(Un)Civil Democracy: Political Incivility as a Communication Strategy 3031544048, 9783031544040

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(Un)Civil Democracy Political Incivility as a Communication Strategy Sara Bentivegna Rossella Rega

(Un)Civil Democracy

Sara Bentivegna · Rossella Rega

(Un)Civil Democracy Political Incivility as a Communication Strategy

Sara Bentivegna Department of Communication and Social Research University of Rome “Sapienza” Rome, Italy

Rossella Rega Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences University of Siena Siena, Italy

ISBN 978-3-031-54404-0 ISBN 978-3-031-54405-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54405-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Acknowledgements

This volume condenses the outcomes of three years of dedicated research on the topic of incivility. Throughout this journey, we have engaged in insightful discussions with numerous colleagues at conferences, seminars, and various other occasions. We extend our heartfelt thanks to all of them for their valuable contributions. We are also grateful to the referees who provided feedback and suggestions, significantly enhancing the structure and content of this volume. Special recognition is due to Luigino Ceccarini, a friend as much as a colleague, who has always supported our quest to understand the phenomenon of incivility despite the challenges we encountered. Lastly, our appreciation goes to Paolo Mancini, with whom we exchanged ideas and discussed the findings of our research during various meetings with students organised by the University of Perugia.

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Introduction

The Use of Incivility for Good and for Bad The awareness that political incivility is increasingly widespread and harmful to our democracies has been a feature of many reflections on recent political events. Scholars, observers, and citizens share the sense that we are witnessing a progressive barbarisation of politics. When asked for their opinion, citizens express no doubt that political incivility is a serious problem that needs addressing. With this premise in mind, the objective of this book is to examine political incivility as it manifests in contemporary democracies. Let’s be clear from the outset: we are not dealing with a new phenomenon. Numerous and diverse expressions of political incivility have been recorded and reported in the past. Our book’s central thesis revolves around a fundamental shift: incivility has evolved into a strategic asset that diverse public actors now harness to accomplish distinct objectives. These actors are not limited to political representatives. They also include journalists, citizens, social movements, and protest groups. These individuals collectively contribute to the construction of the “political spectacle”. In short, incivility has become a resource to be leveraged, depending on circumstances, to take advantage of opportunities. These opportunities may be political (to prioritise an issue or introduce a new actor into the political landscape), media-related (to gain increased visibility or audience share), or relational (to enhance visibility and centrality

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within an integrated communication ecosystem that now encompasses both legacy and social media). This implies that we deny, or at least downplay, the relevance of incivility, which is often understood merely as an outburst of anger or a momentary loss of control in discursive interaction. Of course, such occurrences can and do happen. However, they are distinct from cases where political actors systematically use incivility to build a persona as candidates opposed to the political establishment. These actors engage in open and perpetual conflict with the media, accusing them of being “fake” because they interpret events in ways they do not like. To simplify, we could say that a nervous outburst is a limited episode that does not define the profile of the actor responsible for it. On the contrary, the second case reflects a deliberate communication strategy that employs crude language, stereotypes, and demonisation of political opponents or other adversaries to reach specific segments of the electorate and position the actor’s political offering. The current high profile of incivility is due precisely to certain actors adopting specific communication strategies aimed at achieving particular objectives. If the value of incivility has undoubtedly increased in recent years, it is due to the numerous transformations that have affected both the political and media systems. At this point, we should clarify that, in our opinion, the spread of political incivility has undoubtedly benefited from the success of digital media, but this is by no means the whole story. It is common to attribute incivility to the advent of social media, but such an interpretation overlooks the profound transformations that have affected society as a whole. Before exploring these transformations, it is important to define what political incivility is. The most recent reflections on political incivility all start from the recognition that, like many others relating to contemporary political life, it is a slippery concept. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that incivility is fundamentally characterised by a disregard for the established social and cultural norms dictating personal interactions, as well as those dictating the operation of democratic systems. In essence, it encompasses the transgression of both the norms concerning civil interpersonal conduct and those governing societal affairs, where the exchange and contention of varying viewpoints are expected to occur in recognition of/respect for democratic principles. Viewed as a strategic resource, political incivility has been significantly encouraged by well-known phenomena such as polarisation and populism.

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These are expressed through a media ecosystem in continuous transformation due to the platformisation and hybridisation of communication. In various ways, these phenomena contribute to the production and diffusion of “moments of incivility”, creating conditions for the emergence of in-group versus out-group divisions, distancing from the elites, and identification with the people through the use of raw and direct language. These developments occur in an environment where attempts to gain visibility rely on provocation, evoking emotions in users, the logic of algorithms, and interconnections between media platforms, resulting in a continuous feedback loop. The idea that we live in an increasingly polarised society is difficult to dispute, as evidenced by the vehemence and bitterness that characterise public discussions of political disagreements. It is almost impossible to remain unaware of the depth of feeling surrounding issues such as Brexit, Europe, pandemic containment measures, vaccines, the conflict in Ukraine, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, and more, all of which are highly publicised and used by actors to create real divisions among groups. The heterogeneity of the themes around which divisions are created and articulated demonstrates that ideological polarisation has given way to affective polarisation, expressed primarily in terms of out-group animosity or negative feelings towards the other (out-group animus ). These negative feelings are often expressed through incivility, including insults, exclusion of others, ridicule, and stereotyping of individuals and groups. In-group versus out-group conflict is evident in all types of political communication, whether it involves political leaders, citizens engaged in social media discussions, or radio and television talk show hosts and their guests. Common to all these scenarios is the presence of mutual distrust, where the possibility of dialogue with the other is excluded. In the dynamics of polarisation, maintenance of a social identity is the overriding concern, strengthening citizens’ affiliations with the groups they identify with and their rejection of those who think differently. This binary conflict, characterised by adherence to one’s own group and the exclusion of others, takes on tribal characteristics, providing fertile ground for the emergence and proliferation of incivility. It also shapes citizens’ information consumption habits, leading them to seek confirmation of their own beliefs while avoiding information that challenges them. Populism, in turn, amplifies the value of incivility in contemporary societies. Political leaders perpetually seek direct contact with voters, aiming to portray themselves as authentic representatives of popular sentiments,

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elevating their profile, and positioning themselves as champions of the people against the elite. In their quest to distance themselves from the elite and interpret citizens’ feelings of anger and frustration, political leaders resort to colloquial and easily understandable forms of expression, often using direct and vulgar language. In this context, bad manners become key to effective discourse, accepted by both political actors and media operators, who are traditionally drawn to violations of civility norms. The widespread use of these rhetorical techniques leads to the “normalisation of incivility”, spread by both political leaders and citizens. Not only does an aggressive and discriminatory linguistic code become prevalent, but polarising traits that emphasise “us and them” mentalities further complicate the reconciliation of conflicting interests. In short, populism as a communicative style involves the adoption of informal language designed to mirror that of the public, while resorting to aggression and insults designed to delegitimise the role and public image of presumed enemies. Finally, political incivility has been encouraged by changes affecting the infrastructure of social communication. These changes have led to the creation of a hybrid media ecosystem where disintermediation and reliance on algorithms have impacted all aspects of social life and politics, integrating with the practices of legacy media. Platforms that structure information flows through algorithms have established a framework for a new public sphere where participation and efforts to gain visibility rely on politically incorrect language and aggressive, uncivil rhetoric, which is socially rewarded. Simultaneously, the importance of engagement and virality in social media communication rewards provocative content, leading to wider and faster dissemination and increasing the visibility of those who employ incivility. Consequently, platforms accentuate and amplify these actors’ voices, while traditional sources serve as amplifiers, contributing to the spread of incivility. The constant need to occupy space in the attention market by generating engagement and increasing audience shares leads both social media platforms and traditional media to produce, promote, and propagate episodes, expressions, and manifestations of political incivility. In summary, this context creates ideal conditions for the growth of incivility and enables political actors to exploit it in various novel ways. On careful examination, incivility is seen to be useful in at least three respects. Its “expressive” force allows those who use it to gain immediate recognition and visibility. It facilitates “aggregation”, leading actors

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to identify with acts of incivility, adopt them, and unite with others. It enables “mobilisation”, potentially leading to significant forms of political commitment. Those who use incivility for communication do so for a range of purposes, combining these three elements in various ways to achieve different ends. The following chapters present an in-depth analysis of how various actors employ incivility. The first chapter offers a comprehensive examination of the objectives that drive political actors to resort to incivility, including the construction of a personal brand, the affirmation of political identity, the mobilisation of supporters, and, of course, the conquest of visibility in media coverage. Politicians’ outrageous statements or other instances of incivility gain algorithmic power (generating followers, reactions, comments, retweets, and likes) that allows them to dominate media coverage and influence the political agenda. At critical moments, especially when the risk of losing an election is high, political actors can exploit incivility to their advantage due to the resulting visibility. Unfortunately, the use of incivility with the aim of gaining visibility, whether for the leader, the party, or a specific issue, no longer seems restricted to election campaigns or specific political actors. Different is the case of the use of incivility for the building of a personal brand aimed at enabling the immediate recognition of the political actor as one who refuses to conform to the conventions of established political processes. It is not surprising that the recourse to incivility is so widespread in an era when rejection of the so-called technocratic elite, expressions of empathy with voters, manifestations of authenticity, anger, and other emotions have become effective means of generating appeal. Indeed, if populism is viewed as a performative style, the creation of an uncivil brand appears to be a useful way of conveying the rejection of traditional political actors whom voters are tired of and dissatisfied with. Furthermore, resorting to incivility simultaneously allows political actors to emphasise certain defining characteristics for themselves and, consequently, for the subjects they aim to represent electorally. In this context, incivility is used to establish identity ownership, meaning a group identity (related to partisan, ethnic, gender, religious or other affiliations) reflected in the individual identity of the political actor. In short, through incivility, political actors seek to embody, interpret, and sometimes legitimise (as in the case of manifestations of racism) identity traits specific to the groups whose political and electoral support they have or seek to acquire.

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Finally, incivility serves as a potent tool for political actors to mobilise their supporters. These actors call upon their followers to take sides in favour of the in-group and against the out-group, thereby contributing to the classic phenomenon of polarisation. Whether supporters are mobilised in support of or against a particular position is a secondary concern. What truly matters is the strategic deployment of incivility to engage supporters, both through social media and street demonstrations. In the second chapter, our focus shifts to how incivility is employed strategically to craft the “spectacle of politics”. This endeavour has become increasingly intricate due to the rapid proliferation of information sources and the subsequent intensification of competition for attention. In this context, incivility functions as a valuable tool for capturing specific audience segments. This includes individuals driven by confirmation bias who engage with partisan media, actively seeking content that aligns with their preexisting beliefs. The resulting polarised communication mirrors the division seen in contemporary public discourse. It is fuelled by the same dynamics of in-group versus out-group interactions, manifested through insults, delegitimisation, stereotyping, and the exclusion of those with differing viewpoints. These practices are conspicuous in both traditional media and digital platforms, with the common purpose of presenting biased interpretations designed to reinforce a sense of belonging or exclusion. However, incivility is not limited to constructing biased interpretations. It also serves those, such as talk show hosts striving to boost their audiences or enhance their visibility on social media platforms that reward emotionally engaging content. What these cases share is a recurring narrative structure centred on radicalisation, simplification, and the stark contrast between opposing positions. Staged conflicts, spanning from verbal attacks to physical confrontations in face-to-face encounters, revolve around emotionally charged and deeply divisive themes. The construction of a narrative depicting politics as contentious and uncivil aims to capture and retain larger portions of the audience. As individuals accustomed to the logic of social media platforms engage with these shows by commenting on TV programme clips on their personal social media accounts, they further contribute to the ongoing spectacle. The third chapter explores how citizens use incivility in a context marked by political polarisation and the accelerated proliferation of emotional storytelling facilitated by digital platforms. People often perceive incivility as a “low-cost” communication tool that is easy to use

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and potentially accessible to everyone. While they may not always employ incivility strategically or with full awareness of its potential consequences, citizens play a crucial role in constructing the “spectacle” of incivility, which operates on three main levels. Firstly, at the individual level, adopting aggressive language and disseminating conspiratorial content or views that reflect disdain for democratic institutions are means through which citizens can increase their visibility and public notoriety. Secondly, incivility can foster a sense of community among like-minded individuals and generate animosity towards opposing groups. Among enthusiasts of vehement styles of political discourse characterised by negativity, binary mindset, and intolerance, incivility serves as a powerful tool for bringing people together, encouraging interaction, promoting emulative behaviour, and fostering complicity. The third level involves citizens using incivility as a form of genuine political engagement. In these cases, opponents are no longer merely objects of derision or the basis for collective pastimes within the in-group. Instead, they become actual adversaries to be challenged and defeated. Often, mobilisation against them takes place in response to appeals from political leaders, highlighting the fact that the deliberate use of incivility by charismatic politicians can mobilise people against perceived enemies and fuel highly corrosive forms of conflict. Ultimately, incivility can become a weapon in the hands of marginalised groups or individuals who lack other means of making their voices heard. The fourth chapter explores how breaking established rules and violating norms of civility can serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, it can bring a specific issue to public attention. On the other, it can underscore that these rules are biased, unfair, and not universally shared. For instance, groups in power often use the norms of civility to stifle protest and delegitimise those who attempt to oppose them. Consider instances of incivility in public discussions about racial discrimination in both the United States and Europe. Incivility, conveying a recognisable symbolic and rebellious message due to its expressive value, can become a test of political agency for citizens, demonstrating empowerment and serving as a corrective to a lack of rights. Examining incivility as a tool of struggle and its ripple effects on authorities and society reveals two interrelated mechanisms. On the one hand, incivility appears promising for those expressing dissenting or marginalised views within formal institutional settings, seeking to assert their rights and promote greater political and social inclusion. On the other, accusations of incivility can be an effective tactic for established

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groups seeking to maintain existing power asymmetries and stigmatise those attempting to rebel. The fifth chapter considers the consequences and risks associated with the proliferation of uncivil practices in the political sphere. While these practices may be strategic for the actors employing them, the same cannot be said for democracy as a whole. Although establishing causal relationships between variables is a complex task, especially when it comes to the impact of incivility on democracy, the last chapter attempts to highlight what appear to be some of incivility’s consequences. To begin with, a public discourse dominated by incivility can contribute to a spiral of cynicism and political disaffection. This manifests as citizens progressively distance themselves from politics and democratic engagement. Additionally, exposure to political discourses that delegitimise others and violate democratic principles may foster the growth of anti-deliberative and polarised attitudes among citizens. This, in turn, amplifies aversion towards those with differing opinions. Moreover, the disregard for others, in combination with the rules governing social life implicit in uncivil acts, can erode democratic traditions based on dialogue among proponents of competing viewpoints. A lack of respect for others and the delegitimisation of actors and institutions, such as party leaders and legislatures, risk destabilising democracy. This places the issue of incivility among the most urgent matters currently requiring attention.

Contents

1

Politicians and the Attractions of Incivility Incivility as an Intentional Choice Brand(ish)ing Incivility Performance of Identity Politics Incivility and Negative Partisanship Bibliography

1 2 6 11 15 18

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The Media Industry of Incivility High-Choice Environment vs Limited Attention Span Polarised Media for a Polarised Audience Constructing the “Uncivil Spectacle” Why Does Incivility Sell? Bibliography

23 24 28 32 35 38

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Citizens and the Seductive Power of Incivility Incivility: A “Low-Cost” Communicative Resource The “Need to Perform” The “Need to Belong” The “Need to Engage” Bibliography

43 44 47 51 54 59

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Incivility as a Tool for Social Change The Politics of “Dissent” Civility or Politeness? Unequal Power Relations Disguised by Good Manners

63 64 67 xv

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Incivility as a Democratic Weapon of the Powerless The Civility of Incivility: Conceptual and Practical Challenges Bibliography

70 74 78

Incivility and Democracy Why Does Civility Matter? Incivility and Mistrust in Politics Implications of Incivility in Public Discourse “Us” and “Them”: Incivility and Polarisation Bibliography

81 82 85 88 92 94

Index

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About the Authors

Sara Bentivegna (Ph.D.) is Full Professor of Political Communication at University of Rome “Sapienza”. Her current research projects are about political incivility and public debate in a time of disrupted public spheres. Rossella Rega (Ph.D.) is Associate Professor of Journalism and New Media and Media Industry and Strategic Communication at the University of Siena. Her main research interests focus on political communication, incivility, journalism and the public sphere.

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Politicians and the Attractions of Incivility

Abstract This chapter examines the use of incivility by political actors in relation to three primary objectives: building a personal brand, constructing a political identity, and mobilising supporters. First and foremost, it highlights how the use of incivility allows for the immediate recognition of the political actor employing it and, simultaneously, leads to a distinct separation from the traditional political context. Through the frequent deployment of bad manners, emotionalism, and aggression, political leaders redefine their image, distancing themselves from the socalled technocratic elite while also fostering a reconnection with their communities. In the hybrid media system, these mechanisms also enable politicians to increase their media exposure and influence over the media agenda. Second, by facilitating an emotional connection with voters, the use of incivility allows politicians to define a group identity and reinforce a sense of belonging—whether it be social, cultural, or ethnic—for which they become the spokesperson. Finally, we will explore how incivility can function as a lever to mobilise supporters and facilitate various forms of political engagement, both within online platforms and in physical public spaces. Keywords Incivility as a brand · Identity politics · Affective polarisation · Negative partisanship

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Bentivegna and R. Rega, (Un)Civil Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54405-7_1

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Incivility as an Intentional Choice In late May 1856, within the corridors of the United States Senate, a representative of the Democratic Party, Preston Brooks, assaulted Republican Senator Charles Sumner with a walking stick. This brutal attack, resulting in severe physical harm to Senator Sumner, was triggered by a speech he had given in the Senate a few days earlier, advocating for the abolition of slavery in the United States. This incident, prominently featured on the cover of Susan Herbst’s eloquently titled book, “Rude Democracy” (2010), is worth highlighting for its identification of an extreme display of incivility in a distant historical context, often perceived as vastly different from the politics of contemporary times. It also serves as a compelling illustration of the contentious nature of the issues that frequently give rise to or accompany forms of incivility—in this case, the issue of slavery in the United States. In addition to this episode, regarded as a milestone in the discussion on political incivility in democratic regimes, one should not overlook the incident involving Nikita Khrushchev at the UN General Assembly in October 1960. In this case, it was not a physical attack on the representative of another country but rather a demonstration of vehement disagreement with the preceding speech by Khrushchev, who removed his shoe and slammed it on the table. While this action may seem insignificant compared to more recent incidents of incivility, it was perceived as an unprecedented and extraordinary event at the time, given the political figure involved (the then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the location (the glass palace hosting the UN). Once again, this incident has become legendary and has been replicated, with some adaptations, in subsequent years by other actors in different contexts, as we will explore in the following pages. In addition to providing a historical perspective on incivility in politics, these incidents serve as an effective illustration of how incivility can manifest as isolated, emotion-driven acts motivated by anger and aggression. These incidents are clear examples of incivility conceived as a “state” (Herbst, 2010, p. 10), subject to change depending on mood and circumstances, rather than a fixed “trait” established once and for all. Precisely because it is a state, incivility can be activated based on circumstances, functioning as a genuine strategic resource that political actors frequently employ with the intention of achieving specific objectives.

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This is exactly what Sarah Palin did when, as the Governor of Alaska, she found herself nominated for the Vice Presidency of the United States on the Republican ticket with John McCain in 2008. Preceded by the nickname “Sarah barracuda” given to her in the state she governed, her entry into national politics should be remembered for her stated intention to offer a different kind of politics. She sought to present herself as “an authentic representation of ‘real’ America against the ‘lamestream’ media and pretentious, big-city elites, who favor big government and other evils” (Ouellette, 2012, p. 186). Palin constructed this representation through the use of aggressive and emotional rhetoric, leveraging it to attack opponents, mobilise supporters, and garner media coverage. Notably, this characterisation of Palin in terms of incivility, cultivated and strategically exercised over time, stood in stark contrast to McCain’s portrayal as a figure of civility, thereby establishing the well-known “good cop/bad cop” dynamic. While John McCain adopted a restrained and measured style to reassure moderate voters and temper heated sentiments, Sarah Palin played the incivility card to actively engage voters and generate emotional support for the Republican ticket (Herbst, 2010). Her campaign even used slogans like “John McCain. Not Hussein” in reference to the democratic candidate, Barack Obama. Sarah Palin’s strategic use of incivility should not be dismissed as a unique case driven solely by the need for attention and visibility for a relatively unknown candidate. Instead, it serves as a precursor to the support observed on both sides of the Atlantic for political actors, parties, and movements that have made incivility their trademark. Beyond the well-known case of Donald Trump, often referred to as “the Insulter in Chief” (Gastil, 2019), numerous political leaders have strategically embraced incivility. One of the cases most reminiscent of the former U.S. President is Jair Bolsonaro, President of Brazil from 2019 to 2022, renowned for his vehement and aggressive rhetoric, targeting leftwing political opponents, journalists, and the media. His potent campaign aimed to delegitimise these groups and cast doubt on the 2022 presidential election results, which ultimately led to his removal from office. This campaign laid the groundwork for an atmosphere of hostility that engulfed the nation shortly after the inauguration of the winner, Lula da Silva. Bolsonaro’s supporters even stormed the government headquarters in Brasilia on January 8, 2023, in protest of the election outcome. The scenes and images closely resembled the assault on Capitol Hill two years prior, on January 6, 2021, when a large crowd of Trump supporters

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descended on the Capitol buildings, chanting slogans like “We will never give up” and “Stop the steal”. While the event was a useful reminder of the implication’s incivility can have for democratic stability, it is important to highlight Bolsonaro’s skill in crafting an image of himself as an authentic, original, and spontaneous leader, especially through shrewd use of social media (Venturelli et al., 2023). By openly criticising “political correctness”, his populist rhetoric expanded his support among millions of Brazilians weary of institutional decorum and the use of rational argument in negotiations between opposing forces and groups (political parties, LGBTQIA+, indigenous minorities, etc.). Adoption of the so-called bad manners (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014) characteristic of the communicative style of neo-populist formations was in Bolsonaro’s case taken to a level of virulence and misogyny rarely found in the words of his populist counterparts. Noteworthy examples include his comments regarding congresswoman Maria do Rosario, who didn’t deserved to be raped because she was “too ugly”, or those referring to Workers’ Party activists, labelled as “scoundrels”: “Let’s machine-gun the petralhada” (Venturelli et al., 2023, p. 75). However, another individual has pushed the boundaries to similar extremes—Javier Milei, an ultra-liberal and far-right politician, who has exerted significant influence on the political landscape in Argentina since his debut on television in 2016. Milei, a climate-crisis denier who advocates for widespread gun use and opposes abortion, feminism, and sex education in schools, strategically harnessed incivility to craft a compelling public image. He began his journey with a symbolic chainsaw, pledging to reduce public spending, trim the number of ministries, and generally lower the costs associated with what he refers to as the “caste of politicians who steal and are leading the country towards the abyss”. Milei has meticulously constructed his identity, both linguistically and otherwise, in deliberate contrast to the established political order. His communication style adopted a simplified, gut-level language that resonated instantly with voters. One of his more memorable phrases involved advocating that certain politicians needed to be “kicked in the ass”. Essentially, Milei, tapping into social discontent and the electorate’s frustrations, skilfully used bad manners to channel the anger and frustration of countless Argentinians affected by the ongoing economic crisis that had persisted since 2001.

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Europe is not short of examples either. In France, the 2022 Presidential elections witnessed the divisive and aggressive campaign of the farright ultra-conservative Eric Zemmour, often referred to as the “French Trump”. Zemmour, who had been convicted in 2019 for incitement to religious hatred and racial discrimination, intensified political polarisation with his rhetoric. More recently, Poland experienced what The Economist described as a campaign that “set the record for bitterness”1 and animosity among candidates during the September–October 2023 elections. A sharpening of the tone in political discourse is common during election campaigns. However, in Spain—think of Pablo Casado (Partido Popular) or Santiago Abascal (Vox)—in the UK—especially under the leadership of Boris Johnson but not only him—and in Germany—where it is sufficient to recall the combative tones of the representatives of Alternative für Deutschland (“AfD”), the far-right party—expressions of incivility are regularly found even outside such contexts. While we could continue to present additional instances of incivility employed by political actors, both past and present, our primary objective extends beyond this. We aim to identify the underlying objectives of incivility and its use as a strategic tool for achieving specific goals. Before delving into the functions of incivility, it’s crucial to remember that the decision to employ it is based on an assessment of its potential impact on public discourse. It’s evident that when a political actor resorts to incivility, it generates substantial media coverage, positioning both the actor and the associated theme—such as immigration, security, or genderrelated issues—at the forefront of public attention. As we will explore in greater detail in the subsequent chapter, this phenomenon is a reflection of media dynamics and the mobilisation strategies, both in support and opposition, that can be adopted on the Internet by supporters, organised groups, or vocal ordinary users. These actions contribute to the emergence of the swarm effect, which often characterises online discussions. This centrality in the debate, despite the episodic and time-limited nature of incivility, not only grants visibility to the subject but also casts other subjects or themes into the shadows. Returning to the functions of incivility, political actors strategically employ it to:

1 See: https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/10/05/after-a-brutal-campaign-pol and-gets-ready-to-vote.

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a. Cultivate a personal brand that ensures immediate recognition and sets them apart from the traditional political landscape to the extent that their mere mention evokes the Zeitgeist they aspire to represent (Mazzarella, 2019). b. Trigger a process of identification among the electorate by incorporating elements of identity politics (identity politics ) into their communication practices (Kreiss et al., 2020; Wodak, 2021), thus distinguishing themselves from other groups (Achen & Bartels, 2016). c. Galvanise supporters by creating an in-group/out-group dynamic (Herbst, 2010). It is worth noting that these functions are not mutually exclusive and can often overlap, sometimes forming part of broader strategies with different objectives. As we will explore in greater depth below, the functions may evolve over time based on the results achieved and the characteristics of the involved actors. Our central argument is that these three functions collectively account for the widespread adoption of incivility as a strategic tool by numerous actors in the contemporary political landscape.

Brand(ish)ing Incivility In an era when a multitude of actors can participate in public discourse, albeit sporadically and sometimes unintentionally, the quest for visibility is a common goal among many political figures. Whether or not achieving such visibility necessitates resorting to uncivil styles of communication appears to be of little concern to those engaged in self-promotion efforts. Rather, as mentioned previously, incivility represents a strategic resource that can be employed in various circumstances. It is from this perspective that we should interpret the following incidents involving two political representatives who, up to the point at which they resorted to incivility, had not garnered much attention from other political or media figures. The first incident occurred in September 2009 during a joint session of Congress. President Obama’s speech was disrupted by Joe Wilson,2 a Republican representative from South 2 After launching his accusation against President Obama, Joe Wilson apologised, claiming he had let his emotions get the better of him. It was subsequently suggested

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Carolina, who shouted, “You lie!”. This marked the first instance of a U.S. President being interrupted during a congressional address, and this forceful breach of parliamentary decorum was viewed as an “infamous act”. The second incident involved Nathan Miller, a Republican and (at the time) Deputy District Director of the State Board of Equalisation for Riverside County, California. Miller, who had not previously been known for holding radical views or making headlines in the press, gained attention in early August 2016 during one of the most acrimonious election campaigns since the Civil War, as noted by historian Douglas Brinkley.3 Running for re-election in November, Miller posted an image of a masked and bloodied executioner with the text “I’m ready for Hillary” on the official Twitter account of the Riverside County Republican Party (0803-2016). Despite Miller expressing regret for his ill-advised action and resigning amid the ensuing controversies,4 the unprecedented violence of that gesture immediately captured the attention of news outlets, briefly elevating Miller to national notoriety. While the theatricality and virulence of the Californian Republican’s action vaguely resemble other memorable instances of incivility, such as Khrushchev’s almost fifty years earlier, its media impact and symbolic significance cannot be compared to them. In Miller’s case, his action contributed to only a fleeting episode of self-promotion, confined to a brief moment in time and limited to insiders. The aforementioned episodes were exceptional events that increased their perpetrators’ visibility for a limited time, contingent upon the amount of media attention they received. Something similar, mutatis mutandis, to the coveted yet fleeting “15 minutes of fame” that many aspire to. In contrast, the attempt to build a personal brand is distinct. Far from being exhausted in a single event, it involves activating and that the apology was unnecessary, as he had vocalised what millions of Americans were thinking. Remarkably, there was even a substantial flow of financial support from his backers (Gitlin, 2013). 3 See: https://www.kpcc.org/show/airtalk/2016-08-09/history-of-violent-rhetoric-inpresidential-campaigns. 4 Miller’s expression of regret was published by DesertSun: “I regret putting people

at the County Party in a position where they have had to deal with the consequences of my actions. (…) As well as others. It cost me my job, has created a considerable hardship for my family and had emboldened my political opponents”. See https://eu.desertsun.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/08/05/gopoperative-asked-resign-over-hangman-tweet/88318614/.

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deploying a specific framework for interpreting activities attributed to the actor. In such cases, we are dealing with a genuine strategy, often successfully employed by individual political actors and political forces alike, with the intention of establishing stable and immediately recognisable public profiles through the display of forms of incivility. Furthermore, associating an actor with a specific framework aligns with media coverage built on well-established and familiar elements, simplifying the task of narrating and interpreting events related to them. From this perspective, the incivility brand linked to an actor streamlines journalistic efforts in reconstructing related events and simultaneously facilitates interpretation for those engaging with the informational product. But why do political actors adopt brands based on incivility? Before addressing this question, it is important to reiterate that both incivility and civility are strategic resources available to political actors seeking to carve out spheres of visibility and connect with their electorates. If we frame the issue in these terms, we can view civility as equivalent to a tool or a political weapon—a tool intentionally used, for better or worse. In contrast, someone may employ incivility (Herbst, 2010). One classic example of the use of civility to construct a personal brand is that of Barack Obama, who frequently emphasised during election campaigns and his presidential terms that to maintain a healthy democracy, a foundation of civility in our public discourse is essential. This need arises from the fact that it is not feasible to demonise opponents by labelling them as Nazis or socialists, for instance, and then expect to “sit at the same table” and engage in a “serious and rational debate” about what needs to be done. In his words, “such vilification and exaggerated rhetoric close the door to the possibility of compromise”.5 Turning to the use of incivility, one must consider the specific context in which political actors operate. In today’s political landscape, constructing an uncivil brand has become a reflection of the prevailing Zeitgeist , defining the contemporary era as one marked by an allencompassing confrontation between technocratic elites and the people (Moffitt, 2016). Confrontation of this nature is often characterised by the use of language and behaviours considered inappropriate within the political context. In such instances, the adoption of an incivility brand

5 Barack Obama made these remarks during the course of a graduation-day speech at the University of Michigan on 20 May 2010.

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or rhetoric plays a significant role by facilitating the immediate identification of those positioned outside the elite, aligning them closely with the people who share similar rhetorical styles and behaviours (Bratslavsky et al., 2020; Jamieson & Taussig, 2017; Ott, 2017; Ott & Dickinson, 2019). In essence, this approach could be described as a low-fidelity communicative strategy, which results from a dual process. On one hand, it reshapes the leader’s image by frequently emphasising authenticity and empathy. On the other, it helps to recreate a bond between the leader and their community. It’s no surprise that this strategy has gained prominence in the new media landscape. The online environment enables practices like disintermediation and horizontal and vertical interaction, which are fundamental communicative pillars underlying the goal of redefining the politician’s image. This transformation goes beyond mere visibility; it seeks to construct an image that defies the conformism associated with traditional politics and establishes genuine opportunities for contact with voters. The incivility brand effectively serves these purposes by allowing the communication of authenticity and empathy through the adoption of everyday, emotive language, often laced with anger. In short, it enables the creation of a public image that portrays the political actor as distinct from the technocratic elite. If we consider populism as a specific performative political style (Moffitt, 2016), the construction of a personal brand rooted in incivility takes on a clear meaning. Elements such as bad manners, demonisation of opponents, denial of inconvenient truths, and a lack of respect for democratic institutions collectively place those associated with these behaviours outside the realm of traditional politics. In a nutshell, the slogan “no politics as usual” finds another means of expression and interpretation through the incivility brand, appealing to both political actors and the people weary of conventional politics. Turning to the contemporary political context, numerous examples could be cited to illustrate the pervasiveness (both geographically and politically) of this communicative style. Among Italian political forces, the early phases of Beppe Grillo and the Five Star Movement serve as an emblematic case of unabashedly employing incivility as an identifying and distinctive element. Originating as a political entity in stark opposition to the elite, the Movement’s baptism occurred during a public demonstration in Bologna, aptly titled a “Fuck-you Day”, which was a direct challenge to the entire political class. After firmly establishing their otherness, the Five Star Movement continued their ascent to power by

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adopting behaviours aimed at delegitimising political institutions. These actions included theatrically displaying can openers during their inaugural appearance in Parliament, symbolising their intent to figuratively open the seats of power like cans of tuna. They also compiled blacklists of journalists they considered hostile to the Movement and embraced a new language that expressed the anger and discontent of the people. Undoubtedly, these tactics contributed to the Movement’s detachment from traditional politics. Beyond the Italian context, similar instances abound in other European countries characterised by the ascent of right-wing, populist, and anti-system forces. Take, for instance, the Spanish leader of Vox, Santiago Abascal, known for his ad hominem attacks on the then-Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez. Similarly, the Dutch leader of the Party for Freedom (“PVV”), Geert Wilders, the leaders of Germany’s “AfD”, and Marine Le Pen leader of France’s Front National (“FN”), have embraced an aggressive and discriminatory rhetorical style that defies the norms and standards of polite political behaviour (Moffitt, 2016). Their objective of discrediting and delegitimising the “enemies of the people”, primarily the political elites but also “fake news outlets” (Hameleers & Minihold, 2021), and ethnic, religious, or sexual out-groups, finds in the brand of incivility an effective and immediately recognisable form of expression for voters. In this context, the incivility brand serves as an effective and immediately recognisable means of expression for voters. Notably, the Spanish far-right leaders have unleashed aggressive attacks against the left-wing opposition, particularly Pablo Iglesias, resorting to derogatory terms like “jerk” [mamarracho], “son of a bitch” [Hijo de puta], “slob” [guarro], and “son of a terrorist” [hijo de un terrorista] (del Mar Rivas-Carmona, 2023). Similarly, Wilders employs derogatory language to criticise the Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, labelling him a “failed idiot” [faalhaas], “greedy” [gierig], and “big hypocrite” [grote hypocriet] (Hameleers, 2023). The German far-right, “AfD”, sought and obtained visibility through numerous slanders against Angela Merkel (“arrest Merkel”), the media (accused of spreading falsehoods through a “lying press”), and immigrants.6 Its transgressive and provocative rhetoric 6 Former AfD leader, derided the idea that migrants made for a more culturally diverse society, remarking: “What should we make of the campaign ‘Germany is colourful’? A compost heap is colourful, too”. See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/ 06/afd-leader-frauke-petry-criticised-comparing-migrants-compost-germany.

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has been termed a veritable anti-democratic discourse, characterised by an unprecedented mix of intolerance and outrage (Lugosi-Schimpf & Thorlakson, 2021). Beyond Europe, numerous examples illustrate the success of discursive codes aimed at breaking taboos, ranging from Bolsonaro and Milei to Australian far-right leader Pauline Hanson. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the most prominent figure in the realm of incivility has been Donald Trump. The effectiveness of the brand he meticulously constructed is abundantly clear in the following statement, which highlights his unscrupulous use of falsehoods to such an extent that “one of the most reliable predictors of truth in the contemporary political landscape is that the president has asserted its opposite” (Ott & Dickinson, 2019, p. VIII). The provocative nature of this assertion and its reference to the incivility brand, particularly in the context of Trump deliberately employing falsehoods, is unmistakable and resonates with many. The body of evidence regarding Trump’s triumph in establishing the all-encompassing incivility brand is extensive. One could delve into studies demonstrating his proficiency in transforming political critiques into personal insults (Winberg, 2017) or his capacity to construct a rhetoric of political perversion that contributes to the normalisation of political rudeness (Wodak et al., 2021). Furthermore, his ability to shape politics into a captivating spectacle founded on insult and the demonisation of opponents (Mazzarella, 2019) and his exploitation of reality TV logic rooted in sensationalism, self-promotion, and authenticity (Ott & Dickinson, 2019) have all been documented. However, this is not the appropriate venue for a comprehensive analysis of the Trump brand. Instead, our focus is on underscoring how incivility can serve as a pivotal component in the branding of a political figure. It facilitates personal visibility while simultaneously constructing a communicative style that distinctly sets itself apart from traditional politics. This phenomenon is noteworthy, considering the poor state of health many contemporary democracies.

Performance of Identity Politics In addition to contributing to the construction of a personal brand, incivility plays a vital role in defining certain aspects of a political actor’s identity, which, in turn, shapes the groups from which they seek political-electoral support. Recognising the significance of identity in the relationship between citizens/voters and political actors, as well as in

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voting decisions, is a common thread among scholars of democracy and political communication. Within the realm of democracy scholarship, Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels’ “Democracy for Realists” (2016) provides valuable insights. The two authors begin with a comprehensive critique of the “folk theory” of democracy, which posits a direct connection between well-informed citizens and their voting decisions based on candidates and policies. This perspective aligns with the deliberative concept of democracy and the ideal of the well-informed citizen (Schudson, 1999). However, empirical research reveals that citizens often possess limited information, and their willingness to critically assess policy proposals is frequently lacking (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). So, how do voters make decisions in such a scenario? Achen and Bartels (2016) propose an alternative approach known as the “group theory of democracy”. This theory places social identity at the core of democratic processes, asserting that voters, even the most informed ones, normally make choices not based on policy preferences or ideology but based on who they are—namely, their social identity. These social identities, in turn, shape their way of thinking, what to think, and where to place themselves in the party system. According to this perspective, citizens understand which social groups different parties represent and develop their political identities based on their proximity to or distance from these groups. Lilian Mason (2018) concurs with this viewpoint, asserting that the two major parties in the United States now represent distinct groups. This has spawned a process of “social sorting”, where citizens express their electoral preferences based on their social identities. Research on social sorting over the past four decades has revealed that “Democrats are now firmly aligned with identities such as liberal, secular, urban, low-income, Hispanic, and Black. Republicans are now solidly conservative, middle class or wealthy, rural, churchgoing, and white” (ibid., p. 26). The recognition of a connection between electoral preference and social and political identity by voters entails political actors taking actions aimed at reinforcing the identities they represent. Continuing along this line of thought but shifting to the communicative side, some scholars argue that “much political communication can be seen as the performance of identity ownership” (Kreiss et al., 2020, p. 3). This phenomenon closely resembles the concept of issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996), which involves the association of specific themes with political actors based on

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their ability to address issues effectively (e.g., welfare or security). Furthermore, it has been highlighted that political actors “construct and perform prototypical group identities around partisan affiliations, racial and ethnic identities, genders, religious affiliations, and personal values and tastes” (Kreiss et al., 2020, p. 2). Incivility is sometimes employed in the development of such prototypes, as can be observed in many recent international political events. Examples from recent international political events allow for a closer look at this phenomenon. Once again, Donald Trump provides a clear example of how incivility can be used strategically to assert and reaffirm identity ownership. One notable incident occurred in July 2019 when Trump used multiple tweets to attack four Democratic Congresswomen whom he accused of opposing the construction of the Mexican border wall. In these tweets, he spread false information about their nationalities, claimed that the congresswomen were not American citizens, and suggested they should “go back” to their countries of origin, which he described as “completely failed and crime-infested places”, and cease dictating American government actions. This episode encompasses various aspects of incivility prevalent in contemporary American politics, including the use of falsehoods to support one’s positions, racial discrimination, stereotyping of other countries, and exclusion of others from political debate. While the effects of this communicative performance on the public will be explored later, it’s important to focus on Trump’s intent at this stage. His intent can be interpreted as a decision “to be offensive in order to construct a particular kind of identity, one that would appeal to some sectors of the public” (Wodak et al., 2021, p. 374). Specifically, Trump aimed to appeal to segments of the public expressing so-called white rage (Ott & Dickinson, 2019), individuals who identify as white, working-class, religious, and believe that America has been in decline for years. These groups harbour frustration towards ongoing societal changes, apprehension about the future, and nostalgia for a past characterised by employment opportunities, strong family bonds, and a societal hierarchy where minorities and foreigners had well-defined roles outside and below the established social order (Wodak, 2021). In targeting the four Democratic Congresswomen, Trump merely followed through on his 2016 Republican Party Convention declaration: “There are forgotten men and

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women in our country. People who work hard but no longer have a voice. I will be your voice”.7 Moving beyond the American context, similar attention to the issue of identity can be observed in the rhetoric of many leaders of farright political movements. For instance, consider Giorgia Meloni and her speech titled “Italian Pride”,8 Eric Zemmour, the founder of the ethno-nationalist party La Reconquête, or Viktor Orbán, who frequently emphasises national pride through images posted on Instagram along with slogans like “Greater Hungary” or “The homeland above all” (Szebeni & Salojärvi, 2022). In these instances, the construction of patriotic sentiment goes hand in hand with a staunch defence of borders, culture, national products (from food to sports), race (e.g., “Italians first”), and religion (e.g., “Christian identity”). The exaltation of national identity (“us”) is often accompanied by attacks against those who do not conform to this framework. Foreigners, immigrants, and Muslims often become the primary targets of various forms of discriminatory incivility (Bentivegna et al., 2022). What is common among these leaders is the use of derogatory stereotypes against these targets, often labelling them as drug dealers, thieves, or criminals. Expressions like “ethnic replacement” or “great replacement” are also employed. Consequently, these figures not only highlight the traits and values of groups defending the interests of the “natives” against foreigners but also provide a voice and representation to concerns shared by substantial segments of the population. According to the identity ownership approach, these segments often feel marginalised and forgotten by progressive and pluralistic political culture. Many more examples could be recalled to support the notion that political actors frequently use incivility to perform identity ownership. It is important to note that political incivility is just one of the many elements contributing to the construction of such group identities. Nevertheless, it is increasingly prevalent in shaping prototypes of group identity, substantiating the idea that politics often requires incivility to define its own

7 Donald Trump’s speech to the 2016 Republican Convention is available at https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=va9ilyjMyik. 8 The speech—given by Giorgia Meloni in the Piazza del Popolo in Rome on 19 October 2019—ended with a call to defend Italian national identity: “We will defend our identity. My name is Giorgia. I am a woman. I am Italian. I am a mother. I am a Christian. You’ll never take these away from me”; see https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=LPgkWze3bIk.

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characteristics and mobilise citizens. This mobilisation, one could argue, is frequently oriented “against” others, aligning with the traditional ingroup vs. out-group logic that characterises the well-known phenomenon of polarisation.

Incivility and Negative Partisanship Associating incivility with the mobilisation of supporters might initially appear unconventional, but upon closer examination, the connection between these two phenomena becomes clearer, shedding light on the state of contemporary democracies. Linking the mobilising power of incivility to the well-studied phenomenon of polarisation, which has long been a focal point for scholars examining political transformations, reveals important aspects of our argument. However, before delving into the details, it’s crucial to briefly consider the phenomenon of polarisation. Firstly, it’s essential to acknowledge that despite extensive analysis and frequent discussion in both academic and journalistic fields, polarisation is a complex and multifaceted concept with varying definitions and interpretations. One crucial distinction within the polarisation discourse pertains to polarisation among elites and citizens. On the elite front, polarisation is often described as a hardening of political positions, with Democrats shifting towards liberal positions and Republicans towards conservative ones (Mason, 2013). This has significant consequences for the selection of representatives in Congress, the homogenisation of ideologies, and the diminishing presence of moderate voices. On the citizens’ front, polarisation manifests as a similar hardening of positions, but it can lead to different outcomes, including emotional responses. For instance, during the 2020 presidential campaign, nine out of ten voters expressed fear that the victory of a candidate from the other party could cause “irreparable” damage to the United States (Dimock & Wike, 2020). To understand such widespread fear about the victory of a different party, it’s essential to recognise the affective dimension of polarisation (Iyengar et al., 2012), characterised by mutual aversion among members of different groups or political parties. In this manifestation of polarisation, the ideological component often takes a back seat to the point at which, as argued by Liliana Mason in the U.S. context, we encounter “uncivil agreement”, where Americans tend to agree on many issues but simultaneously hold prejudices and harbour anger towards each other (Mason, 2013). Polarisation in this

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sense has the significant advantage that it does not assume ideological polarisation, typical of a bygone era when identification was with a party, but instead assumes the attribution, based on the classic in-group vs. out-group logic, of negative traits to individuals identifying with another group. This profound sense of otherness and distance can even lead to explicit expressions of displeasure at the prospect of one’s son or daughter marrying someone from another political party (Iyengar et al., 2012). In short, the divide is no longer primarily ideological but rather related to group identity and perceived differences from other groups. From this perspective, the role of incivility in constructing communicative rhetoric expressed in emotional and negative terms, used to highlight proximity and distance between individuals, becomes increasingly apparent. Equally evident is the danger of rendering serious and rational debate, as well as reaching agreement through political negotiation (essential pillars of the functioning of Western democracies), nearly impossible. It’s crucial to note that this is not an argument for equating polarisation with incivility; they are distinct phenomena (Mutz, 2007, 2015) involving both elite conflicts and those among citizens, sometimes through a process of mimicry (Gervais, 2017). However, it cannot be denied that the two phenomena often coexist, leading to a substantial body of literature investigating the widespread use of incivility in strongly polarised contexts and its electoral consequences (Geer, 2006; Gervais, 2021; Skytte, 2021). Moreover, in an era marked by the infusion of emotion into public discourse (Davies, 2018), the resort to language that implies authenticity and proximity between the speaker and the listener and the embrace of coarseness in thought and behaviour tend to generate support for one’s own group while fostering the isolation and rejection of other groups. Consequently, there is increasing talk of mobilisation against, rather than for, and the rise of negative partisanship (Caruana et al., 2015), characterised by forms of disdain, rejection, and anti-fandom directed at individuals, as exemplified by Brexit, Trump’s campaigns, and numerous populist parties or movements founded on the rejection of the other (Sandvoss, 2019). In the case of Brexit, those in favour of “Leave” mobilised citizens against the “establishment” and the status quo, with former Prime Minister David Cameron becoming a prime target for forms of incivility and ad hominem attacks throughout the campaign (Usherwood & Wright, 2017). It is no coincidence that Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s rhetoric, following the tumultuous consequences of the Brexit referendum, became increasingly divisive and dangerous. It was marked

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by terms like “cowards and traitors” directed at rivals, insinuations against institutions (“Parliament against the people”), and corrosive invective against parliamentarians attempting to prevent a no-deal Brexit. Johnson even stated that these parliamentarians “should be lined up against a wall and shot for treason” (Brabin & Dromey, 2019). Furthermore, resorting to verbal attacks, stereotyping the opposition, attempting to exclude groups considered adversaries, and calls for violent forms of protest tend to trigger corresponding forms of involvement and engagement, especially in the context of social media. This means that supporters actively participate in the implementation of the communication strategy. We will examine these dynamics in more detail when discussing the use of incivility by citizens. However, numerous empirical studies have already provided valuable insights into this phenomenon, showing increased engagement with communications from leaders expressed in uncivil terms across various contexts (Bordignon, 2020; Rega & Marchetti, 2021; Skytte, 2021). In summary, the use of incivility by political actors serves a dual purpose: it reinforces, accentuates, and highlights polarised positions on the one hand, and it offers supporters the opportunity to express their sense of identity on the other. In doing so, it indirectly challenges the notion that the divisive and sometimes uncivil confrontational styles exhibited by political leaders are not appreciated by [American] citizens who, for the most part, are more educated than their leaders (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008). This suggestion has been contradicted on several occasions, from the events of January 6, 2021, which marked the culmination of Trump’s communication strategy aimed at contesting the election result and preventing the proclamation of the new President, to more recent cases such as Bolsonaro, who inspired the revolt of his supporters and the assault on the Brazilian federal government headquarters. Aside from these exceptional cases, there is no doubt that the mobilisation of supporters through the use of incivility can activate forms of dark participation, which can remain confined to the online realm or spill over into the streets of cities, as witnessed in Washington and Brasilia. It would be unwise to dismiss the cited examples as isolated incidents confined to specific contexts and historical moments. Unfortunately, the use of incivility by political actors triggers dynamics of mobilisation among their supporters that multiply and exacerbate political divisions. Particularly on the web, where incivility can easily proliferate and spread, and political campaigns can transform into veritable hate speech campaigns.

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It is highly unlikely that political actors are unaware of these risks or the potential effects of such campaigns on a country’s political climate. Instead, it is more probable that the need to reaffirm one’s positions to reiterate one’s group identity and mobilise one’s supporters lies at the core of building a communication strategy based on incivility.

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In A. S. Walter (Ed.), Political Incivility in the Parliamentary, Electoral and Media Arena (pp. 35–55). Routledge. Mason, L. (2013). The Rise of Uncivil Agreement: Issue Versus Behavioral Polarization in the American Electorate. American Behavioral Scientist, 57 (1), 140–159. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764212463363 Mason, L. (2018). Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/ chicago/U/bo27527354.html Mazzarella, W. (2019). Brand(ish)ing the Name. Or, Why Is Trump so Enjoyable? In W. Mazzarella, E. L. Santner, & A. Schuster (Eds.), Sovereignty. Three Inquiries in Politics and Enjoyment (pp. 113–160). University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/9780226668550-003 Moffitt, B. (2016). The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation. Stanford University Press. Moffitt, B., & Tormey, S. (2014). Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style. Political Studies, 62(2), 381–397. https://doi.org/10. 1111/1467-9248.12032 Mutz, D. C. (2007). Effects of “In-Your-Face” Television Discourse on Perceptions of a Legitimate Opposition. American Political Science Review, 101(4), 621–635. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305540707044X Mutz, D. C. (2015). In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences of Uncivil Media. Princeton University Press. Ouellette, L. (2012). Branding the Right: The Affective Economy of Sarah Palin. Cinema Journal, 51(4), 185–191. https://doi.org/10.1353/cj.2012.0076 Ott, B. L. (2017). The Age of Twitter: Donald J. Trump and the Politics of Debasement. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 34(1), 59–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/15295036.2016.1266686 Ott, B. L., & Dickinson, G. (2019). The Twitter Presidency: Donald J. Trump and the Politics of White Rage. Petrocik, J. R. (1996). Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study. American Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 825–850. Rega, R., & Marchetti, R. (2021). The Strategic Use of Incivility in Contemporary Politics. The Case of the 2018 Italian General Election on Facebook. The Communication Review, 24(2), 107–132. https://doi.org/10.1080/107 14421.2021.1938464 Sandvoss, C. (2019). The Politics of Against: Political Participation, AntiFandom, and Populism. In M. A. Click (Ed.), The Anti-Fandom: Dislike and Hate in the Digital Age (pp. 125–146). New York University Press. https:// doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479866625.003.0009 Schudson, M. (1999). The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life. Harvard University Press.

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Skytte, R. (2021). Dimensions of Elite Partisan Polarization: Disentangling the Effects of Incivility and Issue Polarization. British Journal of Political Science, 51(4), 1457–1475. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000760 Szebeni, Z., & Salojärvi, V. (2022). “Authentically” Maintaining Populism in Hungary—Visual Analysis of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Instagram. Mass Communication and Society, 25(6), 812–837. https://doi.org/10.1080/152 05436.2022.2111265 Usherwood, S., & Wright, K. A. (2017). Sticks and stones: Comparing Twitter Campaigning Strategies in the European Union Referendum. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(2), 371–388. https://doi. org/10.1177/1369148117700659 Venturelli, G., Tamaki, E. R., & Ferreira, M. G. M. (2023). The Sharp-Tongued Loudmouth: Incivility and Debasement in Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro’s YouTube Livestreams. In O. Feldman (Ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric: Dissing Opponents, Journalists, and Minorities in Populist Leadership Communication (pp. 73–86). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-98199-0894-3_5 Winberg, O. (2017). Insult Politics: Donald Trump, Right-Wing Populism, and Incendiary Language. European Journal of American Studies, 12(2), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.4000/ejas.12132 Wodak, R. (2021). The Politics of Fear: The Shameless Normalization of Far-Right Discourse. Sage. Wodak, R., Culpeper, J., & Semino, E. (2021). Shameless Normalisation of Impoliteness: Berlusconi’s and Trump’s Press Conferences. Discourse & Society, 32(3), 369–393. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926520977217

CHAPTER 2

The Media Industry of Incivility

Abstract This chapter delves into the orchestration of political spectacles and the deliberate use of incivility by the media as they navigate an increasingly competitive landscape for public attention. In this environment, strategies such as delegitimising opponents, hurling insults, and excluding those with differing opinions prove effective in reaching niche audiences that are receptive to such messages, often driven by confirmation bias. However, the utility of incivility extends beyond merely constructing a biased or distorted interpretation of reality. It can also benefit those seeking to expand their audience, such as in the case of talk shows or in the context of social media, where emotionally engaging content is rewarded. By stoking conflicts cantered around the radicalisation, simplification, and opposition of social groups, incivility becomes a valuable resource that can be harnessed within a hybrid media ecosystem to gain an edge in the competition for attention and to reach ever larger segments of the audience. The strategic resource of incivility will therefore be analysed in relation to (a) the diffusion of a partisan interpretation of political information in both the traditional media and online contexts; (b) the use of the drama and tension of uncivil conflict to heighten levels of interest in news programmes; and (c) the logic of the journalistic narrative of politics and its tendency to intensify visibility for uncivil actors and behaviour. By examining these facets, the chapter aims

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to provide a comprehensive understanding of how incivility is strategically deployed within the media landscape to shape political discourse and attract audiences in an era of heightened competition for attention. Keywords Attention market · Partisan media · Uncivil spectacle · Incivility-focused coverage · Desensitisation

High-Choice Environment vs Limited Attention Span The notion that “politics does not exist in an empty space but takes shape in a media environment” (Prior, 2007, p. 26) holds true, and this principle is as applicable to politics in general as it is to the specific context of uncivil expressions. Before delving into the details of the latter, it is imperative to explore the media environment in which these expressions operate and how it has evolved. This exploration is particularly vital given the numerous ways in which actors compete for attention through communication strategies rooted in incivility. The growth in the number of ways in which actors vie for attention reflects the fact that there has been a complex process of transition from a scarcity of supply to communicative abundance. The transformation from a scarcity of communicative resources to a state of communicative abundance has given rise to complex dynamics. Russell Neuman (1991) was among the first to empirically examine this transition, highlighting consequences such as intensified competition for mass-audience preferences and audience segmentation and specialisation. Bruce Bimber (2003) shares this view, defining communicative abundance as the third technological revolution to have marked news media and democracy in the United States. In the era of abundant communication, the audience becomes fragmented, and content becomes increasingly specialised, creating a crisis in citizens’ relationship with news media. Unlike the past when broadcast television provided essentially the same information to a large audience, the current media landscape has disrupted the routine, daily, acquisition of political information (Prior, 2007). In essence, there has been a shift from exposure to political information by default (Neuman, 1991) to more deliberate, choice-based forms of exposure (the effects of which

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are sometimes mitigated by the hybridised nature of the media environment) (Prior, 2007). The change marks a shift to what has been called a “Post-Broadcast Democracy” (ibidem), where citizens have abandoned the daily summons of television news because they can choose from a wide variety of platforms. The increased freedom of choice, brought about by the evolution of media hardware, has long been recognised as involving the risk that the uneven distribution of political information helps to generate centrifugal forces among the population (Blumler, 2016; Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). The increased freedom of choice, facilitated by evolving media landscape, carries the risk of unevenly distributing political information, potentially exacerbating centrifugal forces among the population. With the rise of digital media and the hybridisation of media systems, information abundance has become more pronounced. This has given rise to a high-choice political information environment, marked by diverse political information sources available to all citizens (Strömbäck et al., 2022). This provides the stage for fierce competition for that most valuable of commodities: user attention, giving birth to the attention market (Webster, 2014). This market is a battleground where legacy and digital media compete for attention and where the competition takes place not only among broadcasters but also across various genres, leading to a pronounced trend towards content specialisation aimed at attracting specific audience segments (Prior, 2007). In this attention market, major TV networks target the generalist audience through major events such as singing competitions and sports events (Eurovision, Superbowl), while other players specialise in catering to specific niche segments. This specialisation has led to the creation of channels known for their distinctive content and recognisable brands. This trend extends to news media, where the emphasis is on shaping perspectives rather than providing factual accuracy. According to Zaller (1992), news can be seen as “a marriage of information and predisposition: information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predispositions to motivate some conclusion about it” (Zaller, 1992, p. 6). In the current polarised political environment, news outlets find it crucial to tailor their offerings to meet user expectations. And it is for this reason that so-called partisan media come into the picture. Partisan media do not merely report the news but offer a distinct interpretive point of view. They are characterised by a viewpoint in favour of a political party or interpretation, such that they create a consistently

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liberal or conservative reading of the news (Levendusky, 2013). Notable examples include Fox News and MSNBC in the United States, both openly aligned with the Republican and Democratic parties, respectively. Online, Breitbart News, formerly directed by Steve Bannon, an adviser to Donald Trump, reflects the positions of the American Alt-Right. In the United Kingdom, conservative and sensationalist tabloids like the Daily Mail and The Sun have been joined by newer media outlets like GB News and TalkTV , both known for hosting controversial programmes and right-wing political figures such as Nigel Farage and Piers Morgan, respectively. Understanding these transformations in the media landscape is essential to comprehending how incivility is strategically employed and amplified within this complex ecosystem. We will explore these examples in the paragraphs that follow, but it is clear that partisan media cater to an equally partisan audience, employing mechanisms of selectivity (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Stroud, 2010) and contributing to the production of echo chambers (Sunstein, 2001). Partisanship has evolved with cross-national changes in media and political systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). In contexts marked by political parallelism and external pluralism, online platforms produce specialised content reflecting diverse positions on contentious issues such as antiCOVID vaccines, euthanasia, abortion, and immigration. In France, for example, alongside traditional media, numerous “partisan” outlets have emerged (e.g., Egalité et Réconciliation, Fdesouche, Sputnik, etc.) expressing anti-establishment, populist opinions in open dissent with mainstream publications (such as Le Monde, Le Figaro, Libération, Le Parisien, 20 Minutes, Les Echos, etc.) and elites. In Italy, where there is a high level of polarisation, newspapers such as il manifesto, which still calls itself a “communist daily”, La Verità, il Giornale, and Libero, characterised by partisan, polemical, and right-wing positions, vie for attention alongside Il Fatto Quotidiano (close to the Five Star Movement), Il Primato Nazionale (a sovereigntist daily), and numerous blogs. In the current hybrid context, influenced by both media logic and network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015), whether partisan viewpoints are present on television or websites is relatively unimportant. What truly matters is the daily fuelling of polarised communication through political incivility, including insults, exclusion, de-legitimisation, and stereotyping of those with different views, as well as the dissemination of distorted interpretations. This incivility activates the in-group vs. outgroup logic inherent in polarisation, leading to the creation of symbolic

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codes representing belonging or exclusion from the group supporting a particular stance. In essence, incivility aligns seamlessly with partisan and polarised content aimed at solidifying diverse audience segments, which often themselves contribute to the production of the information concerned. However, biased news media coverage is not the only sources of incivility. Another type of offering that relies on it is the so-called outrage industry. Here, the goal is not to support some specific party or cause but simply to construct a narrative using insults, quarrels, and mutual de-legitimisation with the aim of attracting attention (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014). The resulting show can be staged in a wide range of communicative environments and involve any actor who cares to participate. The aim is to use generalisations, stereotyping, aggression, sensationalism, or outright lies about opposing groups or individuals to elicit visceral responses from the audience—responses such as anger, fear, or a sense of moral superiority. The heightened levels of incivility that result are usually successful in attracting reasonably sized audiences, including those who enjoy intense conflict and those who dislike it but are curious about its outcome (Settle, 2018). This gives rise to the “paradox of incivility”, where those witnessing uncivil displays, whether on television or social media, are simultaneously attracted and repelled by it (Mutz & Reeves, 2005). It cannot be emphasised enough that in the current hybrid media environment, the value of incivility in the competition for attention is primarily due to the role of social media. Empirical research has long shown that the importance of engagement and the focus on virality in social media communication create a preference for provocative content. Whether it originates from legacy media, political figures, or regular users, content with elements of incivility tends to circulate more, even when accompanied by statements condemning it. For all that online platforms distance themselves from uncivil or hate speech, it continues to circulate throughout the available channels, generating substantial engagement, even if only in the form of negative comments and condemnation by other users. This discussion of the reasons for the widespread use of incivility in the creation of political spectacle would be incomplete without considering journalistic logic. This, as is well known, prioritises conflict in political storytelling (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 1993; Skytte, 2021) to attract potential audiences’ attention. This tendency is rooted in the

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ways in which political storytelling typically takes place and is found both in everyday political reporting and election campaigns. This narrative approach, aimed at introducing elements of drama and conflict, not only attracts attention but also fosters a growing distrust of politics (see Chapter 5), generating what was termed, some years ago, a “spiral of cynicism” (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). The framework developed so far sets the stage for the subsequent discussion by placing the phenomenon of political incivility in the context of a hybrid media environment, where various actors vie for supremacy in the attention market. The strategic use of incivility will now be examined in relation to: a. the propagation of partisan political information through traditional media and the web; b. the use of drama and tension of uncivil conflict to heighten levels of interest in news programmes; c. the logic of journalistic storytelling about politics.

Polarised Media for a Polarised Audience The consensus among scholars in recent decades is that political reporting has undergone a significant shift towards its partisan roots. This phenomenon is evident in the increasing number of media sources that explicitly support a particular point of view (Levendusky, 2013). This shift from objective journalism (Schudson, 2001) marks the resurgence of partisan media, which interprets reality exclusively in favour of one side or the other (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Druckman et al., 2018; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Levendusky, 2013; Skytte, 2021). Even before this phenomenon became pronounced with the advent of the Trump presidency, concerns had been raised about the potential dangers of biased media narratives leading to the emergence of parallel realities, where one side is always right and the other always wrong. Events during Trump’s tenure further underscored the risks associated with the spread and degeneration of partisan interpretations, challenging traditional journalistic norms. Regrettably, this phenomenon is not confined to a specific country, subject, time, or place. Referring to more recent political events, readers may recall the controversies surrounding the role of partisan media in the parliamentary

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elections in Poland on October 15, 2023. These elections culminated in the unexpected victory of the liberal, pro-European opposition. A Financial Times article titled “Partisan Media Deepens Poland’s Political Divide Ahead of Elections”, published a week before the vote, criticised the state television channel for its biased role in the election campaign. The TV channel was accused of disrupting the press conference of challenger Donald Tusk, the leader of Civic Platform, by posing questions aligned with the favourite topics of the nationalist Law and Justice Party, particularly focusing on Tusk’s alleged ties to Russia and Germany. This episode reveals that media polarisation affects not only niche publications with small, partisan audiences but can also involve larger public media organisations when right-wing populist parties like PiS come to power, drawing them into the process of polarisation. Contrary to the belief that partisan media is exclusive to the US, available evidence strongly suggests otherwise. Studies examining this phenomenon in other countries, such as Hameleers’ (2019) comparative analysis of the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, illustrate the strategic use of incivility by partisan outlets like Fox News, The Sun, and de Telegraaf during pivotal events such as the 2016 Presidential campaign, the Brexit referendum, and the 2017 general election. Hameleers’ study highlights how The Sun constructed a pro-Brexit discourse by portraying the European Union as an “antidemocratic regime” while de Telegraaf mobilised its readers against refugees and migrants while also printing allegations of corruption within the Dutch establishment. Essentially, these outlets, aligning with audience expectations, depict a polarised reality that accentuates social divisions between “us” and “them”. Upon closer examination, the partisan interpretation of news and current affairs extends beyond recent political events and deserves attention precisely because it is more complex than it may initially appear. In fact, it is often considered one of the most notable changes in the media environment in the last quarter of a century (Druckman et al., 2018). The success of partisan media results from a combination of factors, including the proliferation of informational offerings, leading to a competitive battle for capturing audiences, and the fragmentation of the audience itself, which increasingly makes selective choices (Stroud, 2010). On the supply side, both traditional and digital media have focused on niche audiences with partisan perspectives, driven by the logic of the attention market (Webster, 2014). This has resulted in a prevailing trend of diversified and partisan content. On the audience front, the search for content aligning

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with one’s own viewpoint has led to a consumption pattern where users actively participate in selecting the media they consume as alternatives to traditional news media, often perceived as biased (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013). Explanations for the rise of partisan media in terms of demand and supply must also consider the needs of news consumers for alternative information sources distinct from what traditional news media provide. The search for information that aligns with one’s own point of view drives the creation of offerings that construct worldviews in line with the preferences of their intended audiences. Particularly relevant to our discussion of incivility is its instrumental use in creating in-group vs. outgroup dynamics, a key characteristic of partisan media (Druckman et al., 2018). Research conducted by Kathleen Jamieson and Joseph Cappella (2008) on the conservative media establishment in the early 2000s— including Rush Limbaugh’s radio talk show, Fox News, and The Wall Street Journal —reveals how these sources fostered a closed community whose interpretations of reality resembled those typically found in echo chambers. This groundbreaking study has the significant merit of identifying the defining features of these media. Regarding incivility, these media employ a specific strategy involving the slander of traditional media, stereotyping of individuals and groups, demonisation of political opponents, ridicule of opponents’ proposals, and frequent resort to ad hominem attacks . In essence, they extensively draw from the repertoire of political incivility as it has evolved in recent decades. Recent research has uncovered a compelling link between the consumption of partisan media, particularly of a conservative nature, and the proliferation of political misperceptions —distorted understandings of political issues, actors, and events (Garrett et al., 2019). Essentially, right-wing media, by promoting discourses filled with indignation, anger, and incivility towards perceived adversaries (including political opponents, mainstream media, migrants, foreigners, outsiders, etc.), amplify public emotions. This heightened emotional state makes individuals more receptive to information that lacks clear evidence and even to news content that is distorted or false. Over time, this contributes to a growing sense of alienation from news sources, fostering systemic distrust of the media. The depiction of mainstream media as untrustworthy, labelling their products as “fake news”, has a dual effect: it intensifies the inclination to align with partisan offerings on the one hand and discredits other sources of information on the other. Whether this is a result of a genuine

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campaign to discredit them, lacking evidence to support alleged bias, is secondary to the point that “the more we discuss media bias, the more people believe it to be real” (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008, xi). Deceptive reconstructions of political situations are a common trait of partisan media and a classic indicator of political incivility, extensively documented in existing literature (Bentivegna & Rega, 2022; Stryker et al., 2016, 2022). Additionally, framing mainstream media in these terms can be seen as an example of stereotyping the other, aiming to prompt rejection by emphasising negative aspects and thus fostering distrust. This not only applies to the media but also to political opponents, who are portrayed not merely as individuals with differing beliefs but as individuals deemed dangerous (Levendusky, 2013). Claims about the supposed danger posed by opponents often escalate to their outright demonisation, at times reaching the extreme of branding them as “Nazis” (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008), with the implicit suggestion that compromise with them is impossible. The events of the Russo-Ukrainian war that erupted in February 2022 serve as a stark reminder of the risks associated with demonising others, as well as the continued relevance of accusations of Nazism, used, in this case, to justify the occupation of another country under the pretext of “de-Nazification”. Regardless of the specific label (Nazi, Taliban, etc.) employed, the common thread in such accusations is the dissemination of information that is decisively negative about members of the out-group (Brunidge, 2022) with the aim to foster rejection and distance. Similarly, ridiculing opponents and their proposals, highlighting their mistakes and gaffes (Levendusky, 2013), and resorting to outright insults and ad hominem attacks are employed as communication methods. In all these instances, we encounter communication methods that evoke strong emotions while simultaneously hindering the pursuit of compromise between the parties involved. The potential devaluation of the opposition (Skytte, 2021) or members of the out-group appears inconsequential to a communicative approach that appears, day after day, news item after news item, comment after comment, to have no other aim than asserting its own diversity. The primary objective is to be chosen as the spokesperson for a particular point of view, a shared parallel reality. In response to this tendency, communication channels—both traditional and digital—seize the opportunity to gain visibility and recognisability, employing all available means to offer radicalised and polarised positions that resonate with their target audiences. From this perspective, incivility

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is just one of several means chosen to achieve a favourable outcome in this regard.

Constructing the “Uncivil Spectacle” The use of incivility as a tool for shaping news provision extends beyond partisan media; it is also employed by media and news sources more focused on creating spectacle around political themes than on defending a particular viewpoint. Most readers have likely encountered discussions, both in traditional and social media, characterised by insults, shouting, and de-legitimisation. This recurring narrative structure revolves around radicalisation, simplification, and opposition between different positions, fostering continuous clashes among the involved actors. While this widespread use of incivility has attracted the attention of public discourse observers concerned about its potential impact on democracy, our discussion will not focus on its disruptive effects but rather on its use as a strategic resource to increase visibility and audience size within a hybrid media system. Such use is typical of television news programmes that rely on conflict and polarised political exchanges inherent in contemporary public debates to boost their popularity. With this backdrop, it’s worth exploring the strategic use of incivility to orchestrate confrontations between individuals holding opposing positions and points of view. In such settings, there’s a deliberate selection of actors representing extreme positions (Mutz, 2015), akin to a wrestling match, creating a spectacle where acrimonious conflict defines the encounter’s meaning. Often, the same actors are chosen to play their designated roles, taking critical positions that go against the grain, regardless of the issue (such as the pandemic or the war) at the top of the news agenda at the time. But whether or not this is case this is secondary, even though it helps to establish intertextuality across television, print media, and social media platforms. The conflicts that unfold daily in broadcast media draw substance from the continual manifestation of emotionally engaging and highly divisive issues. In recent years, topics like the COVID-19 pandemic (including vaccines, green passes, and mask-wearing), the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Israel-Palestine conflict have all provided the bases for hosting intense clashes between representatives of opposing positions. This mode of constructing public debate, evident in television,

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radio talk shows, and various social media discussions, reflects a monothematic, absolutist, and simplified communication style that guarantees the provision of spectacle through the staging of all-out battles. Numerous programmes exemplify how journalists, politicians, pundits, and citizens engage in verbal combat, demonstrating not so much a commitment to informational pluralism—often claimed to dignify the resulting spectacles—but rather a dedication to provocation and outrage. Examples include the French programme Touche Pas à Mon Poste! (literally, “Don’t Touch My TV Set!”—a pun on the anti-racist slogan “Touche Pas à Mon Pote!” or “Don’t Touch My Pal!”), which prominently featured the far-right during the 2022 Presidential campaign (with guests like Éric Zemmour, Pascal Praud, and Jean Messiha). Another example is the Italian radio show La Zanzara, hosted by Giuseppe Cruciani, known for its bold style and political incorrectness. In the United Kingdom, farright talk shows on GB News and TalkTV have faced investigations by broadcasting regulatory authorities following allegations of infringing on rules concerning political impartiality.1 But beyond these and other examples that could be cited, it is crucial to recognise that this fusion of information and entertainment, characterised by frequent displays of political incivility, has been a long-standing feature of news broadcasts in most contemporary democracies. Programmes and journalists, drawing on specific political traditions, have turned this blend into a kind of trademark. This phenomenon is not new. The use of conflict, rooted in the dramaturgical approach identified by Murray Edelman (1988), has been a means of generating citizens’ interest in politics for a long time. The approach is based on the confrontation between the leader and the enemy as the fundamental structure of the political narrative. Politics has, therefore, long been narrated from the perspective of conflict and competition among its actors, supporting the disheartening observation that incivility is to political television as violence is to television dramas (Mutz, 2013). However, this long-standing narrative pattern has undergone a significant shift. In brief, the novelty lies in the fact that this representation of politics centred on conflict and confrontation is no longer confined to specific programmes or communication interactions; instead, it has permeated all media environments. The novelty, therefore, lies in its 1 See The Guardian article reporting the affair at: https://www.theguardian.com/ media/2023/jul/03/ofcom-to-investigate-gb-news-and-talktv-over-impartiality-rules.

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pervasiveness and popularity, proving to be extremely lucrative for all the actors involved—commentators, journalists, experts, politicians, and citizens—as well as for the media platforms hosting it. A contentious segment from a talk show benefits not only the programme hosting it but also other media outlets commenting on it and social media platforms facilitating discussions about it. Unlike in the past, where the narrative of politics offered by “outrage television” was confined to the programme hosting it, today, it can be found in all media environments. When it comes to platforms, scholars have long recognised that content evoking emotional reactions and fostering engaged discussion has the greatest likelihood of going viral and achieving significant online circulation (Ledwich & Zaitsev, 2019; Rains et al., 2017). It is crucial to highlight that platforms, driven by economic considerations, have little interest in restricting the circulation of such content. Despite having policies to curb the spread of aggressive content, these efforts often have limited results. During the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Facebook publicly announced a greater tolerance for hate speech directed at Russians, citing the protection of freedom of speech in response to the military invasion. While this position aimed to contribute to the efforts of the Ukrainian people to defend themselves, it must be acknowledged that, regardless of intent, platforms find incivility lucrative as it significantly boosts traffic towards them. The popularity of such communication reflects the degree of polarisation among both political elites and ordinary citizens, as well as the intense competition among news sources to capture and retain audience shares, coupled with the inclination of social media platforms to reward emotional content. User approval and involvement also play a significant role; framing politics as a wrestling match offers entertainment, information, a sense of community, and affirmation of one’s opinions. What results is a composite offering, emerging across various platforms at different speeds, one created through direct user involvement. An uncivil incident on a television talk show, for instance, becomes a topic of discussion on social media, a means to affirm group membership, a source of argument, or a platform from which to challenge others’ viewpoints. The popularity of this type of communication is rooted more in the experience it provides than in any information it supplies (Young, 2020). In summary, it is crucial to recognise that framing politics as a wrestling match serves a wide range of individual needs and has now acquired an established and recognised role in shaping contemporary public discourse.

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The potential implications for incivility and democratic principles, such as limiting the scope for compromise and caricaturing the political system (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013), seem to be of little concern to those engaged in its creation. What seems to prevail is the notion that it can be a form of enjoyable entertainment, much like many extreme sports (Mutz, 2013).

Why Does Incivility Sell? The starting point for reflecting on the interest in political incivility in journalistic coverage can only be the recognition that it is inherently newsworthy, following the principle of “man bites dog”, representing the violation of a norm (Gitlin, 2013). The type of norm violated, whether it relates to individual interactions (good manners) or has public and institutional implications (as in the case of discrimination and stereotyping, for example), is of secondary importance; the focus is on the breach of established norms of behaviour and respect. The media’s interest in such violations is perennial, evident in the coverage of off-air moments where public figures use vulgar language or express discriminatory judgements. The progressive blurring of the boundary between the public and the private and the increasing availability of evidence (in the form of images and videos assembled by witnesses to uncivil incidents) contribute to its prevalence in journalistic reporting. While not a new phenomenon, there has been a notable increase in the coverage of incivility, reflecting popular perceptions that politics is becoming more disjointed and combative, as evidenced by the detailed compilation of lists of expressions of incivility on the part of various political actors.2 The continual attention to incivility paradoxically amplifies the impact of the words or events, contributing to a more toxic atmosphere while providing visibility to the individuals involved. This heightened visibility can, in some cases, reflect a deliberate strategy to secure free media air by leveraging the natural journalistic interest in the conflict between actors and positions. 2 A list of uncivil expressions attributed to Donald Trump was first published by The New York Times in 2016 in an article written by Jasmine Lee and Kevin Quealy carrying the revealing title, The 199 persons, places and things insulted by Donald Trump on Twitter: a complete list, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/28/upshot/ donald-trump-twitter-insults.html. After about a year, the list had grown to 382 instances and when updated in May 2019 it shot up to 598 instances (most recent updating May 24, 2019).

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From this perspective, politicians resort to negative advertisements that generate controversy and conflict, attracting the attention of journalists (Geer, 2012) is understandable. While the effectiveness of negative strategies in generating electoral support and bringing campaign success remains uncertain, the widely shared notion is that negativity, akin to other news values, enhances the newsworthiness of events. Consequently, negative messages and ads garner more extensive media coverage. It is indisputable that “negativity sells”, and as John Geer (2012) bluntly put it, the increased emphasis on controversy and conflict in media coverage of campaigns has, without doubt, changed the nature of electoral competitions. The real reason candidates and parties resort so frequently to attack messages lies not in the belief that they can directly influence voters but rather in the incentives offered by the media; namely, the hope of altering the media’s campaign narrative, thereby increasing the chances of emerging victorious at the polls. Beyond the US context, where the initial studies on negative campaigning originated, numerous studies show that the use of aggression and attack in electoral campaigns is now widespread and takes place across countries with widely varying political, cultural, and social systems (Gerstlé & Nai, 2019; Maier & Nai, 2023). Summarising these studies in detail is beyond the scope of this work. However, it is sufficient to say that hostility among candidates has become a dominant strategy in contexts where media coverage of political events tends to be negative, emphasising the “centrality of conflict” and disputes among candidates (Esser et al., 2016; Ridout & Smith, 2008). In short, it is media logic and the inclination to frame events in terms of drama and controversy that explain the current upsurge in the use of attack strategies by politicians and parties (Hassell & Oeltjenbruns, 2016; Maier & Nai, 2023), all seeking attention and visibility in newspapers and on television. This tendency, which “rewards” conflict-based strategies, helps clarify the journalistic treatment of incivility. On the one hand, it inevitably leads to heightened visibility for uncivil actors and behaviour. On the other, it significantly contributes to shaping interpretations of the concept of incivility itself. It is important to bear in mind that, beyond enhancing the visibility of the actors involved, journalistic coverage of certain episodes labelled as uncivil thereby influences the public’s understanding of incivility by highlighting specific behaviours. During the US presidential campaign in 2016, for instance, The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal took contrasting positions on the use of the term “lie” in their

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campaign coverage, illustrating opposing approaches in reporting uncivil behaviour, such as the candidates3 proliferating lies (Muddiman, 2018). The former used the term liberally, while the latter opted for more circumspect language. Despite the diverse range of behaviours exhibited, these examples attest to the widespread awareness among journalists of their inevitable involvement in the dissemination of uncivil discourse within the public debate. This awareness is expressed in connection to the various frames of incivility that can be utilised, spanning from those defending the freedom of speech (Freedom Frame) to those emphasising the logic of the business model (Business Frame) that governs news sites (Meltzer, 2015). Regardless of calls for the exercise of greater responsibility by journalists, the construction of uncivil public discourse continues to rely significantly on journalistic sources. This contribution not only mirrors the evolving interpretation of incivility but is also influenced by the adoption of the journalistic frame of conflict governing political narratives (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). This frame, regularly employed in news coverage, becomes particularly pronounced during election campaigns when political competition is framed as a game (Patterson, 1993). As in the case of a game, particular effort is devoted to identifying any violations of behavioural norms that could impact the competition’s outcome. It is important to recognise that incivility aligns with the news value of conflict, leading journalists to highlight or exaggerate attacks and incivility, evident in the way direct confrontations between candidates are portrayed through “incivility-focused news coverage” (Goovaerts, 2022). Actors accused of incivility or portrayed as uncivil make few, if any, attempts to resist the frame, recognising that the media coverage gives them visibility. While incivility is commonly criticised in contemporary societies, it may, in some cases, contribute to building a personal brand or defining a political identity that resonates with like-minded voters. This underscores incivility as a strategic resource for obtaining media coverage.

3 The reasons for the decision of The New York Times are explained in an article by Dan Barry, entitled In a Swirl of ‘Untruths’ and ‘Falsehoods,’ Calling a Lie a Lie, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/business/media/donald-trump-liemedia.html. The position of the Wall Street Journal, in contrast, is explained by Kate Sheppard in an article published in the Huffington Post titled “Wall Street Journal Editor Says His Newspaper Won’t Call Donald Trump’s Lies ‘Lies’”, available at: https://www.huf fpost.com/entry/wall-street-journal-lies-donald-trump_n_586934b8e4b0eb586489df43.

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Whereas the adoption of a conflict frame, which aims to identify and highlight expressions of incivility, undeniably brings short-term benefits in terms of clicks and attention for media sources, it equally undeniably damages informative media because it leads to a decrease in their credibility and induces people to seek alternative sources (Goovaerts, 2022). We will have the opportunity to revisit this discussion in the final pages of this text, but for now, the low levels of trust in news outlets apparent in the major democracies around the world (Newman et al., 2023) already seem indicative of an ongoing trend.

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Maier, J., & Nai, A. (2023). Mapping the Drivers of Negative Campaigning: Insights from a Candidate Survey. International Political Science Review, 44(2), 195–211. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512121994512 Meltzer, K. (2015). Journalistic Concern about Uncivil Political Talk in Digital News Media: Responsibility, Credibility, and Academic Influence. The International Journal of Press/politics, 20(1), 85–107. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1940161214558748 Muddiman, A. (2018). Attributions of Incivility in Presidential Campaign News. In B. R. Warner, D. G. Bystrom, M. S. McKinney, & M. C. Banwarth (Eds.), An Unprecedented Election: Media, Communication, and the Electorate in the 2016 Campaign (pp. 115–133). Bloomsbury Publishing. Mutz, D. C. (2013). Television and Uncivil Political Discourse. In D. M. Shea & M. P. Fiorina (Eds.), Can We Talk? The Rise of Rude, Nasty, Stubborn Politics (pp. 68–71). Pearson. Mutz, D. C. (2015). In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences of Uncivil Media. Princeton University Press. Mutz, D. C., & Reeves, B. (2005). The New Videomalaise: Effects of Televised Incivility on Political Trust. American Political Science Review, 99(1), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051452 Neuman, W. R. (1991). The Future of the Mass Audience. Cambridge University Press. Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Eddy, K., Robertson, C. T., & Nielsen, R. K. (2023). Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2023. Reuters Institute for Study of Journalism. Retrieved November 23, 2023, from https://reutersinstitute.pol itics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2023-06/Digital_News_Report_2023.pdf Patterson, T. E. (1993). Out of Order. A. Knopf Incorporated. Prior, M. (2007). Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections. Cambridge University Press. Rains, S. A., Kenski, K., Coe, K., & Harwood, J. (2017). Incivility and Political Identity on the Internet: Intergroup Factors as Predictors of Incivility in Discussions of News Online. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 22(4), 163–178. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12191 Ridout, T. N., & Smith, G. R. (2008). Free Advertising: How the Media Amplify Campaign Messages. Political Research Quarterly, 61(4), 598–608. https:// doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314202 Schudson, M. (2001). The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism. Journalism, 2(2), 149–170. https://doi.org/10.1177/146488490100200201 Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M. V. (2000). Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News. Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93–109. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2000.tb02843.x

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CHAPTER 3

Citizens and the Seductive Power of Incivility

Abstract This chapter delves into citizens’ use of incivility, focusing on how it can serve as a “low-cost”, easily accessible, and potentially powerful tool for sharing their opinions. While citizens may not always employ incivility intentionally, and their use of it can often be spontaneous and driven by strong emotions, there are situations and circumstances where extreme language or attacks on democratic values can be a resource for citizens on multiple fronts. This chapter will explore three primary dimensions of citizens’ use of incivility. First, it will examine the individual dimension, where individuals can use incivility to increase their visibility and attention in the public arena. In some cases, employing uncivil language or behaviour can draw more attention to an individual’s views or actions. Second, the chapter will explore the inter-individual dimension, focusing on how incivility can function as a means of aggregation among people who share binary thinking and intolerant opinions. It can stimulate interactions and foster a sense of group membership among individuals who use incivility to express their shared views. The third level of analysis will delve into forms of political participation where incivility is not merely directed at expressing contempt but is used to mobilise against a perceived opponent. In these cases, incivility becomes a tool for citizens to rally together and strive for victory over their antagonistic subjects or groups. Overall, this chapter aims to provide insight into how citizens utilise incivility as a tool in various dimensions of public discourse and political engagement. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Bentivegna and R. Rega, (Un)Civil Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54405-7_3

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Keywords Incivility as an identity-display · Uncivil performance · The paradox of incivility · Incivility and the group dynamic

Incivility: A “Low-Cost” Communicative Resource In the summer of 1986, Radio Radicale (a historic Italian radio station directly linked to the Radical Party) opted to suspend broadcasts and leave the microphones open to citizen interventions to draw attention to its serious financial situation and risk of imminent closure. This initiative led to eight hundred hours of uninterrupted recording during which obscenities, profanity, and vulgarity alternated with racist language (targeting “niggers”, “Jews”, etc.), political denigration (of Communists and Christian Democrats), and sporting insults, earning the station the monikers “Radio parolaccia” (Radio Swearword) and “Radio bestemmia” (Radio Blasphemy). The “Radio swearword” affair highlighted, well in advance of the advent of social media, a number of issues concerning the intoxication of the public sphere, about which we have struggled to offer convincing sociological explanations to this day. The considerable attraction of the Radicals’ initiative, in fact, testified to a desire for citizen participation and the fact that when finally presented with the opportunity to intervene in public debate, many citizens were wont to turn it into a sort of collective rant. What this reveals is that, as a social phenomenon, the “emotional dump” was around long before the Internet—thus challenging the idea that the Web itself is what has been primarily responsible for the degeneration of public debate in recent years. Of course, this is not to suggest that the affordances of online platforms have not contributed to the current state of affairs. They have, if nothing else, simplified and accelerated the circulation of offensive content. The proliferation of opportunities for interaction both horizontally (between citizens) and vertically (between citizens and elites) has undoubtedly been significant, fuelling the spread of aggression in various forms. However, acknowledging this contribution is not equivalent to providing a comprehensive explanation for the growing tendency to adopt uncivil attitudes when discussing politics. This premise logically leads to a series of questions: What leads citizens to adopt aggressive, offensive, or hateful language? What purposes does this “communicative escalation” serve?

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It is often argued that episodes of incivility from below in digital environments are driven by users’ perceptions of their anonymity and their ability to hide behind nicknames and impersonal accounts. However, this explanation fails to account for instances of incivility that occur on platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter (now X), where people tend to use their real names and have profiles that include photos and other personal information. This suggests that there are more fundamental reasons underlying uncivil behaviour, such as the sense of disinhibition felt within impersonal digital environments due to the absence of social constraints present in face-to-face communication. Examples include the lack of eye contact with other users who might express disapproval or the asynchronicity of communication, the latter of which prevents immediate reactions to interlocutors. Equally significant is users’ tendency to view the online world with detachment, as if it were a parallel reality they can “leave behind” as soon as they switch off their devices. Also important is their inclination to prioritise group identity over individual identity, evident in phenomena like online “shitstorms”, where masses of users, carried away by a wave of negative emotions, participate in impromptu hate campaigns, posting comments they would probably not make in other contexts. All these considerations are an essential part of the story, but they fail to account for the fact that incivility can also be a resource. In our opinion, in today’s political and communicative context, incivility has also become a resource for citizens who can, in certain circumstances, use incivility to “raise their voices”, express outrage, and gain an advantage over others. As Gina Masullo Chen aptly put it, “By being uncivil, people decrease the value of the person whom they attack and, perhaps, increase their own value, by showing dominance much like a wolf baring its teeth or growling” (Masullo Chen, 2017, p. 7). In short, incivility becomes an “instrument of power” for citizens, a strategy by which they can assert themselves and exert control over others. In our view, this provides a more convincing explanation for phenomena such as bullying/cyberbullying, harassment, and hate speech, which are generally targeted at more vulnerable individuals and groups, such as women, immigrants, people of colour, Muslims, LGBTQQIA+ people, and so forth. However, compared to other actors, many of whom strategically use incivility to boost the ratings of a TV programme, influence issues on the political agenda, and/or control public debate, the case of citizens is

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more complex. They often act without a full awareness of the implications of their actions. Examples of this include the incitement to violence tweeted by a representative of the student union at McGill University in Canada, “punch a Zionist today” (Arnold, 2017), or the Facebook post of an Italian pensioner whose gratuitous and especially brutal attack on President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella led newspapers to dub her the “hating grandmother”. Such cases can be viewed as instances where citizens seize an opportunity to publicly express feelings of frustration and anger against the current enemy, whether it be Zionists, Mattarella, or another group or individual, often without considering the consequences. In recent years, numerous examples of hostility and harassment campaigns targeting politicians, celebrities, and other prominent figures in public life have arisen. Consider the case of the actress Leslie Jones, who has been the target of racist and sexist comments for years (Oluo, 2016), or the British Labour MP Tulip Siddiq, who regularly receives online threats (Saner, 2016). NBA champion James Harden became the target of insults and racist comments when Adidas chose him as its spokesperson to celebrate the brand’s 70th anniversary. In these cases, where incivility is expressed spontaneously, it serves an “expressive” and almost liberating function, allowing individuals to vent their anger in response to a specific event. Whether the attack is an isolated outburst or an impromptu hate campaign involving many participants, these manifestations of aggression and incivility from below are often involuntary, spontaneous, and fuelled by the heat of the moment. This explains why those involved may later feel remorse, as was the case with the so-called hating grandmother who insulted the President of the Italian Republic. These examples illustrate that incivility is also a “low-cost” communicative resource: it is simple to use and potentially accessible to everyone. This cost-effective resource allows citizens to play a significant role in constructing the “spectacle” of incivility and can be explained through the following dimensions: a. The individual dimension: the search for public attention and visibility stemming from the “need to perform”. b. The inter-individual dimension: individuals’ search for integration among themselves and distance from others, expressing the “need to belong”. c. The public dimension: arising from the dynamics of political mobilisation, expressing the “need to engage”.

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We will commence the remainder of the discussion presented in this chapter by focusing on the individual dimension, where incivility can variously play an expressive, performative, and identity role. We will then progress to consider the inter-individual level, on which incivility performs an aggregative function, nurturing a sense of camaraderie and community. We will conclude with an examination of the public dimension, where incivility becomes the engine for forms of genuine political engagement. These three levels of analysis intertwine and overlap, held together by a political context in which increasing polarisation, affect, and the underlying logic of platforms and algorithms all contribute to amplifying identity-based political processes.

The “Need to Perform” Even individuals who do not belong to the elites can use incivility. One prominent example of this can be seen in the case of the police officer who was openly critical of government COVID-containment measures and became a minor celebrity of the no-vax movement in the space of just a few weeks. Her incendiary and offensive statements concerning the government and, in particular, the Premier, Mario Draghi; her systematic association of “green-pass” vaccination requirements with totalitarianism, along with other uncivil gimmicks, drew massive media attention. Indeed, so great was the attention that for a short while, she enjoyed celebrity status to the point that she was able to attempt a political career by running for Parliament in the Italian general election of 2022. Her short period of fame was facilitated by the specificities of the Italian context, where the media system has always been very highly attuned to reporting manifestations of incivility. The initial parliamentarians representing the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement, “M5S”) shared a parallel journey facilitated by a well-organised campaign orchestrated by the prominent entertainer Beppe Grillo. Comprised of regular citizens lacking prior political experience, they capitalised on the wave of moral and cultural outrage directed at the so-called caste. These parliamentarians strategically employed incivility to challenge the legitimacy of the established political elite and the media, often perceived as representatives of the entrenched establishment. Episodes such as these highlight a central aspect of the strategic uses of incivility; namely, it is a communicative asset potentially available to ordinary citizens to create a public profile and promote themselves in

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the media. From this perspective, incivility is neither new nor difficult to explain; the search for notoriety reflects what Christopher Lasch referred to more than forty years ago when he predicted the transformation of narcissism from a psychiatric disorder into the forma mentis of an entire society (Lasch, 1979). What is new, however, is the social, political, and communicative context in which these aspirations develop: a context that has turned incivility into a useful resource for gratifying people’s performative needs. Two phenomena can explain this change. First, the convergence of digital platforms and the mass media. In turn, this has altered the significance of celebrity status (Driessens, 2013), such that it is important not just in the world of the arts and entertainment but in all spheres of social life, including current affairs, politics, and political activism. Influenced by social media, TV contests, and reality shows, ordinary people are increasingly accustomed to “acting” in a performative sense—attempting, for example, to manage their relationships with their followers, seeking authenticity and intimacy with them (Marwick & Boyd, 2011), or producing and distributing engaging content that can be successful online. Incivility can bring success in carrying out these activities because it can help ordinary users engage and create complicity with and among their followers, voice opposition to the dominant or politically correct, and maximise the reaction of their audience. Second, the affordances of social media platforms actively promote the circulation of emotionally charged negative content, thereby facilitating the spread of various forms of incivility. This propensity towards irreverence has been a hallmark of Internet culture from the beginning, with a notable example being the prevalence of trolling and the pursuit of “lulz”. These trends have played a pivotal role in the widespread adoption of corrosive and politically incorrect communication styles, which were previously confined to specific subcultures, including those associated with the Alt-Right movement. Consequently, they have normalised the generation and dissemination of content that openly undermines democratic institutions and values. This normalisation has reached the point where digital cultures centred around transgressive behaviour and cynical amusement, as outlined by Jane (2019), have desensitised users to messages and actions involving sexist, racist, and homophobic denigration or discrimination. Such content is sometimes not only tolerated but also positively received, with some users even deeming it as “just funny stuff”, as observed by Haynes (2019).

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It is worth highlighting that even if other users dislike them, displays of incivility still seem to be “rewarded” by the rating systems of the platforms (Rains et al., 2017). It is often the uncivil comments left by readers beneath posted articles that elicit the most reactions from other users. No matter whether the shared opinions are positive or negative, the effect is to increase the visibility of the article in question. Therefore, “there are incentives for incivility to exist in comments” (Muddiman & Stroud, 2017, p. 604), and if users continue to reward uncivil content through their “recommendations”, then journalists will have an incentive not to censor it. Finally, political confrontation and aggression are self-generating. Because hostility in online exchanges is widespread and even rewarded, people tend not only to accept it but also to use it themselves when engaging with each other in political discussion (Hmielowski et al., 2014) or debating divisive issues such as civil rights, immigration, and other sensitive topics (Coe et al., 2014). The various mechanisms illustrated so far are influenced by numerous factors, such as subjects’ attitudes to conflict (Sydnor, 2019) or rudeness (Mölders & Van Quaquebeke, 2017). In many cases, individual instances of incivility are public acts of identity assertion driven by motives of which their subjects are not necessarily even aware. In certain circumstances, extreme language or attacks on democratic values can be a useful means for individuals to increase their popularity and gain stronger positions in social networks. In such cases, incivility serves as a tactic for gaining immediate visibility and impressing specific audiences (such as the novax movement or those holding racist beliefs) or for displaying a specific identity in order to attract attention and recognition from a particular audience (Vrooman, 2002). In this context, another crucial factor to consider is the influence of political affiliation, a salient identifier comparable to ethnicity, race, or gender, when it comes to the use of incivility (Rains et al., 2017). The articulation of a specific political identity frequently aligns with the adoption of incivility. Consequently, not only do individuals who exhibit stronger partisan tendencies and engage more actively in online political discussions tend to employ uncivil language (Rossini, 2021), but incivility in readers’ comments often incorporates references to partisan terminology (Muddiman & Stroud, 2017). While none of this is particularly surprising given the current state of political polarisation, the incivility associated with it is only partially

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related to political disagreements on issues or policy. In fact, incivility serves as a means of marking one’s otherness vis-à-vis the other party, overpowering it, and fuelling rancour against it. For example, the aim of partisan name-calling—through such expressions as “Crooked Hillary” or “Sleepy Joe” (Dusso & Perkins, 2023), typical of the US—is to belittle those who think differently while simultaneously enhancing one’s own value. Therefore, thanks to the fact that they embody an immediately distinguishable communicative style, partisan incivility and related communicative practices (such as ranking and sharing activities) become “identity markers” useful for public self-promotion. Meanwhile, people evaluate incivility differently depending on their partisanship, tending to assess it more negatively if the opposing party uses it and viceversa (Muddiman, 2017). Finally, the intent and mode of expression of incivility vary with its intended target. For example, when targets are historically devalued subjects (people of colour, religious and ethnic minorities, members of the LGBTQQIA+ community, etc.), incivility is used primarily as a tool of oppression, to denigrate or silence the other. The self-assertion of the individual sometimes takes the form of subjugation of the other. In online political discussions, in particular, these modes of expression often aim to create a climate of intimidation with regard to minorities. However, when the targets are members of the political elite, incivility may be used for contrasting reasons. For example, to alert the public to improper behaviour on the part of political representatives, to voice political criticism, or to express dissatisfaction or outrage (Rossini, 2021). Political representatives have long been subject to harassment and insults from the public, mainly because of their images as powerful people (Ward & McLoughlin, 2020). The affordances of social media platforms, nonetheless, have helped to amplify these tendencies, making such channels ideal venues for sporadic interventions aimed at targeting representatives or engaging in uncivil hit-and-run behaviour. Those subject to uncivil attacks on social media receive them directly and publicly. Furthermore, there is a strong likelihood that the visibility of such incidents encourages other users to launch similar discourse (Ward & McLoughlin, 2020). Emblematic in this connection is the November 2016 case of the Canadian MP, Sandra Jansen. Following her decision to leave the “PC” (the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada) and join the “NDP” (the New Democratic Party), she became the subject of insults and

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outraged comments1 (including “What a traitorous bitch!”, “Stay in the kitchen where you belong!”, and “Fly with the crows and get shot!”). These public insults served to amplify the existing climate of hatred and misogyny against her. Regardless of its target audience, the issue it relates to, or its type, incivility can be used by citizens for both performative and expressive purposes in the public arena to rapidly acquire visibility and notoriety.

The “Need to Belong” In addition to helping citizens acquire fame and visibility, incivility enables people to experience a sense of complicity and camaraderie with their fellows. They may also be motivated to emulate the behaviour of others. In such incidences, incivility acquires an aggregate function by reinforcing senses of connection within groups and communities. After all, it is well known that processes of identification are based on desires that relate both to the self and to the others, and that the need for self-affirmation is intimately linked with the need for integration. In considering these issues, it is useful to start with what has been referred to as the “paradox of incivility”. This term highlights the fact that incivility arouses both revulsion and attraction, fostering negative feelings at the same time as it exerts a strong pull on citizens. The paradox has been identified by observing the reactions of television audiences watching heated debates between politicians (Mutz & Reeves, 2005) and has been examined in several strands of research, especially studies on negative campaigning. The vexata questio that has driven these studies concerns the mobilising potential of hostility campaigns and, thus, their capacity to increase voter interest and participation (Brooks & Geer, 2007). As much as people disapprove of uncivil attacks and the use of negative campaigning, they are unwittingly drawn to them “in much the same way that shoppers find themselves drawn to the tabloids in the checkout aisle” (Martin, 2004, p. 546). In short, although people condemn certain practices, they are inclined to follow precisely the most disrespectful candidates and conform to their ideas. These findings confirm that politics is often governed by the unexpected, such as, for example, the finding that citizens can develop feelings

1 Source https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38083249.

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of empathy for politicians who explicitly violate norms of social conduct. This is especially true of people who believe that disrespect is a “necessary evil” in politics (Mölders & Van Quaquebeke, 2017) or those who are comfortable with conflict. In these cases, vitriol can elicit pleasure and enthusiasm, and even lead to political violence. Crucially, this is not the case with civil politics, which does not seem to engage, entertain, or motivate people—whether they are conflict-oriented or conflict-unfriendly—as much as uncivil politics does (Sydnor, 2019). In short, unedifying as it is, individuals seem to be more attracted to conflict and political incivility than to diplomatic and conciliatory politics; they are more entertained and excited by reading violent content than civil political exchanges (Mutz, 2007). This explains the success of programmes based on the oppositional narratives typical of the outrage industry that have been observed in the United States (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014). In addition to gratifying people’s desire for entertainment and excitement, such programmes respond to their need for social inclusion and membership of communities. They foster, in fact, a sense of interconnection among people who would otherwise feel excluded, misjudged, or disliked either because they exhibit attitudes that are considered uncivil (e.g., beliefs that are commonly held as racist or intolerant), or because they are uncomfortable discussing political issues with those who disagree with them. In the case of fans of such programmes—among the best known is the one hosted by Tucker Carlson on Fox—the sense of community is palpable: the fans are completely unrelated, but they need to be “reassured” and integrated within the group. In their eyes, the spaces created by the programme seem like “safe havens” where they can express their views without the risk of being censored or socially isolated, and— as some of the interviewees confess—without being “afraid of being perceived as racist” (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014, p. 149). This feeling of solidarity between enthusiasts of political discourse dominated by negativity, binary thinking, and overtly intolerant views stimulates active interaction among the individuals concerned. Sometimes, it even stimulates the development of stable ties (through blogs, meet-ups, etc.), creating forms of complicity that allow participants to proudly emphasise the distinctiveness of their positions compared to those of their opponents: the elite representatives of a progressive political culture inspired by principles of pluralism. The need to identify and attack an opponent is a continual feature of the group dynamics that develop around uncivil discourse. Moving,

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for example, from the U.S. political context to the much lesser known context of India (Udupa, 2019), it is striking that fans of the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, are constantly engaged in derisive attacks on the liberal leftist intelligentsia, who they openly mock on Twitter through the use of ironic hashtags and variously offensive nicknames (such as “pseudoseculars” and “urban naxals”). For young, right-wing, tech-savvy Indians, such behaviour is increasingly perceived as a form of collective entertainment, where the success of a hashtag, in the gamified context of trending topics, represents a victory over each other’s out-group narratives: a moment of pleasure and satisfaction, the result of the joint effort of the group’s members. But while those identified as outsiders and “enemies” vary as contexts change, the two functions of uncivil discourse do not. On the one hand, it fosters a sense of community and belonging among those on the same side; on the other, identifying an out-group to serve as a powerful social glue for those opposing it. An indicative example relates to two studies on the political backlash that arose in Hong Kong in response to the actions of mainland China. The first study examined political discussion on the Chinese social network Weibo (Song & Wu, 2018), while the second was focused on a popular online discussion forum in Hong Kong, the Golden Forum (Song et al., 2022). Though the antagonists were different—in the first case, Hong Kong residents, and in the second case, residents of mainland China—the mechanisms that generated a sense of complicity were not. In both cases, third-person pronouns (“they”) associated with irreverent expressions were used to raise the sense of camaraderie. It is precisely this process of creating distance from the “other” that seems to lead to the spiral of incivility. This spiral of incivility seems to work as follows. As we have seen, incivility seems to attract, seduce, entertain, and engage to the point of stimulating those who witness it to adopt it. Imitation can take place in one of two ways: by replicating the uncivil messages of political and media actors (Gervais, 2017; Rega & Marchetti, 2021) or by mimicking them among peers. In both cases, a vicious cycle of growing incivility is created. The first case is easily understood, given the long tradition of studies dealing with how citizens’ attitudes and opinions are influenced by those of elites (media and politicians). In the second case, uncivil speech seems to shape interactions between citizens. Having been socially recognised and embraced, it is subsequently transmitted from user to user until it becomes a norm (Song et al., 2022). This behavioural shaping occurs

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especially in online political conversations and group dynamics, in which individuals not only tend to imitate the general tone of the group with which they identify but also to use forms of incivility in an attempt to further blend in with other members (Kwon & Gruzd, 2017). From this perspective, we can better understand why shared forms of derision referring to the “other”, the out-group, have such wide resonance. Going back to the China-Hong Kong conflict, Hong Kongers were called “gang can” (ignorant, foolish; Song et al., 2022), while mainland Chinese tourists were associated with the “Chee-na” meme (Song et al., 2022). In such cases, the use of “name-calling”, rather than signalling an emotional outburst, represents an act of adherence to the group, its codes, and performative styles. These are replicated in order to affirm one’s membership and connection with other members of the community. From this perspective, emulating displays of incivility can be interpreted as a well-developed form of “social glue”.

The “Need to Engage” So far, we have seen how incivility helps individuals to assert their identity, cement relationships with people belonging to the same group, and clearly identify a counterpart, perceived as an outsider. However, counterparts not only inspire more or less severe insults or provide the material for collective pastimes by in-group members. In some cases, they are actual enemies against whom members of the in-group seek to mobilise. This is especially likely in the context of elections, during which competition is explicit and politically aligned voters may view rivals as “immoral”, “untrustworthy”, or in need of being stopped by whatever means necessary (including the resort to cheating, lying, personal attacks, physical assault or intimidation; Miller & Conover, 2015). In these cases, incivility can push people to take an active part in the political game, so much so that they become protagonists in high-profile public events such as the assault on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021. One need only read some of the tweets posted by Donald Trump’s supporters in the days leading up to the assault to get an idea of the activating power of incivility (“see you there Mr President. I’ll be there speaking and fighting for you” @DavidJHarrisJ, 31-12-2020; “Big Protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there,

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will be Wild!” @djcalligraphy, 30-12-20202 ). Meanwhile, on the far-right platform, Parler, the tenor of conversations among supporters was even more violent, with explicit calls for the murder of Vice President Pence and Speaker Pelosi (Borah et al., 2022). That extraordinarily significant event confirmed that voter mobilisation increases when the prospects of defeat are more evident and imminent (Miller & Conover, 2015) and that political incivility can motivate and even “arm” citizens. Yet, it was not the only event to have done so. An extensive body of literature has investigated the relationship between Trump’s anti-establishment and inflammatory rhetoric and the violence of his supporters, expressed both verbally on digital platforms and physically in the streets (Hayes, 2021). The violent speeches given during the 2016 election rallies and the increase in violence against minorities in the counties where the rallies were held testify strongly to this correlation.3 Equally indicative are the protests that erupted in different parts of the country following Trump’s appeals against planned restrictions aimed at pandemic containment (Westermeyer, 2021). However, perhaps the affair that reveals the relationship between incivility and mobilisation most clearly concerns the former president’s famous racist and misogynistic attack on the “Squad” of four Democratic Congresswomen, guilty, in his view, of opposing the construction of the wall on the border with Mexico. Bresnahan and colleagues (2021) studied the infamous chant “Send her back!” intoned by the audience during the Republican rally in Greenville, NC, following Trump’s comments against the Congresswomen. In order to understand how people justified their support for, or criticism of, the racist chant, the scholars analysed the comments that users posted beneath articles published by newspapers and journalists with contrasting political orientations reporting this episode.4 The comments written under the articles penned by journalists aligned with pro-Republican and right-wing positions (Fox News and Carlson’s

2 The messages were posted in response to Trump’s tweet “JANUARY SIXTH, SEE YOU IN DC”, Dec. 30, 2020; see Hayes (2021). 3 See the analysis by Ayal Feinberg and colleagues in The Washington Post, March 22, 2019, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/trumps-rhe toric-does-inspire-more-hate-crimes/. 4 The analysis was conducted on the websites of two centre-left publications, the New York Times and the Washington Post, the conservative broadcaster, Fox News, and the Twitter account of the right-wing journalist, Tucker Carlson.

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Twitter account) clearly show the starring role taken by the interventions of citizens who helped create an uncivil spectacle by spreading divisive, discriminatory, and undemocratic narratives. These comments included the use of infamous labels against the Congresswomen—called the “Jihad Squad”, the “four Congresswomen of the Apocalypse”, and “America haters”—and highly offensive remarks directed especially at Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez—described as “an opportunist”, “a despicable woman. All she wants is money”—and Ilhan Omar, accused, for example, of being a “disgusting hypocrite” and an “evil demon” (Bresnahan et al., 2021, pp. 342–343). In this specific hate campaign, incivility took one of two basic forms. On the one hand, some racist messages sought to exclude female representatives from the public arena. This was evident, for example, from the message repeated in the majority of comments (“send her back home”) and from the countless messages posted against the representative of Somali origin, Omar, well summarised by this tweet: “Send her back! We do not want immigrants that hate us here and more so… get her out of office! Impeach her!” (ibid., p. 344). On the other hand, there were conspiracy theories and Islamophobic narratives according to which there was a “written plan of the Muslim Brotherhood to destroy America”, while Ilhan Omar was aiming “[…] to establish a caliphate in the U.S.” and the four Congresswomen were elected to “usurp our government” (ibid., p. 343). In short, in addition to illustrating all the characteristic features of Trump’s uncivil discourse (stereotyping, racial discrimination, and the use of lies), the examples highlight the level to which prejudice against legitimately elected female congresswomen had grown, revealing how incivility can stir people up against “perceived” enemies and fuel highly corrosive forms of opposition. In this regard, incivility can make people “more belligerent”, recalling, in so doing, William Davies’ (2018) point that politics has become more incandescent and angrier in the contemporary era. Yet demonising enemies is nothing new. What is new is the nonchalance with which today’s politicians stimulate conflict, particularly in Western democracies, where political confrontation often amplifies emotional opposition between groups. Whether this is rooted in opposition to the anti-COVID vaccines, the debate on the Russian-Ukrainian or Israeli-Palestinian wars, or in something else, is entirely secondary.

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More important is that the divisions give rise to fundamental positions and fierce attacks on those on the other side of the debate. The most illustrative examples are those that involve populist-type groups and formations that are wont to resort to binary distinctions, visceral discourses, and “rejection” of the other both figuratively and—in the cases of things like the single currency, immigrants, etc.—actually. Within such communities, incivility is shaped and expressed by spreading divisive discourses—based on the exclusion and dehumanisation of specific groups of enemies—hate ideologies and conspiracy theories promoting anti-establishment views. Exemplary in this regard is the so-called AltRight Movement, a label identifying a wide array of pro-Trump groups and individuals who actively participated in his 2016 election campaign.5 It is clear from their participation how incivility is experienced and normalised in user practices and how useful it can be in garnering mainstream media attention. Through the strategic use of social media, memes, and bots, coupled with excellent knowledge of attention-hacking techniques to increase the visibility of their content, during the course of the campaign, the far-right groups managed to spread Islamophobic, misogynistic, and racist views on a mass scale, thereby influencing the media agenda and the coverage given by newspapers to the two candidates. Emblematic was their successful strategy against Hillary Clinton, whose health was publicly questioned, prompting speculation that she had problems of some severity. Through online networks, amplification, and strategic framing, various actors (bloggers, communities, and farright media) were able to spread conspiracy theories about the democratic nominee’s physical and cognitive problems throughout mainstream election reporting, with the hashtag “#HackingHillary” spread on Twitter being reported by many influential news outlets.

5 The research by Marwick and Lewis (2017) examines how the “various internet subcultures – sometimes summarised as the Alt-Right but more accurately an amalgam of conspiracy theorists, techno-libertarians, white nationalists, Men’s Rights advocates, trolls, anti-feminists, anti-immigration activists, and bored young people – leverage both the techniques of participatory culture and the affordances of social media to spread their various beliefs. Taking advantage of the opportunity the internet presents for collaboration, communication, and peer production, these groups target vulnerabilities in the news media ecosystem to increase the visibility of and audience for their messages” (Media manipulation and disinformation online, p. 3, available at: https://datasociety.net/pubs/ oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline.pdf).

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Interesting examples highlighting the active role of citizens in the construction of populist narratives can often be observed in Facebook discussion groups in the Netherlands (Hameleers, 2019). In this setting, expressions of incivility sometimes take the extreme form of posts containing incitements to hatred and violence against two main targets. One is the government and, in particular, the prime minister, accused of lying and betraying citizens and, therefore, deserving of removal. Such posts include, “Let’s put Rutte (the Prime Minister) and his criminal organisation on the streets” and, “It would be a fantastic day if someone would hit this nation’s traitor with a bullet through his head” (Hameleers, 2019, p. 156). The second group that is subject to incitement to hatred is immigrants. Members of this population are often described using dehumanising terms, such as “monkeys”, “dogs”, or “rats”, which serve to degrade their humanity, foster prejudiced attitudes, and perpetuate harmful stereotypes. For example, in reference to refugee barges, one user commented: “It’s just like killing a fly, you won’t notice. Because there are so many of them” (Hameleers, 2019, p. 158). It’s worth noting that calls for violence do not seem to be a prerogative of web-mediated contexts only. One need only reread the passages in Rude Democracy (Herbst, 2010) devoted to Sarah Palin’s supporters and their participation in the 2008 election campaign to get the idea. At one of the many campaign rallies—Pennsylvania, October 2008—the leader’s violent outbursts against Obama led her fans to start chanting, “Off with his head!” and “Kill him!” (Herbst, 2010, p. 43). This case, as with those concerning Trump, strongly highlights the idea that leaders’ targeted use of incivility can produce forms of tribal participation on the part of their followers. Individuals who find unity and strength in feelings of hatred towards a common enemy rather than in a shared ideology (Sandvoss, 2019) tend to develop more uninhibited behaviours of radical hostility. The group dynamic, in turn, increases levels of aggression towards opponents, with participants being more inclined to behave and act in less inhibited ways than they would as individuals (Tajfel, 1970). This overview of forms of participation “in opposition to” opponents does not exhaust the analysis of the mobilising power of incivility. Empirical research that seeks to move beyond overly normative interpretations reveals another, more nuanced aspect of incivility, highlighting some of its potentially constructive elements in fostering participation. Focusing on online political news comments, which play a pivotal role in promoting

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balanced discussions among citizens on matters of general interest, it has been observed that incivility can catalyse user engagement (Borah, 2014). Even when expressions of incivility are present, participants in debates often incorporate rational arguments and maintain a reasoned and well-informed exchange on contentious issues (Oz et al., 2018). In many instances, incivility and deliberation coexist in political conversations among individuals with differing viewpoints (Masullo Chen, 2017). Moreover, incivility can sometimes facilitate a more thorough consideration of diverse perspectives, enabling individuals to articulate their positions more effectively within a political discourse (Rossini, 2020). Such cases confirm that incivility is not amenable to definitive interpretations, and the fact that it has contrasting effects only confirms what we wrote at the beginning: namely that it is a state rather than a stable trait. Consequently, to understand its effects, it is essential to always consider the contexts in which it occurs; the characteristics, values, and goals of the actors; and the target(s) they are trying to hit.

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CHAPTER 4

Incivility as a Tool for Social Change

Abstract One key aspect explored in this chapter is how individuals and groups employ incivility to draw attention to specific issues and to underscore the unfairness and bias inherent in prevailing norms of civility. For those who have few alternatives to advocate for their rights or demand greater socio-political inclusion, incivility can be a powerful tool to achieve these objectives. The chapter also explores the mechanisms that authorities use to counter incivility when it is employed as a tool of dissent. It draws on examples from both historical and contemporary contexts, such as the civil rights movement, women’s suffrage demonstrations, and digital forms of disobedience, to illustrate how breaking established rules and violating norms of civility can serve a dual purpose for those with limited means of asserting their ideas. While incivility can empower those expressing dissenting or marginalised viewpoints in formal institutional settings, enabling them to claim their rights and advocate for greater socio-political inclusion, accusations of incivility can be weaponised by powerful organisations seeking to maintain existing power disparities in society, stigmatising and discrediting those who oppose them. The last section examines the circumstances under which uncivil politics can inspire opposing practices and movements that aim to combat incivility as well as the dynamics of how the fight against incivility can become a central objective for certain movements and individuals.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Bentivegna and R. Rega, (Un)Civil Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54405-7_4

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Keywords The weapon of incivility · Civility as a field of struggles · Civil disobedience · The “ethic of incivility”

The Politics of “Dissent” “Democracy may require withdrawal from civility itself […]. We call these situations social movements, strikes, demonstrations. We call the people who initiate such departures from civility driven, ambitious, unreasonable, self-serving, rude, hot-headed, self-absorbed […]” (Schudson, 1997, p. 308). This was Michael Schudson’s conclusion to one of his bestknown reflections on the role of conversation in a democracy, pointing out that political and social change is often the result of practices that must be considered uncivil. This throws a spotlight on the issue we will discuss in the following pages: the use of incivility to achieve positive goals, to enable marginalised groups to claim rights and achieve political recognition, and to contribute to the expansion of the democratic public sphere (Zerilli, 2014). One might be tempted to assume that such a function has been historically important—that it was significant in, for example, the cases of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, who made essential contributions to democratisation processes within their respective countries—but that it is of little relevance to modern democracies. However, this impression is shown to be mistaken as soon as one reflects on the persistent shortcomings of today’s democracies. These include gender inequality; the lack of rights of the LGBTQI+ community, of ethnic minorities and of other historically marginalised groups, and more subtle forms of exclusion rooted in everyday social and political practices. As an instrument of protest, incivility can take the form of large-scale acts of civil disobedience, aimed at challenging laws and government policies. However, it can also take the form of small-scale acts of rebellion, designed to challenge procedural and institutional shortcomings of advanced systems of government, which, while claiming to be based on principles of equality, deny citizens equal access to basic resources. One thinks, for instance, of the struggles of undocumented migrants denied the right to vote or, to take a less orthodox example, of practices of hacktivism inspired by principles of open access. In this connection, it is worth mentioning the case of Aaron Swartz, a PhD student at Harvard

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University and author of the Guerrilla Open Access Manifesto,1 arrested in January 2011 for using his academic account illegally to download over 4.8 million scientific articles. Aimed at freeing “information blocked by publishers”—because, as he himself wrote, there is no justice in following unjust laws (2008)—Swartz’s initiative ended tragically, in 2013, with his suicide following a thirty-five-year prison sentence. From a normative standpoint, it is at least doubtful whether his action should be classified as a criminal act—rather than as a form of digital disobedience and civic resistance against inequality. Beyond the judgements one may have about it, the point to underline is how practices of this type can sometimes represent expressions of political agency on the part of citizens: demonstrations of empowerment designed to act as a “corrective” to a lack of the rights normally guaranteed to a democratic citizenship (Edyvane & Kulenovic, 2017). From this perspective, incivility may be perceived as an instrument of political change and the achievement of greater equality. Even if it fails in this respect, it still sends a powerful message by challenging certain practices or institutions upheld by dominant ideologies. The provocative gesture of Colin Kaepernick, the San Francisco 49ers quarterback who refused to stand during the national anthem in 2016, is a good example. Motivated by a desire to challenge deeply rooted practices of violence in American policing, his gesture not only succeeded in bringing the issue of discrimination and racist violence to public attention, but also became a symbol of universal protest. The decision of the African-American athlete and “Black Lives Matter” activist, Gwen Berry, to turn her back on her country’s flag while standing on the podium at the Olympic qualifiers in the summer of 2021 was another example. From these examples, it is immediately apparent that the power of incivility as an instrument of protest often lies in its symbolic significance. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes, dissent is accompanied by forms of actual confrontation or actions that go beyond “a mere appeal to the conscience of the powers that be and their respective majorities” (Celikates, 2016, p. 43). This occurs when real moments of rupture take place, resulting in tangible political, legal, or economic consequences. Such instances include direct actions like acts of sabotage against facilities

1 Swartz, A. Guerrilla Open Access Manifesto, 2008, available at: https://archive.org/ details/GuerillaOpenAccess Manifesto.

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conducting animal testing, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) cyberattacks that disrupt websites and servers, or blockades of infrastructure and transportation means, such as those related to nuclear waste, carried out by environmental activists. Governments often label these initiatives as violent, uncivil, or criminal, especially when conducted by marginalised groups. In some cases, even terms like “terrorist” or “cyber-terrorist” are attached to those involved in such activities, recognising the significant impact labels have on public opinion. However, the practice of labelling dissent is not new; it has a long history. Citizens’ demands for recognition, participation in democratic processes, and greater involvement in shaping their society are often handled in these ways, which, by their very nature, have accompanied and influenced the debate on incivility from the very beginning. Indeed, historically, disenfranchised minorities, such as women and African-Americans, have regularly been accused of incivility just because they have “dared” to stand up in public and claim their rights. The same thing happens today more than a century later. When faced with protest groups, from the Occupy Wall Street movement opposing inequality by occupying Zuccotti Park in 2011 to the anti-racist Black Lives Matter movement, authorities tend to treat dissent in a similar way: by criminalising activists and depicting them as a threat to the established order. Edyvane (2020) articulates this process succinctly when he refers to incivility as dissent: “the powerless are ignored and this compels them to shout. When they shout, they are charged with incivility” (p. 98). The examination of incivility as an instrument of struggle and the reactions it elicits from authorities and society highlights two complementary and interdependent functions. On the one hand, incivility appears to be a potentially effective tool for those expressing dissenting or marginalised views within formal institutional settings. It serves to elevate the profile of an issue in public discourse, assert rights, and advocate for greater social and political inclusion. On the other hand, accusations of incivility can be an equally effective means for established groups seeking to uphold existing power relations. Such groups use accusations of incivility to stigmatise those attempting to challenge the status quo. In the following pages, we will take a close look at two processes. The use of incivility for the purposes of protest and the pursuit of demands for greater inclusivity; and, conversely, the appeal to norms of civility for the purposes of stifling dissent and preserving inequality. This will reveal how vagueness surrounding principles of civility have contributed to the

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uses and abuses of the concept over time. Starting from an analysis of these ambivalences and lexical uncertainties, we shall highlight the ways in which calls for more moderate practices and conduct are in many circumstances used as tools to suppress dissent. We will then consider the politics of contestation, exploring the diverse forms that incivility as a means of protest can take. This includes both the everyday resistance practices of historically marginalised groups and acts of civil disobedience and protest by various movements. Finally, we will try to understand when and how, in the case of movements that make the struggle against incivility their raison d’être, incivility can inspire action of the opposite kind.

Civility or Politeness? Unequal Power Relations Disguised by Good Manners Exploring the role of civility in silencing dissent and preserving social and political hierarchies may initially seem unrelated to the central themes of this book. However, bearing in mind our invitation to consider civility and incivility as “states” (Herbst, 2010, p. 10)—that can be activated for the achievement of specific goals, positive or negative—it is apparent that the two are closely related. In particular, incivility is often framed as a violation of interpersonal etiquette between individuals rather than as a transgression of democratic principles like inclusion, pluralism, and tolerance (Papacharissi, 2004). According to this view, appropriate behaviour, a polite demeanour, and good manners are considered civil, but these rules of conduct are not neutral; they are defined and imposed by those in positions of power on individuals with less power, who are expected to display deference and courtesy to their superiors. As Linda Zerilli (2014) plainly puts it, a misconception or incomplete understanding of civility, often equating it with mere politeness, has historically perpetuated inequality and upheld patriarchal and male chauvinistic social norms. The veneer of politeness and good manners, in fact, helps to mask unequal power relations, which is why civility—understood, to repeat, as mere politeness—can even make people less susceptible to perceptions of actual social oppression and injustice.2 When framed this way, periodic 2 Taking perhaps the most controversial and divisive case in American history, that of racism, Zerilli (2014) shows that this conception of civility played a crucial role in promoting an idealised conception of race relations. From a different perspective, but

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appeals to good manners in public debates can be useful to those seeking to limit and control the rights of the marginalised in order to maintain the privileges and power of the strong. If participation in democratic life is granted only to those who conform to what is deemed an acceptable style, anyone expressing dissent or engaging in radical protests to challenge these behavioural norms and secure greater rights will automatically be accused of incivility and restricted in their fundamental freedoms. Although these constraints are less overt today, they still underpin highly unequal standards of behaviour. For example, African-American men are judged more harshly than white men when they raise their voices or express anger in public (Strachan & Wolf, 2012). Similarly, gender norms impose asymmetrical expectations on women. Women are socialised to adopt more respectful and polite forms of interaction; they are expected to be moderate and deferential, refraining from interrupting others, being aggressive, or using offensive or vehement language (ibidem). This is way feminist movements challenge these norms openly, they face stronger public sanctions, and the accusation of incivility is strategically used to position them outside the democratic perimeter, as exemplified by the use of the derogatory term “femiNazis” to discredit feminists by associating them with Nazis (Braunstein, 2018). However, the indirect effects of these constraints are more widespread. They discourage political engagement among women and members of minority groups (Strachan & Wolf, 2012). So, how does this conservative and sometimes undemocratic use of the concept work in practice? The metaphor of “civility contests” (Braunstein, 2018) provides a useful framework. It suggests that those who hold institutionalised power systematically engage in defining symbolic boundaries between civility and incivility. They use these distinctions to control, suppress, or redirect political protests towards more peaceful forms of expression. This framework is evident, for example, in the case of the Black Lives Matter movement, where the police harassment of protesters labelled as uncivil sends a broader message: that excessive anger on the

one still useful for the purposes of understanding the misconceptions concerning civility, Papacharissi observes that “[…] it is not civility that limits the democratic potential of conversation, but rather, a confusion of politeness with civility. It is adherence to etiquette that frequently restricts conversation, by making it reserved, tepid, less spontaneous” (2004, p. 260).

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part of protesters invalidates their legitimate demand for equal rights as other citizens, extending beyond the immediate context. The classification of actions or behaviours as civil or uncivil is influenced by the positions of the actors in relation to political and institutional power, and these dynamic shapes their roles in the “civility contest”. An interesting example of this is John Adams, who, before becoming the President of the United States, was a “revolutionary” (ibid., p. 618). As a revolutionary, he rejected the legitimacy of civility norms, but once in power, he signed controversial and unpopular laws known as the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which used incivility as a justification for imprisoning or deporting foreigners critical of the government or deemed dangerous to national security. Linked to this is what we might call the logic of double standards, illustrated by two episodes. The first, already mentioned, relates to Colin Kaepernick whose refusal to stand during the national anthem was imitated by other athletes. Donald Trump stigmatised their behaviour as unacceptable and offensive to the country, suggesting that they should leave their professions and move abroad (Braunstein, 2018). Trump echoed the sentiments of many Americans who interpreted the athletes’ peaceful protest as an affront and security threat. This underscores how attributions of incivility are influenced by those in power and societal prejudices. The second episode is the Charlottesville riot. In August 2017, a demonstration by white supremacists against the removal of Confederate monuments in the city turned it into a theatre of violent clashes, which led the governor of Virginia to proclaim a state of emergency. The white supremacists engaged in violence, injuring many people and causing the death of a woman. Surprisingly, Trump did not condemn them and even suggested they were defending patriotic American values. This highlights the bias underlying the civil versus uncivil distinction, how it operates and how it is applied and, at the same time, adds another piece to the jigsaw of what is meant by (in)civility. Indeed, the juxtaposition of the two terms reveals that, rather than being defined by a specific offence, incivility is defined according to who commits it (Braunstein, 2018). Thus, in the definition of an action or behaviour as uncivil, what counts is the context in which it takes place, the interpretation of the beholder, his position in the hierarchy of power, and who performs the action. Some individuals and groups enjoy a kind of “privileged legitimacy” (Smith, 1996) that shields them from condemnation, while

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less privileged groups often face more negative reactions for the same behaviour. This double standard further clarifies how the instrumental uses of civility work and why some individuals and groups are more sheltered than others from the attribution of incivility and the consequences that flow from that. It is clear from what has been said so far why appeals to civility are often mistrusted. Not only can they contribute to maintaining the status quo, but they can distract from what is really at stake in many of the uncivil episodes of contemporary political life: the—often disregarded—demand that we see each other as equal citizens (Zerilli, 2014) deserving the same respect and rights. These underlying issues often revolve around political and social inequality, discrimination, and the denial of equal freedom and rights to all members of the community. From this perspective, incivility becomes a symptom of deeper and more concerning problems in society.

Incivility as a Democratic Weapon of the Powerless What do poaching by British farm labourers, protest by the suffragettes, collective action against neo-liberalism and the revelations of Edward Snowden have in common? Clearly, these are quite distinct expressions of dissent, differing in terms of their objectives, their levels of articulation and organisation, and their degrees of public visibility. What links them is the fact that they reflect demands for greater democracy—fairer rights for all, more inclusive and transparent decision-making processes, etc.—and a resort to forms of contestation not officially recognised by the system. They confirm that, as an instrument of dissent, incivility can be manifested in various ways. Over time, it has been used by diverse actors, all of whom have challenged existing norms, reinterpreted them in a more democratic sense, and opposed those who established them. Acts of rebellion against those in power have in many cases developed in combination with impromptu expressions of opposition that have not always been identifiable as such and therefore punishable as such. One key concept in this context is “infrapolitics”, as described by James C. Scott (1990). Infrapolitics refers to the political actions and stratagems of subordinate groups that do not necessarily involve open and collective opposition to those in power or total conformity. Instead, it operates in the space between these extremes, encompassing a multitude

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of actions and strategies expressing protest against various forms of injustice and oppression. Infrapolitical actions vary depending on the context and include tactics such as sabotaging crops, forms of indolence, low productivity, appropriation of land, unauthorised gleaning, self-reduction of rents in kind, and failure to fulfil feudal obligations. It’s particularly striking that norm violation in these actions implies an awareness on the part of the rebels of their rights, which, due to their inability to assert them openly, are exercised in a coordinated but covert manner. These actions express ideological dissent through circumspect and silent yet politically significant forms of contestation. When frontal attacks are precluded by those in power, the powerless express ideological dissent through circumspect and silent, but politically significant forms of contestation (Scott, 1990). The repertoire of action devised to escape the clutches of repression is rich and varied. It includes the use of alternative linguistic codes; forms of derision of power; techniques of disguising political messages; practices that “trace” normality and conform to its canons (such as the mass walks organised in Poland to challenge the martial law instituted against regime dissidents). In all these cases, incivility can be seen as a democratic weapon used by the weaker parties. In more modern settings, the need to hide from power is sometimes fulfilled in a completely contrasting manner. Where political and institutional systems are egalitarian, albeit not always sensitive to the demands of particular categories of people, dissent requires not going unnoticed in the public sphere and the media in order to influence the political agenda. Therefore, the logic changes, but some of the expedients used actually hark back to earlier traditions of popular struggle. One only has to think of the strategies adopted by collective movements such as, for example, boycotts of the products of multinational corporations, or the irreverent demonstrations of Gay Pride, etc. Generally speaking, it can be argued that for weaker actors or for those who act as spokespersons for them, incivility can be used in two main ways. Firstly, it can be used expressively to convey an immediately recognisable message of dissent, often outspoken and theatrical in democratic systems or allusive and subtle in other cases. Secondly, it can be used in instrumental-strategic ways to produce or at least make political change more likely. Breaking the rules involved in such contestation and causing symbolic and material damage caused to those on the receiving end of

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the protest3 may encourage those in power to reconsider their policies and actions. The relationship between these two aspects, the symbolic and substantial, emerges clearly in relation to the field of civil disobedience, which is also a form of protest against the norms of civility established by those in power. Traditionally understood as “a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies” (Rawls, 1999, p. 320), civil disobedience has a number of distinctive features. It is public action; it is non-violent and represents a form of active refusal by citizens to obey certain government provisions. Those who decide, publicly and explicitly, to break them accept the legal and practical consequences of their conduct. The battle of women in the United Kingdom for the right to vote falls partly into this category. Members of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (“NUWSS”) engaged in various forms of protest, such as chaining themselves to public buildings, organising petitions, and attempting to obstruct the work of Parliament. However, there were also more radical elements within the movement that engaged in violence against police officers, attacks on public and private property, and arson. These actions led to the criminalisation of the women’s movement, with accusations of incivility, violence, and danger. The key question raised by these actions is whether, when faced with protests by citizens demanding greater rights, it is more sensible to abandon vague appeals to the ideal of civility and focus instead on addressing the underlying democratic deficit. Viewing forms of dissent as signals highlighting obstacles to creating a model of citizenship worthy of the name suggests that they can help revitalise, rather than undermine, democratic institutions. To underline this virtuous function, it has even been suggested that there exists “an ethics of incivility” and that incivility may “make a distinctively valuable contribution to the repertoire of democratic resistance” (Edyvane, 2020, p. 106). This idea, bizarre at first 3 In this regard, a particularly clear example is the form of protest adopted by the activist group, Kein Mensch Ist Illegal (No human being is illegal) to draw attention to the inhumane practices of forced repatriation of refugees carried out by Lufthansa in collaboration with the German authorities. Through sensational actions, such as the infiltration of activists dressed as stewards into the Lufthansa convention and the promotion of a new tourist class (the “Lufthansa Deportation Class”) through marketing and advertising material, the group managed to gain public and media attention. Its action later forced the airline to adopt a more cautious policy.

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sight, that there exists an ethics of incivility, needs to be treated with due caution. On the one hand, it seems very promising because it helps us to move away from normative approaches aimed mainly at condemning and prohibiting actions that violate prevailing norms. We have seen that uncivil behaviour often expresses a demand for recognition of one’s participation in pursuit of the common good. Whether it takes the form of protest against racial violence or against exclusion of the powerless from a series of rights, branding these practices tout court as threats to democracy does not help the cause. However, such an interpretation could be used to defend contrasting but equally questionable interpretations, ones that go so far as to justify any type of behaviour—secret conspiracies, forms of illegality, etc.—aimed at achieving democratic objectives (Edyvane & Kulenovic, 2017). The complexity of this issue is evident, and there is no one-size-fits-all solution. The need to move away from normative interpretations anchored to astatic idea of civility is reinforced when considering new forms of dissent organised on the web. In the digital realm, there is often a contradiction between rules established by tech companies and the original culture of the open and mutualistic Internet. Violations of these rules by movements inspired by principles of open access have sparked debates about whether such actions can be considered updated forms of civil disobedience. Well-known cases like that of Edward Snowden (the former CIA agent and collaborator of a consulting company working for the National Security Agency) who, in June 2013, publicly revealed top secret documents on mass surveillance programmes conducted by the US and British governments. Snowden, accused of espionage and theft of government property—Trump called him a “terrible traitor” who deserved to be executed4 —could represent a case of digital disobedience, in which the use of incivility is associated with vindication of the legitimate rights of citizens to individual privacy. The role of incivility as an instrument of protest becomes clear through the analysis of cases like these. While historical and political contexts change, the use of incivility to challenge the dominant system of rules

4 Trump in particular called Snowden a “traitor” from the beginning of the story and argued that he should be executed; see Trump Says He’ll Look into a Pardon for Edward Snowden, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/15/us/politics/ trump-snowden-esper.html.

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remains a recurring path taken by those seeking change and greater democratic rights.

The Civility of Incivility: Conceptual and Practical Challenges We have observed that incivility has been strategically employed to advocate for more inclusive rights and obligations, as well as to thrust certain emancipatory issues into the spotlight. In these instances, incivility serves as a valuable resource not only for individual actors, such as politicians, citizens, or media outlets, but also for groups, collectives, or movements championing themes and issues that have been marginalised in public discourse. The prominence of the collective dimension reinforces the notion that we should view (in)civility as “a political weapon” (Herbst, 2010). In its broadest and most political interpretation, civility, seen as a shared heritage of democratic values—encompassing inclusion, pluralism, equal rights, and more—may, at times, necessitate the breaching of social norms of politeness. This breach allows for the articulation of multiple demands emerging from the grassroots. In essence, while the presence of incivility in public discourse can sometimes undermine the discourse itself, there is no denying that, in specific circumstances, actions challenging norms of civility can invigorate public debate. Moreover, the objective of democratic politics should not be to stifle dissent and eliminate political conflict; rather, it should aim to harness these passions in service of a democratic project. In this regard, Chantal Mouffe aptly noted that politics in a healthy, pluralistic democracy is necessarily “agonistic” (1999). With these considerations in mind, it is intriguing to scrutinise recent examples that illustrate the connection between the vibrancy of public discourse and citizens’ capacity to respond to manifestations of incivility by those in power. In reality, it is not overly challenging to identify instances where groups, initiatives, or movements have made opposition to the uncivil and intolerant politics of their institutional representatives a central pillar of their existence. In some cases, incivility, originally employed as a tool of protest, has become the very object of protest. One of the most notable examples of this nature is the movement of women against Trump, known as the Women’s March. This movement emerged in the wake of the inauguration of the then-President on January 21, 2017, with the explicit goal of sending a resounding

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message to the administration: women’s rights are human rights. Right from the outset, the potential of this message was evident, as it quickly transcended national boundaries and assumed an international dimension, rallying global support for women’s rights. As the Facebook page of the Women’s March in London reported, “We will march… for the protection of our fundamental rights and for the safeguarding of freedoms threatened by recent political events” (Schmidt & Almukhtar, 2017). This protest rapidly gained a global following, with participants from Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Europe, Australia, Japan, and numerous African countries. Going beyond its initial objective of combatting the misogynistic and sexist culture embodied by Donald Trump, the Women’s March movement embraced broader objectives: “to fight disinformation, racism, white supremacist ideology, and discrimination against minorities (…); to promote equal rights for all”5 and to reestablish the foundational values of a pluralistic, open, and inclusive democracy at the forefront of public discourse. In essence, it served as an exemplar of transversal civil reaction against the uncivil degeneration of politics. The role of movements that emerged in Brazil to counter Jair Bolsonaro’s deceitful and intimidating politics is equally significant. Various activist groups, such as Ocupa MinC RJ, Brazil’s Unified Black Movement, and Reage Artista, had consistently opposed the government’s political methods. However, during the coronavirus pandemic, they successfully mobilised the entire country against Bolsonaro’s denialist approach, ultimately calling for his impeachment. Whether this mobilisation took the form of digital engagement through the proliferation of videos and materials on social media during the “Brazilian D-Day” (Dia-D, January 21, 2021, #impeachmentdebolsonarojá) or the physical presence of masses in the country’s squares during impeachment rallies, is of secondary importance. More significant, from our current perspective, was the simple fact that civil society and a large number of citizens, faced with the arrogance of power and the systematic use of lies, chose to rebel publicly by courageously expressing their anger. Their actions epitomised what Karen Tracy (2010) refers to as “reasonable hostility”, a form of antagonism that arises in response to injustice or threats. It is a kind of antagonism that is partially “constrained”. To be deemed reasonable, it must evolve 5 The aims and objectives of the movement are set out at: https://www.womensmarch. com/about-us.

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as a response to an attack, refraining from personal insults and adhering to socially rooted standards of judgement. However, it is an antagonism that underscores the necessity of passionate and angry expression, which Tracy posits is “essential to public life” (Tracy, 2010, p. 202). This perspective by American scholar Karen Tracy highlights the view that collective indignation can be regarded as an essential driver of social change rather than as a threat to the quality of public discourse. As demonstrated by the two cited cases, indignation is not merely an expression of anger for its own sake or a negative judgement about a specific action or event. On the contrary, by touching upon collective values and beliefs, indignation can also serve to fortify the norms of coexistence and the very identity of the community by inciting it to action or reaction (Mancini, 2023). This perspective helps elucidate the emotionally charged reactions of Black Lives Matter (BLM) activists to the systematic injustices embedded in American institutions riddled with racism, sexism, and homophobia. In line with this view, scholars William Keith and Robert Danisch (2020) emphasise how the BLM protests bear witness to the fact that “the social democracy that underlies our institutions is incomplete” (p. 153). They disagree with the criticism voiced by Barack Obama, who suggested that BLM activists “should be willing to sit down and discuss their agenda with leaders in power rather than ‘yelling at them’” (Atkinson, 2016). Keith and Danisch argue that the real incivility lies not in activists raising their voices to their political representatives but in a system where the likelihood of an African-American man being shot by the police is over three times greater than that for a Euro-American man. From their point of view, it is understandable why the leaders of BLM are reluctant to engage in dialogue with deeply racist and uncivil institutions: “The refusal to engage deeply uncivil institutions (…) seems reasonable and civil to us” (Keith & Danisch, 2020, p. 163). Numerous examples of this nature could be cited, but the key takeaway is that incivility is a flexible resource that can be employed to challenge the imperfections of the status quo and advocate for democratic reform. Up to this point, our focus has primarily been on the substance of these actions and the motivations driving them. However, another central aspect to consider is the methods and forms of dissent adopted by activists, which can naturally vary depending on their areas of operation. Recent protests against climate change denial by various governments, for instance, have shed light on the tactics used by activists to garner support and elevate

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the public profile of the issue. Some youth movements, such as Extinction Rebellion, Just Stop Oil, or Last Generation, aimed to capture attention and surpass the threshold of newsworthiness by targeting works of art (including those by Botticelli, Van Gogh, Monet, Klimt, etc.) by smearing them with washable paint or applying glue to the frame or protective glass. These bold actions were intended to raise awareness among citizens that environmental issues can no longer be postponed. However, in some segments of public opinion, these actions had a boomerang effect, with some factions perceiving them as subversive and, therefore, uncivil gestures. While activists justified the extremism of their actions based on the importance of the issues they sought to highlight, others interpreted these activities as expressions of anger for their own sake. Irrespective of individual judgements, the discussions ignited by the proliferation of such initiatives allow for a further reflection: the transgression of behavioural norms and values in an attempt to challenge power can be effective tools for democratic change when supported by civil practices implying recognition of one’s membership in the community. In the case of the aforementioned environmental movements, the methods of protest undertaken do not appear to contribute to strengthening the norms of coexistence or the identity of the community. Consequently, actions taken against cultural heritage—defined by their perpetrators as “non-violent” and motivated by civil objectives such as truth, democracy, security, and the well-being of citizens—paradoxically risk weakening and delegitimising the very aims of the protest. The debate on these forms of mobilisation is ongoing and has yet to yield definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, the examples considered demonstrate the vigilant role adopted by citizens during moments of political representation crisis, deadlock, or the erosion of democratic practices. In recent years, especially in response to the extreme and aggressive qualities of political discourse, citizens have not only displayed commendable levels of resilience but have also demonstrated an ability to redefine the game, steering it in an alternative direction. Evidence of this can be found in numerous initiatives developed worldwide based on values of recognition and respect for others, the sharing of authentic experiences, open and non-prejudicial communication aimed at connecting people rather than driving them apart. Consider, for example, the Hate Speech Task Force of Amnesty International, which monitors discussions on the Facebook pages of

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newspapers and intervenes in debates on sensitive topics (such as Islamophobia, gender issues, and the criminalisation of solidarity) to counter uncivil comments and discriminatory language. Other examples include groups inspired by the Swedish model, such as #jagärhär, founded by journalist Mina Dennert, which promotes active citizen participation in the fight against hatred and fake news. Another instance is Change My View (CMV), an online community on Reddit dedicated to constructive dialogue and open discussion of various topics, encouraging users to express their opinions and to examine and understand those of others to the extent that they sometimes change their perspectives on a particular subject. These signs invite us to consider the possibility that, despite the contradictions and sometimes counterproductive effects of excessively radical expressions of dissent, the plurality of voices and demands expressed in the public sphere, for all their ambivalence, represent an enriching element. In the absence of definitive answers, we cannot help but concur with Phillips and Milner’s observation regarding the ambivalence that permeates contemporary public discourse (2017). They point out that “if history has been plagued by a lack of voices and representation, maybe the future will be plagued by too many and too much — and that’s progress, even if it’s also impossibly ambivalent” (p. 200).

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Keith, W. M., & Danisch, R. (2020). Beyond Civility: The Competing Obligations of Citizenship. Pennsylvania State University Press. Mancini, P. (2023). Perché non ci indigniamo. Rubbettino. Mouffe, C. (1999). Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? Social Research, 66(3), 745–758. Papacharissi, Z. (2004). Democracy Online: Civility, Politeness, and the Democratic Potential of Online Political Discussion Groups. New Media & Society, 6(2), 259–283. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444804041444 Phillips, W., & Milner, R. M. (2017). The Ambivalent Internet: Mischief, Oddity, and Antagonism Online. Polity. Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press. Schmidt, K., & Almukhtar, S. (2017, January 17). Where Women’s Marches Are Happening Around the World. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/interactive/2017/01/17/us/womens-march.html Schudson, M. (1997). Why Conversation Is Not the Soul of Democracy. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 14(4), 297–309. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 15295039709367020 Scott, J. C. (1990). Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. Yale University Press. Smith, C. (1996). Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism. Routledge. Strachan, J. C., & Wolf, M. R. (2012). Political Civility: Introduction to Political Civility. PS: Political Science & Politics , 45(3), 401–404. https://doi.org/10. 1017/S1049096512000455 Tracy, K. (2010). Challenges of Ordinary Democracy: A Case Study in Deliberation and Dissent. Pennsylvania State University Press. Zerilli, L. M. G. (2014). Against Civility: A Feminist Perspective. In A. Sarat (Ed.), Civility, Legality, and Justice in America (pp. 107–131). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107479852.005

CHAPTER 5

Incivility and Democracy

Abstract After defining the concept of political incivility and elucidating the phenomenon from a theoretical standpoint, the chapter draws on empirical research on the impacts of incivility, focusing on three key aspects of discourse. Firstly, there is an escalation in distrust of political representation that ultimately leads to citizens distancing themselves from politics and democratic engagement over time. Secondly, when discourses are grounded in the delegitimisation of others and democratic processes, anti-deliberative and polarised attitudes tend to rise, fostering aversion towards those with differing viewpoints. This undermines the potential for dialogue and engagement among citizens, which is a fundamental element of democratic life. The third dimension under scrutiny is the growth of polarisation, particularly in its manifestation as “affective polarisation”. By highlighting the shared roots of incivility and polarisation, both of which thrive on identification with one’s own group and the rejection or distancing from others, the chapter underscores the risks associated with the spread of “uncivil polarisation”. These risks impact both the functioning of democracy and citizens’ relationship with politics. Keywords The value of civility · Political distrust · Uncivil polarisation · Civil disagreement · Democratic values

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Bentivegna and R. Rega, (Un)Civil Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54405-7_5

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Why Does Civility Matter? To complete the analysis of the strategic uses of incivility, it is essential to consider its impact on democracy. This need arises from the recognition that “any healthy society should set civility as a goal, even while it debates what civility means for us today” (Boatright, 2019, p. 4). Zizi Papacharissi (2004) shares this sentiment, asserting that “conversations on the meaning of citizenship, democracy, and public discourse highlight civility as a virtue, the lack of which carries detrimental implications for a democratic society” (p. 260). But what does it mean to assert that every healthy society should aim for civility or that its absence has harmful consequences for democracy? What are those consequences, and why should we be care about them? Before addressing these questions, it’s important to recognise that “civility achieves nothing in and of itself”, and even a “sympathetic audience can view civility as an unwelcome distraction from strategic planning” (Gastil, 2019, p. 163). This statement is, of course, an exaggeration intended to emphasise how challenging it is to associate the concept of civility with the strategic plans of individual actors seeking to achieve specific objectives. It’s easier, as we’ve seen in previous pages, to identify the numerous forms of incivility as a strategic resource available to politicians, the media, citizens, and other actors. However, to fully understand the significance of political incivility and its implications for democratic systems, we must begin with the etymology of civility, which places the civies (the citizens) and the civitas (the city)—that is, the individual actor and the collective entity—at the centre. Governance of the civitas is based on the comparison of different viewpoints and the selection of those preferred by the citizens. In order for a shared decision to be reached, the different positions must be capable of being known and evaluated, just as the decision-making mechanisms must be shared and recognised. Civility, therefore, supports the community (Gastil, 2008) and the individuals who are part of it, and is a shared heritage rather than a strategic resource available to individuals, as is often the case with incivility. It’s precisely because civility is about the community that there have been so many “calls for civility” in recent years. The concerns expressed by political actors and scholars reflect their awareness of the harm associated with the proliferation of incivility. While civility may have few individual advantages, it is crucial at a collective level for fostering discussion and democratic debate.

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Paying attention to the spread of incivility means acknowledging the symptoms of democratic malaise present in Western societies. Other symptoms, such as information disorder, are perceived by the public as more threatening than incivility. However, in our view, incivility is equally, if not more, threatening precisely because it is often treated as a problem of politeness rather than responsiveness. In short, we worry about information disorder but tend to overlook the danger of incivility, forgetting that it too involves the use of lies, slander, and defamation—phenomena that create fertile ground for disinformation campaigns designed to damage or hinder a party involved in a discussion (as seen, for example, in the Brexit referendum of 2016). Furthermore, while remedial measures have been taken by tech companies and governments to address information disorder, incivility has undergone a process of normalisation. This normalisation has thrived in the proliferation of populist parties, which often adopt communication styles that are uncivil or employ language designed to convey their distance from traditional elites and their alignment with ordinary citizens. We will delve into these aspects in greater detail in the following pages. However, for now, it is crucial to clarify what we mean by political incivility. If civility is a fundamental attribute of democratic life, its definition can vary based on theoretical constructs, operationalisations, and empirical interpretations that depend significantly on the context. Furthermore, the act of defining incivility is an exercise of power that often aims to establish what is considered civil and what is uncivil, sometimes with the intention of silencing dissenting voices or maintaining forms of social inequality. With that in mind, we can explore how researchers have defined the concept by drawing from their theoretical reflections and empirical analyses of how citizens understand the term. At the core of the various definitions offered is a shared understanding of incivility as a violation of norms of respect—for other participants, the setting, and the topics discussed (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014; Coe et al., 2014; Gervais, 2014; Mutz, 2015)—within public discourse (Gastil, 2008). Additionally, it has been viewed as a breach of democratic norms or as a threat to democracy and individual rights (Papacharissi, 2004). Recognising the complexity of the phenomenon, scholars have approached incivility as a breach of multiple norms, encompassing both “personal-level” and “public-level” norms (Muddiman, 2017), or as behaviour that violates interpersonal respect (incivility) or threatens democracy, such as intolerance (Rossini, 2020). As we explored in the

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previous pages of this volume, incivility can manifest in various ways, spanning from sexism and racism to discrimination, insulting behaviour, violence, attempts to silence others, the mystification of reality, and more. By delineating the semantic field of incivility—understood as a violation of interpersonal norms and the functioning of democracy (Bentivegna & Rega, 2022)—scholars have facilitated a substantial body of empirical research into its prevalence and how it is perceived. This research has yielded valuable data describing not only the evolution of the phenomenon but also its long-term effects on democratic processes. Our interest here lies in these effects. In other words, after discussing the phenomenon from the perspective of individual actors and its role in identity politics and attracting audiences, we will now explore it from the standpoint of society as a whole. Society faces a threat from the lack of respect for others and the failure to adhere to the norms governing social life. In short, “when politicians resort to insulting each other or referring to their opponents by demeaning nicknames, […] they undermine the dignity and seriousness of politics” (Laden, 2019, p. 12). Unfortunately, the increasing adoption of communicative styles typical of populism has contributed to transforming political discourse into one that often disrespects others and disregards the rules of the democratic game. Many years ago, Barack Obama warned of the risk of growing citizen alienation from politics due to the proliferation of acts of incivility and violence. He argued that “only a more honest and civil society can help us face the challenges posed to our country1 ”. Regrettably, many events in recent years have been influenced by decisions and strategies that embody very different values. The decline of civility in public life has escalated to the point where awareness of the threat inherent in the use of political incivility extends beyond political actors and scholars to encompass citizens, as evidenced by data on perceptions of the problem in different countries.2 Understanding the consequences of political incivility for

1 Speech delivered by Barack Obama in Tucson, in memory of the victims involved in the shooting of the Democratic Party Congresswoman, Gabrielle Giffords, on January 8, 2011. 2 According to a survey conducted by the Weber Shandwick organisation a few years ago, 75% of Americans agreed that there is a crisis of civility. Our research group conducted a survey in January 2022 revealing an even larger proportion among Italian citizens: 80%.

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democracy is challenging due to the complexity of social phenomena, which often makes it difficult to identify causal relationships between variables and can lead to misleading interpretations. Nonetheless, we propose that the phenomena described below are linked to the spread of political incivility. The first concern relates to the way cynicism and political disaffection (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997) have led to a progressive distancing of citizens from politics and democratic values. Exposure to political discourses that seek to delegitimise others and violate democratic principles fosters the growth of anti-deliberative and polarised attitudes, intensifying feelings of aversion towards those with differing views. The lack of respect for others reveals that political incivility has reached a point where it undermines democratic stability, initiating a process of delegitimisation that affects both individual actors (such as leaders or parties) and democratic institutions (defined as the sites and processes of political decision-making).

Incivility and Mistrust in Politics Among the numerous phenomena attributable to political incivility, one prominent issue is the erosion of trust in politics and the delegitimisation of political institutions. For decades, shifts in the relationship between citizens and politics have been linked to changes in the media environment, starting with the advent of television and later encompassing entertainment, the Internet, and social media. Unfortunately, many analyses have stopped short of examining the consequences of political media coverage, but when this approach was adopted, data indicated that journalistic coverage of congressional speeches frequently violated norms of respect for others (Uslaner, 1993). These breaches were connected to citizens’ feelings of dissatisfaction with Congress (Elving, 1994). Moreover, the emphasis on conflict between political parties was shown to be associated with an increase in political cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Consequently, it was hypothesised that political journalism, which consistently seeks conflict and clashes among actors, was responsible for unfavourable attitudes towards politicians (Patterson, 1993). These attitudes extended to the media itself, leading to increased mistrust and delegitimisation (Goovaerts, 2022). The combination of negative information coverage and the availability of television images form the basis for the “videomalaise” theory

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(Robinson, 1975). This theory suggests a direct link between television news consumption and the decline of trust in politicians and political institutions. Although the empirical findings were not always consistent, the “videomalaise” thesis gained considerable traction in the 1980s, particularly regarding the idea that political television had intensified “ordinary Americans’ traditional low opinion of politics and politicians, by exacerbating the decline in their trust and confidence in their government and its institutions” (Ranney, 1983, p. 86). The dissemination of images related to politicians and political arenas, including verbal or even physical confrontations, was associated with negative public attitudes towards politics. On the other hand, it is challenging to maintain a positive attitude towards politics after witnessing images of the U.S. Congress being occupied by Donald Trump supporters or hearing speeches marked by stigmatisation, stereotyping, or threats to minority groups. This negative relationship is often explained by appealing to the sense of intimacy activated by the television (Hart, 1994). Television brings viewers into close proximity to political actors and institutional settings, intensifying the emotional impact of encounters between political figures. These emotions might appear unrelated to politics but are prevalent in contemporary political discourse (Davies, 2018). In today’s media ecosystem, where legacy media and social media intermingle, intimacy and emotion are inherent elements of communication in all contexts. According to some scholars, “when political actors engage in televised interactions that violate the norms for everyday, face-to-face discourse, they reaffirm viewers’ sense that politicians cannot be counted on to obey the same norms for social behaviour that ordinary citizens abide” (Mutz & Reeves, 2005, p. 2). However, the rise of new populist parties has significantly altered these expectations concerning political actors. Voters likely welcome violations of social norms, interpreting them as expressions of closeness to them and distance from the elites. This dynamic involves a mirroring operation, appealing to voters based on identification: “I’m like you, you can vote for me”. The erosion of trust in politicians and politics, therefore, does not seem to result from disappointed expectations but, conversely, from a strong identification that leads to the denial of differentiation and claims of superiority that once motivated voters to choose someone who “knew more than the citizens”. The relationship between journalistic coverage of political incivility and an increase in distrust has been the subject of extensive empirical research

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(Van’t Riet & Van Stekelenburg, 2022). This research has demonstrated a decline in trust in political institutions after exposure to uncivil content (Borah, 2014; Forgette & Morris, 2006; Mutz, 2015; Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Alongside these studies, additional research has suggested a link between incivility and distrust in politics only in specific circumstances (Mölders et al., 2017), or it has found no link at all (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Otto et al., 2020). The contradictory nature of these results can be explained by the contrasting ways in which the concept of incivility has been operationalised, the various forms of expression analysed, and the different contexts in which incivility episodes have occurred. However, it is important to emphasise that, to a varying degree, episodes of incivility contribute to altering the public’s perception of political actors and institutions. Naturally, when an uncivil incident involves a member of the political group to which we belong, we tend to be more tolerant and may even overlook it. At times, we may feel better represented or even fully “represented”, especially when certain political actors help shape our political identities. Conversely, we often condemn as uncivil the same expressions used by actors who do not align with our political group. This duality in evaluation impacts our overall perception of politics, leading us to divide it into “ours” and that of “others”. Thus, although incivility enables political actors to attract attention—by arousing feelings of rejection but also considerable curiosity about the outcome of the conflict—it contributes to negative perceptions of the political elite (Mutz, 2015). It is important to note that these processes are amplified within the current media ecosystem. Opportunities to witness uncivil incidents are no longer confined to journalistic coverage but are magnified by the various platforms and social networks available. The potential for direct interaction with political actors or their supporters as part of our daily media experience further normalises expressions of incivility. While disaffection with politics is a long-standing issue and cannot be attributed to a single cause, it is evident that distrust in politics has risen considerably in Western democracies in recent years. Regardless of the precise causal mechanisms, it is clear that certain phenomena, such as incivility, are correlated with increased mistrust and the delegitimisation of political actors and institutions. Furthermore, when politics involves discrimination against perceived “others”, silencing dissenting voices, and resorting to insults and ridicule against opponents, it becomes challenging to maintain trust in and respect for those responsible for governing the civitas .

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The element of intolerance inherent in incivility inevitably leads to the delegitimisation of politics and its actors, further alienating citizens. This issue goes beyond mere revulsion or annoyance with the impoliteness of those in the political arena; it touches on a deeper problem. It undermines the very essence of politics, which is rooted in the ability to engage in discussions among individuals with differing viewpoints to reconcile competing interests. Distrust in politics intensifies when the importance of civility is disregarded. Civility, in essence, is “one of the cooperative virtues of political life” (Rawls, 2001, p. 117). It is a virtue that, despite individual differences, enables everyone to express their views while acknowledging each other as members of the same community.

Implications of Incivility in Public Discourse The recognition of civility as a fundamental virtue in politics is closely intertwined with the acknowledgement that conversation lies at the heart of democratic life. Here, conversation is not merely an opportunity for discussing predefined interests; instead, it embodies the capacity to listen, comprehend, and mediate conflicts, forming the essence of strong democracy (Barber, 2003). Its significance for democracy stems from the understanding that “a conversation follows an informal dialectic in which talk is used not to chart distinctions in the typical analytic fashion but to explore and create commonalities” (p. 183). Viewed in this light, conversation becomes a pivotal element of democratic existence, and the detrimental consequences that incivility can have on it become evident. Before delving into the substance of these consequences, it is important to clarify that the incivility under discussion extends beyond the common impoliteness or rudeness often encountered in political discourse. A passionate and vigorous exchange between contrasting viewpoints does not automatically qualify as uncivil; at times, the defence of one’s position can become forceful and aggressive without transgressing the norms of democratic coexistence. In fact, there are instances where “the civil thing to do is to speak out, leading to a more aggressive, pointed brand of communication that better strengthens one’s position” (Masullo Chen et al., 2019, p. 3). While this viewpoint may initially appear somewhat extreme, it finds resonance among many scholars (Schudson, 1997; Tracy, 2010). For example, Phillips and Milner (2018) propose that in the face of social

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injustice, racism, sexism, and sexual violence, “pointed – even impolite – responses to systematic antagonism can absolutely serve public ends” (p. 187). Michael Schudson, in an article titled “Why Conversation is Not the Soul of Democracy” (1997), argues that democracy occasionally necessitates the rejection of civility, stating that “Democracy may sometimes require that your interlocutor does not wait politely for you to finish but shakes you by the collar and cries, ‘Listen! Listen for God’s sake!’” (p. 308). Therefore, norms of politeness can be transgressed; while Schudson explains that “democratic conversation is conversation not among intimates nor among strangers but among citizens who are acquainted by virtue of their citizenship” (p. 306). What characterises democratic conversation therefore is shared citizenship. This implies that civility transcends mere adherence to good manners; it is manifested through belonging to the same community. Consequently, confrontation can be aggressive, but as long as it rests on mutual recognition of each other as members of the same community, it does not constitute incivility. Disagreement “is not a reason to cease conversing with one another” (Laden, 2019, p. 14) when “we engage in genuine dialogue with our fellow citizens, making room for their voices to be heard, and making an effort to understand and appreciate what they say” (ibidem). On the other hand, disagreement and the clash of ideas are essential components of a functioning democratic system. This is because it is through dialogue among actors with different political perspectives that citizens shape their own opinions on matters of public interest and gain insight into others’ viewpoints (Barber, 2003). The potential benefits of the informal discussions that frequently occur on social media platforms should not be dismissed simply because participants sometimes become passionate when defending their ideas in the face of disagreement. The crucial question is whether such behaviour involves intolerance, oppression, or the exclusion of others (Rega et al., 2023; Rossini, 2020). These forms of expression do indeed pose a threat to the collective traditions of democracy (Papacharissi, 2004). In such cases, the right to equal dignity within a pluralistic democracy is effectively denied to some citizens (Habermas, 1998). While disagreement should certainly not be a reason to cease communication with one another, it is equally true that when the conversation turns uncivil, it can foster the toxic atmosphere often associated with contemporary public discourse (Bentivegna & Boccia Artieri, 2020). This

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atmosphere is characterised by a strong emotional component along with the expression of discontent and disaffection with politics. Communicative disintermediation, facilitated by the expansion of expression opportunities provided by social media platforms, is often linked to the dissemination of emotional and divisive messages, rapidly circulated and amplified by legacy media. In other words, discursive dynamics, particularly the informal ones that take place online, rarely start from recognition that participants belong to the same community committed to addressing issues of common and public interest. More frequently, they represent an opportunity for involved actors to engage in trolling (Phillips, 2015), flaming (Hmielowski et al., 2014), or harassment (Sobieraj, 2020), thus asserting their dominance and control over others (Masullo Chen, 2017). In a way, these behaviours represent the opposite of recognition of belonging to the same community; they epitomise an extreme assertion of individuality. The growing prevalence of this confrontational approach to disagreement in online conversations contributes to the creation of the often-discussed toxic climate in public debate. In addition to fostering a toxic atmosphere—which has even led to speculation concerning the possible end of public debate as known hitherto (Thompson, 2016)—the incivility that accompanies public discourse has further adverse consequences. Firstly, it repels individuals who cannot tolerate a certain level of conflict (Sydnor, 2019), thereby reducing the number of participants in the discussion and making it less inclusive. Confronted with discussions tainted by vulgarity, stigmatisation of individuals and groups, and other forms of incivility, some individuals may opt to abstain from participating. This self-exclusion impoverishes the debate and generates a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), with individuals perceiving themselves as holding a minority position compared to the dominant climate of opinion and choosing to remain silent for fear of social isolation. While incivility does not necessarily lead to social isolation, it can result in exclusion from discursive networks and it may lead to individuals becoming the target of “shit-storms” behaviour. Secondly, uncivil behaviour by political elites can lead to an increase in anti-deliberative attitudes, division, and partisan conflict among citizens (Gervais, 2019; Jamieson & Hardy, 2012). Moreover, the presence of incivility in debates between political actors can encourage imitative behaviour among citizens (Gervais, 2017). This has been observed, for instance, in relation to posts by political leaders on Facebook. When such posts contain elements of incivility, they can lead to heightened hostility

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in user comments, including shouting, insults, vulgarity, racist and homophobic remarks, as well as expressions of contempt directed at targeted groups (Rega & Marchetti, 2021). On the other hand, it’s challenging to imagine citizens adopting civil and respectful behaviour towards each other when their political representatives engage in stigmatisation, stereotyping, and silencing of those who hold differing views. However, communicative mimicry clearly highlights the danger and corrosive consequences of the incivility “acted out” by political representatives. Media actors’ incivility is equally significant, as forms of emulation can also occur in this context. In particular, research has shown that when individuals are exposed to like-minded uncivil media that align with their own views, their tendency to use hostile and caustic language increases (Gervais, 2014). This vicious circle between the incivility of political and media elites and incivility on the part of citizens is further exacerbated by journalists’ tendency to be drawn to disagreement expressed in an unusually quarrelsome manner. Television and radio talk shows, partisan media outlets, and the websites and social media accounts of mainstream news outlets tend to give greater prominence to moments of incivility on the part of political actors than to instances of mediation and the pursuit of dialogue. Defamation of political rivals, insults, or confrontations during political debates attract more attention from journalists and resonates more in the hybrid ecosystem. However, as Jamieson and Hardy (2012) understood long ago, humans learn by modelling, so witnessing these moments can discourage people from reflexively attempting to engage with those who hold different views. If we link these tendencies to our natural inclination “to marry, live near, and talk politics only with those with whom we agree” (ibid., p. 415), the opportunities for individuals with contrasting opinions to engage in civil and constructive discussions with each other diminish significantly. Therefore, public discourse dominated by incivility not only makes it more challenging to resolve disputes but also diminishes the opportunities for people to engage in conversations aimed at “exploring and creating commonalities” (Barber, 2003, p. 183), making such opportunities increasingly rare.

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“Us” and “Them”: Incivility and Polarisation Much attention has been devoted to the issue of polarisation in discussions about the state of contemporary democracies. As is well known, the phenomenon is not new: political polarisation in the United States had already attracted scholarly attention in the last century and it acquired particular visibility with the disputed presidential elections of 2000, when the media began circulating descriptions of the electorate as deeply and irrevocably divided (Fiorina et al., 2008). Since then, the issue has become a prominent feature of public discourse, garnering increasing attention in journalistic coverage of politics year after year (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2016). It has reached a point where journalists themselves have started to analyse and reflect on polarisation, producing in-depth analyses such as those described by Ezra Klein (2020) in his book, “Why We’re Polarised”. Among scholars, discussions surrounding polarisation have led to a sort of “reflected polarisation”, where some believe the phenomenon has intensified over time (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008), while others downplay its growth (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008). The ambiguity of the concept of polarisation, which can be interpreted at different levels (societal, group, and individual) and related to various phenomena, contributes to this difference in perspectives. On the one hand, polarisation can refer to the contrast between opposite extremes within a system, and on the other, it can pertain to the positioning of a group that firmly adheres to an extreme stance (Wojcieszak, 2011). The most prominent type of polarisation in contemporary politics, as discussed in previous pages, is affective polarisation. This type of polarisation results from a mutual aversion among supporters of different parties and groups towards those who do not share the same beliefs (Iyengar et al., 2012). Citizens increasingly view themselves as “fields of mutual distrust”, making them progressively less open to engaging in dialogue with members of other parties or groups and respecting their viewpoints (Lugosi-Schimpf & Thorlakson, 2021). Consequently, feelings of hostility towards others are frequently expressed through various forms of incivility, including insults, mockery, and negative stereotyping. It’s evident from the preceding discussion that polarisation and political incivility, although distinct phenomena, have a reciprocal influence on each other. While polarisation heightens conflicts and the use of attacks and incivility by political actors engaged in communication, public discourse marked by incivility widens the perceived gap between

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groups and positions, resulting in increased feelings of mutual hostility or affective polarisation. In other words, affective polarisation intensifies. Determining whether polarisation causes incivility or incivility causes polarisation could be a challenging question to answer; however, it may not be the most productive one to ask. That said, both polarisation and incivility seem to share a common root in citizens’ tendencies to identify with their own groups and distance themselves from other groups. This behaviour often finds expression in various forums, frequently through incivility. Belonging to one’s in-group and rejecting or distancing oneself from out-groups can manifest through exposure to information sources that exclude those with differing opinions, resorting to insults, ridicule, stereotypes, and stigmatisation. In some cases, these sources may even provide—as happened during the Covid epidemic—manipulated or unfounded data to support their consumers’ positions. Furthermore, citizens reaffirm their identification with their own group and rejection of others during numerous discursive interactions on social media platforms. These platforms create an environment conducive to affective polarisation by facilitating the negative evaluation of users with divergent viewpoints (Settle, 2018). Upon closer examination, the deterioration of public debate isn’t the only issue at hand. The unwavering defence of one’s position through any available means leads to a preconceived rejection of mediation, compromise, and the ostracisation of political opposition. The search of mediation and compromise is cast aside in favour of decisions made by party leaders who prioritise standing firm on their principles over compromising with the other side (Wolf et al., 2012). Consequently, polarisation within the political elite and the “uncivil” rejection of the other—whether it be opposing parties, political opposition, or individuals—preclude compromise and result in “lowered affective evaluations of the political opposition” (Skytte, 2021, p. 1458). To conclude, the relationship between polarisation and incivility appears exceptionally complex and challenging to resolve. Numerous studies have explored this issue without reaching definitive conclusions (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Coe et al., 2014; Mutz, 2015; Skytte, 2021). Nevertheless, these studies all underscore the dangers associated with the growth of “uncivil polarisation”, both in terms of democratic functioning and citizens’ relationships with politics. The call for politicians to “disagree without being disagreeable” does not seem to have been

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widely accepted or translated into effective practice. Unfortunately, political leaders, and consequently partisan citizens, continue to express their disagreements in a disagreeable manner. A quick look at the social media accounts of leaders such as Trump, Bolsonaro, Orbàn, Milei, Wilders, and others reveals the bitterness and anger frequently directed towards “others” with different political positions, be they political opponents, the media, immigrants, foreigners, or religious and ethnic minorities. The increasingly frequent attacks on opponents amplify the perceived differences among citizens and generate prejudices against those outside their own groups. This issue extends beyond the realm of incivility. As eloquently argued in Beyond Civility (Keith & Danisch, 2020), these modes of communication and relationships create an environment in which it becomes challenging to build or maintain a democratic culture, “because it defaults on the hard, necessary work of cooperating and living well with others with whom we may disagree or whom we simply dislike” (p. 165). Especially in today’s complex, multicultural democracies that demand dialogue and cooperation among supporters of alternative and opposing positions, a culture that suppresses dissenting viewpoints jeopardises democratic traditions. In this sense, far from being an abstract principle to aspire to, a public discourse that is both formally and substantively civil—characterised by inclusivity, openness, and equality—appears to be a necessary condition for “practising democracy as a way of life” (ibid., p. 167).

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Index

A Ad personam/Ad Hominem attack, 10, 16, 30, 31 Affective polarisation, ix, 15, 92, 93 Affordance, 44, 48, 50, 57 Aggressive rhetoric, 3 Agonistic, 74 Alt-Right, 26, 48, 57 Ambivalence, ambivalent, 67, 78 Amplification, 57 Antagonistic, 44 Anti-establishment, 26, 55, 57 Anti-fandom, 16 Assault, 2, 3, 17, 54 Attention-hacking, 57 Attention market, x, 25, 28, 29 Attitude to conflict, 49 Authenticity, xi, 9, 11, 16, 48 B Bad manners, x, 4, 9 Belonging (sense of), xii, 53 Binary thinking, 52 Broadcast television, 24

C Caste, 4, 47 Celebrity, 47 Civies, civitas , 82, 87 Civil disagreement, 82 Civil disobedience, 64, 67, 72, 73 Collective traditions of democracy, 89 Communicative abundance, 24 Communicative mimicry, 91 Complicity, xiii, 48, 51–53 Compromise, 8, 31, 35, 93 Conformism, 9 Conversation, 54, 55, 59, 64, 68, 82, 88–91 Cynicism, 28, 85 D Dark participation, 17 Defamation, 83, 91 Delegitimisation, delegitimising, xii, 10, 77, 85, 87, 88 Deliberation, 59 Democracy, 8, 12, 24, 32, 58, 64, 70, 73–77, 82–85, 88, 89, 94

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 S. Bentivegna and R. Rega, (Un)Civil Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54405-7

99

100

INDEX

Democratic values, 49, 74, 85 Demonisation, viii, 9, 11, 30, 31 Desensitisation, 48 Dialogue, ix, 76, 78, 89, 91, 92, 94 Disaffection, 85, 87, 90 Disagreeing, disagree, ix, 52, 76, 93, 94 Disinformation, 75, 83 Disinhibition, 45 Disintermediation, x, 9, 90 Dissatisfaction, 50, 85 Dissemination, x, 26, 31, 37, 48, 86, 90 Distrust, ix, 28, 30, 31, 86–88, 92 Divisions, divisive, ix, xii, 5, 16, 17, 29, 32, 49, 56, 57, 67, 90

E Echo chamber, 26, 30 Elite, ix–xi, 3, 8–10, 15, 16, 26, 34, 44, 47, 50, 52, 53, 83, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93 Emotion, ix, xi, xii, 2, 3, 6, 15, 16, 30, 31, 34, 45, 54, 56, 86, 90 Empathy, xi, 9, 52 Emulation, emulate, 51, 91 Enemy, enemies, x, xiii, 10, 33, 46, 53, 54, 56–58 Entertainment, 33–35, 48, 52, 53, 85 Equality, 64, 65, 94 Equal rights, 69, 74, 75

F Facebook, 34, 45, 46, 58, 75, 77, 90 Fake news, 10, 30, 78 Far-right, 4, 5, 10, 11, 14, 33, 55, 57 Flaming, 90 Folk theory, 12 Fragmentation, 29 Frame, 8, 36–38, 67, 77

G Generalisation, 27 Group theory, 12 H Harassment, 45, 46, 50, 68, 90 Hateful language, 44 Hate speech, 17, 27, 34, 45 High-choice environment, 24 Hostility, 3, 36, 46, 49, 51, 58, 90, 92, 93 Hybridisation, hybrid, ix, x, 25–28, 32, 91 I Identity, ix, xi, 4, 6, 11–14, 16–18, 37, 45, 47, 49, 54, 76, 77, 84 Identity ownership, xi, 12–14 Identity politics, 6, 11 Ideological polarisation, ix, 16 Incivility as a state, 2, 15, 49 Inclusivity, 66, 94 Information disorder, 83 Infrapolitics, 70, 71 In-group, ix, xii, xiii, 6, 15, 16, 26, 30, 54, 93 Instagram, 14, 45 Insult, ix, x, xii, 11, 26, 27, 31, 32, 35, 44, 46, 50, 51, 54, 76, 84, 87, 91–93 Interconnection, ix, 52 Internet, 5, 44, 48, 57, 73, 85 Intimacy, 48, 86 Intimidation, 50, 54 Intolerance, xiii, 11, 83, 88, 89 L Legacy media, x, 27, 86, 90 Lies, 18, 27, 33, 36, 37, 56, 65, 75, 76, 83, 84, 88 Like-minded, xiii, 37, 91

INDEX

Lulz, 48

M Media coverage, xi, 3, 5, 8, 27, 36, 37, 85 Media environment, 24, 25, 27–29, 33, 34, 85 Media logic, 26, 36 Mediation, mediating, 91, 93 Mimicry, mimicking, 16, 53 Misogyny, misogynistic, 4, 51, 55, 57, 75 Misperceptions, 30 Mobilisation, xi, xiii, 5, 15–17, 46, 55, 75, 77

N Name-calling, 50, 54 Narcissism, 48 Nazis, 8, 31, 68 Negative partisanship, 15, 16 Negativity, xiii, 36, 52 Networked media logic, 26 News outlets, 7, 25, 38, 57, 91 Newsworthiness, newsworthy, 35, 36, 77 Normalisation, x, 11, 48, 83

101

Partisan audience, 26, 29 Partisan media, xii, 25, 26, 28–32, 91 Performative style, xi, 54 Personal brand, xi, 6–9, 11, 37 Personal-level and public-level incivility, 83 Physical confrontations, xii, 86 Platforms, ix, x, xii, 25–27, 32, 34, 44, 45, 47–50, 55, 87, 89, 90, 93 Pluralism, pluralistic, 14, 26, 33, 52, 67, 74, 75, 89 Polarisation, viii, ix, xii, 5, 15, 16, 26, 29, 34, 47, 49, 92, 93 Political perceptions, 35, 87 Political perversion, 11 Populism, populists, viii–xi, 4, 9, 10, 16, 26, 29, 57, 58, 83, 84, 86 Post-broadcast democracy, 25 Protest, vii, xiii, 3, 17, 55, 64–77 Public discourse, xii, 5, 6, 8, 16, 32, 34, 37, 66, 74–76, 78, 82, 83, 88–92, 94 Public life, 46, 76, 84 Public sphere, x, 44, 64, 71, 78

O Opponents, viii, xiii, 3, 7–9, 11, 30, 31, 52, 58, 84, 87, 94 Ostracisation, 93 Out-group, ix, xii, 6, 10, 15, 16, 26, 30, 31, 53, 54, 93 Outrage, 11, 33, 45, 47, 50, 51 Outrage industry, 27, 52

R Racism, xi, 67, 75, 76, 84, 89 Reasonable hostility, 75 Rejection, reject, ix, xi, 16, 31, 57, 69, 87, 89, 93 Respect, viii, x, 9, 35, 65, 70, 77, 83–85, 87 Responsiveness, 83 Rewarding, rewarded, x, xii, 34, 36, 49 Rivals, 17, 54, 91 Rudeness, rude, 11, 49, 64, 88

P Paradox of incivility, 27, 51

S Self-promotion, 6, 7, 11, 50

102

INDEX

Sensationalism, 11, 27 Sensitive topics, 49, 78 Sexism, 76, 84, 89 Shitstorms, 45 Shout, shouting, 7, 32, 66, 91 Silence others, 84 Simplified language, 4 Slander, 10, 30, 83 Social networks, 49, 53, 87 Social sorting, 12 Spiral of silence, 90 Stereotyping, stereotypes, viii, ix, xii, 13, 14, 17, 26, 27, 30, 31, 35, 56, 58, 86, 91–93 Stigmatisation, stigmatise, 66, 69, 86, 90, 91, 93 Storytelling, xii, 27, 28 Strategic framing, 57 T Toxic, 35, 89, 90 Transgression, transgressive, viii, 10, 48, 67, 77

Trolling, 48, 90 Twitter (now X), 7, 45

U Uncivil polarisation, 93 Us and them, x

V Vicious circle, 91 Videomalaise, 85, 86 Violence, 7, 33, 46, 52, 55, 58, 65, 69, 72, 73, 84, 89

W Web, 17, 28, 44, 58, 73 White rage, 13 Wrestling, 32, 34

Z Zeitgeist , 6, 8