137 102 7MB
English Pages 157 Year 1963
BERTRAND RUSSELL
UNARMED VICTORY
SIMON AND SCHUSTER NE"W"
YORK
1963
Br .:1i·�_:: ; . :�. ·_. �-= DLT.
AUG 15 '63 0 7 1
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF REPRODUCTION IN WHOLE OR IN PART IN ANY FORM COPYRIGHT @
1963 BY BERTRAND RUSSELL
PUBLISHED BY SIMON AND SCHUSTER, INC. ROCKEFELLER CENTER, NEW YORK
20,
630 FIFTH AVENUE
N. Y.
FIRST PRINTING LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER:
63-16994
MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONTENTS
I
THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND
2
THE CUBAN CRISIS
7 20
A. The Castro Regime and the U.S.A. B. The Days of Crisis C. The Settlement 3
THE SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE
79
A. Outline of the Genesis of the Dispute B. The Dispute C. The Aftermath 4
LESSONS OF THE TWO CRISES
141
1 THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND
DURING THE DA vs
of October 24 and 25, 1962, those who had knowledge and imagination went through an anxious time. It seemed probable that, at any minute, war between America and Russia would break out and would involve, in all likelihood, the extinction of the human race. If you had private affections, if you had children or grandchildren for whom you had hoped a happy future, if you had friends whom you loved, you could expect their death in the coming week. Within this brief period of time, there would cease to be any to enjoy the poetry of Shakespeare, the music of Bach or Mozart, the genius of Plato or Newton. All the slow building up of civilization in art and science and beauty would be at an end-forever, so far as this planet is con cerned. If you spoke of these things to your friends, they
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said: "But, surely, you can understand the great issues involved. Is the world to be governed by godless Com munists (or, alternatively, rapacious capitalists)? Is it not your duty to die for the right, without regard for ,vhat ever loss may be entailed?" And so the great march to ward disaster went on. I asked myself if there ,vere no sane men in the seats of power. At the last possible mo ment, the answer came: Yes, there was one sane man. It happened that he was on the side of Russia. This was an unimportant accident. His sanity saved the world; and you and I still exist. This crisis in October was so sudden and so s,vift that the usual forces making for conciliation had no time to act. There was no time for the United Nations to suggest conciliation. There was no time for the neutral nations to suggest compromises. There ,-vas no time for pacifist organizations to arrange demonstrations. In paralyzed terror the world looked on as, hour by hour, the distance between American and Russian ships grevv less. In the time available, only individuals could act. ,vith little hope of success, I decided that I must telegraph to Ken nedy and Khrushchev beseeching them to let the human race continue to exist. I had had reason, already, to think that Khrushchev might not be offended by my approach to him. I had sent a message to an international Congress in Mosco,v in ,vhich I said, inter alia: The present situation is one involving imminent and daily peril, not only to the nations of NATO and the ,varsa,v Pact, but to all mankind. Of all the risks that are involved in this or that policy, none is even approximately as great as the risk of
THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND
9
nuclear war. I shoud like every negotiator from the West to state: "I am firmly convinced that a nu clear war would be worse than the world-wide vic tory of Communism." I should like every negotiator from the East to declare: "I am firmly convinced that a nuclear war would be worse than the world wide victory of capitalism." Those on either side who refuse to make such a declaration would brand themselves as enemies of mankind and advocates of the extinction of the human race. At present, negotiators tend to be obsessed by possible dangers in any suggested concessions to the other side and to forget that the continuation of the arms race involves far worse dangers than those that negotia tors are apt to emphasize.
Khrushchev had picked out this passage in my message for special commendation. In the West, the message was less favorably received: the pundits of the British La bour Party made an abortive attempt to have me ex pelled from the Party for talking to Communists. In this book, I propose to relate from n1y personal point of view the history of t\vo crises: the Cuban and the Sino-Indian, in both of which I tried to influence the leaders and public opinion on both sides. I shall be giving partly an account of ,vhat I tried to do and partly the relevant public events. I hope that the personal cor respondence and documents ,vhich I shall be publishing will give a sense of immediacy and sho,v the day-to-day development. It is a pleasure to me to have an oppor tunity to acknowledge publicly my debt to my secretary, Mr. Ralph Schoenman, and to those in London ,vho helped us, Mr. Alastair Yule, Mr. Christopher Farley,
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and Mr. Nicholas Johnson. Mr. Schoenman did super human work and did it excellently well, during both the nights and the days of these perturbed weeks of inter national crises when letters and statements, telegrams and telephone calls had to be dispatched and received at all hours around the clock. It is owing to him and to his colleagues and their helpers in London that I was able to keep abreast of the quickly moving events and to send out the letters and statements and telegrams that I wished to send. Many people sent letters to the heads of the states involved. 1 I had good luck in being an swered, and at considerable length. This encouraged me to continue. Many people seem to have been surprised that I should intervene in such matters ,vithout having More than that, many people were calling together their co-workers in movements that had been striving for peace in the world and urging them to take what measures they could to bring a solution to the Cuban affair that would not annihilate us all. The Secretary-General of the Pugwash Movement of Scientists, Professor Rotblat, for instance, was busy telephoning and cabling to Pugwash scientists in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., urging them to use whatever influence they had on their respective governments. An emergency meeting of the Pugwash :Move ment of Scientists of East and ,vest ·was being proposed. The Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Alexander Topchiev, responded immediately and effectively. (Academician Topchiev has since this time died). He will be very greatly missed, in not only scientific but other relations between East and ,vest. He spoke to the Soviet Premier, and he accepted an emergency conference of scientists and did what he could to forestall a military response from the Soviet Union. His efforts in this crisis ·were consistent with all that he sought to achieve in the Pugwash Conferences in bringing about understanding between East and ,vest and in preventing nuclear war. Professor Rotblat found that his initiative was responded to in the same measure by American Pugwash scientists. In addition to other Pugwash action, Professor Linus Pauling and his wife Ava Helen Pauling cabled to the President and spoke out as they always do to a seemingly hysterical American public. 1
THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGRO UND
11
any official status, but I think events show that, even in our highly organized world, there are things that a private individual can do which are much more difficult for a minister or an organization. In particular, it is much easier to agree ,vith a powerless individual with out loss of face than it is to agree with those whose argu ments are backed by H-bombs of almost infinite destruc tive power. Another advantage enjoyed by a private in dividual is the possibility of acting swiftly. This was especially important in the Cuban crisis. Ever since 1914, I have been ,vatching the world slide downhill, forget the comparatively civilized usages of the nineteenth century, forget all lessons of toleration, and diminish, at an accelerating rate, both the degree and the extent of civilized life. I had wondered if there was anything that I could do to turn the ,vorld from this downward course. Officially, the victors in both world wars were in favor of disarmament and of the creation of an international organization capable of pre serving peace. In fact, however, the most po,verful among the victors prevented, first the League of Nations and, then, the United Nations fro1n exercising decisive po,ver in the direction of peace. The League of Nations suf fered the fatal drawback that the U.S. ,vas not a me1nber of it. It showed, from the first, a disastrous timidity in dealing with aggressive nations. When Italy bombarded a Greek island, the League of Nations decided that jus tice would be done by making the Greeks pay for the bombardment. When Italy invaded Abyssinia, there ,vas a pretense of imposing sanctions, but care ,vas taken to make them ineffective. Mean,vhile, the rise of the Nazis created a ne,v danger in the face of ,vhich the League of Nations was completely po,verless. I had been a paci-
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UNA RME D VICTORY
fist in the First War and, until after Munich, I hoped that a pacifist attitude would be possible in relation to the Nazis. I have never been a theoretical pacifist. I have always held that some wars have done more good than harm and that such wars are justifiable. In the early months of the First World War, which, as I have said, I opposed, I published an article in the International journal of Ethics enumerating four kinds of wars which I should be prepared to support. I had hopes until after the time of Munich that the Nazis might be persuaded into not invading other countries. Their invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland proved that this hope was vain, and at the same time evidence accumulated as to the utterly horrible character of their internal regime. The two factors led me reluctantly to the conviction that war against the Nazis was necessary. I still think that the Nazis could not be tolerated, but it cannot be said that the outcome of the Second World War was satisfactory. As soon as the German menace was-for a time, at least-overcome, the hostility between Russia and the West, ,vhich the ,var had suspended, broke out with renewed vehemence. In the United Nations, the veto in the Security Council resulted in impotence. What was new, after the Second "\Var, ,vas the destruc tive power of nuclear ,veapons. ,vhen these came to be possessed by both sides, it became obvious that nothing desired by any government could be achieved by nuclear \var, but the strength and habit of tradition ,vas such that governments ,vent on exactly as before, threatening each other and pursuing po,ver and prestige even at the risk of complete disaster to all sides. The immense destructive power of nuclear weapons
THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND
13
made world ,var untenable, and the death of Stalin made coexistence possible as well as necessary. Unfortunately, anti-Communist propaganda of the time of Stalin has continued unabated since his death. We are told, and many of us believe, that the \\Test stands for freedom, while Communist governments impose a kind of slavery. I will admit at once that there is not as much freedom in Communist countries as I should ,vish to see. But I must add that the same is true of the anti Communist countries. It might be enlightening to com pare the cases of Ivinskaya in Russia and of Morton Sobell in the U.S.-both deplorable and against which I have protested vehemently. One might, also, contemplate the continued incarceration of prisoners in Greece, and the recent barbaric doings in France, if one is inclined to congratulate oneself upon the freedom of the West. It might even be well to contemplate the doings in Mis sissippi, South Africa and Notting Hill. Spain and Por tugal are supposed to belong to the "free world," al though both have governments which are abominable tyrannies. In America, Communism has recently become criminal. Throughout the years since Stalin's death, there has been increasing freedom in the East and dimin ishing freedom in the West, with the result that, by this time, the difference is not very notable. Mean,vhile, hatred and readiness for war are inculcated in the West and in China and India, but no longer in Russia. I have tried, throughout recent years, to diminish in tolerance and to make populations a,vare of ,vhat a nu clear war would mean. It is as part of this effort that I have been active in the two crises ,vith ,vhich this book is concerned. It happens that in both these crises the
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UNA RMED VICTORY
Communists seem to me to have behaved better than their opponents, and this might lead the reader to sup pose that I am more favorable to Communism than is, in fact, the case. A few words may serve to make my position clear. I do not like Communism became it is undemocratic. I wrote a very hostile criticism of it after a visit to Russia in 1920, and the expectations which I then expressed were fulfilled in the time of Stalin. Both before and after this time, in 1896 and in 1934, I wrote very hostile criti cisms of Marx, and I see no reason to recant what I then said. Communist regimes have been imposed by force in Eastern Europe and, no doubt, would have been im posed in many other places if it had been possible. The East German regime is called the German Democratic Republic, although it is imposed by alien military force upon a population which is opposed to it. The same may be said of Hungary, where Russia has exhibited the kind of imperialism that it condemns when practiced by others, and, also of China in relation to Tibet. But there are also many aspects of capitalism of which it is impos sible to approve, especially in its dealings with under developed countries. Capitalism in Katanga has sho,vn itself just as evil as Communism in Hungary. And I think almost the same can be said of capitalism in many parts of Latin America. For my part, I am a believer in democratic socialism. I dislike Communism because it is undemocratic, and capitalism because it favors ex ploitation. But whenever the question of peace or war is relevant, the merits of either side become insignificant in com parison with the importance of peace. In the nuclear age, the human race cannot survive ,vithout peace. For this
THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND
15
reason, I shall always side with the more peaceful party in any dispute benveen powerful nations. It has hap pened that in both the disputes with which this book is concerned, the Communist side has been the less belli cose, but it cannot be said that this is always the case. And, where it is not, my sympathies are anti-Communist. In the following pages, I shall be mainly concerned with local events in Cuba and the Himalayas, but I should like to preface this account with some more gen eral observations. In Cuba, the contest was a naked one between Communists and anti-Communists. In the Sino Indian dispute, on the contrary, the contest began by being purely nationalistic. China had its nationalism, and so had India. Neither appealed to the merits or de merits of Communism. In Cuba, assuming that the United States abides by its not very precise pledge to abstain from invasion so long as Cuba renounces nuclear arms, the outcome has been, on the whole, good. The installation of nuclear arms in Cuba ,vould have been regrettable, as is their installation in any ne,v territory. But we have not observed that either the U. S. or Britain has taken a stand against Canadian nuclear ,veapons. In the first moment of Russian retreat, it was hoped that there might be a lessening of East-West tension, but this hope has rapidly faded. The ,vest has persuaded itself, quite fallaciously, that Russia will always yield to a sho,v of determination. Russia, on the other hand, has felt, as the British felt after Munich, that yielding to pressure must not become a habit. Consequently, the ,vorld situa tion remains much as it was before the Cuban crisis. In the Sino-Indian dispute, the outcome remains un certain. The Chinese, from the first, have offered nego tiation, but whether India will no,v accept negotiation
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UN A RME D VIC T O RY
except on terms intolerable to the Chinese, remains doubtful. Nehru has talked of a "long war" and has been negotiating military support from the U.S. and Britain. If this long war takes place, the consequences are likely to be disastrous. It cannot be supposed that China can be defeated without the use of nuclear weapons, and, in spite of all differences between Russia and China, it re mains probable that, if nuclear ,veapons are employed against China, Russia will come to her defense and the human race will become extinct. By invoking Anglo American aid, India has transformed the war from a local boundary dispute to a part of the great contest bet,veen Communism and its opponents. At the time of writing, it is not too late to hope that this disaster may be averted by negotiations, but this profoundly important issue re mains in doubt. Every contest in every part of the world tends, at present, to become part of the great East-West contest. I believe this contest to be utterly foolish. I hold, ,vith Khrushchev, that only misguided public opinion and the po,ver-impulses of great states make the contest seem inevitable. China thinks other,vise, and so, apparently, do po,verful forces in the U.S. A brief historical revie", will explain why I disagree ,vith bellicose opinion in China and in sections of the U. S. Communisrn may be vie,ved from the \Vest from three different aspects : as a conspiracy, a religion, or a tech nique of government. I n favor of the vie,v of it as a con spiracy, there is the fact that all the leading Russian Communists ,vho came to po,ver in 19 1 7 had been en gaged, not in political agitation such as ,vas practiced by Western socialists, but in undergTound ,vork, mainly led by Russian exiles living abroad. This ,vas an inevitable
THE INTE RNATIONAL BACKG ROU ND
17
result of Czarist tyranny, which made open political op position impossible. The conspiratorial methods ,vhich had succeeded in Russia were, for a time, left as a legacy to the Communist Party. For example, in Czechoslovakia and in attempts to capture certain British trade unions. This conspiratorial aspect, however, has gru\vn steadily less with the consolidation of Communist power in East ern Europe and China. On this account, it no longer has the importance that it once had. Another view of Communism is to regard it as a reli gion and see its rise as analogous to the rise of Islam. Considered as a religion, there is nothing new in Com1nunism. It existed among many heretical sects through out the Middle Ages. Sir Thomas More in his Utopia contends that Christ was a Communist and maintains that this ,vas the only successful argument in converting the inhabitants of Utopia to Christianity. "\Vhat l\farx added to this traditional Communism ,vas a ne,v pseudo scientific basis and a ne,v dynamic of hate. The religious aspect of Marxism has, hu\vever, been fading. There are sacred texts in Christianity and sacred texts in l\Iarxism. The governments of Christian countries have ignored their sacred texts ever since the time of Constantine. The government of Russia has begun to ignore its sacred texts since the death of Stalin. There is, however, a differ ence. The sacred texts of Christianity, so far as politics are concerned, are on the whole desirable. The sacred texts of l\farxism are not, since they embody �Iarx's spite and hatred. China, as yet, adheres to the 1\,,f arxist dogma that a great war bet,veen capitalism and Communism is inevitable. I think it is fairly safe to assume that time ,vill soften Chinese Communist orthodoxy as it has soft ened that of Russia, but the process ,vould, of course, be
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enormously accelerated if the West treated China reason- ably by admitting it to the United Nations and not flouting it as a pariah. There is a third Western view of Communism which regards it as a technique for putting absolute power into the hands of governments. In the past, economic and political power have not been in the same hands. The rise of industrialism in Western Europe was achieved in defiance of aristocratic political power. But this phase is ended. One might say, though this would be, in some degree, an excessive simplification, that in capitalist countries the captains of industry appoint the politicians, while in Communist countries the politicians appoint the captains of industry. There are limits, however, to the power of politicians in Communist countries. It is clear that Khrushchev's policy as opposed to that of Stalin is mainly inspired by the Russian popular desire for con sumer goods. Orthodox Marxism has been rendered out-of-date by two modern facts : on the one hand, America and West ern Europe have shown that under capitalism wage earners need not remain at subsistence level and that their poverty in the early days of industrialism was only a temporary phase ; in the second place, nuclear weapons have made it evident that neither Communism nor capi talism can achieve its ends by ,var. After a general nuclear war, if any populations survive, they ,vill certainly not have political or economic institutions such as either capitalists or Communists desire. It is much more likely that they ,vill be composed of roving bands of hungry marauders not subject to any central governmental con trol. Khrushchev seems to have understood this fact. China and America have no t. I t follo,vs that the only
T H E I NTE RNA T I ONA L B ACK G ROUND
19
alternative to absolute disaster since the invention of nuclear weapons is peaceful coexistence. We are told by fanatics of both sides that peaceful coexistence is impossible because the other side is so wicked. This was said in the conflicts between Christians and Mohammedans, and in the contests between Catho lics and Protestants. In the one case, it took seven cen turies to learn the possibilities of coexistence. In the other case, it took a hundred and thirty years. Nowadays, the lesson must be learned more quickly if there are to be any left to learn it.
r ,I
2 THE
C UBAN
CRISI S
A . THE CASTRO RE GIME AND THE U . S . A .
I N THE COURSE of the Cold War there have been various moments of sharp conflict. The most drama tic and the most dangerous of these so far has been the Cuban crisis, when the outbreak of all-ou t nuclear ,var seemed to be only a matter of hours a,vayo To under stand how the crisis arose, i t is necessary to say something of the rela tions between Cuba and the U .S. and the reasons for their gradual ,vorsening. The problem of the relations benveen the U . S. and Cuba is no ne,v one. Thomas Jefferson, ,vho is not usually regarded as an imperialist, declared : "\Ve must have Cuba. " For a time, ho,vever, the U .S. ,vas con tent to ,vait, acquiring mean,vhile, by ,var, Florida and the western possessions of l\f exico ,vhich no,v make u p more than half the territory of the U . S. The Cubans rebelled against 20
THE C U B AN CR I S I S
21
Spain and, in the end, were helped in their rebellion by the U.S. In 1 8 98, when President McKinley made the speech which led to the war with Spain, he barely men tioned that, on the previous day, Spain had agreed to grant all his demands-and that the war was totally un necessary. Congress passed a war resolution which de clared, in ter alia J that "the people of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free, and independent." But the inde pendence that Cuba achieved by the Spanish-American War was that of obeying the U. S. instead of Spain. Cuba has an equitable climate and a fertile soil. More than half of its area is arable land. But it has, also, exten sive deposits of iron, nickel, chrome, manganese and copper. To a very unwise degree Cuba concentrated on growing sugar. Throughout the first half of the nine teenth century, much of the sugar was grown by peasant proprietors, but, gradually, there was an increasing con centration in huge latifundia, the capital for ,vhich came from the U.S. By 1 946, 0. 1 % of the farms owned 20. l % of the land, and 8 % owned 7 1 . 1 % of the land. The popu lation in 1 954 was about six and a half million, and most of it was desperately poor. The State of Dela,vare, ,vhich is about the same size as Cuba, had an average income per head, in 1954, of $2,279 a year; Cuba had, at that time, an average of $ 3 1 2 per head-or $6 a ,veek. There was a very great difference bet,veen urban and rural Cuba : 85% of the rural houses in Cuba had no running water and 54 % had no water closets or privies of any sort. In consequence, large numbers of children "'ere afflicted with parasitic worms, suffered miserably, and died a painful death. Education had been ahnost entire l y neglected. True, some places had school buildings, and some others had teachers, but very fe,v had bo th. On l y
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35. l % of the children were attending school. Owing to the seasonal nature of the demand for labor on the plan tations-the sugar crop is peculiar in that most of the labor on it is required during only four months of the year-only about 2 5 % of the labor force ,vas employed at any time. No provision was made to help laborers to survive during the other eight months. Rural laborers in Cuba were at a very low level of poverty. They had barely enough food to enable them to work, and most of them suffered in some degree from disease, chiefly hookworm. But from the point of view of Cuban land owners and American interests, the system was com pletely satisfactory. Vast fortunes were made by means of the exploitation of Cuban labor, which was poor, diseased, ignorant and powerless. Throughout a long series of years, Cuba was governed by brutal and corrupt dictators, upheld by the U. S. be cause they encouraged the exploitation of the peasants so profitable to the rich sugar interests in the U. S. For a brief period of four months in 1 9 3 3, Cuba had an honest President called Grau, but he initiated reforms and, therefore, was not recognized by the U. S. He was suc ceeded by Batista, who was generally admitted to be a ruffian. But he was not the sort of ruffian to ,vhom the U. S. took objection. H is policy ,vas good for those rich American capitalists who gained their ,vealth from Cuba. He did nothing to mitigate the sufferings of the Cuban population but, on the contrary, augmented them by allowing the big industries of the U. S. to import into Cuba thousands of Haitians and Jamaicans and Chinese coolies who were housed in barracks on the plantations and substituted, at a pittance, their work for that of the
T H E C UB A N C R I S I S
23
Cuban laborers, thereby increasing the gains of the owners. I t was against these condi tions, and especially in the interests of Cuban rural labor, that Castro's rebellion was direc ted in 1 959 upon i ts triumph . I t was not, at first, anti-U . S. or pro-Communist, but was primarily an agrarian revolu tion intended to improve the intolerable conditions of rural workers in Cuba. Castro has said : The people we counted on in our struggle were these: Seven hundred thousand Cubans without work, who desired to earn their daily bread honestly with out having to emigrate in search of livelihood. Five hundred thousand farm laborers inhabiting miserable shacks, who work four months of the year and starve for the rest of the year, sharing their misery with their children, who have not an inch of land to cultivate, and whose existence inspires compassion in any heart not made of stone. Four hundred thousand industrial laborers and stevedores whose retirement funds have been em bezzled, whose benefits are being taken away, whose homes are wretched quarters, whose salaries pass from the hands of the boss to those of the usurer, whose future is a pay reduction and dismissal, ,vhose life is eternal work and whose only rest is in the tomb. One hundred thousand small farmers who live and die working on land that is not theirs, looking at it with sadness as l\1oses did the promised land, to die without possessing it ; who, like feudal serfs,
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have to pay for the use of their parcel of land by giving up a portion of their products; who cannot love it, improve it, beautify it or plant a lemon or an orange tree on it, because they never know when a sheriff will come wi th the rural guard to evict them from i t. Thirty thousand teachers and professors who are so devoted, dedicated and necessary to the better destiny of future generations and who are so badly treated and paid. Twenty thousand small businessmen weighted down by deb ts, ruined by the crisis and harangued by a plague of filibusters and venal officials. Ten thousand young professionals : doctors, en gineers, lawyers, veterinarians, school teachers, den tists, pharmacists, newspapermen, painters, sculp tors, etc., who come forth from school with their degrees, anxious to work and full of hope, only to find themselves at a dead end with all doors closed, and where no ear hears their clamor or supplica tion. These are the people, the ones who know mis fortune and, therefore, are capable of fighting with limitless courage ! To the people whose desperate roads through life have been paved ·with the brick of betrayals and false promises, we were not going to say : "We will eventually giYe you """hat you need, " but rather here you have it, fight for it with all your might so that liberty and happiness may be yours ! . . . The problems concerning land, the problem of industrialization, the problem of housing, the prob lem of unemployment, the problem of education,
TH E CU BAN CRI SI S
25
and the problem of the health of the people; these are the six problems we would take immediate steps to resolve, along with the restoration of public liberties and political democracy. Perhaps this exposition appears cold and theoreti cal if one does not know the shocking and tragic conditions of the country with regard to these six problems, to say nothing of the most humiliating political oppression. Eighty-five per cent of the small farmers in Cuba pay rent and live under the constant threat of being dispossessed from the land that they cultivate. More than half the best cultivated land belongs to for eign ers. In Oriente, the largest province, the lands of the United Fruit Company and West Indian Company join the north coast to the southern one. There are two hundred thousand peasant families who do not have a single acre of land to cultivate to provide food for their starving children. On the other hand, nearly three hundred thousand ca b a l lerias (about thirty-three acres each) of productive land owned by powerful interests remain uncul tivated.1
These words are part of a speech of Castro's mad� sometime before he gained power. Since he has been in power, he has faithfully endeavored to carry out this program. It should be observed that his overtures to Com munism are the effect and not the cause of American Cf. " Cuba. Anatomy of a Revolution " by Leo H u berman a nd Paul M. Sweezy, published in The J\,f o n t h ly R eview for July and August, 1 960, in New York. 1
i
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hostility. It should also be noted that when Kennedy declares to an enthusiastic multitude that he will restore freedom to Cuba, it must be understood that he means freedom for the children to die agonizing deaths from hookworm and for the rest of the population to be sub ject to a ruthless and brutal government of corrupt dic tators ,vho will provide riches for inhabitants of the U.S. and a very few of Cuba. 2 Although Cuba is nominally an independent country with a right to determine its own economic policy, the U . S. adopted a new form of the Monroe Doctrine. It con sidered that it had a right to dictate what form of govern ment should prevail in every country of the Western Hemisphere. An unofficial invasion of Cuba, consisting mainly of Cuban emigres to the U.S., was viewed ,vith favor by the U.S. authorities, but to their regret was ign ominiously defeated in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs. After this, the Cubans, not ,vithout reason, felt themselves threatened by the danger of an official invasion from the U.S. 3 The U.S. imposed a blockade against any importaI do not wish to suggest any special wickedness in America . I t is not so long since George Lansbury was sent to j ail because he took successful measures to reduce infan t mortality in Poplar. And for many years Ireland had good cause to complain of the exploitation of absen tee landlords. Nor is Bri tish behavior in Katanga to be boasted of. 3 In late December, 1 962, Castro freed the prisoners-most of them Cuban emigres from his rule to the C .S .-taken during this abortive attack on Cuba, and a llowed them and their fam ilies to return to America, ob tain ing, as a q u id pro q u o, fifty- three million dollars' worth of medici nes and food for the Cuban people . In late August the Cuban Ambassador to the l_; .K. priYately informed me of h is govern men t's anxiety about impending i1n-asion and global crisis oYer Cuba . I said I sh ould be will ing to do what I could to bring cau tion to the great powers and, upon a second communica tion from the Ambassador 2
THE CUBAN CRISIS
27
tion of arms to Cuba. Cubans appealed to Russia, which expressed willingness to supply arms in spite of the U.S. blockade. Many people do not realize the completely unjusti fiable character of America's blockade of Cuba. Cuba had not committed any hostile act against America. The sum total of America's grievances was that the U.S. did not like the sort of government the Cubans preferred, and that this form of government was calculated to diminish the incomes of certain enormously rich Americans and thereby save many undernourished Cubans from desper ate poverty. It is not surprising that America disliked the Cuban appeal to Russia, but America had only itself to thank for it, since the embargo on Cuban sugar com pelled Cuba to seek a market elsewhere. The U. S. is not supposed to be at war with Russia, and any sovereign state has an indisputable legal right to seek the friend ship of Russia without, thereby, giving the U.S. any legal ground for hostile acts. Under the imminent threat of invasion, Cuba set to work to try to be capable of self defense. America endeavored to secure the support of on September 3, 1 962, I issued the following statement to the Guardian: "The situation of Cuba inYolves a serious threat to the peace of the world. The Cubans have every right to the government they wish and if it is a communist government it in no way justi fies American in tervention. If the United States invades Cuba it may provoke dan gerous warlike action from the Soviet Union. If Russ ia supplies arms and troops to Cuba the danger of unw ise and warl ike action by the Ameri cans will be increased with the imminent risk of world war. The situa tion demands a definite undertaking by the government of the United States not to invade Cuba and by the Soviet Union not to give armed support to Cuba. Precipitate action by either may provoke world-wide disaster." Needless to say.. the Gua rdian did not consider this worth printing.
28
UNA R M ED VI C TORY
the Western world for the doctrine that Cuba must await its fate in passive renunciation. 4 The President of the U. S. arrogated to himself the right to threaten publicly the Soviet Union with nuclear destruction unless the Soviet Union bowed to American will. The question of whether or not the Soviets had, in fact, placed missiles in Cuba was infinitely less important than the action taken by the President, for there were missiles around the world, all of them reprehensible, but it was the combination of military blockade and the threat of nuclear war which brought mankind to utmost peril. I have had occasion during the weeks following the crisis to point this out to hostile journalists in the follow ing way. Suppose Mao Tse-tung and Premier Khrushchev were to announce that the puppet Chiang Kai-shek pos sessed nuclear rockets and was in occupation of islands acknowledged to be part of the mainland of China. Chiang Kai-shek had never renounced his intention of invading the Chinese mainland, and American officers were training for and organizing the use of these nuclear weapons. Therefore, unless these rockets were imme diately removed, there ,vould be a Sino-Russian invasion of Quemoy, Matsu, and Tai,van. A blockade would be imposed, and any ship of the American Seventh Fleet which disallo,ved a Sino-Russian boarding party for pur poses of inspection ,vould be sunk. Were the United States to reply in any part of the ,vorld, such as Vietnam America might, perh aps, have reflected that the U .S. fought a war with Great Britai n because the British obj ected to American trade with Napoleon with whom they were at war. The U.S. fought to protect the right of her ships to trade with whichever country she wished. 4
THE C U B A N C R I S I S
29
or Berlin, there ,vou ld b e a nuclear attack upon the U . S. itself. In that mad con tingency, I should occupy myself ,vith condemning the posi tion adopted by the Chinese and Russians and ,vith urging patience upon Kennedy. I should not feel obliged to make clear that my condemna tion of the Sino-Russian blockade did not imply approval of the nuclear rockets in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek. I choose this example because the press so blinds us to any perspective that it is necessary to translate actions into parables involving an ini tiative of " the enemy" in order to enable us to see the perfidy of our o,vn behavior. The situation in Tai,van, as in Turkey, is no di fferen t from that to ,v·hich Kennedy ,vas obj ecting in Cuba, and his ac tion in Cuba ,vas comparable to a Russian mili tary blockade of Turkish ports or of a Russian convoy around Bri tain . Nothing so ,vel l illustrates the danger to which the people of Britain were exposed by the pol icy of their government as the Cuban crisis. For, if it is legi timate for the American government to consider the presence of missiles on Cuba to cons titu te a hostil e act, then ho,v can ,ve interpret the presence of hydrogen bombers, nucl ear rockets and Polaris submarines in the Bri tish I sl es? The Uni ted States justified its actions in the UN by claiming that in the modern ,vorld i t ,vas not necessary to haYe an open declaration of ,var. The mere presence of ·w hat i t called "aggressive ,veapons" ,vas a suffici ent ac t of hosti l i ty to justify measures such as ,vere being ta ken by the U . S. This staten1en t by i\dlai Stevenson in the lJ N is one ,vh ich bears most careful scru tiny for, in i ts ·,w ay, i t underlines the cause that the unilateralist 1nove1nen t has been ma king in this country. N uclear ,vea pons are the1n-
30
UNA RME D VICTORY
selves an imminent threat to the peace of nations and a hostile act. They are instruments of total annihilation, which depend on hairtrigger control and on warning systems measured in moments. In technological terms, such weapons completely transform the nature of rela tionships between nation states. Such ,veapons do not permit formal declaration of hostilities. They do not allow elaborate consideration of alternative policies. They are weapons of total death. The U.S., in the midst of a war fever, was holding Congressional elections in which the candidates vied with each other in bluster, bullying, and ferocious im perialism. The following remarks are some quotations which illustrate the state of mind in Congress just pre vious to the Cuban crisis. They are taken from /. F. Stone's Weekly of October 8. A Democrat from South Carolina said : According to my distinguished friend from Flor ida, who is so eloquent and who recently came from my part of the world, if you do not stop Castro now, soon, real estate in Florida will not be worth fifty cents an acre . . . . It is as simple as the ABC's if you give the military the word to go ahead, and we can blockade Cuba. You say, "You cannot do it, you may bring on a rain of missiles. ' ' If you are afraid to die now, you will be afraid to die two years from now. Let me say that the greatest philoso pher the ,vorld has ever had was old Plato. He said, " Only the dead have seen the end of war." If blockading Cuba brings on war, let our boys die for America. They are not interested in Laos, they
THE C U B AN CRI SI S
31
are not interested in Indonesia, they are not inter ested in Berlin. . . .
All the quotations given by Mr. Stone, of ,vhich this is only a sample, merit reading in this connection. There is evident in them not only a bevy of odd misconceptions, among ,vhich is the strange and offensive belief that one does not want a nuclear war only because one is afraid to die oneself, but there is a tone of braggadocio and desire for war that is appalling. All this was justified in Ameri can public opinion by the argument that Communism is wicked since it destroys freedom . Under Batista the rural population of Cuba had had full freedom to starve. Under Castro, it had freedom to obtain as much food as is necessary to avoid malnutrition. Almost all American public opinion regarded the former freedom as prefer able-for Cuba. In the next section of this book I shall relate the history of the crisis from my personal point of view and in con nection with my own involvement in it. As regards this particular crisis, my vie\v was anti-American. This had nothing whatever to do ,vith any estimate as to the gen eral merits of Communism. It ,vas concerned only with the action of statesmen in one particular context and ,vith the relation of such action to the paramount danger of nuclear war. In the crises during Stalin' s day I placed the blame quite differently. In this crisis, America sho,ved willingness for nuclear war ,vhile Russia did not, and I consider such willingness far the most important issue on every occasion on which it is relevant. I fully ad mit that it ,vas both natural and reasonable for America to dislike the prospect of Russian nuclear \veapons in
32
UNARMED VICTORY
Cuba. What, however, was both surpr1s1ng and disap pointing was that America at no time showed any under standing of the correlative feelings of Russia. America and her allies have established along a great part of the Russian frontier nuclear bases offering a far greater threat to Russia than would have been offered to the U. S. by the installations which Russia proposed to establish in Cuba. The proper course for America would have been to offer to negotiate an agreement with Russia that neither side should have nuclear installations on alien territory. A lack of understanding of the feelings of an opponent has been, throughout, an obstacle to successful negotiations and, consequently, a danger to mankind.
B . THE D AY S
O F C RI S I S
During the month of October, the ,vorld learned that Russian ships, some of which contained arms, ,vere approaching Cuba, and that American ships engaged in the blockade were lying in wait for the Russian ships with orders to stop and to search them, by force if neces sary. There �vas every reason to think that the Russian ships ,vould resist such force, and that ,var benveen Rus sia and America ,vould instantly break out. As Khrush chev, a fe,v days later, pointed out in a letter to me, such a ,var ·w ould immediately become nuclear and ,vould bring vast and unimaginable disaster upon the ,vhole world. Never before in the course of a long life have I experi-
THE C U BAN CRISIS
33
enced anything comparable to the tense anxiety of those crucial hours. 5 I sawr, in my mind's eye, the Russian ships sailing wesn..,...ard into the Caribbean and the U . S. ships ,vaiting to grapple ,vi th them. I sa,v, in i1nagination, the whole world in flames by the next day, most hu1nan beings dead, and the survivors reduced to a condition of utter misery. Hour by hour, the desperate ne,vs ,\T as ex pected. Hour by hour headlines appeared in the press such as those in the Daily Ske tch of October 2 5 . Khrush chev orders SAI L O N-O R SIN K. U . S. ,vAITS . . . WATCHES. Hour by hour, over ,vireless and tel evision, came news of ,var preparations in Russia and even more frenzied preparations in America-,varlike speeches by the President of the U .S. and other officials and the evacu ation of the families of officers and troops in Florida. Hour by hour, nothing happened to stem the i1npending destruction of mankind. 6 There are, however, two, at least, fairly well-known men in this coun try who have publicly chided the British public for being alarmed by the Cuban crisis. One of these men even wen t so far as to say that we should have kept silence and, with quiet docil ity, backed up our ally. It would have been " more dignified·· (cf. O bse n 1 er, November l l , 1 962) . It is an attitude d ifficult to understand in ,·iew of the manifest danger, and I belieYe that there are few well-informed people anywhere in the world who found themseh'es at the time of the crisis as imperturbable as these two gentl emen proclaim that they were. In the words of the American news commen tator l\.. alter Lipp mann , "It was a very near th ing." (O bsen,er, December 2, 1 962 .) 6 In the past I have hoped that at the onset of a crisis tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people would come out to proclaim their right to live. The Cuban crisis made clear to me tha t rather than provoke people to staunch resistance, such a crisis intimidates them with an ever greater sense of futility. '"\\"hat good, , . they thought, "does it do now to stand or sit in the streets outside the American Embassy? How would that change the course of events? " I t is no small commentary on our planet that those who feel most strongly about 5
34
U N A R M E D V I C TORY
On October 22 things seemed at their darkest. That evening I put out a press statement-which, like my later statements, ,vas largely ignored by the press-saying: It seems likely that '\\'i thin a week you will all be dead to please American madmen. President Kennedy has called the ��bassadors of all NATO and Latin American countries to meet in Washing ton. �!embers of the American Cabinet and leaders of Congress have been summoned. Vice-President Johnson has flo,vn to ,vashington. Tonight at 1 2 this �ue felt most helples., because of their very consciousness of the extremi ty of the situation last October. Yet there were demonstrations. though not so large as I had hoped. Perhaps the most impr�ive was held in �ew York Citv, where the Reverend Michael Scott and the Re\·erend A. ll uste spoke to ten thousand Americans.
J.
J
D uring the weeks following the early apparent end of the Cuban crisis I ha\·e been given ample evidence that there are very many people in all parts of the world, including the U.S., who had been. unlike the two imperturbable gentlemen already alluded to, as worried as I. Such thankfulness welled up in the letters and telegrams and messages of all kinds that I received as I have not experienced before. Amongst other demonstrations lP was one that I found especially touching., a small and spontaneous gathering of people from all about r in �onh \\ ales, my neighbors amongst the farmers and local busi ness people and their families . Th�- came with banners and home made signs to a field outside m�- house. I had not known that they were coming till half an hour before the first of them began to arrive. They came for no other reason than that they wished to affirm their desire to Ii,.-e. I tried to say to them that this crisis, which we had so barely survived., was, in fact, a reflection of the permanent danger to all of us. It had brought to our conscious and imaginative understand ing the meaning of nuclear rockets surrounding us, primed on a T moment s notice and waiting for the smallest mishap to be fired in a rain of agonizing death. I tried to thank those who had come, and I found i t difficul t to finish my remarks. The occasion was reported in The WesteTT& .1.\lail and Y Cy m ru (Xo 1iember 1 5, 1 962) . It was, as I have
said, to me, a very moving occasion, though the Guardian (November 12 7 1 962) did its best to ridicule it.
TH E CU BAN C RI SI S
35
midnight the BBC light program carries an emer gency speech of the President of the United States. It will be followed by a news conference of the American Pentagon. These are facts. I appeal to my fellow countrymen to listen to this speech tonight. Should there be any suggestion of war or of an action calculated to provoke war, I urge every human being who loves life to come out in the streets of our country and demonstrate our demand to live and let live. There must be no WAR. The President's speech was not pacific . As I said in a short press statement on the morning of the 2 3rd : " Ken nedy's speech brings humanity to the edge of nucl ear death , " and I urged all who ,vished to survive to protest at once. He spoke of the nuclear missiles ,vith ,vhich Rus sia was supplying Cuba and of the missil e bases ,vhich, by aerial photography, the U . S . had discovered tha t Russi a was building in Cuba . In the ne,vs broadcast follo,ving his speech samples of these photographs ,vere sho,vn and the Secretary of Defense, �,f r. 1\,fcN amara, said th at some of them were oriented toward the central part of the U . S . I t is no,v known with a fair degree of certainty that the range of Sovie t missiles in Cuba ,vas much overesti mated by these U . S . officials-whether inten tionally or not is debatable. I t is probable tha t their range ,vas no more than five hundred miles. 7 Ho,vever that may be, the That official U .S . estimates were open to doubt was made public in the U.S. in the trusted leading American magazine, A via t i o n U'eek , in a leader by i ts edi tor, Robert Hale. This article was quoted at considerable length and commen ted upon in an extremely in teresting report by Leonard Beaton on the fron t page of the G uardian of November 1 5 . 7
36
U N A R I\I E D VICTORY
alarming cry ,vas taken up in various parts of the U.S. that Russia ,vas preparing to bomb the ,vhole U.S. from Cuba. 8 In particular, it ,vas taken up by congressional candidates ,vho sa,v their chance to appear brave and helpful and patriotic before their constituencies. As a result, there ,vas a great boom in the sale of fallout shel• ters, and some cities, such as Philadelphia, ,vere put on a ,vartime footing ; in Washington, there ,vas an especially rapid sale of bottled water; and oddly enough, not only in the U. S . , but in various parts of the ,vorld, "\Vest Berlin and S,vitzerland notably, people set about laying in sup plies of food to last at least a fortnight ( lVestern. Mail J October 25). In the U. S. , the President ,vas urged by "responsible" politicians to invade Cuba at once-en couragement ,vhich he ,visely refused. 9 He did, ho,vever, alert the U.S. forces, including nuclear forces, in .A.mer ica. An interesting comment-not kno,vn at the time to the public-upon the warlike determination of the Presi dent is the fact that the General in command of the NATO Forces refused to alert his nuclear forces. It ,vas later reported that the President ordered such an alert
�fr . Grimond, the leader of the Liberal Party, put a pertinent question in connection with this when he asked during a speech at Deemers, Orkney, " It is true that the creation of bases in a new area so cl ose to F lorida was provocati,-e. but why did �Ir. Khrushchev do it? He cou ld obliterate most of America in any case." ( lVestern Alai!, Octo ber 25 .) 9 It is enl ightening as to the state of m ind of America that as late as Decem ber 3 . �Ir. Adlai Stevenson was castigated in an article in the Sa t u rday E1•c n i n g Pos t an d elsewhere for preferring "pol itical n egotia tions to the alternative of mil itary action." It is a pity that �Ir. Steven son ·s friends h a ve taken pa ins to deny that he d id this. Had he done it, his voice wou ld h a,-e been the one thi n small voice of sanity in official C.S. circles. (The Ti m es and G u a rdia n , December 4, 1 962 .) 8
THE CU BAN CRISIS
37
and that General Norstad declined to implement this order on the ground that it would be a dangerous and provocative act. The article in which this story occurred was in my possession but, regrettably, has been misplaced so that I cannot give the source. Several people, ho\vever, confirm having seen the report. On the 2 3rd also, I sent telegrams to the heads of state involved and to various influential politicians. I tele graphed to President Kennedy: Your action desperate. Threat to human survival. No conceivable justification. Civilized man con demns it. We will not have mass murder. Ultima tums mean war. I do not speak for power but plead for civilized man. End this madness.
And to Premier Khrushchev I telegraphed: I appeal to you not to be provoked by the un justifiable action of the United States in Cuba. The world will support caution. Urge condemna tion to be sought through United Nations. Pre cipitous action could mean annihilation for man kind.
I urged Prime Minister Macmillan "to prevent Ameri can madness from bringing on nuclear war. Speak out while time permits. " To Mr. Hugh Gaitskell I tele graphed urging "Opposition to join our mass protests against imminent disaster threatened by American mad ness over Cuba. This is the moment to act. ' ' And to Secre tary-General U Thant I appealed " for swi ft condemna tion of tragic U.S. action, " and offered to do anything that he wished to aid him.
38
UNA RME D VICTORY
In the afternoon of that same day, October 2 3 , I ap pealed to the British press "to allow the people to know of the grave danger facing mankind and to urge people to demonstrate and to act against death, and on behalf of human survival. " And the next day, the 24th, I put out a leaflet: YOU ARE TO DIE
not in the course of nature, but within a few weeks. And not you alone, but your family, your friends, and all the inhabi tan ts of Britain, together wi th many hundreds of millions of innocent people elsewhere. WHY? Because rich Ameri cans dislike the governmen t that Cubans prefer, and have used part of their wealth to spread lies about i t. WHAT CAN YOU DO?
You can go out into the stree t and into the market pl ace, proclaiming: "Do not yield to ferocious and insane murderers. Do not imagine that it is your duty to die when your Prime ivl inister and the Presi dent of the Uni ted States tell you to do so. Re member rather your duty to your family, your friends, your coun try, the world you live in, and that future world which, if you so choose, may be glorious, happy, and free." AND RE�JE�IBER : CON FOR l\IITY 1\IEAN S DEA TH. ONLY P ROTEST GIVES A HOPE OF LIFE.
T HE CU B AN CRI SI S
39
This statement ,vas circulated as a leaflet in \Vales and was printed by the Cuban Embassy, 1 0 and distributed widely by the Committee of 1 00, the British-Cuba Com mittee, the British Peace Committee and youth groups of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. It ,vas not, so far as I know, published by the press any,vhere in Britain. Few, if any, of my statements ,vere. Events moved so quickly and time was so short that I communicated to the press the contents of my messages at the same time that they were sent. Upon rechecking ,vith the agencies to determine what it was that they were releasing, it was found that the agencies were releasing one-third of a sixty-word message. What I was saying with careful prep aration and much thought, was being totally distorted in
M y secretary in London was, of course, in touch with the Cuban Ambassador in order to try to obtain information as to events in Cuba itself. He found that he, like a ll others who went into the Cuban Embassy, was questioned intimidatingly by police, who demanded to know the name and address and purpose of visit of all those who approached the Embassy. The quest for fresh information proYed unavailing as the Cuban Ambassador himself was cut off from com munication with Havana save about the most trivial and irreleYant matters. At this critical moment, he had no idea what h is govern ment 's instructions were, what the situation was in the view of his government, and how he might be expected to act. \Vhether this was due to fail ure on the part of his government to instruct its own representatives as to its case, or due to censorship on the part of the British government, I do not know. The fact is that the Ambassador was isolated and when he, in turn, learned that none of my messages or statements were being reported in the B ritish press, he respon ded with generosity, and immediately offered to pay for full page advertise ments of anything I cared to say about the crisis in the British press. (The British press was hardly receptive to this plan.) The Ambassador was perfectly aware th at he might find my views contrary to his own, but he was firm in his belief that his country had nothing to fear from examination of the facts surrounding the crisis. 10
40
UN A RME D VI C TORY
the dispatches of the news agencies. Before my message could be received by its intended recipient, the news agencies would be communicating something entirely different during a crisis in which moments counted. In the hope of overcoming this apparently insuperable diffi culty, my statements and messages were given to Tass and to Hsinhua, and sometimes returned to this country by way of some foreign agency. Mr. Macmillan acknowledged the receipt of my tele gram, as did Mr. Gaitskell some days later, the latter "en closing a recent statement of the National Executive Committee, " 1 1 and I received a sympathetic response from U Thant-indeed, I was in friendly communication with him throughout the crisis. No reply came from either the American President or the Soviet Premier. Then, in the middle of the afternoon of the 24th, re porters of the daily press and various broadcasting asso ciations began to telephone me. They told me that Premier Khrushchev had publicized through Tass Agency a long letter to me in reply to my telegram to him. Owing to its having already been published in an other country, the press of this country ,vere interested. The Labour Party Executive ·w as gravely concerned about th e U.S . blockade and, o n October 2 4 , i t cal led for a O N investiga tion o f the allega tion of missile bases in Cuba. " I f long- range m issiles have been se t u p in Cuba th en this presents a serious , new , potential threat to the security of the LT .S. and the \Vestern Hemisphere . " It deplored any extension of nuclear weapons to countries wh ich d id not already h ave the m . ( l l "esten1 1'1 a il & Da ily Teleg ra p h , October 25, 1 962.) It is, perh aps, strange t h a t the Labour Party Executi ve , and some o thers, were so insistent u pon cal l ing in the lT N a s med iator. They should haYe obsen·ed t h a t . whereas we m ay con sider t h e lT N to be the cat 's whiskers, mos � of the inh abi tants of the U .S . consider it merely a ca t ·s paw. 11
THE CU B AN CRI SI S
41
They suddenly discovered that I had been rather con cerned about the crisis in Cuba. By that evening a crowd of reporters had already gathered in my home asking for my comments on the letter from Mr. Khrushchev which I had not yet seen but the contents of which had been read to me over the tele phone. During the next days, I was besieged from morn ing to night by reporters, and both day and night by telephone calls from all parts of the world. 1 2 I was startled by the ignorance of most of these journal ists and by what such ignorance revealed of the workings of the press and its power to distort. The information that came over the tapes had apparently got no further than the copy editor. I had to tell them step by step what
I answered the q ues t ions o f t hese j ournal ists and radio reporters to the best of my abi l i ty, and bore w i t h the television ligh t s and their wires wh ich , for some days, made moving about in my ho use a h azard, because I hoped that, in view of the serious danger through which we had a l l l ived and w h ich was not yet a l toge ther passed, a few facts tha t h ad not been published in our coun try m igh t be prese n ted to the public. But the ex pense of energy a nd time was al most entirely wasted . Some papers asked for special i n terviews of considera ble length . The reporters for the most part seemed friendly and to have a fa irly j ust estimate of wh a t was go ing on . B u t when I looked at and h eard the reports publ ished i n thei r papers and on the wireless, I found that eac h newspaper published only that part of their reporter's in terv iew with me that fi tted w i th wha t they had a lready p u b l ished a n d co lored what they d id p u blish accordi ng to their already determ ined view of what h a d taken pl ace and their own advertised pol i tical bias. ,v hen I saw some of these reporters l a ter, they apologized to me and sa id that their edi tors had in terfered w i th their stories. Only one, h owever, had the cou rage to stand out aga i nst h is ed i tor. H e resigned fro m a great daily paper because h is edi tor refused to pu blish the i n terview wh ich the edi tor had arra nged for h i m to h ave with me . He deserves honor. I f more reporters h ad t h e courage of their convict ion s, t h e da i l y press m ight be more trustworthy and more i n teresti ng. 12
42
U NARME D VI C TORY
it was I had been saying over the three previous days. If reporters on newspapers are so ill informed of the very news they are expected to purvey, what are ,ve to say about the caliber of information which reaches the pub lic? I found the individual reporters pleasant and sym pathetic-though perhaps pretending only in order to get my cooperation-and they seemed genuinely relieved by the seeming subsidence of the danger of war. This ,vas a more important and hopeful fact than their ignorance. On the following day, I received the letter itself from the Russian Embassy in London. I give it in full in trans lation as it was the first indication of sanity on the part of the possible belligerents that ,ve in this country had been given. MR. RUSSELL, I received your telegram and express sincere gratitude for the concern you have displayed in con nection with the aggressive actions of the United States in pushing the ,vorld to the brink of war. I understand your worry and anxiety. I should like to assure you that the Soviet government will not take any reckless decisions, will not permit itself to be provoked by the unwarranted actions of the United States of America and will do everything to eliminate the situation fraught ,vith irreparable consequences ,vhich has arisen in connection with the aggressive actions of the United States govern ment. ,ve shall do everything in our power to pre vent war from breaking out. ,ve are fully aware of the fact that if this ,var is unleashed, from the very first hour it will become a thermonuclear and world war. This is perfectly obvious to us, but clearly is DEAR
T H E C U B A N CRI SI S
not t o the government of the United States ·which has caused this crisis. The American governmen t is said to have em barked on such a reckless course not only because of hatred for the Cuban people and their govern ment but also out of pre-election considerations, in the flurry of interparty pre-election excitement. But this is madness ,•.hich mav lead the \\"Orld to the catastrophe of a thermonuclear ,,,ar. The persons who are responsible for the United States policy should ponder the consequences to \\·hich their rash actions mav lead if a thermonuclear \\"ar is un leashed. If the w·ay to the aggressive policy of the American government is not blocked, the people of the United States and other nations \\-ill have to pay \\·ith millions of lives for this policy. I beg you, �fr. Russell, to meet ,,.ith understand ing our positions, our actions. Realizing the entire complexity of the situation brought about by the piratic actions of the .American government ,,.-e cannot agree ,,.-ith them in any form. If \\·e encour age pira cy and bandi�- in international relations, this \\-ill not conduce to consolidation of the norms of international law· and, consequently, of legal order on , .-hich normal relations are based ben..·een States, ben"·een nations, ben•.-een people. Therefore if the United States government ,,·ill crudely trample upon and violate international rights, if it does not follo,,· in its actions the ap peals of reason, the situation having tensed up to the limit may get out of hand and this may resolve into a \\·arid ,•.-ar ,,·ith all the regretful consequences to the peoples of all countries. ✓
1
43
44
UN A R M E D VI C TORY
This is why what is needed now is not only the efforts of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and Cuba, which has become, as it were, the main focus of the world crisis, but also the efforts of all states, all peoples and all segments of society to avert a military catastrophe. Clearly if this catastrophe spreads out, it will bring extremely grave conse quences to mankind and will spare neither right nor left, neither those who champion the cause of peace nor those who want to stay aloof. I want to say once more: we shall do everything possible to prevent this catastrophe. But it must be borne in mind that our efforts and possibilities are efforts and possibilities of one side. If the Ameri can government will be carrying out the program of piratic actions outlined by it, we shall have to resort to means of defense against an aggressor to defend our rights and international rights which are written down in international agreements and expressed in the United Nations Charter. We have no other way out. It is well known that if one tries to mollify a robber by giving him at first one's purse, then one's coat, etc. , the robber will not become more merciful, will not stop robbing, on the contrary, he will become increasingly insolent. Therefore, it is necessary to curb the highwayman in order to prevent the jungle law from becoming the law governing relations between civilized peo ple and states. The Soviet government considers that the gov ernment of the United States of America must display reserve and stay the execution of its piratical
THE CU B AN CR I S I S
45
threats which are fraught with most serious conse quences. The question of war and peace is so vital that we should consider a top-level meeting in order to discuss all the problems which have arisen, to do everything to remove the danger of unleashing a thermonuclear war. As long as rocket nuclear wea pons are not put into play it is still possible to avert war. When aggression is unleashed by the Ameri cans such a meeting will already become impossible and useless. I thank you once more for your appeal, prompted as it is by concern for the destinies of the world. Respectfully yours, N. KHRUSHCHEV Moscow, October 24, 1 962
The rational tone of this letter, its assurances that the Soviet Union would not permit itself to be provoked into reckless action, understanding as it did the finality of such action, and the proposal of possible negotiation in stead of war, brought a ray of hope-and ·was acknowl edged as doing so by the reporters who welcomed it. It brought no more than a ray of hope, however, and, very welcome though that was, it still contained the ominous determination not to give ,vay to the piratical, as it termed it, institution of a blockade against Cuba. If Rus sia persisted in this determination, war would result. I therefore decided to appeal again to Mr. Khrushchev. I telegraphed that evening:
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UNA RME D VICT O RY
Thank you for your heartening reply. I congratu late you on your courageous stand for sanity. I hope you will hold back ships in Cuban waters long enough to secure American agreement to your proposal. Whole world will bless you if you succeed in averting war. If there is anything I can possibly do please let me know.
And at the same time, I telegraphed to President Ken nedy : I urge you most strongly to make a conciliatory reply to Khrushchev's vital overture and avoid clash with Russian ships long enough to make meeting and negotiations possible. After shots have been exchanged i t will probably be too late. I appeal to you to meet Khrushchev. If there is anything I can do please let me know.
Far from welcoming Premier Khrushchev's cool and rational statement, the heads of various states in the " Free World"-notably in the U.S., of course, and Britain continued to breathe fire and brimstone. And they said that the Russians were untrustworthy and probably would not, whatever their Premier said, act in a pacific way. The first substantial basis for the accusation of "double-dealing" against the Russians was Zorin's asser tion to the U N that there were no Soviet rockets in Cuba. The best account of this matter that I have seen is in the Guardian ) December 24. Khrushchev, very soon after Zorin's statement, repudiated it and admitted the exist ence of Soviet rockets in Cuba. The G uard ian states that in the opinion of UN observers, according to the Reuters
THE CU BAN CRI S I S
47
reports, it seems that Zorin had been inadequately briefed. This seems probable, as Russia had made no attempt to conceal its nuclear installations in Cuba and was ,vell aware that the U.S. had conclusive evidence of their existence. Zorin has since been removed from his post as Russian envoy to the UN and there seems little doubt that this is due to his misleading statement. It should also be remembered that Zorin had been a Stalin ist and was probably out of sympathy with Khrushchev's policy. It would seem, therefore, that the charge of du plicity could only be made against Zarin personally in view of the very rapid repudiation of his statement by Khrushchev. On October 24 the British in the UN Security Council gave their unqualified support to the U.S., and the Brit ish Permanent Representative, Sir Patrick Dean, de nounced Russia's "calculated double-dealing" in deceit fully placing long-range missiles in Cuba, thereby upset ting the balance of military power. He must have been considerably surprised when Khrushchev, of his own voli tion, offered all that Sir Patrick's resolution asked the Security Council to demand-but which it did not de mand. It does not seem to have occurred to either Sir Patrick Dean, or to the British Foreign Minister, Lord Home, that the dealings of the " Free World" are not always entirely free of deceit. So sure of the frank honesty of the U.S. were they that it does not appear to have occurred to them to question whether, in actuality, the missiles that so perturbed them were long-range missiles. We now know that they were not. In their outrage, they lost their sense of proportion and forgot that the one thing to be avoided was war-nuclear war. Had they de voted themselves as zealously to pacifying the U. S. and
48
U N A RME D VI C TORY
to persuading both it and Russia to negotiate as they did to vilifying the Russians, they might have been of greater benefit to humanity as well as to Britain, in particular, than they proved to be. As it was, Lord Home was espe cially emphatic about the "double-dealing" propensities of the Russians. He dwelt, also, upon the dangers of a Munich-like appeasement of the foe-Communism. He pointed out that he, at least, had learned from Munich that appeasement resulted only in a delayed but, be cause delayed, more virulent struggle. It escaped him, and doubtless many of his listeners, that he had not learned the lesson now essential to have in one's mind, that war, which would inevitably escalate into nuclear war and global nuclear war, m ust be avoided. It was difficult to discover what Mr. Macmillan and other im portant British politicians who were in office ,vere doing or thinking. They seemed to be occupied chiefly ,vith the fact that America was acting without previous consulta tion with Great Britain. They, too, seem to have failed to learn a lesson that one would have thought obvious, and that had been pointed out to them by U . S. military experts such as Herman Kahn, Fryklund, and McNa mara, and, in England, by me and many others, that it would not be possible in the midst of s,viftly moving events and in emergency for the authorities in the U.S. and those in Britain to consult and comfortably ,veigh the pros and cons, or, indeed, to give no tice ahead of time of ,vhat had been decided upon by either authority. Meanwhile, the Americans continued ,vith their war brouhaha speeches and preparations. The next news to reach us was that Russian ships had entered the blockaded area, but had permitted the Amer icans to board and search them. No arms had been
THE CU B A N CRI S I S
49
found upon them. It ,vas known, however, that Russian ships which were carrying arms ,vere approaching the blockade, were ,vithin an hour's distance of the blockade. This was the crucial hour. The ,vorld ,vaited breath lessly in expectation of the fatal ne,vs that Russian and American ships had met and shots had been exchanged. No such ne,vs came. And at last it was learned that Khrushchev had ordered some ships to turn a,vay and others to submit to .,American inspection. It ,vas this de cision of Khrushchev's ,vhich made the preservation of peace possible. It was a unilateral act and a very brave act, since it exposed him to the charge of yielding to threats. Khrushchev ,vas, of course, sneered at by many, but I think the ,vhole tone of his pronouncements then and since sho,vs that ,vhat mainly influenced him was the horror of global disaster. For this magnanimous act he deserves the gratitude of the ,vorld. I also gave a statement to the press. It was reported out of context and in such a manner as to suggest that I was supporting the presence of missiles in Cuba and "re peating" the Soviet vie,v. The statement ,vas as follo,vs : Premier Khrushchev is personally responsible for the avoidance of a war of nuclear devastation. He has acted with the greatest restraint in a crisis of the first magnitude. He has carried out every let ter of the pron1ise contained in his message to me. He promised to do nothing rash and nothing ,vhich ·w ould risk conflict and tw·eh·e Russian ships turned back from their destina tion at Cuba. He has stopped all further shipments. This leaves Cuba blockaded. �Ir. Khru shchev's desperately important moderation makes it
50
UNA RME D VIC TORY
incumbent upon President Kennedy to accept his offer to meet and discuss outstanding issues at the highest level. The blockade violates international l aw. It is illegal. I t is immoral. If the blockade is defensible when applied to Cuba then it is j ust as applicable to Great Bri tain. America should con sider the War of 1 8 1 2. If nuclear bases are intoler able in Cuba, they are in tolerable everywhere. This is the heart of what I have been saying to the Bri tish people for the length of our campai gn for nuclear disarmament. Nuclear bases threaten the peace of all. Now is the moment for us to realize that we have been on the very edge of the end of human life on our planet. Mr. Khrushchev' s offer to meet and discuss the sources of conflict must be supported by every sane man and woman.
During the crisis I was asked for messages for meet ings, 1 3 demonstrations, individuals, in many parts of the 13 The aerial photographs aroused skepticism in me because I thought them unclear and insufficient as evidence, quite apart from the grave issue of the nature of American response to them. This was to be borne out by the vast miscalculation or misinformation about the character and range of these missiles so confidently identified on the spy photographs. I sent this message to the Committee of 100 : During the past week we have been brought to the very edge of extinction. The American action in Cuba is unqualifiably mad. If missile bases are intolerable in Cuba, they are intolerable in Great Britain, and if a blockade which amounts to war can be j ustified for Cuba, then Khrushchev, by the same a rgument, should blockade Great Britain. Let us consider American j ustification. They say offensive missiles are in Cuba. This may or may not be true. Certainl y their spy photo graphs are indicative of nothing in themselves . It mi�ht be interesting to speculate on A merican reaction to spy planes sent by Cuba over
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51
world, and did my best to comply ,,-rith the requests.u To the publisher of The Va11co uue,· Su n ., for instance, I wrote: My ,-ie,,"S ,,;th regard to the crisis are that the l\"amiogton. But •-hat of the actual complaint America makes. Does she think that nuclear submarines are acceptable but stationary bases are oot? Does she think that Polaris submarines in the Hol"\"" Loch are �defensive·· and not . ...gg1essi,"'e""'? And Turkey? .And Siam? The double-dealing of •-hich Lord Home speaks is a fitting descrip tion of American double-thinking and the double standard of �lac millan !ls so-called so�� on go,-ernment. This blockade and the obsequious suppon it has evoked from toadies, is the most irresponsible action 1'--C ha,"'e seen for some time ann more graphic than any before to the people of Britain . Nuclear bases threaten the peace of all and panicularly those who are host to them. They create fe.ar:, they create panic� they contribute to the climate which makes mass murder feasible and they a.re them sel"'eS instruments of mass munler. \\:e must rene•- effort to persuade the people of this coun�- that Britain as a satellite contributes to the likelihood of e..xtinction for man . .As for the l""oice of Britain as pan of XA TO !' "..e ba,-e again seen that if .America "-ere to declare the planet flat and the Tories a host of baboonsl' the Prime Minister "..mud spend fortunes lo persuade us all that gaping primates 1'-ere a grand species!' especially fitted for the new and adl""enturous conditions pro,ided by the Oat earth "..e all haYe desired since the _-\.mericans told us to do so. The Bahamas fiasco. Sk�bolt and the ·•British Independent Deterrent" (!) do not 1'-eaken my case. H I sent another message on the same day (October 26) to the British Cuba Committee: From the inception of the Cuban Revolution it has been the pur pose of American policy to destroy it. America has used eT"ery de,ice
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behavior of Khrushchev provides evidence that the Soviet Union does desire an end to the Cold War. I think we can see this most clearly if we would consider the result of a blockade of Formosa, Que moy or Matsu by the Chinese or Russian govern ments, accompanied by a threat of nuclear war if the missiles located there were not immediately dismantled. President Kennedy would not have had the courage to have done what Premier Khru shchev did with regard to Cuba, in my view. I think, therefore, that the opportuni ty which now is open to us all is entirely dependent on Ameri can awareness of the fact that it is the Russians who have provided evidence of their \\ illingness to take great steps under difficult circumst ances, and that i t is now incumbent upon President Kennedy to consider the right of his governmen t to maintain missile bases around the perimeter of the Soviet Union. If you are anxious about bases in Cuba, bases which are intolerable, as are all nuclear bases, then you must be honest enough to consider how the Soviet Union feels and how the Chinese feel about bases which have been surrounding them for many years. I believe that the responsibili ty of the news papers is to alter the climate of fanaticism, to cease 7
available to her, short of dropp ing an H-bomb on the island. . . . The blockade is an act of war tan ta mount to a threat of nuclear war. Lord Home, in calling the blockade a "legal nicety," is guilty of consum mate hypocrisy when he accuses the Russians of dou ble-dealing. Perhaps he would comment on American reaction to Cuban spy planes over ,vashington. . . .
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considering the Soviets as devils, and to recognize that unless a way is found quickly to end the Cold War, we are all likely to be exterminated. The average man should take it as an imperative moral duty upon his conscience to oppose policies of genocide, whether of East or of West, and to insist upon sincere and serious effort to prevent the unnecessary conflict between the two Great Powers.
Khrushchev had held back his ships. Immediate dis aster was averted. I expected the whole world to be ready to congratulate Mr. Khrushchev, but in this I was disappointed. Although after Khrushchev withdrew his ships the situation was less tense than it had been, there were still some difficult obstacles to overcome. The Americans had discovered by aerial reconnaissance that Russia was preparing nuclear installations in Cuba, and Khrushchev ,vas accused of duplicity because he had said that the arms he was supplying to Cuba were purely defensive. Americans said that nuclear weapons in Cuba were not defensive, although they have for many years maintained that American nuclear weapons are defen sive wherever they may be found-but, of course, that's different! To return to the progress of events during the critical days: Khrushchev now ,vent further in pacification. He agreed to dismantle the nuclear bases in C uba and to pack up and lvithdra,v from Cuba if the U.S. ,vould guarantee that it would not invade Cuba. The U . S . demanded inspection of the alle ged nuclear missile sites to make sure that the Russians kept their ,vord and dis mantled them. Castro refused to have inspection. The situation had deteriorated again.
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My former cables to President Kennedy had not re ceived any reply-I was told that they were lost, could not be "located"-but on the 2 6th I received an answer ing cable from him. It read: To BERTRAND RussELL, I am in receipt of your telegram. We are currently discussing the matter in the United Nations. While your messages are critical of the United States, they make no mention of your concern for the introduc tion of secret Soviet missiles into Cuba. I think your attention might well be directed to the burg lars rather than to those who have caught the burglars. J OHN F. KEN NEDY
I t is true that I had not expressed concern for the intro... duction of "secret Soviet missiles into Cuba. " I could understand the hysteria that swept over the U.S. upon hearing of them, for the U.S. has heretofore had no powerful enemies upon its borders. But the presence of these missiles, even if they had really been secret and even had they been long-range, did not materially change the situation. Russia already possessed the po,ver to blot out the U. S. if she wished to do so by long-range missiles based in Russia and missiles based upon sub1narines-a fact which the U.S. under other circumstances is fond of mentioning-just as the U.S. possesses the pu\ver to blot out most of Russia. The point of the Cuban affair ,vas to avoid war whatever the provocation, and thereby to avoid the destruction of both the U. S. and Russia as ,vell as the rest of the ,vorld. As to President Kennedy 's remark about burglars : it is singularly n1a l a pro p os. Nobody
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could accuse the Cubans of being burglars, since they had not left their own island. As for the Russians, they came at the invi tation of the Cubans and were no more burglars th an are the American forces in Bri tain and Western Europe. Bu t in view of the repeated American threats of invasion of Cuba, the Americans were at least contempla ting "burglary. " I replied to President Kennedy at once : DEAR PRESIDENT KEN NEDY,
Thank you for your reply to my cables. I under stand your anxiety about nuclear missiles. My point is that a blockade which threatens the sinking of Soviet ships brings mankind to the edge of annihila tion. I beg you not to invade Cuba or to risk nu clear war. Could you accept United Nations inspec tion of bases and offer bases in Turkey in exchange? The removal of any bases from the Russian perim eter would immensely strentgthen America' s stand on behalf of peace and would bring a comparable Soviet response. I am appealing to Dr. Castro to accept United Nations inspection in exchange for your solemn pledge that Cuba will not be invaded by the United States. It is in your hands to transform a situation of grave crisis into one of immense hope. Peaceful initiative from you now would bring the world's gratitude. Res pectfully, BERTRAND RUSSELL
I
At the same time, 3 : 30 in the morning of October 2 6, telegraphed to Premier Khrushchev who seemed to
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have a firmer grasp of the terrible issues at stake than was held in the U .S. : D EAR PREMIER KHRU SHCHEV,
May I humbly appeal for your further help in lowering the temperature despite the worsening situation. Your continued forbearance is our great hope. With high regard and sincere thanks, BERTRAND RUSSELL
And, also at this time, I cabled to Dr. Fidel Castro :
15
DEAR DR. CASTRO,
I feel great compassion for yourself and for the beleaguered people of Cuba. I appeal to you with all my heart to allow United Nations inspection of Cuba, and to seek United Nations protection. Such a gesture from you is not required by international law. It would give mankind a reprieve from certain conflict and make survival possible. To defend Cuba against American invasion can now mean only the annihilation of the whole human race. I ask you humbly to accept the unwarranted
I learned that the news agencies had refused to summarize this message fairly, let alone to publish it in full. The report that they gave was distorted . I informed the Cuban Ambassador and Tass, who corrected in their own reports the distortion of the British press. The message had been composed pa instakingly to provide the greatest possib ility of acceptance by the Cuban leader. Did the newspapers wish Castro to reject this proposal? Or were they gunning for me because of my opposition to British governmental policy? Or was it merely that they lacked the imagination to consider it important to report accurately an appeal from me to the Cuban Premier? 15
T H E CU BAN CRISIS
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American demands regarding supposed missiles. This would remove the pretext for invasion. The world would rise to support you in thankfulness. I beg you for the sake of humanity to accept dis mantling of any missiles, even i f only defensive, in exchange for a solemn pledge that Cuba will not be invaded. Anxiously and respectfully, BERTRAND RUSSELL
And on the 2 6th I sent, also, a long letter to Premier Khrushchev : DEAR MR. KHRUSHCHEV,
I wish earnestly to express to you my gratitude for the great caution you have shown in this profoundly grave crisis for mankind. I particularly feel that the initiatives you took in turning back ships, agreeing to discuss outstanding sources of dispute, and in halting further shipments of arms were acts for which we must all express our sincere thank£ulness. I am, of course, greatly honored that you replied to my cable to you and that you responded so gen erously to the suggestions in my message. I am dis tressed by the behavior of Mr. Macmillan and, in particular, the hypocritical comment of Lord Home. One might have hoped that in a crisis as extreme as this some sense of proportion could be found in them. It should be clear that if the Ameri can block ade against a sovereign state does not constitute a violation of international law and an aggressive act, then these two gentlemen could have no complaint to an action by you toward Great Britain of the
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same kind because of the bases and polaris sub marines stationed here. They are aimed at the Soviet Union. I mention this now because it seems to me that this grave crisis illustrates the extreme danger to which humanity is continually exposed through the retention of rocket and hydrogen bases in all parts of the world. If, because of your courageous initiative, we escape from the crisis over Cuba with out conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, a new crisis in another area is bound to occur. I think you will agree that the situation with regard to Berlin is untenable and cannot be expected to last without a renewed crisis. It is my conviction that no negotiations can suc ceed unless there is the will and, in fact, the over riding determination that they should succeed in the minds of the participants in them. I appreciate that in the atmosphere of the Cold vVar such con tacts are difficult because each side must consider whether it is appearing to "give" more than it is "receiving" and the consequence is great fear of loss of face. Even when it is obvious that failure to reach agreement can result in the gravest disasters for the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, it remains very difficult for agreement to be reached. I have a sense of anxiety now that if the talks for which we are so grateful fail to produce tangible results and compromise, the very possibility of such talks will be impaired for the future. Past experience has shown that many considera-
T H E CU B AN CR I S I S
tions other than those of reaching agreement may motivate participants in such discussions. I think that the mood of the Americans at the moment is such that talks may be very difficult indeed, al though I am in entire agreement with you that they are essential. It seems to me that an initiative of another kind from you could electrify the world and make these and fu ture talks far more likely to lead to the result that we desire. Could you make a unilateral gesture -a dramatic and far-reaching gesture and then request the Americans to match it? The abandon ment of the Warsaw Pact, for example, could be the basis for a request that the Americans make a similar gesture in Turkey and Iran, in West Ger many and in Great Bri tain. I fear that unless a unilateral step of clear and decisive kind is taken towards ending the Cold War -one which no amount of propaganda from the other side can distort-talks are not likely to be successful as they must be. I si ncerely wish they would remove the bases around the perimeter of the Soviet Union and then ask you to make a compa rable gesture for peace. I ask you to take the ini tia tive because I have the highest hopes that you will understand what prompts me to do so and because I believe that you will be more inclined to take a decisive step to end the Cold War. In negotiations I should hope that any poin t of dispute might be submi tted to neu trals for their arbi tration and tha t both sides should be willing to accept the compromise proposed. Even this, I
59
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feel, will not be sufficient to end the arms race with out a decisive move on the part of yourself and your government. I hope earnestly that you will be able to keep your initiative for peace and will make a peace offering to the world irrespective of American be havior. You have done so with regard to the rash and dangerous action of Mr. Kennedy. May I convey, once again, my heartfelt thanks for all that you have done in these recent desperate days. With my warm good wishes and my respect, Yours sincerely, BERTRAN D RUSSELL
This letter had been written on the 2 6th, as I have said. Khrushchev ultimately agreed to dismantle the nuclear bases in Cuba and to pack up and ,vithdraw. The following day I telegraphed to U Thant: U T HANT, Situation so grave, could you personally go to Cuba to act as arbitrator, inspect bases, formulate proposal? No one else so able to intervene. Your presence could forestall the final folly. In warm friendship and continued regard, 1\f y DEAR
BERTRAN D RUSSELL
Castro, also, asked U Thant to Cuba to mediate, but the U. S. refused to accept the United Nations as inspec tors of Florida camps or to discuss Guantanamo base. Castro, in turn, felt that he could not count sufficiently upon the objectivity of inspection omitting American
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invasion centers in Florida and Georgia. U N inspection on American soil did not appeal to the U. S. government. Meanwhile, Khrushchev had taken up the suggestion of trading a disbandonment of Turkish bases for that of the Cuban bases, but Kennedy had refused. Things seemed to be at an impasse. The only hope for mankind was for one of the nations involved in the dispute to give way. There appeared to be no use in appealing to the U . S. to do this. The U.S., obsessed with the proud glory of "standing firm, " would quite evidently not even con template making any sort of magnanimous gesture for the sake of humanity as a whole-did not understand the need for it, or what not making it involved for them selves as well as for all people the world over. They wished only to prove their power and, again, the "firm ness" of their stand against Communism. They had been indoctrinated with the pernicious belief that only "the American way of life" can be tolerated. The only other point of view that they saw lay in the attitude of "Better Red than Dead' '-a slogan which has been fathered upon me, although it is not mine but a translation of the slo gan of a hostile German journalist. I believe in the pos sibility of coexistence. Though I do not believe in the beneficence of Communism just as I do not believe in that of many other religions, and have opposed it both privately and publicly ever since I began to study it in 1 8 96, I believe that it is quite possible for people ,vith various religions and peoples of various economic and political systems to live together in this world. At this juncture of history it appeared to me that not my o,vn " Free World, " but only the Commun ists invol ved in the dispute understood the significance and probable conse quences of their actions. I determined, there fore, to ap-
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peal again to U!Stro, and I telegraphed him at midnight of the 28th : DE.AR. DR. CAsnto, In the light of .A.merica·s total and dangerous un"41-illingness to respond to moderation, could you make a great gesture for humani ty and agree to dis mantle the bases? The fate of mankind rests with �rour decision. I am not making this communication public without your consenL "' '\ ith warm regard, BERTitM-1'1> RUSSELL
_.\nd, in desperation, an hour later I telegraphed the follo,-.ing memorandum to �fr. Khrushchev: The U.S. rejection of }·our proposals to trade Scnriet installations in Cuba against NATO installa tions in Turkey is totally unjustifiable and is a sign of insane paranoia. Stripped of diplomatic ,rerbiage, the position of the U.S. go,-ernment is this: "Unl� everylxxly e,.-ervwhere does exactlv what we wish, we'll exterminate the human race. .. They have the power to do this and it seems they also have the will. \Vhat are sane people to do in ,iew of this armed madn�? I think, though w'i th great reluctance, that sane people ought to lield as far as is necessary to avoid catastrophe. The end of the human race would be defi.nithie, "·hereas American insanity may be tem porarJ. It seems to me, therefore. that you ought to �
I
TH E CU BA N CR I SI S
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dismantle Soviet installations in Cuba under the guaran tee of inspection by U N O, de1nanding only, in return, that when U X O gives the necessary guar an tee, the Ameri can blockade of Cuba should be lifted . I think i t should be made evid en t to ,vorld public opinion that this action is only taken in response to a kind of blackmail \\T hich is nei ther sane nor 1norally j ustifiable. I send this memorandum on the presen t situation in Cuba. I have not made it public, and I shall not do so unless it meets with your approval . I t asks of you a sacrifice ,vhich you may find excessive and intolerable. "\Vi th lasting esteem, BERTRAND RUSSELL
Late that day, the 28th, ,,T e learned that Pren1ier Khrushchev had offered to remove all missile bases in Cuba, to withdra,v missiles and Soviet emissaries from Cuba and to export no more missiles to Cuba. He had offered salvation to mankind. The relief ,vas over,vhelm1ng. Some time later, I sent out the following press state ment: I say to Premier Nikita Khrushchev that man kind owes h im a profound deb t for his courage and his determination to preven t war due to American militarism. Under the public threat of a great pov.1 er, he has ignored the dictates of false pride, the infantile code ·w hich leads men of po"y er to put aside the interes ts of human ity for their own
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muscle-armed prestige. I cannot praise sufficiently the sanity and magnanimity, the willingness to do all required to solve this overwhelmingly grave crisis. It is absolutely essential to examine what Mr. Khrushchev has done. He has stopped his ships from entering the blockaded area. He has promised to take no rash action or to run the risk of nuclear war. He has offered to dismantle the bases and has asked for the exchange of some of those which ring his country. He has now unilaterally agreed to re move all Cuban bases and has yielded to demands made under the threat of force. I pay tribute to him. It is important to see that he has also offered to prevent other conflicts from occurring which could lead to world war. President Kennedy is under a moral obligation imposed on him by humanity, and has an absolute duty to meet with Mr. Khrush chev and to earnestly pursue the removal of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to achieve disarmament, and, as Mr. Khrushchev has said, to consider all issues of peace and war. If ever words have been matched by deeds, they have been so by the Soviet Union. The concrete deed is the ending of this crisis. If the United States has ever been sincere in its claims to be will ing to agree to end the Cold War, on the condition that Russian deeds matched her words, then now is the time for the United States and lVIr. Kennedy to prove it.
But the United States and lVIr. Kennedy found them selves un,villing to prove it-perhaps in vie,v of their past bullying ,vords and that of their politicians and daily
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organs of publicity who have for long been inciting their people to ,var. Perforce, they accepted l\Ir. Khrush chev's offer, but they did so grudgingly and ,vith open suspicion as to his good faith. I am ashamed to say that the politicians and press of my o,vn country have upheld them in this, doing their best to make it appear that �Ir. Khrushchev "backed down" from fear of Russian defeat, and that mankind ,vas saved from immediate annihila tion by American "strength" and detern1ination not to give way. Owing to this shortsighted and ungenerous attitude, the United States has sho,vn herself unable to negotiate calmly and objectively, and the Cuban affair still drags on. The terrifying center of the cyclone, ho,vever, has moved away from Cuba, and the peoples of the ,vorld, and the lovely ,vorld itself and all that man has created, have been permitted to survive for at least a few· 1nonths longer than at the end of October seemed li kely. ,vith Khrushchev's offer and its ungracious acceptance, my o,vn involvement in the Cuban crisis ended. It ren1a ined only for me to send some expression of my o,vn inex pressible gratitude to Premier Khrushchev, and I did so in a telegram sent late in the evening of October 28 : �I y DEAR l\l R. KHRUSHCHEV, I should like you to know of my personal feeling about your solving the Cuban crisis. I have neYer known any states1nan act wi th the 1nagnanimity and greatness that you have shown over Cuba and I wish you to be clear that every sincere and honest hu1nan being pays you homage for your courage. With las ting esteem, BERTRAND RUSSELL
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U NAR M ED VICTO R Y
C. THE SETT LEMENT
From the point of view of preventing a general nuclear war, the climax of the Cuban crisis was when Khrush chev ordered the Russian ships to avoid conflict ,vith American blockading ships. From this moment, i t be came clear that the Soviet government, bu t not the gov ernment of the U.S. , considered the survival of the human species more important than the question of whether Cuba should be allowed to have the govern ment it wanted. Until this moment, there had been not very much to choose between American and Russian policies. But when K.hrnshchev gave this indubitable proof of his determination to avoid general nuclear war, the U .S.S. R. became the more rational of the nvo con testants. From an American point of vie,v, however, the dispute remained tense for some time after the ,vith drawal of the Russian ships. The Russians had been con structing nuclear bases on Cuba and importing nuclear weapons. They had, at the same time, stated that the arms they were importing into Cuba were purely defen sive. This was regarded by the U.S. as a deception and as a reason for not trusting Russia to carry out any agree ment that might be reached. It ,vas pointed out that all America's nuclear preparations were considered defen sive. For example, Hanson "\V. Bald,vin, in the New York Tim es of November 7, said : "The United States'
THE CU B AN C RI SI S
67
contention, shared by its allies, has always been that its overseas bases were established solely in answer to Com .. . . . aggressive . expans1on1sm. '' mun1st It might be retorted that the bases which Russia was establishing in Cuba were established in answer to U.S. aggressive expansionism. But the view persisted in the U .S. that all Communist arms are aggressive and all anti Communist arms are defensive. As for "deception, " no attempt was made by the Russians to conceal what they were doing. Some of their installations ,vere close to main roads and all were open to observation by American planes. The Russians agreed to remove all that they had done in the way of nuclear preparations and were willing to have the removal guaranteed by United Nations inspec tion. Fidel Castro announced, after considerable discus sion with U Thant, his acceptance of United Nations inspection. But he stated that it was only just that similar inspection should take place in the invasion camps of the United States, located in Florida and Georgia. What would American reaction be if Cuban recon naissance planes flew over Florida and Georgia, not to mention Washington? The United States further main tain in eastern Cuba at Guantanamo a military base in direct opposition to the wishes of the government of Cuba. Tens of thousands of American troops are on Cuban soil in this base. Castro demanded the end of this foreign base as a further condition and sought to raise the matter in the United Nations. How would Englishmen feel about the maintenance of a hostile Soviet military base in East Anglia, against the wishes of the people and government, but retained through threat of immediate nuclear attack if it were
68
U N A R M E D VICTORY
interfered with economically or militarily? America complains of a Cuban threat to herself but considers it outrageous that Cuba requests that a military base con taining tens of thousands of Marines and jet planes at combat readiness be removed. I can think of no com parable example of blindness to the other's point of view or more explicit a show of imperialism. By means of this disagreement the crisis was kept alive. But it was obvious that it could no longer be worked up to a war pitch. Although not everything is as yet definite, the outcome is clear. 1 6 In return for removal of all Rus sian heavy armament and personnel from Cuba, the U. S. government has given a not very precise pledge to abstain from invasion of Cuba. If this pledge can be relied upon, the outcome is, on the whole, satisfactory. One cannot desire to spread nuclear weapons to any region which has hitherto been free from them, but one could wish that American alarm over nuclear ,veapons in Cuba would have enabled Americans to understand Russian alarm at the U. S. installations at many points close to the Russian frontier, not to speak of the danger of giving nuclear arms to Canada and various European and Asian nations who have not heretofore possessed them. But this does not seem to have happened. The U. S. remains vigi lant of all follies save its own. Cuba ,vas abundantly justified in preferring neutral inspection to inspection by the U. S., for, at the same time that U. S . authorities ,vere loudly complaining of Russian It is no longer cl ear since the re turn of the Cuban prisoners to the U .S. on December 29 and Ken nedy 's omin ous speech on tha t occasion. If the U .S. or the Cuban " refugees" are encouraged to itwade Cuba again , the affair may be opened to its full ex ten t once again. 16
THE CU BAN CRISIS
69
"deception, " the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Arthur Sylvester, made a distinctly surprising confes sion. 17 The Times of December 1 2 reports that he said that news "generated" by the American government was used successfully in the Cuban crisis and that the government would continue to use "news" to further its foreign policy. Of course, he said, the government must not put out false information. But news was "a weapon in the American arsenal. " To this he added somewhat startlingly: "I think the inherent right of the government to lie to save itself when faced with nuclear disaster is basic. " When he was reprimanded for these remarks, he repeated that they were all true but ought to have been made by his official superiors. An example of the kind of "lies" in which the U. S. authorities were indulging was given by Robert Hale in A viation Week (cf. footnote 7, page 35). In view of such confessions Cuba could hardly be expected to ac cept U.S. pledges as reliable. It seems to have gone unnoticed by most of the gen eral public of both the U. S. and Britain that the Presi dent has quietly changed the focus of the Monroe Doc trine. The Doctrine used to be that no state outside the Western Hemisphere must interfere in the internal af fairs of any state in the Western Hemisphere. Now, the recently proclaimed Monroe Doctrine is that if any sov ereign state in the Western Hemisphere is threatened with invasion from the U. S. on the sole ground that the U.S. does not like its form of government, no state out side the Western Hemisphere must offer help to the He was, perhaps, inspired by Holy \Vrit-Jeremiah I 7 : 9 : "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked. " 17
70
U NAR l\1 ED VICTOR Y
threatened state. This, of course, makes nonsense of the UN Charter. It must be remembered that the cause of the crisis was America's attempt to destroy the Castro government and replace it by one more favorable to American financial interests. There can be little doubt that, but for Russian intervention, America would have persisted in this course, thus committing exactly the same crime as Russia had committed in Hungary and East Germany. There is no logic in opposing such crimes ,vhen committed by one side and extenuating them if committed by the other. I do not know why Khrushchev decided not to fight on the Cuban issue. The U.S. government, of course, thought that it was because Khrushchev was frightened by the American show of boldness. There has been a fairly successful attempt in the U.S. to label as co,vardice any shrinking from a nuclear war. I do not think, how ever, in view of Khrushchev's many pronouncements in favor of peaceful coexistence, that his motive in allow ing the continued existence of mankind was anything that could be called co,vardice. I think, on the contrary, that he acted as he did from consciousness of the im measurable disaster that a nuclear ,var would bring about. I have no doubt that he ,vished to help Cuba and would have persisted in his attempt if it had not involved nuclear war. I also think that to cause nuclear war is the greatest crime that is open to a man in the present state of the world. To shrink from this crime, so far from being colvardice, is sanity, and may involve, as it did in the Cuban crisis, the highest form of courage. I t is a pity that Khrushchev's dramatic action for the avoidance of ,var did not receive a more generous re sponse in the \Ves t. The general reponse of the officials
T H E C t: B A X C R I S I S T
71
of the ,vest, especia l ly in the L . S. and Bri tain, ,\-as one of j eers, mistrust, and prol onged hosti l i ty. I t seemed to me so dangerous that I l\TOte a letter on �oYember I S to the rVash ington Post tryi ng to point ou t w·here such an attitude ,\·as likely to lead. I t said : I am profoundly concerned at the recent .Ameri can statements on Cuba and on ou tstanding issues with the Soviet Union. Under public threat, �fr. Khrushchev ,-.·ithdre,\? mis.5iles from Cuba and his so doing preven ted conflict, the consequences of ,\-hich could only have been ,vorld ,var III . It is question able whether �Ir. Kennedy w·ould have responded in similar manner had the blockade been of For mosa and by China. Xonetheles.s, in ,..ithdra,..�ing all missiles :\Ir. Khrushchev received the unequiv ocal assurance that the sovereign ty of Cuba ,•,ould be respected by the Uni ted States. Since this solemn assurance, American officials have declared that they intend to con tinue appli cation of trade embargoes, of economic boyco tt, and to reserve the right of mil i tary in tervention . It is declared that Dr. Castro's form of governmen t can "' not be tolera ted in the \\ estern Hemisphere. This is the grossest imperialism. It is w·ithout a shred of j ustification in in ternation al Ia,\? and i t is a prin ciple \\"hich, if adopted , means that the strong may forever destroy the sovereign ty of those ,\·eaker than themselves if they decide to disapprove of the poli cies of the lat ter. The attempt to l'1T iggle from a public promise is a danger to peace and a display of bad faith. I ·w ish to call to the attention of the American public that
72
UNARME D VICTOR Y
those not partisan to the Cold War are appalled by the belli cosity of the government of the United States. Honesty requires that every conscientious per son insist upon American adherence to her pledge and upon American willingness to cease the attempt to destroy the government of Dr. Castro . The resolution of the Cuban crisis affords an opportunity such as has not been available before to a suffering world. The Russians have taken a painful decision which they honor in deed. It is for the United States to respond with magnanimity and to enable agreement on Berlin, nuclear tests, missiles around the world and all issues which, should failure to agree take place, will lead inex orably to the final crisis. We all know that Mr. Khrushchev has based his leadership upon the possibility of agreement with the United States government on outstanding issues. I consider it a matter of personal integrity for men and women around the world to insist that such an agreement take pl ace and that every effort be made by the United States to be reasonable and just.
There have, since that date, been a few just and gen erous statements made by officials. U Thant, whose posi tion demands a just balance bet,veen East and West and whose expressed opinions have ahvays shown him to be both just and generous, has asserted categorically that the U .S.S. R. does not ,vant ,var ( Th e Times ) D ecember 3). Sir Frank Roberts, until recently the British Am bassador at l\Josco,v, has stated that Khrushchev is "turn ing to the \Vest" (Su n day Tirn es J November 1 8). Even Lord Home has admi tted that th ere are "liberalizing
THE CU BAN CRI SI S
73
forces" in the U .S. S. R., but has asserted that these are not reflected in external policy (Guardian, December 1 4). For the most part, hoWever, the British Foreign Secretary has vehemently followed the line taken by Britain at the Security Council where Britain accused the U. S.S. R. of "lies, deceit, and double-dealing" (Daily Mail, October 25). This failure to respond to Khrush chev's more peaceful mood is infinitely regrettable and appallingly dangerous. Khrushchev's policy has enemies in the Communist camp, and, if the West insists on try ing to make it a failure, there is a very real danger that his Stalinist opponents may succeed in bringing about his downfall. If this happens, responsibility will lie very largely with the West. I must repeat what I have said elsewhere, that my opinions as to the Cuban crisis are not due to any love of Communism. My own preference is for democratic so cialism, and I am vehemently opposed to the Communist misuse of the word "democratic. " When the East German regime is described by Communists as "The German Democratic Republic, " when, in fact, it is an autocratic regime established by alien military force, I feel indig nant, but I think that the prevention of nuclear war is an issue which transcends in importance all other issues in international affairs and, whenever this issue is rele vant, I feel that support is due to the more pacific party. It is only for this reason that since, though not before, Khrushchev decided not to challenge the blockade, I have thought him more praiseworthy than his opponents. To sum up: Although there are still matters that are undecided in the Cuban dispute, it is now fairly clear what the ultimate settlement will be. It does not seem likely that the U. S. will invade Cuba or prolong the
74
UNAR �I E D VICTORY
blockade except as regards armaments, and it is certain that Cuba ,vill receive no further arms or nuclear installa tions from Russia. 18 Both of these are grounds for re joicing. The spread of nuclear ,\T eapons to ne,,· countries is ahvays to be deplored and, if Cuba had them, other Latin American countries ,vould quickly follo,v suit. Even more important than this, is the setback to .L.\meri can economic imperialism. Those ,\·ho prate about the " Free ,vorld" seem to think that throughout the ,vest ern Hemisphere the only freedom should be freedom to obey the United States. Every po,,·erful nation, includ ing Britain, has, in its day, been equally guilty of this sort of imperialism. But, in the nuclear age, policies of this sort have become unbearably dangerous. It is to be hoped that they ,vill increasingly disappear in both East and ,vest. The most remarkable feature of the ,vhole course of the Cuban crisis is the success of unilateralism. Khrush chev ,vithdre,v his ships as a unilateral action on the part of the Soviet Union. If he had not acted unilaterally, it is almost certain that there ,,·ould have been ,\?ar. To be ,villing to risk nuclear ,var is madness. The U. S. ,vas ,vill ing to run this risk. Khrnshchev, at the very last possible moment, shovled himself un,villing. Regardless of the relative merits of capitalism and Communism, the ,vorld must, in this matter, regard Khrnshchev as preferable to the politicians of the ,vest. He has been engaged in try ing to create an atmosphere in ,vhich successful negotia tions bet,veen East and ,vest may become possible and the Cold ,var may be brought to a peaceful solution.
18
T his was wri t ten j ust before December 29, 1 962 .
THE C U BAN CR I S I S
75
On the ,vhole, the Cuban crisis, which might have meant ultimate disaster, has helped to bring some of the Great Po,vers to their senses and has proved to them once again that it is not by error and militarism that the troubles of the world can be cured. Unfortunately, the effect in the U. S. has been of a less desirable kind. It is thought, in that country, that Khrushchev's retreat was not due to realization that nuclear ,var would be disaster for everybody, but ,vas inspired by plain cn,vardice. There is, therefore, a tend ency in America to think that every dispute can be solved by bullying and that everybody outside America will give ,vay on everything if the U. S. authorities are "tough. " When Khrushchev removed nuclear ,veapons from Cuba, it ,vas thought that America, as a q u id pro q u o, would abstain from invading Cuba. This, ho,vever, is coming to seem more and more doubtful. As I pointed out on the occasion of the liberation of prisoners cap tured by Cuba in the defeat of the invaders at the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy made a great speech to some fifty thou sand Cuban refugees ""rhich is reported as follo,vs in the Su nday Times of December 30 : President Kennedy told Cuban refugees yesterday that by helping to free people from Cuban prisons "the United States has been given the opportuni ty to demonstrate once again that all men ·w ho fight for liberty are our brothers and shall be un til Cuba and all other subjugated countries are free. " Amid cries of " Viva," 1\tlr. Kennedy addressed about 50,000 Cuban refugees and other specta tors in Miami. He said he was confident that all over Cuba there were men ,vho held their faith in freedom and
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"are determined to restore that freedom so that the Cuban people may once more govern themselves."
Because it sho,vs the values for ,\·hich mankind is to perish, it bears repeating. To symbolize his commit ment to " free Cuba, " �Ir. Kennedy addressed ·w·ith par ticular praise the representative of the rebels, the former security man under Batista ,\�hose responsibility included torture camps in Santiago de Cuba, �Iatanzas Province and Havana. I t must be understood that the "freedom" ,vhich Kennedy promises is freedom to obey the lJ . S . and to abandon efforts to raise the standard of life for the very poor of Cuba lest such efforts should diminish the in comes of some very rich people in the U .S. Apart from claptrap, this is ,,·hat "freedom" means to the American goYernrnent. I t is much to be feared that success has proYed intoxicating and ,vill lead to an era of bullying ,vhich , if not stopped, must lead to ,vorld-,vide disaster. 19 rn The progress of e,·ents in regard to Cuba after the date of the writing of this chap ter have taken the following course : �fr. Vasili Kuznetso,· . the So,·iet First Deputy Foreign �linister, and �Ir. Adlai Stevenson � chief r.s. delegate to the C � , who have headed the Russian and r .S . bodies negotiating the di fferences that arose from the Cuban crisis� signed a letter to C Thant on January 7 saying that they had come to sufficient understanding for it to be no longer necessa�- for further action to be taken about Cuba by the Security Council of the C � . They said � however, that ' "it had not been possible for the two go\·ernmen ts to resolve all the problems that had arisen in connection with ' this affair' " (G ua rdia n , 1 ' 8 , 63) . They "expressed the hope tha t the episode would lead to ' the adjustmen t of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war.' The letter did not specify the areas of disagreement remaining� but the r .S. has still not gh-en a formal guaran tee that it ·would not invade Cuba, embodying the declaration
TH E CU BA N C R I S I S
77
By January 12, the time of ·w riting the final addition to this chapter of the crisis, it has become fairly apparent that the crisis is far from over. The Guardian reports to day-and I quote its report in full : A number of nations have been warned that they face the possible loss of American aid if their ships continue to trade wi th Cuba. In making this an nouncement, the State Department explained today that it was carrying out the obligations placed on i t by Congress when i t passed the foreign aid program in October. The Aid Bill required aid to be cancelled to all countries whose ships carried goods to Cuba. The law, however, did not make i t clear whether aid was to be eliminated if any shipping took place, to this effect made by President Kennedy on November 20 last" (Daily Worker, 1 /9/63). According to Th e Times ( 1 / 1 0/63) , all this "means that the United States will not continue to press for on site inspection of the dismantled missile bases in Cuba, or for the withdrawal of at least 1 5,000 Soviet troops which it believes are still in the island . It will maintain aerial reconnaissance, however, and will not give any formal guarantee against the invasion of Cuba as demanded by the Russian and Cuban governments." As to the feelings of the unfortunate Cubans, no one seems to pay much attention to them. The Da ily nr ork er reports on January 9, 1 963 : " In a separate letter to U Thant, the Cuban delegate to VN, Senor Lechuga, decl ared that Soviet-A merican negotiations had 'not led to an effective agreement capable of guaranteeing in a permanent way, the peace of the Caribbean and in liquidating exis t ing tension. ' He said the Cuban gm·ernment considered that the negotia tions had not produced agreements acceptable to Cuba 'because the U .S . govern ment, far from ceasing its aggressive policy, had maintai ned the position of force assumed in violation of international j uridical principles . ' The Cuban government also rej ected the U.S. statement that it reserved 'the right to carry out its own inspection and control. ' "
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or only in the even t of strategic goods or Com munist block cargoes going to Cuba. Mr. Rusk, the Secretary of State, was said today to have told the Senate Forei gn Relations Committee that no American commitment to abstain from in vasion of Cuba was now in existence. A pledge to this effect never became operative because no agree ment could be reached on inspection of Russian missile bases in Cuba.
Put more briefly : If the Cubans do not desert Castro, they shall starve to please Washington. This, of course, is not "aggressive imperialism. "
3 THE
S IN O - INDIAN
DI S P UTE
.A .
O uTLIN E O F THE
GENE SIS
OF THE D I S PUT E
in the Sino-I ndian dispu te are unfamiliar to most people in the ,vest, and even their names ,vere, for the most part, unknow·n to 1nost of us. Before considering the boundary dispute, a fe,v general ,vords as to the t"·o dispu tants are necessary. India, be fore the dispu te, ,vas unal igned. I ts g0Yern1nent ap peared secure, and the country ,,·as a sho,vpiece for those ,,:-- ho considered democracy possibl e in .A.sia. I ts econom ic policy ,vas mildly socialistic, but it carefully abstained from fayoring eithe-r bloc. International ly, the Indian government stood , in general , for peace and concil ia tion, for ,,·hich it did useful ,vork, especial ly in Korea . There w·as evidence, ho'\\T ever, that, ,vhen India 's na tional interes ts ,,·ere in,r olved , the Indian government ,,·as not capable of the i1n partial i ty ,,·h ich i t urged in
THE REGio�s co�CERNED
79
80
U NA R M ED V ICTO R Y
disputes to which it was not a party. The chief instances of this were Kashmir and Nagaland. The government of China, after a long period of chaos, had been acquired by the Communists. It was firmly established and popular in China as far as can be discovered. It was the first strong government in China for a hundred years. Apart from the Communist issue, China seemed to be repeating a pattern which had gov erned its history since the third century B.c. The rule has been that, after a period of internal unrest, a strong government emerges which gradually loses its strength, giving place to a new cycle of anarchy and order. The present government of China, because it is Communist, is hated in the West, and has been kept out of the United Nations by the influence of the U. S. The Chinese gov ernment, however, is not on good terms with the govern ment of the U.S.S. R. Khrushchev holds that coexistence between East and West is possible, and that the present tension can be eased, largely by concessions ,vhich he is willing to make. The Chinese government, on the con trary, is persuaded that there must, sooner or later, be a world war between Communists and anti-Communists. On this immensely important point, all friends of peace, and, indeed, all who desire the survival of the human race, must side with Khrushchev against the Chinese government. It is ardently to be hoped that China ,vill, in time, come around to Khrushchev's vieiv. China has a larger population than any other state and is capable, in time, of becoming the most powerful country in the world. It is natural to suppose that this prospect is not wholly pleasing to the U .S.S.R. However that may be, Chinese military strength is a matter of the future.
TH E S INO - IND IAN D I S PUT E
81
The dispute bet\veen China and India has not been on any ideological ground, but solely on certain terri torial questions in regions where the frontier was ill de fined. The regions concerned were in the H imalayas, mountainous, very sparsely inhabited, and of no impor tance to either party except for military reasons. It is a romantic region famed in the history of the Buddhist religion. Intrepid Indian missionaries at about the be ginning of the Christian era ventured across passes seven teen thousand feet high to reach China, which at last they converted to the Buddhist faith. Later, when Bud dhism in India was· beginning to fade, a return stream of Chinese pilgrims crossed the same mountains to visit the holy places of their faith. Tibet, nominally subj ect to China, but in practice almost independent, became to Buddhists a sacred land under the government of the Dalai Lama, who had the kind of sanctity that Catholics attribute to the Pope. So remote and uninhabited were the frontiers that the records show only a few cases in centuries in which there is definite proof as to where the frontier was at the time concerned. This disputed area cannot be said to be decisively Chinese or Indian. I have pored over maps and docu ments presented by the Chinese and Indians, and the only certain conclusion to ,vhich it is possible to come is that each has tenuous claims and neither has decisive ones. Each side can produce documents establ ishing ad ministrative and tax control over these remote regions. Each side can produce maps allocating the area in ques tion to the one claiming it. The Chinese display Indian maps of 1 954 ackno,vledging the territory in dispute to be that of China. The Indians produce documents to
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UN A R M E D VICTORY
the effect that the Chinese maps claiming these areas were acknowledged to be in error at the time they ,vere produced by the government of China. The defining of the frontier throughout its 2, 300 miles was eminently a matter suitable for negotiations, supple mented, ,vhere necessary, by impartial arbitration. It is generally believed in the West, and vehemently asserted by India, that the Indian case, throughout the ,vhole length of the disputed frontier, is legally indisputable. The Chinese, however, have prim, a facie evidence ,vhich needs to be examined by uncommitted experts, and in a good many regions there is no decisive evidence either way. The question of the frontier has been complicated during the present century by various events. .A.fter the Chinese Revolution of 191 1, ,vhen China became a Re public, Tibet declared its independence, and this was not disputed by China until the present Communist government came into po,ver in I 95 0. ,vhen the Com munists took over, the Chinese invaded Tibet and es tablished themselves by military conquest. Chou En-lai describes the forces employed as "The Chinese People's Liberation Army." It is a curious description. Appar ently the Tibetans were to be liberated from desires which the Chinese felt sure they could not genuinely entertain. The Chinese forces ,vere, in fact, no more of a "liberation army" than had been the British forces in India. There ,vere, also, complications due to the transi tion in India from British rule to independence. The Indian government claimed the territory ,vhich had been claimed by the British government of India, but the Chinese maintained that parts of this territory did not
T H E S INO - IND IAN D I S P U T E
83
really form part of India and had been claimed only by British imperialism. All these different factors compli cated the dispute. In all the discussions between China and India as to the frontier, it is agreed that the frontier can be divided into three parts: eastern, middle, and western. There is a long interruption in the middle where Nepal is a buffer between India and China. In the eastern sector, the In dian claim is based upon the " McMahon Line. " The Chinese, since the frontier disputes began, always speak of this as "the illegal so-called McMahon Line. " The line lvas negotiated in 1 9 1 4 between Tibet and the Brit ish government of India. The Chinese maintain that Tibet ,vas not an independent power and did not possess treaty-making rights. These rights, according to the Chi nese, have belonged to China. At the time that the Mc �Iahon Line was negotiated, however, a Chinese official ,vas present throughout the negotiations and raised no obj ection to the frontier between India and Tibet as arranged in that treaty. China, moreover, in other con texts, was admitting the independence of Tibet. A minor point, which Chou En-lai considers of sufficient impor tance to mention in a letter to Nehru, is that in the original map the western end of the l\1cl\1ahon Line starts from 2 7 degrees, 44 . 6 minutes, north latitude, ,vhereas the Indian government nu\v claims that it starts at 27 degrees, 48 minutes north latitude. It seems aston ishing that this difference of a very few miles can be thought of sufficient importance to be mentioned in a general discussion of di fferences. The Chinese also object that the present Indian government ought not to clai1n rights derived fro1n the British imperialist govern1nent.
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U NARM E D VICTORY
The Indians might retort that the Chinese government of Tibet is just as imperialist as was the British govern ment of India. India has, however, a more effective reply: In 1 9 1 4, three years after the Chinese revolution which abolished the Emperor, China recognized the treaty making rights of Tibet, as is assumed in other parts of the Chinese case against India. 1 The central portion of the Sino-Indian frontier has caused less difficulty than the eastern and western por tions. The western portion is the one where the differ ences are most stubborn and most difficult to compose. In the ,vestern portion of the boundary, the main dis pute is as to Ladakh, more especially the northeastern corner of Ladakh which is called Aksai Chin. Chou En-lai, in a letter to Nehru, dated November 4, 1 962, says: "The Aksai Chin area has always been under Chi nese jurisdiction. " Aksai Chin was proclaimed by the Chinese as self-evidently, through language and name, non-Indian. Aksai Chin, the Chinese Charge d'Affaires explained to me, means " Chinese \Vhite Plain" and not " Indian White Plain. " It ,vas through this area that back in 1 950 the Chinese liberation army entered the Ari dis trict of Tibet from Sinkiang. Again it was through this area that, from 1 95 6 to 1 957, the Chinese government constructed the Sinkiang-Tibet highway involving gi gantic engineering ,vork. Yet the Indian government arI The difficulties concerning the 1\fcMahon Line for one not an expert are illustrated by a letter from John 0. Crane which a ppeared in the New Yo rk Ti m es of November 26, 1 962 and was quoted in Peace News, Decem ber 2 1 : "This e,·ening we pulled out our 1 940 Oxfo rd A dva n ced A t las to show our 1 2 and 14 year old sons the McMahon Line. I m agine our surprise to find instead the boundary line between India and Tibet to be Yirtua lly that now cla imed by Chin a."
TH E S I N O - I N D IA N D I S PUT E
85
bi trarily said that i t was not unti l 1 95 7 that the Chinese side came to th is area and, on th is pretext, unilaterally al tered the state of the boundary in the western sector by force from 1 9 6 1 on·w ard, occupied large tracts of Chi nese terri tory east of the 1 959 line of actual con trol and � set u p over forty military points. The Indian government gives a qu i te di fferen t account of the matter and main tains that Aksai Chin has always been under Indian ad ministration . I t is a li ttle difficult to explain how it came abou t, in that case, that China could construct a great military road wi thou t the Indian authorities knowing of it until the construction of the road was completed. Al most all the facts as to this region of Ladakh are contro versial. Perhaps the I ndians controlled a part of i t and the Chinese another part of it, but this is only a conjec ture. Parti tion might be the best solu tion . The Chinese point out that they successfully settled their bou ndaries with all other coterminous states, and that they have at all stages been willing to negotiate with India, while India refused any negotiations that did not, from the beginning, concede all her claims . The Indian point of view, on the other hand, is that there can be no reasonable doubt of the ju stice of India's terri torial claims and that it is preposterous to suggest that perhaps the Indians were the first aggressors. As to negotiation or arbi tration, Mr. N ehru wrote to Mr. Chou En-lai ex pressing willingness to submit the qu estion of Ladakh to the In ternational Court of Ju stice at The Hague. During the height of th e Cuban crisis, on October 24 ) the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai , proposed a cease-fire to Mr. Nehru along ,vhat he considered to be the lines of "actual con trol " beginning November 7 , 1 95 9 . I n this proposa l, h e rei terated that h e wou ld be
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UNARMED VICTORY
prepared to hold in abeyance the question of jurisdic tion over any area where there is disagreement ,vith the government of India, and wished it to be clear that his proposal was not intended to determine de facto the designation of these areas. The Chinese have stated that they were always prepared to negotiate the areas in ques tion withou t prejudicing the ultimate disposition of them. The reply of the I ndian government has been that the Chinese gradually have established de facto con trol over certain areas which would be very difficult to alter once the principle of negotiation were accepted and that, therefore, India required en tire Chinese with drawal before she would consider discussion. To Chou En-lai, this posi tion amounts to a demand that China concede the disputed region in advance as a condi tion for discussion . Where there is such conflict between the statemen ts of two sides, i t is almost impossible for a private person to reach a conclusion of the territorial qu estions in volved, nor do I wish to do so. I wish only to urge that the whole of the dispute should be settled by negotiation and that the "long war" which the Indian governmen t seems to contemplate would be u tterly disastrous to both India and China and migh t easily become a nuclear world war. From the point of view of the rest of the world and of hu manity in general, the details of the boundary dispu te are irrelevant. \Vhat is clear is that there ought not to be war over them. The Ch inese cease fire and wi thdrawal strongly suggests that China is more anxious to pu t an end to the conflict than is I ndia.
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B . THE DISP UTE
When fighting began in the disputed regions, I though t, at first, as did almost everybody in the West, that China was wholly in the wrong and had undoubtedly been the aggressor. I telegraphed to Prime Minister Nehru, with whom I had for long been on friendly terms, on Novem ber 8 saying: While I think you are entirely in the right over the boundary dispute with China I plead with you to accept cease-fire to permit talks to begin. Al ternative may be disastrous for India and world as a full-scale conflict may make negot iations impos sible. I appeal as a lifetime friend of India to agree to Chou En-lai's offer while time permi ts otherwise world war may result.
It was indeed true that I had been a lifelong friend of India. My great-great-grandfather had been Governor General of India (and his great-grandson, Viceroy) and when I was a little boy tales of him had seemed to me romantic and interesting. Very many years later, I was the President of the India League and ,vorked for her freedom. On the other hand, again ,vhen I was a small boy, a party of Chinese in beautiful robes and pigtails had come to see my grandfather at Pembroke Lodge and
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stirred my curiosity and interest; and again, many years later, I became much interested in Chinese philosophy, especially in Chuang-tze, and after living and tra veling in China for eight months I felt that I had many sym pathetic Chinese friends and I greatly admired the Chi nese. When the Communist Revolution took place in China, I felt desolated, though I saw nothing good to uphold in Chiang Kai-shek. I thought that the brain washing of which I read and the intensive destruction of old traditions and learning ,vould destroy what I had found delightful and admirable in China. Now, after the last month, I do not feel at all sure of this. At any rate, though it seemed to me a forlorn hope-I then pinned my hope upon the Indians in whose many protestations of love of peace at any price I had largely believed-I felt that, having telegraphed to Mr. Nehru, I had better try to get into some sort of touch ,vith Prime �Iinister Chou En-lai, and I telegraphed to him, also, on Novem ber 8 : May I appeal to you to prevent inflamed national passions from translating border disagreement into tragic major conflict. Could you begin cease-fire and seek Indian agreement to follow suit so that talks may begin before maj or war engulfs the ·world. Respectfully, BERTRA�D Rt:SSELL
In consequence of these telegrams, the Indian Deputy High Commissioner and the Chinese Charge d' Affaires in London both came to see me, both expounded their territorial claims at considerable length . After listening to ,vhat both had to say, I told both that it ,vas quite
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89
impossible for me to form any j udgment in such an obscure and difficult matter. Both the I ndian and the Chinese governments have very kindly supplied me with official literature on the dispu te . .A.fter doubts and hesi tations, I have come to the conclusion that the evidence is so conflicting that i t is impossible for a private person to decide ,vhich side, if ei ther, is more in the righ t on the territorial question. I urged that the ,,.. hole border dispute, throughou t the 2 , 300 miles of i ts length, should be dealt ,vith by negotia tion and, w·here agreement proved impossible, by arbi tration, and that meantime there should be a cease-fire . I explained tha t the one overriding necessi ty ,vas that the fighting should stop before the dispu te ble,v up to a great ,var and the nuclear po,vers "1 ere dra,vn in. I f tha t ha ppened, mankind ,vas doomed. The presen r a tion of the human race ,vas the important point, hu,,.. ever much that ,vas unpalatable. I t had to be sw·allu,ved by either side . To this point of vie,v the Depu ty H igh Commissioner could find no an s,ver, and finally professed h imself convinced tha t it w·as the central and important point . The Chinese Charge d' .A.ffaires l istened ,,·hen I said the same things to him, but did not commi t himself. It ,vas the Chinese govern ment, ho,vever, ,,·ho, w·i thin a matter of hours, an nounced its "·illingness to stop fighting in order that the border dispu te might be negotiated or, fa il ing that, ar bitrated. India, on the other hand, refu sed to negotiate about any of the dispu ted territory and, also, refused a cease-fire, except on terms ,,,. h ich conceded most of In dia's claims. In the hope that some neu tral nation friendly ,vi th both combating pow·ers might find a ,,·ay to prevai l u pon them to solve the qu es tions peaceful ly, I ,\Tote the
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following day to President Sukarno of Indonesia, with whom, several years earlier, I had had some correspond ence: D EAR PRESIDENT SUKARN O,
I am writing to you out of deep anxiety about the dispute between India and China. It seems to me that the imminent possibility that the conflict be tween them may become general adds a note of great urgency. If such general fighting ensues, the prospects of talks and negotiations will end. At the moment, Chou En-lai offers cease-fire, although on terms which are unpalatable to 1\!Ir. Nehru. I ap preciate the delicacy of this situation, but it is also true that should the Cold War become an integral part of this grave dispute, ·world war is certain to ensue. You are recogn ized as being genuinely neutral as between India and China and, I sincerely hope, can play a decisive role in mediating between these two great countries. I appeal to you to take swift action, the immediate object of which would be to gain cessation of hostilities long enough to allow those genuinely impartial to consider a compromise solution. To the world's benefit you have maintained a policy of non-align ment in the Cold ,var, of oppo sition to imperialism and of clear neutrality benveen East and ,vest. This admirable fact and the large population of overseas Chinese in your country grants to you the particular opportunity to initiate deten te.
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May I appeal to you for your mediation, as the consequences of increased conflict are so grave that I fear it may soon be too late for mankind? I hope you will agree that cease-fire gives the opportuni ty for calm and amicabl e consideration of the issues, whereas the present si tuation diminishes the oppor tunity of such talk with every moment. With my warm regard and respect, Yours sincerely, BERTRAND RUSSELL
During the next few days I received the first of the many letters that I ,vas to receive from Indians ,vho had previously commended me for ,vorking for peace and professed themselves believers in nonresistance, asking me how I could possibly fail to uphold India in her fight against Communist aggression. I had also one or nvo from Chinese in opposite vein, though they ,vere calmer in tone. On November 14, I received a telegram from Mr. Nehru in reply to my telegram of the 8th. It said : Thank you for your telegram dated November 8. Chou En-lai's offer of a cease-fire on the basis of the Chinese three-point proposal is in effect a demand for surrender on terms to be accep ted and imple mented while large Chinese armies are on Indian soil . No coun trv, much less India, can submit to the mili tary dictates of an aggressor. We have no desire to continue mil itary con fl ict, nor do we desire any part of Chi nese terri tory but there can be no compromise ·w i th aggression . The .I
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first essential if we are to revert to peaceful processes is to undo the aggression by restoring the status q uo an te September 8, 1 962. j AWAHARLAL N EHRU
Both in tone and in substance this response surprised and distressed me. It held out no hope that any peaceful solution might ever be arrived at, but appeared to be an ultimatum that the Chinese must give in at every point. Though I still thought, and continued for some time to think, that India was the injured party, and my sym pathies in this dispute were ,vith her, I was disturbed by the rapidly increasing war hysteria there as evidenced, not only by the tone of this telegram, but by the news given us daily in our press. Two days later, on November 1 6, I received the fol lowing telegraphed letter from Premier Chou En-lai: M r. Bertrand Russell, London. I thank you for your message of November 8 1n which you expressed concern over the Sino-Indian boundary question. I well understand your anxiety over the possibility that the present Sino-Indian border conflict may expand. Your attention must have been attracted by the three proposals the Chinese government put forward in its October 24 statement for speedy cessation of the border conflict, reopening of peaceful negotiations and settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. In the border clashes of the past year, China was always the at tacked party and finally, compelled by the massive attacks launched by the Indian government, could
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93
not but act in self-defense. At present, the Indian side not only refuses to conduct peaceful negotia tions but is preparing to launch attacks on an even larger scale. Here lies the main danger today. The Chinese government ·w ill not change its stand in striving for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question on a fair and reasonable basis and, so long as there is still a ray of hope, will continue i ts efforts toward this end. I hope you will use your distinguished influence to promote a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian bound ary ques tion. CHOU EN-LAI
November 1 6, 1 962
Though I could not quite agree that China had ah\�ays been the attacked party, still less that India had launched ' 'massive attacks upon China,'' if Chou En-lai ,..ras to be believed, China seemed at least-in spite of the ·w·ords of her Chairman , Mao Tse-tung, that she did not fear nuclear war-to have grasped the point that any expan sion of the border dispu te into a full-scale ,,-ar must be stopped. India, in her refusal to have anything to do with negotiation not based upon Chinese concession of all the points at issue, seemed far from grasping that essential point. China, alone, had offered to behaYe reasonably in the lamentable circumstances then per taining. I determined, therefore, to make a further t }l to see if China could be persuaded to go eyen to greater length in order to achieve the end that wre both appar ently sought, and I '\\Tote a long letter on that sa1ne day to Premier Chou En-lai �rhich '\\Tas sent to him bv the Chinese Embassy. (All the letters and communications� 7
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UNAR M ED V ICTOR Y
of course, went through the embassies of the govern rnents to whom or from ,vhom they came, since that was the quickest way of getting them to their destina tions. In the Cuban crisis, it had often seemed quicker to telegraph direct.) Prime Minister Chou En-lai. D EAR MR. CHOU E N-LAI,
I am writing to you to express my deep anxiety concerning the rapidly deteriorating state of world affairs. You will know that I lived in China, al though for not as long as I might have wished, and feel great friendship for the people of China. I have opposed the attempt to impose an absurd diplomatic embargo upon your great nation. I have publicly denounced the absurdity of sustaining by force the puppet regime of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. I consider your government to have acted with forbearance with regard to the provocation provided by the Seventh Fleet of the United States, the declared aggressive intentions of Chiang Kai shek, and the arms buildup in Quemoy, Matsu and Taiwan itself. I believe that the willingness of China to be patient about her obvious rights and grievances with regard to Taiwan and the Straits is something for which mankind owes gratitude. In our dangerous world discredited men such as Chiang Kai-shek are able to make of their private interest and gain, a quarrel the result of which can be annihilation for hundreds of millions of human beings. This is why I believe that the truly strong and the wise are con-
T H E S I NO- I N D I A N D I S P U T E
fident in their strength and wisdo1n and do not respond to the petulant and d angerous provocations such as have been provided by Chiang Kai-shek. I am also appreciative of the tolerance of your govern ment of the colony of Hong Kong which I consider to be another instance of a wise and a strong pol icy. The appeal of China lies in her exa1nple and not in the pract ice of those who, by their actions, show l ack of confidence. I am deeply troubled by the conflict between India and China. I do not wish to pass j udgment on the defini tion of the bord ers between China and India, for I am not competent to do so. I an1 anxious about the fighting beca use, it seems to 111e, the arousal of national passions can but cloud the actual source of difference and make calm and true con sidera tion of the facts impossible to conduct. I feel disturbed because of the suffering and loss of life and of the grave danger con tained in the imminent prospect o f the Cold War be ing intro duced into th is dispu te, a possibility which only the irresponsible can desire. M ay I appeal to you in the sp iri t of Chinese patience over Taiwan and the atte1np ted d i plomatic isolat ion whi ch has been so unj ustly con trived by the United States? Does not the great ness of China allow cease-fire with wi thdrawal of the troops o f each nation fro1n the area in di spu te, for the sake of the two peoples who should surely be struggl ing to gether for e1nancipation from the true en emies of man : exploitation, hunger, ignoran ce and d isease? I am conscious that there are those who would seek advan tage from every instance of the prob-
95
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Iems which developing China experiences. I appre ciate that some in the West would exploit this tragic quarrel with India. I sincerely hope that you will from your own strength take the initiative to stop the actual fighting before general war can ensue, allowing talk and impartial examination by the friends of India and China and the people of Asia to settle amicably these differences. In friendship and with concern, Yours sincerely, B ERTRAND RUSSELL
In the hope that India might be brought to accept the overtures of Ch ina, I also wrote to Mr. Nehru : D EAR MR. NEHRU,
I am grateful to you for your reply to me, coming as it does at so distressing a time for India. I find the situation you describe of grave importance and great concern. Chou En-lai's offer of cease-fire does indeed assume that the Chinese will not withdraw over the twelve-mile area in dispute, as a conse quence of cease-fire. This is unpalatable to you quite understandably, but surely it can not be considered a demand for surrender? Such a demand would en tail a threat to cease hostilities or face massive invasion, the object of which would be the over running of India by Chinese forces. It is a war of this very magnitude that I humbly suggest is the desperate danger to be avoided. It can not be possible that the particulars of right which are so in dispute can be resolved in India's favor prior to cease-fire. I wish it could be so. Aggression along borders must be set beside the
THE SI NO -I N DIA N DI S PUTE
incredible consequences of complete war, the direct involvement of Cold War partisans, the rapid esca lation, the even greater demands of national honor which all will feel. It is not easy for me to appeal to you where my sympathies are so strongly with India. I do so in the sad knowledge that concession of the momen t may be the course sanity demands. Surely you do not wish to refuse now a cease-fire which may be im possible to secure several weeks hence? During the Korean War, the conflict between Arabs and Israel, Egypt and Britain, America and Cuba, Congolese and Katangans, i t has been India's voice which always has sounded the note of reason. The bitterness of Arabs over Pales tine and the feelings of Egyptians over Suez were understandable and their sense of wrong subs tantial in fact. But the immediate rights and wrongs which surround the conflict might at any moment have been lost in the greater calamity. You have said this and I feel it is only to you that I can hopefully appeal for a diffi cult decision which may forestall an irremediable world d isaster. All the factors which pertained to these previous situation s apply, and, now the very na tion from whom mediation has been so needed, is a partisan. The world will be in your debt if you find it pos sible to agree to cease-fire, even if on terms which offend, for the sake of sparing India and mankind ultimate disaster. With my high regard, Yours sincerely, BERTRAN D RUSSELL
97
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My natural instinct in any international situation such as this Sino-Indian affair is to turn to U Thant and the United Nations in appeal for their intervention. In this case the unfortunate exclusion, the silly exclusion of China from the United Nations made their interven tion difficult. But in face of mounting Indian warlike ness and the blind agitation of the West when faced ,vith anything to do with a Communist po,ver, it seemed _to me that desperate measures ,vere necessary. There ,vas just a chance that the UN might be able to prevail upon India, which is herself in the United Nations and, ironically, has wished China to be invited to become a member. I was sure of the sympathy of the (then) Acting Secretary General, and decided to write to him even though he, possibly, could take no measures. Here is my letter: D EAR
u THANT,
May � appeal _ to you once again for your urgent intervention? I fear that extension of conflict be tween Indi a and China can only lead to the rapid involvement of nuclear powers . Prime Minis ter Nehru himself has been the ini tiator of compromise agreemen ts . Korea is an example and the bitterness fel t by Arabs over Pales tine is another. Always, the particular rights and wrongs are overshadowed by the terrible implications of failure to come to agreemen t. The cease-fire of Chou's may no longer be avail able should fighting become general . I am anxi ous that Nehru be prevailed upon to consider the pos sibility of stopping fighting and then seeking arbi-
.
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tration. He is most accessible and India is a tireless supporter of the United Nations. I hope you will feel able to advocate cease-fire. It is difficult for India, but her future, and that of humanity, will be in far greater jeopardy should hostilities continue much longer. With warm regard, Yours sincerely, B ERTRAND RUSSELL
The press in this country had waxed almost as hysteri cal as the Indians themselves in anger against Chinese "aggression" and, sympathetic as I still was to the Indian point of view, I deeply deplored that the Chinese case should never be presented, for, even then, I saw that the Chinese clearly had a _case whether one agr�ed or not. But I decided that I ought not tQ be deflected from hammering at the point which was mos� important to the whole world and which the press seemed not even to see, namely, that fighting must stop before it turned into a full-scale ,var and embroiled the world in nuclear war. I therefore issued a statement to the press, also on November 16, stressing that point. As ,vas, I suppose, to be expected, almost no newspaper took up this _ state, ment, save The Times, whose reports, in _ connection with both the Cuban and the Sino-Indian disputes, were usually fuller, more temperate in tone and more accurate than those of the other papers that I saw. The statement read as follows : One week ago I appealed privately to Prime M inister Nehru, Prime M inister Chou En-lai and to
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President Sukarno with regard to the dangerous conflict on the Sino-Indian borders. I consider the paramount need to be a cessation of hostilities. It has been India's great role in the past to show the world that the issues of dispute were not to be compared in importance with the desperate danger of general conflict. One can not have a third of the world's peoples at war without nuclear powers becoming involved. Korea, the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Suez war, the Congolese fighting, Cuba-these are examples of critical moments when the mediation of neutrals served to show that compromise, unsatisfactory to the national expectation of belligerents, was the sane and only course, for extended conflict not only solves no problem but makes the prospect of event ual negotiations even more difficult. I consider that the Chinese were to blame for in augurating provocation, but I nevertheless think that India ought to accept the Chinese offer of a cease-fire, although its terms may be distasteful to India. Whatever the border situation may be, it seems to me that cease-fire is of paramount im portance before the war extends and mankind is engulfed.
Though I hoped that my voice in this statement, taken with the fe,v other voices raised in a similar cry, might serve to bring home to the British public the real danger that the Sino-Indian fighting threatened them ,vith, it was obviously even more important to try to bring it home to the Indians themselves. For a good many years Th e Sta tesman of Ne"r Delhi had been publishing ar-
T H E S I N O -IN DIAN DI S PUTE
10 1
ticles and asking me for n1ore than I ,vas able to send them, so I dispatched to them on November 1 6 the following article: The Editor of The Sta tesman, New Delhi. D EAR SIR,
I write out of the deepest concern for India. �f ay I ask you if you ,vill permit me to publish the following message in your journal? "The present conflict between India and China has inflamed national passions and all friends of India understand her feelings. I t is of great im portance, however, to see that the disagreement over the border shared by two great countries must not become a general and full-scale war between India and China. There can be no other outcome bu t world war conflagration should this tragic develop ment take place. Once such a course has begun, there will be no return, the prospect of negotiation will have ended. India's vital interest will be ir revocably harmed. "At this moment, the figh ting has not become such as can not be ended easily. This may soon be untrue. With one-third of the people of the ,vorld at war, it can not be possible to keep out the nuclear powers. "As a lifetime friend of India, I appeal to her to show her greatness not by insisting upon the rights of territory to the risk of human surYival. The Arabs feel as strongly about Palestine and so do the Congolese about Katanga. Kurds consider their
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·wrongs to be unparalleled. Yet in each instance, the merits of their argument are vastl)y overshadowed by the incalculable disaster ,•fhich full-scale con flict ·would mean in each of these areas. � uclear po,\Ters ,•,ould not remain uninvolved long as the recent Cuban dispute has shown. "Indeed it has been India ·who has shov.n man kind that this is true through her appeals and her ad,-ice. Ah,Tals India has said that the issues of dispute ,vere to be put second in importance to the value of compromise settlement and the avoid ance of nuclear war. So i t ·was in the Korean ,var, and Indians ·were responsible. "I raise ID)' voice to appeal to the Indian nation to agree to cease-fire now, to accept talks v.-i th Chou En-lai over the border, even if territorial sacrifice is a possible consequence. I do so because time is shon and the failure to achieve cease-fire \\-ill mean extinction for the human race. " BERTRA..,-n RCSSE.lL
,-.a.S
This message not published by Th e Sta tesman of Ne,\- Delh i . 2 �.\s more and more letters and documents filled ,\�i th ,..�ar hysteria poured in upon me from India, I understood ,.... hv. During the next n .... o days, I devoted myself to dis cussing the dispute and to studying the positions of the n..-o dispu tants and the questions involved. I ,,-as im pressed by the facts both that China had been able to settle all her other border disputes b y n egotiation and
� It has� since then. been published in The Sta tesma n of Karachi.
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had already, before this last and disastrous flare-up, offered to negotiate with India the border questions which were in dispute between them. In fact, I was be ginning to feel that China had behaved more reason ably than had India. In view of this, on November 19 I wrote to Prime Minister Chou En-lai suggesting a step which I should previously have thought it useless to suggest, involving as it did an obvious sacrifice on the part of China who was victorious and militarily stronger than India. D EAR MR. CHOU EN -LAI,
I am most grateful to you for your considered reply to my earlier message. Since then I have ad dressed a letter to you in which I expressed my earnest hope that you may find a way to phrase your proposal for cease-fire in such a fashion that Mr. Nehru will be able to accept it. I appreciate the intricacy and the delicacy of the situation. I have had an opportunity to hold a most fruitful dis cussion with the Charge d'Affaires of your govern ment, Mr. Hsiung Hsiang-hui, and with his aide, Mr. Hsieh. Through these talks I have come to understand more fully the views of your government on the difficult problem of the boundary between China and India. I much appreciate the cooperative man ner in which such problems have been settled in the past between China, Burma and Nepal. China's relations with Bhutan, Sikkim and Pakistan are model. I am also conscious of the importance of your repeated proposals for negotiations, particu larly as these proposals specify that the area in dis-
1 04
U N A RME D VICTOR Y
pute and the boundary are not to be prejudiced by the onset of cease-fire to the advantage of either India or China, and that outstanding matters are to be referred to discussion for the solution of them. I note the important offer made in your three proposals for withdrawal from the line of actual control, which conforms to the line of November 7, I 959, and that each side undertake not to cross the line. The further suggestion of an area of twenty kilometers on either side of the line to be vacated by both armies seems to me also entirely reasonable. I have, therefore, expressed to Mr. Nehru my be lief that a cease-fire such as you propose should be accepted. It is my understanding that India feels that the Chinese definition of the traditional and customary line is contrary to their own . The area which Mr. Nehru requests be vacated, which had been under Indian control prior to September 8, I 962, seems to represent the basic difference prevent ing an acceptance of cease-fire. This area, which was placed under Indian j urisdiction through In dian initiative since 1 959, is felt by both parties to belong to them. My intensely felt view is that it would be tragic if some tentative understanding could not be reached about this very area. Would it not be pos sible for your government to require all troops to vacate this particular area-that which India has occupied since 1 959 and until September 8, 1 962, and felt by China to be her own? Might it be possible for a cease-fire to occur on
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the basis of complete troop withdrawal from this area, without prej udice to the claims of either, thus leaving to nego tiations the final decision as to the nature of control in the future? I know that this will be pain£ul for the people of China since they feel tha t this area is, in fact, their own. The principle whi ch you have so admirably advanced permi ts wi thdrawal elsewhere by both. Could this not be offered for the region under Chinese con trol since September 8? I appreciate that problems of administration would arise for those communities within the re gion, but I should imagine that the absence of military forces would enable civilian authorities from China and India to cooperate while the ques tion of nationality for the area was in abeyance. M ight I further suggest that countries such as Indonesia, neutral in the dispute between China and India, might assist in arbitrating the dispute, once cease-fire has been achieved? I anxiously hope it may be possible to find a formula along such lines to enable a cease-fire to come into effect. I assure you that I shall do all within my capacity to promote peaceful settlement and that I am urging conciliation upon Mr. Nehru. Wi th high regard, Yours sincerely, BERTRAND RUSSELL
This letter, which asked the Chinese government to declare a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Chinese troops from the land that they had occupied since September
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8-which India considered to be hers whereas the Chi nese believed it to belong to China-was telegraphed to Premier Chou En-lai. The next morning I issued a press statement, hoping to cool the mounting fervor of support for the Indians in their desire to fight on and of hatred for the Chinese who were generally said to be, as all Communists ,vere said to be, "double-dealing. " Little of the public feeling was based upon evidence, for the press provided little actual evidence and almost none at all concerning the Chinese case. I had small hope, ho,vever, that a press statement given out by me ,vould be used by the press as indeed it was not-but I felt I had to do all I could on the very bare chance that it might help. The statement read as follows : The border dispute between Indi a and China can only be prevented from becoming a general conflict by a cease-fire in the immedi ate future. After talks totaling over four hours wi th the Depu ty High Com missioner of India, Mr. Kewal Singh, and the Charge d' Affaires of China, Mr. Hsiung Hsi ang-hui, it is cl ear to me that the failure to stop this war soon will i nexorably involve the nuclear powers, the consequence of ·\.vhich can only be total disaster for Ind ia and China and for mankind. The cease-fire offered on October 24 by Prime Minister Chou En-lai is unpal atable to Indi a and the terms wh ich India would accept are unpalatable to China. Every effort must be made to bring the two sides to cease fire pending arb itration of the entire area in dispute. No conceivable difference between China and India is as grave to the interests
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of each as the extension of this tragic conflict.Once this occurs there will be no negotiations. Asia and the world will be engulfed.
Then, suddenly, later that same day, November 20, came the announcement that the Chinese government had declared a unilateral cease-fire and a withdra,val of their troops, beginning on December I , to the line of actual control of November 7, I 959-further than even the Indians had demanded. Though I had hoped for such a move, I had felt it a forlorn hope. The Chinese had reached the southern slopes of the mountains and had Assam at their mercy. The difficult fighting in the passes was finished, and no powerful military obstacle existed to prevent a Chinese occupation of the Indian plains. I cannot think of any other instance in which a victorious army has been halted in this way by its o,vn government. Because it had seemed to me, from Chou En-lai's letter and from my talk with the Chinese Charge d'Affaires, that the Chinese were, in the matter of the border dispute, reasonable and temperate, I had thought it worth while to write to Chou En-lai as I had done, appealing for such magnanimous action on the part of the Chinese government, but I ,vas taken by surprise, as was the rest of the world, that they believed suffi ciently clearly and strongly that war must be avoided to take such extreme measures, to make such a sacrifice of their gains. It seemed to me, as it had on the earlier dramatic occasion of the turning away of the Russian ships in the Caribbean, that all the world should acclaim this Chinese action. But I remembered the churlish welcome given by the Western governments to Mr. Khrushchev's action,
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and suspected that again the West would merely indulge its hatred by further cries of "double-dealing. " And I understood that India might be beset to an even greater degree than she already was by a feeling of humiliation. I thought-which was proved to be foolish of me-that perhaps I could get an immediate statement into the press that would show at least one voice raised in praise and I issued the following statement that evening: The announcement by Prime Minister Chou En lai and the government of China to unilateral cease fire should be universally welcomed as a generous action. The world was again on the brink of dis aster, and only the unimaginative will cavil at con gratulating the Chinese for their decision. It is desperately important to be clear about the way in which the crises in Cuba and over the Sino Indian boundary have been eased. Not through immediate negotiations but through unilateral ac tion by a belligerent, have they lessened. When national passions are inflamed, fear and hatred resurgent, it is too late for deliberations and calm exchange. Decisive action by one side to show clearly the will to end dispute is the effective way to pre vent escal ation to disaster. The Chinese action should receive support, for unless ·we are capable of acknowledging generosity ·where it occurs we can not hope to see man survive long on the planet.
The press, so far as I know, took no notice of this state ment. It and the mass of the public and the govern ments, responded to the Chinese action as I had feared they might. It seemed to me that, in vie,v of the Indian
THE SINO -IN DIAN DI S P UTE
109
war hysteria-which was likely, for a time at least, to be exacerbated-the Indian government would have a diffi cult time in replying to the Chinese. It was hardly likely, even if they wished to do so, that the government could so flout the outraged fighting spirit of the people as to respond adequately. Bitterly ironic as I felt it to be that it should be the Chinese who were showing an understanding of the dangerous implications of the dis pute instead of the Indians, who in cases in which they had not been directly involved had shown an equal belief that war should be avoided for the sake of human ity, I could understand what an extraordinarily diffi cult position the Indian government must be in. Yet day by day the press and private letters from India spoke of India's determination to fight on to save her honor, of the general belief that the words of the Chinese could not be trusted. Reports came that the Indian govern ment refused to declare a cease-fire, that it would never negotiate. Day by day the situation seemed to deteri orate. I determined, therefore, to write privately and at considerable length to Mr. Nehru, setting out once again the implications of the situation as I saw them and appealing to him to act in accordance with what I knew had, formerly, been his belief. The letter, sent on No vember 23, ran as follows : D EAR MR. NEHRU,
In writing to you this further letter, I cannot claim any right derived from diplomatic status, nor do I speak as more than an individu al. I am wri ting in the hope that we may still exchange such vi ews as individuals, al though the conditions of grave crisis are upon us. You know that I have urged that
1 10
UNAR M ED VIC TOR Y
you should accept the Chinese proposal for cease fire. I feel compelled to place this plea in the broad est context-the material from which whatever hopes we may have for this world of ours spring. What is to happen to the possibility of peace if those spokesmen for mediation do not apply the wisdom of such a course to their own circumstances? I fully grasp the difficulties faced by India and by yourself at this time. What, however, is to happen if this war continues? What conceivable perspec tive is there for man? The involvement of the nuclear powers, the decimation of the forces of neutralism with regard to the Cold War, the in evitable escalation of arms until China and India themselves reach for nuclear weapons. What is to happen to the chances for peace i f India too defines honor and integrity i n terms of national pride, victory in war, and military defeat of aggressors? If even India no longer feels that national action, even territorial sacrifice, even uni lateral concessoin, are more to be admired than the psychosis of militarism, what can we expect of the future? If in the past Arabs and Israelis, Chin ese and Americans in Korea, Russians in Cuba, could not have been appealed to from a position with the wider issues paramount in mind, would there be yet life on this planet? And India? A nation in poverty struggling to emerge wi thout the devices of totali tarianism, what of it? How long before India is run by the army, its chief of staff and those politicians who feed upon militarism? What is to become of democratic social ism, of free India, of crushing hunger? Is India to
T H E S I NO- I ND I AN D I S P U TE
111
become another Siam in the name of defending her freedom? I appeal to you to recognize that all that you have wished for your country and for mankind is in jeopardy if this war continues, and if the terms of national honor are those such as Bismarck would have understood. The social conditions of under developed Asia are such that democratic institutions will not survive six months of militarism and the stoppage of economic development. The military and economic dependence upon the United States which follows will destroy Indian nonalignment from the moment of its onset. There will be no retreat then from satellite status, for the hostages of economic dependence and the blackmail of economic reprisal will be definitive. These are the clear and practical consequences for India if this cease-fire does not stand, and if even the potential negotiations are not begun with the utter determination to reach settlement, whatever the momentary cost in border territory. The wider issue is the likelihood of nuclear war, the end of the democratic experiment in Asia, the crude line-up between American and Sino-Soviet satellites every where among the uncommitted of the moment. I beseech you to consider whether anything ·we desire is possible if this conflict extends. Every sane human being will admire the courage of this sort of action and not the historic postures of national belligerence, pronouncements of death or dishonor, and destruction to the aggressor. Those who are not sane may become so in time in the face of a great example. Without such an example in the nuclear
1 12
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age, we are condemned to the mad. I am utterly convinced that India's national honor and man's future can only be served by the courage to reject those who can not see beyond the first fortnight of military resistance. We who wish to preserve man on this planet must accept that in the nuclear age, to permi t ex tended war is to defeat everything we consider important and to strengthen those who are in capable of grasping the short time man has to learn this lesson of survival. I have admired for a great length of time the leadership you have brought to India and the policy of nonali gnment you have personally wrought. I wish both to be preserved. I write with respect and strong feeling, Yours sincerely, B ERTRAND RUSSELL
As I could not seem to get anything printed in a Brit ish newspaper, I accepted an invitation of the Van co uver Sun to send it a short statement. I ,vas particularly glad to do this because the papers were full of the rumors from Pakistan that the Indian government had entered into mili tary alliance ,vith the United States. These were merely rumors, but in case there ,vas any basis whatever for them, it seemed to me that .A.merican public opinion should be warned of ,vhat military help from the United States to India would mean. This state ment, unlike that to the Indian Sta tesman� was pub l ished. I t ,vas sen t on November 2 3 , and said : Americans and Canadians are not sufficiently aware that the Sino-Indian border conflict is on the verge of becoming a war such as will involve the
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nuclear powers. American and British military in volvement will force the hand of Russia and may well bring the fall of Khrnshchev, with a Stalinist replacement the frui t of American belligerence of the moment . Khrushchev has been trying to lower the temperature of the Cold War. A Stalinist would reverse this trend. Extended war in India means : ( 1 ) The immediate danger of nuclear war; (2) The end of democracy in India; (3) The end of India as a nonaligned power. No conceivable interest of India's can be served by this inevi table consequence of continued con flict. The du ty of North Americans is to urge upon their governmen ts the co urse of mediation . Any at tempt to entangle India in military agreemen ts wi th the United States will directly transform wha t is, at the moment, a boundary dispu te into a world CTISIS.
The curren t offer by China of a cease-fire wi thou t prej udice to the terri torial claims of ei ther party should be accepted. Any perspective would show that this is the sane course in a nuclear age, and India should be the first nation to grasp this. There is very short time in which to learn this elementary lesson of survival for mankind.
The following morning I replied to the friendly letters I had received from U Thant :
DEAR
u THANT'
I am most grateful to you for your kind let ters . The unilateral initiative by Prime l\1inister Chou
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En-lai is heartening and commendable. I have been communicating with Prime M inister Nehru and Prime Minister Chou En-lai in the hope that the entire matter could be deferred from conflict and given over to arb i tration in the presence of those neutral as between China and India in their quarrel. I earnestly hope that Mr. Nehru will accept the curren t Chinese offer and I have sought to explain to him why I feel this so strongly. It was good of you to pass on my letter to the Permanent Representative of India. I join in your hopes that the cease-fire will remain effective. Wi th good wishes, Yours sincerely, BERTRAND RUSSELL
I decided, also, to try to encourage President Nkrumah in his efforts to cool the temperature of the Sino-Indian dispute and I wrote to him on that same morning : D EAR PRESIDENT N KRUMAH,
I am wri ting to you to express my thanks for your sensible and admirable efforts to preven t the exten sion of the Sino-Indian boundary dispu te and to forestall the dangerous possibilit y of mili tary i n volvement by Bri tain an d other Cold War powers. I have been greatly encouraged by the unilateral cease-fire on the part of Prime Minister Chou En-lai and the governmen t of China. I hope that Mr. Nehru will find it possible to accep t negotiations. I am anxious that su ch negotiations succeed for, should they founder, the very mechanism of pre venting a tragic conflict would be impaired and
T H E S I NO- I ND I AN D I S P U T E
1 15
general war could well be the consequence. If agree ment is to take place, it seems to me that each side will require utter determination to reach it and the will to compromise, for it is not likely that either China or India can be completely satisfied in the realization of what each considers to be their rights, if agreement is to occur. Such a result may be greatly facilitated by the presence of a party re spected by both and desirous of such an agreement, although impartial to both India and China. May I humbly ask you to offer your services in the arbitration of the dispute for such a role as you might undertake could remove points of difficulty where they occur and make it far more available to each to accept compromise suggestions, which might be difficult to allow if they came from the antago nist. I believe deeply that you could perform a vital service to the peace of the world and the essential improvement of the deteriorated relations between China and India. I hope very much that you will find this possible. With my respect and good wishes, Yours sincerely, BERTRAND RUSSELL
A little later that day, November 24, I received a letter from Premier Chou En-lai which seemed to me both ex ceedingly interesting and important: 3 This let ter had an enligh tening, though I fear not singular, fate at the hands of the press. Its treatmen t seems to show the remarkable similarity of the deeply incised grooves in the minds of news editors. 3
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Mv DEAR LoRD, I have received with honor your letters dated November 6 and 1 9, 1 962, and read with great pleasure your statement welcoming and support ing the Chinese government's statement of Novem ber 2 1 . I am deeply moved by your good wishes and efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question and your deep interest in world peace. I am sincerely grateful to you for the pro-
It seemed to me that the letter might be of interest to the public, especially as they had had so little of the Chinese point of view given them in the daily papers. My past experience , however, of the way in which letters and statements to and from me were cut up and, therefore, misrepresented by the press, made me wary. My secretary was tele phoned by the news editors of the O bserver and of the Sun day Times for the letter. I offered them the letter on the condition that they should publish it in full. Both editors, having ascertained the length of the letter, accepted the condition and professed themselves eager to publish i t. Each, in turn, asked for an outline of what had led up to Premier Chou writing to me, and was given it. Tha t happened on Saturday afternoon. That evening, first the news editor of the Sunday Times rang to say that he found that, because of difficul ties of space, he could not publish the full letter, but would, instead , publish a story including the background facts that he had obtained by promising to print the letter in full. Remonstrances had no effect upon him. Shortly afterward, the news editor of the O bseroer rang up and repeated almost word for word the speech that we had received from the news editor of the Sun day Ti mes . Fortunately, having ral lied from the first telephone call, we were able to take some measures and, under pressure, the news editor of the O bseroer was persuaded to keep his word, al though owing to his hesitations, it was too late for him to do so in the country editions of his paper. The news editor of the Su n day Ti mes, however, persisted in duplicity : his account included some of the facts that he had obtained when promising to publish the let ter, and remarked that I had received a letter from Premier Chou of which, he said, though he had the text of the letter, "It is believed that it only thanks Lord Russell for his peacemaking efforts and repeats China's willingness to open round- table discussions with India."
THE SINO-INDIAN DISP UTE
found fri endship for the Chinese people and the condemnation of U . S. occupa tion of China's terri tory Taiwan, which you have expressed in your letters. The Chinese government issued a statement on October 24, I 962, putting forward three proposals. Unfortunately, they were repeatedly rej ected by the Indian governmen t. In order to reverse the daily aggravating Sino-Indian border si tuation due to the Indian government's refusal to en ter into negotia tions and i ts continued expansion of the armed border conflict, and in order to demonstrate i ts great sincerity for stopping the border conflict and settling the Sino-Indian boundary question peace fully, the Chinese governmen t issued a statement on November 2 1 , 1 962, decl aring three measures in cluding the unilateral observation of cease-fire and withdrawal along the en tire border by China on its own initiative. Now, I wish to tell you that from 00.00 hours on November 22 the Chinese fron tier guards have ceased fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. I bel ieve that this accords with the desires you expressed in your messages. You suggested i n your le tter of November 1 9 : "All troops to vacate this particular area-that which India has occupied since 1 959 and un til September 8, I 962, and fel t by China to be her own." I be lieve that you have noted that the Chinese govern ment has declared in i ts statemen t of November 2 1 that, beginning from December 1 , the Chin ese frontier guards would wi thdraw to posi tions 20 kilome ters behind the line of actual control which exis ted between China and India on November 7,
117
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I 959, and would then be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1 962. The Chinese government hopes that the Indian government will respond posi tively to the Chinese government's NoYember 2 1 statement and adopt corresponding measures. Once the Indian government has done so, the Sino-Indian border will become tranquil and a demilitarized zone 40 kilometers wide can be established between China and India. It goes without saying that ad ministration will continue to be exercised by the administrative authorities of each side existing in the Zone of their own side of the line of actual con trol between China and India. The Chinese government hopes that the Indian government will be willing to change its past atti tude and sincerely settle the Sino-Indian boundary question through friendly negotiations. I hope that you will continue to use your distinguished in fluence to urge the Indian government to respond positively to the Chinese government's November 2 1 statement and adopt corresponding measures. At the same time, the Chinese government also hopes that all friendly countries and peace-loving public figures will exert their influence to urge the Indian government to return to the conference table. These efforts will be great contributions to peace. Please accept my high regards. CHOU EN-LA I
That evening I replied to Prime Minister Chou En-laj as follows :
TH E SI N O -I N DIAN DI S PUT E DEAR MR. CHOU-EN-LAI,
Your letter to me of November 24 has given me the greatest pleasure and I am honored to receive it. I should wish you to know that your decision not only to wi thdraw to the lines behind the posi tions of September 8, bu t to do so unilaterally, fills me with admiration, for I have little doubt that but for this decision the tragic conflict would have vastly enlarged and the world would be imperiled. Your action i n every way accords with the sugges tions in my letter of November 1 9 and I am in your great debt for your agreement with them. I bel ieve that in initiating this cease-fire without waiting for the possibil i ty of Indian agreement to abide by the stoppage, you emphati cally hal ted a grave situation in rapid deterioration on the Sino-Indian boundary and clearly gave evidence of the complete sincerity of your government to resolve the differences through negotiated settlemen t. Immedi ately prior to my receiving your good letter I had wri tten a long letter to M r. Nehru say ing almost exactly what you have suggested. Al though I have not yet received a reply, I should like you to know that I have high hopes th at the answer may be favorable. You know that I had urged ac ceptance of your proposals of October 24 both privately to Mr. Nehru and publ icly in Great Britain prior to your statemen t of November 2 1 . My posi tion is that the paramou n t issue is to end conflict and that all matters of d i spute concern ing the Sino-Indi an boundary should be set tled through arbitration with a defin ite detern1ination to reach
1 19
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agreement on the part of both India and China. I appreciate that you have emphasized your own wishes for such negotiations. There is one particular fear I should wish to mention to you. Should the negotiations we desire begin, the failure of such negotiations would be most dire as such failure would remove the very method wherein conflict may be permanently ended. It is likely that success in such negotiations will require the absolute determination on the part of both India and China to reach agreement, even if this may entail compromise on the part of each. It is not l ikely that either India or China can be completely satisfied in the realization of what each consider to be their rights, if agreement is to occur. M ay I suggest that such agreement and such ad vance by each party from views which may now be unacceptable to the other, could be facilitated by the presence of a party desirous of such agreement but genuinely impartial? I do not know whether President Sukarno would be felt to be acceptable or whether President Nkrumah might be considered another who could provide this service. I wish only to suggest that points of difficulty might well be eased and over come through the presence and arbitration of such individuals. Please accept my sincere gratitude for what you have done to halt the fighting and believe that I shall do ,vhatever I can to assist the peaceful and friendly settlement of the unfortunate and, I hope, short-lived disagreement between India and China. If there is any further way in ·which I may assist
THE S INO - IND IAN D I S PUTE
12 1
the Chinese people and the cause of world peace, I should be honored to be able to do so . Wi th my high regard and warm wishes, Yours sincerely, BERTRAND RUSSELL
My work for the day, November 24, was finished with a statement to the press. The British press had been so heavily loaded with the Indian point of view and feel ings that it seemed to me that it must be almost im possible for anyone who had no other means of gleaning the news of what was going on in regard to the Sino Indian dispute to understand just what had happened so far and what might happen. My statement, therefore, was an attempt to describe very briefly, from my per sonal point of view, how the situation had progressed and stood and might proceed. But the press were not much interested in anything that gave the Chinese an inning, and not at all in what I might be doing or think ing, so they did not take up the statement. The following day, I wrote a short letter to Mr. Hsiung Hsiang-hui, the Chinese Charge d' Affaires, ,vho, as the Indian Deputy High Commissioner had done, had con tinued to send me his government's news releases and documents relating to the Sino-Indian dispute. I wrote to Mr. Hsiung : I am very glad to receive the letter from Mr. Chou En-lai of November 24. Before receiving it I had already written on November 23 a long letter to Mr. Nehru saying almost exactl y wh at Mr. Chou En-lai suggests. To this letter I have not y et re-
1 22
UNA RME D VIC TORY
ceived an answer, but I have hopes that the answer may be favorable.
And, on November 2 6, I wrote-to what avail, I do not know-to Mr. Diwakar, the head of the Gandhi Peace Foundation at New Delhi : D EAR M R. DIWAKAR,
I wri te to you with a sense of urgency and con cern. I have sought to raise my voice on behalf of sanity in the Sino-Indian dispute. I appealed to Mr. Chou En-lai for unilateral cease-fire in my first message to him and later to withdraw in the eastern sector to the lines prior to September 8 so that cease-fire could occur, on the condition that no troops, including Indian, occupy this area in dis pute. He seems to have responded. I wrote an article for The Statesman of New Delhi appealing for Indian acceptance of the cease fire of October 24. It was refused. I am disturbed tha t Indian workers for peace are silent at this desperate moment. I appeal to you in the name of all we have worked for to make known the letters I enclose to the people of India . I appeal to you to speak for cease fire. Please inform me about this, if at all possible. With warm good wishes, Yours sincerely, BERTRAND RUSSELL
P.S. I have sent the article intended for The Sta tes man of New Delhi to The Statesman of Karachi in the hope that they will publish it. I should be grate-
TH E SINO -INDI A N DI S P UT E
1 23
ful if the Gandhi Peace Foundation and yourself will circulate the article and letters.
Four days later I made a statement in the Welsh press \vhich had shown itself far more readily disposed to con sider what I was seeking to achieve than the English press. I tried, in this statement which can1e on the eve of the Chinese withdrawal of their troops, to present my reasons for feeling it urgent that the Indians accept the cease-fire: When the Sino-Indian border conflict began, I thought that India was in the right and that China was the aggressor. I telegraphed to both Nehru and Chou En-lai urging a cease-fire. In consequence the Chinese Charge d' Affaires and the Indian High Commissioner both came to see me and a t great l ength set forth their respective points of view, which they supported by documen ts. I discovered that the Chinese case was very much stronger than I had thought and, also, that it is very doubtful whether the Chinese were the first aggressors. I continued to urge a cease-fire. Nehru ref used, but Chou En-lai went even further than I suggested in the direction that I had advoca ted. It seems to me now the clear and absolute duty of India to agree to negotiations as soon as the Chinese have completed their withdrawal . The line to which they are wi thdrawing concedes more even than India claims, except in Ladakh where the Indian claim is very shaky, as opposed to the fact that the Chinese
l '.i
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U NARME D VICTORY
constructed a great military road there without the Indians being aware of i t. If Indi a continues the fighting i t will only be for reasons of prestige and n ational pride. If they con tinue for such reasons they will forfeit the respect of all impartial or peace-loving persons.
Th e Indian governmen t continued not to accept the Chinese cease-fire or to declare a cease-fire in response, though, in actual fact, I believe that it did institute a cease-fire. The Indian people continued to shout that they never would accept the Chinese proposals, that such acceptance would mean surrender and dishonor for their country. The Bri tish press reported this Indian attitude with gusto and continued to doubt whether the Chinese really would withdraw their troops as they h ad proposed doing. Bu t, on D ecember I , the Chinese, as they had promised, began the withdrawal of their troops. I telegraphed Mr. Nehru : I sincerely hope that you will respond to the cease fire decision of the Chinese realizing that disen gagemen t does not prej udice your argument but only facilitates peaceful negotiation . For peace rather than nuclear war not only the peoples of India and China will thank you but those of the whole world.
And I telegraphed to Mr. Chou En-lai : Urge patience on Sino-Indian dispu te. Nehru must yield to world pressure for your sane action. Conflict will be globally disas trous.
'·
{ I
T H E S INO - IN D IAN D I S P U T E
1 25
For another ,veek the situation changed little. One day it ,vould look as if the Indians ,vere beco1ning cahner and migh t agree to negotiation, another day the old brouhaha about national honor would burst out again. The Chinese continued to withdra,v their troops and to ask India to agree to their proposals. On December 9, the Chinese were said to have "issued an ultimatum, " by the British press but " the ultimatum" consisted merely in a repeated request for an Indian official reply to their proposals. It seemed impossible that the Indian government could refuse to negotiate. Its delay, one supposed, was owing to the warlike passions of its people which had been aroused to fever heat during the figh t ing, especially owing to their losses and retreat, and nat urally took a long time to cool. They had remained at fever heat-so hot that a paper in New Delhi was writ ing about "Peace-A Slogan to Deceive and Blackmail. " And they boasted of India's determination t o fight on against the "Dragon, " Communist China: To retrieve each inch of the motherland sancti fied by the blood of its Jawans became the nation's dominant purpose; to direct the country's diplomacy to this one single purpose, the people's firm man date. India had accepted the challenge. ( In dia A ccep ts the Challenge, published by the Afro-Asian Council, New Delhi).
It was difficult to keep patience ,vith the Indians for constantly referring to th e "sacred soil" and the "hol y land" of India (though possibly no 1nore difficult tha n ,vith the Chinese ,vhen they refer to the "liberation" of Tibet ,vhen they mean the conquering of that country).
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U N A RME D VICTORY \ I
I love England passionately but it ,vould not occur to l me, or to others in like case, even in time of war to refer � to her "sacred soil . " On Dece1nber 1 1 , I received a long and friendly pri vate letter ,vritten on December 4 to me by l\1r. Nehru explaining the difficulties of the Indian government, and, on that same day, a letter from President N krumah wri tten to me on November 30 which said : DEAR LORD RUSSELL,
I am most grateful for your kind letter of Novem ber 24, I 962, concerning the Sino-Indian border dispute. I too have been greatly concerned about the deterioration in the relations between India and China and, from the very beginning of the conflict, have been in close touch with Mr. Chou En-lai and Mr. Nehru on the matter. The unilateral cease-fire arranged by China has made it possible for us to pursue our efforts to get India and China to negotiate. I have been informed today that a special mission is on its way from India, led by the Indian 1\Iinister for Law, to discuss the points of view of the Indian government on the situation ·w ith me. I have already instructed the Ghana representa tive at the United Nations to work in close col laboration with other Afro-Asian representatives there to try and get China and India to come to terms on the issues in dispute between them. I am also sending a delegation to Colombo sometime next week to j oin other Afro-Asian delegates to ex amine ways and means of bringing the dispute to an end. The best course, it seems to me, might be
T H E S I NO- I ND I AN D I S P U TE
1 27
the setting up of an impartial committee of experts respected by both sides, who can demarcate clear frontiers that can be recognized by India and China and become internationally acceptable. It appears that such an objective, if it could be attained, would remove the barrier of the so-called McMahon Line that has come to be regarded as one of the unpleasant legacies of a colonial past. I have been most encouraged by your message, and can assure you that I will continue to do all I can to prevent the extension of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. With respect and good wishes for the coming year. Yours very sincerely, Kw A M E N KRU MAH
Two days later, December 13, I wrote privately to Mr. Nehru in reply to his exceedingly interesting letter of the 4th : D EAR MR. N EHRU,
l\tly warm thanks for your very forbearing letter of December 4. I can assure you that I quite appre ciate the difficulties of your position . . . . I am very glad to note that you say that "in any event, we (India) are not going to break the cease-fire and indulge in a military offensive." I am also very glad to note that in certain circumstances India would consent to arbitration. I cannot see that there is the faintest national humiliation in submitting legal questions to neutral arbitration. The whole legal position as to the frontier is tangled and obscure and controversial, and I do not see that either side has
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a right to insist upon i ts own interpretation as a prel iminary to negoti ation or arbitration . As re gards the two different l ines a t present suggested by the governments of India and China, I cannot see that this is a very important matter provided that i t is accep ted by both sides that the lin e is pro vision al and may be al tered by subsequent nego tiations. You mention that the Chinese proposals give Chin a a dominating pos1 t1on " especially 1n Ladakh." I should have thought that this is out weighed by the Chinese concessions further east, especially the M cM ahon Line. Moreover, while I do not pretend to any well-grounded opinion as to the legal position of the frontier, i t has seemed to me from what I have been abl e to ascertain that Indian cl aims in Ladakh are open to question. This whole matter, of course, would be one for the arbitrator, if arbitration is agreed to. I do not feel that the particular line to be adopted during negotiations, and to be i tself sub j ect to negotiation, is very importan t. I think that either India or China would be ill-advised in mak ing its own position a sin e q ua n on . I am wri ting to the Chinese government in this sense. If the whole dispute is submi tted to arbitration , the ques tion as to the posit ion of the frontier will become a legal one, and "vhatever has happened in the fight ing hi therto will be irrel evan t. I cannot see that this would consti tute any surrender to Chinese aggres sion . As to the principle of arb itra tion, if you feel no doub t that the Indi an legal posi tion is val id, you can surely trust an impartial arbi tra tor to find that
THE SINO -IN DIAN DI S P UTE
1 29
this is the case. If, on the other hand, there is any thing that appears to an impartial arbitrator ques tionable in the Indian legal case, I cannot believe that you would wish to insist on this portion of your case. In conclusion, I wish to repeat that my interest in the matter is in the re-establishment and preserva tion of peace, and that this seems to me far more important than any of the territorial claims of either side . . . .
On that same day, I wrote, as I had told Mr. Nehru I intended to do, to the Chinese government, in the person of the Charge d'Affaires in London: DEAR MR. Hs1uNG,
Thank you for your letter of December I 3 . There seems now considerable hope that the differences between China and India will be settled by negotia tion or, if necessary, arbitration. I note that China has suggested one provisional frontier line during negotiation and India has suggested another. Pro vided it is understood that the l ine is to be part of the matter to be negotiated , I cannot see that its exact position is important. I have written to l\fr. Nehru in this sense, and I should like to see neither India nor China make this or that prel iminary line a sin e q ua n on, for negotiations. I hope that both governments will take this view, which I feel convinced is the wise one, to avoid delay in negoti a tions in the supreme interest of peace. I shall be very grateful if you will transmit this letter to l\'1r. Chou En-lai.
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C . THE AFTE RM ATH
I
_,.
Both sides lay stress on what they call "the line of actual control. " This line, it is admitted, was different at dif ferent dates. The Chinese, after their unilateral cease fire and withdrawal, proposed that, during negotiations, the line of actual control should be ,vhat they estimated it to have been on November 7, 1959. The Indian govern ment insisted, instead, upon what it estimated the line to have been on September 8 , 1962. This line is more favorable to China than to India except in Ladakh, where the Indian line gives a jog into what China con siders her territory. Conversely, the line suggested by China is more favorable to India than to China except where it cuts off the little jog in Ladakh which the In dians consider to be Indian territory. A small p_�_r t � £ Ladakh, then, seems to be the nub of the dispute. So far:- i10 agreement has been reached as to the line to be adopted before negotiations are permitted to begin. I should have thought it obvious that the difference is not sufficiently important for either side to insist upon its own suggestions, especially as the difference is to be only temporary, pending negotiations. Th_� !eal hitch_�eems _to be one of pride and prestige. Yet, from a letter ,vritten on December 20, and re ceived by me on December 24, from Mr. Nehru , I gather that India considers the establishment of the line that it has demanded of primary importance before negotia-
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tions can start. Mr. Nehru's letter concerns itself almost entirely with controverting my expressed belief that "the Chinese case was very much stronger than I had thought" and, in particular, my doubt as to "whether th��_hinese were the first aggressors. " Neither my belief nor my doubt were achieved easily. I came to them, as I have said, by a study of the documents sent me by both the Deputy Indian High Commissioner and the Chinese Charge d'Affaires, and I came to them reluctantly since I both fear and intensely dislike Chinese Communism, wherever it differs with the policy of Mr. Khrushchev. I cannot, however, feel certain that these pro-Chinese con clusions were valid. Mr. Nehru maintains that the Chinese were the first aggressors and points out that India had said that she would discuss the matters connected with the boundary dispute with China if China would restore the position to that of September 8, 1962. He does not seem to think that the Chinese withdrawal to a position far less ad vanced except in a small part of Ladakh than that of September 8, I 962, would cover the point. He states, also, that India, later, proposed that the matter might be referred to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. I had not known this, nor do I see why, if India proposed this, she considers negotiation or the submis sion of the questions to any other neutral arbitrator to be an admission of victory by the Chinese. It is, on the other hand, easy to understand that the Chinese might fight shy of having the International Court of Justice at The Hague as having a Western bias. The suggestion of India's alignment with the West given by her recep tion of arms from Britain and the U.S., but not from Russia, can hardly be considered to be soothing to
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China's suspicions-any more than her ostracism from the UN. The really discouraging point in all governmental pronouncements from India is that there is no sugges tion in them that the important matter is that negotia tions, not fighting, must take place in order to achieve the one thing-the avoidance of war-which lvill save India itself and China and the rest of the world from disaster. It may be, of course, that the efforts of the Con ference in Colombo and Mrs. Bandaranaike's mission to both the Indian and the Chinese governments may soften the present impasse to the point ,vhere mediators ac ceptable to both India and China may be drawn in and negotiations be made possible. The irritation apparently felt by India concerning China's settlement with Paki stan as to their Kashmir border is not, however, likely to facilitate matters. Meanwhile, there seems no slackening in the bellicose temper of the Indian public. I have received many let ters during the past month and very recently along the lines of the following paragraphs taken from one of them : As a humble citizen of India I wish to state that I have read in New Delhi's papers that you condemn Anglo-American arm supplies for India. According to you, this poses a grave danger to peace. I have a great respect and regard for the English culture and character ·which beautifully shines al most in every sphere of life but I and my other friends ·who are standing by me at the time of writ ing this letter, are all surprised how a man of your fa1ne, abil ity and character can feel like this. How
THE S INO - IN D IA N D I S P U T E
sudden, unprovoked and treacherous is this Chinese invasion of India, now everybody knows it. It is now beyond doubt that China has been cunningly and secretly preparing for a war against his peaceful neighbor-India. The world knows how bro therly, fai thfully and generously, India has been treating China even at the cost of some displeasure to others. How has China paid for all this generosi ty? China has paid for all this in form of a treacherous inva sion on the sacred soil of India-sacred from times immemorial . What a bogus propaganda this Peking radio carries on. Peking says it is India whi ch is attacking China; China is not attacking India. How decei tful this propaganda is, you must be knowing. China is now the common enemy of all those who stand for peace, progress and an honorable living. This evil must be nipped in the bud by the united actions of all those who are likely to be bitten by this stray dog. Can there be anything more heinous and decei tful than what the Chinese have done to India. Now what are these cease-fire conditions. Would any self-respecting country ever submi t to such humiliating and treacherous conditions. I know India would prefer to die than to submit to the rule and dictates of these bloody Chinese. Chinese are a nation of cheats and criminals. They have proved this by their heinous crimes toward hu mani ty. It is strange, Sir, that a man of your ability and understanding has uttered not a single word to condemn this unprovoked Chin ese invasion and i t i s further very surprising tha t yo u have u t t ered
} 33
1 34
UN A RMED VIC TORY
not a si ngle word of sympathy for India who is a victim of this aggression. I feel you must be mis informed about the true facts of the case or perhaps great is the philosophy of great persons which a common man fails to understand. If I be wrong to infer like this, I shall be too pleased to know it.
I have received only a few letters from India deploring the border fighting and discussing what can be done to avoid war. And very few of these letters have come from those who have been upholding the doctrines of non violence, who had professed themselves folln\vers of Gandhi, and who have been adjuring others to ,vork for peace as they themselves were working. One of my Indian correspondents, a science professor, has for many months -over a year-been warning me of the fierce nationalism being fostered amongst Gandhians. In November he wrote: World events having been moving with electric speed and the manner in whi ch Gandhi 's disciples have been acquitting themselves in various prob lematic situations, like the "liberation" of Goa and settlement of the border dispute with China, must have given you a clearer picture of Gandhi's con ception of "nonviolence. " So soon after their talks with you, these tru e "votaries" of the Mahatma have come out in their true colors! There is a reign of terror in India today and the voice of intellectuals is more effectively choked in this so-called free India than it ever was in the days of the British Raj ! The ·way i n nocent people are being exploited, intellec-
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135
tuals silenced and businessmen robbed in the name of war, often makes me question : "'Vhat worse will the Chinese do?" Could you not use your influence to drive Nehru in the direction of sanity? The reports of your moves, appearing in the hero-worshipping Indian press, have disappointed all lovers of peace and jus tice. I f I may be allowed to say so, they betray lack of proper-objective-understanding of the Sino Indian boundary dispute and the role of Nehru in this matter. If you were to contribute your mite toward the solution of this issue, you should have put i t to him plainly, what the true nonviolent Gandhian-method of tackling such problems was and whether h is actions were in consonance with his proclaimed ideals. Putting such persons in the wrong and exposing glaring contradictions in their professions and practices would be greatest service to the ends of peace and justice in the world. I t is averred in some quarters that Communist China has tarnished Social ism. But has Gandhian India glorified the Mahatma? Even now ·when China has declared cease-fire, the disciples of the l\I ahatma are accentuating ·war hysteria just to retrieYe their prestige lost during their recent reverse, o,ving largely to their o,vn lack of vision and practical wisdom.
The writer of this letter has since been arrested under the recent " Defense of India Ordinance" for resisting India's war effort, but his case is being reconsidered on the basis of his solemn assurance that he ,vil l not offer any further criticism of the government's policies.
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I think it more than probable that, if I had as many Chinese correspondents as Indians, I should receive let ters just the converse of those above. In India, and I suspect China, nationalism has been used and played upon and encouraged to such an extent that it is quite out of hand. In an earlier letter than that of December 20, Mr. Nehru had spoken of the necessity of keeping up nationalistic feeling in order to put through the re forms needed to build up India to subsistence level, certainly to prosperity. If this feeling entailed warlike attitudes, it was deplorable but possibly necessary. I find it difficult to believe that nationalistic feeling cannot be focused directly upon the internal prosperity of a coun try without encouraging ,varlike pride, though, admit tedly, such encouragement has been the traditional rnethod used by governments in the past. It is to me, who have never been sympathetic to Communism, an ironic and distressing thought that only Yugoslavia, and possibly, very recently, Russia-both Communist coun tries-have eschewed the use of such encouragement, but, as far as I know, no Western country has done so. Both the governments and the press of Western countries have during the recent crises concentrated upon whip ping up warlike enthusiasm and hatred. As regards the Sino-Indian crisis, one must hope that, as the result of further reflection, some boundary line ,vill be agreed upon by both parties so that negotiations can take place. Can either the Indian or the Chinese government seriously maintain that disagreement on this point is ,vorth a great ,var? Already, India has ceased, in fact, though not in form, to be neutral as bet,veen East and ,vest, and has, thereby, increased the chance of ,vorld ,var . She has ob-
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13 7
tained arms from both the British and the U. S. govern ments, and collected large sums of money from the peo ple of the West for her defense. Why, one wonders, is it less wicked for India to obtain arms from the West than for Cuba to obtain arms from the East? The "bal ance of power, " which was so much discussed during and after the Cuban crisis, is surely changed by India's new status. Moreover, it cannot be wholly pleasant for Communist po,vers to have India turn entirely to the West in spite of the fact that Russia has been friendly to her. But perhaps the worst blow to the peace of the world is the fact that her defection from strict nonalign ment weakens the bloc of neutral powers and their po tential weight as arbitrators, especially since India was more politically mature than most of the others and has been regarded as a leader in all matters where neutrality might be helpful. l\;f eanwhile, the only obstacle to peaceful negotiations is the difference between India and China as to the temporary provisional line of separation between their rival forces while agreement is sought as to a permanent frontier. What will happen if no agreement is reached on this question of a temporary line? Fighting will be resumed, and at first the Chinese will have the advantage. America and Britain will come to the aid of India, but will find that they cannot defeat China unless they employ nuclear weapons. They ,vill employ them. China will compose its differences ,vith Russia, and Russia also ,vill employ nuclear weapons, not only against India, but also against the West. Within a few days, the whole world ,vill become as empty and desolate as the Himalayan passes are now. Is this what you want?
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It now seems as if Mrs. Bandaranaike had succeeded in her mission to China and might be successful also on that to India. On January 7, the Chinese gave "a posi tive response" to the proposals of the Colombo confer ence of Afro-Asian nations for solving her border dispute with India. The communique issued jointly by Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Ceylonese Prime Minister, and Mr. Chou En-lai said that the Peking talks last week took place in a cordial, friendly atmosphere which they felt would be helpful to negotiations. It quoted Mrs. Ban daranaike as believing that China's unilateral move in ceasing fire and withdrawing her troops from the Sino Indian battle zones "indicated China's sincerity" for peaceful settlement. 1\1r. Chou in turn paid tribute to the efforts of the six nations represented at the Colombo conference, the communique said, adding: The Chinese government gave a positive response to the proposals of the Colombo con£erence . . . (Guardian, 1 / 8 /63). As yet ( 1 / 10/ 63), the Colombo proposals have not been made public, but, according to the Guardian's corre spondent at New Delhi, "under the Colombo formula the substance of the Indian condi tions for talks is con ceded in the Ladakh sector. But India's insistence on a Chinese withdrawal to the positions of actual control on September 8, 1962, has not been accepted. The line pro posed by the mediators requires the Chinese to go back even farther beyond the September 8 positions in sev eral parts, though in some areas the line is forward of those positions. It is, ho,vever, in the determination of the demilitarized area that India stands to gain. Contrary
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1 39
to the Chinese demand that both sides withdraw to a depth of 20 kilometers, the Colombo solution requires only a Chinese withdrawal of 20 kilometers. In addition both sides are permitted to post civilian pickets in the demilitarized zone. This would retain for India the sym bol of sovereignty but not through military pickets" (Guardian, I /8 / 63). The Guardian, also, made the in teresting report that the communique said that A solution should be in the spirit of the Bandung conference of Afro-Asian nations, which favored peace£ ul coexistence.
If the Chinese accept this, it is very hopeful indeed. The Daily Worker reports on January 9 that Mrs. Ban daranaike was proceeding on her mission to India with " 'hope and confidence. ' " In its report of January 1 2, the Guardian states that "in their compromise formula the six nonaligned nations at Colombo . . . allowed Indian positions even beyond the September 8, 1962 line in most areas but agreed to a Chinese advance in some places behind that line. A no man's land of 20 km. ,vas demarcated by suggesting a unilateral Chinese withdrawal behind the proposed new line. Both India and China were to have civilian ob servers in the no man's land. While this formula does not fully meet India's requirements it concedes the sub stance of the Indian demand. Having accepted the Co lombo proposals the Chinese have placed the responsi bility for rejection on India. " But, as the Guardian remarks, "it is not going to be easy for India to accept. " Mr. Nehru is caught bet,veen his repeated insistence upon the line of September 8, 1962, and the excited
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nationalism of his people, and the probable reactions of the world if he refuses. On the other hand, "talk about the 'war effort' continues in conditions ,vhich conform to an unstable peace but not to war" and negotiations ,vith the Chinese will probably prejudice the willingness, as the Guardian points out, of the West to provide mili tary aid to India. The report ends : "As if to create fur ther doubts in the minds of the Indian people, Mr. Chou En-lai has now sent to Mr. Nehru verbal greetings for the ne,,v year with the Indian Charge d' Affaires who arrived from Peking last night"-on January 9, that is. Mr. Chou En-lai can evidently do nothing straightfor wardly, according to the Guardian. The formal discus sions between the Indian government and Mrs. Ban daranaike are to begin on January 1 2.
4 LE S S ONS
OF
'l, H E
C RISE S
TW O
VARious THINGS may be learned from the course of the two crises, one in Cuba and the other in the H ima layas. One of the things shown by the Cuba crisis was how easy it is for unintended war to result from the practice of brinkmanship. It seems highly probable that Khrush chev never int.ended an actual clash between his ships and the blockading force of the U. S. But in the hours before he ordered his ships to withdraw, all sorts of accidents might have caused the clash that he aimed at preventing. There might, for meteorological reasons, have been an interruption in communications of Rus sians with Moscow. There might, on either side, have been an accidental explosion which would have been attributed to enemy action as in the case of the J\Jain e 141
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in 1 8 98. There might have been, on either side, an over zealous captain who exceeded orders. There might have been, on either side, an outbreak of bellicose feeling so vio�ent that the government concerned would have been unable to control it. Fortunately, none of these things happened, but the risk was undeniable. So long as the practice of brinkmanship continues, the risk also will continue, and, during a brinkmanship contest, nobody in any part of the world can be confident of existing a week hence. This risk will persist until there is nuclear disarma ment. It is now twenty-one years since Pearl Harbor. The world survived Pearl Harbor, though at a terrible cost, but, if nuclear weapons had existed at that time, it would probably not have �urvived. And who c� n say that a Pearl Harbor is no longer possible? The H imalayan dispute has made very evident the danger that a local war may becom� general. India has appealed to Britain and the U.S. for arms and has thus ceased, in effect, �o be an uncommitted po,ver. It is as yet impossible to guess whether Britain and the U. S . ,vill be willing actually to fight against China, but it is ·certainly possible that this may occur. If it does, it becom_es proba ble that China will compose its disagreements with Russia. In which case; th� ,var ,vill becon1e World War I II . This sort of danger is involved in any local dispute, although it is such that those ,vho cause it to be- realized, even if they may bring destruction to others, are pretty sure to bring it to themselves also. If the West goes to the assistance of Ind ia, one of the consequences may well be the co1nplete extinction of the whole Indian population. N uclear ,veapons, in fact, are not a strength, but a
..
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weakness, to . those who employ them. Since they are bound to lead to retaliation, they entail upon nations using them a greater disaster than complete submission namely, annihilation. One of the almost inevitable consequences of any war is that governments are tempted _ to whip up warlike feeling. This happened in the U.S. over Cuba and in India over the disputed frontier. When populations have ·been worked up to a pitch of bellicose excitement, it becomes very difficult for governments to restrain them.- This has happened most notably in India. The gq_ver�men t misled the-population by concealing the fact that the Chinese had a legal case which, on the face of it, ,vas as strong as the Indian case, and that what was needed ,vas negotiation su pplemented by arbitration if necessary. . China was willing to ad_o pt this course, but India was not, because the . Indian government had per suaded Indian public opinion t�at the Chinese had no case. In America, · the same sort of thing happened, and was only defeated by Khrushchev's very dramatic uni lateral �ithdrawal. In both countries, irresponsible jour nalists joined with �v·ernment, or even went beyond it, in in_flam'ing- hatred of the enemy anq. urging that any negotiation was a fo �m of cowardice. One can hardly suppose that the journalists concerned wanted a ,var which would haye ruined them along with everyone else. Apparently, they relied u pon their government to avoid war. They were prepared to increase their circulations by extreme attitudes, although this made it difficult for their governments to avoid a general war. Ne,vspaper and industrial magnates, alike, must be a,vare that divi dends are no use to corpses, but they are willing to in-
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crease the risk by an irresponsible advocacy of mass mur der. There is a widespread feeling in India-and elsewhere -that "honor" demands the continuation of the war until India has military successes even though such suc cesses are only possible with the help of Britain and America. The conception of "honor" involved is a very curious one. It seems to be implied that there is nothing honorable in seeking peace, but only in the merciless massacre of foreigners. This point of view is old and traditional. It is stated in a manner very relevant to the Sino-Indian dispute in Ham let ., Act IV, scene 4. Hamlet finds an expedition sent by Norway against Poland. . . . to ga in a little pa tch of gro und
Tha t ha th in it n o profi t b u t the na me. To pay five duca ts, five, I wo u ld n o t farm it; Nor will it y ield to Norway or the Pole A ran ker ra te, shou ld it be sold in fee. Hamlet replies : Why, then the Polack never will defend it. He is told : Yes, 'tis already ga rrison ' d. Hamlet concludes that it is quite right to make war for what he calls "this straw." He says: R igh tly to b e grea t Is n o t to stir with ou t great argu men t, B u t grea tly to fi n d q uarrel in a straw Wh en h onour's a t th e sta ke.
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He concludes:
. . . from this time forth,
My though ts be b loody, or be n othing worth!
The result was not wholly satisfactory. It is sad to find this conception of "honor" endorsed by a disciple of Gandhi. The Cuban crisis brought out very clearly the total impossibility of consultation among the Western Powers when instant action is necessary. The British, obsessed by the memory of their former supremacy, have shown themselves incapable of grasping the fact that, in a crisis, Western decisions must be made by America without waiting for the slow process of consulting allies. This has been obvious to the American authorities for a con siderable time. The British grumbled that they were not consulted about Cuba. But this was unreasonable on the part of the British authorities owing to the necessity for instant action. It ,vas not unreasonable on the part of the public, since the British government had over and over again deceitfully assured the public that there would be consultation. But the anger of the British pub lic should have been directed against its o,vn govern ment, not against the U.S. In fact, there are no,v only t,vo independent powers, namely, the U.S. and the U.S.S. R. A decision whether their allies are to live or die rests with these two. This is humiliating to Britain, France and Western Germany, but, so long as they refuse to recognize it, their policies are nothing but make-believe. This is bound to be the case in any s,vift crisis as it ,vas in the case of Cuba. It is doubtful ,vhether any country ,vill survive a nuclear ,var, but it is obvious, except to
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blind patriots, that neutral nations will have a better chance of surviving than will the allies of the U.S. or the U.S. S. R. The American bases in various European countries are a provocation to Russia, and make it cer tain that the countries concerned will be attacked by Russia in the event of war between Russia and America. All the countries which have allowed American bases on their territory have increased their danger without a� preciably adding to the military strength of the \Vest. This is recognized by orthodox American ,vriters such as Kahn and Fryklund, but in Europe it is not yet under stood. When the imminence of war over Cuba first dimin ished, there was hope, which was expressed in America as well as elsewhere, that other causes of conflict might prove possible to be solved by negotiation. Unfortu nately, this hope is not so strong as it was in the first months of detente . But it is not yet ,vholly extinct. It was a natural consequence of the general relief that was felt when it was found that war ,vas not going to occur on this occasion. What caused it to fade in America was the silly outcry that Russia had acted deceitfully about nuclear installations in Cuba. This gave warmongers the chance to say that negotiation with Russia is futile since Russia cannot be trusted. This cry ,vas taken up ,vith enthusiasm by the British press. A first leader in the Guardian of December 2 7 labors ,vith the Russians, who do not seem to understand, it thinks, that, if they remain as deceitful as they obviously are, it is impossible for the West to trust them and, naturally, negotiations can not be carried on ,vhen one side mistrusts the other. The Gu ardian does not labor with the '\Vest to be less deceitful. Indeed, there is not the faintest suggestion in
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the leader that there is any reason for the Russians to mistrust the West. 1 It wou ld be considerably more help ful to the world if the Guardian were to discuss the neces sity for both East and West to give u p their suspicions in fact, to eschew the provocation of mistrust-so that negotiations may be carried on withou t constant recrimi nations and with the necessary sincerity. At present, one must rest upon the hope that peaceable pronouncemen ts from the Communist side will have a good effec t. Khrush chev has hinted that he is willing to make concessions abou t Berlin. What is more surprising is that Ulbricht in the name of East Germany has spoken with an en tirely new mildness. Given a little response from the West, there is more hope than there ever was before tha t the Berlin problem may be satisfactorily solved. If so, the frigh t caused by the Cuban crisis will have done some good. Both crises have afforded examples of unilateral action by one of the parties to the contest. The u nilateral action by Russia prevented the outbreak of a world war which would otherwise have been almost certain . The uni lateral cease-fire and wi thdrawal by the Chinese gave an opportunity to India to arrange a b ilateral cease-fire and a peace by negotiation . But whe ther India will take the opportunity is still doubtful. In both cases the reaction of the other side was not quite wha t might have been expected . The Americans qu ite falsely attribu ted Khrushchev's action to cowardice and many of them fel t The leader dep lores b i t terly the most recen t Russian h igh a l t i tude and a tmospheric n uclear tes ts, but does not men tion the fac t th a t the U .S . has been making h igh a l t i t ude tests and a tmospheric tests during the same per iod- though with somewh a t l ess success. 1
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the kind of annoyed frustration that a cricket fan ,vould feel if the Australians suddenly refused to play a sched uled test match. This was a frivolous point of view, but a very common one. In India the reaction was more solemn. During the period ,vhen the Chinese were vic toriously advancing, Indians had sudqenly a,vakened from Gandhian dreams and had indulged in a very in tensive war propaganda. Just as people had · begun to get excited, the Chinese went and ,vithdre,v to the in dignation of the ,varmongers, . ,vho said: -� ' How can they do this to us! We hoped by our propaganda to reverse the fortunes of ,var and ,vin victories ,vhich ,v�uld giYe a luster to our arms outweighing that ,vhich the Chinese had already ,van. , Ho,v can they so humiliate us! " The withdra,val ,vas regarded as a trick by the notoric;>usly wily Chinese to de�eat the Indian efforts for the con struction of a vast, po,verful, military machine. The Chinese ,vithdra,val could not, like Khrushchev's, be plausibly attributed · to fear, since the Chinese armies were in full _flush of victory, but, since it annoyed the Indian ,varmongers, Indian opinion thought that it must have some devious. sinister motive. Nevertheless, it still seems more likely than not that the Chinese uni lateral action ,vill have prevented border conflict from developing into a great ,var. 2 Many people have been surprised to find that in our highly organized ,vorld there is still room for individual initiative. It is easier for a great po,ver to concede some thing to an unarmed individual than to a hostile pu,,·er Cf. a report from �ew Delhi en t i t led " The �ightmare of India" in Peace Sews, December 28, 1 962 , for an excellent expos i t ion of the turmoil of mixed feelings created in India by China·s un ilateral ac t ion. 2
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breathing destruction. Khrushchev's pride might have made it difficult for him to concede anything directly to the U. S. government, ,vhereas concessions to an indi viq.ual ,vhose sole concern was the desire for peace pre sented less difficulty in the futile contest of pride and prestige. Individuals have a further advantage: they can act quickly, without waiting to consult colleagues. When the next fe,v h9urs ,vere l�kely to be decisive, this was an important reason for the emphatic expression of in dividual opinion. It is, perhaps, not too much to hope that the two re cent crises will have had some influence in the \Vest in discrediting the belief that all Communists are wicked . � and all anti-Communists are- virtuous. It seems that the converse of this belief is already largely discredited in Russia, which ha; come to desire peace above everything. I fear that it is not yet discredited in China, but there is good reason to think that China ,vill, before long, go through the same development as has taken place in Rus�ia. We must hope that in the West, also, there ,vill be an increasing number of people ,vho have ceased to believe that it is worth destroying human life because the other side is "wicked. " The division of whole popula tions into "good" and "bad" is a childish habit fostered by fai ry tales. We are all of us a mixture of good and bad, and there is not a preponderance of good on the side of those lvho are filled ,vith self-righteousness. Little Jack ·H orner pulled out a plum and said, "'\Vhat a good boy am I, ' ' but the world did not agree ,vith him, nor ,vi11 it agree ,vith those nations ,vhich have pulled ou t a plum while boasting of their o,vn virtue. \Ve are all human beings ,vith very si 1nilar needs and desires. En mity is folly, since nine-tenths of the interests of rival
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nations are identical. All can be happier if they forget their quarrels. Perhaps future crises, such as the two with which we have been concerned, may lead the Great Powers to grasp this very simple truth . I will end this book with a few general reflections. The world has survived the Cuban crisis and it seems probable that it will survive the Sino-Indian conflict, but, unless policies are radically changed, some conflict, sooner or later, is pretty certain to end in disaster. Gov ernments know this. Populations know it if they choose, but generally manage to turn their thoughts aside from such an unpleasant subject. It seems odd that neither in governments nor in populations is there sufficient love of life to cause a revulsion against policies leading to universal death. There are, in fact, things that people love more than life. Epaminondas and Wolfe, mortally wounded, learned that they had been victorious and ex claimed with their last breath, "I die happy. " This stereo type governs people's thoughts in international conflicts. Willingness to die for a cause has been generally ad mired and, in the past, in the main, rightly. But, in the contests that are now likely, no one's death ,vill serve any purpose. No cause that anybody can value will be fur thered by anybody's death. Nevertheless, old ,vays of thinking and feeling linger on. Those \\rho th ink that it would be rather a pity if the human race destroyed itself are supposed by many to be only actuated by fear of their own death. This curious distortion is due to emotions which are primitive and deeply instinctive, especially pride and hate. The danger presented by nuclear ,veapons is not thought of as a general danger to mankind, but as a danger to our o,vn group, caused by the ,vickedness of the other. Fear of
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enemy bombs is rational, but so is fear of our o,vn bombs since they cannot be employed ,vithout producing re taliation. Unfortunately, the fear generated by the exist ence of nuclear ,veapons is directed only against the "enemy. " The fear causes hate, the belief that the other side is ,vholly ,vicked and our o,vn side ,vholly good. These reactions, ,vhich are caused by the danger, im n1easurably increase it. This is a common resul t of irra tionality due to fear. Fire in a theater causes panic in which people in the doorways crush each other to death although all could be saved by an orderly exit. So long as the attitude of rivalry between different groups per sists, motives of pride and prestige make agreement al n1ost impossible. If people could learn to view nuclear war as a common danger to our species, and not as a danger due solely to the wickedness of the opposing group, it ,vould be possible to negotiate agreements which ,vould put an end to the common danger. This demands a renunciation, or at least restraint, of passions which, though they have ahvays been harmful, have only in recent years threatened utter and total disaster. Among such passions, perhaps the most important is nationalism, especially that of the most po,verful coun tries. I do not mean to suggest that nationalism is ""holly evil. It has t\\1 0 sides: love of one's o,vn country, and hatred of other countries. One is good ; the other is bad. Nationalism is a force ,vhich has been steadily increasing ever since the end of the Middle Ages. \Vhile it led to the liberation of oppressed countries, it deserved sup port, but, when it passes beyond that to the domination of the strong, it becomes an evil ,vhich, in our present world, is likely to ruin the strong as ,vell as everyone else. If astronomers discovered a large comet l i kely to
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collide with the earth and destroy a large part of human life, there would be a combined effort to deal ,vith the peril. It is this way that the nuclear danger ought to be viewed-not as a reason for hating this nation or that, but as a reason for common effort against the general peril. I do not know whether mankind is capable of such a departure from ancient ways of feeling and thinking, but, if it is not, there is little hope for our misguided species. It is scarcely likely that mankind can successfully sur vive a whole series of such crises as those that have taken place in I 962. They cause continually increasing nervous tension and, sooner or later, it will come to be felt that an explosion would be less trying than continual appre hension. If nuclear ,var is to be avoided ,vith any degree of permanence, there will have to be changes both in popular feeling and in institutions. It is likely that these changes will only be brought about gradually if at all. I incline to think that the first and least difficult step will be an ackno,vledgement by governments that nuclear war cannot achieve anything that anybody would desire. I should like to see the U. S. and the U.S. S. R. issue a joint statement to this effect, pointing out that they have one supreme common interest, namely, survival, and that both will sacrifice this common interest if there is a war. Acts, as ,veil as ,vords, sho,,v that Russia is ap proaching this point of vie\v. America, as yet, is not, and no more is China. The Americans apparently trust to induction by simple enumeration: America has won every war hitherto and therefore ,vill win every future war. China trusts the sacred texts of orthodox l\tfarxism. But it is not irrational to hope that both these great
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powers may come to acknowledge the futility of nuclear war. If this could be achieved, their governments, along with that of the U. S. S. R., could agree to j oint propa ganda and could, within a very short time, persuade the great majority of public opinion in their several coun tries. If this had been achieved, it would become very much easier than it is at present to secure the general abolition of nuclear weapons. This would not, of itself, prevent nuclear war, since, if war broke out, each side could at once proceed to manufacture the prohibited ,veapons , but it would put an end to the day-by-day terror ,vhich results from the knowledge that at any moment, if they choose, our "enemies" can exterminate us. The state of terror produced by this knowledge is the chief obstacl e to rational negotiation. It would, also, put an end to the very real danger of nuclear accidents. The next step should be an agreement by all states, initiated by the most powerful among them, that all disputes should be subrnitted to the arbitration of dis interested parties. Gradually, the arbitrating bodies, which such a policy would produce, ,vould acquire such moral authority that it would be very difficult for any government to flout the decisions of arbitrators. By such measures, war might come to be felt obsolete, and there might be readiness for more fundamental n1ethods of avoiding it. The only ultimate and secure means of preventing wars employing methods of mass destruction is ,vorld government. There are exactly the same reasons for world government as there are for the internal govern ments of separate states. For the prevention of private
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murder there is an elaborate machinery of police and criminal law. For the prevention of murder of one coun try by another, there is no such provision. If a world possessing scientific technique is to have any security of continued existence, there must be law in international relations and not only between private citizens of one state. And if international law is to have any reality, it must be backed by international force, j ust as national law is backed by a national police. The first and most difficult measure required for an effective world govern ment is that it should possess armed forces obviously and indubitably capable of defeating any state or combina tion of states that might attempt to resist its authority. The world government, therefore, ,vill have to have a monopoly of all the major weapons of war. The armed forces of the world government will have to be carefully constructed so as to avoid the possibility of groups forming within the armed forces who are wedded to this or that nation or ideology. This means that every fairly large group in the international armed forces would have to be composed of individuals from many different nations and of many different races. Only if this is done, will it be possible to prevent the growth of contingents not loyal to the purpose of the interna tional government. The international government should possess the raw materials necessary for weapons of mass destruction. This would prevent the possibility of the surreptitious pro duction of such weapons by some rebellious state or group of states. There should be international criminal law and inter national criminal courts. No treaty between states should be valid unless rati-
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fied by the international legislature, which should have power to abrogate or modify any treaty between states which it considered to constitute a danger of war. Broadly speaking, the powers of the international gov ernment should be only such as are required for the prevention of war. In all other respects, constituent states should retain their autonomy. The measures outlined above are, in part, difficult of acceptance and sure to meet with vehement opposition. Perhaps further experience of crises may make them acceptable, but perhaps our species will prefer to perish. A choice is before us. I do not venture to prophesy how· we shall choose.