Turning Points: The Eastern Front in 1915 1440844534, 9781440844539

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Turning Points

Turning Points The Eastern Front in 1915 Richard L. DiNardo

Copyright © 2020 by Richard L. DiNardo All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: DiNardo, R. L., author. Title: Turning points : the Eastern Front in 1915 / Richard L. DiNardo. Other titles: Eastern Front in 1915 Description: Santa Barbara, California : ABC-CLIO [2020] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019041762 (print) | LCCN 2019041763 (ebook) | ISBN 9781440844539 (print) | ISBN 9781440844546 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: World War, 1914-1918—Campaigns—Eastern Front. | BISAC: HISTORY / Military / World War I Classification: LCC D551 .D56 2020 (print) | LCC D551 (ebook) | DDC 940.4/25—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019041762 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019041763 ISBN:

978-1-4408-4453-9 (print) 978-1-4408-4454-6 (ebook)

24 ​23 ​22 ​21 ​20  1 ​2 ​3 ​4 ​5 This book is also available as an eBook. Praeger An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 147 Castilian Drive Santa Barbara, California 93117 www.abc-clio.com This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

For Dennis Showalter, an inspiration to us all.

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction

xi

Maps

xv

Chapter 1

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

1

Strategists, Strategy, Operations, and Coalition Warfare

27

Chapter 3

Equipping the Man and Manning the Equipment

39

Chapter 4

Bloody Winter: January–February 1915

51

Chapter 5

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

69

Chapter 6

Spring Reversal: May–June 1915

89

Chapter 7

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

107

Chapter 8

Action on the Flanks: September–October 1915

133

Chapter 9

Aftermath and Assessments

147

Chapter 2

Notes

161

Bibliography

233

Index

247 A photo essay follows page 132. 

Acknowledgments

Writing a book is a peculiar sort of endeavor. Putting words to paper is usually done in solitude; collecting the research that underpins the work involves a great many people, as does the creation of the book itself. First, many thanks to Padraic (Pat) Carlin and the staff at ABC-CLIO. They have always been most supportive of the project and are excellent to work with. This is my third book with them on the subject of World War I, and you work with a publisher repeatedly only when the process is as easy as they can make it. Many thanks to my old friend Jack Tunstall, for generously providing documents from his extensive work in the Austrian archives in Vienna. Bruce Gudmundsson also provided material from his impressive collection of material on the army of the Kaiserreich. The staff at the Library of the Marine Corps at Quantico, Virginia, was most helpful in tracking down and obtaining works via interlibrary loan. The Marine Corps University Foundation provided generous financial support to facilitate several research trips to Germany. Finally, thanks go to the director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Colonel William McCollough, USMC, as well as the dean of academics, Dr. Doug McKenna, and his successor, Dr. Jonathan Phillips, for their support. Completing a manuscript and publishing it is a time-consuming activity, and the gentlemen mentioned above were always willing to allow me the flexibility in managing my time to bring the project to a successful conclusion, while also fulfilling my own obligations to the Command and Staff College. There are also a great many people to thank on the other side of the pond. The staff at the Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr (ZMSB) library at Potsdam were most helpful, especially in regard to their collection of German regimental histories, always a critical source for anyone writing on World War I. Dr. Martina Haggenmüller of the Bavarian Military Archives was very helpful in regard to obtaining material

xAcknowledgments

concerning some of the Bavarian units involved in the campaign. Finally, the staff of the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv was extraordinarily helpful in providing documents to me. Many thanks to the staffs of all three institutions for putting up with my not exactly fluent German. Anytime I go to Germany, I always have a great time, thanks to the hospitality of my friends, especially Annie Foerster, Klaus Maier, Detlef and Johanna Vogel, and Jürgen Förster. My friends have always been supportive of these endeavors, so I would like to thank Al, Jay, Pat, Sheila, Scott, Mary, Martin, Dan, Karl, and Karen. The personal and professional often mix. Cynthia Whittaker, a superb scholar of Russian history, was a teacher of mine and a dear friend for over forty years. Two other critical influences were the late William O. Shanahan and the late David Syrett, who was also my Doktorvater. There are many in the fraternity of military historians whose friendship and support I value. Most notable in this regard are Jim Corum and Rob Citino. Most important, however, is my friend of many years, the inimitable Dennis Showalter. Aside from being a prolific writer, Dennis has also been a great mentor. He could always be counted on to give a piece of writing a good sanity check and has always been supportive of so many of us. Since we all stand on his shoulders, this book is dedicated to him. I have the blessing of love and support of two families. My parents, Louis and Ann DiNardo, were always supportive of my choice of career, dubious though it may have seemed. Thanks also to my brothers, Robert and Jerry, and to their respective wives, JoAnn and Vinece. Thanks also to my nephew Michael; my nephew Thomas and his wife, Lisa; my niece, Ann Marie, and her husband, Brian Hardgrove; and the two newest additions to the family, Elani DiNardo and Cliff Hardgrove. The Moxley family of Baltimore, Maryland, has been a source of love and support, especially the Farmer family, David Farmer and Eileen Moxley Farmer and their daughters, Alison and Amanda. The most important Moxley is, of course, my wife, Rita, who is blessed with limitless amounts of love and patience. Although I have mentioned a great many people here, I alone am the author of this book and thus bear sole responsibility for any errors and omissions.

Introduction

Towards the end of March the German G.H.Q. arrived at the firm conviction that it would not be possible for the enemies in the West to force a decision in a measureable time, even if further portions of the formations in process of reconstruction on the Western front had to be used in the East to annihilate the offensive power of the Russians for all time. —Erich von Falkenhayn1 One of the greatest misconceptions of intellectuals, especially those of a Marxist orientation, is that history proceeds in particular direction toward a predetermined outcome. This notion, based on the regarding of history as a linear phenomenon, is both appealing and deceptive. The appeal of such an approach is that it helps the historian explain the course of rather complicated events. At the same time, however, such an approach serves to oversimplify. This is especially true when it comes to military history. It is far too easy, for example, to draw a direct line from Gettysburg to Robert E. Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, although some recent scholarship has challenged that notion.2 If there is one human activity that is nonlinear in nature, it is war. Indeed, this is one of the central themes of Carl von Clausewitz’s classic analytic work, On War. Certainly, one conflict that was most nonlinear in its conduct was the First World War. Embarked upon by the major European powers for reasons that ranged from coping with an existential threat (Austria-Hungary), to demonstrating ethnic solidarity (Russia), to an almost paranoid fear about encirclement (Germany), the participants had only the haziest notions as to what they wanted the world to look like after victory had been secured. All of the major powers entered the war with plans that called for a quick victory.3 By the end of 1914, all of the plans had miscarried. Thus as 1915 dawned, all of the belligerents were now faced with the prospect of fighting and winning a prolonged and bloody war. The year

xiiIntroduction

would certainly see a number of turns in the fortunes of the contending powers. Nowhere was this truer than on the eastern front. The year began with the Central Powers, most notably Austria-Hungary, teetering on the edge of disaster. By the end of the year, the situation had been completely reversed. All of Imperial Russian Poland had been occupied, along with a large part of the Russian Empire’s Baltic provinces. South of the Pripet Marshes, by the end of 1915 the Austro-Hungarians had recovered almost all of the territory lost in the war’s opening campaigns. At the same time, while they were flush with the thrill of victory, the tremendous gains of 1915 raised issues that would produce sharp conflict between Germany and Austria-Hungary, particularly over the issues of further strategic direction of the war and war aims. Such conflicts were exacerbated by personality clashes among the men directing the German and Austro-Hungarian high commands, as well as dissension within the highest echelons of the German military establishment. With regard to military operations, the eastern front in 1915 was marked by a number of interesting facets, especially from the perspective of the Central Powers. First, the northern end of the front was the Baltic coast, one of the few places where there was a realistic possibility for cooperation between the German army and the German navy. In the interests of full disclosure, however, it must be stated here that naval matters will not receive much attention in this book. The conduct of operations on the eastern front in 1915 also revealed the major differences between the German high command (Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL), headed by Erich von Falkenhayn and the top German headquarters in the east, Oberbefehlshaber Ost (Ober Ost), led by the duumvirate of Paul von Hindenburg and his ambitious chief of staff, Erich Ludendorff. Hindenburg and Ludendorff still believed in the notion enshrined in prewar German war planning that a successful offensive campaign could be concluded with a battle of annihilation, completely destroying the enemy force. After all, both the men, but Hindenburg in particular, had come to popular renown in Germany with their crushing victory that destroyed much of the Russian 2nd Army at Tannenberg in August of 1914. The twosome would spend much of 1915 trying to recreate the success of 1914 and arguing that it could be accomplished on a much vaster scale. Falkenhayn would take a much-different approach, based on attacks launched by large forces on relatively narrow fronts. Success would be based on overwhelming the defenses at specific points, creating gaps in the defensive lines that would allow for the resumption of mobile operations. The principal executors of this approach would be August von Mackensen and his much-better-known (at least to casual students of the period) chief of staff, Hans von Seeckt. The rise to prominence of this German military

Introduction

marriage must also be seen within the broader conflict between Falkenhayn at OHL and his enemies at Ober Ost. Also playing an important role in the events of 1915 on the eastern front was Austria-Hungary. Peering into the abyss in the late winter of 1915, by the end of the year, Austria-Hungary was still in a difficult situation, although less perilous than before. As usual, the focal point of Austro-Hungarian military efforts was the controversial chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, Franz Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf. Well aware of the increasing need for German aid, Conrad would spend the entire year seeking a victory that Austria-Hungary could claim as its own so that the dual monarchy could still assert a degree of independence from Germany within the Central Powers. Matters were made worse by the relationship between Conrad and Falkenhayn, which was fraught with all manner of difficulties even in the best of times. By the end of the year, the two men were barely on speaking terms, a circumstance that would have deleterious effects on the ability of the Central Powers to conduct the war. For Russia, the year 1915 was also a critical one. The Russian army began the year seemingly on the cusp of success, especially against hated AustriaHungary. Although the northwest front had sustained serious defeats at Tannenberg and First Masurian Lakes, Russian troops still stood on East Prussian soil. Influential figures at the Russian high command (Stavka) were still advocating for another invasion of Germany to the Russian commander-inchief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. By the end of the year, the Grand Duke, who had to bear the responsibility for defeat, was gone. Sent to the Turkish front in the Caucasus, the Grand Duke was replaced by Tsar Nicholas II, a decision that would have a critical impact on Russia internally. This study will seek to examine these campaigns, which represented the apex of mobile warfare in the period after the opening campaigns, when each side was trying to come to grips with a situation that, while not entirely unanticipated, was still very much uncharted territory. Success in 1915 on the eastern front was by no means assured for either side at the start. Triumph and failure depended upon the ability of each side to harness man power, technology, and tactics in ways that would break the deadlock and allow for the resumption of mobile warfare. We must begin with a brief recounting of the campaigns of 1914, to provide the proper background and context for the present study. Before embarking on that endeavor, however, several matters must be dealt with. The first concerns the geographic scope of this study. The area encompassed in this work begins at the Baltic coast and then runs south through the present-day Baltic States, Poland, and Ukraine, with the Black Sea as its southern terminus. Thus, the present work will not cover operations in the Caucasus between Russia and Turkey.4 Nor will this work cover the Serbian campaign

xiii

xivIntroduction

of 1915. Although the decision to mount the campaign had an effect on and was impacted by events on the eastern front, it was a separate operation. While certainly an interesting campaign, the invasion will not be covered here, although it has received some deserved attention recently.5 Another matter to be dealt with is the delineation of units. Since the movements and actions of armies from three countries are going to be described and analyzed, some departure from normal convention is in order to aid the reader in differentiation. German and Austro-Hungarian field armies, such as the German Eleventh Army or Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, will be rendered in this manner. Russian field armies will be described with Arabic numerals, as in the Russian 11th Army. Corps for both sides will be described with Roman numerals, plus any other geographic or military descriptors. Thus, one will see units described as German XXXXI Reserve Corps or the Russian II Siberian Corps. Divisions and Regiments will be described using Arabic numerals throughout. The names of German and Austro-Hungarian officers will be rendered in German fashion. Thus, the name of the German emperor will be rendered as Wilhelm II, not William II. Likewise, the name of the Austro-Hungarian commander-in-chief will be rendered as Archduke Friedrich, not Frederick. German and Austro-Hungarian general officer ranks will be rendered in the original German terms. Thus, for example, the chief of staff for the German Eleventh Army will be rendered as Generalmajor Hans von Seeckt, not Major General Hans von Seeckt. On the last page of this book there will be a table of German and Austro-Hungarian general officer ranks and their American and Russian equivalents. Likewise, Russian names will be rendered in the Russian fashion. Thus, the Russian commander-in-chief is Grand Duke Nikolai, not Grand Duke Nicholas. Finally, as is inevitable with any work on this area of the world during this time, one must deal with the issue of place names. The most notable example of this is the capital city of Austrian Galicia, which can be rendered as Lemberg (Austrian), Lviv (Ukrainian), Lvov (Russian) or Łwow (Polish). Further north, one can use either Posen (German) or Poznan (Polish), and the list is endless. For the purposes of this work, the place names used will be those used in 1915. This will serve to keep it simple and make the work more accessible to a broader audience. Now that the necessary administrative details have been dispensed with, we can embark on our study. That will begin with a brief discussion of the prewar plans of the combatants and the results that followed their being put into action.

Mackensen’s advance on Przemysl, May 1915. (Germany, Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. 14 Vols. Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1925–1944.)

Mackensen’s advance on Lemberg, June 1915. (Germany, Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. 14 Vols. Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1925–1944.)

The Siege of Novogeorgievsk, August 1915. (Germany, Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. 14 Vols. Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1925–1944.)

The Advance on Brest Litovsk, summer 1915. (Germany, Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. 14 Vols. Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1925–1944.)

Conrad’s “Black-Yellow” Offensive, summer 1915. (Germany, Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. 14 Vols. Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1925–1944.)

The attempt to encircle the Russian west front, September 1915. (Germany, Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. 14 Vols. Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1925–1944.)

CHAPTER ONE

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

In my opinion, the whole European War depends on the outcome of the struggle between Germany and France, and so the fate of Austria will not be decided ultimately on the Bug, but on the Seine. —Generaloberst Helmuth von Moltke, February 10, 19131 Hopefully we will return victorious after November. —General der Infanterie Viktor Freiherr von Dankl2 In the coming days, I foresee the start of a new and probably prolonged period of battles in the left bank of the Vistula against large German and Austrian forces, the outcome of which will be of decisive importance. —Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, October 1, 19143 I am only afraid that the Austrians are done for. —Max Hoffmann, November 22, 19144 The prospect of war between the three empires that occupied central and eastern Europe after 1871 had been present for some time. Long-term antagonism between Russia and Austria-Hungary, dating from the Crimean War, could bring the two empires into conflict. Recognizing this, German

2

Turning Points

chancellor Otto von Bismarck sought to minimize this possibility by cobbling together Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia in the League of the Three Emperors.5 The league, however, came apart after a few years. Tension among the empires grew when Russia went to war against Turkey in support of Bulgarian independence. After Russia’s military victory in 1878, with the support of other European powers at the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck was able to impose on the Russians modifications to the Treaty of San Stefano. With anti-German feelings in Russia running high and the league in ruins, Bismarck went to his next best option: signing a long-term alliance with AustriaHungary on October 7, 1879.6 The creation of the dual alliance with Austria-Hungary raised the possibility of joint war planning. Although Germany now had a political alliance with Austria-Hungary, it was not accompanied by a formal military convention. In September 1882, the chief of the German General Staff, Generalfeldmarschall Helmuth von Moltke, met the Austro-Hungarian chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Friedrich von Beck-Rzikowsky. Beck proposed just such an agreement, and Moltke, urged on by his then deputy Alfred von Waldersee, accepted the proposal. Before a written agreement could be drawn up, however, the project was scotched by Bismarck’s strenuous objections.7 Although he acceded to Bismarck on this occasion, Moltke also told Beck that his latitude in military planning did not depend on the Foreign Ministry. Moltke also rationalized that as long as the two allies kept each other informed about their respective plans, each army could conduct its own campaign.8 This loose relationship between the two general staffs continued through the 1880s, reinforced perhaps by diplomatic events. Bismarck sought to resurrect the League of Three Emperors, and negotiations were well advanced by 1881. Reinforced in urgency by the assassination of Tsar Alexander II on March 1, 1881, the Second League of Three Emperors was signed on June 18, 1881.9 Although the league was renewed in 1884, a resumption of tensions between Austria-Hungary and Russia over Bulgaria in 1885 resulted in the collapse of the arrangement the following year. With the idea of a multilateral arrangement including Russia now dead, Bismarck went to his only alternative: signing a secret bilateral agreement with Russia, the Reinsurance Treaty, in 1887.10 During Moltke and Beck’s era, Germany and Austria envisioned a simple war-planning concept in regard to Russia based on the shape of the existing borders. While the German army would stand on the defensive in the west against France, complimentary offensives would be launched from Germany and Austria-Hungary into the westward jutting salient of Russian Poland.11 The period 1888–1891 was a momentous one for German diplomacy and war planning. Wilhelm I died on March 9, 1888. His successor, Crown

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

Prince Friedrich, ascended to the throne as Emperor Friedrich III. Already stricken with throat cancer, Friedrich III died on June 15, 1888. The death of Friedrich III after only one hundred days on the throne meant that the German Empire was now in the hands of Wilhelm II, the twenty-nine-year-old son of Friedrich III. Differences in age and personality alone almost guaranteed that the new kaiser and the aging chancellor would have differences. Above all, Wilhelm II demanded loyalty, something that the aging and imperious Bismarck, who by now spent most of his time at his Friedrichsruh estate, would not give.12 Not surprisingly, the relationship between the two men soured quickly. Each man accurately characterized the other. Bismarck, already warned by Wilhelm I and Friedrich III, thought the new kaiser to be shallow, impulsive, and immature. Wilhelm II, for his part, lacked intellect but was capable at times of shrewd judgments about people. Wilhelm II regarded Bismarck, then in his midseventies, to be high-handed, arrogant, and inflexible.13 Ultimately, given Wilhelm’s position, there could be only one resolution to the problem. In a dispute over domestic policy, Wilhelm II dismissed Bismarck on March 16, 1890. With Bismarck now gone, the course of German foreign policy changed considerably, starting with the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty in the summer of 1890. Russian foreign policy, influenced by Pan-Slavist thinkers and diplomats, now moved almost inexorably toward an alliance with France, which was consummated in 1894.14 The prospect of Germany facing a twofront war was now a reality. While Germany was going through considerable changes in the directors of its foreign policy, similar changes were occurring in the military. Moltke, the military architect of the Kaiserreich, retired in 1888. His successor was Alfred von Waldersee, who, although an able military officer, was also given to political intrigue. An opponent of Bismarck, Waldersee welcomed Bismarck’s departure.15 Like Bismarck, however, Waldersee also ran afoul of the kaiser. Waldersee found Wilhelm II’s impulsiveness rather unsettling. Waldersee’s enemies within the government reinforced the principle of civilian control over the military; most notable of these enemies was the new chancellor, Leo von Caprivi, who agreed with that principle even though he was a former general. This was done through issuing subordinating military attachés to the Foreign Ministry instead of the General Staff. Wilhelm II ultimately decided in favor of the Foreign Ministry, a serious bureaucratic defeat for Waldersee. The final straw was Waldersee’s scathing critique of the kaiser’s performance in the autumn maneuvers of 1890. Wilhelm was never one to take criticism gracefully, and Waldersee was effectively demoted to command of a corps in January 1891.16 For the position of chief of the General Staff, Wilhelm appointed Alfred von Schlieffen, one of Waldersee’s deputies. Although Moltke, very late in his

3

4

Turning Points

tenure, developed a plan for more of the German army to deploy to the west against France, the general concept of his plan remained the same: to stand on the defensive in the west, while undertaking a limited offensive in the east. Waldersee continued this general apportionment, although he took a more offensive approach in both the east and the west.17 Schlieffen would take a much-different approach. However, the tendency for foreign policy and military planning to be conducted in relative isolation from each other remained unchanged. Schlieffen was also circumspect enough to avoid involving himself in political matters.18 Schlieffen was not only confronted with the distinct possibility of a twofront war but was also facing a much-improved and -expanded French army. By 1896, Schlieffen clearly regarded France as the most dangerous of Germany’s potential opponents. In addition, fearing the prospect of an openended campaign in the vast spaces of Russia, Schlieffen reoriented the focus of German war planning to the west.19 A detailed examination of Schlieffen’s concept of a quick-victory offensive against France is outside the scope of this study.20 From the standpoint of this study, the most important impact of Schlieffen’s appointment was on the relationship between the German and Austro-Hungarian general staffs. During Moltke’s tenure, communications with the Austro-Hungarian General Staff were fairly regular, conducted normally by correspondence, punctuated with the occasional personal meeting. This practice continued during Waldersee’s brief tenure as chief.21 Once Schlieffen took the reins and began to shift the focus of German war planning to the west, communications between the general staffs began to assume a more intermittent character. Beck’s first meeting with Schlieffen, at Moltke’s funeral in 1891, did not go well. Beck found Schlieffen to be laconic and not forthcoming at all. Thereafter, Schlieffen gave Beck no indication of the changes he was instituting to the German war plans, although it should be pointed out that Schlieffen was under no obligation to do this, given the absence of a military convention. By the end of Schlieffen’s term in office, the nature of communications between the two general staffs could best be described as merely obligatory, such as the exchange of holiday greetings.22 It seemed certain that relations would improve in 1906. In 1903, now in his seventies and in declining health, Schlieffen asked Wilhelm II to consider appointing a replacement. The search for Schlieffen’s successor produced some odd moments, including one candidate, Generalfeldmarschall Count Dietrich von Hülsen-Haeseler, dying in a rather embarrassing situation. Ultimately, the choice for chief of the General Staff fell to Generaloberst Helmuth von Moltke, a nephew of the victor of 1866 and 1870.23 The transition from Schlieffen to Moltke was matched by a similar process in Vienna. Although he had tried to modernize and expand the AustroHungarian army, Beck’s vision of the army as an institution was more

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

nineteenth century than twentieth. Beck had also run afoul of Francis Joseph’s heir, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who exerted powerful influence in military matters. After a poorly conducted maneuver in the fall of 1906, Francis Joseph, at the likely urging of Franz Ferdinand, dismissed Beck. The new chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was Generaloberst Franz Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf.24 To be sure, relations did improve, although given the circumstances at the end of 1905, the bar was set at a low level. Moltke and Conrad met personally in Berlin in May 1907. Thereafter they corresponded regularly, and Conrad attended the German army’s 1909 fall maneuvers at Bad Mergentheim.25 The improved relations still only went so far. Moltke was apparently ignorant of the difficulties that confronted the Austro-Hungarian army. For example, in 1913, Moltke, who shared many of the racial prejudices held by many at the court in Berlin including the kaiser, projected that the next war would be one of “Germandom versus Slavdom.” In response, Conrad was forced to point out that some 47 percent of the dual monarchy’s inhabitants were Slavic.26 Although by this time the main effort of the German war plan was focused on France, Moltke refused to provide any real detail to Conrad. For his part, Conrad continued to rely on a vague promise from Moltke in 1909 in regard to a German offensive on the Narew River in Russian Poland, even though Moltke clearly told Conrad in a February 10, 1913, letter that in the event of war, “the fate of Austria will not be decided on the Bug, but ultimately on the Seine.”27 The idea of sharing plans more fully took a major blow with the Redl affair. In 1900, the Russian intelligence service was able to catch wind of the homosexuality of Colonel Alfred Redl, an Austro-Hungarian staff officer who had occupied a number of critical billets, including as head of the Evidenzbüro, the army’s counterintelligence service. After ensnaring Redl in a planned seduction while on a trip to Kazan, the Russians confronted Redl with compromising photos. Although the Russian intelligence service in Poland, headed by Colonel Nikolai Batyushin, had the leverage of blackmail over Redl, the Russians also paid the normally impecunious officer considerable sums of money, thus enabling a rather lavish lifestyle.28 Redl apparently gave the Russians a tremendous amount of material, although at least one scholar has questioned this. Of particular interest to the Russians were the Austro-Hungarian mobilization and war plans that Redl provided. Austrian suspicions were aroused when the Russian press foolishly discussed Austrian plans. Ultimately, sheer mischance brought about Redl’s undoing. Redl received his payments in cash through the mail, sent by his Russian handlers from Germany. In April 1913, when one package that Redl had failed to claim in time was sent back to Germany, postal officials opened it and, finding a large amount of cash, alerted the German authorities. The Germans duly passed this on to the Evidenzbüro, which launched an investigation.29

5

6

Turning Points

On May 24, 1913, Redl picked up a payment at the post office and was tracked to the Hotel Klomser in Vienna. Once in his room, he was confronted by a group of officers, including the head of the Evidenzbüro, Colonel August Urbanski ´ von Ostyrmiecz, who presented Redl with the evidence against him and arrested him. Urbanski ´ informed Conrad of Redl’s arrest while he was dining at the Grand Hotel in Vienna. Conrad’s immediate reaction was to launch a cover-up and thus avoid the embarrassing spectacle of a public trial. He ordered that Redl be interrogated to find out the extent of his espionage and then be allowed to commit suicide. After questioning him, Redl’s one-time protégé Captain Max Ronge left a pistol with one round in the room. Redl took the hint and shot himself in the early morning hours of May 25, 1913.30 Conrad’s attempt at covering up the Redl affair blew up in his face almost immediately. The press got wind of the matter, and the exposure of the details of Redl’s private life made for lurid reading in the Viennese papers. Conrad sought to minimize the damage of the Redl affair in his explanations to Austrian foreign minister Leopold von Berchtold and to Moltke. Responding to an inquiry from Berchtold, Conrad assured him that while Redl’s activity had caused serious damage, it would not affect the outcome of a war, presumably one against Serbia. While Conrad had failed to keep the Redl scandal under wraps, he was more successful in concealing the scope of Redl’s activities from the Germans. To some degree, Conrad’s ignorance was of his own volition. The lone interrogation that Conrad had authorized had not yielded much information. Thus, the only thing Conrad could do was to assure Moltke that Redl could not have betrayed “the whole of their private correspondence.” Understandably, Moltke did not find this comforting. It did, however, give him all the more reason to withhold as much detail about the German war plan as possible from the Austro-Hungarians.31 The result was that when the war began, Germany and Austria-Hungary pursued what might be called “parallel warfare” instead of coalition warfare. Although the two powers were fighting the same set of enemies, each pursued its own war plan. Using Schlieffen’s concept with Moltke’s modifications, the Germans would make their main effort in the west against France. In the east, Generaloberst Max von Prittwitz and Gaffron’s German Eighth Army, consisting of the I, XVII, XX, and I Reserve Corps with the 1st Cavalry Division and various Landwehr and garrison units, had orders simply to defend East Prussia against an expected Russian offensive.32 Confronted with their own two-front war against Russia and Serbia, the Austro-Hungarians developed a complicated scheme that depended on good timing and equally good judgment. Since the most common scenario envisioned going to war against both Russia and Serbia, deploying forces would be allocated accordingly. Echelon A, consisting of twenty-eight infantry

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

divisions divided among the First, Third, and Fourth Armies, would be committed to the Russian border. Minimal Group Balkan, consisting of the Fifth and Sixth Armies (XIII, XV, and XVI Corps), would be deployed along the border with Serbia. Echelon B, the Second Army (IV, VII, VIII, and IX Corps), would go to either to Galicia, Serbia, or the Italian border, as circumstances required.33 Russian war planning was greatly impacted by a vicious factional squabble over long-term control of Russian military policy. One faction, headed by the controversial war minister Vladimir A. Sukhomlinov, was more inclined toward reform in the broadest sense. Sukhomlinov’s opponents were a coterie of officers who were close to Tsar Nicholas II’s cousin Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. While not the complete reactionaries that they have often been portrayed as, they took a very different approach to the matters of reform and military policy, particularly on the strategic issue of fortresses.34 The almost constant clash between the two factions soon extended into the matter of war planning. Russian planning revolved around the prospect of a war that Russia feared that it would have to fight and one that Russia preferred to fight. It was war against Germany that concerned the Russian military. These concerns were heighted in the period after the Russo-Japanese War, which left the Russian army in a very poor state. Indeed, the threat of German military action during the Bosnian Crisis in 1908 forced Russia to back away from the prospect of war against Austria-Hungary. At the Franco-Russian staff talks in 1911, the Russians admitted that an early offensive against Germany was not within the realm of possibility. The Russian government also made sure that the roads near the German border were poorly maintained, lest they facilitate a German advance into Russian Poland.35 After the post-1905 reforms, the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff was the agency most responsible for planning. Given that the organization responsible for planning was a relatively new creation, the process of war planning in Russia was not nearly as well developed as in Germany. Instead of detailed war plans, the Main Directorate of the General Staff produced numbered mobilization plans.36 By early 1914, the Russian mobilization plan was Mobilization Schedule 19. The mobilization schedules were further developed into two variants: A for Austria-Hungary and G for Germany. As Mobilization Schedule 19G was not complete in July 1914, 19A was the mobilization schedule adopted. It called for the deployment of thirty infantry and nine and one-half cavalry divisions against Germany, while some forty-six and one-half infantry and eighteen and one-half cavalry divisions would be sent to the Austro-Hungarian border.37 Once the initial period of mobilization was over, Russian war planning was hampered by a lack of focus and clashing factions within the General Staff and the War Ministry. Sukhomlinov and his chief assistant, General

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Turning Points

Yuri N. Danilov, argued for the earliest possible offensive against Germany. Since the majority of the German forces were expected to be committed to an offensive against France, both men believed that it was imperative that Russia do something to alleviate German pressure on Russia’s ally, in keeping with the stipulations of the Franco-Russian alliance. In addition, at least early on, given that the Russians would enjoy superiority in the size of forces, attacking the German forces in East Prussia at the start would give Russia its best prospect for success.38 The opposing faction, headed by General Mikhail V. Alekseev, chief of staff of the Kiev Military District and a former member of the General Staff, took a different view. He regarded the Balkans as Russia’s primary area of interest and thus gave higher priority to the defeat of Austria-Hungary. Alekseev argued further that a quick and decisive victory over Austria-Hungary would also force Germany to divert forces from the west. In addition, a rapid knockout of the dual monarchy would provide a powerful inducement for neutral countries in the Balkans to join the Entente against the presumably vulnerable Central Powers. Thus, by Alekseev’s thinking, the easiest route for Russia to Berlin was via Vienna.39 Given competing factions and ideas, plus the lack of a mechanism and a process for detailed planning beyond mobilization, it is perhaps not surprising that plans for actual operations fell between two stools. In response to the difficult operational terrain of East Prussia, Danilov’s concept required four field armies. The implementation of Alekseev’s idea likewise demanded the preponderance of Russia’s mobilized forces. On February 12, 1912, the chiefs of staff of Russia’s frontier military districts with General Staff planners held a conference but failed to arrive at any clear resolution of the question. Ultimately, the Russian army would try to execute both concepts with fewer forces.40 The process by which Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary went to war in 1914 lies beyond the scope of this work.41 In the actual event, all of the war plans miscarried to varying degrees and in different ways. The failure of the Schlieffen plan with Molke’s modifications is well known.42 The German war plan for the eastern front also failed, although in subtle ways. Prittwitz’s German Eighth Army got off to a rough start at Gumbinnen, although Prittwitz’s plans were deranged to some degree by the actions of the I Corps commander, the obstreperous Hermann von François.43 The resulting setback at Gumbinnen caused Prittwitz sufficient worry that he initially ordered the Eighth Army to retreat all the way to the Vistula River, effectively ceding much of East Prussia to the Russians. Although he reversed himself quickly, the initial decision conveyed to Moltke the impression that Prittwitz had lost control of both the situation and himself. Already in a difficult situation at Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) in the west, Moltke had to act, and he relieved both Prittwitz and the Eighth Army’s chief of staff,

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

Georg von Waldersee. The latter relief was somewhat embarrassing for Moltke; Waldersee had been Moltke’s deputy on the General Staff prior to the outbreak of war.44 To command the Eighth Army, Moltke put together one of the most famous military marriages in German military history. The Eighth Army’s new chief of staff was the hard-driving and ambitious Erich Ludendorff. Born on April 9, 1865, in Kruszevnia, a rural village near Posen in East Prussia, Ludendorff attended one of the lesser known Kadettenschulen at Plön.45 After enjoying a career marked by distinction, including attending the Kriegsakademie in 1890, and a number of staff appointments, Ludendorff was assigned to the General Staff in Berlin in 1904. This brought him into association with Moltke, who by that time was one of Schlieffen’s deputies.46 At the onset of war, Ludendorff, then with the staff of the German Second Army, distinguished himself at the siege of Liege. Leading several brigades in an infiltration attack that penetrated between the heavily manned forts, Ludendorff seized the lightly defended citadel in a coup de main, an action that earned him Germany’s highest award, the pour le mérite.47 With the perceived crisis in the east at hand and a new command team needed, Moltke thought Ludendorff was just the man to be the new chief of staff. Thus, on the evening of August 22, Ludendorff was summoned to OHL, then located at Koblenz. Arriving at six o’clock the next morning, Moltke briefed Ludendorff on his new mission and sent him off to pick up the new Eighth Army commander in Hanover while on route to East Prussia.48 The new commander of the Eighth Army was the recently retired Paul von Hindenburg.49 Born on October 2, 1847, in Posen, Hindenburg entered the Kadettenschule in Liegnitz in 1859. As a young officer, Hindenburg served in both the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars. After graduating from the Kriegsakademie in 1876, Hindenburg enjoyed a solid, if unspectacular, march up the ranks of the German army. Once considered a possible successor to Schlieffen, Hindenburg retired on January 9, 1911. Hindenburg was reactivated on August 22, 1914, and appointed commander of the Eighth Army.50 To be sure, the choices for the new command team of the Eighth Army were Moltke’s. Wilhelm II was not particularly enamored with either man and regarded Hindenburg as simpleminded. Hindenburg was far too stolid a personality and lacked the kind of dash that Wilhelm found so attractive. Finally, Hindenburg had made the signal mistake of not letting the kaiser’s side win in the annual 1908 maneuvers. Although Ludendorff had received his pour le mérite from Wilhelm II personally, the kaiser disliked the highly strung Ludendorff and thought of him as an unscrupulous social climber who lacked breeding. The kaiser’s acquiescence here was just one more example of his prewar promise to Moltke to stay out of day-to-day military matters.51

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Turning Points

More deranging to the German war plan was what Moltke sent to the Eighth Army after dispatching Hindenburg and Ludendorff to East Prussia. After several days of deliberation, even with the situation in the west approaching its climax, Moltke decided to send the XI Corps and the Guard Reserve Corps, now available after the successful conclusion of the siege of Namur, to reinforce the Eighth Army.52 In the actual event, the presence of these two corps did not matter, as they did not get to East Prussia in time to participate in the Tannenberg operation. The Austro-Hungarian war plan produced results that could only be described as utterly unsuccessful. The Austro-Hungarian forces invading Serbia, consisting of the Austro-Hungarian Fifth and Sixth Armies, were commanded by Feldzugmeister Oskar Potiorek, the governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A rival to Conrad, Potiorek was responsible for the security arrangements in Sarajevo when Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife came for their ill-fated visit. After the onset of hostilities, Potiorek launched two invasions of Serbia, in August and September, respectively, both of which came to grief at the hands of the Serbian forces commanded by Radomir Putnik. A third effort, launched to retrieve both Austria-Hungary’s military fortunes and Potiorek’s career, enjoyed some initial success when it captured Belgrade. An overly optimistic Potiorek presented the city as a jubilee gift to Francis Joseph.53 Potiorek’s third effort, however, also came to a bad end, as a Serbian counterattack drove the Austro-Hungarian forces back over the Save and Danube Rivers. The three Austro-Hungarian offensives against Serbia were complete failures. Although the Serbian armies had suffered considerably, losing about 163,000 dead, wounded, and captured, the Austro-Hungarians lost far more. Potiorek’s forces lost some 30,000 dead, 173,000 wounded, and 70,000 captured. The final casualty was Potiorek’s career. He was dismissed from his position on December 22, 1914, and was forced into retirement on January 1, 1915.54 Far worse was to come on the Russian front. Unlike the Serbian front, where Conrad was willing to leave Potiorek to his own devices (and suffer the consequences of any failures), he took a much more hands-on approach to the matter of Russia. On August 16, 1914, Conrad established headquarters for Armee Ober Kommando (AOK) at the fortress and communication hub of Przemy´sl. From there, Conrad with Archduke Friedrich (his nominal superior) would direct his armies.55 Conrad’s efforts were undone by his own errors and misjudgments. The very first error was the result of Conrad’s own indecision. Even though it seemed that Russian intervention was inevitable, Conrad decided to send the Second Army to the Serbian border. Although Conrad reversed himself, it was too late to recall the trains. Conrad had the Second Army go to the Serbian, detrain, and then reentrain to come back to Galicia. Once at the

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

Serbian border, however, Conrad let some of the Second Army’s corps become involved in Potiorek’s initial offensive against Serbia. Thus, while part of the Second Army’s strength was frittered away on the Save River, an understrength Second Army ultimately arrived too late to prevent the unsatisfactory outcome in Galicia.56 In addition to undercutting the strength of his own forces facing the Russians, Conrad made two other errors. First, perhaps as a response to the Redl revelations, Conrad moved the deployment areas for his armies in Galicia farther away from the frontiers than had been called for in the original war plans. Thus, his soldiers would have to make a much-longer march to the Russian border, under the difficult conditions of the Galician summer.57 Conrad’s second error was borne of his aggressive nature. Although he knew that his armies in Galicia would be even more inferior numerically since he had retained at least two corps from the Second Army on the Serbian front, Conrad’s bias for the offensive prompted him to decide to attack anyway. With an additional hundred-mile march for his infantry, cavalry ill equipped to perform the critical function of reconnaissance, and a typically underfunded aviation component, Conrad’s armies blundered forward blindly into the enemy.58 Although the Austro-Hungarian First Army commander, General der Infanterie Viktor Freiherr von Dankl, would win an initial hard-fought-ifcostly victory at Krásnik, the success was illusory. Russian strength began to increase as the southwest front completed its mobilization. By the beginning of September 1914, Russian 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th Armies were considerably stronger than their exhausted and depleted Austro-Hungarian opponents.59 Thus, it would be fair to say that by the middle of September 1914, as Conrad was pulling his armies back to the San River, the Austro-Hungarian war plan was in ruins. The results produced by the Russian mobilization process were perhaps more positive than normally thought. Prodded by the French, the Russian high command, headed by Grand Duke Nikolai, rushed the northwest front into an offensive against East Prussia. Following Mobilization Schedule 19A, General Yakov Zhilinski’s northwest front armies (Pavel Rennenkampf’s 1st and Aleksandr Samsonov’s 2nd) began their offensive operations well before the Germans expected, even before their own mobilization was complete. Consequently, the two armies went forward with inadequate cavalry, thus leaving them with insufficient resources for reconnaissance, a capability essential for a campaign in East Prussia.60 The course of the Tannenberg campaign is too well known to need to repeat here.61 Although the Russian XIII and XV Corps were destroyed and the XXIII Corps was severely mauled, costing the Russians about 165,000 casualties (including 92,000 prisoners), substantial parts of the 2nd Army escaped the Tannenberg disaster. The II Corps was incorporated into

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Turning Points

Rennenkampf’s 1st Army, which was still ensconced on German soil. Meanwhile the Russian I and VI Corps were able to create a strong defensive position on the Narew River, covering Warsaw, where a new 2nd Army would be created. Farther south, matters went considerably better for the Russians. The somewhat slower pace of Russian mobilization allowed the armies of the southwest front to absorb the casualties suffered in the initial battles of Krásnik and Komarów. In addition, the open nature of the terrain on the Russian side of the border provided ample space for the Russian armies to fully deploy their strength, swallowing up the numerically inferior Austro-Hungarian armies.62 Finally, the operational geography favored the Russians on the Austro-Hungarian side of the border. The southwest front’s armies could aim concentric attacks at Przemy´sl, thus giving all of Ivanov’s forces a common objective.63 Thus, by the late summer of 1914 on the eastern front, the only war plan that was still in play, at least marginally, was Russia’s. As summer gave way to autumn, both sides had to recalibrate their plans, forces, and commanders. For the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the issue of command in coalition warfare and relations between them raised its head in various ways. Relations between the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, not great to begin with, deteriorated considerably. Karl Graf von Kaganeck, the German military attaché in Vienna, urged Waldersee (then Moltke’s deputy) for the German high command to be completely honest with the AustroHungarians about the Schlieffen Plan. In addition, both Germany and Austria-Hungary were slow in dispatching representatives to each other’s headquarters. It was not until August 4, 1914, that they agreed to the exchange, and the Austro-Hungarian representative, Count Josef von Stürgkh, did not depart Vienna until August 7.64 Once they were in their respective posts, the opacity continued. Stürgkh, installed at OHL, received little information about the progress of operations in Belgium and France. Neither he nor Conrad were made aware of the deterioration of Moltke’s condition, both mentally and physically. To add insult to injury, OHL did not inform Conrad that Moltke had been removed from his position and was replaced by Erich von Falkenhayn. Conrad, for his part, called for Hindenburg and Ludendorff to launch an offensive against the Russian forces in northern Poland. As the German Eighth Army had to do some refitting of its own after Tannenberg and Rennenkampf’s Russian 1st Army was still ensconced on German soil, Conrad’s suggestion was rebuffed, with Wilhelm II personally relating this to Stürgkh.65 Another issue that came to the fore was that of unified command. As noted previously, the Austro-German alliance had no military convention associated with it, and the elder Moltke at least implied that there was no real need for one.66 As the scale and complexity of the forces and plans involved increased, the matter of a unified command always lay just below the

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

surface. By 1914, there were a couple of different approaches to the question. Ideally, one of the two monarchs would exercise overall command in the east, but that was impossible. Francis Joseph was far too old and in poor health, and Wilhelm II was precluded by the element of his erratic personality. In addition, the kaiser had already promised Moltke that he would refrain from interfering in day-to-day military matters, something of which the Austro-Hungarians may not have been aware.67 Conrad also apparently desired the position, if it was ever to be created. This quickly became an impossibility, especially after Hindenburg gained the stature accorded him as the victor of Tannenberg. The idea of having any German general in overall command, let alone Hindenburg, was anathema at both AOK and the Ballplatz. Thus, the issue continued unresolved.68 As September wore on, the operational focus on the eastern front shifted to the north and the south. The German Eighth Army, now with the XI Corps and Guard Reserve Corps in hand, turned against Rennenkampf’s 1st Army. The offensive, which began on September 9, 1914, after two days of probes, went forward but at a slow pace. Already badly spooked by Tannenberg, Rennenkampf was not about to let himself get caught in another encirclement. The 1st Army beat their feet for the border. By the third week of September, the 1st Army, pursued by Hindenburg’s forces, had reached the safety of the Nieman River.69 Matters farther south went much more in the favor of the Russians. With the mobilization of Ivanov’s southwest front just about complete, by the end of August, the Russians were ready to go over to the offensive against the already depleted Austro-Hungarian armies. After a few days of tough fighting, Alexei Brusilov’s 8th and Nikolai Ruszki’s 3rd Armies got the upper hand along the Gnila Lipa and Zlota Lipa Rivers. By August 31, 1914, the Russians had torn a hole nine miles across in the Austro-Hungarian line. Through the first week of September, the Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia tried to cling to their positions, as the key battle developed around Rawa Ruska. Ultimately, the Austro-Hungarians had too many gaps and overlapped flanks to deal with. The Russian victory at Rawa Ruska was both a military disaster and a personal tragedy for Conrad. Not only did the AustroHungarian defeat mark the end of Conrad’s plans, but also one of the AustroHungarian fatalities at Rawa Ruska was Conrad’s son Herbert, killed in action on September 8, 1914.70 Faced with the potential destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Third Army, Conrad had no choice but to pull back his battered armies toward the San. Once they reached the river, however, the Austro-Hungarian retreat had to continue on to the Dunajec and Biala Rivers. In the process, Conrad had to abandon Lemberg and the critical Galician oil fields to the Russians. In addition, Conrad decided to reinforce the fortress of Przemy´sl so that it could withstand a Russian siege, while he shifted AOK’s location to Neu Sandec.71

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Turning Points

Conrad’s forces were now forced back between the San and the Carpathian Mountains, but with East Prussia almost entirely cleared, the Central Powers could act in concert, at least to some degree. On September 15, 1914, OHL created a new German field army, the Ninth, out of most of the corps of the Eighth Army. Seeing the chance to break up Hindenburg-Ludendorff duumvirate, Falkenhayn named Generaloberst Richard von Schubert as commander, with Ludendorff as his chief of staff.72 Ludendorff, however, successfully lobbied OHL that Hindenburg be the commander of the Ninth Army, given that it would have the preponderance of German forces on the eastern front. Hindenburg was appointed commander of the Ninth Army on September 18, 1914, while Schubert took command of the Eighth Army.73 Meanwhile Conrad, with his armies backed up between the San River and the Carpathian Mountains, was able to scrape enough man power together to reinforce his armies to a “respectable” strength with 477,000 infantry, 26,000 cavalry, and 1,578 guns.74 Although the Central Powers were now acting in a unified manner, the issue of command and mutual understanding came up again, and in a negative way. Although Ludendorff and Conrad had their first meeting at Neu Sandec on September 18, 1914, and would develop a good relationship in a personal sense, a number of Germans, including Ludendorff, could not resist from indulging in an orgy of “I told you so.” Ludendorff privately could not refrain from noting that while Conrad had been critical of German methods before the war, the actual experience of combat had led to a change of mind. Max Hoffmann perceptively noted that the Austro-Hungarians were now paying a high price for years of parsimony. Such attitudes were common among high-ranking German officers.75 The issue of command remained thorny. Although once it was deployed, the German Ninth Army would be operating on the left end of a line with the Austro-Hungarian First, Fourth, and Third Armies, Hindenburg’s force would operate independently, answering solely to OHL. To add insult to injury, the plan of Hindenburg’s army would force Dankl’s Austro-Hungarian First Army to shift its advance in order to cover Hindenburg’s right flank. This was much to Conrad’s irritation, but given the circumstances that now obtained on the eastern front, it could not be avoided.76 From the standpoint of the Central Powers, the impending offensive was well timed. In their retreat, the Austro-Hungarian forces had been able to put some distance between themselves and the armies of Ivanov’s southwest front. With the Russian pursuit running out of steam, Ivanov called off the pursuit on September 23, 1914, and ordered his forces to transition to defense along the San. Meanwhile Brusilov, now controlling both the Russian 3rd and 8th Armies, devoted a sizable part of the 3rd Army to besieging Przemy´sl, especially after an attempt to take the fortress by storm foundered with heavy casualties. Even just establishing a complete investment of the fortress took

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

time; they did not complete that task until September 23, 1914. The rest of Ivanov’s forces shifted their weight toward Poland.77 The autumn campaign in Poland during September and October 1914 was an excellent example of Carl von Clausewitz’s description of war as a clash of two living organisms. The Ninth Army’s drive, assisted by the AustroHungarian First Army, was aimed initially at what Hindenburg and Ludendorff thought was the flank of the Russian southwest front, supposedly located on Middle Vistula.78 The offensive got off to a good start, with a hardwon victory at Opatow at the end of September. The Russian forces opposing the Ninth Army appeared to be no more than two infantry divisions and seven cavalry divisions, so Hindenburg and Ludendorff set their sights higher. The Ninth Army would now drive across the Vistula and attack Ivangorod and Warsaw.79 Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided that the main effort in the advance against Warsaw would be entrusted to Mackensen. Aside from his own XVII Corps, Mackensen was given control of the ad hoc Corps Frommel, consisting of the 8th Cavalry Division, 18th Landwehr Division, and the 35th Reserve Division. Mackensen also got at least one brigade of the XX Corps.80 While the Germans moved against Warsaw, Conrad’s armies also went back over to the offensive, although not nearly as a quickly as the Germans preferred. While the Austro-Hungarian First Army tied in with the German Ninth Army’s flank at Opatow, on October 5, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Third, Fourth, and Second Armies crossed the Wisloka River. As the deteriorating weather turned the roads into bottomless ruts of mud, the AustroHungarians struggled toward the San. Faced with an Austro-Hungarian advance, Brusilov launched one final effort to storm Przemy´sl, but the attack lacked time and heavy artillery and the assaults were beaten off by the garrison. On October 9, 1914, Przemy´sl was reached, much to Conrad’s relief, although the Russians were not fully driven away from the fortress until October 12, 1914. With that, the Austro-Hungarian advance came to a halt.81 Meanwhile, the Russians had not been idle. To begin, the Russians needed to make decisions about commanders. The most notable Russian casualty from Tannenberg was Samsonov, who shot himself on August 30, 1914. The other was Zhilinski. Given a relatively free hand by Grand Duke Nikolai and Stavka in directing the armies of the northwest front, and with Samsonov dead, Zhilinski was left to bear the greatest responsibility for the disaster. The Grand Duke relieved Zhilinski on September 16, 1914. The new commander of the northwest front was Nikolai Ruzski, who had cautiously, if competently, commanded the 3rd Army. The damage to Russian morale by the defeat at Tannenberg and the changes of commanders was offset somewhat by the victories in Galicia and the seizure of Lemberg.82 Changes of commanders and plans continued as the action shifted from East Prussia to the south. To extend Rennenkampf’s line along the Nieman,

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a new 10th Army was created, commanded by Vasily Pflug. The recreated 2nd Army, rebuilding around Warsaw, was entrusted to Sergei Scheidemann. As Ruzski was moving up to command the northwest front, command of the 3rd Army was given to the Bulgarian Russophile general Radko Radko-Dmitriev.83 With the German Ninth Army advancing toward Warsaw and the AustroHungarians moving back toward the San, Grand Duke Nikolai saw an opportunity. Under French pressure to undertake an operation against the Germans and recognizing that the German Ninth Army’s left flank was vulnerable, the Grand Duke directed Ivanov to shift three of his armies to the northwest. This turned out to be the 9th, 4th, and 5th Armies. The 5th Army, commanded by General Pavel Plehve, together with the reconstituted 2nd Army, which had been shifted from Ruzski’s northwest front to Ivanov’s southwest front, would strike the left flank of the German Ninth Army. Hindenburg thought the Grand Duke’s plan a very good one.84 The Russian effort, however, enjoyed mixed success at best. The Grand Duke’s intentions were undone by his own doing and by mischance. The execution of the Grand Duke’s plan depended on the smooth cooperation between Ruzski, now commanding the northwest front, and Ivanov, the commander of the southwest front. Too often, however, the front commanders worked at cross-purposes, and the Grand Duke was either unwilling or unable to impose his will on them. In addition, the poor weather made shifting the 5th Army up to Warsaw time-consuming. Finally, German aerial reconnaissance detected signs of the Russian buildup, reporting it to Hindenburg and Mackensen. This intelligence was confirmed by the good fortune of a document capture.85 By the time Ivanov issued the order for the offensive on October 9, the German Ninth Army had reached the end of its logistical tether. The region had very little left to offer in terms of supply. Count Harry Kessler, a high born aesthete, literary critic, and bon vivant serving at Ninth Army headquarters, noted the barren condition of the area. In addition, both the Ninth Army and the Austro-Hungarian First Army lacked the heavy artillery needed to tackle the fortifications at Warsaw and Ivangorod. Relatively forewarned, Mackensen and Hindenburg were able to manage the retreat adeptly, although the Russian attack did cause Mackensen some bad moments. The Ninth Army retreated southwest, toward the Pilica River and the AustroHungarian border, scorching the earth as they went in order to slow any Russian pursuit. The Austro-Hungarian First Army fell back from Ivangorod toward Opatow and then beyond.86 Their drive on Warsaw stymied, the Germans made two important changes. The first involved the command structure. On November 1, 1914, Hindenburg was promoted to Generalfeldmarschall and then named commander of all German forces on the eastern front, from then on known as

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

Oberbefehlshaber Ost, or Ober Ost. Hindenburg recommended that command of the Ninth Army go to Mackensen, to which OHL agreed.87 Considering the almost-constant acrimony that ensued between Falkenhayn’s OHL and Ober Ost, it is worthwhile to briefly digress into the who and the why of Ober Ost’s creation. Although the order that announced the creation of Ober Ost was published in the kaiser’s name, it is extremely unlikely that he had much, if anything, to do with this move. After all, Wilhelm II had already promised that he would not interfere in the day-to-day conduct of military affairs.88 Much more likely, and to some degree ironically, the creation of Ober was probably the inadvertent doing of Falkenhayn. Once the decision had been taken to create additional army-level headquarters, first the Ninth and then the Tenth, as additional forces were shifted from the west to the east, a higher headquarters was required to provide coordination. Falkenhayn’s OHL staff was too small to be able to direct matters in both the east and the west at the same time. In addition, matters in the west often demanded Falkenhayn’s full attention. Thus, the easiest solution was to set up an overall headquarters in the east. The senior officer and soonto-be Generalfeldmarschall, Hindenburg was the logical choice for the position. Once established, OHL essentially left Ober Ost to its own devices.89 With command matters settled, the focus of German operations shifted back to the northwest. The German Ninth Army, with Mackensen now in command, moved by rail to the area between the minor fortresses of Posen and Thorn. The objective for the new offensive was Lodz. Located about sixty miles from the German border, Lodz was the center of the textile industry in Russian Poland and an important road and rail hub. Possession of the area would provide good quarters for the rapidly approaching harsh winter. Finally, Lodz could provide the base from which a future offensive against Warsaw could be launched.90 Mackensen’s thrust would be complemented by an attack by General der Kavallerie Edouard von Böhm-Ermolli’s AustroHungarian Second Army and the Archduke Josef Ferdinand’s AustroHungarian Fourth Army from the Cracow area. The sector between the Germans and Austro-Hungarians would be covered by the Army Detachment commanded by General der Infanterie Remus von Woyrsch.91 Mackensen’s offensive began on November 11, 1914. Over the next month, Mackensen’s force engaged major elements of Ruzski’s northwest front in what amounted to a duel, each side parrying the blows of the other and then launching counterthrusts. The most dangerous situation for Mackensen was when Russian counterattacks resulted in the encirclement of the General der Infanterie Reinhard von Scheffer-Boyadel’s German XXV Reserve Corps, a predicament that earned Mackensen some harsh criticism from Hoffmann in his diary.92 Although Stavka anticipated a major success that manifest in the destruction of the XXV Reserve Corps, the Germans evaded annihilation. Scheffer

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kept his head, ordering a retreat toward the road junction of Brzeziny, which he reported by radio. Informed of the situation, Mackensen reacted swiftly, directing the XX Corps toward Brzeziny. Orders were sent by aircraft to Generalleutnant Curt von Morgen, instructing him as well to send forces of his I Reserve Corps to Brzeziny. Finally, a successful conclusion to the XXV Reserve Corps encirclement depended on close cooperation between Plehve’s 5th Army and Scheidemann’s 2nd Army. However, direct communication between the two commanders was poor, and proper coordination by Ruzski’s northwest front was also lacking.93 The upshot of all this was that Scheffer’s force, numbering about 60,000 men, escaped. To add insult to injury, the XXV Reserve Corps also brought out some 10,000 prisoners and a number of captured guns, along with more than 3,000 wounded. Nonetheless, Mackensen’s initial thrust against Lodz had been thwarted. The I Reserve Corps alone had suffered about 8,000 casualties in November.94 The German Ninth Army fell back to the Bzura River. Bolstered by reinforcements from the west, most notably the II Corps and the III Reserve Corps, Mackensen was able to restart the attack, despite the rapidly deteriorating weather (temperatures in late November had dropped to below 10 degrees Fahrenheit) and a shortage of artillery ammunition. During the first week of December, the Germans were able to get to a position that threatened the Russian forces in Lodz with encirclement. Stavka thus ordered the abandonment of Lodz, which was occupied by elements of the German XVII Corps, on December 6, 1914. Although Lodz was now in German hands, the true goal of the operation in Ludendorff’s mind, the encirclement of the Russian forces defending Lodz, had not been achieved.95 While the forces under Ober Ost and the Russian northwest front dueled for the control of westernmost part of Russian Poland, the Russian southwest front was pushing Austria-Hungary into a major crisis. The German failures at Warsaw and Ivangorod in October made it difficult for the AustroHungarian forces to hold the line of the San River. The Austro-Hungarians began to fall back. Recognizing this, the Russian southwest front armies began to retake the initiative. On November 5, 1914, Ivanov ordered an offensive and designated the 11th Army to besiege Przemy´sl.96 Over the course of November, the Austro-Hungarian Second and Third Armies fell back from the San, cautiously pursued by the Russians. The Russians were also pressing the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, threatening Cracow from the east. Conrad directed the commandant of Przemy´sl, Feldmarschallleutnant Hermann Kusmanek von Burgneustädten, to prepare for another siege. Similar instructions were given to the garrison of Cracow, also a fortress. Conrad also moved the location of AOK from Neu Sandec to Teschen, where it would remain.97 By the end of November, Austria-Hungary’s situation on the eastern front was critical. The Fourth Army’s retreat to cover Cracow had opened a wide

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

gap between it and the Third Army, which had been driven back toward the Carpathian passes by Brusilov’s 8th Army. The rapidly changing situation in Poland and Galicia also presented Stavka with a new set of choices. On November 29, 1914, Grand Duke Nikolai met his front commanders at Siedlce, the location of northwest front headquarters. Despite trained reserves running short, Danilov, as Stavka’s chief operations officer and ardent hater of all things German, called for yet another offensive against East Prussia. This was rejected by the Grand Duke, as well as the two front commanders. Ivanov, however, suggested that given the state of the Austro-Hungarian forces, an attack by the southwest front would have a better prospect of success. As Ivanov put it to the Grand Duke, “the way to Berlin lies through Austria-Hungary.”98 The Grand Duke, as per his previous conduct, failed to render a clear decision. Although he rejected Danilov’s proposal for a renewed attack against Germany and authorized a retreat by the northwest front, Nikolai Nikolaevich continued to waffle about what the southwest front should do next. Thus, Ivanov’s offensive continued, almost by inertia.99 While the Russian high command struggled to reach a clear consensus, the Central Powers were trying to do the same, while dealing with the difficulties associated with coalition warfare. These difficulties started with the rather fraught relationship between Conrad and Falkenhayn. Since Conrad had not been informed of Moltke’s dismissal, Falkenhayn’s appointment was something of a surprise. Conrad made certain that the relationship with Falkenhayn got off to a bad start. Invited to Berlin for a conference slated for October 28, 1914, Conrad decided not to attend. Instead, Conrad sent his adjutant, Lieutenant Colonel Rudolf Kundmann, to stand in for him. Falkenhayn understandably took this as a snub.100 The first face-to-face meeting between Conrad and Falkenhayn took place on December 2, 1914, at Breslau, Germany. The other participants involved were Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Archduke Friedrich, and Wilhelm II. Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Falkenhayn engaged in the main discussions. For the Austro-Hungarians, the meeting descended to a “mere formality,” while the kaiser indulged his penchant for making ridiculous statements. The only tangible outcome was that the Germans and Austro-Hungarians continue their offensive efforts.101 The plans for both sides yielded, at best, mixed results. The decision to have the northwest front retreat to a more defensible position east of Lodz along the Bzura and Rawka Rivers allowed the Russians to blunt any further German advance by Mackensen’s Ninth Army. Attacks over the second and third weeks of December produced little more than casualties. Thus Mackensen, with his troops exhausted and winter closing its grip, went over to the defensive. To the northeast, the German and Russian forces held the positions reached at the end of the Masurian Lakes operation, with the Russians

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still ensconced in a sliver of East Prussian territory. South of the Ninth Army’s sector, Böhm-Ermolli’s Austro-Hungarian Second Army, which included some German units, made some short advances in the area south of Lodz, but these efforts also ran out of steam.102 Conrad’s efforts to halt the Russian advance were successful, but at a cost. Using the roads and rail lines around Cracow, Conrad put the AustroHungarian Fourth Army, now commanded by Archduke Joseph, in a very advantageous position. Attacking the flank of Radko’s Russian 3rd Army, the archduke’s forces, bolstered also by the German 47th Reserve Division, drove the Russians back some forty miles, eliminating the threat to Cracow. Farther to the southeast, the Russian 8th and 9th Armies drove deep into the Carpathian passes before the advance was halted by stiffening AustroHungarian resistance and deteriorating conditions. Przemy´sl, with its garrison of 130,000 troops, 30,000 remaining civilian inhabitants, and 21,500 horses, would have to withstand what was clearly understood to be potentially a much-longer siege.103 It was now apparent that the war was going to extend into 1915, and both sides sought to organize their respective rear areas. For the Germans, this meant expanding the network of depots near the East Prussian frontier. For example, the war minister ordered Lötzen to be expanded as a depot. The officer responsible for undertaking the task was the deputy corps commander of the XX Corps, the local unit based in the area.104 The expansion of logistical facilities was essential as the size of German forces in the east increased over the course of 1914, and it also allowed the Germans to correct serious errors that had been made, particularly in logistics. The most egregious mistake concerned the mismanagement of equine resources. At the outset of the war, the German army had made no provision for the care of lightly wounded or exhausted horses. This resulted in the needless loss of numerous horses. Meanwhile, the German military sought to expand its industrial output in order to cope with the demands of modern industrialized war waged on a vast scale. Thanks to the capabilities of Walter Rathenau, Germany was able to do that.105 The Austro-Hungarians also had to reorganize their rear area. The army had to be replenished with men and almost wholly reequipped. The nature of the empire presented continued problems for the mobilization and training of millions of soldiers. Replenishing equipment, however, proved to be a more tractable matter, owing to the activity of the Austrian war minister, Alexander Krobatin.106 In addition to feeding the population under wartime conditions, the Austro-Hungarian government also had one more problem to cope with: large numbers of refugees. Germany also had to deal with refugees created by the Russian invasion of East Prussia. Fortunately for the Germans, operations in East Prussia were of a relatively brief duration. Schneidemühl, a

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

small city in East Prussia on the Berlin-Bromberg rail line, for example, had to deal with trainloads of refugees from border towns over the course of late August and early September 1914. By November, however, the situation had changed to the extent that the German army was able to establish a prisoner of war camp at Schneidemühl. The refugees were able to return to their homes, or rather what was left of them.107 The Austro-Hungarian situation was far grimmer. A large chunk of Galicia had been lost, including major cities such as Lemberg. Even before the first siege, a large portion of Przemy´sl’s civilian population had been evacuated. A further 8,000 people left in the interval before the second siege began. A large number of civilians also fled Cracow as the Russians approached. Thus, by the late autumn of 1914, the Austro-Hungarian government had to deal with caring for hundreds of thousands of refugees.108 The Russians had similar problems in adjusting to the needs of what now looked to be a prolonged war. Like its German and Austro-Hungarian opponents, the Russian government sought to expand its production of arms and munitions as rapidly as possible, while also replenishing its man power. In the area near the front line, the Russian army had two similar-but-different tasks to undertake. The first was to take over the civil administration of Russian territory near the front. This applied particularly to Poland, where the army had to take control of the maintenance of law and order, as well as the gathering of supplies and food.109 The second major task for the Russian army was to organize and maintain a government of occupation for the conquered territory. Of the three combatants, only Russia had been able to occupy a large swath of enemy territory that it now had to administer. This turned out to be a source of conflict between Stavka and the government, owing to unclear demarcation of authority. The first military governor of Galicia, Colonel Sergei Sheremetiev, pursued a pro-Polish policy, based on the proclamation issued by Grand Duke Nikolai to the Polish inhabitants of Austria-Hungary. Such a pro-Polish line, however, soon ran afoul of the local pro-Russian elements, as well as Russian nationalist politicians in the Russian Duma.110 The Grand Duke then appointed Count Georgi Alexandrovich Bobrinski as governor general of Galicia. Bobrinski was a large landowner who had made his fortune in sugar. His cousin Vladimir was a major figure in the Duma and an ardent Russian nationalist. As the new governor general, Bobrinski instituted price controls, ostensibly to contain inflation. He would also introduce cultural and religious steps to Russify the area, which would bring him into conflict with Stavka, especially Grand Duke Nikolai’s chief of staff, General Nikolai N. Yanushkevich.111 All of the combatants entered the war with carefully designed war plans. All of them miscarried. The same fate befell the follow-on plans formulated by the respective belligerents. These failures were accompanied by losses

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that could be described only as immense. Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes alone, for example, cost the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies some 250,000 casualties.112 Losses incurred in the campaigns in Galicia and Poland were also considerable. Thwarting the German attack on Warsaw alone, for example, cost the Russian 2nd, 4th, and 9th Armies probably over 150,000 casualties. Fighting in Galicia, while more successful, cost the southwest front another 230,000 casualties, just in August and September alone. Taken all together, Russian casualties likely came close to 1,000,000.113 These losses were difficult to replace. Although the Russians had over 3,000,000 men in some type of reserve status at the start of the war, the number was very deceptive. Of all these reservists, only a very small number, perhaps about 200,000, were fully trained, and these men were used up very quickly. By October 1914, commanders such as Brusilov were concerned about the inadequate training of reservists and draftees used as replacements. Losses in officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were also difficult to replace.114 Changes extended to the upper ranks of the Russian army as well. Zhilinski, relieved in the aftermath of the Tannenberg disaster, was packed off to France as Stavka’s representative to French headquarters. Zhilinski’s tenure as a military diplomat proved to be about as successful as his tour as commander of the northwest front. After making himself thoroughly unwelcome at French headquarters, in 1916 Zhiliniski was recalled at the insistence of French commander-in-chief Marshal Joseph Joffre.115 At the army level, changes of command were rather more frequent, especially in the northwest front. Rennenkampf evaded any culpability for Tannenberg. Although Rennenkampf’s 1st Army was able to outrun the German Eighth Army in its retreat toward the border in the Masurian Lakes operation, his plainly pessimistic attitude did not impress his superiors. A lackluster performance in the initial stages of the Lodz campaign proved the final straw; the Grand Duke relieved Rennenkampf, turning the 1st Army over to Alexander Litvinov. Scheidemann’s leadership of the 2nd Army was also found wanting. He was removed in favor of Vladimir Smirnov.116 Vasili Pflug, commander of the 10th Army, ran afoul of Ruzski when Pflug exceeded his orders in a minor Russian operation on the Nieman River in late September, launching an ill-considered night attack attended with heavy casualties. Ruzski dismissed Pflug and replaced him with an aged-but-experienced staff officer, Faddei Sievers.117 While the relief of Rennenkampf, Scheidemann, and Pflug could certainly be justified on the basis of unsatisfactory performance, many in Russia saw an ethnic aspect to the Grand Duke’s actions. Anti-German sentiment had been on the rise in Russia for some time, and the outbreak of war only exacerbated such feeling.118 The removal of these commanders was regarded by many as an effort by Nikolai Nikolaevich to purge Germans from the upper

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

echelons of the Russian army. This was fraught with some difficulty for the Grand Duke, especially in the case of Rennenkampf, who was well connected to the court. Although the Grand Duke prevailed in this matter, it served only to deepen the mutual dislike between Nikolai Nikolaevich and Tsarina Alexandra.119 The German army had enjoyed the most success, but in World War I, victory rarely, if ever, came cheap. Tannenberg was relatively inexpensive, as one can estimate German casualties to be around 20,000, including losses suffered at Gumbinnen.120 Success and failure became more dearly bought as time went on. Casualties in the Lodz campaign and its aftermath, for example, were over 100,000.121 Despite the losses, the German army had scored several critical successes, most notably Tannenberg at the start of the war and Lodz near the end of the year. From a broader operational perspective, Germany’s key advantage was its road and rail system. Perhaps the most important factor that made Tannenberg what it was, as Gerhard Gross has argued, was that Tannenberg was defensive battle fought on German soil.122 The ability to mount the Lodz campaign so quickly after the conclusion of the failed Warsaw operation was a tribute to the German rail system. In operations close to German territory, the German rail and road system gave the German army a degree of nimbleness unmatched by either friend or foe on the eastern front.123 Another key factor in the German army’s performance in the campaigns of 1914 was its overall quality. The German army could rely on a pool of relatively well-educated men. While the vast majority of soldiers did not take the arbitur, they did have enough education to allow them to ascend, if successful, into the noncommissioned officer corps, a critical component of the army. Reserve units in the German army were maintained at a fairly high standard and were well led. Reserve officers were usually well educated, and reserve commissions were valued by those who held them. Thus, once mobilized, while German reserve units had the usual problems adapting to active service, they were able to catch up quickly. Even the Landwehr Corps, composed of older men and given a relatively limited mission, was able to get up speed in a short time.124 Command was another edge for the Germans. To be sure, not every German commander was a Frederick or Moltke the Elder in waiting. Prittwitz’s initial conduct as commander of the Eighth Army was wobbly enough for the younger Moltke to relieve both Prittwitz and his chief of staff, Georg Waldersee. François, who was insubordinate but lucky in the Tannenberg campaign, found Hindenburg a far less patient superior than Prittwitz. After one insubordinate act too many, François was dismissed by Hindenburg.125 Such incidents as those of Prittwitz and François, however, were few and far between. German commanders performed well, especially in critical situations, exemplified by Scheffer’s handling of the XXV Reserve Corps while

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Turning Points

surrounded by the Russians. It is also interesting to note how much use the Germans got out of their retired general officers. Hindenburg was the most famous example, but there were others. Woyrsch, who had also retired in 1911, was able to make positive contributions, beginning with his providing support to Dankl’s Austro-Hungarian First Army at Krasnik.126 Of the three belligerents on the eastern front in 1914, the AustroHungarian army was the most impacted. With about two million officers and men, Francis Joseph’s army was the smallest of the major continental powers that went to war in 1914. The army had also been the most poorly funded over time and was often the victim of the nature of the dual monarchy’s political structure.127 The lack of funding left the army short of weapons, especially artillery, and other equipment. Thus, in the estimation of the German liaison officer at AOK, August von Cramon, the Austro-Hungarian army was capable of only dealing with Serbia. Coping with the Russian army, that could field as many as six million men once fully mobilized, was beyond the capability of the Austro-Hungarian army.128 In the actual event, AustriaHungary got the worst of all possible worlds, having to fight Russia and Serbia at the same time. Given its size at the start, it is not surprising to note that the AustroHungarian army was the most severely impacted by the losses suffered in the 1914 campaigns. Between defeats in Serbia and Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian Army suffered about 957,000 casualties, including 189,000 killed, 490,000 wounded, and 278,000 taken prisoner. Officer casualties came to some 22,310, including 3,168 killed. Over 1,000 guns had been lost, of which only about one-third had been replaced. Losses in horses had also been enormous, around 150,000.129 The loss of so many officers (about half of the prewar officer corps) was serious as, given the polyglot nature of the army, the replacements did not have the linguistic capabilities needed to deal with the soldiers beyond the eighty words in German, the language of command. The Austro-Hungarians did their best to maintain existing units rather than create new ones. The magnitude of the losses, however, made sure that very few surviving veterans were around to transmit the hard lessons of combat experience to the under trained newcomers.130 The Austro-Hungarian army was particularly hard hit in the realm of command. Some general officers broke down mentally under the strain of combat and heavy casualties. Deeply affected by the casualties inflicted on his 15th Infantry Division at Komarów, Feldmarschallleutnant Friedrich Wodniansky von Wildenfeld shot himself on August 27, 1914. Wodniansky was not the only Austro-Hungarian general officer to do so.131 A more common fate for Austro-Hungarian generals was relief from command. The numbers alone were staggering. By the end of 1914, four of the six original army commanders had been relieved. Of the seventeen corps

Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East

commanders, six had been relieved, along with ten division commanders and twenty-four brigade commanders. The basis for these reliefs varied, ranging from attempts to shift blame for defeats to unsatisfactory performance. To be sure, there were some bright spots, such the performances of Dankl and Svetozar Boroevic´ at army-level command, while Feldmarschallleutnant Artur Arz von Straussenberg and General der Infanterie Hermann Kövess von Kövessháza had distinguished themselves as corps commanders.132 By the end of 1914, the three combatants on the eastern front were in situations that bore some similarities but also some critical differences. All three countries had executed their war plans, and all three had failed, with heavy casualties. Some failures, however, were worse than others. Clearly the worst failure was that of Austria-Hungary, which was now teetering on the edge of catastrophe. While Russia had driven Austria-Hungary to the edge of defeat, it had suffered several demoralizing setbacks at the hands of the Germans. As for Germany, the war in the east had produced some impressive successes, most notably at Tannenberg and later at Lodz. These were offset, however, by the failure before Warsaw and by the need to provide aid to the hard-pressed Austro-Hungarian forces. In any case, both sides started 1915 in quest of a plan that would bring victory in the east.

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CHAPTER TWO

Strategists, Strategy, Operations, and Coalition Warfare

In my view, the four new corps, that should be ready in January, must be committed to the east to clear up the situation there, and then we can attack in the west with a superior force. —Generaloberst Hans von Plessen, December 31, 19141 I was able on this occasion to become with the ideas of Conrad. He is an educated officer, but no great man. —Erich Ludendorff, January 2, 19152 The proposals of the Austrian G.H.Q. were agreed to. —Erich von Falkenhayn3 With the plans of both sides now essentially in tatters, it was high time for the leaders of the respective sides to reconsider their strategy. This process revolved around two facets: the individual personalities involved and the institutions of which they were a part. A brief survey of these factors is now in order. For this study, from the standpoint of January 1915, the three people who arguably mattered the least were the respective heads of state. The kaiser’s promise to stay out of day-to-day matters has already been noted. Theoretically, Tsar Nicholas II was supposed to assume the mantle of commander-in-chief.

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Pressure from his ministers, however, led the tsar to remain in Petrograd and to appoint his cousin, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, as the head of Stavka. As for the Austro-Hungarians, Francis Joseph was simply too old.4 The effective removal of the three monarchs from the making of strategy left these matters in the hands of their respective heads of their militaries. For the Russians, this was the cousin of Nicholas II, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Born on November 18, 1856, the Grand Duke was destined to be a cavalryman from birth, given that his uncle Alexander II had the Grand Duke enrolled in the Guards Life Hussar Regiment while he was still in the crib.5 After receiving a well-rounded education, aided with the benefit of foreign travel, Nikolai Nikolaevich entered the army in 1873. Attending the Nikolaevski General Staff Academy, the Grand Duke graduated in April 1876 with the rank of captain. Almost immediately thereafter Nikolai Nikolaevich went to war. His father, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich senior, was the commander of Russian forces going to war against Ottoman Turkey in support of Bulgaria’s independence. Nikolai Nikolaevich junior saw the Russo-Turkish War at the highest and lowest levels, taking part in the crossing of the Danube in June 1877, while also spending a good deal of time at his father’s headquarters.6 After the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War, the Grand Duke enjoyed a successful career in the cavalry, although Nicholas II’s refusal to permit Nikolai Nikolaevich to enter into a morganatic marriage nearly resulted in his resignation. Ultimately, however, Nikolai Nikolaevich took command of the 2nd Cavalry Division after an extended leave. After a successful tour as a commander, the tsar appointed Nikolai Nikolaevich the inspector general of cavalry in 1895. In that position, the Grand Duke did a great deal to reform the Russian army’s cavalry branch, earning plaudits even from his critics.7 A marriage to Grand Duchess Anastasia Nikolaevna, daughter of Prince Nicola of Montenegro, although a source of personal joy to the Grand Duke, met with the disapproval of both Nicholas II and Tsarina Alexandra. Appointed to head the Council of State Defense in 1907, the Grand Duke sought to bring about reforms to the Russian army, desperately needed after the disastrous defeats in the Russo-Japanese War. Ultimately, his efforts in this regard foundered after the Grand Duke lost a bureaucratic battle over the issue of the independence of the General Staff from the War Ministry. Nikolai Nikolaevich’s principal opponent, General Vladimir Sukhomlinov, gained control over both organizations in December 1908 and eventually succeeded in getting the Council of Ministers to abolish the Council of State Defense.8 Although somewhat diminished in stature, the Grand Duke continued to hold the position of commandant of the Petersburg Military District. The appointment of Nikolai Nikolaevich as commander-in-chief was regarded by many as something of a surprise, but once Nicholas II was convinced not to

Strategists, Strategy, Operations, and Coalition Warfare

take command personally, it is difficult to see anyone other than the Grand Duke filling the role. Given the nature of the imperial Russian government, the presence of the royal family at Stavka was imperative, and no one else in the royal family enjoyed the military reputation that Nikolai Nikolaevich did.9 Once appointed commander-in-chief by Nicholas II, the Grand Duke quickly arrogated power to himself, effectively freezing out the War Ministry. At one point, Sukhomlinov’s name was dropped from the list of persons allowed to visit Stavka, and Sukhomlinov had to go to the tsar to have the omission corrected.10 Given that the Grand Duke was accountable only to the tsar and that Nicholas II was not inclined to take an active role, the making of strategy in early 1915 rested with the Grand Duke and a small group of officers. While the appointment of the Grand Duke was met with wide support in the army, it did have its downside. After his resignation from the State Defense Council, Nikolai Nikolaevich had been largely removed from planning. Thus the Grand Duke would need some time to get up to speed. Nikolai Nikolaevich also asked for appointment of Generals Fedor F. Palitsyn and Mikhail V. Alekseev as chief of staff and quartermaster general, respectively, a request the tsar rejected. For the sake of continuity, the Grand Duke would have to rely on the officers then filling those slots, Generals Nikolai N. Yanushkevich and Yuri N. Danilov. This troika would be responsible for directing Russia’s war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.11 Of the two junior members of the troika, Yanushkevich was perhaps the oddest choice for the position he held. Yanushkevich was rather young (fortysix years of age) and had not seen any real field service, having spent most of his career working in the War Ministry or at the General Staff Academy. Although he was intelligent, nothing in his background or career indicated that he was possessed of exceptional skill or insight. Yanushkevich had the ability to span the bridge between the two major factions of the Russian high command. Yanushkevich was Sukhomlinov’s choice to be chief of the general staff, but he had also enjoyed the patronage of both the tsar and the Grand Duke earlier in his career. Alfred Knox, the British officer at Stavka, described Yanushkevich as being more courtier than soldier.12 Yanushkevich was influential, in that he was Stavka’s gatekeeper, thus determining who would get access to the Grand Duke. He also served as the conduit between Stavka and the War Ministry. More influential in regard to operations was Yuri Danilov, the quartermaster general. His career in the army was much broader than that of Yanushkevich and encompassed a combination of staff and line assignments, including a tour as commander of the 166th Infantry Regiment. Assigned to the General Staff in 1908, he became something of a protégé of Sukhomlinov and was critical to the development of the Russian mobilization plans of 1914. Knox considered Danilov to be the best mind in Stavka. While many Russian officers would be critical of

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Danilov’s ideas, Knox noted that “no one ever suggested the name of an officer who could have done better.”13 The location of Stavka is also worthy of comment. Throughout 1914 and 1915, Stavka was housed in two trains and one building at a railway siding in a pine forest near Baranovici, a small city of perhaps as many as 30,000 people. The city’s population had a substantial Jewish segment, thus making Stavka’s location ironic, given that both the Grand Duke and Yanushkevich were virulently anti-Semitic.14 Baranovici was a suitable location, in that it was the junction of three rail lines, thus giving the Grand Duke easy access by rail to his principal subordinate commanders. On the other hand, it was relatively isolated, with neither a telephone exchange nor a wireless radio station. The only long-distance means of communication was a single Hughes teletype machine. Thus, the flow of information into and out of Stavka was slow, and in a fast-moving situation, matters could and did at times escape from Stavka’s grasp. Finally, it must be noted that the size of Stavka itself was very small, perhaps about sixty personnel in all. The veritable nerve center of Stavka, Danilov’s offices, which encompassed the intelligence, operations, and general sections, was manned by no more than twenty general staff officers.15 Thus, while it can be said that the Grand Duke could command the Russian field forces arrayed against the Central Powers, maintaining any kind of control over them would be far more difficult, if not impossible. The Grand Duke well understood the position of Russia within the context of the Entente’s military strategy. Owing to geography alone, it was not possible to synchronize Russia’s military actions with those of the French and the British. Also, the French commander, Marshal Joseph Joffre, could communicate with the Grand Duke only indirectly, having to go through the French ambassador and military attaché. Nonetheless, Nikolai Nikolaevich sought to be as accommodating as possible to French requests for action, especially against Germany. The Grand Duke was also expressed considerable interest in the British idea of an offensive against Turkey in the Dardanelles to open up a supply route to Russia. Finally, like his British and French counterparts, he was most interested in bringing Italy and Romania to the Entente side.16 When it came to operations, like military commanders of that day, the Grand Duke had a penchant for the offensive. He could come up with some interesting concepts, like the Warsaw counteroffensive, which earned the praise of Hindenburg and others.17 Aside from the Grand Duke, the most critical member of the troika in regard to operations was Danilov. Yanushkevich was much more concerned with logistics and administration. Thus, operational concepts usually originated with a memo from Danilov.18 Two other individuals also had input into the development of Russian operational plans: Generals Nikolai Ruzski and Nikolai Ivanov, the respective commanders of

Strategists, Strategy, Operations, and Coalition Warfare

the northwest and southwest fronts.19 Arguably the results were less than desirable. Naturally, Ruzski and Ivanov could be expected to look out for the interests of their respective commands, thus often putting them at loggerheads. By 1915, Danilov’s desire to invade East Prussia had become an obsession. The Grand Duke proved either unwilling or unable to impose his will so that a decision could be made and seen through.20 Russian planning for 1915 started with a memo by Danilov outlining three courses of action for the Russian army. One was Danilov’s favorite, a new invasion of East Prussia. In Danilov’s mind, this would have to be accomplished before the war could be carried into Germany.21 Another course of action called for an advance on the left bank of the Vistula River, presumably to envelop the left flank of the Austro-Hungarian armies. Finally Danilov suggested a third idea, namely an advance from the Konsk-Opoczna area toward Petrikau. This would recover much of the territory lost in the Lodz campaign late in 1914.22 After reading Danilov’s memorandum, Nikolai Nikolaevich dispatched him to Ruzski’s headquarters at Siedlce on January 17, 1915. Ruzski thought that the East Prussian option was best, and Danilov reported this back to Stavka on his return. The following day Yanushkevich telegraphed Ruzski the news that the Grand Duke also agreed on the East Prussian option. Executing this option required the creation of a new field army, the 12th, composed of ten divisions, including the newly arriving IV Siberian Corps. Plehve, then commander of the 5th Army, was designated by the Grand Duke to command the new 12th Army, while Aleksei Churin would take over the 5th Army. All preparations were to be completed and the offensive set for February 23, 1915.23 Not surprisingly, the person unhappiest with this plan was Ivanov. On January 20, 1915, Ivanov sent a message to Stavka informing Stavka that his staff had been working on a plan to invade Hungary since December 1914, which he had not told them of because his staff had not yet completed the preliminary work. To execute the idea successfully, Ivanov requested four to five additional divisions. Both Ivanov’s proposal and his request failed to gain any traction. The plan was briefed to Nicholas II when the tsar visited Stavka a few days later. After the tsar gave his approval (more a pro forma gesture than anything), Nicholas II and his entourage paid a brief visit to the fortress at Ossowiec, where a heavy-caliber shell was fired toward the German lines, before heading back to Petrograd.24 Thus the initial Russian plan was to try conclusions yet again with the Germans. The formulation of strategy and operations for the Central Powers at the beginning of 1915 depended upon two very different men. In 1915, Germany’s military fortunes depended upon General der Infanterie Erich von Falkenhayn, born on November 11, 1861, to an old West Prussian family, the lineage of which went back to fourteenth-century Thuringia. The

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Falkenhayn family had a tradition of military service that included Erich’s grandfather. Several of Falkenhayn’s six siblings also served in the army, including his older brother Eugen, who was a General der Kavallerie.25 After attending the main Kadettenschule at Lichterfelde, Falkenhayn was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1880 and posted to the 91st Infantry Regiment. Over the ensuing three decades, Falkenhayn enjoyed a rather unusual career. After spending time in Chile and China as an instructor, Falkenhayn was assigned as part of the international force created to crush the Boxer Rebellion. This assignment brought Falkenhayn to the notice of Wilhelm II and the kaiser’s brother Prince Heinrich. Falkenhayn’s youthful appearance and his manifestly high level of energy were two traits that always appealed to Wilhelm II, and it was entirely in keeping with Wilhelm II’s manner of doing things that he appointed Falkenhayn, then a relatively junior Generalmajor, as Prussian war minister in 1913, replacing the older General der Infanterie, Josias von Heeringen, who had moved on to another assignment. To mitigate any issues with rank, the kaiser quickly advanced Falkenhayn to the rank of Generalleutnant.26 Given the political milieu from which Falkenhayn came, it is not surprising that he took a rather conservative approach as war minister. The most notable political controversy that involved Falkenhayn was the Zabern Affair. In October 1913, a Lieutenant Forstner posted in the Alsatian town of Zabern made critical comments about the local population that were eventually published. Riots ensued, and given that Alsace had only recently come out from under military governance, civil order was still the province of the army. The army, with Falkenhayn’s support, began rounding up protesters. This action, however, earned severe criticism in the Reichstag, especially from the Social Democrats. The affair concluded with several officers, including Forstner, facing charges but eventually being let off with a slap on the wrist, and Wilhelm II had to back his chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, against a vote of no confidence in the Reichstag.27 In the realm of purely military matters, Falkenhayn pursued the traditional Prussian approach of quality over quantity in regard to the ability of individual soldiers. He also sought to increase the ammunition supply per artillery piece from 1,200 shells to 1,500 shells, although Falkenhayn was not able to achieve the proposed improvement before the outbreak of war. Finally, as war minister, Falkenhayn was strongly supportive of Germany going to war in 1914.28 During the 1914 campaign in the west, Falkenhayn traveled with OHL. As Moltke’s physical and mental health broke down over the course of that summer, Falkenhayn gradually stepped into the role of chief of the General Staff in a de facto sense. He also impressed Wilhelm II with his fairly calm demeanor, which made a considerable contrast with Moltke’s clearly deteriorating condition. Ultimately the kaiser decided to make what had been

Strategists, Strategy, Operations, and Coalition Warfare

obvious now formal and officially appointed Falkenhayn as the new chief of the General Staff on November 3, 1914.29 This appointment surprised many, just as his previous appointment as war minister had surprised many. Falkenhayn was not quite fifty-three years old and was a relatively new Generalleutnant. In picking Falkenhayn, the kaiser passed over a large number of more senior officers. The issue of rank was solved quickly when the kaiser promoted Falkenhayn to General der Infanterie. Also, Falkenhayn gave up the position of war minister to one of his closest collaborators, Generalleutnant Adolf Wild von Hohenborn. This move was designed to alleviate any possibility of conflict with the Reichstag, which might have qualms about one man holding the positions of war minister and chief of the General Staff.30 Falkenhayn’s position was a difficult one for several reasons, some of which were of his own making and others not. It was no surprise that any number of senior officers were miffed that Wilhelm II elevated someone so junior to so high a position. In that sense, even though the kaiser had minimal involvement in the daily conduct of the war, his support of Falkenhayn was crucial throughout the latter’s tenure as head of OHL. Given Wilhelm II’s notably mercurial temperament, Falkenhayn’s position always rested on what could become quickly shifting sand. Falkenhayn’s relative youth and junior status also made his relationship with the army difficult. Thus, he never had even OHL entirely under his control. At times, even people who normally were supporters, such as Wild, were critical of Falkenhayn’s conduct of the war. Often, the deposed Moltke served as a focal point, receiving missives from Ludendorff and anonymous officers in OHL complaining of Falkenhayn’s failures. Ultimately, Falkenhayn’s uncertain relationship with OHL would play an important role in his downfall in 1916.31 Another reason that Falkenhayn found opposition among some of his commanders was his views on strategy. At heart, Falkenhayn was a westerner. For Falkenhayn, the west was the decisive theater of war and Britain was the principal enemy. Victory in the east, even if it were achieved (an outcome Falkenhayn considered unlikely), would not induce the Western powers to quit the war. As Falkenhayn and his operations officer Gerhard Tappen envisioned it, the goal of an offensive in the east was to drive the Russians back to a line near the Pripet Marshes, which could be held by reserve and Landwehr units. This would free up ten corps for a decisive attack in the west.32 Related to the idea of Britain as the main enemy was his concern for Ottoman Turkey, which had joined the Central Powers in November of 1914. As Turkey was the only member of the Central Powers that had a border with Britain, or at least Britain’s imperial possessions. Thus, for Falkenhayn, Turkey was the only conduit by which the war could be taken to Britain.33 It was,

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however, isolated geographically. If full advantage were to be taken of Turkey’s joining the Central Powers, a direct overland route would have to be opened through Serbia. That would have to be done once the crisis on the eastern front had been overcome.34 The center of opposition to Falkenhayn’s strategic vision was Ober Ost. Both Hindenburg and Ludendorff, as well as some of their senior staff, were convinced that the way to victory in the west lay through knocking Russia out of the war. To some degree, this attitude is normal for any commander and staff in a major command. Senior staff officer Max Hoffmann, for example, wrote in his diary on April 3, 1915, that the center of gravity of the war must be shifted to the east. In the same entry, he then discounted the possibility of a separate peace with Russia, going so far as to claim that even if Nicholas II did try to negotiate, the Grand Duke would have him murdered!35 Second, Hindenburg and Ludendorff also believed that a decisive victory in the east was a possibility in 1915. Taking Russia out of the war would free up the extra forces needed for the final decisive offensive in the west. Ludendorff, in particular was also very much attracted to the notions of eastern expansion so dear to pan-German groups.36 Aside from differences on strategy, there was no small amount of personal animus against Falkenhayn emanating from Ober Ost, but the reasons are not readily apparent. Hindenburg did not say anything in his memoir, although he must have regarded himself as far more qualified than Falkenhayn from the perspective of age (he was fourteen years older than Falkenhayn) and rank (Hindenburg was a Generalfeldmarschall, while even after a quick promotion, Falkenhayn was still a General der Infanterie).37 Hoffmann derided Falkenhayn as an “evil genius,” while Ludendorff dismissed Falkenhayn as a “gambler.”38 The reason for criticism in such personal terms, however, is not entirely clear. Aside from the almost-constant sniping from Ober Ost and other senior officers, Falkenhayn had another problem to deal with: geography. The normal location of OHL was on the western front. Falkenhayn believed that under Moltke, OHL’s control over the German armies in the west was too loose. Thus, at the end of September 1914, as Falkenhayn was becoming the de facto head of OHL, its location was moved from Luxemburg to the Mézières-Charleville area. As for the eastern front, Ober Ost was generally left to its own devices.39 The situation on the eastern front in 1915, however, demanded that Falkenhayn and OHL go to there to work closely with Austro-Hungarian AOK. For this purpose, an alternate OHL site was established at Pless, roughly about an hour’s ride by auto from AOK in Teschen. When Falkenhayn had to travel to Pless, he would have to go by train, taking most of the OHL staff with him. To handle matters in the west, a deputy operations officer, Fritz von Lossberg, was left behind in Mézières with seven General Staff officers.40

Strategists, Strategy, Operations, and Coalition Warfare

In many ways, Falkenhayn was a man of the twentieth century. In trying to overcome the difficulties associated with directing Germany’s war effort over such vast distances, Falkenhayn embraced every modern means of communications available. OHL in Mézières was well equipped with telegraph, wireless radio, and telephone. Given the amount of traveling that Falkenhayn had to do and the distances involved, Falkenhayn regarded personal meetings as too time-consuming. Falkenhayn thus tried to do as much business as possible by telephone.41 A far different personality was Falkenhayn’s counterpart at AOK, Generaloberst Franz Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf. Conrad came from a military family. Conrad’s father, Franz Xaver Conrad von Hötzendorf, was a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars who had fought at Leipzig in October 1813. After that, he enjoyed a lengthy career in the cavalry until he was disabled while leading his regiment against revolutionaries in 1848. Born on November 11, 1852, Conrad followed in his father’s footsteps. Attending the Maria Theresa Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt, Conrad graduated in 1871 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in the infantry. Over the next four decades, Conrad enjoyed a highly successful career. His record as a division commander established him as a very innovative officer. His greatest notoriety, however, was during his tenure as an instructor at the Austro-Hungarian War College, where Conrad earned a reputation as a military writer and theorist. A dynamic teacher, he gathered around him a coterie of officers who became his devoted protégés.42 In contrast to Falkenhayn, Conrad was much more a man of the nineteenth century. Conrad distrusted the telephone and thus tended to shun the device. Instead, he preferred personal meetings, and then the next day he would write a lengthy memo, often arguing precisely the opposite of what had been decided the day before at the meeting. Even their writing styles were very different. Conrad’s written communications were done so in the kind of florid style common in nineteenth-century German. Individual sentences could run on for as long as eight or ten lines or more. Falkenhayn, by comparison, was a man of few words. His written communications were penned in the kind of clipped, terse style that was the very essence of Prussia.43 Falkenhayn and Conrad differed in couple other critical ways. As noted previously, Falkenhayn had to do a great deal of traveling. Conrad, in contrast, was generally stationary, once AOK was established in Teschen. While he would go to various places for the occasional meeting with Falkenhayn or Ober Ost, Conrad rarely left AOK headquarters at Teschen. Normally, Falkenhayn would come to Teschen after an hour’s trip by automobile from Pless. This tended to work against Conrad in the sense that the two men presented very different images. After a one-hour trip at high speed in an open automobile, Falkenhayn would project an image of youthful vigor, with a dust-covered overcoat and goggles and a cigar clenched in his teeth. He would loom over the

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older and shorter Conrad, who would greet Falkenhayn wearing an immaculate uniform, the very image of the word “punctilious.”44 Conrad also found one other way in which to distinguish himself from his German and Russian counterparts. On January 20, 1915, Conrad was visited in Teschen by his mistress, Gina von Reininghaus. While Conrad was a widower, Reininghaus was married to Hans von Reininghaus, the Austrian hotel magnate. After a lengthy and complicated process that took up a good deal of Conrad’s time in 1915, Gina obtained a divorce and Conrad was able to marry her. The happy couple set up housekeeping in Teschen, and other officers at AOK took their cue from such an example.45 The picture of idyllic domesticity in Teschen presented a stark contrast to the Spartan conditions that obtained at Stavka in Baranovici. It also did not sit well with AOK’s German counterparts, who were accustomed to the more businesslike atmosphere at OHL. German officers posted in Vienna or Teschen, like attaché (and strictly observant Catholic) Karl von Kaganeck, were outraged at such apparent Viennese moral and military lassitude. More practically, Teschen was simply too far away from the front to allow AOK to exercise control over armies in Galicia or Serbia.46 The leaders of the Central Powers met in Berlin at the War Ministry on January 1, 1915. The conference was attended by Falkenhayn, Conrad, Ludendorff, and the kaiser. With four new German corps about to be activated, the use of those new formations had to be discussed. Another major concern was the besieged fortress of Przemys´l, as well as the perilous situation of the Austro-Hungarian forces in the Carpathians. Conrad desired help in the form of a German offensive. This was music to Ludendorff’s ears, as Ober Ost was already pressing OHL for forces for a new offensive in East Prussia. In addition, Conrad asked for German forces to shore up the AustroHungarian forces in the Carpathians, allowing him to free up forces for a forthcoming offensive aimed at breaking through the Russian positions in the Carpathian passes and pressing on to Przemys´l.47 In regard to shoring up the Austro-Hungarians in the Carpathians, Falkenhayn sought to kill two birds with one stone. After some consideration and consultation by telephone with Ober Ost, Falkenhayn agreed to send forces to the Carpathians. This would ultimate turn into the Süd Army, headed by hawk-nosed General der Infanterie Alexander von Linsingen. The Süd Army would have the German XXIV Reserve Corps, with the 1st Infantry Division, 3rd Guards Infantry Division, and the 48th Reserve Division. The AustroHungarian component would be composed of Group Hofmann (55th Infantry Division and 131st Landsturm Brigade), the 12th Landsturm Brigade, the 19th Infantry Division, plus the 5th and 10th Cavalry Divisions. Once assembled, the Süd Army would be inserted into the Carpathian front between the Austro-Hungarian Third Army and the eponymous Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin, an army-sized unit that held the southernmost part of the line, extending down to the Romanian border.48 Falkenhayn named

Strategists, Strategy, Operations, and Coalition Warfare

Ludendorff as Linsingen’s chief of staff, thus once again seeking to break up the Hindenburg-Ludendorff combination. To the south of the German Ninth Army, another combined force, Army Detachment Woyrsch, would cover the line to the left flank of the Austro-Hungarian First Army.49 Unfortunately for Falkenhayn, his second attempt to break up the firm of Hindenburg and Ludendorff was no more successful than the first. The move was recognized for what it was, and Ludendorff quickly raised a fuss. Hindenburg also took the extraordinary step of threatening to resign. Wilhelm II understandably took this high-handed stunt rather negatively, referring to Hindenburg as the “new Wallenstein,” the able-but-unscrupulous Austrian general in the Thirty Years’ War. Ultimately, Hindenburg and Ludendorff got their way, but at a cost. General der Infanterie Paulus Alfred Wilhelm von Stolzmann became the Süd Army’s chief of staff. The behavior of Ober Ost, however, put them on the kaiser’s bad side. Thus, for the coming months, every time Ober Ost clashed with OHL, Wilhelm would invariably side with OHL.50 Since the new situation demanded a much-closer degree of cooperation between OHL and AOK, the position of liaison officer was an important one. The task of liaison officers at a headquarters is to present the views of their commander to the commander at the headquarters where they were posted. Liaison officers, especially in a coalition setting, are also intelligence collectors, gathering as much information as possible about the allied force. That normally involves developing close personal relationships with not just the commander at the headquarters but also some of the key staff officers. In this regard, OHL was much better served than AOK. The Austro-Hungarian liaison officer at OHL was General der Infanterie Count Josef von Stürgkh, the brother of the Count Karl von Stürgkh, minister president of Austria. A career officer, Stürgkh was assigned as the AustroHungarian liaison officer to OHL upon the outbreak of the war. Stürgkh, however, did not leave Vienna for OHL until August 7, 1914.51 Once at OHL, Stürgkh did not make much of an effort to develop sources of information among the OHL staff. For their part, the Germans were not forthcoming with information. Thus, over the course of 1914, both Stürgkh and AOK were in the dark about the conduct of the campaign in the west and Moltke’s gradual breakdown.52 Far more successful in this assignment was Colonel (later Generalmajor) August von Cramon. Born on April 7, 1861, Cramon received his commission as a lieutenant on February 13, 1883. He then enjoyed a successful career in the cavalry, including a stint as commander of the Guards Cuirassier Regiment. Serving as VII Corps chief of staff in August 1914, Cramon went through the summer campaign of 1914 in that capacity. In the fall of 1914, he did a short tour as commander of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade in the Champagne region of France. At the end of January 1915 Falkenhayn appointed Cramon as OHL’s liaison officer to AOK.53 Once at Teschen, Cramon was assisted in his job by a few others. This included Kaganeck occasionally, as he often split his time between Vienna

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and Teschen. Cramon also had the assistance of an intelligence officer, initially his nephew Captain Fritz von Rothkirch, and Rothkirch’s relief, Paul Fleck, when Rothkirch rotated to a new assignment.54 Cramon was a very successful liaison officer for a few reasons. First, he was able to gain Conrad’s trust, not an easy thing, given the often fraught relationship between Falkenhayn and Conrad. Second, Cramon was able to develop good relationships with some key staff officers at AOK, including Feldmarschallleutnant Anton Hoefer, Conrad’s operations officer, and AOK’s intelligence officer, Oskar Hranilovac. In addition, Cramon was also able to tap into the network of attachés in the neutral countries, probably through Kaganeck’s offices.55 As a result of Cramon’s efforts, Falkenhayn was blessed with a wealth of information about Austro-Hungarian operations. Cramon provided a report to OHL on AOK every day, usually by telegraph. Longer reports might be done by letter. The extant communications between Falkenhayn and Cramon reveal a great amount of detail about Conrad’s operations, as well as any information about Russian movements detected by Austro-Hungarian intelligence or German military attachés, especially the attaché in Bulgaria. August von Mackensen, who would figure prominently in the campaign of 1915, regarded Cramon as a most felicitous choice for such a position.56 For both Falkenhayn and Conrad, a favorable outcome on the eastern front would have one other positive effect: the influence such an event would exert on the neutral countries following the war closely. Of major concern, especially to Conrad, was Italy. Having effectively withdrawn from the Triple Alliance in 1914, Italy was now regarded as clearly leaning toward entering the war against Austria-Hungary. Falkenhayn’s suggestion that AustriaHungary make some concessions to Italy in the Tirol and Dalmatia prompted a sarcastic comment from Conrad that Germany should cede Alsace-Lorraine to France.57A quick victory over Russia might dissuade the government of Antonio Salandra from taking the plunge, at least against Austria-Hungary. Two other neutrals also in play were Romania and Bulgaria. A continued Russian possession of the Carpathian passes—or, even worse, an advance from there on to the Hungarian plain—could bring a Romanian intervention. Russia had promised support for Romania’s territorial claims against Hungary.58 As for Bulgaria, Falkenhayn and Conrad agreed that Bulgarian participation was a prerequisite for any new operation against Serbia. Thus, a major victory over Russia would perhaps simultaneously discourage Romanian intervention while it would draw Bulgaria into the war.59 By the beginning of 1915, those officers on both sides responsible for the conduct of the war on the eastern front had made decisions for the coming year. Broad concepts were decided upon, and the mechanisms created to turn those concepts into plans then went into operation. The execution of those plans would depend upon the institutions created for just that purpose. An examination of those military establishments is now in order.

CHAPTER THREE

Equipping the Man and Manning the Equipment

Our troops are brave but young. In attack they are not as good as the old troops. —Erich Ludendorff, April 1, 19151 So we had to mount again, which was always the worst part, for since conscription had been introduced the requisitioned horses were as gun-shy as the reservists who had been called up were wretched horsemen. —Austrian cavalry trooper Oskar Kokoschka, 19152 As cadres melted away, reinforcements arrived untrained, and what was worse, unarmed. —Anton Denikin3 By early 1915, all of the armies that had gone to war in 1914 had endured five months of sustained and often heavy combat. What kind of shape were the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian armies in by January 1915? How did each of them compare to their opponents, and even their allies, in terms of both man power and equipment? Of the three armies on the eastern front, the Austro-Hungarian Army was easily the most severely impacted by the campaigns of 1914. Hamstrung at times by the political structure of the dual monarchy (the Hungarian Honved was larger and often better funded than the Austrian Army) and chronically underfunded, the Austro-Hungarian army in 1914 was easily the most fragile

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of the combatants on the eastern front. Cramon, a sympathetic observer who well understood the army’s capabilities and limitations, later stated that the army could mount a major campaign against Serbia, but that was about it.4 By early 1915, probably the most amazing thing about the Austro-Hungarian army was that it was still in existence. Losses had been severe, totaling about 957,000, including 189,000 killed and 278,000 taken prisoner. Half of the prewar officer corps had become casualties (over 26,000), including over 3,100 killed.5 Losses in equipment were also huge, with over 1,000 guns lost, along with 150,000 horses. Only a small percentage of the losses in equipment had been made good.6 The war ministries of Austria and Hungary had been able to raise the man power for the coming campaign of 1915. The tempo of operations and the pace of losses, however, meant a clear-if-unavoidable degradation in the standard of training. Although a million men were found for military service, a large portion of the men were not fully trained. Austria-Hungary lacked the kind of large pool of trained reservists that was such a critical component of the German army.7 Far worse was the matter of replacing losses of company-grade officers and noncommissioned officers. This was especially true given the polyglot nature of the empire and the linguistic requirements for officers. The potential replacement officers often lacked the education to master the requisite amount of German, the language of command. One historian described them as “no more than civilians in uniforms.” Thus, the Austro-Hungarian army would almost invariably be short of officers.8 The army’s diverse ethnic nature was also cause for concern. This was especially true for some of the Slavic units in the army and their willingness to fight against the Russians. Such concerns seemed justified when it appeared that some Czech and Romanian units were behaving badly in the face of the Russians. Desertions of soldiers from the Trentino and the Tirol to Italy and Switzerland were a problem in 1914, and such worries could only be heightened by the prospect of Italy’s declaration of war against Austria-Hungary.9 Logistics was also an area where the Austro-Hungarian Army was suffering. The enormous losses in artillery had not been made good, with less than one-third of the 1,000 lost guns replaced. In August 1914, Austria-Hungary had about 2,500,000 modern rifles on hand. The annual production of 150,000 rifles could not compete with the losses suffered. Thus, of the million men called up for service in 1915, only one-third could be equipped with the most modern rifle, the Steyr Mannlicher M1895. The remaining men had to be armed with older models.10 Losses in transport had also been considerable. Over 150,000 horses had been lost, and a large amount of rolling stock in Galicia had been destroyed or captured.11 The loss of transport impacted the Austro-Hungarian indirectly in other ways. Specialty equipment, such as proper seasonal uniforms,

Equipping the Man and Manning the Equipment

was not sent to the troops in anything like a timely fashion. Although the Austrian official history claimed that there were ample supplies of the proper clothing for winter, thanks to the efforts of the home front, the reality at the front was a different matter. The British officer at Stavka, Alfred Knox, noted that an Austro-Hungarian officer had recorded in his diary how six men and one officer in his unit had frozen to death in one night in November. The troops in the Carpathians in January 1915 were still clad in summer uniforms, having to endure the severe cold. This led to numerous casualties from frostbite, a loss that was in many ways avoidable.12 This war, like every war, disparately impacted the various branches of the Austro-Hungarian army. The infantry had priority on being refitted and equipped, although, as we have seen, only a portion could be rearmed with the most modern rifles available. The cavalry, on the other hand, had largely disappeared after the first five months of combat. The 1914 campaigns had been expensive, in terms not only of man power but also horseflesh. The remaining horses had to be reserved for more logistically oriented tasks, such as hauling wagons or guns. In addition, the lightly armed and relatively small cavalry divisions would have to devote a portion of their limited strength to care for the horses in static situations. Thus, a large number of cavalry regiments had to be dismounted permanently. Regiments that retained a mounted status had their own problems. New horses had to be acclimated to the peculiarities of military service, such as the report of firearms. Replacement cavalrymen also proved to be poor horsemen. Additionally, Austro-Hungarian cavalry did not employ the lance, an item that both the Russian and the German cavalry still regarded as valuable in mounted combat, even in 1915.13 The Austro-Hungarian artillery was also in poor shape. Even before the start of the war, Austro-Hungarian infantry divisions had the fewest guns, compared to similar Russian and German formations. The inability to make good losses suffered in 1914 ensured that the Austro-Hungarian infantry would continue to be hampered by a lack of adequate field artillery support. Measures such as bringing older or obsolete models back into service were but acts of desperation. On the more positive side, the Austro-Hungarian army could still field high-quality heavy artillery pieces, such as the 305 mm heavy howitzers that were critical to destroying the forts at Liege. Rarer but even more effective were the larger 380 mm howitzers. The production of shells also lagged. In 1914, Austria-Hungary produced a total of 375,000 artillery shells. Over 1915, this would more than double to 950,000. In any case, this was grossly insufficient to meet the needs of industrialized warfare.14 The Austro-Hungarians could still put a small number of aircraft aloft. As in all other areas of military endeavor, the Austro-Hungarian air service (part of the army) was small and underfunded. Although the Austro-Hungarian air service had expanded a bit over the course of 1914 and into 1915, it was

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still small.15 However limited in number, aircraft were critical. Aircraft were far better suited, theoretically at least, to reconnaissance than cavalry, especially in conducting distant reconnaissance. In the context of early 1915, aircraft were critical in maintaining communications between AOK and the besieged fortress of Przemys´l. The long-term continuance of air activity, however, would be at risk if the Russians continued to hold the Galician oil fields.16 All taken together, the Austro-Hungarian Army in early 1915 had shown surprising resilience. It had persevered in the face of enormous losses and paid a heavy price for years of parsimony. Whether or not it could now make up the deficit in resources while in the midst of war was open to question. Even more unknown was whether or not the army could overcome the ethnic issues that threatened to tear the empire apart while fighting a potentially existential conflict. Thus, the early 1915 Austro-Hungarian army, while still an active military force, was still a very fragile one. The German army, like its Austro-Hungarian ally, had also absorbed the shock of combat 1914. It, too, had suffered a tremendous number of casualties. Nonetheless, the German army was in much better condition than its Austro-Hungarian counterpart. The German practice of maintaining a large pool of reservists paid dividends in terms of having large numbers of men available for duty. The downside was that many of the reserve formations committed to combat late in 1914 lacked adequate training and tactical acumen at the regimental level and below. Otto Köhler, for example, was drafted in the summer of 1914, and after ten weeks of training, he was due to be sent to the front as an infantryman. Fortunately for Köhler, a medical student, he was suddenly posted to a Landwehr medical company that was part of the 88th Infantry Division. Units with such rapidly trained men as Köhler took unnecessarily high casualties at the ill-considered attack at Ypres in November 1914.17 Nonetheless, the survivors were now well experienced in combat. By early 1915, it is not hyperbole to say that any distinction between regular and reserve units in terms of capability was rapidly disappearing.18 The new men, be they draftees or reservists, still had the spirit of 1914. Ernst Günter Schallert, a young (twenty-two-year-old) member of the Prussian Guard, informed his parents on January 10, 1915, that his brother Helmut had succumbed to his wounds. Despite the grief, Schallert still expressed the feeling and his willingness “to do our duty to the Fatherland.” Such sentiments were not rare. Ismar Becker, a Jewish soldier serving at Ober Ost, wrote to Sigmund Feist (the director of Berlin’s Jewish orphanage) on March 7, 1915, expressing the hope that a really decisive victory would be won soon.19 The blurring of the difference between regular and reservist in the face of combat experience and losses had a social impact as well. Fritz Philipps, a

Equipping the Man and Manning the Equipment

student from Jena, expressed surprise on December 8, 1914, at his promotion to lieutenant and his assignment to the 2nd Guards Grenadier (Kaiser Franz) Regiment. As might be expected, before the war, the roster of officers of such a regiment was filled with officers from the nobility. So many officers had been casualties, however, that as early as December 1914, positions for officers in Guards regiments had to be filled with nonnobles and even officers with reserve commissions. Thus, as long as the war went on, the German army would continue to undergo a social revolution of sorts.20 The German soldier enjoyed the support of an array of weapons that were the best that an industrialized economy could produce. The basic infantry weapon, the Mauser Gewehr 98, although not quite the equal of the American 1903 Springfield in handling or the British Lee Enfield in rate of fire, was nonetheless an excellent weapon in its own right. The Mauser design was reliable and tough, and as it was manufactured to incredibly fine tolerances, it was extraordinarily accurate. This capability made it very attractive to the German army, which prided itself on developing its soldiers into skilled marksmen. Cavalry troopers were armed with a carbine version of the weapon, and for operations such as the invasion of Serbia, infantry could be armed similarly as well.21 One critical weapon, the importance of which the German army had judged correctly before the war, was the machine gun. Instead of dispersing machine guns among battalions in a regiment or brigade, each German infantry regiment had a machine gun company, with six Maxim machine guns. This unique organization gave a German infantry regiment commander the ability to concentrate fire at a specific point. Another important weapon was the mortar, but in the German Army of World War I, such weapons were the province of the engineer branch and thus an asset at the disposal of the infantry division commander.22 German army artillery was in the midst of transition. The test of war in 1914 had revealed deficiencies in the German artillery. The standard German field gun, the 77 mm C-96nA, proved inferior to the French 75 mm gun in regard to range, but had its advantages as well, such as its armored shield and better handling. Ammunition consumption rates proved to be far beyond the prewar estimates, which were decades old. Also, the constant wear on the gun tubes resulted in unexpected losses in guns.23 Given the experience gained in 1914, one element of artillery practice that the Germans sought to improve was high-angled fire. Thus, the army began to slowly phase out the C-96nA, refitting it with a howitzer carriage to allow for high-angle fire. Also gaining in favor was the lFH 98/09 105 mm light howitzer.24 In addition, the German army expanded its park of heavy artillery, which was classified as starting with 150 mm caliber, ranging up to the 210 mm howitzer. Also expanded was the park of super heavy artillery, starting with the L/12 280 mm howitzer (Mörser), going up to the Krupp M Gerät

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420 mm howitzer, more popularly known as the “Big Bertha.” The heavy artillery was an asset for a corps, army, or army group commander to allocate as needed.25 The German cavalry was having a difficult time adjusting to the realities of modern warfare. German cavalry divisions were too lightly armed to have a major impact on the battlefield, however valorously they performed, especially on the western front. A German cavalry division had the same number of machine guns as an infantry regiment. Once positional warfare became the order of the day in the west, about the only thing to be done was to dismount the cavalry units and rotate them through spells of duty in the trenches as infantry.26 On the eastern front, however, there was still scope for the employment of cavalry. When the war began, the only German cavalry on the eastern front was the 1st Cavalry Division. For the 1915 campaign, the 1st Cavalry Division would have plenty of company. By early 1915, there were six cavalry divisions in Ober Ost’s area of responsibility.27 Nonetheless, the employment of cavalry remained problematic. Cavalry divisions remained lightly armed. Requirements to hold the lines demanded that regiments spent periods of time in the trenches. When not in the trenches, regiments were used as emergency forces, positioned near the front in case of enemy attack. Regimental histories noted how this was duty for which the cavalry was ill suited. Such periods, however, did allow the regiments to get rest and care for their horses.28 Given the size of the eastern front, it seemed that cavalry once more might have scope for employment, although that would depend on the course of operations. The principal mission of the cavalry is reconnaissance. Even before the war, however, it was becoming clear that the mission of reconnaissance was being usurped by the emerging technology of aircraft. Moltke decided that the German army should buy aircraft in 1911, a policy the Bavarian War Ministry followed a year later. The employment of aircraft was codified in doctrine when the army produced an aviation manual in 1913, and reconnaissance was declared to be its principal mission.29 In 1914, the German army had an inventory of 230 aircraft. Each German army and corps commander had an aviation detachment at his disposal, and the Germans could also employ airships. Aircraft proved to be a major asset to the German army on the eastern front in 1914. Reconnaissance missions brought critical information that enabled the Eighth Army to execute the encirclement of the Russian 2nd Army at Tannenberg. Hindenburg later said that the victory would not have been possible without the efforts of the aviators.30 One practice the Germans quickly mastered was the ability to employ aircraft in the role of spotting for artillery, thus enabling the artillery to adjust its fire. This practice made a considerable impression on the Russians. On January 4, 1915, a Russian infantry lieutenant told the Russian Jewish writer

Equipping the Man and Manning the Equipment

S. A. An-sky about how once a German observation plane located a Russian battery, the pilot would indicate the target by firing a flare. German artillery would then bring down highly accurate fire on the target. The lieutenant wondered why the Russians failed to engage in this practice. Bombing raids were also conducted, but this activity was limited largely to airships and was of limited effectiveness. Of three combatants on the eastern front, the Germans were the most advanced in regard to airpower.31 Perhaps the weakest part of the German army was logistics, although one could argue that this weakness was more a matter of planning than capability. When it came to operational planning, too often logistical considerations, which should have been critical, were simply ignored or brushed aside with hopelessly optimistic assumptions.32 The German army, however, did have some important capabilities in regard to supporting and sustaining its soldiers. For many German soldiers, the most important cannon in the German army was the “goulash cannon,” the term used by soldiers for field kitchens. Intelligent commanders such as August von Mackensen recognized the importance of such services in enabling soldiers to meet the high demands of war, especially in a mobile campaign like Tannenberg.33 Theoretically, the German army’s medical services should have been outstanding. Germany was a leader in the field of medicine and public health before the war. During the war, Germany mobilized over 24,000 doctors, the great majority of whom served in the field. Like every other military in World War I, the German military medical services were overwhelmed by the factor of scale. The sheer number of casualties and the severe environment of the eastern front reduced care in field hospitals to a standard slightly above the American Civil War, with amputations being the most common procedure.34 The medical service on the eastern front was also responsible for minimizing the impact of disease. To be sure, this duty was also undertaken by medical units on the western front, especially in regard to typhoid fever and dysentery.35 On the eastern front, however, this duty took on a major cultural significance. In an institutional sense, the German army reflected the outlook of German society, or at least its elite element, in regard to the area beyond Germany’s eastern front. The “east,” which included some areas of Austria-Hungary, was an area untamed by civilization; inhabited by people regarded as backward, at least culturally; and rampant with all manner of disease, including typhus, cholera, and spotted fever. Such concerns were made more acute when someone close to the German leadership, such as the son of Wilhelm II’s adjutant, Hans von Plessen, was hospitalized with typhus while serving on the eastern front. Thus, the medical service, while dealing with these issues as well as those wounded in combat, also built and ran the delousing stations near the frontier, which every German, regardless of rank, had to go through before leaving the eastern front for Germany or even other theaters.36

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In early 1915, the German army was still a robust force, although it had undergone severe trials. It was also a learning organization and certainly sought to incorporate the experience gained in the first five months of war. How well these lessons were learned, or even if they were the right ones, would be discovered over the course of 1915. Like its two opponents, the Russian army also had to deal with the shock of combat on a massive scale. The execution of the Russian mobilization plan had mixed results. The speed of the mobilization allowed the northwest front to mount an offensive, although with incomplete forces, that served to surprise the German high command, although the result was disastrous for the Russians. The mobilization of the southwest front moved at a slower pace. In the end, however, the pace of mobilization allowed Ivanov to develop his strength so that it came to bear against the Austro-Hungarians after Conrad’s armies had suffered losses in the initial battles.37 Like all of the other armies that fought in 1914, the one thing the Russian army had not anticipated was the scale of the losses suffered. The Russian army had not invested much effort in the development of a large reserve component, like the German army’s. The army had a pool of about 200,000 trained reservists in 1914, and this stock of man power was exhausted very quickly. The ability to replace losses was hindered by a very complicated system of exemptions based on nationality and occupation, which would result over time in social unrest. Matters were made worse by the statistical department of the Russian General Staff, which was regarded as a place where well connected incompetents could be warehoused until their retirement.38 Like the other armies of World War I, the Russian War Ministry instituted a program of compressed training to generate replacements. Recruits coming from the replacement depots were kept away from the front and put through an “accelerated training” program. Ideally the course also allowed for the identification of prospective NCOs. These men, along with those tasked with using equipment such as machine guns or artillery pieces, would be given additional training, conducted by combat experienced officers.39 Judgments of the program’s effectiveness varied, depending upon the position of the examiner. Danilov, reflecting the rather detached position of Stavka, thought the program successful. Officers closer to the front, such as Anton Denikin, implied that the program was a failure. Too many replacements arrived at the front lacking in training and, in many cases, without even rifles.40 The Russian infantryman of 1915 was basically a sturdy fellow, inured to hardship. When well trained, he was skilled in the art of camouflage and tenacious in the defense. In the attack, the Russian infantryman was hamstrung by poorly conceived tactics. The Russian infantry was well armed, when it was armed. The standard Russian infantry weapon, the Mosin-Nagant

Equipping the Man and Manning the Equipment

M91 bolt action rifle, was a fine weapon, qualitatively on a par with its other European equivalents. The machine gun was also based on the Maxim gun system, like almost every other major European army. The Russian army emphasized marksmanship in its training. It also had a tradition of raising sniping to a high degree. When the Russians had the ability to employ firepower in the right circumstances, they could give their opponents, be they Austro-Hungarian or German, a bloody nose.41 The Russian army had a tradition of employing cavalry, both regular and irregular, going all the way back to Peter the Great. The individual Russian cavalryman was, in the words of Knox, “a fine man well mounted.”42 Nikolai Nikolaevich had spent a great deal of time and effort during his tenure as inspector general of cavalry introducing reforms to modernize the cavalry and enable it to meet the demands of modern war. The regular Russian cavalry was well equipped and able to fight both mounted and on foot against its opponents. It was equipped with a carbine version of the M91 and, like the German cavalry, preferred the lance for mounted combat.43 Aside from regular cavalry, the Russians also employed large numbers of irregular cavalry, notably in the form of Cossack divisions. The Cossacks retained their reputation as horsemen. While ill suited to major action on the battlefield, in mobile situations, swarms of Cossacks often served to reduce German cavalry reconnaissance missions to exercises in futility, as one German army document later admitted.44 The Cossacks also retained their welldeserved reputation for indiscipline. They were notorious for looting and mistreating civilians, particularly the Jewish population living within the Pale of Settlement.45 The Russian artillery was armed with a fine field piece, a 76 mm gun, the near equivalent of the French 75 mm gun, and the Russian army had 6,200 of these weapons in 1914. Heavier artillery was lacking. In 1914, the Russian army had only 750 heavy field guns, a mix of pieces of 107 mm, 122 mm, and 152 mm caliber, mostly of French design. Howitzers and mortars were in short supply. Larger guns, those over 200 mm in caliber, generally went to the fortresses in Russian Poland.46 Like its opponents, Russia had a fledgling air arm, dating from 1912, when the army bought a French Bleriot machine and instituted a training program at Gatchina.47 Russian military aviation was aided by the patronage of Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich. The promotion of aviation by both the government and civil society, plus the French alliance, enabled the Russian army to create an air service that possessed 244 aircraft in 1914, the second-largest such force in the world.48 In 1915, the Russians had the first long-range aircraft unit, the Eskadra Vozdushykh Korablei, or EVK, the Squadron of Flying Ships. Based on Igor Sikorsky’s Ilya Muromets, the most advanced multiengine aircraft of the day, able to carry up to six hundred pounds of bombs, the EVK was subordinated

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Turning Points

directly to Stavka. The EVK could conduct bombing, reconnaissance, or transport missions. Although the Ilya Muromets did have its critics, including Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich and Brusilov, the EVK provided Stavka with a potentially important capability.49 While each of the branches of the Russian army was capable of performing well in its own right, the problem was getting them to act in concert. Each branch preferred to act independently of the others. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich’s reforms had modernized the Russian cavalry, but they were designed to enable the cavalry to operate independently of the other branches. The artillery, the most technologically advanced and best educated branch, looked upon the infantry with disdain and often failed to support the foot soldiers. Early on in the war, commanders failed to make use of aircraft for reconnaissance, even though the action of Captain Viktor Tkachev in August 1914 proved vital to the Russian 4th Army at Krasnik. Nor was there any attempt to integrate aircraft and artillery, a failure that was not lost on perceptive Russian infantry officers.50 Thus each branch of the Russian army fought its own war. For the Russian army, logistics was something of a mixed bag. Once war began, the railroad service descended into chaos, much of which was due to unclear lines of authority. Theoretically, a rail line remained under civilian control until it came into an area near the front, when control of the rail line passed to the military authorities. In reality, once war began, civil railroad officials were happy to cede all authority to military officers and then left the military to figure things out, not bothering to lift a finger. In addition, no real attempt was made to overcome the rail gauge barrier between Russia, a problem that mattered most in Galicia, where a relatively deep penetration of enemy territory had been made. Beyond the railroad, logistics depended on horses. The Russians did better in this regard, when the Grand Duke instituted a horse depot system that served to correct the initial inadequacies. Logistics would remain a critical continuing problem for the Russian army. Even though the Russian economy expanded considerably, if insufficiently, in producing the material for the army, getting weapons and ammunition to the front remained problematic. The chief of staff of the Russian 9th Army told Knox in November 1914 that the “miserable railway service” kept his soldiers short of small arms ammunition, let alone artillery shells.51 Other logistical aspects of the Russian army were reasonably good. The Russian soldier was well fed and supported by medical services that were equivalent with their opponents, especially once soldiers were evacuated from the theater of war back to the homeland. Russia had a large Red Cross organization, and civil organizations such as the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Towns created networks of hospitals. These were supplemented by ethnically based hospitals, such as Jewish hospitals.52

Equipping the Man and Manning the Equipment

The greatest weakness of the Russian army, however, was not material but psychological. The vast majority of the soldiers serving in Russia’s forces were illiterate. Many had no real understanding of the cause for which they were fighting. The Russian government tried to stimulate patriotism amongst the illiterate soldiery by means of the graphic arts, including Lubki and postcards. The upper levels of Russian government and society persisted in the notion that the mystical bond between the tsar and his loyal peasant soldiers would see the country through the ordeal of war.53 Such attitudes were hopelessly naive, given the events of 1905 and the aftermath, where resentments lingered. Being part of a multiethnic empire, Russian soldiers took a view that looked more toward a local identity rather than a Russian one. Thus, in terms of its morale, the tone of the Russian army had withstood the shocks of 1914, as defeats had also been offset with victories. Whether or not the Russian army’s morale could absorb the impact of a major defeat remained to be seen.54 All of the combatants on the eastern front went to war under the assumption that the war would be short. The strengths and the limitations of each had been tested by the strain of combat. Although losses had been heavy, each of the belligerents had survived intact, but the desired victory had eluded them. Now those armies would be tested again in 1915, this time in the harshest of environments.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Bloody Winter: January–February 1915

Evidently the enemy is expecting our offensive in this region [East Prussia], or is himself preparing some decisive action. —Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, January 26, 19151 Pray God that this will make the Russians give up the game. —General der Infanterie Robert Kosch, February 5, 19152 The attack in the Carpathians goes forward only very slowly, as only I have always believed. —Erich Ludendorff, February 2, 19153 Also infantry attacks are hardly possible since the men, sunk up to their chests in snow, move forward so slowly that they are shot down like rabbits by the Russians from their secure cover. —Count Harry Kessler, February 6, 19154 For the Central Powers in early 1915, the most critical word was the name Przemys´l. The prospective fall of the besieged fortress was regarded as a disaster by the Austro-Hungarian government as well as AOK. Militarily, Przemys´l’s fall would entail the loss of the large garrison of 130,000 officers and men, of which almost 35,000 were combat troops, plus the guns and other equipment in the fortress. Loss of the fortress would be a major blow to the already battered prestige of the Austro-Hungarian army and would provide a corresponding boost to the Russians. Diplomatically, the fall of Przemys´l, and the

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possible eruption of the Russian army on to the Hungarian plain, would make intervening in the war on the side of the Entente very attractive indeed to Italy and Romania.5 Conditions within the fortress presented a mixed picture. Although Przemys´l had held out, the condition of the fortress and the troops defending it were steadily deteriorating. The fortress commandant, General der Infanterie Hermann Kusmanek von Burgneustädten, was able to get messages to AOK by aircraft or by radio. He reported that food supplies could be extended to February 7, by means of slaughtering additional horses. The physical condition of the troops, however, was steadily worsening. Sending an order back to Kusmanek by aircraft, Conrad instructed him to form a breakout force of five divisions and to leave the fortress manned by a minimal garrison. Kusmanek’s breakout force was ideally to be used in conjunction with Conrad’s relief effort.6 Conrad hurriedly sought to put plans in motion to relieve the besieged fortress. The principal thrust was entrusted to the Austro-Hungarian Third Army, commanded by General der Infanterie Svetozar Boroevic´. Supporting attacks would be made by Linsingen’s Süd Army and Pflanzer-Baltin’s Army Group, in reality a reinforced corps.7 The forces required to make these attacks moved into their respective assembly areas over the first three weeks of January 1915. Austro-Hungarian forces moved by rail to Mezölaborcz, while the units of the Süd Army arrived in Munkacs, where Linsingen established his headquarters. The twenty divisions of the Austro-Hungarian Third Army and the Süd Army contained about 175,000 men, supported by 1,000 guns.8 Farther to the southeast, Pflanzer-Baltin’s forces held the extreme right Austro-Hungarian flank. Conrad was further buoyed when Falkenhayn confirmed that four corps were being sent to Ober Ost for an attack in East Prussia, to support Conrad’s effort.9 Even before the attack began, Conrad’s efforts ran into difficulties. Once off the trains, troops had to deal with the harsh environment of the Carpathian mountain range. The heavily forested Carpathian Mountains shape a large curve to the east and southeast. The mountain range was not high, the highest pass being about 2,000 feet. The area was extremely rugged, negotiable for large forces only at several major passes, most notably Dukla, Lupkov, and Uzsok Passes. The area had other dangers as well, especially for wounded soldiers. It was not uncommon for an Austro-Hungarian casualty list to have the following notation next to a soldier’s name: “devoured by wolves.”10 The difficulties of the terrain, bad enough in in itself, were compounded by the severe weather. Even as early as the fall of 1914, there were clear indications that the winter of 1914–1915 was going to be a very hard one. Uzsok Pass was hit by a heavy snowstorm on September 28, 1914. As early as November of 1914, there were instances of Austro-Hungarian soldiers freezing to death.11 By January 1915, the Carpathians were regularly lashed by

Bloody Winter: January–February 1915

heavy snowstorms. Even worse were the intermittent rainstorms, which promptly turned into a coating of ice on the ground, as temperatures regularly dipped well-below freezing. Thus, the troops, in the process of moving to their forward positions, often had to contend with deep snowdrifts sometimes over six feet. In some cases, units literally had to shovel their way forward.12 Troops also had to be equipped for mountain warfare. Heavier vehicles had to be exchanged for lighter ones, and vehicles had to be fitted with sleds in place of wheels. Proper clothing for the environment had to be issued as well. These materials were not available in sufficient quantity. Another item that was in high demand but in short supply was mountain artillery.13 Preparing for the impending offensive, the biggest problem the AustroHungarian and German forces had was a lack of troops trained for mountain warfare. For the Austro-Hungarians, the lack of mountain troops was a matter of short-sighted misuse. The Austro-Hungarian army had mountain units at the onset of war in 1914. These specialist troops, however, were committed to combat in Galicia in the summer of 1914, where they suffered grievous casualties. As for the Germans, their mountain troops did not yet exist. OHL, working with the Bavarian War Ministry, would create an Alpine Corps (actually a division-size formation composed of Bavarian units), but only over the spring and summer on 1915.14 As the deployment continued, other problems arose. The deployment itself was time-consuming, much more than Conrad wanted, although his timetable was rather unrealistic. With the Russians entrenched on the higher ground, soldiers and officers who were not careful fell victim to Russian sharpshooters. Thus, the Austro-Hungarian Third Army lost the element of surprise, which could have been critical, as Brusilov noted that his line was rather thinly spread at the time. The appearance of German troops in Munkacs was greeted warmly by the local population, a circumstance repeated in other Hungarian towns as well. The German soldiers, for their part, were rather curious about the strange appearance the local civilians presented. The arrival of German troops in Hungary was noticed not just by the Hungarians. The Russians also discovered the buildup of Linsingen’s army rather quickly as well.15 As the Austro-Hungarian Third Army and the Süd Army deployed, the commanders had to hash out details and coordination measures. This also presented a serious problem. The Austro-Hungarian Third Army’s line incorporated Dukla Pass; Lupkov Pass, which was the most direct route toward Przemys´l; and Uzsok Pass. These passes were widely separated. Bororevic´ was concerned that once his forces were engaged in the passes, they would be vulnerable to Russian counterattacks. Indeed, Brusilov desired just such an offensive, although Ivanov overruled him.16 Vereczke Pass, in the Süd Army’s sector, was closer to Uzsok Pass. The Süd Army’s principal mission was to protect the right flank of the Austro-Hungarian

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Third Army. On January 16, 1915, Boroevic´’s chief of staff, Generalmajor Adolf von Boog, came to Munkacs for a conference with the Süd Army staff to settle issues regarding the Third Army’s right flank and Süd Army’s left.17 Conrad’s plan was simple. Boroevic´’s Third Army would drive to the north. Once they were through the mountains, the advance would move straight on to relieve Przemys´l. The Third Army’s right flank would be covered by the Süd Army and Pflanzer-Baltin’s group, making their own subsidiary attacks. According to Conrad’s calculations, concern for the fate of Przemys´l did not allow for a more elegant solution.18 The Austro-Hungarian offensive started on January 23, 1915, and things went wrong almost immediately. The weather failed to cooperate, as the troops attacked Russian positions in the midst of a blizzard. The temperature hit a low of minus thirteen degrees Fahrenheit. The Austrian official history admitted that despite the most strenuous efforts, many troops had not been properly equipped for winter campaigning in the Carpathians. Conditions prevented the Austro-Hungarian Third Army from deploying its artillery in large numbers. Thus, Austro-Hungarian troops had to attack Russian defenses with inadequate artillery support.19 Consequently, the progress, when made at all, was painfully slow. The main effort of Boroevic´’s left, Archduke Joseph’s VII Corps, made no gains at all in trying to get through Dukla Pass. Farther south, Group Puhallo, commanded by Feldzeugmeister Paul Puhallo von Brlog and consisting of Puhallo’s V Corps as well as the XVIII Corps (in reality just one division) under Feldmarschallleutnant Heinrich Tschurtschentaler von Helmhein, tried to get through the area east of Lupkov Pass. Having to work through some of the toughest terrain in the Third Army’s sector, Puhallo’s Austro-Hungarian V Corps simply lacked the strength to get through the Russian defenses, especially in view of the harsh conditions.20 The best progress was made where Conrad desired it least. On the extreme right of Boroevic´’s line, the eponymous Group Szurmay, a reinforced corps commanded by Feldmarschallleutnant Alexander Szurmay, was able to gain control of Uzsok Pass, but again at terrible cost. Likewise, Linsingen’s attacks made progress in Vereczke Pass, before it too ran out of steam in the face of Russian opposition and brutal weather. Finally, minimal gains were made by Pflanzer-Baltin’s weak forces against equally thin Russian opposition.21 Conrad’s attacking forces were debilitated as much by the weather as by the Russian defenses. Transport difficulties, including a lack of sleds, prevented the delivery of warm food to the troops. Thus, soldiers had to go several nights in a row without hot food, as temperatures regularly dipped down to minus four degrees Fahrenheit. Inadequate clothing resulted in a dramatic increase in frostbite and hypothermia. Some wounded soldiers preferred to commit suicide, either by shooting or by exposing themselves to Russian fire, rather than face the “White Death,” a term applied to demises ranging from

Bloody Winter: January–February 1915

freezing to death to falling prey to roving packs of wolves. The Russians likewise suffered terribly from the privations.22 With the offensive fighting power of the Third Army effectively broken by the end of the month, Boroevic´’s fears were confirmed. On January 26, 1915, Ivanov asked Stavka for reinforcements. Although Stavka was more concerned about a potential German offensive against the northwest front, Ivanov was able to pry the XXII Corps from Ruzski’s hands and send it to Brusilov’s 8th Army. Brusilov then committed his right in an attack against the Boroevic´’s forces in the Dukla Pass area. Despite a shortage of artillery shells, the Russians tumbled the Austro-Hungarian III, VII, and X Corps back into the Laborcz Valley, and on February 6, Brusilov’s forces took Mezölaborcz.23 Despite his failure, Conrad would not stop. He was driven by several different considerations. First, with the Russians now in the Laborcz Valley and in control of Mezölaborcz, the Hungarian government was concerned about the prospect of a Russian invasion of Hungary. Second, in regard to coalition warfare, Conrad desperately wanted a victory that would belong exclusively to Austro-Hungarian army. Thus, he was willing to decline the offer of additional assistance from the Süd Army outside of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division to reinforce the Third Army. The attack would resume all along the line. Finally, Conrad was most concerned about Przemys´l’s deteriorating situation. Although Kusmanek was able to extend food supplies further by slaughtering more horses, starvation was beginning to exert its grip. The harsh winter, also marked there by heavy snows, inflicted the same kind of injuries on the garrison’s soldiers as those suffering in the Carpathians. Although the garrison and the civilians had some protection in the form of the buildings, the constant artillery fire had blown out all the windows. Ersatz materials could fill the gap, but inadequately. Help had to come soon. For Conrad, the fall of Przemys´l would almost certainly trigger the entry of Italy into the war against the Central Powers.24 Drawing reinforcements from the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army and receiving replacements, Conrad demanded that the offensive be renewed and that Mezölaborcz be recaptured. To prepare a new offensive where the first one had enjoyed whatever success it achieved, the Austro-Hungarian Second Army headquarters was inserted into what had been Boroevic´’s right. The Second Army commander, General der Kavallerie Edouard Baron von BöhmErmolli, would now exercise command over Group Szurmay, which would be reinforced by the German 3rd Guard Infantry Division, the only German help Conrad was willing to accept.25 Boroevic´’s Third Army continued its attacks into the third week of February, along with the Süd Army and Pflanzer-Baltin’s group. As before, Conrad’s main effort made little headway in the face of continued cold and deep snow, now combined at times with sudden thaws. Especially damaging to Conrad’s hopes was that Mezölaborcz remained in Russian hands. Likewise,

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the Süd Army also made slow progress, against well-dug-in Russian troops, even though the weather occasionally cleared enough to allow reconnaissance aircraft to provide information on the movement of Russian reinforcements and improve artillery accuracy. Pflanzer-Baltin’s group, however, made surprising progress despite its weakness. Opposed by weak Russian forces, Pflanzer-Baltin’s troops took Czernowitz on February 17 and ultimately reached Stanislau three days later.26 Conrad’s first two efforts had been costly failures. The Austro-Hungarian Third Army alone had suffered 89,000 casualties, roughly half of Boroevic´’s initial strength. Casualties in the Süd Army, while not readily available, were considerable. The 1st Grenadier Regiment, for example, counted on January 21, 1915, a strength of 2,569 officers and men. By February 12, 1915, the regiment’s strength was listed as 1,252 officers and men, roughly half of the regiment’s strength less than a month before.27 The gains made by Pflanzer-Baltin, which included taking 60,000 prisoners, did little to offset the losses. Conditions in the Carpathians now served to frustrate the Austro-Hungarians in other ways. While cold and snow had dominated in January, February’s weather was unpredictable. Heavy snowstorms and brutal cold now alternated with sudden thaws. As a result of the constantly changing conditions, the unit now regularly reported large numbers of sick, beyond the usual cases of frostbite. On February 12, 1915, for example, the Süd Army’s war diary recorded that in Linsingen’s German units, the 48th Reserve Division, reported losses of 4 killed, 30 wounded, 6 missing, and 35 sick.28 Two days later the German 1st Infantry Division reported losses of 15 killed, 34 wounded, and 68 sick.29 On February 21, 1915, the 3rd Guard Infantry Division reported losses of 9 killed, 27 wounded, and 165 sick. Harry Kessler, a staff officer at the Süd Army, noted the prevalence of intestinal maladies amongst troops already exhausted from having to deal with deep snow, mud, ice, and tough Russian resistance. Incidents of frostbite were especially damaging, since cases often ended with amputation of the effected limbs.30 Outside the titanic struggle in the Carpathians, the rest of the front that was under the aegis of AOK was quiet. Army Detachment Woyrsch, for example, spent January and February not doing much, aside from improving its trench system. Medical personnel were also trying to deal with the prospect of disease, with cholera being common. The number of cases served to overwhelm hospitals.31 Perhaps the most notable event was the visit on January 27 of a group of military attachés, including those from Romania, Italy, and the United States. The period of quiet also extended to Dankl’s AustroHungarian First Army. Indeed, there is no mention of Dankl’s army for the months of January and February of 1915 in the Austrian official history of the war.32 The failure of Conrad’s first effort to relieve Przemys´l had not gone unnoticed, either in Vienna, OHL, or Ober Ost. The Ballplatz was increasingly concerned

Bloody Winter: January–February 1915

about Italy. Although diametrically opposed on the general direction of the war, Falkenhayn, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff agreed that something had to be done to relieve Austria’s desperate situation.33 Thus the mantle for relieving the Austro-Hungarian emergency would fall to the German army. For much of January 1915, activity on the northern side of the eastern front was a curious mixture of old and new practices in warfare. The Russians employed their cavalry in patrolling along the German border to keep prying German eyes at bay. Although the weather was cold, it was clear enough for the Germans to employ aircraft. Aerial reconnaissance discovered the assembling of Russian forces that would later constitute the 12th Army. Aside from reconnaissance, German aircraft occasionally struck at operational targets. On January 18, 1915, for example, Plehve’s 5th Army headquarters was attacked by, according to British officer Sir Alfred Knox, “a big German biplane,” which dropped about a dozen bombs. Some of Plehve’s guards were killed, but the 5th Army’s commander and staff came through unscathed.34 The German army’s main effort, under the direction of Ober Ost, would be made in early February after the four corps promised by Falkenhayn at the New Years’ Day conference in Berlin appeared at the front. In the meantime, Mackensen’s Ninth Army, having recovered from its exertions in the Lodz campaign, would be committed to a limited attack in Poland. The attack, to be made at Bolimow, was designed to draw Russian forces from other sectors of the northwest front, thus aiding the impending offensive in East Prussia. In order to avoid unnecessary losses, Mackensen’s attack, made by the I Reserve, XVII, and XIII Corps on a narrow front, would be supported by 518 heavy and light artillery pieces. Thus, as Mackensen noted, “the artillery would do the main work.” In another interesting twist, included in the artillery preparation for the attack was the firing of some 18,000 shells carrying xylyl bromide, a chemical irritant more powerful than standard tear gas. Initially scheduled for January 27, 1915, unfavorable weather mandated postponement of the attack to January 31, 1915.35 January 31, 1915, dawned clear and cold. Mackensen’s attack opened with the planned bombardment. The old hussar’s high hopes for the gas’s effectiveness were not met. Although the gas did cause some casualties, the weather minimized its impact. The cold served to keep the gas close to the ground, and in some cases, an unfavorable shift in the wind blew some of the gas to the advancing Germans. Over the first few days of February, Mackensen’s attacking elements gained little ground, having often to engage in close combat. Although some 5,000 prisoners and a dozen machine guns were captured, Mackensen preferred that more ground be taken instead of prisoners.36 The northwest front did send some reinforcements to the General Aleksandr Litvinov’s 1st Army. Litvinov, however, failed to control his most headstrong subordinate, Vasily Gurko. He committed forces to a counterattack that did recover the ground lost in Mackensen’s initial attack but extended it

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long after it had achieved its purposes. Russian losses came to about 40,000, with I Siberian Corps and VI Corps being hardest hit. German losses were less, but still Bolimow could not be counted as a success. In his memoirs, Ludendorff claimed the Bolimow attack to be a great strategic success, but this was wishful thinking after the fact. Also noteworthy was the fact that the Russians failed to inform their Western allies of the German use of gas.37 The principal German effort in the winter, however, would be made in familiar territory: the Masurian Lakes region. German intelligence had identified that the Russian 10th Army, estimated to have about six corps, had poorly protected flanks. While overstating the size of the 10th Army, the German intelligence assessment was certainly correct in regard to its dispositions. Sievers’s army was arrayed as follows: the rightmost unit, the III Corps, was northeast of Gumbinnen; the oversized XX Corps (27th, 29th, 53rd, and 28th Divisions) held a long line just east of Darkehmen; the XXVI Corps was east of Angerburg and Lötzen; and the left flank was held by the III Siberian Corps opposite Nikolaiken, with its back to Spiriding Lake, one of the largest in the area. The 10th Army’s leftmost unit was the 57th Infantry Division, located at Johannisburg. The 10th Army’s reserve consisted of a single regiment.38 The 10th Army’s line was long and thin. The two divisions of the III Corps, the 73rd and the 56th, each held a line over twelve miles in length. Secondary and reserve positions were sketchy at best. Russian 10th Army’s position was overlapped by two German armies, the Eighth and Tenth. The 10th Army was thus vulnerable to encirclement. With four new corps being deployed to Ober Ost, plus some forces sent from the Ninth Army, a successful envelopment of Sievers’s army could be the decisive success Hindenburg and Ludendorff were looking for, as well as a help for the Austro-Hungarians. The German perception was that Russian morale was in bad shape and that another severe defeat could trigger some sort of political crisis.39 On January 20, 1915, Falkenhayn sent confirmation to Hindenburg that a new field army, the Tenth, composed of four corps, was to be placed at Ober Ost’s disposal. Falkenhayn also acceded to Ober Ost’s request for heavy artillery, agreeing to send two battalions of heavy mortars (most likely 210 mm Mörser), plus some 100 mm guns. Falkenhayn also held out the promise of two batteries of 305 mm mortars, if circumstances warranted.40 Having sent forces to Ober Ost, Falkenhayn asked Hindenburg for details about what Ober Ost planned to do with the new forces. Hindenburg replied on January 31, 1915. The plan was to take three newly arrived corps, plus the 1st Cavalry Division, to attack and encircle the Russian 10th Army from the north, while an attack from Lake Spirding in the south would also be launched. The possibility of a new Russian attack in East Prussia was dismissed.41 The execution of Ober Ost’s plan would be entrusted to two key officers. The commander of the German Eighth Army was General der Infanterie Otto von

Bloody Winter: January–February 1915

Below. Born on January 1857, Below was from a military family. A graduate of the Kriegsakademie in 1887, he enjoyed a successful career in the infantry. At the outbreak of war in 1914, Below was appointed to the command of the I Reserve Corps. His conduct during the Tannenberg campaign and later the First Masurian Lakes operation earned him the plaudits of his superiors and a promotion to General der Infanterie. In November 1914, Below was selected to command the Eighth Army, replacing the obstreperous Hermann von François, an almost meteoric rise in the army of the Kaiserreich. The impending offensive would be his debut at army command in a major operation.42 Below’s principal colleague in this endeavor was the German Tenth Army commander, Generaloberst Hermann von Eichhorn. Born on February 13, 1848, Eichhorn hailed from a famous Prussian family. One of his grandfathers was a Prussian minister of culture, while the other was the philosopher Friedrich Schelling. Eichhron, like a few of his contemporaries, had served in both the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars. Like Below, Eichhorn was a Kriegsakademie graduate. Over the course of the imperial period, Eichhorn had a fairly standard career, with a mix of line and staff positions. Promoted Generaloberst in 1913, Eichhorn was projected to play an important part in a potential war. In 1914, however, he was seriously injured in an accident suffered while on horseback and thus missed the 1914 campaign. In January 1915, Eichhorn was returned to duty. After taking part in a successful action at Soissons in early 1915, he was appointed commander of the Tenth Army on January 28, 1915.43 Like the Austro-Hungarians, the Germans also had to prepare for a winter campaign in a harsh environment. Vehicles had to have wheels removed and replaced with sleds. Soldiers arriving in theater were inoculated against cholera, and proper clothing was also issued. Troops also made their own improvisations. While the standard German army winter coat offered protection against the natural elements, the field gray color did little in the way of preventing a soldier from being silhouetted in a snowy background. Enterprising soldiers, like those from the 5th Guard Grenadier Regiment, thus decided to lay their hands on anything white that could be worn over their uniforms. This included tablecloths from restaurants and bedsheets from hotels.44 Other improvisations were made in an organizational sense. The lightly armed German cavalry divisions upgraded their firepower in an unofficial sense at least. The 1st Cavalry Division discovered that the officially allotted six machine guns were insufficient. Since the German Eighth Army had captured a considerable number of Russian machine guns, regiments like the 4th Uhlans created their own machine gun sections, using captured Russian machine guns. This would place a bit more firepower at the disposal of the regiment’s commander.45 Like the Austro-Hungarians in the Carpathians, simply getting units into position was arduous business. Even though many guns were now outfitted

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with sleds, it sometimes required as many as a dozen horses to haul even one gun. Soldiers had to trudge on snow covered and icy roads, often having to deal with man-high snowdrifts. This was also done in the midst of heavy snowstorms, usually accompanied by biting cold and sharp winds, with temperatures regularly dipping down into single digits on the Fahrenheit scale. Often the field kitchens could not keep up. The absence of the “goulash cannons” was keenly felt by soldiers in need of hot food.46 The operations plan was relatively simple, if also ambitious. The main effort of the Tenth Army would be on its left flank, aimed at working around the right flank of the Russian 10th Army. The German Eighth Army, adjacent to the Tenth Army, would make its main effort on the left, which overlapped the left flank of the Russian 10th Army. The Eighth Army’s attack, pressing through the Masurian Lakes area, would eventually encircle the Russian 10th Army south of the lakes. The attack would be supported a number of very heavy artillery batteries, including four 100 mm batteries, four 210 mm howitzer batteries and two batteries of Austro-Hungarian 305 mm howitzers. The preparations were kept as secret as possible. Mail, both incoming and outgoing, was stopped in the last few days before the start of the offensive. The bad weather, which caused such difficulties in the deployment, likely contributed to the element of surprise, as aerial reconnaissance was grounded for both sides.47 The Russians discovered the German buildup on February 4, but given the state of the roads and the miserable weather, there was not much Ruzski or Grand Duke Nikolai could do in the way of getting reinforcements to the 10th Army. In addition, much of their attention was taken up with the formation of the 12th Army, then still in progress. Sievers and his chief of staff, Baron Budberg, however, failed to take any measures to change the tactical dispositions of the 10th Army. Although the XX Corps, commanded by General Pavel Bulgakov, held a long front in the center of Sievers’s sector, it was still the densest part of the army’s front and thus most in danger of envelopment.48 The German offensive unfolded in a somewhat staggered fashion. Dawn on February 7, 1915, was accompanied by, in Below’s words, “a furious snowstorm” and a temperature of nineteen degrees Fahrenheit. Below’s left flank was his main effort, manifested in General der Infanterie Karl Litzmann’s XL Reserve Corps. Litzmann’s corps, one of the four newly created corps, consisted of the 79th and 80th Reserve Divisions. To give Litzmann’s force more punch, the 2nd Infantry Division, part of Generalleutnant Robert Kosch’s I Corps, was subordinated to Litzmann’s command. In addition, Litzmann received the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, plus several engineer companies, and sizeable artillery support, including a number of heavy guns.49 Litzmann’s force, with Landsturm troops providing a security screen, took up positions in the forests west of Johannisburg. With three divisions well supported by heavy artillery and combined arms, Litzmann’s force enjoyed

Bloody Winter: January–February 1915

considerable superiority over its Russian opponents. Aided by the snowstorm, Litzmann’s attack achieved complete surprise. Although the 79th and 80th Reserve Divisions had to contend with three feet of snow and advanced slowly, Sievers’s leftmost unit, the 57th Infantry Division, was simply crushed by the weight of Litzmann’s attack. Generalleutnant Adalbert von Falk’s 2nd Infantry Division (an East Prussian outfit) stormed a position outside of Johannisburg.50 Litzmann decided to continue the attack the next day. The 80th Reserve Division would take the road junction of Bialla, while the 79th Reserve Division covered the 80th Reserve Division’s right flank. Once Bialla was secured, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade would extend the advance, blocking the roads east of Johannisburg. The town itself would be seized by the 2nd Infantry Division. The attack went off as planned, but some minor hitches developed. The 79th Reserve Division fended off a counterattack by the remnants of the 57th Infantry Division. The 80th Reserve Division, fighting Russians and bad roads, took Bialla only late in the afternoon. The cavalry, also delayed by bad roads, failed to get beyond Bialla. Troops were not the only ones frustrated by bad roads. In the course of day, Litzmann moved his headquarters to Königsdorf, but the automobile he was traveling in got stuck in a snowdrift several miles from the town. He finally got to Königsdorf that evening in a sleigh. The best success was achieved by Falk’s 2nd Infantry Division, which took Johannisburg in a well-executed encircling attack, destroying the 1st Siberian Regiment. By the evening of February 8, almost 4,000 prisoners, thirteen guns, and a number of machine guns had been taken.51 The scattering of the 57th Infantry Division and the seizure of Johannisburg exposed the left flank of Evgeny Radkevich’s III Siberian Corps. Radkevich, however, kept his head, and the corps conducted an orderly retreat to the southeast. Stavka remained rather passive. Although the Grand Duke had informed the tsar of the possibility of a German attack in late January, he spent February 7 escorting Nicholas II, who was visiting Stavka. Right after the tsar departed for Petrograd, the Grand Duke headed off to Gomel, to review the reforming XV Corps. Given the relatively limited means of communications available at Baranovici and with Ruzski in deteriorating health, Sievers was effectively left to his own devices.52 Sievers’s problems were compounded when Eichhorn’s German Tenth Army opened its attack. Eichhorn had left the majority of his line covered by the 10th Landwehr Division and the 16th Landwehr Division from Königsberg, along with the 5th Guard Infantry Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division holding the northern flank. Behind the front, however, Eichhorn and his chief of staff, Colonel Emil Hell, created a powerful attacking force on the army’s left flank, with the XXI, XXXVIII Reserve, and XXXIX Reserve Corps, a total of six infantry divisions, heavily backed by artillery. This would form the left great pincer in the envisioned encirclement. As with Litzmann’s force

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on the other flank, the Guards and the cavalry kept Russian probing attacks at bay while Eichhorn’s assault force got into position.53 Eichhorn’s attack against General Nikolai Epanchin’s III Corps got off to a slow start on February 8. The already snowy Masurian countryside was pelted with yet another major snowstorm. The conditions made it difficult for the attacking Germans to get forward. Operations were also hampered by the relatively limited amount of daylight. The XXXVIII Reserve Corps, commanded by General der Kavallerie Georg von der Marwitz, was able to reach the lines of the 1st Cavalry Division after a painfully slow march, and a late afternoon attack against the Russian positions was thrown back.54 The XXXIX Corps, commanded by Generalleutnant Otto Freiherr von Lauenstein, had similar problems with strong Russian resistance and difficult terrain, in this case a swampy forest. By 5:00 p.m., the troops of the 77th and 78th Reserve Divisions were exhausted. The XXI Corps, headed by General der Infanterie Fritz von Below (cousin of Otto von Below), also enjoyed only limited success. Conditions were such that troops could cover only about a mile an hour. Field kitchens failed to keep up. Shelter amidst the damaged and destroyed villages was hard to come by. Relatively intact buildings, especially public ones such as schoolhouses, would be appropriated by medical personnel. Sometimes even shelter could be dangerous. The 70th Infantry Regiment, for example, lost thirty-eight men in a house fire on the night of February 8. Conditions were equally, if not more, difficult for the horses.55 The German attack picked up a bit of steam over the next few days, although there were still hiccups. On February 9, Litzmann and his headquarters reached Bialla, much of which had been destroyed. He directed his two reserve divisions to advance against Lyck and Arys, into the rear of the Russian 10th Army. A short break in the weather allowed the Germans to get some reconnaissance planes in the air. Aerial reconnaissance, plus intercepted wireless traffic, indicated that the Russians were retreating. Although the weather made heavy demands on the troops, Kosch noted in a letter to his wife that conditions were just as bad for the Russians.56 Litzmann’s infantry made slow progress on February 9, fighting freezing weather and Russian counterattacks. Even more frustrating for Litzmann was the poor performance of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which advanced only a little over five miles northeast of Bialla. That was enough for Litzmann to relieve the brigade commander, Colonel von Printz, replacing him with Generalmajor Eberhard Graf von Schmettow, the commander of the brigade’s parent formation, the 4th Cavalry Division. On February 10, the advance continued. Below’s aim was to use the rapid seizure of Lyck and Drygallen to execute a short encirclement of the III Siberian Corps, caught between Kosch’s I Corps, which had taken Lötzen, and Litzmann’s XL Reserve Corps. Kosch at least was still hopeful for major results, as the conditions made as difficult for the Russians to retreat as for the Germans to advance.57

Bloody Winter: January–February 1915

Below’s plan, however, was frustrated by the two things he could not control: the weather and the Russians. The area where Below’s main force was operating was hit by a fierce snowstorm on the night of February 10, covering the countryside with another three feet of snow, while temperatures dipped to ten degrees Fahrenheit. Telephone lines were damaged or even cut by the cold and the storm. The practice of using staff officers to provide guidance to units failed when the officers got stuck in snowdrifts. The conditions drove marching men and horses to the very end of endurance. A number of wounded on both sides froze to death.58 The Russians also thwarted Below’s plans. Radkevich was able to conduct a skillful defense, using his own III Siberian Corps as well as elements of the XXVI Corps. A strong force from Lyck stopped the 2nd Infantry Division (now back under Kosch’s I Corps), in its tracks on February 11. Litzmann’s two divisions reached the villages of Klein Rogallen and Prostken the same day, but then they asked to remain in place, in order to afford the troops some much needed rest. Over the next several days, the efforts of Litzmann and Kosch made slow progress at best. Although reinforcements arrived in the form of an infantry brigade and the rest of the 4th Cavalry Division, little headway was made against Radkevich’s Siberians. Matters were not helped by the arrival of yet another snowstorm, this one accompanied by temperatures so low that the water in the jackets of the machine guns froze solid. The situation was difficult enough that Below was able to skip the kaiser’s visit to Lötzen on February 13, sending his deputy in his place, all with Wilhelm II’s approval. Ultimately the III Siberian Corps, along with elements of the XXVI Corps, was able to escape encirclement, although somewhat damaged, losing 8,000 prisoners, twenty-one guns, and thirty-four machine guns.59 Although dented, Sievers’s left flank was holding; however, matters on the 10th Army’s right flank had deteriorated into a very dangerous situation. On the morning of February 9, Eichhorn’s powerful flanking force renewed its attack all along the line against Epanchin’s III Corps. The 75th Reserve Division stormed the positions of the 56th Infantry Division and some cavalry, taking 1,900 prisoners and four machine guns. The 76th Reserve Division, on the 75th Reserve Division’s left, reported meeting only light resistance. The XXXIX Reserve Corps and the XXI Corps also attacked, and both corps reported meeting resistance from no more than one division, presumably the Russian 73rd Infantry Division.60 By the evening of February 10, it was clear that the 10th Army was in serious trouble. Epanchin’s III Corps and supporting cavalry had been severely mauled. The remnants were retreating toward Kovno. This exposed the flank of XX Corps. Epanchin compounded matters by failing to inform either the adjacent corps commander, Bulgakov, or Sievers of the direction of his retreat. Although Ruzski wanted Sievers to hold his ground in order keep the

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invasion of East Prussia in play, Sievers plainly understood that retreat was his only option. Thus, on February 11, Sievers ordered a general retreat.61 With the Russian 10th Army now in a general retreat, the Germans made every effort to close the pincers on the 10th Army. On February 13, Kosch’s I Corps entered the severely damaged town of Lyck. The Russian XXVI Corps and III Siberian Corps had reached Raigrod and then kept on retreating toward the swampy Bobr River and the cover of the fortress of Grodno. The XX Corps, having occupied the center of Sievers’s original line, was now in the greatest danger of encirclement. Bulgakov’s most direct route of retreat was to the east.62 Eichhorn’s troops, however, were able to cut off Bulgakov’s eastern retreat route. Eichhorn’s 16th Landwehr Division, being pinched out of the line, was sent to the northeast to cover the Tenth Army’s left flank, along with the 5th Guard Infantry Brigade. The pincers of Below and Eichhorn now aimed at Augustowo. Over several days, the troops of the XXXVIII Reserve, XXXIX Reserve Corps, and XXI Corps, plus the 1st Cavalry Division, undertook a series of grueling marches. The principal enemy the soldiers had to deal with was hunger. With the field kitchens unable to keep up, soldiers were living off of “iron rations,” or foraging in the already devastated countryside. Fortunately for the Germans, the Russian retreat provided a solution to the problem. On February 15, for example, the 70th Infantry Regiment, part of the 31st Infantry Division, captured a Russian depot at Sopocklinie. The supplies taken allowed the entire 31st Infantry Division to feed itself for a whole day. Likewise, the 1st Cavalry Division was able to make use of captured Russian field kitchens. The XXXVIII Reserve Corps war diary noted on February 12, 1915, that the supplies used by the corps consisted almost entirely of captured Russian material.63 By the evening of February 14, the German Eighth and Tenth Armies had almost completely encircled the Russian XX Corps, most of which was still in the Augustowo Forest. On February 15, Russian forces attacked Litzmann’s two divisions at Graljevo, seeking to break out. The Russians facing the 80th Reserve Division were able to pry open a small gap of just under two miles between the division’s right flank and the Lyck River. The forces facing the 79th Reserve Division were driven back, toward Kosch’s oncoming I Corps, plus the 10th Landwehr Division. After enduring severe cold, both sides had to now deal with a sudden thaw, which traded deep snow for deeper mud. Another important impact of the thaw was that the water courses in the area, most notably the Lyck and Bobr Rivers, along with the Augustowo Canal, now became major obstacles. Ultimately, the encirclement was completed when Lipsk and Augustowo were taken on February 16.64 The next week followed the normal course of a battle involving an encircled force. Stavka and the northwest front moved up the reformed XV Corps from Gomel and the II Corps, which had been part of the 1st Army, to

Bloody Winter: January–February 1915

reinforce Sievers. These forces would attack the outer German lines, especially Litzmann’s reservists. Attacks would also be launched against XXXVIII Reserve and XXXIX Reserve Corps, which was Eichhorn’s covering force. Meanwhile the XXI Corps, plus the rest of Below’s Eighth Army, would destroy the remaining Russian forces in the Augustowo Forest.65 Outside the Augustowo cauldron, a standoff developed. Russian attacks to break through to the Russian XX Corps were halted by German covering forces. Likewise, efforts by Below and Eichhorn to advance the front toward the Nieman, Narew, and Bobr Rivers met strongly manned Russian positions. Inside the cauldron, the 42nd Infantry Division, part of the XXI Corps, advanced on Augustowo, while Kosch’s I Corps along with part of the 3rd Reserve Division and the 10th Landwehr Division, fought their way into the Augustowo Forest. Matters for both sides were complicated by another severe cold snap, accompanied by another heavy snowstorm on the night of February 16. Kosch noted that on February 18, the snow was “knee deep.” The weather also likely served to disrupt communications between the Tenth Army and the XXI Corps.66 Resistance inside the cauldron was finally extinguished on February 22. Although the 10th Army was still intact, it had been severely mauled. The battered III Corps, III Siberian Corps, and XXVI Corps were able to reach the relative safety of the Nieman and Bobr Rivers, covered by the guns of the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno. The XX Corps was a total loss. Total Russian casualties came to about 150,000, including 92,000 prisoners. Among the latter were nine general officers, including Bulgakov and three of his division commanders. Equipment losses included 295 guns and 170 machine guns.67 In addition to the casualties listed above, there were four other notable Russian casualties. The first two were Sievers and his chief of staff, Budberg. Sievers had lost control of the situation once the retreat was ordered, and this aroused Stavka’s ire. Ruzski also encouraged this criticism, as it served to deflect attention away from his complete passivity during the battle. Sievers and Budberg were thus dismissed. Sievers did return as chief of staff for the 12th Army in July 1915, but the appearance was brief. Sievers would be dead before the year was out, supposedly by his own hand. Radkevich, who had done well with the III Siberian Corps, was named commander of the 10th Army. Epanchin, whose untimely retreat left the flank of the XX Corps open to Eichhorn’s thrust, was also sacked by the Grand Duke.68 The most notable Russian casualty was Lieutenant Colonel Sergei N. Miasoedov, a controversial and often impecunious staff officer in the intelligence section on the 10th Army’s staff. Miasoedov’s service in the Gendarmes Corps and near the German frontier allegedly brought him into contact with the German intelligence service and high German officials. He had even gone on two stag-hunting expeditions in the Rominten Forest with Wilhelm II in 1904 and 1905. Miasoedov also had two other strikes against him that

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put him in Stavka’s crosshairs. The first was the fact that he was Jewish. The second was that he was something of a protégé of Sukhomlinov.69 The aftermath of Second Masurian Lakes, plus the shell shortage, led Stavka to search for scapegoats. Chief among the witch-hunters were the two top Russian counterintelligence officials in the northwest front, General Mikhail D. Bonch-Bruevich and Colonel Nikolai Batyushin. The had their sins to whitewash, as they had largely missed the German buildup until it was too late.70 Miasoedov was arrested on the basis of flimsy evidence, most notably the dubious testimony of one Lieutenant Yakov P. Kolakovski, an officer who had been captured at Tannenberg. Kolakovski claimed that he offered to spy for Germany in order to escape the harsh conditions of German captivity. Once sent to Sweden by the German secret service as part of the plot to get him back to Russia, Kolakovski went to the Russian embassy in Stockholm. Once back in Russia, Kolakovski denounced several people, one of whom was Miasoedov. Arrested on March 3 by order of the chief of staff of the northwest front, General A. A. Gulevich, at the insistence of the Grand Duke, Miasoedov was brought to Warsaw for a court-martial organized by Bonch-Bruevich. After a proceeding marked by vague allegations and questionable evidence, Miasoedov was found guilty and hanged less than a mere six hours later. Nikolai Nikolaevich also had several of Miasoedov’s associates, all Jews, arrested. They too were hanged. The search for scapegoats had been successful. In addition, the Miasoedov affair further served to taint Sukhomlinov.71 Casualties on the German side are difficult to calculate. Such statistics are rarely seen in officially sanctioned German works. A recent popular work put German losses at about 20,000. Losses, as always, were unevenly distributed. While the cavalry regiments were able to escape serious losses, some infantry regiments had suffered severely. By February 17, for example, the 70th Infantry Regiment, part of the 31st Infantry Division, had an average of about two hundred rifles in its battalions. Likewise, strenuous marches and heavy combat also took a serious toll on the 42nd Infantry Division. The 221st Reserve Infantry Regiment, part of the 79th Reserve Division, lost 38 killed and 143 wounded over February 12–19. The more heavily engaged 263rd Reserve Infantry Regiment lost 80 killed and 378 wounded. Another increasing problem was sickness. Sudden changes in temperature, lots of precipitation, frozen or otherwise, and an irregular diet often marked by poor quality rations resulted in a sharp increase in the number of cases with intestinal ailments.72 Politically the Second Masurian Lakes operation was important, and it marked another feather in the cap of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Kosch spoke for many when he wrote to his wife that “we trust in dear God and Hindenburg.”73 The Second Masurian Lakes campaign also marked the last battle of the war that was fought on German soil. With the Russian presence

Bloody Winter: January–February 1915

expunged from German territory, Ober Ost sought to expand the war into Russian Poland. The immediate objective was to reach the Narew and Bobr Rivers. Of the two rivers, getting over the Bobr was most problematic. Once covered by a thick sheet of ice, the recent thaw expanded the already swampy river to almost two miles wide.74 The best units to accomplish this were the Tenth Army, the Eighth Army, and its neighbor on the right, the eponymous Army Detachment Gallwitz. After the Bolimow attack, the German Ninth Army went over to the defensive. On the day of the start of the German Masurian Lakes attack, Ober Ost issued orders to Gallwitz. The army detachment commander was tasked to cover the right flank of Below’s Eighth Army with Gallwitz’s left, while the right flank would rest on the right bank of the Vistula River. The movement of Gallwitz’s force was also designed to minimize the impact of any intervention by the Russian 12th Army, the existence of which was well known to the Germans, up to and including the fact that Plehve was named its commander.75 Starting on February 10, Gallwitz’s forces advanced slowly into Russian Polish territory, having to deal with the same difficulties that bedeviled both sides in Masuria. Meanwhile, Ober Ost reconfigured the Eighth and Tenth Armies. Litzmann’s XL Reserve Corps, plus Falk’s 2nd Infantry Division and the 4th Cavalry Division, was transferred from the Eighth Army to the Tenth. Below’s Eighth would operate against the Narew River, while Eichhorn’s Tenth Army would try to get across the Bobr.76 By February 24, the German 1st Reserve Division, part of Morgen’s I Reserve Corps, advancing against the Russian 1st Army, had seized the road junction of Przasnysz from the Russian 63rd Reserve Division. Stavka and the northwest front, however, were putting measures in hand to deal with the new German advance.77 The outcome of these moves for both sides would be decided in March. The bloody battles in the winter of 1914 demonstrated the shortcomings of the style of warfare preferred by Conrad and Ludendorff. The kind of rapid offensive Conrad desired was understandable, given his concern for Przemys´l. The winter weather, however, made speed almost impossible to attain. In addition, Conrad’s choice of the Third Army’s sector as the place for the offensive was a poor one. Although the distance between Boroevic´’s army and Pryzemys´l was the shortest, and the route the most direct, it lay through perhaps the most rugged terrain in Europe. In addition, it was stoutly defended by Russian troops under their ablest field commander. Even if both Dukla and Lupkov Pass were forced, the advance would have to be broad enough that several other passes be taken as well, in order to create stable shoulders for the penetration. Any narrow thrust out of the Carpathians would be an inviting target for a Russian counterthrust.78 Likewise, Ober Ost, although more successful than AOK, failed to achieve the decisive success desired by Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Certainly a great deal was expected of the offensive by the Eighth and Tenth Armies.79

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Although Sievers’s 10th Army was severely battered, only the XX Corps was completely destroyed. The winter weather made conditions difficult for all sides. For the Germans in addition, once the scene of operations shifted toward the Russian border, the kind of road network so critical to the outcome of Tannenberg was simply absent. Also, despite Hindenburg’s assertion that these were no longer the Russians of Zorndorf and Ludendorff’s claim that the Russian Army could be broken, the Russian 10th Army still proved a tough opponent and made the clearing of the Augustowo Forest a costly operation. Finally, the Masurian victory was simply too far away to matter, much like Pflanzer-Baltin’s success at Czernowitz.80 For the Russians, the winter battles in the Carpathians and Masuria demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the tsar’s army. The soldiers remained tough and capable, both in enduring hardship and engaging in combat. In addition, the Russian forces proved sufficiently resilient that not only was Conrad’s first Carpathian offensive repulsed but also Brusilov’s 8th Army was able to counterattack and seize the critical rail junction of Mezölaborcz. The course of the winter battles showed that Stavka was lagging in its ability to make decisions and carry them out quickly. Both Stavka and Ober Ost had plans to launch an offensive in almost the same area. Aided by a superior rail network and supply system, however, the Germans were able to get their attack in first. This forced Stavka into a reactive mode, in which the initiative was conceded to the Germans. The German attack also served to disrupt the assembly of the Russian 12th Army, but to a lesser degree than Ober Ost hoped. The ebbing of German offensive impetus would give the northwest front the opportunity to wrest the initiative from Ober Ost. How well that could work would still depend on the ability of Stavka in general, and the Grand Duke in particular, to exercise control over the two front commanders. The record in the winter of 1915 did not inspire confidence in that regard.81 From the Russian point of view, perhaps even more disturbing was the lack of introspection in Stavka after the defeat in Masuria. To be sure, the reliefs of some commanders, such as Sievers and Epanchin, was justified. Far too much effort, however, was expended in chasing down hapless characters such as Miasoedov, who was made into a convenient fall guy. In addition, while the shortage of artillery shells was a problem, too often it served as a convenient crutch for commanders to explain failures.82 For all of the bloody combat in the winter of 1915, none of the combatants had scored a decisive victory. Each had sustained setbacks and attained successes, but the overall picture had remained essentially the same. The German position in East Prussia had improved slightly, while the AustroHungarian situation in the Carpathians had generally worsened. Most critically for Conrad, Przemys´l remained besieged by the Russian 11th Army. The deteriorating situation of the fortress, however, ensured that its fate would be decided sooner rather than later.

CHAPTER FIVE

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

In addition, the enemy has brought forward strong forces in the direction of Przasnysz and Lomsha. —Erich Ludendorff, March 12, 19151 Nikolasha came running into my carriage, out of breath and with tears in his eyes, and told me of the fall of Przemys´l. —Nicholas II, March 22, 19152 This strength demands, however, that for the moment every general stops hanging his head and being listless. —Conrad von Hötzendorf, April 19153 The results of the battle in Masuria from the German perspective varied according to rank. Some lower-ranking soldiers saw this as the beginning of better things to come. Otto Köhler, a doctor in the German XXIV Reserve Corps, hailed the results of the Second Masurian Lakes operation. Köhler wrote to Sigmund Feist, the director of the Jewish Orphanage in Berlin, on February 24, 1915, that he hoped to send Feist greetings from Warsaw soon.4 Some generals, too, regarded the February victory as having a major impact. Generaloberst Hans von Plessen, the aged adjutant of Wilhelm II, believed that the victory would end the war of position and even relieve the AustroHungarian position in the Carpathians. Robert Kosch, the eternally optimistic commander of the I Corps, wrote to his wife on March 2, 1915, that “the decision lies here in the east, where the situation remains favorable.”5

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Some higher-ranking German officers knew better. This started with Erich Ludendorff. On March 12, 1915, Ludendorff wrote to Moltke that while the Second Masurian Lakes operation had been “a complete tactical success,” it was not as significant in a strategic sense. Likewise, Max Hoffmann of Ober Ost’s staff believed that Germany could destroy the Russian armies, but only if it was fighting without Austria-Hungary. Erich von Falkenhayn who, given his position as head of OHL had to keep the bigger picture in mind, informed Ober Ost on February 19, 1915, that the victory in Masuria now allowed for the withdrawal of forces from northern Poland for employment elsewhere.6 Meanwhile, the units that had been involved in the Masurian battles took the opportunity to relax and rest a bit. The 249th Reserve Infantry Regiment was fortunate to move into an area that had escaped being plundered. The men were able to requisition from the local population and obtained abundant amounts of food. In a classic case of better late than never, the 221st Reserve Infantry Regiment finally received its Christmas packages on February 18, 1915. That, plus the arrival of its logistical elements, improved the supply situation. The 5th Guard Grenadier Regiment, which had lost over four hundred men, was able to receive replacements on March 6, 1915, at Reidenburg, after its transfer to Army Group Gallwitz.7 Falkenhayn’s desire for the transfer of units from Ober Ost to other fronts notwithstanding, Hindenburg and Ludendorff planned to strike while the iron was hot. With the Eighth and Tenth Armies reorganized after the Second Masurian Lakes campaign, they would resume the advance, along with Army Detachment Gallwitz. The objective was to take the line of fortresses guarding the Narew and Bobr Rivers to the northeast of Warsaw. In the aftermath of the Masurian battle, German forces had seized the road junctions of Przasnysz and Mlawa near the end of February.8 There is an old saying that in war, the enemy gets a vote, and in this case, the Russians were about to exercise their franchise. Stavka had pulled together a sizable force for an attack. The 10th Army, now under Radkevich, had thirteen infantry and five cavalry divisions. To the 10th Army’s left was Plehve’s newly created 12th Army, with twelve infantry and two and one-half cavalry divisions. The attack force was rounded out by the 1st Army, with twelve infantry and six and a half cavalry divisions.9 To be sure, the numbers given here sound greater than they actually were. A number of Radkevich’s divisions, for example, had been badly beaten up in the Masurian Lakes battles. In addition, Ruszki’s entire operational reserve consisted of the rebuilt XXIII Corps (3rd Guard Infantry and 62nd Reserve Infantry Divisions) scattered between Warsaw and Bialystok. Nonetheless, Ruszki’s northwest front went over to the offensive at the end of February. The objectives, however, were limited. The Grand Duke made it clear that the goal of the attack was simply to drive German forces from Russian territory.10

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

Ruzski gave the order for the offensive to begin on March 2. The main weight of the attack was borne by the Russian 1st and 12th Armies. The target was the seam between the German Eighth Army and Army Group Gallwitz. Some regiments had seen an increase in Russian activity on their fronts in the last days of February. Some of these actions became quite serious. On February 23, 1915, a Russian attack against the 31st Infantry Division hit a soft spot in the German line. The 31st Field Artillery Regiment was reached. The Russians captured eighteen guns, and the regimental commander was killed before the Russians were driven off. Likewise, an effort by Litzmann’s XXXX Reserve Corps against Ossowiec made no progress.11 The Russian attack jumped off on March 1 and made some initial headway. The force most severely impacted was Gallwitz’s. Although it inflicted considerable casualties, his left flank, in particular the I Reserve Corps, also took a severe mauling. The 36th Reserve Division and the 9th Landwehr Brigade came in for very rough treatment. The Russian 12th Army drove Gallwitz’s forces back from the approaches to Lomsha. The II Siberian Corps recaptured Przasnysz, taking 3,600 prisoners and eight guns. Gallwitz was able to stabilize the lines, and by the middle of March, the Russian offensive had lost much of its steam.12 Reinforced, Gallwitz mounted a counterattack, which regained some of the ground lost. Przasnysz, however remained in Russian hands. For his part, Plehve met Gallwitz’s counterattack with further attacks of his own. Some of these gave the Germans some bad moments. On March 16, for example, a heavy Russian attack surrounded elements of the 249th Reserve Infantry Regiment. A quickly organized relief effort by the 151st Infantry Regiment restored the situation, but at the cost of eighteen dead and forty-six wounded. The 5th Guard Grenadier Regiment had a similar experience at Hill 168 near Nowe as well.13 The Russian 10th Army’s attack was made on a wide front, over sixty-five miles. Its progress was slow, hindered by German resistance and the problematic terrain. The pattern of attack and counterattack resulted in the battle line swaying back and forth over the course of two weeks. Ultimately the 10th Army, like the 12th, settled for some limited gains. On evening of March 16, Ruzski, at the insistence of the Grand Duke, issued an order for all armies of the northwest front to halt any further attacks and to fortify the lines currently held.14 By the end of March, both sides were exhausted and readily agreed to a truce for Easter. Losses on both sides has been considerable. Russian losses amounted to perhaps 100,000. The Germans had also suffered as well. The initial Russian attack netted a considerable number of prisoners. One older source claims as many as 30,000, although more recent studies lower the number of prisoners taken. In addition, the Russians also took sixty guns.15 Nonetheless, the defeat at Przasnysz ended Ober Ost’s major efforts to operate against the Russian fortress network on the Narew and Bobr Rivers. For the

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Russians, while the lines had stabilized, the situation was regarded by Grand Duke Nikolai as sufficiently dangerous to refuse permission for the tsar to visit Lomsha.16 The tsar had to be content with a visit to Ossowiec, where the garrison fired the guns toward the German lines in honor of his visit. The Russians also tried to use the success at Przasnysz in a psychological manner, dropping leaflets from aircraft on German units announcing the victory.17 With major operations now at an end, the northern part of the eastern front settled into what the Germans referred to as “Stellungskrieg,” positional warfare. Both sides worked on developing their trench systems, although neither side attained the level of complexity that prevailed on the western front. Troops also took advantage of the lull to mend uniforms and repair equipment. Both sides also sought to incorporate the lessons drawn from the most recent battles and to apply them to training and organization. In this regard, however, it did seem that the German army was much better than the Russian army.18 Since the lines were often miles apart, the area between was patrolled vigorously by both sides. This was usually done by small mounted detachments, either from infantry divisions or from cavalry regiments, during their respective turns of duty in the trenches. The majority of the horses were quartered about six miles behind the front. German detachments were opposed by Russian regular cavalry formations or by the more numerous Cossack units. The many combats did not have any real impact on the situation, but they served to increase casualties by small increments. Interestingly, both sides lamented the shortage of lances.19 The battle of Przasnysz had considerable consequences on both sides. At the time, high-ranking German officers, such as Ludendorff and Hoffmann, blamed the 9th Landwehr Brigade for the initial Russian success.20 The recent fighting, however, also served to disabuse people of the idea that final victory in the east could be attained quickly. Ludendorff implied that a decisive victory was a long way off, although he blamed this more on the deficiencies of the Austro-Hungarians. He remained conspicuously contemptuous of the dual monarchy, and he blamed the problems he saw on the eastern front on Austria-Hungary, an attitude Hoffman shared.21 The perpetually grouchy Ober Ost staff officer also noted with some irony that a negotiated peace with Russia, unlikely in any case, could only be attained by betraying AustriaHungary. Although he did not blame Austria-Hungary, even Kosch, the eternal optimist, admitted to his wife on March 12 that “I no longer believe in a rapid end to the war.”22 Ober Ost’s operations against the Russian forces on the Narew and Bobr Rivers frustrated, Hindenburg and Ludendorff shifted their efforts to the northwest. They perceived in late March that the Russian forces near the Baltic coast consisted only of about 4,000 soldiers, backstopped by a motley collection of militia. An advance up the Baltic coast to the nearest Russian

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

base at Libau would also find support from the German navy. German intelligence had reported that British submarines that had slipped into the Baltic were using Libau as a base. Seizing the port would be of value to the German navy while it would also improve the army’s logistical situation in that part of the eastern front. Finally, the prospect of moving into the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire appealed to Ludendorff. Like many other Germans of his age and education, Ludendorff embraced the assumptions of racial and cultural superiority of German civilization over that of Russia.23 Sensing an opportunity, Hindenburg and Ludendorff began collecting something of a scratch force. The largest single component would be cavalry. As the pace of the 1914 campaign on the western front slowed and maneuver space shrank, the scope for the employment of cavalry correspondingly diminished. Thus, by the fall of 1914, OHL had shifted about half of its ten cavalry divisions to the east.24 This trend continued into early 1915. The 3rd Cavalry Division and the Bavarian Cavalry Division came in from the west. In the case of the Bavarian Cavalry Division, this started with a four-day train trip from the western front.25 Once the divisions had arrived at Stallupönen on April 4, 1915, they moved toward the border. Once near the border, the regiments exchanged their heavy army vehicles for the lighter local carts. Lances were issued, and even bicycle troops had to exchange their bicycles for horses. In accordance with what had now become standard practice, each regiment was issued two additional machine guns and then sent a detachment of fifteen men, headed by an officer, to Jüterborg for a course of instruction. Another issue for the newly arriving regiments was the acquisition of interpreters, a resource not heavily in demand on the western front. For units operating in East Prussia, the readiest source for interpreters was the local Jewish population living just inside the Russian border, as it was familiar with Russian, perhaps German, and also Yiddish, which was fairly close to German. The Bavarian 1st Uhlan Regiment, for example, engaged some Jewish interpreters for pay.26 All this, however, took time. In addition, as Ludendorff noted, replacements were slow in coming to the units that had seen a good deal of fighting in February and March. Finally, one other element mandated that Ober Ost stand down during late March and much of April: the weather. As noted previously, the second Masurian Lakes campaign and the ensuing Russian attack at Przasnysz were conducted under extraordinarily harsh weather conditions. The poor weather continued. Cold and snow now alternated with rain and mud. Even as late as April 27, frost covered the ground. Lieutenant Flöel of the 67th Field Artillery spoke for many when he wrote on March 21, “the start of spring–according to the German calendar–but here it is still winter, snow and cold.”27 The whipsawing weather conditions, plus the poor quarters and supply difficulties, led to another reason for a basic suspension of operations: sickness.

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By the end of March, a number of regiments were reporting increasing numbers of sick. Sickness was also no respecter of rank. The changing temperatures and the wet weather combined to give Kosch a bad case of catarrh by the middle of March. The condition of Kosch’s sinuses was such that on a visit to Below’s headquarters, Below ordered him to see his headquarters physician. The increasing numbers of sick also served to increase pressure on hospitals, already overcrowded with wounded since the start of the year. In addition to men, horses too were exhausted and desperately in need of some rest.28 Like Ober Ost, the Russian armies of the northwest front were exhausted by the latter part of March. Like the Germans, the Russians also suffered from the harsh conditions, battle casualties, and sickness.29 The most notable casualty from sickness was Ruzski. The health of the “Hero of Lvov” had been deteriorating for some time. With active operations on the northwest front now over, Ruzski submitted his resignation to the Grand Duke on the grounds of ill health.30 The aftermath of the battle of Przasnysz had several repercussions for Russia, in terms of strategy and command. In regard to command, there was a flurry of recriminations at the lower levels. Most of these were aimed at Plehve, the 12th Army commander. Vladimir Bezobrazov, the cantankerous-but-well-connected commander of the Guard Corps, was highly critical of Plehve, accusing him of launching attacks without adequate artillery preparation. Bezobrazov also damned Plehve for launching repeated attacks against well-established German defensive positions, describing one such effort by the III Caucasian Corps as a “super crime!” Bezobrazov also sought to encourage dissent from his fellow corps commanders. He found a receptive ear in General Irmanov, commander of the III Caucasian Corps.31 Despite Bezobrazov’s efforts, Plehve would remain in place. The aftermath of Przasnysz also had consequences for Stavka’s strategy. Even before the attack, Nikolai Nikolaevich had announced that the objectives for the offensive would be limited. Once the lost territory had been regained, that would end the advance. There would be no third invasion of East Prussia. The Grand Duke reinforced this by appointing Alekseev, a known opponent of invading East Prussia, as Ruzski’s replacement.32 Rather than expend further efforts and resources against Germany, the Grand Duke decided to shift the focus of Russia’s efforts to the southwest front. The ultimate objective would be Budapest. The taking of Budapest, while almost certainly fatal to Austria-Hungary, would also allow the possibility of broadening the offensive to Cracow and even farther north. In addition, success in Hungary would embolden the uncommitted neutrals, most notably Italy and Romania, to take the plunge into war on the side of the Entente.33 All of this, however, required that the matter of Przemys´l be resolved first. Thus, the focus of attention on the eastern front centered on events in and near the Carpathians.

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

By late February 1915, it would be fair to describe Conrad’s mental state as one of desperation. His first attempt to relieve Przemys´l had ended in a bloody failure. Although the garrison continued to defend Przemys´l’s outer works stoutly, fighting off Russian assaults, the food situation was becoming increasingly serious.34 Conrad’s second Carpathian offensive continued into the middle of March. Böhm-Ermolli’s Second Army continued its attacks, which served only to increase casualties. Over the first two weeks of March 1915, the Austro-Hungarian Second Army lost 51,000 men, including 10,000 missing. Further east, the Süd Army spent its time trying to get through two ridge lines known respectively as Zwinin I and Zwinin II. Given that the Süd Army had already suffered serious losses in the first Carpathian offensive, progress was limited, while casualties continued to mount.35 Even as Conrad’s second offensive was in its last gasps, it merged with one last effort to relieve Przemys´l. Böhm-Ermolli would continue the attack. His efforts would now be aided by the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, commanded by Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. The Archduke’s force would attack the Russian positions in the Gorlice-Jaslo area. These operations would coincide with a breakout effort by the Przemys´l garrison. Conrad briefed this plan to Francis Joseph and his ministers in Vienna on March 7, 1915. The emperor was opposed to the breakout attempt, regarding it as a forlorn hope.36 The third Carpathian offensive suffered from the same deficiencies as the first two. The continuing bad weather made it difficult to get guns forward. In addition, concerns about the Austro-Hungarian’s Fourth Army’s northern flank limited the number of units that could be committed to an attack. Ultimately, only a scratch force based on the Austro-Hungarian VI Corps (39th Honved Infantry Division and the 12th Infantry Division) plus two divisions from other corps attacked the Russian defenses at Gorlice. Launched on March 8, the attack broke down within a few days, as the Russian positions proved too strong for the limited Austro-Hungarian attack force, commanded by Feldmarschallleutnant Artur Arz von Straussenberg.37 The bad weather, marked by below-zero temperatures and heavy snowfall, continued to dominate the Carpathian front. As March wore on, the cold and snow was mixed with the occasional thaw, followed by nighttime refreezing. Not surprisingly, the number of sick shot up alarmingly. On March 13, 1915, for example, the Süd Army recorded casualties for that day of 54 killed, 137 wounded, and 493 sick. This applied to the Austro-Hungarians as well.38 While Conrad’s armies struggled to reach Przemys´l, the siege of the fortress proceeded apace. Although Kusmanek had been able to stretch the food supply to a surprising degree, any improvisation has its limits. By early March 1915, just about every horse that was available for the purpose had been slaughtered for food, and even horse meat was running short. Malnutrition among soldiers and civilian alike had reached terrifying proportions.39

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Communication between AOK and Kusmanek remained relatively regular. When weather allowed, an aircraft carrying mail, newspapers, and documents could sneak in. Sometimes, however, the combination of weather and Russian ground fire brought down aircraft inside Russian lines.40 Contact by radio was more reliable, but it too was a trade-off. The Russian 11th Army, commanded by General Andrei Selivanov, had signals units that were able to intercept messages between Teschen and Przemys´l. Although AOK was aware of this and tried to mitigate it by using what was considered a high-grade cipher, the Russians had broken that as well.41 On March 16, an aircraft arrived at Przemys´l bearing a demand from AOK for a breakout by the garrison, which would be in concert with Böhm-Ermolli’s efforts. Kusmanek replied that a breakout attempt would occur no later than March 19, given that two days would be needed to prepare. On March 18, Kusmanek informed AOK that the effort would take place the next day. Owing to the difficult terrain to the west, the initial direction of the breakout would be to the east, toward Lemberg. The Russians, of course, were also aware, as Kusmanek’s signal had been intercepted and decoded.42 Kusmanek distributed the remaining food supplies, giving priority to soldiers over civilians, and then moved his best units into their jump-off positions. The breakout attempt on March 19 initially made surprising progress, but once the well-informed and prepared Russian defenses were fully aroused, the breakout attempt quickly collapsed. The Austro-Hungarian garrison was driven back to the fortress’s defensive perimeter, accompanied by a Russian artillery barrage. With food supplies exhausted, Kusmanek had no choice. After a heartfelt exchange of radio messages with Francis Joseph informing him that Przemys´l would have to be given up, Kusmanek ordered the remaining artillery ammunition blown up, along with some fortifications.43 The garrison disabled as many guns as possible, and Kusmanek had 700,000 kroner paper notes burned and the remaining horses butchered. Parliamentarians were then dispatched to Selivanov’s headquarters to make the final arrangements. On March 22, 1915, Przemys´l was turned over to the Russian 11th Army, which occupied it the following day. The booty included nine hundred guns, nine generals, over 2,500 officers, and 117,000 soldiers (including 9,000 sick and wounded), plus 20,000 civilians who worked for either the Austro-Hungarian military or the civil administration. The Russians also recovered 2,000 Russian soldiers who had been held in the fortress as prisoners.44 The outcome of the Carpathian winter campaign was worse than Conrad could have envisioned in his most terrifying nightmares. The Austro-Hungarian field armies suffered about 600,000 casualties. In addition to that, the Przemys´l garrison of over 120,000 men was a total loss. By the end of Conrad’s last effort to relieve Przemys´l, the Austro-Hungarian army had been reduced, in the words of the Austrian official history, to a force composed of “Landsturm and militia.”

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

The German deployment of the Süd Army to the Carpathians involved the commitment of 87,000 troops, of whom 32,000 became casualties.45 The garrison of Przemys´l was evacuated from the fortress starting on March 26, 1915. The prisoners, provided with food by Selivanov’s forces, were initially marched back to Lemberg and then paraded through the city. From there, in ten days the Russians moved just over 100,000 prisoners east by foot and rail movements to Kiev. They were preceded Kusmanek, his staff, and general officers. Sukhomlinov ordered that prisoners be put to work after they had recovered some degree of health. Once the prisoners did recover, they worked in various details. Bezobrazov, for example, had ten Austro-Hungarian prisoners working on his estate at Mel’nikovka in western Siberia.46 The damage to the Austro-Hungarian army was as much psychological as it was physical. The harsh conditions, poor supply situation, heavy casualties, and constant demands to attack shattered the already fragile morale of the dual monarchy’s army. Commanders were affected as well. Conrad’s aide Rudolf Kundmann noted that the heavy losses in the second offensive sent Böhm-Ermolli into a deep depression. Conrad himself showed signs of mental strain, manifested in a nervous facial tic. After being informed of the loss of Przemys´l, Francis Joseph broke down and wept. In occupied Lemberg, the reaction among the non-Slavic inhabitants to Przemys´l’s fall was also depression. The sight of prisoners being marched through the streets was taken as an unfortunate sign that the Russians were here to stay.47 The reasons for the Austro-Hungarian failure were legion. The one factor that was not in Conrad’s control was the weather. To be sure, the weather, as Kosch noted to his wife in Masuria, was bad for both sides.48 Nonetheless, it probably impacted the Austro-Hungarians more, as they bore the onus of attacking. The other reasons for Conrad’s Carpathian catastrophe were personal, institutional, operational, and tactical. While the need to act quickly was understandable, the choice of attack sectors was not. Conrad’s decision to use the most direct route to Przemys´l condemned his armies to attack through some of the worst terrain in Europe, at the worst time of the year. Given that his first effort was going to be his strongest, Conrad’s best option probably would have been to reinforce the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, for an attack in the Gorlic-Jaslo sector. The seizure of the key road junction of Zmigrod, as was planned in the third offensive, would have had a greater impact on the Russian forces in the Carpathians, as Mackensen’s attack in May (discussed in the next chapter) showed. In addition, a breakthrough in that sector allowed for an easier, if somewhat more distant, approach to Przemys´l, than struggling through the Carpathian passes.49 Conrad’s decision to relieve Przemys´l served to expose further the institutional weaknesses of the Austro-Hungarian army. Parsimonious budgets over a long period ensured that the Austro-Hungarian army went to war with the

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thinnest of margins in terms of equipment and man power. Losses suffered in 1914 only exacerbated the problem. Although some progress had been made in making these losses good in 1915, it was not enough to offset the deficit.50 Consequently, Conrad’s armies had to undertake their offensives in the Carpathians with a critical lack of artillery. During the second Carpathian offensive, for example, Böhm-Ermolli’s Second Army averaged just six guns for just over half a mile, and in some sectors, even that modest standard could not be met. In addition to the shortage of guns, ammunition was in short supply. The ammunition that was available contained too many shrapnel shells, which were ineffective against trenches, and not enough high explosive rounds.51 Operationally, the Russian seizure of Mezölaborcz made it very difficult for Böhm-Ermolli to assemble forces for the second offensive. It also forced the Austro-Hungarian Third Army to continue attacking to recover the Laborcz Valley long after its offensive power had been spent. Tactically, AustroHungarian tactics showed little adaptability to the new circumstances of the modern battlefield. The high number of casualties, especially among officers, made it difficult to incorporate tactical lessons learned from the initial campaigns. Matters were made worse by ineffective artillery action. Lack of good positions for observation, plus poor indirect fire techniques, sometimes resulted in Austro-Hungarian shells hitting the attacking infantry. This served only to damage morale further.52 In the end, all of these factors, plus determined Russian resistance, gave Conrad the worst of all possible worlds—almost a million casualties suffered and nothing to show for it. For the Russians, the capture of Przemys´l presented both challenges and opportunities. The day after the surrender, Russian forces moved into Przemys´l. In keeping with Russian occupation policies and repeating scenes played in Lemberg and across Galicia, Cossacks began mistreating Przemys´l’s Jewish population. In addition to sheer anti-Semitism, Jews were under suspicion as spies, part of the espionage mania that marked Stavka, coming on the heels of the Miasoedov trial and execution. Even then, Yanushkevich considered Bobrinski’s policy toward Galicia’s Jewish population to be entirely too lenient.53 The morale of the Russian army was buoyed greatly by the fall of Przemys´l at all levels. Nicholas II was at Stavka when news of Przemys´l’s fall arrived. The Grand Duke, with tears in his eyes, rushed to the tsar’s carriage to convey the news. They later toasted the success with champagne.54 German and Austro-Hungarian soldiers, if they were not informed by their own authorities of Przemys´l’s surrender, certainly learned of it from the Russians. Troops on the front line heard loud cheering from the Russian lines. In a number of cases, the Russians erected plainly visible signs or banners announcing Przemys´l’s fall.55 In a strategic and operational sense, the thwarting of Conrad’s Carpathian offensives and the successful conclusion to the siege of Przemys´l presented

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

Russia with an opportunity to knock Austria-Hungary out of the war. This was understood by both Stavka and the southwest front. Ivanov started this by going over to the offensive, against Böhm-Ermolli’s Austro-Hungarian Second Army. Initially, this took the form of a counterattack by the Russian 3rd Army after Böhm-Ermolli’s initial thrust had been broken. On March 19, 1915, the Grand Duke formally ordered an offensive by the southwest front, ultimately aimed at Budapest. To bolster Ivanov’s offensive, Stavka sent all of the mountain artillery, the one type of artillery for which ample stocks of ammunition were available, to Galicia.56 With Przemys´l occupied and Selivanov’s units assigned to reinforce Brusilov’s 8th Army, Ivanov’s southwest front continued its attack. The Russians likewise had their challenges to overcome. Success in thwarting Conrad’s efforts to relieve Przemys´l had come, but at a considerable cost. Even though bolstered by reinforcements from Selivanov, the units of the Russian 3rd and 8th Armies had taken a considerable battering of their own. The lack of heavy field artillery was keenly felt.57 The logistical issues that had plagued the Austro-Hungarian offensives impacted the Russians as well. The lack of railway lines was a problem, made worse by the fact that the Russians apparently made little effort to convert rail lines in occupied territory from the narrower European gauge to the broader Russian one. In late April 1915, for example, in order to visit Galicia, the Grand Duke and Nicholas II could travel by rail only as far as Brody, just inside the Austro-Hungarian border. From there, they would have to go to Lemberg and Przemys´l by auto. The Russian supply services thus had to rely on horses to haul supplies and ammunition to the forward units. The weather continued to be vile, as heavy snowstorms alternated with sudden thaws. Matters were not helped when the tsar decided to visit Galicia in late April. Brusilov thought the visit was poorly timed and interrupted commanders in the midst of dealing with more important issues.58 Despite these handicaps, the southwest front’s offensive made slow, if costly, progress. In clear contrast to East Prussia, where a truce was observed, Easter Sunday in the Carpathians was marked by hard and bloody combat. With little available in the way of reserves to send to his hard-pressed forces, Conrad and his army commanders could only order their soldiers to hold out at all costs. The disparate ethnic composition of the Austro-Hungarian army was magnified on April 3, when the 28th Infantry Regiment, a Czech unit from Prague, surrendered almost as a whole, several companies not even firing a shot.59 By April 6, Kaganeck described the Austro-Hungarian forces as “rotten and decayed.” Operationally, Brusilov’s battered 8th Army had forced the even more severely mauled Austro-Hungarian Second Army back from Uzsok Pass and Dukla Pass.60 The situation in late March was sufficiently serious for Conrad to ask Falkenhayn once again for help. Two days after Przemys´l’s surrender, Conrad

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sent a message via Cramon to Falkenhayn requesting German units for employment in the Carpathians. While he was still not definitively committed to a major investment in the Carpathians, Falkenhayn did recognize the threat to Austria-Hungary. To shore up Böhm-Ermolli’s Second Army, Falkenhayn created an oversized corps consisting of the 25th and 35th Reserve Divisions, drawn from Woyrsch’s force and the German Ninth Army, plus the 4th Infantry Division, drawn from the Süd Army. Since the corps was deployed to a marked by the Beskiden Ridges, the force was designated as the Beskiden Corps. Command was entrusted to General der Kavallerie Georg von der Marwitz, who had distinguished himself as commander of the XXXVIII Reserve Corps in the Masurian Lakes campaign.61 The arrival of the Beskiden Corps during the Easter week battle embroiled the unit and its commander in combat and controversy. The corps was assigned to support an attack by the Austro-Hungarian X Corps against the Russian 8th Army in the Laborcz Valley. Launched on April 3, the X Corps attack collapsed almost immediately with a determined Russian night counterattack. Marwitz committed his troops to shore up the position, and on April 4, he launched the Beskiden Corps in an attack that recovered the ground lost. An angry Marwitz then demanded the removal of the X Corps commander, Feldmarschallleutnant Josef Ritter von Krautwald, a request that AOK acceded to almost immediately.62 By the end of the Easter week battle, both sides were exhausted. Conrad’s armies had held the line, easing the tension that AOK was rife with during that battle. The Russian forces that had borne the brunt of the fighting in March and April were well-below strength. On April 10, Ivanov recognized that his forces had reached the limits of their endurance and ordered them to fortify the lines they currently held. Any further offensive actions would be taken only in order to improve the tactical positions already attained. Russian logistics remained problematic. Ivanov also worsened his own situation by inserting the 11th Army after Przemys´l’s fall into the line between the 8th and 9th Armies, instead of using the forces previously engaged at Przemys´l to reinforce the 3rd and 8th Armies.63 Exhaustion prevailed among the Central Powers as well. The condition of the Austro-Hungarian armies at the end of the Carpathian winter war of 1915 has been noted. The German Süd Army, which had lost 36 percent of its strength, was also exhausted. Outside of some minor tactical adjustments, there was little activity. The biggest problem that Linsingen’s forces had to contend with remained sickness, although that would improve with the weather. The regiments, however, had suffered significant casualties and were in dire need of replacements.64 The crisis remained. While the events in the Carpathians and fall of Przemys´l did not influence the decision of Antonio Salandra’s government to

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

bring Italy into the war (Italy was going to do so in any case), the Balkans was another matter.65 The Russian successes in the Carpathians and at Przemys´l would prove that the prospect of Russian aid was no illusion. Thus, Russia could make promises of Austro-Hungarian territory to Romania in exchange for Romania’s entry into the war. An early Romanian entry, followed by an Austro-Hungarian collapse, could dissuade Bulgaria from joining the Central Powers, an essential prerequisite to an operation against Serbia. Continued Bulgarian neutrality would leave Ottoman Turkey isolated and vulnerable.66 Although convinced that the western front was the primary theater, Falkenhayn realized that a major effort in the east had to be made to relieve the situation facing Austria-Hungary. After the commitment of the Beskiden Corps, Conrad still had to ask Falkenhayn for an additional four divisions. Falkenhayn, however, had something different in mind. War Ministry official Ernst von Wrisberg developed a reorganization plan. By reconfiguring German infantry divisions to three regiments from the four-regiment square pattern, the Germany army was able to create a small strategic reserve. Originally projected to create up to twenty-four divisions, the plan resulted only in the creation of fourteen divisions, which were ready by the spring of 1915.67 Nonetheless, the creation of a strategic reserve allowed Falkenhayn to act decisively in regard to Austria-Hungary’s dire situation. The fall of Przemys´l brought Falkenhayn to a decision. On March 25, 1915, Falkenhayn and Cramon exchanged lengthy communications about the state of affairs on the eastern front. The outcome of the messages gave Falkenhayn an accurate picture of the balance of forces on the front between Austria-Hungary and Russia. While recognizing the need for the dispatch of the Beskiden Corps to shore up the Austro-Hungarian position in the Carpathians, both men realized that the impact of the corps on the overall situation would be minimal.68 Cramon followed up the exchange of messages with lengthy appreciation of the situation as well as a couple alternatives for where a large force could be committed offensively. Falkenhayn also consulted with the chief of the OHL rail section, Colonel Wilhelm Groener, on the feasibility of moving a large force quickly to one of several areas, according to a series of possibilities. Obviously informed of Wrisberg’s reorganization plan, Groener had already conducted a study on the possible deployment of a force of as many as eight corps for a major offensive in the east.69 On Easter Sunday, 1915, as his armies battled in the Carpathians, Conrad met Falkenhayn in Berlin. The best Conrad could do was to assure Falkenhayn that every possible measure was being taken to hold the front in the Carpathians. Both men agreed that the prospect of a separate peace with Russia was highly unlikely and that Italy’s entry on the side of the Entente was now a certainty. In regard to a major commitment of forces to the eastern

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front, Falkenhayn remained noncommittal. Conrad was aware of the new forces being generated by Germany, but he was in the dark as to where these units would be employed.70 A further exchange of messages with Cramon allowed Falkenhayn to zero in on a specific target. Cramon provided information to Falkenhayn on the state of the railroads in Austria-Hungary and on the condition of the AustroHungarian armies. After further consultation with Groener and Tappen, Falkenhayn made his choice. On April 13, Falkenhayn sent a message to Conrad. Falkenhayn rejected the idea of a few additional divisions to shore up the front, in the manner of the Beskiden Corps. Instead, Falkenhayn presented Conrad with a fait accompli. A new German field army of eight divisions, strongly supported by artillery, was being created. It would be deployed in the Gorlice area for an attack toward Sanok. The attack would be supported by the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army. As Germany was providing the preponderance of forces, the operation would be commanded by a German general. The details would be hashed out at a personal meeting.71 Given Austria-Hungary’s dire situation, Conrad had little choice but to agree. On April 14, he boarded a train and arrived in Berlin at 6:00 p.m. There, Conrad met with Falkenhayn, Tappen, and Groener. The details of rail movement and tactical matters were smoothed over quickly. The most contentious issue was command. Conrad bristled at the idea that the AustroHungarian Fourth Army, or at least part of it, would be subordinated to a German commander. Falkenhayn, however, had both sufficient leverage and the principle of unity of effort to get his way.72 Conrad, his wife, and his postwar supporters tried to take credit for the idea of the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive. This was part of the effort to paint the picture of Conrad as one of the war’s great strategic thinkers.73 Falkenhayn’s supporters, naturally, made the exact opposite claim. Cramon split the difference, suggesting that both Conrad and Falkenhayn arrived at the idea separately, if somewhat serendipitously.74 The time line noted above suggests that the lion’s share of the credit should go to Falkenhayn. Conrad told Falkenhayn that he had considered an offensive in that same area but lacked the forces for it. That was perhaps the closest Conrad came to tacitly admitting that his decision to launch the first Carpathian offensive where he did was a mistake.75 Falkenhayn’s decision to undertake the offensive at Gorlice was marked by strategic necessity, shrewd operational analysis, and moral courage. The strategic circumstances described earlier, plus Falkenhayn’s own assessment of Germany’s strategic goals, mandated that a major effort be undertaken to relieve Austria-Hungary’s dire situation. Operationally, Falkenhayn’s selection of the Gorlice region for the site of the attack was astute. The Austro-Hungarian rail system in that area enabled the rapid deployment of the newly created German Eleventh Army. The relative lack of lateral communications available to the

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

Russians in that sector of the front ensured that the attacking forces would enjoy superiority for some time. Finally, Falkenhayn’s decision required no small amount of moral courage. The idea of a major attack at Gorlice was opposed by Tappen and War Minister Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, because the operation would not be controlled by Ober Ost.76 Ultimately, Falkenhayn’s prevailed. The attack would either confirm or disprove the wisdom of Falkenhayn’s judgment. Another question to be decided was who would command the Eleventh Army. According to Cramon and his assistant Paul Fleck, the slate of possible candidates consisted of Falkenhayn, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Mackensen. The first three were unacceptable for reasons of impracticality (Falkenhayn), temperament (Hindenburg), or personality (Ludendorff). Another possible choice was Linsingen, commander of the Süd Army. Although senior enough and certainly able, Linsingen’s acerbic personality was already too well known to AOK.77 Thus, command of the offensive would be entrusted to another duo who would constitute perhaps the second-most-famous military marriage in German military history, surpassed in fame only by Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Mackensen would command the Eleventh Army, with the brilliant Hans von Seeckt as his chief of staff. The careers, personalities, and relationship of these two men bear a closer examination. The senior member of the pair was Generaloberst August von Mackensen. Product of a nonnoble Saxon family, Mackensen was born on December 6, 1849. Mackensen’s family was prosperous enough to enable him to serve as a one-year volunteer in the Franco-Prussian War. Distinguished service with the 2nd Life Hussars brought with it an iron cross and a reserve lieutenant’s commission. After a short stint as a student at the University of Halle, Mackensen entered the regular army in 1873.78 Mackensen enjoyed a fine career in the cavalry, especially in Life Hussar units, which brought him to the notice of the Hohezollern court. A tour as adjutant to Wilhelm II helped earn him an ennoblement. Although Mackensen did not attend the Kriegsakademie, he did a tour on the General Staff, serving in the section that dealt with Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Russia. An appointment as commander of the XVII Corps was regarded as a fine way to close a most successful career.79 Far from ending Mackensen’s career, the onset of war extended it. Success as commander of the XVII Corps in the Tannenberg campaign led to Mackensen commanding an ad hoc army in Hindenburg’s abortive Warsaw campaign in the autumn of 1914. After taking command of the German Ninth Army on November 1, 1914, Mackensen led it through the successful Lodz campaign in late 1914. In early 1915, he launched the limited attack at Bolimow, marked by the use of poison gas.80 Mackensen presented an odd picture. His association with the 2nd Life Hussars, plus the peculiar manner of German regulations regarding uniforms

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for general officers, meant that a good many of the pictures of Mackensen feature him wearing the Life Hussar uniform, with its distinctive busby with the death’s head skull and bones. This served to given Mackensen the appearance of a warrior from a bygone age. The most common analogy was to the hero of the Napoleonic Wars Gebhard von Blücher.81 His anachronistic appearance notwithstanding, Mackensen was well attuned to the environment and demands of command in modern warfare. He was able to grasp and exploit the potential of the new and more powerful artillery, as well as the emerging technologies of aircraft and telephone.82 Mackensen also understood the peculiarities of command in modern warfare. This was amply demonstrated in a letter he wrote during the Lodz campaign: It seems quite strange to me, that I sit here at my desk and map table, while my troops fight between the Warthe and the Vistula. Such, however, is the conduct of modern warfare. The distances of the march routes and the battlefield, the extent of the latter and the whole technical apparatus of the modern army brings it out so. Hohensalza is very good in this respect. It is valuable for the conducting of business when a headquarters remains in the same place for a longer time and becomes a traffic center. Units report by telephone and wireless radio and receive orders by the same means. One is far from particular staffs and still speaks constantly with them and is constantly in contact with the battle front. The business area of my headquarters here is in a Gymnasium. All of my sections make demands on my time. I work in the room with the directors.83

Although the notion of chateau generalship in World War I is something of a myth, Mackensen was a dynamic combat leader. Often during these operations and later in the war, he would often go personally to the critical point of an operation.84 Aside from sheer military ability, Mackensen had one other important asset to bring to the table: his personality. Everyone who knew Mackensen esteemed him highly as a person. Ludendorff thought Mackensen “a generous and noble man.” Every chief of staff who served under Mackensen adored him, and subordinate commanders such as Max von Gallwitz likewise thought the world of him. Even Generaloberst Hans von Plessen, the member of Wilhelm II’s court who was most critical of him as a commander, regarded Mackensen as “a splendid man.”85 Mackensen’s personality made him an excellent fit for the position of commander of the Eleventh Army. The role called for the conduct of coalition warfare at a high level. Mackensen would have to deal with both Falkenhayn and Conrad. Service at the Hohenzollern court certainly impressed Mackensen with the importance of protocol. Mackensen was also a tactful person,

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

and this enabled him to navigate the shoals of the often fraught relationship between Falkenhayn and Conrad.86 On the night of April 16, 1915, Mackensen received two messages at his headquarters in Lodz. One was from OHL ordering him to report to Charleville, while the other was from Hindenburg thanking his for his service and wishing him luck. Arriving in Charleville on April 18, Mackensen was ushered into the presence of Wilhelm II, who informed Mackensen officially of his appointment as commander of the Eleventh Army. An evening meeting with Falkenhayn followed, during which Mackensen was briefed on the upcoming attack. The old hussar then left for Eleventh Army headquarters at Neu Sandec, via Berlin, and arrived on April 25. There he would meet his new command while also renewing acquaintance with his chief of staff.87 The German Eleventh Army’s chief of staff was another rising star among staff officers, Hans von Seeckt. Born on April 22, 1866, Hans von Seeckt hailed from the Pomeranian nobility. His father, Richard von Seeckt, was an army officer with extensive service in 1866 and 1870, who would reach the rank of General der Infanterie. Seeckt entered the army in 1885 as a cadet with the Kaiser Alexander Guard Grenadier Regiment, a unit in which his father had served.88 Commissioned in 1887, Seeckt demonstrated ability sufficient to earn him admission to the Kriegsakademie in 1893. After graduating in 1896, Seeckt followed the normal career path of both command and staff assignments. The onset of war found Seeckt in the position of chief of staff of the III Corps in the west. Seeckt established his reputation as a staff planner and organizer in the direction of two attacks, one at Vailly in October 1914 and the other at Soissons in January 1915. Falkenhayn also got on well with Seeckt, and so on March 9, 1915, Falkenhayn tapped Seeckt as chief of staff for the yet-to-be-formed Eleventh Army.89 The fact that Seeckt was chosen as the chief of staff a month before Mackensen was named commander, in the same way that Ludendorff and Hindenburg were paired for the German Eighth Army in 1914, has occasioned comment from authors, especially those unacquainted with the practices of the imperial German army. While a chief of staff was not the equal of a commander, he and the commander did share command responsibility. The chief of staff, however, had unquestioned authority for organizing the staff, in accordance with the German army’s regulations.90 The more traditional interpretation of the relationship between a commander and his chief of staff tended to regard the chief of staff as the more important of the two. In this regard, people have extrapolated from the relationship between Hindenburg and Ludendorff that the chief of staff was more important and then applied this generally throughout the army. Thus, commanders such as Crown Prince Wilhelm, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, Mackensen, and others were regarded as mere front men for their chiefs of staff.91

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While this can be said to be true in the specific case of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, extending this notion across the army is simply unwarranted. Even Crown Prince Wilhelm, as Dennis Showalter noted recently, demonstrated better judgment than expected, especially as the war went on. Crown Prince Rupprecht, while not the most adept tactician, often showed shrewd insight on operational and strategic matters. Nor could this kind of generalization be applied to professionals like Max von Gallwitz or Otto von Below.92 In the case of Mackensen and Seeckt, there were those who thought that Seeckt was the brains of the duo. The senior Austro-Hungarian officer at Mackensen’s headquarters during the Serbian campaign, for example, regarded Mackensen as nothing more than “Seeckt’s mouthpiece.” This image continued into the postwar period. B. H. Liddell Hart, for example, described Seeckt as “Mackensen’s guiding brain.”93 Others knew differently. Ludendorff hailed Mackensen as “a distinguished man and a brilliant soldier.” Alfred Jansa, a young Austro-Hungarian staff officer attached to the operations section of Mackensen’s headquarters for the Serbian campaign, got the chance to watch the duo at close quarters. While Jansa noted that Mackensen and Seeckt made their major decisions behind closed doors, he was convinced that Mackensen was the driving force of the duumvirate. The final word should be left to Seeckt. Although he made the usual comparison to Blücher, Seeckt noted that Mackensen’s range of both theoretical and practical knowledge was “impressive.” In addition, Seeckt happily informed his wife that Mackensen had very few “vanities” that needed to be appeased.94 The force entrusted to Mackensen and Seeckt was large and well equipped. The German components were the X Corps, the XLI Reserve Corps, the oversized Guard Corps, and an ad hoc corps organization called Corps Kneussl, named for the commander of the Bavarian 11th Infantry Division, Generalmajor Paul Ritter von Kneussl. The Austro-Hungarian component was the VI Corps, commanded by Feldmarschallleutnant Artur Arz von Straussenberg, then considered one of the army’s up-and-coming leaders. The German Eleventh Army was strongly supported by heavy artillery, including 150 mm howitzers and German 210 mm and Austro-Hungarian 305 mm heavy mortars.95 Since the majority of the German divisions in the Eleventh Army were coming from the western front, the units had to be given training to prepare them for the conduct of mobile operations. The movement of the units from the western front to Austro-Hungarian territory was handled very smoothly. Groener had established a good working relationship with Colonel Johann Straub, the chief of the railroad section at AOK.96 Once they arrived at the rail heads, units moved up to their assembly areas. Heavy German vehicles were exchanged for lighter Austro-Hungarian ones. Troops then moved up to their

Spring Crisis: March–April 1915

front line sectors, with movements carefully controlled to avoid Russian aerial reconnaissance.97 Once at the front line, efforts were made to conceal the German presence. Officers conducting reconnaissance of their sectors wore all or parts of AustroHungarian uniforms. Security was further enhanced by the evacuation of the civilian population from areas around German positions. Communications equipment was guarded, with swift death sentences meted out to anyone who was too close to German telephone lines.98 Artillery batteries were moved into carefully concealed firing positions. The combination of highly accurate maps provided by the Austro-Hungarians and aerial reconnaissance allowed Mackensen’s artillery chief, Alfred Ziethen, to develop a bombardment plan that did not include the recently arrived artillery units registering their guns.99 While the German Eleventh Army deployed, Mackensen and Seeckt attended to matters of coalition warfare. Here Mackensen showed a good deal of deftness in handling relations with the Austro-Hungarians. Almost immediately after Macksensen’s arrival at Neu Sandec, he, Seeckt, and operations officer Fedor von Bock traveled to Teschen. There, Mackensen laid out to Conrad and Archduke Friedrich (nominal commander of the Austro-Hungarian army) the command relationships in accordance with the brief received from Falkenhayn. Mackensen followed the outlines of what Falkenhayn and Conrad had agreed to in the April 14 meeting. To ease the blow to Austro-Hungarian sensitivities, Mackensen promised that the dual monarchy’s prestige would not be damaged. Cramon also got OHL to agree to have Mackensen’s situation reports sent to him as well, thus keeping AOK in the loop.100 Since Mackensen had at least a degree of control of the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, the old hussar thought it a good idea to make a personal visit to the Fourth Army headquarters at Brzesko. While Seeckt met with his opposite number, Feldmarschallleutnant Rudolf Krauss, to resolve any issues concerning tactical coordination, Mackensen established a good personal relationship with the archduke. Mackensen thought that the meeting was worthwhile just for the personal relation aspect alone, showing a deft touch that was such a rarity among the German army’s general officers.101 The Germans were relatively successful installing the Eleventh Army in its sector. To be sure, it was not entirely problem-free. Regiments suffered casualties, especially in officers, at the hands of Russian snipers. The security measures undertaken by the Germans, however, served to frustrate efforts by the Russian intelligence service to gain information about the enemy forces opposite the Russian 3rd Army.102 The Russian high command also believed that the major German effort in 1915 would be in the west. Stavka had received reports of German units arriving in the middle of April. By April 25, the Russians confirmed the presence of the German Eleventh Army. On April 28, 1915, the Grand Duke informed Nicholas II of the existence of a

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major German concentration in the Gorlice area. Mackensen and Seeckt realized by April 27 that the Russians knew of the Eleventh Army’s presence. Thus, Mackensen set the date for the attack. The offensive would begin on May 2. “Longer than that,” wrote the old hussar, “I cannot wait.”103 Early spring of 1915 marked probably the high point of Russian operational and strategic success in the war. The hard-won-but-costly victory at Przasnysz reversed some of the gains made by the Germans in the winter and stabilized the situation of the northwest front. The southwest front’s success in fending off Conrad’s offensives in the Carpathians, plus the victorious conclusion of the siege of Przemys´l, inflicted serious casualties on an Austro-Hungarian army that could ill afford them. The southwest front’s ensuing offensive, although ultimately unsuccessful for the Russians, brought Austria-Hungary to the point of collapse. While Grand Duke Nikolai’s control over the two fronts was still too loose, he was wise enough not to press his luck against the Germans after Przasnysz. The decision to shift the main effort to the southwest front was unquestionably the best course of action open to Stavka.104 By the spring of 1915, the war had reached a possible turning point. After the bloodletting in the Carpathians, Austria-Hungary lacked the strength to drive the Russians from the Carpathian passes. Austro-Hungarian strength, already depleted, was certain to be further strained as it was now a given that Italy would soon enter the war on the side of the Entente. A continued Russian presence in the Carpathians would constitute a constant threat to Hungary. A Russian eruption on the Hungarian plain would almost certainly trigger the collapse of the dual monarchy. An Austro-Hungarian collapse would almost certainly entice Romania to enter, while also dissuading Bulgaria, thus leaving Turkey in an isolated situation.105 Thus, Germany was in a position where unless something drastic was done to relieve Austria-Hungary, the war would be lost before the end of 1915. Although convinced of the primary importance of the western front, Falkenhayn correctly understood the need to undertake a major operation to aid his ally. The decision to send a major force to Galicia required no small amount of moral courage on Falkenhayn’s part, as even his closest subordinates, such as Tappen and Wild, were opposed to a major commitment in the east.106 The wisdom of this decision would be proved or refuted when Mackensen and Seeckt set the offensive in motion.

CHAPTER SIX

Spring Reversal: May–June 19151

All goes well and progresses. —Hans von Seeckt, May 3, 19152 Losses have been immense. —Captain Neilson, May 19, 19153 Eastern Galicia should become part of Russia. Western Galicia, when its conquest has been completed, should form part of the kingdom of Poland, within the empire. —Count Vladimir Bobrinski, October 15, 19144 Lemberg has fallen. —August von Mackensen, June 22, 19155 The German offensive on the eastern front began on April 27, 1915, with a large-scale cavalry operation at the northern end. According to Ober Ost’s directive, the strategic goal was to fix Russian forces on that part of the front. The German navy’s Baltic Squadron was slated to make only a limited contribution, namely a demonstration of off Libau.6 The advance was made by Group Lauenstein, an ad hoc formation composed of three infantry and three cavalry divisions drawn from the German Eighth and Ninth Armies. The operational objective was the rail junction of Schaulen. Russian strength opposing Lauenstein was estimated to be about 25,000 men, supported by only a handful of artillery pieces and machine guns.7

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Launched on April 27, 1915, the advance made limited progress. In some areas, the advancing Germans met only minor rear guards; in other cases, some regiments ended up fighting severe actions against opposing Russian regular cavalry units or the more numerous Cossacks. Movement itself was hampered by poor roads, swampy terrain, and broken bridges. In any case, Stavka clearly saw the move as merely diversionary. Grand Duke Nikolai wrote to the tsar at the end of April that the German buildup in Galicia was of much greater concern.8 On May 2, 1915, Mackensen unleashed his force against Nikolai Protopopov’s Russian X Corps, part of Radko-Dmitriev’s 3rd Army. In some cases, especially where artillery preparation was insufficient, the Russians had enough small arms and machine gun firepower to give the Germans a bloody nose. In other areas, Ziethen’s carefully considered fire plan, marked by a four-hour barrage backed by heavy guns and weakly opposed by the Russians, devastated the thinly strung-out defenses of the Russian 9th and 31st Infantry Divisions. Mackensen’s attack was weighted on the Eleventh Army’s right flank, with Korps Kneussl (composed of the Bavarian 11th Infantry Division and the 119th Infantry Division) as the main effort, had to do some sharp fighting at Gorlice.9 By the end of May 2, gains had been made along Mackensen’s entire front. Over the next several days, the German Eleventh Army, supported by AustroHungarian Fourth Army, made a penetration several miles deep into the Russian defenses. Total casualties for the German Eleventh Army up to May 5, 1915, came to about 20,000. On the Russian side, Protopopov’s X Corps had been severely mauled, reduced from an original 34,000 to no more than 5,000. The neighboring IX Corps had also been handled roughly. Guns were lost, and the Eleventh Army bagged 17,000 prisoners. Even worse for RadkoDmitriev, his plan to eliminate the deepest German advance at Gorlice fell apart almost immediately. His local reserve, the 63rd Infantry Division, had been sucked into the fighting at Gorlice and was quickly rendered ineffective. The II Siberian Corps and the III Caucasian Corps, both recently assigned to the southwest front, ended up being drawn into heavy fighting with the Prussian Guard Corps, at precisely the opposite part of the line where RadkoDmitriev needed them.10 By the evening of May 5, 1915, Mackensen had gotten a clear picture of the extent of the Eleventh Army’s success, as well as the unraveling of the Russian forces opposing him. Thus, on May 6, 1915, Mackensen was able to inform OHL of the extent of the victory. The Eleventh Army and the AustroHungarian Fourth Army would continue their advances. Duly apprised of Mackensen’s success, AOK now ordered Böhm-Ermolli’s Austro-Hungarian Second Army to go over to the attack, thus exerting pressure on Brusilov’s 8th Army in the Carpathians.11

Spring Reversal: May–June 1915

Over the ensuing several days, the Eleventh Army continued in the direction set out in the army’s directive of April 27. By May 9, the key road junction of Zmigrod was taken, and the nearest water obstacle, the Wisloka River, had been crossed. Thus, by May 9, 1915, all of the goals outlined in the original directive had been met. In addition, Mackensen and Seeckt also had to spend a couple of days entertaining the kaiser and his entourage. With protocol satisfied, Mackensen then wrote to Falkenhayn (who sent it on to Conrad), seeking guidance from OHL and AOK as to the next steps to be taken.12 Not surprisingly, Conrad and Falkenhayn disagreed over the course of action to be taken. Conrad wanted Falkenhayn to send reinforcements from the western front to Galicia, reinforcing the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army’s advance. Conrad also wanted to reinforce Pflanzer-Baltin’s group. Falkenhayn dismissed the notion of drawing reinforcements from the western front, as the British and French had just opened a major attack in the west between Loos and Arras. The best Falkenhayn could do was to attempt to pry a few divisions from Ober Ost. Since Mackensen’s offensive was the decisive operation, Falkenhayn suggested that the planned reinforcements for PflanzerBaltin be sent to the Fourth Army. The one significant point of agreement was that Mackensen should continue the advance to the San River.13 The upshot of the exchange between Falkenhayn and Conrad was that Mackensen’s advance would press on to the San, although no specific objective was provided. Although Conrad was concerned that a setback for PflanzerBaltin could entice Romania to enter the war, Falkenhayn pointed out that continued success in Galicia would be enough to deter Romania, and that opinion was supported a few days later by the German military attaché in Bucharest. These issues would have to be definitively thrashed out at another face-to-face meeting. Meanwhile the concerned parties came up with suggestions the recent battle’s proper name. Ultimately Conrad’s proposal of “GorliceTarnow” was found to be acceptable to all parties.14 While AOK and OHL hashed out strategic issues, the offensive continued. The Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army had been supporting the German Eleventh Army’s attack. Now the Austro-Hungarian Third Army went on the offensive against the Radko-Dmitriev’s leftmost unit, the XXIV Corps, holding Dukla Pass. Already weakened by the departure of units sent to contain Mackensen’s advance, the Russian position quickly crumbled. On May 7, 1915, elements of the Austro-Hungarian Third Army were able to surround and capture much of the Russian 48th Infantry Division, including the division staff and its commander, General Lavr Kornilov.15 On May 12, 1915, Conrad came to OHL’s eastern front headquarters at Pless for a meeting with Falkenhayn. After hashing out the issues raised in the flurry of messages over the previous week, Conrad and Falkenhayn came to an agreement. The German Eleventh Army would cross the San River and

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isolate Przemys´l from the north. The Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army would cover the Eleventh Army’s left flank in the area between the Wislok and Vistula Rivers. The Austro-Hungarian Third Army was tasked with the capture of Przemys´l. Finally, the Austro-Hungarian Second Army and the German Süd Army would advance through the mountains, with Drohobycz as the intermediate objective and the Dniestr River as the distant objective.16 Russian reaction to Mackensen’s attack at Gorlice-Tarnow could best described as slow, confused, and indecisive. The Grand Duke’s initial reaction was to direct Ivanov to detach the XXXIII Corps from the 9th Army (opposite Pflanzer-Baltin) and send it to Radko-Dmitriev’s assistance, but Ivanov demurred, as he planned to attack Pflanzer-Baltin’s group with the 9th Army. On May 4, Nikolai Nikolaevich informed Nicholas II that the attack had been contained. Reassured by his uncle, the tsar made no mention of the matter to the tsarina.17 The insouciant atmosphere at Stavka and the southwest front quickly descended into confusion and chaos. By May 4, Radko-Dmitriev had a clear picture of the X Corps’ dire situation. He informed Ivanov that the only course available was to retreat to the Wisloka River. Ivanov ordered that the line of the Wisloka be held, as a further retreat by the 3rd Army would require the neighboring 4th and 8th Armies to retreat as well. The idea of a limited withdrawal, approved by the southwest front and Stavka, was rapidly overcome by the course of events. By May 8, the Eleventh Army reached the Wislok River, in effect penetrating the entire Russian position. The Grand Duke ordered the V Caucasian Corps in Odessa to go to Lemberg. It would take time for the corps to get there, however, so in the meantime, Stavka and the southwest front were reduced to moving single divisions to the critical sector.18 After an attempted counterattack by the Russian XXI Corps on May 10 made little if any impression on the Germans. With that, organized resistance by the 3rd Army collapsed. Radko-Dmitriev ordered a general retreat, although the ultimate destination was open to question. Eventually the Grand Duke, Ivanov, and Radko-Dmitriev settled on the idea of holding the line of the San River. Brusilov’s 8th Army had to abandon the hard-won position in the Carpathian passes. The Russians scorched the earth as they retreated, and the Russian 3rd and 8th Armies were able to retire in reasonably good order. The Russian retreat was also aided by the fact that Mackensen’s forces were in serious need of a pause, as the Eleventh Army was almost ninety miles from its nearest railhead. Although the Prussian Guard, German X Corps, and Austro-Hungarian VI Corps had already crossed the San, they confined their advance to securing respective bridgeheads. The Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army also closed up on the San.19 With Mackensen’s forces now across the San in places, Falkenhayn and Conrad, after yet another exchange of messages, had another meeting at Teschen at 6:00 p.m. on May 18. Although the conversation mainly concerned

Spring Reversal: May–June 1915

Italy and Bulgaria, Conrad and Falkenhayn agreed on the next steps for Mackensen and Seeckt, much in accordance with earlier meeting on May 12.20 Mackensen and Seeckt, for their part and with Falkenhayn’s encouragement, had to make some considerable alterations to the plans. Difficulties in bringing supplies forward, combined with Russian resistance, served to slow the advance of Boroevic´’s Austro-Hungarian Third Army to a crawl. Mackensen and Seeckt decided that once the San River was crossed, Korps Kneussl and the XLI Reserve Corps (commanded by General Hermann von François) would turn southeast. The XLI Reserve Corps would sever Przemys´l’s eastward communications, while Kneussl’s Bavarians and the Austro-Hungarian Third Army would converge on the fortress from the north and west.21 Both sides tried to make the most of the pause in operations. With the railroad brought forward, Mackensen and Seeckt sought to rebuild their stock of artillery ammunition, which had been severely depleted since the onset of the offensive. The German and Austro-Hungarian air detachments, which had displaced forward, flew endless reconnaissance missions to give commanders an idea of Russian dispositions. Regiments also received replacements, enabling them to rebuild their strength, which in some cases had fallen considerably from before the attack.22 For their part, the Russians were also trying to make the best possible use of the respite in operations in Galicia. Tactically, this involved trying to construct a defensive position to hold the line of the San River. An attempt to build up a reserve for a counterattack against Mackensen failed because of the inability of the transport system to move units from the northwest front to the southwest front. In regard to command, changes were made. The most notable change concerned the 3rd Army. The course of events over the last three weeks had been trying for Radko-Dmitriev, and the conduct of the retreat from Gorlice had earned him criticism from both Ivanov and Brusilov. On May 20, Radko-Dmitriev was dismissed by Ivanov and replaced by General Leonid Lesh. Another casualty was Ivanov’s chief of staff, Vladimir Dragomirov. As Mackensen’s offensive unfolded, Dragomirov became ever more given to melancholy. By the time the Germans and Austro-Hungarians reached the San, Dragomirov’s reaction ranged from skepticism about holding the San to panicky statements calling for a retreat all the way to Kiev. The highly strung chief of staff was relieved on the grounds of “nervous exhaustion” and was replaced by Sergei Savich.23 With the preparations complete, the German and Austro-Hungarian offensive resumed on May 24, after a two-hour barrage. The position of the Russian XXI and XII Corps at Radymno collapsed under the attack of François’s XLI Reserve Corps. The haul of booty included 9,000 prisoners, fifty-two artillery pieces, and forty-two machine guns. The XLI Reserve Corps crossed the San and headed for Naklo in order to cut Przemys´l’s eastward communications.24 For its part, Korps Kneussl worked its way toward Przemys´l’s north edge.

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Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian VI Corps and the Guard Corps covered the left flank of Mackensen’s attack force. A Russian counterattack by the III Caucasian Corps succeeded in collapsing one of the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army’s bridgeheads and threatened the German X Corps. This caused Mackensen and Seeckt some bad moments, but they ultimately mastered the situation. The Austro-Hungarian Second and Third Armies continued to make slow progress.25 As Mackensen and Seeckt had to stretch their forces to cover the everextending flank, Falkenhayn sought to get them some reinforcements. Ober Ost rebuffed a request from OHL for four divisions. Although the FrancoBritish offensive on the western front was causing some anxiety for the Germans, Falkenhayn decided to take the risk of withdrawing some units from the west to reinforce the success in Galicia.26 On May 30, 1915, Tappen arrived in Jaroslau to inform Mackensen and Seeckt that several additional divisions would be headed their way. Seeckt also briefed Tappen on the course of operations and plans for the immediate future regarding Przemys´l.27 For the Russians, once the line of the San was breached, the most pressing matter was whether or not to attempt to hold on to Przemys´l. As before, there was considerable disagreement between Stavka and the southwest front about the feasibility of holding the fortress. Matters were not helped by the deteriorating relationship between the Grand Duke and Ivanov. By conscripting labor from Przemys´l’s population, the Russians had repaired the damage to the fortress from the most recent siege. Ultimately, after a somewhat tense meeting with Ivanov at Kholm on May 30, Grand Duke Nikolai decided by the absence of decision. The commander of the fortress, General Sergei Delvig, was given no specific order to retreat and was left to defend Przemys´l with the remnants of six infantry divisions, all of which had been badly mauled over the last month.28 The third siege of Przemys´l proved to be the shortest. The German and Austro-Hungarian heavy artillery had gotten into position, and the expenditure of carefully husbanded ammunition for these calibers was linked to both ground and aerial observation. The actual assault was left to the Bavarian 11th Infantry Division, reinforced with elements of the 119th Infantry Division, the Hungarian 11th Cavalry Division, and the German 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment (Queen Augusta).29 The attack began on May 30, with a slow and deliberate artillery bombardment. Observation, both ground and aerial, enabled the gunners to adjust their fire with considerable precision. With the improved accuracy, Mackensen’s artillery could devastate Forts Xa and XIa. After two days of artillery preparation, the infantry assault started on June 1. The Bavarians seized Forts X and XI, while the Augusta Regiment’s Fusilier Battalion moved into Fort XII. After a Russian attempt to retake Fort XI collapsed in a welter of casualties, Delvig, on orders from Brusilov, pulled the remaining defenders out of

Spring Reversal: May–June 1915

the fortress on June 2, with the rear guards demolishing the remaining bridges over the San.30 On June 3, 1915, the Bavarians and Austro-Hungarians moved into Przemys´l, much to the relief of the civilian population. A brief kerfuffle arose when Mackensen announced the fall of Przemys´l in a tactless manner, proclaiming to Vienna that the German Eleventh Army was “laying Przemys´l at the feet of Your Majesty” (i.e., Francis Joseph). This unusually maladroit statement caused hard feelings in both Vienna and Teschen. Quick diplomacy by Cramon served to smooth ruffled feathers.31 With some degree of comity restored, Wilhelm II and Francis Joseph were delighted to award medals to some of the key commanders, with Conrad, Mackensen, Seeckt, François, and Kneussl at the top of the list.32 The advance of the “Mackensen Phalanx” (as the Russians called it) galvanized the armies at the southern end of the eastern front. After the deadly exertions of March, April had been relatively quiet for both the German Süd Army and Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin. Perhaps the most notable change was in organization. On May 8, 1915, Pflanzer-Baltin’s command was redesignated as the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army.33 The weather in that part of the Carpathians continued to be drastically changeable, sunny weather followed by wintry spells. This correspondingly impacted the health of the troops. Even as late as April 28, 1915, the daily number of sick outnumbered the total of killed and wounded combined. Casualties also came in other ways. On April 29, a medic in the 3rd Battalion of the 221st Reserve Infantry Regiment brought in an unexploded grenade, which promptly detonated, killing two and wounding nine.34 At the southern end of the front, it was the Russians who made the first move. The Grand Duke and Ivanov, trying to force OHL to shift troops from Mackensen’s sector, ordered General Platon Lechitsky’s 9th Army to attack Pflanzer-Baltin’s Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army. The 9th Army had about 120,000 men, facing Pflanzer-Baltin’s 80,000. A major victory in the Bukovina might also influence Romania to enter the war, as it was now abundantly clear that Italy was about to declare war on Austria-Hungary.35 Pflanzer-Baltin had been alerted to the impending Russian offensive from intercepted radio messages. Nonetheless, the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army was in a difficult position. Its supply was dependent on a rail line that ran through Hungarian territory, making it vulnerable to interference by Hungarian politicians, keeping in character with the nature of the AustroHungarian political system. Thus, when Lechitsky opened his offensive on May 9, the Russian XXXIII Corps crossed the Dniestr, the Russians had little trouble driving back the thinly spread out German 9th Cavalry Brigade.36 The advance warning had allowed Pflanzer-Baltin to concentrate reserve forces. These were committed to fighting as the Lechitsky widened his offensive with the XXXII Corps and the III Cavalry Corps. Pflanzer-Baltin’s

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principal subordinate organization was Group Marschall, a mixed formation with German and Austro-Hungarian units commanded by German Generalleutnant Wolf Freiherr von Marschall. Although Marschall’s soldiers fought back stoutly, ultimately Russian numbers told, so that Pflanzer-Baltin had to order a retreat to the Prut River. In addition, Conrad decided to send the Austro-Hungarian III Corps to reinforce the Seventh Army, although Falkenhayn regarded this as an unnecessary diminution of forces. By the middle of May, Lechitsky had won in effect a pyrrhic victory. Although the Russian 9th Army had taken 20,000 prisoners and other booty as well as captured Czernowitz, the ultimate impact was minimal. Romania remained neutral, and Lechitsky’s attack was too far away to impact the course of events on the San.37 With the capture of Zmigrod, the Germans effectively outflanked the Russian forces in the Carpathians. As a result, the Russian hold on the Carpathian passes began to loosen. As noted earlier, Dukla Pass had been abandoned to the Austro-Hungarians. As units were being drawn northward to contain Mackensen’s advance, which now included the Austro-Hungarian Second Army, Linsingen saw his chance. On May 11, he decided that the Süd Army would go over to the offensive against General Dmitri Shcherbachev’s Russian 11th Army.38 On May 12, the Süd Army finally took the Russian position at Zwinin II, capturing several thousand prisoners. Harry Kessler noted the majestic view he enjoyed, watching long columns of German troops pursuing the Russians as they retreated from the Carpathians.39 Linsingen’s attack continued over the next week. By May 19, however, the Süd Army’s momentum slowed to a stop. Shcherbachev’s forces had retreated to a well-prepared position and mounted a tough defense, punctuated by local counterattacks. Losses were considerable. The 3rd Grenadier Regiment, for example, lost 42 killed and 110 wounded, from May 19 to 24, serious losses for a unit already depleted by a considerable amount of combat.40 With supply difficulties mounting, Linsingen decided that a short pause was in order. Ammunition stocks were rebuilt, and heavy guns were displaced forward. A sense of urgency was renewed when news arrived of Italy’s declaration of war against Austria-Hungary.41 Once preparations were completed, Linsingen’s attack resumed on May 26, with the road junction of Stryj as the objective. Progress was slow and bloody. Another short pause ensued, and Linsingen renewed the attack on May 30, this time with a supporting attack by Pflanzer-Baltin. With the Austro-Hungarian III Corps now in hand, Pflanzer-Baltin decided to regain the initiative against Lechitsky’s 9th Army. The combined effort met with some success, as Stryj was captured by the German 3rd Guard Division on May 31.42 The seizure of Stryj, accompanied by the capture of over 9,000 prisoners, fifteen machine guns, and eight artillery pieces, marked the end of major fighting at the southern end of the front. The Russian 11th and 9th Armies were clearly retreating to the Dniestr River. They were pursued by the German

Spring Reversal: May–June 1915

Süd and Austro-Hungarian Seventh Armies. Once the Dniestr was reached, that would bring an end to the campaign on the southern end of the front, at least for a while, as events in the Bukovina would take a back seat to the campaign farther north.43 After the fall of Przemys´l, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians engaged in both planning and reorganization. On May 31, Mackensen and Seeckt had suggested to Tappen that, with the fall of Przemys´l immanent, moving on to Lemberg was the next logical step after the capture of Przemys´l.44 Although Italy’s declaration of war against Austria-Hungary had been long expected, it set Conrad off on a new target for his obsessive personality. He now hungered to launch a powerful offensive in the Tirol in order to punish Italy for its perfidy. Falkenhayn, however, was not going to be drawn into what he regarded as a distraction. On June 2, 1915, at Pless, Falkenhayn met Conrad at the latter’s request. Using Italy’s failure to declare war on Germany to his advantage, Falkenhayn minimized the amount of assistance that Germany would send to the Italian theater and announced that such forces would be for defensive tasks only. Thus, Conrad would have to settle for the advance to Lemberg. Falkenhayn also made it clear that after operations in Galicia were concluded, Serbia would be the next target.45 While Conrad and Falkenhayn hashed out strategic matters at Pless, operational matters were dealt with at Mackensen’s headquarters at Jaroslau. Tappen’s promise of fresh divisions began to appear in the form of the 22nd and 107th Infantry Divisions, obtained from Ober Ost. The XXII Reserve Corps (the 43rd and 44th Reserve Divisions), commanded by General der Kavallerie Eugen von Falkenhayn (Erich von Falkenhayn’s older brother), came from France. Following Falkenhayn’s corps from the west was the Bavarian 8th Reserve Division.46 The divisions coming from the west had to undergo a number of procedures that were concomitant with units headed for the eastern front. Aside from preparing for mobile operations, units received all manner of information on the Austro-Hungarian army. Incoming units also received reports incorporating the lessons learned by the German army in the east over almost a year of combat operations.47 Logistically, Mackensen’s situation improved after the fall of Przemys´l. The railroad reached Jaroslau on June 2, 1915, and the rate of progress was such that railroad would soon reach Przemys´l. The improving rail situation allowed the Eleventh Army to rebuild its stocks of ammunition, especially for its heavy guns. In addition, regiments that had been in action since the start of the offensive were able to incorporate replacements and to receive packages from family members or organizations at home.48 The lull in operations also allowed the Germans and Austro-Hungarians to displace their aviation detachments forward to new bases, from which extensive aerial reconnaissance of the new Russian positions could be conducted.49

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Command arrangements changed as well. With Italian intervention now an actuality, Austro-Hungarian army commands had to be reshuffled. The Austro-Hungarian Third Army headquarters was disbanded, and its subordinate units were assigned to the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army. The Third Army headquarters and staff would be reconstituted on the Serbian border, replacing the Fifth Army headquarters. The Fifth Army headquarters was moved to the new Italian front. After commanding the Austro-Hungarian Third Army during the vicious Carpathian winter battles, Boroevic´ was now tasked by Conrad with organizing the defenses against the impending Italian offensive.50 With the Austro-Hungarian Army departing from the area, command arrangements for the advance on Lemberg were changed. OHL gave Mackensen control of an army group, placing the Austro-Hungarian Second and Fourth Armies under his command. Thus, Archduke Ferdinand and BöhmErmolli would receive their orders from Mackensen, not AOK. Although Conrad hated the arrangement, he had little choice but to abide by it.51 In reality, giving Mackensen and Seeckt operational control over the neighboring Austro-Hungarian armies on each flank promoted better coordination for the coming advance on Lemberg. Just as the Germans and Austro-Hungarians were trying to refit and prepare for the next advance, the Russian southwest front was desperately trying to put together a defensive line after the fall of Przemys´l. The southwest front had taken a severe mauling in May 1915. Estimates for total losses in Ivanov’s command in May vary. Grand Duke Nikolai informed the tsar that over the course of May, the southwest front had lost 300,000 men. The Austrian official history, citing a Russian source, put Russian losses at 412,000. Falkenhayn estimated that some 170,000 prisoners had been taken.52 The problem for the Russians, however, went far beyond a mere question of numbers. Although no major Russian units had been encircled and destroyed, with the exception of Kornilov’s 48th Infantry Division, a large number had been reduced to hollow shells. Brusilov reported that each corps in the 8th Army was reduced in strength to the equivalent of a division. A British liaison officer described the 3rd Army as nothing more than “a harmless mob.” Losses in equipment had also been immense, far outstripping production. Efforts to make up the difference through foreign imports also yielded disappointing results. Replacements who reached the front often arrived without even rifles.53 As Przemys´l was now in Mackensen’s hands, the goal of the southwest front was to retain Lemberg. Ivanov had cobbled together a line covering Lemberg. The line was covered by Lesh’s 3rd Army and Brusilov’s 8th Army. Lesh’s force consisted of the XV, IX, XIV, X, III Caucasian, XXIV, and IV Cavalry Corps. Brusilov also controlled a large number of corps. All of these units were severely short of men and equipment. Ivanov dismayed Brusilov

Spring Reversal: May–June 1915

further by withdrawing several corps from Brusilov and sending them to backstop Lesh’s line. Matters were further complicated by the impact of Russian occupation policies, marked by a conflict between Stavka and the Russian governor, Bobrinski. Thus, the southwest front faced Mackensen’s army group in front, while it had to deal with a restive population in the rear.54 During the first week of June Mackensen’s forces conducted limited attacks, some of which were successful, others not. One notable setback at Josefowka on June 7, involving a joint attack by the Austro-Hungarian XVII Corps and the German XLI Reserve Corps, led to sharp criticism of the Austro-Hungarian corps by the Eleventh Army. Archduke Friedrich, the nominal head of AOK, had to take the extraordinary step of writing a letter to Mackensen and swearing by the competence of the corps commander, General der Infanterie Karl Kritek.55 The new offensive by “Mackensen’s Phalanx,” as the Russians called it, would begin on June 12 with a preliminary attack by the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army and the German Eleventh Army’s left flank at Sienawa. Artillery preparation would begin with on the evening of June 12, extending overnight, the barrage reaching its height between 4:00 and 5:30 a.m. The key was the precise timing between the lifting of the barrage and the infantry assault, both set for 5:30 a.m. The initial attack got off to a good start, and the 22nd Infantry Division was able to occupy Sienawa.56 The main attack on June 13 produced initial uneven results. The German XLI Reserve Corps made some progress and took 1,400 prisoners, but at the cost of 1,000 casualties. The adjoining Austro-Hungarian VI Corps was able to advance about a mile.57 Mackensen’s main effort in the center, based on the oversized and recently replenished Guard Corps supported by the XXII Reserve Corps, also found tough going on June 13. Nonetheless, a penetration of the Russian position had been achieved.58 Two more days of combat revealed the Russian defenses to be tough but ultimately brittle. After another day of hard combat, the Russian defense began to break apart. By June 15, it was clear that the Russians were falling back. The German Eleventh Army began to advance more easily. The AustroHungarian Fourth and Second Armies also began to advance, although the latter did so under the impact of a lashing telegram from Mackensen, ordering Böhm-Ermolli to attack “forcefully.”59 On June 15, Mackensen noted that since the start of the offensive two days earlier, some 35,000 prisoners had been taken. Prisoner statements and other sources of intelligence indicated that the Russian 3rd Army had moved back to a position based on a chain of lakes and forests on both sides of Grodek, extending to Janow. German commanders thought that the position would not be difficult to storm, although some minimal preparation would be needed.60 German confidence was mirrored by Russian despondence. Once Przemys´l was lost, Brusilov was very pessimistic about the prospects of

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holding Lemberg. Tactically, he regarded the city as untenable. The first signs that the tide of the war had turned came on May 16, when German aircraft bombed the city. The impression that Russian rule in Lemberg was rapidly drawing to a close was further confirmed when authorities, including Bobrinski, decamped for points east, taking anything of value they could carry. They were accompanied by some residents, mainly Poles and Ruthenians, who were seen as having collaborated with the Russians. In a final sign, after the start of Mackensen’s attack on June 19, the Grand Duke ordered the removal of any material of military value from the city, an activity that was accompanied by a good deal of looting.61 The attack against the Grodek position was in some ways a replay of the attack against the southwest front’s defenses after the fall of Przemys´l. The initial attack on June 19 by Mackensen’s army group, with Falkenhayn, Wilhelm II, and his retinue in attendance, met some tough initial resistance. By the next day, however, the Russian defense collapsed.62 The seizure of Rava Ruska, effectively isolating Lemberg from the north, forced Lesh’s 3rd Army to retreat to the north. Meanwhile, Brusilov’s 8th Army retreated to the east. On June 22, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian XIV and IV Corps, part of BöhmErmolli’s Austro Hungarian Second Army, pressed through Lemberg, and continued to advance to the east. Böhm-Ermolli and his staff entered town that afternoon. The German Eleventh Army and the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army turned part of their forces north, pursuing the retreating 3rd Army.63 The capture of Lemberg ended the spring campaign in Galicia. While the critical drama played itself out in Galicia, events also unfolded on other parts of the front. The German advance in Lithuania, designed to support Mackensen’s expected success, continued into May. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the operational objective was the rail junction of Schaulen. Launched on April 27, progress was limited. Operations were marked fights between German and Russian cavalry units. Several attempts to trap small detachments of Russian troops failed. On occasion, units such as the Bavarian Cavalry Division ran into serious trouble when confronted by Russian entrenched units backed by artillery. The German Baltic Squadron played its part, conducting a quick sortie from Memel against Libau on April 28, 1915.64 With the Russian forces now withdrawing to a strong position covering Schaulen, the focus of operations changed. Although Schaulen was still the major objective, an additional task for Group Lauenstein was the capture of Libau. Although no major Russian naval forces were stationed at Libau, its seizure would provide the small German Baltic Squadron with an advanced base, allowing it to confine the much-larger Russian Baltic Fleet to its bases at Petrograd and Kronstadt.65 The relatively porous lines and thinly spread forces allowed ample scope for cavalry. The advance against Libau itself would be left to 3rd Cavalry

Spring Reversal: May–June 1915

Brigade, reinforced by two Landsturm battalions, four artillery pieces, and some mortars. Cavalry divisions would send forth detachments to interrupt Russian rail communications between Schaulen and the Baltic coast. The navy would also once again play a role, attacking coastal defenses. This had to be done quickly, as statements from local residents and reports from agents and aerial reconnaissance pointed to the likelihood of Russian reinforcements arriving in the area.66 The German attack began on May 5. Aerial reconnaissance reported that the Russians were removing men and material from Libau. Consequently, little resistance was offered to the German unit, commanded by Generalleutnant Günther von Pappritz. The German naval flotilla sent to engage the coastal defenses was informed by aerial reconnaissance that Russian units were blowing up the coast. By the evening of May 7, Libau was in German hands, along with 1,500 prisoners, twelve guns, a number of machine guns, and supplies. Pappritz was named the military governor.67 The German cavalry operations against Russian rail communications, which began before the advance on Libau, enjoyed limited success at best. Setting out on April 29, the Bavarian Cavalry Division spent two weeks riding across the Russian rear area behind Schaulen. The division briefly occupied Mitau but, with Russian reinforcements arriving, retreated back over the Dubissa River, after covering 310 miles. In some cases, they inflicted damage to Russian communications, destroying railroad tracks and cutting telegraph wires. In other cases, such attempts ran afoul of Russian garrisons, plus regular cavalry and Cossack units. During one of these fights, one of the division’s brigade commanders, Generalmajor Freiherr von Crailsheim, was mortally wounded by a Cossack with a lance. The 6th Cavalry Division had a similar experience.68 To strengthen the attack on Schaulen, Ober Ost decided to reinforce Lauenstein with the I Reserve Corps. Progress was slow, as the advancing units had to deal with swampy, forested terrain, poor roads, and a vigorous Russian defense marked by frequent local counterattacks. By the middle of May, the advance had reached the line of the Windau and Dubissa Rivers. Schaulen remained in Russian hands, although it was now in the front line. Hindenburg informed Falkenhayn on May 18 that the present situation in Lithuania called for holding the line of the Windau River, covering Libau and the Dubissa, until the recently taken area could be organized and fortified. All this, added Hindenburg, could take some time. After their exertions, the cavalry divisions required rest and refit, especially for the horses.69 After a hectic first two weeks of May, both sides reorganized. The Russians were able to repair most of the damage done by the German cavalry. Reinforcements drawn from the 10th, 12th, and 1st Armies were sent in via Mitau to shore up the position and to protect Riga. The fall of Libau caused something of a panic in Riga. Once order was restored, industrial facilities were

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removed and sent east, along with part of the population. On the German side, the arrival of the I Reserve Corps mandated higher reorganization. Thus, on May 26, 1915, the Nieman Army was created, and General der Infanterie Otto von Below, previously commanding the Eighth Army, was named commander of the new force.70 The reorganization was also mandated by Libau’s importance. The German high command thought that holding the port was critical, given that possession of Libau was seen as a critical prerequisite to a subsequent advance on Riga. Both Falkenhayn and Hindenburg were concerned about the prospect of a Russian offensive to recapture Libau. The concern was well placed. The northwest front redeployed Plehve and the 5th Army headquarters from Poland to Lithuania. The forces previously belonging to the 5th Army were subsumed into the 2nd Army. By the middle of June, Plehve’s force had been reinforced to about fifteen divisions, roughly divided equally between infantry and cavalry.71 To preempt this, Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided to mount a limited attack along the entire front. The Nieman Army and the Tenth Army would attack with the aim of taking Schaulen, while also setting the possibility for an attack on Kovno. The Eighth Army and Army Group Gallwitz would continue to fix Russian forces in their respective sectors. The Ninth Army, now commanded by Prince Leopold of Bavaria, would make an attack toward Warsaw, once again employing poison gas. Ludendorff, ever the optimist, believed that decisive results could be obtained if a few additional divisions were committed to the attack north of the Nieman River.72 The result was a June marked by light and indecisive fighting along Ober Ost’s front. After considerable preparation during May, the Ninth Army’s attack was approved by Ober Ost on June 17. The attack, however, never came off in June, as unsuitable weather conditions for the use of gas persisted throughout the month. Gallwitz’s force had spent a very quiet May. Perhaps the most notable event was when the king of Saxony, Friedrich August III, visited Gallwitz’s headquarters on May 13.73 In accordance with Ober Ost’s wishes, Gallwitz went over to the attack. The attack was limited in its territorial ambitions and met with considerable resistance, marked by counterattacks conducted by several Siberian units. Gallwitz reported that, according to subordinate units, the Russians had employed dum-dum bullets, a type of ammunition that had been outlawed by the Hague Convention in 1899.74 On the basis of the reports, Gallwitz authorized that any Russian prisoners found with such ammunition be shot on the spot. Ober Ost then extended this policy its other subordinate armies. Operationally, however, the attack failed to keep Russian forces from being withdrawn and sent to other sectors of the front.75 The German Eighth and Tenth Armies had similar experiences with their attacks in June. Limited gains were made on the ground. The XL Corps, for

Spring Reversal: May–June 1915

example, was able to gain control of the Kovno Forest. The fighting was sporadic, and casualties on both sides were limited. Some regiments, such as the 4th Uhlans, took advantage of the lull to institute a training program to improve the proficiency of replacements in areas such as horsemanship and shooting. The commander of the 151st Infantry Regiment used the break to undergo an operation in the hospital at Ortelsburg.76 With the supporting attacks contributing very little, the German Nieman Army and the Russian 5th Army fought a bloody-but-indecisive action. In some sectors the Germans advanced, while in others, the Russians did. By June 20, the German offensive had ground to a halt. Seeking to ensure the retention of Libau, Hindenburg and Ludendorff moved the 3rd and 41st Infantry Divisions to reinforce Below. Hindenburg informed Falkenhayn that no further offensive action could be undertaken until early July. For their part, the Russians were mainly concerned with holding Riga. Thus, by the end of June, the situation on the northern end of the front had reached stasis.77 May and June of 1915 saw a complete reversal of fortune on the eastern front. The Russian threat to Austria-Hungary had been excised. Austro-Hungarian morale was further buoyed by the liberation of Lemberg. When Archduke Friedrich, Conrad, and their entourage left Teschen for the train station to go to Lemberg, enthusiastic crowds lined the road. Even Ludendorff described the Austro-Hungarian army as “invigorated.” Likewise, in Lemberg, a number of inhabitants greeted the appearance of Böhm-Ermolli’s troops on June 22 with rapturous enthusiasm. The following day, Mackensen, along with the BöhmErmolli and the commander of the Austro-Hungarian IV Corps, conducted a more formal entry into the city, followed by a parade headed by the archduke.78 With Austro-Hungarian authority restored in the form of the new governor, General Hermann von Colard, measures were put in hand to purge the civil administration of anyone regarded as a collaborationist or with Russophile tendencies. Conrad took the opportunity to visit the grave of his son Herbert, who had been killed at Rava Ruska in September 1914.79 In addition to recovering Przemys´l and Lemberg, Mackensen’s offensive had also recovered the Galician oil fields. Although the Russians had conducted a “scorched earth” policy with some vigor, the main damage caused against oil-producing facilities consisted of burned wooden derricks. These could be replaced quickly. In other cases, the Russians carried out the policy of scorched earth in a rather haphazard manner. In some areas, there was only the quick destruction of crops. In others, not just crops and foodstuffs were destroyed but any and all industrial and transportation facilities as well. In addition, population and livestock were removed. In May 1915 alone, for example, the Russians removed 26,000 civilians from Galicia. These lack of consistency in these activities led Grand Duke Nikolai to issue an order to his army commanders in an effort to impose a common standard.80

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The extent of Central Powers’ success and Russian misfortune could be measured in casualties. To be sure, victory had not come to Mackensen cheaply. Between May 2 and June 22, 1915, the German Eleventh and the Austro-Hungarian Fourth, Third, and Second Armies had taken a total of 87,000 casualties, including 12,000 dead. By comparison, Russian losses were enormous. The southwest front’s losses in prisoners alone were three times that of Mackensen’s total casualties. By the end of June 1915, the total Russian army was short by about 500,000 men. Even if replacements could be found, only about 40,000 rifles were on hand to equip them. The absence of any major encirclements led adherents of the Schlieffen school to consider the achievement of Mackensen and Seeckt as no more than a “tactical success.”81 The results of Gorlice-Tarnow impacted the situation for both sides in other ways. On June 22, 1915, in an atmosphere at Pless made giddy by success and champagne, Wilhelm II announced the elevation of Mackensen to Generalfeldmarschall, while Seeckt was promoted to Generalmajor. This made the duo the equivalent in rank to Hindenburg and Ludendorff. While the promotions were certainly deserved, Seeckt speculated to his wife with perhaps justified cynicism that Falkenhayn might have been trying to set up Mackensen and Seeckt as a sort of counterweight (Gegenspiel) to Hindenburg and Ludendorff.82 On the Russian side, the campaign in Galicia also had repercussions. To be sure, the Grand Duke remained popular, both in the army and with the allies. Someone, however, had to bear the onus for the defeats. That someone was Sukhomlinov. By the middle of June 1915, the matter of shortages of arms and ammunition, especially for artillery, was a well-known subject. Sukhomlinov was coming in for considerable criticism in Petrograd. When Nicholas II visited Stavka on June 24, 1915, the Grand Duke took his shot. Immediately upon the tsar’s arrival, Grand Duke Nikolai pressed the him to dismiss Sukhomlinov. The Grand Duke got his way; Nicholas II sent Sukhomlinov a letter dismissing him, while also thanking Sukhomlinov for his services.83 Sukhomlinov’s replacement as war minister was General of Infantry Aleksei A. Polivanov. Born on March 16, 1855, Polivanov hailed from an old Russian noble family. A veteran of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, he later graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1888. In 1905 he was appointed chief of the General Staff. Later he became the assistant war minister. In that position, he did much to undermine his boss, Sukhomlinov. Polivanov played a role in the arrest and execution of Sergei Miasoedov, a Sukhomlinov protégé, on dubious espionage charges after Second Masurian Lakes. Sukhomlinov later accused Polivanov of writing anonymous poison pen letters to various people in Petrograd and Stavka. Nonetheless Polivanov was a considerable improvement as war minister over the corrupt Sukhomlinov. Technologically adept, Polivanov was able to institute a number of policies that would serve the army well in the future.84

Spring Reversal: May–June 1915

The advance on Lemberg also deranged the Russian armies in an organizational way. While Brusilov’s 8th Army retreated east, Lesh’s 3rd Army retreated north. Thus, on June 25, 1915, the 3rd Army passed under control of the northwest front. This left the southwest front reduced to three armies: the 8th, 9th, and 11th. The rest were in the northwest front’s area. To fill the gap between the 3rd and 8th Armies, a separate force consisting of the XXIX, V Caucasian, II Caucasian, and XXIII and IV Cavalry Corps was assembled, later designated as the 13th Army, commanded by General Vladimir Gorbatovski.85 The reasons for German success and Russian failure were the same. The carefully planned attack developed by Mackensen’s staff demanded precise timing between the artillery and the infantry. This was achieved in most cases. The disparity in quantity was also matched by a gap in number of guns employed and the overpowering superiority of Mackensen’s forces in heavy guns. By comparison, cooperation between the arms in the Russian army was almost unknown. Even where artillery ammunition was available in sufficient quantities, coordination between the artillery and the infantry was poor at best. On the northern end of the front, coordination between Russian infantry and cavalry was weak.86 German advantage in artillery was magnified by air superiority. Although the German air presence on the eastern front was small compared with that on the western front, it was more than enough. Aided by an Austro-Hungarian aviation effort, the Germans were able to overwhelm the small Russian air force. While German air attacks were more annoying than effective, German and Austro-Hungarian aerial reconnaissance made its artillery incredibly effective.87 Linking aviation detachments to individual heavy artillery batteries enabled the heavy artillery at Przemys´l to shoot with incredible accuracy. The improved accuracy was critical, given that the ammunition stock for the heavy calibers was much reduced after the expenditure of the opening attack.88 In terms of command, Mackensen enjoyed the advantages of a peculiar combination of modernity and remoteness. Modernity came in the form of the telephone. In 1914, it was clear that the German army had still not quite figured out how to use telephone. A corps, for example, had only sixty-two miles of telephone wire in 1914, not nearly enough for a mobile campaign.89 By 1915, however, the German army had a better handle on the problem. Mackensen’s headquarters and those of subordinate units conducted a great deal of business by telephone. The available orders by corps and divisions make a point of setting a date and time for the establishment of telephonic communications with higher echelons. Telephone also provided a measure of security for communications, and harsh security measures for telephone lines helped stymie Russian intelligence service efforts to divine German intentions.90 German adeptness with the telephone enabled Mackensen and

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Seeckt to control the forward movement of forces, even though Mackensen’s own headquarters displaced forward several times. Mackensen and Seeckt also profited from the remoteness of the theater. OHL’s eastern front headquarters at Pless was not as robustly equipped in regard to communications as its western locations. In addition, matters on the western front demanded that Falkenhayn return to Mézières on short notice. Thus, Mackensen and Seeckt had relatively free hand in managing affairs. They did not have to contend with the kind of meddling “General Staff husbandry” (Generalstabswirtschaft) that was the common practice in the west.91 This allowed for a relatively quick German decision-making cycle. By comparison, Russian decision-making was slow. Brusilov was critical of Ivanov, for example, in getting reserves to Radko-Dmitriev once the storm broke over the 3rd Army. Radko-Dmitriev also lost control of his forces in the 3rd Army’s retreat. Danilov was critical of the northwest front’s inability to transfer forces to the southwest front in a timely fashion. At times, the Grand Duke was guilty of indulging in wishful thinking instead of sound strategic analysis.92 The fall of Lemberg brought an end to the spring campaign in Galicia, at least for the time being. The shape of the front now dictated that the campaign would move in a different direction, as spring turned into summer. The bone of contention would now be Poland.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 19151

The goal of the operation would be to have the Second and Eleventh Armies advance between the Bug and the Vistula against the line Brest Litovsk–Warsaw, while the Fourth Army advances on both sides of the Vistula. Thus a decision would be brought about against the Russian west and northwest fronts. —Hans von Seeckt, June 15, 19152 I have decided to take supreme command of the army. —Tsar Nicholas II, August 19, 19153 By the end of June 1915, it had become high time for both sides to reconsider their strategic situations. Grand Duke Nikolai’s position was indeed an odd one. Although the Russian armies had suffered serious defeats in May and June, the Grand Duke’s political position never seemed stronger. He had been able to engineer the dismissal of Sukhomlinov as war minister, pinning responsibility for the shortage of artillery ammunition on him. Sukhomlinov’s replacement, Polivanov, was more supportive of Nikolai and less corrupt than Sukhomlinov as well. In addition, the Grand Duke also saw the replacement of two other major figures in the government as steps forward. Minister of Justice Ivan Shchelgovitov and Director General of the Holy Synod Vladimir Sabler were replaced by Aleksei Khvostov and Aleksandr Samarin, respectively. Nikolai regarded these measures as important to reducing the malign influence of Grigory Rasputin over the tsar’s government. The Grand Duke’s attempt to unseat the Siberian monk, however, ran afoul of opposition by both Nicholas II and Tsarina Alexandra.4

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Militarily, the Russian position was another matter. While the Caucasus front remained quiet, the defeats of May and June in Galicia had wiped out most of the gains that had been made in 1914. Two iconic places that had been captured in 1914 and 1915, Lemberg and Przemys´l, had been lost and restored to Austro-Hungarian authority. The advance of the Central Powers in Galicia had created an extended front along southern Poland. By late June, it had become clear that the Germans and Austro-Hungarians had reoriented their forces for an attack into southern Poland, and measures were put in hand in anticipation of just such an attack. Bezobrasov’s Guard Corps was moved from the 12th Army to the 3rd Army, along with the VI Siberian Corps. The II Siberian Corps was moved to Evert’s 4th Army.5 Additionally, the Russians asked their allies to help them by attacking on the western front as well as sending material aid. The perceived failure of the Western powers’ to fulfill this request led to some hard feelings on the part of some in Stavka toward the allies.6 For their part, the situation facing the Central Powers was complex. Like their opponents, both Germany and Austria-Hungary had to manage a multifront war. For Austria-Hungary, the Serbian front was stable at the moment. While the Italian declaration of war caught Austria-Hungary in a potentially vulnerable situation, slow Italian mobilization and an inspired defense by the Austro-Hungarian forces on the Isonzo front mitigated any advantage Italy may have gained from its entry into the war.7 In the east, the operations of May and June had excised the Russian threat posed earlier in the spring. Austro-Hungarian intentions at this point rested primarily on Conrad’s obsessive personality. By the summer of 1915, there were three constants in Conrad’s life. The first was his desire to marry his mistress, the soon-to-be-divorced Gina von Reininghaus. The second was an overpowering urge to punish Italy for its perceived perfidy. The third one was the need to score a victory that would belong primarily to Austria-Hungary, especially as Conrad was plainly aware of the dual monarchy’s increasing dependence on Germany. Italy represented the best chance for Austria-Hungary to achieve this. Conrad went so far as to suggest that a separate peace with Serbia be made so that accounts with Italy could be squared.8 Falkenhayn’s situation was even more complex than Conrad’s. On June 14, 1915, the French launched a heavy artillery bombardment against German defenses in the Artois region, followed by a major infantry assault two days later. The French assault made some penetrations into the positions of General der Infanterie Ewald von Lochow’s III Corps. Although these penetrations were cleaned up by German counterattacks, the situation caused consternation at OHL. Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg in particular believed that the situation had become critical. Although Falkenhayn’s more placid estimate of the situation proved correct, he was sufficiently

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

alarmed about the lack of reserves in the west to shift forces from the east. Thus, Mackensen had to give up four divisions, including the recently arrived Bavarian 8th Reserve Division, the 56th Infantry Division, and the XLI Reserve Corps.9 Equally troubling to Falkenhayn was the isolated situation of Ottoman Turkey. Although the Gallipoli peninsula was held by a combination of British bungling and a dauntless Turkish defense, there was serious concern about Turkey’s ability to sustain the defense as well as considerable concern about ammunition. In addition, Turkish forces were defending Baghdad against a British thrust up the Tigris River.10 Thus, Falkenhayn’s view of strategy, which saw Britain as the main enemy, demanded that Serbia be overrun and a secure land route of communications to Turkey be opened up. Falkenhayn plainly informed Conrad of this fact on June 13, 1915. Falkenhayn and Conrad had long agreed that Bulgarian participation was a critical prerequisite to another invasion of Serbia.11 Given the situation and his strategic priorities, Falkenhayn thought that the best course of action for the immediate moment was a continuation of the offensive in the east. Conrad was still confident that the Russian southwest front could be brought to a decisive battle west of Lemberg. Hans von Seeckt, however, had something more ambitious in mind. On June 15, 1915, Seeckt wrote a lengthy appreciation of the situation of the Eleventh Army. Seeckt considered the fall of Lemberg as a foregone event. What had to be considered was what should be done next. Seeckt suggested that once Lemberg was taken, any major advance to the east would be fruitless. Instead, the German Eleventh Army, plus the Austro-Hungarian Second and Fourth Armies, should turn north. Advancing into the area between the Vistula and Bug Rivers, the ultimate target would be Brest Litovsk. Accompanied by an implied offensive by Ober Ost’s forces from the north, the Russian northwest front’s armies could be cut off in Russian Poland. The Süd Army and the AustroHungarian Seventh Army would advance east of Lemberg to find suitable defensive positions.12 Falkenhayn’s initial reaction to Seeckt’s proposal was skeptical, as indicated by his cryptic marginalia. On June 19, 1915, Seeckt got another chance to pitch his idea when OHL arrived in Jaroslau for a visit to Mackensen’s headquarters. Seeckt, with Mackensen’s support, briefed Falkenhayn on the plan. Sufficiently persuaded, Falkenhayn outlined the idea to Conrad in a telegram on June 23. The following day, Seeckt briefed a more detailed version of the concept to both Conrad and Falkenhayn at Jaroslau.13 Seeckt’s concept was attractive to both Conrad and Falkenhayn for several reasons. First, having Mackensen’s force in motion would keep the initiative in the hands of the Central Powers, something that appealed to Falkenhayn and Conrad’s innate aggressiveness. Straightening the line by pinching out the salient of Russian Poland would shorten the front, thus freeing up at least

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some of the forces needed for the invasion of Serbia. The destruction of the Russian forces in Poland might also push Russia into making a separate peace. Finally, the weakened state of Russian forces in Galicia offered Conrad the potential for the Austro-Hungarian army to score a victory that it could call its own. On June 28, Conrad and Falkenhayn met at Pless, to discuss the final details. Falkenhayn also secured the approval of the kaiser, who, officially at least, was the ultimate authority. Since Seeckt’s proposal called for the participation of Ober Ost, at least by implication, some buy-in on the part of Hindenburg and Ludendorff was required.14 The Ober Ost gang had not been idle. Hindenburg and Ludendorff had their own ideas about how to proceed after the fall of Lemberg. The Ober Ost staff looked at a variety of courses of action, ranging from fairly conservative direct advances on Warsaw to more wide-sweeping concepts. In keeping with their ambitious approach to conducting operations, Hindenburg and Ludendorff preferred a campaign on a far grander scale. The Tenth Army, supported by the Nieman Army, would take Kovno and the press on to Vilna. The ultimate objective would be Minsk, thus completing a vast envelopment of Russian forces north of the Pripet Marshes.15 The matter was hashed out at a conference at Posen on July 2, 1915. The major figures involved were the kaiser, Falkenhayn, Conrad, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff. Falkenhayn had already conferred with Mackensen and Seeckt the day before and was thus able to present their views. Hindenburg laid out the case for the Kovno option. The initial step, taking Kovno, could be done quickly. Pressing on to Vilna and later Minsk offered the best prospect for a decisive result. The other courses of action proposed, Hindenburg suggested, offered at best only limited results. In some cases, the nature of the pursuit would be frontal, thus allowing the Russians to outrun the German forces.16 Falkenhayn, however, had executed a classic bureaucratic maneuver. By securing the support of Conrad and Wilhelm II, Falkenhayn had basically determined the outcome of the meeting even before it convened. Falkenhayn laid out the plan for the next offensive, and the kaiser gave his approval. Hindenburg and Ludendorff remonstrated, but the decision had been made even before they stepped into the conference room. Both men were furious. Max Hoffmann noted in his diary that Ludendorff especially returned to Ober Ost headquarters at Lötzen in a “savage” mood. Falkenhayn followed this up with a message to Ober Ost demanding confirmation from Hindenburg and Ludendorff that their actions would conform to the plan decided on at Posen.17 The conference at Posen provides an excellent illustration of the conflict between two profoundly different approaches to the conduct of operations. Ober Ost, as ever, was trying to repeat the success of Tannenberg on a grand scale. Falkenhayn’s approach was based on the “bite and hold” concept

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

employed by Mackensen and Seeckt. Any serious analysis would conclude that Falkenhayn’s idea was simply better. The logistical realities of the eastern front better supported Falkenhayn’s concept. Bringing the railroad forward toward Cholm and Lublin to support the northward advance of Mackensen’s armies was a less difficult matter than doing the same for an offensive aimed northeast toward Minsk. Likewise, Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s concept of advancing by long bounds from Kovno to Vilna and then to Minsk was unrealistic in a logistical sense. The extant rail net, exacerbated by the gauge barrier, simply could not support such an advance. The same problem also rendered an intermediate idea suggested by François unworkable. Thus, logistically, Falkenhayn’s concept was far more realistic than that of Ober Ost.18 Operationally and tactically, Falkenhayn’s concept was sounder than Ober Ost’s. François noted that the long thrust envisioned by Hindenburg and Ludendorff would create points vulnerable to Russian counterattacks. In addition, even if the imagined pincers met at Minsk, there would still be too many gaps in the lines to trap successfully the retreating Russian forces. Falkenhayn’s plan, based on Mackensen’s previous success, offered a better prospect for victory. For his part, Wilhelm II’s support for Falkenhayn allowed the kaiser a measure of payback for Hindenburg’s resignation threat earlier in the year.19 The execution of the coming offensive required some reorganization and redeployment. The reorientation of the German Eleventh and AustroHungarian Fourth Armies to a northward direction meant that the right flank and rear of Mackensen’s army group had to be protected. By July 12, 1915, the German Süd Army and the Austro-Hungarian Second Army had reached positions on the Zlota Lipa and the lower Bug Rivers, respectively. These movements served to Mackensen’s rear, as well as the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army’s left flank. Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian First Army, occupying a narrow sector between Woyrsch and the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, was withdrawn, moved across the rear of the German Eleventh Army, and then inserted into its new sector, to the left of the AustroHungarian Second Army.20 The need to cover the German Eleventh Army’s right flank necessitated the creation of a new force. Thus, on July 6, 1915, the Bug Army was created. The new force was composed of units drawn from the Eleventh Army and the Süd Army. The Eleventh Army provided the XLI Reserve Corps, whose transfer to the west had been canceled, the 107th Infantry Division, the Bavarian 11th Infantry Division, and some heavy artillery. The Süd Army contributed the Beskiden Corps and the 1st Infantry Division. The new army would also have the German 5th Cavalry Division. The Bug Army would be subject to Army Group Mackensen’s orders. It would, however, take some time and effort to assemble the Bug Army. The 1st Infantry Division, for

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example, had to come up from the Zlota Lipa River, where it was supporting the Süd Army’s crossing. This was done by foot marches carried out only at night, in order to avoid Russian aerial reconnaissance. The division only reached its assembly area on July 13 and would be afforded only one day of rest before the start of the offensive, although its status was as the army reserve.21 The command arrangements for the new offensive renewed previous controversies. Army Group Mackensen now consisted of his own Eleventh Army, plus the newly forming Bug Army, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand’s Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, and Feldzeugmeister Paul Puhallo von Brlog’s Austro-Hungarian First Army. As before, Mackensen would be subject to the orders of OHL and AOK, although any directive from AOK would have to be approved by OHL. The arrangement still rankled Conrad, although he admitted there was little he could do about it.22 Another command issue that cropped up was the matter of the Bug Army. Falkenhayn’s choice to command the Bug Army was Linsingen. Conrad objected, although the reasons for his attitude remain obscure. Falkenhayn response to Conrad amounted to telling him in effect to mind his own business. Falkenhayn also pointed out that assigning Linsingen to the Bug Army would essentially get the obnoxious Prussian out of Conrad’s hair. Linsingen’s place as head of the Süd Army would be taken by General der Infanterie Felix Graf von Bothmer, whose virtues Falkenhayn extolled. Ultimately, Falkenhayn’s views on all these issues prevailed. In addition, Conrad’s proposal to put the Süd Army and the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army under Pflanzer-Baltin’s command was dismissed as “unnecessary.” The only matter on which Conrad got his way was keeping the Austro-Hungarian VI Corps under the Eleventh Army, instead of it being transferred to the Bug Army.23 Conrad’s position vis-à-vis Falkenhayn suffered further almost immediately after the latest round of acrimonious bickering. On the night of July 6 to 7, 1915, Evert’s Russian 4th Army launched an attack on the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army at Krasnik, the scene of one of the initial encounters between the Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies in 1914. The attack was then joined by elements of Lesh’s 3rd Army. By the afternoon of July 7, the Russian XXV and VI Siberian Corps had driven the Austro-Hungarian VIII, X, and XIV Corps back over a mile. Although Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was able to impose order on the chaos, he had to employ all of his available reserves. Second Krasnik served to give the Austro-Hungarian army yet another black eye. Although Conrad assured Falkenhayn that the situation of the Fourth Army was not serious, the Austro-Hungarian II Corps had to be shifted from the AustroHungarian First Army to shore up the Fourth Army.24 While the Fourth Army was having its difficulties, the Eleventh Army too was finding the going tough in late June and early July, as it changed its orientation to the north. Crossing the prewar border into Russian Poland in the

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

last days of June, the German Eleventh Army encountered increasingly stiff opposition, often marked by Russian counterattacks. At the village of Sitno, for example, the Augusta Regiment fought an ultimately successful but bloody action, at the cost of eighteen dead and fifty-seven wounded. The X Corps had a similar experience as it crossed the border into Poland. By the start of July, German intelligence was aware of the presence of four new units,: the Russian Imperial Guard, XXXI, the II Siberian and VI Siberian Corps, and the 13th Army headquarters, commanded by General Vladimir Gorbatovski.25 These units had built up a very strong position behind the Wieprz River. This, plus the need to take steps to protect the German Eleventh Army’s lengthening right flank, led to a halt in the campaign, while these issues were hashed out at Posen.26 The lull in the campaign gave Mackensen’s units a needed respite. Some time was needed to allow supplies, especially food, to catch up to the regiments. In addition, a number of regiments received sizable numbers of replacements, allowing them to regain a measure of strength. Steps were taken to minimize the impact of disease. While some of this was a matter of German cultural prejudice, disease could have personal impacts, such as the death of the commandant of François’s headquarters or the illness of the son of the kaiser’s adjutant Hans von Plessen. Thus, while Mackensen’s forces would still be understrength by the time the offensive into Poland would resume on July 13, 1915, they would still have regained much of their offensive power.27 In addition to preparing men and equipment, changes were made in regard to commanders. Linsingen’s appointment to command of the Bug Army and Bothmer’s taking over the Süd Army have already been discussed. Other changes occurred at lower levels. Although the XLI Reserve Corps remained in the theater, its commander did not. François headed back to France, to take command of the VII Corps. The command of the XLI Reserve Corps was taken over by Generalleutnant Arnold von Winckler, commander of the 2nd Guard Division. The command of the 2nd Guard Division passed to Generalleutnant Walter Freiherr von Lüttwitz. Kosch was moved from the I Corps to the recently arrived X Reserve Corps, part of the Eleventh Army.28 While Mackensen’s army group made its preparations, Ober Ost made ready to carry out its part of the plan. Since the main effort would be the advance across the Narew, the onus of the attack would rest on Army Detachment Gallwitz and its commander, General der Artillerie Max von Gallwitz. Born in Breslau on May 2, 1852, Gallwitz came from a nonnoble family with a tradition of military service. His father and maternal grandfather had been NCOs in the Landwehr and the Prussian regular army, respectively. Given a natural aptitude for mathematics, Gallwitz sought and gained service in the artillery. Joining the 9th Field Artillery Regiment, a unit from SchleswigHolstein, Gallwitz served at the siege of Metz in 1870.

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By the end of the Franco-Prussian War, Gallwitz, now an ensign, was commanding a gun battery. After the war, Gallwitz enjoyed a fine career in the artillery and was an influential advocate for modernization of the artillery while posted in the War Ministry. After he had a successful tour as a division commander, Wilhelm II raised Gallwitz to the nobility in 1913. At the outset of war in 1914, Gallwitz took command of the Guard Reserve Corps, which he led with distinction in both the western and eastern front. By early 1915, Gallwitz was commanding an eponymous army detachment, which he led through the Second Masurian Lakes and the ensuing battle of Przasnysz. Well regarded as a combat commander, Gallwitz would be the tip of Ober Ost’s spear.29 On July 4, 1915, Ludendorff visited Gallwitz’s headquarters at Soldau to brief Gallwitz on the results of the Posen conference and get his views on the coming offensive. Gallwitz now commanded a force consisting of the I Corps (led by Generalleutnant Johannes von Eben), plus the XI, XIII, XVII, and XVII Reserve Corps. The artillery component of the army detachment included 39 light howitzer (105 mm) batteries, 38 heavy howitzers (150 mm), 71 field gun (77 mm) batteries, 6 batteries of 210 mm Mörsers, and over 5 batteries of 100 mm field guns. Altogether, Gallwitz had probably over 620 guns of all types at his disposal.30 Gallwitz divided his force into two unequal groups: a smaller one (XIII and I Corps) east of Przasnysz and the larger group west. The western group, with the XI, XVII, and XVII Reserve Corps supported by the majority of the artillery, would launch the main attack. The XIII Corps would support the western group’s left flank, while the I Corps would engage in a feint attack. The three corps designated as the attack force would have 400,000 rounds of artillery ammunition for their guns. Extensive preparations were also made for the care of the anticipated number of wounded.31 Although the decision had been made, during the week after the Posen conference, Hindenburg and Ludendorff persisted in pushing the Kovno option. Finally, on July 9, 1915, Falkenhayn made it clear to Ober Ost that the matter of Kovno had been decided. To ensure that the option adopted at Posen was being followed, Tappen was dispatched to the eastern front, first to Ober Ost headquarters at Lötzen, and then to Gallwitz’s headquarters at Soldau. In addition, other officers apparently from OHL were posted to various sections of Gallwitz’s headquarters. Since both Hindenburg and Ludendorff regarded this as an unwarranted intrusion, Tappen was received with icy reserve by Hindenburg and especially by Ludendorff. Despite the high level of toxicity, Tappen was able to get his way. The date for the offensive was set for July 13, 1915. This would coincide roughly with Mackensen’s effort, which would commence two days later.32 To a degree, Falkenhayn’s suspicion of Ober Ost was warranted. Although Gallwitz’s formation was well supplied, reinforced, and equipped for the

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

coming offensive across the Narew, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had other fish to fry as well. The Nieman Army, whose sector was quiet for much of June, was reinforced for an advance into Lithuania and Latvia. Hindenburg once again requested support from the Baltic Squadron as the army advanced along the coast. Seeckt later dismissed the effort as a “private war” conducted by Ludendorff to satisfy the appetites of various pan-German organizations.33 While high-ranking officers squabbled, argued, and ultimately decided, the lower units across Ober Ost’s area of operations prepared for the coming attack. Regiments absorbed replacements, ammunition stocks were built up, and defensive positions improved. Sometimes journalists were taken up to quiet sectors. Even though major fighting was absent, there was the usual patrolling. The German cavalry, most of which was concentrated in the Nieman Army, suffered an embarrassing episode on June 18, when the Russian Ussuri Cavalry Brigade successfully penetrated the German lines, destroyed the 2nd Cavalry Division’s supply train, and attacked the 6th Cavalry Division’s supply train as well. The Russian troopers also cut a number of telephone lines. The Ussuri Brigade escaped back to Russian lines the next day.34 On July 13, 1915, the general offensive of the Central Powers began. Spearheaded by Army Group Gallwitz and the German Eighth Army, the offensive began in the early morning hours of July 13, 1915, marked by cloudy, if also moonlit, skies. Gallwitz noted that the Russian defenses were well developed, with several positions based on well-built trenches that also made excellent use of the terrain. Since the German trenches were about 1,000 yards from the Russian forward trenches, the goal for the attacking forces was to get to a jump-off position just 250 yards from the first Russian position.35 Given the strength of the Russian position, German preparations were undertaken with considerable care and attention to detail. Gallwitz’s artillery plan was developed by Richard von Berendt, another rising star in the artillery branch of the German army. Registration fire began on July 11. Fire for effect began at 4:00 a.m. on July 13. The objective was to destroy Russian obstacles. After several hours of general barrage by heavy artillery, the light guns would open up, laying down a rolling barrage. The attacking infantry corps would do so in a staggered fashion. The XI Corps would go forward at 8:00 a.m., followed an hour later by the XVII Corps. The XIII Corps would advance at 8:42 a.m.36 The attack enjoyed immediate success. The artillery barrage took a heavy toll of the Russian troops in forward positions. The 11th Siberian Division lost 9,000 casualties, almost 60 percent of its strength, in one day. Although some pockets of resistance required some hard fighting to overcome, the German commanders were very pleased with the progress made. Generally, the attack had achieved considerable surprise. Gallwitz reported that three Russian defensive positions were overrun. Booty included several thousand

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prisoners, several artillery pieces, and machine guns.37 The advance continued over the ensuing several days. On July 14, Przasnysz, the site of Gallwitz’s setback at the hands of Plehve’s 12th Army in March, fell to the XVII Corps. Resistance was offered only by rear guards. In the space of a few days, all of the organized positions north of the Narew River had been overrun. In addition, aerial reconnaissance reported no meaningful movements of Russian reserves; the enemy was in full retreat. By July 16, however, the momentum began to slow, as Gallwitz’s forces approached the broad and swampy Narew River. In addition, resistance began to stiffen, as units approaching the river began to take casualties from Russian artillery posted south of the river.38 While Gallwitz was carrying out the main attack, the armies on each of his sides did their part. The Eighth Army, commanded by General der Artillerie Friedrich von Scholtz, launched an attack on July 13, also making progress. After several days, especially the XXXVIII Reserve Corps, which adjoined the I Corps, had also closed up to the Narew. On Gallwitz’s left flank, the German Ninth Army had done little aside from launching an ineffective gas attack, which resulted in the seizure of a hill and friendly casualties.39 While Gallwitz and Scholtz attacked, the Ninth Army conducted feints, to fix the Russian 2nd Army. While this appeared to be successful, Ober Ost concluded by July 16 that the Russians would soon be retreating, an assumption that proved correct.40 While the Ninth Army and Army Detachment Woyrsch followed the retreating Russians, Gallwitz undertook an operational pause. The Narew River, as the German official history noted, was a considerable military obstacle, especially along the roughly sixty-two-mile-long sector between Novogeorgievsk and Ostrolenka that Army Group Gallwitz was assigned to cross. In the summer of 1915, the average width of the river varied from 80 to 150 yards. The nature of the banks meant that guns and vehicles required bridges for crossing the river.41 For Gallwitz, the two key places to capture were Pultusk and Rozan. Thus, several days of preparation would be needed to bring the requisite artillery, engineering, and bridging assets into position. Although considerable losses had been inflicted on the Russian 12th and 1st Armies, including taking over 17,000 prisoners, serious resistance had to be reckoned on.42 Although Gallwitz had ample reason to pause for a few days, the brief halt served to reveal the continuing distrust between Falkenhayn and Ober Ost. On July 18, 1915, Falkenhayn wrote to Hindenburg. While noting that the kaiser was immensely pleased with the successes of Ober Ost’s forces, Falkenhayn also, again using the Wilhelm II as a vehicle, expressed the hope that a crossing of the Narew would be undertaken as soon as possible. Falkenhayn’s suspicion had some foundation, since even though the Kovno option had been rejected at the Posen conference on July 2, it was clear that Hindenburg and Ludendorff were still not willing to simply let it go.43

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

While Gallwitz started the northern part of the offensive on July 13, Mackensen launched the southern offensive two days later. Mackensen’s armies faced a well-organized defensive position; Evert’s 4th Army faced the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, an enlarged 3rd Army (seven corps and two Cossack cavalry divisions) opposed the German Eleventh Army, and Gorbatovski’s 13th Army (five corps and five cavalry divisions) faced off against the Bug Army astride the Bug River. The biggest drawback for the Russian was the massive shortage of equipment, especially weapons. Commanders often had to drill and train replacements without rifles.44 Although Mackensen expressed “complete confidence” in the ability of his forces to get the job done, the task facing his army group was a daunting one. Unlike the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive, this time there would be no advantage of surprise. Strengthened Russian air defenses, both aerial and ground, resulted in the loss of several German aircraft. The Russian defensive lines were carefully laid out to make maximum use the terrain. There were logistical complications as well. Railroads heading north from Lemberg were all single track. Once the Russian border was crossed, bringing the railroad forward to support Mackensen’s advance would have to overcome the gauge barrier. Mackensen’s initial objective, the rail line between Lublin and Cholm, was sixty miles from the border, thus the very edge of the Eleventh Army’s operational range.45 Still another concern was the security of Mackensen’s right flank. The two armies that covered Mackensen’s right flank, the Austro-Hungarian First Army and the Bug Army, had to cross the Bug River and then advance north astride the river. Linsingen had considerable misgivings about this. The Bug itself, a river with very steep banks, had only a limited number of crossing points. Once crossed, Linsingen was concerned about his own right flank. The best way this could be done was by the Austro-Hungarian First Army’s capture of Władimir Wołynsk, the major Russian railhead in the area.46 Linsingen would have additional security for his right flank in the form of Cavalry Corps Heydebreck, an ad hoc force composed of the Austro-Hungarian 4th and 11th Cavalry Divisions and the German 5th Cavalry Division. The eponymous unit was commanded by Generalleutnant Ernst von Heydebreck.47 The seizure of Władimir Wołynsk was the occasion for yet another disagreement between Falkenhayn and Conrad. The latter thought three divisions sufficient for the task, while Falkenhayn thought a considerably larger force would be necessary. Ultimately, a compromise was reached, although Falkenhayn still regarded the force allocated to Władimir Wołynsk to be insufficient.48 Consequently, Mackensen’s offensive got off to a slow start. The AustroHungarian First Army’s effort to cross the Bug at Sokal on July 15 enjoyed only limited success, in that a small bridgehead was created by the AustroHungarian I Corps north of the town. Linsingen’s army, to the left of the First

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Army, also had to contend with determined resistance.49 While the preparatory artillery bombardment had destroyed Russian barbed wire, concrete blockhouses armed with machine guns could inflict serious casualties. In addition, the Russian ammunition had eased to an extent. That allowed Russian artillery, aided by aerial reconnaissance, to employ counterbattery fire effectively against the XLI Reserve Corps. Determined Russian counterattacks made taking every hamlet a tough fight.50 Mackensen likewise encountered similar problems with the German Eleventh Army and the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army. The position occupied by Lesh’s 3rd Army behind the Wieprz River was described as “immensely strong.” Consequently, when the Eleventh Army kicked off its attack on July 16, it made very little progress, despite a three-hour artillery bombardment.51 The attack continued the next day. Hard fighting at Krasnostaw by the Guard Corps against the Russian Guard resulted in the creation of a bridgehead over the Wieprz by July 19. The XXII Reserve Corps and the X Corps also needed several days to fight their way through the Russian defenses.52 The Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army also made slow going, especially in the center of its sector. Progress was slow enough that Falkenhayn sent Tappen to Teschen in order to get Conrad to spur Archduke Joseph’s troops to greater efforts.53 By July 19, Mackensen’s forces had penetrated the defenses of the Russian 4th, 3rd, and 13th Armies on a twenty-mile front to a depth of over seven miles. Although 15,000 prisoners and twenty-two machine guns had been taken, success had not come cheaply. The Austro-Hungarian VI Corps had taken 7,000 casualties. The total strength of the Prussian Guard Corps now amounted to no more than 12,000 men. In addition, many of Mackensen’s units who had been in action since the beginning of May were showing signs of fatigue.54 Matters were made worse by the poor weather. The area was lashed by heavy rainstorms. By July 20, Harry Kessler described the roads as “awful.” Normally sandy in dry weather, several days of severe storms turned the roads into ruts of “thick, gooey mud.”55 Thus, although Mackensen’s offensive had made some gains initially, after several days it appeared to be slowing considerably. The start of the major German offensive against Russian Poland had critical impacts further up the chain of command. Although the Russian defenses had stood up so far against the onslaughts of Gallwitz and Mackensen, neither Stavka nor the northwest front was sanguine about the prospect of holding Russian Poland. Alekseev, the Grand Duke, and his advisors could read a map and quickly divined OHL’s intentions. Their deductions were supported by prisoner statements. As early as July 19, Alekseev was given the latitude to abandon Warsaw if necessary. Industrial equipment and agricultural goods had already been sent east in large amounts.56

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

On the German side, the slowing of momentum triggered a new round of sniping between Falkenhayn and Ober Ost. Falkenhayn was suspicious that Hindenburg and Ludendorff were not giving Gallwitz sufficient forces for the offensive across the Narew. Instead, the duo was reinforcing the Nieman Army for an offensive into Lithuania, an attack that Falkenhayn regarded as an extraneous excursion of dubious strategic value. In addition, Falkenhayn also considered Ober Ost’s behavior, with some justification, as going back on commitments made at Posen on July 2.57 To ensure that the offensive across the Narew would continue, OHL dispatched two infantry divisions, the 54th and 58th, from the western front to Ober Ost, specifically to reinforce Gallwitz. Hindenburg responded by assuring Falkenhayn that the line of the Narew would indeed be broken.58 Meanwhile, Mackensen was able to restart his offensive. While his Eleventh Army rested for a day or two, the baton was taken up by the AustroHungarian Fourth Army. On July 22, the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army drove back Evert’s 4th Army. Archduke Joseph’s troops took 12,000 prisoners and twenty-three machine guns. Advances, however, had to be limited in order to enable neighboring German troops in the Eleventh Army to catch up. The Eleventh Army was still having its own problems. Russian defenses had firmed up, and not just on the ground. On July 23, 1915, Kosch informed his wife that his headquarters had been attacked three times by individual Russian aircraft, each carrying five or six bombs.59 While Mackensen’s forces were attempting to regain momentum, pressure on Alekseev’s northwest front began to come from two directions, namely the west and the north. Gallwitz used the operational pause to reposition his forces to take Pultusk and Rozan, the two places critical to any crossing of the Narew. In addition, heavy artillery was displaced forward, and German reconnaissance aircraft provided Gallwitz with information about the disposition of Russian reserves. Gallwitz’s attack would coincide with attacks by the Ninth Army and Army Detachment Woyrsch. OHL issued the official order for the attack over Wilhelm II’s signature, the date set for July 24, 1915.60 Gallwitz’s attack actually began on July 23, with some preliminary operations against the Russian defenses at Pultusk and Rozan. He now had an additional infantry division in hand, the 54th, just arrived from the western front (the 58th Infantry Division went to the Eighth Army). After defeating a Russian night attack at Rozan on the night of July 22, Gallwitz’s forces began moving toward the Russian forward positions at Pultusk and Rozan.61 During the night, the Russian 1st Army evacuated both places. German troops who moved in on the morning of July 24 found that retreating Russian troops had destroyed the bridges in both places. Engineers were on hand, however, and pontoon bridges were quickly erected. By July 26, Gallwitz had four corps (XI, XIII, XVII, and XVII Reserve) across the Narew and was approaching the

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middle Bug River. Gallwitz informed Ober Ost to the effect that he considered the situation satisfactory.62 While Army Detachment crossed the Narew and headed for the middle Bug River, the Eighth Army made little progress in its attack. Although the Narew was crossed in a couple of places, in other places the defenses of the Russian 12th held firm. An effort by the German XX Corps to cross the Narew on the night of July 23–24, for example, broke down in the face of Russian machine gun and rifle fire, aided by searchlights. Ossowiec and Ostrolenka remained in Russian hands.63 While Gallwitz got his forces across the Narew, Prince Leopold’s Ninth Army got his attack underway. The Russian position in Poland already starting to collapse, the Ninth Army’s units found the forward Russian defenses abandoned. They began to move east, once again meeting serious Russian resistance. At Blonie, to the Ninth Army’s right, Army Detachment Woyrsch also started to move toward the Vistula River. The advance of these two armies brought them up against two of the principal Russian fortresses in their respective sectors, Novogeorgievsk and Ivangorod. German aerial reconnaissance now focused its effort on Warsaw.64 Although Gallwitz’s army group had crossed the Narew between Rozan and Pultusk and reached a line less than twenty miles from the Bug, immediate exploitation south was not possible. Russian resistance had stiffened considerably. Gallwitz explained his halt to OHL July 28. The I Corps had still not crossed the Narew, but would do so on July 28 or the next day. Additional preparations were also required, including displacing artillery and supplies forward. Finally, Gallwitz had to dispatch forces as part of the group needed to besiege Novogeorgievsk. Thus, the attack would resume in two or three days.65 While Gallwitz’s force was crossing the Narew, Mackensen was repositioning his forces to restart the attack of the German Eleventh Army. Mackensen and Seeckt massed a group consisting of the X Corps, X Reserve Corps, and XXII Reserve Corps, placing it under the command of X Corps commander General der Infanterie Otto von Emmich. This group would attack west of the Wieprz River, thus skirting the strongest part of the Russian defenses and tying in with the right wing of Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army.66 While Mackensen was regrouping for the next attack, Falkenhayn and Conrad argued over a potential redeployment of Austro-Hungarian forces. An Italian offensive had caused a crisis. On July 25, 1915, Conrad decided to transfer the Austro-Hungarian XIV Corps from the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army to the Isonzo front.67 Cramon, who was always well-informed about the goings on at AOK, presumably informed Falkenhayn about this move. Falkenhayn quickly informed Conrad that any such transfer required the approval of OHL. Conrad adeptly found a way of getting other reinforcements to the Isonzo front and thus quickly backed away from moving the XIV Corps out of

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

Poland. The crisis on the Isonzo soon subsided, but the episode, concluded by a snide telegram by Falkenhayn, marked yet one more signpost in the saga of fraught relationship between Falkenhayn and Conrad.68 The Russians for their part attempted to disrupt German preparations with counterattacks. These combats served to inflict casualties on both sides. Perhaps the most notable one was Bezobrasov. Ordered by Lesh to launch an attack on July 24, the assault resulted in heavy losses to the Russian Grenadier Guard and the Pavlovski Guard Regiments. This resulted in yet another row between Lesh and Bezobrasov. This clash proved to be the last straw. Bezobrasov either offered his resignation, which Lesh eagerly accepted, or Lesh relieved him, depending on whom one reads.69 Bezobrasov’s replacement was Lieutenant General Vladimir A. Olukhov, who moved over from the XXIII Corps. The cantankerous-but-well-connected guardsman then complicated matters for the Grand Duke by decamping to Baranovici and hanging around Stavka for several weeks, inveighing against Yanushkevich, Danilov, and others. Grand Duke Nikolai would have liked to get rid of him, but given Bezobrasov’s connections to the court, the best Nikolai could do was to be nice to Bezobrasov, while also keeping him on the shelf.70 Gallwitz’s crossing of the Narew now presented the prospect of crossing the middle Bug and seizing Siedlce. Losing Siedlce would sever Russian forces’ communications in Warsaw. Already cognizant of the prospect of an encirclement in Poland, on July 25 the Grand Duke informed the tsar that an evacuation of Russian forces from the left bank of the Vistula River was necessary. It was becoming ever more evident that the Russians would have to abandon all Polish territory west of the Bug River.71 The combined German-Austro-Hungarian offensive into Poland in late July and early August were launched in a relatively well-timed fashion. The initial move was made by Woyrsch. Falkenhayn wanted Woyrsch’s force to cross the Vistula between Warsaw and Ivangorod. To placate Conrad, the Austro-Hungarian XII Corps, part of Woyrsch’s detachment, would move directly on Ivangorod. In Conrad’s view, this would protect the left flank of the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army.72 Woyrsch carried out his task brilliantly. On July 29, the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army crossed the Vistula south of Ivangorod. Woyrsch used his Landwehr Corps to cross the Vistula the same day, using pontoon bridges to cross the half-mile-wide river north of the fortress. The move, described as a “pretty piece of work” by the normally unimpressed Hoffmann, caught the Russians off guard. Even as Woyrsch was assembling heavy artillery for a siege of Ivangorod, the Russians were evacuating the fortress. After ammunition and bridges were blown up, the Russians abandoned the fortress, which was occupied by the Austro-Hungarians on August 4, 1915.73 While Woyrsch was crossing the Vistula, Mackensen was restarting his own offensive. The recent pause allowed for artillery ammunition stocks to

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be rebuilt and for additional reconnaissance of Russian positions to be undertaken. Thus, Mackensen’s newest effort opened with a major barrage of the Russian positions facing Emmich’s attack group. The German artillery effort severely mauled the II Siberian Corps, whose trenches proved unable to withstand the German bombardment. Emmich’s force consequently made good progress west of the Wieprz, driving Lesh’s 3rd Army back over a mile and taking several thousand prisoners plus some machine guns.74 Further east, Mackensen’s attack made only slow progress against a much better developed Russian defense. The Guard and the Austro-Hungarian VI Corps made only limited advances. The Bug Army also enjoyed tactical success, but only at the cost of considerable casualties.75 The combination of Gallwitz’s crossing of the Narew, Woyrsch’s isolation of Ivangorod, and Mackensen’s penetration of the 3rd Army’s defenses on the Wieprz clarified the situation for the Russians. For both Stavka and the northwest front, abandoning Poland was no longer a possibility; it was now a necessity. Alekseev ordered the abandonment of Russian Poland—at least all territory west of and including Warsaw. The only place to be held was the fortress of Novogeorgievsk, a move that was endorsed by Stavka, which had given Alekseev carte blanche by this time.76 The Russian retreat was to be conducted in the style of 1812. Although the Grand Duke had issued orders to commanders that the evacuations were to be conducted in an orderly fashion, the directive had no real effect. Troops quickly got out of hand and began destroying almost anything they could get their hands on. German troops commented on the ubiquity of solitary chimneys, the remaining signs of what had been Polish farmsteads.77 Aside from material destruction, Alekseev also ordered the removal of population, willing or not. Just as the Austro-Hungarian and German authorities had to deal with an influx of refugees in 1914, Russian authorities now had to deal with a veritable torrent of as many as three million refugees, many of whom had been forcibly removed from their homes. The flood of refugees severely strained the resources of municipal authorities as far east as Moscow. This also served to undermine the tsarist government.78 The abandonment of Warsaw raised yet another point of contention between Germany and Austria-Hungary, namely the manner in which the Central Powers troops would enter the capital of Poland. Austrian foreign minister Stephan Graf Burián von Rajecz, informed Falkenhayn via Conrad that he wanted a joint, high-profile, and triumphant entry into Warsaw. This would involve at least one division of Austro-Hungarian troops, preferably a cavalry division that could be shifted from Army Detachment Woyrsch without much effort.79 Falkenhayn’s response called for a very different approach. Still wanting to keep the possibility of a separate peace with Russia in play, Falkenhayn wanted a low-key entry into Warsaw. Falkenhayn was concerned that a triumphant parade into Warsaw would serve only to harden

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

Russian attitudes. Falkenhayn’s concern in this case was shared by Conrad. Ultimately, Falkenhayn got his way; the German entry into Warsaw was very muted. Although the capture of Warsaw was a major boost to German morale, Falkenhayn even persuaded Wilhelm II not to have church bells in Germany rung, as would normally have been the case for a success such as this.80 With Warsaw in German hands and the Russian position in Poland collapsing, Falkenhayn now had several other issues to deal with. As the eastern front was starting to flatten out, Falkenhayn began to consider where the offensive could be halted. The front now shortening, Falkenhayn could consider withdrawing forces for employment in other theaters, perhaps as many as ten corps. The first pressing need was the matter of Serbia. With the Turkish armies still facing the British at Gallipoli, the Sinai, and Mesopotamia and the Russians in the Caucasus, a land route to Turkey had to be opened. That could be done only if Serbia was overrun. The other principal issue was the western front. Although the German defenses in the west had held, French and British attacks had caused the Germans some bad moments. As the Russian threat was eliminated for at least the foreseeable future, steps could be put in hand to resolve the problem posed by France and especially Britain.81 The matter of Serbia came to the top of Falkenhayn’s list of priorities. The victories over the Russians, plus successful defensive operations by the Germans in France and Austria-Hungary in Italy, had far-reaching impacts. Romania, neutral but still a member of the Triple Alliance, decided to maintain that stance. The Bulgarian government, headed by Tsar Ferdinand and his prime minister, Vasil Radoslavov, now saw the best chance for Bulgaria to regain territory lost to Serbia in the Second Balkan War. Even before the prospect of Warsaw’s fall came into view, in late July Falkenhayn, despite Conrad’s objections, opened negotiations with Bulgarian representative Lieutenant Colonel Petur Ganchev.82 One constant in Erich von Falkenhayn’s situation as head of OHL was the continuing acrimony with Ober Ost. Falkenhayn’s policy toward Ober Ost in early August was an interesting mixture of carrots and sticks. With Warsaw now in German hands, Falkenhayn at last gave Ober Ost the go-ahead for an attack on Kovno, although Hindenburg and Ludendorff grumbled that it came too late. In addition, Army Group Gallwitz was redesignated as the German Twelfth Army.83 On the other hand, Falkenhayn sought to limit further the size and scope of Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s authority. On August 5, Falkenhayn informed Ober Ost that the Ninth Army and Army Detachment Woyrsch were being combined into an army group, to be commanded by Prince Leopold of Bavaria, who would also still command the German Ninth Army. The new army group would be under the authority of OHL. Falkenhayn assured Hindenburg that the arrangement was temporary, for the operational purpose of facilitating the command and control of forces

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operating on the Vistula. In the same message, Falkenhayn also mentioned the possibility of the installation of a General Government in Poland, seated in Warsaw.84 Hindenburg, whose authority was now reduced to the German Eighth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Nieman Armies, was not reassured. The skeptical head of Ober Ost also wanted to know how the creation of a General Government impacted Hindenburg’s position as the chief of civil administration in Poland. Like his assurance about Army Group Prince Leopold, Falkenhayn’s assurance of Hindenburg’s position in regard to civil administration was not readily believed.85 As the campaign in Poland was turning daily into more of a pursuit, much of August was taken up with fortresses. OHL’s July 24 directive had stipulated that the fortresses in Russian Poland were to be taken, although any siege of a fortress that needed to be undertaken would be done so with the smallest amount of forces required.86 With Ivangorod and Warsaw now occupied, the four fortresses that were of principal concern were Ossowiec, Kovno, Novogeorgievsk, and Brest-Litovsk. Ossowiec, the small fortress on the Bobr that had defied Gallwitz for months, continued to hold out against the German Eighth Army. On August 6, a chlorine gas attack was launched against Ossowiec, which caused some 2,000 Russian casualties, but the garrison’s survivors were able to smother the follow-on assault by Landwehr infantry with artillery fire from the fortress. Ultimately, the advances of German forces in sectors on each side of Ossowiec forced the Russians to abandon the fortress on August 20.87 The most notable siege was that of Novogeorgievsk (present-day Modlin). When Alekseev (with the Grand Duke’s blessing) ordered the retreat from Poland, he mandated that Novogeorgievsk be held. As the fortress guarded the confluence of the Narew and Vistula Rivers, it was a critical communications hub. Alekseev believed that a stout defense would at least delay the progress of German operations, perhaps for months. Built in the 1880s, the fortress had been modernized in 1892. By 1915, however, the fortress was well on its way to museum-piece status. The garrison consisted of about 92,000 men, commanded by General Nikolai Bobyr. The garrison’s units consisted of outfits such as the 63rd Infantry Division, which had still not recovered from May fighting in Galicia, plus the badly battered 11th Siberian and 58th Infantry Divisions. Although well stocked with artillery, the fortress lacked ammunition. In addition, there were only enough rifles to arm about 50,000 men in the garrison.88 The siege of Novogeorgievsk would be undertaken by an ad hoc force. After crossing the Narew River, Gallwitz detached the XVII Reserve Corps and a corps-sized force commanded by Generalleutnant Gustaf von Dickhuth-Harrach. Both corps were composed of Landwehr and Landsturm units. In addition, the Ninth Army contributed several Landwehr and Landsturm units in the form of Group Westernhagen. OHL entrusted command of

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

the siege to an expert, General der Infanterie Hans Hartwig von Beseler, who had commanded the siege of Antwerp the previous year. His chief of staff, Generalmajor Traugott von Sauberzweig, was drawn from the staff of the Ninth Army.89 Once assembled, Beseler’s force was given the grandiloquent designation Army Group Beseler. Beseler’s force moved to encircle the fortress, but once there, the beginning of the siege would have to wait for the arrival of the needed heavy artillery, which had to be brought up from Ivangorod, a process that would take some time, as only one rail line was available to the Germans for that purpose. In addition, some heavy artillery was already in action at Kovno. Thus, fortresses would have to be taken sequentially. With the attack at Kovno underway, the proper siege of Novogeorgievsk would have to wait.90 Beseler’s task was eased considerably by a stroke of great luck. On July 17, as Beseler’s forces were beginning to arrive at Novogeorgievsk, a company from the 10th Landwehr Regiment encountered and ambushed a Russian staff car from the fortress. Only the driver survived; the two passengers, both engineer officers, were killed. One of the officers was Colonel KorotkovichNotschevnoi, the chief engineer of the fortress. The car also contained an extensive cache of maps and documents revealing the state of Novogeorgievsk’s fortifications. This was a valuable find, as the Germans had only rudimentary knowledge of the fortress’s defenses.91 The document capture of July 17 gave Beseler a critical advantage, in that he now knew which parts of the fortress had not been modernized. The investment was ultimately completed by the infantry on August 9. While the infantry moved into position, the Germans undertook the tricky process of bringing their heavy artillery into play. Beseler was having to walk a fine line. The key to a successful siege was the heavy artillery, and moving it into position took time. At the same time, Beseler was under pressure from both OHL and Ober Ost to wrap up the siege as quickly as possible so that troops and equipment could be freed up for use elsewhere.92 Confident that Novogeorgievsk would be captured quickly, Beseler was not going to be rushed. Operating with troops who were not really intended for employment in active operations, Beseler needed to offset the quality of his troops with careful preparation in the use of his trump card, heavy artillery. Already armed with the captured documents, Beseler supplemented this by several days of extensive reconnaissance, both on the ground and in the air. Based on captured information and his own experience at Antwerp, Beseler decided to concentrate his firepower at a specific spot in the fortress’s defenses: the place where the fortifications were most obsolescent. For Beseler, this was the sector covered by Forts XIV, XV, and XVI. Seizure of these works would put Novogeorgievsk’s citadel within easy range of the heavy artillery. Detailed planning of artillery fires was left once again in the

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hands of Richard von Berendt, who had developed the fire plan for Gallwitz’s attack across the Narew.93 Beseler’s attack began on August 13. After registering guns, fire for effect began at 6:00 a.m. and continued until 9:30 a.m., halted only by two tenminute pauses.94 At 9:30 a.m., the infantry assault commenced, with the main attack being launched by the 14th Landwehr Division and Brigade Pfeil, also a Landwehr outfit. Over the next six days, the 14th Landwehr Division and Brigade Pfeil clawed their way through the Russian positions toward Forts XIV, XV, and XVI. A pause was undertaken to enable Berendt to displace his heavy artillery forward to new firing positions. The main effort was supported by Dickhuth-Harrach’s corps, which attacked toward Forts X and XI.95 By August 19, the Germans were on the cusp of taking the outer forts, which would then make the citadel vulnerable to heavy artillery. The handwriting on the wall, Bobyr yielded to the inevitable. On August 19, he decided to surrender the fortress, a decision that was announced early the next day. All intact bridges in the fortress across the Vistula and Narew were to be preserved, and any war material still in Novogeorgievsk were to be turned over to the German occupation troops. Booty included 90,000 prisoners (including six general officers), 103 machine guns, and 1,600 guns, of which about 700 were modern pieces, plus large quantities of ammunition, clothing, equipment, and food. The kaiser was on hand, with Falkenhayn, the next day to present awards to Beseler and Hindenburg.96 For the Russians, the rapid fall of Novogeorgievsk was a disappointment. Although well aware that the fortress could not be relieved, Alekseev was willing to leave the garrison there in the expectation that a stout defense would buy the Russians several months.97 In the event, Novogeorgievsk fell only a week after siege operations were begun. Nonetheless, a siege was at least required. The fall of Kovno was an entirely different matter. Like Novogeorgievsk, the fortress of Kovno was completed in 1892. The city, the seat of Russian government in the province of Lithuania, had a population of some 74,000, about half of whom were Jewish. The citadel was surrounded by a ring of outer forts about five miles from the city. Most of the forts were modernized and the defenses brought forward by several more miles before the war. Like other fortresses, Kovno possessed some modern artillery but also a larger number of obsolescent pieces. The garrison, commanded by an aged cavalry general named Grigoriev, numbered about 90,000.98 With Hindenburg and Ludendorff now free to pursue an attack on Kovno, the task was now entrusted to Eichhorn’s Tenth Army in general and Litzmann’s XL Reserve Corps in particular. Reinforced with the 4th Cavalry Division, Litzmann decided to aim his assault at sector encompassed by Forts I, II and III, west of the Nieman River. Aerial reconnaissance showed these to be older works, although recently constructed fieldworks extended the defenses to a distance of over seven miles from the city. Litzmann divided

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

his force into four sectors, massing his heavy guns in the two center sectors.99 As with Novogeorgievsk, once the Russian forward defenses were overrun, German heavy artillery could be brought into play against the inner works of the fortress. Litzmann spent much of late July and early August deploying his artillery. By August 8, he had arrayed some 130 guns of all calibers for the operation. His most important weapons were the twelve superheavy howitzers capable of high-angled fire. Fire for effect began on August 8, with targets having been identified by aerial reconnaissance. The infantry assault began about noon on August 8, spearheaded by the 79th Reserve Division and the 9th Landwehr Brigade. The outer Russian positions were taken, along with over 2,000 prisoners, eighteen machine guns, and four artillery pieces. Artillery fire from the fortress, however, was sufficiently lively to prompt Ober Ost to request that OHL divert additional heavy artillery from Woyrsch. Nonetheless, the attack made good progress. On August 12, a Russian deserter reported that Fort I had been “completely destroyed” by German heavy artillery. An attempt by the Russian 10th Army to attack Litzmann’s right flank was defeated by the German XXI Corps.100 Litzmann’s reservists and Landwehr soldiers worked their way forward inexorably, and on August 16, the 76th Reserve Division took possession of the ruins of Fort I and penetrated the area between Forts II and III. Attempts by Stavka to rush reinforcements to Kovno proved again to be too little, too late. Litzmann now made ready for the final assault against Kovno, with the 76th and 79th Reserve Divisions. On the night of the August 16, the Germans intercepted a wireless radio message from Grigoriev to the Russian 10th Army. Grigoriev noted that losses were high and that telephone contact with Vilna had been severed. Under these circumstances, Grigoriev announced that he was ordering the abandonment of the fortress.101 One of the first evacuees was Grigoriev himself. On August 17, Grigoriev and an accompanying priest decamped by auto from Kovno to Vilna, apparently without informing his chief of staff. The Russian position collapsed and abandoned what was left of Kovno’s defenses, although the railroad bridge over the Nieman was demolished. Litzmann’s divisions occupied the fortress the next day. Informed of Grigoriev’s desertion, an alternately despondent and outraged Grand Duke had Grigoriev tracked down, arrested, and hauled before a court-martial, which sentenced the seventy-year-old general to fifteen years of hard labor. While the number of prisoners was limited (about 20,000), the Germans captured 1,300 guns and large quantities of artillery ammunition.102 With the examples of Novogeorgievsk, Ivangorod, and Kovno in front of them, the matter of Brest Litovsk was not in doubt. The Russian position in northern Poland collapsing, the Russian forces opposing Army Group Mackensen began to draw back as well. Mackensen, now firmly tied in with Army

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Group Prince Leopold, began to advance to the northeast. Opposition consisted of numerous Russian rear guards. Some of these fights were quite bloody. One such action between the Kaiser Alexander Guard Regiment and a Russian Guard infantry regiment on August 14 resulted in almost 1,000 casualties on both sides.103 On August 23, the XXII Reserve Corps crossed the Bug north of Brest Litovsk, and the Prussian Guard crossed the following day. Meanwhile, the Bug Army, after widening its bridgehead over the Bug at Wlodawa on August 17, began to advance northeast, aiming at the roads and rail lines east of Brest Litovsk.104 The Russians were not about to let another garrison be trapped in a fortress. The forts were destroyed, and the bridges over the Bug were demolished. The Russians also evacuated most of the population, which had numbered 50,000 before the war. On August 26, the Bug Army’s Beskiden Corps took possession of the ruins of the forts, while the Austro-Hungarian VI Corps pressed on into the now nearly empty citadel and town.105 The advance continued on for the next few days. Ultimately, the extent of Mackensen’s advance was to a line about thirty miles east of Brest Litovsk. That marked the end of the Central Powers’ major effort on the eastern front in the summer of 1915. While the major offensive of the Central Powers reached its climax crossing the Bug, there was some action on the flanks that can be dealt with briefly. The German northern flank was the province of the recently created Nieman Army. The Russian force in the Nieman Army’s sector was weak, with only a few infantry divisions. Both sides held large parts of their respective sectors with cavalry.106 As Eichhorn’s Tenth Army readied its attack on Kovno, the Nieman Army launched its attack on July 14, 1915. With the Russians somewhat thin on the ground, Below’s units made progress, and the Russians retreated back toward Mitau. As Below’s force approached the Dvina River, the Russian 5th Army attempted a counterattack, but it was quickly checked.107 Much of August was spent fortifying the ground gained, while the cavalry on both sides spent much time patrolling or, as in the case of the German 1st Cavalry Division, were pulled south to support actions such as the attack on Kovno.108 Still seeking a victory he could call his own, Conrad sought to continue the offensive in the south, while Mackensen’s forces turned north. The major objectives were the key railroad junctions of Kovel and Rovno. The former was especially important, in Conrad’s view. Seizing Kovel would widen the gap between the Russian northwest front and southwest front, and offer the prospect of outflanking Brusilov’s 8th Army. For Conrad, Kovel’s vulnerability of had been shown by Cavalry Corps Heydebreck’s quick advance on Kovel.109 The effort against Kovel would be conducted by Austro-Hungarian First and Fourth Armies, the latter being shifted to the south as its sector was pinched out by converging advances in Poland. The effort against Kovel would be supported by advances by the German Süd Army and the

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army. These advances involved crossing a series of rivers. The first step was to cross the Zlota Lipa River and advance to the Strypa River. Once across the Strypa, the next objective would be the Sereth River.110 After the exertions of June, however, as well as Pflanzer-Baltin fighting off a Russian attack in early July, much of July and August would be consumed with preparations. For example, upon reaching the Zlota Lipa on July 5, the 221st Reserve Infantry Regiment spent the rest of the month and early August incorporating large numbers of replacements, including twenty-one officers and 919 men.111 Like their German and Austro-Hungarian opponents, Ivanov’s southwest front also desperately sought some relief. Ivanov had relocated his headquarters to Berdichev, just over 120 miles from Kiev. The location of Ivanov’s new headquarters was quickly revealed by intercepted wireless radio messages. To compensate for the shortage of Russian rifles, Brusilov issued captured Austrian weapons to those soldiers who had been unarmed previously. To halt any offensive efforts by the Austro-Hungarians, Brusilov could still rely on solid units such as Denikin’s Iron Brigade. With his headquarters now established just inside the Austro-Hungarian border at Brody, Brusilov sought opportunities to strike at the Austro-Hungarian forces opposite him.112 The outcome, however, would have to wait until the autumn. The end of the summer of 1915 brought considerable changes on both sides. For Germany, as the conquest of Russian Poland was complete, the invasion of Serbia now moved to the top of the strategic agenda. The first step in this project, the adding of Bulgaria to Central Powers, came ever closer to conclusion. Ganchev, who had returned to Bulgaria on August 10, was now ready to return Pless and close the deal on behalf of the Radoslavov government.113 Far more momentous were changes on the Russian side. Operationally, once Mackensen’s offensive effectively ruptured the seam between the northwest and southwest fronts, the balance between them became disproportionate. By July 1915, the southwest front controlled only the 8th, 9th, and 11th Armies. The other seven field armies came under the northwest front. Even an officer as able as Alekseev would have difficulty exercising control over such an unwieldy mass of armies. Thus, on August 17, Stavka reorganized its subordinate fronts. Ruszki now took over the new north front. Composed of the 6th, 12th, and 5th Armies, the north front covered the Dvina River and the Baltic coast. Alekseev took over the west front, which controlled the 10th, 1st, 2nd, 4th, 3rd, and 13th Armies. Ivanov remained in command of the southwest front, covering the area south of the Pripet Marsh. With the front moving east, Stavka, which had been located at Baranovici since the start of the war, now had to decamp to a safer site. Mogilev, the provincial capital of White Russia, with good rail communications and the needed facilities, was chosen as the new site. The Grand Duke and his headquarters moved from Baranovici to Mogilev on August 20, 1915.114

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Far more important were the consequences of the defeats for the high command. As the reverses mounted over the spring and summer, people at the court and in Stavka engaged in recriminations. Certainly, there was a great deal of bitterness at the French and the British. The common accusation was that the French and British were fighting to the last Russian.115 Closer to home, although Polivanov’s work at the War Ministry had done much to ease the shortage of artillery ammunition, commanders were eager to use the spring and early summer’s shell shortages as a crutch. The most logical scapegoat in this regard was Sukhomlinov. Added to this was usual mania about spies and saboteurs, often focused on the Jewish element of the population. The outcome of these pathologies was Sukhomlinov’s arrest and fresh outbreaks of anti-Semitism.116 There had also been sharp criticism of Stavka’s conduct of the war. Attention here focused on Yanushkevich and Danilov. The Grand Duke, however, refused to abandon his two closest aides. Simultaneously standing by his aides while evading responsibility, the Grand Duke argued that only the tsar could remove them.117 However, the fall of Kovno, plus growing criticism of Stavka at the court and his own sense of duty, prompted Nicholas II to make a fateful decision. The tsar decided to relieve the Grand Duke and assume command of the Russian armies. Some objected to this action. Polivanov remonstrated with Nicholas against taking this step, fearing for the personal position of the tsar should there be further defeats. Nicholas II, however, would not be deterred. On August 19, 1915, he dispatched a letter to the Grand Duke, relieving him as head of Stavka and appointing him viceroy of the Caucasus and commander of all Russian forces there. Yanushkevich would accompany the Grand Duke as chief of staff, while Danilov was appointed commander of the XXV Corps.118 The summer of 1915 marked perhaps the apogee of Erich von Falkenhayn’s power as head of OHL. He had been able to restrain Conrad from pursuing emotionally satisfying but strategically disruptive schemes for an offensive against Italy. Falkenhayn had also prevailed in his struggle against Ober Ost, executing a brilliant bureaucratic maneuver against Hindenburg and Ludendorff at the Posen conference on July 2, 1915. Although Hindenburg and Ludendorff continued to push the Kovno option to OHL, while Ludendorff complained privately to Moltke, it was Falkenhayn’s concept that was carried out.119 The Posen conference clearly illustrated the essence of the disagreement between OHL and Ober Ost over the approach to the war in the east. Hindenburg and Ludendorff remained committed to the idea of the decisive battle of encirclement, while Falkenhayn and Mackensen pursued a much more deliberate approach. The course of events suggests that given the environment of the eastern front, logistical challenges made Falkenhayn and Mackensen’s gradual method more feasible than that of Hindenburg and Ludendorff.120

The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915

In broader terms, the conquests of the 1915 summer campaign presented the Germans and Austro-Hungarians with a new set of problems. The prime of these was what to do with the areas of the Russian Empire that had been occupied. Lithuania would remain under the administration of Ober Ost. This was certainly in keeping with the expansionist elements in the German government and Ludendorff’s own notions. Ober Ost would also prefer to have administered occupied Poland as well. OHL, however, had something different in mind. On August 5, 1915, Falkenhayn informed Ober Ost that the occupied portion of northern Poland would be organized into a General Government and placed under a German general headquartered in Warsaw.121 Falkenhayn’s proposal met with considerable opposition by Hindenburg. For their part, Hindenburg and Ludendorff suggested that Beseler be appointed governor general. Ultimately, Falkenhayn mollified Hindenburg to a degree. After setting forth the geographical boundaries of the General Government, Falkenhayn informed Hindenburg that Ober Ost would still have operational control over any field forces within the area of the General Government, as well as all fortress troops. As per Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s suggestion, Beseler was appointed governor general on August 24, 1915. Beseler, however, answered only to OHL.122 Issues for the Austro-Hungarians were slightly different. First, imperial political authority had to be reasserted over areas that had been occupied by the Russians. This was done with a measure of retribution toward those who were seen as collaborators. Since the oil-producing areas had been recovered, these had to be put back into operation. Fortunately for the Austro-Hungarians, damage was not extensive, and AOK sought to gain a much-greater degree of control over the fields and to alter the ethnic composition of the area. Finally, Austria-Hungary had to organize and administer its own small slice of occupied Russian territory, centered around Lublin.123 For the Russians, the results of the great retreat were mixed. Although the Germans had suffered about 200,000 casualties and the Austrians much more, these numbers paled in comparison to Russian losses. Russian casualties since the start of 1915 came to close to 2,000,000. In prisoners alone, the Russian armies lost anywhere from 500,000 to 800,000, depending upon the source. Losses in equipment had been enormous. Large numbers of guns that had been placed in fortresses were lost, and the employment of German and Austro-Hungarian heavy artillery revealed the flaws in the prewar fortress-network policy. Nonetheless, the army was able to retreat successfully, maintaining its organization. Large encirclements such as that of Tannenberg had been avoided. In addition, thanks to Polivanov’s efforts and shortening supply lines, the ammunition crisis had eased.124 Most important, however, was the tsar’s assumption of the Stavka command, replacing the troika of the Grand Duke, Danilov, and Yanushkevich. The impact of the change would become apparent only over time.

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For Falkenhayn, the fall of Brest Litovsk marked the effective end of the campaign in the east. With the signing of the convention with Bulgaria nearing, the eastern front slipped from the top of Germany’s strategic priorities list. Falkenhayn made this clear to Ober Ost on August 31, 1915, when he stated that goal now was to attain the shortest line possible so that troops and equipment could be withdrawn from the east for employment on other fronts.125 Ober Ost and Conrad, however, had one more effort in mind, as did the Russians.

Erich von Falkenhayn, the head of OHL in 1915. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Franz Baron Conrad von Hotzendorf, the head the AustroHungarian high command. (Harris & Ewing Collection, Library of Congress)

General Radko Radko-Dmitriev, commander of the Russian 3rd Army, which was crushed at Gorlice-Tarnow. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Hermann Kusmanek von Burgneustaedten, the commandant of Przemysl. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Paul von Hindenburg and his staff, taken just after Tannenberg. He is flanked by Erich Ludendorff on his right and Max Hoffman on his left. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Wilhelm II visits the German Eleventh Army. Opposite the kaiser is August von Mackensen; between them is Han von Seeckt, Mackensen’s chief of staff. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Tsar Nicholas II visiting the front. Grand Duke Nikolai is standing in the car behind the tsar. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

General A. A. Polivanov. As Russian war minister, he introduced a number of useful reforms. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Nikolai Ivanov, commander of the Russian southwest front. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

One of Przemysl’s forts, after being battered by German and Austro-Hungarian heavy artillery. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Prince Leopold of Bavaria. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Max von Gallwitz, commander of the German Twelfth Army. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Austro-Hungarian troops advancing in the Carpathians in early 1915. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Austro-Hungarian artillerists loading a 30.5 mm heavy howitzer. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

German soldiers being deloused before departing from the eastern front. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

The staff of a Russian field hospital. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

An Austro-Hungarian heavy artillery piece, captured by the Russians. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

General Otto von Emmich, commander of the X Corps, and his staff, in Galicia. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

Russian prisoners being moved through Lemberg, c. July 1915. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress)

CHAPTER EIGHT

Action on the Flanks: September–October 1915

The allies will immensely appreciate your action. —Tsarina Alexandra, September 6, 19151 Today we are in possession of the great and beautiful old capital of Lithuania. —Karl Litzmann, September 18, 19152 Our breaking through the enemy lines brought no advantage. —Anton Denikin3 The Russian losses are enormous; ours are considerable. —Ober Ost War Diary, September 21, 19154 The beginning of September 1915 on the eastern front was marked by important changes on both sides. For the Central Powers, the most notable event was the signing of the military convention with Bulgaria. Negotiations, which had begun in late July, picked up speed after the fall of Brest Litovsk on August 26. Negotiations were also propelled by the prospect of bad weather closing in on the Balkans, precluding the needed campaign against Serbia. Once the final details were hashed out in a three-way negotiation among Berlin, Vienna, and Sofia, Conrad, Falkenhayn, and Ganchev met at Pless on September 6, 1915, to sign the military convention. Thus, Bulgaria formally committed to the war on the side of the Central Powers. The convention stipulated that Germany and Austria-Hungary would attack Serbia within thirty days of signing the agreement, while Bulgaria

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would follow suit five days later. The invasion force would consist of six German and six Austro-Hungarian divisions, plus four Bulgarian divisions. These divisions would be organized into three field armies, one German, one Austro-Hungarian, and one Bulgarian. The three armies would be under an army group headquarters. The convention specifically named Mackensen as the commander of the army group. The old hussar was the only logical choice. The Bulgarians had categorically denied an Austro-Hungarian demand for an Austro-Hungarian commander, and Mackensen was perhaps the most popular German field commander in Vienna.5 The signing of the convention, plus Falkenhayn’s desire to make Germany’s main effort in 1916 in the west, presaged major changes for the German forces in the east. Army Group Mackensen was disestablished on September 8, 1915. The old hussar went on leave the next day, his first leave since the start of the war, while Seeckt oversaw the establishing of the army group headquarters in Hungary. OHL reserved the rail line from Bialystok to Ostrolenka exclusively for the Eleventh Army, which was also due to go to Hungary. Gallwitz, named to command the Eleventh Army for the impeding Serbian operation, relinquished command of the Twelfth Army to General der Infanterie Max von Fabeck, brought out from the western front. Chiefs of staff were changed as well. Colonel Gottfried Marquard accompanied his boss, Gallwitz, to the Eleventh Army, while Fabeck was joined by his chief of staff, Hermann von Kuhl.6 A number of corps and divisions that had been engaged in the spring and summer campaigns in the east were withdrawn or transferred as well. The Prussian Guard Corps, which had been in action since May 2, was in desperate need of rest, refit, and replacements. The Kaiser Alexander Regiment, for example, was a shadow of itself by the middle of August, numbering only 450 men. The 1st Guard Infantry Regiment had suffered losses equivalent to its strength at the start of the campaign. The Guard Corps was sent back to the western front.7 Kosch’s X Reserve Corps was moved back to Warsaw in early September. He was certain that the corps would be employed elsewhere, but the ultimate destination was still unknown. A congratulatory message of thanks from Mackensen was followed by an order sending the corps and its two subordinate formations, the 101st and 103rd Infantry Divisions, to Hungary.8 Falkenhayn’s XXII Reserve Corps (43rd Reserve, 26th Infantry, and 44th Reserve Divisions) was also sent to the Hungarian border for the Serbian campaign. Also dispatched from the eastern front was the IV Reserve Corps, with the Bavarian 11th Division, the 105th Infantry Division, and the 107th Infantry Division. The 25th Reserve Division, drawn from the Beskiden Corps, joined the III Corps, transferred from the west, along with the 6th Infantry Division.9 The German commitment to the Serbian campaign was considerably larger than that stipulated in the convention. The commitment was the result

Action on the Flanks: September–October 1915

of yet another controversy between Falkenhayn and Conrad. Although the language of the convention plainly stated that Austria-Hungary would provide six divisions, almost immediately after signing it, Conrad was compelled to ask Falkenhayn for aid. Conrad’s effort against Rovno was faltering. In addition, a renewed Italian offensive on the Isonzo also demanded attention. Thus, forces previously earmarked had to be retained on the eastern front and Italy. Falkenhayn was almost certainly (and understandably) irritated, but the strategic situation demanded that the Serbian operation have priority. Thus, Germany provided the additional forces in the form of Falkenhayn’s XXII Reserve Corps.10 For the Russians, the major change was the personal assumption of command of Stavka by Nicholas II. The tsar was intelligent enough to recognize that he lacked the professional training and background to allow him to run the war from Stavka by himself. Thus, an exceptionally competent chief of staff was required. Evert was considered, although jumping someone from army command to de facto command of Stavka would be unusual for a military establishment so attached to seniority. Ultimately, the tsar chose Alekseev. Highly regarded by both the Romanov court and by the Grand Duke, and experienced at the highest levels of command, Alekseev was certainly qualified for the position in a professional sense. Distinctly apolitical, Alekseev was thus unconnected to the intrigues that revolved around the sinister figure of Grigory Rasputin. Alekseev, however, was not well regarded by the officers at Stavka. He was considered too junior, although one could suspect that such criticism was based on the fact that Alekseev came from very humble beginnings.11 In many respects, the tsar’s Stavka was an improvement over that of the Grand Duke. Nicholas II himself was possessed of a far calmer demeaner than the Grand Duke, who was subject to wide swings in mood. Alekseev was tireless, with a willingness to work hard. He also outfitted Stavka with better communication equipment, as opposed to the single Hughes machine of the Grand Duke’s headquarters at Baranovici. Mogilev, the new site for Stavka, was a reasonable choice, with good rail and river communications. In contrast to other possible choices, such as Kaluga or Orsha, Mogilev had the requisite buildings to house a headquarters. Others thought Mogilev was something of a lousy provincial town, without any real comforts or diversions.12 Perhaps the biggest weakness was the fact that Alekseev was not much given to the delegation of authority. In addition, particularly in matters of some weight, Alekseev could be given to indecision. This made for difficulties, as Nicholas II could never be described as a model of decisiveness. Thus, even though it functioned better, Stavka could at times get too involved in minutiae while critical operational decisions went begging.13 The change of command was conducted smoothly. The Grand Duke took the tsar’s decision with good grace and departed for his estate at Pershino on

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September 7, 1915, for twelve days of leave before assuming his new position in the Caucasus.14 Both sides recognized the momentousness of the change of command. German officers saw the Grand Duke as the personage providing the energy, cohesion, and discipline to the Russian armies. He was, in the eyes of German officers ranging from Hans von Seeckt to Harry Kessler to Max von Gallwitz, the glue that held the tsarist armies together.15 Reaction in the Russian army was rather mixed. Although considerable feeling had been aroused against Yanushkevich and Danilov, this did not carry over to the Grand Duke, at least personally. Although the tsar’s good intentions could never be doubted, there was no question as to his lack of military knowledge and experience. Like his German cousin Wilhelm II, Nicholas II did have military service in his background. Also similarly, both men’s military service was incurred in their youth, overloaded with artificial circumstances, and of relatively short duration. Thus, neither monarch could be considered a military professional. In the case of Nicholas II, his military service was in no way comparable to the long career of the Grand Duke.16 Aside from military concerns, there was concern that the tsar would be consumed by domestic political matters. To be sure, there were many who saw this as a positive. Nicholas II needed to be engaged in domestic policy and politics, at least as a way of minimizing the role of Tsarina Alexandra and Rasputin, whose unpopularity in Petrograd was steadily increasing. In addition, there was some concern among the allies about tsar’s replacing the Grand Duke and taking personal command. The Grand Duke had developed very good relationships with the allied liaison officers at Stavka. One of the first acts Nicholas II undertook after assuming command was to give an interview to Danish intermediary Hans-Niels Andersen. The tsar, seeking to reassure Russia’s allies, informed Andersen that under no circumstances would a separate peace with Germany be sought. Finally, with the tsar in personal command, there would be no way to shield the tsarist regime and its head from responsibility for further defeats.17 With Russia undergoing command changes, and Germany removing forces from the theater, one might have expected the conduct of operations to slow considerably. Such was not to be the case. Each of the contending powers pursued an offensive military operation on its own and for its own reasons. Conrad, for reasons ranging from personal to concern about the prestige of Austro-Hungarian arms, still sought a victory that the AustroHungarian army could call its own. He decided that the best place to attack would be south of the Pripet Marsh with Lutsk and Rovno on the Styr River as the immediate objectives. If successful, the advance could be extended all the way to Kiev.18 Conrad had assembled a considerable force of fifteen infantry divisions plus several cavalry divisions in the Austro-Hungarian Fourth and First Armies. Taking a page from Falkenhayn’s book, Conrad made the two armies

Action on the Flanks: September–October 1915

an army group, placed under Fourth Army commander Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.19 The idea for the offensive was to get around the northern flank of Brusilov’s 8th Army. The attacks by the archduke’s army group would be supported by subsidiary attacks by Böhm-Ermolli’s Austro-Hungarian Second Army, the German Süd Army, and Pflanzer-Baltin’s Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army. Altogether Conrad had amassed some thirty-eight infantry divisions, including several German units, for his offensive. If entirely successful, in Conrad’s habitually overoptimistic view, as many as twenty-five Russian divisions could be encircled and destroyed.20 Both sides had taken advantage of the lull in operations to incorporate replacements and rebuild stocks of ammunition. Brusilov was acutely aware of the threat to his northern flank and sought to pull it back to a more defensible position. He finally got permission from Ivanov to do so on August 27, and the retreat came at a most opportune time.21 Conrad’s offensive began while Brusilov was already moving back. Thus, Archduke Joseph’s troops hit only Russian rear guards and were consequently able to make good progress as they advanced toward the Styr River. By the beginning of September, the Austro-Hungarian Fourth and First Armies had taken Grodno and Lutsk, and had established bridgeheads across the Styr. The Süd Army, along with Pflanzer-Baltin’s Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army, advanced toward Tarnopol and the Sereth River.22 Conrad, however, was deeply frustrated. The timely retreat ordered by Ivanov and organized by Brusilov enabled the Russians to escape Conrad’s clutches. The 8th Army was able to take up a strong position behind the Styr River, with the Pripet Marsh covering his right flank. Conrad lashed out at his commanders, demanding greater efforts. The Archduke Joseph and Puhallo responded by launching a series of ill-considered attacks against the Russian positions. This served only to pile up casualties and deplete Austro-Hungarian strength, at relatively little cost to the Russians. One Austro-Hungarian staff officer, Major Karl Schneller, described the affair as “absolutely shameful.” The failures also forced Conrad to admit to Falkenhayn that AustriaHungary could not come up with the forces for Serbia demanded by the Military Convention, a deficit the Germans would have to make up.23 The advance of the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army toward Rovno created a considerable gap of almost eighty-seven miles between Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army and its left flank neighbor, the Bug Army. Conrad wanted the gap covered and asked Falkenhayn for cavalry. Falkenhayn directed the AustroHungarian 11th Cavalry Division from Cavalry Corps Heydebreck (then in a quiet sector on the Bug) to the Fourth Army. Austro-Hungarian difficulties, however, inevitably invited a Russian counterattack. By this time, the shortage of shells was easing, although some units were still short of weapons, and the army in general was struggling to keep pace with losses, especially of trained officers. On September 6, 1915, Ivanov launched an attack with the 9th and

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11th Armies, trying to open the seam between the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army and the German Süd Army. The following day the Russians enjoyed success, as the Russian XXII Corps drove back the Süd Army’s Corps Hofmann (its Austro-Hungarian element), taking eight German guns plus a number of prisoners.24 The Russian advance continued over the next several days, and by September 9, it had created a dangerous situation between the German Süd Army and the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army. Conrad’s aide Kundmann blamed this situation on the field commanders, whose conduct he described as poor. According to Kundmann, they were only too ready to issue orders to retreat at the first opportunity, an opinion shared by Bothmer, commander of the Süd Army.25 An effort by Böhm-Ermolli’s Austro-Hungarian Second Army to relieve the situation to the south foundered on tough resistance by the Russian 11th Army, and a counterattack drove the attackers back to their original line. The Russian commanders, Lechitsky of the 9th and Shcherbachev of the 11th Armies, continued their attacks, attempting to widen the gap between the German Süd Army and the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army.26 The difficult situation at the southern end of the eastern front produced yet another meeting. On September 14, 1915, Falkenhayn arrived in Teschen at about 9:00 a.m. and met with Conrad. Falkenhayn suggested a retreat to the Zlota Lipa River. He also agreed that the Austro-Hungarian XVII Corps, previously earmarked for Serbia, be sent to shore up the position. Ultimately, the arrival of the Austro-Hungarian XVII Corps, plus a retreat to more defensible positions and the natural erosion of Russian offensive strength, enabled the Germans and Austro-Hungarians to stabilize the lines. Tarnopol, the original object of the Süd and Seventh Armies, remained in Russian hands. The Russian 9th and 11th Armies claimed that they took about 36,000 prisoners and thirty guns.27 Just as the crisis with the Süd Army and the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army was abating, Brusilov launched his counterattack against the AustroHungarian Fourth Army on September 16, 1915, and achieved immediate results. After several days, Lutsk was retaken by Denikin’s “Iron Division,” Brusilov’s most reliable outfit and one of his best subordinate commanders. There was some argument over who should have gotten more credit for the success at Lutsk—Denikin or the commander of the XXX Corps, Andrei Zaionchkovski—and the result was an ugly spat between the two men. Brusilov tacitly decided when Denikin was rewarded for his efforts by promotion to lieutenant general. The booty was also considerable, with Brusilov’s forces capturing almost 45,000 prisoners, nine guns, and 108 machine guns.28 The success of Brusilov’s counterattack touched off a new row between Conrad and Falkenhayn. With the Austro-Hungarian Fourth and First Armies losing ground, men, and equipment, Conrad was compelled to go to Falkenhayn yet again for aid. Conrad also wanted an immediate attack by

Action on the Flanks: September–October 1915

Linsingen’s Bug Army to relieve pressure on the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army. Falkenhayn sent two divisions from the Bug Army to the south, with Heydebreck’s German 5th Cavalry Division to follow.29 Falkenhayn also sought and got the forces reorganized. The departure of Mackensen and his army group headquarters had created a hole in the Central Powers command structure. As early as September 8, 1915, Falkenhayn had mention to Linsingen in a message the prospect of the latter taking command of an army group. The crisis created by Brusilov’s attack brought just such a move about. On September 18, 1915 OHL, with AOK’s consent, created Army Group Linsingen, consisting of the Bug Army, the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, and the Austro-Hungarian First Army. Falkenhayn also went so far as to suggest that Linsingen directly run the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, in effect relieving Archduke Joseph. Conrad flatly rejected this idea.30 Russian aerial reconnaissance revealed the arrival of German reinforcements. Anticipating an effort against his right flank, Brusilov repositioned his forces against such a possibility. Ivanov, however, decided to undertake an overly complicated scheme. He ordered Brusilov to evacuate Lutsk, retreating to his start line on the Styr River. Once the enemy pursuit reached Brusilov’s new line, the Russian VIII, XII, and part of the XXXIX Corps would fix the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army. The Russian XXX and most of the XXXIX Corps, concealed in the forests around Kolki, would fall on the German and Austro-Hungarian left flank.31 As Ivanov’s plan was overly complicated, it is not surprising that it quickly fell apart. The time need to decode Ivanov’s original message and reply to it resulted in the Russians having to retreat in the daytime, not at night, as originally planned. As a result, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians quickly detected the retreat and pursued the Russians closely. In addition, the position that was to conceal the Russian counterattack force was marked by swampy and often unsuitable for large forces. Both pursuers and pursued were hampered by poor roads.32 Consequently, the Russian counterattack achieved little, and Lutsk ultimately remained in the hands of the AustroHungarian Fourth Army. A bit farther north, the Bug Army captured Pinsk on September 16, 1915. As the “Black-Yellow” offensive devolved into yet another operation in which the effort expended and casualties suffered were disproportionate to the territory gained, morale at AOK hit a new low. Staff officers on the Russian section of AOK began referring to the offensive as the “Herbstsau” (autumn swinery). Based on his conversations with people at AOK, Cramon informed Falkenhayn that the offensive had cost the Austro-Hungarians another 200,000 casualties. In fact, the totals given to Cramon were low; the actual losses ran to 230,000, including over 70,000 captured, plus losses in weapons and equipment.33 Conrad and Kundmann blamed the field commanders. That attitude was shared by the Germans, ranging from the

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typically negative Ludendorff and Lindsingen to even the usually more sympathetic Bothmer. Although critical of his subordinate commanders, Conrad never once bothered to leave Teschen in order to get a firsthand look at conditions at the front.34 While the fighting in Volhynia played itself out in a welter of bloodshed, Ober Ost made its final effort to achieve the long-desired encirclement of Russian forces. With Kovno in German hands and the forces of both sides spread thinly between Kovno and the Baltic coast, Hindenburg and Ludendorff saw a chance to envelop and destroy the forces of the Russian west front retreating from Poland and Lithuania. They developed a most ambitious plan to bring about the desired result. While the German Eighth and Twelfth Armies crossed and secured the lower Nieman River, the German Tenth Army would attack toward Vilna. The flanking effort of the Tenth Army would be carried out by an ad hoc VI Cavalry Corps, commanded by Generalleutnant Otto von Garnier (also known as Cavalry Corps Garnier) with the 1st, 3rd, and 9th Cavalry Divisions. The cavalry’s task was to sever the rail line at Smorgon and block the Russian retreat. Thus, the Russian forces would be trapped and destroyed in an area bounded by the Nieman, Wilija, and Berezina Rivers.35 In the eyes of its authors, the plan had the promise of potentially great results. Using aerial reconnaissance reports, the commander of the German Tenth Army, Generaloberst Hermann Eichhorn, estimated that as many as four Russian corps could be trapped and destroyed. Such a result would be a greater victory than Tannenberg.36 The plan depended on two critical factors. The first was the cavalry’s ability to get behind the retreating forces. The route of the VI Cavalry Corps into the Russian west front’s rear offered the alluring prospect of conducting a war of movement. Troopers would not have to contend with heavily fortified positions, wire obstacles, or well-defended hamlets. Far more problematic was the ability of the cavalry to block the retreating Russian infantry successfully. That the cavalry was too lightly armed to deal with heavier enemy units, let alone the more numerous Russian cavalry, was well known to the German high command in the east.37 The other critical part of Ober Ost’s plan depended upon the ability of Eichhorn’s infantry to get forward quickly enough to link up with the cavalry. To give Eichhorn’s force some added punch, Hindenburg sought to retain the X Corps, which was due to depart the western front. Concerned about the western front, Falkenhayn denied Hindenburg’s request, although he appreciated Hindenburg’s position on this issue. Thus, Hindenburg and Ludendorff would have to make do with the forces they had.38 The weight of the German operation would be on the left of the Tenth Army. For this purpose, Eichhorn created an attack group composed of the III Reserve Corps, the I Corps, the XXI Corps, and the XL Reserve Corps,

Action on the Flanks: September–October 1915

plus the VI Cavalry Corps. Command of this force was entrusted to Litzmann, the commander of the XL Reserve Corps. The infantry corps would advance on Vilna, trying to fix the Russian forces, while Garnier’s cavalry would block the Russian retreat. The Nieman Army would advance on a broad front toward the Dvina River, aiming for Friedrichsstadt and Dünaberg.39 Ober Ost’s offensive opened in a staggered fashion. While Litzmann’s force repulsed a Russian attack, the Nieman Army pressed toward the Dvina River. On August 28, Below ordered the I Cavalry Corps to seize Friedrichsstadt. The effort miscarried. The cavalry divisions were lacking in artillery, and the Russian defensive positions were much more extensive than previously thought. An effort to get around the defenses by crossing the river below the town was also unsuccessful. Given the initial failures, the commander of the I Cavalry Corps, Generalmajor Manfred Freiherr von Richthofen, decided that a more deliberate approach was in order, and a halt was ordered until sufficient artillery could be brought to bear.40 The second attempt, made with better artillery support and the support of the I Reserve Corps, took Friedrichsstadt on September 3, 1915. The haul of prisoners was rather small, only 2,400. The seizure of Friedrichsstadt was followed by the Nieman Army’s advance along the Dvina River down to Dünaburg. The Dvina marked the final line between the Nieman Army and the Russian 12th Army in 1915. Riga would remain in Russian hands until September 1917.41 The advance of the Nieman Army to the Dvina drew sufficient Russian forces north to open a gap in the Russian line between Vilna and Dünaburg, giving Eichhorn’s flanking force its opportunity. On September 9, Litzmann’s attack group began its advance toward Vilna, on a front of about fifteen miles. Vilna was also attacked by German aircraft. Garnier’s VI Cavalry Corps, composed of the 1st, 3rd, and 9th Cavalry Divisions, slipped through the Russian lines, moved east, and then on September 12 turned southeast toward Smorgon, some fifty-four miles east of Vilna.42 Combined with the Russian west front armies continuing to hold the line strongly against the German Twelfth, Eighth, and the right wing of the Tenth Army, the German main attack made sufficient initial progress to raise the alluring chimera of a great encirclement. Hindenburg once again took the opportunity to renew his requests for retaining the X Corps. As noted earlier, Falkenhayn gave a polite but firm denial.43 Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s plan, however, began to go awry quickly. After holding the line strongly for a day, the Russian forces opposite Ober Ost’s armies began to retreat. Ober Ost instructed the Tenth Army to order the XXI Corps to attack forcefully and fix the Russian forces before, thus preventing them from moving against the enveloping force. Garnier’s cavalry force, although making progress toward Smorgon, was having its own problems. It had slipped through the lines into the Russian rear, but Russian

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cavalry and Cossack units were soon nipping at the heels of the VI Cavalry Corps. Thus, of Garnier’s three divisions, only the 1st Cavalry Division could be employed in blocking the Russian 10th Army’s retreat, once Smorgon was reached on September 15. The 3rd and the 9th Cavalry Divisions had to cover the flank and rear of the 1st Cavalry Division’s bridgehead over the Wilija River. An effort to reinforce Garnier by moving the Bavarian Cavalry Division from the Nieman Army resulted in a pointless horse ride of eightyseven miles; the Bavarians arrived too late.44 Evert’s reaction to Ober Ost’s offensive displayed both skill and energy. Evert created a new 2nd Army with the XXXVI, XXVII, XIV, and IV Siberian Corps and then sent them toward the threat to Russian rear, clearing the way for the retreating Russian 10th Army. At the same time, the rear guards of the Russian V Corps, V Caucasian Corps, and II Caucasian Corps considerably slowed Litzmann’s advance. On September 18, the new Russian 2nd Army began to reach the Smorgon area, just as the 14th Landwehr Division entered Vilna.45 Litzmann’s force drove forward desperately, trying to reach the cavalry. The advance was urged on by both Hindenburg, Falkenhayn, and Litzmann, demanding the utmost from the troops.46 Despite their hectoring, Litzmann’s advance stalled. The right flank of his force had to contend with a Russian counterattack, which was successfully fended off but cost time. The left wing of Litzmann’s attack group had to contend with bad roads, partially or totally destroyed bridges, and stubborn Russian rear guards. Likewise, the neighboring Eighth and Twelfth Armies also met tough resistance. The 37th Infantry Divison, part of the Eighth Army, took the town of Skidel on September 11, after a two-day fight and at the cost of considerable casualties.47 The supply situation was most difficult, a problem for which Ludendorff had already blamed Groener, claiming that OHL neglected to repair the railways north of Kovno and criticizing the tardy completion of the railroad bridge at Kovno, then due to be ready on September 18. Groener hotly rejected the accusation, noting the technical difficulties involved in rebuilding the Kovno bridge. He also reminded Ludendorff that OHL’s rail section had wanted to double track the rail line to Kovno, but Ober Ost had rejected the suggestions. Groener then informed Ludendorff that the rail network in the Ostrolenka area had priority because of its importance for the redeployment of forces from the eastern front for use elsewhere. Groener further reminded Ludendorff that all this information was readily available at Ober Ost from Lieutenant Colonel Kersten, Groener’s representative. Kersten also suggested that units might travel on foot, as it would be faster than the available rail system would allow.48 The combination of factors outlined above served to slow Litzmann’s advance to a crawl when speed was most needed. When the bill came due, the cavalry paid the price. After occupying Smorgon on September 15, the 1st

Action on the Flanks: September–October 1915

Cavalry Division was able to raid Russian baggage trains. Captures brought in provisions, ammunition, and, in one case, 17,000 rubles. The first portent of real trouble came on September 19, when the Russian XXXVI Corps (presumably its lead elements), attacked the 1st Cavalry Division’s position at Smorgon. The position held, but the situation was clearly deteriorating. On September 20, 1915, the Russian 2nd Army launched a deliberate and well-planned attack. The Germans had intercepted the radio message ordering the attack but deciphered it too late. Well supported by artillery, the Russian assault crushed the German bridgehead, severely mauling the 1st Cavalry Division in the process. The Russians took three hundred prisoners and inflicted a large number of killed and wounded. The authors of the regimental history for the 4th Uhlans called September 20, 1915, “a black day,” Smorgon was retaken by the Russians after house-to-house fighting, and the retreat route for the 10th Army reopened. The effort to create a larger scale Tannenberg had failed.49 Elements of Litzmann’s attack force made contact with Garnier’s VI Cavalry Corps on September 22, allowing the exhausted troopers to slip back behind the German lines. By that time, the Russian 2nd Army had built up a strong position on the Wilija. The German Tenth Army’s advance, like that of the adjacent Eighth Army, slowed to a stop by the end of September. Both sides were exhausted. Aside from casualties, both armies were suffering from the effects of extended campaigning. Units already worn down by combat casualties also had to worry about diseases. A doctor in the German 249th Reserve Infantry Regiment noted in September an increasing number of foot ailments in his unit.50 Although Ober Ost ordered the Eighth, Tenth, and Twelfth Armies to resume a limited advance toward Minsk and the Beresina River, it was plain that the offensive was over. Russian defenses had firmed up, and new efforts resulted in, at best, minor successes. At times, these were attained at heavy cost to units, such as the 16th Landwehr Division. Russian attacks were likewise either unsuccessful or quickly contained. The Nieman Army had reached the Dvina. Further north, there was lots of skirmishing between the I Cavalry Corps and Russian cavalry from the 12th Army, but without any real results. Hindenburg grumped to Falkenhayn that withdrawing the 26th Infantry Division disrupted a plan to take Riga.51 With the invasion of Serbia (which included the 26th Infantry Division) now taking center stage, by the end of the first week of October 1915, Ober Ost had to go over to the defensive. Cavalry units, whose horses needed rest, were withdrawn from the front, often being assigned to less onerous duties such as coast defense.52 Action on the other fronts also gradually ground to a halt in September and October. Army Group Prince Leopold, which had brought its line forward to link up with armies under Ober Ost’s control, had its advance halted by OHL on September 25.53 Linsingen’s recently formed army group, partly

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in response to Conrad’s calls for assistance, attacked toward Rovno with the Bug Army in an effort to relieve the right flank of the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army.54 Over the course of the first half of October, the Bug Army drove forward, its right wing aiming for the rail junction of Rovno. The result was a slow, grinding advance against Brusilov’s 8th Army, often having to deal with local Russian counterattacks. The attack did calm the situation of the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army.55 Brusilov, however, had anticipated an attack by the Bug Army and had a response ready. On October 16, 1915, after a powerful artillery barrage, Brusilov launched a counterattack at Chartoriski. The attack broke through the lines of the Bug Army and compelled a short-but-hurried retreat.56 Ultimately, the line stabilized. Linsingen’s attack had relieved the AustroHungarian Fourth Army and gained some territory, but Rovno remained in Russian hands. The action between Linsingen and Brusilov marked the end of combat operations in October. The other major event in that month was social. On October 19, 1915, Conrad married Gina in Vienna. Conducted at the only Protestant church inside the Ringstrasse, the ceremony was attended by a small circle of guests, including Kundmann and Austrian war minister Alexander Krobatin. As noted earlier, the newlyweds set up housekeeping in a villa in Teschen, close to AOK, and other officers took their cue from this. Gina made a regular habit of hosting tea parties, which eventually morphed into rather grand social occasions attended by AOK staff officers, generals, and civilian officials. All this served to convey to straightlaced Germans such as Kaganeck and Cramon the impression that the Austro-Hungarians were profoundly unserious about conducting a war.57 The battles of September, especially Ober Ost’s effort to trap the Russian 10th Army, showed the defects of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff approach to conducting war. The only force available to Ober Ost capable of gaining the kind of operational depth needed to accomplish the encirclement Hindenburg and Ludendorff envisioned was the VI Cavalry Corps. The course of events showed the defects of the German mounted arm, shortcomings that were already well documented. Ubiquitous Russian cavalry and Cossack units forced Garnier to be more concerned about his flank and rear. Thus, Garnier could employ only one-third of his force to accomplish his main mission. The cavalry itself was too lightly armed to deal with a properly supported infantry assault, as the course of the fight at Smorgon on September 20 showed.58 The failings of the German cavalry were magnified by the inability of Litzmann’s attack force to advance quickly enough to reach the cavalry. Logistics, or rather the lack of attention to it, had been a long-standing flaw in German military planning.59 Circumstances on the eastern front demanded increased attention to logistics, and German resources in this regard were

Action on the Flanks: September–October 1915

limited. Since rail lines had to be rebuilt in order to overcome the gauge barrier, lines had to be prioritized. For OHL, priority had to go to the lines in the Ostrolenka area, which were critical to moving forces from the eastern front back to the west or down to Hungary for the invasion of Serbia. Ludendorff’s complaint, as manifested in the acrimonious exchange of messages with Groener, amounted to nothing more than the kind of parochialism that sector or even theater commanders often exhibit when engaging with superior authorities over strategic priorities.60 In addition to logistical difficulties and an inadequate mounted arm, the attempt to encircle the Russian 10th Army failed due to several other factors. First, the roads were poor, often being nothing more than sandy tracks. Second, the effects of months of campaigning was beginning to tell on the German army. Troops and horses were simply beginning to break down physically and needed rest. Finally, the Russian army had gained considerable experience and ability in conducting delaying operations, by the use of scorched earth policies and skillful rear guard actions.61 For Conrad, the course of the late summer and early fall provided yet more disappointment. The Black-Yellow offensive, far from giving Conrad the victory he sought, resulted only in more losses and yet another occasion where he had to go to Falkenhayn for assistance. Conrad’s discomfiture was compounded by Brusilov’s well-timed counterattack. Likewise, Ivanov’s offensive gave the Süd Army some difficult moments as well. All this confirmed the rapid sinking of Austria-Hungary to a plainly subordinate status to Germany within the Central Powers, in ways ranging from military to financial.62 For the Russians, the months of September and October had mixed results. On the negative side, losses continued to be high. Territorially, all of Poland and much of Lithuania had been lost. Almost all of the gains made against Austria-Hungary in the 1914 campaigns had been lost, with the exception of one small sliver of territory near the Romanian border. Politically, the course of the war had damaged severely the legitimacy of the tsarist regime. Nicholas II’s personal assumption of command, while well intentioned, also exposed the tsar to being held responsible for further defeats. The Russian rear area remained riven with fantastic conspiracies about German spies and the suspect loyalty of Russians with German names.63 There were, however, some glimmers of hope. Polivanov had done quite a bit to clean up the administrative mess Sukhomlinov left. Once appointed war minister, Polivanov began to put the replacement system on a better footing. The effects of that improvement would not be felt fully until 1916.64 The weapons and ammunition situation was also beginning to improve. Most notable was the easing of the shell shortage. With the retreat shortening supply lines, the arrival of supplies from allied sources, and rational improvements in production, stocks of Russian artillery shells began to increase. It is worth noting that Ober Ost reported to OHL that it could detect no shortage

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of equipment on the part of the Russian army in September 1915. Finally, while Nicholas II was no real substitute for the Grand Duke in terms of military knowledge and experience, Alekseev’s revamping of Stavka improved the conduct of the war at the highest levels.65 The rise in Russian artillery shell stocks was more noticeable. In the spring, German accounts during Mackensen’s offensive noted the weak response of the Russian artillery. By the late summer and early fall of 1915, German regimental histories and official documents mention Russian use of artillery, at times describing the fire as “lively” or “heavy.” The Russian attack against the Süd Army and the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army in September and Brusilov’s counterattack at Chartoriski in October were both preceded by major artillery bombardments. Likewise, at Smorgon, the 1st Cavalry Division got hit by a heavy artillery barrage before elements of the Russian 2nd Army drove it out of the town.66 September and October’s events also showed that the Russian army, although incapable of launching major offensive operations, could still conduct local attacks, especially in the southwest front’s sector. Against the AustroHungarians, these assaults could be successful and gave Falkenhayn and especially Conrad some bad moments. Even against the Germans, the Russians were becoming able to mete out some punishment against German units, inflicting casualties. On September 21, 1915, Ober Ost’s war diarist wrote that Russian casualties were “enormous” but then noted that German casualties were “considerable.”67 With the battles of September and October petering out, the Russian armies licking their wounds, and major German (and some Austro-Hungarian) forces being withdrawn from the theater, it was clear that the campaign season for 1915 was over. Units were ordered to dig in for the coming winter.68 The center stage of the war had moved to Serbia and would then move back to France in 1916. With the lull in operations in effect, it was time for both sides to reflect, assess, and draw conclusions from what had occurred. In addition, while the Russians would try to reorganize what they had retained, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians now had to consider what to do with what they had gained.

CHAPTER NINE

Aftermath and Assessments

After the Skat party this evening His Majesty began to talk of the annexations and reorganizations in the East. The whole of Poland must remain German, etc. —Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, October 12, 19151 Austria-Hungary (must) either lose Galicia or bring Congress Poland into some close relationship with the monarchy. —Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister István Burián2 Divergent goals. Verdun–Italy. —Lieutenant Colonel Karl von Kaganeck, April 27, 19163 The actions in September and October marked the last major fighting for the eastern front in 1915. In November, elements of the Russian 9th and 11th Armies launched local attacks against the German Süd Army, along the Styrpa River, serving only to pile up casualties. No ground was gained by either side. In December 1915, with Serbia now overrun and a secure route to Turkey opened by Germany, Stavka moved the Russian 7th Army from Odessa to the southwest front. Another attack failed as well.4 Similar actions were fought along other parts of the front. In the case of the Bug Army, one of these fights claimed the life of Generalmajor Siegfried Fabarius, commander of the 82nd Reserve Division.5 Outside of these limited actions, the front settled into what both sides estimated would be a protracted period of trench warfare. Units dug in and improved positions. Regiments received replacements, a welcome sight to ranks reduced by months of active campaigning and hard combat. The expected lull in operations would give units the chance to incorporate replacements more fully into their organizations, instead of throwing them directly into combat.6

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Cavalry divisions, ill-suited to trench warfare, had been pulled away from the front line as well. In the German case, most cavalry units were sent to the Baltic coast, to give the men and especially the horses much-needed rest and rehabilitation. The same held true for artillery units. The most frequent activity thereafter was patrolling. The Russian armies did similarly.7 Bad weather, marked by cold and snow as early as November, brought combat operations, outside of the minor fights mentioned above, to an end. The suspension of combat operations allowed for a quiet holiday season. Christmas trees were put up by both sides, and the Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Russians held Christmas celebrations. On the German side, at least, Hanukkah observances were also held.8 Both sides had taken prisoners in varying numbers. The Russians had taken tens of thousands of German prisoners, the majority coming from the battle of Przasnysz. The Russians brought in far more Austro-Hungarian prisoners, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, the single largest haul coming from the siege of Przemys´l. By the first anniversary of the war’s onset, some 730,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers of all ranks were prisoners, the vast majority of whom were in Russian hands. For their part, the Austro-Hungarians had taken thousands of prisoners. The combatant that had taken the largest number of prisoners by far was Germany, bringing in anywhere from 750,000 to 950,000 prisoners in 1915 alone, depending upon the source.9 Although the 1907 Hague Convention had issued clear guidelines for the treatment of prisoners, none of the belligerent powers abided by them fully. For their part, the Russians used Austro-Hungarian prisoners to dig trenches near the front line, the enhanced possibilities for escape notwithstanding. In other cases, Austro-Hungarian prisoners were employed as laborers on farms or landed estates. Bezobrasov, for example, had ten Austro-Hungarian prisoners detailed to his estate to provide farm labor. Not to be outdone, the Germans used Russian prisoners as teamsters for their infantry divisions. Kosch’s X Reserve Corps, for example, had two hundred Russian prisoners assigned as teamsters to each of its subordinate divisions before the invasion of Serbia. Others were used as slave labor in factories, although the results were ineffective.10 With so many prisoners around, it was not surprising that there were escape attempts. Although Austro-Hungarian prisoners were generally regarded as docile, sometimes prisoners tried to escape, such as one of the ten prisoners working on Bezobrasov’s estate. Russian escapes usually occurred near the front line, and such incidents could cause an uproar in the rear area of the various field armies. The Russians would try to get German prisoners as far east as possible. Aside from the well-known example of Lavr Kornilov, perhaps the most incredible escape story was that of Erich Killinger. A German naval aviator, Killinger was captured on April 6, 1915, after ditching in the Baltic. After jumping off of a train on the Trans-Siberian

Aftermath and Assessments

Railway near Vladivostok, Killinger and two comrades made their way into Chinese territory. The German naval intelligence service facilitated Killinger’s travel to the coast. A voyage to San Francisco and a cross-country train trip to New York ensued. Rearmed with a new fake Swiss passport and cash, Killinger went by ship to Norway, slipping past British security and returning to Germany on March 6, 1916.11 Both sides also saw prisoners as potential future recruits. Russia, AustriaHungary, and to a lesser extent Germany had disaffected ethnic minorities. Given that there had been several instances of Czech soldiers surrendering to the Russians in large numbers, the Russian government recruited prisoners into a Czech Legion to fight against Austria-Hungary. Likewise, the Germans sought to make use of Polish military man power, and Polish units, also called legions, had existed since the start of the war. These units, while committed to fighting the Russians, were equally committed to Polish independence.12 The matter of recruiting prisoners of war to one’s cause was but a subset of a much larger issue: war aims and the accompanying political reorganization. Other than France, none of the belligerent powers went to war with a clear vision of what the postwar situation would look like. These ideas changed with the twists and turns of military fortunes over the course of 1915. In early 1915, the Russians confidently expected to expand the writ of tsarist authority over all of Austro-Hungarian Galicia and perhaps into Hungary. By the end of the year, the situation was completely reversed. Bobrinski, whose position as military governor of Galicia had seemed assured after the fall of Przemys´l, was an unhappy memory in Lemberg by the time AustroHungarian troops reoccupied the city on June 22, 1915. South of the Pripet Marshes, Ivanov’s principal concern was the security of Kiev. North of the marshes, all of Poland and much of Lithuania had been lost. Internal Russian politics had also reached a critical turning point. Although Nicolas II remained firm in Russia’s commitment to the war, the domestic peace, manifested in the “sacred union” between the tsar and the people at start of the war, had fractured badly. The magnitude of the defeats suffered over the course of 1915 resulted in the demand that heads roll. The first of these was the hapless Miasoedov, and then Sukhomlinov in late June. Danilov, Yanushkevich, and the Grand Duke followed almost two months later. In some of these cases, the changes were justified, and the new people, Polivanov in particular, produced positive results. More importantly, there were increasing signs of dissatisfaction with tsarist governance at every level of society. Matters were not helped by the flood of over three million refugees streaming into Russia’s cities.13 While the tsar’s concern for the army and the country was genuine, the personal assumption of command at Stavka exposed him to responsibility for any further defeats. The tsar’s decision to leave Tsarina Alexandra in charge in Petrograd could be regarded only as the worst possible error, given Alexandra’s own personal

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insecurities and her increasing dependence on Rasputin.14 None of this boded well for the future. The relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary experienced several sharp turns over the course of 1915. The year started with the AustroHungarian emergency, marked by the hideous, futile struggle in the Carpathians, and the loss of Przemys´l. By late March 1915, there was serious concern at both OHL and AOK about the survival of the dual monarchy.15 Falkenhayn’s decision to commit major forces to the eastern front, Mackensen’s attack at Gorlice-Tarnow, and the subsequent advance through Poland and Galicia changed all that. By the end of 1915, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians had to start considering war aims in a much more serious way. In this regard, the success of the Central Powers revealed some potential cracks in the foundation of the alliance. The primary problem was how to dispose of what had been Russian Poland. Initially, at least prior to Gorlice-Tarnow, Bethmann indicated tacitly to Mackensen that he had no interest in annexing Poland.16 Success has a way of changing one’s view, however, and by the fall of 1915, Bethmann was described by one historian as a “moderate annexationist.” Others had more expansive notions of what Europe should look like were Germany to win the war. By late 1915, the term “Mitteleuropa” had become well known in Germany, although its definition varied considerably along the political spectrum. Progressive liberal politician Friedrich Naumann may have popularized Mitteleuropa with his very popular book (100,000 copies sold) of the same name in October 1915, but his concept of Mitteleuropa was much different from that of Ludendorff.17 The Ober Ost chief of staff was far more expansionist in his mind-set from the beginning. Thoroughly imbued with idea of spreading German Kultur to the uncivilized peoples of the east, Ludendorff’s ties to pan-Germanist expansionist organizations were well known. Seeckt once complained to his wife that the entire advance into Lithuania was simply a matter of Ludendorff doing the bidding of these groups.18 Caught in the middle of this subset of antagonisms between Falkenhayn and Ober Ost was the new governor general of Poland, General der Infanterie Hans Hartwig von Beseler. Falkenhayn had appointed Beseler to the position as the siege of Novogeorgievsk was still going on. From Falkenhayn’s standpoint, naming Beseler to the position made sense. Beseler’s name had been mentioned as a possible replacement for Falkenhayn as early as December 1914. Putting Beseler in Warsaw would place him in a position of being both out of sight and out of mind.19 In addition, Beseler’s appointment coincided with Falkenhayn’s creation of Army Group Prince Leopold (with the Ninth Army and Army Detachment Woyrsch), which was placed under the control of OHL. Thus, the creation of the General Government and Army Group Prince Leopold enabled Falkenhayn to curtail Hindenburg’s and Ludendorff’s authority both operationally and administratively.20

Aftermath and Assessments

Beseler himself accepted the appointment with mixed feelings, as he preferred continued service in the field. He also did not know much about Poland, which he readily admitted. Once installed in Warsaw, however, Beseler began to institute policies that were regarded as too favorable toward the Poles, causing heartburn in both Berlin and Vienna, as neither the German nor AustroHungarian government envisioned an independent Polish state.21 While the relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary began to erode diplomatically in 1915, militarily the deterioration was far worse. To be sure, relations between Conrad and Falkenhayn were strained even at the best of times. The emergency of early 1915 brought the two men closer together, but once the threat was eliminated by the summer, discord began to reappear. Falkenhayn was irritated by Conrad’s Black-Yellow offensive, which the former considered counterproductive. Matters were made worse when the losses incurred resulted in Conrad’s almost immediately reneging from the force provision stipulations of the Military Convention after its signing.22 The final straw was Conrad’s withdrawal of the Austro-Hungarian Third Army from Army Group Mackensen in the aftermath of the Serbian campaign. The Austro-Hungarian advance into Montenegro and Albania, ordered by Conrad without any prior consultation with Falkenhayn, enraged the latter. While it gave Conrad his long-sought victory, the move into Montenegro and Albania almost tore the Central Powers apart. Bulgarian tsar Ferdinand returned all of the medals he received from Austria-Hungary. Falkenhayn summoned Cramon to Oderberg and informed him that he would no longer trust AOK, nor would Falkenhayn try to justify Austro-Hungarian behavior to the Bulgarians.23 While Falkenhayn had grown increasingly irritated with what he regarded as Conrad’s duplicity, Conrad had become increasingly resentful of the mounting German domination of the alliance and what he regarded as Falkenhayn’s sneering, sarcastic attitude. By December 1915, the two men were not communicating at all. This put the respective liaison officers of each power at AOK and OHL in a very difficult position, as each hid their boss’s plan for 1916 from their ally.24 December 1915 showed the drastic difference between the two sides in the war when it came to coalition warfare. The military representatives of all of the allied powers met at Chantilly from December 6 to 8, 1915, to discuss proposals and arrive at a common plan for 1916.25 In contrast, there was no communication at all between Conrad and Falkenhayn during the period between December 22, 1915, and January 19, 1916. Each man worked on his own plan for 1916, and the two were wholly divergent from the standpoint of coalition warfare, as Kaganeck noted in his diary. Thus, while the course of 1915 marked the high point of success for the Central Powers, fissures were appearing that would serve to undermine the alliance, both diplomatically and militarily.26 The course of the 1915 campaign on the eastern front only served to heighten the conflict between Falkenhayn and Ober Ost. The personal reasons

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for the enmity between Falkenhayn and the leading lights at Ober Ost has been discussed earlier.27 There were times when Falkenhayn was able to appease Hindenburg and Ludendorff, especially when he provided the needed reinforcements to launch the attack against the Russian 10th Army at the Masurian Lakes. The course of operations, especially after the recapture of Lemberg, highlighted the nature of the disagreement between OHL and Ober Ost in regard to both strategy and the conduct of operations. As a local theater command, Hindenburg and Ludendorff always regarded the east (quite naturally) as the critical front. Falkenhayn, having to take a wider view and being a westerner at heart, always regarded the east as a secondary theater. He was certainly willing to pursue the prospect of a separate peace with Russia, while it existed. This was certainly the reason behind Falkenhayn’s demand for a low-profile entrance into Warsaw. The statement by Nicholas II to HansNiels Andersen, however, made sure that concluding a separate peace with Russia would remain a chimera.28 Once it was clear that there would be no separate peace with Russia, Falkenhayn could go ahead with his strategic plans. Thus, major forces would be withdrawn from the eastern front for commitment to the west or against Serbia. This triggered yet another contretemps with Ober Ost about efforts by Hindenburg and Ludendorff to retain as many forces a possible, especially in regard to the operations in the late summer and fall, starting with advance on Kovno. Ober Ost believed that OHL was trying to undermine its efforts, while OHL thought Ober Ost was being either too parochial in its view or arguing in bad faith. This resulted in an exchange of sharply worded messages between Ludendorff and Groener over the issue of railroad reconstruction and an even testier exchange between Falkenhayn and Ludendorff in early October 1915.29 The enmity between Falkenhayn and Ober Ost would remain a constant, but for now at least, Falkenhayn held the upper hand. The approach to operation also clearly highlighted the dissension between OHL and Ober Ost. Still adhering to the Schlieffen paradigm of the large-scale encirclement, Hindenburg and Ludendorff sought to re-create their success at Tannenberg. The best they were able to achieve was the destruction of the Russian XX Corps at Second Masurian Lakes. The effort to attain a large encirclement in Poland in September failed, and the key enveloping element, Garnier’s VI Cavalry Corps, had one of its divisions severely mauled in the effort. The contrasting approach was that of Mackensen and Seeckt, employed at Gorlice-Tarnow. The “bite and hold” method, marked by careful artillery preparation and precisely timed infantry assaults, produced major results. Massive casualties were inflicted, and great swathes of territory were gained. There were, however, no spectacular encirclements. Thus, for adherents of

Aftermath and Assessments

the Schlieffen school such as Herman von Kuhl or Groener, Gorlice-Tarnow was classified only as an “ordinary” or “tactical” victory.30 From the standpoint of logistics, however, the system employed by Mackensen and Seeckt and supported by Falkenhayn was much better attuned to the eastern front’s difficult environment. The difference between the two approaches was illustrated in the discussions concerning the Polish salient prior to the Posen conference on July 2, 1915. The final plan, crafted by Seeckt and supported by Mackensen and Falkenhayn, reflected a muchbetter grasp of the logistical realities of the eastern front than the overly ambitious grand envelopment proposed by Ludendorff.31 The Posen conference itself was notable for two reasons. First, the conference was a masterful bureaucratic ambush of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, mounted by Falkenhayn. The major issues had already been decided before the Ober Ost duumvirate even walked into the conference. This was quickly recognized by Ludendorff, who not only had been outmaneuvered, which was galling enough, but also had been outfoxed by Falkenhayn, his inveterate enemy. The conference also marked one of the few times that Wilhelm II involved himself personally in a military matter, given his promise before the war to refrain from doing so. The episode enabled Wilhelm to get a small measure of revenge against Hindenburg for his high-handed resignation threat earlier in the year. Nonetheless, while the year 1915 saw Falkenhayn reach perhaps the apogee of his power, the erosion of the kaiser’s position continued apace.32 In terms of performance, the numbers speak for themselves. The year 1915 had been a disastrous one for the Russian Army. Casualties over the course of 1915 ran to as many as 3,000,000. The number of prisoners lost ran from a conservative estimate of 750,000 to as many as 950,000, depending upon the source.33 The Austro-Hungarian Army had also suffered severely in 1915. Total casualties, including the additional strains of a new Italian front and an active campaign against Serbia, came to over 2,000,000, which included 181,000 killed. The vast majority of these losses were incurred on the eastern front. The terrible winter campaign in the Carpathians and siege of Przemys´l imposed a severe bloodletting on the army, as the Austrian official history admitted.34 For the Germans, success on the eastern front came at less of a price, but it was still not cheap. Total German casualties on the eastern front in 1915 exceeded 200,000 killed, wounded, and missing.35 There were several reasons for German success and for Russian and AustroHungarian failure. First, for the German army, any distinction between German regular and reserve formations had effectively disappeared by the middle of 1915. Reserve units played important roles in the critical operations mounted by the German army in the east. Even the Landwehr formations generally performed well, although they were not really designed for operating beyond the German border. The excellent performance of the German

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army’s reserve component (including the Landwehr) gave it a critical advantage over both its Russian opponent and its Austro-Hungarian ally.36 The Germans also profited from the ability to exploit the potential of three separate-but-interconnected forms of technology: aircraft, artillery, and telephone. The number of aircraft employed by the Germans on the eastern front was relatively limited in comparison to the effort in the west. German aircraft, along with their Austro-Hungarian allies’, gave the Central Powers a critical advantage. Close aerial reconnaissance provided detailed information on Russian defenses. More distant reconnaissance kept commanders such as Eichhorn and Mackensen apprised of the movements of Russian reserves. By the summer of 1915, the German army readily recognized the importance of aircraft in this regard, especially considering the well-documented inadequacies of its mounted arm.37 German air dominance also had two other manifestations. The first was in the form of direct air attacks. Although bombs were small and aiming devices were lacking, attacks did show the potential that aircraft held as weapons. The first was strikes against key strategic or operational targets. A German air attack, in January, for example, almost decapitated Plehve’s 5th Army headquarters. Although in the actual event only a few of the guards were killed or wounded, the results could have been far worse.38 The second consequence of German and Austro-Hungarian air dominance was the maximization of the effectiveness of heavy artillery. Given the fact that stocks of ammunition for such calibers had to be husbanded and expended carefully, aerial spotting for the artillery was critical. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians developed the practice of associating heavy artillery with aviation detachments. During the siege of Przemys´l, the Central Powers’ air dominance allowed them the luxury of observing every shot from a heavy artillery piece, thus enabling quick correction, with devastating results.39 The combination of artillery and aerial reconnaissance, plus careful preattack preparation, enabled the Germans to combine the employment of artillery and infantry most effectively. Mackensen’s Gorlice attack, for example, featured precise timing between the lifting of the artillery barrage and the start of the infantry assault. The employment of heavy artillery also marked the end of the utility of fortresses. In 1914, fortresses such as Ivangorod and Ossowiec played an important role in blunting German offensives. In 1915, the arrival of heavy artillery turned fortresses into serious liabilities.40 The ability to harness the capabilities of the artillery, aircraft, and infantry proved to be one of the key reasons for German success. Another important technology leveraged by the Germans in particular was the telephone. In 1914, the German army had not yet figured out how to use telephone. By 1915, the Germans had a much-better grasp of the potential offered by telephone. Although the use of telephone in the Masurian Lakes operation was limited because of the harsh conditions, the Gorlice-Tarnow

Aftermath and Assessments

offensive was run effectively by telephone. Aided by the negligible Russian artillery response and harsh German security measures, telephone afforded Mackensen and Seeckt an unmatched degree of control over the duo’s operations. During the campaigns in Galicia and Poland, Mackensen and Seeckt had to displace their headquarters several times. Considering that by high summer, Mackensen’s force was an army group, moving such a headquarters in any age is a considerable undertaking. At no time, however, did Mackensen ever lose control over his forces.41 In contrast, the Russians did a poor job conducting combined arms operations. Relations between the infantry and artillery were poor before the war; the artillerists, who regarded themselves as elite, looked down their noses at the infantry. The impact of war did little to change this attitude, and relations between the branches remained bad. The Russians also failed to link artillery with aircraft. A Russian junior officer noted to the writer S. A. An-sky that a signal flare fired from a German aircraft was often followed by an artillery barrage. He then wondered why the Russians seemed to be unable to do this.42 This situation continued through most of 1915. It was only after the December failure of the 7th Army’s attack in the south that part of the army, spearheaded by Brusilov, began to study seriously the matter of attaining closer cooperation between the infantry and the artillery.43 Russian slowness to make critical adjustments in tactics in some ways was reflective of their command system. Unlike OHL, Stavka did not seem to have a systematic method for learning lessons from prior experiences. Stavka operated with a deficit of communications equipment. Thus, the northwest and southwest fronts were generally left to their own devices. This problem worsened over the course of 1915. Although the tsar’s Stavka was better equipped with the means of communication, the presence of the Pripet Marsh effectively left the southwest front to fight its own war. In addition, although Alekseev was a hard worker, he too often got sucked into dealing with the mountains of minutiae generated by a mass army. Thus, while Brusilov learned important lessons from the campaigns of 1915, these same lessons were not learned by the north and west fronts. The uneven approach in gathering lessons from prior operations was reflected in the results of the attacks launched by the Russian army in 1916. The success of Brusilov stood in stark contrast to the debacle of the Lake Naroch attack in March 1916.44 Of all the armies that fought on the eastern front in 1915, the AustroHungarian army came out of it with a peculiar mixture of gain and loss. The gain came mainly in the form of territory. By the end of 1915, the looming Russian threat to Hungary had been eliminated, and just about all of the territory lost by Austria-Hungary in 1914 had been regained. The Galician oil fields had also been recovered, although the Russians had burned about 70 percent of the existing derricks. The southern part of Russian Poland and part of Ukraine came under Austro-Hungarian military government. Thus,

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by the end of 1915, German and Austro-Hungarian leaders could seriously discuss the future organization of these territories.45 Loss was another matter, and a far more serious one. Strategically, although the victories of the spring and summer kept Romania out of the war, Italy still came in, declaring war on Austria-Hungary on May 24, 1915. Not only was this move an added strain imposed on the Austro-Hungarian army, matters were made worse by Falkenhayn’s refusal to declare war on Italy for understandable, if unstated, reasons.46 Although Falkenhayn would send a small contingent of troops to hold part of the line, the dual monarchy would have to shoulder almost the entire burden for the new front.47 Tactically, the Austro-Hungarian army suffered considerably. The losses sustained over the course of 1915 were difficult, if not impossible, to make good. The number of company-grade officers in particular was problematic, given the unique language requirements of the multiethnic force. These problems only worsened with the Black-Yellow offensive against Rovno. Although the attacks launched by Brusilov and Shcherbachev in the south late in the year were contained or repulsed, the Austro-Hungarian army’s tactical competence and sheer reliability were coming increasingly into question. By the end of 1915, it was becoming common practice to have German units interspersed along the Austro-Hungarian part of the front as “corset stays.” While not necessarily a problem if the Russian army remained in a depleted condition, any kind of Russian recovery would bode ill for the Austro-Hungarians.48 In assessing the conduct of the key commanders of the three armies involved, sometimes one has to look at several levels of war simultaneously. This would apply to Conrad, Falkenhayn, and Grand Duke Nikolai, as well as Alekseev. From the standpoint of strategy, Falkenhayn emerges as the clearesteyed of the four. While he correctly surmised that the western front was the principal theater, Falkenhayn also realized that before anything could be done in regard to the west, several prerequisite issues had to be resolved. The first was relieving Austria-Hungary’s critical situation. Once that was achieved, a land route to Turkey had to be opened. Falkenhayn resolutely stuck to his plan, and in 1915, he achieved most of his aims. He continued the campaign in the east, as long as the possibility of achieving a separate piece with Russia was considered in play.49 In regard to the operational level, Falkenhayn once again showed good judgment. The narrow sector between Gorlice and Tarnow was well chosen as the site for Mackensen’s offensive. Once underway, Falkenhayn was able to provide timely guidance, while at the same time, the circumstances of the eastern front required that control be kept light. He also showed a good understanding of the logistical challenges of the eastern front, rejecting the grandiose scheme of Ober Ost in regard to the offensive into Poland, opting for the more reasonable plan proffered by Seeckt.50

Aftermath and Assessments

Conrad, by contrast, comes off not nearly as well. His tenure at AOK was marked by errors, often born of obsession. In 1915, Conrad’s initial obsession was the relief of Przemys´l. While the concern was understandable, Conrad’s fixation led to mistakes of haste and judgment. The choice of the Dukla Pass sector for his first Carpathian offensive can be regarded only as a grievous error. Once that attack had been defeated, Conrad persisted in attacking, succeeding only in bleeding his forces white. Although Conrad’s supporters and acolytes tried to award him the credit for Mackensen’s success at GorliceTarnow, the documentary record suggests that the lion’s share of the laurels in that regard should go to Falkenhayn.51 Two other manifestations of Conrad’s obsessiveness were military and personal. The military one was Italy’s declaring war against Austria-Hungary. Once Italy’s entry into the war was an accomplished fact, Conrad became ever more obsessed with punishing Italy for its perfidy, which led to a yet another series of spats with Falkenhayn and certainly contributed to Falkenhayn’s decision not to declare war against Italy in 1915.52 Personally, Conrad was able to achieve his great aim of marrying Gina. The rather idyllic existence the newlyweds created, however, clearly set a bad example followed by others at AOK and made a bad impression on Conrad’s German allies. Also, at no time during his tenure at AOK did Conrad tear himself away from his self-made Eden to visit the front. While the term “chateau generalship” is a somewhat overused chestnut, Conrad’s personal living arrangements provided that kernel of fact that serves as the basis of every cliché.53 At the highest level of war, the two major Russian figures were the Grand Duke and Alekseev. Grand Duke Nikolai remains an enigmatic figure, with supporters and critics. His record is a surely a mixed one. At times, Nikolai gave too much latitude to Danilov, who was continually focused on defeating Germany. After a limited defeat at Second Masurian Lakes and an equally limited success at Przasnysz, the Grand Duke wisely shifted the main Russian effort to the south against Austria-Hungary. This approach produced better, but not decisive, results. When events, such as the collapse of the Russian 3rd Army under the weight of Mackensen’s attack at Gorlice-Tarnow, moved rapidly, Stavka was too lightly equipped with communications to exert control over events. Nikolai was perfectly willing to travel to headquarters of the northwest or southwest fronts, but events sometimes moved faster than the Grand Duke’s train. He did, however, maintain the army’s organization as it retreated across Poland. Although his German opponents often regarded the Grand Duke as a rock-steady commander holding the Russian army together with iron discipline, the stress of the campaign drove Nikolai at times almost to despair.54 Given the lack of professional knowledge and experience on the part of Nicholas II, command responsibility really fell on Alekseev, the tsar’s chief of staff at Stavka. On the whole, Alekseev’s Stavka functioned a bit better than

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the Grand Duke’s. Mogilev was better appointed with communications equipment and had access to good rail, road, and river routes. In regard to command issues, Alekseev instituted a much-needed reorganization of the front north of the Pripet Marsh, dividing the unmanageable northwest front into the north front and the west front. As a headquarters, however, Stavka remained small in comparison with its opponents. Although Alekseev was highly intelligent and blessed with the capacity for hard work, he was essentially a one-man operation. Stavka would function as long as Alekseev remained impervious to illness or exhaustion. In regard to coalition warfare, both the Grand Duke and Alekseev, as well as the tsar, did their best to play the role of faithful ally.55 At operational and tactical levels of leadership, the Germans can fairly claim the honors. Hindenburg and Ludendorff showed continued ability in employing their forces, although at times they were dismissive of other considerations, such as weather and logistics. This was clearly the case in the Second Masurian Lakes campaign and later in Ludendorff’s plan for the great encirclement of much of the Russian northwest front in Poland. For much of 1915 on the eastern front, Mackensen was the man of the hour. The duo of Mackensen and Seeckt proved one of the most formidable examples of the unique German approach to command in the war. Both men showed a splendid grasp of the tactical, operational, and logistical challenges, coming up with reasonable approaches to overcome them, both in Galicia and Poland. The Mackensen and Seeckt team also kept clear of the political machinations that swirled around Falkenhayn’s OHL, prompting Seeckt to mention to his wife that the duo was being employed by Falkenhayn as a kind of “counterweight” (Gegenspiel) against Ober Ost. In short, Mackensen and Seeckt were a team of troubleshooters who could be counted on to do OHL’s will while also refraining from going rogue.56 As the more public face of the pair, Mackensen was the recipient of the concomitant publicity, which, combined with his penchant for flashy uniforms, made the old hussar a war hero in Germany with a degree of popularity that was second only to Hindenburg. In addition, both Mackensen and Seeckt proved adept at coalition warfare, a field in which most German general officers lacked aptitude.57 Several other German commanders marked themselves as worthy of advancement to higher positions and ranks. Prime among these was Gallwitz. His performance as commander of an eponymous army detachment and later the Twelfth Army, was good enough to earn him the command of the German Eleventh Army, the critical component of Mackensen’s force in the invasion of Serbia. Linsingen’s tenure as commander of the Süd and Bug Armies was considered sufficiently successful by Falkenhayn to result in his appointment to an army group command.58 At the corps and division level, several German commanders distinguished themselves. Woyrsch, commanding a force composed of some Austro-Hungarian units and German

Aftermath and Assessments

Landwehr formations, skillfully executed a crossing of the Vistula River that impressed even the perpetually dour Max Hoffmann. Corps and division commanders such as Kosch, Litzmann, Marwitz, and Kneussl to name but a few, turned in performances ranging from workmanlike to superb.59 The performance of Austro-Hungarian commanders presented a mixed record. Boroevic´, who commanded the first Carpathian offensive, was too constrained by terrain, weather, and lashing messages from Conrad to display his ability. The offensive was also not much to Boroevic´’s taste. Conrad’s appointment of Boroevic´ to command the defenses of the Italian front, however, proved to be perhaps the best decision he made during his tenure at AOK. As commander of the Austro-Hungarian Second Army, Böhm-Ermolli failed in the Carpathian offensive, but he showed ability in the spring offensive and was able to march into Lemberg on June 22 and claim the honors for liberating the capital of Austrian Galicia. At the corps level, the record is equally mixed. The low end of the range was represented by Feldmarschallleutnant Josef Freiherr Krautwald von Annaue, who was relieved as commander of the X Corps at the demand of Marwitz, after an attack quickly fell apart.60 At the top of the spectrum were commanders such as Hermann Baron Kövess von Kövessháza and Arz von Straussenberg. Their records of success in command of the XII and VI Corps, respectively, marked them as rising stars in the army.61 The Russian subordinate commanders’ record was similarly mixed, although not necessarily as awful as earlier writers have presented. To be sure there had been a great deal of churn over the course of 1915, especially at the upper echelons of command. The northwest front in particular had proven problematic. The original commander in 1914, Zhilinski, was dismissed in the aftermath of the Tannenberg disaster. His successor, Ruzski, proved too fragile in terms of health to last very long. Alekseev did not last long either, as he was moved up to act as the head of Stavka once Nicholas II removed the Grand Duke and assumed command.62 Once in command of the west front, Evert kept his head and reacted quickly against Ober Ost’s attempted encirclement, rapidly shifting the 2nd Army to deal with the German cavalry threat. Ivanov had the longest tenure at front command, taking charge of the southwest front at the start of the war and still leading it at the end of 1915. While he could be credited with some successes, especially against the Austro-Hungarians in 1914 and against Przemys´l in 1915, the relentless advance of the “Mackensen Phalanx,” as the Russians termed it, took its toll. By the end of 1915, Ivanov was showing signs of considerable strain, especially mentally.63 The picture becomes more depressing as one moves down to the army and corps level. There were few bright spots beyond Brusilov. Although a number of generals had been relieved (the Germans removed other generals by death, capture, or wounds), there were still too many characters such as Bezobrasov,

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who were well connected to the court and who remained resolutely out of touch with recent developments in tactics, techniques, and procedures. Commanders remained cautious and unwilling to take any kind of risk. They also tended to use the shell shortage as a crutch, even after the crisis had begun to abate.64 Over the course of 1915, the war saw a great many turns. The year had opened with the distinct possibility of the Central Powers, at least AustriaHungary, facing defeat, while Turkey faced Britain and Russia in isolation. By the end of 1915, the war had turned in a very different direction. While not completely eliminated, Russia had at least been neutralized as a problem for the immediate future. The tsarist regime had suffered immense losses in territory, man power, and equipment. It would take some time, the Germans estimated, for the Russians to make good their losses in men and equipment.65 With Bulgaria now a member of the Central Powers and Serbia overrun, a land route to Turkey had been opened. After the severe defeats inflicted against the British at Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia, the situation had changed. By the start of 1916, it seemed that the war had turned in Germany’s favor. With the eastern front quiescent, the Balkan and Italian fronts relatively tranquil, and the Lusitania crisis with the United States finally dampened down, OHL could devote its full attention to the western front. The war would turn in a different direction in 1916. What that precise direction would be, however, remained to be seen.

Appendix German and Austro-Hungarian General Officer Ranks German

Austro-Hungarian

American***

Generalmajor Generalleutnant General der Infanterie* Generaloberst Generalfeldmarschal

Generalmajor Feldmarschallleutnant Feldzeugmeister** Generaloberst Feldmarschall

Brigadier General Major General Lieutenant General General General of the Army

*Other equivalents include General der Kavallerie, General der Artillerie, etc. **Other equivalents include General der Infanterie, Kavallerie, Artillerie. ***The Russians followed a progression similar to that of the US Army. The only differences are that the Russians used the term Colonel General and Marshal.

Notes

Introduction   1. Erich von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914– 1916 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920), 72.   2. Gary W. Gallagher, “Our Hearts Are Full of Hope: The Army of Northern Virginia in the Spring of 1864,” in The Wilderness Campaign, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 36–37.   3. For deciding to go to war, see Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For war planning, see Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, eds., War Planning 1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Paul Kennedy, The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914 (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1979).   4. For an introductory survey, see David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 178–208.  5. The most recent work on the 1915 Serbian campaign is Richard L. DiNardo, Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015). See also M. Christian Ortner, “Die Feldzüge gegen Serbien in den Jahren 1914 und 1915,” in Der Erste Weltkrieg auf dem Balkan, ed. Jürgen Angelow (Berlin: Wissenschaft Verlag, 2011), 123–142. For the ensuing occupation of Serbia, see Jonathan E. Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Tamara Scheer, “Manifestation österreichisch-ungarischer Besatzungsmacht in Belgrad (1916– 1918),” in Der Erste Weltkrieg auf dem Balkan, 211–240.

Chapter 1: Best Laid Plans and Their Miscarriage: The 1914 Campaigns in the East   1. Field Marshal Franz Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 6th ed. (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1921), 3:145.

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  2. Quoted in Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918 (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2013), 174.   3. Quoted in Paul Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014), 175.   4. Major General Max Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, trans. Eric Sutton (London: Martin Secker, 1929), 1:50.   5. Jonathan Steinberg, Bismarck: A Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 327–328.   6. George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875–1890 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 36–37; and Steinberg, Bismarck, 386.   7. Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1957), 707; and Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, trans. Heinz Norden (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969), 1:222–223. It is surprising to note that at the time of this writing (2016), there is still no biography of Moltke in English. There is also no recent biography of Moltke in German. Kessel’s study, published in 1957, remains the definitive work.   8. Richard L. DiNardo and Daniel J. Hughes, “Germany and Coalition Warfare in the World Wars: A Comparative Study,” War in History 8, no. 2 (April 2001): 167; and Gisbert Beyerhaus, Einheitlicher Oberbefehl: Ein Problem des Weltkrieges (Munich: F. Bruckmann Verlag, 1938), 17.   9. Kennan, Decline of Bismarck’s European Order, 75; and Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Volume III: The Period of Fortification, 1880– 1890 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 90. 10. Steinberg, Bismarck, 424; and Kennan, Decline of Bismarck’s European Order, 253–264. It is interesting to note that Bismarck kept the existence of the Reinsurance Treaty secret from Moltke. See Graydon A. Tunstall, Planning for War against Russia and Serbia (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1993), 28. 11. Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 308. 12. Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II, Volume 1: Prince and Emperor, 1859–1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 126; and Steinberg, Bismarck, 440. 13. Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1964), 306; Cecil, Wilhelm II, 1:130–132; and Steinberg, Bismarck, 439–440. 14. The story of Franco-Russian relations is carefully traced in George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984). 15. Ritter, Sword and the Scepter, 1:235; Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, 3:371; and Steinberg, Bismarck, 467. 16. Ritter, Sword and the Scepter, 2:129–130; and Cecil, Wilhelm II, 1:184–185. 17. Kessel, Moltke, 707–708; Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” 309; and Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (Oxford: Berg, 1991), 128.

Notes

18. Cecil, Wilhelm II, 1:187; Ritter, Sword and the Scepter, 2:130; and Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning, 128. 19. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” 312; and Robert A. Doughty, “France,” in War Planning 1914, eds. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 146. 20. Literature on this topic alone has been sufficient to keep logging companies in business for decades. Interest, always high, really ramped up after the emergence of previously unknown material from the archives of the defunct East German state. The most important recent work on this topic is the highly revisionist book by Terence Zuber, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871–1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Zuber’s work evoked a great many responses. In 2005, the Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt (now the Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaft der Bundeswehr, or ZMSB) hosted a conference in Potsdam on questions raised by Zuber’s work. The results were published the following year. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross, eds., Der Schlieffen Plan: Analysen und Dokumente (Munich: Oldenberg, 2006). An English translation appeared in 2014. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross, eds., The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I, trans. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014). 21. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” 309; and Kessel, Moltke, 716. 22. Norman Stone, “Moltke and Conrad: Relations between the AustroHungarian and German General Staffs, 1909–1914,” in The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914, ed. Paul Kennedy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), 224; Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914– 1918, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 51; Beyerhaus, Einheitlicher Oberbefehl, 17; Tunstall, Planning for War against Russia and Serbia, 46; and Ritter, Sword and the Scepter, 2:240. 23. Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning, 214–217; and Cecil, Wilhelm II, 2:138. Born on May 23, 1848, in Gersdorf, Mecklenberg, Helmuth von Moltke was a nephew of the mastermind of the victories in the wars of unification. Moltke joined the army in 1869 and saw combat the next year in the Franco-Prussian War, in which he served with distinction. After that, Moltke served in a series of command and staff appointments, as well as adjutant to his uncle. In 1899, he was promoted Generalmajor. Service as adjutant to his uncle and follow-on assignments with several units in the Prussian Guard Corps brought Moltke into the orbit of Wilhelm II. Appointed as quartermaster general to the General Staff in 1904, Moltke played an important role in the 1905 autumn maneuvers. The kaiser appointed Moltke as Schlieffen’s successor at the end of 1905, overriding Moltke’s own objection that he was not suited for the post. Moltke’s concerns about his fitness proved well founded; he broke down both mentally and physically under the strain of the 1914 campaign. Replaced officially by Erich von Falkenhayn as chief of the General Staff on November 3, 1914, Moltke lived in retirement until his death on June 18, 1916. Holger H.

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Herwig and Neil M. Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Westport, CT: Grenwood Press, 1982), 257–278. 24. Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1976), 136–137; Geoffrey Wawro, A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 39; and Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston, MA: Humanities Press, 2000), 80. 25. Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke, Erinnerungen-Briefe-Dokumente, ed. Eliza von Moltke (Stuttgart: Der Kommende Tag, 1922), 252; Richard L. DiNardo, Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 6; and Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 101. 26. Moltke, Erinnerungen-Briefe-Dokumente, 374; Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 3:146–147, 148; John C. G. Röhl, The Kaiser and His Court (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 199; and Cecil, Wilhelm II, 2:174. 27. The 1909 correspondence is reprinted in Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 1:379–393, 403–404, 631–634; and Ritter, Sword and the Scepter, 2:243–246. Moltke’s February 10, 1913, letter is reprinted in Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 3:145. See also Moltke, Erinnerungen-Briefe-Dokumente, 252; Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 113; Hew Strachan, “Die Ostfront. Geopolitik, Geographie, und Operationen,” in Die vergessene Front. Der Osten 1914/15: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung, ed. Gerhard P. Gross (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 16; Stone, “Moltke and Conrad,” 229; and Tunstall, Planning for War against Russia and Serbia, 74. 28. Georg Markus, Der Fall Redl (Vienna: Amalthea Verlag, 1984), 72; and John R. Schindler, “Redl–Spy of the Century?” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 18, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 486–487. 29. Markus, Der Fall Redl, 200–201; and Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 86. Slightly more skeptical is Schindler, “Redl–Spy of the Century?” 497. 30. Markus, Der Fall Redl, 212–224; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 125; and Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 83. More skeptical of the notion of Redl committing suicide is Schindler, “Redl–Spy of the Century?” 494–495. Markus’s Der Fall Redl remains the only full-length study of the case. 31. Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 126; Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 169; Beyerhaus, Einheitlicher Oberbefehl, 20; and Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 3:368. 32. Dennis E. Showalter, Tannenberg: Clash of Empires, reprint ed. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004), 5–7; and Annika Mombauer, “German War Plans,” in War Planning 1914, 63. 33. Günther Kronnenbitter, “Austria-Hungary,” in War Planning 1914, 34–35; Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 77; and Tunstall, Planning for War against Russia and Serbia, 94–95. Tunstall’s work remains the most comprehensive study of the subject. 34. A full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this work. Those interested should consult Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (New

Notes

York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 17–36; David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 32–51; David R. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” in Military Effectiveness, Volume 1: The First World War, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 252–285; Bruce W. Menning, “War Planning and Initial Operations in the Russian Context,” in War Planning 1914, 92–125; W. A. Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag von Reimar Hobbing, 1924), 268–352; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 88–113. 35. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, new ed., trans. Isabella M. Massey (New York: Enigma Books, 2005), 1:285–286; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 46; and L. C. F. Turner, “The Russian Mobilization in 1914,” in War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914, 253. 36. Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 19–20; and Menning, “War Planning and Initial Operations in the Russian Context,” 81. 37. Boris Khavkin, “Russland gegen Deutschland. Die Ostfront des Ersten Weltkrieges in den Jahren 1914 bis 1915,” in Die vergessene Front, 68; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 49. 38. Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 33; Menning, “War Planning and Initial Operations in the Russian Context,” 119; and Turner, “The Russian Mobilization in 1914,” 257–258. 39. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 49; Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 66; Menning, “War Planning and Initial Operations in the Russian Context,” 117. 40. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 49; and Bruce W. Menning, “The Offensive Revisited: Russian Preparation for Future War, 1906–1914,” in Reforming the Tsar’s Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution, eds. David Schimmelpennick van der Oye and Bruce W. Menning (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 228. 41. The issue of the causes of World War I has kept diplomatic and military historians employed for decades. Albertini’s three-volume study, The Origins of the War of 1914, remains the classic work. See also Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York: Harper Collins, 2013); and Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 47–111. For a sampling of the scholarship concerning the three countries involved in this study, see Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War, reprint ed. (Boston, MA: Belknap Press, 2013); Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 85–120; and Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel. Germany and AustriaHungary in World War I: The People’s War (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 7–52. 42. The most useful studies in English of the 1914 campaign in the west are Sewell Tyng, The Campaign of the Marne, reprint ed. (Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing 2007); Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume 1: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 163–280; and Holger H. Herwig, The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2009).

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43. Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 226; Showalter, Tannenberg, 170–171; and Herwig, First World War, 82. 44. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1925), 2:102; Showalter, Tannenberg, 198–199; and Herwig, First World War, 53. Prittwitz, who up to that point had enjoyed an unblemished career, never recovered from the relief. Unemployed for the rest of the war, Prittwitz died in Berlin on March 29, 1929. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 289. In the German system, the commander and his chief of staff were a team, although the commander held the ultimate responsibility. Thus, once Moltke made the decision to relieve Prittwitz, Waldersee had to go as well. 45. Manfred Nebelin, Ludendorff: Diktator im Ersten Weltkrieg (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 2010), 25; and Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 231. The role of the Kadettenschule in producing officers for the German army is discussed in Jörg Muth, Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War II (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2011), 85–114. 46. Nebelin, Ludendorff, 65. 47. Strachan, First World War, 1:211; Franz Uhle-Wettler, Ludendorff in seiner Zeit: Soldat-Stratege-Rovolutionär. Eine Neubewertung (Berg: Kurt Vowinckel-Verlag, 1995), 110; and Nebelin, Ludendorff, 118–121. 48. Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1919), 34. 49. Hindenburg’s full name was Paul von Beneckendorf und von Hindenburg. For the sake of simplicity, he will be referred to as Paul von Hindenburg. 50. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 184–185; and Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, reprint ed. (North Charleston: Jazzybee Verlag, 2016), 48. 51. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 2:107; Showalter, Tannenberg, 202–203; and Cecil, Wilhelm II, 2:211. 52. Showalter, Tannenberg, 294. 53. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 336. 54. Richard L. DiNardo, Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2025), 19; and Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 286. A man utterly broken by his failures, Potiorek died at Klagenfurt on December 17, 1933. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 286. 55. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1931), 1:55; and Graydon A. Tunstall, Written in Blood: The Battles for Fortress Przemys´l in WWI (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 31. 56. Tunstall, Planning for War against Russia and Serbia, 232–233; Lothar Höbelt, “‘So wie wir haben nicht einmal die Japaner eingegriffen.’ ÖsterreichUngarns Nordfront 1914/15,” in Die vergessene Front, 88–89.

Notes

57. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 131–132; Tunstall, Planning for War against Russia and Serbia, 177; and Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 165–167. For a more typically positive view, see Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 1:163. 58. Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 198; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 153; Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 176–178; Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 179; and John. H. Morrow Jr., Building German Airpower, 1909–1914 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 113. 59. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 95. 60. Menning, “War Planning and Initial Operations in the Russian Context,” 129; and Nicholas N. Golovine, The Russian Campaign of 1914, reprint ed. (Uckfield: Naval and Military Press Limited, 2015), 80–81. 61. For just a few sources, see Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 2:111–246; Prit Buttar, Collision of Empires: The War on the Eastern Front in 1914 (New York: Osprey, 2014), 148–202; Golovine, Russian Campaign of 1914, 166–327; Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 61–67; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 59–76; and Strachan, First World War, 1:323–331. Showalter, Tannenberg, passim, remains the best full-length study. 62. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 205; Richard L. DiNardo, “The Operational Implications of Geography, Space and Distance on the Eastern Front, 1914– 1917,” in Geo-Strategy and War: Enduring Lessons for the Australian Army, ed. Peter Dennis (Canberra: Big Sky Publishing, 2015), 59; and Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 1:169. 63. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 95. 64. Karl Graf von Kaganeck Diary, August 4, 1914, MSg 1/1914, BundesarchivMilitärarchiv, Freiburg-im-Breisgau, Germany (hereafter cited as BA-MA MSg 1/1914); Gunther Kronenbitter, “Die Macht der Illusionen. Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch 1914, aus der Sicht des deutschen Militärattachés in Wien,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 57, no. 2 (1998): 542; and Count Josef von Stürgkh, Im deutschen Grossen Hauptquartier (Leipzig: Paul List Verlag, 1921), 14. 65. Herwig, First World War, 105; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 154–155; Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 4:656; Stürgkh, Im deutschen Grossen Hauptquartier, 40–41; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 76. 66. Beyerhaus, Einheitlicher Oberbefehl, 17. 67. General der Infanterie Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, “Heeresleitung,” in Die militärischen Lehren des Grossen Weltkrieges, ed. Generalleutnant Max Schwarte (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 2; Beyerhaus, Einheitlicher Oberbefehl, 29–30; and Cecil, Wilhelm II, 2: 211. 68. Beyerhaus, Einheitlicher Oberbefehl, 20; and Gary W. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914–1918 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985), 53. The Ballplatz, or Ballhausplatz (the first is a shortened version of the second), was the location of the Austrian Foreign Ministry in Vienna.

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69. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 2:282; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 63–65; and Stone; Russian Army in the Great War, 78–79. 70. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 93; General Aleksei A. Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 47–49; Anton Denikin, The Career of a Tsarist Officer: Memoirs, 1872–1916, trans. Margaret Patoski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 237–238; Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 223–225; Herwig, First World War, 92–93; Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 4:769–770; and Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 156. 71. Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 4:729; Alison Fleig Frank, Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 185; Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 254–255; and Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 249. 72. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 5:408; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 67; and Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 53. 73. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 5:409; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 67; Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 57; and Strachan, First World War, 1:360. 74. Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 254–255; and Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 276. 75. Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:43; Buttar, Collision of Empires, 316; and Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 58. 76. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 276; and Tunstall, Planning for War against Russia and Serbia, 258. 77. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 1:380; Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 78–79; Tunstall, Written in Blood, 65; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 106. 78. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 5:416; Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 97; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 69; and Wolfgang Foerster, ed., Mackensen: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen des Generalfeldmarschalls aus Krieg und Frieden (Bonn: Wahlband der Buchgemeinde, 1938), 68. 79. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 5:435–436; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 69; and Strachan, First World War, 1:361. 80. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 5:438; and Foerster, Mackensen, 73. 81. Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:45; Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 279; Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 82; Tunstall, Written in Blood, 92; and Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 1:391–392. 82. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 79; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 167; and Yuri Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915 (Jena: Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1925), 246. 83. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 79; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914– 1917, 98. 84. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 174–175; and Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 71.

Notes

85. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 177–179; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 109–110; Foerster, Mackensen, 79; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 5:444; Richard L. DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby: August von Mackensen, 1914–1916,” in Arms and the Man: Military History Essays in Honor of Dennis Showalter, ed. Michael S. Neiberg (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 136; and Khavkin, “Russland gegen Deutschland,” 73. 86. Laird M. Easton, ed. and trans., Journey to the Abyss: The Diaries of Count Harry Kessler 1880–1918 (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 653; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 72–73; DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby,” 136; Danilov; Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 321; Austria, Bundesministerium, ÖsterreichUngarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 1:492; and Buttar, Collision of Empires, 346. 87. Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 75; Theo Schwarzmüller, Zwischen Kaiser und Führer. Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen: Eine politische Biographie (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995), 97; and Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 74. 88. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 6:37; and Cecil, Wilhelm II, 2:211. 89. Erich von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914– 1916 (New York: Dodd Meade, 1920), 30–31; Fritz von Lossberg, Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1939), 129; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 13–14. 90. Herwig, First World War, 108; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 75; Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 295; and DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby,” 137. 91. Herwig, First World War, 108; Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 2:74; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 1:503–504; and Brono Clemenz, Generalfeldmarschall von Woyrsch und seine Schleiser: eigenhändige Auszüge aus seinem Kriegstagebuch, Lebensgeschichte des Feldherrn (Berlin: Carl Flemming A. G., 1919), 143–144. Born on February 4, 1847, near Breslau, Remus von Woyrsch entered the army in 1860 and served in both the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars. After a successful career including stints as a division chief of staff and commander of the VI Corps, Woyrsch retired in 1911. Recalled to service with the outbreak of war, Woyrsch was given command of the Silesian Landwehr Corps, a formation manned by older reserve soldiers. Designated to defend German border with Russian Poland, the Landwehr Corps was directed to the aid of Dankl’s Austro-Hungarian First Army near Krasnik. Woyrsch and his corps also took part in the abortive Warsaw-Ivangorod offensive. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 360; and Short Biographical Chronology of Remus von Woyrsch, BA-MA MSg 109/10694. 92. Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:51. 93. Buttar, Collision of Empires, 378; Foerster, Mackensen, 110; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 122; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 188. 94. Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 84; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 6:287; and Buttar, Collision of Empires, 375. 95. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 6:285–287; Herwig, First World War, 109; Foerster, ed., Mackensen, 116–117; Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 84; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 124.

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 96. Denikin, Career of a Tsarist Officer, 245; Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 181; Tunstall, Written in Blood, 128; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 1:563; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 114.   97. Tunstall, Written in Blood, 121; and Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorff, 160.   98. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 188; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 123; and Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 302.   99. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 189; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 108. 100. Herwig, First World War, 106; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 167; Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 5:340; Gerhard Tappen Diary, October 30, 1914, BA-MA RH 61/986; Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996), 196; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 19. 101. Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 5:660; and Cecil, Wilhelm II, 2:217. 102. Foerster, Mackensen, 123; Austria, Bundesministerium, ÖsterreichUngarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 1:768; Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 108; and Max von Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916: BelgienOsten-Balkan (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1929), 144–158. 103. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 305–306; Höbelt, “Österreich-Ungarns Nordfront 1914/15,” 96–97; Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 99; and Tunstall, Written in Blood, 127. 104. Deputy Commander, XX Corps to War Ministry, November 5, 1914, German Documents in Russia, First World War, Akte Nr. 280, Deutsches Historisches Institut, Moscow (hereafter cited as DHI, Akte Nr. 280). 105. Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischen Uhlanen Regiments Nr. 12 (Berlin: Bernard und Graefe, 1931), 143; Herwig, First World War, 166–167; Holger H. Herwig, “The Dynamics of Necessity: German Military Policy during the First World War,” in Military Effectiveness, 1:84–85; Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866– 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 354–355; and Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 40–43. 106. Herwig, First World War, 166. 107. Watson, Ring of Steel, 163–164; and Svetlana Palmer and Sarah Wallis, eds., Intimate Voices from the First World War (New York: William Morrow, 2003), 48–52. 108. Tunstall, Written in Blood, 104–105; and Watson, Ring of Steel, 186–187. 109. Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), 119–121; Joshua A. Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 39–40; Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:263–266; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 167–168.

Notes

110. Mark von Hagen, War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 24–25; and Mikhail N. Loukianov, “The First World War and the Polarization of the Russian Right, July 1914–February 1917,” Slavic Review 75, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 877–878. The Grand Duke’s proclamation is reprinted in Jesse Kauffman, Elusive Alliance: The German Occupation of Poland in World War I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 26. 111. Hagen, War in a European Borderland, 25; Dominic Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution (New York: Viking, 2015), 175–176; Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse, 43; Watson, Ring of Steel, 189; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 209. 112. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 80. 113. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 247; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 112. 114. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:278; Lieutenant General Nicholas N. Golovine, Russian Army in the World War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1931), 46; Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 364; and Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 93. 115. After returning to Russia, Zhilinski joined the anti-Bolshevik White forces. He died in Ukraine in 1918. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 365. 116. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 124. After his relief, Rennenkampf had to face a commission of inquiry investigating corruption in the cavalry branch. Connections to the Romanov court allowed Rennenkampf to stay out of prison. After the Bolshevik coup, Rennenkampf joined the White forces. Captured by Bolshevik forces in Ukraine, Rennenkampf was executed in March 1918. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 297. 117. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 106–107. 118. Anti-German sentiment was most famously expressed in Nicholas II’s decision to change the name of the Russian capital from the German-sounding Petersburg to the more Russian Petrograd. These sentiments extended to the broad populace as well. Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse, 94–95; and Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 1. Lohr’s work remains the principal study of the subject. 119. Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen, 391; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 192. 120. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 2:243; and Buttar, Collision of Empires, 199. 121. Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 108. 122. Gerhard P. Gross, The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger, ed. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 109. 123. Showalter, Tannenberg, 146; and Foerster, ed., Mackensen, 88.

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124. Showalter, Tannenberg, 112–113; Herwig, “Dynamics of Necessity,” 1:93; Craig, Germany 1866–1945, 186–192; and Clemenz, Generalfeldmarschall von Woyrsch und seine Schleiser, 120. 125. Buttar, Collision of Empires, 361. 126. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 360. 127. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 97. Appropriations for the Austro-Hungarian army required the agreement of both the Austrian parliament in Vienna and the Hungarian parliament in Budapest. The two parliaments rarely agreed. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 106. 128. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 29–30; and August von Cramon, Unser ÖsterreichUngarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg. Errinerungen aus meiner vierjährigen Tätigkeit als bevollmächtiger deutsche General beim K.u.K. Armeeoberkommando (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 200. 129. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 338–339; Istvan Deak, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 194; and Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 288. 130. Höbelt, “Österreich-Ungarns Nordfront, 1914/15,” in Die vergessene Front, 108; Deak, Beyond Nationalism, 194; and Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 180. 131. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 209; and Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 234. 132. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 362; Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 244; Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 71; and DiNardo, Invasion, 47.

Chapter 2: Strategists, Strategy, Operations, and Coalition Warfare   1. Hans von Plessen Diary, December 31, 1914, BA-MA RH 61/933. Plessen, one of the oldest general officers in the German army (he was born in 1841), was Wilhelm II’s adjutant. Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II, Volume 2: Emperor and Exile, 1900–1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 20.   2. Erich Ludendorff to Helmuth von Moltke, January 2, 1915, Nachlass Erich Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2.   3. Erich von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914– 1916 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920), 65.   4. David R. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” in Military Effectiveness, Volume 1: The First World War, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 291–292; Paul Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University, 2014), 133; and Gisbert Beyerhaus, Einheitlicher Oberbefehl: Ein Problem des Weltkrieges (Munich: F. Bruckmann Verlag, 1938), 30.  5. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 7. The Russian government was still employing the old Julian calendar, which by 1914 was twelve days

Notes

behind the western Gregorian calendar. All dates in this book will be rendered in accordance with the Gregorian calendar.   6. Holger H. Herwig and Neil M. Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 264; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 23–26.   7. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 264; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 46–49; and W. A. Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag Reimar Hobbing, 1924), 383.   8. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 264; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 112; and Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:255–256.   9. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 264; Dominic Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution (New York: Viking, 2015), 346; and Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen, 382. 10. Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen, 389; and Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:292. 11. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 133–134. 12. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 361; David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 57; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 147; and Major General Sir Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917 (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1921), 1:42. 13. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 125–126; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 148–149; Bruce W. Menning, “War Planning and Initial Operations in the Russian Context,” in War Planning 1914, eds. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 120–123; Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 33; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914– 1917, 1:42. 14. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 142–143; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 57. 15. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 144; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:46. It is interesting to note that in his memoirs, Sukhomlinov complained that his office suffered from a shortage of personnel, for which he, unsurprisingly, held the Grand Duke responsible. Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen, 399. 16. Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 113; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:201; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 197–202. 17. Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, reprint ed. (North Charleston: Jazzybee Verlag, 2016), 71; Wolfgang Foerster, ed., Mackensen: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen des Generalfeldmarschalls aus Krieg und Frieden (Bonn: Wahlband der Buchgemeinde, 1938), 82; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 181. 18. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 361; and Yuri Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915 (Jena: Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1925), 407.

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19. Born on March 18, 1854, to a noble family, Ruzski graduated from a military academy in 1872 and was posted as a company-grade officer to a guards regiment. After seeing action in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, Ruzski attended the General Staff Academy, graduating in 1881. After serving in a highlevel staff position in Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese War, Ruzski had several high-level command and staff positions and was chief of staff for the Kiev Military District. Commanding the Russian 3rd Army in Galicia in 1914, Ruzski enjoyed enough success to be lionized as the “Hero of Lemberg” in Russian war art. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 305; and Hubertus F. Jahn, Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 23. Nikolai Ivanov, born in 1851, was a rarity in the Russian army, in that he hailed from a peasant family. After getting a commission in 1869, Ivanov saw combat in 1877 and then rose in the Russian army steadily, commanding a corps in the Russo-Japanese War. While governor of Kronstadt in 1906, he put down a mutiny and earned the gratitude of Nicholas II. Ivanov was the commander of the Kiev Military District in 1914 and assumed command of the southwest front at the onset of the war. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 193. 20. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 412; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 126. 21. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 412; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 111. 22. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 414. 23. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 127; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 200. 24. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 418; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 128; and Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen, 403–404. 25. Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996), 9. See also, Short Biographical Chronology of Erich von Falkenhayn, BA-MA MSg 109/10859. 26. Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 107–108; Short Biographical Chronology, BA-MA MSg 109/10859; and Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 145–146. It should be remembered that the Kaiserreich was not a unitary polity. Rather, it was a collection of states under the aegis of Prussia. Three states (Länder) had separate military establishments, namely Prussia, Bavaria, and Württemberg. In time of war, the separate armies would be merged into a German army, headed by the Prussian Great General Staff. Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 41. 27. Volker Ullrich, Die nervöse Grossmacht. Aufstieg und Untergang des deutschen Kaiserreichs 1871–1918, reprint ed. (Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2010), 247; Cecil, Wilhelm II, 2:189–191; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 115– 119; Craig, Germany 1866–1945, 297–299; and Martin Kitchen, The German Officer Corps 1890–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 211. 28. Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 144; Cecil, Wilhelm II, 2:189–194; Erich Dorn Brose, The Kaiser’s Army: The Politics of Military Technology in Germany during the Machine

Notes

Age, 1870–1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 151; and Robert T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 91. 29. Cecil, Wilhelm II, 2:216. 30. Hans von Seeckt, “Diary Notes,” January 24, 1915, Nachlass Hans von Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/22; Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, trans. Heinz Norden (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1972), 3:50; Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des preussischen Generals als Kriegsminister und Truppenführer im Ersten Weltkrieg, ed. Helmut Reichold (Boppard-am-Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1986), 53; and Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, 95. 31. Wild, Briefe, 51; Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, 114; Ludendorff to Moltke, January 2, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke, Errinerungen-Briefe-Dokumente, ed. Eliza von Moltke (Stuttgart: Der Kommende Tag, 1922), 409; Walter Görlitz, ed., The Kaiser and His Court: The Diaries, Note Books and Letters of Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller Chief of the Naval Cabinet 1914–1918, trans. Mervyn Savill (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), 57; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 223–224; and Lieutenant Colonel Georg Wetzell, Von Falkenhayn zu Hindenburg-Ludendorff: Der Wechsel in des deutschen Oberstes Heeresleitung im Herbst 1916 und der rümanische Feldzug (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1921), 1. 32. Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 61; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 199–200; Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, 110; and Fritz von Lossberg, Lossberg’s War: The World War I Memoirs of a German Chief of Staff, eds. and trans. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Dieter J. Biederkarken, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 118. 33. Some of Germany’s imperial possessions did border those of Britain, but given the British naval blockade, they were completely isolated and beyond direct help from Germany. 34. Richard L. DiNardo, Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 25–26. 35. Major General Max Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, trans. Eric Sutton (London: Martin Secker, 1929), 1:57–58. Born on January 25, 1869, Max Hoffmann entered the army in 1887. A Kriegsakademie graduate, Hoffmann became what in modern military parlance would be called a foreign area officer, an expert on all things Russian. After serving as an observer with the Japanese forces in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, Hoffmann had a tour with the 112th Infantry Regiment and was promoted lieutenant colonel in January 1914. As a staff officer with the Eighth Army, Hoffmann played a critical, if unheralded, role in formulating the plan for Tannenberg. In November 1914, he moved up to the Ober Ost staff. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 188. 36. Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 78–79; Ludendorff to Moltke, June 18, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Manfred Nebelin, Ludendorff: Diktator

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im Ersten Weltkrieg (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 2010), 173–175; Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 94–95. 37. In the American context, this would be the equivalent of a three star general giving orders to a five star general. 38. Hoffman, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:51; and Ludendorff to Moltke, January 2, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2. 39. Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 255; and Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 129. 40. Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 255; and Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 145. 41. Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 256–257; Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 128; and Richard L. DiNardo, Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 19–20. Gerhard Tappen’s diary conveys the extent of the amount of traveling that Falkenhayn did as head of OHL. See for example Gerhard Tappen Diary, January 11, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986. 42. August von Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg. Errinerungen aus meiner vierjährigen Tätigkeit als bevollmächtiger deutsche General beim K.u.K. Armeeoberkommando (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 105. For details on Conrad’s early career, see Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston, MA: Humanities Press, 2000), 19–80; and Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 118–119. 43. Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 169; Cramon, Unser ÖsterreichUngarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 22; Franz Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf to Artur Baron von Bolfras, April 6, 1915, Military Chancery of His Majesty, File 78, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv–Kriegsarchiv, Vienna, Austria (hereafter cited as ÖSA-KA MKSM 78); Conrad to Falkenhayn, May 18, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/979; Falkenhayn to Conrad, May 6, 1915, ÖSA-KA, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad–Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, File 512 (hereafter cited as ÖSAKA R512); Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 128; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 20. 44. Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 22–23. 45. Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 165; Stone, Eastern Front 1914– 1917, 53; Gina Grafin Conrad von Hötzendorf, Mein Leben mit Conrad von Hötzendorf; Sein geistiges Vermächtnis (Leipzig: Grathlein, 1935), 132; Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 65–66; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 20. 46. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 142–143; Kaganeck Diary, April 12, 1915, BA-MA MSg 1/2514; Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 146; Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 143; and Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 106. 47. Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 58; Ludendorff to Moltke, January 2, 1915; Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1931), 2:93; and Graydon A.

Notes

Tunstall, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 32–33. 48. War Diary of Süd Army, January 13, 1915 (hereafter cited as KTB/Süd Army), BA-MA PH 5 II/322; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 22. Karl Baron von Pflanzer-Baltin was born on June 1, 1855, in Pécs, Hungary. After attending the Maria Theresa Military Academy, Pflanzer-Baltin went into the cavalry. A War College graduate, Pflanzer-Baltin spent time on the General Staff. He was in line for appointment to corps command when poor health forced him into retirement in 1911. Pflanzer-Baltin received his corps command in 1914, when he was recalled to active service. By January 1915, he had established a reputation as one of the Austro-Hungarian army’s more reliable and competent commanders. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 280–281. 49. Born on February 10, 1850, Alexander von Linsingen received his initial commission in 1869. A veteran of the Franco-Prussian War, Linsingen enjoyed a most successful career in the infantry. Promoted General der Infanterie and appointed II Corps commander on September 1, 1909, Linsingen took the corps to war in 1914, fighting in the campaign in the west. Transferred to the eastern front late in 1914, Linsingen was involved in the Lodz campaign. Short Biographical Chronology, BA-MA MSg 109/10865; and Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 227. In his memoir, Falkenhayn rather disingenuously says that Ludendorff was merely being loaned to Linsingen. Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 66. 50. Plessen Diary, January 11, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; Ludendorff to Moltke, January 9, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, 121; Cecil, Wilhelm II, 2:227; Laird M. Easton, ed. and trans., Journey to the Abyss: The Diaries of Count Harry Kessler 1880–1918 (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 670; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 22. 51. Count Josef von Stürgkh, Im deutschen Grossen Hauptquartier (Leipzig: Paul List Verlag, 1921), 14. 52. Herwig, First World War, 105; Stürgkh, Im deutschen Grossen Hauptquartier, 102; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 23. 53. Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 1–3; and Short Biographical Chronology, BA-MA MSg 109/10858. 54. Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 3–4. 55. DiNardo, Breakthrough, 23; and Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 104. 56. Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 126; Cramon to Falkenhayn, April 8, 1915, 11:26 PM, Falkenhayn to Cramon, April 12, 1915, 7:40 PM and Cramon to OHL, June 18, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; and Foerster, ed., Mackensen, 137. 57. Ritter, Sword and the Scepter, 3:60; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 176; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 266–267; and DiNardo, Invasion, 26. 58. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 176. 59. DiNardo, Invasion, 29; and Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914– 1917, 173–174.

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Chapter 3: Equipping the Man and Manning the Equipment   1. Ludendorff to Moltke, April 1, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2.   2. Jon E. Lewis, ed., The Mammoth Book of Eyewitness: World War I (New York: Carroll and Grad Publishers, 2003), 123.   3. Anton Denikin, The Career of a Tsarist Officer: Memoirs, 1872–1916, trans. Margaret Patoski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 252.   4. August von Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg. Errinerungen aus meiner vierjährigen Tätigkeit als bevollmächtiger deutsche General beim K.u.K. Armeeoberkommando (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 200; and Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1976), 172.   5. Geoffrey Wawro, A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 338–339; Istvan Deak, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 194; and Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914– 1918 (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2013), 288.   6. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 338–339.   7. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1931), 2:11; and Deak, Beyond Nationalism, 191.   8. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:12; and Deak, Beyond Nationalism, 194.   9. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 352–353; Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel. Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I: The People’s War (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 249; and Oswald Überegger, “Auf den Flucht vor dem Krieg. Trentiner und Tiroler Deserteure im Ersten Weltkrieg,” Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 62, no. 2 (2003): 356. 10. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 362–363; Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 216–217; and Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:14. 11. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 339; and Max-Stephan Schulze, “Austria-Hungary’s Economy in World War I,” in The Economics of World War I, eds. Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 89. 12. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:14; Watson, Ring of Steel, 213–214; Major General Sir Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1918 (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1921), 1:190; and Graydon A. Tunstall, Written in Blood: The Battles for Fortress Przemys´l in WWI (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 212–213. 13. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:19; Lewis, World War I, 123; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1918, 1:109; Lieutenant Colonel Osterroht and Captain Herrmann, Geschichte des DragonerRegiments Prinz Albrecht von Preussen (Litthauisches) Nr. 1 1717–1919 (Berlin: Verlag

Notes

Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1930), 131; and Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischer Ulanen Regiments Nr. 12 (Berlin: Verlag Bernard und Graefe, 1930), 143. For a more jaundiced view of the utility of the lance, see David R. Dorondo, Riders of the Apocalypse: German Cavalry and Modern Warfare, 1870–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 70. 14. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 174; Graydon A. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 13; Deak, Beyond Nationalism, 191; and Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 217–218. 15. John H. Morrow Jr., Building German Airpower, 1909–1914 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 111–113; and Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 193. 16. Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 174–176; Tunstall, Written in Blood, 131–132; and Alison Fleig Frank, Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 187. 17. Hermann Simon, ed., Feldpostbriefe Jüdischer Soldaten 1914–1918 (Teetz: Hentrich and Hentrich, 2002), 1:356; and Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume 1: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 277–278. 18. Dennis Showalter, Instrument of War: The German Army 1914–18 (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2016), 111. 19. Philipp Witkop, ed., German Students’ Wartime Letters, reprint ed., trans. A. F. Wedd (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 100; Watson, Ring of Steel, 288; Showalter, Instrument of War, 92; and Simon, Feldpostbriefe Jüdischer Soldaten 1914–1918, 1:82. 20. Witkop, German Students’ Wartime Letters, 85. For a good example of a guards regiment with a mix of noble and nonnoble officers in early 1915, see Thilo von Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932), 160–161. 21. Showalter, Instrument of War, 28–29; Dorondo, Riders of the Apocalypse, 69; Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischer Ulanen Regiments Nr. 12, 121; and Richard L. DiNardo, Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 52. 22. Major von Merkatz, “Maschinegewehre,” in Die militärischen Lehren des Grossen Krieges, ed. Generalleutnant Max Schwarte (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 148; Showalter, Instrument of War, 29; Major Augustin, “Minenwerfer,” in Die militärischen Lehren des Grossen Krieges, 158; and Herbert Jäger, German Artillery of World War One (Wiltshire: Crowood Press, 2001), 68. 23. Eric Dorn Brose, The Kaiser’s Army: The Politics of Military Technology in Germany during the Machine Age, 1870–1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 210; Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 100; General Landauer, “Feldartillerie,” in Die militärischen Lehren des Grossen Krieges, 79; and Jäger, German Artillery of World War One, 115. 24. Brose, Kaiser’s Army, 228; and General Landauer, “Feldartillerie,” 82.

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25. Brose, Kaiser’s Army, 228; Lieutenant Colonel Schirmer, “Schwere Artillerie,” in Die militärischen Lehren des Grossen Krieges, 110–111; Jäger, German Artillery of World War One, 68; and Dieter Storz, “This Trench and Fortress Warfare is Horrible! The Battles in Lorraine and the Vosges in the Summer of 1914,” in The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German for World War I, eds. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross, trans. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 148. 26. Major von Ammon, “Kavallerie,” in Die militärischen Lehren des Grossen Krieges, 69–70; Showalter, Instrument of War, 31; and Dorondo, Riders of the Apocalypse, 57. 27. Hans Martens and Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4 (Berlin: Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1929), 32; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1931), 7:456–462. 28. KTB/Third Cuirassier Regiment, 19–24 November 1914, DHI Akte. Nr. 109; Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischer Ulanen Regiments Nr. 12, 106; Paul L. Rempe, ed., From German Cavalry Officer to Reconnaissance Pilot: The World War I History, Memories, and Photographs of Leonhard Rempe, 1914–1921 (El Dorado Hills: Savas Beatie, 2016), 4; and Martens and Zipfel, Geschichte des UlanenRegiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4, 138–139. 29. Morrow, Building German Airpower, 1909–1914, 85; Peter Pletschacher, Die Königlich Bayerischen Fliegertruppen 1912–1919 (Munich: Aviatic Verlag, 1992), 20; James S. Corum and Richard R. Muller, The Luftwaffe’s Way of War: German Air Force Doctrine 1911–1945 (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Company of America, 1998), 37; and Richard L. DiNardo, “German Air Operations on the Eastern Front, 1914–1917,” in Essays on World War I, eds. Peter Pastor and Graydon A. Tunstall (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2012), 66. 30. General Ernst von Hoeppner, Germany’s War in the Air: The Development and Operations of German Military Aviation in the World War, reprint ed. (Nashville: Battery Press, 1994), 24; and Hermann von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, “The Airmen of Tannenberg,” no date, Nachlass Ernst Canter, BA-MA N 50/2. 31. S. A. An-sky, 1915 Diary of S. An-sky: A Russian Jewish Writer at the Eastern Front, trans. Polly Zavadivker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 42; and DiNardo, “German Air Operations on the Eastern Front, 1914– 1917,” 66. 32. Gerhard P. Gross, The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger, ed. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 88–89; and Showalter, Instrument of War, 68. 33. Wolfgang Foerster, ed., Mackensen: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen des Generalfeldmarschalls aus Krieg und Frieden (Bonn: Wahlband der Buchgemeinde, 1938), 46; Simon, Feldpostbriefe Jüdischer Soldaten 1914–1918, 2:409; Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 168; and Richard L. DiNardo, Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 60.

Notes

34. Showalter, Instrument of War, 104; John S. Haller Jr., Battlefield Medicine: A History of the Military Ambulance from the Napoleonic Wars through World War I (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), 158; and Simon, Feldpostbriefe Jüdischer Soldaten 1914–1918, 1:157. For a bird’s-eye view of the German medical service on the eastern front, see Professor Doctor Mangold, “Kriegsbriefe und Tagebücher eines Truppenarztes von der Winter Masurenschlacht, Narew und Wilija-Offensive,” BA-MA RH 61/1532. Mangold was the doctor for the 2nd Battalion of the 249th Reserve Infantry Regiment. 35. Haller, Battlefield Medicine, 158. 36. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81; Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II, Volume 2: Emperor and Exile, 1900– 1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 178; Mark von Hagen, War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 61; Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke, Errinerungen-Briefe-Dokumente, ed. Eliza von Moltke (Stuttgart: Der Kommende Tag, 1922), 374; Plessen Diary, August 19, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; First Lieutenant Herbert Ulrich, Res.-Inf.-Regiment im Weltkriege (Cottbus: Lausitzer Druckerei und Verlagsanstalt, 1925), 227–228; DiNardo, Breakthrough, 113–114; and Simon, Feldpostbriefe Jüdischer Soldaten 1914–1918, 1:156. 37. Dennis E. Showalter, Tannenberg: Clash of Empires, reprint ed. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004), 294; and Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 223–225. 38. Yuri N. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915 (Jena: Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1925), 364; David R. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” in Military Effectiveness, Volume 1: The First World War, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 278–279; Mark von Hagen, “The Limits of Reform: The Multiethnic Imperial Army Confronts Nationalism, 1874–1917,” in Reforming the Tsar’s Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution, eds. David Schimmelpennick van der Oye and Bruce W. Menning (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 47; Joshua A. Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 104; and Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 215. 39. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 365; and Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:282. 40. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 365; and Denikin, Career of a Tsarist Officer, 252. 41. David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 37; and Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:310. 42. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:136. 43. Paul Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014), 57; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:109.

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44. Bavarian 8th Reserve Division, “Excerpt from the Campaign of the German Eastern Army,” June 1915, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv–Kriegsarchiv, Munich, Germany, File 8R/11/1 (hereafter cited as BH-KA File 8R/11/1); and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 101. 45. Bernard Pares, Day by Day with the Russian Army, 1914–15 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1915), 30–31; An-sky, 1915 Diary of S. An-sky, 48; Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse, 62; and Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:299. 46. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 37; and Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:264. 47. Von Hardesty, “Early Flight in Russia,” in Russian Aviation and Air Power in the Twentieth Century, eds. Robin Higham, John T. Greenwood and Von Hardesty (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 19. 48. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:261; and Hardesty, “Early Flight in Russia,” 30. 49. General Aleksei A. Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 18; Hardesty, “Early Flight in Russia,” 33–34; and Scott W. Palmer, Dictatorship of the Air: Aviation Culture and the Fate of Modern Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 71. Although more famous as a developer of the helicopter, Igor Sikorsky (born 1889 in Kiev) was a well-known aircraft designer in Russia. In June 1914, Sikorsky and a crew of three flew the Ilya Muromets from Saint Petersburg to Kiev, a distance of eight hundred miles, with only one short refueling stop at Orsha. Sikorsky left Russia after the Bolshevik coup and settled in the United States in 1919. Johanna Granville, “Sikorsky, Igor Ivanovich,” in Encyclopedia of Russian History, ed. James Millar (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 4:1393. 50. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 57; Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:310; Hardesty, “Early Flight in Russia,” 31; Palmer, Dictatorship of the Air, 66; and An-sky, 1915 Diary of S. An-sky, 42. 51. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:296; Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 367–368; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1918, 1:186. To gauge the initial expansion of the Russian economy, see Peter Gatrell, “Poor Russia, Poor Show: Mobilising a Backward Economy for War, 1914–1917,” in The Economics of World War I, eds. Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 242. 52. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 214–215; Pares, Day by Day with the Russian Army, 1914–15, 11; Florence Farmborough, With the Armies of the Tsar: A Nurse at the Russian Front 1914–18 (New York: Stein and Day, 1975), 28–29; and An-sky, 1915 Diary of S. An-sky, 14. 53. Hagen, “The Limits of Reform,” 47; and Hubertus F. Jahn, Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 40. 54. W. Bruce Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution 1914–1918 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 45; Allan K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers’ Revolt (March–April 1917) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 87–88; and Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:274–275.

Notes

Chapter 4: Bloody Winter: January–February 1915  1. Quoted in Paul Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014), 202.   2. Robert Kosch to Wife, February 5, 1915, Nachlass Robert Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2. Kosch was referring to the impending attack in the Masurian Lakes area.  3. Ludendorff to Moltke, February 2, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2.   4. Laird M. Easton, ed. and trans., Journey to the Abyss: The Diaries of Count Harry Kessler 1880–1918 (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 672. Kessler was a staff officer in the German Süd Army.   5. Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918 (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2013), 306; Graydon A. Tunstall, Written in Blood: The Battles for Fortress Przemys´l in WWI (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 133–134; Gary W. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy: AustriaHungary and the German Alliance, 1914–1918 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985), 63; Lothar Höbelt, “‘So wie wir haben nicht einmal die Japaner eingegriffen.’ Österreich-Ungarns Nordfront 1914/15,” in Die vergessene Front. Der Osten 1914/15: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung, ed. Gerhard P. Gross (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 97; and Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 176.   6. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1931), 2:113; and Tunstall, Written in Blood, 203.   7. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:111; and Graydon A. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 65.   8. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:125; Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 67; Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 312; Carl Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1917), 15; and KTB/Süd Army, January 15, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322.   9. Falkenhayn to Conrad, January 17, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad– Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; and Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 61. 10. Douglas Wilson Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917), 51; Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 6–7; and Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 138. 11. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 18; and Major General Sir Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917 (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1921), 1:190. 12. KTB/Süd Army, January 19, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915, 22; and Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 55.

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13. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:125; and Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915, 19. 14. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 62; Rudolf Kundmann Diary, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; Conrad to Falkenhayn, May 18, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Conrad, May 19, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/979; and Gunther Herbert, Das Alpenkorps: Aufbau, Organization, und Einsatz einer Gebirgstruppen im Ersten Weltkrieg (Boppardam-Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1988), 14. 15. Tunstall, Written in Blood, 201; Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915, 15; Fritz Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches Nr. 3) Nr. 3 (Berlin: Oldenburg, 1924) 71; General Aleksei A. Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 115–116; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:236; and Yuri Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915 (Jena: Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1925), 450. 16. Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War, 51; Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 78; and Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 116–117. 17. KTB/Süd Army, January 15, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322. 18. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:112; and Tunstall, Written in Blood, 211. 19. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:125; and Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 66. 20. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:127; and Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 84. 21. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:128–131; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1931), 7:94; Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 78; KTB/Süd Army, January 27, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Wilhelm Meissinger, Standhaft und treu! Geschichte des Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments 221 (Oldenburg: Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1925), 62; and Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915, 24. 22. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 87; Herwig, First World War, 138; Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915, 22; and Anton Denikin, The Career of a Tsarist Officer: Memoirs, 1872–1916, trans. Margaret Patoski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 253–254. 23. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:134–135; Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 118–119; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 202; David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 140– 141; and Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 97. 24. Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston, MA: Humanities Press, 2000), 168; Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 91; Chief of Staff, Süd Army to August von Cramon, February 6, 1915, and Cramon to Chief of Staff, Süd Army, February 8, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1522; KTB/Süd Army, February 7, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Shanafelt, Secret Enemy, 63; Svetlana Palmer and Sarah Wallis, eds., Intimate Voices from the First World War (New York: William Morrow, 2003), 79; and Tunstall, Written in Blood, 211.

Notes

25. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 100–101; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:150; and Cramon to Chief of Staff, Süd Army, February 8, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1522. Born on February 12, 1856, Edouard von Böhm-Ermolli hailed from a military family. A graduate of the Maria Theresa Military Academy in 1875, Böhm-Ermolli enjoyed a successful career in the Austro-Hungarian cavalry. Appointed General der Kavallerie in 1911, Böhm-Ermolli had led the Second Army during the 1914 campaigns. Holger H. Herwig and Neil M. Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 89–90. 26. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:150; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:98; KTB/Süd Army, February 11, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915, 1; Easton, Journey to the Abyss, 672; and Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 119. 27. Franz von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Kronprinz (1. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 1 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1927), 1:112, 136. 28. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:141; Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 117; KTB/Süd Army, February 12, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; and Herwig, First World War, 138. 29. KTB/Süd Army, February 14, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322. 30. KTB/Süd Army, February 21, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Easton, Journey to the Abyss, 674; Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Kronprinz (1. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 1 im Weltkriege, 132; and Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 119–120. 31. KTB/Army Detachment Woyrsch, January 19, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 IV/43; Ludendorff to Moltke, February 2, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; and Wolf-Rüdiger Osburg, Hineingeworfen: Der Erste Weltkrieg in den Erinnerungen seiner Teilnehmer (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch, 2014), 445. 32. KTB/Army Detachment Woyrsch, January 27, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 IV/43; and Constantin Schneider, Die Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1919, ed. Oskar Dohle (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2003), 259–263. 33. Ludendorff to Moltke, January 27, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Shanafelt, Secret Enemy, 63; Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, reprint ed. (North Charleston: Jazzybee Verlag, 2016), 80; Robert T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 127–128; and Erich von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920), 65. 34. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 130–132; OHL, “Beurteilung der Feindlage im Osten durch die Oberste Heeresleitung im Januar 1915,” c. February 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1522; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:230. 35. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:165–166; and Wolfgang Foerster, ed., Mackensen: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen des Generalfeldmarschalls aus Krieg und Frieden (Bonn: Wahlband der Buchgemeinde, 1938), 125. 36. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:166; Foerster, Mackensen, 125–126; Richard L. DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby: August von

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Mackensen, 1914–1916,” in Arms and the Man: Military History Essays in Honor of Dennis Showalter, ed. Michael S. Neiberg (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 138; Major General Max Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, trans. Eric Sutton (London: Martin Secker, 1929), 2:88, Archivist von Gontard, Ninth Army from January 1 to February 5, 1915, c. 1927, BA-MA RH 61/1593; and Herwig, First World War, 136–137. 37. Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 112; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:237; Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1919), 95; Foerster, Mackensen, 126; and Herwig, First World War, 137. 38. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:238; German Eighth Army, Russian Strength Opposite the Eighth Army, c. February 1915, Nachlass Otto von Below, BA-MA N 87/13; and William C. Fuller, The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 130. 39. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:239; OHL, “Beurteilung der Feindlage im Osten durch die Oberste Heeresleitung im Januar 1915,” c. February 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1522; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:173; Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, reprint ed. (North Charleston: Jazzybee Verlag, 2016), 81; Ludendorff to Moltke, January 27, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Kosch to Wife, February 5, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2; Manfred Nebelin, Ludendorff: Diktator im Ersten Weltkrieg (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 2010), 159; and General der Infanterie Karl Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag R. Eisenschmidt, 1927), 1:317. 40. Falkenhayn to Hindenburg, January 20, 1915; and OHL to Ober Ost, January 27, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1596. 41. Ober Ost to Falkenhayn, January 31, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1596; and Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 81. 42. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 81; and Dennis E. Showalter, Tannenberg: Clash of Empires, reprint ed. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004), 349. 43. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 138; and Short Biographical Chronology of Hermann Eichhorn, BA-MA MSg 109/6856. 44. Major Wagner, Reserve Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 58 (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1923), 10; Jürgen Siehr, 8. Rheinisches InfanterieRegiment Nr. 70 im Kriege 1914–1918 (Saarbrücken: Druck und Verlag der Saarbrücken Druckerei, 1929), 54; Adolf Seneca, Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 2. Unterelsassichen Feldartillerie-Regiments Nr. 67 (Karlsruhe: Sudwestdeutsche Druck und Verlagsgesellschaft, 1935), 73; and Albrecht von Stosch, Das GardeGrenadier-Regiment Nr. 5 1897–1918 (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1925), 146. 45. Captain von Ammon, “Kavallerie,” in Die militärischen Lehren des Grossen Weltkrieges, ed. Generalleutnant Max Schwarte (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 78; David R. Dorondo, Riders of the Apocalypse: German Cavalry and Modern Warfare, 1870–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 70; Hans Martens and Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt

Notes

(1. Pommersches) Nr. 4 (Berlin: Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1929), 114; and Lieutenant Colonel Osterroht and Captain Herrmann, Geschichte des Dragoner-Regiments Prinz Albrecht von Preussen (Litthauisches) Nr. 1 1717–1919 (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1930), 119. 46. Wagner, Reserve Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 58, 10; Otto Meienborn and Walther Goebel, Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 251 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1930), 8; Stosch, Das Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 5 1897–1918, 146; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:320; and Otto von Below, “Winterschlacht in Masuren,” no date, Nachlass Below, BA-MA N 87/58. 47. Ludendorff to Moltke, January 27, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:173; Kosch to Wife, February 5, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, February 5, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:320; and Below, “Winterschlacht in Masuren,” Nachlass Below, BA-MA N 87/58. 48. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:239; Stone, Eastern Front 1914– 1917, 116; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 132. 49. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:177; Below, “Winterschlacht in Masuren,” Nachlass Below, BA-MA N 87/58; and Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:321. 50. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:180–181; Prit Buttar, Germany Ascendant: The Eastern Front 1915 (Oxford: Osprey, 2015), 92–93; Below, “Winterschlacht in Masuren,” Nachlass Below, BA-MA N 87/58; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:322; and Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 97–98. 51. Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:324; Germany, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:181–182; Kosch to Wife, February 8, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2; and Below, “Winterschlacht in Masuren,” Nachlass Below, BA-MA N 87/58. 52. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War, 132–133; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 202–203; Joseph T. Fuhrmann, ed., The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 71; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:241. 53. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:184; Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte der Littauischer Ulanen Regiments Nr. 12 (Berlin: Verlag Bernard und Graefe, 1931), 86; and Stosch, Das Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 5 1897–1918, 147. 54. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:184–185; and Wagner, Reserve Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 58, 11. Born on July 13, 1856 in Pomerania, Marwitz hailed from a noble family with a long military tradition. After entering the army in 1875, Marwitz enjoyed a fine career in the cavalry, serving in a number of Guard cavalry units, along with stints on the General Staff. In 1914, Marwitz commanded the cavalry that led the German right wing into Belgium and France. After the withdrawal from the Marne, Marwitz commanded the cavalry involved in the race to the sea. Once the western front had devolved into positional warfare, Marwitz was appointed commander of the newly created XXXVIII Reserve Corps. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 243–244.

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55. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:185–188; Seneca, Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 2. Unterelsassichen Feldartillerie-Regiments Nr. 67, 75; Siehr, 8. Rheinisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 70 im Kriege 1914–1918, 54; and Professor Doctor Mangold, “Kriegsbriefe und Tagebücher eines Truppenarztes von der Winter Masurenschlacht, Narew und Wilija-Offensive,” BA-MA RH 61/1532. 56. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:198; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:326; KTB/Tenth Army, February 9, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1596; and Kosch to Wife, February 10, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2. 57. Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:327; and Kosch to Wife, February 11, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2. 58. Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:329; Kosch to Wife, February 11, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2; Below, “Winterschlacht in Masuren,” Nachlass Below, BA-MA N 87/58; Karl Heinecke and Bruno Bethge, Das Reserve-InfanterieRegiment Nr. 263 in Ost und West (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1926), 17; and Seneca, Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 2. Unterelsassichen Feldartillerie-Regiments Nr. 67, 77. 59. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:203; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 333; Kosch to Wife, February 13, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2; Below, “Winterschlacht in Masuren,” Nachlass Below, BA-MA N 87/58; Gerhard Tappen Diary, February 13, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 132–133. 60. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:188; and Wagner, Reserve Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 58, 11. 61. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 133; Fuller, Foe Within, 132; and Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 94. 62. Kosch to Wife, February 14, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 134; Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War, 65–66; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:265. 63. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:194; Stosch, Das Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 5 1897–1918, 152; Siehr, 8. Rheinisches InfanterieRegiment Nr. 70 im Kriege 1914–1918, 57; Martens and Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4, 119; and KTB/XXXVIII Reserve Corps, February 12, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1596. 64. Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:339–341; Below, “Winterschlacht in Masuren,” Nachlass Below, BA-MA N 87/58; and Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 98. 65. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 136; OHL, “Beurteilung der Feindlage im Osten durch die Oberste Heeresleitung im Februar 1915,” c. March 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1531; Osterroht and Herrmann, Geschichte des Dragoner-Regiments Prinz Albrecht von Preussen (Litthauisches) Nr. 1 1717–1919, 118; Stosch, Das GardeGrenadier-Regiment Nr. 5 1897–1918, 153; and Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:345. 66. Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 110; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 345–346; Osterroht and Herrmann, Geschichte des Dragoner-Regiments Prinz Albrecht von

Notes

Preussen (Litthauisches) Nr. 1 1717–1919, 119; Meienborn and Goebel, ReserveInfanterie-Regiment Nr. 251, 15; Siehr, 8. Rheinisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 70 im Kriege 1914–1918, 57; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:220–222; Kosch to Wife, February 18,1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2; and KTB/Tenth Army, February 16, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1596. 67. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:237; Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 113; and Kosch to Wife, February 23, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2. 68. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 136; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:297; Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 127; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 217. 69. For details, see Fuller, Foe Within, passim. 70. W. A. Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag von Reimar Hobbing, 1924), 400; and Fuller, Foe Within, 163. 71. W. Bruce Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution 1914–1918 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 112; Fuller, Foe Within, 136–140; Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen, 400; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 216–218. 72. Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 113; Martens and Zipfel, Geschichte des UlanenRegiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4, 118–119; Siehr, 8. Rheinisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 70 im Kriege 1914–1918, 58; Major Hans von Redern, “Die Winterschlacht in Masurien im Februar 1915,” in Im Felde unbesiegt: Der Weltkrieg in 28 Einzeldarstellungen, ed. General der Infanterie Gustaf von DickhuthHarrach (Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1921), 78; Meienborn and Goebel, Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 251, 16; Meissinger, Standhaft und treu!, 69; Heinecke and Bethge, Das Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 263 in Ost und West, 22; and Mangold, “Kriegsbriefe und Tagebücher eines Truppenarztes von der Winter Masurenschlacht, Narew und Wilija-Offensive,” BA-MA RH 61/1532. 73. Nebelin, Ludendorff, 160; and Kosch to Wife, February 27, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/3. 74. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:238; Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 99; and Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War, 65–66. 75. Foerster, Mackensen, 126; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:248; Max von Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916: Belgien–Osten–Balkan (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1929), 186; and OHL, “Beurteilung der Feindlage im Osten durch die Oberste Heeresleitung im Februar 1915,” c. March 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1531. While the German official history cited radio intercepts as the means by which the 12th Army’s existence and the name of its commander was discovered, Knox thought that too many Russian generals were given to talking too much in places like Warsaw, where German spies were thought to be operating. OHL, “Beurteilung der Feindlage im Osten durch die Oberste Heeresleitung im Februar 1915,” c. March 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1531; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:229.

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76. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:249; Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 187; and Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:346. 77. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:253; Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 205; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 220; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 136. 78. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 105–106; Richard L. DiNardo, Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 25; and Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914– 1918, 310. 79. Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 81; Kosch to Wife, February 5, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2; and Ludendorff to Moltke, January 27, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2. 80. Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 79; Ludendorff to Moltke, January 27, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Gerhard P. Gross, The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger, ed. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 109; and Siehr, 8. Rheinisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 70 im Kriege 1914–1918, 58. 81. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:242; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 132; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 193; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 117. 82. Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen, 400; Fuller, Foe Within, 163; David R. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” in Military Effectiveness, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 1:269; Denikin, Career of a Tsarist Officer, 252; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:253.

Chapter 5: Spring Crisis: March–April 1915  1. Ludendorff to Moltke, March 12, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2.   2. Joseph T. Fuhrmann, ed., The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra: April 1914–March 1917 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 99.   3. Conrad to Bolfras, April 6, 1915, ÖSA-KA MKSM 78/14.   4. Hermann Simon, ed., Feldpostbriefe Jüdischer Soldaten 1914–1918 (Teetz: Hentrich and Hentrich, 2002), 1:361.   5. Plessen Diary, February 22, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; and Robert Kosch to Wife, March 2, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/3.   6. Ludendorff to Moltke, March 12, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Major General Max Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, trans. Eric Sutton (London: Martin Secker, 1929), 1:53; and Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, February 19, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/979.

Notes

 7. Mangold, “Kriegsbriefe und Tagebücher eines Truppenarztes von der Winter Masurenschlacht, Narew und Wilija-Offensive,” BA-MA RH 61/1532; Wilhelm Meissinger, Standhaft und treu! Geschichte des Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments 221 (Oldenburg: Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1925), 70; and Albrecht von Stosch, Das Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 5 1897–1918 (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1925), 159.   8. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1931), 7:253; and Max von Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916: Belgien-Osten-Balkan (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1929), 205.  9. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:298; and OHL, “Beurteilung der Feindlage im Osten durch die Oberste Heeresleitung im Februar 1915,” c. March 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1531. 10. David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 136; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:298; and Paul Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014), 222. 11. Jürgen Siehr, 8. Rheinisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 70 im Kriege 1914–1918 (Saarbrücken: Druck und Verlag der Saarbrücken Druckerei, 1929), 63; Adolf Seneca, Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 2. Unterelsassichen FeldartillerieRegiments Nr. 67 (Karlsruhe: Sudwestdeutsche Druck und Verlagsgesellschaft, 1935), 92; Mangold, “Kriegsbriefe und Tagebücher eines Truppenarztes von der Winter Masurenschlacht, Narew und Wilija-Offensive,” BA-MA RH 61/1532; and General der Infanterie Karl Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag R. Eisenschmidt, 1927), 1:362. 12. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:299; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:364; Major General Sir Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917 (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1921), 1:259; and Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 119. 13. Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 229; Heinrich Plickert, Das 2. Ermländische Infanterie Regiment Nr. 151 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1929), 112–113; and Stosch, Das GardeGrenadier-Regiment Nr. 5 1897–1918, 164–165. 14. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:265; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 224. 15. Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 251; Major Wagner, Reserve Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 58 (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1923), 15; Kosch to Wife, March 22, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/3; Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 119; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 137. 16. Fuhrmann, Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra, 87. 17. W. A. Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag von Reimar Hobbing, 1924), 403; Fuhrmann, Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra, 88; and Karl Heinecke and Bruno Bethge, Das

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Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 263 in Ost und West (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1926), 32. 18. Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 252; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:377; Kosch to Wife, April 2, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/3; and David R. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” in Military Effectiveness, Volume 1: The First World War, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 311. 19. Hans Martens and Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4 (Berlin: Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1929), 138; Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischen Uhlanen Regiments Nr. 12 (Berlin: Bernard und Graefe, 1931), 106; Lieutenant Colonel Osterroht and Captain Herrmann, Geschichte des Dragoner-Regiments Prinz Albrecht von Preussen (Litthauisches) Nr. 1 1717–1919 (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1930), 131; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:109. 20. Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:52; Ludendorff to Moltke, March 12, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; and Kosch to Wife, March 6, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/3. 21. Ludendorff to Moltke, April 5, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; and Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:53. 22. Hoffman, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:58; and Kosch to Wife, March 12, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/3. 23. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:282–283; James Goldrick, Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914– February 1915 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 226–227; Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1919), 138; and Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 29. 24. David R. Dorondo, Riders of the Apocalypse: German Cavalry and Modern Warfare, 1870–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 65; and Max von Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915 (Berlin: Verlag E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1924), 4. 25. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:457; Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 5; and Ludwig Freiherr von Gebsattel, Das K.B. 1. Ulanen-Regiment “Kaiser Wilhelm II König von Preussen” (Augsburg: Im Verlag der Buch und Kunstdruckerei I. P. Himmer, 1924), 87. 26. Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 11; Josef von Tannstein, Übersicht über die Tätigkeit des K.B. 1. Schweren Reiter Regiments Prinz Karl von Bayern im Kriege 1914/18 (Munich: Ebersberg, 1921), 28; Martens and Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4, 114; and Gebsattel, Das K.B. 1. Ulanen-Regiment “Kaiser Wilhelm II König von Preussen,” 89. 27. Ludendorff to Moltke, April 27, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Heinecke and Bethge, Das Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 263 in Ost und West, 34; Siehr, 8. Rheinisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 70 im Kriege 1914–1918, 69;

Notes

Gebsattel, Das K.B. 1. Ulanen-Regiment “Kaiser Wilhelm II König von Preussen,” 91; and Seneca, Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 2. Unterelsassichen FeldartillerieRegiments Nr. 67, 102. 28. Siehr, 8. Rheinisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 70 im Kriege 1914–1918, 76; Simon, Feldpostbriefe Jüdischer Soldaten 1914–1918, 1:362; Plickert, Das 2. Ermländische Infanterie Regiment Nr. 151 im Weltkriege, 113; Kosch to Wife, March 17, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/3; Wolf-Rüdiger Osburg, Hineingeworfen: Der Erste Weltkrieg in den Erinnerungen seiner Teilnehmer (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch, 2014), 446; Mangold, “Kriegsbriefe und Tagebücher eines Truppenarztes von der Winter Masurenschlacht, Narew und Wilija-Offensive,” BA-MA RH 61/1532; and Seneca, Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 2. Unterelsassichen Feldartillerie-Regiments Nr. 67, 105. 29. Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), 65. 30. Hubertus F. Jahn, Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 23; Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 119; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 225. 31. Vladimir Mikhailovich Bezobrazov, Diary of the Commander of the Russian Imperial Guard 1914–1917, ed. Marvin Lyons (Boynton Beach, FL: Dramco, 1994), 39–40; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:263. 32. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 220; Yuri Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915 (Jena: Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1925), 441; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 136 and Boris Khavkin, “Russland gegen Deutschland. Die Ostfront des Ersten Weltkrieges in den Jahren 1914 bis 1915,” in Die vergessene Front. Der Osten 1914/15, ed. Gerhard P. Gross (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 75. 33. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 442; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 220–221. 34. Graydon A. Tunstall, Written in Blood: The Battles for Fortress Przemys´l in WWI (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 235–236; August von Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg. Errinerungen aus meiner vierjährigen Tätigkeit als bevollmächtiger deutsche General beim K.u.K. Armeeoberkommando (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 22–23; and Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston, MA: Humanities Press, 2000), 169. 35. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1931), 2:198; Graydon A. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 164; Prit Buttar, Germany Ascendant: The Eastern Front 1915 (Oxford: Osprey, 2015), 132; Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918 (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2013), 316; Carl Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1917), 31; KTB/Süd Army, March 3, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Fritz Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Berlin: Oldenburg, 1924), 85.

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36. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:199; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 171; and Tunstall, Written in Blood, 263. 37. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:200–201; and Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 168. 38. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 164; Tunstall, Written in Blood, 245; and KTB/Süd Army, March 13, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322. 39. Svetlana Palmer and Sarah Wallis, eds., Intimate Voices from the First World War (New York: William Morrow, 2003), 80. 40. Tunstall, Written in Blood, 263. 41. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 143; and Tunstall, Written in Blood, 275–276. 42. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:212; Tunstall, Written in Blood, 276; and Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 316. 43. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:213; Tunstall, Written in Blood, 282–283; and Palmer and Wallis, Intimate Voices from the First World War, 83. 44. Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–191, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 139; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:215–216; and Tunstall, Written in Blood, 288–289. 45. Lothar Höbelt, “‘So wie wir haben nicht einmal die Japaner angegriffen.’ Österreich-Ungarns Nordfront 1914/15,” in Die vergessene Front. Der Osten 1914/15: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung, ed. Gerhard P. Gross (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 100; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:271; and Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 165. 46. Tunstall, Written in Blood, 292–293; Christoph Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, L’viv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2016), 57; and Bezobrazov, Diary of the Commander of the Russian Imperial Guard 1914–1917, 60. 47. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 164; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 169; Herwig, First World War, 139; and Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, L’viv, 1914–1947, 57. 48. Kosch to Wife, February 10, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/2. 49. Richard L. DiNardo, Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 25. 50. Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 218; Geoffrey Wawro, A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 371; Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1976), 184; and Höbelt, “Österreich-Ungarns Nordfront 1914/15,” 109–111. 51. John R. Schindler, “Austria-Hungary in the First World War,” in King of Battle: Artillery in World War I, ed. Sanders Marble (Boston, MA: Brill, 2015), 139;

Notes

and Hans Linnenkohl, Vom Einzelschuss zur Feuerwalze: Der Wettlauf zwischen Technik und Taktik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Bonn: Bernard und Graefe Verlag, 1996), 242. 52. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 170; and Schindler, “Austria-Hungary in the First World War,” 138–139. 53. Palmer and Wallis, Intimate Voices from the First World War, 86–87; William C. Fuller, The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 182–183; S. A. An-sky, 1915 Diary of S. An-sky: A Russian Jewish Writer at the Eastern Front, trans. Polly Zavadivker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 124–125; Mark von Hagen, War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 29; and Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, L’viv, 1914–1947, 43. 54. Fuhrmann, Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra, 99; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 224–225; Bernard Pares, Day by Day with the Russian Army, 1914–15 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915), 160. 55. General Aleksei A. Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 123; Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 86; Franz von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Kronprinz (1. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 1 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1927), 1:144; and Meissinger, Standhaft und treu! 71. 56. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 144; Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 152–153; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:280; Anton Denikin, The Career of a Tsarist Officer: Memoirs, 1872–1916, trans. Margaret Patoski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 251; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2: 224–225; and Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 451. 57. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 144; and Denikin, Career of a Tsarist Officer, 253. 58. Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 134; Fuhrmann, Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra, 105; Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 192–193; and Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 130–131. 59. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow, 190–191; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:252; and Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 185. 60. Kaganeck Diary, April 6, 1915, BA-MA MSg 1/2516; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 143; and Herwig, First World War, 143. 61. Cramon to Falkenhayn, March 24, 1915, 10 PM, BA-MA RH 61/1536; Ludendorff to Moltke, April 1, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:129; and KTB/Süd Army, March 27, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322. 62. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:254; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:131; and Cramon to Falkenhayn, April 6, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536.

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63. Tappen Diary, April 3, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Cramon to Falkenhayn, April 6, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 144– 145; Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 462; and Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 134. 64. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:271; KTB/Süd Army, April 8, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 100; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 165; and Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915, 34–35. 65. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 197. 66. Dominic Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution (New York: Viking, 2015), 331; Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996), 275; Gary W. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914–1918 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985), 65; and Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 318. 67. Daniel J. Hughes and Richard L. DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2018), 294; Fritz von Lossberg, Lossberg’s War: The World War I Memoirs of a German Chief of Staff, eds. and trans. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Dieter J. Biederkarken, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 132; Germany, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:303–306; and Bavarian War Ministry to Bavarian I, II and III Corps, March 21, 1915, BH-KA File 11/52/2. 68. Falkenhayn to Cramon, and Cramon to Falkenhayn, March 25, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 27. 69. Cramon to Falkenhayn, March 26, 1915, 10 AM, BA-MA RH 61/1536; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:349; and Wilhelm Groener, Lebenserinnerungen: Jugend-Generalstab-Weltkrieg, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1957), 224. Born on November 22, 1867, Wilhelm Groener received his initial commission in 1886. An 1896 graduate of the Kriegsakademie, Groener was assigned to the Great General Staff in 1912. Appointed chief of the Railway Section at the onset of war, Groener was promoted to colonel a month later. Groener spent the rest of the war in a variety of high level staff positions, and in late October 1918, he succeeded Ludendorff as first quartermaster general of OHL. He retired from active military service in 1919 but later served as defense minister in 1932. Groener died on May 3, 1939. Holger H. Herwig and Neil M. Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 170–171; and Short Biographical Chronology, BA-MA MSg 109/10861. 70. Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 174; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 276; and Conrad to Bolfras, April 6, 1915, ÖSA-KA MKSM 78/14. 71. Tappen Diary, April 12–13, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 290; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:356–358; Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, 227; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 29–30.

Notes

72. Tappen Diary, April 14, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:361–362; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:306; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 30. 73. Field Marshal Franz Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, 6th ed. (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1921), 5:791; Gina Grafin Conrad von Hötzendorf, Mein Leben mit Conrad von Hötzendorf: Sein geistiges Vermächtnis (Leipzig: Grathlein, 1935), 132–133; August Urbanski von Ostrymiecz, Conrad von Hötzendorf: Soldat und Mensch (Vienna: Ulrich Mosers Verlag, 1938), 310; and Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 221. 74. Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 12; Wolfgang Foerster, ed., Mackensen: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen des Generalfeldmarschalls aus Krieg und Frieden (Bonn: Wahlband der Buchgemeinde, 1938), 144; and Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 287–290. 75. Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 163, and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 30. 76. Robert T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 132; DiNardo, Breakthrough, 31; Erich von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920), 89; Tappen Diary, April 7, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des preussischen Generals als Kriegsminister und Truppenführer im Ersten Weltkrieg, ed. Helmut Reichold (Boppard-am-Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1986), 61; Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 141; Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, 227; and Ludendorff to Moltke, April 1, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2. 77. August von Cramon and Paul Fleck, Deutschlands Schicksalsbund mit Österreich-Ungarn: Von Conrad von Hötzendorf zu Kaiser Karl (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1932), 102; DiNardo; Breakthrough, 36–37; and Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 150. 78. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 235; Richard L. DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby: August von Mackensen, 1914–1916,” in Arms and the Man: Military History Essays in Honor of Dennis Showalter, ed. Michael S. Neiberg (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 134; and Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 24. 79. Theo Schwarzmüller, Zwischen Kaiser und Führer. Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen: Eine politische Biographie (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995), 82; Short Biographical Chronology, BA-MA MSg 109/10865; and DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby,” 135. 80. Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 75; Schwarzmüller, Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen, 97; Foerster, Mackensen, 125; DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby,” 137–138; and Herwig, First World War, 135. 81. DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby,” 157; Schwarzmüller, Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen, 131; and Wolfram Wette, Militärismus in Deutschland: Geschichte einer kriegerischen Kultur (Frankfurt-am-Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2008), 171. 82. Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 65; and DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby,” 158.

197

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83. Foerster, Mackensen, 93–94. 84. DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby,” 159. 85. Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 109; Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 379; DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby,” 165; and Plessen Diary, June 2, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933. 86. DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby,” 164. 87. August von Mackensen, “Gorlice–Brest Litovsk: Vorgänge und persönlich Eindrücke,” no date, BA-MA RH 61/1539; Foerster, Mackensen, 143; and Schwarzmüller, Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen, 105. 88. Hans von Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, ed. Generalleutnant Friedrich von Rabenau (Leipzig: von Hase und Koehler Verlag, 1938), 23; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 40. 89. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 25–26; Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 316; Major Bullrick, “Die Schlacht bei Vailly. Am Oktober 30, 1914, als Ausgangspunkt für der Erfolge bei Gorlice entscheidener neuer taktische Grundsätze,” Potsdam, February 27, 1920, Nachlass Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/22; Edgar von Schmidt-Pauli, General von Seeckt: Lebensbild eines Deutschen Soldaten (Berlin: Verlag Reinar Hobbing, 1937), 33; and Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, 99. 90. Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 89–90. 91. John Wheeler-Bennett, Wooden Titan: Hindenburg in Twenty Years of German History 1914–1934 (New York: William Morrow, 1936), 17; and B. H. Liddell Hart, Through the Fog of War (New York: Random House, 1938), 26. 92. Dennis Showalter, Instrument of War: The German Army 1914–18 (New York: Osprey, 2016), 47; Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 425. 93. Jakob Jung, Max von Gallwitz (1852–1937): General und Politiker (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1995), 63; and B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War, reprint ed. (London: Cassell, 1970), 197. 94. Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 109; Peter Broucek, ed., Ein österreichischer General gegen Hitler. Feldmarschallleutnant Alfred Jansa: Erinnerungen (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2011), 297; Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866– 1917, 116; Seeckt to Wife, April 27, 1915, Nachlass Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/57; and Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt (Frankfurt-am-Main: Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1967), 52. 95. DiNardo, Breakthrough, 43–46; Christian Stachelbeck, Militärische Effektivität im Ersten Weltkrieg: Die 11. Bayerische Infanteriedivision 1915 bis 1918 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010), 66; Austro-Hungarian VI Corps, “Vorbereitung der Schlacht bei Gorlice-Tarnow,” BA-MA RH 61/1616; and General Alfred Ziethen, “Aus grosser Zeit vor Zwanzig Jahren. Die Durchbruchsschlacht von Gorlice,” Militär Wochenblatt 119, no. 41 (May 4, 1935): Col. 1668. 96. Germany, Reichsministerium, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:367–368; Heinrich Kraft, Der Anteil der 11. Bayer. Inf. Div. an der Durchbruchsschlacht von Gorlice-Tarnow (Munich: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1934), 8;

Notes

Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, 228; and Austria, Bundesministerium, ÖsterreichUngarns Letzter 1914–1918, 2:302.   97. DiNardo, Breakthrough, 47–48; Germany, Reichsministerium, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:373; German Eleventh Army, Special Order Nr. 1, April 24, 1915, BH-KA File 11/43/4; German Eleventh Army, “Die Durchbruchsschlacht in Westgalizien,” c. May 1915, Nachlass Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/24; and General Ernst von Hoeppner, Germany’s War in the Air: The Development and Operations of German Military Aviation in the World War, reprint ed. (Nashville: Battery Press, 1994), 45.   98. Fritz von Unger, Das Königin Augusta Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 4 im Weltkriege 1914–1919 (Berlin: Gebr. Ohst Verlag, 1922), 90; Hans Oskar von Rosenberg-Lipinsky, Das Königin Elisabeth Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Zeulenroda: Verlag Bernhard Sporn, 1935), 138; Hermann von François, Gorlice 1915. Der Karpathendurchbruch und die Befreiung von Galizien (Leipzig: Verlag von K. F. Koehler, 1922), 43–44.   99. Ziethen, “Die Durchbruchsschlacht von Gorlice,” Col. 1629; Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, 136–137; DiNardo, Breakthrough, 50–51; and Linnenkohl, Vom Einzelschuss zur Feuerwalze, 266. Born on August 7, 1858, Ziethen obtained his initial commission in the army in 1882 and enjoyed a successful career in the artillery. Promoted to Generalmajor on January 17, 1914, Ziethen commanded an artillery brigade in the west in 1914, before being assigned to Mackensen’s staff in April 1915. Ziethen later became inspector general of artillery schools, with the rank of Generalleutnant. Ziethen retired from the army with the rank of General der Artillerie and died on February 14, 1944. Short Biographical Chronology, BA-MA MSg 109/10874. 100. Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 14; Schwarzmüller, Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen, 104; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:369; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 291; Cramon to OHL Operations Section, and OHL Operations Section to Cramon, April 27, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 41–42. 101. August von Mackensen Diary, April 26, 1915, Nachlass Mackensen, BA-MA N 39/220; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:116; Foerster, Mackensen, 146; and Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 324. 102. Prince Friedrich of Prussia, Das Erste Garderegiment zu Fuss im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1934), 89; Thilo von Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932), 162; and General A. A. Novikov, “Der russische Nachrichtendienst vor der Gorlice-Durchbruch,” Militär Wochenblatt 119, no. 2 (May 11, 1935): Col. 1671. 103. Novikov, “Der russische Nachrichtendienst vor der Gorlice-Durchbruch,” Col. 1671; Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 469; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 230; Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, 119; and Foerster, ed., Mackensen, 146.

199

200Notes

104. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 224; and Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 442. 105. Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917, 173; and Shanafelt, Secret Enemy, 68. 106. Tappen Diary, April 7, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 29.

Chapter 6: Spring Reversal: May–June 1915   1. Much of this chapter is drawn from Richard L. DiNardo, Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010).  2. Hans von Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, ed. Generalleutnant Friedrich von Rabenau (Leipzig: von Hase und Koehler Verlag, 1938), 123.   3. Quoted in Major General Sir Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914– 1917 (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1921), 1:284.   4. Quoted in Bernard Pares, Day by Day with the Russian Army, 1914–15 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1915), 22.  5. Quoted in Karsten Brandt, Mackensen: Leben, Wesen und Wirken des deutschen Feldherrn (Leipzig: Gustav Schloessmanns Verlagbuchhandlung, 1916), 39.   6. Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, reprint ed. (North Charleston: Jazzybee Verlag, 2016), 83; Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914– 1918 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1919), 109; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1932), 8:108.   7. Max von Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915 (Berlin: Verlag E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1924), 12; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:12.   8. Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 17; Ludwig Freiherr von Gebsattel, Das K.B. 1. Ulanen-Regiment “Kaiser Wilhelm II König von Preussen” (Augsburg: Im Verlag der Buch und Kunstdruckerei I. P. Himmer, 1924), 94; and Paul Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014), 230.   9. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:379; David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 152; Boris Khavkin, “Russland gegen Deutschland. Die Ostfront des Ersten Weltkrieges in den Jahren 1914 bis 1915,” in Die vergessene Front. Der Osten 1914/15: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung, ed. Gerhard P. Gross (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 75–76; Heinrich Kraft, Der Anteil der 11. Bayer. Inf. Div. an der Durchbruchsschlacht von Gorlice-Tarnow (Munich: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1934), 25–27; General Alfred Ziethen, “Aus grosser Zeit vor Zwanzig Jahren. Die Durchbruchsschlacht von Gorlice,” MilitärWochenblatt 119, no. 41 (May 4, 1935): Col. 1630; and Franz Freiherr von Stengel, Das K.B. 3. Infanterie-Regiment Prinz Karl von Bayern 1914– 1918 (Munich: Verlag Bayerisches Kriegsarchiv, 1924), 15.

Notes

10. DiNardo, Breakthrough, 66; Yuri Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915 (Jena: Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1925), 490; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:283; Thilo von Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-GrenadierRegiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932), 171; Hans Oskar von Rosenberg-Lipinsky, Das Königin Elisabeth Garde-GrenadierRegiment Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Zeulenroda: Verlag Bernhard Sporn, 1935), 156; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 152. 11. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:405; Wolfgang Foerster, ed., Mackensen: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen des Generalfeldmarschalls aus Krieg und Frieden (Bonn: Wahlband der Buchgemeinde, 1938), 153; KTB/Bavarian 11th Infantry Division, May 6, 1915, BH-KA File 11/4/1; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 70. 12. Falkenhayn to Conrad, May 6, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Foerster, Mackensen, 155; Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt (Frankfurt-am-Main: Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1967), 53; Tappen Diary, May 7–8, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Plessen Diary, May 8, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; and Falkenhayn to Conrad, May 9, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512. 13. Conrad to Falkenhayn, May 9, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Conrad, May 10, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 161; and Fritz von Lossberg, Lossberg’s War: The World War I Memoirs of a German Chief of Staff, eds. and trans. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Dieter J. Biederkarken, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 146–147. 14. Falkenhayn to Conrad, May 10, 1915, 10:30 AM, BA-MA RH 61/979; Conrad to Falkenhayn, May 9, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Falkenhayn to Cramon, May 11, 1915 and Falkenhayn to Eleventh Army, May 12, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 70–71. 15. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1931), 2:337; Anton Denikin, The Career of a Tsarist Officer: Memoirs, 1872–1916, trans. Margaret Patoski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 258; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 154. Kornilov would become the first Russian general officer to escape captivity in 1916, making him a national hero. Named commander of the southwest front in 1917, Kornilov accepted the fall of the Romanov dynasty but quickly became disillusioned with the provisional government of Alexander Kerensky. Kornilov launched a coup against Kerensky in September 1917, but the effort quickly collapsed. After the Bolshevik coup in November 1917, Kornilov became one of the leaders of the White forces. Kornilov was killed in battle on April 13, 1918, near Ekaterinodar. Holger H. Herwig and Neil M. Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 210–211.

201

202Notes

16. Meier-Welcker, Seeckt, 53; Plessen Diary, May 12, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; Tappen Diary, May 12, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; KTB/Süd Army, May 13, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:426; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 72. 17. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 231–232; and Joseph T. Fuhrmann, ed., The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra: April 1914–March 1917 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 124. 18. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 232. 19. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltrkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:436; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:380; Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 494; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 232–233; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 156; Jamie H. Cockfield, “General Aleksei Brusilov and the Great Retreat, May–November 1915,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26, no. 4 (November 2013): 658; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 73. 20. Conrad to Falkenhayn, and Falkenhayn to Conrad, May 17, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/979; Rudolf Kundmann Diary, May 18, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; Notes of General von Falkenhayn on the Result of the Conference in Teschen on May 19, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/979; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 76. 21. Falkenhayn to Eleventh Army, May 18, 1915, Eleventh Army to OHL, May 18, 1915, Falkenhayn to Eleventh Army, May 18, 1915, Eleventh Army to Falkenhayn, May 18, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Eleventh Army, May 19, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536. 22. Hermann von François, Gorlice 1915. Der Karpathendurchbruch und die Befreiung von Galizien (Leipzig: Verlag von K. F. Koehler, 1922), 126; RosenbergLipinsky, Das Königin Elisabeth Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 178; Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 184; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 77. 23. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 505–506; Cockfield, “General Aleksei Brusilov and the Great Retreat, May–November 1915,” 659; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 156–157; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 234; and Fuhrmann, Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra, 132. 24. François, Gorlice 1915, 139–142; Max Eder, Das Preussische Reserve-InfanterieRegiment 269 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn Verlag, 1937), 60; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:166. 25. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:426–429; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:176; AustroHungarian VI Corps, “Offensive östlich des San, Kämpf bei Wietlin-Wyzocke,” BA-MA RH 61/1616; Foerster, Mackensen, 164; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 78–80. 26. Cramon to OHL Operations Section, Pless, May 26, 1915, Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, May 28, 1915, and Ober Ost to Falkenhayn, May 28, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536. The Entente offensive in the west was a classic case of the grass seeming greener on the other side. See Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 151; and Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, 162.

Notes

27. Tappen Diary, May 30–31, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, 142; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 80. 28. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 238–239; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 160; German Eleventh Army, Report on the Fall of Przemys´l, June 1915, Nachlass Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/24; François, Gorlice 1915, 155; Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, 142; General Aleksei A. Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 508; Cramon to OHL Operations Section, Pless, May 29, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 80–81. 29. François, Gorlice 1915, 163; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:179; KTB/Bavarian 11th Infantry Division, May 29, 1915, BH-KA File 11/4/1; Fritz von Unger, Das Königin Augusta Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 4 im Weltkriege 1914–1919 (Berlin: Gebr. Ohst Verlag, 1922), 108; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 81. 30. German Eleventh Army, Report on the Fall of Przemys´l, June 1915, Nachlass Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/24; Paul Fleck to OHL Operations Section, Pless, June 2, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; Stengel, Das K.B. 3. Infanterie-Regiment Prinz Karl von Bayern 1914–1918, 23; Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 150; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 81–82. 31. Svetlana Palmer and Sarah Wallis, eds., Intimate Voices from the First World War (New York: William Morrow, 2003), 91–92; Kundmann Diary, June 3, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; August von Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg. Errinerungen aus meiner vierjährigen Tätigkeit als bevollmächtiger deutsche General beim K.u.K. Armeeoberkommando (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 18. 32. François, Gorlice 1915, 168; Tappen Diary, June 3, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; KTB/Bavarian 11th Infantry Division, June 3, 1915, BH-KA File 11/4/1; Foerster, Mackensen, 167; and Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston, MA: Humanities Press, 2000), 175. 33. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:346. 34. KTB/Süd Army, April 28, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; and Wilhelm Meissinger, Standhaft und treu! Geschichte des Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments 221 (Oldenburg: Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1925), 73. 35. Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 139; Prit Buttar, Germany Ascendant: The Eastern Front 1915 (Oxford: Osprey, 2015), 232; Conrad to Falkenhayn, May 10, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; and Richard F. Hamilton, and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 176. 36. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:358; Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 139; and Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 233. 37. Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 232–233; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:358–361; Conrad to Falkenhayn, May 10, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Conrad, May 10, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau,

203

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Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 139. 38. KTB/Süd Army, May 11, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322. The Russian 11th Army was redeployed to the front after the fall of Przemys´l, being inserted into a sector between the 8th and 9th Armies. 39. KTB/Süd Army, May 12, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Carl Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1917), 37; Laird M. Easton, ed. and trans., Journey to the Abyss: The Diaries of Count Harry Kessler 1880–1918 (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 686. 40. KTB/Süd Army, May 19, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Franz von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Kronprinz (1. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 1 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1927), 1:176; Fritz Schillmann, GrenadierRegiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914– 1918 (Berlin: Oldenburg, 1924), 106; Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 234; and Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915, 40. 41. KTB/Süd Army, May 23, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915, 42; Easton, Journey to the Abyss, 686; and Meissinger, Standhaft und treu!, 80. 42. KTB/Süd Army, May 30, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Kronprinz (1. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 1 im Weltkriege, 1:184; Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 107; and Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:443. 43. Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915, 45; KTB/Süd Army, June 5, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/322; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 142. 44. Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, 145; Foerster, Mackensen, 171; and Tappen Diary, May 31, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986. 45. Conrad to Falkenhayn, June 2, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Erich von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920), 103; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 177; Falkenhayn to Conrad, June 13, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 86. 46. Tappen Diary, May 31, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Falkenhayn to Eleventh Army, June 2, 1915, BAS-MA RH 61/1536; KTB/Bavarian 8th Reserve Division, June 2, 1915, BH-KA File 8R/1/3; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 87. Born on September 4, 1853, Eugen von Falkenhayn was almost eight years older than his ultimately more famous brother. Commissioned lieutenant on December 15, 1870, Falkenhayn spent the first decade of his service with the cavalry. Promoted Generalleutnant on April 14, 1906, Falkenhayn took command of the 11th Infantry Division. On September 10, 1914, He was appointed commander of the XXII Reserve Corps and promoted General der Kavallerie ten days later. Falkenhayn retired from the army on June 30, 1919, and died in Berlin on January 3, 1934. Short Biographical Chronology, BA-MA MSg 109/10857. 47. Bavarian 8th Reserve Division, Uniforms and Rank Insignia of the AustroHungarian Army, June 9, 1915, BH-KA File 8R/11/1; and Bavarian 8th Reserve

Notes

Division, Extract from the Campaign Experiences of the German Eastern Army, June 1915, BH-KA File 8R/11/1. 48. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:217; German Eleventh Army, Special Orders Nr. 53, June 10, 1915, BH-KA File 11/43/1; Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 187; Rosenberg-Lipinsky, Das Königin Elisabeth Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 183; and Walter Luyken, Das 2. Garde-Feldartillerie-Regiment im Weltkriege (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1929), 88. 49. German Eleventh Army, Order for Aerial Reconnaissance, June 6, 1915, BH-KA File 8R/11/1; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 88–89. 50. Kundmann Diary, June 4, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; AOK to All Armies, June 4, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; John R. Schindler, Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 46–47; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 86–87. 51. Falkenhayn to Conrad, June 2, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; AOK to All Armies, June 4, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; Meier-Welcker, Seeckt, 54; and Foerster, Mackensen, 171. 52. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 241; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:451; and Falkenhayn to Conrad, May 17, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/979. For a short survey on the problem of calculating losses suffered and prisoners taken, see Richard Nachtigal, “Die Kriegsgefangenen-Verluste an der Ostfront. Eine Übersicht zur Statistik und zu Problemen der Heimatfronten 1914/15,” in Die vergessene Front, 201–215. 53. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 159; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:287; Denikin, Career of a Tsarist Officer, 258; David R. Jones, Military Effectiveness, Volume 1: The First World War, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 268; and Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 150–151. 54. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:289–290; Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 511; Christoph Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, L’viv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2016), 32–33; and Mark von Hagen, War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 34–35. 55. François, Gorlice 1915, 189–190; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:218; Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to AOK, June 22, 1915, and Archduke Friedrich to Mackensen, July 3, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 89. 56. François, Gorlice 1915, 195; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:469–470; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 90–91. 57. François, Gorlice 1915, 205; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:222; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 91. 58. Prince Friedrich of Prussia, Das Erste Garderegiment zu Fuss im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1934), 102–103; Bose, Das Kaiser

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Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 188–189; Unger, Das Königin Augusta Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 4 im Weltkriege 1914– 1919, 111–112; Rosenberg-Lipinsky, Das Königin Elisabeth Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 185–186; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:222; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 91–92. 59. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:473; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:224. 60. Foerster, Mackensen, 175; François, Gorlice 1915, 213; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 94–95. 61. Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 152; Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, L’viv, 1914–1947, 58; and Cockfield, “General Aleksei Brusilov and the Great Retreat, May–November 1915,” 664. 62. Plessen Diary, June 19, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; Tappen Diary, June 20, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, 153; Foerster, Mackensen, 176; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:233; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 97–98. 63. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:503; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 98–99. 64. Ludendorff to Moltke, April 27, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 83; Germany, Marine-Archiv, Der Krieg zur See. Der Krieg in der Ostsee (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1929), 2:53; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:110; Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 19; and Josef von Tannstein, Übersicht über die Tätigkeit des K.B. 1. Schweren Reiter Regiments Prinz Karl von Bayern im Kriege 1914/18 (Munich: Ebersberg, 1921), 29. 65. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:112; Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 41; and James Goldrick, Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914–February 1915 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 77–78. 66. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:114; Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 40–41; and Tannstein, Übersicht über die Tätigkeit des K.B. 1. Schweren Reiter Regiments Prinz Karl von Bayern im Kriege 1914/18, 30. 67. Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 41–42; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:115; and Germany, MarineArchiv, Der Krieg in der Ostsee, 2:67. 68. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:117; Tannstein, Übersicht über die Tätigkeit des K.B. 1. Schweren Reiter Regiments Prinz Karl von Bayern im Kriege 1914/18, 30–31; Gebsattel, Das K.B. 1. Ulanen-Regiment “Kaiser Wilhelm II König von Preussen,” 104; and Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 51–52. 69. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:119; Hindenburg to Falkenhayn, May 18, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Gebsattel, Das K.B. 1. UlanenRegiment “Kaiser Wilhelm II König von Preussen,” 107; Tannstein, Übersicht über die

Notes

Tätigkeit des K.B. 1. Schweren Reiter Regiments Prinz Karl von Bayern im Kriege 1914/18, 34; and Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 61 70. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:291; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:131; Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 65; and KTB/Nieman Army, May 26, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/314. 71. Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, May 28, 1915, and Hindenburg to OHL, May 28, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:292 and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:131. 72. Tappen to Falkenhayn, June 7, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 224. 73. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:134; Ludendorff to Moltke, June 18, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; Ober Ost to OHL, June 20, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Max von Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916: Belgien-Osten-Balkan (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1929), 260. 74. A dum-dum bullet is a rifle bullet with notches cut into the head of the round near the tip. This causes the bullet to fragment when it hits its target. 75. Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 261–262; Ober Ost to Tenth Army, June 17, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/79; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:138. 76. General der Infanterie Karl Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag R. Eisenschmidt, 1927), 1:406; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:138; Hans Martens and Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4 (Berlin: Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1929), 149; and Heinrich Plickert, Das 2. Ermländische Infanterie Regiment Nr. 151 im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1929), 120. 77. Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 100–101; KTB/Ober Ost, June 20, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; KTB/Nieman Army, June 20, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/314; Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 172 and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:292. 78. Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, L’viv, 1914–1947, 62; Kundmann Diary, June 23, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918 (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2013), 461; and Foerster, Mackensen, 180. 79. Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, L’viv, 1914–1947, 66–67; Conrad to Bolfras, June 27, 1915, ÖSA-KA MKSM 78; Ludendorff to Moltke, June 18, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; and Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 175. 80. Alison Fleig Frank, Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 188–189; Joshua A. Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 77–78; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 99. 81. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 517. A standard example of the Schlieffen school approach to Gorlice-Tarnow is Wilhelm Groener,

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Lebenserinnerungen: Jugen-Generalstab-Weltkrieg, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1957), 232. 82. Walter Görlitz,ed., The Kaiser and His Court: The Diaries, Note Books and Letters of Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller Chief of the Naval Cabinet 1914— 1918, trans. Mervyn Savill (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), 86; Plessen Diary, June 22, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; Meier-Welcker, Seeckt, 55, Seeckt to Wife, June 28, 1915, Nachlass Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/57; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 100. 83. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 245; and W. A. Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag von Reimar Hobbing, 1924), 414. 84. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 285; Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen, 414; W. Bruce Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution 1914–1918 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 145; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 174. 85. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 512; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:292–293; and Stone Russian Army in the Great War, 165–166. 86. Bavarian 8th Reserve Division, Excerpt from the Campaign Experiences of the German Eastern Army, June 1915, BH-KA File 8R/11/1; Ziethen, “Die Durchbruchsschlacht von Gorlice,” Col. 1629; Robert T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870– 1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 137–138; Andrei Pavlov, “Russian Artillery,” in King of Battle: Artillery in World War I, ed. Sanders Marble (Boston, MA: Brill, 2015), 264; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 172. 87. Austro-Hungarian VI Corps, “Vorbereitung der Schlacht bei GorliceTarnow,” June 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1616; François, Gorlice 1915, 22; General Ernst von Hoeppner, Germany’s War in the Air: The Development and Operations of German Military Aviation in the World War, reprint ed. (Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1994), 44; Ziethen, “Die Durchbruchsschlacht von Gorlice,” Col. 1628; and Richard L. DiNardo, “German Air Operations on the Eastern Front, 1914– 1917,” Essays on World War I, eds. Peter Pastor and Graydon A. Tunstall (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2012), 67. 88. François, Gorlice 1915, 174; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 83. 89. Daniel J. Hughes and Richard L. DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2018), 120. 90. François, Gorlice 1915, 44; Corps Emmich, Special Orders for May 5, 1915, May 4, 1915, BH-KA File 11/44/10; and General A. A. Novikov, “Der russische Nachrichtendienst vor der Gorlice-Durchbruch,” Militär Wochenblatt 119, no. 2 (May 11, 1935): Col. 1671. 91. Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 146; and Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 307. 92. Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 135–136; Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 505; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 162; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 232–233.

Notes

Chapter 7: The Summer of Advance and Retreat: July–August 1915   1. Like the previous chapter, much of this chapter is drawn from Richard L. DiNardo, Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010).   2. German Eleventh Army, Estimate of the situation of the Eleventh Army as of noon, June 15, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536.   3. Quoted in Paul Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014), 256.   4. W. Bruce Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution 1914–1918 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 193; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 246; and Boris Khavkin, “Russland gegen Deutschland. Die Ostfront des Ersten Weltkrieges in den Jahren 1914 bis 1915,” in Die vergessene Front. Der Osten 1914/15: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung, ed. Gerhard P. Gross (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 83.   5. David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914– 1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 192; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 251; Major General Sir Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917 (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1921), 1:294; and Yuri Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915 (Jena: Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1925), 524.   6. Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), 20; Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 518; and Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 168.   7. John Gooch, “Italy during the First World War,” in Military Effectiveness, Volume 1: The First World War, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 166; and John R. Schindler, Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 59.   8. Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston, MA: Humanities Press, 2000), 178; Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1976), 190; and Conrad to Bolfras, June 7, 1915, ÖSA-KA MKSM 78.   9. Fritz von Lossberg, Lossberg’s War: The World War I Memoirs of a German Chief of Staff, eds. and trans. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Dieter J. Biederkarken, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 153–154; Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des preussischen Generals als Kriegsminister und Truppenführer im Ersten Weltkrieg, ed. Helmut Reichold (Boppard-am-Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1986), 70; and Wolfgang Foerster, ed., Mackensen: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen des Generalfeldmarschalls aus Krieg und Frieden (Bonn: Wahlband der Buchgemeinde, 1938), 183. 10. Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 157–158; and Sean McMeekin,

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The Berlin–Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 187. 11. Falkenhayn to Conrad, June 13, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; Edward J. Erickson, Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2010), 136–138; Plessen Diary, July 1, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; Erich von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920), 117; and Richard L. DiNardo, Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 32. 12. Conrad to Falkenhayn, June 14, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R512; German Eleventh Army, Estimate of the Situation of the Eleventh Army as of Noon, June 15, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 106. 13. Tappen Diary, June 20, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt (Frankfurt-am-Main: Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1967), 57; Kundmann Diary, June 23, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; and Foerster, Mackensen, 183–184. 14. Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996), 305; Robert T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870– 1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 146; Tappen Diary, June 28, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Kundmann Diary, June 28, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; Holger Afflerbach, “Wilhelm II as Supreme Warlord in the First World War,” in The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in Imperial Germany, eds. Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 205; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 107. 15. Ober Ost, Memorandum for Meeting at Posen on July 2, 1915, July 1, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1919), 114; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 107. 16. Kundmann Diary, July 2, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; Plessen Diary, July 2, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, reprint ed. (North Charleston: Jazzybee Verlag, 2016), 84; Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 117; and Major General Max Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, trans. Eric Sutton (London: Martin Secker, 1929), 2:108. 17. Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:62; KTB/Ober Ost, July 2, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Kundmann Diary, July 2, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; and Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, July 2, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 18. Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 2:111–112; Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 124; Major Henoumont, “Eisenbahnwesen,” in Die militärischen Lehren des Grossen Weltkrieges, ed. Generalleutnant Max Schwarte (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 313–314; Hermann von François, Gorlice 1915. Der Karpathendurchbruch und die Befreiung von Galizien (Leipzig: Verlag von K. F. Koehler, 1922), 252; Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 176–177; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 108–109.

Notes

19. François, Gorlice 1915, 251; Dennis Showalter, Instrument of War: The German Army 1914–18 (New York: Osprey, 2016), 116–117; Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II, Volume 2: Emperor and Exile, 1900–1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 227; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 108. 20. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1932), 8:384; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1931), 2:583–587; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 110. 21. OHL to Süd Army, July 6, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/316; Fritz Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Berlin: Oldenburg, 1924), 119–120; and Bug Army, Army Order, July 13, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/ 316. 22. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 186; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 176; Foerster, Mackensen, 187; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 112. 23. Conrad to Falkenhayn, July 4, 1915, Falkenhayn to Conrad, July 5, 1915, and Conrad to Archduke Friedrich, July 7, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Prit Buttar, Germany Ascendant: The Eastern Front 1915 (Oxford: Osprey, 2015), 286; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:600; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 112. Born in Munich on December 10, 1852, Felix Graf von Bothmer hailed from a Bavarian military family. After joining in 1871, Bothmer spent his peacetime career in the Bavarian army. Promoted General der Infanterie in 1910, Bothmer commanded the Bavarian 6th Reserve Division and the Bavarian II Reserve Corps in 1914. In 1915, Bothmer commanded an eponymous corps in the Süd Army in early 1915. Appointed to command of the army in July 1915, Bothmer would command the Süd Army until its disbandment on February 3, 1918. He later commanded the German Nineteenth Army in Lorraine and was promoted to Generaloberst. Bothmer retired in November 1918 and died in Munich on March 18, 1937. Holger H. Herwig and Neil M. Heyman. Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 92–93. 24. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:602–605; Kundmann Diary, July 7, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; Conrad to Falkenhayn, July 8, 1915, Falkenhayn to Conrad, July 8, 1915, Conrad to Falkenhayn, July 9, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Conrad, July 9, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Tappen Diary, July 8, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 526; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 112–113. 25. Fritz von Unger, Das Königin Augusta Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 4 im Weltkriege 1914–1919 (Berlin: Gebr. Ohst Verlag, 1922), 120–121; Prince Friedrich of Prussia, Das Erste Garderegiment zu Fuss im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1934), 110; First Lieutenant Helmut Viereck, Das Heideregiment. Königlich Preussisches 2. Hannoversches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 77 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Celle: Druck und Verlag August Pohl, 1934), 204–205; Foerster, Mackensen, 187; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918,

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8:383–384; and David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 165. 26. DiNardo, Breakthrough, 111. 27. Thilo von Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932), 202; Max Eder, Das Preussische Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 269 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn Verlag, 1937), 91; Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81; François, Gorlice 1915, 201; Plessen Diary, August 19, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 113–114. 28. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:382, François, Gorlice 1915, 242; Kosch to Wife, June 13, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/4; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 111. François never got beyond corps command. Although an able combat leader, once Hindenburg and Ludendorff formed the third OHL in August 1916, François’s days as a prominent commander were numbered. During his brief stint as commander of the Eighth Army in late 1914, François frequently clashed with Ober Ost. Once in charge, Ludendorff, who raised holding grudges to an art, quickly put François on the shelf. François retired in July 1918. He became one of the many prolific analysts of the war in retirement, before dying in 1933. Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 266. 29. Jakob Jung, Max von Gallwitz (1852–1937): General und Politiker (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1995), 15–18; Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 160; and Showalter, Instrument of War, 118. 30. Max von Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916: BelgienOsten-Balkan (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1929), 269–270; and Herbert Jäger, German Artillery of World War One (Wiltshire: Crowood Press, 2001), 33–34. 31. Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 271; Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 116; and John S. Haller Jr., Battlefield Medicine: A History of the Military Ambulance from the Napoleonic Wars through World War I (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), 158. 32. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:281; Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, July 9, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Tappen Diary, July 10, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:63; John WheelerBennett, Wooden Titan: Hindenburg in Twenty Years of German History 1914–1934 (New York: William Morrow, 1936), 59; Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 272; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 114. 33. KTB/Nieman Army, June 29, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/314; Ober Ost to OHL, July 9, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Max von Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915 (Berlin: Verlag E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1924), 118; Hindenburg to Commander, Baltic Squadron, July 10, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Seeckt to Wife, August 14, 1915, Nachlass Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/58. 34. Heinrich Plickert, Das 2. Ermländische Infanterie Regiment Nr. 151 im Weltkrieg (Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1929), 120; Lieutenant Colonel Osterroht and Captain Herrmann, Geschichte des Dragoner-Regiments Prinz Albrecht von Preussen (Litthauisches) Nr. 1 1717–1919 (Berlin: Verlag Tradition

Notes

Wilhelm Kolk, 1930), 147; KTB/Nieman Army, June 19, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/314; General der Infanterie Karl Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag R. Eisenschmidt, 1927), 1:417; and Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 111–113. 35. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1814 bis 1918, 8:282; Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 276; and Ober Ost to OHL, July 13, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 36. Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 116; Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 276; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:284. 37. Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 277; KTB/Ober Ost, July 13, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 166; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:286–287. 38. Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 279; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:289–290; Douglas Wilson Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917), 65–66; and Plickert, Das 2. Ermländische Infanterie Regiment Nr. 151 im Weltkrieg, 125. 39. Professor Doctor Mangold, “Kriegsbriefe und Tagebücher eines Truppenarztes von der Winter Masurenschlacht, Narew und Wilija-Offensive,” BA-MA RH 61/1532; and KTB/Ober Ost, July 7, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 40. Ober Ost to OHL, July 17, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 41. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:304; and Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War, 66. 42. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:304; and Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 286. 43. Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, July 18, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 129–130. 44. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:389; Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:298–299, 389; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 165–166. 45. Foerster, Mackensen, 189; Norman Franks, Frank Bailey, and Rick Duiven, Casualties of the German Air Service 1914–1920 (London: Grub Street, 1999), 177; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:388; DiNardo, Breakthrough, 118–119; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 168. 46. Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War, 69–70; OHL-AOK Directive for the Conduct of Operations, July 11, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Carl Mönckeberg, Bei Süd und Bug Armee 1915 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1917), 46; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 119. 47. KTB/Cavalry Corps Heydebreck, July 13, 1915, BA-MA PH 8 V/40; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 119. 48. Tappen Diary, July 11, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Kundmann Diary, July 12, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 119. 49. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:626; Foerster, Mackensen, 190; Bug Army to AOK, July 15, 1915, BA-MA PH 5

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II/316; KTB/Bug Army, July 15, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/315; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 121. 50. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:390; Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 121; Eder, Das Preussische Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 269, 92; Bug Army to AOK, July 15, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/316; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 121. 51. Prince Friedrich of Prussia, Das Erste Garderegiment zu Fuss im Weltkrieg 1914–1918, 112; Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 203; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 2:624; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 121–122. 52. Unger, Das Königin Augusta Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 4 im Weltkriege 1914–1919, 125; Hans Oskar von Rosenberg-Lipinsky, Das Königin Elisabeth Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Zeulenroda: Verlag Bernhard Sporn, 1935), 213; Prince Friedrich of Prussia, Das Erste Garderegiment zu Fuss im Weltkrieg 1914–1918, 111–113; Vladimir Mikhailovich Bezobrazov, Diary of the Commander of the Russian Imperial Guard 1914–1917, ed. Marvin Lyons (Boynton Beach, FL: Dramco, 1994), 55; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:392–393; Walter Luyken, Das 2. Garde-Feldartillerie-Regiment im Weltkriege (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1929), 100–101; Viereck, Das Heideregiment. Königlich Preussisches 2. Hannoversches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 77 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 210–211; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 122. 53. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 2:628–629; Tappen Diary, July 17, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; and Kundmann Diary, July 17, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13. 54. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 2:624–625; Prince Friedrich of Prussia, Das Erste Garderegiment zu Fuss im Weltkrieg 1914– 1918, 114; Foerster, Mackensen, 191; Luyken, Das 2. Garde-Feldartillerie-Regiment im Weltkriege, 101; and Meier-Welcker, Seeckt, 59 55. Viereck, Das Heideregiment. Königlich Preussisches 2. Hannoversches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 77 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 213, Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 207; Bug Army to AOK, July 16, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/316; Laird M. Easton, ed. and trans., Journey to the Abyss: The Diaries of Count Harry Kessler 1880–1918 (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 691; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 123. 56. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 166; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 251–252; and Joshua A. Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 83–84. 57. Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, July 20, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 306. 58. KTB/Ober Ost, July 20, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Hindenburg to Falkenhayn, July 21, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 59. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 2:634; Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 300; Foerster, Mackensen, 193; and Kosch to Wife, July 23, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/4.

Notes

60. Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 298–300; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:320; and Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, July 24, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 61. KTB/Ober Ost, July 22, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:313; and Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 300. 62. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:322; Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 302–304; and Gallwitz to Ober Ost, July 26, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 63. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:325; and Plickert, Das 2. Ermländische Infanterie Regiment Nr. 151 im Weltkrieg, 126. 64. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:336–337; Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 302; and Ober Ost to OHL, July 27, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 65. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:326; Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 308–309; Albrecht von Stosch, Das Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 5 1897–1918 (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1925), 204; and Gallwitz to OHL, July 28, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 66. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:408; Foerster, Mackensen, 195; Kosch to Wife, July 25, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/4; Hans von Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, ed. Generalleutnant Friedrich von Rabenau (Leipzig: von Hase und Koehler Verlag, 1938), 178; and Luyken, Das 2. Garde-Feldartillerie-Regiment im Weltkriege, 102. 67. Schindler, Isonzo, 73–74; and Kundmann Diary, July 25, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13. 68. Falkenhayn to Conrad, July 27, 1915, Conrad to Falkenhayn, July 27, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Conrad, July 28, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 2:759; Schindler, Isonzo, 75; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 125. 69. Bezobrazov, Diary of the Commander of the Russian Imperial Guard 1914– 1917, 56; Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 300; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:303. 70. Bezobrazov, Diary of the Commander of the Russian Imperial Guard 1914– 1917, 58; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 259. 71. Khavkin, “Russland gegen Deutschland,” 79; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 253; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 169. 72. Falkenhayn to Conrad, July 23, 1915, and Conrad to Falkenhayn, July 23, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 132; Khavkin, “Russland gegen Deutschland,” 85; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 124. 73. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 2:654; Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:69; Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, July 31, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Johnson, Topography and Strategy in the War, 83;

215

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Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:407–408; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 124. 74. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 2:645; Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 177; Viereck, Das Heideregiment. Königlich Preussisches 2. Hannoversches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 77 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 219; Kosch to Wife, July 30, 1915, Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/4; Foerster, Mackensen, 195; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 125–126. 75. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:403; RosenbergLipinsky, Das Königin Elisabeth Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 229; KTB/Bug Army, July 29, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/315; and Franz von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Kronprinz (1. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 1 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1927), 1:220. 76. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 253; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 181. 77. Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse,. 86; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 253; Philipp Witkop, ed., German Students’ Wartime Letters, reprint ed., trans. A. F. Wedd (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 154; and Easton, Journey to the Abyss, 693. 78. Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon, 156–157; Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse, 92; Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel. Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I: The People’s War (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 268; and Gatrell, Russia’s First World War, 30–31. 79. Conrad to Falkenhayn, August 4, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, ÖSA-KA R 512; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 126–127. 80. Conrad to Falkenhayn, July 21, 1915 (copies to Burián and Bolfras), and Falkenhayn to Conrad, August 4, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Conrad to Bolfras, July 21, 1915, ÖSA-KA MKSM 78; Plessen Diary, August 4, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/933; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 304–305; and Herwig, First World War, 144. 81. DiNardo, Invasion, 32; Conrad to Falkenhayn and Falkenhayn to Conrad, August 5, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, 188; Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 158; and Daniel J. Hughes and Richard L. DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2018), 308. 82. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 175; DiNardo, Invasion, 32–33; Kundmann Diary, July 27, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; and Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 338. 83. DiNardo, Breakthrough, 127; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 85; Ludendorff to Moltke, August 15, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2; OHL to Ober Ost, August 7, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 320. 84. Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, August 5, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 85. Hindenburg to OHL, August 5, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, August 5, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552.

Notes

86. Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, July 24, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 87. KTB/Ober Ost, August 6, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:364; and Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 318. 88. J. Scheibert, ed., Illustrirtes Deutsches Militär-Lexikon (Berlin: Verlag von Pauli’s Nachf., 1897), 506–509; Franz Bettag, Die Eroberung von Nowo Georgiewsk (Berlin: Oldenburg, 1926), 16; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:375; Danilov, Russland im Weltkrieg 1914–1915, 525; Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 181; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 167. 89. Bettag, Die Eroberung von Nowo Georgiewsk, 30–31; General der Infanterie Gustaf von Dickhuth-Harrach, “Die Eroberung von Novo Georgievsk. August 1915,” in Im Felde unbesiegt: Der Weltkrieg in 28 Einzeldarstellungen, ed. General der Infanterie Gustaf von Dickhuth-Harrach (Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1921), 102; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:376; and Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 119. Born on April 27, 1850, Hans Hartwig Beseler joined the Prussian army in 1868. After seeing combat in the Franco-Prussian War, Beseler attended the Kriegsakademie and enjoyed a successful military career. Appointed deputy chief of the General Staff in 1899, Beseler was one of the candidates considered to be Schlieffen’s successor. After Moltke’s appointment as chief of the General Staff, Beseler was ennobled and eventually promoted to General der Infanterie, and he retired from active service in 1910. At the outbreak of war, Beseler was appointed commander of the III Reserve Corps. In September 1914, he was assigned to command the ultimately successful siege of Antwerp. Beseler’s service on the eastern front began in November 1914, when the III Reserve Corps was involved in the Lodz campaign. Herwig and Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I, 85. 90. Dickhuth-Harrach, “Die Eroberung von Novo Georgievsk,” 102; and OHL to Ober Ost, August 7, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 91. Bettag, Die Eroberung von Nowo Georgiewsk, 25; Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 316; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:375. 92. Army Group Beseler, Order of the Day, August 9, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 III/1; Ober Ost to Beseler, August 11, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and DickhuthHarrach, “Die Eroberung von Novo Georgievsk,” 102. 93. Beseler to OHL, August 12, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 316; Bettag, Die Eroberung von Nowo Georgiewsk, 41; Jäger, German Artillery of World War One, 68; Army Group Beseler, Army Order, August 10, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 III/1; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:377–378. 94. Artillery Commander, Army Group Beseler, Artillery Order, August 11, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 III/1. 95. Army Group Beseler, Army Order, August 15, 1915, 6:15 PM, BA-MA PH 5 III/1; Bettag, Die Eroberung von Nowo Georgiewsk, 56; Dickhuth-Harrach, “Die Eroberung von Novo Georgievsk,” 106; and Army Group Beseler to Corps Dickhuth, August 17, 1915, 7:30 AM, BA-MA PH 5 III/1. 96. Bettag, Die Eroberung von Nowo Georgiewsk, 95; Order of the Commandant of Novogeorgievsk, August 20, 1915, 3:30 AM, and Army Group Beseler, Army Order, August 20, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 III/1; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der

217

218Notes

Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:379; and Walter Görlitz, ed., The Kaiser and His Court: The Diaries, Note Books and Letters of Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller Chief of the Naval Cabinet 1914–1918, trans. Mervyn Savill (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), 101.   97. Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 181.   98. Scheibert, ed., Illustrirtes Deutsches Militär-Lexikon, 363; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:1; Knox, With the Russian Army, 191–1917, 1:326; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:474–475; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 175.   99. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:476; and Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:13–14. 100. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:477–478; KTB/Ober Ost, August 9, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:20; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:326. 101. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:479; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:326–327; and Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:24. 102. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:327–328; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 255; Lebenserinnerungen, 2:29; Karl Heinecke and Bruno Bethge, Das Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 263 in Ost und West (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1926), 59; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 187. 103. Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 218; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 128–129. 104. Foerster, Mackensen, 204–205; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:427–428; and KTB/Bug Army, August 18, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/315. 105. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:430; Unger, Das Königin Augusta Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 4 im Weltkriege 1914–1919, 132; KTB/Bug Army, August 26, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/315; and Easton, Journey to the Abyss, 698. 106. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:458. 107. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:458–459; KTB/Ober Ost, July 19, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 158–159. 108. KTB/Ober Ost, August 5, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 164; Josef von Tannstein, Übersicht über die Tätigkeit des K.B. 1. Schweren Reiter Regiments Prinz Karl von Bayern im Kriege 1914/18 (Munich: Ebersberg, 1921), 45; and Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischen Uhlanen Regiments Nr. 12 (Berlin: Bernard und Graefe, 1931), 118. 109. Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 329; Conrad to Falkenhayn, August 14, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; and KTB/Cavalry Corps Heydebreck, August 21, 1915, BA-MA PH 8 V/40. 110. Conrad to Falkenhayn, August 14, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; and German Süd Army to Corps Bothmer, July 4, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/338.

Notes

111. Wilhelm Meissinger, Standhaft und true! Geschichte des Reserve-InfanterieRegiments 221 (Oldenburg: Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1925), 96–97; and Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 329. 112. Conrad to Falkenhayn, August 19, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; General Aleksei A. Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 167; Anton Denikin, The Career of a Tsarist Officer: Memoirs, 1872–1916, trans. Margaret Patoski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 264; and Jamie H. Cockfield, “General Aleksei Brusilov and the Great Retreat, May– November 1915,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26, no. 4 (November 2013): 665. 113. The course of the negotiations is covered in DiNardo, Invasion, 33–34. See also Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917, 174. 114. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 170; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:594; Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 186; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 256. 115. Danilov, Russland im Weltkrieg 1914–1915, 518; Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, 188; and Khavkin, “Russland gegen Deutschland,” 85. 116. W. A. Suchomlinow, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag von Reimar Hobbing, 1924), 414–415; William C. Fuller, The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 150–183; Eric Lohr, “The Russian Army and the Jews: Mass Deportations, Hostages and Violence during World War I,” Russian Review 60, no. 3 (July 2001): 415; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 135–136. 117. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 255. 118. Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon, 159; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 256; and Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:330. 119. Conrad to Falkenhayn, May 17, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/979; Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 103; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 177; Falkenhayn to Conrad, June 13, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; Ober Ost to Falkenhayn, July 21, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Ludendorff to Moltke, August 15, 1915, Nachlass Ludendorff, BA-MA N 77/2. 120. Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 176–177; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 138. On the problem of executing a large scale encirclement, see Richard L. DiNardo, “The Limits of Envelopment: The Invasion of Serbia, 1915,” Historian 78, no. 3 (Fall 2016): 486–503. 121. Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front, 54–55; Seeckt to Wife, August 14, 1915, Nachlass Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/58; and Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, August 5, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 122. Ober Ost to OHL, August 4, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, August 24, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Jesse Kauffman, Elusive Alliance: The German Occupation of Poland in World War I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 30. 123. Christoph Mick, Lemberg, Lwów, L’viv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2016), 64–65;

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Alison Fleig Frank, Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 188–190; Gary W. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914–1918 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985), 70; and Kauffman, Elusive Alliance, 32. 124. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 176–177; Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon, 145–146; Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 256; and Ober Ost to OHL, August 27, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 125. Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, August 31, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552.

Chapter 8: Action on the Flanks: September–October 1915  1. Joseph T. Fuhrmann, ed., The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 177.   2. General der Infanterie Karl Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag R. Eisenschmidt, 1928), 2:55.   3. Anton Denikin, The Career of a Tsarist Officer: Memoirs, 1872–1916, trans. Margaret Patoski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 270.   4. KTB/Ober Ost, September 21, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552.  5. OHL, Military Convention between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria, September 6, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 I/78; Richard L. DiNardo, Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 34; and Theo Schwarzmüller, Zwischen Kaiser und Führer. Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen: Eine politische Biographie (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995), 121–122.   6. Wolfgang Foerster, ed., Mackensen: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen des Generalfeldmarschalls aus Krieg und Frieden (Bonn: Wahlband der Buchgemeinde, 1938), 208; Hans von Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, ed. Generalleutnant Friedrich von Rabenau (Leipzig: von Hase und Koehler Verlag, 1938), 216–217; KTB/Ober Ost, September 10, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1938), 8:518.   7. Thilo von Bose, Das Kaiser Alexander Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 1 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1932), 218; Prince Friedrich of Prussia, Das Erste Garderegiment zu Fuss im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1934), 119; and Richard L. DiNardo, Breakthrough: The GorliceTarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 130.   8. Kosch to Wife, September 3, 1915, and Mackensen to X Reserve Corps, September 3, 1915 Nachlass Kosch, BA-MA N 754/4.   9. DiNardo, Invasion, 43–48; and Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 9:207–208. 10. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1932), 3:188; Conrad to Falkenhayn, and Falkenhayn to Conrad, September 10, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512;

Notes

Erich von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920), 169; and DiNardo, Invasion, 37. 11. David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 173; Paul Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014), 252; and Major General Sir Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917 (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1921), 1:332. Born on November 15, 1857, in Tver Province, Alekseev was the son of an officer who had risen from the enlisted ranks. Alekseev, a graduate of the Moscow Infantry Cadet School, also served in the Russo-Turkish War in 1877. He attended the General Staff Academy and later served in high-ranking positions. He was also one of the few high-ranking officers to emerge from the Russo-Japanese War with an intact reputation. Holger H. Herwig and Neil M. Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 66. 12. David R. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” in Military Effectiveness, Volume 1: The First World War, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 294–295; Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914– 1917, 1:332; and Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 192–193. 13. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:332; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 173. 14. Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 260–261. 15. Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben 1866–1917, 198; Laird M. Easton, ed. and trans., Journey to the Abyss: The Diaries of Count Harry Kessler 1880–1918 (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 699; and Max von Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916: Belgien-Osten-Balkan (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1929), 364. 16. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917, 1:331; Vladimir Mikhailovich Bezobrazov, Diary of the Commander of the Russian Imperial Guard 1914–1917, ed. Marvin Lyons (Boynton Beach, FL: Dramco, 1994), 58; Daniel J. Hughes and Richard L. DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2018), 99; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 173. 17. DiNardo, Breakthrough, 131; and Dominic Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution (New York: Viking, 2015), 347. 18. Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918 (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2013), 467; and Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 150. 19. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 3:74. 20. Herwig, First World War, 150; and Prit Buttar, Germany Ascendant: The Eastern Front 1915 (Oxford: Osprey, 2015), 330. 21. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 3:51–52; and Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 330.

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22. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 3:59–60; Herwig, First World War, 150; Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 332; and KTB/Süd Army, September 3, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/323. 23. Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 469; Herwig, First World War, 150; and Conrad to Falkenhayn, and Falkenhayn to Conrad, September 10, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, ConradFalkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512. 24. Conrad to Falkenhayn, September 5, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Conrad, September 7, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; KTB/Cavalry Corps Heydebreck, August 31, 1915, BA-MA PH 8 V/40; Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 224; Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 3:97–98; and KTB/Süd Army, September 7, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/323. 25. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 3:104–105; KTB/Süd Army, September 9, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/323; Kundmann Diary, September 9, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; and Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 343. 26. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 3:108; KTB/Süd Army, September 12, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/323; and Kundmann Diary, September 12, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13. 27. Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 168–169; Kundmann Diary, September 14, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13; Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 343; and KTB/Süd Army, September 18, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/323. 28. General Aleksei A. Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 179; Denikin, Career of a Tsarist Officer, 265–266; and Jamie H. Cockfield, “General Aleksei Brusilov and the Great Retreat, May– November 1915,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26, no. 4 (November 2013): 668–669. 29. KTB/Bug Army, September 17, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/315; and Falkenhayn to Conrad, September 18, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512. 30. Falkenhayn to Linsingen, September 8, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/316; and Falkenhayn to Linsingen, September 18, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 I/84. 31. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 3:155–156; Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 182–183; and Cockfield, “General Aleksei Brusilov and the Great Retreat, May–November 1915,” 669. 32. Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 183; Cockfield, “General Aleksei Brusilov and the Great Retreat, May–November 1915,” 670; and Army Group Linsingen to Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, September 25, 1915, PA-MA PH 5 I/87. 33. Herwig, First World War, 151; Cramon to Falkenhayn, October 16, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; and Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 475. 34. Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 351; Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 475–476; and Kundmann Diary, September 14, 1915, Conrad Archive, ÖSA-KA B/13.

Notes

35. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:498; and Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 130. There were no permanently established corps-level headquarters for cavalry. On mobilization, two divisions were organized into a temporary organization designated as a Heeres Kavallerie Kommando (HKK). Sometimes they would be organized into eponymous units, such as Cavalry Corps Schmettow. Edgar Graf von Matauschka, “Organisationsgeschichte des Heeres 1890–1918,” in Deutsche Militärgeschichte 1648–1939, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Munich: Bernard und Graefe, 1983), 3:167. 36. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:505; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 76. 37. Hans Martens and Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4 (Berlin: Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1929), 172; Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischen Uhlanen Regiments Nr. 12 (Berlin: Bernard und Graefe, 1931), 128; and Bavarian 8th Reserve Division, Excerpt from the Campaign Experiences of the German Eastern Army, June 1915, BH-KA File 8R/11/1. 38. Ober Ost to OHL, September 11, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Fritz von Lossberg, Lossberg’s War: The World War I Memoirs of a German Chief of Staff, eds. and trans. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Dieter J. Biederkarken, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 158–159; and KTB/Ober Ost, September 12, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. Falkenhayn’s concerns proved justified. On September 21, 1915, the French opened an artillery bombardment of several days’ duration, followed by heavy infantry attacks in Champagne and Artois. The newly arrived X Corps was needed to shore up the German Third Army’s position. Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 188–189; Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 190–191; and Lossberg, Lossberg’s War, 162. 39. General der Infanterie Karl Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag R. Eisenschmidt, 1928), 2:50; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:494–495; and KTB/Ober Ost, August 30, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 40. Max von Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915 (Berlin: Verlag E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1924), 174–175. 41. KTB/Ober Ost, September 4, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 176. 42. Josef von Tannstein, Übersicht über die Tätigkeit des K.B. 1. Schweren Reiter Regiments Prinz Karl von Bayern im Kriege 1914/18 (Munich: Ebersberg, 1921), 46; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:51; KTB/Ober Ost, September 9, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:500; and Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 185. 43. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:500; KTB/Ober Ost, September 11, 1915, Ober Ost to OHL, September 12, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, September 12, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:51. 44. KTB/Ober Ost, September 12, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:508; Major General Max Hoffmann, War

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Diaries and Other Papers, trans. Eric Sutton (London: Martin Secker, 1929), 1:83; Lieutenant Colonel Osterroht and Captain Herrmann, Geschichte des Dragoner– Regiments Prinz Albrecht von Preussen (Litthauischer Nr. 1) 1717–1919 (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1930), 177; and Tannstein, Übersicht über die Tätigkeit des K.B. 1. Schweren Reiter Regiments Prinz Carl von Bayern im Kriege 1914/18, 47. 45. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 172; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:55; and KTB/Ober Ost, September 18, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 46. KTB/Ober Ost, September 17, 1915, and Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, September 18, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:58. 47. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:515; Heinrich Plickert, Das 2. Ermländische Infanterie Regiment Nr. 151 im Weltkrieg (Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1929), 156–157; and Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:57. 48. Ludendorff to Groener, September 10, 1915, and Groener to Ludendorff, September 11, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 49. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:515; KTB/Ober Ost, September 20, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Martens and Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4, 182–183; Osterroht and Herrmann, Geschichte des Dragoner-Regiments Prinz Albrecht von Preussen (Litthauischer Nr. 1) 1717–1919, 181–182; Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischer Ulanen Regiments Nr. 12, 134; KTB/Ober Ost, September 21, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 172. 50. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:520; Osterroht and Herrmann, Geschichte des Dragoner-Regiments Prinz Albrecht von Preussen (Litthauischer Nr. 1) 1717–1919, 190; Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:83; and Mangold, “Kriegsbriefe und Tagebücher eines Truppenarztes von der Winter Masurenschlacht, Narew und Wilija-Offensive,” BA-MA RH 61/1532. 51. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:523; Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 192; and Hindenburg to OHL, September 20, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 52. DiNardo, Invasion, 38; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:67; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:547; Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915, 213; Martens and Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4, 200; and Osterroht and Herrmann, Geschichte des Dragoner-Regiments Prinz Albrecht von Preussen (Litthauischer Nr. 1) 1717–1919, 199. The course of the Serbian campaign lies beyond the scope of the present work. For those interested, see DiNardo, Invasion, passim; and Buttar, Germany Ascendant, 361–388. 53. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:556; and Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 168. 54. KTB/Bug Army, September 18, 1915, BA-MA 5 II/315; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:578; and KTB/Army Group Linsingen, September 23, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 I/83. 55. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 8:580; KTB/Army Group Linsingen, October 5, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 I/83; Fritz Schillmann,

Notes

Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Berlin: Oldenburg, 1924), 144. 56. KTB/Army Group Linsingen, October 16, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 I/83; Jamie H. Cockfield, “General Aleksei Brusilov and the Great Retreat, May–November 1915,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26, no. 4 (November 2013): 670; Denikin, Career of a Tsarist Officer, 268; and Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 150–151. 57. Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston, MA: Humanities Press, 2000), 179–180; Kaganeck Diary, October 21, 1915, BA-MA MSg 1/2517; and Herwig, First World War, 108. 58. Bavarian 8th Reserve Division, Excerpt from the Campaign Experiences of the German Eastern Army, June 1915, BH-KA File 8R/11/1; Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918, 130–131; Martens and Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4, 193; and Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischer Ulanen Regiments Nr. 12, 134. 59. Gerhard P. Gross, The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger, ed. Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 89–90; Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 192–193; and Dennis Showalter, Instrument of War: The German Army 1914–18 (New York: Osprey, 2016), 68–69. 60. Ludendorff to Groener, September 10, 1915, and Groener to Ludendorff, September 11, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; DiNardo, Invasion, 51–52; and Major Henoumont, “Eisenbahnwesen,” in Die militärischen Lehren des Grossen Weltkrieges, ed. Generalleutnant Max Schwarte (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 314. 61. Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 2:119; Martens and Zipfel, Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments von Schmidt (1. Pommersches) Nr. 4, 199; Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 2:59; and Mangold, “Kriegsbriefe und Tagebücher eines Truppenarztes von der Winter Masurenschlacht, Narew und Wilija-Offensive,” BA-MA RH 61/1532. 62. Gary W. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914–1918 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985); 82; Herwig, First World War, 151; and Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 182. 63. Joshua A. Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 106–107; W. Bruce Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution 1914– 1918 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 188–189; S. A. An-sky, 1915 Diary of S. An-sky: A Russian Jewish Writer at the Eastern Front, trans. Polly Zavadivker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 132; Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), 33; and William C. Fuller, The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 195–196. 64. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 222; and Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon, 242.

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65. Ober Ost to OHL, August 27, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 66. Hermann von François, Gorlice 1915. Der Karpathendurchbruch und die Befreiung von Galizien (Leipzig: Verlag von K.F. Koehler, 1922), 48; DiNardo, Breakthrough, 55; Ober Ost to OHL, August 27, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; Franz von Gottberg, Das Grenadier-Regiment Kronprinz (1. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 1 im Weltkriege (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1927), 1:238; KTB/Süd Army, September 7, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/323; Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 150–151; and Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischer Ulanen Regiments Nr. 12, 134. 67. Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 168–169; Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1976), 186; and KTB/Ober Ost, September 21, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 68. Denikin, Career of a Tsarist Officer, 270; Adolf Seneca, Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 2. Unterelsassichen Feldartillerie-Regiments Nr. 67 (Karlsruhe: Sudwestdeutsche Druck und Verlagsgesellschaft, 1935), 185; Otto Meienborn and Walther Goebel, Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 251 (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn, 1930), 78; and Wilhelm Meissinger, Standhaft und true! Geschichte des Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments 221 (Oldenburg: Verlag Gerhard Stalling, 1925), 110.

Chapter 9: Aftermath and Assessments   1. Walter Görlitz, ed., The Kaiser and His Court: The Diaries, Note Books and Letters of Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller Chief of the Naval Cabinet 1914–1918, trans. Mervyn Savill (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), 114.  2. Quoted in Jesse Kauffman, Elusive Alliance: The German Occupation of Poland in World War I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 44.   3. Kaganeck Diary, April 27, 1916, BA-MA MSg 1/2517.   4. KTB/Süd Army, November 4, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/323; Fritz Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918 (Berlin: Oldenburg, 1924), 164–167; and David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 233.   5. Short Biographical Chronology, BA-MA MSg 109/10859.  6. Schillmann, Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm I. (2. Ostpreussisches) Nr. 3 im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 166; Jürgen Siehr, 8. Rheinisches InfanterieRegiment Nr. 70 im Kriege 1914–1918 (Saarbrücken: Druck und Verlag der Saarbrücken Druckerei, 1929), 127; Karl Heinecke and Bruno Bethge, Das Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 263 in Ost und West (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1926), 75–77; and General Aleksei A. Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 192.  7. Max von Poseck, Die deutsche Kavallerie in Litauen und Kurland, 1915 (Berlin: Verlag E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1924), 213; Major Wagner, Reserve

Notes

Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 58 (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1923), 32; Lieutenant Colonel Osterroht and Captain Herrmann, Geschichte des Dragoner-Regiments Prinz Albrecht von Preussen (Litthauisches) Nr. 1 1717–1919 (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1930), 198–199; Ernst Zipfel, Geschichte des Littauischen Uhlanen Regiments Nr. 12 (Berlin: Bernard und Graefe, 1931), 141; and Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 198–199.   8. KTB/Süd Army, November 19, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/323; Heinrich Plickert, Das 2. Ermländische Infanterie Regiment Nr. 151 im Weltkrieg (Oldenburg: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1929), 169; Heinecke and Bethge, Das Reserve-InfanterieRegiment Nr. 263 in Ost und West, 80; and Simon Hermann, ed., Feldpostbriefe Jüdischer Soldaten 1914–1918 (Teetz: Hentrich and Hentrich, 2002), 2:409.   9. Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918 (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2013), 467; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 176. 10. Florence Farmborough, With the Armies of the Tsar: A Nurse at the Russian Front 1914–18 (New York: Stein and Day, 1975), 114; Vladimir Mikhailovich Bezobrazov, Diary of the Commander of the Russian Imperial Guard 1914–1917, ed. Marvin Lyons (Boynton Beach, FL: Dramco, 1994), 60; X Reserve Corps, Special Orders, October 4, 1915, BA-MA PH 6 II/79; and Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel. Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I: The People’s War (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 384–385. 11. Farmborough, With the Armies of the Tsar, 114; Bezobrazov, Diary of the Commander of the Russian Imperial Guard 1914–1917, 60; and Bug Army Rear Area, Search Bulletin Nr. 2, December 9, 1915, BA-MA PH 5 II/319. For details on the story of Erich Killinger, see Dwight R. Messimer, Eleven Months to Freedom: A German POW’s Unlikely Escape from Siberia in 1915 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), passim. 12. Richard L. DiNardo, Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 26; Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1976), 212; and Jesse Kauffman, Elusive Alliance: The German Occupation of Poland in World War I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 68–69. 13. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 174; Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), 77; and Joshua A. Sanborn, Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 108. 14. W. Bruce Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution 1914–1918 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 161–162; and Dominic Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution (New York: Viking, 2015), 347. 15. Cramon to Falkenhayn, March 26, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; Tappen Diary, March 31, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; and August von Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg. Errinerungen aus meiner vierjährigen Tätigkeit als bevollmächtiger deutsche General beim K.u.K. Armeeoberkommando (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 10.

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16. Mackensen, “Gorlice–Brest Litovsk: Vorgänge und persönlich Eindrücke.” BA-MA RH 61/1539. 17. Watson, Ring of Steel, 262–263; Fritz Fischer, Germany’s War Aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1967), 116; and Daniel J. Hughes and Richard L. DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2018), 298. 18. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 46; Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1919), 138; and Seeckt to Wife, August 14, 1915, Nachlass Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/58. 19. Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, August 5, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552; and Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996), 221. 20. Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, August 5, 1915, and Hindenburg to OHL, August 5, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 21. Kauffman, Elusive Alliance, 33–34; Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 341; and Gary W. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy: AustriaHungary and the German Alliance, 1914–1918 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985), 71–72. The matter of German occupation policies in Poland and Lithuania, let alone ultimate war aims, is beyond the scope of the present work. Readers are urged to consult the already mentioned works by Kauffman, Fischer, and Liulevicius. 22. Erich von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914– 1916 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920), 169; Cramon to Falkenhayn, October 16, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; and Richard L. DiNardo, Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 37. 23. Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 45; Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 161; and DiNardo, Invasion, 128. 24. Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 346; Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburger Monarchie 1914–1918, 524; Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston, MA: Humanities Press, 2000), 182; and Herwig, First World War, 161. 25. Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 44–45; Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); 251; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 234. 26. Herwig, First World War, 161; Kaganeck Diary, April 27, 1916, BA-MA MSg 1/2517; and Günther Kronenbitter, “Von ‘Schweinhunden’ und ‘Waffenbrüdern.’ Der Koalitionskrieg der Mittelmachte 1914/15 zwischen Sachzwang und Ressentiment,” in Die vergessene Front. Der Osten 1914/15: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung, ed. Gerhard P. Gross (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 142–143.

Notes

27. See chapter 2. 28. Herwig, First World War, 149; DiNardo, Breakthrough, 131; Falkenhayn to Conrad and Conrad to Falkenhayn, August 4, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; and Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 310. 29. Ludendorff to Groener, September 10, 1915 and Groener to Ludendorff, September 11, 1915, and Ober Ost to OHL and Falkenhayn to Ober Ost, October 6, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1552. 30. General der Infanterie Hermann von Kuhl, Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (Berlin: Verlag Tradition Wilhelm Kolk, 1929), 1:121; and Wilhelm Groener, Lebenserinnerungen: Jugend-Generalstab-Weltkrieg, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1957), 232. 31. Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 178; Dennis Showalter, Instrument of War: The German Army 1914– 18 (New York: Osprey, 2016), 117; and Richard L. DiNardo, “The Operational Implications of Geography, Space and Distance on the Eastern Front, 1914– 1917,” in Geo-Strategy and War: Enduring Lessons for the Australian Army, ed. Peter Dennis (Canberra: Big Sky Publishing, 2015), 75–76. 32. Major General Max Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, trans, Eric Sutton (London: Martin Secker, 1929), 1:62; Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 297–298; Showalter, Instrument of War, 99; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 108. 33. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 176; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 308; and Herwig, First World War, 171. 34. Lothar Höbelt, “‘So wie wir haben nicht einmal die Japaner angegriffen.’ Österreich-Ungarns Nordfront 1914/15,” in Die vergessene Front, 110; and Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1931), 2:271. 35. DiNardo, Breakthrough, 133. 36. Showalter, Instrument of War, 111; Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 294; Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 182; David R. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” in Military Effectiveness, Volume 1: The First World War, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 278–279; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 222. 37. KTB/Tenth Army, February 9, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1596; General der Infanterie Karl Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag R. Eisenschmidt, 1927), 1:326; German Eleventh Army, Order for Aerial Reconnaissance, June 6, 1915, BH-KA File 8R/11/1; Bavarian 8th Reserve Division, Excerpt from the Campaign Experiences of the German Eastern Army, June 1915, BH-KA File 8R/11/1; and Richard L. DiNardo, “German Air Operations on the Eastern Front, 1914–1917,” in Essays on World War I, eds. Peter Pastor and Graydon A. Tunstall (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2012), 68. 38. Major General Sir Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914–1917 (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1921), 1:230.

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39. Austria, Bundesministerium, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914–1918, 2:489; Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1932), 8:231; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 83. 40. General Alfred Ziethen, “Aus grosser Zeit vor Zwanzig Jahren. Die Durchbruchsschlacht von Gorlice,” Militär Wochenblatt 119, no. 41 (May 4, 1935): Col. 1629; Boris Khavkin, “Russland gegen Deutschland. Die Ostfront des Ersten Weltkrieges in den Jahren 1914 bis 1915,” in Die vergessene Front, 79; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 50. 41. Litzmann, Lebenserinnerungen, 1:329; Hermann von François, Gorlice 1915. Der Karpathendurchbruch und die Befreiung von Galizien (Leipzig: Verlag von K. F. Koehler, 1922), 43–44; Captain Schering, “Nachrichtenwesen,” in Die militärischen Lehren des Grossen Weltkrieges, ed. Generalleutnant Max Schwarte (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 359–360; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 140. 42. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:310; and S. A. An-sky, 1915 Diary of S. An-sky: A Russian Jewish Writer at the Eastern Front, trans. Polly Zavadivker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 42. 43. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:306; Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 201; Prit Buttar, Russia’s Last Gasp: The Eastern Front 1916–17 (Oxford: Osprey, 2016), 77; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 233. It is interesting to note that the 7th Army’s attack, commanded by Shcherbachev, receives far more attention in Russian-focused publications. The attack barely rated a mention in either the German or the Austrian official history. 44. Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 223; Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:307–308; and Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 236–237. Although OHL was better organized than Stavka, it too could get bogged down in blizzards of paperwork. See Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 333. 45. Alison Fleig Frank, Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 188; Kauffman, Elusive Alliance, 32; and Mark von Hagen, War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 59. 46. Richard F. Hamilton, and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 176. Falkenhayn’s explanation in his memoirs about keeping lines of communication open with the outside world as the reason for not declaring war on Italy is rather unconvincing. Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 106–107. 47. Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 285. The Italian front, also long ignored, has also recently been the subject of several studies. The best is John R. Schindler, Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). 48. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, 192; and Istvan Deak, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 194. 49. Falkenhayn to Cramon, April 4, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; Tappen Diary, April 14, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/986; Falkenhayn to Conrad, June 13, 1915,

Notes

BA-MA RH 61/1536; and Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 301–302. 50. DiNardo, Breakthrough, 70; Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 303; German Eleventh Army, Estimate of the situation of the Eleventh Army as of noon, June 15, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 178. 51. Graydon A. Tunstall, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 211; August Urbanski von Ostrymiecz, Conrad von Hötzendorf: Soldat und Mensch (Vienna: Ulrich Mosers Verlag, 1938), 310; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 30. 52. Conrad to Falkenhayn and Falkenhayn to Conrad, May 19, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/979; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 284–285; and DiNardo, Invasion, 32. 53. Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, 180–181; Kaganeck Diary, April 12, 1915, BA-MA MSg 1/2514; and Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 106. 54. Yuri Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915 (Jena: Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1925), 407; Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:292–294; and Paul Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: Supreme Commander of the Russian Army (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014), 236–237. 55. Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 191–192; Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:295; and Robinson, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, 260. 56. Richard L. DiNardo, “Modern Soldier in a Busby: August von Mackensen, 1914–1916,” in Arms and the Man: Military History Essays in Honor of Dennis Showalter, ed. Michael S. Neiberg (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 140; Seeckt to Wife, June 28, 1915, Nachlass Seeckt, BA-MA N 247/57; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 141. 57. Theo Schwarzmüller, Zwischen Kaiser und Führer. Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen: Eine politische Biographie (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995), 122; Wolfgang Foerster, ed., Mackensen: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen des Generalfeldmarschalls aus Krieg und Frieden (Bonn: Wahlband der Buchgemeinde, 1938), 212; and Cramon, Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg, 14–15. 58. Max von Gallwitz, Meine Führer Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916: BelgienOsten-Balkan (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1929), 379; Falkenhayn to Conrad, July 5, 1915, AOK Operations Bureau, Conrad-Falkenhayn Correspondence, Russia, ÖSA-KA R 512; and Prit Buttar, Germany Ascendant: The Eastern Front 1915 (Oxford: Osprey, 2015), 286. 59. Hoffmann, War Diaries and Other Papers, 1:69; and DiNardo, Breakthrough, 139. 60. Germany, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 7:131; and Cramon to Falkenhayn, April 6, 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1536. 61. DiNardo, Invasion, 47; Holger H. Herwig and Neil M. Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 71; and Austro-Hungarian VI Corps, “Vorbereitung der Schlacht bei Gorlice-Tarnow,” c. June 1915, BA-MA RH 61/1616. 62. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 223–224.

231

232Notes

63. Danilov, Russland im Weltkriege 1914–1915, 505; Brusilov, Soldier’s Notebook 1914–1918, 193; and Pritt Buttar, Russia’s Last Gasp: The Eastern Front 1916–17 (Oxford: Osprey, 2016), 62. 64. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War, 223–224; Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” 1:311; Buttar, Russia’s Last Gasp, 246–247; and Stone, Eastern Front 1914–1917, 147. 65. Falkenhayn, German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914–1916, 172–173; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn, 353–354; and Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918, 341–342.

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245

Index

Aircraft, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 57, 62, 72, 76, 84, 87, 93, 97, 100, 101, 105, 112, 117, 118, 119, 120, 126, 127, 139, 140, 154 Albania, 151 Alekseev, General Mikhail V., 8, 29, 74, 118, 119, 122, 124, 126, 129, 135, 146, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159 Alexander II, Tsar, 2 Alexander Mikhailovich, Grand Duke, 47, 48 Alexandra, Tsarina, 23, 28, 92, 107, 133, 136, 149 Alsace-Lorraine, 38 Andersen, Hans-Niels, 136, 152 Angerburg, 58 An-sky, S.A., 45, 155 Army, Austria-Hungary, 4, 24, 39, 40, 41, 42, 51, 53, 55, 76, 77, 79, 97, 98, 103, 110, 112, 136, 153, 154, 156 Army, Austria-Hungary, High Command (AOK), 10, 13, 18, 24, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 51, 56, 67, 76, 80, 83, 86, 87, 90, 91, 98, 99, 112, 120, 131, 139, 144, 150, 151, 157, 159 Army, Austria-Hungary, Units: Armies: First, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 24, 37, 56, 111, 112, 117, 118, 128, 136, 138, 139; Second, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20, 55, 75, 78, 79, 80, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100,

104, 107, 109, 111, 137, 138, 159; Third, 7, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 36, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 67, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 104, 151; Fourth, 7, 14, 15, 17, 18, 55, 75, 77, 82, 87, 90, 91, 92, 94, 98, 99, 104, 107, 109, 111, 112, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 128, 136, 137, 138, 139, 144; Fifth, 7, 10, 98; Sixth, 7, 10; Seventh, 95, 96, 97, 109, 111, 112, 129, 137, 138, 146 Army Groups, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 137 Brigades: 12th, 36; 131st, 36 Corps: I, 117; II, 112; III, 55, 96; IV, 7, 100, 103; V, 54; VI, 75, 86, 92, 94, 99, 112, 118, 122, 128, 159; VII, 7, 54, 55; VIII, 7, 112; IX, 7; X, 55, 80, 112, 159; XII, 121, 159; XIII, 7; XIV, 100, 112, 120; XV, 7; XVI, 7; XVII, 99, 138; XVIII, 54 Divisions, Cavalry: 4th, 117; 5th, 36; 10th, 36; 11th, 117, 137; 11th Hungarian, 94 Divisions, Infantry: 12th, 75; 15th, 24; 19th, 36; 39th Honved, 75; 55th, 36 Groups: Hofmann, 36, 138; Marschall, 96; Pflanzer-Baltin, 36, 52, 54, 56, 91, 92, 95; Puhallo, 54; Szurmay, 54, 55 Regiments, 28th Infantry, 79

248Index

Army, Germany, 23, 32, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 57, 153, 154 Army, Germany, High Command (OHL), 8, 9, 12, 14, 17, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 53, 56, 70, 73, 81, 85, 87, 90, 91, 94, 95, 98, 108, 109, 112, 114, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 127, 130, 131, 134, 139, 142, 143, 145, 150, 151, 152, 155, 158, 160 Army, Germany, Units: Armies: Second, 9; Eighth, 6, 8, 9, 12, 22, 23, 44, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 85, 89, 102, 115, 116, 119, 120, 124, 140, 141, 142, 143; Ninth, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 37, 57, 58, 67, 80, 83, 89, 102, 116, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 150; Tenth, 17, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 70, 102, 110, 124, 126, 128, 140, 141, 143; Eleventh, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 95, 97, 99, 104, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 134, 158; Twelfth, 123, 124, 134, 140, 141, 142, 143, 158; Bug, 111, 112, 113, 117, 122, 128, 137, 139, 144, 147, 158; Nieman, 102, 103, 110, 115, 119, 124, 128, 141, 142, 143; Süd, 36, 37, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 75, 77, 80, 83, 92, 95, 96, 97, 109, 111, 112, 113, 128, 137, 138, 145, 146, 147, 158 Army Detachments: Gallwitz, 67, 70, 113, 114, 120; Lauenstein, 89, 100; Woyrsch, 17, 37, 56, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 150 Army Groups: Gallwitz, 70, 71, 102, 115, 116, 123; Linsingen, 139; Mackensen, 111, 112, 113, 114, 134, 151; Prince Leopold, 123, 124, 128, 143, 150; Westernhagen, 124

Brigades: 3rd Cavalry, 37, 60, 61, 62, 100; 5th Guard Infantry, 61, 64; 9th Cavalry, 95; 9th Landwehr, 71, 72, 127; Pfeil, 126 Corps: I, 6, 8, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 113, 114, 116, 120, 140; I Cavalry, 141, 143; I Reserve, 6, 18, 57, 59, 67, 71, 101, 102, 141; II, 18; III, 85, 108, 134; III Reserve, 18, 140; IV Reserve, 134; VI Cavalry, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 152; VII, 37, 113; X, 86, 92, 94, 113, 118, 120, 140, 141; X Reserve, 113, 120, 134, 148; XI, 10, 13, 114, 115, 119; XIII, 57, 114, 115, 119; XVII, 6, 15, 18, 57, 83, 114, 115, 116, 119; XVII Reserve, 114, 119, 124, 126; XX, 6, 15, 18, 20, 120; XXI, 61, 62, 64, 65, 127, 140, 141; XXII Reserve, 97, 99, 118, 120, 128, 134, 135; XXIV Reserve, 36, 69; XXV Reserve, 17, 18, 23; XXXVIII Reserve, 61, 62, 64, 65, 80, 116; XXXIX Reserve, 61, 62, 64, 65; XL Reserve, 60, 62, 67, 71, 93, 102, 126, 140, 141; XLI Reserve, 86, 99, 109, 111, 113, 118; Alpine, 53; Beskiden, 80, 81, 111, 128, 134; Frommel, 15; Guard, 86, 90, 92, 94, 99, 118, 122, 128, 134; Guard Reserve, 10, 13, 114; Heydebreck, 117, 128, 137; Kneussl, 86, 90, 93; Landwehr, 23, 121 Divisions, Cavalry: 1st, 6, 44, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 128, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146; 2nd, 115; 3rd, 73, 140, 141, 142; 4th, 62, 63, 67, 126; 5th, 111, 117, 139; 6th, 101, 115; 8th, 15; 9th, 140, 141, 142; Bavarian, 73, 100, 101, 142 Divisions, Infantry: 1st, 36, 56, 111; 2nd, 60, 61, 63, 67; 2nd Guard, 113; 3rd, 103; 3rd Guard, 36, 55,

Index

56, 96; 4th, 80; 6th, 134; 11th Bavarian, 86, 90, 94, 111, 134; 22nd, 97, 99; 26th, 134, 143; 31st, 64, 66, 71; 37th, 142; 41st, 103; 42nd, 65; 54th, 119; 56th, 109; 58th, 119; 88th, 42; 101st, 134; 103rd, 134; 105th, 134; 107th, 97, 111, 134; 119th, 90, 94 Divisions, Landwehr: 10th, 61, 64, 65; 14th, 126, 142; 16th, 61, 64, 143; 18th, 15 Divisions, Reserve: 1st, 67; 3rd, 65; 8th Bavarian, 97, 109; 25th, 80, 134; 35th, 15, 80; 36th, 71; 43rd, 97, 134; 44th, 97, 134; 47th, 20; 48th, 36, 56; 75th, 63; 76th, 63, 127; 77th, 62; 78th, 62; 79th, 60, 61, 64, 66, 127; 80th, 60, 61, 64; 82nd, 147 Regiments: 1st Bavarian Uhlans, 73; 1st Grenadier, 56; 1st Guard Infantry, 134; 1st Guard Grenadier (Kaiser Alexander), 85, 128, 134; 2nd Guard Grenadier (Kaiser Franz), 43; 2nd Life Hussars, 83; 3rd Grenadier, 96; 4th Guard Grenadier (Augusta), 94, 113; 4th Uhlans, 59, 103, 143; 5th Guard Grenadier, 59, 70, 71; 9th Field Artillery, 113; 10th Landwehr, 125; 31st Field Artillery, 71; 67th Field Artillery, 73; 70th Infantry, 62, 64, 66; 91st Infantry, 32; 151st Infantry, 71, 103; 221st Reserve Infantry, 66, 70, 95, 129; 249th Reserve Infantry, 70, 71, 143; Guards Cuirassier, 37 Army, Russian, 7, 28, 31, 39, 46, 47, 48, 49, 68, 74, 104, 136, 145, 146, 153, 156 Army, Russian, High Command (Stavka), 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 29, 30, 31, 36, 41, 46, 48, 55, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 74, 78, 79, 87, 88,

249

90, 92, 94, 99, 104, 108, 118, 121, 122, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 146, 147, 149, 155, 157, 158, 159 Army, Russian, Units: Armies: 1st, 11, 12, 13, 22, 57, 64, 67, 70, 71, 101, 116, 119, 129; 2nd, 11, 12, 16, 18, 22, 44, 102, 116, 129, 142, 143, 146, 159; 3rd, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 79, 80, 87, 90, 92, 93, 98, 99, 100, 105, 106, 108, 112, 117, 118, 122, 157; 4th, 11, 16, 22, 48, 108, 112, 117, 118, 119, 129; 5th, 11, 16, 18, 31, 57, 102, 103, 128, 129, 154; 6th, 129; 7th, 147, 155; 8th, 11, 13, 14, 19, 20, 55, 68, 79, 80, 90, 92, 98, 100, 105, 128, 129, 137, 144; 9th, 16, 20, 22, 48, 80, 92, 95, 96, 105, 129, 137, 138, 147; 10th, 16, 58, 60, 63, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 101, 127, 142, 143, 144, 145, 152; 11th, 18, 68, 76, 80, 96, 105, 129, 138, 147; 12th, 31, 57, 60, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71, 74, 101, 108, 116, 120, 129, 141, 143; 13th, 105, 113, 117, 118, 129 Brigades, Cavalry, Ussuri, 115 Corps: I, 12; I Siberian, 58; II, 11, 64; II Caucasian, 105, 142; II Siberian, 71, 90, 108, 113, 122; III, 58, 62, 65; III Caucasian, 74, 90, 94, 98; III Cavalry, 95; III Siberian, 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65; IV Cavalry, 98, 105; IV Siberian, 31, 142; V, 142; V Caucasian, 92, 105, 142; VI, 58; VI Siberian, 108, 112, 113; VIII, 139; IX, 90, 98; X, 90, 98; XII, 93, 139; XIII, 11; XIV, 98, 142; XV, 11, 61, 64, 98; XX, 60, 63, 64, 65, 68, 152; XXI, 92, 93; XXII, 55, 138; XXIII, 11, 70, 105, 121; XXIV, 91, 98; XXV, 112, 130; XXVI, 58, 63, 64, 65; XXVII, 142; XXIX, 105; XXX, 138, 139; XXXI, 113;

250Index

Corps (cont.) XXXII, 95; XXXIII, 92, 95; XXXVI, 142, 143; XXXIX, 139; Guard, 74, 108, 113, 118 Divisions, Cavalry, 2nd, 28 Divisions, Infantry: 3rd Guard, 70; 9th, 90; 11th Siberian, 115, 124; 27th, 58; 28th, 58; 29th, 58; 31st, 90; 48th, 91, 98; 53rd, 58; 56th, 58, 63; 57th, 58, 61; 58th, 124; 62nd Reserve, 70; 63rd, 90, 124; 63rd Reserve, 67; 73rd, 58, 63 Fronts: North, 129, 158; Northwest, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 31, 46, 55, 57, 67, 70, 71, 74, 88, 105, 107, 109, 118, 119, 128, 129, 158, 159; Southwest, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 31, 46, 74, 79, 88, 92, 105, 106, 109, 128, 129, 147, 159; West, 107, 129, 140, 141, 158, 159 Regiments: 1st Siberian, 61; 166th Infantry, 29; Grenadier Guard, 121; Pavlovski Guard, 121 Arz von Straussenberg, Feldmarschallleutnant Artur, 25, 75, 86, 159 Augustowo, 64 Austria-Hungary, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 29, 38, 40, 57, 70, 72, 74, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 88, 95, 96, 97, 103, 108, 122, 123, 131, 133, 135, 137, 145, 149, 150, 151, 155, 156, 157, 160 Austro-Prussian War, 9, 59 Baghdad, 109 Baltic Fleet, Russian, 100 Baltic Squadron, German, 89, 100, 115 Baranovici, 30, 36, 61, 129, 135 Batyushin, Colonel Nikolai, 5, 66 Beck-Rzikowsky, Generaloberst Friedrich von, 2, 4, 5 Becker, Ismar, 42 Belgium, 12

Below, General der Infanterie Fritz von, 62 Below, General der Infanterie Otto von, 59, 62, 63, 67, 74, 86, 102, 103, 128 Berchtold, Leopold von, 6 Berdichev, 129 Berendt, Richard von, 115, 126 Berezina River, 140, 143 Berlin, 8, 19, 21, 36, 42, 57, 69, 81, 82, 85, 151 Beseler, General der Infanterie Hans Hartwig von, 125, 126, 131, 150, 151 Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von, 32, 108, 150 Bezobrasov, General Vladimir, 74, 108, 121, 148, 159 Bialla, 61, 62 Bialystok, 70, 134 Bismarck, Otto von, 2, 3 Blücher, Gebhard von, 84, 86 Bobr River, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 72, 124 Bobrinski, Count Georgi Alexandrovich, 21, 78, 89, 99, 100, 149 Bobyr, General Nikolai, 124, 126 Bock, Major Fedor von, 87 Böhm-Ermolli, General der Kavallerie Edouard Baron von, 17, 20, 75, 76, 77, 80, 90, 98, 99, 100, 103, 137, 138, 159 Bolimow, 57, 58, 67, 83 Bonch-Bruevich, General Mikhail D., 66 Boog, Generalmajor Adolf von, 54 Boroevic´, General der Infanterie Svetozar, 25, 52, 53, 54, 56, 93, 98, 159 Bothmer, General der Infanterie Felix Graf von, 112, 113, 138, 140 Breslau, 19, 113 Brest Litovsk, 107, 109, 124, 127, 128, 132, 133 Britain, 33, 109, 123, 160

Index

Brody, 79, 129 Brusilov, General Alexei, 13, 14, 15, 19, 22, 48, 53, 68, 79, 90, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 105, 106, 128, 129, 137, 139, 144, 145, 146, 155, 156, 159 Brzesko, 87 Brzeziny, 18 Budapest, 74 Bug River, 1, 5, 107, 109, 111, 117, 120, 121, 128 Bulgakov, General Pavel, 60, 63, 64, 65 Bulgaria, 2, 38, 81, 88, 93, 123, 129, 132, 133 Burián von Rajecz, István Graf, 122, 147 Bzura River, 18, 19 Caprivi, Leo von, 3 Carpathian Mountains, 14, 20, 36, 38, 41, 52, 55, 56, 59, 67, 68, 69, 74, 77, 78, 79, 81, 88, 90, 92, 95, 96, 150, 153, 157 Chantilly, 151 Charleville, 34, 85 Chartoriski, 144, 146 Cholm, 111, 117 Churin, General Aleksei, 31 Clausewitz, Carl von, 15 Colard, General Hermann von, 103 Congress of Berlin, 2 Conrad von Hötzendorf, Franz Xaver, 35 Conrad von Hötzendorf, Generaloberst Franz Baron, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 46, 52, 54, 55, 57, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77, 78, 87, 88, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98, 103, 108, 123, 128, 130, 132, 133, 136, 137, 139, 140, 144, 145, 146, 156, 157, 159 and the attack at Gorlice, 82 background and early career, 35 and Falkenhayn, 35, 36, 79, 80, 81, 85, 91, 97, 109, 110, 112, 117, 120, 121, 122, 135, 138, 151

251

Conrad von Hötzendorf, Herbert, 13, 103 Cossacks, 47, 72, 78, 90, 101, 117, 142, 144 Cracow, 17, 18, 20, 21, 74 Crailsheim, Generalmajor Freiherr von, 101 Cramon, Colonel (later Generalmajor) August von, 24, 37, 38, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87, 95, 120, 139, 144, 151 Crimean War, 1 Czech Legion, 149 Czernowitz, 56, 68, 96 Danilov, General Yuri N., 8, 19, 29, 30, 31, 46, 106, 130, 131, 136, 149, 157 Dankl, General der Infanterie Viktor Freiherr von, 1, 11, 14, 24, 25, 56 Danube River, 10 Delvig, General Sergei, 94 Denikin, General Anton, 39, 46, 129, 133, 138 Dickhuth-Harrach, Generalleutnant Gustaf von, 124 Dniestr River, 95, 96, 97 Dragomirov, General Vladimir, 93 Drygallen, 62 Dubissa River, 101 Dukla Pass, 52, 53, 54, 67, 79, 91, 96, 157 Dünaberg, 141 Dvina River, 128, 129, 141, 143 Eben, Generalleutnant Johannes von, 114 Eichhorn, Generaloberst Hermann von, 59, 61, 62, 63, 65, 126, 128, 140, 154 Emmich, General der Infanterie Otto von, 120, 122 Epanchin, General Nikolai, 62, 63, 65, 68 Evert, General Aleksei, 112, 117, 119, 135, 142, 159

252Index

Fabarius, Generalmajor Siefried, 147 Fabeck, General der Infanterie Max von, 134 Falk, Generalleutnant Adalbert von, 61 Falkenhayn, General der Infanterie Erich von, 12, 14, 27, 38, 52, 58, 70, 87, 88, 92, 93, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 108, 111, 118, 126, 130, 132, 133, 134, 136, 139, 142, 143, 145, 146, 156, 157 background and early career, 31, 32 and Conrad, 35, 36, 79, 80, 81, 85, 91, 97, 110, 112, 117, 120, 121, 122, 135, 137, 138, 151 and the creation of Ober Ost, 17 and the decision to attack at Gorlice, 82, 83 and Ober Ost, 34, 114, 116, 119, 123, 124, 131, 140, 141, 150, 152, 153 strategic thinking of, 33, 109 Falkenhayn, General der Kavallerie Eugen von, 32, 97, 134 Feist, Sigmund, 42, 69 Ferdinand, Archduke, 98 Ferdinand, Tsar of Bulgaria, 123, 151 Fleck, Paul, 38, 83 France, 1, 3, 4, 8, 12, 38, 97, 113, 123, 146, 149 Francis Joseph, Emperor, 5, 10, 13, 24, 75, 76, 77, 95 Franco-Prussian War, 9, 59, 83, 114 François, General der Infanterie Hermann von, 8, 23, 59, 93, 95, 111, 113 Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 5, 10 Frederick the Great, 23 Friedrich, Archduke, 10, 19, 87, 99, 103 Friedrich III, Kaiser, 3 Friedrich August III, King of Saxony, 102 Friedrichsstadt, 141

Galicia, 7, 10, 11, 15, 19, 21, 22, 24, 36, 40, 48, 78, 79, 88, 91, 94, 97, 100, 103, 104, 106, 108, 124, 149, 150, 155, 158, 159 Gallwitz, General der Artillerie Max von, 67, 71, 84, 86, 102, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 124, 126, 136, 158 Ganchev, Colonel Petur, 129, 133 Garnier, Generalleutnant Otto von, 140, 141, 143, 144 Germany, 1, 2, 4, 7, 23, 25, 29, 31, 82, 88, 97, 108, 122, 129, 132, 133, 136, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 157, 158, 160 Gnila Lipa River, 13 Gomel, 61 Gorbatovski, General Vladimir, 105, 113, 117 Gorlice, 75, 77, 82, 83, 88, 90, 91, 92, 104, 117, 150, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157 Grodek, 99, 100 Grodno, 64, 65, 137 Groener, Colonel Wilhelm, 81, 82, 86, 142, 145, 152, 153 Gross, Gerhard, 23 Gulevich, General A.A., 66 Gumbinnen, 8, 23 Gurko, General Vasily, 57 Hague Convention, 102, 148 Halle, 83 Heeringen, General der Infanterie Josias von, 32 Hell, Colonel Emil, 61 Helmhein, Feldmarschallleutnant Heinrich Tschurtschentaler von, 54 Heydebreck, Generalleutnant Ernst von, 117, 139 Hindenburg, Generalfeldmarschall Paul von, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24, 30, 34, 44, 58, 66, 68,

Index

70, 72, 73, 83, 85, 86, 101, 103, 104, 110, 111, 114, 115, 116, 119, 123, 124, 126, 130, 140, 142, 143, 144, 150, 152, 158 threat of resignation, 37, 111, 153 Hofer, Feldmarschallleutnant Anton, 38 Hoffmann, Max, 1, 14, 17, 34, 70, 72, 110, 121, 159 Hranilovac, Oskar, 38 Hülsen-Haeseler, Generalfeldmarschall Count Dietrich von, 4 Hungary, 38, 40, 74, 88, 134, 149, 155 Isonzo River, 108, 120, 121, 135 Italy, 30, 38, 40, 52, 56, 74, 81, 88, 93, 95, 96, 97, 108, 123, 156, 157 Ivangorod, 15, 16, 18, 120, 121, 124, 125, 127, 154 Ivanov, General Nikolai, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 30, 31, 46, 79, 80, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 106, 129, 137, 139, 145, 149, 159 Janow, 99 Jansa, Alfred, 86 Jaroslau, 94, 97, 109 Jaslo, 75, 77 Jena, 43 Joffre, Marshal Joseph, 22, 30 Johannisburg, 58, 60, 61 Josefowka, 99 Joseph, Archduke, 20, 54, 118, 119, 139 Joseph Ferdinand, Archduke, 17, 75, 112, 137 Kaganeck, Lieutenant Colonel Karl Graf von, 12, 36, 37, 79, 144, 147, 151 Kaluga, 135

253

Kessler, Count Harry, 16, 51, 56, 96, 118, 136 Kholm, 94 Khovstov, Aleksei, 107 Kiev, 93, 129, 136, 149 Killinger, Erich, 148, 149 Klein Rogallen, 63 Kneussl, Generalmajor Paul Ritter von, 86, 93, 95, 159 Knox, Major General Alfred, 29, 30, 41, 47, 48, 57 Koblenz, 9 Köhler, Otto, 42, 69 Kokoschka, Oskar, 39 Kolakovski, Lieutenant Yakov P., 66 Kolki, 139 Komarów, 12, 24 Kornilov, General Lavr, 91, 98, 148 Korotkovich-Notschevnoi, Colonel, 125 Kosch, General der Infanterie Robert, 51, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 72, 74, 77, 113, 119, 134, 148, 159 Kövess von Kövessháza, General der Infanterie Hermann, 25, 159 Kovno, 63, 65, 102, 110, 111, 114, 116, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 140, 142, 152 Krásnik, 11, 12, 24, 48, 112 Krasnostaw, 118 Krauss, Feldmarschallleutnant Rudolf, 87 Krautwald von Annaue, Feldmarschallleutnant Josef Ritter von, 80, 159 Kritek, General der Infanterie Karl, 99 Krobatin, Alexander, 20, 144 Kuhl, Generalleutnant Hermann von, 134, 153 Kundmann, Lieutenant Colonel Rudolf, 19, 77, 138, 139, 144 Kusmanek von Burgneustädten, Feldmarschallleutnant Hermann, 18, 52, 55, 75, 76, 77

254Index

Lake Naroch, 155 Latvia, 115 Lauenstein, Generalleutnant Otto Freiherr von, 62, 101 League of the Three Emperors, 2 Lechitsky, General Platon, 95, 96, 138 Lemberg, 15, 21, 76, 77, 78, 79, 89, 92, 97, 98, 100, 103, 105, 106, 108, 109, 117, 149, 159 Leopold, Prince of Bavaria, 102, 120 Lesh, General Leonid, 93, 98, 99, 100, 105, 112, 121 Libau, 73, 89, 100, 101, 102 Liddell-Hart, B.H., 86 Liege, 9 Liegnitz, 9 Linsingen, General der Infanterie Alexander von, 36, 37, 52, 53, 54, 56, 80, 83, 96, 112, 113, 117, 139, 140, 143, 144, 158 Lithuania, 100, 101, 102, 115, 119, 126, 131, 133, 140, 145, 149, 150 Litvinov, General Alexander, 57 Litzmann, General der Infanterie Karl, 60, 61, 64, 71, 126, 127, 133, 141, 142, 144, 159 Lochow, General der Infanterie Ewald von, 108 Lodz, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 83, 84, 85 Lomsha, 69, 71 Lossberg, Colonel Fritz von, 34 Lötzen, 20, 58, 62, 63, 110, 114 Lubki, 49 Lublin, 111, 117, 131 Ludendorff, General der Infanterie Erich, 9, 12, 14, 18, 19, 27, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 51, 58, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 83, 84, 85, 86, 102, 103, 104, 110, 111, 114, 115, 116, 119, 123, 126, 130, 131, 140, 142, 144, 145, 150, 152, 153, 158 Lupkov Pass, 52, 53, 54, 67 Lutsk, 136, 137, 138, 139

Lüttwitz, Generalleutnant Walter Freiherr von, 113 Lyck, 62, 64 Mackensen, Generalfeldmarschall August von, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 38, 45, 57, 77, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 127, 128, 129, 130, 134, 139, 146, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159 Marquard, Colonel Gottfried, 134 Marschall, Generalleutnant Wolf Freiherr von, 96 Marwitz, General der Kavallerie Georg von der, 80, 159 Masurian Lakes, 19, 22, 58, 59, 66, 68, 70, 73, 80, 104, 114, 152, 154, 157, 158 Memel, 100 Metz, 113 Mézières, 34, 106 Mezölaborcz, 52, 55, 68, 78 Miasoedov, Lieutenant Colonel Sergei N., 65, 68, 78, 104, 149 Minsk, 110, 111, 143 Mitau, 101, 128 Mogilev, 129, 135, 158 Moltke, Generalfeldmarschall Helmuth von, 2, 4, 12, 23 Moltke, Generaloberst Helmuth von, 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 19, 23, 32, 34, 37, 44, 70 Montenegro, 151 Morgen, Generalleutnant Curt von, 18 Moscow, 122 Müller, Admiral Georg Alexander von, 147 Narew River, 5, 12, 67, 70, 71, 72, 113, 115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 126

Index

Naumann, Friedrich, 150 Neu Sandec, 13, 14, 18, 85, 87 New York, 149 Nicholas II, Tsar, 7, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 61, 69, 72, 78, 79, 87, 90, 92, 104, 107, 121, 130, 135, 136, 145, 146, 149, 152, 157, 158, 159 Nicola, Prince of Montenegro, 28 Nieman River, 13, 15, 16, 22, 102, 126, 127, 140 Nikolaevna, Grand Duchess Anastasia, 28 Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke, 1, 7, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 31, 34, 47, 48, 51, 60, 61, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78, 79, 87, 90, 92, 94, 95, 98, 100, 103, 104, 106, 107, 118, 121, 122, 124, 127, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 146, 149, 156, 158, 159 approach to command, 29, 30, 88, 157 background and career, 28 Norway, 149 Novogeorgievsk, 116, 120, 124, 125, 126, 127, 150 Oberbefehlshaber Ost (Ober Ost), 17, 18, 34, 36, 37, 42, 44, 56, 58, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 83, 89, 91, 94, 97, 101, 102, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 124, 125, 130, 131, 132, 133, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156 Oderberg, 151 Odessa, 92, 147 Olukhov, Lieutenant General Vladimir A., 121 Orsha, 135 Ortelsburg, 103 Ossowiec, 71, 72, 120, 124, 154 Ostrolenka, 116, 120, 134, 142, 145

255

Palitsyn, General Feodor F., 29 Pappritz, Generalleutnant Günther von, 101 Pershino, 135 Peter the Great, 47 Petrograd, 31, 100, 104, 136, 149 Pflanzer-Baltin, General der Kavallerie Karl Freiherr von, 54, 56, 68, 91, 92, 95, 96, 112, 129, 137 Pflug, General Vasily, 16, 22 Philipps, Fritz, 42 Pinsk, 139 Plehve, General Pavel, 16, 18, 31, 57, 67, 70, 71, 74, 102, 116, 154 Pless, 34, 35, 91, 97, 104, 106, 110, 129, 133 Plessen, Generaloberst Hans von, 27, 45, 69, 84, 113 Poland, 2, 5, 7, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 57, 67, 70, 89, 102, 106, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 127, 129, 131, 140, 145, 149, 150, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158 Polivanov, General Aleksei A., 104, 107, 130, 131, 145, 149 Posen, 9, 17, 110, 113, 114, 116, 119, 130, 153 Potiorek, Feldzugmeister Oskar, 10 Prittwitz und Gaffron, Generaloberst Max von, 6, 8, 23 Prostken, 63 Protopopov, General Nikolai, 90 Prut River, 96 Przasnysz, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 88, 114, 116, 148, 157 Przemys´l, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 36, 42, 51, 52, 54, 55, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 88, 91, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 105, 108, 148, 149, 150, 153, 157, 159 Puhallo von Brlog, Feldzugmeister Paul, 54, 112, 137

256Index

Pultusk, 116, 119, 120 Putnik, Field Marshal Radomir, 10 Radkevich, General Evgeny, 61, 63, 65, 70 Radko-Dmitriev, General Radko, 16, 90, 91, 92, 106 Radoslavov, Vasil, 123, 129 Radymno, 93 Rasputin, Grigory, 107, 135, 136 Rathenau, Walter, 20 Rawa Ruska, 13, 100, 103 Redl, Colonel Alfred, 5, 6, 11 Reininghaus, Gina von, 36, 108, 144, 157 Reininghaus, Hans von, 36 Rennenkampf, General Pavel, 11, 12, 15, 22, 23 Richthofen, Generalmajor Manfred Freiherr von, 141 Riga, 101, 103, 141, 143 Romania, 30, 38, 52, 56, 74, 81, 88, 91, 95, 156 Ronge, Captain Max, 6 Rothkirch, Captain Fritz von, 38 Rovno, 128, 135, 136, 137, 144 Rozan, 116, 119, 120 Rupprecht, Crown Prince, 85, 86 Russia, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 12, 24, 25, 29, 30, 34, 38, 48, 73, 74, 79, 81, 83, 89, 110, 122, 129, 136, 149, 152, 160 Russo-Turkish War, 28, 104 Ruszki, General Nikolai, 13, 16, 17, 22, 30, 31, 61, 63, 65, 70, 71, 74, 129, 159 Sabler, Vladimir, 107 Salandra, Antonio, 38, 80 Samarin, Aleksandr, 107 Samsonov, General Aleksandr, 11, 15 San Francisco, 149 San River, 11, 14, 15, 18, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96

Sanok, 82 Sauberzweig, Generalmajor Traugott von, 125 Save River, 10, 11 Savich, General Sergei, 93 Schallert, Ernst Günter, 42 Schaulen, 89, 100, 101, 102 Scheffer-Boyadel, General der Infanterie Reinhard von, 17, 23 Scheidemann, General Sergei, 16, 18, 22 Schlieffen, Generalfeldmarschall Alfred von, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 104, 152, 153 Schmettow, Generalmajor Eberhard Graf von, 62 Schneller, Major Karl, 137 Scholtz, General der Artillerie Friedrich von, 116 Schubert, Generaloberst Richard von, 14 Seeckt, Colonel (later Generalmajor) Hans von, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 98, 104, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 115, 120, 134, 136, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156 Seeckt, General der Infanterie Richard von, 85 Selivanov, General Andrei, 76, 77, 79 Serbia, 6, 7, 10, 11, 24, 34, 36, 38, 43, 81, 108, 110, 123, 129, 133, 137, 138, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 153, 158, 160 Sereth River, 129, 137 Shchelgovitov, Ivan, 107 Shcherbachev, General Dmitri, 96, 138 Sheremetiev, Colonel Sergei, 21 Showalter, Dennis, 86 Siedlce, 121 Sienawa, 99 Sievers, General Faddei, 22, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 68

Index

Sikorsky, Igor, 47 Sitno, 113 Skidel, 142 Smirnov, General Vladimir, 22 Smorgon, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146 Soissons, 85 Sokal, 117 Soldau, 114 Stanislau, 56 Stockholm, 66 Stolzmann, General der Infanterie Paulus Alfred Wilhelm von, 37 Straub, Colonel Johann, 86 Stryj, 96 Strypa River, 129 Stürgkh, Count Josef von, 12, 37 Stürgkh, Count Karl von, 37 Styr River, 136, 137, 139 Sukhomlinov, General Vladimir, 7, 28, 29, 66, 77, 104, 107, 130, 145, 149 Sweden, 66 Switzerland, 40 Szurmay, Feldmarschallleutnant Alexander, 54 Tannenberg, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22, 23, 25, 44, 45, 66, 68, 83, 110, 140, 143, 159 Tappen, Generalmajor Gerhard, 33, 82, 83, 88, 94, 97, 114 Tarnopol, 138 Teschen, 18, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 87, 92, 95, 103, 138, 140, 144 Thorn, 17 Tigris River, 109 Tkachev, Captain Viktor, 48 Turkey, 2, 30, 33, 34, 81, 88, 109, 123, 147, 156, 160 Ukraine, 155 United States, 56, 160 Uzsok Pass, 52, 53, 54, 79

257

Vailly, 85 Vereczke Pass, 53, 54 Vienna, 4, 6, 8, 12, 37, 56, 75, 95, 134, 144, 151 Vilna, 110, 111, 127, 141, 142 Vistula River, 15, 31, 67, 92, 107, 109, 120, 121, 124, 159 Vladivostok, 149 Volhynia, 140 Waldersee, Generalmajor Georg von, 9, 12, 23 Waldersee, Generaloberst Alfred von, 2, 3 Warsaw, 12, 16, 17, 18, 23, 25, 30, 66, 69, 70, 83, 102, 107, 110, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 131, 150, 151, 152 Wieprz River, 113, 118, 120 Wild von Hohenborn, Generalleutnant Adolf, 33, 83, 88 Wilhelm, Crown Prince, 85, 86 Wilhelm I, Kaiser, 2, 3 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 3, 4, 9, 12, 13, 17, 19, 27, 32, 33, 37, 45, 63, 65, 69, 83, 84, 85, 91, 95, 100, 110, 111, 113, 114, 116, 119, 123, 126, 136, 153 Wilija River, 140, 142, 143 Winckler, Generalleutnant Arnold von, 113 Windau River, 101 Wislok River, 92 Wisloka River, 91, 92 Władimir Wołynsk, 117 Wlodawa, 128 Wodniansky von Wildenfeld, Feldmarschallleutnant Friedrich, 24 Woyrsch, General der Infanterie Remus von, 17, 24, 80, 111, 121, 127, 158 Wrisberg, Ernst von, 81

258Index

Yanushkevich, General Nikolai N., 21, 29, 30, 78, 130, 131, 136, 149 Ypres, 42 Zabern Affair, 32 Zaionchkovski, General Andrei, 138

Zhilinski, General Yakov, 11, 15, 22, 159 Ziethen, Generalmajor Alfred, 87, 90 Zlota Lipa River, 13, 111, 112, 129 Zmigrod, 77, 91, 96 Zorndorf, 68

About the Author Richard L. DiNardo, PhD, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, has written extensively on a wide variety of topics in military history. He completed his bachelor’s degree in history at Bernard Baruch College, City University of New York (CUNY), and his doctorate in history at the CUNY Graduate School and University Center. Prior to his arrival at Quantico in 1998, he taught at St. Peter’s College and also spent two years as visiting professor at the Air War College in Maxwell Air Force Base. DiNardo is the author or editor of eight books, including Praeger’s Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915, which won honorable mention in the World War I Historical Association’s Tomlinson Book Prize for 2010, and Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 (Praeger, 2015). DiNardo’s other published works include Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse (2005) and Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II (1991). His most recent work, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 (coauthored with Daniel J. Hughes), appeared in 2018. He is also the author or editor of a number of articles on the American Civil War and coeditor of James Longstreet: The Man, the Soldier, the Controversy (1998).