] time. Because of [these facts] it becomes obvious that the first part [of the prescribed time] is the cause of the obligation.56

This text adds a new element to the two-stage model. The obligation is established through the prescribed time of the act of worship and it is valid also for those to whom the divine command is not addressed. In other words, in this model, the cause of time and the

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divine command are attributed different spheres and different functions concerning the obligations. The cosmic cause has the effect to impose on human beings the obligation to worship, whether the obligated humans are aware of this fact or not and whether they are able to execute the command or not. The divine command orders them to execute their obligation. The cosmic causes affect all people, including those who are not in possession of their intellectual capacities during the prayer time, as long as they have come of age. Only children and non-Muslims are excluded. The command to execute the obligation is addressed only to persons who are already obliged by the effect of the causes and who, in addition, are in possession of their intellectual capacities and capable to perform their obligations. The obligating effect of the causes is independent of the intellectual capacities or incapacities of the human beings on which it is exerted. It integrates categories of human beings who are not capable—at least at the moment of the prayer or the fasting—to perform the prescribed acts. The people to whom such a description applies can nevertheless be integrated into the obligations of the law and thus made subjects of the law. The obligation in and by itself (nafs al-wujūb) seems to have the function to integrate categories of people into the law who would be excluded from the status of legal subjects if only people who possess the capacity to perform (ahliyyat al-adā’) were entitled to it. In fact, in the discussion on the relation between the universal obligatory effect of the cosmic causes and the restricted targets of the divine command we are witnessing once more the debate on the relation between the legal personality, i.e. the capacity to acquire rights and obligations through the fact that one is human, and the capacity to execute one’s obligations because one is in full possession of one’s mental capacities. This time, the debate is not centered on human capacities but on the difference between the effects of the causes and the divine command. But it refers to the same problem, the role of humans as subjects of the law. The Transoxanian H . anafīs share the positions of the Iraqi H . anafīs on the two-stage model, to my knowledge first developed

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in Shāshī’s Us. ūl.57 That the prescribed prayer time—and not God’s command—is the cause (sabab) of the prayer is for Transoxanians and Iraqis a constantly recurring statement.58 Sarakhsī also refers to the “cause” to which the norm is attributed as “a cause imposing obligations” (sabab mūjib).59 He explains: The principle of the obligation in legal matters is compulsion (jabr). God’s servant cannot do anything concerning it and he has no choice. The one who imposes obligations is God (fa’inna l-mūjiba huwa llāhu), He is sublime. God’s servants serve Him through the obligations that He imposed on them. And much as they cannot do anything to change the attribute of servitude that is established for them, they have no action concerning the obligation in and by itself. Concerning the causes which the sacred law has made into a cause, they have no choice concerning the obligation. There is also no choice for them concerning the cause, concerning it God’s servant cannot do anything and he has no choice. But the obligation to execute that [obligation] is established through the divine discourse and is never separated from free choice that is given to the slave at the moment of the execution. Through it [i.e. this choice] the meaning of worship and probation is realized in the one who executes [his choice]. This is so, because nobody will be charged beyond his capacity. The obligation in and by itself is established through the determination of the cause (sabab) while the divine discourse, established through command and prohibition, is [still] non-existent. If someone oversleeps the prayer time, the prayer duty is obligatory upon him until he wakes up and performs the cultic duty. [This is so] in spite of the fact that the divine discourse does not apply to the sleeper. The same holds true for the fainted person if he did not stay in the swoon more than one day and one night or for the mentally ill if his mental illness did not last longer than one day and one night. Concerning him the legal effect of the obligation of the prayer duty is established, so that he has to perform the substitute action for the prayer that he did not execute.60

The sphere of the obligation by causes is a sphere of determined consequences. Humans, being servants of God, have to obey the

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consequences of the cosmic order that God has created and determined. They can neither escape the “causes” nor their effects, the ritual obligations. No action can give them any influence on God’s norms, nor on God’s creation. They have no say in the obligations imposed on them by God’s cosmic order: “the one who imposes obligations is God” (al-mūjib huwa llāhu). But when those who are capable to perform valid legal and cultic acts enter into the sphere of the execution of the divine command, that is, at the moment when the time set by God for the performance arrives, the humans enter into a sphere of free choice. They can decide to obey the command or to disobey it. The act of obedience will be rewarded by God in the hereafter; the act of disobedience is a sin and will be punished in the hereafter.61 Dabūsī gives a theological justification for the determinism of the sphere in which obligations are imposed by “causes” such as time for prayer, the month of Ramad. ān for the obligation to fast, the minimum wealth for the obligation to pay the alms tax and the Ka’ba as the cause for the pilgrimage.62 This sphere is clearly distinguished from the sphere of performance that requires the capacity to perform reasoned choices and voluntary acts of obedience.63 He writes: We say, and God grants success, that the cause for the obligation for the [belief in ] the foundation of religion—and that is the cognition of God, He is sublime, in the way He is (fa’inna sababa wujūbi as. li l-dīni—wa-huwa maʿrifatu llāhi taʿāla kamā huwa)—[lies] in the signs in the world that indicate that the world came into being in time (al-āyāt fī l‘ālam, al-dallatu ‘alā hādathi l-‘ālam). These signs are everlasting and eternal, the [world] could not exist if they ceased to be in it (wa-hiya dā’imatun abadan, la yahtamilu zawāluha ‘anhu). Therefore, the obligation [to believe in] the foundation of religion is also everlasting in a way that does not tolerate the cessation [of these signs], their abrogation, and their replacement.64

In the context of the discussion about the role of cosmic signs such as time, and their capacity to impose obligations on human

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beings, I read this statement as underlining the importance of such cosmic structures for the existence of the world and for the belief in God. They serve, therefore, as a justification of the “causes” as factors that will not change as long as the cosmic order exists, and that impose obligations on humans and allow them to link these obligations to God. That is also the way in which Sarakhsī interprets this text, of which he clearly borrows the idea and also part of the wording from Dabūsī. He continues where Dabūsī ends: These signs are not imposing obligations by themselves and the reason of him who is obligated by them is also not imposing obligations on him. Rather, it is God, He is sublime, who imposes the obligations through giving him a tool, so that with this tool he can look for indicants pointing to the cognition of that what obliges.65

Sarakhsī explains: it is as if someone had given him a lamp and told him to use it so as to take a certain way. The divine command is the order to adopt a certain way, not the way itself and not the lamp. Reason is analogous to the lamp, and the signs that show that the world has come into existence in time are the analogy to the way. The human beings’ belief in the truth of this command and their steadfast declaration of this belief is a duty that is in reality imposed upon humans by God. Its visible “cause”[s] (sababuhu l-z. āhir) are the signs that point to the time-bound character of the world and that, therefore, are called the tokens (‘alāmāt).66 The construction of the cultic obligation as a two-stage model is, therefore, in its first stage closely connected with a cosmology and a discussion of capacity that seem to be—at least partly— indebted to Māturīdism. The reception of the Transoxanian H . anafī model of obligation The notion of “causes” that impose obligations upon persons but do not oblige these persons to execute the obligations they

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incurred has met with opposition from many quarters. Some of these came into being in the Mamluk period, but I am not going to address them here. It is in the period from the tenth to the twelfth century that Ashʿarī theologians opposed the doctrine that I sketched out above on theological grounds, and Samarqandī H . anafīs did so on legal grounds. We are informed by Bukhārī (d. 1330) that the Māturīdī school of Samarqand accepted the legal reasoning concerning the “causes” if it is made clear that the lawgiver is God and not the “causes,” because God alone imposes legal obligations. One group of Ashʿarī theologians, we are told, refused in its totality the concept of “causes” imposing obligations. They saw in it a diminution of God’s power. Others accepted it for penal law, in which crimes could be “causes” for penalties, and for transactions (mu’amalāt) among private persons in which objects and acts can be seen as “causes” due to the fact that humans possess assets that can be “causes” for acts and obligations. The same group of Ashʿarī theologians, though, refused to accept the notion of obligating “causes” in the field of cultic acts which, they held, cannot be attributed to anyone but God. The way in which He imposes His obligations, they explain, is a way that cannot be ascribed to anybody else. The H . anafīs insist, in defense of their doctrine, on their interpretation of God’s role as lawgiver who imposes the obligations on humans. We have seen examples of this argument in Sarakhsī’s statement on the relation between God as the one who imposes obligations that are mediated to humans via causes. The “causes” are only means of reaching the goals of the lawgiver. They are God’s tools. This argument is already fully developed in the u. sūl of Bazdawī (d. 1089) and—in greater detail—in ʿAbd alʿAziz al-Bukhārī's commentary to Bazdawīʾs u. sūl.67 As for schools of law, not even the H . anafīs pretended that the Mālikīs and the H anbalīs accepted the H . . anafī doctrine on the “causes.” They insisted rather on “some Shāfiʿīs” who accepted their technical reasoning.

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But the doctrine that I presented above also met with an important opposition from H . anafī jurists who belonged to the school of Samarqand. Their opposition is not focused on the defense of God’s role as supreme lawgiver but rather on the question: what is the purpose of the law? The Samarqandīs start from the premise that law would be meaningless if its prime purpose were not the construction of obligations for human acts. Law serves to direct action. Once this aspect of law is taken care of by the divine command (amr), what could possibly remain as an obligation to be brought about by the “cause” of time? Sarakhsī answers, by pointing out that acts which at one time are considered to be recommendable but not obligatory forms of worship (nafal) and whose choice is left to the individual actor’s decision, at other times are changed into obligatory performances for all, because time is a cause that brings about changes in the quality of acts. He gives as examples the month of Ramad. ān and the fasting. He indicates that time also determines the moment at which fainted persons or sleepers failed to perform the obligatory act of worship and are obliged to perform the substitute action (qad. ā’) for the failed performance of the prayer or the fasting during their due times. Also, if both the sleeper and the fainted person had not yet reached maturity before the moment of the prayer during which they slept or fainted, they would not have been obligated by the divine command to perform that substitute act, because that command would have obligated them to perform their ritual obligation only after they slept or woke up. Time, in other words is a “cause” because it qualifies the cultic acts of humans. The divide between the new Samarqandī doctrine and that of the majority of the H . anafī school goes beyond the question of time as “cause.” A description of the main points of dissent has been transmitted to us in a text on “the branches of the jurisprudence” by a twelfth-century H . anafī jurist from Transoxania who migrated—like many other H . anafī Transoxanian jurists in the period under discussion—from Transoxania via Anatolia to Syria. This migration that characterized the period here under discussion

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has strongly contributed to enhance the influence of the Transoxanian H. anafī doctrine in Iraq, Syria and Egypt.68 The migrant whose text informs us about the relation between the Samarqandī school of H. anafism and the rest of the Transoxanian H . anafīs is ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Abū Bakr ibn Masʿūd alKāsānī. When he reached Aleppo he succeeded his father-in-law as the head of the leading H. anafī college in that city. Kāsānī begins his text with a short and succinct introduction into the H . anafī doctrine of Transoxania concerning the causes of obligation. He states: As for discernment and reason (‘aql), do they belong to the conditions of obligation? And does this also apply to the restoration of consciousness (al-ifāqa) and the alertness of the mind (yaqz. a)? Most of our teachers say that these [attributes] do not belong to the conditions of the obligation. The fasting of [the month of] Ramad. ān is obligatory on the mentally ill, the fainted person, and the sleeper. But it is “the principle of obligation” (as. lu l-wujūb) that is meant and not the obligation to execute [the obligation].

He explains: This [statement] is based on [the fact] that, for them, the obligation consists of two kinds. One of them is “the principle of obligation” (as. lu l-wujūb), i.e. the imposing of an obligation on the legal personality (dhimma). This is brought about through the “causes” and not through the divine discourse (khit. āb). For the establishing [of such an obligation] the capacity to act (qudra) is no condition. Rather, it is established as coercion from God, He is sublime, [and it does not matter] whether the slave [i.e. the human servant of God] wants it or declines it.

Kāsānī then turns to the second form of capacity, the capacity to perform obligations. He writes: The second one is the obligation to execute [the command] (wujūb al-adā’), i.e. the elimination (isqāt. ) of the [burden of the obligation] on the legal personality (dhimma) and its liberation from the obligation [through its performance].

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Kāsānī goes on to describe the opposition to this dominant doctrine that is developed in Samarqand. Kāsānī has, it seems, learned about this doctrine from another Transoxanian scholar and migrant, his father-in-law who was also his predecessor as the head of the major H . anafī madrasa in Aleppo. He writes: Those engaged in examining [the validity of the norms] among our scholars (ahl al-tahqīq min mashayikhinā) from Transoxania (bimā warā’ al-nahr) say that in reality there is only one kind of obligation. That is the obligation to execute [the command] and that all those who are able to execute [an order] belong to the people who have the capacity to be obligated, and those who are not [able to execute the command] are not [capable of being obliged]. That is [the doctrine] chosen by my own teacher, the revered master, the self-denying ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, the superior scholar (ra’īs) among the Sunnis, Muh. ammad ibn Ah. mad al-Samarqandī,69 because the rational [concept] of the obligation is the obligation to execute [a command], such as the obligation to fast and to pray and [to perform] the other acts of worship. Those who do not belong to the persons who are able to execute the obligatory act, i.e. to those able to understand the legal discourse and to perform the [command] included in the legal discourse, do by necessity not belong to the persons who are obligated. The mentally ill, the fainted person, and the sleeper are unable to perform the act [included in] the legal discourse [that commands] the fasting and to execute it, as the fasting commanded by the

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law (al-sawm al-sharʿī) is an abstention for God’s sake [from eating and drinking and having sex during day time] and that is not possible without a [declaration of] intent [to perform the ritual act required by the law]. But these [i.e. the mentally ill, the fainted person, and the sleeper] are not capable of declaring [their] intent, and, therefore, are not obliged [to perform the ritual act].

Kāsānī then discusses the practical consequences of the differences between these two us. ūl doctrines. The two pages in which he does so are written in a dense and complex style, often returning to the same objects in a different light.70 What follows is my effort to interpret his text in view of the literature that I have analyzed above. Kāsānī starts with the cases of the sleeper and the fainted person. There is consensus among all H . anafīs that these two ought to perform an ex post facto substitute performance (qad. ā’) once they wake up or regain control of their intellectual capacities. The reasoning in the texts of the Samarqandī and the majority opinion concerning this matter differ. Those who hold that time is a cause that imposes obligations on the believer see both the person who has fainted and the sleeper obliged by the cause (i.e. the time) and, therefore, under the obligation to perform the failed act of worship as soon as they regain their capacity to perform valid legal acts. Their incapacity to do so while they are asleep or in a state of swoon is due only to accidental states of short duration. They are supposed to regain their capacity shortly. For those who hold that the capacity to perform valid legal acts is the only capacity that counts, the notion of causes that impose obligations that cannot be executed—because the obligated persons do not have the capacity to act—makes no sense. They do not accept the notion that persons who enjoy the capacity to perform valid legal acts have to be obligated—before their performance of the act—by coercive causes, even without their knowledge and even against their will. For them, the capacity to act is sufficient for the performance of valid acts of worship. They do not see any need for a preceding obligation imposed by coercive causes serving as a conditio sine qua non for the validity

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of the ritual act performed by a fully capacitated legal actor. They are persuaded, as Kāsānīi says, that: the obligation to perform a substitute act (qad. ā’) does not necessarily require that there was a precedent obligation. It just requires that the sleeper and the fainted person defaulted on their performance of the act of worship during its prescribed time and regained [after the waking up and the regaining of their senses] the power (qudra) to perform this act of substitution (qad. ā’) without suffering unnecessary hardship (min ghayri h. araj).71

The first doctrine sees an obligation imposed by the “cause” of time as the reason for the “debt” of the sleeper or the person who has fainted. This “debt” obliges them if and when they have recuperated their capacity to act (ahliyyat al-adā’) to perform a substitute performance for the act they failed to perform. Those who see the reason for this “debt” in the default to perform the prescribed act of worship during the time set for it by the law, see in this default, and not in a preceding obligation established by “causes,” the reason for the obligation to perform a substitute action (qad. ā’) after the actors regained their capacity to perform valid legal acts. For all practical purposes this distinction does not, in the cases of the sleeper and the person who has fainted, prevent the H . anafī jurists who adhere to the two doctrines to reach the same result: those who sleep or are in a swoon during the time prescribed for the act of worship have to perform a substitute performance (qad. ā’) once they have regained their consciousness and are able to follow the divine discourse (khit. āb). Both camps also agree that a person who suffers from short attacks of mental illness could be assimilated to the sleeper and the person who has fainted, and be under the same obligation to perform a substitute execution (qad. ā’) for the failed act of worship. This solution should not have posed any problem for those Transoxanian scholars who see the obligation arising from constraining causes (asbāb), in this case, the cause of time, that oblige the believers independently of their capacities to understand the obligation and its cause. The mentally ill can, therefore,

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be obliged by the cause of time. This holds true in particular if their state is caused by attacks of short duration, so that they often recuperate, at least temporarily, the capacity to perform legally valid acts. They can, therefore, after recuperating the sound judgment required, perform a substitute execution (qad. ā’) of the failed act of worship and thus free their legal personality (dhimma) from their obligations. The justification of this analogical assimilation between a sleeper and a person who has fainted on the one hand, and the mentally ill suffering from short attacks of mental illness seems to be more difficult for those who say that the only capacity that exists and counts is the capacity to perform valid legal acts (ahliyyat al-adā’). They can argue that this type of mentally ill person defaulted on the performance of his or her ritual obligation during its prescribed time. The default (fawāt) can take the place of the previous obligation through the cause (sabab) of time in the doctrine of the first group. Once the intermittently mentally ill regain their sound judgment, they regain their capacity to perform valid legal acts and therefore valid acts of worship. But Kāsānī indicates that this is a solution that deviates from strict analogical reasoning (qiyās) and is considered to be an opinion based on legal preference (istih. sān). Strict analogy, he admits, would require that even the intermittently mentally ill would not be obliged to perform a substitute action (qad. ā’), because before he regained his sound judgment he was mentally ill (majnūn), having no capacity to perform valid legal acts and could, therefore, according to the basic assumption of the second group, not have been obligated as long as he remained in that state. Kāsānī points out that a famous early H . anafī, such as Z. ufār (d. 158h./775), as well as the founder of the Shāfiʿī school, Muh. ammad b. Idrīs alShāfiʿī (d. 204h./820), in fact decided that the case of the intermittently mentally ill neither required nor imposed such a substitute act. The case on which the two H . anafī doctrines, on the question of obligation, come to different practical and theoretical conclusions is the case of the permanently mentally ill. The jurists discuss two

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hypothetical cases concerning the permanently mentally ill. I will here only discuss the first case. This case treats a person who loses control over his mental capacities before the beginning of the month of Ramad. ān and recovers them only after the end of Ramad. ān. Those who hold that the only capacity that counts is the capacity to execute the obligations, hold the opinion that as long as he is in a state of mental illness he cannot incur any obligations. They are of the opinion that a substitute performance can be established only through divine discourse. But this discourse is not addressed to those who are unable to understand it and to act accordingly. Therefore, it does not apply to the permanently mentally ill, and for the same reason, the permanently mentally ill cannot be obliged to perform a substitute action (qad. ā’) for a period in which the divine discourse was not addressed to him. Kāsānī states: “This is the doctrine of our scholars.”72 Those who hold that the obligation through causes exists also during the state of mental illness, dissent. They hold that the causes, in particular, time, exert a coercive power over all humans whether they understand that they are obligated or not. The mentally ill person therefore owes the performance of a substitute action (qad. ā’) for the failed performance during his mental illness. As soon as he recuperates his sound judgment he is, therefore, obliged to perform the substitute actions (qad. ā’) for the failed acts of worship. It is on the question as to what degree the permanently mentally ill can be obligated to perform substitute actions for the acts of worship that she or he failed to execute during her or his mental illness that the two H . anafī doctrines on ‘the roots of the jurisprudence’ disagree and produce different and contradictory results. The integration of the permanently mentally ill into the obligations established by the law is a major matter of dissent between the two doctrines concerning the causes of obligations in H . anafī law. Further research on the effects of inclusion and exclusion will have to analyze the case of the permanently mentally ill more seriously in this perspective. It seems obvious,

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though, that a doctrine that turns cosmic factors, such as time and space, into the causes of ritual obligations, independently of the intellectual and bodily capacities of the obligated persons, makes the capacity to be obligated (dhimma) a truly universal character of humans, without any exclusion. The opposed doctrine of the H . anafī school of Samarqand, according to which there is only one form of obligation, based on the capacity to understand the norms of the divine discourse and to act accordingly, has necessarily to be more exclusive and less universal. Notes *

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The author thanks the Wissenschaftskolleg at Berlin for the fellowship and the hospitality that enabled him to write this chapter under the marvelous conditions provided by this institution. The Risāla fī l-us. ūl allatī ʿalayhā mudār furūʿ al-H . anafiyya by Abū l-H. usayn al-Karkhī was published at the end of the Ta’sīs al-naz. ar (pp. 80–7) by Abū Zayd ʿUbaidallāh b. ʿUmar al-Dabūsī (d. 1030 in Bukhara) (Cairo: al-Matba’a al-adabiyya bi-sūq al-khaddār alqadīm, n.d.). Niz. ām al-Dīn Abū ‘Alī Ah. mad b. Muh. ammad b. Ish. āq al-Shāshī (d. 344/955–56 in Baghdad), Us. ūl al-Shāshī wa-bi-hāmishi ‘umdatu l-h. awashihi sharh. us. ūl al-Shāshī, ed. ʿAbdallāh Muh. ammad al-Khalīlī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya [n.d.]). Abū Zayd ‘Ubaidallāh b. ‘Umar al-Dabūsī (d. 430/1030 in Bukhara), Taqwīm us. ūl al-fiqh wa-tah. dīd adillat al-sharʿ, ed. ʿAbd al-Rahīm Yaʿqūb al-shahīr bi-Fairūz, vol. 1 (Riyad: Maktabat al-rushd, 1430/2009). Abū Bakr Muh. ammad b. Ah. mad b. Abū Sahl al-Sarakhsī, Us. ūl alSarakhsī, 2 vols., ed. Abū l-Wafā’ al-Afghānī (Beirut: Dār alma’rifa, n.d.). ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Masʿūd al-Kāsānī, Kitāb badā’iʿ al-s. anā’iʿ fī tartīb al-sharā’iʿ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, n.d.). This book belongs to the discipline of the furūʿ al-fiqh, the “branches of the jurisprudence,” but it contains important information on a discussion among the Samarqandī us. ūlīs which I will quote at length. Abū l-H. asan ‘Alī b. Muh. ammad al-Bazdawī, Us. ūl al-Bazdawī, published at the margin of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-‘Azīz b. Ah. mad

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9 10

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Universality in Islamic Thought al-Bukhārī (d. 730/1330), Kashf al-Asrār ‘an us. ūl Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘arabi) [offprint of the Istanbul edition of 1307/1888]. On the discussion of these terms by theologians and legal scholars of the us. ūl al-fiqh, see Daniel Gimaret, La Doctrine d’al-Ashʿarī (Paris: Les Editions du CERF, 1990), pp. 529–30. Abū al-Wafā’ ‘Alī Ibn ‘Aqīl, Al-Wād. ih. fī us. ūl al-fiqh (Beirut: Orient-Institut der DMG Beirut, 1996, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart), vol. 1, p. 2. Abū H. āmid Muh. ammad al-Ghazālī, Al-Mustas. fā min ‘ilm al-us. ūl (Cairo: Mat.baʿat Mus. t.afā Muh. ammad, 1356/1973), part 1, p. 4. Ahmad Atif Ahmad, Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A Study of Six Works of Medieval Islamic Jurisprudence (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 16–17, 49, 52–6. Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal (New York: Bollingen Series XLIII, Princeton University Press, 1958), vol. 3, pp. 23–30, in particular pp. 28–30. Ahmad Atif Ahmad, Interrelations, pp. 31–7, sees in this approach one of the foundations of “a modern Muslim perspective” on the question of the relation between theory and practice in Islamic law. Abū Ish. āq Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fī us. ūl al-fiqh. Le Livre des Rais illuminant les fondements de la compréhension de la Loi. Traité de théorie légale musulmane. Introduction, traduction annotée et index par Eric Chaumont (The Robbins Religious and Civil Law Collection, School of Law [Boalt Hall], University of California at Berkeley, 1999), pp. 7–34. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., pp. 17–18. For the H. anafīs, beginning with Karkhī, see Baber Johansen, Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1999), p. 32. Abū l-H. usain Muh. ammad b. ʿAlī b. al-T. aiyib al-Bas. rī, Kitāb alMuʿtamad fī us. ūl al-fiqh, édition critique par Muhammad Hamidullah avec la collaboration de Muhammad Bekir et Hasan Hanafi (Damas: Institut Français de Damas, 1964), 2 vols., see vol. 1, pp. 7, 9. For Abū H. āmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), see Baber Johansen, The Changing Limits of Contingency in the History of Muslim Law, The Third Annual Levtzion Lecture (Jerusalem: The Nehemia Levtzion Center for Islamic Studies. The Institute for Asian and African

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Studies. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2013), pp. 22–6. For the H. anbalī Ibn ‘Aqīl see ibid., pp. 26–30, for the Shāfiʿī Abū Ish. āq al-Shīrāzī, see ibid., pp. 30–3. In 1954 Chafik Chehata edited the book on sale by Muh. ammad ibn H. asan al-Shaybānī (d. 805), one of the three scholars who laid the foundations for the legal thought of the H. anafi school of law in the eighth and beginning of the ninth century. In his Etudes de Droit Musulman (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), he comments, in vol. 1, p. 93, on the fact that in this book Shaybānī does not use the term ahliyya (capacity). On p. 94 he adds: “Pas plus dans le Djami’ al-Kabir que dans le Asl, l’on ne trouve une définition ou une délimitation quelconque de la notion d’incapacité.” On p. 100 of the same book he presents the concept of capacity and incapacity of the H. anafī scholar Qudūrī (d. 1037 in Baghdad) and informs us: “Le terme ahliyya de même que la formule ahliyyat al-ada’ ou al-tasaruf sont absents dans tous les textes rapportés au Livre de l’Interdiction.” In his Essai d’une théorie générale de l’obligation (Paris: Editions Sirey, 1969), p. 127, he concludes: “Il est à remarquer que la théorie de l’incapacité ne se trouve pas développée dans les ouvrages de droit [Chehata indicates by the term “droit” the furu’ al-fiqh, the “branches of the jurisprudence”] mais dans ceux qui traitent de la principiologie du droit ou us’ul [sic].” Chehata, Etudes de Droit, vol. 1, p. 78. Ibid., p. 105: “Quelle serait donc, pour Sarakhsi, la capacité ou ahliyya? La ahliyya, dans les textes de Sarakhsi, c’est toujours la capacité d’agir: ahliyyat attasarruf. Il n’est jamais question chez lui, dans tous les livres examinés, de ahliyyat wudjub ou capacité de jouissance.” For the list of these notions of the capacity to incur obligations, see Johansen, Contingency, pp. 194–200, see in particular note 35. Add to this list Sarakhsī, Us. ūl al-Sarakhsī, vol. 1, p. 337. Chehata, Etudes, vol. 1, p. 118. Ibid., p. 133. Kāsānī, Badā’iʿ al-s. anā’iʿ (see above note 5), vol. 1, p. 155, discusses “the incapacity of the children to be obliged to pray” (‘adm ahliyyati wujūbi l-s. alāt). See also ibid., p. 186. Muh. ammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm (Beirut: Dar al-Maʿrifa, n. d.), vol. 5, p. 91. Dabūsī, Taqwīm, pp. 300, 403; Abū Bakr Muh. ammad b. Abū Sahl al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Mabsūt. (Beirut: Dar al-Maʿrifa li-l-tiba’a wa lnashr, 3rd print, 1398/1978), vol. 3, pp. 81, 85, 106, 135; idem,

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Universality in Islamic Thought Us. ūl al-Sarakhsī, vol. 2, pp. 44, 280; Kāsānī (see above note 5), Badā’iʿ al-s. anā’iʿ, vol. 1, pp. 245, 246; vol. 2, p. 69. Sarakhsī, Mabsūt. , vol. 1, p. 252; vol. 2, pp. 15, 28; vol. 3, pp. 61, 63, 75, 85, 143; vol. 4, pp. 148, 154, 161, 166; Kāsānī, Badā’iʿ al-s. anā’iʿ, p. 41; Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, pp. 34, 37, 47. Dabūsī, Taqwīm, pp. 280, 397, 407; Sarakhsī, Mabsūt. , vol. 3, pp. 85, 136; vol. 4, p. 166; Kāsānī, Badā’iʿ al-s. anā’iʿ, vol. 1, pp. 245, 246, 247; vol. 2, pp. 86, 103–5. Sarakhsī, Mabsūt. , vol. 3, p. 85; ʿAlī b. Abū Bakr Al-Marghīnānī (d. 593/1197), Al-Hidāya Sharh. bidāyat al-mubtadi’ (Beirut: Dar alkutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1415/1995), vol. 2, p. 315. Sarakhsī, Mabsūt. , vol. 3, p. 85; the delay of the substitute action becomes sinful only with the death of the obligor, see Dabūsī, Taqwīm, vol. 3, p. 90. Sarakhsī, Mabsūt. , vol. 3, p. 90: it is only after the death of the believer who did not perform the substitute action that penance has to be paid and distributed to the poor. Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, pp. 26–9, points out that already Shaybānī, in the second half of the eighth century, has followed the reasoning that the performance of a substitute act for the failed performance of the original obligation cannot be fixed to a specific point in time. Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 2, pp. 332–3. Ibid., p. 340. For the notion of as. l al-wujūb see Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, p. 100. He points out that the obligor has no free choice either in what concerns “the principle of obligation” (as. l al-wujūb) or concerning the “cause” (sabab) that makes the ritual act obligatory. The obligations, on the other hand, that are based on God’s discourse (khit. āb) “cannot be separated from choice.” For Kāsānī’s detailed statement on as. l al-wujūb see Kāsānī, Badā’iʿ al-s. anā’iʿ, vol. 2, pp. 88–9, see also pp. 9, 10. Ibid., see note 29. Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, p. 74. Ibid., p. 76. Ibid., p. 77. Sarakhsī, Mabsūt. , vol. 26, pp. 84–6. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 124 on the lacking dhimma of the sick person in the field of fasting. Dabūsī, Taqwīm, pp. 209–21, on amr as ījāb (imposition of obligation), su’āl (request), waqf (suspension of judgment), ibāh. a (permissibility), nadb (recommendation), ifkhām (deference), tawbīkh (reprimand, censure); pp. 221–5, on the H. anafī position according to which the command explains that the content of the

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command be brought into existence by the person to whom the command is given. Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, pp. 14–17, discusses the Shāfiʿī doctrine according to which seven possible meanings can be assigned to “imperative” (amr): 1. ilzām (to obligate, to impose a duty), 2. nadb (recommendation), 3. ibāh. a (permissibility), 4. irshād (guidance to a better solution), 5. taqrīʿ (reproof, censure), 6. tawbīkh (admonition, blame) and 7. su’āl (request). He points out that the first one corresponds to the real sense of command, 2-4 can be and, in fact, are contested and 5–7 have no serious relation to the imperative. He also informs us that the H. anafī scholars Karkhī (d. 952 in Baghdad) and his student and successor as the head of the H. anafī school in Baghdad, al-Jas. s. ās. (d. 981), held that 2–4 do not really stand for command but can be used metaphorically for it; on pp. 18–19 he returns to the H. anafī definition of command and its effects to which he dedicates the whole first chapter (pp. 20–78). For this debate, see Abū l-Baqā’ Ayyūb b. Mūsā al-H. usaynī alKaffawī, Al-Kulliyyāt. Mu’jam fī l-mus. .talah. āt wa’l-furūq allughawiyya (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risala, 1413/1993), pp. 419–20, s. v. khit. āb. Al-Shāshī, Us. ūl, pp. 76–7. Dabūsī, Taqwīm, pp. 212–13; Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, pp. 11–12, 16– 19. Al-Shāshī, Us. ūl, p. 77; Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, pp. 11–12, 14. Abū l-Walīd al-Bājī, Ih. kām al-fus. ūl fī ah. kām al-us. ūl, ed. ʿAbd alMajīd al-Turkī (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islami 1407/1986), pp. 226, 309, 311–13, 316. For a H. anafī interpretation of the Mālikī position, see Sarakhsī, Us. ūl , vol. 1, pp. 11–12. Abū Ish. āq Ibrāhīm b. ‘Alī b. Yūsuf al-Fairūzābādī al-Shīrāzī, AlTabs. ira fī us. ūl al-fiqh (Dimashq: Dar al-fikr, 1403/1983), pp. 240–1, defends, against the Ashʿarīs, the position that is held also by other Shāfiʿī scholars, according to which the acts of the Prophet are commands if they were clearly performed in order to impose obligations on the Muslim community. On pages 242–8 he argues that the Prophet’s acts ought to be read in the light of their purposes. If one cannot identify the purpose, one has to suspend judgment. According to another opinion it should then be read as a recommendation, and a third group of scholars holds that in this case it has to be interpreted as obligatory. For a H. anafī interpretation of the Shāfiʿī position, see Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, pp. 11–12.

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Universality in Islamic Thought A few years later, al-Shīrāzī, in his Al-Lumaʿ fī us. ūl al-fiqh, ed. Mustafa Abu Sulayman al-Nadwi (Al-Mans. ūra: Dār al-Kalima, 1418/1997), writes: “Know that the command is an utterance through which one requests an act from someone who ranks below [the speaker]. Some of our co-disciples add to that: ‘in an obligatory way’. But the acts that are not utterances are called ‘commands’ only in a metaphorical way. Some of our scholars say, they are not [called commands] in a metaphorical way. The shaykh and Imam said [ . . . ] ‘In the Tabs. ira I supported this approach. But the first one is more correct.’ ” I read this as a comment on his statements in the Tabs. ira, pp. 240–8 and a weakening of the position that he defended there, according to which one could read acts as utterances that obligate the community if they were not clearly assigned this status by the Prophet himself. It is quite obvious from his quotation that other Shāfiʿī scholars did not find the same difficulties in reading acts as commands and obligations. Abū l-Wafā’ ‘Alī Ibn ‘Aqīl b. Muh. ammad b. ‘Aqīl, Al-Wād. ih. fī us. ūl al-fiqh (Berlin, Orient-Institut der DMG Beirut, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2002), vol. 4, part 1: Kitāb al-Khilāf, p. 83, shows the H. anbalī scholars to hold that acts cannot be commands. Ibn ‘Aqīl states that, according to this opinion, the acts of the Prophet cannot be considered to be commands. But he refers to the opinion of some modern Shāfiʿī scholars according to whom the Prophet’s acts are commands. Ibn ‘Aqīl is convinced that this opinion could be integrated in the doctrine of the H. anbalī school. He returns to this question in vol. 4, part 2, pp. 2–4. He discusses the Shāfiʿī thesis that one has to know the purposes of the Prophet’s acts in order to assign them a status of obligatory, recommended, etc. He suggests that the most reliable approach is to follow the acts of the Prophet in the same way that one follows his words, because in the us. ūl al-fiqh—other than in the us. ūl aldiyānāt—there are no definite proofs. On pages 6–22, he presents the different aspects of this debate. Shāshī, Us. ūl, p. 82: if a man says to his wife “divorce yourself” [from me] (qāla laha talliqi nafsaki) and she says “I divorced” (qad tallaqtu), this command counts for one divorce. The same is true if he commands an agent. At the divorce the command counts for one act. But if his intent was to bring about a threefold repudiation, then his intent is valid. If he says to his slave: “marry,” the command is about marrying one woman, except if the intent of the man who gave the command was to have his slave marry two women.

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The same divorce example is given in the same way by Dabūsī, Taqwīm, pp. 229–30. Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, pp. 21–2 uses a similar example in order to prove that the regular performance of the acts of worship cannot be explained in terms of a conditional command of the kind: you have to pray whenever the time x, indicated for the performance of the prayer, recurs. Sarakhsī states that conditional repudiation is valid once, and is not to be repeated each time the condition occurs. On p. 23 he states: an unconditional order also is not valid for more than one act of the kind requested by it. A man who tells his agent: “buy a slave for me” does not order to him to constantly buy new slaves. The same holds true for the command: “marry me to a woman,” it can only be interpreted as an order to find one woman with whom the man can be married. Dabūsī, Taqwīm, pp. 227–8. Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, pp. 26–30, discusses the “absolute commands” (amr mut. laq) and denies any relation to specific moments of time in them, let alone a sufficient reason to see them as a cause for the repetition of the act the performance of which is requested in these commands. He applies to them the same reason to which I refer in note 48. On pp. 30–6, he discusses the commands that require the receiver to perform acts at specified times. These commands concern, among others, the way in which the law provides for prayer and fasting in the month of Ramad. ān. Sarakhsī makes it quite clear that nothing in such commands can oblige those who receive them constantly to repeat the performance of the acts required during the indicated specified times (see note 48). Ibn ‘Aqīl, al-Wād. ih. , vol. 4, part 1, pp. 128–9, 138 and pp. 150–7 states that whether it remains unspecified in its relation to time (amr mut. laq) or whether it is confined to certain specific times (amr muqayyad), the command requires the regularly recurring repetition of the performance of the obligation established by it. He alerts his readers to the fact that most legal scholars and most theologians do not accept this doctrine and instead request a onetime performance only as far as the command is concerned. He also, on pp. 144–53 defends the doctrine that a conditional order has to be repeated each time the condition recurs. Al-Bājī, Ih. kām, pp. 201–6 holds that an imperative does not require, according to the majority of the Mālikīs, a repetition of the act that is the object of the command.

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Universality in Islamic Thought See Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī, Al-Tabs. ira fī us. ūl al-fiqh, pp. 41, 42: an absolute command (amr mut. laq) does not create the obligation to repeat the performance of the required act regularly; p. 41: a minority of Shāfiʿī scholars holds that it does; p. 47: the conditional command does not bring about the obligation of recurrent performance whenever the condition recurs. A minority of Shāfiʿī scholars hold that it does. In the Lumaʿ fī us. ūl al-fiqh (see above, note 12) the same author points out that if a command orders an act it has to be performed: “each time the command is mentioned the commanded act has to be repeated. Otherwise the believer would act obstinately against the law’s command. If something in the wording [of the command] indicates the [obligation] to repeat the act, its repetition is obligatory. If the command was unspecified and unconditional, there are two aspects: some of our co-disciples said: one has to repeat it to the best of one’s capacity. Others say: [the performance] is not obligatory more than once, unless there be an indicant that suggests the regular repetition of the act. That is the correct opinion.” Shāshī, Us. ūl, pp. 82–3. Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, p. 307 calls it “a way to obtain the norm” but he also states that the norm does not necessarily follow the “cause,” that it is also not co-existent with it and between the cause (sabab) and the norm (h. ukm) stands the ratio legis to which the norm is attributed, whereas the ‘illa is not attributed to the “cause” (sabab). On the other hand, some jurists state that sometimes the “cause” (sabab) exerts the function of the ratio legis. Shāshī, Us. ūl, p. 224, says that when sabab and ‘illa together exert an influence on the norm, the ‘illa will still be considered to be the cause of the norm, except if that is impossible. On p. 226 he shows that sabab can have the function of ‘illa, and on page 227 that the sabab can replace the ‘illa if the ‘illa cannot be established. Shāshī, Us. ūl, p 229; Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, p. 101. Shāshī, Us. ūl, p. 230. The debate over whether the first moment of the prayer or other moments also can be considered as the cause of the prayer obligation is a point of dissent between the Iraqi H. anafīs to whom Shāshī belongs and whose doctrine he represents here, and the Transoxanian H. anafīs. The Transoxanian jurists hold that the prayer time serves as the time frame of the prayer, as its cause, and as its condition and that the question as to which part of it constitutes the cause of the prayer is, in the last instance, decided by the moment in which the person who is obliged to pray

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performs her or his prayer as long as its performance takes place within the time frame. See, for this debate, Dabūsī, Taqwīm, p. 304; and Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, pp. 33–5. Dabūsī, Taqwīm, pp. 300–1, 303, 305; Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, pp. 100, 101. Dabūsī, Taqwīm, pp. 301, 302, 303, 304. Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, p. 22, states that the reiteration of the ritual act is due to “the renewal” (tajaddud) of the “causes” to which the law has assigned the function of “the obligating cause” (sabab mūjib); on p. 30 he identifies the prayer time as the “cause of obligation” (sabab alwujūb) for the prayer. He points out (p. 100) that God “made other causes than the divine discourse (khit. āb) the cause of the obligation.” He also holds that these causes leave no choice to the humans and that they produce their effects as sheer coercion; he underlines (p. 101) that the “causes” exert their obligatory effect (tūjib) on those who are “capable of being obliged” (ahlun li lwujūbi ‘alayhi) and that the law has given these causes the power to obligate in legal matters (mashrūʿāt); he informs his readers (p. 103) that “the cause of the obligation of fasting is the fact [that the human being] lives to witness the month of Ramad. ān enjoying the capacity [of being obliged] and that, therefore, the obligation to fast is reiterated each time the Ramad. ān is coming up again”; p. 105 he talks about the Ka’ba as the “cause” of the pilgrimage. Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, p. 22. Ibid., pp. 22, 101. Ibid., pp. 15, 33–4, 35, 38, 44, 336; Dabūsī, Taqwīm, p. 398: the divine command requires an act fulfilled as a result of free choice and such an act does not exist if the obligor does not have the physical and intellectual capacity to perform valid legal acts, see also pp. 399–400. Ibid., pp. 303–4, 305, 308, 312; cf. Shāshī, Us. ūl, pp. 229, 233, 234. Dabūsī, Taqwīm, p. 398. Ibid., p. 301 (see also p. 302); Sarakhsī, Us. ūl, vol. 1, p. 102–3. Ibid., p. 102. Ibid. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ʿAbd al-‘Azīz b. Ah. mad al-Bukhārī (d. 730/1330), Kashf al-asrār ‘an us. ūl Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī (Beirut: Dar alKitab al-‘Arabi, n.d. [offprint of the 1307 Istanbul edition], vol. 2, pp. 339–42. Wilferd Madelung’s precise and painstaking research has helped us to understand the importance of the contributions to the theology and law of Islam by scholars from Iran, Transoxania and

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Universality in Islamic Thought other parts of Central Asia. His brilliant chapter “The Spread of Maturidism,” in his Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985) provides an important background to all research on the intellectual history of Transoxanian Hanafism. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muh. ammad ibn Ah. mad al-Samarqandī was a prominent representative of the Samarqandī school in theology as well as in law. He was a student of Abū l-H. asan Al-Bazdawī (d. 1089 in Samarqand) and of the famous theologian and jurist Abū l-Mu’in al-Nasafī (d. 1114). His sharh. is an influential commentary on Māturīdī’s Ta’wilāt. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī migrated from Samarqand to Syria, where he died in 1144. Kāsānī, Badā’iʿ al-s. anā’iʿ, vol. 2, pp. 88–9. Ibid., p. 88. Ibid., line 29.

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4 Humanism in Ismāʿīlī Thought: The Case of the Rasā’il Ikhwān al-S. afā’ (The Epistles of the Sincere Brethren and Faithful Friends)

s Ismail K. Poonawala*

Cultural historians are divided as to whether the term “humanism,” a product of the Graeco-Roman humanitas ideal, can be applied to the world of medieval Islam. In his chapter entitled “alNazʿa al-insāniyya fi’l-fikr al-ʿarabī” (The Humanist Trend in Arab Thought), ʿAbd al-Rah. mān Badawī, reflecting on humanism in Arab thought, states that Greek culture was not unique in creating a humanist ideal. Every high culture, he asserts, produces this phenomenon in its own way.1 A number of other scholars, such as Louis Gardet,2 and Mohammed Arkoun3 have discussed and elaborated on humanism as a feature of Arab-Islamic civilization. In The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West, George Makdisi has covered all aspects of Islamic learning and rendered the Arabic term adab as humanism. He states: In classical Islam, each of the two movements [i.e. humanism and scholasticism] has its raison d’être, distinct from the other; yet both sprang from concern for a common source: the Sacred Scripture. The history of their developments is one of interaction in which there was conflict, but never a clean break. The day of humanism dawned some time before Islam’s first century came to an end. The movement arose because of deep concern for the purity of the classical Arabic of the Koran as the living language, as well as the liturgical language, of Islam. Scholasticism owed 65

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Universality in Islamic Thought its rise to the struggle between opposing religious forces, the conflict coming to a head in the third/ninth century inquisition (mih. na), over a century after the dawn of humanism.4

The issue of humanism in Islam is further pursued by Joel Kraemer. In an excellent article, “Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: A Preliminary Study,” he has addressed the theoretical issues raised by cultural historians. Subsequently in his book Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival during the Buyid Age, Kraemer has revisited the debate and reiterated that both terms, “Renaissance” and “Humanism,” belong to Islam as a complex civilization.5 It should be further noted that cultural historians and Islamicists are also at odds over another question that is closely intertwined with the first. It regards whether Islamic civilization belonged to the Kulturkreis (cultural sphere) of Western Europe— sharing a common heritage of classical antiquity—or if it belonged to another cultural orbit.6 Those who support the former thesis maintain that Islamic civilization was part of the cultural sphere of the Mediterranean, which in turn was the underpinning of the Graeco-Roman civilization.7 In the preface to The Jewish Discovery of Islam, Martin Kramer stresses this very point and states: The thread that runs through the contribution of Jewish scholars of Islam is the denial of a dichotomy between East and West. The Jewish discovery of Islam was not distinct from Europe’s; it was an inseparable part of it. But it was overwhelming based against “Orientalism” as an ideology of difference and supremacy.8

In his article “Narrative and Community in Islamic Late Antiquity,” Thomas Sizgorich has indicated that there are many strands of cultural affinities between the early Islamic community and the other communities of Late Antiquity.9 While discussing Henri Pirennes’s Mohammed and Charlemagne and Fernand Braudel’s The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Peter Brown states:

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Historians of late antiquity could now agree that, from A. D. 200 to at least 700, the Mediterranean itself, a clearly defined landscape, encrusted with millennia of experience of human habitation and sharply distinguished from its northern and southern neighbors by a unique ecology and lifestyle, provided a center to western Europe which was notably more palpable than was the somewhat disembodied notion of a spiritual unity realized by the Catholic church.10

In his The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam, George Makdisi has clearly demonstrated that not only did a common spirit encapsulate the entire Mediterranean world during the Middle Ages but scholasticism and humanism, two major intellectual movements in medieval intellectual history, also carry the signatures of classical Islam which is clearly legible in their essential constituent elements.11 It should be noted here that in his article “Dominant Ideas in the Formation of Islamic Culture” Georgio Levi Della Vida also has maintained that Islamic civilization was an outgrowth of Hellenism, just as Islam itself was an offshoot of the Judaeo-Christian religion.12 These thorough accounts, I believe, absolve me from any additional obligation to address theoretical issues. Both Mohammed Arkoun and Joel Kraemer have devoted substantial parts of their studies concerning Islamic humanism to the writings of Abū H . ayyān al-Tawh. īdī (d. 414/1023), an erudite litterateur who had considerable influence in literary and philosophical circles in the latter part of the tenth century. It is a strange coincidence that this study deals with the celebrated encyclopedia, Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-s. afāʾ wa-khullān al-wafāʾ, whose authors were accused by Abū H . ayyān al-Tawh. īdī of harboring heretical beliefs. This is not the time or the place to discuss extensively the latter’s story about the authorship of the Rasāʾil since I have dealt with it in greater detail in a separate, but yet unpublished study.13 It should be noted that there is a long established tradition among the Mustaʿlī-T. ayyibīs of Yemen going back to the dāʿī Ibrāhīm al-H . āmidī (d. 557/1162) which claims that the Rasāʾil were composed by the second hidden imām

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Ah. mad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muh. ammad b. Ismāʿīl. This in turn implies that the dating of the Rasāʾil goes back to the middle or the second half of the third/ninth century. Abbas Hamdani has defended this position by arguing that the Rasāʾil were composed prior to the establishment of the Fāt.imid dynasty in North Africa. The Ismāʿīlī character of the Rasāʾil, in its broader sense, is no longer in dispute. What is still disputed is the precise identity of its authors within the Ismāʿīlī community. Although the exact identity of the authors is beyond recovery this issue is closely tied to the dating of the Rasāʾil. Coming back to our subject of inquiry, I would like to state that, besides the question of their authorship, modern scholarship concerning the Rasāʾil has been preoccupied with analyzing the contents of various epistles and indicating their ur (original) sources, such as the legacy of Greece, that is, Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, as well as the JudeoChristian, Persian, Indian, Buddhist and Zoroastrian legends. Other authors have focused on the different aspects of the Ikhwān’s thought: for example, cosmological doctrines, the theory of the imamate, ethics, educational terms and political thought. As far as I am able to ascertain, the theme of humanism in the Rasāʾil has not been previously explored. The following pages are, therefore, a modest effort to present some of the most prominent universal human characteristics espoused by the Ikhwān. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines humanism as a doctrine, a set of attitudes, or a way of life centered upon human interests or values. It adds that humanism is a philosophy that asserts the essential dignity and worth of humankind and its capacity to achieve self-realization through the use of reason.14 When humanism ceases to be the principal concern of a society, it is argued, barbarism ensues. Hence, humanism has become a component of several specific philosophical systems, and has also been incorporated into some religious schools of thought. It entails a commitment to the search for truth and morality through human means in support of human interests. Humanists endorse a universal morality based on the commonality of human nature,

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believing that solutions to human social and cultural problems cannot be parochial. In addition to the above aspects the other primary features of humanism described in various dictionaries and encyclopedias are: (i) that it is committed to the pursuit of knowledge, the adoption of both religious and non-religious sciences as an educational and cultural ideal in the formation of the human mind and character; (ii) it is also committed to cosmopolitan values of tolerance and understanding between different races and religions based on a conception of common kinship and the unity of mankind.15 Keeping in mind the aforementioned definition, I have collected and organized the Ikhwān’s views, which are scattered throughout the 51 epistles in four volumes plus two summary volumes (al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa), under the following headings:16 1. Mankind’s origin, his place in the universe and his destiny. 2. Rationalism and its limits. 3. Religious tolerance and the spirit of inclusiveness. 4. The Ikhwān’s goal of providing a well-rounded education. 5. The Ikhwān’s bold intellectual attempt to debate not only the inherent tension generated by the anthropocentric view projected in heading number one (mankind’s origin) and the ethical issues it raises, but also to offer a provisional resolution to this dilemma. I think that the latter theme is unique to the history of religious thought in general and Islamic thought in particular. Mankind’s origin, his place in the universe and his destiny Perhaps a good starting point when considering the rich, varied and complex thought of the Ikhwān is to pose the question: what did the Ikhwān themselves think they were trying to accomplish? Or, what was their objective that they diligently pursued throughout their epistles? It is my belief that if this question

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had been posed to the Ikhwān, their reply would have been similar to Plotinus, who, when asked the same question on his deathbed, is reported to have said: “I am trying to bring back the divine in us . . . ”17 A. H. Armstrong, author of The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus,18 states that this ambiguous statement can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Therefore, he attempts to clarify the statement of Plotinus by saying: But if we come to understand as precisely as possible what Plotinus meant by it, we shall be well on the way to understanding his philosophy as a whole. Man for Plotinus is in some sense divine, and the object of the philosophic life is to understand this divinity and restore its proper relationship (never, as we shall see, completely lost) with the divine All and, in that All, to come to union with its transcendent source, the One or Good.19

With some modifications, what Armstrong said of Plotinus is applicable to the Ikhwān. The human soul, according to them, is part of the Universal Soul and belongs to the realm of the spiritual world that transcends the physical world of generation and corruption. It is therefore divine. The philosophical structure and the cosmology of the Rasāʾil, with some adaptations, are derived from Neoplatonism and Neopythagoreanism.20 One might also ask the question: why were the Ikhwān specifically attracted to Neoplatonism? In reply we can say that the Ikhwān were not the only ones fascinated by Neoplatonism. Other groups in Islam as well as in Judaism and Christianity were equally fascinated for many different reasons. First, within the Greek tradition Neoplatonism had become an integral component. And when the Greek tradition was translated into Arabic and transmitted to the Muslims, the latter inherited that legacy.21 Second, it was significant to all the revealed religions since it tried to accommodate God, described as the first principle of reality, or the One who is beyond Intellect (or reason) and being.22 Third, Neoplatonism offered support to the notion in revealed religions that God, the divinity, is active, not just an intellectual concept intellectualizing about itself.23

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In order to understand the origin of humans, their lofty position in the universe and the destiny awaiting their soul’s return to the spiritual realm from whence it began, it is appropriate to outline briefly the Ikhwān’s cosmology.24 According to the Ikhwān, God transcends all thought and all being. He is the One, the originator and the cause of all being. He is unique in every respect and nothing can be predicated about him. The universe, which is quite distinct from Him, is related to God through its existence (wujūd), permanence (baqāʾ), wholeness (tamām) and perfection (kamāl). The universe is derived by emanation (fayd. ), whereas creation is understood as a form of adaptation to theological language. According to the philosophical system of the Ikhwān, the superstructure of the hierarchy of beings originates with the Intellect emanating from God. The Intellect, at times referred to as the Universal Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-kullī al-faccāl) or the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faccāl), is described as the first existent being that emanates from God’s munificence (jūd). It is a simple spiritual substance with the qualities of permanence, wholeness and perfection. The Intellect contains the forms of all things and is in fact the cause of all causes. Second in the hierarchy is the Soul, at times called the Universal Soul (al-nafs al-kullīya), which emerges from the Intellect. It is a simple spiritual substance with the qualities of permanence and wholeness but lacking in the quality of perfection. Third in the hierarchy is Prime Matter (alhayūlā al-ūlā), which gushes out from the Soul. It is a simple spiritual substance that has permanence but lacks both wholeness and perfection. It is also susceptible to form. The cause of the Intellect’s existence is God’s munificence, which springs out from Him. The Intellect instantaneously (daf ʿatan wāh. idatan) accepts God’s munificence and virtues (i.e. permanence, wholeness and perfection), without motion, time or exertion, on account of its proximity to God. Because of its perfection, its munificence and virtues overflow into the Soul. But the latter’s existence is through the intermediary of the Intellect, hence the Soul is deficient in receiving virtues, and its rank is

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below that of the Intellect. To procure goodness and virtue, the Soul sometimes turns to the Intellect and at other times to Matter. Consequently, when it turns to the Intellect for goodness, it is distracted from doing good to Matter, and vice versa. Being imperfect, the Soul becomes attached to Matter, which lacks not only virtues but also the desire to receive them. The Soul, therefore, must turn to Matter, take special care in its advancement by acting on Matter and by making manifest the virtues inherent in it. Hence, the Soul is afflicted with exertion, hardship and misery in reforming and perfecting the Matter. When the Matter accepts the virtues, it attains wholeness, and simultaneously the Soul achieves its own perfection. When the Soul turns to the Intellect, it becomes attached to it and united with it, thus attaining tranquility. The process of emanation terminates with Prime Matter. As the Soul acts on Prime Matter, it receives its first form that includes three dimensions (length, breadth and depth), thereby becoming the Absolute Body (al-jism al-mut. laq) or Universal Matter (hayūlā ’l-kull). Thereupon begins the realm of the composite (ʿālam almurakkabāt). Next, the Absolute Body takes its first form, which is circular because this is the best form. Thus, the spheres and the stars are formed from the Absolute Body. Subsequently the nine spheres emerge, beginning with the outermost sphere (al-falak almuh. īt. ), which encompasses all spheres. Next to it is the sphere of fixed stars (falak al-kawākib al-thābita), followed by the spheres of Saturn (falak zuh. al), Jupiter (falak al-mushtarī), Mars (falak almirrīkh), the Sun (falak al-shams), Venus (falak al-zuhara), Mercury (falak ʿut. ārid) and the Moon (falak al-qamar). The higher the position of the sphere, the purer and finer is their matter. The spiritual force that directs and manages each sphere is identified as the particular soul of that sphere. Below the lunar world comes the physical matter (hayūlā alt. abīʿa) of the four elements: fire (nār), air (hawāʾ), water (māʾ) and earth (ard. ). The Earth, being farthest from the One, is the coarsest and darkest kind of physical matter. The active force of the Soul operates through these four elements by means of heat,

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cold, dryness and wetness and is known as “the nature of generation and corruption (ʿālam al-kawn wa’l-fasād).” Moreover, it produces the generated beings that form the three kingdoms: minerals, plants and animals. The active force operating on each of these generated beings is called the particular soul. Thus, the process wherein the soul mixes with these elements in varying degrees produces the generated beings including the human being, which is the culmination of the process. The human being is, therefore, not only situated at the peak of a hierarchy with inanimate things at the base but is also the noblest of all creations, and the rest of the three kingdoms (i.e. the animal, vegetative and mineral) are subservient to him. Humans, by virtue of their position in the universe, are the central link in a long chain of beings; below them is the animal kingdom and above them is the world of angels. They are connected to both. In the Perfect Human Being, one who has realized his divine origin, the process of generation in descending order from the Absolute Body to the sublunar world comes to an end, and the reverse journey in ascending order back to the Universal Soul and the Intellect, starts. The human being, therefore, fulfills the purpose of creation. In order to further their philosophical claim that a human being is the noblest of all creation the Ikhwān cite the Qurʾān where it states: “We indeed created the human beings in the fairest stature.”25 Quoting from the scrolls of Hermes (s. uh. uf Hirmis, i.e. the prophet Idrīs) and the books of the Israelite prophets (kutub anbiyāʾ banī Isrāʾīl), the Ikhwān state that when God decided to put His vicegerent on Earth He formed the first human being out of dust in a form unrivaled to other animals and breathed into him His spirit.26 As a result, the earthly body of every human is infused with a spiritual soul that provides it with the ability to acquire a noble character and be trained in all the sciences and politics. The purpose of all this, the Ikhwān state, is to enable and prepare him to resemble God, his Creator, because he is His vicegerent on Earth. If a human manages himself well and wisely, his soul will become an angel from among the angels

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that surround Him. In order to support their assertion the Ikhwān quote a passage from a book by the Israelite prophets.27 At several places in the epistles, the Ikhwān assert that the substance of the human soul is celestial and that after the death of the body it will return to its celestial abode.28 At another location in the 34th epistle “On the saying of the sages that the human being is a microcosm,” the Ikhwān state that among the partial souls it is the human soul that resembles the Universal Soul.29 The human soul is further described as a spiritual, celestial substance that is luminous and lives by itself. It has the potential to be the most erudite and full of life. Moreover, it is active in bodies, using them and perfecting them for a time, until it eventually leaves them.30 The soul’s death, on the other hand, is described as ignorance of its own substance (bi-jawharihā) and its lack of knowledge about itself (maʿrifat dhātihā).31 Toward the end of the 46th epistle, entitled “On the essence of faith and the characteristics of the faithful,” the Ikhwān state:

Make every endeavor, O brother, to seek knowledge and [various] sciences and tread the path of the best and the divines who submitted themselves to the will of God. Perhaps your soul might be awakened from the slumber of heedlessness . . . might open the discerning eye and understand the secrets [hidden in] the books of the prophets and allusions [contained] in the divine laws. It would be precisely at that moment that the soul would be ready to receive revelation from the angels. Know, O brother, that your soul is potentially an angel, and can become one in actuality if you follow the path of the prophets and those who were responsible for the promulgation of the divine laws, and act in accordance with their counsels mentioned in their books, which are obligatory in the usages of their laws. Indeed, your soul is also potentially a devil and will one day actually become a devil if you follow the path of the wicked and the infidels.32

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Rationalism The relationship between reason and revelation is one of the most profound topics in the history of human thought. It has been debated for over two millennia and has not lost any of its fascination or freshness. Since monotheistic religions are based on revealed scriptures their relation with reason has been altogether an uneasy one. In religion, reason is more often regarded as a prison or a restriction to be escaped from and not as a key to understanding the world. This demonstrates the limited role assigned to reason in religious thought.33 The rational tradition in Islam can be viewed and studied in various ways. Broadly speaking, as Muhsin Mahdi states, it not only includes the scientists and philosophers but also many of the theological schools and mystics.34 The reason is that whenever they tried to express themselves, or in the case of the mystics who tried to communicate their experience, they were required to use reason. In his attempt to delimit the scope of this tradition, Mahdi continues: The most interesting part of the rational tradition for us is where it comes directly in contact with, and tries to understand, the whole question of religion, the origins and structure of the religious community . . . This normally takes the form of political philosophy, but that is only one part, perhaps the most interesting part, of the way in which the rational tradition tries to understand and deal with the phenomenon of religion and the religious community.35

Having identified the core of the problem, Mahdi adds that the origin of Islamic religious thought or kalām (scholastic theology), is this very question—who has the right to rule the Muslim community?36 Is the ruler designated by the Prophet since he himself was chosen by God? Or, is he to be elected by the community? It is obvious that the issue of the succession to the Prophet created other controversies regarding God’s justice, the qualifications of the leader and a Muslim’s duties. Concerning the main tradition of Islamic philosophy (i.e. the philosophy of al-

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Fārābī, Ibn Sīnāʾ [Avicenna] and Ibn Rushd [Averroes]), Mahdi asserts that it never thought that a society can be based entirely on reason, or that the prophecy or the divine law (in all three revealed religious communities) can be explained purely on the basis of reason. The only way society can be held together, and the only way people can be encouraged to pursue virtues, is through a divine law. Therefore the dominant trend that emerged in Islamic philosophy was to mitigate the conflict between reason and revelation.37 The Ikhwān’s rationalism, if one accepts the pre-alFārābī dating of the Rasāʾil rather than the post-al-Fārābī dating that is generally recognized,38 predates the main tradition of Islamic philosophy as outlined by Muhsin Mahdi. In their synthesis of reason and revelation, the Ismāʿīlīs and the Ikhwān had gone far beyond Muʿtazilī rationalism to encompass the whole spectrum of scientific thought. The Ikhwān had integrated the Greek sciences and their formal reasoning into one universal valid truth that was equivalent to religious reality. In the following pages an examination will be undertaken to determine what the Ikhwān had to say about rationalism, its limits and how they harmonized it with faith and revelation, which will be followed by a scrutinization of their political theory. The story of the debate between reason and revelation began with Plato, a pre-eminent political philosopher.39 In The Republic, which he wrote in the prime of his life, Plato discovered that with intelligent leadership and the educational advantages of a healthy political life there is little need for positive law. But in Laws, written at the end of his life, he became concerned with the alternative to intelligent leadership—the need for a few necessary laws clearly stated and firmly enforced.40 He, therefore, found it necessary to assume the existence of a divine lawgiver, in order to furnish with authority the ordinances by which he hoped to establish his ideal state.41 “No one,” he states, “who in obedience to the laws believed that there were gods, ever intentionally did any unholy act, or uttered any unlawful word.” Very poignantly he also added, “Who can be calm when he is called upon to prove the existence of God?” For “men say that we ought not to inquire

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into the supreme God and the nature of the universe, nor busy ourselves in searching out the causes of things, and that such inquiries are impious; whereas the very opposite is the truth.”42 Plato’s statement goes to the very heart of the controversy between faith and intellect.43 Hence, in Timaeus he elaborated his celebrated theory of God and creation.44 The classical rationalists, such as Plato and Aristotle, believed everything was accessible to reason, except the “first principle” (i.e. the Good, the One, the transcendental, God), which was located “beyond reason.” Having adapted Neoplatonist cosmology, the Ikhwān’s position is very similar to Plato’s. For them, it is not only the “first principle” but also the manner of creation of the universe, and the cause of its existence, which are beyond the scope of human reason. This is explained in the 28th epistle, entitled “The limits of man’s cognitive ability.”45 The epistle begins with the creation of Adam whose upright body was created by God out of dust, after which God breathed into him His spirit, and taught him names. Thereafter, God commanded the angels to bow down before Adam not because of his earthly body, but because of the noble spirit that was breathed into him. Knowledge is, therefore, the sustenance of the soul and its very life—as food, drink and other attainable things are nourishment for the body.46 According to the Ikhwān, knowledge about things could be obtained through three channels: (i) that which is natural and instinctive, such as that which can be arrived at by means of sense perception or that which is based on the rational faculty; (ii) that which could be learned and acquired, such as mathematics and rules of conduct; or (iii) that which is brought by divine law (nāmūs) by virtue of revelation. The Ikhwān reiterate that man’s cognitive ability is limited, especially in acquiring knowledge of the realities of things.47 In the same epistle, the Ikhwān criticize legal scholars (alʿulamāʾ al-sharʿiyyīn) who reject science that deals with the composition of spheres and the influence of the stars (ah. kām alnujūm) on sublunar living beings. Their rejection, the Ikhwān state, could be due to several reasons. First is their inability to understand such a discipline, or their lack of desire even to

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examine it. Second is their preoccupation with the sharīʿa, or their contempt for this science. At the same time the Ikhwān also censure those who have begun deliberation over philosophical sciences or those who have reached an intermediate stage in their study of philosophy but have a disdain for divine law, the rules of sharīʿa, and ridicule the people who are engaged in its inquiry. The Ikhwān once again affirm that their creed is the consideration of all bodies of knowledge, both the philosophical as well as the prophetic sciences, and unveiling the realities of all existing things. Since this knowledge is a vast ocean they were called upon to compile 51 epistles.48 At the end of the third epistle entitled “On astronomy”, the Ikhwān state that the jurists, traditionalists and people of piety forbid the study of astronomy because they believe that the latter is a part of the philosophical sciences. In clarifying their own position the Ikhwān spell out that they themselves do not approve of the study of philosophical sciences for those who did not first study the essentials of religious sciences and the ordinances of the sharīʿa that are obligatory on every Muslim and whose ignorance is not to be excused. However, for those who have completed their studies of the sharīʿa and the ordinances of religion, and have fulfilled the requirements of the divine law, the Ikhwān assert that their indulgence in philosophy will not harm them. On the contrary, it will strengthen their religious belief and add certitude to their conviction.49 They further state that both the philosophical sciences and the prophetic sharīʿa are divine and are in conformity with their intended aim. Their goal is one, however their approaches may vary.50 The ultimate aim of philosophy is, as it is said by Plotinus, to resemble God according to man’s ability and this goal is achieved through four channels: (i) acquiring knowledge of the realities of existing things; (ii) asserting belief in sound opinions; (iii) electing to be molded with noble character and praiseworthy disposition; and iv) having blameless conduct and good deeds. The real objective behind those traits is the refinement of the soul and its advancement from the state of imperfection to that of

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wholeness (tamām), thereby moving from the state of potentiality to that of actuality in order that the soul can attain permanence and eternity in bliss with its fellow souls and with the angels. Similarly, the purpose of prophecy and divine law is the refinement of the human soul and its salvation from Hell (which is described as the sublunar world of generation and corruption) and to lead it to Paradise.51 The Ikhwān did not compose a separate epistle dealing with political theory, but the material related to it is scattered throughout the Rasāʾil. In his article “An Outline of the Political Philosophy of the Rasāʾil of the Ikhwān al-S. afāʾ,” Hamid Enayat has delineated the Ikhwān’s political philosophy.52 He presents his discussion and analysis of the material under three major headings: (i) philosophical postulates; (ii) a critique of social conditions; and (iii) the ideal state. Although it is a wellresearched article, the last part on the ideal state is misleading and based on a misreading of the Rasāʾil. Unfortunately, there is no sustained discussion by the Ikhwān on the ideal state, nor on the ignorant or the deviant one as is found in al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fād. ila. Enayat’s subsequent statement that there are striking similarities between the Ikhwān’s schemes of the ideal state and those of al-Fārābī is, therefore, incorrect. One must remember that Enayat’s article having being written from the perspective of a political scientist does not cover the Ikhwān’s theory of prophecy, which is central to my discussion. I will, therefore, only point out some of his findings and then devote the rest of this section to expounding the Ikhwān’s theory of prophecy. It should be remembered that prophecy is an important subject not only for Muslims but also for Jews and Christians. During the early centuries of Islamic history it became a hotly contested issue and several books were composed in defense of prophecy. It also reminds us of the great debate that took place at the beginning of the fourth/tenth century between the two Rāzīs: the physician-philosopher Abū Bakr Muh. ammad b. Zakariyyā al-Rāzī, who denied prophecy, and his

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compatriot the Ismāʿīlī thinker Abū H . ātim Ah. mad al-Rāzī, who defended it.53 Under philosophical postulates Enayat argues that the Ikhwān’s political views stem directly from their basic philosophy, which is their belief in motion and change as an inexorable process, and a factor of progress both in natural phenomena and in social and political institutions.54 It is worth noting that the concept of revolutionary change in the Rasāʾil is accorded a respectability rarely found in Muslim historical and juridical sources.55 Since human beings possess both knowledge and will, they are presumed to be able to determine their way of life, and devise the social and political institutions regulating their relationship with fellow human beings, otherwise, the Ikhwān maintain that there can be no moral basis for the state.56 It is interesting to note that the term siyāsa, which has several different meanings in Arabic,57 has three different interpretations in the Rasāʾil: (i) the individualistic pursuit of happiness; (ii) statecraft or governing of the people that concerns the social dimension of human life; and (iii) the knowledge of the arts and methods for simultaneously attaining both the spiritual and mundane happiness for the individual and the community. All three nuances are subsumed under the following five categories of siyāsa.58 The first category is al-siyāsa al-nabawiyya (prophetic manner of governing).59 It entails the laying down of the divine laws for curing the ailing souls. This, the highest form of siyāsa, is accomplished only by the prophets. This is followed by al-siyāsa al-mulūkiyya (regal manner of governing), which requires knowledge of the ways to preserve the laws of the prophets and the revival of their traditions. This is the task of the prophets’ successors, the rightly guided Imāms. Al-siyāsa al-ʿāmmiyya (statecraft in general), the third type, pertains to the art of governing various groups, such as the umarāʾ, which entails managing the affairs of some cities and provinces. It requires knowledge of the classes of the people, their conditions, crafts, morals and maintaining cohesion amongst the masses. The next level is al-siyāsa al-khās. s. iyya (individual management), which

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consists of knowledge that every individual ought to have regarding his household management and his means of livelihood. Furthermore, he should review his mundane and spiritual welfare. The last category is al-siyāsa al-dhātiyya (personal conduct). This siyāsa identifies as knowledge that allows every individual to reflect on himself, his character and his own affairs. It should be noted that the classification of five categories of siyāsa in the Rasāʾil is a novel interpretation amongst other Muslim thinkers. Enayat has compiled a fairly detailed account of the Ikhwān’s criticism of the socio-political conditions that prevailed in Muslim society at that time, hence it will not preoccupy us here.60 Therefore, I would like to address briefly the 22nd epistle entitled “On the generation of animals and their species,” which includes the famous debate between animals and humans. It is a rich and valuable document wherein the most severe criticism is leveled against the wealthy, those who go on amassing fortunes without caring for the needy, the privileged and the ruling classes. The focus of the criticism is rendered more explicit in the compendium (al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa), where it is stated that the animals in the story symbolize the masses who blindly follow their rulers, while the humans stand for those who uphold the principle of qiyās (reasoning by analogy). And those who advocate the latter principle, according to the Ikhwān, represent the disciples of Satan, the adversaries of the prophets and the enemies of the Imāms.61 The utopian state envisioned by the Ikhwān and portrayed as “the Excellent Spiritual State” (madīna fād. ila rūh. āniyya) is a state that will be realized after the appearance of the seventh nāt. iq, a cosmic rank described as s. āh. ib al-nāmūs al-akbar, and qāʾim alqiyāma (the one who will raise the Resurrection).62 Let us now examine the Ikhwān’s theory of prophecy as outlined in the 47th epistle entitled “On the essence of divine law, the conditions of prophecy, the quantity of their characteristics and the creed of godly people.”63 The epistle commences with:

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Universality in Islamic Thought Know, Oh brother, may God assist you and us with a spirit of His, that the animals are the embellishment of the earth as the stars are the embellishment of the heavens . . . Indeed, the human is the most perfect animal with respect to form and is the noblest with regards to composition. The best of the humans are those who are rational, and the best of the rational are the ʿulamāʾ. The highest of the ʿulamāʾ in rank are the prophets, peace be upon them! They are followed in rank by al-falāsifa al-h. ukamāʾ. Both the groups [i.e. the prophets and al-falāsifa al-h. ukamāʾ] concur that everything, in fact, is caused (or the effect of a cause, ʿilla) and the Creator, most high and sublime, is the Cause, the Originator, and the One who imparts wholeness and perfection [to the created beings].64

The Ikhwān further state that the position of nubūwa (or nubūʾa, prophethood, prophecy), which follows the rank of the angels, is the highest status that a human can aspire to attain and it is fulfilled if a person acquires all 46 human virtues. The first and foremost is true vision (al-ruʾyā al-s. ādiqa).65 It is part of the prophecy as the tradition states: “A true vision is one 46th of prophecy.”66 Once all those qualities are combined in one person during an appropriate constellation of the stars at a given period of time, that person becomes the mabʿūth (the prophet), s. āh. ib alzamān (master of the age) and imām (leader) of the people for the rest of his life. Upon his death, after promulgating the message revealed to him, putting down the revelation in writing, alluding to its taʾwīl (hermeneutics), setting up the sunna (legally binding precedents) and uniting his community, those traits are his legacy and are a permanent fixture of his community.67 The Ikhwān continue by stating that if all those qualities [implying all 46 virtues] or most of them are combined in one person, that person is most suitable to be the Prophet’s successor. If by chance those qualities are not found in one person but are scattered throughout a group, their rule will prevail and they will be rewarded in the hereafter if that group constitutes one opinion, their hearts are reconciled with love for each other, they support one another to defend the faith, implement the sharīʿa, adhere to

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the sunna, and place the community on the path of religion. On the contrary, if the community becomes divided after the death of the Prophet and diverges from the Prophet’s path, the cohesiveness of the community will be shattered and the state established by the Prophet will disintegrate and their fate in the hereafter will also be ruined.68 Given the situation that prevailed in the Muslim community after the death of the Prophet, the Ikhwān state that the leadership (riyāsa) of the community has two dimensions: physical and spiritual. The former resembles the leadership of kings and tyrants who rule over the people unjustly and for worldly pleasures, whereas the latter signifies the leadership of the lawgiver prophets who administer over the souls through justice and ih. sān (beneficence) for attaining happiness in the hereafter.69 The Ikhwān reiterate that the status of the prophet who brings the divine law has reached the highest and the noblest position a human can hope to attain.70 They further add that the formulation of the divine law, which is a spiritual disposition that emerges from a partial soul united with a human body, occurs with al-quwwa al-ʿaqliyya (rational faculty, or intellectual power) that emanates from the Universal Soul and reaches the particular soul [i.e. the prophet] with God’s permission at a particular period of time.71 It is at this point that the Ikhwān mention that the lawgiver prophet should have the following 12 innate qualities: (i) perfect limbs that will enable him to be readily fit for the appropriate actions; when he performs an action, he accomplishes it with ease; (ii) astute perception of everything said to him, especially the ability to determine what the speaker intends and what the matter itself demands; (iii) exceptional at retaining whatever he comes to know through [sight] and sound. Essentially, he should not forget anything; (iv) an inherent high level of intelligence, so that when he sees the slightest indication of a thing, he can grasp it in the intended manner; (v) the most refined ability of articulation, his tongue enabling him always to concisely express what is in the recesses of his mind; (vi) a devotion to the acquisition of knowledge, namely the ability to easily master material; (vii) a

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fondness for the truth, which includes good conduct toward truthful people and the ability to draw them close to him; (viii) without an appetite for food, drink and sexual intercourse, averse to frivolity, and a dislike for the pleasures which these pursuits provide; (ix) proud of spirit, high-minded and devotion to honor, his soul being by its nature above everything ugly and nonvirtuous, and his high-aspiring spirit rising to the most lofty things; (x) dirhams and dīnārs and other worldly pursuits are of little value to him and he should be abstemious to them; (xi) a predisposition to justice and just people and an abhorrence for oppression by providing justice to those who are wronged and showing pity to those who are oppressed; lending support to what is beautiful, good and just; and not reluctant to concede or demonstrate obdurateness; if he is asked to perform injustice and/ or evil he does not respond; (xii) strong in setting his mind firmly upon the things, which, in his view, ought to be done; he should carry it out daringly and bravely without fear and timidness.72 It is interesting to note that these 12 physical, intellectual and moral qualities, identified by the Ikhwān, are not only listed in the same order by al-Fārābī in his Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fād. ila (the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City), but the actual wording of those qualities is almost the same.73 In the opinion of the present writer, the possibility that either of the two, that is, the Ikhwān and al-Fārābī, might have copied from the other, seems remote given their different orientation. It is more likely that both drew from a common source, namely Plato’s Republic, translated by H . unayn b. Ish. āq. Unfortunately, the Arabic translation did not survive to provide us with conclusive evidence. In his al-Farabi on the Perfect State, Walzer acknowledges that the quest for the identity of the Greek sources (in addition to Plato) used by al-Fārābī in the Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna alfād. ila and similar writings does not yield absolutely certain results. Yet he maintains that al-Fārābī’s thought may be ultimately derived from a Greek tradition originating in the sixth-century Alexandrian tradition of Ammonius’ school. In his review article of Walzer’s aforementioned book, Muhsin Mahdi,

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“al-Fārābī’s Imperfect State,” states that Walzer’s sixth-century Greek source-hunting game has failed to yield any fruit. Hence, any assumption of a common source must be abandoned. Mahdi has exposed other weaknesses in Walzer’s translation, commentary and his thesis that al-Fārābī was promoting Imāmī Shīʿism.74 However, it is to be noted that the utopia imagined by Plato in The Republic is not ruled by laws under which injustice inevitably occurs, but by men and women who have been carefully selected in youth and become wise and good by a long training. The world will never be justly ruled until rulers are philosophers, that is, until they are themselves ruled by the idea of the good, which is divine perfection and brings about justice, which is human perfection.75 It is worth noting that some of those qualities are also mentioned for the holder of the office of the caliphate/imamate.76 Let me briefly mention that al-Fārābī describes the ruler of the perfect state as a person who embodies the perfect rank of humanity and has reached the highest degree of felicity. He then adds that this ideal state cannot be reached unless one has all the aforementioned 12 qualities, with which one is endowed from birth. This person is the one who has attained perfection and has actually become intellect and thought (s. āra ʿaqlan wa-maʿqūlan bi’l-fiʿl). This occurs when his Passive Intellect (al-ʿaql almunfaʿil) has become actualized and has risen to the stage of the Acquired Intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād). When all this is taken as one and the same thing, then this person is the one whom the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faccāl) descends upon. Al-Fārābī continues by identifying when this occurs in both parts of his rational faculty (i.e. the theoretical and the practical rational faculties), and also in his al-quwwa al-mutakhayyila (imaginative faculty or phantasia) he is then the person who receives Divine Revelation, and God grants him revelation through the mediation of the Active Intellect, so that the emanation from God to the Active Intellect is passed on to his Passive Intellect through the mediation of the Acquired Intellect, and then to the faculty of imagination.77 Thus, through the emanation of the Active Intellect to his Passive Intellect, he is a wise person and a philosopher who

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employs an intellect of divine quality, and through the emanation from the Active Intellect to his faculty of imagination he becomes a visionary prophet, who warns the people of things to come. It should be noted that al-Fārābī assigns a lower grade to the faculty of imagination than to the rational faculty. In al-Fārābī’s view therefore, visionary prophecy is inferior to philosophy.78 On the other hand, the Angel of Revelation and the Active Intellect are to be considered as one and the same thing. Another important difference between al-Fārābī and the Ikhwān is their treatment of the Active Intellect. Plotinus does not use this term, but it seems to have been applied to the Universal Intellect in later times and Alexander of Aphrodisias identifies the Active Intellect with the Aristotelian First Cause. In the Rasāʾil the Intellect or the Universal Intellect is called the Active Intellect that emanates directly from God, while in the complex system of al-Fārābī the Active Intellect governs the sublunar world and occupies the last and lowest of a series of ten Intelligences emanating from the One (i.e. God). Both al-Kindī and Ibn Sīnāʾ, on the other hand, placed the visionary prophecy much closer to the religious view. Al-Kindī did not believe that visionary prophecy resided in the inferior part of the soul, particularly the faculty of imagination. For him, the prophet is self-taught, that is, he has no human teacher, and is in no need of philosophical training. His soul is purified and divinely inspired.79 For Ibn Sīnāʾ the prophet is an extraordinary human being who is unsurpassed by the philosophers. Through immediate intuition, he is aware of the truth, which reason is unable to attain. The philosopher can do nothing but confirm in his own way the insight of the prophet.80 The Ikhwān’s views are very similar to those held by al-Kindī and Ibn Sīnāʾ. Abū Bakr Muh. ammad b. Zakariyyāʾ alRāzī, in contradistinction to the above positions, took up Ibn alRāwandī’s hostile attitude to prophecy. In his view Moses, Jesus and Muh. ammad were impostors.81 In another revealing passage, following the enumeration of 12 innate qualities, the Ikhwān draw a clear distinction between a prophet who brings the divine law and a philosopher. They state

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that the former does not attribute whatever he says, does, commands or forbids in the laying down of sharīʿa to his own raʾy, ijtihād and quwwa. Rather, he ascribes it to an intermediary, an angel that is between him and his Lord who brings him revelation at undetermined times.82 As for the philosopher, whenever he deduces a [new] discipline of knowledge, writes a book, derives an art or designs a policy, he ascribes it to his own power (quwwati anfusihim), his own ijtihād and his own good judgment (jawdati raʾyihim).83 In the 50th epistle entitled “On the types of political constitutions (fī anwāʿ al-siyāsāt)”, the Ikhwān state that worship embodies two notions. The first, called al-ʿibāda al-sharʿiyya alnāmūsiyya (religious/ritual worship), is adhering to the lawgiver prophet’s commands and to comply with the acts of devotion and religious observances he has instituted, namely the ritual purity, ritual prayers, fasting, alms tax and pilgrimage. The second type of worship, called al-ʿibāda al-falsafiyya al-ilāhiyya (philosophical/ divine worship), is the profession of the belief in the unity of God.84 In the introduction of al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa the Ikhwān affirm that the profession of tawh. īd, the foremost and the noblest of maʿārif (cognition), consists in acquiring the total knowledge of the realities of things, especially their causes and effects, the essential nature from which they were created, and the purpose of their creation. The path to this knowledge is through philosophy, defined as al-tashabbuh bi’l-ilāh bi-h. asab al-t. āqa al-insāniyya (to resemble God according to human ability).85 The second type of worship implies mortification of the flesh and abstaining the lower soul from carnal pleasures, hence it is very difficult for anyone to combine both types of worship. The Ikhwān assert that they are entitled to claim this unique honor since they combine both alʿibāda al-sharʿiyya and al-ʿibāda al-falsafiyya al-ilāhiyya.86 The acceptance of reason as an ally of faith can be traced back to the very foundation of Islam, that is to say, the Qurʾān. Phrases such as ūlū al-albāb (people of understanding, or those with insight),87 laʿallakum tatafakkarūn (so that you may reflect),88 a-fa-lā tatafakkarūn (why will you not reflect?),89 li-qawmin

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yatafakkarūn (for people who reflect),90 a-fa-lā taʿqilūn (have you no understanding?),91 laʿallkum taʿqilūn (perhaps you will understand),92 li-qawmin yaʿqilūn (for people who reason),93 laʿallahum yatadhakkarūn (so that they may reflect),94 are repeated countless times in the Qurʾān. The Ikhwān’s endeavour to place reason on a high pedestal, therefore, is not unsubstantiated.95 In his article “Reason,” in the Encyclopedia of Religion, Henry Leroy Finch observes that the prestige of reason has declined noticeably in regards to society, due partly to the changing conception of the nature of science as well as to an increasing awareness of the conventionality of what passed for reason. He adds that under the present conditions reason is more likely to be regarded as an instrument or a tool rather than as the supreme defining characteristic of human beings. According to Finch, the effect of this situation upon religion, and spiritual practices and development, remains to be seen.96 Religious tolerance and the spirit of inclusiveness The Ikhwān promoted religious tolerance and the spirit of inclusiveness by affirming the unity and common destiny of mankind. According to Qurʾānic teaching, the Ikhwān maintain that divine guidance is universal and God regards all human beings as equal. Every prophet’s message, although addressed to a specific group of people, carries universal import and must be believed by all humanity.97 Addressing Muh. ammad, God states in the Qurʾān: “[O Prophet], summon [all mankind], and pursue the right course, as thou hast been bidden [by God]; and do not follow their likes and dislikes, but say: ‘I believe in whatever revelation God has bestowed from on high.’ ”98 This is because God is one, the source of revelation is one, and mankind is one. Prophethood is indivisible, and the Qurʾān requires equal recognition of all prophets.99 The Qurʾān also states that although religion is essentially the same, God himself has given different institutions and approaches to different communities so that He might test them.100 At two places, in Sūrat al-Baqara and Sūrat al-Māʾida, it

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states: “Verily, those who have attained to faith [in this divine writ], as well as those who follow the Jewish faith, and the Christians, and the Sabians—all who believe in God and the Last Day and do righteous deeds—shall have their reward with their Sustainer; and no fear need they have, and neither shall they grieve.”101 Religious tolerance and the spirit of inclusiveness epitomized by the Rasāʾil are, therefore, in keeping with the spirit of the Qurʾān. At the beginning of the 45th epistle entitled “On the modalities of social intercourse among the Sincere Brethren,” the Ikhwān insist that their fellow brethren, in whatever region they reside, should organize private gatherings at fixed times in order to discuss their sciences and secrets among themselves. Their discussion should be focused on the science of psychology (ʿilm al-nafs), intellect and the intelligible (al-ʿaql wa’l-maʿqūl), the secrets of the Revealed Books and mathematical sciences. However, their ultimate aim should be the divine sciences. Then, counseling them, they state: Our brethren, may God the High assist them, in general, ought to show no enmity toward any science, nor shun any book, nor cling fanatically to any single creed. For our own creed encompasses all other creeds, and comprehends all sciences. This creed is the consideration of everything in existence, both sensible and intelligible, from beginning to end, whether covert or hidden, manifest or concealed, with a view [to discovering] the source of reality in so far as each and every one of them are derived from a single principle, single cause, a single world, and a single soul . . . . . . Our sciences (ʿulūm) are derived from four sources (kutub, literally, “books”): First, the books compiled by the sages and the philosophers, such as mathematics and physics; Second, the revealed books brought by the prophets, may God’s blessings be on them, such as the Torah, the Gospel, the Furqān [i.e. the Qurʾān], and the scrolls of the prophets . . . and the veiled secrets they contain; Third, al-kutub al.tabīʿiyya (books on natural sciences), that is, the forms of the existing things, such as the composition of the spheres, signs of the zodiac, movements of the stars and the extent of their

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The Ikhwān not only show respect for Judaism and Christianity, the two older Abrahamic faiths, but they also frequently quote from the Torah (tawrā), the Gospel (al-injīl), Psalms (al-zabūr) and other books of the Jewish prophets (kutub al-anbiyāʾ, s. ūh. uf al-anbiyāʾ) along with the Qurʾān.104 This demonstrates their acceptance of the Torah and the Gospel as primary sources and of equal importance to the Qurʾān. It is quite common for the Ikhwān to seek the support of those three scriptures for some of their views that they expound upon in the Rasāʾil. In addition to those sacred writings, the Ikhwān freely draw upon other sources as well, particularly Greek, Persian and Indian literature. Let me take a moment to cite some specific examples from the Bible. First, in the 22nd epistle entitled “Explication of the generation of animals and their species,” during the debate between animals and humans all three scriptures are referred to by the humans to support their contention that the animal world was created for their benefit and for their service.105 Second, in the same epistle, in the section dealing with how jinn dutifully obey their leaders and kings, the Ikhwān state that recitation of a verse from either the Qurʾān, the Torah or the Gospel has the same power to protect the unfortunate traveler from the malevolence of evil jinn and from going mad in the wilderness.106 Third, in the epistle “On astronomy” the Ikhwān state that although one cannot avoid what has been decreed by God, one may, if one has foreknowledge of some impending disaster, take appropriate prophylactic measures, such as prayer, the invocation of God, repentance and remorse, fasting or offering a sacrifice. Then they must cite the last testaments of Moses, Jesus and Muh. ammad to their respective communities to support their supplication.107

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Besides citing the Torah, the Rasāʾil culls from other Jewish texts, such as the Midrash, Talmud, Haggadah, and notably from the Qis. as. al-anbiyāʾ (Stories of the Prophets) since copies of the latter circulated in Arabic. I. R. Netton correctly observes in his book Muslim Neoplatonists that the Ikhwān’s knowledge of Christianity was advanced compared to that of the Old Testament; however, one must remember that the story of Christ as well as Christian piety and asceticism were more appealing to the Ikhwān and directly connected to their teachings. Netton further adds that from the data provided in the Rasāʾil one can construct an accurate and chronological picture of the life of Christ. It should be noted that the Rasāʾil also demonstrate that the Ikhwān were well acquainted with a number of Christian doctrines and with the dissensions that gave rise to these doctrines. The life of Christ according to the Rasāʾil corresponds to that delineated by the four evangelists in their respective Gospels.108 It is worth pointing out that the Ikhwān’s knowledge of Christianity at times reveals a Nestorian perception of the nature of Christ. They were to some extent aware of the Christological controversies between the Nestorians and the Monophysites.109 Their basic attitude toward Christianity extends beyond tolerance as they advise their brethren to read the Gospel.110 Sayings attributed to Christ are scattered throughout the Rasāʾil. Some parallels to those maxims are to be found in the Christian scripture, the Qurʾān and the traditions of the Prophet. Stanley Lane-Poole, who read the summary translations of the Rasāʾil into German rendered by Friedrich Dieterici, was so impressed by the Ikhwān’s philosophy and their sympathetic treatment of Christianity that he concluded his essay “The Brotherhood of Purity” by pronouncing: In their ideal of the higher life, indeed, the Brotherhood of Purity belongs to Christianity rather than to Islām: but, in truth, their noble doctrine appeals to what is best in all philosophies and religions.111

Let me cite some additional examples from Jewish sources. The story of how Esau, the son of Isaac, fought with Nimrod’s son and

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obtained the magic hunting-coat of Adam, which the son of Nimrod wore, is recounted in the last epistle on magic. This coat was covered with pictures of all kinds of wildlife. When Adam wanted to hunt an animal he would place his hand on the picture of the animal that he desired and that animal would halt and became bewildered until Adam seized the animal. Genesis 10:9 states that Nimrod was a mighty hunter, but adds very little. The Ikhwān’s source appears to be the Midrash, since it gives more detail.112 In the “debate between the animals and the humans,” the story of when Abraham was thrown into the fire by Nimrod is alluded to by the crocodile. The latter then recounts how the frog carried water in its mouth and poured it onto the fire to put out the flames.113 In another version of the same story the Ikhwān relate a tradition of the Prophet where he is stated to have said that there were 40 righteous persons in his community who follow the religion of Abraham (millat Ibrāhīm). Hence, the Prophet was asked about the religion of Abraham and he responded that Abraham was upright (kāna h. anīf an musliman) and devoted to God. While he was about to be thrown into the fire the angels in Heaven were filled with pity for him. Therefore, God revealed to Gabriel to go down and assist Abraham if he sought the angel’s help. Consequently, the archangel came down while Abraham was in the catapult (manjanīq) ready to be tossed into the flames. He asked Abraham if he was in need of anything. The Patriarch, because of his trust in the Lord that he would fulfill his promise and rescue him, replied that he did not need the archangel’s help. It was at this moment that God was moved and said in the Qurʾān: “O Fire! Be thou cool, and [a source of] inner peace for Abraham.”114 There seems to be an obvious parallel between this account in the Rasāʾil and the one in the Babylonian Talmud.115 Furthermore, in the last epistle, entitled “On the essence of magic, charms and the evil eye,” the Ikhwān narrate a story about Jacob and how he tricked Laban into giving him a large herd of a particular livestock and then caused this herd to conceive a lot of offspring. The account in the Rasāʾil is very similar to that related in Genesis.116

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In the 44th epistle, “On the creed of the Sincere Brethren,” while discussing the immortality of the soul after leaving the body, the Ikhwān recount the story of Christ’s passion, death and resurrection.117 This long passage from the Rasāʾil is translated into English by Lootfy Levonian, who comments: We have a summary description of the life of Jesus and his preaching, admitting the fact of Jesus’s crucifixion, death, burial, and resurrection. Here is a Moslem association of the tenth century AD whose teaching about Jesus agrees with that of Christianity on those very points, which are denied by Orthodox Islam.118

In the same epistle the Ikhwān draw a parallel between the beginning of the Prophet’s mission and that of Moses and Jesus. The Prophet began his mission by first inviting his wife Khadīja, his cousin ʿAlī and his friend Abū Bakr and then Mālik, Abū Dharr, S. uhayb, Bilāl, Salmān and others.119 This is similar to the way Moses began his mission by first inviting his brother Aaron, then the Israelite scholars (ʿulamāʾ) from the family of Jacob before proclaiming his mission publicly and inviting the Pharaoh. Jesus began his mission in Jerusalem in the same manner. Netton is correct in stating that this refers to Jesus in the Temple in Jerusalem at the beginning of his mission.120 It alludes to the discovery of the 12-year-old Jesus by his parents after spending three days talking to the scholars in the Temple.121 In the Rasāʾil Jesus travels far and wide in Palestine for two and a half years attempting to rescue the people of Israel from “the death of sin,” and working miracles.122 This representation of Jesus closely corresponds with the Ikhwān’s view that the prophets are the doctors of human souls.123 The most striking story of Christ’s teachings as noted by the Ikhwān is when Jesus encountered a group of bleachers (qas. s. ārīn). Jesus asks them whether they would permit the clothes, which they had just washed and bleached, to be worn by their owners if their bodies were contaminated with blood, urine and excrement. They replied that they would not and that whoever would do so was a fool.

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Jesus rebutted by saying that they had done just that. The bleachers did not comprehend what Jesus was hinting at and retorted: How? Jesus responded that the owners of the clothes have cleansed their bodies and that the bleachers dressed them in the clothes that they had whitened, but their souls are still polluted with decay, filled with ignorance, blindness, poor character, hatred, deceit and fraud. He urges them to seek the Kingdom of Heaven. Consequently, all of them were guided to the right path and followed Christ.124 This story is not reported in the canonical Gospels, but it appears in the apocryphal Gospel of Philip.125 In order to support their contention that the human soul is eternal and that it will return to the Garden of Bliss following the death of the body, the Ikhwān acknowledge the pronouncements made by a group of illustrious human figures: Abraham,126 Joseph,127 Pythagoras,128 Socrates,129 Plato,130 Aristotle,131 Bilawhar (the holy hermit of Sarandīb [Ceylon] and Buddha’s teacher),132 Christ,133 the Prophet Muh. ammad134 and the martyrs of Karbalāʾ.135 It is worth pointing out here that besides the story of Christ’s passion, the Ikhwān greatly admired Socrates’ courageous attitude in the face of certain death, as portrayed by Plato in Phadeo. At one place the Ikhwān state that sacrifices are of two kinds: sharʿī (lawful) and falsafī (philosophical). The former is what the faithful is commanded to offer, such as the animal sacrifice following the completion of the pilgrimage to Mecca. The latter is to sacrifice one’s own body and accept death without fear in order to draw close to God, as done by Socrates.136 The spokesmen of the humans are specified in the “debate between the animals and the humans” as representing the major religious traditions and geographical regions, such as a descendant of the Prophet’s uncle ʿAbbās;137 a Persian;138 an Indian from the island of Ceylon;139 a man from Syria, a Hebrew (ʿibrī) from the House of the Israelites;140 a Syrian from the partisans of Christ;141 a man from Tihāma from the tribe of Quraysh;142 a Byzantine from Greece;143 and a man from Khurāsān.144 Toward the end of the debate when the spokesman of the animals and the jinni sages asked the gathering of the humans to expound on the

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characteristics of the noblest of them, such as the prophets, the Friends of God (awliyāʾ Allāh), and the philosophers who resemble angels, all the humans fell silent for a time, thinking over what they had been asked. For a moment no one had an answer. Finally, an insightful man arose. The Ikhwān describe him in the spirit of the oneness of mankind, stating that he was Persian by birth and upbringing, Arabian by faith, professing the true monotheistic religion, Iraqi (cosmopolitan) in culture, Hebrew in lore, Christian in manner, Syrian in piety, Greek in sciences, Indian in contemplation, S. ūfī in conduct, angelic in character, divine in thought, and firmly grounded in knowledge.145 Use of Persian and Indian literature Various elements of Indian and Persian culture and literature are scattered throughout the Rasāʾil. The reader cannot fail to notice that the Ikhwān were relentlessly looking for novel parallels with which to illustrate, substantiate and propagate their views. Persian names, terms and citations from Persian poetry are frequently encountered.146 The Book of Zoroaster,147 and the testament of King Ardashīr I are two such sources.148 Anecdotes from collections called “King Stories” and “Animal Stories” have Persian and Indian origins and are often used. Most of those stories belong to a distinct genre, as they have several common stylistic features. For example, they describe the power of the king who is also a good and wise ruler.149 Some stories are derived from the legend of Bilawhar wa-Būdhāsaf (or Yūdāsaf), known in the medieval West as Barlaam and Josaphant.150 Some stories in the Rasāʾil are told within other stories, a technique derived from Indian literature.151 A few stories are even a mixture of Platonic philosophy and Buddhist legends,152 while others illustrate the immortality of the human soul. Others are didactic, the Aesopic moral stories, such as that of the foxes, the wolf and the lion153 and another about some crows and a falcon.154 In the former, a group of foxes go out in search of food and find a dead camel. While deciding whether to divide it amongst

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themselves, a wolf passes by. The wolf’s father had been a benevolent king of the animals; hence the foxes are persuaded to share the camel with him. The wolf complies with the request, but later becomes greedy and warns the foxes not to return for more. Consequently, the hungry foxes appeal to the lion and recount the series of events. The lion seizes the wolf, kills him and returns the carcass of the camel to the foxes. The moral of the story according to the Ikhwān is that one calamity is overcome by another.155 The latter story concerns a group of crows. Following the death of their just and compassionate king, they became divided among themselves and decided not to empower any member of the royal family who might think that he had inherited the power from his father and would subsequently mistreat them. The crows gather to consult and debate the issue using their raʾy and ijtihād and decide to invite an old and undernourished falcon who feigns modesty and piety to be their king. Soon, the falcon regains his strength and begins to oppress and kill the crows. Before his death the falcon appoints an even more brutal successor from his own kind. The crows repent for their initial decision, but it is too late. The story is an analogy to what happened in the Muslim community following the Prophet’s demise.156 Organization of knowledge Reliable information with a detailed account of Muslim education during the first century of Islamic history is extremely difficult to obtain. In The Rise of Humanism, George Makdisi has collected all the available information from various sources and has concluded that the maktab existed as early as the first Islamic century.157 The maktab, later called kuttāb, is typically described as an elementary school where reading, writing and basic religious education was imparted.158 A close association between al-ʿulūm al- ʿarabiyya (the literary arts) and ʿulūm al-sharīʿa (the religious sciences) in the curriculum of the maktab was well established from the very beginning.159 This is acknowledged by statements ascribed to ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās (d. 68/687–88), a great scholar from the first

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generation of Muslims and the father of Qurʾānic exegesis,160 and by statements attributed to Abū’l-Aswad al-Duʾalī (d. 69/688), an early grammarian.161 The relationship between the two fields of study was reaffirmed by the need in the religious sciences for a thorough knowledge of classical Arabic. Nevertheless, the literary arts were subordinate to the religious sciences. Thaʿlab (d. 291/ 904), the famous grammarian and philologist of the Kufan school,162 was well aware of the fact that his expertise dealt with a human science and not with the religious sciences of the divine Qurʾān and h. adīth. It is reported that he complained about his distress to al-Mujāhid (d. 324/916), the famous scholar of the Qurʾān, of having spent his entire life in a field of knowledge that had no future in the hereafter. He claims to have said: The scholars of the Qurʾān have occupied themselves with the study of the Qurʾān and succeeded. The scholars of law (fiqh) have done the same with law and succeeded. And the scholars of h. adīth have succeeded by studying h. adīth. But, as for me, I have occupied myself with ‘Zayd and ʿAmr!’ I wish I knew what is to become of me in the Hereafter!163

Al-Mujāhid is then reported to have had a dream in which the Prophet appeared to him and instructed him to tell Thaʿlab that he approved of the study of the science of grammar as a necessary tool before undertaking the study of Islamic sciences. The story exemplifies two ideas: first, thorough knowledge of grammar is required for the proper understanding of the Qurʾān and h. adīth; second, the term “grammar” in this context is used to encompass the entire field of literary arts. The introduction of Greek scientific and philosophical works into Islam had a profound impact on the development of Islamic thought and education. Islam, like Christianity before it, faced the problem of how to assimilate the “pagan” knowledge of the Greeks to a completely different conception of the universe that was created by God, who had also provided mankind with guidance through the agency of prophecy. Muslims separated the Islamic sciences from those it referred to as the “foreign sciences,”

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often called ʿilm al-awāʾil (the science of the Ancients) or ʿulūm al-ʿajam min al-Yūnāniyyīn wa-ghayrihim min al-umam (the sciences of non-Arabs, the Greeks and other nations).164 The development of Islamic thought reflects the attempts by the Muslims to reconcile the foreign sciences with the Islamic sciences, both within and without institutionalized centers of learning. By the middle of the third/ninth century as delineated by Makdisi in his novel studies, namely The Rise of Colleges and The Rise of Humanism, either a sharp distinction between the two sets of sciences—the religious and non-religious—or a tripartite division into the literary arts, religious sciences and foreign sciences, had already developed.165 In order to support this contention, Makdisi states that the tripartite division is discernible in the Fihrist of Ibn al-Nadīm (compiled in 377/987–8),166 alKhwārizmī’s (d. ca. 387/997) Mafātīh. al-ʿulūm,167 and Ibn But.lān (d. 460/1068) reminiscent of his contemporaries.168 All three sources identified by Makdisi do not predate the Rasā’īl. Both Ibn al-Nadīm and al-Khwārizmī composed their works during the second half of the fourth/tenth century, while Ibn But.lān lived almost a century later. I would like to point out that the Ikhwān were at the forefront among Muslim thinkers who successfully integrated the tripartite division of knowledge into one organic whole. It should be recognized that knowledge for the Ikhwān was of utmost importance, as demonstrated in their Neoplatonic system. The ultimate aim of learning or acquiring knowledge, as reiterated innumerable times throughout the Rasāʾil, is “the refinement of the soul and improvement of character” in order to attain the greatest happiness, the highest sublimity, eternal life and the final perfection.169 At times the importance of knowledge is depicted by sayings ascribed to the Prophet. One tradition states: “One who knows himself (i.e. about his own soul) knows his Lord.”170 In another tradition, the Prophet, while addressing Muslims, states: “The most knowledgeable of you about himself (i.e. his own soul) is most knowledgeable about his Lord.”171 In keeping with the

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noble aim of acquiring knowledge, they regard the ignorant man’s existence as even being below that of an animal.172 In another passage the Ikhwān state that good conduct is like a ladder for the ascension to the heavens while knowledge is akin to the light that illuminates the path.173 Their adoption of al-ʿulūm al-ʿarabiyya, al-ʿulūm al-sharʿiyya and al-ʿulūm al-falsafiyya was aimed at achieving an educational and cultural ideal in the formation of the human mind and character. They advocated comprehensive humanist education at three levels: Primary, Intermediate and Advanced. The purpose of primary education was to provide a basis in the fundamentals of reading, writing, grammar, poetry, history and other essential arts with an aim to achieve mastery of the Arabic language. The aim of the intermediate level was to impart the proper religious instruction of various disciplines, such as Qurʾānic exegesis, hermeneutics and sharīʿa. The highest stage was reserved for philosophical sciences designated by the 51 epistles, which are arranged in four progressive categories: the mathematicalphilosophical sciences (al-riyād. iyya al-falsafiyya) constituting 13 epistles; the physical and natural sciences (al-t. abīʿiyya wa’ljismāniyya) containing 17 epistles; the spiritual-intellectual sciences (al-nafsāniyya al-ʿaqliyya) pertaining to ten epistles; and the juridical-divine sciences (al-nāmūsiyya al-ilāhiyya) consisting of 11 epistles. In the very first epistle, entitled “On number,” they state that the objective of the philosophers regarding the study of the mathematical sciences is to prepare the student for the next stage, which is the study of the physical sciences that would, in turn, lead him to al-ʿulūm al-ilāhiyya (theological/divine sciences), which is the ultimate goal. The first phase of al-ʿulūm al-ilāhiyya is knowledge of the soul’s existence and its substance, followed by the search for its origin prior to its relationship with the body, followed by the search for its return and the final state of its existence in the world of spirits after it leaves the body.174 In the seventh epistle, entitled “On the theoretical arts,” (als. anāʾiʿ al-ʿilmiyya), the Ikhwān state that the sciences (al-ʿulūm)

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which people pursue are of three kinds: i) practical sciences/arts (al-riyād. iyya); juridical-religious sciences (al-sharʿiyya alwad. ʿiyya); and the authentic (or the essential) philosophical sciences (al-falsafiyya al-h. aqīqiyya).175 Practical sciences are directed toward refinement and culture, and most of them are devised for seeking an improved livelihood and a betterment of worldly affairs. They consist of nine categories: (i) reading and writing (al-kitāba wa’l-qirāʾa); (ii) the science of language, namely syntax and grammar (ʿilm al-lugha wa’l-nah. w); (iii) accounting and business transactions (ʿilm alh. isāb wa’l-muʿāmalāt); (iv) poetry and prosody (ʿilm al-shiʿr wa’lʿarūd. ); (v) the science to foretell future events by omens derived from the actions of birds (ʿilm al-zajr wa’l-faʾl);176 (vi) magic, charms, alchemy and mechanics (ʿilm al-sih. r wa’l-ʿazāʾim, alkīmiyāʾ wa’l-h. iyal); (vii) arts and crafts (al-h. iraf wa’l-s. anāʾiʿ); (viii) buying and selling of goods (trade), agriculture and husbandry (ʿilm al-bayc wa’l-shirāʾ, al-tijārāt wa’l-h. arth wa’lnasl); (ix) biographies and history (ʿilm al-siyar wa’l-akhbār).177 Religious sciences, the Ikhwān continue, are intended for the treatment of souls and for seeking the hereafter. They constitute six types: (i) the science of revelation (ʿilm al-tanzīl); (ii) the science of interpretation (or hermeneutics, ʿilm al-taʾwīl);178 (iii) the science of transmission and history (ʿilm al-riwāyāt wa’lakhbār);179 (iv) the science of jurisprudence, customary practices and legal consequences of the facts of a case (ʿilm al-fiqh wa’lsunan wa’l-ah. kām); (v) the science of remembrance, exhortation and asceticism (ʿilm al-tidhkār wa’l-mawāʿiz. wa’l-zuhd wa’ltas. awwuf); (vi) the science of interpretation of dreams (ʿilm taʾwīl al-manāmāt). The philosophical sciences are divided into four categories: (i) the mathematical sciences (al-riyād. iyyāt);180 (ii) the logical sciences (al-mant. iqiyyāt); (iii) the physical or natural sciences (al-t. abīʿiyyāt); and (iv) the theological or divine sciences (alilāhiyyāt).181 Mathematical sciences are subdivided into four parts: (i) arithmetic, (ii) geometry, (iii) astronomy and (iv) music.182 Logical sciences consist of five kinds: (i) the Isagoge,183

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(ii) Categories, (iii) Peri Hermeneias, (iv) Prior Analytics and (v) Posterior Analytics. In addition to these five treatises on logic that circulated among the Arabs, the Ikhwān add another three: Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric and Poetics.184 Physical sciences, in turn, are divided into seven categories: (i) the principles that govern the bodies (ʿilm mabādiʾ al-jismāniyya), that is, the knowledge of matter, form, time, space and motion; (ii) the science of the heavens and the universe (ʿilm al-samāʾ wa’lʿālam, De Caelo/On the Heavens), specifically knowledge of the substances of spheres and stars, the catalyst for their motions, the reason for the stationary character of the earth and so on; (iii) the science of generation and corruption (ʿilm al-kawn wa’l-fasād, De Generatione et Corruptione), particularly the knowledge of the essential substances of the four elements, their transformation into each other because of the influence of higher forces, and the coming into existence of minerals, plants and animals; (iv) meteorology (ʿilm h. awādith al-jaww), the knowledge of the changes in weather in correlation to the positions of the stars; (v) mineralogy (ʿilm al-maʿādin); (vi) botany (ʿilm al-nabāt) and (vii) zoology (ʿilm al-h. ayawān).185 The Ikhwān further add that medical and veterinary sciences (ʿilm al-t. ibb wa’l-bayt. ara), agriculture (al-h. arth), husbandry (al-nasl) and all other crafts are subsumed within the natural sciences.186 Al-ʿulūm al-ilāhiyya (the theological/divine sciences)187 comprise five types: (i) knowledge of God, the attributes of His oneness, how He is the source of creation, how He causes generosity to overflow and how He grants existence;188 (ii) knowledge of the spiritual world, which is the understanding of simple intellectual substances when they are in abstract forms and free from matter;189 (iii) psychological sciences which encompasses the knowledge of the souls that pervade the heavenly bodies and nature to the center of the earth and how they move spheres and inhabit plants and animals, and also the manner of their resurrection after death;190 (iv) politics which pertains to the prophetic manner of governing, a regal manner of governing, statecraft in general, individual management and personal

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conduct191 and (v) knowledge of the hereafter, which encompasses the ability to perceive the nature of resurrection and the manner in which the souls will rise from the bodies.192 It is worth noting that in their classification of the sciences and in an analysis of their philosophy of education, the Ikhwān pay special attention to trades, arts and crafts, commerce, agriculture and music, which is categorized under mathematics. The science of interpretation/hermeneutics also occupies a prominent place in their ideology. Furthermore, the Ikhwān state that instructing students in the arts and crafts should not be considered less important than instructing them in philosophy. The teacher of a craft is also called ustādh (master), the same term used for the teacher of abstract and advanced subjects. The Ikhwān mention that learning a craft is as meritorious as the pursuit of philosophy or any other science. They further add that the higher level of skill a craftsman acquires, the closer he comes to God, and the more refined he becomes in his craft, the more he resembles the Great Craftsman.193 To further emphasize this point a tradition stating that God loves the craftsman who perfects his craft is ascribed to the Prophet.194 It is for this very reason that philosophy is perceived as humanity’s ability to imitate God.195 The Ikhwān explain in further detail that “resemblance” (al-tashabbuh) pertains to a resemblance to God in knowledge, crafts and the imparting of goodness. For God is the most knowledgeable of all the ʿulamāʾ, the wisest of all the h. ukamāʾ, and the most skilled of all the craftsmen. The individual who becomes increasingly more adept in these characteristics will simultaneously move closer to Him.196 In their organization of the citizens of their utopian state, the first rank is assigned to the artisans who have reached the age of maturity.197 Leaving aside certain similarities between the Ikhwān’s classification of the sciences and that of al-Fārābī, there are some sharp differences among them. A detailed examination is beyond the scope of this study, however, the following observations should suffice. Al-Fārābī divides the known sciences of his day into eight categories, and addresses them in five chapters: (i)

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the science of language (ʿilm al-lisān wa-ajzāʾih); (ii) logic (ʿilm almant. iq wa-ajzāʾih); (iii) propaedeutics (ʿulūm al-taʿālīm),198 introduction to certain sciences like arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music, etc.; (iv) physical sciences and divine sciences (al-ʿilm al-t. abīʿī wa-ajzāʾih wa-fi’l-ʿilm al-ilāhī wa-ajzāʾih) and (v) political science with short accounts of Islamic jurisprudence and theology (al-ʿilm al-madanī wa-ajzāʾih wa-fī ʿilm al-fiqh wa-ʿilm al-kalām).199 Hence, it appears that physics and metaphysics occupy a central place in al-Fārābī’s review of the sciences. With the discussion of metaphysics, the syllabus of the Hellenic sciences is complete except for politics, which the Ikhwān, al-Fārābī and the older peripatetic tradition categorize as ethics and political science. It deals with virtues and their relation to happiness, however, it also includes the political regimes most suited for the preservation of those virtues. It should be noted that logic occupies a much more important place immediately following that of the science of language in the system of al-Fārābī than it does in that of the Ikhwān.200 It should be further noted that religious sciences, except jurisprudence, are totally absent from alFārābī’s organization. Jurisprudence is very briefly described as the art of determining the correct religious beliefs and practices in regards to issues that the lawgiver did not address. It entails drawing an analogy between the unequivocal verses of scripture and the specific issue. Also contrary to the Ikhwān, al-Fārābī closes his discussion of political science with ʿilm al-kalām, while this topic is completely absent from the Rasāʾil.201 Let me digress for a moment to point out what al-Fārābī has to say about the last category. He states that the distinction between a faqīh (jurist) and a mutakallim (theologian) is that the former ascertains the necessary conclusions from the lawgiver’s text, while the latter defends the very premises established by the text of the scripture that are used by the faqīh as the us. ūl (fundamentals). As chance would have it a person could combine both functions. In the remaining part of this section al-Fārābī presents views advocated by the theologians (mutakallimūn).202 It is correct that those views do not represent al-Fārābī’s own views.

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Nevertheless, one is surprised that his classification of knowledge ends on such a note.203 The Ikhwān’s classification of the sciences and their syllabus of education for citizens of their ideal state, on the other hand, are not only well-thought-out but also represent humanistic scholarship. In his book Islamic Education, ʿAbd al-Lat.īf al-T. ībāwī remarks that Muslim philosophers paid very little attention to the philosophy of education. However, he believes that the Ikhwān’s treatment of the subject is more sustained.204 They state that the first four years of human life are for “the completion of nurture and gathering of strength,” during which the infant, under the guidance of the parents, learns mainly through the senses and instinct. This initial stage is referred to as the sinī al-tarbiya (the years of upbringing). Conventional education, according to the Ikhwān, begins after the age of four. From that age until the age of puberty, the child acquires basic skills from a muʿallim (teacher, instructor) in the maktab.205 Rational faculty emerges at the age of 15, and that is exactly the point at which the Ikhwān propose to take over the student’s education. The Ikhwān’s efforts for education, thenceforth, are mainly directed at the youth. They advise their brethren not to bother about the old and senile who have already acquired false beliefs, bad habits and repulsive morals. Youth, on the other hand, have healthy hearts, inquisitive minds, and discerning intellects. They follow the laws of the prophets and search for the secrets of the revealed books; not stubbornly clinging to one creed.206 In order to illustrate their contention they argue that all the prophets were commissioned by God in their youth and that the elders of the community were the first to reject their message.207 It is the youth who constitute a part of the first rank in the Ikhwān’s hierarchy of citizenship in their utopian state.208 The relation between the teacher and his student is described as a spiritual one. In the 45th epistle, entitled “On the social intercourse with the Sincere Brethren,” they state: Know that [your] teacher (ustādh) is the begetter (ab) of your soul, and the cause of its evolution, and the essence of

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its life, in the same way as your father is the begetter of your body, and the cause of its existence. Your father gives you your physical form, while your teacher gives you your spiritual form. This is because your teacher nourishes your soul with knowledge and instructs it with wisdom, and guides it to everlasting bliss, while your father brings you up to make a living in this transient world. Hence, O brother, invoke your Lord to grant you a teacher who is rightly guided and wise.209

Let me conclude this section with a tradition of the Prophet that is cited by the Ikhwān in the ninth epistle entitled “On the morals,” where they extensively dealt with the virtues of seeking knowledge.210 It states: Seek knowledge because seeking knowledge is indeed a sign of those who stand in awe of their Lord. The pursuit of knowledge is worship, meditation over it is glorification of God, search for it is jihād, and instructing those who do not know is equivalent to s. adaqa (charitable gift).211

The allegorical debate between the animals and the humans before the King of the Jinn The publication of a partial Urdu translation of this fable by Mawlawī Ikrām ʿAlī in 1810 in Calcutta,212 and the subsequent publication of the same fragment in its original Arabic two years later, also in Calcutta by Shaykh Ah. mad b. Muh. ammad alYamanī,213 marks the beginning of modern scholarship on the Rasāʾil. Aloys Sprenger appropriately remarked that the publication of this story, particularly because of the novelty of its ideas and the peculiarity of its style, created a considerable sensation.214 Since then the Rasāʾil have attracted the curiosity of scholars, in the East and the West, and this attention has continued unabated to the present day. A critical review of the almost two centuries of modern scholarship on the Rasāʾil is in itself a fascinating study, which I have addressed elsewhere.215 However, I would like to point out that Patricia Crone, a controversial scholar and editor of a new series entitled “Makers of the Muslim World,” correctly

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recognizes the importance of the Rasāʾil and their place in the history of Arabic science, philosophy and literature by allocating a volume to this encyclopedia.216 The fable has been translated into major Western languages. It addresses several motifs, namely, the political, religious and philosophical implications of life in Muslim society at that time. Also, Theodora Abel has analyzed psychological themes in the story,217 while in the introduction to his English translation, Lenn Goodman has dealt with the ecological aspects.218 Before analyzing it from a different angle, namely a humanistic perspective, it is necessary to review the setting of the debate and main arguments presented by both sides: the plaintiffs, that is, the animals, and the defendants, that is, the humans. The story begins as follows. About 70 men of commerce, crafts, wealth and learning from diverse lands were shipwrecked, and cast on the shore of an island. Having found the place rich in fruit trees, fresh water, wholesome air, fine soil, vegetables, herbs and plants, and all sorts of animals—cattle, birds, and beasts of prey— living in peace and harmony with one another, they decided to settle there.219 Soon they forced the cattle and some animals into their service, by riding them and burdening them with heavy loads as they used to do in their former lands. Some animals refused and fled to the forests and hills. The humans pursued and hunted them down, firmly convinced that the animals were like runaway slaves. When the animals learned that this was what the humans believed, they got together and decided to file a grievance against this harsh treatment, oppression and encroachment of their habitat in the court of the just and wise King of the Jinn. The King promptly gathered his Jinnī advisors who included the judges, jurists, philosophers, knowledgeable and experienced persons and summoned the humans to his court and asked them to substantiate their alleged claim against the animals. The human spokesperson, a descendant of [the Prophet’s uncle] ʿAbbās, replied that he had religious and rational proof to corroborate his claim. He then presented several verses from the Qurʾān. One of them I will recite here:

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And He creates cattle: you derive warmth from them, and [various other] uses; and from them you obtain food; and you find beauty in them when you drive them home in the evenings and when you take them out to pasture in the mornings. And they carry your loads to [many] a place which [otherwise] you would be unable to reach without great hardship to yourselves . . . And [it is He who creates] horses and mules and asses for you to ride, as well as for [their] beauty.220

According to the humans, these verses indisputably demonstrated that the animals were created for the humans and for their sake and that the animals were their slaves and they were their masters. In his argument he also added that there were additional verses in the Qurʾān, the Torah and Gospels to further substantiate the position he was propounding. The spokesman of the animals, a mule, refuted the human’s assertion by stating that there was nothing in those verses that supported their claim. Those verses, the mule asserted, merely indicate that God granted kindness and blessings to mankind. Citing a verse from the Qurʾān, which states: “And has made the sun and the moon, both of them constant upon their courses, subservient [to His laws, so that they be of use] to you.”221 The mule exclaimed rhetorically: “Do the Children of Adam think that they too [i.e. the sun and the moon] are their slaves and chattels and that they are their masters?” The mule continued by addressing the Jinnī King: “Your majesty, God created all His creatures in heaven and earth so that some will serve others, either to promote some good or to forbid some evil. God’s subordination of animals to the Children of Adam is solely meant to assist them, not as they dupe themselves into believing and falsely claiming that they are our masters and we are their slaves.”

The spokesperson of the humans simply reiterated his position. Hence, the King intervened and addressing the humans he said: “Only claims which are grounded in definite proof are acceptable

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before this court. What proof, O human beings, have you of your claims?” The spokesperson for the humans replied: “We have rational proofs and philosophical arguments. Our beautiful form, the erect construction of our bodies, our keen senses, the subtlety of our discrimination, our keen insight and superior intellect, all demonstrate that we are the masters and they are the slaves.”222

The animal spokesperson snapped back: “God wisely ordained that human form is better for humans and ours is for us. Since God created Adam and his children naked . . . and gave them fruit from trees as their food and leaves of trees for their clothing . . . He made humans stand erect so it would be easy for them to reach the fruit and leaves. By the same token, since God gave us the grass on the ground for our food, He made us face downward so it would be easy for us to reach it. This, not what the Children of Adam allege, is the reason God made them erect and us bent downward.”223

The King intervened and asked: “What about when God said: ‘Verily, We create man in the best conformation.’ ”224 The spokesperson of the animals replied: “The heavenly books have interpretations (taʾwīlāt wa-tafsīrāt) which go beyond the literal meaning and those ‘who are deeply rooted in knowledge’ (alrāsikhūna fi’l-ʿilm)225 know the true meaning, so let His Majesty, the King, ask ahl al-dhikr.”226 So the King asked the learned sage of the Jinn and He replied: “The day God created Adam, the stars were at their zeniths, the signs of the zodiac were solid and square, the season was favorable . . . hence, matter was given the finest form.” The wise jinni added: “God’s words have another meaning also. They mean, He made humans neither tall and thin nor short and square, but between the two extremes.” The spokesperson of the animals immediately added: “God did the same for us. He did not make us tall and thin, nor short and squat, but in a proper proportion . . . Their claim of acute perception and the powers of discernment are not unique,

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for there are animals with superior senses and more precise sensitivity. The camel, for example, despite his long legs and neck and the elevation of his head in the air, finds his footing along the most arduous and treacherous pathways in the dark of night, something a human could never do without a torch, or a candle . . . As for their claim of superiority in regards to intellect—we do not find the slightest trace of it. If they had such sophisticated minds they would not have ridiculed us and boasted about themselves of things which are neither of their own doing nor acquired through their own efforts, but are among the manifold gifts of God, to be recognized and given thanks for as acts of grace. The truly intelligent take pride only in things which are of their own doing . . . As far as we can see the humans have no superiority to boast about, but only unfounded claims, unwarranted allegations, and groundless contentions.”227

I think I have given you some sense of the original text, which is not only amusing but also enlightening. Time and space do not permit me to give more details, only a summary. Justifications for the humans’ claims are attempted in all manners by various other representatives of mankind, such as a Jew, a Christian, a Zoroastrian from Persia, an Indian, and a Greek, but all those contentions are ultimately refuted by the animals at every moment. As pointed out above by the animal representative, humans’ boasted powers of sensibility and discernment are exceeded in one species of the animals or another, except for one highly ambiguous gift, namely reason. The Ikhwān quite satirically argue that even this precious gift of reason is used by humans in defiance rather than in compliance with the dictates of reason. In other words, God-given reason affords humans the opportunity for heedlessness. Herein lies the crux of the problem. According to the Qurʾānic Weltanschaung, as well as the intellectual principles upheld by the Ikhwān and outlined in the 33rd epistle, entitled “On the intellectual principles of the Ikhwān,” the Universe was created by God with design, wisdom and order wherein everything is

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connected by bonds of continuity. Order is explained by the fact that every created thing is endowed with a definite and defined nature. This nature not only allows everything to function in harmony but also defines their limits. The idea of placing restriction on everything is one of the most irrefutable points in both the cosmology and theology of the Qurʾān. Whereas the rest of nature automatically obeys God, human beings alone possess the choice to obey or to disobey. Moreover, human beings are viewed in the Qurʾān as rebellious and full of pride, attributing to themselves the characteristics of self-sufficiency.228 The humans, in the dispute between themselves and the animals, set themselves apart, above and against the rest of nature. Obviously the humans are then the oppressors and the usurpers. This is the real source of the tension in the anthropocentric view projected by the Ikhwān, which motivated them to compose this fable. In other words, how can human abuse of animals and the destruction of the natural environments be morally justified? I think that the fable and its allegorical form gave the Ikhwān a degree of latitude to critique not only the socio-political conditions that prevailed in Muslim society at that time but also to comment on religion as practiced by the Muslims, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Indians, and Greeks. The role of a religious critic is assigned in the fable to S. āh. ib al-ʿazīma (literally, a person with determination), a high court dignitary and advisor to the King of the Jinn. Like a chief prosecutor, he always points out the shortcomings of the various human spokespersons and reprimands them.229 The Ikhwān’s commitment to the imperatives of sensibilities and moral justice calls upon them to regard the matter of humans’ justification of their claim, both on religious and rational grounds, to be problematic. The parable, therefore, cannot be dismissed or treated simply as a futile intellectual exercise. Before the Ikhwān provide us with a provisional resolution of the dilemma let me summarize the last session of the court, because it offers valuable clues to a solution. An orator from the H . ijāz. pleaded the last argument by saying:

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“The promises of our Lord to us [i.e. the humans] that we will be resurrected on the Day of Judgment, admitted into Paradise . . . [with its vivid description], are stated in some seven hundred odd verses of the Qurʾān, and are specifically related to us and not animals. This clearly indicates that we are the masters and the animals are our slaves.”230

At that point the nightingale stood up and rejoined: “Yes, it is true, O human, but also state the balance of the promise. O humans, you are also promised the torment of the grave, the interrogation by Munkar and Nakīr, the terrors of the Reckoning Day, the rigorous accounting, the threat of entry into the scorching flames of Gehenna . . . the drinking of foul water, and the eating from the Tree of Zaqqūm, hot as molten lava. Every promise of the Qurʾān is followed by a threat. All this is for you, O humans, while we are excluded from it. Just as we are promised no reward, we face no threat of punishment. We are content with our Lord’s judgment in our case, neither for us nor against us . . . The evidence between us and you, O human, is, therefore, balanced, our fates are equal. So what is the matter with you, O human, and all this boasting?”231

The H . ijāzī demanded: “How are we equal, when in either case [i.e. punishment or reward] we survive forever and ever? If we obey, we are with the prophets, Friends of God (awliyāʾ Allāh), the Imāms and the Aws. iyāʾ, Sages, the virtuous and the righteous . . . who resemble the angels . . . And even if we are condemned to punishment, still we will be rescued by the intercession of our Prophet.”232

At that time the leaders of the animals and the Jinni Sages all proclaimed: “Now, at last, [O humans,] you have spoken the truth. Indeed, the examples you have given are something to boast about and something to strive for . . . But, tell us, O community of humans, about the characteristics of those virtuous people and their way of life, if you are truthful, and state those things if you have knowledge thereof.”233

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Just then the entire gathering of humans fell silent, reflecting over what they had been asked. No one had an answer. Finally, a learned, experienced man of intelligence, culture, refinement, and insight, who was Persian by birth and upbringing, Muslim by faith,234 H . anafī in ideology, Iraqi in culture, Hebrew (ʿībrī) in lore, Christian in manner, Damascene in piety, Greek in sciences, Indian in insight, S. ūfī in conduct, angelic in character, and divine in thought—said: “O just King of the Jinn and the community that has gathered together, know that those who are the Friends of God, the choicest of His creation and the best of His servants, have praiseworthy characters, pious acts, diverse learning, noble attributes, knowledge pertaining to God, angelic traits, holy and just conduct, and wondrous ways, which our tongues are weary to describe and no account can do justice to enumerate their ways of life and the virtues of their character.”

Then addressing the just King of the Jinn, the spokesperson continued: “What does your Majesty command with respect to these human strangers and animals?”235 So, the King of the Jinn delivered his judgment that the animals must be subject to the commands and prohibitions of the humans and serve them until the beginning of the new epoch.236 It is worthy to note that in the ʿĀt.if Effendi, the oldest extant manuscript transcribed in 578/1182 and two other old manuscripts, Esad Effendi (numbers 3637 and 3638) the dispute ends without the judgment. I would like to conclude that in the Neoplatonic cosmology of the Ikhwān, humans are at the top of the sublunary scheme and even better than some of the angels. According to the revealed scriptures, humans are the culmination of creation and God’s vicegerents on earth. Despite this lofty station their privilege is not absolute. Because humans are endowed with reason and responsibility, they are subject to the special graces of intercession and redemption. The Ikhwān assert that all human dynasties and empires rise and fall in accordance with God’s decrees and that

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the concepts of adwār and akwār, that is, the conception of history as one of a series of cycles of prophecy, each cycle followed by a gradual decay leading to a new cycle, are applicable to the entire world.237 Humanity’s hegemony on earth is, therefore, of limited duration. There are other spheres of life over which mankind has no control. The verdict announced in the Jinnī court is merely provisional until the current cycle of history ends. Conclusion Intellectual movements become more comprehensible when they are studied in close reference to the socio-political forces that produce them. My reading of the Rasāʾil and some of the major themes that I have analyzed in the foregoing pages clearly indicate that they were a product of a secretive religio-political movement and an intellectual organization of the late third/the beginning of the tenth century, whose goal was to supplant the Sunnī ʿAbbāsid caliphate with a Shīʿī imāmate. The brotherhood of Sincere Brethren and Faithful Friends (Ikhwān al-S. afāʾ wa-Khullān alWafāʾ) was a pseudonym assumed by the authors of this celebrated encyclopedia to conceal their true identity. They describe themselves as seekers of truth whose aim was to reform Muslim society from within. They entered into the ongoing debate, between the proponents of the imported Greek sciences and philosophy and the adherents of Islamic revelation, in which each side claimed to possess the truth. The authors of the Rasāʾil combined the main tenets of the Shīʿī faith, the need for and existence of a divinely sanctioned supreme authority, the Imām, with the validity of reason as a source of knowledge. Thus, they synthesized reason with revelation basing it on Neoplatonic cosmology and Shīʿī doctrine and offered a new world order under the aegis of the Imām, who resembles Plato’s philosopherking. They also formulated a model of an inclusive Islam with values of tolerance and understanding between different religions and cultures. Their so-called “liberal” interpretation of Islam was still rooted in the spirit of the Qurʾān, especially the themes

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present in the verses 62 of sūrat al-Baqara and 69 of sūrat alMāʾida238 and the verses 136 and 285 of sūrat al-Baqara and 84 of sūrat Āl ʿImrān.239 The question as to how the Rasāʾil were received by their readers and their impact on subsequent thinkers is yet to be extensively explored. However, here is a brief glimpse. Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī (d. ca. 390/1000–01), nicknamed al-Mant. iqī (the Logician, for having written numerous commentaries on Aristotelian logic), states in S. iwān al-h. ikma, composed between 339/950–1 and 349/960–1, that the Rasāʾil were current among people and were widely read.240 He also quotes approvingly from them. Another reference, from the same time period, comes from Islamic Spain, which not only further demonstrates the Rasāʾil’s popularity but also the swift movement of the books throughout the Muslim world. The author was Abu ʾl-Qāsim Maslama b. alQāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Qurt.ubī, born in Cordoba in 293/906 and died there in 353/964. In her article entitled “Plants, Mary the Copt, Abraham, Donkeys and Knowledge: Again on Bāt.inism during the Umayyad Caliphate in al-Andalus,” Maribel Fierro states: The Ghāyat al-h. akīm (=Picatrix), an astrological and magical work, and the Rutbat al-h. akīm, an alchemical work, have been attributed to the mathematician Maslama al-Majrīt.ī (d. ca. 398/1007), although the most frequent dates appearing in the mss of such works are the years 339– 342/950–953 in the case of the Rutba, and 343–348/954–959 in the case of the Ghāya, which excludes authorship on the part of Maslama al-Majrīt.ī . . . Finally, in Rutba mention is made of some Epistles that are understood as referring to the Epistles of the Pure Brethren (Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-S. afāʾ). Taking all this into consideration, I agree with Holmyard that the internal evidence of both the Ghāya and the Rutba indicates that they were written between 339/950 and 348/ 959. Maslama b. Qāsim al-Qurt.ubī (d. 353/964) is the best candidate as their author.241

Abū H . ayyān al-Tawh. īdī also refers to the Rasāʾīl in his Kitāb alimtāʿ wa’l-muʾānasa and names four contemporary thinkers from

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Bas. ra as the authors.242 Abbas Hamdani has analyzed alTawh. īdī’s story and demonstrated that the latter’s concern was not to establish the authorship of the Rasāʾil, but to malign Zayd b. Rifāʿa, a man of letters and a close associate of the vizier, Ibn Saʿdān, in the latter’s eyes. Al-Tawh. īdī thought that he could prove Zayd’s unorthodox views by confirming that the latter was associated with the authors of the Rasāʾil while he resided in Bas. ra. I have further elaborated on this issue elsewhere with a full English translation of the relevant passages from Kitāb al-imtāʿ wa’l-muʾānasa and additional material.243 The Rasāʾil were read by Ibn Sīnāʾ (d. 428/1037) when he was young.244 Unfortunately, all subsequent references to the Rasāʾil in the works of al-Bayhaqī (d. 565/1169–70),245 Ibn al-Qift.ī (d. 646/1248),246 Ibn al-ʿIbrī (d. 685/1286), al-Shahrazūrī (d. ca. 687/1288),247 al-S. afadī (d. 764/ 1363)248 and H . ājjī Khalīfa, also known as Kātib Čelebi (d. 1067/ 249 1657) are nothing but variations on the story propounded by al-Tawh. īdī. The reception of the Rasāʾil within the various circles of Ismāʿīlī daʿwa is beyond the scope of this chapter. Manuscript copies of the Rasāʾil seem to be widely scattered. Leaving aside the copies in the private collections of the Bohra families in the Indian sub-continent, there are at least 14 complete copies of all four volumes in the libraries of Istanbul, Paris, London, and the Bodleian alone.250 The oldest extant copy in the ʿĀt.if Effendi library in Istanbul was transcribed in 578/1182.251 This in itself testifies that the Rasāʾil circulated widely in certain circles. Abū H . āmid al-Ghazālī, at the end of the fifth/eleventh century, understood very well that the threat of the Ismāʿīlīs and the Rasāʾil was not merely political but also intellectual. He perceived that it was not simply Muʿtazilite rationalism, for in their synthesis the Ismāʿīlīs had gone far beyond to encompass the entire spectrum of scientific thought. They had integrated the Greek sciences and philosophy and their formal reasoning into one universal valid truth, synonymous with religious reality. Therefore, in addition to his Fad. āʾih. al-Bāt. iniyya,252 which is exclusively devoted to refuting the newly formulated doctrine of

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taʿlīm, that one must accept the absolute authority of the infallible Imām in religious faith, he refuted the Ismāʿīlīs in several other books. In some of those polemical works he loses his customary academic serenity and becomes almost shrill in his denunciation. Referring to the Rasāʾil in his Munqidh min al-d. alāl (The Savior from Error), which has been called al-Ghazālī’s “Apologia pro doctrina sua,” he states that the book of Ikhwān al-S. afāʾ is really the refuse of philosophy (h. ashw al-falsafa) because their philosophy is based on the feeble philosophy of Pythagoras whose philosophy is the weakest of all philosophical doctrines since it had already been refuted by Aristotle.253 Finally, the attempts to reconcile reason and revelation in Islam did not succeed as demonstrated by the failure of the Muʿtazila, whatever their excesses might have been. Similarly the efforts of al-Fārābī at the popular level to make philosophy a part of Islamic education also failed. In the case of the Rasāʾil, their Shīʿī-Ismāʿīlī connection could not remain hidden. Moreover, since the Ismāʿīlīs were depicted as the zanādiqa (the godless) par excellence, their efforts were doomed to failure.

Notes *

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I would like to express my thanks to Eric Bordenkircher, a Ph.D. candidate in Islamic Studies, for carefully reading the final draft of this chapter. His comments and suggestions have helped to improve the text and articulate my thoughts on several issues. ʿAbd al-Rah. mān Badawī, “al-Nazʿa al-insāniyya fi’l-fikr al-ʿarabī,” in his al-Insāniyya wa’l-wujūdiyya fi’l-fikr al-ʿarabī (Cairo: Maktab al-Nah. d. a al-Mis. riyya, 1947), pp. 1–64; idem, “L’Humanisme dans la pensée Arabe,” Studia Islamica 6 (1956), pp. 67–100. It should be noted that in his Translations of Ancient Arabian Poetry (London, 1885), Charles Lyall referred to the early Islamic philologists as “the great Humanists.” In his A Literary History of the Arabs (Cambridge: University Press, 1953; reprint of 1907), p. 32, R. A. Nicholson applauds Lyall’s efforts. L. Gardet, La Cité Musulmane: Vie Sociale et Politique, 3rd ed. (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1969), pp. 273–322.

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M. Arkoun, “L’Humanisme arabe au IVe/Xe siècle, d’après le Kitâb al-Hawâmil wal-Šawâmil,” Studia Islamica 14 (1961), pp. 73–108; 15 (1961), pp. 63–87; idem, Contribution à l’étude de l’humanisme arabe au IVe/Xe siècle: Miskawayh (320/325-421)=(932/936-1030), Philosophe et Historien (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1970). George Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West, with Special Reference to Scholasticism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), p. xix. J. Kraemer, “Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: A Preliminary Study,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 104 (1984), pp.135–64; republished as supplement to his Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival during the Buyid Age, 2nd revised ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992); see also Lenn Goodman, Islamic Humanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Kraemer, ”Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam,” p. 140. Franz Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam, trans. from German by Emile and Jenny Marmorstein (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 1–5. Martin Kramer, ed., The Jewish Discovery of Islam: Studies in Honor of Bernard Lewis (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1999), p. viii. Thomas Sizgorich, “Narrative and Community in Islamic Late Antiquity,” Past and Present, no. 185 (2004), pp. 9–42. Peter Brown, The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, A. D. 200–1000, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), p. 11. Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam, p. 348. G. Levi Della Vida, “Dominant Ideas in the Formation of Islamic Culture,” in The Crozer Quarterly, 21 (1944), pp. 207–16. Ismail K. Poonawala, “Modern Scholarship in Polemical Garb: Two Centuries of Research on the Rasāʾil ikhwān al-s. afā,” unpublished study. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1961), p. 1100. See also The Random House Dictionary of the English Language: The Unabridged Edition (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 691; The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1973), s.v. Humanistic Scholarship, History of (or vol. 8, pp. 1170–83); The Encyclopedia

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Universality in Islamic Thought of Religion, ed. M. Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987), s.v. Humanism (or vol. 6, pp. 511–15). Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. Humanistic Scholarship, History of; Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, s.v. Humanism. All the published editions of the Rasāʾil (Bombay, Cairo and Beirut) list a total of 52 epistles, while all of the 13 internal references in the text of the Rasāʾil state that the total number of epistles is 51. So, what is the source of this discrepancy? The fihrist al-rasāʾil in the ʿĀt.if manuscript (ʿĀt.if library, Istanbul, Turkey), the oldest extant complete copy transcribed in 578/1182, lists 51 epistles, which confirms the internal evidence. The discrepancy seems to have stemmed from counting two epistles in the first volume (on the mathematical sciences) as two separate epistles or one epistle. In published editions the 12th and 13th epistles are regarded as two separate epistles, while both are counted as one in the ʿĀt.if manuscript. P. Henry, “La Dernière Parole de Plotin,” Studi classici e orientali 2 (Pisa, 1953), pp. 113–20 as cited by Armstrong in A. H. Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 215. A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus: An Analytical and Historical Study (Amsterdam: Adolf Hakkert, 1967). A. H. Armstrong, The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, p. 222. Cristina D’Ancona, “Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation,” in Peter Adamson and Richard Taylor, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (Cambridge: University Press, 2005), pp. 10–31; it sums up the salient features of late ancient philosophy and the transmission of Neoplatonic philosophy to the Arabic-speaking world. The Pythagorean features, such as metaphysics of number with respect to the One, at the apex of reality, mathematics and astronomicoastrological considerations, and moral religious preoccupation are obvious throughout the Rasāʾil, especially in the epistles 1, 3, 5, 32, 33 and 52. See also Yves Marquet, Les Frères de la pureté (Paris, 2006); and Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 163. Muhsin Mahdi, “The Rational Tradition in Islam,” in Farhad Daftary, ed., Intellectual Traditions in Islam (London: I.B.Tauris, 2000), p. 49.

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A. H. Armstrong, “Plotinus,” in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, pp. 195–268. Mahdi, “The Rational Tradition in Islam,” p. 50. About Aristotle’s concept of One, Sir David Ross (Aristotle, London: University Paperbacks, 1964), p. 182, states: “The prime mover is not only form and actuality, but life and mind, and the term God, which has not so far appeared, begins to be applied to it.” The cosmology is described in the 32nd epistle, entitled “On the intellectual principles of the existing beings according to the Pythagoreans,” Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-S. afāʾ wa-Khullān al-Wafāʾ (Beirut: Dār Bayrūt wa-Dār S. ādir, 1957), vol. 3, pp. 178–98; hereinafter referred to as Rasāʾil. This paper was written and completed in March 2007; hence no reference is given to the subsequent Arabic critical edition with English translation published by Oxford University Press in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies. For details see Yves Marquet, La philosophie des Ihwān al-S. afāʾ, nouvelle édition augmentée (Paris: ˘ 49–218. This is not the place to note Ismāʿīlī S.É.H.A, 1999), pp. adjustments to Neoplatonism, however, the reader is referred to Paul Walker, Early Philosophical Shiism: The Ismaili Neoplatonism of Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sijistānī (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Ismail Poonawala, ed., Kitāb al-iftikhār by Abū Yaʿqūb Ish. āq al-Sijistānī (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2000), English introduction. Qurʾān 95:4; A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), vol. 2, p. 343. I have changed Arberry’s translation of “man” for the Arabic insān to “human beings,” consistent with my translation of this term throughout this chapter. In his The Message of the Qurʾān (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980, p. 961), Muhammad Asad translated fī ah. sani taqwīmin as “in the best conformation.” In the footnote he explains that everything God creates is formed in accordance with what it is meant to be. For the hierarchy of creation in Islam see Sachiko Murata and William Chittick in The Vision of Islam (New York: Paragon House, 1994), pp. 128–31. Genesis 1:26, 27; 2:7. Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 380; vol. 3, p. 112; it states: .‫ ﻭﻧﻔﺦ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺭﻭﺣﻪ ﻭﺃﺣﻴﺎﻩ‬،‫ﺇ ّﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺭﺉ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﳌّﺎ ﺧﻠﻖ ﺍﳉﺴﺪ ]ﻳﻌﲏ ﻓﻄﺮ ﺁﺩﻡ[ ﻭﺳ ّﻮﺍﻩ‬ In Rasāʾil, vol. 3, p. 141, it states: ‫ ﻭﺃﺧﺮﺝ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ‬... ‫ ﻭﺟﻌﻞ ﻟﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻗﻞ‬... ‫ ﻭﻋّﻠﻤﻪ ﺍﻷﲰﺎﺀ ﻛّﻠﻬﺎ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﻳّﺪﻩ ﺑﻜﻠﻤﺘﻪ‬،‫ﻧﻔﺦ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺭﻭﺡ ﻗﺪﺳﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﳌﻮﺟﻮﺩﺍﺕ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﺩﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﺒﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻥ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﻟﻴﺪﻳﺮﻫﺎ ﻭﻳﺴﻮﻕ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻨﺎﻓﻌﻬﺎ ﻭﻳﺪ ّﳍﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺑﻪ ﺻﻼﺣﻬﺎ‬ . ... In Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 462, it states:

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Universality in Islamic Thought ‫ ﻭﺟﻌﻞ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﻪ ﻣﺮﺁﺓ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﻟﻴﺘﺮﺍﺀﻯ‬،‫ ﻭﺻ ّﻮﺭﻩ ﺃﻛﻤﻞ ﺻﻮﺭﺓ‬،‫ﻷﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺭﺉ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺧﻠﻖ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﰲ ﺃﺣﺴﻦ ﺗﻘﻮﱘ‬ .‫ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺻﻮﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﺍﻟﻜﺒﻴﺮ‬ Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 297–8, 300–2, 306. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 226, 337–8. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 477. It states: ‫ ﻓ ّﻌﺎﻟ ٌﺔ‬،‫ ﻗﺎﺑﻠ ٌﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺎﻟﻴﻢ‬،‫ ﻓ ّﻌﺎﻟ ٌﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺒﻊ‬،‫ ﻋ ّﻼﻣ ٌﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻘ ّﻮﺓ‬،‫ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ]ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ[ ﺟﻮﻫﺮٌﺓ ﺭﻭﺣﺎﻧﻴ ٌﺔ ﲰﺎﻭﻳ ٌﺔ ﻧﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ ٌﺔ ﺣﻴّﺔ ﺑﺬﺍﺗﻬﺎ‬ ‫ ﰒ ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﺎﺭﻛ ٌﺔ ﳍﺬﻩ ﺍﻷﺟﺴﻤﺎﻡ ﻭﻣﻔﺎﺭﻗ ٌﺔ‬،‫ ﻣﺘ ّﻤﻤ ٌﺔ ﻟﻸﺟﺴﺎﻡ ﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻧﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﺒﺎﺗﻴﺔ ﺇﱃ ﻭﻗﺖ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻡ‬... ‫ﰲ ﺍﻷﺟﺴﺎﻡ‬ . ... ‫ ﺭﺍﺟﻌ ٌﺔ ﺇﱃ ﻋﻨﺼﺮﻫﺎ ﻭﻣﻌﺪﻧﻬﺎ ﻭﻣﺒﺪﺋﻬﺎ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‬،‫ﳍﺎ‬ Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 260; see also Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 294; vol. 2, p. 380; vol. 3, pp. 39–40. Rasāʾil, vol. 3, p. 40. Miskawayh states that life is of two kinds: bodily life (h. ayāt badaniyya) and spiritual life (h. ayāt nafsiyya). An ignorant person’s life is of the former type while the life of a learned one is of the latter type. Al-Tawh. īdī and Miskawayh, alHawāmil wa’l-shawāmil, eds. Ah. mad Amīn and Ah. mad S. aqr (Cairo: Lajnat al-taʾlīf wa’l-tarjama, 1951), pp. 284–5. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 122. The Arabic reads: ‫ ﻓﻠﻌ ّﻞ ﻧﻔﺴﻚ‬.‫ ﻭﺍﺳُﻠ ْﻚ ﻣﺴﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﺮﺑّﺎﻧﻴﲔ ﻭﺍﻷﺧﻴﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺃﺳﻠﻤﻮﺍ‬،‫ﻓﺎﺟﺘﻬ ْﺪ ﻳﺎ ﺃﺧﻲ ﰲ ﻃﻠﺐ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﺭﻑ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ‬ ،‫ ﻭﺗﻨﻔﺘﺢ ﳍﺎ ﻋﲔ ﺍﻟﺒﺼﲑﺓ‬،‫ ﻭﺗﺼﻔﻮ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺪﺭ ﺃﻭﺳﺎﺥ ﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﺗﺴﺘﻴﻘﻆ ﻣﻦ ﺭﻗﺪﺓ ﺍﳉﻬﺎﻟﺔ‬،‫ﺗﻨﺘﺒﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻮﻡ ﺍﻟﻐﻔﻠﺔ‬ ‫ ﻭﺍﻋﻠﻢ‬.‫ ﻓﻌﻨﺪ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻳﺘﻬﻴّـﺄ ﳍﺎ ﻗﺒﻮﻝ ﺇﳍﺎﻡ ﺍﳌﻼﺋﻜﺔ‬.‫ ﻭﻣﺮﻣﻮﺯﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﺍﻣﻴﺲ ﺍﻹﻟۤـﻬﻴﺔ‬،‫ﻓﺘﻔﻬﻢ ﺃﺳﺮﺍﺭ ﻛﺘﺐ ﺍﻟﻨﺒ ّﻮﺓ‬ ‫ ﻭﳝﻜﻦ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺼﲑ ﻣﻠﻜﴼ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺇﻥ ﺃﻧﺖ ﺳﻠﻜﺖ ﻣﺴﻠﻚ ﺍﻷﻧﺒﻴﺎﺀ ﻭﺃﺻﺤﺎﺏ‬،‫ﻳﺎ ﺃﺧﻲ ﺃﻥ ﻧﻔﺴﻚ ﻣﻠ ٌﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﻘ ّﻮﺓ‬ ‫ ﻭﺃﻥ ﻧﻔﺴﻚ ﺃﻳ ًﻀﺎ‬.‫ ﺍﳌﻔﺮﻭﺿﺔ ﰲ ﺳﻨﻦ ﺷﺮﺍﺋﻌﻬﻢ‬،‫ ﻭ ﻋﻤﻠﺖ ﺑﻮﺻﺎﻳﺎﻫﻢ ﺍﳌﺬﻛﻮﺭﺓ ﰲ ﻛﺘﺒﻬﻢ‬،‫ﺍﻟﻨﻮﺍﻣﻴﺲ ﺍﻹﳍﻴﺔ‬ .‫ ﳝﻜﻦ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺼﲑ ﻳﻮ ًﻣﺎ ﺷﻴﻄﺎﻧًﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺇﻥ ﺃﻧﺖ ﺳﻠﻜﺖ ﻣﺴﻠﻚ ﺍﻷﺷﺮﺍﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﻜ ّﻔﺎﺭ‬،‫ﺷﻴﻄﺎﻥ ﺑﺎﻟﻘ ّﻮﺓ‬ A. J. Arberry, Revelation and Reason in Islam (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 7. Muhsin Mahdi, “The Rational Tradition in Islam,” p. 43; idem, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 29–46. Mahdi, “The Rational Tradition in Islam,” p. 44. Ibid., p. 48. Mahdi states that in fact, the question of the leadership of the Islamic community was one of the primary questions, if not the primary question, that led to the rise of Islamic theology. The legal qualifications of rulers continued to be discussed for a long time, but the rulers themselves had long since ceased to act as worthy successors of the Prophet. Mahdi, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, pp. 20–3. Mahdi, “The Rational Tradition in Islam,” p. 53; idem, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, pp. 47–62. The Rasāʾil’s philosophy, according to their own statement, was derived from Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neoplatonism and all

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those sources were translated into Arabic by the translators in the circle of al-Kindī. In his Philosophy of Plato, al-Fārābī presents Plato who is neither mystical nor metaphysical but who is primarily political. Timaeus is not a work on cosmology but a political work meant to instruct the citizens in correct opinions. Mahdi, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, p. 56. Plato: The Collected Dialogues including the Letters, ed. Edith Hamilton and H. Cairns with Introduction and Prefatory Notes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. xxiii. Arberry, Revelation and Reason, p. 8. Plato: The Collected Dialogues, Laws, Book X. For the analysis of Book X see A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 489–92. For the discussion of the issue as to why a prophet is needed for the foundation of the law, see Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), pp. 53–64. It is more than an account of the creation of the universe, it is an explanation. Plato: The Collected Dialogues, Timaeus; for its analysis see Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, pp. 436–62. Rasāʾil, vol. 3, p. 18; in Arabic it reads: ‫ ﻭﺃ ّﻱ ﺷﺮﻑ‬،‫ ﻭﺇﱃ ﺃ ّﻱ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ‬،‫ﰲ ﺑﻴﺎﻥ ﻃﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﰲ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﺭﻑ ﻭﺇﱃ ﺃ ّﻱ ﺣ ّﺪ ﻫﻮ ﻭﻣﺒﻠﻐﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ‬ .‫ﻳﺮﺗﻘﻲ‬ Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 18–19. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 19. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 29. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 157; it reads: ‫ ﻓﺈﻥ ﻧﻈﺮﻩ ﰲ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﻻ‬،‫ﻓﺄ ّﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻌّﻠﻢ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ ﻭﻋﺮﻑ ﺃﺣﻜﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻭﲢ ّﻘﻖ ﺃﻣﺮ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻣﻮﺱ‬ .‫ ﻳﻘﻴﻨﴼ‬... ‫ ﻭﰲ ﺃﻣﺮ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﺩ ﺍﺳﺘﺒﺼﺎ ًﺭﺍ‬،‫ﻳﻀ ّﺮﻩ ﺑﻞ ﻳﺰﻳﺪﻩ ﰲ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﲢ ّﻘﻘﴼ‬ It is interesting to note in this respect Ibn Rushd’s treatise Fas. l almaqāl wa-taqrīr mā bayn al-sharīʿa wa’l-h. ikma min al-ittis. āl (The decisive treatise, determining the connection between the law and wisdom). In the opening statement Ibn Rushd states that his goal is to investigate, from the perspective of sharīʿa, whether reflection upon philosophy and the science of logic is permitted, prohibited or commanded. His arguments are quite similar to those advocated by the Ikhwān throughout their epistles. Averroës, Decisive Treatise & Epistle Dedicatory, trans., with introduction and notes by Charles E. Butterworth (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2001). Rasāʾil, vol. 3, pp. 29–30. The Arabic reads:

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Universality in Islamic Thought ‫ﰒ ﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃ ّﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ ﺍﳊﻜﻤﻴّﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺒﻮﻳّﺔ ﻛﻼﳘﺎ ﺃﻣﺮﺍﻥ ﺇﻵﻫﻴّﺎﻥ ﻳﺘّﻔﻘﺎﻥ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺽ ﺍﳌﻘﺼﻮﺩ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ‬ ‫ ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﺃ ّﻥ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺽ ﺍﻷﻗﺼﻰ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻗﻴﻞ ﺇﻧﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺒّﻪ ﺑﺎﻹﻟۤـﻪ‬.‫ ﻭﳜﺘﻠﻔﺎﻥ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﻭﻉ‬،‫ﻫﻮ ﺍﻷﺻﻞ‬ ‫ ﺃُﻭﻻﻫﺎ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺍﳌﻮﺟﻮﺩﺍﺕ‬:‫ﲝﺴﺐ ﻃﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺒﺸﺮ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺑﻴّﻨﺎ ﰲ ﺭﺳﺎﺋﻠﻨﺎ ﺃﺟـﻤﻊ ﻭﻋﻤﺪﺗﻬﺎ ﺃﺭﺑﻊ ﺧﺼﺎﻝ‬ ‫ ﻋﺎﱂ‬،‫ ﻭﻫﻜﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺽ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﺒ ّﻮﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﺎﻣﻮﺱ ﻫﻮ ﺗﻬﺬﻳ ُﺐ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻭﺇﺻﻼ ُﺣﻬﺎ ﻭﲣﻠﻴ ُﺼﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﻨّﻢ‬... .‫ ﻭﺇﻳﺼﺎ ُﳍﺎ ﺇﱃ ﺍﳉﻨّﺔ‬،‫ﺍﻟﻜﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﺴﺎﺩ‬ Hamid Enayat, “An Outline of the Political Philosophy of the Rasāʾil of the Ikhwān al-S. afāʾ”, in S. H. Nasr, ed., Ismāʿīlī Contributions to Islamic Culture (Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1977), pp. 25–49. See Paul Kraus, “Raziana I: La conduite du philosophe, traité d’éthique d’Abū Muh. ammad b. Zakariyyā al-Rāzī,” Orientalia 4 (1935), pp. 300–34; idem, “Raziana II: Extraits du kitāb aʿlām alnubuwwa d’Abū H. ātim al-Rāzī,” Orientalia 5 (1936), pp. 35–6, 358–78; Ismail Poonawala, Biobibliography of Ismāʿīlī Literature (Malibu, Calif.: Undena Publications, 1977), pp. 36–9. See for example Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 186–8, 189. Enayat, “An Outline of the Political Philosophy of the Rasāʾil,” p. 27. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 187, 190; Enayat, “An Outline of the Political Philosophy of the Rasāʾil,” p. 28. In his introduction to The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1971, p. xxviii), Richard McKeon states that according to the traditional order of the books—which has not, however, found favor with recent scholars—Politics would close with the consideration of the conditions of revolution in Book V (which was previously Book VIII), and such a conclusion would be dialectically appropriate, for revolutions occur when the order of the state no longer fits the conditions of its citizens. In his al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Salafiyya, 1951), written following the Mongol sack of Baghdad, Ibn Taymiyya was the first to have introduced a theory of political rebellion in the medieval Sunnī discourse. He states that if a ruler acts against the interests of Islam, not only undermining such a regime is warranted, but its overthrow is also justified. For a systematic examination of the idea and treatment of political resistance and rebellion in Islamic law, see Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion & Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Enayat, “An Outline of the Political Philosophy of the Rasāʾil,” p. 32. The point that social organization and mutual help among members of human organizations are essential for attaining happiness in this world and the next is reiterated several times. For example see, Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 99–100.

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Bernard Lewis, “Siyāsa,” in A. H. Green, ed., In Quest of Islamic Humanism: Arabic and Islamic Studies in Memory of Mohamed alNowaihi (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1984), pp. 3–14. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 273–4; Enayat, “An Outline of the Political Philosophy of the Rasāʾil,” p. 33. Al-Fārābī’s use of the term siyāsa carries almost the same meaning. See al-Fārābī, Ih. s. āʾ al-ʿulūm, ed. ʿUthmān Amīn, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anjlū al-Mis. riyya, 1968), p. 125; English tr. Fauzi Najjar, “Alfarabi: The Enumeration of the Sciences,” in Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, eds., Medieval Political Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 24. Enayat has uniformly translated the term siyāsa as politics, which is incorrect. Enayat, “An Outline of the Political Philosophy of the Rasāʾil,” pp. 34–9. Al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa al-mansūba li’l-h. akīm al-Majrīt. ī, wa-hiya tāj Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-S. afāʾ wa-Khullān al-Wafāʾ, ed. Jamīl S. alība (Damascus: Mat.būʿāt al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī, 1949), vol. 1, pp. 439–45. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 18, 171. It states: ‫ ﺣ ّﱴ ﺟﺎﺀﺕ ﻭﻗﺖ ﺍﳌﻴﻌﺎﺩ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﻔ ّﺮﻕ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺒﻼﺩ ﰲ ﳑﻠﻜﺔ‬... ‫ﻛﻨّﺎ ﻧﻴﺎ ًﻣﺎ ﰲ ﻛﻬﻒ ﺃﺑﻴﻨﺎ ﺁﺩﻡ ﻣ ّﺪﺓ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺰﻣﺎﻥ‬ ،‫ ﻭﻧﺒﻨﻲ ﻣﺪﻳﻨﺔ ﻓﺎﺿﻠﺔ ﺭﻭﺣﺎﻧﻴﺔ‬... ‫ ﻭﺷﺎﻫﺪﻧﺎ ﻣﺪﻳﻨﺘﻨﺎ ﺍﻟﺮﻭﺣﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﺍﳌﺮﺗﻔﻌﺔ ﰲ ﺍﳍﻮﺍﺀ‬،‫ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻣﻮﺱ ﺍﻷﻛﱪ‬ . ... ‫ﻭﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺑﻨﺎﺀ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﳌﺪﻳﻨﺔ ﰲ ﳑﻠﻜﺔ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻣﻮﺱ ﺍﻷﻛﱪ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﳝﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﻮﺱ ﻭﺍﻷﺟﺴﺎﺩ‬ In Ismāʿīlī doctrine he is a lawgiver prophet who brings new sharīʿa, abrogates the previous sharīʿa and initiates a new cycle (dawr) of hierohistory. Farhad Daftary, The Ismāʿīlīs: Their History and Doctrines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), passim. The Arabic reads: .‫ﰲ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻣﻮﺱ ﺍﻹﻟۤـﻬﻲ ﻭﺷﺮﺍﺋﻂ ﺍﻟﻨﺒ ّﻮﺓ ﻭﻛﻤﻴّﺔ ﺧﺼﺎﳍﻢ ﻭﻣﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﺍﻟﺮﺑّﺎﻧﻴﲔ ﻭﺍﻹﻟۤـﻬﻴ ّﲔ‬ Fazlur Rahman states that the Muslim philosophers’ attempt to formulate the theory of revelation, or the theory of prophecy was quite conscious and deliberate. He further adds that every detail of this elaborate theory has its source in Greek ideas, however, the intricate eclectic elaboration is, of course, new. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, p. 64. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 124; it reads: ،‫ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻜﻮﺍﻛﺐ ﺯﻳﻨﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻤﺎﺀ‬،‫ ﺃﻥ ﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻧﺎﺕ ﺯﻳﻨﺔ ﺍﻷﺭﺽ‬،‫ ﺃﻳّﺪﻙ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﻭﺇﻳّﺎﻧﺎ ﺑﺮﻭﺡ ﻣﻨﻪ‬،‫ﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻳّﻬﺎ ﺍﻷﺥ‬ ‫ ﻭﺃﺧﻴﺎﺭ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﻓﻀﻞ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﻫﻢ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻼﺀ‬،‫ﻭﺃﻥ ﺃ ّﰎ ﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻧﺎﺕ ﻫﻴﺌ ًﺔ ﻭﺃﻛﻤﻠﻬﺎ ﺻﻮﺭ ًﺓ ﻭﺃﺷﺮﻓﻬﺎ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺒﴼ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ‬ ‫ ﰒ ﺑﻌﺪﻫﻢ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺮﺗﺒﺔ‬،‫ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻡ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺩﺭﺟ ًﺔ ﻭﺃﺭﻓﻌﻬﻢ ﻣﻨـﺰﻟ ًﺔ ﻫﻢ ﺍﻷﻧﺒﻴﺎﺀ‬،‫ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻼﺀ ﻫﻢ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ‬

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Universality in Islamic Thought ‫ ﻫﻮ‬،‫ ﻋ ّﺰ ﻭﺟ ّﻞ ﻭﺗﻘ ّﺪﺱ‬،‫ ﻭﺃ ّﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺭﺉ‬،‫ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﺮﻳﻘﺎﻥ ﻗﺪ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﻌﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃ ّﻥ ﺍﻷﺷﻴﺎﺀ ﻛّﻠﻬﺎ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ‬.‫ﺍﻟﻔﻼﺳﻔﺔ ﺍﳊﻜﻤﺎﺀ‬ . ... ‫ﻋّﻠﺘﻬﺎ ﻭ ُﻣﺘﻘﻨﻬﺎ ﻭ ُﻣﺒﺪﻋﻬﺎ ﻭ ُﻣﺘ ّﻤﻤﻬﺎ ﻭ ُﻣﻜ ّﻤﻠﻬﺎ‬ Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 125; it states: ‫ ﻭﺃﻥ ﲤﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﰲ ﺳﺖ‬.‫ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﺒ ّﻮﺓ ﻫﻲ ﺃﻋﻠﻰ ﺩﺭﺟ ٍﺔ ﻭﺃﺭﻓﻊ ﺭﺗﺒ ٍﺔ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ ﺇﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺣﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺒﺸﺮ ّﳑﺎ ﻳﻠﻲ ﺭﺗﺒﺔ ﺍﳌﻼﺋﻜﺔ‬ .‫ ﺍﻷﻭﱃ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﺮﺅﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﺼﺎﺩﻗﺔ‬:‫ﻭﺃﺭﺑﻌﲔ ﺧﺼﻠ ًﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻓﻀﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﺸﺮﻳﺔ‬ In his book al-Fawz al-as. ghar (ed. S. ālih. ʿAd. īma. [Paris]: al-Dār alʿArabiyya li’l-kitāb, 1987; French tr. Roger Arnaldez, Le Petit Livre du Salut ([Paris]: Maison Arabe du Livre, 1987), Miskawayh has devoted the third issue to the question of prophecy. He discusses various modes of revelation including the faculty of imagination and has assigned a separate section to the previously cited tradition. The tradition transmitted by al-Bukhārī and Muslim states: “A good vision (al-ruʾyā al-s. ālih. a) is one forty-sixth of prophecy.” Bukhārī transmitted another tradition on the authority of ʿĀʾisha, which states that the Prophet’s mission began with “true visions,” which came to him in his sleep and he said that they were like “the breaking of the light of dawn.” Bukhārī, Matn Bukhārī bi-h. āshiyat al-Sindī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1978), vol. 4, pp. 207–8; Tabrīzī, Mishkāt al-mas. ābīh. , ed. Muh. ammad Nās. ir al-Dīn al-Albānī (Damascus: Manshūrāt al-maktab al-Islāmī, 1381/1961), vol. 2, p. 528; English tr. J. Robson, Mishkat al-Masabih (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1975), vol. 2, p. 962; Martin Lings, Muhammad: His life based on the earliest sources (London: Islamic Texts Society, 1983), p. 43. “A true vision” also occurs in the stories of some prophets, especially the story of Joseph in the Qurʾān. Unfortunately, the remaining 45 qualities are not listed in the traditions. See also al-Tawh. īdī and Miskawayh, al-Hawāmil wa’l-shawāmil, pp. 125–6. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 125; it states: ‫ ﻓﺈ ّﻥ ﺫﻟﻚ‬،‫ﺇﺫﺍ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﻌﺖ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﳋﺼﺎﻝ ﰲ ﻭﺍﺣ ٍﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺒﺸﺮ ﰲ ﺩﻭ ٍﺭ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺩﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺍﻧﺎﺕ ﰲ ﻭﻗ ٍﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺰﻣﺎﻥ‬ ،‫ ﻭﺩ ّﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻨـﺰﻳﻞ‬... ‫ ﻓﺈﺫﺍ ﺑّﻠﻎ ﺍﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ‬.‫ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﻫﻮ ﺍﳌﺒﻌﻮﺙ ﻭﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﺍﻟﺰﻣﺎﻥ ﻭﺍﻹﻣﺎﻡ ﻟﻠﻨﺎﺱ ﻣﺎ ﺩﺍﻡ ﺣﻴّﴼ‬ ‫ ﺑﻘﻴﺖ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﳋﺼﺎ ُﻝ ﰲ ﺃ ّﻣﺘﻪ‬... ‫ ﰒ ﺗﻮ ّﰲ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﻟّﻒ ﴰﻞ ﺍﻷ ّﻣﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﻗﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺴﻨّﺔ‬... ‫ ﻭﺃﺣﻜﻢ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ‬،‫ﻭﻟ ّﻮﺡ ﺍﻟﺘﺄﻭﻳﻞ‬ .‫ﻭﺭﺍﺛ ًﺔ ﻣﻨﻪ‬ The passage strikes a chord with Weber’s theory of charisma and the crucial issue of succession when the personal basis of charismatic authority is removed by the death of the Prophet. Bryan Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 79–80, 83–4. Although the Ikhwān state that they have elucidated the remaining 45 qualities in a separate epistle, they are not to be found in the epistles except for 26 qualities enumerated separately in the same epistle.

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Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 125. The Arabic reads: ‫ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻳﺼﻠﺢ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺧﻠﻴﻔﺘﻪ ﰲ ﺃ ّﻣﺘﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ‬،‫ ﺃﻭ ُﺟّﻠﻬﺎ‬،‫ﻭﺇﻥ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﻌﺖ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﳋﺼﺎﻝ ﰲ ﻭﺍﺣ ٍﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺃ ّﻣﺘﻪ‬ ‫ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﻌﺖ ﺗﻠﻚ‬،‫ ﻓﺈ ْﻥ ﱂ ﻳﺘّﻔﻖ ﺃﻥ ﲡﺘﻤﻊ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﳋﺼﺎﻝ ﰲ ﻭﺍﺣ ٍﺪ ﻟﻜﻦ ﺗﻜﻮﻥ ﻣﺘﻔ ّﺮﻗ ًﺔ ﰲ ﺟـﻤﺎﻋﺘﻬﻢ‬.‫ﻭﻓﺎﺗﻪ‬ ‫ ﻭﺣﻔﻆ‬،‫ ﻭﺗﻌﺎﺿﺪﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﺼﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﺗﻠﻔﺖ ﻗﻠﻮﺑُﻬﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳏﺒّﺔ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ ﺑﻌﻀﴼ‬،‫ﺍﳉﻤﺎﻋﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺭﺃ ٍﻱ ﻭﺍﺣ ٍﺪ‬ ‫ ﺩﺍﻣﺖ ﳍﻢ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟ ُﺔ ﰲ ﺩﻧﻴﺎﻫﻢ ﻭﻭﺟﺒﺖ ﺍﻟ ُﻌﻘﱮ ﳍﻢ ﰲ‬،‫ ﻭﲪﻞ ﺍﻷ ّﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻨﻬﺎﺝ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ‬،‫ ﻭ ﺇﻗﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻨّﺔ‬،‫ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ‬ ‫ ﻭﻓﺴﺪ‬،‫ ﻭﺍﺧﺘﻠﻔﺖ ﰲ ﻣﻨﻬﺎﺝ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﺗﺸﺘّﺖ ﴰ ُﻞ ﺃﻟﻔﺘﻬﻢ‬،‫ ﻭﺇ ْﻥ ﺗﻔ ّﺮﻗﺖ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻷ ّﻣﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻭﻓﺎﺓ ﻧﺒﻴّﻬﺎ‬.‫ﺃﺧﺮﺍﻫﻢ‬ .‫ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ ﺃﻣ ُﺮ ﺁﺧﺮﺗﻬﻢ ﻭﺯﺍﻟﺖ ﻋﻨﻬﻢ ﺩﻭﻟﺘُﻬﻢ‬ Al-Fārābī states that it is difficult to find all those qualities [the 12 qualities described below] united in one person. He adds, a man endowed with those qualities will be found one at a time only, such a man being very rare. Therefore, if there exists a man who fulfills six or five of the aforementioned qualities, excluding the gift of visionary prophecy, he will be the sovereign. Richard Walzer, ed. and trans., Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abū Nas. r al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fād. ila, A revised text with introduction, translation, and commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 48–51. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 128; it reads: ‫ ﻓﺎﻟﺮﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﳉﺴﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺭﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﳌﻠﻮﻙ ﻭﺍﳉﺒﺎﺑﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻟﻴﺲ ﳍﻢ‬.‫ ﺟﺴﻤﺎﱐ ﻭﺭﻭﺣﺎﱐ‬:‫ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺮﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﻧﻮﻋﺎﻥ‬ ‫ ﻭﺃ ّﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﺮﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺮﻭﺣﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﻤﺜﻞ ﺭﻳﺎﺳﺔ‬... ‫ﺳﻠﻄﺎﻥ ﺇﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﺟﺴﺎﻡ ﻭﺍﻷﺟﺴﺎﺩ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻬﺮ ﻭﺍﻟﻐﻠﺒﺔ ﻭﺍﳉﻮﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﻈﻠﻢ‬ ... ‫ﺃﺻﺤﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﺍﺋﻊ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﳝﻠﻜﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﻮﺱ ﻭﺍﻷﺭﻭﺍﺡ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪﻝ ﻭﺍﻹﺣﺴﺎﻥ‬ Ibid., vol. 4, p. 128. Norman Brown states: “It is in terms of prophecy, not incarnation, and therefore in terms of theophany or epiphany that Islam envisages the Divine Humanity: ‘Islam without in any way overlooking the limited and weak aspect of human nature does not consider man in his aspect as a perverted will but essentially as a theomorphic being who as the vicegerent (khalīfa) of God on earth is the central theophany (tajallī) of God’s Names and Qualities’.’’ (Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 53). Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 129; it states: ‫ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ ﺍﻹﻟۤـﻬﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ ﺟﺒّﻠ ٌﺔ ﺭﻭﺣﺎﻧﻴ ٌﺔ ﺗﺒﺪﻭ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻔ ٍﺲ ﺟﺰﺋﻴ ٍﺔ ﰲ ﺟﺴ ٍﺪ ﺑﺸﺮﻱ ﺑﻘ ّﻮ ٍﺓ ﻋﻘﻠﻴ ٍﺔ ﺗﻔﻴﺾ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ ﻟﺘﺠﺬﺏ ﺑﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﻮﺱ ﺍﳉﺰﺋﻴﺔ ﻭﲣّﻠﺼﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ‬... ‫ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺍﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﺑﺈﺫﻥ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﰲ ﺩﻭ ٍﺭ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﺩﻭﺍﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺮﺍﻧﺎﺕ‬ . ... ‫ﺃﺟﺴﺎ ٍﺩ ﺑﺸﺮﻳ ٍﺔ‬ See also Marquet, La philosophie des Ihwān al-S. afāʾ, pp. 501–8. ˘ is not literal, but truthful Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 129–30. My translation to its meaning. Al-Fārābī, Mabādīʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fād. ila, pp. 246–9. M. Mahdi, “Al-Fārābī’s Imperfect State,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 110 (1990), pp. 691–726. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, including the letters, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University

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Universality in Islamic Thought Press, 1971), p. 576. Plato’s Republic (Kitāb al-siyāsa) and Laws (Kitāb al-nawāmīs) were translated by H. unayn b. Ish. āq, see Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-fihrist, ed. Rid. ā Tajaddud (Tehran: Maktabat al-Asadī wa-Maktabat al-Jaʿfarī, 1971), p. 306; English tr. B. Dodge, The Fihrist of al-Nadīm (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), vol. 2, p. 592. For the translation movement of the ninth century see Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early ʿAbbāsid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries) (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 175–86. A commentary on The Republic was used by alFārābī and it constitutes the main part of Ibn Rushd’s commentary. EI2, s.v. Aflāt.ūn, by Walzer; idem, “On the Legacy of the Classics in the Islamic World,” in Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1963), p. 31. It is obvious that the list of the 12 inborn qualities of the ruler of the perfect state originate with Plato from the opening chapter of the sixth book of his Republic. In his Kitāb tah. s. īl al-saʿāda (Attainment of Happiness) alFārābī lists briefly those 12 qualities in a slightly different order and refers to Plato’s Republic. See Kitāb tah. s. īl al-saʿāda, ed. Jaʿfar Āl Yāsīn (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1981), p. 95; English tr. M. Mahdi, “Alfarabi: The Attainement of Happiness,” in Medieval Political Philosophy, p. 80. In his Kitāb al-milla wa-nus. ūs. ukhrā, ed. Muh. sin Mahdī (Beirut: Dār al-Machreq, 1968), p. 72, al-Fārābī also refers to Plato’s Republic. Plato dedicated a significant part of The Republic and the Laws to the importance of moral training in early childhood, see Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State, pp. 444–5. Al-Kulīnī, al-Us. ūl min al-kāfī, ed. ʿAlī Akbar al-Ghaffārī, 3rd ed. (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, 1388), vol. 1, kitāb al-h. ujja; al-Māwardī, al-Ah. kām al-sult. āniyya, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Mus. t.afā alBābī al-H. alabī, 1966), p. 6; Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrāʾ, al-Ah. kām alsult. āniyya, ed. Muh. ammad H. āmid al-Faqī, 2nd ed (Cairo: Mus. t.afā al-Bābī al-H. alabī, 1966), pp. 20–2. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, pp. 11–14, 30–1, 36. Rahman states that the imaginative faculty (al-quwwa al-mutakhayyila) is the central principle on which the Muslim philosophers base their explanation of the inner, psychological process of revelation. AlKindī uses three terms: al-quwwa al-mus. awwira, quwwat altawahhum and quwwat al-takhayyul and equates all three with the Greek al-fant. āsiyya. Al-Kindī, Rasāʾil al-Kindī, ed. Muh. ammad

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ʿAbd al-Hādī Abū Rīda (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1950-3), vol. 1, pp. 167, 284, 295. Mahdi explains why the faculty of imagination is considered lower than the very act of revelation by al-Fārābī. He (Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, p. 162) states: Although Alfarabi is not willing to enter into detail on how revelation or prophecy takes place, he asserts that it is not prophecy (defined as the overflow of the divine mind to the [power of] imagination [without making it quite clear whether the overflow is from the divine mind or from reason or from the illumination itself] but revelation (defined as the overflow of the divine mind to reason) that is the vehicle for the achievement of a human being’s highest perfection and for the excellence of the city he founds and rules. Al-Kindī, Rasāʾil al-Kindī, vol. 1, pp. 372–3; it states: ،‫ ﺻﻠﻮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ‬،‫ ﻛﻌﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﺮﺳﻞ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺍﻹﻟۤـﻬﻲ ﺑﻼ ﻃﻠ ٍﺐ ﻭﻻ ﺗﻜّﻠ ٍﻒ ﻭﻻ ﲝﻴﻠ ٍﺔ ﺑﺸﺮﻳ ٍﺔ ﻭﻻ ﺯﻣﺎ ٍﻥ‬... ‫ ﺃﻧّﻪ ﺑﻼ ﻃﻠ ٍﺐ ﻭﻻ ﺗﻜّﻠ ٍﻒ ﻭﻻ ﲝ ٍﺚ ﻭﻻ ﲝﻴﻠ ٍﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﻳﺎﺿﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﳌﻨﻄﻖ‬،‫ ﺟ ّﻞ ﻭﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻠﻮّﴽ ﻛﺒﻴﺮﴽ‬،‫ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﺧ ّﺼﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻠ ُﻪ‬ .‫ ﺑﺘﻄﻬﲑ ﺃﻧﻔﺴﻬﻢ ﻭﺇﻧﺎﺭﺗﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﺤ ّﻖ ﺑﺘﺄﻳﻴﺪﻩ ﻭﺗﺴﺪﻳﺪﻩ ﻭﺇﳍﺎﻣﻪ ﻭﺭﺳﺎﻻﺗﻪ‬،‫ ﺟ ّﻞ ﻭﺗﻌﺎﱃ‬،‫ ﺑﻞ ﻣﻊ ﺇﺭﺍﺩﺗﻪ‬،‫ﻭﻻ ﺑﺰﻣﺎ ٍﻥ‬ . ... ‫ ﺩﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﺸﺮ‬،‫ ﺻﻠﻮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ‬،‫ﻓﺈﻥ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺧﺎ ّﺻﺔ ﻟﻠﺮﺳﻞ‬ Ibn Sīnāʾ, Avicenna’s De Anima (Arabic Text): Being the Psychological part of Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, ed. Fazlur Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 173, 249–50, 276–7, 292–3; Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, pp. 14–20, 31–45. EI2, s.v. al-Rāzī, Abū Bakr Muh. ammad b. Zakariyyāʾ, by L. Goodman. Gabriel is referred to in the Qurʾān as an agent of revelation, see Qurʾān 2:97; 26:192–5. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 136; it states: ‫ﻭﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺇﺣﺪﻯ ﺍﳋﺼﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻳﻀﻌﻬﺎ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ ﺃﻥ ﻻ ﻳﻨﺴﺐ ﺇﱃ ﺭﺃﻳﻪ ﻭﺍﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩﻩ ﻭﻗ ّﻮﺗﻪ ﺷﻴﺌﴼ ّﳑﺎ‬ ‫ ﻟﻜﻨّﻪ ﻳﻨﺴﺒﻬﺎ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﺳﻄﺔ ﺍﻟﱵ ﺑﻴﻨﻪ ﻭﺑﻴﻦ ﺭﺑّﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﻼﺋﻜﺔ ﺍﻟﱵ‬،‫ﻳﻘﻮﻝ ﻭﻳﻔﻌﻞ ﻭﻳﺄﻣﺮ ﻭﻳﻨﻬﻲ ﰲ ﻭﺿﻊ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ‬ ،‫ ﻭﺃﻟّﻔﻮﺍ ﻛﺘﺎﺑﴼ‬،‫ ﻭﺃ ّﻣﺎ ﺍﳊﻜﻤﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﻼﺳﻔﺔ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺍﺳﺘﺨﺮﺟﻮﺍ ﻋﻠﻤﴼ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ‬.‫ﺗﻮﺣﻲ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﰲ ﺃﻭﻗﺎﺕ ﻏﲑ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ‬ ‫ ﻧﺴﺒﻮﺍ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺇﱃ ﻗ ّﻮﺓ ﺃﻧﻔﺴﻬﻢ ﻭﺍﺟـﺘﻬﺎﺩﻫﻢ‬،‫ ﺃﻭ ﺩﺑّﺮﻭﺍ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ‬... ‫ﺃﻭ ﺍﺳﺘﺨﺮﺟﻮﺍ ﺻﻨﻌﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﺋﻊ‬ . ... ‫ﻭﺟـﻮﺩﺓ ﺭﺃﻳﻬﻢ‬ Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 261–2. In fifth- to sixth-century Athens, the peak of the philosophical curriculum was no longer metaphysics, but theology, i.e. a philosophical discourse about the divine principles, whose sources lie in the revelations of late paganism, in Plato’s dialogues, etc. Referring to this phenomenon C. D’Ancona, “Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation,” p. 16, states that philosophy, insofar as it celebrates the truly divine principles of the visible cosmos, is prayer. See also A. C. Lloyd, “The Later

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Universality in Islamic Thought Neoplatonists,” in A. H. Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, pp. 272–325. This definition of philosophy occurs several times in the Rasāʾil and al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa, vol. 1, pp. 92–123. In his epistle entitled “On the first philosophy,” al-Kindī defines philosophy as “the knowledge of the realities of things according to human capacity.” In another epistle, “On the definition of things,” he defines philosophy as “imitation of God’s actions according to human capacity,” or “philosophy is the man’s knowledge of himself.” He comments that the latter is extremely noble with profound meaning. The Arabic reads: ‫ ﺻﻨﺎﻋ ُﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﱵ ﺣ ّﺪﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﻷﺷﻴﺎﺀ ﲝﻘﺎﺋﻘﻬﺎ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﺷﺮﻓﻬﺎ ﻣﺮﺗﺒ ًﺔ‬،‫ﺇ ّﻥ ﺃﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﻨـﺰﻟ ًﺔ‬ ‫ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﻋﻠﻢ‬...‫ ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺒّﻪ ﺑﺄﻓﻌﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺑﻘﺪﺭ ﻃﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ‬... ‫ﺑﻘﺪﺭ ﻃﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ‬ .‫ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﻣﻌﺮﻓ ُﺔ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﻧﻔ َﺴﻪ‬... ‫ ﺑﻘﺪﺭ ﻃﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ‬،‫ ﺇﻧّﻴّﺘﻬﺎ ﻭﻣﺎﺋﻴّﺘﻬﺎ ﻭﻋﻠﻠﻬﺎ‬،‫ﺍﻷﺷﻴﺎﺀ ﺍﻷﺑﺪﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻜّﻠﻴﺔ‬ The phrase: ‫ ﻭﻫﻮ ﺃﻛﺜﺮ ﺗﺸﺒّ ًﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻫﻮ ﺃ ّﻭﻝ ﻣﺒﺘﺪ ٍﻉ‬occurs in “The Liber de Causis (Kalām fī mah. d. al-khayr): A Study of Medieval Neoplatonism,” ed. and trans. by Richard Taylor (Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the University of Toronto, 1981), p. 236. See also al-Kindī, Rasāʾil al-Kindī, vol. 1, pp. 97, 172 and 173. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 261–3, 268. Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī, al-Muʿjam al-mufahras li-alfāz. al-Qurʾān alkarīm bi-h. āshiyat al-Mus. h. af al-sharīf (Cairo: Dār al-H. adīth, 1987), s.v. al-albāb. Ibid., s.v. tatafakkarūn, yatafakkarūn. Ibid. Ibid., s.v. yatafakkarūn. Ibid., s.v. taʿqilūn. Ibid. Ibid., s.v. yaʿqilūn. Ibid., s.v. yatadhakkarūn. Basing his argument on several verses of the Qurʾān, Arberry has argued that a rational discussion of religious truths was opened by the prophets. Arberry, Revelation and Reason, pp. 12–15. Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), s.v. Reason, by Henry Leroy Finch. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 180, it states: ‫ﺽ ﻭﺍﺣ ٌﺪ ﻭﺇﻥ‬ ٌ ‫ ﻭﻏﺮ‬،‫ ﻭﻣﻘﺼﺪﻫﻢ ﻣﻘﺼ ٌﺪ ﻭﺍﺣ ٌﺪ‬،‫ﺩﻳﻦ ﺍﻷﻧﺒﻴﺎﺀ ﺩﻳ ٌﻦ ﻭﺍﺣ ٌﺪ ﻭﻣﺴﻠﻜﻬﻢ ﺟـﻤﻴﻌﴼ ﻣﺴﻠ ٌﻚ ﻭﺍﺣ ٌﺪ‬ .‫ﺍﺧﺘﻠﻔﺖ ﺷﺮﺍﺋ ُﻌﻬﻢ‬ Qurʾān 42:15; translation is by M. Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, p. 742.

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It states: “We make no distinction between any of them [i.e. we regard them all as true prophets of God].” See Qurʾān 2:136, 285; 3:84; M. Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, p. 28. It states: “Unto every one of you have We appointed a [different] law and way of life. And if God had so willed, He could surely have made you all one single community: but [He willed it otherwise] in order to test you by means of what He has vouchsafed unto you. Vie, then, with one another in doing good works! Unto God you all must return: and then He will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to differ.” Qurʾān 5:48; M. Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, pp. 153–4. Qurʾān 2:62; 5:69. Alludes to the Qurʾān 80:15–16. It refers to the “preserved tablet” (al-lawh. al-mah. fūz. ), kept pure and uncorrupted from the hands of evil spirits, and touched only by the angels. It was the source of all revealed books. Al-T. abarī, Jāmiʿ al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, n.d.), vol. 30, p. 34; al-T. abrisī, Majmaʿ al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān, ed. al-Sayyid Hāshim al-Rasūlī al-Mah. allātī (Sharikat al-Maʿārif al-Islāmiyya, 1379 [1959–60]), vol. 5, p. 438. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 41–2, it states: ‫ ﻭﻻ ﻳﺘﻌ ّﺼﺒﻮﺍ‬،‫ ﺃﻭ ﻳﻬﺠﺮﻭﺍ ﻛﺘﺎﺑﴼ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺐ‬،‫ ﺃﻥ ﻻ ﻳﻌﺎﺩﻭﺍ ﻋﻠﻤﴼ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ‬،‫ ﺃﻳّﺪﻫﻢ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ‬،‫ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ ﻹﺧﻮﺍﻧﻨﺎ‬ ‫ ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﺃﻧﻪ‬،‫ ﻷﻥ ﺭﺃﻳﻨﺎ ﻭﻣﺬﻫﺒﻨﺎ ﻳﺴﺘﻐﺮﻕ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﻛّﻠﻬﺎ ﻭﳚﻤﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ ﺟـﻤﻴﻌﻬﺎ‬،‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺬﻫ ٍﺐ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ‬ ‫ ﺟﻠﻴّﻬﺎ‬،‫ ﻇﺎﻫﺮﻫﺎ ﻭﺑﺎﻃﻨﻬﺎ‬،‫ ﻣﻦ ﺃ ّﻭﳍﺎ ﺇﱃ ﺁﺧﺮﻫﺎ‬،‫ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ﺟـﻤﻴﻊ ﺍﳌﻮﺟﻮﺩﺍﺕ ﺑﺄﺳﺮﻫﺎ ﺍﳊ ّﺴﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ‬ ‫ ﺃﻥ ﻋﻠﻮﻣﻨﺎ‬... ‫ ﻭﻧﻔ ٍﺲ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ٍﺓ‬،‫ ﻭﻋّﻠ ٍﺔ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ٍﺓ‬،‫ ﺑﻌﲔ ﺍﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻲ ﻛّﻠﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺒﺪﺇٍ ﻭﺍﺣ ٍﺪ‬،‫ﻭﺧﻔﻴّﻬﺎ‬ ‫ ﺃﺣﺪﻫﺎ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺐ ﺍﳌﺼﻨّﻔﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﺍﳊﻜﻤﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﻼﺳﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﻳﺎﺿﻴﺎﺕ‬:‫ﻣﺄﺧﻮﺫﺓ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺭﺑﻌﺔ ﻛﺘ ٍﺐ‬ ‫ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺭﺍﺓ ﻭﺍﻹﳒﻴﻞ‬،‫ ﺻﻠﻮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ‬،‫ﻭﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺎﺕ؛ ﻭﺍﻵﺧﺮ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺐ ﺍﳌﻨـﺰﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﱵ ﺟﺎﺀﺕ ﺑﻬﺎ ﺍﻷﻧﺒﻴﺎﺀ‬ ‫ ﻭﻣﺎ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﺳﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﳋﻔﻴّﺔ؛‬،‫ﻭﺍﻟﻔﺮﻗﺎﻥ ﻭﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺻﺤﻒ ﺍﻷﻧﺒﻴﺎﺀ ﺍﳌﺄﺧﻮﺫﺓ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺣﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﻼﺋﻜﺔ‬ ‫ ﻭﺃﻗﺴﺎﻡ‬،‫ ﻭﻫﻲ ﺻﻮﺭﺃﺷﻜﺎﻝ ﺍﳌﻮﺟﻮﺩﺍﺕ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻵﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﺍﻷﻓﻼﻙ‬،‫ﻭﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺐ ﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ‬ ‫ ؛ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﻮﻉ ﺍﻟﺮﺍﺑﻊ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺐ ﺍﻹﻟۤـﻬﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻻ ﳝ ّﺴﻬﺎ ﺇﻻ ﺍﳌﻄ ّﻬﺮﻭﻥ ﺍﳌﻼﺋﻜﺔ ﺍﻟﱵ‬... ‫ ﻭﺣﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻜﻮﺍﻛﺐ‬،‫ﺍﻟﱪﻭﺝ‬ . ... ‫ ﻭﻫﻲ ﺟﻮﺍﻫﺮ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﻮﺱ ﻭﺃﺟﻨﺎﺳﻬﺎ ﻭﺃﻧﻮﺍﻋﻬﺎ‬،‫ﻫﻲ ﺑﺄﻳﺪﻱ ﺳﻔﺮ ٍﺓ ﻛﺮﺍ ٍﻡ ﺑﺮﺭ ٍﺓ‬ See for example Rasāʾil, vol. 3, p. 145; vol. 4, pp. 167–8, where the aforementioned things are summarized, p. 283; vol. 3, p. 246; vol. 4, p. 42. Rasāʾil, vol. 2, pp. 306–7. Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 307. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 156–7. I. R. Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists: An Introduction to the Thought of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-S. afāʾ) (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 54–5. Rasāʾil, vol. 2, pp. 284, 367; vol. 3, p. 161. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 168.

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111 Stanley Lane-Poole, Studies in a Mosque (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), p. 207. 112 For references see Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 126, n. 159. The story is cited in the Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 291–2. 113 Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 266. 114 Qurʾān 21:69; M. Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, p. 495. Asad states in the footnote that the Qurʾān does not state that Abraham was actually thrown into the fire and miraculously kept alive in it. Contrarily, the phrase “God saved him from fire” in 29:24 indicates the fact of his not having been thrown into it. Muslim stories embellished by the classical commentators are traced back to Talmudic legends. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 376–7. For a similar explanation see al-T. abarī, Jāmiʿ al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān, vol. 17, pp. 32–3. 115 Hebrew-English Edition of the Babylonian Talmud, tr. H. Freedman, ed. I. Epstein (London: Soncino Press, 1967); Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 126, n. 168. 116 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 292–3; Genesis 30:25–43. In the present edition of the Rasāʾil it is attributed to the second book of the Torah, which is an error as this story is found in chapter 30 of Genesis, the first book of the Pentateuch and the Old Testament. It should be noted that strictly speaking the term Torah is used for the Pentateuch, however in a wider sense it is applied to the Old Testament. 117 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 28–32. 118 Lootfy Levonian, “The Ikhwān al-S. afāʾ and Christ,” Muslim World 35 (1945), p. 27. The Rasāʾil, like the Nestorians, emphasize Christ’s humanity (nāsūt) rather than his divinity (lāhūt). It was Christ’s humanity that was crucified and his human body was found missing when the tomb was opened. The Ikhwān’s statement that Christ was crucified, and was buried and the implication that he rose from the dead is in sharp contrast to the Qurʾānic assertion, which states: However, they did not slay him, and neither did they crucify him, but it only seemed to them [as if it had been] so. Qurʾān 4:157; Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, p. 134. Al-T. abarī, Tafsīr al-T. abarī, ed. Mah. mūd Muh. ammad Shākir and Ah. mad Muh. ammad Shākir, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dār alMaʿārif, 1969-), vol. 9, pp. 367–78. The Ikhwān’s emphasis in the story is on the soul’s immortality. 119 For the traditional accounts of the earliest converts see W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), pp. 86–99.

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120 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 16. 121 Compare Luke 2:41–50; Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 55. 122 Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 284; vol. 3, p. 485; vol. 4, p. 30. Miracles, such as speaking in the cradle, healing the blind and the leper, etc. are mentioned also in the Qurʾān 5:110–15. 123 This view is repeated several times. See for example, Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 141; vol. 3, p. 12; vol. 4, p. 16. 124 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 29–30. 125 The Gospel of Philip, tr. from the Coptic by R. Wilson (London, 1962), p. 39; Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 57. 126 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 58, 175. Qurʾān 26:81–6 is cited as evidence. It states: “The Sustainer of all the worlds, who has created me and is the One who guides me . . . He who will cause me to die and then bring me back to life . . . O my Sustainer! Endow with the ability to judge with the righteous . . . and place me among those who shall inherit the garden of bliss!” Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, pp. 565–6. 127 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 58, 175. Qurʾān 12:101 is cited as evidence. It states: “O my Sustainer! Thou hast indeed bestowed upon me something of power, and hast imparted unto me some knowledge of the inner meaning of happenings . . . Let me die as one who has surrendered himself unto Thee, and make me one with the righteous!” Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, p. 353. 128 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 34–6, 58, 175. Pythogoras’ al-Risāla aldhahabiyya (The Golden Epistle) containing his counsels for the initiate is referred to. See also Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, pp. 15–16; Marquet, Les “Frères de la pureté”: Pythagoriciens de l’Islam. 129 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 34–5, 58, 73–4, 175, 271 (It refers to Plato’s dialogue Phadeo, which gives an account of Socrates’ last hours and where the talk had turned on the immortality of the soul.) 130 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 35. Plato’s doctrine of the soul remains one of the perplexing puzzles in his philosophy. He believed in the imperishability of the soul (psyche) and discussed the question of the immortality of the human soul in the sense of the survival of human consciousness after death. See Plato: The Collected Dialogues, pp. xx–xxi. 131 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 35, 271. A spurious Aristotelian treatise entitled Risālat al-tuffāh. a (The Book of the Apple) is referred to. It was also known in the West by its Latin title Tractatus de pomo et morte incliti principis philosophorun Aristotelis. See Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 31.

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132 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 175. The story was translated from Pahlavi into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. EI2, s.v. Bilawhar wa-Yūdāsaf, by D. M. Lang. 133 See n. 117 above. 134 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 58, 175. The Prophet’s saying referred to states: “Verily, tomorrow you will arrive at the Pond (h. awd. ).” For the traditions see A. J. Wensinck, Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), s.v. h. -w-d. . 135 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 33, 75. 136 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 270–1. 137 ‫ ;ﻣﻦ ﺃﻭﻻﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﺒﺎﺱ‬Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 206. 138 ‫( ﺍﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﺷﻬﺮ ﻳﻌﲏ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻕ‬i.e. an Iranian from Iraq). Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 278. The term Īrānshahr is applied to the country of Iran (keshvar-e Īrān) during the Sasanid period, which included Iraq. Muh. ammad Muʿīn, Farhang-i Fārisī (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1963–73), s.v. Īrānshahr. 139 ‫ﺭﺟﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻼﺩ ﺍﳍﻨﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺰﻳﺮﺓ ﺳﺮﻧﺪﻳﺐ‬. Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 281. 140 ‫ ﻋﱪﺍﱐ ﻣﻦ ﺁﻝ ﺇﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ‬،‫ﺭﺟﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻡ‬. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 282. 141 ‫ﺭﺟﻞ ﺳﺮﻳﺎﱐ ﻣﻦ ﺁﻝ ﺍﳌﺴﻴﺢ‬. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 284. 142 ‫ ﻗﺮﺷﻲ‬،‫ﺭﺟﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻬﺎﻣﺔ‬. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 285. 143 ‫ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻼﺩ ﻳﻮﻧﺎﻥ‬،‫ ﺭﺟﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﺮﻭﻡ‬. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 286. 144 ‫ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻼﺩ ﻣﺮﻭ‬،‫ﺭﺟﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺧﺮﺍﺳﺎﻥ‬. Ibid. vol. 2, p. 289. 145 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 376, it reads: ،‫ ﺍﳊﻨﻔﻲ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﰊ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ‬،‫ ﺍﳌﺴﺘﺒﺼﺮ ﺍﻟﻔﺎﺭﺳﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﻔﺎﺿﻞ ﺍﻟﺬﻛﻲ‬،‫ﻓﻘﺎﻡ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﺍﳋﺒﻴﺮ‬ ‫ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﰲ‬،‫ ﺍﳍﻨﺪﻱ ﺍﻟﺒﺼﲑﺓ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﻧﺎﱐ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻣﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﺴﻚ‬،‫ ﺍﳌﺴﻴﺤﻲ ﺍﳌﻨﻬﺞ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﻌﱪﺍﱐ ﺍﳌﺨﱪ‬،‫ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻗﻲ ﺍﻵﺩﺍﺏ‬ .‫ ﺍﻹﻟۤـﻬﻲ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﺭﻑ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﺮﺑّﺎﱐ ﺍﻟﺮﺃﻱ‬،‫ ﺍﳌﻠﻜﻲ ﺍﻷﺧﻼﻕ‬،‫ﺍﻟﺴﲑﺓ‬ 146 See for example Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 139, 209, 235 (Persian verses are cited); vol. 1, p. 292; vol. 2, p. 280; vol. 3, pp. 495, 496 (names of Persian kings are mentioned). 147 Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 292; Kitāb Zardāsht is referred to. 148 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 495, 496; it states: ‫ ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﺃﻥ‬،‫ ﻻ ﻗﻮﺍﻡ ﻷﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﺇﻻ ﺑﺎﻵﺧﺮ‬،‫ ﺇﻥ ﺍﳌﻠﻚ ﻭﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﺃﺧﻮﺍﻥ ﺗﻮﻣﺄﻥ‬:‫ﻗﺎﻝ ﻣﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﺱ ﺃﺭﺩﺷﲑ ﰲ ﻭﺻﻴّﺘﻪ‬ .‫ ﻭﻻ ﺑ ّﺪ ﻟﻠﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺎﺭ ٍﺱ‬... ‫ ﻓﻤﺎ ﻻ ﺃ ٰﺱ ﻟﻪ ﻣﻬﺪﻭ ٌﻡ‬،‫ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﺃُ ّﺱ ﺍﳌﻠﻚ ﻭﺍﳌﻠﻚ ﺣﺎﺭﺳﻪ‬ See also Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 129, n. 98. 149 Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 20–2, 315–27 (malik al-Furs, or malikun min mulūk al-Furs); ibid., vol. 2, pp. 460–1 (malikun min al-mulūk, h. akīmun min al-h. ukamāʾ); ibid., vol. 3, pp. 82–3 (min awlād almulūk); ibid., vol. 3, pp. 173–6 (baʿd. mulūk al-Hind ); ibid., vol. 3, pp. 315–19 (anna malikan). 150 See for example, Rasāʾil, vol. 3, pp. 82–3; vol. 4, pp. 14–16, 148–57, 162–4. See n. 132 above. 151 See for example ibid., vol. 4, pp. 152–64.

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For example see ibid., vol. 4, pp. 14–15. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 170–1; Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, pp. 93–4. Rasāʾil, vol. 3, pp. 167–8; Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, pp. 93–4. The Arabic proverb cited is: ‫( ﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺎ ّﻣ ٍﺔ ﺇﻻ ﻭﻓﻮﻗﻬﺎ ﻃﺎ ّﻣ ٌﺔ‬literally, there is no calamity but above it is a greater calamity). See E. Lane, ArabicEnglish Lexicon (London: Islamic Text Society, 1984; reprint of 1863–77), s.v. t.-m-m. It ends with: ‫ ﻓﻨﺪﻣﻮﺍ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ‬.‫ ﻭﻗﺪ ﺃﺧﻄﺄﻧﺎ‬،‫ ﺑﺌﺲ ﻣﺎ ﺻﻨﻌﻨﺎ ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻨﺎ‬:‫ﻓﻘﺎﻟﺖ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺑﺎﻥ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻟﺒﻌﺾ‬ .‫ﱂ ﺗﻨﻔﻌﻬﻢ ﺍﻟﻨﺪﺍﻣﺔ‬ Makdisi, Rise of Humanism, p. 48. Ahmad Shalaby, History of Muslim Education (Beirut: Dar alKashshaf, 1954), pp. 16–23; A. L. Tibawi, Islamic Education: Its traditions and modernization into the Arab national systems (London: Luzac & Company, 1979; reprint of 1972), pp. 23–6. Based on some historical evidence Makdisi suggests that besides teaching “the literary arts,” at times, the maktab also provided a higher level of education and even functioned as a “finishing school,” whose graduates continued their studies on their own, or took up private apprenticeship with a master. Makdisi, Rise of Humanism, pp. 48–9; idem, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), p. 19. Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muh. ammad b. Ah. mad al-Khwārizmī, Mafātīh. alʿulūm (Cairo: Idārat al-t.ibāʿa al-Munīriyya, 1342/1923–4), p. 4. The term “literary arts” is used by Makdisi. Other Arabic terms used are: al-adab, al-ādāb, al-adabiyyāt, ʿilm al-ādāb, al-ʿulūm aladabiyya, ʿilm al-lisān or ʿulūm al-lisān. It included philology, i.e. grammar and lexicography; poetry, with the sciences of metrics and rhyme; rhetoric, as applied to letter-writing and speechwriting; history; and moral philosophy, including proverbs and the science of government. Other Arabic terms for the religious sciences are al-ʿulūm al-sharʿiyya or al-ʿulūm al-naqliyya (traditional sciences). Makdisi, Rise of Hunamism, pp. 88–96, 119–52. Makdisi, Rise of Humanism, pp. 109–10; EI2, s.v. ʿAbd Allāh b. alʿAbbās, by Veccia Vaglieri. Makdisi, Rise of Humanism, p. 111; EI2, s.v. Abu’l-Aswad alDuʾalī, by J. Fück. EI2, s.v. Thaʿlab, Abu’l-ʿAbbās Ah. mad, by Monique Bernards. Yāqūt, Muʿjam al-udabāʾ: Irshād al-arīb ilā maʿrifat al-adīb, ed. Ih. sān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1993), vol. 2, p. 551; it reads:

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Universality in Islamic Thought ‫ ﻳﺎ ﺃﺑﺎ ﺑﻜﺮ ﺍﺷﺘﻐﻞ ﺃﺻﺤﺎﺏ‬:‫ ﻓﻘﺎﻝ ﱄ‬،‫ ﻛﻨﺖ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺃﰊ ﺍﻟﻌﺒﺎﺱ ﺛﻌﻠﺐ‬:‫ ﻗﺎﻝ‬.‫ﻭﺣ ّﺪﺙ ﺃﺑﻮ ﺑﻜﺮ ﺍﺑﻦ ﳎﺎﻫﺪ‬ ،‫ ﻭﺍﺷﺘﻐﻞ ﺃﺻﺤﺎﺏ ﺍﳊﺪﻳﺚ ﺑﺎﳊﺪﻳﺚ ﻓﻔﺎﺯﻭﺍ‬،‫ ﻭﺍﺷﺘﻐﻞ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﻔﻘﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻘﻪ ﻓﻔﺎﺯﻭﺍ‬،‫ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺁﻥ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺮﺁﻥ ﻓﻔﺎﺯﻭﺍ‬ !‫ ﻓﻠﻴﺖ ﺷﻌﺮﻱ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺣﺎﱄ ﰲ ﺍﻵﺧﺮﺓ‬،‫ﻭﺍﺷﺘﻐﻠﺖ ﺃﻧﺎ ﺑﺰﻳ ٍﺪ ﻭﻋﻤﺮ ٍﻭ‬ See also Makdisi, Rise of Colleges, p. 76; English translation is by Makdisi with slight modification. Al-Khwārizmī, Mafātīh. al-ʿulūm, p. 4; other Arabic terms are alʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya (rational sciences), or al-ʿulūm al-ghayr alsharʿiyya. See also Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture. It should be noted that the efforts to classify the sciences in Islam began with al-Kindī. His efforts were based on the Aristotelian division into theoretical, practical and productive as given by Porphyry in the Isagoge. S. H. Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 60. Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, ed. Rid. ā Tajaddud (Tehran: Maktabat al-Asadī, 1971), pp. 3–5. Ten chapters are organized as follows: (i) Languages and Writings, (ii) Grammarians and Philologists, (iii) History, Biography and Genealogy, (iv) Poetry and Poets, (v) al-Kalām and al-Mutakallimīn, (scholastic theology and the theologians) (vi) Fiqh, Fuqahāʾ (jurisprudence and the jurists) and Muh. addithūn (transmitters of traditions), (vii) Philosophy and Ancient Sciences, (viii) asmār, khurāfāt, ʿazāʾim, sih. r (nightly conversation, fairy tales, talismans, casting of spells), (ix) al-madhāhib waʾl-iʿtiqādāt (the H. arrāniyya, Kaldāniyya, S. ābiʾa), (x) Alchemists. His organization of knowledge is divided into two discourses: Islamic sciences (ʿulūm al-sharīʿa) and what is associated with them of al-ʿulūm al-ʿarabiyya; and foreign sciences (ʿulūm alʿajam min al-Yūnān wa-ghayrihim min al-umam). The first discourse consists of six sections: (i) jurisprudence (fiqh); (ii) philosophical/scholastic theology (kalām), it includes Islamic, Christian and Jewish sects; (iii) Arabic language and grammar (nah. w); (iv) the art of writing in various chanceries [al-kitāba wa-] kuttāb; (v) poetry and metrics (al-shiʿr wa’l-ʿarūd. ); (vi) history (alakhbār). The second discourse consists of nine sections: (i) philosophy; (ii) logic (Isagoge plus eight books of Aristotle); (iii) medicine; (iv) arithmetic; (v) geometry; (vi) astronomy; (vii) music; (viii) h. iyal (devising instruments for pulling heavy weight with little power, etc.) (ix) alchemy. Al-Khwārizimī, Mafātīh. alʿulūm, pp. 4–5. It was al-Khwārizmī’s classification of sciences that prevailed during the later centuries of Islamic history. In his Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, pp. 166–75, Gutas has clarified the misconception

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generated by I. Goldziher that Islamic orthodoxy was opposed to the Greek sciences. However, it is undeniable that a strong antagonism toward foreign sciences was one of the reasons for the gradual decline of science and philosophy from the curriculum of medieval Islamic education. This is amply borne out by Fazlur Rahman’s remark in his Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 33, wherein he states: But the most fateful distinction that came to be made in the course of time was between the “religious sciences” (ʿulūm sharʿīya) or “traditional sciences” (ʿulūm naqlīya) and the “rational or secular sciences” (ʿulūm ʿaqlīya or ghayr sharʿīya), toward which a gradually stiffening and stifling attitude was adopted. There are several reasons for this perilous development. For the physician Ibn But.lān see Ibn Abī Us. aybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī .tabaqāt al-at. ibbāʾ, ed. Nizār Rid. ā (Beirut: Dār Maktabat alH. ayāt, 1965), pp. 325–8; EI2, s.v. Ibn But.lān, by J. Schacht. For example the Arabic reads: ‫ ﻭﺍﳋﺮﻭﺝ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ّﺪ‬،‫ ﺃﻭ ﺗﻬﺬﻳﺐ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﺮّﻗﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﻨﻘﺺ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﺘﻤﺎﻡ‬،‫ﺗﻬﺬﻳﺐ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻭﺇﺻﻼﺡ ﺍﻷﺧﻼﻕ‬ ‫ ﰲ‬... ‫ ﻟﺘﻨﺎﻝ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﺒﻘﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻟﺪﻭﺍﻡ ﻭﺍﳋﻠﻮﺩ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻨﻌﻢ ﻣﻊ ﺃﺑﻨﺎﺀ ﺟﻨﺴﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺍﳌﻼﺋﻜﺔ‬،‫ﺍﻟﻘ ّﻮﺓ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻈﻬﻮﺭ‬ ‫ ﻭﺍﻟﻜﻤﺎﻝ‬،‫ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﻘﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﺪﺍﺋﻢ‬،‫ ﻭﺍﳉﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻈﻤﻰ‬،‫ﺗﻬﺬﻳﺐ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﻮﺱ ﻭﺇﺻﻼﺡ ﺍﻷﺧﻼﻕ ﻟﻠﺒﻠﻮﻍ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﺴﻌﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻜﱪﻯ‬ .‫ﺍﻷﺧﲑ‬ ‫ ; ﻣﻦ ﻋﺮﻑ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻋﺮﻑ ﺭﺑّﻪ‬it is repeated at several places. ‫ ;ﺃﻋﺮﻓﻜﻢ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﺃﻋﺮﻓﻜﻢ ﺑﺮﺑّﻪ‬Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 76; 4, p. 231; al-Risāla aljāmiʿa, 1, pp. 497–8; see also n. 87 above. We could not trace this tradition in the Sunnī h. adīth collections, however it circulated widely in the works of Yamanī Ismāʿīlīs, see Ismail Poonawala, ed., al-Sult. ān al-Khat. .tāb: H . ayātuhu wa-shiʿruhu, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1999), pp. 437–8. Al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa, vol. 1, p. 64 (‫)ﺇﻥ ﺍﳉﺎﻫﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺎﱂ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﺩﻭﻥ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ ﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻥ‬. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 217; it reads: .‫ ﻭﺑﺎﻟﻨﻮﺭ ﺗﻬﺘﺪﻱ‬،‫ ﻓﺒﺎﻟﺴّﻠﻢ ﺗﺮﺗﻘﻲ‬.‫ ﻭﺍﳌﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﺭ ﻳﺴﻌﻰ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻳﺪﻳﻚ‬،‫ﻭﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻫﻮ ﺳّﻠﻢ ﺍﳌﻌﺮﺍﺝ‬ Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 75–6. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 266; al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa, vol. 1, p. 219. Marquet (La philosophie des Ihwān al-S. afāʾ, pp. 295–6) translates them as: ˘ Les Sciences Juridiques and Les Sciences Les Sciences Pratiques, Philosophiques, ou Sciences des Réalités. Miskawayh states that al-tat. ayyur (auguring evil from birds’ movements) is forbidden by the sharīʿa, but not al-faʾl. AlTawh. īdī and Miskawayh, al-Hawāmil wa’l-shawāmil, pp. 200–1.

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Universality in Islamic Thought There are several ah. ādīth that approve of al-faʾl. Wensinck, Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane, s.v. f-ʾ-l. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 266–7; al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa, vol. 1, p. 220. The Imāms, the successors of the prophets, are the most qualified in it. As. h. āb al-h. adīth are meant here. In al-Kindī’s Rasāʾil al-Kindī, vol. 1, pp. 364, 369–70, 376, 378, this word is spelled ʿilm al-riyād. āt and at one place as al-riyād. āt wa’ltaʿālīm. In arranging the Aristotelian corpus al-Kindī stresses the importance of these sciences for the study of philosophy. He is said to have composed a treatise on ʿilm al-riyād. iyyāt emphasizing its importance (‫)ﺭﺳﺎﻟﺘﻪ ﰲ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺗُﻨﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻠﺔ ﺇﻻ ﺑﻌﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﺮﻳﺎﺿﻴﺎﺕ‬. Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-fihrist, p. 316; Ibn Abī Us. aybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, p. 289. This fourfold division of the philosophical sciences is also given at the beginning of the first epistle, see Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 49. This division closely resembles that of the Aristotelian corpus given by al-Kindī. Al-Kindī, Rasāʾil al-Kindī, vol. 1, pp. 364–5. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 267–8; al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa, vol. 1, pp. 223–5. The fourfold division of mathematical sciences is derived from the Pythagorean school and was continued in the quadrivium curriculum of the Middle Ages. Miskawayh follows the same division, see al-Tawh. īdī and Miskawayh, al-Hawāmil wa’lshawāmil, p. 162. Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 11. In alKindī, Rasāʾil al-Kindī, vol. 1, pp. 369–70, 376–8, the four categories are: ‫ ( ﻭﺍﻟﺘﺄﻟﻴﻒ‬... ‫ﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﻌﺪﺩ ﻭﺍﳍﻨﺪﺳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻨﺠﻴﻢ )ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ﺍﻟﻜ ّﻞ ﻭﻋﺪﺩ ﺃﺟﺴﺎﻣﻪ ﺍﻟﻜّﻠﻴﺎﺕ ﻭﺣﺮﻛﺎﺗﻬﺎ‬ .‫ ﻭﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺍﳌﺆﺗﻠﻒ ﻣﻨﻪ ﻭﺍﳌﺨﺘﻠﻒ‬،‫ ﻭﻗﺮﻧﻪ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ‬،‫ ﻓﻌﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﺘﺄﻟﻴﻒ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﺇﳚﺎﺩ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﻋﺪﺩ ﺇﱃ ﻋﺪﺩ‬... The Isagoge of Porphyry was an introduction to Aristotelian logic. EI2, s.v. Furfūriyūs (by R. Walzer) and Īsāghūdjī. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 268–9; al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa, vol. 1, pp. 225–8. The titles of all treatises are misspelled in the printed editions, hence I have listed the first five as they are arranged in vol. 1 of the Rasāʾil, epistles 10 to 14. The five treatises listed in the text are: Poetics, Rhetoric, Topics, Analytics and Sophistical Refutations. Al-Kindī (Rasāʾil al-Kindī, vol. 1, pp. 365–8) has listed all eight in the following order: Categories, Peri Hermeneias, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric, and Poetics. The sevenfold division of the physical sciences is the same as in alKindī, Rasāʾil al-Kindī, vol. 1, p. 368:

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‫ﻓﺄ ّﻣﺎ ﻛﻤﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ ﺍﳌﺮﺗّﺒﺔ ﻓﺴﺒﻌﺔ ﻛﺘﺐ‪ :‬ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﳋﱪ ﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺴﻤﺎﺀ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ‬ ‫ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻜﻮﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﺴﺎﺩ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺮﺍﺑﻊ ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺃﺣﺪﺍﺙ ﺍﳉ ّﻮ ﻭﺍﻷﺭﺽ‪ ،‬ﺍﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﺩﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺩﺱ ﻛﺘﺎﺏ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻨﺒﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻥ‪.‬‬ ‫‪186 Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 272; it states:‬‬ ‫ﻭﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﻄ ّﺐ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﻴﻄﺮﺓ‪ ،‬ﻭﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﺍﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﺒﺎﻉ ﻭﺍﻟﻄﻴﻮﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﳊﺮﺙ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﺴﻞ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﺋﻊ‬ ‫ﺃﺟـﻤ ُﻊ ﺩﺍﺧ ٌﻞ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺎﺕ‪.‬‬ ‫‪It should be noted that al-Kindī (Rasāʾil al-Kindī, vol. 1, pp. 364–5,‬‬ ‫ﻭﺃ ّﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻉ ‪368) lists a third category of Aristotle’s works described as‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻔﻴﻤﺎ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﺴﺘﻐﻨﻴًﺎ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﺋ ًﻤﺎ ﺑﺬﺍﺗﻪ ﻏﲑ ﳏﺘﺎﺝ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻷﺟﺴﺎﻡ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻷﺟﺴﺎﻡ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺍﺻ ًﻼ ﳍﺎ ﺑﺄﺣﺪ ﺃﻧﻮﺍﻉ ﺍﳌﻮﺍﺻﻠﺔ‬ ‫‪(those things that exist by themselves independent of matter).‬‬ ‫‪They are:‬‬ ‫ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ‪ ،‬ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﳊ ّﺲ ﻭﺍﶈﺴﻮﺱ‪ ،‬ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﻴﻘﻈﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﻃﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﺮ ﻭﻗﺼﺮﻩ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ ). Al-Kindī, Rasāʾil‬ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﲟﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺎﺕ( ‪187 In Aristotle it is metaphysics‬‬ ‫‪al-Kindī, vol. 1, pp. 368–9, 372–6. After it al-Kindī lists Aristotle’s‬‬ ‫‪books on ethics, especially the Nicomachean Ethics. It is worth‬‬ ‫‪noting that following the classification of Aristotle’s corpus, which‬‬ ‫‪he describes as human sciences (al-ʿulūm al-insāniyya) that could‬‬ ‫‪be acquired by human endeavor, he adds four pages on the divine‬‬ ‫‪science (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī). He adds that the latter is higher than the‬‬ ‫‪former sciences, and cannot be obtained through mental exercise‬‬ ‫‪of mathematical and logical sciences, but it is revealed by God to‬‬ ‫‪the prophets. He states:‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﺑﻄﻠ ٍﺐ ﻭﺗﻜّﻠﻒ ﺍﻟﺒﺸﺮ ﻭﺣﻴﻠﻬﻢ ‪ ...‬ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺍﻹﻟۤـﻬﻲ ﺑﻼ ﻃﻠ ٍﺐ ﻭﻻ ﺗﻜّﻠ ٍﻒ ﻭﻻ ﲝﻴﻠ ٍﺔ ﺑﺸﺮﻳ ٍﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﻻ ﺯﻣﺎ ٍﻥ ﻛﻌﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﺮﺳﻞ ﺻﻠﻮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﺧ ّﺼﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻠ ُﻪ‪ ،‬ﺟ ّﻞ ﻭﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻠﻮّﴽ ﻛﺒﻴﺮﴽ‪ ،‬ﺃﻧﻪ ﺑﻼ ﻃﻠ ٍﺐ ﻭﻻ‬ ‫ﺗﻜّﻠ ٍﻒ ﻭﻻ ﲝ ٍﺚ ﻭﻻ ﲝﻴﻠ ٍﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﻳﺎﺿـ]ـﻴـ[ـﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﻭﻻ ﺑﺰﻣﺎ ٍﻥ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻣﻊ ﺇﺭﺍﺩﺗﻪ‪ ،‬ﺟ ّﻞ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ‪ ،‬ﺑﺘﻄﻬﲑ‬ ‫ﺃﻧﻔﺴﻬﻢ ﻭﺇﻧﺎﺭﺗﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﺤ ّﻖ ﺑﺘﺄﻳﻴﺪﻩ ﻭﺗﺴﺪﻳﺪﻩ ﻭﺇﳍﺎﻣﻪ ﻭﺭﺳﺎﻻﺗﻪ‪ .‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺧﺎ ّﺻﺔ ﻟﻠﺮﺳﻞ‪ ،‬ﺻﻠﻮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﺩﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﺸﺮ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺭﺉ‪ ،‬ﻭﺻﻔﺔ ﻭﺣﺪﺍﻧﻴّﺘﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﻴﻒ ﻫﻮ ﻋّﻠﺔ ﺍﳌﻮﺟﻮﺩﺍﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﺧﺎﻟﻖ ;‪188 Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 272‬‬ ‫ﺍﳌﺨﻠﻮﻗﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﻓﺎﺋﺾ ﺍﳉﻮﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭ ُﻣﻌﻄﻲ ﺍﻟﻮﺟﻮﺩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﺮﻭﺣﺎﻧﻴﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺍﳉﻮﺍﻫﺮ ﺍﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻌ ّﻼﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﻔ ّﻌﺎﻟﺔ ‪189 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 272; ...‬‬ ‫ﻭﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﺭ ﺍﳌﺠ ّﺮﺩﺓ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳍﻴﻮﱃ‪ ،‬ﺍﳌﺴﺘﻌﻤﻠﺔ ﻟﻸﺟﺴﺎﻡ ﺍﳌﺪﺑّﺮﺓ ﺑﻬﺎ‪. ...‬‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻲ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﻮﺱ ﻭﺍﻷﺭﻭﺍﺡ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﰲ ﺍﻷﺟﺴﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﻜﻴﺔ ;‪190 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 273‬‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻟﺪﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﻚ ﺍﶈﻴﻂ ﺇﱃ ﻣﻨﺘﻬﻰ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺍﻷﺭﺽ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺇﺩﺍﺭﺗﻬﺎ ﻟﻸﻓﻼﻙ ﻭﲢﺮﻳﻜﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﻜﻮﺍﻛﺐ ‪ ...‬ﻭﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺍﻧﺒﻌﺎﺛﻬﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺍﳌﻤﺎﺕ‪.‬‬ ‫‪191 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 273; see n. 58 above.‬‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺸﺄﺓ ﺍﻷﺧﺮﻯ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺍﻧﺒﻌﺎﺙ ﺍﻷﺭﻭﺍﺡ ﻣﻦ ;‪192 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 274‬‬ ‫ﻇﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻷﺟﺴﺎﺩ ‪ ...‬ﻭﺣﺸﺮﻫﺎ ﻳﻮﻡ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﺩ ‪ ...‬ﻭﺣﺸﺮﻫﺎ ﳊﺴﺎﺏ ﻳﻮﻡ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ‪. ...‬‬ ‫‪193 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 290; it states:‬‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﻳﺎ ﺃﺧﻲ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺍﳊﺬﻕ ﰲ ﻛ ّﻞ ﺻﻨﻌ ٍﺔ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺒّﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺼﺎﻧﻊ ﺍﳊﻜﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺭﺉ ﺟ ّﻞ ﺛﻨﺎﺅﻩ‪ .‬ﻭﻳﻘﺎﻝ ﺇﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ُﳛ ّﺐ ﺍﻟﺼﺎﻧ َﻊ ﺍﻟﻔﺎ ِﺭ َﻩ ﺍﳊﺎﺫ َﻕ‪.‬‬

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Universality in Islamic Thought See also A. L. Tibawi, “Further Studies on Ikhwān as. -S. afā,” Islamic Quarterly 20–2 (1978), pp. 61–2. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 290; ‫ ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ُﳛ ّﺐ‬:‫ﻭﺭﻭﻱ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﱯ ﺻﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻭﺳﻠﻢ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﺎﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺼﺎﻧﻊ ﺍ ُﳌﺘﻘﻦ ﰲ ﺻﻨﻌﺘﻪ‬ Ibid., vol. 1, p. 290; ‫ﻭﻣﻦ ﺃﺟﻞ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻗﻴﻞ ﰲ ﺣ ّﺪ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﺇﻧﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺒّ ُﻪ ﺑﺎﻹﻟۤـﻪ ﲝﺴﺐ ﻃﺎﻗﺔ‬ . ‫ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ‬ This definition is repeated several times. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 290; see also Tibawi, Islamic Education, p. 39; idem, “Further Studies on Ikhwān as. -S. afā,” p. 62. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 172. It means a preliminary course of study that precedes more advanced instruction. Al-Fārābī, Ih. s. āʾ al-ʿulūm, p. 53; chapter five is translated by Fauzy Najjar, “The Enumeration of the Sciences,” in Medieval Political Philosophy, pp. 22–30. See also David Reisman, “Al-Fārābī and the philosophical curriculum,” in Peter Adamson and Richard Taylor, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 52–71. It reminds us of the debate between Abū Bishr Mattā, a prominent logician of his day, and Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī, a grammarian, that occurred in Baghdad in 326/937–8 and is recorded by Abū H. ayyān al-Tawh. īdī in his al-Imtāʿ wa’l-muʾānasa, ed. Ah. mad Amīn and Ah. mad al-Zayn, 2nd edn. (Cairo: Lajnat al-taʾlīf waʾl-tarjuma waʾl-nashr, [1953]), vol. 1, pp. 107–29. For its summary in English, see Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, pp. 183–4. Al-Fārābī, Ih. s. āʾ al-ʿulūm, p. 53; Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, pp. 112–16; Nasr, Science and Civilization, pp. 60–2 (there are a number of translation errors). The physician Ibn But.lān (d. 460/1068) offers three major divisions of the sciences that had developed among the Muslims by the middle of the third/ ninth century: the Islamic sciences; the philosophical and natural sciences; and the literary arts. See Ibn Abī Us. aybiʿa, ʿUyūn alanbāʾ, p. 327; Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges, p. 75. Al-Fārābī, Ih. s. āʾ al-ʿulūm, pp. 132–8; see also Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 116. To be fair to al-Fārābī it should be stated that in his Ih. s. āʾ al-ʿulūm, he does not explain the relationship between political philosophy, on the one hand, and jurisprudence and theology, on the other. However, he clarifies that relationship in his Kitāb al-milla (Book of Religion), pp. 69–76. For further details the reader is referred to Muhsin Mahdi’s Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy where he has analyzed and interpreted al-Fārābī’s

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political philosophy. Mahdi’s account of al-Fārābī as the founder of Islamic political philosophy is quite persuasive. He states that in the scheme of al-Fārābī metaphysics does not simply crown the sciences, rather it becomes a preface to political science; and political science studies everything that is necessary for the realization of virtue and happiness and their preservation. It is in this sense that jurisprudence and theology are included in political science that deals with the questions of prophecy, divine law and revelation, for these are seen in terms of realization rather than simply as theoretical matters. Mahdi, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, pp. 4–5, 6, 7, 57. A. L. Tibawi, Islamic Education: Its Traditions and Modernization into the Arab National Systems (London: Luzac & Company, 1979), pp. 29, 37–9; idem, “Philosophy of Muslim Education,” in The Year Book of Education (London: Published in association with the University of London, Institute of Education and Teachers College, Columbia University by Evans Brothers, 1957), pp. 84, 88; idem, “Muslim Education in the Golden Age of the Caliphate,” Islamic Culture, xxviii, p. 429. The term maktab is used in the early centuries of Islamic history while the term kuttāb is used during the later period. Kuttāb is generally an elementary school for the teaching of reading and writing, penmanship, Arabic grammar and arithmetic. Some authorities distinguish between this type of kuttāb and another type in which Qurʾān and elementary religious sciences were taught. For details see Ahmad Shalaby, History of Muslim Education (Beirut: Dar al-Kashshaf, 1954), pp. 16–23; in the supplement to the book, the author has given a brief sketch of Ismāʿīlī doctrines and the efforts of the Fāt.imid dynasty to propagate them. See also Tibawi, Islamic Education, pp. 26, 27; idem, “Some Educational Terms in Rasāʾil Ikhwān as. -S. afāʾ,” Islamic Quarterly 5 (1959), pp. 55–60; Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism, pp. 48–50. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 51–2; it states: ،‫ ﻭﻋﺎﺩﺍ ٍﺕ ﺭﺩﻳﺌ ٍﺔ‬،‫ ﺃﻥ ﻻ ﺗﺸﻐﻞ ﺑﺈﺻﻼﺡ ﺍﳌﺸﺎﺋﺦ ﺍﳍﺮﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺍﻋﺘﻘﺪﻭﺍ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺼﺒﺎ ﺁﺭﺍ ًﺀ ﻓﺎﺳﺪ ًﺓ‬،‫ﺃﻳّﻬﺎ ﺍﻷﺥ‬ ‫ ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﻋﻠﻴﻚ‬.‫ ﺇﻥ ﺻﻠﺤﻮﺍ ﻗﻠﻴ ًﻼ ﻗﻠﻴ ًﻼ ﻓﻼ ﻳﻔﻠﺤﻮﻥ‬،‫ ﻓﺈﻧّﻬﻢ ﻳﺘﻌﺒﻮﻧﻚ ﰒ ﻻ ﻳﻨﺼﻠﺤﻮﻥ‬.‫ﻭﺃﺧﻼﻗﴼ ﻭﺣﺸﻴ ًﺔ‬ ... ‫ ﺍﳌﺮﻳﺪﻳﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﳊ ّﻖ‬،‫ ﺍﳌﺒﺘﺪﺋﲔ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﺮﺍﻏﺒﻴﻦ ﰲ ﺍﻵﺩﺍﺏ‬،‫ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﳌﻲ ﺍﻟﺼﺪﻭﺭ‬ .‫ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻌ ّﺼﺒﻴﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻛﲔ ﺍﳍﻮﻯ ﻭﺍﳉﺪﻝ‬... ‫ﺍﳌﺴﺘﻌﻤﻠﲔ ﺷﺮﺍﺋﻊ ﺍﻷﻧﺒﻴﺎﺀ‬ Ibid., vol. 4, p. 52; it states: ‫ ﻭﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻥ‬... ‫ ﻭﻻ ﺃﻋﻄﻰ ﻟﻌﺒ ٍﺪ ﺣﻜﻤﺔ ﺇﻻ ﻭﻫﻮ ﺷﺎ ٰﺏ‬،‫ﻭﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺚ ﻧﺒﻴـ ًﹽﺎ ﺇﻻ ﻭﻫﻮ ﺷﺎ ٰﺏ‬ . ... ‫ﻛﻞ ﻧﱯ ﺑﻌﺜﻪ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﻓﺄ ّﻭﻝ ﻣﻦ ﻛ ّﺬﺑﻪ ﻣﺸﺎﺋ ُﺦ ﻗﻮﻣﻪ‬

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Universality in Islamic Thought It is followed by a lengthy discussion about those who are blessed with wealth but not knowledge, and those who are blessed with knowledge but not wealth, and those who are blessed with neither of the two but endowed with good character, pure souls and sound hearts without corrupt beliefs. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, pp. 57, 173–4. Rasāʾil, vol. 4, p. 50; it reads: ‫ ﻭﻛﺎﻥ‬،‫ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺪﻙ ﺃ ٌﺏ ﳉﺴﺪﻙ‬،‫ ﻭﻋّﻠﺔ ﺣﻴﺎﺗﻬﺎ‬،‫ ﻭﺳﺒﺐ ﻟﻨﺸﻮﺋﻬﺎ‬،‫ﻭﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃ ّﻥ ﺍﳌﻌّﻠﻢ ﻭﺍﻷﺳﺘﺎﺫ ﺃ ٌﺏ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻚ‬ ‫ ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﺃﻥ‬.‫ ﻭﻣﻌّﻠﻤﻚ ﺃﻋﻄﺎﻙ ﺻﻮﺭ ًﺓ ﺭﻭﺣﺎﻧﻴ ًﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﺃ ّﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺪﻙ ﺃﻋﻄﺎﻙ ﺻﻮﺭ ًﺓ ﺟﺴﺪﺍﻧﻴ ًﺔ‬.‫ﺳﺒﺒﴼ ﻟﻮﺟﻮﺩﻩ‬ ‫ ﻭﻳﻬﺪﻳﻬﺎ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﻨﻌﻴﻢ ﻭﺍﻟﻠ ّﺬﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﺮﻭﺭ ﻭﺍﻷﺑﺪﻳّﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺮﺍﺣﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﻳﺮﺑّﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﳌﻌﺎﺭﻑ‬،‫ﺍﳌﻌّﻠﻢ ﻳﻐ ّﺬﻱ ﻧﻔﺴﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ‬ ‫ ﻭﻣﺮﺑّﻴﻚ ﻭﻣﺮﺷﺪﻙ ﺇﱃ ﻃﻠﺐ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﺵ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ‬،‫ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺃ ّﻥ ﺃﺑﺎﻙ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺳﺒﺒﴼ ﻟﻜﻮﻥ ﺟﺴﺪﻙ ﰲ ﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺪﻧﻴﺎ‬،‫ﺍﻟﺴﺮﻣﺪﻳﺔ‬ ‫ ﻫﺎﺩﻳﴼ‬،‫ ﻓﺴ ْﻞ ﻳﺎ ﺃﺧﻲ ﺭﺑّﻚ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻮّﻓﻖ ﻟﻚ ﻣﻌّﻠﻤﴼ ﺭﺷﻴﺪﴽ‬.‫ﺍﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ ﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻔﻨﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻐﻴﲑ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻴﻼﻥ ﺳﺎﻋ ًﺔ ﺑﺴﺎﻋ ٍﺔ‬ .‫ ﻭﺍﺷﻜﺮ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻌﻤﺎﺋﻪ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺑﻐﺔ‬،‫ﺳﺪﻳﺪﴽ‬ See also Tibawi, “Some Educational Terms,” p. 59; idem, Islamic Education, p. 39. A saying ascribed to Pythagoras states: “Fathers are the cause of life, but philosophers are the cause of the good life.” D. Gutas, Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation: A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 1975), pp. 70, 71. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 346–55. All the h. adīth collections begin with a chapter on ʿilm and thousands of traditions are ascribed to the Prophet. Wensinck, Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane, s.v. ʿ-l-m. Rasāʾil, vol. 1, pp. 346–7. It is a long tradition; the beginning reads: ،‫ ﻭﻃﻠﺒُﻪ ﻋﺒﺎﺩٌﺓ‬،‫ ﻓﺈﻥ ﰲ ﺗﻌّﻠﻤﻪ ﻟﻠﻪ ﺧﺸﻴ ًﺔ‬،‫ ﺗﻌّﻠﻤﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻢ‬:‫ﻣﺎ ُﺭﻭﻱ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﱯ ﺻﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻭﺳﻠﻢ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﺎﻝ‬ ‫ ﻷﻧﻪ ﻣﻌﺎﱂ ﺍﳊﻼﻝ‬،‫ ﻭﺑﺬﻟُﻪ ﻷﻫﻠﻪ ﻗﺮﺑ ٌﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﺗﻌﻠﻴ ُﻤﻪ ﳌﻦ ﻻ ﻳﻌﻠﻤﻮﻧﻪ ﺻﺪﻗ ٌﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﺤ ُﺚ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺟﻬﺎ ٌﺩ‬،‫ﻭﻣﺬﺍﻛﺮﺗُﻪ ﺗﺴﺒﻴ ٌﺢ‬ ‫ ﻭﺍﻟﺪﻟﻴ ُﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺴ ّﺮﺍﺀ‬،‫ ﻭﺍﻟﺼﺎﺣ ُﺐ ﰲ ﺍﻟ ُﻐﺮﺑﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﺍﳌﺆﻧ ُﺲ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻮﺣﺪﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻮﺣﺸﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﻣﻨﺎ ُﺭ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ ﺍﳉﻨّﺔ‬،‫ﻭﺍﳊﺮﺍﻡ‬ . ... ‫ﻭﺍﻟﻀ ّﺮﺍﺀ‬ It is a major part of the 22nd epistle entitled “On the manner of the creation of animals and their species,” and is the longest of all the epistles. See Rasāʾil, vol. 21, pp. 203–377. Ikhwan al-Safa ascribed by tradition to Abu Sulaiman [al-Maqdisi] and others, translated from the Arabic into Urdu by Ikrām ʿAlī (Calcutta: Munshi Muhammad Taha, 1810). Tuhfat Ichwan-oos-Suffa, in the original Arabic (‫)ﲢﻔﺔ ﺇﺧﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﺼﻔﺎ‬, revised and edited by Schuekh Ahmud-bin Moohummud Schurwan-ool-Yummunee [Shaykh Ah. mad b. Muh. ammad Shurwān al-Yamanī], with a short preface in English by T. T. Thomason (Calcutta: Printed by P. Pereira at the Hindoostanee Press, 1812).

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214 A. Sprenger, “Notices of some copies of the Arabic work entitled Rasáyil Ikhwán al-Çafâʾ,” Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal 17/i (1848), pp. 501–7; 17/ii (1848), pp. 183–202. 215 See note 13 above. 216 Godefroid de Callataÿ, Ikhwan al-Safa’: A Brotherhood of Idealists on the Fringe of Orthodox Islam (Oxford: One World, 2005). 217 Theodora Abel, “Psychological Themes in a 10th Century Arabic Satire on Men and Animals,” International Mental Health Research Newsletter 13 (1971), pp. 2–4, 9–11. 218 Lenn Goodman, The Case of the Animals versus Man before the King of the Jinn: A Tenth-century Ecological Fable of the Pure Brethren of Basra, translated from the Arabic with introduction and commentary (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1978). 219 Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 205; here the number is given as 70, while on page 298, the number is given as 72. 220 Qurʾān 16:5–8; M. Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, p. 394. 221 For example see Qurʾān 14:33; 16:12; M. Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, pp. 377, 395. 222 Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 209; it states: ‫ ﻭﺗﻘﻮﱘ ﺑﻨﻴﺔ‬،‫ ﺣﺴ ُﻦ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﻨﺎ‬... ‫ ﺇ ّﻥ ﻟﻨﺎ ﺣﺠﺠﴼ ﻋﻘﻠﻴ ًﺔ ﻭﺩﻻﺋ َﻞ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻴ ًﺔ ﺗﺪ ّﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺻ ّﺤﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻗﻠﻨﺎ‬:‫ﻓﻘﺎﻝ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﻲ‬ ّ ‫ ﻛ ّﻞ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻳﺪ ّﻝ‬.‫ ﻭ ﺭﺟﺤﺎﻥ ﻋﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ‬،‫ ﻭﺫﻛﺎﺀ ﻧﻔﻮﺳﻨﺎ‬،‫ ﻭﺩّﻗﺔ ﲤﻴﻴﺰﻧﺎ‬،‫ ﻭﺟﻮﺩﺓ ﺣﻮﺍ ّﺳﻨﺎ‬،‫ ﻭﺍﻧﺘﺼﺎﺏ ﻗﺎﻣﺘﻨﺎ‬،‫ﻫﻴﻜﻠﻨﺎ‬ .‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻧّﻨﺎ ﺃﺭﺑﺎ ٌﺏ ﻭﻫﻢ ﻋﺒﻴ ٌﺪ ﻟﻨﺎ‬ 223 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 210; it states: ‫ ﻭﻻ ﺳ ّﻮﺍﻫﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻜﻮﻥ ﺩﻻﻟ ًﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ‬،‫ ﻣﺎ ﺧﻠﻘﻬﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﺭﺓ‬،‫ ﺟ ّﻞ ﺛﻨﺎﺅﻩ‬،‫ﻭﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ‬ ‫ ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﻟﻌﻠﻤﻪ‬،‫ ﻭﻻ ﺧﻠﻘﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﺭﺓ ﻭﺳ ّﻮﺍﻧﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻜﻮﻥ ﺩﻻﻟ ًﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻧﻨﺎ ﻋﺒﻴ ٌﺪ‬،‫ﺃﻧﻬﻢ ﺃﺭﺑﺎﺏ‬ ... ‫ ﻭﺟﻌﻞ ﺃﺭﺯﺍﻗﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ﲦﺮ ﺍﻷﺷﺠﺎﺭ‬... ‫ ﻭﻫﺬﻩ ﺃﺻﻠ ُﺢ ﻟﻨﺎ‬،‫ﻭﺍﻗﺘﻀﺎﺀ ﺣﻜﻤﺘﻪ ﺑﺄ ّﻥ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ ﺃﺻﻠ ُﺢ ﳍﻢ‬ ‫ ﺟﻌﻞ ﺑﻨﻴﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﻫﻜﺬﺍ ﳌّﺎ ﺟﻌﻞ ﺃﺭﺯﺍﻗﻨﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺸﻴﺶ ﺍﻷﺭﺽ‬...‫ﺟﻌﻞ ﻗﺎﻣﺘﻬﻢ ﻣﻨﺘﺼﺒ ًﺔ ﻟﻴﺴﻬﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ ﺗﻨﺎﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺜﻤﺮ‬ .‫ ﻻ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻮ ّﳘﻮﺍ‬... ‫ﺃﺑﺪﺍﻧﻨﺎ ﻣﻨﺤﻨﻴ ًﺔ ﻟﻴﺴﻬﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ ﺗﻨﺎﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺸﺐ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﺭﺽ‬ 224 Qurʾān 95: 4. M. Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, p. 961. Richard Bell, The Qurʾān: Translated, with a Critical Re-Arrangement of the Surahs (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960), vol. 2, p. 665, translates fī ah. san taqwīm, as “most beautiful erect.” Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qurʾān: Text, Translation and Commentary (Washington, DC: The Islamic Center, reprint of the 3rd ed. [1938]), p. 1759, translates “in the best of moulds.” 225 Reference to Qurʾān 3:7; M. Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, p. 67. 226 Reference to Qurʾān 16:43. Generally translated as “people of the Remembrance” or “who have that knowledge” Asad translates it “ask the followers of [earlier] revelation,” The Message of the Qurʾān, p. 400. He adds that the literal meaning is “reminder,” because every divine message is meant to remind one of the truth.

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‫‪Universality in Islamic Thought‬‬ ‫‪The people to be asked for enlightenment in this respect are‬‬ ‫‪apparently the Jews and the Christians.‬‬ ‫‪Rasā’il, vol. 2, pp. 211–14; it states:‬‬ ‫ﻓﻘﺎﻝ ﺯﻋﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﺒﻬﺎﺋﻢ‪ :‬ﻭﳓﻦ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ‪ ،‬ﻓﻌﻞ ﺑﻨﺎ ﺃﻳ ًﻀﺎ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﳚﻌﻠﻨﺎ ﻃﻮﺍ ًﻻ ﻭﻻ ﺩﻗﺎﻗﴼ ﻭﻻ ﻗﺼﺎﺭﴽ ﻭﻻ ﺻﻐﺎﺭﴽ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﺑﻴﻦ‬ ‫ﺫﻟﻚ‪ ...‬ﻭﺃ ّﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﺫﻛﺮﺗﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻮﺩﺓ ﺣﻮﺍ ّﺳﻜﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﺩّﻗﺔ ﲤﻴﻴﺰﻛﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻓﺘﺨﺮﰎ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﻴﺲ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻟﻜﻢ ﺧﺎ ّﺻ ًﺔ‬ ‫ﺩﻭﻥ ﻏﲑﻛﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻧﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻷﻥ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺃﺟﻮ ُﺩ ﺣﺎ ّﺳ ًﺔ ﻣﻨﻜﻢ ﻭﺃﺩ ّﻕ ﲤﻴﻴﺰﴽ‪ .‬ﻓﻤﻦ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﳉﻤﻞ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻣﻊ‬ ‫ﻃﻮﻝ ﻗﻮﺍﺋﻤﻪ ﻭﺭﻗﺒﺘﻪ ﻭﺍﺭﺗﻔﺎﻉ ﺭﺃﺳﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﺭﺽ ﰲ ﺍﳍﻮﺍﺀ‪ ،‬ﻳﺒﺼﺮ ﻭﻳﺮﻯ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﻗﺪﻣﻴﻪ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻄﺮﻗﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻮﻋﺮﺓ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﳌﺴﺎﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﺼﻌﺒﺔ ﰲ ﻇﻠﻢ ﺍﻟﻠﻴﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻳﺮﻯ ﻭﻻ ﻳﺒﺼﺮ ﺃﺣ ُﺪﻛﻢ ﺇﻻ ﺑﺴﺮﺍ ٍﺝ ‪ ...‬ﻭﺃ ّﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﺫﻛﺮﺗﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺭﺟﺤﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻮﻝ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﺴﻨﺎ ﻧﺮﻯ ﻟﻪ ﺃﺛﺮﴽ ﺃﻭ ﻋﻼﻣ ًﺔ‪ ،‬ﻷﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻟﻜﻢ ﻋﻘﻮ ٌﻝ ﺭﺍﺟﺤ ٌﺔ ﳌﺎ ﺍﻓﺘﺨﺮﰎ ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ ﺑﺸﻲٍء ﻟﻴﺲ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﺃﻓﻌﺎﻟﻜﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﻻ ﺍﻛﺘﺴﺎ ٌﺏ ﻣﻨﻜﻢ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻫﻲ ﻣﻮﺍﻫ ُﺐ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ‪ ...‬ﻟﺘﻌﺮﻓﻮﺍ ﻣﻮﺍﻗﻊ ﺍﻟﻨﻌﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﺗﺸﻜﺮﻭﺍ ﻟﻪ ‪ ...‬ﻭﺇﳕﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻼﺀ ﻳﻔﺘﺨﺮﻭﻥ ﺑﺄﺷﻴﺎﺀ ﻫﻲ ﺃﻓﻌﺎﳍﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﺋﻊ ﺍ ُﶈﻜﻤﺔ ‪ ...‬ﻭﻟﺴﻨﺎ ﻧﺮﺍﻛﻢ ﺗﻔﺘﺨﺮﻭﻥ ﺑﺸﻲٍء ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻏ َﲑ ﺩﻋﻮﻯ‬ ‫ﺑﻼ ﺣ ّﺠ ٍﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺧﺼﻮﻣ ٍﺔ ﺑﻼ ﺑﻴّﻨ ٍﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫‪Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qurʾān (Minneapolis:‬‬ ‫‪Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), pp. 17–36.‬‬ ‫‪Netton (Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 72) read this criticism of some‬‬ ‫‪religious groups, especially Christianity, between the lines and out‬‬ ‫‪of context.‬‬ ‫‪Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 374; it states:‬‬ ‫ﻓﻘﺎﻡ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﳋﻄﻴﺐ ﺍﳊﺠﺎﺯﻱ ﺍﳌ ّﻜﻲ ﺍﳌﺪﱐ ‪ ...‬ﻗﺎﻝ‪ :‬ﻣﻮﺍﻋﻴﺪ ﺭﺑّﻨﺎ ﻟﻨﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﻌﺚ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﺸﻮﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﳋﺮﻭﺝ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻘﺒﻮﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺣﺴﺎﺏ ﻳﻮﻡ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ‪ ...‬ﻭﺩﺧﻮﻝ ﺍﳉﻨﺎﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ ﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻧﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻲ ﺟﻨّﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﺩﻭﺱ ﻭﺟﻨّﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻌﻴﻢ‬ ‫‪ ...‬ﺍﳌﺬﻛﻮﺭ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺁﻥ ﰲ ﳓ ٍﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺳﺒﻌﻤﺎﺋﺔ ﺁﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻛ ّﻞ ﺫﻟﻚ ﲟﻌﺰ ٍﻝ ﻋﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻧﺎﺕ‪ .‬ﻓﻬﺬﺍ ﺩﻟﻴ ٌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻧّﺎ‬ ‫ﺃﺭﺑﺎ ٌﺏ ﻭﻫﻲ ﻋﺒﻴ ٌﺪ ﻟﻨﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫‪Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 374–5; it states:‬‬ ‫ﻓﻘﺎﻡ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺯﻋﻴ ُﻢ ﺍﻟﻄﻴﻮﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻮ ﺍﳍﺰﺍﺭﺩﺍﺳﺘﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﺎﻝ‪ :‬ﻧﻌﻢ ﻟﻌﻤﺮﻱ‪ ،‬ﺇ ّﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﺮ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﻠﺖ ﺃﻳّﻬﺎ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﺍﺫﻛﺮ ﺃﻳﻀﴼ ﻣﺎ ُﻭﻋﺪﰎ ﺑﻪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﺸﺮ ﺍﻹﻧﺲ‪ ،‬ﻣﻦ ﻋﺬﺍﺏ ﺍﻟﻘﱪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺳﺆﺍﻝ ﻣﻨﻜﺮ ﻭﻧﻜﲑ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﺣﻮﺍﻝ ﻳﻮﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﻴﺎﻣﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﺷ ّﺪﺓ ﺍﳊﺴﺎﺏ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﻮﻋﻴﺪ ﺑﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﻨﻴﺮﺍﻥ ‪ ...‬ﻭﺷﺮﺏ ﺍﻟﺼﺪﻳﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻛﻞ ﺷﺠﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺰﻗﻮﻡ ‪ ...‬ﻭﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺬﻛﻮﺭ ﰲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺁﻥ ﲜﻨﺐ ﻛ ّﻞ ﺁﻳ ٍﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻮﻋﺪ ﺁﻳ ٌﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻮﻋﻴﺪ‪ .‬ﻛ ّﻞ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻟﻜﻢ ﺩﻭﻧﻨﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﳓﻦ ﲟﻌﺰ ٍﻝ ﻋﻦ ﺟـﻤﻴﻊ ﺫﻟﻚ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﻛﻤﺎ ﱂ ﻧﻮﻋﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺜﻮﺍﺏ ﱂ ﻧﻮﻋﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻘﺎﺏ‪ .‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﺭﺿﻴﻨﺎ ﲝﻜﻢ ﺭﺑّﻨﺎ‪ ،‬ﻻ ﻟﻨﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻻ ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ‪ ...‬ﻭﺗﺴﺎﻭﺕ ﺍﻷﻗﺪﺍ ُﺭ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﻤﺎ ﻟﻜﻢ ﻭﺍﻻﻓﺘﺨﺎﺭ!‬ ‫‪Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 375–6; it states:‬‬ ‫ﻓﻘﺎﻝ ﺍﳊﺠﺎﺯﻱ‪ :‬ﻭﻛﻴﻒ ﺗﺴﺎﻭﺕ ﺍﻷﻗﺪﺍ ُﺭ ﺑﻴﻨﻨﺎ ﻭﺑﻴﻨﻜﻢ؟ ﻓﺈﻧﺎ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃ ّﻱ ﺣﺎﻟ ٍﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﻗﻮ َﻥ ﺃﺑﺪ ﺍﻵﺑﺪﻳﻦ ﻭﺩﻫﺮ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺪﺍﻫﺮﻳﻦ‪ .‬ﺇﻥ ﻛﻨّﺎ ﻣﻄﻴﻌﲔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻤﻊ ﺍﻷﻧﺒﻴﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻷﻭﻟﻴﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻷﺋ ّﻤﺔ ﻭﺍﻷﻭﺻﻴﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﳊﻜﻤﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻷﺧﻴﺎﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﻀﻼﺀ ‪...‬‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻫﻢ ﲟﻼﺋﻜﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺍﻟﻜﺮﺍﻡ ﻳﺘﺸﺒّﻬﻮﻥ ‪ ...‬ﻭ ﻟﻮ ﻛﻨّﺎ ﻣﺮﺩﻭﺩﻳ َﻦ ﺇﺫﻥ ﻧﺘﺨّﻠﺺ ﺑﺸﻔﺎﻋﺔ ﻧﺒﻴّﻨﺎ ﳏﻤﺪ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻴﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻡ ‪...‬‬ ‫‪Ibid., vol. 2, p. 376; it states:‬‬ ‫ﻓﻘﺎﻟﺖ ﺣﻴﻨﺌ ٍﺬ ﺯﻋﻤﺎ ُﺀ ﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻧﺎﺕ ﻭﺣﻜﻤﺎ ُﺀ ﺍﳉ ّﻦ ﺑﺄﺟـﻤﻌﻬﻢ‪ :‬ﺍﻵﻥ ﺟﺌﺘﻢ ﺑﺎﳊ ّﻖ‪ ،‬ﻭﻧﻄﻘﺘﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﺼﻮﺍﺏ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﻠﺘﻢ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺼﺪﻕ‪ ،‬ﻷ ّﻥ ﺑﺄﻣﺜﺎﻝ ﻣﺎ ﺫﻛﺮﰎ ﻳﻔﺘﺨﺮ ﺑﻪ ﺍﳌﻔﺘﺨﺮﻭﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﺜﻞ ﺃﻋﻤﺎﳍﻢ ﻓﻠﻴﻌﻤﻞ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﻮﻥ ‪ ...‬ﻭﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ‬ ‫ﻓﻠﻴﺘـﻨﺎﻓﺲ ﺍﳌﺘﻨﺎﻓﺴﻮﻥ! ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﺧ ّﱪﻭﻧﺎ‪ ،‬ﻳﺎ ﻣﻌﺸﺮ ﺍﻹﻧﺲ‪ ،‬ﻋﻦ ﺃﻭﺻﺎﻓﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﺑﻴّﻨﻮﺍ ﻟﻨﺎ ﺳﲑﻫﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋ ّﺮﻓﻮﻧﺎ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺎﺭﻓﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﳏﺎﺳﻦ ﺃﺧﻼﻗﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﺻﺎﱀ ﺃﻋﻤﺎﳍﻢ‪ ،‬ﺇ ْﻥ ﻛﻨﺘﻢ ﺻﺎﺩﻗﲔ‪ ،‬ﰒ ﺍﺫﻛﺮﻭﻫﺎ ﺇ ْﻥ ﻛﻨﺘﻢ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻋﺎﺭﻓﻴﻦ‪.‬‬ ‫‪The word in the text is ‘arabiyyan (Arabian).‬‬ ‫‪Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 376–7; it states:‬‬

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،‫ ﻓﻘﺎﻡ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﺍﳋﺒﻴ ُﺮ‬... ‫ ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﻜ ْﻦ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺃﺣ ٍﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﺟﻮﺍﺏ‬،‫ﻓﺴﻜﺘﺖ ﺍﳉﻤﺎﻋﺔ ﺣﻴﻨﺌ ٍﺬ ﻳﺘﻔ ّﻜﺮﻭﻥ‬ ،‫ ﺍﻟﻌﱪﺍﱐ ﺍﳌﺨﱪ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻗﻲ ﺍﻵﺩﺍﺏ‬،‫ ﺍﳊﻨﻔﻲ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﰊ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ‬،‫ ﺍﳌﺴﺘﺒﺼﺮ ﺍﻟﻔﺎﺭﺳﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ‬،‫ﺍﻟﻔﺎﺿﻞ ﺍﻟﺬﻛﻲ‬ ّ ‫ ﺍﻟﺮﺑّﲏ‬،‫ ﺍﳌﻠﻜﻲ ﺍﻷﺧﻼﻕ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﰲ ﺍﻟﺴﲑﺓ‬،‫ ﺍﳍﻨﺪﻱ ﺍﻟﺒﺼﲑﺓ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﻧﺎﱐ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ‬،‫ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻣﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﺴﻚ‬،‫ﺍﳌﺴﻴﺤﻲ ﺍﳌﻨﻬﺞ‬ ‫ ﺍﻋﻠﻤﻮﺍ ﺃﻥ ﳍﺆﻻﺀ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﻧﺘﻢ ﻣﻌﺸﺮ ﺍﳉﻤﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﳊﻀﻮﺭ‬،‫ ﺃﻳّﻬﺎ ﺍﳌﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﺩﻝ‬:‫ ﰒ ﻗﺎﻝ‬... ‫ ﺍﻹﻟۤـﻬﻲ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﺭﻑ‬،‫ﺍﻟﺮﺃﻱ‬ ‫ ﻭﻋﻠﻮﻣﴼ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﻋﻤﺎ ًﻻ ﺯﻛﻴّ ًﺔ‬،‫ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻫﻢ ﺃﻭﻟﻴﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﻭﺻﻔﻮﺗﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻠﻘﻪ ﻭﺧﲑﺗﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺒﺎﺩﻩ ﻭﺑﺮﻳّﺘﻪ ﺃﻭﺻﺎﻓﴼ ﲪﻴﺪ ًﺓ‬ ‫ ﻭﺃﺣﻮﺍ ًﻻ‬،‫ ﻭﺳﲑﺓ ﻋﺎﺩﻟﺔ ﻗﺪﺳﻴّﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﺧﻼﻗﴼ ﻣﻠﻜﻴﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﻣﻌﺎﺭﻑ ﺭﺑّﺎﻧﻴّﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﺃﻋﻤﺎ ًﻻ ﺯﻛﻴّ ًﺔ‬،‫ ﻭﺻﻔﺎ ٍﺕ ﺟـﻤﻴﻠ ٍﺔ‬،‫ُﻣﻔﻨّﻨ ًﺔ‬ ‫ ﻓﻜﻴﻒ ﻳﺄﻣﺮ ﺍﳌﻠ ُﻚ‬... ‫ ﻭﻗ ّﺼﺮﺕ ﺃﻭﺻﺎ ُﻑ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﺻﻔﲔ ﻋﻦ ﻛﻨﻪ ﺻﻔﺎﺗﻬﺎ‬،‫ ﻗﺪ ﻛّﻠﺖ ﺍﻷﻟﺴ ُﻦ ﻋﻦ ﺫﻛﺮﻫﺎ‬،‫ﻋﺠﻴﺒﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﺎﺩﻝ ﰲ ﺣ ّﻖ ﻫﺆﻻﺀ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺑﺎﺀ ﻭﻣﺎ ﺟﻮﺍﺑﻬﻢ؟‬ Ibid., vol. 2, p. 233; it states: ‫ ﻭﻳﺄﰐ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﳍﺎ‬،‫ ﺗﺼﲑ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺒﻬﺎﺋﻢ ﰲ ﺍﻷﺳﺮ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺒﻮﺩﻳّﺔ ﺇﱃ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻨﻘﻀﻲ ﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺁﻥ ﻭﻳُﺴﺘﺄﻧﻒ ﻧﺸﻮ ٌﺀ ﺁﺧﺮ‬... ‫ ﺗﺪﻭﺭ‬،‫ ﻓﺈﻥ ﺃﻳّﺎﻡ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺪﻧﻴﺎ ﺩﻭ ٌﻝ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺃﻫﻠﻬﺎ‬... ‫ﺑﺎﻟﻔﺮﺝ ﻭﺍﳋﻼﺹ ﻛﻤﺎ ٰﳒﻰ ﺁﻝ ﺇﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺬﺍﺏ ﻓﺮﻋﻮﻥ‬ ‫ ﺃﻭ‬،‫ ﻭﻧﻔﺎﺫ ﻣﺸﻴﺌﺘﻪ ُﲟﻮﺟﺒﺎﺕ ﺃﺣﻜﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺍﻧﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﻷﺩﻭﺍﺭ ﰲ ﻛ ّﻞ ﺃﻟﻒ ﺳﻨ ٍﺔ ﻣ ّﺮ ًﺓ‬،‫ﺑﺈﺫﻥ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻭﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ‬ ‫ ﺃﻭ ﰲ ﻛ ّﻞ ﻳﻮ ٍﻡ ﻣﻘﺪﺍﺭ ُﻩ‬... ‫ ﺃﻭ ﰲ ﻛ ّﻞ ﺳﺘّ ٍﺔ ﻭﺛﻼﺛﲔ ﺃﻟﻒ ﺳﻨ ٍﺔ ﻣ ّﺮ ًﺓ‬،‫ﰲ ﻛ ّﻞ ﺍﺛﲏ ﻋﺸﺮ ﺃﻟﻒ ﺳﻨ ٍﺔ ﻣ ّﺮ ًﺓ‬ .‫ﺧـﻤﺴﻮﻥ ﺃﻟﻒ ﺳﻨ ٍﺔ ﻣ ّﺮ ًﺓ‬ Ibid., vol. 2, p. 377; it states: ‫ ﻭﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮﻥ ﻣﺄﻣﻮﺭﻳﻦ ﻟﻺﻧﺲ ﺣ ّﱴ‬،‫ﻓﺄﻣﺮ ﺍﳌﻠ ُﻚ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻜﻮﻥ ﺍﳊﻴﻮﺍﻧﺎﺕ ﺑﺄﺟـﻤﻌﻬﻢ ﲢﺖ ﺃﻭﺍﻣﺮﻫﻢ ﻭﻧﻮﺍﻫﻴﻬﻢ‬ .‫ ﰒ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺣﻜﻢ ﺣﻜﻤﴼ ﺁﺧﺮ‬.‫ﻳُﺴﺘﺄﻧﻒ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﺭ‬ Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 154, 180–1; vol. 4, pp. 146, 186–7, 190. For the translation see n. 101 above. It states: “Say: ‘We believe in God, and in that which has been bestowed from on high upon us, and that which has been bestowed upon Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and their descendants, and that which has been vouchsafed to all the [other] prophets by their Sustainer: We make no distinction between any of them. And it is unto Him that we surrender ourselves.’” Asad, The Message of the Qurʾān, p. 28. Al-Sijistānī, Abū Sulaymān al-Mant.iqī, S. iwān al-h. ikma, ed. ʿAbd al-Rah. mān Badawī (Tehran, 1974), pp. 361–2; he ascribes the authorship of the Rasāʾil to Abū Sulaymān al-Maqdisī. See also S. M. Stern, “New information about the authors of the ‘Epistles of the Sincere Brethren,’ ” Islamic Studies 3 (1964), pp. 405–28. Maribel Fierro, “Plants, Mary the Copt, Abraham, Donkeys and Knowledge: Again on Bāt.inism during the Umayyad Caliphate in al-Andalus,” in Biesterfeldt, Hinrich and Verena Klemm, eds., Differenz und Dynamik im Islam: Festschrift für Heinz Halm zum 70. Geburtsgag (Würzburg, Ergon-Verlag, 2012), pp. 125–44. This article amends some previous errors of attribution of both the Ghāya and the Rutba and corroborates the arguments of Abbas Hamdani for the early dating of the Rasāʾil. See Susanne Diwald, Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie Kitāb Ihwān as. -S. afāʾ, III: Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt (Wiesbaden: ˘ Otto Harrossowitz, 1975), pp. 15–16; and Abbas Hamdani,

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Universality in Islamic Thought “Brethren of Purity, A Secret Society for the Establishment of the Fāt.imid Caliphate: New Evidence for the Early Dating of their Encyclopaedia,” in Marianne Barrucand, ed., L’Egypte Fatimide: son art et son histoire (Paris: Presses de l’Universite de Paris, 1999), pp. 73–6. Abū H. ayyān al-Tawh. īdī, Kitāb al-imtāʿ wa’l-muʾānasa, vol. 2, pp. 3–6. For the refutation see n. 13 above. Poonawala, “Modern scholarship in Polemical Garb”; see n. 13 above. Al-Bayhaqī, Kitāb tatimmat s. iwān al-h. ikma, ed. Muhammad Shafi (Lahore: Punjab University Oriental Publications, 1351/1932–3), p. 40. It is well known that Ibn Sīnāʾ’s father and his brother were Ismāʿīlīs and a copy of the Rasāʾil was in the collection of his father. Ibid., p. 21. Ibn al-Qift.ī, ʿAlī b. Yūsuf, Ta’rīh al-h. ukamāʾ, ed. Julius Lippert ˘ (Leipzig: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1903), pp. 82–8. al-Shahrazūrī, Nuzhat al-arwāh. wa-rawd. at al-afrāh. fī ta’rīkh alh. ukamāʾ wa’l-falāsifa, ed. al-Sayyid Khurshīd Ah. mad (Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1976), vol. 2, p. 20. See G. Flügel, “Über Inhalt und Verfasser der arabischen Encyclopädie ‫ﺭﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﺇﺧﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﺼﻔﺎ ﻭﺧﻼﻥ ﺍﻟﻮﻓﺎﺀ‬. i.e., die Abhandlungen der aufrichtigen Brüder und treuen Freunde,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 13 (1859), pp. 22–4. H. ājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-z. unūn ʿan asāmī al-kutub wa’l-funūn (Istanbul: Wakālat al-Maʿārif, 1941–5), vol. 1, p. 902. Istanbul six copies (ʿĀt.if Effendi MS 1681, Esad Effendi MS 3637, Esad Effendi MS 3638, Feyzullah MS 2131, Koprulu MS 870, Koprulu MS 871); Paris three (Bibliothèque Nationale MS 2303, MS 2304, MS 6648); England five (British Museum MS OR 2359, Bodleian MS 189, MS 296, MS Or 255, MS Or 260). For its description see Diwald, Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft, p. 29. See n. 13 above. Al-Ghazālī, Munqidh min al-d. alāl, ed. and tr. Farīd Jabr (Beirut: Commision Internationale pour la Traduction des Chefs d’oevre, 1959), p. 33 (Arabic pagination); p. 94 (French tr.); English tr. Richard McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazālī’s al-Munqidh min al-d. alāl and other Relevant Works (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1980), p. 89.

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Universality in Islamic Historiography Michael G. Morony

Universality has to do with universal comprehensiveness in range or scope. Universality in historiography would then be a matter of including the history of everything possible across time and space. Ordinarily, this would tend to cross cultural boundaries, and there would seem to be some kind of conceptual kinship between the pre-modern genre of universal history and modern world history projects. In historical thought and presentation universality might be simply encyclopedic, or it might take the form of an allinclusive chronology from creation to the end of the world. In the latter case it tends to be concerned with cosmology and the geography of the world as well as with calculating the age of the world or universe in years and with how much longer it is expected to last. In practice, however, most universal histories encompassed “the history of the universe from the moment of creation until the lifetime of the author.”1 The genre of universal history appears to have originated in a Christian combination of biblical with Babylonian and Egyptian antiquities and the integration of different chronological systems in order to work out the chronology of the events of primordial history beginning with Adam. Sometimes this was joined to commentaries on the six days of creation (Hexaemeron) and included ideas about the origin of the arts and sciences and of civilization in general.2 The incipient inclusiveness of this kind of history lay in the use of non-biblical sources by Christians, and the way it transcended cultures, languages and religions. But this was mainly in terms of the heritage of the Hellenistic world; Christian 145

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writers saw themselves as the cultural heirs and successors of the ancient Israelites, Babylonians and Egyptians, but not of the Persians. The conquest of the Persian Empire by Alexander had included the Persians in the Hellenistic world, but by the time Christians started to write universal histories the Persians were becoming less and less a part of the Hellenistic ecumene. The earliest exemplar of this tradition would seem to have been Julius Africanus (ca. CE 160–ca. 240), who put world chronology into a single millennial framework. But the fourth-century chronicle of Eusebius is more universal in his inclusion of Chaldaeans, Hebrews, Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, although some parts of world history and chronology lay beyond his reach.3 The tenth-century Arabic-writing historian al-Masʿūdī says that he himself used a chronicle of the kings of the world from Adam to Constantine the Great that was written by a fifth-century Alexandrian monk called Annianus.4 This lost chronicle of Annianus was also used by later Eastern Christian historians such as George Syncellos, Elias of Nisibis, Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus.5 There was a long tradition of Christian universal history in Greek, Latin, Syriac and Arabic.6 It should thus be no surprise that Muslims began to write universal histories by the ninth and tenth centuries CE, possibly inspired by the universality of monotheism,7 the existence of an imperial caliphate and commercial expansion. The Qurʾān itself confirmed that creation had a beginning and an end and provided the potential framework for history as a succession of prophets in between. But universality is not necessarily announced in the titles of such works, whether they were the titles actually given by the authors or the titles that came to be used for them. Universality or comprehensiveness could be indicated by words formed from the Arabic roots jīm-mīm-ʿayn or kaf-lam-lam, completeness by words formed from kaf-mīm-lam. What spring immediately to mind are al-Kāmil fī’t-ta’rīkh of Ibn al-Athīr or Rashīd al-Dīn’s Jamiʿu’t-tawārikh, but most titles are not that obvious. The first universal histories complied by Muslims were similar to those produced by Christians in that the history of ancient

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peoples served as an introduction to Islamic history. According to Bernd Radtke, “Islamic universal history generally begins with an elaborate cosmology, continues with the history of the pre-Islamic peoples and empires . . . culminating in the Sīra of Muhammad, after which it usually restricts itself to the history of Islam.”8 A major difference from earlier Christian universal histories is that Muslim historians included the Persians among the ancient peoples. The most obvious explanation for this is that Iran had been included in the caliphal empire and that Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ had translated the Sasanian royal annals into Arabic. The contemporary Byzantine historian George Synkellos, whose history began with the creation of the world and who was writing from about CE 808 to 810, also included the ancient Persians apparently for the first time in a Christian universal history. These were the Achaemenids but not the Kayanids.9 Information on the Parthians/Arsacids and the Sasanids is integrated with Roman history through most of the third century CE. Although Synkellos got no further in his chronicle than the accession of Diocletian (CE 285), he does include a list of Sasanian kings from the beginning of the dynasty (Artaxerxes) until the end (“Hormisdas who was driven out by the Saracins”), most of which probably came from Agathias.10 There is also a clearer sense of the cultural heritage from antiquity among Muslims. According to Jāh. iz. (d. CE 868) the wisdom of all peoples had been passed from one people to another and from generation to generation until it ended up in Arabic literature.11 Masʿūdī (d. CE 956) implies that “like the Greeks in the Roman empire, the ancient Babylonians had contributed to the civilization of the Persian kingdom in which they became absorbed.”12 He also saw the significance of ancient peoples in world history in the arts and sciences they passed from one to another and eventually to Muslims.13 He was aware that Hellenic contributions to science and philosophy continued in both the Muslim world and in Byzantium.14 T. abarī (d. CE 923) is chronologically universal in his concept of history being an account of kings throughout the ages and of

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messengers sent by God from the beginning of God’s creation to its annihilation.15 In the pre-Islamic part of his history he interweaves and synchronizes the histories of Iran, Babylonia, the Israelites after Solomon, the Persians after Alexander, the Romans from Tiberius to Heraclius and the Arabs. But his focus is really on the history of the Muslim community and is thus not “universal” in scope when he comes to the Islamic period. By contrast, Masʿūdī (d. CE 956) is much more universal in scope for both the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. He included virtually every category of people known to him in the inhabited world: those who had preceded the rise of Islam, those who continued to exist afterwards and those who only came to be known afterwards outside the Islamic world. He noted the contributions of other peoples to Islamic civilization but also included those peoples that did not contribute. His originality lay mainly in including non-Muslim peoples after the rise of Islam and not seeing their history as merely as a preface to Islamic history.16 He also saw links among peoples based on a common descent from Adam, noting the descent of particular peoples from biblical figures and connecting non-biblical peoples to a biblical genealogy.17 For Shboul, Masʿūdī had a “comprehensive and immensely wide view of world history” that broadened the horizons of Islamic historiography.18 The heart of Masʿūdī’s cultural-heritage approach to history is contained in his account of the seven ancient peoples whose legacy contributed to Islamic civilization.19 But, as Shboul points out, in some cases these are actually groups of peoples.20 The seven are: (1) the Persians, (2) the Chaldaeans (including the Israelites and the Arabs), (3) the Greeks (including the Romans, Slavs and Franks, that is, the peoples of the north-west quadrant of the world), (4) the Egyptians (including Libyans, Maghribīs and black Africans in general), (5) the Turks, (6) the Indians, and (7) the Chinese.21 This amounts to a comprehensive framework upon which to organize all of the known peoples in the world. There is also a topical comprehensiveness in Masʿūdī’s inclusion of political, economic, cultural and religious matters in the cases of India and China.22

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Masʿūdī’s identification of particular arts or sciences with each of these ancient peoples involves cultural stereotypes. The Persians were famous for political administration and statecraft.23 The Chaldaeans contributed agriculture, architecture, astronomy and astrology.24 The Greeks were responsible for science and philosophy.25 The Egyptians specialized in medicine, astronomy, astrology and magic.26 The Turks excelled in warfare.27 The Indians were the source of astronomy, medicine, theology and asceticism.28 The Chinese were known for their craftsmanship, painting and government.29 The Arabs bequeathed spirituality to the world, having imbibed desert monotheism from their wide open spaces.30 Masʿūdī’s geographical scope was comprehensive. His interest in the contemporary non-Muslim world was not typical, except among some geographers. There is probably a connection between universality in history and in geography. The peoples identified by Masʿūdī are spread from China and South East Asia in the Far East to the Atlantic coasts of Europe and Africa in the West and from the Baltic Sea and Volga Basin in the North to Central Africa in the South.31 This was most of the Eastern hemisphere and amounted to the inhabited world known to Muslim geographers. There was also universality in Masʿūdī’s interest in non-Muslim religions and his use of non-Islamic sources. He had contacts with Jewish scholars, Zoroastrian priests, and Christian and S. ābian scholars and used at least three other world histories by Christian authors in addition to Annianus.32 In many ways Masʿūdī is an outstanding example of universality in Islamic historical thought. His breadth and vision helped to shape the emerging genre of Islamic universal history.33 Maqdisī’s Book of Creation and Chronology, composed in Sīstān in CE 966, was part of this development. The first two volumes are devoted to back-to-back discussions of creation and the end of the world. There is comprehensiveness in his coverage of the denial of creation by the ancients, the claims of dualists, the S. ābians of H . arrān, the Zoroastrians and the People of the Book, ending with

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what Muslims say about creation.34 Volume three contains the preIslamic history of prophets and non-Arab kings, but he says that his contemporaries did not include the histories of India, Byzantium and China because accurate accounts were not available.35 It is in volume four that Maqdisī exhibits a universality similar to that of Masʿūdī in his survey of the religions of the peoples of the world. This was part of a rationalist project of Maqdisī as a Muʿtazilī historian to show how peoples who had not received a revelation developed a natural religion based on reason.36 His scope includes the religions of the Barāhima, the laws of India, China, the Turks, the H . arrānians, dualist religions, idol worship, the varieties of Zoroastrians (Majūs), the kinds of Khurramiyya, the laws of the people of the Jāhiliyya as well as Jews and Christians.37 Some of this came from consulting Zoroastrian priests and Jewish rabbis directly.38 Maqdisī’s survey of world geography in terms of the seven climes is similarly comprehensive but his scope is not quite as extensive as that of Masʿūdī. Maqdisī includes the famous kingdoms of India, Tibet, Gog and Magog, the Turks, the Byzantines (Rūm), the Berbers and the Abyssinians beyond Islamic territory and in the Muslim world the Hijāz, Syria, Yaman, the Maghrib, ʿIrāq, the Jazīra, Adharbayjān, Armenia, Ahwāz, Fārs, Kirmān, Sijistān, Makrān, the Jabal, Khurāsān and Central Asia.39 The rest of volume four and volumes five and six are an account of Islamic history beginning with the prophethood of Muh. ammad until the death of the ʿAbbāsī caliph al-Mut.īʿ l-llāh (CE 946–74). This falls into the general pattern of Islamic universal histories in which the pre-Islamic part is broadly cultural while the Islamic part is a dynastic chronicle. However, there is a hint of comprehensiveness in Maqdisī’s survey of the differences among Muslims that includes the sects of the Shīʿa, the Khawārij, the Mushabbahat (anthropomorphists), the Muʿtazila, the Murjiyya, 40 the S. ūfiyya and the As. h. āb al-H . adīth. The universality of S. āʿid al-Andalusī (d. CE 1069) is even closer to that of Masʿūdī than is that of Maqdisī. This is based on S. āʿid’s Categories of Peoples (T. abaqāt al-umam) although he says that he

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wrote a work entitled Compilation of the Annals of Arab and NonArab Peoples (Fī Jawāmīʿ akhbār al-umam min al-ʿarab wa’lʿajam) that sounds as if it could have been a universal history.41 There is a fundamental comprehensiveness to S. āʿid’s statement near the beginning of his Categories of Peoples that “all the people on Earth from the East and from the West and from the North and from the South, although they constitute a single group, differ in three distinct traits: behaviors, physical appearances, and languages.”42 He goes on to say that the entire human race had formed seven groups of people in the distant past before the division of languages and tribes branched off. They had all been idol worshippers. These seven peoples were (1) the Persians, (2) the Chaldaeans, (3) the Greeks (including the Romans, Franks and Slavs), (4) the Copts (including the Sudanese and Berbers), (5) the Turks, (6) the Indians, and (7) the Chinese.43 This is the same list as that of Masʿūdī, in the same order with similar groups of peoples for Europe and Africa. S. āʿid, however, also classifies these peoples according to whether or not they cultivated the sciences. The eight peoples that did so were the Indians, Persians, Chaldaeans, Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Arabs and Israelites. None of the others showed any interest in science, and in this category he includes the Chinese, Gog and Magog, the Turks, Khazars, Gilān, Kazakhs, Alans, Slavonians, Bulgars, Russians, Berbers, Ethiopians, Nubians, Zanj and Ghanaians.44 The universality of S. āʿid’s geographical scope is similar to that of Masʿūdī, and it is worth noting that S. āʿid includes a survey of those peoples who were not interested in science before he moves on to those who were. It is here that he gives the Chinese credit for being better than anyone else at industrial technology and the graphic arts and remarks on their endurance at hard labor.45 The Turks specialized in warfare, making weapons, horsemanship and tactics.46 The rest of the book follows the order given above for those peoples who cultivated the sciences. S. āʿid includes sketches of their history and the geography of their countries. The Indians were known for their numerals, geometry, astronomy, mathe-

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matics, medicine and music.47 The Persians were famous for their political and administrative ability, medicine, astronomy and astrology.48 The Chaldaeans are credited with mathematics, theology, astronomy, astrology, chemistry and magic.49 The Greeks were philosophers who excelled at all branches of knowledge: mathematics, logic, natural philosophy, theology, political science and astronomy, and continued to engage in the sciences into the Islamic period.50 The Romans also had philosophy but merged with the Greeks and had no real specialty. S. āʿid includes the Christian and S. ābian scholars of the ʿAbbāsī period in this section and tends to use Rūm for Christians in general.51 The Egyptians were masters of all aspects of science and philosophy: mathematics, physical sciences, theology, charms and talismans, chemistry, geometry, astronomy and medicine.52 The Arabs were skilled in astrology, language, poetry and oratory.53 The Israelites were good at (calendrical) calculations for the history of their laws, for performing their religious obligations and for business transactions.54 S. āʿid also notes that Jews, Christians and S. ābians were physicians and astrologers and engaged in logic, philosophy, astronomy and geometry in the Islamic period.55 There appears to be universality in his comprehensive inclusion of the secular sciences. The connection between universality in historiography and geography is made in a somewhat different way in the Compendium of Chronicles of Rashīd al-Dīn (d. CE 1318) that was completed in CE 1310–11. In this case universality was a function of the scope of the Mongol Empire and the presence of foreigners at the court of Ghazan Khan (CE 1295–1304). Rashīd alDīn quotes Ghazan Khan as saying: Until now no one at anytime has made a history that contains the stories and histories of all inhabitants of the climes of the world and the various classes and groups of humans, there is no book in this realm that informs about all countries and regions, and no one has delved into the history of the ancient kings. In these days, when thank God, all corners of the earth

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are under our control and that of Genghis Khan’s illustrious family, and philosophers, astronomers, scholars, and historians of all religions and nations—Cathay, Machin, India, Kashmir, Tibet, Uyghur, and other nations of Turks, Arabs, and Franks—are gathered in droves at our glorious court, and each and every one of them possesses copies of the histories, stories, and beliefs of their own people, and they are well informed of some of them. It is our considered opinion that of those detailed histories and stories a compendium that would be perfect should be made in our royal name, and it should be written in two volumes along with an atlas and gazetteer and appended to the history so that the aggregate of that book would be peerless and include all sorts of histories.56

Accordingly: all the learned and reliable people of the nations menioned above did research, made extracts from the contents of their ancient books, and penned another volume on the histories of all inhabitants of the climes. Yet another volume of atlas and gazetteer was added and appended to this blessed history. The totality was entitled Compendium of Chronicles.57

Rashīd al-Dīn says that he copied everything he found written “in the well-known books of every nation, everything that was known to every tribe through uninterrupted tradition, everything that the wise and learned of every group had reported according to their belief.”58 Copies of his Compendium of Chronicles were produced in both Arabic and Persian. This project clearly reflected the universal pretensions of the Mongol Empire that were in no way Islamic, although the role of the world conqueror would be grafted onto Islamic political and military tradition. The entire first tome (out of two) was devoted to the history of Turco-Mongolian peoples. Yet Rashīd al-Dīn just as clearly wrote the Compendium of Chronicles as a Muslim. The Islamic tradition of universal history is found in part two of the second tome where there is a summary history of all the prophets,

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caliphs and monarchs from Adam until AH 704/CE 1304–5 and detailed histories of every nation in the inhabited part of the world.59 There is also universality in Rashīd al-Dīn’s inclusive attitude toward historical sources: Although the histories of some peoples who are infidels and idolators are nothing but fabulous concoctions and erroneous myths unacceptable to the rational mind, they too have been included so that those of insight may take heed and so that the people of Islam and faith may, by reading it, become informed of the corrupt beliefs of those in error and thereby avoid those things.60

His statement that “every group and class of people relate and hand down accounts of their history according to their own beliefs, and . . . they will naturally prefer their own beliefs to anyone else’s and will exaggerate the truth thereof” amounts to a universalizing generalization based on common human nature.61 Thus, there would appear to have been direct connections among geography, cultural legacies and universality in Islamic historiography. This can be seen not only in the chronological and geographical scope of the universal histories but also their comprehensive inclusion of different peoples and their specialties, different religions and even the secular sciences. But, although examples of universality can be found in Islamic historiography both in chronological and geographical terms, that does not mean that everyone subscribed to it. Notes 1

2

Bernd Radtke, “Towards a Typology of Abbasid Universal Chronicles,” Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies 3 (1990), p. 2. William Adler, Time Immemorial: Archaic History and its Sources in Christian Chronography from Julius Africanus to George Synkellos (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Studies, 1989), p. 3; Radtke, “Abbasid Universal Chronicles,” p. 3.

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6 7

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Adler, Time Immemorial, pp. 1–2; William Adler and Paul Tuffin, The Chronography of George Synkellos; A Byzantine Chronicle of Universal History from the Creation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. xxxiii, lv. Al-Masʿūdī, Kitāb al-Tanbīh wa’l-Ishrāf (Leiden, 1893–4), p. 154. Ahmad M. H. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī and His World: A Muslim Humanist and His Interest in Non-Muslims (London: Ithaca Press, 1979), p. 231. Radtke, “Abbasid Universal Chronicles,” p. 2. Franz Rosenthal, The History of al-T. abarī, vol. 1, General Introduction and From the Creation to the Flood (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 157. Radtke, “Abbasid Universal Chronicles,” p. 2. Adler, Time Immemorial, pp. 4–5; Adler and Tuffin, George Synkellos, pp. xxix, 351–9, 365–9, 371–3. George had meant to come down to his own time but only got as far as Diocletian (CE 285) before he died. George also used different calendar systems. He considered the Hebrew, Egyptian and Roman systems to be better known and excluded the Chaldaean and Indian systems as “untrodden ground” (Adler and Tuffin, George Synkellos, pp. 8–9). Adler and Tuffin, George Synkellos, pp. 517, 519–21. Tarif Khalidi, Islamic Historiography. The Histories of Masʿūdī (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), p. 82. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 121. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, pp. 81, 109. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 113. At.-T. abarī, Ta’rīkh ar-rusul wa’l-mulūk (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1879), vol. 1, p. 5. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, pp. xv, 127, 302–3. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, p. 84; Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 126. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, pp. xxvi, 126. Al-Masʿūdī, Tanbīh, pp. 77–85. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 127. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, p. 90; Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 126. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 153. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, p. 91; Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 103. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, pp. 93–4; Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 121. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, pp. 94–8. Ibid., pp. 98–101; Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 122. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, pp. 101–2. Ibid., pp. 102–6; Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 123.

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156 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61

Universality in Islamic Thought Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, pp. 106–8; Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 123. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, pp. 117–18. Shboul, Al-Masʿūdī, p. 152. Ibid., pp. 99, 107, 114, 231–2, 285–95. Ibid., p. xxiii. Al-Maqdisī, Kitāb al-Bad’ wa-t-ta’rīkh, ed. Cl. Huart (Paris: E. Leroux, 1899–1919), vol. 1, pp. 115–60. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 208. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, p. 68. Al-Maqdisī, Bad’ , vol. 4, pp. 1–48. Cl. Huart, A History of Arabic Literature (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), pp. 284–5. Al-Maqdisī, Bad’, vol. 4, pp. 49–104. Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 121–50. S. āʿid al-Andalusī, Science in the Medieval World: Book of the Categories of Nations, tr. S. I. Salem and A. Kumar (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), p. 15. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., pp. 3–5. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., pp. 12–13. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., pp. 18–19. Ibid., pp. 21, 25, 28. Ibid., pp. 32–3. Ibid., pp. 36–7. Ibid., pp. 39, 41. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., pp. 80–1. Rashīd al-Dīn Tabīb, Rashiduddin Fazlullah’s Jami’u’t-tawārikh = Compendium of Chronicles: A History of the Mongols, tr. W. M. Thackston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 6. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 8.

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The Universality and Neutrality of Science Emilie Savage-Smith

‫ﻣﻦ ﱂ ﻳﻌﺮﻑ ﺍﳍﻴﺌﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﺢ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻋﻨﻴﻦ ﰱ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ‬

Man lam yaʿrifu al-hayʾah wa-al-tashrīh. fa-huwa ʿinnīn fī maʿrifat Allāh taʿālā “Whoever does not know astronomy and anatomy is therefore deficient in the knowledge of God”1 This aphorism is found at the opening of some fifteenth-century Persian anatomical manuscripts. It was presumably used to promote the value of the treatise and to justify the interest in science. Defining what is “science,” however, is problematic, not only in medieval Islam but in today’s modern world as well.2 Although the amorphous English term “science” has been defined in many different ways, there is still no precise equivalent in classical Arabic. The term ʿilm (knowledge, learning) included much that we now consider to be under the umbrella of “science,” but it was also a wider term covering fields of learning considered today to be outside the scientific realm. Moreover, the term s. ināʿah (art, craft) was used interchangeably with ʿilm for many (in fact, most) practices that we have come to associate with the word “science.”3 A useful definition of an art and its relation to science is that given in 1978 by the British moral philosopher Mary Midgley (b. 1919):4 Some people think that what is an art cannot be any part of science . . . By an art I mean a set of skills, which can to some extent be handed down, but which depend much on 157

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Universality in Islamic Thought individual power, insight, practice, and personality. They do not reduce to any set of basic laws (though of course they include skill in understanding relevant scientific laws) or to any single basic method. Law and medicine, linguistics, history, and geography are arts in this sense. So is philosophy. That does not stop them from being scientific in the sense of being systematic, effective, and well related to the findings of other disciplines. They certainly are not “scientific” in the sense of looking like physics. But that is a trivial sense. Each study has its own methods, and becomes deformed if it imitates another. Science cannot be defined by contrasting it with art. Practicing any science properly is an art. When we use the word scientific as an important compliment, we mean “what increases our understanding of the world.”

And indeed this definition by Mary Midgley is a fair description of “science” as it functioned in medieval Islam. For the purposes of this chapter, I am going to narrow the definition of “science” by defining it as the attempt to measure and understand—to the extent humanly possible, a large and important caveat—the physical universe and the structure and function of the human body. While I concur completely with A. I. Sabra that the historian must consider specificity and locality when interpreting the development of Islamic science,5 I wish in this instance to pull back slightly and look at “science” (however defined) in the larger context of medieval Islamic society from the early ninth century through to the fifteenth.6 While ideas begin as local stories, through a scholarly community of shared interests and methodologies, these ideas become of universal influence and importance. For most of the undertakings that I would place under the umbrella of “science”—astronomy, optics, medicine, even astrology—the scholars practicing these arts stated that they were employing (or they urged others to employ if they did not actually do it themselves) methods that typified the Greek science of antiquity—that is, firstly, observation (h. iss, al-muʿāyanah, ras. ad, sometimes simply dalīl); secondly, experience (tajribah or

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iʿtibār, as well as mih. nah, testing); and, thirdly, qiyās, which in this context is usually analogy or analogous reasoning.7 As early as the beginning of the ninth century, we see the remarkable phenomenon of early Islamic scholars doublechecking and testing data received from Greek sources, not simply translating it. The motivation for this merits further exploration by scholars. The process is especially evident in astronomy,8 but it can also be seen in other disciplines such as medicine. For astronomy, the passage of time since the composition of Ptolemaic treatises (roughly 700 years) not only made the testing and confirmation of values possible, but also a rather obvious requirement. By the early ninth century, the value ascribed to the precession of the equinoxes was corrected from Ptolemy’s 1° per 100 years to 1° per 66 years or 1° per 70 years. This was done by observing, at the spring or autumn equinoxes, the stars near the ecliptic that are visible just before the sun rises. According to Ptolemy’s calculations, their longitudes should have been displaced over those 700 years by about 7 degrees, while in fact they were observed to have been displaced by 11 degrees.9 Similarly, the motion of the solar apogee (considered fixed by Ptolemy at 5° 30' Sign of Gemini) had moved 11 degrees by the early ninth century. For observation of the solar apogee, a new technique unknown to the Greeks was devised: observation of the daily declination of the sun at the midpoints of the seasons.10 The value of the inclination (mayl) of the earth’s axis was recalculated from 23° 51' 20", as given in the Almagest, to either 23° 33' or 23° 35' depending upon which authority you are reading. These revisions—not just translations—were already reflected in the mumtah. an zīj (verified tables) compiled in Baghdad for the caliph al-Maʾmūn (r. 813–33).11 For the same patron, al-Maʾmūn, geodetic measurements were undertaken. However, for calculating the distance on the earth’s surface equivalent to the angular distance of 1° (and from that then calculating the circumference of the earth), it was not the passage of time that provided the basis for

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correction, but rather improvement in the technique and precision of measurement.12 George Saliba, in his recent book Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, has suggested that this very early activity of refining the values given in the Greek texts clearly indicated that science, in this case astronomy, was already fairly mature at the time the translations from the Greek were made.13 How else, he argues, would mere translators of entirely new material know how to go about verifying the data and procedures, even developing new techniques for use in double-checking them?14 Where did they obtain their skills to do it? In addition, virtually all the early translators into Arabic were also scholars of considerable originality in their own right and not mere translators. Moreover, new mathematical and trigonometric techniques were immediately employed in the earliest Arabic compositions. Similar innovation can be seen in the earliest Arabic medical treatises, particularly those concerned with surgical techniques and with descriptions of previously unknown conditions, such as smallpox, measles, haemophilia, hay fever and the eye ailment known today as trachomatous pannus. The mindset to test, verify, and even challenge the Greek materials continued to be manifest in the tenth century and in the subsequent centuries. The treatise Doubts about Galen (al-Shukūk ʿalá Jālīnūs) by Abū Bakr Muh. ammad ibn Zakarīyā al-Rāzī (d. ca. 925) is an excellent example of the early analytical and questioning attitude taken by Islamic scholars. This same attitude of critical thinking can be seen in some of the techniques he developed for determining the efficacy of a therapeutic procedure. For example, in his working notes collected over a lifetime of practice and circulated after his death by his students under the title al-Kitāb al-H . āwī (The Comprehensive Book) we find interspersed numerous queries and comments, including one instance in which he foreshadowed by some 1,000 years the modern experimental concept of comparative testing, for Rāzī divided into two groups some patients he thought had the early symptoms of meningitis (sirsām). One set of patients he treated

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with bloodletting while intentionally withholding any treatment from the other group. After describing the procedure, he said: “By doing that, I wished to reach a conclusion (raʾy), and indeed all those of the latter group contracted meningitis.”15 In astronomy a similar literature arose that questioned inconsistencies and contradictions in the writings of Ptolemy and provided novel approaches to mathematical modeling. The most famous of the astronomical shukūk treatises is Doubts about Ptolemy (al-Shukūk ʿalā Bat. lamyūs) written in the early eleventh century by Ibn al-Haytham (d. ca. 1040), perhaps better known today for his work in optics.16 In addition, astronomers continued to improve observational techniques by constructing larger instruments that provided them greater precision, and these efforts to improve the precision of instrumentation continued in the later observatories of Maragha, built in 1259, Samarqand (1420) and Istanbul (1575).17 In the eleventh century Abū ʿUbayd al-Jūzjānī (d. ca. 1070), a student of Ibn Sīnā, rejected a basic feature of Ptolemaic astronomy—the equant (muʿaddil al-masīr).18 Ultimately there was so much questioning of the underlying Greek principles in astronomy that a foundational shift becomes evident in thirteenth- to fifteenthcentury writings, with the “new astronomy” (as Saliba has termed it) rejecting many of the principles of Ptolemaic astronomy because they lacked consistency and violated the principle of uniform motion.19 In medicine, the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries also saw remarkable developments in the field of ophthalmology and ocular surgery as well as revisions of some principles of physiology. The Damascene physician Ibn al-Nafīs (d. 1288), who spent much of his working life in Cairo, composed several influential medical treatises, including one (a commentary on the anatomy in the Qānūn of Ibn Sīnā) in which he challenged on several grounds the accepted Galenic physiology, most famously describing for the first time the pulmonary transit of blood flow from the right ventricle to the left ventricle of the heart.20 An example of ophthalmological literature in which the author displays a highly critical mind is the

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manual written by a fourteenth-century Egyptian oculist named S. adaqah ibn Ibrāhīm al-Shādhilī.21 The point of this rapid survey of scientific activity is to illustrate that well through the fourteenth century, and (in the case of astronomy) into the sixteenth, scholars continued to challenge authorities such as Galen and Ptolemy, as well as Islamic authorities, when their own experiences or reasonings did not support the texts they were reading.22

I For astronomy, medicine and astrology, however, the ability to predict was central, and as a consequence the notion of causality loomed large. It was primarily for that reason that some religious scholars, such as the Damascene theologian Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1318) and before him al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), were at times uneasy with the philosophical practices and methods evident in the scientific discourse. The issues of causality, necessity (d. arūrah), chance (ittifāq) and determinism were part of the religious and philosophical underpinnings of Christian and Jewish communities as well as the medieval Islamic world.23 Almost all scholars engaged to some extent in the debate over qadar, God’s determination of events, led by the Muʿtazilites in the late eighth and ninth centuries and Ashʿarites in the tenth.24 Some wrote on theological and philosophical topics while at the same time, but in separate treatises, focusing more narrowly upon “scientific issues”— examples being Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), Ibn alNafīs (d. 1288) and Qut.b al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 1311), though the latter two occasionally combined in one treatise a deep grasp of theology and medicine or theology and astronomy. Theories of chance, necessity, causation and God’s omnipotence were developed and elaborated in various ways. Most scholars with interests in science opted in one way or another for the premise that while repeated observations may reveal a

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conjunction of attributes it is only a customary conjunction and not a causal or necessary one. Whether these debates in an Islamic setting were any more detrimental or antithetical to “science” than in any other cultural setting—such as Europe, where they also took place—seems doubtful when we look at how science continued to function and develop alongside and following such debates.25 The subsequent centuries saw some remarkable and creative products of scientific work, particularly when compared with what was occurring in Europe at the same time. In other words, some of the most original scientific and medical work was done after al-Ghazālī and even after Ibn Taymīyah. II While most thinkers rejected the notion that the study of science, as well as recourse to medicine, denoted insufficient faith in God, many nonetheless clearly felt the need to justify their interest in knowledge acquired through methods we today call “scientific.” This they did in various ways. Teleological arguments were one of the most common forms of justification. The saying “Whoever has been occupied with the science of anatomy has increased his belief in God” was attributed to Ibn Rushd, a qād. ī and religious scholar who also wrote on philosophy and medicine, and that aphorism was repeated by later writers.26 As is well known, Ibn Rushd was an outspoken critic of his near contemporary al-Ghazālī, but the two were in agreement in their advocacy of anatomy. In his highly autobiographical treatise al-Munqidh min al-d. alāl (The Deliverer from Error), written toward the end of his life, al-Ghazālī made the following statement to support the study of anatomy (tashrīh. ), in words reminiscent of the teleological justifications that Galen had used for the study of the uses of the bodily parts:27 (al-t. abīʿīyūn): They are a group of people who are constantly studying the natural world and

THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHERS

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Universality in Islamic Thought the wonders of animals and plants. They are frequently engaging in the science of anatomy of animal bodies, and through it they perceive the wonders of God’s design and the marvels of His wisdom. With this they are compelled to acknowledge a wise Creator who is aware of the ends and purposes of things. No one can study anatomy and the wonders of the utilities of the parts without deducing this unavoidable inference—that is, the perfection of the design of the Creator with regard to the structure (binyah) of animals and especially the structure of humans.

Although al-Ghazālī denied the certainty of knowledge outside the realm of revelation and questioned previously held notions of causation, nonetheless he strongly supported the pursuit of medicine in general and anatomy in particular. By “anatomy (tashrīh. ),” however, it should be noted that neither Ibn Rushd nor al-Ghazālī meant human dissection (though there were no explicit legal or religious strictures banning it), but simply the study and elaboration of the ideas of the Greek physician Galen (d. ca. 216) regarding the structure and function of the parts of the body as a way of demonstrating the design and wisdom of God.28 Amongst the general learned community, al-Ghazālī came to be associated with the advocacy of both astronomy and anatomy, as witnessed by the aphorism given at the opening of this chapter, which was sometimes employed in his name: “Whoever does not know astronomy and anatomy is deficient in the knowledge of God.” This aphorism is particularly associated with copies of the Persian-language treatise Tashrīh. -i Mans. ūrī written at the end of the fourteenth century by Mans. ūr ibn Muh. ammad ibn Ah. mad ibn Ilyās (fl. 1394–1409), where copyists recorded it in illuminated ʿunwāns or in the margins.29 The saying was repeated, though not attributed to al-Ghazālī, by the seventeenth-century Ottoman bureaucrat and historian H . ajjī Khalīfah (Kātip Çelebī, d. 1657) in his Arabic bibliographical dictionary in the section on books concerned with tashrīh. .30 This apparent support for astronomy as well as anatomy by one of the most prominent and influential of theologians, al-Ghazālī,

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would surely have helped make the intellectual climate favorable to the study of the sciences in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—when the aphorism is known to have been circulating. However, it is perhaps questionable whether al-Ghazālī would also have included astronomy as a prerequisite for knowledge of God (as claimed in the aphorism), for in the discourse on knowledge that opens his Ih. yā’ ‛ulūm al-dīn (The Revival of the Religious Sciences), al-Ghazālī places medicine amongst those praiseworthy (mah. mūd) non-religious sciences, in contrast to astronomy and astrology which he considered blameworthy (madhmūm).31 Throughout this discourse on the nature of knowledge, there are numerous analogies between the science of religion and the science of medicine, as well as anatomy in particular.32 A particularly eloquent teleological justification for astrology was given by Muʾayyad al-Dīn al-ʿUrd. ī (d. 1266), an astronomer working in Maragha and an early reformer of Ptolemaic astronomy. Speaking of astronomy, he said:33 Its subject-matter is the most amazing of God’s achievements, the most magnificent of His creations, and the best executed of His deeds. As for its demonstrations (barāhīn), they are geometrical (handasīyah) and computational (h. isābiyah) and therefore definitive (qat. ʿīyah). The benefit of this science (ʿilm) is immense for the one who contemplates (naz. ara) the celestial marvels and the heavenly motions. For through it [that activity], the mind (al-fikr) has vast scope (majālan wāsican) and an indisputable proof (dalīl) of the existence of the Creator (al-s. āni‛), may He be praised and unequivocally exalted. It [astronomy] touches upon theology (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī) and demonstrates the magnificence of its Creator (mubdiʿ), the wisdom of its Maker (s. āni‛), and the immensity of His power. May God, the best of creators, be blessed.

A very different approach to justification—one that is not teleological but rather stresses God’s revelation of knowledge— can be seen in the opening of an anonymous Arabic Fāt.imid cosmographical treatise compiled in Egypt between 1020 and

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1050, the Kitāb Gharāʾib al-funūn wa-mulah. al-ʿuyūn, loosely translated as The Book of Curiosities of the Sciences and Marvels for the Eyes:34 The first chapter begins: The knowledge of the celestial sphere, and the characteristics (h. ālat) of its revolutions and movements, is a knowledge that eludes humans, who are unable to ascertain precisely its nature and verify its size. This is so because the Exalted Creator has unique knowledge of His mysteries and of His secret will, a knowledge He imparts only to His chosen prophets and the elect pure, reserving that part of the knowledge which He had chosen to give to those prophets and elect whom He has chosen to instruct. It is said—but only God knows His mysteries—that God revealed to Idrīs,35 may the Peace of God be upon him, the secret knowledge of the celestial bodies and the course of the shining stars [planets] in the elevated roof [i.e. the sky] above the laid-down bed [i.e. the earth], together with their competing movements in the orbits of their spheres, according to the plan of God, the Wise and the Omniscient. He has done that so that anyone, whether a scholar (al-bāh. ith) or a rascal (al-nākith), may observe and ponder the power of “He who made constellations in the skies, and placed therein a Lamp and a Moon giving light” [Q. 25:61] and “contemplate the [wonders of] creation in the heavens and the earth, (with the thought): Our Lord! Not for naught hast Thou created (all) this! Glory to Thee! Give us salvation from the Penalty of the Fire” [Q. 3:191].

However they justified it (if they felt the need to justify it at all), the majority of scholars concerned with scientific, medical or technological matters simply got on with it—much as scientists do today, who do not choose to discuss the epistemological, ontological or theological suppositions and implications of their work. III All thinkers of the medieval period took for granted certain scientific concepts which formed a shared body of knowledge that

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circulated and was accepted by all communities and religious confessions. I will give seven examples of scientific ideas that were universally assimilated with little or no challenge:

(1) The sphericity of the earth. This was recognized by all sailors, travelers and learned people—contrary to the erroneous notion common today that people prior to Christopher Columbus thought that the earth was flat. The idea that medieval people were Flat-Earthers arose in the early nineteenth century as a literary fiction. For this modern myth we are primarily indebted to the American novelist Washington Irving (author also of the short story The Legend of Sleepy Hollow), for in his semi-historical life of Christopher Columbus, published in 1828, Irving invented a dramatic scene in which Columbus was bravely defying the universally held notion that the earth was flat. This was, however, simply a myth—but one that proved to be an immensely influential piece of fiction.36 (2) The Euclidean geometry of lines, angles, circles, and cones. (3) The properties of numbers and the principles of calculating with them. Some, however, did question the use of numbers and mathematics in general as being so seductive as to weaken faith in God and lead the user astray.37 (4) The notion of a sphere of stars rotating about the earth, a sphere in which the stars keep a fixed distance between each other and move about the earth with uniform motion.38 In addition to this sphere of stars, there were thought to be additional spheres holding the orbits of the visible planets. That the celestial realm was composed of spheres was universally accepted, but people differed with regard to their nature, number and even their position with regard to the sphere of the moon.39 Along with these concepts went the association

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of seasonal changes with the rising and setting of stars as the sun rises or sets. (5) The basic division of the celestial equator and the ecliptic (the path of sun as seen against the background of stars) into 360 degrees. A corollary of this was the division of one day and night into 24 hours of 60 minutes each. (6) The design and utility of astronomical instrumentation. The astrolabe, for example, represented a two-dimensional model of the universe produced by stereographic projection with respect to the northern celestial pole. This basic design was inherited from Late Antiquity (it was unknown to Ptolemy) and universally accepted within Islam as a means of determining prayer times and geographical orientation. Modifications were made to the design over the centuries, in particular in Muslim Spain and North Africa, where efforts were made to produce a form that was “universal” in that it could be employed at any geographical latitude, unlike the standard form. (7) The notion that disease could be classified and explained in terms of an imbalance of four “humors”: blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. The last item, the seventh, merits further explanation, because its history is somewhat different from the others. The first five scientific concepts that remained essentially unchallenged in Islamic culture were in fact very ancient indeed, most of them traceable in one form or another to ancient Mesopotamia. The sixth, the astrolabe, was derived from late antiquity, and because it involved both metallurgical skills and knowledge of a sophisticated geometric construction, its diffusion and development ran a different course. The description and treatment of diseases in terms of four “humors,” however, was central to ancient Greek medicine and was inherited from the classical Greek-speaking world. Yet this notion of four “humors”—what historians today

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call “humoral pathology”—also came to underlie the medicine attributed by Muslim scholars to the Prophet.40 Prophetic medicine (al-t. ibb al-nabawī) was a term applied to a genre of medical writing whose authors were religious scholars rather than physicians and which employed traditions about the Prophet (h. adīths) and custom (sunna) in order to reflect the practices current in the days of the Prophet. Treatises of this type were composed as early as the mid-ninth century,41 but they became particularly popular in the fourteenth century, perhaps as a result of the occurrence of the Black Death in 1348. Another motivation for the increased interest in this approach to medicine may also have been the anti-philosophical tradition of which the Damascene theologian Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328) was the main proponent. Two of his direct disciples were authors of major treatises on prophetic medicine: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah (d. 1350), a Syrian theologian of the H . anbalī school, and al-Dhahabī (d. 1348), a Damascene scholar of the Shāfiʿī school. Moreover, a later influential advocate of prophetic medicine was Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūt.ī (d. 1505), who abridged Ibn Taymīyah’s treatise against Greek philosophy and logic and, therefore, can be considered within Ibn Taymīyah’s sphere of influence.42 In any case, diagnosis and prognosis play little role in al-t. ibb alnabawī, presumably because they suggest a notion of causality which might limit the omnipotence of God. There is a conscious avoidance of any claims of medicine to absoluteness.43 Yet, despite the qualms about the underlying notions of causality, the authors still accepted and utilized the humoral theory of disease. AlDhahabī opens his book with a discussion of the Greek concepts of humors, temperaments, faculties and six “non-naturals.” In addition to numerous authorities on h. adīth, both al-Dhahabī and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah cite many Greek authorities (Hippocrates, Galen, Aristotle, Plato, Dioscorides) as well as Muslim and (in the case of Ibn Qayyim) Jewish physicians. When discussing the origins of medicine and praising Hippocrates and Galen as the two greatest physicians, al-Dhahabī states, however, that the ultimate source of medical knowledge has to be divine

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revelation and inspiration, glossing his statement with the sentence: “This much is certain: experiences (al-tajārib) and analogy (al-qiyās) are insufficient for it [the development of medicine].”44 As for the Egyptian polymath and Shāfiʿī scholar Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūt.ī, his treatise al-Manhaj al-sawī wa-manhal al-rawī fī alt. ibb al-nabawī (The Correct Method and Refreshing Source for the Medicine of the Prophet) reflects to an even greater extent the basic principles of Greek medicine, including humoral pathology, for it is highly dependent upon a popular epitome of the Canon on Medicine of Ibn Sīnā—the Mūjiz that is customarily attributed to the thirteenth-century Syrian physician Ibn al-Nafīs, who, like al-Suyūt.ī, was a Shāfiʿī legal scholar.45 As for Ibn Sīnā himself, Dimitri Gutas noted in his 2003 study of the medical theory and scientific method in the age of Avicenna that “the theory and principles of humoral pathology are to be accepted as given in natural science (physics) and their investigation is declared off-limits to the physician.”46 That is to say, the concept of the four humors was universally accepted and left essentially unchallenged, as were the other six scientific concepts itemized above. For astronomy and cosmology, a genre similar in purpose circulated under titles such as al-hay’ah al-sunnīyah or al-hay’ah al-islāmīyā, or “Islamic cosmology.” Al-Suyūt.ī composed one of these as well, and here also we see an acceptance of many of the concepts included above amongst the shared body of knowledge accepted by all communities—in this case, geometry and number, as well as the spheres rotating about the earth, with the entire universe, including the earth, pictured as a globe.47 The global ubiquity and circulation of certain scientific concepts48—and here I have given but seven examples—is very striking, for they were accepted by virtually all Islamic scholars and writers of the medieval period, regardless of their confessional allegiance (Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Sabian, pagan, etc.) or their affiliations within that confessional community (Muʿtazilite, Ashʿarite, Shīʿī, Sunnī, Shāfiʿī, H . anbalī, H. anafī, Mālikī, etc.).

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IV Not only were there features of science that were universally accepted by all confessional communities, but certain aspects were sufficiently neutral that people of different religions and outlooks could cooperate without conflict. When discussing issues of scientific or medical content, the relationship between people of different faiths and persuasions appears to have been so easy and unobtrusive that it was largely taken for granted and seldom singled out for comment. When the subject was medicine, Muslims were often teachers of Christians or Jews (or vice versa). For example, Ibn al-Nafīs certified in his own hand that a Christian student had successfully studied with him his own commentary on Hippocrates’ On the Nature of Man. In translation, the note at the end of the only preserved copy of Ibn al-Nafīs’ commentary reads:49 [In the name of] God the Provider of Good Fortune: The wise, the learned, the excellent shaykh Shams al-Dawlah Abū al-Fad. l ibn al-shaykh Abī al-H. asan al-Masīh. ī, may God make his good fortune long lasting, studied with me this entire book of mine—that is, the commentary on the book by the imam Hippocrates, which is to say his book known as On the Nature of Man—by which he [the student] demonstrated the clarity of his intellect and the correctness of his thought, may God on High grant him benefit and may he make use of it. Certified by the poor in need of God on High, ʿAlī ibn Abī al-H. azm al-Qurashī [known as Ibn alNafīs] the physician. Praise be to God for His perfection, and prayers for the best of His prophets, Muh. ammad, and his family. And that is on the twenty-ninth of Jumādá I [in the] year six hundred and sixty eight [= CE 25 January 1270].

In it, we see an example of a prominent Muslim physician and legal scholar instructing a Christian pupil on an Arabic commentary expounding a classical Greek Hippocratic treatise. Numerous other examples can be given. The Muslim Cairene physician and one-time astrologer Ibn Rid. wān (d. 1068) had a Jewish pupil, Ifrāʾīm ibn al-H . asan, who became famous for his

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enormous book collection that boasted 20,000 volumes.50 In the Eastern provinces, there is persuasive evidence that Abū Sahl alMasīh. ī, a Christian physician, was the teacher of Ibn Sīnā, though Ibn Sīnā denied ever having or needing a teacher of medicine, claiming in his short autobiography to have taught himself at a very early age. We know that Ibn Sīnā did address at least one essay (risālah) to al-Masīh. ī, and later medieval bio-bibliographic sources firmly assert that al-Masīh. ī was Ibn Sīnā’s teacher. In any case, al-Masīh. ī was part of the brilliant group of scholars at the court of the Khwārazmshāh Maʾmūn ibn Maʾmūn—scholars that included Ibn Sīnā and the polymath al-Bīrūnī, as well as a Christian physician named Abū Khayr ibn Khammār. According to an account given in the twelfth century by Niz. āmī-i ʿArūd. ī, when the scholars at the court in Khwārazm were summoned in 1010 to the court of a rival ruler at Ghazna (in what is now eastern Afghanistan), Abū Sahl al-Masīh. ī and Ibn Sīnā fled together in the opposite direction from Ghazna, and at Māzandarān (south of the Caspian Sea) they encountered a sudden sandstorm in which Abū Sahl al-Masīh. ī died.51 The mixing and interchange of Christian and Muslim scholars at the court in Khwārazm is very evident, and a similar mixing of scholars of different faiths could be seen at the court of Saladin, who was said to have no fewer than 18 physicians in his service, eight of them Muslim, five Jews, four Christians and one Samaritan. These included, of course, the well-known Jewish physician and philosopher Mūsā ibn Maymūn (Maimonides).52 Another example of the intermingling of confessional communities when studying medicine is the career of the physician Ibn al-Tilmīdh, who died in Baghdad in 1165 at the advanced age of 94 (or 91 solar) years. He was head (sā‛ūr) of the ‛Ad. udī hospital founded in Baghdad in 981 and also leader (ra’s) and presbyter (qissīs) of the Nestorian Christian community in Baghdad.53 Although a Christian, he studied medicine with the court physician to al-Muqtadī, Sa‛īd ibn Hibat Allāh (d. 1101). One of his fellow students was Abū al-Barakāt, a Jewish physician who eventually converted to Islam and with whom Ibn al-Tilmīdh had

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a rather famous feud. Ibn al-Tilmīdh ultimately became court physician, associated with the ruling classes, and had numerous students of his own, including Ibn al-Mut.rān (d. 1191), a Christian who later converted to Islam and found in Saladin a generous patron, enabling him to develop a personal library said to contain 10,000 volumes at his death.54 Nor did it make any difference whether the author of a treatise was a Christian, a Jew or a Muslim. Many of the ninth-century authors of treatises later used by Muslim scholars were of course Christian, but some also were pagan or Sabian—for example, Thābit ibn Qurrah of H . arrān (d. 901), a translator as well as an original and important mathematician in his own right. Ish. āq ibn Sulaymān al-Isrāʾīlī (d. ca. 932), of an Egyptian Jewish family, composed the major monographs on fevers and diagnosis by urine, employed for centuries by most medical writers, both Muslim and Christian.55 A Christian physician of Baghdad by the name of Sābūr ibn Sahl (d. 869) wrote a hospital pharmacopoeia that remained the most important medical formulary for 300 years. In the hospitals in Egypt and Syria, the hospital formulary by the Jewish apothecary Ibn Abī al-Bayān al-Isrāʾīlī (d. ca. 1240) was widely used, though eventually surpassed in popularity by that compiled about 1260 by another Jewish physician, al-Kūhīn al-ʿAt.t.ār, which in turn became the standard text in pharmacy for many decades.56 Many more examples could be given. On occasion, heated debates on scientific issues could be conducted between scholars of different confessions (Muslim arguing against Christian, for example) without the theological differences between the advocates even being mentioned. A single example will have to suffice: Ibn Rid. wān was an irascible and argumentative Egyptian Muslim physician, and he quarrelled in an exchange of letters with the Christian physician Ibn But.lān (d. after 1063) who arrived in Fust.āt (Old Cairo) from Baghdad about the year 1049. In their acrimonious exchanges—centering on the momentous question whether the mature chicken has a warmer nature than a newly hatched bird—they accused each other of medical incompetence, and Ibn Rid. wān went so far as to say that

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Ibn But.lān did not deserve to be called a “physician” (t. abīb). Yet religion did not enter into the debate. While one might have expected that Ibn Rid. wān would refer at some point to Ibn But.lān’s Trinitarian beliefs (since such doctrines were often depicted as polytheistic in Islamic polemical literature), he in fact did not do so.57 The debate, though often personal and vindictive, remained focused on a neutral scientific topic and the definition of a proper physician. In short, the religious views of authors and teachers appear to have mattered little when the discourse concerned medicine. The same may not have been as true in the field of astronomy, where from the Mamluk period onwards the practice of astronomy became increasingly associated with the role of the muwaqqit or timekeeper in the mosques and thus by definition required that the practitioner be a Muslim. Moreover, certain “scientific” institutional activities involved a mix of people representing different religious affiliations. In Islamic hospitals from the tenth century onward, evidence suggests that Muslim, Jewish, and Christian doctors worked together, treating not only patients of their own community, but also those of other communities. A certain caution, however, must be used in analyzing our sources, for while it is evident that the professional staff were often quite mixed, there is little preserved evidence regarding the make-up of the patients. A mixture of theological orientations and sectarian allegiances can also be seen in the observatories that were established in the thirteenth century and later. At the observatory in Maragha (in modern Azerbaijan), for example, whose construction began in 1259, the patron was not a Muslim but rather the first of the IlKhanid dynasty, Hülegü Khān (r. 1256–65), who was in fact a Buddhist. The director of the observatory—and the one who, in his capacity as administrator of the waqf funds for the Ilkhanate, used the religious endowments to finance the observatory—was Nas. īr al-Dīn al-T. ūsī, a Shīʿī with (at least in the early days) Ismāʿīlī tendencies, while the instruments were designed by Muʾayyad al-Dīn al-ʿŪrd. ī, a Sunnī.58 In addition, several Chinese

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astronomers were on its staff, and there is some evidence that Christian and possibly even Jewish astronomers may have been involved in the activities of the observatory.59 On occasion, of course, there were tensions between the different communities. For example, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah in his fourteenth-century treatise on prophetic medicine wrote:60 the Christian’s chief characteristics are stupidity and lack of understanding and cleverness, while the Jews are chiefly characterized by anxiety, worry, and servility. But the Muslims’ chief characteristics are intelligence, courage, understanding, undauntedness, merriment, and joy.

And there are recorded a number of exasperated outbursts of resentment from Muslim physicians because Christians or Jews were dominating the business.61 Nonetheless, I hope that I have demonstrated through these examples that scientific, medical or technological interests could override or go between the different confessional communities with apparent ease and without need of alteration or accommodation. V It is commonly stated in general histories of Islamic culture, and even in the writings of specialists in Islamic history and thought, that, following the theological discourses of al-Ghazālī at the turn of the eleventh to twelfth century,62 science declined in the Islamic world. If that theory were correct, we would expect to see scientific activity and innovation slowing down if not ceasing altogether. Yet that is not what happened. Rather, the subsequent centuries saw some remarkable and creative productivity. I would venture to say that the number of scientific treatises composed in Arabic (not to mention Persian and Turkish), though I have not actually counted them, increased greatly in the Mamluk and later periods—this is evident, for example, from the large number of manuscripts preserved today in collections throughout the world

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as well as in bibliographic lists such as that compiled by H . ajjī Khalīfah (Kātip Çelebī) in the seventeenth century. Most of these treatises remain completely unread today and their contents unknown. But in those that have been studied, innovation can be seen in the challenges and revisions of Ptolemaic astronomy that continued through the sixteenth century,63 in the remarkable ophthalmological manuals of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,64 and in the challenges to Galenic physiology introduced by Ibn al-Nafīs in the second half of the thirteenth century.65 Moreover, the “new” sciences, that is, unknown to the Greeks— such as ʿilm al-mīqāt (timekeeping) and ʿilm al-farā’id. , the mathematical calculation of the distributions of inheritance66— were further elaborated in important ways during the postGhazālian era, and an entirely new form of divination appeared in the thirteenth century, ʿilm al-raml or geomancy, that is notable for its distinctive mathematical structure.67 Higher order magic squares arose at the end of the eleventh century, and in subsequent centuries reached great sophistication in the mathematical methods employed in their construction,68 while (to give just one technological example) a remarkable technique for casting hollow metal seamless celestial globes was developed by astrolabe-makers working in Lahore at the end of the sixteenth century—employing a technique that no workshop today reproduces.69 There was great diversity in medieval Islam in the interpretation of qadar (God’s determination of events) and its implications for the practice of “science,” and great variation in the manner in which “scientists” viewed their discipline in relation to their religious beliefs. Some combined scientific discourse with theological debate, two examples being Ibn al-Nafīs in the thirteenth century, and ‛Alī al-Qūshjī who worked at the observatory in Samarqand in the fifteenth century. The latter, in his theological commentary on Nas. īr al-Dīn al-T. ūsī’s Tajrīd alʿaqā’id (Epitome of Belief), argued that astronomy could make suppositions that could explain phenomena and represent regular

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patterns, but that there was no need to make the claim that it was the only possible explanation. In other words, by such an interpretation mathematical astronomy became a mere calculating device that made no pronouncement regarding causality or God’s qadar.70 Some scholars actively engaged in both theological and scientific speculation, while others practiced their art using a language devoid as much as possible of philosophical implications—this is particularly true of technical, mathematical astronomy which had with time consciously divorced itself from astrology with its physical and metaphysical implications. Yet others simply got on with it without speculating overly much on the philosophical or theological implications (just as most scientists do today).71 The “conflict model” (science versus religion, or reason versus revelation) that dominates modern historical studies of the history of science in medieval Islam is perhaps a greater reflection of the conflict between science and religion that arose in Europe after the so-called Enlightenment than it is of Islamic society itself during the medieval period.72 In the eighteenth century, a move was undertaken in Europe to separate the “scientific arts” from “natural philosophy,” thereby allowing a person to work with “scientific” materials and methods while avoiding any issues of causality. This separation was advocated, for example, by the eighteenth-century naturalist and zoologist Buffon, who held that the “scientific arts” encompassed those techniques useful for calculating and classifying, but were not concerned with the causes and natures of things, the latter being the domain of natural philosophy.73 European science and medicine have since that time been dominated by this dichotomy, and it is through that distorting lens that European historians have traditionally tended to view the history of science in earlier centuries. The conflict paradigm of science versus religion has been reevaluated in recent years by historians of European science and shown to be too simplistic a model to adequately reflect the complex and often very fruitful relationship between the two.74 As

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far as the Islamic world is concerned, even though scholars such as Dimitri Gutas, A. I. Sabra, David King, George Saliba, Jamil Ragep and Ahmad Dallal have published studies arguing for a reinterpretation of the relationship between religion and science in medieval Islam, the standard accounts of intellectual history stress the antagonism between Islam and science and the detrimental effect that theological arguments had on scientific and medical activities—despite the fact that the evidence is to the contrary.75 It is time that historians of Islamic science and history, like our European counterparts, re-evaluate or substantially modify—if not reject altogether—this paradigm.76 As historians of European science are now recognizing, tension between religion and science is not always a bad thing. It can be productive in that it makes scientists evaluate more precisely the soundness, logic and methodology of their discipline.77 The issues of certainty and causality are still major philosophical problems today, but they are largely ignored by scientists and misunderstood by most of the general public. As a fourteenth-century legal authority in Granada, Ibn Lubb (d. 1381) said:78 “the association of one thing with another does not mean that it [the first] is the cause [of the second]”—something we tend to forget today with the daily news-media bombardment of correlations, interpreted by most people as meaning causation. Correlation, of course, as any scientist would tell you, is not the same as causation, but the general public easily confuses them. Differentiation between probability and determinism is important. To the modern scientist, inference from established correlations has implications only for knowledge, not for determinism.79 Statistics is in effect the attempt to quantify uncertainty, not to predict outcome. Modern science describes itself as providing “a makeshift description and probabilistic correlation,” but not an explanation.80 In other words, today’s scientific understanding of probability and prediction is more epistemological than ontological, but earlier thinkers had as much interest in the ontological implications as in the epistemological. If the scientific communities today were forced to examine the

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philosophical and theological issues of causality and certainty—as Islamic scholars felt obliged to do in the pre-modern period— perhaps modern scientists (and the society as a whole) would better understand what they are, and are not, achieving. To return to the medieval Islamic world: the subjects that were being investigated by scientists of the day—the movement of heavenly bodies, the mechanics of levers and geared machinery, timekeeping, the properties of lenses, diseases afflicting mankind, the structure and function of the human body, the topography of the earth—these were and are universal concerns. The methods employed in analyzing them—observation, comparison, experimentation (though not always in the modern sense of the word), and mathematical modeling—were and are also universal. The problems that such methods pose for all monotheistic religions— those of causality and limitation of the omnipotence of the creator—are also universal, for the basic dilemmas are the same in all three confessional communities: Muslim, Christian and Jewish. Because “science” is characterized by these “universal” qualities, it was possible in medieval Islam—as it should be today—for people of divergent backgrounds and beliefs to cooperate and participate in a joint scientific enterprise. Notes 1

2

The quotation is found, for example, in Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, Persian MS 129, fol. 1a, where the author is given as Imām Ghazālī, and (without attribution) in Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Medical School, Trent MS, folio 1b in the illuminated ‛unwān. For further discussion, see below. I wish to thank Wilferd Madelung, for guidance, support and friendship over many years. For this particular chapter I have received very helpful suggestions and encouragement from other Oxford colleagues, including Fritz Zimmermann, Yossef Rapoport, Judith Pfeiffer and Iain Chalmers, though it goes without saying that they should not be held responsible for my interpretations and misunderstandings. For some of the conceptual problems of defining what the “science” is that historians of science are supposed to study, see

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Universality in Islamic Thought Peter Dear, “What is the History of Science the History Of? Early Modern Roots of the Ideology of Modern Science,” Isis 96 (2005), pp. 390–406. S. ināʿah and ʿilm were used interchangeably in much the same way that the Greek terms technē and epistēmē were interchanged; see A. I. Sabra, The Optics of Ibn al-Haytham—Books I–III: On Direct Vision (London: Warburg, 1989), vol. 2, p. 7. For Abū Maʿshar describing astrology as both ʿilm and s. ināʿah, see Charles Burnett, “The Certitude of Astrology: The Scientific Methodology of alQabīs. ī and Abū Maʿshar,” Early Science and Medicine 7 (2002), pp. 198–211, esp. p. 206 note 17. Al-Fārābī even used the term s. ināʿah of kalām; A. I. Sabra, “Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islamic Theology: The Evidence of the Fourteenth Century,” Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften 9 (1994), pp. 1–42, esp. p. 7 note 8. Mary Midgley, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 86; emphasis is in the original quotation. A. I. Sabra, “Situating Arabic Science: Locality Versus Essence,” Isis 87 (1996), pp. 654–70. I will not here discuss the various classifications of learning (ʿulūm)—practical, theoretical, religious, foreign and so forth. Much has been written on this topic, but it does not impact directly upon my central argument; see for example Dimitri Gutas, “Medical Theory and Scientific Method in the Age of Avicenna,” in Before and After Avicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group, ed. D. C. Reisman and A. H. al-Rahim (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 145–62; and J. Jolivet, “Classifications of the Sciences,” in Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science, ed. R. Rashed and M. Morelon (London: Routledge, 1996), vol. 3, pp. 1008–25. For the inaccurate and overstressed dichotomy between the “religious” or “Islamic” sciences and the “foreign” or “ancient” sciences put forward by Ignaz Goldziher and others, see note 25 below. For tajribah (Greek, empeiria) and iʿtibār in Ibn Sīnā, see J. McGinnis, “Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2003), pp. 307–27, esp. pp. 317–27; for h. iss, ras. ad, mushāhādah, and tajribah and related terms used by Ibn Hindū, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and others, see Gutas: “Medical Theory and Scientific Method.” For tajribah, iʿtibār, and istiqrā’ used by Ibn al-Haytham, see Sabra, The Optics of Ibn al-Haytham, vol. 2, pp. 10–19. For tajribah and its link with h. ads (intuition), see

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Tzvi Langermann, “Ibn Kammūna and the ‘New Wisdom’,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005), pp. 277–327, esp. pp. 296–302. For terminology in astrology, see Burnett, “Certitude of Astrology.” The term qiyās tends in specialized scientific and medical treatises to be used more in the sense of analogy and analogical reasoning than syllogism. Later in the navigational literature the term qiyās was employed for the method of measuring latitude based upon the position of the pole star or on a combination of stars; see G. R. Tibbetts, Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean Before the Coming of the Portuguese (London 1971), pp. 312–13 in the section titled “3. Qiyās.” For tajribah as a method to prove the truth of astrological techniques, see also Julio Samsó and Hamid Berrani, “World Astrology in Eleventh-Century al-Andalus: The Epistle on Tasyīr and the Projection of Rays by alIstijjī,” Journal of Islamic Studies 10 (1999), pp. 293–312, esp. pp. 308–9. George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 9–20. See Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, p. 283 note 50 and E. S. Kennedy, “A Survey of Islamic Astronomical Tables,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s., 46 (1956), pp. 123–77, esp. p. 146. Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, p. 82. The value 23° 33' was used in the mumtah. an zīj, and the value 23° 35' in the writings of H. abash al-H. āsib (fl. 840); see Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, pp. 20, 81, and 263 note 49. The measurement of the length of one degree on the meridian by astronomers commissioned around 830 by al-Maʾmūn is reported in several versions. See Syed Hasan Barani, “Muslim Researches in Geodesy,” Al-Bīrūnī Commemoration Volume (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1951), pp. 1–52; Y. T. Langermann, “The Book of Bodies and Distances of H. abash al-H. āsib,” Centaurus 28/2 (1983), pp. 108–28; R. P. Mercier, “Geodesy,” in History of Cartography, vol. 2, Book 1: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies, ed. J. B. Harley and David Woodward (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), pp. 178–81; David A. King, “Too Many Cooks . . . A New Account of the Earliest Muslim Geodetic Measurements,” Suhayl 1 (2000), pp. 207–41. A recently discovered additional version is contained in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Arab. c. 90, fols. 22b–23a; for a preliminary edition and translation of the treatise see Emilie Savage-Smith and Yossef Rapoport (eds.), The Book of Curiosities: A Critical Edition.

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Universality in Islamic Thought World-Wide-Web publication (March 2007) available at http:// www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/bookofcuriosities (accessed 6 May 2013); and for a fuller edition (employing more copies) and annotated translation, see Yossef Rapoport and Emilie Savage-Smith, An Eleventh-Century Egyptian Guide to the Universe: The “Book of Curiosities,” edited with an annotated translation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2013). Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making. For further discussion of the state of science before the translation period, see Anton M. Heinen, Islamic Cosmology: A Study of as-Suyūt. ī’s al-Hay’a as-sanīya fī l-hay’a as-sunnīya with Critical Edition, Translation, and Commentary (Beirut, Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft; Wiesbaden, In Kommission bi F. Steiner Verlag, 1982), pp. 64–76. Saliba presents an intriguing theory that the impetus for the translation movement came about through members of the dīwān of revenue who were already skilled in arithmetical and geometrical (surveying) procedures and methods of computing solar years, but needed to expand their skills and knowledge so as to maintain their dominance in the diwān and in the government. He suggests that fields of knowledge became “tools of political power” (Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, p. 77). al-Rāzī, al-Kitāb al-H . āwī fī al-t. ibb (Hyderabad), 1st ed., vol. 15, p. 122 line 3. For a full translation of the passage, see Emilie Savage-Smith, “Medicine,” in Rashed and Morelon, Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science, vol. 3, pp. 903–62, esp. p. 917. A. I. Sabra and N. Shehaby, Ibn al-Haytham’s al-Shukūk ʿalā Bat. lamyūs (Dubitationes in Ptolemaeum) (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub Press, 1971). For the astronomical shukūk tradition, see Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, p. 94–117. See also A. I. Sabra, “Ibn al-Haytham’s Revolutionary Project in Optics: The Achievement and the Obstacle,” in The Enterprise of Science in Islam: New Perspectives, ed. Jan P. Hogedijk and A. I. Sabra (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 85–118, and Gerhard Endress, “Mathematics and Philosophy in Medieval Islam,” in the same volume, pp. 123–76 esp. 142–51. For a survey of observatories, see Régis Morelon, “General Survey of Arabic Astronomy,” in Rashed and Morelon: Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science, vol. 1, pp. 1–19, as well as the fuller but somewhat outdated study by Aydın Sayılı, The Observatory in Islam and its Place in the General History of the Observatory

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[Publications of the Turkish Historical Society, ser. 7, no. 38] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1960). George Saliba, “Arabic Planetary Theories in the Eleventh Century AD,” in Rashed and Morelon: Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science, pp. 58–127, esp. pp. 103–4; Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, p. 169. The writings of Muʾayyad al-Dīn al-ʿUrd. ī (d. 1266), Nas. īr al-Dīn al-T. ūsī (d. 1274), Qut.b al-Dīn Shīrāzī (d. 1311), Ibn al-Shāt.ir (d. 1375), al-Qushjī (d. 1474) and Shams al-Dīn al-Khafrī (d. 1550) were particularly important in developing this “new astronomy”; see Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, p. 21 and passim. The term “new astronomy” used by Saliba for this phenomenon is not to be confused with the heliocentric astronomy of Copernicus and his supporters which historians have often termed “the new astronomy.” For a comprehensive study of the new physiology proposed by Ibn al-Nafīs and its development as part of his solution to the problem of bodily resurrection, see Nahyan A. G. Fancy, “Pulmonary Transit and Bodily Resurrection: The Interaction of Medicine, Philosophy and Religion in the Works of Ibn al-Nafīs (d. 1288)” (Ph.D. dissertation, Notre Dame University, Indiana, 2006). The treatise by S. adaqah ibn Ibrāhīm al-Shādhilī, Kitāb al-ʿUmdah al-nūrīyah fī al-amrad. al-bas. arīyah (The Ophthalmological Principle for Diseases Affecting the Vision) has not been edited or translated into English. For a sample passage taken from his discussion of the possibility of extracting a cataract, see P. E. Pormann and E. Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine [The New Edinburgh Islamic Surveys] (Edinburgh, 2007), pp. 132–5. One finds many statements in the literature expressing a sentiment that the physician ʿAbd al-Lat.īf al-Baghdādī (d. 1231) put as follows: “Observation (al-h. iss) is a more forceful demonstration than hearing [sam‛, hearing a text recited]. Indeed, observation has greater veracity (as. daq) than Galen, even though he was of the highest rank in terms of investigation and caution in what he pronounced and related;” ʿAbd al-Lat.īf al-Baghdādī, Kitāb alIfādah wa’l-i‛tibār fī al-umūr al-mushāhadah wa’l-h. awādith almuʿāyanah bi-ard. Mis. r, ed. ʿAlī Muh. sin ʿĪsā Māl Allāh (Baghdad: Dār al-H. ikmah, 1987), p. 184. See Catarina Belo, Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroes [Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science; Texts and Studies, 69] (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007) for a discussion of determinism in the works of Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037) and Ibn Rushd

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Universality in Islamic Thought (d. 1198). See also Endress, “Mathematics and Philosophy,” pp. 122–76. See Wilferd Madelung “The Late Muʿtazila and Determinism: The Philosophers’ Trap,” in Yād-Nāma, in memoria di Alessandro Bausani, ed. B. Scarcia Amoretti and L. Rostagno (Rome, 1991), vol. 1, pp. 245–57; and the discussion of occasionalism in the context of contagion explored by Justin K. Stearns, Infectious Ideas: Contagion in Premodern Islamic and Christian Thought in the Western Mediterranean (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). The assertion that scientific activity declined in Islam following the teachings of al-Ghazālī was endorsed particularly by Ignaz Goldziher, “Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften,” Abhandlungen der Königlich Preussichen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Jahrgang, 1915), translated as “The Attitude of Orthodox Islam Toward the ‘Ancient Science’,” in Studies on Islam, tr. and ed. M. Swartz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 185–215. The idea was further developed by Gustave E. von Grunebaum in Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1961) and “Relations of Philosophy and Science: A General View,” in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. G. Hourani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), pp. 1–4. Earlier, a similar interpretation had been espoused by Ernest Renan, “L’Islamisme et la Science,” Journal des Débats (1883), reprinted in Oeuvres Complètes de Ernest Renan, ed. Henriette Psichari, 10 vols. (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947), vol. 1, pp. 945–65. For criticisms of this thesis, see Fancy: Pulmonary Transit and Bodily Resurrection; Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 166–75; Len Berggren, “Acquisition of the Foreign Sciences: A Cultural Approach,” in Tradition, Transmission, Transformation, ed. F. Jamil Ragep and Sally P. Ragep (Leiden: 1996), pp. 270–83; and F. Jamil Ragep, “Freeing Astronomy from Philosophy: An Aspect of Islamic Influence on Science,” Osiris 16 (2001), pp. 49–64 and 66–71. Ibn Abī Us. aybiʿah, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī .tabaqāt al-at. ibbāʾ, ed. A. Müller, 2 vols. (Cairo and Königsberg: al-Mat.baʿah al-Wahbīyah, 1882-4), vol. 2, p. 77 lines 13–14. al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh min al-d. alāl wa-al-mūs. il ilā dhī’ l-‛izzah wa’l-jalāl, ed. Jamāl Salībā and Kāmil ʿAyyād, 10th ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1981), pp. 96–7; translation is that of the present

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author. See also al-Ghazālī, The Confessions of al-Ghazzali, tr. Claud Field (London: John Murray, 1909), p. 25. See Emilie Savage-Smith, “Attitudes Toward Dissection in Medieval Islam,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 40 (1995), pp. 67–110. This Persian-language treatise was dedicated to a Persian provincial ruler who governed from 1394 to 1409, probably a grandson of Tīmūr. See Gül Russell, “Ebn Ilyās,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. 8 (1998), pp. 16–20; and A. Newman, “Tašrīh. -i Mans. ūrī: Human Anatomy between the Galenic and Prophetical Medical Traditions,” in La science dans le monde iranien à l’époque islamique, ed. Ž. Vesel, H. Beikbaghban and B. Thierry de Crussol des Epesse (Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1998; 2nd ed. 2004), pp. 253–71. H. ajjī Khalīfah, Kashf al-z. unūn, Lexicon Bibliographicum et Encyclopaedicum, ed. G. Flügel, 7 vols. (Leipzig/London: published for the Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, 1835-58), vol. 2, pp. 297–9 no. 3003. al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge being a Translation With Notes of the Kitāb al-‛ilm of al-Ghazzālī’s Ih. yā’ ‛ulūm al-dīn, trans. Nabih Amin Faris, 2nd ed. (Lahore, 1966), pp. 37, 45–6, 54, 57, 77, 99 and 142–3; for the Arabic text, see al-Ghazālī, Ih. yā’ ‛ulūm aldīn, 4 parts (Cairo: Būlāq, 1278/1861), vol. 1, pp. 16, 19–20, 24–5, 30, 41 and 59. For further discussion of al-Ghazālī’s attitudes toward medicine, see Savage-Smith: “Attitudes Towards Dissection,” pp. 73, 94–6. For statements similar to those in the Ih. yā’, see a Persian abridgement of the treatise translated into English as The Alchemy of Happiness; al-Ghazzālī, Alchemy of Happiness, tr. H. A. Holmes (Albany, NY, 1873), pp. 38–9, and passages quoted by Seyyid Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 97–8. George Saliba, The Astronomical Work of Mu’ayyad al-Dīn al‛Urd. ī: A Thirteenth Century Reform of Ptolemaic Astronomy, ‛Urd. ī’s Kitāb al-Hay’a (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wah. dah alʿArabīyah, 1990), p. 27 (Arabic text); the translation is that of Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, p. 278 note 3, slightly amended. Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Arab. c. 90, fol. 3b. This style of argument reflects a particularly Ismāʿīlī perspective; see Rapoport and Savage-Smith, An Eleventh-Century Egyptian Guide.

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Universality in Islamic Thought Islamic astrological tradition has identified the prophet Idrīs, mentioned twice in the Qurʾān, with Hermes Trismegistus (G. Vajda, art. “Idrīs,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 3, p. 1030; Kevin van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes: From Pagan Sage to Prophet of Science (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 164–76. For the relevant scene, see Washington Irving, The Life and Voyages of Christopher Columbus, ed. John Harmon McElroy (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1981), pp. 47–53. For Irving’s role in the promotion of this myth, see Jeffrey Burton Russell, Inventing the Flat Earth: Columbus and Modern Historians (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 51–7. Ignaz Goldziher provided the following two quotations: (1) “AlGhazālī (Fatihat al-ʿulūm) said that ‘the study of the sciences of Euclid, the Almagest, and the subtleties of arithmetic and geometry . . . render the mind more acute and strengthen the soul, and yet we refrain from them for one reason: they are among the presuppositions of the ʿulum ul-awaʾil and these latter include those sciences, beside arithmetic and geometry, that entail the acceptance of dangerous doctrines. Even if geometry and arithmetic do not contain notions that are harmful to religious beliefs, we nevertheless fear that one might be attracted through them to doctrines that are dangerous’.” (2) “The lexicographer Abū H. usayb ibn Faris criticized those ‘who claim to understand the essential nature of things by the use of numbers, lines, and points whose relevance I cannot understand; indeed, they weaken faith and cause conditions from which we ask God’s protection’ ” (Goldziher: “The Attitude of Orthodox Islam,” pp. 56 and 194). Robert Morrison, “Reasons for a Scientific Portrayal of Nature in Medieval Commentaries on the Qurʾān,” Arabica 52 (2005), pp. 182–203, esp. p. 189. Robert Morrison, “Qut.b al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī’s Use of Hypotheses,” Journal for the History of Arabic Science 13 (2005), pp. 21–140; Robert Morrison, “The Portrayal of Nature in a Medieval Qurʾān Commentary,” Studia Islamica, 94 (2002), pp. 115–37. See Emilie Savage-Smith, “Were the Four Humours Fundamental to Medieval Islamic Medical Practice?,” in The Body in Balance: “Humoral” Medicines in Practice, ed. Elisabeth Hsu and Peregrine Horden (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013), pp. 89–106. In the eastern provinces two brothers, Abū ʿAttab Allāh and alH. usayn, sons of Bist.ām ibn Sābūr, composed such a treatise drawing upon the authority of Shīʿī Imāms, while about the same time Ibn H. abīb (d. ca. 853) composed in Muslim Spain an essay

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using h. adīths as a major source. For the former see B. Ispahany and A. Newman, Islamic Medical Wisdom: The T. ibb al-aʾimma (London, 1991), and for the latter see C. Álvarez de Morales and F. Girón Irueste, Mujtas. ar fī l-t. ibb = compendio de medicina (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe, 1992). For Ibn Taymīyah’s Jahd al-qarīh. ah fī tajrīd al-has. īh. ah as abridged by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūt.ī, see Wael B. Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). The emphasis is on care and cure through food and simple medicines, proper conduct and invocations to God. For prophetic medicine in general, see I. Perho, The Prophet’s Medicine: A Creation of the Muslim Traditionalist Scholars [Studia Orientalia 74] (Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 1995); and Pormann and Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine, pp. 71–6, 150–1. See also Justin Stearns, “Contagion in Theology and Law: Ethical Considerations in the Writings of Two 14th-Century Scholars of Nas. rid Granada,” Islamic Law and Society 14 (2007), pp. 109–29. Two English translations have been published of Shams al-Dīn alDhahabī’s treatise, both of them incorrectly attributed to al-Suyūt.ī; see C. Elgood, “T. ibb-ul-Nabbi or Medicine of the Prophet,” Osiris 14 (1962), pp. 33–192, and Ahmad Thomson, As-Suyuti’s Medicine of the Prophet (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1994). For the authorship by al-Dhahabī, see Savage-Smith: “Attitudes Toward Dissection,” pp. 73–4; and Perho: The Prophet’s Medicine, pp. 36–40. For the quotation cited here, see Shams alDīn al-Dhahabī, al-T. ibb al-nabawī lil-H . āfiz. al-Dhahabī [ed. not named] (Riyadh: Maktabat Nazzār Mus. t.afā al-Bāz, 1996), p. 234. Nahyan Fancy has noted the dependency of al-Dhahabī’s al-t. ibb al-nabawī upon the Mūjiz, or epitome of the Qānūn, commonly attributed to Ibn al-Nafīs and also questions the attribution of the Mūjiz to Ibn al-Nafīs (Fancy: Pulmonary Transit and Bodily Resurrection, pp. 251–5). For Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, see al-T. ibb al-nabawī, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūt. and ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Arnaʾūt. (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risālah, 1984) and Penelope Johnstone, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya: Medicine of the Prophet (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1998). Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūt.ī, al-Manhaj al-sawī wa-manhal al-rawī fī al.tibb al-nabawī, ed. H. asan Muh. ammad Maqbūlī al-Ahdal (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfīyah, 1986). No translation has been published. The Mūjiz, or epitome of the Qānūn fī al-t. ibb of

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Universality in Islamic Thought Ibn Sīnā, has customarily been attributed to Ibn al-Nafīs, although Nahyan Fancy has questioned this attribution in a recent and important doctoral dissertation analyzing Ibn al-Nafīs’ medical theories in the context of his theological arguments; see Fancy, Pulmonary Transit and Bodily Resurrection. Gutas, “Medical Theory and Scientific Method,” p. 151; the emphasis is part of the original statement by Gutas. For al-Suyūt.ī’s Kitāb al-Hay’ah al-sanīyah fī al-hay’ah alsunnīyah, see the excellent edition and analysis by Heinen, Islamic Cosmology; for the fact that the earth is not depicted as disc-shaped, as some have suggested, see p. 86. For science as a form of circulating knowledge of global ubiquity, see James A. Secord, “Knowledge in Transit,” Isis 95 (2004), pp. 654–72. The statement occurs at the end of a unique copy of Ibn al-Nafīs’ commentary on the Hippocratic treatise On the Nature of Man (Kitāb T. abīʿat al-insān li-buqrāt. ), Bethesda, MD, National Library of Medicine, MS A 69, folio 67b; see Emilie Savage-Smith, “Between Reader & Text: Some Medieval Arabic Marginalia,” in Scientia in Margine: Études sur les marginalia dans les manuscripts scientifiques du moyen âge à la renaissance, ed. D. Jacquart and C. Burnett [École Pratique des Hautes Études, Sciences historiques de philologiques, V, Hautes Études médiévales et modernes, 88] (Paris: Droz, 2005), pp. 75–101, esp. p. 80. For an illustration of this folio, with a transcription of the Arabic text, see Emilie Savage-Smith, Islamic Medical Manuscripts at the National Library of Medicine (http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/arabic; accessed 21 July 2014). Ibn Abī Us. aybiʿah, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, vol. 2, p. 105, lines 18–21; Pormann and Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine, pp. 93–4. See Emilie Savage-Smith, “New Evidence for the Frankish Study of Arabic Medical Texts in the Crusader Period,” Crusades 5 (2006), pp. 99–112. For Abū al-Khayr ibn al-Khammār, see Wilferd Madelung, art. “Abu’l-Kayr b. al-Kammār,” in Encyclopedia Iranica, vol. 1 (1982), pp. 330–1. S. Jadon, “A Comparison of the Wealth, Prestige, and Medical Works of the Physicians of S. alāh. al-Dīn in Egypt and Syria,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 44 (1970), pp. 64–75; S. Jadon, “The Physicians of Syria during the Reign of S. alāh. al-Dīn 570-589 A.H./1174-1193 A.D.,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 25 (1970), pp. 323–40.

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For the life and writings of Ibn al-Tilmīdh, see Oliver Kahl, The Dispensatory of Ibn at-Tilmīd: Arabic Text, English Translation, Study and Glossaries (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007), pp. 7–19. For Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, see Wilferd Madelung, art. “Abu’l-Barakāt al-Bagdādī,” in Encyclopedia Iranica, vol. 1, pp. 226–8. When Ibn al-Tilmīdh died, many of his students as well as other prominent physicians left Baghdad for Damascus and the Nūrī hospital, which by then had been in operation about ten years. This emigration of physicians from Iraq into Syria was a major stimulus to the medical activity in Damascus. For his book on fevers, see J. D. Latham and H. D. Isaacs, Kitāb alH . ummayāt li-Ish. āq Sulaymān al-Isrāʾīlī (al-Maqāla al-Thālitha: fī al-sill) Isaac Judaeus: On Fevers (The Third Discourse: On Consumption), [Arabic Technical and Scientific Texts 8] (Cambridge: Pembroke Arabic Text, 1981); the book on urine remains untranslated and unedited, even though it was the most important treatise on the subject throughout the medieval period. For Sābūr’s formulary, see Oliver Kahl, Sābūr ibn Sahl, The Small Dispensatory: Translated from the Arabic together with a Study and Glossaries (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2004). For the formulary al-Dustūr al-bīmāristānī of Ibn Abī al-Bayān al-Isrāʾīlī, see Paul Sbath, “Le formulaire des hôpitaux d’Ibn Abi Bayan, médecin du bimaristan annacery au Caire au xiiie siècle,” Bulletin de l’Institut d’Égypte 15 (1932–3), pp. 9–78. For the pharmaceutical manual of al-Kūhīn alʿAt.t.ār al-Isrāʾīlī, see Leigh Chipman, The World of Pharmacy and Pharmacists in Mamlūk Cairo (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2010). L. I. Conrad, “Scholarship and Social Context: A Medical Case from the Eleventh-Century Near East,” in Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions, ed. Don Bates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 84–100; M. Meyerhoff and J. Schacht, The Medico-Philosophical Controversy between Ibn Butlan of Baghdad and Ibn Ridwan of Cairo (Cairo: Egyptian University, 1937); Pormann and Savage-Smith: Medieval Islamic Medicine, pp. 92–3 and 101. For T. ūsī’s appropriation of waqf funds for the Maragha observatory, see F. J. Ragep, Nas. īr al-Dīn al-T. ūsī’s Memoir on Astronomy (al-Tadhkira fī ‛ilm al-hay’a), 2 vols. (New York and Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1993), vol. 1, pp. 8–30, who argues that this action was part of “the closing of the gap between religious and nonreligious studies” (p. 8); see also the fourteenth-century Mamluk historian Khalīl ibn Aybak al-S. afadī, Kitāb al-Wāfī bi-alwafaqāt, ed. Hellmut Ritter [Bibliotheca Islamica, 6a] (Leipzig:

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Universality in Islamic Thought Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, in Kommission bei F. A. Brockhaus, 1931), vol. 1, p. 180. For the Maragha observatory in general, see Sayılı: Observatory in Islam, pp. 207–11; Sabra, “Situating Arabic Science,” pp. 665–7; Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, p. 244 et passim; and Saliba, “Arabic Planetary Theories.” Ah. mad Tegüder, the third Il-Khanid ruler (r. 1282-4), changed the policy regarding “Christian and Jewish physicians and astronomers” who had been paid from waqf-derived income under his predecessors Hülegü and Abaqa; see Zeki Velidi Togan, Umumī Türk Tarihi’ne Giriş, 3rd ed. (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1981), pp. 227 and 463 note 135 [I thank Judith Pfeiffer for this reference]; see also Sayılı, Observatory in Islam, p. 209. Seven instruments were carried by Cha-ma-lu-ting (i.e. Jamāl al-Dīn) from the observatory to Hülegü Khan’s brother Qublay-Khān, the first Yuan Emperor of China; see W. Hartner, “The Astronomical Instruments of Cha-ma-lu-ting, Their Identification and Their Relations to the Instruments of the Observatory of Maragha,” Isis 41 (1950), pp. 184–94. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah: al-T. ibb al-nabawī, p. 415; the translation is that of Johnstone, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, p. 288, slightly amended. For example, see Pormann and Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine, p. 80. In particular the influential critique in his Tahāfut al-falāsifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) of the falsafah concept of causality. A. I. Sabra makes the interesting distinction that it was falsafah that was the direct competitor of kalām and not science, and that the specialized scientific disciplines were not perceived as posing a particular threat to religion (Sabra, “Science and Philosophy,” p. 41). See also the recent discussion of science and religion in Ahmad Dallal, Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 110–48. Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making. See, for example, al-Qaysī, Das Ergebnis des Nachdenkens über die Behandlung der Augenkrankheiten von Fath. al-Dīn al-Qaisī, tr. Hans-Dieter Bischoff [Europäische Hochschulschriften; Asiatische und Afrikanische Studies, ser. 27, vol. 21] (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1988); F. C. Blodi, W. J. Rademaker, G. Rademaker and K. F. Wildman, The Arabian Ophthalmologists, compiled from original texts by J. Hirschberg, J. Lippert and E. Mittwoch and translated into English, ed. M. Z. Wafai (Riyadh: King Abdulaziz

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City for Science and Technology, 1993); E. Savage-Smith, “Ibn alNafīs’s Perfected Book on Ophthalmology,” Journal for the History of Arabic Science 4 (1980), pp. 147–206; Pormann and SavageSmith, Medieval Islamic Medicine, pp. 125–35. Nahyan Fancy goes so far as to argue that the “volatile nature of the intellectual landscapes of thirteenth-century Egypt and Syria” permitted and enabled the “eclectic merging of various disciplines and authorities, both religious and rational” which in turn led to Ibn al-Nafīs’ discovery of the pulmonary transit; see Fancy: Pulmonary Transit and Bodily Resurrection, p. 256. Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, p. 78. See E. Savage-Smith and M. B. Smith, “Islamic Geomancy and a Thirteenth-Century Divinatory Device: Another Look,” in Magic and Divination in Early Islam, ed. E. Savage-Smith [The Formation of the Classical Islamic World, 42] (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 211–76. J. Sesiano, Un traité medieval sur les carrés magiques: De l’arrangement harmonieux des nombres (Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes, 1996); Jacques Sesiano, “Quadratus Mirabilis,” in Hogendijk and Sabra, eds. The Enterprise of Science in Islam (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 199–233. E. Savage-Smith, Islamicate Celestial Globes: Their History, Construction, and Use [Smithsonian Studies in History and Technology, 46] (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1985), pp. 61–98. For ʿAlī al-Qūshjī (d. 1474), see Ragep, “Freeing Astronomy from Philosophy,” pp. 61–3 and appendix; see also Endress: “Mathematics and Philosophy,” p. 160. Discussions of astronomy are often found in treatises on kalām, one example being the work of al-Ījī (d. 1355), a Sunnī Shāfiʿī scholar; see Sabra, “Science and Philosophy,” pp. 34–41. Niz. ām al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī (d. ca. 1329), a Shīʿī, presented a “scientific” portrayal of nature in keeping with the views of the falāsifah in his tafsīr on the Qurʾān; see Morrison, “Reasons for a Scientific Portrayal,” and Morrison, “The Portrayal of Nature.” For examples, see Ragep, Nas. īr al-Dīn al-T. ūsī’s Memoir, pp. 17, 38–41, 45–6. See Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making, p. 52; Hans Daiber, “Science and Technology Versus Islam. A Controversy from Renan and Afghānī to Nasr and Needham and its Historical Background,” Journal for the History of Arabic Science 10 (1994),

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Universality in Islamic Thought pp. 119–33; and the recent study by Dallal, Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History. For “scientific arts” as defined by Georges-Louis Leclerc, later comte de Buffon, see Dear, “What is the History of Science?,” p. 400. See, for example, G. Cantor, “Quaker Responses to Darwin,” Osiris 16 (2001), pp. 321–42; J. Hedley Brooke, “Religious Belief and the Context of the Sciences,” Osiris 16 (2001), pp. 3–28; and S. J. Wykstra, “Religious Belief, Metaphysical Beliefs, and Historiography of Science,” Osiris 16 (2001), pp. 29–46. See Ragep, “Freeing Astronomy from Philosophy” for earlier sources. See also Gutas: Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, pp. 166– 75; Sabra, “Situating Arabic Science;” Sabra, “Science and Philosophy;” Fancy: Pulmonary Transit and Bodily Resurrection, pp. 14–31; Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making and Dallal, Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History. The arguments of the mutakallimūn, or practitioners of kalām (which Sabra has suggested should be rendered as “religious philosophy” rather than the more common ”speculative theology”), did of course with time put the falāsifah on the defense, but they continued to interact; see Sabra, “Science and Philosophy,” pp. 22–41. In fact, it could be argued that causal determinism, when applied to the realm of natural science, “might also seem to facilitate scientific progress, because it states that every event has a causal explanation” (Belo, Chance and Determinism, p. 232). Abū Saʿīd ibn Lubb, al-Mi‛yār, vol. 11, p. 353, cited and translated in Stearns, “Contagion in Theology and Law,” pp. 120–1. See the study by Belo, Chance and Determinism, esp. pp. 2–3 note 2. This quoted phrase was used by R. Weatherford with particular reference to quantum mechanics, but I have here expanded it to science in general; see R. Weatherford, The Implications of Determinism (London: Routledge, 1991); the quotation is cited in a different context by Belo, Chance and Determinism, p. 3 note 2.

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7 The Limits of Universalism in Islamic Thought: The Case of Indian Religions1

s Carl W. Ernst

Every religious tradition is claimed by its followers in a range of identifications, from exclusivist—holding that we alone are correct, and all others are condemned—to more pluralistic perspectives, recognizing some legitimacy and worth in other traditions, and even universalist positions, such as the notion that all humans are destined for salvation.2 To what extent have Muslims regarded followers of other religions and faiths as acceptable? In this chapter, I propose to gauge the extent to which certain Muslim writers (especially from the philosophical and Sufi traditions) were drawn to apply universalist understandings to the religions of India. The reason for this choice of Indian religions is simple. While classical Islamic theology, on the basis of Qurʾānic texts, explicitly recognizes only Jews, Christians, and Sabians as “peoples of the book,” the extension of this category of recognized religious groups to other traditions (such as Zoroastrians in Persia) was and is in practice a matter of negotiation in local contexts, requiring the use of analogy with Jews and Christians, or other forms of argumentation.3 Pragmatically speaking, Muslim rulers in India had to face the fact that they were a minority in charge of a vast non-Muslim majority, and on the political level they generally dealt with the situation realistically.4 So what sort of conceptual accommodations were employed by Muslim thinkers commenting on the Indian religions? In pursuing this inquiry, my aim is to employ an analysis of religion that takes account of difference without essentialism; I 193

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assume that we cannot make generalized and abstract assumptions about the nature of religions, but should instead problematize the concept of religion by taking account of historical acts of interpretation, appropriation, and resistance.5 Paradoxically, Muslim philosophers and mystics have been most ready to confer universalistic recognition on the Indian religions to the extent that Indian doctrines and practices could be assimilated into Islamic categories. They employed familiarizing techniques of translation and interpretation with standard Islamic taxonomies to assimilate Indian religions into norms of monotheism and prophecy, as well as more basic concepts of magic, although the issue of idolatry remained a stubborn problem. The examples here are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and they reveal a spectrum of approaches and conclusions indicative of the difficulty of this problem of interpretation.

Al-Bīrūnī and Indian religion The first Arab Muslim authors to describe religion in India never used a single term such as Hinduism; they referred instead to the multiple religions of India, usually numbered as 42, some of which were considered to be monotheistic and prophetic and hence compatible with Islam, while others were not. Early Muslim authors had no clear picture of religion in India, and in fact the term ‘Hindu’ was initially a geographic and ethnic designation.6 The concept of a unitary Indian religion (although without the word Hindu) seems first to have been proposed in the Arabic description of India by al-Bīrūnī (d. 1048), who studied Sanskrit texts on science and religion while in the service of the Turkish conqueror Mah. mūd of Ghazna (d. 1030); curiously, al-Bīrūnī’s notion of Indian religion in the singular seems to have been forgotten until his great work on India was rediscovered by European Orientalists in the nineteenth century. Al-Bīrūnī is of interest in this discussion, not because he extended a universalizing recognition to Indian religions as such, but because of his

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typical method of using categories of Islamic thought as templates for understanding the Indian data. Al-Bīrūnī translated a number of Sanskrit works into Arabic (including selections from Patañjali’s Yogasūtras and the Bhagavad Gītā) in connection with his encyclopedic treatise on India.7 Although authors of Arabic books on sects and heresies, such as al-Shahrastānī (d. 1153), generally devoted a section or a few pages to the religions of India, no other Arabic writer followed in al-Bīrūnī’s footsteps as a specialist on Indian religion and philosophy.8 Wilhelm Halbfass has attempted an assessment of alBīrūnī’s contribution, praising him for his fair and objective approach to India: A clear awareness of his own religious horizon as a particular context of thought led him to perceive the “otherness” of the Indian religious philosophical context and horizon with remarkable clarity . . . Unlike Megasthenes, Bīrūnī did not “translate” the names of foreign deities, nor did he incorporate them into his own pantheon, and of course he did not possess the amorphous “openness” of syncretism and the search for “common denominators.” That is why he could comprehend and appreciate the other, the foreign as such, thematizing and explicating in an essentially new manner the problems of intercultural understanding and the challenge of “objectivity” when shifting from one tradition to another, from one context to another.9

Halbfass’ admiration for al-Bīrūnī’s scholarly achievement is certainly justified, but these remarks call for some qualification. First of all, as stated earlier, al-Bīrūnī’s perception of the “otherness” of Indian thought was not just hermeneutical clarity with regard to a pre-existing division; it was effectively the invention of the concept of a unitary Indian religion and philosophy. Furthermore, Halbfass’s praise of al-Bīrūnī’s bold proclamation of “otherness” obscures the fact that he had to engage in a remarkably complex interpretation of his sources with many “Islamizing” touches. His translation of Patañjali’s Yogasūtras was based on a combination of the original text plus

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a commentary that is still not identified, all rephrased by al-Bīrūnī into a question-and-answer format. Like the translators of preIslamic Greek texts (e.g. Plotinus) into Arabic, al-Bīrūnī rendered the Sanskrit “gods” (deva) with the Arabic terms for “angels” (malā’ika) or “spiritual beings” (rūh. āniyyāt), surely a theological shift amounting to “translation”. He was, moreover, convinced on a deep level that Sanskrit texts were saturated with recognizable philosophical doctrines of reincarnation and union with God, which required comparative treatment: “For this reason their [the Indians’] talk, when it is heard, has a flavour composed of the beliefs (ʿaqā’id ) of the ancient Greeks, of the Christian sects, and of the Sufi leaders.”10 Consequently, al-Bīrūnī made deliberate and selective use of terms derived from Greek philosophy, heresiography and Sufism to render the Sanskrit technical terms of yoga. But al-Bīrūnī’s rationalistic approach to Indian religions remained isolated and almost forgotten, while his Arabic version of Patañjali was described by at least one reader as incomprehensible.11 There is some superficial reference to al-Bīrūnī’s work on India and the Patañjali translation in the Persian Bayān aladyān or The Explanation of Religions of Abū l-Maʿālī, written in Ghazna in 1092.12 It appears, however, that the principal readers of al-Bīrūnī’s work on India were interested mainly from a historical and administrative point of view; the world-historian and Mongol minister Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 1318) drew extensively on al-Bīrūnī’s geographical information, while the Mughal wazir Abū l-Fad. l ʿAllāmī (d. 1602) apparently had al-Bīrūnī’s work in mind when he compiled a detailed but uncritical survey of Indian thought in his Persian gazetteer of Akbar’s Indian Empire.13 Today both al-Bīrūnī’s work on India and his translation of Patañjali exist in unique manuscripts, suggesting an extremely limited circulation. I would like to suggest that al-Bīrūnī’s concept of a unified Indian religion, as a polar opposite to Islam, lay forgotten until it was resurrected in a more radical form by European scholarship a century ago; the growth of the Muslim concept of Indian religions took place largely without reference to al-Bīrūnī. Since Sachau’s edition (1886) and translation (1888) of

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al-Bīrūnī’s work on India was undertaken at the suggestion of the board of the Oriental Translation Fund, and was entirely subsidized by Her Majesty’s India Office, it is tempting to locate this work’s historical importance primarily within the larger political concerns of colonial Orientalism.14 Al-Bīrūnī’s rationalistic and reifying approach to religion, which had practically no impact on medieval Islamic thought, is much more palatable to the modern taste, and this helps explain his popularity today. Illuminationist philosophy and monotheistic Indians One of the notable philosophical frameworks in the Islamic tradition for understanding religion was the Illuminationist (ishrāqī) school associated with Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī, which is strongly engaged with Aristotelian, Avicennan and Neoplatonic philosophy. While it has been frequently suggested that this philosophical school played a significant role among Muslim intellectuals in India, the details have not been well established.15 The first important Illuminationist author to be widely known in India was Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī (d. 1502), a prominent Persian scholar from Shiraz, who was known for his writings on Illuminationism and the Sufi metaphysics of Ibn ʿArabī.16 Davānī was also a chief minister to the Aq-Qoyunlu rulers Uzun H . asan and Yaʿqūb, and his political writings, particularly the Jalalian Ethics, were doubtless partly responsible for his fame in India.17 A number of scattered indications attest to Davānī’s popularity in India during his own lifetime and in subsequent years, and since Davānī and his school are not widely known, I will summarize the evidence here.18 The Naqshbandī shaykh Khāwand Mah. mūd reportedly studied with Davānī before going to India to see Babur.19 Davānī dedicated a political treatise to Sultan Mah. mūd of Gujarat (r. 1458–1511).20 One of Davānī’s foremost pupils, Abū l-Fad. l Astarābādī, went to Gujarat and taught there.21 Another Davānī student, ʿImād al-Dīn Tarīmī, also went to Gujarat, where he taught rational sciences to Wajīh al-Dīn ʿAlawī (1504–89), who later became an important Shat.t.ārī Sufi

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master.22 Davānī was also invited to Sindh by its ruler, Jām Niz. ām al-Dīn (d. 1508), and was evidently planning to go there himself just prior to his death. His disciples Shams al-Dīn and Muʿīn alDīn went in his place and settled in the town of Thatta.23 Another pupil, ʿAlā al-Dīn Lārī, acted as tutor to the Emperor Akbar and to his courtier, Khān-i Zamān.24 But in terms of Illuminationism the most important connection of Davānī to India came even earlier through the able minister of the Bahmani kingdom, Mah. mūd Gāwān (d. 1481), who corresponded with many eminent scholars of Iran and Central Asia, such as the Naqshbandī Sufis ʿAbd alRah. mān Jāmī and ʿUbayd Allāh Ah. rār.25 It was to Mah. mūd Gāwān that Davānī dedicated one of his chief works of Illuminationist philosophy, his Arabic commentary on Suhrawardī’s Temples of Light, completed in 1468.26 There are further indications of the ongoing popularity of Illuminationism in the Mughal period, frequently in connection with the study of Indian thought. In the formulations of the chief minister Abū Fad. l, Illuminationism had become one of the underpinnings of the political theory of the Empire, so it is not surprising to see that literary works of an Illuminationist bent were composed at this time. As an example, Shahrazūrī’s thirteenth-century Arabic history of philosophy from the ancient Greeks up through Suhrawardī was translated into Persian and dedicated to Jahāngīr (then Prince Salīm) in 1602.27 Abū l-Fad. l’s brother Fayd. ī composed a treatise on Vedantic metaphysics entitled The Illuminator of Gnosis (Shāriq al-maʿrifat), and its vocabulary and style strongly suggests that Illuminationism furnished the base for this explanation of Indian philosophy.28 And there is a strong Illuminationist underpinning to the Arabic version of the hatha yoga text known as The Pool of Nectar, which contains in its preface an Arabic translation of some key Persian texts by Suhrawardī.29 While Persian and Indian students of philosophy continued to write commentaries on Suhrawardī’s works, traces of interest in the Illuminationist philosophy among later Indian authors are rare. Yet one Indian Sufi author, ʿAbd alNabī Shat.t.ārī (active 1601–30), wrote a commentary on

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Suhrawardī’s Wisdom of Illumination, though his interest in Suhrawardī was probably a result of his immersion in scholastic philosophy rather than a product of his Shat.t.ārī Sufi training.30 Another Illuminationist author of the Mughal era, Muh. ammad Sharīf [b.] Niz. ām al-Dīn Ah. mad b. al-Harawī, made significant comments on Indian religions in his Persian translation and commentary on Suhrawardī’s Wisdom of Illumination under the title Anwāriyya or The Luminous Treatise.31 Indian sources indicate that Muh. ammad Sharīf was the son of the well-known Mughal courtier and historian Niz. ām al-Dīn Ah. mad, author of the T. abaqāt-i Akbarī or The Generations of Akbar.32 Muh. ammad Sharīf comments on a number of aspects of Hindu religious thought and practice.33 Like al-Bīrūnī, he distinguishes between the ordinary Hindu worshipper and the philosopher: “The teaching of the philosophers of Persia is not in agreement with anything that contributes to idolatry, such as the teaching of the Qadariyya and the Sharafiyya [two Muslim sects accused of dualism] or the idolators of India, contrary to the philosophers of India, who, like the philosophers of Persia, are Unitarians rather than idolaters.”34 In this sense Muh. ammad Sharīf shared the elitist perspective of the Mughal prince Dārā Shikūh, who disdained the ordinary believers among both the Hindus and the Muslims. Muh. ammad Sharīf also comments on the Indian philosophers’ view that perfected ascetics (murtād. ān) and scholars may become connected to the planetary spirits, in an apparent allusion to the yogic practices outlined in chapter IX of The Pool of Nectar; these experiences he compares to the ascensions of Idrīs, Jesus and Muh. ammad.35 Muh. ammad Sharīf makes additional comparisons between the Avicennan theory of multiple separate angelic intellects and the deities (devatā) whose power the Indian sages recognized in natural phenomena; in both cases, he argues, there is a recognition of a single light or source for these separate manifestations. This insight, he remarked, has unfortunately given way over time to blind worship of bodies in the form of Indian idolatry.36 This text furnishes an example of how the Illuminationist philosophy, with its basis in the Avicennan

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critique of religion, provided a means for recognizing the validity of certain aspects of Indian religious thought, although the concept of idolatry acted as a screen for excluding a large sector of Indian religious practices. The Illuminationist school was certainly Islamicate, but since it did not attempt to derive its teachings exclusively from Islamic sources, it was open to reading new teachings, such as those found in India, as part of the same body of material for philosophical analysis. Yet at the same time, Muh. ammad Sharīf employs the standard categories of unitarian monotheism and philosophical angelology to conform Indian teachings to Islamic norms. Ecumenic empire: Abū l-Fad. l’s political view of the Indian epic An oft-cited example of Muslim Indology is the study and translation into Persian of Sanskrit texts (particularly the epics) in an extensive program carried out under Mughal sponsorship; although this enterprise has often been characterized as religious in intent, I would argue that its primary significance is political. The context for the Mughal interest in Sanskrit lies in the imperial program devised by Akbar and followed in varying degrees by his successors. Although earlier writers on the Mughals have treated this interest primarily as an indication of liberal personal religious inclinations on the part of Akbar, this romantic conception should yield to a more realistic analysis of policy aspects in terms of the Mughal ecumenical empire.37 It is anachronistic to read an Enlightenment virtue of “tolerance” into the religious politics of the Mughal era. The original precedent for Akbar’s policies of patronage of multiple religions is probably best sought in the Mongol era, when the prudent insurance policy of the “pagan” Mongols gave generous treatment to Buddhists, Christians, Taoists and Muslims. Akbar’s family conceived of their regime as a continuation of the neo-Mongol empire of Tīmūr (Tamerlane); like Tīmūr, Akbar was furnished with a genealogy that included Chingīz Khān, but in his case it was extended to include the Mongol sun goddess Alanquwa. The symbolism of

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world domination inherent in the Mongol political tradition was given an ingenious philosophical and mystical twist in the writings of Akbar’s minister Abū l-Fad. l, who interpreted Akbar’s role in terms of the Neoplatonic metaphysics of Ishrāqī Illuminationism and the Sufi doctrine of the Perfect Human. This metaphysical apparatus was invoked not merely for its own philosophical consistency, but essentially to undergird the authority of Akbar in an eclectic fashion.38 While coinage with Sanskrit formulas and patronage of different religious institutions (including “Hindu” ones) was a feature of most Indo-Muslim regimes, what distinguished the Mughals under Akbar was their attempt to refocus all religious enthusiasm of whatever background onto the person of the emperor.39 Akbar’s sponsorship of the translation of Sanskrit works was part of the overall literary phase of his reign, which included the regular reading aloud of works from the canon of Persian court literature, history and Sufism. He assigned to the task a number of courtiers who were scholars of Persian but presumably ignorant of Sanskrit; they were assisted, however, by Sanskrit pandits, so that, from a literary point of view, the translation process probably involved a considerable amount of oral explication in vernacular Hindi prior to the composition of the Persian “translation.” Some translators, such as Badā’ūnī, assisted in this project much against their own inclinations. The extent of the sustained translation enterprise can be judged from the numerous manuscript copies, some lavishly illustrated, and the repeated revisions and new translations (in both poetry and prose) of particularly valued texts.40 In political terms, the inclusion and translation of Sanskrit works was designed to reduce intellectual provincialism and linguistic divisiveness within the Empire.41 Sanskrit and Hindi romances, such as the story of Nāla and Damayānti, seem to have been integrated into a literary continuum along with Near Eastern fables like the story of Majnūn and Layla or the tales of Amīr H . amza. Abū l-Fad. l appears to regard the epics Mahābhārata and Ramāyana primarily as histories of ancient India with biographical and philosophical

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overtones. This even holds true of Puranic extensions of the epic, such as the Harivam . śa, which Abū l-Fad. l describes only as a biography of Krishna. Akbar himself entitled the Persian translation of the Mahābhārata as the Razm nāma or The Book of War, underlining its character as a martial epic. Abū l-Fad. l’s complicated vision of the purpose of the Mahābhārata translation is worth examining in detail. On the one hand, he observes that the epic does contain remarkable philosophical and cosmological perspectives of great complexity. Abū l-Fad. l notes that at least 13 different Indian schools of thought are mentioned in the text.42 On the other hand, he points out that a quarter of its 100,000 verses are devoted to the martial epic of the war between the Kauravas and the Pandavas, making it a vade mecum for the conduct of war and battle, and much of the remainder is “advice, sermons, stories, and explanations of past romance and battle (bazm o razm).” 43 In one long passage in his introduction to the Persian translation of the Mahābhārata, Abū l-Fad. l recounts a series of justifications for the translation project, all couched as an expansion of his encomium to his patron Akbar, who is eulogized in the most hyperbolic of terms. Abū l-Fad. l outlines five major objectives: reducing sectarian fighting among both Muslims and Hindus; eroding the authority of all religious specialists over the masses; deflating Hindu bigotry toward Muslims by revealing questionable Hindu doctrines; curing Muslim provincialism by exposing Muslims to cosmologies much vaster than official sacred history; and providing access to a major history of the past for the edification and guidance of rulers (the traditional ethical justification for history).44 Abū l-Fad. l was interested in the philosophical and religious content of the epic, from the perspective of an enlightened intellectual whose cosmopolitan vision had moved him out of a strictly defined Islamic theological perspective. But I think it is fair to say that this intellectual project was thoroughly subordinated to the political aim of making Akbar’s authority supreme over all possible rivals in India, including all religious authorities. The

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translation of the Sanskrit epics was not an academic enterprise comparable to the modern study of religion; it was instead part of an imperial effort to bring both Indic and Persianate culture into the service of Akbar. Pragmatic appropriations of Indian religious practices On a very different level, one can see pragmatic and even enthusiastic appropriations of aspects of Indian practices that were seen as practically beneficial and which could be assimilated to familiar categories. This strategy was applied to the meditative practices of the Nāth jogis, known to Indologists as hatha yoga, which became very popular in some Sufi circles. One example of the Sufi adoption of these practices is a short Persian text on yoga and meditation that is pseudonymously attributed to the famous founder of the Indian Chishtī Sufi order, Shaykh Muʿīn al-Dīn Chishtī (d. 1236). A number of different versions of this treatise are found in manuscripts held in different libraries, often with different titles, though there is a fair amount of overlap in the contents. The pseudepigraphic attribution to Muʿīn al-Dīn Chishtī is both an indication of the seriousness with which Indian Sufis approached the practices of yoga, and a hermeneutic in itself.45 In other words, these teachings were important enough that they should have been part of the teaching of the greatest Sufi master in the Chishtī tradition. This attribution is paralleled by the phenomenon we see in the most important Arabic work on hatha yoga, The Pool of Nectar, which in many manuscripts is attributed to the great Andalusian Sufi master Shaykh Muh. yī alDīn Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240).46 This form of pseudigraphic attribution to Islamic authorities is paralleled by the repeated assertion of equivalence between the most famous Indian masters of yogic lore with esoteric prophets of Islam (Idrīs, Khid. r and Jonah), or the even more striking identification of the Indian gods Brahma and Vishnu with Abraham and Moses. Chapter 3 of Muʿīn al-Dīn’s treatise has a composite structure, in which the metaphysical levels and archangels of Islamicate

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cosmology are linked to the breaths of yogic practice (3.1–6). In the “Treatise on the Nature of Yoga” these are accompanied by what are now unintelligible mantras; unfortunately, the inability of the Persian script to represent short vowels inevitably resulted in chaos whenever it was used for the transcription of Sanskritic phrases. Nevertheless, the text asserts that the realization of these levels is closely related to the supreme spiritual states associated with the Prophet Muh. ammad. Indeed, the text goes on to link these states with knowledge revealed during the ascension of Muh. ammad to heaven, and moreover it maintains that this knowledge was then conferred on Muʿīn al-Dīn Chishtī, either spontaneously by the Prophet Muh. ammad or (in a second version) through the agency of Muʿīn al-Dīn’s master, Shaykh ʿUthmān Hārwanī (3:7–8). In orther words, the principal teachings of this yogic text are alleged to be the essential import of what the Prophet Muh. ammad received during his most sublime spiritual experience. At this point, Muʿīn al-Dīn is warned not to transmit this esoteric teaching to just anybody, but the restrictions are generous enough to include all sincere followers of the Chishtī order in later generations (3.9). The strategy of appropriation demonstrated here is hardly tempered by any sense of difference, in its description of yogic practices as the fruit of the supreme spiritual experience in the history of Islam. Yet in other ways, this text illustrates a failure to synthesize the sources whose alleged unity is its principal contention. This unintentional differentiation between Indic and Islamicate material is evident in the first two chapters, which present separately and with no attempt at integration an account of yogic physiology and cosmology alongside a Qurʾānic and Islamic account of the nature of the world; the only thing that links the two chapters is their emphasis on the equivalence of the microcosm and the macrocosm.47 On an even more basic level is the recognition of Indian practices under the highly flexible category of magic. A fourteenth-century Persian anonymous text on yoga called The 50 Verses of Kamarupa draws eclectically upon Islamic references to

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ease the favorable consideration of occult techniques that are valuable because of their practical results.48 Here one finds that Hindi mantras are transmitted by the prophets Elijah, Jonah, Khid. r, and Abraham. This text also identifies the Sanskrit seed mantra hrim (invariably represented in Arabic script as rhīn) with the Arabic name of God, rah. īm, “the merciful.” This is an interesting esoteric variant on the common pun on the Hindu and Muslim names for God, Rām and Rah. īm. The minor spiritual beings called “digit of the moon” (indu-rekhā) in Hindi are rendered by the Persian term for angel (firishta) (53b). The text demonstrates an unselfconscious domestication of yogic practices in an Islamicate society. Among the breath prognostications, for instance, one learns to approach “the qād. ī [Islamic judge] or the amīr [prince]” for judgment or litigation only when the breath from the right nostril is favorable. Casual references mention Muslim magicians, or practices that may be performed either in a Muslim or a Hindu graveyard (47b), or else in an empty temple or mosque (49b), and occasionally one is told to recite a Qurʾānic passage such as the Throne Verse (Q. 2:255), or to perform a certain action after the Muslim evening prayer. We even hear of a Muslim from Broach who successfully summoned one of the female deities known as yoginis, participating in the rites of her devotees (37a). The text is provided with an overall Islamic frame, through a standard invocation of God and praise of the Prophet at the beginning. Likewise at the end, a quotation of a h. adīth saying and some mystical allusions furnish a religious coloring for the magical practices (55a). These practices remain fundamentally ambiguous, however. “If one to whom the door is opened makes the claim, he will be a prophet; if he is good, he will be a saint; and if he is evil, he will be a magician” (55a). For the average Persian reader, the contents of the 50 Verses of Kamarupa most likely fell into the category of the occult sciences, and its Indic origin would have only enhanced its esoteric allure. The text employs standard Arabic terms for astral magic (tanjīm), the summoning of spirits (ih. d. ār) (30b, 37b), and the subjugation (taskhīr) of demons, fairies, and magicians.49 The chants of mantras of the yogis are

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repeatedly referred to as spells (afsūn), a term of magical significance. Thus there would be a familiar quality about the text, even when these techniques are employed for summoning the female spirits known in India as yoginis. A similar taxonomic approach is seen in the classification of the principal Arabic work on hatha yoga, The Pool of Nectar. Several of the manuscripts (mostly found in Istanbul) contain descriptions and glosses of the text that stress its character as a work of Indian magic, and bibliographers and catalogers have also classified the text under this category. Copies in Cairo have been variously cataloged under the headings of medicine or cabalism. The seventeenth-century Ottoman bibliographer H . ājjī Khalīfa, listing the text anonymously, described it in terms of its contents as a work “on the science of magic according to the method of India.”50 The description of the book in terms of Indian magic was the natural result of the presence of this category in the Islamicate cultural world since early times. The eleventh-century Arabic magical compendium of Pseudo-Majrit.ī, Ghāyat al-h. akīm or The Goal of the Sage, which was translated into Latin under the title Picatrix, contains several standard descriptions of the magical arts of the Indians. Picatrix associated Indian magic with the sciences of letters and magical operations through conjuring. The author of Picatrix also treats control (taskhīr) of planetary spirits as typical of Indian magic.51 The Ottoman polymath Tashköprüzada (d. 1561) was adapting the text to this category when he said that Indian magic specializes in purifying the soul, and he cited The Pool of Nectar as an example.52 Evidently it was under the attraction of this concept that one manuscript of the Arabic version of The Pool of Nectar (Q) was ascribed to T. umt.um the Indian, a name also known to the author of Picatrix.53 The same is true of the marginal note in another manuscript (F) connecting The Pool of Nectar to Tinkālūshā “the Greek” (otherwise known as “the Babylonian,” from Babylon near Memphis in Egypt); Tinkālūshā was the Arabic version of Teukros, an Egyptian astrologer of the Hellenistic period. Works on talismans and cheiromancy

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attributed to him mention also T. umt.um and another Indian, Sharāsīm.54 These fanciful names were manifestations of a kind of esoteric exoticism, in which India is interchangeable with other remote and mysterious locales. The acceptance of a text on yogic techniques among Muslim readers also drew upon underlying similarities with pre-Islamic spiritual practices of theurgy and cabalistic letter-mysticism which partook of some of the characteristics of magic. Philosophical doctrines, such as the emphasis on self knowledge, were given a magical twist in the Greek magical papyri that described how to encounter and master one’s inner daimon.55 From the Chaldaean Oracles to the Neoplatonic meditations of Iamblichus and Proclus, ritual and contemplative practices were used to attain union with the divine. Proclus himself, in addition to writing commentaries on the works of Plato, composed hymns to the planets as the visible representatives of the divine unities, or henads.56 Invocations of the planetary deities were also practiced by the Hellenized pagans of the ancient Syrian city of Harran, who continued to flourish in Islamic times under the pretense of being the monotheistic Sabians of old, and these practices were preserved in Arabic works on magic such as Picatrix.57 Hellenistic invocations to planetary deities were translated into Arabic as late as 1462, when a compendium of the Greek writings of the ‘pagan’ philosopher Gemistos Pletho (including a version of the Chaldaean Oracles) was rendered into Arabic at the court of the Ottoman sultan Mehmet the Conqueror.58 The Persian philosopher Suhrawardī, whose allegories are connected with the frame-story of The Pool of Nectar, was following in the tradition of Proclus when he wrote a series of hymns to the planetary and celestial intelligences.59 So from this tradition there existed an analogue in the Islamic world for the practice of summoning planetary spirits with mantras, as recorded in The Pool of Nectar, as a kind of overlay on the technique of summoning yogini goddesses. In this way the practices described in The Pool of Nectar join the many other secular magical practices of diverse origin that became Islamicized in Arabic versions.60

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While the examples just given might seem eccentric, they nevertheless share the characteristic of providing a positive evaluation of exotic Indian religious techniques, either by attributing them to an illustrious Islamic source or by more casually classifying them as the lower order of magical phenomena. In either case, the recognition of the other as valid is accomplished by redefining it in terms of the familiar. The limits of the appreciation of idolatry Despite the status of idolatry as a condemned religious practice considered incompatible with monotheism and Islamic belief, many Muslim thinkers toyed with the symbolism of idolatry as a signifier for the transcendence of conventional norms. The topos of “true infidelity” goes back to the deliberately blasphemous Arabic lyrics composed by Umayyad aristocrats as they relaxed in Christian monasteries, where wine could always be obtained and pretty faces might be found. With minor shifts, the same kind of imagery could be applied to Zoroastrians (as with the Magians of Hafiz) or to Hindus. For Persian authors like Saʿdī, the symbolism of infidel religions was interchangeable, as he showed in his picaresque account in his Būstān on the temple of Somnath, which indiscriminately mixes terminology from various religions. When treated as a mystical inversion of ordinary religion, “true infidelity” from the time of H . allāj onward became a powerful image for transgressing received ideas. Notable masters of this topos in Sufi literature included ʿAyn al-Qud. āt Hamadānī, and especially Mah. mūd Shabistarī, whose Gulshan-i Rāz contains extensive reflections on how idolatry may conceal the essence of monotheism.61 According to Alessandro Bausani, the symbolism of mystical infidelity was one of the dominant characteristics of Persian poetry by the seventeenth century.62 Yet it was never the case that these raptures on transcending the norms of Islam coincided with cool-headed approval of the ordinary religions of non-Muslims. In terms of the rhetoric of “mystical infidelity,” those common non-Muslims were considered counterfeit infidels.

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Nevertheless, one can find in Arabic and Persian literature a tradition of positive aesthetic reception of non-Muslim cultures, even including the idolatrous paganism of pre-Islamic times. In the case of India, we are in possession of a number of travel accounts provided by Muslim authors. Their quasi-Orientalist descriptions of Indian religions often exhibit a “curious mixture of fear and admiration, and familiarity and loathing.”63 Sometimes the dedication and self-sacrifice of the widow immolated on her late husband’s funeral pyre (the ritual of sati) drew admiration and respect, as in Nauʿī’s Persian poem Sūz o Gudāz (Burning and Melting). It was in this vein that Amīn ibn Ah. mad Rāzī, in his florid Haft iqlīm (The Seven Climes), written in 1594, cited from a lost earlier source an account of the wonders of India, including the always popular stories of self immolation as well as the breathing techniques of jogis. I quote this at length because of the literary style of this account: Muh. ammad Yūsuf Harawī, who was one of the competent people of his age, wrote a treatise on the wonders and rarities of the people of India. There he has related, I was in one of the districts of India and heard that a jogi had appeared who wanted to immolate himself in view of the king of that place. The king of that district passed three days in feasting and mirth, and on the fourth day at dawn, when the orb of the sun had arisen from the citadel of the Orient and became fixed above the tablecloth of dust, a great crowd of the idolaters gathered. That jogi fled from impermanent existence and was suspended in imperishable nothingness, with the cloak of annihilation on his breast and the cap of renunciation on his head. He came before the king and performed the customs of reverence and the necessary salutations. Like a rosebud, his lip was sealed from speech, and in the manner of a narcissus, he kept his gaze directed at his feet as he stood. At his direction, attendants softened goat and cow manure and piled it around him until it came up to his head and shoulders. Then fire was struck

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Universality in Islamic Thought on the left and right, and it began to catch fire until flames rose from all sides, and the moment became hot. At the moment when, candle-like, the flame reached to the throat of that burned one, he turned toward the king and spoke a few words. He bowed his head like a supplicant and laid his forehead on the very face of the flame, and closing his eyes, he expired. (Verse:) His hot-headed lover put a brick beneath his head; He burned so much that finally he put his head on ashes. After searching for the parts of his body for an hour, they saw nothing there except an ashen residue. (Verse:) You are raw as long as a remnant of yourself is out of place; burn wholly like a candle, so you may become perfect. Furthermore, in India there is a group of jogis who practice breath control. They carry their unremitting persistence to the point that they take but a single breath every few days, and they consider this skill the height of perfection and the greatest achievement. Among them was a jogi in Benares who had this quality, such that once Khān-i Zamān kept him buried underground for over ten days. Another time he had him spend nearly twelve days under water, like an anchor, but he experienced no harm or injury at all. Also in the region of Punjab there was a madman, freed from the trammels of the world, who had cast the wealth of the two worlds to one side, having neither connection to the world nor inclination to worldlings. (Verse:) From every eyelash a lily sprang up on his eye, sewing up his vision from the bad and good of time. For his whole life, there is a piece of land where there is a crevice, and he has wedged his left breast, which is the treasury of the jewel of the heart, into that crevice.

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He has restrained his hand from taking food, and he has kept his eye veiled from slumber. The said Muh. ammad Yūsuf has written, I have seen that person, and I heard from the people who were close to him that it is twentytwo years that he has followed this regime. During this time he has not stirred foot or stretched out his hand, and for nourishment he has been satisfied with the smell of food. And God is the lord of assistance!64

Here the marvelous figure of the jogi burning himself alive, and performing superhuman acts of asceticism to rival the desert anchorites of early Christianity, is presented in terms derived from the highly refined esthetic of Persian poetry. Although examples of such aesthetic admiration of Indian ascetics and other marvels could be multiplied, among Indian Muslims there were limits to such positive expressions when idolatry was involved. It may be that theoretical consideration of idolatry in Persia or Anatolia was not nearly as threatening as the question could be in a land (such as India) that was thriving with idolatry. The example I have in mind is the famous story of Moses and the shepherd, memorably told by Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī in his Mathnawī (2:1750–1815). There, we see the shepherd addressing God in the most naïve and simple fashion, offering to sew God’s shoes, comb his hair and kill his lice, as well as massage his feet and sweep out his little room. Moses, the arch-monotheist, is enraged at this blasphemy and denounces the poor shepherd in a lengthy and devastating diatribe. But after he departs in triumph, leaving the shepherd crushed in repentance, Moses is addressed by God with a stern rebuke. The sincerity and intensity of the shepherd’s worship is all that matters, Moses is told, and in presenting this Rūmī even makes an offhand reference to India as the byword for idolatry. God states to Moses I have bestowed on every one a (special) way of acting: I have given to everyone a (peculiar) form of expression . . . Among the Indians the idiom of India is praiseworthy; among the Sindis the idiom of Sind is praiseworthy . . . I look not at the tongue and the speech; I look at the inward (spirit) and the state (feeling) . . . The religion of Love is

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Accordingly, Moses is forced to run after the shepherd to announce his forgiveness in the most liberal acceptance of religious diversity: “Do not seek any rules or method (of worship); say whatever your distressful heart desires. Your blasphemy is (the true) religion, and your religion is the light of the spirit: you are saved, and through you a whole (world) is in salvation.”66 It is noteworthy that in contemporary interpretations of Rūmī as a figure who transcends all religion, this particular text has been frequently cited as a proof text, though translators have pushed the text a little farther toward universalism than is probably justified.67 A Chishtī Sufi master in India was not willing to go so far. Shaykh Nas. īr al-Dīn Mah. mūd “Chirāgh-i Dihlī” (d. 1356) was one of the principal leaders of this important South Asian Sufi tradition in northern India. Although he seems to have been familiar with the writings of Rūmī (he is perhaps the first Indian Sufi known to quote from the poetry of Rūmī), he tells a tale similar to the story of Moses and the shepherd, but in a quite different fashion. In his recorded conversations, known as Khayr al-majālis (The Best of Assemblies), Chirāgh-i Dihlī locates this story unambiguously in India, having the idolater address his idol in Hindi (although the example remains generic, without any identification of the deity). Yet the lesson here is not that God approves of all forms of worship, but that God will accept repentance from idolatry even after many years of such blasphemous behavior: In the age of the prophet Moses (God’s prayer and peace be upon him), there was an idolater among the Israelites, who had practiced idolatry for four hundred years. He had not ceased for a single day in these four hundred years, and he did not raise his head from the foot of the idol, nor did he pray for any necessity during these four hundred years. One day he got a fever, and he placed his head on

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the idol’s foot and said, “Tu merā gusāin, tu merā kartār, mujh is tap tahīñ churā!”. In Persian, that is, he said to the idol, “You are my God, you are my Creator, release me from this fever!” He said this in the Indian language, just as it is written. However much he spoke to the idol, what answer comes from stone? No answer came. His fever increased. He got up and kicked it, saying, “Tu merā kartār nahīñ!” That is, ”You are not my creator!” He went out and saw a mosque before him. He put his head inside the mosque and said once, “O God of Moses!” From the four directions, the cry came, “I am here, my servant! I am here, my servant!” This was heard seventy times, without interruption. He was astonished, saying, “For four hundred years I have not raised my head from the foot of the idol, and I never prayed for any necessity. Today I pray for one, but the idol did not supply my necessity. He gave no reply, no matter how much I implored him. A single time I called out in the name of the God of Moses, and seventy times I heard, ‘I am here, my servant!’ I am His servant! So much of my life has been wasted!” Then he prayed for what he needed: “O God of Moses, remove this fever from me!” At once the fever left him . . . Moses ran barefoot, saying, “Come! For your repentance has been accepted, and your faith has been found acceptable! It is decreed, even so: If for four hundred years, nay! If for four thousand years you practice idolatry and never once lift your head from the idol’s foot, and then despair of him and come to Us, and just once cry out, then seventy times without interruption I will reply, and every necessity that you pray for I will provide to your desire.” The master told this story, and those who were present wept with loud cries and exclamations.68

The divergence of Chirāgh-i Dihlī’s story from Rūmī’s narrative reveals a quite different emphasis. The Indian Sufi is not interested in the sincerity and intensity of the idolater’s worship, nor does he provide any excuse for it based on universalist notions. Instead, the theological issue of worshipping false idols is

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front and center, starkly contrasted with the true God known through prophecy as the Creator, and the Hindi language makes the Indian location of this idolatry unmistakable for the Indian Muslim listeners, who would have understood it perfectly in their mother tongue. Thus the story of the idolater’s renunciation of paganism and his forgiving acceptance by God is what brings the audience to tears, not the notion that God welcomes all forms of worship. This is an instance in which a strong theological resistance barred this Indian Sufi from extending universalist recognition to Indian religions.

Conclusion In it is most extreme form, universalism extends the recognition of religious validity not just to followers of other religions, but to every sinner, so that Ibn ʿArabī envisioned the salvation of Pharaoh himself; this is paralleled by the Christian philosopher Origen, whose doctrine of apokatastasis or restoration included the salvation even of Satan.69 Short of that position, there were still a number of Muslim thinkers who proposed varying degrees of positive recognition of the merits of the religions of India, and I have not mentioned all of them here by any means. This they were able to do by employing the categories (such as Sufism, monotheism, political ethics, magic) that were the common currency of pre-modern Islamicate thought. By pointing to the limitations in their concepts of universalism I am perhaps taking advantage of an ambiguity in our notion of the universal, which is inevitably embedded in the language of some local context or tradition even as it strives for a comprehensive meaning. Nevertheless, these examples indicate that Muslim writers trying to conceptualize the beliefs and practices of Indian religions necessarily drew upon the frameworks—political, philosophical, theological, or occult—that were well domesticated in their own culture. As Rūmī put it, “Everyone became my friend from his own opinion.”

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Notes 1

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An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Giorgio Levi Della Vida Conference on “Universality in Islamic Thought” at the University of California at Los Angeles, 10–13 May 2007. The article was completed while the author was in residence as visiting scholar at the Centre for Civilisational Dialogue, University of Malaya (Fall 2010). It was published in The Muslim World 101 (January 2011), pp. 1–19 and is reproduced here with their kind permission. See the articles “pluralisme” and “universalisme,” in André Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972). Schneider, Irene, “Pluralism: Legal and Ethical-Religious”; Gudrun Krämer, “Pluralism: Political,” in Encylopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, ed. Richard Martin (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), vol. 2. pp. 533–6. While Indian Brahmins and others seem to have been assimilated to the category of dhimmi early after the Arab conquest of Sindh, with a couple of exceptions (notably under the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb) there was hardly ever any systematic attempt by Muslim rulers to apply the jizya tax on non-Muslims to the Indian population; see Peter Hardy, “Djizya. In India,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam. Carl W. Ernst, “Situating Sufism and Yoga,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Series 3, 15/1 (2005), pp. 15–43. Carl W. Ernst, Eternal Garden: Mysticism, History, and Politics at a South Asian Sufi Center (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 22–37. Eduard Sachau, trans., Alberuni’s India (London, 1888; reprint ed., Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1964); Hellmut Ritter, ed., “Al-Bīrūnī’s Übersetzung des Yoga-sūtra des Patañjali,” Oriens 9 (1956), pp. 165–200; Bruce B. Lawrence, “The Use of Hindu Religious Texts in al-Bīrūnī’s India with Special Reference to Patañjali’s Yoga-Sūtras,” in The Scholar and the Saint: Studies in Commemoration of Abu’l Rayh. ān al-Bīrūnī and Jalāl al-Dīn alRūmī, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski (New York: New York University Press, 1975), pp. 29–48; Shlomo Pines and Tuvia Gelblum, “AlBīrūnī’s Arabic Version of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra : A Translation of his First Chapter and a Comparison with Related Sanskrit Texts,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 29 (1966),

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Universality in Islamic Thought pp. 302–25; eidem, “Al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic Version of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra: A Translation of the Second Chapter and a Comparison with Related Texts,” BSOAS 40 (1977), pp. 522–49; eidem, “Al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic Version of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra: A Translation of the Third Chapter and a Comparison with Related Texts,” BSOAS 46 (1983), pp. 258–304. Bruce B. Lawrence, Shahrastānī on the Indian Religions (The Hague: Mouton, 1976); idem, “al-Bīrūnī and Islamic Mysticism,” in Al-Bīrūnī Commemorative Volume, ed. Hakim Mohammed Said (Karachi: Hamdard Academy, 1979), p. 372; idem, “Bīrūnī, Abū Rayh. ān. Viii. Indology,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. 4 (1990), pp. 285–7. Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1928), pp. 26–7. Ritter, “Al-Bīrūnī’s Übersetzung,” p. 167; Pines and Gelblum, “Arabic Version,” BSOAS 29 (1966), pp. 309–10. Pines and Gelblum, “Arabic Version,” BSOAS 29 (1966), p. 302, n. 1, quoting the incomprehension of Ibrāhīm ibn Muh. ammad alGhad. anfar al-Tibrīzī; Fathullah Mujtabai, “Al Bīrūnī and India: The First Attempt to Understand,” in his Aspects of Hindu Muslim Cultural Relations (New Delhi: National Book Bureau, 1978), p. 51, n. 52, cites reactions to the Patañjali translation by Persian authors Abū al-Maʿālī in his Bayān al-adyān, and Mīr Findiriskī in his translation of the Yoga Vāsis. .tha. Abū l-Maʿālī Muh. ammad al-H. usaynī al-ʿAlawī, Bayān al-adyān dar sharh. -i adyān wa madhāhib-i jāhilī wa islāmī, ed. ʿAbbās Iqbāl Āshtiyānī, Muh. ammad Taqī Dānish Puzhūh, and Sayyid Muh. ammad Dabīr Siyāqī (Tehran 1376/1998), pp. 23–4, 98; H. Massé, tr., “L’Exposé des religions,” Revue de l’Histoire des Religions 94 (1926), pp. 17–75; A. Christensen, “Remarques critiques sur le Kitāb bayāni-l-adyān d’Abū’l-Maʿālī,” Le Monde Oriental 5–6 (1911–12), pp. 205–16; Lawrence, Shahrastānī, pp. 89–90. Halbfass, India and Europe, pp. 29–30 (Rashīd al-Dīn), 32–3 (Abū l-Fad. l); Abū ‘l-Fazl ʿAllāmī, The Ā’īn-i Akbarī, tr. H. S. Jarrett, ed. Jadunath Sarkar (2nd ed., Calcutta, 1948; reprint ed., New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1978), vol. 3, pp. vii–ix, 141– 358. Sachau, India, Preface, p. 1. For a recent survey, see Akbar Sobut, “Suhrawardī dar Hind,” in Shahram Pazouki, ed., ʿIrfān, Islām, Īrān va Insān-i Muʿās. ir: Nīkūdāsht-i Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i H. aqīqat, 1385/2007), pp. 125–60.

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See my “Controversy over Ibn ʿArabī’s Fus. ūs. : The Faith of Pharaoh,” Islamic Culture 59 (1985), pp. 259–66. The Akhlāq-i Jalālī or Jalalian Ethics has been particularly popular in India, and it has been repeatedly lithographed there in modern times, though never printed in Iran until the recent edition, Akhlāq-i Jalālī, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Musʿūdī Āranī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i It.t.ilāʿāt, 1391/2013). This text was one of the first Persian texts translated into English during the early colonial period, as The Practical Philosophy of the Muhammadan People, by W. T. Thompson (London, 1839); cf. my translation of chapter 5 of this Persian text in An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, ed. S. H. Nasr and Mehdi Aminrazavi, vol. 4, From the School of Illumination to Philosophical Mysticism (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012), pp. 93–120. Copies of Davānī’s works preserved in Pakistan include an anthology copied in 1518 and another work copied in 1554 in Tatta (Sindh). Cf. Muh. ammad Bashīr H. usayn, Fihrist-i makht. ūt. āt-i Shīrānī (3 vols., Lahore: Dānishgāh-i Panjāb, 1969), vol. 2, p. 207, no. 1127; vol. 2, p. 209, no. 1138; vol. 2, p. 235, no. 1302; vol. 2, p. 266, no. 1475. H. aydar Mirza, Tārīkh-i Rashīdī, in Classical writings of the medieval Islamic World: Persian histories of the Mongol dynasties, tr. Wheeler M. Thackston, Jr. (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012), vol. 1, p. 176 (fol. 217). Ah. mad Munzavī, Fihrist-i mushtarak-i nuskha-hā-yi khat. .tī-i Fārsī-yi Pākistān (Islamabad: Markaz-i Tah. qīqāt-i Fārsī-yi Īrān va Pākistān, 1983– ), vol. 4, p. 2385. ʿAbdullāh Muh. ammad ibn ʿUmar al-Makkī al-Āsafī, ‘H. ājjī Dabīr’ Ulughkhānī, Z. afar al-wālih bi-Muz. affar wa ālih, An Arabic History of Gujarat, ed. E. Denison Ross, Indian Texts Series (3 vols., London: John Murray, for the Government of India, 1910– 28), vol. 1, p. 337; tr. M. F. Lokhandwala, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, 152, 157 (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1970–74), vol. 1, p. 278. Wajīh al-Dīn ʿAlawī, al-Risāla al-mussamā bi-l-h. aqīqat alMuh. ammadiyya, ed. with Urdu tr. Muh. ammad Zubayr Ghulām Nabī Qurayshī (Ahmedabad: Sarkej Rawda Committee, 1385/ 1966), introduction, pp. 9–10. U. M. Daudpota, “Sind and Multan,” in Mohammad Habib and Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, eds., A Comprehensive History of India, vol. 5, The Delhi Sultanat (AD 1206–1526) (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1970; reprint ed., 1982), p. 1127, quoting Tārīkh-i Maʿs. ūmī, p. 75.

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Universality in Islamic Thought ʿAbdu-‘l-Qādir ibn-i-Mulūkshāh al-Badāūnī, Muntakhabu-‘ttawārīkh, tr. Wolesey Haig, Biblioteca Indica, 97 (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1925), vol. 3, p. 329, n. 1. Nazir Ahmad, “Language and Literature-Persian,” in H. K. Shirwani and P. M. Joshi, eds., History of the Medieval Deccan (1295–1724) (2 vols., Hyderabad: The Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1973–4), vol. 2, p. 79. Jalāl al-Dīn Muh. ammad ibn Saʿd al-Dīn Asʿad al-S. iddīqī alDavānī, Shawākil al-h. ūr fī sharh. hayākil al-nūr, ed. Muh. ammad ʿAbd al-H. aqq and Muh. ammad Yūsuf Kūkan (Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, 1373/1953), Arabic introduction, p. xxvi; this edition is based on a manuscript in the Oriental Manuscripts Library in Madras that is contemporary with Davānī. Cf. Shihâboddîn Yahyâ Sohravardî Shaykh al-Ishrâq, L’Archange empourpré, Quinze traits et récits mystiques, tr. Henry Corbin (Paris: Fayard, 1976), pp. 33–66, with extracts from the commentaries of Davānī and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shīrāzī on pp. 67–73; and my translation of book 5 of this Arabic text, in An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, ed. S. H. Nasr and Mehdi Aminrazavi, vol. 4 (London: I.B.Tauris 2012), pp. 93–120. Shams al-Dīn Muh. ammad ibn Mah. mūd Shahrazūrī, Nuzhat alarwāh. va rawd. at al-afrāh. : tārīkh al-h. ukamā, Persian tr. Maqs. ūd ʿAlī Tabrīzī, ed. Muh. ammad Tāqi Dānish Puzhūh, et al. ([Tehran]: Shirkat-i Intishārāt ʿIlmī va Farhangī, 1987). The original Arabic text is Shams al-Dīn Muh. ammad ibn Mah. mūd al-Shahrazūrī (d. 1288), Nuzhat al-arwāh. wa rawd. at al-afrāh. fī ta’rīkh al-h. ukamā’ wa’l falāsifa, ed. Khūrshīd Ah. mad (2 vols., Hyderabad: Dā’irat alMaʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1396/1976). Carl W. Ernst, “Fayzi’s Illuminationist Interpretation of Vedanta: The Shariq al-Maʿrifa,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 30/3 (2010), pp. 156–64. Carl W. Ernst, “The Islamization of Yoga in the Amrtakunda Translations,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Series 3, 13/2 (2003), pp. 199–226. This commentary was entitled Rūh. al-arwāh. fī sharh. al-h. ikmat alishrāqiyya. A list of nearly 50 writings by ʿAbd al-Nabī Shat.t.ārī (mostly commentaries on Sufi classics, Shat.t.ārī works, standard philosophical texts, and wujūdī writings) is given by Munzavī, Fihrist, vol. 2, pp. 999–1000, and also in ʿAbd al-H. ayy b. Fakhr alDīn al-H. asanī, Nuzhat al-khawāt. ir wa bahjat al-masāmiʿ wa’lnawāz. ir, ed. Sharaf al-Dīn Ah. mad (9 vols., 2nd ed., Hyderabad: Dā’irat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmānyya), vol. 5, pp. 269–70.

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Muh. ammad Sharīf Niz. ām al-Dīn Ah. mad ibn al-Harawī, Anwāriyya, ed. Hossein Ziai, Majmūʿa-yi Mut.āla Islāmī (Tehran: Markaz-i Īrānī-yi Mut.ālaʾāt-i Farhang-hā, 1358/1979–80). See C. A. Storey, Persian Literature: A Bio-bibliographical Survey (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1970), vol. 1, pp. 433–5. Badā’ūnī (Muntakhab, vol. 2, p. 363) mentions Muh. ammad Sharīf as having revised his father’s history after the latter’s death. This same author (or possibly a brother) under the name of Sayf Allāh b. Khwāja Niz. ām al-Dīn Ah. mad Muqīm-i Harawī produced several other works of a philosophical bent, including Jawāhar alasrār or The Jewels of the Secrets, as well as Mir’āt al-wah. da or The Mirror of Oneness, completed in 1617 in Lahore. Both works were written in the form of questions and answers on difficult metaphysical questions. Cf. Munzavī, Fihrist, vol. 2, p. 951, no.1611; vol. 2, p. 984, no. 1661. Another MS by the same author, also under the title Mir’āt al-wah. da (collection of Bruce Lawrence, Duke University), has an extensive discussion of religious pluralism in terms of Sufism and wah. dat al-wujūd (pp. 244 ff.). Muh. ammad Sharīf mentions unusual natural sites in India where perpetual fire and wind occur, which were the object of pilgrimage (Anwāriyya, pp. 105–6), cosmological theories of the four ages and the god Brahma (pp. 68–9) and incidents from the life of Krishna taken from the Mahābhārata (p. 212). Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 186. Ibid., pp. 34–5, where the editor’s speculative emendation advaita should be restored to the original manuscript reading devatā, “deity.” There is no discussion of Advaita Vedānta in this text. See John F. Richards, The Mughal Empire, vol. 1.5 of The New Cambridge History of India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 36–40, 44–7. For the general concept of ecumenic empire, see Eric Voegelin, Order and History, vol. 4, The Ecumenic Age (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974). See the stimulating essay of Peter Hardy, “Abul Fazl’s Portrait of the Perfect Padshah: A Political Philosophy for Mughal India – or a Personal Puff for a Pal?,” in Islam in India, Studies and Commentaries, vol. 2, Religion and Religious Education, ed. Christian W. Troll (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1985), pp. 114–37. For coinage with Sanskrit and patronage of non-Muslim religious institutions, see Ernst, Eternal Garden, pp. 47–53. See also Finbarr Barry Flood, Objects of Translation: Material Culture and

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Universality in Islamic Thought Medieval “Hindu-Muslim” Encounter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). On Akbar as the center of all religions, see Harbans Mukhia, Historians and Historiography during the Reign of Akbar (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1976), p. 70. John Seyller, Workshop and Patron in Mughal India: The Freer Ramayana and other Illustrated Manuscripts of ʿAbd al-Rahim (Zurich: Artibus Asiae, 1999). Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, Akbar and Religion (Delhi: Idarah-iAdabiyat-i Delli, 1989), pp. 180–1. Abū l-Fad. l, in Muh. ammad Rid. ā Jalālī Nā’ini and Narayan Shankar Shukla, eds., Mahābhārat, buzurgtarīn manz. ūma-yi kukhna-yi mawjūd-i jahān, Persian tr. from Sanskrit by Mīr Ghiyāth al-Dīn ʿAlī Qazwīnī Naqīb Khān, et al., Hindshināsī, 1518 (4 vols., Tehran: Kitābfurūshī T. uh. ūri, 1358–9/1979–81), vol. 1, p. xx. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. xl–xli. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. xviii–xx. Carl W. Ernst, “Two Versions of a Persian Text on Yoga and Cosmology, Attributed to Shaykh Muʿīn al-Dīn Chishtī,” Elixir 2 (2006), pp. 69–76, 124–5. See Ernst, “Islamization of Yoga.” Ernst, “Two Versions of a Persian Text.” Carl W. Ernst, “Being Careful with the Goddess: Yoginis in Persian and Arabic Texts,” in Performing Ecstacy: The Poetics and Politics of Religion in India, ed. Pallabi Chakrabarty and Scott Kugle (Delhi: Manohar, 2009), pp. 189–203. Prior to the twelfth century, the terms yogin and yogini primarily designated sorcerers according to David Gordon White, Kiss of the Yogini: “Tantric Sex” in Its South Asian Contexts (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 221. Mus. t.afā b. ʿAbdullāh al-shahir bi-H. ājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-z. unūn ʿan asāmī al-kutub wa-l-funūn, ed. Muh. ammad Sharaf al-Dīn Yaltqāya (Istanbul: Wikālat al-Maʿārif, 1362/1943), vol. 2, col. 1649. Pseudo-Mağrit.ī, “Picatrix”: Das Ziel des Weisen, ed. Hellmut Ritter, Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, 12 (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1933), pp. 80–3, 138, German tr. Hellmut Ritter and Martin Plessner, Studies of the Warburg Institute, 27 (London: University of London, 1962), pp. 83–6, 145.

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Manfred Ullmann, Die Natur- und Geheimwissenschaften im Islam, Handbuch der Orientalistik, I. VI. 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), p. 361. Ullmann, Natur- und Geheimwissenschaften, pp. 298–9, 381. Ibid., pp. 279, 329. Hans Dieter Betz, “The Delphic Maxim ‘Know Yourself’ in the Greek Magical Papyri,” History of Religions 21 (1981), pp. 156–71. Proclus, Philosophi Platonici, Opera Inedita, ed. Victor Cousin (Paris, 1884; reprint ed., Frankfurt am Main: Minerva G.m.B.H., 1962), pp. 1315–23; Anne Sheppard, “Proclus’ Attitude to Theurgy,” Classical Quarterly 32 (1982), pp. 212–24. David Pingree, “Some of the Sources of the Ghāyat al-h. akīm,” Journal of the Warburg & Courtald Institutes 43 (1980), pp. 1–15. Jean Nicolet and Michel Tardieu, “Pletho Arabicus: Identification et contenu du manuscript arabe d’Istanbul, Topkapi Serai, Ahmet II 1896,” Journal Asiatique 268 (1980), pp. 35–57. Sohravardī, L’archange, pp. 473–512. Johan Christoph Bürgel, The Feather of Simurgh: The “Licit Magic” of the Arts in Medieval Islam, Hagop Kevorkian Series on Near Eastern Art and Civilization (New York: New York University Press, 1988), pp. 27–52, esp. 37–43. Leonard Lewisohn, Beyond Faith and Infidelity: The Sufi Poetry and Teachings of Mah. mūd Shabistarī (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 1995). Alessandro Bausani, “Letteratura neopersiana,” in A. Pagliaro and A. Bausani, Storia della letteratura persiana (Milan, 1960), pp. 242–7; idem, “Ghazal. II. – In Persian Literature,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 2 (1965), pp. 1033–6. Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Empiricism of the Heart: Close Encounters in an 18th-Century Indo-Persian Text,” Studies in History 15/2, n.s. (1999), pp. 261–91, quoting p. 291. Rāzī, Haft iqlīm, vol. 2, pp. 509–11, quoted by Carl W. Ernst, “Accounts of Yogis in Arabic and Persian Historical and Travel Texts,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 33 (2008), pp. 409– 26. Jalāluddīn Rūmī, The Mathnawi, tr. R. A. Nicholson (London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1977), vol. 2, pp. 1753, 1757, 1759, 1770, with slight modifications. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 1784–5. Coleman Barks and John Moyne render the previously quoted verses as follows: “I was wrong. God has revealed to me / that there are no rules for worship. Say whatever / and however your Loving

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Universality in Islamic Thought tells you. / Your sweet blasphemy is the truest devotion. / Through you a whole world is freed. / Loose your tongue and don’t worry what / comes out. It’s all the Light of the Spirit.” See This Longing (Boston: Shambhala, 2000). Nas. īr al-Dīn Chirāgh-i Dihlī, Khayr al-majālis, comp. H. amīd Qalandar, ed. Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, Publications of the Department of History, Muslim University, no. 5, Studies in Indo-Muslim Mysticism, 1 (Aligarh: Muslim University, Department of History, n.d. [1959]), pp. 120–5; tr. by Carl W. Ernst in Religions in India in Practice, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., Princeton Readings in Religions, 1 (Princeton: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 1995), pp. 513–17. Ernst, “Controversy over Ibn ʿArabī’s Fus. ūs. .”

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s Index

Aaron, 93 ʿAbbās, 94, 106 ʿAbbāsī, 1 ʿAbbāsī period, 152 ʿAbbāsid caliphate, 113 ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās, 96 ʿAbd Allāh al-Labbād, 16 ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Asadābādī, 16, 17, 18 Abel, Theodora, 106 Abraham, 92, 94, 203, 205 Abrahamic faiths, 90 Absolute Body, 72, 73 Abū’l-Aswad al-Du’alī, 97 Abū Bakr, 93 Abū al-Barakāt, 172 Abū Dharr, 93 Abū l-Fad. l ʿAllāmī, 196, 198, 200, 201, 202 Abū Hāshim, 16 Abū Khayr ibn Khammār, 172 Abū l-Maʿālī, 196 Abyssinians, 150 Achaemenids, 147 Acquired Intellect, 85 Active Intellect, 71, 85, 86 acts of worship, 36, 39, 41, 42 adab, 65 Adam, 15, 77, 92, 107, 108, 145, 146, 148, 154 Adharbayjān, 150 ʿadl 10; see also God’s justice ʿAd. udī hospital, 172 Aesopic stories, 95 Afghanistan, 172 Africa, 149, 151 Africans, 148 Agathias, 147 agriculture, 101, 102, 149 ahliyya (capacity), 28

ahliyyat al-adā’ (capacity to perform valid legal acts), 28, 29, 32, 33, 35, 52, 53 ahliyyat al-wujūb (obligations), 28, 29, 33 Ah. mad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muh. ammad b. Ismāʿīl, 68 Ahwāz, 150 Akbar, 196, 198, 200–3 ʿAlā al-Dīn Lārī, 198 Alanquwa (Mongol sun goddess), 200 Alans, 151 ʿAlawī, Wajīh al-Dīn, 197 Aleppo, 23, 30, 49 Alexander of Aphrodesias, 86 Alexander (the Great), 146, 148 Alexandrian, 146 Alfarabi, 19 ʿAlī, 93 ʿAlī ibn Abī al-H . azm al-Qurashī, 171; see also Ibn al-Nafīs ʿAlī al-Qūshjī, 176 alms tax, 87 amīr, 205 Amīr H . amza, 201 ʿamm (general), 24 Ammonius, 84 analogical reasoning (qiyās), 53 analogy, 4, 24, 26, 46, 53, 81, 103, 159, 170, 193 anatomy, 157, 163, 164, 165 Anatolia, 48, 211 al-Andalus, 114 Andalusian, 203 angel, 73, 74, 87, 205 angelic intellects, 199 angels, 73, 74, 77, 79, 82, 90, 92, 95, 111, 112, 196 animal bodies, 164 Annianus, 146, 149 applied law, 25, 26

243

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ʿaql (reason), 9, 49 Aq-Qoyunlu, 197 Arab kingdom, 7 Arab Muslim authors, 194 Arab thought, 11, 65 Arabic, 70, 105, 146, 147, 153, 157, 160, 164, 165, 175, 194, 195, 196, 198, 203, 205, 206, 207 Arabic books, 195 Arabic language, 99 Arabic literature, 106, 147, 209 Arabic lyrics, 208 Arabic medical treatises, 160 Arabic philosophy, 106 Arabic science, 106 Arabic script, 205 Arabic writer, 195 Arabic writings, 16 Arab-Islamic civilization, 65 Arabs, 7, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153 archangels, 203 architecture, 149 Ardashīr I, 95 Aristotle, 19, 77, 94, 116, 169 Aristotelian, 1 Aristotelian logic, 20, 114 Aristotelian philosophy, 197 Aristotelianism, 68 arithmetic, 103 Arkoun, Mohammad, 65, 67 Armenia, 150 Armstrong, A. H., 70 Artaxerxes, 147 art, 145, 147, 149, 157, 158 ascension of Muh. ammad, 204 asceticism, 91, 100, 149, 199, 211 As. h. āb al-H . adīth, 150 Ashʿarī, 14, 19, 20, 27 Ashʿarī theologians, 47 Ashʿarite, 170 Ashʿarites, 162 Ashʿariyya, 11, 13, 14, 16 al-Ashʿarī, Abū l-H . asan, 12, 13, 18 Astarābādī, Abū l-Fad. l, 197 astral magic, 205 astrolabe, 168 astrolabe-makers, 176 astrologers, 152, 171 astrology, 149, 152, 158, 162, 165, 177 astronomers, 153, 161, 165

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

astronomy, 78, 103, 149, 151, 152, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 170, 174, 176 atheists, 12 ʿĀt.if Effendi, 112 ʿĀt.if Effendi library, 115 attributes of act, 12 Averroes, 76; see also Ibn Rushd Avicenna, 19, 20, 76, 170; see also Ibn Sīnā’ Avicennan critique of religion, 199–200 Avicennan philosophy, 197 Avicennan theory, 199 Azerbaijan, 174 Babur, 197 Babylon, 206 Babylonia, 148 Babylonian/s, 145, 146, 147, 206 Babylonian Talmud, 92 Badā’ūnī, 201 Badawī, ʿAbd al-Rah. mān, 65 Baghdad, 16, 19, 23, 27, 37, 41, 159, 172, 173 Bahmani kingdom, 198 Baltic Sea, 149 Banū Isrā’īl, 7 Barāhima, 150 barbarism, 68 Bar Hebraeus, 146 Bas. ra, 115 Bas. ran theological school, 16 al-Bas. rī, Abū l-H . usayn, 17, 27 Bāt.inism, 114 Bausani, Alessandro, 208 al-Bayhaqī, 115 al-Bazdawī, Abū l-H . asan ʿAlī, 23, 47 believer, 40, 41, 51 Benares, 210 Berbers, 150, 151 Bible, 9, 90 Bilāl, 93 Bilawhar, 94 al-Bīrūnī, 5, 172, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199 Black Death, 169 bloodletting, 161 Bodleian, 115 Bohra families, 115 botany, 101 Brahma, 203 branches of the jurisprudence, 25, 28, 30, 32, 48

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Index Braudel, Fernand, 66 breath control, 210 Broach, 205 Brown, Peter, 66 Buddha, 94 Buddhist, 68, 174 Buddhist legends, 95 Buddhists, 200 Buffon, comte de, George-Louis Leclerc, 177 Bukhara, 23 Bukhārī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, 47 Bulgars, 151 burhān (apodictic demonstration), 20 Byzantium, 147, 150 cabalism, 206 cabalistic letter-mysticism, 207 Cairo, 26, 161, 206 Calcutta, 105 caliphate, 7 caliphal empire, 147 caliphate/imamate, 85 caliphs, 154 capacité d’exercice, 29 capacité de jouissance, 29 capacity (qudra,), 2, 3, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55; see also ahliyya Caspian Sea, 172 Cathay, 153 Catholic church, 67 causality, 162, 177, 178, 179 causation, 162, 164, 178 cause/s (sabab), 41, 42, 44–9, 51–4, 71, 82, 89 causes of obligation, 49, 54 celestial bodies, 166 celestial equator, 168 celestial globes, 176 celestial intelligences, 207 celestial sphere, 166 Central Asia, 3, 23, 150, 198 Ceylon, 94 Chaldaean Oracles, 207 Chaldaeans, 146, 148, 149, 151, 152 chance (ittifāq), 162 Chaumont, Eric, 27 Chehata, Chafik, 29, 30, 33 cheiromancy, 206 chemistry, 152

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

245

China, 148, 149, 150 Chinese, 148, 149, 151 Chinese astronomers, 174–5 Chingīz Khān, 200; see also Genghis Khan Chirāgh-i Dihlī, Nas. īr al-Dīn Mah. mūd, 5, 212, 213 Chishtī, 203 Chishtī order, 204 Chishtī, Shaykh Muʿīn al-Dīn, 203, 204 Chishtī Sufi, 212 Chishtī Sufi order, 203 Church, 15 Christ, 91, 93, 94 Christian, 1, 5, 8, 95, 109, 112, 145, 170, 171, 173, 175, 179 Christian astronomers, 175 Christian communities, 162 Christian doctrines, 91 Christian doctors, 174 Christian monasteries, 208 Christian philosopher, 214 Christian physician, 172, 173 Christian piety, 91 Christian scholars, 149, 152, 172 Christian scripture, 91 Christian sects, 196 Christian theologians, 11, 15 Christian universal histories, 147 Christian universal history, 146 Christianity, 9, 14, 70, 90, 91, 93, 97, 211 Christians, 2, 14, 15, 21, 79, 89, 110, 145, 146, 150, 152, 171, 172, 175, 193, 200 Christological controversies, 91 civilization, 145 classical antiquity, 66 classical Arabic, 97 Columbus, Christopher, 167 commands (amr), 28 comparison, 179 compulsion (jabr), 37, 44 confessional communities, 171, 172, 175, 179 confessional community, 170 confessions, 173 conjuring, 206 consensus (ijmāʿ), 24, 26 Constantine the Great, 146 contract law, 42 Copts, 151 Cordoba, 114

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cosmic causes, 25, 43 cosmic signs, 45 cosmological doctrines, 68 cosmological perspectives, 202 cosmologies, 202 cosmology, 46, 70, 110, 145, 170 cosmopolitan values, 69 court physician, 173 covenant, 15, 16 crafts, 102, 106 craftsmanship, 149 creation, 12, 77, 87, 101, 148, 149, 150, 166 Creator, 10, 12, 73, 82, 164, 165, 166, 179, 213, 214 Crone, Patricia, 195 cult, 24, 28, 30 cultic act, 32, 35 cultic acts, 3, 39, 45, 47, 48 cultic duties, 35 cultic duty, 44 cultic obligation, 23, 28, 46 cultic obligations, 32 cultural heritage, 147, 148 cultural legacies, 4, 154 cultural stereotypes, 149 cycles of prophecy, 113 al-Dabūsī, Abū Zayd ʿUbaidallāh, 23, 26, 45, 46 Daftary, Farhad, x dāʿī, 67 daimon, 207 dalīl al-khit. āb (the indication of God’s discourse), 25 Dallal, Ahmad, 178 Damascene, 112 Dār al-Islām, 8 Dārā Shikūh (Mughal prince), 199 Davānī, Jalāl al-Dīn, 197, 198 Day of Judgment, 111 deities, 195, 199 demons, 205 determinism, 162, 178 deva, 196; see also Sanskrit “gods” devatā (deities), 199 devil, 74 al-Dhahabī, 169 dhimma (legal personality), 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 Dieterici, Friedrich, 91 dilemma of the three brothers, 17–18

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

Diocletian, 147 Dioscorides, 169 disease, 168, 179 disobedience, 3, 45 dissent, 26, 50; see also ikhtilāf divination, 176 divine command (amr), 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48 divine command theory, 37 divine discourse (khitāb), 28, 36, 37, 44, 49, 52, 54 divine guidance, 88 divine justice, 15, 16 divine law, 74, 76, 77, 79–81, 83, 86 divine lawgiver, 76 Divine Revelation, 85, 169–70 divine sciences, 89, 99, 100, 101, 103 divine unities, 207; see also henads dowry, 30 dualism, 199 dualists, 149, 150 Earth, 73, 166, 167, 170, 179 Eastern Christian historians, 146 ecliptic, 159, 168 education, 3, 69, 102, 104 Egypt, 15, 17, 30, 48, 165, 173, 206 Egyptian/s, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 152, 170, 173 Egyptian astrologer, 206 Egyptian oculist, 162 elements, 72, 73, 101 Elias of Nisibis, 146 Elijah, 205 elitist rationalism, 19, 20 emanation, 12, 71 Enayat, Hamid, 79, 80, 81 Enlightenment, 177, 200 equant, 161 Ernst, Carl, 4 Esad Effendi, 112 Esau, 91 esoteric prophets, 203 esoteric teaching, 204 essential attributes, 12 essentialism, 193 eternity, 13 ethics, 20, 68, 103 Ethiopians, 151 Euclidian geometry, 167

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Index Europe, 149, 151, 163, 177 European, 178, 196 European historians, 177 European science, 177, 178 Eusebius, 146 Eve, 15 evil, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 84 experience, 4, 158 experimentation, 179 faculty of imagination, 86 fah. wā al-khit. āb (the conclusion a fortiori), 25 faith, 10, 14, 76, 77, 87 faiths, 171, 172, 193 faithful, 11, 13, 14, 18 falāsifa, 19; see also philosophers Fārs, 150 fasting, 87, 90 Fāt.imid Cairo, 17 Fāt.imid cosmographical treatise, 165 Fāt.imid dynasty, 68 Fāt.imid Empire, 16 Fāt.imid Jerusalem, 16 al-Fārābī, 1, 75, 79, 84, 85, 86, 102, 103, 116 fatalism, 11 Fayd. ī, 198 Fierro, Maribel, 114 Final Judgment, 13 Finch, Henry Le Roy, 88 firishta (angel), 205 First Cause, 86 fit. ra, 8, 9 foreign sciences, 97, 98 foundations of the Jurisprudence, 26 four humors, 170 Franks, 148, 151, 153 free choice, 45 free will, 11 French law, 29 Friend/s of God, 9, 95, 111, 112 furūʿ al-fiqh (branches of the jurisprudence), 23 Fust.āt (Old Cairo), 173 Gabriel, 92 Galen, 4, 162, 163, 164, 169 Galenic physiology, 161, 176 Gardet, Louis, 65 Gehenna, 111

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

247

Gemini, 159 Gemistos Pletho, 207 Genghis Khan), 153; see also Chingīz Khān genizas, 21 Gentiles, 16 geodetic measurements, 159 geography, 4, 145, 149, 152, 154, 158 geomancy, 176; see also ʿilm al-raml geometry, 103, 151, 152, 170 German law, 29 Ghanaians, 151 al-Ghazālī, Abū H . āmid, 19, 26, 27, 115, 116, 162, 163, 164, 165, 175 Ghazan Khan, 152 Ghazna, 172, 196 Gilān, 151 God, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 24, 28, 33, 34, 37, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 148, 152, 157, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 171, 205, 211, 212, 213, 214 God’s command, 44 God’s command and prohibition, 11 God’s commands (amr), 24 God’s creation, 4, 11 God’s design, 164 God’s discourse (khit. āb), 28, 34, 35, 36; see also divine discourse God’s grace, 15 God’s inner speech (kalām nafsī), 14 God’s justice, 2, 10, 11, 14, 15, 75; see also ʿadl God’s omnipotence, 162 God’s promise and threat, 10 God’s qadar, 177 God’s revelation, 14, 165 God’s unicity, 2 God’s will, 13, 14 God’s wisdom, 16 Gog and Magog, 150, 151 Goodman, Lenn, 106 good, goodness, 12 13, 14, 17, 20 Gospel, 89, 90 Gospel of Philip, 94 Gospels, 91, 94, 107 government, 149 Graeco-Roman civilization, 66 grammar, 1, 97 Granada, 178

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Greece, 68, 94 Greek, 4, 95, 109, 112, 146, 160, 171, 206 Greek authorities, 169 Greek culture, 65 Greek magical papyri, 207 Greek medicine, 168, 170 Greek philosophy, 113, 115, 169, 196 Greek physician, 164 Greek principles in astronomy, 161 Greek science/s, 76, 113, 115, 158 Greek sources, 84, 159 Greek texts, 160, 196 Greek tradition, 70 Greek works, 97 Greek writings, 207 Greeks, 98, 110, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 176, 196, 198 guidance, 37 Gujarat, 197 Gutas, Dimitri, 1, 170, 178 h. adīth/s, 8, 97, 169, 205 haemophilia, 160 Hafiz, 208 Haggadah, 91 H . ājjī Khalīfa/Kātib Čelebi, 115, 164, 176, 206 Halbfass, Wilhelm, 195 H . allāj, 208 Hamadānī, ʿAyn al-Qud. āt, 208 Hamdani, Abbas, 68, 115 al-H . āmidī, Ibrāhīm, 67 H . anafī, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 38, 39, 112, 170 H . anafī college (Aleppo), 49 H . anafī doctrine, 35, 38, 47, 49 H . anafī doctrines, 53 H . anafī jurist, 48 H . anafī jurists, 34, 47, 52 H . anafī law, 2, 28, 54 H . anafī legal thought, 37 H . anafī madrasa (Aleppo), 50 H . anafī-Māturdī school, 12 H . anafī scholars, 3, 23, 39 H . anafī school, 41, 48 H . anafī school of Samarqand, 55 H . anafī Transoxanian jurists, 48 H . anafīs, 19, 37, 38, 40, 41, 47, 51 H . anafism, 49 H . anbalī, 12, 25, 27, 170

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

H . anbalīs, 39, 40, 47 H . anbalī school, 38, 169 Handlungsfaehigkeit, 29 al-Harawī, Muh. ammad Yūsuf, 209, 211 H . arrān, 149, 173, 207 H . arrānians, 150 Hārwanī, Shaykh ʿUthmān, 204 hatha yoga, 5, 198, 203, 206 heathens, 16 Heaven, 15 heavenly bodies, 179 heavens, 166 Hebrew, 94, 95, 112 Hebrews, 146 Hell, 15, 21, 79 Hellenic, 147 Hellenic sciences, 103 Hellenism, 67 Hellenistic, 145, 146, 206, 207 Hellenized pagans, 207 henads, 207; see also divine unities Heraclius, 148 heresies, 195 heresiography, 196 hermeneutic, 203 hermeneutical clarity, 195 hermeneutics, 99, 100, 102 Hermes, 73 Hexaemeron, 145 H . ijāz. , 110, 111, 150 Hijra, 11 Hindi, 201, 205, 212, 214 Hindi mantras, 205 Hindi romances, 201 Hindu, 194, 199, 201, 202, 205 Hindu doctrines, 202 Hindu graveyard, 205 Hinduism, 194 Hindus, 199, 202, 208 Hippocrates, 169, 171 Hippocratic treatise, 171 historians, 143, 178 historical sources, 154 historiography, 145, 152 history, 158 history of Islam, 147 history of science, 177 homicide, 36 Hormisdas, 147 hospitals, 173

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Index Hülegü Khān, 174 human, 74, 82, 83, 90, 110, 111, 112, 152, 164, 166, 193 human beings, 73, 80, 86, 88, 110 human body, 179 human freedom, 21 human intellect, 9, 11 human nature, 3, 68, 154 human reason, 2, 77 human responsibility, 15 human soul, 70, 94 human souls, 93 humanism, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 humanist education, 99 humanist ideal, 65 humanistic, 106 humanistic morality, 3 humanistic scholarship, 104 humanists, 68 humanity, 88 humankind, 68 humoral medicine, 4 humoral pathology, 169, 170 humoral theory of disease, 169 humors, 4, 168, 169 H . unayn b. Ish. āq, 84 H . usayn, Muh. ammad Kāmil, ix Iamblichus, 207 Ibn Abī al-Bayān al-Isrā’īlī, 173 Ibn al-Athīr, 146 Ibn ʿAqīl, 25, 27 Ibn ʿArabī, Muh. yī al-Dīn, 197, 203, 214 Ibn But.lān, 98, 173, 174 Ibn al-Haytham, 161 Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 115 Ibn Ilyās, Mans. ūr ibn Muh. ammad ibn Ah. mad, 164 Ibn Khaldūn, 26, 27 Ibn Lubb, 178 Ibn al-Malāh. imī, 19, 20 Ibn al-Munajjim, 1 Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, 147 Ibn al-Mut.rān, 173 Ibn al-Nadīm, 98 Ibn al-Nafīs, 161, 162, 170, 171, 176 Ibn al-Qift.ī, 115 Ibn al-Rāwandī, 86 Ibn Rid. wān, 171, 173, 174

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

249

Ibn Rushd, 76, 162, 163, 164; see also Averroes Ibn Saʿdān, 115 Ibn Sīnā, 1, 76, 86, 115, 161, 162, 170, 172; see also Avicenna Ibn Taymiyya, 12, 162, 163, 169 Ibn al-Tilmīdh, 172, 173 idol, 212, 213 idolaters, 5, 16, 154, 199, 209, 212, 214 idolatrous paganism, 209 idolatry, 5, 150, 151, 194, 199, 200, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214 Idrīs, 73, 166, 199, 203 Ifrā’īm ibn al-H . asan, 171 ijmāʿ (consensus), 24 ijtihād, 87, 96 ikhtilāf (dissent), 26 Ikhwān al-S. afā’, 3, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 109, 110, 112, 113 Ikhwān’s cosmology, 71 Ilkhanate, 174 Ilkhanid, 174 Illuminationism, 197, 198 Illuminationist philosophy, 5, 197, 198, 199 Illuminationist school, 197, 200 ʿilm (knowledge), 157 ʿilm al-farā’id. (calculation of inheritance), 176 ʿilm al-ikhtilāf (discipline of dissent), 26 ʿilm al-mīqāt (timekeeping), 176 ʿilm al-raml (geomancy), 176 imaginative faculty, 85 imām, 67, 82 Imām, 9, 113 Imāms, 80, 81, 111 Imāmī Shīʿism, 85 imamate, 68 imperial caliphate, 146 inclusiveness, 69 India, 4, 148, 150, 153, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212 India Office, 197 Indian, 68, 94, 95, 109, 112, 195, 198, 199, 203, 207, 214 Indian asceticism, 5, 211 Indian doctrines, 194 Indian empire, 196

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Indian epic, 200 Indian gods, 203 Indian idolatry, 199 Indian language, 213 Indian literature, 95 Indian magic, 206 Indian Muslim, 211, 214 Indian philosophy, 195, 198, 199 Indian practices, 194, 204 Indian religion, 5, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 203, 208, 209, 214 Indian sages, 199 Indian schools of thought, 202 Indian Sufi, 198, 203, 212, 213, 214 Indian teachings, 200 Indian thought, 195, 196, 198 Indians, 110, 148, 149, 151, 196, 206, 211 Indic, 205 Indic culture, 203 Indic material, 204 Indologists, 203 Indo-Muslim regimes, 201 infallible Imām, 116 infidel religions, 208 infidels, 74, 154, 208 injustice, 13, 17, 84, 85 innate predisposition, 8 inquisition (mih. na), 66 Intellect, 70, 71, 73, 77 intent (niyya), 32, 35, 50 Iran, 23, 147, 148, 198 Iraq, 16, 48, 150 Iraqi, 95, 112 Iraqi H . anafīs, 43 Iraqi scholars, 35 Iraqis, 44 Irving, Washington, 167 Isaac, 91 Ishrāqī Illuminationism, 201 Islam, 2, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 19, 20, 27, 35, 65, 66, 67, 70, 75, 87, 91, 97, 113, 116, 148, 154, 157, 158, 168, 172, 173, 176, 177, 179, 194, 196, 204, 208 Islamic, 4, 153, 163, 197, 204, 205 Islamic authorities, 162, 203 Islamic belief, 208 Islamic categories, 194 Islamic civilization, 66, 67, 148 Islamic community, 66 Islamic cosmology, 170

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

Islamic cult, 35, 36 Islamic culture, 168, 175 Islamic education, 116 Islamic historical thought, 149, 175 Islamic historiography, 3, 4, 148, 154 Islamic history, 147, 148, 150, 175, 178 Islamic hospitals, 174 Islamic humanism, 67 Islamic jurisprudence, 103 Islamic law, 19 Islamic learning, 65 Islamic norms, 200 Islamic period, 148, 152 Islamic philosophy, 76 Islamic polemical literature, 174 Islamic religious thought, 75 Islamic revelation, 113 Islamic scholars, 159, 160, 170, 179 Islamic science, 158, 178 Islamic sciences, 97, 98 Islamic society, 158, 177 Islamic source, 208 Islamic sources, 200 Islamic Spain, 114 Islamic taxonomies, 194 Islamic theological perspective, 202 Islamic theology, 193 Islamic thought, 3, 4, 5, 69, 98, 195, 197 Islamic times, 207 Islamic tradition, 153 Islamic universal history, 149, 150 Islamic world, 148, 162, 175, 178, 179, 207 Islamic worship, 35 Islamicate, 200 Islamicate cosmology, 203–4 Islamicate cultural world, 206 Islamicate material, 204 Islamicate society, 205 Islamicate thought, 214 Islamicists, 66 Islamized, 207 Islamizing, 195 Ismāʿīlī, 3, 68, 174 Ismāʿīlī community, 68 Ismāʿīlī daʿwa, 115 Ismāʿīlīs, 76, 115, 116 Israelite prophets, 73, 74 Israelite scholars, 93 Israelites, 146, 148, 151, 152, 212

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Index

251

al-Isrā’īlī, Ish. āq ibn Sulaymān, 173 Istanbul, 115, 161, 206 istis. h. āb al-h. āl (the presumption of continuity), 25

jurists, 27, 53, 78, 103, 106 justice, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 83, 84, 85 justice of God, 16 al-Jūzjānī, Abū ʿUbayd, 161

Jabal, 150 Jacob, 92, 93 Jahāngīr, 198 Jāhiliyya, 150 Jāh. iz. , 147 Jām Niz. ām al-Dīn, 198 Jāmī, ʿAbd al-Rah. mān, 198 al-Jawzīyah, Ibn Qayyim, 169, 175 Jazīra, 150 Jerusalem, 17, 93 Jesus, 86, 90, 93, 94, 199 Jesus Christ, 15 Jew, 8, 109, 173 Jewish, 11, 89, 170, 171, 173, 179 Jewish apothecary, 173 Jewish astronomers, 175 Jewish communities, 162 Jewish doctors, 174 Jewish physician, 172, 173 Jewish physicians, 169 Jewish prophets, 90 Jewish rabbis, 150 Jewish religious thought, 16 Jewish scholars, 16, 66, 149 Jewish sources, 91 Jewish texts, 91 Jews, 2, 15, 16, 20, 21, 79, 110, 150, 152, 171, 172, 175, 193 jinn/Jinn, 90, 108 Jinnī advisors, 106 Jinnī court, 113 Jinnī King, 107 jinni sages, 94, 111 jogi, 209, 211 jogis, 209, 210 Johansen, Baber, 2, 3 John of Damascus, 11 Jonah, 203, 205 Joseph, 94 al-Jubbā’i, Abū ʿAlī, 16, 18 Judaeo-Christian, 67, 68 Judaism, 9, 70, 90 Julius Africanus, 146 Jupiter, 72 jurisprudence (us. ūl al-fiqh), 23, 103

Ka’ba, 45 kalām, 21, 75; see also theology Karaite, 2, 16, 17, 20–1 Karbalā’, martyrs of, 94 al-Karkhī, Abū l-H . usayn, 23, 32, 37 al-Kāsānī, ʿAlā’ al-Dīn Abū Bakr, 23, 30, 49, 50, 51, 54 Kashmir, 153 Kauravas, 202 Kayanids, 147 Kazakhs, 151 Khadīja, 93 khalq al-af ʿāl, 11 Khān-i Zamān, 198, 210 khās. s. (specific), 24 Khāwand Mah. mūd (Naqshbandī shaykh), 197 Khawārij, 150 Khazars, 151 Khid. r, 203, 204 khit. āb (God’s discourse/divine discourse), 24, 28, 48 Khurāsān, 94, 150 Khurramiyya, 150 Khwārazm, 20, 172 al-Khwārazmī, 98 Khwārazmshāh, 172 al-Kindī, 2, 86 King of the Jinn, 105, 106, 110, 112 Kirmān, 150 King, David, 178 Kingdom of Heaven, 94 knowledge, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83, 87, 99, 101, 102, 104, 105, 112, 113, 152, 157, 164, 165, 166, 170, 178, 204, 207 Kraemer, Joel, 66, 67 Kramer, Martin, 66 Krishna, 202 Kufan school, 97 al-Kūhīn al-ʿAt.t.ār, 173 Kulturkreis, 66

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

Laban, 92 Lahore, 176 Lane-Poole, Stanley, 91 Last Day, 89

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252

Universality in Islamic Thought

Late Antiquity, 66, 67, 168 Latin, 146, 206 law, 8, 15, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 43, 44, 48, 50, 51, 52, 54, 152, 158 lawgiver, 38, 41, 47, 48, 103 lawgiver prophet, 83, 87 legal actor (mukallaf), 28, 35 legal acts (ahliyyat al-adā’), 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 51, 52, 53 legal discourse (khitāb), 35, 49, 50 legal methodology, 27 legal norms, 25, 38, 42 legal obligations, 30 legal personality (dhimma), 2, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 43, 49, 53 legal preference (istih. sān), 53 legal scholar, 171 Levi Della Vida, Georgio, 67 Levonian, Lootfy, 93 Libyans, 148 linguistics, 158 logic, 1, 103, 152, 169, 178 London, 115 love, 15 lut. f (incentive), 11, 17 Machin, 153 macrocosm, 204 Madelung, Wilferd, ix, 2 Magian/s, 8, 208 magic, 5, 92, 100, 149, 152, 194, 204, 206, 207, 214 magic squares, 176 magical arts, 206 magical operations, 206 magical papyri, 207 magical phenomena, 208 magical practices, 205, 207 magician, 205 magicians, 205 Maghrib, 150 Maghribis, 148 Mahdi, Muhsin, 75, 76, 84, 85 Mah. mūd Gāwān, 198 Mah. mūd of Ghazna, 18, 194 Mah. mūd of Gujarat, 197 Maimonides, Moses, 172; see also Mūsā ibn Maymūn Majnūn and Layla, 201 al-Majrīt.ī, Maslama, 114 Majūs, 150; see also Zoroastrians

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

Makdisi, George, 65, 67, 96, 98 Makka, 7 Makrān, 150 maktab, 96, 104 Mālik, 93 Mālikī, 170 Mālikī school, 38 Mālikīs, 39, 40, 47 Mamluk, 47, 174, 175 al-Ma’mūn (caliph), 159 Ma’mūn ibn Ma’mūn, 172 mankind, 69, 88, 109 mantras, 204, 205, 207 Maqdisī, 3, 149, 150 Maragha, 161, 165, 174 Mars, 72 Mashhūrāt, 20 al-Masīh. ī, Abū Sahl, 172 al-Masīh. ī, Shams al-Dawlah, 171 Masʿūdī, 3, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151 mathematics, 77, 89, 102, 151-2, 167 mathematical astronomy, 177 mathematical modeling, 179 mathematical sciences, 89, 99, 100 Mattā ibn Yūnis, 5 Māturīdī school, 47 Māturīdism, 46 Mawlawī Ikrām ʿAlī, 105 Māzandarān, 172 measles, 160 Mecca, 94; see also Makka mechanics, 179 medical, 163, 166, 171, 175 medical activities, 178 medical sciences, 101 medical theory, 170 medicine, 149, 152, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 177, 206 Medina, 7 Mediterranean, 66, 67 Megasthenes, 195 Mehmet the Conqueror, 207 Memphis, 206 meningitis, 160, 161 Mercury, 72 Meri, Josef, x Mesopotamia, 168 Metaphysical, 201 metaphysics, 103 meteorology, 101

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Index Michael the Syrian, 146 microcosm, 74, 204 Middle Ages, 67 Midgley, Mary, 157, 158 Midrash, 91, 92 mih. na/h (inquisition, testing), 159 mineralogy, 101 Mongol, 196, 200, 201 Mongol Empire, 152, 153 Mongol era, 200 Mongols, 200 Monophysites, 91 monotheism, 5, 149, 194, 208, 214 monotheist Gentiles, 16 monotheist theologians, 10 monotheistic Indians, 197 monotheistic religions, 75, 179 monotheistic Sabians, 207 Moon, 72, 107, 166, 167 moral justice, 110 Morony, Michael, 3 Mosaic law, 16 Moses, 86, 90, 93, 203, 211, 212, 213 mosque/s, 174, 205, 213 mubayyan (clearly explained), 24 Mughal, 196, 199, 200 Mughal ecumenical empire, 200 Mughal era, 199, 200 Mughal period, 4, 5, 198 Mughals, 200, 201 Muh. ammad, 1, 8, 9, 86, 88, 90, 147, 150, 171, 199 Muh. ammad Sharīf [b.] Niz. ām al-Dīn Ah. mad b. al-Harawī, 199, 200 Muʿīn al-Dīn, 198 al-Mujāhid, 97 mujbira (compulsionists), 16 mūjib (obligating instance), 28 mujmal (polysemous), 24 al-mukhāt. abun (those subject to the law), 24 Munkar, 111 Muqaddasī, Abū l-H . asan ʿAlī b. Sulaymān, 17 muqallaf (legal actor), 35 Muqammis. , David, 16 al-Muqtadī, 172 Murjiyya, 150 Mūsā ibn Maymūn (Maimonides), 20, 172 Mushabbahat (anthromorphists), 150

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

253

music, 102, 103, 152 Muslim, 1, 2, 5, 7–11, 16, 21, 36, 70, 78, 79, 97, 98, 110, 112, 146, 147, 150, 153, 170– 5, 179, 193, 196, 199, 200, 202, 205, 207 Muslim Aristotelians, 1–2 Muslim authors, 194, 209 Muslim community, 83, 96, 148 Muslim doctors, 174 Muslim education, 96 Muslim evening prayer, 205 Muslim geographers, 149 Muslim graveyard, 205 Muslim historians, 147 Muslim Indology, 200 Muslim intellectuals, 197 Muslim jurists, 36 Muslim magicians, 205 Muslim mystics, 194 Muslim philosophers, 19, 104, 194 Muslim physician, 171, 173 Muslim physicians, 169, 175 Muslim provincialism, 202 Muslim rulers, 193 Muslim sects, 199 Muslim scholars, 19, 169, 172, 173 Muslim society, 106, 110, 113 Muslim Spain, 168 Muslim thinkers, 98, 193, 208, 214 Muslim thought, 1 Muslim world, 147, 150 Muslim writers, 193, 214 Mustaʿlī-T. ayyibīs, 67 Mutakallimūn, 16 Muʿtazila, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 116, 150; see also People of Justice and Unity Muʿtazilī, 3, 10, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 27 Muʿtazilī historian, 150 Muʿtazilī kalām, 21 Muʿtazilī rationalism, 19, 76 Muʿtazilī thought, 2, 12, 16, 20, 21 Muʿtazilite, 170 Muʿtazilite rationalism, 115 Muʿtazilites, 162 al-Mut.īʿ l-llāh, 150 muwaqqit (timekeeper), 174 mystical, 201, 205 mystical infidelity, 208 mystical inversion, 208 mystics, 75

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254

Universality in Islamic Thought

Nakīr, 111 Nāla and Damayānti, 201 Naqshbandī, 197 Naqshbandī Sufis, 198 nas. s. (revealed texts), 25 Nāth jogis, 203 natural phenomena, 199 natural philosophers, 163 natural philosophy, 152, 177 natural religion, 150 natural science, 170 natural sciences, 89, 100, 101 natural world, 4 Nauʿī, 209 Near Eastern fables, 201 necessity (d. arūrah), 162 neo-Mongol, 200 Neo-Muʿtazila, 21 Neoplatonic cosmology, 77, 112, 113 Neoplatonic meditations, 207 Neoplatonic metaphysics, 201 Neoplatonic philosophy, 197 Neoplatonic system, 98 Neoplatonism, 68, 70 Neopythagoreanism, 70 Nestorian/s, 91 Nestorian Christian community, 172 Netton, I. R., 91, 93 neutrality, 4 Nimrod, 92 Nimrod’s son, 91 niyya (intent), 32 Niz. ām al-Dīn Ah. mad, 199 Niz. āmī-i ʿArūd. ī, 172 Noah, 16 non-Arab kings, 150 non-Muslim, 8, 10, 36, 193 non-Muslim cultures, 209 non-Muslim religions, 149 non-Muslims, 1, 3, 16, 35, 43, 208 non-prophetic religions, 12 North Africa, 68, 168 Nubians, 151 nut. q, 9 obedience, 3, 45 obligating instance (mūjib), 28 obligation, 2, 3, 10, 11, 24, 27– 30, 32–8, 40– 54 obligatory act, 50

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

observation, 4, 158, 179 observatory, 174, 175, 176 occult sciences, 205 occult techniques, 205 ocular surgery, 161 Old Testament, 91 omnipotence, 12, 179 omnipotence of God, 169 ophthalmological literature, 161 ophthalmological manuals, 176 ophthalmology, 161 oppression, 12, 14 optics, 158, 161 oratory, 152 Orient, 209 Oriental Translation Fund, 197 Orientalism, 66 Orientalism, colonial, 197 Orientalists, European, 194 Origen, 214 original sin, 15 Ottoman, 164, 207 pagan, 170, 173, 200, 207 paganism, 214 Palestine, 93 Pandavas, 202 Paradise, 79, 111 Paris, 115 Parthians/Arsacids, 147 Passive Intellect, 85 Patañjali, 195, 196 Perfect Human, 73, 201 People of Justice and Unity, 2; see also Muʿtazila People of the Book, 149, 193 Persia, 16, 109, 193, 199, 211 Persian, 68, 94, 95, 112, 153, 157, 164, 175, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 213 Persian authors, 208 Persian Empire, 146 Persian kingdom, 147 Persian literature, 95, 201, 209 Persian poetry, 208, 211 Persian script, 204 Persianate culture, 203 Persians, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152 personal debt (dayn fī dhimma), 32 personal obligation (wājib fī dhimma), 32

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Index Pharaoh, 93, 214 pharmacopoeia, 173 philosopher, 85, 86, 87, 199, 207 philosopher king, 113 philosophers, 1, 2, 19, 20, 75, 89, 95, 99, 106, 152, 153, 199 philosophical angelology, 200 philosophical doctrines, 196, 207 philosophical sciences, 78, 99, 100 philosophy, 19, 21, 78, 86, 87, 91, 102, 116, 147, 149, 152, 158, 163, 198 physical sciences, 99, 101, 103, 152 physical universe, 158 physician, 152, 170, 171, 172, 174 physics, 89, 103, 158, 170 physiology, 161 Picatrix, 114, 206, 207 pilgrimage, 45, 87, 94 Pirenne, Henri, 66 planetary deities, 207 planetary spirits, 199, 206, 207 planets, 166, 167, 207 Plato, 19, 76, 77, 84, 85, 94, 113, 169, 207 Platonic philosophy, 95 Platonism, 68 Plotinus, 70, 78, 86, 196 poetry, 152 political ethics, 5, 214 political philosophy, 75, 79 political science, 103, 152 political theory, 76, 79, 198 political treatise, 197 politics, 101 polytheistic, 174 Poonawala, Ismail, 3 Pope Benedict XVI, 9 Pope Paschal II, 15 positive law, 76 post-Ghazālian era, 176 practical sciences, 100 prayer, 90 prayer times, 168 precession of the equinoxes, 159 predestinarian, 8, 14, 15 pre-Islamic, 196, 207, 209 Prime Matter, 71, 72 probability, 178 Proclus, 207 prophecy, 76, 79, 81, 82, 86, 97, 194, 214

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

255

prophet/s, 1, 7, 9–11, 74, 80–3, 86, 88–9, 93, 95, 104, 111, 146, 150, 153, 166, 171, 205, 212 Prophet, 8, 26, 37, 38, 75, 83, 88, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 102, 105, 111, 169, 205 Prophet Muh. ammad, 7, 8, 94, 204 Prophet’s uncle, 106 prophethood, 7, 9, 82, 88 Prophetic medicine (al-t. ibb al-nabawī), 4, 169, 175 prophetic revelation, 10, 11 Protestant, 14 Psalms, 90 Pseudo-Majrit.ī, 206 psychological sciences, 101 psychological themes, 106 psychology, 89 Ptolemy, 4, 159, 161, 162, 168 Ptolemaic astronomy, 161, 165, 176 Ptolemaic treatises, 159 Punjab, 210 Puranic, 202 pure reason, 19 Pythagoras, 94, 116 Pythagoreanism, 68 qad. ā’ (substitute action/act), 32, 35, 48, 51, 52 qadar (God’s determinism), 162, 176 Qadariyya, 11, 199 qād. ī, 163, 205 Qirqisānī, Yaʿqūb, 16 qiyās (analogy), 24, 25, 81, 159, 170 quasi-Orientalist, 209 Qur’ān, 8, 9, 11, 14, 18, 19, 26, 73, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 97, 106, 107, 110, 111, 113, 146 Qur’ānic, 88, 109, 204, 205 Qur’ānic exegesis, 97, 99 Qur’ānic texts, 193 Quraysh, 7, 94 al-Qurt.ubī, Abū ‘l-Qāsim Maslama b. alQāsim b. Ibrāhīm, 114 Qust.ā ibn Lūqā, 1 Rabbanite, 16 Radtke, Bernd, 147 Ragep, Jamil, 178 rah. īm, 205 Rām, 205 Ramad. ān, 41, 45, 48, 49, 54 Rashīd al-Dīn, 4, 146, 152, 153, 154, 196

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256

Universality in Islamic Thought

rational, 9, 110 rational faculty, 83, 85, 86, 104 rational knowledge, 9, 14 rational mind, 2, 154 rational sciences, 197 rational theology, 2, 9 rational tradition, 75 rational truths, 10 rationalism, 1, 2, 3, 9, 16, 69, 76 rationalist, 3, 150 rationalistic, 5, 196, 197 rationalists, 77 rationality, 9 ra’y, 96 Rayy, 16 al-Rāzī, Abū Bakr Muh. ammad b. Zakariyyā, 79, 86, 160 al-Rāzī, Abū H . ātim Ah. mad, 80 Rāzī, Amīn ibn Ah. mad, 209 al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, 14 reason, 1, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 46, 49, 52, 68, 75, 76, 77, 87, 88, 109, 112, 113, 116, 150, 177 Rechtsfaehigkeit, 29 Reckoning Day, 111 reincarnation, 196 religion, 1, 2, 4, 9, 14, 19, 34, 45, 69, 70, 75, 78, 88, 91, 110, 113, 150, 153, 154, 171, 174, 177, 178, 193, 194, 197, 200, 203, 208, 211, 212, 214 religions of India, 193, 195, 214 religious authorities, 202 religious beliefs, 176 religious communities, 76 religious confessions, 167 religious endowments, 174 religious institutions, 201 religious obligations, 152 religious observances, 87 religious politics, 200 religious practice, 208 religious reality, 115 religious scholar, 163, 169 religious sciences, 96, 97, 100, 103 religious specialists, 202 religious tolerance, 3, 69, 88, 89 religious validity, 214 Renaissance, 66 Resurrection, 81 revealed scriptures, 75, 112

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

revelation, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 75, 76, 77, 82, 87, 88, 100, 113, 116, 164, 177 rights, 33, 34, 37 ritual, 36, 207, 209 ritual act, 51 ritual acts, 3, 36 ritual obligation, 32 ritual obligations, 45, 54 ritual prayers, 87 ritual purity, 87 Roman Empire, 147 Roman history, 147 Romans, 146, 148, 151, 152 roots of the jurisprudence, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 37, 38, 39, 54; see also us. ūl al-fiqh Rukn al-Dīn Mah. mūd b. al-Malāh. imī, 17; see also Ibn al-Malāhimī Rūm, 150, 152; see also Byzantium Rūmī, Jalāl al-Dīn, 211, 212, 213, 214 Russians, 151 Saʿādiya al-Fayyūmī, 16; see also Saʿadiya Gaon Saʿadiya Gaon, 16 S. ābian, 170, 173 S. ābian scholars, 149, 152 S. ābians, 89, 149, 152, 193, 207 Sabra, A. I., 158, 178 Sābūr ibn Sahl, 173 Sachau, 196 sacrifices, 94 Saʿdī, 208 al-S. afadī, 115 al-S. āh. ib b. ʿAbbād, 16 Sahl b. Fad. l al-Tustarī, 17 S. āʿid al-Andalusī, 4, 150, 151, 152 Saʿīd ibn Hibat Allāh, 172 Saladin, 172, 173 Saliba, George, 160, 161, 178 Salmān, 93 salvation, 15, 193, 212, 214 Samaritan, 172 Samarqand, 23, 47, 48, 49, 55, 161, 176 Samarqandī, 51 Samarqandī H . anafīs, 47 Samarqandī school, 49 Samarqandīs, 48 al-Samarqandī, ʿAlā’ al-Dīn, 50 Samuel ben Hofnī Gaon, 16 Sanskrit, 196, 200, 201 Sanskrit epics, 203

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Index Sanskrit “gods” (deva), 196 Sanskrit pandits, 201 Sanskrit romances, 201 Sanskrit seed mantra, 205 Sanskrit texts, 5, 194, 196, 200 Sanskrit works, 195, 201 Sanskritic phrases, 204 Saracins, 147 al-Sarakhsī, Abū Bakr b. Muh. ammad, 23, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 44, 46, 47, 48 Sarandīb, 94 Sasanian, 147 Sasanian kings, 147 Sasanids, 147 Satan, 81, 214 sati, 209 Saturn, 72 Savage-Smith, Emilie, 4 scholars, 166, 173, 177, 178, 199, 201 scholastic philosophy, 199 scholastic theology, 75; see also kalām scholasticism, 65, 67 science, 4, 5, 9, 69, 77, 78, 88, 89, 99, 101–4, 112, 145, 147, 149, 151, 152, 157, 158, 160, 162–5, 171, 175–8, 194, 206 science of magic, 206 science of medicine, 165 science of religion, 165 scientific, 158, 162, 163, 166, 171, 174, 175, 178, 179 scientific activities, 178 scientific activity, 175 scientific arts, 177 scientific concepts, 170 scientific discourse, 176 scientific ideas, 167 scientific issues, 173 scientific laws, 158 scientific method, 170 scientific speculation, 177 scientific thought, 115 scientific treatises, 175 scientists, 75, 166, 176, 177, 178, 179 scripture, 9, 10, 65, 90, 103 sects, 195 sectarian allegiances, 174 sectarian fighting, 202 secular sciences, 152, 154 self-immolation, 209 Shabistarī, Mah. mūd, 208

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

257

al-Shādhilī, S. adaqah ibn Ibrāhīm, 162 al-Shāfiʿī, Muh. ammad b. Idrīs, 30, 53 Shāfiʿī, 25, 26, 27, 170 Shāfiʿī law school, 30 Shāfiʿī scholar, 170 Shāfiʿī scholars, 38, 39, 40 Shāfiʿī school, 39, 53, 169 Shāfiʿīs, 19, 40, 47 al-Shahrastānī, 195 al-Shahrazūrī, 115, 198 Shams al-Dīn, 198 Sharafiyya, 199 Sharāsīm, 207 sharīʿa, 8, 78, 82, 87, 99 al-Shāshī, Niz. ām al-Dīn, 23, 37, 41, 42, 44 Shat.t.ārī, 197 Shat.t.ārī, ʿAbd al-Nabī, 198 Shat.t.ārī Sufi, 199 Shboul, Ahmad, 148 Shīʿa, 20, 150 Shīʿī, 170, 174 Shīʿī doctrine, 113 Shīʿī faith, 113 Shīʿī imāmate, 113 Shīʿī-Ismāʿīlī, 116 Shīʿīs, 20 Shiraz, 197 al-Shīrāzī, Abū Ishāq, 27, 39, 40 al-Shīrāzī, Qut.b al-Dīn, 162 s. īghāt (linguistic forms), 26 Sijistān, 150 Al-Sijistānī, Abū Sulaymān, 114 sin, 45 s. ināʿah (art, craft), 157 Sincere Brethren, 93; see also Ikhwān alS. afā’ Sindh, 198 Sindis, 211 sinner, 10, 32 Sīrafī, 5 Sīstān, 149 siyāsa, 80 Sizgorich, Thomas, 66 Slavonians, 151 Slavs, 148, 151 smallpox, 160 Socrates, 94 solar apogee, 159 Solomon, 148 Somnath, 208

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258

Universality in Islamic Thought

soul, 72, 84, 86, 89, 90, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100–2, 104, 105 South Asian Sufi tradition, 212 South East Asia, 149 spells (afsūn), 206 sphere of stars, 167 spheres, 72, 77, 89, 101, 167, 170 sphericity of the earth, 167 spiritual beings, 196, 205 Sprenger, Aloys, 105 Spuler, Bertold, ix St Augustine, 15 stars, 82, 89, 101, 108, 168 substitute action/act (qad. ā’), 44, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54 Sudanese, 151 S. ūfī, 9, 95, 112, 193, 197, 203 Sufi doctrine, 201 Sufi leaders, 196 Sufi literature, 208 Sufi metaphysics, 5, 197 Sufis, 5 Sufism, 5, 20, 196, 201, 214 S. ūfiyya, 150 S. uhayb, 93 Suhrawardī, Shihāb al-Dīn, 197, 198, 199 Sun, 72, 107, 168 Sunna, 8, 26, 38, 82, 83, 169 sunna of the Prophet, 24, 25 Sunnī, 113, 170, 174 Sunni law, 38, 40 Sunni law schools, 37, 40 Sunni schools of law, 39 Sunnīs, 29, 50 surgical techniques, 160 al-Suyūt.ī, Jalāl al-Dīn, 169, 170 synagogues, 21 Syncellos, George 146, 147 Syria, 48, 94, 150, 173 Syriac, 146 Syrian, 95, 169, 207 Syrian physician, 170 T. abarī, 147 taʿlīm, 116 talismans, 206 Talmud, 16, 91 Taoists, 200 Tarīmī, ʿImād al-Dīn, 197 Tashköprüzada, 206

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

tawh. īd, 10, 87; see also Unicity of God al-Tawh. īdī, Abū H . ayyān, 67, 114, 115 ta’wīl (hermeneutics), 82 temple, 205, 208 Teukros, 206 Thābit ibn Qurrah, 173 Thaʿlab, 97 Thatta, 198 theodicy, 12, 17 theologians, 8, 27, 103 theological debate, 176 theological orientations, 174 theological schools, 75 theological shift, 196 theological speculation, 177 theology, 9, 27, 103, 110, 152, 162, 165 theurgy, 207 Throne Verse, 205 al-T. ibāwī, ʿAbd al-Lat.īf, 104 al-t. ibb al-nabawī, 169; see also Prophetic medicine Tiberius, 148 Tibet, 150, 153 Tihāma, 94 time, 3, 28, 32, 39, 40, 42, 45, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 90, 101 timekeeper, 174; see also muwaqqit timekeeping, 176, 179; see also cilm almīqāt Timūr (Tamerlane), 200 Tinkālūshā, 206 tolerance, 3, 69, 113, 200 topography, 179 Torah, 16, 89, 90, 91, 107 trachomatous pannus, 160 Transoxania, 26, 29, 34, 48, 49, 50 Transoxanian, 29, 50 Transoxanian H . anafī doctrine, 48 Transoxanian H . anafī model of obligation, 46–7 Transoxanian H . anafī scholars, 42 Transoxanian H . anafīs, 43, 49 Transoxanian jurists, 38 Transoxanian scholars, 35 Transoxanians, 44 Trinitarian beliefs, 174 “true infidelity”, 208 T. umt.um, 206, 207 al-T. ūsī, Nas. īr al-Dīn, 174, 176 Turco-Mongolian peoples, 153

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Index Turkish, 175, 194 Turks, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153 Twelvers, 20 ʿUbayd Allāh Ah. rār, 198 ʿulamā’, 82 Umayyad aristocrats, 208 Umayyad caliphate, 7, 114 ʿumūm (general meaning), 25 unbelief, 10, 19, 36 unbelievers, 8, 11, 13, 14, 36 understanding, 3 Unicity of God, 10; see also tawh. īd uniform motion, 161, 167 union with God, 196 union with the divine, 207 unitarian monotheism, 200 Unitarians, 5, 199 universal, 4, 7, 8, 9, 158, 168, 179, 214 universal Benefactor, 10 universal chronicles, 3 universal concepts, 2 universal concerns, 179 universal history, 145, 146, 151, 153, 154 universal human nature, 2, 8 Universal Intellect, 86 universal justice, 21 Universal Matter, 72 universal morality, 68 universal reason, 2 Universal Soul, 70, 71, 73, 74, 83 universal truth, 115 universalism, 4, 5, 212, 214 universalist, 5, 193, 213, 214 universalist understandings, 193 universalistic, 194 universality, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154 universalizing, 194 universe, 1, 12, 71, 77, 101, 109, 145, 168, 170 al-ʿŪrd. ī, Mu’ayyad al-Dīn, 165, 174 Urdu, 105 us. ūl, 103 us. ūl al-fiqh, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 38, 50; see also roots of the jurisprudence us. ūlī, 23

Bourchier – Universality in Islamic Thought

259

Uyghur, 153 Uzun H . asan, 197 Vedantic metaphysics, 198 Venus, 72 veterinary sciences, 101 Vishnu, 203 visionary prophet, 86 Walzer, Richard, 84, 85 Weltanschaung, 109 Western Europe, 66, 67 world conqueror, 153 world-historian, 196 worship, 11, 44, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 87, 105, 199, 212, 213, 214 al-Yamanī, Shaykh Ah. mad b. Muh. ammad, 105 Yaman, 150 Yaʿqūb (Aq-Qoyunlu ruler), 197 Yemen, 20, 67 yoga, 196, 203, 204 yogic cosmology, 204 yogic physiology, 204 yogic practice, 204 yogic practices, 199, 204, 205 yogic techniques, 207 yogic text, 204 yogini goddesses, 207 yoginis, 205, 206 yogis, 205 Yūsuf al-Bas. īr, 16 z. āhir (apparent meaning), 25 Zanj, 151 Zaqqūm, Tree of, 111 Zayd b. Rifāʿa, 115 Zaydīs, 20 zodiac, 89, 108 zoology, 101 Zoroaster, 95 Zoroastrian, 68, 109 Zoroastrian priests, 149, 150 Zoroastrians, 119, 149, 150, 193, 208; see also Majūs Z. ufār, 53

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