Transylvania in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century: The Rise of the Congregational System (East Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages 450-1450, 37) 9789004243620, 9004243623

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Transylvania in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century

East Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 450–1450 General Editor Florin Curta

Volume 37

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ecee

Transylvania in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century The Rise of the Congregational System By

Tudor Sălăgean

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: Bologa (Sebesvár) castle, Cluj county, Romania. ©Photograph by Ştefan Socaciu. Translation: Radu Valentin Băzăvan. Text revision: Andrei Gandila, Crina Gandila. Maps: Vlad Andrei Lăzărescu. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Sălăgean, Tudor. Title: Transylvania in the second half of the thirteenth century : the rise of the congregational system / by Tudor Sălăgean. Description: Leiden : Brill, 2016. | Series: East Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle ages, 450–1450, ISSN 1872–8103 ; volume 37 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016001753 (print) | LCCN 2016006763 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004243620 (hardback : acid-free paper) | ISBN 9789004311343 (e-book) | ISBN 9789004311343 (E-book) Subjects: LCSH: Transylvania (Romania)—Politics and government. | Transylvania (Romania)—Kings and rulers—History. | Nobility—Romania—Transylvania—History—To 1500. | Transylvania (Romania)— History, Church. | Church and state—Romania—Transylvania—History—To 1500. | Congregationalism— Political aspects—Romania—Transylvania—History—To 1500. | Social change—Romania— Transylvania—History—To 1500. | Romania—Politics and government—To 1711. | Romania—History, Church. Classification: LCC DR280.2 .S26 2016 (print) | LCC DR280.2 (ebook) | DDC 949.8/4—dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016001753 Want or need Open Access? Brill Open offers you the choice to make your research freely accessible online in exchange for a publication charge. Review your various options on brill.com/brill-open. Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1872-8103 isbn 978-90-04-24362-0 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-31134-3 (e-book) Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents List of Maps vii Introduction 1 1 The Mongol Invasion and Its Aftermath 4 1.1 Prerequisites 4 1.2 The Organization of Transylvania’s Defense 16 1.3 The Campaign 25 1.4 The Tartar Retreat: The Second Devastation of Transylvania 30 1.5 The Aftermath of the Invasion 34 2 From the Mongol Retreat to the Transylvanian Duchy (1243–1257) 49 2.1 Transylvania and the Council of Lyon 49 2.2 The Years of Recovery (1243–1248) 53 2.3 The Decade with No History (1248–1257) 58 3 The Duchy of Transylvania 63 3.1 Reinstating the Duchy of Transylvania 63 3.2 The Banate of Transylvania (1258–1261) 68 3.3 Civil Wars 71 3.4 Political and Social Change 90 4 Political Crisis in the First Years of Ladislas the Cuman’s Reign: Attempts to Restore the Duchy of Transylvania 108 4.1 The Voivode Nicholas Geregye (1272–1274) 108 4.2 Transylvania under the Rule of the Csák Kindred (1274–1277) 112 4.3 The Saxon Rebellion (1277–1279) 119 4.4 The Aristocratic Triumvirate of 1278: The Domination of the Aba Kindred in Transylvania (1279–1282) 124 5 Regnum Transilvanum: The Rise of the Congregational Regime 130 5.1 The Voivode Roland Borsa 130 5.2 The Mongol Invasion of 1285 135 5.3 Ladislas the Cuman and Transylvania 138 5.4 The Rise of the Congregational Regime 143 5.5 Ladislas iv and the Romanians of Transylvania 148 5.6 The End of Ladislas iv’s Reign 151

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5.7 The “Constitutional” Reform of King Andrew iii 153 5.8 The End of Roland Borsa’s Rule (1294) 156 5.9 Regnum Transylvanum 157 6 Ladislas Kán (1294–1315): The Transylvanian Nobles and the Congregational Regime 166 6.1 The Beginnings of Ladislas Kán’s Power 166 6.2 A Nearly Sovereign Transylvania (1301–1310) 175 6.3 The Major Coordinates of Kan’s Internal Policy 185 6.4 External Policy: Transylvania’s Involvement in the Competition for the Hungarian Crown 202 6.5 The Compromise of 1310 and Its Consequences 214 7 Charles Robert and Transylvania 229 7.1 Civil War (1316–1322) 229 7.2 The Political Regime of the Restoration 237 Conclusions 244 Annexes 249 1 General Congregations and Noble Congregations of Transylvania (1288–1322) 249 2 Dukes of Transylvania 251 3 Voivodes and vicevoivodes of Transylvania 251 4 Counts of the Transylvanian Counties 252 5 Counts of the Szeklers 254 6 Bishops of Transylvania 255 7 Provosts of the Chapter of Transylvanian Church 255 8 Archdeans of the Transylvanian Church 256 9 Provosts of Sibiu 257 Bibliography 258 Index 274

List of Maps 1 2 3

The Mongol Invasion (1241–1242) 5 The duchy of Transylvania 64 Transylvania under Ladislas Kán 109

Introduction In the late 13th century, a number of sources refer to Transylvania as a regnum, apparently different from the regnum Hungariae, but nonetheless part of its political system. The historical approach we propose hereby comes from the necessity to explain the real meaning of this concept, hitherto regarded either as a territorial, state-like entity (primarily by Romanian historians) or as an “oligarchic” regime introduced by the voivodes Roland Borsa and Ladislas Kán in the late 13th and early 14th century (an interpretation favored by Hungarian historians). While Romanian and Hungarian historians agree on the actual meaning of the word regnum, they disagree on its interpretation. Romanian historians have long insisted on the continuity of the voivodal institution and the ensuing state traditions, the origin of which is believed to go back to the “dark ages” of the 9th and 10th centuries. By contrast, Hungarian historians approach this issue as the result of the circumstances surrounding the crisis of royal authority in the late 13th century, when the Arpadian dynasty came to an end. In their views, Ladislas Kán was no different from Matthew Csák, Henrik Kőszegi or Amadé Aba, all “oligarchs” or “kinglets” emerging one by one as as ephemeral political actors, who disappeared as soon as Charles Robert of Anjou managed to secure his power over the kingdom of Hungary. Once nationalist pre- or misconceptions are removed, however, and the historical sources are examined in their own right, one is faced with fewer difficulties in the interpretation of the meaning regnum Transilvanum had for the people at that time. To be sure, regnum nostrum Transsilvanum, as mentioned in a document of duke Stephen (1266), obviously refers to a distinct political unit subordinated to the Transylvanian voivode. Anticipating one of the conclusions of this book, it is worth pointing out that, for reasons spelled out in one of the following chapters, all other refereces to regnum Transilvanum which could be dated firmly between 1288 and 1291 have certainly nothing to do with the voivode Roland Borsa and his territorial authority. The documents containing those references were issued not by the voivodal chancery, but by the Transylvanian noblemen’s congregation, an institution that came into being at that same time. Even the king used that phrase in reference to the ownership of the noble title and its associated benefices or privileges (1291). As a consequence, it appears that the Transylvanian nobility ascribed a new meaning to the term regnum: namely that of a “legal country”, legal community with its own privileges and autonomy. The remarkable development of the Transylvanian nobility beginning with the second half of the 13th century and its rise to the status of a provincial political group, the study of which is one of

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the topics of this book, entailed the bold assertion of a separate, Transylvanian identity. The recognition of such claims led to a distinction most people at that time, including the kings of Hungary, drew between Hungary and Transylvania. There are several examples of how in the late 13th and early 14th century, the Transylvanian nobility opposed any unwanted interference in local affairs of court aristocrats or landlords from outside Transylvania. It is therefore no surprise that the local nobility’s concern with maintaining control over land resources in the province resulted in a specifically Transylvanian way to deal with such issues, which were apparently different from the procedural customs in the kingdom (consuetudo regni). Claims over local land resources are undeniably linked to the political vocation of the provincial elite, which manifested itself in constant efforts to assume decision-making positions. Such aspirations came into being less than a decade after the imposition in Transylvania of the congregational regime. In fact, the policies introduced after 1301 by Ladislas Kán were largely due to the fulfillment of those aspirations. The corporate identity of the Transylvanian nobility, which finds its illustration in the status of “legal country”, was associated to the specific laws, which were different from those applying to the rest of the kingdom of Hungary, exceptions to which were consistently linked to Transylvania. Those were in fact fundamental features of the congregational system, which emerged shortly before and after 1300. The chronological span of this historical reconstruction goes to a certain extent beyond the limits announced in the title. The Mongol invasion of 1241 is commonly viewed as the watershed for the fundamental changes taking place in the Kingdom of Hungary during the second half of the 13th century, and this is definitely true for the history of the province and of its nobility. Ladislas Kán’s term as voivode of Transylvania, in itself the climax of the congregational regime, needs to be examined in its entirety, namely until 1315, long after the consolidation of the Angevine power. One can hardly study the rise of a social elite in its pursuit of full political control without understanding the political context in which such developments took place. A considerable part of this book is thus dedicated to an event-by-event reconstruction of political history, important for the understanding of the circumstances in which the Transylvanian nobility assumed a corporate identity. In paying attention to such details, I strove to offer a comprehensive view of several developments taking place at the same time and therefore shaping in different ways the historical process. For that, I have relied on the meritorious work of a few historians, who have meticulously studied the period and contributed greatly to the reconstruction of historical events.

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The relative historiographic obscurity of the topic is in fact due primarily to the difficult task of disentangling the complicated web of political developments. My own attempt to do that is based on the idea of integrating the historical phenomenon under study within the general history of Transylvania and of the kingdom of Hungary in the second half of the 13th century.

CHAPTER 1

The Mongol Invasion and Its Aftermath For a number of good reasons, the great Mongol invasion of 1241–1242 represented an exceptional event in the history of medieval Transylvania. The invasion sounded the death knell for the previous military and administrative structures of the kingdom of Hungary, which were based on royal fortresses operating as county centers. During the second half of the 13th century, the Transylvanian institutions underwent profound changes. The responsibilities of royal officials, who lived off the exploitation of royal domains, were now largely taken over by the provincial nobility, which, from this moment onwards, became the main military force of the kingdom. In Transylvania, the institutional changes were accompanied by a drastic social reconfiguration, the key feature of which was the growing importance of the lesser nobility. Equally significant was the redefinition of ethnic relations within the province, as Romanians began working together with official institutions and providing military participation in the royal army. At the same time, the great Mongol invasion radically changed the external position of Transylvania, as it cut short the crusading movement in Southeastern Europe, for which throughout the first half of the 13th century Hungary had relied on the cooperation with Latin Empire of Constantinople. The place of Transylvania in this expansion of Latin Christendom into the southeastern region of the European continent is yet insufficiently studied, but from what we know so far it appears that the province was targeted by the Mongols precisely because it was perceived as an advanced bastion of the Hungarian kingdom. Conversely, the 1241 invasion effectively stopped the eastward advance of Western Christianity beyond the Carpathian Mountains. In other words, the Mongols put an end to a century of colonization and crusading. 1.1 Prerequisites 1.1.1 One of the most trustworthy sources depicting the obstacles the Mongols had to overcome to conquer Transylvania, emanating from within the Mongolian world, is Djami ot-Tevarikh (“The Sum” or “The Complete Collection of Histories”),

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1 Adrian 2 Arieșul de Câmpie 3 Avrig 4 Baraolt 5 Bâtca Doamnei 6 Bileag 7 Birtin 8 Bulci 9 Câlnic 10 Cârța 11 Chelmac 12 Cisnădie 13 Cisnădioara 14 Codlea 15 Comana de Jos 16 Crihalma 17 Dej MAP 1

18 Făgăraș 19 Feldioara 20 Frata 21 Gârbova 22 Geled 23 Gilău 24 Hălchiu 25 Hălmeag 26 Hărman 27 Herina 28 Igriș 29 Keve 30 Lomb 31 Lotru 32 Luncani 33 Micloșoara 34 Miercurea Sibiului

The Mongol Invasion (1241–1242).

35 Ocna Dejului 36 Ocna Sibiului 37 Ocnele Turzii 38 Odorhei 39 Orăștie 40 Orlat 41 Piatra Șoimului 42 Pintic 43 Prejmer 44 Racoșul de Jos 45 Rășinari 46 Râșnov 47 Rucăr 48 Săcădate 49 Săsciori 50 Sâncel 51 Sânpetru

52 Sebeș 53 Sibiel 54 Șprenghi 55 Tămașda 56 Tășnad 57 Tâmpa 58 Teliu 59 Tilișca 60 Ungra 61 Ungurei 62 Vărșag 63 Vărșand 64 Vurpăr 65 Zalău 66 Zalnoc

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the monumental work of the Persian scholar Rashid od-Din.1 Although written half-a-century after the events, namely around 1307, this work is invaluable for having relied for the period prior to the reign of Möngke (1251–1259) not only on Juvaini,2 but also on several other sources, which have meanwhile been lost. One of those sources appears to have supplied him with detailed information about the military operations of the Mongols in Transylvania and the neighboring territories outside the Carpathian Mountains. What is the remarkable about this account3 is that, according to Rashid od-Din, the Mongol corps led by Kadan, Büri and Böček, which operated on the southern flank of the great invading army, engaged in no less than five battles, three against the “Sasans,”4 one against the “Ulaghs,”5 and another against Mišelav.6 By contrast, 1  A Jew converted to Islam, Rashid od-Din was born in Hamadan (Persia) in 1247. He started his career as the personal doctor of the Ilkhan Abaqa (1265–1281), and eventually became the financial advisor of his grandson Ghazan (1295–1304), who commissioned to him the writing of a complete history of the Mongols and of their conquest. Unfortunately, a major part of his monumental work was lost. See J. A. Boyle, “Juvaini and Rashid al-Din as sources on the history of the Mongols,” in Historians of the Middle East, edited by Bernard Lewis (New York, 1962), 133–137. 2  The History of the World-Conqueror by ‘Ala-ad-Din ‘Ata-Malik Juvaini, translated by J. A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958). A Persian by birth, ‘Ala ad-Din ‘Ata-Malik Juvaini (ca. 1226–1283), the son of minister of finance of the Great Khan Ögödei, held important offices in the political system of the Mongol Empire. See Boyle, “Juvaini and Rashid al-Din,” 134. 3  “And Kadan and Büri heading towards the Sasan people have defeated this people after three clashes. And Böček walked down the Kara Ulaghi road through the mountains there defeated that brave Ulagh people. And from there he entered the forests and the Yaprak Tak Mountains at the Mišelav border and defeated the enemies who were there ready to fight.” See Aurel Decei, “L’invasion des Tatars de 1241/1242 dans nos régions selon la Djam ot-Tevarikh de Fäzl ol-lah Räshid od-Din,” Revue Roumaine d’Histoire 12 (1973), no. 1, 101–121 (available in Romanian translation in Aurel Decei, Relaţii româno-orientale. Culegere de studii (Bucharest, 1978), here 194). 4  Most likely the Saxons of Transylvania. For the analysis of the text, see Decei, Relaţii, 193–208. 5  Most likely the Romanians in the lands outside the Carpathian Mountains. See Şerban Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire. The Romanians in the 13th Century (Cluj-Napoca, 1998), 100–101. 6  For Mišelav, see Dimitrie Onciul, Originile principatelor române (Bucharest, 1899), 95 and 155–158, who advanced the idea that Mišelav is the same as Seneslav known from the charter granted to the Hospitallers in 1247 by King Béla IV. This identification has been, accepted by Decei, Relaţii, 205–206; Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie tătară şi sud-estul european (Bucharest, 1933), 45; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 102, but questioned by Victor Spinei, Moldavia in the 11th–14th centuries (Bucharest: Ed. Academiei, 1986), 113–114; The Great Migrations in the East and South East of Europe from the Ninth to the Thirteenth Century (Cluj-Napoca, 2003), 431–432; and Dmitrii E. Mishin, “Information on the

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the northern corps under Baydar and Ordu engaged in only one battle, namely that against the German and Polish armies led by duke Henry II of Silesia, which took place on April 9, 1241 at Legnica. Judging by Rashid od-Din’s testimony, the borders of Transylvania were better defended than those of Silesia. There are few reasons to suspect Rashid od-Din for bias or distortion. He may not have had complete information on the defensive system of Transylvania, and thus may have collapsed a series of otherwise disjointed events. Be as it may, the information in his work is still remarkable, for it confirms the fact that the Mongols approached Transylvania with greater difficulty than the southern regions of Poland. The sheer numbers of troops on the southern flank of the invading army bespeak the Mongol awareness of the defense system in and around Transylvania. There is no doubt that out of seven armies deployed for the campaign of 1241, the Mongols reserved no less than three armies to operate on their western flank.7 The invasion forces may have thus consisted of between 120,000 and 140,000 men,8 including the auxiliary forces recruited from the Vlachs in Medieval Islamic Literature (Arabic and Persian),” Romanian Civilization 6 (1997), no. 2, 41–47. 7  Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 33, proposes four armies, as he regards Bochetor and Böček as two distinct characters. Similarly, Victor Spinei writes of several Mongol armies roaming in the lands just outside the Carpathian Mountains. To be sure, according to Rogerius, several other “kings crossed the river named Seret” in the company of Bochetor (“Bochetor autem cum aliis regibus, fluvium, qui Zerech dicitur, transeuntes”). See Master Roger, Epistle to the Sorrowful Lament upon the Destruction of the Kingdom of Hungary by the Tatars / Magistri Rogerii Epistola in miserabile carmen super destruction Regni Hungarie per tartaros facta, translated and annotated by János M. Bak and Martyn Rady, in Anonymus and Master Roger (Budapest/New York: CEU Press, 2010), 166 (Latin) and 167 (English). “Kings,” in this context, may refer however to Kadan and Büri. According to Spinei, The Great Migrations, 430, Master Roger’s Bochetor either Böček, son of Tului, or Bärkäčar, son of Jochi. In addition, the name may be a derivative of the term ba’atur (“hero”, “brave”). Lacking more conclusive evidence, of all three commanders mentioned by Rashid od-Din, Böček seems the most plausible identification for Bochetor. 8  The 50,000 men indicated by René Grousset, L’empire des steppes (Attila, Gengis-Khan, Tamerlan) (Paris, 1965), 328, represent a general estimate of the armies that set off in 1236 in Batu and Subutai’s European campaign. A similar figure is advanced by See K. Koščev, “Ešče raz o čislennosti mongol’skogo vojska v 1237 goda,” Voprosy istorii (1993), no. 10, 131– 135: 130,000–150,000 men, of whom only 50,000–60,000 Mongols. According to Denis Sinor, “Horse and pasture in Inner Asian history,” Oriens Extremus 19 (1972), no. 1–2, 171–183, under normal grazing conditions, the Hungarian puszta could have sustained, anything between 68,600 and 107,300 Mongol horsemen. Sinor believes that the Mongols withdrew in 1242 because of difficulties they faced in feeding their horses and livestock, which would imply

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conquered territories.9 How were these forces organized? Given the Mongols’ use of a military structure based on the decimal system,10 each of the noyons in the Genghis-Khan’s family may have relied on up to 10,000 warriors. Of some ten tümens, one for each of the commanders mentioned in the written sources11 the greatest was led directly by Batu and Subutai, the core force of the Mongol invasion. This army was estimated at over 50,000 men.12 The army operating in southern Poland under the command of Baydar, Ordu, and Kaidu must have had between 30,000 and 40,000 men. After joining the other armies just in time, these troops managed to defeat at Legnica the army of duke Henry II of Silesia, which is estimated at some 30,000 warriors (before the arrival of the support troops sent by the king of Bohemia). Thus, the three commanders operating on the southern flank may have had some 30,000 warriors on horseback, of which 10,000 followed the Danube upstreams (seemingly under the command of Böček), and 20,000 moved against Transylvania.13 No matter how cautiously one may need to treat those figures,14 it seems hard to question that the forces on the southern flank represented about a quarter of the invading army, or three eighths of the total forces that engaged in the battle against Hungary. At any rate, the military force on the southern flank appears disproportionately large, given that on the other two directions, where the Mongol armies were expected to encounter military forces larger than theirs. Moreover, the commanders of the three armies on the southern flank enjoyed a well-consolidated military prestige and at the same time held important positions in the empire’s political hierarchy. Kadan, one of the sons of the Great Khan Ögödei, had earned his excellent military reputation as the commander of one of the three armies which had invaded the Song Empire in that their numbers were larger than the given estimate. The estimate of the contemporary authors (500,000 in Master Roger and Simon of Kéza) are exaggerated. 9   See Koščev, “Ešče raz.” According to Master Roger, 40,000 Rus’ troops opened the way for Batu’s army through the Carpathian passes, while 600 captives taken from Rodna guided Kadan on his westward advance: Master Roger, Epistle, 166–167. 10  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 410. 11  Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 28. 12  This figure is indirectly confirmed by the analysis of the forces engaged in the battle at Mohi on April 11, 1241, The Hungarian army led by King Béla had between 40,000 and 50,000 men. See Bálint Homan and Gyula Szekfű, Magyar Törtenet, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1935), 406. 13  A similar opinion on the distribution of the Mongol forces in A. T. Komjathy, A Thousand Years of the Hungarian Art of War (Toronto, 1982), 20. 14  For a warning against taking figures given in Oriental sources at face value, see Spinei, The Great Migrations, 410–411.

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1235–1236.15 He had also participated in the great European campaign of Batu and Subutai, particularly in the conquest of Riazan’ in 123716 and the decisive battle at Chernigov.17 He then joined Möngke in the expedition against the Circassians on the Kuban River (1238).18 Together with Berke, Kadan may have also participated on the annihilation, in 1239–1240, of the Cuman resistance in Dešt-i Kipčak, while Batu was busy besieging Kiev. This might explain Batu and Subutai’s decision to entrust him with the command of the western flank during the attack on Hungary, the goal of which was to eliminate any resistance Transylvania and to plunder the areas settled by Cumans in Hungary. The Cuman settlements were mainly on the western side of the lands between the Danube and the Tisza rivers, as well as along the rivers Criş, lower Mureş and Timiş.19 During the winter of 1241/1242, Kadan broke the defensive line set up along the Danube by Paul Geregye, the count of Alba, thus opening the way for the second Mongol attack, which stretched all the way to the Austrian border and the Dalmatian coast. In addition, during the Mongol withdrawal of 1242, Kadan did not miss the chance of forcing Serbia and Bulgaria into submission. Büri was also part of the great family of Genghis Khan, for he was the son of Chagatai. Becoming one of Batu’s main adversaries, together with Güyük, he had a key role in the inner strife for power within the imperial family, and he was eventually killed in the process. He earned his military reputation during the campaign against Rus’, largely because of tight cooperation with Kadan. In almost every major occasion, the two warlords appear together.20 Finally, Böček, Tului’s seventh son, had distinguished himself in the campaigns against Volga Bulgaria, the Alans, the Rus’ and especially the Cumans.21 The mission assigned to him during the 1241 campaign was of strategical importance: namely to move around the Carpathian Arc and to enter from the southeast via the Banat region, thus cutting off any possibility for the Cumans of Kuthen to withdraw into the Balkans. Despite such an impressive display of force, the Mongols manage to break through the fortified frontier of Transylvania at a date later than their victories on other fronts. The northern corps had begun the attack on Poland

15  Grousset, L’empire, 323. 16  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 412–413. 17  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 414. 18  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 415. 19  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 309. See the royal diploma of 1279, in HD 427; DIR, II. 219. 20  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 409–413. 21  Decei, Relaţii, 204.

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in February 1241,22 when the towns of Lublin and Sandomierz were taken (February, 13).23 On March 18, Baydar won the battle of Chmielnik,24 followed ten days later by that of Krakow.25 In late March and early April, Baydar and Kaidu’s troops joined in at Wrocław and wiped out duke Henry II’s army at Legnica on April 9.26 Meanwhile, on the central front, the army commanded by Batu had forced its way through the Veretsky Pass on March 10, and two days later smashed the troops led by the Count Palatine Dionysius Tomaj, who had attemped to block their entry into the plains.27 On March 15, Batu’s scouts were already spotted near the town of Pest,28 while two days later the army corps under the command of Šaiban reached the Danube near the town of Vác.29 Over the next few days, Mongol troops pillaged a number of settlements on the left bank of the Danube, with records of the clashes with Ugrinus Csák, the Archbishop of Kalocsa, duke Frederick of Austria, and Bishop Benedict of Oradea.30 Eventually, in early April, after confrontations around Pest, Batu started his simulated retreat to the east, orchestrating the huge diversion that lured the royal army into the ambush at Mohi (April 11, 1241).31 Throughout all this time, the attackers on the southern flank have not accomplished much. The breach through the Carpathian passes was only accomplished on March 31,32 at a time when major victories had been already won on other fronts. By the time Batu made his appearance before the city of Buda and Baydar set Krakow on fire, no Mongol horseman had yet entered Transylvania. On the day of the decisive defeat of the Hungarian army at Mohi, Kadan and Büri’s troops had only reached Cluj and Sibiu. Most historians seem to have been oblivious to the implications of that delay. Why were the Mongols so slow on the southern front? With nothing to suggest that Kadan, Büri and Böcek have started their campaign at a later date, the key to finding a solution lies in the above-quoted account of Rashid od-Din. The only possible explanation for which the Mongols were able to cross the Carpathian Mountains only 22  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 420. 23  Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 31. 24  Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 31. 25  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 420. 26  For Legnica, see Spinei, The Great Migrations, 420–421 with n. 262. 27  Master Roger, Epistle, 160–161; Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century (Boulder/ New York, 1996), 139. 28  Master Roger, Epistle, 168–169; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 151. 29  Master Roger, Epistle, 170–171; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 152. 30  Master Roger, Epistle, 168–173. 31  On the battle at Mohi, see Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 154–160. 32  Annales Frisacenses, MGH. SS. 24: 65–67; Gombos, Catalogus, 315; Jakó 191.

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on March 31 is that they had encountered stiff resistance in the lands outside those mountains, and were bogged in mopping operations before entering Transylvania. At the same time, the southern troops seem to have been farther away from Hungary proper than the armies on the northern and central flanks. There is therefore sufficient evidence to suggest that Transylvania was one of the main targets of the great invasion of 1241, and that the resistance the invaders encountered on their way justified the careful planning of the campaign, the purpose of which was the annihilation of the military potential of Transylvania. 1.1.2 After the battle at Kalka (1223),33 the vast, albeit unstable “empire” of the Cumans underwent a rapid disintegration. That military confrontation shed light both on the winners’ military superiority and on the serious crisis undermining the Cuman political system. In addition, the solution adopted by Kuthen, one of the most important Cuman chieftains—an alliance with the Rus’ princes—had proved ineffectual. Not only did the Rus’ alliance, despite its consistency,34 fail to save the day; later developments, marked by increasing Rus’-Cuman disparities, clearly proved that a permanent alliance was impossible. Under such circumstances, only one power with interests in the region could lend a helping hand to both Cumans and Rus’, and that power was Hungary. The interest of the Hungarian kings in the Cuman steppe was of a rather recent date, and represented one aspect of papal policy of spreading Western Christianity to the East, especially after the creation of the Latin Empire of Constantinople in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. That is why the efforts of the Hungarian kings in that direction were supported by two orders, the Teutonic Knights, who were settled by King Andrew II in the Bârsa region of southeastern Transylvania (1211),35 and a missionary order, the order of the Preaching Brothers, established by St. Dominic of Guzman, 33  See Spinei, The Great Migrations, 402–403, with a discussion of sources; Grousset, L’empire, 308. 34  Grousset, L’empire, 308, believes the Rus’ army to have been as large as 80,000 men, which is most likely an over-estimate. 35  For the role of the Teutonic Knights in the Bârsa (Burzenland) within the broader political context of the crusade in Eastern Europe, see Harald Zimmermann, Der Deutsche Orden in Burzenland. Eine diplomatische Unterschung (Weimar/Vienna, 2000); Şerban Turcuş, Sfântul Scaun şi românii în secolul al XIII-lea (Cluj-Napoca, 2001), 205–233; Şerban Turcuş, “Christianitas şi românii: note privind locul românilor în realitatea creştină occidentală la începutul secolului al XIII-lea,” ActaMN, 34 (1997), no. 2, 23–27; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 40–46.

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who were engaged in converting the Cumans to Christianity.36 The Teutonic Knights began by building an impressive system of fortifications in eastern Transylvania, making it impenetrable to the then seemingly powerful Cuman attacks. Despite unfavorable, if not altogether hostile conditions, the knights started their offensive by expanding their authority over territories outside the Carpathian Arc, to an extent yet difficult to assess.37 Shortly after Kalka, however, the Grand Master Hermann von Salza put under the direct jurisdiction of the pope the Teutonic domain in the Bârsa and the adjacent lands on the other side of the mountains.38 He thus effectively cancelled all allegiance to the king of Hungary, while opening the gate for further expansion eastward. This led to King Andrew’s swift reaction of 1225, when the Teutonic Knights were forced to leave the country. They left behind a legally complicated, yet militarily solid legacy, which enabled the Hungarian king to contemplate for the first time the possibility of expansion outside the Carpathian Mountains to the east, deep into the Cuman steppe. After 1225, Prince Béla (future King Béla IV) became a key player in this borderland, as he was appointed by his father “young king” and duke of Transylvania,39 a title seemingly created for the occasion. Sharing power with King Andrew II,40 Béla had control not only over the military system in Transylvania, which until then had had no unified command, but also over the kingdom’s entire eastern policy. That control became exclusive when, following the conflict between Pope Gregory IX and King Andrew II, Béla became one of the pope’s most trusted collaborators, for Gregory wanted to make him what Béla’s father, in the pope’s eyes, had never been: a true crusader, at least in relation to the Balkan and eastern parts of the European continent. Indeed, soon after that, Prince Béla’s political initiatives in the east were secured with 36   On St. Dominic’s plans to convert the Cumans, see Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Predicatorum Historica, edited by [give the name of the editor], volume 16, part 2 (Rome, 1935), 34–35, 162, 217, 294, 378. See also R. F. Bennet, The Early Dominicans. Studies in Thirteenth-century Dominican History (Cambridge, 1937), 108, according to whom St. Dominic allegedly grew a beard in preparation for his mission to the Cumans. 37  For the most competent discussion of this problem, see Victor Spinei, “Contribuţii la istoria spaţiului est-carpatic din secolul al XI-lea până la invazia mongolă din 1241,” Memoria antiquitatis 6–8 (1974–1976): 109–111; Spinei, Moldavia 49–51. 38  The transfer was approved by Pope Honorius III on April 3o, 1224, See Potthast 7232; DIR I. 204–205, 381–382; HD 85–86; ZW 29–30. 39  The exact date of the appointment is unknown. He was definitely in office on August 1, 1226, when his brother Coloman was already duke of Slavonia, see CD III/2. 90. See also Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 96. 40  Crowned in 1214, for which see Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 49.

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the papal protection, as well as with the cooperation of the Preaching Brothers, shortly after the Dominicans became one of the most important instruments of papal policies in Eastern Europe. Given the disarray in the Cuman world in the aftermath of Kalka, the results of the fruitful combination of Hungarian (Transylvanian) military pressure and Dominican missionary propaganda did not take too long to appear. In 1227, Bortz or Burch, the chieftain of a Cuman tribe most likely located in the western lands of the Cuman steppe, next to Transylvania, decided to convert to Christianity under the spiritual guidance of the pope and the military protection of Hungary. In order to maximize the opportunities thus offered for the conversion of the region to Christianity, a Cuman bishopric was established as the foundation of a very ambitious political program.41 Entrusted to the Dominicans, the bishop of the new diocese became the administrator of a territory which, following the 1224 charter for the Teutonic Knights was a part of the lands they had placed under the jurisdiction of the pope (terra Sancti Petri). As the papal jurists did not regard as closed the conflict between Hungary and Teutonic Knights, Prince Béla could neither assume the title of King of Cumania, nor appoint Hungarian officials in the lands of the Cuman bishopric, even though he was its military protector. That the conversion of Bortz and his tribe had serious repercussions in the Cuman world results from Khan Kuthen’s reaction. He refused Béla’s offer of alliance and preferred to remain on the side of the Rus’ princes until the eve of the great Mongol invasion of Eastern Europe. In 1230, when Béla campaigned against Daniil of Halych-Volhynia and his ally Kuthen, he relied on assistance from another Cuman warlord, Begovars,42 an indication of the growing Hungarian influence in the steppe lands. Daniil and Kuthen remained close allies throughout the entire period between 1227 and 1233.43 After 1235, however, as the Mongols resumed their offensive, they completely changed their strategy. Since 1229, the Mongols had been a common presence on the left bank of the Volga River, and two Cuman tribes (of Durut and Toksoba) had accepted 41  As for the activity of the Dominicans in the lands outside the Carpathian Mountains and the establishment of the Cuman Bishopric, see I. Ferenţ, Cumanii and episcopiile lor (Blaj, 1931); Spinei, Moldavia, 51–54; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 104–107; Turcuş, Sfântul Scaun, 284–302; Turcuş,, “Christianitas şi românii,” 19–21; Victor Spinei, “The Cuman bishopric—genesis and evolution,” in The Other Europe in the Middle Ages. Avars, Bulgars, Khazars, and Cumans, edited by Florin Curta (Leiden/Boston, 2008), 413–456. 42  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 301. 43  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 301–302.

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their hegemony.44 In an attempt to keep the Mongols as far away as possible from their own borders, the Hungarians had established contact with the lands known as Magna Hungaria on the Volga, by means of a Dominican mission. However, such contacts proved inconsequential. Friar Ricardus learned in 1236 in Suzdal, that Magna Hungaria had already submitted to the Mongols. The great invasion of Europe had started. 1.1.3 The effort of the Hungarian kings to expand their influence in the Cuman steppe and beyond, culminating with Dominican mission to the Volga, could not have escaped the attention of the Mongol warlords. The great kuriltai of 1235, at which the decision was taken to attack the Cuman steppe, had explicitly defined Hungary as one of the potential opponents.45 The account of Friar Julian, one of the Dominicans Béla sent to Magna Hungaria, is evidence of the Mongols’ preoccupation with the realm of the Arpadian kings.46 The same is true for Batu’s attempt to establish diplomatic contacts with the King Béla at the beginning of the military operations on the Volga.47 Batu’s contacts with Béla are also mentioned in the chronicle of Matthew of Paris.48 Batu’s insistence undoubtedly concealed a more menacing approach, but also shows that the Mongols were open to negotiations,49 their primary objective being to eliminate (by diplomatic means, if possible) any Hungarian competition in the Cuman steppe. King Béla’s refusal can only be interpreted as accepting the challenge. In reality, the great Mongol offensive had itself opened the gates of the East, for even Kuthen, Béla’s old enemy, as well as some of the Rus’ princes asked for the king’s help and accepted his alliance and protection.50 This newly-acquired 44  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 299. 45  Juvaini, apud Spinei, The Great Migrations, 409. 46  László Bendeffy, “Fontes authentici itinera (1235–1238) fr. Iuliani illustrantes,” Archivium Europae Centro-Orientalis 3 (1937), nos. 1–4, 38 and 42. 47  A letter addressed by Batu to the Hungarian king, which has been entrusted to the Dominican missionary by the prince of Suzdal’, reproached Béla for not answering to the 30 (!) envoys that had already been sent to him. Two versions of the letter in Wenzel, VII, 549–550 and 554–555. 48  Matthee of Paris IV, 274. Batu’s envoy was a former Templar, who was captured and interrogated by duke Frederick of Babenberg in the spring of 1242, while the Mongols reached Austria. 49  Similar messages had been sent by the Mongols to the Rus’ princes before the battle at Kalka. See John Fennel, The Crisis of Medieval Russia (1200–1304) (New York, 1989), 65. 50  Master Roger, Epistle, 136–141.

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influence, after almost two decades of unfruitful attempts, could not be preserved however only by means of political and missionary activities. Béla’s new eastern allies were all awaiting for his serious involvement in fighting the invaders. In this context, under the year 1239 the chronicle of the Cistercian monk Alberic of Trois-Fontaines mentions a Hungarian attack against the Mongols run by a certain “count of Transylvania” (comes Ultrasilvanus). After some initial success, in a battle “near the Meotid marshes” (the name given since Antiquity to the Sea of Azov),51 the commander of the Hungarian expedition into the steppe lands was killed.52 This bit of information is corroborated by the Dominican chronicler Nicholas Trivet, who wrote in the early 14th century and who mentions an attack on the Mongols led by “one of the Polish or Hungarian princes.” Apparently, the attack caused great distress among the Mongols in regards to their relations to the realm of the Arpadian kings, but their “idols” shared the internal contradictions which also divided the Hungarian society.53 Nicholas Trivet’s “prince” is most likely the “count of Transylvania” in Alberic’s account. Who was this character? A count (comes) of Transylvania, also appears in a papal letter of 1238,54 and he may have been a deputy of the voivode’s in

51  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 424. 52  Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. Paul Scheffer-Boichorst, MGH SS 23: 946: “Contra Tartaros vero misit comitem Ultrasilvanum, qui in quodam angusto transito paludum Meotidarum ita confregit primum cornum illorum, quod ceteris retro respicientibus, iam in illis partibus perisse putabatur memoria eorum cum sonitu.” 53  Gombos, Catalogus, 4017, 1707: “Tartari subactis Georgia, India, Armenia maiore ac Turkia, per unum de principibus Poloniam et Hungariam sunt aggressi. Cum vero timerent intrare Hungariam, consulentes idola, dum hostias immolarent, tale accepisse feruntur responsum: Ite securi, quia spiritus infidelitates et discordiae vos praecedent, quibus inter se turbati Hungari vobis minime praevalebunt.” Since the chronicler highlights the fact that the Mongols were afraid to attack Hungary, but not Poland, one could draw the conclusion that the attack came from Hungary. 54  A certain count of Transylvania named Ladislas is mentioned in Pope Gregory IX’s letter of February 11, 1238: “nobilis vir Ladislaus . . . comes eiusdem diocesis /Ultrasilvane/” (DIR, C, XI–XIII, 316–317, 414; Theiner, I, 161–162; Jáko, EO, 187). Ladislas appears to have been in conflict with bishop of Transylvania, who appealed against him to the pope. He was most certainly not the voivode of Transylvania, Pousa, who is specifically mentioned in a separate letter of the same pope dated to January 29, 1238 (RA 637). He may however have been Ladislas Aba, a veteran of the Galician campaigns, in which brother Myke (Miko), former count of Bihor (1212–1222) had lost his life. In 1234, as a reward for his military merits, Ladislas Aba received from King Andrew II a land grant in Bihor (RA 527 with text; DIR I. 276–280).

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charge with the troops on the frontier or even beyond it, within the lands outside the Carpathian Arc and within the Cuman bishopric. The Transylvanian expedition of 1239 must have undoubtedly been associated with the clashes between the Mongols and Kuthen, the latter on the verge of giving up on the resistance that looked initially so promising.55 His decisive defeat in that same year sealed the fate of the entire steppe corridor north of the Black Sea. Kuthen was forced to flee to Hungary together with his Cumans.56 After that, King Béla’s efforts concentrated exclusively on the defense of his own kingdom. He therefore refused to provide assistance to the Kievans besieged by Batu, despite the request of the Grand Prince Mikhail Vsevolodovich.57 Nonetheless, Béla did not hesitate to offer asylum to both Mikhail and, later, Daniil Romanovich, the only Rus’ prince known to have sent troops to Kiev. The reasons for the Mongol attack on Hungary are thus obvious, and so are those that made them hesitate to do so earlier. The asylum Béla offered to anyone asking for it and the enlisting of Cuman refugees turned Hungary into a potential contender to recent Mongol conquests. At the same time, the military campaign of the Transylvanian “count” was not just an intolerable offense, but also a proof that Hungary had the means to put its expansionist plans into the steppe lands in practice. This irrefutable evidence warned Batu and Subutai that, unless the Hungarian menace was removed, the conquest of the Cuman steppe could never be complete. Tackling the Hungarian issue made it necessary to deal a most severe blow on Transylvania, at that time Hungary’s advanced bastion to the east. 1.2

The Organization of Transylvania’s Defense

1.2.1 Prompted by the settlement of the Saxon colonists (hospites), the military network of Transylvania has been revived in the second half of the 12th century. 55  According to Master Roger, Kuthen had initially succeeded in inflicting two defeats on the Mongols. During a third confrontation, however, he he was taken by surprise and was forced to admit defeat. Master Roger, Epistle, 136–137. 56  According to Roger, there were 40,000 Cumans together, with their families, (circa quadraginta milia dicebantur: Master Roger, Epistle, 140–141. András Pálóczi-Horváth, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians. Steppe People in Medieval Hungary (Budapest, 1989), 60–61 has raised doubts about that figure, pointing out that the area in which the Cumans were settled by Béla IV in 1246 could support only between 17,000 and 20,000 families. 57  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 416–417.

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During the first decade of the 13th century, given Hungary’s contribution to the crusade in Southeastern Europe, which resulted in the creation of the Latin Empire of Constantinople, the defense network in Transylvania was reorganized into an even more remarkable offensive structure. This was most likely the period when it was separated from the military organization at the county level and was placed under the command of the count of Sibiu. In addition to an elite force recruited from among German settlers, and the Szeklers troops, the new military organization now harnessed the military abilities of two frontier populations, namely the Romanians and the Pechenegs. An army with exactly that composition is said to have intervened in Bulgaria in 1210, under the leadership of count Joachim (Iwachinus) Türje of Sibiu, in order to provide military assistance to the pro-Hungarian emperor Boril.58 The Pechenegs had already in the 12th century joined the Szeklers in the defense of the eastern frontier of the kingdom, which was at that time placed under the command of the count of Alba. In the early 13th century, they seem to have been in the process of being assimilated.59 Their role was now taken by the older inhabitants of the province, the Romanians, with whom the Pechenegs appear to have cooperated in the past. That Romanians were now included in the military organization of Transylvania suggests that neither the Saxons (German settlers), nor the Szeklers were numerous.60 It was under those circumstances that a royal charter of 122261 acknowledged the existence of a “country of the Romanians” (terra Blachorum), which apparently enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in sharp contrast to the encroachments of the previous decades.62 Another new element appearing in the border area of southern Transylvania, probably again in response to the lack of manpower, was the introduction of the royal servientes.63 The charter King Andrew II granted to Johannes Latinus in 1204 is in fact the first piece of firm evidence pertaining to the institution of servientes in the kingdom of Hungary.64

58  DIR I. 338–339; Wenzel VII. 310–311; Jáko 37: Saxonibus, Olacis, Siculis et Bissenis. 59   N. A. Busuioc-von Hasselbach, Ţara Făgăraşului în secolul al XIII-lea. Mănăstirea cisterciană Cârţa, vol. 1 (Cluj-Napoca, 2000), 151–152 offers examples of noble families from the Făgăraş who were probably of Pecheneg origin. See also 171–338, for place names and other names of Turkic origin from the Făgăraş area. 60  The Saxons were expected to contribute 500 soldiers to the defense of the kingdom (Andreanum, ZW 32–35, DIR I. 208–210). 61  DIR I. 182–184; ZW 18–20. 62  Antal Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului în Evul mediu (Bucharest, 1999), 149–171. 63  On the category of royal servientes see Martyn Rady, Nobility, Land and Service in Medieval Hungary (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000), 35–38. 64  DIR I. 28–29; ZW 7–8; HD 50–51; Jáko 30.

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The influence and authority of the count of Sibiu, which initially seem to have covered the whole of Transylvania, was soon diminished by the settlement of the Teutonic Knights in the Bârsa region in 1211, and the creation of the Banate of Severin in 1232/1233. That various elements in the military organization were supposed to work together results from the right granted in 1224 to the Saxons to use “the forest of the Romanians and the Pechenegs” (silva Blacorum et Bissenorum),65 as well as from the exemption in 1222 of the Teutonic Knights from paying customs duties when crossing terra Blachorum and terra Siculorum.66 The three entities—the Bârsa now in the hands of the Teutonic Knights, “the country of the Blachs/Romanians” and “the country of the Szeklers”—were obviously components of one and the same military system. The fragmentation of the frontier defense, as well as the coordination between the royal troops and the Saxons of the “province” of Sibiu,67 may explain why, shortly after expelling the Teutonic Knights from the Bârsa (1225), King Andrew II established the new title of “duke of Transylvania.” The incumbent—no other than the heir apparent, Béla—had authority over all military structures, which considerably increased their efficiency. As its influence expanded in the Lower Danube in the aftermath of the war with Bulgaria, the military organization of Transylvania came to include also a number of Romanian polities on the other side of the Carpathian Mountains (Transylvanian Alps) along the valleys of the rivers Jiu and Argeş valleys. Béla, on the other hand, promptly placed the Cuman bishopric—including a number of smaller Romanian polities—under his military authority, thus effectively extending the “Duchy of Transylvania” to the southeast across the Carpathian Mountains as well.68 His subsequent coronation as king in 1235 put an end to the “Duchy of Transylvania,” which triggered a conflict between the voivode and the count of Sibiu over authority in the lands from which the Teutonic Knights had been expelled. Along with the efforts the voivode initiated in 1235 to establish his authority in the Bârsa and the eastern area of the Country of Făgăraş, the bishop of Alba Iulia also strove to include those lands in his diocese. The conflict appears to have been 65  For the location of that forest, see Busuioc-von Hasselbach, Ţara Făgăraşului, 254–272; Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 157–158. 66  DIR I. 182–184; ZW 18–20. 67  This results, among other things from the restrictive provisions of the Andreanum of 1224: the Saxons were obliged to accomodate the voivode of Transylvania twice a year, provided that he acted, as specifically mentioned, ad regalem utilitatem. Otherwise, no distinction is made between voivode and any other royal “serf” (dignitary), whom the Saxons were to provide only 50 soldiers, and only at the specific request of the king. DIR I. 208–210, 383–384; ZW 32–35. 68  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 97–103.

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still going on at the time of the Mongol invasion of 1241, which no doubt had serious consequences for the organization of the frontier defense. 1.2.2 Many new fortifications were built in the early 13th century, and old ones were repaired and extended. On the eastern border of Latin Christendom, Transylvania probably had the most fortified frontier. The lance head of this defensive system was the heavily fortified Bârsa region, in which the Teutonic Knights erected five fortresses between 1211 and 1225. After their departure, additional fortifications were erected at the order of the Hungarian crown. The royal donation diploma of 1211 granted the Knights the right to build only timber (-and-earth) fortifications.69 However, eleven years later, when renewing his initial grant, the king had to allow the Knights the right to build stone fortifications, a right, however, which they seem to have already assumed.70 According to Pope Gregory IX’s bulls issued between 1231 and 1234 to endorse the knights’ demands for restitution, there were no less than five fortifications. Moroever, another fortress, built ultra montes nivium, have been erected at a later date.71 The identification of those fortresses (the number given in the papal bulls may be treated with suspicion, given that the purpose of those documents was to obtain restitution) has been one of the greatest challenges of historians dealing with the medieval history of Transylvania. Without getting into the details of that controversial issue, suffice to say that, with the exception of Marienburg—the location of which in Feldioara seems to be accepted by everyone—no other fortress said to have been erected by the Knights has so far been identified on the ground. According to recent opinions, possible candidates are Codlea,72 one of the fortifications in the environs

69  DIR I. 150–151, 369–370; ZW 11–12. 70  DIR I. 182–184; ZW 18–20. 71  DIR I. 245–246, ZW 51 (1231); DIR I. 256–258, ZW 55–57 (1232); DIR I. 272–273, ZW 58–60 (1234). 72  Kurt Horedt, “Zur siebenbürgischen Burgenforschung,” Südost-Forschungen 6 (1941), 588–589;. See also Virgil Vătăşianu, Istoria artei feudale în Ţările Române, IInd ed., Cluj Napoca, 2001, 11; Alfred Prox, “Die Burgen des Burzenlandes,” Siebenburgisches Archiv 1 (1962), 61; Géza Bakó, and Gernot Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften und Gerichtsstühle,” Neuer Weg 8565 (November, 27, 1976), 4, cited in Thomas Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor în Transilvania (Bucharest, 1992), 190–191; Benkő, KMTL, 216; Grigore Ionescu, Arhitectura pe teritoriul României de-a lungul veacurilor (Bucharest, 1982), 132; Paul Binder, “Antecedente şi consecinţe sud-transilvănene ale formării voievodatului Munteniei (sec. XIII–XIV), II,” Acta Hargitensia 2 (1997), 33.

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of Braşov (Tâmpa, Şprenghi or another, yet unidentified location),73 Hălchiu (Heldenburg),74 Râşnov,75 Rucăr,76 Teliu (Cruceburg, Cetatea Crucii),77 Racoşul de Jos (“Mihályvára”, in the Várpatak valley),78 and Comana de Jos.79 Besides strongholds in the Bârsa area, the Teutonic Knights are known to have built another strong fortification (castrum munitissimum) somewhere beyond the mountains, but it is not clear whether or not that fortification is Cruceburg.80 That particular fortress seems to have been bone of contention in the dispute between the Knights and King Andrew II, who had not given his approval for its erection. The fortress was eventually taken by force by the royal troops even before the Knights were expelled from Bârsa in the summer of 1225.81 Pending further archaeological information on the Teutonic fortresses, one document can however assist our approach. In two charters issued on March 17 and March 21, 1240,82 King Béla IV granted to the Cistercian monks a number of four churches in Bârsa, which had been persistently claimed also by the bishop of Transylvania. For reasons that remain unknown, the monks did not immediately obtain the grant, and the king saw it fit to compensate them for the delay. The four churches donated in 1238–124083 were located in Feldioara (Castrum Sactae Marye), Sânpetru (Mons Sancti Petri), Hărman (Mons Mellis) and Prejmer (Tartilleu/Tartilleri),84—all located within the lands granted to the Teutonic Knights in 1211. Judging by the situation in Feldioara, which appears on the list, those churches may have all been located within fortresses. By means of this compromise, King Béla may have attempted to placate the 73  Bakó, and Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften,” 4; Benkő, KMTL, 126. 74  Prox, “Die Burgen,” 61. 75  Bakó, and Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften,” 4. 76  Prox, “Die Burgen,” 61; Ionescu, Arhitectura, 132; Binder, “Antecedente,” 33. 77  Prox, “Die Burgen,” 61; Bakó, and Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften,” 4. 78  Binder, “Antecedente,” 33. 79  Binder, “Antecedente,” 33. 80  The text of the the 1222 donation suggests that Cruceburg, which the king granted to the knights, was located inside the Bârsa area—DIR I. 182–184; ZW 18–20. The fortress beyond the mountains seems to have been erected between 1222 and 1224 with no permission from the king. That in fact was the spark that ignited the conflict of 1224–1225. 81  DIR I. 214–216; ZW 36–38. 82  Michel Tănase, “Avatarurile unui act de donaţie. Donaţia făcută Cistercienilor, în Ţara Bârsei, de către Bela IV, la 17 martie 1240,” Revista Istorică 4 (1993), no. 1–2, 55–80, reviewing previous editions (DIR I. 319–320, ZW 68–69, HD 184–185 and others). 83  Tănase, “Avatarurile,” 69–70 believes that the donation to the Cistercians was probably made in 1238, the documents of 1240 being only the solemn confirmation of the previous transaction. 84  Tănase, “Avatarurile,” 63.

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pope, who has aggressively campaigned in favor of the Knights in the previous years. Even if the churches in question were not in fact restituted to the Knights, they were given now to another monastic order with outstanding contributions to the crusading cause. The papacy seems to have been pleased with the arrangement, which effectively put an end to complaints from Hermann von Salza and his successors. That the king was in a position to transfer immediately the churches in question to the Cistercians may have been the result of his conflict with the Knights.85 The delay must have been caused by the preparations the voivode Pousa made to prevent the Mongol invasion, which in turn would imply that the churches granted to the Cistercians were inside, or at least next to strongholds.86 Despite the fact that the exact location of the five Teutonic fortresses remains unknown, there can be no doubt that the defensive potential of fortresses in the Bârsa area grew considerably during the decade separating the departure of the Knights from Transylvania from the Mongol invasion. According to Thomas Nägler, the Teutonic Knights started out with the building of more than five fortresses, but did not have the time to finish the job.87 Their efforts, though, were brought to fruition by duke Béla (1225–1235) and, after his coronation, by voivode Pousa. Shortly before the 1241 invasion, Transylvania received a significant number of fortifications, which are also mentioned in Alberic’s chronicle.88 Inside Transylvania, and behind the line fortified by the Knights, there were several royal fortresses that had been erected well before 1211. Two of these

85  Tănase, “Avatarurile,” 69–71. It is however less likely that fifteen years after being driven out of Transylvania, the Teutonic Knights continued to cash in revenues from the Bârsa area. 86  Native settlements were discovered in Hărman, Sânpetru, and Prejmer, which could be dated to the 8th–12th centuries. The area must have been populated before the arrival of the Knights. See Alexandrina D. Alexandrescu, Ion Pop, and Maryna Marcu, “Raport asupra săpăturilor de la Hărman, jud. Braşov (Report on the Hărman, Braşov county, digging) (1961–1970),” MCA 10 (1973), 231. As for the settlements of the German “guests” Michel Tănase has demonstrated that they had the same dependant position in relation to the Knights as the Cistercians (Tănase, “Avatarurile,” 71). 87  Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 192. 88  Albericus, in MGH SS 23: 946: Given that the two fortresses that King Béla “fortified” ultra silvas et nemora were of importance, since news about them were sent to the other side of Europe, they could be identified with Codlea and Feldioara. The former must have been built on this particular occasion, the other simply rebuilt, possibly in a different location. See Bakó, and Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften,” 4, cited in Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 191.

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fortresses were Ungra89 and Hălmeag,90 both mentioned together with “indagines Nicolai” from the Micloşoara area, in the royal donation of 1211.91 Also, some of the other fortresses listed by Schullerus as border fortresses (for instance, Crihalma or Săcădate)92 might have undergone some remodeling. On the other hand, most of the fortresses located on the western slopes of the Eastern Carpathians were either reinforced with earthen palisades and wooden poles, or border fence lines (indagines)93 which, according to Albericus, blocked the mountain paths.94 Moreover, there is the possibility that at least two stone fortresses predate the Mongolian assault: Odorhei and Vărşag.95 On the eastern side of the Carpathians the Hungarian crown commanded the border fortress of Bâtca Doamnei (Piatra Neamţ),96 which controlled the access to the Bistriţa valley, in Moldavia. Even though there is no recent evaluation available regarding the state of the fortifications located around 1241 on the Olt Gorge, it is well known that the strategic importance of this region had increased considerably in the first decades of the 13th century.97 In order to secure this mountain pass, the Hungarian crown imposed its direct authority on the western most part of the Country of Făgăraş.98 Besides having the Saxons colonize the region,99 they erected the earthen fortress of Avrig.100 In addition, the fortresses of 89  Stone fortress (70/40 m) researched by archeologists, dating back to the first decades of the 13th century—Radu Popa, Radu Ştefănescu, Şantierul arheologic Ungra, jud. Braşov), MCA, XIV, (1980), 496–503. 90  Lukács, Ţara Fagăraşului, 154. 91  Prima vero meta huius terre incipit de indaginibus castri Almage et procedit usque ad indagines castri Noilgiant, et inde progreditur unsque ad indagines Nicolai—DIR I. 150–151, 369– 370; ZW 11–12. 92  Schullerus, “Die Grenzburgen der Altlinie”, Korrespondenzblatt, XLI, no. 5–8, (1918): 17–21. Same opinion at Horedt, Zur siebenbürgischen, 122. 93  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 425. 94  Albericus, in Gombos, Catalogus, 33. 95  Adrian A. Rusu, “Arheologia, cronologia and interpretarea istorică a unor cetăţi medievale timpurii din Transilvania de est. Note critice”, Crisia XXIV (1994): 43–54. Mircea Rusu, Castrum, urbs, civitas (cetăţi şi “oraşe” transilvănene din sec. IX–XIII), ActaMN VII (1971): 201. 96  Spinei, “Contribuţii la istoria”, 145–148; Moldavia in the 11th–14th centuries, 65–66. 97  Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 161. 98  Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 161. 99  Busuioc-von Hasselbach, Ţara Făgăraşului, 232. 100   Horedt, “Südsiebenbürgische Grenzburgen”, in Siebenbürgische Vierteljahrschrift 64 (Hermannstadt, 1941) 17–19. For a more reserved opinion see also Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 148.

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Orlat101 and perhaps Lotru102 may have been constructed within the same time span. Also, during the reign of Andrew II, Sibiu, the county seat of Sibiu, was expanded and received a stone wall.103 1.2.3 Flaws in the System In spite of the strongholds and the natural advantages that made Transylvania’s military frontier an impenetrable barrier to less persistant invaders, such as the Cumans, certain weakness left it vulnerable to a massive invasion. First and foremost, Transylvania’s defensive capabilities were restricted to the border itself.104 For the Hungarian crown, the consolidation of the military frontier eliminated any threat to the hinterland and no longer required the military reformation of the counties. Such a measure would have inherently entailed a complete overhaul of the administrative system, for which King Bela was anything but ready. Starting with the end of the 12th century, the state’s resources were channeled mainly towards the frontier areas, neglecting almost completely the bigger inland fortresses.105 Thus, should an invader succeed in breaching the frontier, almost no resistance would oppose its advance towards the center of the kingdom. Secondly, the army defending the frontier was not prepared to deal with a massive onslaught; they could only hold back the invaders until the royal army’s arrival. Thus, it is no wonder that in 1241, when the royal army was busy fighting with an invasion in central Hungary, the stiff resistance mounted by the Transylvanians proved to be insufficient. Moreover, the general assembly ordered by king Bela IV in early March deprived the Transylvanian frontier of a great number of potential defenders. It is also known that the king called for all high ecclesiastic officials to spare none of their material resources and to hire

101   Thomas Nägler, “Cetăţile feudale de la Orlat şi continuitatea românilor în sudul Transilvaniei”, Muzeul Brukenthal. Studii and comunicări. Arheologie-istorie, no. 20 (1977): 27–49; Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 157. 102   Horedt, “Zur siebenbürgischen”, 594; See Vătăşianu, Istoria artei, 131; Busuioc-von Hasselbach, Ţara Făgăraşului, 266. 103  Petre Munteanu Beşliu, “Sibiu”, Cronica cercetărilor arheologice 1983–1992. A XXXI–a Sesiune Naţională de rapoarte arheologice (Bucharest, 1997), 96–98. 104  Adrian A. Rusu, Forteresses du Haut Moyen-Âge de Transylvanie. État des recherches, in Frühmittelalterliche Burgen Mitteleuropas bis zum Ende des 12. Jahrhunderts. 4. Castrumbene-Konferenz (Visegrád, 1994), 59. 105  Rusu, Forteresses, 59. Some of these fortresses (Alba Iulia, Cluj-Mănăştur, Arad, Cenad), also incorporated buildings with religious function, and their importance increased above the initial military functions of the fortresses.

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and equip new military units to serve under his command.106 Among those who responded to the king’ summon were Bishops Benedict of Oradea, Bulchu of Cenad, the Provost of Arad and Bishop Raynaldus of Transylvania. The latter became one of the martyrs of the battle of Mohi, which also claimed the life of Provost Nicholas of Sibiu.107 The Bishop of Oradea, succeded in gathering “a great army”,108 that was subsequently defeated under his command in the attempt to liberate the town of Agria (Eger), shortly after it was occupied by the Mongols.109 On its way to Buda, the army led by the Bishop of Cenad was engaged in a series of clashes with the Cumans who were plundering their way out of Hungary.110 Not just the church officials unanimously honored the king’s request, but also the leaders of the counties neighboring Transylvania. Rogerius recounts that count Boch (Both) of Bihor led his men to fight alongside Bishop Benedict in the battle of Agria, but he fails to inform his reader whether he survived it or not.111 On the other hand, the Solnoc county troops, placed under the command of the Count Palatine Dionysius Tomaj, might have been crushed, together with the palatine army, by the Mongols shortly after crossing the Verecke Pass (March 10th, 1241). In one way or another, all these forces, that at least in teory could have pulled a good oar to the defense of Transylvania or at least raise a new defensive line at its western border, were used to defend the core of the kingdom itself. In this context, the forces gathered by voivode Pousa against the Mongols in Burzenland were hardly a match for the invaders. In conclusion, even though Transylvania had a considerable number of strong fortifications they were unevenly distributed along the frontier. Although a great number of them were located in the Carpathian area, a number of potential passes were insufficiently defended. One of these—near Rodna—was in fact the route taken by Kadan’s army. The defensive system set up in the years prior to the invasion failed to make up for the gaps, which allowed the Mongols to succeed in outflanking it.

106  Master Roger, Epistle, 160–161. 107  Master Roger, Epistle, 186–187. 108  Master Roger, Epistle, 178–179: pro se de mandato regis magno exercitu congregato . . . 109  Master Roger, Epistle, 178–181. 110  Master Roger, Epistle, 176–177. 111  Master Roger, Epistle, 178–179.

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25

The Campaign

1.3.1 Despite the lack of sufficient evidence, most historians assumed that the entire Mongol forces employed in the offensive against Central Europe were camped during the winter of 1240–1241 in an area confined around Halych. This hypothesis is not confirmed by any known source. On the contrary, Rogerius accounts that the troops marching through the Gate of Russia under Batu’s leadership were merely a part of the invading army.112 Furthermore, this assumption goes against existing evidence placing the entire Mongol army in the Hungarian plain during the winter of 1241–1242. This placed a huge burden on the area’s food resources which eventually forced the Mongols out of the Arpadian kingdom.113 Even though the geographical conditions of Halych were a lot less favorable for camping an army of nomadic riders compared to those of the Hungarian plain, there are no mentions of a similar food shortage. In addition, the strategic assembly of all Mongol effectives in the Hungarian plain was only the result of the military necessities of 1241–1242. Such a strategy is not recorded in any other episode of the massive European military campaigns started in 1236. Considering the aspects mentioned above, it is more likely that the extensive effectives of the invading army were spread over a vast area alongside the frontiers of the states targeted by these campaigns. The troops led by Baydar and Ordu, the initiators of the attack against Poland (February 1241), were concentrated somewhere around Vladimir, that is, more than one hundred kilometers away from the area where Batu’s troops camped for the winter. The fact that the northern flank of the Mongol offensive was the first to start the military operations was undoubtedly due to the absence of any natural obstacles to hinder their advance. Considering the significant time gap between Batu’s breach of the Verecke pass (March 10th) and the time Kadan and Büri’s troops entered Transylvania (March 31st), the southern flank could not have joined the offensive from the Halych area. If we are to believe that the southern flank did start the campaign from Halych, then Kadan’s delay to join in remains unaccountable. Starting 112  Master Roger, Epistle, 164–165: Bathu maior dominus, dimissa tota familia, solus cum suis militibus et non multis ad dictam portam Ruscie, que propior erat ad locum in quo rex congregabat exercitum, recto tramite properauit, et expugnando exercitu comitis Palatini eandem porta obtinuit et intrauit. 113  See infra, 1.4.

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from the Halych area around the same date as Batu’s offensive, Kadan should have reached the mountains around March 10th and, should have been able to cross them in three days, as indicates Rogerius,114 they should have reached Rodna around March 15th at the latest, which surely did not happen. Hence, we must consider the existence of an additional concentration area on the southern Mongol flank, which was likely located somewhere on the Lower or Middle Dniester. This hypothesis is also supported by the analysis of the attack directions of the Mongol troops on Transylvania. Thus, the conquest and subsequent destruction of the fortress at Bâtca Doamnei (Piatra Neamţ) provides a valuable clues regarding the route taken by Kadan’s army.115 The march took him up the Moldavian Bistriţa Valley until he reached the Dorna Valley. He then must have followed down the Ilva River, making a surprise appearance in front of Rodna on March 30th, 1241. According to Epternach’s account, Büri made his entrance into Burzenland around the same date (March 31st)116 which indicates not only a perfect coordination of these military operations, but also the fact that the two armies seem to have divided themselves shortly before the crossing of the Carpathians, probably somewhere near the junction of Bistriţa and Siret Rivers. The mission of the troops led by Bochetor/Böček, as opposed to that of Kadan–Büri’s army, was to keep under surveillance the movements of the Cuman refugees located in the Balkan Peninsula and to forestall any regrouping attempt on their part. Consequently, this army might have wintered somewhere close to the Danube River, most likely in the Budjak Steppe. 1.3.2 In the winter of 1240–1241, the Mongol troops camped in these regions carried out preliminary military operations similar to those performed by Batu’s troops in the Halych area. In fact, they were familiar with the Cuman steppe from previous years. Back then, Böček managed to stand out against the Cuman leader Bačman,117 and afterwards to participate, alongside Büri in the conquest of Crimea.118 The Cumans’ last centers of resistance were most likely

114  Master Roger, Epistle, 164–167. 115  Mircea Dogaru, Istoria militară a poporului român, vol. I, (Bucharest, 1984), 317–318. Spinei, Moldavia 112, considers this action was made by an army corps subordinated to Kadan. Also Spinei, The Great Migrations, 430. 116  Eodem die (Resurrectionis dominice) alter exercitus eorundem Tartarorum ingrediens provinciam que Burza dicitur—Annales Frisacenses, MGH, SS, XXIV, 65–67; Jakó 191. 117  Decei, Relaţii, 204 118  Spinei, Moldavia, 113.

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annihilated shortly before the offensive in Hungary.119 The fact that the Cuman bishop managed to raise a local army, composed mostly of Wallachians— Rashid od-Din’s Ulaghs—ready to engage in an open combat with the invading Mongol forces is a strong evidence of the political and military structures already existing in the region. While Böček’s victorious troops headed towards a new confrontation with the Wallachians (kara-ulagh) led by Mišelav, and then set foot into Hungary via Severin,120 Kadan and Büri attacked the fortified line of the Carpathians. We can not know for sure whether the division of Kadan and Büri’s forces was part of the initial offensive plan, or it was only the result of the first and least successful confrontation with the defenders of the Carpathian passes. While the route followed by Kadan to reach Rodna seems rather clear, there is still doubt regarding the mountain pass chosen by Büri in order to reach Burzenland, most of the historians favoring the Oituz pass.121 Once they left behind the mountain passes fortified by the locals with palisades,122 the two invading armies were faced with even more difficulties. Kadan succeeded in conquering Rodna—a mining town with no fortifications—after two attacks, and a faked retreat to weaken the town’s defenses.123 After the conquest of Rodna, guided by the newly acquired 600 hostages, among which the Saxon judge Aristaldus, Kadan headed towards Bistriţa, which he conquered on April 2nd.124 The conquest of Bistriţa marked the end of the resistance in the Saxon colonized northeastern Transylvania. The path towards the heart of the province appeared now to be secured. Still, Kadan’s advance went a lot slower than anticipated. He undoubtedly destroyed the salt mines located around Dej and conquered the royal fortress from Dăbâca.125 He then attacked the royal castle of Cluj, which he conquered126 on April 11th and massacred the population. Next, Kadan continued his westward advance and reached Oradea on

119  Byzantine historian Nicephor Gregoras records, around the year 1241, the refuge to the south of Danube of 10,000 Cumans from the North-Black Sea steppe, FHDR III, 500–501. 120  For a different opinion, see: Maria Holban, Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare în secolele XI–XIV, (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1981) 70–73. 121  Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 35–36; Spinei, Moldavia 113. 122  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 430–435. 123  Master Roger, Epistle, 166–167. 124  Notitia Epternach: Feria III eiusdem hebdomande in opido quod Nosa dicitur ceciderunt ex Christianis VI milia XIII. 125  Ştefan Pascu et al., “Cetatea Dăbâca”, ActaMN V (1968): 166, 182–183. 126  Notitia Epternach: item in quodam castro quod dicitur Cluse ceciderunt infinite multitudo Hungarorum.

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April 16th or April 17th—which he conquered after a siege of several days during which he made use of seven war machines.127 On March 31, 1241, after crossing the mountains, the troops led by Büri crushed the army of voivode Pousa. The defeated voivode perished on the battlefield.128 The town of Kumelburch, which Büri conquered on April 4th, could not have been Cetatea de Baltă due to the considerable distance between the fortress and the eastern Transylvanian frontier (impossible to be covered by the invaders in such a short time span). Even though the identification suggested by Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu129 is uncertain, the position of this town must be searched in the same area of the military frontier, mostly somewhere between Burzenland and Transylvania. Once Büri’s troops went beyond the heavily fortified Burzenland they seem to have divided into two groups. One of them continued advancing towards the center of Transylvania, conquering Cetatea de Baltă,130 Alba Iulia131 and presumably Turda. The other army, operating close to the military frontier, went downstream the Olt River Valley, towards Sibiu. This second army was responsible for devastating the Catholic settlements located between the Olt River and the Perşani Mountains,132 and following their way to Făgăraş,133 for destroying the Cistercian monastery of Cârţa.134 The Mongols then laid siege on Sibiu, conquered on April 11 at the end of a fierce resistance.135 The two 127  Master Roger, Epistle, 198–201. 128  Eodem die alter exhercitus eorundem Tartarorum ingrediens provinciam que Burza dicitur, ducem exhercitus transilvane terre cum omnibus suis interficit. 129  Rupea/ Cohalm/ Köhalom—Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 3 130  The site of the royal fortress destroyed by theMongols was identified by Gheorghe Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale de piatră din secolele XIII–XVI (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1986), 89. 131  Annales Frisacenses, Jakó 191; Master Roger, Epistle, 224–225. 132  Binder, Antecedente, 35. 133  See: Lukács, Tara Făgăraşului, 66–70, for discussions regarding the existence, in Făgăraş, of a fortress previous to the Mongol invasion. However, a settlement did exist in that spot. According to a more recent analysis, the Făgăraş thesaurus was buried during the invasion of 1241, see Ernest Oberländer-Târnoveanu, “Din nou despre datarea teazurului de monede bizantine de la Făgăraş (jud. Braşov)”, Studii şi comunicări. Arheologie-Istorie 21 (1981): 287–289. The same dating is suggested in the case of the Sreza-Cârţişoara thesaurus by Lukács, Tara Făgăraşului, 152. 134  D IR II. 55–56, ZW 93–94, HD 322. 135  Notitia Epternach: item feria V ante dominicam misericordia ceciderunt in civitate que villa Hermanni dicitur, plus quam centum miliam. Annales Erphordenses: Tartari . . . civitatem dictam Hermanni villam in Aprili expugnantes, usque ad centum /milia/ ibi peremerunt, predicatorum cenobium ibidem incendentes, Jakó 190.

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army groups reunited devastated Miercurea, Sebeş and Orăştie.136 They continued by marching down the Mureş Valley, conquering Hunedoara137 and the settlements located on the lower Mureş River, and finally reached Cenad sometime around April 25th, several days after Kadan took Oradea. As for Böček, he entered Hungary via Severin and continued the offensive along the Danube line, conquering and destroying the Hungarian border fortresses of Keve and Horom.138 Afterwards, he crossed the Tisza River and camped in the southern part of Pannonia, but did not engage in any other military operations in Banat (present-day southwestern Romania). The conquest and devastation of the Cistercian abbey of Igriş—after an all-out siege in which the Mongols used war machines139—as well as of other monasteries on the lower Mureş River, many of them (Bulci,140 Kenezmonostor, Geled, Chelmac/ Eperjes, Rohonczamonostor etc.141)—severely damaged or even destroyed beyond reconstruction, were all attributed to Büri, who led his troops into the lower Mureş River area during his Transylvanian campaign. Kadan and Büri’s advance through Transylvania was much slower compared to that of the Mongol armies operating in Hungary and Poland. Even though the fortresses failed to stop the Mongol offensive, they at least delayed it. Thus, while Batu’s army crossed the distance between the Verecke pass and Pest at an astounding speed of over 50 km/day, Kadan and Büri’s troops crossed Transylvania, starting from Rodna and Burzenland all the way to the Cluj-Sibiu line, at a speed of only 20 km/day. Also, they most likely did not manage to travel any faster over during their subsequent advance. Thus, neither Kadan nor Büri arrived in time to participate in the decisive battle of Mohi, which gave king Bela the chance to fight an evenly numerical battle. In the end he was not able to capitalize on this chance. Also, it seems to had been the battle of Mohi that brought Batu and Büri in conflict, as accounted in the Secret History of the Mongols.142 During the kurultai initiated after the first stage of the campaign against Hungary, Batu seems to have 136  Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 198. 137  The earth and wood fortress on the Sâm Peter hill, abandoned in mid-13th century— Alexandru Bogdan, “Contribuţii arheologice la cunoaşterea castelului Corvineştilor de la Hunedoara”, BMI 2 (1970): 20–21. 138  Petru Iambor, Aşezări fortificate din Transilvania (secolele IX–XIII), Cluj-Napoca, 2005, 67–69. 139  Master Roger, Epistle, 200–201. 140  Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 97–98. 141  Dicţionarul mănăstirilor din Transilvania, Banat, Crişana and Maramureş. Edited by Adrian A. Rusu. Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2000: 101, 142, 157–158, 217–218. 142  Decei, Relaţii, 203.

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claimed additional distinctions and behaved accordingly. In fact, it was he who had defeated king Bela, while Büri reached his final target, the by now deserted area colonized by the Cumans, more than a month after Batu’s arrival in front of Buda. The Mongols seem to have failed in assessing the difficulties they would face in the process of invading Transylvania. Thus, they left behind them a considerable number of unconquered fortresses143 and were not able to establish a permanent occupation in the area due to their insufficient troops and because of the fierce local opposition. 1.4

The Tartar Retreat: The Second Devastation of Transylvania

Mongols’ retreat from Hungary, in the spring of 1242, must have come as a surprise to contemporaries, at least as much as their devastating invasion. As a matter of fact, the reasons behind the retreat continued to intrigue historians from much later periods. The attempts to clarify these issues have engendered until now at least four different theories:144 1) the “political” theory—still the most widely accepted145—links the Mongols’ retreat to the death of the great khan Ögödei and the beginning of the struggle for succession; 2) the “geographical” theory146 considers the cause of the retreat to be the incapacity of the Pannonian plain’s to provide enough grazing space for the Mongol horses; 3) the theory of the “military weakness”,147 argues that the Mongols relinquished their invading plans due to the heavy losses suffered on the Russian, Polish and Hungarian battlefronts; 4) last, those favouring the “gradual conquest” theory148 consider the 1241 expedition a first stage of the assault on Europe, 143  Master Roger, Epistle, 220–221. 144  Greg S. Rogers, “An Examination of Historians’ Explanations for the Mongol Withdrawal from East Central Europe”, East European Quarterly 30 (1/1996), 3–26. 145  See the examples provided by Rogers, “An Examination”, 8–9. Some of the Romanian historians who adopted this point of view—endorsed, also by the testimony of Plano Carpini—are Sacerdoţeanu, (Marea invazie, 62–63) and Papacostea (Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 157–159. 146  Based on Sinor’s remarkable article, “Horse and pasture”, 171–183. 147  Favoured by the Soviet historiography in the attempted to make the peoples located on the Volga and the Russian knezes the saviors of Europe; according to Rogers, “An Examination”, 12–14. This explanation, present, in the respective period, in other Central and Eastern European historiographies, is also found, for instance, in Istoria României, vol. 2, Bucharest: Editura Academiei: 122. 148  Laszlo Makkai, A History of Hungary (London: 1975), 59–60; Magyarország Története, 1st ed. part2. Budapest, [give publisher], 1984: 1439; Ödön Schütz, “A mongol hóditás nehány problémájáról”, Századok 24 (1959): 230.

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during which the Mongols only intended to prepare the ground for a decisive campaign—which in the end never happened. In spite of their shortcomings and proven lack of persistance,149 each of these theories sheds light on some of the aspects of the Mongol retreat. Furthermore, we must ask whether combining the information offered by these theories, could not in fact bring us closer to a better understanding Batu’s long-disputed decision.150 In this context, one must mention Victor Spinei’s thesis, which succeeds in combining the essential parts of the first three theories151 (given its inconsistent argumentation, the fourth is rather hard to take into consideration). In his remarkable work on the Black Sea policy of the Mongol Empire, Virgil Ciocâltan provides the basics of yet another hypothesis worth considering. His rigorous analysis of the political and economic tendencies of the Golden Horde maintains that Batu had very little interest in the Black Sea and the rest of Europe, as his main interests focused on the Trans-Caucasus and Asia Minor, on the Silk Road and the Fertile Crescent and, last but not least, on the political developments at the Great Khan’s court.152 Under these circumstances, we should ask ourselves whether Batu ever intended to settle in Central Europe. Even though various literary works written by frightened Europeans ascribed the Mongols the desire to conquer various regions of Christendom or even the whole world, we must not forget that according to the Mongol sources the main objective of the military campaign started in 1236 was the conquest of the Cuman Steppe. The Mongol plan to dominate the surrounding territories starting from the Cuman Steppe must not be interpreted as a will to settle in Central Europe. In fact, due to the Mongol way of life settling in Europe would not have appealed to them. Under these circumstances, the 1241 invasion seems to have been justified by the need to protect the Cuman steppe from Hungarian intervention in the region. Thus; the objective of the campaign was to annihilate the offensive capabilities of the Arpadian kingdom and to force its withdrawal from the race to dominate Eastern Europe. The Hungarian nobility seems to have anticipated their intentions and this much can be deduced from their refusal to allow Kuthen’s Cumans to settle in Hungary, lest they antagonize the Mongols. Similar reasons might have led to a decrease in the influence exerted by the pontifical political instruments in this part of the world, in the years that followed the invasion. Both the Dominican order, very active in Eastern Europe 149  For a different opinion see G. Rogers, 15–20. 150  Rogers, “An Examination”, 21. 151  Spinei, The Great Migrations, 441–446. 152  Virgil Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea trade in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, trans. Samuel Willcocks (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 42–55.

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and, quite surprisingly, the Templars, despite their dedication and sacrifice in the battle of Mohi, lost their popularity on the territory of Hungary. The destruction of the Hungarian strongholds located outside the Carpathians, the weakening of the Transylvanian military power and driving the Cumans and of Russian princes (strong opponents of the Mongol domination in Eastern Europe) out of Hungary, were actions taken by the Mongol in order to ensure their success. Once these objectives were achieved, the Mongol presence in Hungary was no longer necessary. More so, a permanent stay would have been implied a high cost for the Mongols. The Hungarian plain could not have sustained the large number of Mongol riders. An army of approximately 120,000– 140,000 soldiers occupying its territory for a year would have led to a complete depletion of its resources. In despite of the impressive shock of the invasion and the decisive victories in open field, the losses had been considerably high and the conquest of Hungary was far from being complete. The unexpected resistance faced by the Mongols during their raids in Bohemia and Austria pointed to the necessity of reassessing a prospective invasion further west. During these raids, the Mongols were met only by the local forces, but to fight the imperial army of Frederick II, or a crusading army prepared against them, would have brought upon them a completely different scale of warfare. Under the circumstances, the Mongols realized that it was not possible to maintain their hold on Hungary with an army of only 6,000 soldiers (as they would do in Kiev).153 In fact, communication would have been difficult given the huge distance between the Arpadian kingdom and the political centers of the Empire. Therefore, an occupation army needed considerable numbers in order to ensure a complete operational autonomy in case of confrontations with the European kingdoms. Thus, in order to settle a considerable army in Hungary, Batu would have been forced to remain on the Danube banks, unable to participate in the political developments within the Empire and to take advantage of the profitable commercial routes of Central Asia. It is likely that the Mongol commanders were satisfied with attaining their initial strategical objective in Central Europe: of discouraging Hungary from venturing beyond the line of the Eastern Carpathians for the entire century that followed the 1241 invasion.

153  Under the command of khan Corenza—identified by the experts as Qurumsi, son of Ordu—this army, led by Batu, expanded its authority over Western Russia and, presumably the Outer Romanian Carpathians. Iohannes de Plano Carpini, ‘Ystoria Mongalorum”. In Sinica Franciscana, I, Itinera et relations fratrum minorum saeculi XIII et XIV, edited by P.A.v.d. Wyngaert (Firenze: Quaracchi, 1929): 106, 108. According to Spinei, The Great Migrations, 459.

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The fact that during their retreat, in the spring-summer of 1242, the Mongols devastated Transylvania in a much more systematic manner compared to the previous year might also indicate that the Mongols intent was mainly to secure their conquests in Dešt-i Kipčak. Transylvania put up a fierce resistance in March–April 1241, and crossing its territory turned out to be an arduous enterprise. Taking advantage of the fact that the Mongols did not leave behind an army, the Transylvanians erected new fortresses and regrouped in case of another invasion.154 Given the fact that Transylvania was, among the territories of the Arpadian kingdom, the closest province to the Cuman steppe, where the 1239 offensive had started, the fighting abilities of the locals were surely known by the Mongols. On the other hand, we must take into account the fact that the troops retreating through Transylvania155 were not part of the two armies led by Kadan that continued their offensive west of the Danube at the beginning of 1242, and returned to the Steppe North of the Black Sea through Serbia and Bulgaria. The soldiers crossing Transylvania had spent the previous months in the Hungarian plain. They were low on provisions and plundering Transylvania was their last chance to increase their booty. Thus, taking full advantage of the opportunity, the withdrawing Mongol troops devastated Transylvania systematically, causing, according to Rogerius and Thomas of Spalato, a severe depopulation of the region.156 Rogerius crossed the region as a Mongol prisoner, which makes him an eye witness of the events. He managed to escape after crossing the mountains, somewhere on Cuman territory, and he returned by foot to Alba Iulia. His testimony is impressive. He recounts crossing deserted villages, feeding on roots and vegetables from deserted gardens, and finding his way back guided by the burnt church steeples. During eight days of walking from the Cuman border to Alba Iulia, Rogerius did not meet one living soul.157

154  Master Roger, Epistle, 220–221. 155  Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 63–64 and note 3—believes that Batu himself, together with Subutai, followed this way back and challenging those arguing that they went back through Bulgaria. However, he failed to take into consideration a possible retreat on the same route initial invasion: Halych—Kiev. 156  Thomas Spalatensis archidiaconus, Historia Salonitarum, in Gombos, Catalogus, 2238: Interea Tartarorum exercitus, depopulata omni regione Transilvana etc.; Master Roger, Epistle, 220–221: Et sic retrocedendo paulatim pervenimus Ultra Silvas, ubi remanserat populi multitudo, et erant post eorum transitum castra plurima preparata. Et quid ultra? Exceptis castris quibusdam terram totaliter occuparunt et eam procedentes desolatam et vacuam reliquerunt. . . . 157  Master Roger, Epistle, 222–225.

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The Aftermath of the Invasion

1.5.1 Immediate Consequences 1.5.1.1 Starvation, Depopulation, and Destruction The immediate consequences of the Mongol invasion impacted mostly the territories that were formerly under their direct control. Due to the military operations and the thorough plundering, the entire agricultural production of 1241 and 1242 was compromised.158 The massive depopulation and the presence of invading troops slowed down production, and the small crops resulted in these circumstances together with the rest of provisions were consumed by the marauders. They also showed a particular interest in collecting the local livestock, which constituted valuable war spoil for a nomadic people. The result was a great hunger that took its toll on the contemporaries. The Lvov anonymous chronicle describes the 1242 famine that struck Hungary as “horrible and never before heard of”. According to the same chronicle starvation brought more death than the invasion itself159 and this information was reproduced in the 14th century Hungarian chronicles.160 The survivors had no choice but to feed on dogs and cats, while human flesh was sold in local markets.161 The settlements were under constant menace from hungry wolves, for fear of which no person left their house unarmed.162 On top of everything else, a dreadful locust invasion destroyed all crops in the summer of 1242,163 making the upcoming Christmas in the kingdom of Hungary the scene of “the greatest misfortune and misery ever seen”.164 No human being could be found “within a 15 days’ walk in any direction from a spot”.165 This vast and 158  S RH, I, 468: et seminare illis temporis non potuerunt Hungari,. 159  Anonymi Leobiensis (Gombos, Catalogus, 271): Interea fames horribilis et inaudita invasit terram Hungariae, et plures perierunt fame, quam antea a paganis. 160  S RH, I, 468: Molto plures post exitum illorum fame perierunt quam illi qui in captivitate ducti sunt et gladio ceciderunt. 161  Anonymi Leobiensis: Canes edebant et cattos, et hominibus humana caro publice vendebatur in nundinis. Spinei, The Great Migrations, 443, finds similar information given by Rashid od-Din: in Hungary and Poland “there was [. . .] such hunger and misery that people ate children meat”. 162  Anonymi Leobiensis: lupi rapaces et infesti, nemini parcentes, praevalerunt in terra, ita quod vix aliquis de domo sua auderent inermis procedere (Anonymi Leobiensis). 163  Anonymi Leobiensis: deinde locusta id, quod seminatum errat, corrosit. 164  Anonymi Leobiensis: A nativitate Christi non est tanta plaga et miseria vista et audita in aliquo regno sicut in Hungaria, prropter peccata eorum. 165  Anonymi Leobiensis: In quindecim diaetis in longitudine et latitudine homo non inveniebatur in regno illo.

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scorched land is the territory lying between the Danube and the Tisza plain, were the Mongols settled in the 1241–1242 winter, devoured its food resources, destroyed a great number of existing settlements and turned their wheat fields into grazing grounds. In the first months of 1243, count Paul Geregye, “before any other noblemen of the kingdom”, dared to cross the Danube and venture inland, and he could only find wilderness, a place where law and order were a distant memory. His deed was considered an extreme act of courage.166 While the Danube was the western limit of the empoverished area, the eastern border was very close to the frontiers of Transylvania. As an eye witness, Rogerius wrote that the Mongols carried out systematic operations in the area, attempting to destroy even the shelters located in the mountains, as testified by the great number of settlements abandoned after the 1241–1242 invasion. On the other hand, Transylvania’s situation was completely different than that of Hungary. Even though the two successive invasions (March 1241 and the spring of 1242) left severe marks on Transylvania, it was never fully and permanently subdued. The amplitude of the devastation was significant but it did not come close to the proportions reached in Pannonia and the Tisza plain. Even though after his escape from the Mongols, in the spring of 1242, Rogerius described the province as completely depopulated, he also recounted that he was saved from starvation by locals who had taken refuge in the mountains. The great number of refugees that Rogerius encountered at Frata were well organized and supplied. Rogerius also indicated that numerous fortifications were erected in Transylvania during the interval between the two invasions, and some were left unconquered by invaders even after the 1242 attack.167 Moreover, the number of communities hidden in the mountains, forests or improvised fortifications, such as Frata or Tămaşda,168 the latter destroyed by the Mongols, was without any doubt greater. The written sources provide a great deal of information regarding the consequences of the Mongol invasion. On May 6th, 1246, bishop Gallus of Transylvania was granted the privilege to colonize six bishopric estates (Alba Iulia, Herina, Bileag, Gilău, Zalău, Tăşnad) that were very low on population.169 Similar references are made to the Sâncel estate (Zonchel)—“which included 166  D IR I 335–337, 427–428, HD 245–247. 167  Master Roger, Epistle, 220–221: Et sic retrocedendo paulatim pervenimus Ultra Silvas, ubi remanserat populi multitudo, et erant post eorum transito castra plurima preparata. Et quid ultra? Exceptis castris quibusdam terram totaliter occuparunt et eam procedentes desolatam et vacua reliquerunt. . . . 168  Master Roger, Epistle, 200–201: Pontes Thome (Tamashida, Thomasbrücke). 169  D IR I. 327–328,417; ZW 72–73.

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and fed three villages in happier times” (1252)170—and Zek estate (1252).171 Also, a document by “young king” Stephen V, dated 1263, contains a list of four settlements, located in the Târnava area, which were “deprived of their rightful inhabitants”.172 Furthermore, the act given by the aforementioned king to the Cistercian abbey of Cârţa (1264) describes its state as “completely deserted after the fury of the Mongol plunder”.173 The scarcity of documents makes a purely quantitative evaluation of the destructions impossible. However, they do shed light on the discrepancy between the northern and the southern part of Transylvania. While some localities on the Someş valley were mentioned as depopulated as late as 1246, the references for southern Transylvania go as late as 1263–1264.174 The same area must be the territory Rogerius crossed in 1242 it was the scene of the most important battles175 and the bloodiest massacres. Furthermore, scholars agree that these areas were the most severely depopulated.176 If indeed southern Transylvania suffered more destruction than the northern part, the explanation must be sought in the different impact of the military confrontations taking place in these regions during the 1241 campaign. In regards to the 1242 retreat, we can only assume that the Mongols hesitated to use the path through Rodna, less frequented at that time, and poured through the mountain passes into southern Transylvania, which would explain the massive devastation therein.

170  D IR II. 5, ZW 79, Jáko 217. 171  D IR II. 5–6, ZW 78–79, Jáko 216. 172  D IR II. 51–52, ZW 89–90, Jáko 241: terras udvarnicarum nostrarum in Transsilvanis partibus existentes legitimis suis incolis carentes Wiz, Munora, Hassach, Nogrech et alias . . . (Veza, Mănărade, Târnăveni, Nocrich). 173  D IR II. 55–56, ZW 93–94. 174  In the counties located in the Tisza Plain (Arad, Bihor, Sătmar and others), mentioned at least until the Mongol invasion of 1285, after which tracing them in documents becomes impossible. 175  Annales Frisacenses, MGH SS. XXIV 65–67, Jáko, 191; Annales Erphordenses, MGH. SS. XVI. 34, Jáko 192. 176  Thomas Nägler considers that the most deserted areas, after the great Mongol invasion, in the province of Sibiu were in the county seats of Miercurea, Sebeş and Orăştie (Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 198). According to Paul Binder the other localities severely hit by the invasion were those with a Catholic population from the Perşani Mountains area: Debran, Veneţia, Dopca, Hoghiz, Racoşul de Sus (Paul “Antecedente”, 35). Despite suggestions in this respect, setting up a list of settlements no longer attested in documents after 1241– 1242 can not lead to a clear conclusion in the case of Transylvania.

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1.5.1.2 Migration As suggested above, the real depopulation of Transylvania was due to the massacres or the enslaving of its inhabitants as well as to the food shortage, a consequence of the systematic Mongol plunders. But there was also a second type of depopulation that was only apparent since it was the result of a massive migration from areas exposed to Mongol attacks to safer areas, usually natural shelters. These migrations mostly affected incipient urban centers (like the bishopric of Alba Iulia, all the other county centers, and the salt exploitation settlements), causing a slowdown or even a halt in their development. The archeological data gathered in Alba Iulia indicate that the city reached the demographic level of 1241 only in the 15th century.177 The city of Cluj was only revitalized in the time of Stephen V,178 while Dăbâca, which had been an important center, faced an irreversible decline. Among the first measures taken by count Paul Geregye after the royal administration was reinstated in Transylvania was against the effects of depopulation, “gathering the population scattered anywhere”, helping them to reestablish their households to a state that permitted economic growth.179 These measures ensured the resuming of some important economic objectives (salt mines, royal estates or those pertaining to the bishopric of Transylvania180) by new relocations meant to fill in the population gaps resulted from the invasion. Same actions were taken by local nobility eager to repopulate their estates. As for the economic centers in the Saxon colonized areas, despite being a frequent target for the invaders, the information we have indicates that the locals overcame the post-invasion crisis faster compared to other regions. The revival was not due to a new inflow of colonists, but to the regrouping of the survivors inside the emerging urban centers. Thus, settlements like Rodna, Bistriţa and Sibiu could resume their development, while settlements located close to the periphery of the province were temporarily deserted.181 In this 177  The archaeological research conducted at the Apor Palace revealed the existence of a gap between surface dwellings from the 12th–early 13th century and the level of inhabitation of the early 15th century, when a repopulation precess can be noted, see Rusu, “Cetatea Alba-Iulia în secolele XI–XIV” (Ephemeris Napocensis 4 (1994): 340–351). 178  D IR III. 251–253, 413–415; ZW 319–320: cum Stephanus illustris rex Hungariae . . . volens olim fundare et congregare predictam civitatem Kuluswar multa prerogativa libertatum ipsos decorasset . . . 179  D IR I. 335–337, 427–428: dispersos undique populus recollegit, collectosque et inventos mantunendo fideliter et conservando . . . 180  D IR I. 327–328, ZW 72–73. 181  Zek (DIR II. 5–6, ZW 78–79), Wiz, Munora, Hassach, Nogrech et alias (DIR II. 51–52, ZW 89–90) etc.

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case, the Saxon deep sense of community seems to have boosted urban development in the aftermath of the 1241 invasion. The population also headed towards safer regions in western Hungary. These migrations continued after 1242 at a slower pace, and consisted mostly in representatives of the high social strata.182 1.5.1.3 Banditry and Insecurity. Institutional Crisis These phenomena were amplified by the Mongol occupation (wherever direct occupation took place), the famine ravages and the massive relocations. The delay in the return of the royal clerks to Transylvania and neighboring regions—as late as the spring of 1243—amplified the crisis and brought even more havoc. Thus, according to the information received from Hungary in the summer of 1243 by Pope Innocent IV: “during the Mongol occupation and even after their withdrawal, some rushed in great enmity against the kingdom itself, setting fire to the goods of many, laying waste and destruction, in overt unlawfulness against the Crucified One”.183 The information was most certainly related to the situation in the eastern regions of the kingdom as the Roman pontiff received it through the envoy sent by bishop Benedict of Oradea soliciting his transfer to the Győr bishopric.184 Other testimonies mention: “the time of the Mongol invasion, when people could no longer guard themselves the way they would have wanted”.185 Also: the “rights of the fortresses . . . ­alienated and mingled during the Mongols”,186 somewhat adding to the image of calamitous times. There were also those who stood against this crisis like count Paul Geregye of Solnoc: “as he came on the other side of the Danube before other noblemen of the kingdom, to destroy the plunderers and the marauders thriving in these parts as well as in Transylvania, putting them to fair judgment . . .”;187 and all the other dignitaries assigned by king Bela IV to reestablish order.

182  As suggested by existing examples: DIR I. 325, HD 218 (the widow of nobleman Andreas Ekly); DIR I. 324, CD IV/1. 280–281 (Benedict, the Bishop of Oradea); DIR I. 325, Theiner I. 188–189 (Rogerius, the Archdean of Oradea); DIR I. 326–327, Theiner I. 229 (Artulf, the Bishop of Transylvania’). 183  D IR I. 324, Theiner I. 188, HD 217 (22 July 1243). 184  Transfer approved by Pope Innocent IV on July 11th, 1243—DIR I. 324. 185  D IR I. 337–338. 186  D IR I. 338–341. 187  D IR I. 335–337, 427–428: prius pre ceteris nobilibus regni ultra Danubium veniens, tam in eiusdem, quam in Transsilvanis partibus fures et latrones, qui tunc in eiusdem locis plures solito surrexerant, extirpando, et justo mediante judicio condemnando.

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1.5.2 Long-term Consequences The great invasion of 1241–1242 had numerous consequences which gave a different direction to Transylvania’s development, fundamentally changing its social and administrative structure. 1.5.2.1 The royal fortresses were strategically important for the invaders. As a consequence, the amplitude of the destruction was considerable. With no exception, the county seats of Transylvania (Alba-Iulia, Dăbâca, Cluj, Turda, Cetatea de Baltă, and Hunedoara) were conquered and burned down while their fleeing population was massacred. The same fate was shared by Sibiu, the county seat of the Saxon colony located in southern Transylvania, and many other royal fortresses from neighboring regions. Furthermore, Cetatea de Baltă was completely destroyed and later rebuilt on a different site. The key element of this fortress was a dungeon made of stone and brick and surrounded by a moat enclosing a surface of merely 100 sqm around it. To the exterior, this rather modest fortification also had an earthen palisade probably reinforced with wood.188 The old fortress of Hunedoara (the fortification located on the Sâmpetru Hill) shared the fate of Cetatea de Baltă and some of its functions were taken over by a small stone fortress built in the vicinity.189 Due to the abandonment of the royal fortress, Hunedoara lost its status of county seat to the new royal fortress of Deva. No less severe was the devastation of Cluj, rehabilitated after a few decades by King Stephen V who colonized the area with German settlers.190 The fortress could not be rebuilt on its previous location, which was now in the possession of the Benedictine monastery of ClujMănăştur.191 After the invasion, the strong fortress of Dăbâca entered a phase of fast decline, but with some mending and consolidation the fortress still kept its military function.192 In this case the Mongol invasion seems to have primarily affected the civilian settlement and but the scale of the destruction was too large for the fortress to preserve its former position. Thus, only decades after the invasion, Dăbâca lost its function of royal fortress and county seat, 188  Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 92–94; Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 125–126. 189  Bogdan, “Contribuţii arheologice”, 20–21. 190  D IR III 251–253, 413–415; ZW 319–320. 191  Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 152–154; Petru Iambor and Ştefan Matei, “Cetatea feudaltimpurie de la Cluj-Mănăştur”, AIIACluj 18 (1975): 299–300; Petru Iambor, Ştefan Matei and A. Halasu, “Consideraţii privind raportul cronologic dintre aşezarea şi cimitirul de la Cluj-Mănăştur”, ActaMN 18 (1981), 150. 192  Pascu, et al. “Cetatea Dăbâca”, 193.

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becoming a simple stronghold owned by one of the branches of the KökényesRadnót193 kindred. The royalty also gave the same kindred the old fortress of Turda, located in the vicinity of the former locality Sânmiclăuş, on the banks of Arieş River.194 Due to its status, the bishopric of Alba-Iulia alone was the exception to this general rule. The reconstruction of Alba-Iulia started shortly after the Mongol invasion, most likely when bishop Gallus took office (1246), and benefited from direct support from the royal and the voivodal institutions. Nonetheless, its reconstruction took place at a slow pace. For almost a century, the former fortified wall of the fortress could not be used.195 Also, archaeological research has shown that a part of the old town was in ruins for a long time, and the repopulation of the settlement to its 1241 level did not occur until the 15thc.196 At the same time, the inclusion of the town of Alba Iulia within the direct possessions of the Diocese of Transylvania197 marks the disappearance of its former military and administrative functions. The decay of the former royal fortresses was the direct consequence of the destruction caused by the Mongols, but also that of the crown’s failure to provide the means for reconstruction. The Mongol invasion made the contemporary face the bitter truth that such fortifications had grown obsolete, and the large scale of devastation hindered the reconstruction of an efficient fortification system within a reasonable amount of time. Their main vulnerability before the Mongols cannot be explained only by the materials used in the building process, although there is no doubt that earthen and wooden fortifications were already considered outdated at the time. However, it is noteworthy that some fortresses like Alba-Iulia, Dăbâca, and Sibiu were surrounded by fortified stone walls, which yet failed to boost their resistance capacity. Even so, the more serious deficiencies were related to the function and size of these royal fortifications, as well as to the human factor in charge with their protection. Their size was undoubtedly exaggerated compared to the number and military potential of the defenders. Thus, the Hunedoara fortress was 220 × 70 meters and had a surface of almost two hectares,198 only a little smaller than 193  D IR II. 213–215, ZW 137, Jakó 294. 194  Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 132–134. For the identification of the Turda fortress see: Petru Iambor, “In legătură cu localizarea cetăţii Sânmiclăuş (Turda)”, ActaMN 14 (1977): 309–314. 195  Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 72. 196  Rusu, Cetatea Alba-Iulia, 340–351. 197  D IR I. 327–328. The part of the city that remained under the royal property and was colonized with Germans was also conceded to the Diocese of Transylvania after the dramatic events of 1277—DIR II. 190–191; ZW 132–133. 198  Bogdan, “Contribuţii arheologice”, 20–21.

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the significantly better populated royal fortification of Cluj-Mănăştur (220 × 98 meters). As for the royal castle Dăbâca, the fortified wall was over 250 meters in length, and due to the triangular shape of the terrace on top of which it was built, its width ranged between 50 and 250 meters.199 The medieval fortress of Alba Iulia maintained the initial shape of the former Roman fortress, in this case a rectangle of 430 × 415 meters.200 Even though we lack this kind of data regarding the fortresses from Turda and Cetatea de Baltă, existing analogies enable us to assume that the fortifications bore the same features. At the same time, the former royal fortresses were inhabited, housing both the administrative headquarters of the counties, as well as those of the main ecclesiastical institutions (in most cases arch-dioceses, but also the Bishopric of Alba-Iulia, and the Benedictine monastery from Cluj-Mănăştur). In addition, these were also economic centers, concentrating the main economic activity of the county—manufacturing, exchange and consumption of goods.201 Besides the permanent population, these fortifications also sheltered the population from the neighboring areas, retreating in panic from the Mongol threat. As centers of administrative power wealth, the royal fortresses represented extremely attractive targets for potential invaders. Through their conquest, the invaders could wipe out with a single blow the entire political, administrative, religious, and economic structure—which indeed happened during the dramatic events of 1241. Consequently, the reformation of the defensive system of the Hungarian Kingdom had to include first of all a clear separation between the military headquarters and the civilian settlements, and also an efficient decentralization of the counties’ defensive system. The conditions of the time compelled the crown to abandon its obligations towards providing immediate protection to religious institutions and civilian population to church authorities, landlords and the community. The new royal fortresses, erected in the second half of the 13th century had an exclusive military function, benefited from better defensive systems, and were attended by garrisons made of professional soldiers. In times of need, they could shelter a handful of officials and a small number of noblemen and their families, but not the local civilians. Cetatea de Baltă represents and example of the first stage of transition towards this new system. As additions to the renovated and reconsolidated fortresses from the frontier, the following decades would witness the rise of stronger fortresses, 199  Pascu, et al. “Cetatea Dăbâca”, 157. 200  Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 81. Different measurement, 440 × 440 m at: Mircea Rusu, “Castrul roman Apulum şi cetatea Alba Iulia”, AIIACluj 22 (1979): 47–70. 201  Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 247–264.

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well equipped to defend themselves against long lasting sieges (Deva, Ciceu, and Hunedoara etc.). As a reaction to a papal directive requiring local church leaders to build adequate refuges for Christians202 and the same suggestions accompanied by donations from the state authorities, the ecclesiastical institutions would make their responsibility to fend for themselves. Thus, the town Alba Iulia became a possession of the Diocese of Transylvania203 which, being reluctant to engage in projects that demanded more than the resources in hand afforded restrain the inhabited area to the southwestern corner of the former royal fortification, enclosing it with an earthen wall and a palisade.204 On the other hand, the Benedictine monastery from Cluj-Mănăştur remained the sole owner of the former precinct of the royal fortress devastated in 1241 and tightened its own defense with a stone precinct in the second half of the 13th century.205 This category of fortified ecclesiastical institutions also includes the Cârţa Monastery and the St. Michael Church from Cisnădioara, both erected in the second half of the 13th century.206 As a part of the new defensive structure, an important function was bestowed by the royalty on the fortresses held by noblemen. In the aftermath of the invasion, Bela IV was obliged to reconsider his defenses and therefore made extensive donations of estates to noblemen in his trust, who were bound to use some of their revenues to consolidate the kingdom’s fortification system.207 The importance of building a defensive system was clearly stated in a series of royal diplomas. One of them referred to the donation of “estates suitable for erecting fortifications to those of our subjects who know how and are capable of building them”.208 This policy seems to have become more popular between 1246 and 1248 when, confronted with the imminence of a second Mongol invasion, king Bela found himself with insufficient fortifications. It was probably within this time span that the count of Solnoc, Paul Geregye, started the construction of the two fortresses: Adrian (Adorján) and Piatra Şoimului (Sólyomkő). Arieşul de Câmpie fortress (Aranyos, Cheud commune), attested 202  R A 769, Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 187. 203  Anghel, Fortificaţii medieval, 72. 204  Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 161. 205  Iambor and Matei, “Cetatea feudal-timpurie”, 299–300; Iambor, Matei, and Halasu, “Consideraţii privind raportul”, 150. 206  Radu Heitel, “În legătură cu unele probleme ale arheologiei cetăţilor de piatră medievale din Transilvania”, BMI XXXIX 2 (1970): 27. 207  Erik Fügedi, Castle and Society in Medieval Hungary (1000–1437) (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1986), 50. 208  C D IV/2, 49; RA 904: loca quaedam munitionibus apta communi baronum nostrorum consilio fidelibus nostris nosse et posse aedificandis habentibus regia auctoritate duximus conferenda.

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in 1246 as part of Paul Gutkeled’s estate in the Solnoc county, was constructed around the same time period.209 During the following decades, fortresses owned by the nobility multiplied significantly in Transylvania. In 1268, a count Rotho sold a property in Bistriţa, with a “stone tower and a wooden house near the tower, and a fortified yard all around”.210 An unknown number of private fortresses located on the Someş Valley, were conquered and destroyed by the army of the bishop of Transylvania around 1282.211 These fortifications, which belonged to a rather turbulent and anarchic nobility, known for hijacking travelers and salesmen who crossed their lands, have yet to be identified. Even though the location of some of the fortresses has been identified, further research did not offer any conclusive information regarding their chronology. The Câlnic fortress is one of the very few fortresses of this type for which there is a remarkably precise chronology established (between 1270 and 1272212). A significant number of the fortresses owned by noblemen in Transylvania seem to have been erected within this time period. According to Rogerius, local communities were the first to participate in this construction effort, which started in the interval between the 1241 invasion and the 1242 withdrawal. Refuge fortifications constructed in the surrounding areas were probably consolidated in the subsequent period, all depending on local resources. In most cases, their very nature makes proper identification impossible. Comana de Jos is one such fortress, dating back to the second half of the 13th century, unable to hold an active military duty due to its modest size and rudimentary defenses.213 This category might also include the fortresses from Sibiel,214 Săsciori, Vurpăr,215 Tilişca,216 Orlat,217 Răşinari, Cisnădie, and Avrig218 209  H O I. 24. Pál Engel, Magyarország világi Archontológiája 1301–1457, (Budapest: HistóriaMTA Történettudományi Intézete, 1996), 1: 268. 210  Turris lapidea et domus lignea apud turrim et curiam circummunitam cum fundo: DIR II 115, 498–499; ZW 99–100. 211  D IR II 239–240; ZW 142–143. 212  Radu Heitel, “În legătură cu unele probleme”, 26. 213  Victor Eskenazy, “O nouă fortificaţie românească din Ţara Făgăraşului. Cetatea Comanei (secolele XIII–XIV)”, RMM.MIA 1 (1981): 34–44; Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 146–148. 214  Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 157; Aurel Decei, “Cetatea Salgo de la Sibiel (jud. Sibiu)”, Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Naţională 8 1939/1942 (Sibiu, 1942): 299–342. 215  Gheorghe Anghel, “Cetatea feudală de la Vurpăr”, Apulum 12 (1974): 295. 216  Thomas Nägler, “Die mittelalterliche Burg Tilişca nach ihrer archäologischen Erforschung”, Forschungen zur Volks- und Landeskunde 10/1 (Bucharest; Editura Academiei, 1967), 77–85. 217  Nägler, Cetăţile feudale, 27–49; Nägler Aşezarea saşilor, 157. 218  Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 148, draws the attention on the possible similes with the Comana fortification.

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all built, maintained and ruled by the members of the community.219 A special, but not unique case was that of the settlement from Gârbova (Alba county), where two fortifications were erected during the same period: a fortress in the center of the settlement, and a fortified refuge for the village community, in the neighboring mountains.220 The new system of fortifications was flexible and dispersed. Each one of its components was able to put up with long sieges from potential invaders while not being in itself an attractive target to justify the time and human losses to conquer it. Largely reinforced over the next decades, the system would hold back the Mongol’s second attempt of invading Transylvania in 1285. 1.5.2.2 The disappearance of royal military bases also marked the end of the military system based on the services of fortress serfs (iobagiones castri). In time this system became obsolete and contemporaries were aware of its limitations. This explains why the new system of military frontier, established in the early 13th century, renounced the use of fortress serfs, in favor of the newly established royal serfs and the military services offered by the free communities. The military service of the serfs, hereditarily bonded to county centers, became unsatisfactory in time. Undoubtedly, at the origins of the family history of all royal serfs appeared an ancestor with certain military skills. Their offspring inherited the status of royal serfs assuming both the obligations and the privileges conferred by this status. In times of need the royal authorities were compelled to appealt to their services even though we can assume that some of them lacked the military skills of their ancestors. In addition, since the status applied to their entire lifespan, we can assume a good number of them were unfit for military service due to old age. Such an army did not hold much military value and made the presence of serfs within the armed forces of the 13th century an exception rather than a rule. Like any state-based system, employing royal serfs to perform military duties presented numerous disadvantages. The maintenance of royal fortresses, one of the main attributions of castrensi, was oriented towards conservation rather than improvement. Thus, in the first half of the 13th century, the county seats of Transylvania presented outdated defensive systems. At the same time, despite royal reluctance, a new and much stronger type of fortification was developing in the area of the military frontier. King Andrew II’s own doubts expressed through an act of donation from 1211 in which he tried to 219  Anghel, “Cetatea feudală de la Vurpăr”, 123. 220  Anghel, “Cetatea feudală de la Vurpăr”, 119–124.

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impose on the Teutonic Knights a reconstruction plan with an old-fashioned fortification system,221 were founded on the state of the royal fortresses from inner Transylvania. In addition, royal serfs, together with other county officials, represented an excessive, cumbersome administrative apparatus, with almost exclusive control over the royal estate. Being in charge with maintaining order on the royal estates, the fortress serfs saw to the preservation of the patrimony—which empowered them to commit abuses against free land owners.222 Tax collection also enabled them to get rich quickly through illegal actions.223 Their judiciary attributes, as well as their power over any estate transactions throughout the county were no less important.224 Such privileges soon turned them into a parasitic social class, numerically exceeding their useful purpose and consuming most of the revenues gathered from the royal estates they administered. By mid-13th century, their distinct legal status, which allowed them to possess personal properties (hereditary), acquire lands and amass fortunes became the guaranty of a wealthy life rather than the expression of military servitude. Their income, largely acquired by participating in county affairs, must have been generous enough since their financial position was similar with that of provincial middle nobility. For example, in 1268, a Turda castle serf sold the inherited estate of Luncani (Gerend);225 in 1275, the former estates of two Solnoc castle serfs who perished without heirs, were given by the king to the Kata kindred;226 in 1291, a serf of Cluj castle sold the Lomb estate for 20 silver marks;227 in the same year, the estate of an Alba castle serf was legally recorded;228 in 1292, Ladislas Borsa bought the Pintic estate from the joint ownership of a Solnoc castle serf and two noblemen.229 Hence, dropping the services of the royal serfs, useless in the new military system, was the expected thing to do. Bela IV remained rather reticent in renouncing the costly services 221  et ad munimen regni contra Cumanos castra lignea et urbes ligneas construere eos permisimus, DIR I. 150–151, 369–370; ZW 11–12; HD 56–58. The Teutonic Knights could not agreewith this stipulation becausetheir numeric inferiority needed to be compensated by technical superiority, including the fortifications. 222  D IR I. 67 (RO 103); DIR I. 140 (RO 369). 223  In 1219, the centurion Voiavoda cashed an additional hefty amount of six silver marks for assimilating the three serfs of the Dăbâca fortress with the castrensii, DIR I. 95 (RO 212). 224  Mentioned in DIR II. 33–34, ZW 26; DIR II. 244, ZW 146. 225  D IR II. 99, HO VII. 111–112, Jakó 270. 226  D IR II. 176, Wenzel IX. 123. 227  D IR II. 350, Teutsch-Firnhaber I. 177–178. 228  D IR II. 348–349, ZW 187–189. 229  D IR II. 383–385, Wenzel X. 84–85.

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of the serfs, considering them a warranty for the well-functioning of the centralized system. In the end it was King Stephen V who decisively encouraged the process. The aforementioned examples, indicating serfs as estate sellers and never buyers, stand as evidence that the office of royal serfs was already collapsing in the last three decades of the 13th century. In addition, the administrative attributions of royal serfs, the support of their social status, decreased considerably in importance and eventually disappeared completely. The Royal Decree of 1261, annulling the judicial duties of serfs over the town of Dej, was the last written source in Transylvania in which their judicial attributions were explicitly mentioned.230 Also for the last time, in 1265, five serfs from Dăbâca castle were called to confirm the legitimacy of a property sale.231 Furthermore, a document from 1266 mentions the last Transylvanian castle serf who, as the king’s man, assisted together with a nobleman to the taking into possession of an estate.232 Starting with the second half of the 13th century, castle serfs would look for ways to rid themselves of their duties and to gain the statute of nobles. This status change was possible at the time only as a consequence of military service.233 Those who failed to adapt would come across increasing difficulties in preserving their hybrid status, semi-dependent and semi-privileged. After the middle of the 14th century, the new royal castle serfs represented a new category, assimilated into the dependent, unprivileged social layer. The differences in position and responsibilities, compared to those of their ancestors from 1200, were considerable. 1.5.2.3 Given the almost total disappearance of the former administrative and judicial system, the crisis of the property system affected primarily the property of the free people. If royal domains, and to a lesser extent church estates, enjoyed protection from the central authority, the private estate was left at the mercy of local officials. Their activity added to the general unlawful seizure of estates and rights, which was favored by the disappearance or refuge of a large number of land owners, and by the destruction or loss of property documents during the Mongol onslaught. Paul Geregye remains the most notorious case. On January 21st, 1249, the king confirmed his possession of no less than 16 estates

230  D IR II 33–34, ZW 26. 231  D IR II 71–72; HO VI. 134–135. 232  D IR II 79–80, ZW 97–98. 233  Erik Fügedi, The Elefánthy. The Hungarian Nobleman and his Kindred, ed. Damir Karbić (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), 37–38.

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in the counties of Bihor, Solnoc and Crasna,234 some of them listed as royal property.235 These estates, accumulated within the five years span (1243–1248) in which Paul Geregye held official duties in the region, were only the part that came into sight of a much larger estate system, which included a series of possessions seized from aristocratic families and noblemen: Chanad—who recovered their Birtin customs service and other estates from Bihor only after appealing the king in 1256;236 Gutkeled—who retook possession of their several estates within the same county, “estranged during the Mongols” and seized by the Geregye kindred only in 1278;237 and Borşa, whose estates, appropriated by one of the Geregye kindred’s friends, were only retrieved through the decision of the 1279 regional congregation.238 This later repossessions were not encountered only in Bihor county. In Transylvania, a certain Nicholas, son of Tywan of Vărşand recovered in 1304 his property of Ungurei (Gregorfalva in Alba county), lost “in the times of the ancient Mongols”. He was able to do so only after tiresome juridical endeavors and after spending 50 silver marks,239 which, if real, could not amount to much less than the market value of the estate itself. There is enough information available in sources to conclude that at least in certain geographical areas old structures and ownership rights were literally obliterated. This also accounts for the changes suffered by the social elite. These forced takeovers were reversed by the use of the same methods, when it was possible (the Gutkeled and Borşa cases), or by costly and time-consuming judicial efforts. We must also assume that families lacking military force, influence at the king’s court or at least the financial resources needed for the expenses of the intricate judicial system of the time could never recover their estates. All these changes ultimately brought about a radical transformation in the social structure of the province. Within this structure, the nobility, with its military capabilities substantially improved after the “natural selection” during the invasion and the ensuing years, became the kingdom’s most important military power. They also took over the control of the administrative functions of the county. On this basis and soon to become a vector for economic 234  D IR I 335–337, 427–428; HD 245–247. 235  Including lands of royal guests: terram Zonuk hospitum castri Zonwk. 236  D IR II 15–16, 16–18; Wenzel VII 458, 474–476. 237  D IR II 195–196; HD 413–414. 238  D IR II 201–203; Wenzel XII 250–253. 239  D IR III 36–37; ZW 228–229.

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development, the Transylvanian nobility defined its own identity in comparison with the non-indigenous aristocracy which would continue to keep almost exclusive grasp over decisional functions. Therefore, once this basis took shape, claiming a more important role within the political system was just a matter of time.

CHAPTER 2

From the Mongol Retreat to the Transylvanian Duchy (1243–1257) The threat of a new Mongol invasion influenced the entire evolution of Transylvania in the two decades following the 1241–1242 onslaught. Taking into account the political, military and organizational efforts of the Arpadian Kingdom to prevent a new invasion and to mobilize all due resources to fight it off, one can split the evolution of Transylvania into two distinct stages: 1) approximately 1243–1247, mainly featuring sustained efforts to offset the impact of the recent invasion and to restore the economic and military potential of the province; 2) 1248–1257, a period marked by the decision adopted by King Bela IV and his military counselors to engage in a more prudent strategy in the case of a new Mongol invasion. If the Mongols were to attack again then all the forces available in the kingdom would be concentrated along the Danube line, which consequently adjourned Transylvania’s recovery and the province entered a long period of stagnation. 2.1

Transylvania and the Council of Lyon

The Council of Lyon. Defining the Response of Christianity to the Mongol Problem The Council of Lyon (June 28th–July 17th, 1245) was a major step for Christianity in setting a coherent anti-Mongol policy.1 Faced with the violent devastation of Hungary and Poland, Pope Innocent IV was compelled to include the Mongol threat among the five plagues which, just like the crucifixion wounds, scourged 2.1.1

1  Alberto Melloni, “I fondamenti del regime di cristianità a Lionese I (13 luglio 1245)”, Cristianesimo nella storia XVIII (1/1997); Giuseppe Alberigo ed., Storia dei concili ecumenici, (Brescia: Queriniana, 1990), 204–207. Pentru evoluţia poziţiei papalităţii faţă de mongoli see Giovanni Soranzo, Il papato, l’Europa cristiana e i Tartari: un secolo di penetrazione occidentale in Asia (Milano: Societa Editrice, 1930), 71–166; Davide Bigalli, I Tartari e l’Apocalisse (Firenze: La nuova Italia Editrice), 1971, 50–63; Jean Richard, La papauté et les missions d’Orient au Moyen Âge (XIIIe–XVe siècles) (Roma: École Francaise de Rome), 1977, 65–86; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 169–172.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_004

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the Church of Christ.2 However, he delayed taking any action until his informing mission returned from the east.3 The evidence gathered on the great invasion of Europe forced the pope to no longer associate the Mongol Empire to the legendary kingdom of Prester John.4 Even so the Roman pontiff had not completely lost hope of Christianizing these fierce warriors, or at least making of them a strong ally against the Muslims (who had reconquered Jerusalem in 1244). Under the circumstances, the Mongol issue was rather left aside in the conciliar debates.5 The main issues discussed focused on more pressing issues like the relationship with Frederick II, the general reform of the Church, the freeing of the Holy Land, and endorsing the Latin Empire.6 Consequently, the 16th Canon of the Concilium, De Tartaris, does nothing more than incriminate the violent devastation of “Poland, Russia, Hungary and other Christian countries” and to recommend Christian princes to reinforce their frontiers with the Mongols, in order to be able to ward off a new invasion.7 It was only a few years later, with the great Mongol alarm of 1248, that Innocent IV allowed crusaders (crucesignati) assigned for the Holy Land to be used against the Mongols, and empowered the Teutons to grant plenary indulgence (the most important spiritual instrument used by the pope) to all who took arms against these new foe of the Christian faith.8

2  Melloni, “I fondamenti del regime”, 67. 3  Run by Franciscan Iohannes de Plano Carpini, the pontifical mission in the Mongol Empire was registered between 1245–1247, and its results were recorded in a vast and detailed report sent to the Roman Pontif—see de Plano Carpini, “Ystoria Mongalorum”, 27–130. For the answer given by the great Khan Güyük to the message sent by Pope Innocent IV see Paul Pelliot, “Les Mongols et la Papauté”, in Revue de l’Orient Chrétien 23 vol. 3–4 (1922–1923): 21. 4  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 164–167. 5  Which in fact, were not assistedby any prelate in Hungary, see Melloni, “I fondamenti del regime”, 65–66. 6  See Giulio Battelli, “I transunti di Lione del 1245”, in Scritti scelti. Codici, documenti, archive (Roma: Multigrafica Editrice, 1975), 171–201; for the Frederick II’s problem see David Abulafia, Federico II. Un imperatore medievale (Turin: Einaudi, 1993), 305–311; J. A. Watt, “Medieval Deposition Theory. A Neglected Canonist ‘Consultatio’ from the First Council of Lyons”, in Studies in Church History, ed. G. J. Cuming, vol. 2 (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1962), 197–214. A just appreciation of the importance given to the Mongol issue by Council, see Spinei, The Great Migrations, 452. 7  Giovanni Domenico Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, vol. 23 (Venice, 1779), coll. 627–628. 8  Maureen Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy. The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the final loss of Jerusalem to the fall of Acre (1244–1291) (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 67–69.

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At the same time, Pope Innocent IV initiated a defensive system against the Mongols in which, thanks to the great diplomatic skills of knez Daniil Romanovich, the kingdom of Halych was granted a key role. Not long after the Mongols’ retreat (1244–1245), King Bela resumed his old policy of attempting to subordinate Halych to the Hungarian crown, and endorsed his son-inlaw, Rostislav Mihailovich, in his attempt to overthrown Daniil Romanovich.9 Rostislav was defeated at Yaroslav by the reunited armies of knezes Daniil and Vasilko, thus putting an end to any attempt of solving the issue by means of arms.10 At the same time, Daniil Romanovich invaded Poland, devastated the towns of Lukow and Seczechov and took over Lublin, where he built a new fortress (1244).11 In order to improve his relationships with Hungary and Poland and to gain freedom of action to negotiate with Batu directly, Daniil Romanovich turned to Pope Innocent IV for protection. That was undoubtedly the primary goal of the Lyon mission led by the Archbishop Peter of Halych, who stirred the spirits in the Concilium with his tales about the origins and habits of the Mongols.12 Daniil Romanovich’s dream to make Halych a buffer state between Europe and the Mongol Empire came to life in the same year (1245), through his trip to Batu’s court and the acceptance of the Golden Horde’s suzerainty.13 Given these remarkable diplomatic achievements, Daniil Romanovich not only secured his throne, but also assumed the role of mediator between the two worlds. Consequently, Hungary refrained from interfering in the affairs of a state under the double protection of the Roman pontiff and the Great Khan of Saray.

9   Around the year 1243, Rostislav Mihailovich, the son of the great Knez Mikhail Vsevolodici of Kiev and one of Roman Msistlavich’s daughters, married Anna, the 4th daughter of King Bela and Mary Laskaris. KMTL 581. 10  Nicholas L. Chirovsky, An Introduction to Ukrainian History, I, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1981, 168; Michael Hrushevsky, A History of Ukraine (New Haven: Archon Books, 1941), 108; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 200. 11  MPH III. 72, 167, 307. Chirovsky, Introduction to Ukrainian History, 170. 12  Annales Burtonienses, Gombos, Catalogus, 113–115; MGH, SS. 27: 474–475. 13  For Daniil Romanovich’s international policy and his relations with the Golden Horde, Hungary and the Holy See George Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, (London-New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–1959), 143–147; Chirovsky, Introduction to Ukrainian History, 169–172; Kosztolnyik, Thirteenth Century, 200–207; Boleslaw Szcsesinak, “The Mission of Giovanni de Plano Carpini and Benedict the Pole of Vratislava”, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 7 (1957): 12–15; Spinei, The Great Migrations, 454; Spinei, Moldavia, 117; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 171–173.

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2.1.2 Consequences for Transylvania Justly assessing the role of Hungary in the new anti-Mongol defensive system, Pope Innocent IV understood he had to make political sacrifices to restore King Bela’s full freedom of action at home. As far as Transylvania was concerned—also represented in the pontifical Curia in February 1245 by a certain Theodoric, parish priest in Sebeş and council member in the Alba bishopric14—these concessions legitimated the loss of all positions gained in the province during the time of popes Celestine III, Innocent III and Honorius III. Such was the case with the government of the free church chapters, towards which Pope Honorius III and Pope Gregorius IX showed an increased interest much to the displeasure of the Hungarian crown during the reign of Andrew II.15 Pope Innocent IV also refrained from interfering with the internal problems of the Hungarian church throughout his entire term. As a consequence, the provost of Arad was forced to swear allegiance to the Esztergom Archbishop16 on March, 31st, 1246. Previously he declined to acknowledge his authority due to a special interpretation of the statute of his chapter, which dated back to Pope Honorius III.17 The chapter of German colonists from Sibiu found itself in a very similar position. Built during the reign of King Bela III18 in a territory previously subordinated to the Bishopric of Alba Iulia and left without any pontifical support, the chapter was now exposed to the pressures exerted by the Bishopric of Transylvania. At the same time, the pope did not support any more the Benedictine Monastery of Cluj-Mănăştur in the conflict with the Bishopric of Transylvania19 and (as proven by the privilege granted to the canonic Theodoric in 124520) showed flexibility in imposing ecclesiastical norms, otherwise enforced in other parts of the Christian world. These exemptions were meant to encourage the devastated church of Transylvania, left without a bishop until 1246. It was only then that Gallus became the new bishop of Alba Iulia, undoubtedly due to these encouraging measures.

14  DIR I 326; ZW 71–72. 15  Tudor Sălăgean, “Honorius III, Transylvania and the Papacy’s Eastern Policy”, TR 4 (1998): 81–84. 16  DIR I 327, Nándor Knauz, ed., Crescens Lajos Dedek, Gabriel Dreska, Monumenta Ecclesiae Strigoniensis Vol. I. (Esztergom, 1874–1924), 362–363. 17  DIR I 219–220; Theiner Augustinus, ed., Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia, vol. I. (Roma-Zagreb: 1863–1875), 62. 18  DIR I 11; ZW 1–2. 19  See: DIR I 220–221; ZW 42. 20  Who, due to the destruction of his revenues by the Mongols’ wrath, was allowed to cumulate the revenues of a not mentioned number of parishes: DIR I 326; ZW 71–72.

From the Mongol Retreat to the Transylvanian Duchy

2.2

53

The Years of Recovery (1243–1248)

2.2.1 Reestablishing Royal Authority in the Regions East of the Danube Due to the mayhem in the territories deserted by the Mongols, bringing them under royal authority represented a difficult and dire process. Although Kadan’s retreat before Trogir had started before mid-March,21 King Bela himself did not leave his Croat refuge to return to Hungary before May 1242.22 Going round the Hungarian moor, now a wilderness, he initially headed to the highland counties in the north, where he spent the winter of 1242–124323 together with a few loyal companions. He returned to Buda on Easter (April, 12th, 1243),24 a holiday which he and his propaganda machine turned into a celebration of the resurrection of the Hungarian Kingdom. The king’s long-lasting journeys, almost as long as his refuge in the Dalmatian Kingdom, were at the root of the scholarly tradition according to which the king, driven away by the Mongol invasion, spent no less than three years away from his kingdom. In fact, King Bela’s whereabouts were recorded not only in the Hungarian chronicles of the 14th century,25 but also in a much earlier royal document (1271).26 Under the circumstances, the recovery of the territories beyond the Danube could not have taken place before early 1243. Due to the turmoil in these territories, such actions required people trusted by King Bela, who were also skillful and motivated enough to assume such a complex mission. It is not surprising therefore, that one of these protagonists was count Paul Geregye, risen to the status of war hero for defending the Danube line against the attacks of Kadan. 2.2.2 Paul Geregye’s Transylvanian Mission In his position of count of the royal county of Alba (Fehérvár) at the outbreak of the great invasion (March 1241),27 young Paul Geregye had plenty of

21  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 174. Also see Marynna D. Birnbaum, The Mantle of Bela IV, in The Man of Many Devices, Who Wandered Full Many Ways. Festschrift in Honor of János M. Bak (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), 499–502. 22  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 185. 23  Mórichida—2 Oct. 1242, RA 722; Verőce—16–21 Nov., RA 723–724; Nitra—24 Jan. 1243, RA 732; Túróc—29 Jan., RA 734. 24  The first documents issued by King Bela IV after his return to Buda on April 16th, 1243, the Thursday after Easter—RA 736, 737. 25  SRH I. 212, 468. 26  DIR II. 143–144; CD V/1. 153–159. 27  RA 674.

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opportunities to display his military qualities.28 His most heroic feat was the fierce defense of the Danube line in the aftermath of the Mohi disaster, when Paul Geregye showed exceptional organizational and military skills. Despite insufficient means and desperate conditions, the young count (who became the judge of the royal court29 by the summer of 1241) succeeded in transforming the Danube into an impenetrable line of defense until late 124130 or early next year.31 A noteworthy exploit which not only covered the retreat of other refugees32 but also offered the defense to the West of the Danube the time required to regroup and to diminish the effects of the second Mongol offensive in the first months of 1242. After the break of the Danube resistance,33 Paul Geregye joined King Bela’s retinue, and remained judge of the royal court throughout the king’s Dalmatian retreat.34 After the king’s return to Hungary in mid-1242, he handed over this office to Demetrius Csák, the representative of a major aristocratic kindred, whose benevolence King Bela was striving to gain. Nonetheless, he retained his former position as count of Székesfehérvár until November 1242,35 which indicates that at this time his Transylvanian mission had not yet begun. Taking into consideration the general situation in the kingdom, the cisDanubian mission of Paul Geregye could not have started before early 1243. However, it could have started a few months before the official return of King Bela to Buda.36 Furthermore, according to the royal charter of 1249, Paul Geregye proceeded in his mission to the East of the Danube River before all the other royal officials who acted in those regions.37 In this situation he might have assumed a series of cumulative functions, not very clearly stated, which 28  DIR I. 335–337, 427–428: the campaigns against Halych, and various clashes in Dalmatia and at the German frontiers. 29  The first mention of September 23rd, 1241, RA 709. The former holder of this office, Andreas, son of Szerafin (1239–1241), disappeared in the Mohi battle. 30  CD IV/2, 222. 31  MGH, SS, XXIX. 592. 32  Distinction highlighted in the royal diploma of 1249, DIR I. 336. 33  The Mongol commander who succeeded in forcing the Danube line, with the help of the tactics of deceitful retreat, was Kadan: simulating the retreat and the abandonment of the camp he drew Paul Geregye’s men into a trap, being caught by the returning Mongols upon the cross of the river. SRH II. 53, 30 and 584, 5. 34  Last reference made on May 10th, 1242, RA 718. 35  RA 723, November 16th, 1242. 36  The list of royal dignitaries from January 29th does not mention any other counts of Székesfehérvár, RA 734. 37  . . . prius pre ceteris nobilibus regni ultra Danubium veniens . . ., DIR I. 428.

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placed in his hands full power over all military, economic and social aspects.38 Initially, the region over which Paul exerted his rule seems to have been limited only by his military capacity. Once the situation in the region to the East of the Tisza River was stabilized, he was confined to the counties of Bihor, Crasna and Solnoc, which were at the time outside the administrative jurisdiction of Transylvania. However, the sole official rank bestowed on Paul Geregye during this time (1242/1243–1248) was that of count of Solnoc.39 In this quality, according to the royal charter of January 1249, he mainly focused in righting the wrongs done by the outlaws who had infested these regions, gathering the dispersed population and reopening salt exploitations.40 He also paid special attention to the royal properties. After 1248, impressed by the way he handled the situation in the eastern counties, King Bela entrusted him with the mission of reconstituting the domains of the royal fortresses throughout the entire kingdom.41 At the same time, taking advantage of his virtually unlimited powers in the region, Paul Geregye seized the opportunity to build a vast personal estate which, according to the royal donation of January 21st, 1249, included no less than 16 domains: Jadani, Ocani, Felcheriu, Beliu, Borşea, Sărand, Haieu, Bical, Fild and Almăjd—in Bihor county; Cuzdrioara, Someştelec and Solnoc—in Solnoc county; Zăuan (Zwan), Nuşfalău and Valcău—in Crasna county.42 The victims of his abusive confiscations were not only free men or members of various social strata more or less privileged (Saxon colonists referred to as hospites, as well as fortress serfs), but also church representatives and important noblemen (members of Chanad,43 Gutkeled44 and Borsa45 kindreds). The latter, despite their prestige, could not recover their properties until many decades later. At royal request, Paul Geregye erected a series of strong fortresses on these estates: Adrian (Adorján),46 presumably Valcău (Valkó), and Piatra Şoimului (Solyomkő—Falcon Rock).47 Despite the 38  . . et cuncta perficere studuit, que et reformacioni regni sciebat, et usui regio expedire, DIR I. 428; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 185, mentions Paul Geregye as royal court judge, position he had stopped exerting for some time. 39  RA 823 (December 12th, 1245); RA 853, DIR I. 329–333, HD 249–253 (June 2nd, 1247). 40  DIR I. 335–337; 427–428. For the Ocna Dejului (Deszakna) exploitations see: DIR I. 334, ZW 76 (February 23rd, 1248). 41  DIR I. 338–341; CD IV/2. 521–522; RA 926. 42  DIR I. 335–337; 427–428; Jakó 209. 43  DIR II. 15–16, 16–18; Wenzel VII. 458, 474–476. 44  DIR II. 195–196; HD 413–414. 45  DIR II. 201–203; Wenzel XII. 250–253. 46  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 265; Győrffy, I. 591–592. 47  KMTL 30, 605, 708.

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scarcity of written sources, we can still assess Paul Geregye’s method of governing as equally discretionary and abusive as it was dynamic and efficient. 2.2.3 Transylvania: the voivode Lawrence48 (c. 1242–c. 1252) Next to Paul Geregye, Lawrence was one of the main artisans of reestablishing royal authority in the inner Carpathian territories. As a member of one of the oldest and strongest aristocratic kindreds, he was among those who followed King Bela into his Dalmatian exile. During this period of time, in a document issued in Klissa, in March–April 1242,49 he was mentioned for the first time as the voivode of Transylvania. Thus, his appointment had been pronounced long before he was literally able to exert this office. On January, 29th, 1243, Voivode Lawrence was still—next to Stephanus (Stephen) Csák, the new ban of Severin—on the list of witnesses of a royal document issued near the Túróc fortress (apud castrum Turuz);50 on June, 5th, he was again mentioned as witness, in a document issued “iuxta Budam in insula que dicitur Leporum”.51 It was only afterwards that Lawrence could have honored his responsibilities in Transylvania, and by then count Paul Geregye had already exerted his power for some time. Lawrence most likely took office no earlier than the summer of 1243. Initially, his activity must have resembled that of Paul Geregye in Solnoc and the counties down the Someş Valley. The objective was to reinstate order and a minimal degree of security in a havoc stricken province, and it claimed a great deal of sustained effort for at least the next two years. In fact, the difficulties he had to overcome in Transylvania are highlighted by the state of the church in the province. By mid-1244, the king failed to find a prelate willing to take over the Bishopric of Alba Iulia,52 and the appointment of Artulf in the summer

48  Engel—Archontológia I. 331, II. 122: mentions him as a member of a presumed Ilidia branch of the Kán family. This identification is doubtful since such a branch of the Kán family never existed. The 1248 document, issued by the voivode at Ilidia (Yliad, DIR I. 334–335, Jakó 208), cannot be considered as evidence of ownership over the fortress. In fact, all other previous (DIR I. 197, HD 81, 1223: possessio regalis Elyad) or later (DIR II. 335) references regarding the fortress confirm its statute of royal property. At the same time, the genealogic filiations suggested by Paul Engel cannot be proven. Identifying this voivode as Lawrence Aba, based on the document from May, 11th, 1279 (ZW 136–137; DIR II. 204; Jakó 366), despite its evasiveness, remains to this date the most plausible. 49  RA 719; CD IV/1. 91. 50  RA 734. 51  RA 744. 52  On June 5th, 1243 (RA 744) and April 21st, 1244 (RA 762) the Bishopric of Alba Iulia was still.

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of 124453 appears to have been more formal than factual.54 The prolonged vacancy of office at the Bishopry of Alba Iulia ended in 1246, with Bishop Gallus accepting this position. Consequently, throughout this interval Lawrence lacked the support of some of the most important pillars in reestablishing order. At the same time the exemption granted by the king to Gallus upon his appointment as Bishop (1246)55 indicates that by that time the church’s properties in Transylvania had unnaturally been under the control of the voivode. A more obvious revival of the province became apparent in 1246. The proper investment of a bishop in Alba Iulia was a success in reinstating a state of normality. Also, by this date, Lawrence had already achieved most of his accomplishments: mending some of the royal fortresses (Cetatea de Baltă, Cluj, Hunedoara—all of them rebuilt on new locations, etc.); reconstituting the royal estate, including the annexation of estates left with no owners after the 1241–124256 events; reopening the salt mines and organizing the salt transport down the Mureş River. Precious information regarding the salt exploitation and trade is provided by a 1248 diploma granted by the voivode to his guests from Vinţ and Vurpăr.57 This document, first through which a Transylvanian voivode granted such a privilege to royal hospites, offers relevant clues on the new sort of voivodal power. The royal prerogatives bestowed on the voivode were much like those boasted by the duke of Transylvania, two decades earlier. Contemporaries and the king himself must have seen the situation as a provisional exertion of power, due to the need of reestablishing order in the inner Carpathian region. However, historical conditions in the second half of the 13th century made this situation permanent. Thus, contrary to the ephemeral reinforcement of royal power, voivodal attributions would only grow more until the time of Ladislas Kán. Just like Paul Geregye, Lawrence took advantage of his position, and become the owner of a vast personal estate in Transylvania. Based on the available data, his properties consisted of several localities in the northwestern part of the province, on the Şieu Valley: Sărata (Sofalua), Chintelnic (Kendtelek), Sărăţel 53  There is little evidence available documenting his presence in the Diocese. First reference was made on June, 15th, 1244, RA 769. 54  In the fall of 1245, with support from the king, he would manage to get transferred to the episcopal see of Győr, DIR I. 326–327, CD IV/1. 378–379. On December 12th, 1245, the episcopal see of Alba Iulia was again vacant, RA 823, CD IV/1. 384. 55  DIR I. 327–328, ZW 72–73. 56  See DIR II. 51–52; ZW 89–90. 57  DIR I. 334–335, 426–427 (1248); ZW 77. Seealso DIR I. 330, 423 (June 2nd, 1247, Diploma Ioaniţilor): ad hec de salibus . . . de quacumque salifodina Ultrasilvana. . . .

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(Zereth), Şieu-Măgheruş (Monyoros), Arcalia (Arukalia), Săsarm (Zeyzorma) and Chiuza (Kuzepfolua).58 Nonetheless, he may have owned estates in other parts of Transylvania as well, but there is no information available to confirm that. 2.3

The Decade with No History (1248–1257)

The Mongol Threat of 1247–1248 and the New Defensive Strategies of King Bela The benevolent attitude manifested by Pope Innocent IV towards Daniil Romanovich was grounded in the intention to speculate on the dissensions confirmed by Plano Carpini between Güyük and Batu. Thus, the pontiff intended to offer the latter the opportunity of a tranquil western border, provided he refrained from pillaging Europe. Only by sealing such an agreement with Batu, could King Bela divert his attention from his eastern frontier and engage in the 1246 war against Austria. He was joined in this enterprise by both count Paul Geregye (later taken prisoner, together with seven other members of his kindred59) and the Cumans who returned to Hungary at King Bela’s request.60 Moreover, according to Russian sources, he also received military support from Daniil Romanovich, the great Knez of Halych.61 The general mobilization towards the Western frontier, which required the services of the troops used to defend the Eastern part of the kingdom, is convincing evidence that throughout 1246 the Mongol threat was no longer deemed imminent.62 The apparent calm came to an end in early 1247, when Güyük was elected Great Khan of the Mongol Empire, and the threat of another invasion of Europe became apparent. In January 1247, alarmed by the information he received presumably from the Russian lands, King Bela wrote to the pope, warning him about the perils from the East. In his reply dated February 4, Pope Innocent IV addressed the king with his usual encouragements, asking for all the details the monarch could provide.63 In the summer of 1247, the distressing news about the imminence of a civil war between Batu, the Khan of the Golden Horde, 2.3.1

58  Jakó 194, 319, 366; DIR II. 204; DRH X. 312–313. 59  DIR I. 335–337; 427–428. 60  Pálóczi-Horváth, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians, 68–70. 61  See indication of sources at Kosztolyik, Hungary, 202. 62  On November, 15th, 1246, Bela IV interceded with the pope for the throne of Austria, vacant after the demise of the Babenberg dynasty, RA 839. 63  Augustus Potthast, ed., Regesta Pontificium Romanorum, vol. II (Berlin: 1875), 12414.

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and the Great Khan Güyük was confirmed by Giovanni de Plano Carpini upon his return from the Mongols. According to the estimates of the Franciscan missionary, Güyük’s victory over Butu was very likely after which the Great Khan would plan another all-in attack over Hungary and Poland within the next three years.64 After the return of the Franciscan missionaries, Bela IV sent his own informers to the East and received a similar report.65 The threat was so serious that in the summer of 1247 the Russian knezes Daniil and Vasilko accepted to acknowledge Rome’s patronage in exchange for the right to “win back” territories and goods they could prove to be their property and to remain of East Christian faith.66 Several months later, in the attempt to set up an efficient resistance in Eastern Europe, Innocent IV negotiated an alliance with the Knezes of Halych Vladimir and Suzdal, and also with the Teutons. The latter were bestowed with the privilege of running the Anti-Mongol front and plenary indulgence.67 The imminence of a new Mongol invasion stirred up spirits in the entire Christian world, while Hungary in particular was governed by generalized panic.68 A new invasion similar to the one from 1241–1242 would have undoubtedly turned the Kingdom of Hungary into ruin. Under the circumstances, King Bela IV hastened the kingdom’s fortification project. This included the erection of the fortress of Buda in order to receive the German colonists from Pest, the settlement of colonists in the Esztergom and Székesfehérvár fortresses, the construction of strongholds in the counties of Szepes, Baranya, Borsod, on the Szigliget isle of Lake Balaton and in Slavonia.69 Also in order to further reinforce the defensive system of the kingdom, Bela IV signed on June 2nd, 1247, a contract with the Hospitallers.70 These defensive measures were exclusively concentrated on the kingdom’s central and Western (trans-Danubian) regions. The disastrous experience from the spring of 1241 drove the king to a rather cautious approach, aimed at avoiding a direct confrontation with the invaders 64  De Plano Carpini “Ystoria Mongalorum”, 93–95, 121. 65  G. Itsványi, “XIII századi feljegyzés IV Bélánok a tatárokhoz küldött követségéről”, Századok 72 (1938): 270. 66  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 171–172; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 211–212. 67  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 172. In January 1249, Innocent IV requested Daniil Romanovich to send the Teutons of Prussia all the information he could muster on the Mongols, see Wenzel, VII, 267. 68  György Székely, “Egy elfelejtett rettegés: a második tatárdúlós hagyományban és egyetemes összefüggésekben”, Századok 122 1988): 52. 69  Fügedi, Castle and Society, 50–53. 70  DIR I. 329–333, 418–426.

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which meant interposing a natural, easier to defend obstacle between them and his troops. This was also his intention back in March–April 1241, but he was urged to engage in the direct confrontation with the Mongols by the Hungarian nobility, who was dissatisfied with the king’s political reform and was trying to conservate of its military role (due to the arrival of the Cumans). The pressures exerted in favor of an open war in April 1241, with disastrous consequences, gave King Bela the authority to decide the strategy in 1247. The letter addressed by King Bela IV to Pope Innocent IV, in November 11th, 1247,71 unveiled the pillar of the new Magyar defensive strategy. The letter was a cry for help, and admonished the Pope and Christian sovereigns for their indifference to the destiny of Hungary. Also, the letter was hinting to a potential alliance with excommunicated Frederick II and even to a covenant with the Great Mongol Khan. King Bela wrote: for this we have resolved after countless considerations, that it be more worthwhile to us and to the entire Europe that the Danube be reinforced with fortresses. For this is the water of our resistance, where Eraclio the defender of the Roman Empire battled with Cosrode, and where not with standing surprise or fierce attacks we fought the Mongols for ten months, our kingdom almost bereft by fortresses and defenders. . . .72 Danube, the aqua contradictionis, became, in King Bela’s vision, the foremost obstacle before the Mongols’ invasion of Europe. At any rate, this defensive strategy came to life in the second half of 1247. The Diploma of the Hospitallers, June 1247, stipulated an even distribution of knights from the Western frontier (which duke Frederick of Babenberg tried to conquer in the events of 1241) and the Severin county which, at the date, 71  DIR I. 344–347; HD 259–262; RA 933a. Since one of the most important dating elements— the marriage of princess Costanza to Lev Danilovici—seems to have taken place, according to the arguments brought by Z. J. Kosztolnyik (Hungary, 201–204), in 1246–1247, dating the letter as from 1247 becomes fully plausible. This is the only date matching with the international status: by November 11th, 1248, six months passed since Güyük’s death and the threat of a new invasion of Europe was no longer imminent. In this context any other previous date can not sustained with evidence. The desperate tone of King Bela could only be explained by the circumstances of the year 1247, when alarming news threatened with another huge Mongol invasion. For a recent analysis of this important document see: Toru Senga, “IV Bela külpolitikaja és IV Ince pápáhaz intézett ‘Tatár’ levele”, Századok 121 (1987): 583–612. 72  HD 259–262: quod esset salubrius nobis et toti Europae, ut Danubis fortaliter munirentur. Hec enim east aqua contradictionis. . . .

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was engulfed in a broader defensive system based on the high peaks of the Carpathians. A few months later, in November 11th, 1247, in his letter to Pope Innocent IV, King Bela already referred to settling some of the Hospitallers in medio regni nostri . . . ad defensionem castrorum que circa danubium edificari facimus, and the rest to be massed (according to the interpretation of Maria Holban73) in a vast Danubian segment located at the convergence with the Tisza River, which was the area that the Mongols pierced through the Hungarian defenses in the winter of 1241/1242.74 Thus, despite his initial intentions, the king had organized the knights into a new, Danube-bound line of defense. Half of them protected the Southern flank, to deter any attempt to close the circle. Although it was closer to the frontier with the Bulgarian Kingdom, the Hospitallers’ front probably did not include the Severin county, at least at the beginning.75 The military grounds of King Bela’s defensive strategy of concentrating all his available forces along the Danube line are unquestionable. In fact, as we are about to see, the Mongols’ half-failed invasion of 1285 was largely due to a similar defense strategy organized by Ladislas IV. However, this strategy left the rest of Transylvania and other vast territories in the east in a state of abandonment, which the king acknowledged of being unable to defend. 2.3.2 Consequences on Transylvania In a time when the shock of the 1241 invasion was not completely overcome, the impact of the new defensive strategy on the development of Transylvania was almost dramatic. Even though, the assassination of Güyük, in April 1248, removed an immediate threat, the decade that followed the Mongol dread of 1247–1248 and the vast efforts to put up a defense slowed down the economic and administrative revival of Transylvania, and consequently the province was thrown into a cone of shadow. Changes were immediately showing in the administrative hierarchy. One of the first effects was the withdrawal from Transylvania of the officials who had actively started its reconstruction. Paul Geregye was the first to leave, for the position of judge of the royal court.76 He was recommended by his expertise in organizing the Danube defense and the restoration of the estranged royal 73  Maria Holban, Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare, 73–85. 74  . . . in confinio cumanorum ultra Danubium et bulgarorum, per quem etiam locum tempore invasionis regni nostri ad nos aditum habuit exercitus Thartarorum. 75  For opinions according to which the Ioanites were not effectively settled in Severin see: Istoria României, II, 145; Turcuş, Sfântul Scaun, 241–242. 76  KMTL 512; DIR I. 427–428.

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estates. Furthermore, in 1247–1248, voivode Lawrence was appointed count of Valkó. This new position brought new organizational and military responsibilities related to the defense of the Danube line that could not be honored together with his voivodal attributions. At the same time, the voivode’s presence in Ilidia (Yliad) in 1248,77 seems to indicate his active involvement alongside the Hospitallers in the defense of the Southern flank of King Bela’s defense system and in the process of consolidating the fortresses in these regions. After 125278 any references regarding the voivodal position disappear for a couple of years, which makes it impossible to speculate on the identity of its holders. However, a certain Herbord presumably held voivodal attributions (mentioned in 1252 together with his brother Lawrence, as buyer of the Sâncel estate79) and confirmed as one of the owners of this estate according to a later source naming him among others.80 The scarce data available from this period is suggestive of Transylvania’s internal turmoil. In 1252, the barren land of a Saxon who disappeared in the 1241 turmoil was conceded by the king to a Székely called Akadas.81 In the same year, half of the Sâncel estate, located at the fertile junction of the two Târnava Rivers, was sold by its owners for a trifling five silver marks.82 In 1256 (May 1st, in mid spring) the Călata road was closed, pending an uncertain reopening.83 In 1257, Transylvanian churchmen were in dire material need, and according to information sent to Pope Alexander IV, they no longer held church service and could not sustain themselves financially.84 Under the circumstances, the Székelys and the Romanians, enclosed in their traditionalist cultures, characterized by autarchy and a subsistence economy, seem to be the main survivors of the period. The social and economic development of these populations, confirmed by the insistent pleas for the payment of animal tax duties to the Archbishopric of Esztergom in 1256 and 1262, was to become more evident in the decades to come.

77  DIR I. 426–427. 78  DIR II. 5–6; ZW 78–79. 79  DIR II. 5; ZW 79. 80  DIR II. 135–136; ZW 110–111 (1271). 81  DIR II. 5–6; ZW 78–79. 82  DIR II. 5; ZW 79. 83  DIR II. 16–18; Wenzel VII. 474–476. 84  DIR II. 14; Wenzel II. 285.

CHAPTER 3

The Duchy of Transylvania The delay in the reconstruction of Transylvania convinced King Bela IV in the late 1260s to abandon the strategic defense he had planned against the Mongol threat in 1247–1248. He also intended to reorganize the administrative system in order to give an impetus to the eastern regions of the Arpadian Kingdom. In this context, he turned to an administrative innovation first implemented by Andrew II, after the banishment of the Teutons, which he himself experimented with as heir to the throne: reinstating the Duchy of Transylvania. The new title was bestowed in 1257 upon Prince Stephen, next in line to the crown of Hungary, who initially left the province after a brief amount of time (c. 1258), in exchange for the title of duke of Styria. For the next three years until his return, similar attributions were exerted in Transylvania by the holder of an improvised office: that of Ban of Transylvania. 3.1

Reinstating the Duchy of Transylvania

The birth, in 1239, of the first son of Bela IV and queen Mary Lascaris, brought great joy in the entire Kingdom of Hungary. The hopes for a boy were very low, not only because of the king’s age (33 years old) but also because the royal couple had already seven daughters. Seen as a token of divine grace, this event triggered a grandiose thanksgiving on the day of St. Luke the Evangelist (September 18th), when even the economically wise King Bela displayed memorable generosity. On this occasion, the venerable Archbishop Robert of Esztergom lived his last great joy, that of baptizing the little prince with the name of the holy King Stephen, the initiator of Christianity in Hungary. Several weeks later (November, 2nd, 1239), the Valon cleric who dedicated most of his life to the church of Hungary passed away.1 Considering the hopes invested in him, the little prince enjoyed the full consideration worthy of a future king. In 1246, on the celebration of his 7th birthday, Stephen was crowned as associated king of Hungary, and received the formal title of duke of Slavonia.2 Also during these years, a future royal court, including 1  Albericus, in Gombos, Catalogus, 33–34; MGH, SS, XXIII, 811. 2  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 190; Kristó Gyula, KMTL, 294. The administration of this province would be effectively exerted by Bans Ladislas Kán (1245–1247), Rostislav Mihailovich (1247– 1248) and Stephen Gutkeled (1248–1259). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_005

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1 Abrud AB 2 Adrian BH 3 Arcalia BN 4 Arieșul de Câmpie (com. Cheud, SJ) 5 Binținți (Aurel Vlaicu) AB 6 Apold MS 7 Bazna SB 8 Bonțida CJ 9 Căpud AB 10 Câlnic AB 11 Cârța SB 12 Chintelnic BN 13 Chiuza BN 14 Cloașter SB 15 Cluj-Mănăștur 16 Cojocna CJ MAP 2

17 Copand AB 18 Crăciunelul de Jos AB 19 Cricău AB 20 Dăbâca 21 Dej CJ 22 Dupusul SB 23 Fundătura CJ 24 Gârbova AB 25 Geoagiul de Sus AB 26 Hașag AB 27 Hădăreni MS 28 Ighiu AB 29 Igrițiu CJ 30 Ip SJ 31 Lujerdiu CJ 32 Măceu HD The duchy of Transylvania. 

33 Mănărade AB 34 Mediaș SB 35 Meșcreac AB 36 Micăsasa SB 37 Mintiul Gherlei CJ 38 Ocna Dejului CJ 39 Ocnele Turzii CJ 40 Odverem AB 41 Pețelca AB 42 Piatra Șoimului BH 43 Rodna BN 44 Ruși AB 45 Sălacea BH 46 Sărata BN 47 Sărățel BN 48 Sângătin SB 49 Sântimbru AB

50 Sebeș AB 51 Sfărașu CJ 52 Stremț AB 53 Stupini BN 54 Sumurduc CJ 55 Suplac SJ 56 Șieu-Măgheruș BN 57 Șieu-Odorhei BN 58 Kezdi (Târgu Secuiesc) CV 59 Teiuș AB 60 Teremia MS 61 Unguraș CJ 62 Valcău SJ 63 Veza AB 64 Vințu de Jos AB 65 Vurpăr SB 66 Zalnoc SJ

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officials such as count Nicholas of Dubicha (treasurer of the young king), Andrew, son of Ivancha and count Herbord, son of Osl, was organized around him.3 The young king also owned territories under his direct administration in various locations throughout the kingdom. In 1254, the young King Stephen, age 15, married a Cuman princess who was also baptized on this occasion with the name of the holy Hungarian Saint Elisabeth.4 Most likely, this political move enabled King Bela to answer one of the demands of Cuman leaders who agreed, back in 1246, to return and help repopulate the Hungarian Kingdom. By giving Hungary a queen, they had more reasons to consider Hungary as their new home. Henceforth, Stephen could already be considered fit to exert some of his royal attributes. Furthemore, as Stephen Gutkeled became the governor of Styria, Prince Stephen seems to have assumed his responsibilities as duke of Slavonia. In 1257, at the age of 18, Stephen became the duke of Transylvania, an office revived by his father especially for him. The Duchy of Slavonia was attributed to the second son of King Bela IV, Prince Bela, born in 1243. King Bela himself had undergone a similar course in his youth. He was crowned as a young king in 1214, and then he consecutively became duke of Slavonia (1220) and later duke of Transylvania (c. 1225). More than assuring succession and reestablishing the tradition started in the very first centuries of the Hungarian conquest,5 the decision to rebuild the Duchy of Transylvania was an attempt to revive the reconstruction of some regions subject to major social and economic difficulties due to prolonged neglect. Hence appointing the very successor to the Hungarian throne as duke of Transylvania was meant to restore the Transylvanians’ confidence in the Hungarian crown. Also, through this move, King Bela renounced the previous strategy of deliberately neglecting the Eastern regions and concentrating his forces along the Danube. King Bela IV adopted a series of measures meant to reinstate the rule of law in the matter of property ownerships. In the decade that followed the great invasion, the royal power prioritized the recovery of the strongholds and that of the church properties that had significantly upheld the defense effort. However, the success of this action was rather moderate. Around 1254, more than a decade after the invasion, the king decided to resume activities related 3  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 190–191. 4  Daughter to Zeyhanus (Szejhán) dux, the main leader of the Cumans returned to Hungary on 1246; she was christened in 1254 at the Dominican Monastery of Buda—Pálóczi-Horváth, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians, 78. Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 190; Kristó, KMTL, 294. 5  For the evolution of Duchy in the Arpadian era see Makk, KMTL, 261; Gyula Kristó, A XI. századi hercegség története Magyarországon, (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974).

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to estate property,6 the beneficiaries of which included, for the first time, free owners. As far as Transylvania and the neighboring regions are concerned, one of the most noteworthy moments of this policy occurred right before the revival of the institution of duchy. In April 1256, the noblemen Ladislas and Thomas from the Chanad kindred petitioned the king regarding the occupation of some of their Bihor properties by Paul Geregye in the years after the Mongol invasion. Compelled by this context, King Bela IV decided, for the first time, against Geregye,7 who had played such a tremendously important role in bringing the Eastern regions under royal control. Moreover, in November the same year, the St. Benedict Monastery, located near the Gran River officially appealed the king for the restitution of properties and rights that had been estranged from them after the Mongol invasion, including the salt customs near Arieşul de Câmpie.8 Eventually, on December 16th, 1256, King Bela reconfirmed a series of previous donations to the Esztergom Archbishop made at the time of its establishment by his royal ancestors. He also paid particular attention to certain revenues and rights in Transylvania, including the right over cashing in “in the name of the king the quitrents from Székelys and Romanians, consisting of big or small livestock and any other animals”, as well as the regular fees paid by the Romanians in the Kingdom of Hungary.9 All these decrees shared a common denominator: they were all meant to put an end to the abuses made by high officials and clerks. Such was the case with the Chanad kindred property, seized by Paul Geregye, or the Arieşul de Câmpie customs post, taken over by the palatine Stephen Gutkeled, owner of numerous estates and a fortress in the vicinity.10 Furthermore, a few years later, one of the palatine’s offsprings, Paul Gutkeled, was granted by young king Stephen legal confirmation of his “right” to cash in revenues related to those properties.11 On the other hand, the revenues claimed by the Archbishopric of Esztergom,

6   István Rákos, “IV Béla birtokrestaurációs politikája”, in Acta Historica Szegedinensis, (Szeged: József Attila Tudományegyetem, 1974), 3 (with document samples). 7   The complaints of Ladislas and Thomas were filed on the March 29th, 1256—DIR II. 15–16, Wenzel VII. 458. On May 1st, 1256, following the royal sentence, the invaded lands and a half of the Birtin custom post were effectively returned to their lawful owners—DIR II. 16–18, 491–493; Wenzel VII. 474–476. 8   CD IV/2. 405–407, DIR II. 48 (summary): in parte Transsilvana tributum salium circa Aranyos habitum. 9   DIR II. 18–20, 493–494; HD 276–277; ZW 80–81. 10  Jakó 202–203. 11  DIR II. 390–391; Wenzel V 66–68.

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were abusively snatched by a plethora of royal intendants.12 Removing all the abuses required the existence of a royal institution with direct control over the entire administrative apparatus. The Duchy of Transylvania seemed to be the best option for such a goal. At the same time, the institution of the duchy was also supposed to assist with more pressing military demands, such as the Hungarian expanding interests in the Balkans and the political crisis experienced by the Golden Horde after the death of Batu Golden Horde (1255). After an uneventful decade, the disappearance of the Great Khan at the age of 48 set the entire Eastern world in motion with threats and optimism alternating at a blinding speed. The rise of Sartaq, a Nestorian Christian (according to Armenian sources), as the new leader of the Golden Horde (1255–1256), brought hope for Christians everywhere,13 and judging by all appearances, broke king Daniil Romanovich’s ties with Rome.14 The consequent death of Sartaq, in conditions that remain unclear and the rise of his son, Oulaqtchi to power did not bring any essential changes to the general context. The new khan engaged to pursue his father’s efforts to integrate the Russian principalities in the Mongol political and military system. To this end, he summoned a meeting with Russian princes, in which he engaged in a lenient policy and granted all their demands.15 Furthermore, respecting the general draft imposed by Sartaq, Oulaqtchi moved on enforcing Russia’s reorganization into military districts, according to the Mongol model.16 Even though these measures fully integrated Russia into the Golden Horde,17 the Mongol dominance relied on the cooperation of the Russian princes and the stimulation they received in order to join the political system of the Golden Horde. The attractive Mongol political offer seemingly caused Daniil Romanovich to turn a deaf ear to the calls and threats of Pope Alexander IV (1256–1257),18 who intended to reconnect Halych to the Roman religious establishment. The the new Russian-Mongol cooperation seemed ready to cast an entirely new 12  Nunc autem quidam judices regni nostri et collectores censuum nostrorum et exactores urbararum, necnon comites camerarum nostrarum sibi et ecclesie sue fraudem facere conarentur, occupando, iurisdictionem prorogando, solutionem quandoque diminuendo, DIR II. 493–494. 13  Grousset, L’empire, 473–474; Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea, 62. 14  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 115. 15  Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, 150. 16  Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, 150. 17  Grekov, Iakubovski, Hoarda de Aur și decăderea ei, (Bucharest: Editura de Stat pentru Literatură Ştiinţifică, 1953), 206. 18  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 181; Chirovsky, Introduction to Ukrainian History, 173.

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light onto the threat from the East, augmenting the feeling of insecurity at the Hungarian Eastern frontier. Due to this colaboration, the Mongols reached in 1257 the boundaries of the Teuton-owned Prussia.19 In these circumstances, which called for the revival of Transylvania’s military potential, King Bela’s solution was that which he himself had experimented in his youth: the reinstitution of the duchy and the ensuing unique military command. However, such a complex endeavor was too great a burden for the still frail 18-year-old prince. Stephen would play more of a symbolic role in this remote region than that of a full-fledged administrator. His presence at the head of the duchy would be brief. In 1258, given the imminent war with Bohemia, Stephen was appointed duke of Styria. At the same time, in order to ensure the continuity of Transylvania’s recovery and the revival of its military potential, King Bela turned to a new administrative innovation: the Banate of Transylvania. 3.2

The Banate of Transylvania (1258–1261)

3.2.1 The ban of Transylvania worked as a substitute for the duke. Similar to the case of Slavonia—which probably served as the example for this model of administration—the king planned to keep the centralized administrative structure of the “duchy” also during the periods when none of the royal family members who owned the duke title was able to lead. In essence, the role of the lord was to exert, in the name of the king, his authority over all the constituencies of Transylvania’s administrative hodgepodge, to control royal servants and to centralize the rule over the province’s military structures. The person appointed by the king, Ernye Ákos, was one of the few who had accompanied Bela IV in his Dalmatian retreat (1241–1243). A few years later he made a name for himself during the war against Austria.20 In 1250 he was the official holder of the office of magister agasonum, and he was granted estates in Sătmar county,21 as a reward for his services. One year later (1251), Ernye Ákos became count of Varasd and in 1254 he was mentioned as count of Borsod,22 a position he probably held until 1256–1258, when his successor was mentioned

19  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 181. 20  RA 928. 21  RA 928. 22  RA 1021 (cu text).

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for the first time.23 There is no evidence to suggest that Ernye Ákos was the leader of Transylvania as of 1252, even though it is believed to have been so in older and also more recent scholarship.24 He must have made his appearance in Transylvania most likely along with Stephen (around 1257), and the later evolution of his ties with the heir point out to the fact that he had previously been assigned by the king to exert some sort of tutelage over the royal son. The reconstitution of the duchy institution and its subsequent replacement with that of the lordship came hand in hand with administrative reforms, the most important being the integration in its administrative system of Solnoc25 county. Up to that point, Solnoc county had not been integrated into the administrative and military structure of Transylvania. On the contrary, the owners of this vast county of foremost economic importance, with its jurisdiction over the Dej salt mine and Transylvanian salt transport and the great storage facility of Sălacea, were high officials of the kingdom. In the first half of the 13th century, this position was reunited with that of curial count, magister tavernicorum or palatine,26 and in the years after the Mongol invasion tenured for this position was no other than Paul Geregye. The subordination of this county to the Duke/Lord of Transylvania was undoubtedly an attempt to channel much of the region’s resources into its own consolidation. Furthermore, whether this had been King Bela’s intention or not, under the administration of duke Stephen V the subordination of Solnoc county to the entire political system ruled by the Duke/Lord of Transylvania would soon turn into subordination to the voivode of Transylvania. Considering other internal objectives after the installation of Ernye Ákos as Transylvania’s ruler, their success was probably just partial. Certain progress had been achieved in better controlling royal servants,27 but the abuses committed by the local lords could not be eliminated completely while they still played a major role in the defensive system of the province after the Mongol invasion. At the same time, the diploma that reconfirmed the privileges of the 23  Corrardus, RA 1133. The dating of the document is uncertain: around 1256 at Szentpétery, and 1258 in HO VI. 96. 24  KMTL 193, 197; Erdelyi Törtenete, I, Budapest, 1987, 312. 25  DIR II. 33–34, 497; ZW 85–86. In 1261, duke Stephen renewed the privileges granted to the Dej colonists, who had received them from Ban Ernye Ákos. 26  On one occasion, in 1214, this office was held by a Transylvanian voivode (Gyula Kán), RA 290; Wenzel VI. 367–368; DIR I. 158. 27  The renewal, in 1262, of the privileges granted to the church of Esztergom eliminates the references to the abuses of royal clerks presented in a similar document from 1256, thus, we can assume that this issue was partially resolved.

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Archbishopric of Esztergom in 126228 and also reasserted his rights over 10% livestock tax imposed on Romanians and Székelys might indicate that at least in Transylvania a series of issues had been left unsolved. This should not come as a surprise since in 1259–1260 dealing with the Mongol threat was undoubtedly the main priority of Lord Ernye Ákos. 3.2.2 The Mongol Invasion of 1260 The rise to the throne of the Golden Horde of Berke, a Muslim, in the aftermath of the assassination of young Oulaqtchi, resumed the Mongol expansion policy towards Central Europe. The entire Christian world looked at the event in awe. As a result, Daniil Romanovich changed his policy and allied with the Catholic world, which triggered an anti-Mongol uprising culminating with his failed attempt to impose his authority over Kiev.29 The lightning retaliation of the new Khan of Saray proved that the military power of the Golden Horde in the area was still impressive. The powerful intervention of the Mongol Commander Burundai from 1258 brought Halych under heel and forced Daniil Romanovich to demolish his fortifications.30 Under these circumstances, the call to arms in a regional crusade against the Mongols addressed by Pope Alexander IV (July 1258)31 was rather late and disappointing. Not only did the support that Daniil expected fail to come once again, but the vengeful Berke decided to respond to the faint challenge with new raids against Poland and Hungary. These raids were an attempt to subdue by means of force any future actions of interference of these powers in the sphere of dominance of the Horde. Thus, in 1259 and 1260 Poland, Lithuania and Prussia were repeatedly raided. The invasion of Poland was particularly violent, sometimes causing population displacements. Among the victims was Boleslaus Pudicus,32 duke of Krakow, who was forced to seek refuge in Hungary. The retaliation against Transylvania must have taken place in the second half of 1260, during or immediately after the end of the Hungarian-Bohemian war, corroborated, with a Bulgarian attack on Severin33 launched at the same time. This raid, which appears to have been rather small in scale, was a total disaster for the Mongols. According to a fragment from the chronicle of Kemāl 28  DIR II. 41–43, HD 307–309. 29  Grousset, L’Empire, 476; Chirovsky, Introduction to Ukrainian History, 172–173. 30  Chirovsky, Introduction to Ukrainian History, 173; Grousset, L’Empire, 476; Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, 157–158. 31  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 116. 32  Grousset, L’Empire, 474, Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 116. 33  DIR II. 62–65.

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Pasha-Zāde: “At that time, a party from Bereket-Khan’s army /. . ./ crossing the Balkan Mountains [= the Carpathians], raided the ill omen Hungarian country. The evil foe victorious in that battle for faith took the survivors of the clash /. . ./ Such as in a game of backgammon one can be outrun, and other times one can be the outrunner, so are the brave-hearted riders, who roam the hunting ground sometimes apprehended, and other times become apprehenders themselves.”34 Despite the lack of conclusive evidence in this respect, we can assume that the Mongol action of 1260 occurred in Southern Transylvania and that on this occasion the Cistercian church of Cârţa probably suffered more devastation.35 The leadership of the military operations and the victory laurel were attributed to Lord Ernye, who coordinated on the battlefield both the border defense troops as well and some of the Transylvanian noble representatives.36 None of Stephen V’s documents otherwise detailed records of his own deeds of arms, mention this campaign which might indicate that it took place before he returned as duke of Transylvania. At the same time it was the future Palatine Lawrence (son of Kemyn), who answered King Bela’s request and ahead of an army recruited by himself, recaptured the Severin county from the Bulgarians.37 Shortly after his success, overlooked by the chronicles due to the rather murky circumstances, Prince Stephen returned to lead the Duchy of Transylvania, after the loss of Styria to King Ottokar II. Due to the fall out with his father, probably dating back to the war against Bohemia, one of Stephen’s first actions as “duke” was to remove Lord Ernye Ákos and to abolish the Banate institution, obsolete after his return. 3.3

Civil Wars

After the Kroissenbrunn defeat, the Hungarian rule in Styria came to an end, and it was officially sanctioned by the peace of April 1261. Prince Stephen returned to Transylvania, and inaugurated one of the most prolific periods in the history of the province. Through a dynamic and innovation-oriented 34  Aurel Decei, “Problema colonizării turcilor selgiucizi în Dobrogea secolului al XIII-lea”, in Relaţii româno-orientale. Culegere de studii, (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică, 1978), 176–177. 35  DIR II. 55–56. In 1264, the monastery is described by duke Stephen as “totally deserted after the wrath of the Mongol scourge”; we do not know whether he was referring to the great invasion of 1241, or of a more recent raid. 36  Some of these special responsibilities were held by count Andrew of Geoagiul de Sus, guerdoned for his merits in the battles with the Mongols—DIR II. 54–55, HD 323, Jakó 252. 37  DIR II. 64–65.

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strategy, duke Stephen was able to reform the social, military and administrative system of Transylvania. Thus, his reforms ended the two decades of recession in the aftermath of the 1241–1242 invasions. The Duchy of Transylvania during Prince Stephen’s time was marked by the conflict with his father King Bela IV, which degenerated in two bloody civil wars. 3.3.1 Origins of the Conflict On Stephen’s return to Transylvania, the conflict with his father king Bela IV was already brewing. The main cause seems to have been the Kroissenbrunn defeat, due to differences of opinion over tactics. From a military perspective, the differences between King Bela and Prince Stephen’s approach were evident. While the King was cautious in politics, but hesitant on the battlefield and far from the ideal of a warrior-king38 (all the great battles he personally led concluded either in defeat or in genuine catastrophes), the young prince possessed all the qualities needed to become an exceptional military commander. Endowed with extreme ambition, strong will, and determination the prince won victories even in what seemed totally compromised circumstances. He also benefitted—unlike his father—from the major ability of being wise in selecting his companions from the best men of arms, noblemen animated by the same ideals of late medieval chivalry that the young prince himself had inherited from his grandfather, Andrew II. He could also be generous to extravagance,39 and he never hesitated in advancing his devotees (often members of smaller, and lesser noble families), to the highest political ranks in the kingdom, granting them generous estates, and making them the core of a new aristocratic stratum in competition with the old aristocratic families grouped around his father. These different traits of personality also influenced his internal policy. Given his complete lack of reverence to the centralist tradition which dominated the Arpadian Kingdom, Stephen was, just like his grandfather Andrew II, adept of the Western feudal system. He never hesitated in ridding himself of the royal fortresses, which he donated to his barons and knights or sold to the people who funded him. Bela IV, on the other hand, was a partisan of the older traditions, of preserving the centralized structure of the state and the royal estate. Ever since he was young, King Bela IV consistently promoted this policy as a form of protest against his father Andrew II,

38  See SRH I. 469 (Chronicon Budense, Chronicon Dubnicense): Erat rex Bela vir pacificus, sed in exercitibus et preliis minime fortunatus. 39  In 1269, he paid Ban Mykud the hefty sum of 100 silver marks for a horse, DIR II. 119–120; HO, 174–175; Jáko 278.

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and attracted the enmity of the aristocracy.40 When the military network of royal fortresses was proven obsolete, King Bela refused to implement the more radical solution of the great scale feudal conscript system (more efficient, but also potentially anarchic and dangerous), and by that to sacrifice much of the royal estate. On his attempt to exert his royal authority onto the aristocracy, he turned to an unusual solution never used to such an extent in the history of Hungary: bringing in warmongering settlers from Eastern Europe and calling to arms various populations within the influence of the Arpadian Kingdom. Consequently, his army, in the battle of Kroissenbrunn, consisted of an odd mix of Ruthenians, Mongols and Poles, external allies of King Bela, joined by Cumans, Slavs, Székelys, Romanians, Pechenegs, Ishmaelites, Greeks and Bulgarians, Serbs and Bosnian heretics.41 Almost naturally, this odd, heterogeneous throng of warriors stood little chance before a Western army run by one of the most brilliant military commanders of the time, King Ottokar II Přemysl. Thus, the 1260 failure only confirmed the policy adopted by Prince Stephen and the distance he took from his father’s obsolete conceptions. At the same time, King Bela’s shift of external political alliances (immediately after Kroissenbrunn, the king had approached Bohemia) obviously attracted the disapproval of duke Stephen. Also, both the Hungarian-Bohemian peace of April 1261 and the marriage of Ottokar II to Kunigunda (Rostislav Mihailovich’s daughter and King Bela’s kin), concluded in the autumn of the same year,42 posed serious threats to Stephen’s succession to the throne. Under these circumstances, the dismissal of count Ernye Ákos, King Bela’s representative in Transylvania, was a true declaration of independence from his father.

40  The vast action of repossessing estranged royal domains had started immediately after his coronation (1235) and involved an impressive administrative and judicial apparatus, see: DIR I. 300–301, 305–310 etc. In the Duchy of Transylvanian these measures were enforced much earlier—DIR II. 254–255, 394–395; ZW 54; HD 120–121. For the noble discontent against this policy see: Master Roger, Epistle, 144–145. 41  adversus regem Russiae et filios eius et ceteros Ruthenos ac Thartaros, qui eidem in auxilium venerant at Boleslaum dux Cracoviensem et Loczkonem juvenem Lausaciae duces et innumeram multitudinem inhumanorum hominum, Cumanorum, Ungarorum et diversorum Sclavorum, Siculorum, quoque et Valachorum, Beszeninorum et Izmahelitarum scismaticorum, etiam utpote Grecorum, Bulgarorum, Rassiensium et Bosniensium hereticorum . . ., HD 287–288. See: Mihail P. Dan, Cehi, slovaci and români în veacurile XIII–XIV, (Sibiu: Publisher, 1944), 17–22. 42  Annales Pragenses, in Gombos, Catalogus, 185: Eodem anno /1261/ 8. Kal. Novembris princeps regni Bohemorum duxit in uxorem Cunegundem, filiam Hostislai ducis Bulgarorum.

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3.3.2 Relations with the Golden Horde Due to the increasingly tensed relations with the pro-Bohemian party behind the Hungarian throne, Stephen had to look for a viable solution to avoid the escalation of the conflict with the Golden Horde and to secure peace at the Eastern frontiers. Circumstances were in fact in favor for initiating negotiations with the Mongols and finding the best compromising solution. At the same time, the failure of 1260 had shown the Mongols that Hungary was far from being an easy prey. Under the circumstances, the negotiations initiated by Stephen with the help of count Ponyth Miskolc,43 a savvy negotiator, resulted in a remarkable diplomatic success. The Hungarian (Transylvanian)—Mongol agreement, most likely signed in 1261, was more than just a simple non-aggression pact. It was on this occasion that the two parties also agreed on their areas of interest in Bulgaria and Cumania. The influence of duke Stephen in Bulgaria was confined to the Iskar Valley, a line that his armies never crossed too far.44 The Mongols most likely agreed not to interfere on behalf of the Bulgarian Kingdom of Vidin, while Hungary consented not to interfere with the Lower Danube. This was undoubtedly the explanation why the Mongols did not offer support against Stephen to the Tarnovo Czar Constantin Tich, their ally in the campaigns against Byzantium. The 1261 agreement was a first remarkable diplomatic success for duke Stephen. Despite the critical moments of 1265, this agreement lasted until the end of his reign, and provided the peace necessary to achieve the major objectives of his policy. 3.3.3 The First Civil War (1262) The immediate cause of the 1262 conflict was Stephen’s wish to be acknowledged as king and to govern the state together with his father. This push was not necessarily the expression of vain ambitions shown by the young prince. It was more of a measure of precaution against the increasingly obvious intentions of King Bela and Queen Mary to provide prince Bela, their second born, with a sizeable chunk from the royal heritage. To prevent future unpleasant events, Stephen arranged to have his succession rights45 acknowledged by Bela IV and 43  DIR II. 133–135, HD 347–348, Jakó 290. 44  The farthermost point reached by the Hungarians in their campaigns in Bulgaria was the Pleven fortress, besieged by count Ponyth Miskolc in 1266 DIR II. 133–135, HD 347–348, Jakó 290. 45  Stephen’s royal title in the documents issued in 1261–1262, a consequence of his coronation in 1246, is a formal one, always accompanied by the “first born of the King of

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to further extend his authority. Even though the only title he possessed at the time, “duke of Transylvania”, implied that Stephen’s authority was restricted to the boundaries of this province, we know for a fact that he controlled the entire area to the East of the Tisza River. Using his royal prerogatives,46 he renewed the privileges of the colonists (hospites) located in Dej (Deeswar), Sălacea (Zoloch) and Sătmar (Zotmar), enforcing them “to join our army and fight alongside”.47 Also by virtue of the same prerogatives, he judged the cases of properties in the counties of Bihor, Sătmar and Bereg.48 His solid position in these regions is confirmed by the unprecedented fact that the Bishopric of Oradea was obliged to ask Stephen to confirme (on September 3rd, 126249), a document issued by the chancellorship of King Bela IV on March 23rd, 1261.50 In addition, after offering support to the “Czar” Rostislav Mihailovich and his successor Iakov Sventislav, through his campaigns in Bulgaria (1261, 1262) Stephen secured their future cooperation and undoubtedly the control over the Banate of Severin. Prior to this initiative, as we have already seen, Stephen carried out negotiations with the Mongols, through the course of which the prince used his self-assumed sovereign prerogatives to negotiate the spheres of influence of Hungary and the Golden Horde at the Lower Danube. Under the circumstances, even though according to a document from December 5th, 1262, the armed conflict between the king and his heir was accidental, one might argue that a direct confrontation was inevitable. Duke Stephen’s decision to extend his authority over the territory between the Tisza and the Danube triggered an argument over the Fylek fortress,51 which captains Henrik Preussel and Franco refused to hand over to the young king. This Hungary” syntagm. At that time Stephen’s royal authority was not acknowledged, and he remained just an heir prince. Until the Peace Treaty from Bratislava, which acknowledged him as the “young King of Hungary”, and stipulated his relations to the father king and was, also, attributed a territory to govern, he would remain, from this juridical point of view, a king without a kingdom. 46  See also the justification of the privilege given to the Dej colonists (1261): ad regiam pertinet maiestatem precibus condescendere subditorum ut numerus fidelium augeatur et regalis potentia latius extendatur, cum regis sit proprium in multitudine populi gloriari, DIR II. 497. 47  Ibidem: ad exercitum nostrum venire et nobiscum exercituare teneantur. 48  DIR II. 35, 498 (July 4th, 1261). 49  DIR II. 35, 498, 41. 50  DIR II. 35, 498, 34. 51  Fülek (today’s Filakovo, Slovakia), located in the Neugrad county (KMTL, 227–228) was one of the fortresses that resisted the Mongol siege of 1241–1242 (Fügedi, Castle and Society, 45).

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incident resulted in a clash between the two sides, sometime in October 1262, most probably close to the aforementioned fortress. Although concluded with the victory of Stephen, the fortress did not surrender. With the prompt intervention of the Bohemian troops sent by Ottokar II52 to support King Bela, which threatened to transform this conflict into a civil war, a truce was secured with the intervention of count Herrandus of Trenčin and magister Ladislas, Archdean of Hont. The treaty, duly signed by the negotiators of the two parties (Bishop Philip de Vác, and Provosts John of Arad and Benedict of Sibiu) under the patronage of Archbishops Philip of Esztergom and Smaragdus of Kalocsa, were concluded in late November 1262 with the peace agreement from Bratislava. The requests made by Prince Stephen were satisfied almost entirely. 3.3.4 The Peace Treaty of Bratislava The Bratislava peace agreement marks the military superiority of the heir to the throne, proven by the rather peaceful approach adopted by King Bela. More than the complete satisfaction in the matter of the Fylek fortress,53 Stephen was acknowledged the official title of “young King of Hungary, Duke of Transylvania and Lord of the Cumans”. In addition, his authority was extended over all the territories of Hungary to the East of the Danube. Without further dwelling on the details of the complicated juridical system through which they attempted to manage the relations between the two distinct state formations created on the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary as a consequence of this treaty, we will show that in the territory administered by “the young king” the administrative and juridical structures were similar to the those subordinated to King Bela and that his court was a copy of his father’s. Also, the Cumans were placed under his control, and King Bela explicitly assumed the obligation to never attempt, through any means, to attract them under his command. On the other hand, Stephen engaged to do the same in regards to the Slavs in Slavonia and the “Teutons” in the counties of Western Hungary, as well as the numerous “Bohemians”, largely mercenaries, in the service of King Bela. The two parties also agreed to never undertake reprisals against the noblemen and royal servants in the service of the other side and to never prejudice their

52  Annales Pragenses, Gombos, Catalogus, 185; MGH, SS, IX, 178:  . . . exercitu transeunte in Ungariam. . . . 53  In the first document issued at Poroszlo, in December 5th, 1262, Stephen renewed the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Bratislava as a consequence of receiving into possession the Fylek fortress.

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properties. The salt exploitation and commerce in Transylvania was placed under the common administration of the two sovereigns.54 Overall, the peace agreement from November 1262 was undoubtedly an exceptional success for Stephen. His prerogatives became practically similar to those exerted by the king himself, and the “young king” title was just a formality which did not entail any real subordination. Through his jurisdiction over the Cumans he became the owner of the greatest army in Hungary, which granted him a crucial role in the external policy of the country. He also controlled one of the most important economic resources of the kingdom, salt, since the activity of Bella’s representatives in Transylvania was conditioned by his good will. 3.3.5 Armed Peace (1263–1264) The Peace Treaty of Bratislava was deemed inacceptable by King Bela, Queen Mary and the aristocratic party supporting them, whose undisputed leader was Palatine Henrik Kőszegi from the Heder kindred. After a year (1263) of apparent peace, marked by an endemic food crisis that was ravaging through Central Europe,55 this aristocratic party started a vast diplomatic and propaganda campaign meant to undermine the positions held by Stephen and to prepare a military retaliation. The aims of the future clash were not limited at rebuking Stephen and regulating on a new basis the relations between the king in power and his first born. With the consolidation of the influence exerted by the Bohemian King Ottokar II Přemysl (a true military and diplomatic tutelage over the royal court of Buda), King Bela and Queen Mary stated their intention to disinherit Stephen and leave everything to their second born, Prince Bela.56 Confronted with this new perspective, an important number of Stephen’s followers, including the voivode of Transylvania, Ladislas Kán,57 radically reconsidered their attitude towards him. They were joined by most of the “loyalist” social categories, who followed Stephen until then only because he was heir 54  The importance of to salt mines and the ensuing revenues is marked by the fact that one tenth of the text of the treaty dwells on this issue. 55  Anonymi Leobiensis (Gombos, Catalogus, 273): Hoc anno /1263/ fuit maxima fames per totam Austriam et Hungariam et Bohemiam et Moraviam, qualis ante raro visa fuit . . . 56  Bornaround 1243, he became duke of Slavonia in 1261. Regarding the intentions of King Bela see: d. ex. DIR II. 158–162; HD, I/1, 388–391. 57  Ladislas Kán changed his allegiance to King Bela, accompanied by his brother Gyula— DIR II. 94–95; HD 331–332; DIR II. 101–103; HD 388–391. For more a more comprehensive list of noblemen rennouncing Stephen’s cause or attempts led by King Bela in order to attract more supporters from his son’s camp, see: DIR II. 94–95, HD 331–332; DIR II. 94–95, HD 331–332; DIR II. 108–110, HO VIII. 110–113; DIR II. 121–123, HD 344–345 etc.

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to the throne and the crowned “young king”: the Saxons of Transylvania,58 the Cumans,59 the middle nobility60 and also the members of the Balkan Commonwealth under his command (including duke Bela of Mačva,61 Czar of Vidin, Iakov Sventislav62 and the Romanian voivode Litovoi). Furthermore, King Bela IV exerted his external influence and was offered more support from his Polish sons-in-law, dukes Boleslav Pudicus of Krakow and Boleslav the Pious of Gnyezno, and also from Prince Leszek the Black, the son of Casimir I, duke of Kujawia.63 At the same time, the diplomatic offensive started by King Bela’s against his son changed the attitude of the Papacy. Before the 1262 war, Stephen managed to attract the good will of Pope Urban IV.64 After the agreement signed at Bratislava, the Roman Pontiff tried not to take sides but rather to assume the role of peace guarantor for Kingdom of Hungary. Thus, after the request of the Pope, King Bela confirmed on August 3rd, 1263 the Peace Treaty of Bratislava, and engaged to never take actions against his son Stephen and his wife Elisabeth.65 A few months later, on February 2nd, 1264, Pope Urban IV addressed identical letters to both kings, father and son, asking them to avoid a civil war at all costs and use their “riches and fortunes” to more noble purposes, such as helping the Holy Land or reconstructing the churches destroyed by the Mongols.66 The privilege granted in the same year by Stephen to the Cistercian Monastery of Cârţa,67 destroyed during the Mongol invasion, might have been an immediate response to this request in the attempt to win 58  DIR II. 158–162, HD 388–391. 59  DIR II. 94–95, HD 331–332. 60  DIR II. 94–95, HD 331–332: “deserting many of our barons and knights, as well as many of our kingdom’s noblemen.” 61  His brother, Michael, was Stephen’s ally in 1262: DIR, 44–49, HD, 300–303. However, duke Bela, who pleaded allegiance to the king in office, played an important military role in the battle of Isaszég, DIR 213–215. 62  For his previous unfaithful acts, which caused the royal campaign of 1266, see: DIR II. 133–135, Jáko 290. 63  DIR II. 82–85, Theiner, I, 284–286. Boleslav V of Krakow (1227–1279) was married (1239) with Bela’s first born, Kunigunda (born 1224), while Boleslav of Gnyezno was married to the 7th daughter, Yolanda (1256). 64  Considering he was liable of persecution from his father, Pope Urban IV granted him the privilege of immunity from excommunication or any other interdict placed on him by any of the prelates from the Kingdom of Hungary. Renouncing this privilege was one of the causes of the Bratislava agreement: DIR II. 44–49, HD 300–303. 65  Wenzel VIII 34–35, Theiner I 459; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 208. 66  DIR II. 59–60, Theiner, I 265–266; HD 314–315. 67  DIR II. 55–56, ZW 93–94.

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papal favor.68 However, in the summer of the same year, after a new round of negotiations with King Bela, Pope Urban IV issued two documents endorsing his cause. In the first document (July 14, 1264) he berated the Cumans, at the time still supporting the young king, and threatened them with expulsion from Hungary if they did not respect the Catholic religious precepts.69 The second document (July 16, 1264),70 much more significant, was incriminating Stephen, addressed not as the “young king” or heir to the throne but as the “King Bela’s firstborn”, for having appropriated a number of Transylvanian properties belonging to Queen Mary,71 and asked for immediate restitution, under church penalties. These assets, according to the text of the papal bull, entered in the possession of Stephen after the Peace Treaty of Bratislava. His request was based on the shaky argument that the agreement was never signed by Queen Mary72 and therefore was null and void. Moreover, the church penalties that Stephen was to be subjected were to be decided by Archbishop Philip of Esztergom and Bishop Omodeus of Györ, both close supporters and promoters of King Bela’s interests. Thus, starting with the summer of 1264, Stephen’s legitimate rights and the peace agreement from 1262 were no longer endorsed by the Papacy. Furthermore, Pope Urban IV tacitly approved new armed regulations between the “young king” and his father, and even to a potential debate regarding the succession to the throne of Hungary. The diplomatic campaign waged against Stephen reached its climax in the fall of 1264, with the extravagant marriage of Prince Bela, his brother, to Kunigunda, daughter of Markgraf Otto III of Brandenburg.73 Organized at Pottenburg, on October, 7th, 1264, under the generous patronage of the King of Bohemia, Ottokar II Přemysl, the pomp of the ceremony lasted in the memory of the contemporaries as a first rank political manifestation.74 According to 68  In this period two ambassadors of Stephen to the Holy See were attested: Joanche, Archdean of Orăştie, present before the pope in Orvieto, in March, 1264 (DIR II. 60–61, ZW 90) and priest Stephen of Transylvania, mentioned in the same place the next month (DIR II. 64, Theiner, I, 267). 69  DIR II. 67–69, HD 317–319. 70  DIR II. 69–70, ZW 92–93, HD 319–320. Jáko 248. 71  Bistriţa (Bistiche), Rodna (Rodona), Jelna (Zolosim), Crainimăt (Querali). 72  “. . . you, under a pact which, without the queen’s consent, was made between you and the said King /Bela/, your father, you transgressed against justice and own, to the loss and damage of the said queen, certain villages and landscalled . . . (see supra).” 73  And of Bojena-Beatrix of Boemia, Ottokar II Přemysl’s sister. 74  Anonymi Leobiensis (Gombos, Catalogus, 273): Eodem anno juvenis rex Hungariae Bela contraxit cum domina filia marchionis Brandenburgensis matrimonium, ob cuius honorem rex Bohemiae Otakerus avunculus suus maximum festum in campo qui Vizze dicitur

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the Dominican Annals of Vienna, the feast organized on this occasion reunited no less than 14 princes, all seated on an equal number of especially erected princely thrones.75 They also must have oferred their allegiance to Prince Bela. Furthermore, through this marriage Prince Bela overcome his brother by becoming the protégé of king Ottokar II, whilst Elisabeth of Cuman origin, Stephen’s wife, did not facilitate any family bonds to the crowned European families. After these festivities and with all the internal conspiracy against him, Stephen’s external isolation was nearly complete. The second civil war was now imminent. 3.3.6 The Second Civil War (1264–1266) At the time of Prince Bela’s marriage, the general offensive against Stephen was probably under way. Unlike the previous conflict, this time King Bela IV had the upper hand, as he relied not only on his obvious military superiority but also on the edge given by the fact that it was an unexpected move. Aware of his weaker position and of the fact that he could not gather all his dispersed supporters in due time, Stephen was forced to assume a defensive stance at this time. Thus, he retreated to Transylvania, hoping he would manage to resist in this natural fortress until the regrouping of his loyal troops. His position deteriorated with the problems inside the province (the Saxon rebellion and the uninvolvement of the local nobility in the first stage of the conflict) and the insufficient forces to tackle the massive invasion of royal troops which attacked almost simultaneously from two different directions. The Cumans, who were now fighting for King Bela, were the first to take action and established their headquarters on the lower Mureş River, near the Transylvanian border. Despite the efforts of Ban Alexander of Severin to regain these territories on behalf of Stephen,76 the Cumans continued their advance on the Mureş Valley under the command of voivode Ladislas Kán and his

celebravit, vocatis ad hoc multis principibus de partibus diversis, cum quibus expensas fecit infinitas; Annales Predicatorum Vindobonensium (Gombos, Catalogus, 182, MGH, SS, IX, 728): Bela filius regis Bele de Ungaria duxit filiam marchionis de Brandenburch, quibus rex Ottakarus fecit maximam sollempnitatem nuptiarum in Vizza, in octava die Mychahelis. Prince Bela received as gift from his parents the fortresses Moson, Bratislava, Nitra and Sopron, together with the Vas, Zala, Somogy and Baranya counties (Wenzel, III, 94–98; Fügedi, Castle and Society, 59; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 208–209), donation confirmed by the pope (Theiner, I 254–255). 75  Ibidem 14 sedilia structa fuerunt, in quibus tantummodo principibus comederunt, Theiner, I 254–255. 76  DIR II. 101–103, HD 339–340.

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brother Gyula.77 They were met by Stephen himself at Deva,78 but his forces had already engaged in a series of other confrontations at the time of the Cumans’ entry in Transylvania, with the main royal army corps led by Lawrence, son of Kemyn, coming from the northwest. Faced with the threat of being encircled, Stephen was forced to divide his forces and leave the defense of Deva against the Cuman offensive to the young and brave Peter Csák,79 while Stephen himself set off, with part of his men,80 to meet the other invading army. The results of the confrontations on the two fronts were radically different. While at Deva, Peter Csák displayed for the first time his brilliant military capabilities, and managed to win the first conclusive victory of this civil war,81 Stephen failed to match the more numerous and tenacious army of Lawrence, son of Kemyn. Consequently, he retreated in the border fortress of Codlea and prepared for a long siege. Thus, in the winter 1264/1265, young King Stephen and his followers were in a critical situation, under tremendous pressure from King Bela and his allies. While Lawrence, the son of Kemyn, practically controlled the entire Transylvania, a third royal army led by Princess Anna, Rostislav Mihailovich’s widow, and her son Bela conquered the Patak fortress and captured Stephen’s entire family (his wife, Queen Elisabeth, together with the young Prince Ladislas and his sisters).82 Furthermore, they succeeded in conquering one of the residences that Stephen inhabited before the war: the Borynka fortress,83 located in the Bereg county. Also, other fortresses defended by the partisans of the young king, including Fyzer84 in the Abauj county and Temethyn85 in the Nitra county, were under heavy siege. At the same time, the Vidin Czar Iakov Sventislav attacked and seemingly conquered Severin86 and voivode Litovoi, the latter’s associate, raided the territories controlled by the young king. 77  DIR II. 94–95, 101–103; HD 331–333. 78  DIR II. 118–119, ZW 105. KMTL 167. 79  DIR II. 158–162, Jakó 325. 80  Including the Chyl of Câlnic (DIR II. 118–119, ZW 105) and Andrew, the son of Ivancha (DIR II. 94–95, HD 331–333). 81  DIR II. 158–162, Jáko 325: idem magister Peters ex missione patris nostri sub castro Dewa contra Cumanorum exercitum viriliter dimicavit, quosdam ex eis captivando, quosdam autem perimendo, triumphalem reportavit victoriam, negotium patris nostri ibi feliciter inchoando. 82  DIR II. 158–162, Jáko 325. 83  Baranka, Ucraina (Ukraine). DIR II. 158–162, Jáko 325. 84  Füzer, cmt. Abauj, Hungary, DIR II. 121–123, ZW 106–107; fortress owned by the Aba: Fügedi, Castle and Society, 48. 85  Temetvény, cmt. Nitra, Slovakia. Loc. cit. 86  DIR II. 133–135, Jáko 290.

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Moreover, King Bela’s Polish allies (Boleslaus Pudicus, the duke of Krakow, and Prince Leszek the Back) started an aggressive offensive against Knez Daniil of Halych and against his nephew, Swarno, the Knez of Vladimir, two of the few outside supporters of the young king.87 The only exception to this general mayhem was Peter Csák, the winner at Deva. Still, he lacked the means to timely jump to the rescue of the young king besieged in Codlea, which proves that the royal army led by Lawrence was truly considerable in numbers. Under the circumstances, the fate of the entire war depended on the Codlea siege. A capitulation would lead to a general surrender, while a victory would enable Stephen to change the course of war to his favor. For Stephen, the Codlea siege—which he called, a few years later, a “place of death and misery”88—was a true turning point and a real test. Also, it was a very severe test of loyalty for all the barons, knights and soldiers. Stephen would never forget those who remained faithful to him in those critical moments. All odds were against the young king when the siege started. Deserted by many of his barons and knights, with no support from the local nobility,89 Stephen seemed to have completely lost faith in his own strength and in victory.90 According to his later testimony (1268), “outside of God, I barely had faith in people”.91 Among those who remained close to him from the beginning of the siege were Alexander, an nobleman with vast properties around Buda, and leader of his own army corps (involved in the Bulgarian campaigns92), count Ponyth Miskolc, remarkable warlord and diplomat, member 87  Initiated in 1265, through Boleslav of Krakow’s campaign in the territories owned by Swarno, the Polish-Halych confrontations continued throughout the next year. In the decisive battle of Zawychost (June, 2nd, 1266), Leszek the Black defeated and killed Roman (Vasilko), the brother of Knez Daniil—Rocznyk Małopolski (MPH, III, 171), Rocznik Franciszkański Krakowski (MPH, III, 48), Boguphali . . . Chronicon Poloniae (MPH, III, 592), Rocznik Świçtokrzyski (MPH, III, 75), MPH, III, 308. The Polish protagonists of this conflict are mentioned as allies of King Bela in the text of the Agreement from the Rabbits Island (March, 23rd, 1266). At the same time, Stephen’s preference for the Bereg county, where he had his winter residence in 1263–1264, explains his ties to Halych. 88  DIR II. 108–110, HO VIII. 110–113 (locu mortis et miseriae). 89  “deserting us and hunting many of our barons and knights, as well as all the noblemen of our kingdom” (DIR II. 94–95; HD 331–332: dereliquentibus et deserentibus pluribus baronibus nostris et militibus et omnibus nobilibus regni nostri); see also DIR II. 146, CD V/1. 238–241. 90  DIR II. 91–92, RA 1873: “he believed he would not resist in against his enemies and the troops of his father who chased him” (Ladislas IV). 91  DIR II. 108–110. 92  DIR II. 101–103.

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of one of the oldest aristocratic families in Hungary,93 Cosma, son of count Cosma of the Gutkeled kindred;94 count Mykud and his two sons, Mykud and Emerich of the Kökényes-Radnót kindred,95 John and Stephen, the sons of count Gwd, Slavonian noblemen,96 Dominic and Thomas brothers, of the Csák kindred,97 the four sons of Mykud, nobleman of Kachuz,98 Jacob, the son of count Emerich99 and Andrew, the son of Ivancha,100 one of the bravest knights ever to serve the young king. Stephen was also joined by the nobles from the territories East of Tisza, which he controlled starting from 1260: magister Thomas, the son of magister Gabriel, with properties in the Ugocsa county,101 and Alexander, the son of Durugh,102 brothers Peter and Jacob, Bihor castle servants.103 Furthermore, some of the noblemen of Transylvania offered their support: count Chyl of Câlnic,104 Teel, son of Ebl of Braşov,105 count Andrew of Geoagiul de Sus106 and his suite, courtiers and other men of inferior rank: count Demetrius, son of Andrew, and the personal servant of Stephen,107 Thomas, later the count of the royal beaters,108 Dominic, the son of Andronikos, of modest origin (de populi castri Zaladiensis), and servant in the young king’s treasury109 and Marcel, the son of Jacob, Vasvár fortress serf and veteran of the Bulgarian campaigns.110 Shortly after Stephen’s refuge to Codlea with his few followers, the fortress was attacked by an army vanguard led by Conrad, brother of Lawrence, son of Kemyn. Determined to take advantage of the general confusion among Stephen’s men and to end their resistance with a decisive blow, Conrad tried to storm the fortress but was stopped at 93  DIR II. 108–110, 133–135. 94  DIR II. 112, HD 326. 95  DIR II. 213–215, Jáko 368. 96  DIR II. 148, HD 368–369. 97  DIR II. 146. 98  DIR II. 147, Zichy I. 28–32. 99  DIR II. 127, HD 345–346. 100  D IR II. 94–95. 101  D IR II. 166–167, Zichy I. 34–35. 102  D IR II. 91–92. 103  D IR II. 105–106, Csáki 1/1. 10. 104  D IR II. 118–119, ZW 105, Jakó 276. 105  D IR II. 135–136, ZW 110–111. 106  D IR II. 117–118. Gyog, Gyogh superior, today Stremţ, Alba county, acc. to Jáko, 391. 107  D IR II. 121–123, HD 344–345. 108  D IR II. 136; Wenzel VIII. 341–343 (comes liscianorum nostrorum). 109  in officiis tavarnicorum, DIR II. 126–127, Wenzel VIII, 306–308. 110  D IR II. 107–108, CD IV/3. 468–469.

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the gates by the men of Alexander, the Ban of Severin.111 Consequently, the royal army started the siege, despite the unfavorable conditions characteristic for the upcoming cold season, which, at least at the beginning, put additional stress on the defenders. The defenders’s ranks were growing thin by the day.112 According to later documents issued by Stephen to credit his men, the night and day watches were very hard to bear.113 Due to physical exhaustion, wounds and difficulty in obtaining supplies, the besieged were at least once very close to capitulating. The fact that they did not surrender was due to chance as the young king asked to negotiate his surrender directly with his father, and the emissary he sent with the message of repentance, Dominic, son of Andrew, was captured by Lawrence, the son of Kemyn, who “tortured him bitterly”.114 This episode seems to have been the only attempt to initiate negotiations. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that the negotiations with Lawrence, the son of Kemyn, whom Stephen would long regard as one of his greatest enemies,115 would have ended up well. Stephen’s thoughts of a potential capitulation eventually diminished as news arrived of partisans from everywhere coming to the rescue. One of the first to offer help was magister Pous and his brother Dominic, who broke the encirclement and managed to enter the fortress accompanied by several supporters of the young king.116 The most consistent support came from Peter Csák who, after his victory in Deva, ran a real tour de force to provide his sovereign with priceless services. While heading towards the Bereg county, home to many of Stephen’s loyalists, he managed to reconquer (at the end of a bloody siege) the Borynka fortress.117 From these positions, in parallel with recruiting soldiers, he negotiated with barons who were unhappy with King

111  D IR II. 101–103. 112  We know, for instance, that Paul of Kachyz was killed during the siege, and that his brother Gaal received a hand wound, DIR II. 147. Also, the sons of count Gwd, John and Stephen were injured, DIR 148. Additional numerous losses of ordinary troops remained unrecorded in the sources. 113  “the night and day guards (nocturnis et diurnis vigiliis)”, DIR II. 94–95; HD 331–332. See also: DIR II. 91–92, 105–106. 114  D IR II. 121–123, HD 334–335 (graviter fuit tormentatus ab eodem). 115  D IR II. 121–123, HD 334–335 (Laurentius filius Kemyn, qui /. . ./ vitam nostram extinguere cupiebat); DIR II. 94–95, Jakó 262 (persecutorem et maiorem inimicum nostrum et nostrorum); DIR II. 103–105, Jakó 267 (maiore persecutore nostro et inimico). 116  D IR II. 96–97, HD 335–336. 117  D IR II. 158–162.

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Bela’s party, and managed to obtain the release of Stephen’s wife and children.118 Also, upon his return to Transylvania, accompanied by his brother Matthew, at the head of an allegedly numerous army, he brought the Saxon territories back to order. Lastly, he reached the Codlea fortress and started a series of harassing operations targeting the assailants.119 Thus, probably around the early winter of 1264–1265, the military balance started tilting in Stephen’s favor once again. Even though his forces were inferior to those of Lawrence, as time went by the assailant became the besieged in an increasingly hostile province. At this moment, Stephen decided it was time for decisive action. According to Stephen’s later testimony, in the battle waged at the foot of the Codlea fortress, the decisive role was played by the artful diversion created by count Ponyth Miskolc,120 who seemingly simulating a desertion, came down to the enemy’s camp together with some of his loyal followers and, “searching their will and minds, handed them to us / King Stephen, n. n. / for sentencing and death penalty”.121 Thus, he “won through both strength and sharpness of mind against the army of infidel barons”.122 Most likely, inside the assailing camp, count Ponyth gave the signal for the start of the battle, at which time Stephen’s knights made their impetuous charge spreading panic among the royal troops. Andrew, the son of Ivancha, was in the first line and lanced the banner bearer and other two knights, and then, he speared Lawrence and took him prisoner.123 Furthermore, Alexander, son of Durugh, speared a knight and took eighteen more prisoners whom he brought before the king “like cattle or calves”,124 and Ban Alexander of Severin speared and stabbed numerous enemies, many others “brought defeated and tied up”.125 Thus, the entire Codlea battle seems to have been a mere cavalry charge.126 The intervention of the

118  D IR II. 158–162. However, it was possible that this episode occurred after the Codlea victory, perhaps in the spring of 1265, see also: DIR II. 133–135; Jakó 290. 119  D IR II. 133–135; Jakó 290. 120  D IR II. 108–110, 133–135. 121  D IR II. 108–110. 122  D IR II. 133–135 (tam per potentiam, quam per astutiam suam devicit exercitum baronum infidelium). 123  D IR II. 94–95. 124  D IR II. 91–92, 103–105; ZW 100–102: quemadmodum boves seu vitulos. 125  D IR II. 101–103. 126  The presence of serfs or other ordinary soldiers was not recorded in any of the royal diplomas (unlike other battles during the same civil war). The merit of victory seems to go to the knights only. Also see: DIR II. 96–97, 118–119, 121–123, 146, 213–215.

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troops led by brothers Peter and Matthew Csák,127 which cut the assailants’ retreat, completed the victory and secured an unusual number of prisoners. Through the Codlea victory and the prior endeavors of magister Peter Csák, King Stephen regained control over the entire Transylvania and the counties to its Northwest (Sătmar, Bereg, Ung, Maramureş), which had always been his strongest possessions.128 Nonetheless, the other counties to the East of Tisza, including Bihor and Arad, were still under King Bela’s authority.129 This victory led to a significant growth of supporters, including some noblemen who cautiously waited for the outcome of the battle before taking action.130 At any rate, after the exhausting campaign of 1264, most of the following year was calm, with the exception of a weak attack from the Cumans of King Bela. They were led in battle by a certain Menk, but they did not pose any real threat to Emerich Kökényes-Radnót and the Mykud brothers who fought back their attack without difficulty.131 It is still unknown whether the undeclared armistice between the two parties occurred after the alarming news coming from the Lower Danube, where the Mongols of Nogai mounted a new threat. According to another possible scenario King Bela was expecting the Mongol aggression to seize the opportunity to launch, with the help of his Western allies, a massive offensive against Transylvania and to disguise it as an honorable crusade. In favor of the second theory seems to plead the desertion of Nicholas Sceuke, the son of count Thomas. He betrayed Stephen and stole 300 silver marks designated by the young king to finance an embassy to the Mongols.132 On the other hand, King Bela obtained from the new Pope Clement IV, on June 25th 1265, the proclamation of an anti-Mongol Crusade in Hungary, Bohemia, Poland and the Brandenburg margraviate, all the countries whose sovereigns had joined

127  D IR II. 158–162. 128  In October, 31st, 1265, Stephen would issue a document at Beltiug (Beltuk), in the Sătmar county—DIR II. 78, CD IV/3 296–297. 129  D IR II. 74–75, HO VI 130–132 (April, 16th, 1265), donated by King Bela to the two servants of the Provost of Arad, for their military services; DIR II. 76–77, CD IV/3 263–265 (October, 17th, 1265) confirmation by Bela of a donation of Bishop Zosyma of Oradea October, 12th, the same year. 130  Among others a count Peter, owner of a fortress in the Gömör county, with his servients (DIR II. 111–112) and the Transylvanians Peter and Iacob of Gerend (DIR II. 124–125, HO VI 166–167), members of the Gutkeled and Monoszló kindreds, see infra. 131  D IR II. 213–215, ZW 137–139, Jáko 294. Probably during the spring of 1265. 132  D IR II. 108–110, HO VIII. 110–113: Stephen himself accuses him of betrayal and of the intent to make his negotiations with the Mongols impossible.

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forces against the young king in 1264.133 Irrespective of King Bela’s intent, the specter of the Mongol threat was warded off by Stephen via the diplomatic services of the same Count Ponyth Miskolc, who, once again, displayed wonderful negotiating skills.134 Stephen’s new diplomatic success in his relations with the Golden Horde left Bela with no other alternative but to continue the civil war. The army sent in the fall of 1265 against his son was this time commanded by the former ban of Transylvania, Ernye Akos, who was very familiar with the terrain and also an experimented military commander. This time Stephen was not caught unprepared. The troops of the young king, led by Count Ponyth Miskolc135 and brothers Peter and Matthew Csák136 (Stephen did not participate in the battle) surprised Ban Ernye somewhere in the vicinity of Tisza and gained a conclusive victory. The heroes of this battle were Egidius Monoszló, Andrew, the son of Ivancha,137 Peter Csák, who was badly injured,138 and Mykud KökényesRadnót, who captured the commander of the royal army.139 The victory against Ernye Akos was probably the decisive factor that drove Stephen to take the initiative and prepare the final assault on the capital. After the preparation and general mobilization of the two sides, Stephen advanced towards Buda, with all the armed men he could gather.140 The decisive battle, one of the most significant for the knighthood of this time, was waged in Isaszeg, not far from the capital of the kingdom. Initially, the numerically superior army of King Bela, under the nominal command of “young Duke Bela”141 but led in the field by Henrik Kőszegi, seconded by Henrik Preussel, 133  Not mentioned in the text of the papal bull, which also raises some questions—DIR II. 75–76, HD 324. 134  He also paid for the mission, which points to the financial difficulties that Stephen was facing (DIR II. 108–110, 133–135). 135  D IR II. 108–110, 133–135. 136  D IR II. 158–162. 137  D IR II. 94–95. 138  “Lanced and cut with the sword”, DIR 158–162. 139  D IR II. 119–120. 140  Even though 1265, is the date generally admitted for the battle of Isaszég, it remains highly unlikely to be the correct one considering the incredible amount of major operations occuring between October 1264–March 1265. Moreover, Wenzel VIII 200–201 (DIR II. 111–112) makes it obvious that the war consisted of two stages, separated by an apparent peace. 141  Generally identified with duke Bela of Mačva—son of Knez Rostislav Mihailovich and Dutchess Anna, the daughter of King Bela IV—based on the information contained in a document issued by Ladislas IV in 1279, ZW 137–139, DIR II. 213–215.

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commander of the Buda fortress, managed to gain the upper hand. The royal cavalry142 charged and pierced the light cavalry and the pedestrian army of Stephen (led by Transylvanian voivode Nicholas Gutkeled143 and the new magister tavernicorum, Egidius Monoszló144) and headed towards Stephen himself, in an attempt to capture or kill him. One of the attackers broke his lance against the young king’s saddle fender and was then killed by Stephen’s lance.145 With the intervention of the knights in Stephen’s immediate entourage, notably Alexander, son of Durugh146 and Mykud Kökényes-Radnót,147 the attack was pushed back. A devastating counterattack ensued (led by Ponyth Miskolc,148 Peter Csák,149 Ban Alexander of Severin,150 count Chyl de Câlnic,151 magister Pous,152 the sons of count Gwd153 and obviously Andrew, the son of Ivancha154) which eventually brought the young king the victory. As a result, Palatine Henrik Kőszegi was taken prisoner together with his two sons,155 the famous Austrian captain Henrik Preussel lost his life,156 and young duke Bela fled from the battlefield.157 This time, for old King Bela IV the defeat was complete.

142  D IR II. 124–125, HO VI 166–167, speaks about the “violent power of the attack”. 143  D IR II. 108–109, CD IV/3 468–469. On this occasion, the following were injured: Marcel, son of Jacob, Vasvár fortress serf, Peter and Jacob, Bihor fortress serfs (DIR II. 105–106) and brothers Peter and Jacob of Gerend (DIR II. 124–125, HO VI. 166–167). 144  R A 1901 a (with text). 145  D IR II. 103–105, ZW 100–102: Et cum quidam miles insignis cum lancea vexillata irruisset in nos et lanceam suam in par[ura] selle nostre fregisset, qui tamen per hastam nostram succubuit in momento . . . 146  D IR II. 103–105, ZW 100–102. 147  D IR II. 119–120. 148  D IR II. 108–110, 133–135. 149  D IR II. 158–162; despite the wounds he received in the battle with Ban Ernye, indicating the relative close succession of the two confruntation. 150  D IR II. 101–103. 151  D IR II. 118–119. 152  D IR II. 96–97. 153  D IR II. 148. 154  D IR II. 94–95, Jakó 262: ipse non ultmis sed primus et etiam prima et prior lancea sua fuit . . . 155  D IR II. 94–95, 103–105. One of them, John, was apprehended by magister Pous (DIR II. 96–97). 156  D IR II. 158–162, 213–215. 157  D IR II. 158–162.

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3.3.7 The Treaty of 1266 Despite the Isaszég victory, the peace agreement from March 23, 1266 was far from being a dictate given by the young king. Both sides were moderate in their claims partly due to the exhaustion installed after a long and bloody civil war, but also because the treaty did not take into account the personal animosities inside the royal family, and was just a regulation of the relations between the two aristocratic parties that financed and waged the war. The text of the treaty158 was promulgated by the two parties under the warranty of Archbishop Philip of Esztergom and confirmed by Pope Clement IV on June 22, 1266.159 Mainly the agreement regulated the juridical relations between the two Hungarian dominia and especially between the two kings and the barons and noblemen who had opted for the other’s party. The political relations between regnum Belae and regimen Stephani, the only terminological distinction suggesting Stephen’s formal subordination,160 and the territorial delimitation of the two kingdoms (mainly confined to the borders agreed in 1262) were the object of later negotiations. Learning from his previous experience, Stephen took all the necessary precautions this time around: the old King Bela undertook the obligation to have the treaty ratified by Queen Mary, Duke Bela and Princess Ana, thus eliminating all possible future challenges. Also, the document confirmed the new administrative powers of Queen Elisabeth over the territories East of Danube which she seized during the civil war as an “heir’s right” from her mother-in-law, Queen Mary.161 Furthermore, the barons and noblemen who owned properties located in the part of the kingdom owned by the opposing side were granted a special status. As part of the pact, they received not only a formal ownership warranty, as stipulated by the 1262 treaty, but also complete immunity. Their domains were exempt from any dues and obligations and were no longer subject to the royal obligation of accommodation. These exemptions were enacted by the sovereign who ruled over the respective part of the kingdom, but as the administrations of the two kings could only exert their attributions in the counties subordinated to them, these domains gained, in fact, complete autonomy. These provisions lay at the basis of the exceptional status of the properties owned by the Csák and Gutkeled kindreds in the Western part of the kingdom and those owned by the Geregye kindred in the Eeastern side. Moreover, to a certain extent, the barons and noblemen from the two camps were encouraged to seek new allegiances while the two kings 158  D IR II. 82–85, Theiner I 284–287. 159  D IR II. 88–90, Theiner I 284–287. 160  No such distinction was made in the text of the Peace Treaty of Bratislava. 161  D IR II. 72–73, HD 327.

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showed a more tolerant attitude towards the aristocracy. Even though enforcing these provisions raised a series of issues, (King Stephen only enforced them on inherited domains, and seized from the “infidels” the properties he himself had granted162) they survived the juridical system of the kingdom, and were reiterated in the “Constitution of the noblemen” from 1267. Overall, from Stephen’s point of view, the 1266 victory reconfirmed his status of associate sovereign and heir to the crown of Hungary and also deterred his brother Bela from being designated as such. Nonetheless, the vast properties owned by the latter (which enabled full control over the Transdanubian part of the kingdom since 1264)—as well as his princely statute and the internal and external support he enjoyed were serious threats for Stephen at the time of the succession. 3.4

Political and Social Change

3.4.1 Duke Stephen and Transylvania During 1260–1270, the young king of Hungary did not have a permanent residence. Until 1266 (the year when the second civil war ended and also when Stephen’s only outside supporter, Knez Daniil of Halych, passed away) he seems to have favored the counties in Northeastern Hungary, near the Ruthenian border. Thus, on July 4th, 1261, the young king was in Sălacea (Zoloch),163 a locality colonized by Germans who enjoyed special privileges granted by him,164 in February 1263 he was in Oradea,165 and in the months of April and May in Patak166 and the Szakolyi (Zokol) Monastery, in the Nógrád county.167 Stephen and his court, including Bishop Zosyma of Oradea,168 spent the Christmas of 1263, somewhere in the Bereg county (probably at Baranka). In the summer of 1264169 he retreated to Transylvania in order to prepare the war against his father. Eventually, on October 31st, 1265, after overcoming the critical stage of the second civil war, Stephen issued a document in Beltiug (Beltuk),170 in 162  D IR II. 96–97, HD 335–336; DIR II. 118–119, ZW 105. 163  D IR II 35; Zichy I 11–12. 164  D IR II 33–34; ZW 26; HD 296–297. 165  R A 1798. 166  R A 1800. 167  R A 1801. 168  D IR II 58–59; Zichy I 12–13. 169  After June 22nd, when his presence is recorded in Sáros, RA 1833 a. 170  D IR II 78; CD IV/3 296–297.

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the Sătmar county. Even though during the second civil war Queen Elisabeth, accompanied by her children,171 sought refuge inside the walls of the Patak fortress, a number of clues indicate that Satu Mare was in fact her permanent residence. The royal estates in this county were her property,172 and the parish priest of Satu Mare, Egidius, was also the chaplain of the young queen.173 Following Sălacea and Dej, Satu Mare entered under Stephen’s protection, and the young king encouraged the Germans to colonize it. The new colonists were granted broader administrative and judicial autonomy. In exchange, they had the obligation to participate in wars and fight in his army.174 After his victory in the second civil war, Stephen covered a greater area, but he continued to dwell mainly in the Northwestern counties.175 These regions, and mostly the hunting grounds of Maramureş, remained among his favorites even after his crowning in 1270. It was here that King Stephen V spent the last winter holiday (1271–1272).176 Stephen’s presence in Transylvania was rather sporadic, except for the critical period of the second civil war. The references he made during the Codlea siege seem to indicate that he considered Transylvania a rather unattractive and remote province, located too far from Hungary. It is still possible that he may have inspected his “Duchy” in 1261 and occasionally in the next two years. As for the period that followed the second civil war, there is no evidence regarding his presence in this province. His temporary residences must have included mainly the localities that benefited from a status similar to Sătmar and Sălacea, such as Dej, and Cluj, a royal property colonized with German settlers around 1261.177 The same category of “safe” havens also included, for instance, Bonţida, which Stephen donated to one of his close men who initiated a similar

171  D IR II 158–162; HD 388–391. 172  D IR II 72–73; HD 327. 173  D IR II 70–71; CD VI/2 388–389. 174  D IR II 33–34, 497; ZW 26 (cca. 1261). In 1271, after the coronation of Stephen, the Satmar colonists would become the beneficiaries of more new privileges, DIR II 137–139; CD IV/3 206–208. 175  Sáros, July 1267 (RA 1865); Ugocsa, August 1267 (RA 1866); Patak, December 1267 (RA 1874) and 1268 (RA 1886). 176  D IR II 145, HD 360–361 (December, 31st, 1271); DIR II 147, CD V/1 210–211 (in Maramorisio, January, 6th, 1272). February, 9th–10th, the king was in Sáros (RA 2154–55). 177  The only information regarding this colonization appears in assume that the colonists from Cluj received privileges similar to the ones in Salacea, Sătmar and Dej, but at a later date.

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colonization program in 1263,178 and Dăbâca, the fortress permanently under the control of the dignitaries most trusted by the king. 3.4.2 Royal Court If in the years that followed the installation of Stephen in Transylvania the political and administrative structures under his command largely included people loyal to King Bela, after 1266 the young king would only tolerate barons and noblemen whose loyalty he verified during the confrontations with his father. Thus, many of the officials mentioned in this age were outstanding veterans from the civil war: Ponyth Miskolc (Ban of Severin until around 1266, would later become count of Dăbâca179), Mykud Kökényes-Radnót, count of Dăbâca, and his son (who became the Ban of Severin), Andrew, Ivancha’s son (of unquestionable loyalty to Stephen, with whom he served since the great Mongol invasion180), received the position of “gatekeeper” (ianitor) of his court,181 Alexander, the son of Durugh (would become the permanent count of Szabolcs), and the other Alexander (who would also exert, in various intervals, the position of Ban of Severin). The great number of Severin bans mentioned during Stephen’s reign (Lawrence, son of Kemyn, Alexander, Ponyth Myskolc, Mykud Kökényes-Radnót, Jula, and Ugrinus Csák) might indicate a limited interest shown by the aristocracy for this function in the province. On the other hand, the palatines were selected from the young king’s very small inner circle. Even though in 1266 the function of palatine (associated to that of counts of Bács and Sibiu) was exerted by Dominic (from the Csák kindred),182 in 1268 it was given to Benedict, who was at the same time the royal court judge and the count of Sibiu.183 In fact, this was not the only time when the palatine and royal court judge offices were held by the same person (the same happen in 1262, unfortunately the name remains unknown). In 1264–1266, Baas, count of Gömör, was the royal court judge, position he might have held until the year 1270.184 In 1265 we find Lawrence, the former voivode of Transylvania185 as the treasurer of King Stephen but later that year the royal finances would be entrusted to Egidius Monoszló. 178  D IR II 52; HO V 40. 179  D IR II 108–110 (1267). 180  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 191; CD IV/2. 54. 181  D IR II 94–95. 182  D IR II 90; Wenzel VIII 147–148. 183  D IR II 113. 184  D IR II 70–71, CD VI/2 388–389; DIR II 91, CD IV/3 322–330. 185  D IR II 73.

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The members of the Monoszló kindred were in fact Stephen’s great favorites and were entrusted responsibilities of foremost importance at his court. Their unique rise became more obvious in the years that followed the second civil war, and it was all the more outstanding because the Monoszló kindred, originally from Baranya county, was not a part of the high aristocracy. If the name of the family had a certain resonance in 13th century Hungary, it was undoubtedly due to the merits of Ban Thomas Monoszló, who participated in the crusade led by King Andrew II (1217–1218) and to the expeditions against Halych. The son of Ban Thoma, Gregory (II) Monoszló, was married to a Bő kindred noble woman and held the position of count of Caraş in 1255,186 which must have included him among the protagonists of the Balkan campaigns for the support of Rostislav Mihailovich. Count Gregory and his sons’ military merits were again highlighted during the second stage of the 1264–1266 civil war, during which time the members of the Monoszló kindred contributed to the victory of the young king.187 Not surprisingly, after 1267, the leader of the family would be entrusted the position of Judge of the Cumans,188 a very important office from the perspective of the balance of forces between the two belligerents. Even though later this position lost all importance and was merged with that of palatine, during the time of internal division, its holder was in charge with the difficult mission to keep the Cumans under control and to prevent them from making an alliance with the aristocracy loyal to King Bela. We have already seen how the authority gained by the young king through the Peace Treaty of Bratislava over the Cumans was growing unstable and in 1264–1265 they not only deserted him in his crucial confrontation with his father, but even fought against him. The peace signed on the Rabbits Island failed to automatically bring the Cumans under the rule of the young king,189 despite his efforts to bring them back to order with the help of Egidius Monoszló.190 Stephen tried to infiltrate his trustees among the Cumans,191 but the return of 186  János Karácsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek a XIV század közepéig, (Budapest, 1900), 834–835. 187  R A 1901 a (with text). 188  Attested in 1269: Karácsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek, 834–835; HO VII 115. 189  From the second part of 1266 to the start of 1268 the dominus Cumanorum office was not included in Stephen’s title, see Imre Szentpétery, “István ifjabbkirálysága”, in Századok, LV 1–5 (1921): 82. 190  R A 1901 a (with text). 191  In 1266, Stephen granted his trustee count Parabuch, with the consent of Khan Keyran, their leader, the ownership of Cuman domains in the Borchol family—DIR II 81–82; Ortvay 3–4; RA 1856, 1876. Those properties were initially given to the Cumans by King Bela.

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the Cumans under his authority, probably one of the political consequences of the great congregation of 1267, needed to be guaranteed by the creation of a royal office that would scrutinize them closely. While the appointment of count Gregory (II) Monoszló as Cuman judge seems to have occurred sometime before the end of 1267, the rise of his three sons (of ages close to that of King Stephen) started soon after the second civil war. Thus, the appointment of Egidius Monoszló as Stephen’s treasurer was already a fact at the time of the Isaszég battle (1266),192 and Gregory (III) Monoszló’s instatement as the treasurer of Queen Elisabeth (although attested only a few years later193) might have occurred on the same occassion. Thus, the two brothers would hold the responsibility for the royal finances until the death of their protector. Furthermore, the youngest son of the family, Peter Monoszló, whom his father destined to an ecclesiastic career, became Stephen’s chancellor from 1266,194 and in 1270 he was invested, through royal decree, as Bishop of Transylvania. 3.4.3 The other three predecessors of Peter Monoszló at the head of the young king’s chancellery (people with sound ecclesiastic education, belonging to some of the most important families), learned all there was to know about the royal court and royal politics from their positions as vice-chancellor, and afterwards took on ecclesiastic careers at the head of the Archbishopric of Esztergom. The fact that they would successively lead the most important Archbishopric of Hungary for a quarter of a century (1274–1298), underlines the remarkable influence exerted by the generation crystallized around Stephen V on the futures of the kingdom during the late Arpadian period. Stephen’s first vice-chancellor, in his service since the time he was the duke of Styria,195 was a certain Benedict from the county of Zala (where he and his family ruled over a number of properties and servants196). Between 1260 and 1263, Benedict exerted, in parallel, the position of Provost of Sibiu. In 1263, after receiving the approval of the Archbishop of Esztergom, Benedict became the Provost of Arad. His new position was subordinated to the Archbishop of Esztergom (who also held the 192  R A 1901 a. 193  In 1272: DIR II 149–150, ZW 116–117. There is no prior reference to this position. 194  Vicecancellarius, the title of chancellor formally belonged to Archbishop Kalocsa. 195  He was attested as notary of the throne’s heir since 1258 but he might have held the office for a longer period of time: Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 191; Wenzel VII. 486: . . . fratres magistri Benedicti, Notarii aulae karissimi filii nostri regis Stephani. 196  D IR II. 74–75; HO VI. 130–132.

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honorary title of chancellor of King Bela). Furthermore, being the vice-chancellor of the young king subordinated him to the Archbishop of Kalocsa, the official holder of the chancellery. His allegiance to the Archbishop of Esztergom, taken once he became the head of the Arad provost, clearly reflected Benedict’s limited freedom.197 At the outbreak of the second civil war, he was forced to choose between the loyalty to his senior and his duty to the Church, since Pope Urban IV openly expressed his support to King Bela. It is not surprising that under the circumstances Benedict abandoned Stephen in 1264,198 forcing him to find another vice-chancellor. This time around, the young king selected from a pool of young candidates who, although belonging to the ecclesiastic order, would not hold any other functions that could interfere with his authority. Under the circumstances, Lodomerius became the new vice-chancellor, and later one of the most prominent Archbishops of Esztergom (1279–1298). The issue of his origin constitutes yet another controversy. His alleged kinship to the Monoszló kindred199 seems difficult to prove. Furthermore, his tight relations with the Borsa kindred, to whom he owed his rise to higher aristocracy, seem to be due to family ties. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that this family of local importance, and of a modest condition around the year 1260, had the means to support him to become the Canon of the Veszprém church (1257–1260), and to finance his studies in Bologna (circa 1260–1263). Thus the origins of Lodomerius should be investigated among the aristocratic families related through an alliance with the Borsa kindred, whose representatives were on the young king’s side, after 1265. Lodomerius exerted the attributions of prime chancellor for no more than two years (1264–1266), but this proved to be the most critical period of Stephen’s reign. Under the circumstances, it was natural for the young king to reward him for his service. In 1266, Lodomerius was instated as Bishop of Oradea, position that remained vacant after the death of Bishop Zosymas (1265), but he received the confirmation for his position (most probably due to King Bela’s opposition) only in 1268.

197  He was fully subordinated to the Archbishop of Strigoniu, except for his potential actions against his own order, most likely the Dominican: DIR II 50; CD IV/3: 164–165. 198  Benedict’s decision was undoubtedly imposed by the circumstances. Stephen was able to understand the situation and after his coronation in 1270, he appointed again the Provost of Arad as vice-chancellor of the royal court. 199  János Karácsonyi, “A merges vipera és az antimonialis. Korkép Kun László király idejéböl, in Századok 44 (1910): 1–24.

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Eventually, Peter Monoszló’s immediate predecessor as the chancellor of the young king was Nicholas Kán, Provost of Alba Iulia,200 who honored his loyalty to the young king, as opposed to the rest of his family. Making good use of his reputation before Stephen, in 1267 he managed to regain some of the Transylvanian properties which belonged to his great-grandfather, Ban Gyula Kán.201 Nonetheless, his term as chancellor was short,202 indicating most likely a provisional solution. 3.4.4 The voivodes of Transylvania Sources are rather scarce regarding the first voivode of Transylvania at the time of Stephen’s Duchy, Ladislas (I) Kán (1261–1264/65). It is known that at the time he played a military role in the Bulgarian campaigns, supporting Iakov Sventislav.203 In 1264, together with his brother Gyula, he convinced the Cumans to swap sides to King Bela and as their leader, initiated the first military action against the young king during the second civil war. After being defeated at Deva by Peter Csák’s army, the brothers Ladislas and Gyula Kán seem to no longer have any contribution to the history of the conflict. It is however beyond any doubt that the Kán brothers owned considerable property in Transylvania, some recovered in 1267, as pointed out earlier, by Nicholas Kán, Gyula’s son. The origin of these domains went as far as the early 13th century, when their grandfather, Ban Gyula, was also voivode.204 More estates were obtained by the Kán brothers during their presence in Transylvania: in 1263, Gyula was granted by King Stephen a massive number of properties in Alba county and near the border with the Sibiu province205 and we can assume that Ladislas, as voivode, must have benefited from royal munificence. Even though many of these properties were undoubtedly confiscated by Stephen after the ‘treason’ (1264), Nicholas Kán’s presence in his entourage and also the fact that he was the Provost of the Alba Iulia chapter enabled him to safeguard some of the Transylvanian properties of his family.

200  The first mention 1265: DIR II 71–72; HO VI 134–135. He came to Transylvania and assumed this position probably during Ladislas Kán (1260–1264). 201  D IR II 97–98; ZW 528. Nicholas is the son of Jula (Gyula) Kán, the brother of voivode Ladislas. 202  Mentioned only once, in 1266: DIR II 90; Wenzel VIII 147–148. He was named cancellarius. 203  D IR II 124–125; Jakó 284. 204  In the years 1201, 1214: KMTL 193. His properties included terra Obruth—DIR II 139; ZW 111–112. 205  D IR II 51–52; ZW I 89–90.

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In addition, Ladislas’ successor, Nicholas Gutkeled (1265–1270), belonged to a powerful aristocratic kindred. Stephen Gutkeled’s son, Nicholas, former palatine, Ban of Slavonia and Governor of Styria, had been a petty Kalnik count (Croatia, 1262–1264), before changing allegiance in favor of Stephen during the second civil war. In addition to commanding the Transylvanian army in the Isaszég battle, he also held, just like his predecessor, major responsibilities in organizing the Bulgarian campaigns.206 Nicholas Gutkeled was not the only member of his kindred to enter the service of King Stephen after 1264. His brother Joachim Gutkeled, King Bela’s former wine keeper in 1263,207 manifested the same political option, being granted by the young king208 the possession of Mehadia and Haţeg (the latter snatched from Litovoi, as a consequence of his position during the civil war). Joachim Gutkeled built around the same time two fortresses on these lands, with donjons of similar planimetrics that must have been the work of constructors coming from the Western part of the province.209 The construction of these fortifications indicates that the area was prone to conflict, and explains why Joachim Gutkeled must have held military attributions for the defence of the frontier. During the same period of time, Paul Gutkeled, Nicholas’s brother, received the recognition (through the benevolence of King Stephen210) of the right to cash in the salt taxes in Arieşul de Câmpie (Oronos), a right granted to by the members of his family in the immediate aftermath of the Mongol invasion.211 Nicholas Gutkeled’s double office, that of Transylvanian voivode and Solnoc county chief,212 required at that time, the advent of the office of Transylvanian vice-voivode, which replaced the older one of viceiudex wayuode (voivode’s vice-judge).213 The restrictions imposed on the activity of the voivodal 206  D IR II 124–125; Jakó 284. 207  K MTL 304. 208  C D V/2 447–449; Jakó 359. 209  See Adrian A. Rusu’s opinion on the matter: “Cetatea Haţegului. Monografie istorică şi arheologică”, in Sargetia XVI–XVII (1982–1983): 341. As for the Mehadia dungeon see Ştefan. Matei, “Aspecte ale arhitecturii de fortificaţii în Banat în perioada feudalismului timpuriu”), in Studii de istorie a artei, ed. Mircea Țoca (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1982): 110–113. 210  D IR II 390–391; Wenzel V 66–68. 211  In the year 1246 (Jakó 202–203), the members of the Gutkeled kindred, including Palatine Stephen, owned numerous properties in the area. The revenues of the Arieşul de Câmpie customs were cashed in before the great invasion by the St. Benedict Monastery located near the River Gran, which later complained about losing these rights, with no success, in November, 8th, 1256 (Jakó 220). 212  D IR II 97–98, 107–108; ZW 528; CD IV/3 468–469. 213  D IR I 310311, 410–411; ZW 66–68 (1238). DIR II 79–80; ZW 97–98 (1266).

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vice-judge, as a result of the privileges acquired by various communities,214 required an extension of its attributes and also the adoption of a new title that would eliminate the previous limitations. The voivode’s main attributions were judiciary, but he also assumed the obligations that the voivode held as count of Alba. One of the early holders of this office was, most likely, the person who represented the young king, on November, 20th, 1266, at the common judicial assembly of barons from the two halves of the kingdom, instituted according to the provisions of the Bratislava Treaty. This character, referred to as “voivode”, was recorded only with the initial L., by the only document that offers information on this event.215 The fact that he participated in the Holy Virgin’s Island Assembly was undoubtedly due to his juridical background. The other representative sent by Stephen to this assembly was magister Baas, the judge of the royal court. Except for the already mentioned cases of Haţeg and Mehadia and the older possessions in the Solnoc county, there is no other clue that the Gutkeled kindred received any further properties in Transylvania. Their presence in this province was, chronologically speaking, strictly limited to the “exile” of the throne’s heir to the Eastern parts of the kingdom. After the coronation of Stephen V as sole King of Hungary (1270) the interest of the main branch of the Gutkeled kindred focused on exerting major offices at the royal court or in their traditional province, Slavonia.216 3.4.5 Administrative Reforms and Social Consequences The policy of reforming the older administrative structures, implemented by Stephen in certain counties in early 1260s, accelerated during the second civil war. This was the direct consequence of the long decades of agony of the military system based on fortresses. Even though the military changes started under the administration of voivode Lawrence, the administrative roles of the fortress serfs and those of the servants subordinated to the curial counts were eliminated in period of time that Stephen was duke of Transylvania. Thus, 214  Including the Ighiu and Cricău colonists—see previous footnote. After replacing the vicejudge with the vice-voivode, its exemption was no longer mentioned in the renewal of the privileges of the two communities. 215  D IR II 91; CD IV/3 322–330. The term might indicate Laurencio barbato, which was used referring to Stephen at a similar assembly in Besenyö (October 1268), but there was no reference regarding his title of voivode: DIR II 113–114. 216  Nicholas Gutkeled, royal court judge and count of Gecske (1270–1274, with interruptions), Ban of Croatia and Dalmatia (1275), Ban of Slavonia (1278–1279): KMTL 457; Joachim Gutkeled, Ban of Slavonia (1270–1277, with interruptions): KMTL 304.

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while the latest mentions of royal udvornici in the province were recorded in 1263,217 the latest record about a castle servant exerting his obligation of witnessing change of property ownership as king’s representative was dated to 1266.218 The last mention of an approval given by the serfs’ community regarding the donation of a property of the Alba fortress (1274)219 slightly exceeds the reign of Stephen V, which might indicate an ephemeral and eventually futile reaction against his reforms. On the other hand, in the Solnoc county, which was placed under the authority of the voivode around this time, the resistance of the old structures was much stronger. The latest mention of a maioris exercitus was recorded in 1275,220 while the serfs of the city still functioned as warrants of property transactions until late that century. The persistence in this county of administrative structures on their way to extinction in Transylvania raises a number of questions regarding the level of integration of Solnoc under the administrative system subordinated to the Voivode’s authority. The large size of the county was the reason why only the region located East of Meseş was eventually integrated in the political and economic system of the kingdom,221 while the Western regions maintained their strong ties to the Bishopric of Oradea and to the Western counties. In the second half of the 14th century, this situation required the division of Solnoc county into two different counties of reasonable size: The Middle Solnoc and the Lower Solnoc. Even though the voivode of Transylvania acted as count of the Middle Solnoc county until the 15th century, it was the Lower Solnoc County that was fully integrated in the administrative system of the seven counties. Through such a policy, the young king intended to replace the older administrative structures with newer ones, which would strengthen his position and also deal a severe blow to one of the strongest pillars of the aristocratic group gathered around his father. The castle servants, a conservative social category which benefited from the traditionalist political program of King Bela, had shown hostility towards Stephen, who could no longer trust them. Under the circumstances, the young king turned to the radical solution of giving away the greatest part of the royal domain to his supporters, in exchange for their 217  D IR II 51–52; ZW 89–90. A series of properties owned by them were donated, on this occasion, to Gyula Kán. 218  Lewe, Alba fortress serf: DIR II 79–80; ZW 96–98. 219  D IR II 171; ZW 126. 220  D IR II 176, Wenzel IX 123. 221  In 1269, the noblemen from the Solnoc county turned to the Chapter of Alba Iulia in order to confirm a property transaction in the Dej area: DIR II 116–117; TeutschFirnhaber I 94.

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military services. This measure was both politically tenable and financially viable. On the short run, since most of these giveaways were in fact been sales,222 through this measure Stephen covered the considerable expenses caused by his lengthy military enterprises and was also a profitable way of rewarding the noblemen who participated in those campaigns at their own expense. These donations did not exempt the residents from paying their royal dues, unless in truly exceptional cases. Consequently, this measure did not diminish the royal revenues. Even more, by laying off the administrative functionaries of these properties, the fiscal and administrative system of the kingdom was significantly simplified. Even though it undoubtedly led to a surge in taxation, this new measure was also an incentive in raising the monetization of the economy. At the same time, it pushed the search for better solutions to raise the profitability of royal, ecclesiastical and aristocratic estates. In this context, the royal example of colonizing craftsmen into these regions and offering them special privileges was followed by clerics and nobles alike. Most of Stephen’s donations, as recorded in the available sources were properties within Alba county, which encompassed numerous royal domains: in 1263—Wiz, Hassach, Nogrech (Veza, Haşag, Ruşi);223 in 1264—Germand, Polcholca, Cupud (Mescreac, Petelca, Capud);224 in 1268–1270—Gywmurd (Sântimbru)225—1266, Kend (Rădeşti);226 in 1269—Coppan (Copand), Iwankateleke (disappeared),227 two unknown properties belonging to the Alba fortress,228 Ratka (Teiuş);229 in 1272—Zwkmand (Odverem),230 Aruszegh (Crăciunelul de Jos);231 sometime between 1261–1272—Sothelik (Binţinţi, today Aurel Vlaicu),232 terra Obruth (Abrud),233 Enyed (Sângătin).234 These properties were followed by a significant number of properties from the Turda county: in 222  D IR II 108–110, HO VIII 110–113; DIR II 119–120, HO VI 173–175; DIR II 155–157: cases in which the donations represented, entirely or partially, a compensation for the failure to pay certain debts. 223  D IR II 51–52, ZW 89–90, Jakó 241. 224  D IR II 54–55, HD 323, Jakó 252. 225  D IR II 79–80, ZW 96–98, Jakó 260. 226  D IR II 53, 228, 503–504, Jakó 274 (dating). 227  D IR II 270–271, CD IV/3 310–311, Jakó 281, 418. 228  D IR II 118–119, ZW 105, Jakó 276. 229  D IR II 117–118, HD 343, Jakó 277. 230  D IR II 145–146, 419, Jakó 317. 231  D IR II 149, 499–500, Jakó 314. 232  D IR II 348–349, ZW 185–186, Jakó 293. 233  D IR II 139, ZW 111, Jakó 287, 310. 234  D IR II 389–390, ZW 191, Jakó 297.

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1270—Hodryv, Lona (Hădăreni, Luna);235 in 1261–1272—the vast land of Arieş (Oronos), located between the Arieş River and Mureş River,236 Scenthmyklous (Sânmiclăuş/Turda),237 Igruchteluk, Kerekyghaz (disappeared).238 Also, properties from Dăbâca county: in 1263—Bonchhyda (Bonţida)239 and around 1261–1269—Dobokavarfalva, Lusad (Dăbâca, Lujerdiu),240 Geneu, Bucteluk, Stephantelke, Schobolotelky (Fundătura and Boc, both disappeared).241 Another county recorded for donations was Târnava: in 1263—Munora (Mănărade);242 in 1267—Mediesy, Mykazaza, predium Nicolai, Thobiasfalva (Mediaş, Micăsasa, Cloaşter, Dupusul);243 and in 1261–1272—Bozna (Bazna).244 Furthemore, Solnoc was also mentioned: in 1263—Drauchvduarhel (Şieu-Odorhei);245 in 1269—Balwanus, villa Nemty (Unguraş, Mintiul Gherlii);246 around 1271— Orrothlonheda (disappeared);247 and in 1261–1272—Zanuk (Zalnoc), Chalanus (disappeared).248 In Cluj county, where the land was largely owned by the church and local noble men, Stephen donated the properties that he initially confiscated: Zomordogi (Sumurduc), confiscated from Mejhedey (around 1262–1266)249 and Teremy (Teremia), land belonging to the Cluj church (1264).250 A similar situation was that of the two properties in the Călata area (Bihor county), Fornos (Sfăraşu) and Stylyteluk (disappeared),251 located near the Western limit of the county and confiscated by Stephen from Dionysius’ sons. On the other hand, the terra Solmus (Stupini),252 located to the easternmost part of the county, near the Saxon district of Bistriţa, might represent an exception from this policy. Moreover, the verbal donation of the town of Cluj (villa 235  D IR II 124–125, HO VI. 166–167, Jakó 284. 236  D IR II 312–314, Sz. Okl. I. 21–23, Jakó 304. 237  D IR II 294–296, HD 470–472, Jakó 434. 238  D IR II 213–215, ZW 137–139, Jakó 368. 239  D IR II 52, HO V 40, Jakó 240. 240  D IR II 213–215, ZW 137–139, Jakó 368. 241  D IR II 119–120, Jakó 278. 242  D IR II 51–52, ZW 89–90, Jakó 241. 243  D IR II 97–98, ZW 528, Jakó 261. 244  D IR III 15–16; ZW 2221–222, Jakó 301. 245  Jakó 242. 246  Jakó 269, with text. 247  Wenzel IX 555, Jakó 312. 248  D RH XI 328–330, Jakó 300. 249  D IR II 49–50, Jakó 278. 250  D IR II 57–58, Sz. Okl. IV 1–2, Jakó 251. 251  D IR II 49–50, Jakó 278. 252  Jakó 560 (with text).

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Kulusvar) to the Bishop of Transylvania,253 presumably made by Stephen, and its confirmation required to King Ladislas IV, remains questionable. Quite likely, this donation was never made. It was invented in 1275, by Peter Monoszló and the Csák party as argument to justify the invasion of Cluj by the bishop. In the case of the Hunedoara county, the uncertain status of much of its territory, reduced to a strip of land following the Mureş River Valley, did not encourage the expansion of the nobiliary estates. The development of the administrative structures in this county occurred during Stephen’s Duchy, and it was stimulated by the construction of the Deva royal castle and by the increasing flow of Transylvanian troops passing towards Severin and Bulgaria. Thus, even though Stephen’s donations only covered a limited area (Fenes (disappeared), Gurbeu (disappeared), Machou (Maceu)254 in 1263 and Haţeg (Hatzok),255 donated to Joachim Gutkeled in 1265), it represented the start of a new stage of aristocratic insertion in Southwestern Transylvania. The administrative status of the Haţeg region seems to remain uncertain, a document from 1276 mentioning it as a distinct county. The intensification of the Hungarian presence in the area required the appearance of the ecclesiastical institution of the Archdeanship of Hunedoara, first attested in 1265.256 The main beneficiaries of these donations were the members of the main aristocratic and noble families, who joined the young king’s army. While the interests in Transylvania of some (Miskolc, Gutkeled) remained superficial, in other cases, such as the Csák or Kán kindreds, the properties received or confirmed in this period (more than eight known, in the case of Kán) were just a part of a long presence in Transylvania, which was continued during the next decades. The massive donations received by count Mykud of the Kökényes-Radnót kindred and his two sons, Mykud and Emerich, (no less than 13 known properties257 in four counties, including two former royal fortresses) from Stephen V, were the cause of their relocation to Transylvania and the raise of a new noble family, Dobokai, separated from the aforementioned kindred. At the same time, Stephen’s donations were also bestowed on many representatives of the Transylvanian middle aristocracy (the Gyogh/Geoagiu noblemen, received five properties;258 Peter and Jacob, sons of Samson of

253  D IR II 174–175, HD 404–405, Jakó 339. 254  Jakó 242; Györffy III 292, 293, 297. 255  Please provide footnote text. 256  D IR II 71–72, HO VI 134–135. 257  D IR II 119–120, 213–215, 270–271, 294–296, Jakó 275, 278, 281, 368, 434. 258  D IR II 54–55, 117–118, 145–146/499, 228/503–504, Jakó 240, 274, 277, 317.

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Gerend/Luncani;259 Bozouch, son of Inouk;260 Mykola, son of Philip, nobleman from Călata;261 Meggyes and Fyoch, from Cluj county;262 the Ip and Suplac noblemen;263 Abraham, son of Ponyth of the Kata kindred264). Furthermore, some members of the Székely family (Stephanus and Dominic, sons of the Székely Benchench,265 who gave the name of Binţinţi village; Peter, son of count Peter the Székely266) and also some Saxon grafs (counts) (Chyl of Câlnic;267 Teel of Braşov;268 Arnold of Apold;269 Hermann of Fatha270) received properties. Among the beneficiaries of such donations, were also included some local communities (the colonists of Ighiu and Cricău;271 the Székelys of Kezdi272) and, also, the Chapter of the Transylvanian church273 (whose provost was in fact a Kán kindred member). These massive donations, which radically reformed the royal domain in Transylvania and its administrative structures, enjoyed undisturbed economic success, reflected both in the apparent growth in the price of property sold and bought, and in the increased number of churches and fortresses owned by nobles.274 This was the case not only with the fortifications of the Gutkeled or Kökényes-Radnót kindreds, but also with a number of fortresses built at the initiative of the most important Transylvanian noblemen: Stremţ, owned

259  D IR II 124–125, Jakó 284; The Gerend/Luncani estate, from which the family name originated, was purchased by them in 1268 from a Turda fortress serf: DIR II 99, Jakó 270. 260  D IR III 15–16, Jakó 301. 261  D IR II 49–50, Jakó 238. 262  D IR II 57–58, Jakó 251. 263  D RH XI 328–330, Jakó 300. 264  Jakó 312. 265  D IR II 348–349, Jakó 293. 266  D IR II 149/ 499–500, Jakó 314. 267  D IR II 118–119, Jakó 276. 268  D IR II 135–136, Jakó 311. 269  D IR II 389–390, Jakó 297. 270  Jakó 302, 560. 271  D IR II 79–80, Jakó 260. 272  D IR II 312–314, Jakó 304. 273  D IR II 139, Jakó 287, 310. 274  Such churches made of stone attested in this period: Fundătura/Geneu (patroned by St. Martyr Thomas): DIR II 119–120; Mureni (Holy Mary), Crit (St. Cross): DIR II 129, ZW 107– 108; Mirăslău (St. Peter): DIR 170–171, Teutsch-Firnhaber I 102–103. The only such church previously attested is the one in Sâncel (St. Martin), 1252: DIR II 5, ZW I 79.

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by the Geoagiul de Sus nobles;275 Câlnic, owned by the count of Chyl;276 and Gârbova, owned by a local Saxon noble family.277 All these were just some of the few new additions in this period of building frenzy, which marked the climax of the “intra-Carpathian castellation”.278 Due to their contribution to the consolidation of the defensive system of the kingdom, the owners of a fortress were granted certain material advantages, as well as the right to bear the title of count. From this time on, this title referred not only to the dignitary in charge of administering a county, but was also a noble rank strictly reserved (at least in the counties) to fortress owners or commanders.279 Stephen V’s donations were good incentives for the middle aristocracy of Transylvania, who took over the attributes previously exerted by fortress serfs. In addition, the changes also stimulated the administrative centralization, considerably consolidating the voivode’s authority over the counties directly subordinated to him. The management of royal domains, previously the task of counts and fortress serfs and collecting royal revenues were from now on the voivode’s responsibilities, enforced with the help of his own administrative system. This new form of centralized provincial administration was an important part of redefining and consolidating Transylvania’s specific identity within the kingdom of Hungary, focusing on a series of particularities exerted more or less since the Arpadian conquest. 3.4.6 External Policy Similar to the Transylvanian Duchy under Bela IV (1225–1235), Stephen’s rule revitalized the Eastern policy of the Arpadian Kingdom. The Hungarian expansion, this time conditioned by the domination of the Mongol Empire over Eastern Europe was, this time, limited to the Northern Balkans. After a brief power vacuum during the second civil war, followed by the defeat of Czar Iakov Sventislav of Vidin in the 1266 summer campaign, the positions 275  Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 170–173. 276  Radu Heitel, Cetatea de la Câlnic (Bucharest: Editura Meridiane, 1968); Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 98–102. 277  Regarding the fortress see: Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 119–121. A count Daniel of Wrbou, mentioned in 1291, might be the builder: DIR II 372–374, ZW 179–180. 278  Adrian A. Rusu, “Cetăţi din voievodatul Transilvaniei (sec. XI–XIV)” (PhD diss., ClujNapoca, 1987), 73–75. 279  The term castellanus, which would later designate the commanders of royal, episcopal or noblemen fortresses, only appeared in Transylvania in the last decades of the 13th century, and the first bearers would only be mentioned in the first part of the next century, see Adrian A. Rusu, “Castelani din Traniylvania in secolele XIII–XIV”, in AIIACluj XII (1979): 72.

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held by Hungary in the area were rapidly reinstated.280 Based on a rather consistent Transylvanian participation,281 the five Hungarian campaigns in Bulgaria282 contributed decisively to the consolidation of Sventislav’s rule over the Czardom of Vidin and also at weakening the positions held by the Czar of Târnovo, Constantine Tich. Even though the sources report the temporary conquest of Pleven by Ban Ponyth Miskolc, during the 1266 campaign,283 it is nonetheless certain that the Hungarians refrained from any action that could be interpreted as a threat to the buffer zone established by the Mongols on Lower Danube.284 Consequently, Hungary’s only solid gain after this sustained military effort was the creation of a buffer state in the Northwestern Balkans, which they could use as the base for a future expansion that would never actually take place. As proven one century later by Louis the Great’s similar attempt to engage Hungary beyond the frontiers of a different and hostile civilization was an experiment with little odds of success. Stephen’s main external policy goal during 1265–1270 was to break the international isolation he was forced into during the second civil war, by his father’s alliance with the king of Bohemia, Ottokar II Přemysl. Despite Stephen’s victory in 1266, the influence of the Bohemian king in Hungary’s internal affairs remained strong. By directly supporting the aristocratic party run by Palatine Henrik Kőszegi, Ottokar II continued to pursue his older goal of preventing Stephen’s succession to the crown of Hungary. To deter the plans of his powerful opponent, duke Stephen initiated in 1268 a successful diplomatic offensive. In August 1268, he visited Krakow and signed a peace and perpetual alliance with duke Boleslaus Pudicus, husband of his sister Kunigunda.285 This diplomatic success marked the first serious breach in the political system devised by Ottokar II, whose aspirations to the imperial crown and domination of Central Europe did not go unnoticed. His Krakow trip was also a pilgrimage to St. Stanislaw’s relics,286 a religiously important enterprise, where Stephen

280  For Stephen’s Balkan policy see: John V. A. Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans. A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1987), 170–183. 281  D IR II 124–125, HO VI 166–167; DIR II 149, 499–500. 282  H D 349–350, DIR II 128. 283  D IR II 133–135, HD 347–348. 284  The Mongols were already settled near the Danube in 1264: Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 120–121. Nogai was appointed as their leader during the reign of Berke (before 1267), see: Ciocâltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea, 248–250. 285  Annales Franciscanum Cracoviensium, MPH III. 49. 286  Annales Franciscanum Cracoviensium, MPH III. 49.

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probably prayed for support and vowed his allegiance.287 By chance or not, after this date the chances were altogether on his side. In November 1268, the death of Pope Clement IV represented the end of the upper ground held by his opponents in the pontifical curia. Furthermore, in 1269, the young prince Bela, duke of Slavonia, Stephen’s rival to the royal crown, met his sudden death, and 1270 marked the consecutive disappearance of both his parents, King Bela IV and Queen Mary. Stephen was thus crowned king in June 1270, his political opponents taking refuge at the Bohemian court of Ottokar II. At the same time, the year 1269 was marked by the prestigious alliance Stephen signed with Charles of Anjou, which later resulted in a double matrimony with most important consequences for the Hungarian kingdom: the marriage of the future king of Naples, Charles II, with Stephen’s daughter Mary, and the engagement of Ladislas, heir to St. Stephen’s crown, with Isabella, daughter of Charles of Anjou.288 Moreover, in 1270, probably as a continuation of the oath taken in 1268, King Stephen V made another pilgrimage to the relics of St. Stanislaw. Ironically, one of his very few followers, who on this occasion pledged his loyalty to the new sovereign, was King Bela’s former Palatine Lawrence, son of Kemyn, his relentless enemy during the second civil war.289 3.4.7 The Crowning of Stephen V As sole king of Hungary caused, just like Bela IV’s coronation in 1235, the dismantling of the institutions of the Duchy of Transylvania. Just like his father, the new king ran an uncompromising centralization policy, also required by the necessity to control the opposition which enjoyed significant material resources and external support. In 1271, in the Pressburg (Bratislava) peace, Ottokar II vowed to no longer support the opposition against Stephen and in his turn, the king would not retaliate against his political opponents among the aristocracy.290 Despite the new king’s efforts to soothe his former adversaries and even have them join him, Stephen’s enemies were always on guard, actively increasing their pool of supporters and when the time came, seized 287  D IR II 140–141, HD 351–352. 288  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 245–248; Oskar Halecki, Jadwiga of Anjou and the Rise of East Central Europe (New Jersey: Columbia University Press, 1991), 20; Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vesper: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 159. Ladislas IV’s marriage to Elisabeth of Sicily was celebrated after Stephen’s death, in September, 5th, 1272. 289  D IR II 140–141, HD 351–352. 290  Pál Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary. 895–1526 (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 107.

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power. In the spring of 1272, this powerful coalition was joined by the Slavonian Ban Joachim Gutkeled, who managed to take Ladislas, heir to the throne, hostage and used him as warranty against any hostilities from his father. The rather sudden and suspicious death of Stephen V in august 1272, threw Hungary into a whirlwind of tragedies that only ended, almost four decades later, with the triumphant instauration of a new dynasty.

CHAPTER 4

Political Crisis in the First Years of Ladislas the Cuman’s Reign: Attempts to Restore the Duchy of Transylvania In the first years of reign of Ladislas IV the Cuman, controlling Transylvania was the crucial factor (in some cases even decisive, as was the case with the Saxon rebellion of 1277) in establishing the balance of forces among the nobiliary parties engaged in internal clashes and, ultimately, in dominating the internal political scene. This period of time saw the transition from Stephen V’s Transylvanian duchy to the congregational system of regnum Transylvanianum, instituted by the provincial nobility of the late ‘80s. Evidence points out the fact that the duchy administrative model was not an exterior episode in the history of Transylvania, as if this province had proved itself incapable of managing a political and institutional autonomy. On the contrary, its revitalization was repeatedly tested with the direct participation of internal forces that favored this evolution. 4.1

The Voivode Nicholas Geregye (1272–1274)

The coup of August 1272, prompted by the death of King Stephen V, brought an aristocratic restoration party to power, consisting of Bela IV’s former supporters in the civil wars of the ’60s who had taken to exile in 1270 upon the death of their protector.1 Returning to Hungary in the mayhem after the death of King Stephen, the exiled noblemen led by Henrik Kőszegi of the Heder kindred took control of the capital after a violent clash with the former supporters of the late King Stephen, lead by Ban Bela Rostislavich, whose allies included Egidius and Gregorius Monoszló, the brothers of Bishop Peter of Transylvania. Afterwards, they shared the government of the kingdom with the main

1  On the general framework of the time and the main events see, more recently, Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 255–271; Szücs Jenö, Az utolsó Árpádok (Budapest: [give publisher], 1993), 279–291; Zsoldos Attila, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik: Magyarorszag története 1301-ig (Budapest: Csokonai K., 1997), 143–147. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_006

Attempts to Restore the Duchy of Transylvania

1 Abrud 2 Agriș SJ 3 Aiud AB 4 Aiudu de Sus AB 5 Albești MS 6 Almaș SB 7 Așchileu CJ 8 Baraolt CV 9 Biertan SB 10 Binținți / Aurel Vlaicu HD 11 Bonțida 12 Borșa CJ 13 Borșea BH 14 Brașov 15 Brethonia HD 16 Călata CJ 17 Câlnic AB 18 Câmpulung AG 19 Căpuș CJ 20 Caransebeș CS 21 Cârța SB 22 Ceaba CJ

MAP 3

23 Cisnădie SB 24 Cisnădioara SB 25 Cojocna CJ 26 Crasna SJ 27 Cricău AB 28 Cristiș-Oprișani 29 Cuzdrioara CJ 30 Dăbâca 31 Densuș HD 32 Deuș CJ 33 Dezmir CJ 34 Dezna AR 35 Domnești BN 36 Fărău AB 37 Finiș BH 38 Gâmbaș AB 39 Gârbova AB 40 Geoagiul de Sus AB 41 Gilău CJ 42 Glogoveț AB 43 Grebenișul de Câmpie MS 44 Gurasada HD

45 Hălchiu BV 46 Hălmeag BV 47 Herina BN 48 Iara CJ 49 Ighiu AB 50 Ilia HD 51 Izvoru Crișului CJ 52 Jimbor BN 53 Jucu CJ 54 Lăpuș MM 55 Legii CJ 56 Luncani CJ 57 Mediaș SB 58 Miercurea Sibiului 59 Mirăslău AB 60 Moruț BN 61 Niraj MS 62 Nochrich SB 63 Ocna Dejului CJ 64 Ocna Sibiului CJ 65 Ocnele Turzii CJ 66 Ozd MS 67 Pâglișa CJ

Transylvania under Ladislas Kán.

68 Palatca CJ 69 Palota BH 70 Panad / Horia AR 71 Pâncota AR 72 Peșteana HD 73 Petrești AB 74 Rediu CJ 75 Rodna 76 Românași SJ 77 Romos HD 78 Rupea BV 79 Sălacea BH 80 Sâmbăta BV 81 Sâncel AB 82 Sâncraiu AB 83 Sând / Săndulești CJ 84 Sânnicolau de Beiuș 85 Sântejude CJ 86 Sântimbru AB 87 Sărata BN 88 Sărățel BN 89 Șard AB 90 Saschiz MS

109

91 Șeica SB 92 Sibiel SB 93 Sic CJ 94 Șieu-Măgheruș BN 95 Șieu-Odorhei BN 96 Sighișoara MS 97 Șpring AB 98 Stana CJ 99 Streisângiorgiu HD 100 Stremț AB 101 Sumurduc CJ 102 Tălmaciu SB 103 Țapu SB 104 Târnăveni MS 105 Teaca BN 106 Topa CJ 107 Valcău SJ 108 Vințu de Jos AB 109 Vița BH 110 Vurpăr SB

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aristocratic group of opposition from the inside, constituted around the Ban of Slavonia, Joachim Gutkeled.2 Under the circumstances, the office of voivode of Transylvania, cumulated since Stephen’s duchy with that of count of Solnoc, was assumed by one of the most ardent supporters of the aristocratic restoration regime, and at the same time a fierce opponent of the Csák kindred: Nicholas, son of Paul Geregye. Furthermore, the father of the new voivode, Paul Geregye, was one of the first royal officials that ventured in a devastated Transylvania to reopen the salt mines and to reinstate peace. He also managed, during this unsettled period of time to create a major estate in the counties of Bihor, Solnoc and Crasna, through what even then considered illegal and violent methods. Consequently, the Geregye kindred acquired plenty of enemies in these regions, and its positions became increasingly tenuous as former owners or their descendants started claiming their rights and joined forces against them in order to recover their lost properties. As adversaries of King Stephen back in the days of the civil war, the members of the Geregye kindred were one of the numerous aristocratic groups that sought refuge in Bohemia at the time of his rise to the throne of Hungary. Upon their return after the peace of Bratislava (1271), they withdrew to their vast properties near Transylvania, nonetheless keeping contact with the aristocratic opposition that was preparing to regain power. It is the only explanation to Nicholas Geregye, the son of Paul, being mentioned as holder of the voivodal office ever since the first list of dignitaries of the new regime (September 1272).3 Nicholas Geregye undoubtedly went through major difficulties to control a province profoundly attached to King Stephen, with hard core of loyal followers (due to voivode Matthew Csák’s and Bishop Peter Monoszló’s activity), who owed their privileges and wealth to the Duchy of Stephen V. Throughout the ‘70s, this part of the nobility would become fiercely hostile against the aristocratic party of Stephen’s former enemies, who had taken control in 1272. It is extremely likely that Nicholas Geregye was unable to take control over Transylvania before the second half of November. His success was 2  This character may have been involved in the death of King Stephen, which occurred in circumstances unclear to this day (Simonis de Keza, “Chronicon Hungaricum”, in IIR, ed. Gheorghe Popa-Lisseanu, IV. Bucharest: Bucovina, 1935, 56; Annales Praedicatorum Vindobonensium, in MGH, SS, IX, 729). The king spent the entire summer of 1272 in Slavonia (RA, 2191–2218), trying to negociate the release of his son Ladislas, taken hostage by Ban Joachim. The king returned from Slavonia in mid July, shortly after he died (August, 6th, 1272). 3  R A 3737, 2314.

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probably due to the compromise between the representatives of the new power of Buda with Matthew Csák, who received the position of Slavonian ban,4 an office similar to the one he was forced to surrender. Nonetheless, while Matthew Csák successfully imposed himself as the newly appointed ban of the entire Slavonia, and the sources record his military clashes at the Carinthian borders,5 the authority exerted by Nicholas Geregye in Transylvania seems to have remained problematic. It is more than obvious that he failed in creating support for himself among the provincial nobility,6 and his relations with Bishop Peter Monoszló, until 1274 caught in a rather reserved attitude towards the new regime, were never to be cordial. His authority was strictly confined to the territory of the voivodal counties, while Sibiu or Rodna “counties” were ruled by high officials or various other men from the royal entourage.7 In addition, the dynamics and broken alliances which featured Hungary’s political life for most of the year 1273 brought, at a certain moment, new surprises even for Nicholas Geregye. In May 1273, the alliance between the Csák, Monoszló and Kőszegi families, in the dissadvantage of the Gutkeled group, including the Geregye kindred, led to the rise of John ( Johannes, Johann) Kőszegi of the Heder kindred as a contender to the voivodal position.8 Most likely the peace that followed, already recorded at the end of May,9 was enforced by the interventions in Buda of the Gutkeled kindred and their partisans. The end of year 1273 ended this feverish repositioning process initiated in November 1272. In October 1273 there were already two opposing sides, after the mergers and alliances concluded among various groups which had until 4  Mentioned as such between November, 27th, 1272, and April, 1273 (RA 2329–2355). 5  For instance: RA 3063: . . . cum Matheum tunc banum totius Sclauonie, quem subtus castrum Lastruch ad confinia Karintie miseramus . . . 6  The only Transylvanian nobleman known to have asked and received confirmation for his privileges this time was Nicholas, the son of Chyl of Câlnic (Kalnuk) (ZW 120; DIR 151). The character was a Saxon noble, thus, explaining the support given by the Saxons, right from the beginning, to the enemies of the Csaks. 7  In March 1273, the count of Sibiu was Ladislas Kán, also the royal court judge (RA 2355– 2357). A certain magister Paulus, count of Rodna and Bistriţa, relative or friend to magister Paulus, High Steward of the royal court, is mentioned in May, 7th, 1274 (ZW, 1, 124; DIR 169; RA 2499). In the same year 1274 (RA 2492, 2543), count of Sibiu and Dăbâca was the former Ban Alexander of Severin. 8  Johanne wayuoda Transsiluano count of Zonuk was, probably, John Kőszegi (member of the Heder family, son of Henrik Kőszegi), count of Zala until March/April 1273, and then count of Sopron from July, the same year. He was mentioned as voivode between May, 12th and 29th, 1273, which have him no time to exert the office (RA 2362, 2364–8, 2370–2, 2375). 9  R A 2374 (May, 28th, 1273).

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then acted rather chaotically. Their confrontation would turn court intrigues and the petty local conflicts, that predominanted until then, into a civil war. Moreover, some of the members of the two sides changed their alliances since August 1272. As a consequence, the party that held the political power and controlled the royal court had much less support, consisting mainly of the members of the Kőszegi—Gutkeled kindreds and a limited number of supporters, including voivode Nicholas Geregye. The opposition, led by Matthew Csák and the members of his kindred, consisted of a greater number of aristocratic families (Aba, Rátót, Monoszló, Kán) and, in addition, an impressive number of noble families discontent with the turn of events in the kingdom after 1272. The attempts to find a compromise, through the mediation of Queen Elisabeth, failed in the first months of 1274.10 Consequently, from spring of the same year, the tensions between the two sides broke into an all-out war. The first action was made by the opposition who took over the Northern and Eastern counties, where the local nobility was obviously favorable to the Csák kindred and hostile to the aristocratic restoration. It was under such circumstances, sometime before the beginning of summer, that Nicholas Geregye lost control over Transylvania, although he would formally continue to hold the office as witness in royal documents until late September.11 4.2

Transylvania under the Rule of the Csák Kindred (1274–1277)

Matthew (Mattheus, Máté) Csák’s control over Transylvania preceded by a few months the victory over the adverse party throughout the entire kingdom. In June, 25th, 1274,12 Matthew Csák was already voivode, issuing sentences in ongoing trials. Furthermore, he cooperated with Bishop Peter and the Chapter of Alba Iulia and also with the Geoagiul de Sus noblemen, who were older partisans of King Stephen. His authority over Transylvania was undoubtedly acknowledged at that time after taking control over the capital and winning a decisive victory against his rivals. These later stages of the civil war took 10  A royal decree from January, 23rd, 1274, mentions that the king, the queen mother, and the great barons of the kingdom came to peace (CD VII/5, 391; RA 2446). It is rather a sample of exaggerated optimism of this mediation attempt, whose failure became obvious a few months later. 11  Even though, in June, 25th, 1274, Matthew Csák issued a decree as voivode of Transylvania, Nicholas Geregye continues to appear as the holder of this position on the lists of dignitaries until September, 25th, 1274, in the eve of the effective takeover of Buda by the Csáks and their allies (RA 2512, 2514–5, 2517–8, 2521–2, 2524, 2531–7, 2542, 2553–5). 12  ZW 124–125; DIR 170–171; Jakó 328.

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place successively in September, respectively October–November 1274. The control over the royal court was secured sometime between September 25th and September 30, 1274.13 The chaos that ensued seems to have created the perfect opportunity for incipient conflicts inside the opposing coalition with regards to the control over Transylvania. In a document issued at that time, the voivodal office was attributed to Egidius Monoszló,14 brother of Bishop Peter, expressing this kindred’s ambition to change Transylvania into its own possession. However, in the days to come, with the arrival of the Csák kindred in Buda, the situation was taken entirely under their control. In fact, the circumstances were rather unfavorable for starting internal conflicts in the coalition, since Henrik Kőszegi, a refugee on his vast estates in Western Hungary, was gathering his men in preparation for an assault against Buda. The decisive battle, the last episode of the civil war, took place at Fövény, not far from Székesfehérvár, in September 127415 and it was concluded with the complete victory of the Csák kindred. Henrik Kőszegi died on the battlefield, and his sons were forced to go into exile. The first list of the royal dignitaries after the Fövény victory, in November 27, 1274,16 is a list of the members of the winning party. On this list, Roland Rátót appears as the Palatine and Dionysius Péc as the Ban of Slavonia, also Egidius Monoszló17 was the already confirmed kingdom treasurer, Peter Aba was the Marshal (magister agasonum), Ernye Akos the judge of the royal court,18 and Nicholas Pok was the Great Steward (magister dapiferorum). Moreover, there 13  The last document issued under the testimony of the dignitaries belonging to the Kőszegi—Gutkeled group was issued in September, 25th (RA 2555). In September, 30th, 1274, the dignitaries of the kingdom are already from the winning party (RA 2559). 14  RA 2556 (with text); Egidius is also mentioned in the text of the document as one of the foremost barons from whom the king takes advice. This entire document, in which the Csáks are not yet present, seems to be Henrik Kőszegi’s attempt to reach a compromise with the more approachable wing of the opposing party. 15  Dating this battle in September, 26th–29th, 1274 (Szücs, Az utolsó Árpádok, 286–287; Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 227) remains questionable. 16  RA 2562, (with text). 17  Egidius Monoszló held the same office during King Stephen, and was probably considered an expert in the field. Durign the regrouping of May 1273 (RA 2362–2556), Gregorius, brother of Egidius and Bishop Peter, became count of Vasvár (comite Castriferrei, a position he also held during Stephen V) and remained loyal to the Kőszegi—Gutkeled party. After September 1274 he would no longer hold any public office. The overturn of June 1275 brought him the temporary and minor position of count of Baranya (RA 2609, 2615, 2650), but he withdrew from politics, in December, after Csáks return to power. 18  Holder of this position until December, 31st, 1274 (RA 2569), after which he disappeared from the lists of dignitaries. Starting from January 1275, the royal court judge was Dionysius Péc (RA 2590).

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were no less than three Csák kindred members with an obvious natural inclination to positions that required direct control over territories: Peter, count of Sopron and Somogyi,19 Ugrinus, Ban of Severin,20 while Matthew, the leader of the kindred and of the entire coalition, kept the office of Transylvania’s voivode and count of Solnoc for himself. It was under this structure that the coalition governed Hungary until early June 1275,21 when retaliation from the regrouped opposing party regained the power for the Kőszegi—Gutkeled kindreds. The decision of Matthew Csák, the undisputed leader of the kindred and of its party, after the Fövény victory, to not take the title of palatine but that of voivode of Transylvania, indicates both tactical reasons as well as a trend within the Hungarian aristocracy, of constituting their own territorial domains, under their direct control, with greater autonomy and lesser interventions from the central power. During the civil war, such domains also offered the human and material resources required for a successful involvement in the battle for power, and also offered a safe refuge, independent from the turmoil and fast-changing politics of the capital. Transylvania was the main component of the political system of the Csák kindred, located at the core of a vast territorial organization which included the Banate of Severin, which was at that time openly subordinated to the Transylvanian voivodes. Even though while Matthew Csák was the voivode, Ugrinus Csák22 was the Ban of Severin, alternations to power among the members of the kindred temporarily pushed in this 19  Between November, 1274 and June, 4th, 1275 (RA 2562–2602). Péter Csák, the younger brother of Matthew, was the father of future Palatine Matthew Csák (the famous opponent of Charles Robert in the first decades of his reign). 20  September, 1274–June, 4th, 1275 (RA 2556–2602). The documents dated September, 7th, 1274, which mention him in this position, are fake (RA 2550–2552). In the document from September, 1274 (RA 2556), Ugrinus Csák was mentioned as Ban of Severin, while voivode was Egidius Monoszló. Even though Ugrinus was a remote relative of Matthew Csák, he was initially allied to the opposing party, and he held from 1272 the office of High Count (magister agasonum) and also count of Sirmium (RA 2314–2414). After joining the Csáks in the spring-summer of 1273, he lost these offices. In the following years, Ugrinus Csák became one of Matthew’s closest allies, and remained by his side even during the most critical periods. 21  After June, 4th, 1275, RA 2602, the last document mentioning the Csáks party as still holding their offices. 22  RA 2556–2602: he held this office during the Csáks’ rule (September, 25th, 1274–June, 4th, 1275). After the return to power of the Csáks, in December 1275, he became the new voivode of Transylvania and royal court judge. Also, he was the Ban of Severin between July 1276 and February 1277 (one reference in this period, probably from the end of the year: RA 2752–1276).

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position a former holder of the office, Mykud of Kökényes-Radnót,23 in-law to the Monoszló kindred24 and, obviously, loyal to the Csák kindred.25 Moreover, Matthew Csák had taken over Transylvania months before the assault on the capital, and there is sufficient evidence to assert that this action had ensured the final success of 1274. As long as the Csák’s controlled Transylvania, their positions remained firm despite the blows received constantly from their opponents. Furthermore, in the summer-fall of 1275 this stategy proved its superiority when, despite the fact that the Csáks lost control over the capital city and also probably much of the country, his position in Transylvania remained unchallenged.26 Using the firm ground that Transylvania represented for the Csák party, they managed to regain the power in December 1275. In order to prevent the events of June from happening again, in the following months, the members of the Csák kindred temporarily renounced the voivodal position27 (the only time during their dominance), and engaged all their resources in controlling the kingdom’s central institutions. Consequently, no less than four members of the kindred held the most important offices of the state: Matthew became the treasurer;28 Peter, who still held the counties of Sopron and Somogyi, assumed the positions of Palatine and Judge of the Cumans,29 Ugrinus was the royal court judge,30 and Stephen (Stephanus), son of Matthew, became the Great Steward, while he was also count of Trenčin. The Csák kindred maintained their control over the counties near the capital city, and they also replaced 23  Between December 1275 and July 1276, while Ugrinus Csák had other assignments. Mentioned in February, 10th, 1275 under unclear circumstances (HD 405; DIR 175). 24  His sister Kata was married to Egidius Monoszló, see: Karácsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek, 835. 25  On July, 8th, 1279, during the last comeback to power of the Csáks, Ban Mykud was repaid, in the name of King Ladislas IV, for his deeds (“. . . during the turmoil in our kingdom . . . he never inflicted any damage . . .”): DIR 213–215; ZW 137–139; Jakó 368. 26  The lists of dignitaries of the new regime led by his adversarie, acknowledge Matthew Csák as the voivode of Transylvania (RA 2604–2652). Between June and October–November 1275, the former voivode, Nicholas Geregye, held the offices of royal court judge and count of Bana (RA 2604–2652). 27  In the first documents issued after the Csáks’ rise to power, Ugrinus is mentioned as the voivode of Transylvania (December, 4th–10th, 1275): RA 2659–2661. On December, 10th, he renounced this position to become royal court judge. 28  December, 4th, 1275–July 1276: RA 2659–2711. 29  December, 4th, 1275–1277: RA 2659–2823. Mentioned again in the summer of 1278: RA 2870. 30  Between December 1275 and February–March 1276. He then becomes voivode until the summer of 1276, when he is mentioned once again as Ban of Severin: RA 2662–2691.

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Ugrinus as Ban of Severin, with the trustworthy Mykud Kökényes-Radnót. On the other hand in Transylvania they were forced to turn to a provisional arrangement employing another member of a high aristocratic kindred. In this context, Ladislas Kán was voivode of Transylvania for a short period (December 1275–February 1276),31 not against the Csák kindred, as previously believed, but with their obvious blessing and during the climax of their reign. Furthermore, in February 1276, Ugrinus Csák renounced the office of royal court judge in favor of its former holder, Moyus (who was in the queen’s trust), and the voivode until the early summer of 1276, when herecered to Matthew Csák.32 Thus, the Csáks kept constant control over Transylvania between 1274 and 1277. This interval was a period of stability for Transylvania, soon to be followed by a period of violent confrontations in 1277–79. As reflected in documentary sources, during the Csák reign justice started functioning again, property transactions were again mentioned, and ecclesiastic institutions resumed their normal activity. In contrast with the troubled politics of the other members of the Monoszló kindred, the cooperation between voivode Matthew and Bishop Peter was successful. The fact that Matthew Csák’s documents, as voivode of Transylvania, were issued in Alba Iulia33 indicates the importance of the city that headquartered the Bishopric, which also became the political capital and symbolic center of the realm. Consequently, for his internal support and the contribution to the stability of power, Bishop Peter Monoszló (1270–1307) was able to initiate his great campaign to expand the domains of the bishopric, which represents the blooming period of this ecclesiatic institution in the entire medieval history. The most important acquisition was possible through the generosity of the Csáks and was recorded in rather questionable circumstances. Based on an alleged verbal donation made by Stephen V, the royal diploma from December 1275,34 which was mostly signed by members of the 31  Ladislas Kán was only mentioned between December, 10th, 1275 and January, 9th, 1276: RA 2662–2687. On the other hand Ladislas’s successor, Ugrinus Csák, was still a royal court judge in February, 2nd, 1276: RA 2691. 32  Probably in June–July: RA 2710–2711. 33  June, 25th, 1274: DIR 170–171; Georg Daniel Teutsch and Friedrich Firnhaber, “Urkunden­ buch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens”, in FRA: Österreichische Geschichtsquellen, vol. 15, 2, (Viena: Druck und Verlag der Kaiserl. Königl. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1857), 102–103; Jakó 328. September, 14th, 1276: DIR 183–184; Teutsch and Firnhaber, “Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens”, 1, 110; Jakó 346. 34  ZW 127 (1275); DIR 174–175 (1275); based on the list of witness, Jakó 339 argues for “1275, after December 10th”. The text of the document indicates that Cluj (colonized by German settlers) was considered of importance by King Stephen, who attempted to raise its prosperity to the same scale as before the invasion. This might raise some questions regarding

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Csák kindred as witnesses, conceded the town of Cluj (villa Clwsvar) to the Bishopric of Alba Iulia. In November, 25th, 1276, a new acquisition just as controversial as the first one and located in the same territory, Izvorul Crişului property (in Bihor county) was acquired as an exchange with the Chapter of Alba Iulia.35 In May 8, 1276, again with the help of the Chapter of Alba-Iulia,36 an institution obedient to the Bishopric, Peter Monoszló received as a loan a hill in the Fyless forest, near Alba Iulia, in order to build a fortification.37 In addition to the support received from the church, the political regime instituted by the Csáks needed the support of the provincial nobility, which, at the time, was trying to consolidate its positions in Transylvania. The political, military and juridical systems continued to function in the same terms as before, through the cooperation with an aristocratic elite insufficiently tied to the province. The execution of the sentence pronounced in November, 1st, 1274, regarding the destruction of a village, was a landmark feature of this reign. The case was chaired by four judges: Matthew Csák, voivode of Transylvania, Peter Monoszló, Bishop of Transylvania, Ban Mykud, count of Dăbâca, and Alexander, count of Sibiu.38 The verdict ruled by the voivode split the responsibility of the sentence with representatives of higher aristocracy, without any reference to the other members of his own kindred. Even though this was probably an extraordinary case, and the goal was to make more powerful the sentence against people as important as Abraham, son of Ponyth of the Kata kindred (the defendant of the case), it also indicates that the Csák kindred rule was far from authoritarian. The character of the regime was probably aristocratic in nature, with oligarchic tendencies.

the reasons for which he later donated Cluj, which he failed to mention in the document. Furthermore, the donation was apparently made shortly before his death, which might explain the missing information from the donation document. On the other hand, since the king died unexpectedly, this verbal donation might have been only a fabrication. 35  CD 5/2. 371–372; HD 1/1, 409; Jakó 348. 36  In 1276 he received the confirmation of the Turda salt mine donation (made by Stephen V): Teutsch and Firnhaber, “Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens”, 1, 109–110; DIR 182–183; Jakó 346; the confirmation of voivode Matthew Csák on the 14th of September the same year—Teutsch-Firnhaber 110, DIR 183–184, Jakó 346. The Transylvanian estates donated by the king to the Bishopric of Esztergom (August, 9th, 1276) were also confirmed: Teutsch and Firnhaber, “Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens”, 1, 108–109; DIR 181–182; Jakó 344. 37  CD 5/2. 370–371; DIR 180; Jakó 341. 38  Jakó 332: Nos M. wayuoda Transsilvanus et comes de Zonuk, P. episcopus Transsilvanus, Alexander comes Zebeniensis et Mykud banus comes de Doboka damus pro memoria.

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The difficulties in controlling the confusing situation in the kingdom forced the Csák kindred to regroup their forces in Transylvania in 1276, and to take advantage, again, of the safe base offered by the province. As of 1274, Matthew Csák turned Transylvania into the center of a vaster political system, which must have included at least the Banate of Severin, and was undoubtedly inspired by Stephen V’s duchy. An explicit and formal reconstruction of the Duchy of Transylvania, the boundaries of which were not clearly determined (followed the lines of Stephen’s variable authority during the division of the kingdom), represented the way for the Csák kindred to secure an undisputed supremacy over the counties they already controlled. Thus, reenacting the political model of the Duchy of Transylvania, which meant controlling a territory larger than that of the duchy itself, was the only way to ensure the role of arbiter of the political scene. Indeed, the years 1276–1277 marked the reappearance in the documents of the terms “duke” and “Duchy” of Transylvania. In August, 6th, 1276, while invited to the hearings regarding the canonization of Saint Margaret of Hungary, the mother to Matthew Csák, a nun in the Dominican monastery located on the Danube Island, was presented as domina Margaretha, mater domini Matthei, ducis Transylvani.39 This reference was confirmed, in May 30, 1277, by references to a “Duchy of Transylvania” (ducatu . . . Transsilvano), made both by Bishop Stephen (Stepanus) of Kalocsa, in a letter to Pope Nicholas III,40 and by a document issued on the same date by the high church officials gathered for their “general assembly”. The document was signed by Archbishop Stephen of Kalocsa, Bishop Phillip of Vác, Bishop Lodomerius of Oradea, Bishop Timotheus of Zagreb, Bishop Dionysius of Györ, Bishop Peter of Transylvania and Bishop Pouka of Syrmium.41 The second document, addressed to the church officials of the “Duchy of Transylvania, belonging either to the Transylvanian diocese or to the holy church of Esztergom”, offers additional details on one of the most important concrete significations of the term “duchy”, namely the fact that it included the Transylvanian diocese and the territory ecclesiastically subordinated to the Archbishopric of Esztergom. Getting the Saxons of the “province of Sibiu” under the control of Transylvanian voivodes and that of Alba Iulia bishops was an older desideratum in the pursuit of which the interests of noble and ecclesiastic elites converged. However, after 1274, since Transylvania was no longer run by a royal family member to whom the Saxons towed obedience, the inclusion of Sibiu county 39  Monumenta Romana Episcopatus Vesprimiensis, I (1103–1276), Budapest, 1896, 163. 40  Jakó 351. 41  DIR 193–195; Jakó 352.

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in the political system created by Matthew Csák could not be accomplished simply by assuming the title of duchy. Firstly, an adequate political solution was needed to legitimate, in case of necessity, a potential turn to force. In order to solve his dilemma, Matthew Csák transferred Ban Alexander of Severin42 from the royal court entourage (close companion of Queen Elisabeth, after September 1247) to the voivode’s entourage. Thus, in November, 1st, 1274,43 this Alexander comes Zebeniensis (who, from September the same year, was no longer included on the royal lists of dignitaries) was one of the three most important provincial officials, next to Bishop Peter and to Mykud, count of Dăbâca, who assisted voivode Matthew in the trial against Abraham Kata. One year later, in 1275, the promotion of Mykud as Ban of Severin entitled Alexander as count of Dăbâca, which added to the title of count of Sibiu, accentuated his “Transylvanization”.44 Thus, the new position of count of Sibiu, whose authority over the Saxons was legitimate, became a member of the voivode’s administrative apparatus and enabled the king to exert his authority over the Saxons of Sibiu. 4.3

The Saxon Rebellion (1277–1279)

The danger of permanently subordinating the Sibiu county to the Transyl­ vanian voivode, a consequence of the pressure exerted over the county for more than a quarter of a century, explains the tense circumstances that triggered the Saxon rebellion of February 1277, the event that put a decisive end to the Csák’s domination over Transylvania. The immediate causes of the Saxons’ involvement in a new violent stage of the internal conflict in the kingdom (1277–1279) were correlated to the disputes around the succession to the Archbishopric of Esztergom, vacant in 1276. This event helped Nicholas Kán, then the provost of the Chapter of Alba Iulia to reappear at in the foreground of the Hungarian political scene.

42  He was Ban of Severin in 1268 (DIR 101–103; Jakó 268), and he was rewarded by Stephen V with properties in the county of Sătmar for his impressive military skills. Most of his estates were probably located around Buda (see: DIR 173). Also, for the “Greece” campaing he was able to arm his own troops, indicating that he possessed important revenues. He was first mentioned as count of Sibiu in April, 26th, 1274 mentioned again in the same office in August and September, same year: (ZW 124, 126, 127). 43  Jakó 332 (with text). 44  DIR 173 (1275).

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Nicholas Kán, who was the royal vice-chancellor (and provost of the Transylvanian church) between September 1272 and February 1273,45 became a favorite of the still young Queen Elisabeth,46 and got actively involved in the political intrigues of the royal court. Ambitious by nature, he managed to become, as of March 1273,47 the Archbishop of Esztergom (vacant after the death of Archbishop Fillip in December 1272), against the will of the canons and despite the fact that he lacked the experience and education required for this position.48 The scandal that emerged (despite his connections to the queen, Nicholas was also accused of threatenning and pressuring the canons who opposed him)49 was too great to allow the former Provost of Alba Iulia to receive the papal consent. Furthermore, he wasn’t popular with any of the nobiliary parties. Thus, in May 1273 Nicholas Kán lost all the positions he held (elected Archbishop and perpetual count of Esztergom, Chancellor of the kingdom and count of Pilis)50 and reentered a phase of utter anonymity for the following few years. The new Archbishop of Esztergom was Benedict, a former Provost of Arad, and affiliate of the Kőszegi-Gutkeled party. Upon the death of Benedict, in 1276, the issue of electing a new archbishop triggered a major internal political crisis, which was one of the main causes that led to another civil war. In this context, Nicholas Kán reasserted his candidature with the support from the Csák party, who had already named him provost of the church of Transylvania.51 Nicholas Kán’s opponent was Peter Kőszegi, Bishop of Veszprem, obviously endorsed by the aristocratic party that gravitated around his kindred. Thus the duel between Nicholas of Transylvania and Péter of Veszprem was the ecclesiastical mirror of the ongoing political conflict between the Csák and Kőszegi kindreds. The Holy See failure to reach a decision caused this conflict to escalate into violence. Furthermore, one of the most outrageous events in face of the contemporaries occurred in the summer

45  RA 2314–2350. 46  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 258. 47  RA 2355 (March, 29th, 1273): venerabili viro Nycolao sancte Strigoniensis ecclesie electo, perpetuo comite loci eiusdem, aule nostre cancellario. 48  After the scandals at the elections for archbishop, in the years ‘70, the chapter 40 of the “constitution” signed by the Synod of Buda (1279) conditioned the access to the upper layers of the ecclesiastic hierarchy, starting with archdean, by a three year canonical education; see: Şerban. Turcuş, Sinodul general de la Buda (1279) (Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2001), 56–57, 176–177, 230–231. 49  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 258–259. 50  Last mentioned in office, in May, 26th, 1273: RA 2367. 51  RA 2718, 2750.

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of 1276, when, in the attempt to prevent Peter Kőszegi’s candidature, Palatine Peter Csák attacked and devastated the Bishopric of Veszprem.52 The events from fall 1276 were the immediate cause of the violent actions taken by the Saxons during the following winter. Given the fact that the Provost of Sibiu was subordinated to the Archbishopric of Esztergom, investing Nicholas in this position would have led to the request of independence from the Bishopric of Transylvania. Thus, the Saxons’ quasi-administrative subordination to the voivode, which Matthew Csák resolved by converting the count of Sibiu into a member of his own entourage, would have been consolidated by subordinating the Provost of Sibiu to the Alba Iulia Bishopric. Faced with such pressure, the Saxons in Transylvania rebelled. On February 21, 1277, in the Reminiscere Sunday, the Saxons in the province of Sibiu, under the leadership of the count of Ocna Sibiului Gaan/Gyan/, son of Alard, attacked the Bishopric of Alba Iulia, which was undefended at the time. On the other hand, the count of Ocna Sibiului was running his own personal vendetta against Bishop Peter Monoszló, whom he held responsible for the assassination of his father.53—The city residents sought refuge inside the cathedral, but the assailants did not hesitate to attack it, rob it and then set it on fire. According to the contemporary sources, the number of Hungarians who were burned alive inside the cathedral, after the Mongol custom (usus tartarica), was nearly 2,000. Among the victims of the Saxon fury were four archdeans of Transylvania (including Agabitus of Alba, Michaelis of Ozd and Bartholomeus of Kukullu/Târnava), eight canons (including the chapter’s plebanian, Racha) and numerous other priests and clerics. The cult objects of the cathedral, together with numerous other valuables (plateis, calices, libros, cruces, vasa, sigilla capituli, indumenta sacerdotalia et omnia ornamenta ipsius ecclesiae) were desecrated and robbed. The Saxon offensive did not stop with the attack against the city of Alba Iulia. Shortly after, the rebellion engulfed entire Transylvania and resulted into much crime, destruction and robbery for the episcopal property and the estates of the canons who survived the Reminiscere massacre.54 The list of episcopal properties destroyed or 52  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 260–262; Remig Békefi, A káptalani iskolák története Magyarországon 1540-ig (Budapest: MTA, 1910), 160. Scholars haven’t reached an agreement regarding the date of this event. Gyula Krisztó, Csák Máté (Budapest: Gondolat, 1986), 48: places the even in the summer of 1276. Szücs, Az utolsó Árpádok, 288: mentiones the event in the year 1275. Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 227: considers that the event took place in March 1276. 53  DIR III. 114–115; ZW 255–256; Acta Gentilis, 208–210. 54  Jakó 351.

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depopulated (not part of the trial iniated by the voivode due to the intervention of Peter Monoszló in 1282)55 included estates in the counties of Alba (Sard/ Sard) and Turda (Sancraiu/villa Sancti Regis), but also numerous estates in Cluj county (Cluj/Clus,56 Gilău/Gylo, Capus/Kopus and Izvorul Crişului/Keresfev). The list included, also, two estates in Northeast Transylvania, Herina/Herena and Domneşti/Bylok, indicating that the Saxons in the Bistriţa area joined the Sibiu rioters. The destruction affected both royal, the part of Alba Iulia that was still under royal rule, and noble properties belonging to the ruling kindred. The atrocities inflicted upon the Alba Iulia cathedral were the counteraction to the devastation of the Veszprém cathedral, which had occurred a few months before. At the same time, their campaign was rejecting the Csáks’ policy of restraining the Saxon liberties and their candidate to the Archbishopric of Esztergom, Nicholas Kán. Thus, the Saxon rebellion was not the spontaneous reaction of an angry mob against episcopal abuse. Moreover, the actions taken by the Saxons were coordinated by the enemies of the Csáks from the counties from the eastern and northern regions of the kingdom. The other protagonists of these events were Roland, son of Mark, who led the rebellion in the Zips county, and the former voivode of Transylvania, Nicholas Geregye. From the time of Stephen V after the 1272 turmoil, the nobleman Roland, son of Mark, ruled over vast properties and exerted a remarkable influence over the Zips county.57 Even though he was associated to the Kőszegi group and a witness in the royal documents from 1274, the victory of the Csáks, in 1274, did not affect his position initially.58 On the contrary, the Csáks apparently tried to win him over. In April 1275, his kindred received several donations, and the ones given to Roland personally were located in the town of Zips.59 Despite the Csáks’ attempts to befriend him, Roland became one of the main supporters of the Kőszegs’ return to power in June 1275. Consequently, he was rewarded with the office of count of Vasvár,60 which did not affect the positions of his kindred in the Zips county.61 In this case, Roland became one of the political victims of the Csák’s restoration (December 1275). The reference made in January 9, 1276, regarding a certain magister Gregorius, Scepus count,62 55  DIR II. 239–240, ZW 142–143, Jakó 391. 56  See also Ştefan Pascu, Voivodatul Transilvaniei, vol. I (Cluj: Dacia, 1972), 177. 57  RA 2333, 2510, 2518, 2599, 2650. 58  Comite Scepusiensis in May 21st, 1275; doesn’t appear on ther list of witnesses: RA 2599. 59  RA 2596, CD V/2. 238. 60  RA 2604–2623. 61  September, 27th, 1275, he is mentioned as count of Zips: RA 2650. 62  RA 2687. Pressumably Roland’s future ally in the 1277 rebellion.

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indicates the Csák’s immediate replacement of a man who was beyond any doubt hostile to them. No surprise then that in 1277, more than a year since his falling into disgrace, Roland was one of the protagonists of the rebellion that brought the Kőszegi kindred to power. He initiated this action in cooperation with the Geregye kindred,63 whose leader, former voivode Nicholas, had also held, between June and December 1275, the position of royal court judge. After the Csáks’ victory, he retreated to his vast estates in Bihor, which were protected by a defense system that included fortresses like Adrian, Solyomkő or Palota.64 In this region, the Geregye kindred could rely on the services of a number of affiliate noblemen families, including Kata, Mykula and Kany. The upheaval of Csáks’ opponents in northeastern counties included, according to the royal diploma of 1285, “our estate Zips together with Gylnuchbana and the land of Nyr, beyond Tisza all the way to Transylvania”,65 and culminated with the bloody rebellion of the Saxons, a severe blow to the Csáks’ domination over the kingdom. The Csák kindred’s temporary lack of reaction was primarily due to the insufficient forces which made it impossibility to deal with the complex challenges they were facing. Indeed, the Eastern insurrection was just a part of a greater plan. The context favored a new rise of the Kőszegs and their main supporter, Ottokar II of Bohemia. It was also correlated with a rebellion in the Maritime Provinces, which expressed their support to the grandson of King Andrew II (also favored by the Venetians), as successor at the Hungarian crown. In 1277, the Csáks engaged their forces against the Western objectives, deemed a priority. Due to the fierce resistance they encountered at the Moravian border, where the Csáks benefited from strong positions, the conflict with Bohemia was limited to small raids and ended in minor skirmishes.66 On the other hand, the Slavonian campaign in support of future king Andrew III required the presence of Palatine Peter Csák, who managed to crush the enemy and reinstate control.67 Regardless of these minor successes, the Csáks’ party was met with serious difficulties in keeping the situation under control. Their main advantage was the fact that they managed to maintain the control of the capital and the royal court. In the attempt to convince the noblemen to support him, King Ladislas IV, at an age which enabled him to legitimately take over 63  RA 2785, 2900; CD V/2. 248. 64  Györffy I 591, 661–662, 650. 65  terram nostram Scepusiensem, unacum Gylnuchbana et terram Nyr ultra partem de Tyzael usque ad partem Transsilvanam: DIR II. 271–273; Jakó 406. 66  RA 2813. 67  RA 2785, 2803.

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the prerogatives of sovereignty, presided, in May 23–30, 1277, a general assembly on the Rákos plain. In this context, Peter Csák gave the office of palatine to Dionysius Péc and invested Nicholas Pok as voivode of Transylvania,68 a function he would not be able to exert. In spite of their attempt to associate with certain powerful families, the crisis committee still dominated by the Csák and Kán families could not issue claims to the domination of the kingdom’s political life. In fact, in the summer of 1278, following pressure from the pope, the Csáks were again abandoned by their temporary allies and were having a hard time finding new ones. 4.4

The Aristocratic Triumvirate of 1278: The Domination of the Aba Kindred in Transylvania (1279–1282)

Chased away from Transylvania by the Saxon rebellion in February 1277 and at the same time faced with the serious external threat posed by the Bohemian King Ottokar II Přemysl, the Csáks were forced to give up on some of their political ambitions and expressed willingness to share the government of the kingdom with the new leader of the Gutkeleds and renegotiate their older alliance with the Aba kindreds. The alliance between the Csáks and Ban Stephen Gutkeled, leader of his kindred after the death of his brother (1277), was concluded in June 19, 1278. Fortunately enough, the information regarding this alliance is available in contemporary documents. Issued under the warranty of King Ladislas, Queen Elisabeth and the bishops close to the Csák party, the document stipulated the restitution to Stephen Gutkeled of all the properties formerly belonging to Ban Joachim (including Haţeg and Mehadia) and also his promotion to royal court judge and count, with an annual stipend (stipendio) of 1,000 silver marks.69 Pressumably in this interval the Csák kindred renewed the alliance with the Aba kindred, whose new military leader, the future Palatine Fyntha, already won his first victory against the Zips county rebels.70 Aware of their own incapacity to resolve the situation in Transylvania, the Csáks ceded the province to their allies, which assumed the hard task of bringing it under control. The primary emergency faced by this aristocratic triumvirate was at that time the Bohemian campaign run by King Ladislas in the service of Rudolf of Habsburg. This campaign was meant to eliminate one of the most important external 68  RA 2823, 2825. 69  CD V/2, 447–449; RA 2870; Jakó 359. 70  DIR II 271–273; HD 452–459.

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supporters of the political intrigues that upset the political life of Hungary, during the 8th decade. As a matter of fact, the Hungarian Army victorious at Dürnkrut (Marchfeld) against Ottokar II consisted of three distinct forces: the king’s Cumans, the private armies of the Csáks and Gutkeleds,71 and the men in the service of the Aba kindred. Even though the sole benefit for Hungary was the elimination of a dangerous opponent,72 the great victory of Marchfeld (August 26, 1278) was a turning point in the evolution of the internal conflict. Lacking support from Bohemia, the Kőszegi kindred was forced to abandon the battle for power. Under these circumstances, the defeat of the eastern strongholds was just a matter of time. The most important role in their annihilation was played by the Aba kindred, which also received support from local elements trying to make a name for themselves. Thus, while the forces of the Aba kindred were engaged in crushing the rebellion in the Northeastern counties during the Moravian campaign, most likely acting in the Nyr region and near Transylvania, the operations in the Bihor area, against the Geregyes, gathered a vast local coalition probably run by Bishop Lodomerius. Still, the most important role was played by his close allies, noblemen members of the Borsa kindred. Due to the fierce resistance of Nicholas Geregye and his allies, the operations in this region lasted longer than planned, until late in the fall of the year 1278.73 Also, some of the strongholds of the rebels were defended until well into the next year.74 In the end the Geregye kindred was completely annihilated and its estates were divided among the winners: the Borşa and Gutkeled kindreds and the Bishopric of Oradea. Immediately after, in the winter of 1278–1279, the reunited forces of the winners from various battle fronts in the northeast, reinforced with local Transylvanian elements and led by the Aba kindred, started the assault against the Saxons in the Sibiu province, led by the nobleman Gaan

71  A. Küsternig, “Probleme um die Kämpfe zwischen Rudolf und Ottokar und die Schlacht bei Dürnkrut am 26. August 1278,” in Jahrbuch des Vereins für Landeskunde 44–45 (1978– 1979): 226–311; A. Pálóczi-Horváth, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians, 70–73. 72  Simonis de Keza considers this victory to be the solution found by young King Ladislas to the older enmity between Ottokar II and his father: Chronicon Hungaricum, in IIR IV, 57–58. 73  On September, 1st, 1278, the hostilities in Bihor were in full swing. Also, according to a document from June, 19th, among the newest enemies of the Geregye kindred was Péter, son of Durugh from the Gutkeled kindred: DIR 195–196. 74  By January, 30th, 1279, Nicholas Geregye and his brother Gregen were already defeated, but their vassal Thoma de Kány continued resisting in the Palota fortress: DIR 201–203; Wenzel XII. 250–253.

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(Gyan), son of Alard.75 Even though the bloody reprisals led by Fyntha, Peter and Amadé Aba ended probably in the late winter of 1279, the Aba kindred members had already assumed Transylvania’s most important offices making it their new realm as early as January 1279. Thus, Fyntha Aba, son of David, was the new voivode of Transylvania and count of Solnoc, Peter Aba became magister agasonum and count of Sibiu and Lawrence Aba, the son of former voivode Lawrence was the new Ban of Severin.76 Unlike the Csák regime, the Aba domination of Transylvania became a family business. After the 1278 agreement, the Aba kindred felt entitled to administer the province through its political clientele and with whatever methods they deemed fit. At the same time, Fyntha Aba never intended to become a perpetual voivode. Furthermore, he never expressed any intent to reinstate the duchy, even though the members of his kindred already controlled all the important institutions: the province itself, the Sibiu province, and the Banate of Severin. On the contrary, in the brief period as voivode (1279–1280),77 Fyntha Aba, together with the other prominent members of his kindred,78 did not seem to seek to exploit the province to the maximum in order to gain the necessary resources to eliminate the Csák and Gutkeled kindreds, who were still their main political rivals. In May 1279, Lawrence Aba sold the Transylvanian possession of Chintelnic79 to count Hench of Rodna for a staggering 150 silver marks. Other possessions that voivode Lawrence had obtained in unclear circumstances in the counties of Dăbâca and Solnoc shared the same fate.80 75  It is of utmost certainty that this campaign against the Saxons only started after the end of the one in Bihor. A certain count Nicholas, Nyr nobleman, who had coordinated the Adrian fortress siege, owned by Nicholas Geregye and his brothers, died in the war of Transylvania against Gyan, the son of Alard (CD V/3. 258–261; DIR II 254–255). Regarding the participation in this campaign of certain Borsod fortress serfs, see: Wenzel, IX 330– 331, and DIR II 242. The event is mentioned after the Bohemian campaign. One of the Transylvanian nobles who perished in this expedition was count Andreas of Gyogh (Geoagiul de Sus / Stremţ): DIR II 228. 76  Wenzel, XII, 250; RA 2942; DIR II 201. 77  Documentary evidence between January, 30th, 1279 (RA 2942) and July, 19th, 1280 (RA 3056). 78  Lawrence Aba, was Ban of Severin between January and August 1279: RA 2942–2985. Peter Aba, was count of Sibiu from January to March, 1279: RA 2942, 2946. In 1279 the office received by voivode Fyntha’s younger brother, Amadé (Omodeus) Aba, who held still in office in 1280: RA 3019, DIR II 227. 79  Kendteluk: ZW 136–137; CD V/2, 547–548; DIR II 204; Jakó 366. 80  Sofalua, Zereth, Monyoros, Arukalia (Dăbâca county), Kuzepfolua (Solnoc county), see: Jakó 194.

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This liquidation of the kindred’s businesses in Transylvania indicated that the leaders only wanted to throw the financial resources obtained in Transylvania in the battle for political power. According to the sources, the expedition organized by magister Georgius Baksa, another prominent member of the Abas’ political suite, against the Wallachian voivode Litovoi, shared a similar purpose. Organized in the first months of the year 1279, in parallel with the war against the Saxons in Transylvania, the expedition against Litovoi set off from the Banate of Severin, where Georgius Baksa was the locum tenens of Lawrence Aba. The military campaign was an undisputed success and it ended with the death of the Wallachian voivode and the capturing of his brother and successor, Barbat. Still, this victory was insufficiently exploited by the winners, who only looted of a great amount of money from the defeated.81 On the other hand, this large sum of money was what the Aba kindred and their treasury needed most. A major step in gaining additional political power was made at the end of the summer of 1279, when the considerable wealth accumulated by Lawrence Aba smoothened his way to becoming the treasurer of the kingdom (magister tavernicorum).82 It was the first political victory in the competition with the most important rival kindred, with the previous holder of the office being Ugrinus Csák. This change also marked the end of the costly political alliance with Stephen Gutkeled, who on this occasion was relieved from being a royal court judge and cashing in his generous stipend.83 At the same time, Lodomerius, the Bishop of Oradea, and allied of the Aba kindred in the confrontation with Nicholas Geregye and also a last minute opponent of the Csáks who had prevented him from occupying the archbishop see for a whole year became the Archbishop of Esztergom.84 These two moves could only have occurred with the support of the papal legate Philip de Fermo, whose interference in Hungary’s political life played a major role in changing the force

81  super quem nos non modicam quantitatem pecunie fecimus extorquere, et sic per eiusdem magistri Georgii servitium tributum nostrum in partibus eisdem nobis fuit restauratum: Jakó 406. 82  RA 3019: the second half of 1279. 83  In July–August, 1279, was last mentioned as royal court judge: RA 2985. In 1280, after a long vacancy, the position was taken by Peter Aba: RA 3056. 84  In January–March, 1279, the episcopal see was vacant: RA 2942, 2946. During this period of time the crisis between the king and the papal legate deepens. Also the candidature of Nicholas Kán, Queen Elisabeth’s favorite and a Csák sympathiser adds to the crisis. In the summer of 1279, after the death of his opponent, Lodomerius receives the interim of the archbishopric (RA 2981), that was finally confirmed the next year (RA 3056).

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ratio among the internal groups and undoubtedly in triggering the great crises 1279–1282.85 The complete takeover of power by the Aba party only occurred in the last months of 1280, at the end of a new stage of the civil war. The opponents of the Abas were Stephen Gutkeled, Akon Geregye and most likely Peter and Matthew Csák. After the victory, Fyntha Aba (now a palatine) and Lawrence became the most powerful men of 1281, the sole holders of a political power they were all too reluctant to share.86 To keep direct control over Transylvania, they entrusted the voivode position to trustworthy allies. Thus, in 1280, the position was held by Stephen, the son of count Tekus of Mera,87 originating from the Abaújvár county.88 Furthermore, he had a vast experience gained as: maior plaustrorum and Count of Patak (1273–1275),89 count of Torna (1277)90 and, in 1279, Ban of Kulchou (Kulcsó).91 His rise was strictly conditioned by the services he brought to the Aba kindred and his authority was exerted only in the area where the Abas prevailed. Despite owning, in 1273, a number of properties in Borsod county,92 Stephen of Mera did not enjoy the political, economic or social power of a voivode, which he received solely for being close the ruling kindred. Later that year (1280), the voivodal position was handed over to a certain Peter (Peters/Péter), son to Dominic,93 a hardly identifiable character, most certainly a member of the same kindred. The complete domination of the Aba kindred, which, besides opposing all other political groups, had brought along severe restrictions to royal prerogatives, reached an end in 1281–1282, when King Ladislas, at the head of a large coalition made of the main aristocratic families, laid siege to former Palatine

85  For the most recent analysis of Philip de Fermo’s activity, run from the perspective of the papal policy towards the central-European space, see Turcuş, Sfântul Scaun, 121–127; idem, Sinodul general de la Buda (1279) (The general synod of Buda—1279), Cluj-Napoca, 2001, 41–46. 86  In a document in 1281, Fyntha and Lawrence Aba are the only ones to appear in the list of royal dignitaries—RA 3113, with text. (Laurentio magistro tawarnicorum nostrorum, Phinta palatino et aliis quampluribus comitatus regni tenentibus et honores). 87  Stephanus/Stephen: DIR II 224–225; Antal Szataráy, Grof Sztáray család oklevéltára, ed. Gyula Nagy, vol. 1 (Budapest: [give publisher], 1887), 24. 88  Györffy, I 78, 109, 118. 89  maior plaustrorum domini regis (in charge with the royal carts): RA 2415, 2676. 90  RA 2798–2800. 91  RA 3019: December 1279. 92  RA 2415. 93  RA 3059–3060.

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Fyntha’s fortresses of Zelench (Slanec) and Patak.94 The campaign eliminated Fyntha Aba from Hungary’s political life. What followed was the instauration, for a brief period (approximately 1282–1287), of a system of governance ruled by the king and based on a balance among the aristocratic parties. Despite the fact that other members of the kindred distanced themselves from Palatine Fyntha’s rebellion, the Aba kindred was distrusted by the king for a while. The only one who would succeed in receiving the royal grace during King Ladislas IV’s reign was Lawrence Aba.95

94  To date this campaign see: Atilla Zsoldos, “Téténytõl a Hód-tóig (Az 1279 és 1282 közötti politikatörténetének vázlata)”, in TSzl 1 (1997): 69–98. 95  Magister tavernicorum and count of Saros from January to September, 1285: RA 3348–3385.

CHAPTER 5

Regnum Transilvanum: The Rise of the Congregational Regime 5.1

The Voivode Roland Borsa

The noblemen of the Borsa kindred, after defeating the sons of Nicholas Geregye, became the true rulers of the counties between Tisza, Mureş and the Transylvanian borders. Still, they were not members of the old Hungarian aristocracy.1 Until around 1280, none of the members of the kindred held any significant political office. Furthermore, after being defeated in the rebellion against Charles Robert, in 1320, the Borsas were almost completely eliminated from the foreground of medieval Hungary’s political life. This might be due to the fact that the roots of the Borsa kindred were not of Hungarian origin. The family probably belonged to the ruling elite who controlled the area prior to the Hungarian conquest or they may have been connected to the companions of Magyar conquerors, who came here around 900.2 Still, the older of the two most important branches of the Borsa kindred was the one in Transylvania, whose properties developed from the nucleus located in the Valleys of the Borsa and Lona, in Dăbâca county. The dispersion and fragmentation of these

1  Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 144. See also Karácsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek, 226–233, 290–293. 2  The attempts to clarify the ethnic origins of this family had been steril. For Slavo-Romanian origins see: Nicolae Drăganu, Românii din secolele IX–XIV pe baza toponimiei and onomasticei (Bucharest: Imprimeria Naţională, 1933), 390, 510; Ioan Pătrut, Onomastica românească (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1980), 25. For Cuman origins see: Nicolae Iorga, Histoire des Roumains, III (Bucharest: Imprimeria Naţională, 1937), 241; Ioan Lupaş, “Voievodatul Transilvaniei în sec. XII şi XIII,” Studii, conferinţe şi comunicări istorice II (1930): 19. For the Kabar or Khazar origins see: György Györffy, Az Árpád-kori Magyarország történeti földrajza, (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1963), 1: 496, 573. For Hungarian origins see: István Kniezsa, Keletmagyarország helynevei I (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1943), 227, 235; László Makkai and András Mócsy, ed., Erdély története I (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1987), 262– 263; questioned by Radu Popa and Nicolae Chidioşan and Antal Lukács, “O reşedinţă feudală din secolele XI–XII la Sânnicolau de Beiuş. Contribuţii la istoria Bihorului medieval” in RMM. MIA 2 (1984): 23. Radu Popa, Țara Maramureşului în veacul al XIV-lea (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1970), 24: argues that the origin of the Borşa name might be the pre-Roman.

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estates3 indicates the repetitive successions throughout several generations. In 1306, during a confrontation with the members of the Kökényes-Radnót kindred over the ownership of Pâglişa (Puklustheluky), located in the immediate vicinity of the Dăbâca fortress, Ladislas Borsa claimed his ab antiquo rights, despite his recent failure to produce any written document as proof.4 Nonetheless, the nobiliary congregation of Transylvania considered his claims to be as rightful as those made by the sons of Ban Mykud. The dispute was won in a judicial duel by Ladislas Borsa’s representatives.5 As for the Bihor branch of the kindred, they gained, at an unspecified date, ownership of the property compactly populated by Romanians ethnics on the upper Crişul Negru River. Its nucleus lay, after all probabilities, in Sânnicolau de Beiuş, where archaeological research of 1971–1982 identified the remains of a nobleman’s residence dating back to the 11th century.6 Under the circumstances, the unusually rapid rise of the Bihor branch of the Borsa kindred to the highest political positions can only be explained by the favorable situation of the 1280s, due to the support the kindred of count Thomas benefited from two key characters of the time: Archbishop Lodomerius and King Ladislas IV. The indestructible alliance between the Borsa kindred and the Bishop of Oradea, Lodomerius, was the keystone in the victory against the Geregye kindred. Noteworthy is the fact that the nucleus of the Bihor properties owned by the Borsa kindred was located in the “land of Beiuş”, a region populated by Romanians. In the middle of the 13th century, the Bishopric of Oradea received, in these regions, major donations from the Magyar crown.7 After becoming Bishop of Oradea (1266), Lodomerius, one of Stephen V’s close allies, might have turned to the sons of count Thomas Borsa for support against Paul Geregye and his successors at the head of the opposing party. Borsa. After 1272, the Borsa brothers constructed the Şoimi fortress which, together with the Finiş episcopal fortress, were two of the most important strongholds against the domination of the Geregye kindred and their allies in Bihor. The victory over the Geregye kindred turned the sons of count Thomas into the main inheritors of the estates previously owned by the defeated. On the long run, these estates provided them with enough material resources to fuel their spectacular rise in the decades that followed. Together with the fortresses of Valcău and Piatra Şoimului, obtained on this occasion, 3  Makkai and Mócsy, Erdély története, 262–263; Karácsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek, 290–293. 4  József Pataki, Anjou királyaink és a két román vajdaság (Cluj: Kolozsvár: Nagy Jeno, 1944), 15–17. 5  Pataki, Anjou királyaink, 15–17. 6  Popa, Chidiosan, and Lukács, “O reşedinţă feudală”, 26–34. 7  Popa, Chidioşan, and Lukács, “O reşedinţă feudală”, 25.

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the Borsa brothers must have also gained possession of the royal fortress from Adrian.8 By extending their control over all these fortresses and estates, the Borsa kindred found itself in the possession of a vast, massive and compact domain. In addition, their military and economic resources made them one of the most powerful aristocratic families in the Kingdom of Hungary. Thus, it was an even more appealing target for the ambitious Lodomerius who, with support from Cardinal Philip of Fermo, managed to obtain, in 1279, the most important position in the ecclesiastic hierarchy, that of Archbishop of Esztergom. As a consequence, King Ladislas IV appreciated the support the Borsa kindred could provide in his attempt to overthrow the domination of the Aba kindred and to establish the much wanted calm amongst the aristocratic parties (1281– 1282). Even though, until 1278–1279 the Cumans offered the king the military support nedeed to preserve a certain independence from the aristocratic factions, after the measures taken against them (after pressures from the papal legate) they no longer stood by the king’s side. Consequently, all major political offices were seized by the Aba kindred. In order to defeat the Abas, Ladislas turned to the services of the Borsa kindred, which he provided with estates and privileges, and turned it from a petty noble kindred into a strong ally. Under the circumstances, Roland Borsa, the oldest son of count Thomas, was appointed voivode of Transylvania. The details of the campaign against the Aba kindred were probably decided in the winter of 1281–1282, when King Ladislas visited Oradea for Christmas.9 Roland was probably appointed shortly before the first official mentioning with the title of voivode (May 19, 1282). Under the circumstances, his appointment could not have coincided with his effective installation in a province still under the rule of the Aba kindred. Furthermore, his first assignment as voivode was to retake the province from the hands of the Abas. It is unclear whether Roland Borsa had the time to impose his authority over all the Transylvanian counties. Nevertheless, the only time when this could have happened was April and June 1282. During the same period of time, the Borsa brothers played a major role in the armed clashes against Akon Geregye in Bihor, the most important local ally of the Aba kindred.10 The dramatic events in the summer and fall of the same year left Roland Borsa little time to launch an expedition in Transylvania. In July–August 1282,11 the king set off on his great campaign against the fortresses of Szalánc and Patak, which must 8   Regarding the fortresses mentioned and the evolution of their status, see: Popa, Chidioşan, Lukács, “O reşedinţă feudală”, 22, 24; Györffy, Az Árpád-kori Magyarország, 593, 660–662. 9   Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 93. 10  DIR II 254–255; HD 447–448; Jakó 405. 11  For the chronology of the events see: Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 69–98.

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have required the presence of the army that the Borsa brothers held in Bihor. Unexpectedly, in the context of the raid against Fyntha Aba which seemed to reach its final stages, the Cumans started their great rebellion. To answer this new challenge King Ladislas headed southwards, engaging in the great battle of the Lake Hód.12 The subsequent victory was also due to Roland Borsa’ intervention.13 Despite the role played in the royal conspiracy against Fyntha Aba and his contribution to the victory against the Cumans, Roland Borsa could not be maintained voivode for long. In the light of the dramatic events of 1282, King Ladislas made another political choice for the voivode office. The lake Hód victory had been obtained by the king with help of all Hungarian aristocratic and noble factions. During the general congregation that followed, at Szeged, between October 24th and 16,14 the king tried to balance the influence of the parties, by making a series of concessions to the high aristocracy. Consequently, Matthew Csák was reinstated great palatine, Petér Aba became treasurer, and Petér Tétény the Ban of Slavonia.15 These concessions represented a postponing of King Ladislas’ intentions to impose a governing regime based exclusively on his supporters. In this governing system, the Borsa brothers would have pressumably occupied important positions. However, at Szeged, Roland Borsa was not able to overcome his low origins and the alliance with the royal faction. Subsequently he was rejected by the old aristocracy and sacrificed in the name of the governing system. Furthermore, Apor (Opour) of the Peć kindred, representative of the old aristocracy, was appointed voivode. Even though his estates were located mainly in western Hungary, Apor Peć was also one of the protagonists of the military confrontations of his time. Also, his brother Gregory was one of the participants to the Balkan expeditions led by Stephen V.16 Apor Peć was voivode throughout 1283 and the first part of 1284. Still, there is little information available regarding his activity.17 Most likely he exerted his office mostly from outside the province. Also, he merely instituted an 12  According to Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 93–96: sometime between September, 17th and the October, 21st, 1282. 13  Chronicon pictum, 97–98: “Lorandus filius Thome, miles strenuus contra Cumanos lanceavit cum impetu virtutis sue, et laudabiliter percussit plurimos et prostravit”. 14  congregatio regni nostri: Szücs, Az utolsó Arpádok, 312. 15  KMTL 475, 650, 662. 16  CD V/3 157–158. 17  The confirmation, in 1283, of the privilege granted by Ladislas IV to the Dej colonists is the only internal document known from his reign, see: DIR II 244; Jakó 401.

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exploitation regime to the benefit of the Hungarian aristocracy. With no properties in Transylvania, the Peć kindred never demonstrated any interest in this province. On the other hand, his allies, the Rátót kindred, took advantage of the political anarchy and managed to extend their control (for a short period of time) over the vast royal estates of Ciceu (Chycho) and Reteag (Rethteg), in Solnoc county.18 The political alliance that imposed Apor Peć as voivode broke apart after the death of Matthew Csák (1284). Thus the governing system was challenged by the Heder kindred, against whom King Ladislas led a military expedition in early 1284.19 The subsequent failure of the campaign, the political crisis in the kingdom and the rising political influence of Archbishop Lodomerius determined the king to institute a new form of government with the the Heder (Nicholas Kőszegi—palatine, Ivan Kőszegi—ban of Slavonia20) and Aba kindreds (Amadé—royal court judge, Lawrence—treasurer21) holding the main offices (summer of 1284). Also, two of the Borsa kindred members were finally granted important positions. Thus, while Roland Borsa was reinstated voivode of Transylvania and count of Solnoc, his brother Jacob (Kopasz) became Great Count (magister agasonum) and count of Borsod.22 It was in this formula, which lasted until 1286, that Roland Borsa’s control over Transylvania was truly effective. Still, on August 1, 1284, despite becoming voivode, Roland Borsa presided, next to the Bishop of Oradea, a congregation of noblemen in the Bihor county with the purpose of reforming the customs system.23 He was mentioned in Transylvania in December 21, 1284, when while in Dej, he acknowledged the rights given to the colonists in this locality in the royal privilege of 1279.24 This document had also been confirmed a year before, by voivode Apor Peć. However, less than a month later, Roland Borsa was forced to suspend his political and administrative activities and deal with the military threat possed by the Mongol invasion led by Nogai and Tula Buga.

18  DIR II 245–246; HD 446. The document is a historic fake, but must also present some acurate information, see: Jakó 402. 19  During January–February: Kosztolnyik, Thirteenth Century, 290. 20  KMTL 475, 650. 21  KMTL 512, 662. 22  DIR II 254–255; RA 3348. 23  DIR II 261–262. 24  DIR II 267–268; ZW 146–147.

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135

The Mongol Invasion of 1285

The Mongol invasion of 1285 was most likely a direct consequence of the Cuman rebellion of 1282.25 Chased away from Hungary by King Ladislas “beyond the mountains, to the Tartar borders, where none of his predecessors trespassed”,26 the Cumans offered their services to Nogai, the Mongol khan of the Lower Danube. With the new military force under his command, Nogai decided to start a vast campaign against an apparently weak kingdom.27 As his grandfather (Bela IV) before him, Ladislas the Cuman was considered responsible by some noblemen for provoking the invasion, due to his connections to the Cumans. Furthermore, in the years to come, some even accused Ladislas of having invited the invaders himself.28 The invasion of 1285 seems to have followed the routes taken by Batu and Kadan, four decades earlier. Thus, while Tula Buga, accompanied by the Russian knezes and Lithuanian troops, stormed into Hungary most likely through the Verecke Pass,29 a second Mongol army commanded by Nogai crossed the Carpathians in the Braşov area and entered Transylvania.30 Most likely, there was a third army following the route taken by Kadan in 1241 to the center of the kingdom. This would explain the Mongol damage inflicted on Bistriţa and Northern Transylvania. In order to ensure the element of surprise, the invasion started in the dead of winter, in the middle of January.31 This explains the Mongols’ cumbersome

25  Petru Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare asupra Transilvaniei în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIII-lea,” AIIACluj XVII (1974): 212–223; V. Spinei, Moldavia, 170–171; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 123–124, 161. 26  de finibus et terminis Tartarorum quos nemo praedecessorum nostrorum peragraverat, ultra Alpes—CD V/3. 410; DIR II 292–293. 27  A significant number of reliable sources blame the Cumans for the invasion: Chronicon Pictum Vindobonense, Chronicon Posoniense, Chronicon Varadinense, Anonymi Leobiensis, Chronicon Austriacum, Miechovius—Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis. See also: Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare,” 214, n. 13. 28  Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 109. 29  Spinei, Moldavia, 122; Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare,” 215. 30  Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare,” 219; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 191. The reconstitution of Nogai’s route is based on the information gathered in the Chronicle of Ipatiev. See also: Antal Hodinka, Az orosz évkönyvek magyar vonatkozásai (Budapest: A. M. Tud. Akadémia kiadása, 1916) 450. 31  According to Matthias Miechovius, the Mongols devastated Hungary: ab octavo epiphaniarum [January, 13th] usque ad festum Paschae [March, 25th]. Gombos, Catalogus, 1610.

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crossing of the Carpathians and the unfavorable weather they had to face during their operations in Transylvania.32 The invasion made it impossible for King Ladislas to summon enough forces to engage in a decisive confrontation with the invaders. Much needed help came from the noblemens’ powerful armed forces. Due to the anarchy in the kingdom and the barons’ custom of solving their differences through violence, the local armies were remarkably swift and also well trained. The army corps led by Roland Borsa, Amadé Aba, Georgius Baksa, Peter of Sáros, and other noblemen in the East managed to disperse a great number of their troops and to release most prisoners taken by the Mongols.33 Thus, even though the invaders arrived in Pest in the first part of their campaign,34 the destruction they caused in central and Northern Hungary was not irreparable. In Transylvania, the areas most affected were in the North, which indicates that one of the invading army used this route leading to the center of Hungary. Thus, the invasion of 1285 affected Bistriţa,35 Ocna Dejului,36 Cluj-Mănăştur,37 Turda and Ocnele Turzii,38 Rimetea Trascăului.39 Despite the relatively significant number of references, the Mongols’ devastation was not catastrophic, and the resistance they faced must have been particularly fierce. The new types of fortifications constructed in the second half of the 13th century, which had proven their resistance during the numerous civil wars and local conflicts after 1262, stood strong before the Mongols. Thus, the Trascău fortress, defended by the Székelys in the Arieş region, resisted all assaults.40 Moreover, by organizing an ambush against the Mongols, the Székelys managed to free more than one thousand men from captivity.41 The only fortress which we are certain the Mongols conquered and destroyed was that of Ban Mykud, in the Arieş Valley. Still, this fortress was the former royal stronghold of Turda42 and the improvements made by the new landlord proved insufficient. On the other 32  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 191. 33  Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare,” 216–217. 34  SRH I 213; SRH II 44, 472. 35  DIR II 279; ZW 149–150. 36  DIR II 354–355; ZW 169–170. 37  Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare,” 218. 38  DIR II 376–377; ZW 181–182. 39  DIR II 377–379; ZW 182–184. 40  DIR II 312–314; CD V/3 452–454: “castro Thuruczkou se viriliter obiecerunt, et contra eosdem Tartaros laudabiliter dimicarunt”. 41  DIR II 312–314; CD V/3 452–454. 42  Iambor, “În legătură cu localizarea cetaţii Sânmiclăuş (Turda),” ActaMN XIV (1977): 309–313.

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hand, according to direct or indirect data available, none of the new generation fortress was conquered by the Mongols. Furthermore, in the Southern and Eastern areas of Transylvania, the Székelys, the Romanians and the Saxons successfully blocked the invasion in its initial phase.43 During the Mongol retreat, taking advantage of the whimsical spring, the local armies inflicted a series of hard blows to the Mongol army.44 Thus, with the advantage of the nobility’s excellent mobilization and the Transylvanians’ remarkable reactivity, the Mongol retreat turned into a disaster for the invaders. In comparison with the disaster caused in the Hungarian kingdom by the great invasion of 1241–1242, the long term consequences of the 1285 invasion were minor. There are no records of deserted or devastated localities in 1285, temporary cease of activity of major economic centers, famine, or depopulation. The state institutions, secular or ecclesiastic, were able to function normally in this period of time. There were no disappearances recorded among the royal dignitaries or clerks, the members of major aristocratic or the aristocratic families. Also, the Mongols were not as successful at conquering fortresses or piercing through fortifications. Furthermore, during the invasion of 1285, they were not the ambushers, but very frequently the ambushed. Constantly harassed by the local forces, the Mongols hastly retreated before the army that King Ladislas amassed on the Western bank of the Danube. Under the circumstances, the theory that this retreat was for Nogai a political success45 Nogai can be disputable. In reality, the invasion of 1285 was for the Mongols mostly a failure that could have easily turned into a catastrophe.46 Even though according to Salimbene, Nogai retreated after signing a “peace” with King Ladislas,47 the invasion of January-March 1285 was the Mongols’ last great invasion of Hungary and the last threat possed to Hungary’s integrity. The indecisive result of this confrontation, together with King Ladislas’ inability to speculate Nogai’s retreat in his external policy, enabled the Mongols to 43  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 261; Knauz, Monumenta Ecclesiae Strigoniensis, 419: “Siculi, Olahi et Saxones omnes vias ipsorum cum indaginibus stipaverunt sive giraverunt”. 44  Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare”, 219 (indicating the sources); Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 191. 45  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 191; V. Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea, 256—for whom, after the 1285 invasion, King Ladislas the Cuman had become “Noghai puppet king of Hungary” is undoubtedly far fetched. 46  According to Spinei, Moldavia, 122: “a demi-failure for the Mongols / . . . / who no longer ventured to organize such vast campaigns against Transylvania and Hungary and confined themselves to mere raids and pillaging along the frontier lines.” 47  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 192.

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consolidate their domination in the Balkans and the Outer Carpathian territories. After this date, however, both sides showed extreme caution in trespassing each other’s territories, in order to avoid any large scale attack. The 1285 invasion was undoubtedly a personal failure for King Ladislas, who did not succeed in playing a decisive role in a moment of major importance for his kingdom. He did not manage to turn Nogai’s havoc into a personal victory, and failed to amass all the armed forced of the barons and the noblemen under the royal banner, as he did at Marchfeld and Lake Hód. The king’s passiveness before Nogai’s invasion shadowed the positive spirit he initiated with the Tétény assembly and the battle of Marchfeld. Moreover, it was during his time that the Arpadian dynasty started its decline. At the same time, the event of 1285 was a major success for the local political forces and the promoters of regional particularity. After proving their military skills, the efficiency of their fortifications and their armed forces, their capability to ensure the security of their subjects (to a greater extent than the king or his dignitaries did), various local elites expanded their net of supporters and deemed themselves entitled to rule large regions of the kingdom. Thus, the events in the winter-spring of the year 1285 constituted a powerful momentum in consolidating the aristocratic “principalities”, and stimulating the accumulation of the regional political power in the hands of those who held the actual military power. 5.3

Ladislas the Cuman and Transylvania

The invasion of 1285 brought to light the king’s lack of significant military resources and his incapacity to compensate for those shortcomings through political skills. The Mongol threat was removed with the intervention of the aristocracy and armed communities supported by the fortresses of the nobility and with almost no help from the king. Consequently, what was left of the prestige of the king was rapidly dimishing, and eventually was lowered to the level of the resources he possessed. Under the circumstances, in parallel with appeals to the Cumans to return under his command, the king saw himself forced to identify a sufficiently stable base that would provide him with an alternative to the eternal dichotomy between the various noblemen factions that he was unable to control. This base could not come from the counties in Northern Hungary or from those across the Danube, which were now under the control of aristocratic families like the Aba, Csák or Heder. Also he could not rely on Slavonia or the Maritime Provinces (Croatia and Dalmatia), where the nobility, influenced by the papal

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propaganda and the peninsular policy, were already in favor of the Naples branch of the Anjou family as successors.48 Therefore, the only option for Ladislas was the nobility from the East of the Tisza River, where no kindred strong enough to join the “oligarchy” had emerged until the 1280s. In the decades after the great Mongol invasion, these regions were forced to accept the domination of aristocratic families from the center and the Western part of the kingdom. The king could only benefit from these loyal keepers of the old Arpadian regulations. Also, this nobility was relatively homogenous, with few social and economic inequalities, and reluctant to the domination of elites from other parts of the kingdom. Moreover, after the political events of 1272–1280, Transylvania, with its outstanding human and material resources, showed potential in becoming a decisive factor in the competition for the domination of the internal political arena, which King Ladislas could not avoid. Thus, Transylvania’s importance in court politics increased, as the king was faced with more difficulties in controlling the internal political development. Moreover, within two months after the Mongol retreat from Hungary, Transylvania was the first province to receive a royal visit. According to the available information, this was also Ladislas’ first visit to Transylvania as a king. The king’s trip to Transylvania was incredibly fast. Even though on May 8, 1285, Ladislas was still on the Csepel Island (Magna insula),49 by May 27, he was already in Alba Iulia.50 After approximately two weeks the king was back in Hortobagy (June, 13th),51 heading towards Zips, which he reached in the second half of July.52 Thus, the effective time spent by the king in Transylvania amounted to no more than two weeks, including the time spent visiting the inner province. The most important goal of this trip (which he made accompanied by voivode Roland Borsa)53 was the assessment of the Mongol destruction and the rewarding of the warriors who fought in the conflict.54 Moreover, this trip was the king’s attempt to wash away his passive approach to the invasion and to take some credit for the victory. This was a remarkable initiative, considering that we have no evidence that King Bela IV, his grandfather, set foot in Transylvania after the events of 1241–1242. 48  Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 110. 49  RA 3358. 50  RA 3361–3363. 51  Hurtubag, RA 3364. 52  RA 3372. 53  Jakó 410. 54  DIR II 273–274; Jakó 408.

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In the following years, the king’s presence to the East of Tisza started resembling a real exile. The formal reconciliation between Ladislas and Queen Isabella, a warranty of his return to Christian values, was put to the test with the deaths of Isabella’s father, Charles of Anjou, and Pope Martin IV (1285). The king reconnected with the Cumans, resumed the liaisons with his concubines and returned to the Cuman lifestyle, which determined the aristocracy of the kingdom to desert him for good. Consequently, Archbishop Lodomerius became the main decision maker in the kingdom. Having to choose between their two protectors, the Borsa kindred did not hesitate in manifesting their favors to Lodomerius, thus becoming adversaries of the king. Despite the royal attempt to reach a compromise at the Rákos congregation (June, 1286),55 peace could no longer be reinstated. In 1286–1287, the Heder kindred openly defied the king, joining Albert of Habsburg, whom his father, King Rudolf I of Germany, wanted to instate as king of Hungary. Giving the request for support from Pope Honorius IV and Archbishop Lodomerius56 to his personal advantage, Rudolf of Habsburg invaded the counties at the border with Austria.57 In this context and with the firm support of the Holy See, Archbishop Lodomerius did not hesitate to excommunicate the king in 1287. Desperate to find a solution to his political dilemma, Ladislas considered an unpopular and impossible alliance with Nogai.58 Looking for an alternative to this compromised reign, Lodomerius managed to gather an increasing number of nobles to endorse Andrew “The Venetian”, grandson of Andrew II, appointed duke of Slavonia, despite King Ladislas’s opposition. Between 1286 and 1290, the king frequently visited the eastern regions of his kingdom, where he wanted to create an internal base of supporters to enable him to turn the tables to his advantage. After the failure of the Rákos congregation, in 1286, he retreated to Kewe, where he was arrested in September 4 and kept in custody until the beginning of the next year.59 Furthermore, during the interval between the spring of 1287 and the next summer, the king made desperate attempts to regain his status and tried to intervene decisively in the rebellious counties located in the northern and western parts of the kingdom. In the fall of 1288, he found himself in a difficult position, which forced him to return to the safer regions. Thus, between September 23 and October 8, the

55  RA 3408–3412; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 292. 56  DIR II 281; HD 466. 57  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 292. 58  Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 109. 59  RA 3418.

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king was in Igriş,60 and on October 27, he was in Braşov,61 where he probably spent the winter. In June 1289, Ladislas summoned the congregation at Föveny, in a last attempt to reach a compromise with his adversaries. After failing again, he was forced to retreat eastward, where he remained, with two short interruptions, until his assassination.62 Ladislas’s persistence in building a base of local supporters overshadowed voivode Roland Borsa’s authority in Transylvania. Provoked by Lodomerius, Roland Borsa changed his allegiance, which determined the king to dismiss Roland and replace him with Moyus Ákos (around 1288). In this period of confusing events, the attitude of Bishop Peter Monoszló played a crucial role. The bishop had voivode Moyus and the “king’s brother-in-law”, Arbuz the Cuman, arrested,63 most likely in the spring of 1289. This was presumably a part of a larger conspiracy orchestrated by Lodomerius. His intention was to deprive Ladislas of his Transylvanian support and speed up the removal of a king considered dangerous by most. Peter Monoszló was eventually forced to change his atittude towards King Ladislas, due to his decision to annul all donations made to the bishopric during his reign (including the city of Cluj and much of Alba Iulia, among others). In addition, the king’s arduous efforts to gather more support had started to pay off. The generosity he showed, in this period of time, to the Bistriţa colonists (whose taxes were cut by a third)64 and the Ocna Dejului colonists (removed from the voivodal jurisdiction,65 and raised to the rank of royal city) as well as his efforts to attract on his side the Saxons from the province of Sibiu,66

60  RA 3506–3508. 61  RA 3509. 62  Kewe, September, 13th (RA 3532–3533); Berechte, November, 4th (RA 3536); iuxta villam Toty, November, 9th (RA 3537); Chanadini, December, 7th (RA 3538); iuxta Keressceg, December, 25th (RA 3539); prope Chegled, March, 5th–6th, 1290 (RA 3551–3552); Karansebus, April, 29th (RA 3553); Cheenk, May, 21st (RA 3555); Zekes, May, 27th–28th (RA 3557–3560); Chanad, June, 18th (RA 3561); Zorvosholm, June, 24th (RA 3562). 63  DIR II 311–312; ZW 162–163 (“cognatum nostrum”, could also have the generic meaning of “kin”). Jakó 450: considers the document to be a fake from the early 14th century, however, information on major political history events could be taken into account. 64  DIR II 306; ZW 149–150; Jakó 446 (July, 22nd, 1289). Reconfirmed on May, 27th, 1290: DIR II 322–323; ZW 166–167; Jakó 458. 65  DIR II 322, 504; ZW 166; Jakó 457 (May, 21st, 1290). 66  On October, 27th, 1288, Provost John (Johannes) of Sibiu was assigned as royal witness: DIR II 304–305; ZW 158–159; Jakó 440. Confirmed by the king’s presence in Braşov, the locality where the document was issued.

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worried archbishop Lodomerius. In the summer of 1288,67 Lodomerius wrote a letter to the inhabitants of Sibiu and Braşov, in which the king received various false accusations. The document probably reflected the threat of Ladislas’s increased notoriety in Transylvania and his successful propaganda. Furthermore, the Székelys located on the Arieş River received, in 1289, the confirmation of their privileges as a reward for their outstanding support given to the king. Royal generosity was also bestowed on numerous Transylvanian noblemen, who offered Ladislas the military power he needed. Thus, the military campaign led by the king against the rebellious nobility in the Zips county benefited from large support from the Transylvanian nobility, who were asked by Ladislas to testify in the matter of some property donations.68 The father of the beneficiary of this donation, Peter, son of Samson of Gerend (Luncani), was mentioned from 1288 as a royal witness,69 proving the solid support given by this Transylvanian noble family to King Ladislas. Another important noble family, the Geoagiul de Sus noblemen, received from the king, on October 19, 1289, a property that had been previously donated to the German settlers of Cricău by Stephen V.70 Thus, Ladislas was willing to make major concessions to keep his supporters close. Moreover, documents show that despite the excommunication pronounced by Lodomerius, the noblemen of Transylvania did not seem to have the intent to boycott the king. Thus, Ban Mykud, one of the important noblemen in Transylvania, did not hesitate to ask the king, in the spring of 1288, for the confirmation of a donation he had made to the Bishopric of Transylvania.71 Furthermore, the church of Transylvania, with the exception of the gap in early 1289, due mostly to Bishop Peter’s political ambitions, maintained cordial relation with the king. In this context, alongside the reconfirmations or enlargements of older donations,72 the king restituted, in 1288, to the Bishopric of Transylvania the tithes in Ugocsa county, seized by Beke Borsa.73 Undoubtedly, the massive military and material support received from Transylvania helped the king overcome the 1287–1288 crises and keep his hopes of strengthening his political position. Thus, his efforts to gain and maintain Transylvanian support explain the expansion, in the same period, of the congregational regime to Transylvania. 67  DIR II 296–299; Jakó 436. 68  DIR II 306–308; HO VI 341–342; Jakó 455. 69  DIR II 304–305; ZW 158–159. 70  DIR II 314–315; ZW 164–165; Jakó 453. 71  Jakó 435 (with text). See also DIR II 294–296; HD 470–472; Jakó 434. 72  See for example: DIR II 306, 309–310; Jakó 447, 448 (both from August, 1289). 73  DIR II 304–305; ZW 158–159.

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The Rise of the Congregational Regime

From the second quarter of the 13th century,74 the county nobility in Hungary’s transdanubian area attempted to obtain an increased level of self administration. Furthermore, congregations of noblemen coming from all over the kingdom were sporadically mentioned since 1267.75 Still, it was King Ladislas IV, aided by his political group that reinstated the noblemen’s congregations, the one who redefined their functions and turned them into a fundamental institution in the government system. The first general congregation was summoned in May 1277 at Rákos, at the initiative of barons and bishops close to the Csák party. On this occasion young Ladislas, age 15, was proclaimed in aetate legitima constitutus and declared his intention to take over the government.76 Bringing a temporary truce between the most important aristocratic factions, this assembly played a decisive role in the preparation of the great victory of Marchfeld (1278), which also fulfilled Ladislas’ personal vendetta against Ottokar II, his father’s archenemy. Through the congregational reform initiated on this occasion, Ladislas IV countered the exclusive control the aristocracy exerted over the internal political life and reestablished the royalty’s direct connection with the lower nobility. This monarchic ideology echoed in the work of the loyal Simon of Kéza, in the vision of whom the members of the noble “states” shared equal rights in the election of the political and military leaders and judges since the beginning of times. In addition, the famous political doctrine treaty of abbot Engelbert of Admont, De regimine principum, presented the same ideology and enjoyed broad circulation until the dawn of the modern era.77 Written in the last decade of the 13th century, the latter work portrayed an ideal past, providing the old Hungary as an example of regimen mixtum based on a harmonious colaboration between a powerful central authority and “most inhabitants” of the country,78 whose association to the act of government could not function in the absence of a parliamentary structure. In a context featuring such ideas, the king easily 74  Fügedi, The Elefánthy, 36–38; Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 120. 75  DIR II 92–94. 76  Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 108. 77  Molnár P., A Magyarországi kormányzat mint a regimen mixtum példája Admonti Engelbertnél (1290-es évek eleje) (The Hungarian kingdom as a regimen mixtum in the work of Engelbert of Admont (about 1290), in Századok, 133, 1/1999, 113–124. 78  ibidem, 117, 123: quale regimen dicitur aliquando fuisse in regno Hungariae, ubi rex solus kingbat, singula secundum rationem et dignitates et honores per Kingm distribuebantur, non secundum nobilitatem generis, sed secundum virtutem, qua se habebat unusquisque ad bonum regni: et in magnis et novis, beneplacitum majoris partis totius populi expectabatur.

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identified the ideological support to meet the aspirations of lesser nobility to be represented in both the kingdom’s general policies and the local and provincial administrative structures. The judicial attributions of county assemblies were thus extended, by royal initiative, towards gaining a much wider importance. Moreover, the royal initiative of eliminating the custom posts, abusively introduced after the death of Stephen V, was enforced not by designating royal judges (as Bela IV did in the attempt to recover the domains of the royal forts abusively estranged) but by allowing the counties and the provincial congregations to make the decision. Thus, the landed nobility gained a weapon they could use against aristocratic interference and abuse, becoming a decision maker in the issues of commercial activities and freedom of circulation. To make the congregational system functional, the king instituted the provincial congregations, meant to relieve noblemen from the suffocating authority of aristocratic families in some counties, and at the same time to overcome the nobility’s vulnerability against the barons at the kingdom’s general congregations. Unsurprisingly, these congregational provinces, which reunited a variable number of counties, followed, whenever these models existed, a number of old territorial structures, some of them possibly tracking their origin prior to the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian basin. These political structures had survived, in various forms, until the 12th century and their memory was still present in the historical tradition of the time. Thus, the congregational province instituted between the Someş, Tisza and Meseş (1279)79 revived the former structure of Menumorout’s country, transformed by the Hungarian conquerors into Bihor Duchy. Moreover, the group of counties on the lower Mureş River80 was related to the former territorial structure of Ohtum’s country. This is especially important considering that the noblemen from the Chanad kindred, the effective rulers of most of the region, were the direct descendants of some of the protagonists of the events which took place around the year 1000. At their turn, Transylvania and Slavonia were provinces with distinct administrative structures, which enjoyed a special status within Hungary, and the congregational provinces molded to the existing structures. Transylvania’s evolution towards a congregational structure, ultimately reaching the status of distinct regnum in the kingdom of Hungary, started at the time when the province became a corner stone in King Ladislas’ attempt to achieve stability. As a matter of fact, there is no evidence of a congregational 79  Initially including the counties of Bihor, Solnoc, Satmar, Crasna, Bekes, Zarand and Szabolcs—DIR II 201–203; Wenzel XII 250–253. 80  In its first form (1285), it included the counties of Timiş, Arad and Cenad—DIR II 274–277; Wenzel IX 419–422.

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system in this province before the Mongol invasion of 1285 and the affirmation of Transylvania’s privileged position in the internal affairs of King Ladislas in the years after 1286. The assertion of the judicial autonomy of Transylvanian nobility could build on precedents in the kingdom of Hungary. Wider pressures for change, begun as a reforming movement started by those at the bottom of the privileged ranks,81 had been initiated by the royal servants, as testified by the Hungarian word szolgabíró, which literally meant judge of servants. According to Elemer Mályusz’s demonstration,82 this term must have been used from the time when the people who organized the self-governing institutions of the county were still called servientes regis, before being named nobiles. In this context, the oldest references of “royal servants” in the kingdom of Hungary originate in the Transylvanian space. Even though the first such mention83 remains debatable, Johannes Latinus’ account, placed by King Emerich inter Theutonicos Transilvanienses at the dawn of the 13th century, is considered to be straightforward.84 The early advent of this social category in Transylvania is related to institutional evolutions in the Transdanubian counties (inspired by Western feudalism) as far back as the castrens structures, in the last decades of Bela IV’s reign. Transylvania’s special position in the kingdom and the specific structure of its judicial organization left little room for the de proprio motu development of such structures. The entire juridical hierarchy of the seven Transylvanian counties was subordinated to the voivode and implicitly to his deputy (the vicevoivode), both, more involved than the king in their own province and far from willings to voluntarily renounce to their important revenues. The voivodes who ruled until 1282 struggled to keep the province under tight control, without allowing the local nobility the opportunity to manifest their own political views. Matthew Csák himself, despite the relatively broad support he enjoyed from the local nobility, did nothing more than to institute some sort of limited “voivodal council”, in which the participation to the decision-making was restricted to the members of the aristocratic members of the faction he ruled. These precautionary measures proved to be entirely justified. Furthermore, the noblemen congregation of Transylvania was a major hurdle for various aristocratic factions attempting to impose their domination in this province 81  Fügedi, The Elefánthy, 41. 82  Elemér Mályusz, A magyar köznemesség kialakulása, Századok, 1942, 272–305. 83  Dating back to the times of Bela III, but available today as a copy from the time of Stephen V—Fügedi, The Elefánthy, 35; Jakó 18 (1088–1090). 84  Jakó 30; ZW 7–8; DIR I 28–29, 368.

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and constituted a severe blow to the authority of voivode Roland Borsa. The particular features of the congregational regime, due mainly to King Ladislas’ attempt to encourage the peripheral regions of the kingdom, led in the case of Transylvania to representations formed only by the landed aristocracy. In order to consolidate their autonomy and make these counties efficient political instruments in the hands of the provincial nobility, the system seemingly admitted the exclusion of dignitaries who did not own land in the respective province, with the exception of the palatine count. Due to this feature characteristic to the Transylvanian representative system (eliminated during the Angevine dynasty) the voivode Roland Borsa, who did not own properties in Transylvania, is never mentioned as taking part in the general congregations of the Transylvanian nobility. According to the sources, the congregations met always in the absence of the voivode, limiting the authority exerted by Roland Borsa in the territory he administered. On the other hand, due to the same mechanisms of the congregational system, Roland’s effective authority became unchallenged in the counties between Tisza and Meseş, despite the fact that he didn’t have there any official position in its support. In these counties, the voivode had all the advantages he lacked in Transylvania: he owned a great number of estates and fortresses, had a number of stable residences and received support from numerous allies. As a consequence, he chaired there all known noblemen congregations. In this context, the king lacked the legal means to counteract his authority, due to the fact that his position was bestowed on him not by the king himself, but by the noble congregation. One of the paradoxes of this incipient stage of the congregational regime was the firm grip Roland Borsa had on the voivodal authority, despite the intention of the sovereign to substitute him with Moyus Ákos and the difficulties he encountered in having his authority acknowledged in the Inner Carpathian region. The explanation can be found in the influence Roland Borsa exerted over Archbishop Lodomerius and through him, over the kingdom’s general congregation, which among its prerogatives included the right to confirm or reject the dignitaries appointed by King Ladislas. Thus, although dismissed by the king in the second half of 1288, Roland Borsa had his title confirmed by the Föveny congregation (1289). This was the last attempt of the king to reach a compromise with the clergy, barons and nobility. Under the circumstances, the vicevoivode presided over and administered the judicial procedures of the Transylvanian noble congregations. For the next couple of decades the vicevoivodes held a key position in the internal politics of Transylvania. The relatively great number of vice-voivodes recorded between 1288 and 1290 indicates the intentions of both Voivode Roland and King Ladislas to counteract each other’s influence. Thus, while Ladislas of

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Sancto Martino, representative of the Transylvanian branch of the Borsa kindred, was obviously the vice-voivode imposed by Roland Borsa and his direct agent, Andrew (II) of Geoagiul de Sus was a “royalist” nobleman, whose relations with the voivode were less amicable.85 The first noble congregation (June 8, 1288),86 presided by vice-voivode Ladislas of Sancto-Martino in association with the four royal judges of the “Realm of Transylvania” (regnum Transylvanianum), took place in Cristiş/ Oprişani (villa Cruciferorum) and assumed the right to decide on issues related to properties. Through a previous court decision, presided by Roland Borsa, the noblemen of the Mykula kindred were forced to pay sixty silver marks to Bishop Peter of Transylvania, as compensation for the damages they inflicted on the bishop’s estates. Since the fine was not paid on the due date, the bishop was given permission by the voivode to confiscate properties that amounted to the sum owed. Bishop Peter’s receiving into possession of three estates (Dumbrava, Stana, Zaonateluke) previously owned by the sons of Mykula, nedeed the consultation and approval of the congregation of noblemen of Transylvania. The congregation authorized Ladislas of Sancto-Martino to entrust the estates to Archdeacon Paul of Turda, the representative of the Alba Iulia Chapter. In case the fine was not paid in one year, the Archdeacon would confiscate their property ownership over the lands. Moreover, the four royal judges who assisted vice-voivode Ladislas in chairing the assemblies were part of the same provincial nobility that also included Ladislas of Sancto-Martino. It is possible that Peter “of Nitra”, earl of Cluj87 was, much like Ladislas of Sancto-Martino, one of the nobles Roland Borsa introduced in the congregation. The identities of the other three noble judges mentioned in the 1288 document are only partly clarified. While count Peter, son of Murun, undoubtedly belonged to the Iara family88 and count Michael, son of Lawrence, was probably a nobleman from Solnoc county mentioned in 1280,89 there is little conclusive evidence available regarding the identity of count Peter, son of Clement. Even so, the available information allow us to conclude that the leading grup of the Transylvanian nobility was located in the Northern counties. The complex ethnic and administrative features of the Inner Carpathian province required a broader congregational structure than that provided by the seven “voivodal” counties. The new system was going to include the 85  DIR III 32–33. 86  DIR II 300–301; HD 474–475; Jakó 437. 87  DIR II 300, Jakó 437. 88  Jakó 425. 89  DIR II 225; Jakó 381.

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representatives of all privileged social strata living in the former Duchy of Transylvania, making this a much more efficient political entity. Such a representative structure, which preceded the Diet of Transylvania, could only be summoned by the king himself, whose authority was acknowledged by all privileged groups. In 1289, King Ladislas summoned an assembly of “Transylvanian clerics, Hungarian noblemen, Saxons and Székelys”. In this context he confirmed, among other things, a privilege to the Alba Iulia Chapter.90 This consultative formula, exclusively subordinated to the king, represented a way of exerting control over the nobility in the counties using the Saxons and the Székelys, traditionally royalist, and the only possibility of reuniting Transylvania at its representative structures. Even though there is not much information available, there are grounds to believe that such general assemblies had been summoned before 1289 in Transylvania. The letter of 1288, addressed by Archbishop Lodomerius to “Hungarian, Saxon, Székely and Romanian noblemen”91 in the counties of Sibiu and Bârsa, phrasing almost identical to that of the royal diploma of 1289, reflected undoubtedly the prior existence of this structure. Not surprisingly, the Romanians were not mentioned in the royal diploma related to the Chapter’s revenues; being Orthodox, they could not have anything to say in an issue regarding a Catholic institution. On the other hand, the Romanians might have participated in the 1289 congregation and even before, as they were probably allowed to discuss issues that regarded them directly, as would happen in 1291. 5.5 Ladislas IV and the Romanians of Transylvania King Ladislas’ treatment of the Romanians living in Transylvania deserves special analysis. The letter addressed by Archbishop Lodomerius to the Hungarian, Saxon, Székely and Romanian noblemen in the counties of Sibiu and Bârsa in Transylvania92 is the first late 13th century document that certifies the Romanians’ attempt to integrate in the structure of privileged classes and assume a specific position in the new political system.93 The letter written by 90  DIR II 309–310; ZW 161; Jakó 448. See also: Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 245. 91  nobilibus Ungarorum, Saxonibus, Syculis et Valachis de Cybiniens et de Burcia countyibus Transylvanianis: DIR II 296–299. 92  DIR II 296–299. 93  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 269–270: refers to the equality between the Romanians and the other “nations” mentioned in this document.

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Lodomerius mentions the presence of Romanians among Ladislas’s potential supporters, indicating the fact that the legitimate ruler of Hungary encouraged them to seek political affirmation. As a matter of fact, in his last years of reign, Ladislas was not longer concerned with ethnical or religious differences. Despite contrary opinions, there is no conclusive evidence indicating that only the Romanians in Sibiu and Bârsa counties, the two administrative units mentioned by the Archbishop of Esztergom, were seeking political affirmation. Lodomerius only addressed the inhabitants of these two counties due to the fact that those were the only Transylvanian regions subordinated to his archdiocese. Furthermore, the other Transylvanians regions, most likely received similar demands and recommendations from the Archbishop of Kalocsa. Unfortunately, no such text survived. Nonetheless, interpretations that plead for broader Romanian emancipation are not mere hypotheses. King Ladislas spent the last years of his life mainly in regions inhabited by Romanians, which were vital to the king for the human and material resources, and also the liaison they could provide with the Outer Carpathian and Balkan territories where Ladislas was looking for new allies. The Romanians, much like the Cumans, were a regular presence in the king’s close entourage, which explains the role they received in the Ipatiev Chronicle regarding the 1290 regicide.94 Furthemore, they were probably also part of the royal army. Indirect evidence is given by the circumstances of the year 1291, when the army requested by King Andrew III from Transylvania included Romanians.95 Under the circumstances, certain interpretations might lead to the identification Ladislas the Cuman as the legendary Laslau Hungarian king from the old Romanian chronicles.96 According to the Chronicle written by Grigore Ureche (Simeon Dascălul), the contribution of the Romanians to the victory against the Mongols, in the winter war, from the Christmas carnival until the lent (dating similar to that of the events from January–March 1285), 94  Decei, Relaţii, 79, n. 4: “That year the Cumans or the Polovts with the Vlachs killed the Hungarian king named Volodislav”. 95  Balint Hóman, Gli Angioini di Napoli in Ungheria (Roma: Reale Academia d’Italia, 1938), 87. One of the goals of the Alba Iulia assembly of March, 1291 was to approve the draft of the campaign against Austria: Gheorghe I. Brătianu, “În jurul întemeierii statelor româneşti (I),” RI 4 (1993): 157; Ioan Aurel Pop, Instituţii medievale româneşti. Adunările cneziale şi nobiliare (boiereşti) din Transylvania în secolele XIV–XVI (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1991), 18. 96  See: Ovidiu Pecican, Troia, Veneţia, Roma. Studii de istoria civilizaţiei europene (ClujNapoca: Ideea Europeană, 1998, 116–117, 140, 150–151, which resumes and develops Bogdan Petriceicu Haşdeu’s theory (Etymologicum Magnum Romaniae, ed. Grigore Brâncuș vol. III (Bucharest: Minerva, 1976), 760).

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determined the king to grant them “estates and inheritances and lands for villages and boroughs / . . . / where they have lived to this day at Maramoroş”. In addition, he “promoted them all”, namely he made them into “royal servants”. The Moldavian chronicler portrayed the rise of the Maramureş Romanians to nobility and their conversion into royal servants, mentioning that this process only became possible in “deserted, wild places”, in regions free from noble possessions, because “the Hungarians would not grant them the right of having hereditary possessions in the country”.97 Moreover, the Moldavian-Russian Chronicle mentions the battles waged by King Vladislav with the Mongols on the Tisza River (most likely the battle on the Hód Lake, with the Cumans mentioned in the chronicle as the Mongols) and “in Transylvania . . . on the Mureş River” (battles against the invaders in 1285),98 reflecting the circumstances of 1282– 1285. Dwelling on the contribution to victory of “ancient Romanians”, guards of the “Greek Christian law”, this source also asserts that the king kept “his faith in Christ a secret, in his heart, and his language and kingly order were Latin”.99 The fusing of Ladislas the Cuman with the image of King Ladislas I was characteristic for a number of hagiographical legends popular in Orthodox cultural settings. The most significant, The Legend of Ladislas and Sava, mentions King Ladislas of Hungary’s miraculous conversion to Orthodoxy during an expedition against the Serbs. According to Ovidiu Pecican, the story was crafted in the Banat area, around the middle of the 14th century.100 The survival of the king’s memory in the orthodox areas of Banat can be only the result of the increased presence of King Ladislas IV in Banat in 1287–1290. During his most glorious years, Charles Robert of Anjou was frequently present in Banat, but there are no remaining traces in the collective memory of the Romanian communities. The prestige and sympathy that Ladislas the Cuman enjoyed among the Romanians in Transylvania was due to the popularity of his decisions regarding religious issues,101 and their benefical political consequences. The Romanians managed to consolidate their institutional autonomy in the border “countries” (Țara Oltului, Maramureş, most likely the Haţeg area and, beyond 97  Grigore Ureche, Letopiseţul Țării Moldovei, (Bucharest: Minerva, 1978), 12–14. 98  Regarding the battle waged by Tirimia nobles against a Mongol corp of troops, see: DIR II 273–274; SzOkl IV 2–3. 99   Petre P. Panaitescu, Cronicile slavo-romane din secolul XVI culese de Ioan Bogdan (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1957), 158–161. 100  Pecican, Troia, Veneţia, Roma, 145–160. 101  For description see: Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 263– 265. Gheorghe. I. Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică despre întemeierea statelor româneşti, ed. V. Râpeanu, Bucureşti, 1980, 137.

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Transylvania, the cnezdoms in the mountainous area of Banat) and were also close to gaining a well-defined role in the political structure of a Transylvanian regnum that King Ladislas was striving to institute. While the Romanian political affirmation did not affect the traditional supremacy of the Hungarian nobility, it paved the way for Romanian knezes towards noblemen status and their integration in the structures of an incipient congregational system. The fact that the Romanians were summoned to the general congregation of Alba Iulia in March, 1291 was, according to Şerban Papacostea,102 a consequence of the political emancipation started in the previous years. The Romanians considered Ladislas the Cuman, to be not just “others’ king”, but also “their king”, and openly showed their consideration. Willing to tolerate their faith and cautiously encouraging their aspirations, the image of Ladislas rose, throughout the centuries, to the legendary features of a founding father, to which a number of later chroniclers would attribute a role in bringing the Romanians in Dacia and constituting the Romanian Countries. 5.6

The End of Ladislas IV’s Reign

The great number of privileges and donations that Ladislas granted to his supporters in the last months of 1289, the call to arms of the nobility from the Eastern Hungarian counties and his obvious interest in forging an alliance with the Mongols indicated that Ladislas was not going to give up on the battle against his opponents. Summoned in an order issued in Cheresig, on December 25, 1289, the army of the Sătmar, Szabolcs and Bereg counties was placed by the king under the command of brothers Stephen and Paul Kállay.103 They were also old enemies of Roland Borsa, whom they accused of having orchestrated the assassination of their brother, Peter.104 The king’s very presence at Cheresig, and the subsequent conquest of the fortress under unclear circumstances, was a challenge to the Borsa kindred, defied by the king on their own grounds. Ladislas’ surprising offensive, at the head of an army gathered during the winter, reached the capital in March, 1290105 but failed to bring a decisive victory. In late April, the king retreated as far as Caransebeş,106 where he tried to strengthen his ranks with locals and maybe form alliances with the 102  Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică, 163–167. For Gh. I. Brătianu’s suggestions see: RI 4 (1993): 41. 103  D IR II 315; CD V/3 506–507. 104  D IR II 312; Wenzel IX 557. 105  R A 3551–3552, March, 5th–6th, 1290 (prope Chegled). 106  R A 3553: April, 29th, 1290, Karansebus.

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neighboring Balkan rulers. During this time, a new candidate to the Hungarian crown emerged in the person of Charles Martell of the Angevine house of Naples, whose family ties recommended him as a formidable contender. His mother Mary was the daughter of the late King Stephen V. In addition, in 1287 he married Klemencia of Habsburg, the daughter of King Rudolf of Germany and enjoyed the full support of Pope Nicholas IV, who did not hesitate to embark on a massive propaganda campaign on his behalf.107 The new candidate raised the political stakes and asked for a swift resolution. The political alliance established by Lodomerius—Heder—Borsa party had already decided to support Andrew the Venetian, who was going to become a mere figure head for their rule. Lacking any kind of influence at Rome or at any of the major European courts, Andrew the Venetian could not even rely on the full support of Hungary, indispensable for challenging the supremacy of the high aristocracy. Even his alleged link to the Arpadian line must have been seen with suspicion by the contemporaries. His father, Stephen, was without doubt the son of Beatrice d’Este, King Andrew II’s last wife. This marriage was, however, celebrated in May 1234. Upon king’s death, which took place on September 21, 1235, Beatrice attempted to leave the kingdom disguised as a page, accompanied by Palatine Dionysius, her alleged lover.108 Such roumors spread with great ability transformed Andrew into an ideal candidate for Lodomerius, who preferred a weak king, who would owe him his crown. The Archbishop’s intentions were dangerously challenged by Germany and Rome. To avoid the failure of his plans, Lodomerius needed to act swiftly and crown his favorite candidate before the opposition would grow bigger. His solution was dishonoring but efficient: the assassination of King Ladislas. There are, however, clues that this action was tacitly approved by the pope, who believed it would benefit the Angevine candidate.109 This action was probably organized by the Borsa kindred,110 helped by the Cumans and perhaps the Romanians, who were a habitual presence in the royal entourage. The choice of the assassins might have served propaganda purposes, as a message for the contemporaries and future kings: the forces that Ladislas believed to be most reliable were in fact the perpetrators of crime and anarchy. The orchestration of the 1290 regicide forever dishonored the Borsa kindred. It was in these tragic

107  Addressing Roland Borsa, among others: HD 497. 108  Suspicions confirmed to certain extent by the fact that the new King Bela IV ordered his eyes to be plucked out: Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 122–123. 109  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 293–295. 110  Chronicon pictum, 98; DIR IV 164–166.

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circumstances that the controversial reign of a fascinating, complex, and a typical character that history has not yet fully deciphered tragically ended. 5.7

The “Constitutional” Reform of King Andrew III

The reforms initiated by Andrew III in the months following his rise to the throne of Hungary were meant to reintroduce a “constitutional” order in a kingdom that had fallen into anarchy. Installed on the throne by the combined action of the barons and the Church, the new king answered their hopes for a political regime that would reestablish the internal order. The Church was also supporting the lesser nobility and saught to reach an internal balance and an efficient central authority. At the same time, Andrew III was forced to reform the system without interfering with the congregational structures introduced by his predecessor in his last years of reign. By his own will, knowing about the existence of similar institutions in Western and Central Europe, or perhaps under the pressure exerted by the lesser nobility, which was not willing to give up on the privileges received during the previous years, the new king respected and encouraged the congregational system, which became a fundamental factor in the kingdom’s internal policies. Thus, in September 1290, shortly after his coronation (July 23), Andrew III summoned the kingdom’s general congregation in Buda, which confirmed and adopted his reform into an organic law. The “constitutions” adopted by the congregation of Buda further consolidated the positions held by the nobility and Church, reflecting the king’s intention to keep under control the anarchic tendencies of the “oligarchy”. Surprisingly, the resolutions of the Buda congregation lacked legislative value by themselves in the Transylvanian regnum, which had consolidated a special position of autonomy inside the kingdom during the last years of Ladislas the Cuman. In order to have the Buda decisions ratified in Transylvania, the king traveled in the province accompanied by the most important dignitaries of his court. In the spring of 1291, he summoned the provincial congregation, the only institution with legislative attributions in the territory. The necessity to organize in Transylvania a second general congregation, after the one organized in Hungary, presided by the same king, indicates that by 1290–1291 the Arpadian kingdom resembled nothing more than a personal union between two almost completely distinct state entities (regnum Hungariae and regnum Transylvanum), as a consequence of the events in Ladislas the Cuman’s last years of reign. Under the circumstances, the king had to take action to limit the attributions of the congregations of noblemen in Transylvanian, in order to increase royal power. Lacking both the means and most likely the

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intention to turn to force, the king opted for a parliamentary procedure. In order to ensure its success, Andrew III had to infiltrate his men in a congregation still faithful to the memory of King Ladislas and therefore distrustful of his regime. The only legal way to reach this objective was to exert his royal right of donation. Once in possession of Transylvanian properties, the recipients of royal donations would become “Transylvanian” noblemen, entitled to attend the congregations of provincial nobility and influence the decisions taken therein. The king traveled to Alba Iulia in the middle of winter, accompanied by a large entourage. Close to the king were Archbishops Lodomerius of Esztergom and John of Kalocsa, numerous bishops and also some of the most important officials of the royal court.111 On December 31, 1290, Andrew III and his court were in Oradea, where they stayed at least until January 7, 1291.112 On January 29, 1291, while on his way to Transylvania, at Filipişul Mic, the king took the opportunity and gave to one of his loyals, count Dionysius Losonci, the possession of the royal domain of Lăpuş in Solnoc county.113 On February 10, Andrew III was already in Cluj and confirmed a tax exemption received by the Bistriţa residents from Ladislas IV, thus showing respect to the late king.114 Upon reaching Alba Iulia around February 20,115 the king remained in the episcopal town for no less than a month, at least until March 22, 1291.116 It was a period of intense political activity, which we are able to reconstitute through the existing documents. The central event of the royal visit was the general congregation of all privileged categories in Transylvania, summoned for the first time on March 11, 1291 (the Invocavit Sunday). A series of preliminary assemblies established the positions to be adopted at the general congregation by each privileged group. Even though there is no information available regarding the preliminary assemblies of the Saxons, Székelys or Romanians, we know however that the nobility’s meeting, presided by count Benedict, the interim of vice-voivode Ladislas and the four noble judges, took place in Miraslău (Meruslo), most likely in February.117 In case the preliminary meetings of the Saxons, Székelys and Romanians indeed took place, this must have occurred in the area of the episcopal town, perhaps in the neighboring localities where their representatives established 111  D IR II 364–366, 366–367, 370–371; Jakó 472, 473, 478; RA 3704. 112  R A 3683–3700. 113  D IR II 356–357; CD VII/2 166–167; Jakó 468. 114  D IR II 360; ZW 171; Jakó 469. 115  R A 3704–3705. 116  R A 3712–3713. 117  D IR II 347–348; Teutsch-Firnhaber 176. For dating, see: Jakó 467.

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their main headquarters. Certainly, the debates carried out in this period focused on the political reform the king was striving to impose. To clearly flesh out the topic of the discussions, on February 22, immediately after his arrival to Alba Iulia, the king promulgated a document which enumerated the decisions adopted by the Buda congregation in September 1290 and expressed his support for them.118 During the same time interval (February 22–24), Andrew III granted a series of privileges to the Chapter of the Transylvania Church and to Bishop Peter himself as a reward for his friendship and loyalty.119 Three weeks before the general congregation, the king was looking for a way to pressure the representatives into accepting his will. As part of his strategy, count Dionysius Losonci received the possession of the Lăpuş domain,120 which preceded the royal donation act from March 11, 1291121 and Ugrinus Csák was granted with the Făgăraş and Sâmbăta properties (in the country of Făgăraş). This iniative required, however, the approval of the general congregation. Due to the well-prepared strategy, the pressures exerted and the favorable impression inspired to the Transylvanian classes by the presence at Alba Iulia of the kingdom’s most important personalities, the congregation did not raise any special problems to the king. His objective to “reform the Transylvanian status”, was attained with no major difficulties. The “constitutional” provisions included in the royal diploma of February 22 were adopted without any modifications, and a copy was entrusted to the Chapter of Alba Iulia.122 The confirmation of the privileges granted by Ladislas the Cuman to the Székelys on the Arieş River123 was most likely just one of the examples of preemptive attitude that the king manifested towards the Transylvanian classes. According to the document that reconfirmed that Ugrinus Csák recovered the properties he claimed in the Făgăraş county, the noblemen, the Saxons, the Székelys and the Romanians in the assembly were consulted individually as well as collectively.124 On this occasion the king showed, once again, his determination in observing the institutionalized procedural formalities. King Andrew III’ was in fact trying to reach his most important objective of his visit to Transylvania and of the the congregation summoned in March, 1291. His final goal was to decrease the autonomy of the province and to reintegrate it in the structures of 118  D IR II 361–365, 505–509; ZW 172–176. 119  D IR II 365–366, 366–367, 367–368; Jakó 472, 473, 474. 120  D IR II 357; Jakó 475. 121  D IR II 368–369; Jakó 476. 122  D IR II 367; ZW 190. 123  D IR II 370–371; HD 511–512. 124  D IR II 369; ZW 177.

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a centralized governing system. It was for this objective that the king had weakened the homogeneity of the provincial nobility by reconfirming the privileges granted by Ladislas the Cuman and recalled to order the Székelys, the Saxons and the other categories of royal colonists, who lacked any interest to disobey the crowned king. In order to test the loyalty of the Transylvanians, Andrew III invited them to join him in his 1291 campaign against Austria. Along the rest of the participants, the Romanians also joined his military forces. The temporary success of this centralization policy found its expression in the participation of the Transylvanian Székelys and Saxons to the general congregation of the kingdom of Hungary held at Pest, in 1298.125 The provincial noblemen were undoubtedly also present, even though they are not mentioned distinctively. The affiliation of the representatives of the Transylvanian classes to the congregations of the entire kingdom interrupted, at least for a period, the enlarged congregation of Transylvania, an indispensable premise for an autonomous large-scale political structure extended to the entire former duchy.126 5.8

The End of Roland Borsa’s Rule (1294)

Roland Borsa took advantage of his position in the new royal order and was able to keep his voivodal office, while his real authority in Transylvania remained unchanged. He continued to rule the province through Ladislas Borsa, whose authority was conditioned by his cooperation with the noblemen’s congregation since he failed to become a prominent figure among the provincial nobility. Lacking significant territorial resources, he could not earn the allegiance of prestigious families. In addition, the other deputy voivodes of the time appear to have ruled alongside Ladislas. On the other hand, there is no information available regarding his deputy Benedict, attested in 1291, and it remains unknown whether he was the voivode’s locum tenens at the congregation or actually its representative to the voivode. In 1292, Ladislas Borsa was no longer deputy voivode, most likely after the local nobility’s reaction against his protector. Thus, at the outbreak of the open conflict between Roland Borsa and King Andrew III (whose support for the lesser nobility attracted the hostility of the barons) the Transylvanian nobility did nothing to support the one person who had been the nominal holder of the voivodal office for a decade. Roland’s last 125  D IR II 392–393, 443–453; ZW 192–193, 211; Jakó 570, 571. 126  See also: Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 256, 260.

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mentioned presence in Transylvania, in the fall of 1293,127 as well as the measures taken on this occasion to attract supporters and loyalties, proved useless in the spring of 1294. The free passage granted by Roland, on May 23, 1294, to the besieged inhabitants of the episcopal fortress of Finiş guaranteed their refuge beyond the territory controlled by the voivode, namely “beyond the Tisza or the Mureş River or even Gilău, in Transylvania”.128 Thus, Roland Borsa confirmed that, at that time, Transylvania refused to acknowledge his authority. The royal campaign against Roland Borsa, which took place between August and October 1294,129 culminated with the siege and conquest of the Adrian fortress, but did not have any other major consequences. Although he received royal pardon and managed to regain a prominent position between the Tisza River and Meseş in a matter of years, Roland Borsa never regained the territories he lost in Transylvania and the influence he exerted during the previous decade over the kingdom’s political life. Lacking the support of the provincial nobility, Roland Borsa never succeeded in becoming a dominant personality in Transylvania’s political life. The fact that, centuries later, he was considered an uncrowned sovereign of the province, a protagonist in the battle for autonomy and the main founding father of regnum Transylvanum is, under the circumstances, one of the most bizarre paradoxes of history. 5.9

Regnum Transylvanum

In order to establish the true nature of the relations between voivode Roland Borsa and the provincial nobility of Transylvania we need to revise the real significance of the regnum notion and the statute of Transylvania as mentioned in numerous sources in the last two decades of the 13th century. The older Romanian historical interpretations, from Ioan Lupaş and Ioan Moga to Ştefan Pascu, placed this denomination in close connection to a superior form of territorial organization (“kingship”). This type of territorial organization, which was allegedly exerted by Roland Borsa, transformed Transylvania into a “constitutionally sovereign country”.130 This interpretation is however rejected both by the voivode’s failure to impose his authority over the Transylvanian nobility and its congregation, and by the fact that the regnum concept itself is never used in relation to Roland Borsa’s territorial authority. 127  D IR II 399–400; ZW 193–194; Jakó 518. 128  D IR II 404–405; HD 524. 129  R A 3987–3995. 130  Pascu, Voivodatul Transilvaniei, 187.

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According to the documents: Ladizlaus vicevoyouoda transsiluanus

Andreas (III.) rex Hungariae

Comes Benedictus gerens vices Ladizlai vicevaivode Transsiluani

June 8, 1288

Peters de Nitra, comes de Kulus, Michael comes, filius Laurencii /Peters comes?/ filius Muron, et comes Peters, filius Clementis, iudices per regnum Transsilvanum constituti . . .131 February 22, 1291 . . . nobiles regni nostri et Saxones Transylvaniani predia tenentes et more nobilium . . . . . . nobiles regni nostri et predicti Saxones regni Transylvaniae . . .132 May 8, 1291 Nicholas de Gumbas et Gregorio de Sancto Rege comitibus per regnum Transsilvanum iudicibus deputatis . . .133

The three references to the regnum Transylvanum/Transylvaniae thus appear in contexts related to the noblemen’s judicial attributions in the congregations (June 8, 1288, and May 8, 1291) or the rights and obligations associated to the noble status (February 22, 1291). At the same time, all three documents presented above are related to the functioning of the congregational system. While the two acts of the deputy voivode Ladislas and of his deputy Benedict were issued during congregations, King Andrew III’s diploma included the provisions that were to be submitted to the general assembly of Alba Iulia, in March 1291. Neither document substantiates the existence of a territorial herrschaft of Roland, any connection between his persona and the usage of the term regnum Transylvanianum becoming thus impossible to prove. We could thus conclude, starting from Martyn Rady’s interpretations,134 that the real meaning of the word regnum, as resulted from the quoted examples, designates the legal community of Transylvania’s nobility, represented in congregatio nobilium. Yet such a conclusion, despite its pivotal significance in our research, only half clarifies the issue. Indeed, regnum (“country”) means here, as elsewhere in 131  C D V/3 434–436; HD 474–475; DIR II 300–301; Jakó 437. 132  C D VII/2 139–147; ZW 172–176; DIR II 361–365, 505–509; Jakó 470. 133  C D VI/1 163–164; ZW 178–179; DIR II 372; Jakó 479. 134  “Voivode and Regnum: Transylvania’s Place in the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary,” in Historians and the History of Transylvania, ed. László Péter (Boulder-New York: East European Monographs, 1992), 87–101.

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the epoch, a “legal country”, a community of the privileged who had reserved the exertion of “constitutional” rights for themselves. We must not forget, however, that this community of the privileged could not have constituted a regnum in the absence of a proper “country”, featuring a well-defined territory, a juridical statute and an institutional system. Similar legal communities undoubtedly existed in other congregational provinces in the kingdom of Hungary. Nonetheless, none was ever mentioned as a regnum. The territories submitted to the Borsa kindred’s rule, Bihor and the other six neighboring counties (outer Solnoc, Sătmar, Crasna, Békes, Zarand and Szabolcs) were a well-defined “congregational province”.135 These counties had a historical tradition that went back to the centuries after the Arpadian conquest, in which a local Bihor ducatus had functioned.136 The origin of this institution comes out of the Anonymous Notary’s Gesta, laying in the agreement between Arpad and the duke of Bihor, Menumorout.137 The limits of the Menumorout’s rule (regnum), as indicated in the chronicle of Anonymus, overlapped almost in detail the counties that formed the congregational province in the last quarter of the 13th century.138 Nonetheless, during the 10th–12th centuries, the high absorption rate of the territories to the East of Tisza in the Hungarian kingdom considerably diminished their historic particularities. “The seven counties” were no longer a well-defined regnum in the second half of the 13th century and consequently they were no longer referred to as such. The nobility in these counties did not consider itself different from that of regnum Hungariae. In addition, these territories were no longer a distinct unit in the kingdom’s political structure, and they lacked a specific denomination. Consequently, the “legal country” formed by the local nobility was just the community of the privileged from the same regnum Hungariae. On the other hand, the territorial identity of Transylvania, as seen by the people of the 13th century, was described by the soucers in the following manner: 135  The first general congregation (generalem congregationem) of the nobles in these counties was attested on January, 30th, 1279: DIR II 201–203; Wenzel XII 250–253. In the first decades of the 14th century, this configuration remained almost unchanged. In 1317 Debreceni Dozsa presided, in Sălacea, the congregation of the Bihor, Szabolcs, Sătmar, Solnoc and Crasna counties: CD VIII/2 52–53, 98–100; CDHA I 435–436; DIR III 276, 280– 281. The only counties absent compared to 1279, were the counties of Zarand and Békes. 136  Makk F., KMTL 261. 137  See Anonymus, Notary of King Béla, The Deeds of the Hungarians / Anonymi Bele regis notarii Gesta Hungarorum, edited, translated and annotated by Martyn Rady and László Veszprémy, in Anonymus and Master Roger (Budapest/New York: CEU Press, 2010), 112–113. 138  Anonymus, The Deeds of the Hungarians, 32–33.

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Bela, rex primogenitus

1231

Bela (IV.), rex Hungariae

1243

Bela (IV.), rex Hungariae

1256

Stephanus, iunior rex Vngariae, dux Transylvaniae Idem

1263

Idem

1267

Capitulum ecclesie Varadinensis

1278

Ladislaus (IV.), rex Hungariae

1285

1267

. . . inutiles et superfluas donationis / . . . / destrueremus, positi in Transylvanis partibus . . .139 . . . cum fidelem nostrum Laurencium vaivodam post conflictum Tartarorum ad partes Transsilvanas misissemus . . .140 Possessiones . . . in partibus Transylvanis sunt hec . . .141 . . . quasdam terras udvarnicorum nostrorum in Transsilvanis partibus existentes . . .142 . . . possessiones avi sui Julae magni in partibus scilicet Transsilvanis existentes . . .143 Et cum Ladyzlaus woyuoda et Jula frater eiusdem venissent cum Cumanis contra nos ad partes Transsilvanas . . .144 . . . porcionem suam de terra Hasadad ipsum contingentem in partibus Transsilvanis existentem . . .145 . . . cum Lorandus filius Mark per suam infidelitatem terram nostram Scepusiensem, unacum Gylnuchbana et terram Nyr ultra partem de Tyzael usque ad partem Transsilvanam contra nostram regia maiestatem potentialiter ocuparent . . .146

These sources highlight that Transylvania was highly individualized in the Arpadian kingdom. This “eastern country”, and its particularities in the political system of the Hungarian crown, was inhabited by people referred to as “the people of Transylvania”, “the residents of Transylvania”, “the noblemen of Transylvania”, or “the Transylvanians”. 139  Z W 54–55; DIR I 32–33, 394–395; Jakó 163. 140  Z W 70–71; Jakó 195. 141  D IR II 21–23; 494–496. 142  C D IV/3 158–159; ZW 89–90; DIR II 51–52; Jakó 241. 143  H O VII 106; ZW 528; DIR II 97–98; Jakó 261. 144  C D IV/3 407–410; DIR II 94–95; Jakó 262. 145  H O VIII 443; DIR II 196–197. 146  H D 452–459; DIR II 271–273; Jakó 406.

The Rise of the Congregational Regime Andreas (II.), rex Hungariae Bela, rex primogenitus Ladislaus (IV.), rex Hungariae

1224

Stephanus archiepiscopus Colochensis

1277

Ladislaus (IV.), rex Hungariae

1285

Idem

1285

Idem

1289

Lodomerius, archiepiscopus Strigoniensis Andreas (III.) rex Hungariae

1288

1231 1273

1291

161

. . . fideles hospites nostri Theutonici Ultrasilvani . . .147 . . . milites nostros Saxones Ultrasilvanos . . .148 . . . Saxones et alii homines regionis Transsilvane ad patrem redierunt, eum naturalem terre dominum cognoscentes149 . . . quidam Saxo, vite detestabili, nomine Gaan filius Alardi / . . . / congregata multitudine sue nationis novissime de partibus Transsilvanis . . . . . . universos gentis Vngarice in ducatu commorantes Transsilvano in quibuscumque latibulis . . .150 . . . contra Gyan filium Alardi in partibus Transsilvanicis pro conservatione incolarum partis illius . . .151 Insuper cum nostros homines fideles Transsilvanos unacum Cumanis nostris contra Dormanum et Bulgaros misissemus, magistrum Georgius exercitus capitaneum preficientes . . .152 . . . quas universi Nobiles partis Transsilvaniae tunc in ipsa expeditione nostra nobiscum existentes . . .153 . . . nobilibus Ungarorum, Saxonibus, Syculis et Volachis de Cybiniensi et de Burcia comitatibus Transil(v)anis . . .154 . . . cum nos universis Nobilibus, Saxonibus, Syculis et Olachis in partibus Transylvanis apud Albam Jule pro reformatione status eorundem congregationem cum eisdem fecissemus . . .155

147  Z W 32–35; DIR I 208–210, 383–384. 148  Z W 54–55; DIR I 32–33, 394–395; Jakó 163. 149  Wenzel IV 23–27; Jakó 325. 150  Jakó 351. 151  H D 447–448; DIR II 254–255; Jakó 405. 152  H D 452–459; DIR II 271–273; Jakó 406. 153  C D V/3 457–460; CD VII/4 211–213; DIR II 306–308; Jakó 455. 154  Századok 44, 1910, 8–11; DIR II 296–299; Jakó 436. 155  D IR II 369, 509.

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The “Transylvanians” mentioned in the first examples were part of the category of German settlers who arrived in the area towards the middle of the 12th century. The number of references mentioning the “noblemen of Transylvania” increased with the rule of Ladislas the Cuman as a consequence of them acting as arms bearers, members of the political class, and landlords. The emancipation and gradual distancing of the nobility of Transylvania from the nobility of the kingdom were motivated by their specific interests, and their accentuated particular features. Furthermore, these examples from the last decade of the 13th century, illustrate the political rise of the other components of Transylvania’s political structure. The examples below indicate once again that Transylvania was perceived, at the time, as being different from Hungary proper: Conventus Monasterii beati Hypoliti Martyris de Zobor Stephanus, iunior rex Vngariae, dux Transylvaniae Ladislaus (IV.), rex Hungariae

1256

. . . occupatione/ . . . / iurium/ . . . / monasterii Sancti Benedicti de Grana / . . . / tam in hoc regno, quam in parte Transylvana . . .156

1268

et cum ipsum castrum (Feketeuholm // Codlea) / . . . / exivissemus, et paulaltim ad nostrum regnum accessissemus domino permittente157 . . . cum dominus rex Bela, avus noster carissimus / . . . / dictum patrem nostrum de suo regno miserabiliter ad partes Transylvanas effugasset158

1279

Even though they do not explicitly refer to Transylvania as regnum, these examples oppose the province to the regnum Hungariae, and implicitly indicate its statute. There are, however, documents dating earlier than the ones from 1288–1291 and issued by the royal chancery in which Transylvania is explicitly referred to as regnum.

156  C D IV/2 405–407; Jakó 220. 157  H O VIII 110–113; DIR II 108–110; Jakó 273. 158  Z W 137–139; DIR II 213–215; Jakó 368.

The Rise of the Congregational Regime Andreas (II), rex Hungariae Stephanus, iunior rex Vngariae, dux Transylvaniae

1206 1266

163

. . . primos hospites regni de tribus villis Ultrasilvanis Karako videlicet, Crapundorph et Rams . . .159 ipsum vaivodam debita sollicitudine invigilantem defensionem et remediis regni nostri Transsilvani . . .160

In what concerns the royal diploma of 1206, it is less likely that Andrew II was reffering to the entire kingdom of Hungary when he bestowed the title of primos hospites regni to the colonisers of Cricău, Ighiu and Romos. In the Western and central parts of the kingdom the German colonization had been initiated long before Transylvania. In this case, we must accept Thomas Nägler’s suggestion161 that the regnum to which the king referred is no other than the regnum Transylvanum. This much is confirmed by the 1266 diploma of “young king” Stephen. A strong identification of a regnum nostrum Transsilvanum can be found in the documents of 1268 and 1279 (quoted above), issued by the chancellery of Stephen or perhaps that of his son Ladislas, where we see a clear distinction between Transylvania and regnum Hungariae. Thus, Stephen classified Transylvania as one of the “countries” subjected to the Hungarian Crown. The king delegated the most important royal obligation of defending its territory to the voivode of Transylvania, his direct representative in the province. The analysis of the sources seems to confirm one of the definitions of the term regnum given by Ştefan Pascu, that of “autonomous state”.162 However, Transylvania’s acquiring this status is in no way connected with an improbable transition to “oligarchy” of the voivodal power in the last decades of the 13th century. As we have seen, Regnum Transylvanum did not designate the territory over which Roland Borsa had succeeded in asserting his authority, but a distinct “country”, governed by a viovode, with its own institutions, laws and legal community (regnum). Based on the regia in persona fiction, Transylvania’s voivode was a royal locum tenens, exerting, as the sovereign’s representative, control over military, administrative and judicial functions of the state. In many ways his status was close to that of palatine count (regni Hungariae palatinus) in Hungary proper, and even closer to the prerogatives held by the Ban of Slavonia (regni Sclavoniae banus). The fact that Hungary, Slavonia, and 159  Z W 9–10; DIR I 31–32, 368–369. 160  Z W 96–98; DIR II 79–80; Jakó 260. 161  Nägler Aşezarea saşilor în Transilvania, 164. 162  Pascu, Voivodatul Transilvaniei, 421.

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Transylvania were three distinct “countries”, with their own institutional structures and a broad autonomy within the Arpadian kingdom is highlighted by the records of magister Gerard of Mutina, from 1281–1286. He acted as pontifical superintendent, charged with collecting the money for the Crusade in Hungary, Poland and Slavonia, which ascertain that Transylvania occupied a distinct position in the kingdom of Hungary, the revenues collected from this province being registered as an individual category.163 In this respect, the anonymous Dominican geographer offers a much more unequivocal account in his Description of Oriental Europe, written around 1307–1308 at the request of Charles of Valois: Hungary is split into two, namely the Transylvanian side and the Danube side.164 The assertion of the congregational system at this time resulted into the redefinition of this province’s juridical regime and a significant increase of its autonomy. Consequently, the precedent of 1290–1291, when King Andrew III faced serious difficulties in imposing a “constitutional” reform in Transylvania which was already implemented in other parts of the kingdom, threatened to become a reccurent theme over the next centuries. This is what explains the particular juridical situations so well expressed by E. Mályusz with his phrase “exceptions in Hungary were rules in Transylvania”.165 The permanent concern of the royal chancellery to formally specify that instructions they issued or sanctions they ruled would apply not only in Hungary, but also in Transylvania comes as no surprise.166 Transylvania’s institutional specificity is often explained by Hungarian historiography with the status of végvidék (borderland), being consequently comparable to existing forms of government in Slavonia and in the frontiers districts.167 Such a comparison is warranted in the case of Slavonia168 alone, and much less 163  Theiner, Monumenta Vaticana, I 1–11; DIR II 232–233. 164  Anonymi Geographi Descriptio Europae Orientalis, ed. George. Popa-Lisseanu, IIR II. (Bucharest, 1934), 30, 58: “Diuiditur enim vngaria in duas partes, uidelicet in partem transiluanam et in partem danubialem”. 165  Elemér Mályusz, “Hungarian Nobles of Medieval Transylvania,” in Nobilities in Central and Eastern Europe: Kinship, Property and Privilege, ed. János M. Bak. (Budapest: Hajnal István Alapítvány, 1994), 38. 166  Martyn Rady, “Voivode and Regnum: Transylvania’s Place in the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary,” in Historians and the History of Transylvania, ed. Laszlo Peter. (Boulder: East Europe Monographs, 1992), 88. 167  Rady, “Voivode and Regnum”, 91; Makkai and Mócsy, ed., Erdély története, 286–287; Mályusz Elemer, Az erdélyi magyar társadalom a középkorban (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézet, 1988), 14–17. 168  The first reference of the regnum Sclavonie dates back to 1240: Tomislav Raukar, Hrvatsko srednovjekovlje (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1997), 74.

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for the Southern frontier districts, whose evolution was characterized by the development of military and missionary structures. Much like Slavonia, 13th century Transylvania was a country which met most requirements for a medieval state. Furthermore, it could be distinguished from regnum Hungariae by its own historical tradition, and its previous independence lost as the result of confrontations and subsequent political arrangements with the Hungarian Crown.169 Thus, referring to the result of Stephen I’s victory over Transylvanian duke Gyula, the Hungarian chronicles of the 14th century, recorded: et ipsum regnum Erdewel monarchie Vngarie adiunxit.170 Unlike regnum Croatiae, regnum Transylvaniae and regnum Slavoniae did not appear in the official titles of the Hungarian kings undoubtedly because they represented early conquests which can be dated before the end of the 11th century. It is well known that the Arpadian kings, from Stephen I to Coloman the Learned held the title of rex Ungrorum (Pannoniorum). It was only after the the latter’s coronation as king of Croatia (1102) that the royal title began to include the autonomous “kingdoms” recently attached to the Hungarian Crown (Croatia, Dalmatia).171 After this date all newly acquired states either conquered or claimed by the Hungarian Crown would be included in the royal title.172 However, the practice did not apply to the territories annexed in the previous centuries.

169  See the more recent Ioan Aurel Pop, Romanians and Hungarians in the 9th–13th centuries (Cluj-Napoca: Center of Trasylvanian Studies, 1996), 60–152. Arguments regarding Transylvania’s statute of “distinct geographical and political entity within the Hungarian area of settlement”: P. Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 24. 170  S RH II 36. 171  K MTL, 352; Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 35–36. 172  Serviae (1202), Galiciae, Lodomeriae (1206), Comaniae (1237), Bulgariae (1255).

CHAPTER 6

Ladislas Kán (1294–1315): The Transylvanian Nobles and the Congregational Regime 6.1

The Beginnings of Ladislas Kán’s Power

6.1.1 The Origins of the Kán Influence in Transylvania1 Ladislas Kán’s rise to the voivodal office must have taken place sometime in 1294, during the conflict between King Andrew III and Roland Borsa. It was a strikingly quasi-anonymous switch of power. Also, there had been no prior relations between the new voivode and the royalty which could justify his coronation. Ladislas Kán was indeed the first of the voivodes attested in the second half of the 13th century who never stood out in the political or military services brought to the crown and also the first of whom we possess no evidence of having belonged to the circle of power around the royal court. At the same time, Ladislas Kán was the first known voivode of the epoch whose family had settled in Transylvania at least three generations prior, at a time when ban Gyula ( Jula) Kán, the great-grandfather of the voivode instated in 1294, was the voivode.

1  Identifying the family of the voivode proved to be a difficult task for several generations of historians. The controversy in the last decades of the 19th century led to Pór Antal’s article, “László erdély vajda és a Keán nemzetsége”, Turul IX (1891): 105–112, in which he raised a number of convincing arguments to this dilemma. The work of the Romanian historians from the interwar period (Ioan Lupaş, “Un voievod al Transilvaniei în luptă cu regatul ungar (1291– 1315)”, Studii, conferinţe şi comunicări istorice II (1940): 33–40 continue to consider voivode Ladislas and vice-voivode Ladislas of Sancto Martino the same person and a member of the Borsa family. Nicolae Iorga (Locul românilor în istoria universală, ed. Radu Constantinescu (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1985), 138–140; Istoria românilor din Ardeal şi Ungaria ed. Georgeta Penelea (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1989), 60; Istoria Românilor (III, Ctitorii), ed. Victor Spinei (Bucharest: 1993, 128–130), followed surprisingly by Maria Holban (Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare, 90.) mentions Ladislas as a member of the Apor family. Lastly, Pataki (Anjou királyaink) published the document from September, 16th, 1306 and showed that voivode Ladislas and Ladislas of Sancto Martino were two distinct characters. The same author argued that Voivode Ladislas belonged to the Kán kindred, based on the testament of Demetrius Necskei’s, the son of the voivode’s sister, which was signed on May, 3rd, 1336: CDHA III. 277–278; DIR IV. 384.

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Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 )

167

A major figure in the political life of the Hungarian kingdom in the first four decades of the 13th century, ban Gyula is attested as holder of the voivode title in 1201 and 1214. As such, he made for himself a vast domain in the Târnava Mare valley.2 He seems to have also possessed the mountainous domain of Abrud (terra Obruth),3 whose gold exploitations, despite the traditional techniques employed,4 most certainly had provided him with important revenues. Gyula Kán also held other major offices during the reign of Andrew II, including that of palatine (1222–1226) and ban of Slavonia (1213, 1219, 1229–1235). In addition, between 1219 and 1221, he was the count of Solnoc, a position which also presupposed administrative involvement in the intra-Carpathian region. Despite his alleged Bulgarian origin,5 the genealogy of the Kán kindred claimed ties with one of the gyula title holders.6 Through their involvement in Transylvania, its members may have claimed certain rights over the heritage of Gyula the Transylvanian, the opponent of Stephen I. After 1235, however, the favors Gyula Kán enjoyed at Andrew II’s court were enough to turn him into an outcast after the coronation of Bela IV. Accused of treason, Gyula Kán was imprisoned and the properties he had received as royal donations, including the ones in Transylvania, were confiscated.7 For more than two decades after ban Gyula’s fall into royal disgrace, the Kán kindred’s interest in Transylvania diminished. Ladislas I Kán, ban of Slavonia (1245–1247), does not seem to have manifested any particular interest towards a province threatened and ruined after the Mongolian invasion. Yet his sons Ladislas and Gyula, as well as their cousin Nicholas, who had joined the party of “young king” Stephen after 1260/61, whom they followed in his Transylvanian “exile”, became a prominent presence in the province’s political and social life. We have already seen that Ladislas (II) Kán had been voivode before the second civil war between king Bela and his son (1260/61–1265), as well as in 1275– 1276, during the Csák domination of Transylvania. He was also count of Sibiu in 1273,8 which gave him the authority to protect his kindred’s estates on the Târnava Mare River, which duke Stephen had granted to their brother Gyula in

2  D IR II 97–98; ZW 528; Jakó 261. 3  D IR II. 139; ZW 111; Jakó 287, 310. 4  Valer Butură, Străvechi mărturii de civilizaţie românească. Transilvania—studiu etnografic (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1989), 372–380. 5  Gyula Kristó, Keán, “Szent István király ellenfele” Acta Historica 98 (1993): 15–28. 6  Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 85. 7  Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 122–123. 8  R A 2355–2376; DIR II 153, 157 (royal court judge, count of Baranya and Sibiu).

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1263.9 In 1267 they extended their holdings with the donations received from the “young king” by Nicholas Kán,10 the son of a brother of ban Ladislas (I), who bore the name of Gyula, according to family tradition. Nicholas Kán had a long career of royal vice-chancellor, favorite of widow queen Elisabeth and aspiring candidate to the Esztergom archbishop position, which he occupied twice yet without pontifical confirmation. Among his titles was that of provost of the Alba Iulia chapter until 1277/1278,11 having held this office since Stephen V’s Transylvanian duchy.12 As such, Nicholas was undoubtedly the main guarantor of the conservation and increase of his family’s Transylvanian properties during the troubled times following the events of 1272. His transfer from Alba Iulia to Székesfehérvár must have been connected to the Saxon rebellion of February 1277, to the outbreak of which Nicholas Kán had contributed as Péter Kőszegi’s rival to the Esztergom archbishopric. Indeed, the latest internal document mentioning him as Alba Iulia provost dates back to July 26, 1276,13 prior to the outbreak of the civil war. After this date, Nicholas ceased assuming this title,14 which was subsequently attributed to him only in two papal bullae issued by Joan XXI and Nicholas III,15 both unaware of the changing political circumstances in Transylvania. The events of this period offer a very good explanation for the tension that plagued, several decades later, the relations between the Saxons and voivode Ladislas Kán. Most likely during the violent events of 1277–1279, the Káns’ domains in the Târnave valley suffered serious devastation. Moreover, these domains were already subject to Saxon colonization after the middle of the 13th century, and the colonists who settled there had made their own distinct organization and aspired to winning the privileges of the “provincials” in the Sibiu county. Kán’s kindred repossession of properties was timely, probably during the campaign against the Saxons led by Fyntha Aba (1278/1279). The tie between the Káns and the Aba kindred was in fact one of the tightest,

9  DIR II 51–52; ZW 89–90; Jakó 241. 10  DIR II 97–98; ZW 528; Jakó 261. 11  The last reference was made on June, 1st, 1278, in a bull issued by Pope Nicolas III (Theiner I 324–326). As of November 1278 to his death, in late 1279, Nicholas Kán was royal provost of Alba and royal vice-chancellor (RA 2911–3006). 12  The first reference was made in 1265: DIR II 71–72, Jakó 257. 13  RA 2718. 14  RA 2823–2842. 15  Theiner I 322, 324–326; Theiner Vetera Monumenta Slavorum meridionalium Historiam Illustrantia I 95–96.

Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 )

169

being further consolidated through matrimonial alliance.16 We must also take into account the possibility that the members of the Kán kindred owned more Transylvanian properties, which they did not abandon despite the Saxon rebellion.17 We can thus state that at the time Ladislas (III) Kán became voivode, as kin to voivode Ladislas (II), his kindred was perfectly integrated in the noble “class” of Transylvania, with all the resulting privileges of being part of the regnum. The Káns’ rooting in Transylvania largely explains the circumstances in which Ladislas (III) became voivode. The last decade of the 13th century was, in the kingdom of Hungary, a time when the nobility’s political role increased unprecedentedly within the congregational system. In the general congregation of Pest of August 1298, the nobles would impose on King Andrew III their association in exerting the executive power.18 The nobility’s delegates became henceforward members of the royal curia, next to the clergy and the high aristocracy. The high maintenance costs at the court would be supported by the royalty via a special retribution fund. Failure to obtain prior consent from the nobility’s representatives rendered any of the king’s measures invalid, except for major donations and granting of office. By consenting to the nobility’s role to validate the appointment of the most important royal d­ ignitaries, the 1298 congregation did nothing but to acknowledge a state of things already in place in numerous regions of the kingdom, most certainly including Transylvania, whose real autonomy had increased remarkably with the rise of the congregational regime. Besides acquiring the right to choose noble judges, at the end of the 13th century the landlords managed to seize more control over the counts in the counties, whom they were empowered to confirm once appointed. This naturally increased the role played by the voivode in Transylvania. As for the deputy voivodes of Transylvania, they were not only selected exclusively from among the provincial nobility, as during the reign of Ladislas the Cuman; moreover, they were at least confirmed in the position by the same nobility, if not appointed by them indirectly to begin with. This right of confirmation was just a step taken towards the final goal of obtaining the right for direct election, and the favorable circumstances of the time ­provided 16  János Karacsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek a XIV. század közepéig (Budapest: Kiadja A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia), 736; Gyula Kristó, “Kán László és Erdély”, in Tanulmányok az Árpád-korról, ed. Gyula Kristó (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1983), 275; CDHA III 277–278; DIR IV 384. 17  A questionable document from 1280 mentioned Jula and Nicholas, sons of the former voivode Ladislas, selling a property located in the Cluj county: CD VII 4 181; Jakó 385. 18  DIR II 443–453; HD 532–540.

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necessary the opportunity. This is, in fact, the only explanation for the existence of such a great number of vice-voivodes during the time of Roland Borsa, including some of his opponents (e.g. Andrew of Geoagiul de Sus). On the other hand, the confirmation of vice-voivodes by the nobility was in line with the reforming spirit of the age, since the judicial attributes associated to this office were persistently claimed by the congregation. From this perspective, the congregational nobility’s attempts to impose similar regulations and means of control over the voivode himself were just the natural consequence of the political evolutions of the last two decades of the 13th century. Roland Borsa’s example, the voivode whose lack of affiliation to the “classes” of Transylvania prevented him from exerting control over the provincial nobility’s congregation, is quite illuminating. By refusing Roland Borsa’s government, the nobility in Transylvania clearly opted for a voivode from its own ranks, one who would defend their values and promote the specific interests of the Transylvanian regnum. The conflict between Andrew III and Roland Borsa created the ideal opportunity to make these desires come true. Undoubtedly, just like any other dignitary of the kingdom, Ladislas Kán benefited from royal investiture, yet his rise to power must have been conditioned by the approval of Transylvania’s nobility, which managed to impose to the king the transformation of the “royal” voivodeship into a “congregational” voivodeship in 1294. At the same time, being the representative of the congregational nobility, voivode Ladislas’s was not in position to exert a strict control over the territory under his administration, of the kind exerted by Matthew Csák, Amadé Aba or Henrik Kőszegi in other parts of the kingdom. Under the circumstances, the new voivode was faced with the opposition of another center of power, constituted around the powerful Alba Iulia bishop, Peter Monoszló, who found himself at the peak of his political career. 6.1.2 Voivodeship and Bishopric in the Last Years of Andrew III (1294–1301) Taking advantage of his position of strength in the province as well as his influence over the royal court, in 1294 Peter Monoszló came just one step away from accomplishing his time-honored goal of bringing Transylvania under the control of his family. As of 1287,19 bishop Peter had succeeded in imposing Michael Bő (de genere Beu), his kin from his mother’s side, as provost of the Alba Iulia chapter, thus gaining complete control over the Transylvanian church. In 1294 Michael Bő’s brother Peter was appointed count of Székely by the king,20 19  DIR II 280–281; Wenzel IV 302–303; Jakó 432. 20  Wenzel XII 557–559; RA 4004; Jakó 530, 533.

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which granted the bishop of Transylvania the political and military support that enabled him to aspire to the dominant position in the province. Bishop Peter’s competition was all the more menacing as he held a number of key positions in the heartland of Transylvania. The most important was undoubtedly the bishop’s city of Alba Iulia which, as proven by the royal visits of 1285, 1287 and 1291, and the provincial Diet of 1291, had preserved its prestige of being Transylvania’s true capital. Next was Cluj, a royal town the bishop had taken over during the troubled days of the mid 1270s, and the two powerful episcopal fortresses of Tăuţi21 and Floreşti.22 Although numerically inferior compared to the fortifications owned by the voivode Peter’s strongholds compensated with their excellent strategic position. Given this strong foothold, the bishop’s property expanded remarkably in the last two decades of the 13th century.23 Bishop Peter expressed his preoccupation with making more territorial acquisitions in the Mureş and Someşul Mic valleys, where the church of Transylvania managed to accumulate impressive estates. The bishop’s penchant for land did not slip unnoticed by his contemporaries. On January 13, 1298, the canons of the Alba Iulia chapter referred to it as such: “the venerable father Peter, by the grace of God bishop of Transylvania, our prelate, who with incessant zeal increased the fortune of the church of Saint Michael and is striving to increase its estates every day. . .”.24 As for the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the corresponding revenues, bishop Peter Monoszló was equally interested in having his rights acknowledged by the Saxon chapters in southern Transylvania, in collecting the bishop’s tithes in Ugocsa County, obtained in the hazy circumstances of late 1260s, as well as in incorporating Maramureş in his diocese. The latter confirms bishop Peter’s expansionist tendencies, probably in cooperation with “voivode” Nicholas Pok, count of Ugocsa and Maramureş,25 which triggered a stiff competition between the Transylvanian and Agria bishoprics in 1298– 1300, the latter being the owner of the counties in the northeastern parts of the Hungarian kingdom. In February 1299, after having attracted support from some of the kingdom’s barons, Peter Monoszló challenged Andrew III’s decision to 21  Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 180–189. 22  Adrian A. Rusu, Cetatea medievală de la Floreşti ( jud. Cluj), EN III (1993): 281–298. 23  For information regarding the expansion of the episcopal domains see: Zsigmond Jakó, “Az erdélyi püspökség középkori birtokairól”, in Erdélyi a keresztény magyar királyságban, (Cluj-Napoca: Erdélyi Múzeum Egyesület, 2001): 100–101. 24  DIR II 439. 25  Before the agreement between the Csák and Aba kindreds, in late 1277, Nicholas Pok exerted for a brief period the role of voivode of Transylvania. The title of “voivode” which he assumed since late 13th century seems to have been purely honorary; the information available does not indicate any competition between him and Ladislas Kán.

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subordinate Maramureş to the authority of the Agria bishopric, claiming this region had belonged to the Transylvanian diocese since time immemorial.26 Faced with this pressure, Andrew III initially decided to defer the issue to the judgment of ecclesiastical forums. Until such judgment, the king revoked the royal decision in favor of the bishop of Agria,27 which confirmed the Alba Iulia bishopric’s possession of Maramureş. On August 10, 1299, following archbishop John of Kalocsa’s sentence favorable to bishop Peter and an additional investigation of the entire issue by Emerich, bishop of Oradea and Ladislas of Tytel, royal court vice-chancellor, Andrew III decided on subordinating Maramureş to the Transylvanian bishopric.28 Yet, at the end of the same year, probably confronted with pressure from the opposing party, Andrew III repossessed bishop Andreas of Agria with spiritual jurisdiction over Maramureş and with the right to raise tithes, which caused bishop Peter to appeal to the Apostolic See on January 6, 1300.29 Despite its failure, the argument over Maramureş tested Peter Monoszló’s influence over the king and the barons and did not find him wanting. His power enabled him to engage with good odds in the confrontation with his rivals, despite his hardly justifiable claims. Bishop Peter was in fact a common presence at the king’s court in Buda, near which the Transylvanian church had succeeded in gaining numerous properties.30 Peter Monoszló and his brothers were also the landlords of estates located in his native Slavonia,31 as well as in other counties of the kingdom.32 His influence in Slavonia consolidated at the time when Michael Bő left the Transylvanian provost to become bishop of Zagreb, an office of high prestige (1298).33 In the congregation of August 1298, Peter Monoszló was mentioned the first in the list of the bishops, the only ecclesiastical dignitaries higher in position being the Esztergom and Kalocsa archbishops.34 Peter Monoszló had in fact attained this position immediately after the coronation of Andrew III. Moreover, he is occasionally attested as a member of the king’s limited judgment council.35 26  DIR II 461; HD 540–541. 27  HD 540–541. 28  DIR II 467, 514–515. 29  DIR II 476–478, 515–516. 30  RA 4338. 31  RA 4004. 32  RA 3973. 33  RA 4165. 34  DIR II 443. 35  DIR II 464–467; Wenzel X 329–332.

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The prestige and influence he enjoyed, doubled by his considerable fortune, conferred Peter Monoszló an exceptional advantage over the provincial nobility. First and foremost he relied on the Dăbâca nobles, who were part of his kindred and who made numerous donations and property exchanges in favor of the Alba Iulia church. The number of aristocratic families whose members had risen in the ranks of the Transylvanian clergy must have also been great, even if we lack sufficient information from sources. The vast estates of the bishopric enabled Peter Monoszló to support a great number of servants and affiliates, the nucleus of his episcopal squadron. In addition to his political moves, there is enough information to certify that Peter Monoszló also enhanced the religious spirit of his congregation. If the Mykud and Emerich Kökényes-Radnót brothers deem necessary to buy back their father’s crusader vote through a consistent donation for the ­construction of the Alba Iulia episcopal cathedral36 (whose long and costly reconstruction was one of bishop Peter Monoszló’s outstanding feats), the sources also mention a premiere for Transylvania, the first wills and testaments made by local nobles to the favor of the Alba Iulia church.37 Without dwelling on these aspects which need special investigation, we must highlight that this assertion of religiousness, reflected in the onomastics of the time, pleads once again for the mutual cooperation and trust between the nobility and the Transylvanian bishopric. Peter Monoszló also stood out through his excellent organization of the bishop’s chancellery,38 which would turn into a model for voivodal administration at that time in full reorganization. We can say that Ladislas Kán’s authority was severely out-shadowed by the bishop’s competition in his first years of rule. Unlike Peter Monoszló, Ladislas Kán did not enjoy much appreciation at the royal court, and his influence among the barons—to the category of whom he undoubtedly belonged— was only modest. Unlike other “oligarchs” of the time, the territorial authority achieved by Ladislas Kán was not based on a family tradition of dominating Transylvania. It did not originate in the troubled period after the great invasion of 1241 or the kingdom’s division between Bela IV and his son Stephen. Moreover, it did not even exist during the times of Ladislas the Cuman, when the other aristocratic principalities were already crystalized in Hungary. Under the circumstances, Ladislas Kán was forced to rely on claiming the political traditions and the ideological program of the Transylvanian regnum. In the 36  DIR II 294–296; HD 470–472; Jakó 434. 37  DIR II 412–413; HO VIII 349–350; Jakó 534. 38  Ciprian A. Dincă, “Despre diplomatica episcopală transilvană (1270–1307)”, Mediaevalia Transylvanica 3 (1–2/1999): 59–70.

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first years of his office, he slowly amassed properties, political influence and regional authority without harming in any way his relations with the provincial nobility. Unfortunately we lack more information about his vice-voivode Joan ( Johannes) of Deuş (Gyos, Cluj county),39 mentioned in two documents in the year 1296.40 In 1304, he had already been dead for some time.41 At that time, the vice-voivode no longer had the prerogatives of presiding over the kingdom’s noble congregation, transferred to the voivode himself. His judicial responsibility continued, however, in close cooperation with noble judges of the counties and the participation in their judicial sessions.42 However, the vice-voivodes of this period were more than just simple clerks subordinated to the royal power. The vice-voivode’s relative freedom from the voivode, which would become more obvious during the time of Ehelleus Ákos, probably originated in a specific modality to define their reports to the noble congregation. Besides consolidating his authority in Solnoc county—an important region due to its economic resources, less affected by the bishop’s authority43— around 1299 Ladislas Kán enforced his plan to make the strong Deva royal fortress his main residence. Firm grasp of these strategic positions enabled him to extend his influence over the lower Mureş valley and to facilitate liaisons with the kindred’s estates in Baranya county. The domination of southwestern Transylvania also enabled him to extend his influence into Banat and to manage his political projects in southeastern Europe. The voivode used this strategy with outstanding political skill to overcome the difficulties he was facing at home. Ladislas Kán’s firm grip over Hunedoara and Haţeg, after eliminating the episcopal competition, brought him in conflict with Peter Monoszló, who would turn to pope Boniface VIII in 1300 to stop voivodal abuse.44 The tense situation between the voivodeship and the bishopric did not break out into open conflict. With the death of King Andrew III (January 14, 1301) and the ensuing dynastic crisis, the balance of power between the bishop and the voivode changed to the benefit of the latter. The bishop’s main political weapon had been his influence at the royal court and its circle of power. The disappearance of the central power brought Peter Monoszló to an inferior position against the voivode, whose positions consolidated after numerous 39  DIR III 242, 411. 40  Jakó 546, 550. 41  DIR III 387–388 ( Johannis vicevoyvode bone memorie). 42  DIR III 387–388. 43  On June, 18th, 1296 the voivode issued a document at Românaşi (Egrug): Jakó 550. 44  Jakó 593.

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regional alliances. Ladislas Kán prolonged the uncertainty of the situation, as it allowed him to accumulate power free of supervision, while bishop Peter fought his way to promote the coronation and acknowledgment of a king who would offer him the leverage to regain the ground lost to the voivode. 6.2

A Nearly Sovereign Transylvania (1301–1310)

Despite the major role played in the history of medieval Hungary, the disappearance of King Andrew III and the end of the Arpadian dynasty was received with non-dramatic resignation by the contemporaries. The political stability of the numerous “principalities” and aristocratic entities that had consolidated in various regions of Hungary largely constituted a warranty for the political stability of the kingdom itself. The congregational regimes which had consolidated almost everywhere stifled the warlike tendencies of the aristocracy, preventing the dynastic crisis to escalate into a succession of internal wars similar to those after the death of Stephen V. Indeed, the congregational system had favored the transformation of the aristocratic principalities into siegeproof bastions not only from the king but also from competing principalities. The regimes of the “oligarchs” were not exclusively based on their personal resources but also on the cooperation with local classes, which exerted various influence on regional leaders. At any rate, the system made it impossible to seize the land of any “oligarch” by eliminating him, and the relative balance between rules was also due to the lack of opportunities for starting conflicts. Under the circumstances, the expansionist tendencies of the “oligarchs” were redirected, mainly to the territories and revenues which had been directly administered by royal clerks until 1301. 6.2.1 Assuming Royal Prerogatives In the case of Ladislas Kán, the royal estates under his jurisdiction consisted of the Rodna silver mines, Bistriţa county, the “towns” of Dej, Cojocna and Sic with the respective salt mines and undoubtedly the various royal revenues resulting from taxes and customs.45 The seizure of these major revenue sources occurred without major difficulties, since the de facto disappearance of the royal power made the voivode of Transylvania the sole regional authority entitled to assume its attributes. This considerably strengthened Ladislas Kán’s position, providing him with the sources to raly the provincial nobility under his control. It also ensured his undisputed superiority over bishop Peter 45  DIR III 172–173; ZW 295–296.

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Monoszló, his main internal political rival. Also, the voivode, as we are about to see, could expand his authority over Székely county and most importantly over the Saxon colonized territory and to redirect Transylvania’s external policies according to its security needs. Assuming and exerting royal prerogatives strictly differentiates Ladislas Kán’s rule in Transylvania from that of his predecessors. One must be cautious when met with theories that his predecessor Roland Borsa exerted the same prerogatives.46 These mainly refer to the title and attributes of Roland Borsa, which were not sovereign in reality and were no different from those of his immediate predecessors. They undoubtedly reflect the existence of a process of enlarged voivodal attributes. However, Roland Borsa’s administration was far from marking the climactic phase of this process. As for Ladislas Kán, there is no doubt that assuming such sovereign prerogatives was mainly made possible by the situation created by the disappearance of the royal power. Such changes became effective in Transylvania and the other territories under his control. The voivode not only felt entitled to take into his direct administration properties and revenues of the king, over which Transylvania’s voivodes had no legal rights. He imposed his authority—or, at least, reserved the rights in this respect—over the royal “counties” of the Székelys and Saxons.47 In addition, he summoned and chaired general congregations, which exceeded the territorial limits of the seven counties of “voivodal” Transylvania.48 Finally, he assumed the royal right to seize estates without legal owners and manage them accordingly (ius regium), and he continued to do so, after the compromise of 1310, even after he pledged his allegiance to King Charles Robert. Significant in this respect is a document of 1313, which mentions the voivode’s appropriation of the estate of a certain Tyuan, who passed away without male inheritors, and then giving it away to the Câlnic nobles.49

46  Ioan Lupaş, “Voievodatul Transilvaniei în secolele XII–XIII,” ARMSI part 3 18 (1936): 94–104; Ioan Moga, “Voievodatul Transilvaniei. Fapte şi interpretări istorice,” AIINCluj 10 (1944): 19–23; Ştefan Pascu, Voievodatul Transilvaniei (Cluj: Dacia, 1971), 1: 186–190; Pascu, Voivodatul Transilvaniei, 4: 421–422. 47  As mentioned in the Szeged agreement (1310): DIR III 172–173; ZW 295–296. 48  We refer mainly to the Niraj congregation (June, 1308), attended by the nobles from voivodal Transylvania and Szekelys and also by the nobles from Slavonia: DIR III 67; Zichy I 117–118; AkO II 391. 49  DIR III 211–212. Confirming this transaction at the request of the Câlnic nobles, who wanted to prevent future appeals, Charles Robert’s chancellery would carefully avoid the reproduction of the passage related to the voivode’s ius eminens: DIR III 215–216; ZW 309–311.

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This is how we must interpret the voivode’s huge accumulation of properties, as mirrored by the sources of the time, especially during Charles Robert’s restoration. Only a certain percentage consisted of properties the voivode ruled effectively as a landlord. Besides the appropriations on the Târnava rivers,50 which would add to the former family estate of the Káns, there were also a number of properties in other parts of Transylvania, which Ladislas and his sons seized through various means.51 The other estates seized included the fortresses and fairs subordinated to the voivodal administration,52 the vast royal domains estranged during Andrew III53 or the Mediaş, Biertan and Şeica districts, the invasion of which the Saxons complained against in 1315.54 Ladislas would then redistribute these properties to his relatives and vassals, according the sovereign right he had assumed. Ladislas mainly expropriated the properties given by King Andrew III to the nobles in Transylvanian to ensure their participation to the congregations. The “victims” included not only Dionysius Losonci-Bánffy, who lost the estates obtained from Andrew III in 1291–1298, but also Ugrinus Csák, who was coerced to surrender his domains in Făgăraş county to voivode Ladislas. This policy was undoubtedly supported by the local nobility, content with the removal from Transylvania of its outside competitors, who had hitherto hindered their access to major offices and the corresponding revenues. 6.2.2 Voivodal Administration This policy conducted in agreement with and to the best interest of the Transylvanian nobility explains the remarkable support enjoyed by Ladislas Kán’s regime. With manifestations specific to a sovereign prince of Transyl­ vania, Ladislas Kán filled his entire administration, from counts and chaplains to administrators and tax collectors, with provincial nobles who, at least since the disappearance of the former royal domain, had not enjoyed such privileges. Such was the case with counts Jacob (Jakab) Cseh of Rediu, count of 50  Jakó 543, 546. Deaj (Deesfalwa), Ceuaş (Chawas), Daia (Danjan), Hagmas, Kurtwelesteleke, obtained in 1301 in a property exchange with count Nicholas, son of Dees: DIR III 10–12; ZW 219–220. 51  Viţa, Ceaba, Babus, Beudin of the Solnoc county, and possessions of the sons of Ladislas (1315): DIR III 241–242; ZW 316–317. 52  Including Bonţida, a major voivodal residence, restituted in 1315 by Charles Robert to the Csák family: DIR III 238. 53  More important domain being that of Lăpuş (terra Lapus), with gold mines and at least five villages, confiscated by the voivode from the Losonci family: DIR III 234–235; Banffy I 42–43. 54  DIR III 240–241; ZW 315–316.

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Cluj in 1312–1314,55 or Dominic of Iara and Nicoalus of Gerend (Luncani), counts of Turda in 1310 and 1312, respectively56 (the latter also commander of fortress Lita57), as well as a certain Seem, count of Arieş Székely (1296).58 As for Dăbâca county, it was most probably ruled by the same Nicholas Dobokai, son of Ban Mykud, certified in this position in 1317.59 The position of count of Hunedoara was probably, cumulated—as would happen during the Angevine restoration—with that of Deva fortress commander, the office being associated with a certain Paul, son of Ladislas.60 The same happened in the Inner Solnoc, whose executive count was a certain Mike, commander of fortress Unguraş,61 and in the Arad and Braşov counties, subordinated to voivode Ladislas, whose owners were the commanders of the fortresses Şoimuş (Alexander, 1309; Dominic, 1310)62 and, respectively, Codlea (Solomon of Braşov).63 Information available to us on the castellans of voivode Ladislas—which, besides the aforementioned, included Nicholas Was of Ciceu,64 Stephen of Piatra Craivii,65 John Nyakas of Glogoveţ66 and Peter of Cetatea de Baltă67—does not completely cover the great number of fortresses he controlled.68 They are, however, enough to highlight the powerful rise, especially after 1301, of the castellan institution, which mirrored the gradual accumulation of power in the hands of voivode Ladislas. This system of government, with obvious centralizing tendencies, required a strong central administration. Indeed, the main structures of the voivodal administration, at least in the interval that followed his settlement in Deva, made a huge quality leap, being entirely compatible with the statute of Ladislas 55  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 248. 56  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 251. 57  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 358; Adrian A. Rusu, “Castelani din Transilvania în secolele XIII–XIV,” AIIACluj 22 (1979): 88, 95. 58  Jakó 543. 59  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 246. 60  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 299; Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 86, 96. 61  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 272; Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 92, 95. 62  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 413; Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 91, 93. 63  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 312; Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 86. 64  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 295; Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 85–86. 65  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 338; Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 90. 66  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 308, Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 87, 94. 67  Jakó 539. 68  We lack similar information for fortresses like Gogan Varolea, Haţeg, Hălchiu, Hunedoara, Menteu and Rupea. It is possible that Ladislas Kán had owned other fortresses as well.

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Kán’s quasi-sovereign Transylvania. Sources testify to the presence of a court judge (iudex curiae), a certain count John, and also of a steward (dapiferum), a certain magister Peter.69 The advent of these offices in Transylvania was an innovation of Ladislas Kán, offering decisive evidence about the existence of a powerful central administration. Thus, the position of royal court judge obviously overlapped the judicial attributes held in the second half of the 13th century by Transylvania’s vice-voivode, and it marked the limitation to the latter’s prerogatives. At the same time, the advent of the steward indicates a more or less complete voivodal court inspired by the model of the royal one. This would explain the way local clerks were transferred to the voivode’s subordination from that of the kingdom’s main dignitaries after 1301. Most certainly, Ladislas Kán made his contribution to organizing the Transylvanian camera, mentioned in the text of the Szeged agreement.70 This fiscal organism, whose main activity was the annual change of currency and the collection of taxes associated with this business (lucrum camerae), paid also by the nobility, seemed to have expanded its activity over the entire Transylvania, including Sibiu county and the Székely area. The control over Transylvania’s camera made the voivode the patron of a well-organized fiscal system which, besides collecting royal taxes and episcopal tithes, controlled the entirety of monetary operations, which included the right to mint coins.71 Under the circumstances, the Deva voivodal court must have been pretty animated. Maurice, the Cricău parish, received by Ladislas in November 1308, said that the interview was attended by the Deva castellan Paul, the son of Ladislas, together with his relative, John Rufus, as well as count Andrew, son of Iohanka, Bas, son of Balos, John of Lomb and numerous others.72 The presence at the court of a great number of nobles as judicial witnesses is occasionally certified by Ladislas himself.73 Despite the scarcity of information, the sources indicate the fact that the nobles present at Ladislas’ court were not associated with other activities. Consequently, they must be considered the voivode’s personal entourage, the people he could trust and kept around him at all times. 69  DIR III 176; Zichy I 122. 70  DIR III 172–173; ZW 295–296; AkO II 862. 71  Charles Robert would acknowledge, in 1336, the Chamber of Transylvania’s right (whose authority was already restricted to the seven counties of the proper voivodate of Transylvania) to issue gold florins, dimes and small dinars: DIR V 377–381. 72  DIR III 121; Kristó, Kán László, 287. 73  DIR III 32–35; DIR III 384–386. In addition, a smiliar situation is connected with the visit of a certain Paul, vicar of the Keve archdean, DIR III 122.

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As for the voivode’s initially rudimentary chancery, it evolved after the model of the episcopal one of Alba Iulia.74 Its chief, the archdean John of Târnava, was actually one of bishop Peter’s jurists, on behalf of whom he had even carried out an assignment to the royal court (1300).75 After 1301, this ambitious character moved into the service of voivode Ladislas, who entrusted him with the reorganization of his chancellery. The rank of protonotarius, held by John of Târnava in 1303–1306,76 conferred him the effective leadership of a presumably well-defined chancellery as well as major juridical attributions. In reality, documents ascribe him a position of power close to that of vice-voivode Ehelleus Ákos, next to whom John of Târnava participated in the authentication and implementation of voivodal decisions. After John of Târnava’s engagement in the competition for the succession to the episcopal see of Alba Iulia the voivode’s notary (notarius) position was given to a certain Stephen,77 of whom nothing else is known. 6.2.3 Solving the Conflict with the Bishopric Around 1306, Peter Monoszló’s old age and probably deteriorating health enabled Ladislas Kán to attempt to take over the Alba Iulia bishopric. The first candidate the voivode prepared for this office was his chancellor, archdean John of Târnava, who—taking advantage of his position as canonic of the cathedral church and the voivode’s support—managed to take control over bishop Peter’s chancellery and to become accepted as his successor. John of Târnava’s political influence largely explains the cooperation between bishop Peter and voivode Ladislas in the years 1306–1307, a period in which the bishop adopted a more determined posision in the dispute over the crown of Hungary, encouraging the voivode to support Otto of Wittelsbach’s candidature.78 Bishop Peter appealed against the excommunication of the voivode by archbishop Vincent of Kalocsa, possibly at the urge of John of Târnava, at a time when he agreed with Ladislas Kán over the takeover of control over the bishopric.79 In the coming months, the attributes of aged 74  For suggestions: Dincă, Despre diplomatica episcopală, 59–69; Fr Pall, “Cancelaria voievodului Transylvaniei la începutul secolului al XIV-lea,” Revista Arhivelor 3 (1/1960): 270–272. 75  RA 4339. 76  DIR III 33–35, 384–386 (October, 16th, 1303). Pataki, Anjou királyaink, 16–17; AkO II 72. 77  DIR III 121 78  See infra, 6.4.3. 79  DIR III 45–46; CD VIII 1 203–204; AkO II 92. The bishopal chancellor, John of Târnava, handed in the appeal to the Dominican prior in Alba Iulia; he probably acted on his own, still, his influence on the bishop appears to be decisive as of that moment.

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Peter Monoszló were completely handed over to John of Târnava who, in early summer, 1307 at the latest, was already the “locum tenens of Transylvania’s bishop”.80 This translation of power seemed to run smoothly and John of Târnava seems to have obtained preliminary approval from the canons with respect to his designation as locum tenens and virtual successor of the bishop in power.81 Nevertheless, the succession was compromised by an aggressive intervention of the voivode, who no longer supported his former chancellor, but decided to instate one of his sons to the episcopal see of Alba Iulia. This abuse, most likely inspired by Henrik Kőszegi’s similar attempts to impose his son Nicholas at the head of the Györ bishopric,82 was a real coup and generated a series of upheavels that undermined the voivode’s position. These events took place in the summer of 1307, a few months before the death of Bishop Peter and the masqueraded episcopal elections of January 7, 1308. Frustrated in his attempts, John of Târnava sought refuge at the court of Charles Robert, whose vice-chancellor he became.83 Using his newly acquired influence, he would become one of the fiercest opponents of Ladislas Kán, the political actions of whom he would in various occasions try to counteract. At the same time, the voivode’s attitude was met with firm opposition from some of the canons of the Chapter of Alba Iulia, seemingly determined in supporting John’s candidature. Under the circumstances, imposing the son of the voivode on the episcopal see required an act of force, which only amplified the already mounting tensions. On the day of Bishop Peter’s death (November 27, 1307), Ladislas stormed into Alba Iulia and arrested the opposing canons who had failed to take refuge out of the episcopal city. In the coming weeks, the voivode organized the pursuit of the canons who had fled so that, on January 7, 1308, he rounded most of the chapter members up for the “election” of his son, in fact nothing short of a dictate. Before the canonics released from confinement, Ladislas Kán in person announced his son’s e­lection,

80  DIR III 60. 81  It is the only interpretation that can be given to the confusing manner in which John formulated his claims over the Transylvanian bishopric, see: DIR III 78–79; Acta Gentilis 161–162. This preliminary “choice” was, naturally, an informal one, at a time when Bishop Peter was still alive. 82  Nicholas Kőszegi had become the Györ provost around the same period, thus guaranteeing the succession for Theodorus Tengerdi (in 1308, see: Engel, Archontologia, 1: 71). In the spring of 1307 Nicholas was, for a brief period, Otto of Wittelsbach’s vice-chancellor: AkO II 131. 83  First incontestable reference was made on August, 26th, 1307: AkO II 230.

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a document which he had drafted himself, reading it to the audience and asking them to validate the decision by applying their seals.84 Although not acknowledged by any superior ecclesiastic authority or any of the other bishops in the kingdom, the episcopal “election” of January 7 enabled Ladislas Kán to exert, in fact, undisputed control over the bishopric, the chapter and all of their properties for more than half a year (January– September 1308). For Ladislas Kán this period, which immediately followed the imprisonment of Otto of Wittelsbach, was the climax of his power. The act of force in January 1308 was not without consequences in the province. Unwilling to acknowledge the voivode’s son’s authority, the Saxon chapters in southern Transylvania refused, as of that date, to pay their monetary dues to the episcopal institution.85 At the same time, the voivode’s brutal treatment of the members of the chapter stirred the wrath of that part of Transylvanian nobility whose interests were related to the Alba Iulia bishopric, and drove it into the arms of the Angevine party. 6.2.4 Vice-voivode The vice-voivodal institution enjoyed a special position in the political structure of Ladislas Kán’s Transylvania, at least from the time its holder became Ehelleus Ákos (circa 1302–1303). Related to Moyus Ákos, Transylvania’s voivode (1288) and Székely count (1291), Ehelleus (II) Ákos started his successful political career employing his remarkable ability to constitute a chain of personal relations well anchored in all the compartments of the Transylvanian political system. The estates of this Transylvanian branch of the vast Ákos kindred lay in the middle and upper Mureş valley, in the counties of Alba, Târnava and Turda, their most important residence probably being at Farău (Forro, Alba county). His father, Ehelleus (I), had received, probably through king Ladislas IV’s donation, the Trascău domain (Torozko), whose importance considerably accrued with the iron mines in the region. In 1291, in parallel with the construction of the noble fortress of Colţeşti, Ehelleus (II) Ákos granted the use of the Piatra Secuiului fortification86 to the Székelys in the Arieş district, securing their devotion.87 After a matrimonial alliance seemingly negotiated by his grandfather, Ehelleus Ákos became related to a kindred of noble Székelys in the Tylegd district. In order to strengthen the family ties, he made a significant donation

84  DIR III 71–72, 77, 86; Acta Gentilis 154–155, 162, 173. 85  DIR III 144, 151. 86  Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 102–106. 87  DIR II 325; ZW 87–88; Jakó 492.

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to his kindred in the year 1294.88 His ties to the Székelys thus became a family tradition and constituted for Ehelleus Ákos the base of a political influence that could not be overlooked. Bishop Peter Monoszló’s attempts to consolidate his own influence among the Székelys by instating Peter Bő as their count (1294) undoubtedly represented a challenge to the Ákos kindred, determining his association to the group amassed around voivode Ladislas Kán. Instating Ehelleus Ákos as the vice-voivode was, in any case, preceded by Peter Bő’ disappearance from Transylvania and, with it, any reference to the count of Székely office also disappeared. The integration of the Székelys in Ladislas Kán’s political system was due, after all probabilities, to the influence exerted over them by Ehelleus, which explains once more the freedom of action specific to this position. We must note, however, that the connections to the Székelys were just one of Ehelleus Ákos’ priorities in growing his political influence. We know that one of his daughters, Elisabeth, became the wife of Nicholas, the son of the Saxon “count” Conrad of Tălmaciu,89 and the youngest of his five sons, destined to an ecclesiastical career, became the Cluj archdean.90 Despite its scarcity—we do not know, unfortunately, who Ehelleus’ wife was, nor the origin of the wives of his first four sons—the information available to us shapes the image of a vice-voivode who enjoyed a distinct position in Transylvania’s political system: far from being considered a simple familiar to Ladislas Kán, he was on the contrary one of his necessary allies; the circle of power constituted around the vice-voivode was an independent one, and his subordination to the voivode just formal. Owning his own fortresses91 and servients92 and a great number of allies whom he generously repaid from what seems to have been a considerable personal fortune, Ehelleus Ákos had his own court in Farău93 with its own chancellery94 and copyists.95 The vice-voivode’s political influence was certainly perceived by Ladislas Kán as potentially dangerous, which 88  DIR II 402–403; ZW 106–107; Jakó 532: the eastern half of the Gerebenes estate (Grebenişul de Câmpie, Mureş county); donation made to his cousins Stephen and Andrew, the sons of Helemban, the husband of his father’s sister. 89  DIR V 374–375; ZW 473–474. 90  DIR IV 8; ZW 349–350. 91  Additional to the Trascău fortifications, Ehelleus Ákos was temporary the owner of the Zadken fortress, property of the Chapter of Alba Iulia: DIR IV 15–16. 92  A certain Paul, servient (serviens) of Moyus Ákos, repaid with the Tychen Szent Marton estate (Târnăveni), attested in 1278: DIR II 189; Teutsch-Firnhaber 114–115; Jakó 362. 93  AkO I 354. 94  A certain magister Paulus, notary (notarius) of the vice-voivode, attested in 1314: DIR III 220–221, 403. 95  Stephanus filius David, officialis suis: DIR III 220–221, 403.

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explains why he tried to restrain it and why collaboration between them was infrequent. We will see that both Ehelleus Ákos and his political allies whom he influenced (e.g. the Székelys, Nicholas of Tălmaciu) would adopt their own political position during the civil war. They hesitated in associating themselves with the rebellion started in 1316 by the sons of Ladislas Kán, to the point where they ended up collaborating with the Angevine party, which would enable them to partially preserve their positions in its regime. 6.2.5 Ladislas Kán’s Territorial Expansion Even if Ladislas Kán’s center of power lay in Transylvania proper, the crisis of royal authority favored a much wider expansion of his political influence. The text of his excommunication pronounced by Cardinal Gentile, on December 25, 1309, made it obvious that Ladislas controlled territories located, from the royal court’s perspective, citra silvas, beyond Transylvania’s borders.96 One must not seek these territories northwestwards, towards the Bihor, Crasna and Sătmar counties—on which the Borsa kindred had a strong hold, and there is no evidence of any open conflict between them and Ladislas97—but down the lower Mureş river valley and towards Banat, which were open and appealing territories and over which the influence of the voivode is well documented. In 1310–1311, Ladislas Kán’s castellans, installed in the Şoimuş fortress, were also counts of Arad;98 a few years later, count Dozsa of Debreczen complained about the abusive seizure by voivode Ladislas of his Panad property (Horia, Arad county),99 located near the former royal fortress of Arad. In April 1310, Ladislas Kán concluded, in Szeged, the preliminary agreement with King Charles Robert’s representatives.100 In addition, the judge of the voivode’s court expected, in September 1310, the comeback of Ladislas de Vngaria in [partes] Transsilvanas,101 and the exertion of at least provisional control over the locality was consequently plausible.102 Most likely this control over the lower Mureş extended gradually. The voivode’s possession of the Şoimuş 96  Ultra silvas et citra silvas: DIR III 164–169; HD 568–571. 97  The Kán family did not own estates in Bihor. Magister Ladislas, son of voivode Ladislas, was owner of the Vasary property (1290): DIR II 325–326; HO VIII. 291–292. Kristó (Kán László, 279) suggested an identification with Ladislas Kán, but he was, in fact, part of the Aba kindred. 98  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 97. 99  DIR III 231–232; CDHA I 380; Kristó, Kán László, 282. 100  D IR III 172–173; ZW 295–296. 101  D IR III 176; Zichy I 122; Pál Engel, “Az ország újraegyesítese. I. Károly küzdelmei az oligarchák ellen (1301–1323),” Századok 122 (1–2/1988): 94. 102  See also: Engel, “Az ország újraegyesítese,” 111; Engel, Archontológia,1: 423.

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f­ ortress, which ­conferred him military control over the entire county of Arad, needs to be placed in relation with his residence in Deva which must have occurred earlier than the year 1300. The subsequent expansion of his authority in Szeged could have occurred with the later growth of his political influence, corroborated with the weakening authority of Ugrinus Csák over the counties in southern Hungary. As for southern Banat, the buffer region between Transylvania and Serbia, it was partially controlled by Theodor Weyteh of the Chanad kindred, who after 1306 at the latest entered under the political influence of Ladislas Kán and his Balkan allies. The fortresses in southwestern Banat (Ilidia, Horom, Vrsac/ Érdsomlyó), before 1311 controlled by Ugrinus Csák,103 seem to have been placed under Ladislas Kán’s and his allies’ influence. Transylvania’s voivode also exerted some influence in Slavonia, where his kindred owned properties.104 This influence, confirmed by a document from 1308,105 was due to his leading position in the anti-Angevine party. 6.3

The Major Coordinates of Kan’s Internal Policy

During the royal crisis, Ladislas Kán managed to build his personal government based on effectively assuming and exerting in these territories the prerogatives of a sovereignty which became almost complete with time. The complex structure of the Transylvanian political system was however far from completely subordinated to the voivode’s administrative apparatus, no matter how well articulated it might have been. If in certain areas of the territories he controlled Ladislas’ authority was almost discretionary—as was the case, for example, with the county of Hunedoara, in which the voivode’s judgment never required noble witnesses106—in other areas it was mediated by his relations in cooperation with the local elite. Such was the case with the congregational nobility, which had not lost its fundamental role in Transylvanian politics. At the same time, according to the preliminary agreement of Szeged (1310), Ladislas Kán’s authority nominally expanded over the entire territory of the Transylvanian “duchy”, being formally acknowledged in the county of 103  Engel, “Az ország újraegyesítese,” 95–97 (map). 104  Györffy, Az Árpád-kori, 256. 105  The voivode’s sentence in a dispute related to a property in the Körös county, favorable to his family from the mother’s side (of the Tétény kindred): DIR III. 67; Zichy I. 117–118; AkO II. 391. 106  D IR III 13–15, 16–17.

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Sibiu and the Székely territories.107 The voivode’s relations with the Saxon and Székely communities require separate treatment, as they had a major contribution to securing the force and stability of the political system he ran. At the same time, the necessity to employ all “elements of energy”108 existing in the province and the direction Ladislas Kán headed to in his external policy after 1301 drove the voivode to cultivate special relations with the Romanians in Transylvania, which were a continuation of the policy started by Ladislas the Cuman. 6.3.1 Nobility and Noble Congregation Ladislas Kán’s regime was defined, during its long evolution, by the cooperation between the voivode and the congregational nobility. Even if the regime instituted by him eluded, to a certain extent, the political role of the noble congregation, no attempts were made to remove its privileges. The interdependence between Ladislas Kán and the noble “state” of the province became obvious since the very start of his term: in April 1296, Ladislas himself presided over the noble congregation that took place in Torda, apud ecclesiam cruciferorum,109 the participants of which included not only the new vice-voivode, named John,110 but also exceptionally the provost John of Sibiu.111 General congregations attested henceforth would be presided by the voivode himself, whose periodic comebacks in villa Cruciferorum would consent to the promotion of this center as the congregational capital of Transylvania.112 The assemblies, which usually took place near the church dedicated to the Holy Cross, property of the Hospitaller order, reunited an impressive number of participants: over 150, in April 1296.113 There were also noble assemblies in other localities as well, but they were rather an exception. One of these, summoned in Românaşi (villa Egrug), in June 1296, to solve the litigation between the Church of Transylvania

107  D IR III 172–173; ZW 295–296. 108  Iorga, Locul românilor, 135. 109  Jakó 543, 546. 110  Jakó 546: Johanne vivewoyuoda. 111  Jakó 543, 546: Johannes prepositus Scybiniensis. 112  Pataki, Anjou királyaink, 15–17; AkO II 72 (1306). Counterfeiters in the last decades of the 14th century also claimed Ladislas Kán had issued a series of documents issued in villa Cruciferorum: Jakó 561, 586 (DIR II 434–435, 470–471). Since none of the forgeries identified today indicates the voivodal court of Deva as the place of issue indicates that during the 14th century Ladislas Kán’s name was still associated with the assemblies of Cristiş/ Oprişani and the congregational system. 113  Jakó 543.

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and a local senior,114 were more limited in participation. As for the 1308 congregation, which took place in Niraj (Neregh), it was motivated, as we are about to see, by the voivode’s intent to confer it broader representation, including the participation of the Székelys. Even in the case of sentences ruled outside the congregation from his court in Deva, Ladislas would not omit, whenever necessary, to mention the noble states’ association to the decision-making process (prehabita matura deliberatione et consilio nobilium terre Transylvaniane, qui nobis tunc aderant, according to the formulation of a document of October 1303115), the only one able to confer authority to voivodal sentences. At county level, the consolidation of the institutions of the noble counties continued to develop along with a more precise articulation of their attributes. If the count was appointed by the voivode, at least in the cases where they also exerted the castellan position of one of the voivodal fortresses, noble judges were elected by the county nobility and no local assembly could take place in their absence. The fact that there were two noble judges in Transylvanian counties, just like in Slavonia (unlike four in most of the counties of regnum Hungarie), probably hints to the reduced size of the provincial nobility. Differences in fortune and social position between the nobles were fairly significant. At its upper level, there was a provincial aristocracy consisting of no more than ten major families. Besides the Transylvanian branches of the Kán, Ákos and Kökényes-Rádnoth kindreds, there were also the Wass116 and Apafi, the families in Luncani (Gerendi), Geoagiul de Sus, Iara and also the elusive Andrew, son of Ipoch, owner of more fortresses and estates than the Transylvanian average nobleman, whose interests at that time were confined to the province and who owned key positions inside the administration, congregational structures or at least in that of noble counties. Noble judges attested in this period in the counties of Cluj (1304,117 1314118), Solnoc (1299)119 and Alba (1320)120 were generally, just like the assessing judges who assisted the voivode during general congregations, members of families with solid ties to the province: Stephen (Stephanus) of Jucu (Suk), Gregory of Geoagiu (Gyog), Stephen of Sâncraiu (Sancto Rege) etc. Involvement in the voivodal 114  Jakó 550. 115  D IR III 32–35, 384–386. 116  See the excellent report of András W. Kovács, “Familia Wass de Țaga în Evul Mediu (Societatea nobiliară de mijloc din Transilvania),” AIICj 36 (1997): 55–92. 117  D IR III 41, 387–388. 118  D IR III 226, 405. 119  D RH XI. 120  D IR III 339; ZW 343–344.

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policy was by no means a rule for the members of this provincial aristocracy. Some of them (nobles of the families of Dobokai, Suki and Gerendi, to mention only the most obvious examples) were clearly in opposition to Ladislas Kán’s regime, and a most of them kept a cautious distance. The cases of active and durable involvement were relatively few: Andrew, son of Ipoch, master of a vast domain in the Şieu valley,121 and a series of castellans, the most important being that of Ciceu, Nicholas Was. The properties and political relations of the members of this kindred constituted a solid base for stability, enabling them to conserve an autonomous position irrespective of the political regime. This provincial “aristocracy”, with obvious aspirations for independence, supported Ladislas Kán so long as he represented an obstacle against the interference of aristocracy from regnum Hungarie, redoubtable competition due to the privileges and donations received from the royal court. At the start of the civil war, most of these families were more interested in seeking ways to come closer to the new royal power than to join in a war against it. Under the circumstances, Ladislas’ direct supporters tended to be members of the small and middle nobility, a social category from which the voivode recruited the retainers, clerks and administrators of his vast domains. These lesser nobles were interested in preventing the instauration in Transylvania of a powerful royal authority and the return of the court aristocracy and its entourage. The immense number of properties seized by Ladislas Kán allowed him to develop more than the Hungarian traditional system of “familiarity”— a true vassalic system. The impulse in this direction had been traced by king Andrew III’s provincial representatives: in an attempt, in 1295, to solve a dispute with count Alard, son of Gyan (the leader of the 1277 rebellion) on the issue of a property which was rightfully the king’s, his representative, magister Vyvianus, left the respective property in the possession of the Ocna Sibiului nobles in exchange for the vassalic oath.122 On his turn, Ladislas Kán seems to have entrusted much of the domains he had seized to his own vassals, as the best way to secure their loyalty. The voivode’s military machine seems to have consisted mainly of small nobles and other categories of free men connected to the voivode in one way or another. Numerous other structures, retainers or vassals among other noble families and their own clients, as well as representatives of the bishopric and the chapter, were a force to be reckoned with. We have actually seen that vice-voivode Ehelleus Ákos himself held an office practically independent from Ladislas, as one savvy enough to ensure his political survival during the Angevine restoration. No matter how great the number 121  D IR III 323–326; ZW 340–341. 122  D IR II 415–416; ZW 199; Jakó 538.

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of servients and familiars of the voivode, they were still insufficient to allow Ladislas Kán to flagrantly ignore the interests of the provincial nobility. It is hard to say to what extent the resistance to interference from aristocratic groups outside the province, undoubtedly a common concern of the Transylvanian nobles, reglardless of rank, could have become a radical “Transylvanian” ideology of supporting the autonomous tendencies promoted by Ladislas Kán. The fierce and prolonged resistance met in Transylvania by the Angevine party as well as Charles Robert’s distrust of the provincial nobility could constitute arguments in this respect. On the other hand, it is certain that the Transylvanian nobility was clearly aware of its Hungarian identity and consequently to its belonging to the greater community of Magyars in the kingdom of Hungary. In addition, they were loyal to the Hungarian crown, whilst trying to navigate its relations with the royal power in a way that would enable them to exert some sort of control over the province. 6.3.2 The Saxons Getting the Saxons in the “province of Sibiu” under the control of Transylvania’s voiovodes and the Alba Iulia bishops had long been a priority of both the local aristocracy and the church. Without attempting to reconstitute the long history of this long dispute, we should at least highlight the fact that after the Mongol invasion of 1241 and especially during the Transylvanian duchy of Stephen V, the Saxon issue had escalated to the next level. Firstly, the ecclesiastical autonomy of the Saxons in the “province of Sibiu” had been guaranteed despite the Alba Iulia bishops’ overt hostility expressed by the Papacy, whose involvement in Transylvania had climaxed during the offices of Innocent III, Honorius III and Gregory IX.123 Yet, after the Council of Lyon (1245), the pope deliberately renounced interfering in the province, leaving Bela IV full liberty to organize the anti-Mongolian defense.124 This deliberate renunciation had a negative impact on the Saxons; significant in this respect is the fact that privileges received from king Andrew II (1224) were no longer confirmed by any of the last Arpadian sovereigns. Secondly, imposing the political model of the 123  The confirmation of the Saxons’ free provost in Transylvania issued by Pope Celestine III (1191): ZW 1–2; DIR I 11. The Saxons’ conflict with Bishop Adrian and the resolution offered by the papal legate (1192–1196): ZW 2–3; DIR I 11–12. Innocent III’s attempt to take the Sibiului provost under papal authority: ZW 10–11; DIR I 152. For the events during the term of Pope Honorius III see: Sălăgean, “Honorius III,” 78–85. 124  For Transylvania’s situation after the Mongol invasion and the consequences of the Lyon Council see: Tudor Sălăgean, “Regnum Transylvanianum. Contributii la studierea genezei unui regim,” MT 2 (1/1998): 117–121.

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duchy in the second half of the 13th century forced the Saxons to acknowledge the authority of Transylvania’s rulers time and again, be they members of the royal family (Stephen V, Ladislas IV) or representatives of the high aristocracy (Matthew Csák, Fyntha Aba), who strove to reconstitute the politic model of the Transylvanian duchy to their own best interest. The first violent reactions of the Saxon colonists against the pressure exerted against them by the voivode came during the time of Stephen’s duchy and the internal turmoil that ensued. While the 1264 rebellion had been exclusively directed against the political authority represented by duke Stephen, the rise to arms of 1277, led by Gyan, son of Alard, was meant to both overthrow the Csáks political regime and counteract the pressure from the leaders of Transylvania’s church: bishop Peter Monoszló and provost Nicholas Kán. At the same time, the 1277 events and the long civil war that followed (it ended only in the winter of 1278/1279, after the victorious expedition against Sibiu of the Aba kindred’s troops) represented the violent expression of ethnic intolerance promoted by the authorities and Hungarian nobility, which had pushed the parties to the brink of war. Barons and prelates reunited in the congregation of May 1277 spoke on this occasion about the Saxons having killed Hungarians in the “duchy of Transylvania”,125 and burning alive, in the Alba Iulia cathedral, of two thousand Magyars.126 They also tell about the persecutions the Transylvanian church and its clerics had to suffer from the “cruel tyranny of outlaw Saxons”,127 describing the terms of a ruthless ethnic conflict in sufficient detail. The last two decades of the 13th century were thus marred by accumulating tension across Transylvania, following the progress of the Saxon colonization. The main protagonists of the Saxon claims were the colonists in the recently colonized territories, who aspired to the political and ecclesiastical privileges of the Sibiu “provincials” The most fearsome opposition came not so much from the political authorities of the duchy or of the kingdom itself but from the Alba Iulia bishopric and chapter, which could not easily accept the ecclesiastic autonomy claimed by the German “guests”. Thus, the first to make clear claims for autonomy, immediately after the victory of king Ladislas IV against the Aba kindred in the civil war of 1282, were none other than the colonists in the Mediaş deanship, the same who, in 1277, had successfully emancipated from the influence of Nicholas Kán. Taken by 125  universos gentis Vngaricae in ducatu commorantes Transsilvano in quibuscumque latibulis, insulis seu munitionibus deprehendere potuit indiferenter gladio interemit: Jakó 351. 126  circa duo millia Vngarorum utriusque sexus, qui causa defensionis in gremium ecclesie confugeran, in ipsa eccclesia flamme incendio concremavit: Jakó 351. 127  per crudelem tyrannidem Saxonum scelestissimorum: Jakó 351.

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surprise and lacking support from any of the central or local political authorities, the Alba Iulia chapter had no alternative but to back down. Through a negotiated act with the Mediaş parish, sanctioned and guaranteed by bishop Peter Monoszló, the canons were forced to accept, on June 23, 1283, to redeem the greater part (3/4) of the cereal, wine, bees and lamb tithes in exchange for a fixed amount (40 silver marks).128 For Transylvania, the novelty of such an engagement made it extremely difficult to enforce. Negotiations and controversies on this issue continued in the following years, and even became the subject of an appeal to the Pontifical See. Eventually, the Mediaş parish won the dispute: the new agreement with the chapter, signed on the May 28, 1289,129 guaranteed this time not only by bishop Peter Monoszló, but also by the provost of Sibiu and the prior of the Alba Iulia convent of the Dominican Order, wholly restated and reinforced the provisions of 1283. Despite leaving room for abuse from the bishops of Alba, as they permanently looked to bring the parishes in the Mediaş deanship back under their control,130 this agreement was a remarkable step towards gaining ecclesiastic autonomy from Sibiu and also a model to follow by the other Saxon chapters outside the “royal territory”. The privileges of the Mediaş deanship had been gained under political circumstances favorable to Saxon communities. The Saxons’ hostility to the Aba kindred had become justified after palatine Fyntha’s rebellion (1282). In addition, the change of attitude towards the Saxons was motivated by their contribution to the fight against the Mongol invasion of 1285. In the last years of his reign, king Ladislas IV used the Saxon communities’ economic and military potential in an attempt to institute a reign that would keep the aristocrats under control. The presence of the king in southern Transylvania in the fall-winter of 1288, along with archbishop Lodomerius’ appeal to the counties of Sibiu and Braşov and the presence of the Sibiu provost in the royal entourage were proof of the Saxons’ entry in the grace of Ladislas the Cuman, which also explains the political capital they accumulated. Their privileged position remained unchanged during the reign of Andrew III. Attending to the “dietal” congregation of Transylvania of March 1291, and then at the general congregation of the kingdom in 1298, further cemented the Saxons’ place in the assemblies. Essential to their rising political influence was not so much the Saxon community spirit as the growing influence of the aristocracy. Taking advantage 128  D IR II 249–250; ZW 145; Jakó 399. 129  D IR II 308–309; ZW 159–160; Jakó 445. 130  A complaint against the Archdean of Alba, who claimed hefty amounts in the account of the right of accommodation, was addressed to Pope Clement V by the dean and rectors of Mediaş on January, 13th, 1308: DIR III 63–64; ZW 237–238; AkO II 303.

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of the uncertainty of their position on the frontier and their social mobility, the Saxon grafs rose as a political factor of real importance. King Andrew III’s document of February 1291 confirms their assimilation into the “noble” state131 and their entitled claim to benefit from the same rights. This was just the climax of the process of emancipation initiated some decades ago, which had given some of the Saxon noble families almost permanence direct role in the military enterprises of the kings of Hungary as well as the opportunity to accumulate major properties. It was not by chance that the Saxon nobility played a major role in the most significant political and military events which involved Saxon communities. Saxon counts also played an active role in the new stage of Saxon colonization in the last decades of the 13th century,132 which resulted in the settlement of the German colonists, or “guests” in the Secaşelor valley, around Sighişoara and in the territory between the two Târnava rivers followed by their subsequent organization into sees and deanships. As a consequence of this new stage of Saxon community expansion, the organization of the Sighişoara see was completed in last quarter of the 13th century,133 when seniores de castro Sex134 were mentioned, clearly pointing out to an advanced community organization. As for Sebeş, the process ended in 1301, when “the judges, jurors and all the guests in Sebeş”135 responded affirmatively to the citizens of Sibiu’s new demand for leave of passage. Two years later (1303) the deanship of Sebeş is mentioned in the agreement concluded between its parishes with bishop Peter Monoszló on how to charge episcopal tithes.136 Next to the aforementioned see of Mediaş and the neighboring Şeica and Biertan sees, the two sees of Sighişoara and Sebeş became the most important Saxon communities which defined the structures of the institutional autonomy outside the initial colonization area. Several smaller deanships joined their attempts to claim full ecclesiastic autonomy (Saschiz, Târnava Mare, Târnava Mica, Spring, Cris, and Cosdu) located in the ecclesiastic subordination of the Alba Iulia bishopric. After 1289, these Saxon chapters made several attempts to gain the ecclesiastical freedom of the Mediaş deanship at least. Nonetheless, this model only played a transitional role for these communities. Their main objective was to become the affiliates of the Sibiu provost 131  nobiles regni nostri et Saxones Transylvaniani predia tenentes et more nobilium. DIR II 505–509; ZW 172–176. 132  Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor 203. 133  Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 206–208, 277. 134  Z W 141; Jakó 384. Pascu, Voievodatul Transilvaniei, 82–83. 135  iudex, iurati et universi hospites de Sebus: ZW 219; DIR III 6–7. 136  Z W 226–227; DIR III 22–23.

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and to gain the same status as other subordinate communities, namely full autonomy from the Alba Iulia bishopric. The considerable difference in status among the Saxon territories largely explains the social complexity in southern Transylvania around the year 1300. Thus, the territorial boundaries of the Sibiu provost, confined to the Sibiu, Nocrich and Cincu chapters, were much more restricted than those of the county of Sibiu which, according to Andrew II’s “constitution” (1224), included the entire territory “from Baraolt to Orăştie”.137 This case, the causes of which have not been completely explained, made, for example, the see of Orăştie depend administratively on the province of Sibiu, yet continue to depend ecclesiastically on the Alba Iulia bishopric. It was thus more than natural for the Saxons in southern Transylvania to address their claims, which varied from appeals to higher instances138 to armed expedition against the chapter, in February 1308,139 mainly to the Alba Iulia ecclesiastic authorities, the main hurdle before their goals. Also, the protagonists of most of the Saxons’ violent actions in this interval, namely the 1277 and 1324 rebellions and the riot of 1308, were the residents of this troubled region, who aspired to similar freedoms as those enjoyed by the colonists from the privileged territory. On the other hand, the interest of the great Saxon communities’ leaders in attending the noble congregations and their assimilation to the noble statute enabled them to adopt a flexible attitude towards voivode Ladislas Kán. Under the circumstances, the preliminary agreement signed in Szeged was non-equivocal: the Sibiu county Saxons were subordinated, until 1308, to the Transylvanian voivode, the provisional authority of whom they acknowledged as derived from his attributes of the king’s territorial locum tenens. The causes may have originated from the conflicts of the summer of 1301 in southern Transylvania.140 The concrete ways in which the acknowledgment was obtained are difficult to reconstruct. In all probability they did not exceed the limits of good neighbors, accompanied by the payment to the voivode of certain taxes and fees. Undoubtedly, the subordination to the voivode, even formal, “froze” all attempts to extend the privileges inspired from the Sibiu model, enabling the voivode to quietly enforce his authority over the “districts”

137  D IR I 208–210, 383–384. 138  See the complaint addressed by the chapter to the pontifical legate, Cardinal Gentile, on January, 1309: the Saxons in the “seven chapters” (Spring, Cosdu, Târnava Mare, Țapu, Saschiz, Criş and Târnava Mică) offend him, harm him, violate his rights: DIR III 93–95. 139  Enforced by armed clergy and laymen in the Deanship of Sebeş: DIR III 155. 140  D IR III 6–7; ZW 219.

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of Mediaş, Biertan and Şeica.141 In what concerns the unique exception of 1301, there is no clue that could help us determine the existence of tense relations between the voivode and the Sibiu residents, before the outbreak of the 1307– 1308 crisis. On the contrary, in 1306–1307 Ladislas Kán and the Sibiu county Saxons converged in endorsing Otto of Wittelsbach’s candidature to the throne of Hungary, marking the climax of good relations that would only deteriorate after the unscrupulous arrest of the Bavarian duke and the voivode’s takeover of the bishopric. These events taking place in the second half of 1307 alarmed the Saxons who then offered their political support to Charles Robert of Anjou. Even if the relations with Peter Monoszló had not been the most cordial, they immediately understood that the voivode’s complete victory over the bishopric made it imminent for Transylvania to become a hereditary principality, which would pose a threat to the county of Sibiu. As of that moment, the Saxons in Transylvania suddenly switched from peaceful neutrality towards Ladislas Kán to full support for the Angevine candidate. Given the unstable balance of power in the province, the firm position they adopted would bring a decisive advantage to Charles Robert. 6.3.3 Székelys The Székelys were much more attached to the political system governed by Ladislas Kán than the Saxons from the county of Sibiu. Nevertheless, they were far from completely subdued. At that time, the Székelys were still a gentilic society, organized around family relations dating back to the colonization period. Of the three traditional ‘orders’, the backbone of their organization, only that of the notables (primores) had adapted to the noble system to a certain extent, which provided personal ownership of the land.142 A certain degree of subordination of the Székely communities to the voivode became, under the circumstances, a military necessity given the long crisis during the interregnum. For this subordination, as suggested by the text of the Szeged pact, Ladislas Kán may have assumed the attributes of Székely count in 1301– 1310, as some of his successors would. The most powerful bond between the noble counties and the Székely territories was still ensured by the Székelys’ voluntary integration within the state 141  D IR III 240–241, 410–411; ZW 315–316. 142  Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 115–117; Ioan-Aurel Pop, Romanians and Hungarians from the 9th to the 14th century. The Genesis of the Transylvanian Medieval State, (Cluj-Napoca: Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 1996), 162–164; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 257–259; Charles d’Eszlary, Histoire des institutions publiques hongroises, vol. 1, (Paris: M. Riviere, 1959), 58–74, 337–338.

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regime, to a greater extent than that of the Saxon communities. Following the great Mongol invasion, the Székelys manifested a strong attraction to gaining noble status and the associated privileges and, as a consequence, the Székely leaders obtained the right to participate, as a distinct “state”, to Transylvania’s general congregation (1291) and to that of the kingdom of Hungary (1298). Their interest in becoming associates to Transylvania’s regime of social states continued during Ladislas Kán’s regime. Seem, the Székely count in the Arieş valley attended, in April 1296, the congregation of villa Cruciferorum.143 In June 1308, Ladislas Kán organized the greatest of the state assemblies during his rule at the boundary of the Székely territory (iuxta Neregh),144 with their leaders’ attendance. Nonetheless, the effective authority the voivode would exert in his relations with the Székelys seems to have been less significant overall. We have already seen how the influence exerted by vice-voivode Ehelleus Ákos over the Székelys in the sees of Arieş and Telegd is much better documented. At the same time, we have seen that the voivode’s political views did not always converge with those of his locum tenens. The remarkable traditionalism featured by Saxon communities made it impossible for them to give up on the allegiance to the king and their involvement in internal political conflicts. There was no clue about the participation of the Székelys to the rebellion started in 1316–1317 by the sons of voivode Ladislas Kán. On the contrary, both Charles Robert and Louis of Anjou would always consider the Székelys their most loyal servants. The Székelys’ subordination to the voivode was much like that of the Saxons, dictated by the political context. Nonetheless, their attraction to the congregational system was a clear sign of evolution that would push the Székelys into the regnum Transylvanianum state regime of the 15th century. 6.3.4 Romanians The difficulties faced in dominating the Transylvanian political stage, interweaved with military and economic reasons, forced Ladislas Kán to continue the strategy used by Ladislas the Cuman in the last years of his reign towards the Romanians in Transylvania. The Romanians’ integration into Transylvania’s political system and the frail attempts to rise as a distinct entity within its borders had been the result of the local society’s long adaptation to the system of values promoted by the Hungarian crown and the constitution of new social elite that would aspire to noble status. The representatives of this Romanian knezes’ that owned land had been summoned by King Andrew III to attend the

143  Jakó 543. 144  D IR III 67.

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general congregation of Alba Iulia, in March 1291.145 Again in 1288 archbishop Lodomerius asked them to withdraw the support to Ladislas the Cuman given together with other Transylvanian privileged states. The Transylvanian ­knezes’ attempts to join the congregational system did not have repercussions on the representative institutions in the autonomous “Romanian” countries. The Haţeg country provides the most significant example in this respect, where knezes’ assemblies attested in the 14th century received strong influences from the noble congregations of Transylvania, manifested in the structure and attributes of the assemblies as well as the local chancellery.146 Even though the status of Romanian knezes in Transylvania was far from being standardized around the year 1300, one cannot doubt that those who had succeeded in maintaining their relative autonomy “bore all the attributes of a Hungarian feudal lord, except for the royal donation and Catholic status”.147 They in fact fully deserved this position especially due to their contribution in defending the kingdom, better documented as we approach the end of the 13th century.148 In the turmoil of the second half of the 13th century, the Romanians’ military role had grown significantly, especially since the process of colonization during this period was motivated mainly by economic reasons, and not for gaining more manpower to consolidate Transylvania’s defense system. This enabled the Romanians to become more than just border guards (as certified once again during the Mongolian invasion of 1285149) and to engage in various offensive campaigns of the Hungarian crown, e.g. the campaign against Ottokar II (1260)150 and Andrew III’s expedition against Austria (1291),151 which 145  For a more recent approach see: Érszegi Géza, “A román nemesek az erdély tartományi gyülésen a 13. század végén? (Egy forráshely ésrtelmezéséhez),” in Nobilimea românească din Transilvania/Az erdélyi román nemesség¸ed. Marius Diaconescu (Satu-Mare: Editura Muzeului Sătmărean, 1997), 36–63. 146  Ioan-Aurel. Pop, Instituţii medievale româneşti. Adunările cnezialeşi nobiliare (boiereşti) din Transilavania în secolele XIV–XVI (Cluj: Dacia, 1991), 25–26, 59–66, 85–101. 147  Ioan-Aurel Pop, “Elita românească din Transilvania în secolele XIII–XIV (origine, statut, evoluţie),” in Nobilimea românească din Transilvania/ Az erdélyi román nemesség, ed. Marius Diaconescu (Satu-Mare: Editura Muzeului Sătmărean, 1997), 45–55 (52); IoanAurel Pop, “Statutul cnezilor supuşi pe domeniile feudale din Transilvania în secolul al XIV-lea,” in Civilizaţie medievală şi modernă românească. Studii istorice, ed. Nicolae Edroiu et al. (Cluj: Dacia, 1985), 102–115; Pop, Instituţii medievale româneşti, 36–57. 148  Pop, “Elita românească din Transilvania,” 42–44. 149  Jakó 407. 150  H D 287–288; DocVal 27. 151  Binder, “Antecedente”, 35–36; Gheorghe Brătianu, “În jurul întemeierii statelor româneşti,” in RI 1–2 (1993): 157; Pop, Instituţii medievale româneşti, 18; Pop, “Elita românească din Transilvania,” 43.

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enhanced the appreciation they enjoyed and increased their military prestige. The Romanians’ martial values, as highlighted by Ladislas the Cuman, as well as their presence in the Bihor military structures subordinated to Roland Borsa152 testify to their involvement in the internal conflicts of the 13th century. They are also indicative of the extension of privileges granted to soldiers also onto Romanian knezes outside the autonomous “countries” in border regions. The Romanians’ economic standing improved in the second half of the 13th century, especially because of their skills in raising sheep, as attested in this period,153 no doubt in close relation to the rise of textile production in Saxon economic centers. The persistent claims of archbishop Fillip Türje, in 1256 and 1262,154 for the Romanians’ and Székelys’ animal tithes can only be explained by their significant value. Also, the expansion of noble domains had grown the interest in using Romanians as labor force. In the first years of Andrew III’s reign, settling Romanians on various ecclesiastic and noble domains required a special permit from the king, who was worried this migration would cost the kingdom some of its most valuable subjects.155 Given the kingdom of Hungary’s feudal anarchy, these transfers had become assimilated to the colonization of foreign “guests”, occurring during the temporary or even definitive suspension of their dues to the royal treasury. Thus, in 1292, the settlement of Romanians on Alexander Ákos’ properties of Ilia, Gurasada and Feneş also resulted into the exemption of dues and taxes to the king, to the benefit of local lords.156 This pseudo-colonization was first attested during the anarchy at the beginning of Ladislas the Cuman’s reign,157 and also represented, beyond the numerous positive consequences that resulted from increasing the number of dwellers, a form of tax evasion that the nobles would embrace in order to increase revenues. Of the two Romanian “countries” which enjoyed internal autonomy while being part of the political system of voivodal Transylvania—Făgăraş and Haţeg—Ladislas Kán became especially interested in the latter after ­establishing his residence in Deva. The Haţeg country had developed its own local life between the 11th and the 13th century, and was affected only to an 152  D IR II 513, 524; DocVal 42–45. 153  D IR II 18–20; 493–494. 154  D IR II 41–43; HD 307–309. 155  See the royal order from November, 7th, 1293, which stipulated that the Romanians who had deserted the royal domain of Scekes (Cunţa) be brought back: DIR II 400–401; ZW 195–196; DocVal 38–40. 156  D IR II 389; DocVal 36–38; Jakó 505. 157  Around 1276, King Ladislas the Cuman approved the colonization of sixty households of Romanians on the Fylesd and Enugd estates of the Chapter of Alba Iulia: DIR II. 400–401; Jakó 342.

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extent of 10–20% by the process of feudalization promoted by the Hungarian state.158 The religious freedom enjoyed by local Romanian knezes, which favored the construction, in the second half of the 13th century, of stone monasteries and churches such as the ones in Densuş or Peşteana, is also certified by a Slavonic inscription from the time of Ladislas Kán (1313/1314), knez Balea, priest Naneş and painter Theophilus, the sponsors and the builders of the oldest wall of the orthodox church of Streisângiorgiu.159 During Ladislas Kán’s rule, according to testimonies from the Angevine restoration, the Romanian knezes Dan and Stanislav seized (recovered?) the Brethonia estate, which had become the possession, at an unknown time, of an aristocrat by the name of Thomas and restituted by King Charles Robert, in 1315, to his kin Nicholas.160 The voivode’s acceptance of knezes’ seizing noble properties illustrates the tolerance that featured the relations with the Haţeg upper class. There is no information on Ladislas Kán’s relations with the Romanians in the Olt (Făgăraş) land. We are unable to establish whether Ugrinus Csák, owner of the Făgăraş and Sâmbăta properties since 1291, remained in possession after 1301 or if, on the contrary, he shared the fate of Dionysius Banffy, the other “royalist” noble introduced in Transylvania in the context of King Andrew III’s efforts to bring this province back under his control. The cooperation between Ugrinus Csák and Ladislas Kán, suggested by Chronicon Posoniense,161 is not sufficient evidence to conclude that Csák was still holding this land after 1301. On the contrary, the fact that the Ujláki family did not ask king Charles Robert after 1315 to restitute these properties seems to suggest that Ugrinus Csák’s himself gave up his estate in Făgăraş as a result of the agreement concluded with king Ladislas. On the other hand, previous interpretations that the Romanian voivode settled in the country of Făgăraş (as stipulated by Ottokar of Styria’s chronicle162) or even that some Romanian voivodes from beyond the 158  Radu Popa, La începuturile evului mediu românesc. Țara Haţegului (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1988), 61. 159  Vasile Drăguţ, Pictura murală în Transilvania (sec. XIV–XV) (Bucharest: Meridiane, 1970), 40–42; Marius Porumb, Dicţionar de pictură veche românească din Transilvania. Sec. XII– XVIII (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 1998), 388; Cristian Moisescu, Arhitectura românească veche, vol. 1 (Bucharest: Meridiane, 2001), 41–42. 160  D IR III 234, 406; DIR III 239–240, 409. The analysis of the entire process was made by Maria Holban, “Deposedări şi judecăţi în Haţeg pe vremea Angevinilor,” in Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare în secolele XIII–XIV (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste, 1981) 232–244. 161  S RH II 48. 162  Adolf Armbruster, “Românii în cronica lui Ottokar de Styria: o nouă interpretare”, Studii. Revistă de istorie 25 (3/1972): 474–482.

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Carpathians exerted, in this interval, direct control over the country163 remain difficult to accept: the military system subordinated to Ladislas Kán was clearly defined, and covered the whole of Transylvania and even some outerCarpathian prolongations; on the other hand, the “country” ruled by the voivode mentioned in the German chronicle was undoubtedly situated in the geographical proximity of the Halych knezdom. In the absence of more precise information, the concrete circumstances in which the “dismount” of Negru Vodă (the Black Voivode) occurred (which the historical tradition sets between 1290 and 1310) are hard to establish. The only clues we have of these events have been transmitted by historical ­traditions referring to the founding of Wallachia, whose late dating raises questions about its accuracy. If the importance of tradition as historical reference was well argued by Gheorghe I. Brătianu,164 it is also true that such analysis requires the same objectivity involved in studying “traditional” sources. The oldest reference to this tradition, as mirrored by the chronicle of Luccari (1605), only informs about the seizing of Wallachia, in 1310, by a Negro Voevoda di natione Ungaro, who, attracted by the country’s beauties and riches, fabricò la cità in Campoluogo.165 In 1656, Paul of Alep presented Negru Vodă (Voivode) as a Romanian comes (count) from Transylvania who, “under permission from the king”, freed Wallachia from the Tatars; also, “his might growing, he became the lord of the country” and erected the Câmpulung monastery.166 The story of the country’s birth following the victorious battle against the Tatars also appears in Paisie Ligaridis’ Chrismology (1656), the founder he indicated being a certain “Vlah the Wallachian”, natural son to the king of Hungary.167 In all the works that approach this matter, drafted in 1677–1691, the Moldavian chronicler Miron Costin invariably indicated the Negru Vodă’s “dismount” (foundation) as a consequence of the victory against the Tatars by “Laslău the King” (= Ladislas the Cuman),168 as mirrored by Viaţa preacuviosului părinte 163  L. Chiţescu, “O formaţiune politică la nord şi la sud de Munţii Făgăraş în secolul al XIIIlea”, RdI 28 (7/1975): 1057–1067. A recent analysis by Lukács (Țara Făgăraşului, 167–171), indicates several weaker points of this theory. 164  Gheorghe I. Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică despre întemeierea statelor româneşti, ed. Valeriu Râpeanu (Bucharest: Editura Eminescu, 1980). 165  Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică, 249. 166  Maria Holban et al. ed., Călători străini despre ţările române, vol. 4 (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1976), 170–171; Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică, 253–255. 167  Ela Cosma, Ideea de întemeiere în cultura populară românească (Cluj: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2000), 515–516. 168  Miron Costin, “Cronica polonă/ Cronica Țărilor Moldovei şi Munteniei (1677),” in Opere, ed. Petre P. Panaitescu (Bucharest: ESPLA, 1958), 207–209; Miron Costin, “Poema polonă/

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Nicodim sfintitul (The Life of Devout Father Nicodimus the Holy), published by monk Stephen of the Tismana monastery in 1763.169 The oldest account of the foundation in a Wallachian chronicle is Letopiseţul Cantacuzinesc (1690) (The Cantacuzino Chronicles), yet it does not indicate the reasons that determined “Radul Negrul-Voivode, high duke of Almaş and Făgăraş” to “come down the Dâmboviţa river” and start “building the country anew”.170 In an attempt to make up for this, the historian Radu Popescu, in Istoriile domnilor Țărei Româneşti (1700) (The histories of Wallachian Lords) suggests two possible “causes” that drove “Radu Negrul-Vodă” to cross the mountains, yet which he acknowledges as simple personal “opinions”, unconfirmed by any historical source:171 a) “to build strongholds for his men and make it easier to defend those in Transylvania, should the Turks invade”, and b) “perhaps the Romanian lord had come to enmity with those of the Hungarians and Saxons, for reasons unknown, and moved herein”.172 Thus, the assumption that the foundation of Wallachia occurred after a conflict between Transylvanian Romanians, on one side and Hungarians and Saxons, on the other, was just a simple “opinion” issued by historian Radu Popescu around 1700, and simply projected a contemporary reality onto a distant past. Not only this assumption was never confirmed by any of the older foundation traditions, but the Wallachian chronicler himself considered it only a possible alternative to the version, common in the other sources, of the mountain cross for the military consolidation of the Transylvanian frontier. The persistence with which this “chronicler’s opinion” was perpetrated in Romanian historiography becomes hard to explain, all the more as it only seems to be confirmed by certain Făgăraş “local traditions” collected by patriot scholars in the last decades of the 19th century (!). On the other hand, the persistence with which the tradition of the “foundation” indicated, as the first stage of this process, a “dismount” taking place in Câmpulung needs to be correlated to Istorie în versuri polone despre Moldova şi Țara Românească (1684),” in Opere, ed. Petre P. Panaitescu (Bucharest: ESPLA, 1958), 228–235; Miron Costin, “De neamul moldovenilor (1686–1691) ),” in Opere, ed. Petre P. Panaitescu (Bucharest: ESPLA, 1958), 207, 228, 273, 385. 169  Vladislav, the king of Hungary, killed in battle “Batie, the Mongol emperor”; Vladislav’s brother, Radu Negru, crossed the mountains and freed from Mongols the “counties” to the east of Olt River: Cosma, Ideea de întemeiere, 513–514. 170  Mihail Gregorian, ed. et al., Cronicari munteni (Bucharest: Editura pentru Literatură, 1961), 1: 84–85. 171  “The reason for which there is nothing written by us or foreigners regarding this, I believe, is that for one of these two reason they moved the see. Come to think of it, one of these reasons must have determined the move.” Gregorian, ed., Cronicari munteni, 227. 172  Gregorian, ed., Cronicari munteni, 227–228.

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the tombstone of a comes Laurencius de Longo Campo, dated 1300, discovered in the first capital of Wallachia.173 According to Gheorghe I. Brătianu, this monument “can be interpreted more as evidence of domination by the Hungarian Crown predating the foundation of a united Wallachia, in the old voivodal residence.”174 The only remark to the above is that this “rule of the Hungarian crown” must have been exerted by Transylvania’s voivode Ladislas Kán. Moreover, the data provided by the historic tradition offers precious information on how at that time, in the south and southeast Transylvania, the older military frontier system functioned, with its multi-ethnic complex structure. Thus, for the author of Letopiseţul Cantacuzinesc, Negru-Vodă’s crossing of the Carpathians must have occurred “with a multitude of nations: Romanians, Catholics, Saxons, all sorts of people”,175 followed in this respect by Johann Filstich, who speaks of “Saxons, Hungarians and Vlahs”.176 As for Paisie Ligaridis, his enumeration of the entourage following “Vlahul Munteanul” (Vlahul the Highlander) is much longer, including “Germans, Hungarians, Cumans, Székelys, and Vlahs, who shattered the musty wings of Tatar tyranny”.177 The simile between the ethnic diversity in the army of “Negru-Vodă” and that of the expeditionary force led by Joachim Türje ca 1210 against Vidin brings to life the reconstitution, probably during Ladislas the Cuman, of the older military frontier structure, in which the Romanians in Terra Blacorum/the Făgăraş Country were essential. The Câmpulung “dismount” seems to have been, under these circumstances, the result of the implantation on the southern side of the Carpathians, of a border military guard. One of its leaders, probably Romanian, was substituted to the Argeş voivode, in unclear circumstances, and later laid the foundations of the “entire Wallachia”. As for the voivode mentioned in Ottokar of Styria’s chronicle, he seems to have not been part of Ladislas Kán’s political system, but was rather one of his more distant allies. This voivode’s “country” must have been located in the nearby proximity of the Halych knezdom, most likely in Maramureş,178 the only logical option. 173  Nicolae Iorga, Istoria românilor, vol. 3 of Ctitorii, ed. Victor Spinei, (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1993), 93, 308; Emil Lăzărescu, “Despre piatra de mormânt a comitelui Laurentiu şi câteva probleme arheologice şi istorice în legătură cu ea,” SCIA 1–2 (1957): 109–127. 174  Brătianu, “În jurul întemeierii,” vol. 4, 155. 175  Gregorian, ed., Cronicari munteni, 1: 84–85. 176  Cosma, Ideea de întemeiere, 516; Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică, 253. 177  Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică, 515. 178  Emil Lăzărescu, “Despre voievodul românilor din 1307–1308,” in AARMSI s.3 27 (1944– 1945): 65; Popa, Țara Maramureşului, 195. To locate it in northern Moldavia see: Brătianu,

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The significant differences in the status of Romanians in various regions of Transylvania, ranging from the quasi-sovereignty of the voivode “from beyond the forest” and the autonomy of the Haţeg nobility to the subordination in noble counties, to their global lack of privileges and their belonging to Orthodox faith undoubtedly constituted the main causes which hindered their emancipation as individualized “state” in regnum Transylvanianum’s political system.179 This is not to say that Romanian elites were not attracted by the privileges deriving from their belonging to Hungary’s aristocracy, it is simply the fact that they could never constitute an elite based on an ethnic privileged state.180 6.4

External Policy: Transylvania’s Involvement in the Competition for the Hungarian Crown

6.4.1 External Policy The Mongolian threat was the main external issue of the first years of Ladislas Kán’s rule. Nogai’s 1292 offensive181 ended with the conquest of Severin under the khan’s allies, the Vidin Sismanides, who would play a major part in southeast European policy until the battle of Velbujd (1330). In the same year, 1292, the Bulgarian czar George Terter, who had repeatedly manifested his availability in joining an anti-Mongolian coalition, was replaced by Nogai with boyar Smilet, a mere proxy. The Serbian king Stephen Milutin was forced to accept Mongol suzerainty and participated in the offensive against Hungary.182 The Mongol hegemony over South-Eastern Europe reached its climax after these events. Moreover, despite the tendencies to turn these relations into direct domination especially after Nogai’s residence was established on the Lower Danube, the hegemony decisively contributed to the creation of p ­ olitical cohesion in the region. Besides the spiritual cohesion provided by the Orthodox faith and the cultural unity brought by the common Slavic culture, the political system created by Nogai contributed to the creation of a historic identity În jurul întemeierii, 142; Zenovie Pâclişanu, “Unde a fost voievodul român al cronicii lui Ottokar de Styria,” in RIR 17 (1947): 121. 179  Pop, Elita românească din Transilvania, 53. 180  Pop, Elita românească din Transilvania, 53. 181  R A 3951. 182  Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 192; Tudor Sălăgean, “Relaţiile internaţionale în Sud-Estul Europei în primul sfert al secolului al XIV-lea,” SUBB-H 46 (1–2/1996): 138.

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specific to this region which consolidated in the following decades. Most likely, this region’s pole of gravity must have attracted Ladislas Kán’s Transylvania, whose strategic interests brough it closer to Nogai’s political system. Nonetheless, during the civil war in the Mongol Empire (1298–1300), Ladislas Kán seems to have granted shelter to Nogai’s son Čaka in Transylvania after the defeats inflicted by the legitimate khan Toqtai.183 Count Lawrence of Câmpulung’s tombstone from the same period could testify to the consolidation of the Transylvanian defense system in the Carpathian arch. The Mongolian attacks against “Hungary” (Transylvania), referenced in the papal correspondence of 1301 and 1302184 must have represented Toqtai’s reprisals after his final victory over Čaka, with decisive support from the new Bulgarian czar, Theodor Sviatoslav (1300–1322). With the growing friendship between the Transylvanian voivode and the Bulgarian czar, around 1303 when Theodor Sviatoslav started his war against Byzantium, these actions stopped. A few years later, Transylvania’s reconnection with Serbia and Bulgaria was already accomplished.185 Moreover, the matrimonial alliance between Ladislas Kán and the Serbian royal family, the voivode’s association to Charles of Valois’ Balkan projects as well as the military support offered to the anti Angevine rebellion started by his sons prove a radical dissociation of Transylvania’s external policy from the one promoted until the last quarter of the 13th century by the Arpadian kings. The voivode’s solid attachment to the southeastern European world represented the premise of the major role the voivode played in the future competition over Hungary’s crown. His relations with the Serbs, the Bulgarians, Ruthenians and the Romanians offered him not only the security he needed but guaranteed effective political and military support, the latter being the factor that made the position of the Transylvanian voivode safe until 1315. Peter Monoszló, Ladislas Kán and Charles Robert of Anjou’s Candidature The competition between Ladislas Kán and bishop Peter Monoszló entered a new phase with Charles Robert of Anjou’s candidature to the Hungarian crown.186 Son of Charles Martell and a relative of Charles II the Lame, king of 6.4.2

183  Spinei, Moldavia, 191. 184  H D 557–560. In the same interval (1300–1302) sources record armed clashes in Lublin between the Poles and a Ruthenian-Lithuanian-Mongol coalition: MPH III 853. 185  Armbruster, “Românii în cronica,” 468–469. 186  Halecki, Jadwiga of Anjou, 19–48; Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 128–134; Bálint Hóman, Gli Angioini di Napoli in Ungheria (Roma: Reale academia d’Italia, 1938).

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Naples, married to one of Stephen V of Hungary’s daughters, Charles Robert took advantage of the opportunity provided by the end of the Arpadian dynasty to avenge his father’s failure in the competition for the crown in 1290, which resulted in Andrew III’s victory. With aid from pope Boniface VIII, Charles Robert initially found the same internal support as his father from the Slavonian nobility and the maritime parts of the kingdom of Hungary, as well as from noble families alienated by the magnates’ unbearable regime. Initially, his supporters connected with the Monoszló kindred played an exceptional role. The most important was undoubtedly Michael Bő, former provost of the Chapter of Transylvania, who became, in 1298, bishop of Zagreb.187 Besides the local importance he enjoyed as a provincial bishop in Slavonia, from where the Angevin party drew the overwhelming majority of supporters, Michael Bő was at the same time close to the Transylvanian bishop Peter Monoszló, one of the very few supporters of Charles Robert from the church of Hungary. The elected Archbishop of Esztergom, George Bicskei (1298–1303), was a supporter of Charles Robert’s candidature, while Johannes (János) Hontpázmány, the archbishop of Kalocsa, was the one who, on August 27, 1301, had placed the Hungarian crown on the head Wenceslas, son of Bohemian king Wenceslas (Václav) II Přemysl. In fact, the delegation that accompanied the archbishop of Kalocsa, in 1301, at the Bohemian court included no less than five bishops (of Agria, Oradea, Vác, Cenad and Bosnia), as well as the provost of Zips.188 In 1303, two years after the announcement of his candidature, following the pressure exerted by the pontifical ambassador Nicholas Boccassini, general master of the Dominican order and cardinal-bishop of Ostia,189 Charles Robert managed to attract the support of some of the greatest church members installed before 1301, the most important being the archbishop George Bicskei and the bishop Theodor Tengerdi of Györ. The other significant supporters of the Angevine party, including the new archbishop Stephen (István) of Kalocsa, bishops John (János) of Nitra and Nicholas of Bosnia, largely ­originated from the higher officials installed and confirmed starting with 1302,190 based on their sympathy for the Angevine cause. Under the circumstances, the ascendancy over the young king by Michael Bő, bishop of Zagreb, enabled him to become, 187  Engel, Archontológia, 79. 188  Thomas Ebendorfer von Haselbach, “Chronicon Austriacum,” in Gombos, Catalogus, 2221. 189  His mission to Hungary occurred in 1301–1303: KMTL 115, 528. See also: Chronicon Austriacum anonymi; Nicolaus Vischelius, “Chronicon Austriacum” in Gombos, Catalogus, 517, 1707; Chronicon pictum Vindobonense, chapter 92, 102. After the death of Boniface VIII, Nicolaus Boccassini became pope under the name of Benedict XI (1303–1304). 190  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 64, 72.

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in November 1303, immediately after the unexpected death of George Bicskei, in Anagni, where he traveled upon the invitation of pope Boniface VIII, the archbishop of Esztergom.191 The immediate consequence of Michael Bő’s rise was the seizure by the related Monoszló kindred of leading positions in the structures of the proAngevine party. Egidius Monoszló, Bishop Peter’s elder brother, had already made a comeback on the political stage in 1302, and took over the strategic fortress of Fülek (Filakovo) in Charles Robert’s name.192 Peter Monoszló himself was close to the Angevine candidate, and was mentioned on the August 24, 1304, the third in rank among church officials, after the Esztergom and Kalocsa archbishops, and the first of the bishops who signed the alliance with Rudolf III’s of Habsburg, duke of Austria,193 opponent of the Přemyslides and candidate to the crown of Bohemia.194 Under the circumstances, the Monoszló kindred revived its older plans to turn Transylvania under the control of their family. The kingdom’s list of barons in the same treaty with Rudolf III briefly mentioned a certain Peter Monoszló as the voivode of Transylvania, a relative of the homonymous bishop.195 At the same time, on the lower Mureş river, still subject to Ladislas Kán’s influence, the innovative Charles Robert organized a “voivodeship” with imprecise boundaries, run by Lawrence Igmánd,196 the founder of the Pâncota (Pankotai) family. Yet, while Lawrence Igmánd managed to establish a solid territorial base in Zarand county, around the Pâncota and Dezna fortresses,197 and have his authority acknowledged by the nobles in the region,198 the members of the Monoszló kindred lost their influence before king Charles Robert after the death of archbishop Michael Bő, in the fall of 1304. Obviously, after this date the projects to make young Peter Monoszló the voivode of Transylvania were completely abandoned. Charles Robert’s intent to withdraw the title of voivode of Transylvania from Ladislas Kán was been motivated by the support he had given to the cause of 191  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 63; AkO I 470. 192  AkO I 300. 193  C D VIII 1 160–161; AkO I 644. 194  This remarkable diplomatic success ensured Charles Robert with the support of King Albert I of Habsburg, the father of Rudolf III, see: Annales Colmarensis maiores, in Gombos, Catalogus, 118. 195  C D VIII 1 160–161; AkO I 644 and Engel, Archontológia, 1: 470. Probably a son of Egidius Monoszló. 196  C D VIII 1 160–161; AkO I 644. 197  Given in 1317 by Charles Robert to his son Nicholas: Engel, Archontológia, 301, 388. 198  On February, 2nd, 1306, he mediated the conflict between the Borsa kindred and a series of local noble families: DIR III 46–47; CDHA I 107–108.

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Wenceslaus of Bohemia. In the summer of 1303, the Esztergom and Kalocsa archbishops addressed the Transylvanian nobles and priests in an open letter to notify them of the firm support given by Boniface VIII to Charles Robert, asking them under threat of excommunication and interdictum, to swear allegiance to him and give up their support of Wenceslas Přemysl’s cause, whose crowning had been invalidated by the pope.199 Thus, Transylvania was obviously hostile to the Angevine party despite Bishop Peter’s dynastic option, most certainly due to the position adopted by its leader. The reasons that drove Ladislas Kán to become the supporter of the Bohemian candidate are hard to explain, especially since a number of his relatives in the Kán kindred’s place of origin had been early supporters of the Angevines.200 He may have followed the example of some of the most important barons of the kingdom (the Csák, Ákos, Rátót, Kőszegi, Aba or Hontpázmány families, to name only the most significant) with whom Ladislas Kán must have been in close contact.201 The assassination of King Wenceslas II Přemysl (June 21, 1305) caused the aristocratic factions in the region to regroup under Charles Robert. Therefore, some of the Angevines’ initial supporters, recruited mainly among the nobility in the Slavonian areas and the region east of the Tizsa River, saw their positions sacrificed again in favor of the older and powerful aristocratic families. The privileges Charles Robert bestowed onto the aristocracy until recently reluctant to him were not taking lightly by some of his older partisans who felt betrayed. The consequences were forthcoming. A great group of the aforementioned nobles, Leukus Pekri, Apor Peć, Lawrence Igmánd, and Peter Monoszló, stopped being Charles Robert’s supporters for a long time, and a member of a major aristocratic family, Theodor Weyteh of the Chanad kindred,202 became one of his fiercest opponents. Also, the year 1305 saw the advent of a new counter-candidate to the crown of Hungary, in the person of the Bavarian duke Otto of Wittelsbach, who managed within a short period of time to attract the

199  D IR III 30–32; CD VIII 1 133–135; AkO I 417 (between June, 26th and September, 7th). 200  It was the case of Leukus (Lökös) Pekri, son of Lawrence, the baron of Charles Robert in 1302–1304, see: Engel, Archontológia, 1: 470, 362. Kristó Gyula, “I. Károly király föúri elitje (1301–1309),” Századok 133 (1/1999): 42, 45: considers him a member if the Kán kindred. This opinion is also shared by Engel, who expressed the highly unlikely assumption that this family has a branch in Ilidia: Engel Archontológia, 1: 470; 2: 122. The Pekri family (Körös county) probably had some family ties with voivode Ladislas, but there is little information available regarding their nature, see: DIR III 67; Zichy I 117–118. 201  Ladislas Kán had family ties with some of these families. Thus, one of his sisters was married to Alexander Nekcsei of the Aba kindred, see: CDHA III 277–278; DIR V 384. 202  Charles Robert’s baron in 1304: Engel, Archontológia, 471.

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support of the nobility to the east of Tisza, primarily of the Borsa kindred, themselves initial supporters of Charles Robert.203 6.4.3 Otto of Wittelsbach’s Candidature to the Crown of Hungary Grandson of Bela IV from his daughter’s line, Otto of Wittelsbach compensated for his late candidature and lack of pontifical support with the endorsement from the noble faction led by Henrik Kőszegi,204 from the German colonists in the entire kingdom of Hungary, and most importantly, from the remarkable edge given to him by the possession of St. Stephen’s Crown and other “sacred” royal insignia, taken in the summer of 1305 from the underaged son of the late king Wenceslas (Vencel) II.205 Entering Hungary around August 7, 1305206 escorted by an important contingent of Bavarian knights,207 despite opposition from his formidable rivals in the House of Habsburg,208 Otto of Wittelsbach met no armed resistance from the undecided supporters of Charles Robert and managed to seize control of Buda in November, without major obstacles.209 On December 6, 1305, bishops Anthony of Cenad and Benedict Rád of Veszprém officiated the crowning ceremony in Székesfehérvár, handing him the symbols of Hungarian royalty.210 Despite this impetuous start, Otto of Wittelsbach’s positions deteriorated significantly in the first half of 1306. His dismissal of the Bavarian knights and the oscillating attitude of the Kőszegs put him in a difficult position against Charles Robert’s supporters and found himself incapable of imposing his authority on the undecided aristocratic factions. In addition, the open hostility Otto met from the pope and the king of Germany Albert I of Habsburg posed 203  Kristó, “I. Károly király,” 47–53. 204  Ottokar von Steier, “Oesterreichische Reimchronik”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 1927. 205  Wenceslaus I designated through testament Otto of Wittelsbach as his son’s tutor: Aventinus, “Annales Boiorum”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 385. Wenceslaus III renounced voluntarily to the crown of Hungary: Chronicon Aulae regiae; Franciscus Pragensis canonicus, “Chronica Pragensis”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 502, 952—or he was forced to abdicate by his father: Ottokar von Steier, “Oesterreichische Reimchronik”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 1929. 206  “Anonymi monachi Bavari”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 281; “Chronicon Osterhoviense”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 592. 207  Vitus Arnpeckius, “Chronicon Baioarie,” in Gombos, Catalogus, 2647. 208   “Chronicon Osterhoviense”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 592; Ottokar von Steier, “Oes­ terreichische Reimchroni,” in Gombos, Catalogus, 1926 (Otto crossed Austria dressed as a merchant). 209  “Chronicon Osterhoviense”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 592. 210  Vitus Arnpeckius, 2647; Thomas Ebendorfer 2222, Chronicon pictum Vindobonense, 93.

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serious difficulties not only in Hungary, but also on his family e states. The situation became more alarming when, after the assassination of Wenceslaus III Přemysl (August 4, 1306), duke Rudolf II of Habsburg, son of Albert I, managed, after his marriage with Elisabeth, Wenceslaus II’s widow, to get the royal crown of Bohemia (August 26). After this dynastic change, Bohemia radically changed its position towards the competition for the Hungarian crown, becoming an ally of Charles Robert. Since after losing the Bohemian support, Buda was no longer safe for Otto of Wittelsbach, turning to the nobility to the east of Tisza was the only alternative. The powerful and compact anti-Angevine block constituted in these regions consisted of numerous friends, potential or declared, of the Bavarian candidate: a major part of the nobility in the counties of Bihor, Zarand and Cenad, led by Beke Borsa, Theodor Weyteh and Dozsa Debreczeni; bishop Anthony of Cenad, already invested as royal chancellor;211 also, the Saxons in the province of Sibiu, who had already provided Otto with a number of soldiers.212 However, the most important of them was Ladislas Kán, the powerful voivode of Transylvania, whose hostility to the Angevine candidate had been adamant and who actually had the sufficient military resources to provide Otto with the protection he needed. Moreover, since the new pope Clement V was hesitant in adopting a clear stance on the issue of the Hungarian succession, Ladislas Kán could also rely, in his support for Otto, on Bishop Peter Monoszló, disappointed with the lack of consideration Charles Robert had shown to his family. The reconciliation between the voivode and the bishop became obvious in late 1306, when Peter Monoszló refused to enforce the excommunication of the voivode pronounced by archbishop Vincent of Kalocsa. To gain some time and allow Ladislas to define his intents to Otto, Peter Monoszló addressed the pontifical curia in an appeal against the measure taken by his hierarchical superior.213 Otto’s near desperate situation led him, after consulting his supporters,214 to accept a term otherwise impossible in normal circumstances: his marriage to the daughter of the voivode, who would become the queen of Hungary. Losing ground to his opponent, Otto of Wittelsbach sacrificed all the benefits which a potential matrimonial alliance with one of the royal European families could provide in exchange for immediate internal support, on which his

211  AkO II 26; DIR III 47–48. 212  D IR III 136–138; ZW 272–274. 213  AkO II 92, 93. 214  Ottokar von Steier, “Oesterreichische Reimchroni”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 1926.

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success in the competition for the throne depended. In early Fall 1306,215 in the company of Beke Borsa216 and other supporters, Otto of Bavaria gave up on Buda and, taking with him the crown and the other royal insignia, started his retreat to the east. Initially, he apparently spent some time in Szeged, trying to prevent the dissolution of his army. With the oncoming winter, Otto crossed the Tisza and settled most likely in Oradea until early February 1307, attempting to consolidate his position with the Bihor nobles.217 It was only after this date that Otto, short of men and resources, headed towards Transylvania, to honor the terms of the contract with voivode Ladislas and get the support to launch a new offensive against Charles Robert. 6.4.4 Ladislas Kán and Albert of Habsburg. Otto of Wittelsbach’s Captivity In the first months of 1307, Ladislas Kán was still determined to observe the pact made with Otto of Wittelsbach, who, if successful, would have opened up the prospect of dominating of the Hungarian political stage. The interdict pronounced against him by archbishop Vincent of Kalocsa did not seem to impress him much: the immediate consequence was the confiscation by the voivode of the archiepiscopal property of Halmas (Almaş).218 Were we to accept the evidence of the narrative sources, once the marriage between Otto and Ladislas’ daughter was sealed, the voivode’s royal son-in-law initially benefited from the freedom of action required to relaunch his cause. At this time, he visited the German town of Bistriţa, whose population was entirely favorable to him219 and, on this occasion, received the oath of allegiance from the Saxons in Sibiu county, who invited him over.220 However, Otto of Wittelsbach’s planned visit to the southern regions of Transylvania never took place. In the summer of 1307 the Angevine party decisively consolidated its positions following intense diplomatic activity. Firmly supported by the Esztergom and Kalocsa archbishops and managing to increasingly develop its power base, Charles Robert succeeded in undermining Otto of Wittelsbach’s position. In June–August 1307, the Borsa kindred, the former supporters of the Bavarian prince, were attracted on Charles Robert’s side, who repaid them with donations in Ugocsa county.221 In the same interval, in unclear circumstances, Anthony, 215  On September, 13th, 1306, Otto was still in Pest: AkO II 70. 216  Chronicon pictum Vindobonense, 93. 217  AkO II 120; DIR III 49; AkO II 131. 218  AkO II 114. 219  D IR III 137. 220  D IR III 137. 221  AkO II 173, 232.

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Otto’s chancellor, lost the position of Cenad bishop to a certain Benedict, who endorsed the Angevine party.222 Moreover, in early August, after a long hesitation, pope Clement V publicly endorsed Charles Robert, continuing Boniface VIII’s policy. The designation of cardinal Gentile of Sancto Martino ai Monti as pontifical legate to Hungary on August 8, 1307, came with firm and detailed instructions for lay and ecclesiastic decision-makers, who were asked to make all efforts necessary to ensure the succession of the house of Anjou’s candidate to the throne.223 Two days later, the Roman pontiff renewed Boniface VIII’s excommunication of Charles Robert’s adversaries, extending it over Otto of Wittelsbach’s supporters.224 The firm attitude adopted by the Papacy also contributed in determining the voivode to look for solutions to terminate the crisis, especially given the impact this decision would have had on Transylvania’s clergy. What caused a spectacular change in Ladislas’ attitude was most certainly the political factor: during the first months of 1307, Transylvania’s voivode realized the little chances Otto stood at that point, but also his own power of negociation, should he decide to switch sides. Consequently, Ladislas Kán’s attitude towards his royal son-in-law changed radically. Indeed, his support of Otto of Wittelsbach had placed Ladislas Kán into the forefront of international politics, which enabled him to find a spectacular solution to his conundrum. In the summer of 1307 (before the August 26) the voivode was visited by one of Charles Robert’s major ambassadors: Paul, provost of Zips, former vice-chancellor of queen Agnes of Habsburg.225 Although we do not know the details surrounding the negotiations, we can assume the king deemed the results very important, since he handomely repayed the legate for the loyalty shown on this occasion. By far the most attractive offer came from the king of Germany, Albert I of Habsburg, interested not only in Otto’s failure in the competition for the throne of Hungary, but also in keeping him in remote Transylvania, so that he could facilitate his son Frederick the Fair’s ascension to the imperial crown. In fact, Frederick the Fair himself cherished diplomatic relations with voivode Ladislas: in a letter probably addressed in the summer of 1307 to one of the kingdom of Hungary’s magnates, he asked for the support of the nuncio he had sent to Transylvania, allegedly with the mission to persuade the voivode to join Charles Robert’s

222  AkO II 197–198, 221, 232. 223  D IR III 52–55; AkO II 201–220. 224  C D VIII 1 207–219. 225  R DES I 231–232; AkO II 230. As the vice-chancellor of Andrew III’s wife see: RDES I 29.

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party.226 At any rate, Chronicon Osterhoviense, a source that provides excellent information on the political events of the time, clearly states that the decision of “duke” Ladislas of Transylvania to make Otto of Wittelsbach his prisoner was taken after Albert of Habsburg’s intrigues who, taking advantage of Otto’s absence, attempted to take control over Bavaria.227 After these political arrangements, at the end of the summer of 1307 the fate of Otto had already been sealed, at that time probably being already captive. Keeping Otto prisoner meant, from Ladislas Kán’s point of view, obtaining high protection from the German king against pressures exerted onto him by Charles Robert and Cardinal Gentile. An inspired plan: indeed, none of the activities run by the king or the cardinal until the summer of 1308 were explicitly directed against him, despite having obtained, after his arrest, the crown the Angevine candidate yearned for. The exceptional fact that the voivode was not mentioned as one whose deeds had triggered the political anarchy in the kingdom must be the reward of his ability to exert a triple blackmail on Charles Robert with the arrest of Otto: holding his foremost political rival into custody; holding the “Holy Crown”, which conditioned the royal crowning; the protection of Albert of Habsburg, compelled to support the voivode who kept his great internal competitor, whose international position enabled him to block any hostile initiative from the pope. Even so, making Otto of Wittelsbach the voivode’s prisoner certainly benefitted the Angevin candidate: the disappearance of the former from the race played an important role in determining the representatives of the most important aristocratic families in the kingdom, reunited, on October 10, 1307, on the Rákos plain, to acknowledge Charles Robert as the king of Hungary.228 6.4.5 The Alliance with Serbia. Charles of Valois’ Political Projects The reasons that eventually led to the release of the Bavarian prince after one year of captivity were undoubtedly linked with the assassination of King Albert I of Habsburg, on May 1, 1308. No longer under his protection, keeping Otto prisoner became pointless, so Ladislas let him go. Even so, by not surrendering the Bavarian duke to Charles Robert and instead letting him go home through Ruthenia and Poland, Ladislas made a clear statement of the fact that he was 226  C D VIII 7 377–378: ceterum quia presencium exhibitorem ad nobilem virum adislaum comitem transiluanum super promocione sepe dicti auunculi nostri regis K(aroli) duximus destinandum, petimus cum affectu per vostram industriam ipsum nunccium modis et verbis dirigi dicto negocio profuturi suisque verbis fidem credulam adhiberi; AkO II 65. 227  Gombos, Catalogus, 592. 228  AkO II 243.

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not ready to make a real deal with the Anjou candidate. Significant in this regard is the fact that Otto’s primary concern, upon returning to Bavaria, was to start a reprisal campaign against Frederick the Fair, which reignited the flames of war between the houses of Habsburg and Wittelsbach, making it necessary for Charles Robert’s troops to step in to support his Austrian ally.229 In order to maintain his position of power, as he remained the most important opposition in the entire kingdom of Hungary, Ladislas Kán needed another alliance that would help him preserve Transylvania’s special position and avoid an unconditional allegiance to the Angevine king. The solution attempted by Ladislas for his comeback on the great European political arena was the alliance with Serbia. The prospect of such an alliance, sealed by the marriage of the voivode’s daughter with Stephen Dečanski, the Serbian heir, became the main goal of Ladislas Kan’s foreign policy in 1307 and represents one of the main reasons for Ladislas’ renunciation of his projects to become related to the house of Wittelsbach. The influence the ambassadors of Serbia and Bulgaria had over voivode Ladislas, according to the testimony of Ottokar of Styria, especially in what concerned the fate of Otto, seems to have reoriented Transylvania’s external policy.230 The stakes were however much greater than that of a simple regional alliance meant to protect the common interests of Serbia and Transylvania against Charles Robert of Anjou’s expansionist tendencies. This Serbian-Transylvanian alliance can only be understood in its full dimension if we place it in the greater context of the larger centralsoutheastern European projects forged in this period by Charles of Valois, the brother of the king of France, Phillip IV the Fair. As nominal ruler of the Latin Empire, Charles of Valois made it a priority to reconquer Constantinople which did not seem so far-fetched in 1306– 1307, after the king received the unconditioned support of pope Clement V.231 Pontifical appeals and the support of the French king resulted in the preliminary agreement of June 22, 1306, between Charles and the doge of Venice, which stipulated that Crusaders would embark at Brindisi, on Venetian ships, sometime between March 1307 and March 1308.232 In this context, the first half of 1307 witnesses feverish diplomatic activity from Charles’ ambassadors in southeastern Europe, one of their achievements being the acknowledgment of 229  “Chronicon Osterhoviense”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 593. 230  Armbruster, Românii în cronica, 468–469; Sălăgean, Relaţiile internaţionale, 143–144. 231  For a complete analysis of Charles of Valois’ eastern policy, see: Angeliki E. Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins. The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 200. 232  Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 206.

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the suzerainty by the Catalan Company233 and the conclusion of a formal alliance with Serbia.234 The stakes of this Serbian alliance had larger implications, which went beyond the common military enterprise against the Byzantines. In Stephen Milutin’s vision, the alliance would be strengthened, much like the Serbian-Transylvanian alliance, by the marriage of Charles, son of Charles of Valois, with Zorica, Stephen Milutin’s only daughter, resulted from an alleged marriage with Elisabeth, Stephen V of Hungary’s daughter.235 The main issue raised by this family bond is that Elisabeth does not seem to have ever been the legitimate wife of Stephen Milutin. Moreover, upon the death of her first husband (1290) she had joined a convent. Her relation with Stephen Milutin must have been an adulterous one (at that time, the Serbian king was married) and apparently against her will.236 The wife of Charles of Valois’ son would thus be the illegitimate daughter of a ‘schismatic’ king, the result of a probably abusive relation, at any rate adulterine, with a Catholic nun. The great-grandson of Louis IX must have found it hard to engage in a less suitable matrimony. We can be sure that the Serbian king’s matrimonial project must have been doubled by an additional offer that was sufficiently attractive so as to compensate these inconveniences: Charles of Valois’ son and his offspring would gain legitimate rights over the crown of Hungary. By encouraging such projects, Charles of Valois only followed the recommendations of his councilor of the Dominican Order who, on his request, had written a valuable Description of Oriental Europe. He advised Charles to conclude an alliance with the king of Hungary, the only one who could offer him enough support to subdue the “barbarian and schismatic” nations living in this part of the world.237 The role that voivode Ladislas Kán would gain after these developments was paramount. The fact that he was in possession of the crown and the ‘sacred’ paraphernalia of the Hungarian royalty could have very well introduced yet another candidate to the Hungarian crown. Moreover, Transylvania’s voivode had already become the main challenger of Charles Robert’s candidature, 233  Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 208. 234  Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 209. 235  Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 210. 236  Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 210. 237  Anonymi Geographi, Descriptio Europae Orientalis, ed. G. Popa-Lisseanu (Bucharest, 1934), 28, 54–55. Regarding the daughter of the Serbian king, her maternal descendance from Hungary’s royal house and the matrimonial projects with Charles of Valois or his son see: Anonymi Geographi, Descriptio Europae Orientalis, 33, 61. Stephen Milutin was characterized by the author (Anonymi Geographi, Descriptio Europae Orientalis, 26, 52–53) in negative notes, emphasizing the fact that Serbian king feared Charles of Valois and was assiduously begging for his friendship.

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and his role in Otto of Wittelsbach’s candidature only increased his fame. Together with the king of Serbia, he was going to become the main supporter of young Charles of Valois, endorsing him in the competition with the other contenders to the throne. Unfortunately, these projects collapsed, much like other political avenues pursued by Charles of Valois, as a consequence of his indecision. A number of unexpected events hastened his failure in Eastern Europe. The death of his wife Catherine of Courtenay, the nominal empress of Constantinople (January 2, 1308) practically annulled his right to become the restorator of the Latin Empire. A few months later, the assassination of Albert of Habsburg (May 1, 1308) offered him the opportunity to engage, with support from his brother Philip IV of France and despite pope Clement V’s opposition, in the competition over the royal crown of Germany. At this moment, the Serbian-Transylvanian alliance became only a regional one, aiming to secure the survival of the two states against the danger posed by the restored Hungarian power. Ladislas Kán’s failed attempts to gain powerful external patronage promptly impacted his internal policy. After monitoring the new political directions Charles of Valois had taken, Cardinal Gentile eventually turned his attention to the Transylvanian voivode in September 1308, and issued an ultimatum to the voivode: his daughter’s marriage to the king of Serbia had to be annulled.238 6.5

The Compromise of 1310 and Its Consequences

6.5.1 Prerequisites of a Compromise One year after the tour de force on the Alba Iulia chapter, Ladislas Kán was still at the height of his power. Being mentioned on November 27, 1308, among the barons who had sworn allegiance to king Charles Robert at the end of the Pest congregationwas, in fact, the rather informal confirmation by Charles Robert and the pontifical legate, cardinal Gentile de San Martino ai Monti,239 of Ladislas Kán’s office held for over fifteen years, as well as a renunciation to previous attempts to replace him. Also, the document from November 27 confirmed the voivode’s prominent position on the political stage of the kingdom of Hungary. Largely an expression of Charles Robert’s and cardinal Gentile’s availability to make some concessions to bring the voivode closer, this political success was all the more remarkable as Ladislas Kán himself had done almost nothing, 238  D IR III 164–169; Acta Gentilis 369–374. 239  AkO II 494; CD VIII 1 264–269; Acta Gentilis 115–119.

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in reality, to deserve it. Firstly, he did not even attend the Pest gathering. On both dates, November 18, when the congregation started and November 24, the voivode was in Deva with his court.240 Under the circumstances, his oath to Charles Robert was at best an indirect one, through a proxy, which according to the customs of the time significantly decreased its value. Moreover, Ladislas Kán did not hesitate to adopt a number of measures that obviously defied the pontifical legate’s authority and his political actions. Being informed that the Saxons in the province of Sibiu planned to address an appeal against him to Cardinal Gentile, he forbade them from crossing the territories subject to the voivodal authorities, thus preventing them from attending the Pest congregation. Insensitive to the protests, he only allowed them free passage “after St. Martin” (November 11)241 or even, according to some testimonies, “after the octaves of St. Martin” (November 18).242 At any rate, this took place only when the assembly had started and the chapters’ delegates stood no chance of attending it. Last but not least, the voivode had shown no signs of willingness to return St. Stephen crown and other royal paraphernalia, which had given him greater negotiation power in Hungary. With his tight relations with Serbia and its Balkan allies, grabbing hold of the royal insignia was at that time the most solid warranty in his quest to preserve his positions, perhaps even a precious trade item for new acquisitions. What Ladislas Kán had failed to understand at the right time was that on November 27, 1308, the simultaneous triumph of pope Clement V on the German Empire’s (Henry VII of Luxembourg) and Hungary’s (Charles Robert of Anjou) crowns—against Charles of Valois and the ambitious pan-European projects of Philip IV the Fair put an end to the succession to the crown of Hungary as an international problem. Indeed, all great candidatures had vanished until that date, and later challengers (i.e. Vladislav Dragutin, Andrew Iurievich) that had only enjoyed local support, were essentially doomed to failure. Under the circumstances, despite the apparent solidity of his alliances and warranties, Ladislas Kán found himself in a delicate position as of December 1308. If until November 1308 the possession of royal insignia had made him the unofficial arbiter of the competition over the throne, it was this ownership that made him the main subject of Charles Robert and cardinal Gentile’s pressure, who could not see their mission complete until Charles was enthroned. At the same time, the Serbian alliance, despite its military guarantees, which also must have been one of the main reasons that stopped Charles Robert from attempting 240  AkO II 488, 492; DIR III 99–100, 110, 117; ZW 244, 249, 252, 257. 241  D IR III 117, 118, 121. 242  D IR III 119, 120.

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any military intervention, increased the isolation of the Transylvanian voivode from the Hungarian clergy and aristocracy, for whom close ties with a ‘schismatic’ king was a difficult option. Thus, the document of November 27, 1308, was the last sign of patience showed by the Angevine party to the voivode of Transylvania. After this date, since Ladislas Kán showed no change in attitude, the conflict became inevitable. However, due to the fact that the elected king Charles Robert lacked the military might to engage in an armed conflict, the entire action against the voivode was left to Cardinal Gentile’s diplomatic abilities. Less than a month after the Pest assembly, the cardinal began to exploit the voivode’s weaker points. On December 10, 1308, a certain Peter of Paris, canon of the church of Transylvania, presented himself before the cardinal as defender of the chapter against the abuses from voivode Ladislas, the most important being the imposing of his son as bishop of Alba Iulia.243 On the December 20, after a first analysis of the documents presented to him, Cardinal Gentile designated a scrutator to investigate the matter. A few weeks later, on January 8, 1309, the same cardinal Gentile started an investigation of the dispute between Ladislas Kán and the Saxon chapters in southern Transylvania, which protested against their ban from attending the Pest congregation and had unsuccessfully solicited free pass through the voivode’s territories.244 Even if this investigation took place in the first months of 1309, a rather slow one due to the hurdles they were met with, it resulted into the rise of internal opposition against the voivode which clearly undermined his position. Reunited in Vinţul de Jos on April 4, 1309, the parish leaders of the “seven chapters” in conflict with the Transylvanian bishopric presented the instructors designated by the cardinal with irrefutable proof of the voivode’s abuse, the witnesses that testified including Sifrid, the prior of the Cistercians of Cârţa, count Solomon of Câlnic and Nicholas, the judge of Sibiu.245 The assembly of Vinţul de Jos definitely turned into a political protest against the voivode, causing him much concern. Thus, through Cardinal Gentile’s manipulations, the voivode had been twice undermined by the Saxons and the Alba Iulia chapter, forces which seemed impossible to congregate just a few years before. In parallel, Cardinal Gentile used his efficient propaganda machine and leverages at his disposal and promoted a policy of internal reconciliation which resulted into agreements signed with the noteworthiest of the a­ ristocratic opposition, including Matthew Csák, Henrik and Nicholas Kőszegi, the m ­ embers 243  D IR III 71–72; AkO II 514. 244  D IR III 93–95; ZW 240–241. 245  D IR III 95–96.

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of the Babonič kindred as well as Paul Subič. The success of his efforts came to light on the first coronation of Charles Robert, celebrated with a special crown on the June 15, 1309. The entire Church of Hungary attended the event. Besides archbishops Thomas of Esztergom, Vincent of Kalocsa and Peter of Spalato, the ceremony was also attended by bishops Emerich of Oradea, John of Nitra, Martin of Eger, Aba of Vác, Peter of Pécs, Benedict of Veszprém, Augustin of Zagreb, Benedict of Cenad, Ladislas of Srim and Gregory of Bosnia, as well as the provosts of Székesfehérvár, Bratislava and Zips.246 Even the bishop of Györ, Nicholas Kőszegi, who did not personally attend the ceremony, was represented by ban Henrik Kőszegi. The same high prelates, except for Nicholas Kőszegi, signed the document of June 24, 1309, validating the crowning with provisional paraphernalia, as the original ones were in the custody of Ladislas Kán.247 Under the circumstances, Transylvania’s bishopric was the only one that did not attend the ceremony, since it was managed by the son of voivode Ladislas after the abuse of January 1308. At the same time, the coronation was also attended by representatives of the most important aristocratic families in the kingdom, such as Amadé Aba, Dominic Rátót, Demetrius Balassa, Fillip Türje, Beke Borsa, Péter and Mark Csák, Stephen Pozsegai, Aladár Forrói and Dionysius Zsadány.248 By pledging their allegiance to Charles Robert, they overtly rejected Ladislas Kán’s opposition to the new regime. At the same time, the Buda synod decisively forbade any marriage between “the daughter, granddaughter or any blood kin” of a Christian catholic and any “patar, gazar, schismatic heretic or any enemy to the Christian faith”, failure to comply within a month resulting in treating the perpetrators as “heretic enemies of the faith”.249 The general cohesion of the Hungarian clergy and aristocracy around Cardinal Gentile was clear evidence that the voivode had lost the battle to impose his son as the Transylvanian bishop. As of that moment, Ladislas Kán’s attitude started shifting towards reconciliation, a calculated move so typical of his political abilities. On August 17, 1309, magisters Nicholas and Peter of Paris, canons of Transylvania’s church, the latter being the chapter’s protesting voice in December 1308 to the cardinal, communicated to the auditors designated by cardinal Gentile that, in the elections held on July 24, the bishopric’s siege had been attributed by the chapter to Benedict, the prior of the Dominican convent on the island of Buda.250 On the same day of August 17, Benedict, “friend of 246  AkO II 668. 247  AkO II 674. 248  Kristó, I. Károly király, 56–59. 249  D IR III 166; HD 569. 250  D IR III 76–77.

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late bishop Peter of Transylvania”,251 received approval from the Dominicans’ provincial prior252 so that, on August 30, the two canons were able to present to the cardinal’s authorities all the documents required by the confirmation of their chosen one, including an appointment decree signed and sealed by 15 of the canons of the episcopal church.253 This new manipulation of the voivode, who clearly intended to have his own man appointed at the head of the bishopric in an unchallenged procedure, caused the energic reaction of Cardinal Gentile, who took immediate measures to counteract it. On September 1, 1309, the auditors of the cardinal declared the documentation submitted by the two canons insufficient, asking for the confirmation through physical presence within 40 days of two instructores designated by the chapter to vouch for the new election and the circumstances surrounding the process.254 At the same time, probably as a consequence of the cardinal’s efforts, John, the archdean of Târnava, former episcopal chancellor and currently provost of Székesfehérvár, overtly expressed his opposition to the election, for reasons he promised to detail at a later date.255 Also, the cardinal’s auditors turned to another strategy of attack: even if the elections of July 24 had proceeded according to canons, which was justifiably doubtful, Benedict’s election was nonetheless not viable. The church of Transylvania had failed to pay the accommodation expenses of the pontifical legate, and therefore the members of the chapter were each in danger of excommunication, and the chapter itself under that of interdict unless justified reasons could be provided.256 Acknowledging Benedict became strictly conditioned by the immediate acquittal of the due and by a valid excuse for the delay. If not, the election made by the excommunicated canons was null. One day later, on September 2, 1309, Gentile addressed the priors of the Dominican and Augustinian convents in Alba Iulia the order to identify and dispatch any alleged contestant of Benedict’s “election”, irrespective of the motives, the cardinal undertaking to make justice.257 Under the circumstances, the month of September became a decisive moment for all the parties involved in the conflict over the bishopric. From Buda, “the elected” bishop Benedict drafted an appeal to the Pontifical See, protesting against the hurdles raised by cardinal Gentile and his men. Informed 251  D IR III 91. 252  D IR III 75. 253  D IR III 73–75. 254  D IR III 78. 255  D IR III 78. 256  D IR III 79. 257  D IR III 79–81.

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of this, the cardinal’s auditors requested a meeting on September 15 to pay the charges in person, which Benedict stubbornly rejected.258 On September 17 tension reached its climactic point: by moving to the Dominican convent in Pest themselves, the auditors sent Benedict an order from the cardinal strictly forbidding any travel to Transylvania under threat of excommunication (!). Benedict responded that he would obey, despite being already prepared for departure.259 What were the reasons that required Benedict’s presence in Alba Iulia and which also provoked such fierce opposition from the cardinal? There can be only one answer: the episcopal elections (the real ones, this time!) which were under way in Transylvania. Indeed, the investigation ordered by cardinal Gentile showed that the decree of the July “election” had been rigged by Ladislas Kán’s chancellery and its “authentication” through the 15 seals of the canons being due to the voivode’s confiscation of the said seals since the electoral masquerade of January 1308.260 Under pressure from the events, forced to set things straight within the 40 days imposed by the cardinal, Ladislas took the inevitable decision to resume relations with the canons and try to impose his will onto them. Around September 13, 1309,261 upon meeting the voivode to ask for the restitution of some of the chapter’s goods confiscated by his lawful servant, cantor Thomas, Dean Elijah found himself faced with a major surprise: Ladislas not only gave him the goods, but also granted him the right to organize episcopal elections. “And when the dean presented himself before Lord Ladislas to demand and receive back the aforementioned, the lord voivode ordered for their return; then he told the dean he would not want to prevent the aforementioned chapter and the church of Transylvania nor to stop them from electing , or to carry on with the arguments and discontents, but wanted the chapter to elect a bishop as always wanted”.262 However, immediately after this formal statement, the voivode presented his set of conditions: “However he would be glad if the chapter elected Friar Peter of the Augustines, or brother Benedict the prior in the isle, of order of the preachers, but he would be even happier of the of the said brother Benedict. And if they chose one of these two, he, the voivode, would return the church all its fortresses and goods, since he knows them and thinks of them as worthy; /. . ./ yet if / the chapter’s candidate, n.n./ were someone 258  D IR III 81. 259  D IR III 83–84. 260  D IR III 72. 261  D IR III 86. 262  D IR III 90.

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who is not a friend, he would not return to them. Anyways, they should do as they want. . . .”263 The alternative was as clear as it could be. The canons had to choose between following the voivode’s directions and recovering their properties immediately, or acting against his wishes and hoping for the king’s and cardinal’s intervention to solve the brewing conflict. After a few days of fierce debates, the voivode prevailed, a resolution which indicates that the royal authority in Transylvania was not yet perceived as a sufficient threat to Ladislas Kán’s position. On September 16, the deans of the seven Saxon chapters confirmed that the voivode was no longer pressing the Alba Iulia canons, allowing them to run free episcopal elections.264 Three days later, on September 19, 1309, the elections were a mere acclaim by the canons of the candidate proposed by the voivode: “And on the day decided for the election the canons of the aforementioned chapter assembled and then magister Benedict /the Ozd archdean, n.n./, the empowered defender raised as an archdean and canonic of the said chapter and said: gentlemen and brethren, we are here to elect our shepherd; ponder and see what needs do a worthy man, for this is why we are here, and : brother Benedict, whom you have many a times examined, would be suitable and worthy, and after saying these he sat. Then the above canons were silent for a while and then John the Noble canon of the said church and others along said and cried together: brother Benedict, brother Benedict and started praising the Lord forthwith.”265 At the same date, archdeans Benedict of Ozd, John of Cluj and Nicholas of Tylegd were already empowered as chapter procurators, with the mission to obtain from Cardinal Gentile the confirmation of Benedict’s election.266 Two weeks later, on October 2, 1309, the prior of the Augustinians convent responded to the request of September 2 from cardinal Gentile claiming Benedict’s election was met with no opposition.267 The issue of the election solved, the only matter remained the payment of the maintenance tax, needed to confirm the chapter’s right to lawfully exert its attributions. The fact that these obligations had obviously not been respected did not represent a major hurdle for the voivode. In fact, in cooperation with some of the canons he had managed to draw to his side (e.g. Salvus, the archdean of Turda, vicar general of the Church of Transylvania during the vacancy of the bishop’s siege, Benedict, archdean of Ozd, and cantor Thomas), Ladislas 263  D IR III 90. 264  D IR III 86. 265  D IR III 90–91. 266  D IR III 85–86. 267  D IR III 87–88.

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Kán solved this problem by turning to a new counterfeit: the respective canons forged a document previously dated with “the 14th of November, 1308”, in which they claimed to have requested a maintenance tax of 12 silver marks, which the chapter fully paid.268 This act, which absolved the entire chapter of any guilt, transferred the responsibility to the three canons. Eventually, the responsibility remained the sole concern of cantor Thomas, the voivode’s yes-man, who, on his turn, found the means to rid himself of it.269 Eventually, through methods unbeknownst, which certify the vast network of relations and the voivode’s eloquence, he managed to obtain from provost John of Székesfehérvár the unconditional acceptance of the election of Benedict (on October 30, 1309).270 Consequently, with the entire paperwork ready, the chapter’s proxy, archdean Benedict of Ozd, presented himself before the cardinal’s auditors and imperatively asked for the validation of the election.271 Even if confirmation was late to arrive, as it only occurred on July 2, 1310272 the elected bishop Benedict set off to Transylvania to take office. However, Cardinal Gentile was not a man to accept defeat easily. Moreover, he understood that it was time to show what resources he still had. Therefore, in a sinister twist of irony, the first obligation assigned to Benedict, as Transylvania’s bishop, was to enforce the excommunication the cardinal had pronounced against his benefactor Ladislas Kán. 6.5.2 Excommunication Pronounced on Christmas Day, 1309,273 the excommunication was largely the expression of Cardinal Gentile’s frustration accumulated after his failed attempts to deal with the bishopric’s problems, which resulted into a compromise imposed by the voivode. It was also evidence of his firm intent to ­suppress any opportunity for Ladislas to exert his diplomatic abilities and provide more unpleasant surprises. 268  D IR III 86. 269  Archdean Benedict of Ozd’s testimony before the cardinal’s auditors (December, 8th, 1309) illustrates that at that time cantor Thomas was the only one under the suspicion of having been excommunicated. Benedict of Ozd however denied this accusation, and asked for a copy of the excommunication that would nominate cantor Thomas: DIR III 88–89. The copy, however, much like the original, was non-existing. All those who refused or delayed to pay the support payment were threaten with but no excommunication had been pronounced on a particular name. 270  D IR III 87. 271  D IR III 87–92. 272  D IR III 92. 273  D IR III 164–169; HD 568–571.

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The case presented by the cardinal rested on three major points of accusation, which recapitulated the entire history of disputes with the voivode and incriminated his lack of receptivity to his demands: Ladislas’ refusal to surrender King Charles Robert the property seized from the Hungarian crown; the marriage of his daughter to the son of Serbia’s schismatic king; the refusal to restitute “the holy crown of the kingdom of Hungary”. These are hard to classify based on importance, e.g. the Serbian marriage issue takes half the excommunication document, while the crown allegations only take five percent,—and it is also unclear whether they reflect the cardinal’s priorities, or if they were only meant to prepare the ground for even harder measures yet to be pronounced against the voivode. The alliance with Serbia had changed Ladislas, from the cardinal’s perspective, into a “supporter of heretics and enemy of the faith”,274 enough to cause a crusade against him, as hinted at in the excommunication. The voivode’s “vassals, counts, chaplains, judges and serfs” were obliged to disobey him henceforth. Even though less likely to have acted accordingly, the increasing internal enemies could have made use of this situation. Indeed, the excommunication put Ladislas in an uncomfortable position. The practical consequences of his interdict by the archbishop of Kalocsa (1306) could be endlessly adjourned using ecclesiastic red tape until the prescription of the main charge against him, the support given to Otto of Wittelsbach was no longer an issue. This time, however, the excommunication pronounced by a pontifical legate de latere could no longer be appealed against, and was to be enforced with immediate effect. The Transylvanian clergy, now run by Benedict, who was far from being a man of action, seems to have acted with certain moderatio. Nevertheless, the unforgiving eye of the cardinal, whose agents were already present in the province, took note and immediate measures to reprimand any transgression. Thus, in a matter of months after his and his supporters’ exclusion from the Christian community, Ladislas Kán was forced to lower the banner of resistance and announce his willingness to negotiate. 6.5.3 The Compromise The negotiations were initiated sometime in March, at the latest. The first contacts between the two sides must have taken place immediately after the start of the new year. This is proven by the change in the terms of the negotiations. On April 8, 1310, in Szeged, before palatine Amadé Aba and Dominic 274  Dominican anonymous identifies “schismatics” with “heretics” when he refers to the Serbs as scismatici perfidi, or scismatici . . . et heretici pessimi: Dominican anonymous, Descriptio Europae Orientalis, 24, 50.

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Rátót, Ladislas Kán was already willing to sign the preliminary agreement with Charles Robert’s representatives: archbishop Thomas of Esztergom and frater Dionysius, the chaplain of Cardinal Gentile.275 The agreement consisted of four points: a) the voivode’s oath of allegiance to Charles Robert; b) Ladislas’ sworn obligation to meet the king “with honor and submission” in the territories he controlled; c) the restitution of the royal crown before the 1st of July or even earlier, should the king decide to come and take it himself; d) the restitution of the following royal properties: the Rodna silver mine; the counties of Bistriţa, Sibiu and of the Székelys; the “towns” of Dej, Cluj and Sic, together with the duty of the royal pantry. The agreement did not make any reference to Ladislas Kán’s alliance with Stephen Milutin, undoubtedly not because the voivode had terminated it. If this had been the case then the king’s representatives would have wanted to include in the text of the agreement the interdiction of any alliance of this sort. On the contrary, the king and the cardinal considered this alliance an accomplished fact, so any reference to it was useless. The Szeged agreement made it obvious that Charles Robert’s main concern was to be acknowledged by the voivode as the king of Hungary and to recover the “Saint Stephen’s” crown. The Szeged document partially responded to these royal demands. The restitution of the ‘holy crown’, whose exceptional symbolic value was fully understood by both sides, was still conditioned by the results of a new round of negotiations, this time between Ladislas and the king: “And the crown of his kingdom we shall return on the decided day, on the octaves of Holy John the Baptist; or, should our master come to Transylvania, anytime before this date, it shall be presented and returned to him, “on condition that, in the same day, we submit our demands to him and ask for fair treatment and reward through royal munificence, as appropriate for his royal highness” (sb. ns.).276 The voivode was obviously seeking to exploit the weak point of a king in dire need of legitimacy. He expressed his willingness to provide it to him with the clear hint that in exchange of such a precious gift the simple lift of excommunication was too small a price. The Szeged agreement was thus just a preliminary deal, a kind of statement of intent. Ladislas Kán’s oath of allegiance was quite informal unless sworn by the voivode in front of the king himself. Nonetheless, the voivode’s propaganda determined the Transylvanian clergy to suspend the enforcing of the interdict as of the start of the agreement. On May 2, Cardinal Gentile had to intervene: the voivode had made nothing but promises until then. The interdict would

275  D IR III 172–173; ZW 295–296. 276  Z W 295–296.

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be lifted only when the promises were transposed into actions.277 Moreover, the cardinal expressed his concern about the restitution of the crown. Ladislas had promised, at a certain time, that this restitution would be made through Bishop Benedict. Gentile wrote the bishop urging him to rush the transaction, as it was allegedly supposed to benefit Ladislas, whom was promised by the cardinal the possibility of profitable conditions.278 The Angevines’ impatience gave the voivode an edge, especially since the cardinal was unable to exert any additional means of pressure. Under the circumstances, even if the deadline set in Szeged for the restitution of the crown, the 1st of June, was not observed, the two sides reached a much wanted agreement either at the end of the same month or at the beginning of the next. The presence of bishop Benedict at Bratislava and his confirmation279 seem to have been related to these circumstances. In August 1310, Ladislas Kán himself went to Hungary to hand over the yearned crown to the king and undoubtedly to pledge his allegiance before him. On August 27, Ladislas was one of the noteworthy participants at the ceremony of Székesfehérvár, in which Charles Robert finally put the “holy crown” on his royal head.280 Upon returning to Transylvania in the second half of September,281 Ladislas set the ground for Charles Robert’s visit to the province, as part of the preliminary agreement signed in Szeged and most certainly the definitive one in the summer of the great coronation. The royal visit occurred at the end of the same year, the propagandistic impact of which was doubled by a subtle regrouping of the internal opposition against the voivode. Upon entering Transylvania in early December, at the head of an impressive suite, which included the Esztergom and Kalocsa archbishops282 and numerous other dignitaries, the king was timely met by magister Nicholas of Dăbâca, the son of ban Mykud and one of the most important opponents to Ladislas Kán’s regime, who “banqueted with the king” in his village of Agriş.283 On route towards Transylvania’s religious center, the episcopal town of Alba Iulia, the king stopped for a few days, around the December 8, on another property of the Dăbâca noblemen: the Sânmiclăuş village near Turda, in which the king issued a number of decrees to the benefit of the 277  D IR III 174–175; CD VIII 1 381–382. 278  Z W 295–296. 279  D IR III 92. 280  S RH I 486; Kristó, Kán László, 291. 281  D IR III 176; Zichy I 122. 282  D IR III 205–206, 398–399. 283  D IR III 180–181; HO VII 362–363.

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c­ olonists from Dej and Satu Mare, the Augustinians convent in Dej and the Dăbâca nobles.284 The king’s route up to this point seems to have included the Sînd/ Sănduleşti (Zinda) village,285 property of the Iara noblemen, who, after 1315, became the beneficiaries of the Angevine restoration. Upon reaching Alba Iulia a few days later,286 Charles Robert failed to organize a political assembly similar to Andrew III’s, his predecessor, two decades ago. On the contrary, he was forced to rush back home to Hungary, where palatine Matthew Csák, taking advantage of his absence, had started hostilities against the king’s supporters in the counties he controlled.287 The king’s expected retaliation against Ladislas thus only managed to reveal his weakness. What were, under the circumstances, the concrete provisions of the final agreement signed by Ladislas Kán and Charles Robert in the summer of 1310? Unfortunately, the document did not survive in its written form. We can, however, understand its content by looking at the document from April 8 and the reports between Charles Robert and Transylvania in the next five years. The mission is simplified by the fact that the Szeged agreement practically contained the totality of the obligations Ladislas Kán had undertaken before the king: the oath of allegiance, the reception of the king in Transylvania, the restitution of the crown and of the royal domains. The king respected the first three conditions during the same year. As for the fourth, we believe it must have been one of the objects of the summer of 1310 negotiations: we know indeed that the city of Bistriţa, which most probably included the silver mines of Rodna, was returned to the king at this time.288 On the other hand, we do not possess for the entire 1310–1315 interval, the name of any Sibiu or Székely count, which makes us believe that after their “restitution” to the king, he merely “granted” them back to the voivode, within the confinements of the agreement. If the privileges granted by the king to the Dej guests, in the course of his visits to Transylvania practically proved the return of this town under royal control, the lack of any reference to the salt mines of Sic and Cojocna may indicate that they were left to the voivode. As for the city of Cluj, it maintained its uncertain status, due to the fact that the bishopric managed to grab hold of it (1275) in rather dubious circumstances. As object of dispute between the bishopric and the voivode, the city remained, after the late 1307 events, under the voivode’s direct administration. But for the exceptions already 284  AkO II 1002–1006 (villa beati Michaelis). 285  D IR III 180–181; HO VII 362–363. 286  D IR III 205–206, 398–399. 287  D IR III 174–175; Theiner I 826–830. 288  D IR III 186–187; ZW 300.

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mentioned, the 1310 compromise enabled Ladislas Kán to keep ownership over the essential components of the political system over which he had long exerted his authority. With these came the voivodal authority, which the king acknowledged at the time when homage was paid to the sovereign. 6.5.4 The Regime of Compromise This regime of compromise, prolonged until the disappearance of the Transylvanian voivode, constituted, on the one hand, a success of the Angevine party and at the same time evidence of the king’s inability to move decisively. Despite the pressure he had to face, the voivode’s “capitulation” was deceiving. The 1310 agreement indeed gave the king means of political intervention in the territories controlled by the voivode. However, not all royal attempts to use them were successful. Taking control over Bistriţa made it possible for Moyus Ákos, the king’s wine master, to initiate a policy of consolidation of a local pro-Angevine movement.289 Hoping to turn Moyus Ákos into one of the instruments meant to contribute to the consolidation of his positions inside the province, Charles Robert only ignored the voivode’s exceptional persuasion skills he had used many a time. Indeed, a few years later, Moyus Ákos became one of the outstanding leaders of the anti-Angevine rebellion started by the sons of Ladislas Kán. Overall, this division of power created with the rise of royal authority in Transylvania was not late to engender a passive tension among the voivode’s supporters and the pro-Angevine party undergoing reorganization, which could at any time break into open conflict. At any rate, despite the skepticism of Pál Engel on this matter,290 which is partially justified, the Rozgony victory against the sons of Amadé Aba (1312), followed by the defeat of Matthew Csák’s late intervention troops, provided Charles Robert with the audacity to take to arms in order to terminate the anarchy caused by the “oligarchs”. From that moment on, Charles Robert made it his main priority to reinstate royal domination over Transylvania and started setting the ground for the great confrontation that would become the landmark of his entire reign. The 1313 document, through which Cluj was being reconfirmed to Transylvania’s291 bishopric, took this major center away from the voivode’s political reach and set the ground for undisputed royal control. The king’s assumed protectorate over the Alba Iulia chapter292 and the

289  Ibidem. 290  P. Engel, I. Károly király, 89–104. 291  D IR III 218; ZW 311–312. 292  D IR III 205–206, 206–207, 398–399.

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Székelys in the Arieş valley,293 the gratifications to some of his supporters,294 his confirmation of the transactions among the Geoagiul de Sus nobles and voivode Ladislas295—they all testify that, as of 1313, this latent conflict developed to the king’s advantage, providing him the time to gain yet more and more ground. At the same time, the cardinal’s merciless financial pressure on bishop Benedict296 doubled, probably, by a similar one from the king onto the voivode, was meant to undermine the material support of a potential Transylvanian resistance. Given this pressure, Ladislas Kán, seemingly on the edge of his physical and intellectual capacity, seemed to focus on passing on his power to one of his sons. Mentioned as the voivode’s associates in purchasing properties,297 or even as confiscators of properties,298 the voivode’s two sons were clearly trained to inherit their father’s office. The voivode’s diminishing power also increased the resistance of those who understood that the restoration of royal power, with its ensuing drawbacks, was occurring to the worst of their advantage. With all these preparations, Charles Robert continued to respect the terms of the compromise, patiently adjourning any move until after the voivode’s disappearance. He carefully avoided any transgressions not wanting to completely alienate Ladislas and his allies. He did not even rush to take advantage of the crisis in Serbia, caused by Stefan Dečanski’s rebellion against his father (1314). By the first months of 1315, when Ladislas Kán passed away, he had not yet taken any action against him. 6.5.5 The Personality of Ladislas Kán We cannot conclude this chapter in the history of Transylvania without attempting to reconstruct, based on the existing documentation, the defining features of this remarkable personality that occupied such an important place in the political life of his age, cherishing relations with the great sovereigns of the time and attempting to rise to their level. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Ladislas Kán acquired his exceptional status mostly through the means of diplomacy and political intrigue. None of the sources available to us provides any clue about military conflicts, usually abundant in the biographies of his contemporaries. Despite fully able to develop a redoubtable military might, 293  D IR III 217, 402–403. 294  D IR III 227–228; ZW 312–313. 295  D IR III 215–216; ZW 309–311. 296  D IR III 195; 200–201, 396–397; 256–270. 297  D IR III 211–214, 215–216; ZW 305–308, 309–311. 298  D IR III 240–241, 241–242; ZW 315–316, 316–317.

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the voivode seems to have never used it otherwise than as political pressure. Although challenged multiple times, Ladislas never got engaged in wars. Also, sources do not record any act of gratuitous violence. The absence of such events during that time must have been compensated by extraordinary political abilities. Failure to do so would have made it impossible for Ladislas to rise to such a high position. Indeed, his actions prove Ladislas was an ambitious, tenacious political figure, resourceful and unscrupulous. His behavior towards Otto of Wittelsbach was dishonoring, even according to the standards of the time. However, he managed to gain through it outstanding political results. Detaining Otto enabled a double blackmail against Charles Robert and Albert of Habsburg, and made his position unassailable until Albert’s assassination. In addition, the royal crown which he seized represented solid warranty against pressure from the pro-Angevine party and constituted at the same time the most precious bargaining chip in the negotiations that ensured his political survival. The same ruthlessness, backed up by a certain lack of consideration to the Church and its men, became obvious in the circuituous evolution of his relations with the bishopric. His failure to subscribe to the time’s religious ideals translated into a remarkable tolerance visible in his attitude towards his Orthodox Balkan allies or the Romanians. Politically courageous, Ladislas did not hesitate in the critical times of 1308–1310 to remain alone against virtually everybody, but did not persist in his rebelliousness beyond the limits of tolerance. Despite such character and intention to transform his rule into a hereditary principality, Ladislas Kán was not a tyrant, or at least he was not perceived as such by his contemporaries. The immense majority of the Transylvanian lesser nobility remained on his side to the very end. Even his internal opponents were exempted from the violent persecution common in other parts of the kingdom. Overall, his long reign seems surprisingly peaceful; often threatening, Ladislas Kán never excelled in brutality. Although a tenacious and balanced statesman, he was also ruthless if it suited his purposes; more of a diplomat than of a soldier; powerful, often threatening, but never warmongering: these are the personality traits of the one who rearticulated the state structures of the Transylvanian regnum, considerably consolidating its autonomy and succeeding in bringing Transylvania to the forefront of European politics.

CHAPTER 7

Charles Robert and Transylvania 7.1

Civil War (1316–1322)

Strategic Preparations. The Voivodate of Nicholas Meggyesi (1315–1316) Ladislas Kán’s disappearance was followed by Charles Robert’s general offensive in the territories east of Tisza, which he had never dared to cross. This was mainly a political offensive, one which did not ignore the strategic aspects of a seemingly inevitable civil war. The king’s most important strategic initiative was to open safe access routes to the heart of the province, which was hostile to him in its entirety, and to constitute a fortified base that would prevent any armed intervention from Ladislas’ sons and their Serbian and Bulgarian allies. The former goal was resolved with the construction of the royal fortress in Bologa1 and the opening of a real strategic road, running parallel to the older, more circulated “salt road”, the disadvantage of which was that it crossed a great number of noble properties owned by the king’s adversaries, which provided direct access to the heart of Transylvania, all the way to Cluj. The latter required the effective installation of king Charles Robert in the Banat region2 and the erection of the mighty fortresses of Timişoara and Lipova, both transformed into permanent royal residences. From here, Charles Robert could control the Mureş valley, opened the same spring following the conquest of the Şoimuş fortress and an equivocal peace agreement with Ladislas Kán’s sons,3 and also the situation at the southern frontiers. Appointing Thomas Szécsényi as count of Arad and castellan of Şoimuş and Nicholas Szécsi as castellan of Haţeg, probably in the same period, responded to the royal necessity of consolidating these conquests. These military preparations were completed through an unequivocal political offensive. Refusing to acknowledge Ladislas (IV) Kán, the son of 7.1.1

1  Adrian A. Rusu, “Începuturile cetăţii feudale de la Bologa,” AMP 4 (1980), 403–420. 2  On March, 14th, 1315, the king was already in the Cenad county, which hints to the fact that Ladislas Kán’s disappearance had already occurred at that time. The first testimony of his presence in Lipova dates from May, 13th, 1315, and in Timişoara, from July, 7th, 1315: Engel, I. Károly király, 137. See also: Györffy, Az Árpád-kori Magyarország, 1: 180–181. 3  Györffy, Az Árpád-kori Magyarország, 1: 111.

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the late voivode, who had followed to the ruling position after his father’s death,4 Charles Robert appointed the aged Nicholas Meggyesi of the Pok kindred as Transylvania’s voivode, expecting his venerability would elicit the Transylvanian nobility’s respect. The fact that in his brief term as voivode, Nicholas Meggyesi’s residence was in the towns of Dej5 and Cluj,6 transformed by the king’s partisans into real fortresses raised against the rebellious nobility, is symptomatic for the directions of increasing king’s influence towards the inner regions of the province. Special attention was paid to Cluj, strategically located at the end of the road opened by Charles Robert on the Crişul Repede river. Promoted by Charles Robert, on August 19, 1316,7 at the status of royal city, Cluj would become within a few decades not just a flourishing economic center, but also the cornerstone of the Angevine domination in Northern Transylvania. In the same context of the political offensive of 1315, brothers Thomas and Stephen Losonci were installed as counts in the Székely county,8 along with the recovery of properties granted to their father by Andrew III.9 The king’s measures in this period were meant to attract as many partisans as possible. The most important internal political force, which could have made a decisive impact in changing the balance of power in Transylvania, was that of the Saxon communities in the province of Sibiu and the nearby sieges. Especially in 1315–1318, when victory was far from certain, Charles Robert courted the Saxons assiduously and did not hesitate to deliver on their most extravagant wishes. The May 25, 1317 confirmation10 of the famous Andreanum, whom none of Andrew II’s successors had dared to renew, was just the effect of such an attitude. The beginnings of this initiative must be placed on August 12, 1315, when the king approved to the full annexation of the sees of Mediaş, Şeica and Biertan to the province of Sibiu.11 After the Transylvanian nobility’s angry reaction to the abuse, the king was forced to cancel this measure in 1318.12 However, he did this by changing the respective sees into a distinct county, 4  Gyula Kristó, “Erdély 1315-ben,” in Emlékkönyv Jakó Zsigmond, ed. Szerkesztette Kovács András, Sipos Gábor and Tonk Sándor (Cluj: Erdéyi Múzeum-Egyesület, 1996), 333–342; DIR III 240–241, ZW 315–316. 5  DIR III 241–241; ZW 316–317. 6  DIR III 243–244; CDHA I 387–389. 7  DIR III 251–253; ZW 319–320. 8  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 192. 9  DIR III 234–235; Bánffy I 42. 10  DIR III 274–275; ZW 322–323. 11  DIR III 240–241, ZW 315–316. 12  DIR III 284–285, ZW 331–332.

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no longer subordinated to Transylvania’s voivode. As an additional compensation, the king granted the residents the complete exemption from any type of military obligations, the payment of supplies taxes and the royal housing due. At the same time, the obligations of the three sees to the king were set to a fixed amount of 400 silver marks a year, which did not relate to the number of subjects, which made it possible for them to attract settlers. Such unheard of privileges would cause the amazement of Louis the Great in 1369, which refused to take them seriously, pointing out that “following such liberties in the so-called privilege of our father there could be too little use and profit for the Royal Majesty”.13 Doubtlessly, such liberties were not made to be observed, and Charles Robert himself may have been aware of that at the time of their issue. From the Transylvanian nobility’s point of view, these royal measures were entirely harmful to their rights. They most certainly contributed to increasing internal discontent and hastened the outbreak of the great rebellion. The king may have lacked more appropriate means to attract the Saxons to his side. The royal generous approach of the Saxons however managed to confine the rebellion to the northern counties of Transylvania. 7.1.2 The Rebellion It is certain that the king seriously prepared his intervention in Transylvania, but it is also clear that his adversaries were equally determined to mount a major rebellion against him. Ladislas Kán’s two sons were the leaders of the movement, and were joined by the Borsa brothers, who had been taken by surprise by the royal invasion to the east of Tisza, the former count of Bistriţa, Moyus Ákos, Peter, Petenye’s son, the sons of ban Lothard Gutkeled, Theodor Weyteh, the ban of Mehadia and most certainly numerous other local leaders who considered the rise to arms as the sole solution. Next were the numerous former servants of the former voivode, counts, chaplains or simple clerks about to lose, along with their political influence, the very sources of their welfare. The rebellion was consolidated by the fact that numerous ‘royal’ fortresses in these territories, including Deva and Ciceu, in Transylvania, as well as the neighboring Mehadia, had not been restituted to Charles Robert’s representatives, but remained in the rebels’ possession. This vast internal coalition, already strong in itself, was supported by numerous external adversaries of the royal power. Contemporary sources mention among them Andrew Iurevich, great knez of Halych, whom the rebels made a candidate for the crown of Hungary; Stephen Milutin, the king of Serbia; Michael Sisman, the czar of Vidin; Basarab, the voivode of Wallachia, and the Lower Danube Tatars, at the time supported by 13  DRH XIII 617–620.

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the mighty Bulgarian power of czar Theodor Sviatoslav. Even if sources are not very generous with details regarding the relations among them, it was obvious that the flames of war that had engulfed the eastern and middle frontiers of the Hungarian kingdom in 1316 were part of the same conflict. The good coordination between the rebels, as well as their external allies is illustrated by the impact that the start of the rebellion (December 1316)14 had on the positions of the Angevine party: Moyus Ákos’ impetuous offense drove Nicholas Meggyesi out of Transylvania immediately. Moyus conquered the royal fortress of Valcău,15 paving the way to the territories controlled by Kopasz Borsa, his father-in-law. The surprising Serbian offensive in the winter of 1316/1317 resulted in Stephen Milutin’s overpowering of the Magyar banate of Mačva. At the same time, in the northeastern counties of the kingdom, Kopasz Borsa started preparing for a spring offensive, which aimed to remove Charles Robert from the throne. 7.1.3 The War The king’s energetic reaction made re-established the balance of power as early as the spring of 1317. The defeat of the Serbian offensive by the king himself and the recapturing of Mačva (January–February) were followed by the great victory of Debrecen, won by Debreceni Dózsa and John Aba against Kopasz Borsa’s troops. This major victory had been preceded by Philippe Druget’s defeat of the attempted Ruthenian invasion. Besieged for months, the Adrian fortress, owned by the Borsa kindred, finally capitulated in the fall of 1317, thus consolidating the pro-Angevine party’s regional strength. Transylvania was the only exception to this streak of royal victories: appointed commander of an army charged with reestablishing order in the province, magister John ( Johannes), son of Benedict, was defeated by Moyus Ákos in May 1317 in a battle fought before the Ciceu fortress, and then forced to abandon the province.16 The king’s solution to deal with the fierce Transylvanian resistance was to appoint Dózsa, the Debrecen victor, as voivode (May 1318).17 Entering the province via the strategic axis Bologa-Cluj, Dózsa managed to win a major victory in Topa, in July 1318, against the troops of Moyus Ákos, Kopasz Borsa, Peter, son of Petenye and the sons of ban Lothard Gutkeled.18 The victory only bought Charles Robert’s supporters enough time to strengthen their bases of action 14  Engel, I. Károly király, 134. 15  Adrian A. Rusu, “Documentele medievale ale familiei Wesselényi (I.),” AMP 5 (1981), 317. 16  Rusu, “Documentele medievale,” 118 and no. 136. 17  Rusu, “Documentele medievale,” 135; Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11. 18  Engel, I. Károly király, 124.

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in Transylvania, and did not decisively undermine the positions of their opponents. In early 1320, taking advantage of voivode’s Dózsa’s temporary absence from the province, Moyus Ákos gathered the rebels and launched an offensive against Cluj, the main royal base of operations. Under the command of Stephen Losonci, the count of Székely, who hastily rounded up the king’s local supporters, including the Jucu noblemen, the royal army won a close, yet decisive victory at Bonţida.19 Moyus Ákos himself lost his life (either in the battle or in the pursuit that followed). Deprived of their main military leader, the rebels took to their strong fortresses and assumed a defensive stance. In the meantime, the king’s victorious campaign in Serbia (1319) led to the full restoration of the Mačva banate and kept the Serbs and Bulgarians away from the clashes in Transylvania. In addition, the Ruthenian threat was removed in the summer of 1320, when the king wedded Elisabeth, the daughter of the Polish king Vladislav Lokietek. The Hungarian-Polish alliance concluded on this opportunity would be one of Charles Robert’s main lines of external policy. In 1321, the almost simultaneous disappearance of Serbian king Stephen Milutin and Bulgarian czar Theodor Sviatoslav triggered internal convulsions in the two north-Balkan states which gradual withdrawal from the conflict.20 Consequently, John of Weyteh’s long resistance ended with an agreement with the king, who finally took possession of the castle of Mehadia, unsuccessfully besieged by the royal troops since 1317. Dózsa Debreceni and Philippe Druget’s victories, in the summer of 1320, diminished the territories under Matthew Csák’s control. After his death, on March 18, 1321, his core possessions would enter, after a frail resistance, under the king’s control.21 The resounding successes of the pro-Angevine party left the Transylvanian rebels in a hopeless position. The last campaign mounted by Dózsa Debreceni, in early summer 1321,22 crushed the last remaining pockets of rebellion, bringing a substantial contribution to the pacification of northern Transylvania. In parallel, after a series of bloody assaults, Nicholas and Dionysius Szécsi, the brothers of the newly installed bishop of Transylvania, Andrew, managed to put an end to the lasting resistance of the strong Deva castle, the last refuge of Ladislas Kán’s sons,23 marking the last armed confrontation of the civil war. Consequently, the other rebels started negotiating, in an attempt to gain favorable capitulation conditions. Indeed, in the second half of 1321, Charles Robert, 19  DIR III 348–349, 427–428; Engel, I. Károly, 129. 20  Sălăgean, Relaţiile internaţionale, 148–149. 21  Engel, I. Károly király, 128–129. 22  Engel, I. Károly király, 129. 23  Engel, I. Károly király, 129; Holban, Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare, 95.

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probably advised by Dózsa Debreceni, played the persuasion card on the rioters. Nicholas, son of Conrad of Tălmaciu, was the first to respond, surrendering the fortress of Salgó (Sibiel) in July, in exchange for a number of properties formerly owned by late voivode Ladislas.24 In the same month, Ehelleus Ákos, who, in the meantime had become Transylvania’s vice-voivod,25 engaged to hand in to the Alba Iulia chapter, within two years, the fortress of Zadkeu (Vălişoara), which he had unjustly occupied.26 Eventually, on November 1, 1321, the new voivode Thomas Szécsényi managed, after the negotiations waged with the castellan Nicholas Wass, to get to surrender the Ciceu castle, the most important center of the anti-Angevine resistance in northern Transylvania. The terms of the capitulation made clear the king’s willingness to compromise in order to put an end to this conflict. Despite the fact that he had kept the fortress for so long “for the sons of voivode Ladislas”, Nicholas Wass was granted in exchange not just absolution for any of his actions and the restitution of all the properties inherited or acquired, but also the right to hold the royal fair of Bonţida and collect the revenues of the customs post.27 There were however rebels who would not reconcile with the king and carried on resisting, whenever possible, for years to come. Such was the impressive case of a certain Solomon, a noble from Dăbâca county, appointed count of Braşov during Ladislas Kán’s reign. Seeking refuge from the Angevine offensive inside the walls of the impregnable fortress of Codlea (where Stefan V had successfully resisted his father’s assault in 1264), Solomon remained there until his death, probably of natural causes, sometime in 1331.28 It was only then that, looking for a solution to return to the royal grace and recover their properties, his family, the Aşchileu and Jimbor noblemen,29 negotiated the surrender of the fortress to the king. 7.1.4 Deceptive Peace The long anti-Angevine resistance in the heavily fortified area of Bârsa Country, which benefitted strategically from a relative geographical isolation and the external support the noblemen could enjoy, was not a defining trait for Transylvania’s political evolution. Throughout the province, Charles 24  DIR IV 49–51; ZW 365–367. 25  Attested as such between May, 5th, 1321 and—July, 13th, 1321: Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11. 26  DIR IV 15–16; ZW 352–353. 27  DIR IV 19–20. 28  DIR V 34–35, 39–40; ZW 447–448, 449–450. 29  DIR V 300; ZW 459.

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Robert’s combination of military pressure with leniency until the death of Dózsa Debreceni (1322) achieved its purpose. In April 1322, the general congregation of Cristiş (Kereztus), presided by voivode Thomas Szécsényi, the count of Székely, Simon Kacsics and bishop Andrew Szécsi, with participation of “nobles from all the parts of Transylvania of the seven counties, as well as the Székelys and the Saxons”,30 seemed to agree on general peace and the return to the congregational system. Moreover, the fact that this “dietal” assembly was not presided by the king, but the voivode, seemed to prolong the status quo during Ladislas Kán’s regime. Transylvania was still acknowledged as a regnum, even if the term was no longer used in the documents relating to this assembly. The regime instituted in Transylvania by the king’s loyalists was not bent on observing the congregational ideals of the provincial nobility, the Saxons, the Székelys and the Romanians, who had made it possible to maintain statehood in this highly complex province in a time when stability was common nowhere else. However, mimicking congregational rights proved soon to be just an appearance, same as Charles Robert’s extravagant promises he had made to ensure victory. The first to face the political pragmatism of the king were none others than those who had been generously promised by the king, in the first years of the civil war, complete fulfillment of their demands: the Saxons in southern Transylvania. They had undoubtedly joined the royalist side hoping to accomplish their older desideratum of extending the privileges of their administrative and ecclesiastical autonomy enjoyed by the province of Sibiu over the entire colonist community in their immediate vicinity. The start had been given by the 1315 annexation of the sees of Mediaş, Biertan and Şeica. Three years later, the king went back on his decision, compensating it through a series of unusually generous privileges and by changing the three sees into a county separated from the administrative structures of voivodal Transylvania. After 1319, with the victory already secured, the king did not grant the same privileges to the other Saxon sees and chapters. On the contrary, after the defeat of the resistance, the dignitaries who had ensured the king’s victory adopted a much harsher attitude towards the Saxons than their predecessors. Confronted with the oppression and huge taxes imposed by Bishop Andrew Szécsi and archdean John of Alba, the dean and the rectors in the Şeica deanship were the first who, in the last months of 1322, addressed a complaint to the Pontifical See.31 Excommunicated by the bishop whom they had previously charged with 30  DIR IV 37, 38–39; ZW 361, 362–363. 31  DIR IV 58–59; ZW 368–369.

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simony, the Şeica parish made another complaint to Pope John XXII, who on his turn addressed the king, asking him so solve this problem. The proportions of the conflict infuriated Charles Robert. In the unequivocal letter he sent to the Saxons in Şeica he asked them to ignore their wicked parish leaders and submit to the bishop. The parish’s failure to comply would result in their banishing. Failure to submit would result in harsh measures taken against them by the voivode. Also, they were to renounce sending any appeals to the pope: the king had already taken care of that, informing the pope he would not allow the country’s prelates and churches to be judged outside his kingdom.32 Addressed to people who had never shown any lack of dignity, such a letter was an open invitation to revolt. At the same time, to add insult to the injury, the king appointed voivode Thomas Szécsényi as count of Sibiu,33 replacing the more temperate Nicholas Telegdi.34 In early 1324, the Saxon rebellion started not as much in the privileged county of Sibiu as in the same contact area between the Saxon colony and that of the noble counties, whose unsettled nature was due to its incompletely defined status. The leaders of the rebellion, the turbulent, fortress owning Saxon counts, originated from the entire territory of the “seven chapters”. The most prominent of them, count Henning of Petreşti, was probably the same as count Hennyng who, in May 1317, had obtained from the king the confirmation of the famous Andreanum.35 Another prominent leader was Herric Magnus in Feirighaz,36 originating from the Sighişoara district, who had managed to obtain, in late 13th century, the acknowledgment of his successful juridical integration in the privileged community of Sibiu Saxons.37 Despite his violent nature, which required the king himself to come around the theater of war, the Saxon rebellion was crushed without major difficulty by the experimented troops of Thomas Szécsényi. One must not question that, in parallel with the reprisals, the king showed his willingness to grant the Saxons a number of unessential concessions. Nonetheless, the 1324 rebellion narrowed down the support base of the pro-Angevine party in Transylvania. Distrusting the local forces, the king decided to use abusive, violent, and venal dignitaries on the sole condition of maintaining order in the province.

32  DIR IV 85; ZW 376. 33  Attested between June, 19th, 1323, and September, 2nd, 1324: Engel, Archontológia, 1: 191. 34  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 191. 35  DIR III 274; ZW 322. 36  Today’s Albeşti, near Sighişoara: DIR V 432–433, ZW 490–491. 37  Nagler, Aşezarea saşilor, 277.

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7.2

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The Political Regime of the Restoration

The regime instituted by Charles Robert in Transylvania, after his victory over the rebellious nobility, was rightfully deemed particular to a “conquered country”.38 More or less intact, its institutions shortly became submitted to the royal court’s intrusive and exploiting policy, usually under the command of abusive dignitaries, rarely Transylvanian. Initially, the evolution in this respect was relatively slow. A certain segment of the Transylvanian nobility had fought alongside Charles Robert in the civil war. Another, probably numerous, had indirectly contributed to the success of the restoration by refusing to join the 1316 rebellion. Moreover, the king had made engagements to the former rebels, whose capitulation had considerably reduced the duration of the war: the capitulation agreement included a one or two year transition in which they would still keep the control of occupied fortresses, and even royal domains. In 1324, on the closure of these episodes, when the first signs of Thomas Szécsényi’s abuses appeared, the nobles in Transylvania were cautious enough to address the issue in corpore to King Charles Robert, who exempted them from descensus and victualia, which the voivode started claiming.39 In what concerns the participation of Transylvanians in the administrative structures of the province, the rule of Dózsa Debreceni proved exemplary. Among other measures he reinstated the former vice-voivode during the time of Ladislas Kán. In order to complete the pacification of the province, Thomas Szécsényi initially saw himself obliged to follow his example. Michael of Jucu (Suki), count of Cluj in 1324, would become the vice-voivode of Transylvania’s between 1325–1330;40 Nicholas Gerendi, count of Solnoc (Interior) in 1325 would become, in 1326, count of Turda, a position he had held during Ladislas Kán;41 the lords of Dăbâca county must have been the nobles of the Dobokai family until 1330, older supporters of Charles Robert and adversaries to Ladislas Kán; between 1331–1334 the office was transferred to another Transylvanian noble, John (János) of Morut (Móric).42 Apparently associated until 1330 with more or less important administrative positions, the Transylvanians were kept at bay from the military bases of the Angevine domination. Indeed, none of the castellans of the powerful royal fortresses active at that time was a Transylvanian noble. 38  Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 73. 39  Mályusz, Hungarian Nobles, 29. 40  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248. 41  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 246, 251. 42  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 246–247.

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Vital for keeping royal control over a province conquered by means of armed force, these castellans, be they Desiderius Elefánti at Bologa,43 Nicholas Szécsi at Haţeg,44 Arnold and Nicholas Rimai at Piatra Craivii45 or Martinus Mátéházi at Deva,46 came from outside of Transylvania, including the king’s trustees or the voivode’s familiars. The growing competition over Transylvania between different aristocratic factions in Hungary eventually led to an even more drastic reduction of the number of Transylvanian nobles who held offices in their own “country”. The years 1320–1327 were marked by the domination of the province by the Kacsics kindred, whose main representatives, voivode Thomas Szécsényi and his kin Simon, son of Michael,47 had become the holders of the most important offices. With the disappearance of Simon Kacsics (d. 1327), Charles Robert decided to put an end to the submission of entire Transylvania to the ­interests of a single kindred. As of this date, the positions previously owned by the voivode’s kin were transferred to Ladislas (Lack) of the Hermann kindred, the founder of the Lackfi kindred, who became count of the Székelys, Bistriţa and Mediaş (1328–1343). There was a fierce competition between the Kacsics and Hermann families; it often came close to degenerating into conflict when, during the campaign in Serbia (1335), one of the voivode’s familiars assassinated Emerich, the son of Ladislas Hermann.48 The king intervened and forced the voivode and his men to pay consistent reparations.49 This incident revealed the existence, inside the province, of a potentially conflictual situation, which made Thomas Szécsényi to only appoint men he could absolutely trust into the administrative and military offices under his jurisdiction. Obviously untrustworthy, the Transylvanians were almost completely replaced by the voivode’s familiars, “imported” from Hungary’s central and northern counties. Thus, the vice-voivode position, which had been almost exclusively in the hands of the Transylvanian nobles since the adoption of the congregational regime, was entrusted to Simon Zsámboki (1334–1336),50 member of a prestigious family of ancient French origin, based in Pilis county, which included 43  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 408; Engel, Archontológia, 2: 68 (originating from the Nitra county). 44  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 326; Engel, Archontológia, 2: 222 (Gömör). 45  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 338; Engel, Archontológia, 2: 205 (Gömör). 46  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 299–300; Engel, Archontológia, 2: 157 (Gömör). 47  Szekely count 1320–1327; Bistriţa 1320–1327, Mediaş 1320–1327 and count of Caraş 1319– 1325: Engel, Archontológia, 1: 111, 142, 155, 192. 48  DIR V 357–358, 511–512, 512–513. 49  DIR V 374, 376, 511–512. 50  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11–12.

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among its ancestors another voivode of Transylvania.51 A few years later he was replaced with Peter (Petö) Derencsényi (1337–1342),52 the voivode’s familiar, from Gömör county. The same county must have been the birthplace of Nicholas Rimai, who after 1330 became castellan of Lita and count of Cluj,53 and Martinus Mátéházi, who, besides being the castellan of Deva, would become the count of Hunedoara.54 Castellans Andreas Jonhos of Piatra Craivii (1338) and Nicholas Zabari of Rupea (1332–1334) came from Nógrád,55 the voivode’s county of origin; John Csaholyi, count of Solnoc in 1333, came from Sătmar county,56 while Peter Perényi, count of Târnava, belonged to a noble kindred from Abaúj county.57 Some of the voivode’s familiars who belonged to prestigious and wealthy aristocratic families were able to supply major resources and a great number of companions. Of these, the most important was Stephen Pogány of the Hontpázmány kindred58 who, cumulating the positions of castellan of Ciceu, Unguraş and Cetatea de Baltă, incorporated them within his own military structure, which included Pethew, the Ciceu vice-castellan,59 Mark Fogacsi, Unguras vice-castellan60 and Peter, son of Barthales,61 all originating from Heves-Ujvár county. Under the circumstances, the Transylvanians were left only with the offices of counts of Dăbâca, Cluj and, perhaps, Turda, counties in which the nobles were powerful enough to exert certain pressure on the voivode. Nonetheless, they enjoyed limited attributes and played an insignificant military role. The major revenues of the new important royal tax (lucrum camerae) were naturally leased directly by the king. Once again, Transylvanians played almost no role in this business.62 Voivodal censure was mainly intended to severely restrict the power of the congregational system. Submitted to a rigid hierarchy and obstructed, fragmented in a succession of small local gatherings, the general congregations were dispersed in time to a formula that would confine them to mere judicial attributions. Let us take, for instance, the year 1337: by early December, Thomas 51  Smaragdus (1206): KMTL 193. 52  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11–12. 53  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 249, 358. 54  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 248, 300. 55  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 338, 348. 56  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 200, 348. 57  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 250; Engel, Archontológia, 2: 189–190. 58  For being voivode Thomas’ familiar see: DIR V 291–292; ZW 458. 59  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 294–295. 60  Engel, Archontológia, 1: 272. 61  DIR V 291–292; ZW 458. 62  DIR V 377–381; Történelmi Tar, 1911, 12–15.

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Szécsényi had already presided two noble congregations, which took place in Turda, on May 1 and November 8; on December 2, he summoned a regional congregation of the nobles in the Dăbâca and Cluj counties in Bonţida,63 later followed, on December 9–10, by a third general congregation in Turda, with nobles from across Transylvania.64 One week later, on December 18, another regional congregation in Cetatea de Baltă was again presided by the voivode, and was meant to solve the litigations between the nobles in southern Transylvania and the Saxons in Sibiu.65 Finally, on February 9, 1338, a new judicial assembly took place in Sântimbru, with attendance from the nobles on the mid-Mureş valley.66 The voivode’s intricate journey between various judicial sieges was meant to prevent the nobles from reuniting into a single assembly and regaining political power. After careful selection, participation to the general congregations became the privilege of few, which made it a lot less threatening to the voivode. However, the provincial nobility itself felt threatened and managed to impose on the king and voivode a series of collective privileges and individual liberties. Transylvania returned to its former status of the time before the congregational regime, that of an an exploited province, fragmented among officials hungry for wealth and power, subject to a continuous drain of resources towards the exterior. The military apparatus maintained by these royal dignitaries was numerous and costly. These private armies of renegade knights took every opportuny to rob local nobles of their fortune and accumulate illicit wealth with the voivode’s blessing. Let us examine a single example: in the year 1332, two of the voivode’s familiars, John Csaholyi and Nicholas Zobory, seized Legii estate (Legyun), belonging to local noble Iwanka (Janka), son of Gregory of Palatca. He filed a suit against them but despite conclusive evidence, the voivode ruled for the impostors, holders of major positions in his military apparatus. Moreover, to cover his biased judgment, Thomas Szécsényi tried to convince Iwanka to give up on his appeal, under threat of death. At that moment, Iwanka took the matter to the Alba Iulia chapter, asking for the authentication of a statement in which, describing the lawlessness of voivode Thomas and his acolytes, also mentioned the reasons for which he would temporarily drop his case.67 Two years later, considering that the nobles of Palatca had been quieted down, the two impostors addressed the king, asking for a 63  DIR V 431–432; ZW 488–490. 64  DIR V 432–433, 448–449; ZW 490–491, 494–495. 65  DIR V 432–433; ZW 490–491. 66  DIR V 431–432; ZW 488–490. 67  DIR V 275; ZW 453–454.

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donation document. But, as a result of Charles Robert’s order at the request of the two, the preliminary investigation for the donation was conducted not by the Alba Iulia chapter, which held attributes in this respect, but by the one in Oradea.68 The blatant royal complicity compelled the Oradea canons to quicken the homesteading of the voivode’s familiars and make all proper arrangements.69 A few months later, the onerous deal came to its final conclusion: the two fresh recipients of the royal donation, filled with “good intent”, expressed their willingness to acknowledge Iwanka of Palatca’s lawful ownership over the property law and to return it to him. Of course, in exchange for an additional “detail”, one hundred silver marks which the legitimate owner had to reimburse them70 to reenter in possession of his own property. The balance of the whole affair? The voivode’s familiars, obviously not interested in durable land ownership in the province, obtained a hefty amount of money by selling Iwanka of Palatca his rightful property, which they had exploited for over two years. This and many similar examples cast a doubt on the legality of most land donations in Transylvania at the beginning of the Angevine era. Assuming a whole range of risks and succeeding, by means unbeknownst to others, to pay off a huge ransom for a Transylvanian noble, Iwanka of Palatca was eventually able to retain property ownership. Other representatives of the same social category were probably less determined, poorer or simply less fortunate. Thomas Szécsényi’s regime was, especially after 1330, one of abuse, confiscation, and unpunished violence. Patron and defender of the members of his large exploitative apparatus, the voivode himself, who accumulated fabulous fortunes, became a role model for them. His venal ingenuity enabled him to snatch properties even from the privileged “province” of Sibiu71 or the free royal city of Cluj (1340).72 Making individual appeals to the king could not bring anything to the locals, because Charles Robert saw the Transylvanian nobility as discredited, potentially rebellious, with absolutely nothing to offer. The king would willingly refuse to contradict the voivode’s decision. In exchange for his loyalty and the consistent contributions to the royal treasury, he was allowed to do whatever he wanted. It comes as no surprise that the 1321–1322 agreements became highly questionable. At least Nicholas Wass and his familiars, under continuous persecution from the king’s local dignitaries, were forced to 68  DIR V 321–322; 576–577. 69  DIR V 326–327; 578–579. 70  DIR V 339–340; ZW 463–464. 71  DIR V 544, ZW 508–509. 72  DIR V 541–543, 608–609.

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ask Charles Robert for the reconfirmation of their rights in 1338.73 Desiderius Elefánti, the Bologa royal castellan, had robbed, a few years back, the Sântejude estate, stealing many horses; others would challenge Wass’s properties.74 All of this happened even though his nephew Nicholas Wass the Younger had participated in the 1335 war against Wallachia, as a defender of the Hălchiu frontier fortress.75 Nothing could better illustrate the precarious positions of Charles Robert in Transylvania than the circumstances of the 1330 campaign against Wallachian voivode Basarab. Had Transylvania’s military system functioned normally, any military campaign across the Carpathians should have considerably relied on the armed forces of this province. During the 13th century, despite the endemic crisis of its latter half, local forces in Transylvania had largely contributed to maintaining an area of military security beyond the Carpathians, even in the context of the Arpadian kingdom’s attempted expansion beyond the safety of its borders. Charles Robert’s policy, however, was different from his forerunners’. Failing or not wanting to reconstitute the Transylvanian “duchy”, be it from the sole perspective of unifying this province’s military apparatus, the king denied the sole viable military instrument that would have enabled him to dominate the outer Carpathians and open access towards the Lower Danube. We see here a typical contradiction between the objectives and the concrete means that would enable reaching those objectives. The great problem of Charles Robert’s reign was not the lack of resources as—Hungary was undoubtedly a military force to be reckoned with, but the inability to get them mobilized. Under the circumstances, the Transylvanian participation to the military campaign against Basarab was insignificant. Not only did the king fail to tap the province’s military resources, despite the residents’ familiarity with the opponents they would face, but sources available to us do not include any of the names of Transylvanian nobles as members of the royal army. The Transylvanian participation to the royal expedition was consequently reduced to the three pillars of royal power in Transylvania: voivode Thomas Szécsényi accompanied by his familiars; Ladislas (Lack) Hermann, count of the Székelys and of Mediaş; and the royal city of Cluj, a substantial contributor of supplies.76 The system devised by the king to keep Transylvania under tight supervision by 73  DIR V 434, ZW 491–492; DIR V 486, 599. 74  DIR V 431–432; ZW 488–490. 75  DIR V 270; ZW 468. 76  DIR V 23–25, ZW 443–445; DIR V 390–391, CD VIII 4 171–173.

Charles Robert and Transylvania

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instating excessive centralization, occupation and exploitation, proved incapable to deal with a major external challenge. The lack of popularity of the representatives of this system and the difficulties they met in keeping the situation under control are proven by an incident that occurred during this expedition: upon their return from the campaign, Nicholas and Martin, the sons of Blawch, who had obtained three properties in the Mediaş district77 through a donation from king Charles Robert, realized that during their absence these estates had been seized back by the Saxons in the Mediaş and Şeica sees, their rightful owners.78 The temporary absence of provincial authorities, probably corroborated with the news of the king’s deafeat, had been enough to let the situation get out of control at least in these problematic territories.

77  DIR V 9; ZW 441. 78  DIR V 9; ZW 441.

Conclusions The second half of the 13th century in Transylvania witnessed the rise of the nobility as social elite with increased political influence. By selecting its members from a relatively heterogeneous social spectrum, mainly based on bravery on the battlefield, this new social class won for itself, just like the rest of the kingdom of Hungary, the status of distinctive “order” or “class”. The Transylvanian nobility, however, added something more: a specific regional identity, favored by the administrative-institutional economy of the province, both rooted in the older traditions of the Transylvanian state consolidated by the very first generations of Hungarian conquerors. This nobility would not forget its Hungarian origins and its due allegiance to the king of Hungary. Hence they would claim their supremacy over the other residents of Transylvania, who were either conquered (Romanians), allies (Székelys) or colonists (Saxons). In relation to the nobility abroad, this class referred to itself as Transylvanian, thus belonging to a “country” over which they exerted the same rights any noble would over his estate. With the rise, from royal initiative, of the noblemen’s congregation, an institution inspired from Western Europe’s corporate thinking, the nobility discovered the most efficient way to identify with the “country” (regnum) itself and to assert its own rights accordingly. Its main concern was land ownership, as the foundation of its social state and livelihood. In 1331, the nobles reunited in the Turda congregation would firmly rise to defend the interests of “noble” John, son of John, son of Geubul of Bistriţa, asking voivode Thomas to refuse enforcing a royal decision to restitute to Bistriţa citizens one of its properties. The justification? “As the Ependorph estate is known to be part of their possessions”.1 “Theirs”, namely the Transylvanian nobles, solidary in defending what they deemed a common heritage of their “class”. Once it had become a legal “country” opposing the aristocratic exclusivism with their own “Transylvanian” exclusivism, the nobility discovered the means to secure control over an important segment of the administrative and judicial structure of the province, from the counts of noble ascendancy and their subordinates to the office of vice-voivode if not higher. At the same time, they possessed the instruments of intervention required to influence Transylvania’s internal and external policies to match their options and interests, even during the reign of Ladislas Kán. 1  D IR V 8; ZW 441: cum ipsa possessio Ependorph inter possessiones ipsorum fore dignoscatur.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_010

Conclusions

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With the end of the difficult first decades of the Angevine domination and the return to the congregation system, the 14th century continued to provide numerous examples of solidarity among the noble “classes”, of assertion and consolidation of their own identity, of preoccupation towards the conservation of “Transylvania’s rights” against whoever would try to violate them, even the king himself. For example, on October 4, 1361, two of Nicholas of Dăbâca’s sons, who had been one of Charles Robert’s first Transylvanian supporters, appeared before the convent in Cluj-Mănăştur and drafted a protest against their call to justice at the royal court. The terms of the protest were unequivocal: “And since this lord king of ours, out of his kingly benevolence, mercifully bestowed this grace upon all the nobles in Transylvania, that they would not be forced to stand trial before the said lord king of ours under any reason whatsoever, therefore they /the Dăbâca nobles, n.n./ would not stand trial at any of these octaves, dreading that the rights of this part of Transylvania be trampled by them (timentes ne in hac parte iura ipsius partis Transsilvane per ipsos infringantur); yet should they start a case and complain against them in Transylvania, namely before our lord voivode, then they are up and ready to obey the country’s rules (in omnibus processibus regni presto essent et parati)”.2 The highlight of the juridical specificity of the “country”, the assertion of “Transylvania’s rights”, is synonymous, in this case, with the rights of the Transylvanian nobles to refute the judgment of the king himself! A constant feature of the Transylvanian congregation in the 14th century, which still awaits a proper treatment by historians, is the process of developing a system of enlarged congregation (the Diet), which would eventually replace the “small” congregation of the nobles in the seven counties to become Transylvania’s main summit. Through the unio fraterna of 1437 and mostly through the Treaty of Union ( foedus) of 1459, the Transylvanian nobility and the representatives of the privileged communities of the Székelys and Saxons established a political system based on the mutual guarantee of liberties. Although these had been granted through royal diplomas, each of these communities would regard them as inalienable rights, hence they all agreed on terms of mutual assistance against any attempt to violate them. The three privileged “nations” of Transylvania thus merged into a single comprehensible unit (tota universitas et communitas adunata), defined, according to the 1459 treaty, as regnum transsilvaniensis.3 These coordinates can be easily traced in the evolution of Transylvania’s political system until it became an autonomous Principality. Such an evolution must have undoubtedly seen cyclical periods of expansion and contraction, 2  D RH XII 44–45. 3  Rady, Voivode and Regnum, 98.

246

Conclusions

the latter often caused by the attempts of the royal power to put an end to this diverging evolution. The exclusion of Romanians from this political system has long been debated. This is especially controversial since for a short while, in 1355, the congregational reaction against Charles Robert’s occupation regime in conjunction with the royal power’s interests at the time led to the temporary reconfirmation of the Romanians in the positions gained in Transylvania’s representative structures during the rule of the last Arpadian kings. Nonetheless, a detailed, sequential analysis of the stages of this historical process could lead, in our opinion, to a number of additional explanations. The powerful rise of the Romanians in the second half of the 13th century was indeed favored by the collapse, before the royalty’s avidity for new human and material resources, of the internal barriers between the limited number of conquerors and the heterogeneous mass of the conquered. More importantly, the Romanians’ adaptation to the values promoted by the new political system on the rise shows no sign of delay at that time. Their traditional institutions seem to have been continuously evolving at that time, adapting to the new reality in a timely fashion. This process of parallel development was eventually slowed down by their exclusion from Transylvania’s political system which could not acknowledge their privileged status without endangering its very existence. Could we explain the rise of Transylvania during the reign of Ladislas Kán as an accident of history, the result of favorable circumstances, as some historians have proposed? Let us try to shed some light on this notion. It is indeed possible that, if Andrew III had had a succesor, the political rise of Ladislas Kán’s Transylvania would have been less impressive. But also, if an unforeseeable accident in early 1307 had removed Charles Robert from the race, enabling Otto of Wittelsbach to become the king of Hungary, Transylvania would have become a hereditary principality, as it was the custom in the Empire. At the level of the immediate history, such “accidents” can work both ways. This makes immediate circumstances insufficient for understanding history, giving true weight to long-term constants which ultimately influence specific events and circumstances, halt or catalyze them, confine them or trace pathways for them to follow. We could acknowledge, in this respect, that Ladislas Kán, a man of his time, was essentially just another “oligarch” in the kingdom of Hungary in the last decades of the 13th century. Nevertheless, unlike the other territories under the control of the “oligarchs”, Transylvania was most certainly different! From this point of view, the rise of the congregational system as well as Ladislas the Cuman’s and voivode Ladislas Kán’s reigns, respectively, ensured the continuity of the Transylvanian regnum, from duke Gyula’s regnum Erdewel to the regnum transsilvaniensis of the 1459 Union, accomplished

Conclusions

247

by keeping the fundamental notions of its juridical autonomy and basic structures of its statehood. The objective of the hereby work was to identify the safeguards and transmitters of these notions. Indeed, analyzing the “long duration” would prove that any circumstances moderately favorable facilitated the assertionof the fundamental notions of the Transylvanian regnum ideology. As for the truly favorable circumstances, they always resulted, in Transylvania, into the reassertion of the vocation for self-determination.

Annexes 1

General Congregations and Noble Congregations of Transylvania (1288–1322)123

Date

Place

Type

Chair

Causes

1288,1 June 8

villa Cruciferorum

Noble congregation (generalis convocatio)

Peter Monoszló, bishop of Transylvania vs. Keminus and John, sons of Mykula

1291,2 January 13

Mirăslău (Meruslo)

Noble congregation

1291,3 March 11

Alba Iulia

General congregation (nobles, Saxons, Szeklers, Romaniana)

Ladislas Borsa, of Sancto-Martino, vicevoivode; Assisted by: Peter of Nitra, earl of Cluj; Michael, son of Lawrence; Peter of Iara, son of Murun; Peter, son of Clement; judices per regnum Transilvanum constituti Benedict, deputy of the vicevoivode Ladislas of Sancto Martino, assisted by four “judges nominated for the realm of Transylvania”, including Nicholas of Gâmbaş (Gumbas) and Gregory of Sâncrai (de Sancto Rege) Andrew III, King of Hungary

1  D IR II 300–301; HD 474–475. 2  D IR II 347–348, 372; Teutsch-Firnhaber 169–170, 176. 3  D IR II 369, 509.

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count Nicholas, son of Mokou vs. Chapter pf the Transylvanian Church

Ugrinus Csák vs. unknown. Witnesses: noblemen, Saxons, Szeklers and Romanians

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Annexes

Table (cont.) Date

Place

Type

Chair

Causes

1296,4 April

in Torda, apud ecclesiam Cruciferorum (Oprişani)

Noble congregation (judicial assembly)

1296,5 June 18

prope villam Egrug (Românaşi)

Noble congregation (judicial assembly)

Ladislas Kán vs. Chapter of the Transylvanian Church Testimonies: 150 noblemen Sons of Bot of Ludos vs. Chapter of the Transylvanian Church

1306,6 September 15

villa Cruciferorum iuxta Torda (Oprişani)

Noble congregation

1308,7 June 17

iuxta Neregh (near Niraj)

13098

Turda (Torda)

General congregation (congregacio generalis) Noble congregation (congregacio)

Ladislas Kán, voivode of Transylvania; Johannes, provost of Sibiu; Myle, preceptor of the Crusaders House of Turda Ladislas Kán, voivode of Transylvania, unacum nobilibus partibus Transsilvane nobiscum consedentibus Ladislas Kán, voivode of Transylvania, unacum nobilibus partis Transsilvane, qui tunc nobiscum erant sedentes pro tribunali Ladislas Kán, voivode of Transylvania, unacum nobilibus regni ad nos pertinentibus (Ladislas Kán, voivode of Transylvania)

Nichoas and Peter, sons of ban Mykud vs. Ladislas Borsa of Sancto Martino John and Peter vs. magister Zemek –

45678

4  Jakó 543, 546. 5  Jakó 550. 6  Pataki J., Anjou királyaink és a két román vajdaság, Kolozsvár/Cluj, 1944, 15–17. 7  D IR III 67; Zichy I. 117–118. 8  AkO I. 813//814.

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Annexes

Date

Place

Type

Chair

Causes

1322,9 April 18–20

Oprişani (Kereztes, Kereztus)

General congregation (Transylvanian nobles, Szeklers and Saxons)

Thomas Szécsényi, voivode of Transylvania, Andrew Szécsi, Bishop of Transylvania, Simon Kacsics, Earl of Szeklers

Gyegus, son of Nicholas and Jacob, son of Apa vs. count of Târnava; Witnesses: all noblemen, Szeklers and Saxons.

9

2

Dukes of Transylvania

Bela IV, Duke of Transylvania, c. 1225–1235 Stephen V, Duke of Transylvania, 1257–1258, 1261–1270

3

Voivodes and vicevoivodes of Transylvania

Pousa 1226–1229 Gyula Rátót 1230–1231 Dionysius Tomaj 1233–1234 Pousa 1235–1241, March Ladislas (Aba ?), comes Ultrasilvanus, c. 1235–c. 1239 Lawrence (Aba ?), 1242–după 1252 Herbordus, (vice)voivode (?), c. 1253–c. 1256 Ernye Ákos, Ban of Transylvania, c. 1258–1261 Ladislas I Kán ( first time) 1261–1265 Nicholas Gutkeled 1265–1270 L., (vice)voivode, 1267 Matthew Csák ( first time) 1270–1272, September Nicholas Geregye 1272, September–1274, June (ante quem) John (Johannes) Kőszegi, 1273, May 12–29 Egidius Monoszló, 1274, September 26–29 9  D IR IV 37–39; ZW 60–63.

252

Annexes

Matthew Csák (second time), 1274, June (ante quem)–1275, December Ugrinus Csák ( first time), 1275, December Ladislas I Kán (second time), 1275, December–1276, February Ugrinus Csák (second time), 1276, February–1276, July Matthew Csák (third time), 1276, July–1277, February Nicholas Meggyesi ( first time), 1277–1278 Fyntha Aba, 1278 (autumn)–1280, July Stephen (Stephanus), son of Tekus de Mera, 1280 (second half) Peter, son of Dominic, 1280 (second half) Roland Borsa ( first time), 1282 Peter, vicevoivode, 1282 Apor Péc, 1283 Roland Borsa (second time), 1284–1285 Moyus Ákos, 1287–1288 Roland Borsa (third time), 1288–1294 Ladislas Borsa, vicevoivode, ante 1288–c. 1291 Benedict, deputy of the vicevoivode Ladislas Borsa, 1291 Andrew of Geoagiul de Sus (Stremţ), vicevoivode, 1290–1292 George Borsa, vicevoivode, c. 1292 Ladislas II Kán, 1294–1315 Peter Monoszló (voivode) 1305 John of Deuş, vicevoivode, 1294–after 1296 Simon, vicevoivode, c. 1300 Nicholas Ákos (voivode) 1307 Ehelleus Ákos, vicevoivode, ante 1303–1315 Ladislas III Kán (unconfirmed) 1315 Nicholas Meggyesi (second time) 1315–1316 Dozsa of Debrecen 1318–1321 Nicholas Vásári, vicevoivode, 1319–1320 Ehelleus Ákos, vicevoivode (second time) 1321 Thomas Szécsényi 1321–1342 Michael of Jucu (Suki) 1325–1330 Simon Zsámboki 1334–1336 Peter (Petö) Derencsényi 1337–1342

4

Counts of the Transylvanian counties

Alba Holders of the office are the vicevoivodes of Transylvania

Annexes Cluj Sebastianus 1229 Peter (of Nitra), 1288 Jacob Cseh 1312–1314 Nicolaus of Dezmir 1315 (count/judge of the nobles)? John Fonói 1317 (also count of Bistriţa) Michael of Jucu (Suki) 1324 Nicholas of Rima (Rimai) 1331–1332 Dăbâca Mykud Kökényes-Radnóth 1269 Ponyth Miskolc 1268–1270 Lawrence Aba (also ban of Severin) 1270–1272 Philip (also King’s cupbearer) 1272 Mykud Kökényes-Radnóth 1274 Alexander (also count of Sibiu) 1274–1275 Nicholas Dobokai (Kökényes-Radnóth) 1317 John Mórici 1331–1334 Haţeg Peter Aba 1276 Nicholas, judge of Haţeg (county) 1315 Hunedoara Martinus Mátéházi 1333 Târnava Rachael 1214 Ders 1331 Turda Dominic of Iara (Járai) 1310 Nicholas Gerendi 1312; 1326 Solnoc (Inner) Nicholas Gerendi 1325 Braşov Nicholas, son of Symon, 1294 Solomon . . . —1315 (1327, 1331)

253

254

Annexes

Counties Outside the Authority of the Voivode

Bistriţa (and Rodna) Aristaldus (Herystoldus), count of Rodna 1241 Paul, count of Rodna and Bistriţa, 1274 Vyvianus, count of Bistriţa (also earl of the royal chamber) 1295 (Ladislas Kán 1301–1310) Moyus Ákos (also King’s cupbearer) 1313–1314 John Fonói (also count of Cluj) 1317 Simon Kacsics (also count of the Szeklers) 1320–1327 Mediaş (and Şeica) Simon Kacsics 1320–1327 Ladislas (Lack), from the Hermann kindred 1328–1343 Sibiu Iwachinus Türje, c. 1210 Benedict (also judge of King’s Stephen royal court) 1265 Dionysius (also palatine, count of Bács) 1266 Benedict (also palatine, judge of the royal court) 1268 Albert (also magister agasonum) 1270–1272 Nicholas (also magister agasonum) 1272 Ladislas (I.) Kán (also judge of the royal court, count of Baranya) 1273 Alexander (also count of Dăbâca) 1274–1277 Peter Aba (also magister agasonum) 1279–1280 Amadé Aba 1280–1282 (Ladislas II Kán 1301–1310/1315) Nicholas Telegdi, Chanad kindred 1323 Thomas Szécsényi 1323–1324 Nicholas of Braşov 1329 Solnoc Paul Geregye 1245–1248 Dionysius Szentgróti, Türje kindred 1251 Starting from 1257/1261, holders of the county are the voivodes of Transylvania

5

Counts of the Szeklers

Moyus Ákos 1291 Peter Bő 1294–after 1295

Annexes (Ladislas II Kán 1301–1310/1315) Thomas Losonci 1315–1320 Stephen Losonci 1315 Simon Kacsics 1320–1327 Ladislas (Lack), Hermann kindred 1328–1343



Counts/Judges of the Szeklers on Arieş

6

Bishops of Transylvania

Seem, 1295 Egidius, son of Kolondus, 1313 Renold, official of Thomas Losonci, count of the Szeklers, 1319 Peter, son of Jacob, judge of the Szeklers on Arieş, 1320

Artulf 1244, June–1245, October/December Gallus 1246, May–1270 Peter Monoszló 1270–1307, November 27 (Ladislas, son of voivode Ladislas Kán, unconfirmed, January–July 1308) Benedict 1308, September–1320, February Andrew Szécsi 1320, March/July–1356

7

Provosts of the Chapter of Transylvanian Church

Nicholas Kán 1265–1268 Clement 1268 Nicholas Kán 1269–1273 Clement 1276 Nicholas Kán 1276–1277 Clement 1286 Michael Bő 1287–1296 Stephen 1298–1306 Gregory 1307–1313 Andrew Szécsi 1318–1320 Dominic Szécsi 1320–1357

255

256 8

Annexes

Archdeans of the Transylvanian Church

Alba Agabitus 1277 Stephanus 1297–1300 (vicechancellor of King Andrew III) John Nobilis, 1318–1320 (chancellor of Bishop Benedict) Crasna John 1286 Santus 1308–1310 Cluj Peter 1294 (dean of the Chapter in Alba Iulia) John Nobilis 1308–1312 Michael Ákos 1321 Dăbâca Dominic 1308–1313 Hunedoara Ceba 1265 Elias 1308–1313 Kezdi Nicholas 1308 Ozd Tiba 1268 Michael 1277 Andrew 1286 Lawrence 1300 Benedict 1307–1313 (episcopal vicar 1313) Eberhard, parish priest of Teaca, vicearchdean, 1318 John 1319 Solnoc Regulus 1265 Nicholas 1300 (notary of the bishop of Transylvania) Gregory 1308 Peter 1318–1320

Annexes

257

Târnava Bartholomew 1277 John 1300–1318 (vicechancellor of King Charles Robert, provost of Székesfehérvár 1307–1322) Turda Bartholomew 1274–1276 (dean of the Transylvanian church) Paul 1288–1307 (episcopal vicar 1307) Salvus 1308 (episcopal vicar 1308) Nicholas 1318–1320 (dean of the Transylvanian church) Tylegd Kylianus, doctor decretorum, 1288–1301 Nicholas 1308 Benedict 1319 (general vicar of the bishop of Transylvania)

9

Provosts of Sibiu

Florentinus 1235 Nicholas (royal vicechancellor) 1241 Benedict (royal vicechancellor) 1261–1263 John ( Johannes) 1288–1296



Deans of Sibiu

Reynaldus 1282 Walbrun 1302 Giselbert 1309

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Index Aba, bishop of Vác 217 Aba, kindred 81, 112, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 138, 168, 171, 184, 190, 191, 206 Amadé (Omodeus), earl of Sibiu, judge of the Royal Court, palatine 1, 126, 134, 136, 170, 217, 222, 226, 254 David, Fyntha’s father 126 Fyntha (Phinta), palatine, voivode of Transylvania 126, 128, 129, 133, 168, 190, 191 John, nobleman 232 Ladislas, judge of the royal court, voivode of Transylvania 15 Lawrence, voivode of Transylvania 56–58, 92, 98, 126, 251 Lawrence (II), ban of Severin, earl of Dăbâca, treasurer 126–129, 253 Myke (Miko), earl of Bihor 15 Peter, magister agasonum, earl of Sibiu and Hațeg, judge of the royal court 113, 126–127, 133, 253 Abaqa, ilkhan 6 Abaújvár, county 81, 128, 239 Abulafia, D., historian 50 Adrian, bishop of Transylvania 189 Adrian (Adorján), castle 42, 55, 123, 126, 132, 157, 232 Agabitus, archdean of Alba 121, 256 Agnes of Habsburg, Hungarian queen 210 Agriș, village 224 Akadas, Szekler 62 Ákos, kindred 182, 183, 187, 206 Alexander, nobleman 197 Ehelleus (I), nobleman 174, 182 Ehelleus (II), vicevoivode of Transylvania 180, 182–184, 188, 195, 234, 252 Elisabeth, daughter of Ehelleus (II) 184 Ernye, ban of Transylvania 68–71, 73, 87, 113, 251 Michael, archdean of Cluj 256 Moyus (I), voivode of Transylvania 141, 146, 182, 183, 252

Moyus (II), earl of Bistrița, comes Siculorum 226, 231–233, 254 Nicholas, voivode of Transylvania 252 Alard, count, father of Gaan (Gyan) 121, 126, 161, 188, 190 Alba, archdeanship 121, 191, 235, 256 county 44, 47, 83, 96, 98, 100, 122, 182, 187, 252 Alba Iulia, bishopric, chapter, city, fortress 18, 23, 28, 33, 35, 37, 39–42, 45, 52, 56, 57, 96, 97, 99, 100, 112, 116–122, 139, 141, 147–149, 151, 154, 155, 158, 161, 168, 170–173, 180–183, 189–193, 196, 197, 214, 216, 218–220, 224–226, 234, 240, 241, 249 Alberic of Trois-Fontaines (Albericus Trius Fontium) 15, 21, 22, 63 Alberigo, Giuseppe, editor 50 Albert, earl of Sibiu, magister agasonum 254 Albert I of Habsburg, king of Germany 140, 205, 207–211, 214, 228 Albești (Feirighaz), village 236 Alexander, ban of Severin, earl of Dăbâca and Sibiu 80, 82, 84, 85, 88, 92, 111, 117, 119, 253 Alexander, castellan of Șoimuș 178 Alexander IV, pope 62, 67, 70 Alexander, son of Durugh, nobleman 83, 85, 88, 92 Alexandrescu, A. D., archaeologist 86 Almăjd, village 55 Almaș, dukedom 294 Almaș (Halmas), village 218 Anagni, town 205 Andreas, bishop of Eger (Agria) 172 Andreas, son of Szerafin 54 Andreas Ekly, nobleman 38 Andreas Jonhos, castellan of Piatra Craivii 239 Andrew, son of Helemban 183 Andrew, son of Iohanka, count 179 Andrew, son of Ipoch, nobleman 187, 188 Andrew, son of Ivancha, count 65, 81, 83, 85, 87, 88, 92

Index Andrew II, king of Hungary 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 44, 52, 63, 72, 123, 140, 152, 163, 167, 189, 193, 230 Andrew III, king of Hungary 123, 140, 149, 152–156, 158, 164, 166, 169–172, 174, 175, 177, 188, 191, 192, 195–198, 204, 210, 225, 230, 246, 249 Andrew (I) of Geoagiu de Sus, count 71, 83, 126 Andrew (II) of Geoagiu de Sus, vicevoivode of Transylvania 147, 170, 252 Andrew, father of count Demetrius 83, 84 Anghel, Gheorghe, historian 28, 39–44, 104, 171, 182 Anjou, House of 139, 210, 212 Anna, princess, daughter of Bela IV 51, 81, 87 Anonymus (Notarius) 159 Anonymus Geographus 164, 213 Anonymus Leobiensis 34, 77, 79, 135 Antonius, bishop of Cenad 207, 208, 209 Apa, father of Jacob 251 Apafi, family 187 Apold, village 103 Apor, kindred 166 palace 37 Arad, castle 23, 184 county 36, 86, 144, 178, 184, 185, 229 provost 24, 52, 76, 86, 94 Arbuz, Cuman 141 Argeș, river 18 voivode 201 Arieș, river 40, 101, 136, 142 seat, region 101, 136, 155, 178, 182, 195, 227, 255 Arieșul de Câmpie (Aranyos, Oronos), castle, village, custom 42, 66, 97 Aristaldus (Herystoldus), count of Rodna 27, 254 Armbruster, Adolf, historian 198, 203, 212 Armenia, country 15 Arnold of Apold, count 103 Arpad, House of 1, 14, 15, 25, 31–33, 49, 63, 65, 72, 73, 94, 104, 138, 139, 152, 153, 159, 160, 164, 165, 175, 189, 203, 204, 242, 246 Arpad, Hungarian leader 159 Artulf, bishop of Transylvania 38, 56, 255 Așchileu, village 234 Augustin, bishop of Zagreb 217

275 Aurel Vlaicu, see Binținți Austria, country 9, 10, 14, 32, 58, 68, 88, 140, 149, 156, 196, 205, 207, 212 Aventinus, chronicler 207 Avrig, castle 22, 43 Azov, Sea of 15 Baas, judge of the royal court 92, 98 Babonič, kindred 217 Babus (Solnoc county), village 177 Bačman, Cuman leader 26 Bács, county 92, 254 Bak, János M., historian 7, 53, 165 Baksa, George, magister 127, 136, 161 Balassa, Demetrius, nobleman 217 Balaton, Lake 59 Balea, knez 198 Balkans 9, 26, 67, 71, 78, 93, 104, 105, 133, 138, 149, 152, 185, 203, 215, 228, 233 Balos, nobleman 179 Banat, region 9, 29, 97, 150, 151, 174, 184, 185, 229 Banate of Severin, see Severin Baranya, county 59, 80, 93, 113, 167, 174, 254 Baraolt 193 Barbat, voivode 127 Bärkäčar, Mongol commander 7 Bârsa 11, 12, 18–21, 148, 149, 234 Barthales, father of Peter 239 Bartholomew, archdean of Târnava 121, 257 Bartholomew, archdean of Turda 257 Bas, son of Balos 267 Basarab I, voivode of Wallachia 231, 242 Bâtca Doamnei (Piatra Neamț), castle 22, 26 Battelli, G., historian 50 Batu, khan of the Golden Horde 7–10, 14, 16, 25, 26, 29–33, 51, 58, 67, 135 Bavaria 194, 206–209, 211, 212 Baydar, Mongol commander 7, 8, 10, 25 Bazna (Bozna) 101 Beatrice d’Este, Queen of Hungary 152 Begovars, Cuman leader 13 Békefi, R., historian 121 Bela, prince, son of Bela IV 65, 74, 77–81, 89, 90, 106 Bela III, King of Hungary 52, 145 Bela IV, King of Hungary 6, 8, 12–16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 29, 30, 38, 42, 45, 49, 51–56,

276 Bela IV, King of Hungary (cont.) 58–63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71–82, 85–89, 92–97, 99, 104, 106, 108, 135, 139, 144, 145, 152, 160–162, 167, 173, 189, 207, 251 Bela Rostislavici, duke of Mačva 78, 87, 88, 108 Beliu, village 55 Beltiug (Beltuk), village 86, 90 Benchench, Szekely leader 103 Bendeffy, L., historian 14 Benedict, archbishop of Esztergom 76, 94, 95, 120, 257 Benedict, archdean of Ozd 220, 221 Benedict, achdean of Telegd 257 Benedict, bishop of Cenad 210, 217 Benedict, bishop of Oradea 24, 38 Benedict, bishop of Transylvania 217–222, 224, 227, 255, 256 Benedict, count, deputy of vicevoivode Ladislas Borsa 154, 156, 158, 249, 252 Benedict, earl of Sibiu, palatine 92, 254 Benedict, father of magister John 232 Benedict, from Zala county 94 Benedict XI, pope 204 Benedict Rád, bishop of Veszprém 207, 217 Benkő, E., historian 19, 20 Bennet, R. F., historian 12 Bereg, county 75, 81, 82, 84, 86, 90, 151 Berke, Khan of the Golden Horde 9, 70, 105 Besenyő, village 98 Beudin (Solnoc county), village 177 Bical, village 55 Bicskei, George, archbishop of Esztergom 204, 205 Biertan, district, seat 177, 192, 194, 230, 235 Bigalli, Davide, historian 49 Bihor, castle 83, 88 county 15, 24, 36, 47, 55, 66, 75, 86, 101, 110, 117, 123, 125, 126, 130–134, 144, 159, 184, 197, 208, 209 duchy (ducatus Byhariensis) 144, 159 Bileag, village 35 Binder, Paul, historian 19, 20, 28, 36, 196 Binținți (Aurel Vlaicu, Sothelik), village 100, 103 Birnbaum, Marianna, historian 53 Birtin, village 47, 66 Bistrița (Bistiche, Nosa), town 27, 37, 43, 79, 111, 135, 136, 141, 154, 209, 225, 226, 244

Index county 101, 122, 175, 223, 231, 238, 253, 254 Bistrița, valley 22, 26 Black Sea 16, 31, 33 Blawch, nobleman 243 Bő (Beu), kindred 170 Michael, provost of Transylvanian church, bishop of Zagreb, archbishop of Esztergom 170, 172, 204, 205, 255 Peter, earl of the Szekelys 183, 254 Boba, Imre, historian 382 Boc (Bucteluk), village 101 Boccasini, Nicolaus, pontifical legate 182, 204 Böček (Bochetor), Mongol commander 6–10, 26, 27, 29 Boch, earl of Bihor 24 Bogdan, Alexandru, archaeologist 29, 39 Bohemia, kingdom 8, 32, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 86, 105, 106, 110, 123–126, 204–206, 208 Bojena Beatrix of Bohemia, sister of Ottokar II 79 Boleslav (Boleslaus) Pudicus, duke of Krakow 70, 78, 82, 105 Boleslav the Pious, duke of Gnyezno 78 Bologa, castle 229, 232, 238, 242 Bologna 95 Boniface VIII, pope 174, 204–206, 210 Bonțida (Bonchhyda) 91, 101, 177, 233, 234, 240 Borchol, Cuman kindred 93 Boril, Bulgarian czar 17 Borsa, kindred 47, 55, 95, 125, 130–134, 140, 147, 151, 152, 159, 166, 184, 205, 207, 209, 231, 232 Beke, nobleman 142, 208, 209, 217 George, vicevoivode of Transylvania 252 Jacob (Kopasz), earl of Borsod, magister agasonum 232 Ladislas (de Sancto Martino), vicevoivode of Transylvania 45, 131, 147, 156, 249, 250, 252 Roland (Lorandus), voivode of Transylvania 1, 130–134, 136, 139, 141, 146, 147, 151, 152, 156, 157, 163, 166, 170, 176, 197, 252 Thomas, count 131 Borșa, valley 130 Borșea, village 55

Index Borsod, castle 75 county 59, 68, 128, 134 Bortz, Cuman leader 13 Borynka (Baranka), fortress 81, 84, 90 Bosnia, bishopric 73, 204, 217 Bot of Ludos, nobleman 250 Bozouch, son of Inouch 103 Brâncuș, Gheorghe, editor 149 Brandenburg, margraviate 79, 86 Brașov, town 20, 83, 103, 141, 178, 254 county 21, 135, 142, 178, 191, 234, 253 Brătianu, Gheorghe I., historian 149–151, 196, 199, 201 Bratislava 75–80, 89, 93, 98, 106, 110, 217, 224 Brethonia, village 198 Brindisi 212 Buda 10, 24, 30, 53, 54, 56, 59, 65, 77, 82, 87, 88, 111–113, 119, 120, 128, 153, 155, 172, 207–209, 217–219 Budjak, steppe 26 Bulchu, bishop of Cenad 24 Bulci, monastery 29 Bulgaria, kingdom 9, 17, 18, 33, 61, 70, 74, 75, 102, 105, 165, 203, 212 Büri, Mongol commander 6, 7, 9, 10, 25–30 Burundai, Mongol commander 70 Burzenland (Burcia, Burza), county 11, 12, 18–21, 148, 149, 234 Busuioc-von Hasselbach, Dan Nicolae, historian 17, 18, 22, 23 Butură Valeriu, ethnographer 167 Byzantine, Empire 74, 203 Čaka, Mongol ruler 203 Călata, region 62, 101, 103 Câlnic (Kalnuk), castle 43, 81, 83, 88, 103, 104, 111, 176, 216 Campoluogo, see Câmpulung Câmpulung, town 199–201, 203 Căpud (Cupud), village 100 Căpuș (Kopus), village 122 Caransebeș (Karansebus), borrough 141, 151 Caraș, county 93, 238 Carinthia, duchy 111 Carpathian Basin 144 Carpathians, mountains 4, 6–10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 22, 24, 26, 27, 32, 56, 57, 61, 71, 104, 135, 136, 138, 146, 147, 149, 167, 199, 201, 203, 242

277 Cârța, monastery 17, 28, 36, 42, 71, 78, 216 Casimir, duke of Kujawia 78 Catalan company 213 Catherine of Courtenay 214 Charles, son of Charles of Valois 213 Charles II of Anjou, king of Naples 106, 203 Charles of Anjou, king of Naples 106, 140 Charles of Valois 164, 203, 211–215 Charles Martell 152, 203 Charles Robert of Anjou, king of Hungary  1, 114, 130, 150, 176, 177, 179, 181, 184, 189, 194, 195, 198, 203–217, 222–238, 241–243, 245, 246, 257 Ceaba 177 Ceba, archdean of Hunedoara 256 Cegléd (Chegled) 141, 151 Celestin III, pope 52, 189 Cenad, castle 23, 29 county 144, 208, 230 bishopric 24, 204, 207, 208, 210, 217 Central Asia 32 Cetatea de Baltă, castle 28, 39, 41, 57, 178, 239, 240 Ceuaș (Chawas) 177 Chagatai, Mongol khan 9 Chalanus, village 101 Chanad, kindred 47, 55, 66, 144, 185, 206, 254 Ladislas, nobleman 66 Thomas, nobleman 66 Chernigov 9 Chelmac (Eperjes), monastery 29 Cheresig, castle 151 Chidioșan, N., historian 130 Chintelnic (Kendtelek, Kendteluk), village 57, 126 Chirovsky, Nicholas L., historian 51, 67, 70 Chițescu, L., historian 199 Chiuza (Kuzepfolua), village 58 Chmielnik, battle of 10 Chyl of Câlnic, count 81, 83, 88, 103, 104, 111 Ciceu (Chycho), castle, estate 42, 134, 178, 188, 231, 232, 234, 239 Cincu, chapter 193 Ciocâltan, Virgil, historian 31, 105 Cisnădie, castle 43 Cisnădioara, village 42 Clement, father of count Peter 147, 158, 249 Clement, provost 255

278 Clement IV, pope 86, 89, 106 Clement V, pope 191, 208, 210, 212, 214, 215 Cloașter (predium Nicolai), village 101 Cluj (Clus, Cluse, Clwsvar, Kulus, Kulusvar, Kuluswar), archdeanship 101, 183, 220, 256 castle, town 10, 29, 37, 39, 45, 57, 91, 101, 102, 116, 117, 122, 141, 157, 171, 223, 225, 226, 229, 230, 232, 233, 241, 242 county 101, 103, 122, 147, 169, 174, 178, 187, 237, 239, 240, 249, 253, 254 Cluj-Mănăștur, abbey 39, 41, 42, 52, 136, 245 castle 27, 41 Codlea (Feketeuholm), castle 19, 21, 81–83, 85, 86, 91, 162, 178, 234 Cojocna, borrough 175, 225 Coloman, duke of Slavonia 12 Coloman I the Learned, king of Hungary 165 Colțești, castle 182 Comana de Jos, castle 20, 43 Comes Ultrasilvanus (see Aba, Ladislas) 15 Conrad of Tălmaciu, count 183, 234 Conrad, son of Kemyn 83 Constantin Tich, czar of Târnovo 74, 105 Constantinople (Istanbul) 4, 11, 17, 212, 214 Copand (Coppan), village 100 Corrardus, earl of Borsod 69 Coșdu, chapter, deanship 192, 193 Cosma, Ela, historian 199–201 Costanza, princess 60 Costin, Miron, chronicler 199, 200 Crainimăt (Querali), village 79 Crasna, archdeanship 256 county 47, 55, 110, 144, 159, 184 Crăciunelul de Jos (Aruszegh), village 100 Cricău (Karako), village 98, 103, 142, 163, 179 Crihalma, castle 22 Crimea, peninsula 26 Criș, chapter, deanship 192, 193 Cristiș (Kereztes, Kereztus, villa Cruciferorum), see Oprișani Crișul Alb, river 9 Crișul Negru, river 9, 131 Crișul Repede, river 9, 230 Criț, village 103 Croatia, banate, province 97, 98, 138, 165 Cruceburg, castle (Teliu) 20

Index Csaholyi, John, earl of Solnoc 239, 240 Csák, kindred 83, 89, 92, 102, 110–120, 122–127, 138, 143, 167, 171, 177, 190, 198, 206 Demetrius, nobleman 54 Dominic, nobleman 83, 92 Margaret, mother of Matthew 118 Mark, nobleman 217 Matthew (Mattheus) (I), ban of Slavonia, voivode of Transylvania 86, 87, 110–112, 114–119, 121, 128, 133, 134, 145, 170, 190, 251, 252 Matthew (Mattheus) (II), palatine 1, 216, 225, 226, 233 Peter, nobleman 217 Peter, palatine 81, 82, 84, 86–88, 96, 114, 121, 123, 124 Stephen (István, Stephanus), ban of Severin 56 Thomas, nobleman 83 Ugrinus, archbishop of Kalocsa 10 Ugrinus, voivode of Transylvania, ban of Severin 92, 114–116, 127, 155, 177, 185, 198, 249, 252 Cseh, Jacob of Rediu, earl of Cluj 177, 253 Cumania (Comania), bishopric, region 13, 74, 165 Cuming, G. J., editor 50 Cunța (Scekes), estate 197 Cuzdrioara, village 55 Dăbâca (Doboka, Dobokavarfalva), archdeanship 256 castle, village 27, 37, 39–41, 45, 46, 92, 131, 173, 224, 225, 245 county 92, 101, 111, 117, 119, 126, 130, 178, 234, 237, 239, 240, 253, 254 Dacia, ancient kingdom 151 Daia (Danjan), village 177 Danube, river 8–10, 18, 26, 27, 29, 32, 33, 35, 38, 49, 53, 54, 60–62, 65, 74–76, 86, 89, 105, 137, 138, 164, 202, 231, 242 Dalmatia, province 9, 53, 54, 56, 68, 98, 138, 165 Dâmbovița, river 200 Dan, knez 198 Dan, Mihail P., historian 73 Daniel of Wrbou, count 104

279

Index Daniil Romanovich, knez/king of Halych 13, 16, 51, 58, 59, 67, 70, 82, 90 Debran, village 36 Debreceni, Dózsa, voivode of Transylvania 159, 232–235, 237, 252 Decei, Aurel, historian 6, 9, 26, 29, 43, 71, 149 Dedek, L., editor 52 Dees, father of count Nicholas 177 Dej (Deesfalva, Deesvar), borrough 27, 46, 69, 75, 91, 99, 133, 134, 175, 223, 225, 230 Demetrius, son of Andrew 83 Densuș, village 198 Derencsényi, Peter, vicevoivode of Transylvania 239, 252 Ders, count of Târnava 253 Dešt-i Kipčak, steppe 9, 33 Deuș (Gyos), village 174, 252 Deva (Dewa), castle 39, 42, 81, 82, 84, 96, 102, 174, 178, 179, 185–187, 197, 215, 231, 233, 238, 239 Dezmir, village 253 Dezna, castle 205 Diaconescu, Marius, historian 136 Dincă, Ciprian A., historian 173, 180 Dionysius, bishop of Győr 118 Dionysius, chaplain 223 Dionysius, earl of Bacs and Sibiu, palatine 254 Dionysius, nobleman of Sfărașu 101 Dionysius, palatine 152 Dionysius (Tomaj), palatine 10, 24 Dniester, river 26 Dobokai, family 102, 188, 237 Mykud (I), count 72, 83 Nicholas, count, son of ban Mykud 224, 250 Peter, son of ban Mykud 250 Dogaru, Mircea, historian 26 Dominic, archdean of Dăbâca 256 Dominic, brother of magister Pous 84 Dominic, castellan of Șoimuș 178 Dominic, father of vicevoivode Peter 128, 252 Dominic, son of Andrew 84 Dominik, son of Andronikos 83 Dominic, son of Benchench 103 Dominic of Guzmán, saint 11, 12 Dominic of Iara, earl of Turda 178, 253 Domnești (Bylok) 122

Dopca 36 Dorman, Bulgarian ruler 161 Drăganu, Nicolae, historian 130 Drăguț, Vasile, art historian 198 Druget, Philippe, palatine 232, 233 Dubicha, county 65 Dumbrava, village 147 Durut, Cuman tribe 13 Ebendorfer von Haselbach, Thomas, chronicler 204, 207 Eberhard, parish priest of Teaca 256 Ebl of Brașov, nobleman 83 Edroiu, Nicolae, historian 196 Eger (Agria), bishopric, city 24, 171, 172, 204 Egidius, earl of the Szekelys on Arieș 255 Egidius, parish priest of Satu Mare 91 Ekly, Andreas, nobleman 38 Elefánti, Desiderius, castellan of Bologa 238, 242 Elias, archdean of Hunedoara 256 Elijah, dean 219 Elisabeth, daughter of Ehelleus Ákos 183 Elisabeth, daughter of Stephen V 213 Elisabeth, queen of Bohemia 208 Elisabeth, queen of Hungary, wife of Charles Robert of Anjou 233 Elisabeth, queen of Hungary, wife of Ladislas IV 106 Elisabeth, queen of Hungary, wife of Stephen V 78, 80, 81, 89, 91, 94, 112, 119, 120, 124, 127, 168 Elisabeth of Hungary, Saint 65 Emerich, bishop of Oradea 172, 217 Emerich, count 83 Emerich, king of Hungary 145 Engel Pál, historian 43, 55, 56, 106, 135, 139, 140, 143, 165, 167, 178, 181, 184, 185, 194, 203–206, 226, 229, 230, 232–234, 236–239 Engelbert of Admont, abbot 143 Enugd (Aiudu de Sus), village 197 Ependorph, village 244 Epternach (Austria) 26 Esztergom, archbishopric 52, 59, 62, 63, 66, 69, 70, 76, 79, 89, 94, 95, 117–122, 127, 132, 149, 154, 168, 172, 204–206, 209, 217, 223, 224

280 Europe 4, 7, 9, 12, 14, 21, 25, 30, 31, 50, 51, 58, 60, 152, 208, 212, 215, 228 Central 25, 31, 32, 70, 77, 105, 153 Southeastern 4, 17, 174, 202, 203, 212 Western 153, 244 Eastern 11, 13, 30–32, 59, 73, 104, 164, 213, 214 Făgăraș, castle, estate 17, 19, 22, 28, 155, 177, 197, 198, 200, 201 region 17, 18, 22, 28, 155, 177, 197, 198, 200, 201 Fărău (Forro) 182, 183 Feirighhaz (Albești) 236 Felcheriu 55 Feldioara, castle 19–21 Fenes 102 Feneș 197 Fild 55 Filipișul Mic, village 154 Finiș, castle 131, 157 Florentinus, provost of Sibiu 257 Florești, castle 171 Fogacsi, Mark, vicecastellan of Unguraș 239 Fonói, John, earl of Cluj and Bistrița 253 Forrói, Aladár, nobleman 217 Föveny, battle, congregation 113, 114, 141, 146 France, kingdom 212, 214 Franciscus Pragensis, canon 207 Franco, captain 75 Frata, village 35 Frederick II, emperor 50, 60 Frederick the Fair, duke of Austria 210, 212 Frederick of Babenberg, duke of Austria 10, 14 Fügedi, Erik, historian 42, 46, 59, 75, 80, 81, 143, 145 Fundătura (Geneu), village 101, 103 Fylek (Filakovo, Fülek), castle 75, 205 Fylesd, village 197 Fyless, forest 117 Fyoch, nobleman 103 Fyzer (Füzer), castle 81 Gaan (Gyan), son of Alard 121, 125, 126, 161, 188, 190 Gaal de Kachuz, nobleman 84 Gabriel, magister 83 Galicia 15, 165, see Halych

Index Gallus, bishop of Transylvania 35, 40, 52, 57, 255 Gâmbaș (Gumbas) 158, 249 Gârbova 44, 104 Gecske, county 216 Geled, monastery 29 Gentile de Sancto Martino ai Monti, cardinal 184, 193, 210, 211, 214–221, 223, 224 Geoagiul de Sus (Gyogh, Gyogh Superior, today Stremț) 71, 83, 102, 104, 112, 126, 142, 147, 170, 187, 227, 252 Georgia, kingdom 15 Gerard of Mutina, papal superintendent 164 Geregye, kindred 47, 66, 89, 110, 111, 123, 125, 131 Akon, nobleman 128, 132 Gregen, nobleman 125 Nicholas, voivode of Transylvania 108, 110–112, 115, 122, 125–127, 130, 251 Paul, earl of Solnoc, judge of royal court 9, 35, 37, 38, 42, 46, 47, 53–58, 61, 66, 69, 110, 131, 254 Gerend, see Luncani Gerendi, noble family 187, 188 Jacob, nobleman 102 Nicholas, earl of Turda and Solnoc (Inner) 178, 237, 253 Germany 140, 152, 207, 210, 214 Geubul, nobleman 244 Gheorghi I Terter, czar of Bulgaria 202 Gilău (Gylo) 35, 122, 157 Giselbert, dean of Sibiu 257 Glogoveț, castle 178 Gnyezno, duchy 78 Gogan Varolea, castle 178 Golden Horde 31, 51, 58, 67, 70, 74, 75, 87 Gombos, Franciscus Albinus, historian 10, 15, 22, 33, 34, 51, 63, 73, 76, 77, 79, 80, 135, 204, 205, 207, 208, 211, 212 Gömör, county 86, 92, 238, 239 Gran, river 66 Grebenișu de Câmpie (Gerebenes), village 183 Greece 119 Gregory, archdean of Solnoc 256 Gregory, earl of Zips 122 Gregory, bishop of Bosnia 217 Gregory, provost 255

Index Gregory IX, pope 12, 15, 19, 189 Gregory of Geoagiu, judge of the nobles 187 Gregory of Palatca, nobleman 240 Gregory of Sâncraiu, nobleman 249 Grousset, René, historian 7, 9, 11, 67, 70 Gurasada, village 197 Gurbeu, village 102 Gutkeled, kindred 47, 55, 86, 89, 97, 98, 102, 103, 111–114, 120, 124–126 Alexander, earl of Szabolcs 83, 85, 88, 92 Cosma, count 83 Cosma, son of count Cosma 83 Durugh, nobleman 83, 85, 88, 92, 125 Stephen (I), palatine 63, 65, 66, 97 Stephen (II), ban, judge of royal court 124, 127, 128 Joachim, ban of Slavonia 97, 98, 102, 107, 110, 124 Lothard, ban 231, 232 Nicholas, voivode 88, 97, 251 Nicholas, judge of royal court 98 Paul, palatine 43, 66, 97 Peter, son of Durugh 125 Güyük, Mongol Great Khan 9, 50, 58–61 Gwd, count 83, 84, 88 Gyegus, son of Nicholas 251 Gylnuchbana (Gelnica) 123, 160 Győr, bishopric, town 38, 57, 79, 118, 181, 204, 217 Györffy, György, historian 55, 102, 123, 128, 131, 132, 185, 229 Gyula, duke of Transylvania 165, 167, 246 Habsburg, House of 207, 212 Hădăreni (Hodryv), village 101 Hagmas, village 177 Haieu, village 55 Halasu, A., historian 39, 42 Hălchiu (Heldenburg), castle 178, 242 Halecki, Oskar, historian 106, 203 Halych, kingdom 13, 25, 26, 33, 51, 54, 58, 59, 67, 70, 82, 90, 93, 199, 201, 231 Hamadan (Iran), town 6 Hașag (Hassach), village 100 Hasdeu, Bogdan Petriceicu, polyhistor 149 Hațeg (Hatzok), castle, estate 97, 98, 102, 124, 150, 174, 178, 196–198, 202, 229, 238, 253 Heder, kindred 77, 108, 111, 134, 138, 140, 152

281 Heitel, Radu, historian 42, 43, 104 Helemban, Szekely nobleman 183 Hench of Rodna, count 126 Henning of Petrești, count 236 Henry VII of Luxemburg, emperor 215 Henry II, duke of Silesia 7, 8, 10 Herbord, son of Osl, count 65 Herbord, vicevoivode of Transylvania 62, 251 Herina (Herena), village 35, 122 Hermann, kindred 238 Emerich 238 Ladislas (Lack), earl of the Szekelys, of Bistrița and Mediaș 238, 242, 254, 255 Hermann of Fatha, count 103 Hermann von Salza, Teutonic Grand Master 12, 21 Herrandus, earl of Trenčin 76 Herric Magnus, graf 236 Heves-Újvár, county 239 Hód, Lake 133, 138, 150 Hoghiz, village 36 Holban, Maria, historian 27, 61, 166, 198, 199, 233 Holy Land 50, 78 Holy See 51, 79, 120, 140, 191, 218, 235 Hóman Bálint, historian 8, 149, 203 Honorius III, pope 12, 52, 189 Honorius IV, pope 140 Hont, archdeanship 76 Hontpázmány, kindred 206, 239 John, archbishop of Kalocsa 204 Horedt, Kurt, historian 19, 22, 23 Horom, castle 29, 185 Hortobagy (Hurtubag), village 209, 246 Hostislai, see Rostislav Mihailovich Hrushevsky, Michael, historian 51 Hunedoara, archdeanship 102, 256 castle 29, 39, 40, 42, 57, 174, 178 county 102, 178, 185, 239, 253 Iakov Sventislav, czar of Bulgaria (Vidin) 75, 78, 81, 96, 104, 105 Iambor, Petru, historian 29, 39–42, 135–137 Iara, village 147, 178, 187, 225, 249, 253 Ighiu (Craphundorph), village 98, 103, 163 Igmánd of Pâncota, Laurent, voivode 205, 206 Igriș, monastery 29, 141

282 Igruchteluk, village 101 Ilia, village 197 Ilidia (Yliad), castle 197 Ilva, river 26 India, country 15 Innocent III, pope 52, 189 Innocent IV, pope 38, 50–52, 58–61 Inouch, father of Bozouch 103 Ionescu, Grigore, art historian 19 Iorga, Nicolae, historian 130, 166, 186, 201 Ip, village 103 Ipatiev, Chronicle 135, 149 Ipoch, father of Andrew 187 Isabella of Anjou, queen of Hungary 106, 140 Isaszeg, battle 78, 97, 89, 94, 97 Iskar, river 74 Iwanka (Janka) of Palatca, nobleman 240, 241 Iwankateleke, village 100 Izvoru Crișului (Keresfev), village 117, 122 Jacob, father of judge Peter 255 Jacob, serf of Bihor castle 83 Jacob, serf of Vasvár castle 83 Jacob, son of Apa 251 Jacob, son of count Emerich 83 Jadani, village 55 Jakó, Zsigmond, historian 10, 15, 17, 26, 28, 36, 40, 45, 55, 56, 58, 66, 71, 72, 74, 78–81, 83–86, 88, 96, 97, 100–103, 112, 115–119, 121–124, 126, 127, 132–134, 139–142, 145, 147, 148, 154–158, 160–163, 167–171, 173, 174, 177, 178, 182, 183, 186–188, 190–192, 195–197, 230, 250 Jelna (Zolosim), village 79 Jerusalem 50 Jimbor, village 234 Jiu, river 18 Joanche, archdean of Orăștie 79 Jochi, Mongol commander 7 Johannes Latinus, royal servant 17, 145 John, archbishop of Kalocsa 154, 172 John, archdean of Alba 235 John, archdean of Crasna 256 John, archdean of Ozd 256 John, archdean of Târnava, provost of Székesfehérvár 180, 181, 218, 257 John, bishop of Nitra 204

Index John, judex curiae 179 John, magister, son of Benedict 232 John, provost of Arad 76 John, provost of Sibiu 141, 186, 257 John, provost of Székesfehérvár 221 John, son of count Gwd 83, 84 John, son of Geubul of Bistrița 244 John, son of Mykula 249 John XXI, pope 168 John XXII, pope 236 John of Deuș, vicevoivode of Transylvania 186, 252 John of Lomb, nobleman 179 John of Moruț, earl of Dăbâca 237 John Nobilis, archdean of Alba and Cluj 220, 256 John the Baptist, Saint 223 Jonhos, Andreas, castellan of Piatra Craivii 239 Jucu (Suk) 187, 233, 237, 252, 253 Julian, dominican friar 14 Juvaini (Ala ad-Din Ata-Malik), historian 6, 14 Kachuz (Kačanov), village 83 Kacsics, kindred 238 Michael, earl of Szekelys, Bistrița, Mediaș 238 Simon, earl of Szekelys 235, 238, 251, 254, 255 Kadan, Mongol commander 6–10, 24–27, 29, 33, 53, 54, 135 Kaidu, Mongol commander 8, 10 Kalka, battle 11–14 Kállay, Paul, nobleman 151 Kállay, Peter, nobleman 151 Kállay, Stephen, nobleman 151 Kalnik, county 97 Kalocsa, archbishopric 10, 76, 94, 95, 118, 149, 154, 172, 180, 204–206, 208, 209, 217, 222, 224 Kán, kindred 56, 102, 103, 112, 124, 166–169, 177, 184, 187, 206 Gyula (I), ban, voivode of Transylvania 69, 96, 166, 167 Gyula (II), son of Gyula (I) 96, 99 Gyula (III), son of Ladislas (I), brother of Ladislas (II) 77, 81, 96, 99, 160, 167, 168 Jula, son of Ladislas (II) 169

Index Ladislas (I), ban of Slavonia 63, 96, 167 Ladislas (II), voivode of Transylvania (as Ladislas I) 77, 80, 96, 111, 116, 160, 167, 169, 251, 252, 254 Ladislas (III), voivode of Transylvania (as Ladislas II) 1, 2, 57, 166, 168–171, 173–186, 188, 189, 193–195, 197–199, 201–203, 205, 206, 208–217, 219–229, 234, 235, 237, 244, 246, 250, 252, 254, 255 Ladislas (IV), voivode of Transylvania (as Ladislas III) 229, 252 Ladislas (V), bishop 229, 255 Nicholas (I), provost of Alba Iulia, archbishop of Esztergom 96, 119, 120, 122, 127, 168, 190, 255 sons of Ladislas (III), see also Ladislas (IV) and Ladislas (V) 229, 231, 233 Kany, kindred 123 Thoma, royal servant 125 Karácsonyi, János, historian 93, 95, 115, 130, 131, 169 Karbić, Damir, historian 46 Kata, kindred 45, 103, 123 Abraham, nobleman 103, 117, 119 Ponyth, nobleman 103, 117 Kata, wife of Egidius Monoszló 115 Kemāl Pasha-Zāde, chronicler 70–71 Keminus, son of Mykula 249 Kemyn, father of palatine Lawrence 71, 81, 83, 84, 92, 106 Kenezmonostor, monastery 29 Kerekyghaz, village 101 Keve (Kewe), archdeanship 29, 140, 141, castle 179 Keyran, Cuman khan 93 Kezdi, archdeanship 256 Szekely seat 103 Kiev, city 9, 16, 32, 33, 51, 70 Klemencia of Habsburg, wife of Charles Martell 152 Klissa, town 56 Knauz, Ferdinandus, historian 52, 137 Kniezsa, I., historian 130 Kolondus, father of Egidius 255 Kökényes-Radnót, kindred 40, 103, 131, 187 see also Dobokai family Emerich 83, 86, 102, 173 Mykud (I) 83, 87, 88, 92, 102, 115, 116

283 Mykud (II), ban of Severin, earl of Dăbâca 83, 86, 87, 88, 92, 102, 115–117, 119, 131, 136, 142, 173, 178, 224, 250, 253 Komjathy, Anthony T., historian 8 Kőrös, county 185 Košcev, V. K., historian 7 Kőszegi, kindred 111–114, 120, 122, 123, 125, 206 Henrik, ban 217 Henrik (I), palatine 1, 77, 87, 88, 105, 108, 111, 113 Henrik (II), palatine 134, 170, 181, 207, 216 Ivan, ban of Slavonia 134 John, son of Henrik 88 John, voivode of Transylvania 111, 251 Nicholas, bishop of Győr 181, 217 Nicholas, palatine 216 Peter, bishop of Veszprém 120, 121, 168 Kosztolnyik, Z. J., historian 10, 12, 42, 51, 53, 55, 59, 60, 63, 65, 78, 80, 92, 94, 106, 108, 120, 121, 134, 140, 152, 167 Krakow 82, 105 Kristó, Gyula, historian 63, 65, 167, 169, 179, 184, 206, 207, 217, 224, 230 Kroissenbrunn, battle 71–73 Kuban, river 9 Kujawia, duchy 78 Kulcsó (Kulchou), banate 128 Kumelburch, placename 28 Kunigunda, duchess of Krakow 78, 105 Kunigunda, queen of Bohemia 73 Kunigunda of Brandenburg 79 Kurtwelesteleke, village 177 Küsternig, A., historian 125 Kuthen, Cuman khan 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 31 Kylianus, archdean of Telegd 257 L., vicevoivode of Transylvania 98, 251 Lackfi, noble family 138 Ladislas, archdean of Hont 76 Ladislas, bishop of Srim 217 Ladislas, comes Ultrasilvanus 15 Ladislas, father of Paul 178 Ladislas I the Saint, king of Hungary 150 Ladislas IV the Cuman, king of Hungary 81, 82, 87, 102, 106–108, 110, 115, 123–125, 128, 129, 131–146, 148–156, 162, 163, 169, 173, 182, 186, 190, 191, 195–199, 201, 246 Ladislas of Tytel, royal vice-chancellor 172

284 Laiou, Angeliki E., historian 212, 213 Lăpuș (terra Lapus), estate 154, 155, 177 Lastruch, castle 111 László, Péter, editor 158, 164 Latin Empire 4, 11, 17, 50, 212, 214 Laurencio barbato 98 Lawrence, archdean of Ozd 256 Lawrence, brother of Herbord 62 Lawrence, father of count Michael 147, 249 Lawrence, father of Leukus Pekri 206 Lawrence, son of Kemyn, palatine 71, 81–85, 106 Lawrence of Câmpulung (Laurencius de Longo Campo), count 203 Lăzărescu, E., historian 201 Legii (Legyun), village 240 Legnica, battle 7, 8, 10 Leporum, island 56 Leszek the Black, prince of Kujawia 78, 82 Lev Danilovich, knez of Halych 60 Lewe, serf of Alba castle 99 Lipova, castle 229 Lita, castle 178, 239 Lithuania, country 70, 135 Litovoi, voivode 78, 81, 97, 127 Lodomeria, province 165 Lodomerius, bishop of Oradea, archbishop of Esztergom 95, 118, 125, 127, 131, 132, 134, 140–142, 146, 148, 149, 152, 154, 161, 191, 196 Lomb, village 45, 179 Lona, valley 130 Longo Campo see Câmpulung Losonci, kindred 177 Banffy, Dionysius 154, 155, 177 Stephen, earl of Szekelys 230, 233, 255 Thomas, earl of Szekelys 230, 255 Lotru, castle 23 Louis IX the Saint, king of France 213 Louis the Great, of Anjou, king of Hungary and Poland 105, 195, 231 Lublin, town 10, 51, 203 Lucas, Saint 63 Luccari, chronicler 199 Lujerdiu (Lusad), village 101 Lukács, Antal, historian 17, 18, 22, 28, 43, 130–132, 199 Luna de Jos (Lona), village 101

Index Luncani (Gerend), village 45, 103, 142, 178, 187 Lupaș, Ioan, historian 130, 157, 167, 176 Lvov, town 34 Lyon, Council of 49–51, 189 Măceu (Machou), village 102 Mačva, banate 78, 87, 232, 233 Makk, Ferenc, historian 65, 159 Makkai, László, historian 30, 130, 131, 164 Mályusz, Elemér, historian 145, 164, 237 Mănărade (Munora), village 36, 101 Mansi, G. D., historian 50 Maramureș, county, terra 86, 91, 150, 171, 172, 201 Marcell, son of Jacob 83, 88 Marchfeld, battle 125, 138, 143 Marcu, M., archaeologist 21 Margaret of Hungary, Saint 118 Mark, father of Roland 122 Martin IV, pope 140 Martin, bishop of Eger 217 Martin, son of Blawch 243 Martin, Saint 103, 215 Mary, queen of Naples 106, 152 Mary Laskaris, queen of Hungary 51, 63, 74, 77, 79, 89, 106 Mátéházi, Martinus, castellan of Deva, earl of Hunedoara 238, 239, 253 Maurice, parrish priest of Cricău 179 Mediaș (Mediesy), town, county, district 101, 177, 190–192, 194, 230, 235, 238, 242, 243, 254 Meggyes, nobleman 103 Mehadia, castle, estate 97, 98, 124, 231, 233 Mejhedey, nobleman of Sumurduc 101 Melloni, Alberto, historian 50 Menk, Cuman leader 86 Menteu, castle 178 Menumorout, duke of Bihor 144, 153 Mera (Slovakia), village 128, 252 Meșcreac (Germand), village 100 Meseș, Mountains 99, 144, 146, 157 Micăsasa (Mykazaza), village 101 Michael, archdean of Ozd 121, 256 Michael, brother of Bela of Mačva 78 Michael, son of Lawrence 147, 158 Michael Sisman, czar of Bulgaria 231

285

Index Michael Vsevolodovich, great knez of Kiev 16, 51 Micloșoara, village 22 Miechovius, Matthias, chronicler 135 Miercurea, seat 29, 36 Mike, castellan of Unguraș 178 Mintiu Gherlii (villa Nemty), village 101 Mirăslău (Meruslo), village 103, 154, 249 Mišelav, voivode 6, 27 Mishin, D., historian 6 Miskolc, kindred 102 Ponyth, ban of Severin, earl of Dăbâca 74, 82, 85, 87, 88, 92, 105, 253 Mócsy, A., historian 131 Moga, Ioan, historian 157, 176 Mohi, battle 8, 10, 24, 29, 32, 54 Moisescu, Cristian, art historian 198 Mokou, father of count Nicholas 249 Moldova, province 22, 150, 199, 201 Molnár, Péter, historian 143 Mongol Empire 6, 31, 50, 51, 58, 104, 203 Möngke, Mongol Great Khan 6, 9 Monoszló, kindred 89, 93, 115, 116, 204, 205 Egidius, royal treasurer, voivode of Transylvania 87, 88, 92–95, 108, 111–115, 205, 251 Gregory (II), earl of Caraș 93, 94 Gregory (III), royal treasurer 94, 108 Peter (I), bishop of Transylvania 94, 96, 102, 108, 110, 111, 116, 117, 121, 122, 141, 170–176, 180, 181, 183, 190–192, 194, 203–206, 208, 249, 255 Peter (II), voivode of Transylvania 205, 252 Thomas, ban 93 Moravia, province 77, 123, 125 Mórichida, village 53 Mórici, John, earl of Dăbâca 253 Moruț, village 237 Moson, castle 80 Moyus, judge of royal court 116 Munteanu Beșliu, Petru, arheolog 23 Mureni, village 103 Mureș, county 183 river 9, 29, 57, 80, 101, 102, 130, 144, 150, 157, 171, 174, 182, 184, 205, 229, 240 Murun, nobleman of Iara 147, 249 Mykola, son of Philip 103

Mykud, nobleman of Kachuz 83 Mykula, kindred 123, 147 father of Keminus and John 147, 249 Myle, preceptor 250 Nägler, Thomas, historian 19, 21, 23, 29, 36, 43, 163, 192, 236 Naneș, priest 198 Naples (Napoli), kingdom 106, 139 Necskei, Alexander, nobleman 206 Necskei, Demetrius, nobleman 166 Negru Vodă, voivode, founder of Wallachia 199–201, see also Radu Negru Nicephor Gregoras 27 Nicholas, archdean of Kezdi 256 Nicholas, archdean of Solnoc 256 Nicholas, archdean of Telegd 220, 257 Nicholas, archdean of Turda 257 Nicholas, bishop of Bosnia 204 Nicholas, canon 217 Nicholas, count of Nyr 126 Nicholas, count, son of Dees 177 Nicholas, earl of Sibiu, magister agasonum 254 Nicholas, father of Gyegus 251 Nicholas, judge of Hațeg 253 Nicholas, judge of Sibiu 216 Nicholas, provost of Sibiu 24, 257 Nicholas, son of Blawch 243 Nicholas, son of Laurent Igmand 205 Nicholas, son of Conrad of Tălmaciu 183, 234 Nicholas, son of Symon, earl of Brașov 253 Nicholas, son of Tywan of Vărșand 47 Nicholas, son of Chyl of Câlnic 111 Nicholas III, pope 118, 168 Nicholas IV, pope 152 Nicholas of Brethonia 198 Nicholas of Dezmir, judge of nobles 253 Nicholas of Dubicha, count 158, 249 Nicolai, indagines 22 Nicolai, predium 101 Niraj, village 176, 187, 250 Nitra, castle, town 53, 80, 147, 249 county 81, 238, 253 bishopric 204, 217 Nochrich, chapter 36, 193 Nogai, Mongol khan 86, 105, 134, 135, 137, 138, 140, 202, 203

286 Nógrád, county 90, 239 Nușfalău, village 55 Nussbächer, Gernot, historian 19–21 Nyakas, John, castellan of Glogoveț 178 Nyr, territory 123, 125, 126, 158, 160 Ocani, village 55 Ocna Dejului, village, salt mine 55, 136, 141 Ocna Sibiului, estate 121, 188 Ocnele Turzii, salt mine 136 Odorhei, castle 22 Odverem (Zwkmand), village 100 Ögödei, Mongol Great Khan 6, 8, 30 Ohtum, duke 144 Oituz, pass 27 Olt, river 22, 28, 200 Omodeus, archbishop of Győr 79 Onciul, Dimitrie, historian 6 Oprișani (Cristiș, Kereztes, Kereztus, villa Cruciferorum), village 147, 186, 250, 251 195, 249 Oradea, town, bishopric 10, 24, 27, 29, 38, 75, 86, 90, 95, 99, 118, 125, 127, 131, 132, 134, 154, 172, 204, 209, 217, 241 Orăștie, archdeanship 29, 36, 79, 193 Ordu, Mongol commander 7, 8, 25, 32 Orlat, castle 23, 43 Orrothlonheda, village 101 Ortvay, Tivadar, editor 93 Orvieto, town 79 Osl, nobleman 65 Ostia, town 204 Otto III of Brabdenburg, margrave 79 Otto of Wittelsbach, duke of Bavaria, king of Hungary 180–182, 194, 206–212, 214, 222, 228, 246 Ottokar II Přemysl, king of Bohemia 71, 73, 76, 77, 79, 80, 105, 106, 123–125, 143, 196 Ottokar of Styria (von Steier), chronicler 198, 201, 202, 207, 208 Oulaqtchi, khan of Golden Horde 67, 70 Ozd, archdeanship 121, 122, 221, 256 Pâclișanu, Z., historian 202 Pâglișa (Puklustheluky), village 131 Paisie Ligaridis, chronicler 199, 201 Palatca, village 240, 241 Pall, Francisc, historian 180

Index Pálóczi-Horváth, András, historian 16, 58, 65, 125 Palota, castle 123, 125 Panad, village 184 Panaitescu, Petre P., historian 150, 199, 200 Pâncota, castle 205 Pâncota (Pankotai), noble family 205 Pannonia 29, 30, 35 Papacostea, Șerban, historian 6, 11, 13, 18, 30, 49–51, 59, 67, 68, 70, 105, 135–137, 148, 150, 151, 156, 194, 202 Parabuch, count 93 Pascu, Ștefan, historian 27, 39, 41, 122, 157, 163, 176, 192 Patak, castle 81, 90, 91, 129, 132 Pataki, József, historian 131, 166, 180, 186, 250 Paul, archdean of Turda 147, 257 Paul, deputy archdean 179 Paul, earl of Rodna and Bistrița 111, 254 Paul, notary of the vicevoivode 183 Paul, provost of Zips 210 Paul, royal servant 183 Paul, son of Ladislas, castellan of Deva 178 Paul of Alep, author 199 Paul of Kachuz, nobleman 83 Pătruț, I., philologist 143 Peć, kindred Apor (Opour), voivode of Transylvania 133, 134, 206, 252 Dionysius, ban of Slavonia 113, 124 Gregory, nobleman 133 Pecican, Ovidiu, historian 149, 150 Pécs, bishopric 217 Pekri, noble family 206 Leukus, nobleman 206 Pelliot, Paul, historian 50 Penelea, Georgeta, historian 166 Perényi, Peter, earl of Târnava 239 Perșani, Mountains 28, 36 Persia, kingdom 6 Pest, town 10, 29, 59, 136, 156, 169, 209, 214–216, 219 Peșteana, village 198 Petenye, son of Peter 231, 232 Peter, archdean of Cluj 256 Peter, archdean of Halych 51 Peter, archdean of Solnoc 256 Peter, archdean of Spalato 217

Index Peter, augustinian prior 220 Peter, bishop of Pécs 217 Peter, serf of Bihor castle 83, 88 Peter, son of Barthales 239 Peter, son of Clement, nobleman 147, 158, 249 Peter, son of Dominic, voivode of Transylvania 128, 252 Peter, son of Jacob, judge of the Szekelys on Arieș 255 Peter, son of Murun of Iara 147, 249 Peter, son of Petenye 231, 232 Peter, son of Peter the Szekely 103 Peter, castellan of Cetatea de Baltă 178 Peter, count of Gömör 86 Peter of Gerend, nobleman 86, 88, 142 Peter of Nitra, earl of Cluj 147, 158, 249, 253 Peter of Paris, canon 216, 217 Peter of Sáros, nobleman 136 Peter the Szekely, count 103 Pețelca (Polcholca), village 100 Pethew, vicecastellan of Ciceu 239 Petrești, village 236 Philip, archbishop of Esztergom 76, 79, 89 Philip, bishop of Vác 76 Philip, earl of Dăbâca 253 Philip, father of Mykola 103 Philip IV the Fair, king of France 214, 215 Philip of Fermo, cardinal 127, 128, 132 Piatra Craivii, castle 178, 238, 239 Piatra Secuiului, castle 182 Piatra Șoimului (Solyomkő), castle 42, 55, 120, 123, 131, 238 Pilis, county 120, 238 Pintic, village 45 Plano Carpini, Giovanni, franciscan friar 30, 32, 50, 51, 58, 59 Pleven, castle 74, 105 Pogány, Stephen, castellan of Ciceu, Unguraș and Cetatea de Baltă 239 Pok, kindred Nicholas Meggyesi, voivode of Transylvania 113, 124, 171, 230 Poland, country 7–9, 15, 25, 29, 34, 49–51, 59, 70, 86, 164, 211 Pop, Ioan-Aurel, historian 149, 165, 194, 196 Popa, Radu, historian 22, 129, 131, 132, 198, 201 Popa-Lisseanu, G., historian 110, 164, 213

287 Popescu, Radu, chronicler 200 Pór, Antal, historian 166 Poroszló, village 76 Porumb, Marius, art historian 198 Pottenburg, castle 79 Potthast, Augustus, editor 12, 58 Pouka, bishop of Syrmium 118 Pous, magister 84, 88 Pousa, voivode of Transylvania 15, 21, 24, 28, 251 Prejmer (Tartilleu, Tartilleri), castle 20, 21 Přemysl, dinasty 205 Prester John 50 Preussel, Henrik, captain 75, 87, 88 Prox, A., historian 19 Prussia, margraviate 59, 68, 70 Purcell, Maureen, historian 50 Pozsegai, Stephen, nobleman 217 Rabbits Island (Holy Virgin, St. Margaret, Buda) 82, 93, 98, 118, 133, 217 Racha, pleban 121 Rachael, earl of Târnava 253 Racoșu de Jos (Mihályvára), castle 20 Racoșu de Sus, village 36 Rád, Benedict, bishop of Veszprém 207, 217 Rădești (Kend), village 100 Radu Negru, voivode, founder of Wallachia 200 Rady, Martyn, historian 7, 17, 158, 159, 164, 245 Rákos, village 124, 140, 143, 211 Rákos, I., historian 66 Râpeanu, Valeriu, historian 150, 199 Rashid od-Din, chronicler 6, 7, 10, 27, 34 Rășinari, castle 43 Râșnov, castle 20 Rátót, kindred 112, 134, 206 Dominic, nobleman 217, 223 Gyula, voivode of Transylvania 251 Roland, palatin 113 Raynaldus, bishop of Transylvania 24 Rediu, village 177 Regnum Erdewel 165, 246 Regnum Transilvanum (Transilvaniae, Transsilvaniensis) 1, 108, 147, 153, 157–159, 162, 163, 165, 170, 173, 195, 202, 228, 235, 245, 247, 249 Regulus, archdean of Solnoc 256

288 Renold, clerk 255 Reteag (Retheg), estate 134 Reynaldus, dean of Sibiu 257 Riazan, town 9 Ricardus, dominican friar 14 Richard, Jean, historian 49 Rimai, Arnold, castellan of Piatra Craivii 238 Rimai, Nicholas, castellan of Piatra Craivii and Lita, earl of Cluj 238, 239, 253 Rimetea Trascăului, village 136 Robert, archbishop of Esztergom 63 Rodna, town, county 8, 24, 26, 27, 29, 36, 37, 79, 111, 126, 175, 223, 225, 254 Rogerius, canon, writer 7, 24–26, 33, 35, 36, 38, 43 Rogers, Greg S., historian 30, 31 Rohonczamonostor, monastery 29 Roland, son of Mark, earl of Zips and Vasvár 122, 123 Roma, city 59, 67, 152 Roman Msistlavich, knez of Halych 51 Românași (Egrug), village 174, 186, 250 Romos (Rams), village 163 Rostislav Mihailovich, czar of Bulgaria (Vidin) 51, 63, 73, 75, 81, 87, 93 Rotho, count 43 Rozgony, battle 226 Rucăr, castle 20 Rudolf I of Habsburg, king of the Romans 124, 140, 152 Rudolf II of Habsburg, duke of Austria 208 Rudolf III of Habsburg, duke of Austria 205 Rufus, John, nobleman 179 Runciman, Steven, historian 106 Rupea (Cohalm), castle, village 28, 178, 239 Russia, country 25, 30, 32, 50, 58, 59, 67, 135, 150 Rusu, Adrian Andrei, historian 22, 23, 25, 37, 40, 97, 104, 171, 178, 229, 232, 237 Rusu, Mircea, historian 22, 41 Ruși (Nogrech), village 36, 100 Săcădate, castle 22 Sacerdoțeanu, Aurelian, historian 6–8, 10, 27, 28, 30, 33 Šaiban, Mongol commander 10 Salimbene, chronicler 137

Index Sălacea (Zoloch), village 69, 75, 90, 91, 159 Sălăgean, Tudor, historian 52, 189, 202 Salvus, archbishop of Turda 220, 257 Sâmbăta, estate 155, 198 Samson of Gerend (Luncani), nobleman 102, 142 Sâncel (Zonchel), village 35, 62, 103 Sâncraiu (Sancto Rege), village 122, 187 Sând (Zinda), village 225 Sângătin (Enyed), village 100 Sânmiclăuș (Scenthmyklous), village 40, 101, 136, 224 Sânnicolau de Beiuș, village 130, 131 Sânpetru, village 20, 21 Sântejude, village 242 Sântimbru (Gywmurd), village 100, 240 Santus, archdean of Crasna 256 Sărand, village 55 Sărata (Sofalua), village 57, 126 Sărățel (Zereth), village 57, 126 Saray (on Volga), town 51, 70 Sáros, county 90, 91, 129, 136 Sartaq, khan of the Golden Horde 67 Săsarm (Zeyzorma), village 58 Saschiz, chapter, deanship 192, 193 Săsciori, castle 43 Sătmar, county 36, 68, 75, 86, 91, 119, 144, 151, 159, 184, 239 Satu Mare, town 91, 225 Sava, Saint 150 Sceuke, Nicholas, nobleman 86 Schobolotelky, village 101 Schullerus, Joachim, historian 22 Schütz, Ödön, historian 30 Sebastian, earl of Cluj 253 Sebeș (Sebus), deanship 192, 193 village 29, 52 seat 36, 192 Secașelor, valley 192 Seczechov, village 51 Seem, earl of Szekelys on Arieș 178, 195, 255 Seneslav, voivode 6 Senga, Toru, historian 60 Serbia, kingdom 9, 33, 185, 202, 203, 211–215, 222, 227, 230–233, 238 Severin, banate 18, 27, 29, 56, 60, 61, 70, 71, 75, 80, 81, 84, 85, 88, 92, 102, 111, 114–116, 118, 119, 126, 127, 202, 253

Index Sfărașu (Fornos), village 101 Sibiel, castle 43, 234 Sibiu (Cibinium), county 17, 18, 23, 92, 94, 111, 117, 119, 121, 126, 148, 149, 167, 168, 179, 186, 191, 193, 194, 209, 223, 225, 253, 254 town 10, 23, 28, 29, 37, 39, 40, 142, 190, 192 provostship 24, 52, 76, 94, 121, 141, 186, 189, 191–193, 216, 250, 257 province 18, 36, 96, 118, 121, 122, 125, 126, 141, 189, 190, 193, 194, 208, 215, 230, 235, 240, 241 Sic 175, 223, 225 Sicilia, island 106 Sifrid, prior 216 Sighișoara, seat 192, 236 Silesia, province 7, 8 Silva Blacorum et Bissenorum 18 Simeon Dascălul, chronicler 149 Simon, vicevoivode of Transylvania 252 Simonis of Keza, chronicler 8, 110, 125, 143 Sinor, Denis, historian 7, 30 Siret (Serech), river 26 Sismanid, dinasty 202 Slavonia, province 12, 59, 63, 65, 68, 76, 77, 83, 97, 98, 106, 107, 110, 111, 113, 123, 133, 134, 138, 140, 144, 163–165, 167, 172, 176, 185, 187, 204, 206 Slovakia, country 75, 81 Smaragdus, archbishop of Kalocsa 76, 239 Smilet, czar of Bulgaria 202 Solnoc, archdeanship 256 castle 45, 55 county 24, 38, 42, 43, 45, 47, 55, 56, 69, 97–99, 101, 110, 114, 126, 134, 144, 147, 154, 159, 167, 174, 177, 178, 187, 237, 239, 253, 254 Solomon, earl of Brașov 178, 234, 253 Solomon, count of Câlnic 216 Someș, river 36, 43, 56, 144 Someștelec (Someșeni), village 55 Someșul Mic, river 171 Somogy, county 80, 114, 115 Song, Empire 8 Sopron, castle 80 county 111, 114, 115 Soranzo, G., historian 49 Spalato (Split), archbishopric 33, 217

289 Spinei, Victor, historian 6–16, 22, 26, 27, 31, 32, 34, 50, 51, 135, 137, 166, 201, 203 Sreza-Cârțișoara, village 28 Srim, bishopric 217 St. Benedict, monastery 66, 97 St. Hypolitus, monastery 162 Stana, village 147 Stanislav, knez 198 Stanislaw, Saint 105, 106 Stephantelke, village 101 Stephen, archbishop of Kalocsa 118, 204 Stephen, archdean of Alba 256 Stephen, castellan of Piatra Craivii 178 Stephen, monk of Tismana 200 Stephen, notary 180 Stephen, priest 79 Stephen, provost of Alba Iulia 255 Stephen, son of Benchench 103 Stephen, son of count Gwd 83, 84, 88 Stephen, son of David, clerk 183 Stephen, son of Helemban 183 Stephen, son of king Andrew II 152 Stephen, son of Tekus of Mera, voivode of Transylvania 128, 252 Stephen I, St., king of Hungary 63, 165, 167, 207, 215, 223 Stephen V, duke of Transylvania, king of Hungary 1, 36, 37, 39, 46, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71–108, 110, 112, 113, 116–119, 122, 131, 133, 142, 144, 145, 152, 163, 167, 168, 173, 175, 190, 204, 213, 251, 254 Stephen Dečanski, king of Serbia 212, 227 Stephen of Juc, judge of the nobles 187 Stephen of Sâncraiu 187 Stephen Milutin, king of Serbia 202, 213, 223, 231–233 Streisângiorgiu, village 198 Stremț, village 83, 103, 126, 252 see also Geoagiu de Sus Stupini (terra Solmus), village 101 Stylyteluk, village 101 Styria, duchy 63, 65, 68, 71, 94, 97, 198, 201, 202, 212 Subič, Paul, ban of Croatia 217 Subutai, Mongol commander 7–9, 16, 33 Suki, noble family 188 Michael, earl of Cluj, vicevoivode of Transylvania 237, 252, 253

290 Sumurduc (Zomordogi), village 101 Suplac, village 103 Suzdal, Russian knezate 14, 59 Swarno, knez of Vladimir 82 Symon, father of Nicholas 253 Syrmium, county, bishopric 114, 118 Szabolcs, county 92, 144, 151, 159 Szakolyi (Zokol), monastery 90 Szalánc, castle 132 Szcsesinak, B., historian 51 Szécsényi, Thomas, voivode of Transylvania 229, 234–238, 240–242, 251, 252, 254 Szécsi, Andrew, bishop of Transylvania 233, 235, 251, 255 Szécsi, Dionysius, castellan of Jdioara and Mehadia 233 Szécsi, Dominic, provost of Alba 255 Szécsi, Nicholas, castellan of Hațeg 229, 233, 238 Szeged, town 133, 176, 179, 184, 185, 193, 194, 209, 222–225 Székely, Gy., historian 59 Székesfehérvár (Fehérvár), castle 9, 17, 53, 257 county 53, 54, 59, 113, 168 provostship 207, 217, 218, 221, 224 Szekfű, Gyula, historian 8 Szentgróti, Dionysius, earl of Solnoc 254 Szentpétery, Imre, editor 69, 93 Szepes, county 59 Szerafin, father of Andrew 54 Szigliget, island 59 Szűcs, Jenő, historian 108, 113, 121, 133 Șard (Sard), village 122 Șeica, deanship 235, 236 county 254 district 177, 194 seat 192, 230, 235, 243 Șieu, river 57, 188 Șieu-Măgheruș (Monyoros), village 58 Șieu-Odorhei (Drauchwrduarhel), village 101 Șoimi, castle 131 Șoimuș, castle 178, 184, 229 Șprenghi, castle 20 Șpring, chapter 193 deanship 192 Ștefănescu, R., archaeologist 22

Index Tălmaciu, village 183, 184, 234 Tămașda (Pontes Thome, Tamashida), village 35 Tâmpa, castle 20 Tănase, Michel, historian 20, 21 Târnava, archdeanship 121, 180, 181, 218, 257 county 101, 182, 239, 251, 253 Târnava Mare, deanship 192, 193 river 62, 167, 177, 192 Târnava Mică, deanship 192, 193 river 62, 177, 192 Târnave, region 36 Târnăveni, village 36, 183 Târnovo, city 74, 105 Tășnad, village 35 Tăuți, castle 171 Teaca, village 256 Teel, son of Ebl 83, 103 Teiuș, village 256 Tekus of Mera, count 128, 252 Telegd, archdeanship 220, 257 seat 195 Telegdi, Nicholas, earl of Sibiu 236, 254 Teliu (Cruceburg), castle 20 Temethyn, castle 81 Tengerdi, Theodore, bishop of Győr 181, 204 Terra Blachorum 17, 18 Terra Hasadad 160 Terra Obruth 167 Terra Siculorum 18 Teremia (Teremy), village 101 Tétény, kindred 185 Peter, ban of Slavonia 138 Teutsch, G. D., editor 45, 99, 103, 116, 117, 154, 183, 249 Theiner, Augustinus, editor 15, 38, 52, 78–80, 89, 164, 168, 225 Theodor Sviatoslav, czar of Bulgaria 203, 232, 233 Theodoric, parish priest of Sebeș 52 Thomas, archbishop of Esztergom 217, 223 Thomas, singer 219–221 Thomas of Spalato, chronicler 33, 217 Tiba, archdean of Ozd 256 Tilișca, castle 43 Timiș, river 9 Timișoara, castle 230 Timotheus, bishop of Zagreb 118

Index Tirimia 98, 101, see Teremia Tisza, river 9, 29, 35, 36, 55, 61, 75, 83, 86, 87, 123, 130, 139, 140, 144, 146, 150, 157, 159, 207–209, 229, 231 Tismana, monastery 200 Toksoba, Cuman tribe 13 Tolna, county 128 Tomaj, Dionysius, voivode of Transylvania  251 Topa, battle 232 Toqtai, khan of the Golden Horde 203 Trascău (Thuruczkou, Torozko), castle 136, 183 estate 182 Trenčin, county 76, 115 Trivet, Nicholas, chronicler 15 Trogir (Trau), town 53 Tula Buga, Mongol khan 134, 135 Tului, Mongol commander 7, 9 Turcuș, Șerban, historian 11, 13, 61, 120, 128 Turda, archdeanship 147, 220, 257 castle, town 28, 39–41, 45, 101, 103, 117, 136, 224, 240, 244, 250 county 100, 122, 178, 182, 237, 239, 253 Türje, kindred Joachim (Iwachinus), earl of Sibiu 17, 201, 254 Philip, archbishop of Esztergom 197 Philip, nobleman 217 Túróc (Turuz), castle 53, 56 Tyuan, nobleman 176 Țapu, chapter 193 Țoca, Mircea, art historian 97 Ugocsa, county 83, 91, 142, 171, 209 Ujláki, noble family 198 Ungra, castle 22 Unguraș (Balwanus), castle 101, 178, 239 Ungurei (Gregorfalva), village 47 Urban IV, pope 78, 79, 95 Ureche, Grigore, chronicler 149, 150 Vác, bishopric 76, 118, 204, 217 town 10 Valcău (Valko), castle 55, 131, 232 Vălișoara (Zadkeu), castle 234 Valkó, county 55, 62 Varasd (Worost), county 68

291 Várpatak, valley 20 Vărșag, castle 22 Vărșand, village 47 Vásáry, Nicholas, vicevoivode of Transylvania 252 Vasary, village 184 Vasilko, knez 51, 59, 82 Vasvár, castle 83, 88 county 113, 122 Vătășianu, Virgil, art historian 19, 23 Velbujd, battle 202 Venezia, city 212 Verecke, pass 24, 25, 29, 135 Vernadsky, George, historian 51, 67, 70 Verőce (Virovitica), town 53 Veszprém, bishopric 95, 120–122, 207, 217 Veza (Wiz) 36, 100 Vidin, city 74, 78, 81, 104, 105, 201, 202, 231 Vienna, city 80 Villa Cruciferorum see Oprișani Vincent, archbishop of Kalocsa 180, 208, 209, 217 Vințu de Jos, village 216 Vischelius, Nicholas, chronicler 204 Vița, village 177 Vitus Arnpeckius, chronicler 207 Vizza, castle 80, see Pottenburg Vladimir, Russian knezate 25, 59, 82 Vladislav, king 150 Vladislav Dragutin, contender to the Hungarian crown 215 Vladislav Lokietek, king of Poland 233 Voiavoda, centurion 45 Volga, river 9, 13, 14, 30 Vršac, castle 185 Vurpăr, castle 43, 57 Vyvianus, earl of Bistrița 188, 254 Walbrun, dean of Sibiu 257 Wallachia 199–201, 231, 242 Wass, kindred 187 Nicholas, castellan of Ciceu 234, 241, 242 Nicholas the Younger 242 Wenceslas I Přemysl, king of Bohemia 206, 207 Wenceslas II Přemysl, king of Bohemia ans Hungary 204, 206, 207, 208 Wenceslas III Přemysl, king of Bohemia 208

292 Wenzel, Gusztáv, editor 14, 17, 45, 47, 55, 59, 62, 66, 69, 78, 80, 83, 87, 92, 94, 96, 97, 99, 101, 125, 126, 144, 151, 159, 161, 170, 172 Weyteh, John of, nobleman 233 Weyteh, Theodore, ban of Mehadia 185, 206, 208, 231 Wittelsbach, House of 212 Wrbou 104, see Gârbova Wrokław 10 Wyngaert, P. A. van den, editor 32 Yaprak Tak, Mountains 6 Yaroslav, battle 51 Yolanda, wife of Bołeslaw of Gnyezno 78 Zagreb, bishopric 118, 172, 204, 217 Zala, castle 80, 83 county 94, 111 Zalău, village 35 Zalnoc, village 101 Zaonateluke, village 147

Index Zarand, county 79, 159, 205, 208 Zăuan (Zwan), village 55 Zawychost, battle 82 Zek, village 36 Zelench, castle 129 Zeyhanus, Cuman leader 65 Zimmermann, Harald, historian 11 Zips (Spišské Podhradie), county 122–124, 142 provostship 204, 210, 217 town 122, 139 Zobory, Nicholas, castellan of Rupea 240 Zonuk, terra 101 Zonwk, castrum 47 Zorica, princess 213 Zosyma, bishop of Oradea 86, 90, 95 Zsadány, Dionysius nobleman 217 Zsámboki, Simon, vicevoivode of Transylvania 238, 252 Zsoldos, Attila, historian 108, 113, 121, 129, 130, 132, 133