Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans: Policies of Continuity and Transformation (Contributions to Political Science) 3031100735, 9783031100734

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Contributions to Political Science

Branislav Radeljić  Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin Editors

Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans Policies of Continuity and Transformation

Contributions to Political Science

The series Contributions to Political Science contains publications in all areas of political science, such as public policy and administration, political economy, comparative politics, European politics and European integration, electoral systems and voting behavior, international relations and others. Publications are primarily monographs and multiple author works containing new research results, but conference and congress reports are also considered. The series covers both theoretical and empirical aspects and is addressed to researchers and policy makers. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed. This book series is indexed in Scopus.

Branislav Radelji´c · Mustafa Cüneyt Öz¸sahin Editors

Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans Policies of Continuity and Transformation

Editors Branislav Radelji´c United Arab Emirates University Al Ain, United Arab Emirates

Mustafa Cüneyt Öz¸sahin Necmettin Erbakan University Konya, Turkey

ISSN 2198-7289 ISSN 2198-7297 (electronic) Contributions to Political Science ISBN 978-3-031-10073-4 ISBN 978-3-031-10074-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface and Acknowledgments

Since the ascendance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkish activism in the field of foreign policy has grown at an unprecedented level. Accordingly, the Western Balkan region is one of the focal areas on the agenda, alongside Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Even though Turkey showed a great interest in the Balkans during the Turgut Özal period, particularly with regard to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is the AKP that has opened fresh avenues by diversifying the country’s foreign policy spectrum, as well as policy instruments. As a result, the Ankara authorities have gradually developed a set of powerful multivector relations in political, economic, and sociocultural spheres. The ideological motives evolving around neo-Ottomanism or even Islamism represent a well-addressed theme in the literature. The notions of common history and cultural connections suggest that Turkey’s endeavor in the Western Balkans ought to be attributed to identity-centered arguments. However, such a standpoint gives priority to transnational bounds beyond the state-to-state relations, whereas economic and political cooperation between Turkey and the Western Balkans is a matter of the rational choice approach. In this context, Turkish foreign policy is best explained if advanced through the lens of raison d’état. Another aspect that deserves more scholarly attention concerns the very modus operandi of bilateral relations, and in this respect, soft power is of paramount importance in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the Western Balkans. Apart from formal channels and government-affiliated institutions, there is a plethora of other diplomacy mechanisms, all playing essential roles in cultivating strong ties with Western Balkan states in order to bolster all sorts of diverse linkages. Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans complements the existing analyses of regional initiatives by looking into the impact of official exchanges, meetings, and treaties. In addition to decoding the essence of bilateral diplomatic relations, this edited collection also seeks to evaluate the structure and extent of economic outreach of Ankara’s involvement and in the Western Balkans. To offer a comprehensive picture, the volume will furthermore tackle the sociocultural component, including the role of art, education, and TV programs as a part of Turkey’s soft power. In their opening remarks, Branislav Radelji´c and Mustafa Cüneyt Öz¸sahin, the editors v

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of the volume, unpack the position of Turkey in international relations by considering Ankara’s ambitions, self-perception, and policy directions, and move on to depict Western Balkans’ reception of Turkish engagement, as well as third parties’ reactions to it. As pointed out, the Turkey–Western Balkan relationship has always been characterized by diplomatic ups and downs, with drivers behind the foreign policy being expected to handle both the peculiarities of domestic preferences and the necessities of the international system. Looking at the scholarship and different layers as the determinants of foreign policy, the prevalent question seems to have concerned revolutionary changes in domestic politics that crystallized with the rise of the AKP. Here, while we are required to consider identity-oriented, structural, and pragmatic dimensions in a holistic manner, it can also be argued that Turkey’s Western Balkan policy has been volatile rather than linear, including variations from country to country as the result of pragmatism. Still, Turkey’s recent diplomatic activism has also experienced limitations; issues evolving around the use of soft power and the role of civil society, the diminished economic capacity aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic, and the ever-obvious disarray among institutions have caused an adverse effect on the design and implementation of foreign policy. In any case, given the Brussels and Washington administrations’ strong relations with the Western Balkan region, Turkish decision-makers should firmly designate the areas of cooperation (and contention) by compartmentalizing the country’s foreign policy. Going forward, the volume will be divided into three parts. The first of them, “Strategies and Policy Dilemmas,” is concerned with Turkish–Balkan interactions, including expectations and dominant challenges. To begin with, Birgül Demirta¸s reviews an ever-increasing engagement of Turkish governments with neighboring regions in the post-Cold War context. More specifically, she is interested in the main features of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) policies toward the Balkans. While considering the elements of change and continuity, this chapter points out that Turkish foreign policy has relied on different instruments given the transnationalized nature—as a consequence of the spillover effects of globalization—of the relationship between the two players. Still, the ruling party’s middle-power activism in the Balkans is not without limitations, which are largely due to the gap between capabilities and expectations, as well as to the overlooked perceptions concerning Turkish involvement among the local communities. The subsequent contribution, written by Ömer Ak, examines Turkey–Western Balkans relations following the July 15 coup attempt. The speed at which states reacted to it, the decisiveness and the language they used in supporting the AKP governments, and the attitude they adopted toward the branches of the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) were among the main determinants of Turkish foreign policy at the time. The interaction with other states was additionally complicated once the Gülen movement had been declared a terrorist organization, given that they hosted different FETÖ-affiliated companies and institutions that were active in fields such as education and tourism. As this chapter will demonstrate, the AKP-led fight against the FETÖ structures in the Western Balkans was not as easy as expected, often provoking tensions and unpleasant conversations. Vladimir Ajzenhamer rightly asks whether Turkey has actually bitten off more than it can chew in the Western Balkans. To offer a conclusive evaluation, he identifies

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major aspects of Ahmet Davuto˘glu’s foreign policy concept known as strategic depth, which turned out to be essential for Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s formulation of a grand strategy, aimed at Turkey’s consolidation and international standing. However, when we consider the Western Balkan region—characterized by divisions and rivalries, especially ethnic and religious animosities and unresolved political issues within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as between Serbia and Kosovo—we find some proper obstacles to the successful implementation of Erdo˘gan’s ambitious project of Turkey’s return to the once Ottoman Balkans. On the one hand, Turkish policy of relying on Albanians and Bosniaks as reliable pivots of Turkish influence in the Balkans, determined by the historical depth, as well as interference in internal divisions among local Muslim communities, has aroused the suspicion of Belgrade and Banja Luka with regard to Ankara’s good intentions. On the other hand, the political rapprochement of Turkey and Serbia, based on opportunism and the evergrowing Turkish investments, has resulted in the resignation of Bosniak political and business elites. Hence, Turkey finds itself between the Scylla of its own neo-Ottoman ideology and the Charybdis of the fickle opportunism of the Western Balkan states, which puts it at risk of hegemonic overreach. The second part, “Fields of Interest,” consists of four chapters. Ertan Efegil and Murat Bayar look into the sociocultural dimension of the AKP’s penetration in the Western Balkans. Aware of the fact that decision-makers are human beings who are influenced by many factors (national and international, but also cultural, psychological, and sociological), the authors seek to address questions in relation to official discourses and discursive trends or shifts that shape Turkey’s foreign policy behavior. The examination of such issues does not only help to comprehend events over a period of time—often controversial—but also to understand their real impact on Ankara’s foreign policy options and preferences. Linking to this analysis is Hüsrev Tabak and Abdulgani Bozkurt’s chapter, which is interested in the dynamics of dissemination of the Turkish Islamic practices to the Muslim communities in the Balkans, and the Turkish Islamic agenda in Turkey’s foreign policy toward the region. As part of the former, the authors survey the country’s culturally framed efforts and collaborations with the local authorities to define appropriate forms of religio-cultural practices for the Balkans. Within the scope of the latter, the employment of Turkish Islamic discourses and references in Turkey’s fight against the Gülenists, among others, are explored by which the religio-cultural rivalry among major Muslim states for influence in the Balkans is unfolded. The argument throughout is built on both societal persuasion, and official and institutional bargaining efforts. Erhan Türbedar provides an in-depth analysis of economic relations between Turkey and Southeast Europe. He examines a range of trends in relation to trade policies, including cross-border trade and patterns of foreign direct investment, as well as implications of barriers to trade. Apart from the respective national data, several global databases are used, which altogether enable a direct comparison of welfare levels between Turkey and the region, and provide a better insight into differences and potential for establishing even stronger economic ties. Finally, the last chapter of this part will look at the often-neglected dimension of Turkey’s cultural and public diplomacy in the Western Balkans as part of the multilateral approach that

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surpasses the elite-centered level of political and economic ties. Accordingly, Adisa Avdi´c-Küsmü¸s offers a brief overview of the key actors and policies promoting Turkish culture, language, and common heritage in the Western Balkans through education, scholarships, and project initiatives. She goes on to highlight the role of cultural diplomacy in transforming the local perceptions of Turkey’s growing influence in the region and thus overcoming the country’s negative image of a former occupying power. As it is argued, such an approach marks a significant shift in Turkey’s traditionally security-oriented foreign policy and demonstrates the ambition to adopt a more comprehensive framework in promoting its interests abroad. Finally, the third part of the volume, “Case Studies,” consists of a number of detailed analyses of Turkey’s interaction with individual states of the Western Balkans. The first of them, produced by Ešref Kenan Rašidagi´c and Zora Hesová, looks at Bosnia and Herzegovina. As noted, under the AKP government Ankara’s foreign policy has led many analysts to suspect it of possessing neo-imperial or neoOttoman objectives. Such suspicions are compounded by the statements insisting that the history and religious identity shared by Turks and Western Balkan Muslims forms the basis of both Turkish–Balkan relations and a common future. Indeed, since the 1990s the policies toward Bosnia and Herzegovina have moved through four distinct phases in which cultural, historical, and religious appeals—backed by substantial financial packages and strategic diplomatic initiatives—have represented just one facet of a broader approach. These policies have also been shaped by pragmatic pursuits of regional influence, the effects of internal (Turkish) transformations, and more recently, president Erdo˘gan’s ad hoc moves, which are less coherent and more short-term in scope. In the case of Montenegro, as argued by Boris Vuki´cevi´c and Marko Savi´c, Turkey’s involvement is manifested on two levels. One concerns its relations with the Muslim population of Montenegro, which consists of Bosniaks and Albanians, making up around 20 percent of the total population. The soft power element is strongly present since the two nations (especially the Bosniaks) share a mutual affinity with Turkey for historical and religious reasons. This is complemented with the political and economic ties, exemplified by a strong link between the AKP and Montenegro’s Bosniak Party. The other level concerns Turkey’s dealings with the Montenegrin government, organizations, and the population overall. In this field, the religious element is naturally muted, while some other initiatives—with the focus on culture, education, and tourism—are emphasized. Turkish economic presence also became much stronger through investments, the organization of high-level economic forums, and the signing of an agreement on defense industry cooperation. As Montenegro gradually moved away from its traditionally pro-Serbian and proRussian policies, it opened space for a stronger presence of Turkey; its involvement was seen as a historical counterweight to Russian aspirations in the region, but also as a strong support for Montenegro’s NATO membership, attained in 2017. Perparim Xhaferi examines Ankara’s foreign policy toward Albania. Having considered past swings, he argues that Turkish politics and its foreign policy in the twenty-first century are far from predictable given the country’s readiness to play and

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try to exploit both sides at the same time, the West and the East, democracy and authoritarianism, Ottoman Islam and Republican secularism. Accordingly, while Turkey’s decision to come closer to the Western Balkans may be inspired by the imperial past, the author is keen on clarifying whether (or to what extent) the fragile Albanian state necessitates Turkish assistance—economic or political—but also military, in the form of defense. The chapter also considers arguments concerning Turkish and Albanian benefits from further strengthening of bilateral relations, and whether such a move can eventually result in major problems for the Albanian state. Still, on the other hand, given the Albanians’ historical experience with their neighbors, Greece and Serbia, Albania clearly finds Turkey more trustworthy—a standpoint suggesting that Tirana does require Turkish presence in the region. Sanja Arežina argues that the AKP’s interest-based pragmatism is the main feature characterizing its approach to the Western Balkan region. As rightly stressed, through the active diplomacy and the application of various economic and soft power instruments, the Turkish leadership is working to strengthen the Turkish influence in the Western Balkans at several levels: political, economic, and cultural. In her chapter, the author discusses three aspects of Turkish–Serbian relations, including any factors that influence the pace and quality of cooperation between the two, as part of a direct application of Turkish foreign policy instruments. To prove her hypothesis that Turkey, by strengthening relations with the countries of the Western Balkans— and especially Serbia—wants to establish itself as a (macro) regional power in the process of creating a multipolar world order, the author uses structural-functional analysis and comparative analysis. Finally, Bezen Balamir Co¸skun looks at Turkey’s capacity to act as a mediator in resolving the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. Following the 1999 war and NATO intervention, numerous rounds of negotiations took place with Serbia being determined to reject any plan which implied Kosovo’s independence. Despite Serbian objections, the Kosovo Albanian leadership declared independence in 2008. Subsequently, the Brussels administration engaged in talks between Belgrade and Prishtina; while the EU’s efforts resulted in some technical agreements, including the Brussels Agreement to integrate the Serb minority in northern Kosovo, the process has witnessed setbacks and has failed. More recently, the US has become involved in the mediation resulting in a normalization agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, signed in September 2020. While all the major international actors have attempted conflict resolution between the Serbs and Albanians, this chapter will discuss Turkey’s potential to use its policies toward Serbia and Kosovo to bring the two parties together and put an end to the conflict. This would go hand in hand with Turkish decision-makers who continue to highlight Ankara’s role at the global level in raising awareness and providing a platform for international mediation. The contributors to the volume deserve the best possible recognition by the editors. Without their ideas, timely submissions, and revisions, as well as their belief in the importance of the present project, this collection would not have been possible, let alone materialized. In addition, it is a pleasure to thank Johannes Glaeser, senior acquisitions editor for Economics, Political Science, and International Relations at Springer, for his full support from the very beginning to the finishing line. Also, the

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editors thank the anonymous reviewers and any other colleagues for their suggestions or detailed feedback about individual chapters and the collection as a whole. Finally, the editors wish to thank their College of Humanities and Social Sciences, United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, and Faculty of Political Science, Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya. Al Ain, United Arab Emirates Konya, Turkey

Branislav Radelji´c Mustafa Cüneyt Öz¸sahin

Contents

Turkey and the Western Balkans: Between Existing Scholarship and the Quest for Additional Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mustafa Cüneyt Öz¸sahin and Branislav Radelji´c

1

Strategies and Policy Dilemmas Turkish–Balkan Interactions: Impact of Historical Legacy, Global (Dis)Order, and Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Birgül Demirta¸s

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Transformation of the Relations Between Turkey and the Western Balkans Following the July 15 Coup Attempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ömer Ak

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From Strategic Depth to Hegemonic Overreach: Has Turkey Bitten off More Than It Can Chew in the Western Balkans? . . . . . . . . . . . Vladimir Ajzenhamer

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Fields of Interest Turkey’s Western Balkan Policy Under the Justice and Development Party: A Sociocultural Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ertan Efegil and Murat Bayar

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Turkish Islam and Turkey’s Battle for Influence in the Western Balkans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Hüsrev Tabak and Abdulgani Bozkurt Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Erhan Türbedar Turkey’s Cultural Diplomacy in the Western Balkans: Actors, Strategies, and Local Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Adisa Avdi´c-Küsmü¸s

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Contents

Case Studies Development of Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Western Balkans With Focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 Ešref Kenan Rašidagi´c and Zora Hesová Turkey and Montenegro: Old Foes Turned Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 Boris Vuki´cevi´c and Marko Savi´c Modern Turkey and Its Foreign Policy Shift Toward Albania in the Post-Cold War Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Perparim Xhaferi Turkish Foreign Policy Toward Serbia: A Three-Dimensional Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 Sanja Arežina Resolving the Conflict Between Serbia and Kosovo: Can Turkey Act as a Mediator? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 Bezen Balamir Co¸skun

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Branislav Radelji´c is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Government and Society, United Arab Emirates University. He is the author and editor of numerous publications dealing with European Union, East European, and Western Balkan political and socioeconomic developments. Outside academia, on an occasional basis, he conducts research and provides consultancy services within his area of expertise. Mustafa Cüneyt Öz¸sahin is Associate Professor of International Relations, Necmettin Erbakan University. Previously, he was also a non-resident fellow at the Center for Democratic Performance, Binghamton University SUNY. His research is primarily concerned with the politics of Africa and the Middle East, international political economy, and security, human rights, and democratization. He is the author of numerous publications, some of which are published in key international outlets.

Contributors Vladimir Ajzenhamer is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade. His research focuses on the West’s attitudes toward the Islamic world and Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies. He has primarily been interested in Islamic extremism, political-military strategies, identity and ideology of foreign policy, classical and critical geopolitical theory, and the role of various discursive forms in international politics. He is the author of numerous articles and co-author of the book Geopolitical Perspectives of the Modern World. Ömer Ak is a doctoral candidate in Middle Eastern Studies at the Social Sciences University of Ankara. He has also worked as a political consultant and has coordinated various international projects. He was awarded the Archimedes Foundation xiii

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Merit Scholarship by the Estonian Government in 2010 and the Legislative Fellows Program Scholarship by the US Department of State in 2012. His publications are primarily concerned with Turkish foreign policy and the Middle East. Sanja Arežina is Counselor at the Government of the Republic of Serbia and an Assistant Professor at the University of Belgrade. Before being elected the 2020– 2021 Asia Global Fellow at the University of Hong Kong, she had spent time at the Chinese Academy of Governance in Beijing, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and the Academy of European Law in Trier. Her publications cover a wide range of topics, with a particular focus on China, the European Union, and international negotiation strategies. Adisa Avdi´c-Küsmü¸s received her Ph.D. in International Relations and European Studies from Metropolitan University, Prague, and she is currently based in the Department of International Relations, Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University. Her research and scholarly publications tackle the question of post-conflict political and economic developments in the Western Balkan region. Murat Bayar is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul Esenyurt University. He is responsible for courses in the field of sociology, identity politics, political psychology, international cooperation, and foreign policy analysis. His research has been published in various national and international outlets, both in English and Turkish. Abdulgani Bozkurt is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations, Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan University. In addition to his scholarly interests, which mostly cover monarchies and regime survival in the Middle East, he is a public speaker with over four hundred public seminars on Islam and politics. He has also published books—Gayriresmi Hayatlar and Bir Buçuk Günde Seyr-i Âlem, both inspired by his fieldwork. Bezen Balamir Co¸skun is Associate Professor specializing in foreign policy and security. She has worked at several higher education institutions and research centers both in Turkey and abroad, most recently as a visiting scholar at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin and an adjunct professor at TED University in Ankara. Her research and published outputs focus on security, foreign policy, and conflict resolution in Turkey’s neighborhood. Birgül Demirta¸s is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Turkish-German University. She is interested in the Balkans, German and Turkish foreign policies, and gender in the higher education sector. She serves as the managing editor of the academic journal Ulus˙ skiler. She is the author of numerous publications, including books— lararası Ili¸ Bulgaristan’la Yeni Dönem, The Vlachs: A Forgotten Minority in the Balkans, and Turkey, Germany and the Wars in Yugoslavia: A Search for Reconstruction of State Identities?

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Ertan Efegil is Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Sakarya University. Previously, he worked at Beykent University and Eastern Mediterranean University. He is the author of several books and essays about Cyprus, Central Asia, intra-state conflicts, and Turkish foreign policy. He has taught courses and published scholarly outputs on conflict resolution, international law, and foreign policy analysis, with a specific focus on the Middle East. Zora Hesová is Assistant Professor at Charles University. She received her degrees from Sciences Po Toulouse, the Free University Berlin, and the University of Sarajevo. She has been involved in various research projects examining Islam in the Balkans, Islamic intellectual history, and religion and populism in Central Europe. She is also the author of a number of scholarly outputs. Ešref Kenan Rašidagi´c is Associate Professor at the University of Sarajevo. Previously, he served as the Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, International Burch University. In addition to his academic responsibilities and research interests, mostly focusing on nationalism, political Islam, and Turkish foreign policy, he has frequently been invited to provide commentary on the Balkans and the Middle East. Marko Savi´c is a doctoral candidate and teaching assistant at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Montenegro. His main interests include geopolitics, comparative politics, and contemporary international relations, with a particular emphasis on Balkan and Eastern European studies. He is the author of several journal articles and public policy analyses. Hüsrev Tabak is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations, Recep Tayyip Erdogan University. His research focuses on ethnopolitics, transnationalism, and foreign policy analysis. His publications include Diffusionism and Beyond in IR Norm Research (2021), Transnationality, Foreign Policy Research and the Cosmopolitan Alternative (2020), and The Kosovar Turks and post-Kemalist Turkey (2016). Erhan Türbedar received his Ph.D. from Gazi University in Ankara. He has been affiliated with different think tanks and has lectured courses on history, political economy, and security matters of the Balkans. Since 2013, he has held senior advisory positions in international organizations, including the Regional Cooperation Council and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and more recently, he has served as Senior Consultant for the Organization of Turkic States. He is the author of numerous publications. Boris Vuki´cevi´c is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Montenegro. His research interests cover the history of diplomacy, comparative Balkan politics, and contemporary international relations. He is a member of the Editorial Council of the Lexicon of Montenegrin Diplomacy and the Committee for Legal and Political Sciences of Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts. He is the author of numerous scholarly publications.

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Perparim Xhaferi is a researcher at the European Union Centre of Excellence, RMIT University. His main interests include the politics of race, ethnicity, and national identity. Currently, he examines the role of the EU and other regional and international powers in the Western Balkans. He is also an active member of the European Studies Association of Australia and New Zealand.

Turkey and the Western Balkans: Between Existing Scholarship and the Quest for Additional Explanations Mustafa Cüneyt Öz¸sahin

and Branislav Radelji´c

The Turkey–Western Balkan relationship is subjected to some proper historical depth, if not depths given the complexity of the then settings and arrangements. As such, it has always been characterized by diplomatic ups and downs, with drivers behind the foreign policy being expected to handle both the peculiarities of domestic preferences and the necessities of the international system. In addition to this, if Turkey’s relationship with the Western Balkans is to be fully comprehended, one also ought not to neglect the intraregional power balances and the state of bilateral relations. In this context, for example, Turkey–Greece relations have undoubtedly influenced Ankara’s interactions with third countries, including the Western Balkan region. While there have been periods when Ankara’s interest in the Balkans rose significantly, as in the case of the Turgut Özal era, it would not be wrong to claim that the ascendance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has made a major breakthrough in relations with regard to both the range of strategies and the respective instruments used. Without question, the transformation resulting in the early period of the AKP in domestic and foreign policy was unprecedented in many respects. Since such a transformation has also applied to the Western Balkans, the main purpose of this chapter is to review the parameters of Ankara’s diplomatic activism in the region by drawing on the related literature. In general terms, the scholarship emphasizes three different layers as the determinants of foreign policy, with the prevalent one being ascribed to revolutionary changes in domestic politics that crystallized with the rise of the AKP. Within this understanding, the debates on identity with a specific emphasis on neo-Ottomanism are brought to account for the M. C. Öz¸sahin (B) Faculty of Political Science, Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] B. Radelji´c College of Humanities and Social Sciences, United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, UAE e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_1

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M. C. Öz¸sahin and B. Radelji´c

Balkan opening in Turkish foreign policy, whereas other determinants of diplomatic engagement have often been neglected. Moreover, the fact that Turkey has enhanced its capabilities to manipulate opportunities, largely owing to the lenient international system, is another argument found in the scholarly contributions. In addition, it is worth mentioning the third category of analyses that insists that Turkey’s Balkan policy relies on pragmatism stemming from political and economic interests. Against this background, it should also be noted that Turkey’s recent diplomatic activism has had its own limitations as well. Issues evolving around the use of soft power and the role of civil society, the diminished economic capacity aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic, and the ever-obvious disarray among institutions have caused an adverse effect on the design and implementation of foreign policy, including the one toward the Western Balkans. Accordingly, this chapter is broadly divided into three sections. While the first of them looks at the history of Turkey– Balkans relations, with a particular emphasis on the Western Balkans, the second part is concerned with the arguments closely associated with the foreign policy of the AKP-dominated period toward the Western Balkans, and finally, the third part will elaborate on limitations of Ankara’s foreign policy toward the region.

1 Turkey’s Balkan Policy: Unfolding the Historical Legacy The nineteenth century was a period of great changes, leaving a major impact on the histories and development of both the Ottoman and Balkan nations. The rising nationalism coupled with the boosting of Russian influence over the Orthodox nations of the Balkans accelerated the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire across the region (Karpat, 1997; Kösebalaban, 2011: 27). There is no doubt that the Balkans is of particular importance to modern Turkey given its mark on collective national memory, especially following the traumatic events and national revivalism in the region, which culminated in a massive Muslim migration to Anatolia. Indeed, the Balkans occupied a symbolic place both in the late Ottoman period and the early Republican period, so much so that the loss of the Balkans turned into a matter that was difficult to deal with for Turkish elites. As such, the so-called Balkan tragedy is one of the main motives that triggered early nationalism in Turkey (Boyar, 2007; Yavuz & Blumi, 2013). In his study, Eric Zürcher has clearly explained the point as to why the loss of the Balkans was such a great disappointment for Young Turks, once at the kernel of late Ottoman policymaking circles: “With half of the Young Turk leaders hailing from areas lost to the empire in 1911–1913, the loss of the Balkan provinces and the Aegean islands constituted a trauma of the first order. To much of the Ottoman elite, the Balkans (Rumeli) was their home, their ancestral land. It is perhaps useful here to remind ourselves just how long some of the main towns and cities of the Balkans had been in Ottoman hands: places like Prishtina, Üsküp (Skopje), Monastir (Bitola), and Salonica (Thessaloniki) had all been conquered between 1385 and 1390, and so had an Ottoman past stretching back more than 500 years. There was a strong

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consciousness of this fact and a feeling that the legacy of the glorious forefathers had now been lost” (Zürcher, 2010: 118). Following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, Balkan descents continued to occupy sensitive positions not only as politicians or state bureaucrats but also as ordinary citizens, having remained decisive in the decision-making process even in the Republican period (Sayarı, 2000: 177; Türke¸s, 2004: 200). Despite this, political interest in the Balkans fluctuated, hinging on systemic exigences and domestic capabilities, as well as the vision of the leaders. It comes as no surprise that structural factors fed into Turkey’s diplomacy toward the Balkans, suggesting that the exigencies of power balance in different periods of time determined Ankara’s policies.1 For example, the fractionalization and disharmony among Balkan states notwithstanding, the Balkan Pacts of 1934 and 1953– 1954 emerged as two exceptional but also ephemeral initiatives for the purpose of developing friendly relations in the face of common threats in the region (Kut & 2002: 11). While the former pact intended to curb the influence of revisionist Sirin, ¸ Bulgaria and Italy (Balcı, 2017: 68–69; Hale, 2013: 46–47; Türke¸s, 1994), the latter was formed as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Indeed, the communist threat became the leitmotif of Balkan diplomacy in the wake of the Second World War (Balcı, 2017: 114–115; Hale, 2013: 90–91; Kösebalaban, 2011: 73; Uzgel, 2001: 50–51). In this regard, Turkey’s search for a military alliance that would encompass Yugoslavia in the early 1950s aimed at a new security shield against the Soviet threat. Nevertheless, this did not bode well and serve its purpose as anticipated, given the shift in Tito’s foreign policy following the demise of Stalin (Balcı, 2017: 114–115). A similar request was aimed at regional cooperation led by Romania at the end of the 1950s, with the support of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, this time both Turkey and Greece turned a cold shoulder to the proposal, seeing it as a 2002: 12). Soviet plot (Kut & Sirin, ¸ In addition to these diplomatic efforts, several agreements on miscellaneous issues were signed with a variety of Balkan nations. For example, after the agreement of 1938 with Belgrade, a large number of Bosniaks and Albanians migrated from Yugoslavia to Turkey as part of an agreement between the two sides. This trend was followed by a second agreement in 1953 during the Democrat Party era (Harxhi, 2017: 36). However, the relatively positive trend stretching from the 1930s to the early 1950s based on building up alliances did not last. The long-term disagreements over maritime boundaries in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey2 was a cause of concern for Ankara’s plans toward the Balkans throughout the 1960s and 2002: 12–13). That is to say, the Turkish–Greek competition the 1970s (Kut & Sirin, ¸ steered Turkey away from actively engaging with the Western Balkans and forming a coherent policy toward the region until the end of the Cold War. Aside from the dispute with Greece over the Cyprus crisis, political as well as social turmoil in 1

The new Republic’s first contact with the Kingdom of Serbia, predecessor of modern Yugoslavia, occurred in 1925 (Gökçen, 2016: 669). 2 For detailed analyses of the Turkey–Greece rivalry over the Aegean Sea, see Anastasakis (2004) and Arı (1995).

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domestic politics (Aydin, 2000: 104) also inhibited Ankara from setting a consistent and comprehensive foreign policy toward Balkan nations.

1.1 Özal’s Foreign Policy and The Post-Cold War Period in the Balkans With the end of the Cold War, Turkey recalibrated its Balkans policy not only because of systemic transformations but also concurrent leadership change and regional context. In other words, not only did the post-Cold War international system provide Ankara with a room to maneuver but also the rising dynamism in domestic politics— brought about by the prime minister and then president Turgut Özal—gave stimulus to Turkey’s foreign policy. By adopting a proactive approach, Özal pushed the limits of Kemalism not only at home but also in foreign policy (Balcı, 2017: 210–211; Ataman, 2002: 124; Çolak, 2006). The Balkans was also on the agenda of Turkey during the Özal period. Following the migration flows of the early 1950s and then the 1970s, another round of forced migrants from Todor Zhivkov’s Bulgaria occurred during the Özal period (Hale, 2013: 122–123). This drew attention of the Turkish public to the Balkans just before the tectonic shifts of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the Yugoslav state crisis represented another critical point for Turkey’s Balkan diplomacy. Consequently, the Balkans became one of the central pillars of Ankara’s foreign policy, together with the Caucasus and Central Asia. In Özal’s view, this represented an opportunity window for Turkey’s foreign engagement in the new context (Balcı, 2017: 211–212; Kösebalaban, 2011: 122–123; Sayarı, 2000). With regard to the Balkans, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991–1995) and the subsequent Kosovo crisis (1998–1999) served as a catalyst, propelling decision-makers to take concrete steps in their favor. Still, they had to be “cautious” and remain within the contours drawn by the international community (Çali¸s, 2001: 139–142; Gangloff, 2004). Given the American influence on the global agenda in the 1990s, “it was only after the United States got involved in settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994–1995 and after it recognized the FYROM (Republic of Macedonia) and signed military agreements with the latter, that Turkey itself took the step of signing military agreements with Macedonia (April 1995 and July 1996) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (August 1995 and January 1996)” (Gangloff, 2004: 107). As it happened, Turkey became actively involved in peacebuilding operations in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, which went hand in hand with the efforts to create a European security structure (Müftüler-Baç, 2000: 497–498). In this respect, Linden and ˙Irepo˘glu (2013: 232) also emphasize that “Turkey was an active participant in the various peacemaking and peacekeeping missions in the area, including the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), the Implementation Force (IFOR), Kosovo Force (KFOR), and the European Union Force (EUFOR) in Kosovo.” In addition to this, one of the most visible outputs of Özal’s

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foreign policy activism was the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), institutionalized in 1992. It emerged as a regional organization reflecting Ankara’s rising aspirations in the post-Cold War environment, also intended to extend to the Balkans. In fact, as observed elsewhere, “[t]he BSEC facilitated the integration of Turkey with the Balkan countries and the ex-Soviet states” (Ataman, 2002: 140). Meanwhile, Ankara’s interaction with Balkan states in the aftermath of the Yugoslav dissolution was met with great suspicion in Athens. Turkey’s close ties with Muslim-majority states set off alarm bells: “Regional actors, particularly Greece, presented the case as if Turkey worked for the establishment of a new network of alliances of Muslim countries and minorities, known as ‘Muslim Belt’” (Türke¸s, 2004: 203). Moreover, the unresolved issues such as the Aegean problem and the Cyprus dispute between the parties had topped each state’s agenda for so long. In response to the rising tension, Turkey strove to establish strong ties with Albania and (North) Macedonia, both sharing enmity toward Greece (Anastasakis, 2004: 50–51; Sayarı, 2000:177– 178). The animosity between Ankara and Athens reached its climax over the Islets in Aegean, known as Kardak/Imai (Ker-Lindsay, 2000: 217). Nevertheless, some sporadic events seemed to open new avenues for amicable interactions between Greece and Turkey at the end of the 1990s. For example, the Düzce earthquake in 1999 was an opportunity to mend the relations between them, with Athens lending a helping hand to Turkey during the devastating natural disaster (Ker-Lindsay, 2000). In addition to this, the guidance of ˙Ismail Cem was another important factor for the emergence of a cooperative environment. Like Turgut Özal, ˙Ismail Cem was another figure who deviated from Turkey’s traditional foreign policy with his diplomatic engagement at that time (Grigoriadis, 2014). As an influential name at the helm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cem subscribed to a multifaceted approach encompassing an active and peace-oriented foreign policy toward the Balkan space at the end of the 1990s (Cem, 1997; Bechev, 2012: 135). In fact, the earthquake diplomacy kickstarted by Cem paved the way to the cooperative environment. Consequently, Turkey gained an EU candidate status at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 with the approval of Athens (Bechev, 2012: 135; Christofis, 2022: 86; KerLindsay, 2000: 226). This was a critical threshold for Turkey’s regional politics, and also had a solid impact on Ankara’s policy toward the Western Balkans. However, on the negative side, it can be conceded that Turkey’s foray into the Balkans in those years also encountered limitations, since “political quarrels as well as economic crises in Turkey throughout the 1990s” inhibited the country from building sustainable relationships (Ekinci, 2014: 104).

2 Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vis-à-Vis the Western Balkans Under the AKP The fact that Turkish political life underwent a dramatic change with the emergence of the AKP in 2002 has been widely addressed. Since then, the party has become

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a dominant player to hold a grip on power (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012). In terms of political transition, the AKP has claimed to have matured to operate within the democratic system while rejecting the revolutionary trajectory of its Islamist political predecessors (Mecham, 2004; Dagi, 2008; Yavuz, 2009). In its early period, it pursued important steps toward democratization, including the normalization of civil–military relations (Aknur, 2013; Satana, 2011; Tokta¸s & Kurt, 2010). In parallel with developments at home, the AKP also embarked on a new course of foreign policy on multiple fronts. As advanced by Ziya Öni¸s (2011: 58), “Turkey’s foreign policy activism in recent years is a positive development and represents a perfectly legitimate response to the changing domestic and global environment. A more confident Turkey, which is stronger in terms of its economic and democratic credentials, is trying to come to terms with its multidimensional historical heritage, and desires to play a more active role in shaping regional and global developments. In addition, it is a perfectly rational strategy to develop close ties with neighboring countries and to develop ties on the grounds of common economic and security interests as well as cultural proximity.” There is a myriad of assessments concerning the targets and tools of Turkish foreign policy transformation. For example, Ibrahim Kalın summarized the policy’s new principles as “political and economic justice, the balance between security and freedom, and finally trade and economic development” (Kalın, 2012: 14). In addition to this, it can be maintained that the very instruments have also diversified. Perhaps the most effective tools used by the AKP are derived from its soft power capabilities; Turkey has tried to be a center of attraction in view of the changing domestic and international factors. Among these, both Ankara’s EU membership bid and desecuritization of its foreign policy have positively impacted the country’s relative soft power (O˘guzlu, 2007). It can be argued that Turkey’s Balkan policy and the increased activism in the region following the rise of the AKP epitomized another epoch hinging on a number of factors, including common history, geopolitical developments, foreign trade and economy, the position of Turkish minority, and the country’s EU prospects and alternatives (Türbedar, 2011: 140–142). In fact, Turkey–Balkan relations—and this is particularly the case with the Western Balkans—intensified so much so that issue areas and foreign policy tools have been diversified to a considerable extent on both sides. Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, state institutions as well as civil society have not only enumerated quantitively but also played more prominent roles ranging from humanitarian missions to development projects and cultural diplomacy in the Balkans. In this respect, soft power came across as crucial in Ankara’s interaction with the region, which goes well beyond the traditional “state-to-state” relations (Demirta¸s, 2013: 175–179). Even more so, the AKP’s unique Balkan policy bore the imprints of transformation of Turkish foreign policy also in the context of the country’s EU integration and the consequent exploitation of soft power elements as part of the process (Demirta¸s, 2015). Turkey has become an important donor country with robust assistance, including aid packages allocated to the Western Balkans. It adopted an approach described

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as “human-oriented attitude in crisis zones” by the then foreign minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu (2013: 867). With such an approach Turkey has gained credibility and greater visibility in international affairs. In the Balkans, Ankara embarked on missions by launching institutional mechanisms such as the South-Eastern Europe Brigade for provision of regional stability (Bayer & Keyman, 2012: 80; Koç & Önsoy, 2018: 360). With this, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA) emerged as the leading organization in charge of foreign aid and development projects. Although the agency was a product of the 1990s, with a focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia in the post-Soviet context, it has embarked on a myriad of development and humanitarian missions in other regions ever since (Fidan & Nurdun, 2008; Özkan & Demirtepe, 2012). Recently, the T˙IKA took part in numerous missions in the Western Balkans as well, including its 110 projects and other activities aimed at contributing to the educational systems in the region (T˙IKA, 2021). Similarly, it also implemented several projects directed to fight the food crisis across the Balkans (T˙IKA, 2020). Along with the above-mentioned engagement, Turkey has taken an active part in mediation as well. For example, the Friends of Mediation initiative, established as a joint venture with Finland, is noteworthy (Aras, 2012). In the Balkans, the Turkish government has viewed regional crises “as a diplomatic opportunity” and promoted itself as a “mediating country” (Brljavac, 2011). In this context, the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) was brought forward as one of the Ankara-led mediation initiatives between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bechev, 2012: 139; Ekinci, 2014: 108–109; Türbedar, 2011). According to Doga Ulas Eralp (2016: 30): “[o]ne of the most visible results was the Serbian Parliament’s decision to apologize for the crimes committed in Srebrenica during the Bosnian war in July 1995. Another important outcome of Turkish policies was the mutual declaration to open embassies in Sarajevo and Belgrade.” Last, Turkey has effectively applied religio-cultural diplomacy (Donelli, 2019: 114; Ek¸si, 2017: 191–192). It has used religion and language to emphasize commonalities with the Balkans. The Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) came to the fore as a “non-conventional” foreign policy instrument used to present Turkey as the champion of “moderate Islam” in the region and thus as an alternative to Islam’s occasionally extreme forms (Öktem, 2012: 32).3 Moreover, the Diyanet has been used as an efficient tool in Turkey’s fight against the Gülen movement/network (dubbed the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) by the Turkish authorities) in the Balkans (Muhasilovic, 2018; Öztürk & Akgönül, 2019: 233–236). In parallel to religious diplomacy, Turkey has relied on the Yunus Emre Institute, the Anadolu Agency, and Turkish Radio and Television (TRT ) as agents of cultural diplomacy (Ek¸si, 2017). In addition, Turkey has taken advantage of popular culture to penetrate the local environment (Donelli, 2019: 126), and the success of Turkish soap operas has gone beyond expectations in the Balkans (Bechev, 2012: 144; Demirta¸s, 2013: 179). Apart from serving the scope of cultural diplomacy, soap operas turned out to be an economic asset for Turkey (Vraˇci´c et al., 2017: 186). 3

For a comparison of different forms and expressions of Islam in the region, see Koppa (2021).

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3 Theoretical Approaches Toward the Western Balkans Under the AKP Rule The theoretical literature on the Western Balkans in the AKP period can be stylized into three streams, revolving around identity-oriented, structural, and pragmatic factors. Indeed, they do not necessarily present contradictory perspectives; on the contrary, in certain cases, they overlap to offer a full picture of Turkey–Western Balkan relations. Moreover, Turkish decision-makers have not followed a linear path, and thus it is possible to assert that there have been multiple ruptures in the country’s foreign policy over the years, suggesting that it underwent numerous adaptations under the AKP tenure. For example—as well illustrated—Turkey has embraced a new approach by gravitating toward a foreign policy centered on self-interest and defensive reflexes rather than the sheer idealism of the Davuto˘glu period for some time now (Akkoyunlu, 2021; Balcı, 2017: 345–348; Keyman, 2017). This is also valid for diplomacy between Turkey and the Western Balkans, where Ankara’s foreign policy changed conspicuously with the one-man diplomacy of Erdo˘gan, following the Davuto˘glu period (Koppa, 2021). Furthermore, it should be noted that Turkish foreign policy has been showing variations from one country to another within the region, and therefore it would not be wrong to claim that Ankara’s interaction with the Western Balkans has been far from monolithic; it has been rather versatile.

3.1 Identity-Oriented Factors A general approach that accounts for Turkish policy toward the Balkans draws on the country’s identity politics. Theories focusing on identity place culture and history at the core of their analysis, with a specific emphasis on domestic politics. A body of literature has maintained that Turkey is a polarized society plagued with “competing” identities that have impacted on foreign policy decisions as well (Hintz, 2018; Kösebalaban, 2011). With this in mind, Ankara’s policy toward the Balkans, and its Western part above all, heavily rests on the debate evolving around neo-Ottomanism. In retrospect, Turkey’s foreign engagement under Özal was often framed within the rise of neo-Ottomanism (Kösebalaban, 2011: 121; Çolak, 2006; Yavuz, 1998, 2020: 107–125). Similarly, with the ascendance of the AKP and Ahmet Davuto˘glu as a foreign minister, the neo-Ottomanism debate in the context of Turkish–Balkans relations gained another momentum (Dursun-Özkanca, 2016; Rüma, 2010; Somun, 2011), even though it was officially rejected more than once (Hurriyet, 2010). While considered an elusive concept, Hakan Yavuz tends to depict neo-Ottomanism as “[a]n emotional, nostalgic identity. Although obtaining an accurate definition upon which everyone could agree is difficult, there is a generic and working definition that means rooting present notions of Turkish national identity within their Ottoman Islamic heritage. It also entails deeper and renewed cultural and economic engagement with

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territories and societies once ruled by the Ottoman state and an attendant desire to renew leadership of the Muslim world to fend off ongoing destructive Western and Russian invasions and imperialism in the region” (Yavuz, 2020: xii). According to some other examinations, “strategic depth is predicated on geographical depth and historical depth,” which has resulted in the diversification of Turkish foreign policy (Murinson, 2006: 947). Here, it should also be noted that the Balkan region occupied a special place in Davuto˘glu’s doctrine (2001), in particular his focus on “multiple regional identities” (Davuto˘glu, 2008: 78; see also Kösebalaban, 2011: 152). It was widely emphasized that Turkey’s Balkan policy prioritizes Turk and Muslim populations over other nations due to its neo-Ottoman tendencies (Öztürk & Akgönül, 2019: 231; Rüma, 2010: 138). For example, one of the hot topics between Turkish and EU officials with regard to Turkey’s Balkan diplomacy concerned Ankara’s attitude toward predominantly Muslim nations as opposed to other Balkan nations. In the words of one study, “Turkish diplomats have taken their complaints one step further, claiming that the EU has done nothing but destabilize the region. EU diplomats, meanwhile, counter this argument by criticizing Turkey’s partiality in Bosnia and Herzegovina; they claim Turkey is biased toward the Turks/Muslims in the Balkans region. This supposed bias can be interpreted within the broader framework of the so-called neo-Ottomanism” (Rüma, 2010: 137–138).

3.2 Structural Factors The literature on structural factors pertains to shifting positions of global poles of power. The structural changes accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union, coupled with the subsequent transitions within Turkish domestic policy, are of utmost importance when seeking to comprehend its foreign policy toward the Balkans (Demirta¸s, 2013; Ekinci, 2014). Another ground-shattering transformation following the first one was the diminishing economic and political influence of the EU and the US for some time (Kappel, 2011). The newly established vacuum provided an opportunity for other countries, including China and Russia, as the most obvious examples associated with the withdrawal of the US (Mead, 2021). Against this background, it can be noted that such a watershed transformation has also had certain implications for the regional politics pertaining to the Western Balkans. As a parallel to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the withdrawal from the Western Balkans has also been mounted, raising concerns about the prospects and foreign presence in the region (Delkic, 2021). As a corollary to this, it has been argued that the void left is likely to be filled by emerging powers; for example, the 2008 financial meltdown and the declining influence of the EU in the Western Balkans represented a watershed moment for the Chinese and Russian authorities to embrace maneuvering

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activities in the region (Garcevic, 2020; Koç & Önsoy, 2018: 357–358).4 Another closely related point of view is the US pivot to East Asia during the Obama administration (Davidson, 2014; De Castro, 2013; Shambaugh, 2013), which resulted in the Balkans being removed from Washington’s foreign policy priorities. Indeed, the trend of changing policy priorities, largely dominated by the West’s need to monitor Beijing’s moves and positioning in global affairs, remained unabated during the Trump administration (Tzogopoulos, 2017). Against this background, Turkey has also reasserted a spot jockeying for dominance in the region. Such a decision goes hand in hand with the claim according to which the end of unipolarity had a certain impact on Turkish foreign policy (Kanat, 2014; O˘guzlu, 2020), with the country gradually “emerging” as an active “middlepower” of the “post-hegemonic” world (Öni¸s & Kutlay, 2017; for the Balkan case, see Demirta¸s, 2022: 27). In retrospect, Turkish foreign policy rested on a vision aiming for full EU membership, as well as presenting the country as a democracy with a Muslim-majority, and thus as an antithesis to the clash of civilizations (Keyman & Aydın, 2009). At this point, some observers remind us that the “Balkan region is the geographic bridge to the West” (Türbedar, 2011: 140). In addition, Turkey has attempted to claim support from Western Balkan states for its EU bid (Brljavac, 2011; Ekinci, 2014). Nevertheless, this earlier Balkan vision has not remained intact as a result of the upheaval in the international environment. In this regard, Ankara decided to reclaim the “power vacuum,” left by Brussels and Washington (Demirta¸s, 2015: 133; Dursun-Özkanca, 2019: 46–47; Önsoy & Udum, 2015: 189). Hence, the EU–Turkey competition and cooperation across the Balkans5 became one of the vital issues in the literature. For example, while Oya Dursun-Özkanca (2019: 60) argues that Turkey subscribed to independence in foreign policy to “test and challenge the boundaries” of its relationship with the European Union, Dimitar Bechev (2022) tends to believe that even though there are differences of opinions between Ankara and the Brussels administration on several issues, this cannot be considered as a total rupture. On the other hand, from the Western Balkans’ point of view, both Russia and Turkey are useful bargaining chips in the region’s negotiations with the EU, as two alternative power centers (Hake & Radzyner, 2019: 13–14).

3.3 Pragmatic Factors Within the accounts focusing on pragmatic factors, we find an actor-centric approach, which is mainly preoccupied with an expediency-based calculus taking into consideration political and economic benefits. Of course, a definition of foreign strategy 4

By the same token, for accounts dealing with the 2008 financial meltdown and Ankara’s engagement in the Western Balkan region, see Bechev (2012: 137), Dursun-Özkanca (2016: 42), Ekinci (2014: 118), Güzeldere (2021), and Koç and Önsoy (2018: 361). 5 For a further elaboration on this matter, see Alpan and Öztürk (2022a, 2022b), Bechev (2012), Dursun-Özkanca (2016), and Önsoy and Koç (2019).

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informed by pragmatism is an elusive task. According to Charles Phua (2022: 16), strategic pragmatism is based on being “realistic in its analysis and policy options, and flexibly implemented to adapt to the situation, including tactical adjustments and strategic reversals, to achieve the desired vision and goals.” Looking more closely at Ankara’s pragmatism as a central characteristic of Turkish foreign policy but then neglected to a large degree, “scholars have overemphasized the role of domestic identity and ideology in determining Turkish foreign policy” (Danforth, 2008: 85). Within such reasoning, economic relations became a prominent factor with economics-driven motives being key pillars of Turkey’s diplomacy (Kirisci, 2009; Kutlay, 2011). Accordingly, the close cooperation between the government and business elite—with the party leadership being committed to “capital accumulation” through foreign policy (Gürdal, 2022)—was the driving engine of the Balkan policy. Turkey’s venture in the Western Balkans mostly stems from a nation state’s political vision inspired by interests rather than identity-based Ottoman expansionism. Thus, Turkey’s opening toward the region was regarded as a “very pragmatic and realistic endeavor” (Somun, 2011: 37). Similarly, other assessments see Turkey’s behavior as a “pragmatic shift” putting “trade” in its center rather than a byproduct of a foreign policy driven by identity matters (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 4). As also argued by Dursun-Özkanca (2016: 42–43), “[a]gainst the background of the financial crisis in the eurozone, Turkey has been trying to fill a void in the region left by the EU. Turkey therefore increasingly pursues Realpolitik—a pragmatic and interests-based foreign policy … [T]he country seeks to pursue economic statecraft to establish itself as an economic power in the region.” Notably, particularly in the aftermath of Davuto˘glu’s period, Turkey’s Balkan vision, once based on common culture and history, was substituted with an economyoriented foreign policy including president Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s rapport with regional representatives (Koppa, 2021: 255–256). In this context, Turkey’s engagement altered from playing the role of a broker for reconciliation between Balkan states to playing the role of an actor aiming to bolster economic relations with the region (Fekete, 2016). Although economic diplomacy has incrementally prevailed, other forms of soft power in Turkey–Balkan relations—ethnoreligious background and interpersonal ties between leaders—should not be excluded. In fact, all these forms of diplomacy have selectively served Turkish pragmatism in the Western Balkans (Alpan & Öztürk, 2022b).

4 A Reappraisal There is no doubt that Turkey has made substantial inroads and cultivated robust ties with the Western Balkans (Ekinci, 2014). Nevertheless, there have been certain setbacks hindering the deepening of relations. A vital issue discussed is the extent to which Turkey’s Balkan policy is realistic. Despite its relative success in diversifying the foreign policy agenda and tools of diplomacy in the Balkans, it is widely

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argued that there is a major inconsistency between Ankara’s expectations and capabilities (Demirta¸s, 2015: 136). Another significant stumbling block to implementing a consistent foreign policy (not only toward the Western Balkans but other, much bigger geographies) has been the product of the country’s distorted bureaucracy and deteriorating economic situation. One of the often-cited deficiencies concerning foreign policy decision-making processes is the lack of efficient institutional mechanisms. More specifically, following the establishment of a new presidential system after the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey failed to restructure the existing apparatus to improve performance in the field of foreign policy (Aras, 2019a, 2019b; Aras & Yorulmazlar, 2018). In addition, economic uncertainties have potentially hindered the overall activism given the lack of resources necessarily to pursue diplomatic objectives to the fullest. According to some recent interpretations, the country’s budget constraints has intensified (Coskun, 2021), which is not without ramifications on the sustainability of Turkish institutions in charge of foreign affairs.6 On top of this, the Covid-19 crisis has also eroded the already suffering Turkish economic performance (Durmu¸s, 2021), preventing Ankara from preserving the required capabilities to pursue an active foreign policy in the Balkans. Thus, even though Turkey has portrayed itself as a “regional power” hub during the global health crisis, which was used for marketing purposes among the domestic constituency (Demirta¸s, 2022), Ankara’s success in terms of delivering its promises to the Western Balkans, during the Covid-19 crisis, has been dubious in many ways (Güzeldere, 2021). Furthermore, even though Turkish foreign policy has adopted a heavy-handed approach toward the highly securitized Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean since 2016 (Christofis, 2022), the Western Balkan region has not been considered a source of direct threat to Ankara’s homeland security. Thus, an approach largely based on soft power has held sway up until today. Moreover, Ankara has diversified its approach to encompass both economic and leader-to-leader forms of diplomacy (Alpan & Öztürk, 2022b). Nevertheless, it can be maintained that the AKP-dominated government has lost some of its earlier charm in the Western Balkans with regard to soft power as it has undermined democratic credentials (Dursun-Özkanca, 2016: 38; Demirta¸s, 2015).7 As some observers tend to suggest, “if Turkey returns to economic growth, pluralism, democracy, and closer ties with the EU, its influence in the region can be as broad as it was at the beginning of the 2000s” (Vraˇci´c et al., 2017: 199). Last, as briefly mentioned earlier, non-state actors have long been playing a vital role in Turkey–Balkan relations. In this sense, it was claimed that civil society is much more efficient than state institutions in terms of exerting soft power across different regional contexts (see Anaz, 2022), which is also valid for foreign policy toward the Western Balkans. However, the autonomy of these actors is contested; as 6

It is also underlined that recent economic fluctuations in Turkey will have broader implications for not only institutional efficacy but also bilateral economic ties that would eventually affect Ankara’s economic leverage in the Western Balkans (Önsoy & Koç, 2019: 352). 7 Despite this point, the Western Balkan region has also experienced democratic backsliding (Bieber, 2018). Accordingly, this neutralizes the impact of a foreign policy based on democratic values and principles.

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often witnessed, non-state actors are no more than conveyors of the AKP’s foreign policy narrative. As Esra Bulut (2006: 309) has succinctly put it, “trans-state ties have increased in significance, the ‘state’ has attempted to harness or infiltrate the ‘trans-state’ to further state interests.” With this in mind, it is disputed that civil society is autonomous, acting independently of the state in the Western Balkans— an argument especially relevant in the context of the struggle between the Turkish government and the Gülen movement/network in the region. In fact, the friction between two sides turned into a tug of war seeking to exploit the civic realm for their own gains (Dursun-Özkanca, 2019: 60; Muhasilovic, 2018; Öztürk & Akgönül, 2019: 233–236).

5 Conclusion Given the well-rehearsed presence of historical and cultural depths in Turkey–Balkan relations, it is impossible to limit Ankara’s activism to the last two decades. Such an assertion also applies to the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, the AKP period has also implied a new momentum for the overall dynamics, with Turkey having elevated its policy toward the region through an inclusion of new tools and areas of interest (Ekinci, 2014). Accordingly, we should consider identity-oriented, structural, and pragmatic dimensions in a holistic manner. It can also be argued that Turkey’s Western Balkan policy has been volatile rather than linear since the inauguration of the AKP government (Koppa, 2021). Moreover, the AKP’s foreign policy has also displayed variations from region to region and in some cases, from country to country. In the case of the Western Balkans, Ankara has long embarked on a more pragmatist strategy by avoiding a foreign policy narrative solely based on identity (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019; Dursun-Özkanca, 2016, 2019: 38–61; Koppa, 2021).8 To this aim, the strategies adopted vis-à-vis Belgrade, Podgorica, and Sarajevo have not been identical in the sense that whereas Ankara prioritizes economic relations for the former two states, it is the ethnoreligious ties that mostly underpin the basis of diplomatic initiatives for the latter. It should also be stressed that foreign decision-makers have encountered certain setbacks while seeking to keep and improve the existing ties between Turkey and the Western Balkans. In this sense, a well-developed long-term strategy designed and proceeded by institutional channels is paramount. Moreover, the shrinking economic resources, coupled with the Covid-19 emergency, have represented another impediment to attaining foreign policy objectives. Finally, Turkish activism in the Western Balkans is also pertinent to the structural factors, still largely influenced by the Brussels and Washington administrations’ relations with the region. In this regard, Turkish decision-makers should clearly designate the areas of cooperation (and contention) by compartmentalizing the country’s foreign policy. This is even more so given Russia 8

For a robust evaluation of Ankara’s rendition of a set of policies in a simultaneous manner arising out of distinct soft power bases toward the Balkans, see Alpan and Öztürk (2022b).

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and China’s connections with the region and the advancement of their respective interests. All in all, accounts within the theory-informed literature ought to reckon the multiple factors to account for the foreign policy behavior of Ankara toward the Western Balkans, rather than adhering to a monolithic one. In addition to this, the strong and weak points of the conduct of current diplomacy vis-à-vis the Western Balkans ought to be explored through a down-to-earth perspective, falling neither into a grandeur syndrome nor an inferiority complex intoxicated by the influence of the domestic political fray.

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Strategies and Policy Dilemmas

Turkish–Balkan Interactions: Impact of Historical Legacy, Global (Dis)Order, and Agency Birgül Demirta¸s

In 2020, as the world was trying to cope with the Covid-19 pandemic, the impact of climate change including numerous floods and forest fires seemed to have come to a truly alarming point. Both the global health crisis and human-made natural disasters are just two examples of the nontraditional threats faced by humanity. These asymmetrical threats keep pushing the states to implement fundamental changes in their approach toward world politics. In fact, countries’ performance in terms of their responses to these crises will affect the success of their foreign policy as well. In the meantime, global international order has been changing in various ways, in conjunction with economic and political domains. On the one hand, the economic supremacy of certain Western countries is being replaced by players such as China and India.1 On the other hand, some of the traditional concepts of international relations, made up of security- and development-dominated notions, have been acquiring new meanings. As some of the recent crises have revealed, the biggest challenges do not necessarily come from other states, perceived as enemies, but from pandemics 1 On this issue, see: Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7–23; Kupchan, C. (2014). Reordering order: Global change and the need for a new normative consensus. In T. Flockhart, et al. (Eds.), Liberal Order in a Post-Western World. Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy, 1–12; Öni¸s, Z. & Kutlay, M. (2020). The new age of hybridity and clash of norms: China, BRICS and challenges of global governance in a postliberal international order. Alternatives, 45(3), 123–142.

This text builds upon my previous work: Demirta¸s, B. (2017). Reconsidering Turkey’s Balkan ties: Opportunities and limitations. In P. G. Ercan (Ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 129–149; Demirta¸s, B. (2019). Reconsidering dilemmas of Turkish foreign policy: The case of the Balkans. Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, 59(5–6), 64–81. B. Demirta¸s (B) Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Turkish-German University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_2

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and a rise in temperatures, thus human-made disasters. Simultaneously, as a direct impact of the economic shifts in the global order, the political weight of the Western countries is falling. For example, the rise of authoritarianism in Hungary and Poland, and the European Union’s incapability to change its course is a good case in point (Öni¸s & Kutlay, 2019). In addition, the failure of Western policies in Afghanistan and the inability of Brussels and Washington administrations to bring peace to Syria have exposed a major political weakening. Global changes are accompanied by regional and domestic changes. The Balkan region forms part of the European continent and therefore situations occurring elsewhere in Europe are likely to impact the Balkans. Accordingly, Brexit, economic uncertainty, refugee flows, and the rise of nationalism have affected transitions in the Balkans, followed by the rise of illiberalism and reemergence of populist nationalism. Thinking of Turkish national context and foreign policy, since 2010 the country has experienced de-Europeanizing tendencies. Its recently instated sui generis presidential–governmental system is based on an overly centralized governing mechanism. During the second decade of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, the pluralist nature of the Turkish political system has been severely eroded. Due to the widespread suppression of opposition groups, Freedom House (2021) has labeled Turkey “not free.” This chapter examines Turkey’s international relations toward the Balkans, with a special emphasis on the post-Cold War context. It starts by shedding light on the changing identities vis-à-vis a shifting international system. Then, it will move on to look into the historical background of relations, prior to analyzing security issues in the Balkans. This section will be followed by a scrutiny of the fundamental characteristic of Turkey’s regional policy of the last decade. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an examination of the main challenges confronting Turkey’s international engagement.

1 Trends and Challenges of the Current (Dis)Order To understand Turkey’s regional policies, it is necessary to consider the events taking place at the global level, since the global system itself has become drastically different from the time when bipolarity was the dominant framework. During the Cold War when formulating its foreign policy, Turkey had to closely analyze the attitudes of the then great powers. However, following the end of the Cold War, the Ankara authorities have had more space for maneuver; in fact, they have exploited the new setting to launch initiatives across diverse regional contexts, ranging from the Caucasus to the Middle East, from Central Asia to the Balkans. In the view of the neorealist school of thought, change or progress in global affairs stems from two factors: either from a variation of the number of great powers, or from the relative capability of the participating units (Linklater, 1995: 248). Statistics have demonstrated that the center of global economy has been shifting from the West to the East; while the share of the United States and European states has shrunk, the

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share of the BRICS countries has gradually increased from 15.6 percent in 1990 to 30.4 percent in 2019 (Kutlay & Öni¸s, 2021: 1088). The accompanying argument is that the shifting international system has given rise to regional (or middle) powers, and Turkey is one of them. In fact, in the case of Turkey both factors explaining transformation in global affairs are relevant: not only has the international system undergone a radical change, but Turkey’s domestic context has also changed. In the new constellation, Turkey has created initiatives geared toward its neighboring regions, providing for the institution of alternative approaches and involvement in various mediation-facilitation activities. Yet, in contrast to the early 2000s, the second decade witnessed some problems in Turkey’s relations with the Balkans. Such a climate is concerning, given the global instability and lack of leadership, or semiorder, in which some states try to solve problems whereas others ignore them. In terms of the Balkans, while the wars of the 1990s did come to an end and the region has claimed to be ready to pursue processes of democratization and Europeanization, sustainable peace is lagging; expressions of ethnonationalism, the rise of populism and authoritarianism, as well as conflicting arguments about borders continue to shape the headlines. Thinking of Turkey’s involvement in the region, a meaningful examination of its current approach necessitates an understanding of the country’s own national and state identity. Back in the early 1990s, in response to the new global circumstances, Turkey embarked on a fresh debate about its foreign policy in the new millennium—a debate tightly connected to those related to Turkey’s identity. For some, Ankara was supposed to focus on the newly independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and forge bonds based on the common identity of so-called Turkishness. Others maintained that Turkey should embrace a much more religiously framed foreign policy, and hence try to consolidate its relations with countries with a Muslim majority population. Finally, another group believed that it was best if Turkey simply continued with its European orientation, as was the case during the Cold War (Demirta¸s-Co¸skun, 2008). The dominant view turned out to be that while Turkey should follow the European path, it must neither ignore the newly established states in its neighboring regions nor other states that have been ignored by the great powers. Within such a mindset, the 1990s was also a period seeing frequent discussions about Turkey’s Ottoman past. Traditional Turkish foreign policy tended to ignore the Ottoman period as much as possible and acted as if the Ottoman legacy did not have any influence upon Turkish society, or on Turkey’s foreign and security policies. But, with the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, Turkey’s decision-makers started to advocate that the Ottoman legacy could no longer be ignored (Çalı¸s, 2001). Indeed, this chapter assumes that interests cannot be understood by isolating identity in foreign policy analysis; in other words, those in charge of foreign policy can define national interests only if taking national identity into account. While located in Asia and Europe, with history based on both Western and Eastern values, Turkey is an insightful case study in constructivist terms. This study argues that Ankara’s shifting positioning in international politics as well as the country’s identity and reinterpretation of its own history gives meaning to Turkey’s policies toward the Balkans.

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2 Historical Background of Turkey–Balkan Interactions The Ottoman Empire has left a considerable impact on Balkan territories and their societies, with the Ottoman legacy still being found in many political and sociocultural aspects. One important effect of this legacy concerns the state borders, which were drawn as a result of their wars with the Sublime Porte as well as the interventions of the Great Powers (Todorova, 1996: 54). Another aspect of the Ottoman legacy can be observed in the demographic structure. The empire’s settlement policies contributed to the multicultural and multireligious nature of the Balkans. Besides placing Turkish populations in various parts of the region, Ottoman rulers brought the Serbian and Romanian populations to Banat and Albanians to Epirus, Kosovo, and Macedonia (Sugar, 1977: 283). Turkish minorities, especially in Bulgaria, Greece, and North Macedonia, as well as the Muslims of Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, form part of the Ottoman legacy (Váli, 1971: 197). The fact that Muslims populating the territories of the former Yugoslav state were and continue to be called Turks is a symbol of the living memory of the Ottoman state among the Balkan peoples. Moreover, the remaining Ottoman buildings, common cuisine, and social beliefs point to the strong influence of the Empire (Jelavich, 1983: 105; Steinke, 1990). Many Turkish-origin words are found in Balkan languages; the term “Balkan” itself is a Turkish word meaning a series of mountains (Jelavich, 1983: 1). It is worth stressing that after the formation of nation-states across the Balkan peninsula, their leaders often resorted to the discourse of the “Ottoman yoke” (Jelavich, 1983: 104–105) and started to depict the Ottoman past and, above all, the Ottomans as the “Other”; by overemphasizing the negative features of the empire (and ignoring the positive parts), they hoped to strengthen national consciousness. Such an attitude of the ruling elites led to hatred toward Turkey and suspicion toward Turkish minorities living within their borders, and consequently posed a challenge to cooperation between Turkey and some of the Balkan states. However, the historical legacy—with all its features, including misrepresentation—remained a relevant dimension in Turkish–Balkan interactions. For example, and in the context of state identities and the international system, the multipolar environment of the interwar years provided for regional initiatives, as seen in the case of the Balkan Pact of 1934. The pact was an important step in the history of cooperation among Balkan countries, even more so given that it was a Balkan-originated treaty and not a product of external interference (Özcan, 1995: 285). In comparison, the post-1945 bipolar structure witnessed the dominance of great power politics in regional affairs. Aware of risks and threats, the countries of the region had to act within the limitations of the Cold War environment. Under such circumstances only countries with similar identities (Eastern or Western) had an opportunity to come closer together. With the détente period, and thus improvements in relations between the opposing blocs, Turkey pursued a more active policy toward the Balkan region, as confirmed by the 1968 Agreement on Migration and Family Unification between Sofia and Ankara, which aimed to reunite families that had been separated because of the expulsion policies of the Bulgarian regime in the 1950s (Özcan, 1995: 288; Váli, 1971: 203).

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Later, as the Cold War came to an end, Turkey’s approach toward the Balkans was primarily preoccupied with security issues due to the wars of Yugoslav succession. The changing international circumstances means that Turkey could develop its own initiatives and seek to contribute to the solution of the Yugoslav drama. Indeed, the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 and then the war in Kosovo in 1999 provided Ankara with an opportunity to find a new place and identity for itself in the international system. From the very beginning of the Bosnian crisis, Turkey launched a number of farreaching initiatives while insisting on the necessity of international military measures. As the then-term president, it invited the Organization of the Islamic Conference to an extraordinary meeting and proposed an action plan for the solution to the conflict. It also convened a Balkan Conference and made major moves within the UN, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), all to convince its Western partners of a military campaign. In addition, Ankara invested efforts in reaching an agreement between Bosniaks and Croats. In sum, its approach throughout the war was active, consistent, and assertive (Demirta¸s-Co¸skun, 2006). As it happened, the Turkish leadership kept emphasizing that Ankara had to play a leading role in regional affairs. By referring to the expectations of Bosniaks from Turkey, Turkish decision-makers made sure that they would listen to such expectations and act accordingly. Furthermore, members of the Turkish political elite compared Turkey’s role in Bosnia and Herzegovina to that of the US in the Persian Gulf, since the Bosniaks perceived Ankara as a key factor in their home affairs (Toker, 1992). They believed that for as long as they managed to prove Turkey’s indispensability in the Balkans, they were to be considered in international forums— as suggested by various visits and official exchanges, including Turkey’s invitation to the London Conference. Therefore, it could be argued that Turkey’s Western identity, and its interest in the preservation of this identity in the post-Cold War context, appeared as crucial in formulating Turkish policies. By being active on the Balkan stage and undertaking a supportive role for Bosniaks in international platforms, Turkey attempted to prove its significance to the Western world. Similarly, in the case of the Kosovo war, Turkey’s approach was proactive though it kept a low profile. It joined the West’s efforts to find a solution, and while it was not as active as it had been during the Bosnian war, it nevertheless acknowledged that it would not hesitate to take part in a joint military intervention. The Ankara administration warned the Western countries not to be too late in reacting to the atrocities in Kosovo. All this showed Turkey’s ambition not to remain on the sidelines of international efforts but to be engaged in them. As rightly remarked elsewhere, Kosovo was another case where Turkey could present itself as an important ally of the West; in congruence with its mission, it took part in the air strikes (Uzgel, 2001).

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3 Regional Security Issues: From Negative to Positive Peace Although the current security environment in the Balkans is radically different from the one characterizing the 1990s, it has not yet reached the level of positive peace. Considering that the concept of security has acquired multiple meanings and cannot be limited to military security, there are various security issues remaining to be resolved in the region. One of them is the predominance of ethnic nationalism in the majority of the post-Yugoslav countries (Yugoslavia itself represented one of the best examples of multiculturalism). Despite the fact that more than two decades have passed since the end of the violent conflicts, ethnic nationalism is still a fact of life in many parts of the former Yugoslav territories—an aspect illustrated by the high level of support that nationalist parties receive from the electorate. Because of emigration, both during and in the aftermath of the wars, the post-Yugoslav space lost a solid portion of its former multicultural outlook. Strangely enough, the nationalist rhetoric has also been reflected in the legal structures; for example, according to the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, only members belonging to one of three major ethnicities can be a candidate for the presidency. Even though the 2009 decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdi´c and Finci cases ruled in favor of changing the relevant law (ECtHR, 2009), the Bosnian authorities have not implemented the necessary change yet. Furthermore, there are still disputed borders in the Balkans, such as those involving Kosovo and Serbia, or Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. World history has taught us that only in regions where no dispute over borders exists, can there be durable peace. In fact, it is the absence of territorial issues that permitted the European integrationist project—an example of security community. Therefore, it can easily be assumed that the resolution of border issues is a sine qua non for the establishment of a positive peace in the region. On the other hand, if EU membership prospects for the Western Balkans were clearer, the vitally important problems could be solved in an easier way. But due to reasons stemming from the regional countries’ reluctance to reform themselves, as well as the EU’s economic crisis and enlargement fatigue, make discussions about progress highly speculative since the general ambiguity in relation to EU membership complicates transformation processes across the Balkan peninsula. As some scholars have warned, delaying EU accession of the Western Balkan region runs the risk of seeing parts of the Balkans turn into a ghetto (Massari, 2005). In fact, another important security issue is related to the mushrooming of organized crime due to the violent events of the 1990s. The problem had reached such a level that EU Member States mentioned it in the 2003 European Security Strategy (European Council, 2009). The degree of the problem is better understood with the example of the chaotic environment in Albania in 1997, when one million Kalashnikov rifles were stolen from the army barracks (Ramet, 2010: 2–14), and it can be imagined that some of these weapons ended up abroad. The range of activities of the regional crime groups varies from arms to drugs and human trafficking. Linking these issues is the persistence of economic problems. While going through multiple transition

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processes, the Balkan region has taken a long time in most of the countries. While experiencing multiple transition-related obstacles, it has taken a long time for the Balkan countries’ GDP to return to the 1989 levels. For example, Romania was able to reach its 1989 GDP only in 2004 and Croatia reached it in 2005, whereas for Bulgaria and North Macedonia, it took until 2006 (Bardos, 2008). The high unemployment rates among the youth—for example, 34 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina (World Bank, 2021b) and 46 percent in Kosovo (World Bank, 2021a)—give a clue about the seriousness of the economic situation. Finally, Balkan countries have found it difficult to deal with the past. The respective parties have adopted one-sided responses to questions about what happened back in the 1990s. Individually, and without paying due regard to the narratives of the other side, they tend to argue that it was only them who suffered and were victims of the bloody conflicts, while the other party was the aggressor. In light of this, it can be argued that although the era of violent conflicts is over, there is still no durable peace; in other words, the transition from negative to positive peace (Webel & Galtung, 2010) across the post-Yugoslav space is still ongoing. In terms of Ankara’s involvement, during the Yugoslav wars and transition processes of the 1990s, Turkish decision-makers sought to provide adequate responses and contribute to conflict termination and post-conflict peacebuilding. By taking part in a variety of initiatives and by being vocal about the region in different international gatherings and organizations, the Turks kept raising awareness of the magnitude of the crisis and inviting the international community to adopt a more proactive approach. For example, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) actively participated in the UN Protection Force, Implementation Force, and Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, Concordia, and Proxima in North Macedonia, in the UN Mission in Kosovo, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, and Kosovo Force (KFOR), and Operation Alba in Albania. Furthermore, in the framework of the Partnership for Peace, Turkey provided training to officers of the countries seeking to become full NATO members (TAF, n.d. [a]). In short, by looking at the main course of Turkey’s activism in the 1990s, it is right to conclude that it was mainly political and security oriented. However, it is noteworthy that some of the military missions have also contained cultural components. For example, TAF provided Turkish language courses in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Romania (TAF, n.d. [b]). In response to changing regional and international circumstances as well as Turkey’s growing self-confidence, Ankara’s approach has gradually shifted and as such, has been dominated by soft policy instruments. Though the political and security dimension in bilateral and multilateral relations have continued without any interruption, the use of economic and cultural tools has steadily increased—a trend which may be interpreted as one of the consequences of Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy (Bechev, 2012: 133). The intellectual basis of Turkey’s new approach was explained by the then foreign minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu (2011) in his article “A forward-looking vision for the Balkans.” At a time when it seemed that most international actors had lost their enthusiasm for new initiatives to address the remaining regional problems, Turkey stood out as an actor closely following the developments

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and working to find solutions to some of the regional issues. Its approach was often described as value-based and future-focused, with the main principles being linked to inclusiveness and regional reintegration, with a particular emphasis on European integration and development of a common stance in regional and international organizations (Aras, 2012). With the aim of overcoming the bitter memories of the past, Ankara has favored an approach focusing on the future and imagined witnessing a more constructive relationship between the parties. Another feature of the Turkish approach has been its insistence that the Balkan region belongs to its own people, and therefore they are the ones who should be deciding on its future. In the list of features of Turkey’s ties with the Balkan countries, transnationalization has stood out as ever-increasing. In a 2012 study, Kemal Kiri¸sci pointed out that transnationalization has been a major feature of Turkish foreign policy toward its neighboring regions, mainly thanks to three channels: economy, movement of people, and civil society initiatives. The Balkan region represents an appropriate case study to examine the increasing ties beyond the state-to-state level (Kiri¸sci, 2012).

4 Anatomy of Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Balkans: Recent Developments Many of the policies of the early 2000s were nothing more than a continuation of Ankara’s post-Cold War foreign policy. With fundamental goals having remained almost the same, only differences in instruments and accompanying discourses can be identified. To begin with, Bosnia and Herzegovina has featured as a key Balkan country on the Turkish foreign policy agenda mainly because of the fragility of the interethnic relations and the resulting deadlock in the functioning of the political system. As Turkey was not part of the EU-US-led Butmir process, aimed at fixing some of the alarming problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ankara leadership launched its own initiative to bring the parties together and encourage them to engage in robust dialogue (Türbedar, 2011). Although the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war, it did not provide for a stable and well-functioning political system; the fact that it takes more than a year to form a new government after elections is a sign of a political stalemate. Furthermore, the statements of Republika Srpska leaders, with its former president and one of the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik, at the forefront, in which they regularly question the territorial integrity of the country (including calls for an independence referendum), sustained the crisis (Türke¸s et al., 2012). The Turkish initiation of two trilateral mechanisms pointed to the relaunch of an active foreign policy. It was within that framework that encounters of the foreign ministers of Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, as well as the foreign ministers of Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia took place. The summit in Istanbul, which for the first time brought together the presidents of Serbia and

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Bosnia and Herzegovina, Boris Tadi´c and Haris Silajdži´c (Kohen, 2010), resulted in the Istanbul Declaration on June 24, 2010. It was considered a historic document since it guaranteed the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SEECP, 2010). Moreover, given the total failure of the Butmir process, Turkey’s initiatives did prove a success, even if limited. Besides Belgrade’s assurances in relation to the Bosnian territorial integrity, Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed to send an ambassador to Belgrade after a three-year interruption. In addition, in 2010 the Serbian Parliament adopted a declaration condemning the crimes in Srebrenica (SBG, 2010). Furthermore, Turkey assisted with Sarajevo’s acceptance into the Membership Action Plan, as part of the NATO accession process (Rüma, 2011: 135–137). In this vein, where Turkey based its mediation efforts on trust-building measures between the parties (Zenelaj et al., 2015), some progress could be achieved. However, the initial enthusiasm surrounding the trilateral mechanism has gradually lost its momentum. In the meantime, we have witnessed the most astonishing improvement in relations between Turkey and Serbia. Although the Ankara–Belgrade rapport went through a hard time in the 1990s, as soon as the Yugoslav conflicts were over, they agreed to fix their relationship. In fact, in the view of both countries’ leaders, the current Turkish– Serbian relations have lived a golden period and have been in the best shape ever. Even though the two countries do not share any border, their decision-makers still refer to each other as neighbors, which is an indication of the degree of rapprochement (AA, 2010). While there are obvious points of disagreement between them, such as the status of Kosovo and its international recognition, Ankara and Belgrade have ignored differences between them and given priority to issues on which they can cooperate (Arežina, 2018). Kosovo is another important partner of Turkey in the region. When Kosovo declared independence in early 2008, Turkey recognized it the following day; this move took place in the midst of discussions as to whether Kosovo’s declaration was in line with international law. Here, the question is, how can we explain Turkey’s positive attitude toward Kosovo’s independence considering its traditionally cautious policy? Accordingly, does Ankara’s policy represent a change or continuity in Turkish foreign policy? Looking back, it was the Turkish president Turgut Özal who recognized Ibrahim Rugova as president of Kosovo, which was a symbol of Turkish sympathy toward the Kosovo Albanians. However, with the conflict eruption between the parties in the late 1990s, Turkey initially tried to engage in dialogue with both the Serbs and Albanians. Ankara supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, while emphasizing the rights of Albanians as per Yugoslavia’s 1974 constitution. In the aftermath of the 1999 NATO intervention, Turkish forces took part in KFOR, and Turkey also started to pay close attention to the problems of the Turkish minority living in Kosovo. At home, both leftist and rightist political parties in the opposition supported the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in sessions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Almost all opposition parties accused the government of only supporting the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and not paying adequate attention to the problems of Kosovo. Therefore, from the very beginning, the government’s cautious approach inspired heavy internal exchanges. As suggested by Charles Hermann (1990), it can be argued that a policy can be re-evaluated if it leads to a reaction

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from other actors, and this has been visible in Turkey’s policy toward Kosovo. When the negotiations between Albanians and Serbs seemed to have reached a deadlock in 2007, and as US-led Western countries started to look more favorably on the idea of Kosovo’s independence, Turkey also began reconsidering its own stance. By analyzing the discourse of Turkish politicians and diplomats from 2005 onward, it is possible to identify the beginning of a change in the Turkish approach. Hence, Turkish recognition of Kosovo’s independence on February 18, 2008, represents continuity rather than change. According to Hermann’s model, we can interpret it as a program change, and thus as a tactical change rather than a total restructuring. Furthermore, Turkey’s recognition of Kosovo did not lead to any deterioration in its relations with Serbia; both countries “agreed to disagree” on the Kosovo matter (Petrovi´c & Relji´c, 2011: 169). An important feature of Turkey’s Balkan policy in the first decade of the 2000s has been its emphasis on soft power (The Economist, 2011). In continuation of the foreign policy approach of the Özal era, economic aspects have occupied an important place. In accordance with the liberal view and the idea that increasing economic relations will lead to an improvement in political relations and economic interdependence, Ankara has advocated better economic ties with regional countries. However, as it is not the state but the private sector that is expected to increase trade and investment, the basic aim is to facilitate and encourage an increase in bilateral trade relations. The practice of having business people join foreign trips of key decision-makers began under Özal, but then it was suspended by subsequent coalition governments. It was brought back by the Justice and Development Party after it came to power in 2002. This indicates the impact of a “trading state” approach in Turkish foreign policy (Kiri¸sci, 2009). Affected by the dynamism of Turkish foreign policy in the first decade of the 2000s, some Turkish companies have also started to use a similar rhetoric. For instance, Can Akın Ça˘glar, the general director of Ziraat Bank—the largest public bank—stated that they aimed to transform the “local power” of the bank into “regional power” and become “a big player” (Vatan, 2010). Besides benefiting from multidimensionality and robust economic ties, Turkish foreign policy has also relied on another element of soft power—culture, primarily language. In 2007, the Yunus Emre Institute (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü—YEE) commenced its activities and so far, fourteen Yunus Emre Cultural Centers have been opened in eight Balkan countries. In addition to offering Turkish language courses, they host other cultural activities as well. The role of language in Turkey’s ties with the region has only been recognized lately, despite the fact that there are many similar words between the Turkish language and the languages of the region. In some places, Yunus Emre Centers have also delivered classes in the Turkish language in public schools. The center in Sarajevo is a good example since it is thanks to its attempts in the academic year of 2012–2013 that 59 primary and secondary schools introduced Turkish as an elective course, resulting in 4,863 students selecting Turkish language courses (YEE, 2013). It is noticeable that the Turkish language has been emerging as a lingua franca in the region, unrivaled by any other regional language (Öktem, 2011). Furthermore, the region has seen a trend to open Turkish universities, including the

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International Balkan University in North Macedonia and the International University of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina, among others. In Turkey itself, since the early 1990s, a robust scholarship scheme has been implemented (and has gradually covered the whole world), allowing foreign students to pursue higher education in Turkey. Thus, while benefiting from culture has surely formed part of the foreign policy of Western countries, Turkish decision-makers have also become aware of the increasing salience of soft power instruments in an ever-globalized environment. The increasing interest in Turkish media in the Balkan countries stands out as a proof of Turkey’s soft power. The Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) founded TRT Avaz to broadcast cultural programs as well as daily news in Balkan languages, and hence to serve as a cultural bridge. Most recently, TRT has also opened a branch in Sarajevo. Such a move corresponds to the opening of the Directorate of the Balkan Region in the Anatolia Agency (AA), also in Sarajevo. Broadcasting in all three local languages—Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian—the Turkish news agency provides not only a medium to report about developments in Turkey to the region, but also to familiarize the Turkish public with the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since Turkish media outlets mostly depend on foreign sources on Balkan issues, and the media in the Balkans also take news about Turkey from foreign broadcasters, the AA office in Sarajevo has proved to be a strategic decision with great potential. It is of symbolic relevance that a member of presidency at the time, Bakir Izetbegovi´c, attended the opening ceremony (AA, 2012). The news content across the Balkan countries is heavily supplemented with Turkish soap operas. Although the trend started to take place in the first decade of the 2000s, it reached its peak with the series “Magnificent Century” (Jovanovi´c & Tokyay, 2012). While thorough examination still needs to be conducted to explain the massive popularity of Turkish TV series, arguably cultural similarities have driven it. As experienced by the author of the chapter, there are people in Bosnia and Herzegovina who have learned to carry out daily conversations in Turkish just through these series. Finally, in Turkey, interactions are also evident in the activities of municipalities, especially those with a significant number of Balkan-origin people. For example, 32 percent of all Turkish twin-town partnerships are with the Balkans (Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 147). The demographic structure impacts city diplomacy. To name just one case, Istanbul’s Bayrampa¸sa Municipality, where many residents have origins in the Balkans, has been quite active in that regard; since 2005 the municipality has organized social and cultural activities within the “Ramadan in the Balkans” project (Bayrampa¸sa Belediyesi, n.d.). Another example is the ˙Izmit Municipality, which has pursued various projects including the construction of a center for social and cultural activities in Momchilgrad/Mestanlı in Bulgaria, and the building of a children’s playground in Travnik in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, some of the activities of city diplomacy have been directly related to the policies of the AKP, which has undoubtedly implied politicization of Turkey’s local diplomacy (Muhasilovi´c, 2020).

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5 Challenges in Turkey’s Balkans Policy in Its De-Europeanized National Context In recent years Turkish democracy has experienced a decline, largely due to the AKPled government’s abuse of power, which has given away the pluralist understanding that had marked its early years. In particular, the rule of emergency, implemented after the coup d’état attempt on July 15, 2016, has radically decreased the level of democracy. The change of the political system from parliamentarian to a sui generis presidential–governmental model has resulted in the aggregation of all major powers in the Office of the President and the erosion of the role of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. However, the March 2019 local elections (and the second election for the Istanbul Greater City Municipality in June 2019) have changed the balance of power in local politics, since municipalities in most of the major cities, including Ankara and Istanbul, were won by the opposition. In terms of the coup attempt and changes in the political system, Turkey’s fight against the Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) has created problems in the Balkans as well. As reported by the pro-government Turkish media, FETÖ-related schools and institutions continued to operate in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia (Sabah, 2018). Despite all Turkish attempts, not all of them could be shut down. Turkish efforts to have six Turkish citizens who allegedly had links with the FETÖ deported from Kosovo in 2018, as a result of apparent cooperation between Turkish and Kosovo intelligence agencies, created a political crisis locally. Kosovo president Hashim Thaçi and prime minister Ramush Haradinaj criticized the operation; the latter forced Interior Minister Flamur Sefaj and the head of the intelligence organization, Driton Gashi, to resign. Hence, Turkish decisionmakers have continued cooperating with some members of the Kosovo authorities while ignoring others. Another instance of Turkey’s assertiveness was evident during the Bulgarian general elections in 2013 and 2017. Given that the AKP was not on good terms with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (HÖH), whose majority support came precisely from the Turks in Bulgaria, some AKP MPs openly supported the Freedom and Honor People’s Party in 2013 (Bursada Bugün, 2013; Ege’de Sonsöz, 2013). However, the party failed to meet the threshold needed to enter the parliament. Four years later, the AKP decided to support the newly established Democrats for Responsibility, Solidarity, and Tolerance (DOST), which also failed to meet the threshold. Since then, the AKP has refrained from influencing the outcome of elections in Bulgaria. The above examples show that there are several substantial limitations to Turkey’s Balkan policies. Moreover, the period since 2011 has witnessed increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the AKP government, characterized by arrests of journalists, interference in the private life of individuals, limitations to freedom of assembly and expression, otherization of those holding different opinions from those of the ruling elite, the creation of a prejudiced version of Westernism by reproducing conspiracy theories—all symptoms of Turkey’s path from procedural democracy

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to de-democratization (Demirta¸s, 2018). Nowadays, the main challenge is whether Turkey can actually move to procedural democracy first, and then to substantive democracy, as its ability to become an influential regional power depends on whether it can manage to institutionalize its democratic structures (Öni¸s & Kutlay, 2013: 1418). Interestingly enough, when the AKP’s elites faced a sequence of corruption charges in late 2013 and early 2014, the support coming from the Balkans was used to justify their authority in a national context. While facing corruption charges themselves, the then prime minister Recep Erdo˘gan and several ministers gained various kinds of support from different levels of the region. Political leaders, representatives of Muslim communities, and Turkish communities living in different Balkan countries extended their endorsement to the Turkish government. As a member of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Presidency Bakir Izetbegovi´c called Erdo˘gan to express support for the leadership and the “brother nation,” the leader of the Islamic Community of Montenegro, Rifat Fejzi´c, claimed that Erdo˘gan was not only the prime minister of Turkish people but he was also the leader of the whole Islamic world. In fact, in response to the judicial process initiated against AKP key figures, in all mosques in Montenegro and Sandžak as well as in the Gazi Hüsrev Begova mosque in Sarajevo, there were Friday prayers in support of the Erdo˘gan government (Habercim, 2014; Yeni S¸ afak, 2014). This kind of regional support was consequently exploited by Erdo˘gan himself when stating on various occasions that the prayers of Bosnia, among others, such as those of Baghdad, Cairo, and Damascus, “would be enough for us” (Yeni S¸ afak, 2013).

6 Conclusion While tracing the changes and continuities, this chapter has put forward three arguments. First, Turkish foreign policy toward the Balkans is no longer based on politicalsecurity issues alone but also on soft power, which has gradually consolidated its importance. Second, the nature of relations has become transnationalized, which suggests that there are some elements of adjustment, mainly with regard to actors and instruments, whereas the basic goal remains the same—construction of a stable region anchored in the Euro-Atlantic structures. Third, the increasing level of proactivism in Turkey’s Balkan policies has faced important challenges as well. Though Western Balkan countries are yet to achieve durable peace, some progress has been recorded through Turkey’s courageous initiatives. Nevertheless, such developments have lately taken place alongside a frequent reference to the Ottoman past that provokes mixed feelings across the region. According to some observers, regardless of whether Turkey is willing to admit it publicly, the Ottoman past is present and as such it impacts all foreign policy aspects, with some going so far as to claim that Turkey has a hidden agenda that is supposed to result in the recreation of the Ottoman Empire. While the latter point of view has been rejected by the Turkish elites

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as unfounded, even misperceptions deserve sufficient attention given their ability to reassure the most concerned actors and eventually contribute to problem solutions. In any case, a reconsideration of Turkish identity alongside the country’s perception of interests has come hand in hand with the changing international circumstances and Turkey’s need to adapt to them. This has brought with it the use of new instruments and a fresh formulation of Ankara’s ties with the region. The roots of the changes can be traced back to Turkey’s Europeanization process where it acquired a new understanding of security; even though Turkey’s EU accession has been suspended, its impact is still visible. However, as Turkish democracy has been deteriorating, problems have also emerged in the relations with the Balkan region. Involvement in internal affairs of different countries and assertive unilateral initiatives have created tensions. While Turkey has tried to become a regional power in the Balkans since the early 1990s, the recent experiences have shown that it is a good record of democratic practices coupled with Ankara’s soft power instruments that is needed more than any other arrangement to ensure robust prospects for Turkish progress in regional ties. Otherwise, the prospects remain highly questionable. In addition, the global problems such as the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change, and Turkey’s responses to them, as well as the future of Ankara’s now-stalled Europeanization process, are likely to affect Turkish–Balkan interactions in the coming years.

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Transformation of the Relations Between Turkey and the Western Balkans Following the July 15 Coup Attempt Ömer Ak

The failed coup attempt by the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) on July 15, 2016, transformed both domestic and foreign policies in Turkey. Its traumatic impact led to major changes in domestic politics, while the disappointment with the attitude of the Western allies during the coup attempt undermined trust between Turkey and the West, and shifted Ankara’s priorities in foreign policy. Just after the coup attempt, the Turkish government initiated a large-scale investigation against FETÖ. Some observers even argued that the fight against FETÖ turned into a “witch hunt” (The Economist, 2016). Defining it “a gift from God” (Sık, ¸ 2016) on the very night of the coup attempt, president Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan seized the opportunity to accelerate his “purge of opponents” (Pope, 2017: 19) and began to criminalize parliamentary and social opposition. The declaration of the state of emergency consolidated the control of the government over the political system. The constitutional amendment referendum on April 16, 2017, which was defined as “a choice between one-man rule and democracy” by the political opposition (Birgün, 2017) provided the legal basis for the new regime. Erdo˘gan believed that “foreign powers” were behind this threat (The Independent, 2016). Moreover, as the issues such as the Syrian war, the fight against terrorism, and developments in the eastern Mediterranean became increasingly critical in the same period, confidence in relations with the United States (US), European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have been severely shaken. Feeling an existential threat, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government began to question its foreign policy and alliances as well. As a result, foreign, defense, and security policies were adapted to the new conditions, as perceived and interpreted by Erdo˘gan and his close circle. The speed at which states reacted to the coup attempt, the decisiveness of the language they used in supporting the Turkish government, Ö. Ak (B) International Relations, Social Sciences University of Ankara, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_3

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and the policies they followed against the branches of FETÖ within their borders were among the main determinants of Turkish foreign policy in this period. The Western Balkans continued to be an important region in Turkish foreign policy after July 15, because of its existential significance for the AKP. From the very beginning, the AKP defined its foreign policy based on identity and geography (Davuto˘glu, 2001). The historical Ottoman-Turkish presence and the current existence of kinship communities in the Western Balkans strengthened the legitimacy of the identitybased foreign policy. Thus, this is where the AKP managed to implement the “soft power” strategy most effectively. Before July 15, FETÖ was among the soft power elements of Turkish foreign policy with its schools, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and commercial activities abroad; in fact, it received significant support from the AKP governments (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 21). The FETÖ movement was effective in the Western Balkans from its very early years. Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the organization, called on his followers to establish schools and companies in Central Asia and the Balkans and to form well-trained elite cadres to be effective in the post-Cold War period (Solberg, 2007: 446). FETÖ-affiliated institutions and companies operated in many different fields from education to tourism, from media to broadcasting in Western Balkan countries before July 15. Due to the identity-building importance of the region for the foreign policy of the AKP, great emphasis has been placed on the fight against the FETÖ in those parts following the coup attempt (Koç & Önsoy, 2018: 364). However, this fight was not as easy as expected. For example, FETÖ-affiliated schools were so powerful in the region that even the children of the ruling elite such as the presidents of Kosovo and Albania were educated there (Sabah, 2018). In addition, the concerns about the rule of law resulting from their EU integration process prevented Western Balkan states from giving the support expected by the Turkish government to its fight against the FETÖ. In light of these developments, this study examines the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Western Balkans following the July 15 coup attempt. The first part will address international developments regarding the region. In the second part, the relations between Turkey and the region before the AKP governments will be explained. After evaluating the foreign policy of the AKP in the Western Balkans before July 15, the transformation of Turkish foreign policy following the coup attempt will be discussed. The last part will evaluate Turkey’s relations with the individual Western Balkan states, and the concluding section will consider Turkish foreign policy toward the region following July 15 more generally. By examining the transformation of Turkey’s Western Balkan foreign policy after July 15 in detail, this analysis seeks to explain how July 15 was a breaking point that changed Turkish foreign policy fundamentally.

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1 The Power Vacuum in the Western Balkans The Western Balkan region has experienced turbulent times in the international arena in recent decades. It experienced civil wars in the aftermath of the Cold War, after which it became open to the influence of the US and NATO allies, also accompanied by military interventions. During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the Serbian government tried to prevent separation while the constituent republics sought their independence—a bloody process that divided the former Yugoslav federation into seven states. Among these, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) witnessed the Srebrenica massacre, one of the greatest human tragedies in Europe since the Second World War and the first legally documented genocide in the world, during which Serbian soldiers brutally murdered over 8,000 Bosnian civilians (Herman, 2006: 409–410). In the first decade of the 2000s, the region turned into the subject of the EU enlargement process. However, in the 2010s, it moved away from the focus of the EU and the US and started to whet the appetite of Russia, China, and Turkey (Lika, 2015: 62–63).

1.1 The Failure of EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans The relevance and influence of the EU in the Western Balkans started to increase in the first decade of the 2000s, with the diminishing interest of the US in the region. Back in the 1990s, the US military presence was remarkable; various interventions were carried out under Washington’s supervision. The wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, as well as the 2001 uprising in (North) Macedonia were unmissable opportunities for the US to demonstrate its military and political superiority, but also to show its interest in European security matters in the post-Cold War context. As the American interests shifted to the Middle East after the September 11 attacks, Washington demanded more responsibility from the EU in terms of its regional security. With the precondition that the Western Balkan region is included in the EU integration process, the Bush administration started to withdraw troops as of 2001. As a result, the diplomatic, economic, and military effectiveness of the Brussels engagement in the Western Balkans became more prominent (Uzgel, 2013: 690). In the new setting, the task of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended in 2004 and was replaced by the EU Force (EUFOR). For example, while the US financial aid to Balkan countries was $621 million in 2002, it went down to $284 million in 2010 (Arı & Pirinççi, 2011: 26). Adversely affected by civil wars in its neighborhood, the EU started to expand toward the Balkans to increase stability in the region. The November 2000 EUWestern Balkans summit held in Croatia was critical. Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) were signed with North Macedonia in 2004, Albania in 2006, and Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008 in exchange for a

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commitment to carry out reforms requested by the Brussels authorities (Djurovi´c & Ja´cimovi´c, 2014: 12–13). Another summit in June 2003 initiated the “BalkanEuropean Integration Process,” which stipulated that the countries in the region could become EU members if they complied with the Copenhagen Criteria (Uzgel, 2013: 691). Slovenia’s accession to the EU in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the provision of EU financial assistance, and the expansion of visa liberalization opportunities gradually increased the EU’s effectiveness and weight in the region. However, after the membership of Croatia in 2013, the enlargement of the EU came to a complete halt. In addition to the problems related to the EU’s absorption capacity, the European debt crisis experienced by the member states in parallel with the financial and economic crises elsewhere in the world also had an impact on the overall mood and developments. Western Balkan countries were more negatively affected by the crisis due to their economic and financial vulnerability (Barlett & Prica, 2011: 4–5). The so-called Berlin Process, initiated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2014 for the Western Balkans, was another vital step toward solving the problems between the countries of the region. The EU aimed to offer non-members a perspective of full membership within acceptable time limits. Regional economic cooperation was the expected outcome of the Berlin Process in the medium and long run. More precisely, the integration of the Western Balkans into the European energy system in all respects was one of the key goals, since the region has constituted an important cornerstone in European energy supply security (Griessler, 2020). Although important steps were taken in the first stage of the Berlin Process, the image and credibility of the EU were damaged, especially due to the bottleneck in the integration of Skopje and Tirana. Despite the accession talks with Serbia (18 of 35 chapters) and Montenegro (all chapters), Brussels has appeared reluctant toward the Western Balkans (Periši´c, 2021: 98–100). Due to the veto of North Macedonia’s membership process by Bulgaria, Albania (whose negotiation process is progressing in parallel with that of North Macedonia) could not make any progress on the EU path. The suspension of the EU enlargement by the 2010s left the Western Balkans almost alone and a “power vacuum” had emerged, in terms of both politics and security (Lika, 2015: 59; Vraˇci´c, 2016: 5).

1.2 Russia, China, and Turkey as Alternative Power Centers The indecision and uncertainty within the EU toward the Western Balkans inspired other actors’ interest in the region’s geostrategic significance. Among those, Russia, China, and Turkey have stood out. The region is of symbolic importance to Russia’s foreign policy, in addition to the historic and cultural, but also geostrategic value. Many Russian politicians saw the collapse of Yugoslavia as the first attempt at “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet era (Ydyrys, 2017), and therefore the Kremlin has taken some steps to strengthen its influence in the region since the end of the Cold War. In the 2010s, Moscow was determined to take advantage of the absence of

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Brussels and Washington, and the crises faced across the region. For the Russians, this was also an opportunity to fuel problems in the courtyard of the EU and NATO. Two main factors enabled Russian political initiatives in the Western Balkans: first, some countries failed to fully integrate into the EU and NATO, and second, the EU has turned a blind eye in front of the region’s corrupt politicians and their incitement to vulgar nationalism instead of European values (Hodži´c, 2016). China became the third most important actor in the region with its economic investments as part of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative (Shopov, 2021). Projects such as a bridge over the sea in southern Croatia, modernization of the Serbian telephone administration, and construction of a highway in Montenegro to connect Belgrade and the Adriatic Sea can be considered among the moves made by China to influence the region. One of the most important moments of China’s economic expansion to the Western Balkans was the purchase of the Greek port of Piraeus in April 2016 and making it the second-largest port in the Mediterranean (Rhode, 2021: 394–395). China has gradually improved its penetration in culture and media sectors. All these initiatives have weakened the economic sphere of influence of the EU and caused the region to move away from the economic umbrella of the EU (Larsen, 2020: 3). While Russia has been influential in the Slavic countries Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey has marked an effective presence in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Northern Macedonia, where Muslim communities live (Lika, 2015: 62–63). Due to the historical and cultural ties with the region and the decrease in the interest of the US and the EU in the Balkans, Turkey has wanted to seize new opportunities. Especially since the late 2000s, Ankara has embraced an approach referred to as neo-Ottomanism (Öktem, 2012). Conservative and traditionalist Erdo˘gan governments have relied on culture, religion, and other soft power mechanisms, which are based on the “historical allure of Pax Ottomanica for Balkan Muslims” (Rašidagi´c & Hesová, 2020: 97). While Turkey’s ties with the region are shaped culturally and historically, it also operates through investments in economic fields such as banking and construction, similar to China. However, since the EU has come to perceive the increasing presence of Russia, China, and Turkey in the Western Balkans as a threat to its own interests, the Brussels leadership has rekindled the EU’s approach toward its neglected backyard. This perception of threat is visible in French president Emmanuel Macron’s speech at the European Parliament in 2018 when he said that he did not want the region to turn away: “I don’t want a Balkans that turns toward Turkey or Russia” (Radosavljevi´c & Morgan, 2018). By stating that if the EU did not offer a real perspective to the region, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz also remarked that “other superpowers—China, Russia, or Turkey—will play a bigger role there” (Reuters, 2021). The European Commission, which adopted a strategy document for the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans in 2018, announced a series of actions to revive the reform momentum across the region. As noted, Montenegro and Serbia, which are the most advanced in the negotiation process, could become members in 2025 if they fulfill the necessary reforms and membership conditions. In February 2020, the European Commission reformed the methodology of its enlargement policy under the title

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of “Enhancing the accession process: A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans.” The new approach has reorganized thirty-five negotiation chapters under six key policy clusters, suggesting that the new methodology will be applied in the negotiation process of Albania and North Macedonia (Suboti´c & Omeragi´c, 2021). Later, in October 2021, EU enlargement was brought up again at a summit hosted by Slovenia, whose attendees reiterated their promise of membership to the Western Balkans, two decades ago. During the summit, EU representatives agreed that the countries of the region can become EU members upon successful fulfillment of the criteria. All these steps expose the EU’s concern that has arisen from the growing influence of Russia, China, and Turkey in the region. As the Slovenian prime minister Janez Janša has put it, “[t]he European Union is the biggest investor in the region. But in those areas, we have competitors. There is also China, Russia, Turkey. They are also coming with the investment, and they are not conditioning this. We are conditioning this with European standards, the rule of law reforms, which is OK if there is a light at the end of the tunnel. But if the EU membership perspective is not granted, then I think we will start to lose this competition battle … I think that nobody or almost nobody from the Western Balkans wants to be part of China, Russia, or Turkey. They want to be part of the European Union. But if this perspective is not real, then we are losing momentum and we are at a crucial moment” (Koutsokosta, 2021). In fact, since the late 2010s, the EU has been trying to develop a new perspective for the region, recognizing the political, economic, and security risks posed by its neglect of the Western Balkans.

2 Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Western Balkans Before 2002 The Balkan region has always had special importance for Turkey. During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, economic and cultural activities were mainly carried out in Istanbul and the Balkans, let alone the fact that 62 of the 215 Grand Viziers of the empire were of Balkan origin (Sancaktar, 2010: 329). The constitutional movements over the last years of the empire, and the opinion leaders who were influential in the establishment of the Turkish Republic, were also of Balkan origin. With the 1877– 1878 Ottoman-Russian war, waves of immigration from the Balkans to Turkey began and lasted for almost 120 years. The last wave of migration occurred in the 1990s due to the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. The Ottoman legacy, including ethnic and religious affiliations as well as strong kinship relations, has made the Balkans in general remain emotionally attached to Turkey (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 4). However, from the early days of the Republic, as an extension of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s understanding of “Peace at Home, Peace in the World,” governments have been sensitive to avoid attitudes that would give the impression of meddling in the internal affairs of other sovereign states in the Balkans.

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It is hardly possible to object to the view that this foreign policy stance—consistently followed until the AKP governments, with a short break during the prime ministry (1983–1989) and presidency (1989–1993) of Turgut Özal—contributed to Turkey’s foreign and security policies. As will be discussed in detail later, the perception of the Ottoman heritage in the region did not always provide positive results as envisioned by Turkey. Since the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, when the Ottoman army under the command of Sultan Murad IV defeated the forces of Serbian Prince Lazar, there is a negative perception of Turks in some Western Balkan societies. For Christians in the Balkans, this war is a symbol of resistance against the Ottomans and Ottoman heritage. Balkan nations fought for their national independence against the Ottoman Empire from the beginning of the nineteenth century, which strengthened the negative perception toward the Turks. The memory of these experiences continues in many parts of the Western Balkan region even today (Lika, 2015: 58). In the twentieth century during the Soviet control in the Balkans, Turkey was “absent from the region” (Rašidagi´c & Hesová, 2020: 97). Subsequently, the collapse of socialism provided the Ankara authorities with greater maneuverability in their dealings, including the foreign policy, in the Balkans—an involvement additionally inspired by the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia (Demirta¸s, 2015). Parallel to these developments, a neo-Ottoman approach began to emerge in Turkey in the 1980s. Its advocates saw Turkey as the center of Islamic civilization in a geography stretching from Central Asia to the Balkans (Solberg, 2007: 434), and argued that this capacity should be exploited in foreign policy. When this search for a new orientation in foreign policy overlapped with the collapse of Yugoslavia, favorable conditions to apply such a strategy arose. Although Turkey aimed to fill the power gap with neo-Ottomanism in the early 1990s, this policy was soon abandoned. When ethnic conflicts broke out in the region in a short time, Ankara changed its attitude toward the Balkans by evaluating the realities of the region, its capacity, and the positions of other major actors more soundly. Turkey carried out an effective diplomatic and military activity during the Yugoslav wars, to “prove its importance to the Western world” (Demirta¸s, 2013: 168). In fact, the then foreign policy was in full harmony with those adopted by its Western allies, especially the US (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 7). Turkey’s active role commenced with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) and then continued with strong support for Kosovo’s independence, following an earlier confrontation in the late 1990s. With some exceptions, Turkish decision-makers avoided unilateral initiatives and acted jointly with the US and international organizations (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 7; Solberg, 2007: 435; Uzgel, 2013: 690), which is fully in line with Atlanticism (Rašidagi´c & Hesová, 2020: 101). In December 1995, the Implementation Force (IFOR, later renamed to Stabilization Force), consisting of 60,000 soldiers, was formed to ensure and supervise the implementation of the Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnian war and to prevent reemergence of conflict. Turkey participated in IFOR under the command of NATO with 1,500 soldiers. After the Kosovo war, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), consisting of 50,000 soldiers, was deployed to Kosovo under the command of NATO,

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while the political and social administration was left to the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Turkey joined KFOR with 1,000 soldiers stationed near Mamusa, Dragusha, and Prizren, where the Turks lived. In short, Turkey has played an important role in post-conflict peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in the region with its military and police forces (ISAC, 2011: 7). Even today, Turkey is among the countries that contribute to these missions the most. However, at the beginning of the new millennium, as the EU had begun to set the agenda for the Western Balkans, Turkey started to lose the influence it had gained in the previous decade; this was due to the change in regional dynamics and the priority given to the Middle East in foreign policy. Between 1999 and 2002, during the coalition government of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Turkey employed a limited openness toward the Balkans. Ismail Cem, the foreign minister of the coalition government, abandoned the role of “brother” and emphasized the discourse of “countries with which we share a common history” (Uzgel, 2013: 693). Cem tried to benefit from Turkey’s historical and sociological richness in placing Turkish foreign policy on a more pluralistic and versatile route. He was in favor of Turkey blending the Eastern and Western elements in its identity and establishing closer relations with non-Western geographies (Özel, 2014). These efforts also paved the way to the policies followed in the first decade of the 2000s by AKP governments. In fact, some observers even argue that a much more active foreign policy was implemented toward kin and coreligious communities in the Western Balkans during the Foreign Ministry of Cem compared to the period of the AKP (Solberg, 2007: 436). All in all, the end of the conflicts in the region, and the EU and NATO membership processes of Western Balkan states did not leave much choice for Turkey to become effective in regional politics (Uzgel, 2013: 707).

3 The AKP Governments and the Western Balkans The AKP came to power following the 2002 general elections. While initially accepted as a party that valued freedom and democracy, it has gradually become more authoritarian or inclined toward left-liberal policies. According to Nilüfer Narlı (2019: 57), the long-lasting AKP-dominated governments can be divided into three periods: the liberal period (2002–2008), the period characterized by a move away from liberal policies (2008–2014), and the so-called period of a new Turkey (post2014). Veysel Kurt (2019) considers these periods in terms of foreign policy and thus talks about a time when international politics seemed relatively predictable (2002– 2010), a time when regional turbulence began (2010–2015), and a time when turbulence peaked (post-2015). However, Asli Aydınta¸sba¸s (2019: 4), offers a different three-term classification when looking at Ankara’s foreign policy toward the Western Balkans; in her view, the first term was shaped by the Atlanticist approach cultivated in the early years, the second was shaped by the foreign policy based on the Ottoman legacy when Davuto˘glu was influential, and finally, the third is a term of

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Erdo˘gan’s consolidation of his own power, complemented with a strong emphasis on the imperial past and additional trade cooperation. One thing these three classifications have in common is that AKP was more liberal in the beginning. Back then the foreign policy model was also partially compatible with the traditional understanding; it was centered on international legitimacy and as such, it did not question the existing alliance system and the international status quo. Indeed, there were some elements of continuity in Turkish foreign policy toward the Balkans, which were rooted in the 1990s. They included the continuation of the order established with the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the support for the Albanians’ efforts for autonomy/independence in Kosovo, the advocacy for Western Balkan countries’ NATO membership, the presence of Turkey in the region as much as possible, and the protection Turks in the region (Uzgel, 2013: 694). This period lasted roughly until 2008 or until the moment when the European debt crisis intersected with the general elections in Turkey. With the 2007 presidential election and then the 2008 general elections, the AKP consolidated its power and started to become more prominent in domestic and foreign policy. This coincided with the decline in Turkey’s relations with the EU since the government—it gained enough power to act independently of the traditional foreign policy principles—began to move away from the Western axis in foreign policy. However, there are different opinions about the duration and conclusion of the second period; while some cite 2014 (the beginning of a new Turkey), others see 2015 (the peak of turbulence in foreign policy) as the turning point. This study considers 2016 as the second turning point due to the profound impact of the July 15 coup attempt on both domestic and foreign policy. After July 15, even the decades-old alliance structure of Turkey in foreign policy has become questionable. Relations with the US and NATO have declined, and close relations with Russia have been established. More precisely, the military and security axis has changed so much that Turkey has taken the risk of moving away from the NATO axis and buying an air defense system (S-400) from Russia, one of NATO’s biggest threats.

3.1 Neo-Ottomanism and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans In the first years of the AKP, the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy, namely Westernism, the pursuit of international legitimacy, and the preservation of the status quo (Oran, 2004), were largely followed and never questioned to any large extent. However, with the 2008 electoral victory, the AKP invested efforts in the consolidation of its power. The weakening of Turkey’s EU membership prospect also contributed to the decision to question and reconsider the traditional foreign policy understanding. The shift, while not seeking international legitimacy nor really caring

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about Western institutions, challenged the international status quo. In the literature, this approach is often called neo-Ottomanism (Ça˘gaptay, 2009; Tüysüzo˘glu, 2013; Uzgel & Yaramı¸s, 2010; Yavuz, 2020). Neo-Ottomanism, first voiced by Özal and his fellow journalists, writers, and politicians in the early 1990s, came to the fore again in the first decade of the 2000s, with the AKP coming to power. This also meant a “reinvention” of Turkey’s approach toward the Western Balkans (Huski´c, 2020: 83). Neo-Ottomanism takes its foundations from the Turkish Islamic efforts emerging with the 1980 military coup. By referring to the Ottoman past, it envisioned a policy that considers Turkey as the big brother of the former Ottoman territories (Balkans and the Middle East) and kinship communities (Central Asia). Aiming to fill the power vacuum that emerged after the end of the Cold War in the Balkans, Turkey claimed to maintain order in the region, relying on Ottoman domination that lasted for nearly five centuries. Neo-Ottomanism has been adopted as the ideology of the religious/conservative segment in Turkey, which considers itself as the antithesis of Kemalism (Uzgel & Yaramı¸s, 2010: 36). The neo-Ottomanists saw the Islamic identity and Ottoman past as important assets for Turkey to pursue a more assertive foreign policy and argued that Turkey had a legitimate claim to be a regional power (Rašidagi´c & Hesová, 2020: 102). They belittled the loyalty to the borders of the National Pact and the status quo, which is considered the basis of Kemalist foreign policy. This is what makes neoOttomanism a deviation from the traditional Turkish approach; they argued that Turkey should follow a more active foreign policy that does not bind itself with such borders. Accordingly, the region where this policy produced the most tangible results was the Western Balkans (Lika, 2015: 58). Ahmet Davuto˘glu was among the leading ideologues and practitioners of neo-Ottomanism, although it was him who stated that “[t]he term neo-Ottomanism is a malicious approach. I refused it at every opportunity, but someone else used the term specifically to evoke fear, as an impulse to reckon with the past, and to minimize our growing influence in this region” (Hürriyet, 2011). In his role of the architect of the AKP foreign policy until July 15, Davuto˘glu argued that principles such as security for everyone, regional ownership, high-level political dialogue, and economic dependency should be taken seriously when dealing with the Balkans. In his view, the Balkans represented a key geopolitical spot, both as the main belt of the Eurasian continent descending from the steppes to the Mediterranean, and as a place of high geocultural importance because of the region’s position between the East and the West (Davuto˘glu, 2001: 120). Due to the 2007 global financial crisis, several eurozone member states were unable to pay their debt on their own. The crisis turned into a debt crisis at the European level toward the end of 2009. Since Western Balkan countries were the most economically and financially fragile in Europe, they were affected the most; they were left alone by the EU and their membership processes started to slow down. Turkey saw that setting as an opportunity for a greater engagement in the Western Balkans. In his famous speech in Sarajevo in 2009, Davuto˘glu underlined the success of the Ottoman centuries of the Balkans, with the promise that the golden age of the Balkans could be recaptured. He called on the countries of the region to reintegrate

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under the leadership of Turkey to make the Balkans and the Middle East come to occupy a truly important place in the world, as it was during the Ottoman period: “Like in the sixteenth century, which saw the rise of the Ottoman Balkans as the center of world politics, we will make the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, together with Turkey, the center of world politics. This is the objective of Turkish foreign policy, and we will achieve this. We will reintegrate the Balkan region, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, based on the principle of regional and global peace, for the future, not only for all of us but for all of humanity” (Davuto˘glu, 2011).

3.2 Regional Ownership and Inclusiveness as Part of the Western Balkans Policy At the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) Summit on June 23, 2010, in Istanbul, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010) revealed Ankara’s position vis-à-vis the Balkans: “Our Chairmanship’s motto ‘from shared history to common future’ is the expression of our understanding of the Balkans.” The day before, in preparation for the summit, Davuto˘glu had hosted a meeting with key participants (different ministers of foreign affairs), during which he stated that Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Balkans consisted of two basic principles: regional ownership (the countries of the region working together voluntarily to solve their problems) and inclusiveness (acting by taking into account the attitudes of all parties) (Koç & Önsoy, 2018: 358–361). Defense, economic cooperation, culture-inspired exchanges, and the rights of Muslims in the region dominated the AKP’s agenda (Narlı, 2019: 75–76). Looking at the Brussels administration, policies concerning visa-free travel, cultural diplomacy, and stronger economic relations were the main features of the EU’s neighborhood policy (Demirta¸s, 2015: 133). In this period, Turkey was influential in the implementation of tripartite consultation mechanisms, especially between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, and between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 9–10). Many high-level visits took place between 2009 and 2013, bringing Bosnian and Serbian representatives to the same table; the Serbs eventually condemned the massacres in Srebrenica (Vraˇci´c, 2016: 10) and committed themselves not to challenge Bosnia’s territorial integrity (Rašidagi´c & Hesová, 2020: 103). These mechanisms confirmed Turkey’s strategic importance and paved the way for Ankara to become a key mediator in the Western Balkan region (Vraˇci´c et al., 2017: 184). Turkish soft power strategy was conceptualized around four pillars: education, Islamic history, religious institutions, and media/popular culture (Rašidagi´c & Hesová, 2020: 105). To pursue its mission, Ankara relied on organizations such as the Yunus Emre Institute, Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs), the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), and different nongovernmental organizations. For

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example, while the T˙IKA was established in 1992, the YTB and the Yunus Emre Institute were both established under the AKP governments; all three still carry out activities such as public diplomacy, development assistance, and cultural and educational activities within their fields. In addition, the Diyanet embraced public diplomacy and foreign policy as a tool to influence developments in the Balkans. By sending imams to areas with a Turkish population in Europe, it has tried to break the influence of other Muslim communities on Turks and to preserve the TurkishSunni understanding of Islam. The Diyanet’s activities primarily targeted places where Turkey’s neo-Ottoman aspirations and religious foreign policy understanding intersected (Öztürk & Gözaydın, 2018: 335). Meanwhile, many Islamic Communities and sects began to intensify their activities in the region. In particular, the Süleymancılar, Menzil community, and Gülen movement (FETÖ) operated through student houses, educational institutions, commercial enterprises, and nongovernmental organizations. Their activities were easily accepted as they came with a moralist, quietist, and neo-Sufi understanding of Islam (Rašidagi´c & Hesová, 2020: 106). Schools and universities established by the Gülen movement were recognized as high-quality educational institutions to which the local elites also sent their children. The movement’s activities were strongly supported by the AKP government on the grounds that they contributed to Turkey’s soft power and public diplomacy. The support coming from the government, including diplomats and other public officials at the highest level, resulted in a rapid recognition and strengthening of the Gülen movement across the Western Balkans. Before July 15, there had been many active institutions and companies known for their links to the FETÖ and operating in all sorts of fields; for example, the movement had fifteen schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, twelve in Albania, seven in North Macedonia, five in Kosovo, and one in Serbia (Anatolia Agency, 2016).

4 July 15 Coup Attempt and the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy July 15 represented a turning point, with a major impact on Turkish domestic politics as well as the country’s foreign policy. Most obviously, the authoritarian tendencies of the AKP government increased. With the declaration of a state of emergency, operations against FETÖ gained momentum, as it was clear that FETÖ members had infiltrated themselves into the most private parts of the state. As part of the government’s accelerated efforts to concentrate power, a new system was shortly adopted allowing Erdo˘gan to gain full control over domestic and foreign policy. This meant that he was in a position to completely abandon institutional practices pursued until that point (Kiri¸sci & Toygur, 2019: 6). In the new context, foreign policy became pragmatic; it moved away from the liberal or Atlanticist policy followed in the first period (2002–2008) and the neoOttoman policy followed in the second period (2008–2016). In fact, the pragmatic

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or opportunist approach started to express itself a few months before the failed coup attempt, during the fight against a parallel state structure (Rašidagi´c & Hesová, 2020: 97). The statements of Binali Yıldırım, who became a prime minister after Davuto˘glu, reveal the change in foreign policy: “Turkey will make a significant effort to regain old friends and make new friends” (Keyman, 2017: 64). Moreover, Ankara welcomed “moral realism” instead of Davuto˘glu’s “civilizational realism” —a shift that combines “hard power-based military assertiveness and humanitarian norms in addition to new capacity—and strategy-based parameters” (Keyman, 2017: 55). While the new policy was based on the Sunni-Islamic identity, and especially in light of the civil wars in Libya and Syria, it favored revisionism in terms of relations with the West. Such an attitude was closely related to the suspicion that some Western states, especially the US, were behind the coup attempt. The government thought that the Western allies did not react adequately and failed to provide sufficient support to the handling of the coup-related chaos. As a result, decision-makers started to question the loyalty and friendship of NATO partners (TRT World, 2021). The fact that FETÖ leader Fethullah Gülen was living in the US was also among the factors that shaped the government’s perceptions of the US (Ak, 2016: 1). In response to all this, Erdo˘gan ended up seeking new friendships and he got closer to Russia and China. One of the outcomes of improving ties with Moscow was to purchase Russian S-400 missiles despite Washington’s objections and threat to remove Turkey from project F-35 (Gürsel, 2019). With regard to Western Balkan countries, Ankara dropped the dimensions of kinship ties and common history, which was one of the most important changes in Turkish foreign policy at that time. Instead, it adopted a uniform approach toward the region as a whole. As revealed by foreign minister Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu, Turkey left its “artificial differentiation” approach: “In the region, we advocate avoiding artificial divisions and prioritize the principles of inclusion and regional ownership” (Çavu¸so˘glu, 2016: 48).

5 Turkish Foreign Policy and the Western Balkans Following July 15 By the end of the Davuto˘glu period, the AKP’s relations with the Western Balkans had started to deteriorate. One reason was the states’ concerns about Turkey’s neoOttoman aspirations, while the other was connected to the political crisis in Turkey, which started with the 2013 Gezi Park events,1 and then continued with the December 17–25 process.2 Before July 15, Turkey’s official rhetoric had caused suspicion in 1

On May 31, what began as a local demonstration against the demolition of a public park in Istanbul escalated into anti-government protests of unprecedented proportions in Turkish modern history (Can Gürcan & Peker, 2015: 321). 2 The process involved major corruption charges involving four cabinet ministers and their relatives, as well as a number of state bureaucrats.

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the Western Balkans about Ankara’s neutrality, with a potential to deepen divisions among different ethnic groups (Vraˇci´c, 2016: 6). Expectations evolving around economic assistance that Turkey had promised to the region did not materialize either; despite its economic growth, which inspired greater commitment to the region, Turkey did not become its strong economic partner. Nevertheless, after July 15, historical and cultural ties continued to be an important feature of the AKP’s approach toward the Western Balkans. The statements of ˙Ibrahim Kalın, Erdo˘gan’s chief foreign policy adviser, are significant in this sense: “No Turk considers Sarajevo, Mostar, Pristine, Skopje, or Novi Pazar distant places. Balkan Muslims feel the same about Istanbul, Bursa, Konya, and cities in Anatolia.” According to Kalın, Turkey shares “a geography of mind and heart” with the Balkans (Kalın, 2018). Viewed from this perspective, neo-Ottomanism continued even after the July 15 coup attempt (Öztürk & Gözaydın, 2018: 349). Still, the way foreign policy is implemented has changed. Instead of an ideological approach as Davuto˘glu advocated, Erdo˘gan preferred a pragmatic one, with an “erratic decision-making and authoritarian streak” (Rašidagi´c & Hesová, 2020: 104–105). He started to use international relations for domestic policy consumption so he could obtain the time and room for maneuver needed in domestic politics. In the Western Balkans, Erdo˘gan established personal relations with whoever was in power, regardless of their political views. Close friendships with the Serbian nationalist Aleksandar Vuˇci´c (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 17) and with the Albanian socialist Edi Rama (Madhi, 2021: 158) are good examples. Heads of state and governments of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia were among the special guests of Erdo˘gan when he took an oath at the new presidential palace in Ankara on July 9, 2018. The same leaders were again together with Erdo˘gan at the opening of Istanbul Airport, which started operating in October 2018. All this was a major recognition for Western Balkan leaders, who felt excluded by the Brussels authorities—they were welcomed by Turkey, and Erdo˘gan felt good about his power and regional leadership. When FETÖ was declared a terrorist organization in the aftermath of July 15, the attitudes of other countries and the status of FETÖ-affiliated institutions there became important determinants of Turkish foreign policy. Due to the identity-building importance of the Western Balkans for AKP’s foreign policy, great emphasis has been placed on the fight against FETÖ in the region. However, this has not been as easy as expected. On the night of the coup attempt, Western Balkan leaders gave their full support to Erdo˘gan (and to Turkey, more broadly). His Albanian friend, prime minister Rama, wrote on Twitter: “Happy for the brotherly Turkish people and our valuable friend president Erdo˘gan for going out—with full success—from a very difficult night.” And his Bosniak friend, a member of the presidency, Bakir Izetbegovi´c also revealed his support by writing the following: “My message to my brother Erdo˘gan is that he has strong support here, among us in Bosnia” (Vraˇci´c, 2016: 31). Still, these leaders did not show an enthusiastic attitude toward closing down the institutions and organizations affiliated with FETÖ. The Albanian Council of Ministers decided to close FETÖ-affiliated schools in 2020, thus four years after the coup attempt. The fact that the children of the Kosovo prime minister were students

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in FETÖ schools brought up allegations that the prime minister himself was under FETÖ influence. Over the years, FETÖ had been active in the Western Balkans and allowed to establish an effective organizational structure.3 Since it operated in areas such as education, tourism, and media broadcasting, it was also present in the bureaucracy thanks to the fact that those who had been educated in FETÖ schools were eventually given jobs in the public sector (Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 61). In addition to schools, FETÖ ran thirty-three NGOs in the Balkans, most of which were in the Western Balkans (Polis Akademisi Ba¸skanlı˘gı, 2018: 54). It should be noted that Turkey had actually started to fight FETÖ before July 15. The Maarif Foundation, which was established to create an alternative to FETÖ schools abroad, was one of the tools employed. The number of FETÖ schools taken over by the Maarif Foundation by mid-2021 reached 220 in nineteen countries, and with the newly opened schools, the total number increased to 363. The foundation has remained in contact with 37 countries expecting the transfer of FETÖ-affiliated schools (TRT Haber, 2021).

5.1 Albania Turkey considers Albania as a country of strategic importance for stability and lasting peace in the Balkans, and Ankara has openly supported Tirana’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). With military and security cooperation being deemed crucial, Turkey has provided robust support in the fields of training, logistics, and modernization (Çavu¸so˘glu, 2016). In addition, Erdo˘gan has stressed the significance of interaction in the economic and cultural heritage spheres. He has also stressed that the two parties’ authorities agree on the threat posed by FETÖ to both (Hürriyet, 2021). FETÖ has been highly influential in Albania. The organization, which started its activities in Albania with the 1993-established Gülistan Foundation had two universities, fourteen schools, and ten dormitories. With this capacity, it reached 6500 students in Albania alone. FETÖ attracted the children of Albanian senior businessmen, politicians, and bureaucrats by providing scholarships and better education, compared to other schools in the country. Consequently, it matured into a solid 3

After the coup attempt, different ministries prepared reports on FETÖ activities within their own fields. As disclosed, 19,660 students attended FETÖ schools in the Balkans, and the majority of them were in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In Albania alone, under FETÖ supervision there were two universities, ten high schools, five of which were madrasas, four primary schools, five kindergartens, and ten dormitories; there were 6,500 students, the highest figure among Balkan countries. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FETÖ controlled one university, four high schools, six primary schools, four kindergartens, and ten dormitories; there were 2,800 students. In Kosovo, FETÖ was in charge of four high schools, three primary schools, three kindergartens, and six dormitories; there were 2,500 students. In North Macedonia, FETÖ had five high schools, one primary school, one kindergarten, and ten dormitories; there were 2,000 students. The country with the least number of students was Montenegro; there, ten people lived in one dormitory controlled by FETÖ (Karaku¸s, 2016).

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network in the political and economic circles (Polis Akademisi Ba¸skanlı˘gı, 2018: 55). Before July 15, Turkey demanded that Albania close FETÖ schools. During his visit on May 13, 2015, Erdo˘gan said: “I know this structure [FETÖ] also operates in Albania. With my brothers Edi Rama and Bujar Nishani, I have discussed this issue and I am sure that they will do the right thing” (Likmeta, 2015). However, this interference provoked some quite negative reactions from the government and parliamentarians, with the vast majority of deputies seeing Erdo˘gan’s request as unacceptable. As they argued, given that Albania was not a Turkish colony, there was no space for the “acting like a father” approach toward Albania (Vraˇci´c, 2016: 31). In October 2016, then Albanian foreign minister Ditmir Bushati paid an official visit to Turkey, which was described by foreign minister Çavu¸so˘glu as an indicator of solidarity between the two countries in the aftermath of July 15 (Çavu¸so˘glu, 2016). A couple of days later, the then president of Albania Bujar Nishani visited Turkey within the scope of the Seventh Bosphorus Summit. In December, upon the invitation from Erdo˘gan, he attended the opening ceremony of the Eurasia Tunnel held in Istanbul. His successor president Ilir Meta visited Turkey to attend the opening ceremonies of Istanbul Airport in October 2018, and then the Grand Çamlıca Mosque in May 2019. Prime minister Edi Rama visited Turkey in July 2017 to attend the twenty-second World Petroleum Congress, then he was received by Erdo˘gan at the summer palace in Marmaris in July 2019, within the framework of a special visit. In fact, the relationship between Rama and Erdo˘gan has been a special one. Rama states that he was inspired by Erdo˘gan’s Istanbul mayorship when he was the mayor of Tirana (Madhi, 2021: 158). He visited Erdo˘gan when he was a candidate for prime minister in 2013, which was “an unforgettable visit” (Madhi, 2021: 157). Since then, Rama has been visiting Turkey frequently. He was present at the wedding of Erdo˘gan’s daughter in 2016 as a witness. In addition, just before the 2021 elections, Erdo˘gan gifted a TC-ANA airplane, which was one of the official presidential planes of Turkey, to the Albanian government. He made another gesture to support Rama in the election process, by having a 150-bed hospital built in Albania during the Covid-19 pandemic. Years after the July 15 coup attempt, Albania decided to close three FETÖaffiliated schools (Hafiz Abdullah Zemblaku madrasah in Korça, Ali Korça madrasah in Kavaja, and Memorial International School of Tirana) in September 2020 (Avrupa’nın Sesi, 2020). Rama visited Turkey in January 2021 and met with Erdo˘gan to sign several agreements, including the transfer of a Tirana-based FETÖ university to the Maarif Foundation (Alta¸s & Beyaz, 2021). Nevertheless, many FETÖ schools and institutions have continued their activities in Albania. Turkey’s requests to extradite FETÖ members from Albania are persistently rejected or stalled by the Albanian authorities. For example, Muhammed Yasir Aydo˘gmu¸s—a member of the team that provided intelligence to the Twitter account of “Fuat Avni,” which was used by the FETÖ as a propaganda tool—was caught with his wife and two children while trying to cross the border in Albania with a fake passport in October 2017. The Durrës Court overturned the prosecutor’s detention order and decided to hold Aydo˘gmu¸s, pending trial. Aydo˘gmu¸s requested political asylum and protection in Albania. Following the verdict, the Turkish Embassy in Tirana appealed the decision. However, the court

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decided to re-detain Aydo˘gmu¸s, and as it turned out, Aydo˘gmu¸s escaped from the reception center with his wife and two daughters shortly afterward (Yeni S¸ afak, 2017). It is not certain whether the Albanian authorities acted negligently or deliberately in this case. In any case, the following statement by the Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs to his Turkish counterpart suggests that Albania is not really willing to fight the FETÖ: “Albania adheres to several important international documents relating to extraditions. Any such policy should follow the diplomatic route, and not press conferences” (Balkan Insight, 2018). Looking closely, the developments in the post-July 15 context show that relations between Turkey and Albania have become a matter of personal connections between key political leaders. As a result of proximity, there is a great deal of cooperation on pragmatic issues taking place between the two countries. However, due to the political dimension of Turkey’s fight against the FETÖ and the presence of an obviously influential FETÖ lobby in Albania, Tirana has refused to contribute to this fight and meet Turkey’s expectations.

5.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina A previously established close relationship between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina also continued in the aftermath of July 15. In terms of political and economic relations, both sides have always approached each other with a positive attitude. Mutual visits between decision-makers and cooperation agreements signed between the two countries in a variety of fields continued intensively after July 15. Turkey has supported the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and multiethnic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it has contributed to its EU and NATO integration. The Bosnian authorities applied for EU membership in February 2016, which is important to Turkey as well since it would provide Ankara with additional opportunities and logistics in terms of trade with the EU. Still, Bosnia and Herzegovina is home to numerous FETÖ initiatives and its leadership does not seem ready to take any major steps. Although Bakir Izetbegovi´c, chairman of the Presidential Council, has repeatedly stated that the FETÖ is a treacherous terrorist organization, the FETÖ-affiliated schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been closed down, which is a major disappointment for Turkey. Following an inspection in 2016, these schools were allowed to operate on the grounds that no evidence or violation was found (Vraˇci´c, 2016: 13). While closely following the activities of the FETÖ movement, Turkey still expects the Bosnian administration to take firm steps with regard to such schools (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 22). For example, the group of educational institutions “Bosnia Sema” changed hands twice, especially after the loss of students and reputation after July 15. The schools affiliated with the organization were transferred to the company US Global Education and then to the British Richmond Park Education, all within two years. The group, which hosts kindergartens, primary schools, and high schools in Sarajevo, Biha´c, Tuzla, and Zenica, as well as the International Burch University in Sarajevo, denies FETÖ

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affiliation. However, it is noteworthy that the last owner of the schools is the former director of the FETÖ-linked private Hay school in Denmark, while the representative of the same enterprise was previously the head of FETÖ-linked Feza Educational Institutions in Iraq (Aliju & Gül, 2018). The journalist Özer Özsaray is a good example of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s stance on FETÖ. Özsaray, who is wanted on FETÖ charges, has been detained in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2016. Turkey demanded his extradition, but the court decided in November 2018 that Özsaray could not be deported until the conclusion of the case. At the hearing held in December, the court decided to reject Turkey’s extradition request. The Turkish Embassy in Sarajevo objected to the decision in April 2019. The file was re-examined by the Ministry of Justice and the Board of Judges, which had the final say, who decided at the May 2019 meeting that the extradition of the journalist was not legally possible and that the appeal was closed. The decision emphasized that an organization called “FETÖ” was not recognized, according to the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sputnik‚ 2018).

5.3 Kosovo Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo, the day after its unilateral Declaration of Independence on February 17, 2008. There is an active Turkish community in Kosovo, and a large number of people of Kosovo origin live in Turkey. The existing historical, cultural, and other ties have served as an inspiration for the development of bilateral relations. The good nature of relations between Turkey and Kosovo after July 15 has been confirmed by the frequency of visits between their leaders. President Hashim Thaçi, who considers Turkey “the greatest ally of Kosovo” (Madhi, 2021: 161), paid an official visit to Turkey in December 2016 upon Erdo˘gan’s invitation. Later, in July 2018, Thaçi traveled to Turkey to attend Erdo˘gan’s swearing-in ceremony and then, three months later, to attend the opening ceremony of Istanbul Airport. Like Rama, Thaçi regularly uses expressions praising Erdo˘gan, some of which go so far as to call him one of the most powerful leaders in the world (T24, 2010). Thaçi expressed his loyalty to Erdo˘gan on the morning of July 16, immediately after the coup attempt. He condemned the attempts and declared his “support of the democratically elected government, and law and order in the country” (Madhi, 2021: 163). FETÖ operates in Kosovo through the Gülistan Educational Institutions and the Education and Culture Foundation. These enterprises provide kindergarten, primary, and high school education in Gjakova, Lipjan, Prishtina, and Prizren, and some of the schools offer dormitories for male and female students (Polis Akademisi Ba¸skanlı˘gı, 2018: 56). Kosovo, like Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, is hesitant to fulfill Turkey’s demands in relation to FETÖ. A 2018 development caused a political crisis and resulted in the dismissal of some public officials. More precisely, Kosovo extradited six alleged FETÖ members to Turkey in March 2018, all caught during an operation

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led by the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT). The next day, Kosovo prime minister Ramush Haradinaj stated that he was unaware of this incident and dismissed the Minister of Interior and the Intelligence Chief (Rašidagi´c & Hesová, 2020: 120). Erdo˘gan accused Haradinaj of acting on the orders of others (FETÖ) and asked the Kosovo authorities to do what was necessary. In his response, Haradinaj remarked that Turkey should not interfere in Kosovo’s internal affairs (Deutsche Welle Türkçe, 2018). On the other hand, president Thaçi supported Turkey in the fight against FETÖ: “If a person or organization is a terrorist for Turkey, it is a terrorist for Kosovo as well. We will not make any concessions on this issue, we will fight” (Milliyet, 2016). While Turkey’s relations with Kosovo were harmonious and without problems under Thaçi’s presidency, they did experience stagnation when he left office in November 2020.

5.4 Montenegro An important element of the relations between Turkey and Montenegro is the presence of Bosniaks and Albanians, who make up 17 percent of Montenegro’s population. Turkey is one of the most important diaspora countries of Montenegro, and the existence of related communities that migrated to Turkey at various points is an additional reason for robust bilateral relations (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). When Montenegro declared independence in 2006, Turkey was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with it. Ankara has given full support to Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic integration; the protocol regulating Montenegro’s accession to NATO was signed at the May 2016 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Brussels. In terms of official visits, Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovi´c visited Antalya in June 2020 on the occasion of the Southeast European Cooperation Process Summit and the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Subsequently, Erdo˘gan paid a visit to Montenegro (for the first time) in August 2021, during which he stated that Turkey strongly supports Montenegro’s NATO membership as well as the country’s EU membership aspirations. To contextualize Ankara’s engagement with the Balkans as one of the foreign policy priorities, Erdo˘gan stressed that Turkey has a historical responsibility toward the region. He underlined that the policy followed by Turkey in the Western Balkans increased the confidence of the respective countries (Turkish Presidency, 2021). In Montenegro, FETÖ is less effective compared to the rest of the Western Balkans. A language course in the capital Podgorica and a small student dormitory in the Bosniak-populated city of Rožaje are known for their proximity to the organization. However, there has been a sudden increase in the number of companies with Turkish capital in Montenegro in recent years. In 2017, more than 440 companies with Turkish capital were registered in the country. The number of such companies has increased almost six times in a single year. Nebojša Medojevi´c, one of the leaders of the Democratic Front, stated that most of the Turks who came to Montenegro are

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sympathizers of Fethullah Gülen, according to the information he obtained from sources at the Montenegro National Security Agency (Barukcic, 2018).

5.5 North Macedonia Turkey was the first state to recognize North Macedonia with its constitutional name and as a “nation,” and to appoint an ambassador in Skopje. Once the political crisis in North Macedonia had terminated in 2017, high-level visits between the two countries gained momentum. President Gjorge Ivanov paid an official visit to Turkey in February 2018 and then attended Erdo˘gan’s swearing-in ceremony in July. In the fall, Ivanov also attended the Ninth Bosphorus Summit in Istanbul (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). FETÖ members, who possess considerable power in North Macedonia, use the country as a transit route to other European destinations. Due to the visa exemption agreement, FETÖ members can easily enter North Macedonia. There, FETÖ is involved in a wide variety of areas ranging from education to trade, from the nongovernmental sector to political parties and state bureaucracy. In the capital and the towns of Gostivar, Struga, Strumica, and Tetovo, there are eight schools in total under the name Yahya Kemal College (YKC), covering the stages from kindergarten to college. Since 2016, as a result of Turkey’s attempts, two FETÖ-linked schools have been shut down. The printing of the newspaper Zaman Macedonia ceased in February 2019 due to financial difficulties, decreased public interest, and Turkey’s active struggle (˙Idriz & Aliju, 2019). The Democratic Union for Integration, a coalition partner of the Macedonian government, is an important political actor opposing the closure of FETÖ schools. Pi¸star Lutfiu, who served as the Minister of National Education and Science in the previous government, displayed a great resistance to closure requests at the Council of Ministers meeting. In an interview with Zaman Macedonia, he said: “Yahya Kemal Colleges operate under the law, this is what concerns us” (Sabah, 2017). The sign of FETÖ-affiliated Yahya Kemal College, located in the capital’s Macedonia Square, was removed in January 2018 and soon after replaced with the logos of Halkbank Skopje and the Turkish Maarif Foundation. One of the college’s two branches (in the Butel district) emptied its building due to the decrease in the number of students and was expected to end its activities in full (˙Idriz & Abdula, 2019). However, despite the good relations between the two countries, North Macedonia has not acted as willingly and enthusiastically as expected in Ankara.

5.6 Serbia The fact that Serbia is at the center of the Turkey–Western Europe route is a factor of utmost importance to Turkish citizens living in the West. In addition, Bosniaks,

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who have many relatives in Turkey, live in the Sandžak region of Serbia, and as such, the region is key in terms of bringing the parties closer and providing space for economic cooperation. In this context, apart from supporting lasting peace in the Balkans, Turkey has also supported Serbia’s integration with the EU. In the post-July 15 periods, Erdo˘gan visited Serbia in October 2017. Serbian president Vuˇci´c paid an official visit to Turkey in May 2018 and then again in June, as Erdo˘gan’s special guest at the opening ceremony of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). As stated earlier, Vuˇci´c also attended the opening of the new Istanbul Airport and Erdo˘gan’s inauguration ceremony as well. Finally, he visited Istanbul in September 2021 and had a closed meeting with Erdo˘gan. These visits point to an advanced level of Turkey–Serbia relations, as well as a close relationship between Erdo˘gan and Vuˇci´c. In 2017, during his visit to Belgrade, Erdo˘gan praised Serbia’s contribution to the fight against FETÖ: “I know how much my friend Vuˇci´c has fought against FETÖ. We will expel the gang called FETÖ from the Balkans as well as from this country. We have full confidence in Mr. Vuˇci´c. One of the first leaders to support us on the night of July 15 was him. With this stance, I would like to thank Mr. Vuˇci´c once again, on behalf of myself and my nation. He showed that he is our true friend” (Turkish Presidency, 2017). Erdo˘gan visited Serbia again in October 2019 to take part in the second meeting of the Turkey–Serbia High-Level Cooperation Council. At the joint press conference with Vuˇci´c, Erdo˘gan stated that Turkey plays a constructive role in the stability and prosperity of the Balkans: “We support the Euro-Atlantic orientation of the region. We are trying to help the countries of the region to increase their dialogue and cooperation by leaving the current problems behind.” Just before the press conference, several agreements were signed in the presence of both leaders.4 In Erdo˘gan’s view, “[o]ur cooperation has reached an excellent level. Undoubtedly, my esteemed friend has a great share and contribution in this” (Turkish Presidency, 2019). These statements reveal how well he has established relations with Vuˇci´c and how decisive personal contacts are in Turkey’s Serbian policy. Behind the personal dimension, as Erdo˘gan stated, lies Vuˇci´c’s support for him after the coup attempt. While there are countries in the Western Balkans that exist which are much closer to Turkey in terms of ethnicity, religion, or culture, Erdo˘gan has nevertheless established one of the best relations with Serbia and Vuˇci´c. This fact suggests that after July 15, idealism was abandoned in Turkish foreign policy, and while neo-Ottoman discourses decreased, a pragmatic approach was given a priority.

4

Military Framework Agreement, Security Cooperation Agreement, Science and Technology Cooperation Protocol, Cooperation Agreement in the Fields of Industry and Technology, Memorandum of Understanding on the Reconstruction of the Kasapcic Bridge, Memorandum of Understanding on the Implementation of Joint Patrol Police Services, Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Turkey Development Agency, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Fields of Family and Social Protection, and Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Electronic Communications and Postal Services.

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6 Conclusion Since July 15, Turkish foreign policy toward the Western Balkans has been characterized by both continuity and change; while the coup attempt has undeniably resulted in major shifts, there are certain strategies that the AKP has followed since coming to power. One of the crucial elements of continuity is the playing down and the surely limited role of the institutional structures such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other related ministries. Institutions such as T˙IKA, YTB, and the Yunus Emre Institute have preserved their importance in the implementation of foreign policy. In terms of education, while before July 15 it was monopolized by FETÖ-affiliated institutions, in the new setting it has nevertheless remained a relevant soft power but under different supervision. The Turkish authorities established the Maarif Foundation to break the FETÖ influence in the Western Balkans. Consequently, some FETÖ schools were transferred to the new foundation and some new schools were formed from scratch, controlled by the foundation. Neo-Ottomanism is an element of both continuity and change. Turkey has not abandoned the understanding of neo-Ottomanism in the region; however, its understanding is no longer based on dreams, but on realistic and pragmatic goals. For example, foreign minister Çavu¸so˘glu describes the Balkans as “the pearl of our heart’s geography” while stressing that Turkey is a country that everyone trusts, a country with an inclusive and embracing modus operandi (Çavu¸so˘glu, 2021: 13). The isolation of Turkey from international relations also played a role in the embracement of pragmatism. Confronted with the US and Russia in Syria, moved far away from the EU membership process, and excluded from the process of deciding energy routes in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey had no other choice but to become less selective in choosing its allies. The emphasis on history, religion, and culture has been replaced by the prospect of economic cooperation. The trauma and feeling of insecurity created by July 15 pushed Erdo˘gan to get closer to leaders who supported him right on the night of the coup attempt, such as Serbian president Vuˇci´c, known as an extreme nationalist. This friendship can only be explained by pragmatism and is in sharp contrast with an ideological neo-Ottoman approach. Moreover, the stagnation of Western Balkan countries’ EU membership processes has also contributed to the development of close bilateral relations. The weakening of an EU perspective increased the influence of individual leaders and decreased the role of institutions in foreign policy. As authoritarian and populist leaders gained power, they began to form partnerships with similar characters. Still, the claim according to which there are close relations between the leaders of the region is highly questionable, if not a pure illusion. For example, no country has yet taken any concrete steps with regard to FETÖ. The transfer of some FETÖ-affiliated institutions to Turkey or the extradition of some FETÖ members cannot be interpreted as an indicator of the general trend in relations but as a deviation. Six FETÖ members extradited to Turkey by Kosovo caused a political crisis in Kosovo. In addition, in response to the closure of FETÖ schools or the pressure put on those institutions, students and their families organized protests in various countries. In addition, these

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countries refrain from supporting Turkey’s fight against the FETÖ on the grounds of Turkey’s notorious human rights and rule of law record. In short, good relations between leaders do not always mean good relations between countries. The EU has neglected the Western Balkan region for a long time, which has let actors such as Turkey, Russia, and China gain influence. Still, the EU’s interest in the region has recently started to increase again, as confirmed by the October 2021 Western Balkans Summit. On the other hand, if the EU fails to meet the membership expectations in the medium term, the Western Balkans may again turn their direction and welcome China, Russia, and Turkey, possibly even more than before. As rightly observed by Rama of Albania, unless Western Balkan countries become full members of the EU, they will remain under pressure from other political forces (Orlandi, 2021). The re-acceleration of the EU membership process may provide advantages for Turkish–Western Balkan relations as well. The region is on the main route between Turkey and the EU, and therefore it is of great significance for Turkey’s trade with the EU. The seemingly good relations between Turkey and the Western Balkans in the aftermath of July 15 may not be long term, since they are dependent on personal relations between the leaders. Various anti-Turkey circles, pro-FETÖ groups and individuals, and political elements that are extremely critical of the AKP are widespread and quite influential across the region. Under such conditions, Turkey needs to reconstruct its relations with Western Balkan countries based on international law and well-known diplomatic mechanisms. It is reasonable to believe that populist authoritarianism will decline when the Western Balkans region rejoins the EU route. Unless relations are reconstructed on an institutional basis, Turkey is likely to lose its privileges granted on personal relationships, and Ankara’s sphere of influence will be filled by other actors.

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TRT World. (2021, July 12). How the July 15 coup attempt has impacted Turkey’s foreign policy. https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/how-the-july-15-coup-attempt-has-impacted-turkey-s-for eign-policy-48296 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2010, June 15). Press release regarding the Summit Meeting of the Heads of State/Government of the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and Summit Forum on Cultural Corridors. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-133_-15-june-2010_press-release-regarding-_the-summit-meeting-of-the-heads-of-state_government-of-the-southeast-european-cooperation-process-_seecp__-and-summit-forum-of-cultural-corridors_.en.mfa Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2021). Balkanlar. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.tr.mfa?a46 52a89-e587-4528-907b-84ed8f33b97c Turkish Presidency. (2017, October 11). Türkiye ile Sırbistan Arasında Yeni Bir Dönem Ba¸slatıyoruz. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/84893/turkiye-ile-sirbistan-arasinda-yenibir-donem-baslatiyoruz Turkish Presidency. (2019, October 7). Türkiye Balkanlar’ın istikrarı ve refahında yapıcı rol oynuyor. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/110978/-turkiye-balkanlar-in-istikrari-ve-ref ahinda-yapici-rol-oynuyorTurkish Presidency. (2021, August 28). Türkiye, Karada˘g’a en fazla yatırım yapan ilk 10 ülke arasında yer alıyor. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/130204/-turkiye-karadag-a-en-fazlayatirim-yapan-ilk-10-ulke-arasinda-yer-aliyorTüysüzo˘glu, G. (2013). Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dı¸s Politikası: Yeni Osmanlıcılık ve Türk Avrasyacılı˘gı Ekseninde ˙In¸sa Edilen Bir Pragmatizm. Alternatif Politika, 5(3), 295–323. Uzgel, ˙I, & Yaramı¸s, V. (2010). Özal’dan Davuto˘glu’na Türkiye’de yeni Osmanlıcı arayı¸slar (Yearnings for neo-Ottomanism in Turkey from Özal to Davuto˘glu). Do˘gudan, 16, 36–49. Uzgel, ˙I. (2013). Balkanlarla ili¸skiler. In B. Oran (Ed.), Türk Dı¸s Politikası, Kurtulu¸s Sava¸sı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt III (2001–2012) (pp. 690–708). ˙Ileti¸sim Yayınları. Vraˇci´c, A. (2016, December). Turkey’s role in the Western Balkans. SWP Research Paper, RP11. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2016RP11_vcc.pdf Vraˇci´c, A., Joseph, E. P., & Ivanovi´c, T. (2017). Turkey in the Western Balkans: A waning interest. In C. Toperich & A. Ü. Noi (Eds.), Turkey and Transatlantic Relations (pp. 183–199). Center for Transatlantic Relations. Yavuz, M. H. (2020). Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism. Oxford University Press. Ydyrys, K. (2017, January 10). Rusya’nın Balkanlar’a Yönelik Politikası ve Ukrayna Krizi – 2. ANKASAM. https://www.ankasam.org/rusyanin-balkanlara-yonelik-politikasi-ve-ukraynakrizi-2/ Yeni S¸ afak. (2017, November 11). Fuat Avni’nin köstebe˘gi kaçtı. https://www.yenisafak.com/gun dem/fuat-avnininkostebegi-kacti-2809208

From Strategic Depth to Hegemonic Overreach: Has Turkey Bitten off More Than It Can Chew in the Western Balkans? Vladimir Ajzenhamer

Soon after the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) gained power in the 2002 parliamentary elections, Ahmet Davuto˘glu’s holistic foreign policy concept of “strategic depth” became the cornerstone of Turkish grand strategy, used by Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan to achieve regional hegemony and bring Turkey back to the “great powers club.” Even after the split between these two key political figures of modern Turkey, Davuto˘glu’s ideas remained, at least to some extent, the strategic imperative of Erdo˘gan’s foreign policy. This was confirmed by numerous statements made by ˙Ibrahim Kalın, who stepped into Davuto˘glu’s shoes as the chief advisor to the Turkish president. However, when it comes to the Western Balkans, which has an important place in the Turkish strategic vision, the political situation is determined by a much more complex reality, substantially different from that depicted by Davuto˘glu and later by Kalın. Divisions and rivalries within the Western Balkans, especially the ethnic and religious animosities and unresolved political issues between Sarajevo and Banja Luka, as well as between Belgrade and Prishtina, constitute the main obstacle to the successful implementation of Erdo˘gan’s ambitious project of Turkey’s return to the once Ottoman Balkans. The initial assumption of this chapter is that mutual quarrels between the Balkan political elites, stuck in the wartime legacy of the 1990s, represented a major setback to a successful embodiment of Davuto˘glu’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy. On the one hand, the Turkish policy of relying on Albanians and Bosniaks as reliable pivots of Turkish influence in the Balkans, as well as its interference in internal divisions among local Muslim communities, raised the suspicion of Belgrade and Banja Luka regarding Ankara’s “good intentions.” On the other hand, the economic “carrot” in the form of promised Turkish investments in the region softened the Serbian side. Hence, Turkey found itself between the Scylla of its own neo-Ottoman V. Ajzenhamer (B) Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_4

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ideology and the Charybdis of the fickle opportunism of the Serbian political elites, which ultimately led to a situation that could be described as hegemonic overreach. This chapter focuses on the Davuto˘glu era of Turkish foreign policy, particularly on the ideas set out in his book Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position, published in 2001, which I argue has become a practical guide for the effectuation of Ankara’s national interests—Turkey’s grand strategy itself. While trying to answer the question why the “zero problems” policy failed in the Western Balkans, this chapter will analyze the gap which arose between Davuto˘glu’s strategic vision and its implementation through the regional foreign policy practice. I will argue that in the case of the Western Balkans, the excessively widely set regional substrategy of Turkish grand strategy caused a mismatch between its capabilities and the desired objective. Here, the capabilities imply resources and means or instruments available for its realization, while the objective is to achieve regional hegemony. I will build this argument by triangulating a set of realist and constructivist concepts such as grand strategy, hegemon, otherness, and hegemonic overreach. While the grand strategy and hegemonic overreach will be the subject of further conceptual discussion, the concepts of hegemon and otherness will be understood in the broadest sense. By hegemon I imply a state that possesses, as Dennis Florig (2010: 1104) noticed, “great power—not only economic or military, but also political, institutional, and even ideological.” However, it is important to point out that its power is not of an imperial character, but is rather based on some degree of consent. On the other hand, I will view otherness as a process of identity construction in which a distinction is made between Us and Them, similar to Carl Schmitt’s opposition of friends (Freund) and foes (Feind). The first part of the chapter will try to provide the most suitable definition of the grand strategy, as well as a set of criteria to be used to confirm the assumption that Davuto˘glu’s “strategic depth” is in fact the grand strategy that Erdo˘gan accepted and put into motion as the conceptual logic behind Turkey’s current foreign policy. Furthermore, my analysis will identify the main ends and means of Turkey’s grand strategy, emphasizing those concerning the Western Balkans. The major strongholds of Turkish influence in the Western Balkans will be mapped, as well as potential opponents that can limit the spread of its regional power. Finally, by implementing the concept of otherness and concept of hegemonic overreach developed by Florig, I will try to point out the strategic mistakes which led to the debacle of Davuto˘glu’s policy toward the Western Balkans.

1 Does Turkey Have a Grand Strategy? In its fundamental form, grand strategy represents a concept with which military strategists and historians attempted to dislocate strategic reasoning from the battlefield to the realm of statecraft, to establish a holistic approach to mobilization and governing of all available resources that states could rely on in preparation for the war (Corbett, 1911: 308; Fuller, 1923: 211–228; Hart, 1991: 322). However, as this

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concept gained favor among political scientists, primarily those interested in international relations, its meaning overcame the mere confines of a military strategy, i.e., the strategy of war preparation, leaning increasingly toward the realm of foreign policy,1 and becoming intertwined with new key concepts such as peace, security, and national interest. As Edward Mead Earle points out, grand strategy is not just the art of war in the contemporary world, it is also “the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed” (Earle, 1948: viii). A further elaboration of this idea, and its greater inclusion in the domain of international politics, was given by authors such as Barry Posen, Stephen Walt, and Paul Kennedy. The views of Posen and Walt are quite complementary, having slight differences between them, while Kennedy’s interpretation can be seen as a further step toward the expansion of the concept. Posen (1984: 13) sees grand strategy as a political-military means–ends chain whose ultimate goal is the security of a state, while Walt (1989: 6) views grand strategy primarily as a plan by which states strive to make themselves more secure, i.e., which “identifies the objectives that must be achieved to produce security, and describes the political and military actions that are believed to lead to this goal.” Unlike them, Paul Kennedy makes a more significant leap toward making the concept more “political” by putting politics per se at its core, thus making grand strategy and statecraft synonymous. The classical realist and neorealist view of security is where a state’s desire for survival represents the causa prima of world politics (Mearsheimer, 2014: 45; Morgenthau, 1959; Waltz, 1996: 54), albeit not the only goal driving the state behavior. Guided by this, Kennedy sees grand strategy as an expression of national leaders’ ability to gather and use all relevant political and military elements with the goal of maintaining and expanding the long-term interest of the state (Kennedy, 1991: 5). In doing so, Kennedy approaches Waltz’s neorealist interpretation of world politics. This is where states can strive for a wide array of goals in the international arena, besides mere survival and security— from wealth and prosperity, through sovereignty, autonomy, and independence to supremacy and domination (Waltz, 1979: 92, 112, 175; 1993: 54–55).2 Similarly, Paul van Hooft is on the same page as Kennedy. His conceptualization of grand 1

This does not mean that foreign policy should equate with grand strategy, or that grand strategy represents just one aspect of foreign policy. Hal Brands explains the difference between the two by saying that “foreign policy is the sum total of a government’s interactions with the outside world, and it is expressed through initiatives ranging from diplomacy to foreign aid to humanitarian relief to the use of military force. Grand strategy, in contrast, is the conceptual logic that ensures that such instruments are employed in ways that maximize the benefits for a nation’s core interests. Grand strategy inevitably shapes a nation’s foreign policy—and thus its military policy, its diplomacy, and other subsidiary components of foreign policy—but the concepts are not one and the same” (Brands, 2014: 3–4). 2 It is important to notice that there is a clear causal link between minimal and maximal goals, because if the former is not achieved, the latter remains out of reach. As Robert Jervis points out, security is the most important vital interest of every state, followed by all other state interests (for example, economy and prosperity), which, in return, contribute to strengthening the state’s security (Javris, 1998: 23).

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strategy synthesizes all the aforementioned views, leaving room for different theoretical perspectives and interpretations of national interest in the Waltzian range from minimal to maximal goals. For van Hooft (2017), “Grand strategy is the highest level of national statecraft that establishes how states, or other political units, prioritize and mobilize military, diplomatic, political, economic, and other sources of power to ensure what they perceive as their interests. Depending on one’s theoretical perspective, these perceived interests focus the most minimal goal of ensuring the state’s survival, pursuing specific domestic interests or ideational coalitions, or establishing a specific regional or global order.” In this chapter, I will use van Hooft’s conceptualization, mainly because of its unequivocal definition of grand strategy as statecraft, thereby giving the political dimension precedence over military and security dimensions (that are also present in his definition). In addition, when it comes to the analysis of Turkish grand strategy, van Hooft’s openness toward different theoretical viewpoints gives his conceptualization a comparative advantage over others. This is because it enables the usage of the concept of grand strategy for a wide array of both the goals of the current Turkish government and the means that they use to achieve them.3 However, to avoid being overly adulterated and inclusive, some limitations have to be placed on the given definition, at least in the context of its form and implementation. Otherwise, there exists a danger of every ad hoc interest (put forth by everyday politics) to be proclaimed as the goal of grand strategy. Therefore, as a theoretical supplement of sorts, Iver Neumann and Henrikki Heikka’s definition will be used, primarily because it is more precise when it comes to the implementation and form of grand strategy. These authors see it as a “set of preconditions for action, at a specific time and in a specific place, which may exist in more or less explicit and systematized form, and that is actualized in practices” (Neumann & Heikka, 2005: 14). In other words, grand strategy must have a specific space–time framework, it must be presented in a way that relatively accurately and systematically unites the set goals and means for their realization and, finally, it must be put into action.4 By supplementing the conceptual framework in this way, we can formulate five key points, i.e., criteria, necessary for a certain type of state policy, or more precisely 3

We should have in mind van Hooft’s remark here, that the adjective “grand” does not relate to the grandiosity of ambitions of a state and that the concept of grand strategy “does not suggest expansive goals but rather the managing of all the state’s resources toward the means of the state’s perceived ends” (van Hooft, 2017). 4 Some authors believe that grand strategy does not need to be strictly formalized in such a way. Focusing on the military-security dimension of grand strategy, Colin Gray believes that, in the case of an armed conflict, every state will put all available means on the table regardless of whether it explicitly formulated its grand strategy or not. On the other hand, a clearly formulated strategy in the form of a state document does not represent a guarantee that it will be implemented (Gray, 2010: 55). Edvard Luttwak goes a step further in relativizing the importance of a formal framework of grand strategy, believing that all states have a grand strategy whether they know it or not (Luttwak, 2009: 9). Some authors, on the other hand, connect the presence or absence of a formally defined grand strategy with the intentions of its creators. They believe that elements and operations of grand strategies may be unveiled, articulated, and divulged or not, depending on the nature of what is desired to be achieved by it (Kachiga, 2019: 16).

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statecraft, to be labeled as grand strategy. It is necessary that the strategy behind a state’s foreign policy is: (a) explicit and systematized in a certain way (but not necessarily formalized through official state documents); (b) spatially focused and temporally appropriate (which does not mean that it is time-limited, but it definitely must be in line with the prevailing zeitgeist); (c) unequivocal when it comes to the goals it strives to achieve and represents as the national interest (which by no means limits its diversity, thereby enabling it to encompass Waltz’s scale of state desires); (d) all-encompassing when it comes to the means that include military, diplomatic, political, economic, and other sources of power that can be used to accomplish the set goals; and (e) put into action. We should have in mind that the introduction of such criteria represents a deliberate simplification which can help us recognize grand strategy more easily, although not ideally. This is especially true in the cases when a grand strategy is not formalized or transparent. To a large degree the stated key points encompass all three meanings of grand strategy identified by Nina Silove: a deliberate, detailed plan (or to use Silove’s words—the “grand plan”); an organizing principle used to guide policy actions (referred to by Silove as the “grand principle”); and finally, a pattern in state behavior or “grand behavior” (Silove, 2018: 8–15). Although Silove’s approach makes identifying grand strategy easier, her conceptual distinctions rest upon dividing grand strategy into three ideal-type categories. In the realm of practical politics, making such distinctions is not frequently possible because they often overlap to a greater or lesser degree. Similarly, despite them having shared elements, it remains unclear whether identifying one or two out of the three previously mentioned concepts, is it sufficient to proclaim a certain political action a grand strategy?5 Therefore it seems that a simpler approach might be better and more practical. By using the previously defined key points (or criteria), I will attempt to construct a more parsimonious theoretical instrument that will enable a more efficient detection of Turkish grand strategy. When it comes to the first criterion—explicitness and relative systematization— we might wonder if there even exists something like a Turkish grand strategy. If we take into account the fact that Turkey lacks an official document with a significantly vast strategic reach to be characterized as a grand strategy, the answer would be clearly negative. Mustafa Aydin (2021: 208) notices that “Turkey has never published a fullscale official grand strategy or doctrine paper in the academic sense of the concept, although various versions of the unpublished and secret ‘National Security Policy Document’ contain indications of such a strategy.” Following Silove’s distinction between the three meanings, this author attempts to fit certain strategic practices of Turkey into the concepts to prove that grand strategy, albeit not transparently, stands behind them. As a Turkish embodiment of a “grand plan,” he sees the National Security Policy Document (NSPD), which is drafted and then revisited as necessary by the National Security Council, as a document “that contains an analysis of the internal and external threats facing the country, as well as the general principles 5

Silove even argues that it might be more purposeful to give up on the concept of grand strategy and focus on one of the three previously mentioned meanings (Silove, 2018: 56–57).

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for the country’s foreign and security policies,” supplemented with the National Security Strategy Paper that outlines available resources, possible strategies, and implementation guidelines” (Aydin, 2021: 205, 208). NSPD is a document that the Turkish government classifies as a state secret, making any insight into its content possible only owing to sporadic leaks. Still, based upon the material that reached the public, Aydin (2021: 208) concludes that it is “quite clear that it represents a ‘grand strategy as a plan’ per Silove’s categorization.” I will not disprove Aydin’s thesis of NSPD being a “grand plan” in a Turkish way, but I will still expand the search for a full-scale official grand strategy paper outside the state documents. Namely, my claim is that with the AKP’s rise to power, Turkey finally achieved an explicit and systematized grand strategy. Nevertheless, it did not originate from an official strategy or doctrine paper by the political or military elite, but on the contrary, from the pen of an academic and an international relations theorist. We are talking, of course, about Ahmet Davuto˘glu and his book Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position— the excellent work dedicated to the geostrategic position of the Republic of Turkey and the role it ought to play on the post-Cold War international scene. Since we can also observe grand strategy as “the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy” (Brands, 2014: 3), it is safe to assume that its “substance” need not come solely from the domain of practical politics, nor it is required to be in the form of an official state document. The claim that Davuto˘glu’s Strategic Depth should be observed as a guide for the highest state policy, i.e., Turkish grand strategy itself, will be briefly explained by applying the five previously formulated criteria. First, Davuto˘glu begins his magnum opus with a detailed analysis of the most important characteristics of the post-Cold War international system, based upon which he identifies and systematizes the challenges—in terms of risks and opportunities—that Turkey faces at the start of the new millennium. In this book he also precisely and unequivocally defines the vital national interests of Turkey and holistically approaches the mapping of the resources Turkey has at its disposal and needs to mobilize to realize those interests. In that sense Strategic Depth, although extensive, complex, and everything but light reading for those outside academic circles, is by its content an explicit and systematized guideline for conducting foreign policy at the highest state level. Second, Davuto˘glu’s geostrategic approach to interpreting the international position of Turkey (as well as the guidelines stemming from it) fulfills the criterion of spatial focus as well as the criterion of temporal appropriation—being in line with the prevailing zeitgeist. On the basis of historical continuity with the Ottoman Empire, as well as taking into account numerous power vacuums that arose following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar order, Davuto˘glu (2014: 111–212) draws a precise map of Turkey’s spheres of interest. In doing so, he ties his strategic vision with a clearly defined geographical area and current historic moment which he sees as a window of opportunity (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 37). Third, Davuto˘glu unequivocally defines the goals that serve the project of restoring Turkey’s great power status as the key national interest. Namely, such goals are increasing Turkish influence in the mentioned spheres of influence, including a more proactive Turkish role in global

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and regional international organizations, more assertive participation in the creation of a stable global and regional order, etc. (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 218–271, 476–488). Fourth, on the basis of the “know-how” principle, Davuto˘glu holistically approaches the problem of operationalization by pairing the stated goals with the most adequate available sources of power, taking into consideration military, diplomatic, political, economic, cultural, and other resources (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 41–104). Finally, having in mind that soon after the AKP took power, Ahmet Davuto˘glu first became the special advisor of the Turkish prime minister, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and finally the prime minister, it is more than justifiable to claim that he took his foreign policy ideas from paper to practice (Grigoriadis, 2010: 6; Novakovi´c, Bogosavljevi´c & Albahari, 2019: 6). This claim is supported by the focal points and the center of gravity of Turkish foreign policy in the past two decades coinciding with the guidelines set forth by Strategic Depth (Bugarˇci´c, 2014: 13), as well as the match between academic prescription and political practice continuing after the Erdo˘gan– Davuto˘glu split. Also, we should have in mind that following Davuto˘glu’s entry into politics, the main principle and the official motto of Turkish foreign policy became “zero problems with our neighbors.”6 This represents the “know-how” principle—in which Aydin (2021: 210) sees Silove’s “grand strategy as an organizing principle”— that was also formulated, determined, and elaborated precisely in Strategic Depth, although not in such a “catchy” and simply formulated manner (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 150–155). There is no doubt that Strategic Depth was primarily written with the ambition to serve Turkish decision-makers as a grand strategy. This proposal was accepted thanks to a shared ideological world view of Davuto˘glu—a professor, and Erdo˘gan— the leader of the AKP. This is especially true in the case of the shared view on the importance of the Ottoman legacy for repositioning the Republic of Turkey in contemporary international relations. In that sense the duo, akin to the period when Kissinger and Nixon led the US foreign policy,7 worked in unison to achieve the goals of “strategic depth,” following the roadmap laid down by Davuto˘glu, and applying all available means he pointed out. On the following pages the focus will be placed on the main ends and means of Davuto˘glu’s grand strategy, with the detailed emphasis on key Turkish interests in the Western Balkans and instruments of their realization.

6

This policy is not only publicly proclaimed as a “motto”; its detailed explanation can also be found on the official website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 US President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger have been remembered in the history of international politics as an exquisitely compact foreign policy duo, so unison in foreign policy conduct that it is sometimes referred to as “Nixinger” (Hughes, 2021). For having a great influence on the formulation of Turkish foreign policy, Davuto˘glu has been frequently dubbed as “Turkish Kissinger” in public.

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2 The “Strategic Depth” of Turkey’s Grand Strategy Even though the collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to Turkey losing its great power status, it has never actually disappeared from the international scene. Following the victory in their war of independence and the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkey became a typical example of what many realists call a status quo state (Schweller, 1994: 104–105; 1996: 99). Under Atatürk, Turkey did not strive to resurrect the fallen Empire but took a neutral position in international politics (Bozdaglioglu, 2003: 57), with the predominant focus on protection and preservation of its existing status in the post-First World War international system. This status assumed a national state, which had disavowed all revisionist aspirations toward the newly independent non-Turkish Ottoman territories. On the internal front, the caliphate had been replaced with a secular state, while the sultanate had been replaced by a republican form of government. Atatürk’s reform, directed toward modernization and Westernization of society, revoked Ottoman institutions with Islam losing its role as a cohesive factor of society, being exiled to its margins (Bozdaglioglu, 2003: 35– 36). The famous motto of Atatürk—“Peace at home, peace in the world” (Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh) became the Turkish “grand strategy as an organizing principle” (Aydin, 2021: 209), guiding Kemalist elites even after Mustafa Kemal’s death. This principle outlined a defensive and a pro-Western foreign policy vector. Following such a vector, Turkey led a relatively passive foreign policy until the end of the Second World War, completely turning its back to the Islamic world and avoiding any kind of interference in the internal affairs of former Ottoman provinces turned into independent states. Faced with Soviet territorial pretensions toward its northeastern provinces and Moscow’s demands for a military base in the Straits (Üstün, 1997: 32), Ankara changed its passive policy, first becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and then beginning the process of Euro integrations. Turkey spent the rest of the Cold War era in a relatively undisturbed international hibernation, firmly “tucked” into its role as the southeastern flank of NATO, only to be placed in the EU’s “waiting room” following the Cold War’s end. The Western turn had far-reaching consequences for Turkish society. Atatürk’s reform tore the nation in half, creating two parallel worlds—one secular and modern, modeled in the West, and the other persistently traditional and loyal to Islam (Markovi´c, 2009: 18). The Westernization process was never successfully completed because of both the fierce resistance of the traditionalists to the reform and the gradual alleviation of Kemalist repression, which came following the introduction of a multiparty system and the government of Adnan Menderes. Soon after, using its practice of “correcting” political life by military coups, the Turkish Army took control of the state, focusing their attention on the new threat to Atatürk’s legacy—the increasingly stronger Left. Lingering in the shadow of these new ideological divisions, Ottoman traditionalism merged with Islamism gradually gained strength, and step by step crawled back to the political scene. As early as the 1980s, president Turgut Özal began to openly flirt with the Islamists, while something virtually unthinkable happened during the 1990s—hardline Islamist Necmettin Erbakan came to the helm

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of Turkey as the prime minister. During this period, the first signs of a foreign policy turn became visible. Pro-Western orientation was still not questioned, but Ankara focused its attention ever more frequently on the Islamic world and on those states which were once part of their Empire. The first steps in that direction were made by Özal when he launched a Pan-Turkic policy toward Central Asia and allowed the United States to fly sorties against Iraq from Turkish bases during the First Gulf War (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003: 3). Then, during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, Süleyman Demirel and Tansu Çiller returned Turkey to the Western Balkans via the US- and NATO-led interventions (Ekinci, 2009: 50–53; Gangloff, 2005: 173). The next was Erbakan’s turn to Libya and Iran, and the climax was reached through the support Ankara gave Bush’s “global war against terrorism” and military intervention in Afghanistan after September 11. However, although this turn in foreign policy was a clear indicator that Turkey was awakening from its international slumber, it was still primarily ad hoc, and as such it was strategically unprepared and improvised (Novakovi´c, Bogosavljevi´c & Albahari, 2019: 6; Tanaskovi´c, 2015: 57). It was only Ahmet Davuto˘glu who gave a real purpose to the newly awakened international activism of Turkey. According to Davuto˘glu, the Ottoman geographic and historic legacy mandates contemporary Turkey to abandon its passive foreign policy pattern of the Kemalist Republic and to take an active participation in establishing the contemporary international order. To achieve that, Turkey requires a holistic and synergic strategic guiding which would take into consideration experiences from both the modernization period of the Republic as well as the pre-Republican legacy (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 107). Building the foundation for his grand strategy, Davuto˘glu took a critical stance toward the former, striving to rehabilitate and reaffirm the achievements of the Ottoman state to the highest degree possible. Arguing that, following the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey was forced to establish separate internal and foreign identity, Davuto˘glu negates the honesty of the Kemalist pro-Western orientation by reducing it to pure pragmatism. He believes that the newly formed Turkish Republic broke ties with the Islamic world out of foreign policy realism because its tying with the Middle East and Asia would provoke anti-Turkish policy of Western states. However, things stood differently internally—Islam remained the cohesive social factor (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 87). Davuto˘glu notes that the Kemalist political elite believed that by focusing on political unity and the preservation of borders, it would “purify” Turkish political identity and its institutions in a way that they would no longer provoke hostility from the West. Having a passive pro-Western foreign policy, “Turkey, from the aspect of international position, decided that, instead of making a radical decision and accepting to be a weak center in its specific civilizational sphere, it should be a regional power that enters the security shield of the dominant Western civilizational sphere” (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 87). However, the collapse of the bipolar order and the escalation of the globalization process awakened Turkish awareness of deeper geopolitical “givens”—a unique geographical position and rich historic and cultural heritage from the time of the Ottoman Empire (Davuto˘glu, 2008: 77–79). Therefore, structural preconditions have established themselves and allowed Turkey to break free from the international hibernation in which it spent most of the twentieth century.

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Hence, Davuto˘glu (2008: 77–78) found his grand strategy on the idea of strategic discontinuity with both the Cold War and the post-Cold War image of Turkey as the “defensive wall of the West,” “bridge-state, that just connects two dots,” “frontier state,” or the state “on the edge of either the Islamic world or the West.” Instead of Turkey as a mere geographical “link” that territorially connects Europe and Asia, Strategic Depth offered a different view of Turkey’s role in the international system. This view is based upon the rejection of the perception (as well as self-perception) of Turkey as the forefront of Asia, or the periphery of Europe, and its acceptance as the so-called central state. Here “central” has a significantly more complex and essential meaning than that of other states whose “centrality” arises namely from their geographical location (Bilgin, 2008: 154; Davuto˘glu, 2008: 78–79). Namely, in the case of Turkey, its centrality is not simply a spatial feature, but it also possesses cultural and historic dimensions. It arises from both its unique geographical position, and from the cultural and historical heritage of the Ottoman Empire. When it comes to the geographical factor, it is important for Turkish centrality because it makes Turkey a country with multiple regional identities. Geographically speaking, it is at the same time a Middle Eastern, Black Sea, Caucasian, and Balkan country, with its geographical hinterland encompassing the Mediterranean, Central Asian, and Caspian areas. Therefore, observing Turkey through the lens of geography, it is the “center” where three continental massifs meet—European, Asian, and African (which makes Turkey geopolitically more relevant than other regional “centers” such as Germany, Russia, or Iran). Turkey is a central state because it is “both an Asian and a European country, and is also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean” (Davuto˘glu, 2008: 78). Thus, for Davuto˘glu (2014: 33, 35–38), Turkey does possess the quality of the so-called geographical depth. On the other hand: “… just as geography, history, too, may come to constitute a country as a central country. Some countries play the central country role in their own region as a reflection of their cultural and historical heritage” (Davuto˘glu, 2008: 79). Therefore, the so-called historical depth is equally if not more important for Turkey’s central position both on the world map and in international politics. This is another rare quality that Turkey possesses; this time a civilizational one (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 33, 35–38). Regardless of its deviation from the Orient made by Atatürk, Davuto˘glu believes that modern Turkey stayed attached to its Ottoman past through state continuity and therefore inherited all benefits and connections of the Ottoman cultural, religious, and historic legacy within the great geographical space that was once a part of the Empire. Finally, to more thoroughly explain the specific position that Turkey has in contemporary international relations, Davuto˘glu introduces the “concept of strategic depth (stratejik derinlik) that incorporates the components of historical and geographical depth. According to his opinion, Turkey has the potential of ‘strategic depth’ because, as the successor of the history and geography of the Ottoman Empire, it possesses great historical and geographical depth, being that, as a part of central Eurasian geopolitical spaces, it was for centuries the epicenter of events” (Tanaskovi´c, 2015: 55). However, for Davuto˘glu (2008: 79) “strategic depth” represents not just the potential, but at the same time a historical dictum that compels Turkey to “make

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its role of a peripheral country part of its past, and appropriate a new position: one of providing security and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighboring regions.” If this is done, Turkey will fulfill its historical destiny and become the central state of the new Eurasian order. When put into motion, the policy of “strategic depth” soon became known as neoOttomanism. This nickname, given by the domestic critique, will in time become a generally accepted colloquialism around the world marking a “complex macroideological platform according to which today’s Turkey, as its [Ottoman] legitimate civilizational heir, should reaffirm the entirety of spiritual, cultural and political heritage of the Ottoman Empire in order to secure and effectively play the role of one of the globally important international factors in the ongoing redistribution of power and influence in the world” (Tanaskovi´c, 2010: 8). However, we should be wary of equating the strategy of “strategic depth” with neo-Ottomanism because analytically speaking, that would be a gross oversimplification. Ottomanism was a nineteenth2005: 61) that was formed to maintain century nationalist-liberal movement (Seker, ¸ the social cohesion and unity of the Empire through “the formation of a civic Ottoman national identity overarching ethnic, linguistic and religious identity” (Grigoriadis, 2010: 4). On the other hand, neo-Ottomanism represents a term originally created to describe the aforementioned foreign policy of president Özal during the 1980s (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 99–100). If we observe foreign policy as being conditioned by grand strategy, as suggested by Brands (Brands, 2014: 4), it is clear that the guiding principles of Turkish foreign policy go beyond the neo-Ottoman framework. This is true even if we understand neo-Ottomanism much more extensively than its original meaning. In other words, the Turkish foreign policy practice points to the existence of a significantly broader strategic framework which cannot be squeezed into the ideological box of neo-Ottomanism. This is quite obvious from the five principles of Turkish foreign policy formulated by Davuto˘glu himself (2008: 72–84; 2012: 1–5): (a) balance between security and democracy internally, as a precondition for accomplishing influence in the international environment; (b) a policy of zero problems with neighboring states; (c) development of good relations with neighboring regions; (d) multidimensional foreign policy toward global actors; and (e) rhythmic diplomacy. Out of the five principles, only the second and third ones can fit into the neoOttoman framework, while the other three go greatly beyond it. The first principle is, although not transparently, directed toward the full civilian control over the military and removing the danger of a military coup d’état. Ever since the AKP came to power, this has hung over their heads in a manner akin to the anecdotal Sword of Damocles. As such, it is in the legal context and in the sense of democratic values much

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closer to the Western political culture8 than to the Ottoman political legacy, especially regarding the aspects of civil–military relations. In fact, if we take into account that the history of military coups is by no means an invention of Republican military elites, but is deeply embedded in Ottoman history,9 this principle can be interpreted as a corrective of the political deviations inherited from the Ottoman times. On the other hand, the “policy of zero problems” assumes a proactive approach to foreign policy that strives to “reinforce security through the absence of problems with neighbors” (Petrovi´c, 2011: 6) through regional cooperation, and aims to redirect “national aspirations from security concerns to economic prosperity and international trade” (Baudner, 2014: 80). Similar to the first, Davuto˘glu sees the second and third principles as conditio sine qua non of strengthening Turkey’s international position and expanding its regional influence (Davuto˘glu, 2008: 81; 2012: 2). This is precisely why his critics mistrust the initiative to establish good neighborly relations through intensive work in resolving mutual disputes, because they see these principles as a Trojan horse in which Ankara hides its hegemonic ambitions and neo-Ottoman ideological agenda. As the discussion revolves around peoples and regions that were once part of the Ottoman Empire and with whom, as Davuto˘glu (2012: 2) states, Turkish people share a common history and joint destiny, the neo-Ottoman dimension of the “strategic depth” policy is here most easily noticeable. First of all, this is because the “historical depth,” meaning the Ottoman legacy, is clearly highlighted in Strategic Depth as the main advantage of Turkish foreign policy toward the neighboring areas. Therefore, the instrumentalization of history and culture is precisely the main target of numerous critiques directed at Ankara by its immediate surroundings. These critiques accuse Davuto˘glu and Erdo˘gan of unilaterally romanticizing the Ottoman legacy, which does not match with the historical experience of Christian peoples, as well as non-Turkish Muslims that were under the Ottoman rule (Anastasakis, 2012: 190–191; Novakovi´c et al., 2019: 3). Speaking of the last two principles—multidimensional foreign policy and rhythmical diplomacy—they completely leave the neo-Ottoman framework and reveal Turkish aspirations to become a globally relevant power. Multidimensional policy assumes the relativization of Atatürk’s Western foreign policy vector, by turning toward Eurasia and improving relations with Russia and China. Rhythmical diplomacy, on the other hand, assumes a more assertive and dynamic diplomatic activity, not just bilaterally but multilaterally as well (Davuto˘glu, 2008: 82–83). As the ultimate purpose of his grand strategy, Davuto˘glu (2008: 83) sees the transformation of Turkey into a “responsible state which provides order and security to 8

We should have in mind that the first steps toward establishing civilian control over the army were taken only after the Turkish Parliament adopted a “harmonization package,” known as the “Seventh Package of Reforms,” with the EU in 2003. With this reform package, civilian predominance over military elites within the “Council of National Security” was achieved, reducing this governmental body to an advisory role from the previously strong position that had enabled military interference in civilian authorities’ decision-making process since 1982 (Ajzenhamer & Rokvi´c, 2016: 230–232; Sakallio˘glu, 1997: 157–158; Ðuri´c & Ajzenhamer, 2011: 457–458). 9 Ottoman sultans lost their thrones on eleven occasions in the mutinies and coups started by soldiers supported by bureaucrats or the Ulama (Ekinci, 2016).

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the region, one that prioritizes democracy and liberties, while dealing competently with security problems at home. Turkey’s aim is to intervene consistently in global issues using international platforms, which signifies a transformation for Turkey from a central country to a global power.” Fulfillment of this goal depends on the successful implementation of grand strategy at all three levels that the principles cover—national, regional, and global. Therefore, neo-Ottomanism, most noticeable at the level of foreign policy toward near abroad and neighboring regions, can be observed more as a substrategy or even a set of similar (cultural and historical) instruments in the service of grand strategy than as grand strategy per se. To equate Turkish grand strategy and neo-Ottomanism means to misunderstand and overly simplify not the goals that Davuto˘glu outlined, but the instruments available to Turkish foreign policy when it comes to achieving the set goals, as well as the actual reach of those goals.

3 Turkey Returns to “Rumelia” In Davuto˘glu’s eyes, the Balkans represents a transitional area of the Eurasian central continent, as well as a constituent part of the near land sphere of the Balkans—the Middle East—Caucasus that Turkey belongs to both geographically and historically. Therefore, the events happening within this sphere directly influence Turkish foreign policy, meaning that Turkey must not, “due to the attractiveness of integration with Western Europe and [other] extra-regional alliances, make the mistake of alienating [itself] from this sphere” (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 131). The security of Turkey depends on the turbulent turmoil within the Balkans. This is true not just in the case of its European part, the so-called Eastern Thrace, but the Anatolian hinterland as well. Therefore, the ways in which Turkey deals with the challenges and crises in the area stretching from Bosnia and Herzegovina, over the Levant, and all the way to the Caspian Sea, directly reflect its position and influence on the global political scene. Consequently, the Balkans—especially the Western Balkans—represents a sphere of interest on which the success of Davuto˘glu’s “grand strategy” greatly depends. Historically speaking the Balkans, or Rumelia (Land of the Romans) as the Ottomans dubbed it, was at the same time both the cradle of Ottoman Europe and their European tomb. Following the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the process of dislocation of Turks from the European soil (except from Eastern Thrace) was finalized. The Republic of Turkey, as the successor of the former Empire, had to relinquish its influence in the region by taking a neutral stance toward the events unfolding in the region until the end of the twentieth century. However, as Davuto˘glu points out, even though the Ottoman Empire was banished from the Balkans, the geopolitical and geocultural vacuum that it left behind has never been successfully filled—resulting in the bloody armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. A great number of Turkish citizens can trace their heritage to the Balkans (the exact number is not known but estimates vary from 4 to 10 million) from where their ancestors—Turks and Muslim Slavs—fled in several migration waves during

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the twentieth century (Anastasakis, 2012: 192; Gangloff, 2005: 180–181; Petrovi´c, 2011: 7). This fact caused great attention from the Turkish public during the 1990s regarding the fate of Western Balkan Muslims as well as the remaining Turkish minority. As noticed by Novakovi´c et al. (2019: 5), “the wars in the former Yugoslavia began an emotional spiral within both the Turkish elite and the population, pushing Turkey to intervene.” Driven by the internal burst in sentiment, Turkey went to a diplomatic offensive by demanding through international organizations—NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) —that the international community became more involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it (if needed) intervened militarily to secure the implementation of the UN resolutions (Gangloff, 2004: 105–106). Although there were voices in the Turkish public that demanded a unilateral action in order to protect Muslims (Anastasakis, 2012: 192; Ekinci, 2009: 42–49), Turkey opted for participation in a multilateral military operation within the ex-Yugoslav space, first in Bosnia and Herzegovina and then in Kosovo. Yet, such an engagement was by no means as fierce and intense as one would expect on the basis of the public debate (Anastasakis, 2012: 193; Gangloff, 2004: 111; Gangloff, 2005: 173, 176–177). This is because Turkey completely followed the US policy toward the Yugoslav wars. It was involved in securing a no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their F-16 fighter jets participated in NATO air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. Similarly, Turkey participated in the peacekeeping operations in the region—UNPROFOR in Croatia, IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo, Alba and Proxima missions in Albania and North Macedonia (Anastasakis, 2012: 203). However, when it came to unilateral action, it was completely absent. As noticed by Sylvie Gangloff, “it was only after the United States got involved in the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994/1995 and after it recognized the FYROM (Republic of Macedonia) and signed military agreements with the latter, that Turkey itself took the step of signing military agreements with Macedonia (April 1995 and July 1996) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (August 1995 and January 1996)” (Gangloff, 2004: 107; see also Gangloff, 2005: 174). Despite the fact that, as a Cold War residuum of Ankara’s relation with the Balkans, the pro-Western vector prevailed regarding the participation in the conflict resolution in the ex-Yugoslav space, Davuto˘glu sees Turkish engagement as a positive (although not sufficient) leap from the decades-long defensive foreign policy pattern. For him, the return of Turkey to Rumelia is an expression of geopolitical necessity, a necessity demanding the vacuum of a “political center,” caused by the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, to be filled (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 133). The collapse of the bipolar world and the geopolitical vacuum that opened in the Turkish near land sphere following the dissolution of the USSR and the fall of socialism, provided Turkey with a chance to regain a significant influence in the Balkans. With its fast-growing economy, the second-largest standing military force in NATO, institutional membership in all major international organizations, and a growing political reputation, Davuto˘glu saw Turkey as the only natural candidate for the role of a regional hegemon. Although he did not put it so explicitly, the goal of the Western

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Balkan piece of his strategic puzzle was to achieve regional hegemony, as a precondition for strengthening the Turkish national security and further improvement of its international position. The Ottoman cultural and historical heritage of the Balkan region provides a favorable environment for such an endeavor. Therefore, Davuto˘glu sees the countries in which Muslims represent the majority—Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania—as well as Muslim minorities in mostly Orthodox states—Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro—as main regional allies and the pivots of Turkish power in the Western Balkans. Bosniaks and Albanians have represented two backbones of Turkish–Balkan policy since the establishment of the Ottoman rule until today. By adopting Islam, “these two autochthonous Balkan peoples had put the center of gravity on Islam and the Ottoman elements in Balkan geoculture that rests on the Catholic-Orthodox-Islamic, or Roman-Germanic-Russian-Ottoman foundations” (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 293). Following the end of the Cold War and the rejection of socialist ideology, these peoples began a political transformation in line with their religious and cultural past. Islamic revivalism among Muslim communities in the Balkans led to their rapprochement to Turkey as somewhat of a cultural hub and a regional patron. This was confirmed by the fact that a large number of Balkan Muslims sought refuge in Turkey while fleeing from conflicts in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s (Anastasakis, 2012: 193; Bechev, 2012: 212; Gangloff, 2005: 184). As Othon Anastasakis (2012: 186) highlights, “the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the weaker position of Muslims in Bosnia, FYR Macedonia or Kosovo (as a province of Serbia) allowed Turkey to become the ‘protector’ of these communities.” Thus, the Balkan Wars from the late twentieth century pointed to a necessity for Turkey to return to the area from which it had been banished through wars at the beginning of the same century. It was also to protect Bosniaks and Albanians who, as traditional pivots of Turkish power in the region (but also the greatest beneficiaries from the period of the Ottoman rule), found themselves under pressure from local Christian peoples following the Ottoman expulsion, as well as European powers that had protected them. Out of fear of the formation of a pro-Greek Orthodox axis, which was a constituent part of Turkish elites’ foreign policy perception during the 1990s (Bechev, 2012: 213), Davuto˘glu paints a picture of the Balkans as a permanent geopolitical battlefield where interests of regional players and great powers collide. Such geopolitical competition is the result of a continuity of great power rivalry which, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, confronted three historical heritages or three spheres of influence— Romano-Germanic, Orthodox-Slavic, and Ottoman. Owing to German Imperialism and Russian Socialism, the first two were more predominant during the twentieth century than the Ottoman sphere of influence, with it being on the defensive since the nineteenth century. Observing the Balkan geopolitical chess board, Davuto˘glu maps the presence of great powers in the role of the so-called balancers—first Great Britain and France, and today, the United States as well. During the Bosnian war, the Anglo-French block was driven by the policy of containing the growing German-influenced Security Council; this block indirectly protracted the crisis in favor of Bosnian Serbs and regional interests of Russia. On the other hand, in Europe

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balancing the traditional German-Slav rivalry and opposing a military intervention in the UN, the Dayton Agreement brokered by the United States and Germany allowed Germany to achieve their geostrategic interests and reach the Adriatic Sea by securing the inviolability of Croatian borders. In such a way, through mutual rivalry of German and Slavic interest spheres as well as the Germanophobia of the Anglo-French balancers, “the Balkan crisis practically turned into a movement for eliminating Islam and Ottoman identity in the region” (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 292). Davuto˘glu sees the Dayton Agreement as highly unfavorable for Bosniaks because despite securing the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it did not secure geostrategic conditions to prevent their assimilation into one of the two previously mentioned spheres of influence. On the other hand, under the Dayton political and legal framework, Serbs and Croats managed to consolidate their influence over territories that are crucial for the geopolitical prosperity of Bosniaks. As far as Albanians are concerned, Davuto˘glu believes that their position within the Balkan balance of power is only partially strengthened by the NATO intervention and withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. The main threat to the Albanians still comes from the Serbian-Greek alliance that Davuto˘glu sees as a natural alliance akin to the TurkishBosniak-Albanian one. This alliance is characterized in great deal by a uniform stance toward the Albanian question, which may lead to a new crisis of a wider regional scale, because North Macedonia, which also hosts a significant Albanian minority, would also be drawn into it. A simultaneous pressure of the Orthodox-Slavic trio— Belgrade, Athens, and Sofia—on Skopje, as well as their desire to place North Macedonia under their control, could be an overture into a new Balkan conflict. However, the main danger for Turkish influence in the Balkans regards Kosovo which, as a central area, connects Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak10 with a majority Albanian axis Macedonia–Albania. If Kosovo were to be returned to the control of Belgrade, it would lead to the marginalization of these peoples and the breakup of a singular space of Ottoman heritage, making Turkey once more pushed out of the Balkans. Therefore, for Davuto˘glu, the key to the Balkans lies in securing the future of Bosniaks and Albanians, with Turkish strategic priority being protecting and strengthening their position in the regional geopolitical culture and geopolitical turmoil. According to him, these peoples tie their future with the power and influence of Turkey, thus making their fate Turkish responsibility and commitment, but also a key geopolitical interest because it represents the most important means of forming the Turkish influence sphere in this region (Davuto˘glu, 2014: 294). Since coming to power, the Turkish foreign policy practice has confirmed the adherence of the AKP to this principle on multiple occasions. This was seen both in the situations that were directly and transparently related to the strengthening 10

Sandžak is a geopolitical region lying in the area where Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina border each other. In this area there used to be a Serbian medieval state called Raška and following the Turkish conquest, this territory acquired the name Sandžak (as per Turkish “Sanjak,” which means an administrative-territorial unit) and was incorporated into Bosnia. After the expulsion of the Ottomans from the Western Balkans, Sandžak was territorially divided between Serbia and Montenegro. Today, the largest Bosniak community in the region, after Bosnia and Herzegovina, lives in Sandžak (Ajzenhamer, 2012: 17–23).

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of the Bosniak and Albanian geopolitical position in the Balkans, and through the practice of indirect political influence, based on economic assistance and engagement in preserving Ottoman identity. For example, Turkey was one of the first countries that recognized the independence of Kosovo—a unilateral decision of the Kosovo Parliament that Belgrade has been attempting to disprove on the international scene until today. In 2006, when there was a consideration of terminating the Office of High Representative (OHR) in Sarajevo, Turkey strongly opposed such a possibility together with the United States. Besides that, Turkey successfully lobbied NATO to offer Bosnia and Herzegovina a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in April 2010 (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2016: 37). On the other hand—indirectly, the intensive regional engagement of Turkish public and private institutions represent another example of the endeavor to improve the geopolitical position of Bosniak and Albanian peoples and put them under the patronage of Ankara through strengthening the sense of common identity with the Turks. One of the most influential institutions active on that agenda is the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA) —frequently perceived as “one of the principal vehicles of Turkish soft power in the region” (Novakovi´c et al., 2019: 24). Others include the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), as well as the Yunus Emre Institute. These institutions are focused primarily on preserving the Ottoman legacy and promotion of Turkish culture, as well as, in the case of T˙IKA, on the projects directed toward improving living conditions in the environments with the Muslim majority. However, while continuously being on the side of Bosniaks and Albanians, Ankara has never lost the big picture or significantly more extensive goals that demanded Turkey to become the regional hegemon in the Balkans. Such an endeavor was not plausible without at least some level of approval by the Christian peoples in the Balkans. In the Western Balkans, such support had to come from the Serbs primarily because of the central position Serbia holds within the ex-Yugoslav space and its (regionally speaking) large market. Even more so, the relatively low level of bilateral relations with Turkey made Serbia an ideal testing ground for the “policy of zero problems” (Bechev, 2012: 220). Therefore, after being appointed the foreign minister in May of 2009, Davuto˘glu launched a diplomatic offensive in the Western Balkans, with the goal of strengthening bilateral relations with the countries of this region (especially Serbia), but also creating a multilateral mechanism of regional cooperation with Ankara as its pivot. In order to succeed on both fronts, Ankara first needed to convince Belgrade that its policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina “attempted to simply support Bosniak existence and strength in the failed framework of the Dayton Agreement and help maintain the minimum stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina within the framework of the international community—and nothing more” (Ruma, 2010: 135). In order to convince the Serbian side that he was not working on the implementation of the neoOttoman agenda, Davuto˘glu took it upon himself to mediate the resolution of a multitude of post-Dayton quarrels that plagued Bosnia and Herzegovina. Using the fact that Turkey was the chair of the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) during 2009/2010, Davuto˘glu met with his counterparts from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the margins of the summit held in October 2009. Highlighting the

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need for a constitutional reform of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a precondition for the gradual abolition of the OHR, the Turkish minister tried to please both sides. He implicitly told the Bosniak side that he saw the Republic of Srpska as a problem for maintaining the state unity. On the other hand, he hinted at the possibility that, under the right conditions, Turkey would support the removal of the OHR, an instrument of interference by the international community in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, institutionalized by the Dayton Agreement. Soon after this event there was the visit to Belgrade by Abdulah Gül—the first official visit of a Turkish president to Serbia since 1986, when Belgrade had still been the capital of Yugoslavia. By means of this visit, Ankara attempted to boost bilateral relations between the two states that had hit rock bottom following the Turkish recognition of Kosovo’s independence (Bechev, 2012: 222). On that occasion, Gül and Serbian president Boris Tadi´c agreed that they disagreed regarding Kosovo, thus pragmatically leaving aside this issue in favor of improving economic cooperation and launching joint infrastructural projects like the construction of a highway connecting Belgrade and the port city of Bar in Montenegro. As noticed by Dimitar Bechev (2012: 222), “Gül’s visit was a game changer, laying the foundation for much more cooperative interaction, and challenging the image of Turkey as exclusively focused on Balkan Muslims.” Davuto˘glu’s proactive and dynamical foreign policy quickly started giving results. Representing itself as a regional economic tiger,11 Ankara successfully diverted attention from the local security issues to the potential economic benefits of the bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Turkey and Western Balkan states. “Policy of zero problems” was quickly accepted in Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Belgrade as a framework for settling tensions between them and fostering regional cooperation. As a result, two trilateral consultation mechanisms were set in motion—one with Serbia and Bosnia, and the other with Croatia and Bosnia. Envisioned as a series of meetings at a presidential level, the Belgrade-Sarajevo-Ankara trilateral started quite ambitiously. Already during the first meeting on April 24, 2010, in Istanbul, Gül, Tadi´c, and the chair of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Haris Silajdži´c signed the “Istanbul Declaration on Peace and Stability in the Balkans” which guaranteed territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2016: 37). As early as March of the same year, the Serbian Parliament, in line with the principles of the Istanbul Declaration, adopted the “Declaration Condemning the Crime in Srebrenica,” with which the Serbian side made a significant step toward reconciliation in the region (Bechev, 2012: 221). This event was also a prelude to the visit of the Turkish state delegation to Serbia headed by Erdo˘gan. On that occasion, the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries, Davuto˘glu and Vuk Jeremi´c, signed a treaty on the mutual revocation of visas, while the Turkish prime minister and Serbian president visited Sandžak where they opened the Turkish cultural center “Kemal Atatürk.” By the next year, another trilateral meeting had taken place— - devo this time in Karador in Serbia, while during the same year Davuto˘glu took

11

Turkey’s economy bounced back from the global crisis 2007–2008 with incredible growth of 9 percent in 2010 (Vraˇci´c, 2016: 12).

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active participation as a mediator in the process of reconciliation between two quarreling Islamic communities in Serbia—one supported by Sarajevo and the other by Belgrade. While it seemed that the Turkish locomotive drove the Western Balkan wagons toward a more prosperous future, thus dragging the region out of the sludge of its conflicting past, by the time the third trilateral meeting had taken place, the first signs of upcoming problems were seen. Belgrade witnessed a change in power, with the new Serbian President Tomislav Nikoli´c—formerly a high-ranking member of the rightwing Radical Party and now the president of the centrist and populist Serbian Progressive Party (SNS)—highlighting his discontent at the summit in Ankara regarding Turkey’s consistent calls for a wider international recognition of Kosovo, calling for Turkey not to lobby for Kosovo’s membership in international organizations (RTV, 2013). In doing so, Belgrade clearly indicated that they would no longer follow Tadi´c’s policy of leaving the Kosovo question aside, and that the pragmatic formula of “agreeing to disagree” had been considered closed. Despite that, this summit saw an adoption of a joint declaration highlighting the role of trilateral meetings as an institutional framework of regional cooperation (B92, 2013), as well as the signing of a declaration on economic and trade cooperation between these three countries (RTS, 2013). However, the remarks made to the Turkish side by the Serbian president were an overture to Serbia not participating in the next summit planned for December 2013, following Erdo˘gan’s statement during a state visit to Kosovo that “Kosovo is Turkey and Turkey is Kosovo” (Al Jazeera Balkans, 2013). This major setback in the multilateral cooperation coincided with the beginning of a troubled period for Turkish foreign policy. This period was caused by drastic geopolitical upheavals in another part of the Turkish near-land sphere—the Middle East. The Syrian civil war, the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), and the escalation of the migrant crisis eventually led to the collapse of the “policy of zero problems with neighbors,” not only in the Middle East but also in the Balkans. Coping with multiple problems simultaneously—high expenses of maintaining national security in an immediate war environment, providing humanitarian aid to a large number of Syrian refugees who sought refuge at its territory, and facing a growing internal political uncertainty which began with the Gezi Park protest—the Turkish economy began to falter abruptly. Without the prospect of economic gain, the interest of the Western Balkan countries in cooperation with Turkey also began to fade. Turkey had lost its hegemonic momentum in the region, and it would take several years for Turkish foreign policy to consolidate and return to its Balkan tracks. However, this time, without Davuto˘glu as a chief operative. Nevertheless, this new phase of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Balkans is beyond the scope of this chapter. Although Davuto˘glu, due to his proactive approach, earned the right to be called the “Turkish Kissinger,” his shuttle diplomacy did not achieve the desired results despite the initial success. On the one hand, the historic moment and the geopolitical circumstances turned against him. It could be claimed that, in Machiavelli’s terms, “Fortuna” was not in his favor. But on the other hand, as I will show in the following section, it was the discrepancy between the main objective of his regional strategy and

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its key means—the economic “carrot” offered to the Western Balkans countries and instrumentalization of the Ottoman heritage—that led to the collapse of the “policy of zero problems” and ultimately to its unofficial abandonment by Erdo˘gan.

4 Turkey: A Hegemon that Never Came to Be At first glance, the “policy of zero problems with neighbors” seems like nothing but a true success story. However, although alluding to the shared Ottoman history of the two Muslim peoples, Erdo˘gan’s statement that Kosovo is Turkey, and that Turkey is Kosovo, reignited old and never-forgotten fears of Ankara’s neo-Ottoman project in Belgrade. The Serbian president’s suspension of participation in the trilateral as well as the cancellation of the new summit that was to be held in Belgrade, showed that the problems among Balkan neighbors were far from “zero.” Disputes between Bosniaks and Serbs, and Serbs and Albanians, as well as mistrust by all regarding Ankara’s true intentions, once put under the rug by promises of economic prosperity, gradually outgrew the initial opportunist enthusiasm caused by Turkish proactive diplomacy. As I have previously pointed out, changes in international circumstances and the economic decline of Turkey that began in 2013 (Spicer, 2021), have significantly affected the loss of Turkish hegemonic attractions, thus increasing the tension between Turkey’s desired goals and realistic possibilities of achieving them. According to Dennis Florig (2010: 1105–1106), this kind of situation can be labeled as hegemonic overreach representing the mismatch between capabilities of the hegemonic state and the mission of transforming the international environment in line with its objectives. Florig’s original conception of hegemonic overreach was intended for the global framework in his attempt to explain several cases of the US foreign policy failure. Unlike Kennedy’s concept of imperial overstretch that, as Florig (2010: 1105) points out, represents “an unavoidable, inevitable, mechanical process devoid of human will or choice,” hegemonic overreach rests upon willful human action, and is therefore a product of bad choices. Thus, if we were to adapt the concept of hegemonic overreach to a regional framework, it fits perfectly in the case of Turkey as the hegemon that never came to be. What could be the practical signs of Turkish hegemonic overreach in the Western Balkans? As previously highlighted, the main goal of Davuto˘glu’s Balkan strategy is the achievement of regional hegemony as a precondition of strengthening the national security of Turkey as well as improving their international position. As any hegemony implies, from a Gramscian point of view, a certain degree of consent by those that are being subdued by it, the precondition for the establishment of a regional hegemony in the Western Balkans is not only the consent from the Muslims but Christians as well. In order for such consent to be secured, the instruments or means that the aspiring hegemon utilizes need to be, if not attractive, then at least acceptable to those that hegemony is being forced upon. In attempting to achieve its goals in the Western Balkans, Turkey relied upon two instruments—its own economic power and the exploitation of the shared cultural and historical heritage of the Ottoman Empire.

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The moment that economic power started to fade, and the “carrot” of economic benefit disappeared, Turkey was left only with the instrument of “historical depth.” The problem lay in the fact that the attractiveness of this instrument was not only perceived differently among the Balkan peoples, but it also seeded new discord in the Western Balkans. What is the main problem with the Turkish instrumentalization of the Ottoman heritage in the Balkans? First and foremost, Davuto˘glu’s interpretation of the era of the Ottoman rule is one of a “golden age” and a “success story,”12 which does not match with the perception of the shared history by the Christian populace of the Balkans, but also not all Muslim communities there either. For the Balkan Christians, the Ottoman Empire is seen as an enemy that conquered their medieval states and separated them from their natural civilization hub that is Europe. Anastasakis (2012: 190) highlights this aspect by saying that “in the national histories of most of these states, the Ottoman period is viewed as a period of dislocation from European progress. Furthermore, many of the current politico-cultural trends of clientelism, patronage, and weak administration are seen as the poor legacy of the Ottoman times.” Because of this, Christian peoples from the Western Balkans—Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians—rather align themselves with their pre-Ottoman past, viewing medieval times and antiquity as their “moment of glory” that Davuto˘glu wishes to credit the Ottomans with. On the other hand, “not only is the Ottoman presence in Albania seen as an occupation, but it is also regarded as a national tragedy” (Anastasakis, 2012: 190). Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina by no means represents an exception from this rule. Despite the Turkish support during the 1990s wars and lobbying for it to join NATO, a group of pro-European Bosniaks sees a potential danger in the Turkish return to the Balkans mainly when it comes to the process of the EU accession. However, the problem goes beyond differences in perception. The practice of romanticizing the Ottoman past and exploitation of joint cultural and historical heritage leads to an overemphasis on the Ottoman and Islamic identity of the Balkans, therefore further deepening the existing ethnoreligious divides in the region. Establishment of an Ottoman identity of the Western Balkans, as a unique self of Turks, Bosniaks, and Albanians, has an inevitable consequence in producing and antagonizing the other, personified by their Christian neighbors. The constitution of the other represents a subtext that is present in Ankara’s Balkan narrative, as well as in their concrete political and economic moves, especially since Davuto˘glu became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. When it comes to the public narrative, since their coming to power the ruling AKP elite follows Davuto˘glu’s matrix where Bosniaks (both in Bosnia and Sandžak) and Albanians are represented as ethnic groups whose existence is permanently threatened in the Balkans. In this scenario, Turkey is always given the role of a 12

Soon after becoming the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Davuto˘glu visited Sarajevo in 2009 where he officially opened the conference “Ottoman Heritage and Muslim communities in the Balkans.” On that occasion, during the opening speech, he presented the view of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans as the “golden age” whose success should be reproduced through mutual reintegration of the Balkans and the Middle East to establish a globally more significant region and reestablish Pax Ottomanicca within this area (Anastasakis, 2012: 189).

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protector and patron, while the elements of economic power (trade, investments, and loans), and sometimes military power as well, are being used as de facto proof of Turkish care for her Balkan protégés. An example can be found in the frequently repeated claim by Erdo˘gan that the Bosniak leader and first president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovi´c, left the state in his care, stating that Bosnia and Herzegovina is an Ottoman legacy (Al Jazeera Balkans, 2017). However, the Turkish president was known to be even fiercer when it comes to the role of the protector. Thus, when a Turkish warship sailed into the Bosnian port town of Neum as part of a military exercise, Erdo˘gan stated: “I swear by Allah that, while I am alive, if anyone in any way touched the Bosniaks, they would have one hundred million Turks against them. Therefore, do not be surprised when a Turkish warship sails into Neum because this is our sign of support for Bosnian sovereignty” (Jurilj & Diab, 2014). Finally, we should include Erdo˘gan’s previously mentioned statement that Kosovo is Turkey and Turkey is Kosovo, given in 2013 during the visit to Prizren, into the corps of statements given to strengthen the Ottoman self of the Balkan Muslims. These, as well as similar statements, were nothing more than putting Davuto˘glu’s agenda into motion via populist rhetoric. Yet, even though the primary goal of these statements was to secure greater connection of Bosniaks and Albanians with Turkey as their cultural and religious hub, their byproduct was the re-instigation of regional tensions between Serbs on one side and Bosniaks and Albanians on the other. In addition, as noticed by Inan Ruma (2010: 139), not only did insisting on the Ottoman identity triggered Serbian nationalism, but it also diminished Turkish chances of being a successful mediator in regional disputes. This is precisely why the question of Turkish mediation in political frictions in the Balkans proved to be controversial. The subtext of producing the other was noticeable even when the identity narrative was nowhere to be seen. There are two illustrative examples of this “silent” praxis of constructing otherness. During the general election in October 2010, Turkey supported Haris Silajdži´c for the Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Silajdži´c was known for his continuous calls for the Republic of Srpska to be abolished, calling it a “genocidal creation” (Bechev, 2012: 213), and therefore was quite unpopular among the political elite in Banja Luka. Although another candidate won these elections (Bakir Izetbegovi´c, the son of Alija Izetbegovi´c), Bosnian Serbs saw Turkish support for Silajdži´c as an act of Ankara openly siding with Sarajevo in their dispute with Banja Luka. Another, even more illustrative example is the Turkish attempt to reconcile the quarreling Islamic communities in Serbia in 2011, in which Davuto˘glu himself participated as the mediator. The crux of the quarrel revolved around the independence of Islamic Communities in the former Yugoslavia. Following Yugoslavia’s dissolution, Islamic Communities of its former republics—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro proclaimed their independence. Islamic Communities of Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia remained attached to the Riyasat (the highest administrative unit of the Islamic Religious Community) in Sarajevo (Filamonova, 2010). During 2007, the Serbian Islamic Community showed an intention to step out from a subordinate position in relation to Sarajevo, and form its own Riyasat, headquartered in Belgrade. However, one fraction of this community stayed loyal to the Bosnian

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Riyasat and seceded, thus forming the Islamic Community in Serbia (IciS), while the other community bore the name the Islamic Community of Serbia (IcoS). This event started the quarrel revolving around the legitimate claim of representing Muslims in Serbia. Relying on shuttle diplomacy, Davuto˘glu attempted to resolve this dispute, proposing the abolishment of the position of Reis-ul-ulema (the highest religious head) for Serbia, which practically meant the loss of religious autonomy of IcoS and resubjugation to the Riyaset in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ultimately, IcoS rejected his proposal, stating that it did not reflect the needs of all Muslims in Serbia, given the fact that besides Bosniaks, a large number of Roma and Albanians are also Muslims. However, this statement was only a formal excuse, because the prevailing opinion in IcoS and among political elites in Belgrade was that Ankara favored the interest of the Bosniak side in the dispute. On top of that, Belgrade feared that the return of IcoS under the control of the Bosniak Riyaset would indirectly allow a greater influence of the Turkish Diyanet on Muslims in Serbia, especially Bosniaks in Sandžak. Even when it comes to the question of the economic cooperation between Turkey and Western Balkan states, the subtext of otherness cannot be evaded. Analysts of Turkish foreign policy point out that Turkey is using economic diplomacy as a bait for all Balkan states, but also that the main target of Turkish investments, entrepreneurship, and economic aid (by both state and non-state actors) is predominantly Balkan Muslims and their states, i.e., environments in which Muslims are the predominant populace (Petrovi´c, 2011: 10). During Davuto˘glu’s era, Turkey invested most in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo. As Mustafa Çakir (2014: 84) points out, “Turkish investments in the Balkans region increased substantially, but on a country basis there are big fluctuations. However, Turkey is not among the top five in any country except Albania and Kosovo. Turkey became the fifth country having the largest share in FDI [foreign direct investment] stocks in Albania in 2011, and in 2013; it was the third largest source of FDI to Kosovo.” Although it is difficult to give a definitive answer to the question to what extent we are talking about strategic moves and to what extent they are just simple opportunism, many authors see the unequal distribution of Turkish investments across the region as Davuto˘glu’s plan of creating close relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania (Vraˇci´c, 2016: 12). When it comes to Serbia, in the first several years of Davuto˘glu’s foreign policy activism, an increase of Turkish FDI was noticeable, but it was nowhere close to the previously mentioned Muslim states (Çakir, 2014: 85). However, in line with Davuto˘glu’s modus operandi, the Turkish economic boost in Serbia was primarily directed toward Sandžak, which was defined by Ankara as the economic bridge between the two countries. In Sandžak, Turkey develops intense economic ties, constantly insisting on the importance of “family” and “business” connections that exist between Serbia and Turkey due to numerous Sandžak diaspora settled in Istanbul. Given that it is the least economically developed part of Serbia, Ankara is also present there through financing infrastructural projects (building and rebuilding roads, schools, hospitals, and sports venues), humanitarian aid, as well as restoring monuments of the Ottoman heritage. In this manner, both the economic and cultural dependence of Sandžak Bosniaks on Ankara is being accomplished, therefore

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implying that Turkey represents the sole guarantee of their survival and prosperity. In the same way, we can also interpret the purpose of opening a large number of Turkish educational institutions,13 financing nongovernmental organizations, and numerous cultural foundations in an area including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak, Kosovo, and Albania. Taking everything into account, it is evident that within the observed timeframe Turkish foreign policy carried a significant mark of Davuto˘glu’s “Strategic Depth,” regardless of whether we are dealing with the narrative of Turkish officials, political mediation, or economic cooperation. Each of the mentioned dimensions greatly rested on targeting Muslims in the Western Balkans and instrumentalizing the common Ottoman heritage to construct a sense of belonging to the joint Ottoman self . In line with Davuto˘glu’s idea of creating an identity platform for achieving regional hegemony, Turkey put all its activities—mediating in political and religious disputes, economic aid, infrastructure project donations, education of future Bosniak and Albanian elites, financing NGOs, setting up media in the Turkish language, and so on—into the context of protecting and supporting local Muslim communities. This dimension of Turkish policy was at first ignored by Serbia because of the “carrot” of economic gains that Turkey offered in return. However, when Ankara faced the mentioned economic, political, and security issues (that consequently led to the slowing down of the Turkish economic locomotive in the Balkans), allegations of the Turkish neo-Ottoman agenda coming from Belgrade and Banja Luka became ever louder. For the Serbs, Turkish presence in the region quickly became less and less desirable and Turkish diplomacy was increasingly labeled as a onesided policy in favor of Albanians and Bosniaks. The situation would change again after Davuto˘glu was relieved as prime minister at the end of his era. Soon after, a period of complete centralization and personalization of Turkish foreign policy by Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan began. Erdo˘gan’s foreign policy would remain faithful to Davuto˘glu’s strategic guidelines in theory only, and in practice it would rest more on Erdo˘gan’s personal relations with the Balkan leaders as well as ad hoc chances and economic opportunism stripped of ideological shackles. Davuto˘glu’s mistake regarding the Western Balkans lies in the fact that by making a misevaluation of the strategic potential of Turkey and choosing the instruments of expanding the influence in the region poorly, he led Turkey into hegemonic overreach. While he was aware that hegemony requires consent, he believed that the consent could be realized among the Balkan Muslims by evoking memories of the 13

Fethullah Gulen’s Hizmet Movement was particularly active in this field. His educational institutions arrived in the Balkans under the guise of the “Bosna Sema Foundation” and the Foundation for Culture and Education “Atmosphere” (Mehmeti, 2012: 217; Yavuz, 2013: 259). Prior to the conflict between Erdo˘gan and Gulen, and Ankara’s pressure on the Balkan states to shut down this institution due to Gulen’s alleged involvement in organizing the 2016 military coup attempt, Hizmet’s schools and educational centers made a great contribution to strengthening the ties between the Balkan Muslims and Turkey (Trapara & Ajzenhamer, 2013: 301–303). Another important function of Gulen’s educational institutions in the region was to suppress the radical Islamic element (Wahhabi and Shiite) that was imported into this area during the wars of the 1990s (Ajzenhamer, 2013).

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golden age of the Ottoman rule, when these peoples enjoyed a privileged regional position, as well as through large investments in their underdeveloped post-Socialist economies. On the other hand, he was convinced that the Serbs (that were, along with the Greeks, never mentioned in his “Strategic Depth” in the context of cooperation, but solely as regional competitors) would keep their eyes wide shut in front of Ankara’s endeavors to strengthen the regional position of Bosniaks and Albanians, and therefore the Ottoman Islamic identity of the Western Balkans, out of pure opportunism for Turkish investments and promised infrastructural projects. Although his assessment seemed correct at first, it quickly became evident that the situation was not so simple. Although Turkey did confirm its position as a patron and benefactor among Bosniaks and Albanians (at least to a degree that the Western presence in the region post-Dayton and post-Kumanovo allowed for), there is a significant room to debate on the sincerity of their mutual relation. However, with the Serbs, even despite their initial opportunism, things were significantly different. Once the economic incentive disappeared, the Serbs took a traditional antagonistic posture toward Turkey, fully aware of the subtext of Davuto˘glu’s policy. In other words, out of the two key instruments of his strategy, one was not sustainable in the long run, while the other became increasingly counterproductive without the first one. Therefore, we can observe that Davuto˘glu did not adequately align the Balkan segment of his grand strategy with plausible capabilities—both the Turkish potential per se, and their potential given the regional circumstances (primarily post-conflict environment and then the calculative interests of the Balkan peoples). Furthermore, Davuto˘glu made another important oversight that Florig points out as a frequent mistake of (potential) hegemons. Time is never still, and geopolitical circumstances change despite hegemons’ intentions to structure the international environment to maximize their advantages. Although Professor Davuto˘glu realized that the end of the bipolar world opened new possibilities for Turkey, Minister of Foreign Affairs Davuto˘glu did not succeed in anticipating the consequences that the new geopolitical turmoil in the Turkish near-land sphere would have on their hegemonic potentials. Once he began his hegemonic expansion, Davuto˘glu overlooked one simple truth that “even hegemons cannot command the tides of history to cease to move” (Florig, 2010: 1112). Even when the gears of change began turning and when it became clear that the hegemonic attraction of Turkey was starting to fade, Davuto˘glu firmly continued implementing the set goals by the already greatly compromised means.14 In doing so, he missed the chance to buy time through flexibility and to wait for Turkey to consolidate itself before continuing with his agenda.15 Such an oversight was not surprising because, to create his grand strategy, Davuto˘glu had to adopt a hegemon’s way of thinking. Consequently, this produced a certain degree of alienation from reality that is characteristic of every hegemon. As noticed 14

We should have in mind that the controversial statements that were quoted in this chapter (including the one that served as a formal cause for the cooling of Serbian-Turkish relations) were made precisely at the moment when Turkey began facing a political and economic crisis. 15 This is exactly what Erdo˘ gan did a few years later when he took the wheel of Turkish foreign policy into his own hands.

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by Florig (2010: 1112), “the hegemon is generally inclined to apply its normative matrix to other states and peoples even in situations where it is likely to be resisted. Convinced its ideas are the guide to right reason and its practices ensure the smooth operation of the global system, the hegemon is disposed to bring its will to bear even in cases where its understanding of local conditions is limited, and its way of thinking and methods of conflict resolution are alien.” Although Florig speaks about the global system and not regional balances, the causal logic of failure is perfectly applicable to Davuto˘glu’s attempt to achieve the Turkish hegemony over the Western Balkans. Convinced that its strategic vision is correct, the Turkish foreign policy led by Davuto˘glu disregarded the local conditions, approaching regional problems onesidedly and imposing solutions that only served Turkish interests. In reaching the regional hegemony as the crucial precondition for realization of his grand strategy, Davuto˘glu leaned on the instruments that were not completely adequate to this goal, or better yet—that were not adequate to this region. While economy alone could have secured a greater Turkish influence over Western Balkan countries, the instrumentalization of Ottoman cultural and historic legacy led to emphasizing otherness, i.e., deeper antagonization among Muslims (Bosniaks and Albanians) and Christians (Serbs) instead of strengthening a joint Balkan self . Overly confident in the correctness of his vision, as well as the attractiveness of both instruments, Davuto˘glu missed foreseeing what would happen if the first instrument failed. When such a thing happened, he did not want to face reality and one simple truth that comes out of it—the past and nostalgia are simply not as attractive as money and promises of economic prosperity.

5 Conclusion A few years after Ahmet Davuto˘glu had been removed from the office of prime minister and his move to the opposition camp, Turkey returned to the Western Balkans. So far, it seems that in the region Turkey is doing better than ever before, despite still being haunted by a persistent economic crisis back home. Although another important figure of the AKP—Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu—is now the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the relations between Turkey and other countries (including the neighboring ones) are directly managed by president Erdo˘gan. The foreign policy pattern resting upon a new dynamical duo, like Erdo˘gan and Davuto˘glu used to make, has not been repeated this time around. The current Turkish foreign policy is based upon a centralized model in which relations with other countries depend primarily on the “quality” of Erdo˘gan’s personal relations with the other countries’ heads. However, it seems that precisely this kind of personalized modus operandi perfectly suits the Western Balkan countries in which political regimes are becoming more and more autocratic (Freedom House, 2021: 7–8, 12). Following the political retirement of highly conservative and nationalistically oriented Tomislav Nikoli´c and the more pragmatic Aleksandar Vuˇci´c becoming president, the relations between Serbia and Turkey began to improve. This was largely

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because while still being a prime minister, Vuˇci´c had taken a much softer stance toward the Turkish presence in the region than pro-Russian Nikoli´c. During the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, Vuˇci´c promptly expressed support to Erdo˘gan even though the coup was still ongoing and its outcome still uncertain. Vuˇci´c then proved himself as highly cooperative regarding Erdo˘gan’s demands for shutting down Fethullah Gülen’s educational institutions as well as the extradition of fugitive members of the Kurdish guerrillas.16 This turn in the relationship of Belgrade toward Ankara, colored by personal sympathies between Vuˇci´c and Erdo˘gan, has led to more intensive cooperation between the two countries. As Novakovi´c et al. (2019: 10) point out, “Belgrade and Ankara’s relationship reached unprecedented heights, with a number of cordial visits of officials and meetings between prime minister/president Vuˇci´c and Erdo˘gan, investment and increasing trade between the two states. So much so, that some media suggested that Serbia is becoming a key Turkish partner in the Western Balkans.” The Sarajevo-Belgrade-Ankara trilateral was revived, new Turkish investments in the regional infrastructure have been announced, trade is on the rise, and the Turkish and Serbian presidents “re-agree” that they disagree on Kosovo. Seemingly, the Serbian side is once again prepared to keep its eyes wide shut regarding the negative aspects of the Turkish foreign policy for the prospect of their investments. Similarly, it seems that Erdo˘gan has removed the ballast of “Strategic Depth” in his policy toward the region. Davuto˘glu’s grand strategy, at least temporarily, has a more significant role in the internal politics of Turkey (as a constituent part of domestic populist folklore)17 than as a guideline of Erdo˘gan’s political moves toward the Balkans. Does that mean that Erdo˘gan has given up on the dream of Turkey being a global power and a regional hegemon, which he shared with his former colleague Ahmet Davuto˘glu? It is doubtful that anyone in the Western Balkans believes such a thing. Yet, it is clear that one lesson did not slip past the Turkish president as it had done in the case of his former advisor, minister, and prime minister—do not bite off more than you can chew.

16

Starting a crusade against the Hizmet network in the region, Ankara sent an official request to Belgrade to close institutions linked to the Gulen movement (Filipovi´c, 2016). Bejza primary school and educational center in Belgrade, which was under suspicion of being part of Gulen’s network of educational institutions (Vukovi´c & Popadi´c, 2016), was closed in May 2018, without any public explanation from the Serbian officials. Also, in December 2017, Serbia deported an official of the Kurdistan Freedom Party to Turkey “despite his claim for asylum and a request by the UN Committee Against Torture (OHCHR), at the beginning of the same month, that Serbia not deport the official because of the risk that he would again be subjected to torture” (Novakovi´c et al., 2019: 10). 17 The newspaper article “What does Turkey want in the Balkans?” written by Erdo˘ gan’s advisor Ibrahim Kalın and published in the Turkish paper Daily Sabah (Kalin, 2018), should be interpreted precisely in that context. A few years ago, this article briefly re-actualized the question of neoOttomanism in the Western Balkans. In fact, in this text, Kalın did not state anything new and original. Following in Davuto˘glu’s footsteps, he continued to observe the Balkans through the lenses of geographic and historical depths, and to insist on the Ottoman heritage as a cohesive factor that ought to be used as the foundation for sustainable peace and prosperity. In other words, it was just a neo-Ottoman déjà vu for internal purposes.

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However, it remains to be seen to what extent Erdo˘gan is willing to stick to this lesson in the future, or if he will, blinded by the regrowth of the Turkish influence in the region, fall in the same trap making a new hegemonic overreach. Such a situation is not inconceivable. Political rapprochement of Turkey and Serbia, whose leaders have constantly pointed out in the past few years that the relations between the two countries are at all-time high, presents a new challenge. The increase of Turkish investment in Serbia is increasingly provoking displeasure of Bosniak political and business elites, who now feel deceived by Erdo˘gan, just as Serbs felt cheated by Davuto˘glu a few years ago. Therefore, this could be a new variable in the Turkish– Balkan equation, the one which could easily turn the growth of the Turkish regional influence into a new decline. On the way in which Erdo˘gan will deal with these matters depends the final answer to the question: has Turkey bitten off more than it can chew in the Western Balkans?

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Fields of Interest

Turkey’s Western Balkan Policy Under the Justice and Development Party: A Sociocultural Perspective Ertan Efegil

and Murat Bayar

The Balkan region has always been of utmost strategic relevance to Turkish decision makers. Following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk gave priority to the question of security in the Balkans, and as a result of his diplomatic engagement, the Balkan Pact was formed in 1934. Later, during the Cold War, due to the bipolar structure of the international system Turkey approached the Balkans as geostrategically divided into two camps; while maintaining relations with the pro-Western regional states, Ankara reduced its interaction with others to the lowest level. Due to the Cyprus problem, although Turkey tried to improve its relations with the non-aligned countries, it could still not consolidate relations with all the Balkan states because of its pro-Western orientation. With the emergence of new opportunities in the post-Cold War context, which also provided space for changes in Turkey’s own positioning within the international system, the Ankara elites started to pay a closer attention to the Balkans as a whole, seeking to establish friendly relations with the countries and their respective peoples with whom this was not possible before. During the 1990s, Turkey was preoccupied with the Yugoslav wars and accordingly it took part in different initiatives aimed at bringing the conflict to an end. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government came to power in 2002, and since then the Turkish state has focused even more on developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the regional states and nonstate actors. In particular, Ahmet Davuto˘glu’s understanding of foreign policy, largely referring to the Ottoman history, religious, and sociocultural values, has maintained that Turkey should take the role of an order-building country in the region. E. Efegil (B) Faculty of Political Science, Sakarya University, Serdivan, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] M. Bayar Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Istanbul Esenyurt University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_5

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This chapter examines the effect of the concept of culture on Turkish foreign policy toward the Western Balkans. It is concerned with the AKP’s understanding of culture and civilization, as well as the presence of cultural sensitivities in the official rhetoric and their impact on foreign policy processes. While the question of culture in the field of international relations can hardly benefit from the mainstream rational theories since the study of culture itself and the results it will eventually reveal are considered irrational, the present analysis rests upon constructivist theory. Therefore, the goal of this study is not to assess performance within the framework of strategic considerations, but to emphasize the role and visibility of sociocultural values in Turkey’s Western Balkan policy.

1 Constructivist Theory and the Notion of Culture Constructivist theory, while representing a post-positivist view of reality as being socially constructed, accepts the sociology of knowledge approach (Küçük, 2009: 780). Although it is mainly encountered in the philosophy of science and social theory, rather than the discipline of international relations (IR), it has nevertheless been represented across the entire field of social sciences, including its strong influence in IR. The 1966 study The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, written by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, is considered one of the first and most important contributions to the field. As indicated by the title, reality and knowledge are socially constructed while such processes contain different thoughts and approaches. Looking elsewhere, the English School considers states as social entities; as the pioneer of the construction theory, it has focused on the historical, social, and cultural dimensions of IR, and argued that the international community is a social construction of states that share specific values, norms, and institutions (Küçük, 2009: 775). Constructivist theory is the only approach applied to the cultural phenomenon in understanding and explaining international relations and foreign policy decisions. Its members object to notions of self-interested material welfare and the struggle for the good life; they see the social rules and thought systems as the determining factors. Thus, while liberals and realists are preoccupied with the selfish, ambitious, and selfinterested nature of states as key players, constructivists’ actors (agents) are evaluated in homo sociological terms (as individuals who comply with the rules and values of the society they live in) (Efegil, 2012: 57–58). In this context, the constructivist theory challenges the basic assumptions of rationalism, such as the immutability of international politics and the existence of anarchic structure. According to this theory, to conduct impact analysis it is necessary to look into intersubjectivity. Understanding the social world is possible through practice and interpretation of meanings. In fact, the realities constructed between subjects make the constructivist theory anti-rationalist (Zehfuss, 2002: 3–4). Constructivists attach particular importance to cultural elements in the execution, understanding, and explanation of the behaviors—including the politics—claiming

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that all behaviors are formed in the context of intersubjective relations and perceived through their own world (Fischer, 2006: 48). The cultural values and beliefs, which stem from the relationships and interactions that individuals establish with one another within their society, are guiding categories, especially in the framing of problems (Efegil, 2012: 196–197). Different socialization processes of decision makers, whose identity is determined through culture and common interests, pave the way for different national behavior patterns. Socialization is defined as the process of internalizing customs and traditions of the society in which individuals live. Therefore, the socialization process is a never-ending apprenticeship practice. It is a realm in which the individual learns to adopt certain behavior in accordance with the expectations of others through diverse modes of interaction (Riutort, 2017: 77). As a result, while being a member of the society, the individual applies their cultural characteristics to their decisions, and their actions take into account the characteristics of the nation they are a member of. With this in mind, individuals who serve as decision makers in political settings can be influenced by the culture they grew up in. Culture, which is not innate but internalized in the socialization process from birth, provides individuals with information about what to do, what to believe, what to attach importance to, and how to react in different situations. This is purposeful and handed down from generation to generation; it constitutes the features that characterize a nation and distinguish it from others. While culture plays an active role in political, socioeconomic, and family life, it is determined by language, religion, and traditions. Also, it concerns every segment of the country. In this context, the leaders’ cultural values and beliefs, as well as their role and responsibility in directing foreign policy, are considered highly important. The determination of states’ foreign policies in harmony with their cultural elements is effective both in terms of their legitimacy and acceptance by the majority. Culture also implies emotional preferences, especially in foreign policy matters that relate to religion and ethnicity, which suggests that culture legitimizes emotionally driven decisions. For example, in the nineteenth century, concerning the Slavs in the Balkans, the Russian Tsar did not hesitate to employ cultural propaganda against the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Such an approach was expected to mobilize Pan-Slavic sentiments of Croats, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Slovaks, and Ukrainians, so that the influence of Russia in the Balkans and central Europe would increase. Another example can be seen nowadays with Russia trying to hide its desire to revamp the political power of the former empire on ethnic grounds, by insisting on its project to protect all Russian people. The interference in the internal affairs of the states that gained independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union through the medium of ethnic sensitivities reveals the role of culture in both policy choices and legitimation in the Russian foreign policy (Fischer, 2006: 56). Accordingly, as some authors have rightly suggested, given that the socialization process of individuals and the cultural heritage they acquire from the society they grew up in are effective in decision-making processes, the effect of culture serves as an independent variable (Hudson, 2007: 24). Alongside this stance, the cognitive differences that cause preference in the selection of methods to be used for problem-solving are closely related

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to cultural factors. Thus, culture, while influential both on the cognitive structures of decision makers and on the shaping of social institutions, affects the solutions produced in the face of the problems encountered.

2 Manifestation of Culture in Foreign Policy The phenomenon of culture gains its full meaning in social structure and sociocultural context. For this reason, it is necessary to explain the relationship between culture and politics, and even more specifically, to redefine the place of culture in politics. However, in this attempt, we should be careful not to detach culture from its own context even though the very examination of culture, due to the lack of a fully agreeable definition, necessitates some kind of modeling in practice. Culture includes symbols, rituals, norms, as well as other social practices, and it is shaped by historical contexts, ethnoreligious circumstances, and political traditions. There is no single dominant cultural value in society and sometimes, besides the dominant culture, there may be more local/regional cultural values. Also, since culture is not static, it can change over time. Dominant cultural values can also determine foreign policy decisions (Eyadat & Mahafza, 2010: 165–166; Jeffords, 1994; Liland, 1993). Alison Dundes Renteln (2004) defines culture as a dynamic value system that allows community members to interact with each other. As argued, the information coming from the environment is affected, interpreted, and constructed from the interaction created by society’s cultural and historical elements. Therefore, different cultures may have a different notion of understanding because the cultural differences are related to the beliefs and behaviors. The cultural values of each country are also unique to itself (Eyadat & Mahafza, 2010: 166). Ultimately, the cultural leanings of decision makers can be vital to understanding their views, attitudes, and decisions. For the clarity of this chapter’s examination of the effect of culture on Turkish foreign policy, it is necessary to define the culture and divide it into certain categories. In this sense, we have opted for three headings—ethnic identity, religion, and historical heritage, as recommended by Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson’s (2005) study of cultural elements to be considered when analyzing the link between culture and politics.

2.1 Ethnic Identity The word “ethnic” (from Greek ethnos), when examined in terms of its meaning, is used in many languages to indicate people or nations, and its main emphasis is on the very origin. The concept is generally used in relation to languages, traditions, religions, cuisines, and other cultural practices of different cultural groups (Lemert, 2006: 174). Ethnic groups are groups of people who believe that they have a common origin and belief system, and they share the same fate and memories historically.

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This sense of partnership is very effective in the formation and expansion of the ethnic group. Also, it does not matter if there is any blood connection between the group members; what is a decisive factor in such groups is the belief shared by their members about having a common origin. For this reason, it is accepted that ethnic groups are political groups organized around a common origin (Weber, 1978: 389). Ethnicity is a general name for groups of people in which individuals exhibit unique cultural behaviors and believe to have common characteristics as the others of the same origin. The individuals of the same origin believe in the cultural matters’ commonalities such as language, religion, and customs, and in addition, they are defined and perceived by the outsiders through such bonds. However, ethnicity is quite different from the concept of race and, even more so, it is a concept developed against race (Marshall, 2009: 215). Ethnicity, as opposed to race, refers to cultural elements. Within its framework, the members’ value and belief systems, religions and traditions, history and national origins, language and sense of humor, and even dietary practices are evaluated. In other words, in the concept of ethnicity, all the features that are not biological or genetic and that also characterize an ethnic group can be mentioned. For this reason, people sharing the same ethnic origin claim a specific cultural group identity for themselves and in the meantime, are defined as having this identity by the others (Andreatta & Ferraro, 2013: 50). Ethnicity plays a role in the formation of a society’s national culture, together with its production and consumption patterns, language, religion, art, and other similar elements. In addition, change and development of these elements is also a determinant in the shaping of the national culture. Although there are ethnic cultures at the core of national cultures, this does not allow for all ethnic cultures to be considered in connection with the national one because the ethnic cultures are not always linked to a political union, namely the state. In other words, we may encounter ethnic identities that cannot be directly related to any political union. Ethnic identities living in or under another culture can be found in different geographies (Gökçe, 1998: 286). Fredrik Barth’s (1969: 10–11) definition of ethnic culture exemplifies this situation. Ethnic identity or ethnic culture represents an essential element, which maintains itself biologically for at least a few generations; by establishing fundamental cultural values and areas of interaction and communication, it is conducive to the formation of a different group. Barth’s definition does not question the relationship of ethnic identity with any political union such as the state. From a different perspective, Anthony Smith (1994: 42) draws attention to six indispensable elements in the definition of an ideal ethnic culture. According to him, an ethnic community can be organized around a collective name, common ancestry myth, shared historical memories, at least one distinctive feature, special bond with the homeland, and a sense of solidarity. Any group approaches the ideal ethnic type to the extent that it possesses these common and distinctive characteristics. It is also essential that its members share these elements. In cases where these six elements are evident, Smith argues that a community with a common identity and culture can be mentioned. Considering the ontological and epistemological origins of ethnic identity, the importance of the concept for the present analysis is easily recognized. While the concept implies a feeling of belonging to a common origin, it does not stipulate a

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biological or political partnership. It is this feeling that is thought to have influenced the speeches of Turkish decision makers toward the Western Balkans. It is predicted that the cultural partnership mindset in the dealings with the region’s societies may be an effective instrument of Turkish foreign policy.

2.2 Religion Religion is considered a basic component of culture. In the formation of a cultural system, religion plays an important role together with the common mindset, as well as art, science, and ideology elements. Religion is an element consisting of beliefs and practices that shape daily life, and by also allowing individuals to make sense of their lives and convey their emotions, it influences the cultural system in place. Making sense of life roughly requires being able to deal effectively with situations that threaten emotions; such situations usually refer to futile, irreparable, or unjust events that individuals may encounter throughout their lives (Geertz, 1973: 100). This suggests that certain living conditions that people may encounter cannot be corrected. However, such situations do become manageable through religion. In this context, culture emerges as the roof element that dictates what people believe and how to act in line with their beliefs (Geertz, 1973: 100). According to Émile Durkheim (2005: 27), religion is a social phenomenon. Common imagination expressing collective realities can emerge within the social structure in relation to religion. In this context, the realization of religious rituals and practices is aimed at maintaining social unity. In other words, the group members who get together around religion stay in touch through religious interactions. Religion itself and its accompanying features are also tools that provide social cohesion; according to Durkheim (2005: 27), by signifying a bond and union, religion functions within the social structure as the most fundamental force that provides people with integration and togetherness. However, religion’s unity creation function is not limited to this situation. At the same time, it shapes the established relations between different societies through the concept of religiosity. It does so in two ways. On the one hand, it makes the members of same religion develop close relationships in different societies. On the other hand, it affects the attitudes of societies belonging to the same religion toward each other. Thus, religion is one of the basic elements enabling both communities and societies to come together or regulate their relations with each other (Fichter, 1996: 83). In addition to the above, religion affects the values and norms of communities. With the religious issues taking place within the foundations of cultural teachings, it can be said that the norms and values of a community exist in parallel with the religious principles, and it is by these means that the cultural teachings are shaped. Pitirim Sorokin (1994: 39) mentions that society’s understanding of religion and its characteristic features are compatible. According to him, religion is a characteristic symbol of societies. Moreover, the most basic function of religion is socially

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oriented—a condition directed to protect and strengthen solidarity among individuals. Furthermore, although different manifestations are encountered, the essence of religion is eternal; the differences in its concrete practices do not affect its essence. As can be seen, religion is a cultural element that plays an active role in acculturation processes, and given its influence on everyday practices and decisions, religion is a cultural element that should be taken into account when examining perspectives, behavior patterns, and lifestyles of individuals, groups, and societies in a sociocultural system. Thinking of the present study, religion has maintained its importance for the Turks at every stage of their history. Both before and after the adoption of Islam, religion has preserved its decisive influence upon the people and society. Obviously, with religion having also maintained an effective position in the cultural understanding of the AKP today, the presence of Muslim groups in Western Balkan societies is a key aspect to be considered when analyzing the position of Turkish decision makers toward the whole region.

2.3 Historical Heritage History represents a basis for individuals, groups, and societies to make sense of the world and construct their future. By making past experiences available, history (in its most classical form) can be defined as a memory of the humanity. Information about different societies and their cultures provides better recognition of those societies and cultures, which is also true for their members. In other words, as the knowledge of cultures deepens, the societies become more understandable to their members. Members themselves need to recognize values in relation to the cultural past and historical heritage, so they can analyze their progress and become able to make sense of life and illuminate the future (Öz, 1999). Individuals born into a culture and who complete their socialization process with the framework of that culture inevitably become a part of that same culture. This brings about the transfer of cultural characteristics to the individuals’ experiences in every moment of their life, which makes cultural characteristics observable in all their behaviors and decisions. This is the reason why members of a particular culture show resembling behavior patterns. On the other hand, the world we live in is not designed in the context of cultural similarities or differences. The borders dividing the world into political units may not reflect cultural characteristics; sometimes the process of redrawing borders can divide cultural groups or human communities with similar cultural values. However, this separation may not be experienced as a cognitive rupture that directly destroys the shared past and memory, or future expectations. In the context of the present study, the question of historical heritage is highly relevant since there has not been a complete break between the states that have common borders with Turkey, or that have already historically experienced shared destiny. When it comes to historical heritage in Turkey’s foreign policy, the first thing that comes to mind is the geography of the Ottoman Empire. This geography

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covers different countries that are divided by political borders but have cultural and historical similarities. The fact that the concept of historical heritage is directly related to the phenomenon of ethnic identity and religion, as well as the presence of a Muslim community in the Western Balkan geography (a community of Turkish identity ethnically), has brought about the establishment of cooperative relationships. Because of this, it is necessary to examine whether the historical sense of partnership, which is thought to be built in the cognition of Turkish decision makers, is effective in foreign policy behaviors.

3 The AKP’s Understanding of Culture and Civilization The sociocultural values are deemed crucial in the AKP’s understanding of politics. While they have appeared under different names since the establishment of the party, it can be said that these values are shaped around three main concepts, which consequently give directions to the party’s domestic and foreign policies: (a) conservative democracy, (b) imperial remnant, which is also cited as neo-Ottomanism, and (c) Islamic civilization, which focuses on the development of understanding of Turkish and Islamic civilization (the Turkish Islamic synthesis). With regard to the conservative democracy concept, while it sometimes appears as proper conservatism and sometimes as conservative democracy, it also bears similarities with the ideas of right-wing political leaders such as the former prime minister Adnan Menderes and former president Turgut Özal. However, the AKP’s standpoint differs from other right-wing political parties because religious sensitivities find much more space in its mentality. With such sensitivities, the party has aimed to unite three different ideologies—Islamism, nationalism, and Westernization— that have provoked long-term debates in all areas of the social structure since the establishment of Turkey (Akdo˘gan, 2003: 105). Religion and nationalism are on the agenda as the most important carriers in understanding conservative democracy. Although the Westernism is seen as the opposite of conservatism, it is combined with the understanding of new conservatism and can at least be evaluated within such a harmony (Tekin, 2004: 97–100). Conservative democracy is featured in many speeches of president Recep Erdo˘gan. The concept can actually be described as an extension of the definition of Islamic democrat—a continuity justified by the fact that the AKP has been trying to create a new understanding of politics since its inauguration. The concept of Islamic democrat, unlike that of conservative democracy, refers directly to religion, namely Islam. With regard to the imperial remnant concept, it concerns foreign policy behavior that is developed in relation to historical, religious, and cultural ties. This concept, also depicted as neo-Ottomanism at both national and international levels, has been the subject of severe criticism from both inside and outside the AKP. Former prime minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu, who was in charge of the formulation of the concept, strongly rejected the label neo-Ottomanism because it evoked a unilateral hegemonic relationship. For this reason, it is accepted that the idea of neo-Ottomanism does

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not really reflect the AKP’s foreign policy perspective. On the other hand, neoOttomanism does not have a concrete meaning either. It is associated with the Özal period, and it has roughly reflected the dream of a regionally sovereign Turkey that is a leader across the territory of the former Ottoman Empire. This idea, in which the ethnic Turkish element is emphasized, sacrifices the relations with the West and it is incompatible with the notion of democracy. Therefore, neo-Ottomanism is not found meaningful (Yavuz, 2001: 45). Since 2008, one of the main goals of the foreign policy, as originally tabled by Davuto˘glu, has been to restore Turkey’s historical and cultural connections so that Turkey would become a key country in the region. Davuto˘glu (2008: 79) argued that Turkey had to replace its past role of a peripheral country with a new one, by taking steps aimed at the improvement of stability and a security environment, as needed to occupy the central position in the region. Neo-Ottomanism is thus ascribed to the AKP period to point to the position of a regional power without pretentions to pursue imperialist expansion. It can be seen as a policy choice that is supposed to emphasize Turkey’s (soft) power. Within this approach, where the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the place of Islam are rediscovered, a new national consensus is sought—a consensus framed around a softer understanding of secularism. At the same time, self-confidence is a key element of this conceptualization and consequent consolidation of soft power (Duran, 2009: 398). Finally, with regard to the Islamic civilization concept, the statements of AKP Chairman and president Erdo˘gan on the subject represent the main point of reference. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the so-called Other, as expressed during the 2005 European Council meeting. As reported by issue of the Turkish Bulletin at the time, Erdo˘gan maintained that throughout history, relations with others had been shaped by ignoring them or by establishing dominance over them. According to him, this type of a relationship has the potential only for conflict, and the way of orienting toward others is important for the establishment of stability and lasting peace. For this reason, Erdo˘gan emphasized that the Other should be thought about, and that it was necessary to question who the Other is, and whether it even exists. Because, in his view, Turkey is aware of its special responsibility for the advancement of Asian and European religions and cultures (Türkiye Bülteni, 2005). Such a claim carries important clues about how to approach the Other; the fact that Turkey plays a vital role in shaping the relations with the Other, is one of the main problems experienced by the world. This role is due to its unique location between Asian and European cultures, and the status of being a geocultural center for the development of geopolitical dialogue between Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. In the examination of Erdo˘gan’s understanding of culture and civilization, the existence of a dual emphasis draws attention. One emphasis is on Turkish history and the Turkish world. For example, at one point, Erdo˘gan mentioned that the Turks need to increase unity and solidarity among them to regain their former power; by becoming more active on the international stage, they could contribute to the peace and stability of the region. Therefore, to better protect the rights and interests of the people, the Turkish-speaking states that act in coordination with the foreign policy and gain strength from each other occupy a critical place in Erdo˘gan’s perception

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of culture and civilization (Türkiye Bülteni, 2006). A similar discourse was spotted on another occasion, when he talked about a brotherhood formed around the ancient values, common history and culture, and the human subjects in the Turkish world. As he insisted, strong and unshakable ties possess huge potential, and therefore proximity and cooperation between peoples should be constantly encouraged (Türkiye Bülteni, 2007). Another emphasis in Erdo˘gan’s stance on culture and civilization is on Islam. As he stated in 2008, with Islam as the common denominator, the Turks and the Arabs are brotherly nations, and even though they do not speak the same language, do not come from the same geography, and do not even have the same color and other characteristics, they still have a common history, culture, and values (Türkiye Bülteni, 2008). With this in mind, the Erdo˘gan regime’s understanding of culture and civilization points to a product of synthesis (Islam and Turkishness) rather than a product that is fed from a single source. In other words, the AKP considers the ethnic and religious identities and the historical heritage concepts, and understandably all these variables should be taken into account when discussing different stages of foreign policy.

4 The AKP Government’s Western Balkan Policy Turkey has focused heavily on the Western Balkans since 2002. Erhan Türbedar (2011: 140–142) identifies four reasons for such an engagement, including the longterm common history, one million people of Turkish ethnic origin who live in the region, geopolitical conditions, and economic/commercial relations.1 On the other hand, Hüsrev Tabak (2018: 82) emphasizes that the AKP government has three priorities in the foreign policy field, which seek to maintain high-level political dialogue, to ensure the highest level of economic integration, and to preserve the multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious social structure of the region. As we know, nationalism is an ideology which looks at the world through a certain mental structure and at the same time calls the masses to feel, position themselves, and act in a particular way (Saraço˘glu, 2013: 54). In this sense, official texts and discourses of the AKP expose these essential elements of nationalism. However, since its establishment, the party has sought to separate itself from Kemalist nationalism which had settled in Turkey (Saraço˘glu, 2013: 54). Given that the AKP has become politically socialized within the boundaries of Erdo˘gan’s “national opinion” movement, therefore, the AKP’s ideological and sociopolitical roots have been greatly influenced by Turkey’s Islamist political trend (Duran, 2013: 97; Jung, 2012: 33). In addition, the AKP does not adopt the international vision of the Welfare Party, which focuses only on the leadership of the Islamic world. As former prime minister Davuto˘glu used to state, the AKP uses Turkey’s historical heritage and its unique 1

President Erdo˘gan also expressed this view in one of his speeches; he stated that Turkey’s presence and effectiveness in the Western Balkans are based on historical and cultural, as well as geopolitical and geostrategic factors (Presidency, 2019).

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geopolitical advantages as possible foundations for rising to the status of a central power with a multidimensional foreign policy (Dalay & Friedman, 2013: 132). Moreover, as further clarified by Cenk Saraço˘glu (2013: 55), within the framework of the AKP nationalism, the concept of nation is established on the basis of common Islamic cultural elements and the Ottoman past. As also observed, the weight of the concept of nation identified with the Turkishness in the official discourse has decreased dramatically in favor of Sunni Islam, which characterizes the Ottoman past. In line with this, the national historical interest—which is another core element of nationalism— is described as re-accessing the political power of the Ottoman Empire, which is thought to represent the rise of the nation. References to the Ottomans’ historical, religious, and cultural values are used effectively in the foreign policy applied in the Western Balkan region, especially in the discourses concerning those areas with high concentration of the Ottoman remnant. According to Zeynep Elif Koç and Murat Önsoy (2018: 314), Turkey under the AKP has pursued an increasingly disconnected strategy and, in contrast to the popular perception, it has done so by making minimal use of its historical and friendly ties with the former Ottoman lands. The current foreign policy is closely related to the foreign policy vision of the AKP, especially of the former prime minister Davuto˘glu. In this context, Davuto˘glu assumed that with the AKP leadership’s attainment of selfconfidence and consolidation of national identity, Turkey would rise as a regional power and become the natural and rightful hegemon of the region (Gürpinar, 2020: 9). Still, the AKP needs a civilizational vision itself to transform Turkey into a regional power or an order-building actor since a multilayered foreign policy should be able to bring all parties together when necessary. According to Burhanettin Duran (2009: 93), the AKP’s discourse on civilization is defined as national, Islamic, and universal. This understanding of civilization rejects the possibility of an identity crisis in Turkish foreign policy and a limited choice between the Western alliance and Islam or the East. From this perspective, Turkey refuses to see its role as a bridge between the West and Islam, a front line of the West, and a country torn between two historical, geographical, and cultural regions with which it has strong ties. On the contrary, it presents itself as a core country that plays a constructive role in the peripheral regions. Aware of its leading position in civilizational terms, Turkey claims that it can become one of the most important global actors once it has combined its central country position with its strategic depth. Considering these views, the Western Balkan region is considered a key cultural sphere of influence for Turkey. Following the centuries-lasting rule and then the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish authorities preserved strong ties with the region and continued to be influential in regional politics, despite their limited foreign policy capacity. When the AKP came to power in 2002, Ankara further increased its engagement in the Middle East and the Western Balkans (Telci & Peneva, 2019: 237). As clarified elsewhere, for the party, the long legacy of the Western Balkans being part of the former Ottoman Empire has played a crucial role in sharing the common moments in the cultural, religious, and state affairs (Ek¸si, 2017: 194–195; Ibish, 2016: 76). For example, while speaking in Kosovo in 2018, Erdo˘gan clearly underlined the

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relevance of Ottoman Islamic elements in Turkey’s regional policy (Büyük & Öztürk, 2019: 120). Other decision makers have also emphasized the concepts of Islamic civilization and Turkey’s Ottoman past,2 which goes hand in hand with Davuto˘glu’s discourse about Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy (Dalay & Friedman, 2013: 130). In October 2009, while speaking at the opening of the “Ottoman Heritage and Balkan Muslim Communities Today” conference in Sarajevo, Davuto˘glu defined the Western Balkan region as a “geopolitical buffer zone,” which had become the center of world politics during the Ottoman rule in the sixteenth century. Moreover, he promised that Turkey would “reinvent” and “reestablish” the region: “Our foreign policy aims to establish order in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East … We will make these regions, together with Turkey, the center of the world’s politics of the future” (Petrovi´c & Relji´c, 2011: 162).3 Later, in one of his 2017 speeches, Erdo˘gan expressed that Turkey has a common destiny and historical unity with its “brothers” in Rumelia and the Western Balkans (Yeni Balkan, 2017). In addition, by saying that as the people of the region, they built history together (Habertürk, 2013), Erdo˘gan underlined that Turkey “knows the Western Balkan geography, peoples, and policies very well” and kept referring to the Ottoman past (Sözcü, 2013). As expected, the authorities gave more space to the concepts of history and memory, as well as culture and civilization in their speeches (Nuro˘glu & Nuro˘glu, 2019: 231; Tabak, 2018: 77). Among all the elements, Islamic civilization and the Ottoman past have stood out in Turkey’s new world vision (Tabak, 2018: 77). Nevertheless, the Ankara administration has also stated that the new Western Balkan region would be built upon political dialogue, economic interdependence, and cultural tolerance and integration (Bechev, 2012: 138; Tabak, 2018: 83). To proceed with implementation, Turkey has forged close relations with the Muslims and ethnic Turks (in particular in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and North Macedonia), and other related communities in the region, which are former subjects of interest of the Ottoman Empire (Nuro˘glu & Nuro˘glu, 2019: 217; Tabak, 2018: 83).4 For example, as part of the overall commitment to the region, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA) restored the historical monuments emphasizing the Ottoman Islamic past (Tabak, 2018: 84). Although the accompanying discourses have often created the perception of neo-Ottoman penetration (Koç & Önsoy, 2018: 358), Turkey’s policy has still included both ideological and pragmatic 2

In fact, the majority of those who voted for the AKP, which has a background in Islamic conservatism, embraced the Ottoman past and Islamic values. Therefore, one of the reasons why the AKP includes these concepts in its discourses is that it wants to convey messages about domestic politics (Bechev, 2019: 41). 3 However, after this speech, other regional nationalist circles claimed in the international academic and political environments that Turkey’s involvement in the Western Balkans was based on the idea of neo-Ottomanism, mentioning that it had an ideological character and historical and religious roots (Türbedar, 2011: 140). Different circles also praised Davuto˘glu’s speech for the thought that the Ottoman past could guide the future in the Western Balkans (Bechev, 2019: 41). 4 In one of his speeches, president Erdo˘ gan underlined the sociological ties he has with the people in the region, stating that the Turkish citizens from the Western Balkans are not immigrants, but on the contrary, they are the original children of Turkey (Yeni Balkan, 2017).

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calculations (Bechev, 2019: 42). In this context, it has also been affected by the developments in the region (Nuro˘glu & Nuro˘glu, 2019: 213). More precisely, Ankara has paid close attention to matters pertaining to security, commercial exchanges, and geographical conditions, has provided economic and technical assistance to the region, and has undertaken the mission of goodwill in solving regional problems (Bechev, 2019: 42–43; Koç & Önsoy, 2018: 357–359). The role of religion in the AKP’s Western Balkan policy is of particular importance. In the view of Duran, a member of the president’s Foreign Policy and Security Council, the AKP has integrated the Islamist policies into the concept of a democratic regime.5 Thus, the reason why Turkey plays an active role in the Western Balkans is a responsibility revealed by the understanding of civilization. According to Dietrich Jung, this type of policy has an ideological and sociopolitical counterpart in the Islamist sections of Turkey. Nevertheless, the Turkish authorities add the religious concepts to the human rights context. As a result, AKP officials include religious concepts in their discourses for as long as they support Turkey’s political and economic interests (Jung, 2012: 25, 34–37). When it comes to practice, although they do not see religion as a guiding concept in foreign policy, they do act under the influence of Islamic values. Through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, Turkey has focused on spreading moderate and secular Islam in the region; in this context, it has built new mosques and religious schools, as well as appointed religious officials, provided scholarships, and distributed religious books (Telci & Peneva, 2019: 244). Still, as a result, as it has been reported, the Directorate has struggled with the radical Salafist interpretation of Islamic values (Bechev, 2019: 44).

5 Conclusion The present study offers a number of conclusions. To begin with, Turkey did not plan its Western Balkan policy only on the basis of material elements, and therefore did not define its national interests as expected by the realist school of thought. Again, as stated in theory, the sociocultural environment in which Turkish decision makers grew up, as well as their personal perceptions, have impacted on foreign policy planning. For example, former prime minister Davuto˘glu, president Erdo˘gan, and other AKP officials coming from the political Islamist understanding have attached great importance to the golden periods of Ottoman history, which have consequently been prominent elements in the formation of the Western Balkan policy. In fact, these decision makers make major references to Islam in terms of cultural and social values, and for this reason, the references to the Ottoman past, Islamic brotherhood, and Turkishness shape the AKP’s foreign policy understanding.

5

In his speeches, Erdo˘gan has stated that Muslim societies living in different parts of the world, from the Balkans to Southeast Asia and Africa, need the support of the Islamic world (Hürriyet, 2016). This standpoint complements Professor Duran’s statement.

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Moreover, Turkey’s Western Balkan policy has been affected by changes in internal factors, including cultural, historical, and religious values, but also social structure and voters’ expectations. By looking at statements of decision makers, it is obvious that cultural elements, namely the ethnic identity, the Islamic belief, and values constructed around historical heritage, are intensely expressed. On the other hand, as some have rightly suggested, society’s cultural and historical values affect the incoming information. In fact, Turkish decision makers have viewed and interpreted the information and certain approaches coming from the Western Balkan region from the perspective of their own cultural values. In addition, the adopted culture plays a guiding role for the decision makers about what should be done. For example, when decision makers look at the Western Balkans, many are likely to see the former Ottoman subjects; therefore, they automatically support a close relationship with the region and advocate a unity between Turkey and the communities there in the context of the Ottoman religious values. Ethnic identity is also prominently observed in Turkey’s regional policy. AKP elites use the Ottoman history and are inclined to make reference to the golden age of the Ottomans in the region. All of this is complemented with the question of religion, which is visibly present. Although Turkey has openly declared its intention to spread moderate and secular Islam in the region, and within the framework, different representatives have not hesitated to forge better links and benefit from the regional Muslim communities. Those who support the AKP have a political Islamist understanding and admire the Ottoman history. Such links contribute to the process of consolidation of soft power, which further complements and paves the way to security and economic cooperation. Thus, it is obvious that common historical, religious, and cultural ties between Turkey and Western Balkan countries shape the development of their bilateral and multilateral relations.

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Turkish Islam and Turkey’s Battle for Influence in the Western Balkans Hüsrev Tabak

and Abdulgani Bozkurt

The Davuto˘glu era in Turkey’s foreign policy has often been labeled as being guided by neo-Ottomanism, due to the bold references to the Ottoman civilizational heritage as a bond in rebuilding Turkey’s relations with the countries in the former Ottoman hinterland. Turkey’s approach to the Balkans is said to be giving the most evident proof of such an intention in the country’s foreign policy. The neo-Ottoman objectives have been fiercely denied by the consecutive Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments, due to the connotations Ottomanism bring, which include hegemonic patronage, domination, interventionism, and imperialism. While we are not sure whether calling Turkey a hegemonic power in the Balkans would be appropriate, we do boldly claim that some aspects attributed to being neo-Ottoman have long been part of Turkey’s foreign policy and the prominent of them is Turkish Islam. We will elaborate on what Turkish Islam denotes, yet as an ethnoreligious norm it has been a foreign policy priority for quite a long time now, by which Turkey shaped the religio-cultural power balance in diaspora and kin spaces, including the ones in the Balkans. It has therefore been a practice that Turkey’s intervening will manifest itself under both secular and conservative governments, and what never changed in the practice of Turkish Islamic foreign policy has been that both secular and conservative governments have been ethnocentric in relating Islam to the foreign policy agenda. Both believed that Turkish Islam is superior, for instance, to Salafi or Shia Islam, both have used Islam to extend their control over overseas kin and diaspora communities, both wanted the kin and diaspora communities to practice Islam as Turkey does, and both have endeavored to protect the Turkic and kin states

H. Tabak (B) · A. Bozkurt Faculty of Economics, Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan University, Rize, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] A. Bozkurt e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_6

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in Central Asia or the Balkans (today this extends far beyond) from the invasion of alien and radical streams (Salafism and Shiism). The Turkish Islamic foreign policy therefore is an interventionist and transformative policy—still, we are quite not sure whether this would be adequate to call it hegemonic. Yet, there is no doubt it is consequential for the target community/state, as it creates or makes the target part of a foreign-infused religio-cultural rivalry, and again without a doubt it provides Turkey with certain strategic gains, in the case of the Balkans with regional ones. This research explores these gains and the practice of the interventionist and transformative ethnocentric foreign policy, and the rivalry around different theologies of Islam particularly in the Western Balkans. The flow of the argumentation in this chapter is as follows. We initially elaborate on the scope and history of the Turkish Islamic foreign policy of Turkey. We then move on to a discussion on the relevance of the Balkans for Turkish Islamic foreign policy. The final two sections examine the Turkish Islamic foreign policy in the Balkans through unfolding the diverse strategies and instruments utilized by Turkey on the ground, which include the reinvention of Turkish Islam as an authentic Balkan practice and the alienation of rival practices including Salafism, Shiism, and Gülenism toward which Turkey fights an all-out diplomatic war. In writing the last two sections, we overwhelmingly used the interviews we conducted with Turkey’s incumbent or former mission officials, particularly with the Diyanet personnel in four countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia).1 We asked them three interrelated questions: what does Turkey do with religion in the Balkans, why does Turkey use an ethno-cultural religious discourse, and what does Turkey think would happen if it was not present on the ground? The responses mostly confirmed the already known aspects of Turkey’s religious discourse in the Balkans, yet particularly the responses to the two latter questions revealed the rationale behind the sustenance of religious rivalry from the perspective of Turkey.

1 Islam and Foreign Policy in Secular Turkey For a secular country to have religiously defined missions and concerns in foreign policy may sound categorically controversial, particularly from an identity politics perspective. Yet, religion has proved to be a significant lever to be utilized in both international and regional politics for Turkey, and has defined many strategic moves the state has taken. Quite understandably, the Ottomans had a history of acting as protectors of Muslim communities and they did so even when they lost territories to the newly independent states throughout the nineteenth century. It would not be wrong to suggest that this mission of the Ottomans was partly taken over by Kemalist 1

The interviews were conducted online via the use of phone call or zoom meetings in September 2021. With some of the interviewees, we had the chance to talk twice, to confirm the claims other respondents put forward. The identities of the interviewees are anonymized due to ethical concerns and to the nature of the work our interviewees conducted, or still conduct.

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Turkey—the country, despite the secular rebuilding efforts, including the abolition of the caliphate, showed interest in the affairs of the Muslims in the former Ottoman hinterland (Tabak, 2016). Accordingly, the Muslim communities in the surrounding countries were given diplomatic support against the governmental oppression they experienced, or religion served as the defining grounds in the actualization of the population exchange between Turkey and Greece, and in receiving immigrants from Yugoslavia throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Landau, 1995). Along with diplomatic-level involvements, there were certain institutional-level initiations illustrating the religion’s utilization in foreign policy by the secular Turkey. For example, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (referred to as the Diyanet) acted in a way of maintaining the Ottoman Shaykh-ul-Islam’s mission of guiding the people in the former Ottoman hinterland in religious issues. Upon the request of the Muslims in Cyprus in 1953, the Diyanet published a fetwa on a dispute within the Cypriot Muslim community regarding whether the Quran might be written in Latinized Turkish letters (Özdemir, 1999: 198). In tandem with this, today Diyanet works as an arbitrator body for the countries in the Balkans, between Muslim minorities and the state; as it is legislatively accepted by some countries, for instance Montenegro, when a domestic Islamic authority is unable to offer a solution on religious issues, the Diyanet’s solution will be embraced (Ünal, 2012: 25). Moreover, delivering overseas religious services had become a central mission for the Diyanet as early as the 1970s following the formation of diaspora communities first in Europe, and later throughout the world by the 1960s onward due to mass worker migrations. The Diyanet commenced sending temporary and permanent imams to the newly formed diaspora localities to 2013). Beyond this, by the provide the emigrants with religious services (Senay, ¸ mid-1980s the Diyanet itself also began establishing affiliated mosques (through its branch, the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs, among others), along with supporting the mosques built by the various Turkey-originated religious groups. Nevertheless, the mission of providing religious services extended from the late 1980s onward toward the former Ottoman hinterland and beyond, particularly toward Central Asia, upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Nevzat & Hatay, 2009: 922– 923). Despite such involvements though, it should be borne in mind that religion was for a long time a national security subject in domestic politics. A distinction should therefore be made here; the secular Turkey utilized religion in foreign policy, yet the motive was not to Islamize overseas localities. It was rather to extend its control over overseas kin and diaspora communities. A reason why this may not be seen as controversial is that the religious groups the secular Turkey considered as hindering the secular character of the Turkish society were operating widely in the diaspora communities and were financially supporting the activities in the homeland. Therefore, so the country made use of the Diyanet to control the practice of Islam not only in Turkey, but also in the Turkish diaspora communities for the sake of protecting the secular practice of religion back home. This has been the historical practice, so the question arises: what about the religious conservative AKP? What has it been doing with Islam in foreign policy? To say the last first, surprisingly, the secular mission of controlling communities abroad has been maintained by the conservative AKP, yet in more nuanced and institutionally diverse ways.

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The AKP has been accused of having an Islamist ideology, thus pursuing an Islamic foreign policy for quite a long time now—whether it would be called so, it is clear that the AKP does bold things with Islam in foreign policy (see Tabak, 2017). It justifies its alliances in religious brotherhood or declares itself as the savior and protector of the Muslims worldwide. Indeed, when we group such practices conducted by Turkey with reference to Islam, particularly under the religious conservative AKP, we see that it deploys Islam as two distinct, partly complementary, and partly conflictual practices, namely Islamic Internationalism and Turkish Islamism. Islamic Internationalism refers to the idea that religious identity should be the core reference on which interstate and intercommunal relations are built, so it aims to redefine the secular international identity and sense of belonging for Turkey. As might be expected, the secular Turkey did not have an Islamic Internationalist inclination in its foreign policy; contrarily it refrained from cultivating close ties with the Islamic states. It was due to this refrainment that despite becoming a member of the Islamic Cooperation Organization, Turkey did not ratify its constitution until 2008—doing so was long considered as being against the secular character of the state, therefore unconstitutional. What secular Turkey did with Islam was rather part of Turkish Islamic tendency; we will come to this later. The Islamic Internationalism was first politically supported by Necmettin Erbakan and his Milli Görü¸s (National View) organization in the 1970s; the coup against his reign in 1997 was also partly due to such a path. Erbakan’s Islamic Internationalism was mostly envisaging state-level engagement—he advocated building Islamic UN, Islamic NATO, Islamic Common Market, and others, and initiated the building of the Developing-8 (D-8) (Robins, 1997). The AKP extended the relations toward societal and cultural domains, made use of institutions with overseas missions such as the Diyanet, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA), or the Yunus Emre Institute in building relations with the Muslim communities, and integrated nongovernmental and humanitarian initiatives to its policy toward Muslims. Thus, the ummah-focus turned into a broader humanitarian Islamic Internationalism with stronger state and civil society involvement (Tabak, 2017). Hence, AKP replaced state-centrism and intergovernmentalism in Islamic Internationalism with nongovernmental and humanitarian diplomacy; however, these became possible through the desecuritization of religion in domestic politics first. Turkish Islam is a concept shedding light on the inherently ethnocentric character of the practice of Islam in Turkey. For both the Islamists and the seculars, Turkey stands out as an exemplary country (within the Muslim world) practicing Islam the most authentically and truly possible, as social anthropologist Jenny White (2013, 188) observed: “Turks of every political persuasion with almost one voice proclaim Turkish Islam different from and superior to other forms of Islam, particularly that practiced in the Arab world.” The distinct and superior character of the Turkish Islam led the seculars to oppose radical Islamic practices and ideologies such as in Iran or Saudi Arabia, and to their penetration into Turkey—the international opposition to radical Islam (such as Shiites or Wahhabis/Salafis) was concomitant to the domestic political fight against political Islamism. For the seculars, the Kemalist

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reformation of Islam saved the Muslims from backwardness and savagery, and introduced them to the righteous and respectful pathway for incorporating the religious lifestyle into the modern world. The securitization of religion in both the Republican era and later in the 1990s was thus to protect the modern practice from political Islamists—with international ties with radicals elsewhere—who would eliminate the so-called Kemalist gains in the religious domain. The religiously devoted people and the Islamists as well championed the moderate character of Turkish Islam and considered the Shiite or the Wahhabi Islam as extreme practices hindering the global representation (through leading to Islamophobia) and cultural unity of Muslims (Tabak, 2017: 95). Rather, they glorified the moderate and cosmopolitan religious heritage of the Ottoman Islamic civilization, made the idea of “Islam is performed best in Turkey” a foreign policy priority, and hence endorsed the idea that “Turkey’s Islamic experience matters to all Muslim countries in an age of modernity” (Tabak, 2016: 119–120). As part of this, the AKP intended to internationally promote this good practice of Islam through competing with rival and radical beliefs on the ground, to recover the destruction the radical and extremist Islamists created. The institutions such as the Diyanet, with offices and religious officials abroad, or T˙IKA acted as the conveyors of the Turkish Islamic message and heritage, while at the governmental level Turkey joined the global military alliance, for instance, against Al-Qaeda or DAESH (Çitak, 2010; Öktem, 2012: 42). Moreover, the Diyanet organized Eurasian Islamic Meetings and Meetings of African Continent Muslim Countries and Societies, as part of which Turkish Islam is presented to the religious authorities in the Muslim countries as “a test case for a synthesis of Islam and democracy … [and] a model for the Islamic world” (Dere, 2008: 299). Nonetheless, following the July 15 failed coup in 2016 in Turkey, the overseas Turkish Islamic entrepreneurship also included a global fight against the Gülenists (the Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü—FETÖ, as called in governmental discourse in Turkey) by which the religious group has been religiously denounced as extremist and harming the Turkish Islamic mission, as the Gülenists have historically claimed to be representing Turkish Islam abroad (Balcı, 2003). In the practice of Turkey, Turkish Islam and Islamic Internationalism have had contradictory teachings, yet Turkish Islam has been the primary grounds with which the country’s religious exceptionalism and the neo-Ottoman endeavors (via selfattributed responsibility toward the Muslim world) in foreign policy have been justified (see Tabak, 2017).

2 The Relevance of the Balkans for Turkey and Turkish Islam The Balkans’ relevance to Turkey, first and foremost, emanates from the fact that Turkey is a Balkan country. This geographical belonging has been shared by intellectual, immigrant, or governmental circles in Turkey, irrespective of their political

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orientation. It is thus believed that Turkey shares with other Balkan states historical, cultural, and geographical connectedness and this fact should shape the country’s policies toward the region. In the historical context, however, Turkey’s approach to the Balkans was defined by the international systemic structural determinants. Even during the 1990s, despite the vast public support for direct involvement in the Bosnian civil war, for instance, Turkey’s Balkan policy was shaped within the framework of its NATO alliance. With the AKP era, however, Turkey developed a more assertive engagement with the region and followed three priorities—maintaining “high-level political dialogue,” achieving “maximum economic integration,” and making sure of the “preservation of the region’s multiethnic, multicultural, multireligious social structure” (T˙IKA, 2015a). As part of the first two concerns, Turkey has increased its presence in the financial and industrial sectors of the Balkan countries, along with the diplomatic mediatory initiations and defense collaborations for contributing to the stability and security of the region. As a result, while Turkey’s trade volume in economic relations has unprecedentedly increased, its diplomatic influence has alike been improved, as seen for instance in the frequent exchange of high-level diplomatic visits (Hake & Radzyner, 2019; Mitrovi´c-Boškovi´c et al., 2015). Nonetheless, the latter concern brought about a bold and interfering social and cultural dimension to Turkey’s foreign policy, and this manifested itself as an emphasis on an Islamic civilizational interpretation of history, culture, and geography of the region and on a transnational historical Ottoman memory utilized in building, maintaining, and enhancing relations with the kin communities in the region. The Balkans, within this scope, has become a showcase for the interfering will of Turkey—the accusations of neo-Ottomanism were triggered by such an intention (Mitrovi´c-Boškovi´c et al., 2015: 107). The interventionist tendency of Turkey, however, was not always compatible with the Balkan policies of Turkey’s European and transatlantic partners. More precisely, Turkey has often been portrayed as in a strategic competition with them, despite the continuous cooperation in other domains including security and humanitarian aid (Dursun-Özkanca, 2016). For instance, Turkey’s involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s intercommunal affairs, while welcomed by some, has also been approached with mistrust by the EU as Turkey’s presence was seen as guaranteeing the interests of the Bosniaks, while undermining those of Bosnian Serbs and Croats (Bechev, 2012; Petrovi´c & Relji´c, 2011). Also, as seen in France’s mistrust, Turkey, indeed along with Russia, is seen making the Balkan states as moving away from European values and civilization, thus making them fail in Europeanization (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019). Turkey’s response to this has been that Turkey, as a country that successfully blended democracy and traditional values and lifestyle, is necessary for the Balkans to protect it from sliding into radicalism and fundamentalism in a politico-cultural domain. Thus, Turkey’s politico-cultural presence is portrayed as vital for the moderate Islam’s rule in the region, particularly among the Muslim population. Turkish Islam’s role in the Balkans becomes relevant within this very scope. Turkey holds that in order for the Balkan states to suppress extremist religious groups and sects—including Wahhabism (Salafi Islam) and other Salafi fundamentalists, Shiite radicalism, and Gülenists—Turkish Islam, something also authentic to the

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Balkan soil, should become widely adopted in the region. This is the ground on which Turkey’s involvement and interference in the region becomes a necessity. As for Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s religious influences in the region should be balanced and eliminated, an argument concomitant to its broader rivalry with Salafism or Shia in regional politics, and something complementary to its broader Turkish Islamic foreign policy (Duran & Yılmaz, 2013; Koppa, 2021). Moreover, for Turkey, the Gülenists constitute a security threat not only to Turkey but also to other countries they are operating in. The governmental-level diplomatic initiations of Turkey have remained limited in terms of reaching to and molding the overseas public opinion—as the group was long seen as the representative of Turkish Islam in the respective countries. This is due to Turkey’s decades-long backing of the group, and also that the religious discourse of the group is often seen as moderate compared, for instance, to the Salafis. So, for Turkey, its broader public diplomacy campaign was needed to be assisted by a religiously defined approach, as part of which the group could be religiously denounced, and its qualities for representing Turkish Islam could be eliminated. Therefore, Turkish Islam has become a ground to be able to deal with Wahhabism, Shia, and Gülenists in the Balkans within this very scope and the strategic gains it provides Turkey with are quite self-evident: this is something to be further elaborated below. Notwithstanding this, Turkey deals with Shia, Wahhabism, and Gülenists in the Balkans through disseminating Turkish Islamic practices to the Muslim communities. Also, through employing a Turkish Islamic agenda in foreign policy, as part of which various institutions with overseas cultural missions and with access to both ordinary people and the governmental officials have been deployed (Tabak, 2018). These institutions include the Diyanet, the Yunus Emre Institute, T˙IKA, the Maarif Foundation, and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB).

3 Reinventing Turkish Islam as a Balkan Practice The dissemination of the Turkish Islamic practices and narratives to the Balkans has been the most evident proof of Turkey’s intervening will toward the region. The sphere of influence was aimed to be solidified through making the Balkan Muslims adopt/emulate the religio-cultural progress Turkey achieved in cultural and religious domains. This was done as a Muslim country with a recognized record of successfully blending democracy and Islam, and with a responsibility toward the region as its former ruling power. Looking more closely at the work performed by individual institutions, when T˙IKA was initially established in the early 1990s, its mission was ethnically defined—it was to provide development assistance to the newly independent Turkic states in Central Asia. By the AKP, T˙IKA was given a primary mission of “coordinating the protection of cultural heritage abroad,” thus re-erecting the Ottoman Islamic artifacts for rebuilding the historically broken cultural relations of the ˙ Dünyası, 2012a, 2012b). President Recep Erdo˘gan Muslim world with Turkey (TIKA

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˙ described T˙IKA’s cultural mission as follows: “TIKA employees should be aware of the fact that in addition to the projects they carry out in the countries, they are the transmitters of Turkey’s history, civilization, culture, and values, they work as modern alperens [conquerors of hearts and minds]” (T˙IKA, 2015b). T˙IKA’s alperens were not alone in their mission; the Diyanet’s imams were their principal partners. With the AKP, Diyanet’s already internationalized mission of controlling the practice of Islam in diaspora spaces gained novel religious activism— it became the primary mobilizer of Turkish Islam and the forefront protector of the Turkish Islamic religious identity abroad against Shia and Salafism (Bulut, 2004: 8). Along with providing religious services through sending imams and establishing affiliated mosques, Diyanet sponsors the building of theology faculties and imamhatip schools abroad, for instance in Bulgaria (Aydın, 2008). It also sponsors students from the Balkans each year to study at imam-hatip schools and theology faculties in Turkey, and maintains a strong relationship with the official religious authorities of the Balkan states (Korkut, 2010). Sponsoring students to be educated in Turkish universities was a long practice that began with the Great Student Exchange Project (Büyük Ö˘grenci Projesi) initiated in the early 1990s to bring students from the Turkic world to Turkey. With the establishment of the YTB, this project was renamed as Türkiye Bursları (Turkey Scholarships) and the scope of the project, in terms of the beneficiary countries and communities, was extended. The initial beneficiaries were those with ethnic unity with Turkey, yet it has shifted toward the communities with cultural unity with Turkey—“[t]oday, there is no single Muslim and/or Turkic populated country which is left outside the target audience” (Tabak, 2016: 47). The Balkan countries have an exceptional place in the allocation of the scholarships. For instance, the applications to Türkiye Bursları received from the Balkan countries constitute only 1.5 percent of total applications, however, they make up around 15 percent of total beneficiaries of the bursary (Türkiye Bursları, 2019, 2020). YTB undertakes another mission related to Türkiye Bursları, which is the Turkey alumni meetings and the formation of Turkey alumni associations abroad. Accordingly, YTB encourages Turkey graduates—the ones given a bursary—to establish Turkey alumni associations in their own countries to maintain Turkey’s communication and contact with scholarship holders (YTB, 2019). These associations also act as local collaborators of Turkey in the diffusion of Turkish Islamic practices.2 YTB organizes annual meetings to bring these associations together and to encourage other graduates to establish such associations in their countries. The Yunus Emre Institute is also involved in promoting Ottoman Islamic culture abroad, yet its influence is limited to the cultural domain. However, another institution, the Maarif Foundation, deserves mentioning here. This is the institution principally established to take over the Gülenist schools abroad, and to extend the fight against FETÖ to the public domain in countries where the Gülenists are well organized. Since the Gülenists operate principally in the education sector, the importance 2

Similar associations are also formed by the imam-hatip graduates in the Balkans; Western Thrace Imam-Hatip Alumni Association is one of the well-organized ones.

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of the Maarif Foundation becomes clear. So far, the foundation has taken possession of tens of Gülenist schools around the world, yet its achievements in the Balkans remained limited. We will come to this in the next section. Before moving to how these institutions are deployed, we should also mention the use of Turkish Sufi groups (tariqa) in the Balkans as part of the Turkish Islamic mission. As the representative of Sufi Islam, a core component of Ottoman/Turkish Islam, these groups were long present in some of the Balkan countries, beginning from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, with the AKP’s coming to power they gained further motivation and access to the region, as the countries were welcoming these groups with an expectation of acquiring humanitarian aid. These organizations, along with religious services, provide substantial infrastructural support—they built schools, mosques or even contributed to the restoration of Ottoman cultural artifacts. They facilitated delivering Turkish Islam’s message of authenticity in the Balkans; thus, Turkish Islam’s reinvention as a local practice owes it to these Sufi groups. This is as important as Turkey’s restoring tekkes and shrines, or its vast use of Sufi philosophers such as Rumi or Yunus Emre (the Yunus Emre Institute is named after him) as a common ground between the local beliefs and the Turkish Islam. So, to say the least, they increased the credibility of the authenticity claims of Turkey. In the building of the authenticity narration, the Ottoman past of the region has been principally recalled. Accordingly, during the Ottoman era, Islam had two institutional appearances in the Balkans: the caliph and the Sheikh ul-Islam on one hand, and the diverse tekkes throughout the region on the other. The former were following the Hanafi school of law, while the others were the followers of the Anatolian Sufi (Bektashi) orders. Following the withdrawal of the Ottomans from the Balkans, the religious legacy was continued to be maintained through the mosques with Ottomaneducated local imams and the tekkes. Yet, during the Cold War, particularly in Yugoslavia, most of the tekkes were closed down while the mosques began to be headed by imams trained in the Arab world. Following the demise of the former Yugoslavia, the national official religious authorities in the newly emerged states were highly confused regarding the religious positioning they would take and the newly surfacing “foreign” representations of Islam in their countries were further complicating their positions (Duijzings, 2000). The Turkish Islamic mission that Turkey initiated introduced the new states the third way, with yet a cost of rapprochement with the Ottoman past of their countries; some countries did well in this and welcomingly embraced the Ottoman heritage, while others were hesitant. Nonetheless, the discourse of shared historical and cultural context and Turkey’s concomitant endeavors for re-erecting the Ottoman heritage all over the Balkans provided Turkey’s diplomatic mission members and the local collaborators with the necessary grounds to operate. Within this scope, to symbolically redecorate the cities with standing Ottoman monuments, Ottoman-era mosques were restored and put into religious service, along with hundreds of other Ottoman-era artifacts such as lodges, shrines, fountains, bridges, and hammams. In the Balkans alone, T˙IKA and the Diyanet in collaboration with the official religious authorities renovated more than twenty mosques between

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2008 and 2013 alone, and the figure has been rising since then (T˙IKA, 2013). Moreover, Turkey—via the funds provided by the Diyanet—has built Ottoman-Turkish style new mosques, such as the ones in Prishtina (the Central Mosque), Tirana (the Namazgah Mosque), and Skopje (Skopje Mosque), which are the biggest mosques in those countries (TDV, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c). Concomitant to redecorating the cities with standing Ottoman artifacts or Ottoman-style mosques, Turkey’s diplomatic missions, in collaboration with the locals (Turkey’s graduates and alumni associations, pro-Ottoman groups, and ethnic Turks), have endeavored to make Turkish Islam—the authentic belief of the Balkans now—gain further ground. This is particularly against the alien forms of (harmful) practices; to do so has indispensably required them to work for increasing the number of Turkey-graduated imams and religious officials recruited by the official Islamic authorities in the Balkans.

4 Saving the Balkans Through Turkish Islam We argue that Turkey’s wide presence on the ground to promote Turkish Islam in the Balkans is to fight two battles abroad—the first is against the radical Islamic streams promoted by Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the second is against the Gülenists. Turkey fights with all these streams and groups in domestic politics as well, so the fight in the Balkans is an extension of the domestic securitization abroad. Below, we separately elaborate on Turkey’s Turkish Islamic fights against the Salafis, Shiites, and Gülenists.

4.1 The Fight Against Salafi Islam The Salafi influence in the Balkans mostly rests on the civil war era involvements, particularly of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries in the Western Balkans (Bardos, 2013: 62). Yet, long before the 1990s in the post-war context, the socialist governments in Yugoslavia and Albania had a policy that made the Muslim communities take religious education for their clerics in Saudi Arabia and other Arabic states. Therefore, the makeup of clergy in the post-socialist period was those with close connectivity with Salafism during the state-building era. Even today, as a continuity of this tradition most of the students in the Balkans with an intention to pursue a career in theology go to divinity schools in the Arab world (Interview 5). The Saudi Arabian financial and material support during the war in the 1990s continued in the new states with Muslim populations in the Western Balkans, bringing Salafism huge room for exerting influence. Along with humanitarian and developmental aid the Salafis provided, they built mosques and madrassas (religious schools) in the Wahhabi style and curriculum—this has been a move changing the religio-cultural character of the traditional Muslim communities of the Balkan countries. The mosques built and receiving funds from the Saudis are reportedly well over four hundred in Bosnia

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alone and it is thus often believed that Salafis “systematically pursue[d] a goal of political influence” through these mosques (Racimora, 2013: 1). In a recent official visit to Sarajevo by the Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance, for instance, the minister—in his visit to the King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo, the most notable Wahhabi-style mosque in the Balkans—urged that “the mosque increase its education and advocacy programs … in accordance with Islamic values,” with Islamic values here referring to the Salafi Islam (Arab News, 2021). Along with the government-level supports, Saudi charities as well enjoy a wide presence on the ground, delivering aid to the Muslims throughout the Balkans. While the Salafi governmental support often targets the city centers, the Saudi charities work mostly in the remote parts of the countries and recruit followers there easily. As observed by our interviewee in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a result of three decades of work by the Wahhabis and other Salafis, now among the Muslims there emerged three groups of local Salafis: “The first group are apolitical in their daily lives and became the followers of the Hanbali school due to the influences of the Arabs who came to the Balkans during the war era. They are identifiable from the dress code they adopt in their daily lives. The second group are keen on activist work, often pour into the streets for protests and take a radical and skeptic position toward issues such as LGBT; they are often Eurosceptic. The third group is composed of Salafis who joined or are looking for opportunities for joining the jihadi fight in Syria or Iraq. The members of this last group are those fighting in the Balkans with local or foreign beliefs other than Salafism. In the target of their work we often find Shiites or Ottoman heritage” (Interview 4). From the perspective of Turkey, the involvements of particularly the third group are seen as a direct threat to the Ottoman religio-cultural heritage of the region, and the country allocated resources to counterbalance their involvements. For Turkey, however, the balancing involvement is particularly required because the Salafis are backed substantially by Saudi Arabia—so what happens on the ground is that Turkey and Saudi Arabia compete for cultural influence and political control (similar to the competition between them for regional influence and patronage) (Bulut, 2004: 8). They employ similar tools such as restoring mosques, providing financial support for imams/preachers, giving bursaries to students for religious education in Turkey or Saudi Arabia, training imams, distributing religious books written on Turkish/Salafi Islam, providing Turkish/Arabic language courses, or providing developmental and humanitarian assistance (Telci & Peneva, 2019). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey enjoys support from the Riyasat (the official Islamic authority), as similar to Turkey it follows the Hanafi school in its interpretation of the practice of Islam. As seen in the threats the Riyasat received from DEASH, the religious authority was standing against the radicalization of the Bosnian Muslims through Salafi mobilizations. So, they strictly denounced and even worked to prevent the Bosnian Muslims joining the so-called jihadi fight in Iraq or Syria (Balkan Insight, 2017). Turkey made use of this discomfort to further denounce Salafi Islam for being alien to the Balkans and being radical, and to promote Turkish Islam as the appropriate, authentic, and native belief for the region to be safely adopted and maintained. By this, religious radicalism can be eliminated, radical religious activism can be pacified, and Saudi

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Arabia’s influence in the region can be broken (Öktem, 2010; Stojarová & Stojar, 2019). The harsh rivalry in Bosnia, however, cannot be seen in Albania, even though Salafism is noticeably common among the Albanian Muslims, particularly among the youth in the country. For Turkey, the presence of Salafis in Albania is something unexpected; as one of our interviewees reported, “[o]ur friends from Turkey who visit Albania often get surprised seeing that Salafism is so common in Albania, particularly among the youth. When they look at the way most of the young people pray in mosques, they will see that most of them pray according to the Salafi style, not according to the Hanafi school (as the Ottoman legacy requires), and that the dress code among those performing prayer is noticeably in the Wahhabi style. We explain to them that following the independence, Albania quickly opened up to Arab countries on religion. [In return,] the Arabs acted on very quickly and entered Albania under the name of charity associations and left huge influences on the practice of religion and religious understanding. For the last three decades, imams and students returning from the Arab world [following their religious education] adopted Salafi Islam and taught religion Albania in that way” (Interview 1). Nonetheless, among the Muslims in Albania, the change in Islamic doctrinal persuasion was followed by changes in clothing and cultural practices. Together with the global concerns on Salafism, radicalism, and jihadism, such changes led the secular government to securitize the Salafi organizations in the country and to close down their institutions during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Nonetheless, Albania also opened up to Turkey in the 1990s and the country became an alternative destination for religious education. On the side of Turkey, this coincided with its broader opening toward the former Ottoman hinterland in the Balkans. Particularly via the involvement of religious groups, the Gülenists being the most powerful of them, Turkey intended to disseminate the Turkish Islamic practices to Albania. Due to the influence, the Gülenists secured governmental trust in Albania in a relatively short period. When the Salafists were securitized, the Gülenists became the ones to be relied on by the Albanian government as the representative of the moderate and secular Islam in the country. It was due to this that the Salafi institutions, the ones closed down by the government, were handed over to the Gülenists. For Albania, the Turkish Islam as represented by the Gülenists at the time was compatible with the traditional practice of Islam in Albania, both referring to the secular communist era and the historical Sufi (Bektashi) practice. As Kerem Öktem (2012: 50) reported with reference to an interviewee from the Muslim Community of Albania (KMSH), “[i]n 1998, the madrasa of Kavajë was saved from a Wahhabi group and given into the care of the Gülen foundation. In 2005, the influential madrasa of Tirana was given up by a Qatari foundation and placed into the custody of the Gülen community. And in 2010, the Cemaat [Gülenists] also reconstructed the madrasa in Korça, where it demolished and rebuilt the mosque first built by the Arabs.” Turkey, today, with again reference to Turkish Islam, intends to change this perception in Albania and deploys all possible means to fight against the Gülenists; we deal with this part of the story in detail below. Regarding the Salafis in Albania, the Diyanet still shares its concerns with the Albanian public regarding radicalism

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among the Salafis, and presents the practice of Islam in Turkey as a moderate and native one. On these very grounds, the Diyanet still sees the Salafi organizations and practices as foreign to the Albanian land, while Turkish Islam is some part of it. In its fight against the Salafis, however, the Diyanet cannot work with the official Islamic authority, the KMSH as to Turkey, it has been controlled by the Gülenists. So, the Diyanet’s complaints about the dominancy of Salafi imams within the KMSH or about the obstacles the Turkey graduates face in their search for finding a position as imams or preachers within the KMSH, remain unanswered. As an interesting fact, though, we saw in our interviews that the Gülenists’ control within the KMSH, something we will elaborate on later, brought the Salafis and Diyanet closer. This does not mean that the competition between them is over, or that they work together, but rather it means that a common foe and its control within the official religious authority lead these two groups to seek grounds for cooperation. The Salafis intend to get back the institutions the Gülenists took over and maintain the Salafi profile of the imams throughout the country. The Diyanet, on the other hand, intends to get rid of the influence the Gülenists enjoy within the country. As one interviewee stated, “[o]ur friends with a Wahhabi or Salafi mentality [in the country] have recently been more reasonable and moderate. They carry out their religious work in a somewhat softer way… [as recently observed] they seem to be expecting a rapprochement from Diyanet. We hear that they [including the Salafi imams within the KMSH] want to cooperate on religious issues. There was nothing like this before. Turkey was always a country of bid’ah in their eyes, thus a country that cannot be taken as an example in terms of religion” (Interview 1). We cannot readily conclude here that the Diyanet gave up its competition with Salafis in Albania, yet it seems that they tend to see the Salafis as a potential ally against the Gülenists as well. This is why a local informant, a Turkish graduate local imam in Albania, stated to us regarding the issue that “Salafism is the prevailing understanding in Albania. If Turkey says we cannot work with them, I think we will all lose against them [Gülenists]; the Diyanet of Turkey, Turkey’s cemaats, Salafis, or [local] imams [within the KMSH]” (Interview 2). In Kosovo, we see something similar to Bosnia in terms of relations with the official religious authority—the Diyanet secured close relations with the Islamic Community of Kosovo, and they jointly fight against both the Salafis and the Gülenists. This however should not imply that these fights constitute a major concern in the Islamic Community’s everyday agenda of governing the religious affairs of the community. However, since the Kosovar government, similar to the Bosnian and Albanian governments, strictly disapproved of the radicalism the Salafis preach in the country, Turkey benefits from such a concern in conjoining the fights against radicalism. What is more important in Kosovo, in terms of Turkey’s/Diyanet’s politics of influence is that they secured strong local nongovernmental backing. Accordingly, the Turkey Alumni Union (TÜMEB),3 together with Diyanet, initiated campaigns 3

This local organization was named the Turkey Alumni Association (Türkiye Mezunları Derne˘gi) before the YTB initiated its project of supporting the opening of unions of Turkish alumni abroad. It later changed its name to Türkiye Mezunları Birli˘gi.

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for altering the Islamic doctrinal profile of the religious officials within the Islamic Community in favor of Turkish Islam. The concern has been thus to open more room for the divinity school graduates of Turkey to secure places within the official Islamic authority as imams or preachers. T˙IKA and the Yunus Emre Institute have been supporting TÜMEB in their activities all along, including but not limited to project funding, equipment support, or joint events. The latter includes the Rumi Week commemorations and through organizing events on Sufism, these local organizations convey the Turkish Islamic message of “Sufism is something good,” against the Salafis’ denouncing it; something expected to be also welcomed by the Bektashi orders in the country (Tabak, 2016: 143). At this very juncture, Turkey has been closely watching the Salafi groups’ attempts at replacing the Ottoman-era mosques with their architectural style. It cooperates with the locals in this regard—a prime example of this was the restoration of the Murat Bey mosque in Janjevo after local protests and concomitant diplomatic initiations of Turkey. Accordingly, as Tabak reports (2016, 155), the Salafis approached the local authorities and asked their permission to demolish an old Ottoman mosque, the sixteenth country-built Murat Bey mosque, due to its decaying and losing its historical character, with an aim to build a “nicer one” in its place. The building of an Arab-style mosque in place of an Ottoman mosque was frustrating for the ethnic Turkish minority and the Turkish mission, and immediately after this was heard, a diplomatic initiation was taken and the mosque was restored by T˙IKA. This was a move for preventing the fading away of the Ottoman cultural history of the country, yet it was as much a move for preventing the Salafis’ gaining further ground and replacing the Ottoman/Turkish Islam with Salafi Islam in Kosovo.

4.2 The Fight Against the Gülenists For Turkey, the overseas securitization of the Gülenists—concomitant to the domestic one—has been a constant foreign policy priority since early 2014 and the battle abroad has unprecedentedly increased ever since the failed coup in July 2016. The government since then has been running a public diplomacy war against the Gülenists, with the Balkans coming to be a leading front in the fight against the group. This was because during the failed coup attempt in Turkey, the Balkans became an important destination for the Gülenists fleeing the country and the Balkan states were already harboring a vast number of Gülen-affiliated institutions. In the Balkans, Turkey strives to convince the target governments for the closure and later handing over to Turkey of the Gülen schools (used to be known as Turkish schools, Türk Okulları), for banning the Gülenist schools from using Turkish flag or other Turkey-related symbols (including names such as Mehmet Akif Schools/College, Yahya Kemal College, Turgut Özal University), for the extradition of the Gülenists to Turkey, for cutting the financial resources of the group, and for disrupting the group’s use of media to create a negative image of Turkey in the related countries.

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Turkey’s Turkish Islamic fight against the Gülenists was part of this broader public diplomatic war against the group. Gülenists became a target of Turkish Islamic policies due to the group once being de facto acting as the representative of Turkish Islam in the countries where the organization had institutions. Considering they had support from several secular and conservative governments in Turkey in the historical context, the country was at ease with this. However, particularly following the coup attempt, a religiously defined political fight was organized to support the broader targeted diplomacy campaign. By this, Turkey intended to change the Gülenists’ historical claim of representing Turkish Islam abroad. The Diyanet denounced the movement and, via religious references, declared it a terrorist organization (Diyanet, 2016a); it then asked the religious authorities in the Balkans to follow suit (Diyanet, 2016b). As part of this, Diyanet published a book religiously denouncing FETÖ and translated it into tens of local languages (Diyanet ˙I¸sleri Ba¸skanlı˘gı, 2020). It also sent a letter to the religious authorities “warning them of the danger posed by FETÖ and urging them to break off relations with this group, if a relationship existed” (Yeni S¸ afak, 2016). The letter urged that “FETÖ terrorists are killing civilians without hesitation—this kind of organization poses a threat to all states … (t)hese terrorists hide themselves as successfully as chameleons do, by acting as if their purpose is to promote peace based on dialogue, inter-religious tolerance, and agreement” (Yeni S¸ afak, 2016). In the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia declared at the governmental level that an organization that constitutes a security problem for Turkey will also create a security problem for them, so they promised to join the fight against the Gülenists. However, Gülenaffiliated schools and institutions are still open in the Balkans and only in a handful of cases are high-ranking members of the network handed over to Turkey for legal prosecutions (Ekinci, 2018: 178). As an achievement though, the Maarif Foundation opened private schools in all educational levels from nurseries to universities in the region, to alternate the Gülenist schools and to claim the ownership of the reputation of the Turkish schools. The schools include, for instance, the University of New York Tirana and New York Primary and High Schools (in Tirana), the Maarif Schools Sarajevo, the International Maarif Schools in Prishtina and Prizren, and the International Maarif Schools in Skopje and Tetovo. In Turkey’s claiming back the ownership of the Turkish Islamic mission, the Diyanet has been at the forefront of the diplomatic efforts. The Diyanet, as already stated, religiously denounced the Gülen movement, declared it as a terrorist organization, built direct contact with the official Islamic authorities, and cooperated with the local Turkey alumni (mostly the divinity school graduates) to break their influence of the Gülenists. It would, however, be an exaggeration to suggest that Diyanet created a success story out of its efforts in the Balkans. In Albania, for instance, the Diyanet admittedly failed in achieving any of the listed efforts. Despite the close diplomatic relations Turkey and Albania sustain, the Diyanet rarely finds access to the governmental circles giving credit to the claims on FETÖ, or its efforts rarely become consequential. This is also the case in the Diyanet’s relations with the official religious authority, the KMSH, as the Diyanet

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lacks access to the KMSH. As our informant stated, this is because “the KMSH is controlled by the Gülenists, it is taken hostage by them. And the ordinary Muslims show no interest in the affairs of the KMSH,” thus of the Gülenist cadres within it (Interview 1). This claim of our interviewee checks out as it was also expressed by the former mufti of Tirana during the elections for the KMSH chairmanship—he was later removed from duty by the new chair (Albanian Daily News, 2013). The KMSH’s close relations with the Gülenists have also been confirmed by a novel dynamic on the ground in Albania, as “the Salafis intend to cooperate with the Diyanet against the KMSH and to break the Gülenist control over the authority” (Interview 1). This is because, to our interviewee and as mentioned above, the Salafi institutions and schools were securitized and closed down in the early 2000s—their premises, however, were handed over to the Gülenists. Today, while the Salafis are still approached with suspicion by the government and the general public, toward a common enemy, Salafis invite the Diyanet to cooperate. The Diyanet approaches the Salafis with caution, though. As our interviewee observes, “the Salafis in Albania adopt a moderate discourse on Turkish Islam and the local Hanafi practices, it inclines toward collaborating”—yet there has still not been any joint project conducted in this regard (Interview 1). Moreover, since the Diyanet is unable to work with the official Islamic authority, the Turkey-graduated imams’ recruitment within the KMSH remains limited. As our interviewee argues, only the Turkey graduates who maintained connections with the Gülenists during their stay in Turkey still enjoy recruitment opportunities, while the KMSH closes its doors to Turkey graduates who are not affiliated with them. In fact, this has also been the reason Turkey still has not opened the Namazgah Mosque built in Tirana. The mosque has long been completed, however Turkey is concerned about its management—it is expected by Turkey that the KMSH will appoint a Gülenist imam to the mosque. Since the mosque will also generate some income in terms of rental avenues, Turkey does not want the Gülenists to benefit from such financial opportunity, along with the religious one that being the imam of the biggest mosque in the country will bring about. Turkey rather prefers its imam to be a Turkey graduate sharing the Turkish Islamic view (Interview 1; Interview 2). As part of a local collaboration, the Diyanet also approaches the Bektashi orders to change their position toward the Gülenists. This is particularly because the Gülenists have initiated campaigns for overcoming the Sunni–Bektashi hostility in the country, so they secured quite a hospitable approach from the Bektashis. By using the references of historical ties, the Diyanet endeavors to change their position (Interview 1; Interview 2). The reason the Diyanet failed in eliminating the Gülenists’ influence in Albania has often been explained by our interviewees. It is with reference to Albania being the country where the Gülenists have been most powerful in the Balkans, and also the international support, particularly from the US, which the Gülenists secured. As part of this, the governments became hesitant to act against the movement due to a possible diplomatic problem with the US. Our interviewee suggests, in this sense, that the external diplomatic support the Gülenists secured—particularly from the US— made them untouchable. Otherwise, to our interviewee, it would not be possible for

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the Gülenists to still have a stronghold influence in the country while Erdo˘gan and the Albanian prime minister Edi Rama have a close relationship (Interview 2). In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the atmosphere is mostly in the Diyanet’s favor, specifically in terms of the relations with the official Islamic authorities. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Gülenists’ influence over the Riyasat is nonexistent; the Riyasat rather intensely cooperates with both the Diyanet and the Maarif Foundation. Right after the coup attempt the grand mufti of Bosnia, Husein Kavazovi´c, sent a support letter to the Diyanet, denouncing the coup and FETÖ, and joined the meetings the Diyanet organized as part of the Eurasian Islamic Council following the coup attempt (Diyanet Haber, 2017; Daily Sabah, 2016a). Kavazovi´c also expressed to the press that “Like in all parts of the world, FETÖ exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina … [and] against this organization legal means will be used” (Preljevi´c, 2017: 383). Developments considered such as joining the fight against the Gülenists in Bosnia, and the Gülenists’ call for the transfer of some of their schools to the Riyasat, for instance, were rejected by the institution. Therefore, some of the schools were closed down due to financial burdens experienced, particularly in the post-2016 context (Interview 3). Moreover, Riyasat rather facilitated the opening of the Maarif schools in the country, by renting its own premises to the Maarif Foundation (2017). In a similar vein, the school buildings Gülenists had to vacate, due to financial problems, were rented back either to Turkish mission bodies or pro-Turkey local NGOs (Sedef, n.d.). While these examples show that some of the promised measures were taken, this does not mean that all Gülenist schools were closed down. Government pressure led to the change in ownership of the Gülenist schools, which were transferred from the founding association (Foundation Bosna Sema) to a company called Global Education but still, this was a symbolic change as “the staff and structure of the Gülenist schools remained the same” (Preljevi´c, 2017: 378). This confirms what our interviewee stated: “The Gülenists lost power in Bosnia, but it is hard to claim that they have disappeared. Their schools still have not been closed down and they are still functioning” (Interview 3). This was a result, as per our other interviewee, of “the influence the Gülenists enjoy within the ministerial cadres” and also that the Gülenists “are supported by both the EU and the US due to their opposition to Turkey” (Interview 4). In Kosovo, similar to the grand mufti of Bosnia, the head of the Islamic Community of Kosovo attended the Eurasian Islamic Council meeting in 2016. The mufti delivered a speech and noted that “Muslims in the Balkan countries were not aware before July 15 that FETÖ would be such a danger, and attempt to seize power in Turkey.” He also stated that the Gülenists first made their “foray into Kosovo by setting up a school after the war ended in 1999 and acquired clout by attracting academics, politicians, business people and intellectuals to the cult.” Their influence within the Islamic Community, as the mufti suggested, is nonexistent as “Muslim scholars rejected cooperation with them” (Daily Sabah, 2016b). However, he also added that the group “still enjoys support from some political parties in the country” (Daily Sabah, 2016b). The Diyanet’s activities against the Gülenists in Kosovo are mostly run in collaboration with the Islamic Community. Since the Islamic Community is an independent body, the financial support it gets from the government remains limited,

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and Turkey uses this as an opportunity to extend its influence within the community. In some of the mosques such as the Sinan Pasha Mosque in Prizren or the Mamusha Mosque, Turkey deploys imams from Turkey to deliver religious services. With the support of the local NGOs or the Turkey Alumni Union (TÜMEB), as mentioned previously, the Diyanet intends to increase the number of the recruited Turkey graduates within the Islamic Community as imams or preachers. To encourage the Islamic Community, the Diyanet pays the salaries of Turkey-graduated imams and preachers (Tabak, 2016: 143). For the Diyanet this is particularly important also for fighting against the influence of the Gülenists within the Kosovar community (Interview 5). Again, the Diyanet pays particular attention to the publication of books in the Albanian language, including books on the FETÖ threat, and distributing them to the imams throughout the country via the Islamic Community (Interview 5). Our interviewee in Kosovo also complained about the support the Gülenists get from the US, to explain why Turkey’s broader involvements targeting the Gülenists remain inconsequential in the country.

4.3 The Fight Against Shia Islam Iran’s political presence in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, goes back to the civil war years as Iran provided military and financial assistance to the Bosnian Muslims as part of an Islamist mission. However, the stories in Albania and other Albanian-populated areas in the Balkans were quite different— Iran’s involvement had a cultural/sectarian ground targeting particularly the Bektashi orders. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran built close relations with Alija Izetbegovi´c both during and after the war, and in particular due to the support they provided, Bosnian people at the time had positive thoughts toward Iran. It is often suggested that the Bosniak Muslims were inspired by the 1979 Iranian revolution, and the military support the Bosniaks received from Iran reached as much as two-thirds of the entire weaponry they were given (Progonati, 2017). Although this claim may not seem to be so reliable, it was also argued that “Turkey and Saudi Arabia were very willing to deliver weapons and lure Izetbegovi´c away from Iran” (quoted in Bardos, 2013: 62). Nonetheless, what is clear is that Bosniaks were supported by the holders of Shiite Islam, Salafi Islam, and Turkish Islam in the 1990s and their rivalry in the aftermath of the war confirms this. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, benefiting from such a hospitable context, Iran carried out several educational and cultural activities; for instance, it opened the Ibn-i Sina Institute in 1996 and later the Mullah Sadra Foundation in 2003 (Berkolli, 2021d). The Mullah Sadra Foundation has been particularly important for Iran in achieving dialogue with religious elites and the public, and in building cooperation and coordination with the Riyasat, the official Islamic authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other Iranian institutions founded in Bosnia include the Kewser women’s organization, the Djulistan pre-school, primary, and secondary school, the Znakovi vremena

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journal, and the Sahar TV channel, among others. As Liridona Berkolli (2021c) of the Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara (IRAM) suggests, “[the Mullah Sadra] Foundation has clear intentions to convert the Bosnian Sunni Muslim people to the Shiite sect. Bosnian translations of Shiite religious books, especially books of the Shiite hadith, their high-quality publication, their very rich portal, and many other pieces of evidence prove that the Mulla Sadra Foundation makes capital investments in the field of Shiite theology and Islamic culture. All these activities and investments were used to install the Iranian ideology and narrative of Shiism in this country.” Dževada Šuško suggested that since “they address all levels of society in Bosnia” the Iranian institutions “have the potential to import a new religious practice” (Šuško, 2017). Due to the presence and functioning of all these institutions—and since Bosnia did not close them as the many Balkan states did due to international pressures—it is often argued that Bosnia may be the country Iran has the most influence in the region (Berkolli, 2021d). Nonetheless, despite the wide cultural institutional presence of Shiite Islam in Bosnia, Turkey believes that it cannot compete with Turkish Islam, due to it being an alien practice to the Balkans; so most of the time Turkey’s targeting Shiite Islam was strongly practiced. As one of our interviewees suggested, “[t]hanks to the relations established with Izetbegovi´c, Iran seized the opportunity to enter the Balkans. However, it was countered by an idea that it had to fight against, which is Turkish Islam. Combining traditional secular Turkish Islam with religious tones, the AKP is in an effort to develop cooperation that will prevent Iran, which it sees as its rival in the region (especially in the Middle East) from gaining a position in the Balkans. However, it should be stated that the rivalry between these two powers [Turkey and Iran], especially in the Turkish foreign policy during the AKP period, has been implicit and acute. Turkey believes that today, the sympathy toward Iran may not be as much as it was during the Bosnian war years. [Moreover] the sectarian polarization that came out of the Syrian war changed the Bosniaks’ perception of Iran. Also, for Turkey, Shiite Islam would never get rooted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since it is a country with a Sunni majority population” (Interview 4). In Albania, the Iranian presence is built on totally different grounds compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Iran has given particular importance to be culturally present among the Albanians due to the Albanian Sufi (Bektashi) orders sharing certain grounds in belief with Shiism. The same is also argued by Turkish Islam, as the Bektashi orders are considered as the continuation of the Ottoman Islamic heritage in the Balkans. With this in mind, in Albania, Iran established the Saadi Shirazi Cultural Foundation in 1995 and the Rumi Foundation in 2007 as part of its cultural diplomacy efforts. The Quran Foundation was established in 2000 for providing religious services and education in the country, the Bektashi orders being also the target of such involvement. However, recently Iranian activities on Albanian soil were securitized by the government and as of 2019, all Iran institutions were closed down in the country as its ideology was seen as hindering the democratic values in Albania (Berkolli, 2021b). The worsening of the diplomatic relations between Iran and Albania reached its peak particularly following the USA’s killing of the Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq (January 2020), as Albania was the target of Iranian criticism for its alliance with the US. Yet, the relations were at odds since

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2013 when Albania decided to grant refuge to the members of the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK) due to an agreement with the US (DW, 2020). MEK is a group that attempted to overthrow the Iranian regime, thus is considered a terrorist organization by Iran. In 2018, for instance, Albanian security forces discovered Iranian “terrorist cells” in preparation for attacks on the MEK refugees (VOA News, 2020). So, in Albanian public opinion, Iran is approached with suspicion, therefore Iran has a complete lack of political influence in the country, yet the cultural unity argument is still in circulation. In Turkey’s account, the Iranian presence in Albania has been a concern, particularly for the cultural argument. Turkey does not want the Bektashi orders to consider themselves as part of a Shiite Islam—as for Turkey, they have been a solid part of the Ottoman religious legacy. Plus, once the Albanian Bektashi orders begin to consider it so, it would easily spread to other Albanian communities in the region. In this regard, one interviewee suggested that “Iran has no historical ties with the country [Albania]. Shiites have no historical ties in here. Yet still there stands a reality: among the Albanian Muslims, Bektashi belief is quite common. Albania is considered the center of Bektashi belief. The Bektashis were endeavored to be propagated as a distinct Islamic belief, closer to Shiite Islam, by Iran. Iran’s cultural centers or schools were used to prove such a cause. This has been unacceptable for Turkey. Recently Iran lost its power in Albania, so its works are not so influential now” (Interview 1). For Turkey, therefore, Shiite Islam hinders the argument that Turkish Islam is also the representative of Sufi Islam in the Balkans. The Diyanet has approached the Bektashi orders to make sure their religo-cultural alignment remains with the Turkish Islam rather than the Shiite one (Interview 1; Interview 2). Something similar has been the case in Kosovo. Following the 1999 war, Iranian cultural organizations were opened up and these organizations targeted the Bektashi orders, supplied them with Shia literature, and also maintained contact with the religious authority. In the mid-2010s, however, similar to Albania, in Kosovo many of the Iranian-based institutions were closed down. The reason for the closure however was quite different in Kosovo than Albania. The Kosovar government was uncomfortable with the religious radicalization in the country triggered by the Syrian civil war, and with the concomitant escalation of rivalry between the Salafi and Shia organizations. Moreover, the Islamic Community stated, following the arrest of a Kosovar citizen due to her urging revenge following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, that Kosovar Muslims are Sunni and that Shia tradition “was unknown among us before,” as it is a practice predominantly followed in Iran and Iraq (Balkan Insight, 2020). Shia influence has remained particularly limited in Kosovo and the Turkish Islam was influential in this because, as Liridona Berkolli of IRAM suggests, “the strengthening of Turkish Sufi discourse and its presence in Kosovar society has succeeded in taking the place of the philosophical-mystical narrative of Shi’ism” (Berkolli, 2021a). In the words of one interviewee, “[d]espite all the restrictions, Iran continues its activities in Kosovo, yet it cannot find a place for itself like Turkey and Saudi Arabia do. In Kosovo, the majority of the population is Sunnis and Turkey aims to prevent Shi’ism from being influential and gathering supporters in this country,

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both through cooperation with local administrators and through its own activities with local people … and since the Sunni community and the Bektashi community in the country have a secular and liberal appearance, the Hanafi school is more acceptable for the society compared to the Salafi school or Iranian Shiism, which envisage a more radical interpretation and lifestyle. Benefiting from its secular past, Turkey presents Turkish Islam as an optimum ideology for the Balkans, and struggles with Iran as well as with other groups” (Interview 6).

5 Conclusion When asked questions in relation to why Turkey does what it does in the Balkans, our interviewees felt the need to define Turkey’s involvement on the grounds of brotherhood and unity, since they hold/held government/diplomatic positions themselves. Accordingly, it is understandable that they are biased and tend to attribute good intentions to Turkey’s actions. Having this in mind throughout, though, what we have seen is that Turkey’s Turkish Islamic policy toward the Balkans, albeit interventionist and transformative, does not contain a direct hegemonic control dimension. This is because the policy is more in line with the ever-continuing domestic and broader regional politics of the country (against the radical streams). Moreover, the global constraints were all present and have affected the conclusiveness of Turkey’s Islamic-oriented foreign policy. In this sense, we may even claim that Turkey would not be the hegemon even if it desires to be, due to the control the global processes have in the Balkans. Both the successes and the failures against the Salafis, Shiites, and Gülenists are also related to the global processes. Accordingly, the governmental securitizations of Salafi Islamic groups were following the global war on terror in the Balkans and of the Shiite Islam were due to the US’s influence in Albania and Kosovo. Relatedly, the hesitations in Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo in taking definitive decisions targeting the Gülenists were due to the global support the movement secured. The limits of Turkey’s influence in the Balkans are therefore clearly drawn by global actors and processes (on the limits of Turkey influence, see Koppa, 2021). Yet, still Turkey benefits from Turkish Islamic references in its foreign policy and the religio-cultural overseas rivalry. First and foremost, by promoting Turkish Islam, it establishes the long-claimed superiority (along with moderateness, appropriateness, and exemplariness) of Turkish Islam over other rival forms of Islamic practice including Salafi Islam and Shiite Islam. This is an indication of the continuity of the ethnopolitical concern in Turkey’s foreign policy. In addition, via a competition with Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Balkans, Turkey contributes to its broader rivalry against them in Middle Eastern regional politics— something that materialized in Syria or Egypt. Since Turkey’s influence remained relatively limited compared to others in the Middle East, “Turkish Islam in the Balkans” provided Turkey with a means to possibly outweigh its regional rivals in terms of religio-cultural influence. Moreover, with an emphasis on radicalism, Turkey

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defined the Salafi and Shiite influence as leading to the Middle-Easternization (not Balkanization this time) of the Balkans, portraying Turkey as the country working for preventing the spread of religious radicalization in the region. Here, Turkish Islam stood as a discourse enhancing the religio-cultural status quo in the regional countries. It affirmed the local securitizations of, thus fights against, religious radicalism and as a moderate religious persuasion Turkish Islam provided the governments with a narrative of historical coherence and coexistence facilitating managing religious diversity in the Balkan countries. Yet, this does not change the fact, as Branislav Radelji´c (2010: 12) observed, that the Saudi, Iranian, and Turkish religio-cultural activities, and presence in the Balkan countries have been adversely consequential in “the construction of a unifying identity among the Muslims.” Nonetheless, from the perspective of Turkey, the country claiming the guardianship of the Ottoman religio-cultural heritage—against the Salafi groups’ targeting it—provided further grounds for justifying its long-term politico-cultural presence and influence in the Balkans. Turkey is suggested to be present on the ground to protect the very history of the Muslim people in the Balkans from alien practices and radical streams. The Ottoman legacy here gave Turkey a chance to present Turkish Islam as an inclusive and all-embracing alternative, against Salafi Islam and Shiite Islam’s targeting mostly different segments of the Muslim communities in the region. The Gülenists’ inclusion into the Turkish Islamic foreign policy is a special case; it represents the flexibility of the Turkish Islamic discourse, as it easily turned into a means to denounce a former government-supported Turkish Islamic group. Accordingly, the fight against the Gülenists became part of an effort to claim back ownership of the Turkish Islamic cause, and the fight contributed to Turkey’s broader global public diplomatic war against the movement. The first aim of the country has been successfully actualized—Turkey is seen as the sole representative of the Ottoman religio-cultural legacy in the Balkans. Regarding the second cause, however, there is barely a success story to be seen—except for some partial progress, the securitization has mostly failed. Most of the Gülenist schools are still open or in some countries, they still enjoy institutional sheltering, despite Turkey’s close relations with the related countries at the governmental level. The support the Gülenist networks secured globally seems to have played a pivotal role here. The fight against the Gülenists, however, introduced a novel dynamic to the Turkish Islamic fight. As we have seen in our interviews, Gülenists’ influence in religious institutions, such as in Albania or Bosnia, would lead the Salafis and the Diyanet to communicate and cooperate against the Gülenists. This is understandable to a certain degree, as Turkey is still concerned that the Gülenists may jeopardize the broader Turkish Islamic cause of the country by diminishing its influence. However, how collaboration between Salafis and the Diyanet would affect the Turkish Islamic narrative and mission will require further research. A final word should be made on our limitations. We conducted interviews with Turkey’s incumbent or former diplomatic mission personnel, mostly from Diyanet, in four Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. The rivalry was observable in the first three countries; in North Macedonia, however, we could not find adequate verified information, so we could not provide

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extended coverage of it in the discussion. Yet still, we conducted an interview with a Turkish official and we should say that we can barely talk about a political Salafi mobilization in the country, and the Salafi influence remains limited to some segments of the Albanian community. This has, however, been a result of the diasporic ties the community maintains with Kosovo and Albania. Iranian influence however is not observable at all. As regards the Gülenists, their influence within the Islamic Religious Community (IRC) of North Macedonia remains limited and the North Macedonian government, at least at a discursive level, supports Turkey’s cause. However, Gülenists still have a stronghold in the media and are supported by some anti-Turkey nationalist political groups; the Diyanet often becomes a target of their defamation. Again, North Macedonia is an Orthodox majority country and the Diyanet’s activities are confined mostly to the Muslim Albanian and ethnic Turkish communities. These communities, as minorities, have favoring tendencies toward Turkey—due to the aid and developmental support they receive, and to the widespread diaspora ties they maintain with Turkey—so the offenses of the Gülenists do not change their broader favoring position toward Turkey or the Diyanet (Interview 7).

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Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe Erhan Türbedar

Since the founding of the Republic of Turkey, Southeast Europe (SEE), or the wider Balkans, has represented an important foreign policy element for Ankara. Turkey considers itself as a Balkan country, not so much because of its geographical position, but because of its long-standing common history and cultural similarities with the peoples of the Balkans, and the fact that Turkish citizens have strong familial connections and unbreakable ties with this region. Apart from the occasional bilateral oscillations in relations between Turkey and Greece, Ankara maintains friendly relations with all countries of the SEE region. In this framework, no matter which government comes to power in Turkey, it makes political, economic, and sectoral agreements with the SEE countries to reassure confidence in relations during its term of office. Moreover, parallel to the growth of self-confidence in Turkish foreign policy, the last two decades have witnessed a proactive approach and the growing role of Turkish diplomacy in the geography spanning from the SEE to the Middle East and Central Asia. The new Turkish foreign policymakers wanted a greater value for Turkey in the international system and demonstrated ambition to solve problems in the regions around Turkey. In the SEE region, the growing role of Turkish diplomacy was particularly evident in the Western Balkans and has led to intensive discussions in media and academia about Turkey’s overall position and intentions in those countries. While some saw Turkey as a rising power contributing to the peace and stability in SEE, others perceived it as a country with a secret agenda for this region (Türbedar, 2011). Turkey has often been criticized without providing evidence that it sought to increase its socalled neo-Ottoman influence in the SEE through cultural, political, and economic E. Türbedar (B) Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_7

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means. This narrative had almost become an urban legend in SEE countries. Nevertheless, after the attempted coup in 2016, Turkey concentrated its efforts on resolving internal issues, reducing its presence in SEE almost to the level of observers. Despite this reality, even today it has become a practice in SEE to mention Turkey alongside Russia and China as one of the countries trying to fill a geopolitical gap created by the EU’s irresponsible behavior toward the Western Balkans (Dnevni Avaz, 2019; DW, 2019; Romac, 2021). Turkey’s growing economic presence in SEE has increased interest in economic relations and has become part of the debate on Ankara’s role in this region. On the other hand, many SEE countries struggling with economic difficulties visibly display the intention to develop economic ties with Turkey. However, as the economic aspect of relations between Turkey and SEE is insufficiently explored within academic studies, it is often possible to hear more speculations and assumptions than facts. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an in-depth analysis of economic relations between Turkey and SEE, to try to portray a more complete and more realistic picture on this issue. This study provides calculated statistics that directly compare welfare levels between Turkey and SEE, explore economic trends in their relations, and examine what their economic relations look like today. The first part compares GDPs and levels of economic development, explains Turkey’s economic importance for SEE countries, and elaborates on the economic significance of the SEE countries for Turkey. The second part provides information on Turkey’s existing institutional framework, which provides a basis for further developing economic relations with SEE countries. In addition, the chapter offers a detailed trade analysis of trends and shares in Turkey’s trade with SEE countries, and an evaluation of trade patterns at sectoral and commodity levels. Trade complementarities and untapped trade potentials are also elaborated. Finally, the chapter also explores Turkey’s foreign direct investments in SEE, including Turkish contracting companies’ activities, which are becoming more visible every year. For analytical purposes, the Western Balkans, composed of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia, are interpreted as a subcategory of the SEE region. Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Romania, and Slovenia are referred to as EU-5, another subcategory. The Western Balkans and EU-5 together constitute the wider SEE region. To avoid discrepancies of national economic statistics that arise due to differences in practiced methodological and technical standards, several reliable global databases are used which consolidate and standardize statistics, making country comparisons possible. All data in this chapter are my own calculations, done based on the databases mentioned in combination with each figure or table.

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1 Understanding the Significance of Economic Relations Between Turkey and SEE Over the last few decades, Western Balkan countries have passed through the challenges from which they will be recovering for a long time. Recent developments in this region give an impression that the Western Balkans have two different faces today. Domestic political and security challenges, periodic oscillations in bilateral relations, and persisting old sources of tension dominate the region’s first face. In the second face, the Western Balkan countries are trying to work together and develop regional projects spanning trade, investment, and rural development to scientific cooperation. Moreover, expectations of all SEE countries are to benefit politically from stronger partnerships, economically from the expanded economic opportunities and improved connectivity, and geopolitically from enhanced stability and security. In this regard, SEE countries are trying to extend their economic cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, including Turkey, to reap greater benefits from international trade, foreign direct investment, innovation, and infrastructure projects. From the perspective of Turkey, globalization has dramatically increased competition in world markets. Therefore, deepening the interaction of the Turkish economy with the different parts of the world, including SEE, through bilateral and multilateral approaches, is playing a significant role in Ankara’s foreign policy efforts.

1.1 Comparison of GDP Levels Turkey’s economy is one of the largest in the world. According to IMF data, in 2020, Turkey ranked as the eleventh biggest economy globally by GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP) or nineteenth by GDP in current prices. Turkey’s economic transformation and robust economic growth were a source of inspiration for many developing economies. Rapid urbanization, opening up to the world economy in the 1980s, the introduction of structural and macroeconomic reforms including fiscal discipline at the start of the 2000s, a robust financial sector, a constantly growing domestic market (supported with a young population), and a dynamic private sector have altogether contributed to an almost steady growth of Turkish share in the world economy (Kepenek, 2016). In contrast to Turkey, whose share in the world economy increased from 1.4 percent in 2000 to 1.9 percent in 2020, shares of Western Balkans and EU-5 countries in the global economy did not undergo significant changes within the same period (Fig. 1). However, the Turkish economy also has its own weaknesses. As a capital-scarce country, Turkey’s growth depends heavily on the availability of foreign capital. In this regard, the most significant fragility of the Turkish economy is the structural current account deficit and the high level of foreign-currency-denominated debt held by the private sector, increasing Turkey’s external financing needs. Accordingly,

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E. Türbedar

Turkey

over the last three decades, Turkey’s economic growth had to be supported by shortterm inward capital movements, or “hot money,” which refers to speculative funds controlled by investors who seek high returns in the short term. However, short-term inward capital movements tend to withdraw from a country when the macroeconomic balance’s sustainability is questionable, which Turkey experienced during the 1994 and 2000/2001 financial crises (Sönmez, 2003: 97–170). After 2001, following guidelines from the IMF’s stabilization program and economic reform program launched by former finance minister Kemal Dervi¸s, Turkey’s economy has experienced one of its most successful growth phases. Moreover, Turkey started to attract considerable amounts of foreign direct investment (Öni¸s, 2008: 38). This economic success and the improving political stability in the country led to the growth of self-confidence in Turkish foreign policy. There was also an attempt to develop a multidimensional foreign policy, popularized by the slogan of “zero problems” with all neighboring countries, including SEE. Still, the Turkish economy has been experiencing similar financial pressures in recent years. As a result, the Turkish lira rapidly lost value against the dollar and paved the way for the melting in GDP values in current dollars, despite economic growth. The Turkish GDP in current dollars lost around 25 percent of its value, decreasing from $957.5 billion in 2013 to $719.5 billion in 2020 (Fig. 2). Concerns over existing macroeconomic imbalances, a wave of tightening monetary policy in advanced economies, existing geopolitical tensions around Turkey, the impact of mass migration, and economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic all led to the depreciation of the Turkish lira. Moreover, the shift to a presidential system in 2018 has resulted in the significant centralization of decision-making power, affecting the success of economic governance, including the Central Bank’s autonomy and overall predictability in the Turkish economy (Adar & Seufert, 2021: 13–20). From July 2019 to March 2021, the governor of the Central Bank of Turkey was changed four times, indicating that this crucial monetary institution lost its autonomy. These developments have also exacerbated internal and external economic imbalances, exacerbated economic uncertainty, and further shaken the stability of the Turkish lira. The economic instability also resulted in a slowdown in the dynamism of Turkish foreign policy, and forced Turkey to deal more with its own problems. Although Turkey faced a significant decline of GDP values in current dollars, its GDP in 2020 ($719.5 billion) was almost equal to the aggregated GDP of the Western

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Balkans and EU-5 countries ($727.2 billion). The total GDP of the Western Balkans was worth $112.4 billion in 2020 and represented only 0.2 percent of the world economy. The GDP of the EU-5 countries averaged $593.9 billion from 2010 until 2020, reaching the highest point of $638.5 billion in 2019 (Fig. 2). The considerable difference in GDP levels is also visible among the SEE countries. The share of Romania and Greece within the SEE countries’ total GDP in current prices accounted for 60 percent ($436.5 billion) of it in 2020. Near 10 percent of the total GDP of SEE countries belonged to Bulgaria ($68.6 billion), 7.8 percent to Croatia ($56,925 billion), and 7.3 percent to Serbia ($53 billion). When ranked by PPP-adjusted GDP, the shares are slightly different, but the ranking is more or less the same (Fig. 3). Real GDP growth figures for the last twenty years continue to display robust growth momentum for Turkey. From 2000 to 2008, Turkey’s economy on average grew by 5 percent. Further, Turkey’s average growth rate in the 2009–2017 period was comparatively higher (5.5 percent). The real GDP growth of Turkey accelerated sharply in 2017, to 7.4 percent (from 3.2 percent in 2016) owing to government stimulus measures, government credit guarantees to SMEs, improved export competitiveness, and major public infrastructure projects. However, despite efforts to stimulate domestic demand, financial pressures, combined with global events (such

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Fig. 3 Shares in the combined GDP of the SEE countries (2020, percent) (Source IMF [2021a]. Note PPP-based GDP in current international dollars was used for the country weights to generate the Western Balkans and EU-5 averages

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as a slowdown in the world real GDP growth rate, a rising threat of protectionism, vulnerabilities in emerging markets, and a significant decrease in global FDIs), have severely disrupted Turkey’s economic growth. Turkey’s economy escaped recession in 2019 with a symbolic growth rate of 0.9 percent. However, even if economies worldwide plunged into deep contractions due to the Covid-19 pandemic-imposed lockdowns, Turkey managed to avoid entering a recession comparatively, with real GDP growth of 1.8 percent in 2020 (Fig. 4). From 2000 to 2008, the Western Balkans were among the world’s most dynamic regions in economic terms. Following the painful period of transition and transformation of the 1990s, Western Balkans countries enjoyed an average growth rate of 5.8 percent in the first eight years of the 2000s. However, the global economic downturn in 2009 caught the Western Balkans off guard, causing the countries to suffer in the economic sphere. Consequently, economic growth has slowed down in the Western Balkans, with an average real GDP growth rate of 1.5 percent from 2009 to 2017 (Fig. 4). Real growth rates of Western Balkans economies were at more satisfactory levels in 2018 and 2019, but still away from the region’s average registered for the 2000–2008 period. The economic climate in the EU-5 countries remained relatively favorable from 2000 to 2008, with an average real growth rate of 4.5 percent. However, the average economic performance of EU-5 countries was unfavorable in the 2009–2017 period, mainly due to negative growth rates in Greece and Croatia. The EU-5 countries grew faster in 2018 and 2019, but were still below the average growth rates achieved from 2000 to 2008 (Fig. 4). All SEE economies experienced negative growth in their GDPs in 2020 as a consequence of the Covid-19 pandemic. To better understand the differences in levels of prosperity among SEE countries, the index of GDP per capita in PPP shown in Fig. 5 is expressed in relation to the European Union average (EU-27), set to equal 100. If the index of a country is lower than 100, this country’s level of GDP per capita is lower than the EU average and vice versa. In this regard, in 2020, PPP-adjusted GDP per capita of SEE countries

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Fig. 5 Index of real GDP per capita (EU-27 = 100, PPP, constant 2017 international $, percent) (Source IMF [2021a]. Note The figure is using average GDP per capita of European Union [UK excluded] as basis of comparison at 100)

ranged from 24 percent of the EU average in Kosovo to 85 percent of the EU average in Slovenia (Fig. 5). PPP-adjusted GDP per capita was 62 percent of the EU average in Turkey. It is evident from Fig. 5 that except for Greece, SEE countries and Turkey have demonstrated some convergence dynamic toward GDP per capita of the EU. However, the distance of Western Balkan countries from EU-average welfare remains significantly high.

1.2 Turkey’s Economic Relevance for SEE Countries Turkey’s economic performance provides an understanding of the country’s importance for the SEE countries as an economic and strategic partner. Particularly Western Balkan countries are becoming increasingly interested in attacking Turkish FDIs because their development needs are seldom accompanied by the necessary resources to meet them. In general, SEE governments are searching for new ways to finance their development needs because all sources of finance—public and private, domestic, and international—play an essential role in financing the new investments across sectors. Other than investments, with a population of 83.6 million in 2020 (which is significantly higher than the total population of SEE countries, estimated at 65.1 million by the World Bank), Turkey represents a significant market by itself. Moreover, Turkey’s experience in the market economy from the 1990s and 2000s could be highly relevant to structural reforms in SEE countries, particularly in managing urbanization, industrialization, and global integration. Further, infrastructure development, encouraging private tourism investments, SME development, technology and knowledge transfers, branding, and global promotion are some policy areas in which cooperation between Turkey and SEE countries could yield results. Turkey can also be a growth opportunity for businesses of SEE countries, both as a big market and as a stepping

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Map 1 Economies in which Turkey is the top investor in at least one sector (Source Djurica and Ça˘glar [2015, p. 45], based on FDI markets data and TEPAV calculations)

stone into the MENA region and other world markets in which Turkey is already a significant player (Map 1). SEE countries may also benefit from Turkey in terms of acquiring some economic privileges. Many SEE countries are small states in relation to Turkey. Still, being a small economy in relation to other countries enables smaller partners to seek favorable deals and gain special economic privileges in different circumstances (Prasad, 2009: 41–64). For example, Western Balkan countries gained different privileges from Turkey regarding free trade agreements (FTA). Turkey removed customs duties to industrial products originating from Kosovo in 2008. In contrast, Kosovo agreed to gradually nullify its customs duties to industrial products originating from Turkey in nine years, starting from 1 September 2019, when the FTA between Turkey and Kosovo entered into force. Similarly, after Turkey removed its customs duties on industrial products of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia, Ankara granted these countries a five-year transit period for the gradual nullifying of their customs duties applied to industrial products from Turkey.1 The first decade of the 2000s witnessed the rising prominence of Turkey as an emerging donor, which contributes to the international development finance landscape (Quadir, 2013: 321–328). This issue also makes Turkey attractive in the Western Balkans. According to OECD’s Creditor Reporting System, from 2015 to 2019, with near $36.1 billion Turkey was the sixth-largest Official Development Assistance (ODA) provider globally. However, in the same period, almost 83 percent of the total ODA provided by Turkey went to Syrian refugees, whose registered number in Turkey was 3,701,584 as of August 2021 (Mülteciler Derne˘gi, 2021). On the other 1

Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Turkey provides access to all FTAs signed between Turkey and other partner countries at https://ticaret.gov.tr/dis-iliskiler/serbest-ticaret-anlasmalari/yururluktebulunan-stalar.

36.8

26.7

26.4 Finland

45.0 Russia

Croatia

58.9 Saudi Arabia

Luxembourg

66.4

103.5 Italy

Czech Republic

113.6 UK

74.6

113.7 Norway

Slovenia

120.4 France

285.2 Japan

147.1

288.7 Austria

149

Kuwait

314.8 Sweden

434.2 Turkey

Switzerland 578.8

US

Germany

UAE

803.2

1790.8

2123.4

Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe

Fig. 6 Top 20 bilateral ODA providers to the Western Balkans (Gross disbursements, current prices, million USD, 2015–2019) (Source OECD [2021]. Note A disbursement is the placement of resources at the disposal of a recipient country or agency, or in the case of internal developmentrelated expenditures, the outlay of funds by the official sector. Bilateral ODA flows are calculated based on 29 DAC countries and 21 non-DAC countries that are reporting to the OECD)

hand, Turkey is still on the list of countries eligible to receive ODA. Due to the influx of large numbers of refugees, from 2015 to 2019, Turkey received $18.9 billion from official donors that are reporting to the OECD. In the same period, $15.1 billion went to the Western Balkans from official donors (OECD, 2021). Turkey was the fifth-largest bilateral ODA provider to the Western Balkans in the 2015–2019 period, with a total ODA value of $434.2 million (Fig. 6). Out of this, $154.2 million went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, $116.6 million to Albania, $73.8 million to North Macedonia, $49 million to Kosovo, $21.9 million to Serbia, and $18.4 million to Montenegro. ODA provided by Turkey to the Western Balkans includes aid from different Turkish institutions, including technical and developmental aid by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA). Here it should be noted that five SEE countries reporting to the OECD, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Romania, and Slovenia (EU-5), contributed $129.8 million as ODA to the Western Balkans and $79.8 million to Turkey in the same period (OECD, 2021).

1.3 Economic Significance of SEE for Turkey SEE economies also have significance for Turkey, although many Turkish companies tend to perceive SEE countries as small markets. From the perspective of Turkish business people, SEE countries are divided into two groups regarding the economic rules under implementation. The Western Balkans make up the first group of countries, which were under the umbrella of the same state until the beginning of the 1990s, except for Albania. The second group is the EU-5 countries whose markets are regulated with the EU rules and regulations. For that reason, doing business in EU-5 countries is contingent on attaining different standards and obtaining specific

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permissions. Therefore, conditions in the Western Balkans for developing economic cooperation seem to be more favorable for Turkish companies interested in investing in SEE but without experience in doing business in EU countries. Besides existing opportunities of doing business in SEE, these countries can be a springboard for Turkey’s companies to access the Western EU markets. Moreover, positioned between Turkey and the largest EU countries, the geographic location of SEE countries creates natural business opportunities, especially in logistics, packaging, and manufacturing that necessitates rapid delivery to the Western EU markets. In addition to this, SEE countries’ existing unique economic relations with other parts of the world make them an essential destination for business. For example, due to the existing FTA between Russia and Serbia, doing business in Russia could be cheaper if the production facilities of Turkish companies are invested in Serbia. In general, the internationalization of production has significantly contributed to countries like Turkey in market-oriented policies and developing their foreign economic relations (Strange, 2003: 62). The Turkish economy would not have progressed so successfully from import substitution policies and protection toward export promotion, liberalization, and privatization without the political desire of governments to create national wealth through engaging in the world markets (Kılıçkıran, 1998: 81–90). As a result of reforms, Turkish entrepreneurs have opened to the world economy and gradually reduced their dependence on the domestic market. Further, technological development, the growing mobility of capital, and the decreasing costs of communication and transportation have led to increasing numbers of Turkish companies planning their activities on a global basis. Today, the significance of the relations between state and firms in Turkey is more visible than ever. In recent years, Turkish foreign policy has eased the problem of movement and getting visas for Turkish business people in many countries, including SEE. It is also interesting to note that Turkish officials are accompanied by many Turkish business people—often affiliated to the ruling party—in most high-level visits to SEE countries in the last two decades. However, it is still possible to hear that too many business delegations from Turkey visit the SEE countries and promise investments, but they rarely realize them (Djurica & Ça˘glar, 2015: 48). Tim Judah of the Economist described this reality in words, “there has been more talk than cash” (Judah, 2011).

2 Turkey’s Institutional Aspects of Economic Relations with SEE Countries After following inward-oriented development strategies for 50 years, Turkey switched to outward-oriented policies in the early 1980s. As a result, a much more open trade regime replaced the protection and import substitution policy. Further opening up of the economy has paved the way for Turkish membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 26 March 1995 and a Customs Union agreement

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151

with the EU, which entered into force on December 31, 1995 (Nuri & Eren, 2013: 140–142). With the Customs Union agreement, Turkey was obligated to implement the EU’s Common Customs Tariffs, applied to the imports of goods across the external borders of the EU. Moreover, Turkey adopted the EU trade policy, and by 2001 started to implement all the preferential trade agreements the EU had concluded with third countries (Togan, 2011: 2–3). Currently, Turkey has twenty-two FTAs in force. By September 2021, three FTAs were under ratification process, and seventeen FTA negotiations were launched (Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Turkey, 2021a). Turkey has effective FTAs or Customs Union relations with all SEE countries. As can be seen from Table 1, the first FTAs were signed with Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and North Macedonia between 1997 and 2000, whereas the FTA with Kosovo entered into force only in 2019. Albania’s postponements in foreign trade liberalization and Serbia’s preoccupation with the political issues in the Western Balkans have delayed the signing of FTAs with these countries. On the other hand, Kosovo has long avoided the FTA with Turkey due to weaknesses in the competition against the Turkish economy. On August 1, 2021, a revised FTA between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into force (Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Turkey, 2021b). Further, additional protocols for trade in services and agricultural concessions were signed for FTAs with Serbia (in 2018, two protocols) (Resmi Gazete, 2019) and Montenegro (in 2019, one protocol). From the beginning, Turkey’s trade with Greece was part of the Customs Union agreement with the EU. On the other hand, after becoming members of the EU, Turkey’s FTAs with Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia were replaced with the Customs Union. It should also be noted that Turkey possesses trade and economic cooperation agreements, double taxation avoidance agreements, Table 1 Free trade agreements with Turkey Signing date

Effective date

Romania

March 28, 1997

February 1, 1998

Bulgaria

June 19, 1998

January 1, 1999

Slovenia

May 5, 1998

July 1, 2000

North Macedonia

September 7, 1999

September 1, 2000

Croatia

March 13, 2002

July 1, 2003

Bosnia and Herzegovina

July 3, 2002

July 1, 2003

Albania

December 22, 2006

May 1, 2008

Montenegro

November 26, 2008

March 1, 2010

Serbia

June 1, 2009

September 1, 2010

Kosovo

September 27, 2013

September 1, 2019

Source Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Turkey (2021a) Note Revised FTA with Bosnia and Herzegovina has entered into force on August 1, 2021. Turkey’s Customs Union agreement with the EU became lawful with Greece in 1996, Slovenia in 2004, Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, and Croatia in 2013

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E. Türbedar

and agreements on mutual administrative assistance and cooperation in customs matters with all SEE countries. These are the critical documents in establishing legal infrastructure for the development of bilateral economic relations. Further, Turkey has signed bilateral investment treaties with SEE countries, except for Kosovo (UNCTAD, 2021a). Apart from the legal agreements, Turkey uses political tools to develop bilateral economic relations with the SEE countries. In this regard, Turkey has established intergovernmental Joint Economic Commissions (Karma Ekonomik Komisyon [KEK]) with all SEE countries. These commissions are generally co-chaired at the ministerial level, and delegations consist of representatives of all relevant line ministries and institutions. The commissions have been particularly effective in setting goals at the macro level, identifying challenges, developing solutions, and ensuring coordination among relevant public institutions. Since ministers co-chair these meetings, it is easier and faster to reach a solution with the necessary political will and authority. The Ministry of Trade carries out all preparations, negotiations, and monitoring activities related to the Joint Economic Commissions on the Turkish side. In addition, another essential tool that Turkey benefits from in developing economic relations with the SEE countries is high-level visits. During these visits, many bilateral agreements are signed, including sectors such as energy, transport, infrastructure, science, and tourism. Moreover, visits at the highest level are frequently followed with business forums organized as a side event, where many company representatives from Turkey participate. Several institutions are supportive of the development of Turkey’s foreign economic relations. The Ministry of Trade provides export support, including export preparation, marketing, and branding. As of 2011, the Ministry had also been implementing state aid programs to ensure a sustainable increase in services exports. The Ministry of Trade also carries out a comprehensive program for providing technical consultancy services abroad (Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Turkey, 2021c). On the other hand, the offices of the commercial counselors, which operate under Turkey’s embassies, work to improve cooperation between public institutions, find solutions to the problems experienced by Turkish companies, and provide matching between companies of two countries. The Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DE˙IK) significantly contributes to developing business relations, lobbying, providing business platforms, and conducting business diplomacy. DE˙IK is an umbrella organization for 145 country-based business councils, two special-purpose business councils, and five sectoral business councils (DE˙IK, 2021). Bilateral business councils are established with all SEE countries (Table 2). The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) also maintains regular contacts and hosts meetings with SEE countries’ business people. TOBB is also an active member of the Association of Balkan Chambers. In 2020, TOBB intensified the establishment of bilateral chambers, including with SEE countries (TOBB, 2021). As of August 2021, bilateral chambers of commerce and industry were established with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia (Table 3). The general intention of these bilateral chambers of commerce and industry is, among

Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe

153

other things, to (1) advocate for regulations that will improve bilateral trade and investment conditions; (2) bring the suggestions of the business people to the attention of the decision makers; (3) inform parties about bilateral opportunities and possibilities for cooperation with third countries; and (4) facilitate direct contacts between the business community and high-level government representatives. It is also useful to mention the Turkish Exporters’ Assembly (TIM), representing 61 Exporters’ Associations and more than 95,000 Turkish exporters. TIM takes part in determining export targets and policies, and contributes toward reaching the export goals. Finally, many associations contribute to the development of bilateral economic Table 2 DE˙IK Business Councils with SEE countries (as of August 2021) Year of establishment

Company representing DE˙IK/Turkey

Counterpart organization

Turkey-Greece BC

1988

DCT Trading Dı¸s Ticaret Ltd. Sti ¸

Greek Exporters Association (SEVE)

Turkey-Bulgaria BC

1991

Sarten Ambalaj San. Tic. A.S¸

Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Turkey-Romania BC

1991

Balkanlar Yapı Market ˙Ith. ˙Ihr. Ltd. Sti ¸

Chamber of Commerce and Industry Romania

Turkey-Albania BC

1992

Aktif Yatırım Bankası A.S¸

Tirana Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina BC

1995

Çilek Mobilya Sanayi ve Paz. Tic. A.S¸

Foreign Trade Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Turkey-Croatia BC

1995

Tav Havalimanları Holding A.S¸

Croatian Chamber of Economy

Turkey-North Macedonia BC

1995

Economic Chamber of North Macedonia

Turkey-Slovenia BC

1997

Be-Ka Sa˘glık E˘gitim Tıbbi Malz. Gıda ˙In¸s. San. ve Tic. Ltd. Sti ¸ Fatih Canpolat Tekj. ˙Iç ve Dı¸s Tic. San. Ltd. Sti ¸

Turkey-Montenegro BC

2002

Boyut Plastik Profil ve Folyo ˙Iml. San. Tic. Ltd. Sti ¸

Chamber of Economy Montenegro

Turkey-Serbia BC

2002

Salko Bisiklet San ve Tic. Ltd. Sti ¸

Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia

Turkey-Kosovo BC

2008

Özer Konveyor Band Turizm ve San. ve Tic. A.S¸

Kosovo Chamber of Commerce

Source DE˙IK (2021)

Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia

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E. Türbedar

Table 3 TOBB bilateral chambers with SEE countries (as of August 2021) Date of establishment

Counterpart organization

Turkey-Serbia Chamber of Commerce and Industry

December 2017

Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia

Turkey-Albania Chamber of Commerce and Industry

December 2019

Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Albania

Turkey-Kosovo Chamber of Commerce and Industry

February 2000

Kosovo Chamber of Commerce

Turkey-Bulgaria Chamber of Commerce and Industry

May 2020

Bulgarian-Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina Chamber of Commerce and Industry

November 2020

Foreign Trade Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Turkey-North Macedonia Chamber of Commerce and Industry

June 2021

Economic Chamber of North Macedonia

Source TOBB (2021)

relations of Turkey with SEE countries, such as the Center for Development of Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (B˙IGMEV) and the Kosovo Turkey Chamber of Commerce (KTTO).

3 Trends and Shares in Turkey’s Trade with SEE Countries One of the most important economic development factors is foreign trade. Turkey’s total foreign trade turnover in 2020 was $389.2 billion, making it the biggest trading nation among the SEE countries. However, Turkey’s trade demonstrated deficit recently; in general, this stemmed from strong domestic demand and rising global energy prices. From 1996 to 1999, Turkey’s total exports of goods to SEE countries averaged only $1.1 billion (IMF, 2021b). Moreover, it could be argued that at least in the first half of the 1990s, Turkey’s exports to most of the SEE countries were more characterized as shuttle trade,2 with traces even today. Turkey’s trade in goods with the Balkan countries has experienced a significant revival since 2000 (Fig. 7). Above all, FTAs signed with Bulgaria and Romania contributed to the start of such a positive trend. Further, Turkey has developed a more systematic and long-term approach toward the SEE countries by putting the “Strategy for Development of Trade with Neighboring and Surrounding Countries” into effect in 2000 (Nuri & Eren, 2013: 140–144). The strategy was not specific to SEE countries but has covered 52 countries and a wider geographical area. From SEE countries, the strategy covered only 2

Shuttle trade refers to the activity in which individual entrepreneurs buy goods abroad and import them for resale in street markets or small shops. Often the goods are imported without full declaration to avoid import duties (OECD, 2002: 225).

Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe

155

12

6 4 2

0.9 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.5 2.0 3.1 4.2 5.2

8

7.0

10

7.4 7.5 8.4 7.8 9.1 9.8 9.0 10.0

10.3 11.5

14

11.7

16

13.8 14.1 13.2

Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, North Macedonia, and Romania in its original form. In 2013, the strategy was revised to cover other countries from Turkey’s wider surroundings, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (today Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia). Two additional factors should also be mentioned when explaining the rapid increase of Turkey’s export to SEE countries after 2000. First, with the impact of the 2000–2001 economic and financial crisis in Turkey, Turkish companies have begun to strive more for foreign trade. Second, SEE economies began to recover after 2000. From 2000 to 2018, the average growth rate of Western Balkans and EU-5 countries was 5.8 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively (Fig. 4). Turkey’s trade with SEE countries measured through exports of goods rose from $1.4 billion in 2000 to $11.5 billion in 2008 (Fig. 7). In this period, Turkey’s exports of goods to SEE countries on average grew by 30 percent annually, which is higher than the 22 percent average annual growth registered in Turkey’s total exports of goods (IMF, 2021b). Turkey’s exports of goods to SEE increased considerably after the contraction and stagnation in 2009–2010—the global economic crisis period— reaching the highest level of $14.1 billion in 2019. Maintaining contactless trade during the Covid-19 outbreak in 2020 helped Turkey keep its exports of goods to SEE countries at $13.2 billion. In the long term, Turkey succeeded in increasing its exports to both Western Balkan and EU-5 countries. However, in 2020, the share of EU-5 countries in Turkey’s total exports of goods was 6.1 percent, significantly higher than the Western Balkans’ share of 1.7 percent. Still, from 1996 to 2020, Turkey’s exports of goods to the Western Balkans remained stable, compared to considerable fluctuations observed in Turkey’s exports of goods to EU-5 countries (Fig. 8). From 2014 to 2020, Romania (29.8 percent), Bulgaria (21.4 percent), and Greece (10.7 percent) had the most significant shares in Turkey’s exports of goods to SEE,

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

0

Exports to Western Balkans

Exports to EU-5

Total exports to SEE

Fig. 7 Trend of Turkey’s exports of goods to SEE countries (Billion USD) (Source IMF [2021b])

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E. Türbedar 8.6%

Fig. 8 Shares in Turkey’s total exports of goods (%) (Source IMF [2021b])

6.1%

3.3% 4.2% 1.7%

Western Balkans

2020 EU-5

3.2%

3.0%

2.6%

BiH

Croatia

Kosovo

0.6%

3.3% North Macedonia

Montenegro

3.3%

2014-2020 average

Albania

6.5% Serbia

Slovenia 10.7%

15.6% Greece

21.4% Bulgaria

Romania

29.8%

2007-2013 average

2017

2014

2011

2008

2005

1999

2002

1996

0.8%

Fig. 9 Shares in Turkey’s regional trade with SEE (Exports of goods, percent) (Source IMF [2021b]. Note Data labels indicate 2014–2020 average values)

constituting the 66.8 percent of Turkey’s exports to this region (Fig. 9). These three countries have the highest GDP levels among the SEE countries. In 2020, the GDP levels of Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece were $247.2 billion, $189.3 billion, and $59,093 billion, respectively. Therefore, Turkey’s exports of goods to SEE are significantly concentrated in Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Still, although Greece had 2.8 times higher GDP than Bulgaria in 2020, it was not Turkey’s second most important trade partner in the SEE region. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that political oscillations in bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece influence the real potential of their economic relations. In addition, it is necessary to note that the share of Greece in Turkey’s exports of goods to SEE countries decreased from 19.8 percent in 2007–2013 to 15.6 percent in 2014–2020. Shares of Romania and, to a lesser degree, shares of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in Turkey’s exports of goods to SEE have also decreased in two compared periods. From 2007–2013 to 2014–2020, shares of Slovenia and Serbia in Turkey’s exports of goods to SEE have increased most significantly. Turkey ranked among the top ten exporters of goods to SEE countries from 2010 to 2020, except Greece and Croatia. Turkey was the second-biggest exporter of goods

Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe

157

to Kosovo, fourth to Albania, fifth to Bulgaria, and sixth to Slovenia. In the opposite direction, SEE countries do not rank among the top ten exporters of goods to Turkey. In the same period, Romania ranked nineteenth among top exporters of goods to Turkey, Bulgaria twentieth, and Greece twenty-second (Table 4). From 2015 to 2020, Turkey was a significant export destination for Bulgaria; 8 percent of total Bulgarian exports of goods went to Turkey. In this regard, Bulgaria remains significantly reliant on Turkey’s economic growth trends. In the case of Greece, exports of goods to Turkey represented 5.8 percent of Greece’s exports to the world in the same period, while for Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Romania, this ratio was between 3.3 and 4.2 percent. In contrast, Turkey’s market seems not to be utilized by exporters of Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, North Macedonia, and Serbia. From 2012 to 2020, their exports of goods to Turkey accounted for only 1–1.8 percent of their exports to the world (Fig. 10). Table 4 Rank among top exporters of goods (2010–2020 average) Turkey’s exports to SEE countries

SEE countries’ exports to Turkey

Kosovo

2

Romania

19

Albania

4

Bulgaria

20

Bulgaria

5

Greece

22

Slovenia

6

Slovenia

59

Romania

7

Serbia

61

Bosnia and Herzegovina

8

Croatia

70

North Macedonia

8

Bosnia and Herzegovina

77

Serbia

8

North Macedonia

91

Montenegro

9

Albania

97

Greece

12

Montenegro

124

Croatia

18

Kosovo

126

8.0%

1.4%

1.2%

1.1%

1.0%

Croatia

Albania

Slovenia

1.8% Serbia

2.4%

Kosovo

3.3%

Romania

3.4%

BiH

Montenegro

Greece

Bulgaria

4.2%

N. Macedonia

5.8%

Fig. 10 Turkey’s share in total exports of goods of SEE countries (2015–2020 average, percent) (Source IMF [2021b])

158

E. Türbedar Turkey's trade with EU-5

-7.2

-6.8

10.4

11.2 -7.9

11.3

9.5 -7.9

7.3

8.0 -6.3

8.0

7.4 -11.1

6.3 -10.1

-7.2

-0.80 2.6

-0.78 2.8

-0.92 2.2

-0.83 2.8

-0.72 1.7

-0.78 2.0

-0.59 1.7

-0.72 1.8

2020

-0.55 1.4

2018

2017

2015

2016

2014

2012

-0.55 1.5

Balance

2013

2011

2010

2018

2020

2017

2019

2016

2012

2015

2011

2014

2010

2013

-0.34 1.4

Imports

2019

6.2

Exports

-11.3

Balance

6.9

Imports

-9.5

Exports

-7.4

Turkey's trade with Western Balkans

Fig. 11 Trade in goods balance (Billions of current USD) (Source IMF [2021b])

Turkey exported $22 billion to, and imported $7.6 billion from, the Western Balkans during the 2010–2020 period, leading to a positive trade balance. The trade surplus in Turkey’s export to the Western Balkans averaged $1.3 billion from 2010 until 2020, with the highest at $2 billion in 2019 (Fig. 10). From 2010 to 2015, Turkey exported $42.1 billion to and imported $56.6 billion from EU-5 countries, resulting in a negative trade balance of $14.5 billion. However, from 2016 to 2020, Turkey’s trade in goods with EU-5 countries realized a surplus (Fig. 11). Services sectors play a growing role in Turkey’s trade with SEE countries, as is shown in Fig. 12. Services activities include transport, tourism, financial services, use of intellectual property, telecommunications and information services, government services, maintenance, and other professional services from accounting to legal services. From 2016 to 2019, Turkey was a net service exporter to SEE, with an increasing trade surplus. In 2019, Turkey’s service exports to SEE countries (tourismtravel excluded) increased to near $1.5 billion, while Turkey’s services imports from SEE countries amounted to $663 million (Fig. 12). Out of Turkey’s services exports to the SEE region, 82 percent went to the EU-5, and 89 percent of Turkey’s services imports from the region came from EU-5 countries. Unfortunately, existing databases on trade in services do not provide enough data on bilateral trade. For that reason, it is not easy to conduct a more detailed analysis of bilateral trade potentials and complementarities. However, a more detailed analysis of trade in goods would be helpful to better understand the nature of trade between Turkey and SEE countries.

3.1 Trade Patterns at Sectoral and Commodity Level Figure 13 shows the trade distribution between Turkey and SEE countries according to three broad types of goods: capital, intermediate, and consumption goods. The structure of products exported by Turkey to SEE countries has slightly changed over time. While 33 percent of its exports to SEE countries were consumption goods in 2010, almost 9 percent were capital goods. In 2019, the share of Turkey’s export of consumption goods to SEE decreased to 26 percent, and the export of capital goods

Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe

159

increased to 16 percent. Turkey’s exports of intermediate goods did not change over the last decade and remained at 58 percent. The Western Balkans were also exporting mainly intermediate goods to Turkey, but its share had decreased from 91 percent in 2010 to 76 percent in 2019. In the same period, the Western Balkans’ consumption and capital goods exports to Turkey increased to 17 percent and 7 percent, respectively. Intermediate goods also represent the largest share in EU-5 exports to Turkey. However, the share of capital goods in EU-5 exports to Turkey declined from 9 percent in 2010 to 6 percent in 2019 (Fig. 13). A high share of intermediate goods—those goods that are necessary for the manufacturing of final goods—in total exports among Turkey and SEE countries implies considerable interconnectedness in the supply chain across these countries. It could indicate the more significant trade potential among Turkey and SEE countries if existing barriers to trade are well identified and removed. Figure 14 presents the sectoral distribution of exported goods between Turkey and SEE. In 2020 manufactured goods, and machinery and transport sectors dominated the exports of both parties, whose shares in Turkey’s export to SEE were 62.1 percent, and SEE countries exports to Turkey were 50.9 percent. Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, and crude materials were the third and fourth largest sectors in SEE countries’ exports Fig. 12 Trade in service (Millions of current USD) (Source TÜ˙IK [2020]. Note Tourism [travel] is excluded)

1 477

1 397 1 258 1 096

530

542

605

663

2016

2017

2018

2019

Turkey's exports of services to SEE Turkey's import of services from SEE

Fig. 13 Structure of trade among Turkey and SEE countries (percent) (Source UN Comtrade [2021], based on BEC Rev.4 categories. Note Data for Kosovo not available)

9%

16%

33%

26%

7%

91% 58%

58%

2010

2019

Turkey's exports to SEE Intermediate goods

2010

7% 17%

9% 8%

6% 8%

76%

83%

86%

2019

2010

2019

WB exports to Turkey

EU-5 exports to Turkey

Consumption goods

Capital goods

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to Turkey, with a total share of 26.4 percent in 2020. Values of other sectors can be followed from Fig. 14. As can be followed from Fig. 15, in 2020 64 percent of Turkey’s global exports of goods were low-tech and medium-tech products. The share of resource-based products was 18 percent, while primary products stood at 10 percent and high-tech products at only 4 percent. This picture illustrates that Turkey could be considered an innovative economy. However, Turkey has to prepare its institutions, infrastructure, companies, and human capital to jump from low and mid-tech to high-tech. The technological intensity of goods exported by Turkey to SEE countries provides a similar picture. In 2020, Turkey’s medium-tech goods (38 percent) dominated exports to SEE and were followed by low-tech goods (36 percent). Shares of resource-based goods in Turkey’s exports to SEE were 13 percent, primary products 10 percent, and high-tech only 3 percent. Technology-containing products are exported to a lesser degree by SEE countries to Turkey. Only 47 percent of exported goods to Turkey were low-tech or high-tech products, whereas 57 percent were resource-based or primary products. From Fig. 16, it could be concluded that particularly Western Balkans countries are not sufficiently innovative economies, and on the import side, they need to import high value-added

Fig. 14 Sectoral trade among Turkey and SEE countries (2020) (Source UN Comtrade [2021], SITC2 classification. Note Data for Kosovo not available. 2018 data for Bulgaria)

34%

34%

18%

Medium Tech

Low Tech

Resource Based

10%

Primary Products

4%

High Tech

Fig. 15 Technological classification of Turkey’s exports of goods to the world (2020) (Source UN Comtrade [2021], based on Lall [2000])

3%

3%

2%

4%

27%

28%

31%

40%

18%

9%

12%

10%

34% 15%

13%

21%

13%

WB exports to Turkey

36%

Turkey's exports to WB

EU-5 exports to Turkey

Medium Tech

Turkey's exports to EU-5

WB exports to Turkey

EU-5 exports to Turkey

Turkey's exports to WB

37%

161

Turkey's exports to EU-5

Low Tech

EU-5 exports to Turkey

WB exports to Turkey

Turkey's exports to WB

Turkey's exports to EU-5

Turkey's exports to EU-5

Primary Products

Turkey's exports to WB

WB exports to Turkey

Resource Based

EU-5 exports to Turkey

Turkey's exports to WB

EU-5 exports to Turkey

Turkey's exports to EU-5

WB exports to Turkey

44%

Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe

High Tech

Fig. 16 Technological classification of exports of goods between Turkey and SEE countries (2020) (Source UN Comtrade [2021], based on Lall [2000]. Note Data for Kosovo not available)

goods such as new technologies required for their economic modernization. However, Turkey can be partly considered a source of such technology products, which is a limiting factor in further increasing trade volume between Turkey and SEE countries.

3.2 Trade Complementarities and Untapped Trade Potential The Trade Complementarity Index measures the degree to which the export pattern of one country matches the import pattern of another. A high degree of complementarity is assumed to indicate more favorable prospects for a successful trade arrangement. The index takes a value between 0 and 100, with zero indicating no overlap and 100 indicating a perfect match in the import/export pattern. Findings presented in Fig. 16 indicate that in 2020 Turkey had high trade complementarities (between 55 and 69) with SEE countries. SEE countries also have high trade complementarity with Turkey, except for Albania, and to a lesser degree Montenegro and North Macedonia. Data for Kosovo is not available, but it can be predicted that the complementarity of its exports with the imports of Turkey is below the average. Interestingly, all countries subject to Turkey–SEE trade have increased their mutual trade complementarities between 2000 and 2020. Only Slovenia’s trade complementarity with Turkey slightly decreased in the two compared years (Fig. 17). In 2020, Bulgaria and Romania had relatively better trade complementarity with Turkey. Overall, the situation with trade complementarities between Turkey and SEE countries shows that both sides would significantly gain from the increased trade volume. However, Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia would have to invest in diversifying national economies and thus better integrate into the

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global economy. Figure 18 shows that in 2017, only 176 products from Montenegro were subject to international trade. In the same year, Albania exported 586 products, and North Macedonia 703 products, which are small numbers compared with the number of products exported by Turkey, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The experience of countries that have successfully achieved economic diversification suggests that the primary role should be assigned to the manufacturing sector. Private sector development and industrialization would be important long-term sources for the diversification of the economies of the Western Balkans. In this process, governments have a vital role in ensuring well-functioning institutions and appropriate legislation, infrastructure, and human resources development, and encouraging and supporting innovation and technological upgrading (Kniivilä, 2007). Increasing trade between Turkey and SEE countries could also be possible by removing existing tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Although Turkey possesses FTAs with the Western Balkans and a Customs Union agreement with EU-5 countries, agriculture, services, and sensitive industrial products remain subject to tariffs. On the other hand, existing non-tariff measures (NTMs) also limit the trade potential between Turkey and SEE. NTMs are imposed in different forms, including contingent trade protective measures, price control measures, sanitary and phytosanitary matters,

Slovenia

N. Macedonia

Bulgaria

Croatia

47 34

34 BiH

26

33

43

53 Greece

2000

2020

47

51

56

57

57

51

62

61 47

58

62 51

55

62 42

49

63

50 Bulgaria

2000

48

63

64 62

65

64 53

46

69

67 50 Croatia

SEE countries' exports to Turkey

19

Romania

59

52

69

Turkey's exports to SEE countries

N. Macedonia

2020

2507

2546

Slovenia

Romania

Turkey

2435 Bulgaria

2183

1802 Serbia

Greece

1735 Croatia

1041

703 N. Macedonia

BiH

586 Albania

176 Montenegro

Fig. 18 Number of exported products (2017) (Source WITS [2021], based on UN Comtrade. Note This indicator gives the number of products exported. A product is counted if it is exported to at least one destination in the selected year with a value of at least $US10,000. Data for Kosovo not available)

3405

Fig. 17 Trade complementarity index (Source WITS [2021], based on UN Comtrade. Note The trade complementarity index indicates to what extent the export profile of the reporter country matches, or complements, the import profile of the partner country. A high index may indicate that two countries would stand to gain from increased trade liberalization. 2003–2020 data for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 2007–2020 data for Montenegro. Data for Kosovo not available)

Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe

163

Greece Coverage ratio

Romania

90%

97%

Manufacturing

55%

Slovenia

Natural Resources

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Natural Resources

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Natural Resources

Agriculture

Natural Resources

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Natural Resources

Agriculture

Manufacturing Croatia

Agriculture

4.0 0%

Manufacturing

4.0

20%

Bulgaria

92%

98%

86%

89% 5.0

Natural Resources

5.0

4.0

98%

89%

98%

89% 5.0

4.0

64%

5.0 40%

86%

60%

98%

89%

86%

80%

18.0 16.0 14.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 5.0 4.0 6.0 2.3 1.2 0.9 4.0 2.0 0.0 86%

15.5

15.5

15.5

15.5

100% 98%

Coverage ratio

120% 15.5

Prevalence score

quantity control measures, export-related measures, technical barriers to trade, preshipment inspection, and other measures. Two descriptive indicators commonly used to quantify the intensity of NTMs are coverage ratio and prevalence score. The coverage ratio captures how much of an economy’s trade is subject to NTMs (the share of imports affected by one or more NTMs). The prevalence score indicates how many distinct NTMs are applied to regulated products (the average number of NTMs affecting an imported product) (Disdier & Fugazza, 2020: 29). Figure 19 shows that the sector most heavily affected by imposed NTMs in Turkey and EU-5 is agriculture. The share of imported agricultural goods affected by one or more NTMs in these countries was 97–98 percent. The difference is evident in prevalence scores. In EU-5 countries, the average number of NTMs affecting imported agricultural products was above 15 in 2021, whereas Turkey imposed 2–3 NTMs on imported agricultural products. Compared to EU-5, on average, Turkey was also imposing a smaller number of NTMs for the manufacturing sector and natural resources. The share of imported manufacturing goods affected by one or more NTMs was at 55 percent in Turkey, significantly lower than 92 percent in Slovenia and 89 percent in Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, and Romania (Fig. 19). The International Trade Centre (ITC) predicts the bilateral export potentials for each country by forecasting factors such as the future of GDP and population, supply performance, demand for the selected product, forward-looking tariffs, and the trade relationship’s relative strength between the exporting and importing countries (ITC, 2021). Table 5 shows the values for actual exports and potential exports until 2025. The difference between potential and actual exports in value terms leaves room to realize additional exports until 2025. Thus, according to ITC prediction, until 2025,

Turkey

Prevalence score

Fig. 19 Coverage ratios and prevalence scores of non-tariff measures (2021) (Source UNCTAD [2021b]. Data as accessed on 11 September 2021. Note The coverage ratio captures how much of an economy’s trade are subject to NTMs. The prevalence score indicates how many distinct NTMs are applied to regulated products, on average. Data for Western Balkans not available)

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Table 5 Potential of exports in goods between Turkey and SEE countries Turkey’s exports to SEE Exports in 2020 (Million $)

Albania BiH Bulgaria

475.3 446.5 2634.4

Croatia

390.5

Greece

1799.8

SEE countries exports to Turkey

Export potential until 2025 (Million $)

Untapped potential in other products (Million $)

571.1

311.3

Exports in 2020 (Million $)

30.7

Export potential until 2025 (Million $)

Untapped potential in other products (Million $)

Achieved

8.1

748.9

400.3

184.5

276.1

203.3

Achieved

1000

2047.6

2500

1200

748.9

400.3

210.8

Achieved

713.9

1528.3

230.2

150.2

Achieved

565.3

Montenegro

103.1

151.0

89.0

15.5

19.4

8.2

N. Macedonia

415.9

626.1

341.0

97.7

137.9

113.5

3894.0

4700

2200

2396.2

3500

1700

Romania Serbia

1018.0

1600

826.7

363.4

481.9

308.9

Slovenia

1641.4

Achieved

836

449.9

537.9

351.4

Source ITC (2025). Data as accessed on September 11, 2021

Turkey’s exports of goods to SEE countries could increase by $2.4 billion, compared with the exports achieved in 2020. Similarly, SEE countries’ exports to Turkey could increase by $1.9 billion until 2025. It is interesting that Turkey has already achieved its predicted export potential for 2025 in Bulgaria, Greece, and Slovenia. Similarly, Albania and Greece achieved the same in Turkey’s market (Table 5). When actual exports exceed potential exports, this can have two possible meanings: (1) the importing country’s market has been so far neglected, and (2) other suppliers exist with unused export potential in exporting countries (ITC, 2021). Besides export potential until 2025, ITC also predicts untapped export potential in other products. The export potential value is an indicative benchmark of an “optimal” allocation of trade flows but not an absolute limit on possible export values. Even if one country has exceeded its export potential value3 in another country, the untapped potential may remain across many other products. According to ITC, the untapped potential value signals room for export growth if frictions, such as regulations, buyer–seller mismatches, difficulties in complying with product-specific market entry requirements, can be overcome (ITC, 2021). If this happens, Turkey’s additional export potential (untapped export potential) in SEE until 2025 would be $7.1 billion, whereas SEE countries could export additional goods totaling $4.6 billion (Table 5). 3

Export potential value can be defined as the potential value at which a country can export its products to a certain target market given its current supply capacities, and the target market’s demand and market access conditions (Cheong et al., 2018: 8).

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165

4 Turkey’s Investments in SEE: Unresolved Puzzle Foreign direct investments (FDI) are the largest external source of finance for developing economies. During the 1990s, Turkish investors in SEE countries mainly operated in the retail sector, but they have become active in many sectors today, including manufacturing. Romania and Bulgaria were among the first countries where Turkish companies went abroad for investment. One of the Turkish companies’ most significant challenges in SEE in the 1990s was related to money transfers and banking transactions. For that reason, since the second half of the 1990s, Turkey has encouraged investments in the SEE countries’ financial sector and allowed state-owned banks to operate there. For example, Turkey’s state-owned Ziraat Bank opened a representative office in Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately after the war there (1992–1995), under very challenging conditions. Ziraat Bank was the first bank to introduce credit cards, ATMs, commercial vehicle loans, and the Western Union money transfer system in this country (Özeni¸s, 2009). However, the fast momentum of entry of Turkey’s banks in SEE countries could not be sustained afterward, mainly due to increased competition from the financially strong Austrian, Greek, and Italian banks. The 2000/2001 financial crisis in Turkey also affected this process significantly. Nevertheless, the presence of Turkish banks became a powerful tool for strengthening Turkey’s economic activities in SEE. Turkish banks are present in all SEE countries: Ziraat Bank in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, and Montenegro; Halkbank in North Macedonia and Serbia; ˙I¸sbank in Bulgaria and Kosovo; Garanti BBVA in Romania, Kentbank in Croatia, and TEB in Kosovo. Further, Turkish Çalık Finansal Hizmetler A.S¸ bought Banka Kombetare Tregtare of Albania and has expanded its activities to Kosovo. The existence of Turkish banks in the SEE countries creates the opportunity for Turkish business people to access financial support, acquire market intelligence and connections, and communicate in their native language with bank representatives. One of the significant constraints for Turkish SMEs in doing business abroad is language skills (Djurica & Ça˘glar, 2015: 46). For that reason, Turkish-speaking citizens in SEE countries appear as a great advantage for the business people of Turkey. Figure 20 shows that 863,621 people were registered as ethnic Turks in the latest official censuses held across the SEE countries (Only data for Greece is estimated since this country does not collect official data on ethnicity). It should be noted that Turkish universities present in SEE countries such as the International Balkan University (IBU, 2021) and the International University of Sarajevo (IUS, 2021), as well as the Maarif Schools of Turkey (TMF, 2022) present in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Romania also significantly contribute to generating Turkish-speaking human capital. There is also a growing interest in Turkish courses organized by Turkey’s Yunus Emre Institute (YEE, 2021), which has offices in SEE countries, except for Bulgaria, Greece, and Slovenia. Turkish Airlines and private Turkish airline company Pegasus also play an essential role in improving economic relations between Turkey and SEE countries. These

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Fig. 20 Turkish population in SEE countries (Source UN [2020], data based on the latest official censuses; Minority Rights Group International [2020] for Greece; Kosovo Agency of Statistics [2013, p. 11] for Kosovo)

airline companies connect Turkey to all SEE countries with multiple daily flights and offer many connecting flights from SEE-6 countries to the rest of the world. Many successful Turkish entrepreneurs from ˙Izmir, Bursa, the Thrace region, and the wider Aegean and Marmara regions of Turkey have their family histories rooted in SEE. They represent a significant potential for Turkish investment in SEE countries (Djurica & Ça˘glar, 2015: 46). Turkish FDIs are particularly in the Western Balkans. Still, some parts of SEE countries’ societies fear possible domination by states larger than themselves and have a critical approach to Turkish investments. Some Western Europeans also negatively view Turkish FDIs, fearing that rising investment could increase Turkey’s political influence in the Western Balkans (Aspen Institute, 2015). From the perspective of Turkish companies, which used to operate in Turkey’s market with an 83.6 million population in 2020, SEE economies are small with a relatively low purchasing power of its citizens. Further, uncertainties arising from economic and political instability, and difficulties in choosing reliable business partners altogether discourage Turkish business people from investing in SEE countries. However, the economic size of a country should not be perceived as a constraint for FDIs per se. This means that if a country has enough knowledge skills at competitive prices and an attractive investment climate, it can attract significant FDI volumes (Cooper & Shaw, 2009: 7). For example, from 2000 to 2009, with an average population of 46.4 million people (in that period), EU-5 countries attracted more inward FDIs than Turkey. Again, with 18.7 million people in 2003, the Western Balkans were more successful in FDI inflows than Turkey. Moreover, while Turkey registered a negative (decreasing) trend in attracting inward FDIs from 2011 to 2019, Western Balkans and EU-5 countries maintained a positive (increasing) trend (Fig. 21).

EU-5

Western Balkans

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

167

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

32 28 24 20 16 12 8 4 0

2000

Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe

Turkey

Fig. 21 FDI inflows (Billion USD) (Source UNCTAD [2021c] , Annex table 1; Lack of data for Kosovo in UNCTAD statistics compensated with Central Bank of Kosovo [2021])

Existing national and international data sets provide enough data on FDIs for countries at a national level. However, analysis of FDIs at the bilateral level remains challenging due to a lack of reliable data. Table 6 shows different estimates on Turkish FDIs in SEE countries. According to the Central Bank of Turkey, Turkey’s outward FDI stock (cumulative value of all FDI outflows) in SEE totaled near $2.4 billion in 2020. This estimation is done based on interbank money transfers between Turkey and SEE countries. Another estimate comes from IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS), which reports inward FDIs at a bilateral level based on official data reported by countries. Calculations based on CDIS 2019 data show the total stock of Turkish FDIs in SEE at $3.8 billion. Annexes of the World Investment Report 2021 issued by UNCTAD show a higher estimate of the total value of Turkish investment in SEE at 4.4 billion in 2020. On average, values provided in Table 6 show that Turkey’s FDIs in SEE countries are primarily concentrated in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo. According to UNCTAD estimates, in 2020, Turkey ranked among the top ten investors in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, and among the top twenty investors in Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Croatia (Table 7). At the regional level, Turkey was the thirteenth biggest investor in Western Balkans, twentieth in EU-5 countries, and eighteenth at the SEE level in the same year. Austria, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and the United States were the top five investors, with 45.4 percent of the share in inward FDI stock of SEE countries. At the SEE level, total FDIs of Russia and China, frequently subject to geopolitical discussions in this region, were $13.2 billion and $3.6 billion, respectively (Table 8). These figures show that Turkey is an emerging investor in SEE, but not among the most prominent ones. Data sources on bilateral investments provided in Tables 6 and 8 are important to get a general picture of foreign investment. However, these data also have a serious shortfall. Namely, international organizations report investment data based on official statistics received from countries. Official statistics of countries record only the capital that is directly exported from the national economy. Investments realized

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Table 6 Turkish investments in SEE countries, different estimates (Inward FDI stock, million USD) Central Bank of Turkey (2020)

IMF (2019)

UNCTAD (2020)

Ministry of Trade of Turkey (2019–2020)

Albania

602

591

743

1800

BiH

250

232

255

276

Bulgaria

349

1034

1216

2860

Croatia

138

249

277

255

Greece

47

71

103

100

Kosovo

176

490

432

436

Montenegro

151

61

74

49

N. Macedonia

252

385

442

1370

Romania

165

586

691

8565

Serbia

209

125

169

250

Slovenia

13

9

15

83

TOTAL

2,352

3,831

4,417

16,044

Source Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (2021), IMF (2021c), UNCTAD (2021c), Annex Tables 3 and 21; Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Turkey (2021d). Lack of data for Kosovo in UNCTAD statistics compensated with Central Bank of Kosovo (2021)

through third countries are not reflected in national statistics. For example, Si¸ ¸ secam, a company with Turkish capital and one of the largest foreign investors in Bulgaria, has realized its investment through the Netherlands (Sofya Ticaret Mü¸savirli˘gi, 2020: 99). The investment of Si¸ ¸ secam is not reflected in Turkey’s official outward FDI statistics because capital has not been exported from Turkey. Similarly, the FDI value of Si¸ ¸ secam is registered as an investment of the Netherlands in Bulgarian inward FDI statistics. For that reason, the value of Turkey’s investments in SEE could be much higher than officially declared statistics. The Ministry of Trade for Turkey strives to overcome this issue by tasking the offices of the commercial counselors operating under Turkey’s embassies to capture a more realistic picture of Turkey’s FDIs, by surveying national companies present in the host countries. According to estimations of the Ministry of Trade of Turkey provided in Table 6, the total stock value of Turkey’s FDIs in SEE was above $16 billion in 2020, 3.6 times higher than the figure from UNCTAD data, and 4.2 times higher than IMF data. The most significant difference comes in value related to Romania, where Turkey’s FDI stock is estimated at near $8.6 billion (see Table 6). This effort of the Ministry of Trade of Turkey is valuable, however far from being reliable due to lack of a standard methodology and professionalism. Instead, the offices of the commercial counselors tend to overestimate Turkish investment in countries they operate. For example, in her speech at the First Economy Conference of the Turkey-Albania Chamber of Commerce and Industry Forum (January 2021), Turkey’s former trade minister Ruhsar Pekcan said that the market value of the investments made by Turkish companies in Albania was approaching $1 billion (Çetinkaya, 2021). Another example came from the youth

N. Macedonia

6

BiH 10

Bulgaria 14

Montenegro 16

Croatia 19

Romania 21

Greece 28

Serbia 33

Slovenia 41

Source UNCTAD (2021c), Annex Tables 3 and 21. Lack of data for Kosovo in UNCTAD statistics compensated withCentral Bank of Kosovo (2021)

Kosovo

4

Albania

4

Table 7 Turkey’s rank among top investors in SEE (2020)

Economic Relations Between Turkey and Southeast Europe 169

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Table 8 Biggest investors in SEE countries (2020, inward FDI stock, billion USD) Western Balkans

EU-5 countries

SEE level (Western Balkans and EU-5)

Austria

9.5

Germany

37.9

Germany

44.6

Germany

6.7

Austria

32.7

Austria

42.2

Switzerland

6.0

Netherlands

22.1

Netherlands

27.9

Netherlands

5.8

Italy

20.4

Italy

25.0

Russia

5.6

United States

19.4

United States

24.2

United States

4.9

Switzerland

15.5

Switzerland

21.5

Italy

4.6

United Kingdom

14.6

United Kingdom

18.9

United Kingdom

4.3

France

11.6

France

14.5

Slovenia

4.1

Belgium

10.5

Russia

13.2

Croatia

3.1

Ireland

8.5

Belgium

11.5

France

2.9

Russia

7.6

Ireland

10.0

Greece

2.7

Greece

4.9

Greece

7.6

Turkey

2.1

Czechia

4.6

Canada

6.2

Canada

2.0

Spain

4.5

Slovenia

5.3

Serbia

1.8

Canada

4.3

Czechia

5.0

China

1.6

Sweden

3.2

Spain

4.5

Ireland

1.5

Luxembourg

2.6

Croatia

4.5

Bulgaria

1.3

Japan

2.4

Turkey

4.4

UAE

1.2

Hungary

2.4

Sweden

3.7

Belgium

0.944 Turkey

2.3

China

3.6

Denmark

0.901 Denmark

2.0

Luxembourg

3.0

Montenegro

0.886 China

2.0

Denmark

2.9

Hungary

0.543 Poland

1.8

Hungary

2.9

Sweden

0.530 Israel

1.4

Japan

2.8

Bosnia and Herzegovina

0.499 Croatia

1.4

UAE

2.4

Romania

0.470 Slovenia

1.2

Poland

1.8

Japan

0.441 United Arab Emirates

1.2

Serbia

1.8

Luxembourg

0.409 Norway

1.1

Israel

1.4

Albania

0.370 South Africa

1.0

Bulgaria

1.3

Czechia

0.338 Hong Kong

0.7

Norway

1.1

Other countries

4.6

8.1

Other countries

16.6

Other countries

Confidential/Unspecified 7.1

Confidential/Unspecified 17.8

Total FDI inward stock 89.8

Total FDI inward stock 271.5 Total FDI inward stock 361.3

Confidential/Unspecified 24.9

Source UNCTAD (2021c), Annex Tables 3 and 21. Lack of data for Kosovo in UNCTAD statistics compensated with Central Bank of Kosovo (2021)

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171

and sports minister, Mehmet Muharrem Kasapo˘glu. At the signing ceremony of the twelfth term protocol of the Turkey-Albania Joint Economic Commissions, he announced $1.8 billion as Turkey’s total FDI value in Albania (Samur & Gazio˘glu, 2020). The highest estimation of $3.5 billion of cumulative Turkish FDIs in Albania came from Turkey’s Ambassador in Tirana, Murat Ahmet Yörük (TRT Avaz, 2021). Another interesting case comes from Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Bosniaks complain that Turkey invests more in Serbia than Bosnia and Herzegovina (Karabeg, 2017). However, as is visible in Table 6, there is no evidence to support such a claim. To respond to objections, in addition to capital investments, the Turkish Embassy in Sarajevo has estimated all financial contributions made by Turkey to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1996 until 2017 and reached a value of about e1 billion. Turkish officials still use this value in the context of Turkish investments in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Saraybosna Ticaret Mü¸savirli˘gi, 2020). As of June 2021, the total number of companies with capital from SEE countries registered in Turkey was 2333 (Ministry of Industry and Technology of the Republic of Turkey, 2021).4 This number remains small compared to 16,525 registered Turkish companies only in Romania as of July 2021 (National Trade Register Office of Romania, 2021). UNCTAD estimates do not report any FDIs of SEE countries in Turkey. The Central Bank of Turkey reports only for FDIs of Greece in Turkey, at $56 million. IMF estimates Greek investments in Turkey at $45 million, Bulgarian at $3 million, and Bosnian and Herzegovinian at $2 million. Greek total FDIs in Turkey were at $6.6 billion in 2010, according to the Central Bank of Turkey. However, Greece de facto left the Turkish market, especially with the sale of Eurobank’s stakes in Tekfenbank in 2012 and the National Bank of Greece’s stakes in Finansbank (Atina Ticaret Mü¸savirli˘gi, 2020). Speaking about Turkey’s investments in SEE countries would remain incomplete without mentioning the contracting sector. Turkish companies undertake projects in a wide range of sectors, from highways to housing. As of the beginning of 2021, the cumulative value of Turkish contracting projects in SEE countries was above $14.3 billion. Approximately 30 percent of the total value of Turkish contracting services in SEE countries has been realized in the projects in Romania, 13 percent in Bulgaria, 12 percent in Albania, and 10 percent in Kosovo (Fig. 22). The upcoming projects in SEE, especially regarding the transportation infrastructure, may make this region even more attractive for the Turkish contracting sector. These projects, expected to be supported by the EU funds or international financial institutions, will offer the Turkish contracting sector new opportunities. Moreover, if the agreement on the Sarajevo–Belgrade highway (peace highway) is reached, with a total value of around e4 billion and which should be partly financed by Turkey, Turkish investments and contracting services in SEE will become more visible. Obviously, the investments component of Turkey’s economic relations with SEE countries develops in one way, from Turkey toward SEE countries. Particularly 4

786 from Greece, 654 from Bulgaria, 283 from Romania, 179 from North Macedonia, 110 from Serbia, 96 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 85 from Albania, 49 from Kosovo, 44 from Slovenia, 33 from Croatia, and 14 from Montenegro.

172 Fig. 22 Value of projects undertaken by the Turkish contracting companies (2020, cumulative values, billion USD) (Source TMB [2020], TMB [2021), Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Turkey [2021c]. Note 2017 values for Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina)

E. Türbedar

Romania

4.3

Bulgaria

1.9

Albania

1.8

Kosovo

1.5

Croatia

1.1

N. Macedonia

1.1

Slovenia

1.0

Serbia 0.818 BiH Greece Montenegro

0.565 0.243 0.111

governments of the Western Balkans, confronted with stressed budgets, have big expectations from countries like Turkey, in the way that they want more investment but less politics.

5 Conclusion During the past two decades, Turkish foreign policy in SEE has attracted significant interest. Until 2016, Turkey’s growing role in the geography spanning from the Middle East to the SEE region was more than visible. However, in the period after 2016, domestic politics prevailed within Turkey. Consequently, the international role of Turkey has significantly decreased, except in Central Asia, where Turkey’s solidarity and cooperation with the Turkic states reached historic high levels. Accordingly, it could be argued that today’s overall role of Turkey in SEE has been overestimated and shown as much greater than it is in reality. Still, today’s world order has inevitably tied countries together by trade, investments, transportation, energy, infrastructure, and innovations. Moreover, globalization has dramatically increased competition on world markets, which encouraged almost all countries to expand their interaction with the global economy through unilateral reforms and building robust economic partnerships. The growing economic relations between Turkey and the SEE countries should be understood in this context. Turkey represents a growth opportunity for businesses of SEE countries, both as a large market and as a stepping stone into the MENA region and other world markets in which Turkey is already a significant player. On the other hand, with a total GDP of $727.2 billion in 2020, SEE countries represent an additional market for Turkish business people. Moreover, the geographical location of SEE creates natural business opportunities, especially

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in logistics, packaging, and manufacturing, that necessitates rapid delivery to the Western EU markets. Existing institutional infrastructure in Turkey supports the development of economic relations with SEE countries. Turkey increased its trade volume with these countries in the last two decades. In 2020, 7.8 percent of Turkey’s total exports went to the SEE countries, increasing 2.6 percentage points from 5.3 percent in 2000. Turkey ranked among the top ten exporters of goods to SEE countries from 2010 to 2020, except Greece and Croatia. Before the global economic slowdown created by rising uncertainty in the global trade, geopolitical issues, the Brexit issue, and diminishing FDI flows, in 2019 Turkey’s exports to SEE reached $14.1 billion in goods and near $1.5 billion in services. In the same year, Turkey imported $7.7 billion in goods and $663 million in services from SEE countries. Turkey’s exports to SEE are significantly concentrated in Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. However, shares of Slovenia and Serbia in Turkey’s total exports to the SEE region have increased most significantly from 2007 to 2020. From the perspective of SEE countries, Turkey is the most significant export destination for Bulgaria and Greece. In the 2015–2020 period, 8 percent of total Bulgarian exports of goods and 5.8 percent of total Greek exports went to Turkey. Political oscillations in bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece influence the real potential of trade between the two countries. Still, a relatively high degree of trade complementarity between Turkey and SEE countries shows that both parties would significantly gain from increased trade volume. Moreover, a high share of intermediate goods in trade between Turkey and SEE countries implies considerable interconnectedness in the supply chain across these countries, and indicates more favorable prospects for a successful trade arrangement. The last two decades have also witnessed the rising prominence of Turkey as an emerging donor. Turkey was the fifth-largest bilateral ODA provider to the Western Balkans in the 2015–2019 period, with a total ODA value of $434.2 million. Turkish FDIs are also constantly growing but have not yet reached the desired level. Turkey appears as the eighteenth largest investor in SEE, according to calculations based on UNCTAD data. However, estimates on Turkish FDI stock in SEE vary significantly, ranging from near $2.4 billion to $16 billion. Still, it is evident from the existing data that Turkey’s FDIs in SEE are primarily concentrated in Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. In the opposite direction, SEE countries’ FDIs in Turkey are almost nonexistent or symbolic. In any case, many tools could support the deepening of economic relations between Turkey and SEE; for example, building connections among the young entrepreneurs of Turkey and SEE countries by organizing networking events, start-up weekends, and joint incubation centers, could be helpful to this end. In addition, supporting networking, matchmaking, and B2B sessions between Turkey and SEE, providing systematic information about market opportunities and specific investment projects, can promote multilateral business schemes and new investments. It is unquestionable whether the continuous development of political relations and cooperation between Turkey and SEE countries could expand their economic

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relations in the future. Turkey will sustain its sincere efforts to develop economic relations with all parts of the world. Moreover, if Turkey surpasses its current economic instability and strengthens economically in the future, its welfare will spill over to the surrounding areas, including SEE countries. However, the state is not the one that invests—it is the private sector. Turkey will probably continue to encourage Turkish business people to do more business in SEE. But as always, Turkish private sectors’ presence in SEE will be tightly connected to improving the business and investment climate in the region. In other words, economic opportunities will determine the directions of Turkey’s trade and investment flows in the SEE countries, not the choices made in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara.

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Turkey’s Cultural Diplomacy in the Western Balkans: Actors, Strategies, and Local Perceptions Adisa Avdi´c-Küsmü¸s

This chapter seeks to shed light on Turkey’s Balkan policy under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) within the framework of soft power and, in particular, cultural diplomacy. Geopolitically, the Balkan region is often perceived as the gate connecting Turkey with the rest of Europe as well as Turkey’s natural area of expansion (Garcia, 2020). The rise of the AKP at the beginning of the 2000s coincided with the relative stabilization of the political situation in the Balkans, which allowed the government to shift away from a security-oriented approach to adopting soft power policies. Common historical and cultural heritage was viewed as the basis for deepening economic, political, and security cooperation. A shared legacy stemming from the Ottoman past paved the way for a culture-oriented strategy whose practical implementation depended on new actors and institutions such as the Yunus Emre Institute, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF), and TRT World. Overall, the past two decades of Turkey–Balkans relations could be described as a period of rapprochement that has transcended the elite level so that strong ties with people could also be built. Turkey’s strategy of winning hearts and minds is in sharp contrast with the Western carrot and stick approach, since it has provided the Western Balkans with an alternative to being caught in the perpetual state of being Europe’s backward neighbor. Turkey’s Balkan policy in the first decade of the 2000s was defined in line with AKP’s identity and its focus on common historical, religious, and cultural ties. The leadership has labeled the Balkans as “Evlad-ı Fatihan,” as per the Ottoman remnant that occupied a special position in the Islamic civilization (Ek¸si, 2017: 197). In fact, five centuries of the Ottoman rule in the region left behind a vast legacy, including the largest autochthonous Muslim community in Europe. A. Avdi´c-Küsmü¸s (B) Faculty of Political Science, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_8

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The traces of this period are present in the local art, architecture, cuisine, language, and music, both among Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants (Oruç, 2011). Despite the tendency to view the Balkan region as somewhat homogenous, each country’s background or development is different and represents a complex mixture of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities. These differences are reflected not only in their relations with one another but also in the level of their interaction with Turkey; while certain countries welcome Turkey’s growing influence, others express concern over Ankara’s intentions and long-term agenda. Instead of developing a country-specific policy, Turkey has adopted a pragmatic approach and intensified cultural diplomacy activities in countries and regions with more pronounced Islamic heritage and a dominant Muslim population, which is perceived as a leverage (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia’s Sandžak region). As an emerging regional and global power, Turkey has gone through a profound intellectual and identity transformation, which marked the beginning of a new foreign policy approach. The attitude shift was underpinned by the rejection of the Eurocentric historical narrative and Turkey’s embracement of its unique conditions and experience. The transformation is described as the “new Turkish story” (Kalın, 2011: 11), rooted in the country’s rich heritage and shared Ottoman legacy with dozens of ethnic communities, including Abkhazians, Albanians, Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Azeris, Bosniaks, Circassians, Greeks, Jews, Kazakhs, Kurds, Kyrgyz, Turkmens, and Uzbeks. Accordingly, Turkey’s soft power potential extends from the Balkans to Central Asia and the Middle East, and it is closely linked to the dynamics of common memory and identity conscience. The Western Balkans follows Central Asia in occupying a central position in terms of activities within the scope of Turkish cultural diplomacy. The unprecedented volume of projects, exhibitions, Turkish language courses, student exchange and scholarship programs, and the accompanying media coverage have inspired some authors to label the trend as “Turkish cultural diplomacy attack” on the Balkans (Ek¸si, 2017). At the same time, the academic circles discussing Turkish soft power are preoccupied with the “rise and fall” dynamics (Benhaïm & Öktem, 2015; Keyman, 2012). Within this discourse, the first decade of the AKP rule is described as hyperactivism or proactivism (Keyman, 2012), which caused an overstretch of capacities and forced the government to redefine its foreign policy priorities. Such a need is closely related to the dramatic changes in the regional political landscape; the escalation of tensions caused by the Arab Spring, the war in Syria, and Turkey’s internal security issues undermined Turkey’s soft power approach and forced it to reevaluate its foreign policy priorities. These developments also coincide with changes in the AKP’s foreign policy leadership and Ahmet Davuto˘glu’s withdrawal from power. While considered the mastermind behind the party’s foreign policy, the recent reorientation is by no means solely the product of Davuto˘glu’s absence and should rather be viewed as the outcome of the culmination of regional and domestic security challenges. The euphoria surrounding the Turkish proactive approach and the global expansion of Turkey’s influence started witnessing a decline with the growing concerns surrounding the country’s capacity to implement such an ambitious agenda.

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Not only the Balkan region, but Europe as a whole is losing centrality in Ankara’s foreign policy to places such as Africa and the Middle East. Cultural diplomacy seeks to gradually transform deep-rooted perceptions—a process requiring consistent efforts over a long period of time. Countries facing economic and security crises naturally navigate toward quick-fix solutions with immediate and visible outcomes. This is why the initial enthusiasm regarding cultural diplomacy in the Balkans is increasingly replaced with notions of economic and military security. In this context, this chapter will examine Turkey’s main cultural diplomacy tools and strategies in the Western Balkans over the past two decades. It will look into the activities of the above-mentioned public and cultural diplomacy institutions. At the same time, it will emphasize key challenges and limitations of Turkish cultural diplomacy in the Balkans in the post-Davuto˘glu context. In addition to referring to official strategies and activity reports, the chapter will also consider local perceptions of Turkey’s cultural engagement in the region, as discussed by local observers and official representatives.

1 Diplomacy in the Information Age: Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Modern diplomacy is characterized by the rising number of actors, instruments, and agendas that operate in an environment that by far exceeds the scope and realm of conventional diplomacy. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted, “diplomacy has expanded its remit, moving far beyond bilateral political relations between states into a multilateral, multifaceted enterprise encompassing almost every realm of human endeavor” (UN, 2001). The often-repeated mantra of the world becoming a global village meant that states had to quickly adapt and embrace a diversified, multidimensional foreign policy. The rise of communication technologies and social media marked the shift from the so-called club diplomacy to network diplomacy (Heine, 2013). In practice, this meant that the traditional hierarchical structure was replaced by a flatter and wider one, consisting of multiple players, issues, and programs. With this in mind, cultural diplomacy is one of the most comprehensive attempts to rise to the challenge of conducting diplomacy in the age of information. While France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have a long history of using cultural diplomacy to convey messages and attract foreigners, emerging powers have only recently started using culture as a tool to spread their values and increase international influence. While some regard cultural diplomacy as a tool or a method of public diplomacy, others treat it as a synonym for soft power and public diplomacy (Cummings, 2009). Despite this debate and the partial conceptual overlap, cultural diplomacy and its effectiveness principally depend on the country’s soft power capacities. The concept of soft power was introduced by Joseph S. Nye who rejected the assumption that power was inherently linked to force and coercion, but claimed

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that soft power derived from the “attractiveness of a country’s culture, political notions, and policies” (Nye, 2004: 4). Effective cultural diplomacy, therefore, allowed the states to shape other actors’ actions and attitudes through the power of attraction rather than the use of force. In Nye’s view, soft power has three key elements, including “country’s culture (in places where it is attractive to others), country’s political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and country’s foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004: 11). Soft power goes beyond the country’s military and economic capabilities and encompasses the sociocultural capital. Hard power is not necessarily accompanied by soft power and some countries exercise significant soft power despite limited military power. Nye cites the Scandinavian region as an example where countries’ soft power potential greatly surpasses their hard power capabilities thanks to their norms, education, science, and mediation efforts. Cultural diplomacy is specifically based on the premise that art, education, and language are a fundamental dimension of culture and that they can draw people together by transcending conflicting political and economic interests. According to Simon Anholt (2010: 100), cultural diplomacy transforms perceptions and removes barriers between nations: “Cinema, music, art, and literature add color, detail, and richness to people’s perception of the country and help them to get to know the place almost as well as if they’d been there; better, in fact, because the picture that’s painted is often a little idealized, and all the more magical for being intangible and incomplete.” The most prominent feature of cultural diplomacy is its multifaceted nature and the diversity of actors and policies that have to be adjusted to fit specific local conditions. Still, tools and policies that work in one country do not necessarily achieve the same outcomes in another, since local habits and understandings can significantly vary among nations and sometimes even among various groups of the same state. For example, the growing narrative of Islamization of Turkish politics may have a positive impact in the Middle East and increase the soft power potential, while in the Balkans, known to be mixed, secular, and religiously moderate, the same narrative may not be well received. Moreover, even if it is unable to change the course and outcome of contentious issues, cultural diplomacy can challenge the dominant narratives by offering opportunities to overcome polarization by targeting audiences beyond official diplomatic circles. Cultural diplomacy is therefore a sort of a quest for universal values that transcend state borders and national identities. At the international level, the United States was the first country to introduce the notion of soft power into its foreign policy strategy, recognizing it as an important tool to project norms and shape the country’s reputation abroad. In the post-Cold War period, the soft power approach has gained prominence in a number of emerging middle powers, including Brazil, China, India, and Turkey. Conscious of the limitations as to what hard power can achieve in the international system, the emerging powers started advancing their soft power capabilities. While the US is still considered the world’s only cultural superpower (Benhaïm & Öktem, 2015: 3), the influence of other powers is increasing along with their more assertive role; for example, India has earned the title of the world’s “reputational power” due to its unique, unobtrusive, persuasive soft power capacities (Cohen, 2002).

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The so-called Turkish model of soft power emerged in the 1990s. Back then, both American and Turkish foreign policymakers promoted the idea of Turkey as a model for Central Asian republics in terms of embracing capitalism and democracy at the backdrop of being a Muslim-majority country. The aim was to build relations with the newly independent nations on the basis of common identity and historical legacy. Major steps, however, took place a decade later, in response to the September 11 events and the need to adequately respond to challenges in the region. What is rather unique about the Turkish model is its impact on the country’s international reputation as well as domestic politics; the increasing focus on soft power and the demilitarization of foreign policy was coupled with limiting the role of the military in domestic politics. The importance of soft power for emerging countries is well illustrated by the then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s conceptualization of soft power as “flexible power,” suggesting that “the doors that cannot be opened by the sword can be opened with a pen.”1 The shift in foreign policy called for the establishment of new institutions that could implement the new agenda. During its first decade, the AKP-led government established several public and cultural diplomacy institutions, assigning them the task to increase the country’s soft power potential. This was a period of tectonic changes in Turkey’s foreign policy. As described by Enes Bayraklı (2012), the early years of the AKP’s rule represented the transformation from a Lockean culture based on rivalry and suspicion to a Kantian culture based on friendship and cooperation. Following the deterioration of the security situation in the region, Turkey’s approach shifted toward the adoption of soft power in combination with deterrent power. In 2013, Erdo˘gan stated that “a soft power claim that is not supported by deterrent power is only talk.”2 Soft power, therefore, does not form the core of Turkey’s foreign policy approach but rather plays the role of complementary power to military and economic strength. In the wake of the emerging regional security and economic challenges, the country was forced to redefine its priorities and increase its hard power capacities.

2 Turkey’s Cultural Diplomacy in the Western Balkans: Opportunities and Limitations By the time the AKP rose to power, the international attention had already shifted from the Balkans to the Middle East, following the invasion of Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. The slow progress of the EU integration process, including EU conditionality and the expectation of local elites to adopt unpopular reforms, led to the rise of Euroskepticism and negative attitudes toward EU membership (Belloni, 2016). Turkey’s negative image of a former occupying power was balanced by the fact that it encouraged countries to pursue EU and NATO paths, while at the same time deepening bilateral ties. The Western states’ involvement in the region was 1 2

Erdo˘gan’s speech at the 144th anniversary of Turkey’s Red Crescent Society, August 11, 2012. Erdo˘gan’s address to the High Council for Science and Technology, January 15, 2013.

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often perceived as a form of neo-imperialist or capitalist exploitation of vulnerable societies (Chandler, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011). Ankara faced the difficult challenge of avoiding the same trap and achieving a healthy balance between being actively involved in the region and distancing itself from the negative image of a former occupying power. The first decade of AKP’s foreign policy was dominated by Ahmet Davuto˘glu’s vision of Turkey’s “strategic depth,” entitling it to play a leading role in various regions and increase its international presence and recognition: “Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities and thus has the capability as well as the responsibility to follow an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy. The unique combination of our history and geography brings with it a sense of responsibility. To contribute actively toward conflict resolution and international peace and security in all these areas is a call of duty arising from the depths of a multidimensional history of Turkey” (Davuto˘glu, 2001:142). The country’s cultural and historical ties with the former Ottoman territories were viewed as sort of a treasure chest that could help unleash diplomatic potential. In this context, the Balkans became the focal point, and Davuto˘glu especially stressed the importance of Muslim communities there, as Turkey’s natural allies: “The basis of Turkey’s political influence in the Balkans is the Ottoman remnants, the Muslim communities. […] At first, Turkey’s natural allies are the two countries with a Muslim majority [Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina]. The will to turn this common historic accumulation into a natural alliance has now emerged” (Davuto˘glu, 2001: 123). Turkey’s version of moderate Islam and the active engagement with local Muslim communities, especially in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia has been described as a barrier protecting the region from religious extremism (Çalık Muhasiloviç, 2016). In his 2009 speech in Sarajevo, Davuto˘glu reflected on the relevance of the Balkans: “Like in the sixteenth century, which saw the rise of the Ottoman Balkans as the center of world politics, we will make the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, together with Turkey, the center of world politics in the future. This is the objective of Turkish foreign policy, and we will achieve this” (cited in Muzalevsky, 2012). Davuto˘glu’s emphasis on the Ottoman glory was met with mixed reactions across the Balkans and perceived by some as a neo-Ottoman ambition to restore the old borders and power. However, this interpretation is contrary to Davuto˘glu’s foreign policy vision that was based on overcoming Turkey’s traditional militaristic hard power image, and expanding its influence through conflict resolution, economic cooperation, and culture. References to the common Ottoman heritage are rather an inclination to restore the cultural influence and prestige of Turkey in the territories that were once part of the Ottoman Empire than an aspiration to conquer and rule (Taspinar, 2008). Rejecting the neo-Ottoman view as simplistic and misinterpreted, ˙Ibrahim Kalın, a high-ranking AKP official, asserted that Turkey’s cultural diplomacy should not be viewed through the lens of neo-Ottomanism but rather as a “process whereby Turkey’s new geopolitical imagination and the new possibilities in the global political system allow the people of the region to reconcile with their history and geography” (Kalın, 2011:10).

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Table 1 The diplomatic foundation of the international cultural relations of Turkey and Balkan countries Year

Country

Agreement

2004

Bosnia and Herzegovina

An Exchange Program in the Fields of Culture, Education, Science, Youth, and Sport

2004

Kosovo

Cultural Cooperation Agreement

2004

Macedonia

Cultural Education Protocol

2006

Croatia

Cooperation Program in the Fields of Education, Science, Culture and Art, Youth, and Sport Areas

2007

Greece

Cultural Exchange Program

2008

Bulgaria

Cooperation Program in the Fields of Science, Education, and Culture

2009

Serbia

Cultural Cooperation Program

Source Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Culture and Tourism Agreements Index (Kültür ve Turizm Anla¸smaları Dizini), https://teftis.ktb.gov.tr/TR-267882/kultur-ve-turizm-anlasmalari-dizini.html

Under the AKP leadership, Turkey has pursued proactive cultural diplomacy in the Western Balkans by signing bilateral agreements (Table 1) that became the basis for deeper cooperation in the fields of art, culture, and education. A further step was the establishment of institutional infrastructure capable of carrying out activities and projects across the region. The 2004–2010 period was marked by a remarkable increase in development assistance projects, education activities, and the opening of Turkish cultural centers in several cities across the Balkans. The following sections will explore the instruments of Turkish cultural diplomacy and their activities in the Western Balkans. All listed institutions are actively involved in the implementation of cultural diplomacy strategy and strengthening Turkey’s soft power capacities.

˙ 2.1 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) Turkey under the AKP has become one of the top global providers of humanitarian assistance. While in 2002 the volume of development aid amounted to $85 million, by 2011 it reached $1.3 billion (Karagül, 2013: 89) The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2018) ranked Turkey as the most generous country in the world for providing $8.1 billion of humanitarian aid, followed by the US, which had delivered $6.7 billion. T˙IKA was established in 1992, with the goal of assisting the Turkic republics in their political and economic transition. In terms of organizational structure, T˙IKA had been placed under the jurisdiction of various ministries (initially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then the Office of the Prime Minister and the rotating ministry in charge). With the shift to the presidential system in 2018, T˙IKA was moved under the authority of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism that responds directly

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to the Office of the President. This shift demonstrates the increasing centralization of power that is likely to have a lasting impact on T˙IKA’s activities, considering that the regional preferences and the type of projects would be defined in line with the ruling party’s ideology and interests. T˙IKA’s strategy, sometimes labeled the “Turkish-style development model” is based on responding to priorities defined by local actors and therefore allowing significant local agency. The founding documents list transparency, nondiscrimination, and partnership with local communities as priorities, with the activities ranging from health and sanitation to artistic events and restoration of Ottoman monuments. Back in the early 1990s, apart from going through a difficult process of statebuilding, Central Asian countries faced a power vacuum and identity issues that stemmed from their complex relations with Russia. For Turkey, this was an opportunity to increase its influence in the region while emphasizing cultural ties and shared values. The initial projects focused on economics, accompanied by major investments in agriculture, infrastructure, and the financial sector. To address the identity dimension, T˙IKA centered on education and began building schools, universities, and libraries; education was deemed key to increase national awareness and balance Russian influence. The first T˙IKA program office was established in Kyrgyzstan in January 1993. As it happened, the government quickly recognized T˙IKA’s potential in the implementation of foreign policy objectives and approved the expansion of its projects to the Middle East, the Balkans, and Africa. The number and the scope of T˙IKA’s projects in the first decade of the 2000s reflected the profound changes in foreign policy brought by the rise of the AKP. The number of Program Coordination Offices increased from 12 in 2002 to 62 in 2019 across sixty countries (T˙IKA, 2020: 22), confirming a significant policy shift from a security-oriented approach toward humanitarian and cultural diplomacy. In the Balkans, T˙IKA’s involvement commenced in 1995 by providing logistic and technical assistance in war-torn areas. The establishment of coordination offices and delivery of aid to local communities in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia illustrate the significance of the Western Balkans in Turkey’s development agenda. Under the AKP rule, T˙IKA’s investments in the Balkans have increased more than seven times (Ek¸si, 2017: 15). By 2005, the Balkan region received 35 percent of T˙IKA’s investments, and in 2006 more than 30 percent of all T˙IKA projects were carried out in the Balkans (Nuro˘glu, 2013a). It has implemented more than 900 projects in the Balkans and the aid to the region reached $87.22 million in 2019 (T˙IKA, 2020: 30). Looking at individual recipients, Bosnia and Herzegovina is given priority and has received more aid than all the other Balkan countries combined. Still, it should be noted that the expansion of T˙IKA’s projects could also be observed in other regions, with 20,000 implemented projects in the period between 2003 and 2017, compared to only 2,000 projects in the 1992–2002 period (T˙IKA, 2018: 18). One of the most visible and discussed dimensions of T˙IKA’s work in the Balkans concerns the restoration of old Turkish and Ottoman buildings—mosques, madrasas, and bridges. Most of them were destroyed during the war and rebuilding them is a way of restoring their old glory and preserving the Ottoman heritage as an inherent part

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of the Balkan nations’ identity. For example, rebuilding the Mehmet Paša Sokolovi´c Bridge in Višegrad was not only a way to restore the tourist attraction and the symbol of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also a way to keep the Ottoman legacy alive. Some of the restoration projects include the Parrucë Mosque in Albania, Sandžakbeg and Hünkâr mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mustafa Pasha Mosque and Ishak Çelebi Mosque in North Macedonia, and the Emin Pasha Mosque, Piri Nazır Mosque, and Alaaddin Bey Mosque in Kosovo, as well as the Ottoman-era bridge in Konjic, the old town of Sarajevo (Bašˇcaršija) and the Ram Fortress in Serbia. The projects focusing on the restoration of Ottoman and Islamic buildings catch the most media attention, and they are often portrayed as part of Turkey’s neo-Ottoman approach and its rising ambitions in the Balkans. In response to this kind of criticism, the T˙IKA has stated: “T˙IKA does now have a hidden agenda and our goal is to deliver aid where it is needed. We are strongly dedicated to humanitarian causes and close cooperation with local communities regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation. […] We do not implement or impose any project without consulting the local parties and without their explicit request. Our only aim is to reduce inequality and increase the quality of life, we do not expect anything in return” (T˙IKA, 2016). While the vast majority of projects are undertaken in cooperation with Muslim communities, T˙IKA has also sponsored the restoration of churches and monasteries, and has closely cooperated with all ethnic and religious groups in the Balkans. Following the request of the National Conservation Center of the Republic of North Macedonia, the T˙IKA team assisted in the measurement and field studies on the Macedonian St. George Church, near Kumanovo. It also established a fire alarm system against the fires in a Franciscan monastery in the Bosnian town of Fojnica (Çalık Muhasiloviç, 2016). One of the most recent examples is the restoration of the tombstone of Moše Rafaela Attiasa, a nineteenth-century Jewish intellectual and historian, carried out at the request of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Jewish community (Krehmic, 2019). The tombstone contains writings in Bosnian, Hebrew, and Turkish, and as such it testifies to Sarajevo’s rich cultural and historical legacy. The T˙IKA 2020–2023 plan includes twenty new restorations, including the Sisak Islamic Cultural Center in Croatia, Elˇci Ibrahim-Pašina Medresa in Travnik in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Berat Hünkâr Mosque and Gjirokastër student dormitory in Albania. Despite the overwhelming media focus on such activities, they comprise less than 15 percent of all implemented projects. The investment in the health sector is three times larger but receives far less attention in the media and is rarely mentioned by local political actors (Çalik Muhasiloviç, 2016). T˙IKA’s development assistance programs also cover agriculture, education, sanitation, and technical assistance, as well as income-generating projects such as beekeeping, animal breeding, and greenhouse cultivation. Other projects have focused on the automotive, metal, and textile industries, with the goal of reducing unemployment in the region. In addition, T˙IKA’s presence is important in terms of its ability to react in cases of immediate threats as in the case of the 2019 earthquake in Albania. Turkey was the first country to dispatch emergency teams to deliver aid in the format of tents, blankets, and food packages (T˙IKA, 2020: 141). A similar scenario occurred in 2014 when the region

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Table 2 T˙IKA’s international assistance by region (%) Year

Balkans

2005

35.05

Middle East-Africa 8.0

Central Asia-Caucasus

South-East Asia/ Pacific/Latin America

External Relations & Partnerships Department

55.51

2006 2007

26.83

12.87

56.63

2008

24.58

15.43

53.89

2009

26.85

24.68

44.44

2010

29.79

21.63

36.65

2011

6.3

23.87

46.6

2012

3.0

77.0

18.0

2013

21.4

55.44

21.83

2014

21.25

44.96

28.6

2015 2016

11.04

44.51

9.92

2.43

8.95

2017

26.95

22.55

11.35

5.58

8.08

2018

23.80

27.93

11.33

5.26

6.86

Total

21.40

32.40

32.89

4.42

7.96

Source Data based on T˙IKA yearly activities reports (2006–2018), https://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/yayin/ liste/tika_faaliyet_raporlari-22?page=2 (cited in Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 75)

was hit by severe floods causing damage to housing and infrastructure. T˙IKA’s immediate response and assistance to local communities regardless of their ethnicity or religion shifted the local perceptions and contributed to Turkey’s positive image (Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 78). In line with other public diplomacy institutions, T˙IKA has expanded its activities to more distant regions, with the growing number of projects in Africa and the Middle East (Table 2). For example, while in 2005 only 8 percent of T˙IKA assistance went to the Africa/Middle East region, in 2012 the share reached 77 percent. The share of support allocated to the Balkans decreased from 35 percent in 2005 to 23 percent in 2018. Still, during the 2005–2018 period, the Balkans were ranked third in terms of T˙IKA aid, after Central Asia and Africa/Middle East.

2.2 Yunus Emre Institute The establishment of the Yunus Emre Institute in 2007 marked a structural change in Turkey’s foreign policy approach with the growing focus on soft power. Yunus Emre was an Anatolian poet whose writings represent universal values and peace, and reflect Turkey’s desire to promote them internationally. The government

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has perceived the institute as the primary instrument of Turkish cultural diplomacy, resembling institutions such as the British Council, the Confucius Institute, the Goethe-Institut, and the Istituto di studi italiani. According to the founding documents, the institute’s mission is to enhance Turkey’s recognition and prestige in the international arena through cultural means. Language serves as a cultural diplomacy tool to build geopolitical ties and present the national culture to foreign audiences. The promotion of the Turkish language, culture, and art abroad is understood as means of increasing exchanges that would facilitate cooperation in other fields. As rightly pointed out elsewhere, “[i]f you are thoroughly familiar with someone else’s language and literature, if you know and love his country, its cities, its arts, and its people, you will be instinctively disposed of, all other things being equal, to buy goods from him rather than from a less wellknown source, to support him actively when you consider him right and to avoid punishing him too fiercely when you regard him as being wrong” (Parsons, 1984: 11). The Yunus Emre Institute operates fifty-eight cultural centers abroad, which offer Turkish language classes and coordinate dozens of artistic, cultural, and scientific events. So far, the language courses have attracted around 100,000 students in fortyfive countries (Yunus Emre Institute, 2019: 1). Looking at the regional distribution, 27 percent of all institutes are based in the Balkans, followed by the rest of Europe which hosts 25 percent (Yunus Emre Institute, 2018: 14). In the Balkans, the first Yunus Emre Institute was established in Sarajevo in 2009 and, in Ahmet Davuto˘glu’s words, “this was not a coincidence but a carefully thought strategic decision” (Yunus Emre Bülteni, 2009: 3). He went on to explain that Sarajevo was like a “miniature version of the Ottoman heritage” and that “if you could understand Sarajevo you could understand all of Ottoman history” (Yunus Emre Bülteni, 2009: 3). This view placed Bosnia and Herzegovina at the center of Turkey’s new Balkan policy, due to a partially romanticized vision of this state as a space of inherent tolerance and coexistence. In the following years, the Yunus Emre Institute scaled up its presence in the region by establishing twelve Turkish cultural centers (two in Albania, three in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one in Croatia, three in Kosovo, one in Montenegro, one in North Macedonia, and one in Serbia). This number showcases the determination to attract and hopefully win the hearts and minds of local people and consequently increase Turkey’s appeal in the region. The activities of the Yunus Emre Institute focus on four categories: language instruction, an art-related program, academic cooperation, and cultural diplomacy. Based on the regional distribution of Turkish language learners, the Balkans are at the top of the list, with around 33 percent of the total number (followed by Asia with 22 percent, Africa with 19 percent and the Middle East with 18 percent) (Yunus Emre Institute, 2018: 85). The success of language teaching as a public diplomacy tool depends on the perception and attractiveness of the language abroad. For example, English, French, and Spanish attract millions of new learners across continents, which is due to the colonial legacy as well as the appeal of culture and potential employment opportunities. In comparison with other foreign languages in the Balkans, the popularity of Turkish still falls behind English or German.

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A. Avdi´c-Küsmü¸s

In addition to providing Turkish language courses covering A1 to C1 levels, the Yunus Emre Institute offers Turcology programs and Turkish as an elective class, especially in remote places with insufficient facilities (tutors and study materials). The institute’s most far-reaching project launched in the Balkans is “My Choice is Turkish” (“Tercihim Türkçe”), which is aimed at introducing Turkish as an elective class in primary and secondary schools. In 2017, 164 schools subscribed to this program (more than 150 are in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Yunus Emre Institute, 2018: 92). The schools that adopted the Turkish language as an elective course are in seven out of ten cantons; no Serb or Croat majority school in Bosnia and Herzegovina offered it which, once again, demonstrates the role of the Balkan Muslim communities in Turkey’s catalyzation of soft power in the region. In Kosovo and North Macedonia, Turkish is already recognized as a minority language, and classes are offered to students of Turkish origin. Other significant activities include the establishment of new departments of Turkish language/Turcology in the Balkans (at Zenica University and Džemal Bijedi´c University in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at Cyril and Methodius University, Goce Delˇcev University, and the University of Tetovo in North Macedonia, at the University of Prishtina in Kosovo, and the University of Novi Sad in Serbia). For some observers, the intensity of Turkish diplomacy in this regard is “Turkish educational diplomacy attack in the Balkans” (Ek¸si, 2017: 13). At the same time, it can be argued that Turkey is responding to the growing local demand and increased interest in discovering the shared historical and linguistic ties as part of a broader reflection on issues of identity and self-discovery. In fact, in academic circles, there is a growing interest in learning not only Turkish but also the Ottoman language as a way of reconnecting with the past and exploring the long-neglected historical dimensions. The recent popularity of the Turkish language among younger generations is partially linked to their desire to stand out, since nearly everyone speaks English or German. At the same time, the other explanation offered is more straightforward—they attend Turkish courses simply because they have an opportunity to do so. Such an attitude reveals the relevance of opening cultural centers in the region and making the Turkish language and cultural activities easily accessible. While the predominant focus of the Yunus Emre Institute is on language, it also implements projects in the fields of art and culture that emphasize the shared heritage and provide insight into the complexities of the local cultural landscape. An example of such initiative is the Reconstruction of Cultural Heritage in the Balkans project, jointly realized by the institute and the Central Bank, and aimed at identifying and restoring the historical manuscripts from the Ottoman era. As part of this endeavor, the institute signed a protocol with the oldest library in the Balkans (Gazi Hüsrev-beg Library) in 2017, which paved the way to restoring the manuscripts and transferring them to digital databases (Anadolu Agency, 2017). In addition, to increase interest among local communities, the institute has also organized exhibitions (for example, the Gobekli Tepe Exhibition and the Turkish Miniature Exhibition), including presentations of traditional Turkish art and handicraft (paper marbling, and sand and glass painting), and courses on Turkish archery. One of the institute’s most popular projects in the Balkans is the film festival, also known as “The Week of Turkish Film,” which

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introduces Turkish cinematography and screens selected movies in dozens of cities across the region. Despite the pronounced criticism aimed at the Yunus Emre Institute’s overwhelming emphasis on Islamic and Ottoman elements of the Turkish culture, its initiatives are nevertheless met with interest and admiration. The opportunity to see and experience something different from the Western culture is appreciated as it sparks exploration and possibly redefinition of the relationship between current identities and historical legacies. Somewhat understandably, some of the institute’s activities have caused controversy, if not actual outrage. For example, the celebration of the Turkish national holiday (April 23, Çocuk Bayramı) is marked with the “Kids’ Festival” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when thousands of schoolchildren who are learning Turkish are photographed waving Turkish flags (Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 93). According to the local media, such events reflect a neo-Ottoman approach, as they celebrate another country’s state holiday in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This kind of pursuit of cultural diplomacy increases tensions and paints a negative picture of Ankara’s aspirations.

2.3 Education as a Cultural Diplomacy Tool International education is traditionally linked with the superiority of Western states and marked by the overwhelming dominance of the English language and curriculum. Similar to the north–south development divide, the flows of international education have often been understood as a one-way street, with the developed countries performing the role of providers and the developing nations that of recipients of international education policies—a process which also included a gradual transfer of Western ideas, norms, and culture. With the rise of new powers, the internationalization of education is recognized as a key aspect. Since the middle of the first decade of the 2000s, China initiated student exchange and scholarship programs, and many other countries (Brazil, India, South Africa, and South Korea) have opened their universities to foreign students. In contrast to 1975 when the number of students studying in a country other than their own amounted to only 800,000, in 2010 this number stood at 4.5 million and in 2020 it reached 7.5 million (YTB, 2021). Language, history, and worldviews are promoted through informal education at home but also through formal education at schools. This is why, next to the family, school is the most significant “agency for cultural reproduction, socialization, and identity formation” (Williams, 1992). Such a view explains the strong link between education and identity as well as the formation of attitudes toward other nations, and scholars have already pointed out the long-term importance of accommodating international students in terms of projecting soft power (Nye, 2008). One of the most quoted examples of successful relationship building is the case of majority leaders who supported the US operation in Iraq being US alumni (Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 215). International student mobility programs and state-sponsored scholarships are

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regarded as influential tools of public diplomacy that increase mutual understanding and solidarity between countries (Bevis & Lucas, 2007: 27). The AKP-led government has also recognized the diplomatic potential of student mobility and education programs, which resulted in the establishment of two institutions: the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) in 2010 and the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF) in 2016. Both of them are actively involved in the internationalization of the country’s education system, which in the case of the Western Balkans has been visible in the growing number of schools and scholarships granted to local students. Turkey is also aware of the need to compete with other powers that have the potential to attract more students due to their quality of education, geographical proximity, and better employment opportunities. This is especially the case in Austria, Germany, and other EU countries. Turkey struggles to meet the same standards, and despite high ambitions, it still lacks the capacity to host large numbers of international students. The number of state universities in Turkey is still limited compared to the number of potential domestic students; to put this into a wider perspective, if counting the Balkan region as a whole, it has almost three times more universities per capita than Turkey (Webometrics Ranking, 2021). The country faces a similar challenge when it comes to student dormitories; it has struggled to provide suitable accommodation despite significant improvements and government investments. Another potential weakness of Turkey’s educational diplomacy concerns the centralization of power and the fact that the YTB’s scholarship program reflects the ruling party’s preferences. This kind of centralization of public diplomacy can make it difficult to implement consistent policies in the long run, since the orientation is likely to shift with each new government. The lack of vision and long-term objectives can easily reduce the role of public diplomacy to being just another ideological tool in the hands of the government (Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 227).

2.4 Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) With the AKP’s proactive approach to consolidate ties with Turkish communities abroad, the government adopted a strategy, including a legal framework, which provides for closer relations with the expats and their political participation in Turkish affairs. In fact, the YTB emerged from the need to offer a coordinated and comprehensive response to the problems of the Turkish diaspora, ranging from economic hardship to institutionalized discrimination. Imagined as a common platform, the YTB is expected to facilitate communication and better cooperation between the government and the affected communities (also to improve their identity consciousness). Along with the focus on Turkish citizens abroad, YTB activities have also covered the so-called sister communities across various regions (the Western Balkans

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being one of them), characterized by a common historical legacy and deep-rooted cultural ties. The Turkey Scholarships (Türkiye Bursları) program is central in the YTB agenda, having become one of the most effective public diplomacy instruments. It has the potential of shaping perceptions and thus inspiring long-term changes in Turkey’s international image. In 2012, when it was launched, the program attracted almost 10,000 applications, and in 2017 the number exceeded 100,000. In 2020, a record number of applications was seen, with 145,000 applications from 167 countries (YTB, 2020). The scholarship program seeks to become a brand that attracts gifted students and is comparable to similar programs, such as Chevening, DAAD, or Fulbright. In contrast to the United Kingdom and the United States, known for a long history of scholarship and student exchange programs, Turkey is a latecomer. The practice of granting government-sponsored scholarships to international students goes back to 1992 when the “Great Student Project” (“Büyük Ö˘grenci Projesi”) was established (Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 49). Under this project, students from sister communities in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia were granted an opportunity to study in Turkey. The program was run by the Ministry of National Education until it was transferred to the YTB in 2012, largely in response to the lack of experience and clear strategy, and thus inadequate responses to challenges posed by the accommodation of a large number of foreign students. The YTB grants comprehensive scholarships, which cover tuition, transportation, student housing, and the cost of general health insurance. Upon arrival, international students attend a one-year Turkish language program organized by various learning centers. They are expected to become fluent and proceed with university education in Turkish. Looking at the Western Balkan region, it has witnessed a growing interest among high school students in pursuing higher education in Turkey. The reasons behind this are multiple, from poor conditions in local universities to Turkey’s increased appeal as an education hub. The 2019 and 2020 reports showed an increase from 12 to 15 percent of scholarship holders coming from the Balkans (YTB, 2020: 32), which is a significant share compared to the size of the population, as well as an indicator of Turkey’s educational diplomacy success. Still, despite this, there is an evident shift in regional preferences which also mirrors the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. The number of students from the Middle East and SubSaharan Africa countries is on the rise; for example, the number of African students tripled in only three years (2010–2013), which happened at the expense of European students that marked a 30 percent drop in the same period (Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 227). Other countries, such as France, Germany, and Russia, target specific regions where they provide scholarships, combining them with country’s security and economic interests. In the case of Turkey, the scholarship and student exchange programs are overstretched across vast geographical areas, which consequently means strained budgets and failure to achieve a meaningful soft power impact. Such an approach, as rightly summarized elsewhere, threatens to “leave Turkey without any significant soft power impact neither on the Balkans nor Africa and other countries” (Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 290).

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In addition to the above, one of the YTB’s main challenges is that many students return to their home countries without completing their studies. This is, to a large extent, due to the poor language preparation that makes it difficult for students to follow the classes and take exams in Turkish; as revealed by some surveys and interviews, “the language of instruction was the biggest challenge to international students … 109 out of the 195 students expressed dissatisfaction with the language of instruction of their respective programs” (Aras & Mohammed, 2019: 433). Another reason behind noncompletion of studies is related to the scholarship allowance, especially when currency devaluation is taken into consideration; and unfortunately, periodical increases of the scholarship amount have not reflected the fall of the Turkish lira (Muhasilovi´c, 2020: 239). In other words, this has made Turkish scholarships less attractive to foreign students, while those already studying in Turkey have experienced strains on their budget and had to return to their home countries. Given the obvious challenges, the question is whether the resources Turkey spends on scholarships are a worthy investment in terms of soft power impact. Maintaining close ties with YTB scholarship graduates once they have returned to their home countries is a fundamental step toward the establishment of political and business connections abroad. For example, in 2017, “Turkey Again: Alumni Meeting” gathered more than 1,000 YTB-sponsored graduates as part of the effort to strengthen their ties with Turkey (YTB, 2018). It was noted that thanks to their experience of studying in Turkey, former scholarship holders were able to contribute to improving the links between Turkey and their own countries by working in, for example, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, the Turkish Maarif Foundation, Turkish Airlines, Anadolu Agency (YTB, 2018). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the alumni formed an association with the goal of sharing information and intensifying cooperation among the present and future graduates. However, the YTB still needs to develop a more efficient alumni network that would result in concrete projects, so that the breadth of student exchange diplomacy can be properly measured.

2.5 Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF) Since the 1980s, Turkey has engaged in the opening and administering of schools abroad. They are embassy-like schools, which suggests that their objective is not to appeal to foreign students but rather to respond to the education requirements of the Turkish diaspora (Akgun & Ozkan, 2020: 61). While the establishment of the YTB was an important step toward strengthening Turkey’s role in the field of international education and increasing its visibility abroad, its performance is mostly limited to bringing foreign students to Turkey and thus it has failed to have a global impact. Accordingly, the establishment of TMF in 2016 as a separate institution marked the beginning of Turkey’s more systematic approach to international education. Its main purpose, as stipulated in the founding documents, is to establish international schools and provide formal education on all levels (kindergarten to university), and act as

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Turkey’s gateway to the international educational arena. At the same time, TMF’s educational activities were placed in the wider framework of cultural diplomacy, aimed at promoting a positive image of Turkey abroad and enhancing a broad range of interactions. While seeking to distance itself from the narrative of spreading neo-colonial ambitions through education, the TMF placed special attention on absorbing national values and adjusting the education approach to the local setting. Its logo resembles the traditional Anatolian carpet, consisting of various shapes and colors that symbolize the richness of cultural heritage and inclusiveness. However, some scholars view the TMF as the result of the urgency to project Turkey’s soft power in the field of education (Akgun & Ozkan, 2020: 60). The rise of the non-Western world in the field of international education has created fresh opportunities for Turkey and the AKP has been eager to take advantage of new developments. Following the failed coup attempt in July 2016, the Turkish government assigned the TMF to take over the administration of hundreds of overseas schools linked to the Gülenist movement (FETÖ) (Akgun & Ozkan, 2020: 60). As of January 2021, TMF runs 377 schools at different levels, 42 dormitories, and one university, in a total of 47 countries; there are currently 23 Maarif schools in the Western Balkans (seven in Kosovo, six in Albania, four in Bosnia and Herzegovina, four in North Macedonia, and two in Serbia) (Istanbul Education Summit Booklet, 2021: 21). The local attitudes toward Turkish schools and universities have been mixed and dominated by nationalist rhetoric warning against the spread of ideas often labeled as cultural aggression. For example, the establishment of the University of New York Tirana under the Turkish Maarif Foundation was met with suspicion and regarded not as an “educational intervention, but a political one” (Mejdini, 2019). Such an attitude somehow reflects a wavering trust in Turkish schools due to political and security controversies surrounding the Gülenist schools. There is a strong reluctance to becoming indirectly involved in Turkey’s domestic issues. This is why one of the TMF’s most important tasks in the Balkans has been the promotion of high-quality education that goes beyond politics, capable of attracting talented students and filling the gap in the absence of resources and innovation.

2.6 Media and Cultural Diplomacy: TRT World and TV Series International broadcasting has long been associated with the advancing of foreign policy interests and cultivating public opinion in other countries. In response to the rise of communication technologies, states have adopted media strategies as a foreign policy instrument, with news agencies, television channels, radio stations, films, and series providing a platform through which governments can appeal to international audiences (Price, 2003). Looking back, the earliest example of organized use of media for political purposes was the inauguration of Radio Moscow in 1929 in

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four languages, aspiring to explain the Communist Revolution to a wider audience (Rawnsley, 2016: 43). The importance of international broadcasting in projecting a positive image abroad and gaining support was soon recognized by other states, as well (China, with the Central Broadcasting System in 1928 and then with the Radio China International in 1941, Great Britain, with BBC Empire Service in 1932, the United States, with Voice of America in 1942, and in Germany, with Deutsche Welle in 1953) (Rawnsley, 2016: 43). In the more recent context, Turkey has joined the countries recognizing the importance of the media as a mechanism of cultural diplomacy to shape public opinion abroad. Since 2015, as per the AKP rule, the Istanbul-based TRT World has offered programs in English and reached Europe, Africa, and Asia. During its launch, the Turkish president criticized the Western media’s biased representation of Turkey (Yesil, 2015) and stated that TRT World was going to challenge their one-sided perspective. On the other hand, TRT Turk and TRT Avaz have continued to focus on special content in Turkish, which focuses on the Turkish diaspora and Turkic communities in 27 countries spanning the Balkans to Central Asia and the Middle East. For example, in 2010, TRT Turk started to cover the Balkans through exploration of various links with Turkey (Balkan Atlas, Balkan Stories, TRT Balkan Voice, and Balkans and Migration Documentaries). In the Balkan Atlas program, the region is described as a group of autonomous nations with a great culture that is also “one of us” and therefore “stronger bonds between Turkey and the Balkans and Balkan Turks” had to be promoted (TRT Avaz, 2017). In January 2021, it was announced that TRT would be stepping up its presence in the Balkans and establishing TRT Balkans with headquarters in Skopje and a regional office in Sarajevo, and with programs broadcast in Albanian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, English, Macedonian, Serbian, and Turkish (Buyuk, 2021). The decision to expand is viewed as part of the Turkish government’s strategy to strengthen its influence and increase its visibility in the Balkans. At the same time, the sharp increase in media presence takes place in response to local demands and positive reactions to news and programs that cover not only the political situation, but also the local people, culture, and arts. While news agencies and TV programs are an important part of gaining international support and granting legitimacy to specific government policies, popular culture (music, television, and the movie industry) is as important in terms of a nation’s soft power potential (Çevik, 2014: 80; Kunczik, 1997). Despite not forming the government’s official agenda, the global success and profound impact of Turkish soap operas on the state’s public image abroad have turned them into a key tool of nongovernmental public diplomacy instruments. Since the first decade of the 2000s, Turkey has gradually become the second-largest exporter of TV series, reaching 400 million viewers in 75 countries (European University Institute, 2014; see also Anadolu Agency, 2014). The widespread popularity of Turkish TV series is met with mixed reactions in some Balkan countries that perceived them as another expression of Turkey’s neoOttoman ambitions. Extreme nationalist groups have called the authorities to ban them to defend their countries from Turkish cultural invasion. For example, in 2012

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a law was passed in North Macedonia, which prohibited their broadcasting; as the Macedonian Minister of Information Society and Administration, Ivo Ivanovski, put it, “[t]he Turkish series are wonderful, but we cannot forget 500 years of servitude under the Ottoman Empire” (Gündüz, 2020; Zalewski, 2016). Similarly, the Serbian ultranationalist parties introduced petitions to ban Turkish TV series and praised the decision of the Greek ANT1 channel to stop showing them in response to Turkey’s decision to convert Haghia Sofia into a mosque (Naša Borba, 2020). Indeed, the volume of series broadcast on local TV channels is perceived as Turkey’s somewhat ominous attempt to spread cultural and political influence. At one point, an average TV station in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed 2,235 min of Turkish series a week, amounting to a day and a half every week (Vraˇci´c, 2014: 14). A popular joke in the Balkans says that “when the Ottomans were defeated in the Balkans, they promised they would return in episodes (series)” (Nuro˘glu, 2013b: 8). In academic circles, Turkish TV series are also criticized for distorting historical facts and presenting an idealized version of events and figures that carry a nationalist and neo-Ottoman sentiment (Frank, 2016: 48). The impact of the Turkish TV series goes beyond the ultranationalist and conservative views of the Turkish influence in the Balkans. A survey examining the local attitudes toward Turkey in the 2008–2011 period demonstrated a significant change in positive attitudes (Table 3). The shift in perceptions is linked to Turkey’s intense economic and cultural involvement, but it also coincided with the rise of popularity of the Turkish series. Later, a survey conducted in 2016 showed that those people who followed the Turkish series tended to have a more positive impression of Turkey than those who did not watch them (Bilgin, Demir & Labas, 2016). The success of Turkish TV series is generally explained along the lines of “cultural compatibility” and the notion of “cultural intimacy” that is rooted in common history and tradition. According to the Serbian sociologist Ratko Božovi´c, people enjoy recognizing cultural and linguistic similarities as well as family values (Gündüz, 2020). Apart from this, the stunning scenery of Turkey’s coast and cities awakened curiosity and attracted unprecedented interest in visiting Turkey. In this context, one Table 3 Peoples’ attitudes toward Turkey in the 2008–2011 period (%) Countries

2008

Albania

80

0.5

69.2

0.8

Bosnia and Herzegovina

41

20.08

50.6

8.6

Croatia

23.4

9.1

33.5

3.4

Kosovo

79.3

3.3

92.7

1.9

Montenegro

22.2

9.2

30.4

9.6

North Macedonia

77.9

1.5

70.3

1

Serbia

12.9

22.8

14.4

19

Friendly

2011 Hostile

Source Gallup Balkan Monitor (Ekinci, 2014: 116)

Friendly

Hostile

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of the most observed positive impacts of the series is an influx of Balkan tourists to Turkey. As reported by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the number of tourists from the Western Balkan region alone was 182,233 in 1997, and 550,422 in 2012 (Ekinci, 2014: 116). In addition, a survey of more than 2,000 people from Bulgaria, Croatia, North Macedonia, and Serbia revealed that 80 percent of those watching Turkish series wanted to visit Turkey, demonstrating the existence of an undeniable link between TV series and tourism (Ekinci, 2014: 116).

3 Local Perceptions and Limitations of Turkey’s Soft Power The impact of soft power and cultural diplomacy is notoriously difficult to measure considering the lack of quantitative criteria that could estimate its outcomes. Moreover, soft power does not necessarily guarantee political power; in Nye’s (2006) words, “[if] a foreigner drinks Coca-Cola or wears a Michael Jordan T-shirt [this] does not in itself mean that America has power over him.” In Turkey, when the AKP came to power, its agenda was rooted in reasserting the country’s place globally through the reconstruction of national identity and values. With Turkey’s democratic rule and economic success being the key elements that contributed to the positive image abroad, the assumption was that soft power would materialize in terms of growing influence in regions where military power was not an option. While cultural diplomacy is effective in periods of relative political stability and economic prosperity, its impact is limited in the wake of regional conflict, economic hardship, and the threat of irredentism. Since 2015, the Turkish government has been forced to simultaneously balance its security priorities and pursue cultural diplomacy in regions where it could still be effective. The country’s economic decline and currency crisis have had a profound impact on cultural diplomacy, since they do not only make Turkey less attractive in the eyes of the foreign audiences, but also limit the resources it can invest for soft power purposes. Turkey’s soft power in the Western Balkans is also affected by the security challenges and escalation of hostilities in the region. The political crisis in Montenegro, the ongoing tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, and the threat of secession of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina push the Ankara authorities to adopt a more hands-on strategy, especially because of its NATO status. In times when the local actors expect Turkey to undertake direct and concrete steps toward stabilization of the Balkans, focusing on cultural diplomacy is likely to increase frustration and negative attitudes. As one of the interviewed local administration representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina commented, “Turkey keeps boasting about its love for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and organizing Turkish tea and baklava parties, but this is not what we need. If it wants to demonstrate commitment, it needs to increase investments and show a firm hand when our sovereignty is under attack” (interview, August 10, 2021; author’s own translation). This attitude reflects the limitations of cultural diplomacy and underlines the importance of implementing a balanced and coordinated foreign policy. With this in mind, cultural diplomacy should be viewed

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as an integral part of a multidimensional approach that includes strong security as well as deep economic and geopolitical ties. As emphasized by a local policymaker, “the cultural diplomacy is sort of a cherry on the top, thus it comes after intense cooperation has been properly established in other areas. You cannot build relations solely on cultural proximity” (interview, August 12, 2021; author’s own translation). The pattern that can be observed in all Turkish public diplomacy institutions reflects an ambition to become a reputable power in the Balkans. However, they lack a clear strategy (Muhasilovi´c, 2020). To some extent this is due to the lack of experience given that most public diplomacy bodies have been instituted under the AKP leadership. On the other hand, cultural diplomacy is often caught in between domestic issues, and turned into a matter of daily politics and ideological differences between the ruling party and the opposition. The regional preferences and development projects in distant regions are also hotly debated, especially in times of economic crisis and the devaluation of the Turkish lira. In addition, the changing dynamics of Turkish domestic politics have had a profound effect on Turkey’s standing abroad, since the perceptions of Erdo˘gan’s increasing grip on power have undermined the reputation of his state as a model that successfully combines Islam, secularism, and democratic values. It would, however, be misleading to link these developments to home issues alone and neglect the wider regional context. The lack of understanding of Turkey’s security concerns and the limited cooperation in this regard on the side of Western partners has undoubtedly contributed to the narrative of rising authoritarianism and vilification of Erdo˘gan. In return, Turkey’s soft power discourse has started to lose its momentum, and Turkey’s cultural diplomacy has consequently struggled to achieve a meaningful impact amid security and internal challenges.

4 Conclusion The general understanding of Turkey’s role in the Western Balkans—initially dominated by the questions evolving around history, identity, and religion—has turned into a complex love–hate relationship. Under the AKP leadership, Ankara adopted a soft power approach based on the shared historical legacy of the Ottoman era, and to pursue its cultural diplomacy, the ruling elite established a network of institutes in charge of the provision of education, and organizations in charge of restoration projects and allocation of development aid. The diversification of actors and strategies demonstrated Turkey’s new aims and claims in foreign policy (Davuto˘glu, 2008), which corresponded with the AKP’s multifaceted approach to foreign policy, also reflecting structural changes in the conceptualization of power and national interests. Instead of developing a country-specific strategy, Turkey adopted a communitybased strategy with a strong emphasis on local Muslim communities (in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and the Sandžak region of

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Serbia). The cooperation with these communities has served as a catalyst in the projection of Turkey’s soft power in the region. The complexity of the local context and the intense international involvement in the region pushed Turkey to adopt a multidimensional approach that emphasizes Turkey’s benign role as a power that respects each country’s sovereignty and aims at facilitating the transition process and economic recovery. Turkey’s strategies in the Balkans, therefore, had two main aims—to show the capability to assist the local actors in navigating the post-war reconstruction and to transform the negative image of a former occupying power. Despite the accusations of neo-colonial ambitions and religiously motivated agendas, Turkey’s strategy is based on the pragmatic instrumentalization of power. It seeks to utilize potential comparative advantages in terms of shared historical legacy and culture, and at the same time to avoid the perception of an intruding power. The wide network of Turkish cultural diplomacy actors and their activities in the Balkans have caused anxiety and suspicion over Turkey’s intentions and ambitions in the region. Davuto˘glu’s vision and romanticized narratives of the Ottoman glory were met with reservation, if not major skepticism. Still, such narratives became the sources of Turkey’s new identity under the AKP leadership, and this is why the strategy toward the Western Balkans was not revised even after Davuto˘glu’s resignation. His withdrawal from power demonstrated the need to replace the individual-centric approach with a consistent and comprehensive strategy that would decrease the vulnerability of the Turkish soft power to changes in domestic and international politics. Turkey’s cultural diplomacy activities have a profound effect on Turkey’s position in the Balkans as they are self-enforcing and form a “virtuous circle” (Jabbour, 2015). For example, a student attending the Yunus Emre Institute’s language courses will be attracted to watch Turkish TV programs, apply for a scholarship in Turkey, or choose Istanbul as a travel destination. This grants a continuing interest and enables a rediscovery of cultural ties, transmission of values, and consolidation of emotional bonds. However, Turkey’s potential is burdened by the lack of consistent long-term strategy, geographic overstretch, and limited resources. With the changes in Turkey’s Euro-Atlantic relations as well as the growing engagement in distant locations such as Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Western Balkan region is not on the priority list in terms of public diplomacy and resources invested in the region. In other words, the activities of public diplomacy institutions mirror the changes in the government’s foreign policy orientation. In the long run, Turkey’s position in the region will depend on several factors. Domestic politics and the state of economics will surely determine the level of involvement. In addition, foreign policy objectives and priorities might shift toward other regions, especially those that are crucial in terms of security and natural resources. Finally, the success of Turkish cultural diplomacy in the Balkans will also depend on the engagement of other actors seeking to maximize their power in the region.

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Case Studies

Development of Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Western Balkans With Focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina Ešref Kenan Rašidagi´c and Zora Hesová

Long before President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan held a mass electoral rally in Sarajevo in 2018, Turkey’s relations in the Western Balkans, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, had been noted as a sign of Europe’s weakening influence in the region. Along with Russia and China, Turkey is widely seen as having filled the vacuum left by the EU (Bassuener, 2019; Chrzová et al., 2019). Unlike these other aspiring power centers, however, Turkey’s renewed presence builds on the historic role of the Ottoman Empire in the region and Turkish links to Balkan Muslims. Toward the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the assertive foreign policy of Turkey began to be seen as a return to more imperial goals in the form of neoOttomanism (Öktem, 2012; Rucker-Chang, 2014). To that end, Erdo˘gan exploits the historical allure of Pax Ottomanica for Balkan Muslims, to reestablish a sphere of influence in the region based on a “special relationship” rooted in culture, religion, and soft power persuasion. This special relationship is frequently evoked by Turkish leaders, such as when prime minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu praised the Ottoman-era Western Balkans as a region not on the periphery, but at the center of the world’s stage and vowed to work toward restoring this geopolitical centrality, stability, and prosperity. Yet, nine years later, any promises that Turkey could deliver peace and prosperity to the region were brought into question by Erdo˘gan’s 2018 rally in Sarajevo. Held mainly for the Turkish diaspora and a domestic audience, the divisive

Previously published in Croatian International Relations Review, XXVI(86), 2020, 96–129. E. K. Rašidagi´c (B) Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina e-mail: [email protected] Z. Hesová Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_9

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effects of the rally raised concerns about the nature of neo-Ottomanism. Is it a stabilizing neighborhood policy, a bid for regional influence, or a public relations front for a continued policy of aggressive pragmatism? While the Ottoman legacy has become part and parcel of Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years, the cultural basis for neo-Ottomanism in the Western Balkans should not be presumed. Contrary to the rhetoric of its neo-Ottoman narrative, Turkey was in fact absent from the region for most of the twentieth century, only assuming a more active role during the turbulent 1990s, before again strengthening relations with Western Balkan states from around 2005. Both of these periods of heightened engagement were linked to Islamist influences, but they also represented pragmatic opportunities for Turkey to play a key role in international affairs. Indeed, Turkey developed a sort of activist diplomacy under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Ahmet Davuto˘glu, the foreign minister and later prime minister, who sought to become a regional powerbroker and lay the ground for cultural, religious, and economic ties with the Western Balkans. After he left office in 2016, Turkish foreign policy took another turn back toward pragmatism and opportunism in the wake of a failed coup. This chapter examines the strategies and results of Turkish neo-Ottomanism. After presenting an analysis of the main phases of Turkish foreign policy toward the Western Balkans, the tools and limits of Turkish soft power in the region will be discussed. Finally, this analysis will consider recent changes in Turkey’s approach to foreign policy in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt.

1 The Four Phases of Modern Turkish Involvement in the Western Balkans and in Bosnia and Herzegovina The relations of Turkey with the countries of the former Yugoslavia can be divided it into four distinct periods, beginning after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It was only then that Turkey reengaged in the region, somewhat tentatively, having kept its distance for the first seventy years of the modern republic. The second phase of these relations was marked by Turkey’s active support for Western policies amid the wars of the 1990s, within the Euro-Atlantic framework. After a short period of passivity, Turkey again asserted itself in the Western Balkans in a third phase of engagement that followed the 2002 ascent of the AKP, and was especially active from 2009 to 2015 when Davuto˘glu worked to reorient Turkish foreign policy. The fourth phase has aligned with the reassertion of president Erdo˘gan’s leadership since the July 15, 2016 failed coup, and his highly pragmatic, some would say opportunistic, style of politics.

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1.1 1922–1992: Distance as Policy Even before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman court in Constantinople had largely abandoned Balkan Muslims following the Berlin Congress. Then, upon the founding of the modern Turkish Republic in 1922, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk actively sought to distance the Republic from its Ottoman past—politically, culturally, and religiously—including by fully disengaging from former Ottoman possessions. For seventy years, from 1922 to 1992, Ankara was fundamentally disinterested in the Balkans and nurtured no ties with Muslim communities in the region. Historical ties to Balkan states were also denied within the Republic. Turkey hosted hundreds of thousands of Balkan Muslims that fled during the Ottoman retreat or in its aftermath, yet only a small minority retained their Bosniak, Albanian, or Pomak identities. Unlike the Ottoman Empire beforehand, the objective of the Republic was to fully assimilate this Balkan Muslims into the Turkish national corpus. While earlier refugees had settled in more or less compact settlements in Western Anatolia, exiles from the Kingdom, and later Republic, of Yugoslavia were scattered throughout Turkey (Mujadževi´c, 2017: 54). Since these Muslim emigrants from the Balkans often relocated en masse, from extended families to entire villages, they maintained few ties with the region. Combined with the policy of Turkification they encountered inside Turkey, which was implemented in earnest in the early years of the Republic, their former cultural and linguistic identities were essentially erased. Thus, of an estimated 350,000–4,000,000 Turks of Bosniak origin, very few speak the Bosnian language (Mujadževi´c, 2017: 53). The secularist policies of the Turkish Republic also left Balkan Muslims seeking religious instruction in other parts of the Muslim world. Atatürk’s opposition to religious education and the diminishing public role of religion in the country, which culminated in the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, motivated Bosnian and Albanian Muslims to pursue their religious educations in Cairo, Damascus, or Sarajevo and after the Second World War, in Libya, Saudi Arabia, or Iraq. The number of religious students in Istanbul, Ankara, or Konya was minimal until the rise to power of the AKP, when Balkan Muslims finally began returning to Turkish religious institutions. After the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy was focused on maintaining a firm alliance with the United States, and the agenda was dominated by Cold War concerns. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the installation of the new world order, however, Ankara began reasserting itself as an increasingly prominent player on the world stage. Yet, in the early 1990s, under President Turgut Özal, Turkey sought to gain influence not in the Balkans, but in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Özal foresaw opportunities in this Turkic region, with which Turkey shared a certain measure of linguistic, cultural, historical, and religious identity (Larrabee, 2003: 99–126). The first Turkish strategic endeavor in Central Asia that was truly independent of the United States was nevertheless countered by pro-Russian resistance and eventually ended in failure; Turkey only managed to exert a strong influence in Azerbaijan, its closest neighbor, both territorially and linguistically.

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1.2 The 1990s: The Era of Atlanticism Turkey finally became involved in the wider Balkan region when war broke out in the early 1990s, showing a particular interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The plight of Bosnian and later Kosovo Muslims attracted the attention of Turks and inspired their solidarity, especially among those who traced their roots to Balkan states. Islamist parties also used the circumstances to raise their political profiles and gain legitimacy. On top of this, the role of the United States in propping up the central Bosnian government late in the war called for the inclusion of allies considered friendly to the Bosniaks. Turkey responded positively and became an active participant in the international community’s policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo in the 1990s. However, this was also a time of considerable internal political upheaval in Turkey, which limited the ability of its government to successfully formulate foreign policy vis-à-vis the crisis in the Western Balkans. This constrained Turkish action to diplomatic activities undertaken within the Euro-Atlantic multilateral framework, under US leadership. At the beginning of the Bosnian war, in April 1992, the Turkish Grand National Assembly sent a fact-finding commission, which called for the provision of humanitarian aid to Bosnian citizens (Busra, 2013). In 1993, Turkish prime minister Tansu Çiller implored the international community to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, and in February 1994, she paid a visit to the besieged Sarajevo along with the then prime minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto (Busra, 2013). The Turkish government then engaged in two rounds of forceful diplomacy to assist the government in Sarajevo. Working in concert with the Americans, Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Çetin visited Bosnia twice to help convince the Bosnian leadership to join diplomatic efforts meant to reconcile the conflict between the Bosniaks and the Croats, thereby contributing to the signing of the Washington Agreement in 1994. Turkey was also involved in supplying arms to Bosnia (Vraˇci´c, 2016: 8), though it did not lead these efforts. Turkish leaders worked with other Muslim actors in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to respond to the failure of the West to protect Bosniaks from ethnic cleansing as well, producing a number of resolutions in support of the Bosnian government. This included the 1995 Conakry resolution, which reaffirmed that OIC states were not obliged to respect the “illegal and unjust” arms embargo imposed on Bosnia (Karˇci´c, 2013: 334). Despite these activities, Turkey was criticized, even within its own borders, for doing too little to assist the Bosnian government during the war. Many felt the Turkish government had especially failed Bosniak refugees, hundreds of thousands of whom were welcomed and cared for by countries in Western Europe, while only some 20,000 were officially accepted by Turkey (Mujadževi´c, 2017: 56). Moreover, Turkish leaders chose not to provide these refugees with refugee status, insisting they were guests (musafir) and absolving the government of any financial and legal responsibility that would otherwise arise from international legal obligations (Busra, 2013). In this way, Turkey’s participation in diplomatic, humanitarian, and stabilization efforts in both Bosnia and Kosovo was of an auxiliary diplomatic and military nature, and fully within

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the framework of Atlanticism. While Turkey failed to develop a greater independent initiative, this engagement did allow it to assume a role in Western alliances and in long-term stabilization programs in the Balkans. The Turkish Army has been engaged in small numbers across the Balkans since then, and Turkey has become part of the Peace Implementation Council, the Southeast European Cooperation Process, the SFOR, and other EU- and UN-led structures. Still, following the end of the war in Bosnia and the intervention in Kosovo, Turkey largely disengaged again from the region, apart from the aid it supplied to Macedonia within multilateral military structures in the first decade of the 2000s (Vraˇci´c, 2016: 18).

1.3 2003–2016: Foreign Policy Activism Under the AKP Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans took on a new assertiveness under the AKP government, which increasingly legitimized its interest in regional countries on the basis of both cultural and historical ties. As president Erdo˘gan’s spokesman ˙Ibrahim Kalın put it, “No Turk considers Sarajevo, Mostar, Priština, Skopje, or Novi Pazar distant places. Balkan Muslims feel the same about Istanbul, Bursa, Konya and cities in Anatolia” (Kalın, 2018). This shift in Turkey’s foreign policy was facilitated by two key changes within the AKP. First, emboldened by successive electoral successes in 2007 and 2008, the AKP felt free to advocate a more conservative political platform that openly employed religious language and imagery. At the AKP Congress in 2012, Erdo˘gan further emphasized common Islamic identity as a basis for foreign policy (Mujadževi´c, 2017: 75). Second, between 2009 and 2015, Turkish foreign policy was led by the visionary Ahmed Davuto˘glu. In his manifesto, Strategic Depth, written when he was still an academic, Davuto˘glu articulated a foreign policy that reflected the ideological stance of leaders in the Özal era, who embraced a Turkish Islamic synthesis. This perspective was gradually adopted by Turkish elites, who no longer viewed Islam as a challenge to a secular republic but as an element of Turkish national identity. Davuto˘glu saw both Islamic identity and Ottoman history as resources for a more assertive Turkey, which sought to build its role as a regional power. The Balkans in general, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, represented areas of particular interest for Davuto˘glu; but it was solidarity with Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s, when Erdo˘gan was mayor of Istanbul, that gave Turkish Islamists an opportunity to advance this objective. Islamists seeking to claim a special role in international relations used this solidarity to inspire mass mobilizations, and since this time, Bosnia has remained (along with Gaza, Kashmir, and others) a focus of AKP foreign policy initiatives (Mujadževi´c, 2017: 59–60, 152). Between 2009 and 2015, under Davuto˘glu—first in his capacity as a chief foreign policy adviser to prime minister Erdo˘gan and then as the minister of foreign affairs—Turkey became an increasingly active player in a widening sphere that extended from the Central Asian “Stans” in the east to North Africa in the west, to the Western Balkans in the north. While this area roughly follows the outlines of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish officials reject this comparison. Indeed,

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during the first years of this phase of Turkish foreign policy, the AKP pursued activities in the Balkans that were less focused on re-creating past relations on the basis of a neo-Ottomanist approach to Muslim societies (in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania), instead putting their efforts into engaging across the region to secure Turkey’s position as a center of influence. The foreign policy of the AKP has maintained this focus on achieving influence through regional stabilization efforts, economic and strategic investment, and cultural diplomacy. In fact, Davuto˘glu referred to “Turkey’s primary interests in the Balkans” as including activities to help to “normalize bilateral relations among the Balkan states, to deepen regional integration” (Raxhimi, 2011). Beginning in 2009, Turkey thus engaged in “hyperactive diplomacy” (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 20) regarding political relations between Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia, with the explicit aim of breaking the political deadlock that existed between Bosnia and Serbia. After the failure of US-led efforts toward post-Dayton constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey stepped in to fill the void, successfully initiating two trilateral consultation mechanisms—one with Bosnia and Serbia, and one with Bosnia and Croatia. To that end, Turkish political figures, including President Abdullah Gül, prime minister Erdo˘gan, and foreign minister Davuto˘glu, paid several visits to the Western Balkans between 2009 and 2013. Davuto˘glu especially engaged in shuttle diplomacy, eventually fulfilling three highly visible and symbolic objectives: (1) bringing Bosnian and Serbian representatives to the same table, (2) obtaining a Serbian condemnation of the massacres that took place in Srebrenica (albeit without using the term genocide) and an official recognition of Bosnia’s territorial integrity, and (3) unblocking the appointment of Bosnian Ambassador to Serbia Boriša Arnaut. The second of these was achieved through the Istanbul Declaration on Peace and Stability, signed in 2010 by Turkey, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which recognizes and guarantees Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Still, Erdo˘gan’s diplomatic activity has been most successful where least expected—in Serbia, a country long considered to have a highly negative view of Turkey—because the prime minister and then president of Turkey has strategically pursued personal relationships with every Serbian president since 2010. Notably, he met that year with president Tadi´c in Srebrenica, on the anniversary of the July 1995 genocide. Erdo˘gan has maintained cordial relations through each subsequent change of government in Serbia, including with prime minister Ivica Daˇci´c and president Tomislav Nikoli´c. In 2013, when Nikoli´c met with president Gül, the Turkish president forecasted an “economic boom” in Serbia and proclaimed the country a “close neighbor” to Turkey (Poslovni dnevnik, 2013). Relations between Turkey and Serbia have now reached a new peak in the ongoing and very close relationship shared between presidents Erdo˘gan and Aleksandar Vuˇci´c. Nevertheless, continued Turkish efforts toward multilateralism in the Balkans have had only limited results. For instance, when Erdo˘gan hosted Vuˇci´c and Bosnian president Bakir Izetbegovi´c in January 2018, he was unable to heal any of the fractures that remain in Bosnian–Serbian relations as a consequence of the past.

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Turkey did succeed in positioning itself as a broker in the conflict within Montenegro’s Islamic Community. But after this initial success, Turkish ambition to be a broker of stability faltered as further initiatives floundered. Most notably, attempts to negotiate an agreement between rival factions within the Islamic Community of Serbia failed and led to its eventual split. The limits of this arbitration were related to perceptions that Turkey’s approach was less than impartial (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2019). The Turkish plan was seen as favoring the faction of Adem Zilki´c and Sulejman Ugljanin over that headed by Novi Pazar strongman Muamer Zukorli´c.

1.4 2016–Present: Erdogan’s Post-Coup Assertion of Authority Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans changed course considerably in 2016, due to both the departure of prime minister Davuto˘glu and to the political earthquake that followed the attempted military coup in July. The period since then has represented a radical departure from a largely predictable Turkish foreign policy approach toward the region in all previous phases. This new posture is characterized by erratic decisionmaking and the authoritarian streak of president Erdo˘gan, discussed in more detail in Sect. 4.

2 Turkish Soft Power in the Western Balkans By 2010, Turkey had reinvented its political approach to the Western Balkans. By leaning into cooperation and culture, Ankara had increased its presence in the region over 20 years, providing Turkey with significant visibility (Huski´c, 2020). This was facilitated by soft power activities (Benhaïm & Öktem, 2015) and by an activist diplomacy increasingly accompanied by cooperative efforts in which Turkey appeared to emulate the European Neighbourhood Policy (Demirta¸s, 2015)—from visa-free relations to cultural diplomacy to religious sponsorship. In this way, Turkey sought to expand its influence, especially among Balkan Muslims, through soft power concentrated in four main areas: religious institutions, Islamic history, education, and media and popular culture.

2.1 Religion and Religious History Following the political transformation that took place under AKP leadership, a main avenue for Turkey’s soft power has been its Ottoman Islamic heritage. The relatively pious AKP not only replaced the once-dominant secular elites who previously helmed

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the state, but also slowly reshaped the role and form of religious institutions within Turkey. As prime minister, Erdo˘gan was able to impose a new politics, despite the secular military elite, through a series of symbolic changes that included lifting the ban on headscarves in universities (in 2008), allowing religious high school students to be admitted to universities (in 2009), and generally increases the use of religious language in political discourse. He also strengthened the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet ˙I¸sleri Ba¸skanlı˘gı, or Diyanet) and gave it a role in foreign policy, in the Balkans and beyond. Even before these changes to Turkey’s foreign policy, Turkish nongovernmental religious groups had established a visible presence in the Western Balkans. After the wars in the 1990s, several Turkish neo-Sufi and Islamic revivalist movements found a home in the region, through Süleymancılar student houses, the Menzil community, and Gülen-run private schools (Huski´c, 2020; Mujadževi´c, 2017; Solberg, 2007). In the first decade of the 2000s, the Gülen movement (which members refer to as Hizmet, or service) was especially active in building an extensive institutional network across Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia. These groups, which adhered to a Turkish style of Islam, were seen as only marginally motivated by religion; and unlike Saudilinked organizations, known for proselytizing, Turkish groups primarily focused on providing quality educational and humanitarian services to local communities. Granted, these services were colored by a moralist, quietist, neo-Sufi form of Islam; but Turkish groups presented their Islamic tradition as broadly identical to local practice. Turkish activities in the religious arena, and specifically tied to religious heritage, became more visible with the advent of the AKP’s assertive foreign policy, which stressed the historical inevitability of Balkan–Turkish relations by emphasizing a shared Ottoman past. The AKP saw the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA) as a primary means to strengthen cultural relations, investing more than half its funds into the rebuilding or rehabilitation of a number of significant Ottoman Islamic heritage monuments that were damaged or destroyed in the Bosnian war, from mosques in Banja Luka and Foˇca, to Ottoman-era madrasas, to the old Mostar bridge (Huski´c, 2020). Turkey also gained leverage over some Islamic institutions through its financial support of efforts to modernize religious infrastructure. This included the building of new mosques, Islamic centers, and student dormitories, as well as support for the cultural and religious activities of official Islamic Communities (IC) in the region. Still, some of the initiatives financed by Turkish donors were completed independent of, or despite the intent or planning of these ICs. For example, the Turkish municipality of Bursa funded the construction of a mosque in central Sarajevo that was situated next to the tomb of a popular, recently passed Sufi authority, without first seeking the approval of the IC. Turkish foreign influence in the Western Balkans also developed in several more explicitly religious ways under the AKP. Early in its administration, the AKP government reopened Turkish Islamic higher education institutions to students from both the Balkans and Central Asia, and began offering stipends for religious study. Like all Islamic policy in Turkey, this program was administered by the Diyanet. In the

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Balkans, the main activity of the Diyanet was selecting students for Turkish scholarships (Solberg, 2007), and it was thus considered to have “only limited impact” when it came to exerting Turkish influence in comparison to private Turkish Islamic organizations (Sarajli´c, 2011: 185). But this changed after 2009, when the AKP began to see the Diyanet as a key and influential conduit of state religious policy within Turkey, on top of its efforts abroad. To this end, the Diyanet was developed into a center of religious power and was made directly responsible to the prime minister (Öktem, 2010: 31). This new role of the Diyanet was most apparent in Bosnia, but also in Kosovo and Albania, and it was met with some local resistance. As Öktem notes, the limits of the AKP’s policy were first apparent in Bosnia—the Balkan country with the most institutionalized Islamic administration—where, precisely because the Diyanet was a powerful state institution, it was not seen by Bosnians as a source of religious or spiritual authority (Öktem, 2010). Unlike the administration of the former Ottoman Caliphate, the Diyanet is a sizable ministerial agency of government, whereas the Bosnian reis (the highest elected religious leader among Bosnian Muslims) is independent of the state, instead representing a religious community. Hence, the practical influence of the Diyanet in the Western Balkans grew rather slowly. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, longtime Bosnian reis Mustafa Ceri´c (1993–2012) was an ambitious religious and political figure who had sought to balance foreign support from abroad between the Gulf states, Turkey, Europe, and even Libya. While he was close to Diyanet leadership, he fell out with Turkey over its policy toward Serbian Muslims (Mujadževi´c, 2017: 113). It was not until after the September 2012 election of Husein Kavazovi´c as the new Bosnian reis that relations between the IC and Turkey improved, and successive heads of the Diyanet have become frequent visitors to Bosnia. Moreover, a permanent representative of the Diyanet is now stationed at the Turkish Embassy in Sarajevo. Upon entering office, reis Kavazovi´c was able to build upon his existing relationships with the Diyanet, thanks to the fact that Diyanet leaders have long maintained ties with lower-ranking Bosnian Islamic officials. For example, Kavazovi´c already knew the current president of the Diyanet, Dr. Ali Erba¸s, from a previous visit Erba¸s made to Sarajevo. In a significant gesture, Kavazovi´c invited Dr. Erba¸s to deliver a Friday khutbah (sermon) at Sarajevo’s main mosque, in Turkish, during a March 2018 visit by the Turkish prime minister. Since the mid-2010s, the Diyanet has also been visible at other religious events in Bosnia, including official iftars, outdoor prayers, and historical commemorations (Faktor, 2016). Representatives appear at the openings of Turkish investments in Bosnia as well. This presence has influenced and altered some existing local customs and rituals. Turkish organizations stage highly public ceremonies for the circumcision of young boys, for instance, and play Ottoman military marches at traditional outdoor prayer events, such as the annual “Days of Ajvatovica”—both of which were hitherto unknown among Bosnian Muslims. Across the Balkans, Islamic Communities actively sought and found a certain degree of patronage abroad when they needed resources in the 1990s to rebuild community infrastructure after the communist era, to establish schools and universities, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to repair the destruction of war. However, its

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turn toward Turkey followed what Öktem has called a “Wahhabi intermezzo.” The country’s first post-war partners were Gulf states, whose presence was criticized as a channel for Salafi/Wahhabi proselytism. At the time, Turkey was catering instead to small Turkish minorities in Macedonia and Kosovo. It was only under the AKP that Turkish authorities sought and offered collaboration with national Islamic Communities. Turkey has since become the main partner of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, unlike in Bulgaria for example, the Diyanet has no direct (or indirect) financial or administrative control over Bosnian Islamic institutions, though its informal influence is certainly growing. Turkey must contend with a highly organized Islamic institutional structure in Bosnia, where religious leaders maintain a decades-long tradition of managing their own religious and external policies and relations. Turkey has also attempted to partner with Islamic institutions in Kosovo and Albania, with arguably even less success than in Bosnia. Turkey has reconstructed Ottoman-era mosques and has proposed the construction of new mosques in both Prishtina and Tirana, even building the largest mosque in the Balkans in Tirana, in the ostentatious Ottoman style. Yet, after president Erdo˘gan personally opened it in 2015, the project was met with strong local criticism (Colborne & Edwards, 2018; The Economist, 2016).

2.2 Education and the Media The rise of the Diyanet in both Turkey and the Balkans was accompanied by a move toward the convergence of state and non-state Turkish Islamic networks (Solberg, 2007). Even before the foreign policy turn of the AKP, private Islamic organizations such as those mentioned above—the Quran study groups of the Süleymancis, the humanitarian Menzil movement, and educational institutions of the Hizmet movement—were laying the groundwork for a Turkish cultural and religious infrastructure in the Balkans. These neo-Sufi and Islamic groups all established religious circles and offered an array of services, but the Hizmet was by far the most active. Beginning in 1997, it founded a system of primary and secondary schools, and universities in the Balkans, as it had in Turkey and other parts of the world (Knezevic, 2016). High schools established by Hizmet were regarded as especially high-quality institutions to which local elites were happy to send their children, including the Bosna Sema school in Sarajevo and the Yahya Kemal school in Macedonia. Universities launched by Hizmet in the Balkans drew paying students from the religious strata in Turkey, especially while the headscarf ban in Turkish universities was in force, along with local elite and scholarship students. These universities, such as Burch in Sarajevo and Epoka or Bedër in Tirana, were more modern than state schools and more oriented toward academic output, especially in the humanities. But aside from its educational offerings, the Hizmet movement also represented Turkey, Turkish culture, and Turkish Islam abroad, and it funded the translation and publication of texts by Said Nursî and Fethullah Gülen that argued for a modern, moderate Islam, open to dialogue and social responsibility. Parallel to these activities,

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the movement also published weekly magazines in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Novo Vrijeme) and Macedonia (Zaman Macedonia), and held regular events with local elites to share the Hizmet message. In the first decade of the 2000s, support for these private Turkish educational initiatives and the promotion of Turkish Islam flowed from the Turkish administration. In fact, president Gül opened the International Burch University in Sarajevo in 2010, when private religious actors were still seen as crucial to Turkish soft power abroad. However, by the end of the first decade of the 2000s, AKP leadership began taking more direct control of initiatives shaping foreign cultural relations. In 2007, for instance, the Yunus Emre Institute (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, or YEE)—the Turkish equivalent of the German Goethe-Institut—was founded to offer language courses and host cultural events outside Turkey. By 2015, some two dozen YEE locations had opened across the Western Balkans, with multiple locations in several countries in the region (Anadolu Agency, 2018). In addition to offering Turkish language courses, YEE facilitates educational initiatives such as the Mevlana Exchange Program, which provides scholarships for exchange students to Turkish universities. Alongside these state efforts, the AKP engaged businesses close to the party in private educational entrepreneurship, resulting in the establishment of the International University of Sarajevo in 2004 and the International Balkan University in Skopje in 2006. As this form of AKP-led private activism intensified, Bosnia became even more of a focal point. Turkish investors founded several influential media outlets in the country, under the auspices of Simurg Media, the most prominent of which are Stav magazine and the web portal faktor.ba (which was originally a daily newspaper before it was closed down due to low circulation). These ventures have strengthened the Turkish media presence in Bosnia, previously filled almost solely by the Turkish news agency Anadolu—which began operating in Bosnia in 2012, and broadcasts in local languages. Many local news outlets distribute free content from Anadolu and TRT (Turkish Radio and Television), adding to the space Turkish news agencies account for in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 2015, when Faktor and Stav were launched, Turkish media has engaged directly in Bosnian politics. While these outlets also report on Turkish internal and external policy issues (in a way that is highly propagandized), their main focus is on promoting the agenda and activities of the leading Bosniak political party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which receives reliably favorable coverage (Huski´c, 2020; Janusz, 2015). Elsewhere in the Balkans, Turkey has managed to make inroads partly by achieving greater viewership for its domestic soap operas, which constitute a substantial amount of the programming on some channels, including in Serbia and North Macedonia (Cabric et al., 2013). In both of these countries Turkish soap operas are immensely popular, and have successfully projected an image of Turkey as modern and industrious (Huski´c, 2020). Together with Turkey’s visa-free regime and the frequent direct flights offered by Turkish Airlines to and from the region, these cultural diplomacy initiatives have contributed to bringing Balkan societies closer to Turkey. Through these various soft power projects, Turkey has positioned itself as an influential and desirable neighbor to the Balkans. Turkey’s “mosque diplomacy” (Tol, 2019) and patronage of Islamic institutions has been aided by intermediaries

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such as the Islamic Community; by offering quality private education at all levels, local language media, news wires, and popular culture, Turkey has become a major player in the region, as well as a major partner to many Balkan Muslims, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This cultural penetration began well before the rise of the AKP through private initiatives, but it certainly intensified in the mid-2010s when AKP-oriented companies and state institutions took the foreign policy reins from previous non-state actors.

3 Limits to the Thesis of “Neo-Ottomanism” The foreign policy of the AKP in the Balkans has met a mixed reception. For some local media and analysts, the term “neo-Ottomanism” has become a critical descriptor for a Turkish foreign policy perceived as high-handed, insincere, and Muslim-biased. Yet some Muslims in Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, North Macedonia, and the Sandžak region see Turkey as both a partner and a “protector” (Vraˇci´c, 2016: 6).

3.1 Distrust of Neo-Ottomanism The return of Turkey in its “neo-Ottoman” form has been widely discussed by diverse voices. In the West, it has not necessarily been described in negative terms. In the Washington Post, for example, Michael Birnbaum (2013) called modern Turkey a “gentle version of the [Ottoman] empire”. Yet in the Balkans, after Turkey’s early years of diplomatic activism, strong local criticism grew toward what some viewed as a covert neo-Ottomanist or even Islamist agenda in Turkish activities. In this context, careless rhetoric by the highest Turkish officials raised suspicions about the AKP’s bias and undermined some diplomatic efforts (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019). To some extent, Turkey may have miscalculated how its history would play in the region. National identities in Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania are literally constructed upon narratives of liberation from the Ottoman Empire; and in Serbia especially, post-Yugoslav nationalism actively revived the traumas of Ottoman conquest. It is therefore unsurprising that any hints of neo-Ottomanism in Turkish policy have been viewed through a highly critical lens in the Western Balkans. Moreover, Serbian university lecturer, former diplomat, and writer Darko Tanaskovi´c has developed an influential discourse on neo-Ottomanism over recent decades, in which he interprets the foreign policy of the AKP, as articulated by Davuto˘glu, as an ideological product of domination (Tanaskovi´c, 2010). Since Tanaskovi´c began developing the concept, the question of Turkish neo-Ottomanism has been taken up by a wide range of media and academic actors in the region. At an April 2011 conference addressing “New Turkish Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans,” organized by the International and Security Affairs Center in Belgrade, Serbian authors Žarko Petrovi´c and Dušan Relji´c highlighted that careless rhetoric by Turkish officials in

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public diplomacy played a role in reinforcing perceptions of neo-Ottomanist intentions. Their criticism was especially directed at statements made by Davuto˘glu in a 2009 speech in Sarajevo, which emphasized the centrality of Ottoman heritage: “Our history is the same, our fate is the same, and our future is the same. Similar to how the Ottoman Balkans [rose] to the center of world politics in the sixteenth century, we will make [the] Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East, together with Turkey, the center of world politics” (Demirta¸s, 2015). On another occasion, Davuto˘glu expressed Turkey’s desire for a new Balkans, based on political values, economic interdependence, and cultural harmony: “This was the Ottoman Balkans. We will reestablish this Balkans. People are calling me neo-Ottoman, therefore I don’t want to refer to the Ottoman state as a foreign policy issue. What I am underlining is the Ottoman legacy. The Ottoman centuries of the Balkans were success stories. Now we have to reinvent this” (cited in Aydınta¸sba¸s [2019]). As Petrovi´c and Relji´c (2011) noted, Davuto˘glu was “not winning the hearts of non-Muslims in the Balkans” by making such assertions. Indeed, this rhetoric by leading AKP figures led to a backlash, especially in leading Serb nationalist-oriented media in Serbia and in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (RS). In the RS, suspicions about Turkey’s neo-imperialism were echoed by the entity’s leader Milorad Dodik, who claimed that a “project of Islamization” in Bosnia was being led by Bakir Izetbegovi´c, the Bosniak member of the country’s tripartite presidency. Dodik said further that he was unsurprised by a highly controversial statement made by Turkish prime minister Erdo˘gan in 2013 that that “Kosovo is Turkey, and Turkey is Kosovo.” Those who have concerns about Turkish foreign policy under the AKP point regularly to Davuto˘glu’s 2001 book, Strategic Depth, which they consider a blueprint for Turkey’s perceived neo-Ottomanism. In it, Davuto˘glu envisioned Turkey as among the world’s “central powers” and contended that “Turkey should develop a proactive policy commensurate to its historic and geographic depth, which is amplified by its Ottoman legacy.” Arguing that Turkey aspires to become more than a regional player, Davuto˘glu made the case that the country should play a leading role in all the multiple regions to which it can assert belonging—the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea Basin, the Mediterranean, and the Gulf and Black Sea basins. To do this, he believed Turkey “should capitalize on its soft power potential … based on its historic and cultural links with all the regions which it belongs to, as well as its democratic institutions and thriving market economy” (Grigoriadis, 2010). Turkey’s foreign policymakers themselves have rejected the term neo-Ottomanism, as well as the notion that they have any grand imperial designs. Davuto˘glu addressed the label explicitly in 2011, telling an interviewer, “I am not a neo-Ottoman. Actually, there is no such policy” (Raxhimi, 2011). An analysis of Turkish foreign policy texts and activities fails to reveal any cohesive project of neoOttomanism with clear goals and immediate objectives, or the actions necessary to achieve them. Rather, it appears that Turkey has simply exploited the existing ties developed on the basis of history and culture by Turkish non-state actors since the 1990s, to boost Turkish state influence in the Western Balkans. In Strategic Depth, Davuto˘glu emphasized the importance of Turkey finding a way to use soft power to ascend to the status of a major power, insisting that “Turkey needs to put aside

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the militaristic image which its strong military and history of military tutelage over society and politics has bequeathed. Instead, it should promote conflict resolution, regional economic cooperation which would obviate the need for regional intervention of great powers” (Grigoriadis, 2010). In the Western Balkans, local conditions presented an opportunity for Turkey, which stepped into the void left by the departure of the EU and the US late in the first decade of the 2000s. In this context it is notable that, despite nationalist critiques of neo-Ottomanism, some Serbian nationalists have lauded Erdo˘gan for coming into conflict with the EU and have hailed his friendship with Russia (Bechev, 2017).

3.2 Turkish Pragmatism Beyond taking advantage of existing religious and cultural ties, and the draw of Turkish media, Turkey has shown no strategic favor to Muslim-dominated areas of the Balkans. To the contrary, Turkish trade and military relations follow no clear cultural logic but are instead highly pragmatic. According to ˙Ibrahim Kalın (2018), an aide to Erdo˘gan, “Turkey invests in all Balkan countries without discrimination in regard to ethnic and religious identities … [and] Turkey supports the NATO and EU membership process of Balkan countries.” In fact, by combining regional stabilization efforts, trade, investment, cultural diplomacy, and soft power, Turkish policy in the region has emulated the Neighborhood Policy of the EU (Demirta¸s, 2015), without focusing solely on its cultural and historical legacy. In trade, Turkey has signed bilateral free trade agreements with every Western Balkan country: with Bosnia in 2003, Albania in 2008, Serbia in 2009, and Kosovo, FYROM, and Montenegro in 2010. In the wider Balkans region, Turkey’s main trading partners are not Muslim-majority states, but EU members (Romania, Slovenia, Greece, and Bulgaria). Trade with these EU states accounts for more than two-thirds of Turkey’s exchange with the entire region. Indeed, Albania is the only Western Balkan country for which Turkey is a top-three trading partner; trade in the region is generally dominated by EU countries, most notably Germany, Austria, and Italy. In Bosnia, for instance, Germany topped the list of 2018 trade partners and Turkey ranked just seventh (Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, 2018). Still, Turkey’s bilateral economic relations with Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia are growing. Among these, Turkish trade and investments have intensified most significantly in Serbia (Geopolitical Futures, 2017). But it is Bosnia that remains the recipient of the largest “cultural investment” by Turkey, through T˙IKA (Mujadževi´c, 2017). The country’s complicated administrative environment and reputation for corruption (Lakic & Buyuk, 2018) have weakened investment opportunities, however, and even with support from both T˙IKA and the state-owned Ziraat Bank, Turkey contributes only 3 percent of its total investments in Bosnia, where it does not figure in the top ten foreign investors (Foreign Investment Promotion Agency, 2019).

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Turkey appears to favor the ease of relations it enjoys with Serbia, which has become its main economic partner in the region. While Turkish trade with the Western Balkans grew almost tenfold between 2002 and 2016, trade with Serbia constituted a third of this and amounted to some $1 billion (Harper, 2018). Serbia is also key to large Turkish infrastructure projects in the region with both economic and strategic impacts, such as the TurkStream natural gas pipeline (Zuvela, 2019) and the construction of a Belgrade–Sarajevo highway. Turkey pledged to finance this highway at a cost of e3 billion (Lakic & Buyuk, 2018), but disputes about how the project should be implemented have raised new questions about Ankara’s visions for the Balkans. In Bosnia, Serbs prefer a northern route through the RS, while Bosniaks want the highway to take a southern route that will link Serbia’s Muslim-majority Novi Pazar with Sarajevo (Lakic, 2018). Other strategic acquisitions by Turkey in the Western Balkans reflect an aim to leverage influence across the region, rather than to develop religious and ideological projects. For example, in late 2008, Turkey bought 49 percent of B&H Airlines, Bosnia’s national carrier (though the company folded in 2015), and Turkish companies have contracted to run Prishtina’s international airport for the next 20 years, along with airports in Skopje and Ohrid. Turkey also funded the construction of a key highway linking Kosovo to Serbia and Albania, and plans to build part of the planned 445 km highway that will stretch from Belgrade to Bar, Montenegro. Moreover, although business confidence in Turkey has eroded since 2009 due to the 2008 global economic crisis, the 2016 attempted coup, and the falling lira, Turkish exports to the Balkans increased in 2018. Ideology and historical heritage clearly play a minimal role in these recent Turkish trade and investment decisions in the region, and in Turkey’s foreign policy; for, while Serbia is the country most critical of perceived neo-Ottoman tendencies, it has nonetheless become Turkey’s main partner in the Western Balkans. It seems Turkish policy in the region may have been one of pragmatism all along. In fact, by 2011, Davuto˘glu had called Turkey and Serbia “key partners for peace and stability in the Balkans,” noting “a common will and desire to forge a strategic partnership” (Raxhimi, 2011). The reasons for this are obvious. Serbia is the largest country in the Western Balkans, and a neighbor to the EU, and it put great effort into attracting investments. Further, its vertical administrative and political environment is familiar to Turkey and thus a “suitable place for Turkish entrepreneurs’ business mentality” (Harper, 2018). Of course, this does not mean Turkey is opposed to using the embrace of Muslim-dominated countries in the region to strengthen its political and cultural influence—and to translate this influence into strategic leverage in this geopolitically important area, seen as a gateway to Europe. Yet, Turkey continues to do this within a framework of Atlanticism and continues to support the accession of Western Balkan countries to both the EU and NATO.

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4 Post-2016 Policy: The AKP, Gülen, and an End to Grand Strategies The fourth phase in Turkish relations in the Balkans has followed the breakup between the 2016 AKP and Fethullah Gülen’s Hizmet movement, as well as constitutional changes in Turkey that affected foreign policy. While the direction of this policy has not shifted course, its style has changed substantially. Turkish foreign policy is now marked by the ascendance of an authoritarian president who uses international relations for domestic consumption and embeds domestic priorities into foreign relations.

4.1 Diplomacy Driven by Domestic Policy In 2016, Turkey’s approach to the Western Balkans took a new turn for the third time in less than 20 years. First, in May, Davuto˘glu—the architect of Turkey’s activist foreign policy and the prime minister at the time—resigned. Then, in July, a failed military coup fundamentally altered modern Turkey. President Erdo˘gan accused the Hizmet Movement and Gülen himself of planning to overthrow the government and engaged in a systematic and far-reaching effort to root out Hizmet influencers both in Turkey and abroad. Hizmet had facilitated the AKP’s rise to power and its takeover of state institutions that Gülenists had populated. But in 2013, Erdo˘gan and the AKP moved against their former allies following the collapse of the high-profile “Ergenekon” plot, which involved a secular “deep state” organization said to be linked to Hizmet members in both the judiciary and the police. After a failed attempt by the Hizmetinfiltrated prosecutor’s office and police to move against corrupt businessmen and officials tied to the AKP, the government acted decisively, closing down Hizmetlinked schools and businesses and purging the ranks of the judiciary and the police. This crackdown only intensified in the aftermath of the attempted coup in 2016. These actions by the government altered the nature of the Turkish political system, changed the composition of the elite, and redefined the roles of key political actors. Purges of business elites and political institutions had not ended with the imprisonment and exiling of presumed Hizmet sympathizers, but had extended into the AKP itself. Leaders at the highest echelons of the party were removed and, for all practical purposes, president Erdo˘gan alone was left in control of the AKP and the country. Positions formerly occupied by high-profile politicians were filled by AKP loyalists and Erdo˘gan’s authoritarian style reshaped the foreign policies crafted by Davuto˘glu. Policymaking and implementation processes that were once complex were replaced in many cases by unilateral decision-making by the president, followed by implementation without examination or criticism. Hence, by 2018, the Turkish political system was classified as unfree by Freedom House, having ceased to represent the democratic model it held until 2016. These political changes have inevitably affected foreign policy, and the Balkans have become a space in which Turkey now seeks to

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fight domestic political struggles and gain legitimacy for foreign policies carried out elsewhere. This use of international relations for domestic purposes did not begin in 2016, though. In fact, many earlier public references made by Turkish officials to Ottoman heritage, viewed by some in the Balkans as neo-Ottoman, were primarily directed to a Turkish audience. On a number of occasions, during elections or military campaigns, this “domestication” of Turkish foreign policy has clearly been prioritized. In 2014, for instance, Bosniak leader Bakir Izetbegovi´c controversially greeted Erdo˘gan as “our leader” by video link from Bosnia during an election rally held in Turkey (Jutarnji List, 2014). In January 2018, prominent Sarajevo mosques organized public prayers for the success of Turkey’s “Olive Branch” offensive in Syria (Klix, 2018). Perhaps most visible, however, was a May 2018 election rally in Sarajevo, which was organized by an AKP-linked group as a substitute for rallies the AKP was prevented from holding in Germany and Austria. The Sarajevo rally was part of the Turkish presidential election campaign and was directed at European Turks voting in the elections from abroad (Weise, 2018). Public displays of personal loyalty have also become a more noticeable part of Bosnian–Turkish relations, with Muslim leaders in Bosnia making their affection for Erdo˘gan clear during his visits and election campaigns, especially since the 2016 coup attempt. In turn, Erdo˘gan has fully supported Izebegovi´c in his political campaigns, as has the state-owned Anadolu news agency. Erdo˘gan has developed a similar political partnership with Kosovo’s Hashim Thaçi (Buyuk, 2016) and has also cultivated a personal relationship with Albania’s Edi Rama—who received an invitation to Erdo˘gan’s daughter’s wedding. Indeed, rather than being driven by Islamist or neo-Ottomanist objectives, the foreign policy of Erdo˘gan’s AKP has been concentrated on nurturing loyalties and relationships with many regional partners. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nationalist SDA party and associated media have emphasized the link between Bosniaks and Turkey. Local SDA groups actively helped promote a book entitled Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan: the Birth of a Leader (Besli & Özbay, 2011), and Turkish-leaning media propagated a story about Bosnia’s wartime leader Alija Izetbegovi´c, Bakir’s father, having entrusted Bosnia to Erdo˘gan (Mujadževi´c, 2017). In 2018, TRT aired a Turkish-made dramatic mini-series, “Alija,” about the life of Izetbegovi´c. Still, Turkey’s support for Bosniak nationalist leaders appears to have been driven less by a desire to strengthen Muslims in Bosnia than by the personal preferences of Erdo˘gan based on his own considerations and interests. Before backing SDA leader Izetbegovi´c, for example, Erdo˘gan had chosen to back his rival Haris Silajdži´c, with whom he had developed a close relationship in Istanbul. Silajdži´c, who won the 2006 election with Turkey’s support, was later responsible for stalling the unsuccessful push for reforms by the EU and the US, and ultimately for their withdrawal. It was only after this that Turkey partnered with the SDA.

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4.2 The Effect of the 2016 Coup Attempt on Foreign Policy Erdo˘gan’s instinct for developing loyalty with other strong leaders was mutually beneficial, but at the expense of institutional relations. In the aftermath of the failed coup in 2016, this approach gradually impacted the quality of Turkish foreign policy. Quite unambiguously, Turkish priorities in relations with Balkan countries began to be defined by the AKPs struggle against Hizmet, to the extent that Turkey’s prestige and ability to carry out foreign policy were affected. Gülen’s movement had once been the vanguard of Turkish soft power across the region. In combination with the foreign policies of Davuto˘glu, Turkish state agencies and AKP-linked private companies had succeeded in building a parallel infrastructure of Turkish schools, media, and businesses. But from July 2016 on, Turkey pursued a policy of competition and replacement, and no longer by soft means. Turkish officials and partners of Erdo˘gan in the Balkans now refer to Hizmet as “Gülen’s terrorist organization (FETÖ),” the term used by AKP leaders. Erdo˘gan aide Ibrahim Kalın has called Hizmet a “cultish belief system” and a threat to Balkan countries (Kalın, 2018). For several years, Turkish officials from ambassadors to Erdo˘gan himself have demanded that Hizmet-linked educational institutions in the Balkans be closed down and their property transferred to Turkish embassies or other proxies of the Turkish state, such as the Maarif Foundation. These officials have repeatedly called for the closure of both Epoka and Burch Universities, for instance. Turkey has also pressed governments in the region to extradite a dozen or more people residing in several Western Balkan states (Dizdarevic, 2018; Karaj, 2018), including citizens sought by Turkish courts for membership of the Hizmet movement (Mejdini, 2017). In March 2018, this pressure manifested in scandal with the outright abduction of six Turkish nationals from Kosovo. Among those targeted were a teacher and educational administrator, and footage of their arrest went viral in Kosovo, where the government faced embarrassment. Prime minister Ramush Haradinaj was forced to publicly deny advanced knowledge of the operation (Naddaff, 2018). Balkan countries have faced a dilemma when it comes to Turkish demands for business closures and extraditions: either oblige Turkey, an important partner, in contravention of the law; or refuse to comply and safeguard Turkey’s international reputation, and thus antagonize Erdo˘gan. Notably, unlike the case in Central Asia, many Balkan governments have resisted Erdo˘gan’s pressure (Erebara, 2018). Still, several have offered verbal assurances to Turkey or have facilitated compromise solutions, such as when the Bosnian Sema schools were transferred to a new owner with no Hizmet affiliation. The one-sidedness of Turkey’s demands on this issue has led to public criticism and even protest. In North Macedonia, for example, after the Turkish ambassador claimed the Yahya Kemal school in Skopje may be grooming terrorists, parents of students replied en masse by posting photos of their children online (Turkish Minute, 2018). In Albania, the Majority MP refused to oblige Turkey in exchange for a new mosque, saying that Albania was not a Turkish colony (IPPM, 2015). Critical observers in the press have also warned Bosnians that

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president Erdo˘gan is not a “sultan” and is not offering them stability (Mujanovic, 2018). It is clear that Turkey’s coordinated campaign to foster the loyalty of Balkan leaders has not yielded the results Ankara had hoped for, making it difficult for Turkey to leverage power through any cultural influence it may maintain. In some places, this approach has plainly backfired by coming off as overtly self-serving and raising questions about the motives of Turkish foreign policy overall. Moreover, president Erdo˘gan’s style—which prioritizes personal relationships over traditional institutional channels—has been increasingly on display, such as when he hosted Serbian president Vuˇci´c along with Bosniak SDA leader Izetbegovi´c, instead of inviting the chairman of the Bosnian presidency at the time. This style has itself limited Turkey’s influence in the region, as Erdo˘gan has mistakenly expected an equivalent of his authoritarianism in local leaders. According to Dimitar Bechev, Erdo˘gan appears less motivated by a desire to support local Muslims than by his need to mark Balkan turf as his, not Gülen’s, and to assert Turkish authority among Sunni Muslims specifically (Bechev, 2017). Indeed, the strategic turn Turkey took in 2016 revealed that Turkish influence in the region is weaker than projected and represents less to fear than initially asserted by critics of neo-Ottomanism (Vraˇci´c et al., 2017: 185). For example, Turkey’s continuing efforts to engage in mediation in the region have met only limited success. Erdo˘gan has been unable to settle the dispute between Bosnia and Serbia concerning the route of the Belgrade–Sarajevo highway, Turkey is no longer a player in Kosovo negotiations, and it was EU and US diplomats who brokered an end to the protracted crisis in North Macedonia.

5 Conclusion This critical overview of evolving Turkish policy toward the Western Balkans has shown that, since the end of the Cold War, successive Turkish leaders have followed their own paths. Since the 1990s, Turkey has clearly seen the Western Balkans as a region in which its projection of influence is partly facilitated by a shared historical narrative, relationships between religious institutions, and opportunities for the development of friendly relations among political elites. Turkey was first spurred to seek a role on the international stage in the context of Euro-Atlantic efforts in the postYugoslav crisis. Later, under AKP rule, exerting influence in the region was again attractive to Turkey when its own EU accession process stalled, and it observed the EU and US withdrawing from the Western Balkans. Yet, none of Turkey’s governments, whether in the secular 1990s or the moderate Islamic next decade, has formulated a cohesive strategy for dealing with the region. Turkey has succeeded in becoming a key player in the Balkans, in terms of multilateral politics and economic relations, but not more broadly. Initial Turkish successes in other areas have not produced any important breakthroughs, such as in addressing the most pressing security and development issues facing the region.

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Cultural diplomacy was only part of Turkey’s foreign policy strategy; yet, during the AKP’s mandate, Turkish foreign policies around the world did assume a more ideological dimension, with Islamic references featuring prominently in the speeches and actions of the country’s leadership. However, any such rhetoric not buoyed by consistent financial and political support had limited practical effect. Turkey’s government had its limits, too. While Turkey’s state administration became a general partner to the Islamic Community in Bosnia in 2013, its religious policies were constrained by existing relations with Serbia. Ultimately, this support for Balkan Muslim leaders was highly visible but fickle, and brought Turkey little authority. The resources Turkey has been able to muster when it comes to regional trade and investment simply cannot measure up to the EU, in terms of financial aid, foreign direct investment, or market opportunities. Ankara’s economic priorities have revealed the extent to which Turkish policy is in fact driven less by ideology and more by pragmatism. Turkey continues to trade at a greater rate with EU members and larger Balkan countries such as Serbia, than with Muslim-majority states. All in all, Turkish foreign policy has been in constant, with sometimes wildly shifting priorities, as seen in the superficial and fluctuating support Turkey offered the Bosnian government in the 1990s and into the next decade. More recently, Turkey’s priorities and the focus of its foreign policy shifted again after the 2016 failed coup. Yet, the heavy-handed and personalized style of president Erdo˘gan has further limited the effectiveness of this policy as well as Turkey’s appeal as a source of stability. For all the grand plans that emerged from the leadership of Ahmet Davuto˘glu and his vision of Turkish foreign policy, under the AKP, Turkey has failed to provide any meaningful and reliable political or economic alternatives to the Balkan states. Thus, if neo-Ottomanism is deployed by Turkey, it seems to be only one of many foreign policy instruments and appears to be used only in countries where Turkish officials believe they can build upon a cultural sameness, that is, in Bosnia and Kosovo. Even there, though, neo-Ottomanism does not play significantly into Turkey’s foreign policy outlook. Instead, Turkish foreign policy is largely guided by pragmatism, realism, and lately, domestic policy.

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Karaj, V. (2018). Turks fleeing a crackdown find haven in Albania. Balkan Insight, December 21. https://balkaninsight.com/2018/12/21/turks-fleeing-a-crackdown-find-haven-in-albania-1219-2018/ Karˇci´c, H. (2013). In support of a non-member state: The organisation of Islamic Conference and the war in Bosnia, 1992–1995. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 33(3), 321–340. Klix. (2018). U Begovoj i Carevoj džamiji u Sarajevu održana molitva za vojnu akciju Turske u Siriji. January 27. https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-begovoj-i-carevoj-dzamiji-u-sarajevu-odrzana-mol itva-za-vojnu-akciju-turske-u-siriji/180127002 Knezevic, G. (2016). Bosnia’s Gulenist network. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 22. https:// www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-gulenist-network/27873908.html Lakic, M. (2018). Bosnian Serbs oppose Sarajevo-Belgrade highway plan. Balkan Insight, May 23. https://balkaninsight.com/2018/05/23/bosnia-s-entity-block-sarajevo-belgrade-highway-0522-2018/ Lakic, M., & Buyuk, H. F. (2018). Turkey-Bosnia ‘love match’ fails to sway investors. Balkan Insight, June 5. https://balkaninsight.com/2018/06/05/turkey-bosnia-love-match-fails-to-swayinvestors-06-02-2018/ Larrabee, F. S., & Lesser, I. O. (2003). Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty. RAND. Mejdini, F. (2017). Turkey presses Albania to extradite key ‘Gulenist’ suspect. Balkan Insight, October 13. https://balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-to-face-turkish-request-to-ext radite-gulen-supporter-10-13-2017 Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations. (2018). Analiza vanjskotrgovinske razmjene Bosne i Hercegovine. Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations. Mujadževi´c, D. (2017). Asserting Turkey in Bosnia: Turkish foreign policy and pro-Turkish Activism in Bosnia – Actors, Discourses and Textual Corpora (2002–2014). Harrasowitz. Mujanovic, J. (2018). Bosnia should beware of Turkey’s ‘sultan’. Balkan Insight, May 22. https:// balkaninsight.com/2018/05/22/bosnia-should-beware-of-turkey-s-sultan-05-21-2018/ Naddaff, A. (2018). ‘Turkey’s puppet’: How Erdogan’s anti-Gulenist campaign is roiling Kosovo. World Politics Review, September 11. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/25853/tur key-s-puppet-how-erdogan-s-anti-gulenist-campaign-is-roiling-kosovo Öktem, K. (2010). New Islamic actors after the Wahhabi Intermezzo: Turkey’s Return to the Muslim Balkans. European Studies Centre, Oxford University. Öktem, K. (2012). Global Diyanet and multiple networks: Turkey’s new presence in the Balkans. Journal of Muslims in Europe, 1(1), 1–32. Petrovi´c, Ž, & Relji´c, D. (2011). Turkish interests and involvements in the Western Balkans: A score-card. Insight Turkey, 13(3), 159–172. Radio Slobodna Evropa. (2019). Može li Turska pomiriti muslimane u Srbiji? March 1, https:// www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/srbija-turska-muslimani/29797693.html Raxhimi, A. (2011). Davutoglu: ‘I’m Not a Neo-Ottoman’. Balkan Insight, April 21. https://balkan insight.com/2011/04/26/davutoglu-i-m-not-a-neo-ottoman/ Rucker-Chang, S. (2014). The Turkish connection: Neo-Ottoman influence in post-Dayton Bosnia. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 34(2), 152–164. Sarajli´c, E. (2011). The return of the consuls: Islamic networks and foreign policy perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 11(2), 173–190. Solberg, A. R. (2007). The role of Turkish Islamic networks in the Western Balkans. Südosteuropa, 55(4), 429–462. Tanaskovi´c, D. (2010). Neoosmanizam: Povratak Turske na Balkan. Službeni glasnik. The Economist. (2016). Mosqued objectives. January 21. https://www.economist.com/europe/2016/ 01/21/mosqued-objectives Tol, G. (2019). Turkey’s bid for religious leadership: How the AKP uses Islamic soft power. Foreign Affairs, January 19. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-01-10/turkeysbid-religious-leadership

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Turkish Minute. (2018). Turkish ambassador implies Gülen schools in Macedonia raise terrorists. May 9. https://www.turkishminute.com/2018/05/09/turkish-ambassador-implies-gulen-schoolsin-macedonia-raise-terrorists/ Poslovni dnevnik. (2013). Turski predsjednik Gül najavio ‘gospodarski bum’ u Srbiji, 2013. February 4. http://www.poslovni.hr/svijet-i-regija/turski-predsjednik-gul-najavio-gospodarski-bum-u-srb iji-229478 Vraˇci´c, A. (2016). Turkey’s role in the Western Balkans. SWP Research Paper, December. https:// www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2016RP11_vcc.pdf Vraˇci´c, A., Joseph, E. P., & Ivanovic, T. (2017). Turkey in the Western Balkans: A waning interest. In S. Toperich & A. Ü. Noi (Eds.), Turkey and Transatlantic Relations (pp. 183–199). Center for Transatlantic Relations. Weise, Z. (2018). Turkey’s Balkan comeback. Politico, May 15. https://www.politico.eu/article/tur key-western-balkans-comeback-european-union-recep-tayyip-erdogan/ Zuvela, M. (2019). Serbia to start building TurkStream pipeline stretch in March or April. Reuters, February 7. https://www.reuters.com/article/serbia-gas/serbia-to-start-building-turkst ream-pipeline-stretch-in-march-or-april-idUSL5N2027BQ

Turkey and Montenegro: Old Foes Turned Partners Boris Vuki´cevi´c

and Marko Savi´c

While for many Balkan and Middle Eastern nations a cornerstone of nation-building was the centuries-long resistance to the Ottomans, nowhere was this process as significant as in Montenegro. The whole history of the nation between the mid-fifteenth century and 1913 was represented as a permanent struggle against the Ottoman invaders, which was the driving force behind the state-building movement and the unification of the country. The glorification of battlefield victories of this small nation in the mountains, against the great empire, was also celebrated in the national epic The Mountain Wreath, and this attitude continued well into the twenty-first century. There was not much space for closer ties between the two nations during the 1990s, when Montenegro remained in its union with Serbia, while Turkey, on the other hand, was seen as an ally of the Bosnian Muslims in the Yugoslav wars. However, significant changes in Turkey (notably the coming of the Justice and Development Party [AKP] to power), Montenegro (the split in the ruling party and reversal of both domestic and foreign policies), and in the wider region (democratic reforms, along with the (re)emergence of the presence of non-Western actors, notably Russia and China, as well as Turkey) opened the way for a new beginning in the relationship between Turkey and Montenegro, following its independence in 2006. As in the case in certain other post-Yugoslav countries, the Turkish policy toward Montenegro operates on two separate levels. One relates to their relations with the Muslim population of Montenegro, which makes up roughly one-fifth of the country’s population and consists of both Bosniaks and Albanians. The soft power element is strongly present here, since these two national minorities, and particularly the Bosniaks, share a mutual affinity with Turkey because of historical, religious, B. Vuki´cevi´c (B) · M. Savi´c Faculty of Political Science, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, Montenegro e-mail: [email protected] M. Savi´c e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_10

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and traditional ties. Following this, political and economic ties were strengthened, including strong relations between the AKP and the Bosniak Party in Montenegro. The other level of engagement is national, where Turkey has forged stronger ties with the Montenegrin government, its institutions, and the population as a whole. There, the religious element is naturally muted, but many other things that offer scope for good common ground between the two countries are emphasized—from overlapping customs and traditions to similarities in cuisine, architecture, loanwords in the languages, and so on. As such, the Turkish approach makes extensive use of soft power instruments. These range from the activities of the newly opened Yunus Emre Institute, many cultural projects supported by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA), aid to scholars and the medical systems of Montenegro, and scholarships for Montenegrin students, to the promotion of highly popular Turkish TV shows, Turkish travel destinations, and the translation and promotion of works of Turkish literature. The Turkish economic presence has also become much stronger through investment, the organization of high-level economic forums, and the signing of an agreement on defense industry cooperation. Finally, the political relationship became much more dynamic during the 2010s, with many exchanges of high-level visits, including president Recep Erdo˘gan’s in 2021. As Montenegro has moved away from its traditionally pro-Serbian and pro-Russian policies during the last fifteen years, it has opened up space for the stronger presence of Turkey, seen at the same time as both the historical counterweight to Russian aspirations in the region, but also as a fellow NATO member, who strongly supported Montenegrin NATO membership, which was granted in 2017.

1 The Long History of Montenegrin–Ottoman Conflict It is not uncommon that narratives about nation-building processes heavily rely on the struggle against an occupying foreign power. Since the Ottoman Empire ruled a large part of the Mediterranean world, many countries have included their fight for freedom against the Ottomans as part of their historical narrative, and the same has applied to the Balkan nations. For example, the most significant Albanian national hero is the fifteenth-century leader of the anti-Ottoman revolt, Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeu (Skanderbeg) (Winnifrith, 1992: 74), while the central event of the Serbian romanticization of history is the martyrdom of the Serbian heroes during the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 (Johnston, 2003: 184). However, these narratives have never been as compelling and important as the one produced in Montenegro. The presence of the Ottomans in Montenegro lasted from the second half of the fourteenth century until the Balkan Wars of 1912/13. During this period, the Ottomans were in charge of a large part of today’s Montenegro, while smaller parts (such as Kotor) remained in the Venetian, later briefly French, and finally Austrian hands. Ever since it began to be present in the region, the Ottoman Empire had contacts and engaged in occasional conflicts with the Montenegrin feudal state of Zeta. Eventually, Zeta became a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire before becoming

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subsumed into the empire proper in 1496. Still, the Ottoman rule in the central part of Montenegro (what is today known as Stara Crna Gora or Old Montenegro), a hilly and arid limestone region, was contested from the very beginning. Soon that part of the country became autonomous, before Montenegro gained de facto independence in 1796 (Andrijaševi´c & Rastoder, 2006: 80), with wider and official recognition being secured only at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 (Lawrence, 1895: 70). Throughout the years of struggle, the narrative of a small tribe of warriors up in the misty mountains defying the great Ottoman Empire was formed, supported by the accounts of various foreign artists and travelers, including Prosper Mérimée, Alexander Pushkin, and Alfred Tennyson (Ledbetter, 2016: 130; Wachtel, 2011: 297). Practically all major events in Montenegrin history of the epoch related to battles against the Ottomans (such as Carev Laz [1712], Martini´ci and Krusi [1796], Grahovac [1858], and Vuˇcji do and Fundina [1876]) or institution- and legislation-building, again in the process of resistance against the Ottomans, such as the creation of the first written legal code—the Code of Petar I (1796–1803). The fact that Montenegro was a theocracy until 1852 led by prince-bishops certainly helped, since it emphasized the difference between Montenegrins and Ottomans even more strongly, as the conflict was depicted as a struggle between Christianity and Islam (restated with slogans such as “For the Cross and Freedom!”) (Brkovi´c, 1988: 84). The final addition to the mythic narrative was the publication of the Montenegrin national epic The Mountain Wreath in 1847, written by Petar II Petrovi´c Njegoš, a Montenegrin prince-bishop, philosopher, and poet, dealing with some largely fictional events and set in the early eighteenth century. Through this, three distinct and opposing civilizations are described (Ivi´c, 1995: 188): the heroic-patriarchal classic Montenegro, the oriental-Islamic Ottoman Empire, and, to a lesser extent, the west-European Venetian civilization. Only in 1878 did the Ottoman Empire recognize Montenegro as independent at the Congress of Berlin, and a year later formal diplomatic relations were established. Diplomatic missions opened in the two countries’ then capitals, Istanbul (at the time known throughout the South Slavic lands as Carigrad or the Imperial City) and Cetinje (Raspopovi´c, 2009: 280, 326). To celebrate the 140th anniversary of this milestone date, various events were organized in 2019 with the aim to prove that there is also a tradition of diplomacy and cooperation between the two nations, usually understood as historic adversaries. Other good examples of past ties were also highlighted, including the role of the Baki´c brothers from Montenegro who, as students, were among the founders of the famous Turkish professional football club Galatasaray. A memorial plaque in their honor was erected in the village of their birth in northern Montenegro, in the presence of the vice president of Galatasaray (Softi´c, 2014). Another fact concerning cooperation of the past era is that, by buying a house in Cetinje for its diplomatic mission, the Ottoman Empire was the first foreign country to own a property in Montenegro (Raspopovi´c, 2009: 327; Suver, 2013: 128). The Montenegrin prince (and later king) Nicholas visited Sultan Abdülhamid in 1883 and 1899, who gifted him the Emirgian Palace on the Bosphorus, to be used as the seat of the Montenegrin diplomatic mission. Through the second half of the nineteenth-century Ottoman-Montenegrin relations gradually improved. They

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moved from pseudo-consular representatives (such as hrvat-bashas, a kind of unofficial Montenegrin consular representative in Istanbul) and various consular representations (consuls, consular agents, and—in terms of Ottoman representation— vice-consuls), to full and official diplomatic relations. Niko Hajdukovi´c, who would become King Nicholas’s close associate and later minister of internal affairs, studied in Istanbul and highly praised the way the Turks treated the Montenegrins who lived or studied there. While trying to show the changing attitude toward the Ottomans (often called “Turks” in Montenegro), he cites different encounters and anecdotes with the king himself. On one occasion, the king called Hajdukovi´c “a Turk” (since he lived in Istanbul for years), saying that it was not something pejorative, because Turks were very brave and great heroes; on another occasion, when an Italian-schooled Montenegrin officer avoided a duel with Hajdukovi´c, the king said he was not surprised since “Turks have always been better than Italians” (Hajdukovi´c, 2000: 380). During his 1899 visit to the Sultan, Nicholas wrote in his memoires that there was “a systematic injustice of all Christianity and the so-called civilized world against Turks” since “Turks are the descendants of an elite, brave, and noble race.” Further on, he justified the actions of the Ottoman state against the Armenians and mentioned the Ottomans’ recent victory against Greece who had “impudently attacked a stronger country” (Petrovi´c Njegoš, 2007: 391–412). It was remarkable that, only a few years after their centuries-long hostilities had ended, there were such sympathies expressed toward the former enemy. However, a new war broke in 1912, when Montenegrin territory was significantly enlarged by acquiring a region to the north (mostly the southern part of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar) (Imamovi´c, 1998: 458; Treadway, 1998: 112) and the Ottoman Empire was finally expelled from most of the Balkans (Dündar, 2006: 37; Pearson, 2014: 14). Relations between the two ceased, since they did not have a common border any longer, as the Empire’s borders moved eastward by hundreds of kilometers. As Montenegro became merely a province, and later, a federal unit of Yugoslavia and, on the other hand, Turkey did not show much interest in Balkan affairs, there was not much space to encourage stronger ties and resetting of relations. Even after the Ottomans were long gone, the narrative of the small and heroic Montenegro fighting (and usually defeating) a much stronger and larger oppressor remained and was used routinely even in the context of more recent events, including the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, when the Montenegrins largely aligned with the Serbs against, among others, the Bosnian Muslims who were seen—or at least presented at times— as the heirs of the Ottomans (Winslow, 2002: 341). However, as the Montenegrin government started turning toward the West in the second half of the 1990s, and as it needed support from its national minorities (who are largely Muslim, although there is also a Roman Catholic minority), parts of the traditional narrative were abandoned, and new interpretations were introduced. As this coincided with changes to Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, making its presence the largest it had been for almost a century, a new phase in the relationship between Montenegro and Turkey could begin.

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2 Relations Reborn: The Relationship Since Montenegrin Independence in 2006 After more than seven decades of being part of different Yugoslav states and another fourteen years of living in a union with Serbia, Montenegro regained its independence in 2006. Turkey was among the first countries to recognize it, on June 12, 2006, the same day the EU did so, and less than ten days after independence was officially proclaimed. The opening of embassies in Podgorica and Ankara followed shortly afterward. As noted without any hesitation, both sides were interested in forging stronger ties. Montenegro, as part of the Balkans, and formerly part of the Ottoman realm and also as a country on its path toward EU accession (confirmed in 2010 when it was granted EU candidacy status), naturally became a state of interest to the wider, transformed foreign policy of Turkey. The significant number of Muslims living in Montenegro also helped these ties, since most of the Balkan Muslims, no matter whether they were of Turkish, Albanian, or Slavic origin, maintained cultural and economic links with Turkey. A large number of Yugoslav Muslims, including many from Montenegro, left the country in the interwar period but also during the communist era and later, during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s (Kiri¸sci, 1995: 70–72). Such connections certainly helped, and played an important role in future developments, particularly since in the period between 2009 and 2020, and again since 2022, Bosniak and Albanian political parties formed part of the ruling majority, and for most of the time held the balance of power in Montenegro. The changes in both countries, in terms of internal political dynamics and reshaping of foreign policies, were crucial for the so-called new era in relations between Turkey and Montenegro. After a tumultuous decade of the 1990s, marked by frequent changes of government, a fragmented parliament, and an economic crisis, Turkey has pursued reforms in almost every field. Looking at the agenda of the AKP, which came to power in 2002, a more active foreign policy was given priority, particularly in the regions historically and culturally close to Turkey (the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East). A more robust foreign penetration was made possible thanks to the recovery of the Turkish economy, which reached an annual growth of 6 percent in the first decade of the 2000s; this trend was stable until the outbreak of the 2008 global economic crisis. If we take into account that Turkish activism in the Balkans gained new momentum precisely in the middle of that decade, then it is very clear that such an involvement was largely stimulated by the country’s internal economic prosperity (Koç & Önsoy, 2018: 358). It was in accordance with the “Strategic Depth” (Stratejik Derinlik) doctrine, formulated by the main architect of Turkish foreign policy in the first fifteen years of the AKP rule, Ahmet Davuto˘glu. In his view, Turkey was supposed to intensify its presence and interaction with the Balkan region, first with the communities it was historically close to (such as the Bosniaks and Albanians), and then with the countries with the dominant Christian population (Demirta¸s, 2015: 130). Here, it is important to point out the concept of neo-Ottomanism, which has occupied some substantial space in both academic and policymaking circles. The

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legacy of history in Turkey’s modern foreign policy is related to the strengthening of the AKP and its consolidation of power, including the gradual implementation of a conservative Islamic agenda. This has implied a return to traditional values, frequent references to moral issues, but also an intensified rhetoric about the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the necessity of maintaining ties and protecting Muslims throughout the world. Moutsis (2017) further argues that Ottomanism in its original sense explains the aspiration of Ottoman elites to strengthen Ottoman identity in a multinational realm. Therefore, neo-Ottomanism is not a completely accurate term, if we consider that Turkish foreign policy, with a pronounced ambition, is based on the twin engines of economic dynamism and Islam. Turkish foreign policy toward the Balkans contains these elements and is based on economic aid and investment, but also rhetoric that often speaks in terms of shared Ottoman heritage—an aspect Turkey has used to present itself as the protector of all Muslims in the Balkans. This is also reflected in the official political discourse of the AKP and its official policy toward the Balkans (Moutsis, 2017: 174). Such tendencies could be identified in Davuto˘glu’s speech, delivered during the conference The Ottoman Legacy and the Balkan Muslim Communities Today, held in Sarajevo in 2009. He made it clear that the Balkan region was a periphery under the Alexandrian and Roman empires, and that the Balkan region reached a central position, both geographically and in terms of importance, only under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, in the sixteenth century. Since this was a period of prosperity and peace, it deserved to be revived. True, Davuto˘glu (2009) distanced himself from neo-Ottomanism as a discourse, speaking of the Ottoman state in terms of its legacy, not in terms of it being a guide or model for a foreign policy actor. According to post-2002 foreign political doctrine, Turkey could no longer be content with being a “flank country” as it was in the Cold War or even a “bridge country” as it was generally characterized, but it rather sought to position itself as a key player, influential not only in its immediate surroundings, but also beyond (Altunisik, 2011: 195). It can be argued that Turkey used traditional foreign policy instruments, including bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and participation in international missions during and immediately after the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In the post-conflict period, in line with its strategy, Turkey has sought to perform a leading role in a number of regional initiatives, such as the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), and the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). Guided by international trends in foreign policy preferences, Turkey began to base its foreign policy much more on public diplomacy by actively promoting and maintaining peace and stability in the region (Mitrovi´c-Boškovi´c et al., 2015: 103). Although initially it advocated for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, Turkey recognized and established diplomatic ties with all the emerging states after the disintegration of Yugoslavia; in addition, it engaged with the UN and NATO peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and took part in UN Operation Alba which aimed to bring peace and stability to Albania, while also keeping its forces within KFOR, established after the 1999 Kosovo war (Ekinci, 2013: 9).

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The development of relations with Montenegro and other Western Balkans countries was in accordance with the main principles of Turkish foreign policy: zero problems with its neighbors, as the Balkans belong to the immediate or wider neighborhood of Turkey; a multidimensional foreign policy, which unites new engagements and old alliances again regarding the two layers of relations in the Balkans with the Muslim communities, which have long-standing ties to Turkey, and others, formerly enemies; and underlying the importance of Turkey’s role in providing mediation in regional and global conflicts (Altunisik, 2011: 195). An important aspect of Turkish public diplomacy in this period is related to the implementation of the so-called peacekeeping diplomacy. The Ankara leadership has managed to build a trilateral consultative mechanism between Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, and another one between Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. The 2010 Trilateral Balkan Summit brought together the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia for the first time since the former Yugoslav wars (Mitrovi´cBoškovi´c et al., 2015: 109). The regional approach of Turkish foreign policy projects the image of Turkey as a normative force that insists on the use of peace instruments and economic incentives in the (in)direct neighborhood, especially in those areas which have experienced conflict or political and social turbulence (Kaliber, 2013: 26). It can be said that Turkey has a much wider space for engagement in the Balkans than its rivals, who also have an interest in this area, through Turkey’s use of the social and cultural activities of soft power institutions, and public and cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, Turkey uses almost all the instruments and mechanisms of soft power in the Balkan countries, which significantly indicates the connection of the communities of states and the deepening of its cultural influence (Ek¸si, 2017: 192). In the context of the post-Cold War international relations, the role of Turkey has changed—its position in global affairs has risen and its room for maneuver increased dramatically. In terms of its economic capabilities, political significance, and its unique geographic position, Turkey has become one of the most dominant actors in its region and beyond (Çelik, 2016: 36). As summarized elsewhere, “Turkey has gone from being a peripheral player in a global, bipolar conflict to being a central actor in a raft of actual or potential regional conflicts; as a state, it has literally gone from flank to front. Before 1989, Turkey was a status quo power par excellence. It neither wanted nor sought change. If anything, Turkey, with its efforts to liberalize its economy and to move from an import substitution-led to an expert-led economy in the early 1980s, could plausibly have claimed that it was effectively anticipating the changes in the international system, certainly at the economic level. Nevertheless, Turkey had systematic change thrust upon it at the end of the 1980s” (Robins, 2003: 12). Certainly, the stability of the government during the first decade of AKP rule, and the undisputed leadership of its president, Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, significantly helped the new profile of Turkey in terms of international relations, including its role in the post-Yugoslav space as a whole. In the case of Montenegro, it has also experienced a series of changes and reforms, particularly in the field of foreign policy. Montenegro was the only Yugoslav republic that remained in a union with Serbia in 1992, when Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and

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Herzegovina, and Macedonia decided to leave the Yugoslav federation. Such a decision was a result of the first multiparty elections in Montenegro in 1990, won by supporters of the Serbian nationalist president Slobodan Miloševi´c. With the exception of Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro were the only former socialist countries to have former communists win their first multiparty elections (Goati, 2000: 27). Montenegro followed the Serbian authorities into isolation from the international community, because of their involvement in the Balkan Wars, and only in 1997 did the Montenegrin prime minister, Milo Ðukanovi´c, turn his back to Miloševi´c, and become a pillar of the struggle against his regime (Vuki´cevi´c, 2017: 111). This further resulted in the Montenegrin government search for allies in the West (among NATO members), as well as for allies at home, among the minorities (mainly the Bosniaks and Albanians) (Vuki´cevi´c & Šturanovi´c, 2021). Montenegro gradually moved toward independence, which was finally achieved through a referendum of May 21, 2006, the results of which were accepted without any question by the international community. Even though Turkey did not play an active role in the prereferendum processes in Montenegro, the shifts, both in terms of its leadership’s turn away from Serbian nationalist policies and thus the expression of interest in the NATO alliance, and in terms of the entrance of political parties representing minorities into the government, suggested that preconditions for closer cooperation between the two countries were being met. The fact that the government had to lean on support from the Bosniak Party was probably crucial in speeding up Turkish involvement in the country, as internal changes proved once again adaptable to foreign evolvement (Vuki´cevi´c, 2017: 133). Although the Bosniak Party (along with the other parties representing national minorities) briefly went into opposition after the 2020 elections, the messages from the highest state officials of Montenegro remained the same. Thus, the president of the Montenegrin Parliament Aleksa Beˇci´c in 2021 called relations between the two countries “excellent” and “strong” (Ozturk, 2021), and the respective foreign ministers met in Brussels and agreed on further cooperation in areas such as tourism and fighting the Covid-19 pandemic (Alhas, 2021).

3 The Two Tracks of Turkish Relations with Montenegro: Montenegrin Muslims and the Montenegrin Government The role of Islam in Turkey’s foreign policy is worthy of consideration, especially in terms of the unique connection between secularism and Islam. In the Turkish socioeconomic context, the relationship between religion and politics is a dynamic process, characterized by constant changes, often referred to as a “Turkish style of secularism.” This creates a social reality in which believers who are culturally conservative promote secularism in society, while those who consider themselves modernists and secularists take firmly conservative political views. This paradox is the result of the constant dynamics of politics and religion, which directs the flow of politics in Turkey, as well as of its foreign policy, and indeed, the AKP’s coming

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to power further exposed such contradictions. Thus, the initial consensus among liberals, those on the center-right, and those conservatives who supported the AKP, was established on the basis of an attempt to balance the secularism of the Kemalist period with a deviation from the singular and restrictive policies from that period (Yavuz & Öztürk, 2019: 5). The complex and at times contested history opens the door to two different approaches toward the Western Balkans—a purely political, temporary, and variable term, coined to avoid any association with the former Yugoslav state and to depict countries in the wider Balkan region which have not yet joined the EU. Three of its states—Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—are predominantly Muslim, and the other three—Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia—although being predominantly Christian Orthodox, have strong Muslim minorities. Their presence is the outcome of the long process of Islamization, brought by the Ottomans, with different results from one country to another. This suggests two pathways or two levels of relations between Turkey and these countries’ governments, but also between Turkey and their Muslim populations, and their political representatives. According to the 2011 census, Muslims account for 19.1 percent of the population of Montenegro; they include a majority of Slavic Muslims (either declared as Bosniaks, Muslims by nationality, which was a term coined during the communist era, or Montenegrins of Islamic faith), and a minority of Albanians (roughly onefifth of all Montenegrin Muslims), as well as some Roma (Atlantic Initiative, 2020: 6). Unlike in some other Balkan countries such as Bulgaria, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, there is no authentic Turkish population living in Montenegro, save for some new arrivals who have settled over the last decade. Thus, the most obvious link between the two countries is the Montenegrin Muslims, who are not ethnically related to Turks but still, as the consequence of emigration many of them have relatives in Turkey (Rastoder, 2018: 131–132). Institutionally, Turkish influence is mostly channeled through two structures, the Islamic Community in Montenegro and the Bosniak Party (Jankovi´c, 2016). The Bosniak Party, the main party representing Bosniaks in Montenegro, cultivates close links with Turkey, especially with the AKP leadership. They consider themselves a bridge between the two countries, and frequent visits by various Bosniak officials to Turkey are often accompanied by financial support and Turkish investment. The regions where Muslims are concentrated in Montenegro, notably the country’s northeast areas, tend to be less developed and mostly depopulated, so support from Turkey and diaspora communities living in Turkey is very important. By keeping close relations with the Islamic Community of Montenegro, Turkey wants to come across as a protector of Muslims, particularly in those areas where they are a minority and where they may feel vulnerable. The fact that it was the Ottomans who brought Islam to the Balkan Muslims—unlike the case of some other formerly Ottoman possessions (including certain Arab countries)—makes the religious link even more special (Buturovic, 2006: 97; Fine, 1996: 11). While their ethnic roots and the language are completely different from those of Turkey, there are many similarities between Bosniaks and Muslim Albanians on the one hand, and the Turks on the other, which are based not only on tradition and customs, which are usually

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shared with many Christians in the Balkans, but above all on religious and historic ties. With this in mind, some of the issues that are better avoided in communication with the Montenegrin government or other governments of Balkan countries with a Christian Orthodox majority, such as the issue of the Ottoman conquests and Islamic faith, are rather emphasized when dealing with the Bosniaks and, to a certain extent, the Muslim Albanians, and their respective representatives. Therefore, two different approaches exist when Turks are dealing with their partners in Montenegro, and these approaches differ in what they emphasize, but as minority parties mostly identify with Montenegro and as they participate in the country’s government, they do not collide. One crucial moment illustrating the ties between the Montenegrin Muslims and Turkey, but also of major relevance for the deepening of relations between both the Montenegrin government and the Islamic Community and Turkey, was the signature of the Agreement on the Regulation of Relations of Common Interest between the government of Montenegro and the Islamic Community in Montenegro. It was signed in 2012, following the earlier Basic Agreement with the Holy See, and preceding a similar agreement, signed shortly after with the Jewish Community (Vuki´cevi´c, 2014: 107–109). The questions of why the agreements were signed before the new Law on Religious Communities was adopted, and why the agreements were signed with smaller religious communities before being signed with the largest community by far (the Serbian Orthodox Church), are beyond the scope of this analysis and will not be discussed in detail. Still, these decisions have had political consequences, since they triggered a string of turbulent and controversial events that facilitated the fall of the Montenegrin government almost a decade later (Hafner, 2020; RTCG, 2021a). In any case, the fact that the agreements with these other communities, including the Islamic Community, were negotiated and signed relatively easily and almost without any obstacle, showed that the government saw them as partners or even allies, while it simultaneously adopted a more hostile attitude vis-à-vis the Serbian Orthodox Church. The agreement cites the attachment of the Islamic Community in Montenegro to Turkey from the very beginning; as per the preamble, the Islamic Community of Montenegro relies on the tradition of Sheikh-ul-Islam in Istanbul. Going forward, according to Article 5, the government guarantees the Islamic Community the freedom of communication and preservation of historical ties with communities in other countries, especially with the Islamic Community in the Republic of Turkey (Vlada Crne Gore, 2012). Thus, while there are many Islamic Communities— including those in various neighboring countries—only the Turkish community was singled out, stressing the special nature of the relationship and the kind of protector status the Turkish community (and the Turkish state) has for Montenegrin Muslims. This role is even more emphasized in Article 23, according to which the Islamic Community in Montenegro agrees that if a problem arises in the community itself, it cannot be resolved on its own, but that arbitration would be conducted by the Islamic Community of Turkey, which will then submit a proposed solution to the government of Montenegro in a confidential manner. Thus, the Turkish Islamic Community is involved, serving as an arbiter, in internal matters related to the Islamic Community

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of Montenegro, and it thus operates as a partner in a triangular relationship, which also includes the government of Montenegro. Turkish influence over the Muslim community is reinforced by the fact that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates still wield relatively little religious influence in Montenegro (Beckmann-Dierkes, 2018: 36). The Montenegrin (mostly Bosniak-Muslim) diaspora in Turkey is numerous, as many Muslims left Montenegro for Turkey during the twentieth century. As a result of the Balkan Wars, then in the era of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the later communist rule, and finally the Yugoslav crisis, thousands of Muslims from Yugoslav lands decided to settle in Turkey. From the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until 1970, different data, although incomplete, suggest that Turkey received over 1.5 million Muslims from the Balkans. On the other hand, based on the data from 1913 to 1997, it is estimated that over 300,000 Muslims from Yugoslavia emigrated to Turkey (Baklacıo˘glu, 2015: 50). The estimates differ significantly as detailed records were not kept of either emigrants or immigrants (Rastoder, 2018: 35). While the most numerous were Bosnian Muslims, Kosovo Albanians, and Turks and Albanians from Macedonia, there were also numerous Montenegrin Muslims, mostly from the northern parts of Montenegro (Bandžovi´c, 2011: 146–147). In 1989, they organized around the emigrants from Yugoslavia, later renamed the Bosna-Sancak Association, whose many members originated from northern Montenegro. When in January 2008 the Montenegrin foreign minister Milan Ro´cen became the first senior official of Montenegro to visit Turkey, three agreements were signed, including protocols on cooperation between the two foreign ministries and their diplomatic academies, as well as an agreement on abolishing visas for all type of passports holders in both countries (Vlada Crne Gore, 2008). This agreement helped mutual relations, as at that time both countries’ citizens required visas to enter most European countries, including EU Member States. Mutual visits continued, and in 2009 the Turkish president Abdullah Gül visited Montenegro for the first time, leading a large group of Turkish entrepreneurs attending the first forum on economic cooperation and investments between Turkey and Montenegro. Political and diplomatic interest was also put forward through other high-level visits, including those of foreign minister Davuto˘glu in 2009, 2011, and 2013, and foreign minister Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu in 2017 and 2020. However, although announced on several occasions, president Erdo˘gan’s visit to Montenegro took place only in 2021 (CDM, 2020; European Western Balkans, 2017; RTCG, 2021b). The fact that, for a long time, he has managed to visit all Montenegro’s neighbors but Montenegro, with some of his trips involving a rather robust program (such as the one to Serbia, which included a large rally in Novi Pazar) sends a signal that the overall interest in Montenegro might actually be less when compared to its larger neighbors. On the other hand, the highest Montenegrin officials frequently visit Turkey, usually with palpable results; for example, prime minister Igor Lukši´c’s 2012 visit was marked by five agreements being signed, related to labor, air traffic, social security, and foreign investments. At one point, the rhetoric accompanying high-level meetings gained a unique momentum, so much so that Mustafa Sentop, ¸ Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, assessed mutual relations between the two countries

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as not merely friendly, but fraternal (Mina News, 2020). For two terms, Sentop ¸ served as the Chair of the Turkey-Montenegro Parliamentary Friendship Group (Pobjeda, 2021), and some argued that the relations between the two countries represented “a special relationship” (Vescotto, 2020). For example, while emphasizing the importance of the Muslim population for Turkey, foreign minister Çavu¸so˘glu said that “the comfort of our Muslim brothers in Montenegro is also our comfort. Every Montenegrin Muslim has relatives in Turkey. Muslims and our kin societies are one of our foreign policy priorities” (Radio Free Europe, 2020).

4 The Growth of Economic and Cultural Relations Economic cooperation and trade are identified as priority areas in the relationship between Turkey and Montenegro (Osvrt, 2019). In May 2007, the Office of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA) opened in Montenegro, and since then, it has realized more than three hundred projects in the field of agriculture, culture, education, health, religion, and other areas. By contrast, the T˙IKA office in Serbia was inaugurated two years later (RTS, 2019), and has been involved in a smaller number of projects overall even though it has received more money, which points out the comparative rise of Turkish interests in Montenegro. As in other fields, it is also visible through T˙IKA activities that there are two levels of involvement. On the one hand, T˙IKA supported various projects related to the reconstruction and conservation of buildings which represent Ottoman heritage (such as the Clock Tower, one of the symbols of the Montenegrin capital city, Podgorica) or the Islamic faith more generally. Turkey has also supported the health system and educational infrastructure in Montenegrin regions where Muslims make up a large part of the population (Omeragic, 2019; Portal Crna Gora Turska, 2014; TRT, 2015). By supporting these usually underdeveloped areas, Turkey strengthens its presence among the Muslim population and sends them a message that it is out there for them. In addition, T˙IKA is involved in many other projects which do not have any direct link with either Turkish heritage in Montenegro or its Muslim population, which is a sign of Ankara’s determination to reinforce the relations with the country as a whole and to solidify the image of Turkey as a friend and close partner of Montenegro. The most significant Turkish investment in Montenegro came from Gintas Construction Contracting & Trade, with a $50 million Mall of Montenegro in Podgorica, being one of the largest retail centers in the country (SEEBTM, 2011). In addition, the Turkish company Tosçelik bought Nikši´c Steel Mill, and Global Ports bought a part of Montenegrin’s most important port, Bar (Capital.ba, 2013). Although the Montenegrin market is saturated with commercial banks, the Turkish Ziraat Bank entered it as it opened its branch on the main street of the capital city. Moreover, Turkish manufacturers Do˘gta¸s, Enza Home (part of Yata¸s Group), and LC Waikiki entered the Montenegrin market. Furthermore, in 2016, the Turkish Net Holding Company signed the agreement on a takeover of the management of the

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casino in the upmarket Splendid Hotel in Beˇci´ci, and opened new casinos in the Avala Hotel in Budva and the Hilton Hotel in Podgorica. While Turkey was not among the leading countries regarding foreign investment (being the tenth largest investor in Montenegro in 2019–2020), it ranks top on the list of countries of origin of foreign-owned companies in Montenegro. Almost 30 percent of all foreign owners in Montenegro in 2019 were Turkish citizens or companies, which was a major jump from less than 10 percent back in 2017. In pure numbers, there were 3,662 Turkish-owned companies registered in Montenegro, while in 2016 there were only 71, and during 2019 alone the rise was 47.8 percent (Miladinovi´c, 2020). One of the reasons behind this is due to low taxes, easy registration, and the symbolic level of required initial capital. The number of Turkish companies is already greater than, for example, the number of Serbian or Russian companies that have long been at the top (Marovic, 2020). The target cities are Podgorica and Budva, a major seaside destination, which also boasts a number of Turkish shops selling leather, jewelry, souvenirs, and Turkish delicacies (Kulidzan, 2018). Additionally, a few thousand Turkish citizens have decided to settle in Montenegro, citing the economic and political advantages and various similarities between the two peoples and cultures (Tomovi´c, 2019). Also mentioned is the host country’s NATO membership and European perspective, and the rather difficult political and economic climate back in Turkey (Kulidzan, 2018). Turkish imports into Montenegro rose 66 percent in 2019, reaching $131.5 million, with the goal of foreign trade between the two to reach $250 million in 2022 (Biogradlija, 2020; Buyuk, 2020). The growing Turkish presence is a quite visible phenomenon, as billboards and neon signs advertising real estate and car hire offer in the Turkish language, having replaced those previously seen in Russian and English (Al Jazeera, 2019). The political and diplomatic importance of Turkey to Montenegro was also proved by the opening of a consulate general in Istanbul—one out of four that it has worldwide (the other three being in Frankfurt, New York City, and Sremski Karlovci in Vojvodina, Serbia). As its diplomatic network is not well developed, characterized by a lack of human and financial resources, Montenegro usually relies on honorary consuls, and it has also opened honorary consulates in various Turkish cities including Antalya, Gaziantep, Iskenderun, Istanbul, and Izmir (RTCG, 2021c). Cooperation is also evident between the local communities, as there are several towns that have signed twinning agreements; the two capitals became sister cities in 2019 (Vijesti, 2019). As a matter of appreciation, a street in Ankara is named after Podgorica, while a new boulevard in Podgorica was named Ankara Boulevard. The symbol of the Turkish capital city, Atakule Tower, was illuminated in the colors of the Montenegrin flag on May 21, 2021, to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of Montenegrin independence (Brljavac, 2021). Over the last two decades, Turkish cultural influence has become much more present across Europe and throughout the world—a change closely associated with the country’s political and economic profile (Çevik, 2019: 64). The first Nobel Prize in Literature awarded to a Turkish writer went to Orhan Pamuk in 2006. His successes led to a greater interest in and translation of Turkish literature across the Western Balkans. While Turkish cinema did score a few important awards before (“Susuz

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Yaz” [Dry Summer] won the Golden Bear in Berlin in 1965, and “Yol” [The Road] won the Palme d’Or in Cannes in 1982), it appears that only at the start of the 2000s did Turkish cinema become consistently present and acclaimed. The director Nuri Bilge Ceylan received the Grand Prix in Cannes in 2003 for “Uzak” [Distant] and in 2011 for “Bir Zamanlar Anadolu’da” [Once Upon a Time in Anatolia], as well as the Best Director Award in 2008 for “Üç Maymun” [Three Monkeys], before winning the Palme d’Or for “Kis Uykusu” [Winter Sleep] in 2014. Other directors, such as Semih Kaplano˘glu, who won the Golden Bear in 2010 for “Bal” [Honey], or the German-Turkish Fatih Akin, who received the same award in 2004 for “Duvara Kar¸sı” [Head-On] have also become well-known figures of world cinema. Turkey has also scored well in other fields, where an even wider audience was reached; for example, having won the Eurovision Song Contest in 2003, it hosted the event in 2004, and it has also marked successes in popular sports, by securing third place at the 2002 World Cup, and by having a basketball team as the runner-up at the 2001 European Championship and 2010 World Championship, both hosted by Turkey itself. All of this brought it even closer to the Balkans—states and peoples alike. Further to the world-renowned successes, some other soft power means have surely helped solidify Turkish ties with the Balkans. More than elsewhere, this has become visible through Turkish TV series, particularly soap operas, with some of them being placed in specific historic contexts that simultaneously made it possible for Turkey to rewrite its own history (Isaev, 2020). The presence of Turkish soap operas is not so surprising if we consider the fact that Turkey has been present, although on a lesser scale, in the world of broadcasting in the Balkans since 1969, when Turkish television programs were made available in Macedonia. Various soft power studies regard such trends as relevant when analyzing the impact of culture (Soydan & Yusuf, 2018: 163). Turkish TV stars have become extremely popular and their visits to the region are seen as major events. TV series, from “Binbir Gece” [One Thousand and One Nights] and “Yaprak Dökümü” [The Falling Leaves], to “Muhte¸sem Yüzyıl” [Magnificent Century], known through the Balkans as Suleiman the Magnificent, to “Fatmagül’ün Suçu Ne?” [What is Fatmagül’s crime?], translated as Lost Honor), have attracted a large audience throughout the region. One of the highlights was the singing of the folk song “Sejdefu majka budaše” [Seydefa’s Mother Wakes Her Up] in an episode of “Magnificent Century,” a song popular throughout the Balkans, particularly in Montenegro. One of the characters in the show was Ta¸slicali Yahyâ bey, a real historic personality, originally from Ta¸slıca or contemporary Pljevlja in Montenegro, which points out to the shared history between Turkey and the area of today’s Montenegro. All the above contains a strong symbolic value—through television, the Turkish language and Turkish people, and what is their culture and traditions, have entered hundreds of thousands of households in the region. Suddenly, many Montenegrins would be able to see that the Turkish way of life is actually much less different from what many imagined to be the case. They were also able to listen to the language and spot many similar words, to watch examples of everyday lifestyle in Turkish homes and to realize that their customs are similar, to learn more about Turkish cuisine and its strong influence on Montenegrin cuisine, and to be exposed to the

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beauties of Istanbul and other cities and landscapes of Turkey. In fact, it has become a major tourist destination, with tours to Istanbul being supplemented with visits to places featured in different TV programs, alongside the real historic locations such as Topkapı and Dolmabahçe. Turkish Airlines introduced and then gradually increased the number of regular flights between Podgorica and Istanbul, making Turkey much more accessible to Montenegro than ever before. Even during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Turkish carrier continued with its travel services, with a short break due to the total lockdown. Thus, when almost all other companies decided to stop flying to Montenegro Turkish Airlines continued, which somehow provided Istanbul with additional credibility as a transit point for travelers to Montenegro and those from Montenegro who were going to Western Europe or the Western Hemisphere. For many in Montenegro, Istanbul has come to represent a window to the world. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, Turkey was one of the first countries to offer assistance to the Balkan countries. For example, in April 2020, a Turkish military plane donated medical aid (test kits, face masks, and protective medical suits) to Montenegro. The so-called Covid diplomacy further stressed Turkey’s interest in the Western Balkans, including Montenegro. Analysis, albeit from a short distance in relation to the pandemic, shows that the Western Balkan region, through Covid diplomacy, might act as a new place of interaction and cooperation between the EU and Turkey (some sort of rapprochement) (Lika, 2020: 8). This is possible for at least two reasons, one stemming from the fact that Turkey has strong historical and cultural ties with the Balkans, and therefore this is the area where Ankara can project its soft power to the greatest extent, and one stemming from the Euro-Atlantic agenda of the Western Balkan countries, which is strongly supported by Turkey and the Brussels administration. In addition, by sharing a common strategy in relation to the Western Balkans, Turkey, and the EU are trying to minimize the influence of China and Russia in this area (Lika, 2020: 9). This aspect of Turkish soft power and public diplomacy can also be considered one of the concepts of the new Turkish foreign policy as shaped by Davuto˘glu, according to whom, the strengthening of Turkey’s role as a donor country should stand out. The donor narrative predominantly derived from investment and provision of assistance, and with this in mind, T˙IKA has been a key player. Moreover, the donor approach and implementation of initiatives covered by it is perhaps the most successful part of the foreign policy of the AKP era (Ek¸si, 2016: 49). To consolidate Turkey’s cultural role in Montenegro, the Yunus Emre Institute was opened in Podgorica in 2014. Since then, it has pursued many activities, focused on the promotion and popularization of Turkish culture and language courses. Cultural and scientific cooperation was formally launched through the signature of agreements between national institutions; for example, an agreement between the two National Archives was signed in 2011 and, given the vast amount of sources accompanying the long shared history, such an initiative paves the way to fresh research projects, especially those requiring Ottoman-era documents that are yet to be brought to light (Daily Sabah, 2016). The two national academies, the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA) and the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts (CANU) also cooperate, with the latter having published a series of books of Ottoman sources on

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˙ Montenegro, and the eminent Turkish historian Ilber Ortaylı was elected a foreign member of CANU. Other institutions, such as the Supreme Court of Montenegro and the Court of Cassation of Turkey have also developed closer ties (Vrhovni sud Crne Gore, 2020). On the other hand, Diyanet, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which is another institution that Turkey uses for public diplomacy, is not present in Montenegro; still, in 2021 Diyanet was the coordinator, together with the Turkish Embassy in Podgorica, of the financial assistance provided to build a mosque and an Islamic cultural center in Bijelo Polje, a municipality in northern Montenegro. The groundbreaking ceremony was attended by Professor Ali Erba¸s, the president of Diyanet, who conveyed president Erdo˘gan’s greetings to the Muslim sisters and brothers in Montenegro (Diyanet, 2021). Cooperation in the field of education has grown enormously, notably with regard to the number of Montenegrin students receiving scholarships to study language or pursue undergraduate and postgraduate studies in Turkey (Tahirovic, 2014: 74). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were Montenegrins who studied in Istanbul, but later on, the interest seemed to disappear. Nowadays, as the result of investments, hundreds of Montenegrins have degrees acquired in Turkey, and as they return to their homeland upon completion of their studies they form an important link between the two countries. In 2018, the Montenegrin Association of Turkish Alumni (MASAT) was inaugurated (Jovanovi´c, 2019; Karastanovi´c, 2021). Besides cooperation between Montenegrin and Turkish universities, among its goals are the promotion of Turkish culture in Montenegro, as well as promoting Montenegro in Turkish institutions (Omeragic, 2018a). On December 4, 2018, when the MASAT office was opened, Abudallah Eren, president of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, emphasized its importance for relations between the two countries, while the Turkish ambassador in Montenegro Serhat Galip called the alumni “the best ambassadors of Turkey in Montenegro” (Omeragic, 2018b). Based on research conducted by the Organization of Montenegrin Students Abroad in 2019, over 1,400 Montenegrin students were studying in other countries, with Turkey being ranked second after Italy (Ozan, 2019). Montenegro has always recognized Turkey as a well-established NATO member, and the support Ankara provided to Podgorica’s path to NATO membership, which was finalized in 2017. The two countries’ navies held their first joint exercise in 2009, and have continued their cooperation ever since (Lukovi´c, 2015; Radio Jadran, 2019). Military cooperation has continued to improve, as also expressed through the 2019 Military Financial Cooperation Agreement. In Ankara, the agreement was signed “with a view to further strengthen the military cooperation within the scope of longstanding friendly relations” and also “to contribute to restructuring of the Armed Forces of Montenegro” (Vlada Crne Gore, 2019). Indeed, there are no major diplomatic issues that may endanger the stability of relations between the two. Despite certain unfounded claims, Montenegro is not considered a shelter for Gülenists, and there are no Hizmet schools in the country, unlike in some neighboring states. The Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu expressed his gratitude to Montenegro and its citizens for not supporting “a coup d’état against the president” and not “providing refuge to putschists” (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2020). Montenegro has

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refrained from criticizing Turkish government actions with regard to various issues, ranging from minority rights to the alleged targeting of journalists and increasing signs of authoritarianism in different situations, whereas these actions have been heavily criticized by the EU and some Western countries (Deutsche Welle, 2018; EURACTIV, 2021; Gourlay, 2021; The Guardian, 2020). Like president Erdo˘gan, the Montenegrin president Ðukanovi´c has switched between prime-ministership and presidential functions, remaining for most of the time his party leader. Podgorica has no problems with Ankara over the Israel/Palestine question. Montenegro does not maintain too-close relations with Israel, and, unlike most Western European countries, it has recognized Palestine, which has an embassy in Podgorica (Israel has a non-residential ambassador, with its seat in Belgrade, and Montenegro also has a non-resident ambassador in Israel). As such, there have been no problems similar to those between Turkey and Kosovo concerning the opening of a Kosovar embassy in Jerusalem, which led to an unusual row between Ankara and Prishtina. Montenegro enjoys close economic relations with Azerbaijan, a close Turkish ally and another major investor in Montenegro (Pejovi´c, 2020). On the other hand, relations with Armenia are not, unlike during the Soviet-Yugoslav era, particularly substantive. Montenegro remains, along with other post-Yugoslav states, in the diminishing group of European countries not to officially recognize the crimes committed against the Armenians in the early twentieth century as genocide. The reason behind this is not the nature of Western Balkan states’ relations with Armenia (the Armenian diaspora in the former Yugoslavia was minimal), as much as their fear of damaging the existing economic cooperation with Turkey. Moreover, in Montenegro, where the government has already depended on the Bosniak Party, the stability of the government could easily be jeopardized by such recognition. However, since the Bosniak Party has not participated in the government 2020– 2022, there were certain hints suggesting that the above issue may be put in front of the members of the parliament, seen mainly as a way of countering the recognition of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre as genocide. Being a small country with a heterogeneous population, Montenegro remains sensitive to foreign influences. Given its history, it is not surprising that Turkey and Russia, among others, seek a stronger foothold in Montenegro. This might have a mitigating effect on its home affairs. With the Bosniak Party being close to Turkey and with the pro-Serbian and Serbian parties projecting Russophile attitudes, it is preferable for Montenegro and the Balkans overall that the conflict and competition between these two regional powers does not spill over into their own lands. Still, the somewhat ambiguous attitude of the Montenegrin public toward Turkey is found in the Center for Insight in Survey Research’s Survey of 2017, which showed that 42 percent of respondents agreed that strong relations with Turkey served Montenegrin interests, whereas 28 percent disagreed (similar numbers to those for the US), and 7 percent thought that Turkey was the biggest foreign donor to Montenegro (comparable to 11 percent who chose the US, 9 percent who chose Russia and China each, and 6 percent who chose Germany). Quite interestingly, Turkey also came second among the least preferable countries to invest in Montenegro, with 12 percent (Center for Insights in Survey Research, 2017).

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5 Conclusion The initial interactions between the Ottoman Empire and Montenegro date back to the fourteenth century and until the second half of the nineteenth century, they were dominated by cycles of conflict. Since 1496, it was a relationship between a rebellious province, gradually transformed into an autonomous and then a small de facto state, and a great empire. The heritage of this centuries-long conflict is still present in the historical narrative of Montenegro; this is of course much less the case in Turkey, as its relations with Montenegro represented a tiny piece of a much bigger mosaic. After the formal recognition of Montenegrin independence in 1878, diplomatic relations were established and even then, merely a few years after the end of the lengthy struggle, it was obvious that the two countries had many things in common. However, the Balkan Wars finally ended relations between them. Turkish presence in what was Montenegro was insignificant, and it mostly remained so throughout the difficult years of the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia, when Montenegro formed a union with Serbia and aligned with it politically. Changes of the early twenty-first century brought mutual interest to the forefront, with Montenegro being ready to reset its foreign policy, regain independence, and prioritize EU and NATO memberships. Turkey, on the other hand, renewed its interest in the Western Balkans, with Montenegro being one of the points of reference, both because of its relatively large Muslim community and its government policies which supported Turkish involvement. They agreed a common ground for further development by attracting Turkish investment, Turkish-owned small private companies, and Turkish soft power means of different sorts. Indeed, ever since the re-emergence of Montenegro as an independent state in 2006, the relations between Ankara and Podgorica have witnessed an upward trajectory, and there have been no real obstacles. Both have experienced a long-lasting, one-party rule—the AKP in Turkey and the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) in Montenegro. Their dominance, either alone or together with ideological allies, under the authoritative leadership of Erdo˘gan and Ðukanovi´c, contributed to the stability of relations between Turkey and Montenegro. However, as in any multiparty system, the grip on power of ruling parties in both countries was already challenged, with the AKP having suffered setbacks in major cities in local elections and the DPS having finally lost its power in the August 2020 parliamentary elections. While changes in the political subjects forming the government might put the trajectory of mutual relations into question, it appears that the Montenegrin government between 2020 and 2022 (without any Bosniak or Albanian parties, yet supported by numerous parties, including those of pro-Serbian and pro-Russian orientation), as well as the current one, has not considered altering its foreign policy principles, including its partnership with Turkey. The solid relations between them have worked well for both, and the similarities in customs and traditions, their Mediterranean identity as well as the importance of tourism for both countries’ economies, NATO membership, and good traffic connections, among other things, will probably continue to underpin relations between Ankara and Podgorica

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despite possible changes in either countries’ political setting or in the overall regional preferences.

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Modern Turkey and Its Foreign Policy Shift Toward Albania in the Post-Cold War Era Perparim Xhaferi

Turkey’s foreign policy shifts toward the Western Balkans are not a new phenomenon. Since the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the country has experienced a range of interesting swings. Sympathizers of two main blocks, secular Republican and Islamic Ottoman ideologies, are monitored by the army and its powerful generals that have often intervened to take the lead of the country. Turkey is also known as an eastern NATO member with strong connection to the eastern powers such as Russia and China. Turkish politics and its foreign policy in the twenty-first century are unpredictable and it seems the country will march on both sides at the same time, Western and Eastern civilization, democratic and authoritarian rules, Ottoman Islamic and secular Republic policies. However, there is a common issue, which brings together all sides of Turkish politics and its foreign policy—the move toward the Western Balkans, where Albania carries out a special role. Accordingly, this chapter will explore complexities surrounding Turkish identity and will aim to shed light on modern politics in Turkey and Ankara’s policy toward the Western Balkans in the post-Cold War context. While Turkey’s benefit in coming closer to the region may be linked to its imperial past, it will be useful to examine whether the new and fragile Albanian democracy still requires Turkish political and economic support, and especially its defense mechanisms in a continuously struggling Balkan region. However, it remains to be seen how these developments will affect the Euro-Atlantic vision of Albania. With this in mind, the present paper also considers the following questions: what are Turkey and Albania likely to gain from further strengthening of bilateral relations, and can such a move create additional complications for Albania when the country’s European “dream” seems still far away?

P. Xhaferi (B) EU Centre of Excellence, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_11

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1 Turkish Modern Identity and Civilization Turkey’s Ottoman past was largely responsible for a general perception that Turks were Easterners. However, the father of modern Turkey and the president of the first Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, managed to launch a new era. This fresh post-Ottoman movement was also inspired by the famous sentence of the late Ottoman intellectual, Abdullah Cevdet, who insisted that “[c]ivilization means European civilization” (Rustow, 1987: 14). Atatürk and his followers praised European civilization that, following Cevdet’s thought, “must be imported [to Turkey] with both its roses and thorns” (Rustow, 1987: 14). Atatürk introduced some rigid and pragmatic reforms, determined to secularize Turkish polity and society through separating the state from religion in a similar way to what occurred in some Western countries. However, it has been argued that reforms such as abolition of the Caliphate, replacement of religious courts with secular counterparts, introduction of a Westernstyle education system, substitution of the traditional Arabic-Islamic scripts with the Latin alphabet, and adoption of the European theater, music, and law codes from different European countries aimed only to reform Islam (Heper, 2004: 5). Nevertheless, Atatürk’s attempts to bring Western culture closer to Turkey and his legacy was challenged and questioned soon after his death in 1938. Soon after the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 debates related to religion and Turkish identity—two issues linked to each other—reappeared in Turkish politics and society. Religion has divided the Turks into two political groups: those who subscribe to a secular, republican view, known as Kemalists and those who side with Islamic neo-Ottoman views. Hence, Ankara will be careful to “balance its neoOttoman and Kemalist instincts” (Taspinar, 2008: 28). For Hakan Yavuz (1998: 27), from 1947 to 1974 Turkey’s foreign policy was driven by a new “statist elite” who tried to split the Ottoman era from the modern-day republican Turkey, by portraying the former as founded on Islamic ideology. However, as this scholar has argued, the policy of “disengagement” with Islam created a considerable gap between the general populace and the Turkish elite. Perhaps the radical reform of Islam, in such a short period of time, was a very ambitious task. Nonetheless, Turkey’s new elite aimed to join the European integrationist project—a decision that was reinforced after December 1, 1964, when Turkey became an associate member of the European Economic Community (more recently, the EU) (Mango, 2004: 258). The decision to join NATO in 1952 was a perfect moment to end Turkey’s long struggle of being portrayed as anti-European and anti-Western, and since then, it developed positive relations with Western Europe and the US until 1974, when Turkey invaded and occupied Northern Cyprus, ultimately subjecting Ankara to economic and military sanctions. However, NATO membership did not stop Turkey’s first coup in 1960, which was followed by the US ban on the provision of spare military parts and logistics; declining the capacity of the Turkish military (Erickson, 2004: 26). The embargo ended in 1980 when the Americans realized the

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importance of Turkey as an ally against the Soviet Union, but also a secular and pro-Western Islamic state (Erickson, 2004: 27). A second military coup occurred in 1980; relative normality was reestablished in 1985 and since then, the Turkish state has been in the hands of “conservative, moderate, and Islamic parties” (Erickson, 2004: 27).

1.1 Turkish Domestic Politics in the Twenty-First Century: Restoring Islamism and Neo-Ottomanism For some Turks Islam represents a bridge with the Ottoman past and brings back memories of those times when Turkey enjoyed relative prestige. In the twenty-first century a new Turkish middle class, close to the government, has embraced Islam as an ideological tool, aiming to craft a new Turkish national identity. Concepts of “neoOttomanism” and “Islamism” which are linked to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) started to flourish. From 2001, when the current Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan founded the AKP—which came to power in 2002—the country’s political and religious orientation began to change. The AKP was established on the foundations of a moderate Islamic ideology and united several existing conservative parties; as such, it has been successful in five consecutive elections in 2002, 2007, 2011, 2015, and the presidential elections of 2018. It is somewhat paradoxical that for nearly two decades Turkey has been led by the AKP, a party that in appearance seems to rush toward reforms and EU accession, while on the other hand, it is discovering values of Islam and the Ottoman glory (Özel, 2007: 21). Some believe that Turkey is not aiming to resurrect the Ottoman Empire but rather to extrapolate influence in a way that bolsters Turkey as “a bridge between East and West, a Muslim nation, a secular state, a democratic political system, and a capitalistic economic force” (Taspinar, 2008: 3). Nonetheless, the April 2016 declaration of the Turkish head of Parliament, ˙Ismail Kahraman, stating that Turkey is “a Muslim country and this is why we need an Islamic constitution” does not leave any room for speculation. He was immediately criticized by the opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu who argued that the father of modern Turkey, Atatürk, built the state based on laicism and religious freedom. It is questionable whether Turkey has achieved any separation of religion and state to date. What appears clear is the fact that Erdo˘gan’s center-right, AKP is an Islamic party wishing to keep Turkey away from the West. During the parliamentary and presidential elections in June 2018, the AKP lost its controlling majority in the assembly after nearly sixteen years, and was now having to rely on the support of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) that outperformed expectations to win more than 11 percent of votes (Reuters, 2018). The extreme-right MHP has espoused a mix of nationalism and skepticism toward the West, which has come to complement the Islamic ideology of the AKP. The opposition group led by the center-left Kemalists or the Republican People’s Party (CHP) allied before the 2018 elections with the

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pro-European Iyi Party and the Sunni far-right conservative Saadet Party (Reuters, 2018). However, opposition parties have found it difficult to challenge Erdo˘gan. The pro-Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) was not part of an alliance and earned 11.7 percent of votes to become the assembly’s second-largest opposition party after the CHP. Domestically and internationally, criticism continues to rise regarding Erdo˘gan’s move toward abandoning the West and aligning Turkey with the Middle East by using sectarian politics to help him turn himself into a regional leader—a sort of “new caliph” or the leader of the Islamic world (Aksoy, 2015). The AKP’s neo-Ottoman approach “seeks to rise above … Kemalist paradigm” (Taspinar, 2008: 3), by portraying a sort of Muslim “macro-identity among populations that share the Ottoman Islamic heritage” (Yavuz, 1998: 40).

1.2 Turkey’s Foreign policy: Joining the European Union or Becoming the Western Balkan Leader? The AKP has sought to convince the Turkish people that the EU is not the only alternative. In fact, the deadlock between Ankara and the Brussels administration has gone through a rollercoaster journey, with the EU expecting Turkey to resolve its issues with Cyprus as well as to make progress in terms of human rights, media freedom, and the fight against corruption. Nevertheless, the question to be asked is whether Turkey will wait for the EU to eventually include it as a member state or whether it will redirect its focus toward the alternative of becoming a regional leader? EU membership represents not only an aspiration but also a challenge for the Ankara authorities (Mango, 2004: 4). Since 2015, Turkey’s leverage toward the EU has increased due to Europe’s difficulties to accommodate large numbers of refugees fleeing ISIS and the Syrian war; so far, Turkey has received the largest number of Syrian refugees, performing the role of a buffer zone for Europe. It was a crucial player for the NATO forces using the proximity of its bases to defeat ISIS and the Syrian regime. Finally, Erdo˘gan’s decision not to condemn Russia’s war in Ukraine and the deal of buying Russian defense armaments is another indication of Turkey’s aim to decrease the appetite of joining the EU and replace it with the desire of becoming a regional leader. Despite the Middle-Eastern countries, restoring control over the Western Balkans is a common denominator for all sides of Turkish politics. They support Ankara’s foreign policy toward the region, especially relations with Albania. Although postimperial relations with the region have been good since the creation of modern Turkey, some believe that the twenty-first-century trends “have never been more intensive since the foundation of the Turkish Republic” (Petrovi´c & Relji´c, 2011: 169). The speech of the former foreign minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu, delivered at the conference Ottoman Legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities in Sarajevo in 2009, is described as a shift in Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans. A year later, Davuto˘glu revealed the country’s twenty-first-century foreign policy, known for its slogan “zero problems

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with neighbors.” As per the so-called Davuto˘glu doctrine, “Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade: First, it aims to achieve all EU membership conditions and become an influential EU member state by 2023. Second, it will continue to strive for regional integration, in the form of security and economic cooperation. Third, it will seek to play an influential role in regional conflict resolution” (Davuto˘glu, 2010). While Turkey joining the EU by 2023 has proved unrealistic, its engagement with the Western Balkan countries is notable. It seems that in the twenty-first century, Davuto˘glu’s previous dogmas regarding the revival of the Ottoman glory in the region have matured into a neo-Ottoman platform based on “religious nationalism” (Parllaku, 2016). For some observers, Turkey “has leverage and increasing capacities in the Western Balkans,” which must be accepted and recognized by the EU (Petrovi´c & Relji´c, 2011: 159). For others, there is no doubt that Turkey is working to become the main power of the region, and it is merely a question of time when this will happen (Erickson, 2004: 42). Indeed, as clarified elsewhere, “Turkey uses its influence in the Balkans as an example of its geopolitical importance and Ankara wants to demonstrate that a permanent peace in the Balkans is unattainable without Turkey’s help” (Türbedar, 2011: 154). During the winning ceremony of the Turkish elections in July 2011, Erdo˘gan claimed that the AKP’s victory aimed to serve not only the Turkish people, but maintained further that “the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans have won as much as Turkey” (Cornell, 2012: 13). While it is unclear to what the Albanian people have benefited from the win of the AKP, in the last decades, as argued by Svante Cornell, Turkey has shown less predictable foreign policies that occasionally clash with those of the West. The absence of common values between the West and Ankara makes Turkish foreign policy unpredictable and unique, but it also poses an additional challenge for the Western Balkan region and Albania.

2 Relations Between Turkey and Albania post Cold War Turkey was at the frontline on two major events that emerged at the beginning of the twenty-first century: the Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, and Albania became a NATO member in 2009. In both cases Turkey was the Albanian supporter, recognizing Kosovo from day one and by having lobbied for Albania’s entry into NATO throughout. Since then, visits of Albanian high officials to Turkey and their counterparts to Albania have intensified. Like his predecessors, the Albanian prime minister Edi Rama, elected in June 2013, highlighted the need for “strategic relations with Turkey,” which, according to Rama, were to be given an immediate, “special priority” (Tase, 2014b). This decision advanced a new momentum for bilateral relations and Turkish foreign minister Davuto˘glu paid a visit to Albania in October 2013. During the visit he aimed to create a framework by establishing a high-level strategic cooperation platform and to embark on sustainable political and economic relations between the two countries. In Davuto˘glu’s view,

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Albania and Turkey endeavored to work together to realize common goals, helped by the High-Level Cooperation Council (Tase, 2014b). The council was established as a bilateral body of two foreign ministries that would maintain close relationships between the two governments and discuss items of mutual benefit. According to the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Albania signed 74 bilateral agreements with Turkey in the period between 1992 and 2013, more than with any other country except Italy and Germany. It is significant to note that 29 of the agreements with Turkey concerned military and defense matters. Since his election as a prime minister, Rama has regularly depicted Erdo˘gan as his big brother and the relationship between the two has strengthened. Relations between Albania and Turkey started to flourish after the end of the ColdWar in Albania. One of the main challenges for the 1991-inaugurated yet fragile Albanian democracy was its dire economic situation. Back then, Turkey responded immediately; president Turgut Özal announced an aid package of almost $14 million to Albania through Eksim Bank—the first donation of such a scale to Albania. Subsequently, the revival of bilateral relations brought about an increase in economic, political, and defense support to Albania, also followed by Turkish investments to restore mosques and other religious buildings, ambulances and hospital equipment, and police motor vehicles, as well as provision of scholarships for Albanian civilian and military students to study in Turkey (Vickers & Pettifer, 1997: 221). In 1992, the Turkish government granted a further $29 million to address the food and technology sectors, as part of Albania’s economic recovery (Tase, 2014a). One of the first Turkish high authorities to reintroduce official visits to the now democratic Albania was General Do˘gan Güre¸s, in November 1991. Six months later, prime minister Süleyman Demirel did the same, at which point an agreement of bilateral friendship and cooperation was signed (Limaj, 2012: 36). As a figure known for his pro-Albanian sympathies, Demirel reassured the Albanian leadership that “Turkey was committed to provide $50 million in humanitarian and logistic assistance to Albania” (Tase, 2014a). Considering the historical issues that Albania had with its neighbors, namely Greece and Serbia, the humanitarian aid served to reinforce the idea that Ankara was its best supporter in the region. Demirel’s visit paved the way to the first ministerial meeting held in Ankara in July 1992, which was followed by the visit of president Özal to Albania in February 1993. Özal addressed the Albanian National Assembly and signed “a fifteen-year economic agreement with Albania that would cover a wide area of cooperation from infrastructure projects to military assistance and growth of the tourism industry” (Tase, 2014a). Two months later, in April 1993, the Albanian president Sali Berisha returned the visit, followed by the Albanian prime minister Aleksandër Meksi at the end of the same year. During the presidential meetings, Özal sought to convince Berisha to recognize the newly independent state of Macedonia (now North Macedonia), arguing that it would make the Balkan region more peaceful. On the other hand, Berisha raised concerns with regard to Albania’s tensions with Greece and Serbia, and asked for a total economic and defense support from Turkey (Tase, 2014a). The use of the term “total” was intentional; at the end of the Cold War, Albanian authorities aimed to fully rely on Turkey. At the same time, Albania’s position created perfect conditions for the

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Turkish authorities to advance their own influence. As a result, in December 1992, in response to the Turkish pressure, Albanian delegates agreed for their state to join the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), without consulting the Parliament (Vickers & Pettifer, 1997: 105). Such a move triggered a fierce debate as to whether Albania’s identity was shifting toward Islam and the East (Young, 1999: 11). In fact, by this point, Albania had secured substantial financial assistance in the form of donations from Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, to restore old and build new mosques, and to establish Islamic schools (Bogdani & Loughlin, 2007: 82). While for Albania—the poorest country in the Balkans—this aid was critical, Turkey used its support for Muslim Albania to reestablish an official presence in the Balkan region. Some criticized Özal’s provision of help as opportunistic in nature, taking advantage of Albanian poverty to advance Turkey’s aspirations. As summarized by Peter Tase (2014a), Turkey stepped in when Albania’s need was greatest, taking advantage of Albania’s weaknesses to potentially exploit the old imperial subject and subsequent Eastern Mediterranean ally. Another crucial moment for Albania was the collapse of the Albanian government in 1997 due to failed pyramid schemes, which brought about another opportunity for Turkey to support Albania. Pyramid schemes caused political unrest almost to the point of a civil war. Albanian and the international media reported over 2,000 deaths in 1997, with the Albanian government having lost control of some areas of the country (Jarvis, 1999: 31). In the absence of government authority, armed gangs took control of entire areas, and the Albanian government lost its legitimacy, which created another opportunity for Greece and Serbia to advance their territorial claims. Once more Albania’s historical neighbors advanced their own agendas, as they had already done in the first half of the twentieth century. The so-called ghost of North Epirus resurrected when the Greek flag was seen in protests in Sarandë, Delvinë, and Gjirokastër in south Albania, while the north and the rest of the country were reported to be under a danger of a Serbian invasion (Limaj, 2012: 106–108). During the turmoil, Turkey stepped in to protect the territorial integrity of Albania, and following the advice of General ˙Ismail Karadayı, on March 29, 1997 Turkish prime minister Tansu Çiller reassured Albania that Turkey would not stay passive in the face of threats to divide Albania (Limaj, 2012: 108–109). During his April 1998 visit, now president Demirel was accompanied by key ministerial figures, leaders of different institutions, and members of the business community. Standing before their Albanian peers, the Turkish delegation reassured the Albanian people of Ankara’s good intentions. After warning the international community that Turkey could not “allow the terrible tragedy of Bosnia and Herzegovina [to] happen again,” Demirel argued that it was necessary to “immediately halt the bloodshed in Kosovo; restore the fundamental human rights and grant full freedom to Albanians in Kosovo; start a dialogue between all parties immediately and ensure people who were forcefully chased and driven out of Kosovo return to their respective lands” (Tase, 2014a). Given that the Kosovar Albanians were facing ethnic cleansing by the regime of Slobodan Miloševi´c, Demirel’s visit was highly significant in reconfirming Turkish assistance for the Albanian people during the most difficult period since the fall of communism. For example, Speaker of the Albanian

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Assembly, Skënder Gjinushi, affirmed that “the assembly and all political parties, despite their program differences, […] all want to strengthen bilateral ties with the Turkish government” (Tase, 2014a). Demirel’s visit concluded with the signing of bilateral agreements on social policy and labor reforms, reviews of the migration policy, employment monitoring and analysis, and media and research on the impact of social policies in Albanian communities. The Albanian national TV channel signed a further agreement with the Turkish TV channel ARD, which covered a series of programs, professional training, and logistics. All these agreements were to ensure that by the end of the century, relations between Ankara and Tirana would continue to progress and pave the way to an even closer relationship in the future.

2.1 Cultural and Historical Ties Cultural ties have helped the consolidation of the relationship between Albania and Turkey and facilitated the overall accommodation of Turkey’s interest in the Western Balkans. According to the former Albanian ambassador in Turkey Genci Muçaj, the number of Turkish citizens having Albanian heritage is estimated to be around five million (Telegrafi, 2015). This is significant, since it is comparable to the number of Albanians living in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia combined. Although the majority of people with Albanian heritage living in Turkey are assimilated and no longer send large remittances to Albania, the cultural bridge between the two countries is maintained through other areas of mutual interest. The Turkish government is promoting cultural ties through agencies such as the Maarif Foundation, the Yunus Emre Institute, the Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA), and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), all operating in Albania. As pointed out by Erdo˘gan, the Turkish government “greatly values the Ottoman-era historical buildings, which reflect our [Turkish and Albanian] shared culture. Through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, we have implemented over 500 restoration projects, worth nearly e20 million” (Albanian Government, 2021). While T˙IKA has restored “mosques, bazaars, and historical houses,” Erdo˘gan has used such agencies as a leverage to also invest in religious institutions (Ben-Meir & Xharra, 2018). A significant proportion of contributions has been allocated with the ambition of supporting Albanian Muslims (The Economist, 2016). For example, the Great Mosque “Namazgja,” which is the largest mosque in Albania, cost around $36 million and was fully funded by the Diyanet (Ben-Meir & Xharra, 2018). When meeting the Albanian diaspora in the United States, Albanian foreign minister Ditmir Bushati denied Turkey’s influence in Albania; he claimed that the Great Mosque was built to satisfy the needs of Albanian Muslims (Ben-Meir & Xharra, 2018). While there is no doubt that Turkey has sought to secure influence in Albania through religion, the Albanian leadership has been determined to deny Turkish interference in Albania’s cultural and religious matters. In fact, the government has hidden from the public details concerning sponsorship of at least a dozen mosques in Albania, which are believed to be fully financed and inaugurated by

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Erdo˘gan (Ben-Meir & Xharra, 2018). Since the collapse of communism and the breakup of Yugoslavia, there have been more than 1,000 mosques restored and built in Albania, with a further 1,000 in Kosovo, constructed by Turkey and Arab countries. Such an engagement may not be considered an economic assistance, but rather an investment in a long-term project centered around Islam (Shala, 2018).

2.2 Reestablishing Islam in Albania The Ottoman occupation of Albania began in 1385 and ended on November 28, 1912 (Albanian Independence Day). As any other colonial occupation, the Ottomans ruled the country by imposing their culture and standards. The Ottoman religion was one of those features and Albanians converted to Islam either by force or voluntarily; thus, along with the two Christian faiths, Albanians started to embrace two forms of Islam: Sunni and Bektashi. These four religious concepts survived and flourished after the restoration of religious freedom by the Albanian Parliament in December 1990. As a result of a disastrous economic situation associated with the communist regime, religious concepts were superseded by people’s needs for basic commodities such as food, shelter, and employment. Due to the political instability of the early 1990s, when both Europe and the United States were reluctant to invest in Albania, the slogan “Toward Europe or Islam” became part of the Albanian media and political discourses (Vickers & Pettifer, 1997: 105). Therefore, religious element came back to people’s attention. Islam became a powerful tool for the Albanian government when Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia commenced to funnel money to rebuild Islam (Deliso, 2007: 30–31). Indeed, the religious orientation of the external involvement in the post-Cold War era did trigger a serious challenge for the Albanian society’s identity. Although the then governments proved to be more materialistic than secular, a lack of a clear perspective in the new context would come to create a range of issues for Albanian politicians in the decades to come. Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer (1997: 117) observed that “the intellectual disorientation being caused by the religious struggle in terms of the traditional national identity is considerable and has been an important factor in the difficulties the government has faced.” Although an active OIC member since 1992, in February 2014 the then head of Parliament and later president Ilir Meta refused to participate at the OIC’s Ninth Parliamentary Assembly, held in Tehran. Meta downplayed his absence by placing the blame on his government’s budget, but it is argued that Albania’s Euro-Atlantic commitments were the real reason behind the Albanian absence from OIC forums (Mejdini, 2017). In 2017, Albania sought to excuse its absence by blaming the short notice given by the organizing country, Turkey; this was an urgent meeting with the goal to counteract president Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Although in the twenty-first century, there is little tension between the Turkish government’s way of supporting Islam and the Albanian multireligious approach, the

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effect of Islam in Albania provokes ongoing debates (Kadare, 2006). Islam has been a very efficient tool in the hands of the Turkish government in bringing Albania closer to Ankara since the early 1990s and the emergence of several Turkish primary and secondary schools, with either religious or secular curricula across the Albanian state. Both the Turkish government schools and Turkish-sponsored private Islamic schools (committed to interfaith dialogue, globalization, and making money), have changed the face of Albania’s education system (Krauthamer, 2012). As warned by Vickers and Pettifer (1997: 108), “a major growth of Islamic influence in Turkey would certainly have effects in Albania.” According to them (1997: 116–117), these cultural similarities explain the traditional white Albanian fez, which is “a glimpse back to the Ottoman world in the center of a small European city.” Nevertheless, superficial analyses of Albanians and their identity are dangerous as they have produced endless stereotypes (Xhaferi, 2020). Other indications of Turkey’s religious policy are found in the attempt to bring back the headscarf for 9 to 10-year-old girls, as well as to build a mosque on every university campus in Turkey (Stafa, 2014). In secularists’ understanding, such initiatives form part of the AKP’s agenda “to Islamize Turkish society” (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008: xii). Concerns in relation to the developments surrounding Turkish Islam that could also influence the Albanian identity rank high at a time when the Albanian government and religious communities are promoting harmony and coexistence (Squires, 2014). For Albanian identity the link between Islam and the Ottoman past is problematic.

2.3 Post-Cold War Economic Gains Economic gains are one of the main reasons why Albania has welcomed Turkish return. The Turkish gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021 was expected to reach $740 billion, which is almost thirty times greater than that of Albanian and Kosovo combined. More importantly, imports from Turkey are crucial to the Albanian economy; as reported by the European Commission (2020), in late 2020 imports from Turkey occupied second place (having increased from a previous 9 percent to 9.57 percent), whereas out of the total Albanian exports, 0.7 percent went to Turkey, which was insignificant. During a 2017 interview for the Albanian Top Channel, Erdo˘gan proudly announced that Turkey had already invested e3 billion in Albania and went on to state: “I don’t know how many investments have arrived from the EU, but ours will not stop” (Top Channel, 2017). Following the 2019 Albanian earthquakes, Erdo˘gan clarified that Turkish companies had invested more than e3.5 billion in Albania, providing “jobs to nearly 15,000 Albanian brothers” (Albanian Government, 2021). In accordance with the official praise, the economic connections between the two countries have continued to improve. More than 600 Turkish companies, including Aldemir, Armada, Çalık Holding, ENKA, Ginta¸s, Hes Kablo, Makro-Tel, Metal Yapı, Sekerbank-BKT, ¸ Servomatik, and Türk Telekom, have invested and operated

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in crucial sectors of the Albanian economy. Kürüm has invested in the iron and steel industryMapo, managing the only functional part of the previous backbone of the Albanian mineral industry, the Elbasan metallurgic factory. Turkish investments are also present in sectors such as consumer goods, education, energy, health, manufacturing, mining, and retail. To support these companies, the number of Turkish citizens residing and working in Albania is greater than any other European citizens (Mapo, 2013). In September 2018, Turkish workers living in Albania reached 32 percent of the total foreign labor, followed by Chinese workers (Tema, 2018). Some observers have described Turkish economic involvement as “the second invasion” of Albania (Shala, 2018), whereas for the Turkish government there is no aim to economically dominate the region. In reality, Turkish authorities were never satisfied with the trade data with Albania, as mentioned by the new Turkish Ambassador Murat Ahmet Yörük, who in February 2018 stated that Turkish investments in Albania, although having reached a good level, deserved to increase further (Ora News, 2018).

2.4 Turkey’s Muscles to Protect Albania? Turkey is a trustworthy strategic partner for Albania’s security matters and therefore the defense sector has led the cooperation between them. This is mainly due to Albania’s need for Turkish military muscles, which in the post-Cold War era have been evident. The modern Turkish Army has grown rapidly while operating within the NATO alliance since 1990, as confirmed by its participation in missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Somalia. Edward Erickson (2004: 42) believes that Turkey “has shown the willingness to defy the US” and in his opinion, it is not a question whether Turkey will become a powerful political and military regional player, but when that will actually happen. Albania has heavily depended on Turkish “assistance in training and supply of cutting- edge defense technology, as well as the reconstruction of Albania’s military bases and their maintenance” (Tase, 2014b). The first post-Cold War military partnership agreement between the two was signed in late 1992, aimed at specifying bilateral cooperation in the areas of military education and technology (Limaj, 2012: 38). Since then, the Turkish military personnel of the infantry, but also air, land, and naval forces have trained Albanian forces; in addition, they have provided technological equipment necessary to modernize military infrastructure (Tase, 2014b). The number of high-level military visits between Albania and Turkey has also increased. Turkish counterparts have trusted Albanian defense authorities as initially shown in 1992 when the Albanian defense minister Safet Zhulali visited Turkish military bases and factories, and had access to sensitive information when no other defense minister from a non-NATO country had been allowed anything similar (Tase, 2014a). A month later, after the Albanian delegation’s return from Turkey, “the Turkish Gearing Class destroyer, TCG Mare¸sal Fevzi Çakmak” visited the Albanian port of Durrës (Tase, 2014a). Some more recent examples of strong military ties between the two countries

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include high Albanian officials’ proud welcome of the Turkish submarines “TCG Sakarya” and “TCG I. ˙INÖNÜ ‘S 360’” to the Durrës civil port in 2014 and 2017 respectively. Apart from demonstrating the high level of trust between Ankara and Tirana, Albania has used such episodes to showcase Turkey’s power in the Western Balkan region with a direct message to its neighbours Serbia and Greece. Looking at some official statistics, Turkey has spent more than any other country on the training of all levels of Albanian military (Limaj, 2012: 39). It has equipped the local guard, coached the special troops, and reconstructed the military base at Pashaliman, the Marine Academy of Vlorë, and the Air Force Academy of Kuçovë. More than 1,000 Albanian students and military personnel were educated at Turkish universities, and Turkish military officials have trained more than 3,000 Albanian troops in Albania. This breadth of engagements suggests that Turkey possesses a detailed knowledge of Albanian security matters. It seems that Albania’s need for Turkish military muscle at the beginning of the twenty-first century goes hand in hand with Turkey’s aim to advance its agenda in the Western Balkans.

2.5 Energy Security Albania is hoping to consolidate its geopolitical position in the region through one of the biggest projects, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which is now providing for the first time non-Russian gas to Europe. TAP was inaugurated in 2003 as the best way of delivering Caspian natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas field to Italy, and from there to other parts of Europe. The pipeline should meet the Turkish Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) at the Greek–Turkish border, and the TANAP will then connect with the South Caucasus Pipeline Expansion (SCPX) that runs across Georgia and Azerbaijan. The TAP is an 870 km-long venture and will cross Greece, Albania, and the Adriatic Sea to deliver gas to southern Italy. In the twenty-first century, Europe’s energy sources are heavily dependent on Russia, and the TAP seems to be the first attempt to diversify the European market. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the current war in Ukraine, disagreements between a number of EU countries and the Kremlin deepened, resulting in American and European sanctions against the Russian Federation. Thus, the TAP’s importance has increased for all economies of countries involved in the project that would directly benefit from the gas distribution. Other countries in the Balkans, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, have also hoped to secure a share of the cheaper gas. Nevertheless, the TAP offers an economic win–win situation for all countries where the gas pipeline runs through. For Albania, the TAP is the biggest international investment, placing it along with Turkey and Greece at the core of energy security policies within the European Union. It will, however, remain to be seen as to whether that TAP may also

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improve trilateral relations between Turkey, Greece, and Albania, after centuries of extremely troubled relations (Demetriou, 2013: 2). Still, the latest shifts of Turkey’s foreign policy designed to develop a closer relationship with Moscow (Panorama, 2017), and to provide for delivery of gas from Russia to Turkey through the “Turkish Stream,” a pipeline that is situated only 10 km from the TAP, have created tension and competition. In any case, Turkey will be a key player here since both the TANAP and Turkish Stream are designed to run through its territory, and thus Albania is aware of Turkey’s leverage. On the other hand, as a NATO member, Turkey is under the pressure of the EU and the US to support sanctions against Russia where energy is a key factor.

3 Albanian Foreign Policy Controversy Being in the middle of the battleground between Western and Eastern civilizations, there is no doubt that Albanian people have suffered more than any other of their Balkan counterparties. Since the occupation of the Albanian-speaking lands at the end of the fourteenth century, for more than five centuries Albanians were considered as Turks and Albanian-speaking lands as part of the Ottoman Empire. Although during its decline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the Ottoman Turks tried hard to keep Albanian lands, they could not prevent Balkan nationalism. This was a period of sharp rise of the Albanian awakening, whereas in the neighborhood, Greece and Serbia had already begun with the nation- and state-building process following their independence from the Ottomans. Supported by big powers at the time, the two showed no hesitation to carve up Albanian lands while the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapsing. Considering the historical background and the relationship between the modern Turkey and the Republic of Albania in the last century, the question nowadays is whether the links with Turkey are strong enough to stop Albania from developing closer ties with the West (Xhaferi, 2020)? More specifically, is Albania seeking to reorient itself toward the West and restore its pre-Ottoman European identity and the Western-Christian orientation? Albania has indeed developed some proper connections with the West, but will the state authorities quietly accommodate Ankara’s requests? Turkey under Erdo˘gan has leverage over Albania and thus pressures in the areas related to economy, energy, and regional security are obvious. Furthermore, past factors testifying to cultural ties and religious outlook may help the Turkish leadership to extend influence over Albania, but will this be enough for Albanian people and policymakers to abandon the West?

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The focus of both Albanian and Turkish governments in the twenty-first century has been on strong mutual support, even though it is unclear to what extent the Albanians themselves have been fond of such an arrangement. There have been indications of some citizens not being pleased with the increased Turkish influence; a good example of this sentiment is the April 2018 conversation between foreign minister Bushati and the Albanian diaspora in the United States, when he was asked to explain why the Albanian government was flirting with Turkey while also hoping to become an EU member (Ben-Meir & Xharra, 2018). Another example was the vandalization of Hasan Pasha’s memorial in the city of Shkodër in July 2016 (Top Channel, 2016). At that point, the Turkish flag was removed, after the Turkish commentator Talha U˘gurluel called the Albanian national hero Skenderbeg a “bandit” who had come down from the mountains and was also known for attacking women and children, in the same way that “terrorist Kurds” attack the Turkish state today (Top Channel, 2016). On another occasion, on February 17, 2017, Turkish flags were removed from Prishtina streets during the Independence Day celebration in Kosovo (Koha Jone, 2017), which sent a message that not all Albanians approve of the Kosovar and Albanian governments’ decisions to look to Turkey for increased international support. Ultimately, people of both states have started to question whether they actually need all the mosques, built over the past two decades. What is less apparent is whether these are isolated acts of a small number of dissatisfied crowds, or they reflect a growing and predominant point of view. In any case, these incidents confirm that members of the Albanian and Kosovar societies want to participate in the debate, and they cannot be ignored. Although the building of mosques appears to be Turkish long-term “investment” in the Balkans, Albanians need schools, hospitals, and other basic services first.

3.1 The Albanian Sentiment About the Ottomans and Modern Turks The Albanian–Turkish relationship in historical, cultural, and political terms is complex (Pajaziti, 2011: 2). Albanians have mixed views with regard to the Ottoman era. The theories of Ismail Kadare and Rexhep Qosja represent two schools of thought concerning the Albanian position toward the Ottoman occupation and issues evolving around culture, language, and religion. Kadare’s position against the Ottomans and the religion they exported to Albania is criticized by Qosja, who is seen as moderate and thus pro-Turkish. Albanians blame the Ottoman Empire, not modern Turkey, for halting their country’s historical development. After the well known Albanian armed resistance against the Ottomans led by Skenderbeg in the fifteenth century, it was now time for the rilindja writers who started the process of distancing Albanian identity from the Ottoman culture. In today’s textbooks, rilindja figures are identified as fighters for the Albanian cause with everything they had at their disposal, “me pushkë dhe me penë

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[through guns and pens].” An example is the rilindja illuminist Naum Veqilharxhi, the author of the first Albanian language schoolbook, Abetare, in 1846. He warned that “nations need a written language as the only way of surviving” (Panorama, 2011). Other rilindja representatives with significant impact on Albanian identity formation were the Frashëri brothers. Sami Frashëri (1850–1904, known in Turkey as Semseddin) ¸ was a writer, linguist, and playwright, who had a major role not only in the creation of the Albanian alphabet in 1886, but also in the founding of Turkish alphabet (Gawrych, 1983: 523). In 1879, he established a cultural and educational organization named “Printing of Albanian Writings” in Constantinople (Zickel & Iwaskiw, 1994: 19). He refined the grammar of the Albanian language in 1890, but also illuminated the future of Albania. In line with Veqilharxhi, he stressed that Albania must become an independent nation at some point (Gawrych, 1983: 523). Sami’s older brother, Naim (1846–1900) labeled the Ottomans “a big beast” that had come from Asia, characterized by “cruelty in their eyes” and “a satanic heart,” who “killed, severed, and impoverished” in a way that “grass wouldn’t grow” wherever the beast stepped on the Albanian soil which had otherwise “flourished” (N. Frashëri, 1967: 99–100). The eldest brother, Abdyl (1839–1892), was also known as one of the first political ideologues of the Albanian awakening playing a crucial role in the League of Prizren. Abdyl was captured by Turkish troops and sentenced to jail for his anti-Turkish propaganda (Elsie, 2010: 147). Therefore, Albanian rilindja figures forged the anti-Turkish sentiment, a concept found in present-day textbooks in primary and secondary schools. For example, The History of the Albanian People, published by the Academy of Sciences of Albania, describes Ottoman Sultans as invaders of the Albanian lands; they caused ruin and destruction, and took the Albanian children hostage (Pajaziti, 2011: 6). This fact has not gone unnoticed by Turkish authorities who refuse to describe the Ottoman occupation of Albania by using the term “invasion.” According to the Turkish narrative, the Ottomans came to Albania to administer and protect it instead. Recent requests addressed to the Albanian and Kosovar governments to alter the presentation of Ottoman history in textbooks, and to portray the Ottomans as “friendly administrators” (Rrozhani, 2011) or, preferably, “protectors” who brought about political stability on the Albanian-speaking lands highlight this belief, and show that this is a complex issue, which continues to cause trouble in the bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania. Nonetheless, the Ottomans brought about little to no progress in Albanian speaking lands (Xhaferi, 2020: 33–74). During his visit to Tirana in October 2009, foreign minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu observed that Turkey and Balkan countries share “a common history, destiny, and future” (Rexha, 2017: 30). His comment sparked a debate in the Albanian media, but the leadership was hesitant to clarify as to whether the Turkish authorities had also requested amendments to Albanian textbooks (Rexha, 2017: 30). In reality, in 2011, the Turkish prime minister, the minister of education, and the Turkish Embassy in Prishtina officially did request Kosovar authorities to review all history textbooks that discuss the Ottoman ruling of Kosovo and remove words such as “‘barbaric,’ ‘wild,’ ‘invasion,’ ‘violence,’ ‘murder,’ ‘blood tribute,’ and ‘slavery’” (Rexha, 2017: 31).

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As a result, a commission led by Kosovo’s Ministry of Education reviewed the textbooks and found that they portrayed the Ottomans as “severe conquerors” and thus removed 90 percent of controversial words and phrases (Rexha, 2017: 38). This move ignited a real debate in Albania and Kosovo. The Kosovar-Albanian historian Frashër Demaj expressed his disappointment with both Albanian and Kosovar governments for interfering with historians and specialists in the field. Demaj openly refused to recognize decisions made by the commission which tackled scholarly issues and simultaneously ignored copyright policies (Koha Net, 2013). In March 2013, an Albanian prominent writer, Ismail Kadare, led a petition signed by one hundred intellectuals (Murati, 2013), which was sent to the Albanian and Kosovar presidents, Bujar Nishani and Atifete Jahjaga. The petition demanded that any amendments on the Albanian history need to be analyzed and implemented in accordance with the established methodological principles of historical science, and not in accordance with the interests of the Turkish government. The petition reminded the authorities that the Ottomans “occupied” Albanian-speaking lands not in a “friendly” way, but rather through force; their actions disconnected Albania from Europe and caused indelible drama and tragedy to the historical memory of the Albanian nation. It also stressed: “The Turkish occupation for five centuries was violent, and within this period there were continued acts of violence, killings, and exterminations, while Albanians were the most persecuted people of the Empire … Let’s remember the fact that unlike other languages of the Empire, the Albanian language was forcibly prohibited. This fact alone reveals the genocide of the Ottoman Empire against Albanians, their culture and identity … We cannot hide historical truths … The changing of history by Turkish experts represents cultural aggression, striking at the backbone of the nation; unacceptable insults for Albanians with consequences for their future and identity” (Gazeta Shqip, 2013). The petition, of course, did not represent the views of the Albanian and Kosovar governments, but rather the independent voices of Albanian writers, academics, and artists who lived in Albania and abroad, all with a certain level of influence over Albanian thinking. Nevertheless, the Turkish government has continued to use its political influence against Albanian and Kosovar authorities, constraining them to reinterpret history in a way to depict Turks in a more positive light. Others, such as the Turkish scholar Erhan Türbedar, maintain that Turkey has not done enough to halt prejudices that associate Turks with the Ottomans. For example, Türbedar believes that Albanians are rewriting their history and portraying Turks as enemies of Albanians, despite cultural similarities and their love for Turkish television series. He notes that the Academy of Sciences of Albania portrays the Ottomans as “fanatic, backward, and intolerant rulers, who oppressed Albanians with heavy taxes, political discrimination and the absence of the most elementary human rights and would even resort to the massacre of the Albanian population” (Türbedar, 2011: 150). While Türbedar is convinced of the Albanian pro-Western orientation in the twenty-first century, the Ottoman past remains a thorn in bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania. What do the Albanian people think about the matter? Some scholars believe that the negative perception of the Ottomans represents Albanian elitist views, whereas

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in reality, Albanian people living in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia have generally positive sentiments toward Turkey (Pajaziti, 2011: 9). A 2008/2009 survey suggested that Macedonian Albanians are closely tied to the Ottoman-Turkish culture and language. As summarized elsewhere, they speak more Turkish than the Albanians of Albania and Kosovo, and 41.2 percent of them call Turkey “fatherland,” compared to 0.6 percent of Kosovars and virtually no Albanians. According to Pajaziti, the majority, 60.6 percent of Albanians and 53.8 percent of Kosovar Albanians, think that Turkey is a friendly country, while Kosovar Albanians seem to be closer to “the Turkish cultural code” (Pajaziti, 2011: 12). Moreover, almost one-third of Albanians considered Istanbul as the most beautiful city in the Balkans to spend their vacations, better than Tirana or Athens. Debates on social media show a clear division between those Albanians who perceive themselves as having Western European identity and others who are more sympathetic to Turkish or oriental identity. If Turkey were a major source of influence, power, and employment, we could have expected to see the majority of Albanian migrants choose Turkey as their destination. This is not, however, the case. Since 1991, the main destinations for Albanian migrants are two EU countries, Greece and Italy. While this may in part be due to geographic proximity, the perceived cultural ties with Turkey are clearly not strong enough to attract large numbers of Albanian migrants. Still, in the last ten years, Turkey remains the top tourist destination for Albanians (Mejdini, 2017). It makes sense to claim that at the popular level, modern Turkey is a close culturally related country for many Albanians, but not a major player in terms of employment or the provision of a better future (Balaban, 2015: 493–494). In the last couple of decades Turkish television programs have gained a momentum, aiming to portray a new Turkish society that can be identified as a role model across the Balkans. In North Macedonia, 95.1 percent of Albanians spend between one and four hours per day watching Turkish TV series (Pajaziti, 2011: 10). Although the rates in Kosovo and Albania are lower (61.2 percent and 38.7 percent respectively), the empathy for Turkish culture is nonetheless evident. Turkish influence in the Western Balkans, and especially in Albania, reveals geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocultural doctrines (Lami, 2017: 36). While Albanians enthusiastically watch Turkish programs and absorb Turkish culture, on the other hand we find significant media pundits and public intellectuals who identify Ottoman characters with negative traits, including promiscuity and polygamy (Sulstarova, 2010: 354). Overall, unlike the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey is considered by everyday Albanians to be a country with a compatible friendly culture; yet the damage caused by Ottomans to the Albanian-speaking lands is still present in their subconsciousness.

3.2 Turkey to Offer “Carrots” to Albania After building the Fier Hospital in 2021 in response to the 2019 earthquake in Albania, the Turkish government also built 522 apartments, dozens of commercial properties, and underground parking spaces in the town of Lac. In January 2022, president

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Erdo˘gan visited Albania to personally mark the completion of this project, and to inaugurate the Et hem Bej Mosque, renovated by the T˙IKA. Erdo˘gan delivered a speech at the Albanian Parliament reminding the audience of the fraternity between Turks and Albanians. His repeated request to expel from Albania all remnants of the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) provoked another round of criticism, as it did the fact that Erdo˘gan chose to visit Albania on the day coinciding with the date of the death of the Albanian national hero Skenderbeg. However, little was heard the previous year, when the Albanian leadership agreed the purchase of TB2 drones from Turkey. In the twenty-first century, it is unclear whether Turkey is only offering “carrots” to Albania and further steps toward Turkey will complicate Albania’s Euro-Atlantic path.

4 Conclusion Modern Turkey is a powerful player in the Western Balkan region. However, controversies surrounding the Turkish national identity cannot be ignored. Domestically, Turkey is divided between secular Kemalists and those subscribing to Islamic or neo-Ottoman modus vivendi. The division is also reflected in the unpredictability of Turkish foreign policy. Despite tensions on both sides, Erdo˘gan’s Turkey has sought to portray itself as both Western and Eastern, as an authoritarian democracy—a secular, but also an Islamic country that is protecting Western Balkan Muslims from Islamophobia. As demonstrated in this chapter, Turkey has invested a lot of effort and resources to get closer to the Western Balkans. Brief analyses of beneficial factors for Albania to accommodate Ankara’s presence in the post-Cold War context have primarily related to economy, energy, and security matters; a poor Albania of the early 1990s provided a golden opportunity for Turkey to get closer to the region. Given Albania’s historical experience with their neighbors, Greece and Serbia, Albania clearly finds Turkey more trustworthy. With this in mind, Tirana needs Turkish economic and military presence in the region. In the twenty-first century, political relations between the two have reached a new level, with neither of the governments showing any intention to slow down.

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Turkish Foreign Policy Toward Serbia: A Three-Dimensional Relationship Sanja Arežina

In July 2021, while speaking at the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) meeting of provincial heads, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan stressed the significance of the 2023 presidential elections and the desire for Turkey to be listed among the seven most powerful countries globally (Cakmak, 2021). Therefore, many domestic and foreign policy moves of the AKP government are aimed at achieving this goal on the centenary of the creation of Ataturk’s Republic of Turkey, but also at enabling the ruling party to win the elections. The Western Balkan region occupies a significant place in the AKP’s foreign policy plans, interest and active presence that has gradually, yet very tactically, increased. The reasons for this include the fact that large numbers of Muslims live in the Western Balkans, as well as that millions of people living in Turkey have roots in this region. Through active diplomacy and application of various economic and soft power instruments, the Turkish leadership has strengthened the influence in the region at several levels: political, economic, and cultural. On the other hand, the growing Turkish involvement in the 2010s has also provoked a closer attention to Ankara’s maneuvers in the Western Balkans by the rest of the international community. Looking at specific states, in addition to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia has ranked highly on the Turkish agenda while being seen as a key strategic partner for securing and strengthening Ankara’s influence in the region (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 16). While the literature has seen a good number of analyses of Turkey–Western Balkans relations (primarily dealing with neo-Ottomanism as a kind of causa prima and the driving force of Turkish foreign policy) (Arežina, 2018; Güzeldere, 2021; Lika, 2015; Önsoy & Koç, 2019; Rashid & Sheikh, 2020; Zoltán, 2021), no comprehensive examination of the relations between Turkey and Serbia has been offered thus far. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to fill the gap by providing a robust evaluation S. Arežina (B) University of Belgrade & Government of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_12

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of Turkish–Serbian relations following the AKP’s rise to power in 2002 (bearing in mind its global, regional, and national aspects), with a particular focus on the party’s influence on Turkey’s foreign policy and the consequent impact of such an arrangement on the relationship between Ankara and Belgrade. To prove the hypothesis that by strengthening relations with the countries of the Western Balkans (especially Serbia), Turkey wants to establish itself as a (macro) regional power in the process of creating a multipolar world order, the author uses structural–functional analysis and comparative analysis. While the former is used to explain changes in Turkish foreign policy and their impact on Turkish–Serbian relations, the latter is used to compare three different periods of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP and Turkish–Serbian cooperation in those contexts. With this in mind, the present study benefits from academic and policy documentation, official statements, and news outlets (Serbian, Turkish, and international). In addition, it has also benefited from informal conversations the author conducted with various Serbian, Turkish, and other European analysts, businessmen, journalists, officials, and researchers who were directly involved in various aspects of Turkish–Serbian relations. The chapter consists of five parts. The introductory section provides the context, by explaining the crux of the problem and the hypotheses. Going forward, it will look into the three different periods in the Turkish foreign policy toward the Western Balkans under the AKP. The third section will explain the progression of Turkish– Serbian relations since 2002. This will be followed by the identification of key factors that have shaped cooperation between them. Finally, the fifth part will explore the so-called three-dimensional progress of Turkish–Serbian cooperation following the signing of the 2009 Free Trade Agreement. The concluding remarks will summarize the findings and provide an idea as to what the future direction of Turkish–Serbian relations may look like.

1 Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Western Balkans Under the AKP Like many other countries, Turkey has been struggling with its internal soulsearching, including the consolidation and quest for new perspectives on its own domestic and foreign policy. In that process, which has been going on since November 2002 when the AKP came to power, Turkey has undergone three major changes in foreign and domestic policy. During the period 2002–2012, the AKP gradually pursued re-Islamization of Turkish society—otherwise referred to as neo-Ottomanism. The creator behind this project was Ahmet Davuto˘glu, former minister of foreign affairs and prime minister, who translated his academic ideas into concrete foreign policy doctrine and practice (Ajzenhamer & Trapara, 2013: 1), and articulated a foreign policy that reflected the ideological stance of the key figures of the Turgut Özal era, who had embraced a Turkish-Islamic synthesis. This perspective was correspondingly adopted by the

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country’s elites, who no longer viewed Islam as a challenge to a secular republic but as an element of Turkish national identity. By unlocking certain internal tensions and through significant social and systemic reforms, the AKP sought to achieve social cohesion internally and move from the conflict to cooperation externally to build a fresh identity, compatible with its ambitious role in the broad region of Eurasia (Petrovi´c, 2011: 6). For it to become a prestigious actor and powerful enough to accomplish its goals, Turkey sought to dehierarchize bilateral relations and present itself as a “state lighthouse,” which possessed a strong influence on its civilization zone (Avijucki, 2009: 25). In this respect, five principles of foreign policy became key: a balance between security and democracy (to present Turkey as a democratic country that fully respected Western values); the policy of “zero problems with the neighbors” (Tanaskovi´c, 2010b); proactive and preventive peace diplomacy aimed at fostering security and the high-level political dialogue, economic integration, interdependence, and multicultural coexistence; multidimensionality with which Turkey wanted to supplement its NATO role by building relationships with other influential players such as Russia; and “rhythmic diplomacy,” which was supposed to increase the space for Turkey in international and multilateral agreements (Davuto˘glu, 2009). To accelerate the national process of Europeanization, Turkish decision-makers embraced a pro-Western and pro-European stance in foreign policy, which was reflected in the adoption of liberal pro-democracy values to provide the most appropriate solutions to Turkey’s structural, economic, and social problems. In parallel, their approach looked to maintain and improve Ankara’s relations with nearby countries, under the idea of “zero problems with the neighbors.” Accordingly, the diplomatic initiative in the Western Balkans was conceptualized through three goals: to strengthen relations with the traditional partners, to open up to countries with which Turkey had experienced problems, and to play a mediating role and lead multilateral initiatives to promote regional stability (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011). As part of its overall agenda, it was during this period that Turkey expanded visa-free travel and concluded free trade agreements with its Western Balkan neighbors. The second period of Turkey’s pursuit of major changes began in 2008 and lasted until 2016 when Davuto˘glu stepped down as prime minister. After the second victory in the 2007 parliamentary elections and the inauguration of Abdullah Gül as president, the AKP government felt confident enough to launch a process of transformation based on identity at home and in relations with external actors. Such a move coincided with the decline of the West’s primacy in global politics, which was already expressed during the 2008 global financial crisis, and Turkey’s own disappointment with the EU due to the growing opposition from some of its member states with regard to Turkish membership. US President Barack Obama’s announcement of a gradual American withdrawal from the Middle East and a “pivot to Asia,” as well as the failure of EU policy in the region, created a power vacuum at systemic and regional levels and further motivated the Turkish leadership to actively pursue “strategic autonomy” replacing the logic of interdependence (Çagaptay, 2019). Still, in the given context, “strategic autonomy” implies double connotation. First, it constitutes a framework within which the country’s ruling elites can align themselves with non-Western great powers (China and Russia, in particular), and balance the US-led hierarchical order

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(Çagaptay, 2019). Second, and more importantly, it serves as a legitimating foreign policy discourse by which an authoritarian populist government can mobilize its support base at home. However, and this is a paradox, while the “strategic autonomy” discourse repositioning Turkey as a “global player” paid the short-term populist dividends at home, it actually isolated the country in the international system by creating new forms of dependence on non-Western powers. At the same time, internally, relations between the AKP and the Gülen movement deteriorated, and a war over power and influence commenced. As a result, the AKP began to employ different tactics against the opposition, including populism and conservatism as means to separate themselves. During the first years of this period, the AKP pursued activities in the Western Balkans that were less focused on re-creating past relations on the basis of a neoOttoman approach (in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo and Metohija), instead of investing their efforts to engage across the region to secure Turkey’s position as a center of influence. The AKP has maintained this focus on achieving the influence through regional stabilization efforts, economic and strategic investment, as well as through cultural diplomacy. In fact, Davuto˘glu referred to “Turkey’s primary interests in the Balkans” as including activities to help to “normalize bilateral relations among the Balkan states, to deepen regional integration” (Raxhimi, 2011). However, in the second half of this period, Erdo˘gan began to strengthen a neoOttoman approach toward Muslim societies in the Western Balkans, which began to create a negative impression in Serbian public opinion and led to an interruption of meetings within the regional initiatives started by Turkey. Finally, the third period began in 2016, in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, when Turkey stepped up to fight the Gülen movement, which was especially present and strong in the Western Balkans. With Davuto˘glu leaving office and his replacement Binali Yildirim now Turkey’s prime minister, the country’s foreign policy became more realistic—Erdo˘gan-centered and economy-driven. The ideological zeal of helping transform the region to reflect Turkey’s domestic values (under the stewardship of AKP governments), has gradually given way to the more realist concern of preserving Turkey’s territorial integrity and the societal cohesion amid the re-emergence of traditional security concerns to the south (Oguzlu, 2020: 136). In terms of maximization of populist dividends, Turkey’s overambitious and often unilateralist foreign policy in this period has been based on the use of hard power blended with a discourse on national autonomy. Certainly, this is also a consequence of the presidential system implemented in the summer of 2018, which places the president at the center of all decision-making (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 18). Over the years, the aggressive autonomy-based foreign policy has paid some dividends for Erdo˘gan; he boosted his domestic popularity, yielding the electoral support for the presidential regime despite a political and economic governance crisis, and divided the opposition by stigmatizing critics of the government’s foreign policy as the ones who are not “domestic and national” (for example, Turkey’s extensive military involvement in Syria generated little criticism) (Kutlay & Öni¸s, 2021: 1099–1100). It seems that the unifying element has been a strong anti-Western geopolitical identity and a willingness to use unilateral hard power to pursue a particular interpretation of national

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interests. In addition, Erdo˘gan has used references to religious symbolism and the Muslim identity in his autonomy-based liberationist discourse to further fragment the opposition and cultivate the popular support (as in the case of the decision to convert the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque). By doing so, he subdued opposition parties and mobilized the conservative segments of the population, but without considering the negative implications for Turkey’s global standing. At the same time, Ankara has confronted its Western allies in several fields. Relations with the EU have deteriorated to the extent that Turkey is now perceived as a typical Middle Eastern country, even a buffer state, whereas only a decade ago it was considered a potential EU member state. For the US, Turkey has become a geopolitical rival, not a strategic partner, especially as it is increasingly teaming up with Russia. On the other side, Turkey has not engendered an equal partnership with Russia, and relations between Ankara and Moscow are susceptible to conflict and fall well short of a real strategic partnership (for example, in Syria and Libya, Turkey and Russia have been on opposite sides, while their troops have served together as peacekeepers in the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict). In addition, as of 2020, Turkey did not have ambassadors in Egypt, Israel, or Syria—the three key regional states with which it cultivated strong ties in the early 2000s as part of attempts to position itself as “a benign regional power” (Öni¸s & Kutlay, 2013: 1409–1426). This policy resulted in poor results in the 2018 presidential elections when the AKP mustered only 52% of the total vote. AKP dominance was challenged once again in the March 2019 municipal elections when the main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), in alliance with other opposition parties, took over key municipalities including Istanbul, Ankara, and Antalya (Kutlay & Öni¸s, 2021: 1100–1101). Thus, the Turkish leadership began to return to the old operational logic—to reduce the number of enemies while increasing the number of friends (Oguzlu, 2020: 136). At the beginning of the third period, the Turkish policy toward the Western Balkans represented a radical departure from a largely predictable approach toward the region in all previous periods. This posture has been characterized by erratic decisionmaking and the authoritarian streak of president Erdo˘gan defined by the struggle against the Gülen movement to extend Turkey’s prestige and ability to carry out foreign policy. Accordingly, Turkish state agencies and AKP-linked private companies have engaged in building a parallel infrastructure of Turkish schools, media, and businesses, but no longer by soft means. More recently, the Turkish policy toward the Western Balkans has come to be dominated by a pragmatic focus on greater economic ties and a prominent role of the Turkish president by his direct involvement and personal ties with Western Balkan leaders.

2 Turkish–Serbian Relations Under the AKP Following the changes in political regimes in Turkey and Serbia at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the relations between the two began to progress. To attract capital, they signed an agreement concerning Reciprocal Promotion and Protection

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of Investments in 2001, which proved crucial for the strengthening of their overall economic cooperation and development. In line with Ahmed Davuto˘glu’s 2001 book Strategic Depth, the Turkish leadership began to look at their country as a “heart” of Eurasia rather than a “bridge” to it, as its natural center which would play a key role in resolving the political and economic issues over a wide area “from the Adriatic Sea to Central Asia.” This meant that Turkey no longer wanted to be just a “Western gatekeeper” or “geostrategic pivot” to stabilize the Black Sea region, but that it wanted to establish itself as a “geostrategic player” which would play an increasingly important role in the entire wider neighborhood. Therefore, its foreign policy became increasingly marked by multidimensionality with the aim to promote the international and regional cooperation, especially with the Western Balkans (Brzezinski, 2001: 48). On the other hand, the Serbian leadership saw the strengthening of relations with Turkey as an opportunity to attract Turkish companies to Serbia, which was of great importance in terms of its economic consolidation. Although bilateral relations between Ankara and Belgrade have progressed over the years, this process has not gone without diplomatic setbacks and incidents. Turkey was one of the first countries that recognized Kosovo’s unilaterally proclaimed independence, the day after it adopted the Declaration of Independence on February 18, 2008. Recognition by the Turkish state represented an aggravating factor in the rapprochement between Serbia and Turkey, and the harmonization of their foreign policy positions in the region (Mesci, 2008). However, in June 2009 they signed a Free Trade Agreement, and this was a major step forward as substantial trade flow started to take place on the principle of a zero customs rate. Numerous visits by high-ranking Turkish and Serbian officials followed, which positively influenced the development of mutual trust between them but also reminded the parties of their traditionally rich political, economic, and cultural cooperation. In October, the Turkish president Abdullah Gül visited Serbia, and the Serbian president Boris Tadi´c returned the visit at the end of the year. In fact, Tadi´c visited Turkey again in April 2010, which was followed by the visits of the president of the National Assembly Slavica Ðuki´c-Dejanovi´c in December 2010, and prime minister Mirko Cvetkovi´c in March 2011. From the Turkish side, prime minister Erdo˘gan visited Serbia in July 2010 (Rankovi´c, 2010). The culmination of the Gül-Tadi´c cooperation in the field of protection of state interest of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the Declaration on the Condemnation of the Crime in Srebrenica, adopted in March 2010 by the Serbian National Assembly. A month later, Turkey launched the so-called Trilateral Consultation Mechanism with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, as well as with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, to present itself as a guarantor of peace in the Balkans. The foundations of the trilateral consultation with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia were laid in the Istanbul Declaration on Peace and Stability, signed on April 24 by Gül, Tadi´c, and the Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Silajdži´c. Apart from getting together to sign a declaration that recognizes and guarantees the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the encounter of the three leaders was supposed to be an additional stimulus for a comprehensive

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political, economic, and cultural interaction among Ankara, Belgrade, and Sarajevo. Another trilateral consultation was held in April 2011 in Serbia and, on that occasion, Davuto˘glu depicted Turkey and Serbia as “key partners for peace and stability in the Balkans,” noting “a common will and desire to forge a strategic partnership” (Raxhimi, 2011). He sharply criticized the use of the term “neo-Ottomanism” to describe Turkey’s foreign policy, modifying the celebration of the “Ottoman heritage” into softer rhetoric about the common past of Turkey and other peoples in the area (Raxhimi, 2011). A truly significant moment for the Turkish–Serbian relationship occurred in 2013, during the meeting between the Serbian president Tomislav Nikoli´c and his Turkish counterpart Gül, who forecasted an “economic boom” in Serbia and proclaimed the country a “close neighbor.” President Nikoli´c visited Turkey again a few months later, when a new trilateral meeting among the leaders of Turkey (Gül), Serbia (Nikoli´c), and members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bakir Izetbegovi´c, Željko Komši´c, and Nebojša Radmanovi´c) took place, this time under the slogan “Joint Construction of the Future.” However, following prime minister Erdo˘gan’s October 2013 speech in Prizren, during which he urged the attendees to “remember [that] Kosovo is Turkey and Turkey is Kosovo,” president Nikoli´c canceled the Trilateral Summit of Turkey, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, scheduled for December 2013 in Belgrade, and froze further participation in meetings of this type. With regard to this incident, the Turkish foreign minister claimed that Erdo˘gan’s statement was taken out of context and thus misinterpreted by the Serbian political leadership and public opinion; apparently, the speech was intended to express closeness between Kosovo and Metohija and Turkey, with Erdo˘gan referring to Kosovo and Metohija as the second homeland. The drama was finally overcome in April 2015 with the official visit of the president of the Serbian National Assembly Maja Gojkovi´c to Turkey. Later, in December, prime minister Davuto˘glu visit Serbia, after which a new visit to Turkey by Gojkovi´c was realized, in September 2016 (Glavonji´c & Zori´c, 2015). The post-2016 period has been Erdo˘gan-centered, with an economy-driven foreign policy. In terms of Turkey’s relations with Serbia, president Aleksandar Vuˇci´c visited Turkey in July 2017 and president Erdo˘gan traveled to Serbia in October—a visit marked by the signature of sixteen agreements, including the Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High Council for Cooperation between Serbia and Turkey. Erdo˘gan stated that trade cooperation between the two countries amounted to $800 million and that he expected further growth in the years to come, while Vuˇci´c pointed out that Serbia was one of the first countries whose officials defended the Turkish order during the coup attempt (Al Jazeera, 2017). Apart from Belgrade, Erdo˘gan visited Novi Pazar, where he said that “we will protect our friendship,” pointing out that the Sandžak region, whose population is predominantly Bosniak, is one of the most important bridges connecting Serbia and Turkey and, as such, with a potential to positively influence the development of bilateral relations (Srbija Danas, 2017). In December 2017, as a pledge of good relations, Serbia extradited Kurdish political activist Cevdet Ayaz to Turkey, who was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for violating the constitutional order, despite the recommendation of the

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UN Committee against Torture that Serbia refrain from extradition because there was a risk that he would be subjected to torture in his home country. In early 2018, the deputy prime minister and minister of trade, tourism, and telecommunications Rasim Ljaji´c visited Ankara, where he signed protocols with the Turkish economy minister Nihat Zeybekçi to expand the 2009 Free Trade Agreement and to revise the 2001 agreement concerning Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (Bodur, 2018; Ekapija, 2017). The fact that the relations between the two countries (but also with others in the Balkan region) kept improving was reconfirmed in late 2018 when the new Istanbul Airport was inaugurated; no Western European politicians were present, whereas the leaders of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia were actually there (Al Jazeera, 2018). The Turkish president was in Serbia again in October 2019 to attend the opening of the Belgrade–Sarajevo highway construction, as well as the meeting of the Trilateral Committee for Economic Cooperation of Turkey, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This visit was followed by two trips by president Vuˇci´c to Turkey, in September 2020 and September 2021. In both cases, he expressed gratitude to his Turkish counterpart for robust assistance in the form of donations of medical protective supplies sent to Serbia at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, but also announced the establishment of a simpler procedure for a faster flow of goods and services between the two countries (Consulate General of the Republic of Serbia in Istanbul, 2021c).

3 Factors that Influence Turkish–Serbian Cooperation Turkish–Serbian relations are influenced by a number of factors, most notably domestic politics and growing nationalism in Turkey. With the AKP coming to power, the former bastion of secularism in the Islamic world began to challenge its Kemalist legacy and to consequently revitalize decades of repressed Islamic identity. In this mindset, the army has been placed under the control of the civilian authorities, depriving the very army of its decades-long role of the main guardian of the republic and secular order. In addition to changes at the domestic level, there are also changes at the foreign policy level, with Turkey having decided to pursue a much more aggressive policy. Such an approach primarily serves to divert attention from the political and economic governance crisis, as well as to subdue opposition parties and mobilize conservative segments of the population to strengthen electoral support for the presidential regime. At the same time, Turkey has consolidated its presence in the Western Balkans (especially after failing to impose itself as a dominant partner in the Middle East), given the common cultural and historical background with the Muslim population there, as well as the presence of millions of people with Balkan origins who inhabit Turkey itself. In the words of president Erdo˘gan’s spokesman Ibrahim Kalın, “[n]o Turk considers Sarajevo, Mostar, Priština, Skopje or Novi Pazar distant places. Balkan Muslims feel the same about Istanbul, Bursa, Konya and cities in Anatolia” (Kalın, 2018).

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Going forward, both countries practice interest-oriented pragmatism through active diplomacy and the application of various economic and soft power instruments. Accordingly, Serbia and Turkey pursue a foreign policy that is as independent as possible, hoping to reduce dependency, especially on the great powers. This kind of similarity is an additional driver behind the rapprochement at various political, economic, and cultural levels. This can be seen in the example of economic pragmatism that the two countries have placed at the very core of cooperation, leaving aside other issues that are characterized by certain divergencies. Alongside this, despite difficulties surrounding the recognition of Kosovo by Turkey and President Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman statements in Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia and Turkey have embraced pragmatism in front of issues of common interest, primarily the economy. Therefore, they signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2009, and then in 2015, they renewed the frozen Trilateral Summit of Turkey, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, by renaming it the Trilateral Committee for Economic Cooperation of Turkey, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing on economic cooperation. As a result, they have experienced an increase in economic exchanges to e1.32 billion in 2020, thus by 5.5 times compared to 2009 (RTS, 2021). The third factor concerns Turkey’s efforts to establish a single Islamic Community in Serbia. There are two Islamic communities in Serbia. The first is the Islamic Community in Serbia, headed by Mufti Mevlud ef. Dudi´c, whose main spiritual authority is former Mufti Muamer Zukorli´c, then a prominent Bosniak politician in Serbia who was linked to the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second is the Riyaset of the Islamic Community of Serbia, headed by Reisu-lulema Sead Effendi Nasufovi´c, who believes that Serbia should have its own Islamic Community unrelated to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkey’s efforts to negotiate an agreement between the two rival Islamic communities in Serbia failed and led to a deeper split between them. The Turkish plan was seen as favoring the faction of Zilki´c/Nasufovi´c and Ugljanin over that headed by Novi Pazar politician Muamer Zukorli´c (Arežina, 2018: 211). However, both sides have expected the legitimization of their status as the only legal Islamic Community in Serbia. Therefore, the Islamic Community that supports Zukorli´c (who passed away in November 2021) was unpleasantly surprised by the presence of the Turkish representative at the appointment of the Mufti of the Sandžak Islamic Community of Serbia in Tutin (Bakraˇcevi´c, 2019). The fourth factor is related to Turkish support for Bosniaks and Serbian support for Republika Srpska. While intensively investing in the Muslim part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to keep economy alive, Turkey also tried to use the intensified cooperation with Serbia to further isolate and seclude Republika Srpska. In this light, we should look at the trilateral cooperation among Turkey, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Turkey’s assertive moves to improve mutual relations between the two countries, which Banja Luka perceived as one of the mechanisms by which Turkey was trying to favor the Bosniaks (Blic, 2011). Namely, in Republika Srpska the trilateral Ankara-Belgrade-Sarajevo arrangement was seen as a Turkish attempt to win regional support to strengthen Bosniak positions in the highly complex Bosnia and Herzegovina situation (Slobodna Evropa, 2010). After

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- devo three summits (Istanbul in 2010, Karador in 2011, Ankara in 2013), eight meetings of foreign ministers, two declarations, and a number of agreements (including the Free Trade Agreement), Turkey’s desire to impose itself as a mediator failed due to biased statements toward the Muslim population. Erdo˘gan’s statement that “Turkey is Kosovo, Kosovo is Turkey” provoked the Serbian president Nikoli´c to freeze Serbia’s participation in trilateral consultations (Politika, 2013). Two years later, the respective foreign ministers met to discuss the scope of future meetings, agreeing that only greater economic cooperation was in the immediate interest of all parties. Consequently, the ministers of trade began to meet once a year within a new mechanism—the Trilateral Committee for Economic Cooperation of Turkey, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, Turkey’s support for Kosovo’s unilaterally proclaimed independence is yet another factor shaping Turkish–Serbian relations. Since 2008, Ankara has supported Prishtina’s efforts to advance in securing international recognition and, above all, to become a member of numerous multilateral organizations. In Kosovo and Metohija, Turkey plays a visible role through a combination of economic and infrastructural arrangements, new educational institutions, and numerous NGOs. Erdo˘gan’s support could also be seen during his visit to Prizren in October 2013, when calling Kosovo his second country. During the meeting with the prime ministers of Kosovo and Albania, Hashim Thaçi and Edi Rama, Erdo˘gan’s stated that “Turkey is Kosovo and Kosovo is Turkey,” to which the Serbian leadership responded by stipulating that such comments represented “a serious violation of international law and interference in Serbia’s internal affairs” (Daily Sabah, 2013). Since 2019, in his public appearances Erdo˘gan has stressed his support for a dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina so that a compromise solution could be reached. At the same time, bearing in mind that Kosovo and Northern Cyprus experience similar issues as entities that are fighting for the recognition of their statehood, Erdo˘gan’s used his July 2021 visit to Northern Cyprus to say that Turkey was actively working on new recognitions of Kosovo, and to also announce his upcoming conversation with the US president Joe Biden on this very matter at the UN General Assembly, which eventually did not take place (B92, 2021). The sixth factor concerns Erdo˘gan’s showdown with the Gülenists, which began on July 15, 2016. His request that the foreign authorities extradite all Turkish citizens, sought over allegations of having links with the FETÖ movement (founded by the Turkish Imam Fethullah Gülen, in exile in the United States), and therefore to be blamed for the coup attempt, has reduced the Gülen movement’s influence abroad. This also applies to the Western Balkans, where their schools existed, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo and Metohija. In the latter, the movement has increased its presence since 2004, through the Atmosphere Foundation for Education and Culture, which was first located in Prizren and then transferred to Priština in 2006 (Mehmeti, 2012: 217). Its main goals covered “modernization” and “education” of the youth of Kosovo and Metohija, and the curbing of radical Islamic teachings originating from the Arabian Peninsula. To support the AKP government, Serbia responded positively to five requests for the extradition of Turkish citizens until early 2021; among them is Kurdish political activist Cevdet Ayaz (sentenced to fifteen

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years in prison for violating the constitutional order), who was delivered in late 2017, despite the recommendation of the UN Committee against Torture to refrain from extraditing due to possible torture in the home country (Cvetkovi´c, 2021). In addition to these five extraditions, in 2018, the Prishtina minister of internal affairs expelled six Turkish citizens who were employed in Mehmet Akif Schools that belong to the Gülistan educational institution. In recent years, these schools have been replaced by the schools of the Maarif Foundation whose existence has been approved by the AKP government. Accordingly, the foundation’s annual budget has significantly increased by a presidential decree (to £1.23 billion or around e140 million), with money to come from the general budget of the Ministry of National Education (Bianet, 2021). The seventh factor is relations with the European Union. Namely, the European aspect of Turkish identity has always played an important role in Turkish foreign policy, both during the rule of the Kemalists and after the Islamists came to power. The reason for Ankara’s refusal to prevent the invasion of Iraq from its territory was not the Islamic solidarity with Iraq, as some might think at first, but the fact that Germany and France—the leading EU states—opposed the Iraqi intervention. In doing so, Turkey sought to reaffirm its European orientation and identity (Brown, 2007: 109). Turkey’s alignment along the Berlin–Paris axis continued even after the Iraqi intervention. In addition, Turkish officials skillfully used the EU accession criteria as an excuse for the internal reforms to change the concept of Turkish society and the state, which until then had been largely based on the Kemalist legacy embodied in the army’s strong role in political life (Tanaskovi´c, 2010a: 67–68). However, due to the slowdown in the EU accession process (Turkey has been a candidate for membership since 1999, and negotiations began in 2005), and the resistance of some EU Member States with regard to Turkey’s membership (primarily Germany, France, and Austria), an anti-Western sentiment developed among members of the Turkish political elite, especially after their country became a bulwark in preventing new waves of migrants from the east (McLaren, 2007: 252). As the result, Turkey has increasingly turned to the Western Balkans, where it has actively employed diplomacy to strengthen its European identity and position as a pivotal Eurasian power. While filling the power vacuum left by the EU in the region, Turkey has emerged as an alternative partner to Serbia that understands what it means to be exposed to conditions that did not apply to the existing EU Member States. Relations with Russia are also a key factor. The Turkish–Russian rapprochement began when the AKP came to power. During the first decade of AKP rule, economic interests enabled both countries to “isolate their trade and investment ties from the major differences in foreign policies toward the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus, as well as from the competition with each other to control the energy flows in the Caspian Basin” (Aliriza & Flanagan, 2013: 4). Accordingly, Turkey’s response to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 was much milder than the reaction of the US and some EU member countries. Therefore, it was to be expected that in 2010, relations with Russia would gain in intensity through the partial institutionalization of cooperation (establishment of the Cooperation Council, an annual summit, as well as the joint Strategic Planning Group) and the establishment of the Strategic Partnership. In early December 2012, the Russian president Vladimir Putin paid an official

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visit to Istanbul, during which the two countries moved from economic cooperation to political harmonization of decisions on the war in Syria, thus introducing Ankara’s great foreign policy turn toward Moscow. The relationship was further strengthened as a consequence of Turkey’s worsening relations with Western powers in the wake of the July 2016 coup attempt and the Russian assistance so that Turkey could defeat the PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups in northern Syria. This was followed by the signature of an agreement on the construction of the Turkish Stream and the purchase of the S-400 missile system. By strengthening relations with Russia, Turkey has shown a greater degree of autonomy in relation to the United States, wanting to confirm the status of a middle power, which is capable of conducting regional policy independently of the global powers’ will. Still, Turkey has more conflicting interests with Russia than common ground (as in the cases of Syria and Libya where Ankara and Moscow found themselves on opposite sides, yet with their troops serving together as peacekeepers in the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict), but it nevertheless has deeper economic ties with Moscow than with Washington. All in all, these two powers represent “cooperative competitors” who take care that their geopolitical differences do not jeopardize their trade interests. On the other hand, the Serbian leadership is also proud of its cooperation with Russia. The Turkish Stream passes through Serbia, which brings energy security and generates a transit tax from the flow of gas; the new “Balkan route” pipeline goes from Russia and Turkey, through Bulgaria to Serbia, and then to Hungary (Reuters, 2021). The ninth factor concerns the relations with the United States. From the American perspective, Turkey is an important member of NATO, the host of some key military bases of the alliance, a well-regarded partner in the “war against the terror,” and a defense line from threats from the Middle East. The connection between Ankara and Washington is primarily based on a unified pursuit of security, and not on political engagement or historical ties, deep economic interdependence, or sociocultural ties. A good relationship with the US was the focus of Turkish foreign policy before the AKP’s rise to power, and then continued to be a priority until 2012. Still, once in power, the AKP gradually sought to redefine its relations with Washington and reduce its security subordination to the Americans. On the other hand, the US has tried to preserve the previous security hierarchy, established during the Cold War. The turning point was the intervention in Iraq, which changed the perception of the US from a reliable strategic partner to that of an ally as well as a security threat. The series of incidents that followed deepened the mutual mistrust, which was reflected in serious differences in foreign policy (toward the Israeli–Palestinian issue, the Armenian issue, Iran, Israel, Syria, etc.), but also the public accusations of human rights violations in Turkey, which led to a drastic decline in the popularity of the US in the Turkish public opinion and the hostile rhetoric of politicians in both countries (Walker, 2012: 151–153). Due to the purchase of the S-400 missile system from Russia in 2019, Washington suspended Ankara from the global F-35 Joint Strike Fighter partnership and imposed the CAATSA sanctions (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) (CNN, 2019). In July 2021, the US stated that it was determined not to lift the sanctions, and that it would introduce new ones in case Turkey opted for an additional purchase of Russian weapons, which president Erdo˘gan had actually

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announced (1News, 2021). The lack of mutual partnership is also reflected in Turkey’s relations with other countries including the Western Balkans such as Serbia, which has also tried to find its own mechanism to cooperate with Washington. Finally, the tenth factor is the Covid-19 pandemic. Its outbreak in Europe at the beginning of 2020 exposed the health capacities of Turkey and Serbia, and that special attention had to be paid to strengthening their weakened economic performance. Immediately in April and May 2020, Turkey sent its first donations of medical equipment to Serbia and other Western Balkan countries. Still, Turkey has not developed its own vaccine yet, which means that it cannot pursue its own vaccine diplomacy (Güzeldere, 2021: 10). In any case, in May 2021, the two countries accepted vaccination certificates against Covid-19 (Consulate General of the Republic of Serbia in Istanbul, Turkey, 2021b).

4 Turkish–Serbian Three-Dimensional Cooperation Over the past two decades, Turkey’s relations with the Western Balkans have significantly intensified. Erdo˘gan’s diplomatic activity has been most successful where least expected—in Serbia, a country long considered to have a highly negative view of Turkey (Rašidagi´c & Hesova, 2020: 104). Although there have been evident ups and downs between them, it is clear that the most important driver of Turkish–Serbian relations stems from the strategically pursued personal relations of the prime minister and the then president of Turkey with every Serbian president since the signing of the Free Trade Agreement in 2009. In terms of political relations between Serbia and Turkey, they can be characterized as “very good,” with pursuing a foreign policy that is as independent as possible, while the broad-based relations serve to reduce dependencies. Since 2010, Erdo˘gan has maintained cordial relations through each subsequent change of government and presidency in Serbia, including with prime minister Ana Brnabi´c and president Aleksandar Vuˇci´c. It can be said that relations between Ankara and Belgrade have reached a new peak in the ongoing and very close relationship between the respective presidents. To show the importance of good relations with Serbia, during these years, “some of the most active and promising diplomats of the Turkish Foreign Ministry were employed at the Turkish Embassy in Serbia” (Öztürk & Akgönül, 2020: 230). Since the AKP has come to power, twenty (out of seventy-six in total) bilateral agreements have been signed and ratified, the most important being the 2001 agreement concerning Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (expanded in 2018), the 2009 Free Trade Agreement (revised in 2018), and the 2017 Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council. During Erdo˘gan’s visit to Serbia in 2019, the Security Cooperation Agreement, the Cooperation Agreement in the Field of Industry and Technology, the Memorandum of Understanding on Joint Police Patrols of the Serbian and Turkish police, and the Science and Technology Cooperation Protocol were signed. In April 2021, the

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Consulate General of Turkey was opened in Novi Pazar, followed by an announcement of another consulate opening, in Niš (Milievi´c, 2021). After his September 2021 stay in Ankara, president Vuˇci´c announced that president Erdo˘gan would visit Serbia by the end of 2021 (Danas, 2021b). In terms of economic relations, they are constantly improving thanks to the aforementioned agreements. In 2020, trade reached e1.32 billion, which is 5.5 times more than in 2009, before the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement, and it can be said that Serbia is Turkey’s largest economic partner in the Western Balkans. As reported by the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of 2020 more than 800 Turkish companies operate in Serbia, employing around 10,000 people. When it comes to the Turkish direct investment in Serbia, the National Bank of Serbia reported that it reached e145.6 million for the period 2010–2019, (Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Serbia, 2021). For example, textile factories were opened in Leskovac and Krupanj, Teklas Automotive opened its plant in Vladiˇcin Han and took over the plants and workers of the company Geox in Vranje (Consulate General of the Republic of Serbia in Istanbul, Turkey, 2021a), Aster Tekstil opened its factories in Niš, the Çalık-Limak consortium bought the local company for distribution and supply of electricity KEDS and Güri¸s purchased a wind farm in Kosovo and ˇ Metohija; the reconstruction of EI Cegar (metals) factories in Niš and a school in Novi Pazar was started, along with several bridges (Novi Pazar is the center of the Muslim minority in Serbia) (Arežina, 2018: 208). These successes were repeated when Turkey won tenders to acquire and reconstruct two airports. It participated with $10 million in the reconstruction of Morava-Ladevci, a military airport near Kraljevo, which was officially opened in October 2011 (Petrovi´c & Relji´c, 2011). In 2010, the Turkish-French consortium Limak-Aeroport de Lyon won the contract to manage the International Airport Adem Jashari in Priština, for a period of 20 years. As a part of the agreement the Turkish company invested e140 million in airport infrastructure (Kömürcüler, 2013). In addition, Turkey has expressed interest in boosting traffic infrastructure in Serbia, in Raška and Kosovo and Metohija (Markovi´c, 2011: 63–64). In 2010, the USTurkish consortium Bechtel-Enka won a e600 million tender in Kosovo and Metohija to build a highway Prishtina–Elez Han (General Jankovi´c), which connects Serbia and North Macedonia, as well as Vrmnica-Prishtina-Merdare, which connects Serbia via Kosovo and Metohija with Albania. Later, the same Bechtel-Enka consortium was successful in central Serbia, when they were awarded a e745 million tender to build the Morava highway (N1, 2015). In 2018, the Tas, yapı company won a tender worth e24 million to reconstruct the Novi Pazar–Tutin road (in the South Serbia region inhabited by Bosniaks), and then, in fall 2019, Tas, yapı inaugurated the construction of the Belgrade–Sarajevo highway’s first phase. The opening ceremony, presented as a historical development, was attended by Erdoˇgan, Vuˇci´c, and members of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tripartite presidency. Moreover, Belgrade and Istanbul have been connected through cargo flights, national air carriers, and Turkey’s low-cost Pegasus ˇ canska banka in Airlines. The Turkish Halkbank bought the majority share of Caˇ 2015, and Ziraat Bank opened offices in Kosovo and Metohija in 2015.

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In terms of cultural relations, they are primarily based on common history, linguistic heritage, and folklore and customs existing between the two peoples. It is estimated that the number of Turks in Kosovo and Metohija is around 30,000 (1.5% of the total population), and they are mostly settled in the area around Prizren and Kosovska Mitrovica. Therefore, Turkey is very active in assisting its “diaspora” through a large number of Turkish NGOs. In this sense, the Turkish–Serbian cultural relations take place through formal channels, such as the state-linked Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA) and the Yunus Emre Institute, but also other diplomatic mechanisms as well as business associations and Islamic NGOs. Cooperation also exists in areas involving art, language, literature, cinematography, and audio-visual creation. In addition to projects in the field of education, agriculture, animal husbandry, health, and work on the reconstruction of cultural and historical monuments (of which about 150 have been realized since 2009), T˙IKA allocated e1.35 million toward the reparation of damages caused by the May 2014 floods in Serbia. With the intention of facilitating mutual visits of Turkish and Serbian citizens, especially when it comes to cooperation in the field of economy and tourism, the two countries signed visa relaxation agreements, accepted certificates on vaccination against Covid-19, and Turkey opened a Turkish Cultural Centers in Novi Pazar and Belgrade (N1, 2015; Blic, 2016; Srbija Danas, 2016; Veˇcernje Novosti, 2016). Through the Great Student Project (Büyük Ö˘grenci Projesi), which was initiated in the early 1990s by Turgut Özal, Turkey has welcomed hundreds of Albanian students on scholarships, as well as several thousand of those studying at their own expense. At one point, the Turkish Ministry of Education reported that its universities had five times more students from Kosovo and Metohija on scholarships than from Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no doubt that the majority of these students would return to Kosovo and Metohija and that the contacts established during their stay would have paramount importance for mutual relations. Apart from offering programs in the national language, Turkish National Television (TRT ) also has programs in Albanian, Bosnian, and Serbian. In Kosovo and Metohija, some dozen newspapers are published in Turkish, some of which include the highly popular Tan, Sesimiz, and Darlik Jeni Donem. In addition, four radio stations—Kent FM, Kosovo Radio, New Period Radio, and Mehmetcik, a station of the Turkish KFOR in Prizren—regularly broadcast programs in Turkish. In addition to the easily accessible films and series of Turkish production, Turkish cultural centers have provided Serbian audiences with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with Turkish folk traditions and customs through different artistic and cultural activities including calligraphy, watercolor painting, and Turkish language classes. During the meeting between the Serbian minister of culture and information Maja Gojkovi´c and the Ambassador of Turkey to Serbia Tanju Bilgiç in February 2021, it was agreed that work on preserving the common cultural heritage should be intensified in the coming period. In that context, they discussed the realization of specific reconstruction projects (the Ram Fortress, Mehmed Pašha Sokolovi´c’s fountain, the mosque in Sjenica, the Small Staircase in Kalemegdan Park, the hamam in Novi Pazar), among which are the renovation of the steam bath of Brothers Krsmanovi´c and the Bajrakli mosque in Belgrade (Danas, 2021a; Stojanovi´c, 2021).

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5 Conclusion The starting point of this study was the foreign policy pursued by Turkey since the AKP came to power in 2002. For the first ten years, the party gradually pursued re-Islamization of the society, which is associated with the phenomenon of neoOttomanism. Multidimensionality, cooperation with the EU, and the policy of “zero problems with the neighbors” became the main determinants of its foreign policy. To become an internationally respected actor and strong enough to accomplish its goals, Turkey sought to dehierarchize bilateral relations and present itself as a “state lighthouse” that exercises a strong influence over its civilization zone. Therefore, the AKP government launched a diplomatic initiative in the Western Balkans, the most important goal of which was to forge sound relations with the traditional partners in the region, including Serbia. During the period 2012–2016, Turkey pursued transformation in the context of its identity, at home, and an active search for “strategic autonomy.” This implied moving from the cooperation with the West, primarily the US and the EU (due to disappointment with some member states’ readiness to oppose Turkey’s EU entry), to diversification of cooperation with other great powers, especially non-Western ones (China and Russia), and use of a legitimating foreign policy discourse to mobilize AKP’s support base at home. At the beginning of this period, the overall engagement in the Western Balkans consisted of a targeted shift from the neo-Ottoman approach to the Muslim societies to initially establish good cooperation with Serbia as a key country in the region, and then, in the second period, Ankara’s approach embraced the full neo-Ottoman perspective. Consequently, the intensity of political relations with Serbia was reduced, until the respective leaders concluded that it was still necessary to take a pragmatic approach embodied in economic cooperation. During 2016–2021, Turkey stepped up its efforts against the Gülen movement, after the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, and Ahmet Davuto˘glu stepped down as prime minister. This was especially felt in the Western Balkans where Turkey started to replace the movement’s institutions with the Maarif Foundation’s institutions. Ankara’s foreign policy became more Erdo˘gan-centered and economy-driven. The ideological zeal of helping transform the region to reflect Turkey’s domestic values has gradually given way to the more realist concern of preserving Turkey’s territorial integrity and the societal cohesion amid the re-emergence of traditional security concerns to the south. Relations with the Western allies have deteriorated, but no equal partnership could be seen in relations with Russia. It did not take long before Davuto˘glu’s “zero problems with neighbors” seemed to have been replaced with a “problems with all neighbors” policy. The epilogue of this domestic and foreign conundrum was evident in the 2018 presidential elections when the AKP mustered a smaller total vote than in previous elections. Regardless of this, Turkey’s relations with the Western Balkans, especially Serbia, have grown stronger. This chapter concludes that Turkish foreign policy, although significantly different in the three mentioned periods, has had a clear goal to establish itself as a (macro) regional power in the process of creating a multipolar world order; the strategically

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independent foreign policy it has pursued is aimed at enabling it to reach the status of “middle power.” Cooperation with the Western Balkans, especially with Serbia as a key actor in the region, has been approached as crucial. Relations between Ankara and Belgrade experienced a major boost after 2009, following the signature of the Free Trade Agreement, and additionally intensified after the failed coup attempt in 2016. President Erdo˘gan’s personal relations with his Serbian counterpart Vuˇci´c have formed the backbone of the newest phase of Turkey’s involvement in Serbia, resulting in a significant increase in political, economic, and cultural cooperation. A closer look at the Turkish–Serbian cooperation also reveals that while some factors were more dominant in one period and not the other, other factors remained equally dominant throughout. In any case, all of them have had a positive effect on the Turkish and Serbian leaderships, except for Ankara’s support for Kosovo’s unilaterally proclaimed independence. While since 2008, this factor has had a negative potential to destroy the progress made in the cooperation between Turkey and Serbia, it is thanks to the interest-oriented pragmatism of both players that this factor has been set aside for the sake of mutual gains. For Serbia, the priority is to strengthen economic relations and attract investments from Turkey (as clearly visible during the Covid-19 pandemic), whereas the AKP government has sought to consolidate its presence in the Western Balkans in a bid to show that it represents a significant “middle power.” Going forward, we can expect to see an even stronger Turkish–Serbian cooperation, primarily in the field of economy, which will continue to be the main driver of Ankara’s relations with Serbia at all levels, as well as to see an expanded and more solidified cooperation with other Western Balkan countries. Accordingly, since presidents Erdo˘gan and Vuˇci´c are guided primarily by pragmatic interests, they are likely to put aside contested issues and focus on issues of mutual benefit. At the same time, Turkey will continue to exploit its historical links with Muslims in the Western Balkans, to further increase its influence, an achievement that president Erdo˘gan has already used to boost his position both internally and geopolitically. Thanks to that, the AKP government is one step closer to reaching the declared goal of Turkish policy, stipulating that in 2023—on the centenary of the creation of the Ataturk Republic—Turkey will become one of the seven most influential countries in the world.

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Resolving the Conflict Between Serbia and Kosovo: Can Turkey Act as a Mediator? Bezen Balamir Co¸skun

The conflict between Serbia and Kosovo is often referred to as a frozen conflict. Following the end of war in 1999, Kosovo became a self-governed territory, administered by a UN interim administrative mission. Subsequently, talks aimed at determining its final status brought the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian authorities around the negotiating table. As it turned out, such initiatives—accompanied by prominent international actors—did not manage to end animosity between the parties. Accordingly, this chapter will address Turkey’s potential as a mediator in the process of resolving conflict between Belgrade and Prishtina. Since the 2010s, Turkish foreign policymakers have highlighted Ankara’s global role in raising awareness and creating mechanisms for conflict resolution. In this regard, Turkish diplomats, alongside their foreign colleagues, have engaged in mediation and other relevant activities, particularly across the former Ottoman areas of influence. The Western Balkan region has become a focus of Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy and engagement in peacebuilding. To offer an answer as to whether Turkey can act as a mediator resolving the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo, the chapter will start by providing a brief overview of the problem between them, and then move on to consider and evaluate the international community’s efforts. Following these contextual sections, the analysis will focus on the role of mediation in Turkish foreign policy and the prospects and challenges for the Ankara leadership to act as a mediator between Belgrade and Prishtina.

B. B. Co¸skun (B) Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, TED University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Radelji´c and M. C. Öz¸sahin (eds.), Turkey’s Return to the Western Balkans, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10074-1_13

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1 Origins of the Conflict Between Serbia and Kosovo Kosovo is a small, self-declared independent state in the Balkans. The majority of Kosovo’s two million population is ethnically Albanian and Muslim, while ethnic Serbs, primarily inhabiting northern parts, are Christian Orthodox. Kosovo was the core of the medieval Serbian empire, and then from the mid-fifteenth to the early twentieth century it was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. During this period, Islam expanded in Kosovo, which increased the volume of Muslim Albanian population. In the early twentieth century, Kosovo became a province of Serbia and then Yugoslavia, with Muslim Albanians having gradually outnumbered the Orthodox Serbs. The Albanians fought against the Ottomans in the Battle of Kosovo Polje (1389); their choice of side did not alter the Serbs’ conflictual attitude and national interests. The process of Islamization in the region had deepened the cultural divide by introducing the problem of religious difference between the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. While during the Ottoman rule, Muslim Albanians enjoyed a privileged treatment since they were considered allies in suppressing Serbian uprisings against the Ottomans, it is also true that the conflict between Serbs and Albanians gained its momentum with the rise of each party’s nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century (Bebler, 2015). During the First Balkan War (1912–1913), the Serbian state and Kosovar Albanians clashed. The Kingdom of Montenegro and the Kingdom of Serbia had ambitions to expand into the Ottoman lands; in fact, the Austro-Hungarian Empire supported the territorial aspirations of Serbia, Montenegro, and other Orthodox states in the Balkans. In October 1912 the Montenegrin army, followed by the Serbian forces shortly after, invaded the territories of northern Albania. The primary objective of Serbia was the “liberation of its Serbian minority of the ‘Ottoman bondage’” (Bebler, 2015: 153). Serbia’s conquest was illegitimate since the occupation was against the will of the Albanian population. As per Leon Trotsky, then a journalist interested in documenting Serbian atrocities, the occupation resulted in almost 25,000 deaths of Kosovars and Turks. However, at the London Conference, the European powers allowed Serbia to keep Kosovo. Both the 1912 and 1918 Serbian conquests left a mark on the collective memory of the Kosovo Albanian population. Consequently, during the Second World War, the Italian and German troops were perceived as liberators. While parts of Kosovo were occupied by Italy and incorporated into the Kingdom of Albania, the rest of it was divided between Germany and Bulgaria. In 1944, the Kosovo National Liberation Council was established and a resolution calling for reunification with Albania after the war was adopted (Bebler, 2015). However, due to the Tito–Stalin conflict, Kosovo remained a province within Serbia, a part of the Yugoslav federation (Bebler, 2015). In 1971, the Yugoslav constitution granted Kosovo equal status alongside the six republics, and in 1974, it obtained the right to issue its own constitutions (Allcock et al., 2021). Later, throughout the 1990s, the Yugoslav state experienced ethnic tensions and wars of secession. When Slobodan Miloševi´c became the president of Serbia in 1989, the Serbian government changed the status of autonomous provinces

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and deprived them of political control. In response to this move, Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Kosovo Albanian population, organized nonviolent protests against Serbia, which also intensified tensions between the two ethnic groups. In the meantime, Rugova’s opponents, who argued that their demands could not be secured through peaceful means, established the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1996. In 1998, an Albanian-led rebellion triggered the Kosovo conflict, by selecting to attack local Serbian targets. In response, Serbian special police killed fifty KLA members, which provoked additional rounds of violence (Chadwick, 2019). While the Serbian police and Yugoslav armed forces attempted to take control over Kosovo, the atrocities being committed made many people decide to escape and seek refuge elsewhere. The Contact Group, an informal coalition bringing together France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, requested a ceasefire and withdrawal of Serbian and Yugoslav forces. Miloševi´c agreed to meet the demands but nevertheless did not implement them (Britannica, 2021). The KLA rearmed during the ceasefire and renewed its attacks. The Serbian forces responded with a counteroffensive and engaged in ethnic cleansing. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemned the excessive use of force and imposed an arms embargo, but the violence continued (Chadwick, 2019). While the international community demanded a ceasefire, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started to plan a military intervention. As reported, the killing of forty-five ethnic Albanians in Raˇcak, in January 1999, represented a turning point in the developments (Chadwick, 2019). In March, the conflict reached its culmination when NATO launched airstrikes against Serbian military targets, which simultaneously saw hundreds of thousands of people driven out and having to relocate (many in Albania, Montenegro, or North Macedonia). In June, NATO and the Yugoslav authorities signed a peace accord ensuring the withdrawal of troops and return of nearly one million ethnic Albanians and half a million internally displaced people. The majority of Serbs left Kosovo. UN peacekeeping forces were deployed, and Kosovo came under a UN administration (Allcock et al., 2021). The war in Kosovo is often cited as one of the bloodiest tragedies in the Balkans. The breakup of the Yugoslav federation left around 250,000 dead or displaced. The Kosovo case is remembered as a turning point for the international community by “compelling a collective armed intervention for the express purpose of implementing UNSC resolutions but without UNSC authorization” (The Independent Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 19). NATO deployed its armed forces and placed the controversial doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” in the international community’s agenda (The Independent Commission on Kosovo, 2000). However, more than twenty years after the end of the war, tensions between Albanians and Serbs have not disappeared. Sporadic violence and anti-Serb riots occurring throughout the early part of the twenty-first century have claimed lives and resulted in the displacement of 4,000 Serbs. Despite the involvement of international bodies such as the UN, NATO, or the Contact Group, the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia remains in place. In February 2008 Kosovo declared its independence, which is still deemed a highly controversial topic within the international community.

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2 Conflict Resolution Attempts of the International Community To resolve the conflict between Serbia and Kosovar Albanians, diplomatic efforts of the international community commenced long before the war of 1999. Since the early 1990s, international organizations and various Western governments had been aware of the risk of conflict in the region. The UN itself hosted several rounds of negotiations, but Serbia has rejected any plan that considered Kosovo’s independence. Since 2011, the EU has led talks between Serbia and Kosovo, which resulted in some technical agreements including the 2013 Brussels Agreement (officially known as the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations) to integrate the Serb minority in northern Kosovo. It did not take long before it became clear that the volume of setbacks would not allow for any major progress, let alone full settlement. More recently, the Washington administration has become involved in the mediation process, and an economic normalization agreement between Serbia and Kosovo was signed in September 2020. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, despite Serbian objections. While the US and the majority of EU Member States recognized it almost immediately, others— including Russia and China—decided not to do so. In fact, the conflicting positions with the EU proper (with Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, and Cyprus being opposed to recognizing Kosovo’s independence), have been accompanied by Beijing and Moscow’s vetoes over Kosovo’s membership of the UN. Still, in 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence was lawful, but the ICJ’s decision was strongly rejected by the Serbian authorities (Allcock et al., 2021). With regard to the early initiatives aimed at conflict resolution, they already appeared in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the international community failed to prevent the four Yugoslav wars. In the case of Kosovo, the international community was accused of not providing sufficient support to the nonviolent resistance movement. Furthermore, the exclusion of Kosovo from the 1995 Dayton negotiations led Kosovar Albanians to think that violence was the only way to attract international attention (The Independent Commission on Kosovo, 2000). The diplomatic efforts of 1998 proved that there was little chance that diplomacy would actually work. While the Holbrooke–Miloševi´c agreement of October 1998 provided for international monitors and succeeded in reducing the overall violence, the situation took a completely different turn in December when Serbian forces reentered Kosovo. In March 1999, the failure of peace talks resulted in NATO’s 78-day airstrike against Yugoslavia. Miloševi´c’s withdrawal of troops from Kosovo was followed by the instatement of the UN-sponsored Kosovo Peace Implementation Force (KFOR), established by the UNSC Resolution 1244. Accordingly, twenty-eight states agreed to send troops; as clarified elsewhere, the purpose of KFOR was “to maintain a safe and secure environment, freedom of movement for all citizens in Kosovo, and to facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans” (Bogedal, 2021: 1). Despite the presence of KFOR, tensions between Serbia and Kosovo continued, and this was especially evident in the period from 2004 to 2006, thus just before the

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beginning of talks to determine the status of Kosovo. In this context, the UN hosted seventeen rounds of negotiations; the plan concerning the status was negotiated by the former Finish president Martti Ahtisaari and, as somewhat expected, was rejected by Serbia (Sharma, 2020). In the absence of an internationally agreed clear-cut determination of the status of Kosovo, two main tracks of Western diplomacy emerged, each offering a solution to the problem. The first track was the EU-led “Belgrade–Prishtina dialogue,” a mediation process which initially focused on technical measures but then evolved into a political dialogue (Hartwell, 2019). By offering an EU membership prospect, the Brussels authorities brought the Serbs and Kosovars to the negotiation table; in fact, normalization of relations was presented as a condition for EU membership (Hartwell, 2019). In this context, thirty-three agreements were reached. The 2013 Brussels Agreement authorized Prishtina to control the land of Kosovo, and Belgrade agreed to transfer the control of four Serbian municipalities in northern Kosovo to Prishtina. In exchange, it was agreed to form the Association of Serbian Municipalities (Zajednica Srpskih Opština, ZSO), an agreement that was not implemented due to the protests by the opposition in Kosovo (Szpala, 2018). In July 2020, the negotiations were resumed after two years of interruption. After a virtual meeting organized by EU officials, Serbian president Aleksandar Vuˇci´c and Kosovar prime minister Avdullah Hoti came to Brussels for face-to-face talks. In the view of Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the encounter marked a constructive discussion aimed at normalization of relations (EURACTIV, 2020a). The second track was the US-led “Serbia–Kosovo dialogue.” In August 2019, Matthew Palmer was appointed a US special envoy to the Western Balkans. Following his appointment, in September Richard Grenell became a special presidential envoy for the Serbia–Kosovo talks. He initiated a diplomatic process instead of supporting the EU’s Belgrade–Prishtina dialogue. Therefore, the US opened up the Serbia– Kosovo dialogue (Hartwell, 2019). Then US president Donald Trump persuaded both sides to sign a pact to normalize economic relations; the pact placed an emphasis on job creation, economic growth, and economic cooperation across a broad range of issues (EURACTIV, 2020b). However, as argued by some policy analysts, Trump’s “involvement in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia was superficial, […] undermining the crucial rule of the EU and ignoring the basic points of disagreement between the two countries” (Nikaj & Hoxha, 2020). On the other hand, there are high hopes for the Biden administration to bring the EU Member States together to resolve the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. According to Edward Joseph (2021), the Washington and Brussels administrations lack the leverage that is required to resolve the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, and their inability to come up with a proper policy has left both parties in limbo. He is right to ask, why is the Balkan region “still in the grips of ethnic nationalist leaders who openly call for updated versions of ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Greater Albania,’” and why is Russia “readily able to perpetuate the region’s divisions?” The answer to these questions is also related to the inability of Western actors to resolve conflicts in the region (Joseph, 2021: 1). The lack of joint action on behalf of the EU and the US paves the way for Russia

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and China to undermine the normalization process. Russia has done everything in its power to keep Serbia and other Western Balkan countries out of the EU and NATO. On the other hand, China has consolidated its relationship with Serbia, which is seen as an alternative to Serbia’s integration into the EU. With this in mind, to reach a long-lasting peace in Kosovo, observers have called for an American return to the conflict resolution table by “protecting Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity, supporting liberal democracy in the Balkans and acting in tandem with the EU and the UK” (Hartwell, 2019: 1).

3 Mediation Theory Mediation and conflict resolution are used to solve disputes. While conflict resolution is a broad concept that employs different methods, mediation refers to a specific process which implies involvement of a neutral, third party. Oliver Richmond defines mediation as an “approach to conflict resolution in which impartial third parties help disputants resolve conflicts through a process of information and social influence, without using violence or invoking the authority of a legal system” (cited in Bercovitch & Lee, 2003: 2). Those in conflict seek assistance or accept help from an outsider to change perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law. In fact, mediation is one of the most common conflict resolution mechanisms in international conflicts; as such, it is a complex and dynamic process between mediators and the conflicting parties or their representatives. Often, mediators have resources and interest in the conflict or its outcome (Bercovitch & Lee, 2003). The UN (2012: 1) views mediation as an “important tool for conflict prevention, management, and resolution.” In internal armed conflicts, more than a quarter (N = 72) of all internal armed conflicts after the Second World War (N= 285) have been resolved through third-party mediation. More recently, mediation attempts in Libya (Berlin Conference in 2020) and Syria (Astana Talks in 2018) have shown that mediation is commonly chosen for addressing wars peacefully (Mehrl & Böhmelt, 2021: 45). Studies confirm that mediation is the most coherent and effective response to international conflicts. It is also noted that certain styles of mediation tend to be more effective in specific conflict situations, and thus a one-size-fits-all approach does not necessarily guarantee a desired outcome. Usually, mediators follow three low- to high-level intervention strategies: communication-facilitation, procedurelike, and directive. Communication-facilitation strategies are the most common ones, but directive strategies tend to be more successful (Bercovitch & Lee, 2003). In the directive approach of mediation, the mediator aims to influence the content and final decision of the negotiation. Jacob Bercovitch (2009) defines mediators as political actors who employ the available resources for mediation purposes because they expect to gain something from the resolution of the conflict. Thus, the act of meditating makes the mediator part of a conflictual relationship. The mediator may threaten to employ diplomatic

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sanctions or incentives and aids to the country (Ruggeri et al., 2017). The choice of mediation strategy depends on the context of conflict. Several factors—conflict intensity, type of issues, conflictual parties’ political, economic, and social structures, their previous relationship, the mediator’s identity, rank, and the timing of the mediation—affect mediators’ choice of method and their potential for success (Bercovitch, 2009). For example, “mediation in low-intensity conflicts is likely to take the form of negotiation, and in high-intensity conflicts, more active forms of mediation may be needed to prevent escalation” (Bercovitch, 2009: 344). If conflictual parties have similar political and social systems, they can be more open to active mediation approaches, whereas if conflictual parties have few similarities, the mediator needs to employ strategies to increase trust (Bercovitch & Lee, 2003). In international mediation, international organizations, states, and individuals may act as mediators. The literature on mediation offers detailed accounts of the mediator’s roles, skills, and behavior (Bercovitch et al., 1991). Since mediation is a voluntary process, the chosen mediator’s unique features are essential for the success of mediation. In understanding the mediator’s influence on the mediation process and outcomes, some scholars insist on the importance of the mediator’s skills and cultural background (Carmelina & Lázaro, 2003). In any case, by inviting or accepting mediation, conflicting parties seek to reach a compromise in a conflict. The third party may be an individual, country, or organization that is not a party in the conflict. As far as the characteristics of mediation are concerned it is a voluntary process, which occurs when conflicting parties call for assistance. Without the willingness of conflicting parties, “a successful mediation outcome is unlikely to be achieved” (Bercovitch & Lee, 2003: 2). In this context, conflicting parties’ motivation, the level of trust the disputants have in a mediator, the relationship between conflicting parties, and the conflictual issues are considered key in mediation efforts (Bercovitch & Lee, 2003; see also Bercovitch, 1997).

4 Mediation as a New Sector of Turkish Foreign Policy According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “[l]ocated in geography affected by active, frozen, and potential conflicts, human losses, forced migration, economic destruction, the deterioration of cultural heritage and environment, Turkey pursues the goal of eliminating these. Within this framework, Turkey plays a pioneering role at the global level in raising awareness and creating capacity for mediation, a method of peaceful resolution of conflicts, to achieve sustained peace, stability, and prosperity in her neighborhood and beyond” (Republic of Turkey MFA, n.d.a). More precisely, Turkish foreign policy’s direction and leading principles drastically changed with Ahmet Davuto˘glu, the minister of foreign affairs between 2009 and 2014. As a scholar of international politics, Davuto˘glu introduced new concepts and principles into Turkish foreign policymaking. As he argued, mediation should be an integral part of Turkey’s new foreign policy direction, which is active, multidimensional, and also visionary. With this in mind, Turkey was “a suitable mediator

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over a wide geographical range” as a result of the country’s “cultural-civilizational background and long experience with Western political and security structures” (Davuto˘glu, 2013: 90). While Turkish policymakers defined Turkey as a “natural born mediator,” this new principle of Turkish foreign policy was labeled a “new sector” by the media (Süleymano˘glu-Kürüm, 2011). Consequently, since the 2010s, Turkey has reinforced its role as a mediator in regional and international situations, in combination with other instruments (diplomatic, economic, and military). In 2010, Turkey launched the “Mediation for Peace” initiative with Finland at the UN General Assembly and as the outcome, Resolution 283 was adopted at the General Assembly (A/65/283). In 2012, the Secretary-General presented the “Guidance for Effective Mediation” (United Nations, 2012). It was translated into Turkish and became the first non-UN official language document (Republic of Turkey MFA, n.d.a). Furthermore, Turkey became a member of the Group of Friends of Mediation, which was formed in 2014 to encourage mediation in resolving regional and sub-regional conflicts. Together with Finland and the Swiss Presidency of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Turkey imitated a “Group of Friends of Mediation” (GoFoM) within the OSCE in 2014. The March 2020 meeting of the GoFoM was hosted by Turkey, and the impact of developments in the international system on negotiators and mediators was discussed (Republic of Turkey MFA, n.d.a). In a similar vein, since 2018, Turkey has submitted several resolutions on “Strengthening the Mediation Capacity of the Organization of Islam Cooperation (OIC).” Based on these resolutions, the OIC established a “Contact Group of Friends of Mediation” to contribute to the efforts in capacity building for mediation. As stressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey has actively worked in recent years for the resolution of many conflicts in a broad geography” (Republic of Turkey MFA, n.d.a). In this context, Ankara has engaged in internal reconciliation efforts in Iraq, Lebanon, and Kyrgyzstan, and, even more so, it has become part of trilateral cooperation processes to achieve peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans (Republic of Turkey MFA, n.d.a). During the first half of the 2010s, Turkey’s mediation efforts also focused on the Palestinian question and the Iranian nuclear issue, and with the “Heart of Asia–Istanbul Process” initiative, it became part of the peaceful resolution concerning Iran’s nuclear program (Aras, 2012; Republic of Turkey MFA, n.d.a). Besides the neighboring regions, Turkey has also engaged in Asia; for example, as a member of the International Contact Group, alongside Japan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom, Turkey has observed the Philippines’ peace process. In 2012, the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) reached an agreement on a road map for ending the conflict in Mindanao. Even though Malaysia led the process, the chairman of MILF, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, thanked Turkey for its constructive role in the negotiations (Aras, 2012). During the same period, Turkey was also involved in an international attempt to solve Buddhist groups’ violence against Arakan Muslims in Myanmar. More recently, in 2021, Turkey’s name was pronounced as a mediator between Ethiopia and Sudan. As stated by Ambassador Dina Mufti, “Ethiopia would appreciate the Turkish government’s mediation on the recent border conflict with Sudan”

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due to Ankara’s close relations with both countries (Abdu, 2021: 1). Besides this case, Turkey was involved as a mediator in the Afghan peace process and, in this context, it took the lead to host a peace conference in spring 2021, to determine the future of Afghanistan. However, this US-backed event had to be postponed because the Taliban refusal to attend (Shalizi, 2021). In any case, Turkey has been involved in resolving the Afghan conflict since the 2010s. As discussed by Bülent Aras (2012: 6), Turkey’s engagement in Afghanistan has consisted of “reconciliation and restructuring in Afghan society, bridging the gap between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and enhancing regional cooperation between Afghanistan and countries in its neighborhood.” Turkey is also involved in restructuring the military capabilities of Afghanistan, and since 2001, it has led NATO operations twice; it was in control of Kabul Central Command and two Provincial Reconstruction Teams operated under Turkey’s supervision (Aras, 2012). In 2021, Turkey committed itself to protect the Kabul airport. In the post-2010 period, Turkey has sought to increase soft power, visibility, and recognition at the global level. As argued by Ambassador Burak Akçapar (2019), director-general for conflict prevention and crisis management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s mediation portfolio consists of three pillars: providing mediation and facilitation in the field; supporting the mediation activities of other actors; and building awareness and capacities in international organizations. As far as the Balkans is concerned, the region became one of the primary interests of Turkish foreign policy during the early 2010s. Since then, Ankara has attempted to play the role of mediator and led multilateral initiatives in the region. Turkey has fostered good relations with Balkan countries, especially with Serbia (Arežina, 2018). In the next section, Turkey’s problems and prospects as a mediator between Serbia and Kosovo will be discussed.

4.1 Turkey as an Aspiring Actor in the Balkans Turkey’s ambition to become a mediator in international conflicts has coincided with the ascendance of Turkey as an aspiring actor in the Balkans. Turkey has engaged in the region as soft power (Çevik, 2019). Ahmet Davuto˘glu’s strategic depth doctrine paved the way to the introduction of soft power as a foreign policy approach. Within this framework, Turkey has relied on its cultural and historical affinity with the Balkan region. Humanitarian and development aid has been an integral part of Turkey’s soft power approach, including its mediation efforts; in this context, provision of humanitarian aid has been closely related to Ankara’s peacebuilding and development initiatives (Lehutová, 2019). This idea is pursued, mainly via assistance provided for building and reconstruction projects, and to proceed with its agenda, Ankara has employed a strong network of government and non-government actors to be represented in the Balkans (Çevik, 2019). Apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entities such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet), the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority

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(AFAD), the Office of Public Diplomacy, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T˙IKA), and the Turkish Red Crescent have become the leading institutions supporting Turkey’s engagement in the Balkans. In particular, T˙IKA has become very active in conducting Turkey’s development cooperation policy and, as such, a key actor in shaping Turkish foreign policy in the region. In fact, 18 percent of T˙IKA’s budget has been allocated to the Western Balkans (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019), and it has mostly been spent on renovation of mosques and other buildings from the Ottoman era. In Kosovo alone, T˙IKA carried out more than 650 projects between 2005 and 2020. In addition, since 2008, T˙IKA has actively participated in the Prishtina Program Coordination Office, which has served to strengthen friendship between Turkey and Kosovo. In addition, T˙IKA has implemented more than eighty capacity-building programs and, even more recently, in fighting the Covid-19 pandemic, it has delivered 32 tons of food to people in Kosovo (T˙IKA, 2021). In Serbia, T˙IKA opened its office in Belgrade in 2009, and since then it has supported projects in several sectors, including agriculture, education, healthcare, and administrative and civil infrastructure. As in Kosovo, the restoration of monuments became an essential aspect of T˙IKA’s work in Serbia; it has provided over four million euro for the restoration of Sheikh Mustafa’s Türbe, Damat Ali-Pasha’s Türbe, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha’s Fountain, the Kalemegdan staircase, the Ram Fortress, and Sultan Valida Mosque (Todorovi´c, 2021). In fighting Covid-19, to support the production of masks and disinfectants in Serbia, T˙IKA donated sewing machines and necessary materials to the women’s association Hatice in Novi Pazar (Öztürk, 2020). Still, most of the projects concern restoration of Ottoman heritage, which is considered a strategic move. As noted by Miloš Todorovi´c (2021: 152), “by doing so, Turkey is … cultivating its soft power … Turkey is preserving its own culture while spending millions helping other countries, a ‘win–win scenario.’ Yet, by doing so, the country opens itself to criticism which has been especially problematic in the recent decades—neo-Ottomanism.” Against this background, if we look at the state of relations, Turkey and Kosovo have always maintained good relations. In Kosovo there is a Turkish community, which forms a little more than 1 percent of the society. Furthermore, there are Kosovars who speak the Turkish language, which is also adopted among the official languages in certain municipalities. The Turkish community of Kosovo is represented by a minister in the cabinet and MPs in the Assembly, as well as by the Democratic Turkish Party of Kosovo (KDTP). There are almost five hundred Turkish companies operating in Kosovo, and Turkey is the third foreign direct investor in Kosovo, together with Germany and the United Kingdom (Republic of Turkey MFA, n.d.b). As soon as Kosovo declared its independence, Turkey recognized it; indeed, even before that, Turkey opened a Cooperation Bureau in Prishtina in 1999, which was subsequently upgraded to an embassy in 2008 (Republic of Turkey MFA, n.d.b). In return, the Kosovo authorities have acknowledged the importance of Turkey for their state’s recognition by the international community (Çetinkaya & Yüzba¸sıo˘glu, 2021). In the case of the relations between Turkey and Serbia, their representatives (together with those of Bosnia and Herzegovina) have signed the Istanbul Declaration, which was a historic thaw in relations between them. Furthermore, Ankara

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has formed mechanisms to facilitate peace and security in the region, and the tripartite cooperation among Ankara, Belgrade, and Sarajevo is perceived as a mechanism capable of bringing these countries closer together (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019). As underlined by the Republic of Turkey MFA (n.d.c), “relations between Turkey and Serbia have reached the highest level in the last years throughout the history of both countries in line with the ‘strategic partnership’ objective.” In October 2017, Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s visit to Serbia was “the first occasion on which Serbs had received a Turk with such warmth” (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 2). Last, as reported elsewhere, president Erdo˘gan’s interactions with Serbian and Kosovar leaders also play an essential role in Ankara’s outreach in the region (Madhi, 2020). Thus, his own modus operandi has become Turkey’s top diplomatic channel in the region; for example, he was the first leader to receive Hashim Thaçi in his capacity as Kosovo’s president in 2016.

4.2 Turkey as a Mediator Between Serbia and Kosovo? As far as the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo is concerned, the conflict is ethnically charged. Following the bloodshed, international actors embraced mediation as a part of their conflict resolution approach. Even though the international community’s efforts proved that mediation between Serbia and Kosovo is not an easy task, the dialogue between them has continued, which in itself shows that both sides recognize its significance. The resolution depends on Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. However, even the prospect of EU membership and the material concessions promised by the US have not managed to persuade Serbia to recognize the statehood of Kosovo. In this context, thanks to its soft power and engagement at the highest levels, Turkey has come to enjoy a favorable status in the eyes of Kosovars and some Serbs. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inaugurated mediation as a new dimension in Turkish foreign policy, the government believed that the historical ties were sufficient for Turkey’s engagement in the Balkans. In a way, president Erdo˘gan’s good relations with the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo, and Turkey’s increasing soft power in the region, provided a solid basis for Ankara to promote itself as a mediator to end the deadlock between Serbia and Kosovo. A good track record of impartiality of international leaders is crucial for the success of mediation, since the absence of impartiality represents a major challenge when pushing the parties to settle their disputes. On the other hand, the question of leverage over the other party cannot be ignored. In this context, compared with the EU and the US, Turkey’s material and diplomatic capacity is quite limited. Except for the provision of foreign aid and promises to increase bilateral trade, Turkey does not have much to offer to keep Serbia and Kosovo in negotiation. Thus, its solo mediation capacity is limited. Mediators assume various roles and responsibilities, namely “directive (promoting specific outcomes), non-directive (producing a favorable climate for mediation), and reflexive (discovering issues, facilitating better understanding)” (Sargsyan, 2003: 3). As noted previously, the mediator’s preferences in terms of mediation style

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are also crucial. William Zartman and Saadia Touval (1985) classify mediation styles as communication facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. For both Serbia and Kosovo, Turkey is a respected and trusted regional actor. As a result of its limited solo mediation capacity, Ankara’s engagement in the conflict resolution process remains reflective. Its engagement is based on the communication facilitation between conflicting parties. Last but not least, the common perception of Turkey’s involvement in Kosovo as a reflection of neo-Ottoman ambitions (Bechev, 2017; Rüma, 2011; Todorovi´c, 2021) and fears of the spread of neo-Ottomanism in Kosovo have appeared as obstacles for Turkey’s projections as an honest mediator. With regard to the concerns about neo-Ottomanism, analysts such as Aydınta¸sba¸s (2019) and Rüma (2011) see them as groundless; as clarified, “the AKP’s approach once deserved a ‘neo-Ottoman’ tag, but president Erdo˘gan has since refocused on personalized diplomacy” (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019: 1). Another obstacle for Turkey’s full engagement in the region is Russia’s stance on the Balkans. While being a prominent actor in the region, Moscow forms part of the great power competition in resolving the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. Russia’s position has also been shared by Serbian president Vuˇci´c, who has insisted that any decision on Kosovo would require Russian consent (Samso, 2020). Looking at the regional and international balance of power, as a middle power, Ankara needs to initiate any mediation act together with great powers, as it has been the case in Syria, where Turkey joined the Astana Process together with Russia and Iran. However, in the case of Serbia and Kosovo, Turkey’s position is on the opposite side of Russia. Despite the existence of close relations between two leaders, there is no Turkish–Russian coordination. Historically, they have competed for power in the Balkans, and Turkey’s interest in the region is not compatible with Russia’s projections for the Balkans (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2019). Thus, the best option for Turkey to engage is through the Group of Friends of Mediation of the OSCE, which already has a field operation in Kosovo. In this context, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo supports the implementation of agreements stemming from the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina (OSCE, n.d.). Thus, contributing to other, in-place efforts would significantly elevate Turkey’s potential as a mediator in regional conflicts. In this respect, analysts are right to suggest that Turkey sees its role as a mediator in international conflicts to build a new agenda that enables the US and Turkey to work together. Therefore, mediation between Kosovo and Serbia, and the consolidation of the state of Kosovo, have become a foreign policy matter for the Ankara leadership (Vuksanovic & Tzifakis, 2021).

5 Conclusion This chapter briefly reviewed the origins and the most current developments of the Kosovo conflict, by pointing out that it remains one of the frozen conflicts of the post-Cold War period. The question of independence continues to divide Serbia and Kosovo, with Belgrade refusing to recognize Kosovo’s statehood. Despite the

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critiques of having a neo-Ottoman agenda, Turkey has continued to project itself as a soft power in the Western Balkans. Its soft power initiatives and president Erdo˘gan’s personal relations with the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo have coincided with Ankara’s efforts to become a mediator in international conflicts. However, neither the leaders’ mediation attempts nor soft power projects have helped Turkey persuade the Serbian side to recognize Kosovo’s statehood. To conclude, if Turkey succeeds in clearing the fears of neo-Ottomanism in Kosovo, it may become a credible player in the eyes of the conflicting parties. Indeed, Turkey carries out most of the features of a good mediator but still lacks the material and diplomatic capacity to put pressure on Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s statehood. Moreover, Ankara’s mediation offerings in the case of the Kosovo conflict, including its soft power endeavors, have reflected Turkey’s middle power position. Thus, the best option for Turkey seems to actively contribute to the EU’s and the US’s conflict resolution efforts. This would surely elevate its potential as a mediator.

Appendix 1: Timeline of the Kosovo Conflict (1987–1999) (Extracted From PBS Frontline, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html) 1987

Slobodan Miloševi´c visited Kosovo; Serb nationalists embraced him as he promised to defend their interests in the province

1989

Miloševi´c introduced changes in the Serbian constitution that reduced the provincial autonomy of Kosovo

1991

Republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence

1992

War erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. First European states, then the US extended diplomatic recognition to the three major breakaway Yugoslav republics, but not Kosovo. In May 1992, Kosovar Albanians elected pacifist Ibrahim Rugova as a president in unofficial elections

Dec 1992

US president George Bush informed Miloševi´c that Serbian aggression in Kosovo would bring a unilateral US military response. The Clinton administration reiterated the threat through 1998

1995

On November 21, the Dayton Accord ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kosovo issues, however, remained unresolved

1996

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started sporadic attacks against Serb authorities in Kosovo. As a result, Serbian repression in Kosovo increased

Oct 1997

Violence escalated in Kosovo as Serbian security forces clamped down resistance and KLA stepped up its attacks (continued)

310

B. B. Co¸skun

(continued) Mar 1, 1998

Rugova’s shadow government reportedly urged Kosovar Albanians to defend themselves against the Serbs

Mar 5–7, 1998

After KLA attacks on police, Serb security forces killed over fifty Albanians in the village of Prekaz. In the following weeks, tens of thousands rallied in Prishtina to protest Serbian atrocities

Mar 7, 1998

Madeleine Albright stated that “[w]e are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia”

Mar 9, 1998

“Contact Group” countries (UK, US, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) met in London to discuss the Kosovo question

Mar 23, 1998

Rugova was reelected president of Kosovo with 99 percent vote in controversial elections (boycotted by increasingly popular Kosovar Albanian hard-liners)

Mar 31, 1998

UN Security Council resolution 1160 condemned Yugoslavia’s excessive use of force, imposed economic sanctions, and banned arms sales to Serbia

Apr 23, 1998

In the national referendum, 95 percent of Serbs rejected foreign mediation to solve the Kosovo crisis

May 1998

The meeting between Rugova and Miloševi´c on May 15 quickly broke down

Jun 1, 1998

Rugova met UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to request UN/NATO intervention

Jul 6, 1998

Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission began monitoring operations in the province

Aug 1998

Serbian forces intensified their offensive by attacking KLA and Kosovo Albanian villages in the Drenica region

Sep 23, 1998

UN Security Council approved Resolution 1199, demanding a ceasefire, Serb withdrawal, and refugee return, as well as calling for unspecified “additional measures” if Serbia refused to comply

Oct 16, 1998

Miloševi´c agreed to allow unarmed OSCE ceasefire monitors—the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)—into Kosovo. As a result, NATO extended the ACTORD (force activation order) deadline until October 27

Dec 1998

Following border clashes and skirmishes in Kosovo, NATO began deploying in Macedonia an “extraction force” (XFOR) to defend peacekeepers in Kosovo

Jan 29, 1999

Contact Group foreign ministers issued an ultimatum to Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in London, calling for them to begin peace talks in France at Rambouillet on February 6

Jan 30, 1999

NATO renewed its military threat, and approved its ACTORD

Feb 1, 1999

Kosovo Albanians announced they would participate in talks in France; KLA agreed to participate the following day

Feb 6, 1999

Rambouillet peace talks began in France, though Miloševi´c refused to attend (continued)

Resolving the Conflict Between Serbia and Kosovo …

311

(continued) Feb 23, 1999

Rambouillet talks paused to allow the Albanian delegation to return home for consultations

Mar 12, 1999

KLA reported their readiness to sign a peace pact

Mar 15, 1999

Peace talks began at Rambouillet reconvene at Avenue Kléber conference center in Paris

Mar 18, 1999

In Paris, Kosovo Albanian delegates signed the autonomy plan. However, Serbs refused and began “winter live fire” exercises in Kosovo the next day

Mar 19, 1999

In light of the failure of peace talks and the massing of Serb troops on Kosovo’s border, Clinton met with the foreign policy team to review NATO plans and strategy

Mar 20, 1999

Kosovo Verification Mission left Kosovo. Serbian forces quickly moved in, began a new offensive in northeastern and northcentral Kosovo

Mar 24, 1999

The Kosovo air campaign began. In a televised address, Clinton ruled out the use of ground troops to fight a war in Kosovo. Instead, officials hoped for a quick resolution, in line with their experience in Bosnia before the Dayton Agreement. To signal Russia’s displeasure, prime minister Primakov canceled a trip to Washington in mid-flight

Apr 3, 1999

Central Belgrade was hit by NATO missiles for the first time. Air commanders bombed FRY and Serbian Interior Ministries as they sought to make clear their determination to “go after the head of the snake” in Serbia

Apr 10, 1999

NATO approved the “Allied Harbor” deployment of 8,000 men in Albania, ostensibly to aid humanitarian and refugee efforts

Apr 14, 1999

Yeltsin appointed Chernomyrdin as a special envoy to the Balkans. It was considered a Russian shift on Kosovo and a desire to salvage the relationship with the West

Apr 30, 1999

NATO strikes on Belgrade continued, targeting FRY Defense and Army headquarters

May 6, 1999

At the Group of Eight (G8) meeting in Germany, Rugova called for a NATO force in Kosovo and a Serb withdrawal

May 22, 1999

NATO mistakenly bombed a KLA position in Košare, reportedly killing 67

Jun 8, 1999

During G8 talks in Cologne, allies and Russia reached an agreement on a possible UN resolution to sanction the peace deal

Jun 9, 1999

NATO and FRY officials initiated a Military Technical Agreement to govern the Serb withdrawal

Jun 20, 1999

Serbs completed the withdrawal from Kosovo, and Secretary-General Solana formally ended NATO’s bombing campaign

Jun 21, 1999

Under NATO pressure, KLA agreed to disarm

Sep 20, 1999

KFOR certified that the KLA had completed demilitarization

312

B. B. Co¸skun

Appendix 2: Timeline of Conflict Resolution Attempts after 2010 (Extracted From European Parliament Briefing and BBC Kosova Profile, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635512/EPRS_BRI(2019)635 512_EN.pdf, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-183 31273) 2008

Kosovo’s unilateral Declaration of Independence was recognized by most European countries and the United States

2010

The International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence did not conflict with international law

2011

Direct EU-mediated talks between Serbia and Kosovo began for the first time since the latter’s Declaration of Independence

Sep 2012

The group of 23 EU countries, the US, and Turkey, overseeing Kosovo since 2008, ended its supervisory role over the government although NATO-led peacekeepers and EU rule-of-law monitors remained

Apr 2013

Kosovo and Serbia reached a landmark agreement on normalizing relations that grants a high degree of autonomy to Serb-majority areas in northern Kosovo. At the same time, both sides agreed not to block each other’s efforts to seek EU membership

2015 and 2017 Between 2015 and 2017, little progress was made on reaching new agreements. Instead, a series of confrontations brought relations to a new low Jan 2017

A Serbian train decorated with the words “Kosovo is Serbia” in twenty-one languages headed for the Serb-majority Kosovar town of North Mitrovica, causing outrage in Kosovo

Sep 2017

Ramush Haradinaj was given the task of forming a new government, ending months of political deadlock after elections in June

Jan 2018

Ethnic-Serb politician Oliver Ivanovi´c was murdered in northern Kosovo

Mar 2018

In a move described by Serbia as a criminal act and a provocation, Belgrade representative, Marko Ðjuri´c, was accused of illegally entering Kosovo and expelled

Aug 2018

Kosovar and Serbian presidents, Hashim Thaçi and Aleksandar Vuˇci´c, floated the idea of a “border correction” as a way out of their impasse, but the proposal quickly ran into opposition

Nov 2018

Kosovo brought in 10 percent customs duties on imports from Serbia, subsequently raised to 100 percent, after Serbia blocked Kosovo’s efforts to join Interpol

Dec 2018

Kosovo decided to upgrade its security force into a fully-fledged army. Although the Kosovar army is small with just 5,000 troops, Serbia saw it as a threat and warned that the move could trigger a military response (continued)

Resolving the Conflict Between Serbia and Kosovo …

313

(continued) Jul 2019

Prime minister Haradinaj resigned after The Hague war crimes court summoned him for questioning as a suspect

Oct 2019

Opposition parties Vetëvendosje (Self-determination Movement) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) won the parliamentary election

Jun 2020

Avdullah Hoti of the LDK became prime minister of a coalition excluding Vetëvendosje, whose leader Albin Kurti briefly preceded him as head of government from February

Nov 2020

President Thaçi resigned on learning that the Kosovo war crimes tribunal in The Hague confirmed his indictment for war crimes. Parliament speaker Vjosa Osmani succeeded him in April 2021

Sep 2021

The EU mediated a deal between Kosovo and Serbia. Both sides agreed on a deal to end border tensions. Under the agreement, NATO troops replaced Kosovar police units on the border. In addition, both countries agreed to place unique stickers on car license plates to remove national symbols and allow free movement of citizens

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