Turkey - Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952 : The First Enlargement of NATO 0714648558

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TURKEY­

ANGLO-AMERICAN

SECURITY INTERESTS

1 945-1 952

TURKEY­

ANGLO-AMERICAN

SECURITY INTERESTS

1945-1952 The First Enlargement of NATO

Ekavi Athanassopoulou

FRANK CASS

LONDON

•

PORTLAND, OR

First published in 1999 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX1 4 4RN

and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS

2 70 Madison Ave,

New York NY 10016

Transferred to Digital Printing 2005

Website: www.frankcass.com Copyright© 1999 Ekavi Athanassopoulou British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Athanassopoulou, Ekavi Turkey- Anglo-American security interests, 1945-195 2: the first enlargement of NATO 1 . North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2. Turkey - Foreign relations- United States 3. Turkey - Foreign Relations Great Britain 4 . United States- Foreign relations- Turkey 1945-1953 5 . Great Britain- Foreign relations- Turkey 1945I. Title

327.5.'61'041

ISBN 0-7146-4 855 -8 (cloth) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Athanassopoulou, Ekavi. Turkey- Anglo-American security interests, 1945-195 2: the first enlargement of NATO I Ekavi Athanassopoulou. p.

em.

Includes bibliographical references (p.

).

ISBN 0-7146-4 855 -8 (cloth) 1 . United States- Foreign relations- Turkey. 2. Turkey Foreign relations- United States. 3. United States - Foreign relations - 1945-1953.4 . North Atlantic Treaty Organization - History. 5 . Great Britain- Foreign relations- Turkey. 6. Turkey- Foreign relations- Great Britain. I. Title. E1 83.8 .T8 A84 327.5610 73-

1999

dc2 1

99- 1 0622 CIP

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher of this book.

CONTENT S

List of Illustrations Foreword by William Hale Preface Map: Turkey in its Geopolitical Context (1952) 1.

Turkey's Security Considerations during the

Interwar Period

vi

vii

ix

xiv

1

2.

From One War to Another

35

3.

1948: 'We Are Indeed at a Critical Moment'

85

4.

1949: Ankara's Frustration Grows

127

5.

1950: An Eventful Year

149

6.

Towards Accession

187

7.

Conclusion

236

Biographical Notes on Turkish Statesmen

245

Bibliography

247

Index

269

ILLU S T R AT ION S

page

1. The handing over of the accession documents of Turkey and Greece to NATO, Washington, DC, February 1952.

223

2. Turkish statesmen at a North Atlantic Council meeting, Paris, December 1952.

224

3. Turkish delegation at a North Atlantic Council meeting, Paris, April 1953.

225

4. Turkish, Greek and American statesmen at a North Atlantic Council meeting, Paris, April 1953.

226

FORE WOR D

During the long period of the Cold War, Turkey's attachment to the NATO alliance was one which seemed to be little questioned by either side. The Turks saw themselves as being in the front line of the Cold War confrontation, and the commitment to the west was almost universally accepted in Turkey. On the western side, Turkey was seen as the comer-stone of western security in the eastern Mediterranean. Nonetheless, as Ekavi Athanassopoulou's original and detailed account shows, the birth of the alliance was long, complex and difficult. By delving into the archives, she shows that the outcome was certainly not pre-ordained, and the story could well have ended differently. Like a novelist with characters but no plot, the politicians, diplomats and generals worked out the ending as they went along. For those mainly interested in Turkey's modem diplomatic history, this fascinating study fills an obvious gap in the literature: there are a number of accounts of Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War, but no comprehensive scholarly survey of the crucial phase which followed it. This account also makes some important points about global relationships and the policies of the main powers during the formative years of the Cold War. For the Americans and British, the relationship with Turkey was largely determined by broad e.)(.pectations about the future balance of world power. In 1945, Stalin made a clear bid to realise the old Russian dream of establishing control over the Black Sea straits, and of reducing Turkey to a Russian puppet. The Turks were naturally determined to resist the challenge, but needed western support to do so. From their nineteenth-century experiences, the British realised the danger at an early stage, but could not carry the burden of supporting Turkey by themselves, and had difficulty in persuading the United States to fill the gap. Until late 1950, policy-makers in Washington had pigeon­ holed Turkey as part of the Middle East, which was seen primarily as a British responsibility, peripheral to American interests. In 1947, the ' Truman Doctrine' signalled US readiness to take over the financial cost Vll

Foreword

of supporting Greece and Turkey from the bankrupt British, but left the United States still unwilling to give the Turks the definite security guarantees which they needed against the USSR. American perceptions were not decisively altered until the outbreak of the Korean war, which convinced Washington of the need for a vastly increased defence budget, and for global containment of Soviet power. By the spring of 1951, President Truman and his advisers were persuaded that Greece and Turkey should be admitted to NATO, as the easiest and most straightforward of a number of alternative security projects. However, at this late stage, it was the British who turned out to be the main obstacle, since they clung to the notion of positioning Turkey not in NATO, but as the regional bulwark of a 'Middle East Command', under British control. Turkey could only be admitted to NATO, they argued, if it accepted this role as a prior condition. The Turks had no wish to be tied down in this manner, and the Americans supported them. In effect, Britain had to accept that Washington was the dominant decision-maker, and that Britain could not act independently in the Middle East. Unfortunately, it took the Suez fiasco of 1956 to drive this lesson home in London. As this book points out, the story also points up some important conclusions about Turkey's position, as a relatively small state in an era of great-power confrontation. Although the Turkish leaders' arguments were not always convincing for the western allies, their country turned out to be more than a mere pawn on the international chess-board. In fact, they eventually managed to get their way on all their essential points, by becoming a full member of the NATO alliance, without having to undertake definite commitments in the Middle East which they were either unable or reluctant to assume. Apart from meeting their essential security requirements, and providing valuable economic aid, their membership of the alliance secured their recognition as a member of the western comity of nations. This was a goal which had lain at the heart of Turkish policy since the mid-nineteenth century, reinforced by the modernist project which Atatiirk had launched. It is still central to Turkish thinking and, in particular, to Turkey's current bid to gain full membership of the European Union. On the other hand, there are those in Europe who still have doubts about Turkey's 'European' or 'western' credentials, just as they did at the time Turkey was trying to join NATO half a century ago. In this way, some of the features of the Turkish­ western relationship are still just as important as they were in the early years of the Cold War.

Dr William Hale School of Oriental and African Studies, London, June 1999 Vlll

P RE FA CE

The first enlargement of NATO in 1952 to include Turkey (and Greece) constitutes an interesting chapter in the history of the early Cold War as well as of republican Turkey. The expansion of NATO into the eastern Mediterranean made it an integral part of western European defence, consolidated American presence in the region and, as a result, further empowered the United States to shape in a decisive way the foreign policy of Turkey and Greece in the decades to follow. Turkey's alliance with the United States through the North Atlantic Treaty fulfilled the long-standing wish of Turkish political circles to safeguard their country's security vis-a-vis Russia, its traditional enemy, but also to tie Turkey to the western world. On the other hand, Turkey's accession to, and military integration with NATO supported by Washington against the wishes of London, put the seal on the end of Britain's American­ independent policy in the eastern Mediterranean. This book describes the considerations in the minds of Turkish political leaders which urged them to institutionalise Turkish-American relations in the aftermath of the Second World War, their relentless (after 1947) efforts to obtain an American security guarantee, and the evolution of American and British strategic thinking towards Turkey between 1947 and 1952 in the context of their strategic planning in the eastern Mediterranean. What emerges quite clearly is that, first, after the war Ankara addressed the question of Turkey's security in a way which mutatis mutandis revealed a long line of continuity in Turkish foreign policy and security thinking since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Geopolitics and, without doubt, the fact that most of the political personalities who shaped or influenced foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s were still in power until1950 accounted for much of this continuity.1 Second, Washington's reluctance to extend a security guarantee to Turkey was a clear manifestation of the mismatch between the United States' Cold War political objectives and its military

Preface

preparedness until the end of 1950. It was also a revelation of weakness in American political and strategic thinking. The US was slow to realise that its refusal to extend a promise of support to Turkey in the event of a war was not compatible with its huge investment in the country, its prestige as a global power, or its security interests in the Middle East and indeed western Europe. Third, London's calculations that Britain could count on the Americans to assume its financial responsibilities in Greece and Turkey while, to a large extent, it would still be able to dictate to the Americans and the Turks its policy in the eastern Mediterranean were proved entirely erroneous. By 1950 London was in no position to act - in relation to Turkey - independently of the Americans, or to influence decisions even in Ankara. Turkey and Greece were invited together to join NATO, but the invitation to Greece was the consequence of the invitation to Turkey. Since the British had notified the United States that they were to cease financial aid to Turkey and Greece, and the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the two countries were considered in Washington as Siamese twins from a security point of view. In fact Athens, preoccupied with domestic political and economic problems in the aftermath of the civil war, had not been active in pressing the Americans for a formal pledge of support. That is why this book, though it does bring the Greek factor into the picture, focuses on the thinking and diplomatic activities of Turkey, the United States and Britain. The primary research sources for this study have been mainly British and American. These sources provide a fairly clear picture of American and British strategic thinking regarding Turkey during the period under examination, though a substantial body of British official documents in connection with American-British discussions between 1950 ap.d 1951 over Middle East defence (and presumably Turkey's role in \t) were still classified when this research was completed. The same sources have also been the principal pool of ihformation about Ankara's security considerations at the time. A researcher dealing with the history of modem Turkey is handicapped by the fact that Turkish archives of most of the republican period are not accessible. Consequently, the state of mind of Turkish statesmen has to be recreated mainly by foreign records. Major Turkish political figures left no memoirs of the early Cold War period. The part of President Ismet Inoni.i's memoirs referring to the Second World War and the postwar period was still unpublished when the writing of this book was concluded. Thus, the personal account of Feridun Cemal Erkin, the Turkish ambassador in Washington throughout the period that Ankara was pressing the Americans for a guarantee, has been useful, despite the fact that Erkin does not reveal X

Preface

very much about the inner thinking of the Turkish government at the time.2 The memoirs of Zeki Kuneralp - private secretary to the General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1947 and 1949­ have also been helpful, although they devote limited space to the years under question in this study.3 As a result of the meagre Turkish primary research material available, Ankara's foreign-policy decisions taken in meetings behind closed doors are not known. What is known is only the foreign representatives' impression of what Ankara's thinking may have been, or what the Turks chose to tell them. This unfortunately accounts for a somewhat incomplete and less than clear picture of Ankara's point of view, as compared with that of Washington or London. It also means that the different political decisions taken by Ankara can be explained only on the basis of general considerations and that the influence of individual actors cannot be established. There is a consensus among students of Turkish political history that during the Second World War and up until 1950 Ismet Inonii, the Turkish President and chairman of the Republican People's Party (RPP), the only political party until January 1946, was mainly responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs in consultation with senior members of cabinet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs like Hasan Saka, Necmettin Sadak, Feridun Cemal Erkin and Numan Menemencioglu.4 However, only few details are known as to how influential these individuals were. Similarly, little is known about foreign-policy making in Turkey after 1950, when the Democrat Party came to power. Biographers of Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister during the Democrat Party's years in power, point out that he attributed great importance to foreign affairs, which he considered to be his own domain.5 It is hard to establish an idea as to what extent Menderes was influenced by his close political friends and colleagues in matters concerning international affairs. Obviously, serious research in this field is needed before a clear picture can be drawn. There has been a lot of joy but also pain involved in the lonely adventure of writing this book and there are many whom I would like to thank for their unconditional support along the way: Professor Ralph Smith, for his guidance, his patience and for initiating me into the research of history; Dr William Hale for his advice and long fruitful conversations; Dr Feroz K. Yasamee for his critical eye, which left me with no room for laziness; Professor Michael Dockrill for his essential research advice. I am beholden to Sir Bernard Burrows for kindly agreeing to be interviewed, for his patience in answering all my questions and for bringing to life the thoughts and sentiments of the Foreign Office in the xi

Preface

late 1940s and early 1950s. I am obliged to Mr Nicholas Hay, Dr Robert Bickers and Dr Tim Wales for their willingness to discuss the difficulties of my work and for proofreading drafts of it. I am indebted to Dr David Taylor for his support and for fmding solutions to seemingly insoluble practical problems; also to Mrs Joyce Hutchinson and Ms Brita Pouget for their encouragement and help in sorting out any problems I had with word-processing. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Mrs Sylvia Heim, who so kindly assisted me in relation to my search for a publisher. My grateful thanks also go to my family and my friends for their support, understanding, and wise (at least most of the time) advice during the years I have being working on this project. For her warm hospitality in Washington as well as her unfailing care, special thanks are due to my American friend, Ms Patricia Carley. I shall always be indebted to the Sofia Saripolou Fund, University of Athens, which relieved to a great extent my fmancial worries during the time of my research. I am also most grateful to the Program in Hellenic Studies, Princeton University, for offering me a visiting research fellowship which allowed me to complete the collection of my material. For his solid advice and personal interest in my work, my special thanks are extended to the Executive Director of the Program in Hellenic Studies, Mr Dimitris Gondicas. Finally, I am warmly appreciative of the professionalism, assistance and friendliness of the staff at the University of London Library, at the Public Record Office, at the Liddell-Hart Archives Centre, at the Mudd Library, Princeton University, particularly Ms Nanci Young, Mrs Monica Ruscil, Mr Daniel Link and Mr Terun Weed. I would also like to thank Mrs Celeste Delmoitiez Palmer, at the NATO Media Library and Mr Sel uk Unal, third secretary of the Turkish Embassy in Dublin, for their consideration and the speed with which they helped me in my research for photographic material for this book. I must also offer my deep thanks to Mrs Carmel Ryan and Miss Anne Butler, at the University of Limerick Library; without their competence and wholehearted assistance the completion of this book would have been extremely frustrating. NOTES 1.

In order to illustrate this continuity the first chapter analyses Turkish security considerations during the interwar period.

2.

Feridun, C. E.,

D1

lerinde 34 Yil: Amlar-Yorumlar, Vols. 1-2 (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurum

Basunevi, 19 8 0). 3.

Kuneralp, Z.,

Sadece Diplomat (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaas1, 19 8 1 ).

4 . For Inonii's almost absolute authority in the domain of foreign affairs see Weisband, E.,

Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 33-4 6; Aydemir, - S., 1kinci Adam,

xii

Preface Vol. 2 (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1976), p. 154 ; K

ak:. C., TUrkiye 'de Milli Sef Donemi,

( 1938-1945) (Ankara: Yurt Yaymevi, 19 86), pp. 39 2-5 .

5 . Aydemir, S. S., Menderes 'in Drami (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1969 ), passim; K1sak:orek, N. F., Benim Gozumde Menderes (Istanbul: Otuken Yaymevi, 1970), p. 375 ; Fersoy, 0. C., Adnan Menderes: Bir Devre Admz Veren Ba§bakan (Istanbul: Mayatas, 19 7 1 ), pp. 265 -7.

xiii

Key:

Hitay

(A le x an d ria to Turkey 1939)

TU R K EY IN IT S G E O PO LITICA L C O N TEXT (1952)

1

T U R KE Y ' S S E CU R I T Y

CON S I D E R AT ION S D U R IN G T HE

INTE RWA R PE R IOD

TURKE Y' S INTERNATIONAL POSITION IN THE 1 920s

Since 1830 Russian expansionism had directly challenged the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and gave rise to intense rivalry in the region among the Great Powers, particularly between Russia and Britain. As a result the 'Sublime Porte' sought, and was able, to safeguard the security of the empire vis-a-vis its northern neighbour by: means of alliances with the other European powers. 1 This state of affairs did not outlive the First World War. The young Soviet regime established after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was faced with enormous internal difficulties which restrained its expansionist aims. Domestically fragile and threatened by the possibility of western invasion, the Soviet Union could hardly dominate eastern Anatolia or threaten Constantinople. As a result, on the one hand, Anglo-Russian tension in the area abated and, on the other, the new Turkish state which succeeded the Ottomans in Asia Minor and Anatolia was relieved from imminent danger from the North.2 Between 1917 and 1921 the Bolsheviks did try to spread the communist revolution in the Muslim countries of the Middle East. This policy, however, was abandoned as it did not meet with any strong response on the part of the Muslim people. Furthermore, Lenin saw more benefits in supporting and not antagonising surging nationalist movements in Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan in their struggle against the British, who wished to politically dominate the 'Northern Tier' after the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire.3 Lenin's aim was to create a security zone between the Soviet Union and Britain, which had already succeeded - rivalled by the French - in dominating the Arab Middle East and was in occupation of Constantinople and the Straits, the seaway in and out of the Black Sea.4 The Turkish nationalist movement sprang to existence after the defeat of the Ottomans by the Allies in 1918. It was a reaction to the 1

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

occupation of parts of Ottoman territory by entente forces, the designs of the Allies to partition Ottoman provinces and the inability of the sultan's government in Constantinople to safeguard the integrity and independence of the country.5 In late 1919 Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish nationalist movement, unofficially approached Moscow to explore the possibilities of material support in his struggle against western pressure. As a result he received limited supplies of arms and money from the Soviets. Following the Allied (in name, but British in reality) occupation of Constantinople on 15 March 1920 and the strong measures taken against the nationalists by the Ottoman government, now under British control, Kemal sought the establishment of diplomatic relations between his movement and the Soviet Union and officially appealed for Soviet aid in his struggle against the Allies. Moscow responded to the Turkish initiative. Kemal's plead to Lenin for aid, but also for an alliance which would break the diplomatic isolation of his movement, intensified after 10 August 1920 when the sultan signed the Sevres Peace Treaty which left the Turks with a minimal state under the financial and military control of the western powers. The revolutionary Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara, which supported Kemal's movement, had not accepted the Treaty and declared the members of the Constantinople government, who had signed it, to be traitors. 6 The outcome of Turkish-Soviet diplomatic negotiations was the signing on 16 March 1921 of a Treaty of Friendship between Kemal's revolutionary government in Ankara and Moscow. The Soviet Union had signed similar treaties of friendship with the new nationalist government which came to power in Persia after Reza Shah's coup d'etat and with the Afghans earlier in the same year.7 In the 1919-22 period the Soviets provided Kemal with a significant quantity of arms and ammunition but also with financial help which amounted to 11,000,000 gold roubles.8 Kemal's movement was successful in overturning the Sevres Peace Treaty and negotiating in Lausanne (1922-23) new peace terms which met most of the objectives of the Turkish nationalists. It was the first revision of the peace settlement imposed by the victorious powers after the war. Following the proclamation of the end of the sultanate by the Turkish Grand National Assembly dominated by Kemal's supporters, the Republic of Turkey was established on 29 October 1923 with Ankara as its capital. The new political regime was based on a single party, the Republican People's Party (RPP), which was merged with the government. Kemal as president of the republic and party chairman for life effectively controlled both the Grand National Assembly and the government, and it was he who formulated foreign policy in consultation 2

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period

with lsmet lnonii, his Prime Minister until 1937.9 In the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the republic Turkey's foreign policy was subdued, as the regime was initially preoccupied with the consolidation of its internal position and domestic reforms.10 Until 1926, Ankara's main foreign policy concern was to safeguard the integrity of the new state against western imperialist designs. The Lausanne Peace Treaty (23 July 1923) between the Allies and Kemal's government may have left Turkish nationalists with little ground for serious grievances, but it had not established what Turkey would consider as conditions of security around its borders. Relations with Greece were still strained because of the problems arising from the exchange of populations following the end of the Graeco-Turkish war in 1922. The Dodecanese islands off the western coast of Turkey were formally given to Italy, which had occupied them in 1912 during the Tripolitanian War. 11 Thus, the Turks were close neighbours of a power which had clearly shown its expansionist aims over Anatolia in the recent past. At the time of the signing of the abortive Peace Treaty at Sevres between the Ottoman state and the Allies, Italy, together with Britain and France, had concluded a Tripartite Agreement on Anatolia which envisaged its division into spheres of economic exploitation among the three powers. 1 2 The agreement, which, like the Sevres Treaty, was never ratified, provided for the formal acceptance of Italy's 'special interests' in southern Anatolia. What was even more disconcerting from a Turkish point of view was that the Turkish-Iraqi frontier had not been settled yet, owing to an Anglo-Turkish dispute over the Mosul area. 13 As a result, Turkey remained concerned about Britain's imperialist policies in the Middle East. The fact that the Lausanne Straits Convention, signed together with the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923, obliged Turkey to demilitarise the Straits and placed them under international control, rendered the Turks even more uneasy about their national defence, in the event of a conflict with the British. According to the Convention complete freedom of navigation was guaranteed to merchant and war vessels in time of peace. In time of war, Turkey being neutral, there was also to be complete freedom, while Turkey being belligerent, only neutral vessels would be allowed passage. Turkey was granted the right to keep within the demilitarised area of the Straits only a police force and a gendarmerie. In case of war against it Turkey had the right to move its troops into the demilitarised zone, but Turkish troops needed three to four hours to reach the Straits while heavy mobile artillery needed 12 hours to be placed in position.14 Thus, until the question of Mosul was fmally solved in 1926 Turkey's relations with Britain were maintained 'according to the principle of defending territorial integrity and national independence' .15 3

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

In the face of the above security considerations, Turkey continued to seek good relations with Moscow so as to safeguard its northern frontier, strengthen its position vis-a-vis its western neighbours and counter­ balance its uncertain relationship with Britain. Indeed since 1920 Turkish-Soviet relations had been contingent upon the policy of the west, and mainly of London, towards Turkey. The Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship of 1921, which had helped the new Turkish leadership to withstand western pressure during the 1920--22 period, was signed as a reaction to the signing of the Treaty of Sevres. The second important stage in Ankara's relations with Moscow, the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality of 1925, coincided with the final settlement by the League of Nations of the Mosul dispute in favour of Iraq. Turkey, reluctant to accept the decision of the League, became uneasy about the future of relations with London and tilted again towards Moscow, seeking to strengthen its international position. In the words of Ismet Inonti, Prime Minister at the time, the 1925 Soviet-Turkish treaty provided Ankara with moral support as long as the Mosul question was not finally settled. 16 The Soviet Union for its part viewed the treaty as a means to safeguard its vulnerable position in the Black Sea. Moscow was concerned about the 1925 Locarno Pact of mutual guarantees accompanied by arbitration treaties between Germany and France and Germany and Belgium. This western defence system was interpreted in Moscow as an alliance between the western powers and Germany against the Soviet Union. Therefore, Turkey's neutrality in a possible war between the Soviet Union and the west would guarantee free navigation to Soviet warships.17 However, 'the special relationship' between Ankara and Moscow was not, as Ferenc Vali remarks, 'a relationship of trust'. 18 It never became an alliance, and it never diminished the intensity of Turkish fears of Soviet expansionist designs. Turkish political leaders had no illusions about the benevolence of the Soviet Union. 'The Russian-Turkish rapprochement came into being as a result of the threat to both states' wrote the Turkish daily Istikbal on 1 September 1920.19 This threat could not last forever. Ankara knew that it was just a matter of time before the northern neighbour resumed its traditional policies and that in the long run Turkey's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union needed to be strengthened. Turkish statesmen expressed their suspicions and fears of future Russian aggression on many occasions. As the Turkish Ambassador in London in 1926 told Austen Chamberlain, then Foreign Secretary: 'Turkish policy had to take account of two possible dangers, the one nearer, the other more remote. The nearer danger lay in the possible developments of Italian policy; the more remote danger came from the side of Soviet Russia. '20 4

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period In the eyes of Ankara, Turkey's longterm security depended on support from Great Britain which as a naval power with imperial interests in the eastern Mediterranean could counteract any future Soviet expansionist designs in the Dardanelles.21 In fact, as soon as the Turks realised that London was prepared to recognise and accept the new Turkish state they became eager - as the 1920s despatches of the British Embassy in Ankara clearly demonstrate - to establish a friendly relationship with Britain. The signing by Turkey, Iraq and Great Britain of the 5 June 1926 treaty, which formally ended the Mosul problem, facilitated Turkey's detente with the British. In the coming years and up to the signing of the Montreux Convention in 1936 Ankara became active in promoting good relations with Britain and other European states.22 This, however, did not mean a rupture of Turkey's relations with Moscow. On the contrary, further normalisation of Turkish-Soviet relations was sought, though the 1925 Treaty of Neutrality was the last Turkish-Soviet agreement of major importance.23 As the Turkish ambassador in London put it to Chamberlain in another conversation in 1926: 'Turkey was a small and weak nation ... she could not forget that she had an inconvenient and restless neighbour [Russia, but] she must have some point d'appui and, though it was only with Great Britain that she would care to seek an alliance, she could not remain without support from any side.' 24 Cordiality with Britain was seen as a means of strengthening Ankara's position not only as regards any future Soviet expansionism, but also in order to protect its security interests in the Mediterranean in the face of what appeared to be a growing Italian menace.25 Mussolini's consistently advertised expansionist interests in Asia Minor - after 1925 - raised suspicions in Ankara about Italy's intentions. These suspicions were enhanced as a result of the fortification of the Dodecanese, an action which the Turkish government press interpreted as being aimed against Turkey: 26 'a loaded pistol levelled at the heart of Turkey' .27 Turkey did not possess adequate naval forces to protect its long coastline in the event of an Italian offensive, and the demilitarisation of the Straits was another weak point in this respect. Against this background Kemal's increasing desire to strengthen relations with Britain was hardly surprising. Nonetheless, Kemal did not appear ready to commit Turkey in any way. Turkish leadership was still suspicious of the British, and, as a result, reserved in their approach. It was only after the mid-1930s, with the development of increasingly aggressive Italian policies in the Mediterranean, that Ankara accelerated its efforts towards closer ties and even some kind of alliance with Britain. However, as long as Mussolini's official policy continued to be friendly towards Turkey, Ankara sought to come to terms with Rome. 5

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

Hence Kemal was quick to respond to Mussolini's initiative in the late 1920s to improve relations with the eastern Mediterranean state!!. 1\rrkish­ Italian discussions resulted in a treaty of neutrality signed in May 1928. It was the first bilateral political agreement between the Kemalist regime and a major western power since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. It signalled Thrkey's breaking away from what had been until then an exclusive diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union, 28 and looked like a positive development in relation to Thrkey's security in the eastern Mediterranean.29 Thrkey's security in the Mediterranean was further strengthened by the conclusion of a similar treaty of neutrality and conciliation with Greece on 30 October 1930. Until then the main reason for strained Graeco-Thrkish relations, besides recent memories of the Graeco-Turkish war (1918-22), was the problem of property rights created by the exchange of populations following the Lausanne Peace Treaty. During the negotiations of the 1\rrkish-Italian Pact of 1928, Italy had tried to promote the idea of a tripartite agreement between itself, Turkey and Greece. This attempt failed and Italy signed a separate agreement with Greece three months later. Nonetheless, Italy continued to have an interest in bringing the two neigbours close to each other in order to 'create a political constellation in the Eastern Mediterranean under its auspices' .3 0 Thus, partly through the good diplomatic offices of Italy, the issues in dispute between Turkey and Greece were finally settled. The signing of a convention between them in June 1930 regarding the property of exchanged persons, cleared the way for the signing of the 1930 treaty.3 1 Turkey had no outstanding disputes with its other Balkan neighbours. A treaty of friendship between Turkey and Bulgaria dating from 1925 had been supplemented by a Treaty of Neutrality and Conciliation in 1929. There was also a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Yugoslavia signed in 1925 and relations with Rumania, although not under formal agreement, were good. By the end of the 1920s, most of Turkey's security concerns left after the war were eased. Virtually all its borders were clearly defined. Relations between Ankara and the west were gradually established. Moreover, the fact that Turkey was linked with Italy and Greece in what looked like an eastern Mediterranean pact relieved Ankara from immediate concern over Italian expansionist ambitions. Kemal sought accommodation with the west primarily in the light of longterm national security considerations, but aspirations for Thrkey's modernisation and economic development also played an important role in motivating Ankara to promote relations with western Europe. What had started as a process of westernisation in the Ottoman state during the Tanzimat (period of reform and modernisation in the Ottoman Empire 6

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period between 1839 and 1876) reached its climax after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The drive towards Europe - through the secularisation of the state, the introduction of the Latin alphabet and western legal norms by the end of the 1920s - brought to an abrupt end the cultural and political links of the country with the Muslim East, at least at the interstate level. Kemal and his followers decided that Turkey's future lay once and for all with the west. In his words, the west had always been prejudiced against the Turks, 'but we Turks have always and consistently moved towards the West . . . In order to be a civilised nation there is no alternative.'32 In this context, settling old accounts with the western powers was necessary so as to bring Turkey closer to the community of western nations with which Turkish political leaders wished their country to integrate. In addition, western Europe was seen as a potential source of capital indispensable for Turkey's economic progress. The new state focused its economic development on industrialisation, but both private and public financial resources were inadequate to this end. Ankara gave repeated assurances that it was interested in co-operating with foreign capitalists and was prepared to grant them essential guarantees within the framework of local law, but was not very successful in attracting western capital.33 As Z. Y. Hershlag points out 'there is no justification for the often held contention that Turkey refused to accept foreign aid as a matter of principle. The real reasons for very restricted foreign aid until World War II are to be looked for, apart from Turkish conditions, also in the cool attitude of the Powers and of Western capital towards the Turkish Republic after the Lausanne Treaty.'34 The first foreign loan of eight million dollars in 1932 to the newly founded Turkish Republic came from Turkey's only 'friend', the Soviet Union.35 T H E Q U E S T I O N O F R E G I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N T H E 19 3 0 S

The Balkan and Saadabad Pacts In the early 1930s the political security which had prevailed in Europe in the previous decade gave place to insecurity.36 The fact that the League of Nations was not able to deal effectively with the Manchurian crisis in 1931 vividly showed the smaller states that they could not count on the principle of collective security to safeguard their territorial integrity. Mussolini's proposal in June 1933 for the creation of a four­ power pact, which could allow the four powers, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany, more freedom of movement - including revision of the peace treaties - acted as a catalyst in the eastern part of Europe. All 7

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minor powers realised that the task of maintaining the status quo was placed on their own shoulders. A little later, in 1934, the failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference was to be another indication in the same direction. Against the background of the new uneasy European security environment Turkey's own security concerns were enhanced. As a result Ankara intensified its diplomatic activities, which had already been growing since the domestic consolidation of the Kemalist regime in the late 1920s. Ankara's immediate reaction to Mussolini's proposal, which amounted to a European game a quatre, was to strengthen relations with its Balkan neighbours. In September 1933, Turkey signed a pact with Greece with which the two countries 'mutually guaranteed the inviolability of their common frontiers'. The pact was added as a supplement to the Graeco-Turkish treaty of 1930 under which both states had promised not to attack each other.37 In the same month the 1929 Turkish-Bulgarian treaty was prolonged for five years. Treaties of non-aggression and conciliation with Rumania and Yugoslavia were to follow in the same year. These bilateral agreements, like the Balkan Pact which was signed some months later, reflected fears in all Balkan states of a combination of Italian and Bulgarian aggression in the Balkans. At the beginning of the 1930s Italy ranged itself alongside the formerly vanquished countries, which considered that the postwar arrangements had been unfair.38 Italy's expansionist policies in the Balkans and its friendship with revisionist Bulgaria were well known. Bulgaria .· had claims on southern Dobruja and western Thrace, which had been given to Rumania and Greece respectively under the Neuilly Treaty in 1919. Greek and Yugoslavian Macedonia, partitioned between the two countries by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 and confirmed by the Neuilly Treaty, was also a target of Bulgarian irredentism. Bulgaria's military weakness meant that it could pursue its claims only through combined action with Italy. Rome, besides its close links with Bulgaria and revisionist Hungary, had already secured a foothold in the Balkans through Albania, which was entirely dependent upon Italian financial assistance, and an influence over the Fascists in Rumania and the separatists in Yugoslavia.39 For anyone prepared to read or listen, Mussolini made it obvious that he had great ambitions for his country at the expense of others. The growing disequilibrium in Central Europe, which put extra pressure on Yugoslavia and Rumania along with an unexpected Bulgaro-Yugoslav rapprochement, which further alarmed Athens and Ankara, created the final impetus for the conclusion of a Balkan pact. One might have expected that a detente between Sofia and Belgrade would have been met with relief in Ankara and Athens. On the contrary, 8

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period Turkey and Greece grew apprehensive. In their eyes this rapprochement appeared to open up prospects for the fulfilment of Serbian nationalist aspirations for a South Slav Union in the Balkans. Consequently it would have a disastrous effect on the regional status quo.40 The Balkan Pact (9 February 1934) between Turkey, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia as a minor powers' attempt at regional security was not unique.41 There was the precedent of the Little Entente (under the patronage of France) between Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia formed in 1920 and envisaging a common foreign policy to prevent Hungarian irredentism and German expansionism. (In the early 1930s however, its members were gradually drawing apart.) The Baltic Pact, which was to be formed later in 1934 between Lithuania,batvia ancLEstonia as a result of their concern over German policies, also envisaged co-operation in the conduct of foreign affairs. Nonetheless, the Balkan Pact differed from both of them. Unlike the Little Entente the Balkan Pact was not under the auspices of any of the major powers and its provisions were more binding than those of the Baltic Pact. The general aim of the agreement was to guarantee respect for existing contractual agreements and the maintenance of the established territorial order. The contracting parties guaranteed each other's frontiers, and undertook to consult on the measures to be taken in the face of any eventualities which might endanger their security and to consent before entering political agreements with other Balkan countries. The principal objective had been to guarantee each other's borders against aggression by a Balkan state acting on its own or simultaneously with a non-Balkan power. However, the Pact failed in its original intentions - that is, to fortify the Balkans against foreign intervention - and remained mainly the expression of a need for more secure relations between the participants themselves.42 Turkey declared that because of its neutrality treaty with Moscow it would not go to war against the Soviet Union, if the latter attacked Rumania. Greece for its part, would not feel committed to assist any of the other members if they were attacked by another Balkan country assisted by Italy. Turkey's fear of violation of its Thracian borders by Bulgaria, assisted by Italy in the Mediterranean, had driven it closer to the other Balkan states,43 but it immediately became clear that Turkey, like Greece, had little confidence in the idea of regional security safeguarded only by the minor states without any support from the big powers. Undoubtedly, the Balkan Pact provided Turkey with some guarantee in relation to its border with Bulgaria, but could offer no effective solution regarding Turkey's main security problem along its western coast: Italy. Therefore, it was not surprising that on the one hand the Turkish government was loudly 9

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working on regional security with its small neighbours, while on the other it sought to protect Turkey's Mediterranean front by discreetly promoting a closer relationship with Britain and by seeking not to upset relations with Italy. Indeed, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs along with his Greek counterpart were eager to reassure the Italian ambassador in Athens that 'the Balkan Pact would never be against Italy and they insisted that, although their countries had interests in the Balkans their fundamental interest lay in the Mediterranean' .44 What seemed to be in the early 1930s an emancipated Turkish security policy regarding the major powers was rather a tactical manoeuvre in the absence of a real alternative. The pact was a manoeuvre in more than one sense. The creation of a regional pact was important to Turkey in the context of its diplomatic efforts to remilitarise the Straits. Already in 1933 Ankara had tried to promote the idea of an Euxine Pact among the riparian states of the Black Sea, as a means of supporting its efforts to secure the abolition of the demilitarisation clause in the Lausanne Straits Convention. While the Balkan Pact was being negotiated, the Turkish government tested the ground in European capitals on the issue of the remilitarisation of the Straits.45 By establishing cordial relations with its Balkan neighbours the Turks hoped to disperse suspicions that their wish to remilitarise the Straits was driven by an aggressive intent. The Balkan Pact had yet another dimension. It elevated the new Turkish state to a regional status which it had lacked until then. It affirmed its claims and interests as a European power and gave it a voice in the affairs of south-eastern Europe for the first time since the withdrawal of the Ottomans from the Balkans.46 Turkey's wish to raise its regional status was also apparent in its participation in the Saadabad Pact named after the Persian palace where it was signed. This was a non-aggression treaty between Mghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey signed on 8 July 1937, three years after the conclusion of the Balkan Pact, though initial negotiations among the signatories dated from the early 1930s.47 As far as Turkey was concerned the pact represented a means of strengthening its security and of projecting itself as a bridge between the east and the west. As Riistii Aras, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, rhetorically declared through the Havas agency in Aleppo in 1937, Turkey's intention was 'to contribute to the European political life, but by remaining at the service of the. East' .48 In the absence of a common external danger against the four Middle Eastern states (unlike the Balkan states) the general aim of the pact seemed ambiguous. In reality this was an attempt by the four states to guarantee their mutual borders in the face of boundary disputes 10

Turkey's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period (between Turkey and Iran, Iran and Mghanistan, and Iran and Iraq) and of the large number of Kurds living in the bordering territiories of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The signatories undertook to abstain from interference in each other's affairs and to prevent the formation within their territories of bands or organisations seeking to disturb the peace of any of them. They further pledged to consult one another on international questions concerning their common interests. As there was no big power which seemed committed to safeguard the territorial status quo in the region, it was natural that they sought to safeguard it through reaching a mutual understanding.49 Reportedly, Riistii Aras, who was seen as the architect of the 'oriental pact' as well as of the Balkan Pact, said in 1933: 'I am accused of pactomania; No, I simply suffer from paxomania.'5 0 D. C. Watt argues that to the Turks, who were preoccupied with the Italian threat 'the pact represented a removal of a constant source of anxiety on [their] eastern frontiers, [a] narrowing down by the area of the four contracting parties of the field for speculation in terms of military or power politics (that is, an area for foreign intervention) helping to close a large area of the South-West of Asia to adventurous policies by ambitious states'.51 The wish of the four states to strengthen themselves in relation to the Soviet Union should also be taken into account. In the early 1930s, in the absence of any serious concern on the part of Britain and France over security in the Mediterranean, Ankara appeared to adhere to the idea of a collective system of regional security. The fact that other small states around Turkey were also left by the strong powers to their own devices enabled the Turkish government to pursue a very active regional policy for a minor state. However, by the mid-1930s, despite these regional agreements Turkey had not been provided with any significant solution to its immediate major security problem, that is, Italian expansionism. The members of the Balkan Pact which might have provided a shield against Italy were characterised more by the divergence rather than the congruence of their security interests. Consequently, there could be no effective alliance between them to counter a major threat. Ankara was only too aware of this reality. Thus, when the Turkish government found itself in negotiations with the western powers in 1939 it ignored its allies in the Balkans (and in the east) and showed no interest in informing them according to the spirit ­ and letter of the Saadabad Pact - of regional security co-operation.

The remilitarisation of the Straits In the early 1930s, Turkish security policy also focused on the remilitarisation of the Straits. In the face of Mussolini's much advertised 11

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expansionist designs and the obvious weakness of the League as an instrument of arbitration of international disputes, it was natural that defence considerations rendered Ankara uneasy about the demilitarised status of the seaway cutting through Istanbul. It is not hard to imagine that the likelihood of waking up one morning to the fait accompli of the presence of Italian or Soviet warships in the waters of Istanbul must have appeared very real to Ankara. Along with security went the question of national pride and international prestige. The fact that it was the League of Nations, not Turkey, which was responsible for controlling passage through the Straits must have been humiliating to Ankara. Nonetheless, although since 1933 the Turkish government had been active in bringing up the issue of their remilitarisation in European fora, before the Conference at Montreux in 1936 it had expressed no wish for also taking control of the Straits. It is hard to believe that the idea of bringing to an end the international control of the Straits crossed Ankara's mind only at the last moment. It seems more reasonable to assume that it expected that once the signatories of the Lausanne Straits Covention had sat down at the negotiating table to discuss remilitarisation its full demands would meet with greater chances of success. In fact, this was exactly what happened.5 2 The first occasion when the Turkish government raised the subject of the remilitarisation of the Straits was during the Geneva Disarmament Conference, where their attempts were met with a cool reception. Subsequent efforts fared no better. According to John Van Antwerp MacMurray, the American ambassador to Turkey between 1936 and 1942, the Turkish Premier, Ismet Inonii, and the Turkish military were becoming increasingly impatient at the unsuccessful efforts of Riistti Aras to receive a favourable consideration of his suggestions to the League and all interested powers for the refortification of the Straits. Always according to MacMurray (whose dispatches are a valuable source of information about the inner thinking of the Turkish government at the time) Germany's occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 brought things to a head between the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and virtually all other interested authorities of the government, except the President, Kemal Atatiirk. 'Dr Aras at last obtained Atatiirk's ruling in favor of dealing with the matter by friendly negotiations, as against Ismet Pasha's insistence upon presenting the signatories with the fait accompli of reoccupation of the zone.' 53 Atattirk wished to reinforce Turkish security and serve national pride, but, if MacMurray's account is accurate, he must have thought that this had to be achieved without challenging the most important signatory of the Straits Convention and the main interested party, Britain, towards 12

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period whom, he was convinced, Turkey had to look in order to counterpoise the threat of Italian expansionism. As MacMurray wrote in June 1936: 'Turkey is not prepared to commit herself to an alliance [with Britain] and will certainly not overtly or formally involve herself to such an extent; but she does want to take the precaution of establishing a basis of good understanding that might be developed in case Italy were to erupt in this direction.' And he added: 'It is in some quarters known that Ataturk and the British Ambassador have been in direct private correspondence independent of the [Turkish] Foreign Office' .54 Thus, Dr Aras embarked upon convincing Britain. His main argument was Turkey's increased anxiety over security matters resulting from instabi­ lity in Europe. At the same time he did not fail implicitly to warn London of the likelihood of a Turkish unilateral action in the Straits by declaring that instability in Europe made Turkey think that it might be 'a matter of days and hours' before it was compelled to 'take action to safeguard her position in the Straits area' .55 Ankara succeeded in gaining Britain's support for its request to remilitarise the Straits zone. Against Mussolini's expansionist policies - Italy had invaded Ethiopia in 1935 ­ Britain came to acknowledge the need to safeguard the security of the Straits. It also wished not to alienate Turkey, given the importance of its strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean.56 The Montreux Convention of 20 July 1936 gave Turkey the right to remilitarise the Straits as well as allowing it to take over the functions of the international commission which had been responsible for controlling the waterway since 1923. Like the Lausanne Convention, the new agreement guaranteed free navigation in the Straits in time of peace. In time of war, if Turkey was neutral, warships were to enjoy complete freedom of passage; belligerent warships, however, were not to pass through the Straits. In time of war, if Turkey was belligerent, the passage of warships would be left to the discretion of the Turkish government, but its actions were to be subject to a vote of the League of Nations Council. If Turkey considered itself in danger of imminent war it had the right to deny passage to battleships.5 7 According to the regime, which was established in Lausanne, the closing of the Straits in wartime was to be decided by an international commission. Now Turkey assumed this responsibility, since the closing of the Straits in case of war was left to its own discretion. It was this point, which in fact gave Turkey almost absolute control of the Straits, which was to be much contested by the Soviet Union after the Second World War. There can be no doubt that Montreux was a big diplomatic success for Ankara. From a military point of view, Turkey's ability to defend the area of the Straits was increased to an appreciable degree. The main gains, though, appeared to 13

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be in the political field. Mter the First World War, the weakness of the Soviet Union, Britain's domination of the Arab Middle East and the internationalisation of the Straits, which had allowed Britain to move its warships at will into the Black Sea, meant that the geopolitical significance of Turkey as a barrier against Russia's drive into the Near East was limited. At Montreux this changed. Full control of the Straits in time of war gave the Republic of Turkey a paramount strategic importance in the eastern Mediterranean which it had previously lacked, thus enhancing Turkey's international position and bargaining power. On the other hand, Turkey took on a burden which had the potential of throwing it into trouble as it risked getting involved in a conflict with a major power, if it decided not to allow passage for the latter's fleet.5 8 Against this background the likelihood that Soviet-Turkish relations in particular might grow sour emerged strongly. It is true that at Montreux the Soviet Union gained considerably. In a war in which Turkey was neutral, no hostile fleet would be allowed access to the Black Sea, something which the previous regime did not provide for. This new arrangement clearly enhanced Soviet security. On the other hand, however, Turkey's absolute control of the Straits' traffic, when belligerent or in the event of the danger of war, placed Soviet security directly in Ankara's hands. Throughout the nineteenth century Russia had striven to make sure that, if it could not control the 'Straits, its lifeline of commerce and security, nor should any other power. The Tsar had been willing to accept their control by the Ottomans as second best only as long as he felt that they were sufficiently intimidated by Russian strength.5 9 In the 1930s a similar power relationship between Russia and Turkey had not been established. Of course, there existed the Soviet-Turkish friendship, yet the signs coming from Ankara left a lot to be desired as far as Moscow was concerned. Characteristically, the Russians to their fury were informed about Turkey's intentions to seek the remilitarisation of the Straits only after the notes to the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty had already been dispatched. Later, during the negotiations at Montreux, Turkey showed that it did not view itself as Moscow's junior partner in the security of the Straits. As a result there was a certain cooling-off in Moscow's relations with Ankara after Montreux.60 The new Straits regime engendered a potential source of conflict between the two countries which was to surface after the war. One should not forget that the international control of the waterway which had placed both Turkey and the Soviet Union in a relative position of insecurity had been one of the factors which had brought the two countries closer to each other in the 1920s. Did all this escape the minds of Turkish political leaders at Montreux? It is hard to tell, but perhaps it 14

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period did not. One should take into account Ankara's conviction that it was only a matter of time before the Soviets would be in a position to follow an expansionist policy against Turkey. From this perspective Turkish control of the Straits was probably seen by Ankara as making little difference in the end in the context of Turkish-Russian relations, whereas, on the other hand, it increased Turkey's chances to secure western support in the event of a power contest with Moscow.

TURKEY ON THE EVE OF THE WAR: C OMMITMENT AND

NEUTRALITY

I n the 1930s Ankara's security concerns in relation to Moscow were still longterm, but those in relation to Italy were becoming more and more immediate, urging Kemal to seek more vigorously a closer relationship with Britain. Such a relationship was slow to develop. Until 1935, Britain was mainly preoccupied with imperial defence in the Far East and reluctant to enter into any commitments in the eastern Mediter­ ranean, which it felt it would not be able to fulfil. It was only after the Abyssinian crisis (1935-36), when the British realised that their security interests in the Mediterranean were immediately threatened by Italy, that they started thinking seriously about their defence position in the area. What seemed to be a first step towards the reorientation of British foreign policy regarding the eastern Mediterranean took place in 1935. In December ot: that year Britain exchanged assurances of mutual support in the case of attack with the Turkish, Greek and Yugoslav Governments respectively.61 The emerging uncertain security environ­ ment in Europe ushered Anglo-Turkish relations into a new stage. The rapid improvement in Anglo-Turkish relations could be clearly seen in the conclusion of a series of economic agreements. The contract for the building of a large metallurgical plant in Karabuk was given by Turkey to a British firm in 1936, after the Turks had secured a British loan of three million pounds for its construction. Other agreements regarding the undertaking of a number of public projects were also concluded, and consideration was given to the widening of Anglo-Turkish trade.62 Besides Ankara's wish. for close ties with Britain, the latter's friendly attitude towards Turkey during the Montreux Conference had certainly contributed to the creation of a new atmosphere in bilateral relations. At the end of 1936 the Turkish press described Britain for the first time as a 'friendly power' .63 Ankara's deliberate economic drive closer to Britain was the result of economic as much as of political considerations. In the 1930s Germany had 15

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become Turkey's major trade-partner. Until 1936 Ankara was willing to reinforce its economic ties with Berlin in spite of Germany's increasing economic penetration of Turkey. The Turks did not have any other alternative market. Besides the complementary nature of the two economies, Germany followed a policy of competitive export-import prices as a means of building up ties which would allow it to increase its political influence with its trading partners in south-eastern Europe and the Middle East. In the mid-1930s only Germany was willing to absorb large amounts of Turkish agricultural products in exchange for manufactured goods, a great part of which was military equipment for the Turkish army.64 Britain with its policy of imperial-preference and France with its agriculture surplus were not in a position to take Germany's place. This arrangement also suited Turkey from a political point of view. The country had bitter memories of the economic penetration of the western powers, which had contributed to the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Germany, which was internationally weak in political terms, did not seem to represent a threat to Turkish sovereignty. However, by the mid-1930s the growing economic dependence of the country on Germany gave rise to second thoughts in Ankara about Turkish-German economic relations. In 1936 Turkish exports to Germany accounted for 51 per cent of total exports against 19 per cent in 1933. Imports from Germany to Turkey had risen from 25.6 per cent in 1933 to 45.1 per cent of total imports.65 It was time for Ankara to realise that the high proportion of Turkish trade with the Germans might represent a future political danger. In the light of Hitler's aggresive policies Ankara also felt that it should be more cautious in the conduct ' of its relations with the Nazi government, lest Turkey found itself isolated from the west. The cooling of Turkish-German relations which took place during and after the Montreux Conference was another reason which led Ankara to want to counterbalance its relations with Berlin. Throughout 1936 the German press had been hostile to the revision of the Straits regime and in February 1937 the German government made it known to the Turkish government that it disapproved of certain clauses in the Montreux Convention. In essence, Berlin was dissatisfied with the neutrality clause which made it possible for the Soviet fleet to exit the Black Sea without having to worry about Soviet defence and which, on the other hand would prevent German battleships from entering the Black Sea in the event of a war with the Soviets. Ankara's response was to make it clear that the Straits regime was not a German matter and that Turkey would not accept any interference in issues regarding its security.66 In 1937, the Turkish government, having decided not to purchase 16

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period major armaments in Germany, bought 11 military aircraft from Britain. In the same year a British instructor arrived in Turkey to modernise the Turkish Air Force and Turkey was accorded a credit of ten million pounds for its industrial development. In 1938 further agreements were concluded and a Turkish order for 26 warships was presented in London; an additional credit of six million pounds was conceded for the purchase of military equipment. The Turkish government also requested an industrial credit of ten million pounds, which the British granted. The British were inclined to conclude these agreements as a part of their policy of keeping Turkey on their side, but without any political commitment on Britain's part.67 The British General Staff had come to the conclusion that any upsetting of Britain's influence in the Mediterranean might jeopardise its position in the Middle East, which guaranteed, through Suez, the imperial artery to India. Nonetheless, London was still slow to activate a policy which would build a really effective eastern Mediterranean front on Britain's side, with the participation of the smaller states in the region. Indeed, until 1940, Britain thought that the best way to maintain the balance of power in the Mediterranean was to appease Mussolini.68 Similarly Ankara was willing to strengthen relations with the British, but there was no evidence that it was keen to assume any serious political commitment to Britain. Turkish political leaders were aware of the economic consequences that an overtly pro-British policy would have for their country. Britain was not in a position to replace Germany as Turkey's trading partner while Germany appeared willing to make competitive offers so as to maintain its influence in Turkey. In 1938 the Wilhelmstrasse countered the British credits to Turkey by offering a credit of 119 million dollars. At this point the two countries did not reach an agreement, but before long they found themselves in further economic negotiations. 69 However, the Turkish government made a conscious effort to show that Turkey's political independence was not compromised as a result of strong economic relations with Berlin. Characteristically, on 21 December 1938, the Istanbul daily La Republique (the French edition of Cumhuriyet) wrote in relation to Turkish-German economic relations: 'It would be absurd to pretend that economic links between countries cannot create friendly links ... However, nobody can ignore that there is a great difference between sentiments of friendship and political links.' 7 0 In 1938 Ankara made no effort to conceal that it was not to take sides in any prospective war.71 In July that year the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs rejected Ribbentrop's proposal for a Turkish-German promise of neutrality by stressing that Turkey had so far concluded such 17

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agreements only with its actual neighbours whereas with Britain there were no written agreements of any kind. As there were no disputes between Germany and Turkey he could not quite see the advantage of a treaty of neutrality.7 2 Ankara's thinking was clear-cut: as long as Turkey was not confronted with an imminent threat, its interests would best be served by remaining neutral and by making sure it did not find itself at war by accident. In Ankara's view the only development other than an attack against it, which might involve Turkey in a conflict would be an attack by Bulgaria against one of the members of the Balkan Pact, but Turkish officials considered this an unlikely event_ 73 Ismet lnonii, who became the President of Turkey after Atatiirk's death (10 November 1938) and assumed all the powers Kemal had had, and all his senior aides had first-hand experience of the struggle to undo the disastrous political effects of defeat on the Ottoman state during the First World War. Moreover, Turkey, which was at war until 1922, had a memory of long suffering. It was only natural that Inonii would be careful not to embroil his country in a new conflict. Perhaps even more importantly Turkey had no reason to fight a war. The Turks had fought and won their revisionist war back in the early 1920s. The grievances the Lausanne Peace Treaty had left the Turkish government with had been settled or were on their way to being settled. Ankara had achieved its aim to remilitarise and take full control of the Straits, and it was close to satisfying its irredentist claims over Alexandretta (then part of Syria and under French mandate) through negotiations with Paris. Turkish interest in Alexandretta had come to the surface in 1936 as a result of the negotiations between Syria and France for the creation of a Syrian state. Turkey had raised the question of the future status of the province, since the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of 20 October 1921 provided for a special administrative local regime, owing to its Turkish population. In January 1937 a Turkish-French agreement had been reached according to which Alexandretta would be given autonomous status, but it would be linked in a customs and monetary union with the Syrian state. Ankara continued to press hard to take over the province by capitalising on French preoccupation with its security vis-a-vis Germany. By the end of 1938 it had become obvious that the handing over of Alexandretta to Turkey was only a matter of terms and time, since the French were under the pressing need for an alliance with Turkey so as to build a Mediterranean front against Germany.74 There was of course the question of the Dodecanese, which was in Italy's hands, but given the poor condition of the Turkish army it would be suicidal for Ankara to give up its neutrality in the hope of satisfying its claim on them, particularly as up until April 1939 the British, Turkey's natural allies 18

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period

against Italy, followed a policy of appeasement towards Rome.75 In other words, the set of circumstances which might have tempted Ankara into changing its mind about entering the approaching conflict were absent. Against the background of the European crisis, a determined Turkish government followed a pragmatic foreign policy of maximising gains and minimising risks with the aim of earning as much as possible with as little commitment as possible. As Louis Reville wrote in October 1938: one can clearly see that Turkey intends to stay above the conflict due to the exceptional situation in which she stands vis-a-vis the Powers which seek her friendship, whose mutual competition assures to her political and economic success. Paris has settled the question of Ratay [the Turkish name for Alexandretta] in the best interests of the Turks. London brings to the Turkish economy the credits which will allow her to achieve the consolidation of her authoritarian regime. The assistance of Berlin has already been manifested. 76 Nonetheless Ankara sought to combine its neutrality with being strongly sympathetic with Britain.77 The appointment of Rtistti Aras as ambassador to London on 25 January 1939 was a good indicator that not only Mustafa Kemal but also Ismet Inonti attributed great importance to Turkey's relationship with Britain. However, Turkey's balancing act with the major powers seemed to be coming close to an end in 1939. After the occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March the British government approached Ankara to enquire about its attitude towards the organisation of common defence. Turkey's response to London was a reserved one. On 21 March, Rtistti Aras - with the Italian threat in mind - told the British Foreign Secretary that his country would be ready to co-operate with Britain in the Mediterranean. However, 'before accepting any further commitment and before departing from neutrality, the Turkish Government would wish to be reassured on two points. The first [was] would they have Great Britain with them? And the second [was] if they were attacked in the Mediterranean would they have the benefit of direct British assistance?'78 At the same time the Turkish government made it clear to Paris, which had also approached Ankara enquiring about the possibility of a military alliance, that it was ready to negotiate such an accord but as a quid pro quo for the cession of Alexandretta.79 While worrying about defence in the Mediterranean Turkey was also concerned about its security in the Black Sea in relation to the Soviet Union. In early 1939 Turkey gave high priority to its relations with 19

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Moscow. If Turkey was to be involved in a war with Italy in the Mediterranean, or become the object of a German offensive, Ankara wished not to have to worry also about the country's northern borders. On 31 March - and while awaiting the replies from London and Paris Aras visited the British Foreign Office and made an 'unofficial' proposal for the creation of a containment front in eastern Europe with the participation of the western powers and the Soviet Union. According to his proposal Turkey, Russia, Poland and Rumania could participate in a treaty of non-aggression backed by a British guarantee. The signatories should agree to combined action against any party contravening the agreement. Eventually, France could also participate, when its relations with Turkey, still uncertain because of the unresolved Alexandretta issue, improved. The proposal of the Turkish government to bring together the British and the Russians in eastern Europe predated the beginning of the unsuccessful security negotiations between London, Paris and Moscow by two weeks. Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, could not see how such an agreement could build up a front against the Germans. Aras tried to argue that this could be done by the mutual suspicions of the involved parties being dispelled, but he failed to convince him. The plan was rejected by the British Foreign Secretary, but it was interesting because it represented Ankara's frame of mind in 1939. As iikrii Sara oglu, who had replaced Aras as the new Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, told MacMurray in early May 1939, his government 'wished to make sure that Russia would actively participate in the event of a war' and he volunteered his opinion that 'it would be a misfortune for the whole world if throughout a war which would exhaust the rest of Europe, Russia should remain aloof and with its strength intact. Turkey was therefore exerting itself to bring Russia into a common front [in Eastern Europe] . ' 80 What Sara oglu did not elaborate upon was obvious. A treaty of non-aggression between Turkey, Rumania and the Soviet Union backed by Britain would be very advantageous for Turkey as it would tie Britain, its natural ally in the Mediterranean, to its traditional enemy in the North. By bringing Russia and Britain into the same front Ankara hoped to pre-empt the eventuality in which the British and the Russians stood in opposing war camps. Such a scenario must have been a nightmare for the Turkish government. Furthermore, it was only natural for the Turks to wish to safeguard the status quo in the Black Sea by bringing the Soviet Union and Rumania close together. As Rene Massigli, the French ambassador in Turkey, observed in May 1939 'the Turks are realists. Collaboration with the Soviets in a common front with the pacifist powers is not just a sentimental affair. Above all it is a question of geopolitics . ' 81 20

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period

By the beginning of April 1 939 the British had not yet presented Turkey with an encouraging answer regarding the question of a common defence effort in the Mediterranean. The truth was that Britain still preferred a deal with Mussolini over the Mediterranean and was not prepared as yet to take a firm attitude towards Italy. However, Italy's attack on Albania on 7 April 1 939, which also alarmed Ankara, speeded up negotiations on both sides. Germany, on the other hand, increased its efforts to win Turkey over to its side. Franz von Papen was appointed as the new German ambassador in Ankara. His mission was to undermine British influence by convincing the Turks that Mussolini was not going to attack them. Von Papen in his first conversation with Sara oglu on 28 April 1 939, elaborated on how Germany influenced Italy. He even went so far as to say that as long as Turkey was on good terms with Germany Ankara had no reason to fear Mussolini. Von Papen did not succeed in eradicating Turkish fears. The Turkish government remained very suspicious of Italian intentions. There was no chance that the Turks would let their security depend on Berlin's word. In Ankara's eyes only the support of a naval power like Britain could safeguard Turkey's Mediterranean security interests.82 As the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs would put it to his Russian counterpart later in 1 939, when discussing the possibility of a Turkish-Soviet agreement, the friendship of the Ottoman Empire with Germany had not prevented Italy from attacking Tripoli in 1 9 1 1 .83 The analogy in the Turks' mind with the Tripolitanian War could not have been more appropriate. Although Germany and Austria had disapproved, at the time, of Italian aggression, they had remained silent since they did not want to push Italy close to Britain and France.84 On 1 2 May 1 939 a British-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Assistance was signed, to be followed by an identical French-Turkish one on 23 June. The latter was achieved only after the Turks had received satisfaction on all points still in dispute in relation to the Alexandretta question. 85 In fact the Turkish-French Declaration was signed on the same day that an agreement on Alexandretta was signed. According to the declarations it was agreed that each of the two powers would conclude with Turkey a 'definite longterm agreement' and that 'pending the completion of the definite agreement [the two governments] declared that in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area they would be prepared to co-operate effectively and to lend each other all aid and assistance in their power' .86 The course of events appeared to leave Turkey with little choice. Yet, in the months following the declarations of mutual assistance between Turkey and the two western powers the process toward the conclusion of a definite tripartite agreement became very slow. The 21

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

Turkish government drove a hard bargain to secure military and economic aid, before they committed themselves. 87 When taking its decisions Ankara always had to take into consideration the dependence of the Turkish economy on Germany. In July, President Inonii told the British ambassador that Turkey was weaker than it had been two months before. He said that in the past Germany regularly supplied Turkey with war materiel, but since the beginning of the Anglo-Turkish negotiations in April 1 939 delivery was held back while at the same time nothing was coming from the British side. Simultaneously Germany exerted pressure on Turkey regarding further trade agreements. The Germans demanded that, in the light of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey should agree to cancel all existing contracts for war materiel with German firms without claiming indemnity. Moreover, the German government declared that it found the ratification of the Turkish-German credit arrangement inappropriate. If the Turkish government did not agree to these German demands Germany would not renew any trade agreement with Turkey.88 Clearly Turkey would be in no position to bargain with Germany about economic terms if it concluded a military agreement with the west. In August 1 939, the Turks were still engaged in negotiations over their trade with the Reich. The rivalry between Britain and Germany over who would win Turkey favoured Ankara's stalling and careful assessment of its interests. British attempts to keep Italy neutral further encouraged Turkey in its decision to avoid committing itself to a war. From September until December 1 939 a plan for the creation of a neutral bloc in the Balkans with the participation of Italy was being developed, and the British fully supported the plan.89 Lynn H. Curtright rightly argues that in 1 939 British policies in the Mediterranean were contradictory because Britain tried to keep Italy out of the war and bring Turkey in. The British failed to understand that Turkey would have no reason to enter the fighting, if Italy remained peaceful. 90 As long as Italy did not seem to pose an imminent threat against Turkey, Ankara could use the time to benefit from retaining relations with both Germany and Britain. Throughout most of 1 939 Turkey was able to temporise and managed to stay in command of the situation. What altered the game for Ankara was the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression on 23 August 1 939.91 The day after the signing of the pact Sara oglu met with the American Ambassador in the Pera Palace Hotel in Istanbul. According to MacMurray's memo of the conversation Sara oglu exclaimed that the pact had been an absolute surprise and referred to it as 'a coup de theatre unprecedented in history' . He could not foresee the effect the new development would have upon Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union, 22

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period

which now depended entirely upon the spirit which the Soviet government might manifest towards his country, but he believed that it left no possibility for the continuation of the Soviet negotiations with Britain and France.92 In other words, the Nazi-Soviet Pact meant that the nightmare scenario which Ankara had striven to prevent, that is of Russia and Britain in opposing camps, was closer to becoming real. Furthermore, it had acquired an additional ugly twist, the likelihood of combined German-Soviet pressure on Turkey. As a result Ankara was compelled to reach a definite agreement with both London and Paris. A Turkish-Anglo-French draft treaty was agreed upon, in principle, on 1 September 1 939. According to its political provisions Turkey undertook to assist Britain and France, if there were an act of aggression by a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean area, in which these two powers were involved, or if Britain and France were engaged in hostilities by virtue of their guarantees to Greece and Rumania. On the other hand, Britain and France undertook to assist Turkey if, (a) it was involved in hostilities with a European power as a result of aggression by that power, or (b) in the event of aggression by a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey was involved. Besides the treaty, a military convention and a secret special agreement providing for financial assistance to Turkey were also signed. Turkey was to receive ten million pounds credit for arms purchases, and a three million pounds bullion loan, interest free for the first year - later to be increased to five million pounds. (The financial agreement failed to meet all Turkish demands, however.) Protocol 2 of the treaty provided that Turkey was not obliged to fulfil its treaty obligations if this would lead to an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, though according to the Treaty Turkey's two allies were obliged to assist the Turks if they were involved in a conflict with the Soviet Union.93 It was evident that Ankara sought to build through the alliance a position of strength which would guarantee Turkey's security in all events. On the same grounds the Turkish government were hoping to be able to harmonise their new engagements with some security arrangement with the Soviets. The idea of a Soviet-Turkish Black Sea pact had been aired for some time in early 1 939 between Moscow and Ankara. Against the new Straits regime and in view of the forthcoming European conflagration, the 1 925 Turkish-Soviet neutrality treaty, still valid, was not adequate to safeguard Moscow's security concerns. The Soviets wished to obtain as many advantages from their agreement with the Germans as possible without getting involved in the war. Their main idea was to benefit from the dislocation expected to be created around Soviet borders. Hence they wished to secure their borders with Turkey 23

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

and their safety and freedom of movement in the Black Sea. The Germans also hoped that a Soviet-Turkish agreement would drive the Turks away from the Anglo-French camp. The Turkish government for their part were hoping to safeguard Turkey from the danger of Soviet aggression. The conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact had made the possibility of such pressure very likely and urged Turkey to try to secure an understanding with Stalin. At the beginning of August 1 939 the Soviet government had suggested to Ankara the conclusion of a bilateral defence pact. At the end of the month the Turkish government accepted to enter into negotiations with Moscow for some pact of mutual assistance covering aggression in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which should be compatible with Ankara's undertaken obligations towards Britain and France.94 MacMurray talked with Sara oglu just before the Turkish Minister left for Moscow. Sara oglu 'was with a very realistic and cynical apprehension that in view of their unknown commitments to Germany the Russians might well prove to be double-crossing their old friends' . According to the American ambassador, Inonti also shared this apprehension and it was understood that he had given his Minister of Foreign Affairs a warning to be on the alert against any trick detrimental to the interests of Turkey itself or those of its allies, Britain and France.95 When Sara oglu arrived in Moscow for discussions on 26 September, the Russians had already invaded Poland. Germany had attacked Poland on 1 September and the Soviet invasion had followed on the 1 7th. What the Turks had always feared - the revival of Russian expansionist policies - had become a reality. Moscow took no pains to disperse any apprehensions in the minds of the Turks. Upon his arrival Sara oglu was kept at arm's length and treated like a tourist until Stalin had finished his set of negotiations with von Ribbentrop. Nonetheless, despite their fears or rather because of them, the Turkish government could not agree to any arrangement with the Soviets which might jeopardise Turkey's agreement with Britain and France. During the Moscow talks Stalin essentially made the following demands: first, in the proposed treaty with Britain and France the Turks should change their promise to assist the two powers to a promise of consultation, if London and Paris had to activate their guarantees to Greece and Rumania; second, the protocol which absolved Turkey from implementing its treaty obligations, if this would lead it into an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, should be amended to include the provision that in the event that Britain and France were involved in a war against the Soviets, Turkey would not be obliged to support Britain and France and that the treaty should remain inactive for the duration of the 24

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period

said war; third, in the proposed Soviet-Turkish pact Moscow wanted an exclusion clause which would absolve it from assisting Turkey if it were attacked by Germany; fourth, Stalin wanted a joint Turkish-Soviet approval for passage of warships through the Straits either in war or peace. Ankara agreed to the first two demands. Altering the proposed Mediterranean clause to consultation only with the western powers would also be beneficial to Turkey as its main preoccupation was to avoid becoming embroiled in a conflict. Moreover, altering the protocol according to Stalin's demand changed nothing in real terms, since what Stalin wanted to avoid - that is, Turkey's combined action with the British and the French - was already in place. Ankara was confident of its bargaining position and asked London and Paris to approve these changes. The British and the French conceded to them. They rightly believed that unless Turkey was reassured of its security in the north it would not be willing to finalise the treaty and assume commitments in the Mediterranean. A Soviet-Turkish pact, however, with a reservation clause on Germany could not be accepted by Ankara, since it failed to neutralise what Turkey was mostly concerned about, that is orchestrated German-Soviet pressure. Nor could the Turks have accepted the third demand for an agreement with the Soviets in the Straits. This would have reduced Turkey's independence, so much sought after at Montreux, and isolate it diplomatically from the west.96 On 1 7 October Sara oglu left Moscow empty-handed. On 1 9 October the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Great Britain, France and Turkey was finally signed. Had Ankara at this stage come to terms with the idea of Turkey's involvement in the conflict? Did it consider the Tripartite alliance as much as a commitment to its allies as a means of guaranteeing Turkey's security? Probably not. There had been no change in the circumstances which might have commanded the Turkish leadership to give up their determination not to enter the war, unless Turkey was attacked. Britain's promise of military and financial assistance offered consolation, but hardly any confidence, particularly after Europe had witnessed the total collapse of Poland. Even more importantly the fact that it had not been possible for the Turks to secure their position in relation to Moscow set the seal on Ankara's resolution to remain neutral. Despite the signing of the treaty with Britain and France, a shift in the Turkish attitude towards the Allies was already noticeable. On 28 October Hughe Knatchbull­ Hugessen, the British Ambassador, remarked that the Turkish government would be prepared to come to a longterm arrangement with Italy 'if by doing so they could secure peace in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. I am inclined to think this change of view is due to the realisation that they must do everything they can do to strengthen 25

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

themselves against future pressure from Russia. ' 97 When the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact was made known, Sara oglu informed the British embassy that it would have no influence on Turkish foreign policy.98 Certainly, it was not realistic to believe that this would be the case. As Massigli commented back on 1 5 September, 'in fact the proposed Clauses [of the German-Soviet Pact] permitted the USSR to compel Turkey into neutrality without taking part in the conflict' . 99 Ankara felt that by entering the Allied camp it already ran the great risk of a conflict with the Soviets, since the Nazi-Soviet Pact created the danger of German-Soviet collaboration in south-eastern Europe. Inonii and his ministers were convinced that the Nazi-Soviet Pact signalled Russia's return to old Tsarist imperialism. According to MacMurray the only contentious issue among senior Turkish officials was whether Russia was ready to fight for its imperialist ambitions or whether it would prefer to simply feed off Germany's spoils. Sara oglu took the view that Russia's lack of material preparedness would incline it to co­ operate with Turkey rather than against it. Not everybody among senior officials of the ruling Republican People's Party shared his optimism. MacMurray writing to the president of the United States in early November 1 939 reported that 'a different estimate of the situation became a matter of very violent debate and even fisticuffs in one of the private meetings of the official party, although no word of it has been allowed to reach the public ear' . Sara oglu's judgement was viewed as 'too optimistic' and it was maintained that 'the Turkish government should act upon the assumption that Russian neo-imperialism is a definite threat to the security and independence of Turkey' . 100 'Meanwhile' , MacMurray observed, in a similar fashion with his British counterpart, the agreement between Berlin and Moscow 'only makes the Turks more resolute in their policy of holding aloof from involvement in the war' . 1 0 1 Nonetheless, Ankara's adherence to the Tripartite Treaty was of paramount importance in the context of Turkish foreign policy. It demonstrated that to Inonii and his ministers Britain and France were Turkey's natural allies not only in the Mediterranean but also in relation to Moscow. When confronted with a choice between an agreement with Russia and the risk of isolation from the west they chose not to isolate their country from the western powers. There could have been no more clear and explicit manifestation of Ankara's distrust and fear of the Soviet Union.

26

Turkey's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period CONCLUSION

Until the mid- 1 920s, the Turkish Republic was mainly concerned with the expansionist designs of the western powers, and particularly those of Britain. The elimination of the threat from the north - due to the weakness of the new Soviet state - enabled Mustafa Kemal to successfully seek the establishment of friendly relations with Moscow in an effort to counterbalance Turkey's weak position in relation to the west. However, diplomatic isolation from the west was the last thing that the Kemalist regime wished for. As soon as Ankara realised that the British had no hostile ambitions against Turkey, it was eager to start a friendly dialogue with them. Turkish political leaders were not guided in their foreign policy by contemporary events. They were firm in their belief that Moscow's benevolence was contingent upon the difficulties that the new Bolshevik regime was confronted with; therefore it could only be short-term. They contended that in the long run Turkey needed the support of Britain, a naval power with imperial interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, so as to offset the possibility of Soviet pressure in the Black Sea and in Turkish Anatolia. The emergence of Italy in the late 1 920s as an additional threat to Turkish security in the Mediterranean made the need for an understanding with London even more imperative. Thus, after 1 926 Ankara's drive towards Europe, and towards a closer relationship with Britain, was persistent and consistent. In the 1 930s Turkish political leaders sought to increase Turkey ' s security and enhance its strategic importance also by remilitarising, and taking control of, the Straits, as well as by adhering to the idea of regional defence co-operation. Nonetheless, Turkey's participation in the Balkan and the Saadabad Pacts did not constitute a security policy of emancipation towards the major powers. In Ankara's eyes Turkish security in relation to Italy and the Soviet Union, continued to point in the direction of Britain. A British-Turkish close relationship was slow to develop, however. The British having full confidence in the security of their position in the Mediterranean did not consider Turkey's friendship important for their Mediterranean strategy before the mid- 1 930s. The Turks, for their part, preferred to be cautious with Britain. After 1 936, Italy' s overt expansionism, but also Germany's destabilising policies in Europe reinforced Ankara's wish to open a serious dialogue with London. The fact that the Turkish economy was heavily dependent on trade with the Germans made Ankara particularly aware of the pitfalls of finding itself in an exclusive trade relationship with Germany in the event of a war in Europe. Around the same time, 27

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

the British became more keen to secure Turkey's co-operation on their side, but they were unable to meet in full Ankara's military and financial demands. Hence, since Britain could not fully replace Germany as Turkey' s trading partner, Ankara was careful not to cool relations with Berlin. Turkish leaders sought British support to enhance Turkish security, but with as little commitment on their part as possible. By 1 93 8 it was obvious that as long as Italy did not pose an immediate threat to Turkey, Ankara would not take sides in the imminent conflict. Instead, Ankara would play off Britain and Germany to stay out of the war from which Turkey had nothing to gain and too much to lose. In fact, Turkish political leadership had been shrewd enough to exploit the precarious political situation in Europe to satisfy their demands, that is, the revision of the Straits regime and the cession of Alexandretta, without having to resort to fighting. Nonetheless, Italy's invasion of Albania, the outbreak of the war and the Nazi-Soviet Pact all compelled Ankara to conclude an alliance with Britain and France. At the same time, Ankara was after a security agreement with the Soviets in order to neutralise possible Soviet pressure on Turkey's rear, but the Turks were not prepared to enter into an exclusive relationship with Moscow so as to achieve this security objective. Ankara's ideal was to build up a system of defence around Turkey's northern and Mediterranean borders based on balanced relations with the west and the Soviet Union and avoid being involved in the war, unless Turkey was attacked. Faced with the impossibility of such an equilibrium and the risk of combined Soviet-German aggression, the Turks resolved to remain neutral but chose to stay close to the western powers. The Tripartite Treaty was a landmark in Turkey's foreign policy - despite the fact that the course of events would assist Ankara's wish not to assume its commitments to the Allies until the very end of the war. In view of the impending turmoil in Europe, Ankara demonstrated its distrust of the Soviets and its belief that Turkey's overall security demanded co-operation with Britain and France whose interest was to maintain the status quo in the Near East. This basic principle would continue to guide Turkish foreign policy decisions during the Cold War period. Throughout the interwar years Kemal and his foreign policy advisers were quick to respond to changes in the international environment and to capitalise on every opportunity to strengthen Turkey's strategic role. The single-party political system enabled Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Inonii, after him, to conduct the country's foreign policy undisturbed by electoral considerations. The keystone of this policy was to co-operate with the west so far as it was compatible with Turkish objectives. From this co-operation Turkey hoped to gain tangible military and economic 28

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period

advantages and, should it come to the worst, active military support. Besides security considerations, the western-oriented ideology of the new regime meant that there was also an ideological argument for developing closer relations with the west. Modernisation through westernisation was the cornerstone of Kemalism, which wished to identify Turkey as part of Europe. For most of the interwar period Turkey's relations with the various European powers were balanced. This did not imply that Turkish political leaders still had the bargaining power of the Ottoman state to set off one power against the other. It rather reflected the absence of any immediate external pressure on Turkey as well as the absence of rivalry between Britain and Russia in the Near East. The European crisis and its aftermath was to change all this. NOTES 1.

For relations between the late Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers see Anderson, M. S., The

Eastern Question 1 774-I923 (London: Macmillan, 1966).

2 . Hirschfeld, Y. R., 'The Northern Tier in European Politics During the 19 20 s and 1930 s: Prelude to Cold War' , in U. Dann (ed.),

The Great Powers in the Middle East, I9I9-I939

(New York: Holmes & Meier, 19 88), pp. 31 7-30 . 3.

Spector, 1.,

The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, I91 7-I958 (Seattle: University of Russia 's South Flank: Soviet Operations in Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963); Kapur, H., Soviet Russia and Asia I91 7-I927: A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan (Geneva: Imprimerie Genevoise, Victor Cevalier, 1965 ); Ro' i, Y., 'Official Soviet Views on the Middle-East, 1919 -1939 ' , in Dann (ed.), Great Powers. For an Washington Press, 1959); Nollau, G. and Wiehe, H. J.,

interesting analysis of the Soviet security system in the 19 20 s, which dictated a friendly Russian attitude towards the Northern Tier countries see Graham, M. W., 'The Soviet

International Conciliation, 25 2 (19 29 ).

Russia and the West in Iran, I9I8-I948: A Study in Big Power Rivalry

Security System' , 4.

Lenczowski, G.

(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949), pp. 4 1 -7; Adamec, L. W.,

Afghanistan 's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR,

Germany, and Britain (Tuscon, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 19 74 ), pp. 4 2-76;

Reynolds, P. A., British Foreign Policy in the Interwar Years (London: Longmans, Green

& Co., 1954 ).

5. On the Turkish national movement see Smith, E. D., Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist

Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly, I9IO-I923 (Washington,

DC: Judd & Detweiler, 1959).

6. For the text of the Ottoman peace treaty see British and Foreign State Papers (hereafter cited as State Papers), Vol. 1 13 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office), pp.65 2-776. 7.

On Soviet-Turkish relations during the ' war of independence'

see Yerasimos, S.,

Tiirk-Sovyet lli kileri: Ekim Devriminden "Mill Miicadele ' ye " (Istanbul: Gozlem Yaymlan, 19 79 ); Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, pp. 63-82 ; Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, pp. 87-1 14 ; Sonyel, S. R., Turkish Diplomacy I913-I923 (London: Sage Publications, 19 75 ); Bilge, A. S., Gii Komsuluk: Tiirkiye-Sovyetler Birligi Il kileri, I920-I964 (Ankara: Tlirkiye Is Bankas1 Kiiltiir Yaymlan, 199 2 ), pp. 25-1 1 2 . 8. Yerasimos, Tiirk-Sovyet Il kileri, pp.630 -6. 9 . About the nature of the Kemalist political regime see Tunaya, T. Z., Tiirkiye 'de" Siyasi Partiler, I859-I952 (Istanbul: Dogan Karde Yaymlan, 195 2 ); Karpat, K., Turkey 's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

29

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

Press, 1959 ),

10 .

passim; Weiker, W. F., Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath (Leiden: Holmes & Meier, 19 73). Inonii, I., Hat1ralar, 2 Kitap (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi, 19 8 7), p. 233; For an analytical account of Kemalist reforms see Lewis, B., The Emergence of Modem Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); Shaw, J. S. and Shaw, E. K., History of the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19 77), pp. 373-95 .

1 1 . After the end of the Tripolitanian war an agreement between the Sultan and Italy was reached according to which the latter would leave the islands in return for the evacuation of the Ottoman army from Tripoli and Cyrenaica. However, Italy did not give the Dodecanese back, using as a pretext the need to insulate it from the Balkan War, which started soon afterwards. In other words, what took place in Lausanne was the formal acceptance of the Italian occupation of the islands. 12 .

For the text of the Tripartite agreement see State Papers, Vol. 1 13, pp. 79 7-803.

13 .

Inonii, Hatlralar, p. 233. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter cited as FRUS), Vol. I (Washington, DC:

14 .

US Government Printing Office, 1935 ), pp. 1034 -8 ; also, Macfie, A. L., 'The Straits Question: The Conference of Lausanne (November 19 2 2-July 19 23) ' , Middle Eastern Studies, 15 , 2 ( 19 79 ). For Turkish misgivings towards the Straits Convention with regard to Istanbul ' s security see Howard, H. N., Turkey, the Straits and US Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 19 74 ), pp. 1 13-26. For the text of the Convention see

State Papers, Vol. 1 1 7, pp. 59 2-600 . 15 .

Shmuelevitz, A . , 'Atatiirk's Policy Toward the Great Powers; Principles and Guide-lines' , in Dann (ed.),

Great Powers, p. 3 13; Beck, P . J . , ' "A Tedious and Perilous Controversy": Middle Eastern Studies, l7, 2 ( 19 8 1). For Turkish considerations over the settlement of the Mosul issue see, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, Vol. I (London: Royal Institute of lnternational Affairs, 19 25 ), pp. 490 -4 and Kriiger, K., Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East (London: Allen & Unwin, Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 19 18-19 26' ,

1932 ), pp. 1 76-20 2 . Inonii,

16.

Hatlralar, p. 243. Also, Evans, S. E., The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Ataturk, 1919-1938 (Beverley: The Eothen Press, 19 8 2 ), pp. 9 2 -4 .

17.

Graham, 'The Soviet Security System' . For details of the treaty negotiations between

18 .

Vili, F. A.,

19 .

Quoted in Spector,

20 .

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir George Clerk (British ambassador in Ankara), 26 Nov.

Ankara and Moscow see Kapur,

Soviet Russia and Asia, pp. 135 -4 1 . Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 19 71), p. 169 .

19 26,

The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, p. 72 .

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (hereafter cited as DBFP), Series

lA, Vol. II (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office), p. 835 . 2 1. 22.

Shmuelevitz, 'Atatiirk's Policy', p. 3 15 . The different stages of A nglo-Turkish relations since 19 19 are described by Evans,

Slow Rapprochement. For the interwar period Zhivkova, L., Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1933-1939 (London: Seeker & Warburg, 19 76); Hale, W. M. and Bagis, A. I. (eds), Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations (Beverley: The Eothen Press, 19 84 ), Cbs V-IX. For an overall view of Turkish foreign policy in the interwar period see Vere-Hodge, E. R.,

Turkish Foreign Policy 1918-1948 (Geneva: Imprimerie Franco-Suisse, 1950 ); Ataov, T., 'Turkish Foreign Policy 19 2 3-1938 ' , in The Turkish Year-book of International Relations (Ankara: Institute of International Relations, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Ankara, 1961). 23.

In 1930 the Treaty of 19 25 was prolonged for two years, on 30 October 193 1 for five more years, and on 7 November 1935 for ten more years. Other agreements concerning naval armaments in the Black Sea, commerce and navigation were also concluded.

24 .

Sir A usten Chamberlain to R. H. Hoare (British Counsellor in Constantinople), 15 Oct. 19 26,

25 .

DBFP, 1919-1930, Series lA, Vol. II, p. 8 2 8 .

'Memorandum Respecting the Foreign Policy of His Majesty' s Government' by the Foreign Office, 26 April 19 2 7,

DBFP, Series lA, Vol. ill, pp. 794-5 ; Maurice Pemot, 'La

30

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period Turquie et I' Europe',

Revue des questions de defense nationale, 4 (1 939), p. 506;

Shmuelevitz, 'Atatiirk's Policy' , p. 315 . 26.

A parliamentary deputy of Siirt wrote, for instance, in the daily

Hakimiyet-i-Milliye in

1 927, that the fortifications in the Dodecanese and the status of the islands as a naval base could not mean anything other than preparations against Turkey; quoted in Oriente Modemo (Rome, 1 927), p. 72. The dispatches of Baroni Orsini, the Italian ambassador, constantly refer to Turkish suspicions of Italy which were quite often expressed by the Turkish press, see

I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, 1922-1935 (hereafter cited as IDDI) passim.

Settima Serie, Vols. V and VI (Rome: Instituto Poligrafico Delio Stato, 1 967),

Italy' s ambitions, however, did not amount to anything more than rhetoric in the 1 920s, see Segre, C. G., 'Liberal and Fascist Italy in the Middle East, 1 91 9-1 939', in Dann (ed.),

Great Powers, pp. 201-4 , and Erlich, H., 'Mussolini and the Middle East in the 1 920s: The Restrained Imperialist ' , in Dann (ed.), Great Powers, pp. 213- 21 . 27. Description by a Turkish statesman, quoted in Lewis, G., Turkey (London: Benn, 1 955 ), p. 76. 28 .

Orsini to Mussolini, 2 June 1 928 ,

29.

Savadjian, L., 'La politique exterieure de Ia Turquie et le probleme de Ia paix balkanique' ,

IDDI, Settima Serie, Vol. VI, pp. 332-3.

L 'Europe Nouvelle, 8 27 (1 933), p. 1 207; Pierre Rondo!, 'La Turquie et les problemes Mediterranes' , Politique Etrangere, 5 (1 939), p. 54 2. 30. Mussolini' s note 26 Feb. 1 928 , IDDI, Settima Serie, Vol. VI, p. 84 . 31 . lntinii, Hatiralar, p. 238 ; Survey of International Affairs, 1 930, pp. 15 7-68 . 32. K1h9, A., Turkey and the World (Washington, DC: Public Mfairs Press, 1 95 9), p. 4 9; Berkes, N., The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1 964 ), pp. 463-5 . 33.

Hershlag, Z. Y.,

Turkey: An Economy in Transition (The Hague: Uitgeverij Van Keulen N.

V., 1 95 8 ), pp. 34 -46. For an interesting British account of Turkey' s attitude towards the west, and Britain in particular, in this context see memorandum by A. K. Helm (Second Secretary at the British embassy in Ankara), 10 Feb. 1 929,

DBFP, 1 91 9-1 939, Series lA,

Vol. VII, pp. 74 1 - 7. Helm was to be appointed ambassador in Turkey in 1 95 1 . 34 .

Hershlag,

35 .

Hale, W. M.,

36.

For an analysis of international developments in the 1 930s see Carr, E. H.,

International Relations Between the Two World Wars (1919-1939) (London: Macmillan 1 94 7) and Ross, G., The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System, 1914-1945

37.

For the texts of the 1 930 treaty and the 1 933 pact see

Turkey, p. 14 . The Political and Economic Developmnent of Modem Turkey (London:

Croom Helm, 1 98 1 ), pp. 56, 74 .

(London: Longman, 1 983).

State Papers, Vol. 132, p. 8 14 and,

Vol. 136, p. 707, respectively. 38 .

For the first public statements of Italian irredentism see

Survey of International Affairs,

1 930, pp. 1 25 -6. 39.

On Bulgarian relations with its Balkan neighbours and Italy at the time of the signing of the Balkan Pact see Survey

of International Affairs, 1 934 , pp. 509-34 .

40. For a detailed analysis of the quest of the Balkan states for security during the interwar period in the face of the disintegration of the system of collective security see Andricopoulos, Y., 'The Balkan Search for Security in the face of the disintegration of the Structure of Europe after World War One: The Balkan Entente of 1 934 ' (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 1 983); Svolopoulos, C., 'Le probleme de Ia securite dans le Sud-Est Europeen de I' entre-deux guerres: a Ia recherche des origines du pacte balkanique de 1 934 ' ,

Balkan Studies, 14 , 2 (1 973). For an account of the negotiations Survey of International Affairs, 1 934 , pp. 509-36; Campus, E., The Little Entente and the Balkan Alliance (Bucharest: Editura Acadernici leading toward the Balkan Pact see

Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1 978 ). 4 1 . For the text see

State Papers, 1 934 , Vol. 137, pp. 4 96-502. Balkan Alliance.

4 2.

Andricopoulos, 'The Balkan Entente of 1 934 '; Campus,

43.

Mussolini to Vincenzo Lojacono (ambassador in Ankara), 21 Nov. 1 933, Serie, Vol. XIV, pp.4 28 -30.

31

IDDI, Settima

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

44. Pier Filippo De Rossi (Italian ambassador in Athens) to Fulvio Suvich (Under-Secretary of State), 10 Feb. 1 934,

ibid. , p. 767. A little later, the Turkish Secretary-General for Foreign

Affairs told the Italian Under-Secretary of State that 'Turkey wanted to have a Mediterranean and not a Balkan policy' , record of conversation between Suvich and 45.

ibid., p. 876. Survey of International Affairs, 1934, p. 5 1 8 . Andricopoulos, 'The Balkan Entente of

46.

1 934' p. 259. ' Pemot, 'La Turquie et I' Europe' , p. 507; Rondot, 'Les problemes Mediterranes ' , p. 539.

Nurnan (Menemencioglu) Bey, 9 March 1 934,

47.

A narrative exposition of the process of negotiations is given by Watt, D. C. 'The Sa' dabad Pact of July 8, 1937 ' ,

48.

Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, XUX ( 1 962).

Quoted in Colombe, M., 'La Turquie et les problemes du Moyen-Orient, 1923- 1 947 ' ,

Cahiers de 1 ' Orient Contemporain (Paris: Institut d ' Etudes de !' Orient Contemporain), 3eme--4eme trimestres ( 1 947), p. 1 36. Rondot, 'Les problemes Mediterranes ' , pp. 540-5, argues that declarations of this type were maiuly aiming at creating a climate of confidence in the area able to counteract any foreign intervention. However, he also points out that Turkey, through its participation in the Balkan and the Saadabad Pacts, wanted to become the arbitrator in the Near East. 49.

Fleury, A., 'La Constitution d' un "Bloc Oriental" - le pacte de Saadabad ' ,

Revue

d 'Histoire de Ia deuxieme guerre mondiale, 27, 1 06 ( 1 977), p. 12. 50.

Quoted in Savadjian, 'La politique exterieure de Ia Turquie' , p. 1206.

5 1 . Watt, D . C . , 'The Saadabad Pact o f 8 July 1937 ' , i n Dann (ed.),

Great Powers, p . 343;

Colombe, 'La Turquie et les problemes du Moyen-Orient ' , argues that the Saadabad Pact constituted a great success for Turkish diplomacy because it was created at a time when Arab hostility was inflamed by Turkish territorial aspirations over Alexandretta, although Turkey at the time repeatedly repudiated any aspirations over Arab territory, see Rondot, 'Les problemes Mediterranes ' , pp. 543-5. 52.

An analysis of the discussions preceding and during the Montreux Conference can be found in Survey of International Affairs, 1 936, pp. 59 5. and in Deluca, A. R., Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits: The Montreux Conference and Convention of 1936 (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, 1 9 8 1 ) .

5 3 . Memo o f Conversation with the Danish Charge d' Affaires , 1 2 May 1 936, MacMurray Papers, Box 59. 54.

MacMurray to G. Howland (American Embassy, Ankara), 6 June 1936, MacMurray

55.

Sir Percy Loraine (British ambassador in Turkey) to Sir Anthony Eden, 8 April 1 936,

Papers, Box 59.

DBFP, Second Series, Vol. XVI, pp. 662-8. This was the main line to be repeated in the Turkish note to the signatory powers of the Lausanne Treaty and Yugoslavia on 10 April 1 936 (Yugoslavia had refused to sign the Treaty because of differences with Turkey over

Survey of International Affairs, 1936, p. 604. British Foreign Policy, p. 57; Zhivkova, Anglo-Turkish Relations, p. 32. 57. State Papers,Vol. 1 40, pp. 288-300. the Ottoman Debt),

56.

58.

Reynolds,

Different views about the subject and o n how Turkey could have secured a less risky position, are discussed in Deluca,

Great Power Rivalry, pp. 1 1 7-19. Deluca points out that

if the International Commission had been retained, Turkey would have been more secure whenever had to decide about the closing of the Straits. 59.

Taylor, A. J. P.,

The

Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1 954), passim. 60.

Memo of Conversation with the Danish Charge d' Affaires, 12 May 1936, MacMurray

Politique Etrangere, 5 Anglo-Turkish Relations, p. 43; Bilge, Giif Komsuluk, pp. 1 1 3- 1 9 ; Deluca, Great Power Rivalry, p. 1 26, argues that in the summer of 1936 it Papers, Box 59; Reville, L., 'La Turquie et Ia crise Europeenne' ,

( 1 938), p. 499; Zhivkova,

would have been misleading to predict a break in their relations.

Survey of International Affairs, 1935, pp. 248-7 1 . 62. Zhivkova, Anglo-Turkish Relations, p. 50. Information about British economic activity in

6 1 . For the negotiations preceding the exchange of assurances see

Turkey before the Second World War and a comparison with the German activity, is given

32

Turkey 's Security Considerations During the Interwar Period Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XXX ( 1 943). See also Zhivkova, L., 'British Economic Policy in the Balkans on the Eve of World War II' , Studia Balcanica, IV ( 1 97 1 ) . 63. Zhivkova, Anglo-Turkish Relations, p. 5 1 ; Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 1 20. by Mance, 0., 'The Future of British Trade with Turkey' ,

64.

Turkish-German relations in the period between the two wars are discussed by Fleury, A.,

La Penetration Allemande au Moyen Orient 1919-1939: Le cas de la Turquie, de l 'Iran et de / 'Afghanistan (Geneva: A. W. Sijthoff-Leiden, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1 977). 65. 66.

Ibid. , p. 120.

67.

Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 1 1 2-14; Ataov, 'Turkish Foreign Policy' , p. 132; Great Power Rivalry, pp. 1 3 1-3.

Vere-Hodge, Deluca,

Sir Percy Loraine commenting on Sir Osborne Mance' s lecture on 'The Future of British

East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain 's Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 145-7; Zhivkova, 'British

Trade' , p. 1 5 ; Pratt, L. R.,

Economic Policy in the Balkans' . 68.

British Foreign Policy, passim; Pratt, East of Malta, passim; Howard, M., Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain 's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, Vol. I, 1906-1939 Reynolds,

'British Military Preparations for the Second World War' , in D. Dilks (ed.),

(London: Macmillan, 1 9 8 1 ) ; Medlicott, W. N., 'The Hoare-Laval Pact Reconsidered', in

Retreat from Power; Omissi, D., 'The Mediterranean and the Middle East in Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s (London: Macmillan, 1 992); Cohen, M. J., 'British Strategy

Dilks (ed.),

British Global Strategy, 1 935-1939 ' , in M. J. Cohen and M. Kolinsky (eds),

in the Middle East in the Wake of the Abyssinian Crisis, 1936-39' , in Cohen and Kolinsky

Britain and the Middle East. For a most interesting account of the political situation Mediterranean in Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1 938).

(eds ),

in the Mediterranean during the interwar years see Monroe, E., The 69.

Mance, 'The Future of British Trade' .

70.

Quoted in Rondot, 'Les problemes Mediterranes ' , p. 548.

Documents Diplomatiques Fran ais, 1932-39, 2e Serle 1936-1939, Tome IX (Paris: lmprimerie Nationale, 1974),

7 1 . Report b y the French attache i n Ankara of 2 8 March 1938, pp. 126-7. 72.

7 July 1938,

Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 (hereafter cited as DGFP),

Series D, Vol. 5 (Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office), pp. 73 1-2. 73.

MacMurray to Secretary of State, 28 Sept. 1938, MacMurray Papers, Box 66.

74.

The final agreement for the ceding of the area was signed on 23 June 1939. For the French point of view over the issue see the account of the French Ambassador in Turkey Massigli,

La Turquie Devant la Guerre: Mission a Ankara 1939-1940 (Paris: Pion, 1 964), pp. passim. For a detailed account of the bistory of the issue see Survey of 1nternational Affairs, 1921-1939, passim, and Thobie, J., 'Le nouveau cours des relations Franco-Turque et I' affaire du sandjak d' Alexandrette, 1 9 2 1 - 1 9 39 ' , Relations Internationales, 19 ( 1 979); Sadoff, R. B . , 'Prelude to Conflict: Communal Interdependence in the Sanjak of Alexandretta 1920-36' , Middle Eastern Studies, 22, 2 R.,

1 98-2 1 8 and

( 1 986). Sadoff gives an interpretation of the internal political situation of the province in 1 936, based on a socio-economic analysis. 75.

Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An 'Active ' Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University

76.

Reville, 'La Turquie' , p. 503.

77.

MacMurray to the Secretary of State, 28 Sept. 1938, MacMurray Papers, Box 66.

78.

Survey of 1nternational Affairs, 1 939, p. 1 1 3.

79.

For an account of Turkey' s security considerations in 1 939 and of its negotiations with the

On the condition of the Turkish military forces see Deringil, S., Press, 1 989), pp. 3 1 -40.

Survey of International Affairs, The Eve of the War, 1939-1946, pp. 1 1 3-50; Massigli, Mission a Ankara, pp. 198-302; Marzari, F., 'Western-Soviet Rivalry in Turkey in 1939' , Middle Eastern Studies, 7, 1-2 ( 1 97 1 ) ; Watt, D. C., How War Came (London: Mandarin, 1 989), pp. 271-88; Zhivkova, Anglo-Turkish Relations, pp. 95-1 16. different European powers see,

33

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

80. Memo of Conversation with Siikrii Sara�roglu, 3 May 1939, MacMurray' s Papers, Box 68. 8 1 . Massigli,

Mission a Ankara, p. 194.

82. Frank Marzari, 'Western-Soviet Rivalry ' , pp. 73-4;

Survey of International Affairs, 1939,

p. 357. 83. Bilge, 84. Shaw,

Gii Komsuluk, p. 1 36. History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 289.

85. On the final agreement on Alexandretta see references above, n. 74. 86.

Documents on International Affairs, 1939---46 (hereafter cited as DIA), Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of lnternational Affairs ) , pp. 202-4.

87. Sir Hughe Knatchbuli-Hugessen (British ambassador in Turkey) to Viscount Halifax, 1 4 July 1 939 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VI, p p . 353-5. Deringil,

Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 80;

Millman, B., 'Credit and Supply in Turkish Foreign Policy in the Tripartite Alliance of

International History Review, XVI ( 1 994). DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VI, pp. 434-5; Knatchbuli-Hugessen to Halifax, 23 Aug. 1 939, DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VII , p. 1 40; German Foreign Ministry to Ankara, 23 Aug. 1 939, DGFP, Series D, Vol. VII, p. 233; Papen to German Foreign Ministry, 24 Aug. 1939, DGFP, Series D, Vol. VII, pp. 260- 1 ; Papen t o the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs , 28 Aug. 1 939, DGFP, Series D, Vol. VII, pp. 401-2; Ataov, T., Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945 (Ankara: Ankara October 1939: A Note ' ,

88. Knatchbuli-Hugessen to Halifax, 21 July 1 939,

Universitesi Basimevi, 1 965), pp. 39-45. 89. Marzari, F., 'Projects for an Italian-led Balkan Bloc of Neutrals, September-December 1939 ' ,

Historical Journal, XIII , 4 ( 1 970), and Avramovski, H., 'Attempts to Form a Studia Balcanica, IV ( 1 97 1 );

Neutral Bloc in the Balkans (September-December 1 939) ' ,

Curtright, L. H., 'Great Britain, the Balkans and Turkey in the Autumn of 1939 ' ,

International History Review, X, 3 ( 1 988). 90. Curtright, 'Great Britain, the Balkans and Turkey', 9 1 . For the text see

passim.

DIA, 1939-1945, pp. 408- 10.

92. Memo of conversation with Siikrii Saral(oglu, 24 Aug. 1 939, MacMurray' s Papers, Box 69.

State Papers, 1 939, Vol. 1 5 1 , pp. 2 1 3-17; Marzari, 'Western-Soviet Rivalry' , pp. 203-6; Millman 'Credit and Supply ' , passim. 94. Knatchbuli-Hugessen to Halifax, 7 Aug. 1 939, DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VI, p. 623 . Marzari, 'Western-Soviet Rivalry' ; KQ�rak, C., Tiirkiye 'de Milli fief Donemi (1938-1945) (Ankara: Yurt Yaymevi, 1986), pp. 9 1-2; Bilge, G Komsuluk, pp. 129-34. 93.

95. MacMurray to the President of the United States, 9 Nov. 1939, MacMurray Papers, Box 69.

Gii Komsuluk, pp. 1 34-48 ; Ikinci Diinya Harbinde Tiirk Dey Siyaseti (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaas1, 1 982), pp. 28-9; Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 85-8; AtaOv, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 48-60.

96. For an account of the Soviet-Turkish negotiations see, Bilge, Kuneralp, Z. (ed.)

97. Quoted in Curtright, 'Great Britain, the Balkans and Turkey' , p. 454. 98. Knatchbuli-Hugessen to Halifax, 23 Aug. 1 939, 99. Massigli,

Mission a Ankara, pp. 283-4.

DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VII, pp. 155-6.

1 00.

MacMurray to the President, 9 Nov. 1 939, MacMurray Papers, Box 69.

101.

Ibid.

34

2

F ROM ONE WA R TO ANOT HE R

TURKI S H NEUTRALITY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Despite th e Tripartite Treaty o f 1 939, Turkey did not enter the war until 1 945. The course of war events strengthened even more Ankara's determination not to enter the conflict, 'though the Turkish government never denounced its alliance with Britain. Being in full control of the conduct of foreign affairs during the war lnonii subscribed to 'the first principle of military strategy, the need to be prudent' .1 He remained firm on pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy the objective of which was to safeguard Turkey from the great costs of a war which promised it no tangible gains.2 British diplomatic efforts to bring Turkey into the war failed on three occasions: in 1 940, 1 94 1 and 1 943.3 After the Italian declaration of war in June 1 940, Turkey ought to have entered the war under the 1 939 Treaty obligations. Ankara, however, chose for the moment to remain non-belligerent and watch the development of the war in the Mediterranean. Ankara's attitude was elucidated by Necmettin Sadak, editor of the semi-official newspaper Alcyam and a prominent deputy in the Turkish parliament, who wrote that Turkey remained faithful to the Anglo-French Treaty, but, at the same time, he went on to ask, what could the Turks do ' since [their] geographical position was not the same as that of the great democracies?'4 Soon, the French defeat and the isolation of Britain, reinforced Ankara's reluctance to engage in the war. Anglo-Turkish negotiations in late 1 940 over Turkey being given the Dodecanese, if it joined the fighting, ended nowhere, and thus Ankara was given no reason to enter the conflict.5 In early 1 94 1 , in view of an impending German attack on Greece, London renewed its efforts to secure Turkey's co-operation. The Turkish government, however, made it clear that Turkey would fight only if attacked. In the spring of 1 94 1 , the worsening position of the Allies and the presence of German troops in the Balkans compelled Ankara to 35

Anglo-American Security Interests,

!945-1952

reach an understanding with Hitler, yet not at the expense of its alliance with Britain. The Turkish government was pressed by Berlin for an alliance, but rejected these proposals. Instead, it agreed to sign a Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Friendship with Germany on 1 8 June.6 For a moment it looked as if the end of Turkey's friendly relations with Britain was close. London, however, chose to abstain from any action which would alienate Ankara and throw it into the enemy's hands. The German attack against Russia a few days after the signing of the Turkish­ German treaty filled Turkey with joy. It also gave rise to new considerations for the Turkish leaders, reinforcing their decision not to enter an alliance with Berlin. Ankara had no intention of starting a war with the Soviet Union by siding with Germany. The entry of the United States in the war in December 1 94 1 and the Anglo-American entente with Moscow did not change Ankara's decision to remain neutral. Turkey continued to have no reason to enter the conflict while, on the other hand, its trade continued to be dependent on German purchases. Furthermore, Ankara wished for the destruction of Soviet power. Hence, it had an additional reason for not co-operating with the Allies by opening the Straits to the British fleet in order to sustain the Russian war effort. Indeed, when it appeared that Russia might be totally overthrown by German forces Ankara even tilted towards the Axis and approached Berlin for the creation of a Turco-Mongol state in the Caucasus and the Crimea. The halting, however, of the German army at the battle of Stalingrad in September 1 942 brought Turkey back to strict neutrality. By the end of 1 942 it had become almost clear that the Allies would win, but Turkey was still resisting British pressure to fight. The idea of Turkey becoming Allied territory on which Soviet troops would have a right to station must have been discomforting to Ankara. More importantly, Germany was still buying considerable amounts of Turkish chrome, which the Allies did not consider purchasing. Thus, Inonti argued that his country was not adequately supplied for the war and tried to gain time by asking for as much war materiel as possible as a condition of his declaring war on the Axis powers. The Turkish army was really hardly in a position to fight a modern war. After his journey to Adana in January 1 943, Churchill declared that Turkey needed tanks, arms and weapons, and especially instructions on how to use them. 'I have been particularly distressed at the spectacle of the Turkish army ' , h e wrote, 'this has made me comprehend the attitude of the Turks. ' 7 Nonetheless, i n early 1 943 the British government appeared determined to shorten the war by making Turkey fulfil its treaty obligations. The Turkish government stood firm in their decision not to get involved unless all their demands were satisfied. It was only on 17 November 36

From One War to Another 1 943 and after continuous British pressure that Ankara agreed, in principle, to come into the war, but it insisted that an overall plan was needed. In early December 1 943 at the Cairo conference Inonti made it clear that his country would not enter the war unprepared and asked for military materiel. In this way Ankara was still hoping to gain time and so stay out of the fighting. Indeed on 1 8 December, Numan Menemencioglu, who had replaced Sara oglu as Minister of Foreign Affairs in early October 1 942, was assuring von Papen that Turkey would remain neutral. As Deringil comments, 'gambling that short-term unpopularity would give way before Britain's long-term needs of security for her Empire, the Turks dug in their heels' .8 Turkey's intransigence strained relations with Britain. On 4 February 1 944 the British military mission was recalled from Ankara and diplomatic relations were reduced to a minimum. Britain's protests against Turkey's implementation of the Montreux Treaty regarding the passage of German ships brought tension to a head in June 1 944.9 In view of an Allied victory Inonti realised the gravity of the situation for Turkey' s international position and sought to appease London. Menemencioglu, who had been identified in Allied circles as pro-German and was considered by many to be the brain behind Turkish foreign policy manoeuvring during the war, resigned on 1 5 June 1 944. His successor, Hasan Saka, soon after his appointment declared to the British Ambassador the desire of his government to resume negoti­ ations. 10 Ankara agreed to break off relations with Germany on 2 August 1 944. The offensive of the Red Army in late July against the Germans across eastern Europe, which presaged its advance in the Balkans, perhaps also contributed to the decision. One can assume that the last thing Ankara wished was to be on cool terms with Britain in view of the presence of a victorious Soviet Army near Turkey's western borders. By now, Churchill's warning to Ankara in December 1 943 11 that, if Turkey did not abandon neutrality, Britain would not support Turkey regarding the Soviets after the war appeared particularly poignant. Turkey officially declared war on Germany and Japan on 23 February 1 945, just in time to secure its acceptance as a founder member of the United Nations. On the other hand, Ankara also hoped to advance its claims over the Dodecanese islands. Soon after their war declaration the Turkish government put forward their claims over the islands, on the grounds that they had belonged to the Ottoman Empire before the Italian occupation in 1 9 1 2 and that due to their proximity to the Turkish coastline they were essential to Turkish security. 12 However, Turkey's declaration of war by this time was simply symbolic and Ankara was devoid of any bargaining power to press the British over the 37

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

Dodecanese. London had no reason to disappoint Greece over its demand to be given the islands, the population of which was overwhelmingly Greek. 13 Furthermore, the British Middle East Defence Committee found Turkish security considerations unfounded. They argued that other large Greek islands such as Lesbos, Samos and Chios were even closer to Turkey and declined to believe that the Turks genuinely feared that Greece 's possession of the Dodecanese represented a threat to their security. 14 Ernest Bevin, who succeeded Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary after the Labour Party victory in the July 1 945 British general election, was particularly concerned about the effects a denial of the islands to Greece might have. He feared that the position of the Greek government, which was confronted with an economic crisis and political instability due to the polarisation between the parties of the Right and Left, would be further weakened and that British prestige in Greece would suffer. Thus, the Dodecanese were given to Greece, but, owing to the uncertain political situation which made it possible that the Greek communists could come to power and, as a result, Greece might fall into the Soviet orbit, Britain insisted, against Moscow's wishes, on the demilitarisation of the islandsY

ANKARA S E E K S B RI T I S H AND AMERICAN S UPPORT

VIS -A - VIS M O S C O W

B y the end of the war the Turkish-British alliance had been undermined because of Ankara's reluctance to meet its commitments, yet Turkey could ill afford a cooling in its relations with London. Since 1 942 Ankara had been growing increasingly apprehensive of Soviet expansionism facilitated by the destruction of German power in central Europe and the emergence of a victorious Soviet Union. As Menemencioglu had told von Papen and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in 1 943 : 'We wish this war was not to end with a total defeat either on the one side or the other . . . Turkey's interest is in the direction of a negotiated peace. ' 16 To Turkey the total military destruction of Germany was an anathema because it meant that the balance of power in eastern and south-eastern Europe would collapse to Moscow 's benefit, with obvious dire consequences for Turkey's security. 17 Inonii's long-held conviction, was that 'as soon as the Russians came to regard their western boundaries as safe they would no longer care to be friends with us' .18 Therefore, Ankara was compelled to continue to look for a strong friend in the face of Britain, whose imperial interests in the Middle East made it keen to keep the Soviets out of the 38

From One War to Another

eastern Mediterranean. Already, during the last phase of the war, Turkish-Soviet relations had been embittered by Turkish neutrality. In May 1 944 the Turkish government approached Moscow to propose an agreement for closer political collaboration which would include consultation on Balkan questions. The Russian response was that Moscow would discuss closer collaboration with the Turks only if Turkey entered the war on the Allies' side. 19 Soon afterwards tension between the two countries came to a head.20 At the Teheran conference in 1 943 Stalin discussed with Churchill the question of Turkey's absolute control over the Straits. A little later, during the Moscow talks in October 1 944, Stalin raised with the British Prime Minister the subject of a revision of the Straits regime to meet the interests of the Soviet Union. Churchill was sympathetic to Stalin's viewpoint despite the advice of Anthony Eden not to be forthcoming regarding the Turkish Straits question. Eden and Foreign Office officials were of the view that although the Montreux Convention - which was due for revision in 1 946 - needed updating on certain technical issues, Soviet demands for free navigation in the Straits undermined longterm British security interests in the region. At Yalta in February 1 945, the question was once more formally raised. Stalin argued that the Montreux Convention was outmoded and he could not accept an arrangement which left the passage of the waterway, vital to Soviet interests, to the discretion of Turkey. By this time, Churchill had been confronted with the view of the Foreign Office and was more reserved in his attitude. Nevertheless, he continued to think that a major power like the Soviet Union should not be denied access to the open sea. At the end of the Yalta Conference, the British and the Americans agreed to consider any Soviet proposals regarding the regime of the Turkish Straits at the Foreign Ministers' September meeting in London.21 The Soviet leader however, wished to push things ahead. On 1 9 March 1 945 Moscow notified Ankara that the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 1 925 should be amended in line with international developments. In June the Soviets clearly stated their demands. If the Soviet Union were to conclude a new treaty with Turkey, then Russia should be granted a base on the Straits and given the areas of Kars and Ardahan in Turkish Armenia. The amiable interlude of the interwar period between the two neighbours was over. The Turkish Republic, like the Ottoman Empire in the past, had to rely not only on the interest of Britain but also that of the United States, the new major power, to maintain the status quo in the region so as to safeguard its security against the Soviet Union. The Soviet demands in the Straits remained similar to those communicated to the Nazi government in 1 940. During the discussions 39

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

between Ribbentrop and Molotov in Berlin, Moscow raised the question of the Straits, and soon afterwards asked for a base for Soviet land and naval forces within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a longterm lease. The Germans agreed to consider a revision of the Montreux Convention, but due to the deterioration of German-Russian relations no concrete agreement was reached. 22 In its attempt to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean, Moscow continued one of the oldest traditions of Russian foreign policy. Ever since Catherine the Great 'the idea of breaking out of the Black Sea . . . dazzled Russian statesmen' . 23 Vyacheslav Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs from 1 939 to 1 949 and Stalin's closest adviser at Yalta and Potsdam, in his conversations with Felix Chuev explained Stalin's demands in the context of this tradition. In a conversation in 1 978 Molotov said: 'Miliukov talked about the Bosporus all the time. Russian generals talked about it all the time . . . an exit from the Black Sea ! ' ; and again in another talk in 1 98 1 : 'In his last years Stalin got puffed up a bit. In foreign affairs I had to demand exactly what Miliukov demanded - the Dardanelles ! Stalin said, "Go ahead, press them for joint possession ! " Me: "They won't allow it." "Demand it" ! ' 24 Paul Miliukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Russian Provisional Government (March-October 1 9 1 7), was a fervent supporter of the objectives of the 1 9 1 5 secret agreement between Britain, France and Russia. With this agreement London and Paris had promised the Tsar control of Istanbul and the Straits area as a reward for Russia's entry in the war. When Miliukov in May 1 9 1 7 invoked the prize of Constantinople and the Straits, and declared Russia's intention to carry on the war to a decisive victory, he was dismissed by the Provisional Government, whose fundamental aim was to end the war.25 Yet Soviet demands were not just linked with former traditions of Soviet power politics. They were also 'clearly related to the concern not to allow the Mediterranean region to fall entirely into the hands of the British and the Americans after the decline of the French and the Italian colonial powers' .26 As Sir Piers Dixon, private secretary to Ernest Bevin, commented at the time of the September 1 945 Foreign Ministers' conference in London: the new point which seems to me to emerge . . . is the intensity of Russian jealousy of our position in the Mediterranean now that France and Italy ceased to be first-class powers . . . The Russians therefore see us as the unchallenged master of the Mediterranean and the possible leader of a group of countries stretching from Iraq to Egypt, along both shores of the Mediterranean and up to the Atlantic shore and Scandinavia. Such a position of strength by one 40

From One War to Another

power would be a potential threat to Russian security, and should therefore be sapped. 27 The nature of Turkish-Soviet relations since 1 939, or even since Montreux, when Ankara made it clear that it did not wish for an exclusive relationship with the Soviet Union, must have further enhanced Stalin's wishes to secure Russia's strategic interests in the Straits. Moscow could no longer hope to develop with Turkey a close relationship which would meet Russian security concerns regarding the west, as had been the case in the 1 920s. One can assume that Moscow was even convinced that, given the right circumstances, Turkey would choose not to be neutral, but hostile to the Soviet Union in the event of its security coming under threat. Indeed during the Soviet-German war the Russians had firmly believed that Turkey was ready to join the Germans against them and an army had been kept on the Turkish border.28 Soviet demands for Kars and Ardahan were more difficult to explain. The two areas had been ceded by the Ottoman sultan to Russia after the Turkish-Russian war of 1 877. With the 1921 Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship both of them had been given to Turkey. According to Khrushchev, it was Beria, 'the only person able to advise Stalin on foreign policy' , who made Stalin demand these territories. Beria who was, like Stalin, from Georgia, kept bringing up the subject, saying that Kars and Ardahan used to belong to Georgia and the Soviet Union should demand their return now that Turkey was weakened - as a result of its neutrality during the war - and would not be able to resist.29 Soviet appetite for territorial expansion against a weakened Turkey may be a valid explanation. Yet, it is very plausible - as George Kennan, charge at the American embassy in Moscow, and other State Department officials thought at the time - that demands over the two areas were seen by Moscow as a means to increase pressure on Ankara and hence promote Soviet objectives in the Straits30 in what Gormly describes as 'the Soviet method of negotiating whereby point after contested point was added until the opponents willingly conceded in order to resume meaningful discussions' .31 Soviet tactics regarding Turkey annoyed the British who had been awaiting the Soviet proposals to be formally presented to them and the Americans at the London Foreign Ministers' meeting in September. The Turks for their part, sought to secure British support by stressing that the Soviet demands were aimed at bringing Turkey under Soviet control. Eden, who had been reluctant to sympathise with Stalin's demands in the frrst place, had already come to the conclusion that Turkish fears were well justified. Yet Ankara realised that Britain's diplomatic support would not be sufficient; its ultimate diplomatic success in relation to a 41

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revision, akin to its interests, of the Montreux Convention also depended on American backing. The Turkish government looked at the San Francisco Conference, which was opened on 1 5 April, as an opportunity to seek the advice of the Americans as to how it should proceed in the future in relation to Moscow's demands, but the Turks found it difficult to secure from the United States the support they were given by Britain on the issue.32 When London in the summer of 1 945 asked Washington to act jointly and send a demarche to Moscow complaining about the presentation of the Soviet demands to Turkey, the Americans declined to do so. Washington preferred to maintain a detached stance for the time being. Churchill, persuaded by the Foreign Office, had to protest alone. In July 1 945 the British government notified Moscow that the whole question would have to be discussed at Potsdam. At Potsdam ( 1 7 July-2 August 1 945), Stalin repeated his view about the necessity for a revision of the Montreux Convention and asked for Soviet bases on the Straits. Churchill appeared still sympathetic regarding Russia's unrestricted exit to the Mediterranean, but could not agree with the idea of granting Russia any foothold on the Straits. The proposal of President Truman ­ who had assumed office on 1 2 April 1 945 - for free and unrestricted navigation of all international waterways failed to meet Russia's special interests.33 Turkey, who did not participate in the conference, was particularly unhappy with the idea of internationalisatiop which appeared to bring the Straits back to the regime Turkey had succeeded in changing at Montreux. Being unable to reach a solution at Potsdam over how a revision of the Straits convention would meet changed world conditions, the United States, Britain and Russia decided to proceed with direct conversations between each of the three powers and the Turkish government. Moscow, however, did not appear particularly hasty to formally approach Ankara and limited itself to the launching of press and radio anti-Turkish propaganda.34 In the meantime, the Turks sought to stimulate American interest and support on their side in their contest with the Soviets, but with no result.35 At the end of August 1 945, the Turkish ambassador in Washington expressed the disappointment of the Turkish government with regard to the attitude of the United States on the Straits issue. In his view, there was 'a lessening of American interest in Turkish affairs and even some let-down in American support for Turkey' .36 In reality the American government had not reached yet a definite conclusion on the matter. Truman still insisted on the idea of internationalisation as a means of preventing Russia from taking direct action to obtain control of the Straits. The State Department officials, on the other hand, did not think that it was necessary to make 'a great 42

From One War to Another

change' in the present regime of the Dardanelles, as such a change might have to involve the United States in their controP7 In October James Byrnes, Secretary of State, wrote to Truman: 'while I share your view that probably more drastic attention will be necessary in the revision of the Montreux Convention to arrest Russian pressure in this area, I am inclined to doubt the wisdom of putting forth anew your suggestion regarding internationalisation until the Russians have shown their hand' . Byrnes suggested that if Truman wished to go further at this time, Washington could add to the principles to be suggested for the revision of the Montreux Convention that: ' "In the event of interference from any source with the rights of passage guaranteed by the revised Convention, the states parties thereto, including the United States, agree to consult and take collective action within the framework of the United States Organisation to ensure the employment of such rights" . ' However, he cautioned the president that if he wished 'to go this far, it probably would be wise to consult with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate before making our suggestion' .38 Despite acknowledging that Moscow was seeking to expand its sphere of influence in the Black Sea the State Department continued to prefer a slow approach so as to avoid a too-close American involvement in the region. As Byrnes put it to Truman, John Foster Dulles, who at the time was Republican adviser on foreign policy, 'was somewhat wary about undertaking a guarantee of passage in waters so far distant from our shores' . 39 Truman was convinced to give up the idea of internationalisation. In November, the State Department communicated to the interested parties a proposal, already discussed with London, for holding an international conference, with the participation of the United States, if invited. The purpose of the conference would be to revise the Montreux Convention on the basis of three principles: (a) complete freedom of passage to merchant vessels of all nations at all times; (b) complete freedom of passage to the warships of the Black Sea states at all times; and (c) denial of passage to the warships of non-Black Sea states at all times except for agreed tonnage in time of peace or acting under the authority of the United Nations.40 In other words the State Department was prepared to accept that the Soviet Union had legitimate security concerns in the Black Sea and was willing to accommodate them so as to assure a cordial relationship with the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the war Washington was concentrating its attention on Europe and not the Near East, and for most of 1 945 the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union had not yet taken a definite shape. Mter all, this accommodation was not a major sacrifice on the part of Washigton since the advance of air power had rendered passage of 43

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warships through the Straits less important than it had been hithereto. Furthermore, Loy Henderson, director since April 1 945 of the Office of Near Eastern and Mrican Affairs (NEA) at the State Department, pointed out that, as the proposal called for passage through the Straits to be denied and not be closed to the war vessels of non-Black Sea powers, it would permit warships of non-Black Sea powers to go as far as Instanbul without restriction. In fact, the initial draft proposal of the State Department had recommended that the passage should be closed but, as a result of a British suggestion, it was changed to read that passage should be denied. The new Labour government in Britain strongly objected to the idea of having to ask for the consent of Bulgaria and Rumania to send warships into the Black Sea, but agreed to participate in a conference for a revision of the Straits regime. The Turkish government also accepted the American proposal as a basis for negotiations. However, Ankara had good reasons to remain uneasy. The proposal clearly manifested that Washington had given insufficient consideration to Turkey's security interests. A Straits regime which gave unrestricted access to the Soviet fleet was hardly in accordance with Turkey's security considerations. As Feridun Cerna! Erkin, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, put it to the British ambassador in Ankara, the American proposals allowed the Black Sea to be turned into a Soviet naval base from which the Soviets could make expeditions into the Mediterranean. As a result, Ankara feared that it ran the risk of one day finding the entire Black Sea fleet in Turkey's territorial waters.41 Undoubtedly, from Ankara's point of view any revision of the Straits regime which took the control of the seaway from Turkey eradicated the gains at Montreux, and left the country in a disadvantageous position relative to the Soviet Union. The fact that the Russian Black Sea fleet had been totally destroyed in the war did not render Turkish fears unjustified in the long run. Any arrangement which made the Black Sea a Soviet lake would establish Soviet predominance in the area, and render Turkey's eventual fall into the Soviet orbit a relatively easy process. Ankara was not afraid of Turkey being attacked by the Soviets, at least not in the near future. Inonii at a meeting in the early spring of 1 945 at the presidential residence had expressed the view that Moscow could not afford an offensive against Turkey. He pointed out that Soviet losses in the war against Germany had been tremendous, and the need for large occupying forces in Germany, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, and for manpower in the reconstruction of the Soviet Union, made it most unlikely that the Soviet government would embark on a war against Turkey. Nor did he believe that Moscow would wish to create an 44

From One War to Another

unfavourable impression throughout the world as the result of aggression.42 Indeed, in October 1 945, the Turkish army began demobilisation. It was only in the end of October when there were alarming reports of Soviet troop concentrations in Bulgaria and the Caucasus, that Ankara started feeling nervous about the possibility of Soviet aggression, and demobilisation was temporarily halted.43 What Ankara was apprehensive about was the danger of finding itself under constant Soviet pressure. This fear was aggravated by the fact that Turkey was in the midst of an unfriendly political environment. The Soviet denunciation of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of 1 925, and Moscow's demands against Turkish territorial integrity, coincided with uncertainty along most of Turkey 's borders. By mid- 1 945 the communists had taken power in Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Ankara could hardly expect to have good relations with the communist, Soviet-controlled, Balkan regimes. Mter Moscow's denunciation of the Turkish-Soviet treaty, propaganda against Turkey and the Turkish government had been launched by the Yugoslavian and the Bulgarian press.44 The political situation in Greece - where Greek communist and government forces were engaged in a civil war - meant that Turkey's other close neighbour might also fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. The 'First Round' , as it is usually referred to, of the political struggle between the Greek Right and the Left had started in August 1 943 and lasted until February 1 944. During the 'Second Round' between December 1 944 and February 1 945, fighting had broken out in which British military forces were directly involved. After the Varkiza Agreement in February 1 945 the actual fighting stopped. Nevertheless, the country was in a chaotic economic situation and in the midst of political instability, since it remained polarised between Right and Left. Under the circumstances a communist victory in the upcoming Greek elections could not be ruled out. Against this background it was only natural for Ankara to fear that Turkey ran the risk of getting isolated from the west and becoming an easy prey to Moscow's wishes. Events in Northern Iran in late 1 945 could only enhance Turkey's fears of a possible Soviet encircling.45 In November 1 945 an uprising in Iranian Azerbaijan, led by the newly formed Democratic Party, which cut off communications with the rest of the country, was assisted by Soviet troops stationed there. (The Soviets and the British had occupied Iran in 1 94 1 to protect their interests against the spread of German influence among the Iranian government.) By December 1 945 the Soviet Union appeared to have already established a political foothold in Northern Iran through the separatist rebellion in Iranian Azerbaijan and the Kurdish independence movement. In early December 1 945, the 45

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1945-1952

autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Republic in Mahabad, were proclaimed. The existence of a Kurdish autonomous regime backed by Moscow fostered an additional danger for Turkey due to its own substantial Kurdish minority along its borders with Iran. There is little information regarding agitation among the Kurds in Turkey at the time of these events in Iran. However, it appears that there were contacts between the Kurds in the two countries and some meetings did take place. The propaganda material circulating in Iran referred only to the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish regime there, but Soviet agents seemingly promised the creation of a Kurdish republic which would also include Kurds in Turkey and Iraq.46 The idea of an independent Kurdish state comprising the predominantly Kurdish areas in Iraq and Turkey (but not in Iran) had been contained in the abortive Treaty of Sevres in 1 920. This project was finally abandoned at the time of the Lausanne Treaty, but aspirations among the Kurds for a state of their own were kept alive.47 It is reasonable to assume that Ankara was alarmed. After the entry of British and Soviet troops into Iran at the beginning of the war Ankara had already expressed its concern over encouragement given by the Russian army to the Iranian Kurds. On 1 4 February 1 946, the Turkish government, apprehensive about the development of events in Iranian Kurdistan, made an unsuccessful attempt to secure British co-operation against the Kurds in Turkey, if they were to follow the example of their brethren in Iran.48 On top of all this Turkey's relations with Syria were not cordial. Damascus was embittered by the French decision to cede Alexandretta to Turkey, and made it clear that it was unwilling to compromise what it considered its own sovereignty rights in the province.49 In the light of the above it was not surprising that Ankara approached London with the aim of reaffirming its ties with Britain. On 1 5 February 1 946, Hasan Saka raised with Ernest Bevin the question of the 1 939 Anglo-Turkish treaty. Saka was interested either in a revision of the treaty or in a public statement in the House of Commons to the effect that the British government considered themselves bound by the alliance. 50 The Turkish request for a revision was of particular importance. According to Protocol 2 of the 1 939 Treaty, the Turks had no obligation to assist Britain and France, if this involved Turkey in a war with the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, when now approaching London, the Turkish leaders were aware that, due to current international developments, this protocol would almost certainly be cancelled were the Tripartite Treaty to be revised. In other words, as early as 1 946 Inonti appeared ready to leave all past circumspection behind and negotiate a new agreement with Britain even at the risk of entering into some future conflict with 46

From One War to Another

the Russians. Tension in Turkish-Soviet relations coupled with uncertainty around almost all Turkey's borders had left Ankara with little choice other than to seek London's firm support. London felt that it was important to discourage Russian appetites over Turkey and responded favourably to Ankara's requests. In November 1 945 the British agreed with the American proposal for a revision of the Montreux Convention, but they continued to examine the whole question in the context of British strategic interests in the Middle East. The importance the British attached to the eastern Mediterranean lines of communication to the Middle East had already been demonstrated by British interference in Greece since the end of the war in order to ensure the victory of the Right against the Left. 51 In Bevin's words: 'the most overpowering reason of all is that we must maintain our position in Greece as part of our Middle East policy and unless it is asserted and settled it may have a bad effect on the whole of our Middle East position.'52 In the interwar period the Middle East was second to Asia in the context of Britain's imperial interests. By 1 945 this perception was changed due to the growing importance of oil and as a result of clear signs that it would be only a question of time before the British would have to withdraw from India and Burma. Anthony Eden in his 1 945 'Defence of the Middle East' memorandum expressed the view that the Middle East was the core of Britain's imperial policy. Bevin, Foreign Office officials and the General Staff fully endorsed the view of the former Conservative Foreign Secretary and considered the Middle East to be crucial to British security.53 As Bevin would say in 1 947: 'in peace and war, the Middle East is an area of cardinal importance to the UK, second only to the UK itself. Strategically the Middle East is a focal point of communications, a source of oil, a shield to Africa and the Indian Ocean, and an irreplaceable offensive base. Economically it is, owing to oil and cotton, essential to United Kingdom recovery. ' 54 Clement Attlee, the British Labour Prime Minister, did not share the view that Britain's policy should concentrate on the Middle East. He believed that Britain was too weak to retain all its footholds and securing its position in the region was becoming very difficult. Instead, he proposed that Britain should develop its defensive strategy in North Africa.55 However, Attlee's view failed to prevail.56 In January 1 946 F. K. Roberts, at the time counsellor in the British embassy in Moscow, drew attention to the fact that any concessions to the legitimate Soviet demands for a revision of the Montreux Convention, or for bases in the Straits had to be carefully considered against a broader background. He firmly believed that Moscow's ultimate aim was to subjugate Turkey. In this way the Soviets would 47

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safeguard their security in their southern borders, much in the same way they had done in eastern Europe, while at the same time they would have secured an outlet for their commerce and navy into the Mediterranean. Roberts maintained that if the Soviet Union succeeded in its efforts to infiltrate Iran and Turkey, the way to the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal would be open. This could only endanger imperial communi­ cations and British oil interests in southern Iran, where there was the single most important British oil venture in the area. Roberts contended that even limited Soviet success in Turkey and Iran would be seen as a severe setback to Britain throughout the Arab world.57 In a 1 936 memorandum Eden had stressed that the belief of the indigenous populations in the 'unchallenged, and it was thought the unchallengable efficacy and prestige of British sea power in the Mediterranean had guaranteed until then British interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East' .58 Ten years and a world war later, this view was still valid in London. Throughout the Middle East, Britain's prestige and security interests were seen as being closely intermingled. It was with such considerations in mind that 'much to the satisfaction of the Turks' 59 Bevin mentioned the Anglo-Turkish alliance in his speech in the House of Commons on 2 1 February 1 946. 'I want to say we have a Treaty with Turkey . . . I really must be frank and say I do not want Turkey converted into a satellite state. What I want her to be is really independent. I should like to see the treaty of friendship renewed between Soviet Union and Turkey. ' 60 Turkey's role in safeguarding Britain's Middle Eastern position was seen as important as that of Greece's.61 By spring 1 946 Ankara had London's full support in resisting a revision of the Straits regime. Meanwhile, Washington's thinking regarding Soviet demands for a revision of the Montreux Convention had also been evolving. In the end of 1 945 the establishment of the Kurdish Republic and the republic of Azerbaijan in Northern Iran in a manner reminiscent of the first stages of Soviet inflltration of eastern Europe, shifted Truman's administration focus onto the Near East. Meanwhile, American policy towards Russia was rapidly moving away from the idea of co-operation with the Soviets in the pursuit of world peace. The Moscow meeting ( 1 6-26 December 1 945) between the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, which essentially amounted to the division of the world into spheres of influence, was viewed by the Congress and the American public as pandering to Soviet expansionism which had already been consolidated in eastern Europe. 62 The voices of those in the Truman administration who thought the American attitude towards Stalin's designs too compromising gained force. Henderson was paramount in 48

From One War to Another

shaping a tough State Department position in relation to Soviet demands in the Straits. Henderson had been hitherto working on the area of Soviet-American relations. As a consequence he invariably viewed developments in the Middle East in the context of ideological and political balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. In a memorandum of 28 December 1 945 to Dean Acheson, Under-Secretary of State, on the present situation in the Middle East, entitled 'A Danger to World Peace' , Henderson maintained that Soviet policies in the area were conducted with a view to eventually bring the Middle East under Soviet domination.63 Henderson was not the only one who viewed Soviet objectives in the area under this light. Since late September 1 945 Edwin Wilson, the American ambassador in Ankara, had been strongly supporting the Turkish view that Soviet demands in the Straits were, in fact, aiming at bringing Turkey under Soviet influence and were a first step towards Soviet control of the Near and the Middle East. 64 This assessment had also been shared by George Kennan, charge at the American embassy in Moscow.65 On 5 January 1 946 in a letter to Byrnes (which was never mailed) Truman wrote: 'There isn't a doubt in rriy mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language they understand - "How many divisions have you?". ' 66 While such views were gaining force in Washington Kennan sent from Moscow his 'long telegram' of 22 February 1 946, in which he warned about the dangers posed by the Soviet Union and of the need to adopt a tougher line towards Soviet demands. The United States policy towards Russia was entering a new phase and Kennan's memorandum was reflecting and shaping the change at the same time. 67 In the light of the emerging policy of 'firmness' instead of the previous carrot-and­ stick approach, and with attention focused on the Near East, Washington, like London, saw the need to resist Moscow's demands in the Straits. Soviet policies in Iran which developed to a crisis after the failure of the Soviet troops stationed there to meet the deadline for their withdrawal on 2 March 1 946, greatly reinforced the belief in Washington that Soviet designs in the Middle East ought to be dealt with firmness. It was against this background that on 6 March the announcement that the body of the deceased Turkish ambassador to the United States, Mehmet Ertegtin, would be returned to Turkey on the battleship Missouri - an intended signal of American support to Turkey - was made.68 The final withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Iran on 6 May 1 946 after the resolute attitude of the United States confirmed in Washington the view that the United States should not be compromising with Moscow. 69 49

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Against this background the Soviet note to Ankara, (copied also to Washington) of 7 August 1 946 - the belated response to the American proposal of November 1 945 - which did not talk any more about revision of the Montreux Convention, but of a new Straits regime with the participation of Black Sea powers and of a joint system for their defence between the Soviet Union and Turkey, was interpreted by Wilson, in accordance with his previous analysis, as putting Turkish independence and territorial integrity at risk. Henderson, Acheson, James Forrestal and Kenneth Royal - the secretaries of navy and war respectively - concurred. What the Soviet government aimed at in pressing their demands was to soften Turkey's resistance and eventually bring the country into the Soviet orbiC0 The United States was now ready to adopt Britain's hardline policy towards Moscow. In its official reply to the Soviet note Washington, like London, rejected the idea that the establishment of a regime for the Straits was the exclusive concern of the Black Sea Powers and declared that Turkey should remain primarily responsible for their defence. However, the Americans reiterated their willingness to attend a conference for the revision of the Montreux Convention. This conference was never to take place as Moscow had always preferred bilateral negotiations with Ankara. On 24 September Moscow made another effort to put pressure on Ankara by sending - this time only to the Turkish government - a note similar to the one of August. Turkey, however, had again the full support of the Americans and the British who reiterated their previously stated position. Moscow decided to push the matter no further. Clearly Stalin did not wish for an open confrontation with the two western powers. Stalin had counted on Turkey's weak international position and Russia's paramount contribution in the war - or as Molotov put it 'we proposed this control in honor of the victory gained by Soviet forces'71 - to further his objectives in the Straits. The initial encouraging response of Churchill and detached stance of the Americans to his demands led him to believe that he could push on the matter. By late 1 946 he realised that his wartime allies were firm in their decision not to make any concessions. In the words of Molotov: 'It didn't work. If we had gone ahead, everyone would have come down on us. '72 The west found it easier in wartime than in time of peace to consider the idea of Russian control of the Straits. As Molotov commented 'it was an inopportune, impossible affair. I consider Stalin an outstanding politician, but he too made mistakes. ' 73

50

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Mter its notes of 1 946 Moscow did not resume its diplomatic pressure on Ankara. Thanks to combined British-American support, the Turkish government found itself in a strong position regarding Stalin's designs. Nevertheless, the likelihood that the Soviet Union in the future might again raise its demands against Turkey was still there, while there could be no certainty of renewed support from London and Washington. This precarious state of affairs made Ankara wish for a pledge of western support. In December 1 946 the Turkish government approached the Americans with the idea of a regional agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and Turkey, for the defence of the Straits in time of war, so as to allay, as they said, any genuine Soviet fears regarding security in the Straits/4 This was an interesting proposal as the Turks appeared ready to give up their sole guardianship of the Straits in wartime, which they had assumed at Montreux. It seems that at this stage Ankara had come to fully appreciate, perhaps for the first time, the risk it ran by being wholly responsible for controlling passage through the Straits during wartime. The objective of the proposal was clear. Ankara sought to safeguard Turkish security in the Straits by involving the Americans and the British in their defence. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the Turkish government seriously thought that Moscow could be attracted to a scheme which would introduce the two other major powers in the Straits. The Americans however, had no interest in assuming responsibility in the Straits. Byrnes, in his reply to the Turkish suggestion, pointed out that Ankara had apparently overlooked the fact that Soviet fears regarding the Straits were certain to be directed against the United States or Britain and, therefore, a regional pact, as proposed by Turkey, would obviously not be welcomed by Moscow, and the idea was not discussed any further. 75 By late 1 946 Turkey's security concerns regarding Moscow were eased, though they were far from being over, while the country continued to be in the midst of a precarious security environment. The spring of 1 946 had witnessed the beginning of the most bitter 'Third Round' of the civil war in Greece. Increasing support by Bulgaria for the Greek communists, who were operating uncomfortably near Turkey's western frontier in Thrace, made Ankara fear that Bulgaria may resume its old claims over Thrace and pursue them with Soviet backing.76 Were a Slavic federation to be created, as Tito and Dimitrov, the Bulgarian premier, kept suggesting, communist pressure on Ankara's north and north-western borders was likely to increase. The Greek civil war reached its peak in November 1 946 and the chance of a victory for the 51

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Greek communists, who were assisted by the communist regimes in Yugoslavia and Albania, appeared possible. Fears of the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime also along Turkey's western border grew.77 However, the political situation in Iran remained unstable until the end of 1 946. Soviet troops had evacuated Iran in May 1 946, but Moscow's policies there continued to be a matter of international concern. Moscow put pressure on Iran's Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, to hold elections, while the Soviet-supported Tudeh party held almost daily demon­ strations in Iran's major cities and the Iranian cabinet included three Tudeh members and two Tudeh sympathisers. They were dismissed only in October 1 946. Iranian Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan remained outside Tehran's authority until December 1 946 when central control was finally re-established by government forces.78 At the same time, Turkey was faced with cold diplomatic relations in the Middle East. Ankara's relations with the Arab states were officially correct, but not cordial. Tension with Syria was coupled, since the summer of 1 946, with attacks by the Egyptian press against the Turkish government for being a pawn of British imperialism in the Middle East. Egypt's irritation was due to the Turkish representations that it was inopportune - given the emerging tension between the west and the east - for Egypt to demand the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal zone.79 The treaties of friendship which Turkey signed with Iraq and Transjordan on 29 March 1 946 and 1 1 January 1 947 respectively, could not conceal the fact that Ankara, in its efforts to improve relations with the Arabs and to secure a friendly environment along Turkey's eastern borders, had 'little to show for two years' hard work' .80 Iraq ratified the treaty with Turkey more than a year after its signature, and against strong opposition in the country fuelled by Iraqi left-wing papers, which declared that Iraq was being bound to a country controlled by British imperialism. 81 Damascus, for its part, denounced the two treaties as treason against the Arab League and Syria in particular, because they guaranteed Turkey's territorial integrity, and by implication endorsed the annexation of Alexandretta. Fears of an oriental bloc composed of Iraq, Transjordan and Turkey had given rise to tension between all Arab countries and the Hashemite kingdoms.82 In the aftermath of the Second World War the political environment which had provided Turkey with a certain degree of security along its borders in the 1 930s had been transformed. Not only was the Turkish-Russian friendship intermezzo well over, but so was the understanding which Turkey had established before the war with most of its neighbours in the Balkans and the Middle East. Regional co­ operation through the Balkan and the Saadabad Pacts, which had given 52

From One War to Another

Ankara a voice in regional affairs, had been replaced by regional semi­ isolation. Under the circumstances, Turkey made its alliance with Britain the cornerstone of its foreign policy. 83 Indeed, Ankara was extremely careful lest its relations with the British were disturbed. In February 1 947, when Ahmet Emin Yalman, the editor of the independent daily Vatan, published a series of articles accusing Britain of imperialistic policies, the pro-government press launched a campaign against him.84 Certainly Inonti and his aides were also well aware of the importance of pursuing close relations with the United States. Recep Peker, the Turkish Prime Minister, told the American ambassador in August 1 946 that Turkey was 'but slightly and often unfavourably known' in the United States and he intended 'to give attention to making Turkey better known' in America. As he further added his government attached great importance to increasing friendship and understanding with the United States because it was playing the leading international role in maintaining peace and security.85 Yet, in early 1 947, when the policy of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean was still very much an unknown factor, Turkey had to rely exclusively on Britain for political and financial support in order to safeguard its security and to avoid isolation. The British for their part, though very interested in strengthening Turkey in relation to the Soviet Union - as Bevin's statement in the Commons illustrated - preferred not to draw undue attention to the 1 939 Treaty and had no interest in revising it or entering into a new alliance with Turkey, as yet. A revision of the 1 939 Tripartite Treaty would necessarily have to involve the French, something that London was not keen on. The Foreign Office thought that if they were to conclude again an alliance with the Turks, they should rather ask for the participation of the United States, although this, they admitted, would be difficult to secure due to the American dislike for foreign commitments . In any case, they wished to watch international developments and the performance of the United Nations organisation before Britain assumed any new commitments.86 B RITAIN AND THE Q UE S TION OF AID TO GREECE AND

TURKEY

I n late 1 946 i t had become painfully clear to London that the dire financial situation at home, and the growing nationalist restiveness of local populations, handicapped Britain in its effort to retain its predominance in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. 87 Furthermore, the emergence of Russia as a major power, but also growing American economic interests in the Middle East, owing to its 53

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oil reserves, meant that the British ran the risk of being outpaced in the region by both the Soviet Union and the United States.88 'The problem which faced Ernest Bevin and his colleagues was to frame a foreign policy for Great Britain in conditions of grave economic weakness and of seriously diminished political and military power. ' 89 Under the circumstances, the British chose to come to an understanding with the Americans in the Middle East, in the hope that the United States would get involved in the defence of Britain's interests in the region.90 Their belief was that American inexperience in world affairs would allow London's input into American foreign policy. As a verse popular in the diplomatic British foreign service at the time had it, 'In Washington Lord Halifax/ once whispered to Lord Keynes/ it's true they have the money-bags/ but we have all the brains' .91 It was in this context that London presented Washington with demands for assistance to strengthen the military position of Greece and Turkey. In the autumn of 1 946 Britain's ability to maintain its influence in Greece was diminishing at an increasing pace. 92 In September fighting in the north of the country escalated and the chances of a communist take­ over increased. Despite the fact that a communist victory in Greece would terminate Britain's control of the eastern Mediterranean, and hence put at risk its Middle Eastern strategic interests, the British government, unable to meet the cost of British troops there, began their withdrawal on 1 5 September. On 3 October Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, made it clear that any extension of aid to Greece after the end of March 1 947 would imperil Britain's own finances. Bevin accepted the idea of pulling out British troops from Greece, but he was not prepared to give up Britain's position of influence in the country. In mid-October London turned to the Americans asking primarily for assistance to strengthen the Greek army. In a conversation with Byrnes, Albert Alexander, the British Minister of Defence, stressed that his country 'had already shouldered a very large burden in the case of Greece and big expenditure in the case of Turkey. Naturally, their general position being as it is, they wished to reduce their expenditure in those directions as much as possible. ' 93 The British demands fell on sympathetic ears in Washington. The Americans considered that Britain should be primarily responsible for providing arms and military equipment to Athens and Ankara. Nevertheless, at the end of October an NEA memo, approved by Byrnes and Acheson, stated that the United States was prepared to consider the possibility of furnishing aid to Greece and Turkey in the event that Britain was unable to do so. Soon afterwards, Henderson informed the British embassy in Washington that the United States government would be glad to examine 54

From One War to Another

the possibility of helping Britain in the area of military assistance to Greece and Turkey if the British government were unable to supply the essential requirements.94 Since the Second World War the Americans had provided Greek governments with grants ( 147 million dollars up to 1 947), but these were inadequate to meet Greece's severe economic and financial crisis resulting from the war, the internal fighting, and the inefficiency of Greek governments. In the context of the new strategy of 'firmness' in dealing with the problem of Soviet power Washington was now ready to favourably consider providing allies with substantial economic, but also military aid as a means of checking an expansion of Soviet power.95 The next step was for Britain to bring home to the Americans the extent of its weakness to carry on with its financial responsibilities in the eastern Mediterranean. London thought it essential that the Americans should be convinced to step into assisting not only Greece - which was in an obviously grave situation - but also Turkey. The British had no doubts that the two countries were for strategic reasons very closely bound together, and a surrender of either to Russian pressure would gravely undermine the resistance of the other. They insisted that the question of aid to both should be considered as two parts of the same problem.96 This domino theory was going to be endorsed by the Americans and would determine to a large extent their security policies towards the two countries in the years to come. By the end of November 1 946 escalation of communist violence in Northern Greece raised serious questions about the wisdom of the continuation of any British military presence in the country. Earlier in the month the British Chiefs of Staff endorsing a Joint Planning Staff report had drawn attention to the disastrous effect that the withdrawal of British troops from Greece would have: the country would fall in the hands of the communists, the Soviet Union would gain advantage in the eastern Mediterranean, and Turkey would be put under threat. On 1 1 December the Chiefs of Staff alarmed by the situation in Greece reversed their November stance and recommended the quick withdrawal of the British soldiers, but neither they nor the Foreign Office wanted to give up Greece.97 As it would again become clear a little later with the evacuation of British troops from Palestine, what counted for London was 'the minimising of British loss of life and, as far as was possible under the circumstances, British loss of friends' .98 London's alarm over developments in Greece was coupled with frustration at Britain's inability as a result of economic weakness to make good use of Turkey's strategic value in containing Soviet expansion into the Middle East. On 1 January 1 947 the Chiefs of Staff concluded that it was in Britain's interest to assist Turkey so that it could 55

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offer the maximum resistance to Soviet pressure in war as well in peace. Turkey's strategic role would be to delay a Soviet advance to the Middle East as long as possible. 'Should Russia succeed in advancing through Turkey and establishing herself in the Iskenderun area, she will be in a position to build up her forces for a further advance on the Suez Canal area. . . . It is therefore of the greatest importance that any Russian advance through Turkey should be held up long enough to give us time to build up our forces in the Middle East. ' 99 In December 1 946 British strategists had contemplated that in time of war Britain might be able to provide naval assistance in the Aegean given that shore-based air cover was available. They thought it, though, highly unlikely that they could provide Turkey with any naval forces in the Black Sea or the Sea of Marmara. The burden of land operations had also to fall on the Turks themselves as Britain would be unable to spare any forces for Turkey's defence. It was only in the field of air-strikes that the Chiefs of Staff thought it might be possible to assist Turkey with aircraft based in the Middle East, and possibly from within Turkey, if suitable airfields were provided. Clearly, the task of delaying the Soviets was to be left entirely to Turkish forces. These, however, would not be able, at their present state to offer any appreciable resistance to a Russian attack. The conclusion of the British Chiefs of Staff was that a large measure of re-equipment, along with raising the general standard of training in all three services and a plan of economic development which would contribute to enhancing the military readiness of the country were badly needed. 100 Turkey, however, was in no position to undertake on its own the modernisation of its armed forces. In the 1 947 budget, defence already counted for almost half of the total expenditure, placing a heavy strain on the resources of the country, and yet, the British embassy concluded, the sums involved were insufficient for meeting the task of military modernisation. 101 In the face of Britain's inability to continue Turkey's financial support - it had lent Turkey 84 million pounds since 1938 - the Foreign Office believed that unless the United States provided Turkey with credits, the Turks would have to curtail their military expenses although the state of their armed forces was already 'hopelessly weak' . 102 At the beginning of 1 947 the Chiefs of Staff concluded that British aid to Greece and Turkey should be given only if the Americans accepted to share the burden. 103 On 2 January 1 947, Bevin presented in a memorandum the view of the Chiefs of Staff to the cabinet. 104 At the cabinet meeting of 30 January he recommended talks with Washington to find out how the United States could contribute. His objectives regarding Turkey were to persuade the Turkish government to 56

From One War to Another

re-organise and re-equip the Turkish Army, to ask the United States to undertake as large a share as possible of the expenditure which this would involve, and co-operate with the Americans in advising the Turks on the training and organisation of their armed forces. 105 On 2 1 February 1 947, Britain formally announced to the Americans that it would not be able to provide either Greece or Turkey with military and economic aid beyond the 3 1 March 1 947 . 1t also expressed the hope that the American government would assume Britain's burden in both countries. This was estimated to be between 240 and 280 million dollars in the case of Greece, and 1 50 million dollars in the case of Turkey. '06 The Foreign Office had wished for a note to the United States government maintaining that the United States should bear the lion's share. Bevin either in the hope of pushing matters to a head, or because Dalton insisted that all aid to Greece should cease, sent a note saying that the United States should bear all the burden. 107 That was in a sense the second baby that the British government was throwing on Uncle Sam's lap in the expectation that he would take care of it. A week earlier the British government had declared its failure to deal with the Palestine question and announced its referral to the United Nations. This essentially meant that if schemes for a partition of Palestine between the Jews and the Arabs went ahead, the United States would have to step in and police local developments as Britain was unwilling to assume this task. '08 Britain's decision to withdraw from Greece and Turkey was part of Britain's imperial liquidation. Responsibility for Palestine had been passed on to the United Nations. On 2 1 February, just a day before the British note was delivered to the Americans, the British government had publicly announced its decision to withdraw from India. On the same day, the Labour government prepared a White Paper on Britain's economic situation which envisaged serious cuts on expenditure if the British economy was to be restored. Meanwhile, the continuation of Britain's presence in Egypt was becoming increasingly uncertain. Since 1 946 London had been negotiating with Cairo for the withdrawal of British troops stationed at the Suez base. The troops were there in accordance with the 1 936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which had given Egypt full recognition as an independent and sovereign state after 54 years of British domination. The question of Egypt's sovereignty over Sudan, on which there had been no mention in the 1 936 treaty, became also a matter of discussion after the war. These two issues were seen by virtually every political circle in Egypt as matters of national pride, and instigated nationalistic resentment against Britain. Since the 1 936 treaty was not due for revision until 1 956 Britain was not obliged to enter into 57

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talks with the Egyptian government. Nevertheless, when the Egyptians formally requested a revision in 1 945 Bevin, with 'a combination of misguided confidence and false optimism' 109 thought that the basic elements of the old treaty could be maintained. Thus, he agreed to negotiate on the condition that the Suez base would continue to operate under joint Anglo-Egyptian supervision and that British troops would be able to re-occupy it in the event of a Soviet incursion into the Middle East. Discussions went through different stages but in 1 947 they reached a deadlock. The Egyptian political classes, inflamed by nationalistic feelings, which were aroused even further by the termination of French authority in Lebanon and Syria in 1 946, demanded immediate, unconditional withdrawal of the British troops and absolute sovereignty over the Sudan. no These cracks in Britain's armoury caused great apprehension in Turkish government circles. David Kelly, the British ambassador in Ankara, reported a conversation between President Inonii and the editor of Ulus - the paper of the ruling party - which took place on 23 February. During the conversation Inonii had expressed his deep concern over the fuel crisis in Great Britain and questioned whether the British would be able to fulfil their foreign policy commitments in the Middle East or whether they would have to withdraw altogether. m As far as Ankara was concerned there could be no doubt that a British withdrawal could only mean an unchecked expansion of the Soviets, much to the peril of Turkey. Little the Turkish President realised how accurate his concerns over Britain's weakness were, and that London had already stated its decision to cease assistance to Turkey. When in early March the news of this decision unofficially reached Ankara the Turkish government was quick in its reaction. What became the immediate objective was to make sure that the United States would include Turkey in its strategic calculations, as Britain had done. While asking London for confirmation of the rumours coming from Washington11 2 the Turks approached the Americans. On 4 March, Hasan Saka told Wilson that the Turkish government was seriously disturbed. Turkey in the past had looked to the United Kingdom for the supply of military equipment. If the British had asked the United States to assume all political commitments in the Middle East, then Turkey had to ask for American assistance. Saka was keen to make another thing clear. After the war, he said, Britain had been unwilling to provide Turkey with credits for military purposes, yet Turkey could not pay cash. Thus, he stressed the Turkish government would have to seek credits in the United States. 113 Saka's firm approach was dictated by Turkey's many considerations. Immediately after the war the Turkish government had sought not only 58

From One War to Another

American diplomatic support in relation to Stalin's demands, but also financial assistance. In the war years Turkey had multiplied its reserves of gold and foreign exchange due to a favourable trade balance. Nevertheless, the economy of the country had hardly grown and the need for new investment had become obvious. American assistance given to Turkey since the beginning of the war (this aid totalled 1 39 million dollars up to June 1 947) had been limited to military purposes only. 114 Postwar Europe was financially too weak to support Turkish plans for economic development. Consequently Turkey had to tum to the United States. As early as in April 1 945 the Turks approached the Americans with plans for increasing economic and commercial relations. In October 1 945, the Turkish government informed the State Department about its intentions to industrialise the country. 115 To accomplish this, Turkey fervently sought to secure a credit of 500 million dollars in the United States. The American response was that such an amount was out of the question as it was beyond all available resources.116 The Turkish government did not give up its efforts. In early 1 946, they expressed their wish to discuss the question of credit with Secretary of State James Bymes.117 Finally in the end of 1 946 they were granted a credit of 25 million dollars, which gave rise to disappointment as they found it to be an insufficient amount. As a result they carried on pressing for additional credits. Meanwhile there had been a growing realisation in Ankara of Turkey's strategic role for western security interests in the region. Turkish political circles had already begun to draw attention to the fact that it was also British and American security that Turkey was defending when resisting Soviet demands, and so it would be only fair for the cost of this defence to be shared. 118 The Turks knew that Britain's financial situation left no room for them to press on this. However, they certainly felt that with the United States it could be an entirely different case. In late 1 946 Ankara had already started to emphasise the burden of defence on the Turkish economy and tried to associate American economic aid with strategic purposes. Apart from a request for additional economic aid, the Turkish navy had asked for credits to recondition a battleship, and there had been indications that Ankara would request credits for modernising Turkey's military defences. As the Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Office stated to the American ambassador in December 1 946 'unless some real settlement can be made soon thereby relieving Turkey of Soviet pressure, Turkey will be obliged to appeal to US for economic aid as the country cannot continue to carry this burden alone indefinitely' . 119 Nonetheless, the Turkish government was particularly cautious not to give the impression - as in early 1 947 the Turkish Prime Minister Recep 59

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Peker stressed to Feridun Cemal Erkin, General Secretary of the Foreign Ministry - that their demands for assistance amounted to blackmail. 1 20 Nor was Ankara in a position to press too hard its demands for American assistance since after Moscow's note in September 1 946 Turkey had ceased to be the target of any Soviet actions which would justify American assistance. During his conversation with Wilson following the news of the end of British support, Saka could refer only vaguely to reports of 'impending international crisis' . When the American ambassador hedged Saka's demands by stating that the Soviet Union was in no position for a general war and that the situation in Greece, where a fully fledged civil war was taking place, was far more serious than in Turkey, Saka could not but agree with Wilson's arguments. 1 2 1 Turkey's efforts to secure American capital for its development after the war looked almost fruitless by the end of 1 946. Neither the Turkish government nor the American embassy could have even imagined the amount of aid the Truman administration would soon be prepared to allocate to Turkey.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND TURKEY

Reaction i n Washington following the British note announcing the cessation of aid to Greece and Turkey has been extensively written about. 1 22 On 1 2 March 1 94 7 Truman in his message (later to be referred to as the Truman Doctrine) to the United States Congress requested authorisation to extend military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey amounting to 400 million dollars for the period ending on 30 June 1 94 8 . 1 23 After authorisation was granted the administration earmarked 300 million dollars for Greece and 1 00 million dollars for Turkey. The Truman Doctrine was proclaimed without prior knowledge of Turkey's specific military requirements. It was the barrage of questions that the proclamation created which urged the Truman administration to ask London for the fullest information possible. The British, despite their wartime alliance with Turkey, were in no better position to know. To the American question 'does Turkey require tanks, aircraft, guns, highways, or what?' , the British military attache in Ankara could only reply: 'The answer to the question is, yes. She requires all those things and many more.' 124 At first sight the supply of aid not only to Greece, torn by civil war, but also to Turkey was surprising. Among the state officials who were working on the challenge posed by the British note 'it was taken for granted that Turkey as well as Greece would receive American help. Yet 60

From One War to Another

as Acheson worked on the draft legislation, he found it difficult to justify assistance to Turkey. Turkey did not need aid for relief or reconstruction, nor was it wrecked by financial or internal unrest. It was not under any real pressure from the Kremlin. Nevertheless, US officials decided that Turkey must receive assistance. ' 1 25 Since August 1 946 the Truman administration had come to share the British view of Turkey's strategic importance in restraining Soviet expansion southwards. The State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) believed that Turkey was ' the most important military factor in defending the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. By its geographical position, Turkey [constituted] the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. ' 1 26 Though the United States' policy towards the Middle East was not formally expressed before November 1 947 American interests in the region were clear. 'The focal point of those interests was the Middle East's 1 5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, 24 per cent of which were controlled by the United States. ' 127 Forrestal, the Secretary of Navy, was expressing the view of American political and business circles when he was writing in May 1 947 that 'Middle East oil was going to be necessary for this country not merely in wartime but in peacetime, because if we are going to make the contribution that it seems we have to make to the rest of the world in manufactured goods, we shall probably need very greatly increased supplies of fuel. ' 1 28 In Washington's eyes a Russian presence in the eastern Mediterranean meant that Moscow would have the ability to cut the flow of oil to the west and, thus, not only to depress the American economy but also to put a severe strain on Europe's postwar recovery. Then it would be only a question of time before Europe collapsed and went communist. 1 29 Turkey's military role was primarily viewed in terms of blocking a Soviet advance to the south, as a beginning. Postwar American security also necessitated an extensive system of overseas bases which went hand-in-hand with securing military air transit and landing rights. IJo In late January 1 947 the Joint War Plans Committee had requested an analysis of potential capacities of areas in Turkey for B -29 and fighter airfields. In mid-February the Joint Logistics Plans Committee concluded that a total number of 1 8 B-29 and of 90 fighter airfields could be located in the areas of Izmir, Ankara-Kayseri and Adana-Iskenderun, though no study was given to as to how much effort was required to build lines of communications for these airfield sites which were often inaccessible from existing roads or railways.IJ1 It was on the back of such considerations that the decision to extend assistance to Turkey was taken. The aim of the Truman Doctrine was to turn 61

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Turkey into a reliable, strong ally by eradicating Turkey's fears of isolation which could play right into Moscow's hands and by building up its military strength. In the words of a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of March 1 947 to the Secretaries of War and Navy, the objectives of any assistance to the Turks were: a. Primarily to stiffen the Turkish will and ability to resist, to the end that the Turks continue a ftrm national posture against Soviet pressure. b. Secondarily, to improve the Turkish military potential so that in the unlikely event of war, either in the form of an attack on Turkey by the Soviets, or development of hostilities in other areas the Turks will resist with force any Russian aggression and will have the maximum possible military capability to undertake a holding and delaying action in their own country. 132 By late 1 947 the Americans were coming close to fully endorsing British strategic thinking in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, but there was a difference of degree of commitment to the region. At the American-British Pentagon Talks ( 1 6 October-7 November 1 94 7) strategic, economic and political problems in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean were reviewed, with the aim of ironing out differences and developing a common policy towards the region. During the talks the British stressed that the security of the Middle East was vital to the security of the United Kingdom, and the same considerations applied to the countries of the eastern Mediterranean, since they formed with the Middle East a strategic whole. Their conviction was that the whole of the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean would be in 'mortal danger' should any hostile power succeed in obtaining control of Turkey, Greece, Persia (or Italy). Thus they concluded that, if any external threat developed to the security of the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean, Britain must be prepared to make use of its full political, economic and, if necessary, military strength. On 24 November Truman approved a State Department policy paper which endorsed the same general principles that Britain's policy in the Middle East was based upon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had not been consulted prior to the drafting of the paper by the State Department, also adopted the policy statement, though with some reservation. They agreed that the security of the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean was important to the United States, but they viewed it as critical rather than vital. They also cautioned about the consequences of military commitments to the region. Given an extended American military position they thought that 62

From One War to Another

any additional deployment would automatically raise the question of the advisability of partial mobilisation. 133 Indeed the Joint Chiefs of Staff were hoping to tap the man-source of a country like Turkey. The Turks were expected to supplement American military forces, which were inadequate for a major war. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed in April 1 947, in case of war the United States 'must have the support of some of the countries of the old world unless our military strength is to be overshadowed by that of our enemies' . 134 Until 1 950 demobilisation and cutting down on military expenses was the prevailing mode in Washington. As has been noted, 'the United States continued to maintain the largest navy and air force in the world and to retain a monopoly on the atomic bomb. But after one takes into account the US commitments in occupied territories, this country lacked the ground forces required to intervene in anything greater than a minor conflict, such as the territorial dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia over Venezia Giulia. ' 135 Such considerations would have an important role to play in Washington's relations with Ankara in the following years. The Truman Doctrine secured a smooth succession of power in the eastern Mediterranean and promised to retain the regional status quo after Britain's logistic - though not psychological - abdication from the area. The Soviet Union remained officially silent over the granting of American aid to Turkey whereas the Soviet press chose to attack the United States for imperialistic policies in Greece and Turkey. 136 As a result of Washington's positive response Turkey's security concerns were met. The Truman Doctrine did not simply mean more arms for the Turks to stand up to the Soviets. It also manifested that despite the waning of Britain's - Turkey's ally - regional influence, and the shifting of power in the west from Europe to the American continent, Turkey was not left out of the western sphere of interest to face international isolation and an exposed position in relation to any future Soviet demands. As Necmettin Sadak, who was going to be appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs later in 1 94 7, would put it: 'the Truman Doctrine was a great comfort to the Turkish people, for it made them feel that they were no longer isolated' . 137 The Truman Doctrine assigned to Turkey the role of warrior against the Soviet Union. By one of history's ironies it was the most 'evasive neutral' of the war which was among the first to assume such a role in the Cold War. The fact that American support and Turkey's new role became so closely interlinked meant that Ankara could not question the latter without jeopardising the former. However, this by no means implies that Ankara was pushed by the sudden outpouring of American aid to assume Cold War responsibilities against its own wishes. On the contrary, Turkey had been feeling for some time 63

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that it was de facto already checking Soviet expansion and indeed had been asking for aid as a recognition of its role. The allocation of millions of dollars in 1 947 granted this recognition in a most resonant way. There existed in Turkey those who thought that Ankara ought to seek good relations with the Soviets, and that American aid, by provoking Moscow, rendered Turkish frontiers less safe. Nevertheless, these views were not widespread and were aired only in private. As two Izmir newspaper editors told the British consul there, they would be called traitors were they to publish articles favouring co-operation with the Soviet Union.138 Unfortunately there is no accessible information to indicate whether such views were at all a matter of debate among Turkish government circles. In any event, it was the endorsement of the Truman Doctrine with the responsibilities and implications inherent in it which carried the day in Ankara. Nonetheless, the Turkish government felt uneasy about the conditions on which American aid was to be provided. American demands to have free access to supervision of the use of the aid and to report freely on it touched a Turkish nerve. 139 David Kelly reported from Ankara that all leading Turks were privately worried about the implications of American supervision. While they only 'hinted' this to him they were very open with the Times correspondent, to whom they said that they were afraid of 'revival of Capitulations' and of 'Egyptianisation' . 140 The distrust of the Turks was amply demonstrated by their unwillingness to provide any information regarding their strategic plans which would help the American administration know the exact extent of Turkish military needs. Indeed Ankara did not hesitate to make clear that the American bill as drafted contained the right of control to be exercised in Turkey and, if this was implemented, they could not accept any aid. 141 To support its stand the Turkish government resorted to the argument that Russian propaganda foreshadowing Turkey's American 'control' made it even more imperative for Turkey to avoid giving further ground for attacks. 142 Though this may have also been a real concern for the Turks it is more likely that they thought it an effective argument to bring the Americans round to the Turkish point of view. However, Ankara fmally gave in. A qualification asserted in the final agreement signed on 12 July 1 947, was more of a face-saver than of any real value. This read that free access to information and freedom to report it in the press was to be allowed only as far as was consistent with the security of the two countries. 143 American aid to Turkey was to be decided on an annual basis. Of the 1 00 million dollars that Turkey was to be given for the 1948 fiscal year 48.5 per cent would be allocated to the army, 26.75 per cent to the air force, 1 4.75 per cent to the navy. The remaining 10 per cent would be spent on 64

From One War to Another

highway and arsenal improvement. An American military rmsston responsible for the modernisation of the Turkish armed forces was sent to Turkey under the supervision of the American ambassador. 144 Turkey' s final acceptance of American conditions was a major departure from Turkey's conduct of foreign policy since the 1 920s. Before the war, Turkish political leaders had been particularly sensitive towards any action which could be seen as foreign interference in their domestic affairs. 145 In the late 1 940s they were ready to change a long-held attitude due to a most tempting package of military and financial aid, but primarily as a result of the eagerness of Inonii and his government to tie Turkey to the American sphere of interest in the face of the country's precarious position in relation to the Soviet Union. The fact that by that time the Kemalist regime and the identity of the new state was more or less consolidated certainly also enabled Ankara to be more self-confident when dealing with dilemmas of this sort.

A N G L O - T U R K I S H R E L A T I O N S I N 19 4 7

The Truman Doctrine marked 'the end of both British and American illusions that Middle East defence was a matter that could be left to Britain' ,146 though it would take some time before reality fully sank in both in London and in Washington. For Ankara, however, Turkey's alliance with the United Kingdom continued to have its value. American aid was one thing, but a formal commitment of assistance in the event of an attack was another. Nor could American aid be counted upon as a permanent factor. At the United Nations Security Council the Americans had insisted that Truman's decision was a response to the emergency in Greece, and expressed their hope that the United Nations would take over responsibilities of this kind wherever they occurred. 147 Less than two weeks after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the Turkish government again showed their concern for the validity of their alliance with Britain. 148 In June 1 947 the Turkish ambassador in London, in an address at Chatham House, praised the alliance and said that 'never in history have the interests of both our countries been so close' . 149 The Turkish military also expressed their wish for an official visit to Britain, after having already been invited to the United States. 150 London was eager to respond to the request of the Turks for an official visit to Britain. Such was the importance that the Foreign Office attached to the reception of the Turkish delegation that even an audience with the King was arranged for them in November 1 947 . 151 Although Britain had given up financial responsibility for Turkey, both the Foreign Office and the 65

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Chiefs of Staff were determined not to allow British influence there to decline. Just a week after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine the Admiralty had been of the opinion that an official visit to Istanbul by the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean in his flagship was 'highly desirable' . In view of the spectacular involvement of the United States in Turkey it was 'essential . . . that the Turks should not be allowed to forget the meaning of British seapower' . 152 In essence, no one in London had expected 'the burden which was so quietly dropped to be picked up quite so resoundingly' by the United States. 153 It was on the basis of such considerations that the British thought it important to increase the number of their military advisers in Turkey. The Turkish government had asked in 1 946 for an increase in the British service representation with a view to getting advice on the organisation of Turkey's armed forces. Ankara, of course, expected Britain to meet their full cost. In the light of the Anglo-Turkish alliance the Turks also thought that the British should meet the cost of their military advisers already in Turkey. Kelly had expressed the view that in the light of British strategic interest in Turkey - and since the amount required was only 1 1 8,000 pounds (according to the Foreign Office it was 1 70,000 pounds) - the British government should meet Ankara's request. Pending Washington's answer on providing Turkey with military aid, the British Chiefs of Staff decided in February 1 947 to answer unfavourably the Turkish request for more instructors. The Treasury, for its part, did not support Kelly's suggestion that London should pay the cost of the instructors already in Turkey. It argued and the Foreign Office concurred that they should first ask the Turks to pay the cost of the advisers in Turkey and see what Ankara said. Then the whole question could be reconsidered also in the light of the expected American response. 154 In April, however, after the Americans had announced their decision to supply aid to Turkey, the Admiralty recommended to the Treasury that any possible endeavour should be made to meet Turkish requirements for more instructors and the Chiefs of Staff suggested that London should share with Ankara the cost of the instructors in Turkey. In late June the Ministry of Defence urged that additional advisers should immediately be sent to Ankara. At this stage the Foreign Office still insisted that Britain should pay part of the cost of the British military representatives in Turkey only after the Turks had been asked to meet the whole cost. However, Ankara was to surprise London. In September 1 947 the Turkish government informed Kelly of its decision to modify the list it had submitted in 1 946 for additional British officers and moreover, to cut down by 50 per cent the number of the British advisers already in Turkey. 155 The decision embittered 66

From One War to Another

London. 156 The Turks justified their attitude on the grounds of their financial circumstances, yet this volte-face was a sure sign that in the light of the emerging Turkish-American relationship Britain's influence in Turkey was crumbling, despite the importance Ankara still attached to its alliance with London. The Truman Doctrine was doing more than just establishing American presence in the eastern Mediterranean. The massive amount of American aid readily available was rendering old points of logistic reference redundant. Whatever Britain could still offer might have been good enough for Turkey in the pre-Truman doctrine era; now it was too little, too late. Nonetheless, surprising as it may seem, the British tended to believe that the obvious signs of their decline had not had a great effect on Turkey. In the beginning of 1 948 Kelly remarked: we must counteract the effects of our inability to supply the deficiencies in equipment of the Turkish armed forces; of our decision that the Turkish Government must take over the whole cost of maintaining the British service instructors; of the effect on a military-minded and still oriental people of our physical withdrawal from India, Burma, Palestine and Egypt; of the reduction in our armed forces and particularly the misleading first accounts on the reduction in the Navy. Yet, he concluded, 'we have been fortunate in neutralising the effect of these disadvantages ' . Kelly contended that confidence in the recovery of British strength had been maintained in Turkish political and military circles. He stressed that President Inonti, in his review of foreign affairs at the opening of the Assembly on 1 November 1 947, had given priority to Turkey's relations with Great Britain. 157 Kelly appeared oblivious to the fact that given Turkey's formal alliance only with the British this was hardly surprising. Indeed, Ankara was paying tribute to its alliance with Britain, but was hoping for a defence arrangement in the Mediterranean which would permanently involve the United States. F I R S T T U R KI S H S UG G E S T I O N S F O R A M E D I T ERRANEAN

PACT

In early March 1 947, Numan Menemencioglu, now Ambassador in Paris, suggested to Duff Cooper, his British counterpart, a pact between Turkey, Greece and Egypt (Turkey's proposal to include Egypt in such a pact presaged British plans for a Middle East command in 1 95 1 ). Menemencioglu saw the pact as a means to guarantee peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. In his mind it should be accompanied by a 67

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/945-/952

similar pact between France, Spain and Italy to produce the same result in western Europe. The proposal was made at around the time of the Treaty of Dunkirk (4 March 1 947), the British-French agreement for an alliance to address a possible re-awakening of German aggression.'58 Ankara was and would continue to be very sensitive towards international developments. This early attempt by Britain and France to deal with the issue of postwar defence must have encouraged the Turkish government to raise the question of postwar European security in the light of the emergence of a victorious Soviet Union. Menemencioglu's proposal was clearly an attempt to address the need for a security system in the Mediterranean which could check Soviet expansionist desires southwards. In his conversation with Cooper, Menemencioglu stressed that trying to play the role of mediator holding the balance between the east and west was always a fatal policy in the long run. Avoiding any reference to the Turkish attitude and neutrality during the last war, he limited himself to saying that such a policy had produced the ruin of the Ottoman Empire.159 Menemencioglu' s comments on the perils of non-aligned foreign policy were particularly interesting as he was the man who during the war years 'saw nothing inherently wrong in a policy that maintained an alliance with Great Britain and a friendship pact with Nazi Germany' . 160 However, the fact that Ankara appeared ready not to repeat its wartime course in its relations with the powers was not surprising. Turkish political leaders may have changed strategies according to circumstances, but only so as to serve their foreign policy and security aims which fundamentally remained the same. For most of the interwar period Ankara had consistently sought a close relationship with Britain as a means of strengthening Turkish security in relation to Moscow and Rome. Turkey's balancing act at the beginning of the Second World War was again to a large extent the result of its vulnerability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the war the same vulnerability dictated that Ankara had to stick with the western powers. Against the emerging Cold War security environment and Moscow's recent demands, Ankara was convinced that it could not achieve the maximum of security by seeking to balance its position between the Soviet Union and the west, as it had done for most of the interwar years, or between the Allies and Germany during the war. Nor could it feel reassured vis-a-vis Moscow as long as its security ties with the west were not underwritten by a formal alliance. Turkey's neutrality during the war had not been a declaration of principle, but a decision based on realpolitik. After the war Turkish political leaders continued to show the same pragmatism which had characterised their foreign policy for the past 24 years. 68

From One War to Another

In August, Turkish thinking further evolved regarding a Med­ iterranean pact. This should include the Mediterranean powers, Britain and also the United States. The Truman Doctrine, along with develop­ ments in the Balkans, had given Ankara a new impetus to pursue the idea. Tito had made statements in July about a future unification between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. On 2 August 1 947, an agreement signed between the two countries in Bled envisaging a customs union appeared to be the first step towards a large South Slavic state. 161 Were this to be realised communist pressure on Turkey would be likely to grow. Less than a week after the Bled agreement, Feridun Cemal Erkin, now ambassador in Rome, sounded out his British colleague about the idea of a Mediterranean pact, and at about the same time Menemencioglu mentioned the subject at a press conference in Athens. The idea had already been discussed between the Greek and Turkish governments. Constantine Tsaldaris, the Greek Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, had already raised the issue with the Foreign Office. London, however, did not respond. 162 At the time the idea was not discussed further. The significance of this early Turkish proposal lies in the fact that, it came ten months before Bevin's pronouncement in January 1 948 of his plans for a western defence arrangement. 163 The Turkish proposal of a western security system consisting of parallel pacts with the participation of the United States showed that Ankara was doing some serious thinking about the question of the organisation of postwar security in Europe. Interestingly, in 1 947 this thinking was developing along similar lines to that of the British Foreign Secretary.

TURKEY ' S REQUEST FOR AMERICAN AID, AND THE MARS HALL PLAN

The willingness of the Truman administration to provide money for building up Turkish military forces encouraged Ankara's tendency to rely on American capital. Initially the assistance under the Truman Doctrine had been seen by the Turks more as of a strategic nature. However, gradually an attitude 'in favour of a translation of a longer part of the aid from purely military into economic terms' was developed.164 Turkey also hoped to attract American private investors. Necmettin Sadak was alleged to have said in May 1 947, not long before he replaced Saka as Minister of Foreign Affairs, that private American capital was expected 'to play a leading role in the creation of new industries in Turkey' . 165 However, American private capital was slow to arrive. In the 69

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1945-1952

summer of 1 947 the American Twentieth Century Fund conducted a private inquiry into Turkey's resources and potentialities. The results cut short Turkish ruling circles' expectations regarding private American investment in Turkey. Max Weston Thornburg, who conducted the survey, stated to the Turkish press before his departure from Turkey that the country for 'the shortages to be made good from abroad will need business and organisational experience, engineering and other technical services and only then foreign capital' . 166 Hence, Ankara realised that it had to rely on the United States government to finance Turkey's development projects. In September 1 947, Turkey presented the American government with a request for an additional sum of 1 00 million dollars aid. Sadak, as the new Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, referred to the budgetary crisis, which he argued was caused by military expenditure, to support his request. He admitted, however, that part of the amount requested might go to non-military purposes. 167 The Americans could not see much point in the Turkish demands. 168 The country did not appear to be in a financial crisis and it was only recently that the Turkish government had decided to reduce the armed forces from 485,000 men to about 330,000, as a first step towards their rationalisation and modernisation, after constant British suggestions and with the concurrence of the Americans. 169 The Turks were disappointed with the American response and repeated their effort by preparing a detailed report of their military needs. 170 At the same time, Ankara sought to benefit from the Marshall Plan. Turkey was granted only a minor role in the initial phase. It was considered to be one of those countries which should receive priority considerations for purchases, but was not in line for receiving gifts since its economy was far from collapse. During the war years Turkey had accumulated over 260 million dollars in gold and dollar reserves as a result of trade surplus. 171 Indeed, when submitting the 1 947 budget to the National Assembly the Turkish Minister of Finance had stated that Turkey had a favourable trade balance and was doing well regarding its internal and external obligations. As he said, the sole aim of asking for credits was to revitalise the economy. 172 Nevertheless, the news of Turkey's exclusion from the Marshall Aid scheme created a violent reaction in Turkey. The American ambassador reported that the Turks insisted on their weak foreign exchange position and were more upset than he had ever known them since the talks about the Straits. 173 The background to this was that the Turkish government had rashly gambled on the cancellation of the convertibility of sterling by depleting their gold reserves and increasing their note issue to what they now considered a danger point. 174 To support its demand to be included in the 70

From One War to Another

European Economic Recovery Programme Ankara once again resorted to the argument that defence expenditure put a lot of pressure on the Turkish economy. In early January 1 948 President Inonfi reminded the American ambassador of the fact that the Turkish people were conscious of having been under Soviet guns since spring 1 945 , and had in effect been holding the fort for western democracies at a heavy cost to the Turkish economy. Therefore, he said, if the Turkish people were to understand that Turkey was not to be assisted by credits, but must use its extremely limited, and fast dwindling gold and foreign exchange assets for this purpose, there would be deep misunderstanding and disappointment throughout Turkey, causing the feeling that the Turks had been let down. 175 The British were particularly unsympathetic to Turkish grievances. The following comment by a Foreign Office official expressed well the prevailing feeling in the Labour administration at the time: 'I am not inclined to be too sympathetic to the Turkish laments. They are fundamentally in a sounder position than almost any other of the participating countries and will be one of the only countries at the end of the EER [European Economic Recovery] (with Sweden and Switzerland) which will be in dollar balance on present American estimates. ' 176 The soundness of this argument was accompanied with worries about Britain' s own share of American aid; the more participating countries the smaller the piece of the pie for everybody. 177 The idea of the Turks becoming eventually responsible for Britain's getting less aid was even more upsetting to many in London on the grounds that they did not consider Turkey qualified to participate in a programme the aim of which was the economic reconstruction of European states. In September 1 948 (after Turkey had been admitted to the EER), a Labour Party pamphlet on the Western Union178 expressed this feeling, stating that Turkey did not share the cultural heritage on which western civilisation was based and hence it hardly qualified to be a member of the EER and should have been treated differently. 179 American thinking regarding Turkey, however, was evolving along a different path. By the beginning of 1 948 the State Department, further developing the reasoning of the Truman Doctrine, had started to consider the question of additional aid to Turkey. 180 Nevertheless, the Truman administration was hoping that it could lessen the military aspect of the aid given to Turkey under the Truman Doctrine by incorporating it with the wider European economic effort. The essentially military character of the Truman plan had been largely seen as negative and was unpopular in the United States. With the Agreement of 4 July 1 948, the conditions for Turkish participation in the Marshall 71

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1945-1952

Plan were formally agreed. The programme for aid to Turkey became a part of the larger United States programme of collective security and, as Charles Kindleberger put it, by consolidating military aid to Turkey into the European Recovery Programme Washington achieved a clear domestic political gain. 181 Of course, the stated objective of the United States in furnishing Turkey with Marshall Aid was . devoid of any military aspect; the aid was devoted to agriculture, coal-mining and communications. 182 An Economic Co-operation Special Mission arrived in Turkey in 1 948, to supervise the progress of the economic assistance programme. Between April 1 948 and the end of its financial year in June 1 950, Turkey received 1 08 million dollars in direct aid and the equivalent of 75 million dollars in indirect aid from the European Recovery Programme. The flow of American capital to Turkey, between March 1 947 and July 1 948, created a new factor in Turkey's foreign policy. In the 1 930s Turkey's growing economic relations with Britain had been primarily due to security considerations. Good and close relations with the west were also expected to bring about the economic development of the country, but through trade and loans. Mter the war, however, the economic development of the country became a political and strategic argument which Turkey presented to the United States. From a Turkish point of view, American interest in Turkey became essential not only in relation to the security of the country against the Russians, but also for Turkey ' s economic prosperity. Ankara' s demands for American financial assistance constantly grew. The Turkish government was never satisfied with the amount of money which it was given through the European Recovery Programme . 'It was asserted that in dealing with the United States Congress and people it was necessary to observe the Turkish proverb "the child that does not cry is not given the breast" . ' 183 'Why do you not give us as much aid as you give to Greece, especially since we are so much more able to turn it to advantage?' was the constant Turkish question to the Americans at the time.184 These relentless demands became a cause of mild irritation to the Americans. This was clearly expressed by Kenneth Royal, the American Secretary of the Army, during a conversation with Inonii. The Turkish President speaking in French with the American ambassador, who was also present, said that it was 'unjust' to his country for the United States to extend less help to the Turks than to the countries of western Europe. Royal's response was that 'there could be no question of "justice" not without an obligation, and stated frankly that America had no obligation to Turkey ' . The United States, he added, had to decide the apportionment of aid on the basis of the past, the present and the future. 72

From One War to Another

'First America had to remember and provide for its allies of World War Two. Secondly we must evaluate present conditions from the standpoint of world peace and finally, to look ahead to future possibilities in the event of war. ' Inonti could not but agree, but he did not hold back from urging that 'from a more practical viewpoint Turkey offered a high return of mutual security for a minimum investment' . 185 The growing demands of the Turkish government from 1 946 onwards to secure American financial aid should also be seen in the broader context of domestic political developments in the country since 1 945. The era of the single-party political system in Turkey finished with the war. The single-party system in Turkey came to an end as a result of internal socio-economic factors, but also due to the impact that international events had on Turkish political life. Divisions inside the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) among conservatives who opposed change and liberals who favoured democratisation and liberalisation of the regime in tune with the new times came to a head soon after the war was over. 186 The defeat of the dictatorial regimes in Germany and Italy and Turkey's adherence to the United Nations Charter are seen by students of Turkish political history as bearing a direct influence on the liberalisation of the regime soon to follow. 187 To what extent Ankara' s foreign policy considerations, its need for American diplomatic support and credit played a role to the transition of the country to a multi-party system remains an open question. In 1 954 in an interview with Dankwart A. Rustow, lnonti initially denied that his decision for the establishment of a multi-party system had been influenced by foreign policy considerations, but 'then he visibly relaxed, and with a shrewd smile added: "And suppose I had been swimming with the stream, that, too, is a virtue". ' 188 The first signs towards the liberalisation of the regime were shown in the Istanbul by-elections of June 1 945 in which the candidates were freely nominated, though they still belonged to a single party, the RPP. In July of the same year the government allowed the first opposition party, the National Resurgence Party, to be established. In late 1 945 a liberal group of the RPP led by four parliamentary delegates, Celal Bayar (former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance), Fuad Koprulu, Adnan Menderes and Refik Koraltan, left the party. On 7 January 1 946 they announced the establishment of the Democrat Party, which soon became the major opposition party. In the general elections of July 1 946, the first in which other parties were allowed to compete, the Democrat Party gained only 64 seats compared with 395 won by the RPP. This was hardly surprising as the government controlled the election machinery and ballot counting. Nonetheless, the Democratic Party led a vigorous political campaign 73

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

against the RPP government. Inonii's support for liberalisation of the regime - regardless of the damage that this may cause to his party - led after the end of 1 947 to relaxation of restrictions on the freedom of the press which resulted in heated public discussions of the RPP's policies. 'The principal issue of the day was the Government's economic policy . . . [The economy] was marked by spiralling inflation and shortages in the urban areas, and controlled prices for a percentage of the produce of the countryside. ' 189 In December 1 946 the Turkish government informed the American ambassador that widespread discontent over the economy created political difficulties for them. 190 Against this background, American aid was increasingly seen by the Turkish government in the context of domestic politics. After Ankara had been notified that ten million dollars were to be allocated to Turkey for 1 948 under the European Recovery Programme Wilson reported that 'it is entirely possible that the Turkish government will consider its position stronger domestically if it declines the Recovery Programme credits than if it accepts an amount judged unsatisfactory in the light of Turkey's international position and needs' . 191 Indeed, soon afterwards Sadak: informed Wilson of the Turkish cabinet's decision not to accept the offered amount of credit. As Sadak: eloquently put it, were Turkey to accept the ten million dollar credit entirely apart from his personal position, which would be most difficult, the government itself would be in an impossible situation before the National Assembly and would be subject to most serious attacks from opposition and press. After the American ambassador had urged Sadak: that Turkey should reconsider the matter and negotiate an agreement, the Turkish government decided not to decline the offer, but it was clear that they had no intention of using the proposed credit until the amount was increased.192 As a result of the liberalisation of the political regime in Turkey foreign policy had become, for the first time, an issue of domestic political debate. This did not mean that the principles of this policy, as they had been laid down by Atatiirk and developed as a result of international events, were challenged. All parties agreed on a pro-western foreign policy.193 What was challenged was the Republican People's Party performance in the field of foreign affairs. This point should be kept in mind when looking at the way the Democrat Party later pursued Turkey's membership of NATO.

74

From One War to Another CONCLUSION

Despite its alliance with Britain and France, Turkey maintained strict neutrality during the war. Ankara saw no reason to enter the conflict as long as Turkish security was not immediately threatened. By the end of the war the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power with pressing demands against Turkey compelled Ankara to seek a re­ affirmation of its alliance with Britain, which had been damaged by Turkey's refusal to fulfil its treaty commitments. Britain was still the only western power strategically involved in the eastern Mediterranean, and consequently Ankara's natural ally against Soviet southward expansionist designs. However, the manifest waning of British power made it clear that Turkey could not rely exclusively on Britain for its security. The shift of economic and political power from western Europe to the other side of the Atlantic made it imperative for Ankara to secure American interest and support so as to satisfy Turkey's quest for security, economic development - which only American credits could make possible - and inclusion in the western community of nations. Washington's decision to resist any Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean by building up Turkey's military strength, following Britain's military withdrawal from the region, to a large extent served Turkish security interests. Nevertheless, Ankara was aware that despite the Truman Doctrine the United States had not assumed Britain's commitment to militarily assist Turkey in the event of an attack. Therefore, Turkish political leaders had to continue to rely on their prewar alliance with the British while at the same time they were working on the idea of a regional arrangement which would formally engage the Americans in the defence of the eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile Ankara was quick to capitalise on the important international role which the Truman Doctrine had so resoundingly assigned to Turkey. The objective was not only to strengthen its position in relation to Moscow as much as possible, but also to receive as much American economic aid as possible. As a contemporary observer remarked, 'the Turkish diplomat resembles a sort of super real-estate salesman; he bids up the price of his 900 x 300 mile rectangle of territory without of course delivering it. Therefore Turkish leaders embrace the "Truman Doctrine" not only because it satisfies their anti-Russian feeling but also because it has enabled them to exploit their geographical position more profitably than ever before. ' 194 The large amount of military and (through the Marshall Plan) economic aid which was poured into the country had no precedent in Turkish history. During the interwar period Ankara had relied on Britain to strengthen Turkish 75

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

security, but not to promote Turkish economic development. In the postwar period Turkey looked to the United States as a provider in both contexts. Indeed in this, Turkish political leaders did . not essentially differ from their western European colleagues. The Truman Doctrine brought Turkey formally into the anti-Soviet camp. Ankara's new role as a Cold War warrior might appear at first sight to represent a major shift in Turkish foreign policy when compared with Turkey's balanced relations between the Soviet Union and the west in the interwar period, or with its war neutrality. In reality Turkish foreign policy remained very consistent in what had always been a pragmatic orientation. The Turkish-Soviet friendship of the 1 920s and 1 930s was the outcome of particular circumstances, the brevity of which Ankara was well aware of. The pragmatic Turkish leaders never concealed their distrust of Moscow and their preference, should the question arise, to side with the powers which were interested in guaranteeing the regional status quo and represented the western world into which Turkey wished to be integrated. Ankara's war neutrality was not a statement of political principle, but rather a cynical and realistic response to circumstances. Indeed, it had been dictated, among other considerations, by the very vulnerability the country felt towards the Soviet Union. Ferenc A. Vali, commenting on Turkish diplomacy during the Second World War writes that it was 'characterised by singleness of purpose, cold calculation, and farsightedness' . 195 The same character­ istics can be applied to Turkish foreign policy decisions for the period preceding and following the war.

NOTES 1.

Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

Interview with Inonii, 2 1 Sept. 1 966, quoted in Weisband, E.,

University Press, 1973), p. 36. For a discussion of Inonii' s personal handling of foreign

Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 33-46; Koc;ak, C., Tii rkiye 'de Milli Sef Donemi, (1938-1945) (Ankara: Yurt Yaymevi, 1986), pp. 392-5. In

affairs during the war see Weisband,

the words of Zeki Kuneralp (private Secretary to the General Secretary of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs) 'the best description of Turkish diplomacy during the war was the phrase "May God protect me from my friends so that I come around my enemies" ' , Kuneralp, Z.

(ed.), lkinci Diinya Harbinde Tiirk Dz$ Siyaseti (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaas1,

1982), p. 9 1 . 2.

Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 129-66; Baker Fox, A., The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); Ataov, T., Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945 (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Bas1mevi, 1 965); Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy; Weber, F. G., The Evasive Neutral (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979); Koc;ak, Tiirkiye 'de Milli Sef Donemi, pp. 84-324; Deringil, S . , Turkish Foreign Policy; Bilge, Giir;: Komsuluk, pp. 144-258. See also, Kuneralp, lkinci Diinya, There are many studies of Turkish foreign policy during the war; Vere-Hodge,

pp. 147-200.

76

From One War to Another 3.

For an account of the Anglo-Turkish relations during the war see Robertson, J., 'Anglo-Turkish Relations 194 1-45 ' (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London, 1 982).

Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 1 34.

4.

Quoted in Vere-Hodge,

5.

Turkey' s territorial demands over the islands were constantly raised during Ankara' s negotiations with London and Berlin throughout the war, see Weber,

The Evasive Neutral,

passim. 6. State Papers, Vol . 1 44, pp. 8 1 6-17. 7 . Quoted i n Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 1 36. 8 . Deringi1, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 1 6 5 . 9. Macfie, A. L., 'The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45 ' ,

Middle Eastern

Studies, 25, 2 ( 1 989). 10.

Robertson, 'Anglo-Turkish Relations ' , pp. 1 90-23 1 .

1 1 . Anthony Eden, the British Foreign

Secretary, had given a similar warning to

Menemencioglu in November 1 943; Deringil, 12.

Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 1 54, 165.

Sir M. Peterson (British ambassador in Ankara) to FO, 27 Feb. 1 945, F0371148342 R40341 1 8 8 ; Peterson to FO, 1 3 May 1945, F037 1/48342 R83 1 7/ 1 8 8 ; Peterson to FO, 15 May 1 945, F037 1148342 R844 1 / 1 8 8 ; Erkin, F. C.,

Dz$i$lerinde 34 Yzl: Amlar-Yorumlar,

Vol. I (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurum Bas1mevi, 1 980), pp. 226-32. 1 3 . F O t o WO, 6 March 1 945, F0371148342 R4034. 14.

1 5 Aug. 1 945, F037 1148342 R 1 67 1 5.

15.

CAB 1 29(45 ) 1 82, 1 9 Sept. 1 945; CAB 1 29(45)25 1 , 26 Oct. 1 945; Record of Conversation

DBPO, 1 945, Series I, Vol.II, p. 454. Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 5 3 . Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, p p . 1 30-1 ; Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 1 3 3-5 ; Fox, The Power of the Small States, p. 1 82. Quoted i n Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 44. 28 June 1 944, FRUS, Vol. V, p p . 863-4. For Turkish-Soviet relations during the war see, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-I946: The Middle East in the War, pp. 443-66; Bilge, Giir Komsuluk, pp. 1 44--2 58. For an overall account of the Soviet-Turkish crisis in 1 945-1 946 see Kirk, G., The Middle East 1945-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1 954), pp. 2 1-37; Erkin, F. C., Les Relations Turco-Sovietiques et Ia Question des Detroits (Ankara: Imprimerie Turquie, 1 968), passim; Kuniholm, B. R., The Origins of the Cold War, in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1 980), passim; Va!i, F. A., The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1 972); Bilge, Giir Komsuluk, pp. 293-33 1 ; Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 304--9 ; Robertson, 'Anglo-Turkish between Bevin and Molotov, 1 Oct. 1 945,

16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

Quoted i n Deringil,

Relations ' , pp. 245--60. 2 1 . 2 2 Oct. 1 944,

FRUS, 'The Conferences at Malta and Yalta' , p . 328; 10 Feb. 1 945, FRUS,

'The Conferences at Malta and Yalta' , pp. 903-5, p. 982. 22.

Nazi-Soviet Relations, I939-41: From the Archives of the German Foreign Office

23.

Ulam, A. B.,

(Washington, DC: Department of State, 1948), pp. 258-9.

Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 191 7-1973 (New York:

Rinehart & Winston, 1 968), p. 429. 24.

Resis, A. (ed. ),

Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993),

p. 73.

27.

Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 33-40. The Division of the World, 194I-1955 (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 50. Dixon, P., The Life of Sir Piers Dixon, Don and Diplomat (London: Hutchinson & Co,

28.

Ulam, A. B . ,

29.

Khrushchev, N.,

25.

Ulam,

26.

Loth, W.,

1 968), p. 193.

Stalin, the Man and His Era (London: Allen Lane, 1974), p. 567. Khrushchev Remembers, Vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977),

pp. 347-8. 30.

Kuniholm,

Origins of the Cold War, p. 270. The Collapse of the Grand Alliance 1945-I948 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana

3 1 . Gormly, J . L.,

77

Anglo-American Security Interests,

1945-1952

State University Press, 1 987), p. 77. 32.

FRUS, Vol. Vill, pp. 1229-30. On the evolution of American policy and vis-a-vis Turkey in the 1 945-1 947 period see: Knight, J., 'American Statecraft and the 1 946 Black Sea Straits Controversy ' , Political Science Quarterly, 90, 3 ( 1 975); 31 March 1 945,

diplomacy

Knight, J., 'America' s International Guarantees for the Straits: Prelude to the Truman

Middle Eastern Studies, l 3 , 2 ( 1 977); Alvarez, D., Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey 1943-1946 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan

Doctrine' ,

Studies, 1 980); Leffler, M. P., 'Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1 945-1952 ' ,

Journal ofAmerican History, 7 1 , 4 ( 1 985), pp. 807-17;

For American and British thinking and diplomacy following Soviet demands, see Howard,

Turkey, the Straits and US Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Origins of the Cold War. See also Rubin, B . , The Great Powers in the Middle East 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, H. N.,

1974), pp. 2 1 0--60 ; Kuniholm, 1980), pp. 1 9 1 -229.

33.

The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), FRUS, 1 945, Vol. I, pp. 1046-8, Vol.II, pp. 256-9, 266-8, 303-5, 3 1 2- 1 3 , 1427-34.

Origins of the Cold War, pp. 267-8. Relations Turco-Sovietiques, passim. 1. 36. 24 Aug. 1 945, FRUS, Vol. Vill, pp. 123 34.

Kuniholm,

35.

Erkin,

37.

Truman to James Byrnes, 1 3 Oct. 1945, Truman Official File, Part 3, Reel 14, Truman Papers; 'Turkish Report on US policy toward Eastern Europe and the Straits' [record of conversation between Gordon P. Merriam, Chief of Near Eastern Affairs division in the State Department, and the Turkish ambassador], 14 Sept. 1 945, enclosed in Truman to Byrnes,

38.

ibid.

Memo to the President, 1 9 Oct. 1 945, Truman Official File, Part 3, Reel 39, Truman Papers.

Ibid. 40. Ibid. ; 30 Oct. 1 945, FRUS, Vol. Vill pp. 1 265--6. 4 1 . 2 4 Oct. 1 945 , FRUS, Vol. Vill p. 1 259; 2 9 Oct. 1 945, FRUS, Vol. Vill, p. 1 264; ( 5 Nov. 1945), FRUS, Vol. Vlll, p. 1 273. Erkin, Relations Turco-Sovietiques, pp. 3 1 4-17. 42. Bilge, Giif Komsuluk, p. 268. This view was repeated by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American ambassador, 3 1 March 1 945, FRUS, Vol. Vill, p. 1 230. 43. 27 Oct. 1 945, FRUS, Vol. Vill, pp. 1260-2. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 1 80. The 39.

,

,

Red Army continued to be stationed there until 1 947. 44.

Memorandum by Overseas Planning Committee,

31

May

1 945,

F037 l /48790

R9748/9748/44. 45.

For an account of developments in Greece and Iran in 1945-46 see Kuniholm,

Origins of

the Cold War, Chs IV-V. 46.

The British-Consulate General (Tabriz) to Sir Reader Bullard (British Ambassador in Tehran), 7 May 1 945, F037 l/45503 E3660/2495/34; W. J. M. Peterson (First Secretary, British embassy in Beirut) to the British Embassy hi Beirut, 7 Jan 1 946, F0371/52702 E252/104/34; F. K. Roberts (Counsellor, Moscow) to Foreign Office, 2 March 1 946, F037 l/52703 E l 94 l / 1 04/34. On the two separatist movements see Eagleton, W. Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); Ramazani, R., 'The Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People' s Republic: Their Rise and Fall' , in T. Hammond (ed), The

Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1 975). 47.

Arfa, H.,

The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study (London: Oxford University Press,

1966); 'The Kurdish Problem' Foreign Office Research Department, 22 March 1 946, F03 7 l /52702 E2782/1 04/34. 48. 49.

Peterson to Foreign Office, 1 4 Feb. 1 946, F037l/52702 E l 523/104/34. Sanjian, A. K., 'The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian relations ( 1 939- 1 956)' ,

Middle Eastern Journal, X ( 1 956). Syria to this day has not

renounced its claims over Alexandretta. 50.

Minutes by R. P. Pinsent (Southern Department), 29 Nov. 1 946, FO 371/67276 R68/68/44.

5 1 . On Britain' s policies towards Greece i n the early postwar period see Alexander, G . M., The

78

From One War to Another Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British policy in Greece 1944-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 982); Frazier, R., Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-1947 ((Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1 99 1 ) . 52.

CAB 1 29(45 ) 1 07, 2 Aug. 1945.

53.

For the continuity in British foreign policy in the Middle East under the Conservative and

The Politics of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government 1945-46 (London: Verso, 1993), passim. 54. Quoted in Bullock, A., Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Labour governments see Saville, J.,

1985), p. 1 1 3. 55.

Williams, F.,

Twilight of Empire: Memoirs of Prime Minister Clement Attlee (Westport, Attlee (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,

CT: Greenwood Press, 1 978), p. 1 7 8 ; Harris, K.,

1 982), pp. 355-8 8 ; Smith, R., and Zametica, J., 'The Cold War Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered, 1 945-47 ' , 56.

International Affairs, LXI ( 1 985).

For Britain' s policy in the Middle East after the war see Monroe, E., 'British Interests in the Middle East' , Middle East Journal, 2, 2 ( 1 948); Monroe, E., Britain 's Moment in the Middle East (London: Methuen, 1 965), pp. 1 5 1 -77; Northedge, F. S . , 'Britain and the Middle East' , in R. Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-1951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984); Ovendale, R., The English Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War, 1945-1951 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 9 1 - 1 14; Bullock, Bevin, passim; Louis, Wm. R., The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, The United States and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 988).

57.

F. K. Roberts to Bevin, 25 Jan. 1 946, F037 1 15924 1 R5880/52.

58.

Quoted in Cohen, M. J., 'British Strategy in the Mediterranean i n the Wake o f the Abyssinian Crisis' , in M. J. Cohen and M. Kolinsky (eds),

Britain and the Middle East,

p. 23. 59.

Minutes by Pinsent (Southern Department), 29 Nov. 1 946, FO 371/67276 R68/68/44.

60.

Parliamentary Debates, Commons Official Report (London: His Majesty ' s Stationery Office), Vol. 4 1 9 , 1945-6, Cols. 1 356-7.

6 1 . CAB 1 3 1 (46)47, 2 April 1 946; CAB 1 3 1 (46) 10, 5 April 1 946; CAB 1 3 1 (46)5 1 , 10 April 1 946; CAB 1 3 1 (46)80, 1 8 June 1 946; Foreign Office Research Department Memorandum, 6 Jan. 1 947, FO 37 1/5923 1 R 1 7969. 62.

The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1 977), pp. 147-62; Loth, Division of the World, Ch. 4.

Gaddis, J. L.,

Oxford University Press, 1 976), pp. 273-96; Yergin, D.,

63.

The memo was also addressed to James Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, and Colin Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs at the State Department. (Undated) FRUS, 1 946, Vol. VII , pp. 1-6; Brands, H. W., Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 99 1 ) , pp. 1 4 1-6.

FRUS, Vol. Vlll pp. 1248-9; 23 Oct. 1 945, FRUS, Vol. Vlll , pp. 1256-7. FRUS, Vol. Vlll p. 1 25 1 . 66. Poen, M. M. (ed.), Strictly Personal and Confidential: The Letters Harry Truman Never Mailed (Boston: Little, Brown, 1 982), p. 65. The letter was not mailed, but according to 64.

25 Sept. 1 945,

,

65.

27 Sept. 1 945,

,

Truman, he read it to Byrnes on 5 Jan. 1 946 in the Oval Room of the White House,

Origins of the Cold War, pp. 296-8. Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 982), p. 54, also Ch. 3 . For Kennan' s text see 22 Feb. 1 946, FRUS, Vol. Vl, pp. 696-706. 68. Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, pp. 335-6 ; Clifford, C. M., Counsel to the President Kuniholm,

67.

Gaddis, J. L.,

(New York: Random House, 1 99 1 ) ; Alvarez, D., 'The Missouri Visit to Turkey: An

Balkan Studies, 1 5 , 2 ( 1 974). Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Bros. , 1 947) pp. 303-4; Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, pp. 285-350, 378-99. 70. Howard, Turkey, pp. 242-60; 12 Aug. 1 946, FRUS, Vol. VII, pp. 836-8; 1 5 Aug. 1 946, FRUS, Vol. VII , pp. 840-2. Alternative Perspective to Cold War Diplomacy' ,

69.

Byrnes, J. F.,

79

Anglo-American Security Interests, 7 1 . Resis,

1945-1952

Molotov Remembers, p . 73.

72.

Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74.

30 Dec . 1 946,

75.

20 Jan. 1 947,

76.

The Times, 26 Nov. 1 946. On old Bulgarian aspirations over Thrace see Tzvetkov, P. A., A History of the Balkans: A Regional Overview from a Bulgarian Perspective (San Francisco: Edwin Mellen Press, 1 993), passim.

77.

The Communist uprising in Greece was not the result of Soviet interference in Greek

FRUS, Vol. VII, p. 898. FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 8-9.

affairs, though this was not known at the time. Stalin remained loyal to the October 1944 agreement with Churchill which left Greece in the British sphere of influence. The Soviet ruler kept his distance from events in Greece and throughout the civil war he gave no aid to the Greek Communists who were supported by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Dedijer, V.,

The Battle that Stalin Lost, 1948-1953 (New York: Viking Press, 1971), pp. 269-70. On Greece 1941-1949: From Resistance to Civil War: Strategy of the Greek Communist Party (London: Macmillan, 1 992). 7 8 . Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, p p . 383-405. the Greek Civil War see Vlavianos, H.,

79.

Colombe, M., 'La Turquie et les etats arabes au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale' ,

80.

Cahiers de I' Orient Contemporain, 3eme-4eme trimestres ( 1 947), p. 1 39 ; Kirk, The Middle East, pp. 30-1 . For Anglo-Egyptian relations see Ch. 2 in this volume. The Economist, 17 Dec. 1 947, p. 3 1 6. For the texts of the treaties see State Papers, Vol. 1 46, pp. 775-7, Vol. 149, pp. 1 007-8.

8 1 . Kirk, 82. 83.

Th e Middle East, p . 1 5 1 .

Sanjian, 'The Sanjak of Alexandretta' , p. 384. Foreign Office Research Department Memorandum, 24 July R 1 1 084/8 1 70/44; Louis,

84.

1 946, PO 3 7 1 /593 1 6

British Empire i n the Middle East, p. 80.

David Kelly (British ambassador in Ankara) to PO, 27 Feb. 1 947, PO 3 7 1 /67276 R2779/68/44.

FRUS, Vol. VII, p. 845 .

85.

1 7 Aug. 1 946,

86.

Minutes by M.

S. Williams

(Southern Department), 29 Nov.

1 946, F0371167288

R6 1 116 1 1 ; Minutes by Pinsent, 1 1 March 1 947, F037 1167276 R68/68. 87.

For Britain' s declining position in the Middle East and the Arab reaction to the British presence after the war see, Louis,

British Empire in the Middle East; Kirk, The Middle East, pp. 106-3 1 9 ; Monroe, Britain 's Moment, pp. 1 5 1-77; Bullock, Bevin, passim. 88. Bryson, T. A., American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1 784-1975: A Survey (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1 977); Rubin, Great Powers in the Middle East; Miller, A. D., Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1949 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 1 63-72 and passim; 2 May 1 945, FRUS, Vol. VIII, pp. 34-9. 89. Strang, W., Britain in World Affairs (London: Faber & Faber and Andre Deutsch, 1 9 6 1 ) , p. 342. 90.

Nachrnani, A., 'It is a Matter of Getting the Mixture Right: Britain' s Post-war Relations with America in the Middle East' ,

95.

Journal of Contemporary History, 1 8, 1 ( 1 983); Kent, Britain and the First Cold War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1 990), pp. 1 73-4; Ovendale, The English­ Speaking Alliance, pp. 89- 1 1 7 and passim. Quoted i n Gormly, The Collapse of the Grand Alliance, p . 1 9 . Alexander, Prelude to the Truman Doctrine, passim; Frazier, Anglo-American Relations with Greece, passim. 5 Nov. 1 946, FRUS, Vol. VII, p p . 9 1 3- 1 5 . 21 Oct. 1 946, FRUS, Vol. VII, pp. 894-7; 5 Nov. 1 946, FRUS, Vol. VII, p. 9 1 3 . Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 2 1 .

96.

PO to the British Embassy in Washington, Nov. 1 946, F03 7 1 /67288 R6 1 116 1144.

J., 'The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War' , in A. Deighton (ed.),

91. 92. 93. 94.

97.

Alexander,

98.

Holland, R. F.,

Prelude to the Truman Doctrine, p. 225, pp. 234-5. European Decolonization 1918-1981 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1 985),

p. 1 1 8.

80

From One War to Another 99.

CAB 1 3 1 (47), 1 Jan. 1 947, 'Future Policy Towards Turkey and Greece' , Report by COS .

100. CAB 2 1 (46)292, COS(46)292, 16 Dec. 1 946, 'Turkish Anned Forces' (Annex II). 1 0 1 . 'The Turkish Budget for 1 947 and Financial Situation Generally' by the Commercial Department of the British embassy in Ankara, enclosed in FO 3 7 1 16728811 947 R l 5 86/6 1 1/44; Royal Institute of International Affairs,

The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1 950), p. 463. 1 02. Minutes by Pinsent, 28 Jan.

1 947, F03 7 1 /67288 R6 1 1161 1 144; CAB 2 1 (46)292,

COS(46)292, 1 6 Dec. 1 946 'Turkish Anned Forces' (Annex II). 103. CAB 1 3 1/4, D0(47), 1 Jan. 1 947. 1 04. CAB2111 964(4), D0(47), 2 Jan. 1 947, memo by the Foreign Secretary. 105. CAB 1 28/9, 30 Jan. 1 947. 1 06. 2 1 Feb. 1 947,

FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 32-7;

1 07 . On 1 1 February Dalton in a memo to the Prime Minister had reiterated the need to end all financial assistance to the Greeks and Bevin saw reason in this presentation. Dalton, H.,

High Tide and After: Memoirs 1945-1960 (London: Muller, 1 962), pp. 206-9; Gladwyn, L., The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1 972), p. 199; Williams, Twilight of Empire, pp. 1 7 1-2; Alexander, Prelude to the Truman Doctrine, pp. 240--2 ; Frazier, R., 'Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine' ,

Historical Journal, 27, 3 ( 1 984); Boyle, P. G . , 'The British Foreign Office and American Foreign Policy, 1947-4 8 ' , Journal of American Studies, 1 6 , 3 ( 1 983). 108. The fact that the Truman administration contrary to London was supporting the idea of partition and thus was making it increasingly difficult for the British in Palestine to manage the situation allows parallels between the two cases to go only that far. Nonetheless, in both instances the British were inviting the Americans to take on what for different reasons was becoming too burdensome for them. 1 09 . Louis,

British Empire in the Middle East, p. 232.

1 1 0. For a summary of Anglo-Egyptian relations, at the time, see Kirk,

The Middle East, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951 (London: Institute of lnternational Affairs , 1 952); Louis, British Empire in the Middle East, pp. 226-67 and passim pp. 1 1 6-47; Royal Institute of International Affairs,

1 1 1 . Kelly to FO, 27 Feb. 1 947, F037 1/67276 R2779/68/44. 1 1 2. CAB 2 1 / 1 964/ 29, Kelly to FO, 7 March 1 947.

FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 88-9. Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective,

1 1 3 . 4 March 1 947, 1 1 4. Harris, G.,

1945-1971 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1 972), pp. 20-- 1 ; Garrett, 'Assistance to Turkey', pp. 63-4. 1 1 5 . For the state of Turkish economy during the war and postwar industrialisation plans see Singer, M.,

The Economic Advance of Turkey (Ankara: Turkish Economic Society

Publications, 1 977), pp. 5-2 1 , pp. 57-8 .

FRUS, Vol. VIII, pp. 1 309- 10; Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 2 1 . FRUS, Vol. VII, p. 899. Erkin, Dz i§lerinde, Vol. 1, pp. 1 84-7; Kelly to FO, 22 Feb. 1 947, F03 7 1 /67306 R2509/44. 30 Dec. 1 946, FRUS, Vol. VII, p. 899; 10 Nov. 1 946, FRUS, Vol.VII, p. 9 1 7 . Erkin, Dz i§lerinde, Vol. 1 , p. 1 86. 4 March 1 947, FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 88-9 ; On the situation in Greece at the time see Vlavianos, Greece, pp. 1 5 5-60.

1 1 6. 1 8 Oct. 1 945, 1 1 7 . 2 3 Jan. 1 946, 1 1 8. 1 19. 1 20. 121.

122. For a chronological narative of developments in Washington prior to the proclamation of

The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947) (San The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953, Vol. 2 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1 956), pp. 98-1 1 5 ; Acheson, D., Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 2 1 7-25 ; Millis, W. (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 195 1 ) , pp. 245-5 3 , 256-63; Gladwyn, Memoirs, pp. 197-202; Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, pp. 383-4 10; Clifford, Counsel to the President, pp. 1 30-43. Truman Doctrine see Jones, J. M.,

Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955); Truman, H. S . ,

1 2 3 . The decision of the Truman administration to extend military and economic aid to Greece

81

Anglo-American Security Interests,

/945-/952

and Turkey has been the subject of long debate among historians, who chose either to criticise it or to defend in the context of the early Cold War. On this debate, which is beyond the focus of this book see Xydis, S., 'The Truman Doctrine In Perspective' ,

Balkan Studies, 8, 2 ( 1 967); Feis, H., From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1 970) ; Donovan, R. J., Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977); Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War; Ferrell, R. H., Harry S. Truman and the Modem American Presidency (Boston:

Little, Brown, 1983); Leffler, M. P., 'Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO 1 945-1 952' ,

Journal of American History, 7 1 , 4 ( 1 985), pp.

8 1 5- 1 7 . An interesting evaluation of the Truman Doctrine in the context of previous American foreign policies can be found in Gaddis, J. L., 'Was the Truman Doctrine A Real Turning Point?' ,

Foreign Affairs, 52, 2 ( 1 974) and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. For

an analysis of American political rhetoric as expressed by the Truman Administration see Theoharis, A., 'The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign Policy, Internal Security and Domestic Politics in the Truman Era, 1 945-1950 ' , in J. B. Bernstein (ed.),

Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1 970). For Kennan ' s critical comments on the provision for aid to Turkey see Kennan, G. F., Memoirs 1925-1950 (London: Hutchinson, 1 967), pp. 3 1 6- 1 8 . The most serious critics of the Truman Doctrine include: Kolko, G. and J.,

Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1 968); Paterson, T. G., Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 973); Yergin, Shattered Peace. 1 24. Lord Inverchapel (British ambassador in Washington) to FO,

14

March

1 947,

F037 1167306 R3493/44; FO to Inverchapel, 2 1 March 1 947, F03 7 1 /67306 R3540/44; The military attache (Ankara) to FO, 17 March 1 947, F03 7 1 /67306 R3863/44. 1 2 5 . Leffler, M. P.,

A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1 992), p. 1 44; Clifford, Counsel, p. 1 3 3 . 1 26. 23 Aug. 1 946, FRUS, Vol. VII, p p . 856-8 ; 2 1 Oct. 1 946, FRUS, Vol. VII , p. 895.

1 27. Kuniholm, B . R., 'US Policy in the Near East: The Triumphs and Tribulations of the Truman Administration' , in M. J. Lacey (ed.),

The Truman Presidency (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1 989), p. 304. 128. Millis, The

Forrestal Diaries, p. 272. FRUS, Vol. VII , pp. 529--3 2; Memo of phone conversation between Forrestal and Paul Shields, 20 March 1 947, Forrestal Papers, Box 9 1 ; 29 Apri1 1 947, FRUS, Vol. I, pp. 738-46; Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 1 62. 1 30. Schnaebel, J. F., The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume 1, 1945-1947 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1 979) ; Leffler, 1 29 . 12 Oct. 1 946,

M. P., 'The American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1 945-48' ,

American Historical Review, 89, 2 ( 1 984).

1 3 1 . JLPC 35/34, 27 Feb. 1 947, Reel II, Part 2A, Film B , Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1 3 2 . 13 March 1 947,

FRUS, Vol. V, p. 1 1 2. FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 575--6; 5 Nov. 1 947, FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 576-9; (undated) 1 947, FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 5 80-1 ; 'Documents Resulting from Conversations with

133. (Undated), 1 947,

the British in Regard to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East' , enclosed in 1 9 Nov. 1 947, Memorandum o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff t o Secretary o f Defence, JCS 1 8 1 9, Reel I, Part 2B, Film B. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Millis,

Forrestal Diaries,

p. 342. 1 34. 29 April 1 947,

FRUS, Vol. I, p. 739.

1 35 . Polard, R. A., 'The National Security State Reconsidered: Truman and Economic Containment, 1 945-- 1 950' , in Lacey (ed.), Truman Presidency, p. 208 . The Times, 15 March 1 947; 13 June 1 947, FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 198--9. 1 3 7 . Sadak, N., 'Turkey faces the Soviets ' , Foreign Affairs, 27, 3 ( 1 949), p. 46 1 . 1 36.

1 3 8 . V . V . Cusden (Consul General, Izmir) to FO, 24 June 1 947, F037 1 /6730B R9047/44.

FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 1 30-1 . For Turkish reactions see Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 27--8.

1 3 9 . 24 March 1 947,

82

From One War to Another 1 40. Kelly to FO, 17 March 1 947, F037 1/67306 R3658/44. The Capitulations were favourable trade agreements granted to foreign powers by the Ottomans. Gradually, and with the decline of the Ottoman Empire they became a source of exploitation of the latter and were much resented by the Turks as a symbol of inferiority and subservience. The Capitulations were abolished by the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923. 1 4 1 . 4 Apri1 1 947,

FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 1 3 8-9.

1 42. Kelly to FO, 1 0 April 1 947, F03 7 1 /67307 R4847/44. 143.

Treaties And Other International Agreements Of The United States OfAmerica 1 776-I949 TIAS) (Washington, DC: United States Govermnent Printing Office, 1 974), Vol. 1 1 , pp .. 1 1 63-5 ; Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 28.

(hereafter cited as

1 44. For the gradual increase in the number of American officials see, James Madison Garrett, 'Assistance to Turkey as an Instrument of United States Foreign Policy with Emphasis on Military Assistance, 1 947-1955' (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Columbia, 1 960), pp. 74-5. 145. Lewis,

Emergence of Modem Turkey, p. 283.

146. Monroe, E., 'The Middle East ' , in E. Luard, E. (ed.), The (London: Thames 1 47 . New

Cold War: A Reappraisal

& Hudson, 1 964), p. 145.

York Times, 29 March 1 947, pp. 1-2.

148. Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen (British ambassador in Brussels) to Sir. Orme Sargent (Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office), 25 March 1 947, F037 1/67276 R4409/68/44. 1 49. A�tikalm, C., 'Turkey' s International Relations ' ,

International Affairs, XXIII , 4 ( 1 947), p.

49 1 . 1 50. Kelly to FO, 1 1 July 1 947, F037 1/673 2 1 B R9702/9702/44. 1 5 1 . FO to War Office, 9 Aug. 1 947, F037 1167321B R9702/9702/44; FO to the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 29 Oct. 1 947, 1 947 F03 7 1 /6732 1B R 1 4200/9702/44. 1 5 2 . Admiralty to FO, 19 March 1 947, F037 1/67 3 1 8 R3854/3854/44. HMS

Liverpool arrived

in Istanbul on 21 July 1 947 before she sailed to Sebastopol. This combination of visits, instead of an exclusive visit to Turkey, however, gave rise to criticism by the Turkish press and Inonii had to intervene to discourage it; Kelly to Bevin, 1 Aug. 1 947, F037 1/673 1 8 R 1 0863/3854/44. 1 5 3 . Nicholas, H. G.,

Britain and the United States (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963), p. 43.

1 54. Kelly to FO, 22 Feb. 1 947, F03 7 1 /67306 R2509/44; WO to FO, 22 Feb.

1 947,

F037 1/67306 R263 1/44; Minutes by Pinsent, 28 Feb. 1 947, F037 1/67306 R2509/44. 1 5 5 . 25 April

1 947, COS(47)44, F037 1/67307/R5878/44; FO to Ankara, 2 July

1 947,

F03 7 1 /67308 R8747/44; Kelly to FO, 1 7 Sept. 1 947, F037 1/67309 R 1 2 8 1 0 ; WO to FO, 1 4 Oct. 1 947, F03 7 1 /67 3 1 0 R 1 3 9 1 5/44. 1 56. FO to Ankara, 5 Dec . 1 947, F03 7 1 /673 1 1 R 1 5860. 1 57. 'Annual Report on Turkey for 1 947 ' by Sir David Kelly,

1 948, F037 1 n2540.

R840/840/44. 1 5 8 . For a first-hand account of the Anglo-French negotiations see Cooper, D.,

Old Men Forget

(London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1953), pp. 359-73.

1 5 9 . Duff Cooper to FO, 1 4 March 1 947, F03 7 1 167276 R3783/68/44. 1 60. Weisband,

Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 52. The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniverSity Press, 1 956),

1 6 1 . Wolff, R. L., p. 3 1 4.

1 62. Sir Noel Charles (British Ambassador in Rome) to FO, 7 Aug. 1947; FO to the British Embassy in Rome, 12 Sept. 1 947, F037 1/67276 R 1 1 1 25/68/44. 1 63 . See Ch. 3, below. 1 64. The

Economist, 3 Jan. 1 948, pp. 2 1 -2.

165. E. R. Lingeman (Commercial Counsellor at the British embassy, Ankara) to H. Somerville-Smith (Treasury), 1 9 May 1 947, F037 1/67305A R6944/1746/44. 1 66. Memorandum by the Commercial Councellor of the British Embassy (Ankara) (undated), 1 947, F03 7 1 /67305A R 1 1 4 8 1 1 1 746/44; see also Thornburg-Graham Spry, M. V., and Soule, G . ,

Turkey: An Economic Appraisal (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,

1 949).

83

Anglo-American Security Interests,

/945-/952

167. 29 Sept. 1 947,

FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 352-3 . FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 357-8. 169. 23 Aug. 1 947, FRUS, Vol. V, p. 309. 170. 1 0 Oct. 1 947, FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 365-6; 1 2 Nov. 1 947, FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 400- 1 . 1 7 1 . Edwards, A. C . , 'The Impact of the War o n Turkey' , International Affairs, XXII , 3 ( 1 946) ,

1 6 8 . 2 Oct. 1 947,

pp. 389-9 1 ; Alfred, M., 'The Economy of Turkey: An Account of Postwar Developments ' ,

Middle Eastern Affairs, 4 ( 1 953); Singer, Th e Economic Advance of Turkey, p. 1 1 0; Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 24-5, 3 1-2. 172. Statement by the Turkish Minister of Finance, 6 Dec. 1 947, enclosed in F03 7 1 /67288 R 1 5 86/6 1 1 . 1 7 3 . Minutes b y G . A . Wallinger (Head of Southern Department), 2 5 Feb. 1 948, F03 7 1 /72541 R26 1 4/ 1 1 68/44. 1 74. 'Annual Report on Turkey for 1 947' by S ir David Kelly,

1 948, F037 1 /72540

Economic Advance of Turkey, pp. 1 1 0- 1 5 . 1 7 5 . 1 5 Jan. 1 948, FRUS, Vol. Ill , p. 3 6 3 ; 1 7 Jan. 1 948, FRUS, Vol. Ill, p p . 368-70. R840/840/44; Singer,

176. Minutes by C. T. Crowe (Supply and Relief Department), 2 March 1 948, F037 1 /7254 1 R26 1411 168. 177.

Ibid.

1 7 8 . On the Western Union see Ch. 3, below. 179.

Feet on the Ground: A Study of Western Union (London: Labour Party Publication, Sept. 1 948) enclosed in R 1 248/ 1 1 4/44; see also comments by Kelly to FO, 23 Oct. 1 948, F03 7 1 /72535 R 1 2023/ 1 1 4/44.

FRUS, Vol. IV, pp. 34-6; 16 Feb. 1 948, FRUS, Vol. IV, p. 5 3 ; Kirk, The Middle East, pp. 4 1 -2. 1 8 1 . Kindleberger, C. P., Marshall Plan Days (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1 987), p. 123. In 1 949 1 80. 23 Jan. 1 948,

aid to Turkey ceased to be a separate programme and came under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, in 1 950 under the Act for International Development and finally in 1 95 1 under the Mutual Security Act. 1 82.

TIAS 1 776-1949, pp. 1 1 66-76; Garrett, Assistance to Turkey, p. 222. Middle East, p. 43. 1 84. Thomas, L. V., and Frye, R., The United States and Turkey and Iran (Cambridge, MA: 1 8 3 . Kirk, The

Harvard University Press, 195 1 ), p. 128. 1 8 5 . Memorandum of Interview with President Inonii of Turkey (undated), Truman' s Official File, Part 3, Reel 39:04 1 3 , Truman Papers. 1 86. For a detailed and critical account of the political developments during this period in

Turkey 's Politics. For an account of the political spirit prevailing at that Turkey in My Time (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1 956); also Kopriilii, F. Demokrasi Yolunda, ed. T. Halasi-Kun (The Hague: Mouton &

Turkey see Karpat,

time see Yalman, A. E., Co., 1 964).

1 87. Weiker, W. F., The Modernisation of Turkey: From Atatiirk to the Present Day (New York: Holmes & Meier, 198 1 ), p. 8; Ozbudun, E., Social Change and Political Participation in

Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1 976), pp. 44-6. 1 88 . Rustow, D. A.,

'Transitions to Democracy: Turkey' s Experience in Historical and

Comparative Perspective ' , in M. Heper and A. Evin (eds),

State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1 988), p. 245 . 1 8 9 . Ahmad, F., The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975 (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1 977), p. 9 ; Karpat, Turkey 's Politics, pp. 1 37-58 and passim. 1 90. 30 Dec. 1 946, FRUS, Vol. VII, p. 899. 1 9 1 . 3 May 1 948, FRUS, Vol. Ill, p. 434. 192. 5 May 1 948, FRUS, Vol. Ill, pp. 435-6. 193. Except the miniscule Communist Party; Karpat, Turkey 's Politics, pp. 336-7 ; Ahmad, Turkish Experiment, p. 390; various newspaper articles on international affairs by Kopriilii, one of the leaders of the Democrat Party, Koprii l ii, Demokrasi Yolunda, passim. 1 94. Andrew Roth in the Hindu (Mandras, 12 June 1 950) quoted in Ahmad, Turkish Experiment, p. 389. 1 9 5 . Vili, Bridge Across the Bosporus, p. 354.

84

3

1 9 4 8 : ' W E A R E I N D E E D AT A CRITICAL MOMENT '

TURKEY ' S INSECURITY INCREAS E S AS THE COLD WAR

DEVELOPS

The year 1 948 began with clear signs that the west was heading towards a collective security arrangement. On 22 January Ernest Bevin delivered to the House of Commons the following message. We are, indeed, at a critical moment in the organisation of the postwar world, and decisions we now take, I realise, will be vital to the future peace of the world . . . I hope that treaties will thus be signed with our near neighbours, the Benelux countries, making with our treaty with France an important nucleus in Western Europe. We have then to go beyond the circle of our immediate neighbours. We shall have to consider the question of associating other historic members of European civilisation, including the new Italy in this great conception. Their eventual participation is of course no less important than that of countries with which, if only for geographical reasons, we must deal first. 1 Bevin had already communicated these ideas to George Marshall after the conclusion of the last meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1 947. Marshall, who had replaced Byrnes as Secretary of State in January 1 947, had been impressed and suggested that Bevin and himself should work together to determine immediate objectives. In a memorandum to the Cabinet dated 5 January 1 948, Bevin presented his account of Soviet policy according to which British and American interests were undermined everywhere by Soviet tactics. There was a risk, he stated, that the communists would control France, Italy and Greece. If Soviet plans in Greece succeeded Turkey also would collapse. Consequently, the success of Russian expansionist designs would imperil the 'three elements of Commonwealth defence, the security of 85

Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952

the UK, the control of the sea communications, and the defence of the Middle East' . On 8 January Bevin discussed with the Cabinet his idea of forming, with American backing, a western democratic system which would include France, the Benelux countries and Britain and which would eventually extend to comprise Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal. At a later stage Spain and Germany could also be included. The cabinet endorsed the proposal and on 1 3 January Bevin communicated the idea to his French counterpart who agreed to co­ operate. On the same day Bevin sent his memorandum to Marshall and asked what the American attitude would be towards a European defence system. Marshall's reply was cautious but not discouraging. He said that the European states should first show what they could do for themselves and then the United States would consider sympathetically how it could help. The two Sovietologists at the State Department, Charles Bohlen and George Kennan (now Director of the Policy Planning Staff), were against a direct involvement of the United States and Marshall did not wish to complicate the still-pending Congressional authorisation of the European Recovery Programme. Nevertheless, other people in the Truman administration like John Hickerson, Director of the State Department Office of European Affairs, and John Foster Dulles were already supporting the idea of American participation.2 The world division into two blocks of power had become unmistakably clear by the end of 1 947. At the Paris conference at the end of June Molotov had refused Moscow's participation in the programme for European Economic Recovery, as put forward by Marshall's speech on 5 June 1 947. Soon afterwards a Soviet-enforced rejection by the eastern European governments was to follow. While the future of the Marshall programme was thus back in the lap of the US, and more specifically of the American Congress, the Russians were making clear to the world the hostile interpretation they put on it. Communist parties in Western Europe were trying to overthrow pro-Marshall governments, the Cominform was formed (announcement on 5 October) and the Foreign Minister's autumn meeting in London, like all its predecessors stalled under Soviet intransigence. In the middle of December the US gave interim aid to France, Italy and Austria and by a new agreement with the UK relieved her of all dollar expenditure in Germany, as well as assuming seventy-five per cent of the cost of both zones.3 Against this background it was only natural that Bevin's speech would alarm Ankara. The British initiative addressed what the Turks them­ selves also saw as a need for western defence co-operation to 86

1948: 'We Are Indeed at a Critical Moment '

counterbalance Soviet power, but the proposed defence arrangement, to their anxiety, did not encompass the eastern Mediterranean. This exclusion must have seemed foreboding particularly in the light of developments in Greece where the civil war was continuing. On 23 December 1 947 the Communists had proclaimed the 'Government of Free Greece' and the proclamation had been followed by a torrent of anti-Turkish propaganda in the Balkan countries, especially Bulgaria and Rumania. In early January Ankara became extremely worried about the possibility of recognition of this government by the communist countries and as a result the further weakening of the government in Athens.4 With such concerns in mind the Turkish government saw the omission of Greece and Turkey as possible members of the western bloc in Bevin' s speech as deliberate. Vassilis Dendramis, the Greek ambassador in Washington, told Henderson that Feridun Cemal Erkin, who was still ambassador in Rome, was of the view that 'Bevin, had in mind the creation of a bloc of states which would enable Great Britain to make some sort of a deal with the Soviet Union, possibly at the expense of certain small states such as Greece and Turkey' . According to Dendramis, Erkin had interpreted the speech as an indication that Britain was unwilling to tie itself down in the Middle East.5 This was not just Erkin's personal view. It was a 'persistent fear' shared by all Turkish political leaders.6 Immediately after Bevin had delivered his speech Inonii asked urgently for an official summary of it and instructed the Anatolian News Agency to inform him instantly by telephone of world reactions to it, as they came in.7 In a note of 28 January to the British ambassador, the Turkish president stated that the speech had impressed him most favourably because it constituted a decision which meant that leaders in western Europe were about to engage in courageous activity in order to get organised over security matters. 8 Meanwhile Ankara had already started thinking that Turkey should press to participate in the organisation of western defence. According to Kuneralp, this decision was the inspiration of Inonii and to be executed by Necmettin Sadak.9 On 26 January Sadak had met Kelly and implicitly told him that Turkey could play a role in the new arrangements by acting as a link for Britain's security interests in western Europe and the Middle East. As he said, Bevin's speech 'held out the prospect of a system of political and economic collaboration from the Arab states through Turkey, Greece and Italy to the West which the Turkish Government would make every effort to help realise' . Turkish diplomatic efforts in the Middle East, he claimed, were directed towards this end, as Turkey's support for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty had already shown.10 By the winter of 1 948 Britain's profile in the Middle East had been 87

Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952

badly shaken. In July 1 947 Egypt had taken its case against Britain to the United Nations Security Council. The Egyptians argued that the stationing of British troops at the Suez base was an offence to Egypt's dignity and an infringement of fundamental principles of sovereign equality. They also accused London of having encouraged an artificial separatism in the Sudan, aimed at destroying the unity of the Nile Valley. Though Egypt failed to establish its contention that the 1 936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty was no longer valid Britain won only a modest victory. The Security Council did not present the British with an ultimatum to withdraw, but did not make a clear-cut decision in favour of the sanction of the treaties, as Britain had wished. Instead it called on Egypt and Britain to resume negotiations for a treaty revision.11 Whereas Britain could console itself that it could retain its presence in Egypt, albeit seriously challenged, its position in Iraq received a serious blow. The Anglo-Iraqi treaty Sadak referred to was signed on 5 January 1 948 and was a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1 930, due to expire in 1 958. The 1 930 treaty terminated the British mandate and recognised Iraq's independence. It also contained, like the 1 936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, military clauses - Britain's acquisition of two air-bases and the right to transport forces across Iraq in the event of war - which were unacceptable to Iraqi nationalists. The new treaty of 1 948, which Bevin hoped to provide the model for defensive alliances with the other Arab states too, was signed as a first step towards relinquishing British military presence in Iraq. For the time being, however, Britain was again granted the right to use Iraqi soil in case of war and to maintain the bases in Iraq by sharing responsibility with the Iraqis. The new treaty gave rise to serious opposition in Iraq and was never ratified. Iraqi nationalists maintained that it was even worse than the old treaty on the grounds that while Britain enjoyed basically the same rights as before it was no longer committed to defend Iraq in the event of a war. On 2 1 January, five days before Sadak's conversation with Kelly, the Iraqi Regent who had signed the new agreement had stated that he did not intend to ratify it. Developments in relation to Palestine had fuelled the anger of Arab nationalists against Britain. The unexpected announcement by the British government on 26 September 1 947 of the termination of Britain's mandate in Palestine had been followed on 29 November by a vote of the United Nations General Assembly for the partition of Palestine. In the Arab Middle East, London was seen as a collaborator in the establishment of the Israeli state. In Arab nationalist circles 'Zionism' and 'British Imperialism' had become complementary if not identical forces. Even King Abdullah of Transjordan, who had a long friendly relationship with London (backed by an annual British 88

1948: 'We Are Indeed at a Critical Moment '

subsidy of two million pounds), had asked in early 1 948 for a revision of the 1 946 treaty with Britain. Abdullah's aim was more to silence Arab accusations that he was a British stooge than to seriously challenge British military presence in Transjordan. Hence, in the revised treaty the essential military clauses remained unaltered. Nevertheless, his move did not help to alleviate the general feeling that British influence in the area was collapsing. '2 Against such a background, Ankara hoped to activate London's interest in including the eastern Mediterranean in its defence schemes for Europe by pointing out that Turkey was a reliable friend, in favour of the continuity of Britain's presence in the Middle East, who could also assist the British government in its dialogue with the Arab states. There is no doubt that Ankara sincerely wished to assist Britain in its efforts to find some accommodation with the Arabs, as the Turks feared that its withdrawal from the region would create a vacuum which the Soviets might fill. However, Ankara's fundamental motive lay elsewhere. Turkish political leaders had realised that Turkey's role as a defender of western security interests in relation to the Soviet Union was not enough to qualify its participation in Britain's designs for a European system of defence. Therefore, another role likely to secure Turkey's place in it had to be found. Ankara's offer of good services to Britain in relation to the Middle East contained a lot of wishful thinking. As we have seen Ankara's relations with the two Arab countries, Egypt and Iraq, which counted most in British strategic thinking, hardly qualified the Turkish government to carry out the role of go-between. It is true that after Turkey's voting against the United Nations plan for the partition of Palestine in November 1 947 Turkish-Arab tension had been eased.13 Turkey, despite its growing relationship with the United States following the Truman Doctrine, had sided with the British and not with the Americans on the Palestinian issue (Turkey recognised the state of Israel in 1 949, one year after its proclamation). Like many people in the American and British foreign service the Turks feared that a Jewish state would serve Soviet interests in the Middle East.14 One can also assume that the Turkish leadership, in the light of the unfavourable disposition of Arab nationalists towards Turkey and its far from fully satisfactory relations with the Arab states, was careful to avoid fanning tension before the situation in Palestine was stabilised. Nevertheless, Ankara's policy on the Palestinian question could be only of little help in its wish to mediate between the British and the Arabs. The Turkish press, which had taken a very favourable attitude towards the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, had been strongly attacked by Iraqi opposition, which called Turkey a pawn of British imperialism. 15 Ankara's open endorsement of Britain's Middle 89

Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952

Eastern presence deprived it of the status of a well-meaning, independent observer, and automatically placed it in opposition to Arab nationalists. Therefore, it was not surprising that the British did not pay much attention to the Turkish offer. In late 1 947 Bevin simply could not picture Turkey as a possible link with the Middle East. In effect, he thought that in the course of time it would be Pakistan which would become influential among the Arab world, though his view was shared by none of the British representatives in the Middle East, who thought that in the future the Turks would have more chances than the Pakistanis to exert some influence on Middle Eastern governments. 16 Seeking to enhance Turkey's strategic importance by pointing out its geographic position as a bridge between the east and the west was not something new in Ankara's foreign policy. In the 1 930s the Turks had sought to promote such a view through their participation in the Balkan and S aadabad pacts. (The continuity of this idea has been amply demonstrated after the end of the Cold War in Ankara's efforts to portray Turkey as the intermediary between the west and the Middle East, as well as the former republics of the Soviet Union in the Caucasus and Central Asia.) This policy was more than the outcome of political expedience. It also reflected Ankara's psychological need to carve a suitable international role for Turkey, which stood like an isolated island between the Arab Middle East and Europe; the result of the Kemalists' wish not to identify the country with the east and Europe's non­ acceptance of Turkey as European. By late February, while negotiations for a defensive alliance between Britain, France and the Benelux countries were hastened as a result of the Soviet-supported communist coup in Prague (25 February), Ankara grew restless. Sadak requested an appointment with the British Foreign Secretary. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs was going to the Paris European Recovery Programme Conference but, as he explained to Kelly, perhaps with a touch of exaggeration, he was going only in the hope of having a conversation with Bevin. The aim of such a meeting would be to reassure political opinion in Turkey, which was disturbed by events in Czechoslovakia, by uncertainty as to American aid to Turkey under the Marshall Plan (Turkish participation in the Plan was only finalised in July) and by speculation concerning the arrival of a new Soviet Ambassador. Sadak tried to dramatise the situation in Turkey. The incumbent Soviet ambassador had been involved in the cooling of Soviet-Turkish relations in 1 945-46, so Ankara assumed that with the appointment of a new ambassador Moscow intended to approach Ankara with some fresh 'friendly' proposals. The appointment of the new ambassador, Sadak told Kelly, was seen by his government as an 90

1948: 'We Are Indeed at a Critical Moment '

attempt by the Russians to exploit disappointment over Marshall aid and other sources of discontent and to build up a fifth column in Turkey. 17 The same line of argument was repeated by M. Tiirkmen, the Director of the Turkish Military Intelligence, to the assistant air-attache at the British embassy. Tiirkmen believed that an attack by Russia could happen at any time. He argued strongly for the need to include Turkey in western strategic plans. In his view the occupation of Turkey was an essential prerequisite to the Soviet conquest of the Middle East, just as the employment of Turkey as a base by the Anglo-Americans was the key to the destruction of Russia. He stressed that Turkey was ideally placed as an airbase for attacks across the Black Sea to the oil centres of the Soviet Union, between the river Don and the Urals, and that the possibility of an advance into Russia over the Caucasus or seaborne landings across the Black Sea would be very advantageous for the western powers in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. 18 Kelly's reports describing the Turks' pessimism over their security did not generate any great sympathy in the Foreign Office. As one of its officials wrote, 'although the Turks have a good deal over which to be apprehensive, I cannot help feeling that some of this pessimism and gloom may sometimes be exaggerated, with the object of making our flesh creep, and by implication, of getting more material aid from us' . 19 In fact, at the beginning of 1 948 Soviet press comments against Ankara in relation to American and British military involvement in Turkey had increased. This renewed wave of Soviet propaganda had generally been interpreted by the British embassy in Moscow as harbinger of possibly a new diplomatic offensive against Turkey. The Foreign Office, however, took a more sanguine view as it thought that these press attacks on Turkey did not differ from those about almost any other part of the world outside the Soviet sphere.20 Undoubtedly, Turkish pessimism was exaggerated, but the Foreign Office assessment of Turkish motives was too cynical. It is true that since August 1 946, Russia had abstained from any action that would have put Turkey under pressure. Equally, in Turkey there were no grounds for fearing that the Soviets might repeat a coup on the Czech model. Though the liberalisation of the regime after 1 945 had allowed the appearance of left-wing parties and political groups, the convinced leftists were few in number. There are no exact figures of the number of communists in Turkey for that period, but the estimates vary between 1 ,000 and 3,000 sympathisers. In addition, the Turkish state was always alert to suppress any activity deemed hostile to the political regime. In fact, soon after the establishment of the Communist Party in Turkey in 1 946, its activities had been banned.21 Yet, Ankara was not unjustified in fearing that Moscow might start intense diplomatic 91

Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952

pressure with fresh demands, under the guise of a 'friendly alliance' for defence of the Straits.22 The parallel in this case would not be the coup in Prague, but Stalin's approach to Finland in February 1 948 when he asked for a Soviet-Finnish treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance analogous to those Moscow had concluded with Hungary and Rumania.23 As Tiirkmen mentioned to the British assistant air attache in Ankara, the Russian-Finnish situation, where the Finns were standing up against Soviet pressure, was being watched with great interest by the Turks in order to see whether Britain and the United States were going to back the Finns or not.24 Seen from this perspective, the increased Soviet propaganda and the appointment of the new Soviet ambassador provided Ankara with reasonable ground for apprehension. Indeed, later in the spring the Turkish government would decide to recall, in the summer, two classes of reservists to the army.25 What must have made the Turks particularly worried was their uncertainty as to whether they would secure western support in the event of a renewed contest with the Soviets. Turkey's exclusion from the emerging western defence arrangements appeared to leave the country in the periphery of western strategic interests and, as we have seen, had given rise to fears of the Turks being ' sold down the river' by the British any new world agreement between the powers. Thus, Ankara endeavoured to make sure that the spirit of its alliance with Britain was kept alive. Kelly reported that Sadak was harassed and worried and was always seeking reassurance that the British took the Anglo-Turkish alliance seriously. The reaffirmation of Britain's interest in Turkey was so important to Ankara that Sadak and his colleagues were always disappointed when there was no direct reference to the Anglo-Turkish alliance in foreign policy speeches of the British government. In his conversations with the British ambassador, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs never failed to state that Turkey could only rely on Britain's full support against Moscow's diplomatic pressure and, in the last resort, on British active intervention, if Turkey were the victim of Soviet aggression. 26 Vague statements of Anglo-Turkish friendship could not overcome Ankara's sense of insecurity. When the Foreign Office agreed to issue a joint communique, to follow Bevin's forthcoming meeting with Sadak, the Turkish Minister insisted on specific mention of the 1 939 Treaty. 27 Cevat A Ikalm, the Turkish ambassador in London, in his effort to secure this reference, repeated the willingness of his government to play a constructive role in the Middle East on Britain's behalf. He told Bevin that the failure of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty had shown that the Middle Eastern states were not heading in the right direction and the Soviet Union would profit from any dissension between them and the west. 92

1948: 'We Are Indeed at a Critical Moment '

What was needed was a more constructive spirit among the states of the Middle East which, he claimed, Turkey might give as 'their moral leader' . Therefore, the Turkish ambassador thought, the time was appropriate for a gesture of Anglo-Turkish solidarity. 28 One year after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, and in the absence of a formal alliance with Washington, Turkey continued to rely, as a second-best, on its alliance with Britain in its search for security and acceptance as a member of the western world. Clearly, American military aid under the Truman Doctrine was not seen in Ankara as a binding commitment on the part of the United States. In A