Triune God : Incomprehensible but Knowable--The Philosophical and Theological Significance of St Gregory Palamas for Contemporary Philosophy and Theology [1 ed.] 9781443887939, 9781443880558

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Triune God

Triune God: Incomprehensible but Knowable— The Philosophical and Theological Significance of St Gregory Palamas for Contemporary Philosophy and Theology Edited by

Constantinos Athanasopoulos

Triune God: Incomprehensible but Knowable— The Philosophical and Theological Significance of St Gregory Palamas for Contemporary Philosophy and Theology Edited by Constantinos Athanasopoulos This book first published 2015 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2015 by Constantinos Athanasopoulos and contributors Front cover image: “St Gregory Palamas Enthroned”. It is the custom of the families of Palamades to have this icon of St Gregory Palamas sitting on his hierarchical throne (like Christ) in their iconostasis. © C. Athanasopoulos, 2012 Back cover image: Photos of all the participants at the International Conference on St Gregory Palamas (March 2012) at the Ecclesiastical Academy of Thessaloniki and outside the Holy Monastery of Vlatadon in Thessaloniki. © Paul Harkin, 2012. All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-8055-8 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-8055-8

To my father Georgios (+2015) and my mother Charikleia. ݅Ȟ ȝȞȒȝȘȞ, ܿȞșȡȦʌİ, ȜȐȕ߯Ȣ, ‫ ݸ‬ʌĮIJȒȡ ıİ IJȓ ʌȠȚࠛȞ ‫ݏ‬ıʌİȚȡİȞ, ʌĮȪı߯ IJ߱Ȣ ȝİȖĮȜȠijȡȠıȪȞȘȢ. ܻȜȜ’ ‫ ݸ‬ȆȜȐIJȦȞ ıȠ‫ ޥ‬IJࠎijȠȞ ‫ݷ‬ȞİȚȡȫııȦȞ ‫݋‬ȞȑijȣıİȞ ܻșȐȞĮIJȩȞ ıİ ȜȑȖȦȞ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ijȣIJާȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ȡȐȞȚȠȞ. ‫݋‬ț ʌȘȜȠࠎ ȖȑȖȠȞĮȢ. IJȓ ijȡȠȞİ߿Ȣ ȝȑȖĮ;

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................................................ xi Dr. C. Athanasopoulos (Research Associate and Associate Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Open University, UK). A. Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics in Philosophy and Theology Repentance According to Saint Gregory Palamas ....................................... 2 Archimandrite Ephraim, Abbot of Holy Monastery of Vatopaidi (Holy Mount Athos) Theologizing in Saint Gregory Palamas ...................................................... 7 Monk Adrianos (Holy Monastery of Vatopaidi, Holy Mount Athos) The Indisputable Wisdom of the Holy Spirit ............................................. 12 Hieromonk Melchisedec (Holy Monastery of St John the Baptist, Essex, England) Simplicity of God according to St Gregory Palamas ................................. 19 Professor Georgios Mantzaridis (School of Theology, University of Thessaloniki, Greece) St Gregory Palamas and Elder Sophronios of Essex ................................. 28 Professor Georgios Mantzaridis (School of Theology, University of Thessaloniki, Greece) The Theological Presuppositions of the Filioque in the Work of St Gregory Palamas ............................................................................... 38 Professor Dimitrios Tselengides (School of Theology, University of Thessaloniki, Greece) Patristic Evidence Concerning the Procession of the Holy Spirit in Gregory Palamas .................................................................................. 44 Dr Georgios Panagopoulos (University Ecclesiastical Academy, Ioannina, Greece)

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Eucharist and Ascesis: Eucharistic and Therapeutic Ecclesiology in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas .................................................... 66 Dr Stavros Yangazoglou (Hellenic Open University, Athens, Greece) Silence in the Land of Logos ..................................................................... 83 Professor Stephen R. L. Clark (Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, England) St. Gregory Palamas and the Moscow School of Christian Neo-Platonism (A.F. Losev, S.S. Averincev, V.V. Bibihin, S.S. Horujy) ....................... 102 Professor Oleg E. Dushin (School of Philosophy, University of St Petersburg, Russia) St. Gregory Palamas in Russian Thought: Spiritual Practice versus Rationality .................................................................................... 114 Professor Oleg E. Dushin (School of Philosophy, University of St Petersburg, Russia) St. Gregory Palamas’ Critique of Nominalism ........................................ 124 Professor Dan Chi‫܊‬oiu (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Ia‫܈‬i, and Romanian Academy, Romania) St Gregory Palamas and Aristotle’s Categories ...................................... 132 Dr Christoph Erismann (University of Lausanne, Switzerland) The Theotokos as a Mystical Theologian ................................................ 142 Rev. Professor Manuel Sumares (Department of Philosophy, University of Porto) The Open History and its Enemies: Unity of God and Concept of History in Gregory Palamas and Thomas Aquinas ............................. 154 Rev. Professor Nikolaos Loudovikos (University Ecclesiastical Academy of Thessaloniki) Man’s Position in Cosmos according to Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory Palamas ............................................................................... 180 Dr. Filip Ivanovic (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway)

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The Christological Context of Palamas’ Approach to Participation in God ...................................................................................................... 190 Dr Norman Russell (Honorary Research Fellow at St Stephen’s House, Oxford, England) Aquinas and Palamas ............................................................................... 199 Rev. Michael Pacella III (University of St Mary, USA) Saint Gregory Palamas: A Non-philosophical Philosopher ..................... 211 Rev. Michael Pacella III (University of St Mary, USA) The Problem of Deification ..................................................................... 222 Patrícia Calvário (Department of Philosophy, University of Porto) Becoming Homotheos: St. Gregory Palamas’ Eschatology of Body....... 232 Rev. Dr Demetrios Harper (Thessaloniki, Greece) B. History, Cultural Context and Aesthetics Gregorius Palamas’ Theology, as Viewed by the Scholar Demetrios Cydones ................................................................................................... 246 Professor Anna Koltsiou-Nikita (School of Theology, University of Thessaloniki, Greece) “ਫț” and “įȚȐ” in Apodictic Treatises on the Procession of the Holy Spirit of Gregory Palamas ....................................................................... 264 Dr Mikonjia Kneževic (University of Pristina) Taboric Light in Russian Visual Culture: From the Frescoes of Dionisy to the Photographies of Yuri Holdin ...................................... 292 Dr Elena Dulgheru (Romania) Nudity of the Body in the Late Medieval Orthodox Tradition: One Example ........................................................................................... 301 Dr Dimitar Atanassov (Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Bulgaria) The Relationship of the Theology of Uncreated Light in St Gregory Palamas and the Byzantine Iconography of 14th-16th Century .............. 327 Dr Spyridon Panagopoulos (Greece)

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Contributors in Order of Appearance ...................................................... 345 Index of Names........................................................................................ 352 Index of Keywords .................................................................................. 357

INTRODUCTION DR. CONSTANTINOS ATHANASOPOULOS

The Context and acknowledgements It has been more than two years since 35 scholars met at the International Conference on the Philosophy and Theology of St Gregory Palamas in Thessaloniki, Veroia and Holy Mt Athos, in March 2012. The Conference was unique in terms of what it tried to establish: it is not only that it brought together theologians and philosophers, philosophers of art and cultural critics, monks and academics to exchange views in a free and open academic forum on possible readings of themes from the work of St Gregory Palamas; it also provided a valuable and unparalleled learning experience for the about one hundred participants from America, Europe and Russia. The Conference allowed its participants to worship together, venerate the relics of the Saint, travel to holy places in Thessaloniki, Veroia and the Holy Mount Athos and make many new lasting friendships along the way. One of the key characteristics of the Conference was the ability to move into various venues of great interest for Palamite scholars in Northern Greece: we visited the Holy Church (Metropolitan Cathedral) of St Gregory Palamas in Thessaloniki, where his relics can be found (we celebrated his feast there); we visited the Holy Metropolis of Veroia and the Skete of Veroia (this is the Holy Metropolis that proposed in 2009 to the Ecumenical Patriarchate the recognition of all the family of St Gregory Palamas as Saints and the Skete, where the great Saint lived as a hermit for a few but significant years in his life); we visited the Holy Metropolis of Lagkada, Litis and Rentinis, where one can find the famous icon of Palamas Enthroned and where there was a long tradition of the Palamades families (in some areas of Greece, families of laity or groups of monks took the name Palamades or Palamas as part of their dedication to God; a tradition that produced the surname of the famous modern Greek poet Kostis Palamas, 1859-1943); we also visited the Holy Metropolis of Neapoleos and Stavroupoleos (where there is a conscious and systematic attempt to follow the Palamite ecclesiastical engagement with acute social

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problems, such as deprivation and hunger), and the Holy Monastery of Vatopaidi at Holy Mount Athos, (where the Saint lived for most of his life as a monk and spiritual father). As the person who tried to manage all the details of the Conference programme and the various visits, I felt many times that all my efforts would have ended in a terrible failure, if it was not for the support of the Hierarchs and the other dedicated ecclesiastics involved: His Eminence the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki Mr. Anthimos; His Eminence the Metropolitan of Veroia, Naoussa and Campania, Mr. Panteleimon; His Eminence the Metropolitan of Lagkada, Litis and Rentinis, Mr. Ioannis; His Eminence the Metropolitan of Neapoleos and Stavroupoleos, Mr. Barnabas; and the Most Reverend Metropolitan Kallistos of Diokleia. They all embraced us as true spiritual fathers and ecclesiastical leaders, who know the value of St Gregory Palamas for all Orthodox, especially in today's world with the many spiritual challenges and temptations. In terms of the other ecclesiastics involved, a special thanks is owed to the following: Fr Georgios Milkas from the Holy Metropolis of Neapoleos and Stavroupoleos, Fr. Georgios Chrysostomou from the Holy Metropolis of Veroia (now His Eminence Metropolitan Georgios of Kitrous, Katerinis and Platamona), Fr George Stamkopoulos and Fr Nikolaos Loudovikos, both Professors at the University Ecclesiastical Academy of Thessaloniki, Abbot Porfyrios of Holy Monastery of St John the Baptist in Skete Veroias, and Abbot Ephraim and Monk Adrianos of Holy Monastery of Vatopaidi in Holy Mountain Athos. Special thanks are also owed to Professor C. Kontakis (President of the University Ecclesiastical Academy of Thessaloniki) and Professor G. Martzelos (of the Faculty of Theology, University of Thessaloniki and Director of Vlatadon Patriarchical Institute). Finally, thanks are owed to the Friends of Mount Athos (UK) and the Institute for Orthodox Christian Studies in Cambridge (UK) for their assistance in some of the organisational details, before the start of the Conference.

The Papers in this Volume From the 35 speakers at the Conference, 23 sent me their final papers to be published in a Volume of proceedings under my editorship. I thank our merciful God, Lord and Saviour, for allowing me to bring into success my promise to publish the proceedings, a task that occasionally seemed impossible to achieve; I also would like to thank the speakers, who sent me their papers, for their trust in me.

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The papers published here have been selected according to a two stage process: before the Conference, the abstracts of the papers had to be approved in terms of their academic merit; after the Conference, the speakers were invited to submit the final version of their papers according to specific academic standards; the authors who sent me their papers observing these standards and gave me permission to edit their work are now in the Volume. Further additions to the collection were deemed necessary, after the participation of three of the speakers at the Round Table on St Gregory Palamas during the 23rd World Congress of Philosophy in Athens (August 2013). Their work continues some of the ideas they expressed in the earlier Conference, so it was reasonable to include them in this Volume.

The Themes The 13th and 14th centuries have been the most productive and influential in the history of philosophy and theology in the Christian West. Medieval philosophy and theology influenced in many ways contemporary European culture (a fact that is frequently overlooked by some contemporary atheists). A parallel and less influential (for the West) proliferation of arguments and theories took place in the Christian East, due to the defence of the Hesychastic movement offered by St Gregory Palamas and his followers. Palamas is relatively unknown to the West and his Theology and Philosophy remain obscure and relatively eccentric for most scholars (except perhaps a few but significant exceptions, such as the comments of Pope Benedict XVI on Nicholas Cabasilas' The Life in Christ; a Palamas inspired work from a Byzantine saint with strong connection to Palamas). This is by no accident. Palamite theology and philosophy remained dormant in its most part for more than 500 years; prior to this dormant phase, we have the official Church condemnation of the opponents of St Gregory Palamas and their excommunications in 1347 and 1351, the glorification of the Saint in 1368 and the institution of his feast on the Sunday immediately following the Sunday of Orthodoxy; Palamas' theology was recognised as a continuation of the Orthodox theology of icons and it still is the custom in Orthodox monasteries in Greece and Holy Mount Athos to read the Patriarchal Tome of excommunication against Palamas' opponents at the end of the Divine Liturgy on the Sunday of St Gregory Palamas. Undoubtedly, the fall of the Byzantine Empire to the Turks, and the subsequent ruthless subjugation of the East to a barbaric despot, was one of the main reasons for the gap in the widespread use of the Palamite treatises till the 20th century.

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This marginalisation of Palamism in the East is the result of many factors; the Saint was sold as a slave by pirates to the Muslims in the 1350s and he had to confront the best of what the Muslim scholarship had to offer at the time; it is significant that, among his surviving writings, there are works that confront most of the Muslim arguments about God with great success (they are known as Letters to the Thessalonians and in particular the Lecture to Chionas; a lecture that was discussed at the Conference). The persecution in the East was matched by the persecution in the West: the Roman-Catholics considered the writings of the Saint as a major obstacle in their plans for a unification of East and West, under the leadership of the Pope, for a significant part of the last 600 years. Dominican monks living close to Constantinople at the time of Palamas transmitted to Rome their fears for a potential overthrow of their theological scholastic supremacy very early. There is significant philosophical and theological evidence in St Gregory Palamas' corpus to justify this fear (as the careful reader of the papers that follow will find). But even the combined efforts of Martin Jugie, the scholarly contributions to the journal Istina and many other isolated and group efforts in the West during the 20th century proved unsuccessful to contain and reduce the scholarly thirst for answers to contemporary philosophical and theological problems via the Palamite ideas and corpus. In this way, we come to two major sources for the awakening of the interest in Palamite writings in the 20th and 21st centuries: one is the widespread modern use among the Orthodox Church monastics of the collection of writings named Philokalia (ĭȚȜȠțĮȜȓĮ), with small extracts from Palamas' writings (edited by St Nikodemus of Holy Mountain and St Makarios of Corinth in early 18th c., which was published in the West for the first time in Venice in 1782); the other is the Critical Edition of the Writings of St Gregory Palamas (ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ), under the editorship of Professor P. Chrestou (University of Thessaloniki) with the help and support of a large team of significant scholars (Professor G. Mantzaridis, with two contributions in this Volume, being just one of its members) starting in the 1950s. The Critical Edition of the original works of St Gregory Palamas (which is based on a careful study of all surviving manuscripts) produced its last volume (5th Volume) in 1992 (the 1st Volume appeared in 1962), primarily due to the death of Professor Chrestou, but there are many modern Greek editions of works of St Gregory Palamas (some based on the Chrestou Critical Edition) in wide circulation in Greece currently. The Holy Monastery of Vatopaidi further promoted Palamite studies through the publication of the papers from the St Gregory Palamas Conferences in Athens (1998) and Lemessos (1999).

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These papers (48 in total) examined in detail various aspects of Palamite theology and were published in 2000 under the general supervision of Professor Mantzaridis (see Mantzaridis 2000). In the English speaking world, the writings of the Saint remain known primarily through three sources: a small collection of his works in the Patrologia Graeca (Migne edition; in Vol. 150-151), the English edition of the Philokalia (edited by Palmer, Sherrard and Metropolitan Kallistos; in Vol. 4), and the publication of The Triads (in the Classics of Western Spirituality); more recently there are also some collections of his homilies and other minor works in circulation (such as the 150 Chapters). The papers contained in this Volume discuss the importance of Palamite ideas for our knowledge of God in terms of divine energies and our ability to receive and be glorified through them, and discuss the significance of the Palamite ideas in various contemporary debates in Philosophy, Science, Aesthetics and Ethics. Some of the contributors take a more reserved evaluation of the Palamite corpus, preferring to highlight similarities and differences between Palamas and the chief representatives of Medieval Scholasticism, such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Ockham. Other contributors proceed to a radical re-evaluation of Western philosophy and theology, preferring to bring out the reasons for the various Western philosophical and theological shortcomings and offering a wider critique on Western culture. The list of contributors includes some of the top scholars in Palamite studies in both philosophy and theology.

Methodology and Content of Papers It will be useful at this point to see briefly some of the main ideas and arguments proposed by the contributors. I have divided the papers submitted into two groups; this division may seem arbitrary at first, but it can be explained by the fact that the papers in each group have different aims and methodologies. In the first (Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics in Philosophy and Theology), the papers investigate specific aspects in the Philosophy and Theology of St Gregory Palamas. Their approach is less historical and more systematic. They have an active interest in relating their theme to the wider contemporary concerns and debates in Philosophy and Theology (esp. about the nature of things and about God, the way we know the world and/or God, and the way we relate to other people and/or God). In the second (Aesthetics, History and Cultural Context), the primary concern is to relate Palamite views to the wider historical and cultural context of his time. Perhaps some of the papers in the second group could

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be also fitted in the first; for ease of reference and a more research and pedagogy oriented approach (because the hope is that this Volume will not be useful to researchers but also students of philosophy and theology), a more or less arbitrary division had to take place, and I ask for the understanding and forgiveness of the authors, if they feel they should go in a different than the allocated group. My only hope is that my division is a less arbitrary than a more arbitrary one, on the basis of the above justification. I hope that the reader will appreciate the use of this division, after a careful reading of the included papers. In the part of the Introduction that follows, I outline the main arguments contained in the papers and the major connections between the papers in the two parts.

The Arguments and Ideas The first eight papers set the theological agenda of the debates. Abbot Ephraim's contribution is discussing the issue of repentance in St Gregory Palamas' Homilies. He stresses that for the Saint repentance has nothing in common with similar pietistic tendencies in the West; here it has a dynamic, cleansing and restoring role; it is neither pessimistic nor does it make the true believer despondent; it gains a “gladsome mourning” character that is typical of the Palamite understanding of deification. Abbot Ephraim's discussion of prosopeion (facade or mask) as distinguished from the true ontology of person is a familiar theme in St Gregory Palamas' writings and is used as a theme repeatedly by contemporary Orthodox theologians (see for example Zizioulas 1977). Monk Adrianos' contribution looks at the use of important Palamite ideas in the contemporary debates on secularisation and the role and nature of theology as an academic discipline. True theology is dependent on a vertical relation to God; lack of knowledge of the horizontal form of theology is deemed, however, a sin (he follows here a suggestion offered by Elder Sophrony of Essex). Monk Adrianos' critique on post-modernism and various recent theological attempts to re-interpret St Gregory Palamas as neo-patristic or post-patristic lies within the traditional defence of Orthodox monasticism to remain faithful to its own true and experiential knowledge about the union with God. Hieromonk Melchisedec's contribution discusses the very crucial epistemological debates in both philosophy and theology; knowledge about God is important for both theological and philosophical epistemology. By relating the epistemological debates to ethics, Hieromonk Melchisedec brings back the true context of the late Byzantine discussions: Chrestou's twofold epistemology gains a new insight via the use of Elder Sophronios'

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and Saint Silouan's insistence that love is the key to understanding of how this twofold epistemology works in real life (as opposed to an armchair or theoretical one). Ultimately, the answer to the problem of the true relation between philosophy and theology must lie in removing the wedge between epistemology and ethics, as Hieromonk Melchisedec recommends; the consequences of adopting such a grand synthesis for possible solutions in many contemporary problems in theology and philosophy open new avenues for further research and scholarship. Professor G. Mantzaridis' contributions need no recommendation. His authority stems not only from his position in the original editorial team of the Critical Edition of the Collected Works of Saint Gregory Palamas. His many works discussing Palamite ideas (some of them translated into English) provide more than sufficient evidence for his dedication and commitment to explaining Palamite positions and relating them to both the Orthodox patristic tradition and contemporary debates in Theology. Both of his contributions in this Volume were presented at the same Conference. He discussed at the beginning of the Conference (during the Opening Session at the University Ecclesiastical Academy of Thessaloniki and as it was indicated at the programme) only the paper comparing Elder Sophrony and Saint Gregory Palamas. However, after my request to enlighten some speakers at our Conference, who wrongly accused Saint Gregory Palamas of polytheism (or they were very close to doing so), Professor Mantzaridis kindly read the paper on the Simplicity of God at a subsequent session at the Holy Metropolis of Lagkada, Litis and Rentinis (at the International Academy of Theological and Philosophical Studies “Saint Cyril and Saint Methodios”) as an ad hoc addition to the Programme. His paper on the Simplicity of God is by far the most clearly thought, far reaching, and poetic work on the theology of St Gregory Palamas that the reader will enjoy in this Volume. Here the reader will find abundant references to Saint Gregory Palamas' writings (with the original wording cited after the English translation); the reader also will note the Saint's carefully chosen words and their poetic but clear synthesis, showing how clearly structured and systematic Saint Gregory Palamas' theology and philosophy is. One can find in this paper not only a systematic exposition of the arguments that relate to the question of why Saint Gregory Palamas wrote about the Simplicity of God as one of the Triune God's key characteristics and energies, but also why some commentators chose to misinterpret the Saint's writings on this issue. As examples of such poor attempts to misinterpret Saint Gregory Palamas' thought, one could cite here some recent German scholars' attempts to accuse Palamas of ditheism or polytheism due to his distinction of divine

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essence and divine energy; other such recent attempts include some German, French, American and British scholars who claim that Palamas is close to the views of Thomas Aquinas on the simplicity of God. Both kinds of misinterpretations can be easily refuted, if one is to study carefully the paper of Professor Mantzaridis and the actual texts from Palamas. Many other contemporary approaches to Saint Gregory Palamas' ideas in anthropology, existence of God, issues on metaphysics and epistemology, eschatology and deification, would benefit greatly from a careful reading of Professor Mantzaridis' paper on the Simplicity of God according to Saint Gregory Palamas. The paper is a very good starting point for approaching correctly what Saint Gregory Palamas means by simplicity of God; I hope that the translation in English and my corrections (in both contributions of Professor Mantzaridis) do not take out anything significant from his main ideas. The second paper of Professor Mantzaridis is discussing themes in the theology of St Gregory Palamas that were followed and further developed in the theology of Elder Sophronios of Essex. Two themes in particular are of greatest concern here: a) Saint Gregory Palamas' views on God have nothing to do with the essentialism that some commentators (both Orthodox and non-Orthodox) attribute to him. A key misinterpretation here lies in the attempt to regard Saint Gregory Palamas as close to Thomas Aquinas' position on God's essence. The careful reader here will however, see a false Manichaeism emerging in this misinterpretation: either we make Saint Gregory Palamas agree with positions like the ones offered by (for example) Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, Schelling or even Karl Barth on God's existence (in the case of Aquinas, God's existence is entailed by His essence) or we make him agree with essentialism on God (for example, of the Avicenna or the Hegelian variety, where essence as a category of Being is more important than Being itself). b) Professor Mantzaridis also shows that personalism is a wrong interpretation of both Saint Gregory Palamas and Elder Sophronios of Essex on deification; the Boethian naturae rationabilis individua substantia and its Thomist, Scotist and Suarezist overtones fail to capture the reality of the new Adam and thus, fail in two significant ways: a) in terms of their implied theological and philosophical anthropology and b) as approaches to deification. Again here, my advice is to approach Professor Mantzaridis' work as a start in a beautiful journey; interpreting Saint Gregory Palamas is hard work and Professor Mantzaridis shows some of the complexity of the task at hand. Professor Tselengides' paper discusses the theological presuppositions that led the Roman-Catholics (or Latins) in the formulation and establishment of the Filioque in the West, on the basis of St Gregory

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Palamas' Orations on the Procession of the Holy Spirit. This early part of the Palamite corpus brought forward the key differences between Barlaam and St Gregory Palamas and depicted the radical agnosticism of Barlaam and the realistic and pragmatic tendencies in the work of Palamas. Professor Tselengides discusses, with considerable clarity, the important issues both in terms of doctrine and in terms of attitude towards doctrine, which Palamas identified behind the adoption of the Filioque in the West. The typhos of the Latins is summarily described in terms of both a diagnosis and a prognosis making this part of the Palamite corpus of high therapeutic and anthropological value (most notably Fr John Romanides and, more recently, Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos, among others, have further elaborated this aspect of Palamism in their investigations into Orthodox Psychotherapy). Professor Georgios Panagopoulos' paper is focused on the way that St. Gregory Palamas interprets key passages from the corpus of Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria in his 2nd Oration on the Procession of the Holy Spirit to reject the Filioque. Through a quite interesting investigation (which in some ways is a continuation and further elaboration of the discourse outlined by Professor Tselengides in his own contribution here), Professor Panagopoulos approaches the hermeneutic endeavour of Palamas in this work through a grammatical, logical and ontological investigation. His main goal is to establish the coherence of Palamas’ well-structured methodological approach to the relevant patristic texts; in doing so, he proves that Palamas' work summarizes quite well the Orthodox faith about the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone, affirming the experiential knowledge of God that the Apostles and Saints acknowledged in their distinctions between ‫ބ‬ʌȩıIJĮıȚȢ and Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ, using also the distinction between theologia and oikonomia. Even though Professor Panagopoulos' work makes an undue (in my view) distinction between the theological and the philosophical endeavours in the work of Palamas, his detailed and scholarly approach to a quite difficult topic makes it an extremely valuable addition to this Volume and a worthwhile study material for both philosophers and theologians. Dr Stavros Yangazoglou summarises the interpretations on the work of Palamas offered by Greek and Russian theologians and offers theological and ecclesiastical criteria upon which an evaluation of these interpretations can be initiated. His work is extremely valuable for all who are interested in establishing: a) what is the true value of Palamism in theological debates today and b) how difficult it is to make compatible the theology of this great Saint with key contemporary approaches to Ecclesiology in the West. In Yangazoglou's interpretation, Palamas' mystical theology has

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nothing in common with many other significant forms of mysticism and resists persistently the rather simplified contemporary academic approaches. The subsequent papers in the first part enable us to appreciate primarily the philosophical value of Palamas' work. Professor Stephen R. L. Clark's contribution attempts a comparison of Palamas' work to Plotinian Neoplatonism, trying to establish how far was Palamas influenced from it. Again, here, as in the case of Professor Mantzaridis, Professor Clark needs no recommendation from me. He is an important scholar in Ancient Greek Philosophy (and many other philosophical areas) with many significant publications. He tries to approach Palamas' agenda from an objective and non-biased perspective and he manages to establish, I think quite successfully, three key claims: a) Meyendorff was wrong in his claim that Palamas did not have a good understanding of Plato and the Neoplatonists (in fact Meyendorff was wrong about both Palamas and Barlaam, as Professor Clark very well shows); Meyendorff's use of incorrect philosophical terminology perhaps has led many philosophical and theological commentators astray; some key (unsubstantiated) claims about Palamas in wide circulation today in USA and UK perhaps are due to Meyendorff's misunderstanding of the details of the philosophical education that Palamas had to have under the guidance of Theodoros Metochites (I am discussing in detail this topic in a forthcoming work, so I will not enlarge upon this issue here); b) commentators with philosophical inclinations who claim that Palamas was not a good philosopher or that he applied wrongly philosophical methodologies and logic are wrong (the claim can be attributed to scholars -among them more recent are perhaps Sinkewicz and Ierodiakonou- who, in my understanding, support their views via a restricted in scope interpretation of specific passages in the Aristotelian corpus -again I discuss this in more detail in another forthcoming work, so I will not enlarge on this here); c) Barlaam had a fragmentary and incomplete understanding of key texts in Ancient Greek Philosophy and, as such, he could not understand the complexity of the arguments of Palamas. Professor Clark's authoritative analysis of themes from Plotinus that are close to key theses in the Palamite works, no doubt, will instigate further research in the philosophical sources of Palamas and how far these can influence a more appropriate interpretation for his overall defence of hesychasm and his use of the philosophical concept of energeia. There are however, a couple of issues (at least) that Orthodox theologians may see as problematic in Professor Clark's very insightful paper and Orthodox philosophers may have these in mind, when using the overall very

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interesting contribution of Professor Clark. One has to do with the absolute freedom of God that is of paramount importance in the work of Saint Gregory Palamas. Divine energies do not emanate on their own, nor can they create on their own, except perhaps in a metaphorical way. They depend on the absolutely free will of God. The very fact that they create is also not dependent on them. Again, it depends on God whether they exhibit this property or not. It also depends on the free will of the man, who will co-operate with God in receiving them. I think the differentiation from Plotinus here is of key importance (even though I agree with Professor Clark that the stereotypes being traditionally proposed are far from a correct interpretation of the complexity of Plotinus' metaphysics and ethics). The other issue has to do with memory. In Palamas' perspective, memory is of paramount importance for salvation; sin and remembrance of sin are important in both the cleansing process through repentance and in the seeking of forgiveness. They are also factors that make our love for God even more strong both now and in the glorified state; memories are important both before and after salvation; they are part of who we are; the Orthodox belief about salvation is that we will be saved as a psychosomatic unity, as complete humans, and not in parts. The first five papers in this Volume discuss the issues related to repentance and salvation: Abbot Efraim, Monk Adrianos, Hieromonk Melchisedec and Professor Mantzaridis, all discuss this key area in Palamas' theology. But, as I have already mentioned, there are many insights in Professor Clark's contribution to merit a detailed study, for philosophers and theologians alike. Professor Oleg E. Dushin's contributions (the first presented at the International Conference of 2012 and the second at the Round Table Discussion of 2013) discuss the significant influence of Palamism to the development of modern and contemporary Russian Orthodox Theology, Philosophy and Science. Through his learned and detailed studies of the Moscow School of Christian Neo-Platonism and the School of the Slavophiles (both influential on the wider Russian contemporary philosophical circles and Russian science and technology), one can find important and often neglected aspects of how Palamism can contribute to the development of a distinctively Orthodox outlook on our understanding of the world; our current means of understanding, as Professor Dushin shows, are rather limited due to an uncritical adoption of modern scientific norms of rationality and a more serious study of Palamite epistemology might enable us to improve on our scientific, philosophical and theological understanding of both world and man.

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Professor Mihai Dan Chi‫܊‬oiu discusses how Palamas' mysticism can help Western scientific epistemology go beyond representationalism to true realism. He shows how both mysticism and contemporary scientific theory can be joined into a coherent philosophical and theological system. Both his method and observations look very promising for a solution to some of the most cumbersome contemporary philosophy of science and epistemology problems. Professor Christoph Erismann discusses how Gregory Palamas’ One Hundred and Fifty Chapters relate to Aristotle's Categories. He proves convincingly that Palamas offers an original solution to the problem of how the Aristotelian categories can be applied to God, finding that three categories (substance, relation and action) are particularly relevant. He also holds an original view regarding the mode of being for universals, as drawing energy from each of their individuals. Professor Erismann's work provides further evidence to the claim put forward by Kokkinos (Palamas' Byzantine biographer) that Palamas could use very well his Aristotelian studies to provide strong support to his philosophical and theological claims. It also proves that some of the recent work on Palamas in Germany, USA, France, UK and Greece, which moves in the direction of discrediting Palamas' philosophical acuity can only result in a complete failure to understand Palamas' novel approach to ancient Greek logic and metaphysics. Rev. Professor Manuel Sumares' work discusses Palamas' Orations on the Mother of God. These texts are of great value for both philosophers and theologians. One cannot understand Palamas' anthropology and the mystical tendencies in St Gregory Palamas' philosophy and theology without a very detailed study of these orations. Fr Manuel provides a summary of Palamas' arguments and offers some interesting insights regarding Spinoza, Heidegger and Michel Henry. Rev. Professor Nikolaos Loudovikos' contribution goes a step further in the same direction. His discussion of how Palamas' theology and philosophy can help us take a distinctive Orthodox position on History is both illuminating and valuable for all Christians with an interest on Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Culture and Civilisation. His critique on Thomas Aquinas and Aquinas' influence on Hegel and other modern and contemporary philosophers (including Taylor) is opening new horizons for further research. His use of Lipovetsky to describe the narcissistic tendencies in Thomistic thought and its contemporary representatives goes in parallel to the first theological contributions in this volume (Abbot Ephraim's of Vatopaidi contribution makes explicit reference to this), which criticise western culture and modernity for what

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Palamas called ʌȡȠıȦʌİ߼ȠȞ (mask or facade). His rather interesting critique on Balthasar, his use of intuitions from the works of Heidegger and Lasch, and his wider critique on our contemporary political culture and its endemic theological and philosophical problems make his text an essential reading for all political and cultural theorists with an interest in Orthodoxy. Even if some Orthodox (like myself) are rather pessimistic about Fr Nikolaos' approach to improve on Aquinas through Palamas (due to serious problems in Aquinas' Philosophy and Theology and significant incompatibilities between the two, some of which Fr Nikolaos himself admits in his contribution here), his project is both illuminating and hopeful; and definitely in need of further reflection and serious consideration from all Orthodox (pessimist and optimist alike). Dr. Filip Ivanovic, in his very interesting contribution, re-affirms the continuity of Orthodox Mysticism from the Areopagetic texts to St Gregory Palamas identifying common themes between its early and late Byzantine phases. He insists that Palamas should not be seen as opposing the early phase in this Mystical Tradition, but only as making new connections between man and the angelic powers and re-affirming the role of man in the deification process. Dr Ivanovic's work could be seen as the philosophical counterpart to the first few discussions in this volume on the theology of St Gregory Palamas and moves within the parameters of mainstream Orthodox thought on the Areopagetic texts. Dr Norman Russell has as his focus the work of Demetrakopoulos on the Palamite distinction between essence and energies. While his discussion is courteous to Dematrakopoulos' work, he uses his own scholarly studies of the period to outline his disagreement with Dematrakopoulos' reading of key passages from Palamas' works. I would like to add here the opposition to Demetrakopoulos' project from most of the papers in this volume, starting with Mantzaridis (who discusses directly the misinterpretation of Palamas' texts on the issue of the Simplicity of God). Further ideas on how wrong is Demetrakopoulos' project in its approach, one may find in the work of Yangazoglou, Tselengides, Fr Nikolaos Loudovikos, Stephen R. L. Clark, Erismann, and Georgios Panagopoulos. Rev. Michael Pacella III, in his two papers, outlines how Palamas' approach to philosophy and theology is solidly based on the Fathers (primarily St John the Damascene and the Cappadocians). The first paper in some of its claims (esp. in relation to Aquinas) goes against other discussions in this volume (primarily the contributions of Fr Nikolaos Loudovikos, Yangazoglou, Norman Russell, Tselengides and Georgios Panagopoulos), but, overall, both papers show that certainly Palamas

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believed in the co-operation between Philosophy and Theology (a common theme in many of the contributions in this volume). Ms Patrícia Calvário in her discussion presents some of the metaphysical and logical challenges that Palamas had to face in terms of accommodating both the apophatic demands in terms of essence and the cataphatic demands in terms of energies. In her work, she discusses issues that get further elaborated in the more theological works included here (primarily the works of Mantzaridis, Yangazoglou, Tselengides, Abbot Ephraim and Monk Adrianos and Hieromonk Melchisedec), but her agenda is indeed at the centre of the philosophical approaches to Palamas' work (indeed some of the philosophical issues she discusses are developed further in the work of Fr Nikolaos Loudovikos, Fr Demetrios Harper, Erismann and Ivanovic and answers to the questions she raises can be found in the work of Kneževic included in this Volume). In her approach, she is more close to Pacella than the rest of the papers presented here. Together with Professor Clark's contribution, they represent the pluralism with which Palamas' work may be regarded. This pluralism the researcher into Palamas Studies may find most valuable for an academic and balanced dialogue with the arguments at hand. Fr Demetrios Harper's contribution is a further development in the discussion of some patristic themes related to Palamas' anthropology (both in theology and philosophy). Most of Fr Demetrios' discussion relates to the one offered by Professor Mantzaridis and Fr Nikolaos Loudovikos. Fr Demetrios' discussion of how the Eucharistic Ecclesiology of Palamas relates to his Anthropology explains further some of the ideas mentioned in Fr Nikolaos' and Hieromonk Melchisedec's work. Fr Demetrios' elaboration on how Palamas' views on the kat' eikona and Transfiguration of Christ relates to both Palamas' views on death and Palamas' Soteriology is a further elaboration of some ideas mentioned in the theological papers of this volume (i.e., Abbot Ephraim's, Monk Adrianos', Hieromonk Melchisedec's, Mantzaridis' and Yangazoglou's works). In the second part, dealing with the history, aesthetics and wider cultural context of the debates, we start with the work of Professor Koltsiou-Nikita, who examines a rather controversial intellectual figure of the period, Demetrios Kydones. Even though the Kydones brothers were against Palamas and his followers, we can gain important insights regarding the culture of the period through an examination of their lives and work. So, for example, we see, in Koltsiou-Nikita's work, the importance of the role of Emperor Ioannis VI Kantakouzenos (who after the peak of the Palamas- Varlaam controversy abdicated and became

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known as monk Joasaph) in the transformation of the theological debates into major political and ecclesiastical confrontations. Her work relates well with Russell's work in this volume and touches also on the issue of simplicity of God, which is the topic of one of Mantzaridis' papers. Dr Mikonjia Kneževic's scholarly contribution examines in detail the cultural semantics (philosophical, theological, philological and etymological) that Palamas was engaged in, when he discussed the relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Son and the Father in his Apodeictic Treatises. Kneževic proves forcefully that even though there is an apparent inconsistency in the way that Palamas is using the prepositions ek and dia to describe this complex relationship, this inconsistency can be justified due to two main factors: a) Palamas' wish to incorporate, use and interpret correctly the majority of the patristic texts used in the arguments employed at the Filioque debates, and b) his honesty in outlining how he conceives this inconsistency as not important due to the possibility of a non-causal interpretation of the proposition “ek”. Kneževic's work is both systematic and of wider historical and cultural significance, as a hermeneutic study of how these prepositions were used in the cultural context of the time. It serves very well as providing further textual and semantic evidence to the papers of Mantzaridis, Tselengides, Yangazoglou, Georgios Panagopoulos, Erismann, Loudovikos, Russell and Harper. It also serves very well as a basis for a possible response to the papers of Calvário and Pacella and the questions and issues they raise in their work regarding the possibilities for a re-evaluation of the Filioque debates. Finally, Kneževic (combined perhaps with Russell's and other authors' papers contained in this Volume) offers a detailed response on some rather implausible readings of Palamas' corpus in terms of Palamas' use of these two prepositions (evidenced for example in the Barlaam and the Kydones brothers' texts and more recently in John Demetracopoulos', Sinkewicz', Ierodiakonou's, Ivánka's, Williams' and Lowell Clucas' works). Dr Elena Dulgheru discusses the interesting work of Yuri Holdin, a Russian photographer, who dedicated a large part of his life in capturing through light the work and vision of Dionisy, an almost forgotten Russian iconographer with experiences of Taboric light. Here Palamism is expressed in new media and forms and makes the Palamite studies gain a new horizon for further development. Dr Dimitar Atanassov's cultural theory discussion of a letter written by the higher Emperial Court administrator Theodoros Metochites, the teacher of St Gregory Palamas during his youth and a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Constantinople, provides further detail regarding the cultural context of the theological and philosophical debates

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that the other papers in this Volume discuss. Atanassov is using the letter (and the relevant ethnological and historical research) as a starting point in his attempt to embark in a cultural re-evaluation of both the Byzantine intellectuals and the Serbs of that time. The relevant conceptual models and paradigms are analysed, compared and contrasted via the use of phenomenological and deconstruction related methods. His work produces interesting observations regarding the cultural context within which St Gregory Palamas developed and matured. Palamite scholars can find valuable tools in terms of justifying culturally the work of St Gregory Palamas and the anti-intellectualist tendencies in his philosophy and theology. We conclude this section of the Volume with the work of Dr Spyridon Panagopoulos, who shows how Palamas influenced the Byzantine iconographers in the late 14th c. Particular emphasis is given to the work of Theophanes the Cretan and we see through his work how Palamas provided the theological and philosophical basis of what has been termed as hesychastic humanism in the Byzantine and post-Byzantine Orthodox iconography. The discussion of Spyridon Panagopoulos accompanies very well the earlier discussion of Dulgheru in this Volume and provides further evidence for some of the influence Palamas had on the development of Russian iconography and icon studies. I would like to close this Introduction with a few thoughts wishing to summarise, in a way, the main findings from the Conference. One can see two major phases in the debates between Barlaam and Palamas. In the first (early) phase, the focus was methodological; this is how the whole controversy started. Basically Palamas tried to show to Barlaam that Barlaam was using philosophical categories about relations that do not allow the absolute freedom of the hypostases of God; this absolute freedom is necessary, if one is to discuss appropriately, and in an Orthodox way, the relationship between the three persons of the Holy Trinity. Both were agreeing that the Roman Catholic position is wrong on the Filioque. Their disagreement was on the issue of the appropriate methodology we should use to arrive at the opposition to the RomanCatholic addition to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. To support their views on this issue, they used the very best that Philosophy could offer at the time: Neo-Platonic, Aristoteleian and Stoic Metaphysics, Logic and Epistemology. But they also wanted to be true to the Patristic heritage and the true dogma of the Orthodox Church as expressed in the Creed. This was more of a priority for Palamas than for Barlaam, but Barlaam was also

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conscious about this. In their theological approach, they followed the Cappadocians and other later Fathers of the Church (with Palamas using more extensively the Areopagetic Corpus and St Maximus the Confessor). In the second phase, the focus shifted to the Hesychastic practice. This, indirectly, supports the view that Barlaam, seeing that he cannot confront the arguments of Palamas on the theological and philosophical level on the methodology that is to be followed regarding the persons of the Holy Trinity, attacked Palamas on the personal level: Palamas was a representative of the Hesychastic practice as a method to approach God, and Barlaam thought that, by attacking this practice, he can discredit, in this way, Palamas (who had gained in the controversy on the Filioque many followers from the intellectual, ecclesiastical and political circles of Constantinople). The debates during this phase became rather polemical, but arguments from both disciplines (Philosophy and Theology), were used in abundance, in their attempts to use, interpret and re-interpret specific texts from the Fathers and the Holy Bible. There were discussions at the Conference of how far Palamas' arguments can be compared with similar arguments in the West (primarily with Aquinas) or with older periods (primarily Aristotle and the Neoplatonists). I think the correct way to establish this should be through a rigorous examination regarding the following two questions: a) Is absolute freedom for both God and man (as discussed from the time of Maximus the Confessor) secured? For Palamas, absolute freedom for both God and man should not be sacrificed for metaphysical/ logical/ epistemological considerations. b) Is a division of the uncreated and the created maintained at all levels of will and mind/spirit? This radical division can be overturned with the act of God, but it should always be recognised in the relevant metaphysics, especially at the level of essence (ousia). For Palamas, both of these conditions are equally important. If any theory or interpretation falls short on either of these conditions, it is deficient in the eyes of Palamas. It is important to add in all this the wider cultural context: from example, on the one hand, the influence of Theodoros Metochites, as a teacher on both St Gregory Palamas and Nicephoros Gregoras, who followed Barlaam, and, on the other, Emperor John Kantakouzinos' political and ecclesiastical ambient power throughout both phases of the controversy; this wider cultural context had a major significance in making this the most influential philosophical and theological controversy of the 14th c. Both the variety of the topics discussed and the quality of the discussions at the Conference or Thessaloniki and Holy Mt Athos and the Round Table at the World Congress of Philosophy in Athens, guarantee

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the success of this publication and its good reception from scholars interested in late Byzantium and the debates between Barlaam and Palamas. There could be a more detailed discussion of some key aspects in these debates: for example, the logical theory employed by the two protagonists and the ramifications of their approach for contemporary debates in Ecology and Environmental Philosophy and other philosophical and theological disciplines (not already discussed in this Volume), but these topics, perhaps, can be further discussed in future Conferences. I have published in the past some of my views on these and related topics and there is further forthcoming work (see primarily in Athanasopoulos 1994; 2002; 2004; 2009; 2010; 2012; 2013; 2014). Undoubtedly, the influence of these debates in the development of Christianity and indeed in the development of the philosophical and theological disciplines in Europe was of tremendous importance. That we have decided so late to appreciate and re-evaluate their significance, only shows our ignorance about our own past. On my part, I will continue to work for the promotion of Palamas Studies to the best of my abilities. In the context of this, we have created, with Professor Dan Chi‫܊‬oiu and Professor Oleg Dushin (contributors in this Volume), the Palamas Seminar and we have now united forces with collaborators internationally (some of whom are contributors in this Volume) to organise Conferences on Palamas Studies on a yearly basis. As a first step, we have organised, with the assistance of the Holy Metropolis of Veroia, Naousa and Campania. an International Conference on the Philosophy and Theology of St Gregory Palamas (with an emphasis on Hesychasm) in June 2015 (Veroia, Greece). I hope the efforts of the Palamas Seminar will be successful and further developments will follow. In my efforts, I am supported by my family: my father Georgios, who recently “slept in the Lord” and my mother Charikleia, my brother Ioannis and my two sisters, Ioanna and Eurykleia, my wife Maria and our two daughters (Dimitra and Georgia-Charikleia). Support (primarily spiritual) I have received by the ecclesiastics in UK (His Eminence Archbishop Gregorios of Thyateira and Great Britain, Fr Constantinos in Glasgow and Fr Raphael in Edinburgh, and the Fathers, Brothers and Sisters at the Holy Monastery of St John the Baptist in Essex) and Greece (the Fathers at the Holy Monasteries at Skete Veroias and esp. Fr Palamas at Kallipetra, the Fathers at the Holy Monastery of Parakletos at Oropos and the Fathers at the Holy Monastery of Vatopaidi). For my academic existence in the UK, I owe thanks to the Department of Philosophy, Open University, the Staff at the Edinburgh Office (OU),

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and the Philosophy people at the University of Glasgow for their continued academic support to my research and teaching. For translating Professor Mantzaridis' texts, I received help from Demetrios Kontoudis at an early phase of the translation. For proofreading some of the texts contained in this Volume, I received help from Gordon Mclean and Barrie Bowman; I thank all three for their assistance. I am also grateful to Cambridge Scholars Publishing for publishing this collective work and the helpful and patient staff there for their help in making this publication possible. Lastly, I thank our Lord for allowing me to finish this project and I pray that our merciful Saviour will continue assisting and guiding us in our efforts, with the intercessions of Theotokos, St Gregory Palamas and indeed of all the Saints and the Angelic Powers. ǻȩȟĮ IJȦ Ĭİȫ, IJȦ țĮIJĮȟȚȫıĮȞIJȓ ȝİ IJȠȚȠȪIJȠȞ ȑȡȖȠȞ İʌȚIJİȜȑıĮȚ.

Works Cited ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, Ȇ., 1962-1992, ǹȖȓȠȣ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ȆĮȜĮȝȐ ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJ.1-5, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ. ȂĮȞIJȗĮȡȓįȘ, ī., İʌ., 2000, ȅ DZȖȚȠȢ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ ȆĮȜĮȝȐȢ ıIJȘȞ ȚıIJȠȡȓĮ țĮȚ IJȠ ʌĮȡȩȞ: ȆȡĮțIJȚțȐ įȚİșȞȫȞ İʌȚıIJȘȝȠȞȚțȫȞ ıȣȞİįȡȓȦȞ ǹșȘȞȫȞ țĮȚ ȁİȝİıȠȪ, ǿİȡȐ ȂİȖȓıIJȘ ȂȠȞȒ ǺĮIJȠʌĮȚįȓȠȣ, DZȖȚȠȞ ǵȡȠȢ. Athanasopoulos, C., 1994, "Anti-Thomism in Byzantine Philosophy: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, and Moral Ontology in the Theological Opposition to Thomism and Scholasticism", in Philosophy and Orthodoxy, ed. by K.Boudouris, International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, Athens, pp.41-93. —. 2002, “Scholastic and Byzantine Realism: Absolutism in the Metaphysics and Ethics of Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Ockham and the critique of St. Gregory Palamas”, in Verbum, Vol. 6, pp.154-165. —. 2004, “The influence of Ps.Dionysius the Areopagite on Johannes Scotus Eriugena and St. Gregory Palamas: Goodness as Transcendence of Metaphysics” in Agnieska Kijewska, ed., Being or Good? Metamorphoses of Neoplatonism, Lublin: Catholic University of Lublin Press (KUL), pp.319-341. —. 2009, “Food and Drink as Spiritual Nourishment in Orthodox Mysticism ((Ps) Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Symeon the New Theologian and Nicholaos Cabasilas)” in Verbum, Vol. 11, pp.45-68. —. 2010, “Ousia in Aristotle’s Categories”, Logique et Analyse, 53 (210), June 2010, pp. 211-243, (ISSN 0024-5836).

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—. 2012, “The Validity and Distinctness of the Orthodox Mystical Approach in Philosophy and Theology and Its Opposition to Esse ipsum subsistens”, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, Vol. 68, Number 4, 2012, pp.695-714. —. 2013, “St. Gregory Palamas, (Neo-)Platonist and Aristotelian Metaphysics: the response of Orthodox Mystical Theology to the Western impasse of intellectualism and essentialism” in Divine Essence and Divine Energies: Ecumenical Reflections on the Presence of God in Eastern Orthodoxy, edited by C. Athanasopoulos and C. Schneider, James Clarke & Co, Cambridge, pp.50-67. —. 2014, “Mystical Ecology: Food and drink as spiritual nourishment in the Mystical Orthodox Tradition”, in Luc Andrian, Jan-Willem Sneep, Guillermo Kerberand and Robin Attfield, eds., Sustainable Alternatives for Poverty Reduction and Eco-Justice, Vol.1, 2nd ed., Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, pp.79-96. Gendle, Nicholas (tr.), 1983, Gregory Palamas: The Triads, intr. by J. Meyendorff and preface by J. Pelikan, Classics of Western Spirituality, New York, Ramsey, Toronto, Paulist Press. Palmer, G. E. H., Ware, Kallistos, and Sherrard, Philip, 1979-1999, The Philokalia, Vols.1-4, London: Faber & Faber. Migne, J. P., ed., 1857–1866, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, 161 vols, Paris, Imprimerie Catholique [referred to as 'PG']. Sinkewicz, Robert E., 1988, St Gregory Palamas: The 150 Chapters, Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies. Veniamin, Christopher, 2009, Saint Gregory Palamas: The Homilies, Mount Thabor Publishing. Zizioulas, Metropolitan John, 1997, Being as Communion, N.Y., St Vladimir's Seminar Press.

A. METAPHYSICS, EPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS IN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

REPENTANCE ACCORDING TO SAINT GREGORY PALAMAS ARCHIMANDRITE EPHRAIM

Saint Gregory Palamas is a great luminary of the Orthodox Church who, together with his theology – which is a fruit of his life in Christ – contributed to the in-depth revival of Orthodox theology in his era. Here on Mount Athos it is said that the theology of Saint Gregory has filled in not only the gaps of the past, but also of the future. This Athonite saint began his ascetic way of life at our monastery, the Holy Great Monastery of Vatopedi, where he learned the way of mental, or noetic, prayer from the Vatopedi Saint Nicodemus the Hesychast. Illuminated by the uncreated energies of the Holy Spirit, Saint Gregory acquired spiritual wisdom and became a master teacher of the virtues and life in God. Holding fast to the genuine patristic tradition, he did not accept the moralistic view of the spiritual life which others were trying to import from the West and promote in Orthodox places. Within the fullness of the patristic tradition, it is emphasized that repentance is not worked out through certain objective improvements in behaviour, nor by external forms and practices; rather it refers to a deeper and overall change of the person. It is not a transitory remorse due to an awareness of having committed some sin, but rather a permanent spiritual state that marks a steady movement of man towards God and a continuous disposition for correction, healing and the assumption of spiritual struggle. “Repentance is a dynamic transition from an unnatural state of passions and sin into a place of virtue – a return to man’s true nature. It is a complete turning away from sin and a journey back to God” (ȀİııİȜȩʌȠȣȜȠȢ, 2000, p.74). Saint Gregory Palamas comments on this truth repeatedly. “Repentance”, he says, “is to hate sin and to love virtue, to turn from evil and to do what is good” (ȁȩȖȠȢ 59, p. 492). By this description it is clear that this holy Father is not able to look at repentance as a perfunctory and mechanical change, because he defines it as a substantial renewal of the human being. For this exact reason, the reality of repentance cannot be objectified within a framework of impersonal formulas or actions; rather it always rests upon

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the eventuality of personal revelation. “The repenting person seeks with all his heart what is good and, casting off sin, he arrives closer to God”(ȁȩȖȠȢ 3, p.98). For Palamas, and generally for all the holy Fathers, this personal character of repentance excludes any sort of pietistic hue that the West tried to give to repentance and, furthermore, to the spiritual life as a whole. “A piety not in our words, but in deed” (ȆȡȠȢ ǻĮȝȚĮȞȩȞ, p.364), insists the holy Hesychast. Since, however, repentance is the beginning and the end of a life in Christ, it follows that everything finds its measure and worthiness or unworthiness in light of it. Even faith itself “is [only] beneficial, if one behaves according to conscience and is cleansed through confession and repentance” (ȁȩȖȠȢ 30, p.268). Additionally, this is given as a promise and covenant at the time of Holy Baptism. One basic stage that precedes repentance is the awareness and the sense of having sinned, “which provides a great opportunity for reparation” (ȁȩȖȠȢ 28, p.208), observes the holy Archbishop of Thessaloniki. According to Palamas, in order for man to come to repentance, he first arrives at the awareness of his “common transgressions” and feels remorse before God, in Whom he takes refuge “in a broken heart”. He abandons himself to His boundless compassion and, just like the prodigal, he believes he is unworthy to be shown mercy from God and to be called His son. And when with his awareness and sense of sinfulness he draws God’s mercy down upon him, he receives “perfect absolution” through self-accusation and confession (ibid). In his effort to define all the stages of repentance, this Father, wise in the things of God, states characteristically: “The awareness of common transgressions leads to self-accusation; this in turn results in sorrow for sinfulness, which Paul called godly sorrow. This godly sorrow naturally is followed by a broken-hearted confession and supplication before God and the promise of avoidance of evil from then on; and this is repentance” (ibid). As a novel state in man’s life, repentance is accompanied by certain consequences, which in the biblical and patristic language are called the “fruits of repentance”. The holy Father sets forth confession as the first fruit of repentance, because through it the believer gains the healing and purification of his soul and is initiated into a new life. Confession is not, however, the only fruit of repentance. Saint Gregory asserts that the person who truly lives in repentance does not go back to his initial sins; neither does he attach himself to people or things of corruption or give himself to doubtful pleasures. Rather, he scorns present things, looking ahead to those of the future life; he struggles against the passions, strives for the virtues, is vigilant in prayer, rejects unjust gain, is

4

Repentance According to Saint Gregory Palamas

gentle with those who have wronged him, is merciful to those who provoke him, and is ready to help through words, through deeds and through sacrifice those who are in need of him. Thus, when the blessed Father exhorts Christians to achieve the works of repentance, he places special emphasis on humble-mindedness, compunction and spiritual mourning. Summarizing all the attributes of the Christian who lives in repentance, he says: the Christian in repentance is calm and tranquil, full of mercy and compassion for others, yearns for justice, seeks purity, has and brings peace. He patiently works through labours and endures tribulations and feels joy and gratitude when persecuted, cursed, slandered or is in want and for whatever else he suffers for truth and righteousness. Saint Gregory often mentions “godly mourning” (țĮIJȐ ĬİȩȞ ʌȑȞșȠȢ), because he sees it as a basic prerequisite for the release from the shackles of the passions and as a beginning and a source of repentance. Experiencing this painful yet gladsome state – which moved him to sigh from the depths of his heart, “give light to my darkness” – unable to imagine, and rightly so, the passing of man from the life of sin to “true life” without mourning and repentance. When the mind, he says, is liberated from every tangible thing, it rises above the torrent of preoccupations with earthly things and, having come to its senses, is able to see the inner self – the “ugly façade” (prosopeion), in the words of Palamas – that it had acquired from its vagrant wanderings in worldly things, and it hastens to be cleansed from its filth by tears of mourning. Christ proclaimed as “blessed” those who mourn for their sins and for the loss of their salvation caused by sin. Moreover, this is the reason that this mourning is called blessed. Saint Gregory delineates the initial reason for the appearance of this mourning as the deprivation and the absence of Christ from our lives, as well as our fall from the place of freedom from passions in Paradise to a place of suffering and passions. This falling away accounts for the complete tragedy of our separation from God and of the loss of our “face to face” conversing with Him, the loss of eternal life and the loss of glorifying Him in unison with the angels. Seeing the results of this anguish, the godly man wonders, who could possibly be conscious of the loss of all these things and not mourn? This is why he admonishes all the faithful living “in awareness of this loss” to mourn and to be cleansed of “the pollutions from sin” (ȁȩȖȠȢ 29, p.246) by godly mourning. This mourning is considered to be the most natural and spontaneous manifestation that a soul wounded by sin has come to repentance. The Saint uses a wonderful image in order to show that it is the person’s wounds that cause the pain and not the act of repentance itself, which rather brings only joy and consolation to the soul. He says, to someone

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who has sores on his tongue, honey is distasteful and, in order to sense its sweetness, the sores need to be healed. The same thing happens with the fear of God. As soon as the souls in which it is born hears the Gospel message, it provokes sorrow, because they are still encompassed by the wounds of their sins. However, as soon as they cast them off through repentance, they feel the Gospel joy (ibid, pp. 234-236). This is one of the reasons why godly mourning is called “gladsome”. A characteristic attribute of the person who properly repents is the refusal to transfer or assign any sort of responsibility for his sins to others. Man was created with free-will and, according to Palamas, “received a governing power within his rational soul to combat the passions” and has “no one to dominate him or force him” (ibid, p. 236). Through selfaccusation and godly sorrow, he could have regained that which he lost by his refusal to assume his responsibility, as with Adam and Eve. Self-accusation is an inextricable state for the soul that harbours humility. Initially, it leads to the fear of Hell, bringing to mind terrifying punishments – as the Lord has described them in the Gospel – which become even more terrifying because of their eternal dimensions. Hence, the person, who mourns for his sins here and blames himself for them, avoids the unavailing and inconsolable mourning, which the involuntary pangs of conscience create in those who are in everlasting punishment. As ghastly as they may seem to modern man, these thoughts are a way of life for Christians who have embraced the struggle, without the slightest bit of pessimism or resignation from life. Rather, they become the springboard for the cutting off of our relationship to a sinful past and the proof for our intentions, so that we can attract the grace of God. The course of our rectification from the fall though repentance, of our detachment from the slavery of the passions, and of putting into practice of the divine commandments is followed by holy and deified human beings. With this truth as a starting point, Saint Gregory stresses that “though it may not be possible for every Christian to reach the measure of the saints in the great and miraculous achievements that characterize their lives and are completely inimitable, he can and must, however, resemble them and follow them in a course of life towards repentance” (ȁȩȖȠȢ 28, p. 216). Let us not forget that not only the correction of ourselves but of all of society begins with and is founded upon the personal repentance of every man; and this is because every day “we are all to blame for many things” and the only hope of salvation for all of us remains, according to Saint Gregory, the taking up and the living out of unending repentance (ibid, p. 218).

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Repentance According to Saint Gregory Palamas

Works Cited ਞȖȓȠȣ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼, ݈ʌĮȞIJĮ, ȁȩȖȠȢ 59, Ȇİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJࠛȞ IJİȜȠȣȝȑȞȦȞ țĮIJ‫ޟ‬ IJާ șİ߿ȠȞ ȕȐʌIJȚıȝĮ, ȉȩȝȠȢ 11, ǼȆǼ. —. ȆĮȜĮȝ઼, ݈ʌĮȞIJĮ, ȁȩȖȠȢ 3, Ǽ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ ܿıȦIJȠȞ ʌĮȡĮȕȠȜȒȞ, ȉȩȝȠȢ 9, ǼȆǼ. —. ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ݈ʌĮȞIJĮ, ȆȡާȢ ǻĮȝȚĮȞȩȞ, ȉȩȝȠȢ 4, ǼȆǼ. —. ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ݈ʌĮȞIJĮ, ȁȩȖȠȢ 30, Ǽ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJȠީȢ ܻȞĮȕȜȑȥĮȞIJĮȢ IJȣijȜȠȪȢ, ȉȩȝȠȢ 10, ǼȆǼ. —. ȆĮȜĮȝ઼, ਢʌĮȞIJĮ, ȁȩȖȠȢ 28, Ǽ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݌‬ȠȡIJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ IJࠛȞ ܻʌȠıIJȩȜȦȞ ȆȑIJȡȠȣ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȆĮȪȜȠȣ, ȉȩȝȠȢ 10, ǼȆǼ. —. ȆĮȜĮȝ઼, ਢʌĮȞIJĮ, ȁȩȖȠȢ 29, Ǽ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJާȞ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ Ǽ‫ރ‬ĮȖȖİȜȚıIJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ȂĮIJșĮ߿ȠȞ ‫ݧ‬ĮșȑȞIJĮ ʌĮȡȐȜȣIJȠȞ, ȉȩȝȠȢ 10, ǼȆǼ. ȀİııİȜȩʌȠȣȜȠȢ, ਝȞȑıIJȘȢ, 2000, “੘ ੑȞIJȠȜȠȖȚțઁȢ ȤĮȡĮțIJȒȡĮȢ IJોȢ ਱șȚțોȢ țĮIJ੹ IJ੽Ȟ įȚįĮıțĮȜȓĮ IJȠ૨ ਖȖȓȠȣ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠ૨ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼”, ȆȡĮțIJȚțȐ ǻȚİșȞࠛȞ ‫ݑ‬ʌȚıIJȘȝȠȞȚțࠛȞ ȈȣȞİįȡȓȦȞ ݃șȘȞࠛȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȁİȝİıȠࠎ, ‫݀ ݾ‬ȖȚȠȢ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ ‫ ݸ‬ȆĮȜĮȝߢȢ ıIJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ݨ‬ıIJȠȡȓĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ʌĮȡȩȞ, ੊İȡ੹ ȂİȖȓıIJȘ ȂȠȞ੽ ǺĮIJȠʌĮȚįȓȠȣ, ਢȖȚȠȞ ਜ਼ȡȠȢ.

THEOLOGIZING IN SAINT GREGORY PALAMAS MONK ADRIANOS

Your Eminence, venerable scholars, respected conference participants, we welcome you to our Monastery with great pleasure, and we bring you the good wishes of our Elder Ephraim, who now finds himself in a place where he shouldn’t be, yet one in which Saint Gregory Palamas, in accordance with God’s inexplicable providence, also found himself on two occasions. Anyone who has studied the works of Saint Gregory Palamas – and you are among those who have studied his works – will naturally have observed the facility with which the Saint moves about in the sphere of theology. There is no area of theology in which he has not been cited, whether it has to do with dogmatic, pastoral, anthropological, ascetic or other such subject matter. Would this be the fruit of knowledge, I wonder? `In his biography of Saint Gregory, Saint Philotheos Kokkinos, who was a close acquaintance, mentions that the Saint’s words simultaneously captivated and were intelligible to beginners as well as to those with moderate and advanced experience and knowledge. How did this happen? As you all know, Saint Gregory had received a brilliant philosophical education, studying at the University of Constantinople. You will remember that, at the age of seventeen, following an oration at the palace in the presence of the emperor Andronikos Palaiologos, his teacher Theodoros Metochitis exclaimed that “if Aristotle himself were present he would have praised him exceedingly” (ȉıȐȝȘȢ, 1985, p. 438). Gregory, however, left behind his university career and entered the 'university of the desert' at the age of about twenty-two. He came here to Vatopedi, to a hut located across from us (we are now at the main compound of the Holy Monastery of Vatopedi), living in obedience to blessed Nikodemos, “an admirable man both in actions and in thinking” (Ibid., p. 446). Saint Gregory lived in obedience to his elder until the latter’s repose; afterwards he lived in obedience at the Monastery of Megisti Lavra. Following this he withdrew to the hesychastic life at the hermitage of Saint Savvas and in the Skete of Glossia. Though he had great spiritual experiences and revelations, the indication that he had received the gift of

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Theologizing in Saint Gregory Palamas

theology – because theologizing is a gift of God – was the vision he had after sixteen years of ascetic monastic life, where he saw the vessel of milk that changed to fragrant wine. As Saint Philotheos writes, this showed that his ethical words had transformed into dogmatic ones (Ibid., see pp. 466,467). Saint Gregory emerged as a theologian of experience. “His theology is not an intellectual concoction but an expression of existential experience” (īĮȜȓIJȘȢ, 2000, p. 482); it is a fruit of experience in the Holy Spirit. He lived the ascetical hesychastic design: obedience, prayer, theology. As Elder Ephraim of Katounakia used to say, obedience brings prayer, and prayer brings theology as an experiential condition. He considered blessed obedience as the basis for the acquisition of the gift of theology. True theology is the knowledge about God that comes from union with God. Without this union, knowledge about God has no support. It is like speaking about a city you have never visited; you do not know it from experience. Theology as an intellectual pursuit, as a process of reasoning, is far inferior to godly vision. Such theology is sterile and remains at the border of earthly creativity, it ignores the appearance of the uncreated within creation, and it does not contribute to the attainment of communion with God. “This theology is as far removed from the light of godly vision and as distant from fellowship with God, as knowing about something is different from possessing something; because speaking about God is not the same as having fellowship with God” (ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ,1962, p.453). Saint Gregory makes a distinction between theology and divine vision (theoptia). The person who has the experience of Grace, of union with God, is able to speak with authenticity, with a manner of certainty about God, and is able to theologize correctly. This divine union is realized through the presence of noetic activity in the human heart, in the place where man encounters God. “This is highest and most special activity of the mind, by which it sometimes encounters God and rises above itself” (ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p.398). The discovery of this noetic activity and its liberation from the cage of human rational activity is perhaps the most subtle and most significant matter for the interior spiritual life (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ਫijȡĮȓȝ, 2000, pp. 769-779). The union of mind and heart through noetic prayer will evoke the gifts of God, only if one persists with humility and attention in this work. Saint Gregory Palamas states that “for the mind to do this threefold work – that is, by itself to be attentive outwardly, to be attentive to itself, and to pray while being attentive – is perhaps not that difficult. But to remain a long time in this state, which gives birth to the hidden gifts, this is certainly very difficult” (ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1992, p. 158).

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The living experience of Divine Grace, and finally the vision of the uncreated light, provides the sure way of knowing God. It is “the supernatural union with the resplendent light, solely from which the sure theology derives” (ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p. 425). This is grace-filled experiential theology. This does not move about at the level of academic theology and education, but at a much higher level, yet without disregarding the other, “something that would not just be an error, but a sin” (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȩȞȚȠȢ, 2010, p. 61), as Elder Sophrony so characteristically states. Our academic theological education discloses the horizontal plane and familiarizes us with the theological questions of each age, which is always essential as knowledge. The vertical plane, the union with God, offers only the gracefilled theology. It is common knowledge, of course, that academic theology has often stood indifferent to experiential charismatic theology, and at times has even purposely opposed it. This has been the fruit of secularization. The secularization of life and the secularization of theology go hand in hand. As much as the way of life is altered, as much as the Gospel is presented as a truncated rather than complete teaching, as much the believers “are conformed to this world” (Romans 12:2) and distance themselves from the Patristic Tradition, all the more the Church and its theology become secularized. The secularization of theology bears witness to the secularization of the Church, and vice versa. Saint Gregory offers to the Church a grace-filled as well as a composite and pastoral theology. He not only lived the Tradition, he also created it. He supported himself on it, but he also offered his own personal experience inspired by the Holy Spirit. In an amazing, analytical and methodical way, he was able to express truths that pertained to the dogmatic teaching of the Church, its pastoral problems, and its anthropological issues. In one of his homilies, the Very Reverend Metropolitan Kallistos of Diokleia aptly notes that the theology of the twenty-first century will be characterized by a preoccupation with anthropological issues (ȀȐȜȜȚıIJȠȢ, ਫʌȓıțȠʌȠȢ ǻȚȠțȜİȓĮȢ, 2006, p.25). Post-modern man does not really know essentially what man is. Contemporary man has forgotten or, rather, does not know that his essential nature is God-like. All of the various crises that our society is experiencing today are essentially based upon an anthropological emptiness. The anthropology of Saint Gregory Palamas is able to provide timely and complete solutions to these issues. The communion of man with God, according to Palamas, cannot be placed solely within an impersonal or institutional structure, but must be seen as a reality of being.

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Theologizing in Saint Gregory Palamas

Putting it into modern terminology, we could say that the theology of Gregory Palamas is of utmost relevance in two ways. It has a direct relevance to the problems of our age, yet, at the same time, it is relevant for all ages. The Saint has provided a theological foundation for the hesychastic life, which is the essence of the Patristic Tradition, revealing the way to deification both to his contemporaries and to later generations. The way of deification is something that is able to transform the tumult, the fragmentation, the absurdity of post-modernity into unification, forgiveness and reason (logosis) (Athanasius the Great, “ȁȠȖȦșİȓıȘȢ IJ߱Ȣ ıĮȡțާȢ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ IJȠࠎ ĬİȠࠎ ȁȩȖȠȞ, ‫ݺ‬Ȣ įȚ' ‫ݘ‬ȝߢȢ ‫݋‬ȖȑȞİIJȠ ıȐȡȟ”, ȀĮIJȐ ݃ȡİȚĮȞࠛȞ 3,33, PG 26, 396A) in the person of God the Word. In our days, the theology of Saint Gregory Palamas has caught the interest of numerous researchers from all over the world. Many nonOrthodox scholars pore over his works and in many things defer to his writings, in contrast to the anti-Palamites of the early twentieth century, Jugie, Hauscher and Beck. We consider blessed Elder Sophrony, the greatest theological Father of the twentieth century, to be a worthy successor of the charismatic theology of Saint Gregory Palamas. Though it may be structured upon a particular dynamic of expression and terminology, the theology of Elder Sophrony has the same source as the theology of Saint Gregory, because the Elder himself followed the same hesychastic path, the ascetic model of obedience, prayer and theology. We hope that there will continue to be theologians of this model, both in the monastic and in the academic world; both the monks and the academic theologians need to become God-bearers. They might not, of course, reach the height of experience of Saint Gregory Palamas or Elder Sophrony, yet they still need to taste or at least be inspired by something from the experience that both Saint Gregory Palamas and Elder Sophrony shared. Finally, we pray for a dynamic living out of the Patristic Tradition in the post-modern and globalized age we live in, so that theology may bring liberation from the misery of this era and its supposed self-sufficiency. May this theology shake off its secular elements, so that it may not become post-patristic, cut off and alienated from the Spirit who has guided our Church Fathers; rather may it be living, existential, experiential and grace-filled, and both patristic and paternal for our fellow human beings.

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Works Cited ਝȡȤȚȝĮȞįȡȓIJȘȢ ਫijȡĮȓȝ, 2000, “਺ ȤȡȒıȘ IJોȢ ȜȠȖȚțોȢ țĮ੿ ȞȠİȡ઼Ȣ ਥȞȑȡȖİȚĮȢ IJȠ૨ ਕȞșȡȫʌȠȣ țĮIJ੹ IJઁȞ ਚȖȚȠ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼”, ȆȡĮțIJȚțȐ ǻȚİșȞࠛȞ ‫ݑ‬ʌȚıIJȘȝȠȞȚțࠛȞ ȈȣȞİįȡȓȦȞ ݃șȘȞࠛȞ țĮȓ ȁİȝİıȠࠎ, ‫݀ ݾ‬ȖȚȠȢ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ ‫ ݸ‬ȆĮȜĮȝߢȢ ıIJȒȞ ‫ݨ‬ıIJȠȡȓĮ țĮȓ IJȩ ʌĮȡȩȞ, ੊İȡ੹ ȂİȖȓıIJȘ ȂȠȞ੽ ǺĮIJȠʌĮȚįȓȠȣ, ਢȖȚȠȞ ਜ਼ȡȠȢ. ਝȡȤȚȝĮȞįȡȓIJȘȢ ȈȦijȡȩȞȚȠȢ, 2010, ȉȩ ȝȣıIJȒȡȚȠ IJ߱Ȣ ȤȡȚıIJȚĮȞȚț߱Ȣ ȗȦ߱Ȣ, ‫ݕ‬ııİȟ, ݃ȖȖȜȓĮȢ. īĮȜȓIJȘȢ, īİȫȡȖȚȠȢ, 2000, “ĬİȠȜȠȖȓĮ țĮȓ ਥȝʌİȚȡȓĮ. ȉȩ ȝȒȞȣȝĮ IJȠ૨ ਖȖȓȠȣ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼ ıIJȒȞ ਥʌȠȤȒ ȝĮȢ”, ȆȡĮțIJȚțȐ ǻȚİșȞࠛȞ ‫ݑ‬ʌȚıIJȘȝȠȞȚțࠛȞ ȈȣȞİįȡȓȦȞ ݃șȘȞࠛȞ țĮȓ ȁİȝİıȠࠎ, ‫݀ ݾ‬ȖȚȠȢ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ ‫ݸ‬ ȆĮȜĮȝߢȢ ıIJȒȞ ‫ݨ‬ıIJȠȡȓĮ țĮȓ IJȩ ʌĮȡȩȞ, ੊İȡ੹ ȂİȖȓıIJȘ ȂȠȞ੽ ǺĮIJȠʌĮȚįȓȠȣ, ਢȖȚȠȞ ਜ਼ȡȠȢ. ȀȐȜȜȚıIJȠȢ, ਫʌȓıțȠʌȠȢ ǻȚȠțȜİȓĮȢ, 2006, ‫ݷ ݠ‬ȡșȩįȠȟȘ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮ ıIJާȞ 21ȩ Į‫ݧ‬ȫȞĮ, ݃șȒȞĮ. ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, Ȇ., ਩țį., 1962, īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJ. 1, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ. ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, Ȇ., ਩țį., 1992, īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJ. 5, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ. ȉıȐȝȘ, ǻ., 1985, ĭȚȜȠșȑȠȣ ȀȦȞıIJĮȞIJȚȞȠȣʌȩȜİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ȀȠțțȓȞȠȣ ܼȖȚȠȜȠȖȚț‫ޟ‬ ‫ݏ‬ȡȖĮ. ǹǯ ĬİııĮȜȠȞȚțİ߿Ȣ ݀ȖȚȠȚ, 29, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ.

THE INDISPUTABLE WISDOM OF THE HOLY SPIRIT HIEROMONK MELCHISEDEC

1. The Twofold Epistemology At the very outset of his famous trilogy, The Triads, written in defence of the hesychasts of Mount Athos, Saint Gregory Palamas presents his reader with a question that strikes the core of theological epistemology. This question, which today might seem obsolete, it seems to me, still lies very much at the heart of our understanding of God and the created reality. The question in broad lines is: “What is required of us so that we can come to know God?” Furthermore, “What role can secular learning have in this process? Are knowledge of natural sciences, classical philosophy and secular education, in general, merely the prerequisites to such knowledge, or perhaps even the actual way to it, as Palamas’ opponents claimed? Or is there some other kind of avenue to this knowledge, such as the one that the hesychasts might have followed?” To begin with, let me quote some lines from the very beginning of The Triads demonstrating the question Palamas was asked to respond to: I have heard it stated by certain people that monks also should pursue secular wisdom, and that if they do not possess this wisdom, it is impossible for them to avoid ignorance and false opinions, even if they have achieved the highest level of impassibility (apatheia); and that one cannot acquire perfection and sanctity without seeking knowledge from all quarters, above all from Hellenic culture. This education … also leads men to the knowledge of God, for God is knowable only through the mediation of his creatures. They also said: ‘[S]ince the inner principles of these phenomena are to be found in the divine and primordial creative Mind, and the images of these principles exist in our soul, we are zealous to understand them … by the methods of distinction, syllogistic reasoning and analysis; thus, both in this life and after, we wish to be conformed to the likeness of the Creator.’ (Tr. 1.1q)

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According to this account, then (an account which represents the position of the hesychasts’ opponents), perfection in holiness, freedom from ignorance, knowledge of God, and being in the likeness of God in eternity all depend on engaging in scientific research and the study of Hellenic wisdom. There is no way to the knowledge of God apart from that given through the created order. The monk who was asking Palamas about this was unable to respond to such a sophisticated theory, which, in addition to scientific details, included an idea of having the images of the eternal logoi in the human soul (Palamas called the adherents of this doctrine eikonognostes; cf. Tr. 1.1.20). Yet, at the same time the monk knew from his monastic experience that this position could not be correct. Palamas’ initial answer to the monk was that his was a different kind of knowledge, which possessed an unshakeable certainty, and that these were given to him by the grace of the Holy Spirit. The monk was unable to enter into a dialectic disputation with his opponent due to his lack of erudition, but that to Palamas was of little importance, since the monk possessed what Palamas calls the “indisputable wisdom” (sophia anamphilektos; see Tr. 2.1.8 ) granted to him by the Holy Spirit. After all, with a rational dialectic disputation one gains no real truth, since -as Palamas in his famous dictum states- “every argument wrestles with another argument” (logo palaiei pas logos; see Tr. 1.1.1), and there is no end to this exchange of arguments. On the other hand, the knowledge granted by the Holy Spirit establishes the heart, the inner man, in the truth (as the Epistle to the Hebrews testifies; see Heb. 13:9 and Tr. 1.1.1). Such knowledge remains unwavering and cannot be subjected to rational argumentation. It is this unwavering knowledge established by the Holy Spirit that St Gregory Palamas calls “indisputable wisdom”. Palamas is also known for his defence of the demonstrative -or apodeiktikos- method in theology (see Yangazoglou, 1996). Many of the Greek Fathers experienced an intensely ambivalent relationship to the natural sciences and to classical Hellenic learning, and Palamas is not an exception to this rule; one can notice this, for example, by comparing his 150 Chapters with The Triads. The key to understanding this deceptively simple hermeneutical problem was pointed out by the late professor of Patristic Theology, Panagiotes Chrestou, who well over half a century ago introduced to the academic world the concept of double knowledge or twofold epistemology of the Byzantine Fathers (Chrestou, 1977, pp.153-163; this was later endorsed and developed by Nikos Matsoukas in his multivolume Dogmatic and Creedal Theology). The Byzantines examined reality through two different kinds of epistemological

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The Indisputable Wisdom of the Holy Spirit

lenses: a scientific or (perhaps) philosophical avenue for the created order and a spiritual or theological one for the uncreated, divine realm. The Fathers could use both of these avenues, but without ever marrying them (Matsoukas, 1990, pp.137-180). Palamas himself is explicit about this in The Triads (1.3.14), where he contrasts the knowledge of the things of the present age to the knowledge of the eschatological age-to-come, so deeply valued by Athonite monks: “The end that lies before us consists of the future good things promised by God, adoption of sons, deification, and also the revelation, acquisition and enjoyment of heavenly treasures. At the same time, we know that the knowledge gained from secular learning reaches its consummation together with the present age” (Tr. 1.3.14). In the Medieval West, however, things seemed to be rather different. Such clear-cut distinction was not something that the medieval men of the early universities were fond of. Although maybe subject to theology, natural sciences and philosophy were indispensable in pursuit of the truth and perfection, and even of eternal life, as the above text of Palamas suggests (see Drakopoulos, 1987, pp.198-214; Lubac, 1998, pp.40-55). Problems caused by this Medieval relationship between science, philosophy and religion in both scientific and religious circles from the Copernican revolution onwards are well known. Although the picture today has changed, yet such phenomena as the Young Earth Creationism supported by fundamentalist Protestant Christians and the militant quasiscientific attacks against Christianity from some representatives of atheist fundamentalism are but modern by-products of this age-old epistemological problem (see McGrath, 2010a, pp.77-92; McGrath, 2010b, pp. 17-41).

2. Saint Silouan the Athonite Let me at this point introduce another saint of the Holy Mountain into this discussion: Saint Silouan the Athonite. A Russian peasant who became monk at the turn of the twentieth-century, Saint Silouan was someone whose life and writings are a testimony to the indisputable wisdom of Palamas’ Triads. Saint Silouan could be called a theologian of the Holy Spirit and his “theological epistemology” precisely points beyond any secular knowledge. In his very plain style, Saint Silouan can put complex issues in very few words, as he does in this extract on the twofold epistemology: “The things of this earth we may learn with our minds but knowledge of God and of all heavenly matters comes only through the Holy Spirit, and cannot be learnt merely with the mind” (Sakharov, 1991, p.290).

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Now, it is very important to understand this simple statement of Saint Silouan, if we are to establish an Orthodox Christian theological epistemology; and especially if one is to pursue a true knowledge of God: Things earthly are learnt with the mind; things pertaining to God only through the Holy Spirit. Saint Silouan is adamant on this point: God cannot be known through the created order, as the Barlaamites would have wanted (Tr. 1.1.q). God can be known only by and in the Holy Spirit. Contemplation of nature or the study of the Scriptures or the Church Fathers may function as a springboard towards the knowledge of God, but as he says: “There is a big distinction between merely believing that God exists, seeing him in nature or the Scriptures, and knowing the Lord by the Holy Spirit” (Sakharov, 1991, p.301). Saint Silouan is clear: “We may say that we are able to speak of God only in so far as we have known the grace of the Holy Spirit” (Sakharov, 1991, p.358). And again he says: “The Lord is known in the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit pervades the entire man – soul, mind and body” (Sakharov, 1991, p.353). Consequently, according to Saint Silouan’s teaching, there can be no theological epistemology outside the revelation by the Holy Spirit. In this context, St Silouan exemplifies a holy man, who possessed the true knowledge of God, but who quite clearly had no scientific knowledge or classical learning at all; we have other similar examples in the following Saints: John the Baptist, Stephen the Protomartyr, Simeon Stylites, Seraphim of Sarov, the Twelve Apostles, and finally Christ himself. Palamas moreover highlights the fact that Saint John the Baptist didn’t even know the sacred Scriptures, and that Christ would have taught to his disciples mathematical equations, dialectics, physics and astronomy had he regarded these things as the true epistemological way to the knowledge of God (Tr. 1.1.4-5; Sakharov, 1991, pp.291, 357). Palamas sees secular wisdom in a very Pauline vein as wisdom made “foolishness” by God, as merely natural, “psychic” wisdom that cannot obtain the quality of “spiritual” wisdom (Tr. 1.1.5.; 1. Cor. 1:18-25, Rom. 1:22 ). Palamas allows it as a natural gift of God, but nothing beyond that. It cannot take the place of the gift of God’s uncreated grace (Tr. 1.1.22 ). Palamas is also very cautious with apophatic theology. He maintains that the invisible God is seen by those who have purified their hearts “not by sense perception or by intellection or by way of negation, but by virtue of a certain unspeakable power” and “spiritually” (Tr. 1.3.30). Attributing apophatic notions to God in theology or (if apophaticism is understood as part of a spiritual ascent, then) the leaving behind of everything created, even sense perception itself, are not in themselves knowledge of God, let alone union with God. It is what comes after the apophatic that matters,

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The Indisputable Wisdom of the Holy Spirit

namely, “participation in the divine things, their giving and reception, rather than their denial” as Palamas says (Tr. 1.3.18). Palamas’ caution is important for us today, as we tend to think of theology, and sometimes even of spiritual life, mainly as an intellectual preoccupation. His comment from a festal homily hits the nerve: “Saying something about God is not the same as encountering God” (Homily 53; in Veniamin, 2009, p. 437).

3. The Ultimate Method for the Knowledge of God What, then, is the “epistemological method” that both Palamas and Silouan would endorse? They both see only one effective way to the knowledge of God, that is to say, that there is only one epistemological method which can lead to actual knowledge of God, and that is a life according to the commandments of the Gospel, a life that involves repentance and self-sacrifice, but which leads to the participation in the very life of God Himself. Palamas writes: He who improves his life throughout, in accordance with the behests of our [Scriptural] theologians, is filled with divine wisdom, and he truly becomes an image and likeness of God. This he accomplishes only through the keeping of the Gospel commandments (Tr. 1.1.4 ).

Palamas reinforces his position by invoking the authority of Dionysius the Areopagite for whom union with God, which implies existential knowledge of Him, is possible only through “loving and sacredly putting into practice the venerable commandments” (Eccl. hier. 2, PG 3, 392A). Saint Silouan joins them in stating: “We may study as much as we will, but we shall still not come to know the Lord, unless we live according to his commandments, for the Lord is not made known through learning but by the Holy Spirit” (Sakharov, 1991, p.354). It would be impossible here to describe in detail the whole programme that the Gospel commandments involve, but I shall briefly refer to it, through St Silouan. In general, Saint Silouan’s way is the “light burden” of the Gospels and he puts very little trust in ascetic feats, such as fasting or prostrations, especially when separated from obedience, as these may simply foster vainglory (Sakharov, 1991, p.422). Instead, he observes: We do not require wealth or learning in order to know the Lord – we must simply be obedient and sober, have a humble spirit and love our fellowmen. The Lord will love such a soul as this and of his own accord will make himself manifest to her …(Sakharov, 1991, p.354).

But for Saint Silouan there is one further step for the knowledge of

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God. The following anecdote from the 1930’s gives us the ultimate guideline. The then young hierodeacon Sophrony asked Elder Silouan to tell him what, in a nutshell, was the content of the New Testament. Saint Silouan’s reply was succinct: “The whole content of the New Testament is included in these three words: love your enemies” (personal communication: Nicholas Sakharov). And indeed in his writings, Silouan binds this principle to our epistemological quest: “The Holy Spirit is love, and He gives the soul strength to love her enemies. And he who does not love his enemies does not know God” (Sakharov, 1991, p.105). The signposts for the true way, then, according to Saint Silouan are obedience, humility and love for one’s enemies. Throughout his writings he also gives indications as to how to discern whether the spiritual knowledge we may have received is truly given by the Holy Spirit or not. The two most important signs of genuine experience of the Holy Spirit, it seems to me, are peace and joy, which so often are seen as the major characteristics of the eschatological kingdom of God, both in the New Testament (see, e.g., Jn. 17:13, 14:27, Rom. 14:17) and in the Church Fathers (see, e.g., St Maximus the Confessor’s Ambigua 7, PG 91, 10889). Palamas adds to these a number of other distinguishing marks by which to discern the truth from error or delusion, such as: “despising human glory, desire for the things heavenly, settling of thoughts, spiritual rest (joy, peace), humility, calming of pleasures and passions, and an excellent disposition of soul” (Tr. 1.3.48). And if things go wrong, Saint Silouan is giving the warning: “The enemy offers the soul sweetness intermixed with vain self-satisfaction, and thereby is the presence of beguilement made known” (Sakharov, 1991, p.444). Finally, if the wisdom of this world is seen as “foolishness” by Saint Paul and Saint Gregory Palamas, then the way of the cross, the way of humility and of loving one’s enemies, which are “foolishness” to the wise of this world, become, in actual fact, the very epistemological method for knowing the ultimate “object” of knowledge, God. This is, if you like, a “heuristic” method requiring a total involvement of the knower in the process of knowing God; a process, in the end of which God makes himself manifest to the seeker of knowledge in an absolutely personal encounter. Concluding, I would like to make the following tentative proposal. Today we all wish to speak in terms of ontological categories. A philosophically oriented person would want to object to introducing moral categories into epistemology, as I have done here; whilst a moralist might react to my mild philosophizing, when speaking of the knowledge of God. It seems to me, then, that the real problem lies precisely in the fact that we, in modern theological circles, have driven a wedge between ethics and

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epistemology, between spiritual life and theology, and in so doing, we have deprived both of their ontological foundations. If we wish to grant them their true ontological value, we, it seems to me, need to reunite them in order to awaken our “dogmatic consciousness” (Sakharov, 1991, pp.184-192), in a quest that takes us through the “foolishness” of the cross to the indisputable wisdom of Christ’s Holy Spirit.

Works Cited Chrestou, Panagiotes K., 1977, “Double Knowledge according to Gregory Palamas”, in Theological Inquieries 3 [in Greek], Thessaloniki: The Patriarchal institute for Patristic Studies (the article was first published in 1963), pp.153-163. Drakopoulos, Panagiotes, 1987, The Middle Ages: Greek and Western [in Greek], Athens: Epopteia Publications, 2nd ed. Gendle, Nicholas, (transl.),1983, Gregory Palamas: The Triads, with intr. by J. Meyendorff and preface by J. Pelikan, New York, Ramsey, Toronto: Paulist Press. Lubac, Henri de, 1998, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, vol. 1, translated by M. Sebanc, Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd (original French ed. 1959). Matsoukas, Nikos, 1990, Dogmatic and Creedal Theology: An introduction to Theological Epistemology [in Greek], Thessaloniki: Pournaras Publications, 2nd ed. McGrath, Alister E., 2010a, Mere Theology: Christian Faith and the Discipleship of the Mind, London: SPCK. —. 2010b, Science and Religion: A New introduction, Chichester: WileyBlackwell, 2nd ed. Meyendorff, Jean, 1973, Grégoire Palamas: Défense des saints hésychastes, with intr., critical text, French transl. and notes, vols 1 and 2, Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 2nd ed. [Here abbreviated as ‘Tr.’] Sakharov, Archimandrite Sophrony, 1991, Saint Silouan the Athonite, transl. from the Russian by R. Edmonds, Essex: Stavropegic Monastery of St. John the Baptist (original Russian ed. 1952). Veniamin, Christopher, 2009, Saint Gregory Palamas: The Homilies, with intr., English transl. and notes, Waymart, Pennsylvania: Mount Thabor Publishing. Yangazoglou, Stavros, 1996, “Philosophy and Theology: The Demonstrative Method in the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas”, in The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 41, 1-18.

SIMPLICITY OF GOD ACCORDING TO ST GREGORY PALAMAS1 PROFESSOR GEORGIOS MANTZARIDIS

The primary attribute of God is simplicity. If God is not simple but composite of different parts, then these parts must precede God. Yet a God like this cannot be a cause and creator of anything. He is not a real God, the beginning of everything. As the beginning of everything, God must not be composite but simple. In addition, he is not only simple: țĮȓ IJࠛȞ ܼʌȜȠȣȝȑȞȦȞ ܼʌȜȩIJȘȢ țĮȓ IJࠛȞ ‫݌‬ȞȚȗȠȝȑȞȦȞ ‫݌‬ȞȩIJȘȢ (“...and of simplicity to them that are being brought into simplicity; and of unity to them that are being brought into unity”; Dionysius the Areopagite, Ȇİȡȓ șİȓȦȞ ‫ݷ‬ȞȠȝȐIJȦȞ 1,3; PG 3,589C). Thus, without him coming out of his simplicity which is without parts, he is present as a whole, being without parts and unable to be divided into parts (ܻȝİȡࠛȢ IJİ țĮȓ ܻȝİȡȓıIJȦȢ) in all and each of the beings He creates (Maximus the Confessor, Ȇİȡȓ ܻʌȠȡȚࠛȞ, PG 91,1257B). God, says Saint Gregory Palamas, is not some large physical body, that because of His size is unable to fit into a small space, and He is not restricted in a (quantifiable and physical) body. Therefore, he can be everywhere and over everything and inside anything (țĮȓ ʌĮȞIJĮȤȠࠎ įȪȞĮIJĮȚ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ țĮȓ ‫ބ‬ʌȑȡ IJȩ ʌߢȞ țĮȓ ‫݋‬Ȟ ‫݌‬Ȟȓ). And if someone brings in mind the smallest thing, He can also fit into it His whole existence (ǻȚȐȜİȟȚȢ ʌȡȩȢ ȋȚȩȞĮȢ, Lecture to Chionas, 12; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ 1988, p.159). Man is not simple but composite. And this is not primarily due to his being composed of body and soul or due to his having several elements and organs, but due to his having many needs, he is always in need of something. His existence and preservation has a need of things that are outside himself. For this reason, he also needs many senses, so that he can come in contact with these things, know them, acquire them and benefit from them. In addition, God is not simple nor non-composite as an undifferentiated 1 Translated by Demetrios Kontoudis; corrected and edited by C. Athanasopoulos.

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substance or as țĮșĮȡȐ ‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮ (pure energeia), the way Aristotle understood it and, in part, scholastic theology [in the way of actus purus]. This philosophical concept of simplicity, as applied to God, is foreign to the Biblical and Patristic tradition. God is simple because he is without any needs (ܻʌȡȠıįİȒȢ), because he has no need of addition [nor change]. The initial letter of the word ܼʌȜȩȢ (simple) is an indication of addition and affirmation and not of deprivation (as is the case of other uses of “Į-” prefix in Greek words, for example, aporetic, from ĮʌȠȡȓĮ). Thus, we also see that in the New Testament, simple (ܼʌȜȩȢ) is the one who is whole, generous, in contrast with the ʌȠȞȘȡȩȢ (evil) or įȓȥȣȤȠȢ (double minded), as, for example, in Mat. 6,22-23. Jam. 1,5-8. God is simple, although He is Triune. He is simple, although He is distinguished in persons and energy. He is simple, although He is simultaneously accessible and inaccessible. It could also be said that God is simple because He is Triune and because He is discerned in essence and energy: “God is one in essence and energy, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit” (‫ݑ‬Ȟ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓߠ ȖȐȡ țĮȓ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİȓߠ İ‫ݮ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ ĬİȩȢǜ ‫ ݸ‬ȆĮIJȒȡ țĮȓ ‫ ݸ‬Ȋ‫ݨ‬ȩȢ țĮȓ IJȩ ȆȞİࠎȝĮ IJȩ ݀ȖȚȠȞ; see ǻȚȐȜȠȖȠȢ ‫ݽ‬ȡșȠįȩȟȠȣ ȝİIJȐ ǺĮȡȜĮĮȝȓIJȠȣ 37 and 50; in ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p. 200 and p. 212). He also is simple, because He can be simultaneously accessible and inaccessible: “God can be multiplied while remaining one and can give Himself or be communed with in many ways, while remaining without parts in any conceivable way, and He has this unity within Himself by supra-essential power" (‫ ݾ‬ĬİȩȢ țĮȓ ʌȜȘșȪȞİIJĮȚ ȝȑȞȦȞ İ‫ݮ‬Ȣ țĮȓ ȝİȡȓȗİIJĮȚ ȝȑȞȦȞ ܻȝİȡȒȢ, țĮȓ ȝİIJȑȤİIJĮȚ ʌȠȚțȓȜȦȢ ܿIJȝȘIJȠȢ ‫ޓ‬Ȟ ʌȐȞIJ߯ țĮȓ IJ߱Ȣ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȠࠎ ‫݌‬ȞȩIJȘIJȠȢ ‫݋‬ȤȩȝİȞȠȢ ܻȞİțijȠȚIJȒIJȦȢ țĮș’ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡȠȪıȚȠȞ įȪȞĮȝȚȞ; in Ȇİȡȓ șİȓĮȢ țĮȓ șİȠʌȠȚȠࠎ ȝİșȑȟİȦȢ 23; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p.157). Ultimately, God is simple because He is omnipotent, passionless and without need. The ones that are powerful, as Saint Gregory Palamas notes, are the most simple and the all-powerful one is the simplest (ǻȚȐȜȠȖȠȢ ‫ݽ‬ȡșȠįȩȟȠȣ ȝİIJȐ ǺĮȡȜĮĮȝȓIJȠȣ, 53; in ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p.215). The blessed Symeon the New Theologian also writes: “God, the cause of everything, is one. And this one is light and life, spirit and logos, mouth and word…” (‫ݾ‬ ĬİȩȢ ‫ ݘ‬IJࠛȞ ‫ݼ‬ȜȦȞ Į‫ݧ‬IJȓĮ İ‫ݮ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬ıIJȚǜ IJȩ įȑ ‫ݐ‬Ȟ IJȠࠎIJȠ ijࠛȢ țĮȓ ȗȦȒ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ, ʌȞİࠎȝĮ țĮȓ ȜȩȖȠȢ, ıIJȩȝĮ țĮȓ ȡ߱ȝĮ...) And when a man has a sense in a soul and mind (nous) and word (logos), even if this one is due to natural needs, this sense can be divided in terms of its origin to five. All these senses converge and conclude to the mind (nous) that rules over them: it is the mind/nous that sees and the mind/nous that listens (ȞȠࠎȢ ‫ݸ‬ȡߢ țĮȓ ȞȠࠎȢ ܻțȠȪİȚ; Symeon the New Theologian, ‫ݟ‬șȚțȩȢ ȜȩȖȠȢ, 3,7). God is light according to the Blessed Symeon: “The Father is light, the

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Son is light, the Holy Spirit is light. In them a light simple, not created, timeless, co-eternal, with same honor and same glory” (‫ ݾ‬ȆĮIJȒȡ ijࠛȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ, ‫ ݸ‬Ȋ‫ݨ‬ȩȢ ijࠛȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ, IJȩ ȆȞİࠎȝĮ IJȩ ݀ȖȚȠȞ ijࠛȢǜ ‫ݐ‬Ȟ IJĮࠎIJĮ ijࠛȢ ܼʌȜȠࠎȞ, ܻıȪȞșİIJȠȞ, ܿȤȡȠȞȠȞ, ıȣȞĮ߾įȚȠȞ, ‫ݸ‬ȝȩIJȚȝȠȞ țĮȓ ‫ݸ‬ȝȩįȠȟȠȞ; Symeon the New Theologian, ĬİȠȜȠȖȚțȩȢ 3,141-143). And Saint Gregory Palamas writes that this divine light is not only given as undivided to the ones who see it or participate in its glory, but it also has a unifying and deifying power. And, as such, this power unites and lifts those that participate in it, always according to their receptivity, towards the unity and deifying simplicity of the Father (Ȇİȡȓ șİȓĮȢ țĮȓ șİȠʌȠȚȠࠎ ȝİșȑȟİȦȢ, 6; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p.141142). The essence (Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ) of God is without ceasing and remains always inaccessible (ܻȝȑșİțIJȘ) and simple; it is in this way, as Palamas observes, that His energies are being imparted on the creatures. And while those that partake are created and have a beginning, the divine energies that are being partaken are multifarious, uncreated and everlasting, and are “joined together eternally with the everlasting omnipotent and self-contained God and Ruler of everything” (ıȣȞȘȝȝȑȞĮȚ ܻȧįȓȦȢ IJࠜ ‫݋‬ȟ ܻȧįȓȠȣ ʌĮȞIJȠįȣȞȐȝ࠙ țĮȓ Į‫ރ‬IJȠIJİȜİ߿ Ĭİࠜ țĮȓ ǻİıʌȩIJ߯ IJȠࠎ ʌĮȞIJȩȢ; Ȇİȡȓ șİȓȦȞ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİȚࠛȞ, 40-41; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, pp.125-126). In a similar way, the simple white light in nature contains all possible variations of colours. While simplicity is connected with omnipotence and fullness, composition is the result of weakness and destitution. When something is not able to exist and be preserved by itself, it is led necessarily to composition. According to Saint Gregory Palamas, all things that can be found in nature are composite, because they cannot sustain themselves on their own, and they are born as composite for the same reason (‫ݑ‬ț ȖȐȡ IJȠࠎ ȝȒ įȪȞĮıșĮȚ țĮșǯ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȩ IJȚ IJࠛȞ ȖİȞȘIJࠛȞ ȝȠȞȠİȚįࠛȢ țĮȓ ܻȝȚȖࠛȢ ʌĮȞIJȐʌĮıȚȞ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȓ IJİ țĮȓ ‫ބ‬ijİıIJȐȞĮȚ, IJ߱Ȣ ʌȡȩȢ ‫ݐ‬IJİȡȠȞ ‫݋‬ȟ ܻȞȐȖțȘȢ įİ߿IJĮȚ ıȣȝʌȜȠț߱Ȣ, įȚȩ țܻȞ IJ߲ ȖİȞȑıİȚ ıȪȞșİIJȠȞ İ‫ރ‬șȪȢ ܻʌİIJİȜȑıșȘ (ǻȚȐȜȠȖȠȢ ‫ݽ‬ȡșȠįȩȟȠȣ ȝİIJȐ ǺĮȡȜĮĮȝȓIJȠȣ, 53; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p.215). God exists as a Being in itself and disposes Himself to all without sharing anything with them. The ones that are created don’t exist as beings in themselves, but as ones that partake being and as ones that have the need for being. Truth also is congenital with simplicity, as Didymus from Alexandria briefly notes: truth “is congenital with simplicity” (ıȣȝʌȑijȣțİȞ IJ߲ ܼʌȜȩIJȘIJȚ; Didymus of Alexandria, Ȇİȡȓ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ 3,1, PG 39,780D). Divine truth is simple and absolute, while man’s truth is multi-faceted and relative. The more someone approaches divine truth, the more he approaches divine simplicity. This simplicity is neither poverty nor naivety; it is richness and wisdom, self-sufficiency and completeness. Simplicity again, is the absence of any deficiency, of any passion, of any

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Simplicity of God according to St Gregory Palamas

lack; it is the absence of any need for supplementation. In the end, God’s simplicity is related to impassivity. Of course, divine impassivity has no relation to the deliverance from passions, as it is with human [acquired] impassivity. God is impassive because He acts without passion. He provides all without receiving anything. All that God has, writes Saint Gregory, He has them as acting only and not as receiving any action in Himself (‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖࠛȞ ȝȩȞȠȞ, ܻȜȜǯ Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥȓ ʌȐıȤȦȞ țĮIJǯ Į‫ރ‬IJȐ - Ȇİȡȓ șİȓĮȢ țĮȓ șİȠʌȠȚȠࠎ ȝİșȑȟİȦȢ, 26; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p.159). On the contrary, man doesn’t only act but he also suffers. In this way, man’s mind (nous) has externally the ability to think, because he acquires it with an experience or teaching, that is with suffering or a passion. So, the perfection of man that coincides with his deification is not the fruit of an action, but of a suffering or a passion. It is not the same though with God. He doesn’t acquire wisdom through suffering or passion, because he assumes nothing. God is the same always and with His energies, He is revealed as He is. This is valid not only for the Father, but for the Son and for the Holy Spirit as well (ǻȚȐȜȠȖȠȢ ‫ݽ‬ȡșȠįȩȟȠȣ ȝİIJȐ ǺĮȡȜĮĮȝȓIJȠȣ, 40; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p.203). God is simple by His own nature. But simplicity is not God’s nature. Simplicity, Palamas observes, is one of the divine energies (ȝȓĮ IJࠛȞ șİȓȦȞ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİȚࠛȞ). This means that it becomes participable, without offending the imparticipability of divine essence (ousia). Therefore, with their participation to the simplicity of God, angels and souls become simple (Gregory Palamas, ȆȡȩȢ ǻĮȞȚȒȜ ǹ‫ݫ‬ȞȠȣ 9, ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p.383; ǻȚȐȜȠȖȠȢ ‫ݽ‬ȡșȠįȩȟȠȣ ȝİIJȐ ǺĮȡȜĮĮȝȓIJȠȣ, 36; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p. 199; also see īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ĬİȠȜȩȖȠȣ, ȁȩȖȠȢ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJȐ ĬİȠijȐȞȚĮ, 7,PG 36,317D). Saint Gregory Palamas’ opponents, by claiming that he cannot admit simplicity of God in his theological system, they didn’t only use his teaching about the discernment between essence (ousia) and energy (energia), but they also explicitly accused St Gregory Palamas of admitting multiple divinities, in addition to the Triune God. They did not hesitate to resort to counterfeiting his texts, in order to support their own claim. Thus, through the published work of monk Nephon the Candidate, under the assumed name of Demetrios Kydones (and which one can find in Patrologiae Graeca and has a strong polemic anti-hesychastic character), there is cited the following passage which is portrayed as Palamas’ text: “One is the divinity of the three substances; that is, its nature and essence is supra-essential, simple, invisible, incomprehensible, and imparticipable in any way; all other divinities that are called 'God' by the saints, they can either be one or two or more” (ȂȓĮ ‫݋‬ıIJȓ IJࠛȞ IJȡȚࠛȞ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȦȞ șİȩIJȘȢ, ‫ݛ‬IJȠȚ ijȪıȚȢ țĮȓ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡȠȪıȚȠȢ, ܼʌȜ߱, ܻȩȡĮIJȠȢ,

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ܻʌİȡȚȞȩȘIJȠȢ, ܻȝȑșİțIJȠȢ ʌĮȞIJȐʌĮıȚȞ. ǹ‫ ݨ‬įȑ ܿȜȜĮȚ ʌĮȡȐ IJࠛȞ ܼȖȓȦȞ ȜİȖȩȝİȞĮȚ șİȩIJȘIJİȢ, İ‫ݫ‬IJİ ȝȓĮ, İ‫ݫ‬IJİ įȪȠ, İ‫ݫ‬IJİ ʌȜİȓȠȣȢ; ȀĮIJȐ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, PG 154, 848BC). But the original passage, which one can find in Palamas' writings is totally different; in addition. it explicitly discards the multiplication of divinities. The actual passage reads: “One is the divinity of the three substances; that is, its nature and essence is supra-essential, simple, invisible, imparticipable, incomprehensible in any way; if one of the other energies is called divine by the saints, whether one, or two or more... all these are called processions and expressions and powers and energies of the one divinity (that I mentioned above) and naturally they come out of this divinity and without subtracting anything from it” (ȂȓĮ ȖȐȡ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ IJࠛȞ IJȡȚࠛȞ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȦȞ șİȩIJȘȢ, ‫ݛ‬IJȠȚ ijȪıȚȢ țĮȓ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡȠȪıȚȠȢ, ܼʌȜ߱, ܻȩȡĮIJȠȢ, ܻȝȑșİțIJȠȢ, ʌĮȞIJȐʌĮıȚȞ ܻʌİȡȚȞȩȘIJȠȢ. Ǽ‫ ݧ‬įȑ IJȚȢ ܿȜȜȘ IJࠛȞ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİȚࠛȞ ʌĮȡȐ IJࠛȞ ܼȖȓȦȞ ȜȑȖȠȚIJȠ șİȩIJȘȢ, İ‫ݫ‬IJİ ȝȓĮ, İ‫ݫ‬IJİ įȪȠ, İ‫ݫ‬IJİ ʌȜİȓȠȣȢ...IJĮࠎIJĮ IJȠȓȞȣȞ ݀ʌĮȞIJĮ ʌȡȩȠįȠȓ İ‫ݧ‬ıȚ țĮȓ ‫݋‬țijȐȞıİȚȢ țĮȓ įȣȞȐȝİȚȢ țĮȓ ‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮȚ IJ߱Ȣ ȝȚߢȢ șİȩIJȘIJȠȢ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȘȢ, ijȣıȚțࠛȢ ʌȡȠıȠࠎıĮȚ IJĮȪIJ߯ țĮȓ ܻȞĮijĮȚȡȑIJȦȢ; ǻȚȐȜȠȖȠȢ ‫ݽ‬ȡșȠįȩȟȠȣ ȝİIJȐ ǺĮȡȜĮĮȝȓIJȠȣ, 27; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p. 189-190; more on this in ȂĮȞIJȗĮȡȓįȘ, 1998, pp.248-250).

Only God can be absolutely simple, who also is the source of every simplicity. The simple creatures, like angels or the souls of men, are not totally simple neither are they simple by their nature. Their simplicity is secondary and relative. They become and are referred to as “simple” according to their participation in the divine simplicity and in comparison to material bodies (which are not simple). For this reason, sometimes they are presented simple and other times not, depending on their states, their passions, and the corruption that they suffer. But God is not simple by comparison (ܻʌȩ ıȣȖțȡȓıİȦȢ) or by communion (ܻʌȩ ȝİșȑȟİȦȢ), but by Himself and as the transmitter of simplicity; He is the “one who imparts from himself simplicity properly to each” (‫ ݸ‬țĮIJĮȜȜȒȜȦȢ ʌĮȡ’ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȠࠎ ȝİIJĮįȚįȠȪȢ ‫݌‬țȐıIJ࠙ IJ߱Ȣ ܼʌȜȩIJȘIJȠȢ; ǻȚȐȜȠȖȠȢ ‫ݽ‬ȡșȠįȩȟȠȣ ȝİIJȐ ǺĮȡȜĮĮȝȓIJȠȣ, 55; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p.216). Simplicity, according to Saint Gregory Palamas, and according to the tradition of the Orthodox Church in general, has not only a theological importance, but also a soteriological one. Salvation of man itself is accomplished by man’s elevation to simplicity. The uncontrollable fragmentation, in which man has fallen through his disobedience to the divine will, is healed through the restoration of his unity, which, ultimately, is his elevation to the fullness of divine simplicity. This work, which was established by Christ through His incarnation, every Christian is called to imitate by observing the commandments.

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Christ is the new Adam, the new creation. As the non-composite Logos of God assumed in His hypostasis the composite human nature, He gave to it the ability to lead the whole of creation unto the unity of divine simplicity. In that way, man as the conjunction or partaker of everything (‫ސ‬Ȣ ıȣȞįȡȠȝȒ IJȠࠎ ʌĮȞIJȩȢ) and recapitulation (or summation) of God’s creatures (ܻȞĮțİijĮȜĮȓȦıȚȢ IJࠛȞ IJȠࠎ ĬİȠࠎ țIJȚıȝȐIJȦȞ; ‫ݾ‬ȝȚȜȓĮ 53, 35; ȅੁțȠȞȩȝȠȣ, 1861, ı. 172), and with his single composite psychosomatic nature has the unique -among the creatures– privilege to unify and to offer in Divine Eucharist, through one's participation in it, the whole of creation to God. The whole hesychastic tradition that Saint Gregory Palamas defended is characterized by the movement towards the anthropological and the cosmological unity and simplicity and is supported by a significant theological foundation. Man as created, made in God’s image and after God’s likeness, is also an icon of divine simplicity. But divine simplicity, as any other divine characteristic, is maintained and perfected in man only with his participation in the divine energy and life. Although man is composite as any being in need, he is called during his lifetime to claim as his own and to assimilate the divine life and the divine simplicity as a charismatic fullness. This assimilation that initiates the deification of man and the salvation of the whole world is accomplished by the grace of God and by the ascetic struggle of man. Human mind (nous) at first, as it is exalted towards the first Mind or nous (ʌȡࠛIJȠȞ ȃȠࠎȞ), accepts according to its receptivity the betrothal of the good things that will come (IJȩȞ ܻȡȡĮȕࠛȞĮ IJࠛȞ ȝİȜȜȩȞIJȦȞ ܻȖĮșࠛȞ). In this way, he is himself altered and through himself alters: “the attached body towards the one that is more divine… foreshadowing the swallowing of the flesh by the spirit in the age that will come” (IJȩ ıȣȞȘȝȝȑȞȠȞ ıࠛȝĮ ʌȡȩȢ IJȩ șİȚȩIJİȡȠȞ... ʌȡȠȠȚȝȚĮȗȩȝİȞȠȢ IJȒȞ ‫ބ‬ʌȩ IJȠࠎ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ ‫݋‬ʌȓ IJȠࠎ ȝȑȜȜȠȞIJȠȢ Į‫ࠛݧ‬ȞȠȢ IJ߱Ȣ ıĮȡțȩȢ țĮIJȐʌȠıȚȞ -‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 1,3,33; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p.444). This alteration does not have a theoretical character, but an empirical one. It is not accomplished with the used perceptible way, but becomes perceived supraperceptibly (‫ބ‬ʌİȡĮȚıșȘIJࠛȢ Į‫ݧ‬ıșȘIJȒ -‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 1,2,3; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p.396). The perception of the good things that will come (Į‫ݫ‬ıșȘıȚȢ IJࠛȞ ȝİȜȜȩȞIJȦȞ ܻȖĮșࠛȞ) is experienced by man spiritually with the so called “spiritual” or “mental” senses. All these senses are summed up into one spiritual or mental sense that is termed thus, because it exceeds and excesses any natural sense. The man that is away from God is moving towards a continuously increasing fragmentation that is corroding his personal and social life. As

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he remains in this situation, he is unable to become fulfilled as a person and to approach the fullness of divine simplicity that he is an icon of. As God is simple and non-composite, he also wants the souls that are approaching him to be simple and pure (‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 1,2 ,3; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p.396). This approach starts with contemplation and the return of the mind (nous) into the heart, which according to Saint Gregory Palamas constitutes the “inner chamber of thoughts” (IJȩ IJࠛȞ ȜȠȖȚıȝࠛȞ IJĮȝİ߿ȠȞ -‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 1, 2 ,3; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p.396). When man remains focused on the tangible and corruptible, then his mind (nous) also becomes carnal. But when the mind (nous) returns into the heart and is exalted to God, then the flesh also is co-exalted with him. It is altered and it becomes a “house of God” (Ƞ‫ݫ‬țȘȝĮ ĬİȠࠎ -‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 1,2,9; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p.402). The hesychastic life with the one-sentenced prayer [“Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy upon me the sinner”], attends the return of the mind into the heart. This is accomplished with the synergy of divine grace and makes the man lord over his own self. In that way, he is unified and hence, he can direct his whole existence to God by applying the first and greatest command: “thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength” (ܻȖĮʌȒıİȚȢ ȀȪȡȚȠȞ IJȩȞ ĬİȩȞ ıȠȣ ‫݋‬ȟ ‫ݼ‬ȜȘȢ IJ߱Ȣ țĮȡįȓĮȢ ıȠȣ țĮȓ ‫݋‬ȟ ‫ݼ‬ȜȘȢ IJ߱Ȣ ȥȣȤ߱Ȣ ıȠȣ țĮȓ ‫݋‬ȟ ‫ݼ‬ȜȘȢ IJ߱Ȣ įȚĮȞȠȓĮȢ ıȠȣ țĮȓ ‫݋‬ȟ ‫ݼ‬ȜȘȢ IJ߱Ȣ ‫ݧ‬ıȤȪȠȢ ıȠȣ -Mark 12,30; also see Mat. 22,37). The body does not hinder the movement of man towards divine simplicity. On the contrary, it can be offered as a “place” (IJȩʌȠȢ) of approaching it. This is confirmed and not denied by the hesychastic movement. Quoting the Blessed John of Sinai, Palamas writes: “hesychast is the one that hastily confines the bodiless in the body” (‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮıIJȒȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ ‫ݸ‬ IJȩ ܻıȫȝĮIJȠȞ ‫݋‬Ȟ ıȫȝĮIJȚ ʌİȡȚȠȡȓȗİȚȞ ıʌİȪįȦȞ -‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 1,2,6; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p.399; ǿȦȐȞȞȘȢ, ȀȜ߿ȝĮȟ, 27,5). This awkward and paradox work unifies man and prepares his deification. Therefore, the whole hesychastic life is oriented towards the unification of man: unification of the fragmented mind (nous), collection of his immaterial mind inside the body, concentration of the whole man inside his inner body that is called heart (‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 1,2,3; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p.396). This unification effort becomes particularly effective through the one-sentenced prayer. As the simple God, to restore man to himself, Ǿe offers only one sentence, in the same way, the man, who seeks the unifying (İȞȠʌȠȚȩȢ) simplicity, refers to God with a onesentenced prayer (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ǽĮȤĮȡȓĮȢ, 2012, p.385 and after). God loves man. He does not want man to be divided; He wants him

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Simplicity of God according to St Gregory Palamas

whole. And, only when the broken and divided by sin and passions man is unified, he can stand in front his Creator and respond to His command. When man concentrates into himself and unto God, he becomes one spirit with God (‫ݐ‬Ȟ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ‫݋‬Ȟ Ȁȣȡȓ࠙). He is connected with the Logos God, unto whom, in an incomprehensible simplicity, he becomes of a single and universal form and transcends every division; this affirms Saint Maximus the Confessor's belief that the logoi of beings exist and are sustained in a simple and unified way (‫݌‬ȞȠİȚįࠛȢ țĮȓ İ‫ݧ‬ıȚ țĮȓ ‫ބ‬ijİıIJȒțĮıȚȞ; Maximus the Confessor, ȂȣıIJĮȖȦȖȓĮ 5, PG 91,681B). This vertical unity is also followed by the horizontal embrace in love of the whole world, unifying it. So, unity essentially becomes synonymous with simplicity. Man is unified, embraces the whole creation and refers (ܻȞĮijȑȡİȚ) Creation together with himself unto God, in that way manifesting his being made in God’s image (țĮIJ’ İ‫ݧ‬țȩȞĮ ĬİȠࠎ) in its fullness (ȆȡȩȢ ȄȑȞȘȞ 59, ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ 1992, p.224). The place that man and God meet is the heart of man. According to the typical illustration of the book of Revelation, Christ stands at the door and knocks. If someone listens to his voice and opens the door, he will enter and dine with him (Rev. 3,20). When the believer is actually united with Christ, then, as Apostle Paul writes, he acquires “the mind of Christ” (ȞȠࠎȞ ȋȡȚıIJȠࠎ; 1 Cor. 2,16) or, as Saint Gregory Palamas notes: “Christ is being befitted as a preceding or ruling member of man” (‫ސ‬Ȣ ȝȑȜȠȢ ‫ݘ‬ȖİȝȠȞȚțȩȞ ‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 1,3,16; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ 1962, p.426). Thus, he beholds the spiritual things, according to the measure with which he makes his mind (nous) receptive of divine enlightenment (Ibid). God’s truth doesn’t accept partition or division, but is divided indivisibly and is partaken without any division. And the spiritual sense of His truth is approached from man with divine enlightenment, when he has his mind clear from passions. This sense (which is both spiritual and not spiritual) becomes immediately perceptible, not only as the perception of the sensible, but more intensely (‫ݾ‬ȡߣ ȖȐȡ, Ƞ‫ރ‬ț Į‫ݧ‬ıșȒıİȚ ȝȑȞ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫ ݘ‬Į‫ݫ‬ıșȘıȚȢ įȑ IJȐ Į‫ݧ‬ıșȘIJȐ IJȡĮȞࠛȢ țĮȓ IJȡĮȞȩIJİȡȠȞ ‫ ݛ‬Į‫ވ‬IJȘ -‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 1,3,21; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ 1962, p.432). In this way, man is coming out of the cosmic fracture and multiplicity and partakes to the divine unity and simplicity. The completion of this participation is reserved in the age to come, where God united with each of the deified will have one energy with them (ȆȡȩȢ īĮȕȡߢȞ 29, ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ 1966, p.357; also see Maximus the Confessor, Ȇİȡȓ ܻʌȠȡȚࠛȞ, PG 91,1076C). This unity characterizes the Church as the body of Christ and as a community of deification. The Church is one. And the unity of the Church, as catholicity and wholeness, coincides with its truth and simplicity. As Saint Gregory Palamas notes: “the people of the Church of Christ are of

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the truth; the ones that are not of the truth, they are not of the Church of Christ either” (Ƞ‫ ݨ‬IJ߱Ȣ IJȠࠎ ȋȡȚıIJȠࠎ ‫ݑ‬țțȜȘıȓĮȢ IJ߱Ȣ ܻȜȘșİȓĮȢ İ‫ݧ‬ıȓǜ țĮȓ Ƞ‫ ݨ‬ȝȒ IJ߱Ȣ ܻȜȘșİȓĮȢ ‫ݻ‬ȞIJİȢ Ƞ‫ރ‬įȑ IJ߱Ȣ IJȠࠎ ȋȡȚıIJȠࠎ ‫ݑ‬țțȜȘıȓĮȢ İ‫ݧ‬ıȓȞ -݃ȞĮȓȡİıȚȢ ȖȡȐȝȝĮIJȠȢ ‫ݯ‬ȖȞĮIJȓȠȣ 3; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ 1966, p.627). The truth also is simplicity; it cannot be divided, neither can it be subtracted. The one which is true is one (‫ݐ‬Ȟ), while the lie is multi-faceted (ȥİࠎįȠȢ ʌȠȜȣıȤȚįȑȢ -Maximus the Confessor, ȀİijȐȜĮȚĮ șİȠȜȠȖȚțȐ, PG 91,1076Ǻ). Simplicity, as an uncreated energy of the God of Truth, embraces the whole creation, and through man, who stands at the borderline of the material and the spiritual world, directs everything towards the simplifying unity, towards their fulfillment in God.

Works Cited ਝȡȤȚȝĮȞįȡȓIJȘȢ ǽĮȤĮȡȓĮȢ (ǽĮȤȐȡȠȣ), ȆȚıIJȠȓ ıIJȒ įȚĮșȒțȘ IJ߱Ȣ ܻȖȐʌȘȢ, ਯııİȟ ਝȖȖȜȓĮȢ 2012. ȂĮȞIJȗĮȡȓįȘ, īİȦȡȖȓȠȣ, ȆĮȜĮȝȚțȐ, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ, 1998. ȅੁțȠȞȩȝȠȣ, Ȉ., İțį., īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ‫ݾ‬ȝȚȜȓĮȚ ȀǺ’, ਝșોȞĮȚ 1861. ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, Ȇ., İțį., īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJȩȝ. 1, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ 1962. —. İțį., īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJȩȝ. 2, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ 1966. —. İțį., īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJȩȝ. 4, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ 1988. —. İțį., īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJȩȝ. 5, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ 1992.

ST GREGORY PALAMAS AND ELDER SOPHRONIOS OF ESSEX1 PROFESSOR GEORGIOS MANTZARIDIS

St. Gregory Palamas is one of the most important Orthodox theologians of the fourteenth century and one of the most notable Fathers of the Church. Elder Sophrony is one of the most important theologians of experience in the twentieth century and one of the most notable Fathers of the contemporary Orthodoxy. Saint Gregory Palamas had to deal with the intellectualist theology of Barlaam of Calabria and his supporters. Elder Sophrony had to deal with the contemporary Western theology and the wider challenge of secularism. Elder Sophrony used to say that, without the theology of Saint Gregory Palamas, we cannot meet the great challenges of our times. Today, we could say that, without Elder Sophrony’s teaching about the person, we cannot meet the even greater challenges of our own times. The teaching of Elder Sophrony on the person repeats and renders in contemporary language the teaching of Saint Gregory on the deification of man. Saint Gregory Palamas met the important challenge of Christian humanism that questioned the quintessence of the Church as a community of deification, through his proposal that man's deification needs the uncreated energy of God. Elder Sophrony met the contemporary challenges of secularization and globalization that crush persons and annihilate communal life, through the hypostatic principle and man's calling to include in him all human existence and all Being. Saint Gregory and Elder Sophrony didn’t present new theological truths that were not existent previously in the Holy Bible and the Tradition of the Church. Through their use of language, terms and concepts of their age, they met challenges and attacks against the Christian faith with timeless truths of the Church Fathers and their personal way of life. Their shared purpose is to defend the truth about the renewal and deification of man in Christ. 1 Translation by Demetrios Kontoudis; corrected and edited by C. Athanasopoulos.

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A key element in the theology of Saint Gregory Palamas is the distinction between divine essence and divine energy. This distinction that has its roots in the Holy Bible was developed theologically in the Fathers of Cappadocia. Saint Gregory Palamas used this distinction to support the uncreated character of divine energy. This distinction does not introduce a theological innovation, but it is just a theological reworking of a patristic and theologically familiar concept. Every nature has its respective energy. Created nature has created energy, while the uncreated one has uncreated energy. God doesn’t remain incommunicable to man and neither does he communicate with him by using created mediums, but he comes into direct and personal communication with him via his uncreated energy. In this way, man takes part personally in the divine life and becomes god by grace. Palamite theology defends the truth of this renewal and deification of man in Christ, that is to say, of his becoming as a person in God's likeness (țĮșǯ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȓȦıȚȞ ĬİȠࠎ). Elder Sophrony used a similar approach. He used the theology of Saint Gregory Palamas, and especially the distinction between divine essence and divine energy, in order to speak boldly and in a cataphatic way about how to approach God. According to Elder Sophrony, Saint Gregory Palamas explained to us how to stand in front of God, how to know Him in a cataphatic way (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ, 19-11-1989). God’s energy, as Elder Sophrony receives it from Palamas, “is the living God” (‫ ݸ‬ȗࠛȞ ĬİȩȢ). Elder Sophrony notes that with God’s energy we experience the living God as He is accessible to human existence (ȕȚȫȞȠȣȝİ IJȩȞ ȗࠛȞIJĮ Ĭİȩ ʌȡȠıȚIJȩ ıIJȩ ܻȞșȡȫʌȚȞȠ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ -ibid). The exclusive use of apophaticism disconnects theology from ascetic life, transforming it into some kind of ideology. Apophatic theology should not be used for the elimination or reduction of the cataphatic, but as a complement to it and for lifting human existence to its full potential in its union with God. According to Saint Gregory Palamas, apophatic theology is not opposite nor does it nullify the cataphatic, but it indicates as true what is said in a cataphatic way about God and accomplishes this in pious way, because we are not the same as God (‫ܻ ݠ‬ʌȠijĮIJȚțȒ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬ȞĮȞIJȚȠࠎIJĮȚ, Ƞ‫ރ‬įȑ ܻȞĮȚȡİ߿ IJȒȞ țĮIJĮijĮIJȚțȒȞ, ܻȜȜȐ įİȓțȞȣıȚ IJȐ țĮIJĮijĮIJȚțࠛȢ ‫݋‬ʌȓ ĬİȠࠎ ȜİȖȩȝİȞĮ ܻȜȘș߱ ȝȑȞ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ țĮȓ İ‫ރ‬ıİȕࠛȢ ȜȑȖİıșĮȚ ‫݋‬ʌȓ ĬİȠࠎ, Ƞ‫ ރ‬țĮșǯ ‫ݘ‬ȝߢȢ įȑ IJĮࠎIJǯ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚȞ IJȩȞ ĬİȩȞ -ȀİijȐȜĮȚĮ ‫݌‬țĮIJȩȞ ʌİȞIJȒțȠȞIJĮ 123; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1992, p.104). Elder Sophrony similarly observes that the ultra-zealous followers of apophatic theology, in most of the cases, run the risk to accept their noetic, or even their philosophical theory about the inaccessibility and the incomprehensibility of God as the utmost perfection. Many of them tend

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even to claim that the view of the Uncreated Light is less than what men can see in the “Cloud of Unknowing” (ȖȞȩijȠȢ ܻȖȞȦıȓĮȢ). According to their limited abilities of perception the “Cloud of Unknowing” is the highest state human mind (ȞȠࠎȢ) can reach, when it is engaged in theology (ǹȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȩȞȚȠȢ, 2011, pp.299-300). The harmonic synthesis of cataphatic and apophatic theology inside the true perspective of unification with God was introduced by the teachings of the early Fathers of the Church, and fully adopted by Saint Gregory Palamas and Elder Sophrony. Following the spirit of the Palamite texts, Elder Sophrony spoke in contemporary language and used a different terminology; one that is more familiar to us today. Personhood or, to be more precise, hypostasis plays a key role in his theology, which he considers richer in meaning and more appropriate to deliver the true Christian teaching. He mentions hypostatism (‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJĮIJȚıȝȩ) and not personalism (ʌİȡıȠȞĮȜȚıȝȩ), introducing the concept of hypostatic principle (‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJĮIJȚț߱Ȣ ܻȡȤ߱Ȣ). He notes that the hypostatic principle, which characterizes the Triune God, also exists as a possibility (İȞ įȣȞȐȝİȚ) in man who is created according to God’s image (țĮIJ’İ‫ݧ‬țȩȞĮ ĬİȠࠎ); in order for his likeness to lead him to his Creator, his whole theology ultimately results in the defence of the same truth; the truth of man’s elevation to hypostasis or person exists in God's likeness (țĮșǯ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȓȦıȚȞ ĬİȠࠎ), which again is the road to his deification (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ, 7-8-1989). The theology of the person or hypostasis, in the way that is presented by Elder Sophrony, presupposes the teaching regarding the uncreated energies of Saint Gregory Palamas. This teaching, that has been passionately criticised by Barlaam of Calabria and his followers, draws also today the arrows of heterodox theologians without leaving uninfluenced also some Orthodox. The polemic against the teaching of Saint Gregory Palamas in our age necessary entails a polemic against the teaching of Elder Sophrony. In his polemic against Barlaam, Saint Gregory Palamas, while criticising the mistaken belief regarding the created character of the divine energies, also noted the need for emphasising the role of personhood. Adopting almost word for word what exists in Saint Gregory the Theologian's writings, Palamas claims that God, in His communication with Moses, didn’t say “I am the essence” but He said: “I am who Is”; because it is not through essence that being comes to exist, but through being essence comes to be; and He is the One who subsumed all being in Himself (ȀĮȓ IJࠜ ȂȦȣı߲ įȑ ȤȡȘȝĮIJȓȗȦȞ ‫ ݸ‬ĬİȩȢ, Ƞ‫ރ‬ț İ‫ݭ‬ʌİȞ ‫݋‬Ȗȫ İ‫ݧ‬ȝȚ ‫ ݘ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ, ܻȜȜǯ‫݋‬Ȗȫ İ‫ݧ‬ȝȚ ‫ޓ ݸ‬Ȟ [Exodus. 3,14]ǜ Ƞ‫ ރ‬ȖȐȡ ‫݋‬ț IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ ‫ޓ ݸ‬Ȟ, ܻȜȜ’ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ‫ݻ‬ȞIJȠȢ ‫ ݘ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮǜ Į‫ރ‬IJȩȢ ȖȐȡ ‫ޓ ݸ‬Ȟ ‫ݼ‬ȜȠȞ ‫݋‬Ȟ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJࠜ ıȣȞİȓȜȘijİ IJȩ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ -‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ

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‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 3, 2, 12; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p.666; also see Saint Gregory the Theologian, ȁȩȖȠȢ 45, 3; PG 36,625C). The elevation of essence to the status of being implies that being is against essence, which ultimately would mean the existence of being without essence. This mistake was noted recently in theological debates while discussing the concept of the person and some referred to the above cited verse from Saint Gregory Palamas to solve the problem. If we follow Saint Gregory Palamas here, we can avoid essentialism, which the Orthodox theologians correctly dismiss, but there is still the fear that we may embrace in its place personalism. This personalism is totally foreign to the Patristic tradition and to the theology of Saint Gregory Palamas. As Saint Gregory Palamas emphasizes, we can distinguish hypostasis from essence and we can present hypostasis' difference from essence, but we cannot find a hypostasis without an essence (Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫ݏ‬ıIJȚȞ ‫ݧ‬įİ߿Ȟ ‫ބ‬ʌȩıIJĮıȚȞ ȤȦȡȓȢ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ -ȆȡȩȢ īĮȕȡߢȞ 30; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, pp. 358-359). Divine hypostases are not parts of divine essence, because in each hypostasis exists the whole and perfect divinity (‫ݼ‬ȜȘ țĮȓ IJȑȜİȚĮ ‫ ݘ‬șİȩIJȘȢ -ȆȡȩȢ ȆĮࠎȜȠ ݃ıȐȞȘȞ, 9; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p. 371). Elder Sophrony discusses these Palamite Triadological Antinomies in his work “The unity of the Church in the image of the Holy Trinity” (‫ݠ‬ ‫݌‬ȞȩIJȘIJĮ IJ߱Ȣ ‫ݑ‬țțȜȘıȓĮȢ țĮIJ’ İ‫ݧ‬țȩȞĮ IJ߱Ȣ ݄ȖȓĮȢ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ; ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ, 2010b, p. 105 and after), as the key for an Orthodox understanding of what is a person. He believes that this Palamite discussion can safeguard the Orthodox theological thought from any deviation towards essentialism or personalism. Elder Sophrony insists that outside the three divine hypostases no divine essence can exist, but he also notes that neither any divine hypostasis can exist without divine essence. Divine essence is not ontologically prior neither it is more foundational than divine hypostasis. In addition, divine hypostasis cannot precede divine essence. Hypostasis and essence in God are one and the same. Between them there is no antithesis. This was clearly expressed with the revelation that was given to Moses: “I am”. Or put differently “I am Being”, “The One Who is, I am”… This identity is presented as a form of an extreme antinomy, due to the fact that the principle of divine hypostasis, because of its Triadic unity, cannot be reduced to an abstract divine essence. The simple and one Being, the Holy Trinity, reveals a unity of a totally different kind (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ 2010b, pp. 127-128). It is impossible to explain the divine hypostases just as some kind of “relations” inside divine essence. Hypostasis is the one “pole” or the one “aspect” of the one Being. His other “pole” or His other “aspect” is Essence (ibid, pp. 128-129).

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These comments offered by Elder Sophrony, that clearly define the frame within which the Theology of the Person or Hypostasis was developed by Saint Gregory Palamas and the Fathers of the Church, have a crucial importance for the correct approach of man as a person. Significant misconceptions that were recently supported in the debates of Orthodox theologians on personhood would have been avoided, if Elder Sophrony’s comments were taken into consideration. But, at the same time, it must be noted that, whereas in divinity there is no antithesis between essence and hypostasis, in humanity something different is observed. Here we have to observe a serious antithesis between essence and hypostasis, which is most tragic. The person is indeed in antithesis with his nature and his will in antithesis with his actions (see on this issue Rom. 7,15 and after). This is manifested in the experience of everyday life, which led some to support that man must conquer his nature and be released from it. But Orthodox Christian anthropology is against this view. As in divinity, in the same way in humanity, which is created in God’s image, there is no antithesis between essence and hypostasis. The antithesis, which is indeed manifested in action, is due to deviation; it is due to the human non natural mode of existence. Human nature was created in relation and reference to the divine nature. We were created, notes Saint Gregory Palamas repeating Apostle Peter, so that we might be partakers of divine nature (‫ݬ‬ȞĮ ȖİȞȫȝİșĮ șİȓĮȢ țȠȚȞȦȞȠȓ ijȪıİȦȢ; see 2 Pet. 1,4). This means, as he himself adds, that we were not previously joined with divine nature neither we were created as partakers of this nature (ĬİȠijȐȞȘȢ, 15; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1966, p.239). And while man had to move consciously and willingly towards the “in the likeness” (țĮș’ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȓȦıȚȞ), not only he has not done so, but he even walked in the opposite direction, embracing evil as his second nature. This double deviation was caused due to man’s pride. This is what alienated him from the life of virtue which was according to his nature and led him to an unnatural, spiteful and evil life. However, when man humbles himself and regains his natural reference towards God, then the antithesis that exists in him is lifted, he becomes at peace and lives the virtuous life that is according to his true nature (ȆȡȩȢ ȝȠȞĮȤȒȞ ȄȑȞȘȞ, 54; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1992, p. 222). So man is not called to conquer his nature or to be freed from it, but to go against its deviation, to conquer its passions and to direct it to the purpose for which he was created: to the likeness (ıIJȩ țĮș’ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȓȦıȚȞ), to the communion with the divine nature (șİȓĮȢ ijȪıİȦȢ). Through this perspective, man is called to fight against his flesh and hate his own self (Luk. 14,26). Through this perspective, the goals and methods of Christian

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ascesis are explained and achieved, which constitute the central axis in the life and the teaching of Saint Gregory Palamas and Elder Sophrony. And because pride was the cause of man’s deviation, therefore mourning and humbleness are highlighted as the main medicine in order to set him in the right path again. Saint Gregory Palamas, as Saint Philotheos (Kokkinos), Patriarch of Constantinople, his biographer and eulogist notes, had utmost humility and genuine love from the heart (‫݋‬ț țĮȡįȓĮȢ ܻȖȐʌȘȞ); he had deep compunction, mourning and ever flowing tears (Philotheos of Constantinople, ȁȩȖȠȢ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ ݀ȖȚȠȞ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȞ ȆĮȜĮȝߢȞ, PG 151, 569AB). This humility, which resembles Christ’s humility, according to Elder Sophrony, and which constitutes the other side of His love, is proposed as the only way towards the fulfillment of man and his likeness to Christ (ǹȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ 2010a, p.32 and p.89). In addition to compunction, mourning and tears, ascesis has a dominant position in the teaching of Elder Sophrony and brings back to memory the respective teaching and life of Saint Gregory Palamas. Finally, the ceaseless prayer of the heart, which Saint Gregory Palamas defended with strength against the attacks of Barlaam, gained a key importance in the life and writings for Elder Sophrony (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ, 2009a). For Saint Gregory Palamas and Elder Sophrony, the Jesus prayer [Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy upon me, the sinner] is not recommended only for monks, but it is recommended for all faithful. It is indeed noteworthy that Elder Sophrony's mention of Saint Silouan's constant will to pray for the whole world, is reminiscent of Saint Gregory Palamas' earlier (by six centuries) comment (in his “Homily on the Introduction of the Theotokos to the Temple”) that Theotokos is praying for the whole world (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ, 19–3–1990; and 2003, p.488; īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼, ‫ݾ‬ȝȚȜȓĮ 53, 39; ȅੁțȠȞȩȝȠȣ, 1861, p.177) Man’s deification or, in other words, the elevation and fulfillment of his hypostatic principle, is the result of a long and painful ascetic life. But the achievement of virtue and the cleansing of our senses, our minds and our hearts, through continuous ascesis restore peace in the soul of the faithful, as Saint Gregory Palamas writes, and they transform the tears of mourning and of repentance into joy and elation of the heart. Man then is freed from every earthly passion and tastes the divine blessedness (ȆȡȩȢ ȝȠȞĮȤȒȞ ȄȑȞȘȞ, 54-60; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1992, pp.221-224). In this charismatic state, as Elder Sophrony affirms, there is no need for further ascesis. The abundance of divine grace invalidates all natural laws. All events in human life take a positive character, free from internal conflicts (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ, 2010a, p.212).

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Saint Gregory Palamas writes that the man who is filled by the uncreated light hears and sees the invisible (įȚĮțȠȪİȚ țĮȓ ‫ݸ‬ȡߣ IJȐ ܻșȑĮIJĮ), becomes an earthly angel of God and brings with himself the whole of creation unto God, because he partakes of everything and he refers the whole of creation to God, who is above all, in order for his image to be an accurate description of his true ontology (..ܿȖȖİȜȠȢ ‫ސ‬Ȣ ܻȜȘșࠛȢ ܿȜȜȠȢ ‫݋‬ʌȓ Ȗ߱Ȣ ĬİȠࠎ ȖİȖȠȞȫȢ țĮȓ įȚ’ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȠࠎ ʌߢȞ İ‫ݭ‬įȠȢ țIJȓıİȦȢ Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ ʌȡȠıĮȖĮȖȫȞ, ‫݋‬ʌİȓ țĮȓ Į‫ރ‬IJȩȢ ‫݋‬Ȟ ȝİIJȠȤ߲ IJࠛȞ ʌȐȞIJȦȞ, țĮȓ IJȠࠎ ‫ބ‬ʌȑȡ IJȐ ʌȐȞIJĮ įȑ ȝİIJĮȜĮȖȤȐȞİȚ ȞࠎȞ, ‫ݬ‬ȞĮ țĮȓ IJȩ IJ߱Ȣ İ‫ݧ‬țȩȞȠȢ ܻʌȘțȡȚȕȦȝȑȞȠȞ ߃ -ȆȡȩȢ ȝȠȞĮȤȒȞ ȄȑȞȘȞ 59; ȆȡȩȢ ‫ݯ‬ȦȐȞȞȘȞ țĮȓ ĬİȩįȦȡȠȞ IJȠȪȢ ijȚȜoıȩijȠȣȢ 18; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1992, p. 224 țĮȓ p. 239; also, ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțȩȢ ʌȡȩȢ ݃țȓȞįȣȞȠȞ 7, 11, 36; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ,1970, p. 488). Here we have intact the core of the teaching of Elder Sophrony about the man-hypostasis. Every hypostasis, notes Elder Sophrony, is placed in a specific natural environment, which is gradually revealed and becomes the developmental context for the given hypostasis. Likeness to God exists in man’s hypostatic principle as its most inherent developmental condition. The created human hypostasis is called to include in it not only all of humanity and the whole of creation, but also the whole of the fullness of divine and human being (evidenced in Christ) by divine grace, bringing Christ in the praying heart, without man becoming god for the rest of the rational creatures (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ 2010a, p.251, p.257 and p.270). This is the quintessence of the teaching of Saint Gregory Palamas and Elder Sophrony on the deification of man. At this point, we should note the importance of this position for the right theological approach to the contemporary ecological crisis. This crisis is not superficial neither can it be treated only with legal measures and a change in the external behavior of man. The ecological crisis is caused by the inner crisis of man, and the disengagement of the mind from his heart. It springs from man’s failure to embrace with love the whole of creation and to refer creation and himself unto God. The ecological crisis begins from the crisis of man as a person, as hypostasis. And the pollution of the environment reflects the inner pollution of man; the pollution in his mind and in his heart. Without the cleansing of heart from the spiteful dispositions and of the mind from the spiteful thoughts, it is not possible for man to have the right relationships with the world. If man doesn’t start with the crisis that exists in himself, he cannot solve the ecological problem. The renewal of the world presupposes the renewal of human hypostasis. Saint Gregory Palamas' life shows in a practical way the truth of his teachings about the deification of man. It is characteristic that, although he

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had written about hesychia (silence/quietness) motivated from his observations regarding the life of some of his fathers and brothers in Christ, he never dared to write about theosis (deification). Only when the need arose, because of the attacks of Barlaam, he decided to speak, knowing again that an accurate description of the process of deification with human words is impossible: because it remains unknown to all who do not have experience of it (țĮȓ ȜİȖȠȝȑȞȘ ܿȡȡȘIJȠȢ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȘ ȝȑȞİȚ, ȝȩȞȠȚȢ ‫݋‬ȞȫȞȣȝȠȢ...IJȠ߿Ȣ İ‫ރ‬ȝȠȚȡȘțȩıȚȞ Į‫ރ‬IJ߱Ȣ -‫ދ‬ʌȑȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ 3, 1, 32; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1962, p.644). But again, he avoided, because of his humility, to present publicly experiences of spiritual revelations, which he must have had in abundance. Elder Sophrony, in a similar fashion, also avoided making public experiences of spiritual revelations. But when he came to the end of his life and he was very old, while he was day and night fatigued from his bodily afflictions and when he experienced the burden of the criticism of men, he decided to open his heart. Participating in the tragedy of the sufferings of millions of people, who are spread all over the face of the earth bearing their own burdens of sin and affliction, he wrote and delivered sermons, so that he can help at least some of them deal with their temptations and face them more courageously (ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ, 2010a, p. 12). Saint Gregory had the blessing to be born and raised in a family that was struggling for holiness. All the members of his family had evident attributes of holiness, which were cultivated further by him and were peaked in his person. The unusual ascesis, the ceaseless prayer, the unceasing tear, his unwavering dedication to the Orthodox faith, the ceaseless struggle for the truth, peace and justice, the complete poverty, the great humility, the boundless love and at the end the experience of the presence of the uncreated light were the key characteristics of his personality. He is the man that lived theosis already from this life. He is a true example -according to Elder Sophrony’s terminology- of the manhypostasis. The family of Elder Sophrony did not display the spiritual homogeneity in holiness like the family of Saint Gregory. His mother was faithful and according to the testimony of Saint John of Krostand a “just person”. Very pious also was his nanny that had a great influence in his spiritual formation during his childhood. But in general “some diversity of opinions and worldviews” was detected in his household (ǹȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ 2009b, p.13 and after). But also himself, despite the great spiritual experiences he had from his childhood, he was attracted for a while in his youth to eastern religions. These reasons combined with the

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St Gregory Palamas and Elder Sophronios of Essex

particular demands of the modern age must have contributed to giving an experiential emphasis in his theology and not have the apodeictic methodology, which Saint Gregory Palamas followed. Referring to his experiences of spiritual revelations, he notes that these were not absorbed immediately from his reason, in the form of his dogmatic consciousness. (ȆȑȡĮıĮȞ įİțĮİIJȓİȢ ʌȡȓȞ ȜȐȕȠȣȞ ȝȠȡijȒ įȠȖȝĮIJȚț߱Ȣ ıȣȞİȚįȒıİȦȢ - ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ 2010a, p.12). His work “‫ݽ‬ȥȩȝİșĮ IJȩȞ ĬİȩȞ țĮșȫȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ” (We Shall See Him as He is) can be considered as one of his most representative, where he presents dogmatic truths of Christianity as he unfolds the “story of his soul” (‫ݨ‬ıIJȠȡȓĮ IJ߱Ȣ ȥȣȤ߱Ȣ; ibid, p. 255). Elder Sophrony, analyzed the concept of hypostasis on the basis of his description of Saint Silouan of Holy Mountain. In Saint Silouan’s person, his hypostasis, he was seeing the deified man, the complete human hypostasis, which embraces with love the whole divine and human existence and keeps it in his heart. This man-hypostasis he exemplified in himself, when he decided to follow Christ, raise his cross and march to Golgotha. He lived as a monk that tried to have only Christ in him; this he said answering in grace the challenge that came from an Athonite monk few weeks before his death. In this way, he lived perfection, as defined by Saint Gregory Palamas, referring to Saint Gregory the Theologian and saying “this is perfection for us, to allow only God within us” (ȉȠࠎș’ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ ‫ ݘ‬IJİȜİȓȦıȚȢ, IJȩ ȝȩȞȠ IJȠࠎ ȝȩȞȠȣ ĬİȠࠎ ȤȦȡȘIJȚțȠȪȢ ȖİȞȑıșĮȚ ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțȩȢ ʌȡȩȢ ݃țȓȞįȣȞȠȞ 6, 4, 9; ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, 1970 p.386; also see Saint Gregory the Theologian ȁȩȖȠȢ 30, 6; PG 36,112B). But, by having Christ in him, Elder Sophrony also had the whole world in him. As Saint Gregory Palamas, he did not base his anthropology in the philosophical currents of his age. Elder Sophrony and Saint Gregory Palamas based their anthropology on the experience based tradition of the Church, which they lived and have known by themselves from the inside, as its living witnesses and martyrs (ȗȦȞIJĮȞȠȓ ȝȐȡIJȣȡİȢ - ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ 2010a, p.143). Of course, as we have said, they used the language, the terms and the concepts of their times, as the former Fathers of Church also did. But this didn’t influence the essence of their teaching. On the contrary, the use of these terms and concepts opened new horizons to both theological and philosophical thought. Academic discussions of the Patristic texts try to find sources and influences. In a similar fashion, there are academic discussions that try to find similar sources and influences in the texts of Saint Gregory Palamas and of Elder Sophrony. Thus, we have available academic studies that stress the platonic or neo-platonic influences in the work of Saint Gregory Palamas, personalistic influences on the work of Elder Sophrony and so

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on. Indeed, a superficial reading of their works can easily lead scholars astray in their interpretations. But when someone attempts a more careful reading, the impression that he receives is totally different. The words and the patterns of expression are not identical with the truth that is implied, but they are simple and relative means for an indication towards this truth. And the comprehension of this truth cannot be achieved outside the spirit that is behind these words and expressions.

Works Cited ਝȡȤȚȝ. ȈȦijȡȠȞȓȠȣ (ȈĮȤȐȡȦij), ‫ݾ‬ȝȚȜȓĮ ʌȡȩȢ IJȒȞ ȀȠȚȞȩIJȘIJĮ, Dzııİȟ, 19-111989. —. ‫ݾ‬ȝȚȜȓĮ ʌȡȩȢ IJȒȞ ȀȠȚȞȩIJȘIJĮ, Dzııİȟ, 7-8-1989. —. ‫݀ ݾ‬ȖȚȠȢ ȈȚȜȠȣĮȞȩȢ ‫݃ ݸ‬șȦȞȓIJȘȢ, ਯııİȟ ਝȖȖȜȓĮȢ, 2003. —. Ȇİȡȓ ʌȡȠıİȣȤ߱Ȣ, ਯııİȟ ਝȖȖȜȓĮȢ, 2009a. —. īȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ ıIJȒ ȇȦıȓĮ, ਯııİȟ ਝȖȖȜȓĮȢ 2009b. —. ‫ݽ‬ȥȩȝİșĮ IJȩȞ ĬİȩȞ țĮșȫȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ, ਯııİȟ ਝȖȖȜȓĮȢ, 2010a. —. ݇ıțȘıȘ țĮȓ șİȦȡȓĮ, ਯııİȟ ਝȖȖȜȓĮȢ 2010b. —. ȉȩ ȝȣıIJȒȡȚȠ IJ߱Ȣ ȤȡȚıIJȚĮȞȚț߱Ȣ ȗȦ߱Ȣ, ਯııİȟ ਝȖȖȜȓĮȢ 2011. ȅੁțȠȞȩȝȠȣ, Ȉ., İțį., īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ‫ݾ‬ȝȚȜȓĮȚ ȀǺ’, ਝșોȞĮȚ 1861. ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, Ȇ., İțį., īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJȩȝ. 1, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ 1962. —. İțį., īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJȩȝ. 2, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ 1966. —. İțį., īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJȩȝ. 3, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ 1970. —. İțį., īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, IJȩȝ. 5, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ 1992.

THE THEOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE FILIOQUE IN THE WORK OF ST GREGORY PALAMAS1 PROFESSOR DIMITRIOS TSELENGIDES

St Gregory Palamas renewed and gave new directions to the 14th c. theological discourse providing a dramatic influence to the later Orthodox theology and life. His theological contribution was recognised very early; while alive he was named “teacher of piety, ruler of holy doctrine, pillar of correct opinion and defender of the Church”. In his attempt to defend, highlight and establish theologically the spiritual content of the hesychastic life, he examined the theological presuppositions of the Latins, which led them to their chief dogmatic error and ultimately fall: the Filioque. In this paper, we will limit ourselves mainly to the Two Apodeictic Orations on the Holy Spirit, with which he attacked the theological agnosticism of Barlaam, carrier of the humanistic tendencies of his time. Barlaam considered the theological discussion of Filioque as without meaning, because for him (Barlaam) God is completely incomprehensible. In opposition to this view, Palamas believed that the epistemological approach to the Triune God is both possible and certain, through the partaking of the uncreated divine energies by someone who is within the Church (1, 50). Barlaam, taking for granted that it is impossible to prove what is true in theology, stressed that it is not wrong for someone to accept two origins (ܻȡȤȑȢ) in the Triune God, i.e., the Father and the Son, but not in division nor in opposition to each other (First Letter to Akindynos, 2; 1, 12). Barlaam simply accepted the one origin as indirect (‫ݏ‬ȝȝİıȘ) and the other as direct (ܿȝİıȘ). In the West, the theological position of Filioque was formulated much earlier by distinguished Latin theologians, from St Augustine and Anselm of Canterbury to Thomas Aquinas. The Latins, realising that there is a 1 Translated and edited by C. Athanasopoulos.

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danger in admitting a dyarchy (dual principle) in the Holy Trinity, considered the dual origin as in essence coming from one (tanquam ab uno principio). according to the terminology adopted by the Council of Lyon (Mansi XXIV, 81d). On Palamas' account the Latins are admitting the Son as the second cause of the Holy Spirit (2, 32). St Gregory Palamas is based for his theological arguments primarily on the “infallible belief” of the Ecumenical Council of Nicea-Constantinople, which he considered as inspired by the Holy Spirit and expressing the true beliefs of all the Church, both in the West and in the East. He also believed that it was delivered to the subsequent generations in its totality, without admitting any addition or corruption (1, 76). The Second Ecumenical Council does not allow anyone to add to or to change something from the Creed. If anyone changes something in the Creed, he is liable to excommunication and does not belong to the true Church, within which only the ones who “are in truth” belong (Against Akindynos 1, 10). Filioque was not revealed by the Holy Spirit, does not exist in the texts of the Holy Apostles, and no Ecumenical Council admitted a similar position (1, 3). For this reason, Palamas considers Filioque as “perverse” (‫ݏ‬țijȣȜȠȞ) addition to the Creed, as fighting against God (șİȠȝĮȤȓĮ) (2, 28), as Latin innovation (ȜĮIJȚȞȚțȒ țĮȚȞȠIJȠȝȓĮ) (2, 52), as evil belief (țĮțȠįȠȟȓĮȞ), and does not recognise as true the claims of the Latins that they believe the same as the Orthodox and that their difference is only terminological. According to Palamas, the difference between the Orthodox and the Latins is considerable, because the Orthodox do not accept that the Holy Spirit can have as its origin the Son; the Latins accept this position on the origin of the Holy Spirit and thus, it is impossible for the Orthodox and the Latins to have the same concept of the Holy Spirit. The difference between the Orthodox and the Latins is not only limited to doctrine but also in relation to what is considered as a valid approach towards doctrine: they do not recognise in the Creed a truth that cannot be reduced, increased, changed. According to Palamas, the Latins “are impious in their doctrine about the origin of the Holy Spirit in the Son” (2, 32). This very act makes them condemned by the true Church, as St Paul notes (Gal., 1:8; 2, 36), and Palamas wonders at the excessive absurdity (ʌĮȡȐȞȠȚĮ) of the Latins on this issue (2, 32). The Latins are insane (ʌĮȡĮijȡȠȞȠࠎȞ) in their attempt to distort the Father's sayings (2, 42) and they are not sound in their minds (ijȡİȞȠȕȜĮȕࠛȢ), in considering the procession from the Son as evidence for the Holy Spirit's timeless origin from the Son, because this procession is the result of the good will (İ‫ރ‬įȠțȓĮ) of the Son and the power (‫݋‬ȟȠȣıȓĮ) of the Holy Spirit (2, 44). In addition, Palamas insists that Filioque is not

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The Theological Presuppositions in the Work of St Gregory Palamas

only going against the tradition, but it also is against the very words of the Son in the New Testament, because the Son is rejecting that He has the property of causality stating: “my Father is greater than me”. The term “greater” (ȝİȓȗȦȞ), in this case, for the Hesychast theologian, refers to causality in the Godhead (1, 1). The Orthodox Church recognises the equality of the Son with the Father in terms of nature and confesses that the Father is greater than the Son in terms of causality (ĮȓIJȚȠ) (2, 1). For Palamas, the Latins are impious (‫݋‬țIJȩȢ IJ߱Ȣ İ‫ރ‬ıİȕİȓĮȢ) because of the Filioque, and for this reason they are not of the true Church (IJ߱Ȣ ‫ݑ‬țțȜȘıȓĮȢ ‫ݏ‬ȟȦ ıIJȒıȠȝİȞ). It is not only that they have lost the true faith, but their whole approach is problematic (he names them ܻȞȐȖȦȖȠȚ țĮȚ ܻȞIJȚȜȑȖȠȞIJİȢ) (B, 1). He also finds that the Latins are even against the writings of St John Damascene, even though they use some of his sayings to distort them. All the local Churches, at some point in their lives, have lost their true faith, but subsequently they have united with the true Church; the Latins however, cannot return to the true Church, due to their distortions in the Creed and in their attitude towards the Creed. For Palamas, what happened to the Latins is what happens to an elephant (they say that if an elephant falls to the ground it cannot raise itself) (2, 2). It is particularly important for Palamas here to find and characterise appropriately the spiritual disease that makes the Latins remain in their dogmatic fall from the Orthodox doctrine. He finds that the cause for such a behaviour is “typhos” (IJȪijȠȢ2). He believes that this is a passion (disease) that can have no cure by itself (ܻȞȓĮIJȠȞ) and it needs effort and a conscious decision to seek external help to be cured from this disease. It is only after they distance themselves from this typhos that the Latins can accept the divinely inspired words and can be truly cured (2, 2). In reality, Palamas insists, no one can help them but themselves. It is they who remain in their fall through their conscious effort. Any effort from others to guide them out of their fall is returned without any effect but is deemed by God as benevolence. Due to this acquired habit of distorted knowledge (ʌİijȣıȚȦȝȑȞȘ ȖȞȫıȘ), Latins have lost their senses (ܻijȡȠıȪȞȘ) and have lost all divinely inspired knowledge and good will (2, 5). Thus, Filioque is ultimately due to the ignorance of the Latins, and their confused theological thoughts, with the result of distancing themselves from all divinely inspired words (șİȩȜİțIJĮ ȜȩȖȚĮ) (2, 18). It would be useful to see at this point the details of Palamas' critique on the Latin's theological positions. Latins attempt to provide some basis for 2 ȉȪijȠȢ is an ancient Greek word that was used from the time of Hippocrates (460 BC-377 BC) to describe both a feverish disease and a mental aberration or megalomania.

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their Filioque through a re-interpretation of Gal. 4:6 : “And God sent forth the spirit of His Son into our hearts”. St Gregory Palamas here stresses that the Holy Spirit is mentioned here as “of His Son” not with the meaning that it comes from the Son, but only that it resides in the Son naturally and timelessly (Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, ܻȜȜ’ ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬Ȟ IJࠜ Ȋ‫ ࠜݨ‬ijȣıȚțࠛȢ ‫݋‬ȟ ܻȧįȓȠȣ ‫ݻ‬Ȟ) (2, 29). The Holy Spirit is the same as the Son in terms of its essence and nature, but it is not dependent existentially on the Son. In terms of energy is together with the Son and can be sent from the Son, but in terms of its existence, this is due not to the Son but to the One who gave birth to the Son (2, 30; 1, 9). The personhood of the Holy Spirit is essentially and without any distance united with the Son; He is with Him naturally. So, it makes sense to say that the Holy Spirit comes as “of the Son”; but, as a person, the Holy Spirit can only come from the Father. Of the Son and from the Son it is sent to the worthy in terms of divine illumination and appearance of the Son to them (2, 74). As an energy (‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮ) the Holy Spirit comes forth not only from the Father, but also from the Son, and also on its own (ʌĮȡ’ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȠࠎ Į‫ރ‬IJİȟȠȣıȓȦȢ) (2, 81). And now we arrive to these questions: How did the Latins arrive to this doctrinal fall (Filioque)? And furthermore what are the theological presuppositions that led them to this doctrinal deviation from the Creed? First, let us refer briefly to the history of the Filioque. The change in the Creed that the Filioque indicates was suggested for the first time in Toledo (Spain) in 547 and the phrase que filio was added at the Creed that was composed there. In the same city, another local Council, in 589, added the Filioque to the Creed of Nicea/ Constantinople. It did this so as to defend the dual nature of the Son against the then existent in Spain heresy of Arianism (which claims that Jesus is a creation and does not partake of divine nature). In this way, while Filioque raised the Son to the category of the Uncreated, it downgraded the status of the Holy Spirit as a divine person. From Spain, Filioque was passed on to the Creeds of the Churches of the Franks (in 767). Lastly, in 1014, Pope Benedict VIII accepted officially the Filioque addition to the Creed, after pressure from the Emperor Henry II. This addition was declared as dogma in the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 and later at the Council of Lyon in 1274 and at the Council of Florence in 1439. All these Councils are considered as Ecumenical by the Roman Catholics and this makes it even more difficult for them to admit their fall. But there are also particular theological presuppositions for the establishment of the Filioque, that made it easier for the Latins to latch onto their erroneous views. According to Palamas, Filioque as a theological position is due to the Latin's confusion regarding the timeless

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The Theological Presuppositions in the Work of St Gregory Palamas

way of existence of the three divine persons and regarding their mode of appearance in the world. In other words, the Latins are committed to what in the Orthodox Church is known as confusion between Theology and Economy. This means that there is an attempt to confuse the Triadic relations at the level of Economy with the timeless Triadic relations, i.e., relations that existed before time. And this is due to the fact that the Latins do not allow for a distinction between essence (Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ) and energy (‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİȓĮȢ) in God. In this way, the procession or sending forth of the Holy Spirit to the world from the Son, that takes place in time, and it is understood and lived by the Orthodox as partaking of the uncreated energy of the Triune God, is identified by the Latins with the particular mode of existence of the Holy Spirit as Divine Person. So it is obvious for Palamas that Latins confuse the hypostatic properties of the Triune God with His natural and essential energies (1, 15). For this reason, the Latins assign the procession property not only to the hypostasis of God the Father but also to the hypostasis of God the Son. For the Orthodox, all three persons of the Triune God have energies through which they show themselves to and intervene in the world. The Triune God is the Creator, but the Triune God does not beget the Son nor the Triune God sends forth the Holy Spirit. Divine Grace (ȋȐȡȘ IJȠࠎ ĬİȠࠎ) and sometimes so called Spirit (ȆȞİࠎȝĮ), which in these texts has a similar meaning, belongs to each one of the divine persons. But the fountain of the living water of divine Grace (ȗࠛȞIJȠȢ ‫ވ‬įĮIJȠȢ IJ߱Ȣ șİȓĮȢ ȋȐȡȚIJȠȢ) is the Triune God (2, 64). According to the Saint, if the Holy Spirit, as a divine Person, has as its cause both the Father and the Son, then He cannot be God but a creation of God, because it is an established theological truth that “of all creation caused by the Father, the Son is also a cause” (1, 15). In addition, if the hypostatic properties of God become identical to the natural ones, then the Holy Spirit will not proceed only from the Father and the Son but also from the Holy Spirit, resulting in a timeless quad (four persons God) instead of the timeless Holy Trinity that the true Church believes in (1, 15). As a consequence of the above, the procession property cannot be a common property to all three persons of the Holy Trinity. Common in all three persons are only the properties of their one divine nature or put differently the uncreated divine energies emanating from their nature. According to the Saint and all of Orthodox Theology, there is a clear distinction between the nature, the hypostases and the energies of the Triune God. So, the Holy Spirit proceeds timelessly from God the Father and rests in the Son. But He is emanating as Divine Grace from both. And actually from the Holy Spirit also, as one of the persons of the one Triune

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God. Furthermore, if the divine Grace is confused with the hypostasis (person) of the Holy Spirit, as Latins frequently do, then for Palamas, the Saints, as partakers of divine Grace, become gods themselves and equal to Christ (‫ݸ‬ȝȩșİȠȚ țĮȓ ‫ݸ‬ȝȩIJȚȝȠȚ), because they unite in their hypostasis with the Holy Spirit (Letter to Athanasios of Kyzikos 33). But such an inevitable conclusion (if one follows through the argument of the Latins) distorts ontologically both the Theology and the Anthropology of the true Church. This is why Palamas insists that only with the clear and real distinction between essence (Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ) and energy (‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİȓĮȢ) in God can there be an existential procession (‫ބ‬ʌĮȡțIJȚțȒ ʌȡȩȠįȠȢ) of the Holy Spirit from the Father and a procession in terms of appearance and energies to the Son (țĮIJ’ ‫݋‬ȝijĮȞIJȚțȒȞ țĮȓ Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ ‫ބ‬ʌĮȡțIJȚțȒȞ ʌȡȠȑȜİȣıȚȞ). This distinction also allows for a correct interpretation of the New Testament truth that the faithful can become partakers of divine nature (țȠȚȞȦȞȠȓ șİȓĮȢ ijȪıİȦȢ) (2 Peter 1:4). But as Latins confuse the hypostatic with the natural properties of God, according to Palamas, they confuse the mission of the Holy Spirit (ܻʌȠıIJȠȜȒ) with His procession (‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȘ). In this way, they confuse procession with the good will (İ‫ރ‬įȠțȓĮ) and will (șȑȜȘıȘ) of God. But this is a confused doctrine regarding the existence of the Triune God, because, in this way, the Holy Spirit becomes part of creation: according to the Fathers, God created through His will, so if God separates His will from the Holy Spirit, this turns Him into a part of creation (2, 22). It is on this issue that Palamas claims that Latins come close to Arianism. As Arianism claimed that the Son came into existence through the will of the Father, so the Latins believe that the Holy Spirit came into existence via the will of the Father and the Son, due to their (Latins') confusion of procession with mission, good will and will. From what we discussed above, we can conclude that the primary cause of the Latins' erroneous theological presuppositions and ultimately their Filioque is their typhos. This typhos invalidated the presence of the Holy Spirit in the West. According to Palamas and the Orthodox East this presence and life in the Holy Spirit provides the experiential knowledge that “the gift of the Holy Spirit is divine illumination (șİȓĮ ‫ݏ‬ȜȜĮȝȥȘ)” (2, 28). Being denied divine illumination, the Latins led themselves to the confusion between the hypostatic and the natural properties of God, i.e., the most important theological presupposition of Filioque. According to Palamas, the Latins, due to their insistence in the Filioque, lost all Grace and so forfeited their union with the true faith and the partaking of the energies of the Holy Spirit (1, 15). So, while the Latins maintain their Filioque, there is no possibility for a union with the Orthodox Church.

PATRISTIC EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IN GREGORY PALAMAS DR GEORGIOS PANAGOPOULOS

Introduction As the title suggests, it is not my purpose here to give an overview of St. Gregory Palamas’ teaching about the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone. Nor is this to be a thorough investigation of Palamas’ reception and evaluation of patristic testimonies concerning the problem of the Holy Spirit’s procession – although this may actually be implied by the perhaps misleading generality of my paper’s title. Rather, I’ll be endeavouring to analyse the Palamas’ theological interpretation of just a few specially selected patristic passages, which appear to be supporting the Latin teaching of Filioque. My investigation will focus mainly on the well known passage from Gregory of Nyssa’s Ad Ablabium and, secondly on brief quotations mainly derived from Thesaurus of St. Cyril of Alexandreia. My intention is to cast light on the well-structured methodological way with which Palamas, in approaching these texts, manages to summarize the Orthodox faith concerning the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone, i.e., the distinctions between ‫ބ‬ʌȩıIJĮıȚȢ and Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ but also between theologia and oikonomia, as a doctrine based absolutely on the experience of the Saints, Apostles and the Fathers.

A. Gregory of Nyssa’s passage from Ad Ablabium Gregory’s passage from Ad Ablabium (GNO III/1 ) occupies a crucial place within the context of Palamas' 2nd Oration on the Procession of the Holy Spirit. Shortly before the end of this small work, Gregory of Nyssa explains to Ablabius that, if we believe in the existence of three divine Persons, we can maintain the absolute uniqueness of the divine nature; he then embarks on the refutation of a possible objection: if one does not

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accept a difference between the nature of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, then one is obliged to accept a mixture or a synthesis of the divine hypostases. Because, in the present case, he is particularly concerned to show that the second Hypostasis is and remains the only begotten Son of the Father, although the Holy Spirit derives also from the Father, he proceeds as follows: “Although we are confessing the identity of the divine nature, we don’t deny the difference [of the divine Persons] between the cause and the caused, according to which we perceive only the difference between each (the Persons); and we do so because we believe that the one is a cause and the other is from the cause. Nevertheless so far as the caused is concerned, we perceive another difference in it. For the one is perceived as proximate (ʌȡȠıİȤࠛȢ) from the first [the cause], while the other as through the proximate (įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ʌȡȠıİȤࠛȢ) from the first. In this way, the onlybegotten-being of the Son remains unquestionable; also it is not in doubt that the Spirit is from the Father; for the mediation of the Son preserves to Himself the only-begotten-being and doesn’t prevent the Spirit from having the natural relation to the Father” («ȉާ ܻʌĮȡȐȜȜĮțIJȠȞ IJ߱Ȣ șİȓĮȢ ijȪıİȦȢ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȜȠȖȠࠎȞIJİȢ… ȝ‫ܻ ޣ‬ʌİȚȡȖȠȪıȘȢ»).1

This passage has been frequently adduced by those who intend to establish the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son (ex patre filioque). Two phrases seem to provide support to the Latin claim (as Palamas at least understands it), that the Spirit proceeds indirectly from the Father but directly from the Son. Gregory of Nyssa placed the Son between the Father and the Spirit2 by accepting that the Spirit is perceived “through the proximate from the first”, thus giving the impression that he allows for a mediation of the Son in the eternal Procession of the Spirit. Is this true? How does Palamas interpret this “difficult to understand” passage (įȪıȜȘʌIJȠȞ)3 as he himself calls it? Two main points will attract our interest in what follows: the theological-philosophical distinction between cause and caused in the Holy Trinity and the grammatical-philosophical notion of relation. We try to show that Palamas’ combination of these two concepts does full justice to the meaning of the Nyssenian passage and at the same time summarizes the key points of his own teaching regarding the Triune God, drawing 1 Ad Ablabium, Gregorii Nysseni Opera (= GNO) III/1, ed. Fr. Müller, Leiden 1958, 55,24 -56,1-10. 2 Gregory Palamas, ȁȩȖȠȢ ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ ʌİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪıİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ݄ȖȓȠȣ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ, ed. P. Chrestou, īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, vol. 1, Thessaloninki 1988, 123, 20-22. 3 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. P. Chrestou, vol. 1, 125,4.

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upon the witness of the Bible and the patristic Literature especially of the 4th and 5th c. So it will become clear that the passage from Ad Ablabius plays a crucial role in Palamas' 2nd Oration on the Spirit’s Procession, so far as light will be shed on the structural function, which the two main concepts have taken on within the whole frame of Palamas’ works.

B. The correlative concept of Father and Son. Logic and semantic understanding Palamas stresses, at the beginning of his analysis, the fact that Gregory of Nyssa did not have any intention of suggesting what the Latins believe to read in his Ad Ablabium’s passages.4 The latter distinguish the cause in the divinity and so they locate the cause of the Spirit’s existence in the Person of the Father as well in that of the Son (and not even in the same manner)5, while such a thing never crossed the mind of the former (“ȝȘį’ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ ȞȠࠎȞ ȜĮȕȫȞ”). In other words, Gregory of Nyssa did not distinguish the cause, as the Latins do; on the contrary, his statement, rightly interpreted, is contrary to Latins’ suggestion; that is, it allows that the Son, even though He is the only begotten one, nevertheless does not prevent the Holy Spirit from having a proximate causal relation to the Father.6 Moreover, Palamas goes on, Gregory of Nyssa, after having assured us that we don’t deny the difference according to the cause and the caused - and he included into the caused the Son and the Holy Spirit - added that it is only according to this distinction that we perceive the difference between each of them (i.e., the Persons). Hence, Palamas rightly concludes that Gregory of Nyssa would clearly condemn the new Latin doctrine that the Son is not only caused from the Father but he also is, together with the Father, a cause for the Spirit. Palamas’ conclusion is as follows: “We perceive the divine nature only according to the cause and the caused; and on the one hand we don’t hold the cause to be in two Persons, while on the other hand we perceive a distinction into two Persons regarding only the caused”.7 This is the Nyssean “other distinction” (ܿȜȜȘ įȚĮijȠȡȐ) regarding the caused, i.e., that the one Person is the Son and the other “not Son”, and not as the “Italians” suggest, that the one, i.e., the Son, aside from being a caused Person, also is a cause, while the other, i.e., the Spirit, is only

4 Ibid., 125,31-32. 5 “ȀĮ‫݋ ޥ‬Ȟ ‫݌‬țĮIJȑȡ࠙ IJȠȪIJ࠙ įȚĮijȩȡȦȢ”: ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ II, ed. P. Chrestou, vol. 1, 125, 30. 6 Ibid., 126,3-5. 7 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ II, ed. P. Chrestou, vol. 1, 126,14-17.

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caused. Hence the first distinction Gregory of Nyssa makes between the cause (the Father) on the one hand and the Son and the Spirit on the other, who get their being from the cause, bears a clear witness to the fact, that the cause in the Holy Trinity is the Person of the Father alone. Now the formulation “other difference” (ܿȜȜȘ įȚĮijȠȡȐ) mentioned above, Palamas goes on, attests to the fact that here we do not have to do again with a distinction between a cause and a caused; the word “other” makes this point quite clear. The “other difference” concerns the different manner of the caused existence of the Son on the one hand and of the Spirit on the other. The Son exists as a caused Person according to the eternal generation of the Father, while the Holy Spirit also exists as a caused Person but according to the eternal procession from the Father. Up to this point it is quite clear that Palamas’ interpretation highlights one of the two key structures of the Nyssean text, which also provides the basic concept of the Orthodox Patristic teaching about the Triune God at least from the 4th c.: The so called “monarchy of the Father”, i.e., the belief that the Person of the Father is the unique cause, principle, source of existence of the two other Persons of the Holy Trinity. The concept also implies that both the Son and the Spirit are equally caused; it means they have their existence before all time and centuries from the Father as the unique source of the divinity (see the similar views here of Dionysios the Areopagite). This is not the appropriate place to embark on a vast survey of this fundamental teaching of the one and undivided Church of Christ. It would none the less be of importance to remember how decisively Palamas adhered to this.8 Putting aside a large number of Palamas’ references to the monarchy of the Father, we confine ourselves to pointing out that it was precisely upon this basis that he set the refutation of the Filioque doctrine in his 1st Oration on the Procession of the Holy Spirit. Palamas approaches the question starting from the Nicean/Constantinopolitan Creed; he then proceeds to a large number of patristic testimonies, including, besides the Cappadocians9, also St. John of Damaskos10 and Pseudo8 Cf. Lison, JA 1994, L’Esprit répandu. La pneumatologie de Grégoire Palamas. Les Edition du J. Cerf, Paris, pp. 85-86. 9 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 33,1-16; 48, 26-27; 34, 22-28: Basil of Caesarea, Contra Sabellianos 7, PG 31, 616; Gregory of Nazianzos, Oratio 31, 14, ed. P. Gallay, (Sources Chrétiennes, 250), Paris 1978, 302,2-3: “‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ İ‫ݮ‬Ȣ ĬİȩȢ, ‫ݼ‬IJȚ ȝȓĮ șİȩIJȘȢǜ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡާȢ ‫ݎ‬Ȟ IJ‫݋ ޟ‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ܻȞĮijȠȡ‫ޟ‬Ȟ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ”; Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Graecos, GNO III/1, ed. Müller, 25,4-8. 10 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou , vol. 1, 34, 6-9; 38, 9-12: Expositio fidei 3, 5 and 1, 8, ed. B. Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, vol. II, Berlin / N. York, 1973, 118 and 27.

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Dionysius the Areopagite.11 It is noteworthy that in his 1st Letter to Barlaam Palamas agrees with his opponent, that in debating with the Latins on this issue one should argue starting from positions already accepted12; such a position is precisely the notion of the Father as “the unique source of the super essential divinity”, on which one should be reliant in order to prove against the adversaries that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. And this is so because the Latins also accept, or claim to accept, the monarchy of God the Father and honor the Church Fathers who have advanced this teaching. In his 1st Treatise against Akyndinos, Palamas also referred to this central trinitarian concept, but it is specially in his De Unione et distinctione, where he put forward this idea: Drawing from Dionysius the Areopagite, he claims that the first of the three divine distinctions Dionysius refers to, is the distinction of the name and the reality of the Father.13 It is important to mention that Palamas’ insistence on the concept of Father as the unique “șİȠȖȩȞȠȢ șİȩIJȘȢ” (“theogonic divinity”), according to the formulation of the Dionysian Corpus, has its correlative concept in the idea that the being-caused in the divine realm is to be assigned equally to both the Son and to the Holy Spirit, although Palamas reminds his readers that they “are from the Father but not in the same manner”.14 This concept appears again in Gregory’s of Nyssa Ad Ablabium; moreover it is implied in the extract from De Unione et distinctione15 mentioned above and also serves in the two Orations on Holy Spirits’ Procession, as a decisive argument against the Filioque.16 Its ideal formulation is to be found in Palamas’ laconic phrase: “the caused being is accorded to two, the cause to one” (IJާ Į‫ݧ‬IJȚĮIJާȞ ‫݋‬Ȟ įȣıȓ, IJާ Į‫ݫ‬IJȚȠȞ ‫݋‬Ȟ ‫݌‬Ȟȓ).17 One should especially mention the significant importance Palamas accorded to this concept, which will be later adopted by palamite writers

11 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou , vol. 1, 48, 28-30: Dionysios of Areopag, De div. nominibus II, 6, 7, ed. B. R. Suchla, Berlin et al. 1990, 132,1-2. 12 Gregory Palamas, Epist. 1 ad Barlaam 18, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 236,15 - 235,15. 13 De Unione et distinctione, ed. Chrestou, vol. 2, 86, 27-35. 14 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 63,17; ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ II, ed. Chrestou, vol 1, 151,31. 15 Ed. Chrestou, vol. 2, 86, 27-35; cf. Antirrheticus contra Akindynum II, ed. Chrestou, vol. 3, 101, 20-23; Contra Gregoran IV, ed. Chrestou, vol. 4, 375,30-32. 16 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 60,6-16; 75, 33-36; ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ II, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 107; 123, 23 – 124,22; 126, 15-16; 152, 1-3. 17 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou, vol.1, 60,6-7.

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like Markos Eugenikos. At this point, the great Theologian of the 14th c. is following a slightly divergent way in comparison to that followed by the great Patriarch of the 9th c., Photius. Although Palamas insists like Photius18 on the central distinction between the common properties of the Holy Trinity from the unshared hypostatic ones, he is further emphasizing the distinction already mentioned between the unique person as a cause and the two other persons as caused on the other. It also is worthy of note that assuming any involvement of the Son in the eternal procession of the Spirit amounts to a contradictio in adiecto. In paragraph 32 of his 1st Oration Palamas argues that “In the case of the highest and venerable Trinity the common properties exist equally in those in which they are common” (IJ‫ ޟ‬țȠȚȞ‫݋ ޟ‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ ܻȞȦIJȐIJȦ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȠıțȣȞȘIJ߱Ȣ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ ‫݋‬ʌȓıȘȢ ‫ݏ‬ȞİıIJȚ Ƞ‫ݮ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ țȠȚȞȐ)19. Hence, given the Latin suggestion that the Son is proximate from the Father, while the Spirit is not immediate and not only from the Father but also from the Son, if “the being from the Father” does not touch in exactly the same measure on the Son and the Spirit (Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬ʌȓıȘȢ ʌȡȩıİıIJȚ IJࠜ Ȋ‫ ࠜݨ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJࠜ ܻȖȓ࠙ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȚ),20 then their common element of their “being from the Father” is wiped out. This argument surely does not belong to the most accurate ones Palamas has advanced; nevertheless it makes quite clear what is at stake for an Orthodox theologian deeply rooted in the cappadocian tradition: Palamas is fully aware of the central biblical and patristic intuition, according to which the uniqueness of the Triune God is grounded in the monarchy of the Father: This means that whoever suggests any kind of hierarchical relation between the Son and the Spirit according to their “manner of being” (the cause of their eternal existence) undermines the biblical concept of the one God. That’s why Palamas insists in several passages on stressing and reinforcing the concept of “being from the Father”, which must be assigned equally to the Son as well as to the Spirit, even though he stresses that the Son is from Father according to eternal generation, while the Spirit according to eternal procession; at all accounts, he strengthens the Church 18 Cf. Photius of Constantinople, De Spiritus Sancti mystagogia, PG 102, 297A; 316 AB; 324B; 325B. Cf. Evdokimov, P., 2011, L’Esprit Saint dans le tradition orthodoxe, Les Editions du Cerf, Paris, pp. 57-58. See about Photius’ doctrine the recently published dissertation of Alexopoulos, T., 2009, Der Ausgang des thearchischen Geistes. Eine Untersuchung der Filioque-Frage anhand Photios’ Mystagogie, Konstantin Melitiniotes’ Zwei Antirrhetici und Augustins De Trinitate, V&R, Göttingen. 19 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 60,6-7. Cf. Gregory of Cyprus, De processione Spiritus Sancti, PG 142, 279-280. 20 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 60,8-9.

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belief that the personal properties or hypostatic idioms of the Father (without origin, ungenerated, unbegotten and theogonic divinity), of the Son (begotten from the Father) and of the Spirit (eternally preceded from the Father) are unshared and “unmovable”.21 Palamas carefully avoids any reference to his Latin sources; his writings provide information about the Latin arguments in a general way. It is obvious that he was aware of the arguments the Latins had used in the disputation with Barlaam. Moroever, if Kakridis’ suggestion is right, then the text of Palamas’ Orations we have currently represents the revised version Palamas made on the occasion of a debate with a Latin delegation, which took place in 1355.22 Whatever it is, one could be sure that Palamas would strongly reject the Anselmian principle which served even in Thomas Aquinas' corpus to strengthen the Filioque doctrine: “In Deo sunt omnia unum ubi non obviat relatio oppositionis”.23 According to this principle there must be a relatio oppositionis, i.e., a relation in terms of origin between the Persons of the Trinity in order for it to be possible to distinguish between them; this provides the logical and ontological frame of the Filioque doctrine: the Spirit is related to the Father because of the eternal procession from Him, but this must also be the case with the Son, because otherwise their mutual distinction would be called into question; the logical consequence: the Spirit proceeds ex Patre Filioque. In contrast to this, Palamas holds the apophatic ground of the Orthodox Tradition. The Church’s teaching rests upon the charismatic experience of the deified Saints. Precisely on this basis, the Church doctrine on the third Person of the Trinity is that it is proceeding eternally from the divine essence, according only to the Father’s hypostasis, and being eternally the Spirit of the Son upon whom also eternally “is reposing”. In addition, on the basis of John 15:26, Palamas is pointing out to us the biblical recitation of the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan river and the related action of St. John the Baptist, which in the eyes of Gregory Palamas provides an account of the mystical vision of the Lord’s Glory that St. John the Baptist 21 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ II, ed. Crestou, vol. 1, 124, 26-31. See Radovic A., 1991, ȉާ ȝȣıIJȒȡȚȠȢ IJ߱Ȣ ݄ȖȓĮȢ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ ݀ȖȚȠȞ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȞ ȆĮȜĮȝߢȞ (ਝȞȐȜİțIJĮ ǺȜĮIJȐįȦȞ 16), ȆĮIJȡȚĮȡȤȚțȩ ੎įȡȣȝĮ ȆĮIJİȡȚț૵Ȟ ȂİȜİIJ૵Ȟ, Thessaloniki, pp. 136143 and p. 158. Cf. also Photius, Mystagogia, PG 102, 297A. 22 Sinkiewitz, R. E., 2002, “Gregory Palamas”, in: C. Conticello & V. Conticello, La Théologie byzantine et sa tradition, vol. II, Brepols Publishers, Turnhout, p. 138. 23 Werbick, J., 1995, “Trinitätslehre”, in: T., Schneider (ed.), Handbuch der Dogmatik, vol. 2, Patmos Verlag, Düsseldorf, p. 505. Cf. the excellent analysis of Radovic, op. cit., pp. 148ff.

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had experienced. Palamas’ comment on this summarises the quintessence of Orthodox theological epistemology: “we don’t reflect on the things which are beyond all beings, but we are being taught about the things beyond sense by what is being done in an ineffable manner”.24 That is why Palamas doesn’t hesitate to admit that the Orthodox theologians do not claim to possess any knowledge on the order in the Trinity between the Son and the Spirit; not even Basil the Great and Gregory of Nazianzos knew what kind of relation the Son and the Spirit have to each other.25 The central intuition upon which this denial has been set, is the Father’s monarchy. It means, in other words, that according to the Church Tradition the only thinkable distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son rests on their causal relation to the Father alone: The Son is the only begotten one because His personal property (idiom) consists in that He has His everlasting being from the Father in the manner of eternal generation; and the Holy Spirit is a self-subsistent being (hypostasis) distinguished from the Son (even though consubstantial with Him) because He has eternally his existence from the Father alone not in the manner of the generation. This is the deeper reason why Palamas, referring in his De Unione et distinctione to the first of the three divine distinctions mentioned in the Dionysian Corpus, limits himself to emphasizing the distinction of the Father from the Son and the Spirit, making clear that the completely unshared personal property of the Son and of the Spirit consists only in that they have their origin from the Father, the sole principle and source of both of them.26 At this point, the following question can be raised: Is there any reason to suppose that the Orthodox theologians might be embarrassed, if faced with the objection that they are not altogether in a position to distinguish sufficiently enough the hypostasis of the Son from the one of the Spirit? Are they really running the risk of undermining the personal property of the 2nd Person of the Trinity as the only begotten Son of the Father by confusing Him with the, supposed, not clearly distinct third Person of the 24 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ II, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 143,18-23: “Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬ț IJࠛȞ ‫ݻ‬ȞIJȦȞ IJ‫ބ ޟ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ ʌȐȞIJĮ IJ‫ݻ ޟ‬ȞIJĮ ıIJȠȤĮȗȩȝİȞȠȚ, ܻȜȜ’ ‫݋‬ț IJࠛȞ ܻȡȡȒIJȦȢ IJİȜȠȣȝȑȞȦȞ IJ‫ބ ޟ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ ‫ݏ‬ȞȞȠȚĮȞ įȚįĮıțȩȝİȞȠȚ”; cf. Ibid., 124,22-25. Cf. Gregory of Cyprus, De processione Spiritus Sancti, PG 142, 297A. 25 ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ ǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 61,19 – 63,3. cf. Cf. Radovic, op. cit., 158. This point has been emphatically put forward many times by Greek theologians in the history of the Filioque controversy. Already Photius had decisively disapproved of any attempt to think of the Spirit’s otherness toward the Son in terms of a causal order or relationship: PG 102, 320-321. 26 Ed. Chrestou, vol. 2, 86,27-35.

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Holy Trinity, who equally has His existence from the Father? Not at all, says Gregory of Nyssa in the extract of Ad Ablabium. We must now proceed to precisely this item in order to see Palamas’ interpretative approach.

C. The concept of relation: Its logical and semantic meaning After having shown that the passage bears clear witness to the truth that the Father is the unique cause in the Holy Trinity, St. Gregory Palamas comes to illustrate the “other difference” the Cappadocian Bishop of Nyssa spoke of: the difference between the two caused hypostases of the Trinity. In other words, it concerns the “manner of existence” of the Son and the Holy Spirit: “how each of these two Persons is from the cause (sc. the Father)” (ʌࠛȢ IJࠛȞ įȪȠ ʌȡȠıȫʌȦȞ IJȠȪIJȦȞ ‫݌‬țȐIJİȡȠȞ Į‫ݧ‬IJĮIJࠛȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ)– a formulation which Palamas uses infrequently.27 The answer is, says Palamas, that the Son has eternally his existence from the cause according to the manner of generation, while the Spirit exists equally from the cause but not according to the manner of generation.28 Precisely this intuition, Palamas tells us, has been illustrated by the bishop of Nyssa: “For the one [the Son] is perceived as proximate from the first [the cause], while the other [the Spirit] as through the proximate from the first.” How can Palamas tell that? His interpretative approach is grounded on the understanding of the Names Father and Son as well the realities they reveal as relative names (ʌȡȩȢ IJȚ). Both the Son and the Holy Spirit, as already pointed out, are equally second in comparison to the Father, because of causality; nevertheless the Son is intellectually conceived as immediately connected with the Father, because of the logic and semantic function of the names Father and Son. This is not an invention of his own; Palamas remarks that it was Gregory of Nyssa himself, who gives us such an account. The Cappadocian Bishop argues that “it is not possible to think of the Father without the Son, being linked with Him through the pronunciation (of the name Father)”; and then again: “by hearing the Father we conceive also the Son”.29 Palamas tried to make his interpretation on this point as plausible as possible: before dealing 27 ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ ǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 66, 6; ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ II, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 151,13. Cf. 2nd Epistula ad Barlaam, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 264,14. 28 ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ II, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 127,8-11. 29 ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 127, 24-29. Gregory of Nyssa, Adversus Eunomium I, GNO I, ed. W. Jaeger, Leiden 1960, 187,15-19 and 187,28 – 188, 1.

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specially with the Ad Ablabium extract, he had placed it in its suitable macro-textual context: He had, in other words, already quoted two passages from the first Book of Contra Eunomium treatise of Gregory of Nyssa, where the semantic function of the relative Names Father and Son has been discussed: “The Son is connected to the Father… and again the Spirit is tied in with the only begotten Son, who is only intellectually conceived before the Spirit according to his manner of existence” (ıȣȞȐʌIJİIJĮȚ IJࠜ ȆĮIJȡ‫ ݸ ޥ‬Ȋ‫ݨ‬ȩȢ… Ƞ‫ވ‬IJȦ ʌȐȜȚȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎ ȝȠȞȠȖİȞȠࠎȢ ‫ݏ‬ȤİIJĮȚ IJާ ȆȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ, ‫݋‬ʌȚȞȠȓߠ ȝȩȞȠȞ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ IJ߱Ȣ Į‫ݧ‬IJȓĮȢ ȜȩȖȠȞ ʌȡȠșİȦȡȠȣȝȑȞȠȣ IJ߱Ȣ IJȠࠎ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȦȢ).30 As I have tried to establish in a paper recently published,31 Gregory of Nyssa took full advantage of the logic as well as semantic function accorded to the relative Names Father and Son by the Hellenistic, specially Stoic philosophical tradition, in order to argue effectively against his opponent’s claim, according to which one should deny the Son’s consubstantiality with God the Father and accord to him an ontologically inferior place as a second essence created from the first one. It also is worth mentioning, with regard to Gregory’s brother, Basil the Great, that the important role accorded to the relative names has quite recently been illustrated by M. del Cogliano and earlier by D. Robertson.32 Both scholars argue, though from a different standpoint, for a Stoic origin of Basil’s sources. In addition, an influence of the Hellenistic Grammarians cannot be excluded, although their teaching had been shaped under Stoic influences. Whatever the sources, there is no doubt about the central position of the relative names in the thought of the two Cappadocians. Palamas has rightly understood this and perfectly illustrated the key semantic role the concept of relatives’ names plays in the passage under discussion from Ad Ablabium. It would be misleading however to think that Palamas ignored the correlative use of Names such as Father and Son in other passages of his work; even a fleeting glance at the pages of his 30 ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 122, 23-26. Gregory of Nyssa, Adversus Eunomium I, GNO I, ed. Jaeger, Leiden 1960, 224, 25 – 225, 1-2. 31 Panagopoulos, G. D., 2011, “Die Vermittlung des Sohnes beim ewigen Ausgang des Heiligen Geistes aus dem Vater nach Ad Ablabium Gregors von Nyssa (GNO III / I, 55, 21-24 – 56, 1-10)”, in: V. H., Drecoll & M., Bergahaus (eds), Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on Trinitarian Theology and Apollinarism (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, vol. 106), Brill, Leiden, passim. 32 Del Cogliano, M., 2010, Basil of Cesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names. Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth Century Trinitarian Controversy, Brill, Leiden, suo loco; Robertson, D., 2001, “Relatives in Basil of Caesarea“, Studia Patristica, vol. 37, pp. 277-288.

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two Orations on the Spirit’s Procession suffices to provide us with strong evidence indicating how deep with regard to this item his Trinitarian doctrine was rooted in Cappadocian Theology.33 This means further that Palamas, faced with this difficult passage, had no need to rethink or reassess his Trinitarian trajectory. Indeed, having fully assimilated the Cappadocian Trinitarian thought, he was in a position to give an authoritative expression to his insight: Because of the semantic and ontological relation, the Names Father and Son entail the Son’s existence as well as the fact that He is mentally considered as begotten proximately from the Father; the Holy Spirit however, Who is the divine person projected eternally, is to be thought in terms of procession as proximate only from the first divine hypostasis (the Father or hypostasis as projector). From the Father, the Spirit can be considered through the Son precisely by virtue of the necessary logic-semantic correlation of the Father and the Son. Palamas repeats this statement in various forms.34 But his most accurate formulation is the following: “the Spirit is said to be the Spirit of the Father through the Son”, i.e., because of the semantic correlative connection of the Son with the Father. This means, according to Palamas, that the mediation of the Son (‫ ݘ‬ȝİıȚIJİȓĮ IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ), of which Gregory of Nyssa speaks, does not imply a causal involvement of the Son at all – however this might be considered - in the Spirit’s eternal procession from the Father. Such an idea [causal involvement of the Son regarding the Holy Spirit] had already been excluded, given the above attested fact that Gregory of Nyssa accorded equally to both the Son and the Spirit the “being from the cause” (‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ Į‫ݧ‬IJȓȠȣ), although not in the same manner. Hence the results of Palamas’ hermeneutical undertaking could be summarized as follows: The Ad Ablabium passage is not at odds with other evidences from Gregory of Nyssa’s work. It comes clearly to attest to the monarchy of the Father excluding any kind of the Son’s causal participation in the Procession of the Spirit; in doing this, he prevents us none the less from confusing the three hypostases, and especially the hypostases of the Son and the Spirit. The semantic but also ontological correlation between Father and Son, which Palamas illustrated with two examples drawn from the physical as well as the biblical world, permits Palamas to assert correctly: “It is therefore because of the Son that the

33 ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 52, 10-13. ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol 1, 104, 12; 146, 10-11. 34 ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ I , ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 46,7-8; 50,27-29; 52,21-22; ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 146,10-13.

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Father is and is called Father”.35 But we are mentally considering the Spirit, which is not begotten but is proceeded or projected, to be related directly to the one who eternally projects it. So Palamas concludes his syllogism by drawing an analogy between the two semantic correlatives: “As the begotten is disposed toward his progenitor, so in exactly the same manner the projected also is disposed toward his projector, that is, in a direct way”.36 This could be schematically illustrated as following: Į / ȕ : Įǯ / Ȗ, (Į = “ȆĮIJȒȡ ‫ސ‬Ȣ ȖİȞȞȒIJȦȡ” , Įǯ = “‫ ݸ‬ȆĮIJȒȡ ‫ސ‬Ȣ ʌȡȠȕȠȜİȪȢ ‫݋ ݙ‬țʌȠȡİȪȦȞ”, ȕ = “‫ ݸ‬ȊȚȩȢ ‫ސ‬Ȣ ȖİȞȞȘIJȩȢ”; Ȗ = “ਢȖȚȠ ȆȞİ૨ȝĮ ੪Ȣ ʌȡȩȕȜȘȝĮ ਲ਼ ਥțʌȠȡİȣIJȩȞ”)

D. The ontological Understanding of the preposition “įȚȐ”. Cyril of Alexandria’s evidence and his palamic interpretation However, this is not everything Palamas wanted to say about the formulation “įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ”. He also provides an insight into the ontological aspect of the formulation “įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ”. Although Palamas decisively rules out any kind of the Son’s involvement in the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, he provides us, as Gregory and Cyril had also done, with an illustration of the mystery of the eternal life of the Holy Trinity, by referring to mystery of the eternal “ʌİȡȚȤȫȡȘıȚȢ” of the three divine hypostases of the one triune divinity or their everlasting remaining in each other (‫݋ ݘ‬Ȟ ܻȜȜȒȜĮȚȢ IJࠛȞ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȦȞ ȝȠȞȒ țĮ‫ݬ ޥ‬įȡȣıȚȢ), a formulation derived from John of Damascus.37 Let’s focus now our attention on this procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father: The “being proceeded” (‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪİıșĮȚ) from the Father is “the most proper of the particular existence of the Spirit” («IJާ ‫ݧ‬įȚĮȓIJĮIJȠȞ IJ߱Ȣ ‫ݧ‬įȚoIJȡȩʌȠȣ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȟİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ»)38. That is to say, the Holy Spirit has before any time His existence most peculiarly (‫ݧ‬įȚĮȓIJĮIJĮ) from the Father as being only from Him;39 He exists however, before any time, “in” and “with” the Son, or remains in Him and follows Him, as essentially 35 Ibid., 127,30 – 128. 36 ݃ȞIJȚȡȡȘIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ , ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 129, 27-29; cf. Radovic, op. cit., 156. 37 Expostio fidei 14, ed. Kotter, vol. II, 42,11. 38 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol 1, 144, 14-15; cf. ibid. 150,11. 39 Ibid., 145,25-26; cf. 150,10-11: “‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ȆĮIJȡȩȢ ȝȩȞȠȣ įȠȟȐȗȠȝİȞ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȝİȞȠȞ ‫ݧ‬įȚȠIJȡȩʌȦȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȠĮȚȦȞȓȦȢ”.

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connected to Him.40 This is so for two reasons: a) because the procession follows - but not in a temporal meaning41- the generation, and b) because by means of the secret and eternal (ܻʌȩȡȡȘIJȠȢ țĮ‫ܿ ޥ‬ȤȡȠȞȠȞ) generation the Son has from the Father the Spirit, who is of the same divine essence (nature) as the Son.42 There is a lot of evidence allowing us to assert beyond any doubt that Palamas is using the verbs “ıȣȝʌĮȡȠȝĮȡIJİ߿Ȟ”, “ıȣȞĮțȠȜȠȣșİ߿Ȟ” (following with), «ܻȞĮʌĮȪİıșĮȚ» (resting upon) as identical with “‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤİȚȞ”, “‫݋‬ȞȣʌȐȡȤİȚȞ” and “‫ބ‬ijȓıIJĮıșĮȚ” (existing).43 Once again we have the opportunity to attest to Palamas’ agreement with the Cappadocian Trinitarian intuitions, and Gregory of Nyssa’s too. In my recently published paper mentioned above, I argued that the ontological understanding of the formulation “įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ” as implying the eternal existence of the Spirit “in” and “with” the Son but not “from” the Son had been put forward by Gregory of Nyssa. Much earlier Father George Florovsky had also alluded to this fact, being followed by Radovic, who associated this intuition of Gregory of Nyssa to that of Cyril of Alexandria.44 Palamas next discusses a series of Cyril’s quotations. Palamas knew the special interest Latin theologians accorded to several Cyrilian texts, on 40 Ibid., 145,22: “țĮ‫ ޥ‬ıȣȞȘȝȝȑȞȠȞ ijȣıȚțࠛȢ”; also 130,30 – 131,1. Palamas indicates Gregory Nyssa (Oratio Cat. Magna 2, GNO III/4, ed. E. Mühlenberg, 12,25 – 13,1) and Basil’s Epist. 38, 4 (ed. Y. Courtonne, vol.1, Paris 1957, 85,28) as witness. (Cf. ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 59,8-30). The related passage from the Epist. 38, attributed to Basil the Great, “The Son knows the Spirit proceeding from the father as through Him and with Him”, is of great importance. It is nowadays commonly accepted that the Epistle inserted in the collection of Basil’s Letters under the nr. 38 should be attributed rather to Gregory of Nyssa. (See Hübner, R., 1972, “Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasser der der sog. Ep. 38 des Basilius. Zum unterschiedlichen Verständnis der ousia bei den kappadozischen Brüdern”, in: J. Fontaine & C. Kannengiesser (eds), Epektasis. Mélanges patristiques offerts à Jean Daniélou, Paris, pp. 463-490; see however Drecoll V.H., 1996, Die Entwicklung der Trinitätslehre des Basilius von Cäsarea: Sein Weg vom Homöusianer zum Neonizäner, V&R. Göttingen, pp. 279-331; Hildebrand, S., 2007, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea. A Synthesis of Greek Thought and Biblical Truth, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D. C., p. 47.) If this is true, then Palamas’ interpretation of the Ad Ablabium passage gets fully corroborated in an unexpected manner by the Bishop from Nyssa himself. 41 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol 1, 131,4: “ܻįȚĮıIJȐIJȦȢ IJİ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ȤȡȩȞȦȢ IJİ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ܻȤȡȩȞȦȢ”. 42 Ibid., 146,4. 43 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ I, ed. Chrestou, vol.1, 56,3 – 57,13; ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, 104,15 – 105,10; 130,25 – 131,18; 144,21-24. 44 Florovsky, G., 2005, ȼɨɫɬɨɱɧɵɟ Ɉɬɰɵ ɐɟɪɤɜɢ, ACT, Moscou, 210.

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the basis that they seemed to favor the Filioque doctrine.45 Of particular significance are the following controversial quotations: “‫ݴ‬ȞĮ ‫݋‬țȝȐș߯Ȣ ܻʌާ IJ߱Ȣ IJȠࠎ ıȦIJ߱ȡȠȢ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤȠȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ… įİȚțȞȪȦȞ ‫ݼ‬IJȚ ʌȐȞIJĮ IJ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ ‫ݫ‬įȚĮ įȚĮȕĮȓȞİȚ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJާȞ ‫݋‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ijȣıȚțࠛȢ ȖİȞȞȘșȑȞIJĮ Ȋ‫ݨ‬ȩȞ”.46 “݃ʌȠȜȪȦȞ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ܼȝĮȡIJȓĮȢ IJާȞ Į‫ރ‬IJާȞ ʌȡȠıțİȓȝİȞȠȞ, IJࠜ ‫ݧ‬įȓ࠙ ȜȠȚʌާȞ țĮIJĮȤȡȓİȚ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȚ… țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȟ ‫ݧ‬įȓĮȢ ‫ݗ‬ȝ߿Ȟ ܻȞĮʌȘȖȐȗİȚ ijȪıİȦȢ”.47

Palamas’ reply is set upon a twofold basis. First he argues that this Cyrillian quotation, as well as others like this, should be read in the light of the eternal existence of the Spirit in the Son and of the Son in the Spirit, that is, the doctrine of “ʌİȡȚȤȫȡȘıȚȢ”.48 ȉhis claim is fully justified given the fact that St. Cyril speaks clearly of the eternal existence of the Spirit in the Son and vice versa exactly in the same context of the Thesaurus.49 Secondly, when faced particularly with Cyrilian phrases such as “the Saint spirit springs out of the divine nature” and also from the Son’s nature,50 he suggests that such formulations are simply identical with the assertion of the consubstantiality of the Son and the Spirit. Palamas appears therefore willing to allow the application of the formulation “from the Son” (‫݋‬ț) not only on the level of oikonomia as indicating the temporal mission of the Spirit,51 which obviously is the meaning of the De incarnatione Unigeniti passage; more than this, Palamas allows the use of the preposition “from” (‫݋‬ț) linked in with the divine essence even on the level of the eternal existence of the Spirit as long as one keeps in mind the distinction between the divine essence, shared equally by all three persons, and the hypostases itself. In this way, it is in accordance with the Church Tradition to claim that the Holy Spirit springs out of the divine nature and even from the Son’s nature but only 45 Hergenroether informs us that even as early as the 7th c. the western Christians used to appeal to cyrillian texts regarding our issue; see the commentary in PG 102, 411. 46 Thesaurus, PG 75 568c. 47 De incarnatione Unigeniti , PG 75, 1241. 48 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1,130, 25-131,18. 49 PG 75, 568: «݃ȜȜ’ Ƞ‫ވ‬IJȦȢ ‫ݘ‬ȞȦȝȑȞȠȞ, İ‫ ݧ‬țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ıIJ‫ޥ‬Ȟ ‫ݧ‬įȚȠıȪıIJĮIJȠȞ, ‫ޏ‬Ȣ Į‫ރ‬IJȩ IJİ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤİȚȞ ‫݋‬Ȟ Ȋ‫ࠜݨ‬, țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާȞ Ȋ‫ާݨ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬Ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ». Palamas quoted a parallel cyrillian passage (PG 75, 577): “‫݋‬Ȟ Ȋ‫ ࠜݨ‬ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬ʌĮIJȡާȢ ijȣıȚțࠛȢ ‫ބ‬ʌĮȡȤİȚȞ… IJާ ȆȞİࠎȝĮ.. . țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌĮȡ‫ޟ‬ ȆĮIJȡާȢ ijȣıȚțࠛȢ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȚȦįࠛȢ įȚȒțİȚȞ ‫݋‬Ȟ Ȋ‫ ࠜݨ‬IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ”. 50 See other quotations from the De incarnatione verbi in: ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 134,11-22. 51 Ibid.

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according to the Father’s hypostasis.52 The existential procession of the Spirit as well as the eternal generation of the Son is a “work of divine nature” (“‫ݏ‬ȡȖȠȞ șİȓĮȢ ijȪıİȦȢ” -an expression of John of Damascus that Palamas especially prefers to use), but only according to the Father’s hypostasis. This statement is equivalent to the acknowledgement of the Spirit’s consubstantiality with the Son and the Father, as already mentioned. The holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Son and this allows Palamas to claim he is of the same or even from the same essence as the Son; this does not render the hypostasis of the Son a cause of the Spirit’s eternal existence. The following two passages illustrate this well: “ȀĮ‫ݸ ޥ‬ıȐțȚȢ ܽȞ ‫ ݸ‬șİȩijȡȦȞ Ƞ‫ފ‬IJȠȢ ȀȪȡȚȜȜȠȢ ‫݋‬ț IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ȆȞİࠎȝĮ ȜȑȖİȚ, IJާ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȠȪıȚȠȞ ʌĮȡȓıIJȘıȚȞ, ܻȜȜ’ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț Į‫ݫ‬IJȚȠȞ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ IJާȞ Ȋ‫ާݨ‬Ȟ IJȠࠎ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ”ǜ53 “ȉȠȚȖĮȡȠࠎȞ İ‫ܽ މ‬Ȟ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ ȜȩȖȠȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬ț IJ߱Ȣ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȦȢ IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, ܻȜȜ’ ‫݋‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ijȣıȚțࠛȢ țܻț IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ȆȞİࠎȝĮ, įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJާ IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ʌȡާȢ IJާȞ ȆĮIJȑȡĮ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȠȪıȚȠȞ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ IJȠࠎ șİȓȠȣ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ ʌȡާȢ IJާȞ ȆĮIJȑȡĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާȞ Ȋ‫ݨ‬ȠȞ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȠȣıȚȩIJȘIJȠȢ ‫݋‬ȞİIJİࠎșİȞ įİȚțȞȣȝȑȞȘȢ, ܻȜȜ’ Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ įȚĮijȩȡȠȣ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȟİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ, ‫ݫ‬ıȠȞ įȑ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ İ‫ݧ‬ʌİ߿Ȟ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ȆȞİࠎȝĮ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȠȣıȚȩIJȘIJĮ, țĮ‫ݼ ޥ‬IJȚ IJ߱Ȣ Į‫ރ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ o‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ IJࠜ Ȋ‫ ࠜݨ‬IJާ ȆȞİࠎȝĮ”.54

In another passage Palamas provides a summarised formulation: From the standpoint of essence and hypostasis the Spirit is “of Christ” but not “from Him”; from the standpoint of the divine energy he is both of the Son and from Him. For the Spirit is given according to the divine energy from the Son temporally; moreover, the Spirit is eternally “of the Son”, because the Son has eternally the power of “giving” the Spirit’s grace.55 This highly significant statement leads us once again to the concept of the eternal existence and “resting” of the Spirit upon the Son; this is precisely the Cappadocian idea analysed above, which Palamas will reformulate later, in his 150 Capitula, in terms of Augustine’s later theology, speaking of the ineffable love of the Father for the Son and vice versa.56 52 Ibid., 137,3-11; 144,14-29; 146,2-6; also ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol.1, 33,24-26; cf. Photius, Mystagogia, PG 102, 923. 53 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 136,11-13. 54 Ibid., 139,5-11. 55 Ibid., 105,19-21; 106,11-12. 56 150 Capita, 36-37, ed. Chrestou, vol.5, 5,25 - 56,8 . See Jugie, ȂA 1932, “Palamas”, Dict. de Théol. Cathol. XI, 1766; Martzelos, G. D., 1993, ‫ݽ‬ȡșȩįȠȟȠ įȩȖȝĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬șİȠȜȠȖȚțާȢ ʌȡȠȕȜȘȝĮIJȚıȝާȢ. ȂİȜİIJȒȝĮIJĮ įȠȖȝĮIJȚț߱Ȣ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ

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The objection raised by the Latin opponents - that if the Spirit exists before all time from the Son’s nature, it is impossible that He is not, in addition, from the Son’s hypostasis - inescapably entails a complete identification of the divine essence with hypostasis, i.e., an abolition of the distinction between what is common in the Trinity and what is proper to each one of the Persons.57

E. Conclusions We can now summarize what has been discussed up to this point. Gregory Palamas is drawing on Tradition and he is therefore in a position to state the theological meaning of controversial patristic evidence with sincerity, without compromising their logical and grammatical structure. He thereby manages to illustrate the co-eternal existence of the Son and the Spirit as well as their consubstantiality, without jeopardizing the Church doctrine of the Spirit’s existential procession from the Father alone. This doesn’t prevent Palamas from applying to his teaching more recent theological insights, which nonetheless render the true meaning of the traditional texts, as in the case of the distinction, first drawn in the 13th c. by Gregory of Cyprus, between “‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚȞ” and «‫އ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȢ».58 Surely (ĭȚȜȠıȠijȚțȒ țĮȚ șİȠȜȠȖȚțȒ ȕȚȕȜȚȠșȒțȘ 15), Pournaras, Thessaloniki, pp. 115-117; Radovic, op. cit., pp. 168-170; Flogaus, R., 1996, “Der heimliche Blick nach Westen. Zur Rezeption des Augustinus De Trinitate durch Gregorios Palamas”, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik vol. 46, p. 278; Idem, 2008, “Inspiration –Exploitation-Distortion: The Use of Augustin in the Hesychast Controversy”, in: Demacopoulos G., & Papanikolaou A., Orthodox Readings of Augustine, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Chrestwood N.Y., pp. 63-80. (It is, however, noteworthy that this idea doesn’t play any special role in Palamas’ thought, us already Hussey E., 1972, “The Palamite Trinitarian Models”, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, vol. 16, p. 89, correctly clamed). Cf. further Staniloae, D., 1998, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology. The Experience of God, vol. 1., engl. transl. and edited by I. Ionita & R. Barringer, Brookline Mass., 30: “Just as within the Holy Trinity, the Holy Spirit, by coming to rest upon the Son, or shining forth from him, shows forth the Son to the Father, and the Son shows forth the Holy Spirit to the Father, because of the reciprocity existing between them, in the same way within the revelation and its subsequent effects, the Son sends the Holy Spirit forth into our innermost being, and the Spirit sends forth the Son or leads Him before our spiritual vision, or even brings Him directly within us”. 57 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 307, 18 – 308; what this argument is conveying plays a key role in Photius’ refutation of the Filioque: Mystagogia, PG 102, 316AB. 58 The relation between Palamas and Gregory of Cyprus has been already pointed

60

Evidence Concerning the Procession of the Holy Spirit in Palamas

Palamas avoids using this formulation expressis verbis, as already Metropolitan Amphilochios of Montenegro (Amphilochios Radovic) had three decades ago pointed out in his masterful dissertation on the Trinitarian ȉheology of Palamas, but he knows however, how to take advantage of it within the context provided by the Cappadocian teaching of “ʌİȡȚȤȫȡȘıȚȢ”. Palamas declares himself absolutely unwilling to accept even a hint of a causal involvement of the Son in the eternal procession of the Spirit from the Father. He emphasizes that, on the level of the eternal Trinity (eternal manner of existence of the Persons), the preposition “through” (įȚȐ) is identical not with “from” (‫݋‬ț) but with “in” (ਥȞ) and “with” (ȝİIJȐ, ıȪȞ)59 and gives a hermeneutical account of the Ad Ablabium extract of Gregory of Nyssa, which accepts the Cappadocian semantic and theological intuitions, allowing for the Cappadocian application of relative names in Trinitarian Theology and the monarchy of the Father as sole source of the two other Persons in the Holy Trinity. He also affirms the use of the same preposition, “through”, as identical with “from” only on the level of oikonomia, i.e., regarding the temporal revelation, appearance or mission of the Spirit’s grace to created persons for the sake of their sanctification. The exception allowed by him on the level of the transcendental Trinity, i.e., the possibility of asserting that the Spirit is “from” the Son’s nature, touches exclusively on the consubstantiality of the Son and the Spirit. The clear distinction Palamas is drawing here between the transcendent (or theological) Trinity and the immanent one, that is, the temporal mission of the Spirit to the world, constitutes the correlative of the central intuition which pervades his whole work, i.e. the distinction between God’s essence as well as the eternal manner of existence of the Persons on the one hand and the uncreated energy, dynamis, kingdom or grace on the other hand. It is precisely this distinction, which runs implicitly or explicitly throughout

out: Meyendorff, J., 1959, Introduction à l’études de Grégoire Palamas, Editions du Seuil, Paris, p. 313; Lison, op. cit., p. 95; and Radovic, op. cit., pp. 174-175; see however Sieciensky, E., 2010, The Filioque. History of a doctrinal Controversy (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology), Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 274, footnote 78. On Gregory’s of Cyprus pneumatology see further Evdokimov, op. cit., pp. 58-59; Bobrinskoy, B., 2003, Le Mystère de la Trinité, Les Editions du Cerf, Paris, pp. 291-292; and especially Alexopoulos, T., 2011, “Die Argumentation des Patriarchen Gregorios II. Kyprios zur Widerlegung des Filioque-Ansatzes in der Schrift De processione Spiritus Sancti“, Byzantinische Zeitshrift, vol. 104, pp. 1-39. 59 ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǿǿ, ed. Chrestou, vol. 1, 130,25-29; cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 42, 15, ed. J. Bernanrdi, (Sources Chrétiennes, 384), Paris 1992, 82,11-15.

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his two Orations on the Spirit’s Procession, that provides us with the tools necessary to understand Palamas’ refutation of the Filioque doctrine. It is here worth mentioning that the suggestion raised recently even by Orthodox theologians, that here we have to do with a metaphysical speculation, is absolutely beside the point. It never occurred to Palamas to engage in a construction of a metaphysical system.60 His concern was to defend the theological life and practice of all Christians, but especially of the hesychast monks, who sought to achieve from this earthly life the Kingdom of Heaven promised by Jesus himself. The teaching of the uncreated energies, which are inseparable but nevertheless distinguishable, in a manner decent to God (șİȠʌȡȠİʌࠛȢ), from the absolutely transcendental divine essence, is grounded on the mystical experience of the saints of all time; that is, it gives expression to the biblical and patristic intuition that God is revealing himself by remaining at the same time absolutely transcendent; thus, it provides the logical means to interpret the divine oikonomia, as Mantzaridis had accurately suggested. The one Apostolic Church of the Fathers knows empirically that God himself descends in order to be participated by his logical creatures; but, at the same time, this empirical knowledge is apophatic in so far as man becomes aware of the inexplorable deepness of the divine reality, which essentially transcends every knowledge, meaning and sense.61 All that the Saints say about God is nothing but a description of this preeminently charismatic experience of deification, which provides a doxological character; and all that Palamas sought to do was to safeguard this possibility to speak about the Triune God without compromising His Mystery by doing metaphysics. This means all his concern was the charismatic participation in the real, i.e., uncreated life of Christ.62 It is exactly the opposite of what the medieval Latin theologians have done: Having identified theology with oikonomia, or more accurately, having drawn conclusions from the order of revelation back to the eternal manner of existence of the divine persons, they came to see the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit as “included” in the temporal one. Thereupon, to repeat the words of G. Emery concerning the emblematic figure of western Theology, Thomas Aquinas, what the 60 Cf. what Palamas himself says in his Epistle to Daniel of Ainos, ed. Chrestou, vol. 2, 390, 14-23. 61 Antir. contra Akindynum VI, ed. Chrestou, vol. 3, 413,25 – 414,1-18; Triads 2, 3, ed. Chrestou, vol.1, 560,22 - 561,1-20; Ibid. 566,24 – 567,1-11. 62 Cf. the recently published paper of Russel, N., 2006, “Theosis and Gregory Palamas: Continuity or Doctrinal Change?”, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, vol. 50, no 4, pp. 374-379.

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Evidence Concerning the Procession of the Holy Spirit in Palamas

temporal mission adds to the eternal procession “is the temporal outworking of grace in which the divine Person is 'sent' or 'given'”.63 But, because of the fundamental metaphysical assumption, shared both by Franciscan and Dominican magistri, that God, as actus purus, cannot have any real relation to the creature, the “grace” is created, a created habitus, which is infused into the Christian’s soul. In this way, man becomes not really a partaker of the divine life, but only a partaker of a created simulacrum of the transcendent divine essence. It is therefore more than clear that the Filioque doctrine turned out in western medieval Theology to be a kind of “ideology”: It is about the so called filioquism, which thus, appears to be the inevitable outcome of the metaphysical speculation about God as actus purus and the teaching of the created grace; on the contrary, the Orthodox Realism of Glorification is the solid empirical foundation of a sound anti-filioquism, which is not an ideological slogan or battle cry but a condition sine qua non of the real life in the uncreated life of Christ.64 But precisely this life, Christ’s life, is nothing but the eternal uncreated common Love of the three divine Persons, i.e., the eternal remaining of each one in each other. God’s revelation constitutes in a manner the expanding of this uncreated Love to the world as the temporal mission of the Spirit’s grace from the Father through (and even from) the Son in the Holy Spirit for the sake of the world’s creation, providential care and salvation. Man is saved, i.e., deified, by becoming partaker of the uncreated divine grace, which is a common essential and natural energy of the Father, the Spirit and the Holy Spirit. It is on the very level of oikonomia, i.e., of the revelation of God according to his uncreated grace, that Palamas allows the undifferentiated use of the preposition “through” and “from” (įȚȐ = ‫݋‬ț). The uncreated grace is common to all three Persons; thus, the Spirit is sent temporally to the world from the Father through or from the Son but also by Himself in order to create the world, inspire life to the creatures and deify the logical ones. This is the realm of the revealed, i.e., participated God; but it is not identical to the level of the absolutely transcendent divine essence and of the manner of existence of the three hypostases. So, it is absolutely impermissible to identify the order or the manner of the temporal appearance of the divine persons according to their common grace with their eternal absolutely transcendental manner of existence, regarding which we are taught only under the light of the revealed uncreated 63 Emery, G., 2007, The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 273. 64 Cf. the comment of Mantzaridis, G. I., 1963, ‫ ݠ‬ʌİȡ‫ ޥ‬șİȫıİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ܻȞșȡȫʌȠȣ įȚįĮıțĮȜȓĮ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, Thessaloniki, 42; also Lison, op. cit., p. 94.

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common love of the three divine persons.65 Any confusion between oikonomia and the eternal manner of existence of the divine hypostases would unavoidably entail either that God the Father is the sole principle and the sole cause of the divinity in the other two persons of the Triune God before any time and, in the same manner, that He is (as Father, Son and Spirit ) the principle of Creation, or that the created beings exist from all eternity as consubstantial with God.66 In this way, if Palamas has been engaged in a meticulous differentiation of the prepositions mentioned above, he is not putting forward – as Dörrie had earlier maintained regarding Gregory of Nazianzos67 – a propositional metaphysics: He is interested in preventing any ontological confusion between the uncreated God and the created world, while maintaining the possibility of the created being becoming a partaker of God’s real life by means and by virtue of the very love of God, which in Palamas corpus, agreeing with the ecclesiastical tradition, is called goodwill (İ‫ރ‬įȠțȓĮ).

Works Cited Primary Sources Gregory Palamas, ȁȩȖȠȚ ݃ʌȠįİȚțIJȚțȠ‫ ޥ‬ǿ & ǿǿ ʌİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪıİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ݄ȖȓȠȣ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ, ed. P. Chrestou, īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, vol. 1, Thessaloninki 1988.

Secondary Sources Alexopoulos, T., 2009, Der Ausgang des thearchischen Geistes. Eine Untersuchung der Filioque-Frage anhand Photios’ Mystagogie, Konstantin Melitiniotes’ Zwei Antirrhetici und Augustins De Trinitate, V&R, Göttingen. —. 2011, 'Die Argumentation des Patriarchen Gregorios II. Kyprios zur Widerlegung des Filioque-Ansatzes in der Schrift De processione Spiritus Sancti', Byzantinische Zeitshrift, vol. 104, pp. 1-39. Bobrinskoy, B., 2003, Le Mystère de la Trinité, Les Editions du Cerf, Paris, pp. 291-292. 65 Radovic, op. cit., p. 159. 66 Cf. Lison, op. cit, p. 86: “la théologie découle du mode théogonique de la monarchie; l’économie, de son mode démiourgique”; Siciensky, op. cit., p. 145. 67 Dörrie, H., 1969, ”Präpositionen und Metaphysik”, Museum Helveticum, vol. 26, pp. 217–228.

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Del Cogliano, M., 2010, Basil of Cesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names. Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth Century Trinitarian Controversy, Brill, Leiden. Dörrie, H., 1969, 'Präpositionen und Metaphysik', Museum Helveticum, vol. 26, pp. 217–228. Drecoll V. H., 1996, Die Entwicklung der Trinitätslehre des Basilius von Cäsarea: Sein Weg vom Homöusianer zum Neonizäner, V&R. Göttingen. Emery, G., 2007, The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Evdokimov, P., 2011, L’Esprit Saint dans le tradition orthodoxe, Les Editions du Cerf, Paris. Flogaus, R., 1996, “Der heimliche Blick nach Westen. Zur Rezeption des Augustinus De Trinitate durch Gregorios Palamas”, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik vol. 46, pp. 275-297. —. 2008, “Inspiration –Exploitation-Distortion: The Use of Augustin in the Hesychast Controversy”, in: G. E. Demacopoulos & A. R. Papanikolaou, Orthodox Readings of Augustine, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Chrestwood N.Y., pp. 63-80. Florovsky, G., 2005, ȼɨɫɬɨɱɧɵɟ Ɉɬɰɵ ɐɟɪɤɜɢ, ACT, Moscou. Hildebrand, S., 2007, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea. A Synthesis of Greek Thought and Biblical Truth, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D. C. Hübner, R.,1972, “Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasser der der sog. Ep. 38 des Basilius. Zum unterschiedlichen Verständnis der ousia bei den kappadozischen Brüdern”, in: JA Fontaine & CH Kannengiesser (eds), Epektasis. Mélanges patristiques offerts à Jean Daniélou, Paris, pp. 463-490. Hussey E., 1972, “The Palamite Trinitarian Models”, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, vol. 16, 83-89. Jugie, Ȃ., 1932, “Palamas”, Dict. de Théol. Cathol. XI, 1766. Lison, J., 1994, L’Esprit répandu. La pneumatologie de Grégoire Palamas. Les Edition du Cerf, Paris. Mantzaridis, G. I., 1963, ‫ ݠ‬ʌİȡ‫ ޥ‬șİȫıİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ܻȞșȡȫʌȠȣ įȚįĮıțĮȜȓĮ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, Thessaloniki. Martzelos, G. D., 1993, ‫ݽ‬ȡșȩįȠȟȠ įȩȖȝĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬șİȠȜȠȖȚțާȢ ʌȡȠȕȜȘȝĮIJȚıȝާȢ. ȂİȜİIJȒȝĮIJĮ įȠȖȝĮIJȚț߱Ȣ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ (ĭȚȜȠıȠijȚțȒ țĮȚ șİȠȜȠȖȚțȒ ȕȚȕȜȚȠșȒțȘ 15), Pournaras, Thessaloniki. Meyendorff, J., 1959, Introduction à l’études de Grégoire Palamas, Editions du Seuil, Paris. Panagopoulos, G. D., 2011, “Die Vermittlung des Sohnes beim ewigen

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Ausgang des Heiligen Geistes aus dem Vater nach Ad Ablabium Gregors von Nyssa (GNO III / I, 55, 21-24 – 56, 1-10)”, in: V. O. Drecoll & M. A. Bergahaus (eds), Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on Trinitarian Theology and Apollinarism (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, vol. 106), Brill, Leiden. Radovic A., 1991, ȉާ ȝȣıIJȒȡȚȠ IJ߱Ȣ ݄ȖȓĮȢ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ ݀ȖȚȠȞ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȞ ȆĮȜĮȝߢȞ (ਝȞȐȜİțIJĮ ǺȜĮIJȐįȦȞ 16), ȆĮIJȡȚĮȡȤȚțȩ ੎įȡȣȝĮ ȆĮIJİȡȚț૵Ȟ ȂİȜİIJ૵Ȟ, Thessaloniki. Robertson, D., 2001, “Relatives in Basil of Caesarea“, Studia Patristica vol. 37, pp. 277-288. Russel, N., 2006, “Theosis and Gregory Palamas: Continuity or Doctrinal Change?”, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, vol. 50, no 4, pp. 357379. Sieciensky, E., 2010, The Filioque. History of a doctrinal Controversy (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology), Oxford University Press, Oxford. Sinkiewitz, R. E., 2002, “Gregory Palamas”, in: Cǹ Conticello & VA Conticello, La Théologie byzantine et sa tradition, vol. II, Brepols Publishers, Turnhout, pp. 131-188. Staniloae, D., 1998, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology. The Experience of God, vol. 1., engl. transl. and edited by I. Ionita & R. Barringer, Brookline Mass. Werbick, J., 1995, “Trinitätslehre”, in: TH Schneider (ed.), Handbuch der Dogmatik, vol. 2, Patmos Verlag, Düsseldorf.

EUCHARIST AND ASCESIS: EUCHARISTIC AND THERAPEUTIC ECCLESIOLOGY IN THE THEOLOGY OF ST. GREGORY PALAMAS DR STAVROS YANGAZOGLOU

Introduction In recent years, St Gregory Palamas has been depicted as a dogmatician, who focused his attention on the well-known essence energies distinction, and as a master of the noetic prayer and defender of the holy hesychasts. The first Orthodox theologians, who extensively dealt with Palamas, studied his theology of the uncreated energies and the purely ascetical issues surrounding the hesychast doctrine. The Russian émigré theologians, in their effort to counter western theology and its traditional christomonism, proclaimed that Palamas’ doctrine expresses the pneumatological stream of Byzantine theology, which culminated in Palamite Hesychasm. The reception and overall effect of such positions upon modern Greek Orthodox theological thought, and monastic spirituality in particular, have been decisive: they are responsible for the gradual consolidation of a very idiosyncratic form of Orthodox spirituality, amounting to a kind of “secular palamism,” which highlights the various stages of the ascetical life (noetic prayer, the struggle against passions, the emphasis on Christian virtues and neptic literature), almost independently and as disconnected from the sacramental and liturgical life of the Church. In time, a great variety of theological, pastoral and institutional problems have arisen due to the tension between the so-called therapeutic and institutional ecclesiologies in the contemporary life of the Orthodox Church. Especially as regards Greek Orthodoxy, the dilemma or gap between Eucharistic and therapeutic ecclesiology (an indirect spin-off from the theological renewal of the 60s) appears to be intense, and can be attributed to a peculiar reception and interpretation of St Gregory Palamas’ theology.

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In this paper, it will be demonstratively argued with references to the primary sources, that St Gregory Palamas does not suggest an independent economy or action of the Holy Spirit, assuming as he does, rather, that the whole work of the Paraclete depends on Christ’s economy, in the perspective of a full synthesis between the sacraments and ascesis. The complementary relationship of the two is based on the Trinitarian structure of the divine economy, and is further manifested after Pentecost, mainly in the Church’s major sacraments, Baptism and especially the Eucharist: it is there that Christ, as the Paschal lamb, is divided by the Spirit and personally transmitted to the faithful, thereby strengthening and ever furthering the Body of Christ. In the patristic line of thought, espoused and further enriched by St Gregory Palamas, every divine service, and most certainly the sacraments, would be useless and inactive, unless they served as a vehicle for the grace of the Holy Spirit, who keeps together the whole structure of the Church, formed around the local bishops as its genuine fathers and teachers. In the Church, everything is charismatic, and no sacrament is conceivable apart from its Pneumatological constitution: “It is through the sacraments, that Christ justified us.” Baptism and Eucharist regenerate and transform the total human being, restoring it in the unity of its nature and personhood. As there is no distance between Christ and the Holy Spirit, so also is excluded any kind of disparity, divergence or antagonism between the Sacraments and the charismatic life. The ascetic preparation of the faithful is neither an individual achievement nor an end in itself, but “a suffering of the Paraclete,” which invites the free response and synergy of human beings for their union in Christ. In this way, the One Christ becomes by grace “myriohypostatos,” the One who is inclusive of the Many. According to the hesychast theologian, the Church is a “communion of deification” wherein the Holy Spirit, who instituted the Christ event, also is active in the transubstantiation of the holy gifts into the body and the blood of Christ. Participation in the sacrament of the Holy Eucharist not only strengthens the unity of the Church Body with Christ as its Head, but also enhances the multiplicity and personal integrity of each member in a free and unrestrained manner. Every charismatic manifestation from the side of the believers, culminating in the Christocentric experience of the vision of the uncreated light, is but the fruit of the sacramental incorporation into the Body of Christ. The ineffable vision of, and immersion in, the divine glory is really a Christophany, which, as in Mount Tabor, becomes visible within history thanks to the Holy Spirit, offering in effect a real foretaste of the eschatological Kingdom.

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A. Contemporary Interpretations of Palamas St. Gregory Palamas has been presented for years now as a mainly doctrinal theologian, whose teaching focused on the famous essenceenergies distinction, but also as a defender of monastics and a master of the ascetic life. Those Orthodox theologians who first engaged Palamas rather extensively, such as D. Staniloae, V. Lossky, C. Kern, and J. Meyendorff, as well as P. Chrestou, J. Romanides, Theoclitos Dionysiates, G. Mantzaridis, N. Matsoukas, A. Radovic, A. Yevtic, A. Keselopoulos, and others, focused either on his theology of the uncreated energies or on the purely ascetic aspects of the hesychast teaching. In their effort to counter the petrified Christomonism of western theology, the Russian theologians of the diaspora went so far as to situate Palamite theology within the Pneumatological trend that emerged in the Byzantine era, supposedly beginning after the Iconoclasm controversy and culminating in St. Gregory Palamas’ hesychasm. This pneumatological hermeneutic of the Russian theologians, which focused on humankind’s communion with God, maintained that the experience of divine grace had been underdeveloped, in the sense that the whole issue of the vision of God, up to the writings of St. John of Damascus, had been one-sidedly treated from the perspective of Christological doctrine. From St. Symeon the New Theologian and afterwards, by contrast, “Byzantine” theology begins to account for the experience of the vision of God mainly in pneumatological terms, in which context, hesychast “spirituality” was also placed, in its final and more complete formulation by St. Gregory Palamas.1 Following along these lines, Lossky confidently attributes the numerous instantiations of divine grace in saints, particularly such occurrences as glowing and the vision of God, as well as holy relics, miracle-working icons, the appearances of the Theotokos, and every other charismatic element in the lives of practicing Christians exclusively to the work of the Holy Spirit. The theology of St. Gregory Palamas on the uncreated energies of God, the ascetical life of the hesychasts and the vision of the uncreated light by the saints, all signal the primary culmination of this new pneumatological trend. Lossky constructed his theological edifice around the teaching of St. Gregory Palamas, and routinely wrote about an independent “economy” of the Holy Spirit, as something that completes the economy of Christ. Thus, if Christology 1 This constitutes the fundamental backbone of Lossky’s lectures at the Sorbonne, in 1945-46, which were posthumously published. See. LOSSKY VL., Vision de Dieu, Neuchâtel, 1962. Cf. CLÉMENT OL., Byzance et le Christianisme, Paris 1964, p. 35.

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concerns human nature and is inclusive of the Sacraments and the institutional side of the Church, Pneumatology concerns rather the distinct human persons and is indicative of the charismatic aspects of holiness and theosis. The “divinizing” work of the Holy Spirit does not attend to human nature as such, but to the freedom of human persons. What we actually have here, are two distinct sides of Ecclesiology, the Christologicalobjective and the pneumatological and subjective one, respectively.2

B. The problem of the “popularized palamism” These views have had a wide reception and impact on modern Greek theology after the 60s, particularly regarding monastic spirituality: they have been instrumental in the progressive formation of a certain kind of Orthodox spirituality and a particular form of “popularized palamism” which emphasizes the stages of the ascetic life, interior prayer, and the overall instruction on passions and virtues embedded in the ascetic literature, almost apart from the sacramental and liturgical life of the Church.3 The debate between Professor Panagiotes Trembelas, who embodied an outdated academic theology, and Hieromonk Theokleitos Dionysiates, representing the revival of Athonite spirituality, over the place of mystical theology and apophatic epistemology in Orthodox Tradition, is very enlightening and pertinent for our present topic. P. Trembelas4 held adamantly that mystical theology comprised an autonomous and rather arbitrary theological body of knowledge, which was almost completely at odds with every God-derived and authentic source of the Orthodox faith, such as Holy Scripture, the Apostolic Tradition and the Sacraments understood as vessels of grace and sanctification. For, if “mystics” are justified, what need do they have of the Holy Eucharist, inasmuch as solitary contemplation in one’s own cell may 2 See LOSSKY V., Essai sur la théologie mystique de l’Église d’Orient, Paris 11944. Cf. FLOROVSKY G., «Christ and His Church. Suggestions and Comments», in 10541954, L’Église et les Églises II, Chevêtogne 1955, p. 159sq.; STAVROU M., «Quelques réflexions sur l’ecclésiologie de Vladimir Lossky», Contacts, 229/2010, p. 60-73. On this issue, see also YANGAZOGLOU, ST., “Florovsky and Lossky: Reflections on the theological debate over the problem of the two economies,” Theologia 81:4/2010, pp. 187-204 (in Greek). 3 YANNARAS, CHR. Orthodoxy and West in Modern Greece, Athens, 1992, PP. 484489 (in Greek). ZIZIOULAS J., Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, T& T Clark, London 2008, pp. 122-125. 4 See TREMBELAS, PAN. Mysticism, Apophaticism, Cataphatic Theology, vol. 1, Athens 1974, p. 17., vol. 2, Athens 1980 (in Greek).

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well accomplish the vision of God? In his response, Fr. Theokleitos Dionysiates correctly pinpoints the infiltration of western scholasticism and rationalism in Trembelas’ views, attributing it to the lack of apophaticism tainting modern Greek academic theology. In a highly telling critique to Trembelas’ standpoint, Fr. Dionysiates raised the following point with apparent enthusiasm: .

“It was thanks to this ‘tradition’ [i.e., cataphatic theology] that we have reached the dawn of the 21st century, and would still be carrying on as we have all along, unsuspecting that we’ve only upheld one half of Orthodoxy, meaning the confessional aspect and the Sacraments. All the while, we ignored the treasures of the spiritual life, hence falling under the judgment of the scriptural word: ‘no, we have never even heard that there is a Holy Spirit’ (Acts 19:2), partaken of by an alternative to the Sacraments way. Moreover, it was only 20 years ago that a serious discussion began to take place concerning the spiritual aspect of Orthodoxy – which belongs to apophatic theology – through the publishing of patristic and philocalic texts, and the pioneer, for the Church of Greece, research on St. Gregory Palamas and Mystical Theology, first launched by the Russian theologians in the West and later in Thessaloniki, where the project is still under way.”5

For the Athonite scholar, the slightly less rigorous cataphatic theology, i.e., the confessional part of the faith, along with the Sacraments, is followed in principle by the laity. The luxury of apophatic theology, on the other hand, combined with its cataphatic counterpart, belongs to the monastics. These are two ways that are both leading to God, albeit “surely not in equal measure”. For only the exceptional monks “through the purification of the mind” may enter the cloud of unknowing, where God dwells. This insight is directly inspired by the Holy Spirit, and is revealed gradually to the sanctified.6 Following along similar lines, Fr. John Romanides, the first to introduce Palamite theology in modern Orthodox theology, as early as 1956-7, in his legendary dissertation7 laid the groundwork for a particular kind of therapeutic Ecclesiology, wherein the Sacraments tend to be 5 See THEOKLEITOS DIONYSIATES, Monk, «Ȇİȡȓ ȝȓĮȞ șİȠȜȠȖȚțȒȞ ȝİȜȑIJȘȞ», ǹșȦȞȚțȠȓ ǻȚȐȜȠȖȠȚ 29-30/1975, pp. 15-16. 6 See THEOKLEITOS DIONYSIATES, Monk, «Ȇİȡȓ ȝȓĮȞ șİȠȜȠȖȚțȒȞ ȝİȜȑIJȘȞ», ǹșȦȞȚțȠȓ ǻȚȐȜȠȖȠȚ 29-30/1975, pp. 9-18; 31-32/1975, pp. 12-18; 33-34/1975, pp. 8-32. 7 See THEOKLEITOS DIONYSIATES, Monk, «Ȇİȡȓ ȝȓĮȞ șİȠȜȠȖȚțȒȞ ȝİȜȑIJȘȞ», ǹșȦȞȚțȠȓ ǻȚȐȜȠȖȠȚ 29-30/1975, pp. 9-18. 31-32/1975, pp. 12-18. 33-34/1975, pp. 832.

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reduced to mere teletourgical and institutional acts, devoid of an objective healing outcome. In contrast to these, the progressive stages in the charismatic and spiritual life, detached from the Liturgy and especially the Eucharist, are elevated as the sole way of one’s union with God. Despite Fr. John Romanides’ own self-portrayal as one of the pioneers of Eucharistic theology in Greek-speaking Orthodoxy, his ecclesiological angle tends to be singularly therapeutic. In his own words, “these therapeutic steps are the end-purpose of the Church’s sacramental life, as witnessed to by the liturgical texts.” The Sacraments are but the means to an end, their raison d’ être being to confirm the internal prayer.8 Otherwise, they signify nothing more than a massive wizardry, devoid of any potential for grace and sanctification. In spite of his firm underestimation of Russian theology of the Diaspora, Fr. Romanides appears to endorse Lossky’s understanding of the one-sided link between the Sacraments and human nature, and the direct linkage of the Spirit’s charismatic manifestations with particular human beings. Hence, the Holy Spirit is presented as acting and sanctifying the charismatics in an individual manner, without being instrumental in the construction of the very edifice of the Church. The proven feat of the vision of God, and the reification of Church experience as a countable measure of Orthodoxy are herein pronounced as the sole validity criterion for the assessment of every clerical act, and even of apostolic succession, on the basis of an almost scholastic method of verification. As soon as theosis is rendered the sine qua non condition for the bishop’s priesthood, and the reason for the emergence of the order of presbyters, of the parish and the synodical system of the Church, and when, at some point, the divinized Christians began to be viewed as individuals distinct from the parish clergy and belonging to the monastic order, then consequently all common historical successors of Christ and celebrants of the Sacraments were immediately demoted and distrusted, in comparison to the charismatics. For Fr. John Romanides, St. Gregory Palamas had been the chief mouthpiece of this therapeutic and monastic Ecclesiology.9 8 See ROMANIDES JOHN, «Prologue» in Gregory Palamas’ Works, vol. 1, in the series «ȇȦȝĮȓȠȚ Ȓ ȇȦȝȘȠȓ ȆĮIJȑȡİȢ IJȘȢ ǼțțȜȘıȓĮȢ», Thessaloniki 1984, pp. 27-31 (in Greek). «Jesus Christ – The Life of the World», in Xenia Ecumenica 39/1983, Helsinki, pp.232-275. 9 See ROMANIDES JOHN, «Prologue», «ǹǯ General Introduction» and «Ǻǯ Dogmatic-Historical Introduction» in Gregory Palamas’ Works, vol. 1, in the series «ȇȦȝĮȓȠȚ Ȓ ȇȦȝȘȠȓ ȆĮIJȑȡİȢ IJȘȢ ǼțțȜȘıȓĮȢ», İțį. ȆȠȣȡȞĮȡȐ, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ 1984, pp. 5-194. «Jesus Christ – The Life of the World», in Xenia Ecumenica 39/1983,

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Undoubtedly, whatever distinctions can be made between monastic spirituality and laity piety, they cannot be taken as pertaining to a single particular activity of the Holy Spirit; nor should such a divide be seen as placing monastic spirituality to a qualitatively higher order than parish spirituality. The way of asceticism cannot be separated from the way of the Sacraments. A therapeutic Ecclesiology must be organically linked to the Eucharistic Ecclesiology, for if not, a multitude of problems would arise, as a result of the antagonistic relation between asceticism and the Sacraments, between monasticism and the Church in the world, between canonical hierarchy and spiritual elders, or individual piety and the ecclesial conscience. Such problems are a hindrance and an undermining factor to the emergence of the local Church as a Eucharistic gathering under the bishop, for they alter the very nature of Orthodox Ecclesiology, reducing it to the status of a “charismatic sociology.”10 Nowadays, thanks to the appearance of an individualistic type of piety and the establishment of a spiritualistic “elitism” in certain Orthodox circles, it is widely believed that Church membership does not belong to every baptized and struggling Christian, but only to those who demonstratively (as in the natural sciences) possess the gifts of the Holy Spirit, as a necessary outpouring of the believer’s illumination and theosis. This tension between the so-called therapeutic and the institutional Ecclesiological models, in particular, which has long been simmering in the contemporary Orthodox ecclesiological scene, presents various theological, pastoral, and institutional problems. The Greek Orthodoxy, in particular, is intensely troubled by the dilemma or gap between the Eucharistic and the therapeutic Ecclesiology, which may be attributed to the theological shift that occurred in the 60s, particularly in the aftermath of a peculiar interpretation of St. Gregory Palamas’ teaching. It is now customary for a huge segment from both the pastoral and the theological quarters of Church life, to cling exclusively to the therapeutic version of Ecclesiology as the foremost reality; on opposite ends from these, others in contrast champion the liturgical or institutional model alone, without

Helsinki, pp. 232-275. 10 See YANGAZOGLOU STAVROS, Communion of Deification: The Synthesis of Christology and Pneumatology in the Work of St. Gregory Palamas, Domos, Athens 2001, pp. 343-346 (in Greek); also, “Sacramental Hesychasm: The Ecclesiological Prerequisites of the Theology of St. Gregory Palamas,” Synaxe 81/2002, pp. 39-49 (in Greek); “Eucharist and Ascesis: The Ecclesiological Backbone of the Orthodox Ethos,” in ȈȪȞĮȟȚȢ ǼȣȤĮȡȚıIJȓĮȢ. ȋĮȡȚıIJȒȡȚĮ İȚȢ IJȚȝȒȞ IJȠȣ īȑȡȠȞIJȠȢ ǹȚȝȚȜȚĮȞȠȪ, Indictos, Athens 2003, pp. 335-364 (in Greek).

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attempting a synthesis of these two aspects of Church life.11 This tendency has resulted in the appearance of a new piety movement, which used the “return to the Fathers” and the monastic ideal as a pretext for supplanting the gap of the previously dominant piety of the religious fellowships with a set of shallow theological slogans and a predilection for the letter alone of the patristic Tradition. It was actually this confusion of theological and pastoral criteria, which facilitated the strange mixture of the Fellowships’ legacy with the supposedly patristic and traditional attachment to the figure of the spiritual elder. Citing as a pretext the protection of Orthodoxy from the heresies of Western Christianity and Ecumenism, the followers of this “popularized palamism” or “byzantine patriotism” often assume for themselves the role of Church policemen or prosecutors. Under the slogan of salvaging Orthodoxy from Ecumenism and the West, and championing an Old Calendar-like rejection of every theological attempt to move forward and join the dialogue with the modern world and its problems, this tendency becomes in effect the Orthodox counterpart to Vatican’s Defensor Fidei, the true cathedra of contemporary Orthodoxy.12

C. Contemporary objections to Palamism in the West Following along the lines of what had been an “anti-palamite” camp from the outset, several western scholars were quick to indicate linguistic as well as thematic divergences in the teaching of St. Gregory Palamas from that of his contemporary St. Nicolas Cabasilas, to an extent amounting to an allegedly radical disparity between the two. Palamas’ emphasis on the uncreated energies was seen as inhibiting the persons of the Holy Trinity, in regards to both theology and economy. Their role in salvation thus, becomes obscured, if not altogether annulled, their spot 11 The situation is getting out of hand when some find it easy to accuse for heresy those who don’t follow the extremities of the so-called therapeutic approach, especially the renowned theologians who have dedicated their lives to the study, exposure, and witness of Orthodox Ecclesiology in the West. See, e.g. the articles by Metropolitan of Nafpaktos IEROTHEOS VLACHOS, «ȂȓĮ țȣȠijȠȡȠȪȝİȞȘ ĮȓȡİıȘ ıIJȘȞ ȅȡșȩįȠȟȘ ǼțțȜȘıȓĮ», ȆİȚȡĮȧțȒ ǼțțȜȘıȓĮ 230-234/2011-2012 (in Greek). 12 See YANGAZOGLOU S., «Ecclésiologie eucharistique et spiritualité monastique: rivalité ou syntèse?», in L’ecclesiologie eucharistique, sous la direction de J.-M. Van Cangh, Académie Internationale des Sciences Religieuses, Cerf, Bruxelles 2009, pp. 79-95. «ǼȣȤĮȡȚıIJȚĮțȒ İțțȜȘıȚȠȜȠȖȓĮ țĮȚ ȝȠȞĮıIJȚțȒ ʌȞİȣȝĮIJȚțȩIJȘIJĮ. ȉȠ ȗȒIJȘȝĮ IJȠȣ ȖİȡȠȞIJȚıȝȠȪ», in ǹȞĮIJĮȡȐȟİȚȢ ıIJȘ ȝİIJĮʌȠȜİȝȚțȒ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮ, Ǿ «șİȠȜȠȖȓĮ IJȠȣ ’60», Indictos, Athens 2009, pp. 547-631 (in Greek).

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being filled by the “unhypostatized (impersonal) energy.” In effect, Palamite theology was viewed as devoid of a Christological and Trinitarian basis, comprising rather a setback to the simple God of the mystics, this time fashioned in neoplatonic terms. In sum, for these western scholars “Palamism” amounted in reality to an iconoclastic movement, in the sense that the immediate view of God, as championed by the hesychasts, rendered useless the intermediate function of icons, and contested no less the fundamental Christological premise of iconophile argumentation. This alleged devaluation of Christology by Palamas extends all the way to the place and role of the Sacraments in the life in Christ. Thus, if Nicolas Cabasilas presented the life in Christ as being integrated in the Sacraments of the Church, Gregory Palamas was said to have contrastingly situated the reception of divine grace in a “nonSacramental context,” strictly associated with the progressive stages of monastic discipline in quietism. According to this narrative, Cabasilas allegedly reacted against Palamas, mainly by extolling the sacramental life as the true, Christocentric spirituality, particularly in the common participation in the Eucharistic Body of Christ, as opposed to the primacy of viewing the uncreated light, as claimed by the few elect. Hence, if Cabasilas was seen as representing a liturgical-sacramental Ecclesiology and piety, Palamas supposedly introduced a solely therapeutic Ecclesiology, one mandating as the goal of the spiritual life the obedience to commands and the exercise of inner prayer, the two sole means by means of which one reaches the direct contemplation of the uncreated glory of God. In this understanding, Cabasilas’ contrast against hesychasm is enormous. On the one hand, Palamas and the monks, as an elect group, follow a therapeutic and monastic version of Ecclesiology, a kind of pneumatomonism bearing directly on Ecclesiology. Cabasilas, on the other hand, having promoted a Christocentric spirituality intended for lay people, emphasized a liturgical and sacramental spirituality that approached Ecclesiology from a Eucharistic perspective.13 In view of the thick certainties surrounding 13 For such accounts of the relation between Palamas and Cabasilas, see. IVANKA VON E., Sakramental-Mystik der Ostkirche. Das Buch vom Leben in Christus des Nicola Kabasilas, München 1958. MIQUEL P., «L’expérience sacramentelle selon Nicolas Cabasilas», Irénikon 38/1965, p. 176. MÜLLER-ASSHOFF H., «Beobachtungen an den Hauptschriften des Gregorios Palamas und Nikolaos Kabasilas», ibid., Beck H.-G., Ǿ ǺȣȗĮȞIJȚȞȒ ȋȚȜȚİIJȓĮ, ȩʌ.ʌ. . «Humanismus und Palamismus», ibid. . «Von der Fragwürdigkeit der Ikonen», Bayerische ǹkademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Kl. Sitzungsberichte 1975, v. 1, pp. 1-44.

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this picture, it was in vain that scholars like M. Lot-Borodine and others sought to sketch Cabasilas as a “palamite”. In any case, we are finding it hard to follow the persistence of certain western scholars in reiterating that Cabasilas may have been a close friend of Palamas on a personal level, but not in terms of ideology, and that, in spite of lending support to his friend, he had never been a “palamite.” This line of thought chides Palamas’ monastic circle with an overall hostility against intellectuals and theological scholarship, in general. Accordingly, it maintains that for all his participation in hesychast monastic circles, Cabasilas had never himself subscribed to “palamism.” Central to this view is the demarcation between “hesychasm,” on the one hand, as an ascetical and spiritual tradition running deep into the monastic life of Eastern Orthodoxy, and “palamism,” on the other, as a supposedly particular theological and ideological edifice, which is at fault for both annulling divine simplicity with its essence-energies distinction, and for introducing self-subsistent entities between God and the world.14 This syllogism feeds off the polemics of previous Roman Catholic theologians against St. Gregory Palamas,15 and its impact survives to the present day. Against the backdrop of this anti-palamite hermeneutic, it is important to focus our attention on the place and the significance of Sacraments in the teaching of the hesychast Saint. Is there really a theology and an experience of divine grace that stands above, parallel to or over against the Church’s sacramental life? Is the ascetic life of monastics an end in itself, distinct from the sacramental life of the Church? Before embarking on any CONGOURDEAU M.-H., «Nicolas Cabasilas et le Palamisme», ibid., pp. 201-207. For a total review of this problem, see. YANGAZOGLOU ST., “Gregory Palamas and Nicolaos Cavasilas: The Synthesis of the Sacramental and Ascetical Life in the Orthodox Tradition,” Theologia 81:3/2010, pp. 159-179 (in Greek). 14 See, for example, IVANKA VON E., Plato Christianous, Einsieldeln 1964. «Hellenisches in Hesychasmus. Das antinomische der Energienlehre», Epektasis, Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal J. Daniélou, Paris 1972, pp. 490-500. 15 Concerning the anti-Palamite accusations and the Roman Catholic critique of the hesychast tradition, see YANGAZOGLOU ST., ȆȡȠȜİȖȩȝİȞĮ ıIJȘ ĬİȠȜȠȖȓĮ IJȦȞ ĮțIJȓıIJȦȞ İȞİȡȖİȚȫȞ. ȈʌȠȣįȒ ıIJȠȞ ȐȖȚȠ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠ ȆĮȜĮȝȐ, Katerini 1992; Communion of Deification: The Synthesis of Christology and Pneumatology in the Work of St. Gregory Palamas, Domos, Athens 2001, pp. 15-40.; “St. Gregory Palamas and Modern Western Theology,” Theologia 83:3/2012. RUSSELL N., «The reception of Palamas in the West Today», Theologia 83:3/2012. Cf. CONGOURDEAU M.-H., «Nicolas Cabasilas et le Palamisme», in Gregorio Palamas E Oltre. Studi e documenti sulle controversie teologiche del XIV secolo bizantino, ed. A. Rigo, Firenze 2004, pp. 191-210.

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attempt to address these questions, let us state in advance that in our view, the mere positing of such and similar views, questions and perspectives, is an injustice to the theological thought of the Archbishop of Thessalonica, and can be at best attributed to flagrant ignorance.

D. Eucharist and asceticism Judging by the extant sources relating to his life, it can be safely ascertained that Saint Gregory Palamas personally dwelled in the life setting of a “sacramental hesychasm.” In his manifold capacity as monk, priest, and Abbot in Veroia and Mount Athos, Palamas exemplified a remarkable diligence toward the liturgical life and the celebration of the Holy Sacraments.16 As Bishop, he openly declared his daily celebration and partaking of the Sacrament of Holy Communion. At the same time, he urges his flock to participate in the Sunday Eucharistic gatherings of the Church and to partake flawlessly of the holy Body and Blood of the Savior.17 It is doubtlessly telling, that Barlaam’s abstinence from the Holy Eucharist throughout his entire residence in the East was deemed by Palamas as the most striking evidence for the fact that the Calabrian monk had never really been a member of the Orthodox Church.18 Throughout his debate with Barlaam, who maintained, among other things, that the attainment of virtues is a self-sufficient indication of perfection and theosis, Palamas held, contrastingly, that one’s union with God and the vision of God attained by saints do not occur as a result of humankind’s natural capacities, but by virtue of the uncreated divine grace and energy. The virtues themselves, virtues do not effect theosis, but only prepare one’s union with God, and only under certain circumstances. To this effect, Palamas cites in his debate with Barlaam an apposite passage by Dionysius the Areopagite, which we see as a judicious hermeneutical key both for putting the whole hesychast debate in perspective and, more importantly, for demonstrating the unbroken link between the Sacraments and spiritual discipline in the teaching of St. Gregory and, beyond that of the Orthodox Tradition at large: “We can achieve our integration and union with God, as far as it is possible […] as the instruction of the divine words would have it, solely by loving sacred commandments and the services.”19 16 PHILOTHEOS KOKKINOS, Life of Gregory Palamas, 4,4.4,13.4,17. 4,41.5,29-31, ed. P. Christou, pp. 104, 114, 118, 150. 17 Homily 8, 8. Homily 38, 10. Homily 17, 16.17.22. Decalogue 4, Treatises 5, p. 255. 18 Triads 3,1,5. Treatises 1, Chrestou ed., p. 619. 19 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE, Celestial Hierarchy 2, PG 3, 392A. GREGORY

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Palamas dwells more on the first part of the Areopagitic text, the one concerning the loving observance of the divine mandates, leaving the other part, which broaches the celebration of the Sacraments, without comment. Certainly, this is not expressive of any predilection for the ascetic manner of union with God, over against the sacramental one – the two ways are, in any case, strongly intertwined; it simply conveys his view that the former of these requires attestation, as opposed to the latter, which (according to an old theological tradition) is a concealed and private matter. Such is the twofold tradition of theology, according to the Areopagite.20 The Scriptural and Patristic witnesses are replete with evidence corroborating Gospel mandates, Church doctrines, as well as the particular ethos ensuing from these, in other words, from the material observance of divine commands. As a result, the wisdom external to the Gospel, i.e., philosophical knowledge, is of no use at all, as far as salvation is concerned. But, notwithstanding Palamas’ argumentative consistence against Barlaam’s ideological fancies, what is the meaning that the hesychast master ascribes to the Sacraments, particularly with regard to experiencing divine grace? In what manner are the Sacraments related to the ascetic obedience to the commands and the quietism practiced by the monastics? Given the fact that theosis is not a natural habit or imitation, Palamas intertwines the Sacraments with spiritual discipline, making in effect an unbreakable bond of them. The uncreated character of the grace received through baptism and prior to the Sacraments, dwells in the bodies of the saints and it is that which effects their theosis, if activated. After all, that is the meaning of the adverb “solely” in the Areopagitical passage cited above. But the very possibility of observing the commandments, presupposes in the first place the grace procured by believers at baptism from the Holy Spirit. No experience or “spirituality” is in any way conceivable in the Church, unless it is embedded in the uncreated grace of the Sacraments. The entry point for the deification of believers is precisely baptism. It is in baptism that the adoption of the people of God in Christ is PALAMAS, Triads 2,1,39. 20 See Ǻǯ To Barlaam 20, Treatises 1, pp. 271-2, «ǻȚȩ țĮȚ Ƞ ȚİȡȩȢ țĮȚ șİȓȠȢ ijİȡȫȞȣȝȠȢ ǿİȡȩșİȠȢ… Ƞȣ “țĮșĮȡȩIJȘIJȚ ȞȠȣ ȝȩȞȠȞ țĮȚ IJĮȚȢ ȐȜȜĮȚȢ ȚİȡȠȜȠȖȓĮȚȢ, ĮȜȜȐ țĮȚ IJȘ IJȦȞ ĮʌȠįİȓȟİȦȞ ĮțȡȚȕİȓĮ”. țĮȚ ĮȣIJȩȢ įİ Ƞ IJĮ IJȠȚĮȪIJĮ IJȠȪIJȦ ȝĮȡIJȣȡȫȞ (ǻȚȠȞȪıȚȠȢ) țĮȚ IJȠ ıȣȞİʌIJȣȖȝȑȞȠȞ țĮȚ ȣȥȘȜȩȞ IJȘȢ İțİȓȞȠȣ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ ȣȥȘȜȫȢ ĮȞĮʌIJȪȟĮȢ įȚIJIJȒȞ ıĮijȫȢ İȓȞĮȚ įȚįȐıțİȚ IJȘȞ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮȞ. “IJȘȞ ȝİȞ ȝȣıIJȚțȒȞ, IJİȜİıIJȚțȒȞ, ĮʌȩȡȡȘIJȠȞ, ȐȡȡȘIJȠȞ, Ș įȡĮ țĮȚ İȞȚįȡȪİȚ IJȦ Ĭİȫ IJĮȚȢ ĮįȚįȐțIJȠȚȢ ȝȣıIJĮȖȦȖȓĮȚȢ, IJȘȞ įİ İȝijĮȞȒ țĮȚ ijȚȜȩıȠijȠȞ țĮȚ ĮʌȠįİȚțIJȚțȒ, Ș ʌİȓșİȚ țĮȚ țĮIJĮįİȓIJĮȚ IJȦȞ ȜİȖȠȝȑȞȦȞ IJȘȞ ĮȜȒșİȚĮȞ”…». Cf. DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE, On the Divine Names, PG 3, 684B. Letter 9, PG 3, 1105CD.

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enacted (an adoption transcending biological being) thanks to the sanctification and the communion event effected by the Holy Spirit. Wholly granted to believers as a gift, the grace given in baptism resides forever in them, courtesy of divine philanthropy. Nevertheless, while baptismal grace is indeed ineradicable, the maintenance of purity and sanctification lie in the believer’s free will. The new creation and the freedom from death, despite having been given us gratis during baptism, must by all means be preserved till the end with our free acceptance and synergy, in order for our adoption by God and co-inheritance with Christ to become a secure and permanent reality in the coming Kingdom. Following baptism, the Sacrament of the “mystical bread and cup” signifies the charismatic participation of the believer in the sacrificial death and resurrection of Christ. Like baptism, the communion of the Holy Eucharist is wholly a gift. These two Sacraments, both “painless” for the believer, have both been instituted by the “painful” passions of Christ and are an icon of them. Consequently, neither baptism nor the Eucharist comprise a mere symbolic remembrance of the ministry of Christ; rather, they are the sacramental or mystical vessels whereby divine grace is transmitted in terms of an active presence of Christ, thoroughly effecting the theosis of human beings. As Palamas holds, it is from these two Sacraments that salvation and theosis derives, as they encapsulate the totality of the God-man’s economy of salvation.21 Participation in the mystical celebration, communion and gathering of the Holy Eucharist, provides us with the perfect, if clandestine, union with Christ. But it is crucial to point out that it is not a union with the divine nature of Christ, as Akindynos thought, but a communion with His codivine and enhypostatized human nature, which has become a ceaseless and inexhaustible source of sanctification and grace, the selfsame body into which the Eucharistic gifts are transubstantiated. Saint Gregory insists that the Eucharistic bread and wine become literally the Body and Blood of Christ, and so actualize human participation in the uncreated energies of which it is comprised. It is thus made clear, that the distinction between incommunicable essence and communicable energies, so persistently championed by the hesychast theologian, is integrally woven into the sacramental ontology, upon which Saint Nicolas Cabasilas erected his own theological edifice. It is a vision of an unbreakable and multi-layered communion, which transcends all other forms of interpersonal relationships. Christ has become the brother of people, by virtue of the fact that He has assumed their nature; He has likewise become a friend by revealing His

21 Homily 60, 7.

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mysteries, a father by virtue of the adoption of baptism, a groom because He united Himself to us in an unbreakable way, but also a mother, through the transmission of His Body and Blood.22 Christ Himself has revealed that communion with His body is required for inheriting the true life. Thus, what is actually celebrated in the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist is the eternity of the Kingdom. Every time we receive Communion, the uncreated grace, which institutes the Body and Blood of Christ, is at work and envelops us throughout, strengthening our adoption and full incorporation in the divine life. In a real sense, Communion immortalizes us, since our created being becomes rooted in the uncreated energies sent forth by the Holy Spirit, through the Eucharistic Body of Christ. In emphasizing the required spiritual preparation for receiving Communion, St. Gregory unfailingly indicates the need for preserving spiritual integrity unabated. Hence, the fulfillment of divine precepts entails a Eucharistic meaning and content. To the ineffable gift of the Father, and the immeasurable consent of the onlybegotten Son, we offer back in thanksgiving our whole being through our works. After all, the very meaning of the Holy Eucharist does not refer to frequent Communion alone, but to the placement of our being onto God, as well. The reception of grace through the Sacraments is not the result of a given, compulsory procedure; it is the fruit, rather, of a positive human response, in freedom. At the same time, Christ Himself ceaselessly reciprocates the struggle of those striving to follow His commandments, granting them power through the Holy Spirit. When viewed in this way, the observance of the commandments and the acquirement of virtues can never be considered to be ends in themselves or a feat accomplished apart from the Sacraments and the body of the Church, as they are inconceivable without God’s reciprocation and compassion.23 Here we would be remiss, if we failed to remark that human cooperation, as understood by the Orthodox, is assumed and strengthened by God’s grace, in a way that expresses remarkably the paradox of the asymmetrical Christology. What this means is that sacramental grace is offered as a gift and by God’s initiative, not as a necessary reward and trophy. The human contribution to this process, accordingly, consists in the free and active acceptance of this gift, which can be prompted by the distinctive work of the Paraclete. This organic correlation between Sacraments and spiritual struggle, or otherwise put, between the flowing of divine grace and its personal 22 Homily 56, 10-11. 23 Homily 56, 8. Homily 20, 13. Homily 60, 5-6. Homily 31, 15. Homily 56, 15-16. Homily 58, 4. Homily 28, 2-3.

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assumption and implementation by the believer, signifies for Saint Gregory the safe ecclesiological presupposition for the life in Christ. In the manifestation of this sacramental and ascetical cooperation, Christ “renovated not simply the nature, but the hypostasis of each of those that believe, and granted us the forgiveness of sins through the holy baptism, through the observance of the familiar commandments, through repentance, which he handed to those at fault, and through the offering of His very own Body and Blood.”24 Hence, Lossky’s list of distinctions between unity and multiplicity, nature and person, the economy of Christ and the economy of the Holy Spirit, and between the sacramental and ascetical lives, are arbitrary theological constructions that have no place in the teachings of Gregory Palamas. It is this unbreakable intertwining of the sacramental and the ascetical elements of the life in Christ that is reflected in the lives and spiritual struggles of the hesychasts, whose actual experience, the fruition of this joint endeavor, was precisely what was defended from the unjust accusations of Barlaam by Saint Gregory. The purpose of the quietist discipline is the integration, preservation, and full partaking of the uncreated grace, “which is embraced by all who have been mystically cleansed and reborn by water and the spirit.”25 Therefore, following one’s baptism, the various stages of the life in Christ are manifested as the degrees of appropriating the in-dwelling Holy Spirit. Henceforth, all baptized Christians who commit themselves to a continuous struggle to preserve or renew the purity of soul and body, i.e., by observing the Godtaught commandments and acquiring the virtues, “through their own struggle and the help of the Holy Spirit”, prosper and thrive in the life in Christ, “looking as they do inward, and not like those who look outward, at their own spiritual renewal and for signs of it, [otherwise] secret and invisible to the many.”26 This inner renewal, along with the visible or secret gifts that it carries, and which culminates in the view of the uncreated light and theosis, is the fruit of mystical grace and human cooperation intersecting with one another amidst the believer’s ascetical preparation and purity. As a result, all stages on the road to attaining perfection in Christ involve the grace of the Sacraments and depend upon it. Interestingly, St. Nicolas Cabasilas, in his description of the Holy Eucharist as “the ultimate Sacrament, for it is not possible to move beyond it or add anything to it,” does not separate Eucharistic experience from the vision of the uncreated light, but instead identifies the two, depending on 24 Homily 60, 18. 25 Contra 3, 51, Treatises 3, pp. 200. 3,24, pp. 179-180. 26 Contra 5, 92, Treatises 3, Chrestou ed., p. 357.

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the degree of the participants’ ascetical purity: “This very Sacrament is a light to those who are already cleansed, a cleansing force for those who are getting themselves cleansed, and anointer to those who fight against the evil one and the passions.”27 The illumination received in baptism and the partaking of the Lord’s “illuminating body,” unite Christ, in the Holy Spirit, to the particular human hypostasis. Thanks to the communion with His holy body, the Godman Jesus becomes one body and soul, in order to illumine the souls of those who partake worthily in the Sacrament with the splendor of His body’s uncreated energies, just as He had once done to the bodies and souls of the disciples on Mount Tabor. Thus, the foundation of the vision of the uncreated light is Eucharistic. The body of Christ, as the source of the light stemming from the uncreated grace, to the extent that it has been righteously assimilated as to inhere men and women, illumines [the saints] from within,”28 not from outside. It is precisely because this “Christophanic” vision of the uncreated light is instituted by the sacramental life of the ecclesiastical body, that the experience of the hesychasts is radically differentiated from any other mystical experience outside of Christianity. The hesychastic and neptic exercise of the monastics seeking sacramental grace inwardly, acknowledges a key role to mental prayer, as an intrinsic part of the human effort for the visible attainment of participation in the divine grace. The mind (ȞȠȣȢ) as the cognitive instrument of the multi-capable soul, feeds the received grace of the Holy Spirit to its adjacent body, having first freely accepted it. In doing so, the mind ceases to be a passive instrument of the soul and is rather restored, through the cleansing from the passions, to its original capacity and function, that of mirroring the God Word. Thanks to this unitary progress of the mind and the return to the heart, which guards the bodily senses, human beings are brought to a spiritual Sabbath rest. The exercise in abstinence, love, and prayer, prepare us for our active acceptance of the divine grace. Human persons are illumined by the uncreated grace, which through the Sacraments has come to rest deep into their being, making them transparent, guardians, and participants in the light of the Holy Trinity.29 The enhypostatized divine grace is viewed hypostatically by the saints. Inasmuch as the mind, “being wholly an eye,” is attached, through the soul, to the entire human hyspostasis, the experience of divine illumination 27 NICOLAS CABASILAS, On the Life of Christ, 4, 1-2. 28 Triads 1,3,38, Treatises 1, Chrestou ed., p. 449. 29 Triads 1,2,1-7, Treatises 1, pp. 393-400. Cf. Triads 1,3,50. 2,1,31. 1,3,17. 3,2,17. 1,3,31. Contra 7, 31-36, Treatises 3, pp. 484-488. Contra 7, 39, Treatises 3, p. 491.

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is also channeled to the body, with the help of the Holy Spirit; in this way, the sensible part of human nature become capable of feeling the ineffable mystery of seeing God, and even adjust properly so as to enter divine communion. This shouldn’t strike anyone as particularly paradoxical; for the Holy Spirit handles human nature the same way that it touches and sanctifies the material elements of the Sacraments, the icons, etc. It is the whole human being who is illumined and given visual access to supernatural affairs, as afforded by this light-giving ecstatic foretaste of the future. The meaning of humankind’s embodied vision of God, is accounted for by the hesychast theologian in the following astonishing description: “Humans, as though they were earthly angels, pass on, through their own being, the whole of creation, spiritual as well as physical, to God, having been made to [physically] share in every kind of creaturely existence, thus witnessing to their being an image of God.”30 Humanity’s ascetical synergy or cooperation should not be seen in terms of a narrow moralism, concerned only with the salvation of “souls.” Far from that, when placed into a decisively Christological perspective, the divine-human synergy assumes ontological, even cosmic dimensions, since it affects and applies to God’s creation in its entirety. Following the Incarnation of the Word, the fruit of the “God-man’s activity” and the diffusion of His limitless body in history, are the saints of the Church: those who have beheld the uncreated light shine from the glorious body of Christ, as the disciples had first done, on Mount Tabor. Filled with God and Christ-like, not only do the saints share in divine grace, but even transmit it further themselves for the creation and sustenance of the Church’s body, thus making grace sharable and transmissible in history, and so manifesting as well the ecclesiological basis of theosis. The Church, as the “collective body or society of theosis,” does not accept any kind of “individual theosis” or private means of salvation. Be that as it may, the fullness and perfection of the vision of and unity with God, are an event of the eschaton, the coming Kingdom. It is there, that Christ, as “the God in our midst” shall be eternally providing the holy life to the saints through the Holy Spirit, in which the saints shall be progressing from glory to glory.31

30 Contra 7, 36, Treatises 3, p. 488. 31 Homily 45, 10. Triads 2,2,11, Treatises 1, Chrestou ed., p. 517. Cf. NICOLAS CABASILAS, On the Life of Christ, 6, 15-16.

SILENCE IN THE LAND OF LOGOS1 PROFESSOR STEPHEN R. L. CLARK

Introduction and Summary It is customary to contrast the pagan philosophical tradition with the Christian by suggesting that pagan philosophers favoured “reason” over “faith”, and that their doctrines were conveyed as propositions either of a “self-evident” sort or as sound inferences from those first proposals. Barlaam’s dispute with Palamas is represented as an argument between a philosophical rationalist and an intelligent but poorly educated mystic. My object in this presentation is to suggest that it was Palamas who was closer to the actual philosophical tradition of late antiquity, and even of the earlier, “classical” and “archaic” periods. This was not an accident: he was better informed than Meyendorff proposed, and he did not object to the use of “reason” as such, but contended instead that there were demons who had misled the philosophers into adopting irrational conclusions – as that the stars were living gods, that human souls could find themselves reborn in animals, and that there were entirely other peoples far off in the Antipodes. Some of his complaints were mistaken – the usual unsympathetic reading of pagan allegorical expression to be found in most Hebrew and Christian commentators. Platonists – even late pagan Platonists - did not worship many gods or demons, did not despise this world, nor reckon bodies were only fit to be discarded. Nor did they imagine that we could reason our way to much apart from our own insufficiency. They sought instead to set their minds and lives in order, always recalling that this would be impossible without divine assistance, 1 I have addressed related issues about propositional knowledge and mystical experience in Clark 2010, in which I make more use of Montiglio 2000, from whom I have borrowed the title of this paper. My thanks to Norman Russell, Andrew Louth and Constantinos Athanasopoulos for comments on an earlier draft, and to all those who took part in the discussion of Gregory Palamas in Thessaloniki and Mount Athos in March 2012.

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and prayed to be taken up (or back) into the life of God, the dance of immortal love, gazing toward the One but never expecting to comprehend it. In this, they followed a hesychastic discipline that can be identified in Parmenides, and a theological story that appears, in mythological disguise, in Hittite, Egyptian and Greek accounts: the incomprehensible One contains the principles on which all beings depend, and we can – by quietening our minds and calling on God – begin to share the divine life. All this may be, as Palamas contended, a mere parody or misleading story, all the more persuasive for containing elements of truth. My own view is that it can be said of pagan Platonists as it was of the Hebrew Fathers, that not having received the promises they yet saw them afar off, and lived in hope of their fulfilment. They were not guilty of most of the errors imputed to them, by Palamas or even more modern critics. Platonists did suggest – to address one other misapprehension - that it was to be expected, as it were, that the One would let its goodness overflow: it is of the very nature of the One to be generous, and generosity is where we find the One. But Plotinus did not therefore suppose that the One was in any way constrained, nor that the world of our experience was the only possible outcome (as the Stoics claimed). As Palamas also said, “it is the property of the divine energy to create”, but He is not constrained to create any particular thing. The one actual theoretical difference that, tentatively, I propose is this: Plotinus imagines a lasting distinction between – as an example and exemplar – Heracles himself and the shade of Heracles. Heracles himself has forgotten all the detail of the life lived here below, and that is what we should hope to do as well. For the pagan this is all that we can expect. But the Christian hope is for reunion: the shade will also be taken up into the dance, and everything that composed it here and now be given fresh significance. We should direct our attention to other things now, perhaps, but in the hope of a real resurrection. The Incarnation has made the difference – an incarnation whose possibility at least Plotinus did not dispute.

Mistaken Stereotypes By John Meyendorff’s account (Meyendorff 1964) Palamas completed only the trivium and quadrivium “which every cultivated man followed”, and which did not include any study of Plato or later Platonists. He was clearly familiar with Aristotelian philosophy, but perhaps less so with Platonic. Later in life he did quote Porphyry, but only to criticise. It was his opponent, Barlaam of Calabria, who was prepared to cite the pagan Platonists with approval, and who reckoned that nothing which

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could not be demonstrated syllogistically from generally accepted premises should be asserted dogmatically (and especially not any claims about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son). Barlaam’s relativistic tolerance, of course, did not extend to tolerating anything that he himself considered wrong – notably the hesychastic practices that Palamas defended. “Barlaam’s proud temperament and also his spiritualizing convictions, inspired by Platonic philosophy, roused him to the greatest indignation, when he was told that the human body could itself participate in prayer and feel the action of divine grace” (Meyendorff 1964, p.46). Palamas, by contrast, believed that “the process of human thought itself … must be basically transformed by the action of the Holy Spirit in order to receive a sure knowledge of God” (Meyendorff 1964, p.45). Meyendorff is almost certainly mistaken in supposing that Palamas had not read much pagan Platonic philosophy. The 150 Texts (included in the Philokalia) give evidence of an acute philosophical intelligence – though one frequently, it must be said, in error: witness his insistence – in order to avoid the possibility that there are other lands and peoples wholly disconnected from Adam’s race - that the inhabited world is an island, the protruding section of a globe of earth contained within an immensely larger globe of water (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware [hereafter PSW] 1995, pp.349-52 [150 Texts 9-14]). He also was well-read enough to denounce some past philosophy (and – again – was sometimes factually mistaken, perhaps misled by the terms of the Orthodox condemnation of John Italos for teaching doctrines about reincarnation and the Platonic theory of ideas, as well as mocking icons, in 1082 AD2): “These people have arrived at a certain conception of God, but not at a conception truly worthy of Him and appropriate to His blessed nature. For their 'disordered heart was darkened' by the machinations of the wicked demons who were instructing them. For if a worthy conception of God could be attained through the use of intellection, how could these people have taken the demons for gods, and how could they have believed the demons when they taught man polytheism? In this way, wrapped up in this mindless and foolish wisdom and unenlightened education, they have calumniated both God and nature. They have deprived God of His sovereignty (at least as far as they are concerned); they have ascribed the Divine Name to demons; and they were so far from finding the knowledge of beings – the object of their desire and zeal – as to claim that inanimate 2 A suggestion I owe to Andrew Louth. One further oddity of associating iconoclasm with Platonic theory is that Platonists themselves made use of images, as I shall point out later.

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Silence in the Land of Logos things have a soul and participate in a soul superior to our own. They also allege that things without reason are reasonable, since capable of receiving a human soul; that demons are superior to us and are even our creators (such is their impiety); they have classed among things uncreated and unoriginate and coeternal with God, not only matter, and what they call the World Soul, but also those intelligible beings not clothed in the opacity of the body, and even our souls themselves” (Palamas 1983, p.26 [Triads I.1.18]).

But of course it does not follow that he abandoned all philosophy, nor even that he rejected everything that those philosophers had said. After all, denouncing one’s predecessors is one of the most familiar of philosophical tropes: witness Plato, Aristotle, Al-Ghazali, Descartes and Wittgenstein! Much of Palamas’s complaint rests on the usual unsympathetic reading of pagan thought to be found in Hebrew and Christian literature from the very first encounters with a non-Abrahamic culture, and without much effort to say what exactly was the wickedness into which the “demons” led them. Stoic and Platonic philosophers would have replied that “demons” and “gods” popularly so called were either fellow inhabitants of the ordered cosmos, different from us only in having airy or fiery rather than earthy bodies, or else were facets of the Divine. Meyendorff interprets the remark about things that have souls despite being reckoned – at least by Palamas – inanimate as referring to pagan statues, which some writers thought could be animated in religious ritual (see Ennead IV.3 [27].11; Asclepius 37: Copenhaver 1992, p.90). It is more likely to refer to fixed and even planetary stars: Palamas’ complaint elsewhere is that the Greek sages attributed “to the sense-perceptible yet insensate stars an intelligence in each case proportionate in power and dignity to its physical size [and] … wretchedly worshipped these things, calling them greater and lesser gods, and committed the lordship of all things to them” (PSW 1995, p.357 [150 Texts 26]). Actually, the sages mostly rejected the idea that the stars deserved our worship, or that they could control us, though it is true that many thought that the stars deserved respect, and some that we were ourselves destined to live amongst them. The reference to things supposedly without reason which could yet receive a human soul, has to do with the Platonic and Pythagorean belief in reincarnation – a belief rejected by Aristotelians, Stoics and even many Platonists. Even those Platonists, like Porphyry and Plutarch, who felt sympathy and respect for our non-human kindred believed that it was only as human beings that we could hope to escape the Wheel, and that our task was to live by “reason” rather than sensation (but note that “reason” does not mean “ratiocination”). Almost the only semi-accurate criticism of

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pagan philosophy in general is the suggestion that there were other things supposed to be as eternal and unoriginate as God Himself (Matter, the World Soul, the intelligible objects of the Divine Intellect, and other individual souls). But even this criticism has to be corrected. Matter hardly exists at all, and is at most the last faint image of the One Eternal Presence. That the Divine Intellect contains Intelligibles, or the One Logos contains all logoi, is a thought familiar in Christian and Hebrew circles as well as pagan. Why Palamas is so determined to mock the notion that there is a World Soul which controls the whole sensible world and is the root and source of our souls (as PSW 1995, p.348 [150 Texts 4]), I do not know: in fact, the World Soul posited by Plotinus is our Sister rather than our Mother, and is no stranger than any other agent of the One. That our souls – and the World Soul – are derived from the One Presence, and belong There is only subtly different from Palamas' own expectation of being brought up into the Godhead. For pagans, it is true, this counts as a Return, whereas for Orthodox Christians it is an Invitation into a life different from any of which we had previous conscious experience – but in both cases it is still the life from which we take our being. Even before this coming to be we were there, men who were different, and some of us even gods, pure souls and intellect united with the whole of reality; we were parts of the intelligible, not marked off or cut off but belonging to the whole; and we are not cut off even now. (Plotinus Ennead VI.4 [22].14, 18ff; Armstrong 1966-88, vol.6, p.317; all subsequent quotations from Plotinus are drawn from Armstrong’s translation).

There is a genuine difference here, but it is worth noticing that insofar as, by Christian standards, some of us will be granted entry into an eternal life not bounded by linear time it follows that they are There already. And as I will remark later, the ideas, at any rate, on which our lives are founded are eternally present to God, whether they are of a piece with God or created by and within His will. But that is another and much longer story! Meyendorff also repeatedly emphasises, on Palamas’ behalf, the Orthodox Christian conviction that bodies are not themselves evil, and that Resurrection rather than natural, incorporeal immortality, is to be our goal. There is a genuine disagreement here as well, but it should not be supposed that Platonists thought that bodily being was to be despised. Certainly we should not be misled by bodily sensations, nor suppose that bodily successes were what mattered – but any Orthodox Christian, including Palamas, agreed. Conversely, Plotinus insisted that our corporeal being, like the natural world, is an image of eternal beauty, and every creature is to be regarded with affection, as a child of the Father. “For

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anyone who feels affection for anything at all shows kindness to all that is akin to the object of his affection, and to the children of the father that he loves. But every soul is a child of That Father” (II.9 [33].15, 33 - 16.10). It is true that our expectation of immortality does not depend on material identity between this body here and our celestial self, but does it even in the Christian doctrine (see Paul 1 Corinthians 15.35-57)? Possibly, in the late Platonic system, which was declared anathema in Justinian’s day (see Sherwood 1955, pp.77-81), we can expect instead to be stars: indeed we are already stars, that being the place where our eternal selves first entered the physical cosmos in this round of the Wheel. Each soul is the expression of an eternal Form, contained in the Divine Intellect. Our first involvement in the physical realm was to help make this marvellous moving image of eternity, and as such wasn’t a mistake. Unfortunately, we got too involved! We grew tired of being all together, and each wanted a world of our own, forgetting that there is no such independence to be had, and that we can only think we have it by ignoring truth (Ennead IV.8 [6].4, 11f). The souls of plants, so Plotinus jokingly suggests, are the boldest of us all, burying their heads in the earth so as to ignore what they don’t want to know (Ennead V.2 [11].2). Returning in imagination from our selfcentred, self-enclosed, illusion is a philosophical askesis, a prayer to be lifted back to the dance of immortal love (see Porphyry Life of Plotinus 23.36f, after 22.54ff). “It is like a choral dance: in the order of its singing the choir keeps round its conductor but may sometimes turn away so that he is out of their sight, but when it turns back to him it sings beautifully and is truly with him; so we are always around him - and if we were not, we should be totally dissolved and no longer exist - but not always turned towards him; but when we do look to him, then we are at our goal and at rest and do not sing out of tune as we truly dance our god-inspired dance around him” (Ennead VI.9 [9].8, 38ff).3

Plotinus himself is prepared to consider that we might “have bodies” even in heaven: the difference between there and here is that in heaven “our whole bodies speak”. We “would know by intuition (sunesis) what passes from one to another. For here below, too, we can know many things by the look in people’s eyes when they are silent; but there all their body is clear and pure and each is like an eye, and nothing is hidden or feigned, but before one speaks to another that other has seen and understood” (Ennead IV.3 [27].18; also see II.3 [52].7). A merely abstract immortality 3 I would like to note that “conductor” is a mistranslation of “koruphaion”; “the lead dancer” is more appropriate.

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is not what such philosophers imagined. How could it be? “It is the easy life there, and truth is their mother and nurse and being and food – and they see all things, not those to which coming to be, but those to which real being belongs, and they see themselves in other things; for all things there are transparent, and there is nothing dark or opaque; everything and all things are clear to the inmost part to everything, for light is transparent to light. Each there has everything in itself and sees all things in every other, so that all are everywhere and each and every one is all and the glory is unbounded” (Ennead V.8 [31].4, 1-9).

But of course all this may be, as Palamas contended, a mere parody or misleading story, all the more persuasive for containing elements of truth. Even if most of his criticisms are unjust, there were real issues at stake. What mattered for him was the Christian gospel of salvation and resurrection. The Incarnation has made all the difference. The mere fact that many other peoples have recognized our plight and hoped for an escape does not imply that we should accept their escape plans without question. Maybe ordinarily human plans, even very plausible ones, will lead only to further captivity. Maybe they are plans inspired by our captors, so as to control us better. Maybe – and this is most probable of all – the plans may be good “in the abstract”, but not be ones that we ourselves can act upon. Whatever system Palamas promoted we shouldn’t expect that it owed anything to Plotinus. Even to compare the systems may be a source of error. I acknowledge that this may be so, and will gladly receive instruction. But perhaps we can still risk the attempt: at worst, it may reveal the differences more clearly. I also acknowledge that I may myself expect a greater congruence than actually exists, and may – when there is a difference – rather prefer Plotinus! You have been warned.

The Plotinian Way Whatever the truth about the congruence between late pagan thought and Orthodox Christian doctrine (to say nothing of Muslim Platonism of the sort purveyed by the Brethren of Purity: see Netton 1982), there is nonetheless good reason to find fault with what Meyendorff has to say about the Platonic tradition of philosophy. Three things especially are wrong with Meyendorff’s description of Barlaam as indebted to “NeoPlatonism”. First of all the very term is an early modern artefact: Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Damascius and the rest considered themselves simply Platonists (and reckoned Aristotle was one too). Second, and more significantly, if Barlaam was a Nominalist in William of

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Ockham’s style, he was the very opposite of a Platonic realist! Indeed, he also was something other than a Platonist in insisting on a passionless approach to truth, and denying the possibility of special interventions. It would be easier to think of him as a Stoic. Perhaps Meyendorff had some other understanding of what “nominalism” is, but I don’t know what it was. Perhaps Barlaam himself did not understand.4 But the third and most important issue lies in Meyendorff’s recurrent claim that “Platonic dualism” involved a rejection of corporeal reality, and of corporeal rituals. As I have already hinted, Plotinus reserved his fiercest polemic for those who despised the marvellous world we inhabit here and now – and also for those who misused their own and others’ bodies (see Porphyry, Life of Plotinus 15). Though he himself was not much involved in public ritual, those Platonists who followed after were devout ritualists, reckoning that “theurgy” was more important for most of us than any merely intellectual enquiries. Stoics might insist that only “the wise” could ever be the friends of God: Platonists had wider sympathies, identifying “the wise” more widely, and suggesting that even they must wait for God to transform them. The pagan Platonists themselves, of course, acknowledged that not every spirit, every daimon, was our friend, and Porphyry especially reckoned that some rituals, particularly those involving blood sacrifice, served only to feed demons (see Porphyry 2000, pp. 71-2 [2.40]). Iamblichus and the Emperor Julian found reasons to approve even of those sacrifices (see Kahlos 2007, p.125). But these disagreements do not prove that the disputing Platonists had radically different metaphysical beliefs. And neither should we suppose that there is easy opposition between Christian Orthodoxy and serious pagan Platonism: the real disagreements aren’t what Meyendorff suggests. Barlaam’s attack on “navel-gazers”, incidentally, is repeated in an article of the Catholic Encyclopedia, together with the charge that hesychastic

4 It has been suggested, by Sinkewicz (1988, p.243) in discussing Chapter 136 of the 150 Chapters, that Palamas himself was a nominalist (my thanks to Christophe Erismann for this reference). My own interpretation of the chapter is rather in line with Burckhardt 2008, ch.9: “It is clear that, as mental forms, general ideas are only pure abstractions, but to establish this does not touch the Platonic archetypes or 'Ideas', since these are only intellectual dispositions or possibilities, possibilities presupposed by the 'abstractions' which, without them, would be wholly lacking in intrinsic truth”. The point of Palamas’ argument is that secondary substances such as “Man” are not simply abstract concepts, but do indeed have energies of their own, manifested in many hypostases (and probably equivalent to divine intentions). But this is another story!

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practices, as he described them, amount to auto-suggestion. The author speaks of the “grossly magic practices of the later Hesychasts”: “There was a regular process for seeing the uncreated light; the body was to be held immovable for a long time, the chin pressed against the breast, the breath held, the eyes turned in, and so on. Then in due time the monk began to see the wonderful light. The likeness of this process of autosuggestion to that of fakirs, Sunnyasis, and such people all over the East is obvious” (Fortescue 1910).5

Perhaps there are “merely” physiological effects of sitting still, and controlling one’s breathing. Other commentators may wish to respond in more detail to the attack, whether or not they acknowledge that spiritual practices may also have physiological and psychological aspects. It does not seem necessary to suppose that late antiquity borrowed the techniques from India. Nor is it necessary to think, as is proposed in the classic Russian text The Way of the Pilgrim, that “the Indian and Bukharan monks took this method of interior prayer and distorted and ruined it” (Bacovcin 1978, p.46). People everywhere may have found independently that it was possible to calm the mind and make a path for spiritual influences, whether for good or ill. The final goal of Sufism in prayer is that every time the heart beats it should repeat the Name of God. Every time we breathe we should invoke God. We take our breathing so much for granted, but every time we breathe in, we do not know if that breath will come out. We never know which breath will be our last, therefore we must always be mindful of the preciousness of every moment of life. … Every breath we inhale should be identified with the remembrance of God, and every breath that we exhale should likewise be identified with the remembrance of Him (Nasr 2007, p.80).

That there was some contact between Muslims and the Orthodox in Palamas’ day is obvious; maybe there also were contacts between the Orthodox and Hindu or Buddhist sages. What influences there were, and whether the effects were good or bad, cannot be determined by appeal to simple stereotypes. But my present concern is rather with the historical 5 Interestingly, Fazlur Rahman was similarly rude about Sufism on behalf of mainstream Islam, speaking of “spiritual jugglery through auto-hypnotic trances” and “half-delirious theosophy”: Rahman 1966, p.153, cited by Qamar-ul Huda 2002, p.2. “Fortunately”, as Huda remarks, Sufi studies have progressed since then – and so, perhaps, have studies of the Orthodox Hesychastic tradition and of late antique paganism.

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and cultural context of late antiquity. So far from it being the case that “pagan philosophy” was “rationalist”, it is easier – though still mistaken – to argue that it was irrational in origin, and – by late antiquity at least – wholly given over itself to “magical practices”! There is no need to look outside the Mediterranean for the source. According to Diogenes Laertius, Parmenides of Elea was introduced to “hesychia’” by the Pythagorean Ameinias (Diogenes Lives 9.21; see Kingsley 1999 p.162, 173-83; Kingsley 2003), and Peter Kingsley has made a good case for the suggestion that it was by the traditional practice of incubation that Parmenides achieved his insights. Nowadays it is more usually supposed that “hesychia” is only a life of scholarship (!), Parmenides was simply the Father of Logic, and that he reached his paradoxical conclusions by careful consideration of what was and was not absurd. As Kingsley points out, this is not how he presented the case. His poem recounts a near-death experience, initiated by staying very still and withdrawing all attention from external sensory input. What he discovered was an eternal, unchanging presence, opening out into all the different worlds of sensory experience. His discovery also was of a piece with ancient Egyptian testimony, according to which the One beyond being is “one who made himself into millions” (Hornung 1982, p.170). A similar idea is found expressed through the scandalous stories borrowed by Hesiod from Hittite mythology: Zeus – like the Hittite Kumarbi – swallowed “the phallus [of the king] who had first ejaculated the brilliance of heaven (aither)” (Burkert 2004, p.90), and so carries “all springs and rivers, together with all the other gods in himself” (Burkert 2004, p.92). On the one hand, there is the One beyond being and intelligence; on the other, there is the Divine Mind containing the principles of all things. It is possible, so many Mediterranean thinkers supposed, to submit oneself to the Divine Mind, and to the One beyond it from which all things stem. Doing so, by implication, fills us with new life. Putting the older stories aside, also consider how late Hebrew and pagan Platonists addressed the issue. Contrary to the usual account, they did not suppose that we should aim at propositional knowledge, nor did they think that all and only what we could “reason” towards should be accepted. Reason, as the careful consideration of implications and of evidence, has a role to play, but its chief effect is to bring us to acknowledge our own ignorance and confusion. There is even a role for systematic knowledge, of the sort that we can presume is to be found in the Divine Intellect, but there are at least two difficulties with such a scheme. First, and most obviously, even if intellect or mind is always to be respected, it does not follow that our minds are so respectable! “If we

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mistakenly trust our private reasonings we shall construct and build the city of the mind that destroys the truth”, so Philo of Alexandria (fl. 40 AD) tells us (Philo Legum Allegoriarum 3.228f: Winston 1981 p.151). “Is my mind my own possession? That parent of false conjectures, that purveyor of delusion, the delirious, the fatuous, and in frenzy or senility proved to be the very negation of mind” (Philo, On Cherubim, 114f: 1929, vol.II, 77).

And again: “It is a hard matter to bring to a standstill the soul's changing movements. Their irresistible stream is such that we could sooner stem the rush of a torrent, for thoughts after thoughts in countless numbers pour on like a huge breaker and drive and whirl and upset its whole being with their violence... A man's thoughts are sometimes not due to himself but come without his will” (Philo, De Mutatione Nominum, 239f: 1929, vol. V, 265ff)

Almost all our thoughts, indeed, owe nothing to our will! So the very first step is to try and quieten our minds, to call a halt to the incessant monologue in which we mostly indulge, the constant stream of thoughts, hurt feelings, fancies. Ritual, whether overt or private, is a help with this, as is attention to our breathing in and out (which is what Palamas insists is the main point of hesychastic breathing practices: Palamas 1983, p.45 [1.2.7]; PSW 1995, p.337). It may even be a help, sometimes, to hold ourselves to rigorously connected arguments, cast in propositional form. But Plotinus is not unusual in insisting that “the vision is hard to put into words” (VI.9 [9].10, 19). Even the Intellect does not have propositions for its objects. “One must not then suppose that the gods and the ‘exceedingly blessed spectators’ in the higher world contemplate propositions (axiomata), but all the Forms we speak about are beautiful images in that world, of the kind which someone imagined to exist in the soul of the wise man, images not painted but real. This is why the ancients said that the Ideas were realities and substances. The wise men of Egypt, I think, also understood this, either by scientific (akribes) or innate (sumphute) knowledge, and when they wished to signify something wisely, did not use the forms of letters which follow the order of words and propositions (logoi and protaseis) and imitate sounds and the enunciations of philosophical statements (prophoras axiomaton), but by drawing images and inscribing in their temples one particular image of each particular thing, they manifested the non-discursiveness of the intelligible world, that is, that every image is a kind of knowledge and wisdom and is a subject of

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It is commonly suggested, by the way, that Plotinus is here mistaking the nature of hieroglyphs, but there is good reason, despite later oversimplifications or inventions (on which see Hornung 2001), to think that he got it right. “The Egyptians do not hesitate to call hieroglyphs 'gods', and even to equate individual signs in the script with particular gods; it is quite in keeping with their views to see images of the gods as signs in a metalanguage. As is true of every Egyptian hieroglyph, they are more than just ciphers or lifeless symbols; the god can inhabit them, his cult image will normally be in the same form, and his priests may assume his role by wearing animal masks” (Hornung 1982, p.124).

This is not to advocate a polytheistic creed or practice, nor yet a rationalistic. Theoria is the end of Platonic philosophizing: that is, to enter into the divine life. But we should not confuse theoria with intellectual activity in the modern sense. Kallistos Ware is far more accurate than Meyendorff: “In the great period of medieval western theology, there was a wellestablished distinction between the ratio or discursive reason and the intellectus or spiritual understanding. … A similar distinction is drawn by many of the Greek Fathers between dianoia and nous. To use the intellectus or spiritual nous in realms which the ratio is incapable of apprehending is not irrational or obscurantist, but the precise opposite. The obscurantist is the one who makes his ratio the measure of the divine realm, and who refuses to accept the possibility that there may be truths which the ratio cannot grasp... As I sit writing this article in North Oxford I can think of some persons in the university to whom the charge might apply” (Ware 1977, p.50).

Theoria is not discursive, and it requires that we also practice virtue: “It does no good at all to say ‘Look to God’, unless one also teaches how one is to look... In reality it is virtue which goes before us to the goal and, when it comes to exist in the soul along with wisdom, shows God; but God, if you talk about him without true virtue, is only a name” (Ennead II.9 [33].15, 33 – 16.10).

The route that Plotinus envisages is through the inward as well as the outward polishing of our internal statues, images of virtue which will take on a life of their own. Is that itself something that we should be worried

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by? Will the images perhaps be, in effect, demonic? But Plotinus would not have disagreed with Palamas’ scornful enquiry: “Why have these images from the beginning proved ineffective? Is it not because of sin, and also because of ignorance and scorn of divine commandments? Why do we need teaching to see these images, although they are inscribed within us. Is it not because the passionate part of the soul, roused to commit evil, has corrupted them? Is it not because it has overthrown the power of sight of the soul, and driven it away from its primal beauty?” (Triads I.3.32: Meyendorff 1964, p.122).

Indeed, this sort of commentary is very familiar in pagan philosophical circles. Even the images must be abandoned as we move toward the Holy of Holies, stripping off all that might distract us. “The attainment [of the good] is for those who go up to that higher world and are converted and strip off what we put on in our descent; (just as for those who go up to the celebrations of sacred rites there are purifications and strippings off of the clothes they wore before, and going up naked), until passing in the ascent all that is alien to the God, one sees with one’s self alone” (Enneads I.6 [1].7; see also VI.9 [9].11, 16-22 below).

The metaphor of nakedness is a familiar one, employed by Plato, Philo, Porphyry, Proclus and many Christian writers since: I have discussed it at greater length in Clark 2008. The practical effect is to disengage us from our ordinary preoccupations: virtue, he suggests, lies in realizing the unimportance – in a way – of life and property, a notion that has an uncomfortable implication for most of us: “A manifold life exists in the All and makes all things, and in its living embroiders a rich variety and does not rest from ceaselessly making beautiful and shapely living toys. And when men, mortal as they are, direct their weapons against each other, fighting in orderly ranks, doing what they do in sport in their war-dances, their battles show that all human concerns are children’s games, and tell us that deaths are nothing terrible, and that those who die in wars and battles anticipate only a little the death which comes in old age - they go away and come back quicker. But if their property is taken away while they are still alive, they may recognize that it was not theirs before either, and that its possession is a mockery to the robbers themselves when others take it away from them” (Ennead III.2 [47].15, 31-43).

The other and even stranger metaphor that Plotinus sometimes uses is drunkenness: strange because most moralists – like Philo – are likelier to consider that our ordinary, impassioned lives amount to being drunk, but

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in a bad way! “Intellect also has one power for thinking, by which it looks at the things in itself, and one by which it looks at what transcends it by a direct awareness and reception, by which also before it saw only, and by seeing acquired intellect and is one. And that first one is the contemplation of Intellect in its right mind, and the other is Intellect in love, when it goes out of its mind ‘drunk with the nectar’; then it falls in love, simplified into happiness by having its fill, and it is better for it to be drunk with a drunkenness like this than to be more respectably sober”. (Ennead VI.7 [38].35; see Clark 2009).

I suggest in passing that this is closer to the thesis of The Cloud of Unknowing than to that of Ps-Dionysius. “For Denys the divine darkness lies beyond the farthest effort of the mind, and it is the mind (the nous) that enters it: for the author of the Cloud, we enter the cloud of unknowing when we renounce the activity of the mind and rely solely on “the loving power” of the soul” (Louth 1989, p.125). “As if carried away or possessed by a god, in a quiet solitude and a state of calm, not turning away anywhere in his being and not busy about himself, altogether at rest and having become a kind of rest. He had no thought of beauties but had already run up beyond beauty and gone beyond the choir of virtues, like a man who enters into the sanctuary and leaves behind the statues in the outer shrine... They are secondary objects of contemplation. But that other, perhaps, was not a contemplation but another kind of seeing, a being out of oneself (ekstasis) and simplifying and giving oneself over and pressing towards contact and rest and a sustained thought leading to adaptation (perinoesis pros epharmogen), if one is going to contemplate what is in the sanctuary” (Ennead VI.9 [9].11). […] It is there that one lets all study (mathema) go; up to a point one has been led along and settled firmly in beauty and as far as this one thinks that in which one is, but is carried out of it by a kind of swell and sees suddenly, not seeing how, but the vision fills his eyes with light and does not make him see something else by it, but the light itself is what he sees” (Ennead VI.7 [38].36).

It is often said that pagan philosophers trusted in their own efforts to attain beatitude, while Christians recognized that this was beyond our fallen nature. But this distinction too is not well supported. On the contrary, Plotinus followed Plato in thinking that God or the gods would have to come to us. He did not wish to join his friend Amelius in visiting Roman temples: the gods – which is to say, a sudden awareness of beauty and the One - come by grace, and cannot be compelled, only invited. Porphyry said that that “it seems that the gods often set him straight when he was going on a crooked course 'sending down a solid shaft of light',

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which means that he wrote what he wrote under their inspection and supervision” (Life of Plotinus 23). So, Plato distinguished magic and true religion “in that magic makes every effort to persuade the gods, whereas the truly religious behaviour is to leave the gods a free choice, for they know better than we do what is good for us” (Graf 1999, p.27). What seem like “magical practices” are such only in the eyes of the mistaken: even Iamblichus, who preferred theurgy to theology, did not suppose that God could be compelled (see Clarke 2001, pp.23-4). But God or the gods can, they thought, at least be invited, through the practice of disengaged virtue, and imaginative discipline. “Let there be in the soul the shining imagination of a sphere, having everything within it ... Keep this, and apprehend another in your mind, taking away the mass: take away also the places, and the mental picture of matter … calling on the god who made that of which you have the mental picture, pray him to come. And may he come, bringing his own universe with him” (Enneads V.8 [31].9, 8ff; see also Dillon 1986).

Two last, tangential, remarks: one of the commonest themes in theological commentary on the pagan Platonists is that the world is “emanated”, of necessity, from the One, by contrast with the claim of all the Abrahamic religions that God was not constrained to make the world. Another theme is the notion that Matter was, for Platonists, co-eternal with the One, and independent of it. But these claims rest on a misunderstanding, at any rate of Plotinus. Platonists did suggest that it was to be expected, as it were, that the One would let its goodness overflow: it is of the very nature of the One to be generous, and generosity is where we find the One. It also is true that Plotinus and others used the sun and its light, flowers and their scent, as metaphors for the way that the One’s presence filled all worlds. But Plotinus did not therefore suppose that the One was in any way constrained, nor that the world of our experience was the only possible outcome (as the Stoics claimed). As Palamas also said, “it is the property of the divine energy to create” (PSW 1995, p.380 [150 Texts 73]), but He is not constrained to create any particular thing. And Matter, so far as it existed as such at all, was only the most distant of the One’s effects, the notional endpoint of mere possibility, always disguised by the golden chains of being (Ennead I.8 [51].15), very much as the One is veiled by the many million creatures summoned into being in a sort of breathing back and forward (Ennead I.6 [1].9). The world does not have to be as currently it is. But it depends on the forms of being which are implicit in the Divine Intellect. In that sense there is something that is not simply “created” (as though it could be

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otherwise). “How could the predeterminations and the divine volitions that create all existent things be themselves created?” (PSW 1995, p.387 [150 Texts 87, after Ps.-Dionysius) Something is of one substance with the Father such that it cannot merely be created by God’s Will and Reason: quite otherwise, that Something is God’s Will and Reason. “How can the Logos, being the Counsel and Will of the Father, come into being Himself by an act of will and purpose?” (Prestige 1952, p.151, after St. Athanasius). Athanasius, as Mantzaridis says, “distinguishes the will of God from his nature, and even Arius accepts this distinction, saying that the Son came from the Father's will and not from his nature” (Mantzaridis 1977, p.15). If it were to be revealed in the phenomenal world, it would look like Pheidias’s Zeus (so Plotinus said: Ennead V.8 [31].1; see also Cicero Orator II.8-9). That, perhaps, was Plotinus’ mistake – though it is one that too many Western artists have adopted in their portrayal of Christ as tall, blonde and bearded!

Palamas So where does that leave Palamas in his dispute with Barlaam? The standard story seems to be that Barlaam was too much influenced by pagan philosophers, and that Palamas stood firm against this infection. It has also been proposed, for good or ill, that Western Christianity has been damaged by its pagan philosophical inheritance. If all we can strictly “know” of God is what can be reliably deduced from properly accepted premises, it is not difficult to suspect that we shall end by knowing nothing at all. And how, as David Hume enquired, do “mystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible?” (David Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) pt.4 (Cleanthes speaks): Wollheim 1963, p.131). Other branches of Christian (and other Abrahamic faiths) have suggested that it is possible after all, by God’s good grace, to “know” God, and that what is “seen” is God Himself, even if we do not know Him as He does Himself. We can – perhaps – have some hope that we can participate in God’s own life, that we can be “as gods”. Whether this is true is not something that a jobbing philosopher has much right to say, nor even to be certain whether the merely historical story is correct. My object here is only to suggest that it was Palamas who was closer to the actual philosophical tradition of late antiquity, and even of the earlier, “classical” and “archaic” periods. This was not an accident: he was better informed than Meyendorff and others have proposed, even if – as I suspect – he sometimes misunderstood their rhetoric. Platonists did

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not despise this world, nor reckon bodies were only fit to be discarded. Nor did they imagine that we could reason our way to much apart from our own insufficiency. They sought instead to set their minds and lives in order, always recalling that this would be impossible without divine assistance, and prayed to be taken up (or back) into the life of God, the dance of immortal love, gazing toward the One but never expecting to comprehend it. It can be said of them as it was of the Hebrew fathers, that not having received the promises they yet saw them afar off (Hebrews 11.13), and lived in hope of their fulfilment. Mantzaridis’s summary of Palamas’ teaching about hesychia would have been recognizable to Plotinus. He describes hesychia as the “standing still of the mind and of the world, oblivion of things below, initiation into things above, the shedding of thoughts”. “Hesychia, as the standing still of the earthly movement that lacks any ultimate significance and as the forgetting of earthly things that alienate man and identify him with his biological functions, constitutes for Palamas praxis or 'activity' par excellence, and leads to true health and wholeness: ‘This is praxis in very truth, a means of ascent to the true contemplation or vision of God; this alone is the sign of a truly healthy soul . . . through this a man is divinized’. Hesychia makes possible the transformation of time, and its taking up into the eternity of God. The ‘fruit of holy hesychia’, according to Palamas, is the vision of the uncreated light, understood as a vision of God's kingdom21 or as an experience of man's entry into the eternal life of God (Mantzaridis 1977, pp.9-10).

The one difference that, tentatively, I propose is this: Plotinus imagines a lasting distinction between – as an example and exemplar – Heracles himself and the shade of Heracles (Ennead IV.3 [27].27, after Homer Odyssey 11.601ff; see also IV.3 [27].32, 24f). Heracles himself has forgotten all the detail of the life lived here below, and that is what we should hope to do as well – just as Palamas proposed forgetfulness, for now, of all things earthly. Maximus the Confessor acknowledged how difficult this would be! “We carry along with us the voluptuous images of the things we once experienced. Now the one who overcomes these voluptuous images completely disdains the realities of which they are images. In fact, the battle against memories is more difficult than the battle against deeds, as sinning in thought is easier than sinning in deed” (Maximus 1985, pp.41f: Four Hundred Chapters on Love 1.63).

For the pagan this is all that we can expect. But the Christian hope is for reunion: the shade will also be taken up into the dance, and everything

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that composed it here and now be given fresh significance. We must forget and neglect things now, perhaps, but in the hope of a real resurrection.

Works Cited Armstrong, A.H., 1966-88, Plotinus: the Enneads, Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library, London. Bacovcin, Helen, 1978, tr., The Way of the Pilgrim, Doubleday, New York. Burckhardt, Titus, 2008, Introduction to Sufi Doctrine, ed., William C.Chittick , World Wisdom Inc., Bloomington, Indiana. Burkert, Walter, 2004, Babylon Memphis Persepolis: eastern contexts of Greek culture, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Clark, S.R.L, 2008, ‘Going Naked into the Shrine: Herbert, Plotinus and the Constructive Metaphor’ in D.Hedley & S.Hutton, eds., Platonism at the Origins of Modernity, Springer, Dordrecht, pp.45-61. —. 2009, ‘Conclusion’ in Late Antique Epistemology: Other Ways to Truth, eds., Panayiota Vassilopoulou & Stephen R.L. Clark, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp.289-301. —. 2010, ‘How to Become Unconscious’: The Metaphysics of Consciousness, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 67, edds. Pierfrancesco Basile, Julian Kiverstein & Pauline Phemister Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.21-44. Clarke, Emma C., 2001, ed., Iamblichus: De Mysteriis, Ashgate, London. Dillon, John, 1986, ‘Plotinus and the Transcendental Imagination’. In J.P.Mackey ed Religious Imagination, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp.55-64, reprinted in John Dillon, 1990, The Golden Chain, Variorum Press, Aldershot), pp.58-67. Fortescue, A., 1910, “Hesychasm”, The Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company, New York, retrieved January 20, 2012 from New Advent: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07301a.html. Graf, Fritz, 1999, Magic in the ancient world, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Hornung, Erik, 1982, Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt: the One and the Many tr. John Baines, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. —. 2001, The Secret Lore of Egypt: its impact on the West, tr. David Lorton, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Huda, Qamar-ul, 2002, Striving for Divine Union: Spiritual Exercises for Suhraward Sufis, Routledge, London. Kahlos, Maijastina, 2007, Debate and dialogue: Christian and pagan cultures c. 360-430, Ashgate, London.

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Kingsley, Peter, 1999, In the Dark Places of Wisdom, Golden Sufi Center, Inverness, California. —. 2003, Reality, Golden Sufi Center, Inverness, California. Louth, Andrew, 1989, Denys the Areopagite, Continuum, London. Mantzaridis, George, 1977, ‘Tradition and Renewal in the Theology of Saint Gregory Palamas’, Eastern Churches Review, 9, pp.1-18. Maximus the Confessor, 1985, Selected Writings, tr. George C.Berthold, SPCK, London. Meyendorff, John, 1964, A Study of Gregory Palamas, tr. George Lawrence, Faith Press, Leighton Buzzard. Montiglio, Silvia, 2000, Silence in the Land of Logos, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, 2007, The Essential Sayyed Hossein Nasr, ed., William C.Chittick, World Wisdom Inc., Bloomington, Indiana. Netton, I.R., 1982, Muslim Neoplatonists: an introduction to the thought of the Brethren of Purity, Allen & Unwin, London. Palamas, Gregory, 1983, The Triads, tr. Nicholas Gendle; ed., John Meyendorff, Paulist Press, New Jersey. —. (1988) The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, ed., Robert E.Sinkewicz, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto. Palmer, G.E.H., Sherrard, P. & Ware, Kallistos, 1995, eds., The Philokalia, vol.4., Faber, London. Porphyry, 2000, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, ed., Gillian Clark, Duckworth, London. Philo of Alexandria, 1929, Collected Works, tr. F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker et al., Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library, London. Prestige, G.L., 1952, God in Patristic Thought, SPCK, London. Rahman, Fazlur, 1966, Islam, Chicago University Press, Chicago. Sherwood, Polycarp, 1955, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism, Herder, Rome. Ware, Kallistos, 1977, ‘The Debate about Palamism’, Eastern Churches Review, 9, pp.45-63. Winston, D., 1981, tr., Philo of Alexandria: the Contemplative Life, The Giants, and Selections, SPCK, London. Wollheim, R.,1963, ed., Hume on Religion, Fontana, London.

ST. GREGORY PALAMAS AND THE MOSCOW SCHOOL OF CHRISTIAN NEO-PLATONISM (A.F. LOSEV, S.S. AVERINCEV, V.V. BIBIHIN, S.S. HORUJY) PROFESSOR OLEG E. DUSHIN

“The wind blows where it wishes and you hear the sound of it, but do not know where it comes from and where it is going; so is everyone who is born of the Spirit.” —John 3:8

1. Introduction. The development of Russian thought in the 20th century was a dramatic process. Brilliant flourishing of philosophy can be seen in the beginning of century, but in 1922, after the October Revolution, many well-known thinkers were banished from Soviet Russia. Later, in the times of the Great Terror of the 1930s, when exile and execution became usual tools of authorities, many Russian thinkers and priests were killed. The result of this policy was the prohibition of free philosophizing within Soviet state. It is symptomatic that young men, who read the works of classics of Marxism-Leninism and tried to understand the true nature of socialism, were persecuted in the 1970s. In spite of all restrictions which had been widespread in Soviet state, traditions of thought were developing, because, as in all cases of state imposed restrictions, spiritual life and philosophical studies cannot be prohibited. For example, the studies of talented Soviet Marxists, whose ideas were not always supported by authorities, reflected the inclination of the Russian intelligentsia to social justice and its desire for improvement of social life. Many scholars were forced to go into related philosophical areas– aesthetics, logic or philosophy of science. It is widespread knowledge that in the 1970s really successful and fruitful schools in the areas of logical investigation, methodology and philosophy of science were organized in the Soviet Union. Surprisingly, the unique

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school for Byzantine Studies was also created. In addition, fundamental researches in the history of European Platonism were carried out by Professor Aleksey F. Losev, the leader of the “Moscow School for Christian Neo-Platonism” (Horujy, 2003, pp.191-207).

2. Aleksey F. Losev, Imiaslavie and the Fate of Philosophy in the Soviet Russia The origins of the Moscow School of Christian Neo-Platonism date back to the pre-revolutionary tradition – to the philosophy of Pan-unity and Imiaslavie, and to the teachings of Fr. Pavel Florensky and Fr. Sergius Bulgakov. It is known that Pavel Florensky was killed in the Special Purpose Camp that was established exactly for the clergy in the Solovki monastery on the shore of the White Sea. Bulgakov was exiled in 1922. Thus, Aleksey Fedorovich Losev (1893-1988) became the main representative of this school of thought in Soviet Russia. Among his followers in the 1970s were Vladimir V. Bibihin (1938-2004), a translator and an original thinker, who played the role of Professor Losev's Secretary for many years, Sergey S. Averincev (1937-2004), a famous Russian scholar, who studied Ancient Greek and Byzantine culture and literature, and Sergey S. Horujy, an author of numerous works dedicated to the mystical tradition of Hesychasm. Losev originated from the Don Cossacks, he was educated at Moscow University before the Revolution and could translate from Ancient Greek and other European languages. The young Aleksey Losev was personally acquainted with many prominent Russian thinkers. It is important to note that his research and teaching supported the continuity of Russian thought and culture during the Soviet times with the pre-revolutionary philosophical tradition. The theological conception of imiaslavie emerged in the Caucasus and then it was accepted by Russian monks at Mount Athos. However, this idea was officially rejected by the Russian Church. The Russian monks who stood for imiaslavie were returned from Athos to Russia in 1913 and scattered among numerous monasteries and parishes. It should be recognized that the imiaslavie movement revived interest of the Russian educated society to Christianity in general and to the monastic practice of Hesychasm particularly. The reason for this was the remarkable similarity between the historical period of the flourishing of Palamism in late Byzantine Empire and the period before the Bolshevik Revolution. As St. Gregory Palamas’ doctrine of the Tabor Light and Divine Energy became a remarkable event in the mystical traditions of St. Athos in the period of the twilight of Byzantine Empire, on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution the

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Russian imiaslavie provided a powerful impetus to Russian intelligentsia for God-seeking and became a strong incentive to counter mystically the oncoming atheistic Soviet regime. In the 1920s, Losev was one of the leaders of imiaslavie movement in the Soviet Russia. Among the supporters of these ideas were not only priests, theologians and religious philosophers, but also scientists, mathematicians, and even an actor. In 1922, at the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Lavra, Fr. Pavel Florensky performed the mystery of marriage between Losev and Valentine Sokolova. The bride was an astronomer born in Moscow and originated from a merchant family. This young woman became an active participant of the imiaslavie movement. The confessor of the Losev family was Hieromonk David, adept of imiaslavie, former abbot of the Russian St. Andrew Monastery on Mount Athos. On the 3rd of June, 1929, the young spouses took vows under his guidance and were named Andronicus and Athanasia. Fr. Irenaeus, former monk of Panteleimon Monastery at Athos and one of the principal figures of imiaslavie, was also close to the circle of Losev. Despite of all difficulties of life in the conditions of the Civil War and dictatorship of the Bolsheviks, Losev wrote and published eight books in the 1920s. It is interesting that these works were published using his own money. Among these works were "The Ancient Cosmos and Modern Science", "Music as a Matter of Logic", "The Dialectics of the Artistic Form", "The Dialectics of Number in Plotinus", "Criticism of Platonism by Aristotle", "The Philosophy of the Name", "Essays on Ancient Symbolism and Mythology", "The Dialectics of Myth". The three last works were dedicated to the philosophy of imiaslavie. In addition, he wrote numerous articles and prepared papers on imiaslavie. It is especially important that his books have been recognized by the Russian émigrés: the famous Russian philosophers V. Zenkovsky, N. Lossky and S. Frank noted the originality of his ideas and philosophical interpretations. However, the official Soviet ideologues started a real persecution against him; the socalled "Red Professors" criticized him severely and charged him with serious accusations. As a result, his philosophical activity was interrupted by his arrest in 1930. He was sentenced to 10 years in the special labor camps. His friends and companions in the imiaslavie movement were also sent to the camps and exile, and many of them were later executed. Losev was sent to the White Sea – Baltic Sea Canal construction, but in 1932 he was released. The sad result of his staying in the camp was considerable loss of vision. After returning from the camp, he was not able to get a permanent job. He lectured at various Higher Education Institutions in Moscow and the surrounding provinces. Finally, in 1944, he became a

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professor of the Moscow Pedagogical Institute, where he worked at the Department of Classical Philology, then Russian literature, and finally till the rest of his days at the Department of General Linguistics. Since the 1960s, he had been working at his famous eight-volume "History of Ancient Aesthetics" dedicated to the study of Platonism. In addition, in his other researches, he demonstrated the importance of Platonism for Renaissance aesthetics and in the philosophy of Pan-unity of Vladimir Solovyov. During the 1920s, his authored works focused upon ideas commonly associated with imiaslavie and centered on the problems of Name and Myth. He sought to demonstrate the ontological status of the Name and its fundamental importance in the understanding of being by interpreting the texts of Plato, Plotinus, and the Corpus Areopagiticum. Losev discussed these issues in his letters to Fr. Pavel Florensky. He stressed the social role of the Name: if there is no Name, there is no social communication. Besides, the Word determines our consciousness and motivates our will; we can also express the depth of our feelings through the Word. "And we pray and curse by the use of names … and there are no limits for the life of a name, there are no measures for its power. Name and words created and hold the world,"- says the Russian philosopher (Losev, 1997, p.181). In the end of 1920s, Losev worked at the limit of his abilities, knowing that his activity may be interrupted at any moment. In this period, he reveals the meaning and value of Palamite disputes in his "Essays on Ancient Symbolism and Mythology" (1930).

3. Aleksey F. Losev on Palamite disputes "Essays on Ancient Symbolism and Mythology" is a lengthy book consisting of more than 900 pages. It ends with a chapter dedicated to the discussion of theological issues, including the criticism of Barlaam’s point of view and the praise of the teaching of St. Gregory Palamas. The Russian philosopher stresses several important points concerning the fundamental differences between the Byzantine theologians. The first of all is Platonism. According to Losev, Barlaam, who studied the works of Aristotle in the West (and in Latin translations that were made under the influence of Neo-Platonism), inherited the principles of Western tradition and sought to combine Christianity with Platonic philosophy. For Losev, such strategy is absolutely unacceptable because: "Platonism in its theory of intelligent ascent does not concern matters of intimate confession, repentance, and of a struggle, i.e., the struggle with sinful thoughts." (Losev, 1993, p.871). The abstract mode of thought prevailed into the

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philosophical practice of ancient thinkers; there was no fire of the passions and inherent contradictions in one's personality. “Hesychasm recognizes the possibility of ascent”, - Losev says, - “only under these conditions (confession and repentance till to the innermost intimacy and depth etc.), for Plato and Plotinus this is not required” (Losev, 1993, p. 871). The philosophical doctrine of Platonism, according to Losev, asserts "a gaze which sees only the body in being, and actually does not feel the fullness of internal life and living participation in the life and fate of personality" (Losev, 1993, p. 870). The Platonic abstract concept of body doesn’t allow us to understand the integrity of human personality. Losev proposes a paradoxical formula: "Platonism is a-physiological, because it is corporeal; mystical Orthodoxy is cordial, because it is personal” (Losev, 1993, p. 871). In this sense, only one idea is absent in the philosophy of Plato – the idea of Salvation. The second point of disagreement between followers of Barlaam and Palamas is that Barlaam visited Renaissance Italy and incorporated the ideas of Western thinkers into his theory. He rejected the practice of mental prayer because he did not believe in any real possibility of communication with God. The Russian philosopher reminds that in Barlaam’s understanding “the God as an independent being and essence remained per se as an absolute unknown, and Energies, because of their intelligibility had to be completely separated from God, and had to be considered as created” (Losev, 1993, p. 872). On the one hand it was agnosticism in relation to God; on the other, it was a real dualism in the way that we are to understand Divine Energy. In Losev’s opinion, this kind of interpretation was an ill-fated perspective arising out of the development of Western metaphysics. In this regard, the Russian scholar notes that "under the amplification of modern Rationalism, the Dualism of Barlaamism is turned into a Cartesianism and Occasionalism; under the amplification of Subjectivity is turned into a Kantianism; under the condition of weakening of the sense of Transcendence is turned into a Positivism, and so on" (Losev, 1993, p. 873). From this point of view, the confrontation between Palamism and Barlaamism can be seen as developing in opposite directions relative to the development of European culture. In Losev's words: "In Palamism, i.e., in strict Byzantinism, the God is an absolutely unfathomable abyss, who symbolically manifested Himself in certain energy and a name; in Barlaamism, i.e., in the Renaissance philosophy of the West, the God is essentially an abstract concept: in fact there is no God; there are only godless creatures" (Losev, 1993, p. 874). It should be stressed that Losev discusses other dogmatic and

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ecclesiastical issues and religious differences among two directions in Christianity. In his interpretation, Catholicism, based on Aristotelian philosophy, combined idealism and corporeality, and thus, is subordinated to the creation that is characteristically reflected in the sculptures of Christ within the Medieval Gothic churches. Within the Orthodox tradition the transformation of the world came by music, eloquence and fine arts, and its attributes are the ringing of church bells and the prayerful contemplation with the use of icons. Furthermore, Losev could not accept the peculiar erotomania of the Medieval Catholic nuns’ mystical visions. He believed that these revelations were initiated by sinful temptations; in this regard, he paid attention to the “sacred silence” of the Orthodox mysticism of Hesychasm. In general, the Russian philosopher emphasised the difference between the ontologism of the East and the psychologism of the West that was shaped and determined by the writings of St. Augustine. If (according to Losev) in the Western ascetic Revelation there is a search for the path to truth with different inner feelings and personal attitudes, for the Orthodox monk it is always a concrete fact and a with certainty adoption of truth. Thus, it is very important that in the conditions of persecution by the Soviet state Losev turned to Palamism, to the Orthodox concept of Divine Energy, while his starting point was the syncretism of Russian religious philosophy and Solovyev's conception of Pan-unity; and he had done this before the publication of the pro-Palamism famous works of Russian theologians in emigration. "Ascetic and Theological Teaching of St. Gregory Palamas" of Hieromonk Vasiliy (Krivoshein) was published in 1936 and "The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church" by Vladimir Lossky appeared in 1944. Losev finished his studies of Palamite disputes very simply: he published the Acts of Constantinople Council (1351) against Barlaam and Akindynos in his own Russian translation.

4. Vladimir V. Bibihin and Sergey S. Horujy on Hesychasm and Palamism Numerous pupils and followers of Aleksey F. Losev also studied the mystical practices of Hesychasm and Palamism. Unfortunately, their works could not be published under Soviet rule. For example, in 1978, Bibihin made a translation of St. Gregory Palamas' Triads for the Defense of Those Who Practice Sacred Quietude for publication in the 19th issue of Theological works which had been prepared by the Moscow Patriarchate in 1960, but the text was destroyed at the last moment before printing. The reason for its destruction was the numerous references to works of Fr. John

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Meyendorff. As a result, a new version of the translation of Augustine’s Confessions was published instead of the Triads. A translation of the Triads with afterword and commentaries of Vladimir V. Bibihin appeared only in 1995 (St. Gregory Palamas, 1995). A situation with Sergey S. Averincev, who planned to publish an article on St. Gregory Palamas in the 27th issue of Theological works, was quite similar: the article was declined. In his turn, Sergey S. Horujy wrote the book The Diptych of Silence. Ascetical anthropology in theological and philosophical presentation in 1978; however it was published only in 1991 (Horujy, 1991). Russian scholars believed that the doctrine of Palamas cannot be explained from the point of view of any philosophical tradition, including Christian Neo-Platonism (Averincev, 1997, p. 323; Bibihin, 2010, p. 97; Horujy, 1991, p.22, p.42). At the same time they emphasize the high level of his philosophical education recalling the speech at the Imperial palace that fully confirmed the level of Palamas' knowledge in the traditional Byzantine sciences and arts, and above all, in the philosophy and particularly the logic of Aristotle. The high level of St. Gregory Palamas’ education is manifested in his theological treatises and demonstrated by subtle dogmatic-theological definitions. It just so happened that Russian scholars studied Palamas’ teaching in the context of specific philosophical projects. For example, Vladimir V. Bibihin devoted several hours in his course of lectures on "Energy", delivered at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Moscow State University in 1990-1991, to Palamas’ thought. Later, he repeated this course of lectures in the St. Filaret Moscow Orthodox Christian High School in 2002. In his philosophical interpretations, Bibihin works from an understanding that the issue of energy has become one of the most significant for modern civilization, since, on the one hand, everyone talks about the problem of energy resources, the total lack of energy reserves, and the upcoming general crisis, while, on the other hand, the power of the human being and energy of nature are spent on various pointless projects. Modern man is squandering his own power and natural energy on the endless pursuit of the new opportunities. In this regard, the Russian scholar recalls about the energy of quietude as unique practice of Hesychasm and Palamism (Bibihin, 2010, p.137). However this does not mean that dispassion or some kind of heart atrophy is a priority here. Bibihin quotes the words of Gregory of Sinai that "immobility is not enough for Christ to live in a human being" (Bibihin, 2010, p.117). According to Vladimir Bibihin, sinful passion causes dispassion, dementia and weakness of human soul, while the energy of quietude leads to the fullness of mind. This practice

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means “the end of propulsion, internal strife, confusion, end of tortures, anxiety and incompleteness; and more than that, it is a general cessation of all separate actions, when ears hear one but eyes see another and the mind is thinking about the third; it is the collection of all senses and abilities in such a simplicity, which includes the movements of all kind and remains calm” (Bibihin, 2010, p.143). According to the Russian philosopher, such understanding of energy is conceptually proximate to its Aristotelian interpretation. In this regard, Bibihin notes that “in Aristotle the first sign of energy, which is the continuation of Parmenides’ idea of Being, is perfection, completeness. Energy is similar to motion, but the energy per se is completeness and the achievement of a goal (On the Soul, III, 7, 431a6)” (Bibihin, 2010, p.365). However, the Russian scholar emphasizes that the teaching of Palamas is not a philosophical deduction from the dogma, because this is impossible: “the dogma is not subject to mental activity” (Bibihin, 2010, p.115). The issue is important for Palamas, because it is related directly to the possibility of living communion with God. Palamism is “the experience of parting with an efficient, effective, ardent God, and the impulse to stop the departure of such a God is the real essence of Palamite dogmatics” (Bibihin, 2010, p.134). In addition, it is a search for “agreement between the personal grace and life of the world” that can be realized in the idea of deification. In this sense, as Bibihin considers, Energy for Palamas "is the Divine presence". Later on, the Russian scholar adds that the main problem of Palamism is the separation of essence and energies; it is "a problem, significant, if you like it, fruitful and much explaining problem in Palamite thought" (Bibihin, 2010, p.138). The well-known modern Russian philosopher, theologian, translator, and physicist, Sergey S. Horujy offers another interpretation of Hesychasm and Palamism in his numerous monographs and articles. He has a doctorate in Physics and Mathematics, but he currently is the Professor of the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow (the Russian Academy of Sciences) and Director of the Institute for Synergetic Anthropology, which was founded by him in 2005. Horujy formulates the task of his studies clearly: “a new contemporary reading of the entire corpus of Orthodox asceticism is necessary”. In this connection, he stresses that new interpretation should be not simply a retelling of this doctrine but a “reconstruction of practice, presentation of Orthodox feat as a holistic approach of the man to himself, as a way of life and strategy of activity: to see man in his transcendental aspiration, in his living action” (Horujy, 1998, p.25). This experience of Christian anthropology is principally important in the situation of postmodern culture, with its use of strategies of transgression when the

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lack of unity and integrity of human nature leads to the desire to overcome all sorts of boundaries and limits (social, sexual, etc.), that result in death (case of M. Foucault). Experience in Hesychasm moves in an absolutely opposite direction: it is an experience of energy; it means to put a man together in his integrity. In this context, Horujy argues that the anthropological position of Orthodox mysticism and ascetic practice has been expressed in the writings of St. Gregory Palamas. For Horojy, the main part of Palamas’ heritage is a polemical essay Triads for the Defense of Those Who Practice Sacred Quietude. The Russian philosopher emphasizes that “the Triads contain essentially a whole and very clear exposition of Orthodox theology on almost all major doctrinal sections” (Horujy, 1991, p.20). The Russian scholar considers St. Maximus the Confessor, who laid the basic principles for the Orthodox monastic life and deification, to be a founder of the Hesychastic practice. In his turn, Gregory Palamas essentially developed these principles from St. Maximus. Some prominent Russian theologians of the twentieth century - Archimandrite Cyprian (Kern), Archbishop Basil (Krivoshein), Archpriest Gregory Florovsky, Vladimir N. Lossky, Archpriest John Meyendorff - presented in a modern interpretation this practice. In Horujy’s opinion, these Russian thinkers have formulated the conception of a so-called "Orthodox energetism". In fact, for Orthodox theology it represented a real turn towards the ideas of Neo-Palamism. Thus, the Christian Orthodox East has chosen the path of “infinite Patristics”. It is fundamentally important that, in the frames of this movement, Orthodox theology is deployed in the perspective of a theology of energies. For Horujy, Western theological tradition is based on the discourse of essence and makes essentia the highest point of knowledge, which normatively regulates all actions and events. In this discourse, metaphysics instantiates, whilst action is a derivative; that is why in scholasticism dogmatic theology precedes practice. The scholastic system of thought with its piety towards Aristotle’s authority led to the autonomy of reason and to the seclusion of philosophy; however, there were still religious dogmas in philosophy and these served as limits to the use of reason in philosophical research. The next stage of the development of Western thought was the process of secularization of philosophy. Hesychasm offers principally a radically new form of ontology and epistemology (if we can apply these philosophical conceptions here); however, this does not mean that Hesychasm is close to Platonism regarding its dichotomy of body and soul. If Barlaam, a supporter of Platonism, insisted on this sort of dualism, then Hesychasm and Palamism

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proclaimed an “anthropology of wholeness” and defended the idea of the wholeness of human being. In this sense, the doctrine of St. Gregory Palamas as the organic continuation of the Orthodox patristic heritage remains true to Hesychasm and to the mystical experience of communion with God. The Russian scholar many times emphasizes in his monographs and articles that the Christian anthropology of St. Gregory Palamas is particularly relevant in the perspective of modern theological and philosophical discussions. Horujy argues that the experience of Christian mysticism and asceticism is subjective, but, at the same time, it is completely objective. In this regard, the body is not denied but is included in the process of mystical practice. Feelings, emotions, sense of heat or smell are fully real. Human senses and passions per se are not unnatural, hence a practicing ascetic moves from unnatural passions to natural and then to the supernatural. For Hesychasm and Palamism man is a flexible and changeable being, he is open to infinity. The hesychastic conception of man as an infinite being overcomes the theme of death as the finitude of human existence; this conception of death as finitude is particularly popular in modern humanitarian studies especially in the discipline known as Thanatology. Through the practice of mental prayer man can reach the horizon of synergy that combines freedom and grace. In this sense, one of the main motives of all Palamite theological thought, which is closely associated with the experience of the Orthodox monastic asceticism and Hesychasm, is the recognition and defense of a unique opportunity in man’s synergetic union with God: his deification or theosis. In this way, Palamas develops the central theme of Byzantine theology and the whole experience of Eastern Christianity. According to Sergey Horujy, the famous formula of "deification" was expressed by St. Athanasius of Alexandria: “God became a man so that a man might become God”. Macarius of Egypt and Maximus the Confessor contributed to the development of this idea. The Russian scholar emphasizes that, in his teaching, Maximus the Confessor "unites dogma and asceticism, practical evidence and theoretical argumentation, so deification takes the form of a coherent theological conception that is firmly rooted in the “database” of our Fathers" (Horujy, 1998, p.150). In addition, Horujy stresses the impact of Symeon the New Theologian’s mystical practice on the teaching of St. Gregory Palamas. In his opinion, Palamite synthesis is the essence of the Orthodox way of thinking: “The conception of the Divine Energy allows us to link together all elements of the doctrine, which have already been existent for a thousand of years: its dogmatic basis of Trinitarian and Christological theology, the mysticism of

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light in Athos' Hesychasm and its eschatological outputs" - writes the Russian thinker (Horujy, 1998, p.151). Thus, the mystical and theological experience of Palamas is the apex of the Orthodox conception of theosis, that is, deification of the world and man, which certainly has relevance to the whole modern Christian theology.

5. Conclusion As a result, we ought to admit that, in spite of various persecutions, Aleksey Fedorovich Losev ensured the continuity in the development of the original Russian religious philosophy. The merit of Sergey Horujy and other scholars representing the circle of Losev is that they continued to study the traditions of Hesychasm and Palamism and thus, demonstrated the importance of this mystical practice in the contemporary postmodern debates on human nature. They inherited the ideas of Losev and the exiled Russian theologians, who have supported the turn of Russian religious thought to the Patristic heritage of Neo-Palamism.

Works Cited Averincev, S. S., 1996, Rhetoric and the Origins of the European literary tradition, School of languages of Russian Culture, Moscow. Bibihin, V., 2004, Aleksei Fedorovich Losev. Sergey Averincev, Institute of Philosophy, Theology and History of St. Thomas, Moscow. —. 2010, Energy, Institute of Philosophy, Theology and History of St. Thomas, Moscow. Horujy, S. S., 1991, Diptych of silence. Ascetic doctrine of man in theological and philosophical light, Center for Psychology and Psychotherapy, Moscow. —. 1998, The phenomenology of asceticism, Publishing House of Humanitarian literature, Moscow. —. 2005, Sketches of Synergetic Anthropology, Institute of Philosophy, Theology and History of St. Thomas, Moscow. —. (eds), 2004, Hesyhasm: an annotated bibliography, Publications Board of the Russian Orthodox Church, Moscow. —. 2003, “Imiaslavie and culture of the Silver Age: the phenomenon of the Moscow School of Christian Neoplatonism” in Sergey N. Bulgakov’ religious-philosophical way: The international scientific conference dedicated to the 130th anniversary of his birth, Moscow, pp. 191-207. Losev, A. F., 1993, “Essays on Ancient Symbolism and Mythology”, Thought, Moscow.

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—. 1997, Name. Selected works, translations, interviews, researches, archival materials, Publishing House of "Aletheia", St. Petersburg. —. 2002, “Imiaslavie and Platonism. The hard school”, Questions of Philosophy, ʋ 9, Moscow, pp. 102-129. Postovalova, V. I., 2007, “Hesychasm in the creative thinking of Losev (monk Andronick)” in SOFIA: Almanac: Vol. 2: P.A. Florensky and Losev: gender, myth and history, Ufa Publishing House, pp. 207-222. St. Gregory Palamas, 1995, Triads for the Defense of Those Who Practice Sacred Quietude. Translation, afterword and commentaries of V. Bibihin, Canon, Moscow. Tahoe-Godi, Asa, 1997, “Losev”, Young Guard, Series "Life of remarkable people", Issue 742, Moscow.

ST. GREGORY PALAMAS IN RUSSIAN THOUGHT: SPIRITUAL PRACTICE VERSUS RATIONALITY PROFESSOR OLEG E. DUSHIN

1. The actuality of spiritual experience In the moving reality of Post-Modern culture, which fills the latest sociological literature, and which is characterized by wide popularity of clip-art and internet surfing, there has appeared a kind of thinking, which is oriented on the endless shift of pictures and images. One key characteristic in this new thinking is that it does not consider as important a sense of personal self-identity; so there is a legitimate question about the internal principles of what constitutes a person in the Post-Modern era. On the one hand, it seems that our world offers a variety of strategies of choice and possibilities for the realization of individual preferences, yet on the other hand, a traditional form of self-awareness of the European individual, that is rooted in the Christian experience of feelings of sin and repentance, has been eliminated. The history of “I” (Ego), explicated in the West-European philosophy in Augustine's Confessions, who for the first time recognizes libido (sinfulness) as a kind of underground basis of Ego, through the Cartesian subjectivity (Cogito) to the psychoanalytic theory of personality, is transformed into the world of domination of things, where there is postulated a rigid system of social standardization. In pursuit of a higher level of consumption and in the desire to be successful and to live according to standards of prosperity established in the society of PostModernity, the human is constantly in a state of psychological stress and destruction concerning his own identity; moving in this way, he is subjected to the process of depersonalization. Strangely, medieval mystics remarked on facing similar issues thus: the intention to own the external things and the benefits of the outside world would never be adequate for the infinite nature of man, whereas the practice of monastic asceticism and mystical knowledge of God lit the path of attainment of positive spiritual infinity. In the perspective of searching for new forms of identity and

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practice of “self-care”, Post-Modern culture cultivates the strategy of transition of social boundaries and the limits of rationality. In this context, the actuality of the Christian religion and tradition of monastic spiritual experience consists precisely in the fact that they do not deny the mind and body, but they transform both of them in the process of deification (șȑȦıȚȢ). Thus, ascetic struggle is not against nature, but against the unnatural use of corporeality. The body itself is not forbidden, but its misuse, its abuses. In the history of the twentieth century, the study of man acquired the character of an "anthropological disaster". It meant that the basic principles of European humanism were subjected to destruction, demonstrated in turn by their principal imperfection. In the writings of Russian theologians, the problem of human existence appeared as a task of spiritual activity and as an experience of living practice of the Christian faith. During the twentieth century, Russian theologians met with considerable and irreconcilable social and ideological contradictions; Archimandrite Ambrose (Alexey Aleksandrovich Pogodin; 1925-2004), Archbishop Basil (Vsevolod Alexandrovich Krivoshein; 1900-1985), Archimandrite Cyprian (Konstantin Eduardovich Kern; 1899-1960), Father Georges Florovsky (1893-1979), Vladimir Nikolaevich Lossky (1903-1958) and Archpriest John Meyendorff (1926-1992) tried to solve these contradictions and appealed to the heritage of Patristic tradition; in this way, they formed the spiritual and theological school of European thought called the Neo-Patristics, in the frames of which Neo-Palamism acquired a special place and importance. Each of the named Russian theologians played a significant role in the development of Neo-Patristic and Neo-Palamism studies. For example, Archimandrite Ambrose (Pogodin) translated from the Greek the Homilies of St. Gregory Palamas. Unfortunately, for sixty to eighty years in the twentieth century this translation could not be published in Russia, so it was published in Canada. Archbishop Basil (Krivoshein) was a monk of Athos and lived on Holy Mount Athos for twenty years. In September 1947, he was falsely accused of pro-Soviet sentiments (it was during the Civil War in Greece) and was forced to leave Athos. He was temporarily arrested and, after his release, he moved to Athens in May 1950; finally, he went to Oxford in February 1951. There he was a priest, and then a bishop, but he never ceased to feel that he was an Athonite monk. In November 1959, he participated in the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the death of St. Gregory Palamas in Thessaloniki, and in September 1963 he also took part in the celebration of the millennium of Mount Athos in Venice. However, Bishop Basil could get opportunity to visit the Holy Mount again only in 1976. With tears in his eyes he entered the territory of

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the Holy Mount, which was forced to leave 29 years ago. His systematic study "Ascetic and Theological Teaching of St. Gregory Palamas", published in Prague in 1936, became a classic work. Later his studies of Symeon the New Theologian and other Fathers of the Church made him one of the main scholars in the Neo-Patristic school. Archimandrite Cyprian wrote his doctoral thesis on the anthropology of St. Gregory Palamas in the difficult years of the Second World War. It should be noted that Jean-Paul Sartre published his major metaphysical treatise "Being and Nothingness" in 1943, but the thrust of his ideas was fundamentally different. Father Georges Florovsky worked in Paris and in the Universities of the United States; he has acquired recognition not only thanks to his works dedicated to the Patristic tradition of Orthodox theology, but also thanks to the fundamental works on the history of Russian Church. Vladimir Lossky, a theologian of the Paris School, was one of the founders of the Neo-Patristic studies in Orthodox theology. He was a son of the famous Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky, a professor of St. Petersburg University. In 1922, the family of Lossky was deported from Russia. Vladimir studied at the Sorbonne; during the Second World War, he was involved in the French Resistance. He taught dogmatic theology and Church history at the Institute of St. Dionysius in Paris. Publications of Archpriest John Meyendorf devoted to the Byzantine Patristic tradition and St. Gregory Palamas are well-known internationally (Sidorov, 1996); (Smolenkov, 2010). Archimandrite Cyprian emphasizes that St. Gregory Palamas developed a highly intellectual theory of man (Archimandrite Cyprian (Kern), 1996, p.315). According to Palamas, the human body is not filled with sin, as the different Manichaean preachers argued, but the body intertwines with the soul of man that reflects the image and likeness of God. Thus, a human being cannot have only a spiritual existence, neither merely a physical nature; man has both. Moreover, he has a body, soul and spirit; so he cannot be reduced to the status of a social phenomenon that was characteristic of the Communist project. However, the possession of a body gives man the possibility of such a relationship with God, which is not available to angels, because the person feels and perceives, which is of fundamental importance for the mystical practice that involves real sensory experiences. In addition, a human person has unique opportunity to make new forms, though not in an absolute sense as God-Creator, but this ability also separates the nature of man from the angels.

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2. Theology and philosophy The interrelation between theology and philosophy is one of the major problems in the history of Medieval Christian thought, but this topic is quite relevant today. However, the main trends of contemporary philosophical discourse are not at all connected with theological understanding. In this context, it should be noted that modern philosophical investigations are out of the limits of theology. Positions of theology and philosophy look like two parallel lines, which never coincide. Philosophical studies do not allow the understanding of theological truths, because philosophy stops when dogma starts, while theology implies knowledge of philosophy. Examples are the Cappadocians, St. Basil the Great, and St. Gregory the Theologian, who got a philosophical education in Athens. In addition, there are St Gregory Palamas' studies while at Constantinople; a key point in these studies is his demonstration of his philosophical expertise at the palace of the Emperor. In this way, it is especially important that theology does not deny the possibility of logic and philosophy as an experience of searching within human reason; this sometimes can be a particularly painful process. Even though theology needs to engage with logic and philosophy in some way, it is a radically different way of thinking, because it is based on the authority of the tradition of the Church and its timeless dogmatic postulates of faith; on the other hand, philosophy is founded on the freedom of the human mind. Man encounters certain situations and tries to understand the world around him. It is not possible to go out of the limits of time. Philosophy has its own time-related limitations and so the foundations of philosophy cannot be explicated to the ultimate point. The very interesting example of the joining of faith and reason can be found in the history of Russian philosophy, esp. in the teaching of the Slavophiles (Ivan Vasilyevich Kireyevsky and Aleksey Stepanovich Khomyakov). They were secular philosophers and influenced by the ideas of Schelling with whom they were personally acquainted. They raised the question of the priority of faith over the mind, but not denying reason itself, as in the doctrine of Kierkegaard (Either/or), demonstrating that faith is higher than the mind, and so it must include reason. The Slavophiles, being secular scholars, were among the first Russian intellectuals to pay attention to the heritage of the Holy Fathers; they actively cooperated with the Optina Elders, monks of the famous Russian monastery (the Optina Hermitage). According to their doctrine, faith comes from the heart, and not from abstract and “cold” human reason. Faith warms the soul; it gives the person an inner psychological force, the

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vital energy. In this sense, the truth of faith is much more significant for a man than all kinds of logical principles and the rational theories describing the structure of the world in different ways. Faith is a deeply personal experience that cannot be rationalized and explicated completely. This is the unique experience of the heart, which includes the mind, soul, spirit and sensory experiences of body (emotions).

3. The teaching of St. Gregory Palamas in the Russian émigré theology of twentieth century Firstly, it should be noted that there are certain dissonances in the estimates of Palamism between the Russian theologians during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth century, the teaching of Palamas caused critical (sometimes rather negative) comments that in turn were reflections of the influence of Catholic theology and works published at that time in the West. In the twentieth century, the situation radically changed. Russian theologians highlighted the importance of the work of St. Gregory Palamas. Unfortunately, the Russian scholars lived and worked most parts of their lives abroad. They were immigrants, and moreover they were deprived of the very opportunity to visit their motherland. Their lives were the destinies of disadvantaged people, who survived the dramatic transformations of Russia and the world during the twentieth century. However, in spite of the experience of persecution and exile, which of course remained in their minds, they were able to find inner spiritual forces to survive in European and world culture. Apparently, in this context they better understood some fundamental aspects of Christian Orthodox theology. The studies of Patristic heritage and the theology of St. Gregory Palamas were for them not simply the way of abstract theoretical investigations, but a real experience of living activity. It is noteworthy that the era of St. Gregory Palamas was the eve of the collapse of the Byzantine Empire. In such circumstances, Palamas defends the possibility of a living sense of faith and knowledge of God in the monastic practice. The Russian theologians lived through the collapse of the Russian Empire. In these tragic circumstances, they turned to the Christian humanism of Patristic heritage and the teaching of St. Gregory Palamas. In a certain sense, their works defined the basis of the spiritual revival of Orthodoxy. They demonstrated the continuity of the tradition of the Orthodox Patristic theology. In this regard, they emphasized the continuity of Palamas teachings with the theology of Holy Fathers. So, Vladimir Lossky named the doctrine of Palamas a kind of theological

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“synthesis” of Orthodoxy (Lossky, 1972, pp.195-203). Russian theologians considered the work of St Gregory Palamas as a summation of Orthodox Theology during the Byzantine period (Meyendorff, 2003, pp.299-316). Archbishop Basil noted that the mystical texts of Symeon the New Theologian, as well as the Corpus Areopagiticum and works of Maximus the Confessor, played a significant role in the formation of ideas and teaching of Palamas. Father Georges Florovsky describes the work of Palamas as “following the Holy Fathers” (Florovsky, 1987). According to his understanding, it means above all an appeal to the testimony of the Saints, to the living perception of the heritage of Byzantine theology, the important part of which is the works of St. Gregory Palamas. For Florovsky, it is not only the past but it is the living practice of Orthodox faith. Russian scholars believed that the doctrine of Palamas about the Divine energy and the light of Tabor undoubtedly reflected the tradition of Patristic theology. Thus, Orthodox spirituality continued to live and develop in the difficult times of the political decline of the Byzantine Empire. Palamism was in a sense a spiritual response to the situation. Moreover, while the West-European culture of the Renaissance appealed to the earthly powers of man and intended to build a regnum hominum, the mystical teaching of Palamas, which had appeared a century or so before in the Orthodox East, aimed at a living experience of God. Archimandrite Cyprian says that the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries, known in the West as the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern time, or as the Renaissance, are associated not only with the creative works of Dante and the Italian humanists, but in the sphere of a spirituality with the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart and St. Gregory Palamas. The theme of man and his possibilities and ways of living communion with God, the cognition of God in the mystical practices are the key questions for those thinkers (Archimandrite Cyprian (Kern), 1996, p.42). In the tragic times of the twentieth century, Russian theologians encouraged the Christian world to turn to the teaching of Palamas. This turning demonstrated the power of a living sense of faith. Moreover, it was also presented in Russia, not only in the sphere of theological reflections, but primarily in the experience of thousands of ordinary Orthodox priests, who died for the faith during Soviet times, especially in the period of mass persecutions during the 20's-30's. They died with humility, with thanksgiving to God the Creator for the opportunity to die for the Christian faith. Russian theologians noted that the parallelism between NeoScholasticism and Neo-Patristic Theology and, accordingly, between NeoThomism and Neo-Palamism is not fully correct. The Orthodox doctrine

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of Palamas is a mystical experience of God-vision and climbing to the Heavenly (in this context it is symbolically that the dying words of St. Gregory were: “To the Heavenly ... To the Heavenly … To the Light ...”). This mystical experience however, does not deny the mind and senses, but it involves the higher measurement of human spirit. The contrary, the most parts of the teaching of Thomas Aquinas is a strategy for the regulation of human behavior based on Aristotelian ethics. In Thomas Aquinas' opinion, the correct human activity is determined by logic and reasonable principles. In Orthodox mysticism, the center of spiritual experiences is the heart. This monastic practice involves not only deep inner feelings and emotions, but also corporeal transformation. All researchers agree that the practice of mental prayer does not deny the body but opens up the prospect of its transformation, its deification (șȑȦıȚȢ). The first systematic description of the technology of inner prayer, as Vladimir Lossky argues, belongs to St. Symeon the New Theologian (Lossky, 1972, p.190). The practice of "mental prayer" is not the art of combinations of logical-deductive propositions that are based on a scholastic understanding of theology as ars demonstrativa, but it is a real experience of silence, a deep inner experience of grace and Divine Light, a quiet and intimate process of the concentration of mind in its own depths, the feeling of joyful sadness. This practice could not be a part of noisy discussions of students in the Universities; it was inherent in the monastic tradition of Holy Mount Athos and the Russian elders. The rational laws and logic procedures cannot be used in this supra-mental experience. So, if the trend of Scholasticism is aimed on the formal-logical reconciliation that is based only on the principles of reason, then Palamism recognizes a real antinomy, which can be overcome only in a living experience of spiritual knowledge of God. However, first of all, it is, as Archbishop Basil explained, the real practice of continuous prayer, coupled with appropriate corporeal procedures (the rhythm of breathing, tilt of the head, etc.) and the absolute concentration of attention on the heart, which is the center of all spiritual activity (Hieromonk Basil, 1952). In this regard, Archbishop Basil emphasizes the basic priorities: a contemplative life, a real spiritual working and strict asceticism. Such kind of spiritual activity is able to open a special vision, which is inherent in “the eye of the heart”. Since nothing can give any guarantee from possible passions and sinful temptations, so the movement towards purity of heart requires continuous efforts of repentance, humility and prayer. According to Archbishop Basil, this is the main fundamental difference between the mystical theology of St. Gregory Palamas that it is based on the personal spiritual experience and the “ontological” theology of Thomas Aquinas in which the main

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principle is the idea of “analogy of being”. Each of them proposed their own way. The first way is a transformation of human nature (deification); the second way is a strategy of living in this world, but the one without the other cannot exist, just like monks praying not only for themselves but also for all the world and ordinary people (Archbishop Basil (Krivoshein), 1936). In general, following Archbishop Basil, theological differentiation between the Catholic West and the Orthodox East is determined by the predominance of kataphatic or apophatic approaches (Archbishop Basil (Krivoshein), 1936). The positive (kataphatic) approach is inherent in Thomism. His doctrine is determined by the concept of the act of being: all the properties and perfections of created being are explained on the basis of the principle of analogy and by logical laws, so the logic became in the Thomistic doctrine a kind of universal ontology, which includes God Himself. The second negative (apophatic) approach prevailed in the Orthodox mystics. It means that any ontological or logical definitions and propositions cannot be applied to God for He is the Creator and is above all being, so it is not possible to use any logical procedures of our thinking and in the created world to describe Him, because God cannot be measured by the laws of formal logic and characteristics of the human mind. Hence the knowledge of God via the apophatic way has the character of antinomy. Antinomism is not only the core of the basic Christian doctrines, but also the teaching of St. Gregory Palamas on the God’s “essence” and “energy”. According to Vladimir Lossky, the antinomism of Palamas was close to the doctrine of German philosopher Nicholas of Cusa with his idea of coincidentia oppositorum (Lossky, 2013). However, Lossky points out that Western theology does not understand the difference between Divine essence and Divine energy (ibid). The Western theologians recognize characteristics in the very essence of God that are not possible for Orthodox theologians: not through senses, nor through speculation nor in any other way. For the Orthodox, only the characteristics of Divine Energy can be directly known through a special God-vision. This experience of God-vision is characterized by a special insight and perception of the true Light. Russian theologians noted that this Divine light cannot be expressed by the ordinary human language because it does not correlate with the created world; it has an immaterial nature. Perception of the radiance of this uncreated Light is not merely the experience of rational cognition, a kind of enlightenment of the mind. It is available only for those whose hearts were cleansed. It is associated with the transformation of the whole human nature. Archimandrite Cyprian

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writes: “the light of Tabor for the Hesychast is the uncreated Energy of God that is distinct from His essence; energy, thanks to which the knowledge of God and communion with God are possible experientially and existentially. This is the holy ... “cloud” of God, the “cognition through ignorance”, the words that resound in the reverential peace and quietly flowing into the heart of mental prayer...” (Archimandrite Cyprian (Kern), 1996, p.291). The Russian scholar stresses that the light of Tabor demonstrates the perspective of the Kingdom of Heaven. For St. Gregory Palamas, it is an event of special honor, which was awarded to the nature of man. To earn this honour, people are required to follow certain ascetic actions to improve on their own inner man. We are potentially (įȣȞȐȝİȚ) adopted by God, but our problem is that we have to actively aspire (İȞİȡȖİȓĮ) to reach this state.

Conclusion Thus, the Russian theologians argue that St. Gregory Palamas expressed and justified the authenticity and validity of the traditional concept of the Orthodox Church on the uncreated Divine Revelation in the created world. Through the development and refinement of the theological doctrine of the uncreated energies of God and the Divine Light, he demonstrated the reality of mystical communion with God. This mystical communion opened the possibility for a man, in spite of his creaturely limitations, through Grace of God, and without any pantheistic mergers and acquisitions of his Divine Being, to overcome all limitations and unite with God.

Works Cited Archbishop Basil (Krivoshein), 1936, Ascetic and theological teaching of St. Gregory Palamas, [online] Available at: [Accessed 4 September 2013]. Hieromonk Basil, 1952, Athos in the spiritual life of the Orthodox Church. [online] Available at: [Accessed 4 September 2013]. Archimandrite Cyprian (Kern), 1996, Anthropology of St. Gregory Palamas, Moscow, Pilgrim Press. Florovsky, George, 1987, St. Gregory Palamas and the tradition of Fathers, (Ch. 7 of The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, Vol. I, Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View), Vaduz, Europa:

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Buchervertriebsanstalt, pp. 105-120. Lossky, V. n.d. Theology of light in the teaching of St. Gregory Palamas, [online] Available at:

[Accessed 4 September 2013]. —. 1972, “'The vision of God' in Byzantine theology”, Theological Works, 8, pp.187-204; p.195 -203. Meyendorff, John, 2003, St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox spirituality, in Institute of DI DIK, History of Church and East-Christian Mysticism, Moscow: Orthodox Saint Tikhon’s Theological Institute, pp.277-335. Sidorov, A.I. 1996, Archimandrite Cyprian Kern and Orthodox tradition of studies of late Byzantine Hesychasm. In Archimandrite Cyprian (Kern), 1996. Anthropology of St. Gregory Palamas. Moscow: Pilgrim Press, pp.VIII-LXXVII. Smolenkov, N.A., 2010. Studies of the heritage of St. Gregory Palamas in Russian theological science. [online] Available at:

[Accessed 3 September 2013].

ST. GREGORY PALAMAS’ CRITIQUE OF NOMINALISM* PROFESSOR DAN CHI‫܉‬OIU

One of the representatives of the indigenous Hellenism in Southern Italy, Barlaam was very well received by the Byzantine humanists and the aristocratic circles, when he arrived in Constantinople. He came with an intention to study Aristotle on the basis of the original Greek texts. Behind the facade of an apparent cohesion, in Constantinople, at that time, there was a tension between the promoters of Hellenism, who sought to restore the philosophical tradition of Neoplatonism, giving it a greater autonomy from the Christian doctrine and spirituality (known as the “humanists”), and the defenders of a more mystical, ascetic and hesychastic theology based on the Christian Tradition. For the Byzantine Humanists, Barlaam's attempt to approach theological issues from a purely philosophical perspective was, of course, attractive, because it promoted their agenda. Using the apophatic theology of Dionysius, Barlaam affirmed an agnostic denial of the possibility for theognosia, the knowledge of God. Adding to this the Aristotelian argument that the divine transcends all demonstration, Barlaam offered himself as a formidable opponent to the hesychasts. Barlaam sustained that Greek philosophers ruled out the possibility of any demonstration of the divine, because of their foundational belief that the divine transcends human reason. In this framework, what ancients received through contemplation, we can attain now through study and diligence. Through dialectical syllogism, we can logically elucidate simple and partial impressions received by philosophers via divine illumination. Moreover, only the dialectical syllogism can deal with all things, even with the knowledge of the divine. A disciplined and dedicated study of secular sciences can purify the soul's understanding and lead to its assimilation * This paper was made within The Knowledge Based Society Project supported by the Sectorial Operational Program Human Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed by the European Social Fund, and by the Romanian Government under the contract no. POSDRU ID 56815.

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with the divine archetype. It is theognosia by analogy, analogia entis, the analogy of existence between created beings and spiritual, archetypal ideas, inherent in God. This analogical way grants to the human mind the possibility of penetrating the being of God through the study of created reality. Barlaam`s preference for dialectical syllogisms as a mode of access to the knowledge of the divine granted to him the possibility of reducing theology to philosophy. Barlaam's criticism on the hesychastic method of prayer was put forward by making these three assumptions: At the anthropological level: he sustained an anthropology based on a platonic spiritualism; his accusations implied a supposed identification of the supernatural with immateriality. At the gnosiological/epistemological level: the very fact of considering the human body as a receptacle of grace appeared to Barlaam as an intolerable abuse. That because the “return to self” of the hesychastic method was understood not only in the spiritual sense, but also bodily: the body participates in the act of knowledge. Barlaam sustained that the access to the ultimate reality can be only an act of the mind mediated by the hierarchy of the beings. At the ontological level: Barlaam followed the tendency he inherited from the Hellenism to despise matter, and to oppose the material to the spiritual. Gregory Palamas, developed, as a response, a realistic doctrine of supernatural knowledge, independent of any sensible experience, but a knowledge that was given to the whole man (soul and body). Barlaam's agnostic nominalism (implying that there is no possibility of a direct knowledge of the reality of God) was an attempt to express a reaction to the intellectual realism of Thomas Aquinas. And Palamas' answer was, again, a form of realism, but another kind of realism, an existential realism. So, if we can distinguish here two versions of realism (Aquinas' and Palamas'), I consider the one expressed by Palamas to be the stronger version of realism. I will now try to explain why. Palamas does not oppose spiritual to material but the supernatural to created world. In his perspective, supra-rational knowledge is to be preferred over Barlaam’s rationalism (Meyendorff 1998, p.204). He affirms that humans as created beings are bound by their own created state, but when they transcend their own status communicating with God through the divine energies, they participate in the uncreated life. Knowing God does not require certain externalisation between a subject of knowledge and the object known, but a union in the uncreated light; man has no created faculty with which he can see God; to have a vision of God becomes possible because God unites with man, sharing the knowledge

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that He has about himself. Any revelation, any participation, any deification, is thus, a free act of the living God: a divine energy. It is very important to note that the dispute between Palamas and Barlaam was one of exceptional difficulty because of two different uses of the same philosophical ideas and terminology. Barlaam followed the classical Greek use: concepts, abstractions, ideas formed from inference. It’s a version of the rational-demonstrative attitude. But Palamas had to use language in another way, because he had to describe a concrete and immediate mystical experience, so he necessarily used the philosophical terms and ideas as signs, as pointers. This is a version of the experiential attitude. That is why Palamas finds himself in the situation of re-signifying again and again the meaning of certain terms. He feels he has to do this, because coming to terms with the unmediated experience of God, through the vision of “light”, Palamas clearly understood that any use of language can only be a “pointer”, and not a description. He regards the terms “light” and “darkness” as both appropriate: “light indicates the supreme positive character of the experience”, “darkness indicates its radical transcendence vis-à-vis all else that we know” (Gregory Palamas 1983, cf. 2, 5, 1). Palamas insists repeatedly that, when talking of divine reality, we cannot speak with exact precision, but only by the way of a symbol, image and analogy (Kallistos Ware, 1977, p. 53). Palamas' discourse has an amount of ambiguity, and the reason for this is that the discourse followed the apophatic way, the baseline for all eastern theology. More than that, we can talk about an “intended destabilization” of theological language. That is because theological language, while conceptualizing created beings' experience of God, must also call attention to and acknowledge its own shortcomings. No worthy conception of God can be attained through the intellect alone, as true knowledge of God comes from God, leads to God, and conforms to God. The palamite signification of energeia was the milestone in supporting this version of strong realism. Looking for a proper term for the light of Transfiguration, Palamas decides to use Aristotle’s concept of energeia (Bradshaw 2004, p.231). Initially Aristotle uses the term by taking it from Plato: Plato made the difference between the possession (ktƝsis) and the usage (hrƝsis) of things (Platon, Euthydemus, 280 b-e). With Aristotle, it becomes a distinction not between possession and usage in general, but between the usage and possession of a capacity or a faculty of soul. It is important to note that Aristotle admits the existence of several grades of reality. Aristotle's reasoning is that if man is a simple being, man’s sole proper work is to attain truth; on the other hand, if man is composed of several faculties, his proper work is that of the highest among them.

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Consequently, the one who is active in thinking, lives and exists more than the one who is not, and although the highest grade of reality is not described as an actuality (energeia), it is affirmed that a person who is at the highest grade of reality is active (Aristotle, Protrepticus, B 86). The understanding of energeia as an activity can thus receive its technical signification of actuality. For Aristotle, energeia is that kind of activity that is its own goal and can exist only in a state of fulfilment. It is both the substance's cause and the thorough reality, regardless of the appearances it takes. For all of these reasons Aristotle finds energeia worthy of the highest appellation he can give it, that of divinity. In using the notion of energeia to create a distinction from essence or nature, Palamas proceeds very cautiously, because the theological vocabulary of that time was too deeply marked by the essentialist categories of the Greek philosophy. Palamas feels that this use of energeia is necessary in order to express the existentialist reality of the Supreme Being. Paradoxically, in the context of using this concept, the Byzantine author was also being pre-occupied in liberating the theological discourse from Aristotle’s traditional philosophical categories due to their inadequacy in expressing the mystery of the divine communication with man. For example, Palamas refuses to call the energies “qualities of God”, because the quality notion cannot contain the liberty dimension in any way, whereas these energies are the expression of God’s sovereign will. The doctrine of the immanent energies implies an intensely dynamic vision of the relationship between God and the world. The whole cosmos is a vast burning bush, permeated but not consumed by the uncreated fire of the divine energies. These energies are “God with us”. They are the power of God at work within man, the life of God in which man has a share (Kalistos Ware 1975, p.121). Palamas' theology of Light is not a theology which makes use of rational concepts to express abstract realities, but is, on the contrary, the apophatic expression of a mystical experience culminating in the beholding of God (Lialine 1946, p.282). In this way, we can better understand the use of the term by Gregory Palamas in explaining a critical aspect of his doctrine: the signification of the ultimate reality (in other words what content can be given to the notion of reality when the description of the transcendent is the goal). When discussing about the divine light (as energeia), Palamas states that it is a natural symbol, but he denies that it is a created symbol. The argumentation is that a natural symbol always accompanies what it symbolizes, and its existence depends on it, just like the aurora accompanies the sunset, and the heat accompanies the burning power of the fire because of the innate association (Triads 3,1,14).

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If energeia or the divine light has this meaning, then what we call a natural (or physical) reality has a much broader signification. The physical reality is not a static, inert one, but matter plus energy: it is something that can be described as an active alive process, where we find the presence and the intentionality of a Person and that as a natural dimension. On the other hand, we can state that, in this description, ultimate reality is constituted by experience in a most radical way: the ultimate reality is the human experience of the uncreated energies. Any statement that would aim at something beyond the content of this experience, such as the direct knowledge of an essence, is rejected. At the same time, the gnosiological/epistemological pessimism of agnosticism is rejected: the Supreme Personal Reality is not something that cannot be known due to its transcendence, because it makes itself known by its manifestations called energeia. In the case of God, the nature, or physis from which the divine energy proceeds is the essence (ousia) of God, while the hypostasis using the energy is in this instance threefold, because the persons of the Trinity act always together. The “consequence” of the energy, the energima, is the effect of God's activity in the created world. Thus, there is a significant difference between energeia and energima: the energima, as the consequence of God's action, forms part of the created order, but the energy which brings it to being is making itself uncreated and eternal (Ware 1975, p.131). Palamas chose to signify the radical transcendence of the inaccessible aspect of the Ultimate Reality by qualifying “essence” with “superessential” (Triads 3, 2, 7). It is a way of explaining the vertical relationship between God and created being culminating in deification. The hierarchy of God's noetic, linguistic, and experiential relationship with the created world illustrates the interplay between God's accessibility and inaccessibility. The object of the vision in deification is “technically” inaccessible, in that, as created being, it cannot approach the divine energies. Deification requires the “uncreation”, and is beyond sensation, intellection, and all forms of knowledge. The divine light transcends all beings, all created things. The deified subject “sees” the divine light to the extent that the subject is “uncreated”, but no knowledge follows from this state. God's noetic accessibility decreases as his experiential accessibility increases. The superessential essence of God transcends the inaccessibility and accessibility of the divine energies. The name “God” itself refers to the deifying energy. The divine superessence, however, is “more than God”, more than the energetic revelation of God, and it exists beyond all affirmation and negation. God is both “God”, the sum of the names attributed to God based on divine energies, and “more than God”, the

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superessential divine essence (Triads 3,13,31). There is a non-being by transcendence which is accessible to created beings when they are uncreated, a non-being which is not the divine essence; the superessential essence of God transcends even this non-being. When created being crosses into the uncreated dimension, it experiences both the immediate presence of God and God`s incomprehensibility. Beyond this, however, there still lies the Hypertheos, the “more than God”, the absolute inaccessible superessential essence of God (Anastos 1993, p. 349). The multitude of divine manifestations cannot harm the unity of God, for God is beyond categories of whole and parts. Remaining unknowable in His essence, He is revealed in full in each energy, as a living God. God, by virtue of His simplicity, is totally present in His essence and His energies; in this way, Palamas gives an answer regarding the problem of link between the absolute divine and the world. Between God and His creatures there is no independent reality, but God himself, and through a free condescension, it is this reality. Divine energies are not things different from an ultimate “thing” that would be the essence of God. Grace is not an object with which God would reward his creatures, but the very manifestation of the Living One. We could think about an analogy between the recent advances in science (especially quantum physics) and hesychasm concerning the nature of the ultimate reality. Bernard d' Espagnat, in his book On Physics and Philosophy, affirms that the notion of reality per se is considered to be totally independent of our capacity of knowing, and is correlated with the hypothesis that we have direct access to what we call reality (that we can say something true about it). But a number of scientists and philosophers of science sustain that the concept of reality includes in its semantic area also the representation build on what is independent of us (based on the phenomena, i.e., human experience, which can be built without direct reference to reality per se). It is clear that the current semantics of the concept of reality actually contains two major versions, corresponding to a realistic description and to a representationalist one. These two versions conflict each other (d' Espagnat 2006, p.14). But, it is important to note that Palamas' understanding of the possibility of knowing the ultimate reality surpasses this dilemma. Because, as I have already said, there is no need to postulate an independent reality between God and His creatures: God himself is this reality. That is why it has an exceptional value not only for theology or philosophy, but it also can offer a model for our scientific understanding of the world. It is here that d' Espagnat is particularly relevant: The question that now is important in physics is the question regarding the “real nature” of what, in a rather negative language, is called “Something”. This role assigned to “Something” suggestive of integrity, of

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a whole, is a completely alien notion to the minds of classical physicists (Ibid, p.17). In addition, we have to note that hesychasm is different than other spiritual practices, at least in Christianity, by the fact that it emphasizes experience in the shape of an experiment: it is supposed to be a method, with a verifiability criterion, and validation; the method works if it directs us to the ultimate reality, or, in hesychastic language, to the attraction of the uncreated energies. In experimentation what is decisive, the truth criterion, is what is provided by the “appeal to experience”. In modern science this much is clear; but I wish to claim that also for hesychasm we had the same kind of exigency; this is evident, when Palamas, in the heated disputes with his adversaries, used to invoke repeatedly the appeal to experience as a criterion. André Scrima, a Romanian theologian and philosopher offers some reasons why spiritual experience may be considered a valid research object. Firstly, spiritual experience is a manifestation and a sign of a possibility, of a fundamental aspect for human condition. The human being is a “being of experience”. As Scrima indicates, the term “experience” derives from Greek, from peira, that means “try out”, and its root seems to be identical to the one of the term pyr: fire. Experience would be then what comes out of trying out, knowledge by trying things out. Scrima states that the spiritual experience must also represent a study object, because any experience of this kind is creative, founding values, bearing a vision of the world, therefore, a way of founding a cultural tradition (the cultural tradition being understood as live communication and progressive manifestation of a global truth) (Scrima 2008, pp. 198-199). It is worthy of note that this notion of trying out also is implied in French phenomenology. Michel Henry talks about the self-trying out as the main dimension of the earthly existence of man (Henry 2003). In Palamism, the distinction between immaterial and supernatural is implied, thus affirming the possibility of a non-symbolical knowledge of God, and of an effective relationship between God and man. This kind of understanding has exceptional value for contemporary thinking regarding reality. Asserting the existence of an Eastern-Christian philosophy in our days cannot be made without considering the doctrine of St. Gregory Palamas as a central landmark. And if we can talk about an EasternChristian cultural model, the hesychast controversy can be considered as a turning point in defining its shape.

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Works Cited Anastos, Thomas L., 1993, “Gregory Palama's Radicalization of the Essence, Energies, and Hypostasis Model of God”, The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, Vol. 38, pp.1-4. Bradshaw, David, 2004, Aristotle East and West –Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. d`Espagnat, Bernard, 2006, On Physics and Philosophy, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Henry, Michel, 2003, I Am the Truth. Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, trans. Susan Emanuel, Stanford University Press, Stanford. Lialine, Dom Clement, 1946, The Theological Teaching of Gregory Palamas on Divine Simplicity, The Eastern Churches Quarterly, Vol. 4, No.5, pp.266-287. Lossky, Vladimir, 1976, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, St Vladimir`s Seminary Press, Crestwood. Meyendorf, John, 1998, A Study of Gregory Palamas, St. Vladimir`s Seminary Press, Crestwood. Palamas, Gregory, 1983, The Triads, trans. Nicholas Gendle, Paulist Press, New York. Stăniloae Dumitru, 1996, Teologia Dogmatică Ortodoxă, vol. I., Ed. Institutului Biblic ‫܈‬i de Misiune al B.O.R., Bucure‫܈‬ti. Scrima, André, 2008, Experienаa spirituală Юi limbajele ei, Humanitas, Bucure‫܈‬ti. Ware, Kallistos, 1975, “God Hidden and Revealed: The Apophatic Way and the Essence-Energies Distinction”, Eastern Churches Review, Vol. 7, pp.125-136. —. 1977, “The debate about Palamism”, Eastern Churches Review, Vol. 9, pp.45-63.

ST GREGORY PALAMAS AND ARISTOTLE’S CATEGORIES DR CHRISTOPH ERISMANN

Thanks to his biographer Philotheos Kokkinos, we know that Gregory Palamas studied the entire corpus of Aristotle’s works and that, right from his young age, he impressed his audience by his competence in logic.1 In his study of Aristotle, he benefited particularly from the teaching of Theodore Metochites. The use to be made of Aristotle’s thought and how to interpret it were controversial topics in several polemical debates in which Palamas took an active part, in particular in his debate with Barlaam of Calabria on syllogistics.2 It is therefore interesting to try to outline more precisely Palamas’ relation to Aristotelian thought. Other scholarly works

1 Philotheos Kokkinos, Encomium Gregorii Palamae (in D.G. Tsames (ed.) 1985, ĭȚȜȠșȑȠȣ ȀȦȞıIJĮȞIJȚȞȠȣʌȩȜİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ȀȠțțȓȞȠȣ ܼȖȚȠȜȠȖȚț‫ݏ ޟ‬ȡȖĮ. ǹү· ĬİııĮȜȠȞȚțİ߿Ȣ ݀ȖȚȠȚ [Thessalonian Byzantine Writers 4] Centre for Byzantine Research, Thessaloniki, p. 427-591), §11: ǺȡĮȤީ IJާ ȝİIJĮȟީ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȖȡĮȝȝĮIJȚț‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠࠎ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ࠍȘIJȠȡȚț‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ ݸ‬īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ ܿȡȚıIJĮ țĮIJȠȡșȫıĮȢ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫ބ‬ʌާ ʌȐȞIJȦȞ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJࠛȞ ijȘȝȚ IJࠛȞ IJȘȞȚțĮࠎIJĮ țĮșȘȖȘIJࠛȞ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țȠȡȣijĮȓȦȞ IJȠࠎ ȜȩȖȠȣ țĮș’ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡȕȠȜ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬Ȟ ȜȩȖȠȚȢ IJİ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ıȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮıȚ șĮȣȝĮıș߱ȞĮȚ. ȉȠȚȠࠎIJȠȢ ‫ݏ‬Ȟ Ȗİ IJȠ߿Ȣ ijȣıȚțȠ߿Ȣ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȜȠȖȚțȠ߿Ȣ țĮ‫ܼ ޥ‬ʌȜࠛȢ ʌߢıȚ IJȠ߿Ȣ ݃ȡȚıIJȠIJİȜȚțȠ߿Ȣ ‫ޓ‬ijșȘ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާȞ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬ıȠijȓߠ ʌĮȞIJȠįĮʌ߲ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȝĮșȒȝĮıȚ ȝȐȜȚıIJĮ șĮȣȝĮȗȩȝİȞȠȞ ‫ބ‬ʌާ ʌȐȞIJȦȞ IJާ IJȘȞȚțĮࠎIJĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȕĮıȚȜİ߿ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠ߿Ȣ țȠȚȞȠ߿Ȣ IJࠛȞ ࠔȦȝĮȓȦȞ įİȟȚࠛȢ ȝİıȚIJİȪȠȞIJĮ ʌȡȐȖȝĮıȚ, ȁȠȖȠșȑIJȘȞ ijȘȝ‫ ޥ‬IJާȞ ȝȑȖĮȞ, ȜȩȖȠȣȢ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎ ȕĮıȚȜȑȦȢ ʌȡާȢ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȞ ‫ބ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ IJ߱Ȣ ȜȠȖȚț߱Ȣ ݃ȡȚıIJȠIJȑȜȠȣȢ ʌȡĮȖȝĮIJİȓĮȢ țİțȚȞȘțȩIJĮ, IJȠȚĮࠎIJĮ ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȠȣ ȖȜȫIJIJȘȢ ܻțȠࠎıĮȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Ƞ‫ވ‬IJȦ țĮș’ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡȕȠȜ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬țʌȜĮȖ߱ȞĮȚ IJާȞ ȞȑȠȞ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ȝȘį‫ ޡ‬ʌĮȡ’ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJࠜ țĮIJĮıȤİ߿Ȟ ȝȘį‫ ޡ‬țȡȪȥĮȚ įȣȞȘș߱ȞĮȚ IJާ șĮࠎȝĮ, ܻȜȜ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ ȜȩȖȠȞ İ‫ރ‬șީȢ ȝİIJ’ ‫݋‬țʌȜȒȟİȦȢ IJȡȑȥĮȞIJĮ ʌȡާȢ IJާȞ ȕĮıȚȜȑĮ, «ȀĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ ݃ȡȚıIJȠIJȑȜȘȢ», İ‫ݧ‬ʌİ߿Ȟ, «İ‫ ݧ‬ʌĮȡޫȞ ܻțȡȠĮIJ‫ޣ‬Ȣ țĮșȓıIJĮIJȠ IJȠȪIJȠȣ, ‫݋‬ʌ߰ȞİıİȞ ܽȞ Ƞ‫ ރ‬ȝİIJȡȓȦȢ, ‫ޔ‬Ȣ Ȗİ ‫݋‬Ȗޫ ȞȠȝȓȗȦ. ‫ݑ‬Ȗޫ į’ ‫݋‬țİ߿ȞȠ», ijȘıȓ, «ȜȑȖȦ IJȑȦȢ, ‫ݼ‬IJȚ IJȠȚĮȪIJĮȢ ‫ݏ‬įİȚ IJ‫ޟ‬Ȣ ȥȣȤ‫ޟ‬Ȣ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ޟ‬Ȣ ijȪıİȚȢ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ IJࠛȞ ȝİIJȚȩȞIJȦȞ IJȠީȢ ȜȩȖȠȣȢ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȝȐȜȚıIJĮ IJ‫ ޟ‬IJࠜ ݃ȡȚıIJȠIJȑȜİȚ IJȠȣIJȦ‫ ޥ‬įȚ‫ޟ‬ ʌȠȜȜࠛȞ ijȚȜȠıȠijȘșȑȞIJĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ıȣȖȖȡĮijȑȞIJĮ». 2 On late Byzantine debates about the significance and use of Aristotelian syllogistic in theology, see K. Ierodiakonou 2002, ‘The anti-logical movement in the fourteenth century’ in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Byzantine philosophy and its ancient sources, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 219–236.

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have already discussed the issue of the relationship of Palamas’ theology to Aristotle’s metaphysics.3 The main topics I will concentrate on are logic and the ontology of the sensible world. In this paper, I wish to consider his reception of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories in his late thought. In 1349/50, Gregory Palamas wrote the One Hundred and Fifty Chapters on Topics of Natural and Theological Science, the Moral and the Ascetic Life, Intended as a Purge for the Barlaamite Corruption.4 This piece of work, which dates from his period of maturity, is organised in a systematic way and is a testimony of a fully considered version of his thought. Each chapter provides a determination and clear formulation of Palamas’ ideas on a precise topic. The complementarity of chapters provides us with a synthesis of his thought. As regards the issue I consider here (Palamas’ relationship to Aristotle’s categories and the discussion of their validity in ontology and theology), I will mainly concentrate on chapters 132 to 136. I will proceed in three stages: first, I will highlight what Palamas accepts of the categorical doctrine; secondly, I will outline his original answer to the traditional issue of the application of the categories to God, and finally I will analyse the modifications which Palamas brings to Aristotle’s doctrine; this in turn will allow me to consider a central thesis of his ontology of the sensible world. As we proceed, I will highlight the specificity of Palamas’ reading of the Categories – the import of the notion of energeia which is so central to his thought.

1. The general acceptance of the doctrine Evidence of knowledge of Aristotle’s theory of categories can be found in various places of the text. A number of passages testify to the acceptance of aspects of the categorical doctrine. We can observe in Palamas acceptance of the validity of the doctrine of the categories for the sensible world: “all beings as well as those realities that are subsequently observed in substance, can be included within ten categories (İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ įȑțĮ ıȣȖțİijĮȜĮȚȠȣȝȑȞȦȞ), namely, substance, quantity, quality, relation, place,

3 See, among others, T. Tollefsen 2012, Activity and participation in late antique and early Christian thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, p. 185206, and D. Bradshaw 2004, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 221-262. 4 The text is available in Greek and in English translation in R.E. Sinkewicz 1988, Saint Gregory Palamas, The one hundred and fifty chapters, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto. The quotations of Palamas in English are drawn from this translation; on the issue of dating, see p. 49-54.

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time, action, affection, possession and situation”5 (§ 134). This list reflects that of chapter 4 of the Categories 1b26-27. The ten categories are taken as a correct way of understanding created beings and allow for an exhaustive classification of creation, given that all beings – ʌȐȞIJȦȞ IJࠛȞ ‫ݻ‬ȞIJȦȞ – fall under the ten categories. The idea of the categories as an exhaustive classification of onta stems directly from Aristotle’s text (Categories 1a20) and is fully consistent with Aristotle’s point of view. The distinction between substance and accident (Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ - ıȣȝȕİȕȘțȩȢ) is the second element of Aristotle’s theory which Palamas accepts. In paragraph 135, the discussion of divine energy provides the opportunity for recognising the validity of the substance-accident distinction, while keeping open the possibility, in the case of God, of a being which is neither a substance nor an accident: “the divine energy of God is neither a substance nor an accident nor is it classed among nonexistent things”6 (§ 135). However, the text suggests that the substance-accident distinction is valid in the case of the sensible world. So Palamas distinguishes between non-existent things, and existent things, which are either substances or accidents. More importantly, he characterises these last two types of entities. Accidents are that which do pass away but also admit or effect increase or diminution. Substance is characterised as being a thing that can subsist on its own. Ontological independence is the definitional characteristic of substance. A substance subsists by itself (țĮș’‫݌‬ĮȣIJާ) and therefore does not need other entities in order to subsist in being. In both his characterisations, Palamas follows Aristotle. Ontological independence is indeed the fundamental character of Aristotelian primary substances. As to the admission of more and less, that is, of degrees, this is clearly a characteristic of accidental being according to Aristotle. In the Categories,7 he rejects degrees of substance: John is no more human than Paul; a horse is no more substantial than a cat. The first element of

5 Gregory Palamas, Capita 150, § 134, ed. Sinkewicz p. 238: 1-3: ȆȐȞIJȦȞ IJࠛȞ ‫ݻ‬ȞIJȦȞ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ įȑțĮ ıȣȖțİijĮȜĮȚȠȣȝȑȞȦȞ, Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȞ, ȜȑȖȦ, ʌȠıȩȞ, ʌȠȚȩȞ, ʌȡȩȢ IJȚ, ʌȠࠎ, ʌȠIJȑ, ʌȠȚİ߿Ȟ, ʌȐıȤİȚȞ, ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚȞ, țİ߿ıșĮȚ. 6 Gregory Palamas, Capita 150, § 135, p. 240: 13-15: IJާȞ Į‫ރ‬IJާȞ Ƞ‫މ‬Ȟ IJȡȩʌȠȞ țĮ‫ݘ ޥ‬ șİȓĮ IJȠࠎ șİȠࠎ ‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮ Ƞ‫އ‬IJİ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ Ƞ‫އ‬IJİ ıȣȝȕİȕȘțȩȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJࠛȞ ȝȘįĮȝࠛȢ ‫ݻ‬ȞIJȦȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫ݏ‬ıIJȚ. 7 Aristotle, Categories, in L. Minio-Paluello (ed.) 1949, Aristotelis Categoriae et liber de interpretatione, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2b22-28: ǹ‫ރ‬IJࠛȞ į‫ ޡ‬IJࠛȞ İ‫ݧ‬įࠛȞ ‫ݼ‬ıĮ ȝȒ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ ȖȑȞȘ, Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ޡ‬Ȟ ȝߢȜȜȠȞ ‫ݐ‬IJİȡȠȞ ‫݌‬IJȑȡȠȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ ‫݋‬ıIJȓȞ·Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ Ƞ‫ݧ‬țİȚȩIJİȡȠȞ ܻʌȠįȫıİȚ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ IJȚȞާȢ ܻȞșȡȫʌȠȣ IJާȞ ܿȞșȡȦʌȠȞ ܻʌȠįȚįȠީȢ ‫ ݙ‬țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ IJȚȞާȢ ‫ݬ‬ʌʌȠȣ IJާȞ ‫ݬ‬ʌʌȠȞ. ‫ޘ‬ıĮȪIJȦȢ į‫ ޡ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJࠛȞ ʌȡȫIJȦȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȚࠛȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ޡ‬Ȟ ȝߢȜȜȠȞ ‫ݐ‬IJİȡȠȞ ‫݌‬IJȑȡȠȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ ‫݋‬ıIJȓȞ· Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ȝߢȜȜȠȞ ‫ ݸ‬IJ‫ޥ‬Ȣ ܿȞșȡȦʌȠȢ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ ‫ ݸ ݙ‬IJ‫ޥ‬Ȣ ȕȠࠎȢ.

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definition of accidents is shortened by Palamas. He states that accidents are that which do pass away. However, let us develop this formula somewhat: Accidents are that which do pass away, without entailing the suppression of the substance which is their subject. An individual can lose an accidental property and yet continue to exist. This is what is expressed by the distinction between accidental and essential properties. Socrates cannot cease to be a man without disappearing; however, he can cease to be in good health, if he becomes ill. Furthermore, note that admitting degrees must not be understood as a criterion, which has to be fulfilled by all accidents. This criterion is particularly appropriate for qualities, but is not suitable for all categories.

2. The application of the categories to God Palamas discusses the application of the categories to God in chapter 134. The issue of whether or not the categories can be predicated of God or, in the pagan version of the debate, of intelligible realities, is an old and traditional question. Plotinus was the first to put it to Aristotle in the treatises about the genera of being (Treatises 42-44); the issue was debated both in the Latin world under the name of praedicatio in divinis and in the Greek-speaking world. Palamas’ answer to this question is original. He does not choose any of the standard answers, namely, either radically rejecting the relevance of the categories in a negative theology perspective, or accepting the validity of the category of substance only, or admitting the categories of substance and relation because of their usefulness in formulating the Trinitarian question. According to Palamas, three categories are relevant in the case of God: substance (Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ), relation (ʌȡȩȢ IJȚ) and action (ʌȠȚİ߿Ȟ). Palamas states that “God is a hypersubstantial substance (Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡȠȪıȚȠȢ, § 134) in which are observed only relation and action (ȝȩȞĮ IJާ ʌȡȩȢ IJȓ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ʌȠȚİ߿Ȟ, § 134), which do not produce within it any composition or alteration”.8 This position is interesting in that it testifies of a re-appropriation by Palamas of Aristotle’s doctrine. God is substance, but Palamas immediately qualifies this with an adjective reminiscent of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite – hyperousios. God transcends the category of substance. Relation is taken to be valid because the hypostases of the Trinity are distinct from one another, but not in substance. In God, the hypostatic properties (IJ‫ބ ޟ‬ʌȠıIJĮIJȚț‫ݧ ޟ‬įȚȫȝĮIJĮ, § 8 Gregory Palamas, Capita 150, § 134, p. 238: 3-5: ‫ ݸ‬șİާȢ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡȠȪıȚȩȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ, ߄ ‫݋‬ȞșİȦȡİ߿IJĮȚ ȝȩȞĮ IJާ ʌȡȩȢ IJȓ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ʌȠȚİ߿Ȟ, Ƞ‫ރ‬įİȝȓĮȞ ‫݋‬ȝʌȠȚȠࠎȞIJĮ IJĮȪIJ߯ ıȪȞșİıȚȞ ‫ܻ ݙ‬ȜȜȠȓȦıȚȞ.

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132) are referred to as mutual relations (ʌȡާȢ ܿȜȜȘȜĮ ȜȑȖİIJĮȚ, § 132). Relation is important as, without it, the Trinity would not exist; in Palamas’ words: “The trihypostatic character of the Godhead is eliminated if relation is not observed in God’s substance”9 (§ 134). It is interesting to note that, when he wishes to state that the category of relation applies to God, Palamas chooses to say that God is pros ti – he does not use the concept of skhesis, which had been favoured by the Neoplatonists, first and foremost by Simplicius. This choice probably testifies of his desire to remain as close as possible to Aristotle. Relation also is necessary in order to think the creative activity of God: “He is also Creator, principle and master in relation to creation in that it has its origin in him and is dependent on him”.10 On this basis, Palamas introduces a strong and original thesis, which also constitutes an attack against his adversaries: “Those who assert that God is substance alone with nothing observed in him are representing God as having neither creation and operation nor relation”.11 According to Palamas, this is a grave mistake, as it is equivalent to rejecting God’s mastery upon the universe. By refusing to recognize in God anything but substance, the Akindynists eliminated both the three hypostases and the divine economy. The Aristotelian category of poiein is completely rethought by Palamas. According to him, poiein includes dêmiourgein and energein. Insofar as it expresses the demiurgic creative activity, it applies to God: “But creating and acting (ʌȠȚİ߿Ȟ țĮ੿ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİ߿Ȟ) should be attributed in the truest sense to God alone”.12 Obviously, the accidental dimension of the category is completely lost. God’s transcendence – God is hyperousios – implies that the meaning of the categories which are applied to him are rethought in the mode of eminence. That which is accidental for us is eminent for God. This is one of the implications of the fact that Palamas states that poiein and energein should be attributed in the truest sense to God alone. Alêthestata in the sentence indicates that we must understand poiein according to a paradigmatic mode and not according to an accidental one. The divine poiein must be understood in relation to the 9 Gregory Palamas, Capita 150, § 134, p. 238: 19-240: 21: ıȣȞĮȞĮȚȡİ߿IJĮȚ į‫ ޡ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ IJȡȚıȣʌȩıIJĮIJȠȞ IJ߱Ȣ șİȩIJȘIJȠȢ, İ‫ ݧ‬ȝ‫ ޣ‬IJ߲ IJȠࠎ șİȠࠎ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓߠ ‫݋‬ȞșİȦȡȠȪȝİȞȩȞ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ IJާ ʌȡȩȢ IJȚ. 10 Gregory Palamas, Capita 150, § 134, p. 238: 6-8: ‫ݏ‬ıIJȚ į‫ ޡ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬țIJȓıIJȘȢ ʌȡާȢ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ țIJȓıȚȞ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ȡȤ‫ ޣ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬įİıʌȩIJȘȢ, Į‫ރ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫ݗ‬ȡȖȝȑȞȘȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJ߱Ȣ įȠȣȜİȣȠȪıȘȢ. 11 Gregory Palamas, Capita 150, § 134, p. 238: 12-14: Ƞ‫ ݨ‬į‫ ޡ‬ȜȑȖȠȞIJİȢ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȞ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ ȝȩȞȠȞ IJާȞ șİȩȞ, ȝȘį‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ݏ‬ȤȠȣıĮȞ ‫݋‬ȞșİȦȡȠȪȝİȞȠȞ, Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ ޡ‬IJާ ʌȠȚİ߿Ȟ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȞİȡȖİ߿Ȟ, Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ ޡ‬IJާ ʌȡȩȢ IJȚ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚȞ IJާȞ șİާȞ țĮIJĮıțİȣȐȗȠȣıȚȞ. 12 Gregory Palamas, Capita 150, § 133, p. 238: 2-3: IJާ į‫ ޡ‬ʌȠȚİ߿Ȟ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȞİȡȖİ߿Ȟ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ޥ‬ ȝȩȞȠȣ IJȠࠎ șİȠࠎ ܻȜȘșȑıIJĮIJĮ ܽȞ ȜȑȖȠȚIJȠ.

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human poiein in the same mode of eminence as the divine hyperousios with regard to the substances of the created world.

3. The ontology of Gregory Palamas Chapter 136 (a text central to Palamas’ thought) contains an important ontological thesis: “If the substance does not possess an energy distinct from itself, it will be completely without actual subsistence (ܻȞȣʌȩıIJĮIJȠȢ) and will be only a concept in the mind (įȚĮȞȠȓĮȢ ȝȩȞȠȞ șİȫȡȘȝĮ).13 This can be formulated as the following thesis: In order to exist, an entity x must be a substance and must possess an energy which is distinct from substance. While Palamas recognises that particular substance is a reality which subsists without the help of other entities, he states a condition to this subsistence: the substance must possess an energy which is different from it and thanks to which it can subsist. Without this energy, the entity is just conceptual in nature. This thesis allows a distinction between universal entities – genera and species – and particular entities – individuals. Only individuals have the energy needed in order to subsist. Universal entities lack it, according to Palamas: “For what we call the universal ‘man’ (‫ ݸ‬țĮșȩȜȠȣ ȜİȖȩȝİȞȠȢ ܿȞșȡȦʌȠȢ) does not think, does not hold opinions, does not see, does not smell, does not speak, does not hear, does not walk, does not breathe, does not eat – and, to put it simply, does not have an energy which is distinct from the substance and shows that he has individual subsistence (‫݋‬Ȟ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȚ ‫݋‬ıIJȓ). And so the universal ‘man’ is entirely lacking actual subsistence (ܻȞȣʌȩıIJĮIJȩȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ)”.14

Palamas provides a non-realist and anti-Platonic reading of the problem of universals. Universals as such are taken to be just concepts. The universal has no subsistence, for it has no proper energeia. Alone, it does not meet the condition given earlier. But individuals seem to provide 13 Gregory Palamas, Capita 150, § 136, p. 242: 1-2: ‫ ݠ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ İ‫ ݧ‬ȝ‫݋ ޣ‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮȞ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ įȚĮijȑȡȠȣıĮȞ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJ߱Ȣ, ܻȞȣʌȩıIJĮIJȠȢ ‫ݏ‬ıIJĮȚ IJİȜȑȦȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚĮȞȠȓĮȢ ȝȩȞȠȞ șİȫȡȘȝĮ. 14 Gregory Palamas, Capita 150, § 136, p. 242: 2-7: ‫ ݸ‬Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ țĮșȩȜȠȣ ȜİȖȩȝİȞȠȢ ܿȞșȡȦʌȠȢ Ƞ‫ ރ‬įȚĮȞȠİ߿IJĮȚ, Ƞ‫ ރ‬įȠȟȐȗİȚ, Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ ‫ݸ‬ȡߣ, Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫ݷ‬ıijȡĮȓȞİIJĮȚ, Ƞ‫ ރ‬ȜĮȜİ߿, Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ܻțȠȪİȚ, Ƞ‫ ރ‬ʌİȡȚʌĮIJİ߿, Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ܻȞĮʌȞİ߿, Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬ıșȓİȚ, țĮ‫ܼ ޥ‬ʌȜࠛȢ İ‫ݧ‬ʌİ߿Ȟ, Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ ‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮȞ įȚĮijȑȡȠȣıĮȞ IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įİȚțȞࠎıĮȞ ‫ݼ‬IJȚ ‫݋‬Ȟ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȚ ‫݋‬ıIJȓ. įȚާ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJİȜȑȦȢ ܻȞȣʌȩıIJĮIJȩȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ ‫ ݸ‬țĮșȩȜȠȣ ܿȞșȡȦʌȠȢ.

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some kind of subsistence to the specific universal. True to the categorical scheme in which primary substances ground the being of secondary substances, Palamas holds a theory in which the specific universal draws upon the energies of individual substances: But when a man possesses an inherent energy distinct from his substance, whether one or more or all those we have mentioned, it is thereby recognized that the man has an individual subsistence and is not lacking actual subsistence. And since such energies are not observed in one or two or three but in numerous individuals, it is proved that [the universal] man exists in a great many hypostases.15

This position is Aristotelian in nature. The instantiation of the universal by its individuals provides the universal with subsistence. A noninstantiated universal could not exist. In the Categories, Aristotle insists on the fact that, if primary substances do not exist, secondary substances, that is, genera and species, cannot exist either.16 This is the line of thought pursued by Palamas. Without individuals, and in particular without the energeia which individuals possess, the specific universal cannot exist. Universals are dependent on individuals, both for Aristotle and for Palamas. What is new is the role Palamas gives to energeia. The individual is taken to be ontologically primary precisely because it possesses energeia which the universal lacks. Note here how revealing is the vocabulary used by Palamas. An uninstantiated universal would be anhypostatos, lacking subsistence; however this term, historically, tells us something more.17 The concept relates the fact that the universal lacks subsistence with the fact that it lacks links to one or more hypostases, i.e., that it lacks links to particular individuals, i.e., that it is not instantiated. Palamas knows well that, since the beginning of the debates around the 15 Gregory Palamas, Capita 150, § 136, p. 242: 7-13: ‫ ݸ‬į‫݋ ޡ‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮȞ ‫ݏ‬ȝijȣIJȠȞ ‫ݏ‬ȤȦȞ įȚĮijȑȡȠȣıĮȞ IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ ܿȞșȡȦʌȠȢ, ȝȓĮȞ ‫ ݙ‬ʌȜİȓȠȣȢ ‫ ݙ‬ʌȐıĮȢ Ƞ‫ݬ‬ĮȢ ʌİȡ ‫ݏ‬ijȘȝİȞ, ‫݋‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJࠛȞ ȖȞȦȡȓȗİIJĮȚ ‫ݼ‬IJȚ ‫݋‬Ȟ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȚ ‫݋‬ıIJ‫ ޥ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ܻȞȣʌȩıIJĮIJȩȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ ‫ܿ ݸ‬ȞșȡȦʌȠȢ. ‫݋‬ʌİ‫ޥ‬ į‫ ޡ‬Į‫ ݨ‬IJȠȚĮࠎIJĮȚ ‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮȚ, Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬ij’ ‫݌‬ȞާȢ ‫ ݙ‬įȪȠ ‫ ݙ‬IJȡȚࠛȞ, ܻȜȜ’ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬ʌȜİȚȩȞȦȞ IJࠜ ܻȡȚșȝࠜ șİȦȡȠࠎȞIJĮȚ, įİȓțȞȣIJĮȚ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ IJާȞ ܿȞșȡȦʌȠȞ ‫݋‬Ȟ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİıȚ ȝȣȡȓĮȚȢ. 16 Aristotle, Categories 2b5-6: ȝ‫ ޣ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬ıࠛȞ Ƞ‫މ‬Ȟ IJࠛȞ ʌȡȫIJȦȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȚࠛȞ ܻįȪȞĮIJȠȞ IJࠛȞ ܿȜȜȦȞ IJȚ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ· ʌȐȞIJĮ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ IJ‫ܿ ޟ‬ȜȜĮ ‫ݛ‬IJȠȚ țĮș’ ‫ބ‬ʌȠțİȚȝȑȞȦȞ IJȠȪIJȦȞ ȜȑȖİIJĮȚ ਲ਼ ਥȞ ਫ਼ʌȠțİȚȝȑȞĮȚȢ Į੝IJĮ૙Ȣ ਥıIJȓȞ· ੮ıIJİ ȝ੽ Ƞ੝ı૵Ȟ IJ૵Ȟ ʌȡȫIJȦȞ Ƞ੝ıȚ૵Ȟ ਕįȪȞĮIJȠȞ IJ૵Ȟ ਙȜȜȦȞ IJȚ İੇȞĮȚ. 17 On the history of this term, see U.M. Lang 1998, ‘Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church Fathers, Protestant Orthodoxy and Karl Barth’, The Journal of Theological Studies, New Series 49, p. 630-657; see also the considerations on the closelyrelated notion of enhypostaton in B. Gleede 2012, The Development of the Term ‫݋‬ȞȣʌȩıIJĮIJȠȢ from Origen to John of Damascus, Brill, Leiden.

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Council of Chalcedon, universal entities are necessarily instantiated. Both parties in presence, Monophysites and Chalcedonians, had recognized the value of the axiom: ouk esti ousia anhypostatos, which can be translated as follows: There is no such thing as an essence that is not hypostasized. The same axiom, but with physis instead of ousia, is commonly found.18 The axiom quickly came to be considered not only as applying to the issue of the natures of Christ, but also as a thesis of general ontology. This is clear from Leontius of Jerusalem and Leontius of Byzantium19 onwards, and became authoritative with John of Damascus.20 So Palamas demonstrates assent both to the spirit of the Categories and to the agreement which was suggested, from the sixth century onwards, by Christian authors, between Aristotelianism and Christian thought, on the need, in order for a universal nature to exist, for it to be related to particular individuals. Palamas’ solution shows a fundamental agreement with the thesis of the primacy of individual substances in the Categories. The individual, say, this particular man, naturally possesses an energy which is distinct from its essence and makes it exist. The repeated occurrence of this ontological fact – several individuals exist thanks to their energy – maintains the existence of the specific universal. Palamas distinguishes three modes of being in the sensible world: 1) the mode of being of the concept, which is anhypostatos, that is, not realised as, or in, an individual, without hypostasis and energy, and therefore devoid of subsistence; 2) the mode of being of the individual which associates to the substance it is an energy, in order to exist; 3) the mode of being of the universal, instantiated by several individuals, which draws energy from each of its individuals, not through its own subsistence but through subsisting in the hypostases of its individuals. 18 On the use of this axiom in relation to the debate on universals, see C. Erismann 2010, ‘Non Est Natura Sine Persona: the issue of uninstantiated universals from late Antiquity to the early Middle Ages’, in Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500, ed. M. Cameron, J. Marenbon, Brill, Leiden, p. 75-91. 19 Leontius of Byzantium, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, PG 86, 1277D: “One speaks truly in saying ‘there is no such thing as a non-hypostasized nature’”; ‫ ݸ‬IJȠަȞȣȞ Ȝ‫ޢ‬ȖȦȞ ‘Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫ݏ‬ıIJȚȞ ijުıȚȢ ܻȞȣʌިıIJĮIJȠȢ’ ܻȜȘș‫ޡ‬Ȣ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ȝ‫ޢ‬ȖİȚǜ 20 John of Damascus, De natura composita sive Contra Acephalos § 5, ed. B. Kotter 1981, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, vol. 4 [Patristische Texte und Studien 22], De Gruyter, Berlin, 413: 4: “There is no essence which is not realised in a hypostasis, nor is there a nature which is not realised in a person”, Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ܻȞȣʌȩıIJĮIJȠȢ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫ݏ‬ıIJȚȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ ޡ‬ijȪıȚȢ ܻʌȡȩıȦʌȠȢ. See C. Erismann 2011, ‘A world of hypostases: John of Damascus’s rethinking of Aristotle’s categorical ontology’, Studia Patristica 50, p. 251-269.

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Palamas’ position results from the combination of Aristotelian ontology, in which substance is an entity which exists by itself, with Palamas’ own central theme of energy as a condition for existence and, thirdly, with the patristic notion, which came to be widely known from Maximus the Confessor and John Damascus onwards, of enhypostatic existence. In conclusion, the use that Palamas makes of the doctrine of the categories is far from being a mere repetition of Aristotle. Palamas rethinks the theory on the basis of his own ontology and according to the concepts he wishes to promote, most importantly that of energeia. In consequence, his admission of the validity of poiein in speaking about God can be explained by the fact that according to him, the category of poiein includes energein. Moreover, Palamas imports the issue of energeia into the Aristotelian theory of substance. In both cases, the additions make sense; far from contradicting Aristotle or showing an inadequate interpretation of his doctrine, Palamas demonstrates a good understanding of the text and, more importantly, provides a synthesis between the requirements of Christian metaphysics and the fundamentals of Aristotelian doctrine. The introduction of the distinction between substance and energy draws Palamas towards a non-realist interpretation of Aristotelian ontology – he is by far not the only one to have taken this step and the debate between the realist and the non-realist interpretation continues to this day.

Works Cited Aristotle, Categories, in Minio-Paluello L. (ed.) 1949, Aristotelis Categoriae et liber de interpretatione, Clarendon Press, Oxford. John of Damascus, De natura composita sive Contra Acephalos § 5, ed. B. Kotter 1981, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, vol. 4 [Patristische Texte und Studien 22], De Gruyter, Berlin. Leontius of Byzantium, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, PG 86. Philotheos Kokkinos, Encomium Gregorii Palamae, in D.G. Tsames (ed.) 1985, ĭȚȜȠșȑȠȣ ȀȦȞıIJĮȞIJȚȞȠȣʌȩȜİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ȀȠțțȓȞȠȣ ܼȖȚȠȜȠȖȚț‫ݏ ޟ‬ȡȖĮ. ǹү· ĬİııĮȜȠȞȚțİ߿Ȣ ݀ȖȚȠȚ [Thessalonian Byzantine Writers 4] Centre for Byzantine Research, Thessaloniki, p. 427-591. Sinkewicz R.E. 1988, Saint Gregory Palamas, The one hundred and fifty chapters, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto. Bradshaw D. 2004, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

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Erismann C. 2011, ‘A world of hypostases: John of Damascus’s rethinking of Aristotle’s categorical ontology’, Studia Patristica 50, p. 251-269 —. 2010, ‘Non Est Natura Sine Persona: the issue of uninstantiated universals from late Antiquity to the early Middle Ages’, in Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500, ed. M. Cameron, J. Marenbon, Brill, Leiden, p. 75-91. Gleede B. 2012, The Development of the Term ਥȞȣʌȩıIJĮIJȠȢ from Origen to John of Damascus, Brill, Leiden. Ierodiakonou, K. 2002, ‘The anti-logical movement in the fourteenth century’ in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Byzantine philosophy and its ancient sources, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 219–236 Lang U.M. 1998, ‘Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church Fathers, Protestant Orthodoxy and Karl Barth’, The Journal of Theological Studies, New Series 49, p. 630-657. Tollefsen T. 2012, Activity and participation in late antique and early Christian thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York.

THE THEOTOKOS AS A MYSTICAL THEOLOGIAN REV. PROFESSOR MANUEL SUMARES

“Share your wealth abundantly with me, O Lady, and if we cannot contain it, enlarge our capacity and then lavish it upon us. For you alone did not receive by measure, as all things were given into your hands”. —St. Gregory Palamas, On the Entry into the Holy of Holies of Our Exceedingly Pure Lady Mother of God and Ever-Virgin Mary and Her Divine Manner of Life There.

In his account of “the last flowering of Byzantine Orthodoxy,” Jaroslav Pelikan characterised it as the advent of “the mystic as new theologian.” In more precise terms, this refers to the convergence of a heightened development of hesychasm between the 11th and 14th centuries and the composition of the Triads in Defence of the Holy Hesychasts by St. Gregory Palamas in the face of Barlaam of Calabria’s damning criticism of a spiritual practice with deep roots in Orthodox Tradition (Pelikan 1974, 262). There is both an immediate and a more distant context for St. Gregory’s articulation of a new theology in conjunction with the life of prayer. The more immediate guide in that direction was Simeon the New Theologian, who emphasised the primacy of personal experiences of God and His divine light, i.e., communion with the Incommunicable One that is granted through the Incarnation who delivers from sin and grants divine life. The theme of the divine light in relation to the Transfiguration will also play an important role in St.Gregory Palamas’ mystical theology, as will his development of the ancient distinction between (unknowable) divine essence and the uncreated energies permeating all things. In relation to the wider tradition, Pelikan further writes, “The novelty of Palamite theology consisted in the fundamental reinterpretation of emphases going back to Origen and Dionysius the Areopagite; despite a continuing reverence for Dionysius, this issued in a ‘new theology’, for it brought about a further development in the Eastern doctrine of God” (Pelikan 1974, 262).

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However, this development of which Pelikan speaks principally on the basis of the Triads gains a further and significantly contemporary dimension, when read in conjunction with St. Gregory’s sermons on the Mother of God. In these sermons, the Virgin Mary manifestly appears as the model of the mystical theologian, in accordance with the patristic and, therefore, Orthodox meaning of the word, theologia. But, in the process of presenting the case for the Theotokos’ singular place in the lives of the hesychasts, a philosophical issue, raised famously by Spinoza, emerges: “What can the body do?” This is a question, to the extent that it relates to an ontology of power, that is, at least implicitly, pervasive throughout contemporary philosophical thinking. Like Nietzsche after him, power is not what I want but what I have, a differentiable quantity that distinguishes my body, my power, from other existent beings. Significantly, Palamas’ thinking confronts Spinoza’s question precisely at the point where it mattered most to the Jewish philosopher: the capacity of the human body for God. Spinoza would say, for example, in proposition 39 of the Fifth Part of his Ethics: “He who possesses a body fit for many things possesses a mind of which the greater part is eternal” (Spinoza 2001, 252). Spinoza’s naturalistic and intellectualist account of the possibility for beatitude, the unique substance that it presupposes, stands in stark contrast with St. Gregory’s notion of knowing God, namely, a knowledge gained through participation in Christ’s consubstantial bond with the Creator God. Indeed, the promise contained in the relational, self-donating ontology of action that underlies St. Gregory’s thinking is a powerful one, and what it offers owes much to his intimate understanding of and relationship with the Theotokos. As the Mother of Christ/ God, she represents the primary example of a human creature’s union with God through the practice of prayer. St. Gregory will thus, argue strongly at once for the place that the Virgin Mary has in the full appreciation of the Christian faith and for the particular insight that theosis gives in the structure of the real, namely the primacy within creation of human affiliation with the living God. The true drama of Western thought is not – pace Heidegger – the forgetting of the question of being, but rather the forgetting of the question concerning the participation in Absolute Life as sons of God. Or to use, Michel Henry’s expression: our being sons in the Son. This, in essence, is the ontological issue that I should like to point toward mainly (but not exclusively) on the basis of St. Gregory’s sermons on the Mother of God: hers is the Son in whom we are sons; His Mother, our Mother. Her body is capable of God; ours is meant to be as well. When seen in this light, both Spinoza’s question and Heidegger’s quest to overcome ontological forgetting can be set on a quite different course.

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As is well known, the complicity that prayer has with theology received its early formulation by Evagrius, who proposed in 61st chapter of his treatise On Prayer: One Hundred and Fifty-Three Texts: “If you are a theologian, you will pray truly. And if you pray truly, you are a theologian”.1 The theo-logian is to be taken literally as the one who is immersed in the Word (Logos) who is God (Theos), and can say so from personal experience, for he has, in truth and by grace, attained spiritual knowledge, or gnosis, through it. Otherwise said, theologia, inseparable from prayer and practiced “truly,” is attained in the strictest sense of the word: the vision of divine glory that is reserved for the age to come but made available to the saints in the present life as well. In the subsequent development of the monastic tradition, the intellectualist character of Evagrius’ doctrine of prayer was challenged by an older wisdom concerning the deifying experience of God, one closer in time to the first generations of Christians. Late in the second century, Irenaeus of Lyon seems to have set the measure for Christian spirituality by advancing his famous dictum: “If the Word is made man, it is that men might become gods.” The spiritual knowledge attained in theology, to the extent it denotes a loving relationship with the living God, cannot but have the reality of the Incarnation at its very centre. It is thus that Evagrius’ teachings that accentuate the perpetual prayer of the mind will be assimilated and transformed into a prayer focused on the Person of Jesus Christ, the Word Incarnate, the true standard for Christian thinking and the rule for hesychasm. In the words of John Meyendorff “the 'intellectualist prayer' of Evagrius became in the East the 'prayer of the heart', a personal prayer explicitly addressed to the Incarnate Word, the 'Jesus Prayer' in which the 'recollection of the Name' holds essential place (Meyendorf 1974, 25). In view of St Gregory Palamas’ Sermons dedicated to the Mother of God, Meyendorff’s formulation of the mystical theologian’s communion with the Person of Christ and the utter intimacy that it implies is particularly helpful. They reveal, to begin with, that, for him, the Virgin Mary exemplifies to the highest degree the mystical theologian who has a uniquely personal knowledge of the Word and, even as a creature, actually 1 The number of one hundred and fifty-three refers that great catch of fish brought in by the apostles upon being instructed by the risen Christ to cast their nets to the right of where they were in the boat. Hitherto, they had caught nothing. (cf., John 21:6-11) The suggestion is that Evagrius has likewise obeyed the Lord and has acquired wisdom in his doctrine of prayer that he now shares with his reader(s). In addition, the fact that the net did not break under the weight can be thought to mean the wholeness of his doctrine of prayer.

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mirrors the reality of her divine Son. In conformity with “an eternal law in heaven,” as St. Gregory formulates it, “the lesser shall share by means of the greater in what lies beyond” the Mother of God is the summit and full expression of all things holy that can be known in creation (Palamas 2009, 439). He sees her role as mediating the old carnal Israel and the new spiritual one, the Church, i.e., the created natural and the uncreated supernatural. “She alone was shown to be the natural mother of God in a supernatural way” (Palamas 2009, 417). The creaturely mirror of the Most High, she herself mediates in conjunction with the divine Mediator, who came into creation through her. Again, in accordance with that “eternal law in heaven” while we aspire to the holiness that she expresses to a greater degree, she herself has the root of her holiness in her greater Son that she mirrors and transmits to us. For Palamas: “She alone forms the boundary between the created and uncreated nature, and no one can come to God except through her and the mediator born of her, and none of God’s gifts can be bestowed on angels or men through her” (Palamas 2009, 431). What is striking in Gregory’s understanding of The Theotokos is how she bypassed the stages of praktiki (the practice of the virtues, or purification) and of physiki (the contemplation of God in nature, or illumination) and moved directly into theologia (the contemplation of God Himself, or glorification). As such, the Mother of God is the foremost mystical theologian that embodies and precedes all others in excellence. Her privileged access to the knowledge of God is more than noetic, for knowing God also is to have loving communion with Him and to pray that all creation be restored and glorified in Him. In this she is the true theologian who prays truly. And, for this, she was carefully prepared in God’s providence. Nevertheless, her election required her free consent in faith and obedience to live as one who is elect in consonance with the truth of her existence, namely, to magnify the divine presence throughout creation. In his second sermon on her “Entry into the Holy of Holies,” St. Gregory advances a peculiar account of the creation story that finds a place for the Theotokos. As he conceives the story, God created living things, but only man among them was distinguished by the fact that he had a mind. As a consequence of his specific difference in regard to all else made by God, man alone, “if he wishes,” can seek to become God and have his “humble body” exalted in the process. Indeed it was for man that God created all things, but “as the human race progressed, there was no one able to contain God, as the situation demanded” (Palamas 2009, 416). The need of mankind for God was great and so He willed to bring into creation someone “capable of holding the fullness of the Godhead bodily

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and …. to bring Him to birth and to form for all men, before and after her time, ties of kinship with God” (Palamas 2009, 416). In other words, the unique spiritual constitution of human being, i.e., the fact of being created imago Dei, implied a yearning for a corporal existence able to conform to the self-donating supernatural presence that abides in man. For His part, God yearns to deify that very existence and to be in communion with His human creation. For this, in His divine Providence, He brings forth a human mediator worthy to bear His divine reality and to deliver into the course of history His Incarnate Word. It will be an expression at once of His infinite love for man and His will to restore his capacity to relate to Him, i.e., to restore man to his original state of affiliation with God the Father. “Standing between God and every race of men, she made God the Son of man, and men the sons of God” (Palamas 2009, 417). In effect, through the Virgin Mary, God inaugurates a second creation: if the first day of the first creation was that of light to be diffused throughout all that was made, in the second creation we have a preordaining of a human dwelling-place for the one through whom all was made and who will be as a lamp-stand for the divine light newly given for the salvation of man. Just as the material with which lamp filters the light that is produced with it, it is through the materiality of the Virgin that those who seek communion with God may approach His light and truly know Him, “those who long for the outpouring of light and the granting of indescribable divine graces which come through her” (ibid). Those who abide in the light, participating thus in the divine energies, and undergo a transformation and become light themselves, reflecting thus the uncreated radiance of God, as in the Taboric light and the Transfiguration of Christ. Nobility in accordance with nature and the flesh is one thing; nobility by God’s grace is quite another. The notion of literally being high born through grace is thematically central throughout St. Gregory’s meditations on the Mother of God. It will also say a great deal about the monastic vocation and the way to divine adoption, about those who are pure of heart and are able to discern that which comes from God. “The Virgin … has a soul synonymous with everything good and truly noble, which she guards in a perfectly pure body and which appears from without to those who see as we do, but is known from within to the discerning spirit of prophecy” (Palamas 2009, 432). In his sermon “On the Nativity of the Mother of God” and the first one dedicated to the Virgin’s entry into the Holy of Holies, Palamas centres much of his attention on the special kind of noble lineage of which she is the culminating figure: since a tree is known by its fruit and since the Virgin Mary is good beyond compare, then the “tree” that bore her would

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also have its roots in the living God, who is goodness itself. This goodness, having the character of holiness, is most immediately situated in the persons of Mary’s own parents, Joachim and Anna. Descendants of David, they were childless into old age, but, due to their devotedness to the Lord and in consonance with a pattern well established in Hebrew Scripture, they were granted the special blessing of parenting a child who will be decisive in God’s plan of salvation. In describing Joachim and Anna as being “superior in virtue” and having “nobility of character,” Palamas draws on the Protoevangelium of James to bring to the fore their spiritual worthiness as parents of the Mother of God. Here again, the intent is to bring into focus the eternal law of heaven, operative and namely in relation to the virtues associated with the sanctity sought after in the monastic context (chastity, ascetical practices, prayer). Palamas presents his idea in a daring conceit, by which the virginity that Mary would eventually exemplify stands as a reflection of that of God the Father: So those without children were preferred to those with many, that the Daughter with all virtues might be born of highly virtuous parents, the Allpure of those who were exceedingly chaste, and that chastity, conceiving through prayer and asceticism, might, as a consequence, become the mother of virginity, virginity which would bring forth without corruption the divinity begotten of the virgin Father before all ages (Palamas 2009, 336).

It is, however, in the first sermon “On the Entry into the Holy of Holies,” that we find a more explicit presentation of “the starting-point of God’s election” of the Virgin’s preparation to receive the Incarnate Word and to become the new Eve for humankind. Indeed, the line stemming from the first couple has to be reconstituted and given a new consistency. Once again, the new humanity that will come forth by, in and through the Virgin’s divine Son will possess those qualities that will appear in the Mother of God and is cultivated in the monastic life. These will serve as criteria for all followers of Christ who wish to attain theologia. In following the descending genealogy that Luke provides for Jesus, Palamas locates the point from which God will reinitiate the restoration of creation in the birth of the “excellent” Seth. Now, Seth is distinguished by “his orderly conduct, his control over his senses and his magnificent virtue,” i.e., his dispassion (apatheia) and watchfulness (nepsis)” (Palamas 2009, 410). However badly matters provisionally turned (cf. Genesis 6), Seth, who was God’s compensation to Adam and Eve for the loss of Abel,

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is a type of Christ’s Resurrection, for he overcomes the violent way of Cain.2 But whilst Christ will raise up Adam, Seth did not do the same for Abel. Nevertheless in anticipation of those things that will happen through Mary, a son was born to Seth, Enos, who hoped in the Lord and called upon Him. Thus, situated in the line of Seth’s descendents, “worthy, in hope, of divine adoption,” and in accordance with God’s foreknowledge, God’s providential grace saw to it that the hope of Israel will progress discretely through the king and prophet David unto Joachim and Anna: “They were childless, but lived chastely together and were more virtuous than all those who traced back their noble descent and character to David” (Palamas 2009, 411). Pre-ordained in God’s plan to restore creation and, thus, a gift from God even before she was born, she was received by Joachim and Anna as a gift in answer to their prayers for a child. But they would make of Mary a gift in return, i.e., a gift of the gift, for she was given over to the Temple at three years of age, shortly after being weaned. Always interweaving the narrative details of the Protoevangelium with implicit references to the high calling to the monastic life and hesychast spirituality, Palamas underscores Mary’s preference for the Temple and to its High Priest in lieu of her parents and the distracting joys of the natural world. Indeed, he comments that her exemplariness is such that she can be noted to be the first and only person who willingly forsake the world - for the sake of the world - from an infant age and to dedicate herself entirely to unceasing prayer, turning within herself, dwelling in holy quietness, and in “our life’s upper room”. It is, again, as if the child Mary passed immediately into theologia, into having a direct knowledge of God without any concern of acquiring that purity of heart that would enable her to contemplate the presence of the Creator in the order of nature: “The Virgin … could not turn her eyes upon any of these natural wonders (she was not old enough), yet she understood God, and rejoiced as she was brought to Him” (Palamas 2009, 426-427). If this distinguishes the Virgin from all those elected by God throughout the ages, she also serves as pointing to a divine knowledge that is beyond that contemplated in philosophy and the recourse to analogical reasoning. With some parallel to one of the themes that provoked the controversy he had with Barlaam, Palamas grants that first philosophy, which seeks to discern universal principles, even a first principle, free from the contingency of matter, has some merit, but it still ignores a higher, mystical vision of God, one that transcends mere discursive speculation. “Saying something about God is 2 “The name Seth can be interpreted to mean ‘resurrection’, or, ‘a rising up from’, which actually refers to the Lord, Who promises and gives everlasting life to those who believe in Him” (ibid, p. 411).

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not the same as encountering God” (Palamas 2009, 437). For our purposes, we acknowledge that the Mother of God enjoyed such an encounter of the most immediate kind; her purity made her a perfect human vehicle for the Incarnate Word, whom she will know as such; and her knowledge of God takes the form of a living communion. In the example of the Virgin, “… we attain to that unknowing which lies beyond knowledge, that is to say, above every kind of much-vaunted philosophy, even though the purpose of the most excellent part of philosophy is knowledge” (Palamas 2009, 437). The Virgin’s entry into the Holy of Holies, into the innermost sanctuary, the place where God is encountered, is conjoined with the paradox that she herself becomes the antitype of the temporal Holy of Holies as conceived by Israel. Everything about her is magnified, because the God who makes His abode in her also makes her the Holy of Holies in whom humankind might find her motherly comfort and protection. In order to describe the nature of this intimacy between Mother and Son, Palamas advances a striking image in regard to the Virgin’s conception of the Son of God by the Holy Spirit: “There was nothing between the One overshadowing and the one overshadowed, not air, either earthly or heavenly, nor anything perceptible or beyond our perception” (Palamas 2009, 434). And precisely because there is nothing between the Holy Spirit and the Virgin, what takes shape in the womb of the Virgin is the Word of God that is being communicated by the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father. She is called Mother of God, because she contains God in her human body. We have seen how God fashioned her through is providential grace; now she fashions God in a human form and flesh that will be physically present for men to see and touch the immaterial reality of the Son in His bodily matter. In explicating the divine reality being magnified in the Virgin Mary, Palamas conceives of God establishing her as “an icon of everything good” an expression of such beauty on display for both the angels in heaven and mankind on earth, that both dimensions of reality are thereby enhanced. The model for the theologian who prays truly, the Virgin sought God in the inner sanctuary, the spiritual Holy of Holies, having freed herself from the seduction of the exterior world. Thinking in terms of the hesychast method of prayer, Palamas proposes that she “united her mind with its inclination to turn within itself, with attention and unceasing holy prayer” (Palamas 2009, 441). Otherwise put, the mind is guided into the heart that directs the entire organism and, through unceasing prayer, allows grace to gain possession of the heart. Grace (or the uncreated energies) reigns over all thoughts and members of the body; subject to the Spirit, a

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power is recalled from within the purified heart becoming itself a dwelling (Ark, Tabernacle, etc..) of God, who is at once circumscribed and magnified in it. St. Gregory’s poetic and spiritual exploration of the Protoevangelium, attributed to St. James, in regard to the Virgin’s entry into the Temple from a very early age clearly means to situate the hesychast vocation within the parameters of her own union with her divine Son. Her body was made capable for receiving and being deified by God. Over against Barlaam’s objections concerning this kind of knowledge in the bodily life of man, St. Gregory argues that this is precisely the aim of the hesychast method of prayer: the transformation of the body by uncreated grace. From the Triads, we read: “...those who have elevated their souls with divine longing, their flesh also is being transformed and elevated, participating together with the soul in the divine communion, and becoming itself a dwelling and possession of God; for it is no longer the seat of enmity towards God, and no longer possesses desires contrary to the Spirit” (Palamas 1983, I,ii,9). What is persistently at issue in St. Gregory’s advocacy of hesychast spirituality is the full reality of the Incarnation.3 From this point of view, we can understand his preference in proposing the Virgin Mary as a model of mystical ascent in lieu of figures like Moses, who is honoured but whose spiritual knowledge cannot match hers. “She ran towards God with unrestrained love and persevered on her own in the inner sanctuary, as though continuously ministering to God in an indescribable way. Nothing of the sort ever happened to Moses” Palamas 2009, 426). In the continuation of this passage, St. Gregory assigns to Moses the role of prefiguring the Mother of God: “... after turning his attention to virtue and struggling to acquire it, and after going up the mountain to God, [Moses] was deemed worthy to be initiated into the signs prefiguring the Virgin, and ceaselessly assisted in the preparation for her”. As Meyendorff sees it, this comparison is remarkable for it brings out the way St. Gregory takes a different path than the one established by Origen, namely, one that sees Moses ascending the mountain as the pattern of spiritual growth in Christ. To have put Mary in that role is truly remarkable. In following the Virgin 3 The true dimension of St. Gregory Palamas’s theological efforts is nicely stated by John Meyendorff: “For it was the Christian faith itself, and not just one form of spirituality, which he felt himself to be defending in his Triads in Defence of the Hesychasts” Meyendorf: 1964, 134). Meyendorff will go on to emphasise the theme of the Incarnation at the centre of St. Gregory’s responses to Barlaam on the subject of the body. Barlaam’s position is, according to Meyendorff, based on a Platonic underestimation of the importance of the body in knowing spiritual reality.

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in her total self-giving to God, even unto consenting to be His Mother, the hesychasts practice their spirituality as a way to attain the sanctifying and deifying grace given in the Incarnation, an event that altered substantially our knowledge of God, an event and reality made possible by the Mother of God. In relation particularly to the flesh, the Virgin’ s bearing of the divine Christ gives to it a potential for transformation and eternal life. The human body becomes intimately identified with the site from where Christ is acting from within His creation in order to redeem it and raise humankind into a deified state. Following the tradition established by Macarius, St. Gregory maintains that our rational, incorporeal power is conjoined to us in the controlling organ of the heart. Here, the inner quiet attained by the hesychasts is fruitful in sounding the depths of the experience to the extent that in hesychia they “gather together the mind and enclose it in the body, especially in that ‘body’ most interior to the body, which we call the heart” (Palamas 1983, I.ii.3). In noteworthy consonance with what Michel Henry has tried to communicate to contemporary philosophers, according to St. Gregory, it is “the greatest of Hellenic errors” to have encouraged the mind to go “out of the body itself with the aim of contemplating intellectual visions” (Palamas 1983, I.ii..4); this has only led to heresy and folly – like that manifested by Barlaam. Rather the mind is to be recollected within the body and within the dynamics of its own selftranscending activity. This properly spiritual activity acquires a momentum of its own, i.e., it does not derive causally from the body. Generating its own power, it penetrates “the body from the mind, in order to transform the body into something better and to deify it by these actions and passions” that are common to both body and soul (Palamas 1983, II.ii.5). The yearning struggle for the divine bears with it the purification of the faculties belonging to the whole of human being, body and soul; it is man in his entirety that receives the grace of deification and shares the divine light. Indeed, the attaining of theology, i.e., the experience of contemplating God, made possible by a “spiritual light,” “an energy of the Superessential,” at once transcending sense perception yet transforming it (Palamas 1983, III.ii.14). With the Virgin serving the primary example, Palamas proposes that “… anyone fortunate enough to attain to the divine energy, and to undergo divine transformation, himself becomes completely like the light, and by means of the light sees clearly things which, were it not for this great and inexpressible grace would be invisible to all … ” (Palamas 2009, 442). The energy, the divine light, that - as exemplified in the Transfiguration - Christ possesses by nature communicates to composite

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human beings the possibility of deification by grace. In a sermon dedicated to the dispensation accorded to the flesh for those who believe in Christ, St. Gregory teaches that, to realise the new life God sought to bring to humankind, He could not be born in a natural way, i.e., “He could not have made His flesh an inexhaustible source of sanctification, with abundant power to wash away the defilement of our First Parents, and sufficient to sanctify everyone who came after Him” (Palamas 2009, 118). The hesychast life of prayer endeavours precisely to follow Christ in the hope of incorruptible life, moreover the hope of Christians tout court. But, in consonance with St. Gregory’s understanding of the Virgin’s example for the monks on Mount Athos, the specific intention of hesychast spirituality is to direct our mind and will to the Kingdom within, i.e., the incorporeal circumscribed in the body with the power to penetrate and organise matter. It is, after all, living matter, and, on that basis, can acquire, with the “visitation of divine grace” and the intercession of the Theotokos, a form of life capable of union with Christ. The Mother of God represents a singular exemplification of capax Dei. Yet the effects of the Incarnation made possible through her consent are transubstantiating, as Palamas’s homily “On the Holy and Dread Mysteries of Christ,” suggests. Sharing the same flesh and blood with us, becoming like us, He is our Brother and Redeemer. But the full benefit will come in the Eucharistic participation in His body and blood and our transformation not only in terms of being in God’s image, but – in accordance with His invitation – in the clothing of us in Him, the King and God of heaven, thus being transformed into a delightful dwelling place for the sublime Trinity. Our body becomes His Body, our potential, that power that comes to us through participating in the sacramental life of the Church, effectively His Body and figured in the Mother of God. Grace can transport us into a shared corporality in and with the Body of Christ, our divine affiliation restored and assured, ultimately deified. Or otherwise expressed and in accordance with the terms implied in Spinoza’s question, the body has – like the body of the Theotokos containing the uncontainable – differentiable quantities of divine grace that distinguishes it from other existent beings and prepares it for the freedom of the sons of God. It underscores the possibility of self-transcending life, sustained by the coinherence of the life of the uncreated and that of the created – or even the transforming of the created energies into the uncreated by grace.

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Works Cited Meyendorff, John 1963, The Study of Gregory Palamas, The Faith Press, London. —. 1974, St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodoxy Spirituality, St. Vladimir’s Seminary, Crestwood. Palamas, Saint Gregory 1983, Gregory Palamas: The Triads, edited by John Meyendorff, The Paulist Press, Mahwah, N.J.. —. 2009, The Homilies, Mount Thabor Publishing. Waymart, Pa. Pelikan, Jaroslav 1974, The Christian Tradition: The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600- 1700), volume 2, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Spinoza, Benedict 2001, Ethics, Wordsworth Editions. London.

THE OPEN HISTORY AND ITS ENEMIES: UNITY OF GOD AND CONCEPT OF HISTORY IN GREGORY PALAMAS AND THOMAS AQUINAS REV. PROFESSOR NIKOLAOS LOUDOVIKOS

Introduction Is it legitimate to claim that there exists a deep relationship between the way God’s unity is understood, and the concept of History that this way probably implies? History is man’s history, or, better, man is history, but man’s understanding of both his selfhood and his works, or, in other words, of his historicity, is, unavoidably, closely bound to his understanding of God’s being – not because Feuerbach was right in claiming that the Absolute is an attribute of human consciousness, but because, in our Western world, man ever understood his self only as an image of and in reference to the Absolute. So it seems that this implication is plausible. But if this is true, then two different theological ways of thinking of History are respectively inaugurated, as I am going to argue, through the work of Gregory Palamas and Thomas Aquinas. Can we combine them? But let us first try to spell them out, starting, of course, with a theological evaluation of the essence-energies distinction, which is relevant to our subject.

1. The Textual Evidence in Palamas Our initial preoccupation here is not so much to examine the legitimacy of the distinction between essence and energies in Gregory Palamas’ work, but rather to try to answer the question concerning whether God’s unity is somehow affected by this distinction. In Palamas’ vocabulary, however, this distinction does not compromise either the divine unity or the divine simplicity, as it only means that, non paradoxically, divinity is not exhaustively expressed in its communion with creation, although it is precisely divinity in its totality that comes in communion with beings or, in other words, that God is always

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inexhaustible in his essential expressions ad extra. The reason for this is that for Palamas there is a fundamental ontological identity between essence and energies, which it is absolutely necessary to know if we want to avoid any separate ontologization of the latter. So it is clear that for Gregory, through the distinction between essence and energies, it is the very divinity of God that becomes “participated in and non participated in at the same time, so that we participate in the divine essence and we do not participate in it”.1 In this way, “when you hear the fathers calling the divine essence non participated in (ĮȝȑșİțIJȠȞ), think that they mean essence as it is in itself, without expressing itself to the world. When you hear them calling it participated in (ȝİșİțIJȒȞ) think that they thus mean the procession and the expression and the energy, which pre-exists in God (…) But if you think that, through this energy, it is the very divine essence that expresses itself, even not thoroughly, you are not out of the terms of piety…”.2 Thus, Palamas asserts that “it is possible to use the name of divine essence even for the energies”, and “it is impossible to consider energies as sorts of natures or beings different from the essence”.3 This is an answer for all who accuse him of creating some more or less particular “beings”, separated from divine essence, which are called energies and remind us of those intermediary semi-godly beings, called “henads” by the Neoplatonists, or of establishing a formal distinction between essence and energy. But for Gregory, divine energy can be called by the same term as divine essence, as it has the same essential characteristics with it, while it can be called differently as far as they represent different aspects of the one divinity.4 In other words, “the name God is common for divine essence and divine power and energy along with divine hypostases”,5 as Palamas finally avers; how could it be possible for anyone who knows these texts to admit that he compromises divine unity or simplicity by distinguishing energies from essence? So, “as the hypostatic idioms belong to the hypostases, without being hypostases themselves, in the same way the essential attributes [i.e., the energies] belong to essence without being completely identical to it”.6 Furthermore, God in his wholeness of divinity is present in each one of the 1 Theophanes, 13. 2 Theophanes, 17. 3 Against Acindynus, 2, 17, 86; 2, 14, 63; 3, 13, 42. 4 Op. cit., 3, 13, 45. 5 Op. cit., 5, 3, 7. See also Chapters 150, 135: “divine energy and divine essence belong to one God, or rather they are the same one God”. 6 Op. cit., 3, 13, 48.

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energies and, consequently, anyone who participates in any of these energies participates truly in God as he is;7 this is because in each energy “there is God in his wholeness being present in his creatures, imparting himself to them and absolutely participated in, according to the image of the sunbeam, in a little part of which we can see the sun in its wholeness”.8 Thus, for Palamas, it is not necessary to identify divine energies with divine essence, in order to establish God’s unity. Energies are ontologically one with divine essence, and their distinction, “made by mind”,9 rather signifies God’s unity and real presence in creation. In a way, the Palamite God needs this distinction in order to make his unity apparent in creation, because, as Gregory says, the energy is a natural symbol of God’s essence (and natural here means of the same essence with him, as the beam is a natural symbol of the sun). Thus, God’s energy, expresses the very unity of God’s essence ad extra, in the most perfect way – it is precisely through this distinction between divine essence and uncreated energies, each one of them expressing the Triune God, i.e., the Father acting in the Son through the Spirit, that the unity of the ad extra activities of God with God’s existence per se is made manifest.

2. Thomas Aquinas The basic construction of Thomistic metaphysics, in particular concerning the articulation of his onto-theo-logic has, in my approach, to be initially sought in Summa Contra Gentiles. Let us try to read this work, trying to find assertions that bring us closer to the subject of this essay. So, in ScG I, 45, 6 we read: “every substance exists for the sake of its operation. If, then, the operation of God is other than the divine substance, the end of God will be something other than God, thus God will not be His goodness, since the good of each thing is its end” – for the same reason even “the primary and essential object of God’s intellect is nothing other than Himself” (ScG I, 48). It thus seems at first sight obvious that it is impossible for this theo-logic to admit any divine act/operation/energy going ad extra, as this would mean composition in God, in the sense that there is a potency in him, acting not through His essence but through participation in something outside Him. For strong onto-theo-logical 7 Op. cit., 5, 27, 114. 8 Op. cit., 5, 26, 110. 9 See Irenej Boulovich, The Mystery of Essence-Energies Distinction in the Holy Trinity according to St. Markus Eugenicus, Patriarchal Institute of Patristic Studies, Thessaloniki1983, (in Greek), pp.153-159.

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reasons, God cannot enter the being of other beings, and “He knows other beings as seen in His essence” (ScG I, 49, 5). His active power is totally identical to His essence, because Thomas’ theo-logic demands that any possibility of distinction between essence and will in God is onto-logically unacceptable. The only moment where this postulate seems to have been forgotten, namely in ScG II, 1, where a distinction between an internal and an external operation in God seems possible, is very quickly covered by theo-logical assertions of the aforementioned type. Is finally Thomas for or against such a distinction? Thus, “God’s will is His essence”, since “God’s being does not need superadded perfection” (ScG I, 73, 3). In different case, divine essence would relate to the will as potency to act, creating composition in God (ScG I, 73, 5). Moreover, “the will is the intellect” (ScG I, 72, 3), says Aquinas following Aristotle, and so, “the principle object of the divine will is the divine essence. If the principal object of the divine will is different from the divine essence, it will follow that there is something higher than the divine will moving it” (ScG I, 74, 3). Thomas claims that God wills beings through the will for His being, that is, by willing and loving Himself, or, in other words, that God wills everything through Himself and by willing Himself. It is precisely because of this onto-theo-logic that Thomas adopts his famous position concerning participation of beings in God through likeness (ScG I, 75, 4) – the only perhaps way to describe participation in God without metaphysically disturbing his onto-logical unity. Because of this absence of any strong theoretical possibility of distinction between essence and will/power/action, after and along with the onto-theo-logical assertion of their identity, it is clear that for Thomas God’s external relations “have no real being in God” (ScG II, 12, 3). That means that these relations refer to God only “in accordance with our manner of understanding” (ScG II, 13-14). Besides, in the same perspective, and “as the ultimate end of things is to become like God” (ScG III, 19) this can be only achieved by imitation of his goodness (ScG III, 20), in the sense that the creatures “participate somewhat in His likeness” (ScG III, 25, 1). It is clear that here participation seems, at first sight, to be metaphysically restricted to a merely human act. This is the theo-logic of participation; but this is not all that Thomas has to say about participation. As I have argued elsewhere, there exists in the Summa Theologica, a sort of contradiction, which seems to suspend the above onto-theo-logic for the sake of a more entire theory of participation, where a full distinction between essence and energies in God is introduced, and this makes us think of a possible “Palamite” completion of Thomas’ theory of

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participation. I do not ignore that, for many contemporary Thomist scholars, all the above assertions already mean Aquinas’ intention to construct a theory of participation, which wants to be as radical as that claimed by the pro-Palamites, but the almost absolute prevalence of his onto-theo-logical preoccupations, do not help Aquinas to articulate convincingly such an existential reality. Thus, it is clear that another reading of Aquinas is needed – and not only for the Orthodox – where all of his onto-theo-logical claims above can remain valid, (because God’s internal unity of essence and energy does not necessarily mean that He does not act for the sake of His creatures) provided that a solution is found concerning his lack of an explicit and solid ontological formulation of this distinction-in-unity between essence and energies, beyond any conventional philosophical metaphysics. That was precisely the way all the great Orthodox theologians, from the centuries of the Turkish domination, from Gennadios Scholarios on the 15th century to Vikentios Damodos on the 18th century, read and accepted Thomas’ metaphysics, minus his inability to convincingly make a distinction between essence and energies. In my view, this can happen only if Thomas’ claims and contradictions are read precisely in the perspective of the Greek and Palamite essence-energies distinction. In this “Palamite” reading of Aquinas, all of his onto-theo-logic can be accepted, provided that, in a second step, a clear tropal [modal] distinction between divine essence and energies is made: divine energies, though absolutely metaphysically united with divine essence, represent the tropos [mode] of existence of divine essence ad extra. I am not sure that Thomas would necessarily disagree with such an interpretation of his theological intentions. But this reading is not yet accepted (or even perhaps understood) by the Thomists, and, consequently, the Thomist account of participation seems still non convincing for those Orthodox, who are aware of the Greek Patristic tradition on this subject. Now, how can we describe the – still – two accounts of God’s unity above, regarding the sort of participation that they imply?

3. The two accounts compared It seems that what we have before our eyes are two different conceptions of analogy. The Palamite view is the traditional Greek Patristic understanding of analogy as an analogical act between ontologically different beings. Analogy here always means a synergetic dialogical reciprocity, where these beings come into communion thoroughly, not only intellectually, and “energy” is the circulating gift of love between

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them – created energy in unconfused commixture (ĮȞȐțȡĮıȚȢ is the Greek word used by Palamas) with uncreated energy. This dialogical reciprocity culminates and is ultimately expressed in the eschatological, enhypostatic formation of human nature in Christ, by the Spirit. As we have already said, Thomas has difficulties in convincingly and explicitly articulating this distinction-in-identity between the active will and the essence of God, which could sustain a really dialogical constitution of created beings, through the energetic outlet of divine will. Divine will, as logos and energy, creates, for Palamas, its dia-logos and syn-energy, i.e., created essence, recapitulated in human essential (willing and acting) hypostasis. All this ontology of dialogical reciprocity, initially developed by some of Palamas’ favorite teachers, such as Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor, remained, as it seems, in its details, alien to Thomas.10 Thomist analogy can hardly be called really dialogical (i.e., based upon a dialogical understanding of divine energy as the external tropos of divine essence, participated in by human beings through their respective created energies, which are the external manifestation or tropos of existence of human essence), and it gives the impression of a, more or less, monological analogy of similitude, as I have called it elsewhere (i.e., a dictated and restricted participation, passive on the part of beings, and without “real being” in God) although Thomas really strove to create an ontology of participation and communion between beings and God. In conclusion, while for Palamas it is not necessary to existentially, or, better, tropally, (i.e., according to their tropos-mode of existence ad extra) identify divine energies with the divine essence in order to speak of God’s unity, for Aquinas, on the contrary, this onto-logical identification seems unavoidable and sufficient (union of God implies an inexorable, not only metaphysical but also ontological identity between essence and energy in God), although Thomas also tried, in STh, not without contradictions, to go further. As it has become clear from our little investigation above, Palamas would agree with this metaphysical identification, under the condition of an existential (tropal) distinction between essence and energies, in a second step, against any such ontological restriction. Thus, the Palamite God is able, without disturbing His unity, to be really present within His creation and to allow real participation to His creatures, while the Aquinatian proposal concerning participation seems inadequate. In other words, concerning participation, Palamas is a substantially better Aquinas. 10 See my Eucharistic Ontology: Maximus the Confessor’s Eschatological Ontology of being as Dialogical Reciprocity, Holy Cross Press, Brookline, Mass., 2010, cf. ch. 6.

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4. The Implications We are now reaching the very core of our subject. Through their specific understanding of analogy, either as dialogical syn-energy or as monological similitude, Aquinas and Palamas also differ in their concept of history, as this can be inferred from their work. David Bradshaw in his interesting book Aristotle, East and West11 uses here the term synergism. It was not very difficult for one of his most interesting critics, Antoine Lévy, to show that there also exists a sort of synergism in Aquinas’ work.12 Far from understanding synergy as an ontological fusion of divine and human energies, Lévy concludes by asserting that “dealing with the principles of cosmic order and deifying grace, the Greek Fathers and Thomas equally believe that participation without confusion rests on efficient causality”.13 For him: “[T]his means that the elect are not deprived of their own natural energeia. They freely use it to welcome the divine one, so that this divine energeia might raise their own created energeiai far above their natural limits, allowing limited minds to contemplate an infinite Reality. This indwelling of God in human beings is therefore described as a circular or perichoretic chain of energeia and pathos, perfective actio and perfected passio, generated by the causal influx of God and implying the free will of the creatures. The elect are able to see God as long as their intellectual faculty is raised to supernatural level of activity under the influx of the divine energeia. This circular synergy, manifesting the uninterrupted movement of God’s energeia which pours forth from the divine essence towards the elect and comes back to its source through their contemplation, does not involve a blending between the uncreated energeia of God and the created energeiai of the creatures at any stage”. 14

This circular synergy is determined by what Lévy calls the Porphyrian Principle, which Bradshaw attributes only to Palamas, while Lévy attributes it both to Palamas and Aquinas. This principle is described by Lévy as follows: “The fact that the intelligible substance A affects the material substance B through its own energeia induces relationship from B to A, but no

11 David Bradshaw Aristotle, East and West, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 12 Antoine Lévy, “An Introduction to Divine Relativity: Beyond David Bradshaw’s Aristotle East and West”, in The Thomist 72 (2008), pp. 173-231, pp183 ff. 13 Ibid, p.189. 14 Ibid, p. 188.

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relationship from A to B. A remains absolute, askhetos, at the very moment where it affects relatively, en skhesei, B. We will designate this asymmetrical system of causation which Porphyry derives from Plotinus, as the Porphyrian Principle”.15

I have some points to make here: first, I agree with Lévy that a sort of synergy is unquestionably present both in Palamas’ and Thomas’ understanding of participation, but the question is how they understand it. I am not absolutely sure that Bradshaw is right when he unreservedly applies the Porphyrian Principle to Palamas, while Lévy applies it to both Palamas and Aquinas; however, in my view, this principle can only be unreservedly applied to Aquinas. While Palamas fervently insists throughout his work, that, through His energies, God, really “gets out from himself” in order to meet the created otherness outside him, Aquinas, on the contrary, insists, in the third part of the Summa Theologica (q. 2, a. 7), that any relation between God and the creature really exists only in the creature, as we have said, as coming from the change which affects the creature, but this does not exist really in God. On the contrary, this relationship really exists in human being precisely because this being is created – therefore we can say that this relation of union is something created (quoddam creatum). What is curious enough is that Thomas describes this kind of created relationship of the creature with God as a non real one, on his part: “therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature, whereas in creatures there is a real relationship to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on God” (STh, I, 28, 1, r. to obj. 3). Second, it is, consequently, obvious that this relationship cannot be defined as clearly dialogical, since it seems to be formed as a passive submission to divine efficient causality: the divine energeia “comes back to its source through their (the elect's) contemplation” – not a word for the Palamite ĮȞȐțȡĮıȚȢ, commixture, which, on the contrary, seems to imply a sort of double participation, or, better, an unconfused perichoresis between created and uncreated energies, which puts them in analogical interaction: the former changes into the latter according to the latter’s mode of existence, while, at the same time, the creature is given a totally specific way of participation according to his particular selfhood and otherness. God remains God and man remains a specific man, and God’s act promotes analogically man’s particular selfhood, changing it into uncreated by grace, while this particularity is left intact. Third, and consequently, as Lévy along with Aquinas insist, God’s 15 Ibid, p.200.

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uncreated energy is transformed into created energy, when it reaches the creature, because: “[I]f the partakers undergo the perfective influence of this unique energeia according to their own finite dimensions, why should not the unique, infinite and absolute energeia of God be described here as simultaneously finite and transient? It is indeed such, insofar as its praxis, that is, its creative and deifying action, is limited”.16

This last claim is the natural upshot of the second. A non dialogical, dictated, limited and unilateral synergism results to an unreal synergism. I call an unreal synergism, the synergism where one of the two energies finally loses its full reality in its communion with the other. By being changed into created, (even if it remains supernatural) when it reaches the creatures, the divine grace is no more a divine grace, but only a human participation in it, or the “supernatural” created version/similitude of it. It may also perhaps be understood, as we can say using Husserl’s phenomenological terminology, as its representation in human transcendental individual consciousness. But why can’t we say that human participation in that grace is also uncreated, precisely through the power of that grace, as Palamas and a whole swarm of Greek Fathers aver? Do we participate really in God as he is, if, after having participated in his divine energy/grace, we change it into a supernatural created similitude of his grace? On the other hand, do we not thus change in us God into a created metaphysical entity, assimilating him in the limits of our – ultimately – non transforming participation? And, furthermore, does not this God ultimately thus deprive created beings from his full divine presence, giving them only a created similitude of him instead? And what sort of understanding of History does this unreal and nondialogical understanding of synergy imply? It is undoubtedly true that, despite the shortcomings, a relationship/participation between man and God, even unreal for the one of its parts, or not completely dialogical, is present in Thomas. The problem is that an antagonistic conception of History can thus be inaugurated. Since, for Aquinas, God’s unity is produced solely through his inner self-assertion, without a real manifestation of it through a really syn-energetic relationship with the creatures in a commixture of energies, the latter struggle to get in a real skhesis with him as he is, and, as this seems impossible to happen as anakrasis/commixture, it results to an incessant historical activity of external and remote imitation of God – which, after the rise of modern 16 Ibid, p. 193.

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atheism, (this impossibility of fully real relationship with God, being perhaps one of its causes), tends even to forget its object of imitation. The historicization of eschatology, the secularization of God’s Kingdom, as it started with Joachim of Flora and culminated in Hegel and Schelling, the birth of human subjectivity as the Second Absolute, in Karl Jaspers’ terms, are perhaps the secularized version of the above theological positions. The created son antagonizes the uncreated Father, in his detached selfunification, self-sufficiency and self-fulfilment. The created son creates unreal and non dialogical relationships with the rest of creatures. The created son abolishes reciprocity and dictates the other’s otherness. Of course this is not what Thomas wanted to say – but can’t we say that this was a flaw or a shortcoming of his way of theologizing? By using the concept of the tropos- mode of existence, which Maximus has transferred from Trinitarian theology to Soteriology, Palamas is able to describe how there exists a possibility of reciprocal openness between created and uncreated through their energies, without their identity, or their energies’ identity, being confused.17 God the Father, through his Son, in the Spirit, acts, and through his energies he assumes his creatures through their own energies, changing the latter’s (not essence but) mode of existence into his tropos-mode of existence, as the latter is externally expressed through the divine energies. What we thus have, are particular created persons tropally acting as uncreated, according to the uncreated agent who assumes them, without their created substance being abolished – created energies thus become, through an anakrasis/commixture with divine energies, without confusion, charismata of the Spirit, and not merely human created events or feelings or anything similar. Thus, against Lévy’s description of the divine energies as becoming “finite and transient” through their contact with created beings, it is, on the contrary (in Maximus and Palamas), precisely those “finite and transient” energies of the creatures that finally become, by grace and not by nature, tropally and dialogically uncreated. Created beings can thus act as uncreated through the anakrasis of their created energies with the divine energies. The West seems still unable to fathom this deep Maximian theological position, of which Palamas is an inheritor. The mystery of this mutual indwelling of created and uncreated via their respective energies, cannot be fully described in Thomist terms, without a recourse to a Maximian/Palamite terminology, though it clearly derives from the Chalcedonian dyo-theletic and dyo-energetic Christology. Synergy in a Palamite perspective is real and dialogical – not only man relates to God

17 See my Eucharistic Ontology…, ch.II,7.

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but God also relates to man, in a real dialogical reciprocity, where creation can be really transformed into uncreated, without any alteration of substances. That means that there exists, at least for Maximus and Palamas, a possibility for a really Eucharistic understanding of History, i.e., for an understanding of History as Truth, in Paul Ricœur’s terms, to wit, as a finally sacred history,18 where historical development is not destined to affirm an antagonistic will to power, but a dialogical reciprocity between man and God. It is true, on the other hand that, as Lévy avers, the Palamite perspective did not find, or has not yet found its way to history, but it is not, as I think, a waste of time to try to spell out, theoretically, this model of historicity, in contradistinction to its Aquinatian more historically successful paradigm- especially in its secular form, as we are going to see later on. I will make the following points: A. Aquinas makes a distinction within God’s act, between the effectus naturae and the effectus gratiae.19 The former has to do with making creation out of nothing, where creatures are given their proper natures, while the latter does not belong to nature, but it is an additional, supernatural gift, which is given in order for a creature to reach his Creator, beyond his natural limits. For Aquinas, grace thus means the way God gives himself to a creature, in history, after (and not simultaneously with) the gift of being: he gives a likeness of divine being to be participated in by his creatures. In a Palamite perspective, this would result in a serious separation between nature and grace, or creation and history, because nature is not then already, from the beginning, in the order of grace, not clearly existing in and through grace, and that means that history can perhaps be conceived as a sort of spiritual correction of nature, and not its fulfilment. There exists here a possibility for history to be against nature, or above nature – a “kingdom of freedom”, against the necessity of nature, as that was put later on, in Kant’s words. B. Close to the above is the distinction between grace and the general Providence of God, because the latter is destined to the whole of creation. Grace is conceived as an auxilium, which is not clearly destined to all the logical creatures. A modern Thomist, Rudi Te Velde, writes on this point: “But if human nature necessarily requires grace, is grace then to be regarded as the logical consequence of God’s having created a human nature with its proper finality? The problem with this way of reasoning is

18 See his Histoire et Vérité, Seuil, Paris 1955 (3rd ed.), p.95. 19 Sth I,q.1,a.8 ad 1.

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that the essential difference between nature and grace would be cancelled and that grace would be nothing more than the supplementary means to an end that is already posited by the constitution of human nature”.20 Thus grace has to do with only some of the logical creatures. In Palamite terms this is not accurate, because for him the uncreated grace is offered to all logical beings, regardless if it is accepted or rejected, precisely because this has to do with the eschatological Providence, which is indeed “already posited by the constitution of human nature”, by God’s freely loving will. Regarding history, the above Thomistic claim introduces a legitimate distinction between human creatures and special human creatures endowed with grace, perhaps because of some sort of semi-predestination. Special human creatures possess the meaning and the key of truth and history – the grace – and they can thus be above the common destiny of human nature. Close to that is the Thomistic distinction between creative love of God, as God’s will with respect to the good of nature, and the elective love of God, which is God’s will with respect to the additional good of grace.21 Thus God himself seems to choose parts of his logical creatures for the above purpose – for Palamas any denial that creative love of God is fulfilled in his elective love would be absolutely unaccepted. C. Another Thomistic claim, which would be of importance for our study of history, is that nature can somehow be initially metaphysically defined without grace22 something which, although it does not mean that nature can be finally fulfilled without grace, is not unaccepted by authors such as Maximus the Confessor or Gregory Palamas. In a secular version of this, history can once again follow its path alone; there can exist a history without God, there can be found a “natural” meaning of things without God, and who knows – as a modern, secular thinker can possibly claim – whether this meaning is, perhaps, even more charitable and philanthropic, precisely because it does not demand any ecstasis of nature beyond its limits, in order to be realised? Nature can then become, possibly as a reaction against its being underplayed by any “transcendental” construal of history as that described in point A above, our immediate divinity, our closest advisor – nature can become history as an unfolding of its inherent immanent wisdom. In a way – and this precisely happened in modernity – history seems more human without grace. D. Close to the above is the Thomistic distinction between a twofold end (or good or perfection or happiness) of man, the natural and the 20 See his Aquinas on God. The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae, Ashgate, 2006, p. 154. 21 Te Velde, ibid, p. 152. 22 Te Velde, ibid, p.153.

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supernatural. Modern Thomists, like Te Velde mentioned above, try hard to smooth this contradistinction, but Aquinas’ texts cannot help him too much. Thus, it remains an open question whether this legitimate natural perfection or happiness can contradict the supernatural one – all the modern Western culture, starting from art and ending up with psychoanalysis, can perhaps be read as a legitimate opposition to the supernatural good of divine grace, which, at the end of the day, can also be understood even as a supra-essential additional gift for those who perhaps possess the “gene of God” in their biological existence, and thus, they need some more consolation from above in order to endure the unhappiness of civilization. It is clear that for Palamas any natural happiness, even if it is a gift, has to be Eucharistically offered back to God, in order to become transformed into an uncreated gift, fulfilling the uncreated call, which lies in the very core of all creatures through grace. E. The last Thomistic claim which has an impact upon our conception of history is perhaps his claim that human happiness, as the ultimate perfection of human being, must relate in particular with the highest power which is formally constitutive of human nature – the intellect. The intellect possessing the highest intelligible object, God himself, represents the highest possible perfection and happiness of human being. The secularised form of this claim produces a concept of history as domination of the “intellectual/spiritual” Ƞver the “non- intellectual/spiritual”, or better, over what we decide that it is not “intellectual/spiritual” enough. History thus, becomes the field of the will to power, as the proper expression of the intellect’s preponderance, and spirituality means domination over and not so much fulfilment of nature and history. The Palamite insistence upon the absolutely psychosomatic nature of participation in God “with every kind of creation, in order for the image of God to be complete”,23 can open another perspective for our conception of historical truth, as a dialogical perfection of all of the logical creatures in God. I would like to stress emphatically that all the above claims did not mean of course, in Thomas’ mind, even the slightest conscious intention of ontological separation between creation and its divine future in God, and we are all indebted to De Lubac for having shown this in his books on Thomas and the surnaturel. This separation was definitively made by the modern secular mentality, perhaps helped by some Medieval misreadings of Thomas’ theology of grace – but it is true that, had Thomas better fathomed what the Greek Fathers aspired to claim on the point of the essence-energies distinction, he would not have given ground for such an

23 Against Acindynus, 7, 11, 36.

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impact of his thought to be tenable. But, precisely because Thomas did not convincingly understood the metaphysical meaning of the above distinction, the rise of nominalism, possibilism, and a more voluntarist theology in Scotus, Occam and others, representing a powerful thrust towards a secular world, as this is claimed by John Milbank and repeated by Charles Taylor,24 are not perhaps far from some serious shortcomings in Thomas’ metaphysics.

5. The Open History and its Enemies So, as we have seen so far in this paper, Aquinas’ persistence upon the need for an onto-logical identification of divine essence with its energies in order to affirm God’s metaphysical unity, without Palamas’ tropal distinction between the two, where the essence-energies distinction affirms this unity between God’s being and God’s act, and offers indeed God to his creatures without separation or confusion, has a great impact upon our conception of history. The modern Western understanding of history as a mainly or primarily human work and task, stems from precisely the secularisation of the above Aquinatian presuppositions of philosophy of history. Thus, after the medieval emphasis of the Aquinatian nature-grace distinction (which, as De Lubac has shown was not Thomas’ intention, although, as I tried to prove in this paper, Thomas himself set the foundations for such a misunderstanding through his excessive emphasis upon the metaphysics of divine unity), it became much easier to assert the autonomy of human history, along with the decisive rejection of metaphysics, in the course of secularisation, which led to (but also followed) Enlightenment. Though the distinction between three phases or periods in the course of human history, namely the Theocratic, the Heroic and the Human period was made by Vico on the 17th century, it was Voltaire in the very next century, who decisively turned away God’s providence from history, making the latter exclusively human. His simplistic belief in rationalism as the only agent of progress of human society towards civil freedom, contrary to Rousseau’s pessimism, created a backdrop of optimism, which also helped Herder to articulate his persuasion concerning humanism as the ultimate goal of history and fuelled Comte’s “worship of humanity”. I mentioned Comte, not only because it was him who greatly improved Vico’s insights, speaking, as it is 24 See Charles Taylor, A secular Age, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, Engl. 2007, pp 773ff.

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widely known, of a Theological, a Metaphysical, and a Positivist period of human history, but also because, by so totally methodologically confusing nature and history, made necessary Hegel’s intervention in order to better articulate their dialectic relationship. With Hegel, we possibly reach, as I am going to argue, the ultimate secular interpretation of the non real synergism and the subsequent change of uncreated grace into created, after its contact with createdness, as described above, for Philosophy of History: it is the emergence of what in this paper is called Closed History, against the Open History, which can be derived from the Palamite work. Thus, here is my question: can’t we say that Hegel’s concept of Spirit is the secular version of the Thomist concept of created grace? For Hegel’s Reason in History, the eternal Spirit needs man for his self- realisation: “The kingdom of the Spirit is created by man. Whatever representation we have concerning the kingdom of God, this is always a kingdom of the Spirit, which is realised in man and must take existence by him. The field of the Spirit is most comprehensive; it contains everything that once attracted human interest and keeps on being interesting for him. Man becomes active inside him; in everything he does, the Spirit activates itself in him.”25

Thus, the Spirit/God exists only as created human spirit: no other Spirit really exists except the Spirit (which exists in man), precisely as created grace is the only possible presence of God in the world. What is eminently important here is that, step by step, the Spirit/God is identified with his created representation. In Thomas, the created subject, existing as a created similitude of God, imitates Him, while it remains encapsulated in his own createdness, without becoming uncreated by grace; this Thomistic imitation as limited (according to Lévy’s term) participation, when it becomes, step by step, secularised, opens the possibility of a Hegelian second Absolute (in Karl Jaspers’ terms), which is the perfect container, and, in this way, substitute for the first Absolute – and then, when we pass from Thomas to Hegel, this Absolute can exist only in the form of his substitute. Thus, the Thomistic separation between God and man through the non real synergism of created grace leads, through the games of narcissism, when it is secularised, to the Hegelian substitution of the human spirit for God: history now becomes a closed history, in the sense 25 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Weltgeshichte, t.1: Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, J. Hoffmeister ed., Meiner, Hamburg 1994 (6th ed.), p.50, (my translation).

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that it is a history that ultimately takes place within the human spirit/world, without any real relationship with the radical (because this is precisely the meaning of uncreated) otherness of God, which can open it not simply to the “supernatural” (which Thomas, as we have already said, carefully distinguishes from the uncreated – e.g. SCG III, 54, 10-11), but to the uncreated. In a sense, the Thomistic doctrine of the exclusively created grace, can perhaps be already seen, on the one hand, in its Hegelian version, as a substitution of the “supernatural” perspective of man and his world for God’s real and unpredictable presence. But, on the other hand, the Absolute becomes its human assimilation, in a double separation from man: first, he does not reveal his uncreated presence as such to man, and, second, he uses man for his own purposes. Thus, in his Elements of Philosophy of Right, the Spirit, for Hegel, reaches his final elevation and becomes a “Spirit of higher rank” (§ 343), after his return to himself as an “absolute Spirit”, through nature and the subjective and objective consciousness, via art, religion and philosophy, in man. What is important here is not only the anthropomorphism of the Hegelian God, who reaches his final identity in and through creation, but also the setting of human historical activity, in a sense, beyond good and evil. As we read in the paragraphs 344 and 348, as well as in his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (§ 551), the states, the peoples and the individuals, are simple and unconscious tools for the Spirit’s ultimate goal of self-elevation and self-realisation, even if, as he explains in the Elements of Philosophy of Right (ch.II,2), this does not mean that human beings cannot be, at the same time, goals for themselves, though in full submission, of course, consciously or unconsciously, to the Spirit’s general goal. This general goal, which is extraordinarily vague for the concrete human subjects (see ch.III,1), lies beyond any moral responsibility and imputation, and that means that the acts of the “great, cosmo-historical human beings” also lie beyond any moral valuation (see ch.III,3, entitled The Way of History’s Evolution). Thus, the secularised Thomistic/Hegelian historicity becomes, step by step totally self-enclosed, self-sufficient, and self-evaluated. Moreover, now the way is open to historicism, in Popper’s terms,26 namely the confidential knowledge of the unchanging laws of history, by some self-elected prophets, who are accorded the supernatural perfection to foresee, predict, and control some coming soon “revolutionary” “historical” events and changes in the context of an intra-historian eschatology, which now expresses the

26 See his The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge, London and New York 1997 (1957), pp 159-161.

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Universal Spirit, in this desperately closed concept of history. As I am going to argue now, this leads to the loss of what I call the real or full history, on the one hand, and the entrapping of history in a collective narcissism, on the other. Hegel fabrics what he calls “history” through (human/divine) Reason, because of his irrational fear of what seems not to obey this Reason, namely desires, instincts, controversies, hesitations, fears, feelings, anxieties, death and evil, the adventures of love and of virtue, altruism, the spirit of sacrifice, and so on. First and foremost, he is afraid of the living and unpredictable God of the Prophets and the Church (the identification of the Church with the State that he makes in the last paragraphs of his Division of the Universal History is absolutely revealing). In psychological terms, Hegel’s concept of history is, as we may call it history as repression, repressing the real and genuine human being, along with the human longing for ontological integrity, sanctity, salvation, resurrection. The greatest part of human reality remains outside that history, being simply called nature and identified with blind necessity, for the sake of an ecstatic conception of the spirit, which is supposedly pure freedom, and it is the only active subject of history.27 Thus, history ultimately becomes the closed history of the transcendental power of the human/divine Reason/Spirit to impose his absolute goal of self-realisation upon the suffering living beings. Closed history is now the history of (the will to) power, and as such, it is the very definition of a supreme narcissism repressing nature’s integrity, and prohibiting its historical rights to be fulfilled, since it exclusively serves the Spirit’s transcendental narcissism of (the will to) power as history, along with a parallel loss of real history as the history of the real and full human selfhood, connected with the natural world. In a further step of this secularisation, it is obvious that such an understanding of history is related not only with the human/divine Spirit, but, in addition, with the way the modern subject, being cut off, according to Charles Taylor, from any transcendental source of meaning, understands life in history. History as truth, as a course of seeking divine and human truthfulness, is now step by step understood as a personal course of acquiring power and domination over what is not “spiritual” enough. The Absolute’s total narcissism passes to his human agent. In this way, the human agent loses real history for the sake of narcissism as history and thus, it loses the deeper meaning of both society and selfhood. But, in order to understand this, how, first, can we better define this

27 See his Phenomenology of the Spirit, in Werke in zwanzig Banden, E. Moldenhauer/K.M. Michel eds, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1969-71, vol. 3, p.326.

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narcissism? Gilles Lipovetsky, in the middle of post-modernity, in his L’ ère du Vide28 already defined modern narcissism as “a void without tragedy and Revelation”, or as “the revolution of anything”,or “to be yourself as a legitimization of anything”, or “the modern deessentialization as the logic of void”, being either individual or collective.29 What is important for our discussion is that this narcissism represents, in my view, the final step of the glorious Western individualism of the Ego cogito and the “detached Self” (in Charles Taylor’s terminology) of Locke’s, Kant’s, Fichte’s, Hegel’s, Schelling’s, Nietzsche’s or Heidegger’s; it just brings to the fore the ultimate destabilisation of this Self in a dissolving coincidence of opposites, where finally the individual prevails over the ecumenical, the psychological over the ideological, the communicative over the political, the variety upon homogeneity, the permissibility upon compulsoriness,30 while the class struggle is replaced by indifference and negotiation.31 To put it in Max Horkheimer’s words, now the subjective discourse prevails upon the objective discourse. In his addendum of 1993, Lipovetsky added some remarks upon the return of morality, traditions, conformism, etc., along with a further hedonistic destabilization, where even the sexual identities become fluid, with no serious sense of contradiction; narcissism becomes more rational and careful, but “the culture of sacrifice remains decisively dead”. Lipovetsky’s Narcissus is even totally submitted to the institutions, but has no questions concerning any ultimate deeply human sense of them. However, this is a further problem of post-modernity, which has brought about, in Graham Ward’s words “the prospect of the reification and commodification (theologically termed: idolatry), not only of all objects, but of all values (moral, aesthetic and spiritual). We have produced a culture of fetishes or virtual objects”.32 Ward connects this with the death of God, but it is perhaps legitimate to rather describe the above situation with Lipovetsky, as “faith à la carte”, or , if you like, faith without commitment. Ward sees here the collapse of the “Promethean will to power – where human beings rationally measure, calculate, predict, and control”, into a “Dionysian diffusion, in which desire is governed by the endless production and dissemination of floating signifiers”. In the terms 28 Gilles Lipovetsky, L’ ère du Vide, Gallimard, Paris 1983. 29 Ibid, Foreword. 30 Ibid, ch. 4. 31 Ibid, ch. 6. 32 Graham Ward, Introduction: ‘Where We Stand’, in The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology, Gr. Ward ed., Blackwell, 2005 (2nd ed.), pp. xiv-xv.

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employed in this text, Ward’s description above, describes Lipovetsky’s notion of narcissism, in terms of an underlying, unconscious perhaps, Weltanchauung. But, shall we see the “Promethean will to power” and the “Dionysian diffusion” as two separate phenomena? Narcissism is Promethean or Dionysian, or, perhaps, both? And is it always connected to the will to power? Christofer Lasch in his seminal work The Culture of Narcissism,33 understood narcissism in light of the Freudian Instinct of Death, as longing for absolute existential balance, as Nirvana, and, as such, as longing for a liberation from longing itself, for the sake of an absolute peace beyond the fear of death, since Narcissus does not want to have any consciousness of the difference between him and the things around him.34 Thus, Narcissus concludes not with controlling, but rather with melting with things – or, better, even when, as I think, he seems to measure, calculate, predict, and control, he rather returns to the safety and non differentiation of the Great Womb; technology then, for example, if we examine its deeper sense in this perspective, rather means not simply domination over but collective narcissism, as returning to the safety of the great created cosmic womb, as this is technologically expanded, facilitated, rehabilitated, and reorganised. In the same way, any expression of the will to power (political, financial, scientific etc.) means, in a deeper sense, individual or collective narcissism, as an effort not simply for domination, but, through this, for an ultimate protection of this final self- sufficiency within the non diversification of closed history, as we described the latter above. Thus, narcissism can be connected to the will to power, and this narcissistic will to power can be, as I think, both Promethean and Dionysian at the same time. What is disturbing is that this growth of narcissism does not prevent selfhood even from being extraordinarily minimized, as Lasch again showed in his The Minimal Self. Psychic Survival in Troubled Times of 1984. In the seventh chapter of this book, Lasch gives an account of the ideological attacks upon the self, making a distinction between an Egoparty, a Narcissus-party and a Super-ego party, striving to show the inadequacy of the three. I tend to conceive of this minimization of the self, not as a denial, but rather as an affirmation of the inner spiritual logic of this cultural narcissism, given that the concept of history it relies upon is a non-open but a mainly or exclusively closed version of it, as we have said, in the sense of a non real, non synergistic, non dialogical and non holistic

33 Christofer Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, W. W. Norton and Co, Inc. 1979. 34 Ibid, Addendum in the 1990 edition.

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history of antagonism to God. This atmosphere of constant inner clashes is created through what Popper called the modern perverted morality and education of “fate” and “destiny” and is based upon the cult of power.35 Ultimately, this context of history is basically a history of power and is responsible for the creation of this modern milieu of total antagonism and social Darwinism, where, as Heidegger has so convincingly shown, being has to be always realised as “more than being”, in order to exist at all, and where selfhood oscillates between narcissistic inflation and minimizing deflation, both being simply the two sides of the same coin. The self is minimized, paradoxically, in order to survive in this necessary seminal narcissism, and every effort to repent and abstain from narcissism appears futile. Heidegger has also shown the underlying nihilism of this spiritual attitude, which creates an environment of both existential and historical marginalisation of anyone who does not comply with this game of power; on the other hand, it is not without meaning that the big majority of the psychic problems modern psychotherapy faces, have been persistently described as narcissistic disorders.36 Narcissism reveals the hidden core of modern historical consciousness, as any historical misfortune is ultimately understood as a threat for our narcissistic vulnerability – precisely because narcissism finally always needs power in order to flourish or to be protected. And, by the way, either on the personal or on the social/political/ financial level, the non “powerful”, or the tired, or the different, must be self-evidently crushed, or forced to withdraw. Thus, any possible meaning of the Western institutions beyond the collective narcissism of financial/ technological power/effectiveness, is totally obscured; the spiritual meaning of history, as a possible prolongation of God’s Incarnation, is of course self-evidently despised and marginalised, even if there exist intellectuals, as happens with Gianni Vattimo, who, paradoxically, declare that the European institutions have already assimilated the Christian values in their very structure. Let us now see how a part of modern Western theology struggles to offer an alternative to the modern need for a different understanding of history. We are going to read now two books by Hans-Urs von Balthasar, in order to search for divergences and convergences with the Palamite view proposed above. The first of these books is A Theology of History.37 35 K. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1945, 1977 (12th ed.), ch.25. 36 See for example Heinz Kohut, The Restoration of the Self, International Univ. Press, New York 1977. 37 Theologie der Geshichte, J. Verlag, Einsiedeln 1959.

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In this book the “normative laws of human nature” in Christ are, in their “union with the person of the divine Word”, “integrated and subordinated within his Christological uniqueness, and formed and governed by it”.38 Balthasar prefers to speak not of an expression, or a transformation, or a fulfilment of those “normative laws” in their opening to divinity, but of subordination. This model of passivity (of Aquinatian provenance) concerning the human natural attributes of Christ, is subsequently transferred in the life in God: “The relationship of the Church and the Christian to the life of the Son must be like the relationship of the Son to the will of the Father: in a sense, one of conception and femininity. The outpouring of the ‘seed of God’ (1 Jn 3:9) into the womb of the world is what happens in the innermost chamber of history. But begetting and conceiving take place in utter self- surrender”.39 By using concepts like the above, Balthasar reminds us of the analogous terms of passivity, femininity etc., which Hadot uses in order to describe the Plotinian type of spirituality.40 He seems not to take into serious account (along with other Western theologians) that, in Christ, not only God assumes man, but also, first and foremost, he offers himself to man, who, in the person of the Theotokos, freely accepts him. That further means that in and through Christ, God’s world is translated into each man’s personal world, and that, in other words, there exists a deeply analogical dialogical reciprocity41 between man and God –man discovers the legitimacy and the eternity of a selfhood and an active natural will and energy in Christ, precisely because, in Christ, God makes man an eternal free receiver of Him, an active selfhood realised through participation in the Christological mystery of the totally active syn-energetic union of the two natures. Man discovers his real self, as he is given to will and act in Christ: this is not just a submission but an extension, an embracing and then a transformation out of friendship and gratitude for Christ – I am given to him because he is first given to me. What is of utmost importance (and here lies perhaps the crux of the mystery of the Christian existence) is that this dialogue between me and God is real, unique, and creative – God changes with man, as one of the recent most illumined and widely recognised saints of modern Orthodox Church, St Paisios of the Holy Mountain, once wrote. 38 Ibid, p. 18. 39 Ibid, p.121. 40 In his Plotin, ou la simplicité du regard, Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris 1989 (3rd ed.) 41 See again the 6th chapter of my A Eucharistic Ontology: Maximus the Confessor’s Eschatological Ontology of Dialogical Reciprocity.

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The meaning of this strange for the Western theological mind phrase is, as I think, that God gives me the possibility of (and assists me in) a totally personal free way of fulfilling an active selfhood within His energetic presence, in order finally not simply to contemplate Him, but to be personally and uniquely in Him – and this distinction between only contemplating God and being fully in God also is Palamite. Even Christ’s commandments, in this perspective, are not invitations for submission, but loving proposals for an existential, dialogical meeting: God proposes the ways He acts as a man, in order for men to find Him through the imitational free participation in these acts. While mere obedience seems , to imply a monological, closed understanding of existence (and history), dialogical reciprocity is the source of the open historicity of the active response as part of the real invitational presence of God in creation. Balthasar’s Thomist theological presuppositions are made even clearer in the book that followed, namely his Man in History: A Theological Study.42 In this book Balthasar seems to have understood, obviously through Maximus the Confessor, that there exists a certain kind of reciprocity between man and God43, but then he insists, in an Aquinatian way, that “the divine power of grace manifests itself in the natural power of the creatur”44 – and not as it is. Man thinks alone of God within the limitations of his nature, and God thinks alone of man within his almighty and powerful essence. So, once again, the dialogue between man and God becomes sheer “obedience”.45 This prevents Balthasar from decisively articulating his right position on the “mutual truth as absolute openness with each other”, between man and God.46 History still remains rather monological and narcissistic – the self-sufficient monologue of God who ordains, and the narcissistic monologue of man who attains – although Balthasar represents one of the most ambitious and learned efforts to overcome it.

6. Concluding remarks Aquinas’ God needs an identification of energy/will with his essence in order to be united. The Palamite God, though we know that, ontologically speaking, He conforms with this, He also needs the distinction of the two, according to their tropos of existence, precisely in order to express this 42 Das Ganze im Fragment, Benzinger Verlag, Einsiedeln 1963. 43 Ibid, p. 204. 44 Ibid, p. 205. 45 Ibid, p. 229. 46 Ibid, pp 233-234.

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unity ad extra. It is clear that this understanding of divine unity affects our understanding of synergy. Thus, it is possible to have either a dictated, created, restricted and passive synergy (Aquinas explicitly denies any dialogical form of synergy in Contra Errores Graecorum),47 which is fully true only on the part of man, or a dialogical synergy, where both energies, created and uncreated, retain their identity, and God becomes a God-foreach-being, transcendental and immanent at the same time. In the first case, unity of God results in a communion between two self-enclosed entities, while in Palamas divine unity is expressed precisely through the act of a dialogical, open communion with created otherness. Is this the only possible reading of Aquinas? Surely not. There is a whole swarm of distinguished Thomist scholars, starting from De Lubac and ending with Rowan Williams, the Radical Orthodox Group, Lévy, and even some Orthodox theologians, such as D. B. Hart, who claim that, on the contrary, it is precisely this identification of energy/will with essence in God that guarantees the real unity of God and creation in Him. None of them has, as I think, for the moment, properly understood that this unity also was Palamas’ main preoccupation. I have indeed the highest respect for their work, precisely because I clearly feel a genuine and deep concern about the Biblical sense of participation behind their reading of Thomas, and if such a criterion is endorsed, then some of the above Thomistic shortcomings will be overcome. It is only in this perspective, that I recently dared to propose a Palamite reading of Thomas, which can perhaps help such an interpretation. My personal impression is that some of the above scholars have already unconsciously adopted a sort of “Palamite” reading of Aquinas regarding participation, while, at the same moment, they fail to see that this is precisely Palamas’ most valuable contribution to Christian theology. Thus, ǿ believe that there can be a rehabilitation of Aquinas in the Orthodox world, but not without the help of the Greek Fathers, and especially Maximus the Confessor and Gregory Palamas. Many aspects of Thomas’ anthropology and even his Trinitarian theology are extremely important for an Orthodox, but I think that his theory of participation will remain controversial, unless we read Thomas 47 See respectively my Theurgic Attunement as Eucharistic Gnosiology: Divine Logoi and Energies in Maximus the Confessor and Thomas Aquinas, forthcoming with Wipf and Stock, as part of the proceedings of the Maximus’ Workshop, held in Oxford in August 2011, edited by Daniel Haynes. See also my “Striving for Participation: Palamite Analogy as Dialogical Syn-energy and Thomist Analogy as Emanational Similitude”, in Divine Essence and Divine Energies: Ecumenical Reflections on the Presence of God in Eastern Orthodoxy, edited by C. Athanasopoulos and C. Schneider, James Clarke & Co, 2013.

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in light of the Palamite essence-energies distinction, as an expression of the Maximian essence-logoi distinction – while Thomas can be very helpful for some pro-Palamites, in order for them not to lose from their sight the need for a solid metaphysics of God’s union. This is perhaps the only way to heal the secular distortion of the relation between God and history, initially made by some versions of German Idealism – I mean the latter’s way of making the Absolute into second Absolute(s), such as created ideas of catholicity, charismatic events, historical schemes etc. As I tried to claim in this paper, this gradually concludes, in our secular era, with an ultimate reduction of participating in this Absolute to an intraworldly and intra-historical narcissism of power, along with the Absolute’s final confinement within the intellectual interiority of the subject who exercises this reduction. Our understanding of synergy, either as passive or active, subsequently affects our concept of history. In the first case, history is the closed history of man’s self-constitution in the order of his nature. Penetration, intellectuality, effectiveness, interiority, seem to be some of the passwords of this first concept of history. In the second case, history cannot be justified unless it is a dialogical change of man’s mode of existence. Incorporation, perichoresis, embodiment, relationality, and, finally, dialogical reciprocity, seem to be some of the passwords of the second concept. A secular version of the first concept has already produced totalitarianism, aggressive capitalism, atheism, and narcissism along with brilliant technological and intellectual discoveries; while a distorted image of the second concept can produce and has already produced at times an over-eschatologization or even a denial of history, an undermining of historical states, a gnosomachy, or even an anthropological monophysitism, where nature is denied instead of being transformed – but this is another long discussion.48 However, the dominating concept of history has been the Thomist. In its gradually secularised, antagonistic, and finally narcissistic imitation of a self-enclosed God, it usually tends to forget history as friendship, gratitude, generosity, responsibility, sacrifice, spiritual knowledge, existential poetics – or, as what Paul Ricoeur called “the sociology of the neighbour”, defining it as “this sort of meeting, which does not stem from any criterion immanent in history”.49 By defining history as “consisting of that which is to be set free” in Christ, and by denying to regard the Second Coming simply “as belonging to the evolution of mankind, and as marking 48 A discussion that I already started, in my book Closed Spirituality and the Meaning of the Self: Mysticism of Power and the Truth of Personhood and Nature, Ellinika Grammata, Athens 1999. 49 Paul Ricoeur, Histoire et Vérité, p.102.

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the final achievement of human progress”, because this would mean “to ignore the divine element, the work of the creator himself in the history of his creation”, Jean Daniélou, on the other hand, highlights some of the characteristic shortcomings of the closed history described above, offering, at the same time, some more sound theological alternatives.50 For all those who can see these shortcomings, time has come for an opening of narcissistic interiority to Eucharistic dialogality, a connection of power with relationality, of intellectuality with embodiment, or of effectiveness with perichoresis. I strongly believe that all the above “passwords” of the “Thomist” understanding of history, in its secularised form, is realistically impossible to be abolished, but they have to be corrected through their reinterpretation in light of the criteria of both Eastern and Western modern and post-modern theological awareness, converging, as I strove to show elsewhere, upon the urgent need for a theology of God-in-and-for-theworld.51 Post-modern thought, with its iconoclastic aura of intellectual suspicion can and has already greatly helped us. This work has not yet been done and it needs to be done urgently and without confessional restrictions; we all need a Christian theology which offers convincing solutions to pressing contemporary issues instead of gazing at the past, and this is perhaps a field for a sound Ecumenical exchange today. The final scheme of open history to be thus constituted is what I call an eschatological ontology of history. History cannot be open unless this participative syn-energetic, dialogical understanding of eschatology is adopted. I have extensively described my understanding of eschatological ontology as eucharistic ontology elsewhere;52 here, I would like to distinguish it once again from what can be called ecstatic understanding of both eschatology and history. The main characteristic of the latter position is an unconscious separation between God and nature/history. Paul’s “eternal power and divinity”, or Palamas’ divine energies, connecting ontologically the created nature/history to the uncreated, are not taken into serious account here. Eschatology as Eucharistic ontology cannot now be a reciprocal exchange of gifts, as Maximus the Confessor insists,53 but an ecstatic movement out of the limits of a dead world, in order to affirm a divine Other, who represents almost an absence from the ontological core of his own creation.

50 See his The Lord of History. Reflection on the Inner Meaning of History, Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1958, p. 202. 51 See the 6th chapter of my Eucharistic Ontology. 52 See the Introduction, and the 5th and 6th chapters of my Eucharistic Ontology. 53 See my Eucharistic Ontology, ch. 6.

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There exists, as I think, a deep feeling of ontological depression behind the above positions, common to a group of modern Orthodox theologians, which perhaps has to do not only with their long and uncritical exposure to Existentialism, but mainly with the way they probably partially misunderstood Palamism, regardless if they fully endorse or, partially or totally, reject it. I have striven to discuss the whole question elsewhere;54 what I want to stress now, is that, as I think, this unconscious interpretation of Palamism as a sort of quasi-Monophysitism, is responsible for the difficulty of some modern Orthodox theologians to fully articulate a concise theology of open history. Thus, some prone to “personalism” among them, tried to defunctionalize the ontologically deficient nature, either by denying the reality of energies, or by attributing them, contrary to the Patristic thought, to person, while the “traditionalist/philokalic”, lose nature, as it is supposedly swallowed by grace. In both cases, created nature remains dead and passive, not really restored, and, consequently, not able to produce a worth-mentioning theology of open history; this is so, because no syn-energetic dialogue can really occur between God and creation in such perspectives. Fortunately, there also exist some more balanced exceptions. The theology of open history proposed here, as a common work of God and man, can be today articulated only in dialogue between Eastern and Western Christianity.

54 See my book Closed Spirituality and the Meaning of the Self: Mysticism of Power and the Truth of Personhood and Nature, Ellinika Grammata, Athens 1999.

MAN’S POSITION IN COSMOS ACCORDING TO DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE AND GREGORY PALAMAS DR FILIP IVANOVIC

There is significant discussion of the fact that Gregory Palamas quotes extensively and follows the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, calling him “the divinely wise theologian”, “the most prominent of theologians next to the divine apostles”, “great Dionysius”, etc. The close relationship Palamas has with Dionysius is, then, clear from both explicit citations within Palamas’ works and implicit allusions to passages from the Corpus Dionysiacum. However, some interpreters have argued that Palamas does not follow Dionysius in all respects, and that he applies correctives to certain of his teachings. It is in this light that the position of man in cosmos, and especially his relation to angels, has been seen as a point of opposition in the works of the two great thinkers. This opposition is due to Dionysius being regarded as an anomaly, some kind of exception in the patristic tradition, whose teaching was difficult to reconcile with the doctrines of other great Fathers; but then, his assumed identity (of being the student of Apostle Paul and first Bishop of Athens) gave such an uncontestable authority that it was not easy to avoid him or to openly accuse him of not being Orthodox. And so, in this perspective, Palamas would resort to “correcting” Dionysius, that is, to interpreting the thought of the Areopagite and drawing conclusions which are not present in his thought (cf. Meyendorff, 1964; Ritter, 1997). The first question that comes to mind is how would it be possible for Palamas to give such a high praise of Dionysius, and yet be aware of his “heterodoxy” and even try to add new meanings to his texts. We will discuss at the end the question whether this is just a result of Palamas’ submission to the alleged apostolic authority of Dionysius, or there is something more to it. For now, let us see what are the issues that divide the Doctor of Hesychasm and the Areopagite. The main point of divergence, pertinent to our topic, should be found in Dionysius’ hierarchies and Gregory’s thoughts on the relation between

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men and angels. As it is already known, the Areopagite talks about a specific order of cosmos, divided into two hierarchies, celestial and ecclesiastical (or “our”, to be more precise). These are then divided into different ranks, so that the celestial hierarchy is divided into three ranks each consisting of three orders: seraphim, cherubim, thrones (first), dominions, powers, authorities (second), and principalities, archangels, angels (third rank). The ecclesiastical hierarchy is then divided into two ranks, laity (consisting of those being purified, lay people, and monks) and clergy (consisting of deacons, priests, and hierarchs or bishops). To these two ranks should be added the third, the sacraments, which consist of baptism, synaxis, and consecration of Myron. This rank was probably added to the overall structure, so that the ecclesiastical hierarchy would have the same number of ranks as the celestial one, according to the idea that our hierarchy is a reflection or image of the celestial. Furthermore, Dionysius considers our hierarchy to be a middle path between the celestial hierarchy and the hierarchy of the Law: “Now, the Word of God asserts that our hierarchy represents a more perfect initiation in that it is a fulfillment and completion of that hierarchy. It is both celestial and of the Law for it occupies a place half way between two opposites” (EH (The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy) V.1, 501BC).

This analogy is brought up in order to show how in the hierarchy of the Law the truth was hidden behind symbols, difficult to interpret, while the ecclesiastical hierarchy operates both through symbols and contemplation, which corresponds to our own constitution as human beings, composed of both soul and body (Louth, 1989, p. 53). On the other hand, the celestial hierarchy’s knowledge is conceptual, since angels are incorporeal beings: “Of course, as I have said already, those beings and those orders which are superior to us are also incorporeal. Their hierarchy belongs to the domain of the conceptual and is something out of this world. We see our human hierarchy, on the other hand, as our nature allows, pluralized in a great variety of perceptible symbols lifting us upward hierarchically until we are brought as far as we can be into the unity of divinization. The heavenly beings, because of their intelligence, have their own permitted conceptions of God” (EH I.2, 373AB).

These permitted conceptions of God seem to be exclusive of angels, and are incomprehensible and ineffable, as explained by Dionysius in The Divine Names: “Nor can one speak about and have knowledge of the fitting way in which the holy angels can commune with the comings or with the effects of the

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Man’s Position in Cosmos transcendently overwhelming Goodness. Such things can neither be talked about nor grasped except by the angels who in some mysterious fashion have been deemed worthy” (DN (The Divine Names) I.5, 593B).

Thus, it seems that angels have more perfect and more fitting knowledge of God than humans, and so, although Dionysius poses angels in the lowest rank of the celestial hierarchy, he still puts them above human hierarchy, so that one might conclude that the angels are mediators between God and humans. This conclusion shows itself even more correct if one bears in mind the passages from The Celestial Hierarchy in which the Areopagite praises angels as “obviously superior in what they have received of God’s largess”, and since they have a more generous community with the Deity, “they have a preeminent right to the title of angel or messenger, since it is they who first are granted the divine enlightenment and it is they who pass on to us these revelations which are so far beyond us”, as it is true that “the Word of God teaches us that the Law was given to us by the angels” (CH (The Celestial Hierarchy) IV.2, 180B). In addition to this, the Areopagite also claims that “the beings of the first rank receive enlightenment from the Godhead through beings of the first rank” (CH VIII.2, 240D), as established by the divine source of all order (cf. Ritter, 1994). On the other hand, Palamas at first glance has a different opinion on the relationship between angels and humans. The difference between the two is in that “our rational and intellectual nature possesses life not only essentially but also as an activity, for it gives life even to the body joined to it”, while on the other hand, “the intellectual nature of angels does not possess life as an activity of this sort, for it did not receive from God an earthly body joined to it, so as to receive in addition a life-giving power for this purpose” (Capita- The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, 30). This rational and intellectual nature of human soul “has alone been created more in the image of God than the incorporeal angels” (ibid, 39). In addition to this, angels were not created to have dominion over those below them, but were destined only to be ruled, while man was appointed “not only to be ruled, but also to rule all things on earth” (ibid., 44). Man is, then, created more in the image of God because he “alone of all creatures possesses also a faculty of sense perception in addition to those of intellection and reason” (ibid., 63). Being a creature composed of body, which belongs to the matter, and of soul, which consists of ultramundane elements, man is always set in between the worldly and the divine, between created and uncreated, as an ornament of the entire creation (Christou, 1968). Man also is the image of the Triune God, because he was created after all things, and “this entire sensible world

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came into being for his sake”, and “the kingdom of heaven was prepared for his sake” (Capita, 24). Therefore, it could be argued that Gregory puts humans above angels, because man is a more perfect image of God, namely due to his possession of the life-giving power, his dominion, and his threefold knowledge (originating in sense perception, intellect, reason). This is where the perceived opposition of Palamas to the Areopagite comes to light. While for Dionysius angels have a more perfect and ineffable knowledge of God, they mediate the revelation of God and are above humans, for Gregory they are the less faithful image of God, and have more modest capacities than man. However, in order to correctly understand this relationship, one has to pay more attention to the proper understanding of Dionysian hierarchies – it is there that the source of the possible confusion lays and it is there that Gregory appears to be not the corrector of Dionysius but his correct interpreter. First of all, it should be noted that the hierarchy in Dionysius is not what the hierarchy has become to mean in our everyday talk – it is not a static, pre-defined ladder by which one climbs in order to attain a higher position and rule over his subordinates. It is rather a cosmic arrangement which works as an outreach of God’s love and in which the members of the hierarchy are members of the community, it is a sort of cooperation between God and man, but not only between God and man, but between men too: in this cooperation some members impart purification, illumination and perfection, while others are in need of such purification, illumination, and perfection (Louth, 2008, p. 41). In this sense, hierarchy is a theophany, in which the divine ray radiates from God and reaches the created order. In Areopagite’s own words: “the hierarchy is a sacred order, a state of understanding and an activity approximating as closely as possible to the divine” (CH III.1, 164D). The hierarchy, then, has a threefold character, it is not just an order, but it is knowledge and activity, and again it is the perfect arrangement which “works out the mysteries of its own enlightenment in the orders and levels of understanding” (CH III.2, 165B) while its purpose is deification, that is, “to be as like as possible to God and to be at one with him” ( CH III.2, 165A; also see Ivanovic, 2010). Having this in mind and reading it against Palamas’ passage in the Triads, where he says that the vision of God happens “not in mediated fashion and through others, but is rather immediate and selfmanifest” (Triads, II.2.29), reveals that Gregory is in fact interpreting the Areopagite in the correct way, in the sense that Dionysius is talking about “levels of understanding” and not about the vision of God. This means that what is mediated is not the vision of God itself, but its understandingknowledge, because the higher orders of the hierarchy (or angels for that

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matter) are not the carriers of this vision, but its interpreters or explainers. So, as both Alexander Golitzin and John Romanides point out, neither Dionysius nor Gregory believed that these visions of either the past or present happened through angelic mediation, but rather that angels served both then and now to explain and interpret the vision (Golitzin 2007, p. 89; Romanides, 1963-1964, p. 257). In addition, Dionysius’ hierarchy is not a hierarchy of being in which lower beings proceed from higher beings; hierarchies are therefore not something between God and humankind, because all beings come directly from God and it is not being that is imparted through hierarchies, but wisdom, that is, knowledge. Thus, in Andrew Louth’s words: “the point of hierarchy, for Dionysius, is not to explain how the manifold nature of existence derives from the One, but rather it is the way everything 'after God' functions as a theophany, a manifestation of God, drawing all back into union with God” (Louth 2008, p. 597). Therefore, what we have here are two distinct concepts, one of mediated knowledge, and another of direct vision. In their understanding of these two concepts, both Dionysius and Gregory fully agree. As was again pointed out by Golitzin, this can be corroborated by passages from Gregory and Dionysius (Golitzin 2007, p. 90). In the Triads, Gregory explains that “while in the most cases you might find that the grace of knowledge is given by intermediaries, the majority of God’s appearances are direct manifestation” (Triads, II.2.30). Such a statement is illustrated by examples given by Dionysius, who talks about “the most divine Gabriel who guided Zechariah the hierarch into the mystery that (…) he would have a son who would be a prophet”, etc., and then Gabriel also “revealed to Mary how in her would be born the divine mystery of the ineffable form of God”, while another angel “forecast to Joseph the true fulfillments” of the promises to David, and “yet another angel brought the good news to the shepherds” (CH IV.4, 181B). All the expressions Dionysius uses refer to announcing, bringing the news, explaining or introducing to the mystery, and so they clearly have a connotation of knowledge and understanding. Another interesting point here is that Gregory illustrates his statement by the example of Moses – the same example Dionysius uses in his Mystical Theology. They both state that Moses was given the Law through angelic mediation, but only in the sense of knowledge and explanation, and not in the sense of mediated contact with God. And so Dionysius explains why our hierarchs also are called angels: “Hence, I see nothing wrong in the fact that the Word of God calls even our hierarch an 'angel', for it is characteristic of him that like the angels he is, to the extent of which he is capable, a messenger and that he is raised

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up to imitate, so far as a man may, the angelic power to bring revelation” (CH XII.2, 293A).

Again we see that the Areopagite assigns to angels the role of messengers and announcers of revelation, and not the role of mediators of divine vision. In this sense, also humans, that is, human hierarchs can be called messengers or interpreters of revelation, in one word, angels. Speaking of “seeing God”, Palamas in Triads explains how this vision does not happen through senses, nor does it happen through intellect. Therefore, it is not the senses (in men) or intellect (in angels), that grants the vision of God, but it is the Spirit, who gives access to seeing God. One has to abandon all perception in order to reach “this union, when the brief vision itself is manifested only to chosen disciples, disengaged by ecstasy from all perception of the senses or intellect, admitted to the true vision because they have ceased to see, and endowed with supernatural senses by their submission to unknowing” (Triads, I.3.17). The ecstasy, cessation of perception and submission to unknowing easily remind of Dionysius’ favorite concepts. And Palamas continues: “Do you now understand that in place of the intellect, the eyes and ears, they acquire the incomprehensible Spirit and by Him hear, see and comprehend? For if all their intellectual activity has stopped, how could the angels and angelic men see God except by the power of the Spirit?” (ibid., I.3.18).

Gregory feels obliged to explain how the union works, in order to emphasize that it is not a discursive accomplishment or an achievement of negation only. It is a cessation, which is accomplished not just in words, but in reality, so that it becomes unknowing beyond knowledge. Here too Palamas quotes Dionysius by saying that “it is in this dazzling darkness that the divine things are given to the saints” (ibid.). Going back to the hierarchies, it is useful to repeat that for Dionysius it is an order, a state of understanding and an activity approximating as far as possible to the divine. This approximation to the divine, assimilation to God, attainment of divine likeness is the main preoccupation of Dionysius. This is the scope of the hierarchy – “likeness to and union with God” (EH II.1, 392A). This likeness is by far greater in angels than in men as they are shaped as close as possible to God. Human souls are on a lower level than the intelligences: “The intelligent and intelligible powers of the angelic minds draw from Wisdom their simple and blessed conceptions. They do not draw together their knowledge of God from fragments nor from bouts of perception or of

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Man’s Position in Cosmos discursive reasoning. And at the same time, they are not limited to perception and reason. Being free from all burden of matter and multiplicity, they think the thoughts of the divine realm intelligently, immaterially, and in a single act. Theirs is an intelligent power and energy, glittering in an unmixed and undefiled purity, and it surveys the divine conceptions in an indivisible, immaterial, and godlike oneness. They become shaped as close as possible to the transcendently wise mind and reason of God, and this happens through the workings of the divine Wisdom. Human souls also possess reason and with it they circle in discourse around the truth of things. Because of the fragmentary and varied nature of their many activities, they are on a lower level than the unified intelligences. Nevertheless, on account of the manner in which they are capable of concentrating the many into the one, they too, in their own fashion and as far as they can, are worthy of conceptions like those of the angels. Our sense perceptions also can properly be described as echoes of wisdom…” (DN VI.2, 868BC).

On the other hand, it is precisely because of senses that Palamas thinks man is on a higher level than angels: “In company with many others you might say that also the threefold character of our knowledge shows us to be more in the image of God than the angels, not only because it is threefold but also because it encompasses every form of knowledge. For we alone of all creatures possess also a faculty of sense perception in addition to those of intellection and reason (…) God granted to men alone that not only could the invisible word of the mind be subject to the sense of hearing when joined to the air, but also that it could be put down in writing and seen with and through the body. Thereby God leads us to a clear faith in the visitation and manifestation of the supreme Word through the flesh in which the angels have no part at all” (Capita, 63).

What should be noticed here is that Palamas claims that humans are made more in the image of God than the angels. But as far as the likeness is concerned, the situation is different, as Gregory says explicitly that “the intellectual and rational nature of the soul, alone possessing mind and word and life-giving spirit, has also been created more in the image of God than the incorporeal angels” – this image we did not lose after the ancestral transgression, but we underwent “separation of the soul from God, and we rejected the divine likeness” (ibid., 39). This kind of discourse Palamas maintains everywhere, as he says for example that “no being is superior to man that it should give him counsel or propose an opinion”, so that “the angels, too, though they surpass us in dignity, yet serve those counsels of His [God’s] on our behalf”, and here too he will add again that angels “surpass us in many ways, but there some in which

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they are inferior to us, namely, as we have said and will say again, with respect to being in the image of the creator, whereby we have come to be more in the image of God than they are” (ibid, 43). Now, this is actually the same idea that is proposed by Dionysius. He too argues that we are made in the image of God, but that we lost the divine likeness, so that the main purpose of the hierarchy is attaining that likeness. On the other hand, angels surpass us in likeness as they draw their conceptions from Wisdom itself. And this is why Dionysius needed to put angels as conveyors and announcers of the divine illumination, that is, wisdom. In fact, this is the same idea that Gregory has, as he always reaffirms our precedence over angels in being created in the image of God, and in the same time he always exclaims how angels surpass us in likeness. This is evidently clear from the following passage in Capita: “But even though we possess the image of God to a greater degree than the angels, even till the present we are inferior by far with respect to God's likeness and especially now in relation to the good angels. Leaving other things aside for now, the perfection of the likeness of God is effected by the divine illumination that comes from God. I should think that no one who reads the divinely inspired scriptures carefully and intelligently would be unaware that the evil angels have been deprived of this illumination and therefore are under darkness, whereas the divine minds are informed thereby and so are called “a secondary light and an emanation of the First Light”. Thence the good angels possess also knowledge of sensible things, for they apprehend these things not by a sensible and natural power but rather know them by means of a divine power, from which nothing present, past or future can be hidden” (ibid, 64).

Therefore, in sense of the divine likeness and of divine illumination and knowledge, angels are indeed superior to humans, and this is exactly what both Palamas and the Areopagite wish to emphasize. Gregory, then, does not in some way correct Dionysius nor does he impose some alien meaning to his texts. Quite the contrary, he demonstrates the correct understanding and interpretation of Dionysius’ anthropology and his doctrine of the hierarchies, which appear to be the dynamic structure of the cosmos in terms of the theophany in which every member of the hierarchy is a manifestation of God, who draws the entire creation to Himself. This approximation and likeness to God is exactly the scope of the hierarchy, with the final goal of union with God. Both Dionysius and Palamas dedicated their work to the explanation of this goal. Finally, in Gregory’s oeuvre the Areopagite is not to be understood as some anomaly, something alien to the Christian and Patristic thought, as some have claimed in the past, but as an active and creative member of that tradition. Palamas, then,

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is not a corrector of Dionysius, but quite the contrary, his correct interpreter, who sees him in the right place of the tradition which goes uninterruptedly from Dionysius to Palamas himself, and perhaps to our own age.

Works Cited Primary Sources Areopagita, Dionysius 1990-1991, Corpus Dionysiacum, 2 vols., ed. B. R. Suchla, A. M. Ritter and G. Heil, De Gruyter, Berlin. Palamas, Gregory 1983, The Triads. Edited by John Mayendorff, translated by Nicholas Gendle, Paulist Press, New York. —. 1988, The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters. A critical edition, translation and study by Robert E. Sinkewicz, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.

Studies Christou, Panayiotis, 1968, “The Teaching of Gregory Palamas on Man”, Myriobiblos, http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/english/christou_palamas.html (Accessed 30/08/2013). Golitzin, Alexander 2007, “Dionysius Areopagita in the Works of Saint Gregory Palamas: On the Question of a ‘Christological Corrective’ and Related Matters”, Scrinium, vol. 3, p. 83-106. Ivanovic, Filip 2010, “The Ecclesiology of Dionysius the Areopagite”, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 27-44. Louth, Andrew 1989, Denys the Areopagite, Continuum, London. —. 2008, “The Reception of Dionysius in the Byzantine World: Maximus to Palamas”, Modern Theology, Vol. 24, no.4, pp. 585-599. Meyendorff, John, 1964, A Study of Gregory Palamas, Faith Press, London. Radovic, Amfilohije, 1991, ȉȠ ȝȣıIJȒȡȚȠȞ IJȘȢ ǹȖȓĮȢ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ țĮIJȐ IJȠȞ DZȖȚȠȞ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȞ ȆĮȜĮȝȐȞ, Patriarchal Institute of Patristic Studies, Thessaloniki. Ritter, Adolf Maria 1997, “Gregor Palamas als Leser des Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita” in: Ysabel de Andia (ed.), Denys l’Aréopagite et sa postérité en Orient et Occident, Institut d’études augustiniennes, Paris, pp. 565-579.

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Romanides, J 1960-1964, “Notes on the Palamite Controversy and Related Topics”, The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, vols. 6 and 9, pp. 186-205 and pp. 225-270.

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF PALAMAS’APPROACH TO PARTICIPATION IN GOD DR NORMAN RUSSELL

Robert Sinkewicz concludes his masterly summary of the teaching of Gregory Palamas in La théologie Byzantine by observing that Palamas was “in one sense wholly traditional” and in another offered “a rereading or even a new reading of the traditional theology, formulated in response to new challenges to the Orthodox faith” (2002, p. 171). He goes on to remark that a “large part of the modern scholarship on Palamite and antiPalamite theology has focused on this polarity, usually to opt for one side or the other” (ibid). It is remarkable how this polarity, stemming in modern times from Jugie on the one side and Meyendorff on the other, still dominates the debate even when it is supposedly free from polemics. And no aspect of the debate provokes more heat than the distinction between the essence and the energies of God. Is this merely an epistemic distinction (a diakrisis kat’epinoian) projected illegitimately by Palamas on to the ontological level, as Rowan Williams has maintained (1977)? Or is it an erroneous distinctio realis, as Palamas’ neo-scholastic critics claim? Or is the distinction, as John Meyendorff has insisted, neither the one nor the other, because, as Palamas says, “the energies are inseparable from the essence, but not identical with it” (1964, p. 225)? The most recent contribution to the debate is a learned and amply documented essay by John Demetracopoulos entitled “Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God’s 'Essence' and 'Energies' in Late Byzantium” (2011).1 Demetracopoulos makes a strong 1 The debate is ongoing. Since I prepared my paper Torstein Tollefsen has published a study of energeia and participation in Basil, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Palamas. Although not wishing primarily to contribute to the debate on Palamism (2012, p.2), Tollefsen argues, rightly I believe, that on essence and energies Palamas was not an innovator but a faithful interpreter of earlier Christian writers and the Sixth Ecumenical Council of 680. He thinks that Meyendorff is

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case for a philosophical incoherence in Palamas that is mitigated, but not entirely resolved, by his immediate followers. He begins his discussion of Palamas himself by observing that he “introduced a peculiar distinctio realis between the 'essence' or 'nature' of God and His 'powers' or 'energies'” (2011, pp. 272-3). He concedes that Palamas maintained that “it is impossible to think of any sort of incision or division between God’s essence and energy” (Against Akindynos II, 12, 54), but sets against this Palamas’ distinguishing between a “higher” and a “lower” divinity. The distinction, Demetracopoulos notes, quoting from Apologia 19, is as real as that between the Persons of the Holy Trinity. He concludes that Palamas “obviously” regarded division between the essence and the energies as radically different and greater than the distinction between the persons of the Trinity (2011, p. 274). The nature of these non-self-subsistent realities, the energies, is genuinely puzzling. They are not “essences” or “natures” but are nonetheless “realities” – pragmata. The multiplicity of God, Demetracopoulos infers, is as real for Palamas as his unity. In disputation with his opponents, Palamas appears to rule out any idea that this multiplicity belongs only to the mental distinctions we make concerning God. Against Akindynos, he rejects the latter’s suggestion that we speak of uncreated powers and energies because of the “partitional character” of our knowledge. And against Gregoras, he claims that our conceiving of God in terms of both division and unity does not mean that these categories belong only to our thinking. Demetracopoulos’ conclusion is that for all his declarations of accepting God’s unity, Palamas’ distinction between God’s essence and his energies is “hardly compatible with God’s simplicity” (2011, pp. 275-6). Like Akindynos and Gregoras, Demetracopoulos suspects the influence of Neoplatonism. He believes the terms “lower deity” or “deities” and “God’s transcendental essence” to be taken consciously from Proclus and to be used in a “non-Dionysian, if not anti-Dionysian, way” (2011, p. 278). All in all, Palamas has allowed non-Christan influences to compromise his Christian faith. Demetracopoulos’ essay is an important contribution to Palamite studies, even if it assesses Palamas, in my view, rather too narrowly in the correct to speak about a distinction between God’s essence and energies (which he prefers to call “activities”) but is uneasy about the term “real distinction”, which he feels “makes the distinction between essence and energies too radical” (2012, pp. 198, 214). Claiming to find Palamas’ discussions of relation and distinction acceptable, even if not entirely satisfactory, he does not subject them to rigorous analysis, nor does he discuss Palamas’ avoidance of kat’epinoian. On essence and energies in the Cappadocian Fathers, the best work is still Martzelos 1984.

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scholastic terms of distinctio realis, major and minor. In this paper, I should like to explore a little further why Palamas is uncomfortable with a “conceptual” distinction, and indeed avoids the expression kat’ epinoian. To understand why this should be so, we need to take into consideration not only the philosophical, but, in addition, the Christological background to Palamas’ thinking. He himself had claimed at the Council of 1351 that his teaching was simply a development (anaptyxis) of what the Sixth Ecumenical Council had had to say about the two energies in Christ (PG 151, 722B). It may be noted, too, that when Prochoros Kydones was first examined by the Patriarch Philotheos over his refutation of the essenceenergies distinction, he was told to go away and study the acts of the same ecumenical council (Russell 2006, p. 80). The Sixth Ecumenical (held in Constantinople in 680) had simply confessed in defence of the Christology of Chalcedon that two wills and two natural operations, or energies, subsisted “indivisibly, immutably, unconfusedly and inseparably” in Christ. The reality of the distinction between the energies was necessary in order to safeguard the true humanity of Christ. Macarius of Antioch’s “one will and one theandric energy” was condemned and Pope Agatho’s insistence that it was the unity not the distinction that was “conceptual” was upheld. In the mid-twelfth century the issue of the relationship between the divine and the human in Christ came up again in connection with a dispute over the meaning of the text “My Father is greater than I” (John 14: 28). Palamas, I believe, often had this dispute in mind in his discussions of unity and distinction. The dispute concerned the view expressed by Constantine, Metropolitan of Corfu, and John Eirenikos, Abbot of the Monastery of Vatala on the Black Sea Coast, that Christ spoke of himself as inferior to the Father on account of his humanity (anthropometriǀs) which as homotheon and homotimon with his divinity could be distinguished only conceptually (kat’ epinoian) from his humanity (Grumel 1932, p. 143). This mental distinction was deemed unorthodox by the authorities, the Emperor Manuel Comnenus himself writing a refutation. In January 1170, Constantine appeared before the standing synod and after due process was condemned and deposed. In the following month, the synod met again to consider the case of John Eirenikos, who, like Constantine, held that the Son was inferior to the Father on account of the kenotic emptying of his divinity through the assumption of the flesh. The anathemas which the synod drew up to be read out on the Sunday of Orthodoxy upheld the view ‘as taught by the saints’ that Christ had declared the Father greater than himself either because the Father was his causal principle or because of the circumscribed properties of the flesh

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united to his divinity, and condemned the view that this Johannine verse had been uttered in virtue of “the flesh being separated mentally (kat’ epinoian) from the divinity as if it had never been united to it” (Grumel 1932, p. 146). An anathema was also inserted into the profession of faith required of candidate bishops before their ordination, who were to affirm that “Christ declared 'the Father is greater than I' even according to his created and passible human nature in which he suffered, which in no way is to be considered naked and separated from the divinity by a subtle mental (kat’ epinoian) division but is always to be seen subsisting with the Word in a single hypostasis” (Grumel 1932, p. 147). It is significant that in the text from Palamas that Demetracopoulos quotes (Apologia 19) to demonstrate how radically Palamas divides God’s essence from his energy, Palamas refers to John 14: 28. Can the twelfthcentury controversy over this verse help us to appreciate more fully the force of Palamas’ argument? Let me quote the relevant passage in Demetracopoulos’ translation (slightly adapted to omit the explanatory expansions): “[T]here should not be any wonder for us that, in God’s case, essence and energy are in some sense one and are one God, and at the same time essence is the cause of the energies and, in virtue of its being the cause, is superior to them. For ‘the Father is greater’ than the Son in terms of His being the cause. And if, in that case, for all the self-subsistence of the Son and for all His being co-substantial, ‘the Father is’ nevertheless ‘greater’, all the more (pollǀ mallon) will the essence be superior to the energies, since these two things are neither the same nor different in substance, for the above refers to self-subsistent realities, whereas no energy is selfsubsistent”. (2011, p. 274)

Palamas is saying here that, if the Father is superior to the Son in virtue of his being the Son’s cause (as the Synod of 1170 had confirmed), even though there is no essential difference between them, then a fortiori (this is the sense of pollǀ mallon) the essence is superior to the energies, especially in view of the fact that the energies, while not alien to the essence, are not self-subsistent realities. Demetracopoulos’ comment that “obviously, Palamas regarded the division between God’s essence and energies as radically different and thus greater than that between the Persons of the Holy Trinity” does not seem to follow. The division between essence and energies is analogous, mutatis mutandis, to that between the Father and the Son, rather than radically different. Other passages in which Palamas appeals to John 14: 28 suggest that he often has the debates of 1170 in mind when quoting this text. In one of his earliest works, for example, the First Apodeictic Treatise (1335), he

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states that the Son is inferior to the Father “not as man alone”, but as God in respect of the cause of deity (Perrella 2003, p. 16 [Apod. Treat. I, 1]). The second point the Synod made, namely, that the distinction between Christ’s divinity and humanity was real and not merely conceptual, was also absorbed by Palamas. His treatise On Unity and Distinction provides a characteristic instance of this near the beginning, where he discusses the difficulty Barlaam and Akindynos both experience in attributing distinctions to the divine. Because they do not accept a real distinction between “greater” and “secondary” within God, they divide God into two distinct realities, one created and the other uncreated (On Unity and Distinction 3). Arius, Eunomius and Macedonius divided the divine hypostases into created and uncreated. Barlaam and Akindynos do the same with regard to the “common processions” (tas koinas proodous).2 In other words, a merely conceptual division of essence and energies locks the energies into the essence and drives a wedge between us and God, with the result that the divine operations are treated as created. An important feature of Demetracopoulos’ work is his discussion of the fascinating fact that Palamas’ insistence on the real rather than the conceptual nature of the distinction between the essence and the energies was reversed by his immediate followers. This, of course, was noted long ago by Martin Jugie (and was denied vehemently by John Meyendorff), but Demetracopoulos for the first time gives us a detailed conspectus of the way almost every Palamite after Palamas himself, including the architect of the raising of Palamism to the status of synodically defined doctrine, the Patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos, started to speak of the distinction as kat’ epinoian. Since Polemis’ work on Theophanes of Nicaea, the adoption of Thomist categories of thought by leading Palamites (through the translations of the Kydones brothers) has been well known. In Philotheos’s case, however, his speaking of the distinction as monǀ tǀ logismǀ and monǀ tǀ nǀ preceded his encounter with Aquinas, for it is found in the Synodal Tome of 1351, which was largely written by him. Why did this change take place? Demetracopoulos rightly points to different approaches by Palamas and his opponents to the interpretations of the relationship between essence and energy found in Basil the Great’s Adversus Eunomium. Interestingly, Basil’s dispute with Eunomius was conducted within the context of another Christological controversy, that of the resurgence of Arianism in the 360s in the form promoted by Aetius and his disciple,

2 Palamas is using Dionysian terms here; cf. the agathas proodous of Divine Names V, 2 (Suchla 1990, p. 181. 18)

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Eunomius. Eunomius, Bishop of Cyzicus, taught an Eunomoean version of Arianism, the simplicity of God in his view taking precedence over all other considerations. The Son of God was the immediate product of the Father, who resembled him only because of the creative power he had received from him. His main arguments are set out in his Liber Apologeticus, the survival of which we owe to the fact that it was copied and bound with Basil’s Adversus Eunomium and De Spiritu Sancto to illustrate the arguments that Basil was countering. In the fourteenth century, there was renewed interest in Eunomius because of his discussions of essence and energy. Indeed, the two main manuscripts that have come down to us derive from the fourteenth century and were very likely copied in connection with the Palamite controversy (Vaggione 1987, p. 22; 2000, pp. 371-2). What particularly interested fourteenth-century readers in connection with the essence-energies distinction was the debate conducted by Eunomius and Basil on how we can know God. Eunomius defined God in terms of causation, holding it to be self-evident that God is ungenerated essence, in virtue of His being the cause of all that exists. To know Him there are two epistemic paths open to us. One is a priori, by reflecting on the essences themselves through pure reasoning and making judgements on each of them; the other is a posteriori, by examining them through their activities (dia tǀn energeiǀn), whereby we discern the essences through their products and effects (Vaggione 1987, p. 58 [Apol. 20.5-10]). We do not get anywhere kat’ epinoian, which in Eunomius’ usage simply means “by human conjecture”. Basil’s view of epinoia was altogether more positive than Eunomius’. For him it was not a human invention or fiction but a reflective process that took sensible reality as its starting point (Vaggione 2000, p. 377; cf. Demetracopoulos 2011, pp. 265-8). It was useful as a tool of intellectual analysis, but was limited with regard to ultimate truth. Although it enabled us to arrive at the idea that God is ungenerated (because otherwise the chain of causality would be subject to infinite regression), it did not enable us to penetrate God’s essence (cf. Basil’s Letter 234 to Amphilochius). The debate was studied carefully by the Palamites – not only Basil’s arguments but, in addition, those of Eunomius. In his study of Eunomian Arianism, Richard Vaggione notes that there is strong evidence that Philotheos not only studied Basil’s arguments, but went back to an independent reading of Eunomius. He comments à propos of Eunomius’ Liber Apologeticus 2.18, 3-7 and 2.19, 38-41: “Philotheus (or his source) must actually have read the Apology, because Basil nowhere quotes this section entire but gives it (with lacunae) in two separate sections…

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Philotheus’ version also has a lacuna, but not the same one” (2000, p. 372, n. 27). It seems to me not unlikely that Philotheos’ avoidance of kat’epinoian, until he came across an acceptable use of it in Demetrios Kydones’ translation of Aquinas’s Summa contra Gentiles (1354) may have been due to Eunomius’ dismissal of it in the Liber Apologeticus. If this conjecture has any value, it may also shed light on another reason why Palamas was so wary of kat’ epinoian. Demetracopoulos has noticed that Palamas and his opponents quote from the same discussion of essence and energies in Basil’s Adversus Eunomium, with the difference that Palamas omits any mention of kat’epinoian. Could Palamas, like Philotheos, have made an independent study of the Liber Apologeticus? If he did, he would have found some statements that were not uncongenial to his position, for Eunomius argues that those who unite the energy to the essence make the world coeval with God (Vaggione 1987, p. 62 [Apol. 22.11-12]), because anything produced by the essence partakes of the essence’s eternity. Eunomius accordingly develops a theory in which God’s ousia is related to his energeia through an intermediate category, his dynamis, or power. The chain of causality passes from the essence through the dynamis to the energy and thence to the creature, the energƝma (Vaggione 2000, p. 250). As Eunomius equated the dynamis with the Son in his Trinitarian theology, Palamas was hardly going to adopt this feature, but he is likely to have been impressed by Eunomius’ argument for the logical consequence of not separating the essence from the energy, and along with that the unhelpfulness of kat’ epinoian, when tying to establish ontological facts. Demetracopoulos attributes Palamas’ doctrine of the energies to the influence of Neoplatonism, not simply the Christianized version mediated through Dionysius the Areopagite, but the non-Christian version elaborated by Proclus. It cannot be denied that Palamas was acquainted with certain Neoplatonic texts – he alludes, for example, to Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus – but it would be wrong to conclude that Palamas’ mental outlook was conditioned by Proclean Neoplatonism.3 Demetracopoulos believes that Palamas’ plural use of “divinities” (theotƝtes) as a synonym for the energies is “redolent of Proclus’ metaphysical tenet that each level of the hierarchical structure of beings derives its ontological grade from its essence, whereas it produces the lower level by granting, in terms of its superior, existence, substance, qualities, and energy to its inferior” (2011, p. 277). Palamas seems to him closer to Proclus than to Dionysius in this respect. But the texts from Proclus’ Elements of Theology that

3 On Palamas’ relationship to his Platonist predecessors, see Stephen Clark’s paper in this volume.

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Demetracopoulos cites (2011, p. 278, n. 40) are not conclusive. Proclus speaks only of higher and lower “gods”, theoi, not theotƝtes (Dodds 1963, p. 132.5-8 [Elements of Theology 150]). Palamas explicitly rejects the expression higher and lower “gods”, for the energies are not selfsubsistent. God is manifested in many “names” – the energies. It is those who participate in them who become “gods”, in the sense of the human beings addressed by God in Psalm 81:6, “I said you are gods and all of you sons of the Most High” (Perrella 2003, p. 1036 [Apologia 37]). On the other hand, Palamas would have found theotƝtes in Dionysius (at Divine Names V, 2 [Suchla 1990, 181.16-18]), even if the usage is different from his own.4 I would call Palamas’ usage an adaptation rather than a contradiction of Dionysius, as Demetracopoulos does. At any rate, theotƝtes does not come to Palamas from outside the Christian tradition. To conclude, I would emphasize, as Metropolitan Kallistos (Ware) did more than thirty years ago (1977), that in discussions of Gregory Palamas’ ideas the historical context has always to be borne in mind. Palamas’ prime concern was not to develop a philosophical system, but to defend the experience of the hesychast monks within the Orthodox doctrinal tradition. Demetracopoulos has offered a valuable philosophical commentary with many new insights. But an adequate interpretative framework for Palamas needs to take his soteriological concerns into account. These concerns reflect the Christological debates of the fourth, seventh and twelfth centuries. If even Eunomius contributed to Palamas’ thinking, that should not shock us. Did not Cyril of Alexandria himself say, in connection with his struggle with Nestorianism (Wickham 1983, p. 62.8-9 [To Eulogius]), that not everything in a heretic’s writings is to be rejected?

Works Cited Basil, Saint 1926-34, The Letters, with an English trans. By RJ Deferrari, 4 vols, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. Demetracopoulos, J. A., 2011, “Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God’s 'Essence' and 'Energies' in Late Byzantium”, in M Hinterberger and C Schabel (eds), Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204-1500, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales Bibliotheca 11, Peeters, Leuven-

4 The Areopagite refers to the divine names or “processions” – Palamas’s energies – as “divinities” and denies that there are higher and lower grades among them because they are all one God.

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Paris-Walpole MA. Grumel, V., 1932. Les regestes des actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople, vol. 1, Institut français d’études byzantines, Paris. Jugie, M., 1931, “Palamas Grégoire”, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, vol. 11, cols 1735-76. Martzelos, G. D., 1984, Ousia kai energeia tou Theou kata ton Megan Vasileion, offprint from the EpistƝmonikƝ EpetƝrida TheologikƝs ScholƝs of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, vol. 28, fascicle 30, 1982, Thessaloniki. Meyendorff, J., 1964, A Study of Gregory Palamas, The Faith Press, Leighton Buzzard. Perrella, E., (ed.) 2003, Gregorio Palamas Atto e luce divina. Scritti filosofici e teologici, Bompiani il pensiero occidentale, R. C. S. Libri, Milan. Polemis, I. D., 1996, Theophanes of Nicaea: His Life and Works, Wiener Byzantinische Studien 20, Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna. Russell, N., 2006, “Prochoros Cydones and the fourteenth-century understanding of Orthodoxy”, in A. Louth and A. Casiday (eds), Byzantine Orthodoxies. Papers from the Thirty-sixth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, University of Durham 23-25 March 2002, Ashgate, Aldershot. Sinkewicz, R. E., 2002, “Gregory Palamas”, in CG Conticello and V Conticello (eds), La théologie byzantine et sa tradition, vol. 2, Brepols, Turnhout. Suchla, B. R., (ed.) 1990, Corpus Dionysiacum I. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita de Divinis Nominibus, Patristische Texte und Studien, band 33, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin. Tollefsen, T. T., 2012, Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought, Oxford Early Christian Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Vaggione, R. P., (ed.) 1987, Eunomius The Extant Works, Oxford Early Christian Texts, Clarendon Press, Oxford. —. 2000, Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution, Oxford Early Christian Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Ware, K., 1977, “The Debate about Palamism”, Eastern Churches Review, vol. 9, nos 1-2, pp. 45-63. Wickham, L. R., (ed.) 1983, Cyril of Alexandria Select Letters, Oxford Early Christian Texts, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Williams, R. D., 1977, “The Philosophical Structures of Palamism”, Eastern Churches Review, vol. 9, nos 1-2, pp. 27-44.

AQUINAS AND PALAMAS REV. MICHAEL PACELLA III

During my research for this project, I have discovered that many Orthodox thinkers such as Metropolitan Kallistos, John Meyendorff, Andrew Louth, and more recently Marcus Plested have commented on the topic at hand being considered. Marcus Plested held a seminar at Princeton University in 2011, which was framed in these words: “St. Thomas Aquinas had, surprisingly, a remarkable career in Byzantium. First translated in 1354, his writings went on to exercise a substantial impact on many of the Theological productions of the last century of the embattled Byzantine Empire. Thomas found admirers among unionist and anti-unionist, Palamites and Anti-Palamites, alike. By contrast, modern Orthodox theologians and thinkers such as Yannaras have routinely rejected Aquinas as an archetypal figure of the erroneous West.”1

These comments by Plested help to substantiate the thought that I hope to convey through the contents of this paper. It is my hope to be instrumental in building a bridge in clarifying the distinctions and similarities in the works of these great and holy men (Aquinas and Palamas), in order for both East and West to enjoy, respect, and benefit from the fruits of their selfless labours. They were men, it has been proven over time, who served the Lord and the Church, and not the likes and 1 This paragraph was taken from an announcement (Aquinas in Byzantium and Modern Greece) that was posted at Princeton University, USA in 2011 for this event. I acquired it while visiting Dr. Plested at Princeton University on April 1, 2011. Marcus Plested was Vice-Principal and Academic Director of the Institute for Orthodox Christian Studies in Cambridge, UK. He was schooled in London and educated at Merton College, Oxford, completing his studies with a doctoral thesis on the Macarian Writings, a fourth-century ascetic text from SyroMesopotamia. He is the author of Plested, M., 2004, The Macarian Legacy, OUP, Oxford, and of many articles on Patristics and Eastern Orthodoxy. He at the time of this retrieval was the George Williams Cottrell, Jr., member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, where he was completing a book on Orthodox readings of Aquinas.

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dislikes of their own whims. The East and the West have been separated by more than geographical location in the theological realm. There was a wide divide especially during the 13th and 14th centuries prior to the Protestant Reformation which greatly impacted the West. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) wrote on similar subjects regarding metaphysical (theological) anthropology and in particular the harnessing of the passions and the cultivation of Christian virtue.2 I have been struck by their similarities, but I have no documentation to verify that Gregory Palamas was ever exposed to the work of Thomas Aquinas. However, I wish to propose in agreement with Andrew Louth that there was a common source that was familiar to them both, found in the works of Saint John of Damascus (c. 675-c.749). Louth explains: “Saint John Damascene forms a strange, though by no means exceptional, case in the history of Christian theology. His influence is far-reaching, not only in later Byzantine theology, where eventually the pattern of John’s theological synthesis became determinative, but also in later Western theology, beginning with the great Summae of the scholastic theologians, for whom his epitome of patristic doctrine (known in the West as De Orthodoxa Fide, ‘On the Orthodox Faith’) became their principal resource…”3

Another recent work (1999) entitled The ground of Union—deification in Aquinas and Palamas by A.N. Williams also highlights the credibility of this inquiry. A complementary passage from the Roman Catholic Missal of 1961 further advances this point: In the entry for March 27—St. John Damascene, Confessor—Doctor of the Church, the Roman Catholic Missal of January 1, 1961 says the following: “St. John distinguished himself against the Emperor of Constantinople for his defense of the veneration of sacred images. He was famous for his great knowledge and for his theological method, which later was a source of inspiration to St. 2 The two scholarly works that I would like to cite as definitive studies for this paper are Kesselopoulos, A., 2004, Passions and Virtues according to Saint Gregory Palamas, and Miner, R., 2009, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. The primary sources are The Philokalia, “On Virtues and the Vices” by Saint John Damascene, Volume Two, pp. 334-342; “To the Most Reverend Nun Xenia” by Saint Gregory Palamas, Volume Four, pp. 293-322; St. Thomas Aquinas, “On the Passions”, in The Complete Thomas Aquinas—Summa Theologica, 1921, transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Fathers of English Dominican Province. 3 Andrew Louth, 2002, St. John Damascene—Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology, Oxford Early Christian Studies, Oxford University Press, p. 1.

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Thomas Aquinas. After many persecutions he died in peace toward the latter part of the 8th century.” It is my assertion that both Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Saint Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) were influenced by this great scholar-saint and due to this tradition certain orthodox teachings were preserved regarding anthropology which go all the way back to the Cappadocians and have their origin in the third and fourth centuries. A quick reference to the Summa Theologica will reveal 201 references to Aristotle by name (it is understood that Aquinas also referred to Aristotle as “The Philosopher”). There are 332 references to Saint John Damascene and a mere 31 references to the Islamic Philosopher Avicenna, Islam's most renowned philosopher-scientist (980-1037). In Robert Miner’s (2009) book entitled Thomas Aquinas and the Passions he creates a link that is critical to this proposition. I quote this lengthy passage as a spring board for this paper. “To say that Thomas refuses to provide a complete definition of the 'passion' may seem perverse. In the first Question of the Treatise (Question 22), Aquinas establishes that passions are in the soul (Article I), in the soul’s appetitive rather than apprehensive part (Article 2), and in the sensitive rather than the rational appetite (Article 3). The Question appears to culminate in the definition of the passion by John Damascene. In the argument sed contra of Article 3, Thomas quotes Damascene, as translated by Burgundio of Pisa: 'A passion is a motion of the power of the sensitive appetite regarding the imagination of good or evil.' To say this differently: a passion is a motion of the irrational soul occurring through a suspicion of good or evil. (22.3. sc; cf. Damascene 1857-66, cols. 940-2). Both the importance and the incompleteness of Damascene’s definition should be observed. The importance is evident. Aquinas might have quoted an Aristotelian definition of passio, but he chooses not to. The movement of Question 22 culminates in Damascene rather than Aristotle”.4

Miner goes on to declare: “In the Prologue of the Ia2ae, Damascene’s authority testifies to the role of 'free choice and power through oneself' in the rational creature’s motion toward the end”.5 I want to establish from the start that Aquinas is rooted in the Christian culture and not in the philosophical culture of Aristotle. The above observation by Miner serves to set the stage for such an assertion. The use of literary vehicles is not to surrender to the thought being proposed by the

4 Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions—A Study of Summa Theologiae Ia2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 29-30. 5 Ibid, pp. 29-30.

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respected author being utilized 6—in this case Thomas using Aristotle for his own ends in service to the Church at least in the West. “But to acknowledge the primary role of Aristotle in Thomas' philosophy is not to deny other philosophical influences. Augustine is a massively important presence. Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus were conduits, through which he learned Neo-platonism. There is nothing more obviously Aristotelian about Thomas than his assumption that there is something to be learned from any author, if only mistakes to be avoided. But he adopted many features from non-Aristotelian sources.”7

In the following excerpt, from A Journal of Orthodox Faith and Culture—Road to Emmaus, Vol. XII, No.4 (Fall 2011, No. 47), a definition of the passions is provided. The excerpt first proposes a question which reads: “What do we mean by 'Death to the World'?” A crystal clear answer then follows: “The world is the general name for the passions. When we wish to call the passions by a common name, we call them the world. But when we wish to distinguish them by their special names, we call them passions. The passions are the following: love of riches, desire for possessions, bodily pleasures from which comes sexual passion, love of honor gives rise to envy, lust for power, arrogance and pride of position, the craving to adorn oneself with luxurious clothing and vain ornaments, the itch for human glory which is a source of rancor and resentment, and physical fear. Where these passions cease to be active, there the world is dead….”8

To substantiate this definition a quote from St. Isaac the Syrian, from the 7th Century, is cited. It reads: “Someone has said of the Saints that while alive they were dead; for though living in the flesh, they did not live for the flesh. See for which of these passions you are alive. Then you will know how far you are alive to the world, and how far you are dead to it.”9 6 Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) a contemporary of both Thomas Aquinas and to some extent Saint Gregory Palamas took similar liberties in conveying the truths of the Gospel by using pagan literature. His greatest work ‘The Divine Comedy’ is an excellent example of this style. Saint Basil (329-379) in his ‘Address To Young Men On The Right Use Of Greek Literature’ provides the justification for this approach. 7 Ralph McInerny, “Thomas Aquinas”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Accessed January 15, 2012. 8 “Death to the World” Zine, Issue No. 1 as recorded in A Journal of Orthodox Faith and Culture—Road to Emmaus, Vol. XII, No.4 (Fall 2011, No 47) Inside Front Cover. 9 Ibid.

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Metropolitan Kallistos Ware in The Orthodox Way offers this comment: “[Our] aim is not to eliminate the passions but to redirect their energy. Uncontrolled rage must be turned into righteous indignation, spiteful jealousy into zeal for the truth, sexual lust into an eros that is pure in its fervour. The passions, then, are to be purified, not killed; to be educated, not eradicated; to be used positively, not negatively. To ourselves and to the others we say, not ‘Suppress,’ but ‘Transfigure.’”10

In light of these reflections, it is important to note that Thomas Aquinas was first and foremost a Christian thinker, heavily dependent on the writings of Sacred Scripture and of the holy Fathers. It is a total misrepresentation of him and his works to refer to him first as an Aristotelian. Where Thomas disagrees with Aristotle, he makes it clear that his thought cannot be synthesized with Christian theology and at times applies Aristotle’s logic to refute his esteemed ‘friend’. There are perhaps different tools utilized by Aquinas and Palamas but the job is completed and done with excellence by both. Review with me, for a moment, a phrase in Volume Four of the Philokalia, where Saint Gregory of Palamas relates his approach to the matter at hand. In section 58 in his treatise to the Most Reverend Nun Xenia he relates: “When every shameful indwelling passion has been expelled and the intellect,11 as already indicated, has returned wholly to itself, converting at the same time the other powers of the soul—and when through cultivating the virtues it sets the soul in good order, ever advancing to a more perfect state, ascending through its active spiritual progress and with God’s help cleansing itself more fully—then it not only expunges all imprints of evil but also rids itself of every accretion however good it is or appears to be.”

This thought of Palamas is comparable to the thought of Thomas on this anthropological theme. It is my contention that none of these similarities stand alone, but due to the fact that they are standing on a common foundation—they can make these similar assertions. Language 10 As quoted in Philokalia—The Eastern Christian Spiritual Texts—Selections Annotated & Explained—The Passions, p. 144. 11 It is important to note the enormous role that the intellect plays in the anthropology of Thomas Aquinas. ‘The intellect’ would be considered the highest faculty of the Soul in his thought—as in ‘And you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” (John 8:32). The knowledge of truth or right reason would then direct or influence the Will to do the right thing because of its prominent place.

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and presentation may differ but the intent is the same and so are the results—personal holiness. According to A.N. Williams: “Meyendorff, indeed, finds in a return to the source hope of bridging even the gap between Aquinas and Palamas themselves”. Williams reflects: “If the doctrinal conclusions of the East and the West seem divergent, and if the distance separating Palamas and Thomas Aquinas seems hard to cross, it is nonetheless true that both branches of the separated Christian world go back to a common Patristic tradition and, ultimately, to a common Gospel. If a common and concerted return to the sources could determine our attitude to teachers of the later date, the clash between the latter would perhaps become less violent.”12

Metropolitan Kallistos in a work entitled “Scholasticism and Orthodoxy” relates a similar sentiment as reported by A.N. Williams in The Ground of Union. “We may ask whether common ground may not yet be found with Palamas. If there is reason for some optimism on that point, it is because, as Ware notes, East and West shares a common past, and this past is patristic: it is false to contrast East and West, as if they were mutually exclusive, because such contrasts ignore the two traditions’ shared past”. Aquinas in his massive work of the Summa Theologiae (1265-1274) quotes John Damascene profusely. As a matter of fact, Damascene is quoted three hundred thirty-two times in this complete and unabridged Document. This thorough investigation should prove Aquinas’ dependence on this great saint. So, we can affirm what G.K. Chesterton in his biography on Aquinas expressed: “[St] Thomas did not reconcile Christ to Aristotle; he reconciled Aristotle to Christ.” 13 Although Saint John Damascene was not the exclusive source of Aquinas’ work, Damascene however dominated his sources as has been 12 These issues were discussed and juxtaposed in chapter 1—“The Problem and its History”—pp. 3-33. 13 Chesterton quotes Aquinas in his biography pertaining to use of pagan literature when he says: “True, man also can be an object; and even a deplorable object. But what man has done man may do; and if an antiquated old heathen called Aristotle can help me to do it I will thank him in all humility.” According to Contos (D. Phil Thesis—1960) pp. 43-44 “Palamas is not totally intolerant of profane learning; much of his own idiom is of Plotinian provenance through St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Dionysius, though he exerted a considerable influence towards the gradual liberation of Eastern theology from Hellenistic thought structure. His quarrel is not over its validity within its proper sphere, but over the failure to acknowledge its limits.”

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proven by this investigation into the most important work of Aquinas’ illustrious career. I will turn next to the celebrated work of Saint Gregory Palamas on the Passions and Virtues. In the work, there were several references to Saint John Damascene.14 This compelling fact was also discerned in many other of the works that were reviewed for this study. The work under consideration is entitled: Passions and Virtues according to Saint Gregory Palamas, by Anestis Kesselopoulos, and has frequent references not only to Damascene's work entitled Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, but also to many Biblical commentaries providing exegesis for clarification and support.15 Although each of these men, Aquinas and Palamas, had great and creative minds, they both remained within the parameters of Sacred Tradition in their deliberations on sacred teachings. A reference to the work of Saint John Damascene On the Virtues and the Vices will reveal the common insight. We read the following explanation: “Man is a twofold being comprising soul and body, and has two orders of senses and two corresponding orders of virtues. The senses of the soul, which are also called the faculties, are intellect, reason, opinion, fantasy and sense perception. The senses of the body are sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch. The virtues which belong to these senses are twofold and so, too, are the vices. Everyone should know how many virtues there are of the soul and how many of the body, and what kind of passions belong to the soul and what kind to the body. The virtues, which we ascribe to the soul, are primarily the four cardinal virtues: courage, moral judgement, self-restraint and justice.”16

The “contemporary” words that would be found in the works of Thomas Aquinas, as relates to the four cardinal virtues, would be courage, prudence, temperance and justice. 14 Gondreau (2002) finds that the “immediate source” of the distinction is Nemesius and Damascene (pp.201-2). As he observes, the distinction is also present explicitly in the anonymous author of the late twelfth-century De spiritu et anima, John of La Rochelle (fl. 1233-9), and Vincent of Beauvais (fl. 1250). Lagerlund and Yrjonsuuri (2002) suggest that John’s influence is so strong as to justify the claim that Thomas’s entire discussion of the emotions is “hardly original” (p. 15). 15 See notes 17, 19 of chapter one. Also notes 74 and 79 from chapter four. Additional references can be found in chapter five, notes 174 and 186 in Kesselopoulos 2004. 16 The Philokalia, 1981, Volume Two, St. John of Damaskos, On the Virtues and the Vices, p. 334.

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Leonidas C. Contos' in his Ph.D. thesis entitled The Concept of Theosis in Saint Gregory Palamas (1960) draws a similar conclusion: “The point is sharpened when we look at the individual figures rather than conciliar group portraits. We may with justice revere the titans of the fourth and fifth centuries as 'great Fathers', and their age as a golden one; but not to infer a subsequent 'iron age, much lower on the scale of spiritual vigour and authority'. For St. Maximus the Confessor and St. John of Damascus do not recede easily into the background”. To further strengthen this lineage of patristic and Middle Ages thought, Contos adds: “And if, as is often done, he delimits the patristic age with Damascene, the historical patrologist is still faced with the impossible alternative of ignoring St. Theodore Studium. By then he is deep within Byzantine territory, and his rubric cannot reasonably omit Photius, St. Symeon the New Theologian, St. Gregory Palamas”. The continuity and congruency of cogent philosophical and theological thought can be traced East and West back to these prominent theological figures as stated above. The least not being Damascene, who appears prominently on each list of authorities consulted by major figures from both sides of the theological debate 17. In Aquinas' text entitled On the Passions, Damascene is cited thirty-seven times. An example of his approach is the following: “On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. Xxi.]”. According to my view the Cappadocian Fathers as a whole (I mention them in light of the reference to Gregory of Nyssa stated above), are a meeting place for East and West theologically speaking. I have arrived at this conclusion after examining the sources used by both sides. The Cappadocian Fathers are Basil the Great (330-379), who was bishop of Caesarea; Basil's brother Gregory of Nyssa (c.330-395), who was bishop of Nyssa; and a close friend, Gregory of Nazianzus (329-389), who became Patriarch of Constantinople. The Cappadocia region, in modernday Turkey, was an early site of Christian activity, with several missions by Paul in this region. Anthropology, theological or otherwise, is complex and not easily understood even by such great men of which we are investigating. The confidence that we can draw from their common ancestry and experience 17 In Peter Lombard, A short Biography, De Ghellinck says the following: “About the same time he had in his hands the newly-finished translation of St. John Damascene by Burgundio of Pisa: all these details show the care he had to enlarge the circle of his knowledge.” De Ghellinck, J., 1913, Peter Lombard—A Short Biography, Encyclopedia Press, New York, p.3.

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cleanses the apparent muddied waters. Anestis Kesselopoulos, in the dedication page of his study Palamas on the Passions and Virtues sums up the mystery of Palamas’ insight as such: “For those who have escaped from the life of the passions which is contrary to nature, have trod along the ‘middle way’ of the virtues which is according to nature, and yearn to pass their lives in theosis, which is above nature”. I can sum it up in a shorter fashion thus: “Passions are contrary to nature; Virtues are according to nature; and Theosis is above nature”. Aquinas and his successors would be in total agreement with this summation; in my view, holiness is attainable, if we live above the passions. The East and West, i.e., Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, unlike Reformed Protestant theology, share the belief that human nature is wounded and not totally decimated. Therefore, there is a hope as conveyed by Apostle Peter when he says: “as His divine power has given to us all things that pertain to life and godliness, through the knowledge of Him who called us by glory and virtue, by which have been given to us exceedingly great and precious promises, that through these you may be partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust.”18 This distinction, unfettered by negativity, sets the stage for the successful process of sanctification without the contradiction which reasons that “although I have been given a 'New Heart' through redemption, it still is not good enough to allow the components of my soul to function faithfully to acquire sanctity on this side of heaven!”. Both Aquinas and Saint Gregory Palamas understood the limits of reason or intellectual powers and the need for true Revelation from God. Saint Gregory in this vein states the obvious to clarify the point, when he says: “Those who possess not only sensual and intellectual powers, but have been blessed with spiritual and supernatural grace as well, will know God not from creatures alone but, God being spirit, in a manner above sense and intellect, spiritually, as they become God’s altogether, knowing God in God.”19 In his book Introduction to St. Gregory Palamas, George C. Papademetriou 20 states regarding the apophatic way21: “Palamas follows 18 2 Peter 1:3-4. 19 Triads II, iii, 68; Contra AK. iv, xv, 3. 20 In his Introduction, Rev. Dr. George C. Papademetriou encourages the study of St. Gregory Palamas for this important reason: “His theology can make a significant contribution to current attempts at dialogue between Orthodox Christians and Western Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, and hence merits the serious consideration of all contemporary theologians.” Papademetriou, 2004, Preface. I hope that in some small way I have contributed to that dialogue.

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the Damascene in his method to the knowledge of truth.”22 I have attempted to ground my research in the deep well of patristic texts to trace the streams of truth to the well sealed oasis of Truth. I believe that there have been many connections unearthed to the works of Saint John Damascene when discussing the formidable theologians of the East in Saint Gregory Palamas and of the West in Thomas Aquinas. Their works must be read side by side with an understanding of the journeys and academic backgrounds of all involved.23 Papademetriou explains as he uncovers the early training of Saint Gregory Palamas: “He attended schools in Constantinople and studied under the direction of the noted theologian and philosopher Theodore Metochites. He studied the liberal arts and specialized in the field of philosophy. He was a brilliant student of philosophy, especially of Aristotle”.24 A pertinent quote from Metropolitan Panteleimon of Veroia, Naousa and Kampania given on 10 March 2012 at the Conference of Saint Gregory Palamas in Greece related the following: “For St. Gregory, secular philosophy was the start, the research and learning alongside eminent scholars of his time in Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire. And he had such a deep knowledge of secular philosophy and was so skilled in the use of philosophical terms and syllogisms, that, as is evidenced by his biographer, the patriarch of Constantinople, Saint Philotheos Kokkinos, when engaged in a philosophical discussion before the Emperor Andronicus II Palaeologos, his answers on the logical writings of Aristotle made the Great Logothete, Theodore Metochites, a profoundly knowledgeable commentator on the ancient philosopher, to declare that if Aristotle himself had been present and listening, he too would have praised him highly.” His Eminence went on to qualify his statement by saying: “The deep and comprehensive knowledge of philosophy does not transform St. Gregory into its captive…”. In his work entitled The Triads, Saint Gregory Palamas has a treatise entitled “Philosophy does not save”, where he is very emphatic about this point. However, this sentiment in the light of the context of which he was writing is not all conclusive as illustrated by several passages in the works of Saint Gregory Palamas, where illusion to philosophical terms are adhered to. Similarly in the philosophical writings of Saint John 21 Pertaining to a knowledge of God obtained through negation. 22 Papademetriou, 2004, p. 72. 23 The disputations and the scholastic approach to debate which was utilized by Thomas Aquinas was the norm for academia in his day in Western Europe. This style would be categorized as formal academic debate. 24 Papademetriou, 2004, p. 3.

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Damascene, we find references to Aristotle; for instance, in Chapter 58 in Philosophical Chapters, he says the following: “The act of the one had and of the one having, as that of the arms and the armed or that of the wearer and the worn, is called a habit.”25 In this passage he is referencing to Aristotle's Categories X. He further states in Chapter 67 the nature of Philosophy when he explains: “Philosophy is knowledge of things which are in so far as they are; that is to say, knowledge of their nature. Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things. Philosophy is a study of death, both that which is deliberate and that which is natural. Philosophy is becoming like God, in so far as this is possible for man. Now, it is in justice, sanctity, and goodness that we become like God. And justice is that which is distributive of equity; …Philosophy is the art of arts and the science of sciences, for, since through philosophy every art is discovered, it is the principle underlying every art. Philosophy is love of wisdom. But, the true wisdom is God. Therefore, the love of God—this is the true philosophy.”26

I do not believe that either Palamas or Aquinas would disagree with this fine assessment of Philosophy. It validates its function in apologetics to satisfy the Thomists, and it alludes to deification to appeal to the Palamites. As was admitted in the recent reconciliation of two estranged groups of Christians a comment was made to this effect “we were saying the same things using different terms”;27 I believe that a similar assessment can be attributed to the works of Palamas and Aquinas in the realm of theological anthropology; the injuries that separate East and West are not just theological or linguistic but they also have to do with personal history and hurt. May God help us to push through our differences by giving us illumination into the process of deification, even if our terms sound alien to each other.

Works Cited Chesterton, G.K., 1933, St. Thomas Aquinas, USA, Ignatius Press, San Francisco. Kesselopoulos, A., 2004, Palamas on the Passions and Virtues, ttranslated and edited by Hieromonk Alexis (Trader) of the Holy Monastery of Karakallou Mount Athos and Harry Michael Boosalis, ST. Tikhon’s 25 Cf. Aristotle, Categories X. 26 St. John of Damascus, 1958, Writings, “Philosophical Chapters”, pp.90-106. 27 This reference refers to two groups of Christians who had been separated by language rather than by content who were reconciled after many years.

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Seminary Press, South Canaan, Pennsylvania. Meyendorff, John, 1964, A Study of Gregory Palamas, The Faith Press, London. Miner, Robert, 2009, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. St. Gregory Palamas, 1983, The Triads, edited with an Introduction by John Meyendorff, ttranslated by Nicholas Gendle, Paulist Press, New York. Palmer, G.E.H., Sherrard, Phillip, and Ware, Kallistos (eds. and trans.), 1995, The Philokalia: The Complete Text, Volume Four, Faber and Faber, London. Papademetriou, George C., 2004, Introduction to St. Gregory Palamas, Holy Cross Orthodox Press, Brookline, Massachusetts: St. John of Damascus, 1958, Writings, translated by Frederic H. Chase, The Fathers of the Church, The Catholic University of America Press Washington D.C. Veniamin, Christopher (ed. and trans.), 2009, Saint Gregory Palamas— The Homilies, Mount Thabor Publishing, Essex, England. Williams, A.N., 1999, The Ground of Union, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford.

SAINT GREGORY PALAMAS: A NON-PHILOSOPHICAL PHILOSOPHER REV. MICHAEL PACELLA III

It is commonly understood that a philosopher is one who loves wisdom and who seeks the truth. Using this criterion, many sages throughout history would qualify as philosophers. Some in the contemporary culture argue that Christianity is not a Religion, but rather a Philosophy.1 I will argue in this paper that it is both a Religion and a Philosophy. I will also argue that Christianity has successfully used the tool of philosophical reasoning to explain some of her most complex and astonishing of theological mysteries in her defense against heresy; and also to communicate to the secular world intangible realities. This is a clear part of the Church’s legacy and of Sacred Tradition.2 Metropolitan Kallistos Ware in a study entitled: “Scholasticism and Orthodoxy” reveals the following: “If these charges [regarding failings of Western theological method] are to be convincing, they must be formulated with greater precision and fully supported by evidence….[Orthodox critics of scholasticism] must indicate with specific reference to the sources, how and when Anselm and Abelard, Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas applied logic to matters beyond logic’s scope. They must indicate in detail how Aquinas relied on philosophy in a way that the Cappadocians and St. 1 “In the Middle Ages philosophy was assigned a secondary role. Its role in society during this epoch is usually defined as follows: “Philosophy is the serving girl of Theology.” However, this is but one view of the issue—what we learn from this expression is that Theology needed Philosophy and used the intellectual arsenal of the latter for its own ends…Thinkers of the Patristic epoch even called the Christian Faith their Philosophy, implying that Christianity had replaced Philosophy primarily as a way of life [The very theme of this conference!] to be considered worthy….Thus the only viable philosophy was religious philosophy.” A.A. Guseynov “Philosophy as an Ethical Project”, The 23rd World Congress of Philosophy, Plenary Session Talk (Athens, 4-10 August 2013) Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, page 13. 2 The language used in the Council of Nicea AD 325 while formulating the Creed illustrates this point.

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John of Damascus did not.”3 Discernment and caution has been encouraged in this process as in the case of great philosophical thinkers such as Saint Basil the Great (329-379 AD) in his “Address To Young Men On The Right Use of Greek Literature”.4 There was however, never a complete rejection of philosophy as a tool used to communicate revelation in this fashion in the history of Christianity, just proposed modifications. In Saint Gregory Palamas’ first part of Topics of Natural and Theological Science and on the Moral and Ascetic Life: One Hundred and Fifty Texts, one could easily have mistaken the words of Saint Gregory Palamas for the words of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) or even of Aristotle himself! In section one of this treatise he states: “Since the nature of this world is such that everything in it requires a specific cause in each instance, and since without such a cause nothing can exist at all, the very nature of things demonstrates that there must be a first principle which is self-existent and does not derive from any other principle”. He further states in section two: “That the world not only has an origin but will also have a consummation is affirmed by the fact that all things in it are contingent, and indeed it is partially coming to an end all the time”. In section three he refers to the ancient Greek sages providing a modification of their thought.5 It is important to note that Saint Gregory Palamas was very familiar with ancient Greek literature in light of his early training. He has not rejected it in my estimation, but has simply put it in its proper place in light of revelation. The early fathers that Saint Gregory Palamas esteemed especially John of Damascus (c.675-c.749) and Dionysios the Areopagite (c.500) whom he thought was an excellent scholar (“St. Dionysios the Areopagite, the most eminent theologian after the divine apostles…”)6 freely used these tools as servants of the Gospel. In his work The Triads, Saint Gregory has a section entitled “Philosophy does not save”7 where he emphasizes this point. However, he 3 Ware, “Scholasticism and Orthodoxy.” p.24—as found in A.N. Williams, The Ground of Union, p.4. 4 Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) a “contemporary” of Saint Gregory Palamas took similar liberties in conveying the truths of the Gospel by using ‘pagan’ literature as a tool to communicate Eternal Truth. 5 The Philokalia—The complete Text compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St Makarios of Corinth (Volume Four), pp. 346-347. 6 This citation is located in section 85 of the 150 Texts. 7 “The relation of philosophy to theology is discussed by Palamas in various writings and especially in the Triads. In the First Triad the question was posed: Is secular wisdom necessary for salvation? Palamas’ response was that divine

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makes other statements that put him square within this enduring tradition. For instance he says: “But if one says that philosophy, insofar as it is natural, is a gift of God, then one says a truth without contradiction, and without incurring the accusation that falls on those who abuse philosophy and pervert it to an unnatural end.”8 The issue for Palamas is the perversion and over-extension of the function of philosophy. Also, as Meyendorff notes, philosophical thought is accepted by Palamas within its proper limits.9 Other selections from the Homilies of Saint Gregory also expose this dependence. For example, in his Homily on the Transfiguration I, he addresses the inconsistency of the Greeks in their thought. It would stand to reason that in order to refute a thought system one must be well versed with its contents. Palamas’ feud with Barlaam the Calabrian is evident of this reality, as will be further discussed. Palamas declares the following: “We are filled with praise and Wonder, when we see this magnificent work of God, the entire visible creation. The pagan Greek sages also extolled and admired it as they investigated it. But whereas we marvel at it to the glory of the Creator, they did so against His glory, for in their wretchedness they worshipped the creature rather than the Creator (cf. Rom. 1:25)”.10

knowledge, which leads to salvation, is derived from revelation and prayer. However, Palamas does not dismiss philosophy and science, nor does he condemn human or secular knowledge. He emphasizes that natural science does not bring salvation. Secular philosophy and science should be used with care as the doctor uses medicine derived from the flesh of the serpent. There is benefit from secular learning, just as there is therapeutic value in the substance of the serpent’s flesh…Palamas insists that philosophy introduces one to the knowledge of beings but this is not adequate to attain the grace of the Holy Spirit. For Palamas secular wisdom as a method is useful to discern truth, as in the medicine made from the serpent’s flesh that avoids the mixture with poison that leads to heresy.” George C. Papademetriou, Introduction to St. Gregory Palamas—The Essence of God, Holy Cross Orthodox Press. Brookline, Massachusetts. 2004, pp. 66-67. 8 “A very important admission on the part of Palamas, who here explicitly accepts the legitimacy of philosophy and the natural sciences within their proper limits.” 9 According to Contos (D. Phil Thesis—1960) pages 43-44 “Palamas is not totally intolerant of profane learning; much of his own idiom is of Plotinian provenance through St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Dionysius, though he exerted a considerable influence towards the gradual liberation of Eastern theology from Hellenistic thought structure. His quarrel is not over its validity within its proper sphere, but over the failure to acknowledge its limits.” 10 Christopher Veniamin, ed., The Saving Work of Christ—Sermons by Saint

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He further states in the same Homily: “There are people in our own times, who boast of pagan Greek learning and the wisdom of this world, and who completely disobey spiritual men in matters of the Spirit, and choose to oppose them”.11 Yet in an earlier Sermon On the Presentation, he alludes to characters and places such as Acheron and the Styx!12 Is Saint Gregory Palamas inconsistent or is he unaware of his own mechanisms? This is the line of thinking that I will pursue in this study: to clarify the subordinate role that secular literature has in light of the revelation of Sacred Scripture and the corresponding role of biblical experience in the thought of Saint Gregory Palamas. He reiterates this line of reasoning in his Second Sermon on the Transfiguration, when he says: “But when, for all these reasons, it clearly appeared that this light is divine, supernatural and uncreated, what befalls those who are excessively taken up with secular, non-spiritual learning, and who are incapable of understanding the things of the Spirit?”13 From this statement is Saint Gregory Palamas declaring that there is no truth at all in secular literature? The evidence does not bear it out! Is it possible that a precedent for this thinking can be discovered in the works of Saint Augustine?14 In their book Love of Wisdom, authors Cowan and Spiegel state: “In our introduction we made the claim that philosophy is the handmaid of theology. In the present context, this means that philosophy assists theology in clarifying the nature of theological truth-claims.”15 Abuse and Gregory Palamas, Mount Thabor Publishing 2008, p. 39. 11 Ibid. page 45. 12 Ibid. page 18. 13 Ibid. page 54. 14 “…so that, as long as we are exiled from there [sc. the heavenly city], we may bear with those, if we cannot correct them, who, with vices unpunished, want the preservation of the commonwealth that the first Romans established and increased by their virtues; though they did not have true piety towards the true God, which was able to lead them to the eternal city by saving religion, even so they maintained an uprightness proper to them, which was able to suffice for the great wealth and fame, the power of civil virtues, even without the true religion, so that it might be understood that, with this true religion added, human beings are made citizens of another city, whose ruler is true, whose light is charity, and whose measure is eternity” (Ep. 138.17, written in 412). “…these people, who showed Babylonian love for the earthly homeland, and by civic virtue, not true virtue but similar to true virtue, served demons or human glory”, Terence Irwin, ed., Augustine: The Development of Ethics. A Historical and Critical Study, Volume 1: From Socrates to The Reformation, Oxford University Press 2007 p. 427. 15 Love of Wisdom, p. 44.

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an improper order of hierarchy was the concern of Saint Gregory Palamas not philosophy’s validity. For some, who have encountered a living faith, their ethnicity and its practices, have become re-ordered and subordinate to their new faith. If there should be a philosophical conflict in the future, faith always takes the pre-eminence. For instance, the Italians are great lovers of wine. However, in America some Christians find it scandalous to drink wine at any time. Italians in a church in Cortland, New York, decided to give up making and drinking wine for the sake of the Gospel and for the weaker brethren (1 Corinthians 8:13). Joseph Felice (c.1889 – c.1978) a veteran of WWI, whom I knew, was such a man. Priorities, not philosophy, is what needs to be emphasized here. When a man or woman chooses their careers over their families, it is a wrongly ordered priority. One does not throw the baby out with the bathwater, but instead separates them in the value of their priority and worth. Language is a science, even more so grammar with its many rules, which cannot be altered. Philosophy has laws, especially laws having to do with logic. Palamas would respect the parameters of these disciplines and even utilize them, but never concede to the fact that revelation (especially as manifested through the Sacred Scripture), was inferior to them or even needed to be evaluated by them. Reason, as a component in the discipline of moral reasoning in the philosophical branch of Ethics, utilizes all of the capabilities of the soul to solve a moral problem. Revelation confirms this exercise, however, a spiritually dull person cannot discern the revelation without the aid of the faculty of reason. Palamas, in the treatise stated above, is not talking to an audience that is in need of Evangelism, but instead of holiness, i.e., deification (theosis and divinization also are words which will be used in this context). The use of philosophy is a precursor to true evangelism: the preaching of the Gospel that pierces the soul with a spiritual awaking. (See for example Saint Paul at Mars Hill with the philosophers of his day in Acts 17:16-34; an event that took place right here in Athens). By referring to Saint Gregory as a non-philosophical Philosopher, my intention is to refocus the theological terminology to the vernacular that was utilized in the formation of Christian doctrine and used in dialogue as stated above. Things were not explained in a flat literal way which is the unfortunate approach of many Christians today. Many of the Church Fathers (e.g., Saint Justin Martyr and Saint John Chrysostom) were philosophical theologians, who understood the principle of approaching the natural realm, before entering the spiritual realm, when unfolding a spiritual mystery. “Chrysostom was educated by one of the leading pagan teachers of his day, Libanius. In his writings, John cites more than 15 ancient Greek philosophers, including at least 30 references

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to Plato”.16 Like it or not this is the true Christian intellectual heritage. As editor and translator of The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, Robert E. Sinkewwicz, C.S.B., says: “The present study has arrived at a number of interesting conclusions that contribute to a fuller understanding of the works of Gregory Palamas. In spite of his hearty polemic against profane wisdom, Palamas had considerable familiarity with the scientific revival of his time and was capable of discoursing on such subjects at least on the popular level.”17

In the West, there are doctrines that are considered De Fide (i.e., of the faith), and must be adhered to, if one is to remain faithful to the tradition. There are traditions that are not salvific and do not have to be practiced in order for one to be saved. The encouragement and propagation of Thomistic scholasticism especially in Catholic Universities is not a necessary absolute requirement for those who teach in Catholic Universities, however it is strongly encouraged and has been as recently as 1998 by Blessed Pope John Paul II in his treatise Fides et Ratio sections 43-44 (“This is why the Church has been justified in consistently proposing Saint Thomas as a master of thought and a model of the right way to do theology”). In his Introduction “Know Yourself”, John Paul II comments on how the East and the West utilized Philosophy and offers an insight into the rejection of the same by Tertullian citing his famous saying: “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” He says the following: “In both East and West, we may trace a journey which has led humanity down the centuries to meet and engage truth more and more deeply.” In section 3 paragraph 2, these words are penned: “Philosophy’s powerful influence on the formation and development of the cultures of the West should not obscure the influence it has also had upon the ways of understanding existence found in the East.”18 Men like Origen and Tertullian were on two different sides of the argument, however, it is apparent that although the rhetoric is present that opposes this pedagogy, it is practiced almost subliminally by all. Origen had a great influence on the Cappadocian Fathers, who are highly esteemed in the East. It should be noted that two of the three Cappadocian Fathers have ties to Plato’s 16 Kevin Dale Miller, “Did you know? Little-known and remarkable facts about John Chrysostom”, Christian History, Issue 44, Vol. XIII, No.4. 17 Robert E. Sinkewicz, C.S.B., ed., The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, A Critical Edition, Translation and Study, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988, Foreword. 18 ٝ Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, Encyclical letter given in Rome, at Saint Peter’s, on 14 September 1998.

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Academy.19 Rowan continues: “Indeed, one can argue that this is what explains why he continued to be read in the Church even after his supposed errors were rejected. Moreover, his influence upon the Cappadocian Fathers of the fourth century means that he is an important source for theology that became the classical articulation of Christian spirituality. Basil the Great, Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa preserved Origen’s thought for the Church and adapted it to a theological explanation of monasticism understood as the perfect life meant to be lived by all”.20 To continue to build the case of this spiritual heritage, he explains: “Through the Cappadocians, Origen’s influence extends to Evagrius Ponticus, the Pseudo-Dionysius, John Cassian, and so to all Christian monasticism, both Eastern and Western”.21 Hans Urs Von Balthasar echoes this belief when he says: “Origen was as towering a figure as Augustine and Aquinas…In the Eastern Church his mysticism of ascent to God remained immensely powerful through medieval and modern times, more powerful than the mysticism of 'dazzling darkness' of the Pseudo-Areopagite…”22 It was also pointed out that like Palamas and his desire to prioritize the two disciplines that “such a statement needs nuance: If his earlier work De Principiis (c.230) still expressed a belief in the possibility of incorporating the Greek world view into Revelation, a late apologetic work, Contra Celsum (c.249) shows how sharp his eye had become to basic distinctions”.23 The question then remains: “Were they philosophical in their orientation? Was Saint Gregory Palamas dependent at all on these mechanisms? Even in his defence against Barlaam did he not have to understand the arguments in order to refute them? Of course we know from history that Saint Gregory Palamas approached the challenge with grace and even complemented his opponent for his wisdom.24 An 19 This not well known fact was explained to me during a discussion at Plato’s Academy on August 6, 2013, with two of my colleagues, who were also attending the conference as we were walking the grounds. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid, Preface XI: “The excellent introduction to this volume demonstrates that as a pure philosopher he was not original but rather he made use of the Hellenistic thought of his day (a mélange of Platonism, Stoicism, and popular philosophy) as a medium for conveying to his contemporaries the depth and breadth of biblical Revelation”. 23 Ibid, “Origen did not wish to be a philosopher but a theologian…” 24 As Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos writes: “At first he did it with great humility and discretion. He finished one of his letters to Barlaam by saying that in spite of the reproach that he felt against Barlaam for his erroneous ideas on serious

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insightful passage from Andrew Louth addresses this oversight. He says the following: “One general and fundamental problem of Patristic theology is its relationship to contemporary Hellenistic culture, dominated, as it was, by ways of thinking which had their roots in Plato; and it was in terms of such methods of thought that Christian theology found its first intellectual expression” (Andrew Louth 2007, p. xi). This is nothing to be reticent about; simply because one uses a literary device does not mean that they sanction the entire world view. In my estimation, a contemporary of Palamas was best at it; I speak of the celebrated Dante Alighieri (12651321). In a talk sponsored by The Oxford Orthodox Christian Student Society on October 20, 2011, Fr. Andrew Louth in his address “Aquinas and Orthodoxy” proposed a connection between Greek philosophy, Saint Basil the Great and Saint Gregory Palamas regarding the teaching on essence and energies. I would like to continue to make that connection, so as to harness the misconception that the West separates Dogmatic from Mystical theology. Fr. Louth in this light also astutely states that Aquinas’ early training was in a monastic setting. There is no doubt that there are limitations to reason and intellect due to the fall of humankind. However, within the process of divinization25 are there no facilities of the soul restored? If the first human had extraordinary abilities (naming the animals in light of their natures), why is it so fascinating that redemption could restore the soul of humans? See for example Psalm 23:3 “He restores my soul”. To repair to the original condition is the connotation of this text; does that mean that the faculties of the soul can be repaired? The prophet Ezekiel (11:19) talks about a day, when a new heart would be given to God’s people; does this speak of a physical heart or of a psychological disposition? “I will give them an undivided heart and put a new spirit in them; I will remove from them their heart of stone and give them a heart of flesh” (NIV). In refuting the Greek notion that the body is restricting and even evil, the Christian anthropologist must oppose this theological questions, he still maintained the same love for him. He called him a very wise man, the best of those who loved and were loved, and he emphasised that in spite of the dispute, the state of peace would be maintained. At the same time he expressed the desire that they should meet to embrace with a holy kiss. Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos, “Palamas: The Dispute With Barlaam”, Preachers Institute/The World’s Premier Online Christian Homiletics Resource, February 25, 2010. 25 “Divinization [then], for Athanasius, is the sharing fully in the life of the Trinity and it is this sharing in the divine life that thoroughly transforms the believer into the adopted likeness of the Son.”—Revd Dr Thomas G. Weinandy.

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thought with the idea of redemption and restoration of the soul; if not, then Christendom denies the transforming power of the cross and any hope of theosis. Saint John Chrysostom in his Commentary on the Psalms, reminds the reader of the Christocentric purpose of the Psalms, when he says commenting on Psalm 45: “This psalm, you see, was composed with Christ in mind; hence it bears the title 'for the beloved' and 'those to be changed'. He worked a great change in us, remember, both a transformation and an alteration in our very condition. Paul, too, suggests this change in the words: “So that if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation”.26 A good example of such a conversion can be observed in the life of The Strong Saint Abba Moses (c. 325-c.400): “In the Lausiac History we read: 'There was a black man named Moses who was by nationality Ethiopian'. He was also tall, or to use Rosweyde’s word, longus. He followed a contemptible, criminal way of life. According to Sozomen: 'Although he was a slave, Moses was expelled from his master’s house because of his wickedness; he turned to a life of brigandage and rose to become a leader of a band of thieves'. Palladius wrote that he was 'the slave of a state official'. He mentions his egregious acts of unbridled barbarism and abominable crimes. By the Grace of God, Moses turned from this sullied course of life by means of true repentance, with a contrite and humble heart, which God’s mercy does not despise'. In addition to this Palladius said: 'This prince of thieves was ultimately in the latter portion of his life brought to feel compunction in virtue of some disaster that befell him, and took himself to a monastery.” “In this way, he achieved a remarkable degree of holiness'”.27 A modern version of conversion can be found in many present day testimonials. One such story was published recently28 in the Yale Alumni Magazine: “Faith, in poetry— Christian Wiman lost his faith in God, fell in love with poetry, edited a prestigious magazine, got married, got sick, and found God again. Now he’s teaching at Yale.” A substantiating thought provided by The Letters Of Saint Anthony The Great (251-356) provides insight into the desired end being the conversion of the sinner. He states: “There are souls which at first were hard of heart and persisted in the works of sin; and somehow the good God in his mercy sends upon such souls the chastisement of affliction, till they grow weary, and come to their senses, and are converted…”29

26 Robert Charles Hill, ed., St. John Chrysostom, Commentary on the Psalms, Exposition on Psalm 45, p. 257. 27 His Grace Bishop Serapion, ed., Saints of the Church Series—The Strong Saint Abba Moses, p. 8. 28 Yale Alumni Magazine, May/June 2013, pp. 50-54. 29 A Letter of Anthony the Solitary and Chief of Solitaries to the brethren dwelling

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In Clement's (96-98 AD) Letter to the Corinthians there are several passages that indicate a precedent had been set regarding the use of Pagan literature in communicating the Good News—i.e., The Gospel. He relates in section [6, 1] the following: “Because of jealousy women were persecuted, Danaids and Dirces (3), suffering frightful and unholy indignities. Stalwart, they finished the racecourse of the faith and received a noble reward…”30 He also makes reference to the well known story of the phoenix.31 I present this information to again illustrate the heritage that Saint Gregory Palamas is drawing from: a heritage that esteemed the Gospel truth above all, but, it was not reluctant to draw from the sources of pagan literature as a means of communicating the truth of the Gospel. All Truth is God’s Truth32, so therefore Saint Gregory Palamas is too in this line of a great intellectual heritage: the non philosophical philosopher!

in every place, Translated by Derwas J. Chitty, Published by SLG Press—Convent of the Incarnation, Fairacres, Oxford, 2005, p. 1. 30 “The daughters of Danaus were slain by unknown tortures; and Dirce was dragged to her death, tied to the horns of a bull. Such mythological references as these would not be lost on Clement’s audience.” 31 “The myth of the phoenix is well-known in antiquity. In De defectu oraculorum Plutarch cites Hesiod’s statement…(Apud Thorndike, History of magic and Experimental Science, Vol. 1, p. 207). The phoenix is known also to Philostratus, Horapollo, The Book of Enoch (Old Slavonic version), Herodotus, Ovid, Pliny the Elder, Tacitus, and doubtless many others. The best-known account of the phoenix in Christian literature is the De ave phoenice, uncertainly attributed to Lactantius.” See William A. Jurgens, The Faith of the Early Fathers, Volume 1,1970. 32 This tradition was continued in the West by Rene’ Descartes as illustrated when he relates in 1641 “To those Most Wise and Distinguished Men, the Dean and Doctors of the Faculty of Sacred Theology of Paris—Rene’ Descartes sends Greetings.” “For although it suffices for us believers to believe by faith that the human soul does not die with the body, and that God exists, certainly no unbelievers seem capable of being persuaded of any religion or even of almost any moral virtue, until these two are first proven to them by natural reason…In fact, I have observed that not only do you and all other theologians affirm that one can prove the existence of God by natural reason, but also that one may infer from Sacred Scripture that the knowledge of him is easier to achieve than the many things we know about creatures, and is so utterly easy that those without this knowledge are blame worthy. For this is clear from Wisdom, chapter 13 where it is said: “They are not to be excused, for if their capacity for knowing were so great that they could think well of this world, how is it that they did not find the Lord of it even more easily?” And in Romans, chapter 1, it is said that they are “without excuse.” Rene Descartes, 2006, Letter of Dedication, p. 1.

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Works Cited Descartes, Rene, 2006, Meditations, Objections, and Replies, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Donald Cress, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge. Guseynov, A. A., 2013, Philosophy as an Ethical Project, 23rd World Congress of Philosophy Plenary Session Talk (Athens, 4-10 August 2013), Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Irwin, Terrence, 2007, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, Volume I : From Socrates to the Reformation, Oxford University Press. Louth, Andrew, 2007, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition. From Plato to Denys, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press; reprinted 2009. Meyendorff, John, 1964, A Study of Gregory Palamas, translated by George Lawrence, Faith Press, London. Plested, Marcus, 2012, Orthodox Readings of Aquinas: Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology, Oxford University Press. Rogich, Daniel M., 1995, translation, introduction and notes, Saint Gregory Palamas: Treatise on the Spiritual Life, Light and Life Publishing Company, Minneapolis, Minnesota. St. Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St. Makarios of Corinth, 1995, The Philokalia, The Complete Text, Volume Four, translated from the Greek and edited by G.E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard and Kallistos Ware. Faber and Faber Limited, London. Veniamin, Christopher, Editor, 2008, The Saving Work of Christ: Sermons by Saint Gregory Palamas, Mount Thabor Publishing, Waymart, PA. Williams, A. N., 1999, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas, Oxford University Press.

THE PROBLEM OF DEIFICATION PATRÍCIA CALVÁRIO

1. Introduction The Hesychast Saints, with their experience of uncreated light, of which the philosopher Barlaam said was a physical light or, at worst, a devilish hallucination, show that in this life man has the ability, through deifying grace, to attain communion with God. Such deification can manifest itself through a radiance similar to that of transfiguration of Jesus at Mount Tabor. The radiance of this light, which also is a deifying light (Triads 1, 3, 5)1 St Gregory explains, is owed to the fact that the whole of man takes part in such divinization, which also includes a transfiguration of the body itself: “For just as those who abandon themselves to sensual and corruptible pleasures fix all the desires of their soul upon the flesh, and indeed become entirely flesh… so too, in the case of those who have elevated their minds to God and exalted their souls with divine longing, their flesh also is being transformed and elevated, participating together with the soul in the divine communion and becoming itself a dwelling and possession of God”(Tr. 1, 2, 9).2 St Gregory’s position raises some issues: how can God’s transcendence be made harmonious with the deifying union, or even preserved under such a union? Gregory maintains God’s transcendence asserting the impossibility of communion with His essence and holds the deifying union through the “doctrine of energies.” Yet, this solution, far from being a mere finishing line, also is the onset of new problems related with the simplicity and unity of divine essence. How can we discern essence (ousia) and energies (energeiai) in God? And how are we to distinguish the energies from one another? Doesn’t this attribute a certain division in God? Or, rephrasing the problem, how can unity and distinction, 1 Triads (from now on Tr.), p.373. All quotations are from the following edition of the complete works of St Gregory: PERRELLA, E. (2003) G. Palamas. Atto e luce divina. Scritti filosofici e teologici. Milano: Bompiani. 2 See also Tr. 2, 2, 12-14.

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indivisibility and divisibility harmoniously co-exist in God? These questions were discussed in the tripartite apology for the Hesychast saints, more specifically, the third Triad. Equally important is the work entitled Divine and Deifying Participation or the Divine and Supernatural Simplicity, even though we can find, somewhat scattered through Gregory’s entire work, passages on this subject. We shall first try to establish what St Gregory means by deification. After this, we shall try to follow the arguments used by the Saint in order to defend his view. We hold that deification, as full union with God, can be asserted only if the distinction between energy and essence is accepted. If this distinction in God is not made, we would have two possible conclusions: 1. If deification is to partake in God itself, then all the saints would be God or co-substantial to the Father. 2. Deification is just a mere union of knowledge with God. Thus, the distinction is essential to reconcile deification, as a true transfiguration of the entire man, including body as well, with God’s transcendence.

2. Deification In this chapter, we will show what deification is according to Palamas. To define deification Palamas makes use of a passage from Maximus the Confessor: “Deification is an enhypostatic and direct illumination which has no beginning but appears in those worthy as something exceeding their comprehension. It is indeed a mystical union with God beyond intellect and reason, in the age when creatures will no longer know corruption. Thanks to this union, the saints, observing the light of the hidden and more-than-ineffable glory become themselves able to receive the blessed purity, in company with celestial powers. Deification is also the invocation of the great God and Father, the symbol of the authentic and real adoption, according to the gift and grace of the Holy Spirit, thanks to the bestowal of which grace the saints become and will remain the sons of God”.3

From this passage, we may say that deification is a direct illumination, a mystical union with God and, finally, becoming son of God. St Gregory asserts that deification starts in this life, that it encompasses the body and it can manifest itself as light.4 This light is of the same nature as the light of Christ’s Transfiguration, of Paul’s illumination while on the road to Damascus, of Stephen’s and Moses’ faces; Adam too enjoyed this light in 3 Tr. 3, 1, 28. 4 Cfr. Tr. 3, 1, 34.

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Paradise, in fact, his very garments were made of this light, when in Paradise. The second part of the third Triad is dedicated to demonstrate the supernatural character of deification. This could not be natural nor a perfecting of man’s natural qualities. Though ascetic exercises are recommended, deification is a qualitative transformation ultimately conceded by God through deifying grace: “you should learn that deification isn’t simply the acquisition of virtue, but that the splendor and grace of God can inhabit us due to virtue, as stated by great Basil, a soul who has enhanced its natural impulses through ascetic exercise and with the help of the Spirit becomes worthy, in God’s righteous judgment, of the splendor of God bestowed by grace upon the saints”.5 Palamas presents some reasons that lead him to defend that deification is not the actualization of a natural potency. It isn’t a natural potency first of all because, if it were, the deified would necessarily, by nature, be God.6 We could ask whether, in this case, since God is man’s creator, wouldn’t He also be, ultimately, the cause of all natural potencies of its creation, including deification? In Triads 1, 1, 22, when speaking of philosophy and true knowledge, Palamas distinguishes nature’s gifts from those of grace. God is the origin of both gifts. In the case of natural gifts, there is a wide engagement of man’s own capacities, that is, nature’s gifts can be developed through exercise and are, moreover, bestowed equally upon everyone. It is precisely the fact that it is possible to develop them through personal effort that makes apparent the natural nature of the gifts. Nonetheless, there is, I believe, a problem, which is that of the will regarding deification. How is man’s will engaged in deification? Though such complex matter can’t be dealt with in a mere few lines, we have to address it, even if only superficially. Palamas asserts that the Saints receive, as a “prize” for their exit to God, the very God that establishes himself in them in virtue of a filiation of the Holy Spirit. More than once he asserts that deification isn’t just the acquisition of virtue, but that the glory of God can reside in the saints through virtue, as stated by St. Basil: “a soul who has enhanced her natural gifts through ascetic exercise and with the help of the Spirit becomes worthy, in God’s righteous judgement, of the splendour of God bestowed by grace upon the saints”.7 If grace’s gifts depend exclusively on God, though man might want to acquire them through ascetic exercises that make him able to receive them, it is God who holds the final word, it is 5 Tr. 3, 1, 27. 6 Cf. Tr. 3, 1, 26. 7 Tr. 3, 1, 27.

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only God by virtue of the finality of His sovereignty, who can “give the increase” (1 Cor 3, 6). So, what should be done in order to obtain the spiritual gifts? To pray? To weep?8 Sometimes, St Gregory seems to claim that there is a kind of fatalism in deification. When he, for instance, says that to each and every one there is a peculiar way of participating in God’s energies9 and also that God has organized the whole universe and formed it “of multiple aspects and wanted some things merely to be, while others would have not only existence but also life; and that some were bestowed with intellective life, while others with sensitive life only; and that some had a mixture of both; and that, of those whom he gave a sensitive and intellective life, some, by a voluntary inclination towards him, were granted unity with him and so lived in a divine and supernatural manner, while considered worthy of his grace and of his divinely operative act”.10 On the other hand, he says that God conveys himself to man in “many and varied ways according to his dignity and the manner in which He is searched”.11 Gregory explains that there is a cooperation of man with God, a synergy, that is, a simultaneous concurrence of grace and human will.12 Nonetheless, we’re not sure that the problem can be solved...13 Let us then leave the question open. Palamas’ opponents assure that, even conceding that the grace in which the saints take communion is uncreated, that is owed exclusively to the fact that all creatures are in God, that all creatures participate naturally in God as their ontological support and not because a supernatural gift is 8 About compunction (penthos) see Hausherr, I. (1944) Penthos: la doctrine de la componction dans l'Orient chrétien. Roma: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum and HUNT, H. (2004) Joy-Bearing Grif. Tears of Contrition in the Writings of the Early Syrian and Byzantine Fathers. Leiden-Boston: Brill. 9 Cf. Tr. 3, 2, 24. 10 Unity and distinction, 16, (ed.) Perrela, E. (2003) Atto e luce divina. Scritti filosofici e teologici. Milano: Bompiani. 11 Tr. 3, 1, 28. 12 Cf. Lossky, V. (2002) The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church. New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, p.197. 13 Experience shows us that few are those who are actually deified in this life. How many monks scrupulously observe their ascetic exercises and yet aren’t assisted by grace? And how many people live a dissolute life and, suddenly, as lightning, God presents himself to them and a true metanoia occurs, possible only through grace? And how many fervently wish for deification and don’t attain it? And how many wish for a strong will, yet “don’t do the good they will but the wrong they don’t will?” Isn’t it already of grace that the soul is “inflamed with desire”? Isn’t it already of grace the capacity to correspond to grace?

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granted to them. In Divine and deifying participation or divine and supernatural simplicity, St Gregory shows how this position is absurd. Such a stance also assumes that God, as creator, confers, together with being and other properties, deification. From this position several absurd conclusions opposed to faith, follow, among them, that deification would be natural, that irrational and inanimate creatures would also be saints, Christ and his parousia would be unnecessary, all creatures would be the temple of the Holy Spirit.14 Experience shows, says Palamas, that there are differences of participation in God, which isn’t acknowledged by positions defending that the saints participate in God in the sense that all creatures participate in God. On the contrary, “though He is in all things and all should participate in Him [says Gregory] in fact, it is only the Saints who participate in Him (...) Only the Saints are called participants in God and participants in Christ”.15

3. Imparticipability of Divine Essence When we attempt the philosophical demonstration of how divine transcendence can be reconciled with deification, on the one hand, and that the existence of distinctions in divine unity does not attain its simplicity on the other, it becomes obvious that these are rather complex issues. St Gregory recognizes the complexity of the matter: “At this point we face a topic which both parties admit is difficult” (On the Divine and Deifying Participation, 1). From the outset, he makes clear that “it is faith that guides Christian doctrine and not, surely, demonstration” (On the Divine and Deifying Participation, 1), but without relinquishing his duty that charity towards his fellow Hesychasts requires of him, i.e., to defend the Hesychastic approach by engaging with the appropriate terminology, in his effort to repel Barlaam’s offensive. Palamas efforts come as a response to the plea of a brother that initiates the apology of the Hesychast Saints: “I ask you, Father, that you teach me what I should say to defend the truth, so that I may be prepared, according to the Apostle, to give reasons for our hope”.16 Von Ivánka sees here the problem of palamism: wanting to provide philosophically “the ontological formula that allows understanding of the essence of grace, force that warrants 'participation in God', and the

14 Cf. On the divine and deifying participation, 1 and 3. 15 On the Divine and Deifying Participation, 10. 16 Tr. First question.

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emergence of the finite creature outside infinite divinity, the relation between the Absolute and the creature”.17 The concepts of ousia and energeia are of basic significance to St Gregory’s arguments. And the distinction he makes between them isn’t a novelty in the theological scenery. Already a long previous tradition18 had adopted the distinction without separation between ousia and that which is around God. For instance, Maximus Confessor, (taking this from the Cappadocians), holds that it is not only an epistemological and ontological distinction but also something directly apprehensible by the soul when, inflamed with desire, the soul strives to know God and realizes that it is an unfeasible quest. Then it moves from ousia to that which is around God.19 Meyendorff mentions that it was the Aristotelian notion of physis that inspired the patristic doctrine of the energeia: “the Aristotelian principle according to which each 'nature' (physis) has an 'energy' (energeia), i.e., an existentially perceivable manifestation, provides the terminological background for the patristic concept of 'energy'”.20 Even though the relevant Aristotelian terminology is insufficient, when applied to God: “However, significantly, the Aristotelian dyad, nature-energy, was not considered sufficient in itself, when applied to God, because in God's nature, the decisive acting factor is hypostatic”.21 One of St Gregory’s innovations, as mentioned by David Bradshaw, was to rejoin under the concept of energeia subjects that were previously considered separately: uncreated light, the things around God, divine names and the issue of inhabitation by the Holy Spirit.22 17 “Mais le problème du palamisme est de vouloir fournir aussi philosophiquement la formule ontologique qui fasse comprendre l' essence de la grâce, force assurant la 'participation à Dieu'”, Ivanka, E. von (1990) Plato Christianus. La reception critique du platonisme chez les Pères de l’Eglise. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, p.391. 18 Lowell Clucas in his dissertation claims that Palamas’s distinction between energy and essence and it’s connection with the divine names is a result of a misinterpretation of the Church Fathers, as Barlaam and Akindynos stated. Cf. Clucas, L. (1975) The hesychast controversy in Byzantium in the fourteen century: a consideration of the basic evidence, p.12. 19 Cf. Bradshaw, 2004, p.189. 20 Meyendorff, J. (1979) Byzantine Theology, New York: Fordham University Press, p.185. 21 Meyendorff, 1979, pp.185-186. 22 “Palamas thus draws together under the single concept of energeia a number of themes that previously had existed more or less in isolation: the uncreated light, the “things around God,” the Cappadocian teaching on the divine names, and the Pauline and Cappadocian understanding of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. All

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There must be distinguished, in St Gregory’s speech, two modes of reference to God’s essence. One mode takes “essence” (ousia) as a name that designates one of God’s powers, the power which creates essence, and, in this case, it doesn’t consider that there is supremacy of this category. It is at the same level of other powers referred to by St Gregory, such as the giving life, the deifying, that which grants wisdom and others. And all of them are uncreated23 and of all God is the essence, but none is the essence of God: “the properties around God certainly are not his essence, while He is the essence of the properties around Him”.24 The other meaning of “essence”, which concerns supra-essentiality, is, to St Gregory, the mystery of God, his imparticipable, uncommunicable and forever unknown dimension. All energies – uncreated light, the names of God, the reasons and models of entities (logoi) – result from God’s supraessential essence, are progressions of God’s supra-essentiality, that is, the unknowable aspect of God or, using an expression from Gregory of Nyssa, “they are God’s back”.25 St Gregory thus, explains how God is simultaneously participable and imparticipable: “Himself, on the one hand, is supra-celestial essence, ineffable and unintelligible, unreduceable and imparticipable; on the other hand, it is the essence of entities, the life of the living, the sapience of those who become wise and simply the unity of all entities of any sort (...). God exists as imparticipable, while supra-celestial, and as participable, while it has a power which creates essence and an energy that intervenes as a paradigm and leads all things to perfection”.26

Some scholars have posed a problem about the ontological status of God’s energies. Are the energies a kind of lesser god? We refer mainly to Martin Jugie and Tomas Tyn, who based on Palamas’ texts collected in the Migne edition, asserted that Palamas defended the existence of a lesser god (the energies) and a higher god (supra-essential god).27

are to be understood in terms of the manifestation of God through His uncreated energies”. Bradshaw, 2004, p.238. 23 Tr. 3, 2, 11. 24 Tr. 3, 2, 25. 25 Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, II, 251. We used the Sources Chrétiennes edition: Danielou, J. (trad.) (1955) Grégoire de Nysse. La vie de Moïse. Paris: Éditions du Cerf. 26 Tr. 3, 2, 25. 27 Cf. Williams, A.N. (1999) The ground of union. Deification in Aquinas and Palamas. New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.14.

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Vladimir Lossky clarifies the matter by stating that there is a work possibly misattributed28 to St Gregory that designates God’s energies as “lesser divinity” in contrast with essence, “greater divinity”. Yet, Lossky remarks that, taking into consideration that Palamas has used these expressions, within the scope of his thought, we can infer that he refers not to a quality but only to a logical sequence, i.e., the manifestation of the energies is logically subordinated to He who manifests himself.29 Von Ivánka observes that Palamas needed an intermediate sphere in order to avoid falling in two statements opposed to Orthodox theology. If we take the grace of God to be the essence of God itself, all Christians possessed by grace will be Christ, will enter into a personal union with the divine essence, will be, at last, consubstantial with the Father. But if we consider grace as a created reality, it can’t elevate to the participation in the divine, it won’t “divinize”. It is therefore necessary, Ivánka concludes, a sphere between the divine substance and the created world, the sphere of the divine energies.30 Palamas explains, precisely, that to assert that nothing exists between the divine essence and the world is the same as divinizing it, for in this way it would be through essence that creatures would take communion in God. Between God’s essence and the creatures would be, in this case, the “reasons and paradigms of entities” (logoi) that pre-exist and exist in the divine intellect, in virtue of which everything was created31 and that also fall under the notion of energeia.32 At this point, I should mention that, as is obvious, for St Gregory, the unity of God isn’t destroyed by the existence of the intermediate sphere of divine energies nor, in the least, with the distinction between several progressions that come from the essence of God. Palamas affirms to exhaustion that to conceive in God several potencies doesn’t compromise his simplicity and unity. Just like the sun, emitting several gleams cannot alter the fact that the sun is one: “The word 'sun' is applied to beams as to the source where the beams originate. It doesn’t follow that there are two suns. There is, therefore, a single God, even when theologically speaking of the deifying grace coming from God. Light is also one of the properties that are around the

28 There are also some works of Palamas that were distorted or mutilated by his opponents. 29 Cf. Lossky, 2002, p.81. 30 Cf. Ivánka, E. von, 1990, p.378. 31 Cf. Tr. 3, 2, 24. 32 Cf. Bradshaw, 2004, p.239.

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Palamas furthermore states that to conceive distinctions in God, here between essence and energy, and in addition between the several energies, isn’t unprecedented. The doctrine of the Trinity already initiates a differentiation in the core of divine unity: “In fact, [St Gregory says] the one God distinguishes itself in three perfect hypostases; in reality, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct persons of the one deity, without there being a contrast or mixture within it”.34 It is through divine goodness itself that it can disseminate itself in multiplicity via several communications.

4. Conclusion Aristotelian terminology is insufficient to build an argumentative base that justifies the existence in God of something that might be communicated and something impossible to communicate, because it leads to antinomies. It can be argued, nonetheless, that the antinomic character is proper, not of a specific terminology, but of all discourse on God. Hence, the privileged use of symbols and metaphors is understood. Gregory Palamas’ positions raise several problems and antinomies that were emphasized through this exposition. It seems to us extremely difficult to avoid qualifying as nominalism or, at best, merely epistemological, the distinctions in God and between God’s energies themselves. If all divine names or what can be said of God, according to an apophatic way, corresponds not to what makes God be what He is, i.e., His essence, but to His visible face, to His manifestation, His economy, what makes it that the very distinction between ousia and energeia is relative to God’s own being? Aren’t the distinctions in God an illusion? Some neopalamites consider that the distinction between the essence and the energies is merely epistemological and necessary to our (finite) thought, which is incapable of understanding, except through this distinction, the creative or deifying action of God. We distinguish only conceptually what is inseparable and introduce distinctions in God, even though they can’t actually be found. The Archimandrite Cyprien Kern asserts that it isn’t divinity in itself that divides in essence and energies, but only our thought that is incapable of understanding otherwise.35

33 Tr. 3, 3, 11. 34 St Gregory Palamas, On Divine energies, 2. 35 Cf. Ivánka, E. von (1990) Plato Christianus..., p.406.

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Yet, it seems to us, Palamas himself wouldn’t agree with the former position. In Divine Energies he states: “Therefore those who say that essence and energy are two names for one meaning [...] only fools those who hear them […]. If in fact essence and energy were completely indifferent, the one or the other would be only the empty sound of a name, because it would have its meaning devoid of its own understanding, and therefore they end up using it as those who speak of God in the way of Sabellius”.36

Palamas couldn’t assert that the distinctions in God were merely nominal or conceptual, because this would eventually reignite the debate about the doctrine of the Trinity. If it were admitted the hypothesis that the distinction between essence and energy was only a fruit of the inability of the human intellect to otherwise know God and His operations, the same possibility would naturally be transferred to the persons in the Trinity, who would then be mere ways of the same God making himself manifest to the world, but in Himself a single hypostasis. Even when Palamas says that the ray isn’t composite just because it also illuminates, or that the sun with a single ray illuminates, heats, makes grow and produces life, we can legitimately conclude that all of it, all those operations, are distinct for us, but that the sun itself remains without distinction. Hence, it seems to us, the energies of God always depend on a reason that discriminates between them and the essence of God. But to say that there isn’t in fact a distinction between God’s essence and energy and wanting to preserve deification forces us to conclude that deification is an ontological union between God and man, which is pantheism. St Gregory wanted to avoid this position. I hope that our study of St Gregory will not descend into a temptation of the Evil one whose presentation of “the profound and varied understanding, the immensity of these knowings in relation to others, suggests wealth or false glory and carnal pleasures, in order to make us dedicate our whole lives to pursuing these things, and not to have the strength to firmly undertake the education that purifies the soul, whose principle is fear of God, that invites continuous prayer in compunction and observance of the evangelical decrees”.37

36 On Divine energies, 6. 37 Tr. 1, 1, 7.

BECOMING HOMOTHEOS: ST. GREGORY PALAMAS’ ESCHATOLOGY OF BODY REV. DR. DEMETRIOS HARPER

In his Homily On the Glorious Ascension of the Lord, St. Gregory Palamas says of Christ’s fulfilment of His dispensation: “By the unapproachable divine fire of His Godhead He cleansed this nature of every tendency towards passion, and made it equal to God”(Veniamin 2002, vol. 1, p. 269). This passage, perhaps as much as any other, expresses the core of Palamite thought. In the original Greek, the phrase “equal to God” or “same as God,” to render it more literally, is homotheos (‫ݸ‬ȝȩșİȠȢ), a term that St. Gregory employs more than one once in his corpus, and which demonstrates his focus on God’s ultimate intention for man: a state of deification or theosis in which man’s created nature not only communes with God but takes on the existential features of divinity to the extent that it may be properly termed homotheos. The doctrine of theosis is one that is commonly attributed to Palamas and one that has made him famous in some contemporary theological circles and helped to make him notorious in others. Less commonly emphasized, however, is the fact that Palamas believes deification is rooted in Christ’s hypostatic union to our human nature in the Incarnation through which created nature’s mode of existence is transformed, causing deification to be attainable for all other instances of human nature. Deification, in causal terms, occurs because of the kenotic act of Christ and involves the transformation of human nature as a whole, soul and body, and not merely the noetic aspect of humanity through a transcendental event, as it is sometimes supposed. The Incarnate Christ is the eschaton of human nature, the paradigm to which all of humanity must aspire and in which all humanity must participate, a reality, Palamas insists, that is inclusive of man’s body as well as his soul. In this paper, I shall focus upon this “eschatology” of human nature in Palamas’ writings, attempting especially to show that an eschatology of human nature also means an eschatology of body.

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A proper articulation of Palamas’ anthropology requires at least a cursory mention of his cosmology and cosmogony. Following in the wake of St. Maximos the Confessor and his great theological synthesis, Palamas set out to articulate a theological perspective that was free from what he considers to be the errors of the pagan philosophers. St. Gregory was explicitly critical of many of the features of the larger Hellenic philosophical tradition, especially those which, in his view, tended towards pantheism by blurring the distinction between uncreated and created being (Meyendorff 1974, pp. 128-30). In the first few pages of the Triads, Palamas writes polemically against the pagan philosophers, accusing them of having “deprived God of His sovereignty” through their ontological monism (Meyendorff & Gendle 1983, p. 26). Palamas goes on to mention the Plotinian doctrine of the “world soul,” the pre-existence of matter, and seems to allude to the henads of Proclus, all of which, he argues, constitute a violation of God’s ontological exclusivity and, consequently, of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Palamas, thus, affirms the need for a careful distinction between uncreated and created being, an explicit corrective of the Hellenic philosophical tradition that goes back to some of the earliest expressions of Christian dogma (Martzelos 2005, pp.14-19). Only God can be said to possess absolute being, while created things are beings to the extent that “they participate in absolute being” (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, p.388). Moreover, all beings that have their being through participation are created by nature and were brought out of nothing by an act of divine will, and are therefore essentially “other” in relation to God. (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, pp. 356-57). This point regarding creation ex nihilo may seem to be mundane, but it establishes the framework for understanding Palamas’ eschatological perspective and helps to distinguish his thought from certain Neo-Platonic tendencies, especially those which identify creation with the fall and link the human body to a loss of ontological fullness (Sherwood 1955, p.4751). In affirming that man and all the bodiless powers are entirely created, Palamas seeks to follow Maximos in correcting an Origenist-style cosmogony by establishing creation and fall as ontologically separate events (Loudovikos 2010, p. 7-10). Man does not acquire a body or a material dimension due to the fall, but is created from the beginning as a noetic soul conjoined (ıȣȞȘȝȝȑȞȠȞ) to a material body (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, pp. 362-63). He is created as a composite or two-fold hypostasis1 consisting of a created soul and body. Palamas, comparing the 1 Palamas does not actually use the term “composite” or ıȪȞșİIJȠȢ in this particular context. However, it is clear from passages in the Natural Chapters that he has this term in mind, when he describes the indissoluble relationship of the soul to the

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soul of man to the bodiless powers, says the following: “On the other hand the noetic and intelligent nature of the human soul has received a life-generating spirit from God since the soul is created together with an earthy body, and so by means of the spirit sustains and quickens the body conjoined (ıȣȞȘȝȝȑȞȠȞ) to it” (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, p. 363).

The “life-generating spirit” that the soul possesses is not an uncreated element within the human hypostasis, but is also created and can be seen as a “power” or “charisma” of the soul, a power that, as Palamas himself points out, the bodiless powers are lacking (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, p. 363). Palamas is quite adamant in asserting all that is termed “noetic”, both that which is human and that which is angelic, is created (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, 362). The body and the soul are thus created together, as one essential reality. The intimate connection between the soul and body is confirmed in the following passage: “The spirit of man that quickens the body is noetic longing (‫ݏ‬ȡȦȢ), a longing that issues from the intellect (ȞȠࠎȢ) and its thought-form (ȜȩȖȠȢ)” (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, 362). It is the soul’s noetic eros for the body that animates it and causes the psychic and somatic parts of man to be one. It is essential to make a distinction between this noetic eros for the body that Palamas presents here in the Natural Chapters and the ijȡȩȞȘȝĮ IJ߱Ȣ ıĮȡțȩȢ (Romans 8:7) or “mindset of the flesh”, as some translate it, that he mentions elsewhere in his corpus (Keselopoulos 2004, p. 25). Palamas clearly ascribes the former to man’s natural or țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬ijȪıȚȞ existence, and he certainly would have considered it to have been an attribute of prelapsarian humanity. The latter, the “mindset of the flesh”, is indicative of fallen man’s inordinate obsession with the sensible world and functions ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬ijȪıȚȞ, or against nature. We will return to this later on. The soul’s natural love for its “particular” (Ƞ‫ݧ‬țİ߿ȠȞ) body is so great, Palamas tells us, that it “never wishes to abandon it” and would not do so, unless faced with an unnatural force (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, p. 363). The coexistence and union of soul and body, as a single human hypostasis, distinguishes man from the angelic ranks and is therefore body. Polycarp Sherwood (1955, pp.51-3), in the introduction to his translations of Maximos the Confessor’s The Ascetic Life and The Four Centuries on Charity, distinguishes the different uses of ıȪȞșİIJȠȢ in the Patristic tradition. When used in an anthropological context, it is meant to indicate that though the human hypostasis is composite, it constitutes a single species or nature. This must be differentiated from its use in Christology, in which case it is used with the intention of indicating the dual natures contained in the hypostasis of Christ.

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intrinsic to the definition of man qua man, and any rupture in this relationship would indicate an overturning of the divinely established order. Though possessing distinct enhypostata, man’s being is defined by the totality of his existence and is his primary essence, to use the Aristotelian phrase (Florovsky 1987, p. 93), consisting of both soul and body together. This is a repetition of a concept we find in St. Maximos, who refers to the form or İ‫ݭ‬įȠȢ of man as “IJާ ‫ݼ‬ȜȠȞ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ” that is, “his being as a whole” (Migne 1857, PG 91, 1112AB; Loudovikos 2005, p. 168; Sherwood 1955, pp.51-2). Palamas further strengthens his position through his appropriation of the doctrine of the uncreated logoi, which he receives from Dionysios the Areopagite and Maximos the Confessor. In Chapter 87 of the Natural Chapters, Palamas quotes the Areopagite: “We call paradigms the essence-forming logoi or inner principles of created things” (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, p. 387). Again following Maximos, Palamas identifies the logoi as șİ߿Į șİȜȒȝĮIJĮ or ʌȡȠȠȡȚıȝȠȓ, that is, divine volitions or predeterminations (Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1085A). While the context of the quote is a refutation of Barlaam and Akindynos and an affirmation of the uncreated nature of the energies of God, Palamas also reaffirms the entirely created nature of the human hypostasis, asserting that the essence of all created things are formed by, but not identical to, the uncreated logoi. Man’s being, though possessing an internal hierarchy (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, pp. 356, 362-3), is thus composed of enhypostata that are ontologically equal insofar as they are both created and co-constitutive of the human substance. Moreover, insofar as man constitutes a totality, the eternal logos or ʌȡȠȠȡȚıȝȩȢ that creates him also predetermines him as such, that is, as a noetic soul with a particular body. Another significant feature of Palamas’ anthropological teaching is his view of man’s creation “in the image” of God or țĮIJ’ İ‫ݧ‬țȩȞĮ. The question of creation “in the image” and its theological application is not necessarily a straightforward issue within the larger framework of the Patristic tradition. The interpretation of the original Biblical passage varies from writer to writer, with some exegetes offering more than one interpretation (Mantzaridis 1984, pp. 15-18). Palamas appears to equivocate at times, suggesting in some passages that the noetic faculty of man’s soul is the exclusive recipient of the divine image, while in others indicating that the image involves all of man’s being. It is outside the scope of this paper to examine all the dimensions of this issue and the reasons for the various expressions. For the moment, I will follow Mantzaridis in saying that the phrase “in the image” is “dynamic” in its significance and, as such, the variety of

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expressions need not be seen as introducing a contradiction in either Palamas’ thought or that of the Patristic tradition in general (1984, pp. 1518). I would, therefore, argue that it is consistent with Palamas’ thought to say that the image of God can be applied to the body as well as the soul. In a work commonly attributed to Palamas, we read the following: “Man cannot be said to be only soul or only body, but both together, both having been created in the image of God” (Migne 1857, PG 150, 1361). This passage is quite clear in its identification of the divine image with both soul and body and would arguably be sufficient, if it were not for the fact that some have questioned the origin of the work from which it originates (Lossky 1976, p. 224). I will, therefore, mention one additional passage from the Natural Chapters in which Palamas equates the tripartite nature of man not with the soul, as he does elsewhere, but with his triform capacity for knowledge. The passage, though lengthy, is worth quoting: “As others have also pointed out, the three-fold nature of our knowledge likewise demonstrates that we, to a greater extent than the angels, are created in God’s image. Indeed, this knowledge is not only three-fold but encompasses every form of knowledge. We alone of all creatures have a faculty of sense perception in addition to our noetic and rational faculties. Since this faculty is united to our reason we have invented multifarious arts, sciences and forms of knowledge. Only to man is it given to farm, to build and to produce from nothing—but not from absolute non-being, for this pertains to God only […] In addition, by the gift of God it pertains to men alone to make the invisible thought of the intellect audible by uniting it with the air and to write it down so that it may be seen with and through the body” (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, p. 375).

This passage, among other things, echoes St. Maximus’ discussion of the synthetic nature of knowledge, that is, the fact that man’s authentic knowledge of the created world consists of sensory intuitions as well as rational intellections (Christou & Meretakis 1992, vol. 14B, p. 370). Man’s knowledge is synthetic precisely because man himself is substantially composed of both sensible and psychic dimensions, both of which work together in harmony, if functioning according to nature, and both of which are necessary for intuitions. What is truly remarkable about this passage is the fact that Palamas argues that it is man’s possession of physical senses and therefore his unique psychosomatic composition that he, more so than the angelic powers, reflects eikonically God’s own creative power. To again quote a phrase from the passage: “Only to man is it given to farm, to build and to produce from nothing, but not from absolute non-being, for this pertains to God only”. Mankind’s ability to “create” within the sensible world, to express himself bodily and sensibly through the

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“multifarious” art-forms and sciences renders him, in terms of his eikonic attributes, superior to the bodiless powers inasmuch as he imitates God’s creative power in the sensible world; it is man’s possession of a body, his biological reality, that indicates his superior eikonic character. Given this passage, I think we can legitimately conclude that Palamas considered the image of God as being “involved” with the body as well as the soul. This leads us naturally to Palamas’ view of the fall and its significance for the human body. While man’s nature, in Palamas’ view, is indeed iconically superior to that of the angels, the fall has rendered him lesser in terms of his likeness (țĮș’ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȓȦıȚȞ) to God. In terms of dignity and honor, the angelic ranks are greater than the human race, man having turned away from his proper eschatological destiny (Mantzaridis 1984, pp. 21-22; Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, pp. 366, 376). We might compare the distinction between “in the image” and “in the likeness” in Palamas to the Aristotelian distinction between įȪȞĮȝȚȢ and ‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮ, or potentiality and actuality. Man, while possessing the potentiality or țĮIJ’ İ‫ݧ‬țȩȞĮ įȪȞĮȝȚȢ to conform to his Archetype and the Archetype’s eternal intentions for his nature, failed to do so, or, more accurately, refused to do so through his disobedience and failed to realize his țĮș’ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȓȦıȚȞ ‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮ. It is this willful failure and the misuse of his eikonic capacity on the part of man that constitutes the problematic aspects of bodily existence, that is, illness, corruption, and finally, physical death (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, p. 367). Critical to the topic at hand is the fact that man’s entire hypostasis, including his soul, become subject to the consequences of his failure to exist in accordance with God’s natural intention for him and his nature (Veniamin 2002, vol. 1, pp.181-83). This unnatural state affects the soul as well as the body and so also is subject to the ontological consequences of the fall, for which Palamas utilizes the Biblical definition, namely, death; physical death is the sensible manifestation of man’s dead state and dead soul. The body, though indeed damaged by the fall, is neither the result nor the cause of the fall (Palmer, Sherrard & Ware 1998, pp. 366-67, 370-71). In describing man’s fallen state as “against nature,” Palamas implicitly appropriates Maximos’ well-known ȜȩȖȠȢ/IJȡȩʌȠȢ distinction, that is, between nature’s essential principle and the way in which it exists (Sherwood 1955, pp. 164-65; Migne 1857, PG 91, 1280A, 1329A, 1341D, 1345B). Death, as it is understood by Palamas, constitutes a mode of existence that goes against nature’s principle, a mode of existence that constitutes a failure to actualize humanity’s eikonic potentiality, a potentiality that is inclusive of the human body and, therefore, the failure of which must also entail somatic consequences. Palamas sometimes uses the term “nature” to indicate man’s fallen state but, as Meyendorff argues,

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the context in which Palamas uses this expression indicates that Palamas means it in a descriptive sense, as “a condition basically contrary to its [nature’s] destiny” (1974, p.122). Man’s necrotic state and unnatural existence gives rise to the “the mind-set of the flesh” (Keselopoulos 2004, p.25), an expression used by the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Romans (Romans 8:7, Meyendorff & Gendle 1983, p. 41). This also functions descriptively, alluding to man’s unnatural state, his improper mode of existence, and his inordinate obsession with the physical world that happens as a result of his existential disposition. Palamas explains this in the following passage: “As for us, we think the mind becomes evil through dwelling on fleshly thoughts (ıȦȝĮIJȚțȠ߿Ȣ ijȡȠȞȒȝĮıȚȞ), but there is nothing bad in the body, since the body itself is not evil” (Meyendorff & Gendle 1983, p. 41). Again, it is the obsession with “fleshly” that is problematic, rather than the body itself. I use “obsession” to emphasize the unnatural mode of this kind of attachment because, as we saw earlier, there is indeed a “rational” love of the body that, in Palamas’ view, accords with nature and man’s natural destiny. It is only due to the fragmented reality of man’s post-lapsarian existence that it becomes necessary to speak about antinomies between “mind” and “body” or “fleshly” and “rational”. Man’s natural state or, better, țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬ijȪıȚȞ mode of existence admits no such divisions. I have so far attempted to show how Palamas’ anthropological teaching reflects an eschatology of nature in potentia, and therefore of body, and lays the foundation for the possibility of theosis. Man’s nature was created as a unified reality with the self-determining potential to respond to his Creator’s image and live in accordance with his nature’s eschata, in accordance with his Archetype. Yet, the actualization of man’s eschatological potential also is causally contingent upon the Incarnation of the Logos and participation in the ontological achievements of his earthly dispensation. Though Palamas makes use of Evagrian language in many of his works, unlike Evagrius his views are strongly conditioned by Christology, and his doctrine of deification depends on the Incarnation of Christ and a rigorous Chalcedonian sense of union and inter-communion between the uncreated and created natures of Christ’s hypostasis (Meyendorff 1974, pp. 135-36). Palamas imitates his theological forebearer, Maximos, in applying a “Christocentric corrective,” to borrow a phrase, to Evagrian theological expressions (Meyendorff 1974, pp.132-33). In his well-known Homily 16, Palamas says the following regarding the Incarnation: “The Lord did not just create man anew with his hand in a wonderful way, but held him near Him. He did not merely restore human nature and raise it from its fall, but in an indescribable fashion clothed Himself in it and

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indivisibly united Himself with it” (Veniamin 2004, vol. 1, p.183).

The Incarnation is described here as achieving two things: 1) correcting man’s fallen mode of existence and 2) uniting human nature unto uncreated in the person of Christ. While it is clearly a significant given that Christ’s dispensation corrects man’s fallen existence, what Palamas wants to emphasize particularly here is the fact that human nature paradigmatically attains fulfillment in the Incarnation, an assertion that is repeated in Homily 26. Speaking again about man’s nature and the charismata with which God endowed it, Palamas says: “God adorned human nature in this way, because He was going to clothe Himself in it. He was to assume it from the blood of the Virgin, transform it into something better, and set it on high above all principality and power […]” (Veniamin 2004, vol. 2, p. 47). The Logos’ assumption of human nature is the actualization and fulfilment of humanity’s destiny and indeed, to the extent that man is the glory of creation, of creation itself. Moreover, nature was endowed with particular charismata, constituted in a particular way, so as to provide the capacity to realize its destiny in the Incarnation. In claiming that all of creation was brought into being in conjunction with the eternal intention for the coming of the Incarnate Logos, Palamas establishes an eschatology in which all of human nature aspires to Christ as its Archetype. Soteriology and eschatology are connected as man has the opportunity to both leave his fallen mode of existence behind and assimilate the grace that both redeems him and changes his nature’s mode of existence from created to uncreated, a point that will be demonstrated below. The fact that Palamas considered creation as unfulfilled prior to the Incarnation is confirmed in yet another passage from Homily 16, in which he says that if the Logos of God had not been made Incarnate, the Trinity would not have been revealed to creation and God would have appeared as “merely some sort of energy observed by creatures” (Veniamin 2004, vol. 1, p.192). This archetypal significance of Christ’s incarnate state is reflected in Palamas’ extensive discussions of the Transfiguration on Mt. Thabor and the light that was manifested to the Apostles in His person. One of the many purposes Palamas had in discussing the event was to show that the real presence of divinity was manifested in the person of Christ, a manifestation that included the participation of His complete humanity, hence Palamas’ insistence that the light must be properly termed “uncreated.” As Palamas says in his Homily on the Transfiguration, “The light of the Lord’s transfiguration does not come into being or cease to be” (Veniamin 2004, vol. 2, p. 138). It is an eternal, divine, and therefore uncreated energy that demonstrates not only Christ’s divinity, but also the

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fact of His deified humanity. Christ, in actualizing human nature in Himself, deifies all aspects of human nature and, inasmuch as He draws it to Himself, causes it to participate in His divinity. Palamas, speaking again of the light of the Transfiguration quotes St. John Damascene, saying: “The Son eternally begotten of the Father possesses the natural and eternal ray of divinity; yet the glory of the divinity has also become the glory of the body” (Meyendorff & Gendle 1983, p. 78). Palamas’ eschatological perspective becomes quite clear here as he makes specific mention of the body itself participating in the very eternal divinity of God and, additionally, we see further the reason for his insistence that the light at the Transfiguration was uncreated. In so doing, Palamas remains consistent both in terms of his holistic approach to human nature, but also with regards to his insistence that the human body reveals the natural state of its possessor. In the case of fallen man, alienated from grace, the body withers and perishes, returning to dust. The body of the Incarnate Logos, on the other hand, communes with divinity itself, and it is fitting, in Palamas’ view, that it would manifest this fact in actuality. It is for this reason that Palamas refers to the light as a “natural symbol,” as it reveals the nature of that which it symbolizes. In showing forth uncreated light from His person, Palamas argues, the Lord “became His own symbol,” and the Archetype for all instances of human nature, both by revealing Himself as the “form” of all humanity and by showing “how God’s splendor would come to the saints and how they would appear in the age to come” (Veniamin 2004, vol. 2, pp.140-41). To take it a step further, we can say that because the body constitutes the sensible portion of the human “essence”, the body of Christ in particular functions as the Archetype of humanity par excellence, revealing materially and phenomenally the fact of created nature’s transformation in His person. The body of Christ consists of a call to all humanity to “imitate” His uncreated life (Meyendorff & Gendle 1983, p. 88; Veniamin 2004, vol. 1, p. 185; Mantzaridis 1998, p.135). To be clear, “imitate” does not merely indicate an external mimicry of the Logos’ dispensation, but rather the reception of His deified mode of existence through participation in Him and the assimilation of the grace that comes of His outpouring into human nature, an idea which Palamas clearly considered to have ethical as well as ontological implications (Mantzaridis 1998, pp. 108-14). In a passage from Homily 21, Palamas compares Christ’s divinity to fire, saying: “The Lord came to send fire upon the earth and through participation in this fire He makes divine not just the human substance which assumed for our sake, but every person who is found worthy of communion with Him” (Veniamin 2004, vol. 1, p. 269).

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Imitation of the Archetype therefore means participation in and assimilation of His uncreated life, a life that is inclusive of all of man’s being, soul and body, as all aspects of man’s essence have become divine through the kenotic work of the Incarnate Logos. Not coincidentally, Palamas employs Eucharistic language throughout his corpus, focusing on the deified body of Jesus and its significance for the human race, especially with regards to its life-giving capacity. In Christ, the “body of death” becomes the “body of life” and the means by which the mystery of the Incarnation is conveyed to humanity. In Homily 16, Palamas refers to the flesh of Christ as “an inexhaustible source of sanctification” (Veniamin 2004, vol. 1, p. 183) by which the effects of the fall are removed in those who participate. Contrary to what some might expect from the defender of the hesychasts and noetic prayer, Palamas uses conspicuously organic and material expressions to expound his Christocentric perspective and establish the framework for a doctrine of deification, a tendency that led John Meyendorff to refer to Palamas’ theology as “Christian materialism” (1974, p. 155). In Homily 56, a homily that Palamas dedicates exclusively to the discussion of ecclesiology and the Sacraments, he says we become “concorporeal” (ıȪııȦȝȠȢ) with the Incarnate one, becoming recipients of the uncreated life that resides in the Body of Christ (Chrestou & Meretakis 2009, vol. 11, p. 402). Palamas does not stop here but compares the intimacy of the familial and marital relationship to the Eucharistic life in Christ: “Christ has become our brother, by sharing our flesh and blood and so becoming assimilated to us… He has joined and bound us to Himself, as a husband to his wife, by becoming one single flesh with us through the communion of his blood; He has also become our father by divine baptism which renders us like unto Him, and he nourishes us at his own breast as a tender mother nourishes her babies” (Chrestou & Meretakis 2009, vol. 11, p. 410).2

The significance of Palamas’ use of somatic relationships as images of the heavenly and Eucharistic should not be overlooked. Palamas does indeed assert in his writings the fact that marriage, human procreation, and childbirth became a part of man’s mode of existence post-fall (Veniamin 2004, vol. 1, p. 182). This, however, is a subject that is too vast to discuss in the present context. Suffice to say for the moment, we should observe that though these somatic relationships are indicative of the transitory life, nonetheless, the fact that Palamas considers them worthy eikones of divine

2 The translation is based on John Meyendorff’s.

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and ineffable truths should tell us that he did not consider them to be merely “fallen functions” but realities capable of pointing to higher things, and therefore redeemable if oriented towards natural existence in Christ. In light of Palamas’ Chistocentrism and emphasis on a psychosomatic eschatology of person, it is much easier to understand his defense of hesychastic praxis, the human experience of the uncreated light, and psychosomatic prayer. The Incarnate Christ is the Archetype, as I have repeatedly emphasized, for all humanity, and His deified body is the eschatological manifestation of the eschata of all mankind. The practitioner of hesychia and psychosomatic prayer, then, is one who seeks to imitate Christ and partake of his divine life, to make the life that is in Christ his own through a “synergetic” effort (Meyendorff 1974, p.165; Mantzaridis 1998, p. 133), in which he orients himself toward Christ by the grace of Christ. Speaking specifically of hesychastic practice, Palamas says: “For if the hesychast does not circumscribe the mind in his body, how can he make to enter in himself the One Who has clothed himself in the body and Who thus penetrates all organized matter[…]?” (Meyendorff & Gendle 1983, p. 45). Palamas thus, links noetic prayer explicitly to participation in Christ and, perhaps even more significantly for the topic at hand, indicates that imitation of Christ is necessarily psychosomatic, as matter itself must attain union with Christ and begin to “live” (Meyendorff & Gendle 1983, p. 45). The rupture in man’s being as a result of the fall and the divisibility that plagues mankind’s post-lapsarian body is overcome through the “circumscription” of Christ in the human hypostasis, as frail matter itself begins to acquire a form after divinity, an event that is exemplified in the practice of the hesychast. This is why it is not inconsistent, in Palamas’ view, to speak of the light experienced by legitimate hesychasts as “uncreated” and, moreover, inclusive of the body. As the divine life is transmitted to those who participate in Christ, the participants experience a change of their mode of existence, such that they acquire the existential ‫ݧ‬įȚȫȝĮIJĮ of their divine Archetype, becoming concorporeal with the Incarnate Logos. Christ’s deifying power becomes “enhypostatic,” working within the entire unified human essence (Meyendorff & Gendle 1983, p. 71), reversing the effects of unnatural existence and bringing man, soul and body, closer to his eschatological destiny, constituting a foretaste of the life to come. In the latter portion of the Triads, St. Gregory explains precisely what he considers man’s eschatological destiny to be and the life that awaits the followers of Christ at the second Resurrection. Basing his views yet again on those of St. Maximos, he says:

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“Listen to the Father. Having explained as far as possible the way in which deified men are united to God—a union akin to that of the soul to the body, so that the whole man should be entirely deified, divinized by the grace of the incarnate God—he concludes: 'He [man] remains entirely man by nature in his soul and body, and becomes entirely God in his soul and his body through grace[…]'” (Meyendorff & Gendle 1983, p. 109-10; Veniamin 2004, vol. 1, p. 206).

Through the grace of the divine Archetype and through His kenotic dispensation, man, though originate by nature, is clothed with divinity, existing as God in body and soul. By way of conclusion, I would reiterate my statement at the beginning of this essay: the Palamite view of deification depends not on man transcending his substance or in overcoming his nature, but rather on the Logos’ outpouring of divinity into human nature, elevating both man’s noetic soul and material body to divinity through His descent. In Palamas’ estimation, Christ is the eschaton of all humanity, inasmuch as He contains the eschata of all humanity in Himself. It is each person’s synergetic and Eucharistic participation in Christ that enables the particular realization of the eschata, as each through his self-determining capacity either assimilates or rejects his eschatological destiny. Those who attain to their proper end do so according to their Archetype, becoming homotheos by grace and enhypostasizing divine life not only in their noetic dimension but in their bodies as well.

Works Cited Chrestou, P & Meretakis, E (trans. & ed.) 2009, Greek Fathers of the Church: The Works of St. Gregory Palamas (in Greek), St. Gregory Palamas Patristic Publications, Thessaloniki. Chrestou, P & Meretakis, E (trans. & ed.), 1992, The Philokalia of the Neptics and Ascetics: St. Maximos the Confessor (in Greek), St. Gregory Palamas Patristic Publications, Thessaloniki. Florovsky, G., 1987, The Byzantine Fathers of the Sixth to Eighth Century, Büchervertriebsanstalt, Belmont. —. 1987, The Eastern Fathers of Fourth Century, Büchervertriebsanstalt, Belmont. Keselopoulos, A., 2004, Passions and Virtues according to Saint Gregory Palamas, St. Tikhon’s Seminary Press, South Canaan. Lossky, V., 1976, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Crestwood. Loudovikos, N., 2010, A Eucharistic Ontology, Holy Cross Orthodox

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Press, Brookline. —. 2005, Orthodoxy and Modernization (in Greek), Armos Publications, Thessaloniki. Mantzaridis, G., 1998, Palamika (in Greek), Pounaras Publications, Thessaloniki. —. 1984, The Deification of Man, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Crestwood. Martzelos, G., 2005, Essence and Energies of God according to St. Basil the Great (in Greek), Pounaras Publications, Thessaloniki. Migne, J.P., 1857-1912, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graecae, Paris. Meyendorff, J & Gendle, N (ed. & trans.) 1983, The Triads, Paulist Press, Mahwah. Meyendorff, J., 1974, A Study of Gregory Palamas, The Faith Press, Leighton Buzzard. Palmer, G, Sherrard, P & Ware, K (eds. & trans.) 1998, The Philokalia (vol. IV), Faber & Faber, London. Sherwood, P., 1955, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism, Orbis Catholicus, Rome. —. 1955, St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, The Newman Press, Westminster. Veniamin, C. (trans.), 2004, The Homilies of Saint Gregory Palamas (vols. 1&2), St. Tikhon’s Seminary Press, South Canaan.

B. HISTORY, CULTURAL CONTEXT AND AESTHETICS

GREGORIUS PALAMAS’ THEOLOGY, AS VIEWED BY THE SCHOLAR DEMETRIOS CYDONES PROFESSOR ANNA KOLTSIOU-NIKITA

In theological scholarship, the Byzantine scholar Demetrios Cydones is known mainly for his pro-latin political views, whereas his brother, Prochoros Cydones, has become famous for his heretic and anti-Palamite beliefs, which were the cause of his condemnation by the Synodal Tome of 1368. However, according to a text found in Codex Vaticanus Graecus 172, f. 167v, Demetrios had also been anathematized for his anti-Palamite views, some time before his death, around 1396.1 It is a fact that Demetrios Cydones attracted the interest of scholars, mainly of linguists and historians, for his translations and epistles; he was, however, less important to theologians, with the exception of a few recent research theological approaches.2 Until now, despite the fact that his prolific writings include numerous scattered references to the theology of Palamas (and also to the issue of “Filioque”), his original theological discourse wasn’t studied and this is because it wasn’t considered important 1 ǻȘȝȘIJȡȓ࠙ IJࠜ ‫݋‬ʌȠȞȠȝĮȗȠȝȑȞ࠙ ȀȣįȫȞ߯, IJࠜ ijȡİȞȠȕȜĮȕࠛȢ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬șȑȦȢ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ǺĮȡȜĮȐȝ țĮ‫݃ ޥ‬țȚȞįȪȞȠȣ įȚ‫ ޟ‬ȕȓȠȣ ȞȠıȒıĮȞIJȚ ʌĮȡĮIJȡȠʌ‫ޣ‬Ȟ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚĮijșȠȡ‫ޟ‬Ȟ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJ߱Ȣ șİȓĮȢ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİȓĮȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎ ‫݋‬Ȟ IJࠜ ĬĮȕȦȡȓ࠙ ȜȐȝȥĮȞIJȠȢ ܻțIJȓıIJȠȣ ijȦIJȩȢ ijȡȣĮȟĮȝȑȞ࠙ țĮ‫ޥ‬ Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ șȡĮıİȓߠ ȥȣȤ߲ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȖȜȫIJIJ߯ țĮ‫ܻ ݙ ޥ‬ȞİȞȑȡȖȘIJȠȞ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ șİȓĮȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȞ ‫ ݙ‬țIJȚıIJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚȞ ‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮȞ įȠȖȝĮIJȓıĮȞIJȚ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ IJࠛȞ ‫ݒ‬ȜȜȒȞȦȞ ȝȣșȠʌȠȚȓĮȞ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȠȜȜȐțȚȢ ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫ݑ‬țțȜȘıȓĮȢ ȋȡȚıIJȠࠎ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJࠛȞ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬țĮȚȡȠȪȢ Į‫ރ‬IJ߱Ȣ ʌȡȠȧıIJĮȝȑȞȦȞ ʌĮIJȡȚțĮ߿Ȣ ʌĮȡĮȚȞȑıİıȚȞ ܻʌȠıIJ߱ȞĮȚ IJ߱Ȣ ‫ݷ‬ȜİșȡȓȠȣ IJĮȪIJȘȢ Į‫ݨ‬ȡȑıİȦȢ ʌĮȡĮțȜȘșȑȞIJȚ, ȝȪıĮȞIJȚ į‫ޡ‬ IJȠީȢ IJ߱Ȣ įȚĮȞȠȓĮȢ ‫ݷ‬ijșĮȜȝȠީ ʌȡާȢ IJާ ijȑȖȖȠȢ IJ߱Ȣ ܻȜȘșİȓĮȢ țĮ‫ބ ޥ‬ʌİȡȝĮȤȠࠎȞIJȚ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ IJȠࠎ ȥİȣįȠȝȠȞȐȤȠȣ, șİȠȝȐȤȠȣ į‫ ޡ‬ȝߢȜȜȠȞ, ȆȡȠȤȩȡȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȀȣįȫȞȘ IJȠࠎ ܻįİȜijȠࠎ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ, ‫ݺ‬Ȣ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ݫ‬IJȚȠȢ Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ ȖȑȖȠȞİ IJ߱Ȣ IJȠȚĮȪIJȘȢ Į‫ݨ‬ȡȑıİȦȢ…ܻȞȐșİȝĮ, Mercati (1931), p.61. See also Tinnefeld (1981), p.47, fn 267. In the years 1391-97 in Constantinople, Palamism dominates and during the persecutions which take place, Demetrios is expelled permanently from this city. The Latin Dominican Ioannes III of Sultanyeh mentions, in the year 1404, in his Libellus de notitia orbis, the anathematization of Demetrios Cydones. 2 For an interesting approach of the theological thought of Demetrios, see Russell (2003), pp.153-174.

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enough.3 How can this be explained? Why a scholar and prolific writer like Demetrios, with such a strong presence in the current affairs of his time, who was touched but also affected by the theological movement of Palamism, contrary to what may have been expected, didn’t produce substantial theological antirhetical discourse? In this paper, we try to answer this question, by examining the factors which contributed to the formation of the features of his theological discourse, since they compose the identity of his discourse. This means that we are going to examine the critical review of Palamas’ theology, not from the point of view of a purely theologian thinker, but in the texts of a humanist-scholar, who plays a very crucial role at that time, with wide action both in the imperial court and in the area of ecclesiastical policy. 4 Demetrios Cydones was described as “the most representative figure” of the second half of the 14th century.5 Perhaps there is no other writer of that time, whose work so intensely represents the experience of the social, political, but, in addition, the theological turbulences, which marked that period. Born in Thessaloniki in 1327/86 from a noble family, he was affected by the Zealots7 movement and was forced to abandon his home town and move to Constantinople. There he was appointed “mesazǀn” by the emperor Ioannes Kantakouzenos, a position which he held with short intervals until the end of his life. The study of western thought, mainly through the translations of theological texts, which Demetrios made, led him to the Latin Church. He embraced the Catholic dogma and, in this 3 See Christou (1971) p.68. As a result of the inadequate knowledge of Demetrios’ theological discourse is to some extent the attribution to him of two works which in fact were not his: The first is a clearly anti-Palamite text in an angry tone, the Adversus Palamam (PG 154, 837-864), which was probably written by monk Nephon. The second is the work of Manuel Kalekas Ȇİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪıİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ݄ȖȓȠȣ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ which is attributed as a work of Demetrios Cydones (PG 154, 864-958), while the homonymous work of Demetrios remains unpublished (an edition of this treatise is in preparation by the writer). 4 For his political activity, see Kianka (1985), pp.175-213. 5 See S. Mergiali (1996) 113-114. 6 Two recent relevant studies: Ryder (2010) and Tinnefeld (2010). The relevant bibliography is abundant. For the biography of Demetrios see Kianka (1980) 5171, id., (1981). Also Tinnefeld (1981) 4-61 and Koltsiou-Nikita (2005)13-41. Yet, the study of Mercati (1931) remains crucial - mainly as far as the information drawn directly from the textual tradition is concerned. 7 As a result of these events Demetrios himself writes the Monody on the Dead in Thessalonica (ȂȠȞ࠙įȓĮ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJȠ߿Ȣ ‫݋‬Ȟ ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓț߯ ʌİıȠࠎıȚȞ), PG 109, 639-652; see Barker (1975), pp.285-290.

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way, he found himself against those who were opposed to the Latins and the union of the Churches. If we add to this the political conflicts, especially the civil ones, which directly concern an emperor’s “mesazǀn”, we can realise that in every stage of his life he had an “opposing awe”, which in some cases had a profound effect on him. One of these cases was his entanglement in the theological conflict, which was related to the movement of Hesychasts and the theology of Palamas. As his work proves, it was an important chapter of his emotionally charged personal life. More specifically, from the related research we reach the conclusion that the review of the theology of Gregorius Palamas by Demetrios Cydones is done each time from a different aspect, which largely determines it. The different aspects include his personal life, his political career, his ecclesiastical policy and to a lesser extent his theological speculation. For the best use and correct assessment of the related testimonies, we think it is meaningful, for methodological reasons, to categorize them as follows: 1. testimonies which deal with the Hesychasts who influenced the imperial environment and concern his political position and career; 2. testimonies which were motivated by the condemnation of his brother Prochoros and constitute personal experience; 3. testimonies which are related to his ecclesiastical policy and 4. testimonies which include elements of theological thought.

1. Political position and career Just one year after his appointment in the position of “mesazǀn” by the emperor (1347), Demetrios seemed obviously annoyed by the monks who loiter around in the emperor’s court posing as authorities and trying to influence the emperor to take their part.8 With a simile lent from Pindar,9 he castigates in a biting way their garrulity. Demetrios turns against the same monks -probably Hesychasts- also in another epistle.10 Mocking his humiliating position at the palace, he sarcastically contrasts his personal poverty with the only wealth of the city, that of the “dogmata”, as it is easier for everyone to philosophize about divine matters than about personal matters.11 Every day Demetrios suffers at the sight of the beard8 Loenertz n. 88 , Constantinople 1348. Complete edition of the Epistles: Loenertz (1956,1960)· German translation and commentary: Tinnefeld (1981-1999). 9 ȜȐȕȡȠȚ ʌĮȖȖȜȦııȓ߯, țȩȡĮțİȢ ‫ޔ‬Ȣ…, Pindar, ȅȜȣȝʌ. 2,156-158 10 Loenertz n. 50 , Constantinolpe 1355-56, addressed to Alexios Kassandrenos. 11 Ǽ‫ݮ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬ȞIJĮࠎșĮ ȝȩȞȠȞ ʌȜȠࠎIJȠȢ, ‫ ݸ‬IJࠛȞ įȠȖȝȐIJȦȞ….țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȞࠎȞ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ țĮ‫ބ ޥ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ IJ‫ ޟ‬ȖȩȞĮIJĮ

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bearers strolling around the palace and considering their ignorance to be a symbol of virtue.12 The monks’ influence in the palace, as shown in Demetrios' texts, even took the form of a slander against him. The first references on the issue of Palamism dated with accuracy are found in three epistles which date from around 1362 and their recipients were in Mystras, which has to be associated with the presence of a group of Palamites in that imperial environment. One of the epistles of that period is addressed to Manouel Raoul Metochites.13 In the text of the epistle, Demetrios defends a theology, which, in his opinion, is in harmony with reason and emphasizes the simplicity, the unity and the apathy of the divine substance and criticizes those who attempt to add to it the abundance, the movement and the physical qualities, ignoring that with this action the largest part decreases while the absolutely pure one, not able to coexist and mingle with other elements, cannot maintain its immutable purity. 14 He induces Raoul to stick to his views and to rely on his studies, and, if he needs any help, then he should counsel his friend and teacher, the remarkable Georgios,15 who is knowledgeable and experienced and has fought many times for these views. On the contrary, he advises him to be cunningly wary and to avoid association with the supporters of the new theology.16 The specific reference to the ministerial circles suggests that Demetrios implies Ioannes IJާ țĮțާȞ Į‫ݫ‬ȡİIJĮȚ, ıȚȦʌࠛȞIJȠȢ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ƞ‫ރ‬įİȞȩȢ, ʌȐȞIJȦȞ į‫ߣࠍ ޡ‬ȠȞ ʌİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJࠛȞ șİȓȦȞ ‫ ݙ‬IJࠛȞ ‫ݧ‬įȓȦȞ ijȚȜȠıȠijȠȪȞIJȦȞ, Loenertz n. 50, 33-35. 12 țĮș’ ‫ݘ‬ȝȑȡĮȞ ‫݋‬ȞȠȤȜȠȪȝİȞȠȢ…ʌȫȖȦȞĮȢ ܿȜȜȦȢ ‫ݸ‬ȡࠛȞ ʌİȡȚijİȡȠȝȑȞȠȣȢ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJࠛȞ ȕĮıȚȜİȓȦȞ, ‫ޖ‬Ȟ IJާ ʌȐȞIJ’ ܻȖȞȠİ߿Ȟ ‫ޔ‬ıʌİȡ ܿȜȜȠ IJȚ ıȪȝȕȠȜȩȞ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ IJ߱Ȣ ܻȡİIJ߱Ȣ (vv. 3537). Cf. Tinnefeld (1981), p. 265. For the position of the Hesychast monks in the palace see also Tinnefeld (1981) p.200. 13 Loenertz n. 30 = Tinnefeld n. 56, autumn 1362 - spring 1363. Raul must have been in the circle of the emperor Ioannes Kantakouzenos, he was Demetrios’ friend and a little younger than him. He also had an educational background in philosophy. 14 ܻȖȞȠİ߿ IJ߲ ʌȡȠıșȒț߯ IJާ ȝȑȖȚıIJȠȞ ‫݋‬ȜĮIJIJࠛȞ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ߲ IJࠛȞ ܿȜȜȦȞ ‫݋‬ʌȚȝİȚȟȓߠ ȝ‫ޣ‬ ıȣȖȤȦȡࠛȞ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȠࠎ țĮșĮȡȩIJȘIJȠȢ IJާ țĮșĮȡȫIJĮIJȠȞ ȝȑȞİȚȞ, Loenertz n. 30, 2527. 15 This reference is found in Georgios the Philosopher. See Tinnefeld (1972), pp.141-171. In another epistle Demetrios expresses his delight that Georgios recognized the dialectical skill of Thomas Aquinas: ʌȐȞȣ į‫ݜ ޡ‬ıșȘȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ĬȦȝߣ įȚȘȜȜĮȖȝȑȞȠȞ ‫ݧ‬įȫȞ ıİ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJĮ߿Ȣ ǻȚȠȝȒįȠȣȢ ‫ݬ‬ʌʌȠȚȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠ߿Ȣ ȁĮȕȣȡȓȞșȠȚȢ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȠȣ įȚĮȜİțIJȚț‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌĮȡİȚțȐȗȠȞIJĮ, Loenertz n. 33,46-48. 16 ȆĮȡĮȚȞࠛ įȑ ıȠȚ IJĮȣIJȓ, Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ Ƞ‫ ރ‬ıijȩįȡĮ ʌȡާȢ IJȠީȢ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȦȞ ȜȩȖȠȣȢ įȣȞȐȝİȞȠȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤȐȗİȚȞ. ȀܻȝȠ‫ ޥ‬Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ‫݋‬ȞIJĮࠎșĮ țĮș’ ‫ݘ‬ȝȑȡĮȞ IJ‫ ޟ‬IJȠȚĮࠎIJĮ ‫݋‬ʌȚIJȓșİIJĮȚ ıIJȩȝĮIJĮ, ‫ޖ‬Ȟ ‫ݘ‬ ܻȞĮȓįİȚĮ țܽȞ ȜȓșȠȣȢ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ܻȞIJȚȜȠȖȓĮȞ țȚȞȒıİȚİȞ, Loenertz n. 30 , 37-40

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Kantakouzenos and his children who were the political representatives of the Palamite teaching in the Peloponnese. Finally, the epistle mentions personal daily problems facing Demetrios in Constantinople, because of the pioneers of this theology, who he calls “mystagogists”. For them every “discourse” is an enemy, while “experience” and “feeling” are everything.17 The repercussions of the anti-Palamite attitude of Demetrios in his political career seem to follow him after the death of his brother too. In 1371, in his Homily to the Emperor Iohannes Palaiologos,18 Demetrios attempts to criticize the theology of all those who not only defame him but also want to offend the emperor because of the fact that he associates with Demetrios.19

2. The personal experience The above mentioned testimonies concerning the political impact seem to be few and sober in relation to the ones motivated by his brother Prochorus' hardships, who was condemned for his anti-Palamite views and a while later died at a young age.20 This event had a huge impact on the sensitive and lonely Demetrios and was intensely impressed in his texts. However, Demetrios doesn’t follow the example of his brother and doesn’t choose the philosophic path of argumentation to confute the theology of Palamas and defend his brother. What he does is to confine himself to an account with strongly personal features, sentimentally charged and therefore often exaggerated. By thorough examination of the relevant scattered references, we can see that Demetrios' criticism escalates, reaching its peak in 1368, which is the year when Prochoros was condemned. The primarily indifferent, mild and often ironic attitude, is succeeded by acute and passionate criticism. In another study of ours,21 we had the opportunity to thoroughly present this escalating criticism, introducing the related testimonies in chronological order. In this study we are going to select some of these 17 ȉȠ߿Ȣ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ Į‫ރ‬IJࠛȞ ȝȣıIJĮȖȦȖȠ߿Ȣ ȜȩȖȠȢ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ݀ʌĮȢ ‫݋‬ȤșȡȩȢ, ‫ ݘ‬ʌİ߿ȡĮ į‫ ޡ‬Į‫ރ‬IJȠ߿Ȣ ʌȐȞIJĮ įȪȞĮIJĮȚ țĮ‫ ݘ ޥ‬Į‫ݫ‬ıșȘıȚȢ, Loenertz n. 30,32-33. 18 Loenertz (1956), pp. 10-23. 19 Ǽ‫ ݧ‬įȑ ȝȠȚ įȓįȦȢ İ‫ݧ‬ʌİ߿Ȟ Ƞ‫ރ‬į’ Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ IJࠛȞ ‫݋‬ȝࠛȞ įȚĮȕȠȜࠛȞ ܿȥĮȣıIJȠȢ ‫ݏ‬ȝİȚȞĮȢ, ܻȜȜǯ ‫݋‬IJȩȜȝȘıĮȞ ܻʌȠʌİȚȡߢıșĮȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ıȠࠎ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țȘȜ߿įĮ IJ߱Ȣ ı߱Ȣ ȕĮıȚȜİȓĮȢ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ȝ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ıȣȞȠȣıȓĮȞ țĮȜȠࠎıȚȞ, Į‫ރ‬IJȠ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ ʌȓıIJİȦȢ ‫ݻ‬ȞIJİȢ ȜȫȕȘ , Loenertz, (1956) pp.19, 29-32). 20 See Russel (2006a) 75-91. For the theological views of both brothers, Prochoros and Demetrios Cydones, see also Koltsiou-Nikita (2006), pp.83-99. 21 Koltsiou-Nikita, (2013).

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testimonies, which we consider to be representative of this attitude. In a short epistle which dates from 1351-1365,22 we can see a manifestation of the anti-Palamite attitude of Demetrios, who expresses his delight for the recovery of the anti-Palamite addressee and warns him to keep a wary eye on the supporters of the new theology, who attributed his illness to the fact that he disdained their theological views. An ironic tone permeates the passage, since by using the alliteration form of speech23 and by invoking an Aesop’s fable24 Demetrios reminds his addressee that his physical illness gave him mental vigour making him ready to reexamine his attitude towards the Palamites. Concluding his epistle, he advises him to demonstrate a certain flexibility and remember their fellow countryman, a philosopher,25 who used to compare his way of life to the canes, which endure the force of the wind, because they don’t resist, while the oak trees and the cedar trees are torn down. The reference to the “Tomoi” 26 places the epistle after 1351, while the ironic and somehow remote way of dealing with the Palamite theology, and also the suggestion for a flexible attitude, leads to the assessment that Prochoros’ hardship had not yet begun27. Approximately three years after this, in an epistle addressed to Astras, in the year 1365,28 his criticism suddenly escalates. The text of the epistle is surprisingly harsh and aggressive. Demetrios severely criticizes Astras for failing to support and adequately defend his brother Prochoros against the attacks of his opponents in Athos. Demetrios uses sharp language,29 22 Loenertz n. 53 = Tinnefeld n. 0124. It is dated in the period 1351-1365. 23 ܻȡȡȦıIJȓĮȞ… ‫݋‬ȡȡࠛıșĮȚ. 24 ‫ݑ‬ȞșȣȝȠࠎ… IJȩȞ… ijȚȜȩıȠijȠȞ, ‫ݺ‬Ȣ IJȠ߿Ȣ țĮȜȐȝȠȚȢ Į‫ރ‬IJާȞ İ‫ݧ‬țȐȗȦȞ ‫ݏ‬ȜİȖİ ȗ߱Ȟ, Ƞ‫ ݪ‬ȝ‫ޣ‬ ijȚȜȠȞİȚțȠࠎȞIJİȢ ʌȡާȢ IJȠީȢ ܻȞȑȝȠȣȢ IJȘȡȠࠎıȚȞ Į‫ރ‬IJȠȪȢ, IJࠛȞ įȡȣࠛȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJࠛȞ țȑįȡȦȞ ܻȞĮıʌȦȝȑȞȦȞ, Loenertz n. 53, 16-19 (Aesopus, Ed. Perry, n. 70 «ǻȡࠎȢ țĮ‫ޥ‬ țȐȜĮȝȠȢ»). 25 Perhaps it could be Georgios Gabriilopoulos. For the identity cf. Tinnefeld (1982) 604. 26 ĭİȓįȠȣ ȝȑȞIJȠȚ IJࠛȞ IJȩȝȦȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȝ‫ ޣ‬ȕȠȪȜȠȣ țĮțࠛȢ ȜȑȖİȚȞ IJȠީȢ ıȣȖȖȡĮijȑĮȢ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȦȞ, Loenertz n. 53, 8-9. 27 It is possible that the official recognition of Gregorius Palamas’ theology in the year 1351 is associated with Demetrios’ working on the translation of Summa contra gentiles, which he begins around 1352, as an answer through Aquinas’ thought. Here Demetrios attempts, by means of the translation, to contradict the texts of the Palamite theology, cf. Kianka (1981) 123. 28 Loenertz n. 96 = Tinnefeld n. 60, spring of 1365. Georgios Synodin Astras was at that time governor of Lemnos. 29 The beginning of the epistle shows this point: ‫ݕ‬ȖȞȦȞ IJާȞ ʌİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJާȞ ܻįİȜijȩȞ ȝȠȚ ȤİȚȝࠛȞĮ, țĮ‫ސ ޥ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬țİ߿ȞȠȢ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ބ‬ʌާ IJࠛȞ șȘȡȓȦȞ ‫݋‬ıʌĮȡȐIJIJİIJȠ ıީ į‫݋ ޡ‬IJȡȪijĮȢ.

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despite the fact that he is addressing a long-lasting friend and, above all, despite the fact that his texts are known for their mild language.30 Considering his brother a paragon of virtue, he attacks directly and overtly all those who daily bring him to court, envy being their only motive, while they use the “new and elegant”31 teaching as an excuse. Referring to the Philippikos Oration of Demosthenes and historical figures, such as Pericles, he warns Astras of a future confrontation. It is obvious that we are in the period, when the rivalry between Prochorus and the Palamites has reached a peak and the criticism against Prochorus considerably affects Demetrios, who expects, at least from his friends, to support him in this ordeal and to contribute to the acquittal of Prochorus. Demetrios' emotional burst reached its peak and became obvious in two epistles to the Patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos, whom Demetrios considers to be the architect of his brother’s distress. The first epistle, written a short time before the trial of Prochoros began,32 constitutes a harsh accusation towards the Patriarch. His bitterness about the course of events and Prochoros’ suffering leaves no room for theological analysis and reasoning. In the second long text, which Demetrios addresses to the Patriarch Philotheos and which is written after the death of Prochoros, he attempts to give a thorough account of the events, the people involved and an estimation of the importance of these events.33 He tries to restore the image of his brother by composing with rhetoric art a comparison and contrast that appears in the whole text: The integrity of the character and the impeccable morals of Prochoros, who was the “jewel” of Lavra34 vs. the hypocrisy and envy of the Patriarch; the documented reasoning and wisdom of Prochoros vs. the lack of arguments of the Patriarch. By using exact quotes from ancient Greek literature and the Bible, he embellishes his text, but also equips himself to give a decisive and fatal hit to his opponent. It is obvious that this extremely harsh attack to the Patriarch, which doubts the credibility of the whole procedure of the trial, exceeds the limits of a theological conflict. This emotionally charged and rhetorically enriched text functions as the background for the criticism of 30 In addition this style is suitable to a politician, like Demetrios, who had the position of a “mesazǀn” in the emperor’s environment. 31 ȉ‫ ޟ‬ȞȑĮ į‫ ޣ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬țȠȝȥ‫ ޟ‬IJĮࠎIJĮ ʌȡȠȕȐȜȜȠȞIJĮȚ, Loenertz n. 96, 68- 69. 32 Loenertz n. 129 = Tinnefeld n. 68, March - the beginning of April 1368. 33 ǻȘȝȘIJȡȓȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȀȣįȫȞȘ ȜȩȖȠȢ ‫ݐ‬IJİȡȠȢ ‫݋‬ʌȚıIJȠȜȚȝĮ߿ȠȢ ʌȡާȢ IJާȞ Į‫ރ‬IJާȞ ʌĮIJȡȚȐȡȤȘȞ țȣȡާȞ ĭȚȜȩșİȠȞ ʌİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎ ܻįİȜijȠࠎ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ țȣȡȠࠎ ȆȡȠȤȩȡȠȣ: The text in Mercati (1931) pp. 313-338. 34 ȀȩıȝȠȞ ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬șİȠࠎ įİįȩıșĮȚ IJ߲ ȁĮȪȡߠ ȜȑȖȦȞ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȠȣ ijȚȜȠıȠijȓĮȞ, Mercati (1931) pp. 323, 69-70.

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Palama's teaching; the assessment is therefore not characterized by coherence and reasoning. The interspersed criticism in this text is found in the following points: 1. The ‘novelty’ (kainotomia)35 of the teaching of Palamas36 and its inconsistency with the previous tradition and thinking of the Fathers.37 2. The questioning of the way the supporters of Palamas try to prove their views and generally their methodology. 3. The rejection of a single and unique God, which Prochoros accepted. This results, according to Demetrios' personal judgment, in the introduction of a lot of gods, which finally leads to the polytheism of the ancient Greeks, just like the polytheism Hesiod or Orpheus acceded to.38 This criticism of polytheism and also of the charismatic and empirical39 theology, which stems from the distinction of essence and energy is motivated by the splitting of the absolute simplicity of God and the non-clear distinction between the everlasting existence and the “kat’ oikonomian” (economical) revelation, which Demetrios had embraced through the work of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine. Finally, in the texts of the epistles which are dated after Prochoros' death there also are many references to the subject of Palamas’ teaching. The obsession of Demetrios with this issue is due to: Į. His psychological need to share his deep sorrow about the loss of his brother with others40 and his desire to restore the memory of his brother, even after his death, 35 ȉ‫ޣ‬Ȟ IJࠛȞ įȠȖȝȐIJȦȞ țĮȚȞȠIJȠȝȓĮȞ…‫ ݸ‬ȆĮȜĮȝߢȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ ޟ‬įȩȖȝĮIJĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ ޟ‬țȠȝȥ‫ ޟ‬IJĮࠎIJĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȞȑĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȐȞIJĮȢ ‫݋‬țʌȜȒIJIJȠȞIJĮ, Mercati (1931) pp. 318, 65 and 86-7. 36 The accusation of novelty which is found in Demetrios texts had already been made by Akindynos, see Nadal (1974) 297-328. 37 About the matter of the connection of Palamas with the Patristic Tradition see Mantzaridis (1983) 23-24 and also Larchet (1986) pp.331-346. See also Russel (2006b), pp.357-379. 38 ‫ݑ‬Ȟ ȝȑıȠȚȢ IJİ ȋȡȚıIJȚĮȞȠ߿Ȣ IJ‫ ޟ‬IJࠛȞ ‫ݒ‬ȜȜȒȞȦȞ ‫ݗ‬ȞȐȖțĮȗİȢ, IJާȞ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ݐ‬ȞĮ șİާȞ ‫݋‬ȟȠȝȩıĮıșĮȚ, IJ߲ į’ ‫ݠ‬ıȚȩįȠȣ țĮ‫ݽ ޥ‬ȡijȑȦȢ ܻIJȠʌȠIJȑȡߠ șİȠȖȠȞȓߠ ıȣȞșȑıșĮȚ, Mercati (1931) pp. 327, 96-8. 39 ȉ߱Ȣ į‫ ޡ‬ȜȠȚʌ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȘȢ țĮ‫ބ ޥ‬ijİȚȝȑȞȘȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țĮșǯ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ ‫ބ‬ijİıIJȘțȣȓĮȢ, țĮ‫ޥ‬ ‫ݷ‬ijșĮȜȝȠ߿Ȣ ıȦȝĮIJȚțȠ߿Ȣ – ‫ ޓ‬IJȠࠎ șĮȪȝĮIJȠȢ- ʌȠȜȜȐțȚȢ ȖȚȞȠȝȑȞȘȢ ȜȘʌIJ߱Ȣ,, Mercati (1931) pp. 327, 79-81. 40 ȆȠȜȜ‫ܻ ޟ‬ȖĮșȐ ıȠȚ ȖȑȞȠȚIJȠ ‫݋‬ij’ Ƞ‫ݮ‬Ȣ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ ʌİȞșȠࠎıȚ IJާȞ ȝĮțȐȡȚȠȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬șĮȣȝȐıȚȠȞ ȆȡȩȤȠȡȠȞ ıȣȞȘȤșȑıșȘȢ, țĮ‫ݼ ޥ‬IJȚ ȝ‫ ޣ‬ʌȡާ IJ߱Ȣ ܻȜȘșİȓĮȢ IJȠީȢ IJ߱Ȣ ܻȜȘșİȓĮȢ ‫݋‬ȤșȡȠީȢ ‫݋‬șİȡȐʌİȣıĮȢ, Mercati (1931) pp. 346, 1-3 (See also Tinnefeld n. 81). Demetrios sends the epistle to a friend, antipalamite, who supported him in his sorrow for the death of Prochoros. He also sends him a copy of his brother’s book to familiarize him with his views: ‫ݼ‬ȝȦȢ ‫ݬ‬ȞĮ ȝ‫ ޣ‬IJȠȪIJȠȚȢ ȝȩȞȠȞ ܻʌȠȜȠȖȠȪȝİȞȠȢ ʌȡާȢ IJȠީȢ IJާ ʌߢȞ ܻȖȞȠȠࠎȞIJĮȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎIJȠ ࠍߠįȓȦȢ țĮIJȘȖȠȡȠࠎȞIJĮ ʌȡȐȖȝĮIJĮ ‫ݏ‬Ȥ߯Ȣ, ʌȑȝȥĮȚ ıȠȚ įİ߿Ȟ ‫ݏ‬țȡȚȞĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ȕȚȕȜȓȠȞ IJȠࠎ ȝĮțĮȡȓIJȠȣ ȆȡȠȤȩȡȠȣ, Mercati (1931) pp. 354, 68-70.

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especially against those who continued attacking him. ȕ. The reintroduction of the issue which was caused by Ioannes Kantakouzenos writing a text after the condemnation and before Prochoros’ death in which the emperor attacks Prochoros’ views.41 The following points are mentioned as examples: One epistle of that period is addressed42 to Theodoros Meletiniotes who was present at the trial of Prochoros and signed the “Tomos” as an Archdeacon43. Demetrios presents him as a fanatic Palamite and harshly criticizes him because he didn't respect Prochoros, not even after his death. On the contrary, he continued attacking him. He therefore challenges him to attack Demetrios instead, if he wants to continue this conflict. It is dishonest to attack someone who is dead; if he wants, he can take Prochoros’ texts and confute his views,44 attempting, even at that moment, an objective discussion with his texts. Demetrios often complains that this didn’t happen while his brother was alive. He highlights the persuasive power of Prochoros’ texts and asks the addressee, in the name of their friendship, to stop the criticism against his brother, as it is not based on substantiated views but on insults. If, however, he doesn’t stop this criticism, he declares that he is not going to use the same weapons. Instead, like Prochoros did, he will remain silent, hoping that the truth itself will shine. In the year 1371-2, Demetrios addresses the emperor Kantakouzenos (and from 1354 the monk Joasaph) and protests for the spread of the text which Joasaph had written against Prochoros.45 It is obvious that Demetrios knew about the existence of that text, which was written after the condemnation, but before the death of Prochoros (1370). However, at first, as he mentions, he didn’t react because he respected the emperor.46 However, when the text was copied and began spreading widely, 41 The text was published by Voordeckers and Tinnefeld, 1987. Short quote of the second Discourse is published in PG 148, 74-75. 42 Loenertz n.151 in Tinnefeld n.94 (autumn 1371 / the beginning of 1372). 43 See Rigo (2004) p.133. 44 ȃࠎȞ įǯ ‫ݸ‬ȡߢȢ ‫ݼ‬ıȠȞ IJާ IJާȞ ȆȡȩȤȠȡȠȞ ȝİIJ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ IJȐijȠȞ ʌİȚȡߢıșĮȚ įȐțȞİȚȞ Į‫ݧ‬ıȤȡȩȞ, …ʌĮȡĮȞȠȝȠ߿ įǯ ܽȞ ‫ ݸ‬įȚįȐıțĮȜȠȢ ܻȞIJ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎ ʌİȓșİȚȞ ‫ބ‬ȕȡȓȗȦȞ…ȜĮȕޫȞ IJȠȓȞȣȞ IJȠީȢ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȠȣ ȜȩȖȠȣȢ –ܼȞ‫ޣ‬ȡ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ܿijȦȞȠȢ ‫݋‬IJİȜİȪIJĮ– țĮ‫ ޥ‬ıȣȞİ‫ޥ‬Ȣ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ IJࠛȞ ܻʌȠįİȓȟİȦȞ ‫ݧ‬ıȤȪȞ, İ‫ ݫ‬IJȚ įȪȞĮȚȠ ܻȞIJȓșİȢ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȠȚȢ ܾ ijȒȢ Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ ıȠijȫIJİȡĮ, țܽȞ Ƞ‫ ݨ‬IJ‫ ޟ‬IJȠȚĮࠎIJĮ țȡȓȞİȚȞ įİȚȞȠ‫ ޥ‬IJࠛȞ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȠȣ IJ‫ ޟ‬ı‫ ޟ‬ʌȡȠIJȚȝȒıȦıȚ, șĮȡȡࠛȞ ܻʌĮȓIJİȚ IJާȞ ıIJȑijĮȞȠȞ, Loenertz n. 151, 41-52. 45 Ep. Loenertz n. 400 in Tinnefeld n. 93, Constantinople 1371/72. 46 ‫ݑ‬Ȗޫ ʌȠȜȜࠛȞ ‫ݐ‬ȞİțĮ įȚțĮȓȦȢ ܽȞ ܻȞIJİȚʌޫȞ IJࠜ ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬ıȠࠎ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȆȡȠȤȩȡȠȣ, ȝߢȜȜȠȞ į‫ ޡ‬țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJ߱Ȣ ܻȜȘșİȓĮȢ, ʌȡȫȘȞ ‫݋‬ȟİȞȘȞİȖȝȑȞ࠙ ȕȚȕȜȓ࠙ ‫݋‬ʌȑıȤȠȞ, ʌȐȞIJĮ IJ‫ ޟ‬ʌȡާȢ IJȠࠎIJȩ ȝİ țȚȞȠࠎȞIJĮ IJ߱Ȣ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ ı‫ ޡ‬IJȚȝ߱Ȣ įİȪIJİȡĮ șȑȝİȞȠȢ, Loenertz n. 400, 4-6.

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Demetrios, with a greatly aggressive mood, addressing the former emperor, harshly criticises him for this action.47 He considers the insult against his brother a personal matter48 and protests not only about the huge spread49 of that text in Ionia, Cyprus, Crete and Palestine, but in addition because, as he discovered himself in one case, it is sent to people who are ignorant, who are not able to judge these theological views and are repulsed only at the sight of text.50 Concluding his epistle he warns him that it is not possible for him to be allowed to defend his unfounded writings at length, while he doesn’t have the right to defend his brother.51 He promises to keep the issue secret, if he immediately stops spreading the text. Otherwise, he threatens to defend himself in any way, despite his great respect for the emperor.52

3. Ecclesiastical-reunion policy The most important aspect of Demetrios’ activity, for which he is primarily known, as we mentioned at the beginning, is his reunion policy.53 For this reason he attempts, among else, in an epistolary treatise, 47 ݃ȞĮȖȚȞȫıțİȚȞ IJİ ‫݋‬ʌȚIJȐIJIJİȚȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȠıĮȞĮȖțȐȗİȚȢ ‫݋‬ʌĮȓȞȠȣȢ ȜȑȖİȚȞ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ, Loenertz n. 400, 19-20. 48 ‫ݕ‬IJȚ į‫ ޡ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ ıȣȞȣȕȡȚȗȩȝȘȞ ‫݋‬Ȟ Ƞ‫ݮ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬țİ߿ȞȠȢ țĮțࠛȢ ‫ݛ‬țȠȣİ, Loenertz n. 400, 356. 49 ȆȠȜȜȠީȢ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ ‫ݯ‬ȦȞȓĮȞ, ʌȠȜȜȠީȢ į‫ ޡ‬İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ ȀȪʌȡȠȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȀȡȒIJȘȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȆĮȜĮȚıIJȓȞȘȞ… IJ߱Ȣ ȞȑĮȢ IJĮȪIJȘȢ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ ʌȐȞIJĮȢ ‫݋‬ȞȑʌȜȘıĮȢ, Loenertz n. 400, 20-23. 50 Ǽ‫ݧ‬ı‫ ޥ‬įǯ Ƞ‫ ݪ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚǯ ܿȖȞȠȚĮȞ ‫݋‬įȩȟĮıĮȞ ıȠijȩȞ IJȚ ȜȑȖİıșĮȚ ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬ıȠࠎ…Ƞ‫ݮ‬ȠȞ ‫݋‬Ȗޫ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ʌĮȡǯ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ ‫ݐ‬ȞĮ İ‫ݭ‬įȠȞ, ߓ IJާ ȕȚȕȜȓȠȞ Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ ‫ݷ‬ȜȓȖ࠙ ʌȡȩIJİȡȠȞ ‫ݏ‬ʌİȝȥĮȢ, ‫ݺ‬Ȣ IJȠıȠࠎIJȠȞ ܻʌİ߿Ȥİ IJȠࠎ IJ‫ ޟ‬ȜİȖȩȝİȞĮ țȡȓȞİȚȞ, ‫ޔ‬ıIJİ ʌȡާȢ IJȠީȢ IJࠛȞ ȖȡĮȝȝȐIJȦȞ IJȪʌȠȣȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȝȩȞȠȞ ‫ݸ‬ȡࠛȞ ‫ݧ‬ȜȚȖȖȓĮ, Loenertz n. 400, 24-28. 51 ȅ‫ ރ‬Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ įȒʌȠȣ ıȠ‫ ޥ‬ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ބ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ IJࠛȞ IJࠜ ȆĮȜĮȝߣ įȠȟȐȞIJȦȞ ܻȖĮȞĮțIJİ߿Ȟ ‫݋‬ȟȑıIJĮȚ, țĮ‫ޥ‬ IJࠛȞ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȠȣ IJ‫ ޟ‬ıĮșȡ‫ ޟ‬ȝĮțȡȠ߿Ȣ ıȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮıȚȞ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡİȓįİȚȞ, ‫݋‬Ȗޫ į‫ܻ ޡ‬įİȜijࠜ ıȣȞȘȖȠȡࠛȞ ܻįȚțȒıȦ. 52 Ǽ‫ ݧ‬įǯ Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ Ƞ‫ ރ‬ȤȐȡȚȞ, ܿȜȜǯ ‫ޔ‬ıʌİȡ IJȚ ȤȡȑȠȢ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ȝ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ıȚȖȒȞ įȑȤ߯, țܻȞIJİࠎșİȞ IJȠࠎ țĮțࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ȝߢȢ ȜȑȖİȚȞ ܿįİȚĮȞ įȓįȦȢ ıĮȣIJࠜ, țĮ‫ݘ ޥ‬ȝİ߿Ȣ IJާȞ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ȕĮıȚȜȑĮ IJȚȝȒıȠȝİȞ, IJާ į‫ޡ‬ ıȪȖȖȡĮȝȝĮ șİࠜ IJİ țĮ‫ݘ ޥ‬ȝ߿Ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠ߿Ȣ ܻȝȪȞȠȞIJİȢ ܻȝȣȞȠȪȝİșĮ, Loenertz n. 400, 44-47. The fact that Demetrios was obliged to have a defence attitude in order to protect himself is obvious because at that time (see above) in a discourse (ȁȩȖȠȢ II) which he addresses to Ioannes Palaeologos (in 1371) he expresses thoroughly the negative effects his brother’s hardship had on him and he criticizes the Palamites intensely, see Loenertz (1956), pp. 10-23. 53 His translations of western works aimed at familiarizing the people in the East with the Western thought, without the language being an obstacle. About the translating activity of Demetrios cf. Glycofrydi-Leontsini (2003) pp.175-185 and Koltsiou-Nikita (2005), pp.33-41.

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to support the authority of the Western Fathers of the first centuries A.D. and to highlight the need that they are accepted in the same way as the Eastern Fathers - with the aim of composing a common and united ecclesiastical body be based on the true faith of Patristics and Biblical tradition.54 In this work, he also criticizes those who support Palamas' theology55, however, this criticism is an attempt to defend the unity of the Patristic tradition, eastern and western. Demetrios defends it with great zest and bases his argumentation for the reunion on it. In order to theologically substantiate his views, he searches for foundation in the biblical texts and especially Paul’s texts, which, as we know, not only Palamas, but also the anti-Hesychasts often use, though interpreting them under different theological preconditions.56 The distinctive feature is that the presence of Apostle Paul in Demetrios’ texts doesn’t offer theological foundation, as someone would expect, but ecclesiastical arguments in favour of the reunion of Eastern and Western Church. For example, an interesting case is the utilization of a Paul’s quote: “For now we see through a glass, enigmatically; but then face to face”.57 Demetrios uses a Biblical quote which was in the heart of the theological debates of that time on the question of God’s vision (theoptia), though not, as we would expect, as a theological argument, but as an element cunningly deployed in an assumption, in order to substantiate the orthodoxy of the Western Fathers: If the faith of this life, Cydones observes, gives way to the “theoria”, and if the “mirrors” and the “riddles” give way to the beauty of the truth, it is obvious that whoever was wrong here in matters of faith, will not achieve the “theoria” there either and will not enjoy “those goods”.58 Therefore, the Western Fathers, whose correctness of faith is being questioned, are 54 Cf. Kianka (1983), pp.419-425. Demetrios wrote one specific epistle about this matter. Edition and New Greek translation of this text, see Koltsiou-Nikita (2000). 55 ݃ȞȩȘIJĮ į‫ ޡ‬ȕȠȣȜİȪȠȞIJĮȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJȠ‫ ޥ‬IJࠛȞ țĮȜࠛȞ IJȠȪIJȦȞ ıȣȖȖȡĮȝȝȐIJȦȞ IJ‫݌ ޟ‬ĮȣIJࠛȞ ʌȡȠIJȚșȑȞIJİȢ ‫ݷ‬ȞȩȝĮIJĮ, Ƞ‫ݮ‬ȠȞ ‫ ݸ‬įİ߿ȞĮ «ȀĮIJ‫ ޟ‬ȁĮIJȓȞȦȞ ‫݋‬ʌȚȤİȚȡȒȝĮIJĮ» IJȩıĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȩıĮ, ‫ݐ‬IJİȡȠȢ «Ǽ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJާ ijࠛȢ ‫ވ‬ȝȞȠȣȢ», ܿȜȜȠȢ «݃ʌȠįİȓȟİȚȢ ‫ބ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ IJࠛȞ ʌȠȜȜࠛȞ șİȠIJȒIJȦȞ», Koltsiou-Nikita (2000), p.190 (ǿǿ, 14). 56 The anti-Hesychasts embezzled the “mystic” teaching of Paul. About the problem of Paul’s mysticism, see Ioannides (1957) pp.32-52, with quotes of assessments of other researchers. 57 ȕȜȑʌȠȝİȞ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ܿȡIJȚ įȚ’ ‫݋‬ıȩʌIJȡȠȣ ‫݋‬Ȟ Į‫ݧ‬ȞȓȖȝĮIJȚ, IJȩIJİ į‫ ޡ‬ʌȡȩıȦʌȠȞ ʌȡާȢ ʌȡȩıȦʌȠȞ, I Kor 13,12. 58 Ǽ‫ ݧ‬Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ IJ߲ șİȦȡȓߠ ȝİIJ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ ȕȓȠȞ IJȠࠎIJȠȞ ‫ ݘ‬ʌȓıIJȚȢ ‫ބ‬ʌȠȤȦȡİ߿ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ‫ݏ‬ıȠʌIJȡȠȞ IJȠࠎIJȠ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ ޟ‬Į‫ݧ‬ȞȓȖȝĮIJĮ IJާ IJ߱Ȣ ܻȜȘșİȓĮȢ įȚĮįȑȤİIJĮȚ țȐȜȜȠȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠıȠࠎIJިȞ IJȚȢ İ‫ݭ‬įİȞ ‫݋‬țİ߿ ‫ݼ‬ıȠȞ ‫݋‬ȞIJĮࠎșĮ ʌİʌȓıIJİȣțİ, ʌࠛȢ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ܻȞȐȖțȘ IJȠީȢ ‫݋‬ȞIJĮࠎșĮ ʌİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌȓıIJȚȞ ıijĮȜȑȞIJĮȢ ȝȒįǯ ‫݋‬țİ߿ IJ߱Ȣ șİȦȡȓĮȢ ‫݋‬ʌȚIJȣȖȤȐȞİȚȞ, ܻȜȜǯ ‫ޔ‬ıʌİȡ IJȚȞ‫ޟ‬Ȣ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȞ ܻȝȣȒIJȠȣȢ, Ƞ‫ވ‬IJȦ IJࠛȞ ܻȖĮșࠛȞ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȦȞ ‫݋‬ȟİȓȡȖİıșĮȚ; See Koltsiou-Nikita (2000), 186 (ǿǿ, 4).

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excluded from the “theoptia”. Given the saintliness of the Western Fathers, we are led to a “proof by contradiction”, since being wrong in matters of faith is incompatible with Christ’s “theoria” by the saints but also with the saintliness of life. In conclusion, e contrario, the Western Fathers are presented as illuminated teachers and worthy of seeing God. Cydones also attempts a literary discussion of this topic in relation to the theology of his time in another part of his work, along with another point of the Palamite theology, the concept of light. However, the question here is not the problem of uncreated (aktiston) light, but the problem of the light of the truth. Demetrios Cydones states that the need to substantiate the credibility of the Fathers, Eastern and Western, and to protect their authority derives from the fact that they are the interpreters of the Biblical prophesies and the mediators of the light of the Scriptures. If we continue to question the credibility of the Fathers, “who will solve for us those riddles and remove the mirrors? Who will present the truth shining bright in front of its lovers eyes?”59 Paul's figure functions here as an allegory in a different direction: it doesn’t concern God’s theoria but the Biblical truth. It is therefore a reading of Biblical testimonies as “signs”, which assists productive comprehension and elevates it to a higher level of thinking. The speciality of his comprehension strategy60 consists in the fact that he chooses, obviously on purpose, Biblical texts which deal with theological problems of his time and were in the centre of theological debates, and while at first they seem to refer the reader to the review of the Palamite theology, Demetrios cunningly includes them in his pro-latin argumentation, so as to prove his own views.61

4. Theological thinking The texts of Demetrios in which there are elements of theological discourse and criticism against the theology of Palamas are mainly the ones which date back in the period 1370-73, not without reason. From the summer of 1371 until the winter of 1374, Demetrios is in the disfavour of the emperor and, as we can conclude from the testimonies, he was 59 ȉȓȢ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ ‫݋‬țİ߿ȞĮ IJ‫ ޟ‬Į‫ݧ‬ȞȓȖȝĮIJĮ ȜȪıİȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ݏ ޟ‬ıȠʌIJȡĮ ʌİȡȚİȜޫȞ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ İ‫އ‬įȚȠȞ ijĮȓȞȠȣıĮȞ ܻȜȒșİȚĮȞ ‫ބ‬ʌǯ ‫ݻ‬ȥȚȞ IJȠ߿Ȣ ‫݋‬ȡĮıIJĮ߿Ȣ ʌĮȡĮıIJȒıİȚ; Koltsiou-Nikita (2000), 226 (ǿǿ 101). 60 In detail, see Koltsiou-Nikita (2002) pp.189-211. 61 As Meyer (1988) in p.12 points out, there are two kinds of quotes: the obvious one and the cryptoquote, which aims at creating a kind of game, a “proper hide and seek” (“regelrechtes Versteckspiel”) and to achieve a specific result (“spezifische Wirkung”).

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condemned, after the death of his brother Prochoros, as a heretic himself. Therefore, he personally undertakes the defence of his theological views, both in his epistles and in purely theoretical discourse. A defence of his personal attitude against a supporter of Palamas’ theology is attempted by Demetrios in an epistle which is addressed to Demetrios Aggelos Manikaites, a great judge in Thessaloniki,62 who, as we are informed, disdained Demetrios as a heretic. In a strongly rhetorical style, with a series of questions and hypothetical thoughts, he resorts to his favourite style of discourse, the pairs of contradiction, in which he compares his views with the corresponding views of the “new theology” of Palamas: He accuses his opponents of dogmatism, polytheism, which means the dismantling of the simplicity and excellence of God, and the failure to substantiate rationally and support all those views. Demetrios, recalling Plato’s Phaedo, feels to be overwhelmed absolutely (ܻIJİȤȞࠛȢ) by an odd feeling (ܿIJȠʌȠȞ ʌȐșȠȢ). In an epistolary treatise63, the genre that Demetrios seemed to cherish, the Byzantine scholar deals with a theological question of Palamas’ teaching. M. Candal, the editor of this work, dates it probably before 1368.64 We personally think that the most possible period was not before 1368, which was the year of Prochoros’ condemnation, but probably from 1370 until 1373/4, given that only in the texts of this period Demetrios seems to resort to a theoretical analysis and support of his anti- Palamite views. In the texts before 1368 this did not happen, possibly because the relevant documentation was done by his brother Prochoros65. Demetrios addresses this epistolary treatise to Konstantinos Asanes66 and attempts to answer the question of the substantial properties of the Holy Trinity, in the way the Palamites referred to it. Clearly influenced by his brother's way of thinking, he borrows terms from the Aristotelian logic and he constructs a series of hypothetical syllogisms in the form of 62 Loenertz n. 116 = Tinnefeld n. 102, Constantinople 1372-73. 63 The Greek title of this text is: «ȉȠࠎ ıȠijȦIJȐIJȠȣ ȀȣįȫȞȘ țࠎȡ ǻȘȝȘIJȡȓȠȣ, ʌȡާȢ IJާȞ ݇ıĮȞ țࠎȡ ȀȦȞıIJĮȞIJ߿ȞȠȞ, Ȇİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ IJࠛȞ ʌĮȜĮȝȚIJࠛȞ ʌȡȠIJİȚȞȠȝȑȞȘȢ ܻʌȠȡȓĮȢ, ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJȠ߿Ȣ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJĮIJȚțȠ߿Ȣ ‫ݧ‬įȚȫȝĮıȚ IJ߱Ȣ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ». Candal (1962) 75 gives a Latin translation of this title: De personarum proprietatibus in Trinitate ad Constantinum Asanem. 64 Candal (1962) pp.115-116. (The text is accompanied by Latin translation). 65 An additional reason grounding our belief that this is the date is that it is not impossible that the treatise of Kantakouzenos against Prochoros and generally his attempt to prove the validity of Prochorus’ theological views, as they were expressed in his work Ȇİȡ‫ ޥ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȞİȡȖİȓĮȢ, lead him to compile a small corresponding treatise. 66 Konstantinos Asanes was the recipient of six letters from Demetrios Cydones during the years 1358-1389, cf. Russell (2003) 157.

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questions, while at the same time the presence of the Latin views on the simplicity and excellence of God is obvious. Yet in the end, borrowing elements from the scene of the guard in Sophocles’ Antigone, he urges Palamas’ supporters not to delay in long and dangerous paths “fragmenting” (țĮIJĮIJȑȝȞȠȞIJĮȢ) and dividing the holy, but to select the short and straight road of the common doctrines (țȠȚȞࠛȞ ܻȟȚȦȝȐIJȦȞ) of the god, so that they could reach the goal and align with what prudence suggests.67 At the same period Demetrios composes his Religious Will.68 He confesses in this text that there are two issues on which he feels the need to express his views, because he believes that he will be asked to give an account on these two issues after death: the issue of the procession of the Holy Spirit and of the Son (“Filioque”) and the issue of Palamas’ teaching.69 Turning against Palamas by name, he attempts a brief mocking and distanced criticism of the “new theology” as he characterizes it again, which he considers an “invention” (İ‫ވ‬ȡȘȝĮ) of Palamas.70 His Religious Will ends with the wish that he would never embrace this “manifold” (ʌȠȜȣȝİȡȒȢ) theology71.

5. The identity of the theological discourse of Demetrios Cydones Based on the above mentioned analysis of the testimonies, which concern Palamas’ theology in the work of Demetrios Cydones, we 67 Ȃ‫ ޣ‬IJȠ߿Ȣ įȣıȤİȡȑıȚ ... țĮIJĮțİȤȡ߱ıșĮȚ ... ‫ޔ‬ıʌİȡ ܽȞ İ‫ ݫ‬IJȚȢ ‫݋‬ʌȓ IJȚȞĮ ıIJĮșȝާȞ ‫݋‬ʌİȚȖȩȝİȞȠȢ ‫݋‬ȟİʌȓIJȘįİȢ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJ߱Ȣ ȝĮțȡߢȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȡĮȤİȓĮȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țȚȞįȪȞȦȞ ȖİȝȠȪıȘȢ ȕĮįȓȗİȚȞ ޾ȡİ߿IJȠ, ‫݋‬ȟާȞ ‫݋‬ʌȚIJȠȝȦIJȑȡĮȞ ‫݌‬ȜȩȝİȞȠȞ șߢIJIJȠȞ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJާ țĮIJȐȜȣȝĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ıࠛȞ ܻijȚțȑıșĮȚ, Candal (1962) p.110. 68 Mercati (1931) pp. 425-435. The text from autograph Cod. Vatic. Gr. 1102, ff. 115r-120v. 69 ‫ݑ‬ȡȒıȠȞIJĮȚ į‫ݚ ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ݏ‬ȤȦ ȖȞȫȝȘȞ ʌİȡȓ IJİ IJ߱Ȣ ȜİȖȠȝȑȞȘȢ IJࠛȞ ȁĮIJȓȞȦȞ ʌȡȠıșȒțȘȢ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ‫ޖ‬Ȟ ‫ ݸ‬ȆĮȜĮȝߢȢ ‫݋‬țİ߿ȞȠȢ ʌĮȡİȚıȒȖĮȖİȞ ‫݋‬ȞIJĮࠎșĮ ʌȠȜȜࠛȞ șİȠIJȒIJȦȞ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ȝİȖȐȜȦȞ ‫݋‬ıȠȝȑȞȦȞ İ‫ރ‬șȣȞࠛȞ ‫݋‬țİ߿ ȝİIJ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ ȕȓȠȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJȠȪIJȦȞ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬įİ߿Ȟ ‫݋‬ȞIJİࠎșİȞ țĮșȘȡȐȝİȞȠȞ ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ țȡȚIJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬țİ߿ıİ ‫ݧ‬ȑȞĮȚ, Mercati (1931), pp. 427, 68-71. 70 ȉާ į‫ ޡ‬IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ įȩȖȝĮ….İ‫ވ‬ȡȘȝĮ ȖȐȡ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ ܻȞįȡާȢ ܻȝĮșࠛȢ ʌȐȞȣ țĮ‫ݧ ޥ‬IJĮȝࠛȢ IJ߲ șİȠȜȠȖȓߠ ʌȡȠıİȞİȤșȑȞIJȠȢ, Mercati (1931), pp. 433, 70-73. 71 ݇ȜȜȦȢ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ܻșȑıȝȦȢ įȚĮȚȡȒıİȚ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡȘȞȦȝȑȞȘȞ ‫݌‬ȞȐįĮ ‫ ݸ‬IJ߲ ʌȠȜȣȝİȡİ߿ IJĮȪIJ߯ șİȠȜȠȖȓߠ ʌȡȠıțİȓȝİȞȠȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާȞ șİާȞ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ ܿʌİȚȡĮ țĮIJĮțİȡȝĮIJȓȗȦȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ıȣȞIJȚșİȓȢ, ߔ įȚ‫ޟ‬ ʌȐȞIJȦȞ IJާ ‫ݎ‬Ȟ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ܼʌȜȠࠎȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ܻȝİȡ‫ޡ‬Ȣ ijȣȜĮțIJȑȠȞ ‫ݼ‬ʌȠȣ ȝ‫ ݘ ޣ‬IJ߱Ȣ șİȓĮȢ IJȡȚȐįȠȢ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȜȠȖȓĮ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ȝȠȞȐįĮ țȦȜȪİȚ….ȝȣȡȓĮ įǯ ܿȞ IJȚȢ İ‫ݫ‬ʌȠȚ țĮ‫ܿ ޥ‬ȜȜĮ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ijșȠȡ‫ޟ‬Ȟ IJĮȪIJȘȞ ‫݋‬ȜȑȖȤİȚȞ ʌİȚȡȫȝİȞȠȢ…IJĮȪIJȘȢ IJ߱Ȣ įȩȟȘȢ ‫ޔ‬ıʌİȡ Ƞ‫ރ‬įȑȞĮ IJࠛȞ ܼȖȓȦȞ ‫ ݙ‬IJࠛȞ ıȠijࠛȞ ܻȞįȡࠛȞ, Ƞ‫ވ‬IJȦȢ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȠȚȢ ‫݌‬ʌȩȝİȞȠȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫݋ ޡ‬ȝĮȣIJȩȞ ʌȠIJİ ȖİȞȑıșĮȚ ijȘȝȓ, Mercati (1931), pp. 434-5, 106-114.

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consider that we can identify the features of his theological discourse. A man of a sensitive and emotional nature, Demetrios is deeply affected in his personal life by his younger brother’s hardship and therefore he attacks Palamas’ theology and mainly all the people involved. In fact, confronting this theology is not his primary goal. The speech he articulates seems to be primarily political. His philosophical argumentation is obviously inferior to the one of his brother Prochoros, while his theological documentation is not powerful. His criticism against the Palamite theology, when it is not made under the influence of the emotional load of Prochoros’ hardship, it is focused on the novelty of this theology against the united Patristic tradition. His criticism often uses a rhetoric and an argumentation which are aimed to reinforce the common Patristic tradition of the East and the West and therefore serve the reunion policy. Being an admirer of the classical education and philosophy, but also thanks to his rich political thinking and experience, Demetrios produces a vivid and often mocking discourse, which, besides the exquisite language and the elaborate application of rhetorical rules, is characterized by the rich use of examples, quotes, and reminiscences which are taken from the classical rather than from the ecclesiastical literature.72 The ultimate criterion of wisdom for Demetrios was in ancient Greece.73 He often resorts to Plato’s terms and pictures, even in his thoughts about the Palamite theology.74. According to all this, perhaps we can say that Demetrios makes a “humanistic” review of Palamas’ theology,75 who seems to follow different paths and look for the light and the truth in the narrow paths of human sense and knowledge, attempting at the same time to align it with his reunion policy. From the assessment deriving from the study of all the works of Demetrios we can draw two conclusions: 72 The quotes in the texts of the national and Christian treatise is very common in the texts of the byzantine correspondence in particular, cf. Tomadakes (1993) 137. As far as the texts of Demetrios Cydones are concerned, we can find quotes from profane writers such as Hesiod, Aristophanes, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Theognis, Pindar, Plutarch, Thucydides, Dion Chrysostomus, Seneca and others. From the Christian treatise quotes from the Bible are often used, in constrast with quotes from the Patristic treatise, which are rarely found. 73 Kaldellis (2007). 74 It is indicative that in his treatise ȁȩȖȠȢ ʌİȡ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎ țĮIJĮijȡoȞİ߿Ȟ IJާȞ șȐȞĮIJȠȞ (PG 154, 1169-1212) Demetrios deals with the issue of the immortality of the soul using clearly Plato’s and not Christian terms. 75 Demetrios, as most anti-Palamites, belongs to a wider group of humanists, who considered the victory of Palamites and Hesychasts as a defeat and resorted to western thought, which, at that time, was in the process of adopting Plato’s humanism; see I. Meyendorf (1959), p.194.

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1. The view expressed in the text of Demetrios’ anathematization, which we mentioned at the beginning of our study, seems to be confirmed: The involvement of Demetrios in the theological conflict about Palamas’ theology is caused by, but also revolves around his effort to defend his brother Prochoros, who, according to the text of the anathematization, is responsible for his heretical views: Į‫ݫ‬IJȚȠȢ Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ ȖȑȖȠȞİ IJ߱Ȣ IJȠȚĮȪIJȘȢ Į‫ݨ‬ȡȑıİȦȢ. 2. We can give an answer to the question we posed, which was why Demetrios didn’t produce substantial theological antirhetic discourse. The politician and scholar Demetrios Cydones, inspired mainly by the ancient Greek wisdom and also by the western thought, which he got acquainted with through his translations, didn’t realize that “the Christian, theocentric humanism, which the Greek Patristic tradition has always represented” 76 and which is represented by Palamas’ theology, couldn’t be aligned with the secular humanism, which he represented and in which he sought his own footing in his antirhetic theological discourse.

Works Cited Beck, H.-G. 1963, “Humanismus und Palamismus”, in Actes du XIIe Congres International d’ Études Byzantines, Ochrid (1961), vol. 3, Belgrade, pp. 63-82. Christou, P. K. 1971, ȆĮIJȑȡİȢ țĮȚ șİȠȜȩȖȠȚ IJȠȣ ȤȡȚıIJȚĮȞȚıȝȠȪ, v. 2, Thessaloniki. Glycofrydi-Leontsini, A. 2003, “Demetrios Cydones as a Translator of Latin Texts”, in Ch. Dendrinos, J. Harris, E. Harvalia-Crook, J. Herrin (eds), Porphyrogenita. Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides, Aldershot: Ashgate, London, pp. 175-185. Candal, M. 1962, “Demetrio Cidonio y el problema trinitario palamitico”, OCP 28, pp. 75-120. Ioannides, Ǻ. Ch. 1957, ȅ ȝȣıIJȚțȚıȝȩȢ IJȠȣ ĮʌȠıIJȩȜȠȣ ȆĮȪȜȠȣ, Athens. Kaldellis, A. 2007, Hellenism in Byzantium, The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition (Greek Culture in the Roman World) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York. Kianka, Fr., 1980, “The apology of Demetrios Cydones. A FourteenthCentury Autobiographical Source”, ByzSt 7, pp. 51-71. —. 1981, Demetrios Cydones (c.1324- c.1397), Intellectual and Diplomatic 76 See I. Meyendorf (2010), p.176. See also Beck (1963), pp.63-82.

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Relations between Byzantium and the West in the Fourteenth Century (D. Phil Thesis, Fordham), New York. —. 1983, “A late Byzantine defence of the latin church fathers”, OCP 49, pp. 419-425. —. 1985, “Byzantine-papal Diplomacy: The Role of Demetrios Cydones”, IHR 7, pp. 175-213. Koltsiou-Nikita, A., 2000, ȉȠ ȀȪȡȠȢ IJȦȞ ȆĮIJȑȡȦȞ IJȘȢ ǼțțȜȘıȓĮȢ. ȂȚĮ ĮȞȑțįȠIJȘ İʌȚıIJȠȜȚțȒ ʌȡĮȖȝĮIJİȓĮ, ĭȚȜȠıȠijȚțȒ ĬİȠȜȠȖȚțȒ ǺȚȕȜȚȠșȒțȘ 42, Pournras, Thessaloniki. —. 2002, «Ǿ ʌȡȩıȜȘȥȘ IJȦȞ İʌȚıIJȠȜȫȞ IJȠȣ ǹʌȠıIJȩȜȠȣ ȆĮȪȜȠȣ ıİ ȝȓĮ İʌȚıIJȠȜȚțȒ ʌȡĮȖȝĮIJİȓĮ IJȠȣ ǻȘȝȘIJȡȓȠȣ ȀȣįȫȞȘ», ǼǼĬȈǹȆĬ (ȉȝȒȝĮ ĬİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ) (IJȚȝȘIJȚțȩ ĮijȚȑȡȦȝĮ ıIJȠȞ ȠȝȩIJȚȝȠ țĮșȘȖȘIJȒ ȃ. ȂĮIJıȠȪțĮ) 12, pp.189-211. —. 2005, ǻȘȝȘIJȡȓȠȣ ȀȣįȫȞȘ MİIJȐijȡĮıȘ IJȠȣ ȥİȣįȠĮȣȖȠȣıIJȚȞİȓȠȣ Soliloquia (ȉ‫ܽ ޥ‬Ȟ İ‫ݫ‬ʌȠȚ ȥȣȤ‫ ޣ‬ȝȩȞȘ ʌȡާȢ ȝȩȞȠȞ IJާȞ șİȩȞ), Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Philosophi Byzantini 11, ǹțĮįȘȝȓĮ ǹșȘȞȫȞ, Athens. —. 2006, «Ǿ șİȫȡȘıȘ IJȠȣ ǾıȣȤĮıȝȠȪ ıIJȘȞ İȡȖȠȖȡĮijȓĮ IJȦȞ ĮįİȜijȫȞ ȆȡȠȤȩȡȠȣ țĮȚ ǻȘȝȘIJȡȓȠȣ ȀȣįȫȞȘ». ǼǼĬȈǹȆĬ (ȉȝȒȝĮ ĬİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ) (IJȚȝȘIJȚțȩ ĮijȚȑȡȦȝĮ ıIJȠȞ ȠȝȩIJȚȝȠ țĮșȘȖȘIJȒ ǹʌ. īȜĮȕȓȞĮ) 16, pp. 83-99. —. 2013, «Ǿ ıIJȐıȘ IJȠȣ ȕȣȗĮȞIJȚȞȠȪ ȜȠȖȓȠȣ ǻȘȝȘIJȡȓȠȣ ȀȣįȫȞȘ ȑȞĮȞIJȚ IJȘȢ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ IJȠȣ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ȆĮȜĮȝȐ», in ȈȪȞșİıȚȢ 2.2 (2013) pp.118141. Larchet, J.-C., 1986, «ȅ ȐȖȚȠȢ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ Ƞ ȆĮȜĮȝȐȢ țĮȚ Ș ʌĮIJİȡȚțȒ ʌĮȡȐįȠıȘ», in ȆȡĮțIJȚțȐ șİȠȜȠȖȚțȠȪ ȈȣȞİįȡȓȠȣ İȚȢ ȝȞȒȝȘȞ IJȠȣ İȞ ĮȖȓȠȚȢ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ ȘȝȫȞ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ĮȡȤȚİʌȚıțȩʌȠȣ ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘȢ IJȠȣ ȆĮȜĮȝȐ (12-14 ȃȠİȝȕȡȓȠȣ 1984), Thessaloniki, pp. 331-346. Loenertz, R.J., 1956-60, Demetrios Cydones, Correspondance, ǿ-ǿǿ, Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Studi e ȉesti, 186, 208. Mantzaridis, G., 1983, ȆĮȜĮȝȚțȐ, Pournaras, Thessaloniki. Meyendorf, J., 1959, Introduction à l’étude de Grégoire Palamas, Patristica Sorboniensia 3, Paris: Seuil. —. 2010, ǺȣȗĮȞIJȚȞȒ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮ (ȝİIJȐijȡ., İʌȚȝ., Ȇ. Ȇ. ȀȠȣȝĮȡȚĮȞȩȢ, Ǻ. ȉıȐȖțĮȜȠȢ), Indictos,Athens. Mergiali, S., 1996, L’ Enseignement et les letters pendant l’ époque des Paléologues (1261-1453), ǼIJĮȚȡİȓĮ IJȦȞ ijȓȜȦȞ IJȠȣ ȜĮȠȪ, ȀȑȞIJȡȠȞ ǼȡİȪȞȘȢ ǺȣȗĮȞIJȓȠȣ 5, Athens. Mercati, G., 1931, Notizie di Procoro e Dimitrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Theodoro Meliteniota (Studi e Testi 56), Città del Vaticano. Meyer, H., 1988 (3ª ed.), Das Zitat in der Erzählkunst, Fischer, Stuttgart. Nadal, J. S., 1974, “La critique par Akindynos de l’ herméneutique

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patristique de Palamas”, Istina 19, pp.297-328. Rigo, A., 2004, “Il monte Athos e la controversia palamitica dal Concilio del 1351 al tomo sinodale del 1368. Ciacomo Tricanas, Procoro Cidonio e Filiteo Kokkinos”, in: A. Rigo (ed.), Gregorio Palamas e oltre, Studi e documenti sulle controversie theologiche del xiv secolo Bizantino, Firenze, pp.1-51. Russell, N., 2003, “Palamism and the Circle of Demetrios Cydones”, in Ch. Dendrinos, J. Harris, E. Harvalia-Crook, J. Herrin (eds), Porphyrogenita: Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides, Aldershot: Ashgate, London, pp.153-174. —. 2006a, “Prochoros Cydones and the Fourteenh-Century Understanding of Orthodoxy”, in A. Louth - A. Casiday (eds), Byzantine Orthodoxies. Papers from the thirty-sixth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, University of Durham, 23-25 March 2002, Aldershot Ashgate, London, pp.75-91. —. 2006b, “Theosis and Gregory Palamas: Continuity or Doctrinal Change?”, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 50:4, pp. 357-79. Ryder, J. R., 2010, The Career and Writings of Demetrios Kydones: A Study of Fourteenth-Century Byzantine Politics, Religion and Society, Brill, Leiden-Boston. Tinnefeld, F., 1972, “Georgios Philosophos. Ein Korrespondent und Freund des Demetrios Kydones“, OCP 38 , pp. 141-71 —. 1981-1999, Demetrios Kydones Briefe I.1, I.2, II, III (Bibliothek der Christlichen Literatur 12,16,33,50), Stuttgart. —. 2010, Die Briefe des Demetrios Kydones: Themen und literarische Form, Wiesbaden Voordeckers, E. & Tinnefeld, F., 1987, Ioannis Cantacuzeni Refutationes duae Prochori Cydonii et Disputatio cum Paulo Patriarcha Latino epistulis septem tradita, CC Series Graeca 16, Leuven. Tomadakes, N. B., 1993, ǺȣȗĮȞIJȚȞȒ İʌȚıIJȠȜȠȖȡĮijȓĮ, Thessaloniki. Wilson, N., 1996, Scholars of Byzantium (Revised Edition), Duckworth, London.

“ǼȀ” AND “ǻǿǹ” IN APODICTIC TREATISES ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF GREGORY PALAMAS DR MIKONJIA KNEŽEVIû

In his major and, unfortunately, often neglected trinitarian writing Apodeictic Treatises on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, as part of the anti-Latin polemics over filioque1, Gregory Palamas displays a series of subtle, sometimes even meticulous terminological distinctions and observations,2 which serve further to explain his main theological 1 For a detailed overview of the filioque issue and the controversy around it, beside the classical study of H. B. Swete, On the History of the Doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit. From the Apostolic Age to the Death of Charlemagne, Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co, London: George Bell & Sons 1876, I refer only to a few more recent publications: B. Oberdorfer, Filioque. Geschichte und Theologie eines ökumenischen Problems, Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie ʋ 96, Göttingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2001 (for Palamas, see particularly: 217-230); P. Gemeinhardt, Die Filioque-Kontroverse zwischen Ost- und Westkirche im Frühmittelalter, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte ʋ 82, Berlin, New York : Walter de Gruyter 2002; D. Koporcic, Filioque: Die Kontroverse um den Hervorgang des Heiligen Geistes in historischer und theologischer Perspektive, München: Grin Verlag 2009 (the section on Palamas: 57-58); A. Edward Siecienski, The Filioque. History of a Doctrinal Controversy, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010 (the section on Palamas: 145-147, 274-275). 2 For example see here Palamas’ insistence on the importance of the usage of definite article: īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠ૨ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼, ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 6, in: īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠ૨ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ. ਫțįȓįȠȞIJĮȚ ਥʌȚȝİȜİȓ઺ Ȇ. Ȁ. ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ. ȉȩȝȠȢ ǹǯ. ȁȩȖȠȚ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțȠȓ. ݃ȞIJİʌȚȖȡĮijĮȓ. ‫ݑ‬ʌȚıIJȠȜĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡާȢ ǺĮȡȜĮ‫ޟ‬ȝ țĮ‫݃ ޥ‬țȓȞįȣȞȠȞ. ‫ދ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ. ਫțįȓįȠȣȞ B. Bobrinsky, Ȇ. ȆĮʌĮİȣĮȖȖȑȜȠȣ, I. Meyendorff, Ȇ. ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ: ȀȣȡȠȝȐȞȠȢ 1962, 21988 [further: ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ [21988]], 23-153: 82.33-34–83.1-3. I quote parallely according to the edition: īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠ૨ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼, ݈ʌĮȞIJĮ IJ‫ݏ ޟ‬ȡȖĮ. 1. ȁȩȖȠȚ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțȠ‫ ޥ‬įȪȠ ʌİȡ‫ޥ‬ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪıİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ݄ȖȓȠȣ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ. ݃ȞIJİʌȚȖȡĮijĮȓ. ‫ݑ‬ʌȚıIJȠȜĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡާȢ ݃țȚȞįȪȞȠȞ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ǺĮȡȜĮߢȝ. ਫʌȩʌIJĮȚ ȆĮȞ. Ȁ. ȋȡȘıIJȠȣ, ĬİȠį. ȃ. ǽȒıȘȢ. ਫʌȚȝİȜȘIJĮ੿ ǺĮı. ǻ.

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standpoint related to the existence of monarchy or monocausality (ȝȠȞĮȡȤȓĮ) within divine being,3 and consequently to support the thesis on hypostatic procession of the Holy Spirit ex Patre solo. Out of this rich conceptual arsenal used by Palamas, the distinguishing of prepositions “from” (‫݋‬ț) and “through” (įȚȐ) has an important apologetic-polemical function. This distinguishing, which is, according to Palamas, over-sighted by the proponents of filioque, should additionally dispute the thesis of one strictly causal function of the Son in relation to the Holy Spirit. The explication of what this important distinction implies and the determination of the meanings that prepositions “from” (‫݋‬ț) and “through” (įȚȐ) cover is brought up sporadically by Palamas throughout the entire treatise. However, ɚ specific part of the treatise dedicated to this subject one finds in 25th chapter of the first, and in 57th–59th, 70th and 75th chapter of the second Apodeictic Treatise on the Procession of the Holy Spirit4. In the essay that follows, I will investigate precisely this distinguishing and semantic arc that the two aforementioned prepositions describe. 1. As is well known, the preposition “‫݋‬ț” is characterized by a variety of functions. Among other things, it serves to point out the motion from one place to another, the origin, the manner of development of a certain event, composition and structure of an object or phenomenon, etc. Except for these functions, the preposition “‫݋‬ț” may also indicate certain motion “from” or “out of”, suggesting in this way “proceeding” or “emitting” of something from its cause or “reason”; where, in that manner, its “efficient cause” or “underlying principle” is to be implied. Considering this last aspect of its meaning, it is understandable that the preposition “‫݋‬ț”, besides a general non-technical use in New Testament,5 had also in the ĭĮȞȠȣȡȖȐțȘȢ, ਫȜİȣș. ī. ȂİȡİIJȐțȘȢ. ǼੁıĮȖȦȖȒ, ȂİIJȐijȡĮıȚȢ-ȈȤȩȜȚĮ ੥ʌઁ Ȇ. Ȁ. ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ, ਰȜȜȘȞİȢ ȆĮIJȑȡİȢ IJોȢ ਫțțȜȘıȓĮȢ ʋ 51, ȆĮIJİȡȚțĮ੿ ਥțįȩıİȚȢ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ ੒ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼Ȣ, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ 1981 [further: ǼȆǼ 51 [1981]], 68-336: 192.12-16. See also: ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 49, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ [21988] 123.15-18, ǼȆǼ 51 [1981] 276.24-26. 3 For a schematic overview of Palamas’ teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit, as well as for the (to the orthodox staindpoint unacceptable) consequences that, in his opinion, the teaching of filioque unavoidably introduces, see: Ȉ. Ǻ. ȈIJȠȜȓȖțĮ, “਺ įȚįĮıțĮȜȓĮ IJȠ૨ ਞȖȓȠȣ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼ ȖȚȐ IJȒȞ ਥțʌȩȡİȣıȘ IJȠ૨ ਞȖȓȠȣ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ țĮȓ Ƞੂ ʌȘȖȑȢ IJȘȢ”, ‫ݑ‬țțȜȘıȚĮıIJȚțާȢ ĭȐȡȠȢ 76 (2005) 165-193. 4 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ⱥǯ 25, Ǻǯ 57-59, 70, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ [21988] 52-53, 130132, 142-143 | ǼȆǼ 51 [1981] 126-128, 290-296, 314-316. 5 For the usage of this preposition in the New Testament, see A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, being Grimm’s Wilke’s Clavis Novi Testamenti,

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early church Fathers almost a technical application as well, being used to point out the causal relation between the person of the Father, on one side, and the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit, on the other. This fact can also be seen from the expressions in the Nicene Creed expressing the aforementioned relationship: “‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ȆĮIJȡާȢ ȖİȞȞȘșȑȞIJĮ” and “‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ȆĮIJȡާȢ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȝİȞȠȞ” – where preposition “‫݋‬ț” appears in both cases.6 Of special significance, of course, is the fact that for expressing a mutual relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit on the trinitarian level, the preposition “‫݋‬ț” was to be particularly avoided. This semantic potential of the preposition “‫݋‬ț”, moreover its foundation in patristic tradition, clearly contributed to its adequate technical application in Gregory Palamas, as well as to the special differentiation of its meaning on his part. This differentiation in meaning is always connected to the adequate theological contextualization, so the meaning capacity and the wideness of the amplitude of the application of the aforementioned preposition are to be determined in Palamas according to whether it is used on a strictly trinitarian or on a strictly oikonomia level. When it comes to the triadological realm of God’s being, the preposition “‫݋‬ț” is connected with the “existential derivation” (‫ބ‬ʌĮȡțIJȚț‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌȡȠȑȜİȣıȚȞ) of the two divine persons, i.e., with the constitution of the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Spirit. In other words, the preposition “‫݋‬ț”, as it has already been suggested by the spirit and the letter of the aforementioned Nicene Creed expressions, is connected with the crucial question of causality within divine being. Following the lead of Cappadocian fathers, particularly on the trace of Gregory the Theologian, and supported by certain concepts from Corpus Dionysiacum,7 Gregory translated, revised and enlarged by Joseph Henry Thayer, New York : American Book Co. 1889, 189-192. 6 Interestingly, the famous place in the Gospel of John (15:26) does not actually use the preposition “‫݋‬ț”, as it is the case with the Creed, but the preposition “ʌĮȡȐ”: “IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJ߱Ȣ ܻȜȘșİȓĮȢ ‫ ݺ‬ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪİIJĮȚ”. According to H. B. Swete, On the History of the Doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit…, Cambridge 1876, 10, “[t]he change of ʌĮȡȐ into ‫݋‬ț in the Creed is curious, and may have been due to imperfect recollection of the original, since no variant exists in any known MS of the Gospel”. In the opinion of G. Bray, “The Double Procession of the Holy Spirit in Evangelical Theology Today: Do Wee Still Need It?”, Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 41, 3 (1998) 415–426: 417418, the prepositions “‫݋‬ț” and “ʌĮȡȐ” are in this context synonymous; John’s commitment to “ʌĮȡȐ” seems to be conditioned by the fact that he uses the same preposition to designate the manner in which the Son comes from the Father. 7 For example see the following expressions, each of them applied to the Father:

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Palamas will strongly persist in his Apodeictic Treatises on the importance of existence of one cause in the divine being. That one (and the only) cause certainly is the hypostasis of the Father, and this causality, identified with his own non-causality, is constituted by begetting of the Son and proceeding of the Spirit: Father is the cause precisely because “ȖİȞȞߢȞ” and “‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪİȚȞ”8 are associated with Him. Due to this strong emphasis of monocausality, it was entirely to be expected that Gregory Palamas would engage a more radical use of the preposition “‫݋‬ț” on the trinitarian level and to connect it primarily with the person of God the Father.9 In simple terms: as preposition “‫݋‬ț” suggests causality, and causality is to be associated with only one person of the Holy Trinity (with the person of the Father), its application also to the Son or to the Holy Spirit is suspended in advance. Therefore, the preposition “‫݋‬ț” within a theological framework is always associated with the monocausality or monarchy, which means that the formulation “‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ȆĮIJȡȩȢ” from The Creed should be read, according to Palamas, as “‫݋‬ț ȝȩȞȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮIJȡȩȢ”. The interpolation “ȝȩȞȠȣ”, which serves further to emphasize not just any causality in divine being, but also its exclusivity, although cannot be explicitly found in the writings of the fathers, is still “implied” (ıȣȞȣʌĮțȠȪİIJĮȚ) not any less as if it was really added; furthermore, it is implied, according to Palamas, “directly and necessarily”.10 In other words, all this will mean that the preposition “‫݋‬ț” in Palamas gains firstly a certain kind of conceptual exclusivity and binding semantic reduction, and, consequently, the role of a trinitarian technical term. The use of this preposition, as it is to be presented later, can however vary in a certain context, but its main purpose consists in the accentuation of monarchy at the trinitarian level. Furthermore, this Palamas’ persistence on “ʌȘȖĮ‫ޥ‬Į șİȩIJȘȢ”, “ȝȩȞȠȢ ʌȘȖ‫ ޣ‬șİȩIJȘIJȠȢ”, “ȝȩȞȘ ʌȘȖ‫ ޣ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡȠȣıȓȠȣ șİȩIJȘIJȠȢ”, “ʌȘȖ‫ ޣ‬țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ȡȤ‫݋ ޣ‬ıIJȚ șİȩIJȘIJȠȢ ȝȩȞȠȢ șİȠȖȩȞȠȢ ‫ޓ‬Ȟ”, “șİȩIJȘȢ șİȠȖȩȞȠȢ”, etc. See: ȉࠜ ıȣȝʌȡİıȕȣIJȑȡ࠙ ȉȚȝȠșȑ࠙ ǻȚȠȞȪıȚȠȢ ‫ ݸ‬ʌȡİıȕȣIJȑȡȠȢ Ȇİȡ‫ ޥ‬șİȓȦȞ ‫ݷ‬ȞȠȝȐIJȦȞ 2, 5, Patrologia Graeca 4, 641D | Corpus Dionysiacum I. De Divinis Nominibus. Herausgegeben von B. R. Suchla, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1990, 128.11; 2, 7, PG 645B | Corpus Dionysiacum I 1990, 132.1, etc. 8 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 42, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 116.14-15; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 262.29-30: “țĮIJ੹ IJĮ૨IJĮ Ȗ੹ȡ [sc. țĮIJ੹ IJઁ ȖİȞȞߢȞ țĮ੿ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪİȚȞ] Į੅IJȚȠȞ IJઁ Į੅IJȚȠȞ”. 9 Cf. ਝ. ȇȐȞIJȠȕȚIJȢ, ȉާ ȝȣıIJȒȡȚȠȞ IJ߱Ȣ ݄ȖȓĮȢ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ ݀ȖȚȠȞ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȞ ȆĮȜĮȝߢȞ, ਝȞȐȜİțIJĮ ǺȜĮIJȐįȦȞ ʋ 16, ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ: ȆĮIJȡȚĮȡȤȚțઁȞ ੎įȡȣȝĮ ȆĮIJİȡȚț૵Ȟ ȂİȜİIJ૵Ȟ 1973 (1991), 155. 10 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ⱥǯ 2, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 31.12-13; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 84.4-5; Ⱥǯ 5, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 32.17-18, 26; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 86.13-14, 23; Ⱥǯ 7, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 35.30-32; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 92.24-6. Cf. Ǻǯ 39, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 113.19-20; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 256.27-28.

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connection of the preposition “ਥț” with monocausality will stay present even when it is transposed on a strictly oikonomia level and when it is no longer linked exclusively to the hypostasis of the Father, but is considered as “by nature and common” (ijȪıİȚ į‫ ޡ‬Ƞ‫މ‬ıĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țȠȚȞȒ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ) to the three persons of the Holy Trinity, and hence as “IJȡȚıȣʌȩıIJĮIJȘ”.11 2. In contrast to the preposition “from” (‫݋‬ț) whose primary use is, according to Palamas, bonded with the trinitarian milieu and expresses hypostatic causality, and whose, consequently, economic contextualization, as it is to be presented later, takes place only at a second step, preposition “through” (įȚȐ) is primarily connected to oikonomia and it cannot be used, by any means, to indicate existential or hypostatic causality. Generally, one can say that the preposition “įȚȐ” in Palamas has a triple function, namely it expresses: a) derivation due to oikonomia of Spirit, which takes place “from” the Father “through” the Son; b) the order of the confession of the three persons in the Holy Trinity, where preposition itself is conceptualized so as (implicitly) to indicate the relationship of a direct causality between the person of the Holy Spirit and the person of the Father; c) the connection between the Son and the Holy Spirit in the domain of triadology; a connection which is, actually, designed to suggest the consubstantiality and the commonness of the one will and energy of three persons of the Holy Trinity. This triple functionalization of the preposition “įȚȐ”, which is, due to the dispersity of the argumentation in the text, sometimes really difficult to grasp, Palamas still resumes in 2, 75: “It is said, again, [that] the Holy Spirit [is] through (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬the Son sometimes as through him conceived (įȚ߫ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ȞȠȠȪȝİȞȠȞ) Spirit of the Father and from the Father, since He is not begotten, but proceeded from, and as proceeded from directly [is] conceived from the One that He is proceeded from. Again [the Spirit] is [through the Son], according to theologians, also as beyond time accompanying (‫ސ‬Ȣ ıȣȝʌĮȡȠȝĮȡIJȠࠎȞ) Him [ the Son] and [as] with Him and after Him, but not [as] from (‫݋‬ț) Him, existing from (‫݋‬ț) the Father, as it is obvious to the reasonable ones from what has been told. For, none of those who reckon well, hearing that the Logos is pre-eternally begotten from the Father, misses the immediate conclusion about the Spirit, Who is accompanying Him connaturally and 11 In other words, when it comes to the economic causality, that is, when it is said that the created world became “from” (ਥț) the God, we do not, although we imply all the three divine persons, speak about three principles, but about one principle, which is now “threehypostatic”. See: ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǹǯ 13, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 39-40; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 100-102. Cf. also: ǹǯ 14, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 40.24-31–41.1-5; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 102.15-28.

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coeternally; according to that, it is not allowed to take “through” (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬as “from” (‫݋‬ț). Again, [the Spirit] is [through the Son] also as through (įȚ‫)ޟ‬ the Son and from (‫݋‬ț) the Son bestowed upon the saints, but not as if preeternally sent out of there or given or originated, if you wish [even] proceeded, but [as] given and revealed, when he condescended to be accepted, and to be revealed as he condescended; because, the essence and the hypostasis of the divine Spirit are never revealed.12

a) We see here that derivation, due to oikonomia considerations, of the Holy Spirit “from” (‫݋‬ț) the Father “through” (įȚȐ) the Son is one of the poles of what Gregory Palamas, for the first time in Apodeictic Treatises 1, 9, through a distinction between the Spirit understood in the sense of “energy” (țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮȞ) and the Spirit understood in “existential and hypostatic” sense (țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬į‫ ޡ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ބ‬ʌȩıIJĮıȚȞ)13, however quite explicitly in 1, 29, calls “the double procession of the Holy Spirit” (‫ݘ‬ į‫ ޡ‬IJȠࠎ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ ʌȡȩȠįȠȢ įȚIJIJ‫)]…[ ޣ‬.14 This thesis, which clearly testifies that Palamas’ distinction between essence and energy is by no means conditioned merely by “historical reasons” or simply by hesychast controversy,15 is one of the cornerstones of the entire Palamas’ triadology 12 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 75, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988) 146.10-26; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981) 322.28-32–324.1-13: “ǻȚ‫ ޟ‬į‫ ޡ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ȜȑȖİIJĮȚ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ, ‫ݏ‬ıș߫ ‫ݼ‬IJİ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ސ‬Ȣ įȚ߫ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ȞȠȠȪȝİȞȠȞ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ʌĮIJȡާȢ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț ʌĮIJȡȩȢ, ݀IJİ ȝ‫ ޣ‬ȖİȞȞȘIJާȞ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤȠȞ ܻȜȜ߫ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣIJȩȞ, țĮ‫ސ ޥ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣIJާȞ ܻȝȑıȦȢ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȞIJȠȢ Į‫ރ‬IJާ ȞȠȠȪȝİȞȠȞǜ ‫ݏ‬ıIJȚ į‫ ޡ‬țĮ‫ސ ޥ‬Ȣ ıȣȝʌĮȡȠȝĮȡIJȠࠎȞ ܻȤȡȩȞȦȢ Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJȠީȢ șİȠȜȩȖȠȣȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ıީȞ Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ȝİIJ߫ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ, ܻȜȜ߫ Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ‫ ޥ‬țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ ‫ބ‬ʌ߱ȡȤȠȞ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJȩșİȞ IJȠ߿Ȣ ıȣȞİIJȠ߿Ȣ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ țĮIJȐįȘȜȠȞǜ Ƞ‫ރ‬įİ‫ޥ‬Ȣ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ IJࠛȞ İ‫ މ‬ijȡȠȞȠȪȞIJȦȞ ȜȩȖȠȞ ܻțȠȪıĮȢ ʌȡȠĮȚȦȞȓȦȢ ‫݋‬ț ʌĮIJȡާȢ ȖİȞȞȫȝİȞȠȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ ‫ݏ‬ȞȞȠȚĮȞ İ‫ރ‬șީȢ ‫ݏ‬ȡȤİIJĮȚ IJȠࠎ IJࠜ ȜȩȖ࠙ ıȣȝijȣࠛȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ıȣȞĮȞȐȡȤȦȢ ıȣȝʌĮȡĮȝĮȡIJȠࠎȞIJȠȢ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ, țĮș߫ ‫ݜ‬Ȟ ‫ݏ‬ȞȞȠȚĮȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬į߫ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ ‘‫݋‬ț’ IJȒȞ ‘įȚȐ’ Ȥȡ‫ ޣ‬ȝİIJĮȜĮȝȕȐȞİȚȞǜ ‫ݏ‬ıIJȚ į‫ ޡ‬țĮ‫ސ ޥ‬Ȣ įȚ߫ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȟ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJȠ߿Ȣ ܼȖȓȠȚȢ ȤȠȡȘȖȠȪȝİȞȠȞ, Ƞ‫ ރ‬ȝ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌȡȠĮȚȦȞȓȦȢ ‫݋‬țİ߿șİȞ ʌİȝʌȩȝİȞȠȞ ‫ ݙ‬įȚįȩȝİȞȠȞ ‫ ݙ‬ʌȘȖȐȗȠȞ, İ‫ ݧ‬į‫ޡ‬ ȕȠȪȜİȚ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȝİȞȠȞ, ܻȜȜ߫ ‫ݘ‬ȞȓțĮ ȜȘijș߱ȞĮȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijİȞİȡȦș߱ȞĮȚ İ‫ރ‬įȩțȘıİ țĮ‫ސ ޥ‬Ȣ İ‫ރ‬įȩțȘıİ įȚįȩȝİȞȩȞ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijĮȞİȡȠȪȝİȞȠȞǜ Ƞ‫ ރ‬Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ Į‫ރ‬IJ‫ ޣ‬țĮș߫ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ ݘ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮ țĮ‫ݘ ޥ‬ ‫ބ‬ʌȩıIJĮıȚȢ ijĮȞİȡȠࠎIJĮȓ ʌȠIJİ IJȠࠎ șİȓȠȣ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ”. 13 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǹǯ 9, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 37.12-14; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981) 96.9-12. 14 For this, see: C. B. Scouteris, “The Double Procession of the Holy Spirit according to Saint Gregory Palamas”, in: Der Heilige Geist im Leben der Kirche. Forscher aus dem Osten und Westen Europas an den Quellen des gemeinsamen Glaubens. Pro Oriente-Studientagung “Der Heilige Geist bei den griechischen und lateinischen Kirchenvätern im ersten Jahrtausend”, Wien, Juni 2003. Herausgegeben von Y. de Andia, P. L. Hofrichter, Pro Oriente ʋ XXIX. Wiener Patristische Tagungen ʋ II, Innsbruck, Wien : Tyrolia-Verlag 2005, 329-338. 15 Cf. ਝ. ȇȐȞIJȠȕȚIJȢ, ȉާ ȝȣıIJȒȡȚȠȞ IJ߱Ȣ ݄ȖȓĮȢ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ…, 159-160. For this, see especially: G. Richter, “Ansätze und Motive für die Lehre des Gregorios Palamas

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and one of the crucial aspects in the treatise taken here into consideration. This first pole of oikonomia implies that “motion” and “procession” of the Spirit is oriented towards the created world and is “conditioned” by it; the Spirit, namely, “outflows down from (‫݋‬ț) the Father through (įȚȐ) the Son” on to the saints, so that this kind of pouring forth is also called “the good will of the Father and the Son, fulfilled out of philanthropy” (İ‫ރ‬įȠțȓĮ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ įȚ‫ ޟ‬ijȚȜĮȞșȡȦʌȓĮȞ ʌȐȞIJȦȢ IJİȜİıșİ૙ıĮ),16 and its meaning corresponds to what Palamas designates by various terms throughout this treatise, such as “mission” (ܻʌȠıIJȠȜȒ), “giving” (įȩıȚȢ), “descension” (ıȣȖțĮIJȐȕĮıȚȢ), “sending” (‫ݏ‬țʌİȝȥȚȢ), “manifestation” (‫ݏ‬țijĮȞıȚȢ), etc. This “manifestation” (ijĮȞȑȡȦıȚȢ) of the Spirit, briefly, actually represents the grace of God, common to the three persons of the Holy Trinity; consequently, the name “Spirit” in this context should not be taken as if it refers to the hypostasis or person of the Holy Spirit, but rather in sense of (uncreated) divine energy.17 The second pole of this double procession of the Spirit, which is, in Palamas’ opinion at least, “revealed through the Scriptures, inspired by God”, refers to the “unconditioned and free, beyond good will and philanthropy, because it is from the Father, not in accordance to the will, but exclusively by nature: pre-eternal and most-supernatural coming forth of the Holy Spirit and movement and procession”.18 In this sense, it is obvious at once, Palamas has in mind the existential procession of the Holy Spirit – its trinitarian aspect, not its manifestation due to oikonomia considerations. This hypostatic aspect of the procession of the Holy Spirit, Palamas also expresses by various terms and phrases, such as: “existential derivation” (‫ބ‬ʌĮȡțIJȚț‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌȡȠȑȜİȣıȚȢ), “procession” (‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȚȢ), “preeternal and incomprehensible procession” (ʌȡȠĮȚȫȞȚȠȞ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ʌİȡȚȞȩȘIJȠȞ ‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȚȢ), “the most-supernatural coming forth and motion and procession” (‫ބ‬ʌİȡijȣİıIJȐIJȘ ‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȚȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țȓȞȘıȚȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȩȠįȠȢ), “preeternal and existential procession” (ʌȡȠĮȚȫȞȚȠȞ țĮ‫ބ ޥ‬ʌĮȡțIJȚț‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌȡȩȠįȠȞ), etc. von den göttlichen Energien”, Ostkirchliche Studien 31 (1982) 281-296. 16 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǹǯ 29, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 55.13-14; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 132.7-8. 17 Cf. ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 6, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 82.25-34–83.1-18; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 192.3-32; Ǻǯ 47, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 120.15-22–121.1-24; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 272.1-31–274.1-2. 18 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǹǯ 29, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988) 55.18-21; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981) 132.13-17: “‫ݕ‬ıIJȚ į‫ ޡ‬țĮ‫ܻ ݘ ޥ‬ȞĮȚIJȓȦȢ IJİ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ʌȠȜİȜȣȝȑȞȦȢ ʌȐȞIJ߯ țĮ‫ބ ޥ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ İ‫ރ‬įȠțȓĮȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijȚȜĮȞșȡȦʌȓĮȞ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ȝ‫ ޣ‬țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬șȑȜȘıȚȞ ܻȜȜ‫ ޟ‬țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬ijȪıȚȞ ȝȩȞȘȞ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ Ƞ‫މ‬ıĮ ʌȡȠĮȚȫȞȚȠȢ țĮ‫ބ ޥ‬ʌİȡijȣİıIJȐIJȘ IJȠࠎ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ ‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȚȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țȓȞȘıȚȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȩȠįȠȢ”.

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As I have already mentioned, preposition “įȚȐ” is applied primarily to that first pole of this “double procession of the Holy Spirit”, that is, to the range of economic manifestation of the Holy Spirit; on this occasion, we find in Palamas’ treatise, more than once, a very clearly defined expression “from (‫݋‬ț) the Father through (įȚȐ) the Son”. The meaning of the preposition “įȚȐ” is here directed primarily towards the energetic procession of the Spirit: Spirit is given to the created world “through” the Son in the sense of “transmission” (ȝİIJȐįȠıȚȢ) of uncreated energy. If we follow carefully the course of the Apodeictic Treatises, we will conclude that exactly this contextualization of the preposition “įȚȐ” is the closest one to Palamas, so it follows to be the most frequent in the treatise.19 Such an application of this preposition gave the possibility to Palamas to make a clear deflection from its causal conceptualization on the trinitarian level, which had a great importance in his polemics against filioque. Furthermore, for such an application and interpretation Palamas could relatively easy find a suitable confirmation in the patristic tradition, which was of decisive importance to him.20 So, while interpreting one section from Gregory of Nyssa’s The Great Catechism, Palamas says: “we found the Spirit as conceived from (‫݋‬ț) the Father through (įȚȐ) the Son, but not [as] proceeding [through the Son]”. Reflecting this place in the light of his thesis of the double procession of the Holy Spirit, Gregory Palamas, then, decisively separates preposition “through” (įȚȐ) from the existential “procession” (‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȚȞ) of the Spirit and links it strictly to oikonomia: “[…] so, He brought forth to us in the best way that revelation, which explains briefly in the following way the things concerning the Spirit: 'for, says He, there is one Holy Spirit, who also from the Father (‫݋‬ț ȆĮIJȡȩȢ) has the existence and who manifests himself through the Son (įȚ’ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ), i.e., to the humans'. Do you see how we should reckon and call the Spirit through the Son? Namely, as the one that is manifested to the humans through him (įȚ’ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ). In that way, then, you also should interpret wherever you find that the Spirit is given and sent through the Son from the Father, unless you want to be opposed to God, but devoted and at the

19 Cf. G. Kapriev, Philosophie in Byzanz, Würzburg : Königshausen & Neumann 2005, 282. 20 For patristic sources that Palamas particularly relies upon in his teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit, see quite schematically: Ȉ. Ǻ. ȈIJȠȜȓȖțĮ, “਺ įȚįĮıțĮȜȓĮ IJȠ૨ ਞȖȓȠȣ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ȆĮȜĮȝ઼ ȖȚȐ IJȒȞ ਥțʌȩȡİȣıȘ IJȠ૨ ਞȖȓȠȣ ȆȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ țĮȓ Ƞੂ ʌȘȖȑȢ IJȘȢ”, ‫ݑ‬țțȜȘıȚĮıIJȚțާȢ ĭȐȡȠȢ 76 (2005) 165-193. It is interesting that Palamas with regard to this subject does not mention Patriarch Photios at all.

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Hence denoting of the Spirit as the one who “through” the Son refers explicitly to his revelation to the humans, in other words, to his energetic manifestation in the created world. In many other places in Apodeictic Treatises we find similar examples of a completely explicit separation of the preposition “through” (įȚȐ) from “pre-eternal procession” (ʌȡȠĮȚȫȞȚȠȞ […] ‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȓȞ […]) and “being” (‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ, İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ) of the Spirit. So, for example, in 1, 29 Palamas says, if I read it correctly, that traditional teaching of Spirit’s “resting upon” the Son excludes that Spirit’s preeternal and incomprehensible coming forth and procession occurs through (įȚȐ) the Son,22 which is, by the way, a directly opposed attitude to Palamas’ in other places obviously relating (and even merging in meaning) to the procession of the Spirit “through” the Son with his resting “on the Son” (‫݋‬Ȟ IJࠜ Ȋ‫ ;)ࠜݨ‬in 2, 45 Palamas, again, says that the Spirit has “being” (IJާ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ) “from” (‫݋‬ț) the Father, while his procession “through” (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬the Son is connected with “revelation” and “giving”;23 in 2, 60 the Spirit’s coming forth “through” the Son is in the same manner associated with the existence of one will of the three divine persons and is therefore connected to the economic giving of the Spirit to the worthy ones, on which occasion it is stated that the one who says that the Spirit has the “existence” (IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ) “through the Son” (įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ) impiously presents the Spirit as an “act of will and so inevitably as a created being, not as a fruit of the 21 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 57, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 130.15-24; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 292.4-13: “[…] ‫ݼ‬Ȣ İ‫ݼ މ‬IJȚ ȝȐȜȚıIJĮ ʌȠȚࠛȞ, Į‫ރ‬IJȠ߿Ȣ ȡȒȝĮıȚ ʌȡȠ‫އ‬șȘțİȞ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ܻʌȠțȐȜȣȥȚȞ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȘȞ Ƞ‫ވ‬IJȦ ʌȦȢ ‫݋‬Ȟ ȕȡĮȤİ߿ įȚĮIJȡĮȞȠࠎıĮȞ IJ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢǜ ‘‫ݐ‬Ȟ ȖȐȡ’, ijȘıȓ, ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ݀ȖȚȠȞ ‫݋‬ț ʌĮIJȡާȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJާ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ ‫ݏ‬ȤȠȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚ߫ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ʌİijȘȞȩȢ, įȘȜĮį‫ ޣ‬IJȠ߿Ȣ ܻȞșȡȫʌȠȚȢ’. ‫ݾ‬ȡߣȢ ʌࠛȢ Ȥȡ‫ ޣ‬IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ȞȠİ߿Ȟ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȜȑȖİȚȞ įȚ߫ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ; ǻȘȜȠȞȩIJȚ ijĮȞİȡȦș‫ޡ‬Ȟ IJȠ߿Ȣ ܻȞșȡȫʌȠȚȢ įȚ߫ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ. ȅ‫ވ‬IJȦ IJȠȓȞȣȞ ȞȩİȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ ‫ݼ‬ʌȠȣʌİȡ ܿȞ İ‫ވ‬ȡ߯Ȣ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ įȚįȩȝİȞȩȞ IJİ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ʌİȝʌȩȝİȞȠȞ, İ‫ݫ‬Ȗİ ȝ‫ܻ ޣ‬ȞIJȓșİȠȢ ‫݋‬șȑȜİȚȢ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ, ܻȜȜ߫ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠࠎ țĮ‫ ޥ‬șİȠıİȕ‫ޣ‬Ȣ țĮ‫ޥ‬ șİȠįȓįĮțIJȠȢ”. 22 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ⱥǯ 29, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 56.24-25–57.1-2; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 134.20-23: “ȀĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠȓȞȣȞ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌȡȠĮȚȫȞȚȠȞ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȘȞ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ܻʌİȡȚȞȩȘIJȠȞ ‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȓȞ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȩȠįȠȞ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȝİȞȠȞ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬Ȟ ȣ‫ࠜݨ‬ ܻȞĮʌĮȣȩȝİȞȠȞ, ʌࠛȢ ܽȞ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ‫݋‬Ȟ ߔ ܻȞĮʌĮȪİIJĮȚ IJĮȪIJȘȞ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌȡȩȠįȠȞ;”. Cf. Ǻǯ 71, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 143.23-26; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 318.2-6: “ȆȠࠎ įȒ ıȠȚ IJާ įȚ߫ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȟ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ IJȠࠎ șİȓȠȣ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȟİȦȢ, İ‫݋ ݧ‬ț ʌĮIJȡާȢ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȝİȞȠȞ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ʌȡާȢ IJާȞ ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȟ ıĮijࠛȢ ‫ݏ‬ȡȤİIJĮȚ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬Ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ ܻȞĮʌĮȪİıșĮȚ IJȩ șİȠȜȠȖİ߿IJĮȚ;”. 23 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 45, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 118.25-26; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 268.12-13: “‫ݾ‬ȡߣȢ ‫ݼ‬IJȚ ‫݋‬ț șİȠࠎ ȝȑȞ, įȘȜȠȞȩIJȚ IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ, ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ IJާ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ, įȚ‫ ޟ‬į‫ ޡ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ȝİIJĮįȚįȩıșĮȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijĮȞİȡȠࠎıșĮȚ”.

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divine nature”;24 also, in 2, 64 we find an attitude that “the Son does not have from (‫݋‬ț) Himself the Spirit, neither the Spirit has through (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬the Son the being (IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ), but the Father has the Spirit from (‫݋‬ț) Himself, proceeding [Him] out of Himself directly, noncausally and preeternally”25. Finally, referring to Cyril of Alexandria, Palamas decisively points out: “Whenever you, therefore, hear Him say that the Holy Spirit pours forth from both of them, as from the Father essentially through (įȚȐ) the Son, do understand reverently that He teaches the transmission of these natural powers and energies of God, but not the pouring forth of the divine hypostasis of the Spirit”.26

According to the above: the use of the preposition “įȚȐ” in Gregory Palamas refers primarily to what he calls “ijĮȞİȡȠࠎıșĮȚ” and “ȝİIJĮįȓįȠıșĮȚ” and it is, bearing in mind this first level of meaning, strictly connected to the oikonomia, i.e., to the field of manifestation of the Spirit in created world through “gifts” (ȤĮȡȓıȝĮIJĮ) or “natural powers and energies” (Į‫ ݨ‬ijȣıȚțĮ‫ ޥ‬įȣȞȐȝİȚȢ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮȚ)27. b) The oikonomia function of the preposition “įȚȐ” is transparent not only in the sense I have just referred to, but also in those places where Palamas connects it to what we could call the order of confession. Taken in this sense, the aforementioned preposition shows the middle position of the Son (ȝİıȩIJȘȢ) “according to the pronunciation on the occasion of 24 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 60, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 132.9-16; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 294.28-33–296.1-2: “‫ ݾ‬ȖȠࠎȞ ȜȑȖȦȞ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ʌȡȠȧȑȞĮȚ țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ȤȠȡȘȖȓĮȞ, IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȕȠȣȜȓĮȞ IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ʌĮȡȑıIJȘıİ țĮȜࠛȢǜ İ‫ރ‬įȠțȓߠ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJާ ıȣȞİȣįȠțȠࠎȞ, IJȠ߿Ȣ ܻȟȓȠȚȢ ȤȠȡȘȖİ߿IJĮȚ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ. ‫ ݾ‬į‫ ޡ‬ȜȑȖȦȞ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚȞ, șİȜȒıİȦȢ ‫ݏ‬ȡȖȠȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țIJȓıȝĮ ‫݋‬ȟ ܻȞȐȖțȘȢ, ܻȜȜ߫ Ƞ‫ ރ‬șİȓĮȢ ijȪıİȦȢ țĮȡʌާȞ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤİȚȞ įȣııİȕࠛȢ ʌĮȡȓıIJȘıȚ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ”. 25 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 64, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 136.6-9; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 302.31–304.1-3: “[…] Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬ȟ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȠࠎ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ‫ ݸ‬ȣ‫ݨ‬ȩȢ, Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ ޡ‬įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ, ܻȜȜ߫ ‫݋‬ȟ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȠࠎ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ ‫ ݸ‬ʌĮIJȒȡ, ‫݋‬ȟ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȠࠎ ܻȝȑıȦȢ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȝİȞȠȞ ܻȞĮȚIJȓȦȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȠĮȚȦȞȓȦȢ […]”. 26 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 20, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 96.23-28; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 220.23-27: “‫ނ‬IJĮȞ Ƞ‫މ‬Ȟ ܻțȠȪı߯Ȣ Į‫ރ‬IJާȞ ‫݋‬ȟ ܻȝijȠ߿Ȟ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬ț ʌĮIJȡާȢ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȚȦįࠛȢ įȚ߫ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ʌȡȠȤİȩȝİȞȠȞ, IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ ȜȑȖȠȞIJĮ, IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ IJࠛȞ ijȣıȚțࠛȞ IJȠȪIJȦȞ įȣȞȐȝİȫȞ IJİ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİȚࠛȞ IJȠࠎ ĬİȠࠎ ȝİIJȐįȠıȚȞ, ܻȜȜ‫ ޟ‬ȝ‫ ޣ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ șİȓĮȞ IJȠࠎ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ ‫ބ‬ʌȩıIJĮıȚȞ ʌȡȠȤİ߿ıșĮȚ įȚįȐıțİȚȞ, İ‫ރ‬ıİȕࠛȢ ȞȩȝȚıȠȞ”. 27 See: ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 10, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 86-87; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 200.

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confession”,28 or, again, according to revelation and manifestation, or according to “knowledge”.29 The middle position of the Son here is not, by any means, conditioned by some substantial reasons, which is something that Palamas clearly pointed out during his explanation of the importance concerning the order (IJȐȟȚȢ) of the persons of the Holy Trinity.30 Namely, saying that the Spirit is “through” (įȚȐ) the Son “from” (‫݋‬ț) the Father does not imply any causality from the Son’s side, neither in this context represents some kind of strictly fixed order inside divine being, but is due to the nature of the names of divine persons and to the fact that the Father can be called Father only “through” (įȚȐ) the Son. Therefore, this is exactly the reason why the Son has the middle position or the “second” place in the confession of the faith.31 The Spirit is, according to Palamas, also directly from the Father, just like the Son is, but due to the semantics of the name “Father” (i.e., due to the fact that “the Son is the Son of the Father, introducing in the thought the Father, even before He Himself is spoken”);32 this existential immediacy of Spirit’s procession from the 28 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǹǯ 23, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 52.10-12; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 126.12-14. Cf. ਝ. ȇȐȞIJȠȕȚIJȢ, ȉާ ȝȣıIJȒȡȚȠȞ IJ߱Ȣ ݄ȖȓĮȢ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ…, 155-156. 29 Cf. ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 41, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 115.15-16; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 260.26; Ǻǯ 45, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 119.11; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 268.29; ǹǯ 8, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 36.23-28; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 94.19-25; ǹǯ 35, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 66.21-23; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 156.6-8. 30 For this, see my work: M. Kneževiü, “The Order (IJȐȟȚȢ) of Persons of the Holy Trinity in ‘Apodictic Treatises’ of Gregory Palamas”, Philotheos: International Journal for Philosophy and Theology12 (2012) 84-102. 31 This argument Palamas will bring up quite often. Thus, for example, to a reasonable question why is the Spirit called of the Son, and not the Son of the Spirit, he will reply that this is so in order for the Spirit not to turn out to be the Father, since “the Son would introduce the Father into one’s thought”; likewise, the Spirit, according to him, is called of the Son in order for one to indicate that he rests on the Son and that is consubstantial with Him; cf. ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 29, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 50.27-29; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 236.26-32; Ǻǯ 31, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 106.5-29; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 242.3-18. Palamas, therefore, also fits the practice of usage of genitive form in regard to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, which has no reciprocal character, into his interpretative scheme within which on this given occasion he also interprets prepositions “ਥț” and “įȚȐ”, as well as the concepts “IJȐȟȚȢ” and “ȝİıȩIJȘȢ”: all these were conditioned via oikonomia and directed to indicate consubstantiality, and in this way they have no connection with essential or hypostatic causality. 32 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǹǯ 34, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988) 64.26-28; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 152.2-4: “‫ ݾ‬Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ȣ‫ݨ‬ȩȢ, ʌĮIJȡާȢ ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȣ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ıȣȞİȚıȐȖİȚ IJ߲ įȚĮȞȠȓߠ IJާȞ ʌĮIJȑȡĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȝȐȜȚıIJĮ IJާȞ ʌȡާ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ȜİȖȩȝİȞȠȞ […]”; Ǻǯ 49, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 122.32-33; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 276.6-7: “ȆĮIJȑȡĮ ȖȐȡ IJȚȢ ܻțȠȪȦȞ, ȖİȞȞȒȝĮIJȠȢ İ‫ރ‬șީȢ Į‫ރ‬IJާȞ ‫݋‬ȞȞȠİ߿

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Father is not that transparent, as it is the case with the Son’s begetting from the Father;33 first of all, due to the fact that “we cannot pronounce in the terms of our language simultaneously both the Son and the Spirit, as they came forth from the Father”.34 This is the reason why it is said for the Spirit that he is “through” the Son; should we call the Father “‫ݑ‬țʌȠȡİȣIJȒȢ”, the preposition we talk about would lose, in a way, its functionality in this context. In other words, if the Spirit, as being proceeded from, is to be directly connected with the Father as the Father, this can only be accomplished only “through” the Son, due to semantic considerations: “‫ޟݑ‬Ȟ į‫ ޡ‬IJާ ʌȡȩȕȜȘȝĮ ʌĮIJȡާȢ ȜȑȖ߯Ȣ, įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ȡİ߿Ȣ”35. Hence, “[…] the Son is and is conceived [as] from the Father, while the Holy Spirit should through Himself be and be conceived [as] from the Emitter, but not [as] from the Father, while through the Son, who is directly conceived [as] from the Father, is the Spirit and from the Father, who proceeds this Spirit and begets the Son. How would one, in this way, say that unbegotten Spirit is from (‫݋‬ț) the one who begets? Should it not be through (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬the Son, who is the only begotten and in this way coconceived directly and immediately with the Begetter, and makes and preserves begetting as His own uniqueness, and shows that the Spirit is from the Father, but not through begetting? Therefore, through the Son the Spirit is and is conceived [as] from the Father; through His own self, again, [is and is conceived as] from the Emitter who proceds Him directly as well”.36

ʌĮIJȑȡĮ […]”. 33 Cf. ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǹǯ 22, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 50.27-29; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981 122.25-26: “[…] IJާ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ȖİȞȞȘIJȩȞ ıȣȞİȚıȐȖİȚ IJ߲ įȚĮȞȠȓߠ IJާȞ ʌĮIJȑȡĮ, IJާ į‫ޡ‬ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣIJާȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ Ƞ‫ވ‬IJȦ”. 34 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ ǹǯ 34, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 64.21-22; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 150.28-30: “[…] ȝ‫ ޣ‬įȣȞĮȝȑȞȦȞ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ‫ݘ‬ȝࠛȞ ܿȝijȦ ʌȡȠijȑȡİȚȞ įȚ‫ ޟ‬ȖȜȫIJIJȘȢ ݀ȝĮ, ‫ޔ‬ıʌİȡ ܿȡĮ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ ʌȡȠ߱ȜșȠȞ […]”. 35 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 56, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 129.29; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 290.19-20. Cf. also: ǹǯ 23, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 52.12-13; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 126.14-15: “ȀĮ‫ݼ ޥ‬IJȚ ʌĮIJȡާȢ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ܽȞ ܿȜȜȦȢ ȜȑȖȠȚIJȠ, İ‫ ݧ‬ȝ‫ ޣ‬įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ ȣ‫ݨ‬ȩȞ”. 36 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 54, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 127.30-31–128.1-10; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 286.15-27: “‫ ݾ‬ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ƞ‫މ‬Ȟ ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ țĮ‫ݏ ޥ‬ıIJȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȞȠİ߿IJĮȚ, IJާ į‫ޡ‬ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ įȚ߫ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJާ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ț ʌȡȠȕȠȜȑȦȢ İ‫ݫ‬Ș ܽȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȞȠȘșİȓȘ, ܻȜȜ߫ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬ț ʌĮIJȡȩȢ, įȚ‫ ޟ‬į‫ ޡ‬IJȠࠎ ʌȡȠıİȤࠛȢ ȞȠȠȣȝȑȞȠȣ ‫݋‬ț ʌĮIJȡާȢ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț ʌĮIJȡާȢ İ‫ݫ‬Ș ܽȞ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ, ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪȠȞIJȠȢ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJާ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ, ȖİȞȞࠛȞIJȠȢ į‫ ޡ‬IJާȞ ȣ‫ݨ‬ȩȞ. ‫ݑ‬ț ȖȠࠎȞ IJȠࠎ ȖİȞȞࠛȞIJȠȢ IJާ ȝ‫ ޣ‬ȖİȞȞȘIJާȞ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ʌࠛȢ ܽȞ ȡȘșİȓȘ; ȅ‫ ރ‬įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJާȞ ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȟ ȝȠȞȠȖİȞ߱ IJİ ‫ݻ‬ȞIJĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎIJȠ ʌȡȠıİȤࠛȢ İ‫ރ‬șީȢ IJࠜ ȖİȞȞࠛȞIJȚ ıȣȞȠȠȪȝİȞȠȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ȖİȞȞȘIJާȞ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȠࠎ ʌȠȚȠࠎȞIJĮ ȝȩȞȠȞ ‫ݫ‬įȚȠȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ıȣȞIJȘȡȠࠎȞIJĮ, IJާ į‫ ޡ‬ʌȞİࠎȝĮ įİȚțȞȪȞIJĮ Ƞ‫ ރ‬ȖİȞȞȘIJࠛȢ ‫ݹ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ; ǻȚ‫ޟ‬

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Therefore, when it is said for the Spirit that he is “through” (įȚȐ) the Son, this does not have a function of pointing to the causality, as the Latins thought, but quite the opposite: it has a function to emphasize, as strong as possible, the factual, but, on the conceptual context, insufficiently transparent relationship of the Spirit with the Father Himself. Since the Son conceptually precedes (ʌȡȠșİȦȡİȓıșĮȚ) the Holy Spirit, emphasizing that the Spirit is “through” the Son serves further to underline the direct derivation of the Spirit from the Father, and also to suspend the interpretation, which would indicate some sort of distance between the Father and the Spirit, as a result of this “theoretical” preceding of the Son. In other words, the precedence of the Son to the Holy Spirit and, consequently, calling upon the Spirit “through” the Son, is here reduced by Palamas to the precedence “in thought”; interpreting the words of Gregory of Nyssa, Palamas says that it is of great importance that he, speaking of the Son’s precedence on the conceptual level, said that this precedence is “not simply in thought” (Ƞ‫ރ‬į߫ ܼʌȜࠛȢ ‫݋‬ʌȚȞȠȓߠ), “but [that it is] only in thought” (ܻȜȜ߫ ‫݋‬ʌȚȞȠȓߠ ȝȩȞȠȞ),37 which actually excludes the logical or ontological “primacy” of the Son with regard to the Spirit.38 In this manner, Palamas applies here a polemical technique of an “ideological boomerang”: namely, he starts from the very assumptions from which his opponents originally started, but then derives completely opposite conclusions from them. In other words, instead of lifting up the IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ܿȡ߫ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ IJާ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȞȠİ߿ıșĮȚ ‫݋‬ț ʌĮIJȡާȢ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮǜ įȚ߫ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJȠࠎ į‫݋ ޡ‬ț ʌȡȠȕȠȜȑȦȢ ܻȝȑıȦȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJާ ʌȡȠȕĮȜȜȠȝȑȞȠȣ”. Cf. also: Ǻǯ 53, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 127.14-16; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 284.31-33. 37 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 49, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 123.15-18; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 276.24-26. Cf. also: ǹǯ 18, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 46.5-9; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 114.26: “‫ݑ‬ț ȝȩȞȠȣ ܿȡĮ IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪİIJĮȚ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ, țĮșȐʌİȡ ‫ ݸ‬ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬ț ȝȩȞȠȣ IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ ȖİȞȞߢIJĮȚ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȠıİȤࠛȢ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ȝȑıȦȢ IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ ‫ݏ‬ȤİIJĮȚ țĮș߫ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ, țĮș‫ ޟ‬țĮ‫ ݸ ޥ‬ȣ‫ݨ‬ȩȢ, İ‫ ݧ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ‫ݏ‬ıȤİȞ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ IJȠࠎ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪȠȞIJȠȢ ‫ݻ‬ȞIJȠȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌĮIJȡȩȢ”. 38 Cf. H. Aldenhoven, “The Question of the Procession of the Holy Spirit and its Connection with the Life of the Church”, in: L Vischer, ed., Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ. Ecumenical Reflections on the Filioque Controversy, Geneva: World Council of Churches 1981, 121-132. On the other side, Palamas probably would not agree with J. Moltmann, “Theological Proposals Toward the Resolution of the Filioque Controversy”, in: L. Vischer, ed., Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ…, 164173, with regard to his thesis that the Son is the logical assumption and objective condition of the procession of the Spirit, although he might accept Moltmann’s standpoint that Son is not the cause together with the Father and that Spirit comes forth from the Father in an eternal presence of the Son who takes some part in this coming forth of the Spirit from the Father.

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“middle position” (ȝİıȩIJȘȢ) of the Son into a general ontological principle, that would imply that the existential procession of the Spirit takes place and from the Son, Palamas actually marginalizes its significance and, reducing it to the “anthropological” determinants, denies it any kind of substantial importance. At the second step, he shows not only that it cannot be taken as the indicative of “intermediate” or “closer” causality from the Son’s side, but it is instead to be seen as a clear sign of the direct pre-eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father. c) Unlike most places in the Apodeictic Treatises on the Procession of the Holy Spirit in which the preposition “įȚȐ” has a primary function via oikonomia considerations, there are, as have been stated, certain sections, where Palamas allows this preposition to have a trinitarian application as well. For our topic, in addition to the important chapter 1, 25, which I will quote below, we should consider equally important the passage in 2, 58, where Palamas now identifies the meaning of the preposition “įȚȐ” with resting “upon the Son” (‫݋‬Ȟ IJࠜ Ȋ‫)ࠜݨ‬, and the passage in 2, 76, where Spirit’s “through the Son” (įȚ’ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ) is also identified with his “existing on the Son” (‫݋‬Ȟ IJࠜ ȣ‫ބ ࠜݨ‬ʌȐȡȤȠȞ), and all this in the sense of indicating of their consubstantiality (țĮ‫ݫ ޥ‬įȚȠȞ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ [sc. IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ] țĮ‫ ޥ‬țĮIJ’ Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ޡ‬Ȟ ܻȜȜȩIJȡȚȠȞ).39 If we now carefully look at all these places, we will find that they have one common denominator: namely, a strong tendency to deprive the preposition “įȚȐ” of any meaning that would indicate causality or mediation referring to the two “caused” persons of the Holy Trinity. Synoptically, when Palamas uses the preposition strictly in the trinitarian realm, he mainly ascribes to it a function of showing the same honour and the same co-eternity of procession and begetting, i.e., of showing that the procession of the Spirit is not secondary with respect to the begetting of the Son. Hence, when it is said that the Holy Spirit is “through” the Son, this is to express the coexistence of the Son and the Spirit, i.e., the fact that both the Son and the Spirit are equally directly and immediately from the Father. In this regard, the preposition “įȚȐ” should be strictly distinguished from the causal preposition “‫݋‬ț” and linked semantically with the prepositions “ȝİIJȐ” and “ıȪȞ”: “Hence, when you hear that the Spirit proceeds 'through' (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬the Son, [you should] realize that He is accompanying the Son. For, in that manner you will understand 'through' (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬not wrongly (țĮțࠛȢ) as 'from' (‫݋‬ț), but as 'with' (ȝİIJȐ), being in accordance with the one who is famous in 39 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 76, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 147.20-29; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 326.5-15.

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“ਫț” and “įȚȐ” in Apodictic Treatises … theology. 'Because', as divine John of Damascus says, 'the Spirit we have learned [as] resting upon the Logos and [as] the one who manifests his energy'. Resting upon means accompanying, just like he says there, so, the Spirit is not and from (‫݋‬ț) the Son, but he is with (ıީȞ) the Son from (‫݋‬ț) the Father, since begetting is accompanied, irremovably and beyond time, by procession. He said 'we have learned' because that is how the Godbearers before him taught; from them being devoted in this way to grasp the Spirit through (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬the Son, he entirely forbade to say that he [= the Spirit] is 'from' (‫݋‬ț) the Son”.40

If we, now, compare this and similar passages from Apodeictic Treatises, where the preposition “through” clearly applies in a trinitarian sense, to the much more numerous examples of its exclusively oikonomia contextualization, we will notice a contradiction. This contradiction, it is already clear, stems from the fact that Palamas, on one hand, denies to the Son the preposition “įȚȐ” in a trinitarian milieu,41 while, on the other hand, the same preposition without major difficulties explicitly affirms the relation to the Son, in the very same context. To resolve this contradiction, it is appropriate, as it always is, to look at the motives. Thus, if one takes into consideration the first group of passages, it turns out that for denying the preposition “through” to the Son in the trinitarian milieu, a vital role was probably played by the fact that before Palamas’ eyes constantly hovered the danger that this preposition would be understood in a causal sense and so it would be identified with the preposition “‫݋‬ț”.42 That is, therefore, the reason why he refrains from connecting the aforementioned preposition on the trinitarian level in any

40 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ⱥǯ 25, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 52.21-26–53.1-6; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 126.23-28–128.1-7: “ȅ‫ރ‬țȠࠎȞ ‫ݼ‬IJĮȞ ܻțȠȪı߯Ȣ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪİıșĮȚ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ıȣȝʌĮȡȠȝĮȡIJȠࠎȞ IJࠜ ȜȩȖ࠙ ȞȩȘıȠȞ. ȅ‫ވ‬IJȦ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‘įȚ‫ ’ޟ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬ț İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‘‫݋‬ț’ țĮțࠛȢ, ܻȜȜ߫ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‘ȝİIJȐ’, IJࠜ IJ߱Ȣ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ ‫݋‬ʌȦȞȪȝ࠙ ıȣȞߡįȦȞ ȝİIJĮȜȒȥ߯. ‘ȆȞİࠎȝĮ ȖȐȡ’, ijȘıȓ, ‘ȝİȝĮșȒțĮȝİȞ’, ǻĮȝĮıțȘȞȩȢ ‫ ݸ‬șİ߿ȠȢ, ‘IJާ ıȣȝʌĮȡȠȝĮȡIJȠࠎȞ IJࠜ ȜȩȖ࠙ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijĮȞİȡȠࠎȞ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ȞȑȡȖİȚĮȞ’. ȈȣȝʌĮȡȠȝĮȡIJİ߿Ȟ į‫݋ ޡ‬ıIJȚ IJާ ıȣȞĮțȠȜȠȣșİ߿Ȟ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫ ݸ‬Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ ‫݋‬țİ߿ ijȘıȚȞ ‫ޔ‬ıIJİ Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ‫ ޥ‬țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, ܻȜȜ‫ ޟ‬ıީȞ IJࠜ ȣ‫ࠜݨ‬ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ‫݋‬ț ʌĮIJȡȩȢ, ıȣȞĮțȠȜȠȣșȠȪıȘȢ ܻįȚĮıIJȐIJȦȢ IJİ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ȤȡȩȞȦȢ IJ߲ ȖİȞȞȒıİȚ IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪıİȦȢ. ȂİȝĮșȒțĮȝİȞ į‫ ޡ‬İ‫ݭ‬ʌİȞ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ IJࠛȞ ʌȡާ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ șİȠijȩȡȦȞ Ƞ‫ވ‬IJȦ įȚįĮıțȩȞIJȦȞ, ʌĮȡ߫ ‫ޖ‬Ȟ ȝȣȘșİ‫ޥ‬Ȣ Ƞ‫ވ‬IJȦ ȞȠİ߿Ȟ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ įȚ߫ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, IJާ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJȠࠎIJȠ ȜȑȖİȚȞ ʌĮȞIJȐʌĮıȚȞ ܻʌȘȖȩȡİȣıİȞ”. 41 Except for the places quoted in the notes 22-26 and 43, cf. also: ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 41, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 115.11, 13; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 260.2122, 23-24: “[…] Ƞ‫އ‬ș’ ‫ ݸ‬ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȣ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ […] Ƞ‫އ‬IJİ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ įȚ’ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ […]”. 42 Cf. D. Ritschl, “Historical Development and Implications of the Filioque Controversy”, in: L Vischer, ed., Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ…, 46-65.

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way with “being” (‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ) or “procession” (‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȚȞ),43 binding it, as already noted, primarily with the oikonomia milieu and energetic procession. However, faced with writings of the fathers where the preposition “įȚȐ” was used in a strictly trinitarian context,44 Palamas, as a faithful admirer of the authority of the fathers,45 was simply forced to accept the use of the mentioned preposition in such a framework as well.46 43 Cf. e. g.: ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 58, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 131.6-8; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 292.27-28: “Ǽ‫ރ‬ıİȕࠛȢ Ƞ‫މ‬Ȟ İ‫ݫ‬ʌȠȣʌİȡ İ‫ބ‬ȡİșİȓȘ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȝİȞȠȞ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ […]”; Ǻǯ 60, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988) 132.13-16; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981) 294.32-33–296.1-2: “‫ ݾ‬į‫ ޡ‬ȜȑȖȦȞ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚȞ, șİȜȒıİȦȢ ‫ݏ‬ȡȖȠȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țIJȓıȝĮ ‫݋‬ȟ ܻȞȐȖțȘȢ, ܻȜȜ߫ Ƞ‫ ރ‬șİȓĮȢ ijȪıİȦȢ țĮȡʌާȞ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤİȚȞ įȣııİȕࠛȢ ʌĮȡȓıIJȘıȚ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJȩ ݀ȖȚȠȞ”; Ǻǯ 60, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 132.20-24; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 296.7-12: “ȆࠛȢ į‫ ޡ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬ij߰Ȣ Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ įȚ߫ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȟ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ‫ ݸ‬ȜĮIJȚȞȚțࠛȢ ijȡȠȞࠛȞ; ‫ݠ‬ȝİ߿Ȣ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ijĮȞȑȡȦıȚȞ ‫ބ‬ʌާ ȤȡȩȞȠȞ Ƞ‫މ‬ıĮȞ ‫ݫ‬ıȝİȞ, ʌȐȞIJĮ į‫ ޡ‬IJ‫ބ ޟ‬ʌާ ȤȡȩȞȠȞ ‫ݻ‬ȞIJĮ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ȖİȞȩȝİȞĮǜ įȚާ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijĮȞİȡȠࠎıșĮȚ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚ߫ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ijĮȝİȞ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ, ܻȜȜ߫ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪİıșĮȚ”; ǹǯ 16, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 131.6-8; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 112.12-17: “[…] țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬ʌߢıĮȞ ܻȞȐȖțȘȞ Ƞ‫ ݨ‬ıȣȞĮȓIJȠȞ IJࠜ ʌĮIJȡ‫ ޥ‬IJާȞ ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȟ ȜȑȖȠȞIJİȢ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ޥ‬ IJȠࠎ ʌĮȞĮȖȓȠȣ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ įȚįȩȞIJİȢ, IJȠıȠࠎIJȠȞ ܻʌȑȤȠȣıȚ IJ߱Ȣ İ‫ރ‬ıİȕİȓĮȢ, ‫ݼ‬ıȠȞ ܻȞIJȑȤȠȞIJĮȚ IJĮȪIJȘȢ Ƞ‫ݨ‬ ʌȡȠĮʌȘȡȚșȝȘȝȑȞȠȚ IJࠛȞ ܼȖȓȦȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Ƞ‫ ݨ‬IJȠȪIJȠȚȢ ıȣȞ࠙į‫ ޟ‬șİȠȜȠȖȠࠎȞIJİȢ”. 44 Which actually “was a traditional teaching of the previous Greek fathers”; see: M. A. Orphanos, “The Procession of the Holy Spirit According to Certain Later Greek Fathers”, in: L Vischer, ed., Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ…, London: SPCK 1981, 21-45 : 25. For Athanasius the Great, see: Ad Serap. 3, 5, PG 26, 633A: “ȅ‫ރ‬ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ‫݋‬țIJȩȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ IJȠࠎ ȁȩȖȠȣ IJާ ȆȞİࠎȝĮ, ܻȜȜ‫ޟ‬, ‫݋‬Ȟ IJࠜ Ĭİࠜ įȚ’ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ‫݋‬ıIJȓȞ”; also: Ad Serap. 3, 6, PG 26, 633BC; cf. G. C. Berthold, “The Procession of the Spirit in Athanasius”, Studia Patristica 41 (2006) 125-131, 128. See also: A. Edward Siecienski, The Filioque. History of a Doctrinal Controversy, Oxford 2010, 39 (for Basil the Great), 43-45 (for Gregory of Nyssa), 47-50 (for Cyril of Alexandria), etc. 45 For a test-case with regard to the Palamas’ relation to the authority (of the fathers), see mine: M. Kneževiü, “‘ǹ‫ރ‬IJȒțȠȠȢ ȖİȖȠȞޫȢ IJ߱Ȣ IJࠛȞ ܻʌȠıIJȩȜȦȞ IJȠࠎ ȋȡȚıIJȠࠎ ijȦȞ߱Ȣ’. The Authority of Dionysius ‘Pseudo’-Areopagite in the Treatise ‘On Divine Unities and Distinctions’ of Gregory Palamas”, Church Studies 8 (2011) 99-123. (in Serbian, with summary in English). 46 On the other hand, patriarch Photius “never explored the deeper meaning behind the formula ‘through the Son’ (įȚ੹ IJȠ૨ ȊੂȠ૨), or the necessary eternal relationship between the Son and the Spirit”, something which, as A. E. Siecienski, The Filioque. History of a Doctrinal Controversy, Oxford 2010, 10, correctly points out, is mainly conditioned by the polemical context: namely, “placed in the position of constantly having to prove the negative (i.e., that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Father and Son), the Greeks emphasized only certain aspects of the Eastern tradition while totally ignoring others”. See also: op. cit., 104.

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“ਫț” and “įȚȐ” in Apodictic Treatises …

While the appreciation of such a practice in some other context would be a common thing, especially since it is in line with Palamas’ theological reasoning, in the context of the polemics over filioque, it just had to be accompanied by additional explanations and reservations. In short, Palamas had to use a particularly striking way to distinguish semantically the prepositions “‫݋‬ț” and “įȚȐ”: preposition “‫݋‬ț” is to be strictly linked to the notion of causality and then to the hypostasis of the Father; the preposition “įȚȐ”, when it is used in the trinitarian realm, is strictly interpreted in causally neutral terms, and its use is limited to pointing out that the Spirit is accompanying the Son, i.e., that he “rests upon” the Son. This terminological demarcation at the semantic level equally suggests a very technical use of the prepositions in question, as evidenced by the fact that John of Damascus, as Palamas states, “forbids” saying that the Holy Spirit is “from” (‫݋‬ț) the Son. Preposition “įȚȐ”, therefore, although being used in the trinitarian framework, does not by any means impose Son as the cause of the Holy Spirit according to His pre-eternal being,47 but simply indicates that the begetting of the Son is accompanied by inseparable, immediate and beyond time procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father.48 In other words, this preposition, since it refers to the coexistence of the Spirit and the Son and to their immediate coming forth from the Father, actually indicates the consubstantiality of the two caused persons of the Holy Trinity. 3. Yet, despite this very explicit distinguishing, there are places in the Apodeictic Treatises, where we find a strict convergence of these two prepositions. This congruence is present first of all on the economic level, but it is, as we shall soon see, applicable even to the trinitarian aspect of God’s existence. More precisely: the congruence of prepositions “‫݋‬ț” and “įȚȐ” on a strictly oikonomia level, which Palamas advocates in many places in Apodeictic Treatises, is actually a reflection of possibility of a congruence of these prepositions on the trinitarian level, congruence whose primary task is to indicate consubstantiality and, consequently, the existence of the one and the same will and energy of the three persons of 47 Cf. ਝ. ȇȐȞIJȠȕȚIJȢ, ȉާ ȝȣıIJȒȡȚȠȞ IJ߱Ȣ ݄ȖȓĮȢ ȉȡȚȐįȠȢ…, 159. 48 The relationship towards the Son, which Palamas denotes with concepts “ܻȞĮʌĮȪİıșĮȚ”, “ıȣȞĮțȠȜȠȣșİ߿Ȟ” and “ıȣȝʌĮȡȠȝĮȡIJİ߿Ȟ”, and which relates not only to economic, but also the triadological milieu, should not be viewed in a dyadic key, but (being that this relationship is owed to the Father) as an expression of the trinitarian divine life. See: Ȉ. īȚĮȖțȐȗȠȖȜȠȣ, ȀȠȚȞȦȞȓĮ șİȫıİȦȢ. ‫ ݠ‬ıȪȞșİıȘ ȤȡȚıIJȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȞİȣȝĮIJȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ ıIJާ ‫ݏ‬ȡȖȠ IJȠࠎ ܼȖަȠȣ īȡȘȖoȡަȠȣ IJȠࠎ ȆĮȜĮȝߢ, ਝș੾ȞĮ: ਫțįȩıİȚȢ ǻȩȝȠȢ 2001, 182-184, 385-387.

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the Holy Trinity49. In contrast, however, to the trinitarian level, on which these two terms must have a strict line of demarcation and can be identified only when the causality is put to the side, in the framework of economy they can, according to Palamas, be used even interchangeably.50 This semantic identification of the prepositions “‫݋‬ț” and “įȚȐ” on the economic level is obvious even from quite unambiguous expressions, such as: “țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ”,51 “įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ”,52 “țĮ‫ސ ޥ‬Ȣ įȚ߫ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȟ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ”,53 “ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚ߫ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ”54 (always followed by mainly concepts related to oikonomia),55 but also from Palamas’ almost compromising and, as far as it was possible to him, yielding “İ‫ ݧ‬į‫ ޡ‬ȕȠȪȜİȚ” (“like, say”), “įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, İ‫ ݧ‬į‫ ޡ‬ȕȠȪȜİȚ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ”.56 This standpoint of his, regarding the possibility of alternate usage of these prepositions on the level of economy, advocated, as I have said, in several places in Apodeictic Treatises, Palamas clearly resumes in 2, 58; however, in doing so, he firmly holds the view that in terms of existential procession of the Holy Spirit preposition “įȚȐ” can never be replaced with preposition “‫݋‬ț” and that the preposition “‫݋‬ț” on the trinitarian level cannot be attributed to the Son: “And even if instead of 'through' (įȚȐ) you wanted to put the preposition 'from' (‫݋‬ț), we would not accuse you at all, if you would only, think and conclude what is true, say that the Spirit is revealed to us from (‫݋‬ț) the Son; if, however, you say that the existence of the Holy Spirit is from the Son, we will put you outside the Church as someone who is out of the 49 See particularly: ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 59, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988) 131.1926; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981) 294.7-15; Ǻǯ 60, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988) 132.9-13; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981) 294.28-32. 50 Cf. ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ⱥǯ 9, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 37.12-13; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 96.9-11; Ⱥǯ 25, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 53.7-12; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 128.813; Ǻǯ 48, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 122.14-16; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 274.20-23. 51 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 73, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 144.26-27; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 320.9-10. 52 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 60, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 132.9; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 294.28. 53 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 75, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 146.20-21; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 324.7-8. 54 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 60, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 132.23-24; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 296.11. 55 Seriatim: “įȓįȠIJĮȚ”, “ʌȑȝʌİIJĮȚ”, “ʌȡȠȤİ߿IJĮȚ”, “ʌȡȠȑȡȤİIJĮȚ”, “‫ݧ‬įȩȝİȞȩȞ IJİ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ijĮȞİȡȠȪȝİȞȠȞ”, “‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȝİȞȠȞ ʌȡާȢ Ƞ‫ވ‬Ȣ ܿȟȚȠȞ”, “IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ȤȠȡȘȖȓĮȞ”, “İ‫ރ‬įȠțȓߠ”, “IJȠ߿Ȣ ܼȖȓȠȚȢ ȤȠȡȘȖȠȪȝİȞȠȞ”, “įȚįȩȝİȞȩȞ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijĮȞİȡȠȪȝİȞȠȞ”, “ijĮȞİȡȠࠎıșĮȚ”. 56 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ⱥǯ 29, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 54.22-23; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 130.20; Ǻǯ 17, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 94.6-7; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 214.27.

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“ਫț” and “įȚȐ” in Apodictic Treatises … limits of devotion. For, since 'we have learned that the Logos is accompanied by the Holy Spirit, who is the power considered by itself in a separate hypostasis, that manifests the Logos, being not able to separate from God, in whom he resides, and from the Logos, whom he accompanies', since the birth is accompanied inseparably and beyond the time by procession, how not to miss it, if referring to the procession, we replace 'through' with 'from'? Reverently, then, if you find somewhere that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son, we will understand and realize the preposition 'through' not in the sense 'from' but in the sense 'with', together with the famous in theology Gregory, who says: 'in our opinion, there is one God, the beginningless Father; the arche of everything, the Son; and not from (‫݋‬ț) the arche, but also altogether with the arche from (‫݋‬ț) the Father, the Holy Spirit'. Because of this, the divine Cyril himself widely concludes in the Treasury that the Spirit dwells naturally on the Son from (ʌĮȡȐ) the Father and writes that from (ʌĮȡȐ) the Father naturally and essentially on the Son comes the Spirit, through whom he sanctifies all by anointing. From the Father, then, comes He eternally on the Son, from the Father, again, through the Son descends He into the sanctified [people], when required”.57

Therefore, from this section it can clearly be discerned that Gregory Palamas allows that the prepositions “įȚȐ” and “‫݋‬ț” can be mutually interchangeable at the level of oikonomia.58 To justify his account on this, 57 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 58, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 130.25-30–131.1-18; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 292.14-33–294.1-6: “Ǽ‫ ݧ‬į‫ ޡ‬țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ȞIJ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‘įȚȐ’ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‘‫݋‬ț’ ʌȡȩșİıȚȞ IJȚșȑȞIJĮ ȕȠȪȜȠȚȠ, ȝİȝȥȩȝİșȐ ıİ Ƞ‫ރ‬įĮȝࠛȢ, ȝȩȞȠȞ IJܻȜȘșȑȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijȡȠȞࠛȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȠıIJȚșİȓȢ, ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ijĮȞİȡȦș‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ IJȩ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ȜȑȖİǜ ܿȞ į‫ ޡ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ IJȠࠎ ܼȖȓȠȣ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ ȜȑȖ߯Ȣ įȚ߫ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤȠȣıĮȞ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫݋‬țIJާȢ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤȠȞIJĮ IJ߱Ȣ İ‫ރ‬ıİȕİȓĮȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬țțȜȘıȓĮȢ ‫ݏ‬ȟȦ ıIJȒıȠȝİȞ ‫݋‬ʌİ‫ ޥ‬Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ‘țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȝİȝĮșȒțĮȝİȞ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ șİ߿ȠȞ ıȣȝʌĮȡȠȝĮȡIJȠࠎȞ IJࠜ ȜȩȖ࠙, įȪȞĮȝȚȞ ‫ݻ‬Ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ij߫ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬Ȟ ‫ݧ‬įȚĮȗȠȪı߯ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȚ șİȦȡȠȣȝȑȞȘȞ, ‫݋‬țijĮȞIJȚț‫ޣ‬Ȟ IJȠࠎ ȜȩȖȠȣ, ȝ‫ ޣ‬ȤȦȡȚıș߱ȞĮȚ IJȠࠎ șİȠࠎ ‫݋‬Ȟ ߔ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎ ȜȩȖȠȣ, ߔ ʌĮȡȠȝĮȡIJİ߿ įȣȞĮȝȑȞȘ;’, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ıȣȞĮțȠȜȠȣșȠȪıȘȢ ܻįȚĮıIJȐIJȦȢ IJİ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ȤȡȩȞȦȢ IJ߲ ȖİȞȞȒıİȚ IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪıİȦȢ, ʌࠛȢ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‘įȚȐ’ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪıİȦȢ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‘‫݋‬ț’ ȝİIJĮȜĮȝȕȐȞȠȞIJİȢ Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ ܼȝĮȡIJȒıȠȝİȞ; Ǽ‫ރ‬ıİȕࠛȢ Ƞ‫މ‬Ȟ İ‫ݫ‬ʌȠȣʌİȡ İ‫ބ‬ȡİșİȓȘ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȝİȞȠȞ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ, Ƞ‫ރ‬ț İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‘‫݋‬ț’, ܻȜȜ߫ İ‫ݧ‬Ȣ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‘ıީȞ’ ʌȡȩșİıȚȞ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‘įȚ‫ ’ޟ‬ȞȠȒıȠȝȑȞ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȝİIJĮȜȘȥȩȝİșĮ, ȝİIJ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ IJ߱Ȣ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ ‫݋‬ʌȦȞȪȝȠȣ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ȜȑȖȠȞIJȠȢ, ‘İ‫ݮ‬Ȣ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ ĬİȩȢ, ‫ܿ ݸ‬ȞĮȡȤȠȢ ʌĮIJȒȡǜ ‫ܻ ݘ‬ȡȤ‫ ޣ‬IJࠛȞ ʌȐȞIJȦȞ, ‫ ݸ‬ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȣ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬ț IJ߱Ȣ ܻȡȤ߱Ȣ, ܻȜȜ‫ ޟ‬ıީȞ IJ߲ ܻȡȤ߲ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȝİIJ‫ ޟ‬IJ߱Ȣ ܻȡȤ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ݀ȖȚȠȞ’. ǻȚާ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ ‫ ݸ‬șİ߿ȠȢ ȀȪȡȚȜȜȠȢ ‫݋‬Ȟ ĬȘıĮȣȡȠ߿Ȣ ‫݋‬Ȟ ȣ‫ ࠜݨ‬ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬ʌĮIJȡާȢ ijȣıȚțࠛȢ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤİȚȞ įȚ‫ ޟ‬ʌȠȜȜࠛȞ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ıȣȝʌİȡĮȓȞİȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬ʌĮIJȡާȢ ijȣıȚțࠛȢ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȚȦįࠛȢ įȚȒțİȚȞ ‫݋‬Ȟ ȣ‫ ࠜݨ‬IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ȖȡȐijİȚ, įȚ߫ Ƞ‫ ފ‬ʌȐȞIJĮ ȤȡȓȦȞ Ƞ‫ފ‬IJȠȢ ܼȖȚȐȗİȚǜ ‫݋‬ț ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ƞ‫މ‬Ȟ IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ ‫݋‬Ȟ IJࠜ ȣ‫ ࠜݨ‬įȚȒțİȚ ܻȧįȓȦȢ, ‫݋‬ț į‫ ޡ‬IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJȠ߿Ȣ ܼȖȚĮȗȠȝȑȞȠȚȢ ‫݋‬ȖȖȓȞİIJĮȚ, ‫ݘ‬ȞȚț߫ ܿȞ įȑȠȚ”. 58 Within his argument on necessity of differentiation between economical and triadological planes of divine existence and, consequently, inability of an exact

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he had a firm basis on the patristic texts – for example, in the famous work by Basil of Caesarea, to whom he refers on a given occasion59. However, the possibility of a trinitarian derivation of the Spirit “‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ”, Palamas, if we follow the main stream of his Apodeictic Treatises, excludes decisively, connecting such an opinion directly with impiety and with heresy. So, just as he reduces the preposition “įȚȐ” in most places primarily to the economic manifestation, Palamas also restricts the use of preposition “‫݋‬ț” with regard to the Son–Holy Spirit relationship to the oikonomia milieu: “So, if it is theologized, again, that [the Holy Spirit] comes forth and from (‫݋‬ț) the Son, it is surely not about that [sc. preeternal and incomprehensible], but about the other procession, which is towards us manifestation and towards those who are worthy transmission”.60 This is the situation up to 2, 59. At this point, for the first time in the entire treatise, the option is taken into consideration that the two prepositions function like synonyms on the trinitarian ground as well. This tendency will experience its wider elaboration later, especially as a part of Palamas’ attempt to offer a more detailed analysis of the thesis from the 33th paragraph of the Treasury by Cyril of Alexandria, according to which “the Spirit is from the essence of the Son and flows forth from the Father through the Son in order to sanctify the creation, flowing forth essentially from both” (‫݋‬ȟ ܻȝijȠ߿Ȟ ʌȡȠȤİȩȝİȞȠȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȚȦįࠛȢ).61 This stance of Cyril of Alexandria was introduced into the debates, as was expected, by analogical conclusion from economical to theological Trinity, Palamas allows that these two prepositions within economy can be ascribed even to the Holy Spirit, as follows: a) in the sense of sending the Son on the occasion of his incarnation, which takes place from the Father and the Spirit, b) in the sense of energetic manifestation, since the “Spirit” as energy is given and manifests itself not only from the Father and the Son (or through the Son), but also from the Holy Spirit Himself. Cf. ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 11, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 87.12-29–88.118; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 202.1-31–204.1-8; Ǻǯ 81, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 151.6-32; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 332.29-31–334.1-26. 59 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ⱥǯ 25, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 53.7-12; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 128.8-13. 60 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ⱥǯ 29, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 57.2-5; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 134.23-26: “ȅ‫ރ‬țȠࠎȞ İ‫ ݧ‬țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ʌȐȜȚȞ ʌȡȠȑȡȤİıșĮȚ șİȠȜoȖİ߿IJĮȚ, Ƞ‫ ރ‬țĮIJ߫ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȘȞ [sc. țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌȡȠĮȚȫȞȚȠȞ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȘȞ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ʌİȡȚȞȩȘIJȠȞ ‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȓȞ IJİ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ʌȡȩȠįȠȞ] ʌȐȞIJȦȢ, ܻȜȜ‫ ޟ‬țĮș߫ ‫݌‬IJȑȡĮȞ ʌȡȩȠįȠȞ, ‫ݜ‬IJȚȢ ‫݋‬ıIJ‫ޥ‬Ȟ ‫ ݘ‬ʌȡާȢ ‫ݘ‬ȝߢȢ ijĮȞȑȡȦıȚȢ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ʌȡާȢ IJȠީȢ ܻȟȓȠȣȢ ȝİIJȐįȠıȚȢ”. Cf. Ǻǯ 75, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 146.20-21; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 324.7-8. 61 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 62, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 134.14-16; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 300.6-8: “[…] țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ȜȑȖİȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȠȤİȩȝİȞȠȞ ‫݋‬ț ʌĮIJȡާȢ įȚ߫ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ țIJȓıȚȞ ܼȖȚȐȗİȚȞ, țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȟ ܻȝijȠ߿Ȟ ʌȡȠȤİȩȝİȞȠȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȚȦįࠛȢ”.

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supporters of filioque, so Palamas nolens-volens had to interpret it in accordance with his own theological views, which he held to be Orthodox; also, he was forced to accept certain terminological solutions, at which he, in the given polemical context, shuddered with a reason.62 Namely: interpreting the aforementioned section from the Treasury, in contrast to the main course of Apodeictic Treatises, where he explicitly argues that the Spirit can be said “from” (‫݋‬ț) the Son only in the sense of transmitting the grace or energy,63 Palamas in certain passages clearly agrees that the preposition “‫݋‬ț” can refer to the Son even on the trinitarian level. So, for example, in that long section on the Holy Spirit, which by its clarity and intonation takes an almost creedal form, Palamas expresses following stances: “The Holy Spirit, before the ages and over the ages and after, as a special feature of the particular mode of existence has the procession from the Father – the only source of godhead – that is, from that hyper-divine essence, but according to the Father’s hypostasis only, since the Spirit also is the hyper-divine and self-existent with no delay in any way with regard to the One who he proceeds from; he is rather indistinguishable and inseparable [from the Father], although he is hetero-hypostatic and selfhypostatic. So, then, being from the Father, the Holy Spirit never separates from him, and is equally united with the Son essentially and inseparably, resting upon him and belonging to him and dwelling always on him by nature: for He [the Son] is the treasurer of the Spirit. Therefore, it is not unusual at all if it is said that [the Spirit] flows forth also from (‫݋‬ȟ) Him and from (‫݋‬ț) His nature, but according to the hypostasis of the Father. And through (įȚૅ) him and from (‫݋‬ȟ) him is naturally given and sent and poured forth and derived, giving himself and manifesting himself through 62 It is not here the case, as it was suggested by ਝ. ȇȐȞIJȠȕȚIJȢ, ȉާ ȝȣıIJ‫ޤ‬ȡȚȠȞ IJ߱Ȣ ݄ȖަĮȢ ȉȡȚ‫ޠ‬įȠȢ…, 165, that Palamas “goes deeper”, in the sense that he consciously and deliberately seeks to give a more elaborate interpretation of the problem in question. On the contrary, the case is that Palamas has found himself at one point driven into a dead-end: encountering, namely, certain passages in holy fathers which didn’t completely fit with the main line of his Apodeictic Treatises (or, more precisely, passages which didn’t exactly serve the polemics against the filioque in his Apodeictic Treatises) and which the “Latins” were refering to, Palamas had to revise his somewhat more unyielding standpoints and terminological limitations, and to make some kind of theological synthesis. In doing so, he remains, however, faithful to his basic triadological principles. To this “compromise” at Palamas’ part indicates Metropolitan Amphilochios himself, saying that “even if saint Gregory accepts that the Spirit flows also from the nature of the Son, he does that condescendingly” (op. cit., 166; emphasis mine). 63 Cf. ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 29, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 105.7-9; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 238.29-30.

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him, also: proceeding – if you wish – towards the worthy ones. If, then, sometimes you hear procession in that context, you should have in mind the manifestation: for, procession from God does not always signify a selfhypostatic existence”.64

In this way, particularly emphasizing the polysemy of the term “‫݋‬țʌȩȡİȣıȚȢ”, to which he pointed out already in 1, 2965, Gregory Palamas now finds to be quite acceptable and furthermore “not at all unusual” what John Damascene, as he says, “completely forbade”: namely, the attribution of the preposition “‫݋‬ț” to the Son in the trinitarian framework. For the same thing (i.e., saying “that the existence of the Holy Spirit comes from the Son”) that Palamas in 2, 58 indicated as a “cast out of the Church”, he already in the next step (e. g. in 2, 65), totally approves, accepting, following Cyril of Alexandria, that the Holy Spirit originates and comes forth “and from the Son” – “if you wish, according to the eternal existence as well” (‫ݏ‬ıIJȦ įȒ, İ‫ ݧ‬ȕȠȪȜİıșİ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ܻǸįȚȠȞ ‫ވ‬ʌĮȡȟȚȞ).66 However, what is here of decisive importance is not just the expansion 64 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 73, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 144.14-31–145.1; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 318.28-32–320.1-15: “ȉާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ ʌȡާ Į‫ݧ‬ȫȞȦȞ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ʌ߫ Į‫ࠛݧ‬ȞĮȢ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ‫ݏ‬IJȚ ‫ݧ‬įȚĮȓIJĮIJȠȞ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ݏ‬ȤİȚ IJ߱Ȣ ‫ݧ‬įȚȠIJȡȩʌȠȣ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȟİȦȢ IJާ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ, IJ߱Ȣ ȝȩȞȘȢ ʌȘȖĮȓĮȢ șİȩIJȘIJȠȢ, ‫݋‬țʌȠİȡİȪİıșĮȚ, IJȠȣIJȑıIJȚȞ ‫݋‬ț IJ߱Ȣ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡșȑȠȣ ‫݋‬țİȓȞȘȢ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ țĮș߫ ‫ބ‬ʌȩıIJĮıȚȞ ȝȩȞȘȞ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌĮIJȡȚțȒȞ, ‫ބ‬ʌȑȡșİȠȢ ‫ݻ‬Ȟ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬IJȠȠȣıȓĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬țĮIJ߫ Į‫ރ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ IJȠࠎ ʌȡȠıİȞİȖțȩIJȠȢ țĮIJ߫ Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ޡ‬Ȟ ܻʌȠįȑȠȞ, ȝߢȜȜȠȞ į‫ ޡ‬ȝȘįĮȝࠛȢ įȚĮijȑȡȠȞ ‫ ݙ‬įȚĮȚȡȠȪȝİȞȠȞ, ‫݌‬IJİȡȠȨʌȩıIJĮIJȠȞ į߫ ‫ݼ‬ȝȦȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Į‫ރ‬șȣʌȩıIJĮIJȠȞ. ȅ‫ވ‬IJȦ į‫ݻ ޡ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡȩȢ, Ƞ‫އ‬IJ߫ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ įȚǸıIJĮIJĮȓ ʌȠIJİ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJࠜ ȣ‫ ࠜݨ‬Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ ‫ݞ‬IJIJȠȞ ‫ݜ‬ȞȦIJĮȚ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȚȦįࠛȢ IJİ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬įȚĮıIJȐIJȦȢ, Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ IJİ ‫݋‬ʌĮȞĮʌĮȣȩȝİȞȠȞ țĮ‫ݫ ޥ‬įȚȠȞ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤȠȞ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬Ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJࠜ ijȣıȚțࠛȢ įȚĮIJİȜȠࠎȞ ܻİȓ Į‫ރ‬IJާȢ ȖȐȡ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ ‫ ݸ‬IJȠࠎ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ IJĮȝȓĮȢ. ȅ‫ރ‬įȑȞ Ƞ‫މ‬Ȟ țĮȚȞȩȞ, İ‫ ݧ‬țĮȓ ‫݋‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJ߱Ȣ ijȪıİȦȢ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ʌȡȠȧȑȞĮȚ ȜȑȖİIJĮȚ, țĮș߫ ‫ބ‬ʌȩıIJĮıȚȞ ȝȑȞIJȠȚ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌĮIJȡȚțȒȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚ߫ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ijȣıȚțࠛȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȓįȠIJĮȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȑȝʌİIJĮȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȠȤİ߿IJĮȚ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȡȠȑȡȤİIJĮȚ, įȚ߫ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ įȚįȩȝİȞȩȞ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijĮȞİȡȠȪȝİȞȠȞ, İ‫ ݧ‬į‫ ޡ‬ȕȠȪȜİȚ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬țʌȠȡİȣȩȝİȞȠȞ ʌȡާȢ Ƞ‫ވ‬Ȣ ܿȟȚȠȞ. ȀĮ‫݋ ޥ‬țʌȩȡİȣıȚȞ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ İ‫ݫ‬ʌȠȣʌİȡ ܿȞ ‫݋‬Ȟ IJȠ߿Ȣ IJȠȚȠȪIJȠȚȢ ܻțȡȠȐı߯, IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ijĮȞȑȡȦıȚȞ ȞȩİȚǜ Ƞ‫ ރ‬Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ܻİ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪİıșĮȚ ʌĮȡ‫ ޟ‬șİȠࠎ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȟİȫȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ ıȘȝĮȞIJȚțާȞ Į‫ރ‬șȣʌȠıIJȐIJȠȣ […]”. – However, speaking here that the Spirit comes “and from the Son”, Palamas quite carefully uses the verb “ʌȡȠȧȑȞĮȚ”, and not “‫݋‬țʌȠȡİȪİıșĮȚ”; in doing so, he follows Cyril of Alexandria, who uses the phrase “[…] ʌȡިİȚıȚ į‫ ޡ‬țĮ‫ޥ‬ ‫݋‬ț ȆĮIJȡާȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Ȋ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ […]” (cf. PG 75, 585A), as well as Maximus the Confessor; cf. in general outlines: G. C. Berthold, “Maximus the Confessor and the Filioque”, Studia Patristica XVIII, 1 (1989) 113-117 : 115. For more details, see: A. E. Siecienski, The Filioque. History of a Doctrinal Controversy, Oxford 2010, 49, 7486. 65 Cf. also: ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 78-79, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 148–150; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 328–330. 66 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 65, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 137.5; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 304.31–306.1.

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of the amplitude of application of the preposition “‫݋‬ț” as such, but the very manner in which Palamas has worked out this expansion. That manner, of course, implied a crucial fence, more precise, essential semantic reducing of the preposition in question, which will now go in a completely different direction in comparison to the original one, that is, towards an etiological (causal) neutralization. In other words, the possibility of assignment of the aforementioned preposition and to the Son on the trinitarian level, Palamas has in the same step clearly conditioned by remark that the preposition “from” here can mean only that the Spirit flows forth “from the nature of the Son”, which is the same as the nature of the Father, and in no way from the very hypostasis of the Son.67 In this way, while interpreting the standpoint of Cyril of Alexandria, Palamas in several places emphasizes that Cyril’s “‫݋‬ț” always has to relate to the realm of nature, whether one suggests with it: a) an energetic derivation of the Spirit from the Son,68 b) essential coming forth of the Spirit from the Father and the Son in the sense of his essential presence in the oikonomia plane, despite the fact that we do not participate in the essence or the hypostasis, but only in the energy,69 or yet c) consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Son and in general consubstantiality of the three persons of the Holy Trinity.70 Palamas is in certain places totally categorical: “whenever”, he emphasizes, “this divinely contemplating Cyril says that the Spirit is from the essence of the Son, he indicates that

67 Cf. J. Meyendorff, 1998, A Study of Gregory Palamas. Translated by G. Lawrence, Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, pp.230-231. However, if Palamas’ interpretation of patristic sections speaking on coming forth of the Spirit “from the nature” of the Son we reduce, together with Meyendorff, to an exclusively eternal “energetic” procession of the Spirit, we will make, at least as it seems to me now, his important apposition “țĮș’ ‫ބ‬ʌȩıIJĮıȚȞ ȝȩȞȘȞ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌĮIJȡȚțȒȞ”, virtually redundant. 68 See: ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 65, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 136.19-30–137.1-3; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 304.14-29; Ǻǯ 69, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 140.17-20–141.1-24; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 312.10-31–314.1-9; Ǻǯ 79, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 149.22-28; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 330.14-20. 69 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 64, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 135.24-28; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 302.15-19. 70 Here I do not go into a more exhaustive analysis of Palamas’ interpretation of Cyril’s standpoint according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds “from both”. For Palamas’ interpretation of Cyril’s standpoint according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds “from both”, see: M. Kneževiü, “‫ݑ‬ȟ ܻȝijȠ߿Ȟ. Cyril of Alexandria and Polemics over ‘filioque’ of Gregory Palamas”, Philotheos. International Journal for Philosophy and Theology 15 (2015), pp.93-116.

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the Son is consubstantial, and not the cause of the Spirit”.71 The coming forth of the Spirit “from” the Son is not linked to the Son’s hypostasis, but exclusively relates to the realm of nature. Hence, “[…] it could be well said that the Spirit does not proceed from the hypostasis of the Son, but naturally from the Father and from the essence of the Son, due to the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, so that – since this shows the consubstantiality of the divine Spirit with the Father and the Son, and not the different existence of the Spirit from the Father –, due to the consubstantiality, it is same to say that the Spirit is and from the essence of the Son and to say the Spirit is of the same essence with the Son”.72

The Spirit’s “from the Son” is, therefore, synonymous with the “from the nature of the Son” and with the “consubstantial with the Son”, since it does not imply any casual derivation of the Spirit from the hypostasis of the Son. Such an interpretation is further supported by Palamas’ repeated emphasis that the Spirit’s flowing forth “from the nature of the Son”, even “according to the eternal existence”, occurs unconditionally “according to the hypostasis of the Father only” (țĮș’ ‫ބ‬ʌȩıIJĮıȚȞ ȝȩȞȘȞ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌĮIJȡȚțȒȞ).73 In this way, every explicit or implicit introduction of the multicausality within the divine being or, again, some differentiation of the causality to “direct” and “indirect” one, is suspended in advance. So, when it is said within the triadological framework that the Holy Spirit is “from the Son”, the preposition “from” (‫݋‬ț) has exclusively the function that was previously assigned by Palamas to the preposition 71 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 64, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 136.11-13; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 304.6-8: “ȀĮ‫ݸ ޥ‬ıȐțȚȢ ‫ ݸ‬șİȩijȡȦȞ Ƞ‫ފ‬IJȠȢ ȀȪȡȚȜȜȠȢ ‫݋‬ț IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ ȜȑȖİȚ, IJާ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȠȪıȚȠȞ ʌĮȡȓıIJȘıȚȞ, ܻȜȜ߫ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț Į‫ݫ‬IJȚȠȞ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ IJާȞ ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȟ IJȠࠎ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ”. ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 76, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 147.24-29; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 326.10-15. 72 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 67, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 139.5-11; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 308.32-33–310.1-7: “ȉȠȚȖĮȡȠࠎȞ İ‫ܽ މ‬Ȟ ‫ݏ‬ȤȠȚ ȜȑȖİȚȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ț ‫݋‬ț IJ߱Ȣ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, ܻȜȜ߫ ‫݋‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ ijȣıȚțࠛȢ țܻț IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ, įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJާ IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ ʌȡާȢ IJާȞ ʌĮIJȑȡĮ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȠȪıȚȠȞ, țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ IJȠࠎ șİȓȠȣ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ ʌȡާȢ IJާȞ ʌĮIJȑȡĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާȞ ȣ‫ާݨ‬Ȟ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȠȣıȚȩIJȘIJȠȢ ‫݋‬ȞIJİࠎșİȞ įİȚțȞȣȝȑȞȘȢ, ܻȜȜ߫ Ƞ‫ރ‬Ȥ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ įȚĮijȩȡȠȣ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȟİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ, ‫ݫ‬ıȠȞ įȑ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ İ‫ݧ‬ʌİ߿Ȟ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ݸ‬ȝȠȠȣıȚȩIJȘIJĮ, țĮ‫ݼ ޥ‬IJȚ IJ߱Ȣ Į‫ރ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ IJࠜ ȣ‫ ࠜݨ‬IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ”. 73 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ⱥǯ 6, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 33.25-26–34.1-2; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 88.17-18, 21-22; Ǻǯ 65, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 137.6-7; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 306.2; Ǻǯ 73, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 144.17, 26; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 318.31-32, 320.9; Ǻǯ 74, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 146.6; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 322.23-24; cf. Ǻǯ 76, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988) 147.24; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 326.9-10.

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“through” (įȚȐ): namely, the function of indicating that the Spirit flows forth from the nature of the Son upon whom he naturally rests,74 and showing that he has one essence and one and the same energy with him and with the Father.75 Moreover, Palamas now, quite explicitly, states that in this sense prepositions “‫݋‬ț” and “įȚȐ” can have the same meaning also on the trinitarian level: “It is necessary, therefore, to consider that, when it makes no difference to say from (‫݋‬ț) the Father through (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬the Son and from (‫݋‬ț) the Father and from (‫݋‬ț) the Son – where in that manner the prepositions 'from' (‫݋‬ț) and 'through' (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬in reference to the [trinitarian] theology mutually have the same meaning –, they [these prepositions] do not manifest division nor differentiation in the Holy Trinity, but unity and commonness with regard to the natural attributes, which indicates that the energy and the will of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one and the same”.76

The preposition “through” (įȚȐ), which “shows the unity and the invariability” (IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ݐ‬ȞȦıȚȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ܻʌĮȡȐȜȜĮțIJȠȞ)77 with regard to the natural attributes, can also have the same meaning with the preposition “from” (‫݋‬ț) on the realm of triadology, only and solely if the latter is deprived of its original triadological meaning, that is, if it is brought from the realm of hypostatic causality to the realm of the nature itself. In this manner, it designates in this context, just like the preposition “through”, a consubstantiality; exclusively in this sense (when it is separated from the 74 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 74, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 146.2-6; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 322.19-24. 75 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 65, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 137.7-11; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 306.2-7: “ǻȚާ Ƞ‫ރ‬įİ‫ޥ‬Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬įȑʌȠIJİ IJࠛȞ ܻʌ߫ Į‫ࠛݧ‬ȞȠȢ İ‫ރ‬ıİȕࠛȞ șİȠȜȩȖȦȞ ‫݋‬ț IJ߱Ȣ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȦȢ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ İ‫ݭ‬ʌİȞ, ܻȜȜ߫ ‫݋‬ț IJ߱Ȣ IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȦȢǜ ‫݋‬ț į‫ ޡ‬IJ߱Ȣ ijȪıİȦȢ IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijȣıȚțࠛȢ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ ‫݋‬ȟ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ İ‫ݫ‬ʌİȡ IJȚȢ ijĮȓȘ, ܻȜȜ߫ ‫ސ‬Ȣ ȝȚߢȢ țĮ‫ޥ‬ IJ߱Ȣ Į‫ރ‬IJ߱Ȣ ijȪıİȦȢ Ƞ‫އ‬ıȘȢ IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ”. See also: ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 74, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 146.2-6; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 322.19-24. Cf. ਝ. ȇȐȞIJȠȕȚIJȢ, ȉާ ȝȣıIJ‫ޤ‬ȡȚȠȞ IJ߱Ȣ ݄ȖަĮȢ ȉȡȚ‫ޠ‬įȠȢ…, 165-166. 76 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 59, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 131.19-26 ; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 294.7-15: “ȀĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȠࠎIJȠ į‫ ޡ‬ıțȠʌİ߿Ȟ IJࠛȞ ܻȞĮȖțĮȚȠIJȐIJȦȞ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫ݼ‬IJĮȞ ȝȘį‫ޡ‬Ȟ įȚĮijȑȡ߯ ijȐȞĮȚ ‫݋‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ʌĮIJȡާȢ țĮ‫݋ ޥ‬ț IJȠࠎ ȣ‫ݨ‬Ƞࠎ, țĮ‫ޥ‬ IJȠࠎIJȠȞ IJާȞ IJȡȩʌȠȞ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ ‫ݧ‬ıȠįȣȞĮȝࠛıȚȞ ܻȜȜȒȜĮȚȢ ‫݋‘ ݘ‬ț’ țĮ‫‘ ݘ ޥ‬įȚ‫’ޟ‬, Ƞ‫ރ‬ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ įȚĮȓȡİıȚȞ Ƞ‫ރ‬į‫ ޡ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ įȚĮijȠȡ‫ޟ‬Ȟ ʌĮȡȚıIJࠛıȚ IJ߱Ȣ ܼȖȓĮȢ IJȡȚȐįȠȢ, ܻȜȜ‫ ޟ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ݐ‬ȞȦıȚȞ țĮ‫ޥ‬ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ܻʌĮȡĮȜȜĮȟȓĮȞ, ‫ݜ‬IJȚȢ ‫݋‬ıIJ‫ ޥ‬țĮIJ‫ ޟ‬IJ‫ ޟ‬ijȣıȚț‫ݧ ޟ‬įȚȫȝĮIJĮ, įİȚțȞࠎıĮ ȝȚߢȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ߱Ȣ Į‫ރ‬IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİȓĮȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬șİȜȒıİȦȢ İ‫ݭ‬ȞĮȚ IJާȞ ʌĮIJȑȡĮ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާȞ ȣ‫ݨ‬ȩȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJާ ʌȞİࠎȝĮ IJާ ݀ȖȚȠȞ”. Cf. also: Ǻǯ 60, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 132.9-13; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 294.28-32. 77 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 59, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 132.2-3; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 294.22-23.

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person and connected to the nature), it can be attributed and to the Son within the trinitarian milieu. In other words, Palamas performs here a semantic shift of the two prepositions which takes an opposite direction to the “Latins”; namely, instead of semantically bringing closer the preposition “įȚȐ” to the causal “‫݋‬ț” in terms of their causality (whereby these two prepositions would have the function of “showing the difference between divine hypostases and the distinctiveness of the Spirit according to His hypostasis from these two hypostases [i.e., the Father and the Son] and from each of them respectively”)78 Gregory Palamas, when he uses these prepositions synonymously with regard to the Son–Holy Spirit relationship, directs their semantics towards consubstantiality, i.e., the commonness and unity of the natural attributes in the Holy Trinity. In addition, as I have said at the beginning, the preposition “‫݋‬ț” retains the exclusivity of designating hypostatic causality, that is reserved only for the Father: this is one of the meanings that preposition “įȚȐ” can never reach; for, its semantic field is always associated with the consubstantiality of the three divine persons and, consequently, with their possession of the one and common to them divine energy. 4. If we, now, in the form of a conclusion, take a glance at the meaning complex of the two prepositions, we can conclude that Gregory Palamas (and this, unfortunately, holds true not only for this particular occasion) does not manifest a remarkable degree of consistency and discipline, when it comes to the precise use of concepts and the very argumentation in relation to them.79 So, according to him: a) the preposition “‫݋‬ț” in the domain of triadology indicates causality and is connected with the Father and only with the Father, and by no means with the Son, b) preposition “‫݋‬ț” in the domain of triadology can still be bound also to the Son, referring, though, not to the causality, but to the consubstantiality, that is to the nature of the Son, c) preposition “įȚȐ” is strictly focused on energetic, oikonomia related manifestation of the Spirit, so in the domain of 78 ȁȩȖȠȢ ܻʌȠįİȚțIJȚțާȢ Ǻǯ 59, ȈȊīīȇǹȂȂǹȉǹ ǹǯ (1988), 131.27-30; ǼȆǼ 51 (1981), 294.16-19. 79 For some examples of argumentative inconsistency in Palamas’ works, see: ī. ਝ. ǻȘȝȘIJȡĮțȩʌȠȣȜȠȢ, 1997, ǹ‫ރ‬ȖȠȣıIJ߿ȞȠȢ țĮȓ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ ȆĮȜĮȝߢȢ. ȉȐ ʌȡȠȕȜȒȝĮIJĮ IJࠛȞ ܻȡȚıIJȠIJİȜȚțࠛȞ țĮIJȘȖȠȡȚࠛȞ țĮȓ IJ߱Ȣ IJȡȚĮįȚț߱Ȣ ȥȣȤȠșİȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ, ਝșȒȞĮ : ȆĮȡȠȣıȓĮ (especially 58-63). However, what Demetracopoulos, despite very useful pointing out of certain logical lapses and inconsistencies at Palamas’ part, seems to overlook is exactly Palamas’ semantic consistency on a strictly theological ground.

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triadology it cannot be said that the Spirit proceeds through the Son, d) preposition “įȚȐ” is applicable in the domain of triadology as well, so that in the trinitarian context, too, can be said that the Spirit is through the Son, in the sense of indicating of his “resting” upon the Son and, consequently, of their consubstantiality and possession of common energy. Hence, a) prepositions “‫݋‬ț” and “įȚȐ” in the realm of triadology need to be strictly distinguished, because one of them points to the causality, and the other one does not, b) prepositions “‫݋‬ț” and “įȚȐ” can, in the realm of triadology, also be identified, if their meaning is devoid of etiological (causal) content and if it indicates the consubstantiality and the commonness of the energy of the three divine persons. Nevertheless, what is here of decisive importance is the fact that this inconsistent use of (technical) prepositions, which through the reading of the treatise at times is quite difficult to follow, still has its semantic consistency, if the text is to be read in good faith. The common denominator of this semantic consistency could be determined through the concepts of monocausality and consubstantiality. Namely on the consubstantiality level, both in trinitarian and oikonomia milieu of energetic manifestation, “‫݋‬ț” and “įȚȐ” are interchangeable concepts, so both can be attributed to the Son. At the other hand, on the level of monocausality they do not have a relation of semantic reciprocity, due to the fact that in regard to the hypostatic causality “‫݋‬ț” can never be attributed as “and to the Son”. Hence, the preposition “‫݋‬ț” in the trinitarian framework always has a “surplus” of meaning in relation to the preposition “įȚȐ”.80 Basically everything, as in many places in Palamas’ writings, depends upon whether it is intended to point to the divine “unities” (‫݌‬ȞȫıİȚȢ) or, again, to the divine “distinctions” (įȚĮțȡȓıİȚȢ): as we have seen above, prepositions “from” (‫݋‬ț) and “through” (įȚ‫ )ޟ‬can even in relation to the triadology be interchangeable, but only under condition that they “do not manifest division nor differentiation in the Holy Trinity, but unity and commonness with regard to the natural attributes”. Palamas’ triadology, despite sporadic conceptual aberrations and sometimes quite unfortunate terminological solutions,81 is clearly 80 As it was rightfully stated by Ȉ. īȚĮȖțȐȗȠȖȜȠȣ, ȀȠȚȞȦȞȓĮ șİȫıİȦȢ…, 178, “the preposition ‘through’ cannot take, as it never took from the Greek fathers, causal meaning for the being of the Spirit”. 81 One good example for this certainly is Palamas’ use of phrases “‫ބ‬ʌİȡțİȚȝȑȞȘ șİȩIJȘȢ” and “‫ބ‬ijİȚȝȑȞȘ șİȩIJȘȢ”. For neoplatonic background of these phrases, see: J. A. Demetracopoulos, “Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God’s ‘Essence’ and ‘Energies’ in Late Byzantium”, in: M. Hinterberger, Ch. Schabel, eds., 2011, Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History

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fixed. Its corner stone certainly is the thesis that there is only one cause in God (the hypostasis of Father) and that exactly this one cause is the greatest guarantee of the personal integrity, consubstantiality, and the ontological unity of the three persons of the Holy Trinity.82

1204-1500, Bibliotheca ʋ 11, Leuven, Paris, Walpole, MA: Peeters, pp.263-372 : 277-278. It is difficult, however, on this basis to ascribe to Palamas a “metaphysical Platonism” (278); in other words, the terminological compatibility does not necessarily imply a semantic compatibility, despite the author’s best intentions and great effort to prove exactly the opposite. G. Kapriev points out to this “irreconcilability of the platonism with the palamism”, in his work: Philosophie in Byzanz, 278-279. 82 The concept of monarchy or causality in Palamas’ theological opus I will discuss in my paper with working title: M. Kneževiü, “The Concept of ‘cause’ (Į੅IJȚȠȞ) or ‘Monarchy’ (ȝȠȞĮȡȤȓĮ) in Writings of Gregory Palamas”, in: M. Kneževiü, B. Šijakoviü, eds., 2012, ȅȊȈǿǹ, ȊȆȅȈȉǹȈǿȈ, ǼȃǼȇīǼǿǹ. Aspects of Thought of Gregory Palamas (1296-1357), Belgrade: The Institute for Theological Research (in Serbian, with summary in English).

TABORIC LIGHT IN RUSSIAN VISUAL CULTURE: FROM THE FRESCOES OF DIONISY TO THE PHOTOGRAPHIES OF YURI HOLDIN DR ELENA DULGHERU

Introduction and Summary One of the most important, but less known icon painters from “The Golden Age” of Russian Orthodox art is Dionisy (c.1430–after 1502). The hesychast experience, which deeply influenced Saint Andrey Rublew’s work, is continued on a new step by Dionisy. The theology of Saint Gregory Palamas brought to Russia by Athonite monks, deeply influenced Russian icon painting. Highly appreciated by his contemporaries, Dionisy's works became rather obscure in the 20th century, especially outside USSR. The reasons: the serious degradation of the Ferapont monastery - the main holder of his frescoes - and the unsatisfying quality of their reproductions in the Soviet albums. The techniques of icon photography and publishing never took into account the theology behind the work. Yuri Holdin (19542007), a Russian art photographer, made more than 300 shots of Dionisy’s Ferapont frescoes, succeeding for the first time to catch their real colours with a richness of details never seen before in reproductions. By reconstructing the behavior of the cathedral’s natural illumination during the time of the Holy Liturgy, Holdin demonstrates that photographing frescoes is a spiritual art, involving not only photographic skills and technology, but a deep theological understanding. Holdin with his work provides the foundations of the art of “pneumatic photography”, conferring to an art strongly connected with technology the elevation of the old medieval icon painting. The spiritual continuity between Saint Gregory Palamas, Dionisy and Yuri Holdin is ensured by the experience of Taboric light shared by all three.

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1. An unusual exhibition At the end of December 2011 an exceptional cultural event was closing in Moscow. It was “The Light of the Frescoes of Dionisy”, an exhibition of worldwide importance, which lasted for a whole year and was hosted by the museum complex of the Moscow Cathedral “Christ the Saviour”. The exhibition was held in the frames of the multi-annual program for culturalreligious restoration, called “The Frescoes of Dionisy to the world”. It was organized by “Russia’s Frescoes” Foundation, with the blessing of his Holiness Kirill, the Patriarch of Moscow and the Whole Russia. More than 300 large posters with photographies of Dionisy’s frescoes from Ferapont Monastery, taken by the artist Yuri Holdin (1954-2007), had been for the first time exhibited together. The series of high-quality photo prints, exposed along the exhibition corridor, which embraces the upper floor of the Cathedral, created a sensation of calm and warm illumination, typical for the frescoes of the great icon-painter of the XIV-XV centuries. Both the exhibition’s curatorial concept, suggesting the dynamics of a pilgrimage, and especially the exceptional quality of the photo prints, accurately rendering Dionisy’s chromatic and tonal atmosphere, conferred uniqueness to this exceptional exhibitional project.

2. Ferapont Monastery Few people today have heard of Ferapont Monastery. It is placed in Vologda region from Russia’s far North, between two lakes, at about 20 km from Kirillo-Belozersk Monastery, to whose history it is closely bound. Both monasteries are more than 600 years old and were founded almost at the same time (1398, 1397 respectively) by the monks Ferapont and Kirill from Moscow Simonov Monastery. Both monks were close disciples of Saint Serge of Radonezj, the founder of a confluence of monastic centres around Moscow. After Kirill had a vision of The Mother of God, the two monks left for the far North in order to found there two places of reclusion. At first, these were two small cloisters in the wilderness. At the middle of XV century the two monasteries become important spiritual and cultural centres. The monks here write lives of the saints, theological and hagiographic texts. Later, the tzars Vasily II, Vasily III and Ivan the Terrible dowered both monasteries with lands, villages and other gifts. The monasteries flourish economically and administratively and their fame reaches Moscow.

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After the failed siege of the Polish-Lithuanian armed troops upon Kirillo-Belozersk Monastery (1612), the furious bands rob for several years the whole region, including Ferapont Monastery, which loses its past glory. The monastery is dissolved in 1798. It is reopened in 1903, while in the reign of Saint Nikolai II (Romanov), when for the first time, the imperial authorities start a huge program of restoration of the monastic complexes in the region. In the Soviet times, the monastery became a part of the art museum of Kirillo-Belozersk monastery. In 1974, the Dionisy’s Frescoes Museum is inaugurated, and the first albums with reproductions of the great icon-painter’s works are edited. This leads to a first national and international recognition of his work in contemporary world. Monastic life is re-established at Ferapont after 1989. It is the frescoes of the famous icon-painter Dionisy (middle of XIV century - beginning of XV cent.), who conferred an increasing fame to the isolated monastery of Ferapont. Between 1500-1502 (or 1502-1503), Dionisy decorated here the imposing stone Cathedral, founded in 1490, an impressive architectonic edifice, the Birth of the Mother of God.

3. Dionisy and his epoch: historical and religious context But who was Dionisy? Outside the narrow circle of art-historians, few non-Russian people know him today. A follower of the famous Theofan the Greek and Saint Andrey Rubliov, having a biography almost as mysterious as theirs, he belongs to the golden constellation of the masters of the period of flourishment of Russian sacred art. He was born about 1430 and died some time after 1502, his parents aren’t known, we do not know his teacher, and we do not know where he died and where he was buried. He had a family and painted together with his sons. His frescoes fascinated his contemporaries, especially the clergy and the hierarchs, who surnamed him “the wise”. The chronicles and hagiographic annals of the epoch call him “the most renowned due to his artistry”. According to the numerous testimonials of his contemporaries, even as early as 1470 he was renowned as the most prestigious Russian icon-painter and his works were estimated as most precious. Important personalities of the times (like Vassian Rylo, the Archbishop of Rostov, Archbishop Ioasaf Obolensky, Saint Iosif Volotzky) ask from him large art works (iconostasis, icons, frescoes). Nevertheless, Dionisy will not become an official court painter and we shall see why. In 1481, he painted the frescoes and the iconostasis of the Dormition Cathedral (Uspensk) in Moscow Kremlin; in 1482, in addition, in Moscow, at the Church of the Ascension of the Lord (Voznesenskaya), he

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renovates the icon of the Mother of God ‘Odigitria’, which afterwards will escape by miracle from a devastating fire and today is one of the most renown and representative of his works. In 1479, together with his sons Vladimir and Feodosy, he paints a series of works, ordered by Saint Iosif Volotzky for the monastery founded by him, Iosifo-Volokolamsk (icons for the old wooden church, the iconostasis and afterwards the frescoes for the stone cathedral). Many of Dionisy’s works were lost or destroyed or preserved just partially (like the frescoes of Moscow’s Chigasovo monastery, which burned in 1547 and the iconostasis of Pavlo-Obnorsk monastery, from which only three icons remained); we only know about them from the documents of the epoch. Dionisy’s artistic maturity, as the art historian Ekaterina Danilova asserts (2006) coincided with Russia’s definitive liberation from The Mongol-Tatar yoke in the epoch of the tzardom of Ioan III. It is a period of extraordinary revival of national religious conscience. The nation reunites its forces around the Moscow monasteries, founded by the numerous disciples of Saint Serge of Radonezj and, in the North, around Venerable Nil Sorsky, stimulating a unique flourishment of ascetical and contemplative life. In 1485, the Venerable Nil Sorsky, one of the monks of KirilloBelozersk monastery, returns from the Holly Mountain of Athos, after a stay of 10 years, and founds not far away from Ferapont, on the river Sora, a small hermitage, which will become a center of ascetical spirituality and dissemination of the Palamite doctrine. In the same period, the Russian Church is confronted with the heresy of Judaisants, which has been secretly promoted within the clergy and the governing circles since 1471. The heresy encouraged Jewish ritual practices and rejected icons. Although is was officially condemned by the Moscow Local Council in 1490, the heresy lasted almost another three decades. Wanting to remain faithful to the true faith, a lot of clergy, monks and hierarchs withdraw from the capital to more secluded regions. So, avoiding the icon-painter’s name in the Moscow annals in the years of the iconoclast heresy (although the painter gained his reputation in the capital) can be considered as a testimony of his refusal to collaborate with the governing circles of the tzar Ioan III, who were corrupted by the heresy (see Ekaterina Danilova 2006). So, in 1489, in the middle of the struggle with the heresy, Dionisy is invited to the secluded Ferapont Monastery by Archbishop Ioasaf (who by the same reasons renounced his title), to paint the stone cathedral of the Birth of the Mother of God, which will be raised a year later, in 1490.

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4. The Theology of Dionisy’s iconography There is a deep relationship between Dionisy’s frescoes and the discourses of defending Orthodoxy, according to Ekaterina Danilova (2006, p. 62). The Russian art-historian’s arguments are, first, the themes of the iconographic program of Ferapont Monastery’s Cathedral, which depicts in its compositions the Saviour’s sermons and marvels, which are related to the discussions with the Jews, as well as the conflicts between heretics and the Holly Fathers (in the depictions of the Ecumenical Councils). Nevertheless, the chromatic language, dominated by gentle ocher, pink and light-blue and aerial solar tones, as well as the imponderable, almost transparent figures of the saints, transpose into sensible forms the Palamite doctrine upon the nature of Taboric light and the graceful meeting between man and God. The black pigment, both in its pure state (and, apparently, in its combinations) is totally lacking from the chromatic palette of Dionisy. Very dark tones are also lacking; even the contours of the objects, human figures and clothes are painted with lines from the same chromatic scale. This is surprising, if we take into consideration the whole painting tradition of those times, and especially Dionisy’s famous forerunner, Theofan the Greek, whose specific mark is given by the dark, brown and black, almost monochromatic tones, vigorously accentuated, here and there, by shining touches of white. Instead of the well-defined graphic style and rigorous geometry of Byzantine painting, Dionisy uses gentle, clean, narrowly distinguishable lines, avoiding as much as possible the agressivity of right or acute angles, but permanently keeping “the awakeness of the spirit”. “From the God of penitence to the God of joy”, from the vigorous graphic style of “The Divine reasons” to the ineffable meeting with God: this is the graphic program of Dionisy, marking in the language of art a substantial mutation of Orthodox theological thought. According to Ekaterina Danilova: “The frescoes of Ferapont monastery are a most precise expression in images of the theology of Uncreated Light of the Transfiguration. The light-bearing power of Dionisy’s art contains a revelation of the transfigured world” (2006, p. 63). In this way, Dionisy's iconography truly represents a culmination age of the pneumatic “art of painting with light” through the incessant inner prayer of the painter, which can be placed within the theological theme of the hesychastic deification of man.

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5. The Hesychast movement in Russian iconography Along with Russia’s return to the Byzantine sources in the second half of XV century, Russian iconography set to itself the goal of the artistic objectification of hesychastic experience. Russian spiritual life, renewed by the hesychastic movement, was looking for new forms to express the experience of meeting God by inner prayer. This pursuit opens a different path from the Byzantine one, hence discovering the unique mission of Orthodox Russia, as the theologian Leonid Uspensky remarks: “The iconography assumed the task to artistically express the experience of contemplating the uncreated light. The iconic image couldn’t have been created without the real experience of meeting God, without experiencing the epiphany. This clearly emphasizes the supramundane essence of the symbolic language of Orthodox art: the figured image is a spiritual vision, governed by the laws of the inverted perspective” (2006, p. 63).

In this way, we can confirm that “the doctrine of Saint Gregory Palamas defined the road of the whole ritual Easter-Christian art, among which created Andrey Rubliov and Dionisy, and at the same time differentiated it from Western Renaissance art, which is founded on ideas, that are opposed to Orthodoxy” (ibid).

6. “A Miracle” named Yuri Holdin. Rediscovering Dionisy The rediscovery of Dionisy by the modern world, in a first stage, from the beginning of the seventies, but especially after 1990, is a miracle itself. This is the miracle, revealed by Yuri Holdin’s photo-exhibition, opened in 2011 at the Moscow Cathedral Christ the Saviour. As you pass through the exhibition and notice the accuracy and richness of the drawing’s details and the harmony of the compositional assembly, you realize the miracle. The famous Dionisy, well-known from the Soviet albums of the seventies, looked always there faded and pale, the yellow-ochre-light-blue colour cast of his frescoes, the slimness and discretion of the lines and the lack of graphic and tonal contrasts (so characteristic of the Byzantine tradition) seemed rather a fault or a feebleness; even the art historians of the time attributed it to the poor offer of pigments of the local geography! Neither the editing nor the printing techniques were the most appropriate to reproduce properly the work of Dionisy. Therefore, the superlatives, attributed to the legendary icon-painter at that time and especially the epithet "the wise”, seemed exaggerated. According to the Soviet albums, his frescoes couldn’t afford to be compared with those of his great

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forerunners, Theofan the Greek and Saint Andrey Rubliov. But, after the revival of Ferapont monastery, here comes a photographer who, without any artistic or technical artifice, succeeds to catch on the film the true value of the enigmatic icon-painter’s frescoes. A great photo-artist, but also a theologically initiated intellectual and a practicing Orthodox. An artist with an infinite patience, tenacity and devotedness. “Suddenly he felt a special empathy with Dionisy”, confesses to me, on the corridors of the exhibition, the widow of Yuri Holdin, Ekaterina Danilova. "He felt that both their special lightness, and their richness in details are valorized at their best at midday, during the culminating moment of the Divine Liturgy, the key eucharistic moment. Then the atmosphere of the whole church seems to become like golden”. And he started to take shots. Slowly, without artificial light, systematically installing the scaffolds from one part of the cathedral to another and searching for the favourable light, in order to valorize both the whole assembly, the hardly distinguishable details, and those that are relieved only by a specific illumination. Patiently looking for the favourable light in the capricious and poor in sunshine weather of the North. Appropriately framing each composition, according to the hermenies (from the Greek term “ermeneia” or İȡȝȘȞİȓĮ), trying to map the plate view of the camera on the non-euclidean surfaces of the medieval architecture, without betraying the geometry of each composition. The shooting process lasted 13 years. And all this work without any support from the authorities.

7. “Pneumatic photo-graphia”: a theological approach to the arts of photography and printing Experts are right when they state that Yuri Holdin opens a new era in the art of photography. The art of writing (or painting) with light”, the art of “spiritual (or pneumatic) photo-graphia” is a notion that doesn’t exist in contemporary visual exegesis, but Yuri Holdin is its pioneer. Even if etymologically “photo-graphia” means exactly “writing or painting with light”, the practice of the craft ignored the spiritual dimension of light, approaching the meaning of the term either to the journalistic realism or, in the other extreme, to the illusionist subjectiveness of the photo-joke or to that of metaphysical photography, not to mention about the grobian aesthetics of commercial photography and the usual hard codes of digital photo-art.

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And this is normal, while the pioneers of photography themselves conceived light only like a physical, and not as a fundamentally spiritual phenomenon. This conception of the art of photography, as an art predominantly concerned with the physical senses or, in the best case, with reason, lasts until today. But (as Yuri Holdin and commentators on his work remind us) light isn’t just a photon beam, but is, first and foremost, a perpetual movement of the spirit! The theological understanding of light (as movement of a living Divine Logos) demands a theological approach to the art of photography, with all required artistic, technical and spiritual aspects: a theological approach to observation of life and to one's relation with the observed subject; a spiritual approach to photo technique, so that the personal implication of the artist and the use of technologies (as close to nature as possible) leave less room to the machine and to the impersonal digital technique. And Yuri Holdin opens this road. His new approach could lead us to a larger understanding of the concept of inverted perspective (which had been formulated by Father Pavel Florensky) and to the development of its applications beyond the perimeter of iconography, the only art that practically acknowledges it yet. But all these are conditioned (like in the Middle Ages and like anytime) by the real encounter of the artist with God, by the experience of the graceful meeting with Divinity. The editing of the photo-albums also was an artistic labour itself. A second labour, as unusual as the shooting, as specialists assert, and unique in all the worldwide art albums market. The pre-printing process of a high quality colour art album requires an accuracy as high as the shooting of the exhibits. It’s extremely difficult to find a unique chromatic key for the whole assemblage of printings, as many art publishers assert. According to the art-designer Boris Denisovski (2006): "For instance, we intended to make an album of the Hermitage, which would have contained all the sections of the museum. But we didn’t succeed to find a unique chromatic key and that’s why the project was abandoned, despite the fact that the photos were made by a high performance professional”. The road from the photographic cliché to the chromatic decomposition and the other mechanical and optical procedures required by the printing process is always influenced by the quality of the pigments and of the paper and by the technical parameters of the printing machine – which are never the same. It’s the road from uniqueness to multiplicity. The road from the uniqueness of the cliché, which is carried out and controlled by human mind, to the multiplicity of the printed product, is always influenced by the uncontrollable concreteness of substance (matter), therefore by hazard. You just feel that you enter into an area of infinitesimal detail,

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technically almost uncontrollable, simply of good or of bad omen, where things either rise or collapse by themselves, where, after a long purely human effort, art mysteriously intertwines with nature and therefore with spirituality, where Mystery either accepts and propels or categorically rejects human labour. The same as in the ancient mystery of rising cathedrals.

8. Conclusions “I don’t know how come, but the prints from Yuri Holdin’s photographic clichées wholly preserve the graphic quality of the originals. As a publisher, did you ever encounter such a thing?” – confesses to me, with the same lucidity, the art researcher Ekaterina Danilova. We enter into the bright cloud of Dionisy’s frescoes, a cloud of Taboric light (and that's not an empty word), which concentrates over centuries the chain of synergic works of the almost forgotten icon-painter from 600 years ago, of the photo artist, publisher and curator Yuri Holdin (who conceived in its entirety the editorial concept of the album and of the exhibition) and, last but not least, of the technical team from PhotoPro company, who accomplished the prints. All this chain of artists and artisans experienced perhaps, more of less intensely, the experience of meeting the divine grace, a spiritual experience that they succeeded to imprint on their profession. The perfectly balanced, aerial and calm musicality of Dionisy’s frescoes, remarked by all commentators, joins together and harmonizes, in the light of the same Holly Spirit, epochs, professions and domains of activity, considered almost incompatible. This is “a Taboric musicality”.

Works Cited Ȼɨɥɶɲɚɹ Cɨɜɟɬɫɤɚɹ ɗɧɰɢɤɥɨɩɟɞɢɹ, ɬɨɦ. 27, 3-ɟ ɢɡɞ., Ɇɨɫɤɜɚ, 1977. Ɇɨɧɚɫɬɵɪɢ Pɭɫɫɤɨɣ ɉɪɚɜɨɫɥɚɜɧɨɣ ɐɟɪɤɜɢ. ɋɩɪɚɜɨɱɧɢɤ-ɩɭɬɟɜɨɞɢɬɟɥɶ, ɂɡɞ. Mɨɫɤɨɜɫɤɨɣ ɉɚɬɪɢɚɪɯɢɢ - Ɏɨɧɞ "ɉɪɟɨɛɪɚɠɟɧɢɟ", Ɇɨɫɤɜɚ, 2001. ɏɨɥɞɢɧ ɘ.ɂ., Ɏɪɟɫɤɢ Ɋɭɫɢ. Ⱦɢɨɧɢɫɢɣ. Ɂɨɥɨɬɨɣ ɜɟɤ ɢɤɨɧɨɩɢɫɢ, XIV-XV ɜɜ. / ɉɪɨɫɩɟɤɬ-ɤɚɬɚɥɨɝ ɮɨɬɨɝɪɚɮɢɱɟɫɤɨɣ ɜɵɫɬɚɜɤɢ, 2-ɟ ɢɡɞ. ɞɨɩ. ɢ ɢɫɩɪ., Ɇɨɫɤɜɚ, Ɏɨɧɞ Ɏɪɟɫɤɢ Ɋɭɫɢ, 2006. Holdin Yu.I., Frescoes of Old Russia. Dionisy. Golden Age of IconPainting in the 14-15th centuries. Catalogue of the photographic exhibition. 2nd edition revised and corrected, Moscow, Foundation “Frescoes of Old Russia”, 2006 (in Russian and English). Official Website with photos from Dionisy's iconography: www.dionisy.ru

NUDITY OF THE BODY IN THE LATE MEDIEVAL ORTHODOX TRADITION: ONE EXAMPLE1 DR DIMITAR ATANASSOV

1. The Theological and Cultural complexity of nakedness The Middle Ages, similarly to all historical epochs, operate with several meanings of nakedness. For example, a popular proverb says: “Naked are people without letters”. This formula can be easily traced back to the Middle Ages. It seems that in earlier epochs the educated person was recognized in his special status, guaranteed because of his knowledge. Here we can outline the first kind of nakedness: ignorance. This conceptualization of nakedness begun probably millenia ago and it’s still valid. The understanding of ignorance in metaphors, related to the range of meanings in nakedness, of the things-before-the-inception, could be found in many contemporary popular narratives. The clothes bring warmness and body comfort in the same way that knowledge puts thoughts in order and under control. ȁȩȖȠȢ turns the primordial ȤȐȠȢ into țȩıȝȠȢ. And, this is one of the running principles in the narrative about Creation in The Holy Bible: the Spirit of God, moving upon the primordial ocean, turned darkness into the first light, the all-nothing into things, the all-present absence into the first substance and presence of the Being. Persons living outside the “ࠔȦȝĮȧțȒ Ƞ‫ݫ‬țȠȣȝȑȞȘ”, which included the areas of Europe under Byzantine rule, in the Byzantine eyes, appeared naked as well. In its fundamental principles, the barbarian world seemed to be identical to childhood in terms of civilization and standards of living: it was all primitive, extreme, and unendurably bright, dazzling. That’s why 1 My first effort to analyze the representation of the naked body in the Middle Ages is made six years ago. A version of the text is published here: Ⱥɬɚɧɚɫɨɜ, Ⱦ. „Ɋɚɡɦɢɫɥɢ ɜɴɪɯɭ ɬɟɥɟɫɧɚɬɚ ɝɨɥɨɬɚ ɩɪɟɡ ɋɪɟɞɧɨɜɟɤɨɜɢɟɬɨ” – Ⱥɪɯɢɜ ɡɚ ɫɪɟɞɧɨɜɟɤɨɜɧɚ ɮɢɥɨɫɨɮɢɹ ɢ ɤɭɥɬɭɪɚ / Archiv für Mittelalterische Philosophie und Kultur, XVII, 2010, pp. 94-117.

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the intellectual sense wasn’t able to work effectively, and to carry out its basic function: to think and to (co)ordinate the world in accordance to standards invented by rationality. Unlike the world of civilization, where all the contrasts were minimized by the maximised and well-controlled productivity of the mind, and all the exorbitances were centred and domesticated, marching from one pole to the other smoothly and in legitimate modality in accordance with the rules of the logic. The transitions (physical and/or intellectual) were always and indispensably gradual, because rush moving could threaten the fragile order of Being. Last, but not least: in the Byzantine context the body nakedness was recognized in its literal meaning. From one side, nudity as a part of human’s intimacy was an element of a particular cultural zone of mentality in traditional communities, hidden carefully behind the inexpugnable wall of taboo. After the commitment of Original Sin, the scandalous nakedness of the body appeared. Although it is clear that the conscious intention to show the bare flesh, even as an attempt to return to the primordial, authentic and direct touch of nature, is a phenomenon characteristic of Modernity, the hinting at or open demonstration of the silhouette details through and by the clothing is more related to contemporary times. Of course, here could be added a reflection on the Christ’s nakedness as well. There’s so much to share about the modesty and the body nudity of the Son of God in all the variety of His iconography.2 There are many other aspects of the Byzantine culture that could be discussed in relation to my topic, but my presentation here will turn to the letter of Metochites, following its narrative details. The body without clothes doesn’t belong, as a historical paradigm of humankind, in advance to the Last Judgment Day, shifting between sin and piety, and learning the rules of The Being element by element. But, it could be considered as existing in the theoretical frame of the time before the Original Sin. Why? – Because, if we accept that the basic principle of passing time is movement, the first generation of people lived without any change of the surrounding and/or themselves, till the fatal intervention of the snake, which ended the Paradise carefree life. There is a good reason to be as it was: the perfect world as it was created and promised by God. This arch-ontological state could be thought in close comparison not with the social time and place, defined by the always-active-transitions, but with a space, inhabited by people, which is an exact copy of the world of 2 See Brown, P. The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity, New York, 1988. Even though the text concerns the Western tradition and the Early Middle Ages, many of its essential findings are still valid in the East and some seven centuries later.

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nature. This law of nature, claiming that events are always the same and nothing is different, removes the possibility to sculpture such an image into a historical narrative. It is colourful enough, but it is out of any narration conventions. Change of the seasons, sunset and the sunrise, river flow in rough canyon, rotation of the heavenly bodies, incept of The Being, all could be painted in a picture, written in a poem, they are perfect art objects. But, it is impossible to be shaped into a narrative structure, because the immobility denies any narration effort. There is no “then” and “now”, so the situation has no (hi)story making capabilities. From a different viewing angle, in the frame of the Orthodox perspective, the body and particularly the naked body are constant elements of the norm, regulating the peoples’ behaviour in society. Seen from a different point of view in this frame principle, somatic and metaphoric meanings of nudity are interlaced: physical with metaphysical, describing the fundamental problem of the process of knowledge production and accumulation. Here we can also read a set of ideas in terms of a supremacy of the Byzantine civilization, imposed by the self-confidence of knowledge monopoly. In the Middle Ages, knowledge is always viewed in absolute dimensions. In Medieval traditional society the notion of truth is thought in absolute measures, that’s why the borders between it and ignorance are firm and impossible to be re-defined. It cannot be relativized.

2. Byzantine attitudes towards nakedness and Metochites' Letter What’s the attitude towards the body nakedness in Medieval times, in relation to the Byzantine and Balkan region? Firstly, let me underline some of the initial conditions of the problem, as I see it. I don’t intend to analyse the body art or any kind of erotic or naked body aesthetic. If I dare to take this analytical direction, the basic frame (the cultural context and the all the definitions, tied to the historical space and time), would be lost completely. That’s why I accept this prior convention – limiting or not – as a conditio sine qua non. While seen in low resolution, the imagery model, figuring out the barbarians in the eyes of the civilized world, can be traced back to texts, dating from the very beginning of Middle Ages.3 The authors (historians 3 Or the last prominent textual evidences of the Late Antiquity – it depends on the standpoint chosen by the interpreter. The use of Antique concepts is framed by the philosophy of Christianity, and that’s why the leading characteristic is the belonging to a Christian civilization, regarded as the only one that can be thought.

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and not only) narrated the migration of new coming tribes and nations that emerged from the East. For example, Amianus Marcellinus (c.330 – c.391) gives a precise description of the people who ravaged the borders of the Empire and devastated the reachable fortresses and adjacent territories. All these warlike masses are bloodthirsty till insanity, but lacking of clothes as well. They keep their bodies with shockingly naked upper parts.4 These pieces of detail generated unexpectedly a long-lived stereotype, significantly more enduring than barbarians themselves. It can be easily found in the visual representation cliché, used in nowadays Hollywood chart-breaking movies, laid on re-activated images, forged just in the ingress of the history into the Early Middle Ages Epoch. In this case, the body nudity was experienced traumatically by the people inside civilization. It was regarded as a sign for otherness, whence it was thought as a factor, which composed the enemy image in even more terrifying way. The nudity of people from outside the definitions of civilization, projected onto the tabooed human’s intimacy, was viewed shocking indeed. In addition, the frequent and quite resounding failures on the battlefields, caused by the unseen warfare methods, made the imagery mixture of lacking positive information and total absence of reference points for recognizing the enemy and to think it, to incline to the registry of the striking and fearsome. The fear grew into atavistic horror, brought by the constant overhang of the existential threat. This threat was increased dramatically and magnified monstrously by the chain of epistemological failures of the people from within Byzantine society. The letter of Theodoros Metochites (1270–1332),5 addressed to Nicephoros Choumnos (1250/1255 – 1327),6 contains the example I shall focus on describing the details of this picture of nakedness.7 One should 4 He is representative of the pagan Antiquity and that’s the reason why in texts of him the Christian understanding is no present in his narrative. But, it is certain that Amianus Marcellinus is a defining element in the transmission of the basic images of Ancient geography and ethnography to the Medievals and Byzantines. 5 Further information about him see in Beck, H.-G. Theodoros Metochites. München, 1952. 6 Verpeaux, J. Nicéphore Choumnos. homme d'état et humaniste Byzantin (ca 1250/1255-1327). Paris, 1959. 7 All the quotes from the source text from now on will be given here according to ɂɡɜɨɪɢ ɡɚ ɫɪɟɞɧɨɜɟɤɨɜɧɚɬɚ ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹ ɧɚ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ (VII-XV ɜ.) ɜ ɚɜɫɬɪɢɣɫɤɢɬɟ ɪɴɤɨɩɢɫɧɢ ɫɛɢɪɤɢ ɢ ɚɪɯɢɜɢ, ɬ. 1 – Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɢ, ɞɪɭɝɢ ɫɥɚɜɹɧɫɤɢ ɢ ɜɢɡɚɧɬɢɣɫɤɢ ɢɡɜɨɪɢ, ɫɴɫɬ. ȼɚɫɢɥ Ƚɸɡɟɥɟɜ, ɋɨɮɢɹ, 1994, ɍɧɢɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬɫɤɨ ɢɡɞɚɬɟɥɫɬɜɨ „ɋɜɟɬɢ Ʉɥɢɦɟɧɬ Ɉɯɪɢɞɫɤɢ“, ɫ. 80-119 (Sources for Medieval history of Bulgaria (VII – XV cc.) in the Austrian manuscript collections and archives, t. 1 – Bulgarian, other Slavic and Byzantine sources, ed. Vasil Giuzelev, Sofia, 1994, Sofia

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examine here the important event that is related to this letter, and which forms part of the political layer of history: the project to establish a dynasty union by marriage between the underage daughter of the Byzantine Emperor, Andronicus II (1282–1328), Symonida (1294–after 1336) and the Serbian king, Stephan Urosh Milutin (1282–1321); the author includes some essential details in relation to this event, allowing us to reconstruct the cultural coordinates of the time, with which we can conceptualize the Byzantine model of thinking about the nude body in this distant epoch, even if this discussion examines it, admittedly, in a fragmentary way. Some important biographical data about the protagonists in the letter: Nicephoros Choumnos (ca 1250/1255-1327) was a teacher of Metochites. There was a connection between the two.8 But there also is a similar teacher-student connection between Theodoros Metochites and the prominent Byzantines Nicephorus Gregoras (1295–1360) and Saint Gregory Palamas (1296–1359): they were all figures of great reputation, who defined a considerable part of the intellectual (but not only) history of the end of the Middle Ages. Therefore, the letter could be considered as representative enough, so as to establish the intellectual climate of the epoch. The attendant of the Byzantine intellectual, the remarkably unwise emissary of the Serbian king Milutin, a constant, but not always adequate, follower of the mission from Constantinople to Skopje and back, aspired to demonstrate his extraordinary masculinity and body endurance. He didn’t miss to show how immune he is to the winter cold. Let me put aside all the clearly visible stereotypes9 here. It’s logical to regard them as characteristic for the Balkan people, viewed from the outside; they are often grouped into a “machismo” behaviour type. But, at the end of the story, the Byzantine observer was vindicated:10 one cold morning the fearless Serb was unable not only to go on the route, but even to get out of

University Press “Saint Kliment Ohridski”, pp. 80-119). 8 A particular aspect of the relationship between the teacher and the student is studied in Sevþenko, I. Études sur la polémique entre Nicéphore Choumnos et Théodore Métochite, Bruxelles, 1962. 9 More about the viewing and seeing from both sides of the civilization border see Ɋɚɞɢʄ, Ɋ. ɂɡ ɐɚɪɢɝɪɚɞɚ ɭ ɫɪɩɫɤɟ ɡɟɦʂɟ. ɋɬɭɞɢʁɟ ɢɡ ɜɢɡɚɧɬɢʁɫɤɟ ɢ ɫɪɩɫɤɟ ɢɫɬɨɪɢʁɟ, ɝɥɚɜɚ 18 – “Ɍɟɨɞɨɪ Ɇɟɬɨɯɢɬ ɨ ʁɟɞɧɨɦ ɫɪɩɫɤɨɦ ɢ ʁɟɞɧɨɦ ɛɭɝɚɪɫɤɨɦ ɩɨɫɥɚɧɢɤɭ”, Ȼɟɨɝɪɚɞ, 2003, ɫ.197-207 (Radich, R. From Constantinople to Serbian lands. A study of Byzantine and Serbian history, Belgrade, 2003, pp. 197207). 10 Sources for Medieval history of Bulgaria…, pp. 103-104.

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his bed due to illness and body helplessness. In a night's time, he lost his remarkable alacrity and extraordinary strength. Because of the sudden worsening of his health status, the delegation was forced to stay until he was fully recovered. The Byzantine diplomat lost no occasion to impose his civilization supremacy and to disclose the real reasons for the misfortunes the Serbian was suffering: exposure of the body to cold weather.11 Metochites in this exchange readily occupied the position of the civilized person and moralized with (not so) moderate didactism, but with jealousy: probably because the aggressive presentation of the naked body of the Serb gave him opportunities for gender interactions as well. The position of the Byzantine intellectual, weak and corporally fragile, proved as morally stable, and it became apparent that the physical power and strength are nothing, if they don’t serve the mind’s domination over the body. All the pieces of advice he gave, until that moment, went to waste – another key fact, drawing the border between the territories of civilization and barbarity. They stayed in an anonymous village until the Serbian guide was able to take his part again. In retrospection, the Byzantine diplomat shared all the non-rational and non-adequate actions the Serb took during the itinerary with his reader Nicephorus Choumnos.12 With the confidence of the possessor of knowledge, well acquainted about the rules of Being and particularly about the way to react to the different seasons and caprices of nature, he marked the distinction between the world of the civilised and the one of the non-civilized people. This didactic13 and initially disproportional attitude was (and still is) characteristic for the relation between a teacher and a student, or a parent and a child. The absence of clothing was the first empirical and epistemological fact that the first people realized after the Original Sin was committed. Facing themselves in a dramatic way, they understood they are naked. A single bite from the tree of knowledge gave Adam and Eve no other, but the principle of the first taboo: the human body has different zones, marked with diverse meanings and located on different sections of the moral scale. That’s why certain body parts should remain covered. According to this taboo, forged by civilization, these zones must be left imperatively as far from peoples’ sight as possible. This episode formulated the first distinction line in Being – the watershed between good and evil. Thereby, the method of basic dialectics was born – the way to 11 Ibid, p. 103. 12 Ibid, pp. 101-102, 104. 13 Ibid, p. 101.

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group the things into two contrast categories, assuming this order is axiomatically given. Here can be added that it’s the first rational technique, invented to organize the world and to deliver a way to understand and solve its riddles, advancing in the knowledge process. The Original Sin changed the fundamentals of Being – it was no longer absolute, but relative. The balance was violated and it would never be restored until the ‫ݏ‬ıȤĮIJȠȞ comes – the end of the time and the finish of history. Once doubt is admitted in the Words of God, this act leads to inception of time in its anthropological dimension. If I dare to deepen this analytical thread, in this way, one can also register the birth of language: the words with sacral status became destitute, and were included into the sphere of the horizontal, everyday life, where things are usual and with no transcendent meaning. It is logical to suppose that the break in the relation between God and human was forged on the notions of “here” and “there”. Furthermore, after the Original Sin was committed, the everyday life in its very banal meaning was invented as well. This mode of life is radically separated from the fundamental things and the depth of their order, which belong to the time before the arch-people were expelled from Eden. And, what was the result? – The shock, merging into helplessness in front of the entirely visible body in all of its parts, both literal and metaphorical. The first couple was faced with the world and this is the first tragedy in humans’ history. The world turned into an inconvenient and hostile place in a moment. Adam and Eve were left destitute of Creator’s guidance, support and protection, but also left naked in front of His all-seeing eyes. Till then His presence and interventions kept away the necessity of going further in the knowledge process and proceeding to forge criteria, and (co)locating them in logic. The naked body became an ontological explosion taking place along with the emergence of human language. From then on the heart-breaking feeling of the broken togetherness with God could be expressed in words and sentences: a relative, conventional, social instrument used to translate and communicate information only inside the borders of human community. That’s why, since the concept of barbarity was forged, one of the meaningful differences between it and civilization is the use of a language, understandable in a universally acceptable definite group. The Bible narrative about the Tower of Babel and the confusion of tongues14 could be interpreted as an echo of the initial transformation of language to a situational tool. Moreover, here could be outlined the beginning of a disjunction process between language and speech. Linguistic theory is still unable to unite firmly the individual speech

14 Genesis 11:1-9.

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act, the sum of speech acts and language. It is still impossible to explain the transition from an individual speech act to all the possible speech acts in order to enclose the speech field and to define it precisely. Things become more complicated, concerning the transition between the sum of speech acts and language. If the first one could be seen through certain rules of logic, even though after meaningful reservations and reductions, then the second one, the legitimization of the relation between the sum of speech acts and language, is still one of the most significant failures in the humanities and one of the widest gaps in the theory of linguistics. However, the emergence of the idea to cover the nude body signified a radical change: the world changed and its first dissolution in the eyes of its recipients took place. The world was split into “the-world-of-myintimacy” and “the-world-out-of-myself”. This episode established the Ego-position of the person in the world, situated in the frame of the partiality, imperfection and radical solitude. The person, stunned of its finitude dramatically, found itself all-alone in front of the phenomenal (dis)order of the world, more and more menacing in its eyes. That’s why the defenceless body requires maximal coverage literally, metaphorically and existentially. And, the necessity for togetherness and consolidation against the threatening storms of Being showed up. The initial consolidation, present genuinely in the meaningful code of Creation, once lost needs to be compensated by a different kind of cohesion, this time fully realized and regarded as shared purpose with identification and protective functions. We can try to see how Metochites tried to understand his companion through this stereotype. For the group he [the Serb] descends from, the anthropological dimension of time had just started: a few centuries separated Serbian people from the dark, pagan past. Because of this, the Serbian body is still not fully condemned to the clothes wrapping regime and clothing is thrown off in every (in)appropriate moment. Body nakedness was impressive for Metochites. It is not only the fact that the legate of Serbian king was demonstrating his nude or not properly clothed body. The Byzantine intellectual was shocked to find that this specific body presentation is characteristic for all the “semi-barbarian” groups: he was deeply touched by the fact that all the people from the villages they passed by or called in, during their long travel, were undressed or dressed in inadequate to the season way, and from this even the most unguarded members of the society, old men and little children, were not excluded.15 “Dressed” and “without clothing” are, let’s use the language of

15 Sources for Medieval history of Bulgaria…, p. 103.

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classical philosophy, two poles of the dialectic scheme, two polar signs, belonging to one and the same scale of meanings. For the first time this scale crystalized just after the commitment of Original Sin. Until it became a fact, the first people had lived in primordial beatitude. This Paradise situation was the reason why they weren’t supposed to invent any criteria for a comparison. The ȁȩȖȠȢ of God was making all they need. The communication was universal and genuine – God and the people were in direct touch, using shared language with fixed shared meanings with no variation due to the singularity of the Truth, as it was given by God. Adam and Eve weren’t supposed to conduct any independent evaluation procedure. Here we could bring out one more key distinction between barbarity and civilization – the model of usage of the language that each employs. The art of flexible usage of the words, the rhetoric, was one of the major inventions of civilization. Let me add that the notion of a civilization in the Middle Ages was deeply tied to the concept of communal language. The barbarians were totally unable to use the language of Christianity, i.e., to be an element of Truth sent down to them. People out of civilization were completely incapable to invent and to apply any tool belonging to communication via language: they were able only to articulate sounds without any semiotic depth. In this way, one can see the idea and the language content of civilization supremacy, which was imposed by Byzantium. The person was recognized as civilized by the use of language. Further in this analysis, one can see the theoretical basis of the trilingual dogma – there is a certain set of languages in civilization and they are the three languages, in which the Holy Scripture is written. This dogma was a certain part of the complex of medieval rhetoric. To think language as a tool, employing words with the right meanings and playing with context, is a definition that matches discoursive language, invented after the authentic bond between God and people was broken. From that moment, the contact with the transcendent substance became effort-taking and spirit-crushing. The proper way of language use was accepted gradually. The communication tools of the barbarians were outside the group of holy languages; that is why respecting an oath, sealed in front of non-civilized rulers, is not obligatory. Because the Serbs were still a step behind in their full membership to the family of the civilized nations, the marriage contract between Stephan Urosh Milutin and the Byzantine princess had to

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be examined point by point and thoroughly by the experienced diplomat.16 Only the holy language, substantially tied to the source of the Truth (The Bible), is able to express a perfect meaning; all other uses of language is partial and can come only close, having no real connection with the Words of God. That’s why the treaty, which was concluded in Skopje, was problematic initially and it required Theodorus Metochites to try really hard. The questionable character of barbarian languages and their unbindingness was proved to be true by the Byzantines in the story we are examining: soon after the agreement, an emissary was sent by the Bulgarian queen to give a counter-proposal. This exchange was seen as unfair and intriguing by the Constantinople delegation and it confirmed a resilient prejudice towards the people that existed out of the Byzantine Empire and confirmed the Byzantines' doubt in the meaning-creative stability of these people's languages.17 It may seem that civilization cannot be considered as a way to God uncritically. A whole variety of social instruments, conventions and regulations is forged in order to keep the humans’ community in a relatively comfortable arrangement, waiting for the Last Day to come. In this way, civilization could be regarded as the last stage of the social evolution process, the highest level of hierarchy in the history process, reachable objectively before the Judgment Day comes. But, the status of the civilization still remains only an episode in the narrative, which will definitely end in the expected ‫ݏ‬ıȤĮIJȠȞ, when the final part of history will come down in glory. The sudden and striking occurrence of the body contours defines one more crucial aspect of the shock the first generation of people suffered. They were naked in front of God’s hypostases, but also in their own eyes and one in front of the other. The arche-people were hopeless, helpless and desolated. Completely aware of their finite possibilities, they were crushed in the tragedy of the realization/discovery of their partial nature not only in the face of all-mighty God, but in front of their own – a mental blast, which bore the first social rule and gave the inception of the painful and agonizing process of shaping society in a harmonious way. As a consequence of the primordial harmony destruction and the rupture of the transcendent togetherness between Creator and creature, there was an imperative necessity to find a mechanism to compensate the deficit, open by the Original Sin. This deficit is fundamental, accepted in the sense of quality; the deficit of the basic and absolute meaning, out of

16 Ibid, pp. 111–116. 17 Sources for Medieval history of Bulgaria…, pp.116-119.

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any social conventions and relative relations. Before Adam and Eve were tempted, all the things were covered with their initial sense, with the arche-sense, perfectly. The snake cast them to relative definitions, to partial validity. It made them transgress from the territory of the eternal, constant and all-valid things to the unsafe terrain of the time-dependant and changeable ones. The variability of the parameters of the world, seen in high resolution, are almost indistinguishable at the large scale, using the categories of the primordial panopticon and always-actual quality of God’s position. I would claim here that both the naked body and human society were invented during the first cycle of the human solitary attempt to mental effectiveness: functioning in an attempt to accomplish its task independently and out of its transcendent basis. Obviously this cycle doesn’t coincide with the act of the political acceptance of Christianity in the Medieval Serbian state, which took place centuries ago, before the meeting of Metochites with his Serbian companion. Because of this, the miserable Serb, although he was Christian,18 was haughtily pushed into the margins of the Christian image of the world: into a place, where the humankind was still living in its childhood. Going further and deeper into the analysis, it seems that the contrast, defined through the barbarian nakedness and the garments of the people from within the borders of the civilized world, is set by the principled understanding that the nations outside civilization are outsiders in the mental map of society in general, because society is an element of the civilization, invented to meet the needs of its process. There is no need for any rules and that’s why the world out of the Empire is not regulated. With social rules the chaos of nature is turned into domesticated and cultured space, marked with the signs of constant efforts to effect a development. Following the understanding of the Middle Ages, although forged and used in a tradition,19 different and to some extent concurrent to the Orthodox one, is Being, developing not out of itself, not by transition from one essence to another, but unfolding inside itself, inside the conditions, pre-defined by The Creator, because it is the crown of ontology and nothing mundane can be more than it. Only God Himself20 occupies 18 Christian callendar were introduced long ago and Orthodox feasts were followed in the Milutin’s court – see Sources for Medieval history of Bulgaria…, p. 110. 19 I mean the tradition of the Western Medieval philosophy and particularly the system of Anselm of Canterbury. 20 The mixture of philosophy traditions is not made in order to legitimate a certain idea, but with purpose to use the conception of Anselm as a tool to approximate the problem and to make it more clear, and thinkable from multiple aspects. The image

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the level of ontology, which is higher than this one. This ontological space of the individual and the one belonging to a social group are acquired rationally and physically from nature and turned into a place of predictability, forging rules and paying respect to them. In its turn, this fact assists the birth of tradition – the slow and long-taking process of knowledge accumulation one layer after another, with extreme care, rationalizing all of its advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, this is knowledge about laws of nature, gained from the position of the outside observer, a topos representing the first stone of philosophy, the method of dispassionate watching. If we need to exemplify this, presumably the closest figure is the popular image of the philosophizing person as a witness, staring the phenomenal disorder of the rotating wheel of Being from the position of the static spindle. The character, appearing out of the rules, the naked one, is different according to its outside look, and it activates the self-definitions of the observer in the meaning of self-qualifier and self-defensive (self) restraint. Furthermore, this set of facts constructs the first complex of conditions for the emergence of the stereotype images: the same stereotypes, used by the Byzantine intellectual before he saw the court of the Serbian king in Skopje.21 The explanation of the hard pre-defined position could be found not only in the mental axiomatic of the educated Christian, but also in the pragmatic description of the facts – less than half a century ago another Byzantine delegate found the Serbian ruler in a picture, which caused spontaneous disgust. The Serbian palace life was described by the Byzantines as strikingly uncultured, discreditable in terms of any respectable statehood. In addition, the queen, the lady with the supreme dignity, equal to the Byzantine empress in her position, the wife of the born in crimson, was seen carrying out everyday household activities. And, the most scandalous thing – housework was a distinctive part of her royal obligations.22 We can recognise in this story two key meanings of nakedness: the pure un-clothed body, accepted as the measure of the stereotype, appearing of The Other, situated as an empirical reality, different from one's own, thought through the figure of the imperial, domineering, curious, but scared person (curious even for the different forms of the fear it could suffer) is actual in the Orthodox East and Catholic West as well. 21 This statement is shared with the complete consciousness, that the stereotype is dependant not on the information, but on the combination between scarce data about The Other, reflected by the self-image. That’s why it could be considered as an instrument for self-knowledge. 22 Sources for Medieval history of Bulgaria…, passim.

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as the Other in the cultural sense; and the nude, viewed in the cultural registry of the time as the scandalous. The first difference is obvious – in the former case the clothing doesn’t cover all the body parts according to the norms of civilization and to the level of knowledge acquired by the person who is clothed; in the latter these particular zones of the body are paraded in open sight, acceptable in terms of their nakedness only in the intimate sphere, belonging to peoples’ private life and used in the specific moments, when a person is involved in the life-creating togetherness. This multi-measured scale can help us understand why the attitude of the Byzantine diplomat towards his Serbian companion moved in sophisticated rhetoric tracks, wandering between direct sarcasm and paternalistic irony, but without any disregard to distinctions, circumscribing the territory of the society and separating it from the fields of the shameful, of the sphere of purposely darkened and suppressed, held somewhere into the social marginalia. Furthermore, shame, regarded as one of the key criteria to formulate the definitive sum of the perimeter of the socially acceptable, is rather inapplicable to the problem of imaging the Other in this concrete historical case. But it is an element of the dynamic self-definition, fencing the perimeter of the tolerable and acceptable, recognizing it after the conception of the basic dialectic “Self-Other”. In other words, the aspect of the shameful draws the frame boundary of the inner social order without any reference to the meta-social one, as it is viewed from the standpoint of the contemporaneity, thought in the scale barbaritycivilization. Back to the idea of a dialectic delineation of the horizon of the body: this dialectic, if accepted without a further explanation, cannot support efficiently the analysis of naked body in the Middle Ages. So, let us discuss further this issue here referring specifically to the cultural history of the protagonists in the letter. At the very end of the XIII c., Serbians are allowed into the family of the civilised “people”, i.e., the Christians. Formally, they are pinned stably on the geographical map of civilization. In addition, theoretically, they might be able to participate in forging key political ties, characteristic of the people inside the Empire’s boundaries and a result of the key difference between the barbarian world and the civilized one. That’s why the inhabitants of the Serbian lands have all the reasons to pretend that their state obtains the status of supreme sovereignty and their ruler has all the legitimate rights to regulate the state policy, i.e., to further the aims and goals of his kingdom. A cursory and not careful reading of the letter of Metochites could verify this conclusion. But, a careful analysis of the text allows for a different interpretation.

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The underage six-year old Symonida sallied out to her future husband not full of joy, but as though she was going to long and undesired relegation – all the Constantinople court, headed by her father, sent her with tears in eyes. She was sent not in sweet euphoria, because of the expectation of the future dynasty marriage; the dispatch of her was viewed not as an initiation, turning the little girl into a woman and wife, because she was still too immature, but it seemed like a funeral procession, bitter separation of a close relative, who was not expected to return again.23 It is mentioned in the letter, that the motive for dispatch of the little Byzantine noblewoman was not the desire for togetherness, warmness and intimate emotions, but political need. She was forced to leave the comfort of civilization and to land in a state with barbarian customs, where the queen was involved in everyday physical labour, part of the housewifely work. The aristocratic wife of the Serbian ruler was seen weaving the fabric of the clothes she wore.24 In the Byzantine eyes, accustomed to refined civilization manners, it was not obvious enough that the Serbian noble family and the usual villagers were part of different social groups, clearly marked and identified. That’s one more reason why the Byzantine intellectual is very confident about the civilisation he is coming from, while narrating about Serbian barbarity25 didactically and keeping a certain distance between him and the Serbs. Facing the everyday convictions of his fellow traveller, there’s no need to prove the barbarian identity of the Serbs. Even though it is not doubtful that the Serbs started to worship the Christian God long time ago, and even though they belonged to the sphere of Orthodoxy, theoretically and practically, they were not fully inscribed into the family of the civilized people yet. Why? Because, in the eyes of Metochites and the Byzantines,they still have a long way to go. For them the anthropological time has started some five centuries ago and it is impossible to cover all the millenniums of the history, passed after the Being was created. They are still short of knowledge, epistemologically naked, and that’s the reason for the hardly acquired match between the imperatives of nature and personal behaviour. It is this shortage of anthropological time that leaves the Serbian people naked. Theodorus Metochites’ thinking used the categories of history and it 23 Although the Serbian king was a “lovable son of the emperor” – Sources for Medieval history of Bulgaria…, p. 114. 24 These impressions are denied by the Metochites himself later. He personally found that the information he had before the arrival in Skopje was outdated. 25 Let me remind that the concept of “noble sagave” has long way to go before it’s forged in the epoch of the Enlightenment.

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evoked images, deriving from his experience in order to understand the situation better: the Serbian queen according to Metochites’ memories spun and weaved, so the Byzantine princess was supposed to live in the same conditions. Serbian society was still living in the time before the division of labour and detailed social hierarchy were invented. Political duties and physical work shared the same raw cultural and anthropological material. The Serbian aristocratic dynasty was not distinctively different from peasantry. There was no established and rigid social differentiation: no ruling people, no separation between the intellectuals and the labour force, the different social segments had not yet established a relationship; there were no possibilities for bidirectional mobility, if the popular scheme of the medieval society, offered by George Duby,26 is applied. Because of this, the Serbian court seemed to the Byzantines primitive and barbarianlike. It sounds paradoxical, but the people from the other side of the dichotomy “barbarity – civilization” were regarded not only as uncivilized, but as history process outsiders. They were out of the anthropological model, conceptualized in the episode of the Original Sin. That’s the explanation why they don’t demonstrate any personal and/or social resistance to the negative environmental conditions. The intellect and the body are still not in shared frame, they don’t act jointly, and that’s why the basic knowledge about humans’ adaptation to the caprice of the nature isn’t still acquired. If we dare to analyse this problem to its very bottom, it would become apparent, that the nations’ histories have variable objective onset points. Moreover, societies have different epistemological accretion rate and unique knowledge experience. The accumulation of knowledge, particularly the invention and application of the rules of the Being, is a time-dependent process. It can be stated, that in the Byzantine conception time matters only in the light of long-term history, experienced in the fold of Orthodoxy. That’s why societies, belonging to the Byzantine commonwealth,27 diverge in accordance to the temporal parameter. Time was equal to a level of acceptance of the civilization model identity. True faith is only able to generate true knowledge, obtained through Revelation. The real time, liable to civilization calculation procedures, was a Christian one. This time was a goal-set continuum with nothing essential happening by accident 26 See Duby, G., 1981, The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined. Chicago. The quotation here is according to the Bulgarian edition of the book: Ⱦɸɛɢ, ɀ. Ɍɪɢɬɟ ɫɴɫɥɨɜɢɹ ɢ ɜɴɨɛɪɚɠɚɟɦɢɹɬ ɫɜɹɬ ɧɚ ɮɟɨɞɚɥɢɡɦɚ, ɋ. 2007, ɫ. 74-76. 27 See Obolensky, D., 1971, The Byzantine commonwealth: Eastern Europe 5001453, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

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and without sublimating into a nothingness, because the substantialized nothing has still a long way to go, so that it can be forged and conceptualised appropriately. This notion of time and nothingness was invented in the XX c. by Jean-Paul Sartre.28 The Being and language could be thought in a shared paradigm, using the neo-positivistic paradigm of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The borders of the language mark the boundaries of the world. There is nothing out of the language – he maintains. Nous explores reality through the inventions and conventions of language, that’s why the definitions of language coincide with the borders of the world.29 Here we could introduce an example: amongst the first tasks the newly-Christianized people were faced with was to forge the basic set of Christian notions in order to provide signification-effective language, able to cover newly-discovered dimensions of the world. Let it be clear: there is neither a doubt about the Christian identity of the Serbs, nor an attempt to prove their full participation to the barbarian ethos. In the contrary, in the very final sentences of the letter, just before the descriptive set-piece about the intension of Bulgarian queen, the widow of the Bulgarian king Smilets, to re-negotiate in order to outrun the little Symonida in the competition for the vacant throne of the queen of the Serbs, Metochites assures explicitly, that the image he had regarding the Serbs up to now is not actual, because at the moment he arrived in Skopje things were totally different. What the unfortunate Serb was missing then? The efforts to exceed the abilities of his body lead to suffering, but we should calculate that the hypothesis that he is situated theoretically out of the paradigm form, formulated on the basis of the Christian religion, proved to be not accurate here. He didn’t simply denude his upper body parts. He was suffering from a lack of cultural cover, which is an endemic characteristic of the civilized nations. This is a synonym of the civilized life as it is the accumulation of cultural products, understood as set of rules for social behaviour and in the plane of the constant analytical-understanding efforts towards Being. He was afflicted by the bitter insufficiency of his epistemology regarding the imperatives of existence. A piece of this logic is present into the everyday 28 Far in XX c., Jean-Paul Sartre ties the Being and the nothing into one philosophic concept, formulating The Being in its initial characteristic as nothing. According to the existential paradigm, Being becomes a thing during the life process, by the multitude of choices made and meanings invented. However, this fact doesn’t deny its genuine nothingness. 29 Wittgenstein, L., 1922, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with an introduction by Bertrand Russel, London, p. 74; 5.6.

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practical principle to meet frosty days in warm clothes, adequate to the idea of protecting the weak body, the analogue of the weak woman’s spirit, failing in front of the mightiness of the Spirit of the God. That’s why the Serb, even though he was living in a space, shared with other people, did not match the criteria that defined society according to the conception of the Medieval Christian anthropology. No, he, the Serb, was a member of the human kind objectively. This is the same human kind, expelled from the Paradise. In this respect, he is expected to be positioned into the framework of society and civilization, in the way the people under the rule of the Basileus, equally descend from Adam and Eve, and are in it. The social factors of Being act upon Romaios, Mezian, Tribali30 and Saracen alike. But, only the person and the society, who are within the perimeter of the Truth, of culture and civilization, are able to accept and use properly the knowledge of God. God reveals to them not only the relations in the Holy Trinity, the essence of the Divine Uncreated Energies, but the imperative of Being and the ways to resist to the negative influences, coming from the surrounding nature. And, as it is written in the Holy Scripture, the flesh always suffers its exiguity.31 It seems that the somatic fragility of the existence-in-body are by no means metaphoric constructions, tied to the possibility for dualistic interpretations. The body is powerless both as substance and as flesh: exposed to the changeable ascendency of the nature it physically resides in, it leads originally to the sin and opprobrium. While analysing these ideas back into the tradition of Christian philosophy, we could reach a principle, characteristic to the Orthodox God-thinking,32 but put into the 30 “Mesians” and “Tribali” are preferred by Anna Comnena ethnonyms, used in with certain purpose to imitate the Ancient models of history-writing, set by Herodotus and mainly by Thucydides – see Anna Comnena – Ƚɪɴɰɤɢ ɢɡɜɨɪɢ ɡɚ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹ, VIII, ɋɨɮɢɹ, 1972, ɢɡɞ. ɧɚ ȻȺɇ, ɫ. 10, 11 ɢ ɞɪ. (Greek sources on history of Bulgaria, VIII, Sofia, ed. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, p. 10, 11 and passim). See the source text also in Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG), Los Angeles, California, USA. 31 I mean the words of Saint Matthew: IJȩ ȝȑȞ ʌȞİȪȝĮ ʌȡȩșȣȝȠȞ, ‫ ݘ‬įȑ ıȐȡȟ ܻıșİȞȒȢ – Matthew 26:41. Such an aspect lays not so deeply under the first surface of the sentence cited. 32 The notion is introduced by Georgi Kapriev and it is forged in order to offer wider and more fundamental understanding about philosophy in Ɍhe Middle Ages. “The thinking of God generates theology.” (auth. transl.) – shares G. Kapriev, see Ʌɢɬɟɪɚɬɭɪɟɧ ɜɟɫɬɧɢɤ, 11, 2 – 8.05.2001 (Literary weekly, 11, 2 – 8.05.2011). The usage of this concept could be traced in Ʉɚɩɪɢɟɜ, Ƚ. Ɇɚɤɫɢɦ ɂɡɩɨɜɟɞɧɢɤ. ȼɴɜɟɞɟɧɢɟ ɜ ɦɢɫɥɨɜɧɚɬɚ ɦɭ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɚ. ɋɨɮɢɹ, 2010 (Kapriev, G. Maximus the

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system and conceptualized completely by Palamism: the concept, that the person is soul-spirit-corporal unity, and that’s the reason why in the Ultimate Day Salvation is believed to affect not only souls, as it is preached by the dualistic reductions of the traditional Western Christian dogmatic, but the whole persons merited in the perfect wholeness, consisting in both the invisible and the visible part – flesh, and its ideal projections. That’s why the person (specifically the Serb) gets ill (generally and in that particular occasion, as described in the letter text): the outbreak of illness in the body could be regarded as reflex against the law of nature. As a biological creature, man is liable to all the advantages and disadvantages pre-installed in it naturally. The weakness and partiality of the intellect that manages the body, always leads to pain, if there are no strict rules. There is still no idea of dialectic and how to use it to understand nature, therefore there’s no notion of measure and moderation – the key meaning, running on the first distinction between barbarity and civilization. So, the people with civilization deficits suffered a lack of delicate methods for an effective self-perception and self-description. The whole set of analytical techniques to recognize the axiologic disposition of the Other was thin and insufficient. This knowledge was too refined for them, so they remained out of the range of the still rough (semi-?)barbarian mind, regardless of their Christian baptism. However, the Serb suffering brings forth the idea of the person as corporal-spiritual unity – key moment in the philosophy of Saint Gregory Palamas, related to both Orthodox anthropology and Orthodox soteriology. The person is Salvation-possible only in its wholeness. The body status corresponds to the level of spiritual development, distancing it from the Truth. That’s why the miserable Serb exposes his defenceless flesh to hardship: mind, unable to control its body, leads it to troubles. This danger-free picture of the strictly hierarchical Byzantine civilization was in contrast with the turbulent rush and sudden strike of the enemy tribes, found on the pages of Amianus Marcellinus. These people seemed to be fully resistant to all the highly contagious diseases, raging in the Early Middle Ages, including even the plague: an exterminating and uncurable one. There’s no single diseased person amongst the barbarian troops, which lead the old Rome to capitulate, without any regard to the neglected upper parts of the body. In fact, they are careless to the whole body and this is proved by their extremely bad personal hygiene; a detail, traumatically noticed by the Romans, who were civilized and aware of the

Confessor. An introduction to his reflective system. Sofia, 2010).

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need to keep the body clean. As soon as the barbarians met the Roman eyes every single impression was studiously written down, in the same fashion as in the description of the character of Metochite’s companion. But, everything begins and ends with the nude body, provoking a reaction of a deeper and deeper obstruction between the actual sight and the curtain of the stereotype. However, the important interweaving between the different sets of criteria for thinking about the nude body, describing the typology of nakedness, shared a few pages earlier, could be outlined here afresh. The body nakedness, showed in an aggressive and intrusive way, partially goes into the perimeter of the nakedness, characteristic of a civilization outsiderness, but also of the lack for an epistemological qualification, although, as it is already stressed, the naked individual shouldn’t be taken to be totally unaware of objective laws and influence of the seasons on the body. A knowledge, which seems to be invented not by a single person: it isn’t sent down before time had began, and it isn’t a priori given. It appears as a social construction, representative of an environment with a loose information saturation, where the civilization has just been born and knowledge would be developed further on. The very concept of knowledge appears as a social device. Before the Original Sin was committed and the first form of peoples’ togetherness was damaged by the sudden disappearance of the metaphysical stronghold, there was no necessity of any kind for a social convention. There was no social agreement or any kind of group contract. The cohesion between people and the togetherness between people and God shared the same space, maintained by the absolute truth, sent down by God. Consequently, the dichotomy “knowledge-ignorance” was still not present, because the act of its invention would violate the perfectness, in which nothing can be added to. The civilized person appeared to possess the knowledge about needs to keep the human physical body in a relatively narrow temperature range. This idea corresponds directly with the conception of the smooth transition, using buffers between the blinding brightness of the world itself, and the mild and rounded vision of the cultural phenomenon,33 which was a key cultural characteristic, unshakeable, domesticated and experimentally-rationally forged in the world of the Byzantine intellectual. Here is the place to take the logical standpoint again, provided a few 33 Although the theoretical view, regarding the world we conceive as a result of the interaction between the sensory instruments and world-as-it-it is forged by Immanuel Kant in XVIII c., such an idea could be applied as tool for approximation here.

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pages earlier by the problem of the shameful. Positively the barbarian could be situated in this notional framework, but, in the letter of Metochites, the Serbian fellow traveller was not a barbarian in the strict meaning of the word. To be more precise, he was in the beginning of the transformation, which was expected to instruct the primitive consciousness and to guide it to the invention of clothing and to the conviction of its proper use. Similarly to the first Biblical couple, who covered their genitalia with fig-leaves, the Serbian guide also left these parts of his body out of sight. In the order of the arche-people, he also didn’t take any measures to overlay his rest corporal parts, where taboo doesn’t stain, making the demonstration of them shameful. He put his health to hardship, because he was not conscious of the liability of his body to illness. In other words, he had no proper knowledge about it. The Old Testament first people were also unaware (through a lack of natural or mental experiment) about the potential challenge, suffered by the body during the cold winter. Times of history were still not conceived, and let’s remind ourselves that one of its fundamental meanings is step by step accretion of positive knowledge (even though this terminology isn’t known in Medieval philosophy),34 always leading the imperfect human triumph over the chaos of the natural element. Probably even more absurd sounds the fact that the Serb had some knowledge of Being, as his knowledge about the world was indeed scarce. This paradoxical presumption is directly indicated by a narrative detail: as per the information of the civilized person, his companion was a victim not to a disease of the legs, feet or knees, but to the upper part of the body.35 Illness affects his throat and nose. From a contemporary point of view there was nothing more reasonable than this. But, in Metochite’s opinion the logical expectation included suffering troubles, located in the lower part of the body, because clothing in the Serbian Middle Ages left

34 In the Middle Ages the concept for undeniable knowledge is neither present as it is in the philosophy tradition after the positivism, nor there could be found a discussion, similar to the debate about the basic characteristics of the methods in the different fields of knowledge, and the bilateral portability and applicability of the theories of sciences and humanities. However, knowledge is a definite part of the medieval civilization. Although it is about positive knowledge of the fact, following the empirical measures of the nature in the first case, and about knowledge as a result of the personal, hypostatic contact with God, synenergia and revelation, they both are able to formulate one of the key standards of the “higher” culture and define the space of the cultured, domesticated and civilized space. In this way, the cultural sphere of Byzantine humanity is forged. 35 Sources for Medieval history of Bulgaria…, pp. 103-104.

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the body from the waist down more vulnerable to illnesses, caused by the winter frost. In the series of Serb's acts described by Metochites, we can also see that he was still at an early stage in human history, so he was still before the coining of intellectual measures to find the virtual and precise dimensions of Being. But, Being itself also recognized him to be outward, away from the stabilized information field and therefore unable to intellectually articulate it. And, the consequence of this fact is not only the appropriate reaction of the people to the various threats of the nature, but the way of thinking through peoples’ acts. In the civilization perimeter, these acts are always predictable and liable to a clear logic, inscribed into the frame of the well-calculated cause and effect and moving into the trajectory of the social healthiness (literal and metaphorical) as well. It was not that his body didn’t recognize the danger and the evilness of the environment. His demonstration could be interpreted as an attempt to use his body endurance to optimize the standard of quality of the flesh, ridiculing Byzantine delicacy and weakness, a result of the cult of Byzantine education and ambition to evolve only the person’s mental abilities. But, the last is what was valid in the eyes of Theodoros Metochites, who was always didactic-ready. But after all, the Serbian fell, stroke down by body illness! It was one of the decisive arguments in favour of the statement, that the barbarity in its Serbian version, dating from the very end of the XIII c., didn’t fit well in the dictionary definition of the word. It was stretched to cover the temperament of the Western Balkan tribes: they were extremely durable, passionate, liable to wild predators, destroying the world of Roman Antiquity in the other parts of Europe as if a mountain river in the spring ran throwing everything down; and mollycoddle Byzantines, tired of civilization, but having an effective mental filter, were leak-tight from all the things that did not fit their cultural measurements. Viewed from the angle of cultural history, this kind of conceptual and concentrated analysis helps in defining and understanding the authentic speech of the epoch. Although the reconstructed picture is fragmented, it is of crucial importance, probably due to its high fragmentation level.

3. Conclusions At the end of our analysis, we can offer some conclusions: first of all, we faced a very detailed image of what counted as barbarity in late Byzantium. Non-christian barbarians were not thought by civilized people as fully developed human beings. They were naked and unprotected in heat and frost, shockingly similar in appearance and temper to the wild

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beasts and irrational creatures.36 Barbarians communicated inarticulately, using mainly simple sounds37 without depth in their system of communication, which did not match the definition criteria of the universal communication tool, invented by peoples’ rationality and civilization: human language. Serbians, like their civilized Christian neighbors in the Late Middle Ages, had their own instrument for verbal communication. But this fact was unable to erase the rough traces, remnants of the barbarian past, from their image, especially in the eyes of the Byzantines. Even though Serbs were not considered as part of the bestial-like tribes and were re-allocated in the wider field of the human kind, it is possible to state that, according to the paradigm of the Byzantine view of the image of the culturally Other, they were still in the beginning of their cultural ontogenesis ladder. Hereby the not tempered mental disposition of the Serb looked not nasty and repulsive, but infantile and funny. The second important conclusion here concerns the installation of these images into the model of Christian anthropology. In accordance to it, the “pure” barbarians, the beast-like tribesmen, probably were not people, or at least were not in the way Byzantines were. If we admit that they are part of human kind, it becomes necessary to introduce a correction coefficient in order to keep the logic of the kernel meanings intact. It seems that putting barbarians and civilized people together in one paradigm could challenge our basic notions, used to conceptualize the anthropological borders and measure scales of the Byzantine world. But, it also is obvious, that they are considered as people. Therefore it’s logical to suppose, that Serbs did not exist in the same tropos, in a shared life modus, being part of the Byzantine ontological horizon,38 where the civilized people were placed. The process of their becoming humans began with the acceptance of the word of God, but apparently was not complete. Put in this frame, Serbians are several steps ahead from the very

36 The deconstruction by logic and the explanation of Creation excludes the idea that the barbarians are not regarded as part of mankind. But, the gap between them and civilization is present, that’s why they are viewed as distant to The Truth. This detail is widely shared and conceptualized in the early Christian authors. For example, see the poem of Paulinus Nolanus. The text is used here in Serbian translation: ɋɜɟɬɢ ɇɢɤɢɬɚ Ɋɟɦɟɡɢʁɚɧɫɤɢ. ɋɚɛɪɚɧɚ ɞɟɥɚ, ɤʃɢɝɚ 1, ɫ. 389-393. 37 “Bar-bar” – the sound they are used to communicate with, which formulates the notion, forged to nominate them by the Ancient Greek tradition. 38 Although such a mixture of notions is to became a philosophical catastrophy, it the case presented it is used in order to enrich the associated meanings, making reflection more possible. It is applied as an optical method for maximal approximation of the analyzed object.

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beginning of the human kind development process. Even though they accepted the Holy Baptism and their membership in the Christian Ƞ‫ݫ‬țȠȣȝȑȞȘ in political terms and the distance between them and barbarity was being increased progressively, their cultural evolution was a long-term process, depending on their advance in the accumulation of cultural knowledge. Through this analytical frame, Serbs remained marked with a significant Otherness and posed a striking cultural difference. Even though they adopted Christianity on the state level and they were more and more distant to their initial barbarism, they were not able to become civilized people automatically and in one day. Serbs inhabited the close periphery of the Empire, so they were touched by the rays of the civilization and true Christian faith, but they were still not fully aware of the deep principles of knowledge. That’s why the higher tradition of God-thinking, which was the result of centuries-long efforts, was still out of range for the Serbian intellectual abilities. The subjects of the Serbian king were still to become fully liable to the light of Orthodoxy, but after a long period of cultural experience. Analyzed by one of the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian philosophy, the situation probably could be viewed in the following formula: there is no doubt that the unique human nature makes thinking of the differences between Byzantines and Serbs, between civilized and barbarians (with full awareness, that the word “barbarian” does not fit precisely its deep and detailed meaning here) impossible in the frame that is defined by the concept ȜȩȖȠȢ IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ. The person could be beast-like, but not according to its nature, not because of the shared human genetics, preinstalled by God in the act of Creation. If we accept that people could differ by the characteristics of the humanity, the definition set of the human nature could be flexible, and it means we are ready to divide Creation into several stages of separate creations. Of course, this may seem as simply a blasphemy. All of us know traumatically well the results of the experiments, carried out during the XX c. to separate the human kind in numerous humanities. We can still remember the terror of the Nazi regime and the Soviet Communism, claiming that certain people do belong to other conceptions of mankind, separated by an ethnic or a class principle. The human ȜȩȖȠȢ IJ߱Ȣ Ƞ‫ރ‬ıȓĮȢ and animal one are different by nature, that’s why a humanity that could be referred to as the animal nature (such as offered by the barbarian paradigm) features in a metaphoric way only. All people are descendants of the Paradise generation and none of them could be thought as an element of a different stem of Being. The main difference between people from the inside and outside of the

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civilization framework could be interpreted from the position of IJȡȩʌȠȢ IJ߱Ȣ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȟİȦȢ – another key Aristotelian notion, where a lighter, but deeper explanation of the problem of body and the barbarity-civilization dichotomy could be built. Calculating the way of existence as an essential element of group identity, let me venture to introduce one more concept, widely used in anthropology. After it was forged39 in the early 20ties of XX c., the cultural concept of a “stereotype” became more and more popular. ȉȡȩʌȠȢ IJ߱Ȣ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȟİȦȢ creates the opportunity to think the Other, to look for the basic reasons for this stereotype image production and to regard the stereotype not in an essentialist way, but as a particular shared space, linking and separating the viewer from the observed at the same time. The stereotype contains specific information not only about the Other, but it also implies mechanisms this information creates and supports activating particular reflexes, and constructs the image of the Other as a result of actual social convention, that takes place in one's own society as well. Thus, we can track out the dynamics of these stereotype images throughout history. The main problem, while analyzing the image of the Serbian kingdom and people, viewed from the Byzantine viewpoint (through the eyes of Metochites) came when Metochites got in the palace of King Milutin and utilized the chance to compare his notes with reality. There were no bad, barbarian, manners any more. At the end of the XIII c. the royal lady from Skopje didn’t participate in the everyday handwork of the household, surrounded with tones of fetid dirt. Videlicet, the intent to imitate the prestigious Byzantine imperial order,40 the equalization ambition,41 worked in favor of a particular civilization influence on the Serbian court. Notwithstanding, the differences between model and influence recipient still persisted. Expressed in the system of Orthodox Christianity, the ‫ބ‬ʌȠıIJȐıİȚȢ of them still remained distant to each other. That’s the reason why the hypostatic communication was variable from the one human group to the other. Here the intuition, that we could find at least one more layer of meanings, sounds logical. Probably the analysis of the letter of Metochites would be more heuristic, if one more concept, came in the Middle Ages thinking system from the philosophy of Aristotle. The delicate difference 39 More information is available in Lipmann, W., Public Opinion, Filiquarian Publishing, LLC., 2007, pp. 79-150. 40 Sources for Medieval history of Bulgaria, p. 109. 41 I would venture to introduce this notion in order to catch aspects of the varied relation of the Balkan states with Byzantium, containing reflexes of imitation, approximation and keeping certain distance from the prototype at the same time.

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between people, who inhabited the two sides of the border of civilization, could be detailed more precisely by introducing the notion ‫ݐ‬ȟȚȢ – the most dynamic part of the shared horizon of the group behaviour. The English translation of this notion is “habit, state or habit of mind”.42 It contains a situation-dependent, even though a shared component of social identity. It is possible to be changed not only from one generation to another, but even in a personal biography. This Aristotelian concept, re-thought in the Middle Ages and suited into the Christian paradigm, reflects the lowest level of the civilization process –the habitual one. That is the disposition to the knowledge acceptance and accumulation. It is possible to state, that one of the main elements of the identity, stored into the meaning layer of ‫ݐ‬ȟȚȢ, is the common past –the shared time, shaped by the habits and states of mind, characteristic for the community. That’s why ‫ݐ‬ȟȚȢ could be thought as a kind of social memory –the memory, in which it is registered the everyday-level of togetherness, the sphere of the conservative attitudes, belonging to the concept of “longue duree”, invented by Fernand Braudel.43 Last, but not least, it could be asserted that the Christianization delivers to the barbarians a higher human quality status, although this single act can be thought only as a beginning of the process of advancing and approaching the ideal. The religion is a doctrinal basis, defining close participation in the civilization model, convertible into distance passed, metaphorically measurable in “epistemological miles” and separating the starting point, the current position and the aimed one, the length of the route between barbarity and a complete adoption of civilization. Back to the terrain of history: persons, who descend from the border societies, located just outside the Byzantium in the Late Middle Ages, are reflected in a particular notion – ȝȚȟȠȕȐȡȕĮȡȠȚ. This concept includes their background: their progeny, made by interaction between the tribes settled down in the Balkans during the Early Middle Ages and the local Byzantinized ethnic substrate, but also their cultural ambiguity, stretched between the Byzantine periphery and the barbarian group they were belonging to. Middle Age Byzantine authors44 forged it and contemporary 42 See A Patristic Greek lexicon, ed. by G. W. H. Lampe D.D., Oxford, 1961, Clarendon Press, p. 497; Greek-English lexicon, compiled by Henry George Liddell D.D. and Robert Scott, D.D., 1883, 7th ed., NY, p. 502. 43 See Braudel, F., 1980, On history, Chicago University Press, pp. 25-54. 44 Michaelis Ataliatae Historia – Ƚɪɴɰɤɢ ɢɡɜɨɪɢ ɡɚ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹ, VI, ɋɨɮɢɹ, 1965, ɢɡɞ. ɧɚ ȻȺɇ, ɫ. 183 (Greek sources on history of Bulgaria, VI, Sofia, 1965, ed. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, p. 183.); also in Thesaurus

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scholars accepted its description,45 calculating the barbarian roots and the not so barbarian present of the specific human groups, that inhabited the ex-Byzantine lands in the “down from the Danube” region. The civilized people, in their turn, didn’t undress except in strictly defined and well-known occasions, but never with no reason and just to be naked. The nude body was that clear mark, providing the code for the recognition of the society on the multi-measure scales of civilization, Christianity, but also epistemology. The body exposed or dressed properly and looking decently could be easily translated into the language of the medieval Byzantine mentality in the following formula: with clothing there were visible results of the process of knowledge accumulation, so there was true faith, i.e., Orthodoxy, and, finally, civilization was born. God does not reveal without good faith. And, as we know from the tradition of the Orthodox God-thinking, the real knowledge, the knowledge about God, is the result of Revelation. It’s theology – Words of God. This casual chain of concepts ended in the notion for civilization and all the notions before it were its prerequisites. Not one of them could be skipped, because only the full combination of them in their accomplished form was able to define the imago-logical territory of civilization. Reaching the end of the civilization process was impossible without a completion of all its preconditions. That’s the reason why the unfortunate Serb, even though a Christian, was still not fully accepted into the family of civilized people.

Linguae Graecae (TLG), Los Angeles, California, 90065-4125 USA; Annae Comnenae Alexias – Ƚɪɴɰɤɢ ɢɡɜɨɪɢ ɡɚ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹ, VIII, ɋɨɮɢɹ, 1972, ɢɡɞ. ɧɚ ȻȺɇ, ɫ. 8 – 149 (Greek sources on history of Bulgaria, VIII, Sofia, ed. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, p. 8 – 149); Nicetae Choniatis Historia et Orationes – ibid., XI, Sofia, 1985, pp. 8-117. All the source texts are accessible in Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG), Los Angeles, California, USA. 45 A critical review on the interpretations of ȝȚȟȠȕȐȡȕĮȡȠȚ in historiography see in Ɍɴɩɤɨɜɚ-Ɂɚɢɦɨɜɚ, ȼ. Ⱦɨɥɧɢ Ⱦɭɧɚɜ – ɝɪɚɧɢɱɧɚ ɡɨɧɚ ɧɚ ɜɢɡɚɧɬɢɣɫɤɢɹ ɡɚɩɚɞ. Ʉɴɦ ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹɬɚ ɧɚ ɫɟɜɟɪɧɢɬɟ ɢ ɫɟɜɟɪɨɢɡɬɨɱɧɢɬɟ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɢ ɡɟɦɢ ɜ ɤɪɚɹ ɧɚ X – XII ɜ. ɋɨɮɢɹ, 1976, ɫ. 94 ɢ ɫɥ. (ȉâpkova-Zaimova, V. Down Danube – border zone of the Byzantine West. History of Northern and North-Eastern Bulgarian lands at the end of X – XI cc., Sofia, 1976, p. 94 and next.)

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE THEOLOGY OF UNCREATED LIGHT IN ST GREGORY PALAMAS AND THE BYZANTINE ICONOGRAPHY OF 14TH-16TH CENTURY DR SPYRIDON P. PANAGOPOULOS

Introduction St Gregory is the theologian of the Uncreated Light. He is the spectator, the theologian and the preacher of the Uncreated Light. Without doubt the central theme in the teaching of St Gregory Palamas is light, around which revolve all the other key issues like the distinction between essence and energies, the knowledge of God not by cosmic wisdom but by divine illumination etc.1 The question of the Taborian Light is one of the most important issues with which St Gregory discusses in his polemical treatises against Varlaam. Varlaam and his supporters believed that light can only be thought as a created and perceived symbol, and they maintained this for the light that was sent forth by Christs’ transfigured body in front of His disciples, on Mount Tabor. However, the Saint demonstrates on the basis of the Holy Scripture and the theology of the Fathers that this light is an uncreated divine energy. This study will be divided into three parts. In the first part, we will refer to the theology of Gregory Palamas on the Uncreated Light and to the relation of light and icon in iconography and especially in monumental painting. In the second part, we will refer, as far as possible, to the relation of Gregory Palama’s theology on the Uncreated Light and of the hesychastic iconography of 13th-16th century. In the third and last part, we will attempt to apply the theory of the Uncreated Light on samples of Palaeologeian and post-Byzantine monumental painting.

1 See also Bogosavljeviü, 2010, p. 255.

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1. i) Gregory Palamas’ theology on the Uncreated Light The two basic works which I will use as sources for the theology of the Uncreated Light of Gregory Palamas are the Triads For The Defense of Those Who Practice Sacred Quietude and his Homilies, especially that one on the Transfiguration. St Gregory mentions several names of this light, which have been proposed by Fathers in the past. Dionysius the Areopagite calls the Taborian Light “șİȠijȐȞİȚĮȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬șİȠʌIJȓĮȞ”,2 “ijࠛȢ ȋȡȚıIJȠࠎ’,3 “ȞȠȘIJȩȞ ‫ݜ‬ȜȚȠȞ”,4 “ĮȓıșȘıȚȞ ȞȠİȡȐȞ țĮȓ șİȓĮȞ”,5 “Į‫ݫ‬ıșȘıȚȞ ʌȞİȣȝĮIJȚțȒȞ”,6 “ijࠛȢ ‫݋‬ʌȠȣȡȐȞȚȠȞ”.7 Likewise the Saint cites the very words of the Lord, Who reveals and names the Taborian Light “ȕĮıȚȜİȓĮȞ IJȠࠎ ĬİȠࠎ” (Mt. 16,28).8 Describing this light in an apophatic way he calls it “ܻʌȩȡȡȘIJȠȞ, ܿțIJȚıIJȠȞ, ܻ߾įȚȠȞ, ܿȤȡȠȞȠȞ, ܻʌȡȩıȚIJȠȞ, ܿʌȜİIJȠȞ, ܿʌİȚȡȠȞ, ܻʌİȡȚȩȡȚıIJȠȞ, ܻȖȖȑȜȠȚȢ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ܻȞșȡȫʌȠȚȢ ܻșȑĮIJȠȞ, ܻȡȤȑIJȣʌȠȞ țȐȜȜȠȢ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ȞĮȜȜȠȓȦIJȠȞ, įȩȟĮȞ ĬİȠࠎ, įȩȟĮȞ ȋȡȚıIJȠࠎ, įȩȟĮȞ ʌȞİȪȝĮIJȠȢ, ܻțIJ߿ȞĮ șİȩIJȘIJȠȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJȐ IJȠȚĮȪIJĮ ʌȡȠıĮȖȠȡİȪȠȣıȚ”.9 Because of the impenetrable density of the cloud of sin, which integrated and oppressed the human race, the Sun of Justice should Himself close the heavens and ascend (Ps. 17,8); He should be incarnated and self revealed: “I am the Light of the world” (Jh. 8,12) and He should enlighten Himself “the people who sat in darkness saw a great Light; and to them that sat in the region and shade of death, Light has sprung up” (Is. 58,10; Mt. 4,16). “God is light” (1 Jh. 1,5) and all the rational beings He creates also are light. Christ “was the true Light which 2 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ, 1,3,26; ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.1, p. 437. 3 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ, 1,3,29; ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.1, p. 439. 4 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ, 1,3,22; ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.1, p. 433. 5 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ, 1,3,26; ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.1, p. 437. 6 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ, 1,3,20; ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.1, p. 430. 7 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ, 1,3,29; ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.1, p. 440. 8 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ, 1,3,26; ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.1, p. 437. For St Gregory the Theologian Christ is “ĭࠛȢ įȑ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ȜĮȝʌȡȩIJȘȢ ȥȣȤࠛȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ȕȓ࠙ țĮșĮȚȡȠȝȑȞȦȞ”, Homily 30, 20, PG 36, 120 BC. According to St Basil the Great: “ĭࠛȢ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJާȞ IJȠࠎ țȩıȝȠȣ ȜȑȖİȚ, IJȩ IJİ ܻʌȡȩıȚIJȠȞ IJ߱Ȣ ‫݋‬Ȟ ߄ șİȩIJȘIJȚ įȩȟȘȢ IJࠜ ‫ݷ‬ȞȩȝĮIJȚ IJȠȪIJ࠙ įȚĮıȘȝĮȓȞȦȞ, țĮ‫ޥ‬ ‫ސ‬Ȣ IJ߲ ȜĮȝʌȡȩIJȘIJȚ IJ߱Ȣ ȖȞȫıİȦȢ IJȠީȢ țİțĮșİȡȝȑȞȠȣȢ IJާ ‫ݼ‬ȝȝĮ IJ߱Ȣ ȥȣȤ߱Ȣ țĮIJĮȣȖȐȗȦȞ”, Against Eunomius, Oration I,7, PG 525 A; Translation: “For instance, when he calls himself ‘the light of the world’, he points out the inaccessibility of the glory in the divinity. He also calls himself this because he illuminates those who have purified the eye of their soul with the splendor of his knowledge”, Mark del Cogliano and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz (eds.), The Fathers of the Church. St Basil of Caesarea Against Eunomius, p. 99. 9 ǹȖȚȠȡİȓIJȚțȠȢ ȉȩȝȠȢ, 4, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol. 2, p. 453.

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lighteth every man that cometh into the world” (Jh. 1,9) to announce to mankind that the light of the Kingdom of Heaven is coming.10 Christ revealed His divine glory twice to humanity. The first time was on Mount Tabor, when His three favorite disciples and the prophets Moses and Elijah were present and the second time when He appeared to all the people who lived before His Advent and whose souls were captive in Hades. Christ descended into Hades and by His divine light He enlightened the darkness of the abyss: “‫ݑ‬ȜİȒıĮȢ Ƞ‫މ‬Ȟ IJ߱Ȣ IJȠıĮȪIJȘȢ IJĮȜĮȚʌȦȡȓĮȢ ‫ ݸ‬ʌȜȐıĮȢ ‫ݘ‬ȝߢȢ ĬİȩȢ, ‫݋‬țİ߿ țĮIJİȜșİ߿Ȟ İ‫ރ‬įȩțȘıİȞ, Ƞ‫ފ‬ʌİȡ ‫ݘ‬ȝİ߿Ȣ ‫݋‬ȡȡȓijȘȝİȞ, ‫ޔ‬ıIJ’ ‫݋‬țİ߿șİȞ ܻȞĮțĮȜȑıĮıșĮȚ, ȝȩȞȠȢ ‫݋‬Ȟ IJȠ߿Ȣ ȞİțȡȠ߿Ȣ ܻȞĮijĮȞİ‫ޥ‬Ȣ İȜİȪșİȡȠȢ […] ܻȜȜ‫ ޟ‬țĮ‫ ޥ‬ijȦIJ‫ ޥ‬ʌİȡȚĮıIJȡȐʌIJȠȞIJȚ șİȓ࠙ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȪȞĮȝȚȞ ȗȦȠʌȠȚާȞ țİțIJȘȝȑȞ࠙, ‫ݬ‬ȞĮ ijȦIJȓı߯ IJȠީȢ ‫݋‬Ȟ ıțȩIJİȚ țĮșȘȝȑȞȠȣȢ[…]”.11 Creation is participant of the divine light and only those people and angels who oppose and voluntarily are separated from Light become dark: “‫ ݾ‬į’ ܻȞIJȚIJĮIJIJȩȝİȞȠȢ IJȠȪIJ࠙, İ‫ݫ‬IJ’ ܿȖȖİȜȠȢ, İ‫ݫ‬IJ’ ܿȞșȡȦʌȠȢ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‫݌‬ĮȣIJާȞ ‫݌‬țޫȞ ıIJİȡȒıĮȢ IJȠࠎ ijȦIJȩȢ, ‫݋‬ȖțĮIJĮȜİȚijșİ‫ޥ‬Ȣ ıțȩIJȠȢ ܻȞĮʌȑijȘȞİȞ” 12. The divine light enlightens the human mind and persecutes ignorance; it leads to both vision and knowledge of God, which cannot be achieved by words and reasoning, but by the purification of the passions through prayer.13 As the womb of eternal life, Church sanctifies those who believe in the divine light primarily through Baptism and then through the Holy Eucharist, but also through their whole holy-liturgic life. During Holy Baptism, in the service of catechumens, the faithful among others sing “‫ݘ‬ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ƞ‫މ‬Ȟ ʌȡާȢ ܻȞĮIJȠȜ‫ޟ‬Ȣ șȑĮ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌȡާȢ IJާ șİ߿ȠȞ ijࠛȢ ܻȞȐȕȜİȥȚȞ IJȠࠎ ijȣȖȩȞIJȠȢ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ țĮțȓĮȞ Į‫ݧ‬ȞȓIJIJİIJĮȚ […]”.14 According to the Thessalonian Saint the faithful, who are in communion with Christ, are enlightened better by the uncreated light, than did the apostles on Mount Tabor: “ȉȩIJİ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ ȝȒʌȦ ijȣȡĮș‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ݘ‬ȝࠛȞ IJȠ߿Ȣ ıȫȝĮıȚ IJާ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ʌȘȖ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ‫ݏ‬ȤȠȞ IJȠࠎ ijȦIJާȢ IJ߱Ȣ ȤȐȡȚIJȠȢ ‫݋‬țİ߿ȞȠ ıࠛȝĮ IJࠛȞ ‫݋‬ȖȖȚȗȩȞIJȦȞ IJȠީȢ ܻȟȓȠȣȢ ‫ݏ‬ȟȦșİȞ ‫݋‬ijȫIJȚȗİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚ‫ ޟ‬IJࠛȞ Į‫ݧ‬ıșȘIJࠛȞ ‫ݷ‬ȝȝȐIJȦȞ ‫݋‬ʌ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ȥȣȤ‫ޣ‬Ȟ İ‫ݧ‬ıȑʌİȝʌİ IJާȞ ijȦIJȚıȝȩȞ· ȞࠎȞ į’ ܻȞĮțȡĮș‫ޡ‬Ȟ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ țĮ‫ޥ‬ ‫݋‬Ȟ ‫ݘ‬ȝ߿Ȟ ‫ބ‬ʌȐȡȤȠȞ İ‫ݧ‬țȩIJȦȢ ‫ݏ‬ȞįȠșİȞ ʌİȡȚĮȣȖȐȗİȚ IJ‫ޣ‬Ȟ ȥȣȤȒȞ”.15 According to Amfilochios Radovic, the theology of St Gregory Palamas on the uncreated light is Christocentric, which means that the meeting of the created and the uncreated is performed in and through Christ. St Gregory is not interested in the divine action, but in the divine 10 Cf. Bogosavljeviü 2010, pp. 257-8. 11 Homily 16, 26; ǼȆǼ 9, p. 458. 12 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ, 1,1,12; ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.1, p. 376. 13 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ, 1,3,13; ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.1, p. 423. 14 Homily 59, 4; ǼȆǼ 11, pp. 484-86. 15 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ, 1,3,38, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.1, p. 449.

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and secret light, as a living and participating reality, that is, the illumination which enlightens and deifies created beings. This light is Christ’s light, the light of His flesh. The possibility of participation in God, in His light, is inconceivable without Christ as the prime union of the created and the uncreated.16 Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos, on the basis of the words of St Gregory Palamas, says that the view of the uncreated light is the same with the view on deification. The view of the uncreated light is the deification of man, because it is made through the transfiguration of man, and of course it is the community of man with God. According to Metropolitan Hierotheos there are many and diverse grades of view of the uncreated light. It depends on the spiritual condition of man and the gift of God. The experience of the catharctic, illuminating and deifying energy of God is effected and depended on the level of participation in divine grace.17 The following extract from the “Hagiorite Tome” served as the basis for Vladimir Lossky to extract important conclusions with regard to the hesychastic heritage of the vision of God: “݇ȜȜȠȣ ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ ijȦIJާȢ ‫ ݸ‬ȞȠࠎȢ ‫݌‬IJȑȡȠȣ į‫ ݘ ޡ‬Į‫ݫ‬ıșȘıȚȢ ܻȞIJȚȜĮȝȕȐȞİıșĮȚ ʌȑijȣțİȞ· ‫ ݘ‬ȝ‫ޡ‬Ȟ Ȗ‫ޟ‬ȡ Į‫ݧ‬ıșȘIJȠࠎ țĮ‫ ޥ‬IJ‫ޟ‬ Į‫ݧ‬ıșȘIJȐ, ߄ Į‫ݧ‬ıșȘIJ‫ ޟ‬įİȚțȞȪȞIJȠȢ, IJȠࠎ į‫ ޡ‬ȞȠࠎ ijࠛȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚȞ ‫݋ ݘ‬Ȟ ȞȠȒȝĮıȚȞ țİȚȝȑȞȘ ȖȞࠛıȚȢ. ȅ‫ ރ‬IJȠࠎ Į‫ރ‬IJȠࠎ IJȠȓȞȣȞ ijȦIJާȢ ȞȠࠎȢ țĮ‫ݻ ޥ‬ȥȚȢ ܻȞIJȚȜĮȝȕȐȞİıșĮȚ ʌİijȪțĮıȚȞ, ܻȜȜ‫ ޟ‬ȝȑȤȡȚȢ ܽȞ țĮIJ’ Ƞ‫ݧ‬țİȓĮȞ ijȪıȚȞ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖ߲ ‫݌‬țȐIJİȡȠȞ Į‫ރ‬IJࠛȞ. ‫ނ‬IJĮȞ į‫ ޡ‬ʌȞİȣȝĮIJȚț߱Ȣ țĮ‫ބ ޥ‬ʌİȡijȣȠࠎȢ İ‫ރ‬ȝȠȚȡȒıȦıȚ ȤȐȡȚIJȩȢ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȣȞȐȝİȦȢ Į‫ݧ‬ıșȒıİȓ IJİ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Ȟࠜ IJ‫ބ ޟ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ ʌߢıĮȞ Į‫ݫ‬ıșȘıȚȞ țĮ‫ ޥ‬ʌȐȞIJĮ ȞȠࠎȞ Ƞ‫ ݨ‬țĮIJȘȟȚȦȝȑȞȠȚ ȕȜȑʌȠȣıȚȞ […] ‫ސ‬Ȣ ‘Ƞ‫ݭ‬įİ ȝȩȞȠȢ ‫ ݸ‬ĬİާȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬Ƞ‫ ݨ‬IJ‫ ޟ‬IJȠȚĮࠎIJĮ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖȠȪȝİȞȠȚ”.18 According to Vladimir Lossky, this point of theology of St Gregory Palamas, which clearly explains the nature of the theology of the apostles on Mount Tabor, comes to crown a long tradition of conflicts about the exceeding of the Platonic meditation between sensible and intellectual, sense and matter, matter and spirit. In this way, St Gregory Palamas appears as a follower of both Maximus the Confessor and Dionysius the Areopagite, who state that the entire man is in communion with the Uncreated, and not as a follower of Origen’s and Evagrius’ spiritualization of the human mind, nor of the material mysticism of the Messalians. This is the anthropology of St Gregory Palamas, which leaves room for a positive ascetic life.19 According to this view of St Gregory Palamas' theology on light, we think that we can classify chronologically the Saint of Thessaloniki among 16 See Radoviü 1973, p. 71. 17 Cf. Vlachos 1996, p. 315. 18 ǹȖȚȠȡİȚIJȚțȩȢ ȉȩȝȠȢ, 6, ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol.2, pp. 575-6. 19 Lossky 1962, pp. 212-3.

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the best of the Old Testament visioners of God and theologians of light, such as Moses and Elijah, the apostles John and Paul, and then with St Gregory the Theologian, Dionysius the Areopagite and St Symeon the Theologian. This is ensured by the beginning of the Synaxarion of the Saint: “ȅ‫ފ‬IJȠȢ ‫ ݸ‬IJȠࠎ șİȓȠȣ țĮ‫ܻ ޥ‬ȞİıʌȑȡȠȣ ijȦIJާȢ ȣ‫ݨ‬ȩȢ”.

1. ii) Light and icon Light in iconography plays an important and multifaceted role. This along with the lines and color is one of the means by which the whole reality of an icon is realized. The use of light in the icon is ruled by the special dogmatic mission of the icon, which lies in its mission to show the invisible spiritual reality of the person or event to which the person participates. The role of light in the icon is identical with the role that the icon in the liturgical eucharistic meeting has. First we must say that the painting of an icon is essentially an illustration with light, the icon being transferred from darkness to light walks the same path of creation from nothingness to existence, from being to not being. Light in the icon is testimony to the presence of divine grace, of God’s creative energy that represents the basis of the icon’s ontology. With the help of light, shade is put on the edge of the person or the object, something which makes it possible to avoid confusion between them, namely beings are identified clearly and firmly. The Byzantine painter does not shade, namely he does not add darkness to his work, but light, he creates with light.20 The secular painting attaches the shades of things to its works according to natural laws. That is why it is characterized as shade-creating (ıțȚĮʌȜĮıIJȚțȩȢ). Instead, the Orthodox iconography is light-creating (ijȦIJȠʌȜĮıIJȚțȩȢ). In no Orthodox icon a shade is assigned. All are bright and clear, nothing is dark and shady, because everything is illuminated by the never-failing sun of righteousness, Christ, Who is the only source of light in His Kingdom.21 Thus, light in the icon has an ontological character, since the enlightened beings exist, while dark beings, like demons, return to not-being. The shaping of light is a sensible interpretation of lighting explained by colours. The shaped lighting gives to the work a high spirituality and an invisible presence of the divine uncreated light. It also achieves the harmonious coexistence of intellectual severity with noble beauty and purified kindness.

20 Skliris 2002, p. 46. 21 Deriziotis 2007, p. 15.

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Light in the picture or in a broader iconographic whole, such as the monumental painting, has as its mission to show on the face of Christ the uncreated light emitted by His divine nature, emitting rays of light to the entire world (via the area of the icon); light in the person of the Holy Virgin and the Saints must demonstrate the deification of their human nature with the gifted light of the uncreated energies, redeeming in this way the entire creation.22 Within the above framework, gold, as a gentle and indestructible metal of high sparkle, has a special place in the delightful aspect of the light of the Kingdom of Heaven, namely of the uncreated divine energies, of the deification of saints. It is used for the halos around the head of Christ, the Holy Virgin and the Saints, or as space around the image on the icon and it also shows the uncreated light of the Kingdom of Heaven, which enlightens the entire surrounding area. The presence of the uncreated light refers to the eschatological reality, which is imprinted on the icon. According to Prof. D. Tselengidis, the Orthodox iconography has an eschatological character: as far as possible, it expresses the prime eschatological fact of the unconfused union of the created and the uncreated, which is experienced in the eucharistic meeting and society. While the icons of the Orthodox church describe the historical characteristics of the depicted prototype, with their unique light they do attempt to express the depicted person also as a citizen of the Kingdom of Heaven. It is therefore evident that theology of light is reflected clearly by Orthodox iconography.23

2. The relation of theology of the uncreated light of St Gregory Palamas and the hesychastic iconography of 14th-16th century Interpreting the symbolism of the new depiction of light that is presented from mid-14th century Byzantium, Ɉɥɝɚ ɉɨɩɨɜɚ states that the depiction of light to the faces of saints under the form of clear white lines is in full agreement with the Palamite teaching on the reality of divine energy, which can unite with man and sanctify the human soul and body. Palamas’ teaching concerning the ignorance of the essence of God and the knowledge of His actions helped to consolidate the artistic depiction of light in the form of visibly expressed light rays, which illuminate the ready material for deification.24 22 Bogosavljeviü 2010, p. 270. 23 Tselegidis 1992, pp. 409-10. 24 Cf. ɉɨɩɨɜɚ 2006, pp. 111-2.

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The humanism of Byzantium puts into the foreground man and the human mind, which is reflected on the face of Jesus Christ, as He is depicted in the iconography of Manuel Panselenos of the Protaton Church on Mount Athos (1290), in which the beauty of human nature is expressed while His divine aspect is put into the background. In this icon, we have a further expression of both the aesthetic and the ceremonial moment, while askesis and mysticism are put into the backround. According to Konstantinos Kalokyris, in the Macedonian technique (or School of iconography) light is spread often lively, it illuminates almost the whole surface of the depicted persons, the sides of the buildings, the environment. It does not create to persons clear impressionistic contradictions with shade, because it is presented by smooth graduations over the lightcoloured surfaces. Essentially here we must not talk about shade with the usual sense, with a view to gray-green tones of the proplasmos of the Macedonian painting. The shade is not here to contribute to the depiction of a third dimension, because here the depth is depicted in colour, namely it is the traditional deep-blue of frescoes, or the gold of mosaics.25 We could mention one significant case where the mode of using gold in the iconography of 15th-16th century can be connected directly to extracts from the Homilies of St Gregory Palamas, with the possibility that they are truly direct inspirations of the iconographers. The first case is related to the icon of the Doubting Thomas the Apostle (Photo 1), which is a work of Theophanes the Cretan in the cycle of feasts of the Stavronikitas Monastery in Holy Mount Athos. In this icon, it is portrayed how Thomas the Apostle sets his finger on the wound of Christ, while His garments are decorated with gilding (chrysokondylies);26 the whole event can be regarded as an illustration of the passage of St Gregory Palamas on the occasion of this feast: “ȉȩ įȑ IJȠࠎ ȋȡȚıIJȠࠎ ıࠛȝĮ, IJȒȞ IJȠࠎ șİȓȠȣ ijȦIJȩȢ ʌȘȖȒȞ țİțIJȘȝȑȞȠȞ ‫ݏ‬ȞįȠȞ, ‫݋‬țİ߿șİȞ ‫݋‬țȜȐȝȥĮȞ ȞȠİȡࠛȢ ‫݋‬ijȫIJȚıİ IJȩȞ įȚıIJȐȗȠȞIJĮ, ‫ސ‬Ȣ ʌȐȡĮȣIJĮ IJȩȞ ĬȦȝߢȞ ܻȞĮȕȠ߱ıĮȚ IJİȜȑȦȢ șİȠȜȠȖȒıĮȞIJĮ, '‫ ݸ‬ȀȪȡȚȩȢ ȝȠȣ țĮȓ ‫ݸ‬ ĬİȩȢ ȝȠȣ'”.27 It is of secondary importance whether Theophanes had taken in mind this Homily during the painting of this icon or not. It is very important the fact that it is identical to the way with which the Saint thinks theologically about this event and the way that the iconographer of the hesychastic period presents the same event.

25 Kalokyris 1989, p. 346. 26 I owe this term (chrysokondylies) to Dr. Eleni Vlachopoulou. 27 Homily 17,20; ǼȆǼ 9, p. 510.

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Photo 1: The Touching of the Apostle Thomas, Theophanes the Cretan, Holy Monastery of Stavronikitas, Mount Athos, 16th c.

It would be good to discuss at this point the stability of light and the trapping of light on the faces of Saints in the icons of Theophanes the Cretan. Many scholars claim that the faces of Saints in the icons of the Cretan iconography shine by light, and that they are illuminated by themselves, which, in other words, means that this light is moved towards the observer, diffusing on him the uncreated divine energies that light symbolizes. Further support to this impression adds the halo, which cannot be neglected during the analysis of the effects of light, because it represents an integral part of the face, of Saint’s personality and of the impression that light creates on his face. After the above basic views we can begin the approach of the use of light, in order to express some of the formulations of St Gregory Palamas’ Christological theology in the hesychastic iconography of 14th-16th

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centuries. We will focus our examination on the person of Christ, Who is the core of St Gregory Palamas’ Christology that is behind hesychastic iconography. We can see this in the icons of this period along with the usual way of depiction of the two natures of Christ: with the red lower dress the Divine nature and with the blue top dress the human nature,28 typical also is the way of the depiction of the Lord’s figure: in the margin of the face a vague shade is depicted and the opposite takes place at the centre of the face which is emphasized by light; darkness is to be repelled to the extremities and light to be poured in the middle of the face, revealing that this visible light is the spiritual content and the reflection of the invisible essence.29 So, unlike previous times the contrast is overemphasized, the rivalry of light-darkness. We believe that with this emphasis on brightness the painters of that period wanted to express the Christological dogma of hesychastic theology, namely, the theology of St Gregory Palamas. With the contrast of the bright and dark bands, as well as the difference of the garments of Christ, the painters wanted to show and separate the two natures of Christ’s hypostasis, the divine and the human. Because the divine nature of the Son of God is His first uncreated and without beginning nature, which sends forth the divine energies, one of which is the uncreated light, one can understand its depiction and particularly of light at the centre of face, as this divine nature constitutes the core of Christ’s hypostasis. The human nature of Christ is depicted around the divine, at the edges of His face in the form of a dark shade. Through the relationship of light and darkness on the face of Christ, we can also demonstrate the relationship of the apophatic of divine essence and the cataphatic of divine energies. In the middle of the figure of Christ, the uncreated light shines brightly as conscious (positive) and communicable energy of His divinity, which, due to divine ȖȞȩijȠȢ, remains unknowable in terms of His divine essence (for St Gregory: “ʌĮȞIJȐʌĮıȚȞ ‫ބ‬ʌİȡȫȞȣȝȩȢ IJİ țĮȚ ܻȞİȓțĮıIJȠȢ ‫݋‬ıIJȚ”),30 its symbol being the subtle shade at the edges of face. Interpreting the significance of light on Cretan icons of Saints, Professor Kalokyris explains further about the uncreated energies of divine 28 Deriziotis 2007, p. 45. [Note from the Editor: In some other commentaries, representing the views of a different school of iconography, we see the signification of colours being the other way around: blue for the divine/spiritual, red for the human; see for example Aidan Hart, The sacred in Art and Architecture: Timeless Principles and Contemporary Challenges, http://aidanharticons.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/SACRED-IN-ART-AND-ARCHITECTURE.pdf (accessed 10.12.2014)]. 29 See Bogosavljeviü 2010, p. 282, n. 2. 30 Ȇİȡȓ șİȓĮȢ İȞȫıİȦȢ, 32; ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol. 2, p. 93.

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Photo 2: Holy Monastery of Iviron, Mount Athos. Christ ȆĮȞIJİʌȩʌIJȘȢ.

essence. This light is a symbol of the catalytic and anamorphic uncreated, but commnunicable, energy (namely the giving) of the uncreated within the essence of God granted to the innermost of the “deified” man, and then poured out. Light in the form of gold halo shines around the head of Saints

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as a view of their interior light, while this again, in bright parallel lines, illuminates the garments. By the depiction of light on the face and on the forehead of the Saviour that is achieved, we see in the foreground His eyes: the emphasis is laid on His eyes that observe and supervise the entire creation. It is Him then, Christ, Who speaks through silence, Who speaks through the gaze, as an intellectual movement from within, from Himself to creation, outwards. The icon that Theophanes the Cretan has painted bears the name ȆĮȞIJİʌȩʌIJȘȢ (Christ the All-Seeing, Photo 2).

3. The Uncreated Light on Palaiologeian and PostByzantine Iconography The first important example of icon for which we can say that it was created under the direct influence of St Gregory Palamas’ Christology, is the icon of Christ Pantokrator (Photo 3), painted in 1363 for the Monastery of Pantokrator on Holy Mount Athos. According to Professor Titos Papamastorakis the dedication of the Monastery of Pantokrator to the Transfiguration of the Saviour is obviously linked to the hesychastic ideas, at a time, when Hesychasm was the main ideological movement. Consequently, one is led to the assumption that also the founders of the Monastery were followers of the hesychastic movement.31 About the mural paintings and the icon Professor E. Tsigaridas says that both of them have the same expression of both severe morals and high spirituality, characteristics which place both the mural paintings and the icon in the same artistic environment. About the lighting of Christ’s face, the same scholar states that thin and thick parallel lines show off the bright volumes of the face lending to the bright flesh the impression of a transparency. The impression is reinforced by shades which without border outline set the face and disappear softly. The same scholar assumes that the painters, as also the icons, come from Thessaloniki. 32 On the icon we see the effort of the depiction of Taborian Light in the form of thin, white lines particularly around the eyes, as well as in the visible parts of the Saviour’s body and also in the hands. These features of the icons of this time ȼɢɤɬɨɪ Ʌɚɡɚɪɟɜ describes as a form of severe graphic style which tends to be formal and Academic.33 This stressed severity is a move towards a more ascetic and sacramental experience of the Lord and the Saints. The aforementioned 31 Papamastorakis 1998, p. 43. 32 Tsigaridas 1999, pp. 61-4. About the mural paintings in Thessaloniki of 14th century, see Mavropoulou-Tsioumi 1992, pp. 658-69, tables 358-70. 33 Ʌɚɡɚɪɟɜ 1986, pp. 156-7.

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Photo 3: Christ Pantokrator.

Academism can be interpreted as an understandable reaction to humanism of the Palaiologeian Renaissance which turned to more classic oriented models. Unlike the negative position towards the hesychastic iconography of Ʌɚɡɚɪɟɜ, Ɉɥɝɚ ɉɨɩɨɜɚ embellishes this icon with the best reviews. The half-body depiction of Christ is broad, of memorable beauty and uplift. The entire outer countenance, the face and the body are literally shining. The face surrounded by sparkle is powerful both in the sight and in the painting surface. By and through Him miraculous sparkle is sent forth. And while we have a complete tranquillity, the absence of the minimum emotional movements, the purity of the situation and the right sight, nothing is distant and foreign. According to ɉɨɩɨɜɚ, during the sixth decade of the same century, along with the fame of the hesychastic victory, we have the beginning of a new phase of the post-Byzantine iconographic style, which focuses on person’s inner sparkle and outer sparkle of

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matter.34 The epitome of the Thessalonian Saint’s theology on divine actions, is the possibility of deification of human nature; the iconographers present it through the use of light and in depicting more bright human figures, emphasising their inner world.

Photo 4: St Gregory Palamas- Moscow

From the second half of 14th century, among the icons that indicate the hesychastic effect, we can mark out the icon of St Gregory Palamas himself (Photo 4), located in the Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow, for which it is supposed that it was painted in Thessaloniki and thereby it 34 ɉɨɩɨɜɚ 2006, p. 526.

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represents a credible evidence on the historical figure of the Saint. The figure of St Gregory Palamas is shown more dark and ascetic than the aforementioned icon of Christ Pantokrator, but the light bearing result of the depiction of the divine actions is the same. To the above picture we will add one other of St Gregory Palamas from the Holy Monastery of Dionysiou on Mount Athos created by the end of 16th century. The painter, knowing his ascetic life and his theological wisdom, portrayed the Saint as a wise man, as a man of meditation and prayer. In this mode, he saw the uncreated light, and was uplifted by it. We have before us a Saint with a clean look and profound thought. He seems distant, suffered, focused on something. It is his daily struggle for the truth of Orthodoxy.35 We can recognise the hesychastic program of St Gregory Palamas regarding deification through uncreated light also on the fresco of Deesis which Theophanes the Cretan has painted over the entrance of the Monastery of Stavronikitas (Photo 5). Thus, on the pages of the open Gospel that Christ holds on his left hand, the hagiographer wrote the following words of Lord: “I am the Light of the world. He that followeth Me shall not walk in darkness” (John 8,12). By this, the hagiograper demonstrated the role of the uncreated light in St Gregory’s and of all hesychastic Fathers’ Christology and anthropology. At the end of the aforementioned verse that Theophanes could not write due to lack of space, one can read this: “[…]but shall have the light of life, because Christ was the true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world” (John 1,9). So we come back again to the basic ontologically, dialectically opposing and conflicting unified pair: light-darkness, lifedeath, being-not being. Theophanes could also use another verse written by the evangelist of Light, John: “And the Light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not” (John 1,5). The spiritual connection of St Gregory Palamas and Theophanes the Cretan, who continues the hesychastic tradition in his own way, is further supported by the unique presence of the Areopagite treatises in the central conch of the sanctuary: Saints Dionysius, James Adelphotheos (Brother of Christ), Hierotheos and Timothy. By highlighting the apophatic theology of the Areopagite treatises into the sanctuary of the monastic church (Katholikon), the special place given to St Gregory Palamas is further justified, for whom the “Great Dionysius” was the forerunner and chief teacher in his theology. The same applies to the selection and placement of the Bishop of Thessalonika in the series of Bishops on the conch of the sanctuary’s apse.He is not only present there but he holds an honorary

35 Gkotsis 2002, p.142.

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position: St Gregory Palamas, Metropolitan of Thessaloniki, is next to St Gregory the Theologian.

Photo 5: Holy Monastery of Stavronikitas, Mount Athos (entrance of the Katholikon). Deisis icon. Theophanes the Cretan.

Conclusion We can conclude our work here by citing the observation made by I. Vranos on the spirituality of Theophanes’ iconography, which he termed as hesychastic humanism and which he regarded it as the result of Palamas’

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Christological teaching: “Theophanes the Cretan, the painter of the socalled Cretan style, depicts the robbers or the crucifiers of Christ in the same spiritual idealization […]. The spirit of forbearance governs him […]. This attitude of Iconography is always consistent to the teaching of the Bible and the Holy Fathers […]. This the paint-brush conveys through a calmness and kindness on evil and good people alike and by infinite goodness on both the righteous and the unjust”36.

Works Cited Primary Sources For the works of Gregory Palamas we used the Greek edition by Prof. Panayotis Chrestou: ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol. 1, Thessaloniki 1962; Vol. 2, Thessaloniki 1966; Vol. 3, Thessaloniki 1970; Vol. 4, Thessaloniki 1988; Vol. 4, Thessaloniki 1992. Ȇİȡ‫ ޥ‬șİȓĮȢ ‫݋‬ȞȫıİȦȢ țĮ‫ ޥ‬įȚĮțȡȓıİȦȢ. ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol. 2, pp. 69-95. Ȇİȡ‫ ޥ‬șİȓȦȞ ‫݋‬ȞİȡȖİȚࠛȞ. ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol. 2, pp. 96-136 ȉȡȚȐįİȢ [‫ދ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ. ȁȩȖȠȚ 1-3. ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ, Vol. 1, pp. 359-364] ݄ȖȚȠȡİȚIJȚțާȢ ȉȩȝȠȢ [݄ȖȚȠȡİȚIJȚțާȢ ȉȩȝȠȢ ‫ދ‬ʌ‫ޡ‬ȡ IJࠛȞ ‫ݨ‬İȡࠛȢ ‫ݘ‬ıȣȤĮȗȩȞIJȦȞ. ȈȣȖȖȡȐȝȝĮIJĮ. Vol. 2, pp. 567-578].

Secondary Sources Andreopoulos, Andreas 2005, Metamorphosis. The Transfiguration in byzantine Theology and Iconography, SVSP, New York. Aspra-Vardavakis, Mary and Emmanuel, Melita, 2005, Ǿ ȂȠȞȒ IJȘȢ ȆĮȞIJȐȞĮııĮȢ ıIJȠȞ ȂȣıIJȡȐ. ȅȚ IJȠȚȤȠȖȡĮijȓİȢ IJȠȣ 15Ƞȣ ĮȚȫȞĮ, Commercial Bank of Greece, Athens. Bogosavljeviü, Dragan, 2010, “Ǿ İʌȓįȡĮıȘ IJȘȢ ȋȡȚıIJȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ IJȠȣ ǹȖ. īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ IJȠȣ ȆĮȜĮȝȐ ıIJȘȞ ĮȖȚȠȖȡĮijȓĮ (14 ȑȦȢ 16 ĮȚ.)”, PhD thesis, University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki. Chatzidakis, Manolis, 1997, ȅ țȡȘIJȚțȩȢ ȗȦȖȡȐijȠȢ ĬİȠijȐȞȘȢ. ȅȚ IJȠȚȤȠȖȡĮijȓİȢ IJȘȢ ǿİȡȐȢ ȂȠȞȒȢ ȈIJĮȣȡȠȞȚțȒIJĮ, Holy Monastery of Stavronikitas Editions, Mount Athos. Deriziotis, Lazaros, 2007, “Ȇİȡȓ ȕȣȗĮȞIJȚȞȒȢ ĮȖȚȠȖȡĮijȓĮȢ: ijȠȡȘIJȑȢ İȚțȩȞİȢ țĮȚ IJȠȚȤȠȖȡĮijȓİȢ”, in Holy Monastery of Meteora (ed.), ǿİȡȐ ȂȠȞȒ ȂİȖȐȜȠȣ ȂİIJİȫȡȠȣ, Kalambaka-Meteora, pp. 12-71. 36 Vranos 2006, p. 44.

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Evdokimov, Paul, 1979, L’art de l’icone, Théologie de la beaute, Desclee De Brouwer. Gerstel, E. J. Sh., 2003, “Civic and Monastic Influences on Church Decoration in Late Byzantine Thessalonike”, DOP, vol. 57, pp. 25539, fig.1-20. Gkioles, Nikolaos, 2009, ȅȚ IJȠȚȤȠȖȡĮijȓİȢ IJȠȣ ȀĮșȠȜȚțȠȪ IJȘȢ ȂȠȞȒȢ ǻȚȠȞȣıȓȠȣ ıIJȠ DZȖȚȠ ǵȡȠȢ, ȉİIJȡȐįȚĮ ǺȣȗĮȞIJȚȞȒȢ ǹȡȤĮȚȠȜȠȖȓĮȢ țĮȚ ȉȑȤȞȘȢ, 9, Athens. Gkotsis, Christos, 2002, ȅ ȂȣıIJȚțȩȢ țȩıȝȠȢ IJȦȞ ȕȣȗĮȞIJȚȞȫȞ İȚțȩȞȦȞ, Apostoliki Diakonia Editions, Athens. Kalokyris, Constantine, 1989, ‘Ǿ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮ IJȠȣ ijȦIJȩȢ țĮȚ Ș ȆĮȜĮȚȠȜȩȖİȚĮ ȗȦȖȡĮijȚțȒ (ȅ ȆĮȜĮȝȚıȝȩȢ ıIJȘ ȕȣȗĮȞIJȚȞȒ IJȑȤȞȘ)’, in ȋȡȚıIJȚĮȞȚțȒ ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ, University Studio Press, Thessaloniki, pp. 341-354. Kordis, George, 1998, Ǿ ȤȡȦȝĮIJȚțȒ įȠȝȒ IJȦȞ įȠȝȒ IJȦȞ ȝȠȡijȫȞ IJȠȣ ĬİȠijȐȞȘ IJȠȣ ȀȡȘIJȩȢ, Armos Editions, Athens. Kuhlmann, Jürgen, 1968, Die Taten des Einfachen Gottes. Einae römischkatholische Stellungnahme zum Palamismus, Würzburg. Ʌɚɡɚɪɟɜ, ȼɢɤɬɨɪ, 1986, ɂɫɬɨɪɢɹ ɜɢɡɚɧɬɢɣɫɤɨɣ ɠɢɜɨɩɢɫɢ, ɂɫɤɭɫɫɬɜɨ, Ɇɨɫɤɜɚ. Lossky, Vladimir, 1962, Vision de Dieu, Neuchâtel. Mantzaridis, Georgios, (ed.) 2000, ȅ DZȖȚȠȢ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ ȆĮȜĮȝȐȢ ıIJȘȞ ȚıIJȠȡȓĮ țĮȚ ıIJȠ ʌĮȡȩȞ, ȆȡĮțIJȚțȐ įȚİșȞȫȞ İʌȚıIJȘȝȠȞȚțȫȞ ıȣȞİįȡȚȫȞ ǹșȘȞȫȞ țĮȚ ȁİȝİıȠȪ, The Great and Holy Monastery of Vatopedi. Mavropoulou-Tsioumi, Chrysanthi, 1992, "H ȝȞȘȝİȚĮțȒ ȗȦȖȡĮijȚțȒ ıIJȘ ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ ıIJȠ įİȪIJİȡȠ ȝȚıȩ IJȠȣ 14Ƞȣ ĮȚȫȞĮ”, in ǼȣijȡȩıȣȞȠȞ, ĮijȚȑȡȦȝĮ ıIJȠȞ ȂĮȞȫȜȘ ȋĮIJȗȘįȐțȘ, v. B’, pp. 658-69, tables 358-70. Meyendorff, Jean (protopr.) 1959, Introduction à l’étude de Géegoire Palamas, Éd. du Seuil, Coll. “Patristica Sorboniensia”, Paris. Ouspensky, Leonid 1993, Ǿ șİȠȜȠȖȓĮ IJȘȢ İȚțȩȞĮȢ ıIJȘȞ ȅȡșȩįȠȟȘ ǼțțȜȘıȓĮ, Armos Editions, Athens. Papamastorakis, Titos 1998, “ǼȚțȩȞİȢ 13Ƞȣ-16Ƞȣ ĮȚȫȞĮ”, in ǼȚțȩȞİȢ IJȘȢ ȂȠȞȒȢ ȆĮȞIJȠțȡȐIJȠȡȠȢ, Mount Athos, pp. 41-145. ɉɨɩɨɜɚ, Ɉɥɝɚ, 2006, ɉɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɜɢɡɚɧɬɢɢɫɤɨɝɨ ɢɫɤɭɫɬɜɚ. Ɇɨɡɚɢɤɢ, ɮɪɟɫɤɢ, ɢɤɨɧɢ, ɋɟɜɟɪɧɢɢ ɩɚɥɨɦɧɢɤ, Ɇɨɫɤɜɚ. Skliris, Stamatis, 2002 (Father), ‘ȆĮȚįĮȖȦȖȚțȑȢ įȣȞĮIJȩIJȘIJİȢ IJȘȢ ȕȣȗĮȞIJȚȞȒȢ IJȑȤȞȘȢ’, in ‫ݑ‬Ȟ ‫݋‬ıȩʌIJȡ࠙, Gregoris Editions, pp. 27-72. Tselegidis, Dimitrios, 1992, “Ǿ ȤĮȡȚıȝĮIJȚțȒ ʌĮȡȠȣıȓĮ IJȠȣ ʌȡȦIJȠIJȪʌȠȣ ıIJȘȞ İȚțȩȞĮ IJȠȣ țĮIJȐ IJȘȞ İȚțȠȞȠȜȠȖȓĮ IJȘȢ ǼțțȜȘıȓĮȢ”, in ȅȚțȠįȠȝȒ țĮȚ ȂĮȡIJȣȡȓĮ. DzțijȡĮıȚȢ ǹȖȐʌȘȢ țĮȚ ȉȚȝȒȢ İȚȢ IJȠȞ ȈİȕĮıȝȚȫIJĮIJȠȞ ȂȘIJȡȠʌȠȜȓIJȘȞ ȈİȡȕȚȫȞ țĮȚ ȀȠȗȐȞȘȢ țȪȡȚȠȞ ǻȚȠȞȪıȚȠȞ, volume B’ Kozani, pp. 405-420.

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Tsigaridas, Efthymios, 1999, “ȃȑĮ ıIJȠȚȤİȓĮ IJȠȣ įȚĮțȩıȝȠȣ IJȠȣ țĮșȠȜȚțȠȪ IJȘȢ ȂȠȞȒȢ ȆĮȞIJȠțȡȐIJȠȡȠȢ ǹȖȓȠȣ ǵȡȠȣȢ”, in ȉȠȚȤȠȖȡĮijȓİȢ IJȘȢ ȆİȡȚȩįȠȣ IJȦȞ ȆĮȜĮȚȠȜȩȖȦȞ ıİ ȞĮȠȪȢ IJȘȢ ȂĮțİįȠȞȓĮȢ, Pournaras Editions, Thessaloniki, pp. 55-64, photos 25-40. Vlachos, Hierotheos (Metropolitan) 1996, ȅ DZȖȚȠȢ īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ Ƞ ȆĮȜĮȝȐȢ ȦȢ ĮȖİȚȠȡȓIJȘȢ, Holy Monastery of the Birth of the Holy Virgin, Livadeia. Vokotopoulos, Panagiotis, 2006, ȉȠȚȤȠȖȡĮijȓİȢ ȀĮșȠȜȚțȠȪ ȂȠȞȒȢ ǻȚȠȞȣıȓȠȣ, Mount Athos. Vranos, Ioannis 2006, ĬİȦȡȓĮ ǹȖȚȠȖȡĮijȓĮȢ, P. Pournaras Editions, Thessaloniki. Zisis, Theodore, 2005, “Ǿ ʌİȡȓ ijȦIJȩȢ įȚįĮıțĮȜȓĮ IJȠȣ ǹȖȓȠȣ īȡȘȖȠȡȓȠȣ ȆĮȜĮȝȐ”, in Ioannis Fountoulis (ed.), ȋȡȚıIJȚĮȞȚțȒ ĬİııĮȜȠȞȓțȘ. Ǿ ǿİȡȐ ǺĮıȚȜȚțȒ ȆĮIJȡȚĮȡȤȚțȒ țĮȚ ȈIJĮȣȡȠʌȘȖȚĮțȒ ȂȠȞȒ ǺȜĮIJȐįȦȞ, University Studio Press, Thessaloniki, pp. 29-39.

CONTRIBUTORS IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE

Ephraim, Abbot of the Holy Great Monastery of Vatopedi, his name in the world Basil Koutsou, was born in Hamochostos, Cyprus in 1956. He is a graduate of the Theological School of the University of Athens. In 1982 he was tonsured a monk in the brotherhood of Elder Joseph in New Skete, Mount Athos. The brotherhood of Elder Joseph took over the manning of the Holy Monastery of Vatopedi and in 1990 the monastery reverted from the idiorrythmic to coenobitic life and Elder Ephraim was enthroned its first Abbot. Adrian, Monk of the Holy Great Monastery of Vatopedi, his name in the world Angelos Diveris, was born in Arta, Greece in 1967. He is a graduate of the Agricultural University of Athens. He lives in the Vatopedi Monastery since 1994, while in 1995 he became a monk. His monastic task is on the publications of the monastery and he is also responsible for the theological Conferences organized by the monastery. Hieromonk Melchisedec (Törönen), born in 1970 in Finland, is a priest at the Monastery of St John the Baptist, Tolleshunt Knights, UK. His earlier publications include: Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor (OUP, 2007); "The Spiritual Man: Body, Soul and Divine Grace" in Forerunner 58 (2011); and "Liturgy in the Desert: a Twofold Immersion into the Pain of this World and the Life of the World-to-Come" in Witness and Mission in the Contemporary World (Alba Iulia University, 2014). Currently he is preparing a Finnish translation of the Orations of St Gregory Nazianzen. Professor Georgios Mantzaridis was born in Thessaloniki in 1935. He taught Christian Ethics and Sociology at the School of Theology of the University of Thessaloniki for more than 30 years. He is a member of the Bioethics Committee of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece. He has published more than 150 papers and more than 10 books, most of them translated into English, French, German, Italian, Serbian, Russian, Polish, Flemish and Roumanian. He was a contributor and member of the editorial team for the Greek Critical Edition of the Collected Works of St Gregory Palamas (under the general editorship of Professor Chrestou). Two of his

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Contributors

books discuss primarily the views of St Gregory Palamas: The Deification of Man: St. Gregory Palamas and the Orthodox Tradition, St Vladimir's Seminary Press (1997); ȂĮȞIJȗĮȡȓįȘȢ, īİȫȡȖȚȠȢ ǿ., ȆĮȜĮȝȚțȐ, 3Ș ȑțį., ȆȠȣȡȞĮȡȐȢ, (1998). Professor Demetrios Tselengides is teaching Orthodox Theology for more than 30 years at the Faculty of Theology, University of Thessaloniki. His published works (in Greek) include: The theology of the image and its anthropological importance (Doctoral thesis, Thessaloniki, 1984); Grace and Freedom in the Patristic tradition of 14th century (1987); The doctrine of Salvation in Luther. Contribution to the study of Luther's theology from an Orthodox point of view (1991); The satisfaction of the divine justice in Anselm of Canterbury. Theological approach from an Orthodox point of view (1991); The Soteriology of Western Christianity. A critical theological approach of the Roman-Catholic and Protestant Soteriology from an Orthodox perspective (2012); Preconditions and criteria of the Orthodox and Infallible theology. Theological and Ecclesiological approaches (2013). Georgios D. Panagopoulos, PhD, is an Associate Professor of Orthodox Dogmatic Theology at the University Ecclesiastical Academy of Ioannina. He was born in Patras, Greece, in 1966. He studied Law, Theology, Byzantine History and Literature at the Universities of Athens, Thessalonica and Munich. He published, among other books in Greek the following: Stoic Philosophy and the Theology of Basil the Great, Athens 2009; An Introduction to the History of Western Theology, Athens 2012; Orthodox Theology and Greek Nation during the period of the Turkish Domination, Athens 2014; Issues on Ecclesiology, Athens 2015. Stavros Yangazoglou graduated from the Faculty of Theology of Aristotle University in Thessaloniki and studied Ecumenical Theology at the Institut Oecuménique de Bossey, Medieval Philosophy and Theology at Fribourg in Switzerland; he was awarded a Th.D. in Systematic Theology. He is a Counselor at the Greek Ministry of Culture, Education and Religious Affairs/ Institute of Educational Policy, and a Hellenic Open University Lecturer at the School of Humanities. He is also a Member of the Académie Internationale des Sciences Religieuses and a Director of the official theological journal of the Church of Greece Theologia; He has published the book entitled Communion of Theosis, The synthesis of Christology and Pneumatology in the work of Gregory Palamas (Domos, Athens, 2001, in Greek) and numerous articles on patristics, dogmatics,

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ecclesiology, systematic theology, contemporary Orthodox theology. Stephen R. L. Clark is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool (1984-2009. He continues to manage an international e-list for philosophers, and to serve as Associate Editor of the British Journal for the History of Philosophy. His books include From Athens to Jerusalem (1984), God’s World and the Great Awakening (1991), Understanding Faith (2009), Ancient Mediterranean Philosophy (2013) and Plotinus: myth, metaphor and philosophical practice (2016). His chief current interests are in the philosophy of Plotinus, the understanding and treatment of non-human animals, philosophy of religion, and science fiction. Oleg Ernestovich Dushin is a Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, and Professor of the Chair of History of Philosophy (Institute of Philosophy, Saint-Petersburg State University, Russian Federation). The topic of his Doctoral Dissertation was “Confession and Conscience in the WestEuropean Culture from XIII to XVI centuries” (June 2006, SaintPetersburg State University). He is the Coordinator of the Center for Medieval Culture Studies, Chief of the Editorial Committee of Almanac “VERBUM”, Head of Saint-Petersburg’ Society for Studies of Cultural Heritage of Nicholas of Cusa, Co-founder of International St. Gregory Palamas’ Seminar. His publications include: “The Models of Conscience: Thomas Aquinas and Vladimir Solovyov” in Questions of Philosophy. 2005. ʋ 3., pp. 149-160. (Modeli sovesti: “Foma Akvinskij i Vladimir Solov'ev”, Voprosy filosofii. 2005. ʋ 3. S. 149-160). Confession and Conscience in the Western European Culture XIII - XVI Centuries. St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg University Press, 2005./ Ispoved' i sovest' v zapadnoevropejskoj kul'ture XIII - XVI vekov. SPb, SpbGU, 2005. “Aristotelianisn and Platonism: the Differentiation of Religious Traditions” (Herausforderung durch Religion? Begegnungen der Philosophie mit Religionen) in Mittelalter und Renaissance. Gerhard Krieger (Hrsg.). Würzburg, 2011, pp.299-306 (Contradictio. Bd. 11). “Schelling and Solovyov on the Problem of Evil” in Cusanus and Schelling in the History of Russian Thought. Ed. by O.E. Dushin. St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg University Press, 2012, pp. 164-178 (Verbum, Issue 14). Dan Chitoiu is Professor at the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Ia‫܈‬i, Romania. He teaches Spirituality of the Christian East and Byzantine Philosophy. His research work focuses on the study and interpretation of

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Contributors

the Eastern-Christian cultural model. His recent books: Persoană, lume, realitate ultimă. Filosofare Юi spiritualitate în Răsăritul CreЮtin (Person, World, Ultimate Reality. Philosophy and Spirituality in the Christian East), Editura Universitară Clujeană, 2014 and Founding Ideas of the Eastern-European Cultural Horizon, LAP, 2014. Fr Manuel Sumares co-ordinates the Philosophy of Religion postgraduate programme at the Catholic University of Portugal's Faculty of Philosophy in Braga. He is currently the Editor of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia. He is also an Orthodox priest of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and serves in Porto, Portugal. Fr Nikolaos Loudovikos is Professor of Dogmatics and Philosophy at the University Ecclesiastical Academy of Thessaloniki and Director of Studies/ Chair of the Department of Theological and Pastoral Studies of UEATh. Among his many publications, the following titles are most relevant to Palamas Studies: A Eucharistic Ontology: Maximus the Confessor's Eschatological Ontology of Being as Dialogical Reciprocity, Holy Cross Orthodox Press, Brookline, Mass., 2010 (in English); Closed Spirituality and the Meaning of Self, Ellinika Grammata, Athens 1999 (in Greek); The Apophatic Ecclesiology of the Homoousios - The Ancient Church Today, Armos, Athens 2002; A History of God's Love, Holy Mountain 2015. Filip Ivanovic (1986) holds Bachelor and Masters degrees from the Department of Philosophy of the University of Bologna, and a PhD from the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies of the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim. Currently he is a research fellow at the Polonsky Academy of the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem. He edited Dionysius the Areopagite between Orthodoxy and Heresy (2011), and authored Symbol and Icon: Dionysius the Areopagite and the Iconoclastic Crisis (2010), as well as a number of articles and papers on Greek and Byzantine philosophy, and patristics. Dr Norman Russell is an honorary research fellow of St Stephen's House, University of Oxford. His publications include Cyril of Alexandria (2000), The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (2004), Theophilus of Alexandria (2007), Fellow Workers with God: Orthodox Thinking on Theosis (2009) and a significant number of articles and papers. His translations of contemporary Greek theologians and philosophers include works by Christos Yannaras, Nikolaos Loudovikos

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and Stelios Ramfos. His current research is centred on St Gregory Palamas. In 2010 he joined the Orthodox Church. Rev. Michael Pacella III, is an Adjunct Professor in the College of William and Mary (USA), a priest with the Charismatic Episcopal Church and Rector of St Michael and All Angels Church (CEC), in Williamsburg, VA (USA). After an active ministry in the USA Army, he taught at various Colleges in USA (Hampton University, St Leo’s College, Regents University, and the Kings College at Jamestown, where he was the primary Theology and Ethics professor in the Seminary). He is currently studying for his PhD with the Cambridge Theological Federation (UK). Patrícia Calvário is a Ph.D student at Institute of Philosophy of University of Porto and FCT Fellow. Her research interests focus on the vision of light in the experience described by Gregory Palamas and the hesychast spiritual school. Fr. Demetrios Harper is a Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Winchester and an Orthodox priest. His PhD dissertation (University of Winchester, 2015) had the title: "The Analogy of Love: The Virtue Ethic of St. Maximus the Confessor". Anna Koltsiou-Nikita is Professor of Ancient Greek in the Faculty of Theology of the School of Theology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (A.U.Th.), where she teaches language and translation of the Biblical and Patristic texts and paleography. She holds a Master's degree from the Faculty of History and Archaeology, School of Philosophy A.U.Th., and a PhD from the Faculty of Philology, School of Philosophy A.U.Th.. Her research interests include the study of the manuscript tradition and critical edition as well as the language (Greek and Latin) and translations of Christian literature. She is the Director of the Department of Biblical Literature and Religious Studies and of the Scientific Meeting of Biblicum of the Faculty of Theology. She is also a member of the A.U.Th. Studies and Research Committee, the ȀǼǼȆ Network (TIETTextual and Interpretational Ecclesiastical Tradition) of the A.U.Th. and the Society of Greek-speaking Translators. Mikonja Kneževiü (1978), Docent for Byzantine Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy in Kosovska Mitrovica, graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy in Nikšiü, University of Montenegro, in 2001. In 2008 he supported his doctoral dissertation on Gregory Palamas at the Department

350

Contributors

of Philosophy, Pedagogy and Psychology (Section: Philosophy) at the Faculty of Philosophy of National and Cappodistrian University in Athens. He is an author of the book Njegoš and Hesychasm, Belgrade: Institute for Theological Research 2015 (in Serbian) as well as of two international bibliographies: Maximus the Confessor (580-662): Bibliography, Belgrade 2012 and Gregory Palamas (1296-1357): Bibliography, Belgrade 2012. He has also published several articles on byzantine philosophy and theology in Serbian and English. He translates from English, Greek and German language. Dr Kneževiü is a Vice President of the Philosophical Society of Montenegro and General Editor of Luþa. Journal for Philosophy and Theory of Culture and Society. Elena Dulgheru (Bucharest, Romania) is a film-critic, poet, essayist, publisher and translator. She has received her Ph.D. with Magna cum laude in Cinematography and Media. She is a Cinema columnist at “Ziarul Lumina” newspaper. She has published the following books (in Romanian): Tarkovsky. Film as a Prayer (Prize of Romanian Film Critic’s Association, 2002); Speaking with Marina Tarkovskaia (2004); The Ladder of Heaven in Cinema. Kusturica, Tarkovsky, Parajanov (2011; Prize of “Diallog” Cultural Association, Prize of Romanian Filmmakers’ Union); For Passing the Horizon and Other Poems (2011). She has published more than 15 studies in collective volumes from Romania, Serbia, Russia, Georgia, Kazachstan, Italy, Brazil. Dimitar Atanassov works as Senior Assistant Professor at the Institute for Ethnology and Folklore Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. His academic interests are focused on history of Balkans, medieval history, Orthodox philosophy and theology, history of philosophy, anthropology of history, history of ideas, ideological representations of history, historiography analysis, (ab-)uses of the past. He has published in Bulgarian, English and Serbian languages. He is member of Association of Byzantine and Medieval Studies in Bulgaria, Bulgarian Society for XIX c., Border Crossing Network and Center for Interdisciplinary History Studies. Spyridon P. Panagopoulos has studied Literature and Philosophy at the University of Patras, Greece. His PhD Thesis at the Ionian University (Corfu, Greece) was on Byzantine Hagiography. His research interests include Byzantine Philology, Byzantine Philosophy, Byzantine History, Byzantine Art, Patristics, Church History until 15th century. He has been invited to give lectures until now in over 30 conferences and workshops in Greece and abroad. He is the author of more than 30 academic papers,

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which have been published after peer review, and he is writing currently three monographs to be published in Greece and abroad. He has reviewed books in several scholarly journals (e.g., Journal of Theological Studies, Al-Masaq, Religious Studies Review, Vigiliae Christianae, Early Medieval Europe etc.

INDEX OF NAMES

Adrianos, Monk of Holy Monastery of Vatopaidi, xxii, xxvi, xxi, xxiv, 7-11. Akindynos (ǹțȓȞįȣȞȠȢ), 34, 36, 38, 39, 48, 61, 78, 107, 136, 191, 194, 227, 235, 246, 253, 262. Andronicus II, Byzantine Emperor, 208, 305. Anselm of Canterbury, 38, 50, 211, 311, 346. Anthimos, Metropolitan of Thessaloniki, xii. Aquinas, Thomas, xv, xviii, xxii, xxiii, xxvii, xxix, 38, 50, 61, 62, 64, 119, 120, 125, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 175, 176, 194, 196, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 217, 218, 221, 228, 249, 251, 253, 347. Aristotle, xxii, xxvii, xxix, 7, 20, 86, 89, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 124, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 157, 160, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 209, 212, 324. Arius the Heretic, 98, 194. Asanes, Konstantinos, 258. Athanasios of Kyzikos (ǹșĮȞȐıȚȠȢ ȀȣȗȓțȠȣ), 43. Athanasius of Alexandria, 10, 98, 111, 218, 279. Athanasopoulos, C., xi-xxx, 19, 28, 38, 83, 176. Atanassov, Dimitar, xxv, xxvi, 301326, 350. Augustine of Hippo, 38, 49, 58, 59, 63, 64, 107, 108, 114, 202, 214,

217, 253. Avicenna, xviii, 201. Balthasar, Hans-Urs von, xxiii, 173, 174, 175, 217. Barlaam or Varlaam of Calavria (ǺĮȡȜĮȐȝ Ƞ ȀĮȜĮȕȡȩȢ), xix, xx, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, 15, 28, 30, 33, 35, 38, 48, 50, 52, 76, 77, 80, 83, 84, 85, 89, 90, 98, 105, 106, 107, 110, 124, 125, 126, 132, 133, 142, 148, 150, 151, 194, 213, 217, 218, 222, 226, 227, 235, 327. Barnabas, Metropolitan of Neapoleos and Stavroupoleos, xii. Barth, Karl, xviii, 138, 141. Basil of Caesarea, 47, 51, 53, 56, 64, 65, 117, 190, 194, 195, 196, 197, 202, 206, 212, 217, 218, 224, 244, 279, 283, 328, 346. Basil Archbishop (Krivoshein), 107, 110, 115, 121, 122. Benedict XVI, Pope, xiii. Bobrinskoy, B., 60, 63. Bradshaw, D., 126, 131, 133, 140, 160, 161, 227, 228, 229. Cabasilas, Nicholas, xiii, xxix, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80, 81, 82. Calvário, P., xxiv, xxv, 222-231, 349. Chi‫܊‬oiu, D., xxii, xxviii, 124-131, 347. Choumnos, N., 304, 305, 306. Chrestou (ȋȡȒıIJȠȣ), P., xiv, xvi, xxix, 8, 9, 11, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55,

Triune God 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 68, 76, 80, 81, 82, 182, 241, 243, 264, 265, 342, 345. Clark, S. R. L., xx, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, 83-101, 196, 347. Clucas, L., xxv, 227. Cyril of Alexandr(e)ia, 44, 197, 273, 282, 283, 285. Cyprian Archimandrite (Kern), 68, 116, 119, 122, 123, 230. Damodos, Vikentios, 158. Daniélou, Jean, 56, 64, 75, 178, 228. Demetrakopoulos, John, xxv, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 289, 290. Descartes, Rene, 86, 220, 221. Didymus of Alexandria, 21. Dionysius the Areopagite, xxix, 16, 19, 48, 76, 77, 96, 101, 135, 142, 180, 188, 196, 221, 328, 330, 331, 348. Drakopoulos, P., 14, 18. Dulgheru, E., xxv, xxvi, 292-300, 350. Dushin, O. E., xxi, xxviii, 102-123, 347. Elijah, the Prophet, 331, 329. Ephraim, Archimandrite, Abbot of Holy Monastery of Vatopaidi, xiii, xvi, xxii, xxiv, 2-6. Eunomius the Heretic, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 328. Evagrius of Pontus (Ponticus), 144, 217, 238, 330. Evdokimov, P., 49, 60, 64, 343. Florovsky, G. (Fr.), 56, 69, 110, 115, 116, 119, 122, 235, 243. Gavras (īĮȕȡȐȢ), 26, 31. Georgios, Metropolitan of Kitrous, Katerini and Platamona, xii. Golitzin, Alexander, 184, 188. Gregoras, Nicephorus, xxvii, 191, 305. Gregory of Nyssa, xix, 44, 45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54, 56, 60, 65, 190, 204, 206, 213, 217, 228, 271,

353

276, 279. Gregory the Theologian of Nazianzos (īȡȘȖȩȡȚȠȢ Ƞ ĬİȠȜȩȖȠȢ), 22, 30, 31, 36, 47, 51, 60, 63, 117, 206, 217, 266, 282, 328, 331, 341, 345. Gregory of Cyrpus, 49, 51, 59. Harper, Demetrios (Fr.), xxiv, xxv, 232-245, 349. Hegel, G. W. F, xviii, xxii, 163, 168, 169, 170, 171. Heidegger, M., xxii, xxiii, 143, 171, 173. Henry, Michel, xxii, 130, 131, 143, 151. Hesiod, 92, 220, 253. Hierotheos (or Ierotheos), Metropolitan of Nafpaktos, xix, 73, 217, 218, 330. Holdin, Yuri, xxv, 292, 293, 297, 298, 299, 300. Horujy, S. S., 102, 103, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112. Hume, David, 98, 101. Iamblichus, 89, 90, 97, 100. Ierodiakonou, K., xx, xxv, 132, 141. Ioannis, Metropolitan of Lagkada, Litis and Rentinis, xii. Ioannis the Philosopher (ǿȦȐȞȞȘȢ Ƞ ĭȚȜȩıȠijȠȢ), 34. Ivanka, von A., xxv, 74, 75, 226, 227, 229, 230. Ivanovic, Filip, xxiii, xxiv, 180-189, 348. Jaspers, Karl, 163, 168. John, Apostle and Evangelist, 50, 102, 144, 192, 193, 203, 266, 331, 340. John Chrysostom, 215, 216, 219. John Italos (Ioannis Italos, ǿȦȐȞȞȘȢ ǿIJĮȜȩȢ), 85. John of Damaskos (Damascene or of Damascus), 40, 47, 55, 58, 68, 138, 139, 140, 141, 200, 201, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 212, 240, 278, 280, 285.

354

Index of Names

John of the Ladder (ǿȦȐȞȞȘȢ ȀȜȓȝĮțȠȢ), 25. John of Sinai, 25. John of Krostand, 35. Jugie, Martin, xiv, 10, 58, 64, 190, 194, 198, 228. Kallistos, Metropolitan of Diokleia, xii, xv, xxx, 9, 94, 101, 126, 131, 197, 199, 203, 204, 210, 211, 221. Kalokyris, Konstantinos, 333, 335, 343. Kant, Immanuel, 106, 164, 171, 319. Kantakouzenos, Ioannis, xxiv, xxvii, 247, 249, 250, 254, 258. Kapriev, G., 271, 291, 317. Kes(s)elopoulos, A., 68, 200, 205, 207, 209, 234, 238, 243. Kirill, the Patriarch of Moscow, 293. Kneževiü, M., xxiv, xxv, 264-291, 349, 350. Koltsiou-Nikita, Anna, xxiv, 246265, 349. Kydones or Cydones (ȀȣįȫȞȘȢ), Demetrios, xxiv, xxv, 192, 194, 196, 246, 247, 248, 250, 252, 256, 258, 262, 263. Kydonis (ȀȣįȫȞȘȢ), Prochoros, 192, 194, 198, 246, 248, 250, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 258, 260, 261, 263. Leontius of Byzantium, 139, 140. Lévy, Antoine, 160, 161, 163, 164, 168, 176. Lipovetsky, Gilles, xxii, 171, 172. Loudovikos, Fr Nikolaos, xii, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, 154-179, 348. Louth, A., 83, 85, 96, 101, 181, 183, 184, 188, 198, 199, 200, 218, 221, 263. Losev Aleksey Fedorovich, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 112, 113.

Lossky, V., 68, 69, 71, 80, 104, 107, 110, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 131, 225, 229, 236, 243, 330, 343. Loudovikos, N. (Fr.), xii, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, 154-179, 233, 235, 243, 348. Lubac, Henri de, 14, 18, 166, 167, 176. Makarios of Corinth, xiv, 212, 221. Mantzaridis, G., xiv, xv, xvii, xviii, xx, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxix, 19-37, 61, 62, 64, 68, 98, 99, 101, 235, 237, 240, 242, 244, 253, 262, 343, 345. Matsoukas, N., 13, 14, 18, 68. Markos Eugenikos, 49. Martzelos, G., xii, 58, 64, 191, 198, 233, 244. Maximus the Confessor, xxvii, 17, 19, 26, 27, 99, 101, 110, 111, 119, 140, 159, 163, 164, 165, 174, 175, 176, 178, 188, 206, 223, 227, 236, 244, 285, 317, 330, 345, 348, 349, 350. McGrath, A. E., 14, 18. Melchisedec, Hieromonk of Holy Monastery of St John the Baptist, Essex, xvi, xvii, xxi, xxiv, 12-18, 345. Meyendorff, J., xx, 18, 60, 64, 68, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, 90, 94, 95, 98, 101, 108, 110, 115, 119, 123, 125, 144, 150, 153, 180, 188, 190, 194, 198, 199, 204, 210, 213, 221, 227, 233, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 264, 286, 343. Milutin, S. U., Serbian King, 305, 309, 311, 324. Moses, the Prophet (ȂȦȣıȒȢ), 30, 31, 150, 184, 223, 228, 329, 331. Nietzsche, F., 143, 171. Nikodemus of Holy Mt Athos, xiv, 212, 221.

Triune God Ockham or Occam, William of, xv, xxix, 90, 167. Origen, 101, 138, 141, 142, 150, 216, 217, 233, 244, 330. Pacella, III, Michael, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, 199-221, 349. Palamas, Kostis, xi. Panselenos, Manuel, 333. Panteleimon, Metropolitan of Veroia, Naoussa and Campania, xii, 208. Panagopoulos, G., xix, xxiii, xxv, 44-65, 346. Panagopoulos, S., xxvi, 327-344, 350. Papademetriou, George, C., 207, 208, 210, 213. Papamastorakis, Titos, 337, 343. Paul Asanis (ȆĮȪȜȠȢ ǹıȐȞȘȢ), 31. Paul the Apostle (ǹʌȩıIJȠȜȠȢ ȆĮȪȜȠȢ), 3, 6, 15, 17, 26, 39, 88, 180, 206, 215, 219, 223, 227, 238, 256, 257, 261, 262, 331. Pelican, Jaroslav, xxx, 18, 142, 143, 153. Peter the Apostle (ǹʌȩıIJȠȜȠȢ ȆȑIJȡȠȢ), 6, 32, 43, 207. Philotheos Kokkinos of Constantinople (ĭȚȜȩșİȠȢ ȀȩțțȚȞȠȢ), 7, 8, 11, 33, 76, 132, 140, 192, 194, 195, 196, 208, 252. Philo of Alexandria, 93, 101. Photius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, 49, 51, 58, 59, 206, 279. Plato, xx, 75, 84, 86, 94, 95, 96, 97, 105, 106, 126, 216, 217, 218, 221, 227, 230, 258, 260. Plested, Marcus, 199, 221. Plotinus, xx, xxi, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 106, 135, 161, 196, 347. Plutarch, 86, 220, 260.

355

Popper, Karl, 169, 173. Porphyry, 84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 95, 96, 101, 161, 196. Proclus, 89, 95, 191, 196, 197, 202, 233. Radovic, Amphilochios or Amfilochios (Metropolitan of Montenegro), 50, 51, 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 65, 68, 188, 269, 274, 284, 329, 330. Ricoeur, Paul, 164, 177. Romanides, J. (Fr.), xix, 68, 70, 71, 184, 189. Rubliov, Andrey, 294, 297, 298. Russell, N., xxiii, xxv, 61, 65, 75, 83, 190-198, 246, 250, 253, 258, 263, 316, 348. Sartre, Jean-Paul, 116, 316. Serge of Radonezj, 293. Schelling, F. W. J., xviii, 117, 163, 171, 347. Scholarios, Gennadios (Patriarch), 158. Scotus, Duns, xv, xxix, 127, 167. Scouteris, C. B., 269. Silouan the Athonite, xvii, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 33, 36. Sinkewicz or Sinkiewitz, R. E., xx, xxv, xxx, 50, 65, 90, 101, 133, 134, 140, 188, 190, 198, 216. Sophocles, 259, 260. Sophrony or Sophronios (Sakharov), Archimandrite, Blessed Elder of Holy Monastery of John the Baptist, Essex, xvi, xvii, xviii, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. Spinoza, Baruch (Benedict), 143, 152, 153. Staniloae, D., xxii, 59, 65, 68, 131. Sumares, Manuel (Fr.), xxii, 142153, 348. Symeon the New Theologian, xxix, 20, 21, 68, 111, 116, 119, 120, 206, 331.

356

Index of Names

Taylor, Charles, xxii, 167, 170, 171. Te Velde, Rudi, 164, 165, 166. Theodore the Philosopher (ĬİȩįȦȡȠȢ Ƞ ĭȚȜȩıȠijȠȢ), 34. Theodore Metochites, xx, xxv, xxvii, 132, 208, 249, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 310, 311, 313, 314, 315, 316, 320, 321, 324. Theokl(e)itos Dionysiatis (Hieromonk), 68, 69, 70. Theophanes the Cretan, 334, 340. Theofan the Greek, 294, 296, 298. Tollefsen, Torstein, 133, 141, 190, 198. Trembelas, P., 69, 70. Tselengides or Tselengidis, D. (ǻȘȝȒIJȡȚȠȢ ȉıİȜİȖȖȓįȘȢ), xix, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, 38-43, 332. Tsigaridas, E., 337, 347. Uspensky, Leonid, 297, 343.

Veniamin, C., xxx, 16, 18, 210, 213, 221, 232, 237, 239, 240, 241, 243, 244. Williams, A. N., xxv, 200, 204, 210, 212, 221, 228. Williams, Rowan, 176, 190, 198. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 86, 316. Ward, Graham, 171, 172. Xeni(a) Nun (ȂȠȞĮȤȒ ȄȑȞȘ), 26, 32, 33, 34, 200, 203. Yangazoglou, S., xix, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, 13, 18, 66-82, 280, 290, 346. Yannaras, C., 69, 199, 348. Zacharias (ǽĮȤĮȡȓĮȢ), Archimandrite of Holy Monastery of St John the Baptist, Essex, 25, 27. Zizioulas, Metropolitan John of Pergamos, xvi, xxx, 69.

INDEX OF KEYWORDS

Dianoia (mind, įȚȐȞȠȚĮ), 25, 137, 246, 274, 275. Dominican, xiv, 62, 200, 246. Energy (energeia, ਥȞȑȡȖİȚĮ), xviii, xxii, 11, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 41, 42, 43, 58, 60, 62, 74, 75, 76, 84, 97, 103, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 118, 119, 121, 122, 126, 128, 129, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 151, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 162, 174, 175, 176, 186, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 203, 223, 227, 228, 230, 231, 237, 239, 246, 253, 258, 268, 269, 270, 271, 273, 278, 280, 283, 284, 286, 288, 289, 290, 291, 327, 330, 331, 332, 342. Eros (਩ȡȦȢ), 203, 234. Essence (ousia, Ƞ੝ıȓĮ), xviii, xix, xxiv, xxvii, xxx, 10, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, 32, 41, 42, 43, 44, 50, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 75, 78, 106, 109, 110, 111, 121, 122, 127, 128, 129, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 142, 143, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 163, 166, 167, 175, 176, 177, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 213, 218, 222, 223, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 235, 240, 241, 242, 244, 246, 253, 258, 269, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 290, 291, 297, 311, 317, 323, 327, 332, 335, 336. Ethics, xv, xvi, xvii, xxi, xxix, 1, 8, 17, 120, 143, 153, 211, 214, 215, 221, 240, 345, 349.

Filioque, xviii, xix, xxv, xxvi, xvii, 38-43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 246, 259, 264, 265, 271, 276, 278, 279, 280, 284, 285, 286. Heart (țĮȡįȓĮ), 3, 4, 8, 13, 15, 25, 26, 33, 34, 35, 36, 41, 81, 85, 91, 108, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 207, 218, 219, 256, 307. Heresy, 41, 73, 151, 211, 213, 283, 295, 348. Hermeneutic(s), xix, xxv, 13, 54, 60, 68, 75, 76. Holy Spirit, xix, xxv, 2, 8, 9, 12-18, 20, 21, 22, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44-65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 149, 213, 223, 224, 226, 227, 230, 259, 264-291. Light (ij૵Ȣ), 20, 21, 30, 34, 35, 67, 68, 74, 80, 81, 82, 89, 91, 96, 97, 99, 103, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 142, 146, 151, 187, 214, 222, 223, 224, 227, 228, 229, 239, 240, 256, 257, 260, 292-301, 327342. Logos (word, ȜȩȖȠȢ), 20, 234, 237, 250, 252, 301, 309, 323. Love (Agape, ਕȖȐʌȘ), xvii, xxi, 2, 16, 17, 25, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, 58, 62, 63, 81, 84, 88, 96, 99, 146, 150, 158, 165, 170, 183, 202, 209, 211, 214, 214, 218, 219, 219, 234, 238, 257, 348, 349.

358

Index of Keywords

Nous (mind, ȞȠ૨Ȣ), 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 30, 81, 94, 96, 234, 330, 316. Methexis (communion, ȝȑșİȟȚȢ), 20, 21, 22, 23. Muslim, xxiv, 89, 91, 101. Neo-patristic, xvi, 115, 116, 119, Philokalia, xiv, xv, xxx, 85, 101, 200, 203, 205, 210, 212, 221, 243, 244. Post-modernism (postmodern), xvi, 9, 10, 109, 112, 114, 115, 171, 178. Post-patristic, xvi, 10. Prosopeion (ʌȡȠıȦʌİ૙ȠȞ or mask or facade), xvi, 4. Psyche (soul, ȥȣȤȒ), 36, 25, 246, 262, 328, 329. Roman-Catholic, xiv, xviii, xxvi, 346. Science, xv, xxi, xxii, 14, 18, 72, 102, 104, 108, 109, 123, 124,

129, 130, 133, 165, 169, 209, 211, 212, 213, 215, 220, 221, 236, 237, 317, 320, 325, 326, 346, 347, 348, 350. Scholasticism, xv, xxix, 70, 110, 119, 120, 204, 211, 212, 216. Simplicity (of God), xvii, xviii, xxv, 19-27, 75, 109, 129, 131, 154, 155, 191, 195, 222, 223, 226, 229, 249, 253, 258, 259. Truth (ਕȜȒșİȚĮ), 2, 4, 5, 9, 13, 14, 17, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 52, 56, 64, 84, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 99, 100, 107, 117, 118, 126, 130, 131, 144, 145, 164, 165, 166, 170, 175, 177, 179, 181, 186, 195, 202, 203, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 220, 226, 242, 254, 256, 257, 260, 303, 309, 310, 317, 318, 319, 322, 340. Typhos (IJȪijȠȢ), xix, 40, 43.