Turning Points in Japanese History 9781315074535, 1315074532, 9781903350058, 1903350050

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Turning Points in Japanese History

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Turning Points in Japanese History

Edited by"

BERT EDSTROM

~ 1 Routledge ~~

Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY First published in 2002 by Japan Library 1his edition published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 7111hird Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© Japan Library (RoudedgeCurzon) 2002 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, without prior permission in writing from the Publishers, except for the use of short extracts in criticism.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue entry for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 1-903350-05-0

Typeset in Bembo 12 on 12pt by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester

Contents

About the Contributors

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Introduction: 'Turning Points' and 'Defining Moments' 1 Bert Edstrom Bukkyo Denrai: The True Turning Point 17 Maciej Kanert 1247 as a Turning Point for the Kamakura Shogunate 25 Kondo Shigekazu A Turning Point in Court-Bakufu Relations During the Edo Period 34 Vtlldo Ferretti The Starting Point of Modern Japanese-Korean 44 Relations: The Letter Incident of 1869 Lionel Babicz Deliberate Non-Communication: The Influence of the Religious Issues on the Diplomatic Talks During the Visit of the Iwakura Delegation to 57 Belgium Arjan van der Weif Rescuing the Prisoners of the Maria Luz: The Meiji Government and the 'Coolie Trade', 1868-75 71 Igor R. Saveliev 84 The Ending of Extraterritoriality in Japan Ian Ruxton Maruyama on Kaikoku: Ruptures in a Frame of 102 Vertical Development Joel Joos

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The Meiji Constitution as Miscalculation Alistair D. Swale The End of World War One as a Turning Point in Modern Japanese History Dick Stegewerns Takahashi Korekiyo's Fiscal Policy and the Rise of Militarism in Japan during the Great Depression Richard Smethurst Japan and Islam Policy During the 1930s Selfuk Esenbel Japan's Foreign Policy and the Yoshida Legacy Revisited Bert Edstrom The Beginning of the End? The Problem of Imperial Succession in Modern Japan Ben-Ami Shillony Index

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232 243

About the Contributors

Lionel Babicz is assistant professor ofJapanese history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of East Asian Studies. He studied at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, and at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales in Paris, where he completed his PhD thesis on 'The Images of Korea in Early Meiji Japan'. His publications include Le Japon face ala Coree al'epoque Meiji (Paris 2002), 'Japon-Coree: les freres ennemis', L'Histoire 265: 2002, 'Les relations nippo-coreennes', Herodote 78-79: 1995. Bert Edstrom is senior research fellow, Japan Section, Goteborg University. His research deals with Japanese foreign policy and international relations. He has also published widely on Swedish-Japanese relations. Recent publications include Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa (Basingstoke and New York, 1999), The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions (editor, Richmond, Surrey, 2000), and Fjiirranniira: Svenska kontakter med Japan genom tiderna [Near but far: Swedish contacts with Japan through the ages] (co-editor and contributor, Stockholm, 2001). Sel~uk Esenbel is professor of modern Japanese history at the Department of History, Bogazici University, Istanbul. Her research interests are peasant uprisings, Western culture, Asianism, and Japanese--Turkish relations. Her publications include Even the Gods Rebel: The Peasants of Takino and the 1871 Nakano Uprising, AAS Monograph 57, 1998; 'A fm de siecle Japanese Romantic in Istanbul', BSOAS 59,1996, japanese Interest in the Ottoman Empire', in The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions, ed. Bert Edstrom (Richmond, Surrey 2000), and other articles on modern Japanese history.

Valdo Ferretti is presently lecturing at the Faculty of Oriental Studies of the University of Rome 'La Sapienza', Italy. His research deals with both Japan's international relations in the twentieth century and Japan's pre-modern history. Recent publications include 'La Rinascita di una grande potenza: II rientro del Giappone nella societa internazionale e l'ed della guerra fredda' (co-editor, Franco Angeli 1999); 'Yoshida's Ideas on China after the Dulles-Morrison Agreement and Its Relevance for Anglo-Japanese Relations', in San Francisco: 50 Years On, Part Two, International Studies 426, 2001; 'Kaigun gunshoku kara Taiheiya sensa made: Nihon kaigun shindokuha no bunretsu ni kansuru ichikasatsu', Kokusai seiji keizaigaku kenkyii, 2001: 8; and 'Emperor Reigen and the Change in Court-Bakufu Relations since the Tenna to the Kyaha Era', East and West 1996: 112. va

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

Joel Joos gained a Ph.D. at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, in 2001. His doctoral dissertation analysed the sources and methods of Maruyama Masao's approach to Japanese history, especially his analysis of modernity. Presently, he is working at the Information Desk of the Japanese Mission to the European Union. Madej Kanert is lecturer of Japanese ancient history at Poznan and Warsaw Universities. His recent works include Mounted and with Girded Swords: Egami Namio's kiba minzoku theory (Japonica 1999),jogu Shotoku Hoo Teisetsu: translation and commentary (Japonica 2001), and The Soga Period: The Political and Social Implications ifjapanese Buddhism, 538-645 (unpubl. PhD dissertation). Shigekazu Kondo is professor at the Historiographical Institute, the University of Tokyo. His specialization is the role of documentation in the political structure of medieval Japan. Ian C. Ruxton is professor of English and coordinator of Freshmen English at the Faculty of Engineering, Kyushu Institute of Technology in Kitakyushu. His recent publications include The Diaries and Letters if Sir Ernest Mason Satow (Lewiston, NY, and Lampeter, Wales 1998) and part 2 of the Chapter on Britain in The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment, ed. Ian Nish (Richmond, Surrey, 1998). He is presently editing Sir Ernest Satow's diaries for his period as minister in Tokyo, 1895-1900, for a forthcoming Edition Synapse volume. Igor R. Saveliev is associate professor of history at Niigata University. He holds a PhD in history from the University of St Petersburg. He is the author of Iapontsy za okeanom: Istoriia iaponskoi emigratsii v Severnuiu i Iuznuiu Ameriku [The Japanese across the Pacific: A History ofJapanese Emigration to North and South America] (St Petersburg 1997) and Globalising Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia (co-editor, Aldershot forthcoming). Ben-Ami Shillony is professor of Japanese history and culture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel. He was a student of Marius B. Jansen and received his PhD from Princeton University in 1971. His books include Revolt in japan (Princeton 1973), Politics and Culture in Wclrtime japan (Oxford 1981), The jews and the japanese (Tokyo 1992), and Collected Writings if Ben-Ami Shillony (Richmond, Surrey, 2000). He has also published books in Hebrew and Japanese. In 2000 he was awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold and Silver Star. Richard J. Smethurst is University Center for International Studies Research Professor and professor of history at the University of Pittsburgh. He has written books on rural support for militarism and on agricultural development and tenancy disputes in prewar Japan. His current research and writing is on the fiscal and monetary policies of Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo during the Sh6wa Depression and their Meiji era roots. Dick Stegewerns is assistant professor of modern Japanese history and comparative culture at Osaka Sangyo University. His recent publications include

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian Brotherhood, or TM>rld Citizenship? (editor, Richmond 2001), 'The Japanese "Civilisation Critics" and the National Identity of their Asian Neighbours', in Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945, eds Narangoa Li and Robert Cribb (Richmond forthcoming), and Adjusting to the New TM>rld: The Taisho Generation of Opinion Leaders and the Outside TM>rld, 1918-1932 (forthcoming).

Alistair D. Swale is currendy a lecturer in Japanese history in the Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. His most recent publication is The Political Thought of Mori Arinori: A Study in Meiji Conservatism which was published by the Japan Library (Richmond 2000). This followed on from earlier contributions to other Japan Library (Curzon Press) tides viz., Leaders and Leadership in Japan, ed. Ian Neary (1996), and The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment, ed. Ian Nish (1998). He has also recently obtained a doctorate from the Faculty of Law at Kyoto University. Arjan van der Werf is a researcher at the Department of Oriental and Slavonic Studies of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, researching Belgian-Japanese relations in the Bakumatsu and Meiji eras. He graduated from Leiden University in 1996 with a thesis on views on Christianity in Meiroku Zasshi and is currendy preparing a dissertation on Early Meiji and the role of religion in the West.

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Introduction

BERT EDSTROM

'In

the modern history of Japan two major events are indisputably noted as turning points: the Meiji Restoration and the Second World War', writes Harry Wray in his introduction to one section of a book aimed at a discussion of Japanese historiography. He continues that even if these events were products of causes that extended backwards, 'an argument can be validly made that Japan after both these events was never the same country again in values, attitudes, and orientation. It is in just such a sense that some students of modern Japan have selected other periods to argue a "turning point" in the course of the nation's history: 1890-1895, 1905-1912, and the Taish6 period (1912-1926), for example' (Wray, in Wray and Conroy

1983: 150). This kind of periodization and singling out of crucial years or periods as being of particular importance is something that I remember vividly from history teaching at school. History, as I remember it, was very much guided by the famous, or infamous claim once made by a leading Swedish historian that the history of Sweden is that of her kings. History was of course not all about the sovereigns and their activities but it was periodicized into the reign of one king after the other: Gustaf Vasa (r. 1523-60), his son Erik XIV (r. 1560-68), Erik's brother Johan III (r. 1568-92), and on it went, down to our own age. History was, if not solely the activities of the sovereign, related to the sovereign. Consequently, when a new sovereign ascended the throne, a new historical period began, in the same way as when J. A. A. Stockwin refers to the ascension onto the throne of the present emperor of Japan as a dividing-line of history: 'The 2

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

inauguration of the new tenno, 55 at the time of his accession, marked a clear break with the past' (Stockwin 1999: 71). Of course, we also learned that the years other than referring to the beginning and end of the reigns of royalties could also be historically important. Even if GustafVasa's ascension onto the throne in 1520 was important, maybe more important was the year 1527 when he decided to replace Catholicism by Protestantism, in 1809 Sweden not only 'lost' Finland to Russia but it was also the year when a constitution was adopted, 1932 was the year of the coalition government among the Social-Democratic Party and the Farmers' Party, etc, etc. In fact, in his history of Swedish school history teaching, Andolf (1972: 47-50) notes that this obsession with years of Swedish history teaching has been observed and discussed by historians and history teachers ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Although many of the historical years we learned by heart were those of kings and queens, a fair number were also those of wars and famous battles. In our studies of history we learned that years count and that certain years were more weighty than others because some important events had taken place that year or during that period, that marked major chronological divisions in history. Still, some years were more important than others, a fair illustration to an observation made by John Dower. 'Great events', Dower writes, 'capture the historical imagination, but often at the risk of creating misleading impressions of disjunctures. In the popular consciousness, the past becomes compartmentalized: pre-this and post-that. And nothing, with the exception of revolution, cuts with a sharper edge than war.' So it is now customary, notes Dower, to separate pre-war and post-war, or pre-1945 and post-1945 Japan (Dower 1983: 343). In fact, so impressive has the impact of the war outcome of 1945, for example, been that this event is widely seen as a great divide, a veritable turning point ofJapanese history. It meant, in the words of a Japanese historian, that 'a new page had been turned in Japanese history' (Kinbara 1985: 2). This collection of essays deals with such moments in Japan's history; moments that can be seen, and have been seen, rightly or wrongly, as turning points, or should, in the eyes of the author, be seen as such. It is based on the section on History, Politics and International Relations of the ninth conference of the European Association of Japanese Studies (EAJS), held in Lahti, Finland, 23-26 August 2000. The EAJS has since its 2

INTRODUCTION

foundation played a key role in Europe for encouraging international research collaboration and cooperation and promoting research onJapan. The EAJS triennial conferences playa central role for Japan researchers as an arena for presenting on-going research and for discussing research results. That research knows no border is graphically shown by the fact the EAJS has a significant number of members from countries outside of Europe, not least Japan and the United States. Given the fact that the Lahti conference took place during the year of the shift from one millennium to another according to the Western calendar, Dr Stephen Large (Cambridge University) and I as section convenors found it fairly natural to give the section the overall theme of 'Turning Points and Defining Moments', and a majority of papers presented at the section during the three days of proceedings reflected this theme. Presentations and discussions soon made it obvious that publication should be considered, and Mr Paul Norbury of the Japan Library graciously offered to consider publishing a book and I was invited to be the editor. It was agreed among participants and the publisher that the prospective book would not be a proceedings-type of work but have a unified theme and this has guided my work as editor. I regret to have to report that some excellent scholarly papers presented at the conference had to be excluded, only because they did not fit the theme of the prospective book. DISCERNING TURNING POINTS

Acceptance of the year 1945 as being a great divide is virtually undisputed as a fact ofJapan's modern history. But other turning points have been discerned as well. In fact, studying Japan's modern political history I have been struck by the frequency by which, for instance, post-war prime ministers have spoken up on this topic. As part of my research into the evolution ofJapan's foreign policy during the post-war period up to 1993, I examined the policy speeches given by prime ministers in the Diet as stipulated in the constitution. These speeches are given at the beginning of the parliamentary session and are politically important since they are intended to be comprehensive presentations of the government's policies. A striking result of that study was the discovery that speeches given by several post-war premiers included passages where the prime minister enunciated 3

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

his view that Japan, the Japanese, Japanese politics, the world, or some other subject was approaching, or had experienced, a turning point (Edstrom 1999: passim). One such case, among many, was when the flamboyant Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro stated in the Diet on January 24, 1983: I feel strongly that Japan is today at a great turning point in post-war history. Now more than ever, we should study more closely what parts of pre-war and post-war history we should bequeath to future generations, and where we should be heading, and should set our guideposts for our new progress. (Naikaku seido hyakunenshi hensan iinkai 1985: 1071)

Nakasone's keen feeling of living through a historical period that was at a turning point was based on his acute awareness of history, and he made sengo seiji no sokessan or the 'general settling of accounts concerning post-war politics' one of the famous slogans for his government. Igarashi Jin has pointed out that what Nakasone declared was at an end and facing 'a great turning point' was post-war history and, in this, his reas~ning differed from the perception of another prime minister, Ohira Masayoshi, who a decade earlier also had discerned the end of a historical period, but then had in mind the age of economics that had reigped ever since the Meiji era (1868-1912). According to Ohira, a time had come when it was necessary for Japan to shift her national goals (Igarashi 1987: 45). Nakasone's declaration that Japan was living through a turning point was something that united him with most of his predecessors as Japanese premiers in the post-war period. These kinds of statements are, if not replete, at least quite common in post-war prime ministerial policy speeches. The recurrence of these kinds of statements would seem to make them belong mostly to what could be called 'foreign policy liturgy', plain rhetoric, whereby certain words 'must' appear in the speech, even if the concepts behind them have little substantive import, and that certain things 'must not' be touched upon (for this concept, see Block 1982: 30). The openings of parliamentary sessions are solemn occasions and comments by the premier on perceived turning points seem probably pertinent. But such remarks by the premier are not always this kind of liturgy. In December 1973, shortly after the first so-called 'oil crisis' that erupted in October of that year, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei declared in the Diet: 4

INTRODUCTION

Japan has so far expanded production and ensured employment thanks to the stable supply of cheap oil. The Arab oil squeeze, however, has caused this country to be confronted with an unprecedented ordeal. We have to seek prosperity with limited natural resources. In this sense, Japan is faced with a historic turning point from a social and economic point of view. (Naikaku seido hyakunenshi hensan iinkai 1985: 878)

At least at the time of his statement, no one would object to Tanaka declaring that Japan was facing a turning point. The turning point he perceived was very real for his contemporaries, in Japan as well as elsewhere, it was a judgement that was not questioned for a long time, since the rampant oil price hikes and their repercussions were seen to mean, in the words of Nakamura Takafusa, Japan's famous economist cum economic historian, 'the complete end of the rapid economic growth which had continued for a period of over twenty years since the 1950s' (Nakamura 1981: 233). I wrote myself of this event in my dissertation in 1988: 'The very sharp dividing line in economic growth before and after the oil price rises of 1973 and its traumatic effects on Japan's domestic economy led many economic analysts to designate the rises [in the oil price] as the great divide in the post-war period. And in hindsight it is almost redundant to state that nothing was quite the same after 1973 as before' (Edstrom 1988: 22). Nevertheless, nowadays, with Japan's economic troubles of the 1990s in mind, which began with the bursting of the economic 'bubble'in 1989, even such a 'traumatic' event as the 1973 'oil crisis' has faded and nowadays might even be designated more as an 'apparent' than a real turning point. It illustrates quite tellingly that even what was once seen to be a glaring case of a turning point might fade away with the passage of time, and that it is important how long a sweep of history that we consider. Takemae Eiji writes that 'If we think in terms of a hundred years or two hundred years, of looking backwards from the year 2052 or the year 2152, we may find ourselves concluding that the occupation was not so significant' (Takemae 1983: 357). More substantial cases of turning points are those that have stood the test of time. In the above quote from Harry Wray, two instances were identified as true turning points of Japan's modern history, the Meiji Restoration and the Second World War. In a recent textbook, the same turning points appear but another is added - 1600 when 'the victory of the Tokugawa family and its allies ended a prolonged period of civil war' (Smith 5

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

1995: 1). It seems that few historians would argue against Wray and Smith: these events were truly moments when Japanese history shifted its course, the very meaning of the concept of 'turning point' as used by Maciej Kanert in his contribution to this volume. He refers to the Jurij Lotman who, Kanert writes, 'believed that periods of determined historical process are separated by certain points of special importance. On the one hand, such a point is the crowning of the past process, while on the other, the result is a "point of choice", from which multiple lines of possible development emerge. Entering into one of those lines sets the historical process on track for a certain period of time.' A neat illustration to this interpretation of the concept of turning point can be given by quoting a passage from a recent textbook on Japanese history in which it is said that 'August 14, 1945, marked a decisive turning point in Japanese history by designating the end ofJapan's imperialistic dream and the beginning of peace, democracy, the rule of law, and the pursuit of economic gains' (Hane 1996: 1). But even if the existence of such a turning point is agreed upon, it is not always self-evident what constitutes the turning point per se, as demonstrated in the contribution to this volume by Joel Joos on Maruyama Masao's ideas of kaikoku, or 'the opening of the country', a self-evident candidate for one of Japan's grand historical turning points. TURNING POINT AS TIME POINT AND TIME PERIOD

Wray's and Smith's turning points referred to above are welldefined in time. Similarly, in a number of contributions to this collection of essays, the turning point is occurring at a specific moment. Ian Ruxton documents how the Japanese succeeded in bringing an end to the unequal treaties that drove Japan's foreign policy in the initial decades of the Meiji period. Once the treaty that would result in the abolishment of these treaties had been ratified in 1894, Ruxton points out, there was no going back to previous policies. Another case is provided in Richard Smethurst's contribution, on Takahashi Korekiyo and his role in Japanese politics: when Takahashi was assassinated, Smethurst writes, 'his death gave new life and power to Japan's military. Takahashi's death removed Japan's "last resistance" to pre-war militarism.' A third case of a specific and well-defined turning point is 1918/19, as convincingly demonstrated by Dick Stegewerns in his contribution to this volume. 6

INTRODUCTION

Now, in the quote from Wray cited above there is an interesting aspect of timing. Wray claims that the Meiji Restoration and the Second World War are two major events that are undisputed turning points. It is easy to see that there is quite a difference between these two events: the Meiji Restoration took place at a specific point in time while the Second World War lasted six years. Turning point as time point or time period is reflected in the Japanese language: a standard dictionary like Kenkyusha's New English-Japanese Dictionary (1960) gives tenkanten as the first Japanese counterpart for 'turning point', of which tenkan means 'change, conversion', and ten 'point', but also tenkanki where ki means 'period, age, date, time, season'. N ow, of the two, tenkan-ten is much less commonly used than tenkan-ki. Thus, the focus seems not to be on the time point, the starting point of a development, etc., but on the fact that the concept implies that the development etc. took a different direction, thus, not the same idea as contained in Lotman's elegant defmition but taking into account part of his idea. This bifurcation of turning point into dealing with either a specific point in time or a period is seldom made or taken into account. And even if the analyst discerns the occurrence of a turning point as taking place at a specific point of time, it might nevertheless be hard to pinpoint when the time point actually occurred, as is illustrated by a quote from my dissertation in which I wrote: 'Even if it proves impossible to pinpoint a single year as the crucial one, several important events took place in the years around 1970 which marked it as a watershed' (Edstrom 1988: 13). Similarly, Koji Taira notes in his discussion ofJapan's post-war economic history: 'Long-term economic statistics suggest that somewhere in the early 1970s there was a turning point in post-war Japan's rate and style of economic growth. The pre-1970s "miracle growth" at a rate exceeding 10 per cent per annum turned into low growth at 5 per cent or so in subsequent years' (Taira 1993: 167). The problem of pinpointing the timing of turning points, however marked their occurrence, can also be illustrated by the question when the Second World War was lost for Japan, which it seems reasonable to argue constituted a turning point. Was it 15 August when hostilities ceased? Or 2 September when the capitulation documents were signed on board the Missouri? Or, as it is quite reasonable to argue, was it 6 August when the atom bomb was dropped over Hiroshima? The question of when the 7

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

war period is over might be seen as trivial, but it is linked to the question when the post-war period started. In Japan the concept of sengo, 'the post-war [period], has a venerable place in the intellectual and political debate; the demise of sengo has been announced regularly since 1956, when the literary critic Nakano Yoshio published his article 'Mohaya "sengo " de wa nai' ['It is no longer "post-war" '] (Koschmann 1993: 403) and later that year was echoed by the Economic White Paper published by the Japanese government using this phrase as its immediately famous sub-title (see Arizawa 1976: 375-7). The basis for the claim brought forward in the Economic White Paper was that Japan's industrial production in 1955 had reached the pre-war level of 1939. A famous case of the post-war period having been declared ended was when Prime Minister Sat6 Eisaku after a visit to Okinawa in 1965 proclaimed: 'So long as Okinawa does not return to its homeland, Japan's post-war period [sengo] will never be over' (Nanp6 d6h6 engokai 1972: 668), and he announced that this was the top priority for his government. Later, the political scientist Watanabe Akio commented: 'With each solution to a troublesome diplomatic issue ... successive cabinet leaders have announced "the end of the post-war period." Premier Sat6 made the most recent such statement on the occasion of the return of Okinawa' (Watanabe 1977: 112). In a recent textbook, Gary Allinson is very precise as to when the war was over and thus one actually saw the turning point: 'Noon, August 15, 1945, when Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's surrender, is often taken as the zero hour in Japan's postwar era. That moment allegedly marks a sharp disjunction between what happened before (war and defeat) and what transpired after (democracy and development), (Allinson 1997: 7). And Carol Gluck has filled in: 'It was as if history itself had been severed and could start again from scratch, the Japanese equivalent of the German sense of 1945 as "the hour zero." ... So strong was the willed separation of past and present that it dominated subsequent historical ordering for over thirty years, displacing the idea of Showa with the founding myth of "the new Japan.'" (Gluck 1992b: 3f) A similar discussion is pursued by Iokibe Makoto in his introduction to a recent volume on the history ofJapan's post-war foreign policy. Iokibe argues that the post-war period can be neatly partitioned into phases, each lasting a decade, in very much the same way as the history of 8

INTRODUCTION

Swedish literature is often seen to consist of writers of the 1880s, followed by writers of the 1890s, etc. (see, e.g., Breitholtz 1988, 2: passim). The main problem of this analysis dividing the post-war period into decades is, according to lokibe, to decide when the '1950s' started; the Occupation period lasted until 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect and could be lumped together with Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's remaining years in office into one period. But with the inventiveness of a true researcher, lokibe comes up with the quite convincing idea that the real divide came in 1950, with the beginning of the negotiations over the peace treaty between Prime Minister Yoshida and the US representative John Foster Dulles (lokibe 1999: 13). lokibe does not begin his analysis of the post-war period on 15 August 1945, but in the midst of the war when the Americans began their planning for the post-war period. So it seems that in reality, the turning point that he discerns was not that clear, or, rather, the turning point had its antecedents. Still further back goes Gary Allinson in his discussion of Japan's 'post-war' history, with 'post-war' covering the period after war started. But 'war' can be differently interpreted. Allinson argues that it is not 1945 but 1932 that is the turning point and, thus, that 1945 is what Maciej Kanert in his contribution to this volume calls an 'apparent' turning point. Allinson writes: That year [1932] marked the inauguration of high imperialism forJapan with the imposition of control over the puppet state of Manchuria. In the same year, the political parties that had once presided over parliamentary governments went into a long retreat, and the government steadily fell under the influence of the military and its collaborators. These are the kinds of political events that often defme historical periods, and they contribute to that purpose here [in Allinson's book]. (Allinson 1997: 6)

Another historian, Hata Ikuhiko, writes of the 'Fifteen-Year War' lasting from the Manchurian Incident to 1945, meaning that 'the Manchurian Incident, the China War, and the Pacific War should not be viewed separately but should be regarded as one continuous conflict' (Hata 1983: 313). If this is the case, the start of the war against China in 1937 cannot reasonably be seen as a turning point, and in this Carol Gluck might agree, or not. She has argued that the true turning point should not be seen to have occurred in 1945, be it 6 August, or 15 August, or 9

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

whatever date, but rather back in 1937 when Japan began the war against China, or in 1931 when the Japanese military occupied Manchuria. Gluck observes in her introduction to a volume of essays on the history of the Sh6wa period: 'People speak of "prewar" Showa, which lasted nearly two decades. Yet a full three-quarters of those years corresponded to Japan's "Fifteen-Year War" against China, which began with the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and did not end until the Pacific War did in 1945. Odd that such a period is considered "before" the war, when, if not in 1931, then at least by the beginning of all-out war against China in 1937, Showa Japan was already Japan at war' (Gluck 1992a: xii). But more often than not, as used not only in common parlance but also in scholarly writings, turning point refers to a period rather than to a precisely defined moment. One type is when an event constituting a turning point has a long conception, as can be exemplified by a quote from John Whitney Hall in his classic text: By 1560 Japan stood on the threshold of an epic turning point in its political history. During the next forty years powerful military forces driving out of east-central Japan under the leadership of three successive military geniuses were to beat the daimyo into submission and impose a rough unity upon the country. The 'thee unifiers' [Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Tokugawa Ieyasu] were daimyo, and the unity they achieved took the form of a military hegemony over the remaining daimyo. By the time of Ieyasu the hegemony was firmly established and legitimized in a new shogunal authority which managed to keep the peace for over two centuries and a half. (Hall 1970: 142)

But the long drawn-out might also be the turning point per se, in the same way as 'event' as used by international relations scholars might be long-drawn out, like a war such as World War II and not at all pinpointed in time as the term might be seen to indicate (see, e.g., Deutsch and Merritt 1965: 135f). In his contribution to a volume on post-war Japan as history, John W Dower notes: In retrospect it is apparent that the early 1970s marked a major turning point in Japan's position within the international political economy. It is from this point that we can date Japan's emergence as a truly global power - and the corollary and irreversible decline of US hegemony. At the time, however, this transformation of power was by no means clear. (Dower 1993: 28) 10

INTRODUCTION

A similar reasoning when the 'turning point' is quite stretched out has been presented by the political scientist Muramatsu Michio. He argues that post-war Japanese politics have undergone three major turning points since Japan formally regained its independence: the first, from 1951 to 1954, allowed the country to establish its own post-war political system; Ikeda's government (1960-64) marked the beginning of the second turning point; while the third turning point began during the Fukuda government (1976-78) when the nation's budget deficit grew to immense proportions (Muramatsu 1992: 145-9). A similar case is found in a recent volume on Japan's history during the reign of Emperor Hirohito. One of the contributors is Herbert Passin, the US scholar who participated in the occupation ofJapan and later has been a long-time observer and student of post-war Japan. He writes of the occupation that lasted for seven years, 1945-52, that 'raJ case can be - and has been - made that the Occupation was one of the main turning points in Japan's history, comparable to the introduction of Chinese civilization in the seventh and eighth centuries and the Meiji Restoration of 1868' (Passin 1992: 119). Passin goes on to discuss facts and developments that have been interpreted as providingpro and contra arguments for the above assertion, and reaches the conclusion that ... in a large sense, the Occupation did accomplish its broad objectives . . . . For all its failings the Occupation did make a difference, and a major one, in the transformation of Japanese society. Specific reforms can be faulted in various ways, but the reform program as a whole did succeed in bringing the common people of Japan into the mainstream of citizenship, both politically and economically, in a way that they had never been before. (Passin 1992: 124f)

For certain, the Occupation can be seen as constituting in many ways a turning point for Japan, in the sense that the ex ante and ex post situations differed greatly. But lasting six years it is certainly an elongated turning point. THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSPECTIVE

In Carol Gluck's sarcastic comments on the view of a 'pre-war' Showa that was seen to last nearly two decades when, in reality, Japan had been long at war, witness the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the all-out war against China that started in 1937, she notes that this weird (I guess in her view) way of looking at 11

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

history 'is a matter of perspective' (Gluck 1992a: xii). That perspective matters vindicated by Valdo Ferretti's contribution to this volume. According to Ferretti, researchers dealing with the power relationship between the court and the shogunate have focused on the Tokugawa period from the seventeenth century roughly up to the middle of the eighteenth century or tended to focus on the course of or the preceding of the Bakumatsu period, and have rarely gone back more than to the Kansei Reforms and thus have missed the turning point of history, when the court grasped the power checking the shogunate. But the perspective is important also in another sense. In his widely acclaimed Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of Vf;OrId VUlr II (1999), John Dower writes of 1945, the illustrious moment that to many seems to be the embodiment of a historical turning point: 'We normally see August 1945 as a great divide between militarist Japan and a new democratic nation. This was a watershed moment, but it is also true that Japan remained under the control of fundamentally military regimes from the early 1930s straight through to 1952' (Dower 1999: 27), thus, no turning point whatsoever. And]. A. A. Stockwin claims in his recently published and widely used textbook that the turmoil in 1960 around the revision of the security treaty between the United States and Japan signified '[a] crucial turning point in the evolution of the Japanese political system was reached in 1960', only to state on the next page that '[t]he suddenness with which the 1960 Security Treaty crisis was over suggests that a strong element of stability underlay the political turbulence' (Stockwin 1999: 53-4), which indicates that the turning point touched upon did not involve all sectors or dimensions of the political system. Another case can be found in the discussion of the Russo-Japanese War. In his contribution to this volume, Stegewerns mentions that 'Revolutions and wars tend to be the most popular signposts for turning points in national histories and world history', a~d an illustration of this point is the Russo-Japanese War. Okawa Shiimei, who figures in Sels;uk Esenbels contribution to this volume, saw the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 as 'a turning point in the awakening of independence movements in Asia' (Najita and Harootunian 1998: 228). In his memoirs the Japan scholar Herbert Passin quotes the 'historian of India, Percival Spear (in his History of India): "Japan's sensational defeat of Russia ... caused Indian hearts to beat faster 12

INTRODUCTION

and youthful imaginations to kindle. As Lord Curzon [the Viceroy] himself remarked: "The reverberations of that victory have gone like a thunderclap through the whispering galleries of the East" .. .' (Passin 1982: 14). The war, in fact, had a wide impact also in the West: Bruce Cumings writes of how 'japan materialized like a Rorschach ink blot onto which Americans and Europeans projected their own hopes and fears' (Cumings 1993: 98). Despite these testimonies, Banno (1983: 163) has made the important point that the war constituted a turning point only in a limited sense since the changes in Japanese politics that it generated were generated by gradual processes begun before the war, processes that did not fade out even after the Taisho crisis of 1912-13. Put simply, the turning point in one dimension may be no such thing in another. But when Banno's argument is scrutinized it seems not to stand the test. As noted by Peter Duus: 'Had the Japanese gone down to defeat in 1905, confrontation between a popular imperialist Japanese nationalism and a popular anti-imperialist Chinese nationalism might never have occurred and ultimately the East Asian crisis might have been avoided. In this sense, the Russo-Japanese War was a turning point not only in the history ofJapanese imperialism but in the history of the world in the twentieth century' (Duus 1983: 157). For Sweden, this is certainly true: the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War made Swedes all of a sudden perceive Japan as a great power that relieved Sweden of the Russian threat and pressure (Edstrom 1998: 13). Banno's reasoning can be seen an argument for the view that the Russo-Japanese War was not a real turning point but what is called an 'apparent' turning point by Kanert in his contribution to this volume. Two of the contributions to this volume present cases of what would be, maybe not 'apparent', but 'potential' turning points, events that might have meant the advent of something new, but did not. Aljan van der Werf deals in his essay in this volume with the visit to Belgium of the famous Iwakura mission on its tour of the world 1871-73, an event that is interesting in that it had the potential of becoming a turning point in the history of Japanese-Belgian relations but became a non-event and, thus, the opposite of a turning point. A similar case is discussed in Sels;uk Esenbel's contribution, on the interrelations between Japanese and Muslims in the 1920s and 30s in which she notes that the policy of participating Japanese failed 'which is part of the reason why we do not know 13

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

of it very much today', but, as she also notes, 'What is interesting for us today is probably what was envisioned rather than what was accomplished.' Maybe one could say that in his elegant contribution to this volume of the problem of imperial succession in Japan, BenAmi Shillony discusses another kind of potential turning point in the sense that the topic of his essay is a matter of the future, whether the imperial family has a future or not. Since the only thing that can be said with certainty about the future is that nothing can be said with certainty, no one can predict whether this is a turning point that will materialize or not. The task of the historian, said Leopold von Ranke, is to clarify 'wie es eigentlich gewesen'. The present collection of essays is aimed at just that. Whether we authors have succeed is up to the reader to judge. BIBLIOGRAPHY Allinson, Gary D. 1997.Japan's Postwar History. London: UCL Press. Andolf, Goran. 1972. Historien pa gymnasiet: Undervisning och larob6cker 182{}-1965 [Senior high school history teaching: Teaching and textbooks, 1820-1965]. Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 44. Stockhohn, Goteborg, Mahlio: Esselte studium. Arizawa Hiromi. 1976. ShiJwa keizaishi [The economic history of the Sh6wa period]. Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha. Banno,Junji. 1983. 'External and Internal Problems Mter the War'. In Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy, eds.Japan Examined: Perspectives on ModernJapanese History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 163-9. Block, Eva. 1982. Frihet, jamlikhet och andra varden: Svensk inrikespolitisk debatt pa dagstidningarnas ledarsidor 1945-1975 [Freedom, equality and other values: Swedish debate on the editorial pages of newspapers, 1945-1975]. Lund: Studentlitteratur. Breitholtz, Lennart, ed. 1988. Epoker och diktare: Allman och svensk litteraturhistoria [Epochs and writers: A general and Swedish history of literature], 2. 3rd ed. Stockholm: AWE/Gebers. Cumings, Bruce. 1993. 'Archaeology, Descent, Emergence: Japan in British/ American Hegemony, 1900-1950'. In Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian, eds, Japan in the World, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 79-111. Deutsch, Karl W, and Merritt, Richard L. 1965. 'Effects of Events on National and International Images'. In Herbert C. Kehnan, ed. International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis. New York ... : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 132-87. Dower, John W 1983. 'Reform and Reconsolidation'. In Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy, eds.Japan Examined: Perspectives on ModernJapanese History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 343-51. 1993. 'Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal 14

INTRODUCTION Conflict'. In Andrew Gordon, ed. Postwar Japan as History. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 3-33. - - . 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of lMlrld lMlr II. London, New York, Ringwood: Allen Lane. Duus, Peter. 1983. 'The TakeolfPoint of Japanese Imperialism'. In Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy, eds. Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 153-7. Edstrom, Bert. 1988. Japan's Quest for a Role in the lMlrld: Roles Ascribed to Japan Nationally and Internationally, 1969-1982. Japanological Studies 7. Stockholm: University of Stockholm. - - . 1998. 'Japan as a Model for Sweden', Center for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University, lMlrking Paper 47. Stockholm. - - . 1999. Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa. Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin's Press. Gluck, Carol. 1992a. 'Introduction'. In Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard, eds. Showa: The Japan of Hirohito. New York: W W Norton, xi-lxi. - - . 1992b. 'The Idea of Showa'. In Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard, eds. Showa: The Japan of Hirohito. New York: W W Norton, 1-26. Hall, John Whitney. 1970. Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times. New York: Dell. Hane, Mikiso. 1996. Eastern Phoenix: Japan Since 1945. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press. Hata, Ikuhiko. 1983. 'From Mukden to Pearl Harbor'. In Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy, eds.Japan Examined: Perspectives on ModernJapanese History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 308-15. Igarashi Jin. 1987. Sengo hoshu seiji no tenkan: '86 nen taisei' to wa nani ka [Conversion of post-war conservative politics: What is 'the 1986 system'?]. Tokyo: Yupiterusha. Iokibe Makoto, ed. 1999. Sengo Nihon gaikoshi [A history of Japan's post-war foreign policy]. Tokyo: Yiihikaku. Kenkyusha's New English-Japanese Dictionary. 1960. Tokyo: Kenkyusha. Kinbara Samon, ed. 1985. Sengoshi no shoten [The foci of post-war history]. Tokyo: Yiihikaku. Koschmann, J. Victor. 1993. 'Intellectuals and Politics'. In Andrew Gordon, ed. PostwarJapan as History. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 395-423. Murarnatsu, Michio. 1992. 'Bringing Politics Back into Japan'. In Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard, eds. Showa: The Japan of Hirohito. New York: W W Norton, 141-54. Naikaku seido hyakunenshi hensan iinkai, ed. 1985. Rekidai naikaku soridaijin enzetsushu [Collection of prime ministerial policy speeches]. Tokyo: Okurash6 insatsukyoku. Najita, Tetsuo, and Harootunian, H. D., 'japan's Revolt Against the West'. In Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, ed., Modern Japanese Thought. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 207-72. Nakamura, Takafusa. 1981. The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Nanp6 d6h6 engokai, ed. 1972. Okinawa fukki no kiroku [The records of the Okinawa return]. Tokyo: Nanp6 d6h6 engokai. Passin, Herbert. 1982. Encounter with Japan. Tokyo, New York and San Francisco: Kodansha International. 15

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY 1992. 'The Occupation - Some Reflections'. In Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard, eds. Showa: TheJapan ofHirohito. New York: W. W. Norton, 107-29. Smith, Dennis B. 1995. Japan since 1945: The Rise of an Economic Superpower. Houndmills and London: Macmillan. Stockwin, J. A. A. 1999. Governing Japan. 3rd ed. Oxford, and Malden, Mass.; Blackwells. Taira, Koji. 1993. 'Dialectics of Economic Growth, National Power, and Distributive Struggles'. In Andrew Gordon, ed. Postwar Japan as History. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 167-86. Takemae, Eiji. 1983. 'Some Questions and Answers'. In Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy, eds. Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 357-63. Watanabe, Akio. 1977. 1apanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1964-1973'. In Robert A. Scalapino, ed. The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 105-45. Wray, Harry, and Conroy, Hilary, eds. 1983. Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

CONVENTIONS Japanese names are given in the Japanese order with the surname preceding the given name. Long vowels are indicated by the use of macrons, except in the case of works and authors published in English and the cities Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe. For transcribing Korean, the Reischauer-McCune system has been used, except for Seoul. For Chinese, pinyin is used with some few exceptions, e.g. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-chek.

16

1

Bukkyo Denrai: The True Turning Point

MACIE] KANERT

iscussing such a contentious and subjective concept as D turning point, one feels obliged to take a methodological stand. What is in fact a 'turning point'? I would like to recall the idea of bifurcation, used by Jurij Lotman from the Moscow-Tartu school of semiotics. In opposition to Marc Bloch from the famous Annales school, who subscribed to relative determinism based on the idea of 'longue duree', Lotman believed that periods of determined historical process are separated by certain points of special importance. On the one hand, such a point is the crowning of the past process, while on the other, the result is a 'point of choice', from which multiple lines of possible development emerge. Entering into one of those lines sets the historical process on track for a certain period of time. Lotman called such points 'points of bifurcation', a mathematical term referring to a change in a certain dynamic system. Japanese historiography dealing with the period from the beginning of the sixth century until the beginning of the Nara period (710-794) seems to disregard the above-mentioned possibilities, concentrating on the historical process itself. I posit, however, that defining the development of a culture or a civilization and keeping the possibilities within one's frame of reference is of great value, especially when one is concerned with 'turning points'. As the famous German historian Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-84) said, 'Unsere Methode ist forschend zu verstehen' (see Topolski, 1998). Taking a closer look at the so-called ancient period of Japanese history one can distinguish four candidates for such a 'turning point'. First I must declare, however, that the point is 17

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

to be the turning from the Yamato state, with a relatively weak position for the emperor, or rather 'the great ruler' [okiml], and with society organized into professional groups of be concentrated around great clans, into a centralized state modelled after that of Sui and Tang China. The four events are: the transmission into Japan of Buddhism [bukkyo denrat] (538, 548, or 552), the Itsushi coup [Itsushi no hen] or the Taika Reforms [Taika no kaishin] (645), the Jinshin Disturbances Uinshin no ran] (672), and the promulgation of the Taih6 Code [TaihO ritsuryo] (702). In this essay I shall try to explain why the arrival of Buddhism to Japan can be seen as the true turning point, but first I would like to justify briefly why the three others are not such turning points. Some time had already passed since the Taika Reforms, which Taika was supposed to start, were 'deconstructed' (to use this up-to-date word). The only fact we cannot deny is the Itsushi coup itself. Leaving aside my view that the Itsushi coup and the ensuing reforms were the direct result of bukkyo denrai, the political enterprises of the new regime were more or less the continuation of the politics of the Soga clan. We do not know the exact moment of introducing the mos_t important reforms; the shosei, or regency of Prince Naka no Oe and his later years as Emperor Tenji (r. 661-72), and the reign of Emperor Temmu (r. 672-86) are most frequently mentioned. The consequences of the coup itself turn out to be limited. Let me call it an 'apparent' turning point. The Jinshin Disturbances had greater meaning, giving the winner, Prince Gama, later Emperor Temmu, a better and most of all a stronger position as a reformer, than that of Emperor Tenji. Nevertheless, the Jinshin Disturbances and the Temmu regime, which emerged from it, strengthened an already existing tendency, rather than constituted the beginning of a new one. And last but not least, the promulgation of the Taih6 Code was undoubtedly an important event, but I prefer to see it as the crowning peak of the process started by bukkyo denrai, the peak that decided the frame of the historical process. If we imagine history as a sine graph with the 'turning points' in the places of a line crossing the axis, the Taih6 Code would be in the most remote point from the axis, between two turning points. In this essay it is argued that the true turning point was the transmission of Buddhism into Japan, which I would like to 18

BUKKy6 DENRAI: THE TRUE TURNING POINT

interpret as an event consisting of two elements: first, an act of international politics, and I am speaking here of the official transmission [koden]; and, secondly, a process of accepting Buddhism, an act of internal politics. Mter examining these two elements I would like to introduce my views on the revolutionary aspects of the new religion. The political character of the official transmission of religion from one state to another is obvious. In China Buddhism did not have the position enjoyed by Christianity in Europe during the Middle Ages. The act of transmitting Buddhism to a foreign polity by a decision taken by ruler of a Chinese state meant that the former joined the Chinese vassal system, chaifeng Oap. sakuho). The Korean Three Kingdoms are a good example. In 372 Fu Jian, the ruler of Earlier Qin dynasty ordered Buddhism to be transmitted to Koguryo. Similarly, in 384 Emperor Xiaowu of the Eastern Jin dynasty had it transferred to Paekche. However, in the case of the third Korean kingdom of Shilla, the process was twofold, for Buddhism was introduced from Koguryo and the official acceptance of Buddhism by King Pophung in 527 was soon paralleled by establishing diplomatic relationship with Northern Wei China. In case ofJapan the situation appears slightly different. Intentionally I set aside the question of whether Buddhism was transmitted in 538, 548 or 552, sharing the views of historians who believe that there were several missions from Paekche offering Buddhist statues, scriptures and monks as a token of gratitude for the military assistance, which Paekche was so desperately looking for in that period. Hence, bukkyo denrai did not have the character of a gift from a suzerain onto his vassal, as in the case of China in relation to one of the Korean Three Kingdoms. There is a possibility that King Song of Paekche intended to strengthen the relations between the two sides, in expectation of even more extensive help. Neither can we overlook the fact that, at least according to traditional historiography, Crown Prince Sh6toku started to send embassies to Sui and Tang China simultaneously with being active in the field of Buddhism. Buddhist inspiration cannot be excluded. Much more important for my interpretation of bukkyo denrai as the turning point is the process of its implementation into the very fabric ofJapanese society and state. The Japanese buddhologist Tamura Ench6 has divided this process into three periods, 538-622,622-70, and 670-710 (Tamura 1975: 47), but I would 19

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

like to set a divide in 645. I shall not go into any detailed presentation and discussion of the reliability of available sources, but concentrate on examining the role of the emperor, the role of the Soga clan and the nature of Soga Buddhism in opposition to Prince Shotoku's Buddhism. The written sources in our hands are the chronicle Nihon shoki (The chronicles ofJapan) compiled in 720,jOgii shotoku hoo teisetsu (The imperial record of Prince Jogii Shotoku, the Ruler of the Law) from the middle Heian period (794-1185), and GangOji garan engi narabi ni ruki shizaicho (The history of Gangoji temple and the record of its property) from 747, which are based on earlier sources and cannot be viewed as reliable. Fortunately, thanks to scores of years of hard critical toil by Japanese historians, headed by the great Tsuda Sokichi, the process by which Buddhism was accepted by the Japanese ruling class can be largely reconstructed. I share the view of Futaba (1962: 47) that all the pre-Taika reports in the Nihon shoki on the imperial activities in the field of Buddhism are post-Taika interpolations, in other words, that there was no such phenomenon as the role of the emperor. However, in order to grasp the nature of the emperor position better, let us examine three emperors, Kimmei, Suiko and Jomei. What was the motive for Kimmei's 'leaping from joy' (Nihongi: 66) decision to transfer the question of accepting Buddhism onto his ministers? Probably the emperor felt the inevitability of the Soga-Mononobe conflict and believed that taking a neutral stand was the safest possible choice. Much more important is an aspect emphasized by Tamura. According to him, Kimmei and his successors on the throne were aware of the religious sanction of their position. The okimi was the ruler by the power of autochthonous kami. Accepting Buddhism would have deprived the ruler of this religious nimbus, which may have been critical, if we consider the rather weak position of the emperor in this period (Tamura 1994: 72). However, Empress Suiko (r. 592-628) is frequently connected to the important events in the early history of the Japanese Buddhism in studies of Nihon shoki presented by researchers such as Fukuyama Toshio, Futaba Kenko and others, and we are justified in claiming that Suiko took the same stand as Kimmei. It is especially important when we consider the Sanbo koryii no mikotonori, the imperial edict to promote the Three Treasures (Nihongi: 123), and the alleged establishment of 20

BUKKy6 DENRAI: THE TRUE TURNING POINT

the priestly officials [sago] (Nihongi: 153), which was meant as a take-over of the control of the Buddhist community from the hands of the Sogas. I claim that the true face of Empress Suiko can be better seen in her edict from the ninth day, second month and fifteenth year (607) of her reign: We hear that Our Imperial ancestors, in their government of the world, bending lowly under the sky and treading delicately on the ground, paid deep reverence to the Gods of Heaven and Earth. They everywhere dedicated temples to the mountains and rivers, and held mysterious communion with the powers of Nature. Hence the male and female elements became harmoniously developed, and civilizing influences blended together. And now in Our reign, shall there be any remissness in the worship of the Gods of Heaven and Earth. Therefore let Our Ministers with their whole hearts do reverence to the Gods of Heaven and Earth. (Nihongi: 135) 1

However, according to Nihon shoki, the next emperor, Jomei (r. 629-41), ordered the construction of the temple Kudaradaiji, completed already after Taika. As adroitly observed by Tamura (1994: 201), it was only Jomei's personal act of faith. The construction of the Buddhist temple by the ruling okimi did not mean that the leading role of protecting Buddhism went from the hands of the Soga clan to the 'imperial' family. Personally, I posit that one can see here factors introduced by Buddhism already functioning, factors that made a real change possible after Taika (Nihongi: 202-3). The role of the imperial clan was minimal. The true protectors of Buddhism were the Sogas with their clan temple [ujidera] at H6k6ji as its centre. It was the Sogas who played the crucial role for the transmission of Buddhism. In their temple resided the sago controlling the Buddhist community. 2 Buddhism of the Soga clan did not differ much from the kami beliefs. The ujidera played an important role in ancestor worship, similar to the function of kcifun. The Buddha relics, the shari, and later Buddhist statues were the objects of worship, believed to possess magical properties. The first nuns were young girls clearly continuing in the tradition of native priestesses consecrated to the local deities [miko] , a tradition that we can follow in the written sources from the times of Himiko, the queen of the country of Yamai. 3 Hayamizu (1986: 77) has suggested that the Sogas were trying to use Buddhism as a source of religious authority opposite to that of the the 'imperial' clan [okimike], the clan of the rulers. In my opinion this interpretation goes too far. I believe 21

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

the Sogas were the protectors and leaders of Buddhism, controlling the whole community through the Hokoji, and doing their best to strengthen their position to challenge not the imperial clan but other great clans of the nobility [gozoku] and to solidify their control over the families of emigrants from the continent, who were the monopoly holders of the new key technologies. For several reasons we cannot 0n¥t another important factor, Prince Shotoku [Shotoku taishll. Oyama (2000) has recently convincingly argued that 'Shotoku taishi' is a product of a later cult and an intentional construction, so that the person we conveniently call Shotoku taishi and connect with the beginning of the Japanese Buddhism, the internal reforms and the beginning of the diplomatic relations with China, simply did not exist. Basically, I agree with this new view since the analysis of available sources does not provide us with credible data supporting the thesis that Prince Umayado was 'Shotoku taishi'. If we accept the hypothesis that Umayado was just an ordinary prince of the imperial family related to the Sogas, we need to rethink the whole Asuka period (587-645) and conclude that the signifIcance of Soga clan in all fIelds of politics as well as Buddhism was even stronger than we had imagined. Let us assume, however, that the traditional image of Shotoku is correct. Kanaji (1985) has divided the development of the Shotoku's Buddhism into three stages: Buddhism as an incantatory religion, identical to that of the Sogas; Buddhism as a state religion; and Buddhism as a religion for personal awakening. It is not easy to establish the contents of the Shotoku's so-called State Buddhism, however, since we simply get bogged down in doubts concerning the reliability of the records on Shotoku, dazzled by his legendary glow. Let us not get caught by the questions of the authorship of Sangyo gisho [The three commentaries on Buddhist sutras of Prince Shotoku], or whether Shotoku and Soga no Umako acted in co-operation or not. If we accept that the Seventeen-Articles Constitution Uiishichijo kenpo] represents the ideals of Shotoku and his followers, we see that Buddhism is not the centre of the state, but we see also the influence of the ideology brought to Japan by Buddhism. The role of religion in ancient Japanese politics is obvious. This is the world of matsurigoto, the world of unity of religion and politics [saisei itchl]' I believe that the political load of the Buddhism transmitted to Japan determined its revolutionary 22

BUKKy6 DENRAI: THE TRUE TURNING POINT

role. Chinese Buddhism was extremely tightly connected, even subjected, to the state. The monks were officials working for the state, functioning for the state and within the frames set by it. The emperor was viewed as the incarnation of the bodhisattva Maitreya Gap. Miroku). This Buddhism, soaked with politics and state ideology, was divided into two paradigms, those of the Northern and Southern Courts until the unification of China by the Sui dynasty. In Northern China the emperors exercised absolute power, strictly controlling also the Buddhist community. In a letter presented to Emperor Wu (r. 561-79) of the Northern Zhou, Lin Rendao wrote that 'the emperor is like Tathagata, and the princes like bodhisattvas' (Tamura 1994: 37). Buddhist law was to be strictly subjected to the law of the state. On the other hand, in the Southern Court the power and prestige of the emperor was much weaker and the influence wielded by the aristocrats much stronger. The Buddhist community enjoyed broad autonomy, indulging in never-ending disputes over whether the monks should or should not revere the secular ruler. An example can be found in a treaty by Huiyuan (334-416), Shamen bujing wangzhe [un (On monks not revering the ruler; Tsukamoto and Umehara 1987: 78). The Buddhist law was to be equal to the state law. These two trends, two paradigms, of Buddhism met in Japan. Southern Court Buddhism reached Japan through Paekche; it is interesting that the treaty was written in a period when Buddhism from the Eastern Jin was transmitted to Paekche. Northern Court Buddhism came from Koguryo and Shilla. The influences of both traditions soon merged. 4 Whether the Sogas saw their chance in supporting the Southern tradition requires further research. As mentioned above, U mayado was not 'Shotoku', although I would not deny his interest in Buddhism and activities in that field, which might have strengthened Shilla's 'Northern Court tendency' (Tamura 1975). At this point, speculating on the contents of those activities belongs to the realm of fiction, not history. The revolutionary meaning of Buddhism was in its contents rather than its agents and their methods. To summarize, I posit that the strong political colour of Buddhism, its pro-emperor and pro-state stand, was a turning point in the perception by the great clans of the emperor's position and prerogatives, a change of an epistheme, to use Michel Foucault's term. Advocating Buddhism in a challenge to the 23

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

okimike, the Sogas remained in the old patterns of thought. But by doing so they endangered their own position by advocating the new order with the emperor in an unquestionable position at its peak, an order coded in the DNA of Chinese Buddhism. It was only a question of time before the new force would break free from the old frame, making the 'law of Buddha and the law of the ruler the two wheels of one carriage'. BIBLIOGRAPHY Furuta Takehiko. 1983. Yamaikoku no hoho [The ways of the Yamai country]. Osaka: Shinshindii. Futaba Kenkii. 1962. Kodai bukkyo shisoshi kenkyu [Studies in the history of ancient Buddhist thought]. Tokyo: Nagata bunshiidii. Hayamizu Tasuku. 1986. Nihon bukkyoshi: Kodai [The history ofJapanese Buddhism: The ancient period]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kiibunkan. Kanaji Isamu. 1985. 'Three Stages in Shiitoku Taishi's Acceptance of Buddhism', Acta Asiatica 47: 31-47. Inoue Mitsusada. 1965. 'Nihon ni okeru bukkyii tiisei kikan no kakuritsu katei' [The process of establishing the control institutions of Buddhist order in Japan]. In Inoue Mitsusada, Nihon kodai kokka no kenkyu [Studies of the Japanese ancient state]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 323-47. Nihongi: Chronicles ofJapanfrom the Earliest Times to A.D. 697. 1896 (1972). Translated from the original Chinese and Japanese by W G. Aston. Reprint ed. Tokyo: Charles E. Tutde. Oyama Seiichi. 2000. 'Shotoku taishi' no tanjo [The birth of 'Shiitoku taishi']. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kiibunkan. Tamura Enchii. 1975. 'Hanka Shiyuizii to Shiitoku taishi shinkii' [Hanka Shiyuizii and the worship of Prince Shiitoku]. In Shiragi to Asuka, Hakuho no bukkyo bunka [Shilla and the Buddhist culture of the Asuka and Hakuhii periods], edited by Tamura Enchii. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kiibunkan, 43-113. - - . 1994. Asuka, Hakuho bukkyoshi [The history of Buddhism in the Asuka and Hakuhii periods]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kiibunkan. Topolski, Jerzy. 1998. Jak si~ rozumie i pisze histori~ [How to understand and write history]. Warszawa: Oficyna wydawnicza Rytm. Tsukamoto Zenryii, and Umehara Takeshi. 1987. Fuan to gongu: Chugoku jodo [Uneasiness and hope: The Chinese Pure Land Buddhism]. Tokyo: Kadokawa bunkii.

NOTES 1. It is interesting that the translator, W G. Aston, wrote in a note: This edict ... sounds very strange from an Empress who was devoted to Buddhism' (Nihongi: 135). 2. According to Nihon shoki in 614 AD (Suiko 22) one thousand men and women became monks for the sake ofSoga no Umako (Nihon shoki: 145). 3. I follow Furuta (1983) who argues that 'Yamai', the original spelling of the Weizhi worenzhuan, is the proper one. 4. Interesting examples of this process are the names of the sogo. See Inoue (1965). 24

2

1247 as a Turning Point for the Kamakura Shogunate

KONDO SHIGEKAZU

n 1247, Shogunal Regent H6j6 Tokiyori destroyed Miura Ivassals Yasumura, who at the time was one of the most powerful in Kamakura. Although this was a major event in its day, it is only with the benefit of hindsight that we can see the events of 1247 to have had much greater implications than anyone at the time could have foreseen. This paper explores both the political and the social significance of this incident. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SHOGUNATE

First, I would like to discuss the political importance of the Miura affair. Although this incident occurred entirely inside of the shogunate, it was closely related to the movement of the imperial court in Kyoto. So I will begin by detailing the governmental structure of both the shogunate and the imperial court and by explaining their relationship at the time. The Kamakura shogunate ruled from 1180 to 1333, but it was not the only government of Japan at the time, for the imperial court ruled in Kyoto. The latter had held power since the seventh century, though the nature of its authority had changed in quality. The shogunate was a relative newcomer, established in the twelfth century in eastern Japan. Formally, the shogunate relied on the imperial court for legitimation. In reality, however, the Kamakura shogunate was stronger than the court, and when war broke out between these two centres in 1221, Kamakura's decisive victory over Kyoto confirmed the shogunate's power (Mass 1979). 25

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

From its founding in the twelfth century, the shogunate was composed of vassals who swore loyalty to the shogun. But in 1203, a new position called shikken was set up alongside the shogun. In this year, the second shogun, Minamoto Yoriie, lost the confidence of Kamakura vassals and was obliged to resign. The third shogun, Minamoto Sanetomo, Yoriie's younger brother, was placed under the guardianship of Hojo Tokimasa, his grandfather on his mother's side. It was common for a grandfather to act as guardian for his grandchild at the time. Tokimasa's position came to be called shikken. But this was only the initial justification for creating the shikken as a regent for the shogun. Before long it came to be recognized that there was another, more important role for the shikken to play that was distinct from the role of the shogun. The vassals swore loyalty to the shogun, and so on the one hand, the shogun was essential for organizational leadership. On the other hand, the shikken was not a master of vassals but merely the first among vassals. The value of having a powerful vassal who was not head of the shogunate had already begun to be apparent by the 1220s, and so Hojo Yasutoki retained the shikken's position when Kujo Yoritsune was inaugurated as the fourth shogun in 1226. The vassals themselves wanted a shikken in addition to a shogun. Vassals were not only warriors but also estate managers. They fought over the income rights to estates and required higher authorities to guarantee their holdings. In exchange for the loyalty of his vassals, the shogun was obliged to support his men even if their demands were unjust. The shogun could make his vassal win if that vassal conflicted with a non-vassal, but the shogun had nowhere to turn if his vassals conflicted with each other. As master of the both of them, he had an obligation to make both of them win. So the shogun was not always suitable in adjudicating disputes (Kondo 1992). However, the shikken could judge cases between the shogun's vassals because he was not the master of them. That was why the position of a shikken was necessary alongside that of shogun. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE IMPERIAL COURT

The model for this system of two power holders atop the shogunate can be found in the imperial court. Within the Kyoto court, rule by the joko began in 1086. joko usually refers to 'an abdicated emperor', but it was also a position that could be given 26

1247 AS A TURNING POINT FOR THE KAMAKURA SHOGUNATE

to the tenno's father even though he had not held the title of tenno. Rulership by joko is known as 'insei,' combining the terms for the residence (in) of the joko and his rule (sei). Even today the person who retires from a certain position exercises an influence over the successor; such a phenomenon is called insei in modern Japanese slang. However, in the original insei system, only the current tenno's direct ancestors - father, grandfather, or in rare cases, great grandfather - were able to wield influence over the tenno. In other words, real power lay not with the tenno, but with the senior male house head of the tenno's family (Kondo 1999; for the classic study, see Hurst 1976). The best example of this phenomenon is the insei administration of Go-Takakura from 1221 to 1223. Because Go-Takakura had never held the position of tenno, his son was appointed tenno precisely so that Go-Takakura could rule as joko (actually hoo, since he had already taken religious vows). Go-Takakura's appointment in 1221 was the result of the imperial court's defeat by the shogunate. The previous joko, GoToba, was exiled for his plotting against Kamakura, and the shogunate named Go-Takakura to replace Go-Toba. It was not the appointment of Go-Takakura's son as tenno that Kamakura sought, but the appointment of the father as head of the insei; Go-Takakura's son was made tenno solely for the purpose of making his father the most powerful figure in the imperial court. Here we can see two basic tenets. First, the head of the tenno's family was the most powerful figure in the court, not the tenno himself. Second, the shogunate could appoint the head of the imperial government. When there was not a direct line senior male relative to head the tenno's family, then the tenno was the head of his own house and ruled directly. If the tenno was still a child, however, then a regent [sesshO) was appointed and became the most powerful figure in the court. The position of regent was a relic of the preinsei period and highly prized by the top families of the Kyoto nobility. In the thirteenth century the regent only exercised authority when there was no senior house head among the tenno's direct ancestors. It was thought to be preferable for the head of the house to wield power rather than the tenno himself, and so if the tenno was an adult but lacked a senior relative, he would abdicate and take over the insei himself, appointing one of his own children as tenno if possible. In the thirteenth century, the power to determine who would 27

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

be tenn6 or the head of the insei lay with the Kamakura shogunate. Kyoto also relied on Kamakura for military, police, and economic matters, so the position of negotiator with Kamakura was extremely important. The person holding this post was referred to as the kanto moshitsugi. Powerful individuals in Kyoto attempted to monopolize this post, and at the same time those who held the position became more influential within the court. All of these developments form the background to a political understanding of the events of 1240s. THE AFFAIRS OF 1246--47

The destruction of Miura Yasumura by Shikken H6j6 Tokiyori in 1247 was the conclusion of troubles that had begun the year before, when Tokiyori had been appointed to the post of shikken. In the course of securing his position, Tokiyori arranged for the exile of rival Nagoe Mitsutoki, removed several opponents from the Board of Councillors [hyojoshu], and chased the previous shogun Yoritsune out of Kamakura. All of these events heralded the downfall of Yoritsune's father, Kuj6 Michiie, who had been the most powerful man in Kyoto. The fall from power of Michiie and Yoritsune was precipitated by Yoritsune's actions in organizing opposition to the shikken. There had been some tension between the shogun and the shikken since the 1220s. In 1226, the shogun, Yoritsune, was officially recognized as an adult, but since he was a mere nineyear-old, the forty-four-year-old Shikken H6j6 Yasutoki was easily able to run the shogunate. But Yasutoki passed away in 1242, and his heir was his grandson, nineteen-year-old Tsunetoki. Shogun Yoritsune was already twenty-five-year-old, and so it was natural for him to feel dissatisfaction with his affairs being managed by a shikken who was younger than he was. Yoritsune acted upon this dissatisfaction, working to organize an anti-shikken fraction within the shogunate. In 1244, Yoritsune passed his position on to his six-year-old son, but in no way did this signify Yoritsune's intentions to retire. According to thinking of the times, as explained earlier, real power was maintained by the direct line senior male relative of the current office holder. Yoritsune left the office of shogun to become the senior male relative of the new shogun, and therefore maintained his power. Seen in this light, we can consider the instigator of the 1246-47 28

1247 AS A TURNING POINT FOR THE KAMAKURA SHOGUNATE

troubles to be on the shogun's side rather than on the side of the shikken. In the third month of 1246, Shikken Tsunetoki became ill and passed his position on to his younger brother Tokiyori. Just prior to that transfer, though, the former shogun Yoritsune replied to a court request for an opinion from the shogunate. It was not strange for a former shogun to reply on behalf of the current shogun, but it was strange for a former shogun to reply when there was a shikken in office. For example, when in 1235 Michiie asked for Kamakura's opinion regarding inviting the exiled Go-Toba back to Kyoto, it was Shikken Yasutoki who replied with a firm refusal, reflecting the power balance between shogun and shikken at that time. Therefore, when the former shogun in 1246 replied to Kyoto, he was trying to make it clear that the shogun's position was stronger than that of the shikken. At the time of this incident, the opinion that Kyoto had sought from Kamakura was regarding the appointment of the kanto moshitsugi. Yoritsune replied that the appointment should go to former regent Kuj6 Michiie and current regent Ichij6 Sanetsune, who would work co-operatively. These appointments would clearly work to the benefit of Yoritsune, for Michiie was his father and Sanetsune his younger brother. If acted upon, this recommendation would have ensured the position of the Kujohouse in Kyoto as well as confirmed the authority of the shogun over the shikken in Kamakura. However, because the affairs of 1246 ended in a victory for Shikken Tokiyori, it was instead the power of the shikken within the shogunate that was secured. In addition, Kuj6 Michiie was disgraced in Kyoto, and Saionji Saneuji was appointed kanto moshitsugi. Saneuji was the maternal grandfather of GoFukakusa, who became tenno that same year. With these events, Saneuji's position as a power holder in Kyoto was secure, and the kanto moshitsugi became a virtual hereditary position within the Saionji family. THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF THE 1247 AFFAIR

The discussion up to now has focused on how the events of 1247 represented a political turning point and a shift in the relations between power holders in Kyoto and Kamakura. However, I would now like to examine how the destruction of the Miura also heralded a social and economic turning point for the larger medieval warrior society. 29

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

In this incident, vassals who opposed H6j6 Tokiyori, including Miura Yasumura and Chiba Hidetane, were eliminated. Originally, the Miura and Chiba families held landholdings which vastly outnumbered those of the H6j6s. It was only due to the H6j6's sudden rise to prominence in the shogunate that allowed the H6j6 to surpass these rivals, and even so the Miura and Chiba remained large-scale landholders. With the destruction of the Miura and the leading Chiba branch, no other landholding families with territory on a scale comparable to the H6j6 remained. Holdings of the Miura and Chiba were confiscated and redistributed among allies of H6j6 Tokiyori. For example, Shibuya J6shin received the Iriki-in as a part of this action. Iriki-in and four other neighbouring large properties had been awarded to the Chiba when the shogunate was first established and passed down to Hidetane as a family inheritance. Shibuya J6shin had been on the losing side during a political struggle in 1213 and lost many of his land rights, but his decision to ally with Tokiyori in 1247 proved very beneficial to his family fortunes: J6shin and four of his brothers received the Iriki-in along with four other properties (Asakawa 1929). The confiscation and redistribution of the lands of the Miura and Chiba to other vassals were by no means unusual; in fact, such was the normal outcome of battles at the time. The importance of this incident is that it was the last time that such a largescale transfer of lands could be carried out. THE MECHANISM OF THE MEDIEVAL WARRIOR SOCIETY

Warrior society operated with warrior land holdings constantly expanding and being distributed among multiple children. By the early twelfth century, warrior development of farmable land had advanced to a nation-wide scale. Lands were divided among multiple heirs, and so each child was motivated to develop new lands to increase his or her holdings. However, by the middle of the thirteenth century, it became more and more difficult to find new lands without owners and of a quality to allow easy development. Under such conditions, in order for warriors to expand their holdings, they had to take lands from other warriors. Battles involving large-scale land holders satisfied this need by redistributing territory from the losers to the winners. 30

1247 AS A TURNING POINT FOR THE KAMAKURA SHOGUNATE

The Kamakura shogunate was a regime based on a confederation of eastern warriors. Lands which came under the control of the shogunate were distributed to its followers, and eastern warriors came to hold territory all over Japan. The destruction of the Taira in 1185, annihilation of the Oshii Fujiwara in 1189, and the defeat of the imperial court in 1221 all resulted in massive land transfers from those on the losing sides to vassals of the shogunate. Conflicts within the shogunate served the same function of redistributing territory. The 1213 destruction of Wada Yoshimori and the 1247 elimination of Miura Yasumura involved not only the redistribution of the lands directly managed by Wada and Miura, but also the confiscation and reapportionment of the lands of their followers as well. However, following the 1247 disturbance there were no more political incidents that led to massive land redistributions. CHANGES IN MEDIEVAL WARRIOR SOCIETY

The disappearance of wars or political incidents that could lead to large-scale land reapportionment had a tremendous impact on Kamakura warrior society, most notably with regard to inheritance practices. Divided inheritance among multiple heirs, the traditional pattern of inheritance, became difficult if not impossible. With repeated instances of divided inheritance, land holdings inevitably became too small to support bushi land management. By the middle of the thirteenth century, the land holdings of warriors in eastern Japan had already reached a size beyond which they could not be further divided (Mass 1989). For the most part, only those vassals who received lands redistributed in the 1247 incident could divide those newly acquired lands among multiple heirs. To return to the earlier example of Shibuya Joshin, he divided his holdings including the Iriki-in among his five sons, and the one son among them who was primary heir and received the largest portion was able to divide his holdings one further time among his own sons (Joshin's grandchildren). This last division occurred in the year 1265. In total, the Iriki-in was divided into nine portions, with further subdivision impractical and therefore impossible (Asakawa 1929: 134-6, 143, 147-8, Kondo 1996). With divided inheritance no longer possible, the result was that a single child among many had to be designated as the sole heir. It 31

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

had been a long-established principle that all children had a right to inheritance. But it was also an established principle that fathers and mothers were free to designate heirs as they saw fit, and if the transmission was clear, then children could not oppose their parents' wishes. So relying on this latter principle, unitary inheritance became more common over the course of the thirteenth century. However, if a father's (or mother's) intentions were not clear, then all children would frequently become involved in a battle over the estate; if the father's (or the mother's) intention could not be established even after investigation, then the estate would be divided among the contending heirs. Houses relying on estates that were subdivided beyond the point of economic feasibility often failed and had their holdings confiscated. In the case of the Shibuya branch house (the house of J6shin's second son), J6shin's great-grandson died without leaving a will, and his lands were divided by his wife and his children into eight portions in 1329. As these small portions could not support the heirs involved, later they were confiscated by the main Shibuya house. The transition from multiple, divided inheritance to single, unitary inheritance led to an increase in inter-family fighting, with those families unable to overcome such squabbles failing to survive. This condition only stabilized around the year 1500. In short, although it was apparent by the year 1300 that divided inheritance was no longer feasible, it took over 200 years before new inheritance practices became firmly established in warrior society. I believe that the extended period of civil disturbances that characterized the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are in part attributable to these social upheavals surrounding inheritance. Warrior society was very different when unitary inheritance became the established practice. Under multiple inheritance, the standing of all the children - sons as well as daughters - had varied little. Girls could expect to receive as boys, and mothers were able to pass on holdings as were fathers. Under single inheritance, however, only one heir was selected from among all the children, and this was usually the oldest boy. The other children became dependent on their elder brother. Girls could not expect to receive as boys, and among the male children the difference between the eldest son and the others was significant. Along with these changes, expectations of increasing the size of holdings largely disappeared; it was sufficient to retain certain properties over several generations. There were numerous 32

1247 AS A TURNING POINT FOR THE KAMAKURA SHOGUNATE

consequences for society. For example, during the period of divided inheritance and expanding land holdings, it was common for people to take the names of the places where they resided, and so the name of fathers and sons were often different. However, with single inheritance and less change in the location of holdings, family names came to be fixed, a practice which continues until today. While these changes only gradually became apparent over the next century, the 1247 destruction of Miura Yasumura marks a starting point for several important medieval social trends. CONCLUSION

The incident of 1247 was brought about by a political system which, although recognizing the shogun as the top authority, still had need for a shikken to mediate disputes. Unable to expand into new lands, landholders adjoining one another were forced to use disputes to grab land from each other if they hoped to pass territory to more than one child. Yet, ironically, it was also this incident that marked the beginning of the end of divided inheritance. A key turning point in Kamakura history, from this date the society that had needed a powerful shikken began to move in a very different direction. Translated by Ethan Isaac Segal BIBLIOGRAPHY Asakawa, Kan'ichi. 1929. The Documents if Iriki. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. CD-ROM version, 2000. Tokyo: Kinokuniya. Hurst, G. Cameron, III. 1976. Insei: Abdicated Sovereigns in the Politics if Late Heian Japan, 1086-1185. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Kondo Shigekazu. 1989. 'Chiisei zaisan sozokuho no seiritsu' [Establishment of medieval Japanese inheritance Law]. In Kazoku to josei no rekishi [History of woman and family], edited by Zenkindaijoseishi kenkyiikai. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 320-43. - - . 1992. 'Honryo ando to tochigyochi ando' [Honryo ando and tochigyochi ando]. In Miyako to hina no chiiseishi [The urban and rural medieval history], edited by Susumu Ishii. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 233--66. - - . 1996. 'Leadership in the Medieval Japanese Warrior Family'. In Leaders and Leadership in Japan, edited by Ian Neary. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 2-25. - - . 1999. 'Insei: The Rule by the Abdicated Emperor', RomanianJournal ifJapanese Studies 1: 129-38. Mass, Jeffrey P. 1979. The Development if Kamakura Rule, 1180--1250: A History with Documents. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. - - . 1989. Lardship and Inheritance in Early Medieval Japan: A Study if the Kamakura Sarya System. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 33

3

A Turning Point in Court-Bakufu Relations During the Edo Period

VALDO FERRETTI

characteristic feature of Japanese history for the period going from the 'rise of the warriors' in the twelfth and thirA teenth centuries up to the Meiji Restoration of 1868 was the double authority exerted by the shogun, as chief of the warrior class and peak of the power structure, through which the latter dominated society; and by the imperial court whose offices remained the same as those of the Taih6 Code [Taiho ritsuryOJ and of the Heian era. Although their function was increasingly becoming only religious and ceremonial, they were endowed with sacred respect and enlightened by a sort of magic aura. Moreover, the idea that the legal foundation of the rule of the buke, or military families, resided with the imperial function was never formally abandoned while the aristocracy conserved both some limited influence, especially in the area of Kyoto, and some economic revenues of its own. The margin of independence that the court as a whole was enjoying during the last epoch of pre-modern Japan, corresponding to the Tokugawa shogunate, was probably narrower than in any time before, even allowing the reflection of some contemporary thinkers that emperors were not monarchs (Wakabayashi 1991: 28-9) in the true sense or at least in the same way as they had been in ancient times. Nonetheless, recent historiography is gradually finding out glimmers, often unnoticed before, showing that between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries the limited autonomy left to the imperial palace and the aristocracy by Tokugawa Ieyasu showed signs of revival. This change was connected with 34

A TURNING POINT IN COURT-BAKUFU RELATIONS

change of the Japanese society and concerned political history as well. Although gaining interest among Japanese scholars, the story of the relationships between the imperial court and the feudal government [bakufu] in the Edo period is still suffering from a kind of historiographic impasse. In fact, most specialists focus on the Tokugawa period from the seventeenth century roughly up to the middle of the eighteenth century or on the years preceding the Bakumatsu period, and rarely go back more than to the Kansei Reforms [Kansei no kaikaku] (1787-93). Following a pattern often accepted for topics broader than institutional history, the watershed of the 1780s is rarely taken into account in both currents of research. It is clear, however, that a major transformation of the balance between Edo and Kyoto was taking place towards the 1760s, roughly speaking between the tenure of Yoshimune as shogun (r. 1716-45) and the rOju years of Tanuma Okitsugu (1772-87). Therefore, developments that ripened at the close of the eighteenth century and continued thereafter must be understood in the light of the crisis encountered by the shogunate and, more broadly speaking, by the society and culture of the preceding decades. Recent research has thrown new light on the attitude of resistance shown by the court after 'the black ships' of Commodore Matthew Perry reached the shores of Japan a century later and especially on the eve of the negotiations of the commercial treaty signed with the United States in 1858. A problem open to historians has become the process which ultimately made Emperor K6mei and his advisers having greater success in facing the shogunate than in any other moment in the Edo period. Actually, although it was not military or economic power that mattered in the Bakumatsu period, it would be difficult for anyone to question that this time confrontation was taking place between two subjects able to engage each other. Hence it should be explained precisely when the court had grasped the power it was making use of trying to check the bakufu and how it was possible for it to grasp that power. In ideological terms it is clear that even an intellectual like Nakai Chikuzan, who was close to Matsudaira Sadanobu, had a very clear idea about the imperial source of bakufu authority (Fujita 1999a: 15), and probably influenced the views of his patron, although he took a different stand on eve of the so-called 35

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

Songo Incident [Songo ikken] in 1789 (ibid.: esp. 124ff).1 Moreover, although research by Japanese scholars is providing us with new material, the basic question when the process of the politization of the court [chotd seijika] first took shape still remains at least partly unanswered. In order to discuss this problem it will be useful to try pointing first to the features of political autonomy in the activity of the imperial institutions after the Kansei Reforms and later to go back to the period preceding them. Findings presented by Japanese scholars will make this work easier. We know today that in the very dramatic days of the coup d'etat of Ii Naosuke in 1859, traditionally linked to the beheading of Yoshida Shoin and Hashimoto Sanai or to the imprisonment of powerful daimyo like Tokugawa Nariaki and Matsudaira Shungaku, perhaps a more impressive clash was avoided. In the attempt to impede the ratification of the Ansei Treaty which opened five new ports to foreigners, for a moment the obstinate Emperor Komei thought of abdicating (Inoue 1993). That was the extreme resort left to the tenno during the Tokugawa period, bringing to mind the strong gesture of his ancestor GoMizunoo on the eve of the Shie Incident (1627) and of his protest against Shogun Iemitsu's and Hidetada's policies vis-avis the big Kyoto monasteries. It should not be overlooked, however, that times had changed in the meantime. Just after the Songo Incident it was noticed that a coming together was possible among nobles [kugyo] who had been punished for their intransigent stand towards the bakufu, like Nakayama Naruchika, and discontented feudal lords (Fujita 1999a: 40-1). During the Ansei period (1854-60), unlike the seventeenth century, it was - if not commonly, at least occasionally - sensed that an offence to the emperor, even if by the bakufu, could stir up discontent and possibly rebellion among the daimyo, and even lead to the extreme point of civil war.2 Perhaps nobody would be able to say safely whether Emperor Komei ever played with ideas of that kind, but we know that he gave up his intentions for a highly calculated reason. The letters he exchanged with Kujo Naotada, the retired kanpaku, show that the emperor was considering that if he should retire, the regency would be taken over by Takatsukasa Masamichi, the former kanpaku. The latter's loyalty to the bakufu will be dealt with later, but, although paying attention to this point also, it looks as if Komei took into account other factors. Although clashing with the prince over 36

A TURNING POINT IN COURT-BAKUFU RELATIONS

the treaty issue, which had led Masamichi to give up the position of taiko or the former kanpaku with right to access to the imperial papers, Masamichi had later bowed and endorsed the negative attitude of the emperor. Hence, the reason for K6mei's mistrust must be found somewhere else, probably revealing other chiaroscuro areas in the back of his mind. The Kan'in no miya branch of the imperial house, to which K6mei belonged, had been on the throne since 1780 and disliked the Takatsukasa after the Song6 Incident. Neither did the emperor want Masamichi, who had been in office for thirtyfour years from 1823 to 1856 and had kept most of his powers afterwards as well, to come to his duties again behind the mask of a powerless eight-year-old sovereign. More fundamentally, going against a pattern of the Tokugawa period which made the kanpaku politically stronger than the emperor himself, letters written by K6mei manifest his joy in getting rid of the powerful courtier. Through the above reconstruction the historian Inoue Kazuo links to the traditionally studied main topics of the turning point of Bakumatsu - the dispute over the shogunal succession and the commercial treaty issue - another contrast nourished inside the gates of imperial palace between K6mei and the kuge, or 'civilian nobilities', houses most loyal to the feudal government (Inoue 1993). The role of the Takatsukasa is at the centre of the discussion of another Japanese researcher, Takano Toshihiko. He argues that after 1795 when Ichij6 Teruyoshi, who had sustained Emperor K6kaku at the peak of tension with Edo during the Song6 Incident, retired, the ranking of kanpaku, the highest in power of the palace, was held for fifty-two years by Masamichi's father Masahiro and later by Masamichi himself, although with a ten-year interruption under Ichij6 Tadakata. As the predecessor of Teruyoshi, Takatsukasa Sukehira had remained close to the bakuJu in the early stage of the incident, relinquishing the office in 1791, Takano (1993: 209-12) argues that since 1795 the tradition of much shorter tenures of the kanpaku had been broken. The feudal government was going to use the Takatsukasa, and to make it famous as the richest among the kuge houses, in order to keep firm control over the palace. Hence it looks as if the loyalty of the other sekke - the five families descending from the old Fujiwara clan whose members in the Edo period had the exclusive privilege to be appointed to 37

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

the ranking of kanpaku and sesshO, an imperial regent for a minor emperor - was or appeared to be less certain. As a consequence the traditional rule of alternation among them was suspended and a rift in the body they represented appeared for the first time. For that very reason the first half of the nineteenth century should be seen as a period of transition, but by enlarging the picture and marking two more points, a parallel process can be revealed. The bakufu was striving to strengthen its own prestige, developing more and more the strategy of having court ranks and offices granted to persons close to itself or cultivating the goodwill of the court. The most representative example of that trend was the request sent in 1826, and accepted in 1827, to have the title of dajo daijin, the highest court rank, bestowed on Shogun Ienari. Two years earlier the Edo government had restored the right for the abdicated emperor to give audience in the Shugakuin imperial villa, and other initiatives, which could seem connected, were going in the same direction. As Masamichi's diary leads us to understand the purpose was to make the relations between both institutions more cordial. The bakufu demand itself was presented in an unusual way. Instead of proceeding through the courtiers in charge of the relations between the bakufu and the imperial court - the usual buke tenso line - fixed by custom and ceremonial, Matsudaira Yasutoo, the Kyoto deputy [Kyoto shoshidaz] , personally paid a visit to Masamichi's house and talked with him of the shogun's wish. Such an extraordinary procedure probably was indicative of Ienari's personal interest in the matter. Though some arguments could be put forward to justify it - Ienari's father Hitotsubashi Harusada had been promoted in his court rank the year before; Ienari's tenure as shogun itself dated for forty years and he already held the office of sadaijin immediately inferior to dajo daijin - the request had no precedent in the Edo period. Shogun Hidetada had been appointed dajo daijin in the seventeenth century but only after his abdication; and to discover other examples one had to go back to the cases of Ashikaga Yoshimasa and Yoshimitsu in the Muromachi period. Mter some hesitation and soul-searching the court complied with the request (Fujita 1999b). Fujita (1999a: 10-16) has offered a description of the historical background of that event. The bakufu worried over the early attempts by the Westerners to break the sakoku policy and was trying to suit the imperial 38

A TURNING POINT IN COURT-BAKUFU RELATIONS

court, which was not unaware in its turn of the threat from outside and, more in general, of what was happening. Matsudaira Sadanobu wrote of how the domestic problem created through the peasants' riots and revolts and the new threat coming from outside were combining with each other (ibid.: 10-11). The overall impression which we may gather from the above studies is that after the Songo Incident, the shogunate was suspicious of the too independent feelings in the aristocracy and ultimately was led to tighten the mechanism of control created at the time of Tokugawa Ieyasu. Nonetheless, the growth of court influence was not slackening, making appeasing policies opportune. In other words, the imperial palace remained as an established political factor, in spite of the heavy hand of Matsudaira Sadanobu and his ultimate victory, while keeping some influence also after the fall of the powerful minister. The above considerations are not enough to answer our initial question about material events signifYing the start of a new phase in court-bakufu relations, however. Before the imperial title incident, the fire of the imperial palace in 1788 should be taken into account. In brief, the bakufu, which did not want to take on heavy expenses, was inclined to concede to the simple reconstruction of the destroyed imperial palace. However, after tiring negotiations, the government ultimately gave in and approved of the building of a structure which to a large degree reproduced the magnificent structure of the Heian period. In 1790 the pompous return of the emperor to his luxury residence (Fujita 1991; Takano 1993: 201-9), which the bakufu did not or could not hinder, sealed the success of Emperor Kokaku in the dispute and a triumphal reaffirmation of the prestige of the throne. In other words, just before 1790 court wishes could not be simply ignored by the shogunate and in that sense constituted a kind of power already. In that respect the role of the Takatsukasa house is worth further attention. Emperor Komei's enthusiasm for Masamichi's resignation as taiko in 1859 ('Thank God', lien no joryoku, he wrote to Kujo Naotada; Inoue 1993: 241) looks like an additional symptom of the absolutist notions cherished by this emperor (cf. Yasumaru 1990). They can be placed in the framework of the compromising attitude of the bakufu after the palace rebuilding issue and of the crisis of the control mechanism exerted through the five sekke. It can be concluded that the 39

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

reduction of tenno authority to mere ceremony or to magic/religious content was starting to vanish between the Kansei and the Ansei periods. The historian Kato Tomoyasu (1995: esp. 183-8) has pointed out that the movement which from the seventeenth century had been pleading for the 'Return to the old' had taken on such a dimension towards 1790 as to nourish a direct contrast between court and the bakufu, explaining the events discussed above of Kokaku's reign and his clash with Matsudaira Sadanobu. If that is true, one cannot but notice that the outcome was produced while the first signals of Western menace to the policy of sakoku could be seen. Hence both factors were interrelating in an unexpected way, producing combined impetus for the development that was to follow. Moreover, the palace affair seems to have occurred too early to explain the Edo attitude only through the need to protect the prestige of the Tokugawa government, which worried about the threat posed by the Europeans. 3 It is doubtful whether other more complex elements were barging in behind the so-called 'Return to the old' movement. 4 All through eighteenth-century Japanese society many cultural or religious trends were more or less confusedly anticipating germs which were to mature on the eve of Bakumatsu. Examples of such 'germs' are Suika shinto and the evolution of Kokugaku, the revival of imperial symbols and images in popular cultures, 'opposition literature' represented by authors like Yamagata Daini and Chikamatsu Hanji6 , resurgent social prestige and religious leadership of the aristocracy. Besides, such phenomena were probably bringing to life values and ideas which, although never fading completely, had been declining from the Muromachi and Sengoku periods. Beginning from the reign of Go-YOzei (r. 1586-1611) the Japanese emperors had been recovering the idea of being the heirs of Jimmu tenno; after them Emperor Reigen (r. 1663-87) had shown an independent attitude to the control structure built by the Tokugawa shogunate. 7 Later, the consciousness of sovereignty had been strongly reviving, especially under the tenure of Emperor Sakuramachi (r. 1735-47). He had reaffirmed his priestly authority in the context of Shinto vs. the shrines directly depending on the imperial throne, and after an interruption of more than one century signed his letters as the 116th successor of Jimmu, while at the same time actively promoting 40

A TURNING POINT IN COURT-BAKUFU RELATIONS

the revival of ancient ceremonies and rituals. 8 The influence on him of Suika shinto is not certain, in spite of the claims of conservative Japanese historians (Kondo 1994), but it is apparent that the doctrine taught on the eve of the Horeki Incident by Takenouchi Shikibu was more aggressive than his master Yamazaki Ansai's had ever been, although we still ignore the details of the former's teaching to the court nobles. It is far more important that such cultural and ideological change was roughly contemporary with the challenge to social stability represented by the peasant uprisings of the same period, when imperial symbols were sometimes appealed to as if they signified a just alternative to warrior rule. These circumstances were not unrelated in their turn to the Meiwa Incident in 1767 and to the thinking of radical intellectuals like Yamagata Daini. Family links between buke and kuge were enhancing the prestige of the court of Kyoto. Although highly controversial, it is difficult to question that the above atmosphere gave more substance to the traditional doctrine and idea, also spread to some extent among peasants and commoners, that the bakufu depended upon imperial investiture, and that the emperor was above the shogun. Is it by chance that Matsudaira Sadanobu, though paying a duty visit to the imperial tombs on visiting Kyoto in 1788, overlooked that of the 'rebel' Go-Daigo (Fujita 1991: 99)? Moreover, the court showed its new standing towards the feudal government, only on the issue of the palace reconstruction. Apparently, we may link such an outcome to the personality or the education of Kokaku and to his sokkin or retainers, who had probably absorbed some of the new ideas at the time of the Horeki Incident of 1757-58. Also the closeness between both episodes confirms that their roots were to some extent common and older. Not only the Songo Incident and the palace affair started roughly in the same years, but evidence suggests that Matsudaira Sadanobu was thinking about both issues at the same time (Fujita 1991: 15), linking them to each other. Their significance belongs to the same historical perspective. If the Songo Incident roughly anticipated Emperor Komei's standing six decades later, the palace question showed that Kyoto could already exert pressure successfully on the bakufu. Hence the basic conclusion seems to be that in chronological terms Emperor Kokaku's reign should be seen as marking a 41

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

new period which would continue after his abdication in 1807 From then on the Kyoto aristocratic society was to be one of the stages where the destiny of Tokugawa bakufu was to be decided. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ferretti, Valdo. 1996. 'Emperor Reigen and the Change in Court-Bakufu Relations since the Tenna to the Kyoho Era', East and ~st (IsIao) 112: 167-74. Fujita Satoru. 1989. 'Kanseiki no chotei to bakufu' [Court and bakufu in the Kansei period], Rekishigaku kenkyii 599: 98-106. - - . 1991. 'Kansei nairi zoei 0 meguru chobaku kankei' [The relations between court and feudal government in connection with the building of the palace in the Kansei period], Nihon rekishi 517: 1-17. - - . 1994. Bakumatsu no tenno [The emperors of the Bakumatsu period). Tokyo: Kodansha. - - . 1999a. Kinsei seijishi to tenno [Emperors and political history of the Tokugawa period). Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan. - - . 1999b. 'Tenpoki no chotei to bakufu' [Feudal government and court in the Tenpo period), Nihon rekishi 616: 1-19. Fukaya Katsumi. 1991. Kinsei no kokka: Shakai to tenno [The state in the Tokugawa period: The emperors and the society). Tokyo: Azekura shobo. Hashimoto Masanobu. 2000. 'Sakuramachi tenno no kan'i seido kaikaku to choi no kakusei' [The awakening of court power and the reform of the rankings system under Emperor Sakuramachi). In Zo ga yuku: Shogun Yoshimune to kyotei 'miyabi' [The elephant comes: Shogun Yoshimune and 'elegance' in the imperial court), edited by Kasumi kaikan shiryo tenshi iinkai. Tokyo: Kasumi kaikan, 167-75. Hayashi Motoi. 1974. 'Kinsei minshii no shakai: Seiji shiso kenkyii no shiryoteki kiso' [The documentary basis of research on popular thought, politics and society in Tokugawa Japan), Senshii shigaku 6: 32-54. Inoue Kazuo. 1993. 'Bakumatsu seijishi no naka no tenno: Anseiki no tenno chotei no fujo' [The emperors in the political history of Bakumatsu. The emperors of the Ansei period: the emergence of the court). In Zenkindai no tenno [Emperors before the contemporary age), 2, edited by Ishigami Eiichi, et al. Tokyo: Aoki shoten,215-48. Kato Tomoyasu. 1995. 'Chogi no kozo to sono tokushitsu' [The structure of court ceremonials and their special characters). In Zenkindai no tenno [Emperors before the contemporary age), 5, edited by Ishigarni Eiichi, et al. Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 149-89. Kondo Keigo. 1994. 'Horeki no hen' [The Horeki change), Geirin 3: 2-23. Kubo Takako. 1997. Kinsei no chotei un' ei: Chobaku kankei no tenkai [The conduct of the court in Tokugawa Japan: The development of court-bakufu relations). Tokyo: Iwata shoin. Takano Toshihiko. 1993. 'Goki bakuhansei to tenno' [Emperors and the late Tokugawa feudal system). In Zenkindai no tenno [Emperors before the contemporary age), 2, edited by Ishigarni Eiichi, et al. Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 175-213. - - . 1996. Kinsei Nihon no kokka kenryoku to shiikyo [Religion and the power of the state in TokugawaJapan). 2nd ed. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai. 42

A TURNING POINT IN COURT-BAKUFU RELATIONS Totman, Conrad D. 1993. Early Modern Japan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. 1991. 'In Name Only: Imperial Sovereignity in Early Modern Japan', The Journal ofJapanese Studies 17: 25-57. - - . 1995. Japanese Loyalism Reconstrned: Yamagata Daini's Ryiishi shinron of 1759. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. Walthall, Ann. 1991. Peasant Uprisings in Japan: A Critical Anthology of Peasant Histories. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Webb, Herschel. 1968. The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Yasumaru Yoshio. 1990. 'Kindai tenkanki no tenn6z6' [Imperial images in the turning points of contemporary history], Shiso 789: 138-50.

NOTES 1. The Song6 Incident is a major episode in the Japanese history of the eighteenth century. For a recent historiographic appraisal, see Takano (1993: 205ft); for a more traditional approach, see Webb (1968). 2. Cf. the documents quoted in Fujita (1989: 104) and Fukaya (1991: 47-8). Fukaya has suggested that Tokugawa Ieyasu envisaged the same kind of menace to the bakufu early in the seventeenth century. 3. This problem was not substantial before 1790, see Totman (1993: 482ft). 4. For a comprehensive treatment, see Fujita (1994). 5. For extensive materials, see Takano (1996) and Walthall (1991). 6. See the surveys of Hayashi (1974) and Wakabayashi (1995). 7. I have dealt with this subject in Ferretti (1996) which contains additional bibliographic references. 8. See especially Sakurarnachi's letter dated Genbun 3/12116, reproduced in Hashimoto (2000: 25).

43

4

The Starting Point of Modern Japanese-Korean Relations: The Letter Incident of 1869

LIONEL BABICZ

t is 30 January, 1869, in Pusan, Korea. Inside the wakan, the Japan House, Kawamoto Kuzaemon, an official envoy from ITsushima, hands a copy of a letter sent by the lord of his domain to the language officer, An Tong-jun. The letter ran as follows: From Taira no Yoshitatsu, Courtier, Lord of Tsushima, and Major General of the Left Imperial Guards ofJapan ... In our country times have changed completely. Political power has been restored to the imperial house .... A special ambassador ... shall bring you news of that event .... I was summoned by imperial edict, and the court ... raised my title and rank ... and appointed me to manage diplomatic affairs with your country ... and also granted me official warrant and seal. The letter which the ambassador will present to you bears the new seal. . .. Although the old seal cannot be easily abandoned, it has to be done, because of a special order from the court. How could there be a principle by which the public interest may be harmed by the private one? (Tabohashi 1940: 151-2; Choe 1972: 147)

Kawamoto briefly informed An of the Meiji Restoration, then asked him to forward this 'advance note', as it was officially named, to the office in charge of Japanese matters in Tongnae and to the Department of Rites in the capital. This was the official way. An listened to Kawamoto, read the letter carefully and responded in anger. His anger was directed at the use of such terms as 'imperial house' or 'imperial edict', which could only 44

STARTING POINT OF MODERN JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS

be used by the Chinese, and at the arbitrarily discarding of the official seal given by the Koreans. An duly notified Kawamoto of his rejection of the letter, and furiously left the wakan (Tab ohashi 1940: 156; Choe 1972: 148; Shim 1997: 83). This tense meeting marked the starting point of modern Japanese-Korean relations. For Japan, the letter incident signalled the beginning of its involvement in Korea, and also on the Asian mainland. For Korea, it was the start of its tragic modern history: a few years later, in 1876, the country would eventually comply with Japanese demands, open up and insert itself into a new and modern international framework. As may be expected, this incident is not presented in the same way in Japan and in Korea. Here is, for instance, how Kokushi daij'iten (The great dictionary ofJapanese history) describes these events: Immediately after its inauguration, the Meiji government sent a diplomatic letter to Korea, asking her to establish diplomatic relations. Arguing that the characters for emperor [kO] and imperial rescript [choku) could not be used for the Japanese emperor, that the sadae relationship with China [relationship of service to a superior) stood at the basis of the international relations, and that Korea was equal to Japan, the Taewon'gun [father of the minor king who held the real power) rejected the Japanese letter. In 1875, amidst the appeals to subdue Korea [seikanron], Japan exercised pressure on Korea through military action taken by the ship Un'yo, and a year later signed with the Min clan government the Japanese-Korean Treaty of Friendship [Nitcho shiiko job] at Kanghwa, by which Korea was opened. (Kokushi daijiten, 9 [1988): 603)

This is the standard Japanese presentation. At the beginning was Korea's will to perpetuate the old order, which clashed with Japan's intention to modernize the relations between the two countries. The reason for the Korean rejection of the Japanese letter is thus presented as being Korea's national isolation policy. This rejection led to calls to subdue Korea, which in turn led to the Un'yo incident, and to the opening of Korea in 1876 (Kang 1977: 140-2; 1994: 60-3; Yamada, et al. 1991: 14; Kimijima and Sakai 1992: 26-34). From the Korean point of view, things look a bit different. At the beginning, says standard Korean historiography, were the Japanese feelings of superiority over Korea. Japan's aim was to make the Korean king a tributary of the Japanese emperor, and to establish the superiority of the latter over the former. These ideas were at the root of the 1868 letter, which Korea had no 45

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

choice but to reject. This rejection lead to the Un'yo incident, and to the opening of Korea (Kang 1977: 140; Kim 1990: 116-8; Pak 1990: 96-101; Cheong 1993: 25-6). Who is right? I will try to show that both are right. The letter incident was indeed part of the modernization ofJapan's foreign relations, but it was also the expression of a will to raise Japan's position vis-a.-vis Korea within the traditional Chinese system. A GROWING DISTANCE: KOREA AND JAPAN AT THE END OF THE EDO PERIOD

The main objective of the new Meiji government in the field of foreign relations has been defined as pursuing the task of ichigenka, or unification, that is, establishing the exclusive control of the central government over foreign relations. The Western powers constituted the first target of that unification process. They had to be convinced of the legitimacy and the good will of the new Japanese leadership. Only then could the relations with the Asian neighbours be unified as well. This objective would be achieved for China in 1871, and for Korea in 1876 (Arano 1988: 245-92; Unno 1995: 11-12). Indeed, at the time of the letter incident, Japanese-Korean relations were still part of a triangular Japan-Korea-Tsushima relationship, and it was actually Tsushima which urged the central government to deal with Korea. The government would seize the opportunity and mark its territory. Tsushima's attempts to get the central authorities involved in Korean affairs can be traced back to the beginning of the 1860s. The domain had been in bad shape for a long time. Its trade with Korea was in continuous decline. In 1861, the Russians had made an attempt to seize part of the domain's territory. Tsushima hoped to find rescue in a total re-shaping of the Japanese relations with Korea, and submitted detailed proposals to the bakufu, the feudal government. Mter the change of power in 1868, the same suggestions were put forward again to the Meiji government. Actually, the traditional frame of Japanese-Korean relations, as it had been defined at the beginning of the seventeenth century, had been undermined long before. The trade between Tsushima and Korea was constantly declining, and since 1776 Tsushima had been receiving regular financial assistance from Edo. It was thanks to this assistance that the domain could 46

STARTING POINT OF MODERN JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS

survive economically. No official Korean delegation had come to Japan since 1811, and that delegation did not go further than Tsushima. The last visit to Edo by Korean envoys had been in 1764. The growing distance between Japan and Korea could also be noticed in the intellectual field. Paradoxically, the growing strategic interest that some Japanese thinkers had been showing in Korea since the end of the eighteenth century expressed, by its lack of realism, how Korea was actually becoming an imaginary entity in Japanese minds. Already at the end of the eighteenth century, Hayashi Shihei was speaking about the importance of Korea for Japan's security. In the 1820s, Sat6 Nobuhiro turned to a more aggressive stance, and called for the conquest of Manchuria, Kamchatka, Korea and China. Both Hayashi and Sat6 referred to the legendary conquests of Korea by Empress Jingii, and to the historical Korean expeditions of Hideyoshi. Sat6 also justified his expansionist claims by the divine essence of Japan, ancestor of all nations of the universe. Mter 1853, similar ideas were expressed both by opponents and by supporters of the bakufu. Yoshida Sh6in stressed the natural inferiority of Korea to Japan. Hashimoto Sanai called for Japanese territorial expansion to Korea and Manchuria, while Yokoi Sh6nan and Katsu Kaishii dreamed of commercial breakthroughs in the Korean peninsula and on the continent (Kimura 1995: 16-20). The theme uniting these ideas was their lack of realism. Not one of these men had ever tried to understand Korean realities and what the nature of its relations with Tsushima consisted in. Their ideas were but mental constructions, cut off from the real world. But they were nevertheless important, because taken together they expressed their authors' ideals and the prevalent state of mind in Japan. Empress Jingii, Hideyoshi, Korea as naturally submissive to Japan were all accepted wisdom, a wisdom which was soon to be used as justification for much more concrete proposals. These expansionist ideas fell on attentive ears in Tsushima. The domain was still retarding economically, and its leadership was increasingly worried about the security of their territory, after the Russian attempt to build a military basis on the island in 1861-62. The British got involved, the Russians withdrew, an anti-bakufu faction took power in Tsushima and concluded an alliance with Ch6shii, inducing Tsushima leaders to undertake 47

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

a new appraisal of Tsushima's relationship with Korea, stressing the urgent need to redefine the very root of those links. Tsushima would try to translate the traditional, unrealistic notions of the time into realistic proposals. InJune 1863, Tsushima submitted to the bakufu a request for assistance, stressing the need for a total re-definition of the Japanese relations with Korea (Kimura 1995: 22-3; Shim 1997: 16-23). Tsushima reminded the bakufu of the threat to Japanese security that a foreign seizure of Korea would pose. The goal of Japanese policy should therefore be to obtain Korea's obedience, that is, to put Korea under Japanese influence. To attain this goal, Japan should first show its good will and its readiness to help Korea. Only if Korea rejected the Japanese offers of friendship should force be used. Tsushima did not phrase its request in narrow economic terms, but in broad security ones. Moreover, Tsushima was suggesting a new and concrete model of action. First, try to persuade. Only if persuasion did not work, use force. Tsushima's proposals were not very detailed, but this two-step approach opened new perspectives. Its realism could win it the support of both the hard-liners and of those in favour of a more pacific policy. This new approach would find its definitive form in November 1864, in a written memorial [kenpakusho] addressed to the hakufu by Oshima Tomonoj6, one of Ts~shima's main leaders (Kimura 1995: 23-5; Shim 1997: 31-3). Oshima would later be deeply involved in the re-definition of Japan's Korea policy after the l\1-eiji Restoration and in the letter incident. The goal stated by Oshima in his 1864 memorial was immense, amounting to no less than a total re-shaping of relations between Japan and Korea. Most of the elements that would characterize Japanese policy in the fIrSt years of the Meiji period were already present. Korea was defined in both strategic and economic terms. The goal was to make Korea obedient to Japanese will. The tactics proposed were to use a stick-andcarrot approach. Oshima explained that Korea was a proud country from which the Japanese could not expect immediate submission. Therefore, Japan should fIrSt show its good will, its readiness to help. Only in the case Korea rejected Japanese friendship should threat, and eventually force, be used. As he put it, three means should be alternatively used towards Korea: gentleness, threat and benefit. Concretely speaking, Oshima was aiming at the 48

STARTING POINT OF MODERN JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS

opening of a number of Korean harbours and abolition of all restrictions on bilateral trade. In order to achieve these goals, Japan should try to bypass the 'brutal and cruel' Korean government and speak directly to the Korean people, to persuade the population that its real interest lay in supporting the Japanese demands. Japan should also be ready to make a show of force, and should eventually send military vessels on manoeuvres along the Korean coasts. Tsushima's approach to Korea was undeniably full of contempt and of feelings of superiority, but it was also characterized by a real attempt at understanding Korean conditions. As the letter incident would ultimately show, Tsushima did not understand Korea much better than others in Japan: the domain would not even be able to inform the neighbouring country of the Meiji Restoration. But for now, Tsushima's approach was characterized by some sort of appealing realism. Indeed, Tsushima and Edo would start to work out plans in order to translate these suggestions into concrete moves. They would plan the dispatching of a delegation directly to Seoul, an unthinkable act in the traditional framework of relations. And on the very eve of the Meiji Restoration, the bakuJu would even attempt, without success, to send a mission to Korea for mediation with France and the United States, countries Korea had just been involved in fighting with. But time was too short, and the task of dealing with Korea would pass over to the new Meiji government (Choe 1972: 139-44; Kimura 1995: 24-5; Shim 1997: 33-58). SELF-PROMOTION VS. CENTRALIZATION: TSUSHIMA AND THE NEW MEI]I GOVERNMENT

Tsushima's groundwork started soon after the Meiji Restoration. The main active figure was Oshima Tomonoj6, who had already lobbied the bakuJu forcefully. The_ first step Tsushima took was apparently to send a letter from Oshima to Kido Takayoshi on 9 March, 1868 (Shim 1997: 69-70). The two men knew each other quite well, from the time of the Tsushima-Ch6shu alliance. Kido was now one of the main leaders of the government and in charge of foreign affairs. Oshima asked Kido to meet with his domain lord, S6 Yoshitatsu, who would come to Tokyo in order to discuss the Korean question. Tsushima's first aim was to see to it that its traditional role 49

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

as intermediary bet\yeen Japan and Korea was confirmed. This was the purpose of Oshima's letter, and of other letters to come. This groundwork bore fruit in a very short time. The Meiji government had no defined Korean policy and no time even to think about Korea, so it found its best option was to accept Tsushima's requests. The first written governmental statement on Korea was issued on 15 April, 1868 (Tab ohashi 1940: 136-7; Kim 1980: 113; Shim 1997: 70). The traditional role of Tsushima as intermediary [ieyaku] between Japan and Korea was confirmed, but in the same breath it was also added that foreign relations were now under the sole responsibility of the government in Tokyo. Tsushima was therefore requested 'to wipe off its outmoded practices', that is, to put an end to the subservient character of its relationship with Korea. And S6 Yoshitatsu was enjoined to inform Korea of the imperial restoration, and especially to emphasize to the Koreans the fact that all matters referring to Korea would have to conform to the government's orders from now on. For that purpose, he was appointed diplomatic auxiliary [gaikoku jimuho]. Thus, although the traditional role of Tsushima was apparently confirmed, the Meiji government's will to eventually take control of the relations with Korea was also made clear. This was the expression of a desire for centralization, and perhaps also for modernization. It is no exaggeration to think that the Meiji leaders, who were just beginning their efforts to make Japan a member of the Western international system [bankoku koho], already had in mind the inclusion of Korea in the new order. This was not exactly what 1sushima, for its part, had in mind. The aim of the domain was to maintain and improve its position, while easing its burden by getting the central government involved. To achieve this goal, the domain adopted tactics of self-promotion. At the end of April 1868, Tsushima submitted a written request (joshinsho] to the government on the need of reforming relations with Korea (Tab ohashi 1940: 137-43; Shim 1997: 70-2). Tsushima was a poor domain, and had to trade with Korea from a disadvantageous position, leading to many humiliations. Tsushima was ordered to end this state of affairs, but was too poor to be able to do so without governmental assistance. In its written request Tsushima set forth the historical, political and economic importance of the relations with Korea for Japan, and stressed the fact that hundreds of years of 50

STARTING POINT OF MODERN JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS

experience had put the domain in the best position to help deal with the neighbouring country. The government responded to Tsushima's proposals by taking a supplementary step that would assert its own preeminence. It informed the domain that from now on, all matters related to Korea would have to be referred to the foreign ministry's branch in Osaka [Osaka gaikokukan]. Tsushima did not lose heart and dispatched Oshima to Osaka in an attempt to salvage its st~tus. Between the beginning ofJuly and the middle of August, Oshima held a series of talks with foreign ministry officials, and submitted no less than seven written requests (Tabohashi 1940: 143-8; Shim 1997: 72-6). The requests were very detailed and concrete, dealing with Japanese-Korean relations in general. Oshima exposed the historical background of these relations, dealt with the persistent problem of Koreans going astray on Japanese coasts, offered ways to promote trade with Korea, and more. Again and again, he stressed the complexity of the Korean situation, and Tsushima's ability to help. To devise a concrete Korean policy would take time, and for the time being Tsushima had to be left in charge. Among these requests and proposals, Oshima also dealt with the proper way of informing Korea of the imperial restoration (Shim 1997: 76; Ishikawa 1999: 41-2). He submitted a draft of the letter to be sent to Korea, and asked for detailed instructions. In particular, Oshima wanted to know which title to use when referring to the emperor. Oshima also addressed the question of the seal [zusho]. Until now, the seal used in the correspondence with Korea had been that given to Tsushima by the Koreans. From now on, Oshima suggested, this Korean seal should be replaced by a new Japanese diplomatic seal [gaikoku kan'in]. The foreign ministry branch in Osaka did not respond to most of Tsushima's requests directly, except the one dealing with the proper way to inform Korea of the Meiji Restoration. On 31 July, the government informed Tsushima that because of the internal situation, it was not prepared yet to discuss details of Korean affairs (Shim 1997: 80-1). Until the day when an official Japanese delegation would be sent to Korea, Tsushima was allowed to pursue its 'private relations' [shih)] with the neighbouring country. By this conceptual distinction, the government was again asserting its will to eventually establish control over the relations with Korea. The government would give its final answer to all Tsushima's requests on August 5 (Shim 51

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

1997: 81). Tsushima would inform Korea of the Meiji Restoration, but all other questions would be postponed until the domestic situation in Japan had stabilized. The main reason for this decision was a lack of interest in Korea, and of knowledge of the country. The Tokyo government had more urgent matters to deal with. To inform Korea of the Meiji Restoration was possible, however, because this was in keeping with the government's general policy of unifying foreign policy. The message would be delivered through the traditional channel of Tsushima, but this channel was formally redefined as an official organ acting in the name of the Japanese authorities in Tokyo. Concrete measures would be taken in the second half of August. Again, these were symbolic measures to assert the control of the central government over the relations with Korea. 56 Yoshitatsu's rank was raised by granting him a court title, and some of Tsushima's institutions were renamed. The domain was then officially requested to hand over to Korea a letter informing the neighbouring country of the imperial restoration (Tab ohashi 1940: 150; Choe 1972: 146-7; Kim 1980: 116-7; Shim 1997: 82-3). TO BELITTLE THE KING: THE LETTER INCIDENT

From the sequence of events described above, it is clear that the letter incident is to be understood in the context of the Meiji government's will to establish its control over Japan's foreign relations. But this is only one side of the story. To understand the other side, the letter itself and the way it was decided upon have to be examined. The government had added one main thing to Tsushima's suggestions concerning the letter and the seal. The letter should take the form of an 'imperial diplomatic letter' [tenno korei kokusho]. This meant that it would be a direct expression of the emperor's will, and that the terminology of the letter would also be imperial. This would indeed belittle the Korean king, the government explained to Tsushima, but this was unavoidable if Japan aspired 'to preserve the balance with China' (Tab ohashi 1940: 144; Ishikawa 1999: 42; Shim 1997: 82). It should be noted that the vocabulary of the Meiji Restoration was to a large extent Chinese (ishin, Tokyo, etc.), and that the spirit of the restoration was also to a large extent Chinese. The stated need to belittle the Korean king has to be understood in this context. 52

STARTING POINT OF MODERN JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS

For the Meiji leaders, informing the Koreans of the Japanese imperial restoration was also to tell them that Japan was now the equal of China, and that Korea was below Japan. On 21 November, 1868, So Yoshitatsu issued a proclamation directed to his domain. He announced that he would send a letter [shokel1 to Korea which would not use the traditional Korean seal [zusho], but a new governmental one [shin'in]. The purpose of this step, he explained, was to correct the bad customs of the past, to wipe off the national shame, and to uphold the power of the Japanese national polity [kokutai kokul1 (Shim 1997: 77-8). So Yoshitatsu appointed two men for the task: his chief retainer Higuchi Tesshiro was named 'special ambassador' [taishu taisashi], and the Korean expert Kawamoto Kuzaemon 'preliminary envoy' [senmonshi or kanji saiban]. This was the protocol. No ambassadorial letter would be accepted directly, but only after being announced by an advance note. Kawamoto's mission was therefore to inform Korea that Higuchi would arrive, and that the traditional seal would be changed (Tab ohashi 1940: 150-1; Choe 1972: 147; Shim 1997: 78). In the very centre of the letter incident were two documents: the 'advance note' [senmon shokei or saiban shokei] of Kawamoto and the 'special ambassador's letter' [taishu taisa shokei] of Higuchi. The first one was the more important of the two, because it was at this stage that the matter would get stuck. Kawamoto left for Pusan on 13 November, 1868. On 30 January, 1869, he finally obtained an interview with the language officer An Tong-jun (Tabohashi 1940: 152-6; Shim 1997: 83). This was the dramatic scene described above. We have seen how An left the wakan angrily, after rejecting the Japanese letter. Higuchi arrived in Pusan the next day, carrying with him the special ambassador's letter. It stated that Japan's imperial line 'had ruled the country for more than two thousand years', but since the Middle Ages, although the political power was in the hands of the emperor, military and diplomatic powers had been entrusted to the shogun. Now a great change had taken place: all the powers had been restored to the emperor. His Majesty was therefore sending to Korea an ambassador to strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries. 'It is His Majesty's sincere wish to further Japan's traditional friendship with your country and to see to it that this friendship lasts ten thousand generations', concluded the letter (Tabohashi 1940: 153-6; Kim 1980: 117). 53

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

Kawamoto's interview with An and Higuchi's arrival marked the beginning of a saga which_would go on for months, even for years. In mid-March 1869, Oshima in person came to Pusan. An reiterated to him his rejection of the Japanese advance note, but promised to refer the matter to his government and to give the Japanese a detailed answer as soon as possible. This answer would indeed come very soon, on 10 April. This was the first written Korean official explanation of the rejection of the Japanese letter. As expected, the Koreans protested against the changes made in the traditional terminology. They rejected the discarding of the traditional seal and criticized Tsushima for having a hand in the whole matter (Tab ohashi 1940: 157-60; Kim 1980: 118; Shim 1997: 84-5). The Japanese were not surprised by the contents of the written answer, since they had already been told the same things orally, so they reacted with moderation. They even agreed to pass on to An a document acknowledging that they had received the Korean reply (Shim 1997: 86). The Japanese hoped this would make matters progress. They were soon to be disappointed. On 20 April, An informed them they had nothing to expect in the near future. The court had more urgent matters to deal with. What is more, since the troubles with the French and the Americans, Korea had adopted a hard-line foreign policy. For the Japanese, their prospects were to have to wait for months, and certainly for nothing. So they decided to take desperate action. They seized An, and informed him that he would not be allowed to leave the wakan before they received a new answer to their request (Tab ohashi 1940: 163-4; Shim 1997: 86-7). The show of force of the Japanese would be a very shortlived. An was released only five days later, after he told the Japanese how the Koreans really viewed the situation. Despite that An's position was not very high, he was the most powerful man in charge of Japanese affairs. He was very close to the Taewon 'gun and represented faithfully the regent's foreigners exclusion policy and his attitude towards the Japanese (Choe 1972: 148; Kim 1980: 118-9). An said three things to those who seized him. First, that Korea was deeply suspicious of Tsushima. If the domain had agreed to collaborate with the Japanese government's move, this was a sign that Tsushima also was interested in changing the traditional order. Second, An wondered why the end of shogunal rule had to affect relations with Korea. There had always been 54

STARTING POINT OF MODERN JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS

an emperor in Japan, and this emperor was above the shogun. So why, in the name of a so-called imperial restoration, should relations with Korea suddenly be modified? And finally, An stated that the Japanese insistence on using imperial Chinese terms was a clear expression ofJapan's intention to reduce Korea to a tributary status (Tab ohashi 1940: 165-6; Shim 1997: 87-8). An's argumentation was impressive. First, the Koreans felt that Tsushima was not only expressing the will of the Japanese government, but was also pushing the move forward. This was true. Second, the Koreans knew that in the name of imperial restoration, Japan was actually opening up to the rest of the world. This also was true. An put his finger on the fact that the Japanese arguments were illogical, showing that the Koreans knew exactly what had occurred in Japan since 1853. And finally, the Koreans were well aware of the Japanese traditional view of their country, as a tributary state, and that the change of terminology was an expression of that view. An's explanations marked the end of the game. They did not change the situation, but helped to clarify it. Oshima left Pusan on 22 April. Tsushima still attempted a last move. The Japanese offered to withdraw the advance note and submit the ambassador's letter directly. This was an unprecedented request, in contradiction to protocol, and the Koreans rejected it. The saga would continue simmering on a low flame until the absorption of the wakan by the foreign ministry in October 1872. Higuchi Tesshir6 would stay inside the wakan for more than three years, waiting for a miracle (Tabohashi 1940: 167-221; Choe 1972: 149-63; Kim 1980: 121; Shim 1997: 88-90). No miracle happened. Back in Japan, Oshima worked out a report for the foreign ministry in July 1869. He recommended sending a mission directly to the Korean capital for talks with the king. Oshima also reminded the government of Tsushima's expertise, hoping the domain would be entrusted with the task (Tab ohashi 1940: 144-6; Kim 1980: 120; Shim 1997: 97-8). But the government was increasingly losing its confidence in Tsushima. The domain's failure to inform Korea of the Meiji Restoration raised growing doubts about its ability to deal with the neighbouring country. Before long, the government would try new forms of diplomacy, more in harmony with its real intentions. In January 1870, three young officials from the foreign ministrywere dispatched to Pusan (Tab ohashi 1940: 227; Choe 1972: 155; Shim 1997: 123). This was to be another turning point ... 55

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Arano Yasunori. 1988. Kinsei Nihon to higashi Ajia [Early modern Japan and East Asia]. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai. Cheong Chae-jeong. 1993. Atarashii Kankoku kingendaishi [A new history of modern and contemporary Korea]. Tokyo: Doshobo. Choe Ching Young. 1972. The Rule if the Taewongun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea. Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University. Ishikawa Hiroshi. 1998. 'Meiji ishinki ni okeru Tsushimahan no doko: Nitcho gaiko ichigenka to Chosen-Tsushima kankei' [The attitude of Tsushima during the Meiji Restoration: Unification of Japanese-Korean diplomacy and Korea-Tsushima relations], Rekishigaku kenkyu 709: 1-17. Kang Jae-eun. 1977. Chosen no joi to kaika: Kindai Chosen ni totte no Nihon [Korean exclusionism and enlightenment: Modern Korean views of Japan]. Tokyo: Heibonsha. - - . 1994. Kankoku to Nihon no koryushi: Kinseihen [History of Japanese-Korean exchanges: The early modern period]. Tokyo: Akashi shoten. Kim, Key-Hiuk. 1980. The Last Phase if the East Asian World Order: Korea,Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kim yong-ho. 1990. 'Kaehangki Hanilkan iii sasangjok taeiing hyongt'ae' [Forms of intellectual response between Korea and Japan at the time of the opening of the ports]. In Ilbon Iii ch'imnyak chOngch'aeksa yongu [Research on the history of Japanese invasion policy], edited by Yoksa hakhwae. Seoul: Ilchogak, 113-35. Kirnishima Kazuhiko, and Sakai Toshiki, eds. 1992. Chosen-Kankoku wa Nihon no kyokasho ni do kakarete iru ka [The description of North Korea and South Korea in Japanese school textbooks]. Tokyo: Nashi no kisha. Kimura Naoya. 1995. 'Bakumatsuki no Chosen shinshutsuron to so no seisakuka' [Debates and policies on a Japanese invasion of Korea at the end of the Edo period], Rekishigaku kenkyu 679: 16-29. Kokushi daijiten [The great dictionary of Japanese history]. 1988. Edited by Kokushi daijiten henshii iinkai. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan. Pak yong-jae. 1990. 'Kiindae Ilbon iii Hanguk inshik' [Perception of Korea in modern Japan]. In Ilbon Iii ch'imnyak chOngch'aeksa yongu [Research on the history of Japanese invasion policy], edited by Yoksa hakhwae. Seoul: Ilchogak, 81-111. Shim Ki-jae. 1997. Bakumatsu ishin Nitcho gaikoshi no kenkyu [A study of Japanese-Korean diplomatic relations at the end of the Edo period and the Meiji Restoration]. Tokyo: Rinsen shoten. Tabohashi Kiyoshi. 1940. KindaiNissen kankei no kenkyu [A study of modern Japanese-Korean relations], 1. Keijo: Chosen sotokufu. Unno Fukuju. 1995. Kankoku heigo [The annexation of Korea]. Tokyo: Iwanarni shoten. Yamada Shoji, Takasaki Soji, Chong Chang-yong, and Cho Kyong-dal. 1991. Kingendaishi no naka no 'Nih on to Chosen' ['Japan and Korea' in modern and contemporary history]. Tokyo: Tokyo shoseki.

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5

Deliberate Non-Communication: The Influence of the Religious Issues on the Diplomatic Talks During the Visit of the Iwakura Embassy to Belgium*

ARJAN VAN DER WERF

INTRODUCTION

The Iwakura embassy despatched by the Japanese government toured several countries of the world - mainly the United States and Europe - from 1871 to 1873. It was headed by key members of the new Meiji government, with Iwakura Tomomi as chief ambassador [taisht1, and Ito Hirobumi, Kido Koin (Takayoshi), Okubo Toshimichi and Yamaguchi Masuka 1 as vice ambassadors [fukusht1. During the tour of the countries, members of the mission studied social and industrial institutions, and made ceremonial visits to heads of state and government. Talks were also initiated on treaty revisions and strengthening of diplomatic and economic ties. 2 Most research on the Iwakura embassy, in the West as well as in Japan, seems somewhat hesitant to state the objectives of the embassy in a definite manner. This seems strange as there is a list of the stated aims of the embassy that was compiled before the embassy left Japan (Gaimusho chosabu 1938, 4: 96-121).3 There is a lot of speculation on this list and how it came to be. Presumably, Okuma Shigenobu had received a document * Acknowledgement:

This paper was made possible by the Research Fund KU Leuven.

57

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from the American missionary Guido Verbeck on what should be studied in the West for promoting Japan's modernization and a better understanding of the West. This was in 1869, well before there were any concrete talks on a diplomatic embassy to the West of this magnitude. Due to these talks, in later years Okuma claimed to be the initiator of the Iwakura embassy, and Verbeck did so as well (Altman 1966: 56). In 1871, Verbeck's outline got into the hands of Iwakura, and at the time of composing the embassy this Brief Sketch, as the outline is called, seems to have been taken as the basis for the list of aims of the embassy. In fact, this list was a virtual copy of what Verbeck had proposed, except for the observation of religion, which was eventually left out, although its importance had been stressed by him (Altman 1966: 57-8; Tanaka 1977 [1996]: 21-5). This list of aims is misleading, however. If we compare the activities of the embassy and the eventual results, there is not much conformity. In hindsight it would be better to take the list of aims as a rough outline of the planning for the embassy, which simply could not execute some of its planned objectives and even seems to have had ulterior motives (Mayo 1967; Suzuki 1996).4 Treaty revision is one of the presumed aims that backfired. The talks on treaty revision in the United States failed due to lack of preparation and authority, despite the fact that Iwakura Tomomi was officially appointed ambassador plenipotentiary [zen ken taisht]' Letters written by Sanjo Sanetomi to Iwakura in 1871 show that the Japanese government did not intend to enter into treaty negotiations, but wanted to stall them because it felt it was in no position to negotiate due to lack of knowledge of international law. 5 The ceremonial visits and talks of the embassy were intended to seek postponement for actually entering into talks on treaty revision (Gaimusho chosabu 1938, 4: 67-73; Altman 1966: 56; Mayo 1967: 390). The embassy only had a broad outline of its task to present to foreign governments in the form of a letter from the emperor. Therefore, while in the United States, and with the opportunity to enter into serious talks on treaty revision, Ito Hirobumi proposed internally to more clearly define the aims of the embassy: We have not been authorized to conclude new treaties nor to abrogate or revise the existing ones. Our main purpose is to discuss with each 58

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country the advantages and disadvantages which we have experienced under the treaties. We must constantly remind ourselves that our ultimate purpose is to extend Japan's rights and privileges ... (Ito, quoted in Mayo 1967: 391)

When Iwakura met President Ulysses Grant in Washington, he presented the letter from the emperor and made a similar statement to the effect that the embassy was authorized to enter into preliminary talks on international issues, keeping the interests of Japan in mind (Mayo 1967: 393). Ito was presumably irritated b'y the fact that the embassy lacked full authority, and he and Okubo Toshimichi went back to Japan to get the proper authority and to advocate the lifting of the ban on Christianity. Ito presumably did this of his own accord (Breen 1998: 155). It may be clear that the aims of the embassy changed during the course of its travel. The actual dealings of the embassy indicate that its main objectives were the introduction of the Meiji government to the foreign powers that Japan dealt with, to show good intentions and, possibly, to smoothen the path for future negotiations on treaties and other dealings and cooperation. Religion was left out of the official aims of the embassy. Nevertheless, almost immediately after the embassy set sail from Yokohama, it was taken up as a subject during the crossover to America. By comparing the notes of Kume Kunitake, the secretary of the embassy, and Jonathan Goble, a missionary who travelled aboard the same ship, a reconstruction can be made. Ambassador Iwakura was introduced to Goble through mediation of Charles E. De Long, the US minister to Japan. Goble said he wanted to meet with those who were in charge of religious matters, and in the absence of such officers, Kume Kunitake and Tanaka Fujimaro, commissioner of the Ministry of Education, were additionally charged with the 'observation of the religions of all countries' [kakkoku shukyo shisatsu). After this sudden appointment the two had several talks with Goble, and they, together with other curious Japanese, attended the Sunday services held in the lounge of the ship as well. Mter disembarking in America there seems to have been no particular visits to religious institutions by Kume or Tanaka as observers of religion. There were, however, some visits to religious institutions made by the embassy as a whole (Yamazaki 1993: 299-300; Yamazaki 1999: 179-89). 59

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DISTINCTIONS AND NOTIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF WESTERN RELIGION

What was Considered Religion? The modern Western notion of religion cannot be applied on the view of religion of the early Meiji period, since religion was an ill-defined concept in the early Meiji period (Yamaguchi 1999: 329-30). There was no specific vocabulary, and the things considered under the term 'religion' - concepts such as shu kyo, shumon, kyomon and several other terms were used in Japan - were teachings closely connected to the church that had been brought in from the West. Both Shinto and Buddhism were for the most part considered outside of religion. They were considered teachings. Within Shinto a clear distinction was made between the kami that were worshipped and the shrines where worship took place. Shrines managed to stay out of the realm of religion whereby they fell outside the laws and regulations that were to manage the sphere of religion from around the time of the Meiji Constitution 15 years after the Iwakura embassy (Yamaguchi 1999: 342-4). Shinto rituals even became controlled by the Dajokan (Ministry of State) instead of the Jingikan (Council of Religion) as early as 1871. 6 Thereby it took its authority from the sphere of politics (Breen 1996: 87). Although a politically-driven structure in Shinto did now exist, it is too early to consider it to be State Shinto. That was to come later, when several edicts and rescripts and the Meiji constitution regulated its connection to the state more clearly. 7 Up to the time of the Meiji Constitution, religion had been an even vaguer area. Kume was later to give a nice illustration of how the notion of religion was used at the time of the Meiji Restoration. The strict rules of the Christian church created a gap between the perception of Christianity on the one hand and Buddhism and Shinto on the other. As Christianity was considered religion, Buddhism and Shinto had to be something else. This dualism of religion/non-religion surfaced in Japanese society only when Christianity entered (again) and was proclaimed to be religion. Thus, Christianity became the standard against which everything that had an air of being a religious teaching had to be measured (Yamazaki 1993: 308; Yamaguchi 1999: 329-30, 339-42, 344). As is well known, Christianity had been banned since the 60

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early Tokugawa period. Some change was anticipated by foreign nations at the time of the overthrow of the bakuJu, but directly after the Meiji Restoration, an edict was issued stating, 'The evil sect called Christian is strictly prohibited. Suspicious persons should be reported to the proper officers, and rewards will be given' (Cary 1909 [1993], 2: 66-7). Due to ample pressure from foreigners in reaction to the treatment of Japanese Christians at the end of the Tokugawa period and the first year of the Meiji period, a conference was held in Osaka in 1868. At this conference, Japan's new government restated their views on Christianity. The main speaker was Okuma Shigenobu who claimed in his speech that Christianity had caused wars and misery in Europe in the name of its lord and was too alien to Japanese society to be expected to be incorporated overnight. The religion was to remain prohibited. The next year, thousands of Japanese Christians were deported again from the village ofUrakami (Cary 1909 [1993], 1: 309-12).

The Notion

if the Iwakura Embassy

The first place one would look for a notion of religion of the Iwakura embassy would probably be the official report of the Iwakura embassy, Tokumei zen ken taishi Bei-O kairanjikki (A true account of the tour through America and Europe of the special embassy; hereafter,Jikkt). Although Kume Kunitake was assigned the task of compiling the Jikki, as well as making observations on religion, his report does not contain any clear statements on religion. The table of contents refers to religion only twice: once in the part on the United States and once in the part on Great Britain. Kume was not too keen to enter into the investigation of religion. In his diary, he stated that 'it could not be helped' that he and Tanaka Fujimaro were assigned to investigate 'the troublesome matter of religion', and in later years he stated that religion was something he 'did not understand very well' (Yamazaki 1988: 72, 79). This does not mean that Kume does not mention religion elsewhere in his report. He refers to Christian church history on several occasions, but his notes are dispersed. To get a clear overview of his views these fragments have to be compiled. This has been done in Yamazaki (1978: 1-3), resulting in a superficial textbook history of the church, which, however, could have 61

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served as an introduction to this topic to Japanese who wanted to know more about Western religion. It does not really give any insight into the notion or appraisal of Kume or other members of the embassy of Christianity, or into how they viewed the role that the church played in Western society. For one, the jikki was written after the return of the embassy to Japan and therefore does not necessarily reflect the thoughts of Kume during the mission's travels, and the more interesting statements on religion by Kume (if we stick to him) were made in later years when he reflects on his life. The parts he wrote on religion are moreover often copies or abstracts of Tanaka's notes or based on his talks with Niijima J6 (in the West also known as Joseph Neeshima). Tanaka Fujimaro was assigned the task of studying religion together with Kume. Tanaka's Riji kotei (Commissioner's report) was the only report he produced after the embassy returned to Japan. It is a systematic presentation of the educational systems of the countries visited by the embassy, with detailed figures for schools, teachers and pupils. He does refer to religion, but only in connection to education. He divides schools into state-controlled or church-controlled, and explains who is responsible for which aspect of education, and who has what sort of rights in the various countries. In this way, one gets an idea of the religious diversity of a country, and of some aspects of the role played by a certain religion, or church, in relation to the state, but knowledge remains shallow. Thus, Tanaka's report does not provide us with a clear view on the notion of religion of the Iwakura embassy. As is the case with Kume's jikki, the parts on religion only serves as an introduction for Japanese who wanted to know more about Western religion. The writings published around that time in Meiroku zasshi by writers such as Mori Arinori, Sakatani Shiroshi, and Nishi Amane would have given those interested a more profound understanding of Christianity, both its doctrine as well as its role in society (van der Werf 1999). Thus, if we want to comprehend the notion of religion of the members of the embassy, or of the embassy as a body representing the Japanese government, we have to turn to other sources. The diaries of the members and the correspondence of the embassy with the government in Tokyo provide some insight, if only in that they show that the members were hopelessly dispersed in their opinions. Again, we do not get an in-depth 62

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insight into their opinion on the role or content of Christianity. Writings deal with the question whether or not the prohibition of Christianity had to be abandoned. This had been an ongoing discussion that started before the Meiji Restoration, but now the embassy faced this matter whenever a diplomatic discussion was entered into. Religion had become a diplomatic matter (Sasaki 1974: 264; Gaimusho chosabu 1938, 4; Breen 1998: 153, 155-60). The statements made by Iwakura on such diplomatic encounters differ a great deal from his own opinion. On all occasions he tried to avoid commenting on the prohibition, but if the other party would not drop the subject, he would go as far as stating that his government intended to look into the matter, or that in due time preparations would be considered to lift the ban. He told of the earnest desires of his government (Breen 1998: 156). Conferences and deliberations taking place before the embassy left Japan make it clear that Iwakura was in favour of upholding the prohibition. The _diaries of Sasaki Takayuki show that Iwakura, Kido Koin and Okubo Toshimichi did not change their opinion. They remained in favour of the ban even after Ito Hirobumi, when in France early 1873, and backed in opinion only by Yamaguchi Masuka, petitioned the government in Tokyo a second time to lift the ban. This time the government responded and took down the notice boards on February 19,1873, when the embassy had just entered Belgium (Breen 1998: 158-9; Yamazaki 1988: 86, 92-3; Cary 1909 [1993], 2: 82). It has been claimed that it was a demonstration in Brussels against the treatment of Christians in Japan that triggered the decision to take down the notice boards. This is not true. First of all, the embassy had been in Belgium for only one full day when the boards were taken down, and Okuma has confirmed that Ito's petition had been decisive in the decision (Breen 1998: 161). Secondly, it is not even certain that the demonstration took place at all. Actually, the claim goes back to a single source, La 'Religion de Jesus' Ressuscitee au Japon by Francisque Marnas. Its author does not, however, make clear how he came to know of this demonstration (see Marnas 1897). Newspapers of the day do not mention the demonstration. The anti-Japanese demonstration probably never took place in Belgium while the embassy was there, and Mamas must have been mistaken. 63

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THE DIPLOMATIC TALKS OF THE IWAKURA EMBASSY WITH THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT

Why did the Iwakura mission visit Belgium? Preliminary talks let alone concrete talks - on treaty revision were thought impossible; Belgium had but little stake in the Japanese economy, and was not one of the countries that demanded the Shimonoseki indemnity. However, Belgium was eager to expand its markets as it had lost overseas territory after the independence from the Netherlands in 1830. At the time Belgium was even the most industrialized country on the European continent with a thriving industry and an impressive railroad network (Vande Walle 1998: 87-91). The modernization in Japan could mean welcome business opportunities for Belgium, and for Japan various Belgian industries and business organizations could provide valuable lessons and models. In his account of Belgium, Kume gives an extensive outline on how to set up and develop businesses the right way, opposed to the flawed methods of the Orient (Kume 1878 [1996]: 170-2,201-2). Moreover, the fact that Belgium was able to survive geographically squeezed in between the great powers of Europe gave the embassy a favourable impression of the country as Japan itself was searching for means to cope with the pressure of foreign powers (ibid.: 165). The talks between the embassy and the Belgian government took place on 23 February, 1873 at the foreign ministry in Brussels, one day before the embassy was to leave for the Netherlands. The talks are not reported in the Jikki. Kume mainly confines himself to his own experiences supplemented by information of other members and specialists at hand, Westerners as well as Japanese. He did not attend the talks and instead gives an extensive report of a sightseeing trip to Waterloo that he and the others took (ibid.: 208-13). According to Japanese sources, the Japanese side was represented by Ambassador Iwakura Tomomi and Vice Ambassador Yamaguchi Masuka and the Belgian by Finance Minister Jules Malou and the foreign ministry official responsible for Japan, Charles de Groote (Gaimush6 ch6sabu 1938, 6: 94-8). Instead of Malou, Belgian sources mention as participant Auguste Baron de Lambermont, the secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, replacing the foreign minister who was said to be sick (Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres 1873; Isomi, et al. 1989: 86-95). 64

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Officially, it might have been a dialogue but the proceedings read like a monologue by Lambermont. The minister's illness might have been an excuse. It is clear that Lambermont knew what he was talking about and for a foreigner in the early Meiji period he was extremely well informed about the industry, resources and financial system of Japan. One might think that the minister was not sick at all, and that Lambermont was put forward on purpose, but that is pure speculation. The talks began with the proper opening greetings, and Iwakura presented Lambermont with a letter from the emperor. In addition, Iwakura made a similar statement as in the United States, and said that the embassy was charged to investigate what amendments could be made to the treaty between Belgium and Japan. Lambermont started out by praising Belgian industry, infrastructure and financial system, and stressed the important role Belgium could play in the development of Japan. On several occasions during the meeting Lambermont would stress the commercial value of Belgium, suggesting renewed attempts of the Belgian government to expand its market to Japan as it had done with the bakufu and the domain of Satsuma (Vande Walle 1998: 86, 91, 93-5). Iwakura who had just toured the country for a week and had seen it all himself, politely confirmed these claims - which he probably had already heard at the sites visited - by saying he 'was glad to hear it', and he 'would certainly report it to the emperor on his return to Japan'. After this promotion of Belgian industry Lambermont switched to the Japanese policy towards foreigners and their religion. Lambermont raised the question of increasing the rights for foreigners to travel in Japan. If Belgians were allowed to travel freely, they could study industry and geography, which would be beneficial to both countries. These were general remarks that did not require any concession from the side of Iwakura. The latter, in the same polite manner as before, stated that he 'was glad to hear it', and that it was 'the strong wish of the Japanese government to open the country'. At this point we are about two-thirds through the talks, and now the revision of the treaty became the subject of conversation. Lambermont immediately made freedom of religion and religious toleration the central theme. Although Belgium is mainly Catholic, he said, it does tolerate all religions and even provides financial support. If Belgium does this, it would be in 65

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the best interest of friendly relations for Japan to tolerate Christianity, for foreigners as well as Japanese. It would also serve the path of civilization that Japan had entered. Iwakura responded that the government had not been too hard on Christian converts and that it was the wish of his government to arrive at religious freedom, the same as the other great powers of the world. Iwakura promised nothing but only stated that it was the wish of his government, that he hoped it would materialize or that he would convey such messages when back in Japan. Lambermont realized he would get nothing further out of Iwakura and replied, in the same manner as Iwakura, that he was glad to hear such a statement. Lambermont was lenient on Iwakura here. The deportations of Japanese Christians from Urakami continued while Iwakura toured the European mainland (Cary 1909 [1993], 1: 312-14), and this treatment of Christians even resulted in an attack on the Japanese policy in the French National Assembly in December 1872. Although in a more diplomatic phrasing, the Japanese religious policy was condemned by French Foreign Minister Comte de Remusat in talks with Iwakura (Sims 1998: 79-83). Lambermont could have easily joined the French line of diplomatic pressure and could have demanded religious tolerance before any further talks on diplomatic relations or trade could continue. The Belgian press did so with harsh editorials that indicated that Iwakura himself as one of the main promoters of persecution against Christianity in Japan (Vande Walle 1998: 99-103). Lambermont, probably with commercial objectives in mind, did not exert any pressure, however. Iwakura now thanked Lambermont for all he had told him, obviously in an attempt to end the talks but Lambermont took up the treaty issue again, asking at what time the treaty revision could begin, and what would be the gist on trade and diplomacy? Iwakura did not respond to these specific questions but only replied that his embassy toured the countries of America and Europe in order to study these themes. Only after the return of the embassy to Japan could there specific answers to these questions be made. With this the talks ended. CONCLUDING REMARKS

At the beginning of this paper, I stated that the objectives, set out before the Iwakura embassy left Japan, were vague and not 66

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observed closely by it. This, I think, is one of the difficulties for studies of the embassy. If compared, the objectives and the actual dealings of the embassy differ to such an extent that one has to discard them. On the other hand, they do, of course, get a significant meaning for a study of what the embassy actually accomplished of its aims. A comparison of aims and results would probably send the embassy into history as one that failed to bring about a turning point. In this sense the embassy can be considered significant in its failure. This is especially true when it comes to treaty revision. Due to lack of authority and knowledge - which has been amply demonstrated by other scholars - such a revision was not accomplished. The embassy accomplished much, however, in terms of observation, study, and the strengthening of friendly relations with the Western world, and it did have considerable influence on the view of the Meiji government on the West and Japan's position in the world. As religion, in particular Christianity, had not been taken up in the primary list of aims of the embassy, it posed a problem opposite to treaty revision: instead of abandoning an aim as was the case with treaty revision, the embassy had to come up with ideas, statements and future policies of the Japanese government, first, during the crossover to the United States, when Iwakura became convinced of the need to study religion, and, later, when the treatment ofJapanese Christians was brought up in the diplomatic talks that the embassy had with foreign governments. The problem posed by the embassy's lack of authority on treaty revision was relatively easily solved by statements that the Japanese mission was only investigating the possibilities for future revisions. However, because the religious issues were connected to treaty revision and other forms of co-operation, the embassy could make no promises to foreign countries, nor could they subsequently receive any guarantees in return. The key members of the embassy continued to have different opinions, which caused confusion and friction, and prevented the embassy from formulating a unified view. Even the taking down of the notice boards prohibiting Christianity did not bring relief. It would have been a major advantage for Iwakura in his diplomatic talks to state that the boards had been taken down, but the prohibition itself remained, and therefore, such a statement would have had no 67

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meaning and might have caused further problems for Japan's diplomatic relations. The above summary of the talks between Lambermont and Iwakura makes it clear that prospects for positive results being reached in these diplomatic talks were small. No concessions were made from either side, and no dates were set for future meetings. Only polite promises were made by the Japanese to convey messages after their return to Japan. Thus, one can conclude that, due to the internal discussions and lack of preparations, several of the talks remained mainly ceremonial. The Iwakura embassy missed several opportunities to reach positive results, not because of ignorance or unwillingness but because of the divergent opinions of the representatives of the new Japanese government. BIBLIOGRAPHY Altman, Albert. 1966. 'Guido Verbeck and the Iwakura Embassy',japan Quarterly 13: 54-62. Breen, John. 1996. 'Beyond Prohibition: Christianity in Restoration Japan'. In japan and Christianity: Impacts and Responses, edited by John Breen and Mark Williams. Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan, 75-93. - - . 1998. '''Earnest Desires": The Iwakura Embassy and Meiji Religious Policy', japan Forum 10: 151--65. Cary, Otis. 1909 (1993). A History of Christianity in japan. 2 vols. Reprint ed. Richmond: Curzon Press. Gaimusho chosabu, ed. 1938. Dai Nihon gaiko bunsho [Diplomatic documents of ImperialJapan], 4, 6. Tokyo: Nihon kokusai kyokai. Isomi Tatsunori, Kurosawa Fumitaka, and Sakurai Ryoju. 1989. Nihon-Berugii kankeishi [A history of Japanese-Belgian relations]. Tokyo: Hakusuisha. Kume Kunitake, ed. 1878 (1996). Tokumei zenken taishi Bei-O kairan jikki [A true account of the tour through America and Europe of the special embassy], 3. Iwanami bunko 770. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. Mamas, Francisque. 1897. LA 'Religion de jesus' (Iaso ja-Kyou) Ressuscitee au japon; Dans la Seconde Moitie du XIXe Sircle, 2. Paris: Delhomme et Briquet. Mayo, Marlene J. 1966 (1988). 'Rationality in the Meiji Restoration: The Iwakura Embassy'. In Modern japanese Leadership: Transition and Change, edited by Bernard S. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian. Michigan: UMI Out-of-Print Books on Demand, 323-69. - - . 1967. 'A Chatechism of Western Diplomacy: The Japanese and Hamilton Fish, 1872',journal of Asian Studies 26: 389-410. - - . 1973. 'The Western Education of Kume Kunitake, 1871--6', Monumenta Nipponica 28: 3-67. Ministere des Atfaires Etrangeres, Archives. 1873. Memorandum d'une conference officielle qui a lieu, Ie 23 jevrier 1873, au Ministere des Affaires hrangeres Bruxelles, entre Ie

a

Baron LAmbermont, Envoye extraordinaire et Ministre PIenipotentiaire, SecrhaireGeneral de ce Departement (M. Ministre des Affaires hrangeres hant empeche pat I'hat

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DELIBERATE NON-COMMUNICATION de sa sante) et S. Exc. Siouni Tomomi Iwakura, Ambassadeur extraordinaire de S. M. I'Empereur du Japon. A.M.A.E. No. 2865. Nish, Ian, ed. 1998. The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. Okubo Toshiakii, ed. 1976. Iwakura shisetsu no kenkyu, ed. [Research on the Iwakura embassy]. Tokyo: Munetaka shobo. Saga shinbunsha Sagaken daihyakka jiten henshu iinkai, ed. 1983. Sagaken daihyakka jiten [Saga encyclopedia]. Saga: Saga shinbunsha. Sasaki Takayuki. 1974. Hogo hiroi: Sasaki Takayuki nikki [Selected scraps: The diary of Sasaki Takayuki], 5, edited by TOkyo daigaku shiryohensanjo. Tokyo: TOkyo daigaku shuppankai. Sims, Richard, 1998. 'France: 16 December 1872-17 February 1873'. In TheIwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment, edited by Ian Nish. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 69-85. Suzuki Eiju. 1996. 'Iwakura shisetsudan hensei katei e no arata na shiten: Kenkyiishi e no hihan to shiron' [A new point of view on the process of formation of the Iwakura embassy: Critique on past research and a proposal], Jinbun gakuha 78: 27-49. Tanaka Akira. 1977 (1996). Iwakura shisetsudan 'Bei-O kairan jikki' [The 'Bei-O kairanjikki' of the Iwakura embassy]. Dojidai raiburarii 174. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. Tanaka Fujimaro. 1873 (1974). Riji katei [Commissioner's report]. Reprint ed. Kyoto: Rinsen shoten. van der Werf, A. M. 1999. 'Christianity in Early Meiji Japan: The Balance of Faith, State, and Church as Seen Through Meiroku Zasshi', Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica 30: 151-88. Vande Walle, Willy. 1998. 'Belgium: 17-24 February 1873'. In The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment, edited by Ian Nish. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 86-108. Yamaguchi Teruomi. 1999. Meiji kokka to shukya [The Meiji state and religion]. Tokyo: TOkyo daigaku shuppankai. Yamazaki Minako. 1978. 'Iwakura shisetsudan ni okeru shiikyo mondai: "Bei-O kairan jikki" ni miru shiikyokan' [The religious issues in the Iwakura embassy: The view on religion as seen in 'Bei-O kairan jikki'], Hokudai shigaku 18:

1-13. - - . 1988. 'Kume Kunitake to shiikyo mondai: Iwakura shisetsudan to shiikyo mondai (sono san)' [Kume Kunitake and the religious issues: The Iwakura embassy and the religious issues (part three)], Seishin Joshi daigaku ronsa 71: 71-94. - - . 1993. 'Iwakura shisetsudan ni okeru shiikyo mondai' [The religious issues in the Iwakura embassy]. In 'Bei-O kairan jikki' no gakusaiteki kenkyu [Interdisciplinary studies on 'Bei-O kairan jikki'], edited by Tanaka Akira and Takata Seiji. Sapporo: Hokkaido daigaku toshokan kankokai, 299-316. - - . 1999. 'Iwakura shisetsudan to shiikyo mondai: Amerika shinbun no bunseki wo chiishin ni' [The religious issues in the Iwakura embassy: An analysis of American newspapers]. In Meiji ishin to seiya kokusai shakai [The Meiji Restoration and Western international society], edited by Meiji ishin shigakkai. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 172-202.

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NOTES 1. Although Yamaguchi's personal name is often rendered as Naoyoshi - which is the normal reading for the kanji used - its proper reading seems to be Masuka, as shown by the business cards the embassy had printed in Paris and presented to the Dutch government in 1873. Still, I have found only one reference work using this reading (Saga shinbusha Sagaken daihyakka jiten henshii iinkai 1983). 2. For a general introduction on the Iwakura embassy, see Tanaka (1977 [1996]), Okubo (1976), and Nish (1998). 3. For documents on the composition and purpose of the embassy, see Gaimusho chosabu (1938), 4. For the hesitation in some quarters and comments on the embassy, see Mayo (1966 [1988]: 323-6), Okubo (1976), Altman (1966), and Tanaka (1977 [1996]: 21-44). 4. See especially Suzuki (1996: 42-7) on the issue of foreign loans. 5. A first introduction on international law to political and intellectual circles only came after the return to Japan of Hatakeyama Yoshinari who had studied and translated the constitution of the United States together with Kido and Kume during the stay of the Iwakura embassy in America (Mayo 1966 [1988]: 330ff; Mayo 1973: 11-12,26). 6. Also called Public Worship Office or Department of Shinto Religion. These, of course, create confusion. Why use terms like 'religion' and 'worship' when Shinto and its shrines were not considered religious? This is, however, a translation problem; the Japanese in itself does not create the confusion. Only because non-Japanese observers considered (consider) Shinto a religion, do these terms turn up in translation. 7. Yamaguchi (1999: 346) even argues that the relation between the state and Shinto was intended to make the shrines independent and self-sustaining.

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6

Rescuing the Prisoners of the Maria Luz: The Meiji Government and the (Coolie Trade', 1868-75*

IGOR R. SAVELIEV

he opening of East Asian countries by Western powers marked the beginning of the large-scale transnational emigration from this region that had hitherto been restricted and even punished by death penalty. The overwhelming majority of emigrants were contract labourers, widely known as 'coolies', shipped from the ports in southern China to developing colonial areas like Hawaii, Peru, Malaya and the Caribbean as a response to the labour shortage caused by the world-wide movement to abolish slavery. Most coolies were recruited voluntarily through negotiations but fraud and kidnapping were not uncommon. The massive employment of the Chinese labourers peaked in the late 1840s, but decreased in the mid1850s, when frequent assaults on British subjects in the treaty ports took place as a reaction of the Chinese towards the brutal recruitment methods employed by foreigners. In 1855, Britain promulgated the Chinese Passenger Act, stipulating the punishment of the illegal employment of Chinese, and pushed the contractors incident in Portugal-owned Macao. Seven years later, in 1862, the United States also introduced similar legislation. Prior to and during the early Meiji period, Japanese, like

T

• The author is grateful to Professor Sakata Yasuo for his insightful comments, Dr Bert Edstrom for providing editorial critique, and Adam Clulow for his invaluable assistance. The larger project of which this article is a part was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Research Promotion Grant No. 12710178.

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other East Asians, were not formally allowed to leave Japan according to a decree issued in 1633 by the bakufu. 1 The opening of Japan in the mid-1850s and the Meiji Restoration of 1868 constituted turning points in that the two-hundredyear-long ban that forbade Japanese to leave their country was removed, but top-ranking Japanese officials proved reluctant to allow Japanese to travel abroad. As will be shown below, their efforts to restrict emigration aimed at preventing Japanese from becoming enmeshed in the 'coolie trade'. Based on Japanese archival records and published diplomatic documents, this essay explores the Meiji government's stance to the 'coolie trade' with special focus on the Maria Luz affair of 1872, and is also an attempt to shed light on the impact of this affair on Japan's foreign policy and on the adjustment of the Japanese legal system to international laws. THE FIRST-YEAR MEN'S INCIDENT

As soon as Shimoda, Hakodate, Nagasaki, Kanagawa (Yokohama), Niigata and Hyogo (Kobe) were opened for foreign trade and foreign settlements were established in Japan, a handful of Japanese were hired as sailors, deck-hands or servants for works inside the settlements. Yet, the issue of their working abroad had not been widely discussed by Japanese offICials until the sudden departure of the first group of contract labourers, later called the 'first-year men' [gannenmono] because they came in the first year of Emperor Meiji's reign, left the port of Yokohama. The Japanese had been recruited for work on Hawaiian plantations by an initiative of the Hawaiian foreign minister, Robert Crichton Wyllie, who contemplated recruiting labourers for his own plantation. Wyllie nominated the US citizen Eugene Van Reed, residing in Kanagawa, to be the consul of Hawaii in Japan. As Conroy's meticulous study has shown, it took considerable time for Van Reed to obtain permission to recruit labourers in Japan, but eventually he was successful in gaining 179 passports [insho] from the bakufu (Conroy 1953: 15-24). At the beginning of 1868, he leased the British vessel Scioto to transport them to Hawaii. This coincided with the fall of the bakufu and formation of the new Meiji government. On 9 May, the day before the vessel was scheduled to leave, the newly established Kanagawa Court [Kanagawa saibansho] took over the 72

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administration of Kanagawa (Yokohama). Higashikuze Michitomi, the court commissioner for foreign affairs [Gaikoku jimu sotoku], who had become aware that a group of Japanese were to be shipped abroad by an American, who represented a non-treaty country, informed Van Reed that he had to return the passports. Although Van Reed immediately followed this order, he asked the court to provide his labourers with new passports and to allow them to leave the country, or otherwise compensate all expenses related to their recruitment. 2 When the Kanagawa Court officials ignored his request, Van Reed warned them that he would ship labourers to Hawaii even if passports were not granted. As Higashikuze Michitomi did not respond, Van Reed ordered the Scioto to depart on 17 May (Imai 1979: 46-7). Most students of the gannenmono incident consider Van Reed responsible for shipping labourers without passports, but revisionist views on the clash between Higashikuze Michitomi and Van Reed are also heard. According to the historian Imai Teruko, the Kanagawa Court should be held responsible for its lack of response to Van Reed's requests (ibid.). Since Van Reed was a US citizen, he had formally the right to hire labourers, since Japan's treaties with the United States and Britain contained a provision which allowed American and Britons to employ Japanese citizens. 3 In addition, the employment procedure was not regulated and shipping had always existed. Shortly after the Scioto departed, Japanese officials realized their mistake and on 25 May Higashikuze Michitomi requested the US Minister to Japan Van Valkenburgh to return the labourers and to punish Van Reed. Van Valkenburgh's response was not satisfactory to Japanese officials. 4 In a dispatch of 26 May, he stated that he 'could not interfere' in the incident, since the Scioto was a British vessel and Van Reed had acted as a representative of the Kingdom of Hawaii. 5 However, he pointed out that 'the act of Congress to prohibit the coolie trade, approved 19 February 1862, and which was framed with regard to China, is hereby made applicable to Japan. '6 Van Valkenburgh's statement, reflecting the American negative stand towards the 'coolie trade', at the same time showed clearly that the American minister did not distinguish Japanese labourers from many groups of fellow Asian 'coolies' recruited in Macao. The reaction of the Meiji government is not clear. Obviously, the Japanese, who were eager to break company with their 73

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backward East Asian neighbours, cannot have been satisfied when the status of 'coolies' was applied to Japanese subjects, as the 'coolies' were often regarded as slaves in the public opinion in the West. Although a deeper insight into the Meiji government's views on this affair cannot be obtained, the government, admittedly, seemed to be afraid that low social status ofJapanese abroad would lead to the further humiliation of Japan as a nation. On 17 April 1869, the decree To Regulate Travel Abroad [Kaigai toka kisoku 0 sadamu] was enacted in Japan. According to this decree, anyone intending to leave Japan for a treaty nation should request a passport from the commissioners for foreign affairs in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagasaki, Hakodate, Hyogo (Kobe), Niigata or Kanagawa (Yokohama) through the ruler of his domain (Yamada 1998: 35). The concerns of the Meiji government about the unauthorized emigrants were aggravated by two reports about the conditions of the gannenmono in Hawaii. The first of them was provided by Shiroyama Seiichi who served as an interpreter for Japanese merchants in San Francisco. Although the Meiji government ordered him to visit Hawaii and meet the Japanese labourers, he did no more than compile English-language newspapers published in San Francisco which led to very negative conclusions on the treatment of the Japanese in Hawaii. The other report was presented by Makino Tomisaburo, the headman of the gannenmono group, and contained a narrative about their cruel treatment, low salary and the hot climate (Nihon gaika bunsho [NGB], 1, 2: 681-2; Hawai Nihonjin iminshi kanko iinkai 1964: 54--5). Both reports reached the Meiji government at the end of 1869 and served as a basis for the Council of State [Dajakan] conclusion that the Japanese in the Hawaiian plantations were maltreated. In 1869, after consultations with the charges d'affaires of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, the Japanese government despatched Ueno Kagenori and Miwa Sukekazu as special envoys to investigate the conditions of the Japanese immigrants in Hawaii. As a result of their investigations and negotiations with the king of Hawaii, David Kalakaua, the amity between two nations was restored and the right of Japanese subjects to reside overseas was recognized. Moreover, the treaty concluded between two countries one year later was the first one, apart from one signed with China, which did not contain extraterritoriality clauses (Hoare 1994: 66). 74

RESCUING THE PRISONERS OF THE MARVI LUZ

The recruitment of Japanese labourers, thereby, was just reverberations of the wide-scale coolie trade which flourished, first in Hong Kong, and, after the 1850s, in Macao. Consequently, although the treaties concluded with Britain and the United States allowed foreigners to employ Japanese, the first real step towards the recognition of the right of common people to be hired and taken abroad by foreigners was taken in 1871. However, as Conroy (1953: 15) has noted, the Japanese government long remained suspicious of emigration to Hawaii, and proposals regarding the hiring of Japanese labourers which followed this event were ignored, especially after the topranking Japanese officials acted as prosecutors against the captain of a coolie vessel in the Maria Luz incident of 1872. PRISONERS OF THE PERUVIAN BARK

In April 1872, the captain of the Maria Luz, Ricardo Herrera, along with the contractor Tanco Armerol recruited 234 Chinese labourers in Macao for Emilio Althaus, a plantation owner in Peru. The labourers were to be transported from Macao to the Peruvian port of Callao. However, the vessel Maria Luz which left Macao on 22 April, which was supposed to bring the labourers directly to South America, was badly damaged by storm. On 5 June, Mutsu Munemitsu, the Kanagawa prefecture governor [Kanagawaken kenret1, allowed Captain Herrera to repair the Maria Luz in the port of Yokohama, which had been opened for foreign vessels. At the end of June, one Chinese labourer escaped from the ship Maria Luz and was found by sailors from the British warship Iron Duke. British sailors accompanied him to the British charge d'affaires, who, in his turn, took him to Kanagawa prefecture government [kencho]. When Herrera was invited to the Kanagawa prefecture government to explain the situation, he pledged that the cruel treatment would not be repeated. However, some days later, another Chinese labourer from the vessel appealed to the British authorities for protection (NGB, 5: 413-5; Kaizuma 1965: 129). An officer from the British warship visited the Maria Luz, but the British military could not intervene, as they were in the territorial waters of a third country, namely Japan. Therefore, they reported the incident to the British charge d'affaires, Robert Grant Watson - the British minister to Japan, Harry Parkes, was on his way to Great Britain at that time - and asked 75

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him to request the Japanese government to conduct an investigation. On 28 June, Watson visited the vessel and after a consultation with the US charge d'affaires, Charles o. Shepard, forwarded a dispatch directly to Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomi, requesting to protect Chinese from abuse. His dispatch reads: The coolie trade between Macao and the western ports of South America, particularly the Peruvian has been characterized by such barbarity and such disregard to the rights of the Chinese Government that it has mostly justly excited the strongest feeling in Europe and all civilized countries. The contiguity of Japan to China and the importance to both countries that nothing should disturb the good feeling at present existing between them renders it most important that Japan should not permit its hospitality to be abused to the possible injury of natives of China. 7

On the same day, Shepard, who as plenipotentiary of the United States had an agreement to represent also the interests of Peru in Japan, promptly informed Soejima that he 'declined to lend in any way' aid to the captain of the Peruvian bark (NGB, 5: 420).

However, even pressure from the British and American charges d'affaires, and from Sir Edmund Hornby, the British chief justice at Shanghai (Hoare 1994: 83), failed to provoke unanimous aspiration inside the Japanese government to assert the rights of Chinese labourers. Japanese sources show considerable diversity in Japanese officials' attitudes towards the Maria Luz affair. While Foreign Minister Soejima succumbed to the requests of the foreign diplomats to rescue the Chinese, Eta Shinpei, the minister of justice [shihogyo] and Mutsu Munemitsu, who combined the posts of Kanagawa prefecture governor and head of the Ministry of Finance Tax Office, strongly opposed Soejima. It is conceivable that he may have considered that if the case was brought to a court in Japan, it might contribute to the struggle for revision of unequal treaties. Nevertheless, Eta agreed with Soejima that the incident could not be neglected for humanitarian reasons and insisted that Japanese authorities could not intervene in incidents involving non-treaty nation subjects, since it might be dangerous for Japan (Kaizuma 1965: 134-5). A conflict between these two influential ministers was settled by Sanja Sanetomi, the head of the Council of State, who ordered the establishment of an ad hoc court [tokubetsu hotel] in 76

RESCUING THE PRISONERS OF THE MARL4 LUZ

Kanagawa prefecture under the direct governance of the foreign ministry. The governor of Kanagawa prefecture, Mutsu Munemitsu, busy with governing the land tax reform [chiso kaikaku] , refused to follow _Soejima's order and resigned. Soejima promptly appointed Oe Taku, who had earlier been a councillor [san}11 of the Kanagawa government, as prefecture governor and head of the ad hoc court which was aimed at settling the Maria Luz affair. 8 Oe sided with Soejima and declined to transfer the case to the Yokohama court as had been requested by Kawano Togama, an official of the Ministry ofJustice (Nihon seiji saiban shiroku [~SSS] 1977: 276-7). On 4 July 1872, Oe began to investigate the case and ordered E. S. Benson, the Yokohama foreign municipal director [kyoryuminchi kantokukanp, and Baba Keijiro, a prefecture government official, to investigate the conditions of the Chinese labourers on board the Maria Luz. Oe's decision to send a Japanese official along with the foreign municipal director was apparently due to his desire to enlist the support of a wider circle of Western diplomats for solving the incident. In addition, as Benson, the second director in the history of the settlement, 'in spite of his election by foreign residents, was obliged to take the Japanese side in disputes' (Hoare 1994: 112), Oe stood a good chance to have the support of the foreign settlement on this Issue. On the same day, Oe along with George Wales Hill, a US advocate in the service of the prefecture governor, and the British consul in Yokohama, Russel Robertson, with the assistance of customs offICer Wu Ding, interrogated Mu Qing, the first Chinese labourer rescued by British sailors.lO They ascertained that Mu Qing had been hired in Macao as a sailor with a salary of two-three yuan a month, but had been treated cruelly by Captain Herrera, which was the main reason for him to escape from the vessel. 11 However, Mu Qing did not have a passport that was officially issued and could not explain how he was going to enter ~ foreign country. During the second interrogation on 6 July, Oe could ascertain that the Chinese labourers, most of whom had been kidnapped, had been cruelly treated. He also found that three Chinese had committed suicide on the way from Macao to Yokohama (NSSS: 278). Captain Herrera, who was also interrogated on 6 July, s!rongly rejected Mu Qing's testimony, and shortly afterwards, Oe decided to keep the Maria Luz in the port, if necessary by 77

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

force. On 8 July, the Japanese foreign ministry forwarded a request to the Japanese navy to see to it that the Peruvian vessel did not leave the harbour, and the navy ministry sent the warship Azuma to the Shinagawa Bay to deter the Maria Luz from leaving (Takeda 1981: 6). Ten days later, on 19 July, police officers sent by Kanagawa prefecture government to the vessel allowed its Chinese passengers to land and stay in Yokohama under the protection of the Japanese authorities. THE PERUVIAN CAPTAIN VS. THE KANAGAWA GOVERNOR

More and more countries became involved in the incident. As Peru had not established diplomatic relations with Japan and did not have a plenipotentiary in Japan, Captain Herrera appealed to E. Loureiro, the Portuguese consul in Yokohama, and asked for his cooperation against the actions_of the Kanagawa governor.12 The latter forwarded a letter to Oe, but had to be satisfied with the explanation that the vessel was under arrest until the situation of the cruel treatment of the Chinese had been clarified (NSSS: 278; Takeda 1981: 64-5). Meanwhile, Captain Herrera hired E V. Dickins, a Yokohama-based attorney, and made a counter-claim with his assistance. He argued that as Chinese labourers were hired in a territory under Portuguese jurisdiction, only Portuguese law could be applied and, as the vessel was under Peruvian flag, consequently, it was not under Japanese jurisdiction. Captain Herrera requested that the Japanese side compensate all expenses related with the vessel's overstay in Yokohama (NSSS: 279). Mter this counter-claim Oe held a series of consultations with foreign diplomats. He was aware of the inexperience of the Japanese officials and immediately hired a number of foreign advisers (ibid.: 279-80). The trial took place twice, first as a criminal case, and then as a civil case. The Peruvian side questioned the right of Japanese authorities to bring the affair to court and argued that the Japanese custom of indenturing young girls by their parents to brothels might also be considered a kind of flesh trade [jinshin baibat1, depriving Japan of the moral right to judge a case concerning the coolie trade. Countering this argument, the Japanese prosecutors could only point to that a bill prohibiting the prostitution [shagi seido] was in preparation. In fact, the discussion on the flesh trade in the court was an 78

RESCUING THE PRISONERS OF THE MA.RlA LUZ

important cause for the Council of State to prohibit this shameful custom, as a step towards adjusting the laws in Japan to the international standards that was a inevitable condition of the revision of the unequal treaties. On 2 October 1872, two months after the case was closed, the Council of State issued a decree that prohibited any kind of the trade in humans. This decree is widely known in Japan as the Act of the Emancipation of Prostitutes [Shogi kaiho rell. 13 _ The counter-argument of the Peruvian side did not prevent Oe from carrying the case through. According to the final judgement the vessel should be sold at an auction, and labourers were to be released and sent back to their homeland. However, the attempt of the ad hoc court to follow Western standards of justice in resolving this coolie trade incident, especially after urgent requests of the British and American charges d'affaires to bring this case to the court, aroused a negative reaction of the consular body. The foreign diplomats showed their dissatisfaction at a meeting on 28 August. They claimed that the Japanese authorities had to consult with them on any affair related with a crime committed by foreigners in the manner stipulated under the fourth article of the regulations of the Yokohama settlement of 1867.14 Even Oe's further appeal to the consular body to approve the court decision was rejected by the consuls of Italy, France, Denmark, and Portugal (IKM, 51: 168-9; Hoare 1994: 89). THE PERUVIAN MISSION TO JAPAN

Mter its complete fiasco in the court, the Peruvian side took steps to reach a compromise. Japan was included in the itinerary of a Peruvian mission to China that had been planned since the early 1870s and that was aimed at securing a treaty with China concerning the recruitment of labourers for Peruvian enterprises. Shortly after the new president of Peru, Manuel Pardo, took power on 2 August 1872, he appointed Aurelio Garcia y Garcia as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to China and Japan. He was a naval captain and famous for his scientific works on navigation and for his aristocratic origin. Foreign Minister Jose de la Riva Aguero instructed him to conclude treaties with China and Japan on the same basis as treaties with most favoured nations. The Peruvian foreign minister insisted especially on the inclusion of a provision 'for the liberty 79

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

of the citizens of each of the contracting parties to emigrate to the territory of the other' (Stewart 1951 [1970]: 162-3). The full set of documents related to the Maria Luz affair was also handed over to the plenipotentiary and he was charged with the task 'to carefully investigate the antecedents of the case and act in such manner as to secure reparation for the injustice and violence of which Captain Herrera had been the object'. According the Peruvian government, the recruitment and transportation of Chinese labourers on board the Maria Luz was made under same legal conditions as contract emigration to the English and French colonies or South American countries. Therefore, Foreign Minister Aguero was convinced that the Japanese authorities did not have any legal grounds for keeping the vessel. Originally, the Peruvian government had the intention to send the mission to China under the protection of two warships, but as the rumours of the Peruvian militant intentions reached Japan, the Peruvian government dropped this idea (ibid.: 165-6). The Peruvian mission arrived in Japan in March 1873 and was received by the emperor on 3 March. The same day Foreign Minister Soejima hosted a dinner for the Peruvian delegation on the occasion of their arrival at the Hamagoten Palace (Stewart 1951 [1970]: 169; Morimoto 1979: 11-2). Aurelio Garcia y Garcia assured Soejima of Peru's peaceful intentions in trying to speed up the negotiations on the Maria Luz case and the conclusion of a treaty of commerce. The Japanese side was represented by Ueno Kagenori who had earlier successfully fulfilled the role of plenipotentiary in Hawaii, in dealing with the case of Van Reed's unauthorised employment ofJapanese labourers. After three months of negotiations, both sides, advised by the American minister Charles E. De Long, agreed to submit the Maria Luz case to arbitration by Tsar Alexander II of Russia, because Russia was one of the few powers not yet involved in the incident (NSSS: 285-6). To cover the expenses of Captain Herrera and Tanco Armero, both sides agreed to the sale of the vessel at an auction that took place on 2 August, 1873. The vessel was sold for 7,250 dollars (NGB, 6: 541). All Chinese labourers were released and sent back to China. Alexander II took over the arbitration of the case and announced his decision in favour of Japan, when the Japanese plenipotentiary Enomoto Takeaki signed the Sakhalin-Kuril 80

RESCUING THE PRISONERS OF THE MARL4 LUZ

Islands Exchange Treaty after negotiations in St Petersburg in

1875. 15 CONCLUSION

The Meiji Restoration marked Japan's transition to a modern state and provided an impetus for the creation of new state institutions, such as the foreign ministry. The gannenmono and the Maria Luz incidents occurred at the time when the revision of the unequal treaties with Western powers was the major concern of Japanese diplomacy. In particular, the Maria Luz incident took place when the Iwakura embassy was making its famous trip to Europe and the United States in order to study foreign legal systems and adjust Japanese laws to international standards. Although few cases of recruitment of labourers came near to matching the large scale of the coolie trade, the emigration issue was a matter of concern for Japanese government and a reason why it remained suspicious towards the emigration of its subjects. The Meiji government feared that discrimination against Japanese could lead to disrespect for Japan as a nation. On the other hand, efforts to rescue Japanese emigrants to Hawaii in 1869-71 and Chinese labourers in 1872-73, successfully fulfilled by Veno Kagenori and Oe Taku, were among the first steps taken by the Japanese government in order to achieve a respected place in the Western state system. Thus, the Maria Luz incident can be regarded as the first case when Japan exercised jurisdiction over subjects of a non-treaty nation. Moreover, the negotiations on the emigration issues was an important motivation for establishing diplomatic relations and concluding treaties of amity and commerce between Japan and two nations of the New World, namely the Kingdom of Hawaii and the Republic of Peru. BIBLIOGRAPHY Conroy, Hilary. 1953. TheJapanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868-1898. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Hawai Nihonjin iminshi kanko iinkai, ed. 1964. Hawai Nihonjin iminshi [A history of Japanese immigration in Hawaii]. Honolulu: Hawai nikkeijin rengo kyokai. [Higashikuze Michitomi]. 1992. Higashikuze Michitomi nikki [The diary of Higashikuze Michitomi], edited by Kasumi kaikan kazoku shiryo chosa iinkai. Tokyo: Kasumi kaikan. 81

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY Hoare, J. E. 1994. Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests, 1858-1899. Folkstone, Kent: Japan Library. IKM. Inoue Kaoru monjo [papers of Inoue Kaoru], 51. Kensei shiryoshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo. Imai Teruko. 1979. '''Gannenmono'' imin mumenkyo Hawai toko mondai ni tsuite no ichikosatsu' [A study of first-year men's unlicensed emigration to Hawaii], Tsudajuku daigaku kiyo 11: 37-66. Kaizuma Haruhiko. 1965. 'Eto Shinpei to Maria-Riizugo jiken' [Eto Shinpei and the Maria Luz incident], Ajia daigaku shigaku kiyo 14: 129-38. Kuykendal, Ralph. 1935. The Earliest Japanese Labor Immigration to Hawaii. Occasional Papers of University of Hawaii Press. Morimoto, Amelia. 1979. Los Inmigrantes Japoneses en el Peru. Taller de Estudios Andinos, Universidad Nacional Agraria, Lima. Naikaku kanpokyoku, ed. 1889. Horei zensho [Complete collection oflaws and ordinances]. Meiji gonen no ichi [The fifth year of Meiji era, 1]. Tokyo. NGB. Gaimusho, ed. 1955-57. Nihon gaiko bunsho [Documents on Japanese diplomacy], 1:1,5,6,7. Tokyo: Nihon gaiko bunsho hanpukai. NSSS. Nihon seiji saiban shiroku [Historical records of Japanese political trials]. 1977. Ed. by Wagatsuma Sakae. 17th ed. Tokyo: Dai-ippoki shuppan. The Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1868. 1869. Washington. Sakata Yasuo. 1991. 'Fubyodo joyaku to Amerika dekasegi' [Unequal treaties and emigration to America]. In Hokubei Nihonjin kirisutokyo undoshi [A history of the Japanese Christian movement in North America], edited by Doshisha daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyiijo. Tokyo: PMC Shuppan. Stewart, Watt. 1951 (1970). Chinese Bondage in Peru: A History of the Chinese Coolie in Peru, 1849-1874. Reprint ed. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. STM. Sogima Taneomi monjo [Papers of Soejima Taneomi]. Kensei shiryoshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo. Takeda Yasumi. 1981. Maria Rusu jiken: Oe Taku to dorei kaiho [The Maria Luz incident: De Taku and the liberation of slaves]. Yokohama: Yiirindo. Yamada (Yagishita) Hiroko. 1998. 'Senzenki no ryoken no hensen' [The modification of the passports for travel abroad in the pre-war period], Gaiko shiryokan ho 12: 31-59. NOTES 1. Emperor Yongzheng banned emigration in the late 1720s. 2. 'Zai Kanagawa Amerikajin Van Riido yori gaikoku jimukyoku ken Yokohama saibansho sotoku Higashikuze Michitomi' [From Van Reed, American citizen in Yokohama, to Higashikuze Michitomi, the commissioner for foreign affairs and governor of the Yokohama Court], 18 April (10 May) 1868, Nihon gaiko bunsho [Documents on Japanese diplomacy; hereafter, NGB], 1, 1: 608; Higashikuze Michitomi nikki [The diary of Higashikuze Michitomi]: 532, 548. 3. The Third Article of the treaty of commerce and navigation signed in 1858 between Townsend Harris, the US minister to Japan, and the representatives of the bakufu stipulated that 'Americans residing in Japan shall have the right to employ Japanese as servants or in any capacity'. The treaty concluded between the British and the bakufu also contained an article which stated that The Japanese Government will place no restriction upon the employment, by British subjects, ofJapanese by lawful capacity'. See Sakata (1991: 648-50). 82

RESCUING THE PRISONERS OF THE MARIA LUZ 4. 'Van Valkenburgh to their Excellencies Hizen Jijin, Higashi Kuze Jijin, May 26, 1868', The Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations if the United States, 1868 (1869: 748); Kuykendal (1935: 17). 5. The Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations if the United States, 1868 (1869: 748). 6. 'Van Valkenburgh to their Excellencies Hizen Jijin, Higashi Kuze Jijin, 26 May, 1868'; see also NGB, 1, 1: 650-2. 7. 'Eikoku dairikoshi R. G. Watson yori Soejima Taneomi gaimugyo ate' [Letter from British charge d'affaires R. G. Watson to Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomi], 29 June, 1872. NGB, 5: 415-8. See also Soejima Taneomi monjo [Papers of Soejima Taneomi; hereafter, STM], Kensei shiryoshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo. 8. Oe Taku was born in a family of high standing of the Tosa clan. On 28 October, 1871, he was appointed seventh-rank official in charge of foreign affairs [shichito shusshi gaikoku jimu kakaTl1 in the Kanagawa prefecture government. On 13 November, the governor, Mutsu Munemitsu, appointed him a councilor [sanjl]. See NGB, 5: 421. 9. In June 1868, the foreign diplomats based in Yokohama and the Japanese government agreed that the foreign residents at Yokohama could elect the foreign municipal director (Hoare 1994: 111). 10. Oe had also been assisted by Zokuyama Toichi, fIrSt-rank official [itto benkan], and Hayashimichi Sanro, prosecuting attorney [kenjitenj. 11. The protocol of the interrogation of Mu Qing and Richardo Herrera, in NGB, 5: 424-2; Takeda (1981: 51-5). 12. Portugal had established diplomatic relations with Japan in 1860. 13. Meiji gonen fukoku dainihyakukyujugo [Decree no. 295 of the fifth year of the Meiji eraj, in Naikaku kanpokyoku (1889: 200-1). 14. Inoue Kaoru monjo [Papers oflnoue Kaoru; hereafter, IKMj, Kensei shiryoshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo, 51: 168. 15. 'Mariya Riizu hanketsu ni kansuru rokoku kotei hanketsu no tsiichisho' [Notification on the decision of the Russian Tsar regarding the Maria Luz court decisionj, STM.

83

7

The Ending of Extraterritoriality in Japan"

IAN RUXTON

The author of China, the Sleep and the Awakening must feel greatly encouraged, whoever he be, by the news received a few days' since, that the foreign powers have at last agreed to the abolition of extraterritoriality in Japan. The struggle of the Japanese to attain this end has been a long and arduous one. For years after the revolution [of 1868] which sent the Tycoon [Shogun] into private life, and recalled the Mikado ['Emperor'] from a shadowy to an actual sovereignty, observers both in Japan and beyond it, predicted that the change had been too sudden, and that a reaction must soon come. (From 'Extraterritoriality and Treaty Revision inJapan', North China Herald, Shanghai, 3 June, 1887)1

he above quotation sadly and prematurely heralded a false dawn, one of many on Japan's long and painful road to untying the Gordian knot of treaty revision. Nevertheless, the ending of the system of consular jurisdiction known as extraterritoriality2 was, this essay will argue, one of the major turning points, or defining moments, in the development of Japan as a modern state. The abolition of extraterritoriality - the condition of foreigners residing in a country not subject to its laws but to those of their 'home' country - constituted one of the two main aims that the Japanese government set itself when negotiating to escape from the humiliation of 'semi-colonial' status by treaty revision, the other being tariff autonomy. The two issues were intertwined throughout the negotiations, though the former was arguably the more fundamental one, and the cause of greater ill-feeling among the increasingly welleducated and aware Japanese people.

T

• The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Kyushu Institute of Technology alumni association (the Meisenkat).

84

THE ENDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN

Attempts at exploring the possibility of revising the 'unequal treaties' - so called because they lacked reciprocity - began somewhat tentatively with the Iwakura Mission (1871-73).3 To understand the importance of the ending of consular jurisdiction, it is first necessary to explain briefly how and why the system was set up, and then to describe the system in operation, and early attempts to abolish it, before relating how it was finally terminated on 16 July 18944, by a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Britain and Japan, which came into force exactly five years later, on 17 July 1899. 5 The 1894 treaty, described by Beasley (1987: 33) as 'the first genuinely reciprocal foreign treaty' also provided for the end of controls over tariffs in 1911. 6 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY, 1858-69'

The foundation of the system of extraterritoriality in Japan was the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce signed by Lord Elgin and representatives of the shogunate on 26 August 1858. 8 This treaty which came into force in July 1859 laid down that in all criminal matters (including those involving Japanese or other non-British foreign residents) all British subjects were to be tried by the British authorities in Japan, who were also to deal with all questions involving the personal status of British citizens. Civil cases between Japanese and British citizens were to be arranged by consultation between the competent officials of the two countries. No provision was made for civil cases between British subjects and those of other foreign powers. The treaty-port system in Japan followed the system already established in China. In March 1859 and the following year, the British government issued Orders in Council, superseded in turn by the China and Japan Order in Council of March 1865, which remained the basis of British jurisdiction in Japan until 1899. This system worked well in most respects for the best part of forty years, though it became, as British minister Sir Ernest Satow observed in a letter dated 15 June 1899, to his friend Frederick Victor Dickins 'daily more and more unworkable' as time elapsed (Ruxton 1998: 268).9 Satow was probably most concerned with the increased workload on under-staffed consulates caused by the growth in numbers of foreign residents. At the same time support from Western businessmen overseas 85

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waned as they gradually realized they must choose between access to the interior markets of Japan and maintenance of the treaty-port system (Hoare 1994: xv). Some defects were evident early: for instance, the lack of jurisdiction in disputes over ships' cargo, matrimonial cases and appeals. All of these had to be referred to the supreme court in Shanghai, a process which was both slow and costly. Other problems included the lack of legal training of many consular officials and the growth of court work, which was not always matched by an increase in consular staff, or by any special encouragement or incentives, financial or otherwise, to obtain legal qualifications. 1o Yet as Hoare (1994: 58) states: 'Even with its defects, the British system was a good one, and it certainly had no challenger in Japan.'l1 THE SYSTEM IN OPERATION, 1869-99

The treaty-port system, affording protection primarily for foreign merchants and missionaries, was established in the years 1858-69 and remained operative with few changes for thirty years. Hawaii and China joined the treaty powers in 1871, and Peru in 1873 after the Maria Luz case (Maria Riizugo jiken; see Hoare 1994: 88-9), bringing the number to eighteen. 12 But China always was something of a special case, and did not appoint a minister until 1878. On the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, the Japanese government announced the end of Chinese extraterritoriality, which was sealed and delivered by the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and its related commercial treaty of the following year. This victory conveniently excluded China from the ranks of treaty powers, freeing Japan from the obligation of granting to Chinese citizens the same rights to reside and trade in the interior [naichi zakkyop3 that would be accorded in time to Europeans and Americans. The greatest champion of the system of extraterritoriality was undoubtedly Sir Harry Parkes, British minister in Japan from 1865 to 1883, and an implacable opponent of treaty revision. He spared no pains in ensuring that the system worked, and that the Japanese would be given no opportunity to criticize it. He 'devoted much effort to seeking and getting an elaborate system of courts and powers, believing that this was an obligation which Britain should not avoid, whatever other countries might do. At the same time he was unwilling to 86

THE ENDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN

concede that the treaties in any way allowed the Japanese jurisdiction over foreigners, and was adamant that Japanese law did not apply to the British community' (Hoare 2000: 113). Parkes defended the outmoded system of foreign post offices, refused to allow Japanese game laws to apply to Britons, prevented the introduction of much-needed harbour regulations and fought hard over the rules applying to travel in the interior of Japan. He was, however, forced to admit defeat when the Japanese government in 1876 sought his agreement to issuing a regulation preventing a British newspaperman, John Reddie Black, from publishing a Japanese-language newspaper, the Bankoku shinbun (News of all nations). He issued the requested regulation on 7 February 1876, under the 1865 Order in Council, and asked for approval from London after the event. On this occasion the British Law Officers of the Crown ruled that Britons in Japan were bound to obey Japanese laws, unless specifically exempted by Treaty, and that the British minister was bound to accept Japanese laws as the basis of his regulations (Hoare 1975; see also Daniels 1996: 164). The significance of this case must not be underestimated: it 'marked the beginning of the end of extraterritoriality in Japan. This Japanese victory was the first and decisive one on the way to full Treaty revision in 1894' (Hoare 1975: 301). Several prominent members of the foreign community were also opposed to treaty revision. E V Dickins (1838-1915), who had qualified as a barrister in 1870, agreed with Sir Harry Parkes and wrote at length on the subject to the Japan Mail (then edited by Captain Francis Brinkley) on 23 January 1882. While sympathizing with the Japanese government, he argued, inter alia, that deficiencies in the criminal code and procedure of the criminal courts, and the lack of civil law and an independent judiciary, meant that Japan was still 'not in a position to claim the full exercise of sovereign rights as against foreigners'. He thought that the consular courts were impartial as between foreigners and Japanese, and that the indecipherable Japanese language itself was a major obstacle to the abolition of extraterritoriality: it should be romanized, at least for public purposes. 14 William Montague Kirkwood (1850-1926) went to Japan in 1874 and worked as a lawyer in Yokohama, then as a legal adviser, first at the British legation (1882-85), and thereafter for the Japanese government until his return to Britain in 1901.15 A 87

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

letter from Kirkwood to Parkes is quoted in Dickins' The Life of Sir Harry Parkes: I do not say that the actual organization of the courts is bad, but I do say that thejudges are as a body incompetent and without qualifications, that in all the Courts in Tokio and Yokohama (Supreme, Appeal and First Instance) there is not a single interpreter of any pretensions to competency, that the judges have no idea of the relative position of bench and bar, and that the equipment of the Courts is such as to render the proper conduct of a suit by counsel almost an impossibility. (Dickins 1894 [1999): 321)

Commenting on this, Dickins notes that his own experience of Japanese tribunals over seven years was 'somewhat different, but equally dismal. The judges seemed to me able, painstaking and impartial, but appeared to have no body of law upon which to found their decisions or guide their procedure' (ibid.: 321). On the other hand, there were some Japanese who wrote frankly and vehemently against extraterritoriality. The most noteworthy of these was the law student Baba Tatsui of Tosa 16, whose English-language pamphlet The English People in Japan (1875) complained of the uncertainty of English common law, refuted the claim that unqualifIed men were appointed as judges in Japanese courts, and pointed out that English laws (e.g. the law of contract) were very complicated, being 'full of technicalities and fictions'. Baba added: If any Englishman come into the interior of the country and commit any crime, or violate our laws, what will be the remedy? He must be brought to Yokohama, where there is a consular court; but it is a very inconvenient thing for the Japanese to bring him up from the interior, perhaps 600 miles, incurring these unnecessary expenses. 17

The force of this complaint was somewhat diminished by the limitation placed on travel in the interior by the treaties, which prevented all except diplomats from going more than 25 miles in any direction from the treaty ports. These restrictions were, however, eased to some extent by Japan in the late 1870s, mainly to allow summer holidays at Hakone and other resorts. 18 EARLY ATTEMPTS AT ABOLITION, 1882-87

The date of Dickins' Japan Mail article is significant in that the preliminary conference on treaty revision began two days later on 25 January and lasted till 27 July, 1882. Satirical and irreverent 88

THE ENDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN

comment was published in the July edition of the Japan Punch. 19 The conference principals were Parkes for Britain and Inoue Kaoru who had been foreign minister since 1879. All the other treaty powers were represented, and Ernest Satow, as Japanese secretary to the British legation and the first English secretary to the conference, worked on translations of draft proposals. (Between 1875 and 1879 Terajima Munenori, then foreign minister, had unsuccessfully offered the opening of more ports in return for tariff autonomy.) 20 Inoue sought to increase both tariff rates and Japan's jurisdiction over foreigners, and a compromise was reached in 1886. Yet the French jurist and long-time government adviser Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie 21 thought the proposed agreement was a threat to Japan's jurisdiction. Others such as General Tani Kanjo22, the prominent anti-foreign traditionalist, were also opposed to it: in June 1886 he resigned from Ito Hirobumi's first cabinet in protest. This led eventually to the suspension of negotiations and Inoue's resignation in 1887. 23 A lengthy and important article entitled 'A New Phase of Japanese Treaty Revisions' written by the London Times Tokyo correspondent (probably Major-General H. S. Palmer24) on 12 August 1887, appeared in the newspaper on 17 September of the same year. In seeking to explain the recent Japanese prorogation of the conference assembled 15 months previously, the author identified three stages, or 'acts' in the drama of treaty revision. The first was the 1882 conference, in which Inoue unsuccessfully proposed 'to throw open the whole ofJapan's territory to foreign residence, travel and trade, simultaneously with her recovery of a considerable measure of judicial autonomy.' Conditions precedent to foreign acceptance were laws consistent with Western principles,25 and a judiciary competent to administer those laws. At the time Japan's criminal code and code of criminal procedure were complete and recognized as up to the required standard, but the codification of the civil laws was not yet complete. 26 Japan was prepared to add foreign judges to her judiciary to preside in a majority in cases in which foreigners were involved. The second act of the drama was a more modest counter-proposal by the foreign powers in the spring of 1884, focusing on tariff revision in exchange for the opening to foreign trade of new 'accessible ports'. This proposal again quickly became bogged down in Japanese counter-conditions regarding consular 89

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

jurisdiction, with the unhappy result that: 'Months of toil and contention were spent in the swamps of this desperate problem' leading only to 'an apparently hopeless deadlock'. The third act began with a joint Anglo-German note of 15 June, 1886, written by the respective ministers, Sir Francis Plunkett27 and Baron Theodor von Holleben, which effectively reverted to the Japanese proposals of 1882 (see Jones 1931: 109). It was accepted as the basis of negotiation, with details to be discussed including the number of courts in which foreign judges should preside, the number of foreign judges, their length of tenure, and the languages to be used in the courts. As negotiations went on, it became clear that Japan's legal codes would have to be submitted to the treaty powers for their approval before treaties abolishing extraterritoriality would be allowed to go into operation. This led to Japanese suspension of negotiations, pending completion of the codes. The author concluded optimistically that the efforts of the 'liberal and helpful' British minister Plunkett and the 'brilliant and indefatigable' Count Inoue, would lead eventually to success, and noted: Finally, it has been shown that solution of the hideous problem of treaty revision may be brought within the arena of things that are possible, and even within a measurable distance. The ways of treaty revision are not ways of pleasantness, nor are its paths the paths of peace. But at any rate Japan now knows what remains to be done before she can escape from her bondage, and she may be expected to set about doing it with increased verve and determination. 28

OKUMA SHIGENOBU AND TREATY REVISION29

Count Okuma Shigenobu became foreign minister in February 1888. He resolved to abandon his predecessor Inoue's policy of negotiating at large and unwieldy conferences between Japan and all the treaty powers en masse, and decided to negotiate separately with each of the treaty powers. The fIrSt approach he made was to Mexico, however, which had no treaty, no residents in Japan and little trade. On 30 November, 1888, a Treaty of Amity and Commerce was successfully concluded in Washington by Count Mutsu Munemitsu and Senor Matias Romero, the respective ministers to the United States, and ratification instruments were exchanged on 18 July, 1889. The agreement was on equal and 90

THE ENDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN

reciprocal terms: in particular, article IV opened all of Japan to trade and residence by Mexican citizens, while by article VIII Japan secured full judicial autonomy over Mexicans in her territories and territorial waters. Okuma's next task was to reopen negotiations with the treaty powers, against the sensitive and volatile background of domestic political enmity and Japanese public opinion. Of these Germany and the United States, where President Grover Cleveland had spoken in Congress (3 December, 1888) of granting relief to Japan from 'undue and oppressive foreign control in matters of commerce', seemed more accommodating than Britain, so Okuma approached them first. But the British were soon involved, with charge d'affaires Henry Power Ie Poer Trench reporting on 29 DeceIl!ber to foreign minister Lord Salisbury a conversation with Okuma who had expressed a strong desire to resume the interrupted negotiations (Jones 1931: 116-8). On 19 January, 1889, the Japanese charge d'affaires in London, Viscount Okabe, sent Salisbury a wide-ranging draft treaty proposing by Article XV the continuance of consular jurisdiction in the treaty ports for five years only. A counterdraft was sent by Salisbury on 21 June to Hugh Frase~o, then British minister, with instructions not to present it to the Japanese government until further notice so that the other treaty powers could be informed of the contents. Article XV was completely rewritten to define the treaty limits during the fiveyear transition period more carefully, and reserving jurisdiction with regard to the personal status of British subjects anywhere in Japan to the consular courts. Fraser received authorization to present the counter-draft on 27 July. He was also instructed to claim for British subjects under the most-favoured-nation clause of the 1858 treaty (Article XXIII) all the privileges accorded to Mexicans under the recently concluded 1888 treaty. This was claimed without reciprocity, but the European powers supported the strict legal right of Britain to do so. (The issue depended on whether the clause was absolute or relative.)31 Meanwhile, on 20 February Japan signed the proposed treaty with the United States minister in Tokyo, Richard B. Hubbard, with Germany following suit later. By early October the British, too, seemed ready to sign. Supervening events conspired, however, against a happy outcome. While the grant of a constitution by the emperor on 91

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

11 February 1889, in place of the prototype of 1868 was welcomed by the powers and signalled the crossing of the Rubicon in terms of the westernization of Japanese institutions, for Japanese cabinet ministers the newly created bi-cameral Diet was 'for many years a curse and a stumbling block' (Jones 1931: 122). The hostility of the inexperienced representatives forced resignations at inconvenient times, when the government was on the point of concluding the treaty negotiations. In addition, public opinion increasingly insisted on absolute equality of treatment in any new treaties. This was encouraged by Professor Alessandro Paternostro 32 , an adviser to the ministry ofjustice, who declared that Japan had the right to denounce the existing treaties if the powers would not concede judicial and tariff autonomy, though he counselled against it. 33 When the London Times published a summary of the proposed AngloJapanese treaty in another article by its correspondent entitled 'The Treaty Drama in Japan' on 19 April, it was soon printed in translation in Japan and aroused a storm of protest over the app_ointment of foreign judges to act on Japanese tribunals. 34 Okuma stood his ground and continued negotiations through August and September with Fraser on the basis of the British counter-draft. He accepted the most-favoured-nation clause, and the maintenance of consular jurisdiction in matters of personal status over British subjects. He agreed that the many British resident in Tokyo but living outside the foreign concession would remain under consular jurisdiction during the fiveyear hand-over period. In return a British demand for foreign judges in the appeal courts, as well as the Supreme Court, was dropped. A personal disaster struck Okuma on 18 October, however, when a fanatic named Kurushima Tsuneki from a Fukuokabased extremist organization (the Genyosha) threw a bomb at Okuma's carriage which almost blew off his right leg. 35 The Kuroda cabinet resigned shortly afterwards, and treaty revision was interrupted again. Al~.mg with Dr Erwin Baelz who witnessed the amputation 2f Okuma's leg, Professor E C. Jones had much sympathy with Okuma's fate (Jones 1931: 124). He had done nothing to lower Japan's prestige in the eyes of the world. Foreign judges in Japanese courts would not be a surrender of judicial auton0l!ly as the laws administered would be Japanese, and in any case Okuma had secured for his government the right to dispense with them altogether after twelve years. 92

THE ENDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN

THE FINAL ACT: THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ENDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Treaty revision (i.e. the recovery ofjudicial and tariff autonomy) as already noted, was the highest priority ofJapanese diplomacy from 1871, but the first real breakthrough was not achieved until Aoki ShiizQ was appointed foreign minister in Yamagata's new cabinet on 24 December 1889. At an interview with Fraser on 27 December, Aoki made new suggestions in view of the risk of an outbreak of feeling against foreigners, but was told to submit them directly to London. 36 Aoki then submitted formal proposals to Fraser on 28 February 1890, which were forwardeq to London on 5 March. In a memorandum and explanatory note Aoki explained the Japanese desire to treat all foreigners equally, and the need for haste because of the imminent convocation of the Diet. As Nish (1999: 135) has noted, Aoki skilfully 'left the powers with the impression that, if they did not give concessions, the treaties would be denounced as a result of the new strong parliamentary opposition which was spreading to public opinion and that the foreign communities would stand to lose everything.' The British response was by a despatch from Lord Salisbury dated 5 June, and a draft treaty and protocol were presented to Aoki on July 15 1890, which he received warmly. A long delay followed while Aoki sought support from all possible quarters and the uncooperative Diet met (November 1890-May 1891). Yamagata resigned on 9 April 1891, due partly to illness, and Aoki himself followed suit on 29 May, taking responsibility for the Otsu Incident in which the Russian crown prince (Tsarevich) was attacked. During the Matsukata government (6 May 1891-8 August 1892) Viscount Enomoto Takeaki was foreign minister, but little progress was made, and an appeal by Enomoto to the Upper House of the Diet on 26 May 1892, not to delay the enforcement of the civil and commercial codes (published in 1890) was rejected. Meanwhile Fraser on the same day suggested that negotiations be resumed in London, away from the Diet and public oppositionY The only minor success for Japan in this period was the withdrawal of Portuguese consuls on account of cost, but this had no effect on the wider issue of treaty revision. On 27 January 1892, Aoki had been posted to Berlin. After 93

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

Mutsu Munemitsu was appointed foreign minister in Ito Hirobumi's second cabinet on August 8 he resolved to build on the advances already made by Aoki. 38 He successfully presented a 'completely equilateral' treaty draft to the cabinet on 5 July 1893, which differed from what he called the 'semi-equilateral' proposals of his predecessors in taking account of the newly promulgated Japanese constitution. Then on 15 September Aoki was instructed to go to London for talks on treaty revision. He was appointed temporary minister to Britain with plenipotentiary powers to discuss treaty revision on 5 December 1893, and presented his credentials on 22 February 1894. The unruly Diet which had demanded unilateral abolition of consular jurisdiction and the recovery of tariff autonomy by an Address to the Throne was dissolved in December, clearing the way for the Anglo-Japanese negotiations to begin in earnest. On 27 December 1893, Aoki presented Mutsu's draft treaty to the British government. There were some differences from Salisbury's 1890 draft, in particular the stipulation that British subjects should retain all rights not specifically abrogated was removed. Lord Kimberley, now foreign secretary in Lord Rosebery's cabinet, objected to the refusal to allow foreigners to hold real property, but was prepared to accept the draft as a basis for negotiations. A despatch on 14 February 1894, from Maurice de Bunsen 39 , then charge d'affaires in Tokyo, almost wrecked the secret talks at the outset by suggesting that Ito and Mutsu were preparing to repudiate the treaties unilaterally, but when official negotiations began on 2 April Aoki was able to smooth things over with help from Fraser who had by then returned to Tokyo. It was said that a speech by Ito had been mistranslated by the pro-Japanese Japan Mail (owned and edited by Captain Francis Brinkley) and Bunsen had misunderstood Mutsu in an interview. The negotiating teams were Aoki aided by Uchida Yasuya40 and Baron Alexander von Siebold41 for Japan, and Francis Leveson Bertie of the Foreign Office assisted by John Harrington Gubbins 42 , the Japanese Secretary on leave from Tokyo. Demands from Bertie for 'full information as to the laws which would be enforceable upon British subjects on the cessation of Consular Jurisdiction' were met by Aoki with a statement of the progress made in codification. The question of land ownership by foreigners in the interior was postponed, while the British desire that the existing system of leases in the foreign settlements 94

THE ENDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN

be untouched was accepted. The term of the treaty was finally fixed at twelve years (Jones 1931: 151, et seq.). An unwelcome hiccup occurred just before the final signature. On 13 July, Aoki sent Mutsu a telegram saying the treaty would be signed the next day. But onJuly 15 another Aoki telegram stated that the British minister (Kimberley) had refused to sign on the fourteenth becaus~ he had received a report that the Japanese minister in Korea, Otori Keisuke, had requested the Korean government to dismiss a British naval instructor. If no explanation were forthcoming within two days the treaty would not be signed. A downhearted Mutsu, fearing failure at the last hurdle, promp_tly denied the report by telegram, adding information from Otori. Finally, he received the joyful news of the conclusion of the treaty early on 17 July. The success of the negotiations, Jones suggests, may be shared equally between three parties. Mutsu 'had played a difficult and hazardous game and won it, after being twice on the verge of disaster. He had gained for Japan far more than her ablest diplomats had dreamed of securing a few years previously.' Failure would have ruined his career, toppled the Ito cabinet, postponed treaty revision indefinitely, and precipitated an antiforeign outbreak among the people. Jones says of Aoki: 'No one had labored more assiduously than he in the cause of treaty revision ... ' And finally the British government is credited for perhaps realizing 'that a refusal to abolish the extraterritorial provisions ... would risk an upheaval in Japan which '" would jeopardize the lives and property of British residents there' (Jones 1931: 154-5). The government had taken an unprecedented step in abandoning its citizens to the jurisdiction of an East Asian power, in the teeth of strong opposition from those selfsame citizens. 43 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The protracted but intense drama of the ending of extraterritoriality inJapan played itself out over the second half of the nineteenth century. The stakes were the highest possible, and as we have seen, there were many players among the treaty powers, both major and minor, and innumerable twists and turns, false starts and disappointments for the fledgling Japanese state before it was finally allowed to take its place in the international community by dint of recognition of its constitution, laws and 95

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

codes. Negotiations held in secret between diplomatic representatives were the final key to opening the door to membership of the international community. Once the landmark 1894 treaty had been ratified, despite its various ambiguities and omissions, there was no going back to the previous negotiations and still less to the national isolation, sakoku, of the Edo era. Japan had truly come of age. BIBLIOGRAPHY Baelz, Erwin 0. E. von. 1932 (1974). Awakeningjapan: The Diary if a German Doctor: Erwin Baelz, edited by his son, Toku Baelz. Reprint ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Beasley, W G. 1987. japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Berlinguez-Kono, Noriko. 2000. 'Debates on Naichi Zakkyo in Japan (1879-99): The Influence of Spencerian Social Evolutionism on the Japanese Perception of the West'. In The japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions, edited by Bert Edstrom. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 7-22. Chamberlain, Basil Hall. 1905 (1971).japanese Things: Being Notes on various Subjects Connected withjapan,for the Use if Travelers and Others. Reprinted. Rutland, VT, and Tokyo: Tuttle. Cobbing, Andrew. 1998. The japanese Discovery of Victorian Britain: Early Travel Encounters in the Far Htst. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. Corr, William. 1999. 'Baba Tatsui and "The English People in Japan"', Kobe International University Review 56: 165-88. Daniels, Gordon. 1996. Sir Harry Parkes, British Representative in japan, 1865-83. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. Dickins, F. V. 1894 (1999). The Life if Sir Harry Parkes. Reprinted. Bristol: Ganesha, and Tokyo: Edition Synapse. Gaikoku shinbun ni miru Nihon: Kokusai nyusu jiten Uapan as viewed in foreign newspapers: A dictionary of international news). 1990. Genbunhen [original text version), edited by Kokusai nyiisu jiten shupp an iinkai. Tokyo: Mainichi Komyunikeshon. Hoare, J. E. 1975. 'The "Bankoku Shinbun Affair": Foreigners, the Japanese Press, and Extraterritoriality in Japan', Modern Asian Studies 9: 289-302. - - . 1994. japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests, 1858-1899. Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library. - - . 1999. 'Captain Francis Brinkley (1841-1912): Yatoi, Scholar and Apologist'. In Britain and japan: Biographical Portraits, 3, edited by J. E. Hoare. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 99-107. --.2000. 'The Era of Unequal Treaties, 1858-99'. In The History ifAnglo-japanese Relations, 1, edited by Chihiro Hosoya and Ian Nish. London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 107-30. japan Punch. 1999. Reprint ed. Tokyo: Yushodo shuppan. Jones, F. C. 1931. Extraterritoriality in japan and the Diplomatic Relations Resulting in Its Abolition, 1853-1899. New Haven: Yale University Press. Kodansha. 1993. japan: An fl/ustrated Encyclopedia. Tokyo: Kodansha. Kornicki, Peter. 1999. Chapter 6 on Dickins. In Britain and japan: Biographical Portraits, 3, edited by J. E. Hoare. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 66-77. 96

THE ENDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN Kuwata, Masaru. 1995-96. 'Kyoryiichi jidai no zainichi Eikoku gaikokan' [The English diplomats in Japan during the period of foreign settlements], Kobe International University Review 49: 82-163, 50: 44-129. Muramatsu, Teijiro. 1995. Westerners in the Modernization oj}apan. Tokyo: Hitachi. Mutsu Munemitsu. 1982 (1992). Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record oj"the Sino-japanese Wtlr, 1894-95, ed. and trans. with historical notes by Gordon M. Berger. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. Nish, Ian. 1997. Chapter 8 on Gubbins. In Britain and japan: Biographical Portraits, 2, edited by I. Nish. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 107-19. --.1999. Chapter 12 on Aoki. In Britain andjapan: Biographical Portraits, 3, edited by J. E. Hoare. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 132-43. - - . 2000. Review of Perez (1999), Proceedings oj" the japan Society 135, Summer: 85--6. - - . ed. 1998. The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. Perez, Louis G. 1999. japan Comes oj" Age: Mutsu Munemitsu and the Revision oj" the Unequal Treaties. London: Associated University Presses. Ruxton, lan, ed. 1998. The Diaries and Letters oj" Sir Ernest Mason Satow (1843-1929): A Scholar-Diplomat in East Asia. Lewiston, NY, and Lampeter, Wales: Edwin Mellen Press. Sims, Richard. 1998. French Policy towards the Baktifu and Meiji japan, 1884-95. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. Swale, Alistair. 1998. 'America: 15 January--6 August 1872: The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightment'. In The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment, edited by Ian Nish. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 1-10. Takeuchi Hiroshi, ed. 1995. Rainichi seiyo jinmei jiten [Biographical dictionary of Westerners who lived in Japan]. Rev. and expo ed. Tokyo: Nichigai Associates. Yokohama Archives of History [Yokohama kaiko shiryokan]. 1987. Mizu to Minato no Onjin H. S. Pa-ma-: Henry Spencer Palmer - A Special Exhibition oj" His Work and Designs for the Water Ki>rks and Harbor Works oj" Yokohama, an illustrated catalogue of a special exhibtion of H. S. Palmer's work and designs for the Water Works and Harbour Works of Yokohama. Yokohama. NOTES 1. Quoted from Gaikoku shinbun ni miru Nihon, Genbunhen, 2: 352. The objections of a Mr Gavin Parker Ness, formerly a barrister in Yokohama, voiced in the March 1887 issue of the Law Magazine of London are discussed. 2. Here I am using the terms 'consular jurisdiction' and 'extraterritoriality' interchangeably, but see the comprehensive recent study by Perez (1999: 48). He quotes Mutsu's distinction made in his Kenkenroku (Mutsu 1982 [1992]). Based on Mutsu's definition, Perez uses the term consular jurisdiction to denote the system of legal machinery that developed in Japan in order to administer the concept of extraterritoriality. I am grateful to Dr J. E. Hoare for drawing my attention to this new and important research, described by Professor Ian Nish in a book review as 'part biography [of Mutsu Munemitsu] and part political history' (Nish 2000). 3. On the Iwakura Mission, see Nish (1998). In his contribution to this collection of essays, Swale (1998) deals at length with the abortive treaty renegotiation attempts in the United States which set the tone for other countries, and describes it as the first lesson for the Japanese in nineteenth-century enlightenment. In fact, the 97

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY Japanese were only empowered to open the question of revision, and not to conclude any new agreement. See also Sims (1998: ch. 6). 4. It is this date, 16 July 1894, or perhaps the date when ratifications of the treaty were exchanged in Tokyo (25 August, 1894), which properly qualifIes as the defming moment. Perez (1999: 9) describes it as 'a watershed in Japanese history'. But the events which followed soon afterwards, namely the Sino-Japanese War (1 August, 1894-31 March, 1895), the Treaty of Shimonoseki which concluded that war (17 April 1895) and the Triple Intervention (23 April, 1895) by the Eastern Dreibund of Russia, Germany and France, all conspired to obscure the importance of the 40-year national crusade for treaty revision and relegate it to 'the backwaters of Japanese history'. 5. The full text of the treaty (comprising 22 articles) is to be found in 'Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty Arrangements berween Great Britain and Japan' (Japan No.1 [C-7545], 1894): 129-35. It is also reprinted in what used to be regarded as the standard work, now arguably displaced by Professor Perez' study, Jones (1931: App. B: 183--6). See also Perez (1999: App. A: 176-87). Only 21 articles are quoted by Perez: for some reason Article XVII on patents seems to have been omitted. 6. Japan did not at once recover full tariff autonomy in 1899, because it had agreed to a conventional tariff (i.e. in line with other countries). But Mutsu Munemitsu won the right to denounce the tariff at the end of the life of the treaty (August 1911). This was a significant improvement on the perpetual fIxed tariff of the Ansei treaties. See Perez (1999: 172). 7. The most useful recent account of the establishment and operation of the system of extraterritoriality is found in Hoare (1994: ch. 3 and 4). 8. The text of the treaty is in Parliamentary Papers (1860), lxix, (Cd. 2589), Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce between Her Majesty and the Sycoon (sic) ofJapan, August, 1858,285-95; as quoted in Hoare (1994: 206, n. 18. 9. The Satow Papers are kept in the Public Record Office, Kew, London, PRO 30/33. See PRO 30/33 11/6. 10. On 16 May 1875, Satow wrote from London to W G. Aston at Tokyo that the Foreign Office had expressed little support for his becoming a barrister and had refused the necessary study leave (PRO 30/33 1112). Compare Hoare (1994: 71): 'Officers continued to be encouraged to study for the Bar.' 11. The American system was disorganized and confusing by comparison. 12. On the Maria Luz incident, see Saveliev (this volume). 13. The term naichi zakkyo may be rendered in English as 'mixed residence of foreigners and Japanese in the interior (i.e. beyond the treaty ports)'. It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into a detailed discussion of the ideas and debates relating to naichi zakkyo which have already been covered elsewhere. For a discussion, see Berlinguez-Kono (2000). 14. Japan Mail, 23 Jan. 1882: 527, as quoted in Kornicki (1999: 75). Dickins unsuccessfully represented the captain of the Maria Luz in the slave trade case (ibid.: 70-2). 15. Kirkwood was appointed legal adviser to the Japanese Ministry of Justice in 1885, and when a foreign ministry judicial review committee headed by Inoue Kaoru was set up on 6 August 1886, he was appointed to it. See Takeuchi (1995). 16. Baba Tatsui (1850-88) was a political thinker active in the Freedom and People's Rights Movement Uiyu minken undO]. He studied English at Keio University and made two trips to England during the 1870s to study Western law and politics. In 1885 he was arrested for anti-government activities and the following year left Japan 98

THE ENDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN for political exile in the United States. He died in Philadelphia the same year. See also Cobbing (1998) for more about Baba in England. 17. For the full text of Baba's paper and a commentary, see Corr (1999). 18. A passport system was established in the early 1870s. Foreigners could travel in the interior on a Japanese-issued passport for limited purposes excluding trade, but remained subject to their own authorities. See Hoare (1994: 47-8, 94-5). 19. Charles Wirgman, editor of the Japan Punch 1862-87, humorously articulated the deep-seated fears of foreign residents when he wrote: 'Knowing the Japanese as well as Punch does, the idea of being under their jurisdiction fills him with horror. They would be so delighted with their new power that within twenty four hours half the foreigners in the place would be taken out of their beds at midnight and placed in durance vile [forced confinement) while the cauldrons filled with boiling oil for their special benefit were being heated up to the proper point' (Japan Punch 8: 234). Later in the same issue Punch admonished the Japanese thus: 'You used to be frogs at the bottom of the well, now you are frogs trying to swell yourselves out to the size of Jumbo but you'll burst in the attempt' (ibid.: 236). The reference to frogs at the bottom of the well comes from a petition to the emperor at the start of the Meiji period. 20. See Jones (1931: ch. 5): 'The First Judicial Reforms in Japan and the Early Attempts at Treaty Revision, 1870-79'. Jones mentions the signing on 25 July 1878, of a commercial convention between the United States and Japan which focused solely on the granting of tariff autonomy, but which was rendered useless by its final article which stated that the convention would only take effect when similar conventions had been signed by all the other treaty powers! 21. Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie (1829-1910) was a French legal scholar, one of many oyatoi legal scholars employed by the Japanese government in the Meiji period. He was opposed to any hasty revision of the unequal treaties, especially as proposed by Inoue Kaoru. Boissonade is credited with the abolition of judicial torture in Japan which was rendered illegal by a notification dated 10 June 1876. See Corr (1999: 183), quoting Chamberlain (1905 (1971): 182). See also Sims (1998: 261-9). 22. Tani Kanjo (1837-1911), general and politician, also known as Tani Tateki. Born in the Tosa domain (now Kochi prefecture). He joined the Meiji government in 1868 and occupied various important posts, distinguishing himself as the commander of the defence of Kumamoto Castle during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. Tani also served as head of the Army Academy. After he retired from active duty in 1881, he and another military man, Torio Koyata (1847-1905), founded the Chiiseit6, a conservative political group. See Kodansha's Japan: An fl/ustrated Encyclopedia (1993: 1526). See also Perez (1999: 77-8). 23. See Jones (1931: 111): 'On July 19 1887, Inouye adjourned the conference sine die "in order to allow the accomplished facts of codification to prove that the Japanese Government was at last in a position to identity its legislation with western principles and render guarantees unnecessary." In the following month he resigned office.' 24. Major-General Henry Spencer Palmer (1838-93) was the permanent Tokyo correspondent of the London Times 1882-85, and thereafter an occasional correspondent with Captain F. Brinkley (1881-1912) and others until his death. From 1897 to his death Brinkley was the permanent correspondent. Both men were strongly pro-Japanese (see Hoare 1999:103). Palmer was born to a distinguished military family in Somerset, England. After graduating from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, he studied engineering and became an officer in the British 99

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY Royal Engineers. He made a great contribution to the planning of modern waterworks systems in Japan, and laid the foundations for the city planning of Yokohama and its port. See Muramatsu (1995: ch. 1). 25. See Chamberlain (1905 [1971]: 278): 'Twelve hundred years ago Japan borrowed Chinese law wholesale. She has borrowed French and German law (that is to say, practically, Roman law) wholesale in our own day. It is hard to see what else she could have done; for she would never have been admitted into the so-called comity of civilised nations unless equipped with a legal system commanding those nations' approval, and those nations approve no legal system save such as they are accustomed to themselves.' 26. See Chamberlain (1905 [1971]: 279-80), for a summary of the codes. The New Civil Code [Shinminpo] replaced the Old Civil Code [KyiiminpO] which had been mainly drafted by Boissonade and promulgated in 1890, but was never implemented. The new code, closer to German than French law in both structure and content, was translated into English by John Harrington Gubbins, and published in December 1897 as The Civil Code ofjapan (Tokio ... 1897). The code was passed by the Diet in March 1896, and promulgated on 23 April. The date of its operation was left for subsequent determination by Imperial Decree. Gubbins acknowledged assistance received from Mr R. Masujima, Hogaku hakushi [Doctor of Laws] of the Japanese Bar, and Barrister of the Middle Temple, and Judge G. Akiyama, President of the Yokohama Regional Court. He also consulted Dr Ludwig Lohnholm's German translation of the Code, and the Commentary written by Messrs. Kakizaki and Yamada. 27. Rt. Hon. Sir Francis Richard Plunkett, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.c.V.O. was born 3 February 1835. Promoted to be Secretary of Legation at Yedo, 14 October 1873, where he was acting charge d'affaires from 8 February till 17 March 1876. Transferred then to Washington, St Petersburg, Constantinople and Paris. Promoted to be Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul-General at Tokyo, 1 July 1883. Made a K.C.M.G., 13 February, 1886. Was one of the British delegates to the Conference at Tokyo for the Revision of the Treaties from May 1886 to July 1887. Later served in Sweden and Norway, Brussels and appointed ambassador at Vienna, 9 September 1900. Retired on a pension, 7 May 1905. Died at Paris, 28 February 1907 (from F O. List, 1908, quoted in Kuwata, 1995-96). 28. London Times, 17 Sept. 1887. Quoted from Gaikoku shinbun ni miru Nihon, 2: 354-7. 29. For a more detailed account, see Jones (1931: ch. 7), 'The Efforts of Count Okuma at Treaty Revision'. 30. Hugh Fraser (1837-94) was not a Japan specialist. He held many diplomatic posts in an almost bewildering variety of countries in Europe, South America and China before being appointed Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul-General at Tokyo on 30 April 1888. He died at his post on 4 June, 1894 (FO. List, 1895) and was buried in Aoyama foreign cemetery, Tokyo. 31. The most-favoured-nation clause as implemented in treaties between Western countries and East Asian countries, especially China and Japan, has been described as a form of 'co-operative' imperialism (Beasley 1987: 17). 32. Alessandro Paternostro (1852-99) advised the Japanese government with regard to the Otsu Incident (11 May, 1891). Appointed lecturer at Meiji horitsu gakko from March 1889, where he taught jurisprudence and international law. Originally came to Japan for three years, but this was extended by one year. He returned to Italy in December 1892. Awarded Order of Rising Sun (Third Class) by Japanese government. Lived in Rome until his death. See Takeuchi (1995).

100

THE ENDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN 33. Sir Travers Twiss, Q.C, La Jurisdiction Consulaire dans les Pays de l'Orient et Specialement au Japon (1893). Pamphlets EO.L. 159,6(4): 34; as quoted inJones (1931: 123). 34. The full text of the article is found in Gaikoku shinbun ni miru Nihon, 2: 380-3. Apparently this article was by H. S. Palmer (see Yokohama Archives of History 1987: 39). 35. Erwin Baelz, the noted German doctor, was called to the Japanese foreign ministry to treat the severely wounded Okuma, and witnessed the amputation performed by Japanese doctors. See Baelz (1932 [1974]: 92). 36. The principal source of this section is Jones (1931: ch 8), 'The Diplomatic Negotiations Leading up to the Aoki-Kimberley Treaty of 16 July 1894'. Jones in turn bases his account mainly on 'Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty Arrangements between Great Britain and Japan' (Japan No.1 [C-7545J, 1894). This is the Blue Book, a collection of documents published 'by command of Parliament'. As Dr J. E. Hoare has pointed out to me Blue Books were often heavily edited, so that the Confidential Print version of the Blue Book or the original documents in the archives may provide a more detailed and accurate record. The archives were not open when Jones researched and wrote his book (Dr J. E. Hoare, personal communication, 20 March 2000). 37. Ian Nish, ed., Asia, 1860-1914, 3,Japanese Treaty Revision, 1878-94, in the series British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Maryland: University Publications of America, 111; as quoted in Nish (1989: 136). 38. See Perez (1999) for details ofMutsu's life (ch. 1) and his involvement with treaty revision (ch. 4 and 5). Perez concludes that Mutsu was the 'indispensable factor in the peaceful resolution of Japan's national crusade' (ibid.: 16). 39. Rt. Hon. Sir Maurice William Ernest de Bunsen, Bart., G.CM.G., G.CVO., CB. (1852-1932). M.A. of Christ Church, Oxford. Mter service in Washington, Berne, Madrid, Paris and Lisbon, he was promoted to be secretary of legation at Tokyo, 1 January, 1891, where he acted as charge d'affaires from 18 June 1892, to 25 February 1894. Assistant Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office, 1915-18. Retired October 1918. (EO. List, 1933). Bunsen is strongly blamed by Perez (1999: 125, 139-40) for his incompetence. Bunsen's knowledge of Japanese was indeed limited, it would appear, since he was only in Japan for a relatively short time. 40. Uchida Yasuya (1865-1936), also known as Uchida K6sai, served as ambassador to Austria and the United States before serving as foreign minister, 1911-12. 41. Siebold, son of Philipp Franz von Siebold, served as both aide and interpreter. He interpreted from English to German and vice versa for Aoki, who felt more comfortable with German (Perez 1999: 122). 42. For a presentation of John Harrington Gubbins, CM.G, see Nish (1997: 107-19). 43. See also Nish (1997: 137). Mutsu, not Aoki, received the ultimate accolade for the treaty.

101

8

Maruyama on Kaikoku: Ruptures in a Frame of Vertical Development

JOELJOOS

INTRODUCTION

eedless to say, the word kaikoku, 'opening the country', is most frequently used in the context of the Meiji N Restoration of 1868. As many words that gained currency during the mid-nineteenth century, this word used to have a slightly different meaning, as it pointed at the 'founding of a dynasty' and corresponded to what nowadays is termed kenkoku, establishing a state. Anyone familiar with recent journalism on political or economic affairs may point out that the word figures in contexts that hardly bear any relation at all to Meiji history: some authors use it allegorically to describe the penetrating effect of recent reforms in the financial world, or the increasing spread of foreign products on Japanese consumer markets. This implies a tacit recognition of the lingering effects of a prekaikoku, a legacy of seclusion and isolation that has not been done away with sufficiently. Not surprisingly, recent journalistic and popularizing 'scientific' works have used sakoku, 'seclusion', as frequently as kaikoku, in a variety of combinations: foreign reporting [rupo sakoku], labour force [rodoryoku sakoku], information [joho sakoku], intellectual exchange [chi no sakoku], culture [bunka sakoku], aeronautical issues [sora no sakoku] , etc. 1 The least one can say is that both terms seem to purvey a vivid imagery of impending, thorough change, or the lack thereof. If we limit ourselves to history, however, a simple search into any collection of relevant books or articles under the heading 102

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kaikoku will result in a long list of titles, almost without exception dealing with the late Tokugawa period, and the ensuing Meiji reforms. On the other hand, even in the field of history, and especially intellectual history, the word is sometimes be used to describe more than one set of historical events. In a particular strand of writings the word points at a state of mind, a national condition that involves the overturning of a closed and old social structure, and thus goes beyond its 'original' meaning, namely that of late Edo and early Meiji reforms. When we consider the former case, i.e. the sphere of historical events in a narrow sense, there seems to be little room for a discussion concerning the events that kaikoku circumscribes. Discrepancy between different versions mostly relates to an incongruous interpretation - the depiction of actual events vary only slightly. It is true that generalizing studies or articles 2 may be tempted to bring it into playas a synonym for 'the first years of the Meiji period', but, certainly, more detailed historical studies use the word for the period preceding the Meiji Restoration and for the process leading to it. Interpreted in this manner, kaikoku can be said to have begun two, three or even more decades before the actual shift of power in the late 1860s. 3 This time-span is marked by several incidents that confronted the feudal regime [baku han taisel] with an impossible predicament: one of the pillars of its persisting dominance had been the exclusion of foreign exchange on anything but a very modest scale. Moreover, this challenge to the prevailing policy was aggravated by increasing problems within Japan. As far as the foreign intrusion was concerned, at least until 1853, the growing 'pressure' in Japan's naval periphery was not perceived as an acute threat by reigning officials. For one, there had been a number of precedents of relatively peaceful encounters atJapan's shores with Western ships, sometimes even resulting in uninhibited international exchange avant-la-lettre, as local fishermen bartered their sake for eagerly consumed whisky or vodka. One incident on a more official, diplomatic level that springs to mind is the warning directed to the shogun by the Dutch king in 1844. Besides offering a description of the international situation, especially emphasizing the threat posed by British colonial aspirations in Asia, this message stressed that Japan's isolation was no longer sustainable and that 'if Japan wants to remain a peaceful land and not be devastated by war and chaos, it will have to alleviate the strict law that excludes 103

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any foreign presence' (Tanaka 1991: 7) . Notwithstanding its pressurizing and slightly condescending tone, the message was not accompanied by more forceful actions from the Dutch, and consequently failed to persuade the bakufu officials. It was only after the arrival of Perry's 'black ships' at an undeniably close distance from Edo that things took a decisive turn and kaikoku, or at least the opening of the ports became de facto irreversible. Within the same boundaries of historical, 'neutral' facts, kaikoku is also used to point at an indigenous force, the so-called 'theory of opening the country' [kaikokuron]. It was endorsed by people who saw Japan's seclusion and ensuing backwardness rather than the mounting foreign pressure and influence as the ultimate threat to its independence, economical as well as military. Its supporters were found among bakufu offICials as well as among vigorous opponents of the feudal system. Some advocated an opening to avoid military conflict, others with the intention to prepare for it, and some even did it in the hope of strengthening the position of the shogunate. Whatever the reasons, mercantilist, imperialist or opportunist, they all opposed the vigorous and violent xenophobia of the adherents of the 'theory of expelling the foreign barbarians' [joiron], a current of thought that played a great part in the defeat of the shogunate but was vanquished as soon as the Meiji oligarchs consolidated their power and had to face international reality. In many writings on intellectual history, kaikoku includes more than the bare fact of foreigners setting foot on Japanese soil, however. The term is contrasted with the closing of the country [sakoku], which clearly denotes a condition rather than an event, and not just any condition, but a condition that is believed to have deeply affected the Japanese way of life and thought (Tsuda 1970). Just as sakoku was not limited to the early seventeenth-century bakufu policy of seclusion, implemented after the decree of 1635 forbidding foreign travelling and that of 1639 excluding Portuguese vessels from Japan, but accounted for a good part of the separate development of a distinctly Japanese 'Edo culture', kaikoku is regarded as involving a whole set of new social relations, economic exigencies, political options. Or, as Nakamura Tadashi epitomized it in a recent publication: What we call 'opening the country' here does not simply imply these visible political phenomena, namely the opening of the country and the 104

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harbours (the collapse of the isolation) through the treaties of the Ansei period. It also implies a set of presupposed ideas and knowledge, the collapse of the isolation policy, the different domestic political and economic factors that strove for at least a breakthrough in the status quo, and also the search for a modernization on a military and technological level in order to withstand foreign pressure, even if these reforms were initially adopted as a policy by the feudal elite to protract and reinforce its rule - kaikoku presupposed all of these and the struggle amongst them. (Nakamura 1997: 5)

As this quotation suggests, this view regards the simple enumeration of treaties and trade figures as insufficient. An important consequence is that authors who adopt this view are forced to go to far greater lengths than their 'forebears' in delineating, scrutinizing and structuring materials considered relevant, in order to persuade their readership. They have to take into consideration past structures of thinking, their reaction towards the foreign presence, their ability to adapt or to insert themselves into new intellectual, social and political realities, and the consequential set of characteristic post-Restoration thought. As a result of these extended efforts, kaikoku has widened its scope to an extent that greatly supersedes what it is supposed to refer to in the context of strictly Japanese 'end of bakufu rule', Bakumatsu, history. Especially since the matter was addressed by historians who claimed to adhere to a world-historical perspective (for example, Marxism but also many of its 'derivatives'), stress came to be laid on the supra-historical meaning of the concept. It was an occurrence of universal historical significance and Japan's experience was only one of the various cases to be found in world history. KAIKOKU IN MARUYAMA'S GENERAL SCHEME

One of the representatives of this line of thought was Maruyama Masao (1914-96), who exerted a significant influence on the interpretation of the concept of kaikoku. He attributed great weight to the phenomenon in universal, and thus also Japanese, history. By the time Maruyama published his essay 'Kaikoku' in 1959, his analyses of the imperial system, Fascism and Meiji thought had already won acclaim by many intellectuals and scholars. This may help to explain why his approach has become so widespread and influential. Whatever the reason, it is a fact that many authors, who elaborated on the concept from a 105

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broader, intellectual-historical point of view, have come to grips with Maruyama's fmdings: they may have commented on it, and even criticized it, but hardly any author has discarded it as irrelevant. Extremely put: elaborating on the term in an intellectualhistorical sense suggests at least some link with Maruyama's scholarship. To give just one example: Tanaka Akira explicitly mentions Maruyama in the volume on kaikoku of the Nihon kindai shiso taikei (Compilation of modern Japanese thought) and points at the weight Maruyama's approach has had in influencing the interpretation of what the word kaikoku means (Tanaka 1991: 416). Tanaka stresses, however, that he wishes to attribute greater weight to internal evolution, and argues that both internal and external elements were instrumental in the successful adoption of Western technologies and ideas. Although this position includes a move towards the interpretation of kaikoku as a limited historical event, Tanaka continues to refer to the notion of an intellectually and spiritually autonomous subject [shutat1 lying at the core of kaikoku, an assumption typical of the intellectual-historical approach. Maruyama's previous articles had already made use of elements that would be central in his 1959 essay and, in this respect, kaikoku was not a totally new concept for him. In the late 1950s, however, its subsidiary role was traded for a leading part and moved to the centre stage. In accordance with Maruyama's growing insistence on the particularities of the Japanese intellectual tradition, kaikoku would figure as one of the key notions in his later historical thinking. Rather than describing the series of events that constituted the process of kaikoku in Japan, Maruyama's treatment linked the historical process of 'opening the country' with the supra-historical category of 'cultural contact' [bunka sesshoku]. While stressing that the decisively interfering of one civilization with the development of another was an essentially universal phenomenon, he pointed out that it was nineteenth-century East Asia that had experienced this 'shock' in its most acute and distinctive form, because it occurred so late and on such an unprecedented scale in what was a distant yet highly developed cultural sphere. Maruyama held that the universality of historical development, interpreted in purely 'dialectic' (Hegelian-Marxist) terms, can be visualized as a vertical, i.e. one line for each geographically distinct civilization. Emphasizing the importance of 106

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cultural contact as a motive power of intellectual development, which stood apart from internal evolution, he felt the need to qualify this paradigm and establish what he called 'horizontal connections' between these vertical lines, i.e. the the universal course of history. Here lies the major appeal of Maruyama's approach: it embeds the kaikoku concept in a general historical context that is relevant to a wide range of scholarly fields and that greatly exceeds the boundaries of research on the Meiji Restoration. A general outline of Maruyama's interpretation of kaikoku can be found in his essay that explicitly deals with the subject\ but is equally elaborated in an essay on method that explicates the position of the supra-historical concept and stresses its crucial role in understanding Japan's modern intellectual history: 'Archetype, old stratum, basso ostinato: My steps concerning a methodology of Japanese intellectual history' (Maruyama 1996,12: 107-56).5 Notwithstanding its unmistakable title, the focus of Maruyama's 'Kaikoku' essay was neither on the actual political process of 'the opening of the country', the authorization for foreign traders to enter Japan, nor on the legal and economic measures taken to incorporate Japan into international society. Neither was his point of departure the Meiji Restoration itself: rather, it was the integration of these events into a larger scheme of intellectual history. He obviously did give an account of some major events but his main objective was to clarify what effect they had had on the intellectual landscape of that time, and how they had conditioned the modern Japan that grew out of it. Maruyama's predominant concern was neither to present historically correct data nor provide a succinct account of the main personalities of that time, or even the main thinkers as such of that era. He was anxious to point out that the events that occurred during these years were part of an all-embracing movement, namely the inclusion ofJapan into world capitalism, as Maruyama himself indicated by the quotation from Marx in the beginning of his essay. 6 As a supra-historical, universal theme, kaikoku pertained to the progress of mankind itself, and it was this perspective that Maruyama refers to when he mentioned the 'open society' of Popper and Bergson. 7 Closest to the strictly 'historical' dimension of the concept was the passage in which Maruyama recognized its 'narrow meaning' as the actual cultural contact between 107

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Western and Japanese world views of the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period, adding, however, that in some respect this contact is still going on. His explanation of kaikoku as a historical incident suggested that the only two options available to the rulers of that time were (1) either to open the country to foreign trade at the risk of being swallowed by superior foreign knowledge, and losing one's 'individuality'; or (2) to continue to avoid any contact with the outside world at the risk of being colonized. Even here, the dual description of the options available should be seen in the light of the two-dimensional conception of the kaikoku-sakoku antinomy, and probably rather so than as a true account of events, based on, for instance, diaries of rulers at that time (Maruyama 1996, 8: 48-9). It is to be understood as one illustration of a 'broader' phenomenon, rather than as the product of meticulous historical scrutiny, an investigation of sources for its own sake as it were. Overall, the social conditions of the Tokugawa period are depicted in a very critical manner and fitted into the category of a 'closed society' (Popper!), not just in the sense of sakoku, although that is a part of it, too. One can say, however, that the impression Maruyama has left us with is one of' cautious exaggeration'. The frame in which Maruyama tried to fit available knowledge on that period was not a neutral one: it should help us to fathom the pervasive change that took hold of the people. At the same time, however, it left hardly any room for a positive evaluation of Edo, which is depicted a rather monotonous manner. Tokugawa Japan was typified as a 'frozen' society that had 'reached perfection in mutual surveillance' [sogo kanshi kiko no ijo na kanpekisa]8 among fiefs and classes, and was not unlike what Harold Lasswell called a 'prison state' [heiei = rogoku kokka]. Its spiritualism and formalism were like those of 'an army at war', but in this case frozen into a 'normal shape' [heijoteki keitat], in which 'strict adherence to the law of the ancestors' [soho bokushu] and 'curbing novelties' [shingi ChOjl] helped maintaining the commoner's perception of the intentionally sealed society [keikakuteki heisa shakat] as a 'natural given' (Maruyama 1996, 8: 49-56). This depiction ran counter to what many others had to say on Edo Japan, for example Tsuda Sokichi, whose work on national thought as reflected in literature gave the impression of Edo as being bustling, culturally developed and even innovative. 9 It is striking that, in other essays and articles, Maruyama himself described and highly esteemed this internal evolution 108

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the most famous example being his essays on Ogyii Sorai and on early nationalism in which he deals with Honda Toshiaki, Kaiho Seiryo, and others. As Maruyama's evaluation of Edo society seemed to depend on the context he was working in, one cannot but conclude that he was quite aware of its ambivalent legacy. Still, in this essay, most of the text is used to illustrate the rigid orthodoxy that dominated Tokugawa Japan: the distrust toward the populace, the fear of a re-emergence of the 'warring states' [sengoku] chaos, the equation of common people and foreigners in their rude quest for (immoral) profit, etc. These were gloomy, feudal shackles that had to be thoroughly adapted before Japan could finally accept Western (=modern) economical and political models. On the opposite end, the essay provides the reader with a variety of anecdotes that describe how the Meiji government attempted to grasp control over the new forces unleashed by the fall of the bakufu, and how it perceived the imminent foreign threat. Thus, the essay conveys a prudent appreciation of the early Meiji situation as it emerged from the changes: it was an era of possibilities, holding within itself - amongst others - the buds of something new, of something that may have turned out to be a bright future, but foundered all too soon. As we suggested above, Maruyama did not regard the Meiji Restoration as the only case in the history ofJapan of a concentrated and sudden opening of the country to influences of the outside world. Actually, he thought it could serve as a precedent, a mirror image ofSCAP rule, at least its first years, which he considered to be the third opening of the country.10 Doing so he implicitly referred to the late sixteenth century as the first opening and the Meiji Restoration as the second. Moreover, on some occasions, he mentioned the Taika Reforms (645) as an early case: this would imply that 'the postwar' [sengo] was no less than the fourth kaikoku. If it was warranted to do so depended on the definitions used, of course, but if the events of 645 and 1945 were to be put on one line, the 'open society'idea of Popper had to be modified. As far as fundamental social and political change and the eventual approximation of an open society is concerned, 1868 and 1945 were far more extensive and penetrative than 645 and the late sixteenth century, and may have matched the above-mentioned Popperian idea to some extent. But Maruyama lamented that even this second (or third) opening, to which one could refer as 'the kaikoku' , perpetrated a state system 109

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that seemed destined to end in dreadful social and military sacrifice, and although the third (or fourth) opening started a process of modernization, matched by mounting foreign 'contacts' even today, it did not really live up to its promises. Whatever the answer to that issue, one consequence of lumping these differing events into one category, was that the close link between kaikoku - as it figured in Maruyama's 1959 essay - and the universal theme of the 'open society' could not be sustained. And so it happened. Although he never dropped the obvious reference to its first meaning (the case of the Meiji Restoration), he tuned down the strong modern(ist) implication of the concept kaikoku in the course of his career. As the term kaikoku was chronologically extended to a much wider field and brought to bear upon events of the late sixteenth - and even the seventh - century, its meaning was no longer 'restricted' to modern thought, democratic movements or liberal social behaviour, e.g. free association [kessha no jiyu] or free speech /ienron no jiyu]. As Maruyama indicated in his essay on his methodological itinerary, before long kaikoku was complemented (and eventually overshadowed) by a broader reference to 'cultural contact(s)' as a universal theme (Maruyama 1996, 12: 123-4). This meant that a strong emphasis on the desired progress of (any, but especially Japanese) society on a universal scale toward a universal goal (human liberty) was now complemented by a major 'lateral' influx of foreign elements. Every civilization was thought to follow a particular path towards higher forms of social organization and to pass through more or less common phases. Unavoidably, however, as civilizations developed and expanded, they would encounter each other, and their profoundly different traditions would collide, peacefully or forcefully, leading to delineation, adaptation, or even integration and assimilation. The vertical line of development, stressed by Marxist historiography, could not account for this 'chemistry' and Maruyama was convinced a complete picture of global intellectual history should comprise a horizontal 'momentum', too. Supposedly, this horizontal contact had existed in Europe for a very long time, and it actually was because of this incessant occurrence (and the less dramatic differences to be bridged) that it had become less conspicuous there. 11 In the case of East Asia distinctions such as East-West or old-new were very clearcut, and the point in time of such an occurrence - the Western intrusion of the nineteenth century - was clearly determinable. 110

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Maruyama held that, instead of reducing their efforts to a fruitless discussion about development stages (unquestioningly extrapolating the European model to Asia), researchers of Japan's intellectual history should devote their energy to the correct assessment of the exceptional importance this sudden influx has had in the history of East Asia. In Maruyama's essay 'Kaikoku' this idea had not yet been elaborated upon, but it appears frequently in his later writings, in a period sometimes dubbed his 'discovery of indigenous tradition'. Although this view oversimplifies the course he took in the latter half of his career, it cannot be denied, as Ishida (1998: 32-6) has pointed out, that the introduction of these so-called 'horizontal elements' has exposed Maruyama's thought to the dangers of a cultural-essentialist interpretation. Notwithstanding his stress on the dangers of such a particularistic view, he kept using an array of categories that may seem too general to present observers, too 'similar'to a resented culturahst or particularist discourse that were hardly ever questioned: nation, culture, civilization, indigenous, and so on. The stress on contacts between 'cultural identities' that were said to stimulate or pressure one another made sense even in a very intuitive manner, but it does not account sufficiently for similar operations within the 'national' circumscription ('domestic colonization', to use the term in Kang 1997), nor for the observation that the difference itself between 'civilizations' is as much a product of the contact between them as of their respective historical experiences until that point in time. Maruyama was not entirely blind to this observation: in one of his essays, he pointed out that kaikoku was not a mere quantitative category, and that it 'implied a dual aspect, namely opening oneself toward the outside, i.e. international society, and simultaneously, distinguishing oneself from (against) international society as a country = a unified nation-state' (Maruyama 1996, 7: 197). But, again, this process is not worked out in detail: the dual effect (inward identifIcation and, at the same time, outward delineation) was attributed to the Asian context, to the experience of a sudden confrontation with Western culture. Moreover, the author rather 'unceremoniously' utilized the expression 'oneself' [jiko] as a synonym for 'culture', while it can be argued that this demarcated, unified and even personalized idea of a 'self' largely was a product of the process following the so-called opening. In the same passage, he 111

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continued to state that, notwithstanding the perspicuous alternation in intellectual life (Maruyama's term was 'the people's spiritual condition' [kokumin seishin jokyo]) brought forth by the Meiji Restoration, a pattern of modification that is typical of Japanese intellectual tradition - basically, its receptivity and its lack of linearity - persists, leading to an even more fragmentary outlook than ever before. Here once more the Japanese deep-seated 'oddness' slipped in through the backdoor. Why do we stress this aspect? Well, the term kaikoku consists of two parts, kai 'opening', and koku, 'country'. We have seen that the 'opening' here was defined in terms of Popper's approach and mainly aimed at freedom from the irrational or (supposedly) natural bonds of society - a process that has not yet been accomplished, not even in the West. If this warranted the quite stark contrast that is suggested between Tokugawa Japan and the Meiji challenge is a question that is not easy to answer. It may, however, occur to the reader that the part played by koku in the scheme presented by Maruyama has a 'cultural' connotation, a 'national' tinge even, that seems absent in Popper's or Bergson's propositions. Basically, it was this part of Maruyama's interpretation that ate into the essence of kaikoku as a broader concept, into the possibility of fundamental change through cultural contact. It was in the course of the 1960s that Maruyama intensified his attempts to pin down the 'true nature' of Japan in world history. This involved greater attention to Japanese thought and traditions per se. The topics previously dealt with were also 'Japanese' but the examination they were subjected to, or the way in which they were represented, was much less focused on the specificity of Japanese thought than on its limited capability of supporting a truly modern society. These early writings recognized the difference of Japanese thinking but, basically, they did so with hardly veiled depreciation, except for some noteworthy yet rare 'hallmarks' like Ogyii Sorai or Fukuzawa Yukichi. The basic swing in Maruyama's thinking in the late 1950s was not a shift from a purely universalistic scheme to a purely culturalistic one. Maruyama never contended that 'Japanese' and 'foreign' should be categorically and absolutely opposed: a multitude of Western (and Chinese) objects and ideas had since long become an inseparable part of Japanese 'tradition'. His interest rested with patterns of thought, with patterns of change, reception and modification: in short, with what he concluded to be the prag112

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matic receptivity for foreign ideas that seemed to run through Japanese intellectual history. The shift that took place was a shift in emphasis from the 'unadapted Japan' (with connotations of ideology [=intention], lack of universal standards) to the 'different Japan', determined by a pertinacious absence of dialectic development (as in Nihon no shiso Uapanese thought], 1961), by a persisting tendency to alter essential parts of foreign thought imported into Japan (as in 'Rekishi ishiki no koso' [The ancient layer of historical consciousness] (1972). Gradually, the gap between Japanese thought as an unconscious pattern of modification and foreign alternatives widened. Maruyama contrasted the conscious development of these foreign ideas 'at home', as reflected in their original contents before arriving in Japan, and, on the other hand, the altered version that was found in Japan later on. He did not single out Japan as a special case to prove its superiority, for sure, and even stressed his aversion of 'uniqueness' as an intellectual-historical angle. Still, the product of his labour was a peculiar Japanese intellectual tradition ('basso ostinato'), void of actual content, without a clear origin, seemingly concurrent with the Japanese people=nation and, at the same time, barely altered since times immemorial. None of these elements instilled fear of a sudden surge of narrow-minded patriotism, but each of them was and still is vulnerable to appropriation by 'scholars' with a less universalistic horizon than Maruyama. The difference between the universal course of intellectual history and the 'Japanese individuality', the line that is to be drawn between them: it is here that both loose much of their independent, explanatory power. What emerges is neither a self-sufficient vertical progress, nor a self-confident description of cultural distribution. 'MARUYAMA' ON HIS HEAD: MORE 'OPENING', LESS 'COUNTRY' ...

At this point, we can summarize Maruyama's arguments as follows: the opening of the country that took place in Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century is an example of a supra-historical, universal phenomenon, namely the crumbling of old, 'closed' structures and the advent of a new and open society; in this case as the result of cultural contact, i.e. the sudden appearance of an different cultural force intruding from abroad. Of course, Japanese scholars did not have to wait for the Meiji period to recognize that Japanese and European 113

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intellectual traditions were different. Sizeable lumps of Western knowledge had made their way to Japan well before the official opening of the country. What made the Meiji period so exceptional was the amount of new information coped with and the fact that the foreign ideas were accompanied by a very tangible menace: warships and soldiers, driven by colonial aspirations far beyond Japan's capacity of defence, threatening its political sovereignty, and even its cultural autonomy. One should not, however, lose out of sight that many of the events of the Meiji period attained their larger-than-life significance with later interpretation, even when, at first sight, it seems as if the epochmaking importance of events of that period are 'self-evident'. Much of what the Meiji Restoration signified to later generations 12 , rested on developments after the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, the nationalist surge of the Sino--:Japanese War and even the Manchurian Incident of 1931. In our view, the kaikoku concept could yield even more results if the focus of discourse were put elsewhere. The intellectualhistorical focus should not be on the opening of the ports, on what preceded it and what resulted from it, but rather on the point in time at which Japan began to refer to itself in historically-defined terms of culture and identity, in terms of opening against seclusion, novelty against tradition, etc. - all of this the broadest of respects and involving more than just a handful of privileged scholars. In this sense, for example, the Edo thinker Motoori Norinaga's strong insistence on Japan's unique and superior status when compared with the Chinese model cannot fully be taken into consideration: it lacked a universal (mankind in its widest sense) and national (the Japanese people) mediation, and appropriated far less elements of the past than modern national-culturalist historiography would consider desirable. Detailed research in that direction greatly exceeds the scope of the present essay, however. For the time being, suffice to say that Maruyama's kaikoku idea is not free from the flaw of blurring the difference between 'what actually happened' and the fliters through which it has come to us. This shortcoming not only implied the contents of the different sources used by Maruyama, but especially the tools (concepts, method) with which they were addressed. In particular, it was his reference to the 'unconscious nature' of the most typical thought pattern of intellectual history in Japan, namely its traditional openness toward foreign influences and yet not being fundamentally altered, that seemed 114

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questionable. He maintained that this pattern, this mechanism had been invisible most of the time, and that its nefarious influence on the fate of modern thought, committed to democracy, freedom and reason, could only be checked by awareness, consciousness of its workings. The consciousness or non-consciousness of the observing subject, in other words, the subjectivity or non-subjectivity of the observer therefore played a crucial part in his description. Acceptance of this 'subjectivation', however, as crucial is tantamount to the apperception of one's own (Maruyama's) position as a pinnacle, a pivot in the intellectual history of Japan. We have indicated that Maruyama made use of a vision of historical progress in stages: this presupposition is, of course, the product of Western scholarship, Marxist-Hegelian historiography, finding its way into Japan. Put roughly, his description of Japan as a country where foreign influences were digested in the very specific manner Maruyama has depicted, as well as his definition of kaikoku against the backdrop of the ideas he expounded in other essays clearly were the product of intellectual developments that started with Meiji, of the introduction and assimilation of 'foreign' thought, of kaikoku itself1 The question remains if Maruyama's works should also be regarded as products of Japan's tradition of openness and receptivity - or perhaps the operation of the 'old stratum', that unconscious momentum of modification ... Unfortunately yet not entirely surprisingly considering the limitations of the human mind, Maruyama did not live up to his own demand for self-awareness [jikaku], i.e. the recognition that the workings of the mechanisms described could (or could not) have played a part in the origin of his own writings. As for his visualization of the relationship between 'universal' development and cultural contact (vertical vs. horizontal), it seems more plausible to take the horizontal element of 'contact' in its broadest sense - and therefore consciously omitting the adjective 'cultural' - as basic and omnipresent: a universal practice of communication, with geographical divergences that, however, do affect the operative principle, i.e. temporality, selfreference, reduction of complexity, functional differentiation, etc. 13 Maruyama held that the more recent the era, the less relevant reference to the spatial remoteness of a place would be. He thus acknowledged the shrinkage of cultural gaps but stressed its historical significance - forgetting that the awareness of a remote and therefore less easily 'affected' position is not a 115

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product of geographical conditions, and even if so, probably of far lesser relevance than what is said about it. In his essay on 'Genkei', Maruyama reduced the difference between the affinity of the insular cultures of Japan and Britain - in opposition to their respective continental counterparts - to the geographical distance to the mainland 14 : the Strait of Dover is much narrower than that of Tsushima. He mentions that Britain had already been conquered by the Romans and made part of continental civilization at a very early stage of its development. Japan, on the other hand, was neither conquered, nor submerged into or assimilated by continental civilization (as was the case with Korea, for example). Therefore, any examination of Japan's cultural or intellectual history should pay much more attention to its 'insularity'than in the case of Britain. Needless to say, in this manner he made abstraction of a vast array of considerations such as, for instance, the origin of the idea of insularity or the idea of culture. In this respect, we could as well put Maruyama 'on his head'. Vertical outcomes would sprout from a basically horizontal foundation. In other words, the idea of history as a vertical progression along a specific path can be seen as a product of a certain academic discourse in Germany, which was transmitted to the rest of Europe and after a while to Japan, where it was taken over by Japanese scholars who used it to describe the history of their own 'culture'. And, alas for Maruyama, it seems that emphasis on the subjective, intentional aspects of this transmission between 'cultures', connoting a personalistic, psychologizing 'identity' [kotaiseI1, is bound to end up in abstractions and even generalization, that often serve other than academic purposes and tend to obfuscate an open and clear-cut approach to the fate of specific ideas in specific surroundings. Nevertheless, to avoid misunderstandings, one has to bear in mind that Maruyama was not a 'nalve scholar'in the line of culturalist 'theories of Japan' or 'theories of being Japanese' [nihonron or nihonjinron]. His considerations of Japan were placed in a larger, universal scheme the aim of which was to include more than just Japan's particularities. As the reader may have noticed, any attempt to find fault with even minor elements of Maruyama's construction involves an examination of his stance at the deepest and most intricate levels: his subjectivism, his rationalism, his axiological premises, which is, again, far beyond the scope of this essay. 116

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Alcock, Sir Rutherford. 1863. The Capital of the Tycoon: A narrative of a three years' residence in Japan. London. Asahi shinbun gakugeibu. 1991. Anata no tonari ni: Rupo sakoku Nippon no 'gaikokujin' [Right Next to You: 'Foreigners' in a Japan that remains closed to reporters]. Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha. Avineri, Schlomo, ed. 1968. Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: His Despatches [sic] and Other Writings on China, India, Mexico, the Middle East and North Africa. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Gluck, Carol. 1985. Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hall, Ivan. 1998. Chi no sakoku: Gaikokujin 0 haijo suru Nihon no chishikijin sangyo [Cartels of mind: Japan's intellectual closed shop]. Tokyo: Mainichi shinbunsha. Ishida Takeshi. 1988. 'Nihon seiji shisoshigaku ni okeru Maruyama Masao no ichi' [The position of Maruyama Masao in the study of the history of Japanese political ideas], Shiso 883: 27-41. Ishihara Takumi. 1992. Gaikokujin koyo no honne to tatemae: Rodoryoku sakoku no ura de nani ga okite iru ka [The truth about employing foreigners: What is happening behind the labour force seclusion?]. Tokyo: Shodensha. Jansen, Marius B. 1991. 'The Opening of Japan',Japan Review 2: 191-202. Kang Sang-jun. 1997. 'Maruyama Masao ni okeru "kokka risei" no mondai' [The question of raison-d'etat in Maruyama Masao]. In Maruyama Masao 0 yomu [Reading Maruyama Masao], edited by Jokyo shupp an henshiibu. Tokyo: Jokyo shuppan, 6-39. Luhmann, Niklas. 1997. Die Gesellschaji der Gesellschcift [The society of society]. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Maruyama Masao. 1992. Chusei to han'gyaku: Tenkeiki Nihon no seishinshiteki iso [Loyalty and rebellion: Phases of the spiritual history of Japan in a period of transformation]. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo. - - . 1996. Maruyama Masao shu [Collected works of Maruyama Masao]. 16 vols. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. Nakamura Tadashi. 1997. Kaikoku to kindaika [The opening of the country and modernization]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan. Nishio Kanji. 1981. Sakoku no kyo'on: Gendai Nihon no seishinteki shoso [The sonorous footsteps of seclusion: Spiritual aspects of contemporary Japan]. Kyoto: PHP kenkyiijo. - - . 1989. 'Rodo sakoku' no susume: Gaikokujin rodosha ga Nihon 0 horobosu [An encouragement of 'labour seclusion': Foreign labourers are destroying Japan]. Tokyo: Kobunsha. Takeda Kiyoko, ed. 1984. Nihon bunka no kakureta katachi [Hidden patterns of Japanese culture]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. Tanaka Akira. 1991. Kaikoku [Opening of the country]. Nihon kindai shiso taikei [Compilation of modern Japanese thought], 1. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. To Nam-sen. 1985. Gendai no sakoku: Ajia kara Nihon no jitsuzo ga mieru [Contemporary seclusion: Japan's true condition brought to light from an Asian viewpoint]. Tokyo: Mekon. Tsuda Sokichi. 1916-21. Bungaku ni arawaretaru waga kokumin shiso no kenkyu [The study of thought in our country as revealed in literature]. Tokyo: Rakuodo. 117

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1970. An Inquiry into the Japanese Mind as Mirrored in Literature: The flowering period q{common people literature. Compiled by the Japanese National Commission for the Unesco. Tokyo: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Watsuji Tetsur6. 1950. Sakoku: Nihon no higeki [Seclusion: Japan's tragedy]. Tokyo: Chikuma shob6.

NOTES 1. Although it was probably somebody else who coined the term, Watsuji (1950) brought it to broad attention. For recent examples of 'associated meanings', see Asahi shinbun gakugeibu (1991) and Ishihara (1992). Most authors are rather critical of the sakoku situation, within as well as from without Japan, see e.g. To (1985) and Hall (1998). Rare but not entirely absent are authors that feel the urge to defend sakoku, its historical significance for presentday society as well as its validity as a policy option even today, see e.g. Nishio (1981,1989). 2. See e.g Jansen (1991). 3. Of course there were previous encounters with Russia at the end of the eighteenth century (Adam Laxman) - and even a certain willingness to contact on the part of the centre of power (Matsudaira Sadanobu) at a certain time, only to end in a reinvigoration of the seclusion policy immediately afterwards. 4. The 'Kaikoku' essay was first published as 'Tenkanki no rinri shis6' [Ethical thought in a period of change], vol. 11 of the Gendai rinri series. See Maruyama (1992). 5. Maruyama's 'Archetype' essay was first published in Takeda (1984) and reprinted in Iwanami shoten's Dojidai raiburarii (1991). 6. The quotation is from Karl Marx' Despatches on China: 'It is the original task of bourgeois society to bring forth the world market and the production that is based on it. And since the world is round, it follows that this work is achieved by the fact that California and Australia were colonized and China and Japan opened up to the world.' See Maruyama (1996, 8: 45). For closer analysis, see e.g. Avineri (1968). 7. It also is the only perspective in which the mobilization of the category introduced by Popper and/ or Bergson seems to make sense at all - knowing that it is the Meiji Restoration (!) that is dealt with. 8. An observation Maruyama seems to share with a rather 'dated' source. Cf. Alcock (1863). 9. As Tsuda saw it. Tsuda (1970) is a translation of what was published between 1916 and 1921 as one of his magna opera. See Tsuda (1970). 10. In his 'Genkei' essay, Maruyama writes: 'At the end of the war, as you all know, this situation [intellectual isolation] suddenly ended and as a matter offact the country was opened up [kaikoku] to a wave of foreign things and ideas ... It was the Meiji Restoration that appeared before my eyes as a double image in those days' (Maruyama 1996, 12: 113-24). He describes the ensuing results of each opening as complete isolation, partial opening and (with a tinge of optimism) complete opening, in the 17th, 19th and 20th centuries respectively. In a later essay, however, he stressed the brevity rather than the profundity of the experience of post-war reform, e.g. in 'The "Origin" of Post-war Democracy' (Maruyama 1996,15: 57-71). 11. Cf. Maruyama's statement in his 'Genkei' essay: 'It is even acceptable to state that ... there is no region that from the dawn of times has experienced such stormy cultural contacts as Europe. But after the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, no experience

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MARUYAMA ON KAIKOKU can be found in Europe that is similar to the "opening of the country" in East Asia at the end of the nineteenth century' (Maruyama 1996, 12: 122). 12. For an extensive treatment, see Gluck (1985). 13. For an extensive treatment on these concepts, see Luhmann (1997). 14. 'One often compares the position of England andJapan as insular countries, but the nature of the difference between both in terms of history derives from the difference between the Channel and that of Tsushima Straight' (Maruyama 1996, 12: 137).

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9

The Meiji Constitution as Miscalculation

ALISTAIR D. SWALE

INTRODUCTION

hile most historians would wisely avoid alighting on any one particular event in isolation as signitying a decisive W turning point in a nation's development, the promulgation of a constitution is perhaps something of an exception. Naturally, 'paper constitutions' have little intrinsic power in and of themselves - even in terms of the principles they embody - beyond the degree to which they find 'life' within practical social and historical circumstances. Their effectiveness lies in how well they provide a formal vehicle for coditying and shaping elements within the existing political configuration. The Meiji Constitution was a response to a pressing contemporary juristic and diplomatic imperative, not all of which was domestically conditioned. We must therefore assess the Meiji Constitution in terms of how well it mediated these various pressures along with the concerns of maintaining a meaningful connection with Japan's existing historical precedents. The task of constructing a narrative on political developments at this time is complicated by the fact that there is still a tendency in scholarship to organize the various political factions and interests according to their proximity or otherwise to the liberal democratic movement and the concomitant Western political tradition of liberalism as typified by either Rousseau or Mill. This practice is less than helpful in that it tends to generate a narrative of the early Meiji period as a struggle between forces of 'good' (liberalism) versus 'evil' (statism) rather than as an extremely volatile and problematic period requiring much 120

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more than simplistic ideological responses to the problem of nation-state building. Various 'models' were presented by various Western nations. The problem was, however, that these were instances of solutions that worked for those particular nations and, by virtue of their nationally conditioned character, could not be transplanted. If there was to be any engrafting of foreign institutions it would take considerable adaptation and reworking of the original to be successful. The Meiji Constitution was one element in a raft of crucial initiatives during the 1880s which required the utmost care, not only for good effect in the contemporary circumstances but also for the sake of national well-being in the ensuing decades. In the following section, an outline of what the panel set up under Ito Hirobumi perceived as the essential issues in the constitutional deliberations and, more particularly, how they conceived of a practical mode of accommodating the conflicting interests is presented. The ultimate aim is to establish whether Ito had perhaps mishandled the detail of the constitution as a document, inadvertantly establishing a political situation that could not help but cause a protracted parliamentary stalemate. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 1880s

Following the political upheaval of 1881, a new direction was introduced to government. As all acquainted with the details of this period are aware, it was Ito Hirobumi who took up the task of overseeing the overhauling of the national bureaucracy, as well as establishing new foundations for the executive and the legislature through the promulgation of a new constitution. The guiding spirit of these reforms was described in a memorial of I wakura Tomomi (penned in fact by Inoue Kowashi) as 'gradualism' [zenshin no shugt1 (Yamamuro 1984: 178-200). This, in essence, signified a commitment to incremental reforms based on pragmatic rather than abstract or utopian ideals. The reforms of the 1880s were, with particular regard to the areas of education and national administration, eminently successful. By 'successful' I mean in the sense of fulfilling the institutional and cultural requirements of the modern nation state. The leading reformers of the period, and one should place amongst these the likes of Ito Hirobumi, Inoue Kowashi and Mori Arinori, were unusual in that they were able to not only 121

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clearly appreciate the nature of the difficulties before them but also put concrete solutions into practice. Nevertheless, perceptions of the original intent of these reformers has arguably been blurred by a certain amount of mythologizing about their intentions based on later historical developments. There still remains a lingering stereotype that by the third decade of the Meiji period politicians and administrators displayed an increasing tendency toward being Prussophiles with an added proclivity towards statism. However, through an examination of the relative historical circumstances ofJapan and Germany at the time, along with ~eference to the work by Baron Kaneko Kentaro, Kenpo seitei to Obeijin no hyoron (The promulgation of the constitution and its evaluation by Europeans and Americans, 1938), it can be demonstrated that those responsible for drafting the constitution were not slavishly adhering to a Prussian model but pursuing the essence of a Japanese constitution in its own right. 1 At first sight there would indeed seem to be many similarities in the circumstances of Japan and Germany during this period. Certainly both were late industrialisers and both were engaged in a process of forging a unitary nation-state at more or less the same time. 2 However, when the specifics of the German case, especially those relating to the evolution of the legal system, are considered, it is apparent that there was in fact relatively little that parallels the Japanese situation. Consolidation of the Germanic states followed the victory over Austria in 1866 fulfilling a large part of Bismarck's aim of systematically neutralising foreign threats. The defeat of the French in 1871 signalled the more or less successful conclusion of the policy. At this point, in the crude sense of territorial and administrative integration, Germany had attained a form of nationhood almost at the same time as Japan. However, an examination of the legal aspect of German unification reveals that the differences were quite marked. A commitment to establishing a single legal code for all of Germany was sought in the Diet through the Lasker-Miquel motion in 1871. However, it was to take three years to even pass the motion through the Diet. The Southern Germanic states had major internal difficulties, as well as antagonisms toward Prussia, which they could not easily resolve. A Vorkommission of five persons was set up to establish the brief for the Kommission that would ultimately deliberate over the specifics 122

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of legal unifIcation. However, the complications involved meant that the Vorkommission could not agree on the substantive items for deliberation but only on the broad objective of unifIcation itself. The Kommission which was originally intended to have been constituted of a similar number of people turned out to consist of eleven representatives. A great deal of horse-trading had been carried out at the expense of the smaller states and deliberations became extraordinarily protracted as the far more able representatives from the North, Bernhard Windscheid and Heinrich Pape, struggled to carry along their less able and less cooperative counterparts from the South. A fIrst draft was not in fact produced until 1888 and was criticised by many from the outset. The task of integrating the laws of the various states had proved quite impossible. In one case the legislation covering the mortgage system entailed recognition of as many as four separate systems to satisfy the disparities between the states (John 1989: 92). The leading fIgures in the Kommission came to rely increasingly on the highly conceptualised approach of legal positivism to resolve contradictions, but ultimately they did not address fundamental inadequacies and the need for more proactive legislation. From the above it would seem unlikely that Ito Hirobumi, the head of Japan's team of constitutionalists, would have failed to recognize these limitations and practical difficulties when he visited Germany in the early 1880s. He would recognize that Germany was in a situation more analogous to pre-Restoration Japan in that it was constituted out of relatively autonomous Kingdoms and Principalities. He would be made aware of the shortcomings of the dominant school of legal positivism in Prussia which was manifestly obtuse with regard to the practicalities of legal and political administration. As it turned out Ito did not turn to Prussia where legal positivism was especially strong but to ajurist who was exiled from Prussia, Lorenz von Stein. Ito made it clear in his writings that he was more interested in 'actual politics' and 'administration' than the analysis of constitutional systems (Sakamoto 1991: 96-7). This accounts for his interest in the work of both Stein and Rudolf von Gneist who, quite contrary to the common perception, were defInitely on the fringe of Germanic jurisprudence at the time precisely because Stein, in particular, had an eye for the practical or what one might better describe as the 123

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mechanics oflaw in society. It was from Stein, the man regarded as the father of administrative studies, that Ito sought what he most wanted to know; what the legal situation in Germany was at the time and what the practical implications were. At the same time, while Ito was greatly impressed with Stein, his admiration was not completely uncritical. In fact, there were even comments within Ito's entourage in Europe that indicated a wearying of over-long discourses on legal technicalities. Ultimately, Ito found that Stein had more appeal to him as a specialist in education (Akita 1967: 237, n. 48). In 1882 it was not as a legal adviser that Ito requested Stein to come and work in Japan, but as an adviser on reforming the education system (Hall 1973: 355). Stein declined on the basis of advanced years and ultimately it was Hermann Roesler, a constitutional specialist and a disciple of Stein, who went instead (Akita 1967: 165). In view of the relative historical circumstances outlined above, Ito's visit to Germany needs to be considered in a more pragmatic vein. Following Germany's surprise victory over France in 1871 much international attention came to be focused on the ensuing developments. The Japanese were particularly impressed by the German successes and by the 1880s there had developed something of a 'German fever' in Japanese intellectual circles. This admittedly later came to form the basis of a conservative ideological bloc that would use the German thought and the German example as ammunition against Francophile liberals. Yet as already mentioned earlier, Ito and his secretariat were certainly not overwhelmed by the German experience to the point of being uncritical. There were some important legal developments under way at the time and they warranted consideration but not to the point of joining the general intellectual fashion of the time. Inoue Kowashi for one was in fact critical of the rather facile German fad amongst Tokyo University students (Yamamuro 1984: 284-317; see also Meiji bunka zenshu (Meiji cultural collection; 4: 427). Consequently, the notion that Ito and his co-workers were Prussia-worshippers seems highly suspect. For further clarification of what informed the deliberations of the Japanese constitutional panel in a positive sense we also have the accounts of the drafting of the constitution written by Kaneko Kentaro (Kaneko 1938: 94-102). In the first instance, Kaneko directly addresses the issue of how applicable the German experience was to Japan at the time, pointing out many 124

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of the historical differences already mentioned. He notes that Germany's highly fragmented composition made the heads of kingdoms more like the Japanese daimyo, an arrangement which had already been dismantled in Japan. In addition, he notes that the so-called' emperor' in Germany did not parallel the position of the emperor in Japan in that the German Kaiser came to his position by flat and also by virtue of being the 'elected' president of the former Northern German Confederation. Finally, regarding the charge often levelled at Ito that he had adopted the Prussian model in toto, Kaneko states that while there were a number of elements in the Prussian constitution that were practically useful, the spirit and philosophy of the constitutions were different. He emphasized that the drafts of the Meiji Constitution had relied on 'historical' jurisprudence rather than 'philosophical' jurisprudence (conceptual jurisprudence) which, though useful for many areas of law such as commercial and civil law, was counter-productive in the fields of international law and constitutionalism. Through the application of what he termed 'comparative analysis', Kaneko asserts that the Japanese jurists concluded that the French, German and English models were all essentially inapplicable to the Japanese situations. Most interestingly, however, the foreign jurisprudential concept that Kaneko regarded as coming closest to the heart of the Japanese constitution - which he states was embodied in the notion of the kokutai - was Edmund Burke's 'fundamental political principle of England' (idem.). This reference to a Burkean notion of the constitution is highly instructive for understanding the viewpoint of the Meiji constitutionalists. It entails appreciating the distinction between the constitution in the sense of the constitution or structure of the polity and a constitution in the sense of a mere document. The former sense is logically prior to the latter in that the term derives its essential meaning from the constitution of the polity in the first instance and only takes on the second sense as attempts are made at written codification. The use of the term constitution in an indiscriminate sense is misleading in that it conceals the tension between practical political circumstances and what law-makers hope to encapsulate through their codifICations. The significant achievement of the drafters of the Meiji Constitution is that they recognised this tension and their attempts at codification were therefore responses to the difficulties presented to them in this light. 125

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It should be noted, then, that the term kokutai is free from the ultra-nationalist nuances that it later had but rather functioned as a dynamic jurisprudential concept which distinguished the historically specifIc constitution of Japan from the theoretical one. 3 It is perhaps understandable that given the train of events following the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution one ought to be rather wary of 'rehabilitating' the phrase. Nevertheless, one must accept that the intellectual and political activities of the Meiji constitutional reformers were not overwhelmingly reactionary or statist, but actually displayed great acumen. The constitutionalists of the Meiji period were both pragmatic and visionary. They well knew the mischief that could be brought about by losing sight of the practical customary basis of law and substituting it with the mere letter of the law. It is precisely their 'gradualism' with its dynamic and organic conception of policy formation that distinguishes their reforms from earlier ones. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that this spirit was not always applied consistently. As one examines the record of the final deliberations over the constitution, it is apparent that there was an impatience to bring the process to a speedy conclusion rather than work out problematic aspects of the final draft in full. ITO AND THE SUMITSUIN DELIBERATIONS

On 16 June 1888, the Constitutional Committee of the Siimitsuin, the Privy Council, met under the chairmanship of Ito Hirobumi. Apart from the chairman, Ito, and the chief secretary, Inoue Kowashi, there were more than twenty persons assembled, most of whom were members of the cabinet. Ito commenced the formal deliberations over the final draft of the constitution at this meeting with an address outlining the main principles by which he expected the deliberations to be guided. This address made it very clear that he had an extremely conservative view of how far Japan's political configuration could be altered in line with the constitutions of the West: Constitutional government is something we find no evidence of in the history of the countries of the East and so, when it comes to establishing a constitution in our own country, it is inevitable that we will have to start with something completely new. For that reason, we cannot expect to know what sort of effect the constitution will have on the country, for good or for ill ... 126

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Consequently, we have had to apply all diligence and care at the earliest stages in the hope that it would produce a good end later on. As every one of you will be well aware, there are no European countries that do not carry out some form of constitutional government, though this is a practice that which has arisen in line with their historical development, a process which stems from a very distant past. It is precisely for that reason that in the case of establishing a constitution in our nation there is the need to find a central pillar of the national polity, to clearly determine that on which the nation is founded. If we do away with this pillar and allow politics to be carried along according to the blind arguments of the people the polity will lose its integrity and the country will fall into ruin. (Ito 1942: 614-6)

Clearly Ito had serious misgivings about how far such a novel experiment could be taken along with a keen sense of the very real perils associated with the misapplication of what was in essence a foreign practice. As any conservative politician would tend to do, he placed priority on political integration before political experiment. In the continuation of the address he emphasized the role of religion in underpinning the development of Western constitutional institutions and stressed the need for some equivalent social force in the Japanese context. Since there was no parallel religious tradition in Japan (Ito even discounts Shinto), he argues in favour of the Imperial Household as the appropriate institution. Of perhaps the greatest significance, however, is Ito's exhortation to the committee to bear the need to maintain the prestige of the emperor in mind throughout the deliberations and to ensure that responsibility would be clearly laid on the emperor's ministerial appointees. As part of rejecting the notion that the new parliament would take a large role in forming the policy of the government, he also clearly rejects the notion of imbibing the spirit of Western constitutionalism so far as separation of powers was concerned. Yet there is evidence that Ito lost sight of these core issues as the deadline for promulgating the final document approached. Certainly he was becoming increasingly subjected to enormous pressures that stemmed from areas that were, strictly speaking, outside the compass of constitutional concerns. Primarily there was the increasingly vitriolic agitation from non-Satsuma/ Choshu groups for a more complete resolution of the unequal treaties. In tandem with this there was the emergence of an increasingly well-organized though nonetheless violent soshi 127

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the political agitators with a strong warrior-like orientation - influence in popular politics which made the matter of balancing popular participation with civil order all the more problematic (Fraser, et al. 1995: 121-9). One third pressure, though of a much more subtle nature, would have come from the bureaucratic and jurisprudential specialists within the deliberative bureau. Along with foreign advisers such as Hermann Roesler, Inoue Kowashi was instrumental in providing the juridical thoroughness in the framing of the constitution. Yet his expertise stemmed from a distinctly continental background in jurisprudence rather than the common law traditions of the English-speaking world. As a result of this, it is arguable that certain avenues for accommodating Japan's political contradictions more flexibly were overlooked. Moreover, although Ito himself had taken enormous strides in coming up to speed with the minutae of constitutional law over the previous four to five years, he was nonetheless no match for the likes of Inoue and was forced to rely on him to provide the juridical mettle when he found himself short. Ito was to fmd that not all of the participants in the deliberations were going to watch the final draft go through without raising serious objections. From a largely unexpected quarter, Mori Arinori, the minister of education who was generally regarded as one of Ito's closest allies, took a confrontational position with regard to particular aspects of the constitution. There are instances where Ito even rebuffed Mori somewhat angrily. As will become apparent in the following, the fact is that Mori displayed an audacious willingness to question the basic premises of the constitution and even urge a major change of direction. 4 The issue that ignited the most heated debate revolved around a phrase in the Fifth Article which presented the notion that legislation would require the new parliament's 'assent' (lit. shonin, or 'recognition'). It was an issue that touched on the sovereignty of the emperor in that it implied that the emperor required parliament's assent to govern. The thing that Mori feared was that the new parliament would misuse the wording to disrupt the smooth government of the country. Naturally, such a possibility was not regarded as fatal to the success of the new parliament by the drafters of the constitution or the committee members but Mori felt that there was a real likelihood that the constitution would be taken more 128

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literally than intended and ultimately perhaps even be used to challenge the sovereignty of the emperor himself. Mori argued that regardless of the fact that foreign constitutions included such phrases, there was nothing in Japan's political culture that correlated to the such a practice overseas. For that reason, Mori indicated that he would much rather see legislation promulgated exclusively through the sovereignty of the emperor (Mori, in

Siimitsuin kenpo seitei kaigi gijirokusho: 52-60).5 The next significant point of contention following the above incident was generated by discussion of the rights and obligations of subjects in Section Two. Immediately after Inoue Kowashi read out the content of Article Eighteen at the beginning of the second section, Mori expressed reservations regarding the words 'rights and obligations' of subjects stating that while 'rights and obligations may well be set down in law, I do not feel it appropriate to set them down in the constitution.' This statement directly challenged the most fundamental premises of the constitutional reform that Ito was trying to effect. In the following retort, the anger of Ito is evident: If we do not lay down the rights of subjects in the constitution but only their responsibilities then where is the need for a constitution? ... Furthermore, the word you propose to use for responsibility is often found in the Chinese and Japanese context but it is certainly not appropriate to a constitutional document ... Your amendment amounts to a proposal opposing the establishment of a constitution! (ibid.: 63-4)

Mori ignored Ito's counter-argument and continued to expound his own. Without reproducing the detail of it here it will suffice to say that the point of interest is the assertion that there were laws which already protect an individual's person and property (presumably he refers to criminal law) and that it would not be necessary or appropriate to include them in the scope of a constitution. This opinion was in direct opposition to the premises of Meiji Constitution. Indeed, it had the hallmarks of advocating an arrangement similar to that found in Britain where legal precedents and certain hallowed documents protected the individual but were not enshrined in a written constitution (ibid.: 64-5). The rather abrupt rejection of Ito's argument must surely have created an atmosphere of high tension. Ito, in either a deliberate act of misrepresentation or as an expression of genuine misunderstanding, dismissed Mori's argument as being 129

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based on Rousseau's theory of rights and therefore having no relevance to the discussion. 6 The stand-off was finally resolved when Yamada Yoshiaki, the law minister, requested that Inoue Kowashi explain the implication of the relevant terms and why they were being adopted. In his exposition Inoue explained that if rights were not incorporated in the constitution, they could not be referred to under civil law. Furthermore, he insisted that balancing rights with the obligations of subjects took due consideration of foreign precedents as well as domestic conditions (ibid.: 66). Inoue's lucid explanation was obviously effective. At the end, Ito called for a vote and the debate was resolved in favour of the existing text. 7 In the above manner, Ito was able to stave off the irksome objections of Mori although he eventually ended up having to forbid Mori from addressing the committee at a later date. Nevertheless, Mori's objections possibly held some weight over time, as the wording of the Fifth Article was altered from' assent' [shonin] to the slightly vaguer, and possibly less binding term, 'agreement' [kyosan]. This did not adequately address the issue raised by Mori, as the way remained clear for challenges to the authority of the executive in the future parliament. For Ito, the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution was an integral part of establishing a full-scale legal system. Moreover, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy was regarded as an important step towards gaining successes in renegotiating the 'unequal treaties'. Even if a commitment to the rights of the people was not incorporated into all constitutions, there was a pragmatic need to advertise the degree of enlightenment that Japan had attained through the constitution. There may well have been a number of committee members who felt uncomfortable with the terminology and concepts adopted from foreign precedents, and there were indeed those who were as ignorant of their implications as Mori claimed. 8 Nevertheless, it is apparent that most, including Ito, were prepared to subdue any reservations they might have to realize the aforementioned objectives. The thing required from the view of political expediency, was a constitution that sounded like a 'genuine' constitution, in other words something convincing by Western standards (Oka 1992). The possibility of deadlocked parliaments on the basis of the aforementioned article was also recognized by Yamagata Aritomo. He was in Germany at the time of the deliberations 130

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but had made sure that he was being kept abreast of the developments (Hackett 1971: 116-7). Following his return he was careful to maintain a purely neutral position in constitutional discussions citing, not without some justification, that he had been absent and was therefore unqualified to comment. His appointment as the first prime minister under the new constitution was also partly based on this perceived 'neutrality'. Nevertheless, Yamagata did have strong reservations about the new constitution and a particular inclination toward maintaining 'transcendental cabinets' in order to avoid the capriciousness of party politics. The first parliament was a tentative success by virtue of a defection of a sizeable faction from within the Liberal Party in support of the government. However, the fact that the executive would from that point on be subject to the stonewalling of the anti-government parties in the parliament was a new political reality that could not be ignored (Hackett 1971: 140-4). Ito was naturally aware of the potential for unseemly conflict in the first popularly elected Diet. He was active behind the scenes during the first session to ensure that avenues of dialogue between the Yamagata cabinet, which wisely included two non'Satcho' figures in Mutsu Munemitsu and Yoshikawa Kensei, and the popular parties remained open (Ito 1999: 55-7). It is also the case that an extra clause was inserted to ensure that existing expenditures could be maintained by the cabinet without a new budget being passed through parliament (although, as later events were to prove, this was a short-term safeguard; see Banno 1992: 108-10, 122-3; see also Hackett 1971: 139-41). Ultimately, one is left wondering what gave Ito the confidence to believe that the Diet would be critical but not uncooperative. The answer possibly lies in the address he made at the first meeting of the constitutional deliberation committee. Ito expected, possibly with some justification, that the sanctity of the emperor and, by extension, the emperor's personal appointees would in the end cower the more aggressive elements in the parliament into a more co-operative stance. This, as we now know was not what in fact happened, indeed the degree of vitriol and violence directed at the government was at times alarming. Yamagata was perhaps more sagacious in his estimation that it would become necessary to force the Diet into compliance through repeated dissolutions before the resolve and 131

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authority of the cabinet would be recognized (Ito 1999: 2-54; Hackett 1971: 149-50). Ito naturally did not attempt to palliate the gravity of the threat to smooth government but his conception of how to deal with it was profoundly different to Yamagata. From as early as 1891 Ito had raised the possibility of relinquishing his aristocratic titles and taking a seat in parliament himself at the head of a political party (Hackett 1971: 150-1). The response to this proposal from the emperor himself was not favourable and so that avenue was abandoned for a time. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade, when the initial impasse in parliamentary politics had been largely surmounted on the basis of the unifying effects of the war with China and the consequent revision of the unequal treaties, Ito showed himself to be more determined in his actions ultimately causing a very open and acrimonious schism with Yamagata in 1898. CONCLUSION

By the end of the 1880s a great deal of the political and social infrastructure requisite of a modern nation-state had been established in Japan. Furthermore, it had been established not so much by means of the blanket adoption of foreign models but the much more painstaking process of adaptation of these to domestic circumstances. This required, of necessity, clarification of the domestic political culture and the scope of feasible reform under contemporary circumstances. Although these reforms were successful in many regards, Ito's constitution was eventually to fail in practice. Mori's attempts to question the spirit and much of the substance of the constitution were to be swept away in the interests of pursuing what were ultimately non-constitutional objectives. The reasons for the failure of the early parliaments are many and varied, and it is certainly beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them in detail. Yet it should at least be clear from the above that the constitutional arrangements eventually settled upon did not adequately clarify the relationship between the executive and the legislature but left it open ended. It could, of course, be argued that this sort of arrangement was precisely the sort required to enable the various antagonistic parties to work their differences out. The constitution, nonetheless, did not guarantee the prerogative of the executive to govern and placed Ito and the other 132

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oligarchs in a position that gave them no recourse to resist an intransigent Diet beyond the draconian alternative of dissolving the assembly. Were there alternatives? If so, would they have amounted to the kind of denial of constitutional government that Ito feared? There were alternative examples of constitutional arrangements that took up these issues and incorporated provisions to safeguard the essential business of government. Britain had maintained a relatively successful parliamentary system prior to 1868 with a mode of cabinet appointment not altogether alien to what the Japanese understood as 'transcendentalism' (Hanham 1969: 75-134). One has to concede, however, that the finely balanced elements of the British political system were the product of a particularly long period of gestation based on legally 'unwritten' practices, an arrangement that might just as easily backfire in the Japanese context as well as fail to provide the judicial substance to the legal system that the Western powers were demanding as a precondition to renegotiation. One further model that did not figure greatly in the constitutional deliberations but may well have been examined in greater depth was the example of the United States which, quite apart from some of the glaringly unpalatable aspects of party-political wrangling in Congress, nonetheless provided a working example of executive prerogatives preserved from such excesses through the power of the presidential veto (Finer, et al. 1995: 105-11). It is tempting to imagine that some arrangement in the Meiji Constitution incorporating a two-thirds majority as the prerequisite to over-ruling the executive might well have been a salutary buffer against what in essence proved to be little more than stone-walling by the anti-government parties. It would naturally be grossly unfair to blame Ito for the miscarriage of the early parliaments. Yet it remains a fact that the letter of the law came to have a decisive impact on later developments. These effects were certainly unintended but the new arrangements left the Satcho oligarchs with less room to manoeuvre than they might otherwise have enjoyed. This does not constitute of necessity a blanket denial of the value of the Meiji Constitution or the merits of developing a more representative form of government at that time. But from the moment of the constitution's promulgation certain avenues of compromise were closed that could no longer be opened. 133

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As something of an historical post script to the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution we might reintroduce the activities of Kaneko Kentar6 who was sent on a broad tour of the West to gauge foreign perceptions of the new constitution in 1893. One figure that stood out as being highly critical of the outcome was the British social philosopher and social evolutionist, Herbert Spencer. Spencer had been consulted on an informal basis by Mori while he was posted in London as Japan's ambassador in the early to mid-eighties. While there is no direct record of what was discussed between them, the discussions held with Spencer by Kaneko revisited the substance of his observations in retrospect. Spencer was very adamant on the point that 'types of political organization are not matters of deliberate choice' but rather something that could develop gradually as local circumstances permitted (Spencer 1882-86: 394). He was highly critical of political reforms that he felt did not allow adequate time for adjustment and accommodation. To Kaneko he sounded his criticisms of the constitution that had just recently been established in the following blunt terms: Since writing to you on Sunday it has recurred to me, in pursuance of my remarks about Japanese affairs and the miscarriage of your constitution, to make a suggestion giving in a definite form such a conservative policy as I thought should be taken. My advice to Mr Mori was that the proposed new constitution should be as much as possible grafted upon the existing institutions, so as to prevent breaking continuity that there should not be a replacing of old forms by new, but a modification of old forms to a gradually increasing extent. (Duncan 1908:319)

Regarding the constitutional reforms in Japan, he specifically reiterated that 'free institutions, to which the Japanese have been utterly unaccustomed, are certain not to work well ... ' (ibid.: 319-20). Spencer, who by this time was established as a notoriously conservative and blunt commentator on contemporary politics left Kaneko in no doubt that the Japanese government had overshot itself, inviting major troubles further down the line. While he possibly overstated the degree of misjudgement, his observations were perhaps the most poignantly close to the mark. Kaneko wrote back and meekly responded that the third elections for the Diet had witnessed less violence than the previous ones. 9 134

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Akita, George. 1967. Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. - - , and Hirose, Yoshihiro. 1994. 'The British Model: Inoue Kowashi and the Ideal Monarchical System', Monumenta Nipponica 49: 413-22. Banno, Junji. 1992. The Establishment of the Japanese Constitutional System. London and New York: Routledge. Duncan, David. 1908. Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer. London: Watts & Co. Finer, S. E., Bogdanor, Vernon, and Rudden, Bernard. 1995. Comparing Constitutions. Rev. ed. New York: Clarendon Press. Fraser, Andrew, Mason, R. H. P., and Mitchell, Philip. 1995. Japan's Early Parliaments, 189(}-1905: Structure, Issues and Trends. London and New York: Routledge. Gibney, Frank. 1992. The Pacific Century: America and Asia in a Changing World. London: Macmillan. Hackett, Roger F. 1971. Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Hall, Ivan Parker. 1973. Mori Arinori. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Hanham, H.J. 1969. The Nineteenth-Century Constitution: Documents and Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Ito Hiroburni]. 1942. Ito Hirobumi den [A biography of Ito Hiroburni], edited by Kaneko Kentaro. Tokyo: loseisha. Ito Yukio. 1999. Rikken kokka no kakuritsu to Ito Hirobumi: Naisei to gaiko 1889-1898 [Ito Hiroburni and the establishment of the constitutional state: Internal politics and diplomacy, 1889-1898]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan. John, Michael. 1989. Politics and the Law in Late Nineteenth-Century Germany: The Origins of the Civil Code. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kaneko Kentaro. 1938. Kenpo seitei to Obeijin no hyoron [The promulgation of the constitution and its evaluation by Europeans and Americans]. Tokyo: Nihon seinenkan. Maruyama Masao. 1961 (1996). Nihon no shiso Uapanese thought]. In Maruyama Masao shu [Collected works of Maruyama Masao], 7. Tokyo: Iwanarni shoten. - - . 1987. 'Kuga Katsunan: Hito to shiso' [Kuga Katsunan: The man and his thought]. In Kuga Katsunan [Kuga Katsunan], Kindai Nihon shiso taikei [A compilation of modern Japanese thought], 4, edited by Uete Michiari. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 475-83. Meiji bunka zenshu [The Meiji cultural collection], 4. Kenseihen [Constitutional volume]. 1992. Edited by Meiji bunka kenkyiikai [Association for research in Meiji culture]. Tokyo: Nihon hyoronsha. Oka Yoshitake. 1993. Oka Yoshitake chosakushu [Collected writings of Oka Yoshitake], 1. Tokyo: Iwanarni shoten. Sakamoto Kazuto. 1991. Ito Hirobumi to Meiji kokka keisei: Kyuchu seidoka to rikkensei no donyu [Ito Hiroburni and the foundation of the Meiji state: The systematization of the Imperial Household and the introduction of constitutional government]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan. Spencer, Herbert. 1882-86. Principles of Sociology, 2. London. - - . Herbert Spencer Papers deposited in the University of London Library by the Atheneum, London 1972. MS.791. Sumitsuin kenpo seitei kaigi gijirokusho [The official record of the Privy Council 135

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY deliberations on the constitution]. 1942. In Mori Arinori zenshu [Mori Arinori collection], 1. Tokyo: Senbund6 shoten. Swale, Alistair. 2000. The Political Thought oj Mori Arinori: A Study in Meiji Conservatism. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. Yamamuro Shin'ichi. 1984. Hosei kanryo no jidai [The age of the legal bureaucrat]. Tokyo: Bokutakusha.

NOTES 1. Of further note in this connection is an article which appeared in Monumenta Nipponica which challenges the conventional perception of the spirit that informed constitutional deliberations around that time. The article introduces a previously unpublished letter of Inoue Kowashi, one of the initial drafters of the constitution, in which the English constitutional tradition is endorsed as the best model for the Japanese one. However, as the writers of the article themselves acknowledge, the letter was penned prior to the initiation of full deliberation on the Japanese constitution in the late eighteen-eighties, a time when there was a surge in German influence among intellectuals, especially at Tokyo University. See Akita and Hirose (1994). 2. The sources that endorse the Prussian-model view are indeed numerous. The following quote is from Frank Gibney's highly influential The Pacific Century: The Germany of Bismarck seemed far more attractive, especially after the victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Like Okubo before him, Ito was impressed by the interesting combination of democracy, welfare, and authoritarianism present in Bismarckian Germany - a newly created modern empire whose recent unifICation of various states under the Hohenzollern Kaiser bore no small similarity to Meiji Japan. In Berlin, despite the presence of political parties, the real power seemed firmly in the hands of the Kaiser's loyal bureaucracy. (Gibney 1992: 99)

3. There is an interesting parallel here with the term kokusuishugi, or 'national essentialism' coined by Kuga Katsunan, the editor of Nihon magazine. As Murayama (1987) notes, this term too started out as a perfectly reasonable reassertion of national culture but soon became a key phrase in the jargon of ultra-nationalism. 4. The discussion here stems from research into Mori Arinori by the author. For more details, see Swale (2000). 5. Mori explained his position in the following terms: If we allot such a degree of power it will create a situation of joint sovereignty between the Emperor and the people which would be a major departure from the constitutional tradition that has been in existence since former times. Even though this form of system is in place in certain foreign countries, it is entirely the product of their particular line of development and, although we cannot afford the time to go into the merits of these foreign examples in detail, we must certainly at least discuss whether such systems should be appropriated in Japan. I am beginning to wonder whether the honourable members of the committee that drafted these articles were fully aware of the implications. 6. For a discussion of Mori's position in the deliberations see also Maruyama (1961 [1996, 7]: 223). 7. Inoue's exposition carried the motion through as intended but the fact remains that Mori's point, which in effect challenged the utility of the Roman law tradition in the Japanese context, was not fully responded to; indeed, taking Mori's objections

136

THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION AS MISCALCULATION into full account would have necessitated going back to the beginning altogether, a possibility that could at this stage in no way be countenanced. 8. See Sumitsuin kenpo seitei kaigi gijirokusho: 60-3, which details discussion of Article Seventeen regarding the succession of the sovereign. The anxieties of some members lies purely in the nuance of the wording in Japanese. Inoue explains that the expression was phrased more or less in accordance with the wording of the Prussian constitution. The matter is resolved by making a minor amendment. See also ibid.: 68-9, where Terajima Munenori expressed reservations about the decidedly unnatural turn of phrase in Article Thirty-Six. Ito disagreed and put the motion to a vote. The motion was lost. 9. MS. 7911216, Herbert Spencer Papers deposited in the University of London Library by the Atheneum, London 1972.

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10

The End of World War One as a Turning Point in Modern Japanese History*

DICK STEGEWERNS

lthough turning points are an essential element of historical explanation and distinguish history from mere chroniA cling, it will hardly be necessary to mention that periodization is nonetheless a very tricky thing. In the first place, mankind itself is characterized more by continuity than discontinuity. Turning points in one's life will not be many. A majority of those asked to pinpoint a crucial turning point in their life might be at a serious loss to come up with an answer. As with man, so with his history. Often there are more reasons to reject than to advocate a certain moment in time as a turning point, whether in political, social, economic or intellectual history. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that in the trade of history-writing, commonly characterized as a discussion without end, discussion is especially fierce when it comes to periodization and many historical works seem to be predominantly concerned with refuting certain 'turning points' and/or establishing new ones. Still, regardless of historical reality, man needs a fair amount of simplification and label-marking in order to structure and digest the vast amount of information with which he is confronted nowadays. He needs neatly divided compartments, he needs periodization, sometimes merely based on the very basic wish to have a historical dividing line between right and wrong or good and evil. Over the centuries, historians have responded • I would like to thank Kevin Doak for having a critical look at this essay and my mother for trying to turn my writings into the Queen's English.

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to this demand from society and come up with periodizations, whether for national histories or for world history. I can remember that in primary school all the years marked on the timeline had for convenience's sake been reduced to numbers with at least one zero at the end, but going up the educational ladder these tended to become more and more specific (and difficult to remember). Dates were omitted, but the names of months started to pop up. Even in the first years at university the main impression one got was that history was nothing but a long and endless chain of innumerable and uncontested turning points. Of course the historian is not the only one to blame. At the university where I teach, students are not always pleased with a picture of history as a complex thing, full of continuity and discontinuity, and different trends going on at the same time. They tend to prefer a clear story of one cause and one effect and they are especially fond of turning points, which seem to function as a sign to set aside the past in order to make room for what is to come. So we provide some. The one I unfailingly provide in my lectures on modern Japanese history and the one I also want to treat here is 1918/19. From a Western point of view this might seem an obvious thing to do. Revolutions and wars tend to be the most popular signposts for turning points in national histories and world history. In this case we have both the end of a period of great upheaval, alternatively termed the First World War or the Great War, and the end of the Russian, German and Austrian empires, so one is bound to expect a turning point at this moment in time. Indeed, many historians provide exactly that. To restrict ourselves to a few prominent (Western) world historians, Eric Hobsbawm treats the First World War as the turning point from the end of 'the age of empire' to 'the age of extremes' (Hobsbawm 1989; Hobsbawn 1996) and E. H. Carr characterizes 1919 as the beginning of the interbellum, also termed 'the twenty years' crisis' (Carr 1939 [1981]). The historical overview of the Western world by Palmer and Colton (1983), endorsed 'in case of historical emergency' by the history department of Leiden University, also makes a fresh new start in 1919 and speaks of the dawn of a new world order. Raising from a small country where most inhabitants are relatively ignorant of their own national history and probably do not even know that the Netherlands did not participate in the First World War, 1918 as a turning point in Dutch history is 139

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probably not that hard to sell. In my day, secondary schools restricted themselves to 'world history'. Apart from the odd Pharaoh or Inca, this was nothing but European history, with the Netherlands only clearly in view during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus it is hardly astonishing that our framework is predominantly (est) European or Western. PERIODIZATION OF MODERN JAPANESE HISTORY AS SEEN THROUGH RECENT WESTERN AND JAPANESE STUDIES

However, Japan of course is an entirely different story. I will not go into the debate whether modern Japan is East or West, or both, or neither and thus a pure Japanese entity. Suffice it to say that in Japanese secondary education Japanese history is taught entirely separately from world history, and that in university the traditional tripartite division between national history, Western history and Eastern history persists. Within this context, and considering the fact that many Japanese during the first years of the First World War spoke of the Great European War, it would seem far more natural to ignore or reject 1918/19 as a turning point in Japan's national history. It is also interesting to see that many Western scholars in the field of modern Japanese history follow in the footsteps of their Japanese confreres. 1 Thus, apart from the question of whether the end of World War One was a common turning point in the history of the modern (Western) world - after all, all turning points are open to question - there is also the question of whether Japan was part of this modern world. Was Japan a part of and thus predominantly swayed by sekaishi (world history) or was Japan in a kokushi (national history) league of its own?

No Turning Point In dealing with the question of whether 1918 was a turning point in Japanese history or not, I will first consider those interpretations that give a negative answer to this question on the basis of a particular Japanese periodization. It hardly needs to be said that the easiest option to create a distinctly Japanese history is to use the nengo, the system of linking a time period to the reign of an emperor. Within this framework 1918 is neither more nor less than the seventh year in the reign of Emperor Taish6. The majority of scholars on modern Japan indeed use 140

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the terms Meiji, Taisho and Showa as convenient adjuncts to give a general indication of what time period they will generally be dealing with, adding or deducing years at their own whim. However, there are also quite a few cases of works which adhere exactly to the reign years. Influential books by Shinobu Junpei (1927) and Shinobu Seizaburo (1951-52, 1954-59), on the diplomatic and political history of the Taisho period respectively, needed some introduction to get to the events of 1912 but they cut their story short exactly at the point of the demise of Emperor Taisho. During the past ten years or so this somewhat strange phenomenon has been most marked in the many books dealing with the Showa period. In the wake of, or sometimes even anticipating, the death of Emperor Showa Japanese publishers treated us to loads of overviews of the years 1926-89, the most notable being the Showa no rekishi-series published by Shogakukan. And even in the West, scholars and publishers seemed to be perfectly at ease to link a period in Japanese history to one individual, judging by titles such as Showa: An Inside History if Hirohito's Japan (Morris-Suzuki 1984), Showa: The Japan if Hirohito (Gluck and Graubard 1992) and The Age if Hirohito: In Search if Modern Japan (Irokawa 1995). Considering the fact that we still lack books that deal with 'The age of Mutsuhito' or 'The age of Yo shihito' in their title, one wonders whether Hirohito was so outstanding that he deserved this special honour or that these days we merely are more prone to cash in on the death of famous persons? Another 'typically Japanese' way of periodization which leaves 1918/19 somewhere in the middle is the idea of a TaishO democracy. Although Imai Seiichi has published a book under this title which deals exactly with the Taisho years 1912-26 and thus seems to be part of the nengo camp (Imai 1966), most scholars who advocate the use of the term Taisho democracy are flexible and tend to include also significant parts of either the Meiji period or the Showa period. On the one hand we have those who emphasize the structure of democracy. They view party cabinets as the main characteristic of a Taisho democracy that lasts from the First Movement to Protect the Constitution of 1912 (or in some cases, the inauguration of the Hara cabinet in 1918) until the bloody end of party cabinets in 1932 (Mitani 1974; Ito 1987; Hane 2000). On the other hand we have those whose focus is more on the spirit of democracy. They tend to stress the factor of a popular force: a civil society that challenges 141

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the powers of the authoritarian state. The latter group usually have the Taish6 democracy commence with the Hibiya Riots of 1905 and come to an end with the Peace Preservation Law of 1925 (Matsuo 1966, 1974; Kinbara 1967, 1994). Apart from the lack of unity as to the exact dates and the determining element, the debate on Taish6 democracy is even further complicated by the fact that in the above camps there exist both positive and negative interpretations of this period. Ever since the end of the Second World War there has been a strong trend to closely link Taish6 democracy to post-war political and social democracy along with international co-operation. Modernization theorists have stressed this period as one of transition: they see this period of party cabinets as an essential prelude to postwar democracy, thus downplaying the meaning of the 1930s and the war years as a dark valley, a temporary aberration from the universal path of modernization. 2 However, there have been at least as many voices who have spoken of Taish6 democracy in terms of failure. They stress the fact that the political parties did not reach out to the masses and sometimes they even strongly cast doubt on the true democratic content of Taish6 democracy.3 Many Marxist scholars, who until the 1970s were extremely influential in Japanese academia, have been keen to point out that Taish6 democracy was nothing but a short and ultimately insignificant period of interruption inJapan's authoritarian internal policy and aggressive foreign policy.4 The standard image inJapan of the Taish6 period and Taish6 democracy, as projected by numerous movies, television series and historical manga is somewhere in between these two interpretations. It is the image of the Taisho roman, the weak yet beautiful flower of freedom and modernism that bravely tried to develop from under the overwhelming load of idai na Meiji, 'glorious Meiji', but was soon dramatically crushed by the gekido no ShOwa, 'turbulent Sh6wa'.5 The idea of a Taish6 democracy was somewhat out of favour during the 1980s but it is interesting to see that it has recently gained a new lease of life in a slightly different form. First of all there is the variant of imperial democracy (1905-32) advocated by Andrew Gordon. His evaluation of the term 'Taish6 democracy'is rather harsh: it is ' ... chronologically inaccurate and analytically empty ... The main reason for the use of the Taish6 label has been its dubious chronological convenience .... As a catchall for a vast array of movements, "Taish6 democracy" is 142

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far too inclusive' (Gordon 1991: 5, 8). However, he is not willing to discard the achievements of Taish6 democracy by throwing away the democratic baby with the Taish6 bathwater: We can better distinguish these strange bedfellows [the labour and tenant unions and the social democratic and bourgeois political parties] by placing the bourgeois parties at the center of a drive in the early twentieth century for political change, the movement for imperial democracy, while recognizing their uneasy relationship with the popular energies that also fueled the movement. We may then consider the movements of workers, farmers, and intellectuals that emerged by the 1920s as often separate from, and sometimes opposed to, imperial democracy. This frees us from concern with the betrayal by the bourgeois parties of an all-encompassing 'Taish6' democratic movement and shifts the focus instead to the contradictory pressures impinging upon these parties. (Ibid.: 9)

Gordon proposes using 'imperial democracy' rather than an ideal Taish6 democracy in order to avoid having to speak of its 'limits', 'shallowness' and 'impurity'. Instead it would be better to highlight 'the" contradictions" at the heart of an actual movement for change that was broadly based and profound' (ibid.: 7). Accordingly, he draws up a new scheme for the interpretation of pre-war modern Japanese history which is characterized by continuity in the form of the adjective 'imperial' yet shows discontinuity in the form of a division into the three distinct periods of imperial bureaucracy, imperial democracy and imperial fascism. The period of imperial democracy is sandwiched between the major turning points of 1905 and 1932 and thus, like most interpretations of Taish6 democracy, attaches less importance to the changes occurring in 1918/19. Yet another alternative to Taish6 democracy has lately been advocated by Arima Manabu in the form of a period labelled the empire amidst 'internationalization' which lasts from 1905 until 1924, exactly the same time span Matsuo Takayoshi and other specialists would term 'the Taish6 democracy'. Arima does not question the 'Taish6' of Taish6 democracy, but rather the 'democracy', which he thinks is a concept that is contaminated by the post-war state-of-mind and accordingly hides historical reality. Instead he emphasizes a different 'mode of thinking' which arose in the 'post-Russo-Japanese War era'. This mode of thinking was characterized by a new international outlook, which nonetheless simultaneously implied a strong reconfirmation of nationality (Arima 1999: 7-38). However, 143

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the mode of thinking during what Arima calls the two victorious 'post-wars'in this one period, the post-Russo-Japanese War and the post-World War One periods respectively, seems to me hardly to be of an identical character and, moreover, the reasons for the ending in 1924 of this new mode of thinking are completely unclear. There is one other 'particularly Japanese' way of periodization making use of the word 'Taish6', which is somewhat exceptional in the sense that, as far as I know, it has only been used by Western scholars. It is the concept of a Greater Taisho introduced in the 1970s by Tetsuo Najita and J. Victor Koschmann. In their view the period 1900-30 was 'a major conflictual "moment'" in Japanese history, and thus definitely not the smooth and secure transitional phase on the way to democracy as advocated by the modernization theorists. Najita and Koschmann confess that there are no convenient benchmarks to demarcate this thirty-year period which they term 'a system of events containing a coherent set of internal identities' (Najita 1982: 11), but more fatal to the concept of a Greater Taish6 seems to be the fact that this 'coherent set of internal identities' remains rather vague. Ever since, this concept has hardly been used, until it was picked up by Sharon Minichiello in her introduction to the edited volume on Japan 5 Competing Modernities (1998). She reiterated that Greater Taish6 was a conflictual period, namely that of several competing modernities, but in contrast to the inventors of the concept she posed that the years 1900-30 constituted 'a coherent historical period' that had 'a clear beginning and ending' (Minichiello 1998b: 2). However, the benchmarks one can discover in her article, such as the formation of the Seiyiikai, the marriage of Crown Prince Yoshihito, East Asian disenchantment with the West, the London Naval Conference and the assassination attempt on Prime Minister Hamaguchi, are all but clear. The coherence of the period is further undermined by the fact that she mentions the 'take-off points' 1905, 1906, and 1917-20. And, to make things even more confusing, in the same essay she simultaneously uses the concept Taish6 democracy, which in her view spans from 1919-32 and within which the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law of 1925 functions as its central accomplishment (ibid.: 1-21). But the one who has been willing to stretch 'Taish6' the most is Bernard S. Silberman in the influential edited volume on 144

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Taish6 democracy entitled Japan in Crisis (1974). His description of 'Taish6' as 'a period of conflict and confrontation' and 'the ubiquitousness and omnipresence of the bureaucracy' (Silberman 1974: 439, 447), is at odds with Gordon's interpretation, but quite close to that of Silberman's contemporaries. It is rather his demarcation of Taish6 which is exceptional: ' ... Taisho did not end with the demise of the parties in the early 1930s but rather ... is descriptive of the era between, approximately, 1900 and the beginning of the PacifIc War.... One can only conclude ... that "Taish6 democracy" and "Sh6wa fascism" were not two distinct phenomena but were patterns of behavior stemming from shared assumptions about the nature of politics and society' (ibid.: 438, 453). Since this interpretation is also very much concerned with the question of whether 1931/32 is a turning point in Japanese history, this is not the right occasion to go into Silberman's argument too deeply. Let me just note that in my opinion this broad sweep of some forty years ignores the fact that within this period one can distinguish several generations who clearly did not share the same 'assumptions about the nature of politics and society'. Another way of taking most of the first part of the twentieth century as a whole and passing over the hub of 1918/19 without much ado, is to identifY this period as the age ifJapanese imperialism. Post-war Japanese Marxist scholars have been rather keen to portray Japan predominantly as an imperialist nation. Within their accounts the years 1905-31 were usually distinguished as the phase of imperialism engendered by capitalism in its mature stage. 6 Post-war Western scholars on Japan have been somewhat less harsh on modern Japan. They were often quite enchanted by the Meiji period (and sometimes by the Taish6 period) and, far from scolding Japan as imperialist and capitalist, were perfectly willing to present the country as a sound model of modern development to other 'late developers'. Apart from the heretic Donald CaIman (1992) who was so bold as to trace the origins of Japanese imperialism all the way back to the beginning of the Meiji period, to be more specific 1873 - the year of the seikanron, most seemed to agree on 1905 - the victorious end of the Russo-Japanese War as the true take-off point for Japanese imperialism? Moreover, whereas Hobsbawm indicated that the Western Age of Empire ended with the First World War, the majority of scholars on modern Japan seem to be perfectly at ease to let the Japanese Age of Empire and imperialism 145

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extend until the end of the Second World War, thus clearly not considering 1918/19 as a point in time when there was a fundamental change in Japan's imperialism. Gordon, as mentioned above, of course is a good example of scholars who argue that empire was foremost on the pre-war Japanese mind, since he detects continuity for the whole period 1868-1945 in the one word 'imperial'. There have been some other broad-sweep periodizations of Japan's history of the first half of the twentieth century that skip 1918/19, such as the era if modern economic growth, 1906-30 (Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973), the era of national mission, 1905-45 (Nomura 1981), the era ofpolitical change, crisis and war, 1905-45 (Duus 1998) and Gary D. Allinson's rather unorthodox period if integrating the nation, 1890-1931 (Allinson 1999), but for reasons of brevity I will not dwell upon them in this essay. 1918 as a Turning Point in Japanese History but Based on Particular Japanese Circumstances

Instead, I would like to consider a few interpretations and periodizations of modern Japanese history that do treat 1918/19 as a major turning point but do so only on the basis of particular Japanese circumstances. It will not be surprising that most of these interpretations accordingly go straight to the heart of the concept of a Taish6 democracy. First of all, I should probably mention Maruyama Masao, the authority on Japanese political and intellectual history, who immediately after the war started to publish a series of articles in which he tried to structurally analyse what went wrong with Japan before the war. I will not discuss his conclusions here, but it is interesting to see that he identifies 1919 - what others would later treat as the height of Taish6 democracy - as the starting point ofJapanese fascism. The years 1919-31 are accordingly labelled the first period of 'fascism from below', a preparatory period that leads to a second, mature period of fascism from below, 1931-36, and ultimately culminates in the period of consummation of fascism and 'fascism from above', 1936-45 (see Maruyama 1964: 31-40).8 Another concept which emerged at the beginning of the 1970s as a direct reaction to the wave of late-1960s studies on the Taish6 democracy was that of the era if the Riform Faction. It was introduced by a revisionist group of Tokyo University 146

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affiliates, led by Ito Takashi, who emphasized the limitations of Taisho democracy and eventually rejected the general characterization of the Taisho period as a time of democracy. Instead, they argued that the period from 1918 to the mid-1930s was best represented by a 'reform generation', a new generation which emerged in the latter part of the Taisho period and which was not so much looking for democracy as for reform, whether to the left or to the right (Ito 1972).9 Although the concept has been quite influential during the 1970s and 1980s, in Japan as well in the West, it is rather a pity that Ito himself in his central volume on the Reform Faction (Ito 1978) does not go beyond enumerating countless reform societies and hardly focuses on linking them more closely, thus failing to give the concept a more solid backbone. In my opinion, 'reform' is too all-encompassing. The Rosokai, for instance, of course is a good example of all sorts of different creeds assembled in one room, but one should not forget that it was a short-lived experiment (1918-21) and shortly after everybody returned to their own more sectarian factions. As intellectuals the 'reformists' shared a common stage and were in close contact, but as political actors there were very clear dividing lines. Moreover, emphasis on the rise of the reform generation during the 1920s often make analysts ignore the facts that in this period a previous older generation still held sway and various 'reformists' only took over during the late 1920s-early 1930s. Minichiello (1984) has used Ito's framework in her research on Nagai Ryiitaro, but rather surprisingly does not once mention it in her introduction to the Competing Modernities volume, which partly deals with the same period. A rather exceptional contribution to this periodization debate has been made by Sheldon Garon, who has pointed out that the years from 1918 to 1945 constitute the period in Japan's modern history in which the state behaved most autonomously vis-a-vis the social classes. In his opinion, the concept of bureaucratic autonomy can function as 'a promising means of describing the continuities between the apparently democratic 1920s and the authoritarianism of the 1930s and war years' (Garon 1986: 8). Once again, I cannot help having strong doubts as to how substantial this phenomenon is, especially when Garon himself already admits that the direction to which this autonomous bureaucracy was working changed considerably over the years (ibid.: 3-21; see also Garon 1987). 147

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The most recent and the most passionate advocacy of 1918 as a turning point in modern Japanese history has emanated from Frederick R. Dickinson. His book, framed around the concept of national renovation, deals predominantly with the political struggles inJapan during the war period, in Dickinson's words 'a battle for national identity' (Dickinson 1999). It seems that the main case he wants to make is that Kenseikai leader Kato Takaaki was the one and only true democrat of the age, that Kato's intentions in confronting China with the notorious Twenty-One Demands were nothing but praiseworthy (imperialism in the service of democracy - an incredible detour), and that the real culprits were army leaders Yamagata Aritomo, Terauchi Masatake, Tanaka Giichi and, last but definitely not least, Kato's political rival Hara Takashi of the Seiyukai. On this, in my view very unconvincing basis, Dickinson also turns his gaze to the post-war period. Here his continuing attack on Hara takes on a somewhat universalistic tone when he starts by pointing out: Particularly ironic is the fact that 1919 is identified not, following the histories of Europe and America, as the year of Versailles but as one year in the life of the Hara regime. For the most dramatic steps towards representative government in Japan in that year came not through Hara's efforts but as a consequence of the Great War and its denouement, the Paris Peace Conference. In fact, by 1919, the Seiyukai and its president had surrendered their role as the most powerful champions of representative government inJapan [sic] to a much more formidable proponent: Woodrow Wilson. (Dickinson 1999: 217)

Nonetheless, in the end Dickinson's definition of 1918/19 as an important turning point in modern Japanese history is based solely on internal political factors. It is characterized as a turning point in the sense of a prelude to the late 1920s when the Seiyukai would 'accelerate its battle against reform', becoming more and more undemocratic and imperialist, and the Kenseikai would 'increasingly embrace the new political and diplomatic trends' (ibid.: 237). Dickinson's first observations on a changed world order that was of overriding influence on developments in Japan deserves a better conclusion than this simplified scheme of good and bad guys, which ignores a tremendous amount of historical facts. To give just two instances, it was the Kenseikai which opposed Hara's post-war policy of no intervention towards China, and it took a long time to bring Kato into line 148

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with the popular demand for unconditional universal - that is male - suffrage. 1918 as a Turning Point in ''WOrld' History and thus in Japanese History

However, there are others who are more consistent in linking post-war changes in the (Western) world and in Japan, and accordingly have come to the conclusion that 1918/19 was a turning point in 'world' history and thus in Japanese history. It is hardly surprising that we can find most of the advocates of this line of thought among specialists on diplomatic history and economic history, two fields in which a broad, international analysis is indispensable. The most conspicuous representative on the side of the diplomatic historians is Akira Iriye, who already in his maiden work After Imperialism (1965) pointed out that' ... the collapse of the diplomacy of imperialism as a mechanism of power politics, and the consequent search for a new order provide a meaningful context in which various countries' foreign policies can be analysed' (Iriye 1965: vii). He thus makes sure to distance himself from several particularist explanations. For instance, he criticizes as 'inadequate' any analysis that originates from the viewpoint of what went wrong in the 1920s, in the sense of preparing the revival of Japanese expansionism. Such an analysis assumes that 'foreign policies are autonomous and continuous' and 'international relations are seen simply as a mechanical sum total of isolated national policies' (ibid.: 2). Iriye by contrast emphasizes the fact that no nation has complete freedom of action: It has only a given number of alternatives, and this range of possible action is often determined by extranational factors, such as considerations of alliances and ententes, as well as what are generally regarded as legitimate and plausible goals offoreign policy. Japanese expansionism, even if it did exist in the abstract, would take different forms as conditions change in the concepts, practices, and patterns of international relations. Changes in these variables, which constitute what one may call the framework or system of diplomacy, will often modify the content and expression of a policy (ibid.: 2; emphases added).

On the basis of a drastic change in this international 'framework or system of diplomacy' Iriye clearly designates 1918/19 as a major turning point. The end of World War One universally implies the end of the age of imperialism (or, in the words of 149

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Kitaoka Shin'ichi, classical imperialism) and the start of a new era of economicJoreign policy, also termed the era of economic expansion, 1918/21-31, as distinct from the preceding imperialist and succeeding militarist eras of expansion (ibid.: 3; Irie 1966, Iriye 1971, 1974).10 In Japanese there is also quite an extensive literature dealing with either the diplomatic history or the economic history of the interbellum period in Japan, 11 which obviously takes 1918/19 as a starting and major turning point and tries to find continuity between the 1920s and 1930s where many others tend to 'take a break' in 1931/32, but for lack of space I will not go into these studies in detail. The last advocate of a periodization of modern Japanese history which takes 1918/19 as a major turning point for nonparticularist reasons is Michael Barnhart (1987). He describes the years from 1919 to 1941 as the period of the search Jor economic security. His focus is on the international post-war trend towards total war thinking, a lesson many countries learned during World War One. He discerns a group of 'total war officers', such as Ugaki Kazushige, Nagata Tetsuzan, Suzuki Teiichi, and Ishiwara Kanji, whose actions were mainly inspired by the quest for autarky in the sense of a self-sufficient Japanese Empire. In Barnhart's view these officers were exceptional in the sense that they were endowed with a predominantly economic outlook towards China and Manchuria, instead of a predominantly strategic outlook. However, unfortunately for these men, this same outlook led them to walk a thin line between the means of Sino-Japanese economic co-operation and the end of Japanese regional leadership, which time and again proved incompatible. THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER OF THE POSTWORLD WAR ONE PERIOD

Having come this far, it is due time for me to make clear where I stand in all this. As one may gather from the title of my essay and the number of subjective statements I have made, I tend to side with those who see the changes brought about by the First World War as being of such influence on the Japanese state, society and people that we can speak of a major turning point in the history of the country. Usually I do not stress the most often mentioned turning point in the year 1918, namely the advent of the 'first true party cabinet' in the form of the Hara 150

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cabinet. In the first place, I am not so sure whether it was the first and - what is more important - it was the logical result of a long-term development. One can see it coming years ahead and many indeed did at the time. I prefer 'real' turning points, moments when people are startled by what has suddenly happened around them, and which forces them to relocate their position and to adjust their opinions and/or their vocabulary. Japanese primary sources from the 1910s and 1920s have led me to believe that the end of World War One is such a moment. So, what are these sudden - and mainly external - changes that took the world and Japan by surprise? Here I cannot help echoing some of the scholars I have already mentioned. First of all, I have to mimic Hobsbawm and Iriye by mentioning the end of the good old imperialism of yore and its concomitant world order. The war had made the United States rich - they had become the world's greatest creditor nation - and powerful. The Americans suddenly found themselves on top of the world, while Europe lay devastated and ruined at their feet. Moreover, the mighty empires of Germany, Austria and Russia had crumbled to pieces, the latter even victim to a communist revolution. This inversion of the former international (pecking) order could not remain without substantial effects. The honourable pastimes of imperialism and expansionism all of a sudden became contaminated words and acquiring new colonies was no longer allowed. Secondly, one should not underestimate the impact of the sudden popularity of the slogan 'the ethnic national right to self-determination' (in Japanese minzoku jiketsu shugi), propagated by both Wilson and Lenin. Many of those peoples which during the age of empire had been slighted as ethnic nations without civilization now considered themselves to be ethnic nations with the right to self-determination. Although most Western advocates of this slogan had not intended to give ethnic national self-determination a wide geographical application, it was not easy to explain why some peoples who previously had been termed ethnic nations (in Japanese minzoku) could not enjoy the same ethnic national rights as others. It is a fact that the colonial empires of the victorious nations, some of which had even expanded considerably during the war, were left intact at the Peace Conference in Paris. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned changed discourse, together with the new slogan of the ethnic national right to self-determination, logically implied 151

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that a ticking time bomb had been placed under the colonial order. Last but not least, I would like to invoke Barnhart and stress the post-war trend of total war thinking. Any observer of World War One could see that this was no longer a nice and heroic war. It was of a completely different quality and quantity - mass slaughter, trench warfare, chemical weapons, submarines, air raids, attrition. The words 'neutral' and 'civilian' did not mean much any more. Moreover, war was protracted. Once a stalemate had been reached, the war to a large extent developed from military into economic competition. Mobilization of the entire nation was demanded. The front was not merely in France and Belgium, it was also in every home. No matter how much one wanted to avoid a repetition of this 'modern' war, one could not just rely on optimistic hopes. One had to make the necessary preparations just in case, and considering the nature of modern warfare these preparations had to be total and to a very large extent economic. EFFECTS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER ON JAPAN

Next, what were the effects of this suddenly changed world order on Japan? Changed Perception of the Outside UVrld and the National Goal

First of all, one has to notice that the Japanese did not feel themselves very much at ease in the post-war world. One might think that they should have been put quite at ease now that their most feared enemy, Imperial Russia, had all of a sudden evaporated. However, by means of the Siberian Intervention (1918-22) they soon managed to provide themselves with a new hostile entity in the form of communist Russia, which was heterogeneous and thus strange and, moreover, proved to be difficult to fight. On the other hand, there was the United States, the new Number One, a country that was neither very easy to fathom for the Japanese, especially with a religious idealist such as Wilson as its leader. True to their European idols, many Japanese intellectuals had taken to looking down on the United States as being at a lower stage of civilization than the Old World. Only an exceptionally keen observer like Hara Takashi was at a very early stage aware of its potential, an awareness which eventually led him to predict in 1917 that 'in the future, America will take the lead in the world' and 'American power vis-a-vis the post152

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war world will be astonishing' (Hara Takashi nikki, 4: Entries of 26 May and 22 October 1917; trans. in Dickinson 1999: 219, 221).12 After the war, Hara was joined in this opinion by the people. Whether they considered the United States to be a friend or a potential enemy, whether they thought in terms of military warfare, economic warfare, or peaceful economic competition, the United States was the model that the Japanese had in mind. America was what Japan sought to be, namely selfsufficient [jikyu jisoku shugt1. If the country wanted to survive and, moreover, wanted to be a fully-fledged player in a post-war world that was to a large extent dictated by the economic power of the United States, it had to compete with the Americans on their terms. It had to be equally fit for modern total war. It had to be economically self-sufficient as well. In a new and strange world where its former European ally often proved absent and eventually undependable, and where the country also had to adjust to an unfamiliar vocabulary with which it was confronted from all sides - from the New World, from the international headquarters of communism, and even from its own colonies and informal empire - Japan felt cornered and isolated. As was often the case, its natural inclination was to turn to its East Asian backyard for a solution. Changed Perception of International Relations and the Legitimate Means of Foreign Policy

Still, no matter how familiar the motion, this time it was orchestrated by a new set of rules, in Akira Iriye's words, by the new 'framework of diplomacy' that prescribes 'legitimate and plausible goals of foreign policy' (Iriye 1965: 2). The conditions for attaining economic self-sufficiency within the East Asian region were clear and all Japanese intellectuals were aware of them: no large-scale armed interventions, no formation of new colonies, a certain degree of respect for the Chinese ethnic national right to self-determination. However, being aware of the rules of the game does not yet imply that one is willing to play by these rules. It is exactly on this point that we can find a division - and in my view, to a considerable extent a generational division - within the camp of those who tried to combine the god of economic self-sufficiency with the restricted legitimate means provided to attain it. Needless to say, this division was mainly caused by the fact that the idea of absolute economic self-sufficiency in a region not completely 153

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part of one's own empire is a contradictio in terminis. In such circumstances one is all but self-sufficient; one remains dependent. And the more so in the case of China - because that of course was what the above-mentioned 'East Asian region' was all about - where since the end of the war nationalism had become a force not to be lightly dismissed. The two ways out of this problem were simple, yet antagonistic. One way was to stick to the rules of the game and, by doing so, to compromise the goal of self-sufficiency somewhat and thus make it less absolute. This method is best represented by the concept of a Sino-Japanese economic alliance [Nisshi keizai damel1. One of the most conspicuous and early proponents of such an alliance was Takahashi Korekiyo. In a few notes circulated privately during his term as finance minister in the Hara cabinet he spoke his mind quite freely on the subject: We have hurt China's self-respect and pride. ... The Group Five demands of the 21 demands almost intruded upon China's sovereignty. . .. We should withdraw the Group Five demands .... We should withdraw our troops from Shaadong as soon as possible ... and should not establish new concessions. ... We should not extract unnatural low prices for iron from Hanyaping Coal and Iron Company ... and we should make sure to protect Chinese profits in joint ventures. (Takahashi 1920: 137-8)

Takahashi stressed Chinese feelings, honour, pride, and profits and accordingly warned his country not to focus on short-term profits. In his 'Opinion on the Establishment of an East Asian Economic Force' of May 1921, he instead expounded the idea of the formation of a long-term Sino-Japanese economic alliance. He called for a fundamental reform ofJapan's China policy in the sense of an emphasis on economic coexistence between the two countries, aimed at the establishment of an East Asian economic force that would be able to compete with the two other economic forces in the world, England and America: Military power is no longer the sole criterion to determine a country's power. Nowadays one should measure its economic power ... that is, the total sum of its natural, scientific and human capacity.... Japan at present cannot compare to the two economic forces England and America. However, if we make no mistakes and make good use of the geographical, natural and economic relations within East Asia, our future is very hopeful. ... It will need no mention that China holds limitless natural resources. If Japan and China joined hands in exploring the natural resources of Asia and developed their power to become one 154

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of the world's economic units, then we could compete with England and America and bring about a tripartition of the world .... However, it is evident that if we indeed want to tie up with China and establish this Asian economic force we will first have to reform our traditional China policy fundamentally. The most important elements of this basic reform are: 1. the swift withdrawal of our troops, which have caused misapprehension amongst both China and the Western Powers. 2. the swift removal of our various military facilities and 3. the resolute reform of all our policies and facilities that could seem to attest to territorial and aggressive ambitions towards Shan dong, Manchuria and Mongolia . . .. Another most urgent precondition is to stabilize a central government in China and to restore its administrative authority over the land. . .. In order to achieve this it is inevitable that the Japanese government spare part of our economic power and openly supply its Chinese counterpart with a yearly amount of futy or sixty million yen in order to compensate the latter's budget deficit .... If we do not succeed in doing so in co-operation with the Western powers through the Four Power Consortium, then inevitably we should do so on our own. This is not merely proper from the position of Japan, but even our natural nusslOn .... If we fail, Japan and China will become estranged, Asia will not be able to exalt its potential economic force, and the economic forces of England and America will immediately penetrate and seize the rule over East Asia. China and Japan will then have no alternative but to succumb to their power. That is the inescapable fate that will descend upon the economically young and weak .... Thus I do not hesitate to assert that the future destiny of our Empire depends upon the establishment of an Asian economic force that will rank amongst the world's [three] economic units. (Takahashi 1921: 144-9)13

The idea that Japan cannot make it on its own, the awareness of Chinese nationalist sentiments, and the accordingly constant and strong emphasis on a Sino-Japanese alliance were also shared by many contemporary commentators, even such inft.uential anti-Seiyukai figures as Yoshino Sakuzo and Horie Kiichi. 14 Notably, these ideas were based on a far more equal relation between Japan and China than was the case in the erstwhile concept of a Japan-led Monroe Doctrine for East Asia, which had been propagated by many of these same commentators during the latter half of the war. It will hardly come as a surprise that the other group of total-war thinkers attached utmost priority to the attainment of the goal of absolute self-sufficiency and thus was more and more forced to sin against the legitimate means to attain this 155

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goal This group is probably best represented by politicians such as Mori Kaku, middle rank officers of the Kwantung Army, and members of the Issekikai. They first chose to assassinate the warlord Zhang Zuolin [Chang Tso-lin] and eventually opted for full-scale military confrontation with Chinese nationalism in order to absolutely safeguard 'the lifeline of Manchuria', an essential pillar in the scheme to attain economic self-sufficiency. This is where I take some distance from Barnhart, who probably would protest that many of his 'total war officers' should actually be included in the first group of advocates of a Sino-Japanese economic alliance. However, in my opinion Barnhart's focus on middle-ranking and high-ranking army officers is too restricted: total-war thinking was an extremely widespread phenomenon in the days after World War One and included many civilians, amongst whom many of the most influential opinion leaders of the day. The majority of these mouthed the internationalist rhetoric of closer economic ties and increased economic interdependence, eventually leading to the impossibility of international warfare. However, in respect to their country's China or Manchuria-Mongolia policy they were often not loath to admit that their most urgent aim was to establish a Sino-Japanese economic alliance and to attain Japanese self-sufficiency (of course there was no word about Chinese self-sufficiency). This ambition was predominantly inspired by the need to hold out in a modern, protracted, total war, no matter whether that was fought by economic or military means. The dividing point between most of the opinion leaders in the 1920s was thus not whether they were total warthinkers or not, or whether they had a predominantly economic view of China or not. Their interpretations of the post-war world order were not that different. In the end it was all about what lesson they had drawn from the Great War: had Imperial Germany been principally mistaken in its goal of autarky or had it principally been mistaken in the selection of its means? (Stegewerns, forthcoming b). Normally, when discussing the China policy of Japan in the 1920s, the juxtaposition is not between total-war thinkers, who give priority to their goal, and total-war thinkers who give priority to propriety, in the form of legitimate means. It is rather between the so-called non-interventionist 'Shidehara policy' and the interventionist 'Tanaka policy'. However, I find these 156

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two very difficult to compare in a meaningful way, since they seem to originate from entirely different worlds. The abovementioned two variants of modern, total-war thinking are both based on the perception that times had changed, and that in the face of the force of Chinese nationalism it would be unwise or even impossible to hold on any longer to the old policy of supporting local warlords to further Japan's aims. The 'legitimate means option' comes down to military resignation and piecemeal gradual retreat from Manchuria (which is my interpretation of the Shidehara policy). The 'absolute goal option', in contrast, comes down to the willingness to adopt a head-on collision course. However, the so-called 'Tanaka policy' is very different and exceptional in the sense that Tanaka Giichi in 1927 still thought that he could continue with business as usual. Chinese nationalism asked for a more serious treatment and a completely different level of resolution. One could no longer linger but had to decide whether to go with the nationalist flow or to contain it by all means. CONCLUSION: WAS 1918 A TURNING POINT? WAS JAPAN PART OF WORLD HISTORY?

In conclusion, I would like briefly to return to the questions I raised at the beginning, namely: Was the end of World War One a turning point in Japanese history? Or, to put it otherwise: Was Japan part of world history? On the basis of what I have previously argued, it will be evident that I would like to answer these questions with a very definite 'yes'. Contemporary opinion leaders also left no doubt whatsoever that in their opinion a new world [shinsekat1 had come about (Stegewerns, forthcoming b). And, how could this have been otherwise in the changed postwar world order where the democratic and republican United States and the communist experiment in Russia were all of a sudden competing for the world's attention. Moreover, apart from the three major, externally induced changes of anti-imperialism, ethnic nationalism and total war-thinking discussed above, there were also some other significant changes. Internally, 1918/19 saw the end of a somewhat gloomy era symbolized by the 'winter period' of thought control in the wake of the High Treason Incident of 1910. All isms of the 1900s and 1910s, no matter how radical, were now suddenly and almost simultaneously introduced - or reintroduced - to the populace. 157

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The forces of the day were in favour of freedom of opinion, making the period from 1918 to 1931 (when for obvious reasons restrictions were firmly reinstated) a distinct period of freedom, openness and lively debate. Gordon (1991: 332) has proposed the term 'the creation of a dispute culture' to describe this phenomenon. In slight contrast to Minichiello's abovementioned volume on 'competing modernities', I often like to label this period as 'the period of competing isms'. The last important change to be mentioned is the fact that, in the wake of the introduction of all these foreign isms, the Japanese started to distinguish society as an autonomous entity apart from the state, what Sugimori K6jir6 has described as the discovery of society [shakai no hakken] .15 For all these reasons, the majority of commentators spoke of a new world, a new order, and a new era. No matter whether they supported it - sometimes even embraced it, like Yoshino Sakuz6 - or rejected it, like Konoe Fumimaro - they all mouthed and adjusted themselves to the new vocabulary of the post-war world (Yoshino 1919a, 1919b, 1919c; Konoe 1918).16 They partook almost without hesitation in a debate on the future of their country and the world, and thus helped to create a distinct period in modern Japanese history. BIBLIOGRAPHY Allinson, Gary D. 1999. The Columbia Guide to Modern Japanese History. New York: Columbia University Press. Arima Manabu. 1999. Nihon no kindai, 4: 'Kokusaika' no naka no teikoku Nihon, 1905-1924. Tokyo: Chiio koron shinsha. - - , and Ito Takashi. 1975. 'Shohyo', Shigaku zasshi 84(3): 60-72. Barnhart, Michael A. 1987. Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Caiman, Donald. 1992. The Nature and Origins rif Japanese Imperialism: A Reinterpretation rif the Great Crisis rif 1873. London: Roudedge. Carr, Edward Hallett. 1939 (1981). The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduaion to the Study rif International Relations. Reprint ed. New York: Harper Collins. Dickinson, Frederick R. 1999. War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center. Duus, Peter. 1983. 'The TakeolfPoint of Japanese Imperialism'. InJapan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History, edited by Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 153-7. - - . 1998. Modern Japan. 2nd edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Fukasaku Kinji. 1988. Hana no ran. Kyoto: wei. Garon, Sheldon M. 1986. 'State Autonomy and Labor in Modern Japan', Working Papers in Asian/Pacific Studies (Duke University) 86, 02: 3-21. 158

THE END OF WORLD WAR ONE AS A TURNING POINT - - . 1987. The State and Labor in Modern japan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Gluck, Carol, and Graubard, Stephen R., eds. 1992. Showa: The japan of Hirohito. New York: W W Norton. Gordon, Andrew. 1991. Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar japan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Hane, Mikiso. 2000. Modern japan: A Historical Survey. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Hara Takashi nikki. 1965. Edited by Hara Keiichiro. 6 vols. Tokyo: Fukumura shuppan. Havens, Thomas R. H. 1978. valley of Darkness: The japanese People and VVcJrld Wtlr Two. New York: W W Norton. Hobsbawn, Eric]. 1989. The Age of Empire, 1875-1914. New York: Vintage Books. --.1996. The Age of Extremes: A History of the VVcJrld, 1914-1991. New York: Vintage Books. lida Taizo. 1997. Hihan seishin no kiiseki. Tokyo: Chikuma shobo. Imai Seiichi. 1966. Nihon no rekishi, 23: Taishii demokurashii. Tokyo: Chuo koronsha. Iriye [Irie] Akira. 1965. After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. - - . 1966. Nihon no gaikii. Tokyo: Chuo koronsha. - - . 1971. 'The Failure of Military Expansionism'. In Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar japan, edited by James William Morley. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 107-38. - - . 1974. 'The Failure ofEconornic Expansionism, 1918-1931'. In japan in Crisis: Essays on Taishii Democracy, edited by Bernard S. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 237--69. - - , and Aruga Tadashi, eds. 1984. Senkanki no Nihon gaikii. Tokyo: !okyo daigaku shuppankai. Irokawa , Daikichi. 1995. The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern japan. New York: The Free Press. Ito Takashi. 1972. 'Nihon "kakushin"-ha no seiritsu', Chuii kiiron: Rekishi to jinbutsu, December: 28-53. - - . 1978. Taishiiki 'kakushin'-ha no seiritsu. Tokyo: Hanawa shobo. Ito Yukio. 1987. Taishii demokurashii to seitii seiji. Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha. - - . 1997. 'Daiichiji sekai taisen to sengo Nihon no keisei: Rikken Seiyiikai no doko', Kyoto daigaku hiigaku ronsii 140(3/4): 155-211. Kinbara Samon. 1967. Taishii demokurashii no shakaiteki keisei. Tokyo: Aoki shoten. - - , ed. 1994. Kindai Nihon no kiseki, 4: Taishii demokurashii. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan. Kisaka Jun'ichiro. 1983. 'The 1930s: A Logical Outcome of Meiji Policy'. Injapan Examined: Perspectives on Modern japanese History, edited by Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 241-51. Kitaoka Shin'ichi. 1978. Nihon rikugun to tairiku seisaku: 1906-1918 nen. Tokyo: !okyo daigaku shuppankai. - - , ed. 1995. Sengo Nihon gaikii ronshu. Tokyo: Chuo koronsha. Konoe Furnimaro. 1918. 'Eibei hon'i no heiwashugi wo haisu', Nihon oyobi Nihonjin 1918.12.15: 23--6. Reprinted in Kitaoka Shin'ichi, ed. 1995. Sengo Nihon gaikii ronshu. Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 47-52. Maruyama Masao. 1964. 'Nihon fashizumu no shiso to undo'. In Maruyama Masao, Gendai seiji no shisii to kiidii, expo ed. Tokyo: Miraisha, 29-87. 159

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY - - . 1969. The Ideology and Dynamics ofJapanese Fascism'. In Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in ModernJapanese Politics, expo ed., edited by Ivan Morris. London: Oxford University Press, 25-83. Matsuo Takayoshi. 1966. Taisho demokurashii no kenkyu. Tokyo: Aoki shoten. - - . 1974. Taisho demokurashii. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. Minichiello, Sharon. 1984. Retreat from Reform: Patterns of Political Behavior in Interwar Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. - - , ed. 1998a. Japan~ Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900-1930. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. - - . 1998b. 'Introduction'. InJapan's Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900-1930, edited by Sharon A. Minichiello. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1-21. Mitani Taichiro. 1974. Taisho demokurashii-ron. Tokyo: Chlio koronsha (revised ed. Shinpan Taisho demokurashii-ron. Tokyo: Tcikyo daigaku shuppankai, 1995). Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. 1984. Showa: An Inside History ofHirohito~Japan. London: The Athlone Press. Najita, Tetsuo. 1982. 'Introduction: A Synchronous Approach to the Study of Conflict in Modern Japanese History'. In Conflict in Modern Japanese History: The Neglected Tradition, edited by Tetsuo Najita and J. Victor Koschmann. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 3-21. Nakamura Takafusa, ed. 1981. Senkanki no Nihon keizai bunseki. Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha. Nomura Koichi. 1981. 'Kindai Nihon ni okeru kokuminteki shimeikan: Sono shoruikei to tokushitsu'. In Nomura Koichi, Kindai Nihon no Chugoku ninshiki. Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 3-46. Ohkawa, Kazushi, and Rosovsky, Henry. 1973. Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Palmer, R.R., and Colton, Joel. 1983. A History of the Modern World. 6th edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ShinobuJunpei. 1927. Taishogaiko 15-nenshi. Tokyo: Kokusai renmei kyokai. Shinobu Seizaburo. 1951-52. Taisho seijishi. 3 vols. Tokyo: Kawade shoMo - - . 1954-59. Taisho demokurashiishi. 3 vols. Tokyo: Nihon hyoronsha. Showa no rekishi. 1988-89. 10 vols. Tokyo: ShOgakukan. Silberman, Bernard S. 1974. 'Conclusion: Taisho Japan and the Crisis of Secularism'. In Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taisho Democracy, edited by Bernard S. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 437-59. (Reprint ed. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Japanese Studies, the University of Michigan, 1999). - - , and Harootunian, H. D., eds. 1974. Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taisho Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Reprint ed. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Japanese Studies, the University of Michigan, 1999). Stegewerns, Dick. 2000. 'The Break with Europe: Japanese Views of the Old World after the First World War'. In The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions, edited by Bert Edstrom. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 39-57. - - . 2001. 'Yoshino Sakuzo: The Isolated Figurehead of the Taisho Generation'. In Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian Brotherhood, or World Citizenship? edited by Dick Stegewerns. Richmond: Curzon Press. - - . Forthcoming a. The Japanese "Civilisation Critics" and the National Identity of their Asian Neighbours'. In Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 160

THE END OF WORLD WAR ONE AS A TURNING POINT 1895-1945, edited by Narangoa Li and Robert Cribb. Richmond: Curzon Press. - - . Forthcoming b. Adjusting to the New VViJrld: The Taisho Generation of Opinion Leaders and the Outside VViJrld, 1918-1932. Studies in the Modernization of japan. 1965-71. 6 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Takahashi Korekiyo. 1920. 'Naigai kokusaku shiken'. In Ogawa Heikichi kankei bunsho 2 (1973), compiled by the Ogawa Heikichi bunsho kenkyiikai. Tokyo: Misuzu shobo, 137-44. --.1921. 'TOa keizairyokujuritsu ni kansuru iken'. In Ogawa Heikichi kankei bunsho 2 (1973), compiled by the Ogawa Heikichi bunsho kenkyiikai. Tokyo: Misuzu shobo, 144-9. Totten, George 0., III, ed. 1967. Democracy in Prewar japan: Groundwork or Fafade? Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. !oyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, and Fujiwara Akira. 1975-77. Nihon kindaishi. 3 vols. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. Wray, Harry, and Conroy, Hilary, eds. 1983. japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern japanese History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Yoshino Sakuzo. 1919a. 'Sekai no daishucho to sono jun' osaku oyobi taiosaku', Chuo koron 1919(1): 142--6. In Yoshino Sakuzo senshu, 6. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996,14-20. - - . 1919b. 'Sekai kaizo no riso: Minzokuteki jiyii byodo no riso no jikka kana', Chuo koron 1919(3): 87-91. - - . 1919c. 'Teikokushugi yori kokusai minshushugi e', Rikugo zasshi 1919(617). In Yoshino Sakuzo senshu, 6. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996, 35-70. NOTES 1. The most common way to divide up Japan's modern history is probably to use the turning points of 1868, 1905, 1932, 1945, and, recently, 1989. 2. The modernization theorists are best represented in the six-volume series Studies in the Modernization ifjapan issued by Princeton University Press (1965-71). The book to establish in the West the 'dark valley' analogy seems to have been Havens (1978). 3. For the debate on the democratic content of Taisho democracy, see the various articles in Totten (1967) and Wray and Conroy (1983: 171-98). 4. !oyama, et al. (1975-77) is a good introduction to this line of thought. A short outline in English is Kisaka (1983). 5. The best example of this image is probably Fukasaku (1988) in which the spectator is treated to a true parade of'Taisha roman' figureheads such as Yosano Akiko, Arishima Takeo, Matsui Sumako, and Osugi Sakae. 6. See, for instance, TOyama, et al. (1975-77) and Shinobu (1951-52,1954-59). 7. This opinion is concisely summarized by an eminent scholar on Japanese imperialism in Duus (1983). It is also endorsed by Kitaoka Shin'ichi in his influential maiden work (Kitaoka 1978). 8. An English translation of Maruyama (1964) is Maruyama (1969). 9. For this refutation of the concept of 'Taisho democracy', see Arima and Ito (1975). 10. For Kitaoka's periodization of Japanese expansionism, see Kitaoka (1978: 1-2). 11. Representative examples are Irie and Aruga (1984) and Nakamura (1981). 161

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY 12. Hara had been aware of the potential of the United States ever since his days as a consul in Tianjin. 13. With the New Four Power Consortium for China ratified only shortly before, Takahashi's note was definitely not something very opportune to discuss in public. Accordingly it had only been circulated among a select group of elder statesmen, ministers and members of the Provisional Committee on Foreign Policy, and had not been brought up at a cabinet meeting. Although the exact contents of Takahashi's written opinion remained secret, the general purport was leaked to the Tokyo nichi nichi shinbun and appeared in its 8 June issue. Mter a storm of indignant reactions in the press Prime Minister Hara Takashi reprimanded Takahashi, slighted it as 'an impractical student argument' [shoseiron) and nothing was heard of it anymore in the tumultuous remaining days of the Hara and Takahashi cabinets, which were seriously lamed by factionalism (Hara Takashi nikki,S: Entry of 14 June, 1921). However, it is clear that Takahashi's private opinion was not that rash but rather ill-timed, considering similar ideas in support of the formation of a Sino-Japanese economic alliance within the Seiyiikai ever since the war. See Ito (1997: 161-4). 14. For Yoshino, see Stegewerns (2001; forthcoming a); for Horie, see Stegewerns (2000). 15. For Sugimori, see Stegewerns (forthcoming b: ch. 6). Iida (1997) also uses the concept of 'the discovery of society'. 16. A recent and faultless reprint of Konoe's well-known article - in sharp contrast to the unreliable version in Konoe's Seidanroku (1936) - can be found in Kitaoka (1995).

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11

Takahashi Korekiyo~ Fiscal Policy and the Rise of Militarism in Japan During the Great Depression

RICHARD J. SMETHURST

T

akahashi Korekiyo became Japan's finance minister for the fifth of seven times in December 1931, while Japan's democratizing society suffered in the depths of the world depression. Hundreds of factories lay idle. Thousands of workers had no jobs. Millions of yen languished in bank vaults uninvested. During the following year, Takahashi reversed the deflationary policies of his predecessor, Inoue Junnosuke, and introduced heterodox counter-cyclical measures of the sort that later came to be called Keynesian. Takahashi took Japan off the gold standard and devalued the yen to stimulate exports; he undertook large-scale deficit financing to promote demand and private investment, and thus to create jobs. As one might expect during the crisis atmosphere of the depression and the aftermath of the highly popular Manchurian Incident, a large share of Takahashi's pump-priming fiscal spending went to the army and navy, organizations which already claimed much of Japan's annual budget. Total expenditures in the current accounts budget rose from 1.5 billion yen in 1931, the final pre-Takahashi year, to almost 2.3 billion yen in 1936, his last budget, an increase of fifty per cent. Japan's military outlay rose from 455 million yen in 1931 to 1.078 billion in 1936, an increase of 133 per cent (Nihon ginko tokeikyoku 1966: 132-3). The army and navy used their additional monies to complete the conquest of Manchuria (Northeast China), to undertake various other military adventures such as an attack on 163

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Shanghai in February 1932, and (in Takahashi's thinking, if not in that of anachronistic and chauvinistic Army Minister Araki Sadao) to modernize their equipment. Over the same several years, the military gradually augmented its power at the expense of Japan's elected leaders, and finally in 1937 invaded China to begin World War II in earnest. Is there a connection between Takahashi's fiscal policies and the rise of militarism? Did Takahashi, as some Japanese scholars write, actively, knowingly, or at least unwittingly, encourage the rise of militarism by his fiscal stimulus? Scores of scholars, journalists, and even novelists have written about Takahashi. There are more than a dozen biographies of him, and I know of fIve that have been published or reissued since 1996. The interpretations of these and other writers on the connection between Takahashi's fiscal policies and the rise of militarism fall into four broad categories. First, orthodox Marxist scholars, influenced by the view of Moscow and the Comintern, aver that Takahashi represented monopoly fmance capitalism and as fmance minister led Japan into the final stage of late capitalist development, 'state monopoly capitalism', fascism and war. Second, a number of historians write that Takahashi, who served in the Seiyiikai, a political party that after Tanaka Giichi became its leader in the late 1920s advocated autarky, an aggressive involvement in China, an expanded military, and a positive spending policy, had a history of economic nationalism - thus he enthusiastically supported increased military spending and aggression in China during the 1930s. His policies, according to this view, contrasted with those of Inoue, who served in the Minseit6, a party that advocated cooperation with the British and Americans over policy towards China and elsewhere, peaceful diplomacy, disarmament and balanced budgets. Third, still others believe that while Takahashi disapproved of excessive military spending and an aggressive foreign policy, because of Japan's political realities in 1932-33, he had no choice but to increase military outlays significantly when he undertook his spending policy to engineer Japan's recovery from the depression. In the process, the army and navy increased their power to such an extent that Takahashi was unable to rein in military spending when he tried to eliminate Japan's budget deficits after its recovery from the depression in 1935. Thus, Takahashi's policies unintentionally unleashed the military and opened the road to war. Fourth and fmally, another group writes 164

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that Takahashi had no responsibility for militarism. He had a long-standing opposition to aggression in China, excessive military spending, and unlike most of his contemporaries in politics in the 1930s, fought a desperate, courageous, and ultimately suicidal battle to keep the army under control. 1 To argue, as the first groups do, that Takahashi, as a representative of 'monopoly finance capitalism', led Japan to militarism, fascism and war is analytically meaningless since the purveyors of this position argue that all Japan's other bourgeois inter-war leaders fell into the same category. Therefore, this paradigm cannot be used to distinguish between the actions of Takahashi and men like Inoue who advocated orthodox classical financial policies. To take the second position, that Takahashi was a long-standing supporter of militarism and aggressive imperialism, flies in the face of the evidence, which I shall present below. One can make a stronger case for the third hypothesis, that Takahashi, by increasing military spending, unintentionally opened the way to militarism. But I shall argue that this was only partly true. Takahashi, even when he increased allocations to the army and navy, consistently gave them less than they demanded, and continually fought the military ministers and their minions both within government circles and publicly. Takahashi's angry confrontations with officers such as Generals Araki and Kawashima were widely reported in the Tokyo and regional press, and cost the finance minister his life in 1936. Thus, my views are best represented by the fourth approach, but with some modification. Takahashi was neither an active nor a passive supporter of militarism and its concomitant aggression in Asia; however, his budgets did allow the military to pay for the conquest of Manchuria and thus to take a preliminary step towards militarism and total war (Tokyo Asahi shinbun, 1 December 1935; Kyoto hinode shinbun, 1 December 1935).2 Takahashi's opposition to militarism, military adventurism, and excessive military spending dates back at least to 1885, when, as a thirty-year-old bureaucrat in charge of patent and trademark laws in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, he became involved in the debate over Maeda Masana's Opinions on Encouraging Industry (Kogyo iken) proposal. Maeda presented to the government a plan to stimulate Japan's economic development by using state funds for low-interest loans to improve traditional enterprises such as agriculture, sericulture, 165

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tea production and ceramics, rather than spending heavily on costly transplant industries such as steel, chemicals and weapons-making, all essential to the military. Maeda also urged that government funds for building Japan's infrastructure go to those projects that would stimulate regional economic development and raise standards of living rather than build central military power. Takahashi argued Maeda's case before the Sanjiin, the highest government council of the time, where he faced the combined opposition of Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi and Home Minister General Yamagata Aritomo, the government's two most powerful proponents of top-down industrialization and the creation of a strong army. Maeda and Takahashi met defeat in the 1885 debate and Maeda's brilliant bureaucratic career came to an end at the young age of thirty-fIve (Smethurst, 2000). But Takahashi continued in government and gained there new directions that he followed for the rest of his life. He thought that enriching the country was more important than building a strong army, that the primary goal of the former was to raise the standard of living of all Japanese, not just to make the country richer, and that the key to economic development was not the central government, but regional entrepreneurs with their intimate knowledge of local markets and production techniques. From this time on, Takahashi's view that an excessively strong and over-funded military not only hindered economic development, but also endangered Japan's security, that diplomats should lead and soldiers follow, that an aggressive, independent foreign policy towards China was dangerous, especially if it alienated China, America and Great Britain, and that the army and navy should be under civilian control, developed step-bystep. In August 1905, just after Japan's military victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Takahashi wrote from London, where he had gone to sell treasury bonds to fund the war, to Matsuo Shigeyoshi, the governor of the Bank of Japan: 'We must resolutely suppress efforts to replace and expand the army's and navy's armaments. It is crucial to avoid developing facilities beyond our nation's economic power. Each minister, and especially the army and navy ministers, must consider which facilities are most important to him, and whether or not the nation's wealth is adequate to support them' (Takahashi 1976, 2: 279).3 Takahashi, as president of the Yokohama Specie Bank, as vicegovernor and then governor of the Bank ofJapan, and as fInance 166

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numster, in 1905-13, consistently opposed seeking foreign loans to pay for an enlarged military to man Japan's growing empire on the grounds that such borrowing endangered Japan's fiscal health and credit abroad. He opposed nationalizing the railway system for the same reasons. Takahashi, although the head of the nation's central bank, sided with the political parties in opposition to the army's demand for two additional divisions in 1912, both because of the needs of Japan's financial probity and because of his fear that a stronger military _made foreign adventure and thus war more, not less likely (Oshima 1969: 58-64; Kimura 1999: 43).4 In a speech given in English to an audience of Americans and Japanese in Tokyo in May 1911, Takahashi said that Japan did not have the resources to act independently in China, but should cooperate with the Europeans and Americans in its economic development: 'Japan is by no means in a position to take any undue advantage on account of the development of China. What are required in China most urgently and in the largest scale are doubtless capital, steel and machinery. But Japan cannot hope, for a long time to come at any rate, to compete with the Western nations in the contribution of these elements. Japan will only share in the benefit resulting from the development of China, which is at the first instance mainly dependent upon the enterprise and resources of the Western nations' (Takahashi Korekiyo monjo: 22). In 1915, Takahashi criticized Foreign Minister Kato Takaaki's handling of the Okuma government's Twenty-One Demands to China as 'absurd' because of his fear that bungled Japanese involvement in China would stimulate military demands for larger budgets, unduly antagonize the Chinese people, and bring Japan's foreign policy into conflict with those of the United States and Great Britain. As Takahashi wrote to Jacob Schiff in New York on 20 April 1915: ... I have little personal concern in the vicissitudes of our home politics, only I am constrained to feel some anxiety about the trend of diplomatic dealings of the present cabinet, especially in regard to the negotiations with China. As Baron Kato keeps secret all matters in this respect, even those already events of the past, we are driven to conjecture by means of reports circulated abroad. It would be fortunate if my anxiety should prove groundless. If, on the contrary, the reports sent back here from abroad be not wide of the mark, there are in store many causes for anxiety, because our diplomacy seems to be conducted in a 167

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too light-hearted manner ... Your view that the relations between Japan and China must be a natural alliance has my warm endorsement; but I rather fear that the way in which the present Cabinet approaches China may tend to alienate the Chinese people from us and to engender their dread and hatred towards us' (Takahashi Korekiyo monjo: 1; Kimura 1999: 55).

In December of the following year, Takahashi wrote an article entitled 'Kokub6 to gaik6' (National Defence and Foreign Policy) in which he laid out the views on the subject that he continued to hold for the rest of his life. Let me paraphrase: National defence is essential to a people. But national defence spending that exceeds the nation's capacity to pay for it is not effective defence, and establishing one's country as a world power is expensive. In the past the army and navy competed for resources unproductively. During World War I, the Western powers developed highly technical and costly weapons. Given the price of these new weapons, unbridled competition between services will not work. Thus, we need a national defence policy based on peace. Diplomacy should set the agenda for dealing with other countries and the military follow. We cannot plan a national defence that takes on the whole world as our enemy. An important goal of foreign policy is to increase the nation's wealth. In the past, foreign policy-makers did not concern themselves with economics, but now they must do so. When the war ends, economic competition will become the primary competition among nations. Until now the military has not thought about diplomacy and economics when developing its plans. Soldiers dislike looking at matters from other than a military point of view. It is crucial for them to remember that difence planning must not hinder economic growth (Takahashi 1916 [1936]; emphasis added). In 1918, Takahashi opposed the Nishihara loans, an effort by the Japanese government of the time to use loans to the Chinese warlord Duan Qirui to advance its claims in Manchuria by making the yen the currency of China's northeast provinces. In fact, in 1921, Takahashi, while serving in the government as finance minister, wrote an article in which he attacked the general concept of using loans to gain specific rights in China. He stated that 'Japan conducts a policy in Shandong, Manchuria and Mongolia that is seen as aggressive and as manifesting territorial ambitions. We must revise this policy immediately.' Takahashi had argued since 1907, when he met the moderniz168

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ing Qing dynasty official Zhang Zhidong, that Japan benefited from a strong, stable and unified China. He reiterated this view in the 1921 article, and accordingly advocated the withdrawal of all Japanese troops and military installations from China, an end to the use of loans to gain railway, mining and other rights there or as a lever to force the Chinese to employ Japanese technicians and advisers, a reversal of the requirement that China provide current or future government income from increased taxes as security for loans, and limitations on one-sided lending to regional and other special interest groups on the mainland (Ogawa Heikichi kankei monjo, 2: 146-7; Kimura 1999: 54-7). In September 1920, frustrated by incessant army demands for larger budget allocations and its refusal to withdraw from Siberia, Takahashi, in a memorandum to Hara Kei, wrote that 'the Japanese organization which most gives foreigners the impression that our country is militaristic is the army's general staff ... By our general staff system, military organizations are not subordinated to the cabinet, but are independent of the nation's political structure. The army does not stop at planning to send troops abroad for military reasons, but interferes in diplomatic and economic policy-making as well, so that our country does not have a unified foreign policy ... Because the army's general staff interferes with other state organs, we should abolish it and unify the army's administration. The navy's general staff happily does not have the same invidious effects as the army's, but it is an unnecessary organ. We should abolish both general staffs at the same time' (Ogawa Heikichi kankei monjo: 140-1; Shinobu 1958: 601; Ito 2000: 296).5 When Takahashi succeeded Hara as prime minister in 1921, he negotiated Japan's participation in the Washington Treaty system, which limited the size of the Japanese navy, required Japan to relinquish its naval base in Shandong, and called on signatories to respect the territorial integrity of China, that is, to avoid military intervention in China's internal affairs. In the mid-1920s, when the Seiyukai's foreign policy proposals under Tanaka Giichi's leadership advocated a more aggressive and independent attitude towards China and the powers, Takahashi continued to support peaceful diplomacy, non-intervention in China, cooperation with the British and Americans, and limitations on military spending, that is views similar to those of Shidehara Kijuro and the opposition Minseito party (Eguchi 1994: 18-19). Takahashi, from early in his life, was a nationalist who was 169

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deeply committed to Japan and its emperor. Takahashi did not oppose the creation of a Japanese empire in the late Meiji period. In fact, he made his reputation as a useful financial statesman in 1904-7 by raising from British, American, and later German and French sources almost half the money needed to pay for the Russo-Japanese War - and he was rewarded for this service with a peerage. But the primary lesson he learned from this experience in London and New York was that Japan could not advance economically, diplomatically or even militarily without the cooperation of the richer and stronger Western powers. He, like Shidehara, the architect of Japan's cooperative policy in the 1920s, believed that the markets, credit, technology and raw materials provided by these two powers and their empires were essential to Japan's economic development. Takahashi spent years building a personal network of Japanese, British, and American bankers. He sent younger Finance Ministry and Bank of Japan officials abroad to nurture the network and at the same time to train them in the necessities of international financial cooperation. Takahashi believed Japan would commit military as well as financial suicide if it went to war with these two stronger states. Takahashi was not a slavish Anglo/ Americophile, but a hard-nosed realist who understood the power of Anglo-American capital and industrial capacity. As he said in his 1921 memorandum on China, 'if China and Japan do not develop cooperatively their latent economic potential, the British and Americans will invade East Asia economically, and we will have no choice but to capitulate under that power' (Ogawa monjo: 148). Takahashi believed that excessive military spending not only threatened Japan's fiscal probity, but also increased the chances of war by making the army and navy stronger, more self-confident, and more likely to undertake adventures abroad. He believed that peaceful diplomacy should lead and the military follow. When Takahashi became finance minister again in December 1931 and began to undertake his spending policies, he did so as an opponent of excessive military spending and aggressive military expansion abroad. At the same time, he did so as a nationalist who supported Japan's empire and its economic competition with the British and Americans so long as that empire-building and competition stayed within boundaries acceptable to these two powers. Takahashi clearly was not an intentional supporter of militarism and the road to war in the 1930s. 170

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But what about the third interpretation of Takahashi's role in the rise of militarism, that by increasing the military's budget he unintentionally unleashed its power? As we have seen above, the military budget grew by more than one hundred per cent during the Takahashi years. When he became finance minister in 1931, the military received 30.8 per cent of Japan's current accounts disbursements; when young officers murdered him in 1936, it received 47.2 per cent. When Takahashi undertook his 'Keynesian' spending policies during the public euphoria over Japan's annexation of Manchuria, an annexation about which he was ambivalent and did not publicly oppose, he had no choice but to give the army and navy their share, as he himself recognized in an interview with the Keynesian economic journalist, Ishibashi Tanzan. When asked by Ishibashi whether an increase in military allocations was the best kind of spending policy to stimulate economic recovery (Takahashi and Ishibashi, unusual in Japan and the West in the early 1930s, recognized the theory which underlay using government spending to create demand and stimulate investment during a depression 6), Takahashi answered, 'Of course military spending is not directly productive ... Warships do not produce other goods, but the money used to build warships is used productively. Mter the ships are launched, they need to be maintained. And the ships use coal, oil and labour. These all create jobs and are expenditures that support people' (Takahashi 1936c: 397-402).7 In other words, defence spending is not the best way to stimulate an economy, but it is better than nothing. According to those who promote this third interpretation, Takahashi's defence spending allowed the two services to build up their strength and popularity, gradually replace the political parties and join the civilian bureaucracy as the driving force of Japan's government, and then lead Japan to war. I agree that increases in military spending, which Takahashi had to allow in spite of his opposition to an aggressive foreign policy, provided a first step towards militarism. But for the following reasons, I think Takahashi's contribution to the rise of militarism was not a major one. First, military spending as a percentage of gross national product did not rise from his second budget on - it remained steady at 5.6 per cent for four years (Nihon gink6 1984: 133; Nihon t6kei ky6kai 1987: 345). The increases in military spending reflected the growth of national wealth brought about by the success of Takahashi's monetary and fiscal stimuli, and were 171

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in line with his oft-repeated dictum that Japan 'must prepare budgets in keeping with the people's income. Financial trust is an intangible matter. Maintaining that trust is our most important duty. If we focus too much on the national defence, we will create runaway inflation and destroy that trust. Then our national defence would not be secure' (Nih on ginko 1984: 169; Tokyo Asahi shinbun, 27 November 1935; Cho 1973: 222). Second, Takahashi saw the increases in budget allocations, including those to the military, as temporary measures. Once Japan had recovered from the depression and the Manchurian situation had been stabilized, Japan could return to balanced budgets. Takahashi told the Diet in a speech on 21 April 1933, that while he did not believe that budgets needed to be balanced in anyone year, they did need to reach equilibrium over multiyear periods. He stated and restated his view that expanded budgets were short-term palliatives to stimulate recovery many times between 1932 and 1936 (Goto 1977: 136-7). Third, he courageously continued, almost single-handedly at the top levels of government, to fight army and navy policies, rhetoric and demands for even larger outlays in an era when the cost of opposing the military could be your life. Takahashi fought the army and navy while he was preparing all four budgets that he created between 1932 and 1936. For example, although Takahashi planned a budget for 1933 that would be 250 million yen larger than the 1932 budget, he received 1.4 billion yen in demands for new programmes. Although the army and navy received more money than they had in 1932, they vigorously opposc:.d Takahashi's limits on their spending (Tsushima 1962: 258; Omae 1999,2000). Takahashi did not oppose the military only at budget time. He consistently criticized the aggressive actions of the military, especially when they threatened Japan's relations with Great Britain and the United States. When the Japanese military dispatched troops to Shanghai in February 1932 during the seizure of Manchuria, Takahashi told Prince Saionji's secretary, Harada Kumao, 'I have been absolutely opposed from the beginning to sending the army to Shanghai. At a recent cabinet meeting, I said [to Araki], "if the situation changes in Shanghai, can't you just bring the troops home?" The army minister replied, "If the army receives an order to do something, it would harm its dignity to withdraw." I answered, "the army's dignity is an internal matter, and when one faces a major international crisis of 172

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this sort, you can't say something as stupid as that [sonna baka na koto 0 itte wa ikan]." From the point of view of Japanese fiscal policy, if the incident turns into war, we don't have the funds to fight for more than half a year. Unlike the situation during the Russo-Japanese War, we do not have justice [ta~i meibun] on our side and thus do not have the sympathy of the powers. Moreover, if we send out troops, the army will claim the socalled right of supreme command, and we won't know when they will bring the soldiers home' (Harada 1950-56, 2: 204-5). In December 1933, while Takahashi was preparing the 1934 budget, Foreign Minister Hirota KGki asked at a cabinet meeting why the United States and Great Britain raised their tariffs against Japanese goods. Takahashi replied: 'The foreigners have joined together to resist Japan not only because of trade friction. This trade resistance is the superficial symptom, but the real problem is the army and navy. The military clique goes all over Japan and talks about a 1935 or a 1936 crisis, and about beginning preemptive wars against the Soviet Union or the United States. Foreigners hear this kind of talk. It is unfortunate that Japan presents an attitude of favouring war when the Americans and Europeans want to avoid conflict. The military's attitudes provoke trade retaliation from foreign countries. The army should be careful in its language. There is no crisis of 1935 or 1936.' Araki turned pale with anger when he heard these words and said, 'There will be a crisis ... , We must prepare' (Harada 1950-56, 3: 198-9). In 1932-33, during a debate over the appropriate currency system to use in Manchukuo, which the army's leaders had just set up as the capstone of their own directly-controlled empire, Takahashi opposed their plan to use Japanese yen on the grounds that Manchuria was not part of Japan, but was an independent country with a long history as part of China. He advocated use of a silver-based currency, that is, one tied to China's monetary system. His view won out until September 1935, only a few months before his death, when the government decided to tie the Manchurian currency to the yen at a rate of one-to-one. At this later time, he again expressed his unease with this outcome because of his fear that the army's planned export of capital to the colony would soak up specie needed for trade with other countries, and especially with technologically-advanced countries. He thus proposed to the cabinet that the government limit investment in Manchuria (Takahashi 1936a: 323-5; Takahashi 173

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1936b: 652-3). It is remarkable that a sitting finance minister would publicly take such positions in direct opposition to the views of the powerfully armed military services. And it is even more remarkable and ironic that Takahashi had a clearer view of the military's own reliance on the United States and Great Britain for technology and advanced raw materials such as aviation fuel than the army's leaders themselves did. Takahashi clearly saw what generals like Araki, who should have, could not: a war with the Anglo-Americans would not only require Japan to fight countries that were more advanced technologically and industrially; it would also cut the Japanese military off from sharing the benefits of those advances. Fourth, when Japan's economy neared full employment and thus recovery from the depression in 1935, Takahashi decided it was time to do as he had promised in 1932, to bring Japan's current accounts budget back into balance and begin to redeem deficit bonds. As part of that effort, he set out to contain and even cut the army's and navy's budgets in the face of intense military opposition. The vituperative debate came to a head at an all-night cabinet meeting to decide the 1936 budget on 29-30 November 1935. In the face of Army Minister Kawashima Yoshiyuki's demands for more and more money, Takahashi repeated words such as: 'I understand the needs of national defence fully. But we must have a national defense that matches our nation's economic power. I absolutely refuse to give the military any extra money.' The army minister replied with language such as 'a viewpoint that opposes the military's demands because they cause the people suffering is wrong. ... Military police should lead, fiscal policy follow.' The twenty-hour cabinet meeting ended at seven in the morning of 30 November, after Prime Minister Okada Keisuke capitulated to the military and forced Takahashi to restore some of the funds it demanded. On his return home, Takahashi's secretaries half carried him from the car to his room, the same room in which he was brutally murdered only three months later (Imamura 1948: 218-24).8 Takahashi continued to stand up to the army and navy for the remaining months of his life. On 5 January 1936, the Tokyo Asahi shinbun carried a New Year's interview with Takahashi in which he criticized Italy's invasion of Ethiopia by saying: 'If a country increases its empire and pours money into it, how big a profit is it going to have? Until the profits come in, the home country has to carry (the colony).' Sugiyama Heisuke, the inter174

TAKAHASHI KOREKIYO'S FISCAL POLICY

viewer, then added, 'This was an indirect way of speaking to the Japanese people about the dangers of empire' (Tokyo Asahi shinbun, 5 January 1936). In a speech on 15 January, Takahashi said: 'Even if the disarmament conference does not reach an agreement (on naval armaments limitations), we cannot think of increasing defense spending. The basic premise of our foreign policy since leaving the League of Nations continues to be the support of world peace. Our current efforts at disarmament are based on a policy of not threatening other countries and of nonaggression, so even if the disarmament conference breaks up, there is no reason for additional military spending' (Tokyo Asahi shinbun, 16 January 1936). And on 17 February, only nine days before his assassination, Takahashi told a jammed auditorium people began lining up four hours in advance to hear him speak - at Hibiya Hall that he was committed to the 'smooth elimination of deficit bonds', which the army and navy understood to mean the smooth reduction of military spending (Tokyo Asahi shinbun, 18 February 1936).9 There is no doubt that Takahashi understood the risks of his opposition to increased military spending in the mid-1930s. Mter the octogenarian joined the Okada cabinet in November 1934, he told an acquaintance: 'If I were younger and could serve the emperor in the future, I would worry about (the young officers), but at my age I have no future. I have to do my service now. I entered the government again thinking that this is my last chance to serve. I am prepared to die now' (Imamura 1948: 235). And in the autumn of 1935, when one of Takahashi's subordinates told him that a young army officer had shouted, 'Bury Finance Minister Takahashi', Takahashi replied, somewhat flippantly for a man in his danger, 'I don't know how many first and second lieutenants there are, but if each one shot me, it would be too much' (ibid.). It is hard not to admire 'Old Takahashi' [Takahashi-o], one of the few leading officials in the 1930s willing to stand up to the 'double patriots'.10 Fifth, some 'ifs' of history. Under the circumstances of the early 1930s, could any finance minister have resisted giving the military additional funds? Even Inoue, Takahashi's tightfisted predecessor, increased the military's allocations substantially after the outbreak of fighting in Manchuria. And could any finance minister who wanted to stimulate economic recovery by increasing fiscal spending, ala Takahashi, have avoided giving the army and navy their shares during the overwhelmingly 175

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popular conquest of Manchuria in 1932-33? And what would have happened if Takahashi had not engineered Japan's economic recovery by the mid-1930s? And could Takahashi have known in 1932 that a re-empowered military would eventually assassinate him as a hindrance to its plans, invade China, and foolishly attack the two most powerful countries in the world, countries which Takahashi himself saw as Japan's logical allies, not its enemies? I do not, of course, know the answers to these questions, but I do think that Takahashi made a remarkably advanced and courageous effort to use fiscal spending to solve Japan's economic problems and at the same time avoid giving too much money and power to the military. Although he failed i!.l the end, I think we should, as the great Marxist economist Ouchi Hy6e did, praise Takahashi for his effort: The February 26 Incident occurred shortly after a picture of Takahashi, reading Sidney and Beatrice Webb's book, Soviet Communism: A New Civilization, appeared in the newspaper. I was impressed that Takahashi sat in his study and read about Russian Communist politics and economics in the midst of the debate [over the military budget]. I was as astonished by the aged politician's actions as I was by the achievement of the aging Webbs, and placed great hope in the efforts of this skilled fmancier to defend Japan's fiscal health. It goes without saying that the 26 February Incident robbed me of this hope. (Cho 1973: 222)11

In the early morning of 26 February 1936, two young officers of Japan's Third Imperial Guards Regiment led one hundred of their men, armed with rifles and machine guns, through the snowy streets of Tokyo to Takahashi's home in Aoyama. They smashed open his front gate, pushed into the house, and hurried to his bedroom. One of the officers shouted 'traitor' as he fired bullet after bullet into Takahashi's prostrat.e body. The other screamed 'heavenly punishment' as he slashed the octogenarian with his sword. Takahashi, needless to say, died in the attack and his death gave new life and power to Japan's military. Takahashi's d~ath removed Japan's 'last resistance' to pre-war militarism (Otani 1986: 141). BIBLIOGRAPHY Allen, G. C. 1962. A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 1867-1937. London: George Allen & Unwin. Bisson, T. A. 1938 (1973). Japan in China. Reprint ed. New York: Octagon Books. 176

TAKAHASHI KOREKIYO'S FISCAL POLICY Cho Yukio. 1973. Showa kyoko [The Showa depression]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. Eguchi Keiichi. 1994. Jugonen senso no kaimaku [The curtain rises on the fifteen-year war]. Showa no rekishi [Showa history]. Shogakukan Library, 4. Rev. ed. Tokyo: Shogakukan. Goto Shin'ichi. 1977. Takahashi Korekiyo: Nihon no 'keinzu' [Takahashi Korekiyo: Japan's 'Keynes']. Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha. Harada Kumao. 1950-56. Saionjiko to seikyoku [Prince Saionji and the political situation], 2, 3. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. Imamura Takeo. 1948. Hyoden Takahashi Korekiyo [A critical biography of Takakashi Korekiyo]. Tokyo: Jiji tsiishinsha. Ito Takao. 2000. Taisho demokurashiiki no ho to shakai [Law and society in the era of Taisho democracy]. Kyoto: Kyoto daigaku gakujutsu shuppankai. Kimura Masato. 1999. Takahashi Korekiyo to ShOwa kyoko [Takahashi Korekiyo and the Showa depression]. Tokyo: Bungei shunjii. Kyoto hinode shinbun. 1935. Dec. 1. Maxon, Yale Candee. 1957. Control ofJapanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-1945. Berkeley: University of California Press. Nakamura Masanori. 1982. Showa kyoko [The Showa depression]. Tokyo: Shogakukan. New York Times. 1936. Feb. 27. Nihon ginko. 1984. Nihon ginko hyakunenshi [Hundred-year history of the Bank of Japan], 4. Tokyo: Nihon ginko. Nihon ginko tokeikyoku. 1966. Honpo shuyo keizai tokeihyo [Hundred-year statistics of the Japanese economy]. Tokyo: Nihon ginko. Nihon tokei kyokai. 1987. Nihon choki tokei soran [Historical statistics of Japan]. Tokyo: Nihon tokei kyokai. Ogawa Heikichi kankei monjo [Writings connected with Ogawa Heikichi]. 1973. Vol. 2, edited by Ogawa Heikichi monjo kenkyiikai. Tokyo': Misuzu shobo. Omae Nobuya. 1999, 2000. 'Saito Makoto naikakuki no yosan hensei to Okurasho' [Forming budgets in the era of the Saito Makoto cabinet and the finance ministry], Hogaku ronso 145(3): 28-50; 147(3): 29-50. Oshima Kiyoshi. 1969. Takahashi Korekiyo: Zaiseika no sukina shogai [Takahashi Korekiyo: The varied life of a fmancier]. Tokyo: Chiio koronsha. Otani Ken. 1986. Okuradaijin no Showashi [A history of fmance ministers in the Showa period]. Tokyo: Bijinesusha. Shima Kinzo. 1983. 'Iwayuru "Takahashi zaisei" ni tsuite' [Concerning the so-called Takahashi fiscal policy], Kin'yu kenkyu 2(2): 83-123. Shima Yasuhiko. 1949. Okuradaijin [Finance ministers]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. Shinobu Seizaburo. 1958. TaishO demokurashiishi [A history of Taisho democracy], 2. Tokyo: Nihon hyoronsha. Smethurst, Richard J. 2000. 'Takahashi Korekiyo's Economic Policies in the Great Depression and Their Meiji Roots'. In Politics and the Economy in Pre-war Japan. London: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1-24. Takahashi Korekiyo. 1916 (1936). 'Kokubo to gaiko' [National defense and foreign policy]. In Takahashi Korekiyo, Keizairon [Economic theories]. Tokyo: Chikura shobo, 655-62. - - . 1936a. Kokusaku un'yo no sho [Writings on carrying out national policy]. Tokyo: ronan shoin. - - . 1936b. 'Rodo/shihon/Manshii mondai' [Labor, capital, and the Manchurian 177

TURNING POINTS IN JAPANESE HISTORY problem]. In Takahashi Korekiyo, Keizairon [Economic theories]. Tokyo: Chikura shobO, 649-55. - - . 1936c. Zuisoroku [Essays]. Tokyo: Chikura shobO. - - . 1976. Takahashi Korekiyo jiden [The autobiography of Takahashi Korekiyo]. Chuko bunko. Tokyo: Chiio koronsha. Takahashi Korekiyo monjo. National Diet Library, Tokyo. Tokyo Asahi shinbun. 1935-36. 1935: Nov. 27, Dec. 1; 1936: Jan. 5, Jan. 16, Feb. 18. Tsushima Juichi. 1962. Takahashi Korekiyo 0 no koto [Concerning Old Takahashi Korekiyo]. Tokyo: Hoto kankokai.

NOTES 1. The biographies I have relied on most heavily are: Imamura (1948), republished by Jiji tsiishinsha in 1958 and 1985 in a series entided Nihon saisho retsuden (Biographies of successive prime ministers); Oshima (1969), Goto (1977), and Kimura (1999). Shima (1983) and Nakamura (1982) present critical analyses of the effects of Takahashi's policies. Nakamura's book is particularly useful because it introduces short descriptions of many differing evaluations of those policies. See Shima (1949: 115, 124) for the view that Takahashi's policies led the way to 'state monopoly capitalism'. In English, Bisson (1938 [1973]: 214-6, 238-9) views Takahashi as defending Japan's 'capitalists' against the inroads of the military. Maxon (1957: 93) writes that' doughty Takahashi' was 'the strongest link in the system of civil restraints on the emerging power of the Japanese army in foreign affairs.' Allen (1962: 137) praises Takahashi for the brilliance of his economic thinking, but faults him for increasing military spending for four years and thus increasing the political power of the army and navy. 2. See Bisson (1938 [1973]: 214) and Nihon ginko (1984: 14), for Takahashi's annual efforts to limit the military budget. 3. Takahashi dictated his memoirs, which covers the fIrSt fifty-one years of his life, 1854--1905, to Uetsuka Tsukasa in the early 1930s. They were published posthumously in 1936, and then again in 1976. I have read both versions, but my page references are to the 1976 edition because they are still in print and thus readily available to the reader. 4. See Takahashi's letter to Jacob Schiff, June 26 1915, Takahashi Korekiyo monjo: 110-4, for Takahashi's role in establishing in 1906 a sinking fund in the annual budget to redeem the Russo-Japanese War loans. 5. Hara, ever the pragmatic politician, suppressed the memorandum as needlessly inflammatory (see Ito 2000: 263). 6. See Takahashi (1936c: 247-9) for Takahashi's use of a geisha house analogy to illustrate the multiplier effect. 7. Already in 1915, Takahashi made a distinction between 'war loans and productive loans'. Takahashi to Schiff, June 26 1915, Takahashi Korekiyo monjo: 110-4. 8. The best description of this meeting and the events leading up to it, is in Tsushima (1962: 258-94). 9. Tsushima Juichi, Takahashi's deputy minister in 1935-36, and his former secretary, reveals that he wrote many of Takahashi's speeches, including this one, but that the fmance minister always rewrote them 'so', Takahashi said, 'ordinary people could understand them' (Tsushima 1962: 58). 10. Takahashi told his son Riichi, working for Mitsui and Company in New York

178

TAKAHASHI KOREKIYO'S FISCAL POLICY in February 1936, 'I am a statesman and very old. Therefore it may be in the future I shall die. In such a case you should remain in America. There would be no use in your coming back to Japan' (New York Times, 27 February, 1936). That day the newspaper carried an obituary that recognized Takahashi's value to Japan, and his nation's loss when he died. 11. Tsushima (1962: 64-5) reports that Takahashi read English-language books and newspapers until the very end of his life.

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