Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific: The Battle for Trusted News and Information 3031475704, 9783031475702

Citation preview

Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific The Battle for Trusted News and Information Edited by Alexandra Wake

Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific “Alexandra Wake draws on her considerable experience in journalism and education to argue an all too simple proposition. That Australia should more adequately fund credible international media to promote peace and avert war, building trust and understanding with those who live without a free media.” —Barrie Cassidy, Award winning Australian journalist, Australia “Almost every Australian knows about the ABC, and almost every Australian has an opinion about it. Far fewer know much about the ABC’s role to broadcast into countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Important though it is as an arm of soft power diplomacy, the ABC’s international service has a record that may be long and, in many ways distinguished but it has also been troubled by repeated funding cuts that are aggravated by the international service’s near invisibility to the Australian public—its ultimate funders. Alexandra Wake is an expert in this field who is able to draw on her experience working at the ABC and buttress it with reflection and scholarship. She has brought together a team of leading contributors to explore the urgent need to adequately fund international broadcasting.” —Prof Matthew Ricketson, Journalism Academic, Author of Who Needs the ABC?, Melbourne, Australia “This book makes a significant contribution to knowledge about media in the Indo-Pacific, a region where trustworthy information is fundamental to securing peace inside and beyond the boundary. Alexandra Wake and her fellow authors examine how the many different news ecosystems are facing the challenges brought about by social media, propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation. The authors are calling on the Australian government to take back its role in helping to resource trustworthy broadcasting into the region, as a means of offsetting the advances currently being made by other regional players such as the China Global Television Network.” —Prof Colleen Murrell, Journalism Academic, Author of Foreign Correspondents and International Newsgathering, Dublin, Ireland

Alexandra Wake Editor

Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific The Battle for Trusted News and Information

Editor Alexandra Wake RMIT University Melbourne, VIC, Australia

ISBN 978-3-031-47570-2    ISBN 978-3-031-47571-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

This book is for my providers of love, tea and dog walking: Andrew, Oscar, and Elijah. It is also a work for my late, and great, Uncle Bruce Silk who truly valued public broadcasting. I am indebted to Dr Xiufang (Leah) Li, Dr Juan Fang, Drew Ambrose, Assoc Prof Damian Grenfell, and Dr Lucy Morieson who provided insightful chapters for this book and gave it a depth that one author could not. Thank you.

Acknowledgements

Thank you to these organisations and people which gave funds or time for this project: RMIT’s School of Media and Communication Journalism Education and Research Association of Australia Ian Potter Foundation East West Centre The Journalism Team at RMIT The following people have been incredibly generous and collegiate in their support along the way, in the five years from inception to conclusion. Thank you: Prof Robert Crawford, Emeritus Prof Rod Tiffin, Prof Linda Brennan, Assoc Prof Lukas Parker, Assoc Prof Steve Cook, Prof Mark Gibson, Prof Tania Lewis, Prof Lisa French, Dr Stephen Quinn, and a number of fantastic broadcasters and broadcast leaders across the Asia Pacific who willingly gave their time and expertise to support the production of this book including Dr Michael Ward, Jemima Garrett, Sue Ahearn, and the ABC alumni. My academic colleagues in the journalism programmes at RMIT, particularly for Chap. 7 Gordon Farrer, and the broadcast journalism academic group of Prof Colleen Murrell, Dr Louisa Lim, Heather Jarvis, and Gary Dickson. This work was professionally edited by Judy Gregory, who patiently caught all the typos that broadcast journalists slip into copy. Also, to my Graduate Diploma of Journalism students at RMIT who sat through much of this book as lectures. vii

viii 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book builds on the work I did as a masters student “Measuring the Success of ABC Training in South Africa: A Case Study in the Production of Western Liberal Broadcast News Values”, and my PhD “Aiding Journalism: Australian Journalism Educators and their Work in Post Conflict States”. Chapter 8 grew out of commissioned work completed for BBC Media Action on Solomon Islands. Wake’s interviews for this project were approved by RMIT University’s College Human Ethics Advisory Network. While all interviewees were offered the opportunity to be named in this work, several chose not to be identified because of the nature of their current or past work. Ambrose’s interviews for this project were approved as part of his Masters of International Development, Documenting Disaster in the 21st Century, supervised by Damian Grenfell.

Contents

1 Australia’s  Voice in the Indo-Pacific  1 Alexandra Wake 2 The  Indo-Pacific’s Broadcast Landscape, Strategic and Military Value  7 Alexandra Wake 3 Distribution  via Shortwave, Satellites, and Social Media 37 Alexandra Wake 4 Transnational  Voices in the Indo-Pacific 61 Alexandra Wake 5 The  Rise of China’s International Broadcasting Services 91 Juan Feng and Xiufang (Leah) Li 6 Diplomacy,  Propaganda, and Journalism in the Digital Landscape115 Xiufang (Leah) Li and Alexandra Wake 7 Social  and Mobile Media in Times of Disaster135 Drew Ambrose

ix

x 

Contents

8 Fact-Checking  and Verification: The Changing Role of Professional Journalists159 Alexandra Wake, Drew Ambrose, and Damian Grenfell 9 A  Case Study of Media Tensions in Solomon Islands, China, and Australia177 Alexandra Wake and Lucy Morieson 10 The  Future and Funding of Transnational Broadcasting and Soft Diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific195 Alexandra Wake Index221

Notes on Contributors

Drew  Ambrose is a multiple-award-winning foreign correspondent, investigative reporter, and documentary maker. The Australian journalist is now a senior on-air presenter who reports across the Asia-Pacific region for the international news network Al Jazeera English. Aside from traditional broadcasting, Drew has been the lead online journalist for many acclaimed innovative digital projects. He holds a Master of International Development from RMIT, where he also completed his Bachelor of Arts. Ambrose has made more than 80 television programmes in 36 nations over the past decade for Al Jazeera’s flagship current affairs programme 101 East and been on frontline of some of the region’s biggest stories including the Rohingya Refugee Crisis, Typhoon Haiyan, North Korean nuclear tensions, the 2014 Thailand Coup, Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Bombings, the Black Saturday Bushfires, as well as the Yogyakarta Earthquake. Ambrose was expelled from Malaysia after he produced a programme detailing the plight of migrant workers during the coronavirus pandemic lockdown. The Global Investigative Journalism Network listed the documentary as one of the best pieces of reporting in Asia during 2020, just one of his many international journalism awards. Juan Feng  is a highly experienced academic in media and communication studies, with a strong commitment to advancing research and teaching in this field. She holds a PhD in Media and Communication Studies from RMIT University. Juan’s research interests include place branding, nation branding, public relations, sports communication, and new media. She has an impressive publication record, co-­authoring four peer-reviewed papers xi

xii 

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

in Q1 ranking journals in the field of communication studies and cultural studies, as well as presenting five papers at international conferences. Damian Grenfell  is an associate professor of Global Studies in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University. He teaches and researches in areas of violence, peace and conflict, humanitarian interventions and global security, and more recently into the social significance of death. He has undertaken a wide variety of research on these themes in Timor-Leste where he has visited and lived for extended periods of time and worked with a wide variety of local, national, and international organisations since its independence. Xiufang (Leah) Li  is a lecturer and former programme manager in the School of Media and Communication at RMIT University in Australia. Previously, Leah worked at different universities in Australia and China, including Macquarie University and as an associate professor at Guangzhou University. She holds a doctoral degree in International Communication and Media awarded at Macquarie University. Her primary research areas are Strategic Public Relations and Digital Communication. She is an invited reviewer for a multiplicity of world leading Q1 journals. Her recent work can be found in Public Relations Review, European Journal of Cultural Studies, Global Media and China, Media International Australia Lucy Morieson  is a journalism researcher and lecturer, currently specialising in Contemporary Politics and Communication. Her research considers the ways journalism is changing as it moves away from legacy forms and is increasingly produced for online consumption. She is particularly interested in the ways journalists and publications navigate the associated shifts in professional practices and identities. Her PhD thesis examined these shifts at two Australian news organisations. She is actively working with RMIT ABC Fact Check on a range of research projects around factchecking and verification. Alexandra  Wake is an associate professor of Journalism at RMIT University. She is an active leader, educator and researcher in journalism. Her research, teaching, and practice sit at the nexus of journalism practice, journalism education, equality, diversity, and mental health. Dr Wake has taught journalism at RMIT, Deakin University, Dubai Women’s College, and was a trainer on international aid projects including at the South African Broadcasting Corporation. Before turning full time to the academy, she spent more than 25 years working for broadcast and print international news agencies in Australia, the Asia Pacific and the Middle East.

CHAPTER 1

Australia’s Voice in the Indo-Pacific Alexandra Wake

While so many are beating the drums of war in the Indo-Pacific, there is a role for those who believe in the power of words to ensure peace and security in our region. Never has it been more important for Australia to have a well-funded transnational public service broadcaster—free of government interference—that can broadcast to our neighbours and support journalism in those countries which do not have their own strong and independent news ecosystems. That means provision of objective and factual journalism delivered by traditional or digital forms, which can be trusted when it is received by audiences, anywhere. It also requires attention to be paid to methods of distribution, not just radio, television, and digital channels that currently exist, but to those who own or control the technologies that are increasingly being used to broadcast to the region. Australia may be a middle-rank nation at the bottom of the world—or as our former Prime Minister Paul Keating once said, the “arse end of the earth”—but we have an opportunity to lean into the unique strategic advantage granted to us by our economic and geographical place in the region. We do not need to be held hostage to the priorities of a popularly

A. Wake (*) RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9_1

1

2 

A. WAKE

elected president in another country or simply sign up to the whims of an old colonial master in another country. Australia must tell its own story to our friends in the region, be a partner to those who are our neighbours, and support those that have not yet developed their own strong journalistic voices. Australia’s transnational broadcaster of choice, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), must stand as an independent entity, act in the interest of the Australia public, and provide trusted impartial, high-quality news and current affairs. It must never be considered a mouth piece of government. Far from it. At times the ABC must report on stories that do not sit well with the domestic government of the day, its foreign office or defence department. It is the role of independent broadcasters to question Australia’s foreign and defence policies. For example, our journalists should ask if it is sensible to buy nuclear-powered submarines which can sit with missiles ready for months under the sea off Taiwan, or if there is another way, perhaps through talking to our neighbours? This is why Australia needs a broadcaster that has funding guaranteed from government, quarantined from government funding cuts and protected from internal ABC management decisions. It also needs a guaranteed way to provide those broadcasts to our regional neighbours, and to ensure that the technology that conveys those broadcasts cannot be turned off by dictators in other countries, or at the whim of a tech entrepreneur, without regard to the security and peace of the region. This book argues that Australia needs its own appropriately funded voice in the Indo-Pacific to broadcast Australia’s views to the world, and to support neighbouring countries which do not have press freedom. While there has been some increased support from the current Labor Government for transnational broadcasting, the safety and stability of Australia, and the region more generally, needs understanding and trust between countries and citizens. Through broadcasting to the region, Australia can rebuild its position as a provider of trusted independent news, and can support journalists across the region to produce free and fair journalism in an increasingly difficult news environment punctuated by bad actors peddling fake news. The following chapters work together to make the case for a fully funded Australian broadcaster that should not be treated as a plaything at the mercy of the government of the day. Theoretically, this book sits within a tradition of advocacy for the positive value of public broadcasting, in accord with the original BBC Reithian standards. However, it also acknowledges the entanglement of this

1  AUSTRALIA’S VOICE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

3

tradition with Western colonialism, placing it in a complex relationship with post-colonial struggles for independence. Australia has been a coloniser itself and through its transnational broadcasting, has, over many decades, contributed to representations of people in the region as inferior ‘others’. While the Reithian and post-colonial perspectives have often seemed to be opposed, there is also considerable potential for positive integration. While colonial thinking may linger in some parts of the Australian media, that way thinking has changed over time, particularly within the ABC, as journalists and other staff have moved to work with our Indo-Pacific neighbours on broadcast partnerships. To that end, this work is self-consciously a book of advocacy for the very best of our colonial past (public service media) and continuing efforts to develop postcolonial perspectives and standards. Chapter 2, ‘The Indo-Pacific’s Broadcast Landscape, Its Strategic and Military Value’, identifies the transnational broadcasters currently operating in the Indo-Pacific, lists the countries being considered in this book, and discusses the fast-changing media landscape in the region. It pays particular attention to the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and notes how the rise of the People’s Republic of China and changes to broadcast technologies have raised security concerns for US-aligned nations. Chapter 3, ‘Distribution via Shortwave, Satellites, and Social Media’ outlines the development of broadcasting in the Indo-Pacific from shortwave to smart phones and low-earth satellites, to show how transnational broadcasters not only need to consider how their product is distributed but how it is being received. While various scholars have provided detailed accounts of broadcasting history from a country-specific point of view, little has been written about newer ways of making and distributing news and current affairs. Drawing on literature and interviews with leading journalists and news managers across the region, this chapter also documents how governments determine if they will use the technology to block or support information being sent to populations. This chapter adds to the argument that Australia needs appropriate and secure funding to work transnationally across radio, television, and digital platforms. Chapter 4, ‘Transnational Voices in the Indo-Pacific’, discusses the major broadcasters that are government or state supported. It features interviews with journalists working in state broadcasters funded by Russia and China, and contrasts their views from journalists at Qatar’s Al Jazeera. This chapter is focused on those broadcasters which produce news and

4 

A. WAKE

current affairs in and for the Indo-Pacific with a particular emphasis on those that have editorial independence and show that Australia’s voice has been missing in the region. In Chap. 5, ‘The Rise of China’s International Broadcasting Services’, authors Xiufang (Leah) Li and Juan Fang map the expansion of China’s transnational broadcasting service networks. They discuss Beijing’s intentions and the implications for the world. With a focus on the English-­ language international offering provided by the four state-run Chinese media outlets, known as the ‘Big Four’, including Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television (renamed as China Global Television Network), China Radio International, and China Daily, Li and Fang explore the broader implications of the rise of transnational broadcasting services for international relations. Authors Xiufang Li and Alexandra Wake embark on a critical examination in Chap. 6, ‘Diplomacy, Propaganda, and Journalism in the Digital Landscape’, of the interplay among news networks, ownership, and the deployment of public diplomacy tactics in contemporary transnational broadcasting. Looking at the current thinking around public diplomacy and journalism as well as the three models of international broadcasting in public diplomacy, the chapter puts forth the emerging model for guiding the engagement of international broadcasting with mediated public diplomacy within the digital media landscape. Award-winning journalist Drew Ambrose writes in Chap. 7, ‘Social and Mobile Media in Times of Disaster’, about the practical concerns faced by broadcast journalists using social and mobile media in their reporting, particularly in times of disaster in the Indo-Pacific. Using interviews with investigative journalists from news outlets tasked with crisis reporting, Ambrose examines how social media platforms have changed the way journalists collaborate with communities. He examines the massive shift in the production of journalistic content from professional journalists to ordinary citizens, and some of the problems that present themselves in the region, through the increase in the availability of raw, unique eyewitness material. In Chap. 8, ‘Fact-Checking and Verification: The Changing Role of Professional Journalists’, authors Alexandra Wake, Drew Ambrose, and Damian Grenfell examine the impact of fake and false news on Indo-­ Pacific communities. They acknowledge that media literacy is a problem in much of the region and argue for greater fact-checking and verification training of journalists Pacific. This chapter adds to the argument that professional broadcast journalists can play a vital role in helping produce trusted news and current affairs content.

1  AUSTRALIA’S VOICE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

5

The need for transnational broadcasting is articulated in Chap. 9, ‘A Case Study of Media Tensions in Solomon Islands, China and Australia’, with authors Alexandra Wake and Lucy Morieson looking at how the tensions are playing out in one Pacific country. This small island state has attracted considerable international attention since it switched diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China, and has been accepting a range of aid from a number of countries, including media aid from Australia. Author and editor Alexandra Wake concludes in Chap. 10, ‘The Future and Funding of Transnational Broadcasting and Soft Diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific’, reiterating that communities in the Indo-Pacific are under intense pressure from a range of actors, and need access to independent and trusted news and current affairs. The boost to Australian transnational broadcasting in the region, and specific funding for aid, is welcomed in this chapter, but she argues it is clearly not enough to support the many and varied countries of the Indo-Pacific, and leaves the future of broadcasts at the mercy of Australia’s internal domestic politics. Australia has an opportunity to be the trusted broadcaster for the Indo-Pacific but needs substantial support for its public service media work, guaranteed ongoing funding, and continued independence. In sum, this book argues that with the war drums beating in some countries there is no time to waste in appropriately funding a fully rebooted and independent Australian broadcasting voice in the region. While the efforts of the current Australia government are welcome, and the efforts of the ABC management laudable, the most recent funding boost is inadequate to fully  broadcast our Australian  voice to the entire Indo-­ Pacific region and further, that the funding remains at the whim of the ruling government. With fraught relations between nations, and a complex political and media environment, Australia must act now to rectify the mistakes of the past by increasing transnational broadcast funding and protecting that funding from future government cuts. If Australia is to meet China’s strategic ambitions for the region, Canberra must also have the long-term vision that Beijing brings to all its decisions, including the media.

CHAPTER 2

The Indo-Pacific’s Broadcast Landscape, Strategic and Military Value Alexandra Wake

Introduction When you look at the expansion of international broadcasting as an arm of soft diplomacy, Governments are using their public broadcasters to do this work. You shouldn’t outsource your diplomatic efforts. (Scott, 2009)

Although most Western countries have long used transnational broadcasters to promote their own political beliefs and ideologies and to spread their culture and language, there has been near hysteria in some parts of the press and security circles about the People’s Republic of China’s ambition to do the same (Hartcher & Knott, 2023; Zhao & Xiang, 2019). China’s expansion into the Indo-Pacific through its Belt and Road Initiative has come at the same time as successive Australian governments have cut funding to the national broadcaster, effectively forcing the Australia Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) to abdicate its role as the voice

A. Wake (*) RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9_2

7

8 

A. WAKE

of independent broadcast journalism in the region. After a sustained campaign from security and communication experts, some funding has been restored by the current Labor Government, but it is not nearly enough to fully fund a broadcaster that has suffered for three decades of misguided government policy in its service to the region. Australia is located in the Indo-Pacific and its continued economic security requires the country to have its own voice, distinctly different from Washington, London, Tokyo, or Delhi, across radio, television and digital spaces with audiences outside Australia’s territorial borders. This argument is the cornerstone of this book. The authors, who are all based in Australia, have spent the past five years observing the media in the region, conducting interviews with working journalists and broadcast experts to examine the value and the role of news-focused transnational broadcasters operating in the Indo-Pacific today, and to discuss their importance not only to the origin broadcasting country but to those they seek to serve/shape or influence. This study examines new ways journalists are operating in an information environment dominated by private platforms and flooded by disinformation and misinformation. In short, economic and digital development has completely changed the lives of the people of the Indo-Pacific, including the way they consume news. This work is centred on the provision of news and information from transnational broadcasters targeted at consumption in foreign territories; it does not deal with the plethora of media that is consumed around the world that is not targeted at other countries or media, that is, other than news and fact-based programming. It accepts without reservation the argument of Neff and Pickard (2021) that well-funded public media systems combined with strong structural protections for the political and economic independence of those systems are consistently and positively correlated with healthy democracies. It also acknowledges that a strong and independent press system can and does have a positive economic impact on countries outside the democratic system (Nguyen et al., 2021). Broadcasting was part of the Australia’s soft power armoury in Asia and the Pacific for more than 80 years until successive governments robbed it of its ability to serve the Indo-Pacific’s disparate audiences. Prime Minister Robert Menzies launched the shortwave service Radio Australia shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War. Television was added in 1993 and online services a few years later. Over those decades, ABC Radio Australia and the variously named television services were trusted voices

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

9

from Australia providing credible news and information in a region now increasingly influenced by autocratic governments. Radio and television are included here in the definition of transnational broadcasters, but the authors all acknowledge that broadcasts are increasingly accessed via online digital media and not with traditional television sets or radio receivers. It is now more common for audiences to access information via Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and WeChat than sit down to traditional broadcast news services. Issues of distribution, and who owns the means of doing that distribution, are also increasingly significant. Determining who is listening or watching any specific broadcaster is difficult to determine for a range of reasons to do with a lack of clear methodology and/or independent research. Although all broadcasters will at times claim growth in figures across services, one broadcast manager acknowledged that there were no real reputable figures. That said, the sheer volume of viewers or listeners has never been the aim of transnational broadcasters seeking to influence other populations. The focus for transnational broadcasters had always been on attracting those in—or likely to get into—positions of power and influence: It’s not how many people they’ve got, it’s who they are, and the influence through that. Although, I do think YouTube numbers are a good indicator for some broadcasters which are very active on YouTube. (Broadcast Expert 3, 2023)

Types of Broadcasters There are different kinds of transnational broadcasters. First, there are those that are publicly funded but retain independence: the best known of these is the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), particularly through its World Service. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation is similar to the BBC. These broadcasters, although paid for by the public, have charters of independence from the political power structures and the economic interests within modern economies. That said, in recent times both broadcasters have suffered from domestic attacks on their services particularly by right-leaning governments. The second type of transnational broadcaster is state-funded broadcasters, which are also state-affiliated media such as China Global Television Network (CGTN) and RTV (formerly Russia TV). These broadcasters are

10 

A. WAKE

most often seen as agents of propaganda and while they do provide some strong journalism in particular areas, they are quite clear that they are providing content that represents China’s national position on various matters. The third type of transnational broadcaster is also government funded but acknowledged as agents of public diplomacy and argue they provide independent news while also pushing their political ideology, as is the case with the Voice of America. Outside a formal war context, broadcasters such as the BBC and ABC have generally been cast as agents of enhancing what Nye (2008) called soft power, where benign broadcasting of factual news programs and lifestyle programming were seen as helping the recipient country, but simultaneously improving the international image and influence of the transmitting country (Morales, 2022). The BBCWS is repeatedly recognised as an institution of major importance to the UK government’s use of soft power. Soft power stands in contrast to hard power’s overtly coercive effort to directly control, usually by the military. In Australia, the ABC has employed soft power by broadcasting children’s shows, documentaries, education programmes, music, rugby league, rugby union, and soap operas, such as Neighbours or reality show Married at First Sight, alongside news and current affairs bulletins. This programming, at times, was interspersed by Australian government advertisements warning people in neighbouring countries not to try to travel via boat to the country to seek asylum. The expansion of Chinese media (alongside China’s military and economic sectors) into the Indo-Pacific has been of increasing concern to those countries which hold different political and cultural values. A Freedom House Report in 2022 found that China had significantly increased its global media footprint between 2019 and 2021 (Cook et al., 2022). Defence analysts like to cite Sun Tzu’s maxim from The Art of War, “supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting” (Giles & Tzu, 2008, p.  79), when considering China’s media global expansion. Those analysts are worried China is using the media as part of an information war, or propaganda campaign, in a way more commonly associated with physical wars such as that occurring currently in Ukraine, or previously in Vietnam or the Second World War. Specifically, they point to China’s use of “three warfares” (san zhong zhanfa) public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare in the conflicts with Taiwan, the South China Sea (SCS), and disputes with India (Clarke, 2019).

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

11

China has four different ways of influencing the information environment in the Indo-Pacific (Dupont, 2021). First, it provides media content in places where there is none; second, they fund or provide ICT infrastructure and services. Third, they provide free education and media training. Finally, they run a public diplomacy campaign to build China’s soft power in the region. Information warfare has changed considerably since the earliest days of broadcasting into neighbour countries. Today’s transnational public broadcasters ABC and BBC no longer simply provide a one-way single source of information to a mass of people in another country, but offer just an interactive broadcast voice to many in a flooded information marketplace. The Internet has allowed almost anyone to broadcast to populations across a range of platforms, some that are open and transparent to all, and others hidden in closed groups such as WhatsApp or Facebook groups. But China is also not the only country in the Indo-Pacific of concern to advanced liberal democracies. Russia is the other obvious example. But China is a formidable economic power and its influence is centred in this work. Its light-intensity branding, wide range of content, and high production values make it appealing and not necessarily identifiable as to its source. Moreover, it has a stated ambition to use the media directly as part of its own foreign policy to sway views in other countries, whereas the BBC and ABC see their position as providing independent journalism, that can be critical of their own government. There are also other political leaders in the Indo-Pacific, even from so-­ called democracies, which seek to curtail news and information to their local communities whether it comes from outside or within their countries. The Indo-Pacific is home to many countries with the worst records for press freedom in the world, and the situation deteriorates month by month. For example, in early 2023, Cambodia’s leader ordered the shutdown of the Voice of Democracy, one of the last independent news organisations in the country. At the time, Amnesty was quoted as saying that the order to close Voice of Democracy “puts the Cambodian public’s access to information at risk now that the government has removed another obstacle along its road to complete control of the country” (Ratcliffe, 2023). Within this context, a trusted Australian voice is needed to provide trusted news and current affairs to communities in the Indo-Pacific region which do not have access to independent journalism, particularly those which do not have independent media systems, and those which are

12 

A. WAKE

struggling with issues around fake news. Second, Australia’s voice in the twenty-­first century is increasingly diverse and includes Australia’s Pacific and Asian diaspora. Although Australia may not lay claim to being a major power in the region, it has a significant presence and voice and through the provision of strong news and current affairs that is independent of the United States, it can take on a large responsibility for acting fairly and in the interests of the region. Where Is the Indo-Pacific? The Indo-Pacific is essentially a strategic geopolitical construct to describe a region that ranges from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia, including India, North Asia, and the United States. The countries that comprise the Indo-Pacific speak different languages, have different cultures and religious beliefs, and live under various political systems. All have different media eco-systems. The democracies of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Indonesia, India and the Republic of Korea are prominent actors in the region. Other nations include Brunei, Cambodia, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. Political, military, and diplomatic leaders tend to use the term Indo-­ Pacific to define the military and strategic partnerships in the region, and to specifically exclude China. The Indo-Pacific four, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, use the term when talking about working together in the region to support freedom of navigation and overflight, connectivity and economic growth, and respect for the rule of law. There are, nonetheless, points of divergence between Australia and the others, particularly when it comes to China, maritime security and connectivity. The United States, under President Joe Biden, is clear in its belief the Indo-Pacific needs robust American leadership because of the increasingly crowded geopolitical environment. Analysts have noted that the strategic neglect of the Pacific Islands Region (PIR) by the United States had led to the encroachment by ‘non–traditional partners’ in an area where the United States had traditionally been the ‘principal external power’ (Dupont, 2021). Further, the Biden government has sought to embrace the region’s multi–polarity and seeks opportunities to enhance its

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

13

engagement in conjunction with like-minded powers such as Australia, New Zealand, France, India, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Furthermore, these partners need to be better incorporated into the existing regional architecture. Doing so will demonstrate a respect for the sovereignty of the Pacific countries to choose their own development partners, while also diluting the influence of China (Dupont, 2021). Although targeted at defence, the United States’ framework for the region specifically mentions the media, and in relation to China, states that one of the United States’ objectives is to enhance US engagement in the region while also educating governments, businesses, universities, Chinese overseas students, news media, and general citizenries about China’s coercive behaviour and influential operations around the globe (O’Brien, 2021). Ironically, then, the United States traces its place in the region back to the “first trading ships that departed for China eight years after the American Revolution, to establishing our first diplomatic presence in India in 1794”. The United States clearly believes its engagement in the region has been built on trade, cooperation, and shared sacrifice, yielding the peace and prosperity enjoyed across the region today (O’Brien, 2021). The alternative term for the region, the Asia Pacific, is out of favour with the Indo-Pacific Four, because when it is used, there is no choice but to acknowledge that Beijing is a serious player with commercial interests, energy sources, and diplomatic ambitions in the region. For that reason, the Asia Pacific is increasingly avoided by military leaders aligned to the United States. There were, for example, just five mentions of the Indo-­ Pacific at the annual defence ministerial forum, the Shangri-la Dialogue, in 2017, but a year later there were 92 different mentions of the region (Choong, 2019). By adopting the term the Indo-Pacific for this book, we acknowledge the important role Australia has in partnership in democracy with India, Japan, and the United States. Australia is clearly part of the region in geographic terms, uniquely traversing the Indian and Pacific Oceans and it also has a clear strategic interest in the geopolitical concept of the Indo-­ Pacific region. Australia has a unique relationship with China, which means we hold a special space in the region insofar as we are not entirely a vassal of the United States. It is for this reason that Australia needs its own clear broadcast voice that can provide trusted and independent information, particularly for those countries which do not have free media systems or have weak media systems that cannot support strong independent journalism.

14 

A. WAKE

Indo-Pacific Media Landscape Many factors affect transnational broadcast news environments. Some nations seek to broadcast into another country to spread their ideology and portray their nation in a positive way. Others use broadcasts to advance their foreign policy interests, while some just see their work as helping to keep expats in touch with ‘home’ or to provide education programs. There are also nations which increasingly see their broadcasts as a way to extend relationships and emotional connections, arguing that broadcasting is less about immediate transactional objectives and more about long-term, deep connections with thought leaders in other countries. Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) have traditionally used their broadcasters to support countries which cannot get news from non-government sources, particularly during periods of unrest or civil war. The United States has been more forthright in using its broadcasters to spread the value of democracy. Of course, every country’s media system is impacted by including culture, history, politics, economy, education, digital adoption, technology trends, media law, and press systems (Kaur et al., 2018). While not all these factors are considered here, it’s safe to say that transnational broadcasters have repeatedly underestimated the cultural, political, and sociolinguistic complexity of the Indo-Pacific and in some cases incorrectly assumed that they have more to offer than local broadcasters. It is true, however, that lower- to middle–income nations in the Indo-­ Pacific have traditionally lacked the resources to sustain a robust and diverse domestic media environment (Dupont, 2021). As a result, many have accepted foreign broadcasters to support or boost local media, and have bought programmes, shared content, and accepted foreign investment in the media. Although Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have traditionally dominated this space in the Pacific, since 2010 there was a severe scaling back of content, including the end of the 75-year history of shortwave broadcasting service, from the ABC’s Radio Australia. This reportedly allowed China to move to the frequencies abandoned by the ABC, a claim the ABC has since rejected. Democratic Neighbours The first major set of countries in the Indo-Pacific media landscape are those which are democratic neighbours. Some of these do not have much requirement for news broadcast from Australia, although others are

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

15

struggling to protect independent media. New Zealand is considered a model for press freedom in the Indo-Pacific and was ranked 13th for the Reporters without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index in 2023. South Korea (47tht) and Japan (68th) also have strong media systems, although RSF has concerns that some journalists in those democratic countries can suffer from self-censorship. The motivation for listening from another democratic nation does not only have to be ‘need’. Interest can be an important motivator too. India, the world’s largest democracy, has an abundance of broadcast media, but the Modi government is using new regulations to control local digital media and to restrain global media reporting on India (Park, 2022). RSF noted in 2023 that all the mainstream media were now owned by those close to the Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Significantly, the government has also given itself greater power to force social media platforms to take down information, after Twitter (now X) refused to block journalists and rights campaigners (TwitterSafety, 2021). In Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy, journalists have been barred from reporting on Papua while Islamic groups have threatened to have reporters jailed under the country’s blasphemy laws (Richburg, 2022). In 2023, Indonesia sat at 108 on the RSF 2023 World Press Freedom Index. In the Philippines (132rd), legal threats are being used by politicians against journalists such as those faced by the founder of online news organisation Rappler, the Nobel laureate Maria Ressa. She has been convicted of cyber libel and she still is grappling with multiple tax charges. In the Philippines, one of the country’s largest and most respected television networks, ABS-CBN, was punished for its reporting on the president and had its broadcasting licence revoked forcing it to morph into an online. In Thailand, although a parliamentary democracy, the crime of insulting the monarchy remains in place and was used at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic against a former opposition politician who criticised a pharmaceutical corporation substantially owned by King Vajiralongkorn (Holmes, 2022). Thailand sat at 106 on the World Press Freedom Index in 2023. Some of the concerns about Malaysia’s laws are also likely to be addressed by the new government, after the editor-in-chief of the digital site Malaysiakini, faced contempt-of-court charges because of reader comments on the site that criticised the judiciary. Malaysian police also investigated journalists from the South China Morning Post and Al Jazeera for reporting on the plight of migrant workers during the COVID-19

16 

A. WAKE

lockdown, forcing Al Jazeera staff to relocate. Malaysia sat at 73 on the World Press Freedom Index in 2023. In addition, there is a need to support the continually growing media systems of developing democracies of PNG (59th), Fiji (89th), Timor-­ Leste (10th), and the Solomon Islands. Fiji has just returned to functioning as a democratic government and has just repealed draconian media laws introduced in 2010 to regulate the ownership, registration, and content of the media (Lewis & Anthony, 2023). Developing Countries Many of Australia’s near neighbours are developing nations, often with undemocratic systems of government. RSF continues to be concerned about the impact of news and current affairs from China being syndicated in these nations. There are particular concerns about the quality and quantity of news available to people in Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. China (179th) ranks as one of the worst countries in the world for media freedom, according to the RSF’s 2023 World Press Freedom Index. Vietnam (178th) and Laos (160th) continue to arrest journalists and bloggers. Myanmar (173rd) is among the largest jailers of journalists, second only to China, and there are serious risks to journalists in that country of being tortured or murdered. Cambodia has forced the shutdown of dozens of radio stations, the closure of the Cambodia Daily and the sale of the Phnom Penh Post to a friendly businessman in Malaysia (73rd). The Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen also uses his own Facebook page to deride what he calls ‘fakenews’ (Richburg, 2022). Cambodia now ranks 147th on the World Press Freedom Index as a result of government prosecution of independent media. Small Island Pacific States These small island states include PNG, Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga (44th), Vanuatu, Nauru, Kiribati, Guam, the Federated States of Micronesia, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, and New Caledonia. Most have historic or colonial links to other countries including France, Portugal, the UK, the United States, and Australia and are often wooed by governments seeking access to their large fishing rights, sea mining wealth or strategic location. Most are so small they are not ranked by RSF in the World Press Freedom Index.

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

17

COVID-19 has caused major financial issues for commercial and government supported news outlets across the Pacific with many news outlets under the threat of financial collapse. Although most Pacific countries generally have locally owned newspapers and radio stations, few have the resources to provide the high-level public interest journalism required for the transnational stories that can impact on their nations (logging, climate change, fisheries). While most small island states in the Pacific have struggling economies, there are considerable differences between Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. Australia has traditionally had stronger links with Melanesia, and New Zealand with Polynesia. While education standards are slipping in most places, Tonga is reputed as having a high number of citizens with doctoral qualifications. Samoa has a functional democracy and ranks at 19th on the World Press Freedom Index. Generally, Polynesians speak English and have reasonable phone/digital access. The same cannot be said of Melanesia, which includes Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu. Melanesia has a limited number of educated leaders, the general populations often have had little or limited schooling, and they have limited access to media, and even less access to social media or television. In the very remotest of places such as outer islands or the PNG highlands, people may only have access to shortwave radio or text updates. It is these countries that have most recently been seen as particularly vulnerable to influence from other nations, unaligned to Australia’s interests or their own. The media environment in all these markets must be considered by transnational broadcasters when determining what content should be produced, and how it should be distributed to audiences. Across all these three regions there are local broadcasters which, at times, would not be able to cover local stories, for fear of being shut down or shut off. For this reason, transnational broadcasters have a clear role to assist. The process of ‘giving’ stories to international news broadcasters to run before the local media has been dubbed ‘Information Laundering’, and in the Pacific, the ABC and Radio New Zealand have done this to support local journalists for many years. Long-time Pacific journalist Bruce Hill explained that no one was fooled by such a move, but it did allow some protection for journalists who could claim they were simply running a report that was already being broadcast overseas (Hill, 2018). At least one nation has become wise to this. Singapore has passed the Foreign

18 

A. WAKE

Interference (Countermeasures) Bill which seeks to stop this practice by labelling offshore-based or funded media outlets as agents of “foreign interference” (Carson & Gibbons, 2023).

Strategic Importance The Indo-Pacific is strategically and economically significant and is often treated as the nations at its centre are on a chess board on which superpowers play. Although many of the nations within the Indo-Pacific are small, they have agency and influence and considerable voting power in international forums such as the United Nations. They can therefore support or veto actions by countries with whom they have diplomatic relations. Increasingly they want their own voice heard on global affairs and have been attempting to take greater control of these diplomatic processes (Fry & Tarte, 2016). Pacific Island states account for around 6% of the vote in the UN General Assembly despite containing only 0.12% of the world’s population. Pacific island countries are also rich in resources and oversee exclusive economic zones about three times the landmass of the United States (Kolbe & Devine, 2022). These small island states also have some of the world’s largest fishing grounds, a resource keenly noted by countries like Japan and China. The Indo-Pacific area at the forefront of climate change and often experiences natural disasters, including tropical cyclones, drought, earthquakes, tsunamis, and floods. The region sits on the Ring of Fire, a zone of tectonic activity which means that earthquakes occur frequently and can cause tsunamis which kill people and destroy fertile land. Pacific small island states in particular tend to have fragile economic security and can find themselves vulnerable to offers of financial assistance. They need to use imported diesel and coal for electricity, and rely heavily on public expenditure to sustain economic growth. They are also vulnerable to decisions by other countries. For example, when Palau reaffirmed its diplomatic relations with Taiwan, China blacklisted the nation as a holiday destination, choking an economy where tourism makes up more than 40% of the national GDP (Kolbe & Devine, 2022). The sea routes through the Indo-Pacific also have economic and strategic importance. All of Asia’s major maritime trading nations, as well as nations from the Middle East and Europe are interested in the Indo-­ Pacific sea routes, particularly the South China Sea. The Indian Ocean is the world’s busiest trade corridor mostly to or from East Asia. China and

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

19

India rely on maritime trade for their commercial and energy security. Although the United States has both a continued strategic role and presence in the Indo-Pacific, some of its role has been outsourced to Australia (particularly in the Pacific). The United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK are increasing their presence in the Pacific to counterbalance China, which has been growing its trade, aid, and diplomatic and commercial activity in the region. All four Western nations were concerned a new China–Solomon Islands security pact could allow Chinese naval vessels to replenish in the Pacific (“Solomon Islands: China deal in Pacific stokes Australian fears”, 2022). Although the idea was rejected by Solomon Island’s prime minister, the fear was that a Chinese naval base would extend China’s military reach in the South Pacific. China’s Ministry of National Defence has also said reports of a naval base were fake news (Bloomberg News, 2022) but China’s navy and air forces are clearly active in the region, as seen with the delivery of relief supplies to Tonga after the devastating volcanic eruption and tsunami disaster in January 2022. The US Biden administration has committed US$810 m to the Indo-­ Pacific region, which includes support for climate resilience and to strengthen Pacific Islands’ economies. It also reopened its Embassy in Honiara, which it closed in 1993. Solomon Islands initially declined to sign the US aid deal because of indirect references in the document to China. The Solomon Islands Foreign Minister told reporters: “There were some references that put us in a position where we’ll have to choose sides, and we did not want to be placed in a position where we have to choose sides (“Solomon Islands would not ‘choose sides’, agrees to US, Pacific Islands accord after China references removed”, 2022)”. After negotiations, the Solomon Islands signed the agreement. China responded saying that Pacific Island countries “must not be viewed as chess pieces in any contest between major powers,” and that China hopes the United States “will genuinely support [Pacific Island countries] in responding to climate change and realizing development and revitalization” [sic] (Chen et al., 2022). Analysts in the United States have called on the US administration to do more, with Alexander B. Gray, a former chief of staff of the White House National Security Council (2019–2021) and director for Oceania and Indo-Pacific Security at the National Security Council (2018–2019), writing that “Washington can no longer afford to outsource its South Pacific diplomacy to Canberra and Wellington” (Gray, 2022).

20 

A. WAKE

Australia announced a Pacific step-up programme with its “Pacific family” in 2018, which it said was aimed at “the sovereignty, stability, security and prosperity of the Pacific” (“Stepping Up Australia’s engagement with our Pacific family”, 2019). The project included a Coral Sea cable, which is completed and delivers high-speed telecommunications to Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. The programme of funding was said to be focused on what Solomon Islands wants, and not what Australia thought was necessary. As the then DFAT Secretary, Frances Adamson said in 2019: “I want to be very clear about that. Australia’s ‘Pacific Step-up’ … is very much guided by what Pacific leaders and communities have told us that they would like us to do” (“Special Session 2: Strategic Interests and Competition in the South Pacific”, 2019). Australia has since started a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure fund, widely seen as a counter to China’s loans in the region. Two of the Indo-Pacific powers, the United States and India, are both engaged in Asia’s most serious security flashpoints with China. Although China and India have had a long rivalry, in a globalised economy they have the means and the motivation to build powerful navies. Even though intentions are currently peaceful, that could change. The US Navy has long guaranteed access to the Pacific, but China and India may want to ensure that they can project their own sea power. Both are becoming more assertive in each other’s waters. Among politicians, military leaders and diplomats in the West, there is increasingly fear of the rise of China spurred on by the use of cheque book diplomacy. Aid from China peaked in the Pacific in 2016 seemingly as a result of Beijing’s tightened control over foreign investment by state-­ owned entities and efforts to tackle China’s domestic debt problem (Deng, 2022). However, China is still underwriting major infrastructure projects across the Indo-Pacific, and there is a fear among many outside the region that Indo-Pacific countries will find themselves increasingly indebted to a country that holds different values. But Australia’s allies still trade on the strong relationships established between Western countries and the Pacific built on strong foundations in the Second World War. Bloody battles in the Pacific led to Australia, United States, and the UK to believe a debt was owed to these countries. As a result, many of the region’s elites were for many decades educated in Australia, New Zealand and to a lesser extent the UK.  In recent years, fewer Pacific leaders have travelled for education to places like Australia, and increasingly people from the Pacific have been concerned about the

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

21

unwelcome legacy of the Second World War from the testing of nuclear weapons to the abandonment of unexploded ordnances which continue to kill people even to this day (Heaton, 2022). Polls by the Australian think tank the Lowy Institute repeatedly find that Australians overwhelmingly acknowledge a moral obligation to help their Pacific neighbours, particularly Papua New Guinea. In 2022, Australians were overwhelmingly in favour of Australia providing foreign aid to Pacific Island states. According to the Lowy Institute eight, in ten Australians (84%) favour providing aid to the Pacific for long-term economic development, and 82% favour providing aid “to help prevent China from increasing its influence in the Pacific” (Lowy Institute Poll, 2022). In 2018, the then Australia’s Defence Minister Marise Payne made it clear that Australia needed to be a good neighbour to a secure, stable Pacific that stood for liberal democracy: As an advanced and developed economy, we have a responsibility to support our neighbours when disaster strikes, and in less urgent or pressing times to share – share lessons and knowledge and skills that increase our collective resilience and capacity for a timely response in the future … Our prosperity relies on economic stability, on open markets and free trade. We’re entitled to rely on our exclusive economic zones, the sovereignty of our borders and boundaries, and to trade fairly, without predatory or unethical behaviour forced upon us. We insist on a rules-based order as liberal democracies. We may, indeed, have different models of governance, but we are unified in exerting our rights, our freedoms and our liberties. (Payne, 2018)

Finally, the United States, UK, and Australia (among many others) are committed to the ideal of democracy, even with all its failings. The rise of China and President Xi raises serious concerns for all advanced liberal democracies concerned about the strategic security of the region and is something that an Australian broadcaster should be covering not only for its domestic audiences, but for those in the region.

War Mongering There is never a more important time for a nation to have a transnational broadcaster than during a time of war, and with heightened military tensions and massive boosts to defence spending, including Australia’s planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines from a deal with the

22 

A. WAKE

United States. These subs—carrying missiles—will be able to sit under water for months without surfacing. Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong has acknowledged the tensions—or hawkish warmongering—in the Indo-Pacific, specifically telling the National Press Club in April 2023 that she was concerned about what she called the regional flashpoints: the Himalayas, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, she warned conflict over Taiwan would be “catastrophic” for everyone involved, arguing “our job is to lower the heat on any potential conflict, increasing pressure on others to do the same” (Wong, 2023). The four US-aligned military powers of Australia, United States, Japan, and India have all elevated their defence spending amid rising tensions with China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (“World military expenditure passes $2 trillion for first time”, 2022), Australian military spending increased in 2021 by 4% to reach $31.8  billion. Australia has further committed to its alliance with Washington, as is illustrated by the plan for Australia to buy nuclear-­ powered submarines from the United States. US Marines have also been on rotational deployments to the northern Australian city of Darwin for a decade and there are further plans to position US fighter and bomber aircraft, ships and soldiers in Australia. Japan has announced a plan to double its total defence budget by 2027—a sum that, if implemented, will make Tokyo the third-largest military spender in the world. It is a massive change in direction for Japan which had pegged itself to a one per cent defence spending-to-GDP ratio (Ioanes, 2023). Tokyo is also strengthening its alliance with the United States, and expanding defence relationships with India in 2020, Vietnam in 2021, Australia in 2022, and the UK in 2023. India has also recognised a need to increase investment in defence preparedness and 13% of the country’s budget is now defence-related. But even this amount is no match for Beijing’s funding and according to SIPRI, China is the world’s second largest military spender, having allocated an estimated $293 billion in 2021, an increase of 4.7% compared with 2020. China’s military spending has grown for 27 consecutive years. The United States, of course, is the largest military spender, amounting to $801  billion in 2021, although it did decrease 1.4% from 2020. In 2023 there has been further US movement in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the Philippines where US forces now have four additional locations where they are permitted to operate. Two of those locations are located in

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

23

Philippines’ northernmost province, approximately 440 kilometres from Taiwan’s southern coastline. These new bases are in addition to the five locations the US military already uses in the Philippines (Gomez, 2023). In this hypersensitive military climate it is even more important that Australia broadcasts news that does not rely on a business model that benefits from further inflaming tensions between countries (Sun, 2023). Trusted news and current affairs from a broadcaster that seeks to partner and engage with the region can be seen as the perfect peaceful response to those who seek to be warmongerers.

Chinese’s Increasing Influence Despite recent trade difficulties, China is still considered the best market for Australian iron ore and coal, as well as some agricultural products and education. Foreign policy analysts have commented that Australia will need to maintain robust trade with China to sustain the investments in defence capabilities to deter Beijing’s potential aggression against Australia or its allies (Ivanov, 2023). It is clear that the rise of China, its increased international influence, including its massive expansion of broadcasting (“China’s State Broadcaster CCTV Rebrands International Networks as CGTN in Global Push”, 2016), greatly concerns advanced liberal nations, and in particular Australia’s ally the United States. The US has responded in the Pacific by re-engaging in the region and opening a number of new embassies in Kiribati and Tonga and boosting its other diplomatic missions including the return of the Peace Corp volunteers to Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu. Beijing was one of the few outliers during the global expansion of liberalism in the first wave of soft power. Despite all the allure of a market economy, it did not sign up, culturally, ideologically, or institutionally, to the liberalism promoted by the United States and others. Today China has morphed itself from a centrally planned economy into the largest trading nation in history. Since the beginning of the millennium, China has begun to embrace soft power as a strategy to promote influence and its position in regional politics (Cho & Jeong, 2008). Beijing’s interpretation and implementation of soft power has also relied on state power and economic coercion, which instead of charming other countries into voluntary interactions has many analysts talking about its negatively impacted reputation (Lee Paul, 2016; Nelson & Carlson, 2012).

24 

A. WAKE

China has been courting countries in the Indo-Pacific with deals under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Through the BRI, China aims to invest in infrastructure in more than 150 countries and international organisations. The Australian think tank the Lowy Institute has estimated China has provided close to $US1.5bn in foreign aid to the region through a mixture of grants and loans since 2017 and was a principal donor in the Pacific. The loans and grants have been directed to projects that countries like Australia simply will not fund. Some examples from the Solomon Islands include a national sports stadium (US$53  million), a National University dormitory complex (US$21.4 million), a medical centre at the National Referral Hospital, and 161 mobile phone towers to be built and supplied by Chinese telco giant Huawei (US$66 million) (Zhang, 2022). China’s use of soft power in the Indo-Pacific has caused considerable disquiet with many analysts/people concerned the United States will respond with hard power. The former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, on a 2017 tour of Australia was among the first world leaders to warn: What we’re seeing now is a desire by China to extend its influence and project its power. First throughout Asia — then, throughout the world. I would hope that Australia would stand up against efforts under the radar, as we say, to influence Australian politics and policy This is an urgent problem and one we must confront immediately and together. (Perper, 2018)

China, it is feared, does not deal in three- or four- year political cycles like democracies, but thinks generationally. When China’s President Xi talks about soft power it is more about how nations can create their own development paths while working to increase interconnectedness. Using its BRI, China’s version of soft power tells its beneficiaries that they do not need to be like China, and that they can retain their own culture, ideology, and institutions while participating in globalisation (Jiang, 2021). Beijing acknowledges its need to contest what it sees as the hegemony of the Western media. President Xi Jinping in 2014 clearly stated: “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative and better communicate China’s message to the world” (Biswas & Tortajada, 2018). China watchers are not convinced, suggesting there is plenty of evidence of the long arm of China reaching into countries where it has no business. The ABC’s Managing Editor Asia Pacific Matt O’Sullivan acknowledged Australia can do more:

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

25

We can’t match the same amount of content coming out of China, but we can ensure that we’re doing the best. What I’ve heard from Pacific media leaders is that a lot of Chinese content isn’t relevant for their audiences because it’s coming from a particular perspective aimed at domestic audiences, that doesn’t really work for them… I think the benefit is that being an Australian broadcaster, we understand the region, we’ve got subject matter experts in the region, we can understand, what is the important part of the story for the Pacific audience. (O’Sullivan, 2022)

O’Sullivan expresses clearly the need for a regional content from an Australian broadcaster, but also acknowledges there’s much more to be done. Broadcast expert, Jemima Garrett from Australia Asia Pacific Media Initiative (AAPMI) said she believed $75  million a year was needed to fully engage with the region, and this would still leave Australia well under the spend of comparable OECD nations (Grasswill, 2023).

The Value of Transnational Broadcasters There are significant numbers of people in positions of power who choose to downplay the importance of independent journalism and seek to encourage a loss of trust in journalism and journalists. The authors, here, unashamedly accept that journalists working for independent media play a vital role in ensuring transparency of government and justice systems. In advanced liberal democracies or even better still, market economies, such as the United States, UK, and Australia, a free press can provide the vigorous and independent journalism required by citizens to make appropriate decisions about their lives, including whom to choose as elected representatives. Journalists must ask the hard questions of authorities, and when they find unnecessary secrecy, ask what is being hidden. Journalists are not the enemy of the people, regardless of how often it is said by people in power. Even outside liberal democracies journalism can play an important role as a watchdog on power for citizens, as is seen with much of the journalism that occurs within China (Josephi, 2012). There is only a little evidence that China, or any other country, directly interferes in the media sector in the Indo-Pacific beyond offering syndicated content and media aid, but financially struggling newsrooms and poorly paid journalists are seen to be particularly vulnerable to influence (Ahearn, 2022b). In 2022, long-time media development manager Sue Ahearn wrote for the Australia Defence Department funded Australian

26 

A. WAKE

Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) that China was winning the information war in the Pacific (Ahearn, 2022b). Drawing on case studies of the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea, Ahearn wrote about the economic vulnerability of the media to the influence of China. Others have also asserted that the actions of the Solomon Islands government in ordering the country’s national broadcaster the SIBC to self-censor its news and only allow content that portrays the nation’s government in a positive light, resembled media policies adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and could essentially make SIBC a mouthpiece for the government (Burgess, 2022). Two years earlier the Solomon Islands government threatened to ban Facebook after criticism over Honiara’s decision to switch allegiance from Taipei to Beijing (Ahearn, 2022a, 2022b). Long-time Vanuatu journalist Dan McGarry, who was denied a work visa to re-enter the country after a short visit to Australia, said while he had no evidence that China tried to influence the Vanuatu government over his residence, he’d seen a tendency in Pacific leaders to emulate behaviour they saw elsewhere (Ahearn, 2022b). Advanced liberal democracies concerned about the strategic importance of the region have been offering significant media training programmes and/or donations to counter donations from China, and international media outlets are reporting upon the region in far more significant ways. Most of this work is done through development arms of the transnational broadcasters, rather than the broadcasters themselves. In the ABC’s case, the work is done by ABC International Development (ABCID) while the BBC has BBC Media Action. Before and since COVID-19, Indo-Pacific journalists (as well as those across other developing countries) have been offered all-expenses-paid trips to China and free graduate degrees to “tell China’s story well” (Lidberg et  al., 2023; Lim & Bergin, 2018). Of course, all countries, including Australia and New Zealand, want their story told well. But the training opportunities offered by China for journalists have to date not so much based on journalism but on Chinese ideology. Lidberg et al. found that some journalists in the Indo-Pacific had visited China multiple times with one from Myanmar visiting nine times. In 2023, Chinese social media featured critics complaining that journalism degrees in China “only teach you one thing: to be obedient” (The Economist, 2023). The complaints reported by The Economist came after the release of a new educational app for Chinese journalists, which features a tutorial called “Ensure that the politicians run the papers, the magazines, the tv stations and the news

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

27

websites”. Another journalist talks about how to guide public opinion. Since 2014, all reporters have had to pass an exam to get a press card. It tests knowledge of the trade and of the party’s ideology. (The Economist, 2023). Groups  of Solomon Islands journalists, including senior journalists, have accepted travel to China as part of the training including the head of the Media Association of Solomon Islands in 2023, Gerogina Keka. Another senior journalist who went to China, Dorothy Wickham, in an earlier visit  wrote that the trip left her concerned that Solomon Islands leaders would not be able to effectively deal with China: Solomon Islands’ regulatory and accountability mechanisms are too weak. We have already shown some spirit with our Attorney-General rejecting a hasty deal to lease the island of Tulagi, the capital of one of our provinces, to a Chinese company, but I fear how fragile and weak my country is against any large developed nation let alone China. (Wickham, 2019)

Some of the same journalists have also accepted training trips to Australia and other places in Europe. China had also offered technical support and equipment (cameras, computers, drones) for future expansion into television but some of this has not yet arrived. The Australian think tank the Lowy Institute raised concern that China may begin news content production, to fill a void left by Australia’s cuts to its Pacific programming under the former Coalition government (Bagshaw, 2022). The Albanese government put some funds back into transnational broadcasting in its first budget with the ABC launching a new pan-Pacific video news programme, although it overlooked the need to boost the Asia sections of the Indo-Pacific. The Pacific was part of an initial $32 m funding boost to expand its content and transmission across the region as the government (Federal Budget response, 2022). Other funds were to  be used to establish a network of full-time local journalists and enhance the capacity and development of media partners with training and activities covering basic professional development, cadets through to leadership masterclasses, and in specialised subjects, such as elections and emergency broadcasting. Apart from Australia and China, the UK, European nations, and Japan have also become major donors in the media sector in the Indo-Pacific. The renewed interest in some of these countries has been met with cynicism by local journalists. As veteran Solomon Islands journalist Dorothy Wickham wrote:

28 

A. WAKE

Since the draft (China-Solomon Island security) agreement was leaked, we have seen arrivals of diplomatic envoys from overseas – the Australians, New Zealanders, Japanese and the big boys, the US. The joke among us is that it took a deal with China for the US to realise we exist. The first reaction of many Solomon Islanders when the US delegation turn up was: please remind them to clean up the Second World War bombs killing people. The China security treaty has changed the political landscape and tested the Solomon Islands government’s commitment to a free press. We now watch to see if it affects other important institutions here. (Wickham, 2022)

There were concerns that China had taken over shortwave radio frequencies abandoned by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (Wake, 2016) but ABC International Services rejected that suggestion saying that it had not occurred. But to be fair, no one really knows who is listening or watching what in the region because the audience research either had not be done, or it has not been published, or done with a different methodology each time  to make comparisons impossible. Working out who is watching or listening on broadcast services is almost as difficult as determining who is accessing what on their smart phones, or where that seemingly  innocent video on Facebook or TikTok originated. One key requirement for any full reboot of Australian transnational broadcasting is to fund proper audience research to ensure that the intended messages are getting to the people who need them.

Broadcast Technology This book centres on the role of international broadcasters that are able to employ technology to continue operations even despite attempts by governments to obstruct production and distribution. It is easy to stop printing presses, delivery trucks, and turn off or block terrestrial broadcasts or even the Internet. Local journalists can be arrested and borders closed to prevent foreign journalists bearing witness in a country. It is much more difficult to turn off satellite television, shortwave radio, or to block Internet powered by low-flying drones. This book acknowledges that there is a new world of broadcasting in the Indo-Pacific because of the profound shift in broadcast and digital technology. Television news and current affairs were once available only to wealthy people in Indo-Pacific countries. As mobile and digital technologies have rapidly improved, and costs decreased, these have also become increasingly accessible for ordinary people.

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

29

Of course, there are still those in far-flung Melanesian states of PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu where there was no access even to an FM radio signal, no television, and limited and expensive Internet availability. But access to the Internet is expected to increase significantly in the Indo-Pacific over the next few years as a result of low-earth satellite technology (The mobile economy Asia Pacific). Broadcast news distributed via smart phones also has a distinct advantage for countries where literacy is low as videos can be viewed and understood with fairly little effort. On the flip side, however, these technologies make it easier to distribute misinformation and disinformation. Social media can be easy to use, and is becoming easier for content makers almost daily. More than two billion people globally now using a Meta product (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp) and advances in AI can help tailor material for non-English-speaking audiences (Create quality video ads that perform, 2022). YouTube, for example, has introduced automated voice-overs in English, Filipino, French, Hindi, Indonesian, Korean, Malaysian, Mandarin, Spanish, and Swedish. Social media has brought with it a range of new issues, with closed or private groups in Facebook and WhatsApp being used to distribute misinformation and disinformation, hate speech, and other concerning information. Many people in the Indo-Pacific simply do not have the literacy or the media literacy to judge if information is truthful. Some countries such as China and Myanmar have also used technology to block access to all or parts of the Internet, and even Pacific governments have at times threatened to block social media (Kant et al., 2018). Nauru had a three-year ban on Facebook from 2015 to 2018, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and Solomon Islands have in recent years threatened to ban the platform (Concerns about proposed Facebook ban in Tonga over anti-Monarch posts, 2019; “Nauru lifts Facebook ban”, 2018). Governments are also using social media to directly influence their own citizens, as well as those in other countries (Johnson, 2022). Pacific countries have been using the capacity of Facebook to broadcast their national election results, live (Kant, 2022). In 2017, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade had already introduced more than 230 social media channels, while the United States has more than 2000, including Chinese language channels. There are now so many ways to interact with  broadcast news. Even gaming platform Twitch announced in 2022 that it would air Vice World News live shows twice a week. Notwithstanding, in April 2023 Vice

30 

A. WAKE

announced it would be laying off staff from its Asia Pacific newsroom including journalists in Hong Kong, Thailand, Pakistan, India, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, and Japan (Dass, 2023). In summary, transnational broadcasters are working in a rapidly changing interactive broadcast environment. They can no longer rely on audiences to tune into to just one station for trusted news and current affairs, but must work harder across broadcast and digital platforms to find audiences and to find ways of ensuring information cannot be simply cut off by those who decide they do not like the content.

References Ahearn, S. (2022a, September 29). The Future of Public Broadcasting is in Danger in Solomon Islands. The Strategist. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ the-­future-­of-­public-­broadcasting-­is-­in-­danger-­in-­solomon-­islands/ Ahearn, S. (2022b, March 17). How China is Winning the Information War in the Pacific. The Strategist. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-­china-­is-­winning-­ the-­information-­war-­in-­the-­pacific/ Bagshaw, E. (2022, August 18). Solomon Islands Signs $100 Million Huawei Deal. The Age. https://www.theage.com.au/world/asia/solomon-­islands-­ signs-­100-­million-­huawei-­deal-­20220818-­p5bb03.html Biswas, A. K., & Tortajada, C. (2018, February 23). China’s Soft Power is on the the Rise. China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201802/23/ WS5a8f59a9a3106e7dcc13d7b8.html Bloomberg News. (2022, April 28). China Says Reports of Naval Base on Solomon Islands ‘Fake News’. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2022-­0 4-­2 8/china-­s ays-­r eports-­o f-­n aval-­b ase-­o n-­s olomon-­i slands-­f ake­news?sref=vxSzVDP0 Broadcast Expert 3. (2023, April 14). Research Interview (Asia Pacific Broadcast Executive) [Interview]. Burgess, A. (2022, August 2). Solomon Islands Orders National Broadcaster SIBC Not to Report Content Critical of Government. ABC News. https:// www.abc.net.au/news/2022-­08-­02/solomon-­islands-­sibc-­anti-­government-­ censorship-­press-­freedoms/101288396 Carson, A., & Gibbons, A. (2023). The Big Chill? How Journalists and Sources Perceive and Respond to Fake News Laws in Indonesia and Singapore. Journalism Studies, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2023. 2192299 Chen, T., Nance, A., & Sumner, H.-A. (2022, November 3). Water Wars: U.S. Unveils First Pacific Islands Partnership Strategy. Lawfare. https://www. lawfareblog.com/water-­w ars-­u s-­u nveils-­f irst-­p acific-­i slands-­p artnership­strategy

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

31

China’s State Broadcaster CCTV Rebrands International Networks as CGTN in Global Push. (2016, December 31). South China Morning Post. https:// www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-­p olitics/article/2058429/chinas­state-­broadcaster-­cctv-­rebrands-­international Cho, Y. N., & Jeong, J. H. (2008). China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects. Asian Survey, 48(3), 453–472. Choong, W. (2019). The return of the Indo-Pacific strategy: An assessment. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 73(5), 415–430. Clarke, M. (2019). China’s Application of the ‘Three Warfares’ in the South China Sea and Xinjiang Obris, 63, 187-208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. orbis.2019.02.007 Concerns about proposed Facebook ban in Tonga over anti-Monarch posts. (2019). Civicus. Retrieved July 8, from https://monitor.civicus.org/ updates/2019/11/14/concerns-­a bout-­p roposed-­f acebook-­b an-­t onga­over-­anti-­monarchy-­posts/ Cook, S., Datt, A., Young, E., & Chan, B.  C. (2022). Beijing’s Global Media Influence. Freedom House. Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Retrieved July 8, from https://apcss.org/about/ap-­countries/ Create quality video ads that perform. (2022). YouTube. Retrieved September 2, from https://www.youtube.com/intl/en_us/ads/how-­it-­works/create-­a-­ video-­ad/ Dass, C. (2023, May 2). Vice Media Group APAC Newsroom Team Hit Hard by Global Restructure. Marketing-Interactive. https://www.marketing-­ interactive.com/vice-­media-­group-­shuts-­down-­vice-­news-­tonight-­broadcast,-­ cuts-­job-­as-­it-­looks-­to-­sell Deng, J. (2022, November 9). An Explanation for the Decline of China’s Aid in the Pacific. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-­interpreter/ explanation-­decline-­china-­s-­aid-­pacific Dupont, P. (2021, February) The United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy and a Revisionist China: Partnering with Small and Middle Powers in the Pacific Islands Region Issues and Insights Working Paper. Pacific Forum (www.pacforum.org: Pacific Forum). https://pacforum.org/publication/issues-­ insights-­vol-­20-­wp-­2-­the-­united-­states-­indo-­pacific-­strategy-­and-­a-­revisionist-­ china-­partnering-­with-­small-­and-­middle-­powers-­in-­the-­pacific-­islands-­region Federal Budget Response—Australian and International ABC Audiences Benefit from Funding Boost. (2022, October 25). https://about.abc.net.au/ statements/2022-­federal-­budget-­response-­australian-­and-­international-­abc-­ audiences-­benefit-­from-­funding-­boost/ Fry, G., & Tarte, S. (Eds.). (2016). The New Pacific Diplomacy. ANU Press. Giles, L., & Tzu, S. (2008). Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. Tuttle Pub.

32 

A. WAKE

Gomez, J. (2023, April 4). Philippines Names 4 New Camps for US Forces Amid China Fury. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/philippines-­ united-­states-­military-­china-­4db2a71161398e2769cceb2838fa2750 Grasswill, H. (2023, April 5). ABC International Spreads Its Wings. ABC Alumni. https://abcalumni.net/2023/04/05/abc-­international-­spreads-­its-­wings/ Gray, A.  B. (2022, September 30). Guarding the Pacific: How Washington Can Counter China in the Solomons and Beyond. Metamorphic Media LLC. Retrieved November 13, 2022, from https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/guarding­the-­pacific-­how-­washington-­can-­counter-­china-­in-­the-­solomons-­and-­beyond/ Hartcher, P., & Knott, M. (2023, March 7). Australia Faces the Threat of War with China Within Three Years—And We’re Not Ready. Sydney Morning Herald. https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-­faces-­the-­threat-­of-­war-­ with-­china-­within-­three-­years-­and-­we-­re-­not-­ready-­20230221-­p5cmag.html Heaton, T. (2022, December 12). US, Japan Left Behind Thousands of Bombs After WWII.  They’re Still Exploding and Killing People in the Pacific. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2022/12/12/us-­j apan-­bombs-­world-­war-­ii-­killing-­pacific-­solomon-­islands/10847258002/ Hill, B. (2018, August 23). Information Laundering in the Pacific. DevPolicyBlog. https://devpolicy.org/pacific-­launder-­information-­20180823/ Holmes, S. (2022, August 19). How Lese Majeste Laws Are Eroding Free Speech in Southeast Asia. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/ how-­lese-­majeste-­laws-­are-­eroding-­free-­speech-­in-­southeast-­asia/ “How China Trains Its Journalists to Report “Correctly”.” (2023, July 20). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/china/2023/07/20/how-­china-­ trains-­its-­journalists-­to-­report-­correctly Ioanes, E. (2023, January 15). Japan’s Plan to Ramp Up Military Spending, Explained. Vox. https://www.vox.com/world/2023/1/15/23555805/ japans-­military-­buildup-­us-­china-­north-­korea Ivanov, P. (2023, April 12). Australia’s Delicate Dance with the United States and China. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-­interpreter/ australia-­s-­delicate-­dance-­united-­states-­china Jiang, Y. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative in Australian Mainstream Media: Why Did Its Narratives Shift from 2013 to 2021? Media International Australia, 1329878X211068835. https://doi.org/10.1177/1329878X 211068835 Johnson, T. (2022). Vice World News To Launch Channel On Twitch. Deadline. https://deadline.com/2022/08/vice-­w orld-­n ews-­t witch-­c hannel­1235094329/ Josephi, B. (2012). How Much Democracy Does Journalism Need? Journalism, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884912464172 Kant, R. (2022, July 8). Pacific Digital Toolbox Needs Expanding to Hammer Out Misinformation. 360info. https://newshub.360info.org/wire?item= ddb9cea4-­4bea-­4c81-­a9ba-­332646380ba6

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

33

Kant, R., Titifanue, J., Tarai, J., & Finau, G. (2018). Internet Under Threat?: The Politics of Online Censorship in the Pacific Islands. Pacific Journalism Review: Te Koakoa, 24(2), 64–83. https://doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v24i2.444 Kaur, K., Nair, S., Kwok, Y., Kajimoto, M., Chua, Y. T., Labiste, M. D., Soon, C., Jo, H., Lin, L. L., Thanh, T., & Kruger, A. (2018, October 10). Information Disorder in Asia and the Pacific: Overview of Misinformation Ecosystem in Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3134581 Kolbe, J., & Devine, P. (2022, July 1). China is Sweeping Up Pacific Island Allies: Here’s how Washington Can Fight Back. Foreign Policy. Lee Paul, S. N. (2016). The Rise of China and Its Contest for Discursive Power. Global Media and China, 1(1–2), 102–120. https://doi.org/10.1177/205 9436416650549 Lewis, L., & Anthony, K. (2023, April 6). ‘One for the Ages’: Historical Day for Fijian Journalism as ‘Draconian’ Media Law Scrapped. RNZ. https://www. rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-­news/487462/one-­for-­the-­ages-­historical-­ day-­for-­fijian-­journalism-­as-­draconian-­media-­law-­scrapped Lidberg, J., Lim, L., & Bradshaw, E. (2023, July 31). The World According to China: Capturing and Analysing the Global Media Influence Strategies of a Superpower. Pacific Journalism Review: Te Koakoa, 29(1 & 2), 182–204. https://doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v29i1and2.1317. https://ojs.aut.ac.nz/ pacific-­journalism-­review/article/view/1317 Lim, L., & Bergin, J. (2018, December 7). Inside China’s Audacious Global Propaganda Campaign. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ news/2018/dec/07/china-­p lan-­f or-­g lobal-­m edia-­d ominance-­p ropa ganda-­xi-­jinping Lowy Institute Poll. (2022). https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/charts/broadcast­services-­in-­the-­region Morales, P. S. (2022). China’s Communication Strategy in Latin America: From External Actor to Close Partner. In X.  Zhang & C.  Schultz (Eds.), China’s International Communication and Relationship Building. Taylor & Francis. Nauru Lifts Facebook ban. (2018, January 31). Radio New Zealand. Neff, T., & Pickard, V. (2021). Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 19401612211060255. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211060255 Nelson, T., & Carlson, M. (2012). Charmed by China? Popular Perceptions of Chinese Influence in Asia. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 13(4), 477–499. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109912000230 Nguyen, J., Valadkhani, A., Nguyen, A., & Wake, A. (2021). Press Freedom and the Global Economy: The Cost of Slipping Backwards. Journalism Studies, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2021.1873822

34 

A. WAKE

Nye, J. S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 94–109. https://doi. org/10.1177/0002716207311699 O’Brien, R. (2021, January 15). US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2021/01/15/u-­s-­strategic-­framework-­for­the-­indo-­pacific O’Sullivan, M. (2022, September 6). Research Interview (ABC Radio Australia’s Asia Pacific editor) [Interview]. Park, J. (2022, March 22). Why Governments in Asia Want to Control a Media They Can No Longer Command. Newsroom. https://ipi.media/why-­govern ments-­in-­asia-­want-­to-­control-­a-­media-­they-­can-­no-­longer-­command/ Payne, M. (2018). Keynote Speech by Australia’s Defence Minister Australia in the Pacific: Enhancing Security Through Regional Resilience. Perper, R. (2018, May 11). Hillary Clinton is Warning Australia to Resist China’s Creeping Influence Before It Spreads to the Rest of the World. Business Insider Australia. https://www.businessinsider.com.au/hillary-­clinton-­is-­warning-­ australia-­to-­resist-­chinas-­creeping-­influence-­before-­it-­spreads-­to-­the-­rest-­of-­ the-­world-­2018-­5 Ratcliffe, R. (2023, February 13). Dictator Hun Sen Shuts Down Cambodia’s VOD Broadcaster. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/ feb/13/dictator-­hun-­sen-­shuts-­down-­cambodias-­vod-­broadcaster Richburg, K. B. (2022, August 10). Press Freedom Under Attack Across Asia. The Strategist. Scott, M. (2009). A Global ABC: Soft Diplomacy and the World of International Broadcasting Bruce Allen Memorial Lecture. Macquarie University. Solomon Islands Would Not ‘Choose Sides’, Agrees to US, Pacific Islands Accord After China References Removed. (2022, October 4). South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/australasia/article/3194753/ solomon-­islands-­would-­not-­choose-­sides-­agrees-­us-­pacific Solomon Islands: China Deal in Pacific Stokes Australian Fears. (2022, April 20). BBC World. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­australia-­61158146 Special Session 2: Strategic Interests and Competition in the South Pacific. (2019). IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. youtube.com Sun, W. (2023, April 20). Fortunes of War: Why the Australian Media Won’t Change How It Writes About China. Crikey. https://www.crikey.com. au/2023/04/20/australian-­media-­china-­warmongering/?fbclid=IwAR0tzE0 KFwQuv6e-­9itz0TwmgwpzRK32p_S_aRy5HI9gN7QeyPkUVPt5Qlk The Mobile Economy Asia Pacific. GSMA. Retrieved July 8, from https://www. gsma.com/mobileeconomy/asiapacific/ TwitterSafety. (2021, February 10). Updates on Our Response to Blocking Orders from the Indian Government. Retrieved August 17, from https://blog.twitter. com/en_in/topics/company/2020/twitters-­response-­indian-­government

2  THE INDO-PACIFIC’S BROADCAST LANDSCAPE, STRATEGIC… 

35

Wake, A. (2016, December 9). Pacific Nations Lose Shortwave Radio Services That Evade Dictators and Warn of Natural Disasters. https://theconversation. com/pacific-­n ations-­l ose-­s hortwave-­r adio-­s ervices-­t hat-­e vade-­d ictators-­ and-­warn-­of-­natural-­disasters-­70058 Wickham, D. (2019, December 23). The Lesson from My Trip to China? Solomon Islands Is Not Ready to Deal With this Giant. The Guardian. https://www. theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2019/dec/23/the-­l esson­from-­my-­trip-­to-­china-­solomon-­islands-­is-­not-­ready-­to-­deal-­with-­this-­giant Wickham, D. (2022, May 3). In 35 Years of Reporting from Solomon Islands, I’ve Never Seen the Secrecy of the Last Few Months. The Guardian. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2022/may/03/in-­3 5-­y ears-­r eporting-­f rom-­ solomon-­islands-­i-­have-­never-­seen-­such-­secrecy-­as-­the-­last-­few-­months Wong, P. (2023, April 17). National Press Club Address, Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/ penny-­w ong/speech/national-­p ress-­c lub-­a ddress-­a ustralian-­i nterests-­ regional-­balance-­power World Military Expenditure Passes $2 Trillion for First Time. (2022, April 25). SIPRI for the Media. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-­release/2022/ world-­military-­expenditure-­passes-­2-­trillion-­first-­time Zhang, D. (2022, November 1). China’s Influence as a Pacific Donor. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-­interpreter/china-­s-­influence­pacific-­donor Zhao, X., & Xiang, Y. (2019). Does China’s Outward Focused Journalism Engage a Constructive Approach? A Qualitative Content Analysis of Xinhua News Agency’s English News. Asian Journal of Communication, 29(4), 346–362. https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2019.1606263

CHAPTER 3

Distribution via Shortwave, Satellites, and Social Media Alexandra Wake

Introduction Transnational broadcasters differ from their domestic counterparts in one major way. While domestic broadcasters are often focused on achieving the largest and broadest reach of viewers and listeners, transnational broadcasters tend to aim only for mass reach when a country no longer has a working media at all. In less dramatic times, they focus on reaching key opinion formers and those who might eventually find themselves in influential positions in their countries rather than people in a village who might chance upon a broadcast and support local broadcast efforts. When transnational broadcasters are welcomed into those countries, distribution can be done through partnerships and on terrestrial or cable radio and television. It becomes far trickier when a country does not wish to receive the broadcasts or seeks to block digital content.

A. Wake (*) RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9_3

37

38 

A. WAKE

Those who access English language transnational broadcast news on digital services, television, or FM radio are likely to be well-educated and engaged in the formal economy: There’s a presumption there’s a level of education that people have attained, but we wouldn’t describe them as an elite. Maybe there are people who are interested in coming to Australia to study or to work, there may be people who have family within Australia or people who are just interested in Australia. The target audience is broad but most still have a level of high school education or higher, generally English speaking. We do offer some content in some markets that is subtitled or in local language. (Broadcast Expert 2, 2022)

Some broadcasters, such as Radio Free Asia, believe it is part of their mission to spread the ideas and ideals of liberal democracies to the widest possible audience. As a result, they target a very broad audience, particularly in those countries where there is no free press at all and do so in local languages, rather than English: It can’t just be the elite, if we are talking about democracy. The population has to understand what’s going on. I go back to Cambodia experience. People came to understand what was happening. What was in their interests, and what wasn’t in their interest, it was people who weren’t formally educated. (Lavery, 2018)

Democracy is struggling to grow, or even to maintain its place, in many of the Indo-Pacific countries. As one Australian journalist based in Thailand remarked: Democracy in the Southeast Asian region is really struggling. We’ve got the Hun Sen in Cambodia, who’s been in power for over 30 years, and like the noose is tightening around… you’ve got newspapers being shut down and outlets like the BBC World Service, or the Voice of America or Radio Free Asia telling stories about human rights activists being charged with frivolous criminal offences and being put in jail. These are important stories, and you’re not necessarily going to get that information from the local press, which is often sort of operating in a heavy censorship/self-censorship kind of environment. (Martin, 2021)

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

39

Transnational broadcasts can reach populations of other countries in a variety of ways, via radio or television channels, social media, stream services, and satellites. It is difficult to turn off a broadcaster located outside a country and increasingly difficult, but possible, to turn off or block the Internet. Delivering news and current affairs to audiences remains difficult when domestic governments don’t welcome it. A study of the press blackout following the 1987 Fiji coup, for example, reported: “Radio Australia became the only reliable source of news as to what was happening” (Ogden & Hailey, 1988). Again in 2009, the ABC was left to provide independent information for local Fijians via shortwave. A text message sent from inside Fiji to the ABC at the time read: “We are trying to listen to you online but are having difficulty. Please keep broadcasting. You are all we have” (Wake, 2016). In Myanmar, in 2009, Aung San Suu Kyi even called on Australia to provide shortwave broadcasts for her country. At the time, the ABC’s Director of International said the move reflected the ABC’s ongoing commitment to serving people in those parts of Asia and the Pacific who live without press freedom (in Wake, 2016). It is therefore important to consider who is being targeted to receive transnational news and current affairs when considering not only in what content is being made for each country but also by  which distribution methods are being used by broadcasters. Some technologies are appropriate for large mass distribution, while more expensive and possibly bespoke models can be better for well-educated and wealthy audiences.

Low-Earth Satellites, Cables, and Nature Tech moguls like Elon Musk, commercial operators, and governments such as China and Australia are all competing to provide infrastructure and connectivity across the Indo-Pacific. But nature has a significant impact on what kinds of ICT infrastructure can support broadcast distribution in the disaster-prone Indo-Pacific. The region sits on the so-called Ring of Fire which causes earthquakes and tsunamis. Much of the region experiences cyclones, strong winds, and tsunamis which can stop transmitters from working. Even the undersea Internet cables which service much of the Pacific are vulnerable to the elements as Tonga discovered after a 2022 volcanic eruption and tsunami. It took more than five weeks to restore the Internet to the main island after the eruption in January, which left the island nation cut off from the world for five days (“Tonga’s

40 

A. WAKE

internet connection is restored more than five weeks after volcanic eruption and tsunami”, 2022). It was the second time in three years that Tongans had faced a communications blackout. Like other Pacific countries, Tonga has been connected to the world only since 2013 by an 827-kilometre-long submarine fibre-optic cable which connects to Fiji. From there it links with the Southern Cross cable that runs between Sydney, Hawaii and California. Submarine cables are damaged approximately twice a week, but most countries have multiple lines not just one (Hogeveen, 2022). Investment in underwater cables and other communications technologies has become an increasingly political space. Australia spent $200m on cables connecting Solomon Islands with Sydney, and co-funded further work for the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, and Palau. But despite this investment there is concern about a lack of capabilities to maintain, repair, and restore connections when disaster strikes (Hogeveen, 2022). The Australian government has also moved to support mobile telecommunications and network services provider in the Pacific by supporting Telstra to buy Digicel Pacific. The Australian government provided a $US1.3 billion investment package to support the deal to ensure secure, reliable, and high-quality services to Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, and Nauru (Telstra finalises acquisition of Digicel Pacific, 2022). However, even Australian ownership has not been foolproof in stopping the technology being used by bad actors. In 2023, the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project reported that the Telstra-owned mobile phone Digicel Pacific appeared to have been exploited to target unsuspecting mobile phone users in Africa in a type of attack that has been used in the past by spy-for-hire operations and state actors (Belford & Dziedzic, 2023). The Solomon Islands government was not involved in that deal as it had secured an $AUD96m loan from China to build 161 mobile communication towers, to be built and supplied by Huawei. A Solomon Islands government press release on the build was reported word for word on the website for the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (GCU Press, 2022; Kusu, 2022). Meanwhile, the Chinese telco Huawei has become a global pariah in many countries, including Australia, because of security concerns over its links to the ruling Chinese communist government. The United States issued a ban on sharing technology with Huawei in 2019 and the British

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

41

government issued an order that telecoms providers would have to stop installing Huawei equipment in the country’s 5G network in 2020 (Kekea, 2022). One way around Internet cables and mobile connections are Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites which are expected to upend the world’s reliance on undersea cables by beaming blanket Internet access to the planet. The flamboyant entrepreneur Elon Musk is behind the Starlink space satellite Internet system, which is possibly the most talked-about LEO company, although there are others including Inmarsat, OneWeb, China’s GalaxySpace, and Iridium. Starlink has a stated aim of delivering high-­ speed internet across the globe and says it will deliver broadband Internet capable of supporting streaming, online gaming and video calls (world’s most advanced broadband satellite Internet). The major difference between Starlink satellites and traditional satellites is that they are 60 times closer to Earth. This means they can deliver faster, more responsive connectivity than normally expected from a satellite Internet service. The technology has particular usefulness for remote places, with Musk warning his Starlink Internet services work best for low population density situations. SpaceX already has more than 3,500 satellites for Starlink, its Internet mega constellation, which already provides service to customers around the world. So fast is the spread of low-earth satellite technology that it is not even mentioned in a 2019 Center for Naval Analysis on the information needs of the Pacific (Dickey et al. 2019). In April 2023, Starlink, the satellite network developed by the private spaceflight company SpaceX to provide low-cost Internet to remote locations was already available in Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Philippines, and across some of the Pacific Islands. It has Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Cambodia, India, and Laos on a waitlist. One considerable concern about the use of privately owned satellites is that the users will find themselves at the mercy of the private owner of the technology. As Australia experienced in 2021 when Facebook stopped its 13 million Australian users from viewing and sharing news, stripping the pages of domestic and foreign news outlets (“Australia to push ahead with news law amid Facebook blackout fury”, 2021), it is now easy to imagine how a private individual working outside any kind of regulatory environment might also make a decision to turn his satellites on parts of the world, which could have catastrophic consequences for the provision of independent news and current affairs

42 

A. WAKE

Shortwave Radio This book was originally prompted by the ABC’s decision to kill off its shortwave radio transmissions which had been seen as a lifeline to large parts of the remotest parts of the Pacific, particularly the Melanesian islands. Shortwave had been employed from the 1930s by governments which wished to directly influence populations during periods of war and conflict. For a long time shortwave had been seen as a foolproof way of broadcasting content into countries which were either very remote, or did not welcome broadcasters from another country. PNG, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu were until recent times among the most frequent users of shortwave for domestic broadcasting across hundreds of kilometres of islands. Shortwave services were seen as vital for remote communities in the Pacific, particularly, but not only, in times of natural disasters like cyclones and floods. In explaining the move away from shortwave, the ABC’s then digital strategy expert explained that people had moved on with their technology: There was a time where Radio Australia presenters would go to Indonesia and be swamped by fans because they were just so well known. Radio Australia played such an important role during the Suharto regime, in terms of providing local audiences there with media which they just weren’t getting domestically. Those days as we see it, are gone. (Hua, 2018)

Broadcasters and governments tend to know shortwave as a historic technology with no modern application. In 2017, the ABC stopped its shortwave broadcasts to save money in the face of ongoing government funding shortfalls. The move met with condemnation from governments, organisations, and ordinary citizens in the Pacific region. In a submission to the Senate Inquiry into the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Amendment (Restoring Shortwave Radio) Bill 2017, the Pacific Freedom Forum argued that: ABC shortwave is a life-saving and cost-effective service which benefits Australia’s relations with the region as much as it benefits its tens of thousands of listeners in the Pacific Islands who depend on it for news and emergency warnings. (Miller et al., 2017)

No one will suggest in 2023 that shortwave is the first choice of audiences for the receipt of news and information, yet the technology remains

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

43

valuable for citizens who are isolated geographically or isolated, due to state control. It also remains valuable for emergency broadcasts because of its ability to reach long distances. Shortwave can be transmitted across thousands of kilometres, but the receiving end can sometimes be quite difficult to hear: If you have anything else you aren’t going to listen. But (people) are going to find technology that you can use—some kind of frequency that can get into—what is available to people. (Lavery, 2018)

However, when other ways of transmission are cut, shortwave remains the only way to reach audiences. Shortwave can get past censors and authoritarian governments. Radio Free Asia is among those who continue to value shortwave for broadcasting into countries such as China (broadcasting in Mandarin, Tibetan, Cantonese, and Uyghur), Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Other nations continue to see the value in the use of shortwave transmitters. When ABC Radio Australia cut its shortwave transmissions, others boosted their efforts. Radio New Zealand International continues to broadcast to the Pacific via shortwave. The BBC boosted its international radio service to the Asia-Pacific (with a focus on Asia) and undertook a £20 million refurbishment to the key HF broadcast site on Ascension Island. Deutsche Welle, NHK (Japan), and the Voice of America continue to broadcast in shortwave (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2017). In Myanmar, locals were turning back to the old technology to access information. An Australian journalist working with Myanmar locals based in Thailand said: “Shortwave is definitely something that people are turning back to …. some of that old technology is a really good, reliable backup option” (Martin, 2021). Although ABC International rejected the claim, China Radio International was reported to have taken over many of the shortwave frequencies once used by the ABC Radio Australia in the Pacific region, including those that reach Vanuatu, Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and New Caledonia (Bainbridge et  al., 2018; Chan, 2018). Radio New Zealand Pacific Technical Manager, Adrian Sainsbury believed the takeover was a deliberate strategy: By starting to use RA’s frequencies, they inherit an audience in the sense that people over time have got used to RA being on those frequencies and

44 

A. WAKE

if suddenly another English language station starts up on it, they’ll listen, say they could be RA. It’s only after listening for a while you realise, hello, this is not Radio Australia, this is a station that’s talking about China quite a bit, and that’s what’s happening. (Sainsbury, 2018)

Former ABC Radio Australia transmission manager Nigel Holmes noted that FM transmitters scattered across the Pacific were mostly out of action due to lack of maintenance. He also summed up the power and importance of HF (shortwave) radio: Across the Pacific cyclones routinely bowl satellite dishes into the ocean, drop local broadcast towers and devastate communities. Political upheavals leave local media under real threat. Local infrastructure such as an electricity plant is often out of action for hours or days for lack of maintenance or funds. In these situations, battery-powered HF receivers are lifesavers. (Holmes, 2017)

Journalism fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Graeme Dobell, also condemned the decision to shut off the shortwave services, noting that while Australia wanted a leadership role in the Pacific, the continued cuts to ABC Radio Australia and the closure of services would harm Australian interests: An independent media is an essential element in Australia’s overarching interest in South Pacific states that are free, democratic and growing. Yet, to save $2–3 million, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in January closed down shortwave broadcasts to the South Pacific, killing off a service with a 75-year history of impartial reporting on the region. (Dobell, 2017)

The Australian government did say in 2022 that it would review the merits of restoring shortwave radio and part of that review would include understanding how many people still have access to shortwave radios and the interest or need to use them as an information source (Gorman, 2022). Nonetheless, there has so far been no suggestion of any resumption of services as at April 2023.

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

45

AM and FM Radio Although increasingly out of favour with Western broadcasters which see greater value in digital rather than traditional media, AM and FM radio stations have been the staple of transnational broadcasters. Radio still plays a significant role in reaching populations in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in countries without strong and cheap Internet connections. Although radio transmitters need to be maintained, radio is relatively cheap for both public broadcaster, commercial operators and even community groups to produce. Radio also does not need people to read, just to listen. AM/FM radio has long been considered the most effective way today to engage audiences in developing countries, particularly in urban and peri-urban regions through FM radio transmission. ABC Radio Australia has transmitters across the Pacific. ABC Australia (TV) broadcasts to 16 Pacific island nations and territories under more than 25 distribution deals (Gorman, 2022). ABC Radio Australia is focused on the Pacific Islands and Timor-Leste, with FM transmitters located in seven countries, and a broad array of digital and social products. ABC Radio Australia also shares a lot of content via partner broadcasters across the region. Much of the content on Papua New Guinea’s broadcaster NBC and provincial stations is created by the ABC, specifically for the Pacific. ABC Radio Australia has one-to-one partner relationships where content is shared for broadcast. Acquiring listener numbers for transnational broadcast stations can be very difficult, and if they are successful in winning audiences, they can harm the local broadcasters who are reliant on commercial funding. Thus, the role of AM and FM radio in many Indo-Pacific countries was very different to transnational broadcasting. As one broadcast executive noted: What people are looking for with radio is that relationship with the presenter and localism. That’s what radio offers. And that’s very hard to provide as an international radio service, unless you’re providing something unique in terms of perhaps incisive news and current affairs. (Broadcast Expert 3, 2023)

Transnational broadcasters are wary of promoting their work in markets where they could potentially damage local news businesses. For many parts of the Pacific, for example, it was more important to consider broadcasting as part of international development:

46 

A. WAKE

Having partnerships and providing windows or content is obviously of far more benefit in developing a local media industry, otherwise, you are just depriving them of revenue. In the Pacific context, most of the government broadcasters do rely on advertising to some extent and that is based on audience numbers. So, you want to support them to be viable. (Broadcast Expert 3, 2023)

Cable and Satellite Television Broadcast television remains a significant distributor of news in many countries across the Indo-Pacific with almost every country, including the poorest, now operating their own TV/video news channel. It is impossible to get accurate data on broadcast audience numbers. The ABC has in the past relied on commercial market researchers to get viewer and listener figures: Data integrity is a real worry. We do get some reports of audience numbers from our overseas partners but it’s fair to say I don’t trust a lot of the figures. Some are commercial rebroadcasters who say they have 85% of the market, but my instincts say don’t trust that. It’s probably better to say we don’t know rather than report back on some of that. (Hua, 2018)

There has nonetheless been a significant change to last century when the transnational broadcasters like the BBC and CNN had massive audiences across Asia, because there were no alternatives. Today, there are multiple television choices, and audiences for English-language transnational news broadcasters are believed to have shrunk. To increase audiences, broadcasters have made partnerships agreements with local stations to rebroadcast content. Content is sent encrypted via a satellite to those stations, and then downloaded for rebroadcast. These syndicated arrangements include content from Australia, and China. In 2015, the ABC had rebroadcasters in 40 different countries and at that time claimed 140 million viewers with potential access to that content although the reality is likely to be far smaller. For example, in a market like India, where there are 800 TV channels, the likelihood of someone having a subscription to a channel that takes ABC content, and then watching something from Australia was very unlikely. Most of the Australian content was accessed by Australians living abroad who already knew of the channel. That in itself is of value: The ABC is

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

47

a­ bsolutely doing its job, because we’re chartered to connect with Australians living abroad. (Hua, 2018)

However, Australia’s international ABC networks gave up a significant voice, and its brand, in the Asian broadcast market as a result of government funding cuts in 2014. Former international TV executive Bruce Dover told a conference of broadcast advocates in Sydney in 2019 that: The ABC Australia Network in the early 2000s, mid-2000s, had broadcast re- distribution partnerships in 30 countries across Asia. It wasn’t only transmitting, it was being retransmitted by, you know, strong, important, well run, cable broadcasters. (Dover, 2019)

Meanwhile, the Asian news market has also changed, rapidly, and many of the new local news networks were very good, and could draw on excellent content from the major news channels like Reuters, BBC and CCTV: The production values of CCTV are excellent. They produce good quality content. They tell good stories. Some of them might be probably China or have a Chinese angle, but generally, it’s good content. So, let’s not pretend that they’re not producing quality and that we can somehow walk in and say our stuff is so good that you’re going to pick it up. It’s not true. There are broadcasters there who are producing good content. (Dover, 2019 )

Regardless of what some people might think about the importance of Australia in the Indo-Pacific, Dover said there simply were not millions of people in Asia waiting for the reappearance of Australian broadcasts on their television sets, or through shortwave radio broadcasts: There’s increasingly little interest in Australia. People in Asia don’t wake up in the morning looking south. They now have access to such an array of relevant local content, and international content that’s being localised, whether it’s through subtitles or dubbed, there is such a big market now to even get a presence that they’re in a region is going to be a challenge. It’s not just about money. (Dover, 2019)

The big transnational news broadcasters were acknowledged that they were generally better placed to work as partners with local channels or as dedicated cable television channels.

48 

A. WAKE

Challenges and Joys of Syndicated Content Syndicated content and rebroadcast deals are seen as the future for transnational and domestic broadcasts, but there is great variation in the level of digital uptake across the region and great variation in the ability of audiences to afford such receiving technology. Some broadcasters offer up their own content for syndication, for free, to many countries. The ABC for example was happy to share its radio work with Pacific stations, in particular: They can choose from those stories, and rebroadcast that content without editing the stories for their audiences. The strategy is that local people are more likely to engage with their local channels and their local services, rather than an international service coming from Australia. It’s incumbent on the ABC to share the Australian voice and to place our content where the audiences are actually going to be listening. (Hua, 2018)

That remained true in 2022 when ABC Asia Pacific editor Matt O’Sullivan noted that the Chinese news agency Xinhua was providing its material for Pacific news outlets: Our role is to do fearless independent journalism and people don’t like that, as we’ve seen in the Solomon Islands recently. People don’t like us being able to tell the full story. I do think there’s a role for the ABC to play in offering our content to other players in the region and to say, you can trust the ABC brand. Because we are seeing, you know, competitors doing that, and we’re often told by Pacific media outlets they would prefer our content, because it’s more relatable to their audiences. (O’Sullivan, 2022)

When China has offered to share news and broadcast services, critics have raised concerns about the independence and validity of the work. After all, China now operates the largest newsroom in the world, which means it often has access from countries and events where others do not. For this reason, the footage provided can be welcomed for rebroadcast in domestic markets. Lidberg et al. (2023) have labelled the syndicated stories from Chinese broadcasters as part of a new sophisticated way of influencing foreign media. One Australian broadcast manager noted there was for a brief time a significant change in China’s attitude to the provision of negative domestic news footage in 2008 with the Sichuan earthquake in which more than

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

49

300,000 people were hurt and between 5 and 11 million made homeless. The footage from China was of the highest quality. It was the first time that the country had provided their own audiences, and others, with footage of such a negative event: That was a big turning point in how CCTV responded to an event. And also, their coverage of issues like SARS. They recognised that the best thing for the country was to get the message out. And that included admitting that they had a problem. (Steele, 2018)

Since then, the approach has changed again to tighten control of how news in China is viewed by the rest of the world. China also has expelled most of its foreign journalists and therefore broadcast footage within the country, particularly during COVID, has been very difficult to obtain (“Factbox: Foreign journalists forced to leave China as diplomatic tensions worsen”, 2020). Since the Sichuan earthquake, there have been numerous other examples of potentially negative stories about China being broadcast, for example, SARs, overworked factory employees, and multiple examples of more political stories that have not had the coverage (the Uyghurs camps). But there have also been many stories of modern China, moving perceptions of the country as being about smokestacks and pollution to luxury cars, ski fields, and high fashion. Most Australians are alarmingly ignorant of the socio-economic development taking place in Asia and the way countries in Asia see themselves and their place in the world. There are very few media organisations with the time and resources to cover all the countries in Asia effectively—beyond headline stories. We have to broaden our perspective and develop a more sophisticated understanding. (Steele, 2018)

Syndicated footage from China’s broadcasters can also have a chilling impact on diaspora in other places. Photographs tweeted by Chinese state media showing hooded Chinese women being deported from Fiji by Chinese authorities provided a strong warning that the country could reach fairly easily into other sovereign nations. It was a very clear message to Chinese expats everywhere: if you mess up, we’ll come and get you. Chinese broadcasters provide a different kind of news to that of the ABC, BBC, etc. The journalists in China, and also in other parts of the

50 

A. WAKE

world such as Singapore, Malaysia, and India, are more likely to provide reports that they describe as ‘responsible’. Responsibility’ is often used as the rationale for controlling reporting, to avoid civil unrest. There are many people, including young journalists who have travelled the world and worked overseas, who still support measures that safeguard stability and prosperity. (Steele, 2018)

Broadcasters now believe that to grow their own audiences they need to provide bespoke content that’s relevant to specific audiences rather than more general content, rather than content that could be seen to be colonial masters speaking to the empire. This is a big part of the push to train local journalists; partnering with local stations and local languages can be a vital part of that strategy in some markets. If you look at the audience for Australia at the moment in nearly every market we don’t even register. There is no measurable audience. So, you know, we’re starting from a low base, but we’re going to rebuild it when we need to talk about language and bespoke content. (Dover, 2019)

This section has argued that syndicated content from broadcasters is welcomed in other countries, particularly when it is work that cannot be provided by anyone else. However, there are concerns that broadcast material, particularly from China, is produced with a differential ideological purpose, and when used in another country can have a chilling effect particularly on the diaspora.

Technology Blockers Dispatching quality independent news and current affairs to transnational audiences can be technically difficult. In China, which boasts a Great Firewall blocking the Internet, access can be turned off, slowed down, and particular sites and apps blocked. In Myanmar the junta also turned off the Internet 21 times in 2021 to stop citizens accessing news services, and India has shut down the Internet to quell dissent in Jammu and Kashmir. Despite being the world’s largest democracy, India shut off the Internet 106 times in 2021, more than the rest of the world combined. The United Nations declared that Internet access was a human right in a non-binding vote in 2016, but that means little when it’s not policed

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

51

internationally. Access Now, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that tracks connectivity around the world, reported that there were 182 shutdowns in 34 countries in 2021. This compared to 159 shutdowns recorded in 29 countries in 2020 (Hernandez et al., 2022). Access Now also noted that there were specific communications platforms blocked in some countries such as, in Pakistan, where authorities cut access to Facebook (now Meta), Twitter (now X), and TikTok, ahead of planned anti-government protests. There have also been many accounts where a government Internet shutdown in one country impacts on citizens in another, and even issues where Internet servers based in China have resulted in people in entirely different countries suddenly being censored of content deemed sensitive by China’s Communist Party. There are often ways for tech savvy citizens to avoid digital firewalls such as using VPN (Virtual Private Networks) even in countries where use of VPNs has been criminalised. When Twitter (now X) was shut down in Myanmar in 2021, Indian citizens who were also cut off reportedly turned to the encrypted messaging system Signal to talk to friends (Bergin & Lim, 2022). Foreign satellite television channels are often given approval in Indo-­ Pacific countries to broadcast to hotels and guesthouses catering for foreign guests and buildings exclusively for use by expatriates. However, these kinds of services are rarely available to ordinary citizens. Some countries including China generally do not give foreign stations landing rights (Ellis, 2002) and/or their broadcasts are often blocked. Radio networks can be more difficult to block but even the Fijian military leader Frank Bainimarama shut down the FM transmitters when he did not like the ABC Radio Australia content being heard in Fiji. Shortwave remains relatively impossible to thwart but requires listeners to be able to have the technology to tune into the service, and the language skills to understand it. There is also hope that satellite technology will be effective in stopping Internet shutdowns in the future. Satellite kits are being used in Ukraine allowing President Vlodymyr Zelensky to broadcast daily videos but it’s not yet available at scale, even for the full population of Ukraine. Elon Musk oferred internet access via his SpaceX Starlink satellites to Gaza aid groups in late 2023, angering Israel who said the internet would be used by terrorists. China is also said to be developing new anti-satellite technology (Bergin et al., 2022).

52 

A. WAKE

Digital Trends The way people access broadcast news and information has rapidly transformed as a result of digital access and smart phones. Many people now view digital social media platforms as the new town square, replacing traditional news sources such as radio and television broadcasts, and newspapers (Senate, 2023). However, these giant social media platforms are owned by private companies or foreign authoritarian states and as a result can use these platforms as a way of promoting their own interests, which may be contrary to the views of Australia and its allies. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence is making it much easier for bad actors to use digital technology to influence foreign communities. It’s easy for those sitting in the United States, the UK or Australia, to assume that use of media and media literacy is the same in other parts of the world. There are certainly some common trends, but in the Indo-­ Pacific there are some distinct differences. Parts of the Indo-Pacific lead the west in digital technologies, while others remain far behind. For example, in many parts of Asia, there was a heavy reliance on chat apps, the popularity of emojis and messaging app stickers long before they were taken up in the West. YouGov, a research data and analytics group, reported in its 2022 Media and Content White Paper that people in Asia, for example, are more likely to increase their use of social media in the next 12 months, compared to those in Europe. Young people in particular were driving this trend. Accessing accurate figures about who is listening, watching or experiencing digital news and current affairs services and social media in the Indo-Pacific remains difficult. The broadcasters often rely on commercial researchers to provide data. Some do not report or appear to use guestimates to report their numbers. Each broadcaster self-reports on their figures and everyone has their own methodology. In 2018 the then ABC digital strategy head, David Hua, said even finding comparable accurate numbers was simply impossible with no global standard and the methodology changing almost every year: One year you’re using a certain product like Google Analytics and the next you’re using web trends or hit wise… You can report on it but … they will say a post has had a reach of 40 million and you ask, is that reach based on a count of someone who’s actually read it in their feed for half an hour or someone who’s just flicked passed it. Sure, they’ve encountered it, so there’s some (minimal) sort of reach there. (Hua, 2018)

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

53

The best comparative data available is private research commissioned by the ABC in 2021 by Tebbutt international, which found that in the Pacific, people who had seen or heard news from China in the domestic media market in the past month were: Fiji 53%, PNG 70%, Samoa 84%, Solomon Islands 65%, Tonga 74%, and Vanuatu 58% (Gorman, 2021). But we do know that Indo-Pacific media consumption habits are changing, and changing quickly. Myanmar, for example, has had significant change since 2013 when prepublication censorship and the lack of independent media made access to reliable information difficult. Internet and mobile technologies were expensive with a SIM card costing up to $US300 and Myanmar had one of the world’s lowest mobile user penetration rates. By 2018 Myanmar’s media landscape was far more diverse, and the population has access to an ever-growing number of media on a variety of platforms. A study by the Danish NGO, International Media Support, found that Facebook was helping to fill information gaps around the country—especially in rural areas (Lehmann-Jacobsen & Htike, 2018). It provides news faster than any other media. At the time of the study, only 34% of the population had a Facebook profile, but the reach of the platform was considered far larger, with most people knowing what Facebook was. People were aware that they could not believe everything they read on Facebook, but with few options to fact-check information available to them, they have to manage with what was easily accessible. Relying on Facebook (Meta) as the sole platform for distributing news is fraught with dangers, not just because the founder could close down news sites at any time (as it did in Australia and Canada) but also because it has been awash with blatant propaganda. In 2023, Meta reported that it had had to close down more than 7000 fake accounts, almost 1000 pages and 15 groups publishing positive views of China (Hatmaker, 2023). Meta researchers found that each of these accounts typically posted positive views about China and criticisms of the United States, Western foreign policy, and were particularly critical of researchers and journalists who had been critical of China or China’s policies. What worked well for transnational broadcasters for many years is changing, and often changing rapidly, and technology improving. News content from broadcasters is now almost always available digitally through a website and or social media pages such as YouTube, Facebook (now Meta), Instagram, WeChat, WhatsApp, Twitter (now X), and digital distribution channels. The top Indo-Pacific stories of the day are often

54 

A. WAKE

republished social media as well as stories from specific focus content such as sports, music, women’s issues, etc. The ABC publishes not only in English but also in Chinese, Bahasa Indonesian, and in Tok Pisin. ABC Asia Pacific editor Matt O’Sullivan said the ABC Chinese YouTube channel had done particularly well for the corporation: We (ABC News) don’t use content on Weibo or WeChat because of problems with those platforms and censorship. We started a Chinese language YouTube channel last year, with an aim of enlisting 2000 subscribers, it’s just about to hit 30,000 subscribers. We’re boosting resources in that space, to be able to produce more video content, especially Indonesia. We look at Indonesia a bit differently, because it’s a smaller team, but they get about 30 million page views a year because their digital content is distributed in Indonesia via syndication partners. (O’Sullivan, 2022)

China broadcast media which once might have been easy to spot for its amateurism has employed excellent English-speaking staff for its sophisticated news networks, and is now considered first-rate by experienced industry professionals. China broadcasts on its own channels, across social and YouTube, and even conducts its own Fact Check operations, although these often seem pointed attacks on other broadcasters such as the BBC which have produced stories that do not fit with China’s projected image. In an off-the-record conversation, one European broadcast policy expert hailed China’s broadcast media advances saying that their work was extremely impressive: I’ve been extremely impressed by the technology and professionalism, it’s up to date, they do fact checking. The whole thing is quite extraordinary. The Shanghai Media Group is super impressive. For those who think the BBC is impressive, you go to Shanghai, it is extraordinary. (Broadcast Expert 1, 2018)

A senior executive with Radio Free Asia agreed that the Chinese media was sophisticated and did not present their work in a way that could be clearly be seen as propaganda: When we think of propaganda from the Cold War, and you laugh. Propaganda can be so much better than that. People, even reasonably educated people, cannot tell the difference. (Lavery, 2018)

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

55

Multi-channel approaches to broadcast distribution do seem to work to reach the largest possible number of people. The ABC is among the broadcasters to have adopted this strategy and reported that its content in the Pacific in 2022 was reportedly higher than usage and interactions with any other transnational provider, including the BBC, CNN, RNZ and CGTN (Gorman, 2022).

The Smart Phone From the highlands of Papua New Guinea to the busy streets of Hong Kong, everyone now carries a smart phone even if they may not yet readily have access to Internet services or even the media literacy skills to read or understand information provided on the phones. As a result, the prominent transnational networks such as the BBC World Service, NHK, France’s TV and radio broadcasters, and US public broadcasters, now target mobile phone users in the production of their work. No longer is news and current affairs simply broadcast on television or radio channels. All news and current affairs are repurposed, or made first, for digital websites, apps, and social media channels. The ABC, for example, allows a video on demand service which can be accessed from a non-Australian App Store. Other digital products, which have a high take-up by audiences outside of Australia, include the new service on abc.net.au and social channels including ABC Australia YouTube, ABC Strategy, Facebook (now Meta), Instagram, and Twitter (now X). Smart phone take-up has been extraordinarily quick in some countries in the Indo-Pacific. For example, in 2015 North Korea was one of the few countries in the world that had more smart phones than Myanmar. Smart phone penetration was about 0.3% and a SIM card cost $US2000. Just four years later, Myanmar had 90% penetration of the 4G network, and 85% of the country’s 50 million people had a smart phone. This also meant that 80% of people in Myanmar were then using the social media Facebook for their news and 65% of the people watched video on their on their smart phones. The smart phone has many advantages. It privileges the images over text, which means that audiences without the ability to read can see and hear stories for themselves. As media literate audiences in advanced democracies know, what is seen online is not always true. Broadcasts accessed on smart phones or other digital devices have created new

56 

A. WAKE

challenges of verification and have caused social unrest in many places across the Indo-Pacific. Anyone with a smart phone can now capture what is unfolding in front of them, and publish it within seconds, if not live. Smart phones also give people access to information from unreliable or unverified sources, which has resulted in increased exposure to incorrect or misleading information. While much information may be shared on social media apps and closed messaging systems with good intentions, increasingly information is deliberately posted to cause mischief and/or inflame relations. While smart phones offer more creative formats, which means that journalists can quickly edit independently verified reports for the news, it also means bad actors can also produce work that can mimic a news report. There’s also an issue with an overproduction of news-like content, much of it not very good. Many people, particularly during COVID, reported feeling overwhelmed by news, which meant they avoided it more. The smart phone has also become central to journalists for the way news is not only collected but also distributed. It is in that gathering and distribution that an issue of credibility and trust has arisen. Smart phone technology has also changed the way journalists work. It encourages journalists to favour the fast and often unreliable reporting instead of more reflective work which were seen as the first draft of history. This fast-paced work makes easy pickings for better resourced public relations professionals to provide their spin on stories. Another problem with the use of smart phones is being caused by artificial intelligence. There are now AI generative websites for video, images, text, research, design, presentations, audio, and productivity. Audiences now need to have high media literacy skills to be able to determine what real journalism is or even who is a real journalist. At the end of 2023, it had become quite easy to record oneself speaking in English and to have that re-voiced by AI into a range of different languages as diverse as Farsi and Mandarin, in a way that appears natural. The Chinese search engine company Sogou and news agency Xinhua have already unveiled an AI composite anchor that can stand and talk at the same time. By using the “Sogou Clone” technology as well as voice, lip movements, and expressions, the AI-synthesized anchor appears “intelligent and realistic” (Yungzhu, 2019). The standing news anchor was an advance upon a two sit-down AI television anchors released the year earlier. Based on two real people from state media channel China Central Television, they were advertised as the “world’s first” anchors with

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

57

synthesized voices and appearances. The AI anchors—one speaking Chinese and the other English—have reportedly hosted over 3,400 news reports, clocking in more than 10,000 minutes of screen time. Those two ‘anchors’ were only shown from the upper halves of their “bodies”, with the new stand-up anchor adding more body language for more natural expression including realistic facial expressions, lip movement, and speech synthesis. Interestingly, China was also leading the world in regulation of AI. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) announced in April that it would require a security review of generative AI services before they would be allowed to operate (Cyberspace Administration of China, 2023). The CAC’s draft guidelines, which were published for feedback, said that providers of services must ensure content was accurate and respected intellectual property, and neither discriminates nor endangers security. Significantly for journalists, AI operators must also clearly label AI-generated content. That regulation is more than what is currently required for Australian broadcasters.

Conclusion This chapter has mapped the strengths and weakness of the various technologies available to broadcasters seeking to influence or service audiences in the Indo-Pacific. It draws on the expertise of news managers and journalists in the region to outline why transnational broadcasters increasingly seeking to partner with local broadcasters and to syndicate content. It discusses the reasons why shortwave radio was dropped by Australia from the suite of broadcast options available. Further, it raises concerns about the rapid update of smart phone technology across a region with a high level of illiteracy, and in particular raises issues with AI technology that is already being used for broadcasts from China. It pays particular attention to concerns about who owns the technology, particularly when that technology is in private hands or the control of other countries.

References Australia to Push Ahead with News Law Amid Facebook Blackout Fury. (2021, February 19). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/19/ australia-­to-­push-­ahead-­with-­media-­law-­despite-­facebook-­blackout Australian Broadcasting Corporation. (2017). Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Environment and Communications. Australian Broadcasting Corporation Amendment (Restoring Shortwave Radio) Bill 2017.

58 

A. WAKE

Bainbridge, B., Graue, C., & Zhou, C. (2018, June 22). China Takes Over Radio Australia Frequencies After ABC Drops Shortwave. Pacific Beat. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-­0 6-­2 2/china-­t akes-­o ver-­r adio-­ australias-­old-­shortwave-­frequencies/9898754 Belford, A., & Dziedzic, S. (2023, September 1). Telstra-Owned Pacific Mobile Network Likely Exploited by Spies for Hire. ABC News (abc.net. au). https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-­09-­01/australia-­owned-­pacific-­ mobile-­network-­likely-­exploited-­by-­spies/102784160. Bergin, J., & Lim, L. (2022, August 29). When Internet Shutdowns Spill Over Borders. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/ aug/29/when-­internet-­shutdowns-­spill-­over-­borders Bergin, J., Lim, L., Nyein, N., & Nachemson, A. (2022, August 29). How to Shut Down the Internet—and How to Fight Back. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/aug/29/how-­t o-­ shut-­down-­the-­internet-­and-­how-­to-­fight-­back Broadcast Expert 1. (2018, July 25). Research Interview (International Broadcast Policy Expert) [Interview]. Broadcast Expert 2. (2022, June 9). Research Interview (Australian International Broadcast Expert) [Interview]. Broadcast Expert 3. (2023, April 14). Research Interview (Asia Pacific Broadcast Executive) [Interview]. Chan, T.  F. (2018, June 28). China Just Took Over Radio Frequencies Left Behind by Australia—and It Shows Beijing is Winning Over the Pacific. Business Insider Australia. https://www.businessinsider.com.au/china-­took-­ over-­abc-­australia-­radio-­presence-­in-­the-­pacific-­2018-­6?r=UK&IR=T Cyberspace Administration of China. (2023, April 11). Public Comments on the Administrative Measures for Generative Artificial Intelligence Services. http:// www.cac.gov.cn/2023-­04/11/c_1682854275475410.htm Dickey, L., et al. (2019, October 12). Mapping the Information Environment in the Pacific Island Countries: Disruptors, Deficits, and Decisions. Center for Naval Analysis (cna.org). https://www.cna.org/reports/2019/12/ mapping-­information-­environment-­in-­pacific Dobell, G. (2017). ABC Shortwave in the South Pacific: From Exit to Engagement, from Retreat to Renewal (Submission to the Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee, Issue). https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/ Environment_and_Communications/Shortwaveradio/Submissions Dover, B. (2019, February 8). Lessons from Asia and Elsewhere. The Future of Australian Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific, UTS. Ellis, D. (2002). Hong Kong: New Measures for Landing Rights of Foreign Satellite Television. Retrieved September 5, 2022 from

3  DISTRIBUTION VIA SHORTWAVE, SATELLITES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 

59

h t t p s : / / w w w. m o n d a q . c o m / h o n g k o n g / t e c h n o l o g y / 1 7 3 4 3 / new-­measures-­for-­landing-­rights-­of-­foreign-­satellite-­television Factbox: Foreign Journalists Forced to Leave China as Diplomatic Tensions Worsen. (2020, September 8). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-­china-­journalists-­factbox-­idUSKBN25Z0QL GCU Press. (2022, April 18). Proposed 161 Towers Project Progressed. https:// solomons.gov.sb/proposed-­161-­towers-­project-­progressed/ Gorman, C. M. (2021). Media Usage in the Pacific. ABC International. Gorman, C.  M. (2022, August 23). The ABC’s Role in Australia’s Pacific Reset. The Strategist. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-­abcs-­role-­in-­ australias-­pacific-­reset/ Hatmaker, T. (2023, August 30). Meta Shut Down a Disinformation Campaign Tied to Chinese Law Enforcement. Tech Crunch (techcrunch.com). https:// techcrunch.com/2023/08/29/meta-­shut-­down-­a-­disinformation-­campaign-­ tied-­to-­chinese-­law-­enforcement/ Hernandez, M.  D., Anthonio, F., Cheng, S., & Skok, A. (2022, April 28). Internet Shutdowns in 2021: The Return of Digital Authoritarianism. Access Now. Retrieved August 30, from https://www.accessnow.org/internet-­ shutdowns-­2021/ Hogeveen, B. (2022, February 16). What the Tonga Disaster Tells Us About the South Pacific’s Cyber Resilience. The Strategist. https://www.aspistrategist.org. au/what-­the-­tonga-­disaster-­tells-­us-­about-­the-­south-­pacifics-­cyber-­resilience/ Holmes, N. (2017). Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Environment and Communications. Australian Broadcasting Corporation Amendment (Restoring Shortwave Radio) Bill 2017. Hua, D. (2018, June 20). Research Interview ABC Digitial Strategy [Interview]. Kekea, G. (2022, August 19). Solomon Islands Secures $100m China Loan to Build Huawei Mobile Towers in Historic Step. The Guardian. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/19/solomon-­i slands-­s ecures-­1 00m-­ china-­loan-­to-­build-­huawei-­mobile-­towers-­in-­historic-­step Kusu, F. (2022, August 17). Proposed 161 Towers Project Progresses. SIBC. https://www.sibconline.com.sb/proposed-­161-­towers-­project-­progresses/ Lavery, S. (2018, July 18). Research Interview Radio Free Asia [Interview]. Lidberg, J., et al. (2023). The world according to China: Capturing and analysing the global media influence strategies of a superpower. Pacific Journalism Review : Te Koakoa, 29(1 & 2): 182–204. Lehmann-Jacobsen, E., & Htike, M.  M. (2018). New Study Sheds Light on Media Habits in Myanmar. International Media Support. Retrieved August 30, 2022 from https://www.mediasupport.org/new-­study-­sheds-­ light-­on-­media-­habits-­in-­myanmar/ Martin, L. (2021, May 21). Research Interview Australian International Wire Journalist [Interview].

60 

A. WAKE

Miller, M., Rheeney, A., Carreon, B., & Rika, N. (2017). Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Environment and Communications. Australian Broadcasting Corporation Amendment (Restoring Shortwave Radio) Bill 2017. aph.gov.au. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/ Senate/Environment_and_Communications/Shortwaveradio/Submissions O’Sullivan, M. (2022, September 6). Research Interview (ABC Radio Australia’s Asia Pacific Editor) [Interview]. Ogden, M.  R., & Hailey, J.  M. (1988). International Broadcasting Services to Isolated Audiences: The Role of Radio Australia During the Fiji Crisis. Media Asia, 15(1), 22–25. Sainsbury, A. (2018, June 25). China Shortwave Foray into Pacific Helped by Aus Withdrawal [Interview]. Radio New Zealand International. https:// www.radionz.co.nz/international/programmes/datelinepacific/audio/ 2018650615/china-­shortwave-­foray-­into-­pacific-helped-­by-­aus-­withdrawal Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference Through Social Media. (2023). Canberra: Australian Government. Steele, D. (2018). Research Interview (Australia Network Broadcast Expert) [Interview]. Telstra Finalises Acquisition of Digicel Pacific. (2022, July 14). https:// www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-­w ong/media-­r elease/ telstra-­finalises-­acquisition-­digicel-­pacific Tonga’s Internet Connection is Restored More Than Five Weeks After Volcanic Eruption and Tsunami. (2022, February 23). news.sky.com. https://news.sky. com/story/tongas-­internet-­connection-­is-­r estored-­more-­than-­five-­weeks-­ after-­volcanic-­eruption-­and-­tsunami-­12549246 Wake, A. (2016, December 9). Pacific Nations Lose Shortwave Radio Services That Evade Dictators and Warn of Natural Disasters. https://theconversation. com/pacific-­nations-­lose-­shortwave-­radio-­services-­that-­evade-­dictators-­and-­ warn-­of-­natural-­disasters-­70058 World’s Most Advanced Broadband Satellite Internet. Starlink. Retrieved April 11, from https://www.starlink.com/technology?referral=RC-­1225-­ 40779-­8&utm_source=AusMetaKVL2Mo YouGov. (2022). Media and Content White Paper. YouGov. Yungzhu. (2019, February 19). Sogou and Xinhua News Agency Jointly Launched the World’s First Stand-up AI Composite Anchor. Tencent.

CHAPTER 4

Transnational Voices in the Indo-Pacific Alexandra Wake

Introduction It takes a certain degree of education and high-level critical thinking skills by audiences to determine if a transnational broadcaster is a trusted provider of independent news, if it is relaying government sponsored propaganda, or whether it is a tool of public diplomacy. Transnational public broadcasters from likeminded democracies such as Germany, France, UK, Japan, and the United States all provide hundreds of millions of dollars a year to their international media and broadcasting activities. China spends billions of dollars a year on its international media efforts. Such huge investments in high-quality news products can make it difficult for audiences to determine if the information they are receiving is coming from a trusted news organisation. This difficulty of trust in brands increases exponentially when the broadcasters’ content is syndicated on domestic news services or picked up and repurposed on social media. Even the social media platform Twitter (now X) struggled in early 2023 when it decided it would put labels on what it called government accounts to provide additional context for those heavily engaged in geopolitics and

A. Wake (*) RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9_4

61

62 

A. WAKE

diplomacy. Its owner Elon Musk said he wanted to provide labels that contained information about the country the account was affiliated with and whether it was operated by a government representative or state-­ affiliated media entity: Our focus is on senior officials and entities that are the official voice of the nation state abroad, specifically accounts of key government officials, including foreign ministers, institutional entities, official spokespeople, and key diplomatic leaders. Where accounts do not play a role as a geopolitical or official Government communication channel, we will not label the account. (About government and state-affiliated media account labels on Twitter, 2023)

But the company immediately came under fire by mislabelling the respected US broadcaster NPR firstly calling it state affiliated and then government-funded. Although NPR gets less than 1 per cent of its funding from the US government, it wouldn’t be considered a government broadcaster and certainly isn’t a state broadcaster like Russia Today or Xinhau. Similarly, the BBC complained about being labelled government-­ funded, reporting that: “The BBC is, and always has been, independent. We are funded by the British public through the licence fee” (Clayton & Durbin, 2023). Musk responded by saying he was trying to provide transparency for platform users but also said he followed BBC News on Twitter (now X), because “it is among the least biased” (Clayton & Durbin, 2023). NPR, which had 8.8 million followers, decided to close its Twitter (now X) account after the labelling debacle. Other news organisations including the ABC had also closed most of their accounts by the middle of 2023. It should be noted, once Twitter’s senior staff had been retrenched, there were few left inside the organisation, and certainly not Musk himself, who understand the difference. While scholars of broadcasting may understand the chasm between independent and government-funded, the narrative is messy. The ABC, like the BBC, does attract some distinct government funding for international services but has enshrined independence from the government of the day. The BBC gets more than £90m per year from the government to support the BBC World Service, which predominantly serves non-UK audiences including those in the Indo-­ Pacific (Clayton & Durbin, 2023). That funding does not change the requirements of the ABC or BBC Charters which state that both broadcasters must be editorially independent.

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

63

The lack of understanding by Twitter about the different kinds of broadcasters may also be the reason the company is failing in its steps to limit the reach of Chinese and Russian state-controlled media outlets. In 2022, Twitter said it flags tweets linked to government-controlled sites such as RT.com or the Global Times and alerts users that Russia or China had editorial control over the outlet’s coverage (Benson, 2022). But Voice of America reporter Wenhao Ma found the platform had begun recommending Chinese government-backed publications to users through its For You page, which was controlled by an algorithm (Ma, 2023).

Types of Transnational Broadcasters There are three main types of transnational broadcasters: public service broadcasters (PSB) which are independent of the government that funds them. These are broadcasters like the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation which receive funds from the public but maintain editorial independence. Then there are state-­ funded media that are beholden to the state that finances them, such as China TV and Russia TV. State-affiliated media can also be controlled by direct or indirect political pressures, and/or control over production and distribution. Additionally, there are government-funded broadcasters that operate as agents of public diplomacy, such as the Voice of America. Al Jazeera English is interesting because it was actually partly inspired by broadcasters such as the BBC. But it is based in and funded by the State of Qatar, which is a monarchy. Al Jazeera is happy to criticise other autocratic, Middle Eastern regimes, but they are suspiciously quiet when it comes to internal Qatar affairs. So, while Al Jazeera English, its audio visual and written forms of journalism are similar to Western anglosphere, the content of its news stories makes it stand apart. Interestingly, this broadcaster announced plans in April 2023 to close its centre in London and move programming to Qatar. There is no universal definition of a public service broadcaster as they all differ slightly but generally they include a variation of the following characteristics: universality of availability; provision for minorities, (especially those disadvantaged by physical or social circumstances); a commitment to the education of the public; distance from all vested interests; not so structured as to encourage competition in good programming rather than competition for numbers; rules of broadcasting which liberate rather than restrict the program maker; and service to the public sphere. This

64 

A. WAKE

includes editorial freedom: the work of public broadcasters should be protected from arbitrary interference and safe-guarded by the norms of media professionalism. It is this last point, editorial freedom, which is crucial for transnational broadcasters if they wish to have the trust of the audience. The link between the desired characteristics of a PSB is directly related to the social responsibility theory and its inherent tenet that the media is obligated to society. Media ownership is a public trust and a socially responsible news media is one that is truthful, accurate, fair, objective and relevant. McQuail (2005) argued PSBs should provide a forum for ideas and should be free, though self-regulated. Media should also follow agreed codes of ethics and professional standards although under some circumstances, society may need to intervene in the public interest. News can either be part of a process of empowerment or dis-­ empowerment and is indispensable to informed decision-making. Those who have lived the transition from propaganda to public service broadcasters clearly understand the difference: A critical, independent and investigative press is the lifeblood of any democracy. It must be free from state interferences. It must have the economic strength to stand up to bullying from government officials. It must be protected so that it can protect our rights as citizens. (Mandela in Tyson, 1983, p. 410)

News, of course, can become a liability rather than an asset when it is produced in an unquestioned hegemonic atmosphere. This can happen when broadcasters give prominence to events of little importance; when partial truths or facts are presented as the whole; when the news contains implicit conclusions which pre-dispose audiences to certain interpretations or interests; when exaggerated fears are created in the hope to condition a particular view or response; when the news is silent on an event of significant public interest. When denied a free press, Indo-Pacific audiences do work hard to get access to alternatives news sources: People are smart these days, they have VPNs, and they have abilities to access things that they wouldn’t be able to otherwise. In Myanmar at the moment, like a lot of Burmese people are using Thai SIM cards to access the

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

65

internet and to find out what’s going on in their country. Despite internet shutdowns, and technology there … you can’t police the flow of information necessarily. (Martin, 2021)

Australia Australia developed a long and distinguished history of transnational broadcasting through radio, detailed in Errol Hodge’s seminal text Radio Australia (Hodge, 1995) and more recently the ABC-commissioned Australia Calling (Kafcaloudes, 2022). Radio Australia began as a service for the distribution of Australian focused propaganda in 1939, with a specific remit to counter propaganda by the so-called Axis powers of Germany, Italy and Japan and to directly influence neighbouring populations during the periods of war and conflict. ABC Radio Australia, which became part of the ABC in 1950, morphed from propagandist into a truly independent broadcaster albeit publicly funded, and dependent on domestic politics for funding security and at the mercy of competing geo-strategic priorities of the time (O’Keeffe & Greene, 2019). Television only became a charter obligation for the ABC in 1983 when the organisation was changed by the government from a commission to a corporation. The ABC ACT 1983 (Cwlth) Section 6 (1b) stated that functions of the Corporation included transmitting to: countries outside Australia broadcasting programs of news, current affairs, entertainment and cultural enrichment that will: (i) encourage awareness of Australia and an international understanding of Australian attitudes on world affairs; and (ii) enable Australian citizens living or travelling outside Australia to obtain information about Australian affairs and Australian attitudes on world affairs. (ABC, 2008, p. 33)

It was another 10 years after the Act changed for the Labor government of Paul Keating government to give $5.4 million to launch Australia Television International (ATI) in 1993. Yet, the government insisted that the service must include advertising, both for financial support and to showcase Australian enterprises in Asia (Grasswill, 2023). The on-going difference in funding between the advertising-supported transnational television service, and the domestic commercial-free arrangement made it difficult for the two to co-exist.

66 

A. WAKE

Today, ABC Australia is the name of the international television service, available via rebroadcasters throughout Asia and the Pacific, and direct via satellite (About us, 2022b) and subscription across the Asia-Pacific region. ABC Radio Australia remains the name of ABC’s international radio service, broadcasting across the Pacific region, Timor-Leste, and Australia (About us, 2022b). ABC Radio Australia is broadcast across the Pacific on 24-­hour FM stations or live satellite, via live stream, on-demand audio, podcast downloads, the ABC Listen App, and on social media through ABC Radio Australia Facebook and via ABC Radio Australia Twitter. It broadcasts in English and Tok Pisin (spoken in Melanesian countries). Despite recent funding boosts, detailed shortly, the ABC International services remain a shadow of their former versions such as ABC Radio Australia and the ABC’s Australian Network—a $250m television service that reached from the subcontinent, through Southeast and East Asia to the Pacific islands. Both services had been able to draw upon a wealth of Indo-Pacific news and current affairs experts in Melbourne and from staff around the country and within the region itself (“Jim Middleton, veteran ABC journalist, signs off for the last time”, 2014). Australia Network developed English language programming and related digital and mobile news stories specifically targeted for different audience communities throughout the Indo-Pacific. It broadcast in Chinese, Indonesian, Vietnamese, French, Cambodian, and Tok Pisin. One of Australia’s most respected scholars of the ABC, Prof Rodney Tiffen (2023), argues that Canberra’s efforts to pursue public diplomacy through the government-funded television services have largely been ineffectual, because the ABC has repeatedly found itself to be a pawn in other political conflicts and relationships. He specifically cites conflicts between opposing Labor and Liberal governments; internal politics between Labor leaders; and even a desire to keep Rupert Murdoch and News Corp ‘on side’. The Abbott Liberal Government’s 2014 axing of a ten-year contract with Australian Television slashed Australia’s transnational broadcasting capacity and domestic agendas have repeatedly trumped what should be a tool of international diplomacy. Long-time ABC executive Geoff Heriot (2023) also argues the Australian government’s cycle of investment and disinvestment in the ABC’s international services has occurred for three reasons: a lack of clarity about the purpose of media operating across territories; a tendency of the broadcaster to fail to acknowledge its political or ideological purpose; and the government treating the ABC as a controlled brand promotion.

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

67

Certainly, the role of the ABC’s radio and television services in the Indo-Pacific this century has been hurt by a combination of “government inconsistency and neglect, ideology-driven decisions, budget cuts and apparent ABC management indifference” (O’Keeffe & Greene, 2019, p.  4). While other countries were beefing up funding for their transnational broadcasting, the Australian government was withdrawing resources from its services, and internal ABC management decisions were making even more cuts (Murrell, 2013, 2016; Wake, 2010). As one news executive quipped: “There are no votes in international broadcasting” (Dover, 2019 ). Raising the awareness of Australian audiences about the value of international services in the Indo-Pacific remained a priority in 2023, with programmes designed for audiences in the Pacific being made available on domestic services: While we’re serving those international audiences, we’re also trying to ensure that we’re telling those (Indo-Pacific) stories for our domestic platforms, so that people understand, beyond the sensationalist headlines, the nuance and the context of the actual situation with China in the region, or with climate change, or any number of other pandemic recovery stories. (O’Sullivan, 2022)

At the end of the last decade, the ABC’s transnational broadcast activities were funded from within the ABC’s Government appropriation to the tune of about $11 million a year. This enabled the ABC to maintain its broadcast platforms of ABC Australia and ABC Radio Australia but the funding did not stretch to create more than a minimum of content for high-priority target audiences across the Indo-Pacific. From 2020, the ABC had some success gaining grant funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to create bespoke content in radio, television, and digital for target audiences across the region. Over 2020 and 2021, the ABC lobbied the then Government and Opposition to convince them of the value of further funding the ABC’s transnational broadcasting activities to expand and increase reach and to engage audiences across the Indo-Pacific. The Labor Party announced its Indo-Pacific Broadcasting Strategy a few weeks before the 2022 Federal election under which it promised to provide an additional $32 million over four years from FY2022. This funding was provided to the ABC in the October 2022 budget to: (1) expand its FM footprint in the Pacific

68 

A. WAKE

and to split the ABC Australia TV channel into two streams, one serving the Pacific and the other Asia and the subcontinent; (2) create more bespoke content for audiences across the Indo-Pacific region across digital, audio/radio and TV/Video; and (3) increase media capacity building and journalism training across the region. Back in 2009, the then ABC managing director Mark Scott had been the most forthright in his acknowledgement of the role of the ABC as a force for soft power diplomacy particularly in the Pacific, warning that Australia needed to take advantage of the opportunities in the Pacific, as other countries, such as China, were showing no such reluctance: As we focus on our broadcasting and project work in the region at the ABC, we never ceased to be amazed by the level of Chinese investment in all aspects of Pacific infrastructure, including communications. (Scott, 2009)

Scott’s concerns about China and other regimes were unheeded by successive Australian governments, culminating in the almost total obliteration of transnational broadcasting services in 2016 and a small continuation of media development support across the Pacific. For several years ‘ABC Australia’ (formerly Australia Plus Television) put out only limited rebroadcasts of domestic content created by a small number of staff, many of whom do not have the depth of knowledge of Asia or the Pacific. ABC video content was also sent out to the region “via partnerships and agreements with in-country television networks, websites, and mobile and social media services” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2017). The ABC put a special emphasis on sharing available content to transnational audiences by removing geo-blocking access to its streaming domestic news channel and via social media channels and YouTube, but developing targeted Pacific or Asian video content was no longer the corporation’s focus. In 2022, with the election of the new Labor government, along with increasing awareness of Chinese activity in the media in the Indo-Pacific, the fortunes of the ABC’s international section were revived. The newly elected Labor Government confirmed its $32 million dollars funding promise for the ABC under its Indo-Pacific Broadcasting Strategy. The question of restoring English language and targeted language broadcasting to the Indo-Pacific was now considered in the wider context of Australian aid and the ABC’s international developmental activities. Australian Government funding for such work is now motivated by an

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

69

interest in security and governance in the region and emergency responses to disasters. Australia’s support of journalism education, media assistance programmes and development programmes are additionally important. In its announcement, the government was clear that part of the funds were to be used not only for increased content for Indo-Pacific digital and linear audiences, but also for an expanded FM footprint for ABC Radio Australia and enhanced media and training activities across the Indo-Pacific. One of the first initiatives from the boosted funding given to ABC International is a new 30-minute pan-Pacific news programme broadcast to Pacific audiences every week on ABC Australia (ABC launches ground-­ breaking new show The Pacific, 2023). Unlike a decade ago, when such a programme would be made by fly-in/fly-out journalists based in Australia, the new Pacific programme has been designed and created specifically for Pacific audiences, and says it is dedicated to covering the stories that matter in the region. The new television programme came a few weeks after the announcement of a new Memorandum of Understanding between the ABC and the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC) in Honiara. The agreement between the two public broadcasters centred on content sharing and media development programmes. In the announcement, SIBC Chief Executive Officer Johnson Honimae said they were grateful for the MoU: We need the help of one of the longest broadcasters in the Pacific region. There is much to share including in the areas of capacity building, technology, and content especially as SIBC, after 70 years of broadcasting, is finally expanding into television. (Australia’s ABC and Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation sign historic new agreement., 2023)

The same announcement also acknowledged that the ABC was enhancing its coverage of Solomon Islands affairs on ABC Australia, ABC Radio Australia, ABC Pacific digital and on the ABC’s domestic services with the appointment of a Honiara-based local journalist. It further made clear that ABC news digital content is syndicated to the Solomon Times and Island Sun. The ABC’s flagship digital offering under the ABC Pacific brand includes the ABC Pacific Facebook page, which has strong engagement from Solomon Islands followers. How successful these projects will be may depend on how fiercely independent the journalists are, and how much they can withstand pressures

70 

A. WAKE

from officials and families. Self-censorship is an issue in some countries as a result of a cultural system in which allegiance is paid first to family and clan. Although Pacific journalists say they work around the system by giving stories to others in the newsroom, or not writing their byline on the story, covering corruption can be particularly difficult. At a workshop in Solomon Islands in August, Tonga’s Broadcom 89.5FM general manager, Katalina Tohi, talked about the possibility of people losing their jobs as a result of their work: Reporting on corruption is easy, but at the end of the day you have to feed your family … at the end of the day we end up reporting what can be reported but most corruptive stories are just left unreported and if you send news reporters (the young ones), they just come back with no stories. (“Pacific journalists discuss challenges in exposing corruption”, 2022)

There’s been no announcement about any increase or return of services to Asian countries, including close neighbours, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam, all of which previously had strong language services from the ABC. China and Indonesian radio services do remain.

Broadcasters of Influence There are hundreds of broadcasters operating in the Indo-Pacific in various languages, and all of these use social media to further spread their work but unless they are broadcasting in English, French or Chinese are unlikely to have much uptake beyond their own borders. Only the Australian and New Zealand broadcasters provide local news in the Pacific and in local languages other than English and French (Dickey et al., 2019). New Zealand Radio New Zealand’s RNZ Pacific service, previously known as RNZI (International) has long been considered one of the Pacific’s most trusted providers of independent public broadcasting (Dickey et al., 2019). This came under question in 2023 when an investigation found that a journalist had made pro-Russia and pro-Palestinian edits on some of its reports from wire services such as Reuters and the BBC (RNZ facing overhaul, 2023). While an audit of the work of one journalist found inadequate supervision and training in the “busy, poorly resourced” digital news team

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

71

was to blame, it shook the reputation of one of the smallest international broadcasters in the world, which had been notable for its stability (About RNZ Pacific (RNZI)). Its nightly Pacific Waves programme is popular around the region. It has focused primarily on the Pacific Island nations, including PNG, but in 2023 started an Asia unit to report on issues relevant to the country’s growing Asian communities. The 2018 NZ Census found that 15% of the country’s population came from India or China. In New Zealand, TVNZ is currently fully commercially funded although it still retains an ethos of a public service broadcaster that it was once. Some of its programming goes out in Fiji, the Cook Islands, and the Solomon Islands, but this is replayed via local channels. This is mostly organised through Pacific Cooperation Broadcasting Limited (PCBL), (PasifikaTV about us) which was set up by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to provide NZ-originated content to other Pacific broadcasters and supports their production of local content with field equipment and training. Its aim is to deepen relationships with Asia Pacific nations by supporting the media sector. Other independent programming comes from Pacific Media Network (PMN) news and Tagata Pasifika television. United Kingdom The BBC World Service (BBCWS) is considered the world’s leading international public broadcaster, claiming a global weekly audience of more than 492 million which is further broken down into a digital reach of 148 million, television reach of 130 million and radio reach of 159 million (Evennett, 2022). Repeated surveys have found the BBC is the world’s most trusted and best-known international news broadcaster and it aims to provide journalism that “contributes to accountability and good governance, to improve the welfare and economic development of citizens in developing countries” (Evennett, 2022). The BBC makes a strong case for the role of independent public broadcasters in soft diplomacy, stressing the difference between state-sponsored broadcasters and the value to democracy and liberty of the BBC’s global reach’ (BBC, 2018). The BBC does, of course, get some financing from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office to help with costs. When its funding was being reviewed in the 2022, the House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee urged the government to publish an assessment of the benefits

72 

A. WAKE

of the BBC’s output towards UK soft power and wider objectives in foreign policy: The BBC continues to provide an essential international service which promotes UK democratic values and informs people across the world. It delivers this through a range of means, including entertainment. This is ever more important in an era of declining press freedom and rising authoritarianism. (Evennett, 2022)

As large and important as the BBCWS is, its emphasis has been more focused on Asia, rather than the Pacific, which has been left to the ABC to service. One broadcast expert noted: The BBC is the best international broadcaster in the world at the moment, but the Pacific has never been a priority for them. (Steele, 2018)

In 2015, there was a push in the United Kingdom for more support for its work internationally. In the Future of News report, the authors argued: If the UK wants the BBC to remain valued and respected, an ambassador of Britain’s values and an agent of soft power in the world, then the BBC is going to have to commit to growing the World Service and the government will have to recognise this. It will mean reversing the trend of closing language services and, with an eye to audiences of need, opening new ones. It will mean taking greater advantage of our strength in English as a global language. In many parts of the world, there is not more free expression but less. Some democracies are proving to be pseudo-democracies. The need for the BBC World Service—in English and in the languages of audiences around the world to provide independent, reliable information to people who sorely need it—is growing. (Parkinson et al., 2015, p. 45)

A year later, the BBC World Service announced a major expansion (BBC World Service announces biggest expansion since 1940s, 2016), including the introduction of a Korean language service, specifically shortwave for North Korea. But in recent years, there have been fears about the independence of its Chinese language section, since the relocation of many personnel to Hong Kong. The BBC World Service states its priorities to include countering the disruptive efforts of broadcasters such as RT (formerly Russia Today), China Central Television (CCTV), and nonstate organisations in the Arab world. Geographically, the emphasis is on

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

73

Africa (where the BBC regards itself as competing primarily with China), and South Asia. BBC World television news had flourished in Asia, broadcasting from Singapore as well as from London and Washington. It produced targeted programming, such as the ‘Asia Business Report’ and ‘Newsday’ from Singapore but was otherwise broadcasting general BBC programmes with a global remit. The editorial emphasis was on business and finance that is aimed more at larger Asian economies and not smaller Pacific countries. BBC World News is also available via an array of television networks in countries including Cambodia, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, and Hong Kong. In 2023, the BBC announced it would launch a new 24-hour channel to replace World News bringing together its UK and global coverage. It brought an end to the BBC World News channel after 28 years. The merged channel is called BBC News. These changes followed other changes at the BBC which had resulted in as many as 1,000 job losses. Those cuts had also forced the closure of foreign-language radio stations such as BBC Arabic (Sticklings, 2023). United States The US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) has six transnational broadcasters, although they are not all considered public service broadcasters: Voice of America (VOA), which was first broadcast in 1942 into Nazi Germany; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; the Office of Cuba Broadcasting with its Radio and TV Marti; Radio Free Asia, which commenced in 1996 with a mission to provide accurate and timely news and information to Asian countries whose governments prohibit access to a free press; the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, which started in 2004, and the Open Technology Fund. Voice of America and Radio Free Asia have no footprint in the Pacific, although they are widely available in Asia. These US networks broadcast in 58 languages reaching a weekly audience of 345 million. The agency claims that a firewall insulates journalists from US Government influence and political pressure, aside from its foreign policy mandate. However, any new CEO of the service must now be appointed by the president and confirmed by the US Senate under new legislation. CNBC Asia-Pacific is a business and financial focused broadcaster which transmits into Asia, to countries including China, Brunei, Hong Kong,

74 

A. WAKE

Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines (About CNBC, 2023). Headquartered in Singapore, the network provides seven hours of live Asia-produced programming, and has a host of dedicated programmes including ‘Asia Business Day,’ ‘Managing Asia,’ and ‘Inside China’ (CNBC Asia Business Day, 2023). Among other broadcasters in the region, CNBC targets wealthier Asian countries rather than the Pacific. CNN International broadcasts its channel into the Asia Pacific. It does not have specifically named programming for the region, but its mixture of news and business content is tweaked according to the particular region of the world to which it is broadcasting at the time (CNN International: This week in the Asia Pacific). Qatar Al Jazeera is one of the best known and most successful broadcasters across the Indo-Pacific. Its English television channel is available via AsiaSat 7 which covers countries including China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste (Satellite Frequencies). It does not cover issues, at least not controversial ones, in Qatar. The station, funded by the Emir of Qatar, proclaims on its website that it has “challenged established narratives and gave a global audience and alternative voice: one that put the people back at the centre of the news agenda”. With offices in Asia, and a growing audience, Al Jazeera is considered a real and credible alternative to BBC and US-based media while new digital start-ups are also filling a void for those who do not wish to use their local media, or those they may consider to be colonial overlords. Al Jazeera has always stressed that it gives a “global audience an alternative voice”, making it “one of the world’s most influential news networks” (About us, 2022a; Al Jazeera: Who we are, 2017). Al Jazeera has a reputation across the Indo-Pacific for telling stories that others will not tell and has garnered international praise, and prizes, for its journalism. Much of the news on Al Jazeera comes from south of the equator, and those stories are then communicated north, which is the reverse of how Western media organisations generally function. Al Jazeera communicates from East to West, rather than from West to East. Al Jazeera pays particular attention in its news coverage to colonial power dynamics that still exist today. Specifically, it devotes some time to critiquing liberal democratic countries, such as the United States and the UK and, where

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

75

appropriate, pointing out the hypocrisy of those particular political regimes. Al Jazeera’s reputation for strong public interest journalism was forged during the Arab Spring, as the broadcaster was the first which understood the implications of the protests that were happening, as well as the need to be a critical witness to the events that unfolded. By using local journalists to cover their home nations, they were able to broadcast immediately, without having to wait for fly-in journalists to arrive in the country. This policy meant Al Jazeera English were ahead of other transnational media organisations. These home-grown journalists were also really crucial for fact-checking because they knew the local context, they knew local geographies, and they were able to even check local dialects, in eyewitness videos that were circulating around social media. While this home ground advantage gave Al Jazeera the ability to use original material rather than rely on analysis from old white men in other countries, it did also mean that sometimes the line between journalist and participant and activist could appear to have merged. While trying to get footage of officials using violence against protestors, Al Jazeera journalists would melt into crowds and it could appear that they were among those taking action. Today, Al Jazeera’s The East101 programme continues to have a reputation for producing documentaries in the Indo-Pacific that local journalists can’t report but this can have consequences for the reporters. Journalist Drew Ambrose found he was no longer welcome in Malaysia after doing a story about the treatment of migrant workers. I guess (Al Jazeera has) the protection to tell stories that the local journalist won’t be able to tell because you’ll be thrown in jail. Or, and it’s too risky. Will you be disappeared. (Martin, 2021)

One of Al Jazeera’s award-winning journalists, Drew Ambrose, has written later chapters in this book on news-gathering practices in the Indo-Pacific, specifically in times of crisis, and around fake news and misinformation. China China’s state broadcasters are discussed at length in Chap. 5. But for here, suffice it to say that Beijing boasts the world’s largest newsroom, when all

76 

A. WAKE

of its news operations are considered. China Global Television Network (CGTN) is available via satellite, local TV stations, and is free online. CGTN has also been a pioneer of media convergence and delivers digital content through CGTN Digital, which is accessible online, on smart phones, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Weibo, and other social media platforms, with over 150 million followers across the globe. Through global video news agencies it also provides news footage TV stations and media organisations across the world. In 2021, China Radio International held licences to broadcast over frequencies in Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu and it could broadcast via shortwave to other countries such as Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and New Caledonia (Dupont, 2021). CRI broadcasts in English, French, and Chinese; however there was reportedly little interest in the shortwave broadcasts. Other major Chinese state-owned media organisations in the Pacific include China Central Television/China Global Television Network (CCTV/CGTN), China Daily, and Xinhua. Xinhua has an office in the Fijian capital, Suva, as well as content-­ sharing arrangements with local news outlets. Across the Pacific, local papers regularly print news from Xinhua. The Samoa Observer was printing two special sections in its newspaper: one section for news from China, and another for news from the United States (Dupont, 2021). The Fiji Sun—which has content-sharing arrangements with both Xinhua and China Daily—prints a weekly Chinese language paper called the Fiji Daily. In the digital information environment, CCTV/CGTN has established itself as a steady provider of news programming in the Pacific, providing content in English or, sometimes Chinese. Beijing’s influence on the media in the Indo-Pacific region is clearly increasing, as the local news ecosystems struggle with economic changes, and seek development and news infrastructure from China. Financially struggling newsrooms and poorly paid journalists are particularly vulnerable to influence. China offers a range of supports to Indo-Pacific journalists including training and equipment as well as free articles to local news organisations in exchange for occasional stories in return. Syndicated news from across the Pacific, including on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, can include copy and images provided by Xinhua news agency. For example, the ABC ran an Australian produced story including photographs from Xinhua of 77 people in shackles and hoods being marched across Fiji’s Nadi airport tarmac onto a China Southern aircraft by Chinese

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

77

police (Hill, 2017). Similar operations with local and Chinese police had been carried out in Indonesia and Cambodia the week before. Analysts from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (funded in part by the Australian Defence Force) believe Xinhau’s release of photos and information for the report served two purposes: domestically, showing China would protect its citizens from fraud and extortion even when perpetrated from abroad. But it was also seen as a show of power to intimidate overseas Chinese, including the diaspora, into refraining from engaging in activities that were contrary to the interests of the PRC (Herr, 2019). There is a perception by some outside China that all their reporting is unreliable. This is far from true. Chinese journalists can and do outstanding journalism across a range of areas, using the most up-to-date technology and in the world’s largest newsroom. Chinese journalists have also written some outstanding investigative journalism around corruption and human rights issues at times including the outbreak of SARS epidemic and the uncovering of underground trade networks that poisoned food. Nonetheless, the Chinese leadership holds a very tight rein on content production, and according to Reporters without Borders is the world’s largest jailer of journalists (including Australian journalist Cheng Lei) (“Cheng Lei: partner of Australian journalist detained in China says he is concerned about her declining health”, 2022). Journalism from Chinese journalists is generally categorised into three zones: the forbidden zone, the permitted zone, and the encouraged zone. The forbidden zone is content that is strictly censored, the green zone is clearly allowed, and the encouraged zone is anything that favours the CCP. As a result, there is no criticism in Chinese media of PRC policies on Taiwan or Tibet. Before COVID, journalists in developing countries across the Indo-­ Pacific and beyond were being offered all-expenses paid trips to China and free graduate degrees to China (Lidberg et  al., 2023; Lim & Bergin, 2018). Groups of Pacific journalists have accepted travel to China as part of the training. Fijian media professionals were among those offered ten-­ month China–Asia Pacific Press Centre Scholarships and a one-month Dongfang Fellowship Program Scholarship. There has also been renewed interest in the region from Australia and its allies. The renewed interest in the Solomon Islands, for example, has been met with cynicism by local journalists. As veteran Solomon Islands journalist Dorothy Wickham wrote:

78 

A. WAKE

Since the draft (China-Solomon Island security) agreement was leaked, we have seen arrivals of diplomatic envoys from overseas—the Australians, New Zealanders, Japanese and the big boys, the US. The joke among us is that it took a deal with China for the US to realise we exist. The first reaction of many Solomon Islanders when the US delegation turn up was: please remind them to clean up the Second World War bombs killing people. The China security treaty has changed the political landscape and tested the Solomon Islands government’s commitment to a free press. We now watch to see if it affects other important institutions here. (Wickham, 2022)

Long-time Pacific media aid worker Sue Ahearn is worried about the impact on journalism in the region and  has argued that newsrooms are financially vulnerable to influence  (Ahearn, 2022). She spoke to a number of media executives in the Solomon Islands in early 2022 and one told her that he would look to China if there was no other help available, but he was later surprised when asked to publish a press release word for word. Another media executive said he only had to ring the Chinese embassy and help arrived, with no expense spared. Journalists in neighbouring Melanesian states of Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea have also reported that their work has been curtailed by demands from China. Russia RT, formally called Russia Today, is a global TV news network with a mission to “cover stories overlooked by the mainstream media … [It] provides alternative perspectives on current affairs, and acquaints audiences with a Russian viewpoint on major global events (About RT, 2022)”. Increasingly available across the Indo-Pacific, RT broadcasts in English, Arabic, Spanish, French, German, and Russian, and sister multimedia news agency RUPTLY provides livestreaming, video on demand, archive footage, and broadcast services. RT’s main focus is on Europe and the Americas, rather than the Indo-Pacific. RT is said to have one of the biggest YouTube audiences on the planet (“RT hits 10bn views on YouTube”, 2020). Sputnik International (formerly Voice of Russia) combines radio and online services with an international newswire (the former Novosti Agency). Sputnik offers 800 hours a week of radio output in some 30 languages, including English, Chinese, Spanish and Arabic. Sputnik is

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

79

widely regarded in the West as a key element of Russian efforts to spread disinformation.

Working for State-Funded Media This section features interviews with key journalists from state-funded broadcasters that work in the Indo-Pacific. Those working for state media outlets are treated as anonymous sources below. All are cognisant that their work within  state funded broadcasters such as CGTN or RT put them into a specific category for scorn from journalistic colleagues, particularly for their media ethics: You would use the term ‘journalists’ quite loosely. You hear the American government criticised in balanced stories on The Voice of America but you would never hear any of the things that was critical of Beijing on the Chinese broadcaster. Very different kettle of fish. (Martin, 2021)

But for many young journalists, or even older experienced hands, a chance to work transnationally can mean the lure of state broadcasters can be strong. China and Russia can now afford to pay Westerners good money to work as journalists for them: The foreigners (at Russia Today) were there for the money. The money is still above the standard rates. Mostly Brits. The ones who are trying to get their first experience, although there is less and less of that. People who are at their end of career, after more money. Some are there for adventure, to do something different, to learn a language, and get out. That’s the minority I think. (Journalist RT, 2019)

One journalist who worked with China state media interviewed for this project in 2018 said he found it a challenge because he had been trained within a media environment that was free to be critical of government, and in the public and private sectors, to hold them to account in the public interest: Inside a state media organisation these journalistic duties are permitted or encouraged only when they fit with the narrative set by authority. (Journalist China, 2019)

80 

A. WAKE

The journalist argued that not all the Western journalists working within Chinese state media were stooges who were devoutly toeing the party line, even if a few certainly appeared to believe the propaganda they produced. As an outsider working in the Chinese system, one journalist said he was aware that the vast majority of the people he worked with were both wise to and sceptical of the Chinese government’s aims and intentions: Most are just trying to do what journalists all over the world want and love to do. They’re trying to tell good stories. And that is possible within these organisations. It is, however, important for individual journalists to know where to draw the line. (Journalist China, 2019)

The Russia TV journalist agreed: It is mostly normal news that you would pretty much find anywhere … something like 10% to 20% really touches Russia’s interests, you know, Ukraine, NATO. The things that Russia is promoting. (Journalist RT, 2019)

Notwithstanding, they knew they were being socialised by the editorial practices in their newsrooms to do stories in a particular way. It’s like an electric fence. You work on the story it’s ready to go and they’ll say that doesn’t work. You have to redo it or they’ll give it to someone else. There’s no threats involved or anything ridiculous like that. It’s just like anywhere: you learn by doing. You realise this doesn’t work so you just have to do it this other way. (Journalist China, 2019)

Foreigners—particularly Westerners—working within a system like China or Russia were routinely used to lend an air of legitimacy or even-­ handedness to reporting. Sometimes this was unavoidable, but other times journalists were able to say no: I have never been able to stop propaganda going out, but I have been able to privately and politely tell managers that I refuse to take part in certain stories or campaigns because I vehemently disagree with their agenda. (Journalist China, 2019)

A Russia TV journalist said his managers knew not to give him reports to work upon that he could not write in an unbiased way:

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

81

They would only give me things that were straighter, and they would never have given me something on Ukraine or something like that. I always had the option of saying I don’t want to do it, and they’d just put someone else on it. (Journalist RT, 2019)

The journalists in both China and Russian media reported a fondness of both organisations for reporting problems with democracies. By focusing on some stories that were played down by other media, the broadcasters could claim that they were giving an alternative view to the audience: One underlying feature of RT was to show a disintegrating, aging Europe that was losing face, so seen through that sphere, something simple like demonstrations on the streets of Paris that no one else is reporting on, could be construed as a Russia angle on the news. (Journalist RT, 2019)

They also learned how to put out reports that were untrue, even knowing that they would be caught out doing so: The idea is to just muddy the waters … ‘someone suggested this’, or ‘the army said this’: obvious fakes are being put on tv, or broadcast in some way, to suggest the most obvious thing (that the Russians gave a missile to people who didn’t know how to use [it]shot down a passenger plane), isn’t the only thing. Sure, it’s a possibility, but there is also a possibility of a Ukrainian fighter jet shooting it down, and then there’s an obvious fake photograph of a Ukrainian fighter jet, completely out of scale and proportion, and they’d say we are looking at all sides of the story, although they aren’t legitimate and shouldn’t be put on air. (Journalist RT, 2019)

They also had to learn to avoid mentioning events and actions that were not supported by the ruling regime. That could be tricky: I had to write a stock markets update for Chinese state TV today and say that the Hong Kong protests were rattling investors without actually mentioning the protests. (Wu & Weaver, 1998).

Even so, some journalists felt that they had done work that they regretted “but those instances have helped me learn where to draw the line, and they are outnumbered by things I’m proud of” (Journalist China, 2019). There was also, always, another journalist who would write the story if they refused. RT for example was staffed by highly intelligent Russians

82 

A. WAKE

who spoke excellent English. The ones you’d find anywhere in a functional newsroom. The journalist who had worked for the state media operations all worried about their employability once they had left, although they were now well trained in being able to spot propaganda. One said he left his job because he was particularly concerned about the attention that Russia was beginning to show in Asia, where low media literacy among populations was likely to cause problems with disinformation and misinformation: I’ve heard rumours that there is more of an emphasis going to be put on Asian news. There is a lot of interest between Russia and China, and Russia turning more and more towards China, they’ll most likely put more money into that. (Journalist RT, 2019)

The ChinaTV journalist said he was actively looking for work but had not found it. I know I risk having been associated with the stigma of state media for working here. But at the end of the day, we’re mostly just trying to tell stories like everyone else. (Journalist China, 2019)

By way of contrast, an Australian journalist working for the Qatari funded news station Al Jazeera found that they benefited from a competitive salary and excellent working conditions. They’re just so organised and committed to the big international stories. The teams are also a great bunch and such professionals. They also have the cash to cover the story properly, which makes a difference. (Clarke, 2019)

This demonstrates that Western-trained journalists working for state-­ funded broadcaster clearly understand the potential problems that occur when they take a position in those newsrooms, and accept that their work can and does provide misinformation which can unduly influence foreign populations.

Other Public Broadcasters in the Indo-Pacific Broadcasters no longer need to rely on transmitters or partnership agreements for their work to be heard in other countries, which means that the Indian diaspora living in Suva or Melbourne can just as easily tune into an

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

83

Indian-produced programme as they can one from Sydney or Seattle. However, the following countries have transnational broadcasters that have traditionally played a role in the Indo-Pacific. France Radio France Internationale (RFI) has long replaced the Le Poste Colonial, which was established in 1933. It is particularly focused on Francophone countries, and targeting local audiences rather than expatriates. RFI is within the remit of the new agency, France Médias Monde, together with other French public international broadcasters France24, and the Arabic language radio station Monte Carlo Doualiya. France24 is a video-based news channel on air and online 24/7 in French, English, and Arabic along with Spanish TV. It is available via cable, satellite, DTT, ADSL, on mobile phones, tablets and connected TVs, as well as on YouTube in four languages, Facebook, and Twitter (Who we are). Germany Deutsche Welle began in 1953 as a German-only shortwave radio service. DW’s TV and Internet services commenced in the 1990s, and now it has online output in 32 languages. Its academy, DW Academy, was founded in 1965 and has trained journalists worldwide. DW says its offerings “convey Germany as a liberal democracy rooted in European culture, providing a forum for German (and other) points of view on important topics, with the aim of promoting understanding and the exchange of ideas among different cultures and peoples” (Who we are). India India’s Doordarshan international TV channel (DD-India) and All India Radio (AIR) broadcast in 27 languages, of which 12 are Indian and 15 foreign, although English predominates (Ramachandran, 2018). Japan NHK World Japan provides content for TV (in English), radio (17 languages), and online in addition to a TV and a radio channel targeted at Japanese overseas. Japan rebranded the service from “NHK World TV” to

84 

A. WAKE

“NHK World Japan” in 2018 (Corporate overview). It has one of the best funded and quality broadcasters but has struggled to keep up-to-date with changing audience habits. Korea Korea’s KBS World TV and KBS World Radio target expatriate Koreans, although many TV programmes are subtitled in English (97%), Chinese (21%) and Malay (10%) (Ki-Sung Kwak, 2017). Arirang International Broadcasting is a broadcasting company operated by the International Broadcasting Exchange Foundation. Information on Korea’s current affairs, culture, and history is provided to the world through TV, radio, and real-time broadcasting. Arirang International Broadcasting began broadcasting in 2004 and says its objective is to “burnish Korea’s image in international communities and to improve relationships with foreign countries through close cooperation with broadcasting companies overseas” (The World On Arirang). Three channels broadcast 24 hours a day with the main language English. In addition, they provide subtitles for Chinese, Spanish, Korean, Arabic, Russian, Vietnamese, and multilingual subtitle services. Singapore CAN, Channel News Asia, CNA, is a Singaporean multinational news channel owned by the country’s national public broadcaster Mediacorp, a state-owned media conglomerate (About CNA, 2022). The English-­ language Asian news network states that it is positioned to understand Asia and reports on global developments with Asian perspectives. CNA can be viewed in 29 territories across Asia with a satellite footprint across Asia, the Middle East, and Australia. It has correspondents in major Asian cities and key Western ones, including New  York, Washington DC, London, and Brussels. CNA is a transmedia company, where users can get content online, on TV and radio and via smart devices. It is also available on social and messaging services, such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Linkedin, and Telegram.

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

85

Conclusion This chapter has acknowledged the huge number of public service broadcasters operating in the Indo-Pacific, and acknowledged that not all transnational broadcasters share public service media traditions and values or have a commitment to upholding global democracy. It specifically looked at the ABC and BBC models, as well as other broadcasters of influence before examining the editorial practices at two state-funded media outlets through interviews with journalists working for ChinaTV and Russia TV. This chapter adds to the book’s argument that publicly funded and editorially independent transnational broadcasters have a particular role in providing free and fair information for others, and modelling press freedom.

References ABC. (2008). Australian Broadcasting Corporation Documents—ABC Charter. ABC.  Retrieved July 16, 2009, from http://www.abc.net.au/corp/pubs/ ABCcharter.htm ABC Launches Ground-Breaking New Show The Pacific. (2023, April 6). https:// about.abc.net.au/press-­r eleases/abc-­l aunches-­g round-­b reaking-­n ew-­ show-­the-­pacific/ About CNA. (2022). Retrieved September 2, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/about-­us About CNBC. (2023). Retrieved April 15, from https://www.cnbc.com/about/ cnbc-­asia/ About Government and State-Affiliated Media Account Labels on Twitter. (2023). https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-­and-­policies/state-­affiliated About RT. (2022). Russia Today. https://www.rt.com/about-­us/ About Us. (2022a). Al Jazeera. Retrieved July 6, from https://www.aljazeera. com/about-­us About Us. (2022b). ABC Radio Australia. Retrieved July 8, from https://www. abc.net.au/radio-­australia/about/ Ahearn, S. (2022, March 17). How China is Winning the Information War in the Pacific. The Strategist. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-­china-­is-­ winning-­the-­information-­war-­in-­the-­pacific/ Al Jazeera: Who We Are. (2017). Al Jazeera. Retrieved November 27, from http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/ Australia’s ABC and Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation Sign Historic New Agreement. (2023, March 28). https://about.abc.net.au/press-­releases/ australias-­abc-­and-­solomon-­islands-­broadcasting-­corporation-­sign-­historic-­ new-­agreement/

86 

A. WAKE

Australian Broadcasting Corporation. (2017). Annual Report 2017 Investing in Audiences. A.  B. Corporation. http://www.abc.net.au/corp/annual-­report/ 2017/documents/ABC_AnnualREport-­2017_Volume-­1.pdf Bagshaw, E. (2022, August 18). Solomon Islands Signs $100 Million Huawei Deal. The Age. https://www.theage.com.au/world/asia/solomon-­islands-­ signs-­100-­million-­huawei-­deal-­20220818-­p5bb03.html BBC. (2018). BBC Annual Report and Accounts 2017/18. http://downloads. bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/repor ts/pdf/bbc_annualreport_201718.pdf BBC World Service Announces Biggest Expansion Since 1940s. (2016, November 16). https://www.bbc.com/mediacentre/latestnews/2016/world-­service-­ expansion/ Benson, S. (2022, February 28). Twitter to Label All State-Affiliated Russia Media. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/28/twitter-­label­state-­affiliated-­russia-­media-­00012351 Cheng Lei: Partner of Australian Journalist Detained in China Says he is Concerned About Her Declining Health. (2022, June 2). The Guardian. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/cheng-­l ei-­p artner-­o f-­a ustralian-­ journalist-­detained-­in-­china-­says-­he-­is-­concerned-­about-­her-­declining-­health Clarke, S. (2019). Research Interview Australian Freelancer. June 14. Clayton, J., & Durbin, A. (2023, April 11). Twitter: BBC Objects to ‘Government Funded Media’ Label. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/ entertainment-­arts-­65226481 CNBC Asia Business Day. (2023). Retrieved April 15, from https://www.cnbc. com/asia-­business-­day/ CNN International: This Week in the Asia Pacific. CNN International. Retrieved August 1, from http://edition.cnn.com/CNNI/schedules/asia_pacific/ index.html Corporate Overview. NHK. Retrieved July 6, from https://www.nhk.or.jp/corporateinfo/english/corporate/index.html Dickey, L., Downs, E., Taffer, A., Holz, H., Thomspon, D., Bilal Hyder, S., Loomis, R., & Miller, A. (2019, October 12). Mapping the Information Environment in the Pacific Island Countries: Disruptors, Deficits, and Decisions. Center for Naval Analysis (cna.org). https://www.cna.org/ reports/2019/12/mapping-­information-­environment-­in-­pacific Dover, B. (2019, February 8). Lessons from Asia and Elsewhere. The Future of Australian Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific, UTS. Dupont, P. (2021, February). The United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy and a Revisionist China: Partnering with Small and Middle Powers in the Pacific Islands Region Issues and Insights Working Paper. Pacific Forum (www.pacforum.org: Pacific Forum). https://pacforum.org/publication/issues-­insights-­ vol-­20-­wp-­2-­the-­united-­states-­indo-­pacific-­strategy-­and-­a-­revisionist-­china-­ partnering-­with-­small-­and-­middle-­powers-­in-­the-­pacific-­islands-­region.

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

87

Evennett, H. (2022). BBC World Service: Soft Power and Funding Challenges. In Focus, Issue. https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/bbc-­world-­service-­soft-­ power-­and-­funding-­challenges/ Grasswill, H. (2023, April 5). ABC International Spreads its Wings. ABC Alumni. https://abcalumni.net/2023/04/05/abc-­international-­spreads-­its-­wings/ Heriot, G. (2023). International Broadcasting and Its Contested Role in Australian Statecraft: middle power, Smart… Power. Anthem Press. Herr, R. (2019). Chinese Influence in the Pacific Islands. Australia Strategic Policy Instittue. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinese-­influence-­pacific-­islands Hill, B. (2017, August 8). Dozens of Chinese Fraud Suspects Deported from Fiji Arrive Handcuffed, in Hoods. ABC Pacific Beat. https://www.abc.net.au/ news/2017-­0 8-­0 8/chinese-­s uspects-­d eported-­f rom-­f iji-­a rrive-­h ooded-­ and-­handcuffed/8786080 Hodge, E. (1995). Radio Wars: Truth, Propaganda, and the Struggle for Radio Australia. Cambridge University Press. Jim Middleton, Veteran ABC Journalist, Signs Off for the Last Time. (2014, September 5). ABC News. Journalist China. (2019, July 1). Research Interview (China State Media Journalist) [Interview]. Journalist RT. (2019, June 25). Research Interview (Russia Today Journalist). Kafcaloudes, P. (2022). Australia Calling: The ABC Radio Australia Story. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. https://books.google.com.au/ books?id=C3e8zgEACAAJ Ki-Sung Kwak. (2017, October 27). South Korea’s Public Broadcasters are in an Impossible Political Position. The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/ south-­k oreaspublic-­b roadcasters-­a re-­i n-­a n-­i mpossible-­p olitical-­p osition-­ 85593. Lidberg, J., et al. (2023). The world according to China: Capturing and analysing the global media influence strategies of a superpower. Pacific Journalism Review: Te Koakoa, 29(1 & 2), 182–204. Lim, L., & Bergin, J. (2018, December 7). Inside China’s Audacious Global Propaganda Campaign. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ news/2018/dec/07/china-­plan-­for-­global-­media-­dominance-­propaganda-­ xi-­jinping Ma, W. (2023, April 14). Against Its Own Policy, Twitter No Longer Limits Chinese State Media Influence. Wenhao’s Newsletter. Martin, L. (2021, May 21). Research Interview Australian International Wire Journalist [Interview]. McQuail, D. (2005). McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory. Sage. Murrell, C. (2013). ABC News 24 and BBC World: A Study of Limited Resources and Challenging Newsgathering. Australian Journalism Review, 35(1), 83–96. Murrell, C. (Ed.). (2016). The International Newsgathering Challenge for Public Service Australian and Canadian 24/7 TV Channels. Peter Lang.

88 

A. WAKE

O’Keeffe, A., & Greene, C. (2019). International Public Broadcasting: A Missed Opportunity for Projecting Australia’s Soft Power. https://www.lowyinstitute. org/publications/international-­p ublic-­b roadcasting-­m issed-­o pportunity-­ projecting-­australia-­s-­soft-­power O’Sullivan, M. (2022, September 6). Research Interview (ABC Radio Australia’s Asia Pacific Editor) [Interview]. Pacific Journalists Discuss Challenges in Exposing Corruption. (2022, September 28). Sunday Isles. https://sundayisles.islesmedia.net/pacific-­journalists-­ discuss-­challenges-­in-­exposing-­corruption/?fbclid=IwAR1eeBBdvHbMkPpici X6CIiVeNqoxqDd_4hTZ1eTo0NJZ-­0-­r fwlTtKgKzM Parkinson, K., Herrmann, S., Kafala, T., Sutton, N., Thomas, H., Thordar, I., Hedley, M., & Scharer, E. (2015). The Future of News BBC. http://newsimg. bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/29_01_15future_of_news.pdf Ramachandran, S. K. (2018, August 6). I&B Ministry and MEA at Odds Over All India Radio External Service. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes. com/india-­n ews/i-­b -­m inistr y-­a nd-­m ea-­a t-­o dds-­o ver-­a ll-­i ndia-­r adio­external-­service/story-­k8CDvm9gmYSJ4gDzuYrHiK.html RNZ Facing Overhaul After Editorial Standards Audit. (2023, August 2). Stuff (Stuff.co.nz). https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/300941952/rnz-­facing-­ overhaul-­after-­editorial-­standards-­audit. RT Hits 10bn Views on YouTube. (2020, January 29). Advanced Television. https://advanced-­t elevision.com/2020/01/29/rt-­h its-­1 0bn-­v iews-­o n-­ youtube/ Satellite Frequencies. Al Jazeera. Retrieved April 15, from http://sat. aljazeera.net/en Scott, M. (2009). A Global ABC: Soft Diplomacy and the World of International Broadcasting Bruce Allen Memorial Lecture. Macquarie University. Steele, D. (2018). Research Interview (Australia Network Broadcast Expert) [Interview]. Sticklings, T. (2023, April 3). BBC Launches New 24-hour Channel to Replace World News. The National. https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/uk-­ news/2023/04/03/bbc-­l aunches-­n ew-­2 4-­h our-­c hannel-­r eplacing-­ world-­news/ The World on Arirang. Arirang. Retrieved July 6, from https://www.arirang. com/prroom/About_ArirangN1.asp?sys_lang=Eng Tiffen, R. (2023). Transmission Interrupted: Australia’s International Television Broadcasting. Australian Journal of International Affairs. https://doi.org/1 0.1080/10357718.2022.2152427 Tyson, H. (1983). Editors Under Fire. Random House. Wake, A. (2010). Snap and Crackle Goes Pop: A Case Study of the Provision of Mobile, Digital, Shortwave and FM News and Current Affairs Broadcast and Published by Radio Australia in 2009 World Journalism Congress 2, Grahamstown, South Africa.

4  TRANSNATIONAL VOICES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

89

Who We Are. Retrieved July 6, from https://www.france24.com/en/about-­us Who We Are: Mission. US Agency for Global Media. Retrieved July 6, from https://www.usagm.gov/who-­we-­are/mission/ Wickham, D. (2022, May 3). In 35 Years of Reporting from Solomon Islands, I’ve Never Seen the Secrecy of the Last Few Months. The Guardian. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2022/may/03/in-­3 5-­y ears-­r eporting-­f rom­solomon-­islands-­i-­have-­never-­seen-­such-­secrecy-­as-­the-­last-­few-­months Wu, W., & Weaver, D. H. (1998, December 01). Making Chinese Journalists for the Next Millennium: The Professionalization of Chinese Journalism Students. Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands), 60(6), 513–529. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0016549298060006004

CHAPTER 5

The Rise of China’s International Broadcasting Services Juan Feng

and Xiufang (Leah) Li 

Introduction Although Western media dominates global media and communications, emerging players in international or transnational broadcasting, such as state-sponsored media from Qatar, Russia, Iran, and China, are competing to gain influence in the international arena (Madrid-Morales, 2021; Thussu, 2018b). A common feature of these media is that they are sponsored by “authoritarian” regimes and their core quest is to increase their agenda-setting capacity on a regional or global scale (Madrid-Morales, 2021). Within these actors, the global expansion of China’s state-run media has evoked the most global attention. The existing body of scholarship (i.e., Hartig, 2020; Huang & Wang, 2020; Pan et al., 2020; Varrall, 2020; Zhao & Xiang, 2019; Zhu, 2022) examines this phenomenon from a political science perspective, using soft power and public diplomacy as analytical tools.

J. Feng • X. (Leah) Li (*) RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9_5

91

92 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

This chapter focuses on China’s strategic approaches and contemporary state in establishing a comprehensive state-run broadcasting service network, with specific reference to the “Big Four”—the Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television (CCTV), China Radio International (CRI), and China Daily—looking at the English-language international offering aired by these media outlets. The second section revisits the historical development of China’s state-run international broadcasting services. The third section looks at motivations for the heavy investment in the development of a comprehensive state-run Chinese broadcasting service network from a political, economic, and cultural perspective. The last section discusses the implications of China’s state-run foreign broadcasting services to the world.

The Big Four The “Big Four” official Chinese media outlets—Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television (CCTV) (renamed as China Global Television Network (CGTN) in 2016), China Radio International (CRI), and China Daily (Zhang et al., 2016) have received significant government funding for global expansion since 2009 (Shi, 2021; Thussu, 2018b; Zhang et al., 2016). It is estimated that the Chinese government has been investing US$1.3 billion annually to increase the global reach of the state-run media (Zubair & Hussain, 2020). The strategy of “media go global” accelerated after the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, made an announcement in 2013 that China should “tell a good Chinese story and better convey China’s message to the world”. These Chinese media outlets are now tasked with the missions to “de-monopolise” the dominant discourse circulated by the Western media on global affairs, induce favourable international opinion about China, promote China’s perspectives in interpreting global affairs, build the country’s national image, and enhance China’s soft power capacity (Hong & Liu, 2015; Zhao & Xiang, 2019). The global expansion of China’s state-run international broadcasting services follows three strategies covering (1) global distribution, (2) cross-­ national cooperation, and (3) technology acquisition (2017), in addition to training foreign journalists. The first strategy of global distribution involves the deployment of journalists across the globe, and the establishment of branches, press stations, and news centres in major countries and regions around the world (Wu, 2017). This global distribution approach

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

93

endeavours to contest the timeliness and exclusivity of “Western media” by sourcing and producing first-hand news content from locals (Wu, 2017). Western media refers to the media outlets in Western countries and was contrasted with the media in the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Ram, 2016). In light of El Damanhoury and Garud-Paktar (2021), the establishment of global news outlets allows state-run media to create content that appears on the surface at least to be unbiased for a global audience, which is useful in strengthening trust in their institutionalised presence and credibility for the views they advocate. The main practitioners of this strategy are Xinhua News Agency and CCTV (Wu, 2017). The second strategy of cross-national cooperation underpins partnership with local media that is ideologically neutral to present China’s messages to local audiences. This strategy takes the modes of adding inset to and/or co-publishing with local newspapers, and purchasing advertising from local media (Wu, 2017). It allows Chinese international broadcasters to overcome the limits required by such legal procedures for foreign actors to undertake international communication activities (Wu, 2017). Importantly, through this approach, content created by Chinese state-run media can be widely circulated to foreign audiences through using their preferred outlets, which helps to obscure the funding source of the content funded by the government (Cook, 2022). The primary player of this strategy is China Daily (Wu, 2017). Since 2018, Xinhua News Agency has also started to sign content-exchange agreements with local news service providers that are located in a wide range of countries, including Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, India, Italy, Laos, Nigeria, Thailand, and Vietnam (Cook, 2022). The third strategy of technology acquisition aims to acquire local media or make strategic investments (Wu, 2017). For instance, acquisitions of technical facilities, such as the purchase and operation of shortwave radio, and investments in information and communication infrastructure (Thussu, 2018a; Wu, 2017): China Radio International is well known for implementing this strategy. Acquisitions of existing local media outlets or establishment of new ones in foreign markets have an impact on the editorial guidelines of local media outlets, resulting in more China-friendly media coverage (Cook, 2022). Beside these three strategies, another global strategy of expanding Chinese media includes training foreign journalists. One of the popular approaches is to invite journalists to study in China, or for journalists and technicians to visit the headquarters of CCTV and China Radio

94 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

International on an annual basis (Douzet et al., 2021). This approach not only allows Chinese political authorities to exhibit the modernity of the country’s communication infrastructure, but also serves to elicit admiration and fascination from the foreign visitors (Douzet et  al., 2021). Compared to large news organisations (e.g., Agence France Presse, the Associated Press or Reuters) that rely on the paid model to distribute their content, Chinese state-run media distributes content free of charge to all local African media, which allows the content to be adopted and widely distributed by local media outlets (Douzet et al., 2021). Strategies to Enhance Social Media Presence of the Big Four The development of the Internet and new media technologies, particularly the arrival of social media, has provided global media outlets with new resources to advance their competitive advantages by potentially breaking down geographical boundaries and surpassing the gateways of mainstream media (El Damanhoury & Garud-Paktar, 2021; Zhang & Ong’ong’a, 2021). Governments have the potential to quickly respond to messages and formulate positive narratives before being confronted with conflicting information from alternate sources (El Damanhoury & Garud-­ Paktar, 2021). This technologic trend, especially using social media, is critical to enhancing China’s international broadcasting capacity (Wu, 2017). The state-run media in China has begun to increase its use of social media accounts on global social media platforms, such as Twitter (now X), Facebook (now Meta), and YouTube, to reach a larger overseas audience (Hartig, 2019; Morales, 2022). All the Big Four—Xinhua News Agency, CGTN, China Daily, and China Radio International—have established their own social media accounts overseas on Twitter, Facebook, or/and YouTube, and Instagram (Gill, 2020; Rawnsley, 2015b). The authors found by the end of 2022, Xinhua News Agency’s social media accounts include @China Xinhua News (98 million followers on Facebook), @XHNEWs (12.2 million followers on Twitter), @New China TV (1.31 million subscribers on YouTube). The social media accounts of CGTN are @CGTN (118 million followers on Facebook), @CGTNOfficial (13.2 million followers on Twitter), and @CGTN (2.91million subscriber on YouTube). Those of China Daily include @China Daily (105 million followers on Facebook), @ChinaDaily (4.2 million followers on Twitter), and @China Daily (53.3 thousand subscribers on YouTube). China Radio International has the

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

95

account @China Radio Intercanal—CRI (4.33 thousand subscribers on YouTube). Further, the International Business Department of Xinhua Agency and its seven regional affiliates have assembled dedicated teams to manage accounts on their social media platforms, and create specialised content aligning with the features of social media platforms (Gan, 2021). Besides strengthening their presence on social media, Chinese state-run media relies on Chinese Internet companies to enhance the dissemination of information on social media platforms developed and operated by the country itself. The Chinese leadership views the deployment of an increasing number of Chinese Internet companies, which are part of the non-­ state business actors in facilitating the global expansion of Internet companies, as helping to promote the nation brand (Budnitsky & Jia, 2018). The social media platforms (e.g., TikTok and Kuaishou, owned by the Chinese technical giants ByteDance and Kuaishou Technology, respectively) are considered as an “emerging force” in projecting the image of China in the digital space (Shi & Zhang, 2019, p. 34). The Big Four have registered their accounts on these platforms, leveraging both their domestic and international reach to make the content accessible to a wide range of young audiences. This includes @Xinhua News Agency (56.8 million followers), @China Daily (37.1 million followers), @CRI Online (6.1 million followers), and CGTN (9.7 million followers) on DouYin, in addition to the registered account @chinadailyoffical on TikTok on behalf of China Daily. Beyond the reliance on traditional social media platforms, Chinese state-run media is committed to developing new service platforms suitable for mobile devices. In 2015, the Xinhua News Agency revitalised its social media platforms under the new brand “New China” (Feng, 2017). It has expanded the online news and information services by creating various mobile news Apps accessible (Xin, 2018), such as Xinhua News (press release App), Xinhua 15 Seconds (short video news broadcasting App), I Was on the Scene (new media press broadcasting App), CNC (mobile video news App), etc. In 2014, CCTV launched CCTVNEWS APP, which is the country’s first English short-form video mobile App (Hu et  al., 2017). It was later rebranded as the CGTN APP in 2016, serving as the official app for China Global Television Network (CGTN). The aim of that is to expand its global exposure by providing overseas mobile users with content about China in English using the popular short-film format (Hu et al., 2017).

96 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

Key Events Driving the Growth of China’s International Broadcasting Services Outside China it seems few acknowledge that the country has a long history of attaching importance to state-run international broadcasting services. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, international broadcasting services have been the focus of the country’s publicity efforts. The Chinese state has repeatedly emphasised the need for Chinese media to give the world the voice of China and to present a Chinese perspective on Chinese and world affairs to a global audience (Varrall, 2020). Xinhua News Agency began to exchange news with other international institutions in the 1950s and had signed agreements with 22 foreign partners by 1967 (Sparks, 2020). CCTV also had initiated some modest exchanges with other countries back in the 1950s (Sparks, 2020), although the subsequent Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) interrupted the official connections between China and the world. The post-1978 period of “reform and opening up” saw the revival of the accelerated development and international expansion of state-run media (Sparks, 2020). This process is marked by several key events that have provided Chinese elites with lessons on the way to utilise state-run media with the goal of building China’s international image (Varrall, 2020). One of the key events was the Tiananmen Square incident (protests or massacre depending on the reader’s perspective) in 1989, which triggered a sharp rise in negative international opinion of China over human rights concerns (Varrall, 2020; Zhang, 2011). In 1995, Zhu Muzhi, the president of Xinhua News Agency, remarked that the media in the Western countries, especially in the United States, had generated anti-China sentiment, and therefore it was critical for the country to speed up the battle to fight for favourable world opinion (Varrall, 2020). In response to the international coverage of Tiananmen Square, the head of the publicity apparatus to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, which is the CCP (Chinese Communist Party)’s highest decision-making body, was promoted, and the State Council Information Office (SCIO) was established to supervise the country’s international communications strategy in 1991 (Rawnsley, 2015b). As a result of these moves, communications were situated “at the heart of China’s policy-making machinery”, and international broadcasting services were asked to be more proactive in representing the state and its international interests (Rawnsley, 2015b, p. 277).

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

97

The 2008 Beijing Olympics was the second event in influencing the development of China’s international broadcasting services. Because of the mismatch between the country’s growing economic power and soft power, the Chinese leadership was keen to create a “new” national image (Gan, 2021; Li, 2017). It used the Beijing Olympics as a significant vehicle to recast its image and win worldwide respect (Varrall, 2020). However, the coverage of anti-Chinese protests and conflicts by the Western media along the torch relay route embarrassed China’s national image, which in turn reinforced Beijing’s determination to shape its international image via its own communication channels (Varrall, 2020). In 2009, the government released the 2009–2020 Master Plan for the International Communication Capacity Building of China’s Major Media (2009—2020年我国重点媒体国际传播力建设总体规划)—abbreviated as the Master Plan—to provide the media sector with strategic guidance. This Master Plan stated the country’s ambition to develop internationally influential media groups with the goal of exhibiting its rising political and economic status in the world (Pei, 2018). Since then, funding has continued to flow in to support the international broadcasting services (Varrall, 2020). The Chinese government reportedly spent a total of US$8.7 billion between 2009 and 2010 to reach out to foreign audiences, with the majority of the funding pouring in to CCTV, China Radio International, the Xinhua News Agency, and the China Daily (Bolsover & Howard, 2019). The Master Plan sits alongside China’s “Media Going-Out” policy that can be traced back to a more general “Going-Out” initiative presented at the 15th Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China in October 2000. Under the “Media Going-out” policy, the Chinese government supported “the launch of overseas bureaux of the main media organisations, the establishment of Chinese Culture Centres and Confucius Institutes in different countries, and the training of export-oriented cultural enterprises and intermediary agencies” (Ye & Albornoz, 2018). The aim of this “Media Going-Out” policy was to nurture a friendly atmosphere allowing global media to document China’s modernisation and development agendas (Hu & Ji, 2012). It serves to promote a set of other Chinese government agendas, called “Peaceful Rise”, “Soft Power”, and “Harmonious World” (Hu & Ji, 2012). Peaceful rise illustrates that China’s ambition of advancing economic growth and improving people’s living standard does not destabilise the international order or pose a threat to its neighbours (Glaser & Medeiros, 2007). Soft power in the Chinese context refers to using peaceful means

98 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

(e.g., culture, education, and media presence) to position China on the world stage and achieve the country’s ambitions (Hunter, 2009). Harmonious World articulates China’s diplomatic vision of establishing a new world order and the determination to rise peacefully (Hao, 2008). Since Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, the Chinese government has become more committed to promoting its message in a way that goes beyond the traditional approach of communist propaganda (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020). The traditional propaganda approach represents the old style propaganda of a Leninist state (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011), in which the media serves as “a vehicle of state propaganda and as the main channel for Chinese citizens to receive news and official information” (Hinck et al., 2016, p. 429). In 2013, President Xi delivered a speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference, emphasising the importance of Chinese media using innovative mechanisms to communicate to the world, especially leveraging the power of digital technologies (China Copyright and Media, 2013). In this speech, President Xi claimed the Chinese media, including Chinese international broadcasting services “must strive to move international communications capacity construction forward, innovate foreign propaganda methods, strengthen discourse system construction … and strengthen [China’s] discourse power internationally” (Varrall, 2020, p.  6). This statement was interpreted as encouraging a two-way communication mode to engage target publics through interaction in public diplomacy activities (Huang & Wang, 2020). At the first meeting of the Leadership Group on Internet Security and Information in 2014, President Xi stated that “captivating online public opinion is a long-term task that requires bringing forth new ideas to improve online propaganda” (Repnikova & Fang, 2019, p.  679). His emphasis on shaping public opinion in the digital space, coupled with the boom in the Internet in China, suggests that the Internet has become a significant component of restructuring the country’s international broadcasting strategies (Bolsover & Howard, 2019). According to the Oxford Internet Institute, it was not until 2019 that the Chinese state showed “new-found interest in aggressively using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube” (Cook, 2022, p.  120). This is further demonstrated by the increasing production of online materials (i.e., Internet memes, clickbait headlines, and promotional videos) for propaganda purposes (Bolsover & Howard, 2019). The next section of this chapter presents an overview of the historical development of the Big Four, including China Radio International, CCTV and CGTN, China Daily, and Xinhua News Agency.

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

99

Historical Development China Radio International China Radio International (known as Xinhua Radio) was founded by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1941 (Huang, 2017; Morales, 2022). It was renamed as Radio Beijing due to its relocation to the city of Beijing, and then relabelled as China Radio International in 1993 (Huang, 2017; Morales, 2022). Since its inception, China Radio International has had a mission of broadcasting to the outside world. During the War of Resistance against Japan (1931–1945) and the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), China Radio International expressed political and cultural views of the CCP to the world by broadcasting programmes in Japanese and English (Huang, 2017). This strategy continued till 2004, when Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, stated that China Radio International should establish a “modern international broadcasting system therefore China Radio International can play a bigger role and exploit the advantages to the full in facilitating China’s international communication” and this viewpoint resulted in the transformation of China Radio International (Huang, 2017, p. 143). In 2007, China Radio International launched online TV programmes and mobile radio. In 2009, the mobile version of China Radio International Online became operational, which represented the country’s first multimedia website in English optimised for mobile devices, and two years later, the French and Spanish versions of the site were launched (Huang, 2017). In 2011, China International Broadcasting Network (CIBN) was launched with the goal of maximising its global reach by expanding its content beyond radio broadcasts and enhancing its online audio-visual materials (Morales, 2022). CIBN is an Internet TV service, which was a joint venture of China Radio International with other corporations. The launch of CIBN marked the comprehensive entry of China Radio International into the field of new media and the beginning of its media convergence process (Huang, 2017). Relying on the rapid development of Internet and mobile technologies, CIBN interacts with global audiences through using multilingual, multigenre, and multi-terminal distribution formats, covering a range of new audio-visual programmes, such as Internet, mobile radio and TV, Internet TV, Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), etc. (Huang, 2017) These

100 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

efforts enable CIBN to be accessible to international audiences, and its content free of charge allows it to be circulated worldwide (Huang, 2017). Nowadays, the production and services of China Radio International have expanded to 65 languages, broadcasting in a variety of formats via shortwave, FM, or online (Becard & Menechelli, 2019; Morales, 2022). It has become the second largest broadcasting organisation in the world, sitting next to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (Becard & Menechelli, 2019). CCTV and CGTN CCTV, formerly known as Beijing Television, was founded in 1958, and renamed as China Central Television (CCTV) in 1978 (Hu et al., 2017). It is “the most important and influential media in China” (Huang, 2020, p.  288), as it is considered important for mainstream news and public opinion in China as well as being the accepted mouthpiece of the CCP (Hu et al., 2017; Huang, 2020). CCTV owns 19 ground channels and 43 digital channels, providing 452 programmes and 935 hours of broadcasting with a viewership of approximately about 0.7 billion people in the world per day (Huang, 2020). In the early days of its establishment, CCTV promoted itself and broadcast Chinese programmes by relying on foreign broadcasting networks. This included developing partnerships with foreign television stations and forming joint operations overseas (Zhang, 2011). With the development of satellite television, CCTV began its overseas expansion and established a department dedicated to foreign promotion in 1984 (Zhang, 2011). In 1985, CCTV launched its first English news program—English News. In 1991, the Foreign Television Centre was established and CCTV began to send programmes via the leased AsiaSat 1, the signal of which covers Southeast Asia to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and this marked a new stage for CCTV to reach out to foreign audiences (Hu et al., 2017). AsiaSat 1 now is a communications satellite owned by Asia Satellite Telecommunications Company based in Hong Kong. Since 1992, CCTV has launched several international channels, including CCTV-4 in 1992, which is China’s first Mandarin-language international channel; CCTV-9  in 2000, which is a 24-hour English-language channel; CCTV-Español and CCTV Français in 2004 (broadcasting in Spanish and French, respectively), CCTV-Arabic and CCTV-Russian in 2009; and CCTV Documentary Channel in 2011 (Hu et  al., 2017).

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

101

CCTV has also expanded its network presence to enhance its international broadcasting capabilities. CCTV’s online television broadcaster—China Network Television (CNTV)—began operations in December 2009, aiming to provide users “with a globalised, multilingual and multi-terminal public webcast service platform” (Hu et al., 2017). CNTV offers services via using integrated broadcasting platforms, including website, networked TV, IPTV, and mobile TV. Among these platforms, CNTV-CBox, a video App designed for users to watch TV programmes from CCTV and dozens of local TV programmes across China, has emerged as the top choice for overseas users to access Chinese TV programmes (Hu et al., 2017). In December 2016, CCTV carried out the latest relaunch, which involved rebranding CCTV News as China Global Television Network (CGTN) for the purpose of consolidating its global reach and managing “the global trend in media convergence” (Fearon & Rodrigues, 2019, p. 103). CGTN is a multi-language, multi-platform media group with six television channels (Sun, 2018). It is formed by a 24-hour news channel in English language, a video content provider, and a digital media division (Sun, 2018). CGTN’s headquarters is located in Beijing with affiliates around the world. Among them, CGTN America Broadcast Centre is located in Washington, DC, CGTN Africa Broadcast Centre is located in Nairobi, and a European branch is located in London (Sun, 2018). CGTN broadcasts six channels (two in English and the others in Arabic, French, Spanish, and Russian) in 171 countries, and has signed cooperation agreements with around 70 foreign media outlets, as well as signed news exchange agreements with hundreds of foreign media outlets (Becard & Menechelli, 2019). CGTN serves the dual mission of acting as a credible global media organisation and as an important government propaganda agency (Fearon & Rodrigues, 2019, p. 103). With its ethos of “see(ing) the difference”, it states its ambition to create “a better understanding of international events around the world, connect continents, and bring a more balanced perspective to global news” (Hu et al., 2017, p. 68); and “promote communication and understanding between China and the world, and enhance cultural exchanges and mutual trust between China and other countries” (Zhu, 2022, p. 4). President Xi urged CGTN to “tell China’s story well, spread China’s voice well … and showcase China’s role as a builder of world peace” (Varrall, 2020, p. 4). The concept of “Da Wai Xuan (大外 宣)” (great external publicity) is written into CGTN’s policy agenda (Zhu, 2022).

102 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

China Daily China Daily is the first national English-language newspaper in China, established in 1981, belonging to the People’s Daily Newspaper Group (Thussu, 2018a). It is considered an authoritative English-language media in China and an essential source of information on Chinese politics, economy, society and culture, commonly referred to as the “Voice of China” or “Window on China” (Hartig, 2017, p. 125), and “the central means of communication between the Chinese government and the non-Chinese-­ speaking world” (Luporini, 2021, p. 254). With international audiences as its primary target, China Daily is considered to “epitomise ‘China’s efforts to attain respected global status’” (Pan et al., 2020, p. 60). The newspaper focuses on domestic issues, especially policies and achievements of the Chinese government. It has a clear international mission to help “the world know more about China and the country’s integration with the international community” (Hartig, 2017, p. 124). The coverage of this media outlet features five areas, including “What is happening in China; why is it happening; what are the future trends; what is the impact on the outside world; and how Chinese people perceive the outside world” (Hartig, 2017, p. 125). Prior to 2009, China Daily was published only in Beijing (Sparks, 2020). After 2009, it expanded into a daily newspaper in North America and was published weekly in Europe, the United States, the UK as well as China itself (Sparks, 2020). Its supplement China Watch is published monthly, being distributed globally as a supplement together with a number of Western media. These Western media outlets are The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal (the United States), The Daily Telegraph (the UK), Le Figaro (France), Handelsblatt (Germany), The Nation (Thailand), Jakarta Post (Indonesia), Uno and El Cronista (Argentina), and Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Russia) (Hartig, 2020, p. 10). In May 2016, Fairfax Media Australia Ltd. signed an agreement with China Daily, meaning that the best-known newspapers owned by this media giant—The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, as well as The Financial Review—agreed to publish an eight-page English version of China Watch once a month (Hartig, 2020). However, Fairfax, which had merged with Nine Entertainment in 2018, quietly ceased carrying China Watch supplements, leading to the termination of this contract in 2020 (Meade, 2020). Since 2022, American newspaper the Los Angeles Times has become the latest paper to publish the English version of China Watch supplement.

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

103

According to China Daily, the supplement of China Watch received over 50 million readers in business and politics in 2016; and it “plays an important role in explaining China to the world and ensuring that the country’s voice is heard” (Hartig, 2020, p. 10). Xinhua News Agency As China’s official and largest state news agency, Xinhua News Agency was founded by the CCP in 1931 (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020). It is a ministry-­ level institution under the supervision of the CCP’s Central Publicity Department that reports to the State Council (Pandey, 2022). Xinhua News Agency has long been “a key disseminator of the CCP’s narrative” (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020, p. 61) as well as “a party and state ideological apparatus … [which has] exhibited a persistent adherence to party principles” (Hong, 2011, p. 382). Xinhua News Agency has had news exchange agreements with foreign news agencies, such as Agence France-Presse (AFP) and the official Soviet news agency TASS since 1950s (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020). Through content exchange, Xinhua News Agency provides dozens of chronically underfunded media organisations around the world with news and photos (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020). By charging less than Reuters and The Associated Press and offering free content, Xinhua News Agency aims to add a “Chinese perspective” to global events (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020). In 2002, Xinhua News Agency launched the “China Focus” column with the aim of introducing current events in China to international audiences and constructing a favourable image of China on a global scale (Zhao & Xiang, 2019). Over the past few decades, the Chinese government has invested heavily in the Xinhua News Agency. This allows the agency to compete with the AP, AFP, and Reuters, while maintaining its commitment to the government (El Damanhoury & Garud-Paktar, 2021) by promoting global reputation and image of China (Cheng et al., 2016). As of 2021, Xinhua News Agency has established 181 branches outside mainland China, surpassing AP, AFP, and Reuters (Gan, 2021). With more than 3,000 journalists and locally recruited staff, Xinhua News Agency provides publications in eight languages: Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Portuguese, and Japanese, as well as a variety of 24-hour-a-day audio, video, and photo programmes (Becard & Menechelli, 2019).

104 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

The Shield and Sword The management of international broadcasting in China is regulated by the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), which is under the supervision of the State Council (Rawnsley, 2015a). In 2004, SARFT made it clear that any international expansion of radio and television stations, including leasing and purchasing new channels or establishing new stations, needed to be approved and regulated by the government (Zhang, 2011). This makes it impossible for any radio or television stations to expand internationally without government approval. In 2007, the CCP initiated the development of soft power at the 17th Party Congress (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020). Since then, terms such as “cultural soft power”, “modern communication system”, and “improving international communication capacity” have appeared frequently in high-level government documents (Huang, 2017, p. 144). International broadcasting now serves as a soft power tool, both as a “shield” and as a “sword” in China (Rawnsley, 2015b, p.  278). The shield function is manifested by one of the goals of China’s international broadcasting expansion—to “drown out anti-China forces in the West” (Rawnsley, 2015b, p. 278) and resist the “China threat theory” that has prevailed since the 1990s (Al-Rodhan, 2007). The motivation for establishing an international news provider derives from the understanding that international news media outlets largely misrepresent China (Sparks, 2020) by adopting a biased and negative perspective to report China-related issues (Rawnsley, 2015b). For instance, the growth and modernisation of China is portrayed as a threat, the “China model” of development is criticised, and achievements and positive aspects of Chinese society are underreported (Rawnsley, 2015b). The sword function is reflected by the second goal of “wrest (ing) global ideological leadership from the hands of the West” (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020, p. 60). The Chinese government realises that it cannot be properly understood unless it establishes international news organisations that can challenge and shake up the “Orientalist” coverage created by the CNN and the BBC (Sparks, 2020). This political dimension also impacts on how domestic media covers international affairs (Gan, 2021). For the Chinese leadership, international communication capacity is not only about projecting a desirable image to overseas audiences, but also shaping how international affairs are communicated to domestic audiences (Gan, 2021). This aligns with the purpose of

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

105

China’s soft power and public diplomacy strategies—to strengthen the governance of domestic political institutions and contribute to the selfperception of the country’s rise under the leadership of the CCP (Klimeš, 2017). Wang Chen, former director of the State Council Information Office, highlighted the importance of “taking consideration of the impact of internal publicity on foreign public opinion as well as the influence of external publicity on domestic social stability” (Yang, 2020, p. 376). The expansion of China’s international broadcasting service meets the aim of nurturing Chinese nationalism that is important to the country’s policymaking (Chen & Wang, 2022). The Chinese government believes it has been poorly represented and a victim of Western media and so by using nationalism it can rationalise its heavy investment in developing state-run media (Varrall, 2020), gain social support for the CCP regime, and justify the approaches of China’s interaction with the international system (Li & Feng, 2021). In addition, the expansion of China’s international broadcasting services is part of the internationalisation of the Chinese economy. Over the past decade, the construction of information and communication infrastructure has characterised the continuous expansion of Chinese state-run media with strong support from the Chinese government (Thussu, 2018a). It is all part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to connect China with the world through building a dense network of “hard” and “soft” infrastructure (Rehman & Noman, 2021; Rolland, 2017; Teo et al., 2019). The BRI has been supported by the $US40 billion Silk Road Infrastructure Fund, which mainly capitalised on China’s foreign exchange reserves (Thussu, 2018a). In addition, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established in 2016 with members from more than 70 countries, has financed these projects, with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) as one of the leading banks (Thussu, 2018a). A senior Chinese official, as reported by China Daily, stated that “‘network construction, services and applications and digital economy’ were crucial for deepening exchanges and cooperation” (Thussu, 2018a, p. 21). This suggests the construction of infrastructure, as part of the global expansion of Chinese state-run media, is one of the strategies of China to integrate into the global economy and trade. It is therefore clear that the expansion of China’s international broadcasting services strategically serves the country’s political, economic, and cultural ambitions. It targets international and domestic audiences in the

106 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

efforts to advance the country’s soft power and public diplomacy goals as well as to consolidate domestic governance. Specifically, it aims to uphold the legitimacy of CCP, encourage openness of international actors to Chinese financing and investment, and to strengthen national pride through utilising nationalism.

Credibility and Growth China’s massive investment in international broadcasting has increased the presence of Chinese media representatives and its voice on major global geopolitical affairs (Gan, 2021). With this global expansion, Chinese state-run media appear to be more confident in setting their own agendas, rather than following those offered by the Western media (Gan, 2021). It’s a global issue with journalists in some countries such as Kenya now using content, especially feature stories supplied by Xinhua News Agency (Madrid-Morales, 2021). The media in Ghana and Malawi have also seen an upward trend in the use of Xinhua content (Madrid-Morales, 2021). Xinhua has also made its presence felt in the Pacific through its office in the Fijian capital, Suva. The agency has agreements in place with Pacific media outlets to supply content. According to R. Herr and researchers at the Australian Strategic Institute, “all local papers in the region regularly feature news from China through their arrangement with Xinhua, sometimes in their news pages or in their regular sections on world news” (Herr, 2019, p. 26). Pacific newspapers also accept from China advertorial content for events, travel and educational promotions (Herr, 2019). It’s not just print media being targeted in the Pacific. English and Chinese language news, documentary and entertainment programming is available for international markets through the China Global Television Network (CGTN). Herr (2019) notes that access to China provides programming via the Internet, free-to-air satellite and satellite cable services as well as local television networks. Many of the Pacific’s cash-strapped national television services have negotiated with CCTV for content and to provide channels for CGTN programming (Herr, 2019). However, considering the number of media platforms developed by the Big Four and the significant amount of investment from the government, Chinese international broadcasters should have done better than its Western competitors (Thussu, 2018b). A study assessing the impact of Chinese state-run media on the news coverage of COVID-19 in 30 African

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

107

countries revealed the content published by Chinese state-run media was far less likely to be adopted by African local news outlets than other major global players (e.g., Reuters, and AFP) (Madrid-Morales, 2021). Similarly, the CCTV Spanish service (CCTV-E) has a very low audience in Spain and Latin America (Sparks, 2020). Although the European edition of China Daily had a circulation of over 90,000 copies in 2014, 88,000 of these were distributed for free, and the actual retail sales in that year averaged 660 copies per day (Sparks, 2020). In the meantime, a 2015 Reuters investigation found that at least 33 radio stations in 14 countries were broadcasting pro-China propaganda while concealing their key shareholder—China Radio International (Bolsover & Howard, 2019). These stations operate without the label of Chinese propaganda and promotion (Yellinek, 2022). Chinese state-run media has struggled to win the trust of local audiences in many places, such as South Africa (Wasserman, 2016). The global expansion of Chinese media is regarded as a political mandate, meaning to meet the government’s agenda by producing immediate, visible, and presentable results (Gan, 2021). The Chinese state-run media has not developed a reputation for initiating reports of any of the major global events (Gan, 2021). Many of the Chinese journalists sent abroad appear constrained by rigid work patterns with a lack of freedom to understand local societies or develop original perspectives on international news events (Gan, 2021). The perception of credibility of Chinese international broadcasters is challenged by the low trust of audiences in state-sponsored broadcasters (Rawnsley, 2015b), which are largely perceived as sinister propaganda that misleads international audiences (Hartig, 2020). These factors do not help to enhance its influence in shaping global discourse. The intention, strategies, and impact of the rise of Chinese state-run media in the world are highly debated (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020). There are growing concerns about the potential threats to local ideology, political and economic culture, and national security. For instance, China is devoted to reshaping the global information sphere through the use of a “worldwide propaganda campaign of astonishing scope and ambition” (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020, p. 59). Since 2020, one of the most common concerns expressed by policymakers, technical sector, civil society, and the media is the potential threat to democratic freedoms and structures posed by the CCP’s media influence (Cook, 2022; Walker et  al., 2016). Governments, thereby, have begun to re-examine the impact of Chinese

108 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

state-run media on themselves and tighten regulations of these media outlets operating locally (Zhu, 2022). In 2021, the British broadcasting regulator, Ofcom, banned CGTN from broadcasting on British radio stations because of a dispute over which of the entities owned editorial control over the Beijing-based media outlet (Zhu, 2022). The regulations of Chinese media have been extended to the online sphere. In August 2020, the then president of the United States, Donald Trump, issued two executive orders to address the perceived threat posed by TikTok and WeChat, banning future deals with the two Chinese parent companies, ByteDance and Tencent. In addition, an investigation undertaken by the Associated Press and the Oxford Internet Institute found that the popularity of tweets provided by Chinese diplomats and state media on Twitter was fuelled by an army of fake accounts (Kinetz, 2021). These fake accounts amplified Chinese propaganda without disclosing the content was government-sponsored (Kinetz, 2021). A more recent claim is that the Chinese state-run media, such as China Radio International, is beginning to sponsor social media influencers to disseminate information about the country (Cook, 2022). According to Kinetz (2021), the online strategies adopted by Chinese state-run media can boost the status of their social media accounts and create an illusion of widespread support for Chinese propaganda via generating fictitious popularity. It, nonetheless, distorted the algorithms of social media platforms, which were designed to facilitate the spread of popular posts, and expose users to the government’s propaganda (Kinetz, 2021). Additionally, fake accounts on social media do not contribute to a healthy information environment, the reach of Chinese information, and the perceived authenticity of Chinese information (Kinetz, 2021). Liu Xiaoming, the former Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom denied these claims, stating that “there is no so-called misleading propaganda, nor exporting a model of online public opinion guidance” (Kinetz, 2021).

Conclusion This chapter has focused on the global expansion of China’s international broadcasting services and reviewed its historical development, strategies, motivations, and implications. Through reviewing the existing debates, this chapter reinforces the argument that the advancement of Chinese

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

109

state-run media in the world serves to achieve the China’s political, cultural, and economic ambitions on the international stage. Moreover, its recent focus on the Internet, particularly on social media, marks a new and more insidious strategy of this global expansion. Since 2012, the CCP has dramatically increased its efforts to shape global media with the aim of showcasing China as a model of governance and information management for developing countries, and of encouraging foreign actors to welcome Chinese investment (Cook, 2022). This effort seemingly has been accelerating, as the CCP seeks to recast the image of China damaged by the international controversy over the origin of the COVID-19 since 2017 (Cook, 2022).

References Al-Rodhan, K. R. (2007). A Critique of the China Threat Theory: A Systematic Analysis. Asian Perspective, 31, 41–66. Becard, D.  S. R., & Menechelli, P. (2019). Chinese Cultural Diplomacy: Instruments in China’s Strategy for International Insertion in the 21st Century. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 62. https://doi.org/10.1590/ 0034-­7329201900105 Bolsover, G., & Howard, P. (2019). Chinese Computational Propaganda: Automation, Algorithms and the Manipulation of Information About Chinese Politics on Twitter and Weibo. Information, Communication & Society, 22(14), 2063–2080. Brazys, S., & Dukalskis, A. (2020). China’s Message Machine. Journal of Democracy, 31(4), 59–73. Budnitsky, S., & Jia, L. (2018). Branding Internet sovereignty: Digital media and the Chinese–Russian cyberalliance. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 21(5), 594–613. https://doi.org/10.1177/1367549417751151 Chen, F., & Wang, G. (2022). A War or merely friction? Examining news Reports on the Current Sino-US Trade Dispute in The New  York Times and China Daily. Critical Discourse Studies, 19(1), 1–18. Cheng, Z., Golan, G. J., & Kiousis, S. (2016). The second-level agenda-building function of the Xinhua news agency: Examining the role of government-sponsored news in mediated public diplomacy. Journalism Practice, 10(6), 744–762. China Copyright and Media. (2013). Xi Jinping’s 19 August Speech Revealed? (Translation). Retrieved August 25, from https://chinacopyrightandmedia. wordpress.com/2013/11/12/xi-­j inpings-­1 9-­a ugust-­s peech-­r evealed­translation/

110 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

Cook, S. (2022). Countering Beijing’s Media Manipulation. Journal of Democracy, 33(1), 116–130. Douzet, F., Limonier, K., Mihoubi, S., & René, E. (2021). Mapping the spread of Russian and Chinese contents on the French-speaking African web. Journal of Cyber Policy, 6(1), 50–67. El Damanhoury, K., & Garud-Paktar, N. (2021). Soft Power Journalism: A Visual Framing Analysis of COVID-19 on Xinhua and VOA’s Instagram Pages. Digital Journalism, 10, 1–23. Fearon, T., & Rodrigues, U.  M. (2019). The Dichotomy of China Global Television Network’s News Coverage. Pacific Journalism Review, 25(1/2), 102–121. Feng, D. (2017). Social Media and Global Conversation. In China’s Media Go Global (pp. 274–292). Routledge. Gan, C. (2021). Expansion of Chinese State Media in Europe and its Impact on Chinese Media Discourse on Europe: The Case of Xinhua News Agency. The 15th Annual Conference on Asian Studies, Date: 2021/11/26-2021/11/27, Location: Online, Gill, B. (2020). China’s Global Influence: Post-COVID Prospects for Soft Power. The Washington Quarterly, 43(2), 97–115. Glaser, B. S., & Medeiros, E. S. (2007). The Changing Ecology of Foreign policy-­ making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of “Peaceful Rise”. The China Quarterly, 190, 291–310. Hao, S. (2008). Harmonious World: The Conceived International Order in Framework of China’s Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 29–55. Hartig, F. (2017). China Daily–Beijing’s Global Voice? In D. K. Thussu, H. d. Burgh, & A. Shi (Eds.), China’s Media Go Global (pp. 122–140). Routledge. Hartig, F. (2019). A Review of the Current State of Research on China’s International Image Management. Communication and the Public, 4(1), 68–81. Hartig, F. (2020). Rethinking China’s Global ‘Propaganda’blitz. Global Media and Communication, 16(1), 3–18. Herr, R. (2019). Chinese Influence in the Pacific Islands: The Yin and Yang of Soft Power. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Hinck, R. S., Manly, J. N., Kluver, R. A., & Norris, W. J. (2016). Interpreting and shaping Geopolitics in Chinese Media: The Discourse of the ‘New Style of Great Power Relations’. Asian Journal of Communication, 26(5), 427–445. Hong, J. (2011). From the World’s Largest Propaganda Machine to a Multipurposed Global News Agency: Factors in and Implications of Xinhua’s Transformation Since 1978. Political Communication, 28(3), 377–393. Hong, J., & Liu, Y. (2015). Internationalisation of China’s Television: History, Development and New Trends. In Routledge Handbook of Chinese Media (pp. 445–463). Routledge.

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

111

Hu, Z., & Ji, D. (2012). Ambiguities in Communicating with the World: the “Going-out” Policy of China’s Media and its Multilayered Contexts. Chinese Journal of Communication, 5(1), 32–37. Hu, Z., Ji, D., & Gong, Y. (2017). From the Outside in: CCTV Going Global in a New World Communication Order. In D. K. Thussu, H. d. Burgh, & A. Shi (Eds.), China’s Media Go Global (pp. 67–78). Taylor & Francis Group. Huang, K. (2017). The ‘going out’of China Radio International. In D. K. Thussu, H. d. Burgh, & A.  Shi (Eds.), China’s Media Go Global (pp.  141–152). Routledge. Huang, L. (2020). Social Media and the Transformation of CCTV News. In J. Hong (Ed.), China in the Era of Social Media: An Unprecedented Force for an Unprecedented Social Change (p. 285). Lexington Books. Huang, Z. A., & Wang, R. (2020). ‘Panda Engagement’in China’s Digital Public Diplomacy. Asian Journal of Communication, 30(2), 118–140. Hunter, A. (2009). Soft Power: China on the Global Stage. Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2(3), 373–398. Kinetz, E. (2021). Army of Fake Fans Boosts China’s Messaging on Twitter. Retrieved April 10, from https://apnews.com/article/asia-­pacific-­china-­europe-­ middle-­east-­government-­and-­politics-­62b13895aa6665ae4d887dcc8d196dfc Klimeš, O. (2017). China’s Cultural Soft Power: The Central Concept in the Early Xi Jinping era (2012–2017). Acta Universitatis Carolinae Philologica, 4, 127–150. Li, X. (2017). From Beijing to Rio: Rebranding China via the Modern Olympic Games. The Journal of International Communication, 23(2), 252–271. https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2017.1347101 Li, X., & Feng, J. (2021). Nation Branding Through the Lens of Soccer: Using a Sports Nation Branding Framework to Explore the Case of China. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 25(4), 1118–1138. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 13675494211011179 Luporini, A. (2021). Metaphor, Nominalization, Appraisal: Analyzing Coronavirus-Related Headlines and Subheadings in China Daily and The Wall Street Journal. GEMA Online Journal of Language Studies, 21(1), 253–273. Madrid-Morales, D. (2021). Who Set the Narrative? Assessing the Influence of Chinese Global Media on News Coverage of COVID-19  in 30 African Countries. Global Media and China, 6(2), 129–151. Meade, A. (2020). Nine Entertainment Newspapers Quit Carrying China Watch Supplement. Retrieved January 30, from https://www.theguardian.com/ media/2020/dec/09/nine-­entertainment-­newspapers-­quit-­carrying-­china­watch-­supplement Morales, P.  S. (2022). China’s Global Media in Latin America: Exploring the Impact and Perception in Mexico and Argentina. In China in the Global South (pp. 79–94). Springer.

112 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

Pan, C., Isakhan, B., & Nwokora, Z. (2020). Othering as Soft-power Discursive Practice: China Daily’s Construction of Trump’s America in the 2016 Presidential Election. Politics, 40(1), 54–69. Pandey, L. (2022). Can State-Owned Media Perform Watchdog Functions? A Case of Nepal. In Global Perspectives on Journalism in Nepal (pp. 174–189). Routledge. Pei, M. (2018). China in Xi’s “New Era”: A Play for Global Leadership. Journal of Democracy, 29(2), 37–51. Ram, N. (2016). Without Free Flow of Information, There Can Be No Serious Democracy. Retrieved October 7, from https://www.thehindu.com/news/ national/without-­f ree-­f low-­o f-­i nformation-­t here-­c an-­b e-­n o-­s erious-­ democracy/article4898966.ece Rawnsley, G. D. (2015a). Chinese International Broadcasting, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. In Routledge Handbook of Chinese Media (pp.  478–493). Routledge. Rawnsley, G.  D. (2015b). To Know Us is to Love Us: Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting in Contemporary Russia and China. Politics, 35(3–4), 273–286. Rehman, F. U., & Noman, A. A. (2021). Trade Related Sectorial Infrastructure and Exports of Belt and Road Countries: Does Belt and Road Initiatives Make This Relation Structurally Instable? China Economic Journal, 14(3), 350–374. Repnikova, M., & Fang, K. (2019). Digital Media Experiments in China:“revolutionizing” Persuasion under Xi Jinping. The China Quarterly, 239, 679–701. Rolland, N. (2017). China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-changer? The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), 127–142. Shi, A. (2021). Recontextualizing Constructive Journalism in Contemporary China: A Comparative and Intercultural Perspective. Social Sciences in China, 42(2), 184–195. Shi, A., & Zhang, Y. (2019). Xinzhongguo xinxiang de zaijiangou: 70 nian duiwai chuannbo lilun he shijian de chuangxin lujing [Reconstruction of China’s Image: An Innovative Approach to China’s Global Communication Theory and Practice since 1949]. Global Media Jounal, 6(2), 26–38. Sparks, C. (2020). China An Emerging Cultural Imperialist. In O. Boyd-Barrett & T. Mirrlees (Eds.), Media Imperialism: Continuity and Change (pp. 275–289). Rowman & Littlefield. Stockmann, D., & Gallagher, M.  E. (2011). Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China. Comparative Political Studies, 44(4), 436–467. Sun, L. (2018). Developments and New Approaches of Internationalizing China’s Media: A Case Study of China Global Television Network (CGTN) in Witness Perspective. Global Media Journal, 16(31), 1–5.

5  THE RISE OF CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES 

113

Teo, H. C., Lechner, A. M., Walton, G. W., Chan, F. K. S., Cheshmehzangi, A., Tan-Mullins, M., Chan, H. K., Sternberg, T., & Campos-Arceiz, A. (2019). Environmental Impacts of Infrastructure Development under the Belt and Road Initiative. Environments, 6(6), 72. Thussu, D. K. (2018a). Globalization of Chinese Media: The Global Context. In D.  K. Thussu, H. d. Burgh, & A.  Shi (Eds.), China’s Media Go Global (pp. 17–33) Taylor & Francis Group. Thussu, D. K. (2018b). A New Global Communication Order for a Multipolar World. Communication Research and Practice, 4(1), 52–66. Varrall, M. (2020). Behind the News: Inside China Global Television Network. Lowy Institute. Walker, C., Plattner, M. F., & Diamond, L. (2016). Authoritarianism Goes Global. Retrieved August 22, from https://www.the-­american-­interest.com/2016/ 03/28/authoritarianism-­goes-­global/ Wasserman, H. (2016). China’s “soft power” and its influence on editorial agendas in South Africa. Chinese Journal of Communication, 9(1), 8–20. Wu, Y. (2017). The Three Patterns of Chinese International Communication. In D.  K. Thussu, H. d. Burgh, & A.  Shi (Eds.), China’s Media Go Global (pp. 247–256). Routledge. Xin, X. (2018). Popularizing Party Journalism in China in the Age of Social Media: The Case of Xinhua News Agency. Global Media and China, 3(1), 3–17. Yang, Y. (2020). Looking Inward: How Does Chinese Public Diplomacy Work at Home? The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 22(3), 369–386. Ye, P., & Albornoz, L. A. (2018). Chinese Media ‘Going out’ in Spanish Speaking Countries: The Case of CGTN-Español. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 13(1), 81–97. Yellinek, R. (2022). China’s Media Strategy Towards Israel. Israel Affairs, 28(2), 184–198. Zhang, X. (2011). China’s International Broadcasting: A Case Study of CCTV International. In J. Wang (Ed.), Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication (pp. 57–71). Springer. Zhang, X., Wasserman, H., & Mano, W. (2016). China’s Expanding Influence in Africa: Projection, Perception and Prospects in Southern African countries. Communicatio, 42(1), 1–22. Zhang, Y., & Ong’ong’a, D. O. (2021). Unveiling China’s Digital Diplomacy: A Comparative Analysis of CGTN Africa and BBC News Africa on Facebook. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891 121106821.

114 

J. FENG AND X. (LEAH) LI

Zhao, X., & Xiang, Y. (2019). Does China’s Outward Focused Journalism Engage a Constructive Approach? A Qualitative Content Analysis of Xinhua News Agency’s English News. Asian Journal of Communication, 29(4), 346–362. https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2019.1606263 Zhu, Y. (2022). China’s ‘New Cultural Diplomacy’in International Broadcasting: Branding the Nation Through CGTN Documentary. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 28, 1–13. Zubair, B., & Hussain, N. (2020). China’s Public Diplomacy and Coomunication Strategy in the US: Lessons for Pakistan. Margalla Papers, 24(2), 57–70.

CHAPTER 6

Diplomacy, Propaganda, and Journalism in the Digital Landscape Xiufang (Leah) Li

and Alexandra Wake

Introduction Public diplomacy initiatives led by governments aim to create influence in attitudes and behaviours among foreign publics, laying the foundation of creating support to a country’s foreign policies. It highlights the role of governments in leading the creation of the linkages between nations through amplifying person-to-person contacts (Chitty, cited in Li, 2011). The common actors in public diplomacy involve governments, publics, and the media. This means that governments can proactively influence foreign public opinion through manipulating media content relating to international affairs for the purpose of advancing the goals of foreign policies. This practice is defined as mediated public diplomacy, highlighting the role of governments using mass communication (including the Internet) in creating a supportive environment for a nation’s foreign policies (Entman, 2008). Within this practice, international broadcasting

X. (Leah) Li (*) • A. Wake RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9_6

115

116 

X. (LEAH) LI AND A. WAKE

services are well practised as a popular tool to achieve public diplomacy objectives. This chapter embarks on a critical discussion about the interplay among news networks, ownership, and the deployment of public diplomacy tactics in contemporary international broadcasting. In the first section, we conceptualise public diplomacy and the extended area of mediated public diplomacy, linking the discussion with transnational journalism while underpinning the interdependence between government, publics, and the media, specific to the cases of CNC (China Xinhua News Network Corporation) World and Press TV (PTV). In the second section, we review the three models of transnational broadcasting in mediated public diplomacy, while proposing the emerging model for international broadcasting engaging with mediated public diplomacy within the digital landscape. We then evaluate the performance of broadcasters in accordance with the four models, especially focusing on empirically observing the online presence of the ABC Pacific, the China CGTN Facebook, and Al Jazeera English. In the third section, we discuss the dilemma between public diplomacy and propaganda in journalistic practice. In the concluding section, we put forward the future trend and future research of the interlink between public diplomacy activities and journalism in the digital media environment, while underpinning the ongoing debate about propaganda embedded in this process.

Public Diplomacy, Transnational Journalism, and Mediated Public Diplomacy Conceptualising Public Diplomacy Public diplomacy is viewed as an instrument to advance a nation’s competitive advantages through promoting the country’s values and beliefs in the international arena. This term is widely defined as purposive communication practices of state actors in one nation to influence foreign publics in different nations in the service of acquiring foreign policy objectives through nurturing an environment among foreign publics that enables the facilitation of diplomatic relations between countries (Malone, 1985; Manheim, 1994; Sevin et  al., 2019). The exercise of public diplomacy intends to grow a nation’s international status and shape a positive image of the nation in the eyes of foreign publics (Li, 2011). Differentiated from

6  DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL… 

117

traditional public diplomacy, public diplomacy focuses on establishing government-to-public rather than government-to-government interaction. In other words, “individuals have an active role and enjoy an interactive relationship with diplomatic actors who usually initiate the activities” (Huang, 2020, p. 3886). The aim of government-to-public interaction in the domain of public diplomacy is to evoke changes in attitudes and behaviours among foreign publics in a particular way that is desired by governments (Li, 2011). From this aspect, public diplomacy underpins the use of non-military means to advance a nation’s ambitions on the international stage. It takes place in various forms of educational and cultural exchanges, broadcasting services, and information and communication programmes (Sevin et al., 2019). Likewise, Cull (2008) notes that there are five components of public diplomacy, including listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and international broadcasting. Within this, Seib (2013) reinforces that transnational journalism, especially international broadcasting using English language, acts as a public diplomacy tool, appealing to governments because of having the capacity to transmit messages to global audiences with low cost and high speed, in addition to the perceived credibility using the journalistic form and principles. Hence, transnational journalism specific to international broadcasting is a form of public diplomacy activities initiated by governments. Mediated Public Diplomacy: Government, Publics, and the Media The actors in public diplomacy activities include not only governments, but also non-governmental organisations, institutions, and individuals (Gregory, 2008). The essential component in a public diplomacy process is linked to the attempts of national actors to influence the media in foreign countries (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). Thus, existing research concentrates on examining the interplay among media content, public opinion, and foreign policy, and the outcomes of that demonstrate the critical role of media in shaping public opinions on foreign affairs as well as in forming the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the reported country (Entman, 2008; Samuel-Azran, 2013). The two-dimensional efforts—agenda building and framing building—are embedded in these government-led practices; and this results in the generation of and the competition for international media attention (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). Agenda building involves “how issues are created and why some controversies or incipient issues come to

118 

X. (LEAH) LI AND A. WAKE

command the attention and concern of decision makers, while others fail” (Cobb & Elder; Cobb, Ross, & Ross, cited in Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 448). This phenomenon is often termed as the CNN Effect, meaning “global television has become a direct and perhaps even dominant actor in the formulation of policies in defence and foreign affairs” (Gilboa, 2002, p.733). Similar to that, the Al Jazeera Effect is described as “operating in a similar manner within the Muslim world, with its regional and global reach broadening pan-Arab and pan-Muslim political interaction and perceived connectedness” (Nisbet et al., 2004, p. 16). The interdependence between governments, publics, and the media is exemplified through the extended area of public diplomacy—mediated public diplomacy. According to Entman (2008, p.88), mediated public diplomacy is concerned with “shorter term and more targeted efforts using mass communication (including the Internet) to increase support of a country’s specific foreign policies among audiences beyond that country’s borders.” It aims to exert influence on news media in other nations for the purpose of producing a positive interpretation of a given nation’s foreign policies (Entman, 2008). Responding to this, governments around the world are devoted to investing in the development of global media outlets in an attempt to channel international public interpretations of current affairs. For instance, the aim of CNC World, a 24-hour global news channel in English launched by China’s state news agency—Xinhua News Agency—is to “present an international vision with a China perspective”, and “broadcast news reports in a timely way and objectively and be a new source of information for global audiences”; and therefore, CNC is viewed as another approach that the Chinese government relies on to raise the influence and challenge foreign media views on the international stage (BBC, 2010). Furthermore, PTV broadcasting in English and French languages, as part of the Iranian state-owned news network owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), has the vision of “break(ing) the global media stranglehold of Western outlets” by presenting the global audiences with voices, perspectives, and stories that are marginalised and underrepresented by the Western powers (Behravesh, 2013). In light of Behravesh (2013), the fact that the head of the IRIB is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader of Iran points to the political association between PTV and the state; and as a result, PTV positions itself as a partisan rather than a professional media agent to provide the global public with another perspective to counter views disseminated by pro-Western or pro-Arab

6  DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL… 

119

media networks. Accordingly, both CNC and PTV are funded by the governments and their objectives resonate with the goal of mediated public diplomacy aired by Entman in 2008. Mediated public diplomacy is further interpreted as “a strategic contest between rival nations over setting the international media’s news agenda” (Sheafer & Gabai, cited in Samuel-Azran, 2013, p. 1297). It highlights the leading role of government in manipulating public opinion on foreign affairs. During this process, government actors deploy framing tactics to making some aspects more salient than the remaining aspects of a situation through defining policy problem, analysing the causes and moral evaluation, and proposing remedy (Entman, 2008). Referring to the instance of US media coverage of American foreign policy, Entman (2008, pp. 90–91) creates the hierarchy of networks that traces how messages of foreign policy travel from government actors to citizens through the media: The cascading network activation model traces the diffusion of frames from the president and administration through the networks of elites outside the administration who also serve as media sources; to the networks of news organizations and within and across them; to the networks of journalists; on to the textual networks of connected and repeated keywords, themes, and visual images and symbols published in media texts; and finally, to the networks of associations activated in citizens’ minds.

In reality, a group of global 24/7 TV news channels through satellites has been established at the beginning of the 2020s to make news reports from the host country’s perspectives. This phenomenon is motivated by the success of AI Jazeera in the Middle East since the mid-1990s; and these news channels include China’s CCTV-9, Russia Today, France 24, Iran’s Press TV, Japan’s NHK World TV, Venezuela’s TeleSur, and the CNC World English Channel of China’s Xinhua News Agency (Chang & Lin, 2014). Walter Isaacson, chairman of the US Broadcasting Board of Governors, described the establishment of Russia Today (RT), Iran’s Press TV, Venezuela’s TeleSur, and China’s 24-hour news channel as enemies to the counterparts in the United States, saying “the Voice of America and its sister broadcasters risked being ‘out-communicated by our enemies’”, although he later clarified that it meant “enemies within Afghanistan— those that advocate terrorism” (VOANews, cited in Chang & Lin, 2014, p. 451).

120 

X. (LEAH) LI AND A. WAKE

Models of International Broadcasting in Mediated Public Diplomacy The Three Models As discussed, transnational broadcasters play a critical role in advancing public diplomacy objectives of governments, and the principles of mediated public diplomacy centring on agenda and framing building are utilised by governments to nurture a friendly international environment for a nation. Indeed, governments around the world work with international public relations firms to shape global media frames and strengthen their visibility and valence in global news content surrounding a nation’s leaders and foreign policies (Cheng et al., 2016). This takes the modes of native advertising, op-eds, television and print advertising, social media platforms, and government-sponsored satellite channels (Cheng et al., 2016). News organisations as a type of non-state actors have been formed to make foreign news reports in support of communicating the national values of their governments to the world, and the advantage of that is to allow for a diverse range of the perspectives used to interpret international affairs (Seib, 2013). As a consequence, the possibility of news reporting being seamlessly infused with political biases and agendas driven by governments cannot be excluded. Following this line of logic, what Seib (2010) refers to—a diverse range of the perspectives in transnational news reporting—can be understood as various perspectives adopted by different governments around the world to frame a given reality to foreign publics, and these perspectives align with the goals of a government’s foreign policies. In accordance with Samuel-Azran (2013), there have been three models of using international broadcasting as a public diplomacy tool since the First World War. This first model featured the use of international government-­sponsored radio broadcasters, such as France 24, Alhurra, CCTV(China), Russia Today, Press TV (Iran), which emerged during the First World War (Samuel-Azran, 2013). These broadcasters spread the values and narratives on behalf of their sponsoring country among foreign publics, which is known as a form of propaganda (Rawnsley, cited in Samuel-Azran, 2013). The second model was characterised by the rise of privately owned global news networks between 1980s and 1990s, such as CNN, Sky News, and MSNBC, and they have become the main channel for international publics to understand international crisis (Samuel-Azran,

6  DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL… 

121

2013). The credibility of these broadcasters was understood to be higher than the international government-sponsored radio broadcasters (El-Nawawy, 2006; Samuel-Azran, 2013). Transnational broadcasters complying with the third model appear to have an interchangeable role falling between government-sponsored and private-owned identified in the first and the second model, respectively. This third model termed as a hybrid state-sponsored/private network means that “a state-sponsored station operates independently in routine affairs, which gives it the credibility of a privately owned station, and reverts to state-sponsored-style broadcasting only during a crisis involving the state” (Samuel-Azran, 2013, p.  1294). This scholar claims that this hybrid model allows the station to accumulate credibility through new coverage during peacetime, as a result of which it serves as a crucial public diplomacy tool to influence public opinion and policies of the target state for the purpose of gaining the sponsoring state’s advantage. Take the example of Al Jazeera, which is viewed as a Qatar-based independent media corporation but funded in part by the Qatari government (Hashmi, 2012). The rise of Al Jazeera since its establishment in 1996 has earned it the reputation of independent reporting that largely differentiates from the state-sponsored news reported by other media outlets in Arabic (Ayish, 2002). It has embodied the success of the new “liberal commercial television” model of press coverage (Ayish, 2002). Compared to the “traditional government controlled” style that dominates the press in the Arab world, this new liberal commercial television model inherits Western-style of journalistic practice that values critical and pluralist opinion of society; and uses it as a guide to achieve objectivity through generating balanced reports of local and regional events–see CNN and BBC as the model (Ayish, 2002). Supporters of AI Jazeera regard it as an objective news station, broadcasting controversial images and talk shows surrounding topics that Arabic-language media avoid being involved in; but some critics raise concern about the station’s journalistic integrity and condemn it as a platform for spreading anti-American sentiment and producing negative coverage of domestic affairs in Arabia, while being reticent about internal affairs of Qatar (El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002). Gambill (2000) remarks that every regime in Arabia has expressed unhappiness about Al Jazeera’s programmes that often cover debates on controversial issues in Arabia; and this explains why the news channel maintains its position as the most popular one in the Middle East. The reports and proactive political talk shows

122 

X. (LEAH) LI AND A. WAKE

made by Al Jazeera have produced tension between its host country Qatar and international counterparts (Ayish, 2002). State sponsorship has enabled Qatar to grow regional and international influence that is far beyond the influence of its military and economic strength (Gambill, 2000). For instance, in reporting Saudi Arabian affairs throughout the Qatari–Saudi conflict over an eight-year period between 2001 and 2008, Al Jazeera transformed into an influential public diplomacy tool for the Qatari government, featuring the third model—a hybrid state-sponsored/ private network (Samuel-Azran, 2013). The emerging model for international broadcasting engaging with mediated public diplomacy within the digital landscape. The advancement of digital technologies as well as the popularity of social media among Internet users have transformed the ways governments and the media communicate with their foreign publics as well as how foreign publics interact with international news. Within this, users proactively utilise social media tools to make contributions to news stories through posting multimedia messages (e.g., photos, audio, video, comment, and liking) to the venues (e.g., blogs and online news sites) provided by community and media organisations; and news organisations and professional journalists encourage these user behaviours by integrating them into the processes of news presentation and dissemination (Almoqbel et al., 2019; Nah & Chung, 2012). This trend prompts public diplomacy actors and international broadcasting service providers to investigate how to leverage the power of social media to acquire the goals of foreign policies. In the scholarly work, there is a lack of consensus about how the term ‘public diplomacy’ should evolve. For instance, the terms of public diplomacy 2.0, digital diplomacy, digital/digitalised public diplomacy, cyber diplomacy, e-diplomacy, networked diplomacy, Facebook diplomacy, and # diplomacy are used interchangeably (Holmes, 2019). Dropping the “public”, digital diplomacy refers to the digitilisation of the overall practice of diplomacy, through which diplomatic actors use digital tools to undertake diplomatic activities; and adding the “public”, digital diplomacy pays attention to the exchange of information between diplomatic and individual actors through the deployment of digital tools (Holmes, 2015; Huang, 2020). Building upon this in conjunction with online political participation research, the term of social-networking-service (SNS) diplomacy is coined to highlight the interaction between diplomatic actors (i.e., governments, their agencies and representatives including politicians

6  DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL… 

123

and foreign service officers) and individual Internet users (i.e., foreign publics) based upon a dialogic mode; and this is demonstrated by four forms of participation: expression, interaction, membership, and campaign (Huang, 2020). The evolution in the conceptualisation of public diplomacy reveals that the primary components of public diplomacy are driven by the development of digital technologies. These include the main subjects of diplomatic actors and individual actors, interaction between these two types of actors, and digital tools. However, interaction between actors is at the core of the contemporary public diplomacy activities in the digital environment; and the creation of interaction online arises from participation. According to Wells (2015, p. 53), online participation is the “single most powerful ethos of digital culture”. Thus, the success of public diplomacy activities in the digital context centres on how diplomatic actors harness the power of digital technologies to communicate with foreign publics and to drive foreign publics to participate in foreign affairs through interaction. In line with the discussion about the interactive essence of public diplomacy in the virtual space, this article proposes the fourth model of utilising international broadcasting in mediated public diplomacy within the digital landscape. This emerging model underpins the importance of benchmarking against the success factor of interaction between international broadcasters and its followers. This model is useful to evaluate the role of international broadcasters in mediated public diplomacy via establishing their online presence to undertake activities in an effort to influence public sentiment so as to acquire support to a nation’s foreign policy goals. In practice, there is a gap of utilising the aforementioned success factor in acquiring the goals of public diplomacy. Reviewing the works undertaken by Cull (2008); Kampf et al. (2015), Metzgar and Lu (2015), Pamment (2016), Huang (2020) claims that a broadcasting-oriented mindset dominates the studies of digitalised public diplomacy; and for the purpose of influencing foreign publics, public diplomacy 2.0 relies on technical interactivity of social platforms in producing and disseminating information, rather than concentrating on motivating public participation in political affairs through using social platforms. Hence, the following section reviews the current trend of how international broadcasting services merge with digital technologies to establish their online presence to undertake journalistic practice in order to engage foreign publics. It then discusses whether the practices succeed or not on

124 

X. (LEAH) LI AND A. WAKE

the basis of the interactive nature of digital public diplomacy. It will be interesting in future research to determine how governments utilise social media to establish a new domain in practising public diplomacy activities. Online Presence Transnational broadcasters make good use of social media to distribute their news content, but branded accounts tend to do little to engage beyond posting original stories with audiences. While the populations of each country favour different social media networking sites to follow the news or catch up with friends, the most popular ones in the Asia Pacific are Facebook (Meta), Instagram, IGTV, Twitter (now X), YouTube, TikTok, LinkedIn, WeChat, Douyin, QQ, Baidu Tieba, and Sina Weibo. Messenger services, such as Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp, are mostly used for texting, although Signal and Telegram are increasingly popular for those seeking encrypted services and are sought-after platforms for groups of likeminded people, who want to have discussions out of sight of those who might disagree with them, or might seek to curb or regulate the conversation. Consumer data firm Statista (Social Media & User-Generated Content, 2022) found that as of February 2022, Facebook accounted for nearly 69% of the social media market across Asia and a survey on digital usage in China in the third quarter of 2021 found that around 77% of respondents had used WeChat for social networking. As Facebook (Meta) remains, for the moment at least, the most dominant of the services outside China, it is significant to look at the kinds of conversations that are being mediated by news producers and their response from readers. We looked at posts on the sites of three news agencies Australian Broadcasting Corporation ABC Pacific, China’s CGTN, and Al Jazeera English between 23 and 29 October, 2022. Some trends were apparent. ABC Pacific, Australia’s international service aiming at the Pacific, posted its work upon Facebook several times a day. Beyond the post themselves, there were no comments from the ABC Pacific branded account or ones from ABC-branded journalists. Posts about sporting events, such as celebrations after the Tonga national rugby league team beat Wales in the World Cup in England, attracted the most attention online with more than 30 messages of support for the players (ABC_Pacific, 2022d). A story about the impact of the continuing leadership of Xi Jinping in China on the Pacific, obtained just one comment and six shares in the 24 hours after

6  DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL… 

125

its posting (ABC_Pacific, 2022b), while a story about the PNG unemployment crisis was shared by readers eight times and attracted six comments from the public (ABC_Pacific, 2022c). An original video story about the Australian budget and its impact on the Pacific had just two shares from readers (ABC_Pacific, 2022a). English language posts on the China CGTN Facebook site were also published multiple times during a day. Similar to the ABC Pacific, there were no CGTN branded comments and little interaction from the general public, except for stories which were not political, such as those featuring wildlife or cultural traditions such as ethnic clothing or music (CGTN, 2022b). Sporting and other competition successes gained more attention with a positive response of 22 comments to a report on wins at the world skills competition (CGTN, 2022d). The Facebook’s ‘thumbs up’ response rather than comments was used more commonly on political stories, such as one celebrating the re-election of the Chinese President at 20th National Congress. A post of the full text of the report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China received more than 300 thumbs up messages (CGTN, 2022a), and a story on the youth response to the congress had a similar number of thumbs up, but few comments (CGTN, 2022c). By way of contrast, Al Jazeera English attracted hundreds of public comments and shares to its Facebook posts. One post about Palestine earned almost 300 comments and 200 shares in less than 10  hours (Al Jazeera English, 2022c) and a post on a shelter for displaced Ukrainian children attracted more than 200 comments and 11 shares in 7 hours (Al Jazeera English, 2022b). Even posts on Al Jazeera where emotion and disaster were not at the centre of the story acquired considerable interaction online. A post about celebrity Kanye West was rewarded with 5.8 k ‘thumbs up’, 1.5 k comments and 300 shares (Al Jazeera English, 2022a). While it was not obvious whether the posted stories from the ABC Pacific or the CGTN were shared in private groups within or external to the platform, it was clear that the public interaction was exponentially larger for Al Jazeera and its particular brand of often disaster-focused and emotional stories. It was also not possible to determine how much sharing of the stories was through paid promotion or organic sharing by readers. However, through examining the above cases, we found a lack of interactions between these broadcasters and their audiences, specifically the ABC Pacific and the CGTN. From this perspective, the reliance on international

126 

X. (LEAH) LI AND A. WAKE

broadcasting in undertaking public diplomacy activities in the participatory media landscape needs to be re-examined.

Public Diplomacy, Propaganda, and Spies Regardless of which models of public diplomacy that broadcasters use, the debate over the way journalistic practice and public diplomacy connect to propaganda is ongoing. Thus, the close link between public diplomacy and propaganda results in public diplomacy often being regarded as a synonymous form of propaganda (Vlahos, cited in Huang & Wang, 2020). This interpretation is attributed to government-led activities of public diplomacy and propaganda having the intention to sway public opinion via instructing the publics to perceive a given issue in a particular way, which helps to nurture an environment in support of a nation’s foreign policies. A contemporary example of this would be the so-called Chinese spy balloon which was shot down over the United States in February 2023. The balloon was framed in statements by US government and the US president as a spy balloon, a line that was repeated by most news outlets, with few accepting the explanation offered by the Chinese government that it was a weather balloon accidentally blown off course. According to the China Daily, the Chinese government issued a statement claiming that “the Chinese side regrets the unintended entry of the airship into US airspace due to force majeure” (Wang, 2023). Stephen McDonnell, the BBC’s well-respected China correspondent, noted in his report that the outrage from both sides contained a fair bit of theatre and that “even if it was to some extent spying, the deployment of this balloon, in this way, at this time, had to have been an error on the Chinese side” (McDonell, 2023). The word ‘spy’ was repeated in most news reports when talking about the balloon, even though the Pentagon itself reported that the technology carried on the balloon would not give China any intelligence-­ collecting capacity beyond existing technology, such as satellites. Although scholarship about propaganda is much more developed now, it was originally conceptualised as purposive management of opinion and attitudes through employing different forms of social communication, such as symbols, stories, speeches, rumours, reports, and pictures (Lasswell, 1971, p.  9). It still  functions as a powerful tool to create influence on individual or groups’ understanding of a doctrine (Newsom et al., 2004, p. 400) through deliberate attempts taking the mode of expressing opinion or action (Lee & Lee, 1972, p.  15). Propaganda initiated by state

6  DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL… 

127

officials, or their political opponents may or may not contain accurate information, but it projects viewpoints from oppositional parties negatively in order to gain public support (Born and Edgington, cited in Endong, 2021). The techniques of propaganda often rely on using emotional means of persuasion to create disruption, division, confusion, or even damage to target audiences instead of convincing the audiences with a given reality or viewpoints (Born and Edgington, cited in Endong, 2021, p. 451). The close link between public diplomacy and propaganda is demonstrated by the statement made by Richard Holbrooke, former US Ambassador to the United Nations: Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare or - if you really want to be blunt - propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what this war (on terrorism) is really about in the minds of the 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance. (Holbrooke, cited in Kruckeberg & Vujnovic, 2005, p. 302)

Drawing upon the propaganda model, media production is not simply determined by professional news ethics and news values, but affected by ideological, political, economic, and cultural considerations (Li, 2011, p. 81). The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfill this role requires systematic propaganda. (Herman & Chomsky, cited in Li, 2011, p. 81)

It is well-known that governments dwell on broadcast media and newspapers and manipulate news coverage to advance national interests and promote international propaganda. This involves the recruitment and some cases bribery of journalists, making the line between propaganda and legitimate journalistic practice obscure (Chang & Lin, 2014, p. 450). For instance, the Committee to Protect Journalists notes that while the practice was thought to be banned in the United States after more than 50 journalists were recruited during the Cold War, the practice remained in place. Lashmar (2020b) examines the widely held belief that news agencies are used as spies. Although he said there was no contemporary

128 

X. (LEAH) LI AND A. WAKE

evidence of the UK or US intelligence agencies participating in such activities, he acknowledges some truth to the claim with a number of caveats: The interchange between intelligence and news organisations has been complex and often fraught; some intelligence agents use false journalistic cover in the field, others have had cover provided by news organisations and some have actually worked for news organisations; staff journalists have been known to work for intelligence as well, and intelligence agencies have run worldwide news networks for propaganda purposes. (Lashmar, 2020a, p. 1551)

That view was also rekindled at the funeral of Australia’s Peter Barnett in 2020. For almost 20 years, Barnett covered international affairs for the ABC. A former Australian Secret Intelligence Service agent told Australia’s Financial Review (Patrick, 2020) that the evidence was circumstantial that Barnett might have passed on intelligence about the highly placed officials he had access to, including US presidents and Asian heads of state. It was, of course, an era when the ABC was more ‘compliant’ towards government (Patrick, 2020). Australian journalist Campbell Cooney (2022) confirmed in an interview for this chapter, that he knew foreign correspondents were approached by those they thought were working for Australian intelligence agencies, seeking information. However, Cooney remarked the general understanding from Australian news bosses was that journalists did not provide extra intelligence, and would only share what they would be already be prepared to publish. Another international broadcast news manager interviewed for this chapter (Anonymous, 2022) confirmed that staff of Chinese heritage had expressed that they sometimes felt they  were being intimidated by foreign actors working for intelligence agencies. The claims of intimidation could not be confirmed but were taken seriously: “If a reporter is worried about the impact of that story on their family at home, we might put a byline on to protect them. We have to think about how do we support people” (Anonymous, 2022). Within the digital media landscape, Chang and Lin (2014) observed the shift of China from focusing on international propagandistic activities in the promotion of ideological and military values to public diplomacy activities to build its images, ideas, and national agendas during the last three decades. Due to rapid changes in the global media landscape from traditional channels (i.e., film, radio, television, cable, and satellite) to the

6  DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL… 

129

Internet, Chang and Lin (2014, p. 453) raise the concern about the effectiveness of both international propaganda and public diplomacy, while pointing out the following: With the advent of fast changing communication capacities and media channels, propaganda no longer follows the familiar mass propaganda and persuasion model established during the peak of two world wars and its acceptance or resistance takes on new meaning thereafter. It is difficult to imagine that what might be true under the perspective of powerful media could still be valid when the larger media environment has changed beyond recognition and the audiences themselves have become active in content production and dissemination.

This observation is demonstrated by the current Ukrainian war, in which international broadcasters sponsored by different governments in the world and individual Internet users present different aspect of the social reality on social media. This practice allows a reader to understand the war from a diverse range of perspectives. Notwithstanding, it makes it difficult for a reader to identify what exactly is happening in Ukraine because of the obscurity between propaganda, news, and public diplomacy. As noted by Seib (2009), the perceived closeness of propaganda and public diplomacy challenges public diplomacy as being an ethical enterprise.

Conclusion All in all, state sponsorship of transnational broadcasters does raise ongoing concern about the credibility of the services provided by these media outlets. As discussed, funding from the government of Qatar to Al Jazeera poses challenges to the objectivity of AI Jazeera’s coverage of political affairs taking place in the Emirate (Gambill, 2000), although we acknowledge its broadcasting beyond specific parts of the Middle East is considered objective. Similar to that, the credibility of PTV as an authentic news network, except for reporting stories directly relating to Iran and Iranian statesmen, is questioned by the global public opinion and elite media communities (Behravesh, 2013). Even public-funded transnational broadcasters, such as Australia’s ABC, which has an arm’s-length relationship with government, can be influenced by framing from military and political elites, access to footage from restricted countries and areas, and from intimidation from foreign actors. Future research investigating the role of

130 

X. (LEAH) LI AND A. WAKE

international broadcasters in undertaking digital public diplomacy activities drawing upon the fourth model proposed in this article would present a comprehensive understanding about the effectiveness of as well as the interplay of power and politics in influencing contemporary practice of international broadcasting.

References ABC_Pacific [A. Pacific]. (2022a, October 25). Before Delivering Its First Budget in Nearly a Decade, Labor Announced Plans to Boost Foreign Aid to the Pacific by Around $1.4 Billion Over the Next Four Years. But Foreign Affairs Reporter Stephen Dziedzic Tells The World the Actual Figure Ended Up Being Even Higher. ABC_Pacific. (2022b). The Pacific Looks Set Benefit Economically, But Some Island Nations Could Also Face “Danger” to Their Democracies, After China’s President Cemented His Grip on the Country’s Leadership. ABC_Pacific [A. Pacific]. (2022c, October 25). Papua New Guinea’s Capital Port Moresby is Grappling with a Youth Unemployment Crisis as Young People Come From All Corners of the Country in Search of Work. ABC_Pacific [https://www.facebook.com/ABCPacific]. (2022d, October 26). There Was Jubilant Street Celebrations in Tonga’s Capital, Nuku’alofa, on Tuesday After Their National Rugby League Team Beat Wales in the World Cup in England. Tonga Beat Wales Convincingly 32-6 and Are Now On Track to Face Samoa in the Quarter-Final. ABC. Al Jazeera English. (2022a, October 26). Adidas Expects to Take a Hit of Up to $246m to Its 2022 Net Income After Ending Its Partnership with Kanye West. https://aje.io/xrf3fx Al Jazeera English. (2022b, October 26). I Heard Lots of Explosions Outside, and Felt Very Scared. #AJLongReads Goes Inside a Shelter for Ukrainian Children Who Have Lost Their Parents or Been Separated from Them. Al Jazeera English. (2022c, October 26). Several Palestinians Have Been Killed and Wounded After Israeli Forces Raid the Occupied West Bank City of Nablus, in an Operation Against the Lions’ Den Armed Resistance Group. We Take a Look at Who the Group Are. Almoqbel, M. Y., Wohn, D. Y., Hayes, R. A., & Cha, M. (2019). Understanding Facebook News Post Comment Reading and Reacting Behavior Through Political Extremism and Cultural Orientation. Computers in Human Behavior, 100, 118–126. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.06.006 Anonymous. (2022). Research Interview with Broadcast News Manager. August 15. Ayish, M. I. (2002). Political Communication on Arab World Television: Evolving Patterns. Political Communication, 19(2), 137–154.

6  DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL… 

131

BBC. (2010). China’s Xinhua Launches Global English TV Channel. Behravesh, M. (2013). Press TV: Iran’s Revisionist Voice in Perspective (http:// www.presstv.ir/, http://www.presstv.com/). Asian Politics & Policy, 5(4), 683–686. https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12061 CGTN. (2022a, October 26). Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China #20thPartyCongress. CGTN. (2022b, October 26). In Recent Years, Hanfu – The Traditional Costume Worn by Han Chinese People Many Centuries Ago – Has Been Growing in Popularity Among China’s Younger Generations, Who Have Become Quite Creative in the Way They Wear It. CGTN. (2022c, October 25). We Talk’: How Youth Around the World View Future Collaboration with China. CGTN. (2022d, October 26). Young Chinese Technicians Won Two Gold, One Silver and One Medallion for Excellence in All Four Contests at the WorldSkills Competition 2022 Special Edition Held in Helsinki, Finland on Monday. Chang, T.-K., & Lin, F. (2014). From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy: Assessing China’s International Practice and Its Image, 1950–2009. Public Relations Review, 40(3), 450–458. Cheng, Z., Golan, G. J., & Kiousis, S. (2016). The Second-Level Agenda-Building Function of the Xinhua News Agency: Examining the Role of Government-­ Sponsored News in Mediated Public Diplomacy. Journalism Practice, 10(6), 744–762. Cooney, C. (2022). Research Interview with Former Radio Australia Correspondent. August 18. Cull, N. J. (2008). Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 31–54. El-Nawawy, M. “US Public Diplomacy in the Arab World: The News Credibility of Radio Sawa and Television Alhurra in Five Countries.” Global media and communication 2.2 (2006): 183–203. El-Nawawy, M., & A. Iskander, A. (2002). Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East. Westview. Endong, F.  P. C. (2021). The ‘Dark Side’ of African Digital Diplomacy: The Response of Cameroon and Nigeria to Separatists’ Online Propaganda. South African Journal of International Affairs, 28(3), 449–469. Entman, R. M. (2008). Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The US case. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 13(2), 87–102. Gambill, G. C. (2000). Qatar’s Al-Jazeera TV: The Power of Free Speech. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 2(5), 1. Gilboa, E. (2002). Global Communication and Foreign Policy. Journal of Communication, 52(4), 731–748. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-­2466. 2002.tb02571.x

132 

X. (LEAH) LI AND A. WAKE

Gregory, B. (2008). Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 274–290. Hashmi, M. A. (2012). Al Jazeera: A Reversal of Perspective. Web. media. mit. edu. Holmes, M. (2015). Digital Diplomacy and International Change Management. In C.  Bjola & M.  Holmes (Eds.), Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (pp. 27–046). Routledge. Holmes, M. (2019). Digital Diplomacy. Retrieved February 3, from https:// www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-­9 780199743292/ obo-­9780199743292-­0258.xml Huang, Q. E. (2020). Facebook Not Statebook: Defining SNS Diplomacy with Four Modes of Online Diplomatic Participation. International Journal of Communication, 14, 18. Huang, Z. A., & Wang, R. (2020). ‘Panda Engagement’ in China’s Digital Public Diplomacy. Asian Journal of Communication, 30(2), 118–140. Kampf, R, Ilan M., & Elad, S. (2015). Digital Diplomacy 2.0? A Cross-national Comparison of Public Engagement in Facebook and Twitter. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 10(4), 331–362. Kruckeberg, D., & Vujnovic, M. (2005). Public Relations, Not Propaganda, for US Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: Challenges and Opportunities. Journal of Communication Management, 9(4), 296–304. Lashmar, P. (2020a). Putting Lives in Danger? Tinker, Tailor, Journalist, Spy: The Use of Journalistic Cover. Journalism (London, England), 21(10), 1539–1555. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884917724301 Lashmar, P. (2020b). Putting Lives in Danger? Tinker, Tailor, Journalist, Spy: The Use of Journalistic Cover. Journalism, 21(10), 1539–1555. Lasswell, H. D. (1971). Propaganda Technique in World War I. MIT Press. Lee, A.  M., & Lee, E.  B. (1972). The Fine Art of Propaganda. Octagon Press, Limited. Li, X. (2011). Reading the Contemporary Giant: China’s Images in the ABC’s Foreign Correspondent Current Affairs Program in the Early Twenty-first. Century Macquarie University. Malone, G.  D. (1985). Managing Public Diplomacy. Washington Quarterly, 8(3), 199–213. Manheim, J. B. (1994). Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence. Oxford University Press on Demand. McDonell, S. (2023). Balloon Saga Deflates Efforts to Mend US-China Relations. BBC News. bbc.com/news, BBC. Metzgar, E. T., & Lu, X. (2015). Tweeting the Pivot? The United States and PD 2.0  in Northeast Asia. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 11(3), 204–215. Web. Nah, S., & Chung, D.  S. (2012). When Citizens Meet Both Professional and Citizen Journalists: Social Trust, Media Credibility, and Perceived Journalistic

6  DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL… 

133

Roles Among Online Community News Readers. Journalism (London, England), 13(6), 714–730. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884911431381 Newsom, D., Turk, J. V., & Kruckeberg, D. (2004). This is PR: The Realities of Public Relations. Nisbet, E. C., Nisbet, M. C., Scheufele, D. A., & Shanahan, J. E. (2004). Public Diplomacy, Television News, and Muslim Opinion. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 9(2), 11–37. https://doi.org/10.117 7/1081180X04263459 Pamment, J. “Digital Diplomacy as Transmedia Engagement: Aligning Theories of Participatory Culture with International Advocacy Campaigns.” New media & society 18.9 (2016): 2046–2062. Web. Patrick, A. (2020). Was the ABC’s Greatest Foreign Correspondent a Spy? The Australian Financial Review (Melbourne), 5, 32. Qingyun, W. (2023). China regrets unintended entry of unmanned airship in US airspace. China Daily. Retrieved 10 January 2024 from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202302/03/WS63dd1b84a31057c47ebacd9f.html. Samuel-Azran, T. (2013). Al-Jazeera, Qatar, and New Tactics in State-Sponsored Media Diplomacy. American Behavioral Scientist, 57(9), 1293–1311. Seib, P. (2009). Public Diplomacy and Journalism: Parallels, Ethical Issues, and Practical Concerns. The American behavioral scientist (Beverly Hills), 52(5), 772–786. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764208326522 Seib, P. (2010). Transnational Journalism, Public Diplomacy, and Virtual States. Journalism studies (London, England), 11(5), 734–744. Web. Seib, P. (2013). Transnational Journalism, Public Diplomacy, and Virtual States. In Foreign Correspondence (pp. 117–127). Routledge. Sevin, E., Metzgar, E.  T., & Hayden, C. (2019). The Scholarship of Public Diplomacy: Analysis of a Growing Field. Sheafer, T., & Gabay, I. (2009). Mediated Public Diplomacy: A Strategic Contest Over International Agenda Building and Frame Building. Political Communication, 26(4), 447–467. Social Media & User-Generated Content. (2022). statista. Retrieved October 26, from https://www.statista.com/markets/424/topic/540/social-­media­user-­generated-­content/#overview Wells, C. (2015). The Civic Organization and the Digital Citizen: Communicating Engagement in a Networked Age. Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 7

Social and Mobile Media in Times of Disaster Drew Ambrose

Introduction New forms of digital communications technologies have altered the communication landscape and to some extent diluted the influence of journalists, particularly during natural and civil disasters (Cottle, 2014; Naim, 2009). Today, many people have access to mobile media production technologies, internet connectivity and online platforms that enable them to self-publish (Cooper, 2019). As a result, this chapter argues the use of digital communications technologies has fundamentally changed the way journalists engage with communities and, in particular, report on emergencies and disasters. To illustrate this change, this chapter draws on how journalists reported a number of disasters over key periods of the twentieth century. Comprehending old structures of communication are important because it illustrates a dichotomy between media practitioners who were originators of information and the impacted communities which were the subject matter of stories. From the 1950s, the media was a powerful communicator in crisis settings because it possessed the tools to record and broadcast footage from far-flung places to countries which might take

D. Ambrose (*) RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9_7

135

136 

D. AMBROSE

action to provide aid. Its influence on distant audiences is best illustrated through the British media’s coverage of the catastrophic African famines from the 1960s to 1980s (Jones, 2019; Franks, 2014). Distressing scenes of mass starvation captured by English television journalists attracted viewers in their millions, an outpouring of donations, charity concerts, and mobilised powerful Western governments to take action. And yet, the disaster-affected African populations were often presented on screen as passive and lacking agency (Cooper, 2019; Jones, 2019). This kind of dichotomy continued with the emergence of 24-hour news channels in the 1990s, which led to live television broadcasting of natural, civil, and humanitarian emergencies. At the time, American diplomat George F. Kennan observed this new style of journalism was incredibly influential in pushing the US Government to intervene in post-Cold War crises without wider Congressional or public discussion (Kennan, 1993). The term ‘The CNN Effect’ is used to describe how such continuous news coverage drove attention and action to disasters (Robinson, 2018). This news-gathering era is important in addressing the key argument of this chapter because rapid development of the digital media technologies greatly enhanced the publishing power of reporters. Satellite equipment enabled journalists to beam live pictures into lounge rooms within minutes of an event occurring. The 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami (also known as the Asian Tsunami) appeared to be the first time that people began to fully realise that broadcast journalism was now driven by bystander content from ordinary people. The dichotomy between ‘reporter’ and ‘reported’ noticeably began to break down. News bulletins featured footage from tourists who recorded the horror of the tsunami on portable video cameras (Cooper, 2019, p. 80). Reflecting the significant shift that coverage of this kind of event represented, Cooper observed the defining images captured during twenty-first-century disasters were produced by affected people and those caught up in the crisis (Cooper, 2019). As in Haiti and Nepal during 2010 and 2015, respectively, earthquake- affected populations harnessed advanced microblogging sites such as Twitter (now X) and phone apps with video livestreaming capabilities to inform the world about their plight in seconds (Cooper, 2019). This chapter shows new approaches being adopted by mainstream media organisations and how news gathering is changing in this new disaster communication paradigm.

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

137

There are three key points: • that people are increasingly using mobile digital technologies to become originators of content; • that journalists are adapting their role to be verifiers, collaborators, and moderators of footage; • and that journalists still have a key role in reporting on disasters because ordinary people face barriers which can inhibit them from being effective communicators. The COVID-19 pandemic has been a pivotal period to examine the changing nature of journalism because the virus has caused catastrophic emergencies in nations with weak health systems (Gill & Schellekens, 2021). Under these conditions, journalists have also struggled to report on a range of issues, including COVID, because of closed international borders and health risks. Posetti et al. (2020) conducted a survey of 1400 journalists from 125 nations revealing that 67% of them were making more use of online communities and digital tools to report on the pandemic. Almost a quarter of respondents said they relied on user-generated content from mobile phones for news gathering. This is significant because affected populations have been able to use their own media production abilities to tell the world about their plight. This chapter argues that while a broader range of local actors can now be communicators and publishers of information in the twenty-first century, journalists continue to hold a significant role as crisis communicators. Seven journalists based in crisis-prone nations across the Asia-Pacific and Middle East were interviewed for this chapter in June 2020. They were drawn from public and commercial media companies. One was a self-­ employed foreign correspondent who worked for a variety of news publications. Those interviewed all produced innovative work for print, online, and broadcast mediums. Five were foreigners working in the country they report on. The last two were people of the nation they reported on, but produced stories for foreign media agencies. They were all chosen because they all had shared experience of reporting on crises regularly in the last two decades. Each journalist is identified here only in broad descriptive terms.

138 

D. AMBROSE

The CNN Effect In the 1990s, a popular theory that came to the fore claimed that rolling media coverage of humanitarian emergencies by 24-hour cable television news channels could influence foreign policy and provoke attention from domestic audiences (Robinson, 1999, 2002). Debate on what became known as ‘the CNN Effect’ focused on whether live reporting played a role in pressuring the US Government and its allies to intervene in post-­ Cold War crises. Shaw, Mermin, and others argued that continuous reporting on human suffering in real time during this period pushed powerful Western nations with foreign policy uncertainty into intervening quickly during humanitarian emergencies (Minear et al., 1997; Shaw, 1996); and Somalia during 1992 (Mermin, 1997; Strobel & Gowing, 1998). In contrast, Gilboa argued that the broadcasting power of these news outlets was exaggerated as media coverage of genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda did not lead to major interventions in these crises (Gilboa, 2005; Robinson, 2005). The CNN Effect captured the impact of new technologies and how these sped up communication. In more recent years, scholars have pointed to the crowded digital media landscape arguing it has eroded the power of journalists (Gowing, 2011; Robinson, 2018). The impact of cheaper digital tools, technological innovation, and the reduced cost of broadcasting from remote areas has also been seen as potentially increasing the influence of local populations (Gilboa, 2005, p.  39). British journalists Nik Gowing and Lyse Doucet, for example, argued the rise of social media platforms and digital production tools could be used by affected populations against repressive forces during violent crises (Doucet, 2018; Gowing, 2011). This chapter extends these arguments further by focusing on the relationship between journalists and local communities in the way stories are covered.

Citizen Journalism Citizen journalism or participatory media are terms used to describe how affected communities are increasingly acting as media producers (Wall, 2019). Whether a one-off act or a sustained campaign of filming, this phenomenon occurs because telecommunications technologies are rapidly giving publishing power to wider society (Nah & Chung, 2020). Citizen journalism is characteristically produced by unpaid people with access to

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

139

inexpensive production tools who play an active role in collecting and disseminating content online (Farinosi & Treré, 2014). How, why and in what circumstances people use citizen journalism is an interesting question that has been extensively studied in Western countries (Bonin, 2016; Thurman, 2008; Williams et  al., 2011). These studies noted that most of the media outlets published eyewitness material and that content from the public was an increasingly common practice because of time and budgetary concerns. Many interviewees, however, raised concerns over the professional standards of citizens as well as the authenticity, quality, and accuracy of the content. Despite these challenges, media experts have predicted future news coverage will be presented more as a conversation incorporating the digital contributions of people with media production capacities (Gillmor, 2004). These kinds of arguments are important, because they show the changing relationship between reporters, communities and how the process of representation in the media occurs. Another common theme in the area of citizen journalism is the way people use technology to counter narratives of the powerful. Italian citizens interviewed after Italy’s 2009 L’Aquila earthquake were asked why they began using participatory media approaches. Those interviewed said they were motivated to post content online because they felt distrust towards the mainstream media, mostly controlled at that time by Italy’s prime minister (Farinosi & Treré, 2014). In another example, when the mainstream media was banned from entering Gaza by Israeli forces during a conflict in 2014, those living there used social media platforms to post graphic images of dead children using the hashtag #gazaunderattack (Chaudhuri, 2019). In China, a country where freedom of the press and speech remains elusive, several ordinary people reported that they posted on digital platforms to give first-hand accounts, to hold officials accountable, and to document the carnage during the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake (Zeng et  al., 2019). This literature shows that people are increasingly seeking to control narratives of self-representation through the use of new technologies. Of course, there are many shortcomings of citizen journalism. Despite the increasing number of technologies that are now widely accessible to ordinary people, this new media climate has also had a disempowering effect on some people during disasters. In a “panoply of voices”, none of them can dominate in an infinite Internet space overcrowded with content (Robinson, 2018, p.  531). Further, journalism focused on natural and man-made disasters is increasingly hijacked by sinister or socially divisive

140 

D. AMBROSE

forms of citizen participation including fabricated news (Quandt, 2018). Content produced by protest networks and militants on social media sites can now dominate societal understanding of many complex crises. Even when eyewitness material is factual, say in the example of the Syrian conflict, some people produce content which blurs the line between reporting and lobbying (Ghazzi, 2014).

Compassion Fatigue News organisations have long struggled to contend with rising compassion fatigue among audiences who are bombarded with images of distant sufferers (Chouliaraki, 2006). Compassion fatigue has been defined as a form of emotional overload where the viewer has seen too much televised despair. Audiences can feel the humanitarian situation is futile and nothing can change the fate of the distant sufferer on screen (Moeller, 2018). The immediacy of some images can bring the world together as a global village in a simultaneous act of mass viewing (Chouliaraki, 2006). The Boxing Day Tsunami was one such event. It prompted a massive international response due to the number of nations that lost people in the disaster and the power of the amateur footage which generated a feeling of loss (Chouliaraki, 2006). Gripping telegenic news events and shocking moments in non-hostile environments are seen as more likely to capture the imagination of an audience (Moeller, 2006). In the communications landscape of the twenty-first century, people are producing compelling content on the frontlines of crises and disasters across the Indo-Pacific. However, the frequent rapid production of eyewitness media about a myriad of crises also saturates Internet platforms which can, in turn, exacerbate compassion fatigue.

Changes to Reporting Practice Mobile devices, smart phones, laptops, tablets, and camcorders, through their availability, affordability and ease of use, have increasingly allowed visual material to be recorded first-hand by those caught in the middle of a news story or crisis. The imagery, either livestreamed or captured by mobile devices, along with accompanying text and audio, can now be rapidly and easily widely distributed by those who recorded it, through the technologies of social media platforms including Twitter (now X), Facebook (now Meta), and Instagram (Cooper, 2019). Communities

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

141

have come to increasingly use these technologies to broadcast their own stories particularly during emergencies such as floods, famines, earthquakes, coups, protests and other forms of political violence. Ordinary people can now be key media producers. Their eyewitness content often captures the peak moments of disasters and other events, as well as the aftermath. Such visceral frontline imagery often eclipses what can be captured through conventional news-gathering methods. Even when a bystander’s life is under threat, people are often emboldened to produce media about an event that would otherwise go unreported by media organizations (Crowe, 2012). In the modern communication landscape, journalists can draw on this content from eyewitnesses for key storytelling components (Crowe, 2012). Digital tools are also used by people to uphold their rights, document abuses, and amplify their views especially during crises that have a political dimension. This particular dynamic changes the way that journalists operate because they now have relatively easy access to material that features interests (political or otherwise) of the affected population.

Eyewitness Media Technological advances and the ease of technological use have forced journalists to change their reporting methods. When catastrophic events occur, journalists have observed that it is those affected who are often the first to publish using smartphones. One journalist, who covers violent humanitarian emergencies, observed that people’s capacity to produce media during disasters forces journalists to make quick editorial decisions: If there’s a breaking news story, I’m probably seeing at first almost a 100% user generated content … it’s like a drip feed … it hones our news judgement … it helps us fill in the puzzle pieces of what’s going on. It might spark us to look at the issue and verify things ourselves. (Journalist Four, 2020)

This comment illustrates that early acts of publishing by a citizen has the power to drive the news agenda. Another journalist based in Indonesia confirmed that content posted by people on social media platforms increasingly allowed reporters to generate story leads, find sources and original angles without leaving the newsroom. As COVID-19 has severely affected Indonesia, the journalist described how those affected use digital technologies to capture gripping footage on the frontlines of the pandemic:

142 

D. AMBROSE

The current coronavirus pandemic really shows you that there are desperate people who just want to be heard. They’ll upload videos of people in the hospital who are basically desperate to get a hospital bed. So that gives you an understanding. (Journalist Two, 2021)

This observation shows that people with enhanced production capacities use their tools to capture disasters in unique ways. People on the frontlines often document unfolding stories through a very personal lens. In the example outlined above, a deadly pandemic is seen through the perspective of a desperate patient in dire need. For journalists, the advantage of having bystanders with digital tools is they document crises and capture footage that would never be filmed by traditional camera crews. Ordinary people can capture a disaster at the very moment it strikes their community. These digital dispatches are particularly valuable as they can draw attention to an event that may otherwise be forgotten if people did not film and share it. One significant example is the phone vision of a tsunami in Indonesia which swept a rock band off stage while they were performing at a seaside concert (Al Jazeera English, 2018). The wave killed more than 430 people but it was a relatively minor event because Indonesia’s proximity to the ‘Ring of Fire’ causes a multitude of catastrophic natural disasters (Siagian et al., 2014; Syamsidik et al., 2020). A videographer based in Asia said the dramatic footage sparked greater interest than an Indonesian disaster of that size would normally warrant because it ‘went viral’: It just shows the severity for that community. So that kind of thing helps our storytelling of how affected people are. That wouldn’t have been captured 10 years ago, for sure … I think phones are amazing. It’s enough to tell any story. (Journalist One, 2020)

Journalists clearly believe digital publishing technologies have given them new opportunities to access people’s stories from unique angles. It is clear that smart phones have replaced television cameras as the main tool to document disasters and are much more advanced than the camcorder vision which dominated the first examples of user-generated content in twenty-first-century disaster zones such as the Boxing Day Tsunami (Cooper, 2019). As smart phone ownership and Internet penetration has dramatically increased, the use of user-created content will also proliferate. Internet use

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

143

is undergoing exponential growth in what were once considered technological backwaters. In many crisis-prone nations, more than half the population has access to advanced technologies, which in turn suggests that there is a greater likelihood of spontaneous events being captured by ordinary people. Eyewitness media content is particularly useful in places considered too dangerous or logistically difficult for journalists to go. Even when reporters are deployed, it can take days to reach a crisis zone because of poor or damaged infrastructure. Before smart phones, journalists relied on material gathered by engaging local journalists, or from foreign news wire companies syndicating text and vision to thousands of media companies who pay a subscription (Hill & Schwartz, 2020). Now, eyewitness footage is relatively easily obtainable and feeds the demands of the relentless, instantaneous 24-hour news cycle: It’s like your default wire service. Badly shot but incredible access and actuality right there on the frontline. It is something you can use quite readily. (Journalist Seven, 2021)

The emergence of people as the first originators of content during disasters has clearly forced journalists to change their reporting practices. It is also changing how journalists engage with and report on communities as they seek out content online.

Harnessing of Digital Technology by Indo-Pacific Populations Some of the most disenfranchised people on earth now have access to digital tools and the ability to share their own stories. They can self-publish on social media sites or collaborate with journalists to articulate their point of views. This is a dramatic change from the last century when people found themselves the subject matter for journalism and had few resources to be independent communicators. Journalists who report on the Rohingya ethnic minority who live in refugee camps near the Bangladesh–Myanmar border say social media platforms have become indispensable as a communication tool to stay in touch with the refugees (Nachrin, 2019). The Rohingya use Twitter (now X) or Instagram to self-publish news about their day-to-day existence in

144 

D. AMBROSE

the camp and to communicate about their plight to a range of stakeholders (Fortify Rights, 2020). Rohingya refugees also collaborate with journalists to tell their stories. For example, Mohammad Arfaat and Mohammad Ahtaram are among those who have worked with journalists to report how they have survived genocide, risked their life at sea, and endure poor conditions in a refugee camp (Ahtaram, 2021; Arfaat, 2020): The journalist who worked with the refugees to get their work published by the New Humanitarian said there was a demonstrated value associated with such material: I connected him with the editor and I was sort of out of the picture and it’s great. He got to write his own opinion … there’s nothing more authentic than that … I think they have more agency. The Rohingya can actually talk about themselves. They don’t need journalists anymore to do that for them. Obviously, the internet and these communications tools are a lifeline to the outside world. (Journalist Six, 2021)

Digital technologies have enabled some of the most oppressed people in the world to articulate their views without it being filtered through a journalist’s lens. They can also counter the narratives of powerful adversaries. According to a correspondent based in Beirut, these communication behaviours are powerful, particularly across the Middle East: The fact everyone has essentially access to a camera means that, like, official narratives can be challenged and disputed. I think it does give them more power because in this clash of competing narratives, they have the ability to actually feed and fuel the narrative that they’re promoting. (Journalist Five, 2021)

Digital communications technologies are being used as a tool of free speech to challenge powerful actors in places where political forces are trying to suppress them. The violent crackdown across Myanmar after the military coup during February 2021 is a strong example of how an affected population can emerge as an important communicator in modern political disasters. A videographer covering the Myanmar story from a neighbouring Asian nation estimated that 90% of the footage used in television news packages originated from mobile phones of eyewitnesses. The journalist argued that such footage helped journalists hold the military to account.

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

145

With bans on independent local news outlets and the jailing of at least thirty-two local journalists, the affected population has emerged as a significant communicator during Myanmar’s post-coup military crackdown (Crispin, 2021). It has predominately been ordinary people, not professional journalists, who have documented atrocities perpetrated by soldiers. At the height of the 2021 Myanmar crackdown, only two foreign disaster journalists from CNN and Southeast Asia Globe were invited to enter the country and they were escorted by official minders during their reporting trip (Mendelson, 2021). The Columbia Journalism Review condemned the escorted journalist’s presence in the country saying it gave the military a platform to push false narratives and endangered the civilian population (Carroll & Htet Paing, 2021). For example, 11 civilians were detained for small interactions with both reporters during their assignment in Myanmar. While both journalists interviewed a military representative, they could not freely report on anti-coup protests sweeping the country (Mendelson, 2021). Professional journalists have mostly failed to independently gather information under these repressive conditions and it has been civilians who have been giving audiences a far more accurate picture of what is happening in Myanmar: When officers were kicking people and making them crawl on the floor like just for sport, people were filming from windows down on the street level what was happening. If we went through as reporters, you’re probably not going to see that unfold because you’re not at places where that’s going to take place. Most likely if we got into Myanmar as when CNN did, you’re going to have minders the whole time following you around. (Journalist One, 2021)

Recognising the publishing power of civilians, Myanmar’s military rulers shut down the Internet at regular intervals after the coup. People overcame these restrictions by using virtual private networks (VPN) or smuggling footage by foot into neighbouring countries (Caster, 2021; Davis, 2021). People’s use of these digital technologies to work around the regime in Myanmar is particularly remarkable because the country has only had access to mobile phones for a decade. Until 2011, when Myanmar transitioned to civilian rule and democratic elections, there was virtually no freedom of speech (Brooten et al., 2019). Now people are producing so much content it is hard for news organisations to keep track of it:

146 

D. AMBROSE

Non-journalists ask me, ‘Are you trying to go to Myanmar?’ I say there’s absolutely no need. I would draw too much attention to myself and get in trouble. All the journalists are literally gone. Maybe a handful are on the ground but they don’t go out or create content anymore. Basically, the whole coverage is citizen journalists. It’s just the victims themselves who film things. (Journalist Six, 2021)

There is recognition that in many areas, an affected population with the capacity to capture content using digital technologies is a greater asset than a professional journalist reporting in the field. Affected populations no longer need the presence of journalists to have their stories told.

The Future of Reporting With ordinary people now holding the power through digital media to tell their own stories, there has been a resulting change to the skill set of journalists. Increasingly journalists are seen as verifiers of content, moderators, and collaborators in storytelling, but it does not mean that power has moved in its entirety to local populations. Journalists in mainstream news outlets continue to have more power than ordinary citizens. First, affected populations often have vulnerabilities which can stop them from being effective publishers. For instance, people may not be safe if they publish their stories directly. Second, the overcrowded digital media landscape can limit the effectiveness of any publishing effort by one person. Third, journalists still hold influence in the world because their perceived impartiality, access to strong publishing platforms, traditional field skills, and ability to harness technologies that can assist people.

The Vulnerabilities of Citizens People caught up in stories, particularly political crises, can face challenges that seriously hinder their ability to be reliable news gatherers. One interviewee who reports in Middle East crisis zones observes that significant ethical concerns emerge when people are used for frontline disaster reportage: There’s people who might be completely hysterical. They might be unhinged … people living in communities experiencing shock don’t tend to film well. (Journalist Seven, 2021)

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

147

This example illustrates that people caught in hazardous traumatic situations can lose their capacity to be effective as news gatherers or storytellers. Three of the journalists interviewed for this chapter expressed concern that news organisations were increasingly reliant on ordinary people to provide content, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. There was a real concern that editors may continue with such processes permanently and fewer reporters would be deployed to highly volatile situations. One journalist described the process of training displaced Rohingya in Bangladesh’s refugee camps in the skills of news gathering, and acknowledged that there was a duty of care concerning people being asked to act as media producers: Obviously, he will say yes, no problem. Is it really no problem? If it goes wrong, it can really go wrong. You don’t want to be responsible for that. You don’t want to incentivise people. (Journalist Six, 2021)

A common concern is the safety of ordinary people acting as journalists. A journalist who is producing television stories on Myanmar’s military coup from another Asian country said many people filming the soldiers’ actions on phones had become direct targets of the military. The journalist’s employer will now only use eyewitness videos which have been published online and in the public domain. The journalist is concerned at the ethical practices of news outlets who hire citizen journalists or buy their footage in highly dangerous situations: Is it okay to ask people to film and put their lives at risk in the middle of riots and shootings? Are they going to get jailed? Are they going to get tortured? That’s kind of prevented us from getting people to specifically film something for us. (Journalist One, 2021)

This journalist observed the volume of eyewitness content from Myanmar dramatically dropped four months after the coup. Two journalists said news outlets needed to ensure that people had safety training and could upload footage safely via online platforms. However, there is often little safety or technological help for content producers in crisis zones. One rare example is Head Set, a company that provides hostile environment training courses for journalists using virtual reality. The company sends headsets to journalists in Indo-Pacific nations so they can learn about situational dangers using immersive technologies (Head Set, 2020).

148 

D. AMBROSE

Another factor that impacts the reliability of people as providers of content is their desire to be anonymous contributors during humanitarian crises. Two journalists interviewed for this work said that those who produce and post content often want their identity protected, as they fear retribution from the use of their work. This can cause serious issues as reputable media companies will not use footage and other content without proper verification. As one journalist indicated, to not properly attribute videos to a source immediately undermines the credibility of the reporting: I think having to put your full name, that means that you have to be fully accountable right for your post online. I’ve interviewed some people after I’ve read their tweets for example, but when I approached them, they prefer to be made anonymous because perhaps of privacy issues. (Journalist Two, 2021)

Credibility of sources is important, as was found in April 2021, when a CNN investigation into a massacre in Ethiopia relied on anonymous work relayed through a secondary source. An unidentified soldier turned whistle-­blower filmed the Ethiopian army killing 35 civilians in the restive Tigray region. Working with Amnesty International’s digital verification unit, CNN pinpointed the massacre site using topographic and spatial analysis. They also determined the perpetrators were Ethiopian soldiers based on their uniform patterns as well as their spoken dialect. However, the anonymous eyewitness sent the video on an encrypted phone application as five clips to a secondary source before it reached CNN (Feleke et al., 2021). Without the raw footage which contained key metadata, the disaster journalists could not confirm the incident date, who filmed it, and could not confirm if the footage was selectively edited. Consequently, the Ethiopian Government was able to dismiss the story arguing that it wasn’t strong enough evidence (Mezzofiore et  al., 2021). While professional journalists are not immune to being jailed or killed in crisis contexts, their status as foreigners makes them less vulnerable than ordinary people who provide information anonymously.

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

149

Publishing Power While new technologies enable ordinary people to potentially reach a global audience, there are often too many people online asking for help and audiences are too fragmented for individual communications to succeed (Robinson, 2018). All the journalists interviewed for this chapter doubted that technological advances truly gave ordinary people the power to significantly change their circumstances through individual efforts. One interviewee who covers Middle East conflict zones argued that most content produced by communities in crisis, particularly in protracted humanitarian emergencies, had a limited capacity to attract significant attention: I feel like it’s easier than ever to get published, it’s as difficult as ever to get someone’s attention…I wouldn’t say that it really helps in a material sense necessarily. It can motivate aid agencies to help them quicker perhaps but I think that would probably be quite marginal. (Journalist Seven, 2021)

A major barrier for those who self-publish on online platforms is the oversaturation of eyewitness content from a range of disasters. In a crowded information space, one journalist operating in Asia said audiences had become numb to the power of grim content produced by ordinary people: I think there’s a significant amount of fatigue. You only obviously get a small window of the world’s attention on anything really. (Journalist One, 2021)

The interviewed journalists also observed that many Indo-Pacific crises still attract little public attention even though affected populations in those disaster zones regularly produce content. One journalist argued that the new digital communications landscape still fails to elevate the status or change public perceptions about these situations: Sadly, the world just kind of expects that there are problems and lots of violence there. It’s really sad but some of these really sad situations and images may not cut through that noise and expectation … It just feels like no one really listens to them, even though they might be broadcasting a lot of images. (Journalist Four, 2021)

The interviewed journalists all rejected suggestions that people could improve their individual circumstances through access to cheap digital

150 

D. AMBROSE

technologies (Gilboa, 2005; Gowing, 2011). However, all could see advantage from events which brought the world together in an act of viral online viewing, such as the telegenic images of the explosion at the port of Beirut and the previous Boxing Day Tsunami (Chouliaraki, 2006). The images of the Indonesian band being swept by a tsunami were used as an example of gripping vital footage that captures an audience’s imagination (Al Jazeera English, 2018; Moeller, 2006). This type of content attracts an audience’s interest irrespective of whether it is captured by a professional journalist or a bystander with a smart phone. There are other factors beyond viral footage that enable a story to resonate with global audiences. The journalist observed Beirut was a major base for foreign correspondents who would have covered one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in history, regardless of the bystander’s footage. There was also immediate interest in the blasts due to early speculation from the then US President Donald Trump, that it was a terror attack in a region where such incidents have wider ramifications (Davies, 2020). The journalist compared the Beirut blast to a similar sized explosion in Equatorial Guinea seven months later which got limited news coverage (Ovaska & Granados, 2021): Someone in Equatorial Guinea for many reasons is far more alien to a western viewer than someone in a city like Beirut. Phone footage would not have made Equatorial Guinea a huge story for a week like the Beirut Blasts were. (Journalist Five, 2021)

The Beirut port explosion shows that factors beyond the footage from an event can push a crisis to the top of a news agenda such as if the media are active in that location, the geographical importance of the area and the disaster’s ramifications for a wider region. This also illustrates that acts of online communication by people does not always resonate with news audiences due to fatigue and an often overcrowded media landscape. While it is apparent there has been a power shift in the working relationship between ordinary people and journalists during the twenty-first century, new news-gathering methods which harness a range of new digital technologies do not always have an impact in the crisis communications landscape.

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

151

The (Enduring) Role of Journalists While ordinary people do now have enhanced publishing capacities, communities still benefit from the work of professional journalists and the vital services they can provide, particularly during disasters. Significantly, journalists have access to reliable news dissemination platforms and through their impartiality, traditional field skills, and ability to harness digital technologies, their work can draw a significant audience to an event or disaster. Professional journalists have an advantage of traditional news dissemination platforms where they can craft and control what is broadcast. However, people caught up in stories often must rely on third-party social media portals to disseminate their work. When people post eyewitness material of atrocities that is considered too graphic, social media companies who host the content can and often do decide to censor it. Some diaspora groups have found a way around this problem and established their own news agencies to broadcast stories. One such example is R Vision, a digital news outlet in Malaysia run by Rohingya exiles which documents the plight of this ethnic minority across Asia (Rose, 2018). That said, it is very rare for affected populations to manage news agencies. Through ownership of their platforms, news outlets still have more control over their disaster journalist’s output, the technologies utilised to produce reports and the narrative of the stories in humanitarian emergencies. Professional journalists are now less commonly used to report directly in crisis zones and now rely on digital communications capabilities of affected populations to produce content. Many of the journalists interviewed for this chapter were strong critics of this mode of reporting and argued that there was no substitute for reporting from the field. A journalist based in an Asian nation argued that the best disaster journalism was a mix of eyewitness content and original field reporting by impartial news reporters. This journalist also argued that he could bring the creative capacity to tell an emotional story which shows the impact of an event on an affected population, whereas phone footage was usually only a raw documentation of an incident but is still an actual narrative: I think it’ll always be important for people to go in physically and have a separate set of eyes actually there. For example, certain protests may look like a huge deal if you see them through someone’s camera or Twitter account. But if you’re actually there at that moment, you may realise it may not really be big. (Journalist One, 2021)

152 

D. AMBROSE

The risk of a professional journalist acquiring incorrect information was also dramatically elevated when they do not travel to the area and rely solely on online communication to carry out their reporting. One interviewee recounted an incident in Bangladesh’s refugee camps where a professional journalist based overseas was using the Internet to contact Rohingya for a story about the first day of the coup in Myanmar. The journalist who was reporting from inside the camps at the same time said the remote journalist inaccurately reported that camp residents were overjoyed about the arrest of civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi: That’s just not at all what was happening. This story is actually extremely dangerous if you just rely on messaging some random dude on Twitter and asking him suggestive questions because you have a deadline and you need to get this done. In these disaster crisis situations, it can have real consequences. (Journalist Six, 2021)

This observation underpins the value of traditional news gathering methods and it also shows the problem with relying simply on digital communications technologies to report these complex stories. Another interviewee expressed concern this new mode of participatory journalism which embraces ordinary people as media producers could undermine the media’s position as an impartial estate in civil society: Ultimately, we’re journalists, not advocates. There are so many aid organisations who have media teams who go out and produce content that fulfils those objectives. There’s a real difference between them and journalists. Like our job is to report the truth and place that truth within the meaning of what’s going on. (Journalist Four, 2021)

However, the majority of journalists believe some level of collaboration with people was a necessary practice. In their view, people in the Indo-­ Pacific were often the first publishers of vital information during major crises through their access to mobile technologies. One interviewee argued that participatory journalism that capitalises on eyewitnesses can culminate in better disaster reporting: We shouldn’t be impartial to the point that it detracts from the journalism. I would say that your role is to tell a faithful, powerful, accurate story. So, if you need to involve yourself with the creators of that content, then I think

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

153

it kind of goes towards helping to make that story more authentic. (Journalist Five, 2021)

Such views align with Houston and Gillmor who predicted that future news coverage will increasingly be active exchanges through forums or conversations between journalists and affected people (Gillmor, 2004; Houston et  al., 2019). When COVID-19 infections rose in the South Pacific, one of the interviewed journalists worked with local people to report on the crisis. For an hour every Friday lunchtime, the journalist hosted a question-and-answer session on Twitter Spaces, a feature within Twitter that enabled users with more than 600 followers to host a live audio online chat room. The journalist gave experts a chance to speak on the platform and it helped counter misinformation among the affected community: The number of people listening was just astronomical. There is not enough appreciation (by disaster journalists) of where the audience is, where we need to go and how we need to change in order to meet that audience because if we’re not careful, the audience will not watch the news. They will believe in rumour on social media. (Journalist Three, 2021)

By facilitating the dissemination of information through live online discussions among the disaster-affected population, the journalists showed how they could assist local populations during disasters. It also showed how new technological platforms are changing the collaborative relationship between journalists and communities. The journalists interviewed for this chapter all believe they owe a duty of care to those who produce eyewitness media for their stories. This is a marked change to the previous century, where affected populations were generally not at risk because of their media production capacities. It is also argued that even though affected populations have more publishing power and agency to amplify their stories through access to new technologies, it does not guarantee that anyone will pay attention. Third, it is argued that while journalists have had to change the way they engage with people and report on disasters, they still hold influence in the communications landscape. While the journalists interviewed for this chapter said this new paradigm provided opportunities for them to produce innovative impactful work, they held different views on participatory disaster-reporting approaches.

154 

D. AMBROSE

Conclusion This chapter has shown how digital tools have fundamentally changed the way journalists in the Indo-Pacific report on and engage with people in times of crisis. In this disaster-prone region, ordinary people are often the originators of content, and their work provides key storytelling components for journalists covering some of the biggest stories of the century. Ordinary people often alert the media to the occurrence of calamity far in advance of traditional broadcast media outlets. The media gathered by ordinary people in crisis zones has advantages for professional journalists but it is not without risks for those on the ground. In instances such as Myanmar’s post-coup crackdown, affected populations are capturing footage so effectively that a reporter’s field presence is considered by many working journalists as no longer necessary. Journalists can strengthen the production capabilities of ordinary people through acts of verification, collaboration, and moderation, which culminate in innovative modes of disaster reporting. For example, ordinary people in the can be taught how to film cyclones and volcanic eruptions on mobile devices, and to set up online chat rooms, but they still need to be able to get their footage to professional journalists for wider dissemination. COVID-19 has fundamentally changed reporting practices, and the long-term impact on journalism could well be significant, not least how pandemic affected populations who produced content for news outlets adapt and continue to express forms of agency in breaking down the divisions between the ‘reported’ and ‘reporter’.

References Ahtaram, M. (2021, May 6). Life at Disaster’s Edge: What It Means to Start OverAgain and Again. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian. org/opinion/first-­p erson/2021/5/6/rohingyarefugee-­r eflects-­o n-­ life-­at-­disasters-­edge Al Jazeera English. (2018, December 23). Dramatic Video Shows Tsunami Crashing Into Rock Concert. Al Jazeera. https://youtu.be/rNQ7nLdUNAs Arfaat, M. (2020, May 1). Why We Rohingya Refugees Risk Our Lives At Sea. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-­ person/2020/05/01/Rohingyarefugees-­Bangladesh-­human-­trafficking-­sea Bonin, G. A. (2016). Organizational Factors Influencing Journalists’ Use of User-­ Generated Content: A Case of Canadian Radio Newsrooms. Radio Journal, 14(1), 109–122. https://doi.org/10.1386/rjao.14.1.109_1

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

155

Brooten, L., McElhone, J. M., & Venkiteswaran, G. (2019). Myanmar Media in Transition: Legacies, Challenges, and Change. ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. Carroll, J., & Htet Paing, T. (2021, April 23). CNN Wades Into Murky Ethical Territory in Myanmar Again. Columbia Journalism Review. https://www.cjr. org/criticism/cnn-­myanmar-­ethics.php Caster, M. (2021, February 13). Myanmar’s Internet Shutdown. New Internationalist. https://newint.org/features/2021/02/13/myanmar­internet-­shutdown Chaudhuri, S. (2019). ‘Telegenically Dead Palestinians’: Cinema, News Media and Perception Management of the Gaza Conflicts. In M. L. Rachel Tavernor (Ed.), Humanitarianism: Key Debates and New Approaches. Manchester University Press. Chouliaraki, L. (2006). The Spectatorship of Suffering. Sage Publications. Cooper, G. (2019). Reporting Humanitarian Disaster in a Social Media Age. Taylor and Francis Group. Cottle, S. (2014). Rethinking Media and Disasters in a Global Age: What’s Changed and Why It Matters. Media War and Conflict, 7(1), 3–22. https:// doi.org/10.1177/1750635213513229 Crispin, S. (2021). Bitter Reversal: Myanmar Military Coup Wipes Out Press Freedom Gains (Committee to Protect Journalists Database, Issue. https:// cpj.org/reports/2021/07/bitter-­reversal-­myanmar-­journalists-­jailedimprisoned-­ military-­crackdown/ Crowe, A. (2012). Disasters 2.0: The Application of Social Media Systems for Modern Emergency Management. CRC Press, Taylor and Francis. Davies, E. (2020, August 4). Trump Says Beirut Explosion was a Bomb as His Generals Don’t Think It was an Accident. The Sun. https://www.thesun.co. uk/news/12314739/donald-­trump-­lebanon-­explosion-­attackbomb-­beirut/ Davis, M. (2021). What’s Happening in Myanmar. Foreign Correspondent. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-­07-­29/whats-­happening-­in-­myanmar/ 13476286 Doucet, L. (2018). Syria & the CNN Effect: What Role Does the Media Play in Policy-Making? Daedalus (Cambridge, MA), 147(1), 141–157. https://doi. org/10.1162/DAED_a_00480 Farinosi, M., & Treré, E. (2014). Challenging Mainstream Media, Documenting Real Life and Sharing with the Community: An Analysis of the Motivations for Producing Citizen Journalism in a Post-Disaster City. Global Media and Communication, 10. Feleke, B., Mackintosh, E., Mezzofiore, G., Polglase, K., Elbagir, N., Arvanitidis, B., & Baron, M. (2021). Two Bullets is Enough: Analysis of Tigray Massacre Video Raises Questions for Ethiopian Army. CNN. https://edition.cnn. com/2021/04/01/africa/tigray-­mahibere-­dego-­massacre-­videocmd-­intl/ index.html

156 

D. AMBROSE

Fortify Rights. (2020). Refugee “Instagrammers” Win Prestigious Social Media Award. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO2011/S00161/refugee-­ instagrammers-­win-­prestigious-­social-­media-­award.htm Franks, S. (2014). Reporting Disasters: Famine, Aid, Politics and the Media. London, England: C. Hurst and Company Limited. Ghazzi, O. A. (2014). “Citizen Journalism” in the Syrian Uprising: Problematizing Western Narratives in a Local Context. Communication Theory, 24(4), 435–454. https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12047 Gilboa, E. (2005). The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations. Political Communication, 22(1), 27–44. https://doi. org/10.1080/10584600590908429 Gill, I., & Schellekens, P. (2021). Covid-19 is a Developing Country Pandemic. Gillmor, D. (2004). We the Media: The Rise of Citizen Journalists. National Civic Review, 93(3), 58–63. https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.62 Gowing, N. (2011). Time to Move On: New Media Realities—New Vulnerabilities of Power. Media, War & Conflict, 4(1), 13–19. https://doi. org/10.1177/1750635210397637 Head Set. (2020). About Us. Head Set main website, viewed 18th August 2021. Hill, J., & Schwartz, V. R. (2020). Getting the Picture: The Visual Culture of the News. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Houston, J. B., Schraedley, M. K., Worley, M. E., Reed, K., & Saidi, J. (2019). Disaster Journalism: Fostering Citizen and Community Disaster Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and Resilience Across the Disaster Cycle. Disasters, 43(3), 591–611. https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12352 Jones, A. (2019). Global Humanitarianism and Media Culture. In M. Lawrence & R. Tavernor (Eds.), Global Humanitarianism and Media Culture. Manchester University Press. Kennan, G. (1993). Somalia, Through a Glass Darkly. The New  York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/30/opinion/somalia-­through-­a-­glass-­ darkly.html Mendelson, A. (2021, April 9). My Unusual Week with Myanmar’s Violent, Paranoid Military Junta. The Washington Post. https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/my-­unusual-­week-­myanmars-­violent-­paranoidmilitary-­junta Mermin, J. (1997). Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy. Political Science Quarterly, 112(3), 385–403. https://doi.org/10.2307/2657563 Mezzofiore, G., Polglase, K., Elbagir, N., & Arvanitidis, B. (2021, June 29). New Video of Ethiopia Massacre Shows Soldiers Passing Phone Around to Document Their Execution of Unarmed Men. CNN. https://edition.cnn. com/2021/06/27/africa/ethiopia-­massacre-­tigray-­mahibere-­degocmd-­intl/ index.html

7  SOCIAL AND MOBILE MEDIA IN TIMES OF DISASTER 

157

Minear, L., Scott, C., & Weiss, T. G. (1997). The News Media, Civil War and Humanitarian Action. Lynne Reiner Publishers. Moeller, S.  D. (2006). “Regarding the Pain of Others”: Media, Bias and the Coverage of international disasters. Journal of International Affairs (New York), 59(2), 173–196. Moeller, S.  D. (2018). Compassion Fatigue. In R.  Bleiker (Ed.), Visual Global Politics. Routledge. Nachrin, T. (2019). Social Media Uses by the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: A Uses and Gratification Approach. International Journal of Social Science Studies, 8(1). Nah, S., & Chung, D. (2020). Understanding Citizen Journalism as Civic Participation. London, United Kingdom: Taylor and Francis Group. Naim, M. (2009, October 14). The Youtube Effect. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/the-­youtube-­effect/ Ovaska, M., & Granados, S. (2021, March 11). Dynamite Explosions at Military Base Devastate Bata. Reuters Graphics. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ EQUATORIAL-­BLAST/DAMAGE/azgpodbravd/ Posetti, J., Bell, E., & Brown, P. (2020). Journalism & the Pandemic: A Global Snapshot of Impacts. https://towcenter.columbia.edu/content/ journalism-­and-­pandemic-­global-­snapshot-­impacts Quandt, T. (2018). Dark Participation. Media and Communication, 6(4), 36–48. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v6i4.1519 Robinson, P. (1999). The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy? Review of International Studies, 25(2), 301–309. https://doi. org/10.1017/S0260210599003010 Robinson, P. (2002). The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203995037 Robinson, P. (2005). The CNN Effect Revisited. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 22(4), 344–349. https://doi.org/10.1080/073931805 00288519 Robinson, P. (2018). The CNN Effect and Humanitarian Crisis. In (1 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 528–536). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315538129-­53. Rose, J. (2018, April 20). R Vision a Digital News Outlet by and for Rohingya People Aims to Shed Light on Crisis. Nieman Lab. https://www.niemanlab. org/2018/04/r-­v ision-­a -­d igital-­n ews-­o utlet-­b y-­a nd-­f orrohingya-­p eople-­ aims-­to-­shed-­light-­on-­crisis/ Shaw, M. (1996). Civil Society and Media in Global Crises: Representing Distant Violence. Pinter. Siagian, T.  H., Purhadi, P., Suhartono, S., & Ritonga, H. (2014). Social Vulnerability to Natural Hazards in Indonesia: Driving Factors and Policy Implications. Natural Hazards (Dordrecht), 70(2), 1603–1617. https://doi. org/10.1007/s11069-­013-­0888-­3

158 

D. AMBROSE

Strobel, W.  P., & Gowing, N. (1998). Late-breaking foreign policy: The news media’s influence on peace operations, 39, 182–184. Syamsidik, S., Benazir, B., Luthfi, M., Suppasri, A., & Comfort, L. K. (2020). The 22 December 2018 Mount Anak Krakatau Volcanogenic Tsunami on Sunda Strait Coasts, Indonesia: Tsunami and Damage Characteristics. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 20(2), 549–565. https://doi.org/10.5194/ nhess-­20-­549-­2020 Thurman, N. (2008). Forums for Citizen Journalists? Adoption of User Generated Content Initiatives by Online News Media. New Media & Society, 10(1). http://nms.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/1/139 Wall, M. (2019). Citizen Journalism: Practices, Propaganda, Pedagogy. Taylor & Francis Group. Williams, A., Wardle, C., & Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2011). “Have They Got News for Us?”: Audience Revolution or Business as Usual at the BBC? Journalism Practice, 5(1), 85–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512781003670031 Zeng, X., Jain, S., Nguyen, A., & Allan, S. (2019). New Perspectives on Citizen Journalism. Global Media and China, 4(1).

CHAPTER 8

Fact-Checking and Verification: The Changing Role of Professional Journalists Alexandra Wake , Drew Ambrose , and Damian Grenfell

Introduction Fake news, or stories that are made up to support certain agendas, are a global problem but have had a particularly deadly impact across many countries in the Indo-Pacific. In a region where young people dominate populations, many countries have poor education systems, and there are high levels of illiteracy and even less media literacy. This facilitates the spreading of fake news from person-to-person or to larger groups on public or private social media and smart phone apps. Even mainstream journalism produced by reputable news outlets—which in the past could generally be trusted—faces issues of trust in a polluted information ecosystem (Wardle, 2020) that swamps legitimate sources of information and reduces confidence in all news media.

A. Wake (*) • D. Ambrose • D. Grenfell RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9_8

159

160 

A. WAKE ET AL.

Although there are vast variations within countries, the Asia-Pacific region is home to 46% of the world’s illiterate youths and 61% of illiterate adults (UNESCO, 2018). The UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) notes that since 2000, the youth literacy rate in the Asia Pacific (aged 15 to 24) has improved tremendously, nearing universal youth literacy in some countries. However, despite the progress in the youth literacy rate, almost 46% of the world’s illiterate young people live in the region. Fake news is a catch-all term that can refer to fictitious articles created to look like legitimate news reports. Misinformation can sometimes simply be a mistake, whereas disinformation is a deliberate attempt to manipulate. Sometimes fake news is designed for humour, but its particularly worrying when reports which pretend to be trusted news are created to help politicians or political parties validate their opinions and to convince people to vote for them. Some fake news reports are designed to exacerbate division between rival political groups and to fan dissent between different groups. Finally, these kinds of stories, particularly when they use fake or misinformed using celebrities and other well-known figures,  can attract attention online as money can be gained from a huge volume of visitors to websites. While fake news has existed for as long as newspapers, the problem most recently has come from false stories being amplified by social media and believed by people who, by virtue of their education or literacy level, may not easily determine that the content is not true. And, to be fair, it can take a high degree of expertise to debunk some of the more sophisticated fake news stories. One senior Australian journalist now based in Thailand, Lisa Martin, said the situation was particularly bad in her region: It’s a massive problem. Take a country like Myanmar. They have a very poor education system, and have been in darkness for five decades. Then they opened up and suddenly there was the internet. The number of people who now have access to the whole world via their smartphone has outflanked digital literacy. I don’t think people necessarily have those critical thinking skills needed to sort out if something’s true or not. (Martin, 2021)

That said, people do not believe everything they read and there is more sophistication among people in the region than they often get credit for. For example, when discussing broadcasts from China, there was an acknowledgement from one broadcast expert that:

8  FACT-CHECKING AND VERIFICATION: THE CHANGING ROLE… 

161

People generally know what they’re getting from the Chinese state broadcasters. But it is still alarming some people don’t realise what they’re ­getting. I’ve had conversations with a number of people where it seems they were not aware of the extent to which the message was controlled. (Broadcast Expert 3, 2023)

Political misinformation is not new in the Indo-Pacific. For more than a decade there have been concerted efforts in digital spaces to influence public opinions with false and often hateful messages during elections and political crises in Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan (Kajimoto, 2021). However, security analysts have become increasingly concerned about state and non-state actors who use social media to push particular agendas. The Australian Defence Department funded think tank, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has issued at least ten reports on the way information is being manipulated online, making it clear that inauthentic and covert efforts to shape political opinions have no place in an open democratic society (COVID-19 Disinformation & Social Media Manipulation, 2020). These ASPI reports include one on Chinese state-sponsored messaging on Twitter (now X) and coordinated anti-Taiwan trolling. There is also another on the growing significance and impact of Chinese non-state actors on Western social media platforms. That report shows that across March and April 2020, a pro-China trolling campaign on Twitter (now X), among other things, harassed and mimicked Western media outlets and joined in pre-existing inauthentic social media campaigns. A third ASPI report was also concerned about state actors in Australia using Facebook (now Meta) to launch coordinated, inauthentic communication campaigns on Australian users. This included running paid advertisements, as well as putting content into Australian Facebook (now Meta) groups for minority communities, hobbyists, and conspiracy theories. Bangkok-based journalist Lisa Martin said during her posting in Thailand  she had seen problems escalate in the surrounding countries  because of fake news online. The worst examples were when fake news inflamed ethnic and racial tensions in Myanmar: In 2017 there was a bit of vigilantism happening. Fake news was stoking what became atrocities. People were egging each other on ... There were cases of Muslim people being accused of raping a Buddhist girl and then

162 

A. WAKE ET AL.

boom, like a whole village is fighting each other. I don’t think it’s going to get better any anytime soon. There is a huge need for more effort in that area. (Martin, 2021)

Fact-Check Laws Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers and civil society organisations in the Indo-Pacific were concerned about Governments using the spread of fake news online as an opportunity to give themselves new powers to crack down on media freedoms and journalists. Fact-check researchers have noted what they see as a worrying trend in Asia for established government fact-checking media outlets (Kaur et  al., 2018). These included Singapore, Malaysia, India, and Vietnam. The researchers warned that: It is a concerning development as the authorities could misappropriate the process and practice of fact-checking for their own political ends in the name of fighting misinformation and disinformation. With limited press freedom (Richburg, 2022) and emerging regulatory frameworks (so-called “fake news laws”), even defining “inaccurate” information could be tinged with undemocratic motivations in this part of the world. (Kaur et al., 2018)

Fears about the chilling impact of fake news laws were further confirmed by researchers Carson and Gibbons (2023) in a study of journalists in Indonesia and Singapore. They acknowledged that governments in these countries, particularly Indonesia, did need to act to stop fake news but warned that how governments responded could have a real impact on journalism. Among their findings was that fake news laws could paradoxically make it more difficult for the public to trust the media, and therefore make it more difficult to tackle harmful misinformation. The Chinese government manages a platform called Piyao (piyao means “refuting rumours”) that curates debunking stories from a variety of media, including state-controlled outlets and government agencies (Kajimoto, 2021). Chinese broadcasters also do their own fact-checking videos in response to reporting that they find offensive. A quick search of the China Daily’s English-language YouTube site features a series of ‘fact-­ check’ videos on a range of issues, some specifically attacking the BBC for its reporting about China’s Uyghur community (“BBC in Xinjiang: Facts Don’t Matter | China Daily Visual Investigation”, 2021), the Winter Olympics, and COVID-19.

8  FACT-CHECKING AND VERIFICATION: THE CHANGING ROLE… 

163

Fact-Checking in the Indo-Pacific Fact-checking by journalists and researchers has become a global industry, with Duke Reporters’ Lab in 2022 recording more than 378 fact-­checking outlets in 105 countries operating in 70 languages (Stencel et al., 2022). There were only 22 fact-checkers in Asia (including Middle Eastern countries) in 2018 but this had grown to 89 active fact-checking outlets by 2021. These were newly established, non-partisan fact-checking initiatives but it excluded governmental-run fact-checker because of their lack or perceived lack of independence. Serious efforts are being put into fact-checking in the Indo-Pacific with organisations like Google promising new systems and search features to supporting fact-checking communities, which would work across the main languages of the Indo-Pacific, including Japanese, Korean, Indonesian, Vietnamese, Malay, Urdu, both Simplified and Traditional Chinese, and a number of Indian languages. Google promised that three dots beside a search query would provide more information about the result and help audiences understand where the information is coming from. It was hoped that this additional material would help people make a more informed decision about the sites they may want to visit (Jay Liu, 2023). Google was also looking at providing more context for videos on YouTube, by expanding information panels giving topical context to Singapore, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, and New Zealand: Now, when people search videos on certain topics prone to misinformation (such as climate change), they’ll see an information panel at the top of their search results or under a video they’re watching which includes links to additional info and context from authoritative third-party sources. (Jay Liu, 2023)

The International Fact-Checking Network from 65 countries, covering over 80 languages, was also among the many organisations flooding the region with fact-checking courses and programmes aimed at journalists in the Indo-Pacific region (IFCN, 2023). One such project is CekFakta, a collaborative fact-checking and verification project for Indonesian journalists, fact-checkers, and citizens to fight misinformation preparing for the 2024 election. Indonesia is the world’s third-largest democracy with more than 260 million residents, but the country’s religious and ethnic pluralism, as well as its rapid adoption of the Internet and social media, have provided fertile ground for misinformation.

164 

A. WAKE ET AL.

In partnership with Internews and the Alliance of Independent Journalists, the Google News Initiative had offered fact-check classes to 1800 Indonesian journalists. The workshops were conducted in Indonesian and led by local journalists, using a curriculum co-created by Indonesian partners in consultation with fact-check organisations First Draft and Storyful (Jay Liu, 2018). Google is not the only one funding such work. A Meta course is now available in 15 languages, including Indonesian, Malay, Thai, Pashto, Sinhala, Tamil, traditional Chinese, and Urdu. Meta’s integrity Partnership spokesperson was quoted as saying fact-checking was an essential pillar of our work to address misinformation at Meta: We believe upskilling people in Asia Pacific with courses like this is critical to help develop and strengthen the entire system … This course is accessible to anyone with an interest in learning about fact-checking, developing their skills and incorporating fact-checking into their daily work. (IFCN, 2023)

This chapter argues that it is better to stop fake news being used by or distributed by trusted news brands in the first place and that there is a unique space for broadcast journalists working across the Indo-Pacific to stop the spread of fake news, by evolving from their original role as the primary information gatherers in the field, to content moderators, aggregators, and fact-checkers. Reporters now need high-level skills in verification and fact-checking to verify the content of information, particularly that provided online, and to examine the motivations and capabilities of those who push content out into the world.

TikTok One way that citizens are influenced by fake news is through social media applications like the Chinese-owned video platforming service TikTok. Until recently, media analysts in the West were only talking about Facebook (now Meta) and Twitter (now X). But younger people now prefer platforms like TikTok and other private messaging systems. TikTok is expected to be the fastest-growing social platform this year. Its user increase in 2023 is predicted to be nearly double that of its much bigger US rival Instagram (13.6% versus 7.3%). Marketing firm Insider Intelligence reported that even though TikTok is banned in India, it will have much of its growth driven by Southeast Asia. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines,

8  FACT-CHECKING AND VERIFICATION: THE CHANGING ROLE… 

165

Thailand, and Vietnam together are on track to account for about half of TikTok users in Asia-Pacific, excluding China. And all of those countries except Singapore will see their TikTok user base rise more than 10% this year (Cheung, 2023). The use of TikTok among young people is particularly worrying to security analysts who fear for the increasing numbers of working-age Gen Zs and millennials who are not media savvy but are eligible to vote in many parts of the Indo-Pacific. In Indonesia, for example, at the 2024 election an estimated 54% of the voters in a population of 270 million people are young (“Indonesian Youth, Take Charge!”, 2022). Candidates in Indonesia are targeting millennial voters because they are credited with deciding the outcome of elections. Young TikTok audiences can be influenced in very subtle ways by fake news being shared by others whose motivations might not be obvious. While legitimate news agencies are on TikTok, they sit alongside individuals who can post anything they like to the app. In 2023, a journalist (Zaffarano, 2023) started counting TikTok accounts that were aligned to news outlets. He counted 35 broadcasters on the app, however, by the very nature of TikTok, more of the outlets counted were organisations more traditionally considered as print or digital publications, rather than broadcaster. Zaffarano had counted a total of 25 Australian news outlets with TikTok accounts in April 2023. In comparison, US news outlets had 649 TikTok accounts associated with them and the UK had 40, including 9 for the BBC, encompassing their Russian and Ukrainian services. Russian news outlets had 19 news outlets on TikTok, Thailand 40, the Philippines 16, Malaysia 15, Singapore 11, India 7, South Korea 6, Japan 6, and Sri Lanka 1. Only two China publishers were listed, China Press (listed in Malaysia) and the South China Morning Post (listed in Singapore). Western governments are also concerned about TikTok because of its Chinese ownership and potential for data leaks to Chinese security agencies. Australia was the last of the so-called Five Eyes intelligence alliance to block the app, following similar decisions by the United States, Canada, the UK, and New Zealand. Its Australian spokesperson has repeatedly said that despite claims the app could be accessed by Chinese officials, because the company is subject to Chinese national intelligence laws, the company has never received such a request and would refuse to provide Australian user data if asked to do so (Al-Khouri et al., 2023).

166 

A. WAKE ET AL.

Verification of Content Journalists have historically been expected to verify information that they receive from sources. After all, authentication of broadcast material has become increasingly important with the dramatic changes to the digital media landscape including the increased use and prevalence of AI applications. False information can spread easily through algorithms on social media sites, Internet search engines and other digital platforms (Carson, 2019, pp. 35–66) and it’s not always easy to find the meta data on a file to verify where and when footage was taken or even whether it was generated by AI. Consequently, there is a growing need for journalists and others who can verify content online. Some material may be created by AI with the very best of intentions. This can be seen in the case of Australian law firm Maurice Blackburn which commissioned the use of AI to create photographs based on the witness statements of 32 detainees, as it is nearly impossible to get visuals from inside detainee camps (Schultz, 2023). Those images came only a month after social media was abuzz with fake images of former US president Donald Trump being tackled by New York City police officers and Russian President Vladimir Putin in a prison suit behind bars. The Maurice Blackburn lawyers were quite clear about their intention to mimic news content: We wanted to create images with the same weight and power as photojournalism. (Schultz, 2023)

But while the lawyers may have been clear in the good intent of their work, the photographs once published online could be easily downloaded and repurposed by another without the same good intentions. Professional journalists working across the Indo-Pacific say they are increasingly having to scrutinise media posted on Internet platforms because Internet users often post or share misinformation, intentionally or accidentally, during a crisis: I think they just want to be viral because I mean this is such a huge story, butsometimes they are doing unethical stuff. Indonesians are very much easily influenced by viral stuff. They believe it is true if it’s gaining lots of traction. Basically, you have to do more verification to get to the truth. (Journalist Two, 2021)

8  FACT-CHECKING AND VERIFICATION: THE CHANGING ROLE… 

167

To improve their verification abilities, many news outlets have established specialist teams to authenticate content, and work as myth-busters, publishing stories that warn of misinformation circulating online, or pieces with verified information about an incident (Juneström, 2021, pp. 501–504). When a volcano erupted in the Philippines in 2020, local agency Rappler used its fact-check unit to warn people not to turn off their mobile phones because of misleading information about phones and radiation during seismic events. Rappler’s work helped protect affected communities because Filipino authorities issue warnings by text message during disasters (Macaraeg, 2022). The New  York Times  Visual Investigations Unit also uses social media footage with satellite technology and publicly available data to expose injustices in disaster zones. Without needing to physically travel to the frontlines of crisis zones, this team has produced evidence that Russian military planes were bombing Syrian hospitals and in another separate investigation exposed human rights abuses being perpetrated against migrants detained on Libyan army bases (Browne et al., 2019; Browne & Triebert, 2019). The establishment of specialist reporting teams that fact-check digital content is a major change to reporting practices that only emerged during the twenty-first century. Such verification processes signify a shift in how journalists report on disasters. During wars, journalists have observed that some content posted online can misrepresent actions on the ground or may be entirely faked. Affected populations increasingly use digital technology to assert their rights and to provide commentary. Those people caught up in the middle of a crisis have a range of reasons to post faked as well as real material online, particularly if they are attempting to provoke change. In such situations journalists need to determine whether the content accurately depicts events: Are they going to use it (mobile phones) responsibly? What happened before the footage? Before the record button was hit? I don’t know. If you are there and on the ground and your job is to report impartially, you take that very seriously and have a team around you to hold each other accountable. (Journalist One, 2021)

This shows that journalists also examine the motivations of people who produce media content. The journalists interviewed for this research observed other actors produce eyewitness media in a crisis zone such as militant groups. While their content was often disseminated for political reasons to advance their agenda, one journalist who was interviewed before the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan said eyewitness

168 

A. WAKE ET AL.

material they produced during their militancy period could not be discounted by the media but should be verified to properly ascertain what is happening: The Taliban will tweet or send you photos of people who have been killed in airstrikes by the US Forces. There is power in seeing those images, but the Taliban are releasing those images for a reason. You cannot trust in that individual case that’s what happened. But can we say overall these airstrikes are killing children? Yes, we can. (Journalist Four, 2021)

This comment (above) is worth re-reading in the light of current wars because it shows that journalists face challenges when verifying incidents during a humanitarian emergency due to the biases of the actors who communicate in crisis zones. The theme of objectivity in crisis zones was explored earlier with studies outlining how the biases of local fixers, sources, and activists who collaborate with journalists can adversely impact their understanding of modern disasters (Ghazzi, 2014; Palmer & Fontan, 2007, p. 15; Quandt, 2018, pp. 37–44). The relevance of this literature here is that it points to how locals, in different capacities, can utilise these technologies for political subterfuge. Interestingly, the interviewee says that eyewitness material from biased sources is still useful and other journalists have used such content to authenticate disaster incidents. For example, in 2019 the BBC’s Africa Eye unit analysed eyewitness videos from more than 300 phone users to document a mass killing committed by Sudanese soldiers during a protest in the capital Khartoum. Demonstrators who ideologically opposed the authorities captured the footage, but through acts of authentication such as forensically cross-­ referencing the protesters’ videos and interviewing soldiers who perpetrated the violence, the BBC built an objective narrative from biased sources (“Sudan’s Livestream Massacre”, 2021). As such, interviewees in this research project explained that as digital communications technologies continue to advance, journalists can remain a relevant force in the disaster communications landscape by providing analysis as verifiers.

Moderating and Capacity Building The broadcast journalist’s role in a digital world is increasingly shifting from an information collector reporting in a crisis zone to an aggregator of content captured by crisis-affected communities—and as a result there is increasingly skill sharing between journalists and community members.

8  FACT-CHECKING AND VERIFICATION: THE CHANGING ROLE… 

169

The technological advancement of digital communication tools and their wider use enables broadcast journalists to build a network of active media contributors whom they regularly communicate with to report on an unfolding story. For example, an interviewee who works as a radio journalist in a cyclone-prone South Pacific nation has run digital workshops since 2019, which train civilians how to film eyewitness footage on their phones. When a cyclone reaches landfall, the research journalist receives up to 30 videos on a messaging app from people who did the workshop. At the height of the disaster, the journalist moderates discussions on online forums and uses the eyewitness footage to educate the affected population so they are aware of the cyclone’s path: I’m better able to analyse and give projections to my audience of what kinds of things to expect. Not just in terms of a cyclone that they should prepare for but also how to source assistance and the next steps. (Journalist Three, 2021)

This shows the journalist uses capacity building and inclusive approaches which involve the affected population in a conversation about the crisis, instead of just reporting the event for an audience. Moderating is a new way in which disaster journalists are engaging with people by mobilising their technological capacities: I think the frequency and severity of disasters in the region have forced me out of my traditional role as a journalist. I feel I can’t be an observer anymore…for those that don’t recognise the changing role that journalists now play in the humanitarian response, you will get left behind. (Journalist Three, 2021)

When compared with older modes of disaster reporting, such sentiments from the South Pacific journalist reflect the dramatically changing role of journalism. Throughout the twentieth century, news production was an elite exercise where the journalist was largely divorced from the affected population. In contrast, the South Pacific journalist facilitates discussion and online contributions from the affected population as a moderator. During the twenty-first century, journalists and affected populations are effectively harnessing digital communication technologies together to create a community that reports collectively when calamity strikes. This participatory approach is therefore a defining change in the relationship between people and disaster journalists when emergencies occur.

170 

A. WAKE ET AL.

Aside from working with affected populations, three research journalists said that disaster journalists were also improving the capacities of local media producers whom they regularly work with in crisis zones. These assistants can gather content remotely for the journalist who then acts as a moderator for their employer. This new technique of news gathering illustrates that disaster reporters are adapting their role due to the enhanced digital production capacities of people in the Indo-Pacific. One journalist has begun improving the media production skills of Rohingya in Bangladesh’s refugee camps. These Rohingya citizen journalists are now commissioned to capture footage and conduct interviews with their own digital communications tools. The interviewee often hears of news or receives the first images of an event which occurs in the camp before other disaster journalists, as a result of this capacity building: I would explain to them how and why we do it. I would explain why I’m doing certain things and possible consequences. I would explain the news gathering process that follows which they are not a part of. (Journalist Six, 2021)

Such inclusive behaviours are significant because these modes of practice contrast with examples of older participatory media approaches. For example, studies on the impact of citizen journalism in China and Italy show that the affected population report news independently without any collaboration with mainstream journalists (Farinosi & Treré, 2014, pp. 73–92; Zeng et al., 2019, pp. 3–12). In these politically oppressive environments, they produced media as a form of counter-narrative to official media agencies aligned with government interests. Two decades later, the enhanced production capacities of local media producers and eyewitnesses is forcing reporters to adapt by embracing moderating as well as capacity building for communities in crisis zones such as refugee camps. The adoption of these inclusive approaches substantiates the chapter’s main contention that journalists working remotely can help build capacity with local journalists by using fact-checking techniques.

Journalists and Citizen Collaboration Aside from building the communications capacities of an affected population, reporters are increasingly collaborating with people to produce impactful journalism. In crisis contexts, collaboration involves journalists

8  FACT-CHECKING AND VERIFICATION: THE CHANGING ROLE… 

171

embedding themselves in an affected community or working in a direct creative partnership with a citizen to produce a story. In collaborative projects, the interview subject has a greater role in producing the narrative story often with direction from a news outlet, whereas eyewitnesses gather content independently when they work with a reporter on a project involving moderation. When reporters harness the digital technological capacities of an affected population to produce a piece of journalism, it also changes the dynamic between the two with the international broadcaster acting as a verifier and fact-checker. When a catastrophic explosion at the port of Beirut killed more than 200 people and reduced Lebanon’s capital city to rubble in August 2020, one research journalist published a compelling online documentary about the disaster that incorporated collaborative storytelling approaches. The project used voice memos, footage, and photos from the mobile phones of eye witnesses to recreate what happened on the day of the explosion. Timelines and interactive maps were used to position each eyewitness in relation to the blast site (Safi et al., 2020). This project drew in a variety of media professionals including a podcasting company. The journalist conducted detailed interviews so that the story could be told in first person from the narrative perspective of different people using their eyewitness content: Like you don’t have to just drop in and give your master narrative of what’s going on … I would say the way I would approach it is, I would go in there and identify who is creating, like, media about what’s going on, build relationships with them and you sort of see it as a collaboration between you and them. (Journalist Five, 2021)

The project was also collaborative in nature because those who captured the footage managed to choose which eyewitness media to incorporate in their story. The interviewee and other journalists who worked on this piece let the eyewitnesses decide what parts of their ordeal that day were the most important to emphasise. This contrasts with traditional practices where reporters determine what elements to include as part of a citizen’s account. The journalist offered further reflections on collaborative approaches by saying that disaster journalists have to think anthropologically about how affected members of a population communicated with each other during the crisis:

172 

A. WAKE ET AL.

How do people communicate? And what is the storytelling potential of that? Journalists should go in with a greater awareness to say, ‘I’ve asked the questions, I know what happened now … can you tell me if there’s any messages or audio on your phone that you recorded about that?’ So, you end up with a rich palette to work with. (Journalist Five, 2021)

The observation shows that access to digital communications technologies provides more humanity, status, and agency to people affected by a crisis. The adoption of collaborative disaster journalism approaches also importantly illustrates the changing role that witnesses can bring as media producers in disaster zones. They are not just those who gather material. Their personality and commentary as bystanders can also be an asset for collaborative disaster journalism projects because it brings a degree of relatability for news audiences. The infusion of personality by these people into their content contrasts with the early characteristics of bystander media. The early wave of digital content from affected populations simply documented the unfolding disaster. Cheap publishing technologies enable impacted communities to convey their hardship and challenges through livestreaming or the regular uploading of video onto various Internet platforms. This change connects to this section’s central argument because those who capture the footage can have an enhanced point of view that journalists can capitalise on through the use of digital tools. When disasters occur in the twenty-first century, the video diary is another popular collaborative news-gathering technique. This is when a person in a crisis zone uses their mobile phone to record personal on-­ camera confessionals and scenes which show the struggles their community is facing. Video diaries are a form of collaboration because a disaster journalist has specifically asked survivors to film these elements as components for a story. During early 2020, Sky News and Channel 4 used this device to document life in Wuhan, China, when it was the epicentre of the COVID-19 pandemic (“Coronavirus: Wuhan Volunteer Describes what it is like to have COVID-19”, 2020; “From Lockdown to Unlocking: Video Diary of Life in Wuhan During the Coronavirus Outbreak”, 2020). Wuhan’s residents filmed their life under lockdown in apartments, shoppers stockpiling goods in supermarkets, empty desolate streets, and even what it is like to contract the virus. As the virus spread, frontline doctors worked with news agencies to document the crisis unfolding in their emergency wards. Another effective example was a video diary by the BBC in Pakistan with Doctor Amara Khalid. When coronavirus cases soared, she

8  FACT-CHECKING AND VERIFICATION: THE CHANGING ROLE… 

173

used her phone to document chaos in Lahore’s busiest hospital over two months. Filming herself throughout, the doctor candidly tells the audience that there is a lack of sterilised medical goggles, patients are placed in wheelchairs when wards are full, and she becomes emotional when her husband contracts COVID-19 (Kermani, 2020). One journalist who uses video diaries to report on disasters observes that it can create emotional relatability between the disaster citizen and the audience: I think it narrows the distance of cultural misunderstanding. If you think what orientalism is, it’s born out of a kind of misunderstanding of an exotic other. Through having smartphones, they publish a common human banality to life. You watch a livestream, you realise that people in the world are really quite similar in various ways and react in similar ways. It very much kind of kills off a lot of that false exoticism. (Journalist Seven, 2021)

This illustrates how when crisis-affected populations work with journalists to produce collaborative disaster journalism, people are no longer a backdrop or subject matter for stories. The representation of those affected by the pandemic contrasts dramatically with British journalist Michael Buerk’s reporting on the 1984 Ethiopian drought, which only featured his narration, the perspective of a white doctor, and the famine-affected population who were only filmed as images (Cooper, 2019, p. 235). Even in the 1990s, when the CNN Effect emerged as a theory to explain the power of 24-hour news gathering, disaster journalists still reported on the plight of affected populations in post–Cold War crises instead of with them. In contrast, this new era of collaboration challenges the dominance of news organisations and their old elitist modes in representing the exotic other. Today, the dichotomy between the reporter and crisis-affected population is moving towards a more equal relationship, where a journalist is more of a facilitator of eyewitness content. In this new process, the media’s influence is undermined by their dependence on communities utilising new digital publishing tools when disasters occur. This illustrates how the use of new technologies by impacted communities is the catalyst that is leading to collaborations with journalists. By working directly with people to produce such outputs as video diaries, this is a clear change in how reporters are increasingly engaging people to create stories where the use of technology has changed the dynamic between the journalist and those affected in crises.

174 

A. WAKE ET AL.

Conclusion Misinformation and disinformation, collectively referred to as fake news,  remains a serious and growing problem across the Indo-Pacific. Journalists increasingly find that they must play a significant role in stopping the spread of misinformation by harnessing new skills to ensure they verify information before spreading it further in legitimate news reports. Furthermore, journalists must update their skills and use them to debunk fake news stories and raise questions about the circulation of incorrect information such as fake videos. By working in collaboration with individuals  who have gathered the material for broadcast  on their mobile devices, better stories can be told that reflect the situation on the ground, as well as assist in building local storytelling capacity. This chapter adds to the argument in this book that the region needs strong and verified news and current affairs from trusted journalists, because of the prevalence of fake news and disinformation, and the danger that they can cause in communities, particularly those with low literacy, and media literacy skills.

References Al-Khouri, C., Lowrey, T., & Long, C. (2023, April 4). TikTok to be Banned from Australian Government Devices. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/ news/2023-­04-­04/tiktok-­ban-­australian-­government-­devices/102183478 BBC in Xinjiang: Facts Don’t Matter | China Daily Visual Investigation. (2021, January 10). China Daily https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kTvDh3V9hw0 Broadcast Expert 3. (2023, April 14). Research Interview (Asia Pacific Broadcast Executive) [Interview]. Browne, M., Hill, E., Triebert, C., Hurst, W., Gianordoli, G., & Khavin, D. (2019, December 31). Hospitals and Schools Are Being Bombed in Syria. A UN Inquiry is Limited. We Took a Deeper Look. New York Times. https://www. nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/31/world/middleeast/syria-­u nited-­ nations-­investigation.html Browne, M., & Triebert, C. (2019, July 17). How the Times Analysed the Migrant Center Airstrike. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/ reader-­center/libya-­migrant-­center-­airstrike-­reporting.html Carson, A. (2019). Investigative Journalism, Democracy and the Digital Age. Taylor and Francis. Carson, A., & Gibbons, A. (2023). The Big Chill? How Journalists and Sources Perceive and Respond to Fake News Laws in Indonesia and Singapore. Journalism Studies, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2023.2192299

8  FACT-CHECKING AND VERIFICATION: THE CHANGING ROLE… 

175

Cheung, M.-C. (2023). TikTok’s Growth Strong Despite Western Bans: Asia-­ Pacific Sees Nearly 60% of World’s Social Network Users. emarketer. https:// www.insiderintelligence.com/content/tiktok-­poised-­strong-­growth-­asia-­faces-­ business-­threats-­abroad Cooper, G. (2019). Reporting Humanitarian Disaster in a Social Media Age. Taylor and Francis Group. Coronavirus: Wuhan Volunteer Describes What it is Like to have COVID-19. (2020, February 26). Sky News. https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-­a-­ volunteers-­life-­in-­wuhan-­and-­what-­it-­islike-­to-­have-­covid-­19-­11942227# Covid-19 Disinformation & Social Media Manipulation. (2020). https://www. aspi.org.au/report/covid-­19-­disinformation Farinosi, M., & Treré, E. (2014). Challenging Mainstream Media, Documenting Real Life and Sharing with the Community: An Analysis of the Motivations for Producing Citizen Journalism in a Post-Disaster City. Global Media and Communication, 10. From Lockdown to Unlocking: Video Diary of Life in Wuhan During the Coronavirus Outbreak. (2020, April 17). Channel 4 News. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBPT3elzEsY&t=28s Ghazzi, O. A. (2014). “Citizen Journalism” in the Syrian Uprising: Problematizing Western Narratives in a Local Context. Communication Theory, 24(4), 435–454. https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12047 IFCN. (2023). Poynter and Meta Partner to Provide Fact-Checking Fundamentals for Asia-Pacific Journalists. Poynter. https://www.poynter.org/from-­the-­ institute/2023/fact-­checking-­fundamentals-­apac-­journalists-­ifcn/ Indonesian Youth, Take Charge! (2022, October 29). Jakarta Post. https://www. thejakar tapost.com/opinion/2022/10/29/indonesian-­y outh-­t ake-­ charge.html. Jay Liu, I. (2018, June 26). CekFakta: Collaborative Fact-Checking in Indonesia. blog.google. https://blog.google/outreach-­initiatives/google-­news-­initiative/ cekfakta-­collaborative-­fact-­checking-­indonesia/ Jay Liu, I. (2023, March 31). How We’re Fighting Misinformation Across Asia Pacific. blog.google. https://blog.google/around-­the-­globe/google-­asia/ how-­were-­fighting-­misinformation-­across-­asia-­pacific/ Juneström, A. (2021). An Emerging Genre of Contemporary Fact-Checking [Article]. Journal of Documentation, 77(2), 501–517. https://doi. org/10.1108/JD-­05-­2020-­0083 Kajimoto, M. (2021). Fact-Checking as a Means to Fight Disinformation: Trends and Challenges Amid Political Turmoil and Elections in Asia (Indo-Pacific Regional Disinformation Research Series) Kaur, K., Nair, S., Kwok, Y., Kajimoto, M., Chua, Y. T., Labiste, M. D., Soon, C., Jo, H., Lin, L. L., Thanh, T., & Kruger, A. (2018, October 10). Information Disorder in Asia and the Pacific: Overview of Misinformation Ecosystem in

176 

A. WAKE ET AL.

Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3134581 Kermani, S. (2020, July 30). Coronavirus in Pakistan; Doctor’s Video Diary of Fight Against Pandemic. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/ world-­asia-­53559251 Macaraeg, P. (2022, February 13). Why Factchecking is Important During Times of Disasters, Epidemics Rappler Online. https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/fact-­check/why-­fact-­checking-­important-­timesdisasters-­epidemics Martin, L. (2021, May 21). Research Interview Australian International Wire Journalist [Interview]. Palmer, J., & Fontan, V. (2007). Our Ears and Our Eyes: Journalists and Fixers in Iraq. Journalism (London, England), 8(1), 5–24. https://doi. org/10.1177/1464884907072419 Quandt, T. (2018). Dark Participation. Media and Communication, 6(4), 36–48. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v6i4.1519 Richburg, K. B. (2022, August 10). Press Freedom Under Attack Across Asia. The Strategist. Safi, M., Blight, G., McMullan, L., Opuku-Gyeni, E., & Costa, M. (2020). Beirut Blast: A Night of Horror, Captured by Its Victims. The Guardian. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/ng-­interactive/2020/nov/12/beirutblast-­a­night-­of-­horror-­captured-­by-­its-­victims Schultz, A. (2023, April 8). These Offshore Detention Photos are Harrowing. But They’re Not Real. The Age. https://www.theage.com.au/national/these-­ offshore-­detention-­photos-­are-­harrowing-­but-­they-­r e-­not-­r eal-­20230407-­ p5cyw4.html Stencel, M., et al. (2022). Fact-checkers extend their global reach with 391 outlets, but growth has slowed. Duke Reporters Lab. www.reporterslab.org Sudan’s Livestream Massacre. (2021, June 11). BBC Africa Eye. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=dR56qxM4kHA&t=1s UNESCO. (2018). Situation Analysis of SDG 4 with a Gender Lens, Target 4.6. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000371226 Wardle, C. (2020). Understanding Information Disorder. First Draft. Retrieved April 25, from firstdraftnews.org/long-­form-­article/understanding-­ information-­disorder/ Zaffarano, F. (2023). Mapping Journalism on TikTok. https://mappingjournalism.substack.com/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_ content=share Zeng, X., Jain, S., Nguyen, A., & Allan, S. (2019). New Perspectives on Citizen Journalism. Global Media and China, 4(1).

CHAPTER 9

A Case Study of Media Tensions in Solomon Islands, China, and Australia Alexandra Wake

and Lucy Morieson

Introduction Solomon Islands—a small and poor island state located to the east of Australia—made global headlines in 2022 when the country’s prime minister signed a security deal with China giving Beijing the right to send naval vessels and police officers to the country (Cave, 2022). After years of concern about the increasing influence of China in the small island state, defence officials in the United States, Australia, and the UK began to publicly express concern that China had over-stepped the line, after already securing deep-water ports and satellite communication sites in the country. Solomon Islands is not the only Indo-Pacific state that is of concern to Australian-aligned defence partners. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been gaining access to strategic resources and locations across the Pacific, for civilian and military uses, at sea, and for satellite communications. Kiribati and Fiji, for example, have also signed deals with

A. Wake (*) • L. Morieson RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9_9

177

178 

A. WAKE AND L. MORIESON

China while countries like Palau have felt the impact on their tourism industry when they refused to switch diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China. Beijing has also been offering support to Pacific Islands media, through funded training opportunities in China for journalists, free syndicated content for broadcast and digital media, as well as grants for infrastructure or vehicles. All of this at the time that Australia, who was traditionally Solomon Islands’ main supporter for media development, had been lessening aid. Solomon Islands provides an interesting case study of an Indo-Pacific nation that needs support from trusted media partners. Solomon Islands has its own weak media system which is struggling financially, even more so since COVID-19. Like many other countries, its national broadcaster can provide free and independent reporting on most subjects, but for a range of reasons there are also times when local journalists cannot tell the stories that need to be told. For this reason, a strong transnational broadcaster can provide news and current affairs about stories that cannot be created locally.

Solomon Islands Media Solomon Islands has a small media sector committed to the principles of Fourth Estate journalism which has been supported for more than 15 years by various Australian aid programmes, augmented by efforts from donors in almost every other advanced liberal democracy on the planet (Wake, 2016). Although the capital, Honiara, and larger settlements are served by local news outlets, those living in the scattered islands and remote locations have no access to any news at all, or may only have access to limited services in another language. Since its establishment in 1976, the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC) has been the country’s primary source of information, education, and entertainment, as well as engagement through online platforms. Despite the rapid take-up of mobile phones and social media across the islands, radio still has the largest reach of all media in Solomon Islands. The SIBC is the most popular media outlet in the country although there are a number of newspapers and commercial and community radio stations that also provide news to the islands, and transnational

9  A CASE STUDY OF MEDIA TENSIONS IN SOLOMON ISLANDS, CHINA… 

179

commercial broadcasters that provide television from other Pacific nations. The SIBC has a strong online presence and offers a page dedicated to podcasts. It claims to have one of the Solomon Islands’ fastest growing Facebook (Meta) communities and one of the leading news platforms throughout the Pacific. Commercial radio has grown but does not focus to the same extent on news. ABC Radio Australia also broadcasts to the Honiara region on 107 FM. ABC news digital content is also syndicated to two newspapers, the Solomon Times and the Island Sun. Television is currently the least developed media form in Solomon Islands. SIBC currently produces a weekly TV News Summary which is relayed on Telekom Television (TTV). TTV is Solomon Islands main free-­ to-­ air commercial television network, broadcasting from Honiara, although it mostly relays overseas content (About TTV). Its HD channels, available in Honiara, offer a mixture of overseas sport, news, and entertainment. SD channels are relayed to five other locations in four of the Solomons’ nine provinces. It can be watched online, although using data to view television is beyond the price point for most Solomon Islanders. TTV conforms to the Australian television transmission standards. Subscription television services also offer some local content in addition to foreign broadcasts. ABC Australia (the ABC’s international TV channel) is available through Satsol TV and the TTV platform. TTV has an arrangement with New Zealand broadcaster Pasifika TV which allows the local content to be shared via the regional platform of Pasifika TV. They also have a similar arrangement with China Global TV Network (CGTN) which has a four-hour slot (4:00–8:00pm) on TV3 (Herr, 2019). Solomon Islands Local Media Agency produces Tavuli News, a daily television news in Solomon Islands and it goes to air Monday to Friday, 9pm (Solomon Islands Time) via TTV1 and repeats middays at 12. It can be viewed on TTV1 via TTV Now App which can be found on Google Play Store. Those in the provinces of Noro, Munda, Ringi, Lata, and Auki with TV sets can also watch Tavuli News at 9pm daily, weekdays. This section has outlined the variety of news outlets already available in Solomon Islands, including from transnational broadcasters on TTV. While print newspapers are available in the country, it is clear that broadcast journalism is the most popular media across the islands.

180 

A. WAKE AND L. MORIESON

Funding Vulnerability The media in Solomon Islands relies on commercial income and support from the government, which was strong during the pandemic. COVID-19 had a significant impact on all news businesses, and staff had to be made redundant, or have quit as a result of low wages. The government has been the largest provider of advertising and has threatened to remove its support from time to time, although during COVID-19 it supported hours of broadcasting to buoy the nation’s spirits. With a weak economy, the advertising markets have been weak. The newspapers had to reduce their coverage, with the Island Sun threatening to close its small bureau in Gizo because of the cost. In early 2023, the only income for one privately owned media outlet was from the street sales of its newspapers. Many journalists lost their jobs, and others had not been paid full wages for months. The funding crisis has made Solomon Islands journalists and newsrooms particularly vulnerable to interference from outside influences. Veteran media development worker and journalist Sue Ahearn spoke to a number of media executives in Solomon Islands in early 2022 who acknowledged that they were actively looking to China for help. One told her he only had to ring the Chinese embassy and help arrived, with no expense spared (Ahearn, 2022). Another said that he would look to China if there was no other help available, and had been surprised to be asked to publish a press release word for word. Journalists in neighbouring Melanesian states of Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea have also reported that their work has been curtailed by demands from China. There had been rumours that China was providing direct financial support for the two main Solomon Islands newspapers, and that the Solomon Star was given a vehicle. The Chinese embassy provided computers to the Island Sun. Japan has provided a backup generator to the SIBC. In July 2023, the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project reported the Solomon Star had received $US140,000 from the Chinese government in return for pledges to “promote the truth about China’s generosity and its true intentions to help develop” the Pacific Islands country (Carreon & Belford, 2023). The OCCRP specifically found evidence—confirmed by the paper’s owner and chief-of-staff—that it sought Chinese funds for a replacement for its aging newspaper printer and a broadcast tower for its commercial radio station, PAOA FM. However, the newspaper’s chief-of-­ staff also told the OCCRP that the paper had retained its independence

9  A CASE STUDY OF MEDIA TENSIONS IN SOLOMON ISLANDS, CHINA… 

181

and had sought help from China as requests to Australia and the United States had been ignored. The University of the South Pacific’s Professor Shailendra Singh was quoted as saying “the Chinese offer hit the right spot,”, with the paper facing financial challenges due to COVID-19 and advertising revenues going to social media. Professor Singh told the ABC that media outlets had become part of the competition between large countries vying for influence in the region and warned other struggling Pacific media companies could be tempted by similar offers (Smith & Mann, 2023). The Solomon Star reacted ‘angry’ to the reporting, running a full front page article condemning the reporting as coming from agents of the United States, and pledging to: “assure the right-minded people of this nation is that we will continue to inform and educate you on issues that matter without any geopolitical bias and that China through its Embassy in Honiara never attempted to stop us from doing so … Solomon Star also continued to publish news items not in the favour of China and the Chinese Embassy in Honiara never issued a reproachment” (Smith & Mann, 2023). Solomon Islands’ media workers are considered to be particularly vulnerable to influence because of their age and level of education and training. The media industry has tended to employ people straight from high school and this has a corresponding impact on the quality of news produced. In 2012, half of the country’s journalists did not have a higher education qualification, which was in sharp contrast to the industry in Australia or the United States where more than 90% of journalists hold at least one degree (Thomas et al., 2012). Many of the more experienced journalists who could potentially support or mentor younger colleagues are now working in other countries or doing other things: award winning journalist Evan Waskua is working for ABC International in Melbourne, Island Sun owner and former editor Priestley Harbu is completing a PhD in Adelaide, and veteran Solomon Islands broadcast journalist Dorothy Wickham is writing for The Guardian, among other projects. Other mid-career journalists have joined the embassies of Australia and UK as Communications Officers. At the same time, journalism has become more difficult in Solomon Islands with closely controlled dissemination of information from the prime minister’s office. Veteran journalist Dorothy Wickham wrote in The Guardian online about the refusal of the government to provide information to local journalists (Wickham, 2022).

182 

A. WAKE AND L. MORIESON

This section has acknowledged that journalists in the Solomon Islands are vulnerable to interference from foreign and domestic factors, because of the funding difficulties in the media industry, and the lack of education and experience of local journalists.

Changing Media Environment The media environment in Solomon Islands is also rapidly changing. Digital access has accelerated quickly in Solomon Islands with the introduction of relatively cheap smart phones and easy access to social media, particularly in Honiara. There were 512,300 cellular mobile connections in the Solomon Islands at the start of 2022, which represents 71.9% of the total population. The number of mobile connections increased by 3% between 2021 and 2022. Despite the high number of phones, 67.8% of the population were not online at the beginning of 2022 (Kemp, 2022). Internet user rates are not as high as mobile phone use because of the relatively high cost and patchiness of service, although an Australian-­ funded Coral Sea Cable is making digital access faster, cheaper, and more reliable, reducing Internet costs by as much as 90%. Sea cables are vital for those who rely on the Internet. There has been increasing emphasis on the use of multiple cables, so when the connection fails (as it did in Tonga during a volcanic explosion), traffic is eventually rerouted where there are others available. The arrival of privately owned low Earth orbit satellites into the Pacific are expected to change countries’ reliance on undersea cables. These low earth satellites are expected to deliver faster, more responsive connectivity than other satellite Internet services. The satellite links are hard to jam, which has caused concern from China (Why China Fears Starlink, 2023). But these satellites are currently owned by private companies, such as StarLink headed by Elon Musk, and therefore remain vulnerable to the whims of an individual or individuals in another country. Cheaper and quicker access to the Internet also means more access to social media. Facebook has already become an important source of information in Solomon Islands, with most news media offering Facebook pages. Meta’s advertising branch claims that Facebook had 137,300 users in the Solomon Islands in early 2022, with an ad reach equivalent to 19.3% of the total population at the start of 2022, or 59.8% of local Internet users (Kemp, 2022). Of those who use Facebook, 45.1% are female, and 54.9% male. Facebook Messenger’s ad reach was equivalent to 5.8% of the

9  A CASE STUDY OF MEDIA TENSIONS IN SOLOMON ISLANDS, CHINA… 

183

total population. Instagram is not as popular as Facebook, with Meta reporting it had 6450 users in the Solomon Islands in early 2022. Instagram’s ad reach was equivalent to 0.9% of the total population at the start of the year (Kemp, 2022). LinkedIn’s advertising resources found that LinkedIn had 18,000 “members” or 2.5% of the total population in the Solomon Islands in early 2022. Twitter (now X) had 1400 users, equivalent to 0.2% of the total population at the time. While Western democracies have had major concerns about the behaviour of Facebook (now Meta), it was seen as a vital communication tool during the pandemic, particularly in the provinces where information from trusted news sources was not readily available. Research conducted by Pacific Media Assistance Scheme (PACMAS) in 2020 reported on the key themes in COVID-19 discussions on Facebook (Meta) and Twitter (now X) in the Pacific. At that point in time the research found that, across 24 Facebook (Meta) pages, discussion of the economic impacts of COVID-19 was the most discussed, representing 27% of the discussions. This was followed by: geo-politics of COVID-19—China (18%); support for local agricultural projects and food security (15%); flagging of misinformation (14%); differentiated responses to ease in lockdown restrictions (13%); gender-based violence awareness and discussion (13% and trending upwards) (Curb the Infodemic. Emerging Trends, 2020). Facebook (Meta) was also used by the local and foreign governments to promote their work. For example, the Chinese Embassy uses Facebook (Meta) in Solomon Islands, posting about its aid assistance, press releases with the Solomons government and stories from official Chinese news outlets. This section has argued that the media environment in the Solomon Islands is rapidly changing and the uptake of Internet means there has been increased reliance on social media. That also means that there is opportunity for the spread of false information, particularly though unverified citizen posts on social media.

ABC International Development Aid ABC ID has been supporting the local media in Solomon Islands, since shortly after arrival of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands  (RAMSI) in 2003. It has a mission to enable media organisations in the region to “connect with Australia and Australian values” (ABC International Development—About Us, 2022). Through

184 

A. WAKE AND L. MORIESON

funding provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ABC ID support and consult in all areas of media development and Communication for Development (C4D), including organisational management, broadcast and media-related production for television stations, radio stations, online and mobile media, broadcast infrastructure, print media, universities, and other education institutions. ABC ID worked closely with all media organisations in Solomon Islands including the SIBC between 2008 and 2013 to ensure citizens had access to diverse media sources and to improve the knowledge, skills, and professionalism of content makers. The DFAT-funded Solomon Islands Media Assistance Scheme (SOLMAS) worked to improve governance and leadership in media communications and included strengthening the role of the Media Association of Solomon Islands (MASI) as a representative institution to facilitate greater coordination between the media and development stakeholders. The reason for the success, or otherwise, of the ABC’s media training in Solomon Islands has been well-documented in other places (Wake, 2016), but through SOLMAS, senior journalists were supported to work inside the newsrooms at the national broadcaster, the SIBC, and the major newspapers. Volunteers Abroad also provided assistance with senior, often retired, journalists assisting within the news organisations. The physical location of journalists within newsrooms did not always sit well with political leaders in Solomon Islands and in the early days of RAMSI, one media development manager was infamously ejected from the country after encouraging frank and fearless reporting from the SIBC staff. From that point on, ABC ID managers have been keen to ensure that they were even more respectful of local leaders (Wake, 2016). MASI and the Pacific Islands News Association (PINA) have been key parts of capacity building in Solomon Islands. Both have received considerable international and business support in recent years, including most recently from the telecommunication provider, bmobile, to host—with PINA—the Pacific Media Summit which took place in Honiara in September 2022. One of the major impediments to the success of media development projects in the Solomon Islands is around the ability of journalists to firstly attend the training, and then to be able to use the training with the support of their supervisors or owners at each news outlet. While much training is provided, it is often well beyond the skills of the trainers, and sometimes completely unsuitable for the country and its conditions. For

9  A CASE STUDY OF MEDIA TENSIONS IN SOLOMON ISLANDS, CHINA… 

185

example, there is little point in running a training programme on how do fact-checking by accessing documents by Freedom of Information laws, if such documents do not exist in the first place. Finally, the significance and impact of family relations (wantok) on story assignments and completions should not be underestimated. There are many stories that simply cannot be written by relatives. Since the end of SOLMAS, ABC ID has also been managing the Pacific Media Assistance Scheme (PACMAS) which is a regional media development programme. PACMAS is designed to improve the capacity of journalists and communication practitioners in the Pacific, including Solomon Islands, to report responsibly on and mediate discussion about key issues affecting development. It is also funded by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). One of the projects completed before the Pandemic was the ‘Pacific Change Makers’, a media capacity building project (Change Makers Solomon Islands Impact Briefing, 2019). The first ‘Pacific Change Makers’ series was produced in Solomon Islands in collaboration with PAOA FM. The series included video, audio, and social media stories, featuring people whose ideas and creativity provide inspiration for others. During the pandemic, a special COVID-19 Reporting and Protecting Information Integrity programme was implemented by ABC ID and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and funded by USAID. The work focused on capacity building for journalists and social media influencers across seven countries, including Solomon Islands. In March 2023, the ABC and SIBC signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) at Honiara, agreeing to more content-sharing and media development programmes (ABC, 2023). In a press release endorsed by both broadcasters, the MOU was said to recognise “the crucial role of public broadcasters as cultural institutions that connect and inform audiences while promoting democracy”. In words that sound more like diplomacy than journalism, the statement continued that it “highlighted the importance of mutual learning and growth, demonstrating the dedication of both organisations to working together to serve audiences better”. The ABC Managing Director David Anderson could not have sounded more like a spokesperson for media through soft power in his comment: The ABC is delighted to continue its partnership with the SIBC. The agreement strengthens media collaboration and exchange between the ABC and the SIBC through training, sharing media expertise and providing technical

186 

A. WAKE AND L. MORIESON

and program (sic) support. We will learn from each other as we seek to serve our audiences better.

The SIBC Chief Executive Officer Johnson Honimae’s own response to the MOU also responded diplomatically with his gratitude to the ABC for continuing the partnership between the two broadcasting organisations by signing the MOU: With the digitisation of broadcasting, such a partnership as outlined in the MOU is the only way to go for a small broadcaster such as SIBC. We need the help of one of the longest broadcasters in the Pacific region. There is much to share including in the areas of capacity building, technology, and content especially as SIBC, after 70 years of broadcasting is finally expanding into television.

With the support of ABC International, the SIBC will launch a national television service, the first of its kind, in time for the 17th Pacific Games in November 2023, in Honiara (ABC, 2023). Ironically, the stadium that has been built for the games has been funded by China through the BRI.

The Media Association of Solomon Islands One way of maintaining distance between a foreign government and the local media is to support local professional support bodies, such as the Media Association of Solomon Islands. MASI has been supported over time by the Australian Government, European Union, UNDP SECSIP, Solomon Government, and the Solomon Islands Electoral Commission (About Media Association of Solomon Islands). MASI looks after members in all media organisations in the country, including newspapers, magazines, radio stations, and television, and since 2006 has played an advocacy role in promoting and defending media freedom and development. The association and its president are vocal on all press matters, including most recently concern about proposed changes to the SIBC by the government through a return to the 1976 Broadcasting Act. MASI’s president Gina Kekea issued a statement that the Solomon Islands government’s planned action was not only a threat to democracy, but also media freedom in the country. She was quoted saying the prime minister could use the Act to stifle information. Kekea was reported as saying she feared the country would descend “into China’s orbit of media

9  A CASE STUDY OF MEDIA TENSIONS IN SOLOMON ISLANDS, CHINA… 

187

suppression, censorship and control” (Sade, 2022). MASI’s members have also been increasingly vocal about China’s media interest in the fragile local media landscape, with concern about the SBIC being reported as a “worrying and an unpalatable” dent in media freedom (Sade, 2022). The MASI president had earlier called on members of MASI to boycott a press conference organised for the visiting Chinese foreign affairs secretary in May 2022, because of restrictions on the number of questions which could be asked. In 2021, MASI had been working with the National Government on a bill to regulate media practitioners in the country, which the prime minister said would regulate “amongst other things the conduct of Media Practitioners” (“Constitution Protects Freedom of Expression: Sogavare”, 2021). MASI has recently completed a scoping study on media accreditation supported by Australian aid funding. It found a need for a mechanism to hold journalists to account for the work they do and also to raise the standard and professionalism of the media industry. The study listed the following MASI priorities as: self-regulatory mechanisms; media legislation; training and development; good working conditions including fair pay; and the freedom to carry out their work without fear. However, the immediate aims of MASI are the creation of: Journalist code of ethics; social media policy; child protection policy; and court reporting guidelines. In late 2023, Keka travelled to China on a trip funded by the All China Journalists Association (ACJA)  to participate  at a Forum for Global Journalists on the 10th anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative. 

Stories that Can’t Be Told There will always be stories that need to be told by local journalists in a country like Solomon Islands that cannot be told by the local journalists. For this reason, transnational media outlets can provide quality unbiased journalism that also serves the needs of the domestic audiences. There are, for example, significant human rights stories that could be exposed by the media in the Solomon Islands. The US State Department noted in its 2021 report that there were “credible” reports of serious acts of government corruption, the existence of the worst forms of child labour, including commercial sexual exploitation of children (“Solomon Islands, 2021a; Human Rights Report”, 2021). Freedom House also notes the concerns about migrant workers who can face forced labour in the mining, logging, and fishing industries (Solomon Islands, 2021b).

188 

A. WAKE AND L. MORIESON

These and other stories can and would upset relationships between countries, demonstrating the need for transnational broadcasters to be guaranteed independence from government interference. This was demonstrated when the Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare made it clear he was unimpressed by the ABC’s coverage of a number of events involving the country’s links to China. Unlike previous Solomon Islands leaders, Sogavare did not attend university in Australia and does not have the links to Australia that others have previously had. He holds allegiances to his fellow Solomon Islanders before any other country. Veteran Solomon Islands journalist Dorothy Wickham wrote in The Guardian online about the prime minister’s stance: Sogavare seems to think the local media have joined forces with foreign entities to attack him personally or his government’s decision to switch allegiances to China. He refuses to be interviewed by local media and often attacks the media on the floor of parliament. Sources outside Solomon Islands are afraid to say anything too strong, in case it affects their ability to visit Solomon Islands again... There is also fear of ridicule and online bullying on Facebook if anyone takes a certain position on the debate about China. (Wickham, 2022)

Sogavare was so upset by the Australian media that his government announced it would block some foreign journalists from entering the country, issuing a statement that reporters who were “demeaning” or engage in “racial profiling” by attacking its ties with China would be banned (Dziedzic, 2022). The government statement warned foreign journalists who did not follow “appropriate protocols” that they would be banned from entering the country. The decision was linked to the broadcast of an ABC current affairs programme about China’s presence in Solomon Islands saying that ABC’s reporting of China’s presence in the island state amounted to “racial profiling”: ABC or other foreign media must understand that the manner in which journalists are allowed to conduct themselves in other [countries] does not give them the right to operate in the same manner in the Pacific … the Pacific is not the same as Australia or United States. When you choose to come to our Pacific Islands, be respectful, be courteous and accord the appropriate protocols. (Iroga, 2022)

9  A CASE STUDY OF MEDIA TENSIONS IN SOLOMON ISLANDS, CHINA… 

189

Significantly, the Sogavare government pointed to the ABC’s viewership in the region and argued that the ABC was using its anti-China attitude to cause “geopolitical fear and uncertainty in the region” (Iroga, 2022). Further, his government said that while Solomon Islands shared the same political ideologies as its traditional bilateral partners, it would engage with whatever country is willing to assist in its developmental needs, regardless of political ideology. It also outright rejected suggestions that China, or any other country, would have a base on Solomon Islands: China relationship is about help improving people’s lives—build roads, bridges, wharves and airports NOT to build a military base that does NOT serve Solomon Island’s interest. There is no need for Australia to be worried. (Iroga, 2022)

This section makes it clear that there are good reasons for news outlets located outside a country to provide quality information across national borders even if it upsets relationships between governments.

Other Media for the Pacific There are few independent journalists in the region that can create stories with a high degree of local knowledge for Solomon Islands or other Pacific nations. Until the 2023 reboot of the ABC’s Pacific programming, the ABC’s PNG correspondent Natalie Whiting was one of the few to call the Pacific home. She’s now been joined by Honiara-based local journalist Chrisnrita Aumanu-Leong and several others across the Pacific islands. ABC International Services has significantly changed its approach to the Pacific in the past couple of years, trying to create greater partnerships in the region and to encourage more Pacific material on domestic screens through outlets such as ABC News. Managing Editor Asia Pacific Matt O’Sullivan said he wanted to build a proper local journalism network across the Pacific, where the ABC supported local journalists to be able to tell their own stories. So far, journalists in Fiji and Solomon Islands are working full-time under contract for the ABC, with others to follow in places like Tonga, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, and Samoa. He was determined that the focus should not just be about flying ABC journalists into the region for major stories but to work with local journalists doing the day-­ to-­day reporting required in the countries:

190 

A. WAKE AND L. MORIESON

We’re not there to be a competitor in the region. We are there to respect local media, and work with local media where relevant and where appropriate. But we will also be the ABC, a trusted voice that’s been there for a very long time … I want to see more Pacific faces on the seven o’clock news. I want to hear more Pacific voices on (ABC current affairs programme) AM. (O’Sullivan, 2022)

There are a number of Pacific-focused news outlets which pay particular attention to Solomon Islands, including the ABC Pacific, Radio New Zealand Pacific, and the Fiji-based regional news magazine Islands Business. China’s Xinhua news agency has a correspondent in Fiji and is looking for Pacific journalists for its TV network. The Australian-based philanthropic organisation, the Judith Neilson Institute for Journalism and Ideas had been paying for journalists to provide stories from the Pacific for The Guardian, but the future of this scheme is unknown as the institute has been reconsidering its direction. A group of former ABC Radio Australia journalists, and others interested in the Pacific, run a Facebook (Meta) page called The Pacific newsroom, which republishes articles already produced across the region to increase knowledge across the Pacific. The ABC Pacific Facebook (Meta) page also has strong engagement from Solomon Islands followers.

Conclusion This chapter has used Solomon Islands as a case study of a country with weak media that needs support from a transnational broadcaster that provides trusted and independent news. It is certainly not the only country, or the only country in the Indo-Pacific, that has a weak media and is vulnerable to inappropriate assistance from foreign actors. While there is excellence in some of the reporting and management in news across Solomon Islands, it is a developing country and the professionalism and capacity of the media sector generally reflect that. COVID-19 has also created a particularly difficult business environment for many news outlets. Those Solomon Island  reporters and editors who can work at a higher level generally move out of journalism into communication or other roles, or work for media in other countries. ABC International has built a strong relationship with the SIBC and other Solomon Islands media through MASI over a period of more than

9  A CASE STUDY OF MEDIA TENSIONS IN SOLOMON ISLANDS, CHINA… 

191

15 years, but it must be acknowledged that its efforts and other aid agencies have not been completely successful. The nation still struggles to provide its own independent journalism on the SIBC because of constraints from a lack of funding, and also government actions (or inactions). Like other nations in the Indo-Pacific, the people of Solomon Islands, and in particular its current prime minister Manasseh Sogavare, are sensitive to protect the country’s sovereignty, and strongly react to any assistance programme that presents as paternalistic or reeks of colonialism. PM Sogavare does not share a loyalty to Australia or to other aligned countries. Previous Solomon Islands leaders had received much of their education in Australia or the UK. While the SIBC struggles for funds and equipment, and its journalists remain poorly educated and poorly paid, it will continue to struggle to provide independent news that can expose high-level corruption, or even raise concerns about deals being struck that may not be in Solomon Islands’ long-term interests. It is clearly vulnerable to inappropriate offers of assistance, in exchange for editorial favours. This therefore demonstrates clearly why transnational broadcasters are required, not just to support the continued training of local journalists and other media support workers, and to support local production of trusted news and current affairs, but also to provide reportage on stories that could not otherwise be told by local news outlets.

References ABC. (2023, March 28). Australia’s ABC and Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation Sign Historic New Agreement. https://about.abc.net.au/press-­ releases/australias-­abc-­and-­solomon-­islands-­broadcasting-­corporation-­sign-­ historic-­new-­agreement/ ABC International Development—About Us. (2022). Australian Broadcasting Corporation. https://www.abc.net.au/abc-­international-­development/about-­us/ About Media Association of Solomon Islands. https://www.linkedin.com/company/media-­association-­of-­solomon-­islands/about/ About TTV.  Telekom Television Ltd. Retrieved November 23, from https:// www.ttv.sb/about-­us/ Ahearn, S. (2022, March 17). How China is Winning the Information War in the Pacific. The Strategist. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-­china-­is-­ winning-­the-­information-­war-­in-­the-­pacific/ Carreon, B., & Belford, A. (2023, July 30). Solomon Islands Newspaper Promised to “Promote China” in Return for Funding. OCCRP. https://www.occrp.org/en/

192 

A. WAKE AND L. MORIESON

daily/17884-­s olomon-­i slands-­n ewspaper-­p romised-­t o-­p romote-­c hina-­i n-­ return-­f or-­f unding?fbclid=IwAR1gcEY3TJqPUvM1-­g TwgAspIXpYsgcc_ 4ppeUSejwa0ie-­KgPbHkh9aJSE Cave, D. (2022, March 24). China and Solomon Islands Draft Secret Security Pact, Raising Alarm in the Pacific. New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2022/03/24/world/asia/china-­solomon-­islands-­security-­pact.html Change Makers Solomon Islands Impact Briefing. (2019). Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved November 14, from https://www.abc.net.au/abc-­ international-­d evelopment/change-­m akers-­s olomon-­i slands-­i mpact­briefing/11724922 Constitution Protects Freedom of Expression: Sogavare. (2021, May 5). Solomon Times. https://www.solomontimes.com/news/constitution-­ protects-­freedom-­of-­expression-­sogavare/10811 Curb the Infodemic. Emerging Trends. (2020). Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved November 14, from https://www.abc.net.au/ abc-­i nternational-­d evelopment/pacmas-­i nfodemic-­s ocial-­m edia-­t racker-­ two/12345518 Dziedzic, S. (2022, August 25). Solomon Islands to Ban Foreign Journalists Entry Into Country Over ‘Demeaning’ Coverage. ABC News. https:// www.abc.net.au/news/2022-­08-­25/solomon-­islands-­warns-­of-­entry-­ban-­ for-­some-­foreign-­journalists/101369548 Herr, R. (2019). Chinese Influence in the Pacific Islands. Australia Strategic Policy Instittue. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinese-­influence-­pacific-­islands Iroga, R. (2022). OPMC Responses to Core Issues raised by 4 Corners. SMB. https://sbm.sb/opmc-­response-­to-­core-­issues-­raised-­by-­4-­corners/ Kemp, S. (2022, February 16). Digital 2022: The Solomon Islands. Data Reportal. Retrieved November 13, 2022, from https://datareportal.com/reports/ digital-­2022-­solomon-­islands O’Sullivan, M. (2022, September 6). Research Interview (ABC Radio Australia’s Asia Pacific editor) [Interview]. Sade, S. (2022, November 13). SIBC’s Editorial Independence Paramount: Dr William Parairato. Solomon Times. https://www.solomontimes.com/news/ sibcs-­editorial-­independence-­paramount-­dr-­william-­parairato/12275 Smith, M., & Mann, T. (2023, August 2). China is Trying to Buy Influence with Media in the Pacific as it Aims to Strengthen Its Presence in the Region. Pacific Beat. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-­08-­02/china-­buys-­influence­solomon-­islands-­star-­newspaper-­pacific/102668914 Solomon Islands. (2021a). (Freedom in the World 2021, Issue. https://freedomhouse.org/country/solomon-­islands/freedom-­world/2021 Solomon Islands. (2021b). Human Rights Report. Bureau of Democracy. US Department of State: 18. https://www.state.gov/wp-­content/uploads/ 2022/02/313615_SOLOMON-­I SLANDS-­2 021-­H UMAN-­R IGHTS-­ REPORT.pdf

9  A CASE STUDY OF MEDIA TENSIONS IN SOLOMON ISLANDS, CHINA… 

193

Thomas, V., Britton, K., Eggins, J., & Macnamara, J. (2012). Solomon Islands Media Research Study 2012: Baseline indicators for SOLMAS Phase III. A. I. Development. Wake, A. (2016). Journalism Training Aid by Australians: A Case Study in Solomon Islands. Pacific Journalism Review, 22(2), 35–48. “Why China Fears Starlink.” (2023, May 18). The Economist. Wickham, D. (2022, May 3). In 35 Years of Reporting From Solomon Islands, I’ve Never Seen the Secrecy of the Last Few Months. The Guardian. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/03/in-­35-­years-­reporting-­from-­ solomon-­islands-­i-­have-­never-­seen-­such-­secrecy-­as-­the-­last-­few-­months

CHAPTER 10

The Future and Funding of Transnational Broadcasting and Soft Diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific Alexandra Wake

Introduction Reflecting Australia to the world, without conflicting commercial objectives, requires credibility, a track record of effective engagement, and an ability to be diplomatically deft, without sacrificing key attributes and values of quality journalism. (Scott, 2009)

This book has grappled with the agreed purpose of transnational broadcasting in the contemporary era. It is no longer the Cold War era, but conditions in the Indo-Pacific are frostier than they have been in a long time. Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong has even referred to the media commentary about the stability of the region as ‘frenzied’ (Wong, 2023). Australia has a unique opportunity to rebuild its position with a trusted transnational broadcaster that provides independent journalism

A. Wake (*) RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9_10

195

196 

A. WAKE

that works with and supports local media in the Indo-Pacific. The newly elected Labor Government has restored some funding to Australia’s international broadcaster as a response to the culmination of thirty years of funding cuts. There is much to rebuild particularly in a digital-first era, and new partnerships to make. The rise of news media from other sources, specifically from China, and fears about Russia and even India, has brought into sharp focus the need for Australia to have its own distinctive voice in the region that differs to that offered by Australia’s allies. The broadcaster can no longer be a colonial voice, but must amplify the voices of Indo-Pacific audiences, which also means Australia needs to rethink broadcasting practices, the way and manner in which it creates content, and adapt to the technological advances and distribution methods, including the ownership of platforms and satellites owned by private interests. Although Australia is a middle-sized nation, alongside the United States and the UK it can play a significant role in the provision of independent and trusted news for the Indo-Pacific, particularly if it works in partnership with local broadcast organisations. American journalist turned diplomat Edward R. Murrow said of public diplomacy that “to be persuasive we need to be believed, to be believed we need to be credible, to be credible we need to be truthful”. That bodes well for Australian broadcasters who provide independent verified information that is valued by local residents to the Indo-Pacific. Nonetheless, no one should be under an illusion that the resumption of a fully funded Australian service to the Indo-Pacific will be watched in large parts of Asia: It’s incredibly sad that through the cuts, the ABC lost access to a lot of great platforms, and a lot of great cable operators. It’s a real shame. Russia Today is far more prevalent in Asia now and because it’s providing a number of countries with fuel and energy relief, they don’t want to take a stand against Russian broadcasting. I think the ABC and Canberra are making mistake if they think that there’s huge demand for Australian content in Asia. Australia just isn’t as relevant as we might like to assume. (Broadcast Expert 3, 2023)

Australia can, if it is given appropriate time and funds, rebuild trust in its broadcast brand particularly across the Asia if it offers the region appropriate valuable intercultural content. Australia, and also New Zealand, can also benefit by trading off their history as local partners to much of the Pacific and in doing so ensure that neighbouring countries are not a source

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

197

of, or a possible vector to, threats to national security. There have been a range of diplomatic and aid efforts from Australian in the Pacific in recent years, but much more work needs to be done across Asia, particularly in those countries without strong media ecosystems. Australian defence officials argue that it is in our national interest to set the agenda in the Indo-­ Pacific, at least, to ensure that other governments and forces do not unduly influence our neighbours or use them to hurt our national interests. We are in a time of ideological and state-to-state rivalry, and power is shifting. Even countries such as India, often hailed as an ally and a large democracy, raise issues for Australia. The rise of nationalism in India has sometimes become conflated with religion and a distorted historical narrative. As one broadcast executive put it, Australia should fear less  about China, and more about India: I am very concerned about the situation in Modi’s India, which has fallen on the Press Freedom Index to 150, out of 180 countries. This is a country that had an incredibly vibrant media until recent times. The level of government influence and control across a wide range of outlets, coupled with media censorship and self-censorship, means very few have the ability to hold the government to account. (Broadcast Expert 3, 2023)

Not only is most of India’s  mainstream media now in the hands of wealthy friends of the Indian prime minister, in May 2023 the government is increasingly working against press freedom and civil liberties such as banning  14 messenger apps, including some which did not need an Internet connect. The apps became popular because the government has been turning off the Internet to Jammu and Kashmir. The government has justified its broad bans by saying the apps are popular among terrorists (Verma, 2023). The job ahead in a rapidly changing world is not easy. Australians, and other allied nations, have repeatedly underestimated the complexity of audiences in the Indo-Pacific, and assumed that they know more and have more to offer than local broadcasters. There can be a tendency to see the news offering in the Indo-Pacific as black or white—it’s either independent or it’s not, it’s all good or all bad. As one broadcast executive noted: The situation in every country is different, and it is nuanced and it’s constantly changing. While some media outlets may be limited in what they can say about their governments, their disaster coverage or coverage of health

198 

A. WAKE

and social issues may be excellent. The approach can change each time there is a change of government or a change in CEO. Some of the best resourced and best equipped newsrooms are in Asia, but it’s also home to a lot of organisations who have stood still for a long time. This is particularly evident in the transition to digital platforms. (Broadcast Expert 3, 2023)

Significant ongoing broadcast investment and partnerships are needed to counter the rise of news voices in the Indo-Pacific, which is contrary to Australia’s position as a supportive neighbour. For some parts of the Indo-­ Pacific, Australia needs to be a broadcast partner, for others it should be a voice that goes beyond territorial lines to provide citizens with factual information that is not available in their own homes. But all of this must be done with an eye to the technology being used by citizens in the targeted countries, and with a distribution method that cannot be switched off by a citizen of a third country.

2023 And beyond It has taken the rise of China in the region for the Australian government and its allies to take seriously more than 15 years of warnings from media leaders that more is needed to be done to provide independent and trusted journalism to our neighbours and to announce at least some re-­engagement with the region. Even analysis from the United States (Dickey et al., 2019) suggests that more could be done to provide public broadcasting to the region, particularly the Pacific and that broadcasting should also be in local languages. Those with experience in the sector say it is time to act now: It is time to really amp up Australia’s international broadcasting now. We can’t wait because the more gains China will make. We need to be out there. We need to be telling Australian stories. (Broadcast Expert 2, 2022)

The Albanese Australian Government announced new funding to the ABC for its transnational broadcast and aid divisions from 2023 which has provided an immediate boost to the output of work from the broadcaster. The $32 million over four years has allowed the expansion of ABC Radio Australia’s FM footprint, adding additional FM transmitter locations to those already across the Pacific and Timor-Leste, and allowing ABC Australia television to be tailored to suit Pacific and Asian time zones. An additional $8.5 m was allocated in the May 2023 budget. Two discrete

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

199

channels of the ABC Australia international TV service were scheduled. The Pacific stream was to include Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste, and the Asia channel would cover from South-East Asia to the Indian sub-­ continent. The total reach of ABC Australia television was to be extended via more than 100 rebroadcast partners in about 40 countries and territories across the Indo-Pacific. The new funds were being also used to create more content for audiences across the Indo-Pacific region including establishing a network of full-time local journalists and a pan-Pacific weekly video news programme, The Pacific, which went to air for the first time in April 2023. The funds also allowed an enhancement of the capacity and development of media partners with training and activities covering basic professional development, for cadets through to leadership master classes, and in specialised subjects such as elections and emergency broadcasting (Federal Budget response—Australian and international ABC audiences benefit from funding boost, 2022). The head of ABC International, Claire Gorman, while being enthusiastic about the funding that has been allocated already, noted that more money is essential to expand Australia’s influence beyond the Pacific and our nearest neighbours: We will do a pretty comprehensive job in the Pacific with what we have now, but more money would allow us to do a lot more pan-Pacific standalone programs like The Pacific. We also have big plans to amplify our reach in Indonesia, the Mekong and the Indian sub-continent. For sustained impact here we do need additional funds. (Grasswill, 2023)

By August 2023, ABC Pacific was claiming that it had more than tripled the amount of Pacific-focused content it is broadcasting across the Pacific and Timor-Leste and was “building a high-value, pan-Pacific service designed for, with and about Pacific people” (ABC Radio Australia more than triples Pacific-focused content with new programming, 2023). The station had also employed more staff with a depth of experience and was developing high-value content for audiences across the region. The ABC said this had only been possible because of dedicated funding for transnational activities from the federal government. The 2023 funding boost has honoured part of the Australian Parliament’s report on strengthening Australia’s relationships in the Pacific (“Strengthening Australia’s Relationships in the Pacific”, 2022) which

200 

A. WAKE

recognised that Australia had a national interest in maintaining a visible and active media and broadcasting presence. The report’s recommendations included: the Australian Government considers steps necessary to expand Australia’s media footprint in the Pacific, including through:

–– expanding the provision of Australian public and commercial television and digital content across the Pacific, noting existing efforts by the PacificAus TV initiative and Pacific Australia; –– reinvigorating Radio Australia, which is well regarded in the region, to boost its digital appeal; and –– consider[ing] governance arrangements for an Australian International Media Corporation to formulate and oversee the strategic direction of Australia’s international media presence in the Pacific. That inquiry made it clear that Australia’s media presence in the Pacific must be enhanced in order to “ameliorate foreign saturation of the broadcast space and the affiliated risk of misinformation and interference”. It specifically referred to the ABC submission that: at the May 2018 Pacific Media Summit in Tonga, [China Central Television] representatives were actively pursuing memoranda of understanding with Pacific media bodies to secure carriage of Chinese content and offering media training to strengthen the influence of the [People’s Republic of China]. (“Strengwthening Australia’s Relationships in the Pacific”, 2022)

Former ABC Radio Australia journalist Jemima Garrett, now at the Australia Asia Pacific Media Initiative (AAPMI), told the Parliament that Australia’s media presence had been weakened to such an extent that it had allowed the Pacific islands to become a contested media environment: The bottom line in the Pacific is that China’s media push is significant, and Australia’s media voice and its development programs are not keeping up. China has comprehensive radio, TV and online services, and it has correspondents in places like Fiji, where the Australian media does not. China’s media services in the region are reaching out for partnerships … It’s not only having an impact on the way governments approach media in terms of media freedom and restrictions on media but it also has the potential to

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

201

make local media financially dependent on help from different parties or editorially compromised. (“Strengthening Australia’s Relationships in the Pacific”, 2022)

Respected long-time PNG correspondent Sean Dorney AO also drew to the parliamentarians’ attention Australia’s dwindling Pacific islands media presence, and spoke about the region being seized by external influences: But the vacant space that was left there when Australia Network disappeared, as people have said, has really been taken over by China. Throughout my time as the Pacific correspondent for the ABC, I saw this Chinese influence growing everywhere. I’ll just end off by saying that, if we did boost broadcasting again, it does require greater collaboration. There are excellent journalists out there in the Pacific that we could work with to create content for both of us. It’s our region, and I think we should embrace it. (“Strengthening Australia’s Relationships in the Pacific”, 2022)

The Australian Government funding has also buoyed ABC managers who now expect to be more closely involved in government’s soft power and public diplomacy activities across the region. As one ABC manager noted, they have been acutely aware of the level of influence that China has been trying to achieve over countries in the region and has been focused on safeguarding and promoting public interest journalism and the role of public interest journalism: That doesn’t mean we’re an arm of the government and that we’re executing the governments foreign policy. But we have regard to what is in the national interest and there’s a level of judgement around that. Obviously, we very jealously guard our independence and make sure that we don’t compromise our independence. (Broadcast Expert 2, 2022)

But even with this funding boost, Australia’s transnational broadcaster is being seriously outspent in the region. International broadcasting is not cheap and strong public interest journalism is expensive. The ABC international funding is paltry compared to other comparative democracies: If you look at the top 10 economies in the world, the majority of them are democracies (ie not Russia and China) are funding international broadcasting because it, as a soft power tool, works. (Broadcast Expert 2, 2022)

202 

A. WAKE

Even when Australia’s broadcast efforts are combined with media from allied countries, the funding is nowhere close to what is needed to plug the information deficit in many countries. This is particularly worrying because unlike the UK or United States, Australia is part of the region and as such we have a particular need to talk to our neighbours. As former ABC managing director Mark Scott argued back in 2009: We cannot abdicate our role as an independent credible voice in the region. Our own independent voice helps assert that we are neither a puppet of the United States nor an extension of the old London-focused Commonwealth of Nations. We need to speak for ourselves and not let others speak on our behalf. (Scott, 2009)

While the boost in funding is clearly welcome, the allocated funds are not enough to plug the information needs of many parts of the region, nor does it address the issue of distribution to the further and most remote parts of the region where there is no, or low-quality news. More is needed if the country’s strategic objectives are to be achieved in the region, specifically with extra funds required for Asia. Australia must take a longer-­ term approach to its relationships with the region and stop future governments from being able to cut the transnational broadcast division for short-term domestic political priorities. China does not take a one election cycle approach to the region, but rather a generational approach. Australia must do the same.

Trusted Broadcaster Trust is a much desired but elusive quality sought by broadcasters just as much as governments, companies, and NGOs. The concept itself is difficult to pin down: even the word trust is often used interchangeably with credibility and reliability, and often in contrast to mistrust and distrust (Fisher et al., 2010). Trust has been increasingly difficult to win and maintain in a media landscape where the tsunami of material on digital platforms provides both real and false information. Further, trust in the media in general, in journalist sources (outlets, journalists, content creators) and specific topics are impacted by people’s age and demographics, political and ideological leanings, and other individual experiences and characteristics (Horowitz & D’Arma, 2023).

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

203

Multiple research reports have shown that public service broadcasters (PSBs) are often among the most trusted sources of media (Newman et al., 2022), but that trust is not simply given. Reuters research has found the ABC and BBC are among the PSBs which have suffered a fall in the level of trust domestically in recent years. Horowitz and D’Arma (2023) argue that public service media can build trust through six core principles: Independence from political, commercial, and other influences and ideologies; Excellence of practice and content; Diversity by providing differing and plurality of views; Accountability by listening to audiences and striving for transparency of processes and practices; Innovation with new formats and new technologies to connect with audiences; and Universality by enabling diverse voices and participation in society. There is still time for Australia’s ABC to regain its position as the trusted independent broadcaster of choice by  providing quality news across platforms and amplifying local voices in the Indo-Pacific. Although clearly it is not perfect, the ABC applies all of Horowitz’s trust principles, and significantly does not bring with it the same amount of colonial or ideological baggage that might come from other places. While Chinese media is present in the main markets of the Indo-Pacific, there are many countries and their citizens which would prefer to be supported by Australia and its allies, rather than find themselves vulnerable to countries that do not share democratic values or act in democratic ways. There is an immediate need to better  support broadcast partners in Indonesia and India, while closed countries like Myanmar and Vietnam with underdeveloped or undemocratic systems of government must get access to independent news and current affairs services from outside services. Although this book has focused on English-language services, it’s important to recognise the need for local language news and current affairs programming for those countries which have struggling or restricted media systems. This means the ABC must hire and also re-hire staff with specialist language and cultural knowledge and fund even more local journalists in-country across the region to provide trusted independent reporting. Australia can do much more to match Beijing, when it offers all expenses training courses, junkets for journalists, free content to broadcasters and newspapers and digital platforms, buying shares in foreign media companies and signing confidential MOUs with foreign media companies and government agencies. Lidberg et  al. reported in 2023 that China had bought two whole media companies and or set up joint media companies

204 

A. WAKE

in the Asia-Pacific (2023). Veteran journalist and long-time media aid worker Sue Ahearn (Ahearn, 2022) who has exposed the financial vulnerability of newsrooms in the Pacific, warned that one editor told her that he only had to ring the Chinese embassy and help arrived, with no expense spared. Journalists in neighbouring Melanesian states of Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea have also reported that their work has been curtailed by demands from China. Australia is well-placed through its ABC International Development division to match, or even make better offers than Beijing. But none of these efforts will be useful if they are not maintained long term  or if they are done in a piecemeal way. Australia’s media aid programmes must have support, not just from governments but from Australian citizens. One way of ensuring that happens is by encouraging Australian audiences to engage even  more with Indo-Pacific content including Australian shows like China Tonight which is available to a broad audience, even on YouTube. The ABC has also taken a small but significant step in that direction by broadcasting its new Pacific program on traditional television in Australia. While it may be useful to Pacific communities living Australia, it also has the advantage of raising the profile of the international services, and the importance of Pacific Islanders here in Australia. We have an amazing opportunity to increase Australia’s literacy on the cultures of the Pacific and the issues that it faces. We can tell those stories about specific people and Pacific cultures and countries across the Pacific. We can provide those stories for people across the Pacific and bring them back and put them on (Australia’s) own domestic channels. (Broadcast Expert 2, 2022)

The problem, of course, is that unlike the BBC World Service, which is a household name in many countries, the ABC’s work as a transnational broadcast is not well-known among the Australian public. ABC Radio Australia has some brand recognition domestically but the constantly renamed television and digital services, now called ABC Australia, hasn’t helped. It has long suffered from this lack of popular support or support from politicians, particularly Liberal Coalition MPs who have been unimpressed by the ABC’s domestic services and used the broadcaster as ABC as a tool in the culture war between the various Coalition and Labor governments. A former ABC Radio Australia head Hanh Tran put it clearly, in 2009:

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

205

The [Australian] government, with certain political expediency can do what it likes [with Radio Australia] unlike the BBC World Service. Britons own that service, the government knows what it is about, they would not allow the government to fiddle with it. But here in Australia we still have got very educated ministers or politicians asking questions “why do we spend millions of dollars entertaining foreigners?” (Wake, 2010)

This section has argued that there is still time for Australia to make its voice heard in the Indo-Pacific but ABC Australia must win ongoing support for its transnational broadcasts and aid work, not only among politicians in Australia, but also the general public. It is only with this support that ongoing financial support for the services will be maintained.

Relevant News and Current Affairs Broadcast experts, inside and external to the ABC, understand that news and current affairs content provided to the Indo Pacific must be relevant to the countries where it is broadcast. ABC Australia has ceded ground to other news outlets over the past two decades as local audiences have taken up new news habits. The ABC must not just resume an old one-size-fits-all approach to the Indo-Pacific, and it must continue to amplify local voices and resist the urge to broadcast to the region like a colonial overlord. There is increasing concern that foreign broadcasters need to partner with local broadcast partners, rather than beam in, in the way the old colonial broadcasters would do. Instead of talking to the region, the mantra is talking with the region. (Dobell, 2022)

Further, it may be time to explore new ways of doing journalism that work better with the issues that impact on the Pacific. Over the years there have been various models of journalism proposed from peace journalism, to development journalism, and partnership journalism. Right now, the type of journalism being most warmly regarded as a possible solution to trust issues and news avoidance is Constructive or Solutions Journalism, which works well with the kind of crisis brought by climate change. While producing work in a Constructive Journalism style, the report is contextualised and solutions included, where appropriate. One Australian journalist working in the Indo-Pacific believes more emphasis on Solutions or Construction Journalism would assist the region:

206 

A. WAKE

Stories that not only hold governments accountable or shine lights into grey areas and darkness, but those stories that do bring people together in difficult times. I don’t think diplomats should have the monopoly when it comes to, I don’t know, soft power in terms of, content creation. (Martin, 2021)

When using Constructive Journalism to underpin reporting, journalists use an evidence-based approach to help citizens understand information by contextualising it and using demographics and research in a way that people can understand how any story or issue impacts on them, where they are in the world. While reports must be accurate and include what is actually going on, there is also an emphasis on reporting underlying causes of an issue, and also on reporting on issues when they are resolved. Further, rather than just covering stories that public officials want covered there is an emphasis on covering stories that the community finds important. It appears timely to also think less about the platforms on which the news and current affairs stories are aired, and more about the production of the original story and the best platform for delivery. Traditional radio broadcasts may need to be lost to some markets, for the development of more distribution on the digital platforms where audiences are gathered. Australia must use the latest technology to reach its audiences, and ensure that it is not, in the words of former ABC International executive Murray Green, “broadcasting to the clouds” (Wake, 2010). Although shortwave technology was the backbone of the ABC’s Radio Australia services for over 70 years, for all its benefits, it simply is no longer the technology of choice for the region. Just as the ABC’s Vietnamese shortwave service was shut down and replaced with a fully online service when that country got access to excellent Wi-Fi, there needs to be properly funded audience research about the broadcast and technology needs of the region now and with an eye to the technological advances coming, particularly the introduction of low-earth satellite technology. Despite the value of shortwave to the people in the most outer islands of Melanesia, it is unlikely that technology will ever be considered appropriate to resurrect. A mixture of services, between broadcast and digital, seems appropriate, to meet audiences where they are: I don’t think you can say we are just going to do social media or we’re just going to have this website. I don’t think you can turn your back on traditional forms of media either, because different mediums reach different

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

207

audiences. Younger audiences are on Instagram and tik tok and all of that, but Granny might just have a shortwave radio in the village in the middle of nowhere in the Papua New Guinea Highlands. No form of technology is completely redundant as long as someone’s using it. The point is this where we’re citizens of the world and it’s important to know what is going on in the world. And I know like you can’t just turn your back on your nearest neighbours. (Martin, 2021)

A diversity of platforms is also useful for those times when governments can make decisions to block the Internet or turn off transmissions. But this has long been the case as Australia discovered during the coup in Fiji which installed Frank Bainimarama as prime minister. As one broadcaster put it: When we are dealing with a situation where our website is blocked, our content is still available on shortwave radio, or when we are dealing with our FM transmitters being taken down, we are still on television we are still online. It’s because it is in so many venues now, the information is easier to get out and it’s reaching more of an audience than it probably did before, because the online content is seen everywhere, not just in the region. (Wake, 2010)

Australia’s voice is clearly not the only one that should be heard in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia should be encouraging and working closely with broadcasters that provide strong independent journalism. Asia media entrepreneur Alan Soon, who is based in Singapore, said he increasingly found himself wanting to engage with Asian media because it gave him another perspective on events in the region. He noted that Channel NewsAsia started in the aftermath of the 1988 financial crisis, when the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew felt that there was a need to tell an Asian perspective on a crisis that had been caused by American ratings agencies in Asia: We all know, even as journalists, that there’s never just one side of things. I do find myself for example, listening to and watching what China is putting out, because I want to know the Chinese perspective on things. You know, whether that’s an official perspective, or a nuanced perspective, it is still an important perspective to understand. It shows you where the world is headed. (Soon, 2022)

208 

A. WAKE

Soon said it was disappointing that Australia had pulled back from Asian broadcasting. It’s very hard for me now, as someone who sits in Singapore to say, what the Australian perspective is on Foreign Affairs, or China or trade, for example. I feel like, if you (Australia) are not able to maintain a voice in that space, you will lose tremendously in terms of credibility, and in the way people understand you. (Soon, 2022)

ABC International claims it is already rebuilding viewership, in times of political unrest or natural disaster. It claims more than 3,615,000 viewers across Asia and the Pacific and ABC Radio Australia reaches 18% of urban Pacific populations. ABC International claims more than 19 million overseas followers on Facebook (now Meta), 1.5 million on Instagram, 5000 on We Chat, and 215,000 ABC Australia followers on Weibo. ABC International head Claire Gorman acknowledged the audience was fractured across platforms and was changing rapidly: Younger audiences, particularly in Asia, are moving away from broadcast and into the on-demand space. It’s a bit different in the Pacific where such things as affordability of devices and data are an issue. Digital coverage is also lacking on remote islands and regions. (Grasswill, 2023)

Although ABC Radio Australia must piggyback off the Radio New Zealand International (RNZI) shortwave service to get its content to those most remote islands, there are plans to get broadcast content to even larger audiences by leverage connections through the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU), to relay its content to a potential audience of 3 billion people across Asia and the Pacific.

Independence Versus National Interest Broadcasting and supporting free and independent journalism in the Indo-Pacific from Australia will not always be welcomed by other countries, even democratic ones. There have been examples of the many years of transnational broadcasting where Australia and others have upset its neighbours by reporting on stories in other countries in a way that upset local politicians, including Solomon Islands and Fiji. Sometimes what is in Australia’s national interests, such as not upsetting the neighbours, is countered by a competing journalistic imperative.

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

209

In 2009, the Fijian government turned off the ABC Radio Australia transmitter because it did not like its coverage of the political upheaval and also blacklisted journalists from Australia and New Zealand for reporting on the coup by Frank Bainimarama. Journalists from both Australia and New Zealand were not given permits to cover a tragic ferry sinking in Kiribati in 2018. In 2019, a commercial television journalist and film crew were detained in Kiribati for reporting on a change in diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China. The government of Nauru banned the ABC from attending the Pacific Islands Forum in 2018 because of coverage about its Australian-funded refugee facility. Nauru also revoked accreditation for New Zealand journalists. In 2019, the Vanuatu government refused and revoked a work permit for the media director at the country’s Daily Post newspaper. The paper claimed the action was in retaliation for stories about Vanuatu enforcing Chinese law within its borders. In 2018, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings, only China’s CCTV was allowed to record Xi’s speech. Regional media outlets, including ABC Australia, were also not permitted to cover a meeting between Xi and Pacific leaders. Bans on questions from Australian and regional journalists have continued into 2022 during the visit of the Chinese foreign minister to the Pacific. Both Nauru and Papua New Guinea have tightened their immigration processes to make it more difficult for visiting foreign media. The Solomon Islands prime minister in 2022 threatened to keep foreign journalists out of his country in reaction to coverage of China. While there are many other examples from the Solomon Islands, there are also stories which have enraged local politicians, which show the inherent difficulties faced by transnational broadcasters when they produce independent news and current affairs, and support local journalists to do the same. Broadcasts, at times, will hold the powerful to account in a way that is likely to upset local governments. But equally, well-trained journalists who are experts in the region need to be appropriately prepared to report on stories in a fair way to all involved. These examples demonstrate the difference between a state-funded broadcaster and a publicly funded broadcaster. Not all the Pacific leaders are as supportive of China as Sogavare and some are quite concerned by China’s actions. The newly elected Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka is investigating claims by the former president of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) David Panuelo that the Chinese government spied on him while he was visiting Fiji. Rabuka stressed the allegations are not proven, but said if they were, then it would be a “concern” for Fiji. Fiji’s former prime minister, Frank Bainimarama, began

210 

A. WAKE

moving away from China during his last few years in office. That shift has been even more pronounced under Rabuka, who moved to cancel a key police agreement with China earlier this year, citing stark differences between the two countries’ legal systems (Movono et al., 2023). In late 2023, in exchange for a guarantee for its citizens to migrate to avoid rising sea waters, the government of Tuvalu struck a diplomatic agreement with Australia which, while respecting the tiny Pacific nation’s sovereignty, gave Canberra rights for future security and defence-related matters.  There are also under-reported stories from the Pacific that would upset Australia’s allies which should be covered by the Australian media. Hawaiian journalist Jon Letman has collated a list of stories of what he calls military conquest and colonisation which he says are under-reported and unnoticed (Letman, 2022). This includes the nuclear waste contained in concrete domes built by the United States at Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands, the destruction of limestone forests on Guam, forced land reclamation for new US military installations in Okinawa, Japan, and US Navy fuel leaks into Hawaii’s drinking water at Oahu. Letman is one of the few journalists in the Indo-Pacific who are trying to capture the impact of the militarisation of the region and its impact on ordinary people. These include Okinawan school playgrounds struck by US military aircraft parts falling from the sky and the Marshallese communities moved from island to island to accommodate the US government’s nuclear weapons testing programme.

Australia’s National Interest Australian broadcasters have generally been expected to work in Australia’s interests, not in the interests of another country, even an ally. As the national broadcaster the ABC has had vast experience of successfully managing such tensions, repeatedly broadcasting into countries during times of conflict and crisis across the Indo-Pacific, from countries as diverse as Myanmar, Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands. Maintaining independence from the government’s agenda has at times strained relations with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and most recently Solomon Islands. But a trusted broadcaster must balance all reporting, even when it means challenging allies’ views, and, when appropriate, calming tensions with regional players. Some security analysts have argued that the

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

211

positioning of American weaponry and bases in the north of Australia potentially means we could become a surrogate US target for the Chinese in the Indo-Pacific. As the late former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser noted a decade ago, admittedly before China became the second largest military spender in the world, misinformation about China in the Western media was designed to condition people to believe that China is the ultimate enemy: If that is what the people accept, then it will happen… We have interest in a peaceful world, and it is time we begin to cut ourselves off America’s coat-tails. We do not want to be caught between the United States and China. There would be no real winners in such a war. Everyone would lose. A small country allied to the United States would lose most of all. (Fraser, 2014)

Australia’s recent decision to sign up for US supplied nuclear submarines is not necessarily in our regional interests, as it goes against our agreement for a nuclear-free South Pacific, signed by Australia and several Pacific nations in 1985 (“Pacific Islands Forum Chairman ‘Reassured’ Over Massive Nuclear Submarine Deal”, 2023). This is the kind of agreement that needs interrogation from Australian journalists. The $US250 billion agreement between the United States, UK, and Australia will result in a fleet of US nuclear submarines with UK tech components as part of a defence and security pact. This will mean Australia becomes one of only seven countries in the world to have nuclear-powered submarines alongside China, India, Russia, the UK, the United States, and France. Likewise, Australian journalists have a role in dampening tensions between neighbours, when they have been untruthfully whipped up through social media. For example, during the first years of the pandemic there was a clear demonising of China and the Chinese people on social media which spilled over into hateful attacks on people in the streets not just in Australia, but also in the Solomon Islands (Piringi, 2021; Schneiders & Lucas, 2020). Social media exacerbated anti-China sentiment in Honiara 2021, leading to three days of riots, three deaths, and the destruction of many buildings in Chinatown. The discontent was whipped up on social media after Solomon Island’s decision to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China (Cavanough, 2020).

212 

A. WAKE

Media Aid Rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific region has led to a rush of media aid donors from US-aligned countries. Although ABC International Development (ABC ID) never entirely left the region, the rush of new donors has led to calls for more to be done to coordinate the efforts of those willing to give money or time to journalism in the region. There is a constant call for Indo-Pacific journalists to take part in training or apply for reporting scholarships from governments and non-government organisations (NGOs) as varied as the Earth Journalism Foundation, RMIT Fact Lab, to the BBC Media Action. On World Press Freedom Day in 2023, a global fund to support independent journalism was launched at the United Nations with Indo-Pacific nations specifically named in the first tranche of countries whose media needs support: Indonesia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Timor-Leste. The global fund will provide financial support directly to media organisations and help to address structural challenges in global media ecosystems and enable media markets to work for democracy. It will specifically also fund initiatives which target “engagement with young audiences, promotion of inclusive newsrooms, and use of emerging technologies” (International Fund For Public Interest Media, 2023). ABC International Development believes it has much more to do in the broadcast space across the Indo-Pacific, as it wrote in its submission to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2022: With the dramatic rise in misinformation, disinformation, censorship and fake news, including by state actors, the ABC’s work with media organisations and communication partners around the Indo-Pacific is more important than ever to build and strengthen local media, fight corruption and support democracy. (ABC, 2022)

ABC ID maintained a small but effective development presence in the Pacific even after the broadcasting funding cuts through the Pacific Media Assistance Scheme (PACMAS). PACMAS has supported media operations across 14 countries in the Pacific, through training programmes, policy and legislative efforts, capacity building in national media associations, targeted developmental aid and investment, as well as significant research

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

213

and evaluation projects. Its activities have included efforts to strengthen political, crime and court reporting, notably in Fiji (Media watchdog role highlighted in parliamentary masterclass, 2016), the production of training materials and teaching curricula with tertiary education institutions (Khosla et al., 2015), and a focus on improving media financial sustainability (Stancombe Research and Planning, 2015). In the last three years, more than 1500 people across the Pacific have taken part in in-person and online training courses and specialist workshops covering topics such as regional economic reporting, national budget and election reporting, emergency broadcasting, climate change, and public health. Journalists from Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and the Philippines also visit ABC Australia, sometimes on professional attachment or for ongoing mentoring (Grasswill, 2023). ABC ID’s work has been funded by grants largely from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, but does accept funds from other bilateral and multilateral donors. The work is undertaken with partner media organisations across the region and involves enhancing both journalism skills and media capacity including analogue-to-digital transition. ABC ID provides support for media alliances, like the Fiji Media Association and the Media Association of the Solomon Islands, which has been campaigning for press access and freedom in the Solomon Islands. There is much more media development work that could be done in the region, particularly in countries which have not garnered the same amount of media attention as the Solomon Islands or Fiji. ABC ID has previously run successful development initiatives such as the Cambodia Communication Assistance Project (CCAP), which focuses on improving local government accountability through the strengthening of media and facilitating a dialogue with citizens (Kalyan et al., 2015). It had an additional priority focus on ending violence against women, and produced broadcast content in partnership with community and government radio stations. This project ran from 2012 to 2018 (Cambodia Communication Assistance Project, n.d.). Many Indo-Pacific countries continue to have limited education facilities, and therefore the ability to build the skills and knowledge required to operate as journalists in a rapidly changing news industry is underdeveloped. As outlined earlier, China is providing scholarships for attendance at Chinese universities and offering fully sponsored training courses. At the same time, the cost of completing a journalism degree or post graduate

214 

A. WAKE

degree in Australia remains prohibitive to many journalists from the Pacific and Asia, even if they are able to pass the academic requirements to enter these programmes with a scholarship.

Conclusion There are clear strategic, military, diplomatic, and resource reasons for Australia to have a strong transnational broadcaster that provides news and current affairs not only to its nearest neighbours in the Pacific but further into Asia where rising and established powers are vying for power and influence. Many of the countries in the region do not have strong news eco-systems or strong media, and rely to varying extents on trusted transnational broadcasters to provide international and even local news. The Indo-Pacific is of strategic military value but also rich in resources from fishing, logging, and mining, particularly gas and rare earth minerals. The Pacific islands are also at great risk and will continue to need help from disasters caused by climate change. Australia holds a unique position to provide trusted broadcasts to the region  during this period of changing power dynamics, which not only service the local information deficit in some parts of the region, but can promote Australian views on international affairs. Thanks to the increased use of digital technologies, the fracturing of audiences, and the spread of misinformation and disinformation, the need for clearly branded news and current affairs from a trusted source has never been more important. Domestically, the ABC remains the most trusted provider of news for Australian audiences. While BBC World (previously the World Service) has long been the leader in the provision of trusted independent news globally, the UK has historically left the Pacific and much of the Indo-Pacific to Australia, and to a lesser extent New Zealand, to service. The retreat of the ABC broadcasts from the Asia Pacific slowly over time and then abruptly in 2016 left the region with few alternatives, allowing for countries such as China to fill the void through its well-funded and vast transnational broadcasting network and government support for foreign news agencies sympathetic to China’s view of the world. It’s not too late for Australia to resume and rebuild its position in the Indo-Pacific, but it needs guaranteed and ongoing funding. One of the biggest challenges for the ABC’s international services, like the BBC World Service, has been their links to the domestic services. While this

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

215

brings advantages in terms of a trusted brand, and economies of scale from the production of news and current affairs content, the governance arrangements leave the transnational services at risk of also being caught in domestic political games and internal management decisions. For more than a decade, there’s been increasing domestic hostility towards the ABC and from conservative governments and commercial interests, specifically the Murdoch media. The ABC isn’t alone in attracting such criticism. Conservative governments including those in the UK have cut funding to the domestic public service broadcaster in retribution for what they believe is left-leaning coverage and to support aligned commercial interests. The cuts have occurred with little thought for the consequences on the public diplomacy aspect of the transnational broadcasters work. Every time ABC management has been forced to reduce its overall costs it has looked to the international service for what is generally seen as less difficult cuts; domestic audiences do not always see the value of transnational work. Repeatedly, reductions to the overall ABC budget have had a devastating flow-on effect to the international radio, television and digital services, leaving in 2016 large swathe of the Indo-Pacific vulnerable to those voices that do not necessarily align to the values of Australia or its allies. With the rise of China, and fears about the rise of other countries, a solution must be found. Australia could consider splitting its domestic and transnational broadcast and digital services, a move that is also being considered by some in the UK (Potter, 2023). This would make it easier to protect the transnational broadcasts and digital services from domestic political debates. But the very value of the ABC comes in a large part from its reputation and links to the domestic service, and its independence means it should not be reliant on one particular part of government, even the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Nonetheless, DFAT has released extra funds to the ABC since the election of the Albanese government, and the fears about the rise of propaganda from China. This boost in funds has been welcomed but much more needs to be done to guarantee funding for trusted independent news and current affairs to all nations in the Indo-Pacific about China’s ambitions in the region. The days of the colonial broadcaster, however, are long over. To be trusted, transnational content must be made with and amplify local audiences and remain constantly in place, through times of peace and crisis. Journalists working for trusted transnational media in the region can lean into reporting the tensions and make things worse, or they can choose to

216 

A. WAKE

provide balanced and independent coverage, fact-check their stories and engage in partnership with citizens and communities, particularly in countries where they are locked out. Australia is well-placed to provide the latter. While the focus of recent headlines and indeed large swathes of this book has all been about China, but there are many other countries such as India and Indonesia which could potentially present future concerns for Australia’s national security. We must take a long-term approach to building and rebuilding trust in our transnational broadcaster by significantly boosting funding, so all the countries in the region can hear Australia’s trusted voice, and that funding for this work must be guaranteed to be free of future government interference. Future funding of an Australian transnational broadcaster must also include not only consideration of the creation of news and current affairs, but also the way the news is distributed to our neighbours. While there is much excitement about the ability of low-earth satellites to bring the Internet, and therefore digital news, to the remotest parts of the Indo-­ Pacific, there is a clear concern that the very nature of the private ownership could mean that someone sitting in another country could easily turn off that access as Meta has done in Australia and Canada, and Elon Musk has done with changing security arrangements on X (previously Twitter). Significantly, while the UK and the United States are friends and allies to Australia, their citizens do not live in the region and their domestic political arrangements should not dictate Australia’s relationship with our neighbours in the region. Like China, Australia must take a multi-­ generational approach to the Indo-Pacific, and guarantee funding to remain a trusted provider of independent verified news and current affairs on and to the Indo-Pacific.

References ABC. (2022). ABC Submission on Australia’s New International Development Policy D.  F. A. a. Trade. https://www.dfat.gov.au/development/new-­ international-­development-­policy/public-­written-­submissions-­2022 ABC Radio Australia More Than Triples Pacific-Focused Content with New Programming. (2023, August 10). https://www.abc.net.au/pacific/abc-­ radio-­australia-­pacific-­content-­revamp/102705890 Ahearn, S. (2022, March 17). How China is Winning the Information War in the Pacific. The Strategist. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-­china-­is-­ winning-­the-­information-­war-­in-­the-­pacific/

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

217

Broadcast Expert 2. (2022, June 9). Research Interview (Australian International Broadcast Expert) [Interview]. Broadcast Expert 3. (2023, April 14). Research Interview (Asia Pacific Broadcast Executive) [Interview]. Cambodia Communication Assistance Project. (n.d.). ABC International Development. Retrieved July 30, from http://www.abc.net.au/abc-­ international-­development/projects/cambodia-­communication-­assistance­project/ Cavanough, E. (2020, July 30). The Small Pacific Country at the Center of a Big Power Play. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_ pacific/china-­taiwan-­dispute-­and-­coronavirus-­aid-­fuel-­hostilities-­in-­solomon-­ islands/2020/07/29/500a7fd8-­cccb-­11ea-­99b0-­8426e26d203b_story.html Dickey, L., et  al. (2019). Mapping the Information Environment in the Pacific Island Countries: Disruptors, Deficits, and Decisions Center for Naval Analysis. Dobell, G. (2022, May 9). Rebuilding Australia’s Media Voice in the South Pacific. The Strategist. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/rebuilding-­australias-­media-­ voice-­in-­the-­south-­pacific/ Federal Budget Response—Australian and International ABC Audiences Benefit from Funding Boost. (2022, October 25). https://about.abc.net.au/ statements/2022-­federal-­budget-­response-­australian-­and-­international-­abc-­ audiences-­benefit-­from-­funding-­boost/ Fisher, J., van Heerde, J., & Tucker, A. (2010). Does One Trust Judgement Fit All? Linking Theory and Empirics. British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 12(2), 161–188. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-­856X.2009. 00401.x Fraser, R. H. M. (2014). Australia’s Role in the Pacific. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 1(2), 431–437. https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.18 Grasswill, H. (2023, April 5). ABC International Spreads Its Wings. ABC Alumni. https://abcalumni.net/2023/04/05/abc-­international-­spreads-­its-­wings/ Horowitz, M., & D’Arma, A. (2023). Public Service Media: Bridging Values and Trust (Media Intelligence Service, Issue). https://www.ebu.ch/research/loginonly/report/bridging-­value-­and-­trust International Fund For Public Interest Media. (2023). International Fund for Public Interest Media. Retrieved May 5, from www.ifpim.org Kalyan, H., Freeman, S., Khosla, V., & Mareudoeb, K. (2015). Talkback Programming (Cambodia Communication Assistance Project Impact Research Briefng, Issue). Khosla, V., Davis, A., Raseta, K., & Cerreto, A. (2015). TVET Journalism Intiative: Pacific Media Assistance Scheme Impact Asssessment. http://www.abc.net. au/cm/lb/9207304/data/journalism-­i nitiative%2D%2D-­r esearch-­ briefing-­data.pdf

218 

A. WAKE

Letman, J. (2022, August). Truth and the Consequences of Colonialism, Conquest, and Control. Stanley Center for Peace and Security. Retrieved August 18, from https://stanleycenter.org/publications/imc-­colonialism-­conquest-­control/ Martin, L. (2021, May 21). Research Interview Australian International Wire Journalist [Interview]. Media Watchdog Role Highlighted in Parliamentary Masterclass. (2016). Pacific Media Assistance Scheme. Retrieved July 27, from http://web.archive.org/ web/20160720104933/http://www.pacmas.org:80/profile/media-­ watchdog-­role-­highlighted-­in-­parliamentary-­masterclassmedia-­watchdog-­role-­ highlighted-­in-­parliamentary-­masterclass/ Movono, L., Sas, N., & Dziedzic, S. (2023, April 6). Fiji Prime Minister Investigating China Spy Claims, Says ‘Survival’ is Key Issue for Pacific Nations. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-­04-­06/fiji-­rabuka-­the-­ pacific-­interview/102186064 Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Robertson, C., Eddy, K., & Nielsen, R. (2022). Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2022. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac. uk/digital-­news-­report/2022 Pacific Islands Forum Chairman ‘Reassured’ Over Massive Nuclear Submarine Deal. (2023, April 11). Radio New Zealand. https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-­n ews/487553/pacific-­i slands-­f orum-­c hairman-­r eassured­over-­massive-­nuclear-­submarine-­deal Piringi, C. (2021, November 27). Solomon Islands Unrest: Three Bodies Found in Burnt-Out Building. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2021/nov/27/solomon-­i slands-­u nrest-­t hree-­b odies-­f ound-­i n-­ burnt-­out-­building Potter, S. J. (2023, July 31). The BBC and the Decline of British Soft Power:How Domestic Politics Muffled the Country’s Voice. Foreign Affairs. https://www. foreignaffairs.com/united-­kingdom/bbc-­and-­decline-­british-­soft-­power Schneiders, B., & Lucas, C. (2020, May 13). Asian-Australian Groups Report Surge in Racist Abuse, Assaults During Pandemic. The Age. https://www. theage.com.au/politics/victoria/asian-­australian-­groups-­r eport-­surge-­i n-­ racist-­abuse-­assaults-­during-­pandemic-­20200512-­p54s6f.html Scott, M. (2009). A Global ABC: Soft Diplomacy and the World of International Broadcasting Bruce Allen Memorial Lecture. Macquarie University. Soon, A. (2022, September 2). Research Interview (Splice Media) [Interview]. Stancombe Research and Planning. (2015). Media Strengthening Pacific Media Assistance Scheme Impact Assessment Briefing. http://www.abc.net.au/cm/ lb/9627970/data/strengthening-­t he-­m edia-­t hrough-­t raining-­i n-­ pacific-­data.pdf Strengthening Australia’s relationships in the Pacific. (2022). D. a. T. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. Canberra, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia.

10  THE FUTURE AND FUNDING OF TRANSNATIONAL BROADCASTING… 

219

Verma, M. (2023, May 1). India has Blocked 14 Mobile Messenger Apps on Security Fears. Yahoo Finance. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/india-­ blocked-­14-­mobile-­messenger-­074000711.html Wake, A. (2010). Snap and Crackle Goes Pop: A Case Study of the Provision of Mobile, Digital, Shortwave and FM News and Current Affairs Broadcast and Published by Radio Australia in 2009 World Journalism Congress 2. Wong, P. (2023, April 17). National Press Club Address, Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/ penny-­w ong/speech/national-­p ress-­c lub-­a ddress-­a ustralian-­i nterests­regional-­balance-­power

Index

A AAPMI, see Australia Asia Pacific Media Initiative Abbott Government, 66 ABC Australia Network, 47 ABCID, see ABC International Development ABC International, 43, 66, 69, 181, 186, 189, 190, 199, 201, 206, 208, 212 ABC International Development (ABCID), 26, 183–186, 204, 212 ABC New, 54, 69, 179, 189 ABC Pacific, 69, 116, 124, 125, 190, 199 ABC Radio Australia, 8, 43–45, 65–67, 69, 179, 190, 198–200, 204, 208, 209 Agence France-Presse (AFP), 103, 107 Ahearn, Sue, 25, 26, 78, 180, 204 Albanese government, 27, 215 Al Jazeera, 3, 15, 16, 63, 74, 75, 82, 121, 122, 125, 129

Al Jazeera effect, 118 Al Jazeera English, 63, 75, 116, 124, 125, 142, 150 Anti-American sentiment, 121 Anti-Monarch posts, 29 Anti-Taiwan trolling, coordinated, 161 Arirang, 84 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 105 Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU), 208 AsiaSat, 74, 100 Aumanu-Leong, Chrisnrita, 189 Australia Asia Pacific Media Initiative (AAPMI), 25, 200 Australia Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 14, 17, 24, 26–28, 39, 42, 43, 45–49, 51–55, 62, 65–70, 72, 76, 85, 124, 128, 129, 179, 181, 184–186, 188–190, 196, 198–206, 208–210, 212–215

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 A. Wake (ed.), Transnational Broadcasting in the Indo Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47571-9

221

222 

INDEX

Australia Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 26, 44, 77, 161 Australia Television International (ATI), 65 B Bainimarama, Frank, 51, 207, 209 Bangladesh, 93, 147, 152, 170 BBC Charter, 62 BBC Media Action, 26, 212 BBC News, 62, 73 BBC World, 73, 214 BBC World Service (BBCWS), 10, 38, 55, 62, 71, 72, 204, 205, 214 Beijing Olympics, 97 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 7, 24, 105, 177, 186 Biden administration, 19 Biden, Joe, 12 Bloomberg News, 19 BRI, see Belt and Road Initiative British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 2, 9–11, 26, 43, 46, 47, 49, 54, 55, 62, 63, 70–74, 85, 100, 104, 118, 121, 126, 162, 165, 168, 172, 203 ByteDance, 95, 108 C Cambodia Communication Assistance Project (CCAP), 213 Cambodia Daily, 16 Cambodian, 11, 66 Cambodian Prime Minister, 16 Campaigns, pro-China trolling, 161 CCAP, see Cambodia Communication Assistance Project CCTV Documentary Channel, 100 Central China Television (CCTV), 23, 47, 49, 72, 76, 92, 93, 95–98, 100–101, 106, 120, 209

CGTN, see China Global Television Network CGTN Facebook, 116, 125 China Daily, 4, 76, 92–95, 97, 98, 102–103, 105, 126, 162 China Daily’s English-language YouTube, 162 China Global Television Network (CGTN), 4, 9, 23, 55, 76, 79, 92, 94, 95, 98, 100–101, 106, 108, 124, 125, 179 China Radio International (CRI), 4, 43, 76, 92–95, 97–100, 107, 108 China’s media, 187, 200 China-Solomon Island, 19, 28, 78 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 26, 77, 96, 99, 100, 103–107, 109 Chinese computational propaganda, 107, 108 Chinese government, 80, 92, 97, 98, 102–105, 118, 126, 162, 180, 209 Chinese influence, 201 Chinese naval base, 19 Chinese President, 92, 98, 125 Chinese state-run media, 93–95, 105–109 CNBC Asia Business Day, 74 CNBC Asia-Pacific, 73 CNC, 95, 116, 118, 119 CNC World, 118 CNN, 46, 55, 120, 121, 145, 148, 173 CNN International, 74 CNN International broadcasts, 74 Cold War, 54, 93, 127, 195 Colonialism, 3, 191 Constructive Journalism, 206 Cooney, Campbell, 128 Coral Sea cable, 20, 182

 INDEX 

COVID-19, 15, 106, 109, 141, 147, 153, 154, 162, 172, 173, 183, 185 Covid-19 Disinformation & Social Media Manipulation, 161 Covid-19 pandemic, 15, 137, 162, 172 Crisis, post-Cold War, 136, 138, 173 D Danish NGO, 53 DD-India, 83 Deep-water ports, securing, 177 Defining SNS diplomacy, 122 Deng, J., 20 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 29, 67, 184, 185, 212, 213, 215 Deutsche Welle, 43, 83 DFAT, see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Dobell, Graeme, 44, 205 Dover, Bruce, 47, 50, 67 Dziedzic, Stephen, 40, 188 E Enewetak Atoll, 210 England, 124 Entman, R. M., 115, 117–119 F Facebook, 9, 11, 16, 26, 28, 29, 41, 51, 53, 55, 76, 83, 84, 94, 98, 116, 124, 125, 140, 161, 164, 179, 182, 183, 188, 190, 208 Facebook ban, 29 Facebook diplomacy, 122 Facebook groups for minority communities, 161 Fact-checkers in Asia, 163 Fact-checking fundamentals, 54, 75, 162, 163

223

Fake news laws, 162 Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), 16, 40, 209, 212 Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), 16, 40, 209, 212 Fiji, 12, 16, 39, 40, 43, 49, 51, 53, 71, 76, 177, 189, 190, 200, 207–209, 212, 213 Fiji Media Association, 213 Fijian journalism, 39 First draft, 56, 164 Five Eyes, 165 Fourth Estate, 178 France Médias Monde, 83 France24, 83 Fraser, Malcolm, 211 Freedom House, 10, 187 French Polynesia, 12 G Garrett, Jemima, 25, 200 Generative Artificial Intelligence Services, 52, 56 Google News Initiative, 164 Gorman, Claire, 44, 45, 53, 55, 199, 208 Green, Murray, 206 Guam, 16, 210 H Harbu, Priestley, 181 Hawaii, 40, 210 Heriot, Geoff, 66 Hill, Bruce, 17, 77 Hodge, Errol, 65 Holbrooke, Richard, 127 House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee, 71 Hua, David, 42, 46–48, 52 Huawei, 24, 40, 41

224 

INDEX

I IFCN, 163, 164 Illiteracy, 57, 159 Illiterate adults, 160 Indian Prime Minister, 197 India’s Doordarshan, 83 Indonesian youth, 165 International Fact-Checking Network (IFJN), 163 Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), 99, 101 Internet shutdown, 51, 65 Internet TV, 99 Iran’s Press TV, 119 Island Sun, Solomon Islands, 69, 179, 180 J Jakarta Post, 102 Japan, 12, 13, 15, 18, 22, 27, 30, 41, 43, 61, 65, 74, 77, 83–84, 99, 165, 180, 210 Japan’s NHK World TV, 119 Journalists to study in China, 93 K Kafcaloudes, Phil, 65 Kajimoto, Masato, 161, 162 KBS World Radio, 84 Keating, Paul, 1, 65 Kekea, Gina, 41, 186 Korean Peninsula, 22 L Labor Government, current, 2, 8 Laos, 12, 16, 41, 43, 93 Letman, Jon, 210 Lim, Louisa, 26, 51, 77 Longmuir, Scott, 207 Low Earth Orbit (LEO), 41, 182

M Martin, Lisa, 38, 43, 65, 75, 79, 160–162, 206, 207 McDonell, Stephen, 126 Media Association of Solomon Islands (MASI), 184, 186–187, 190 Melanesia, 17, 206 Menzies, Robert, 8 Middle East, 18, 84, 119, 121, 129, 137, 144, 146, 149 Military base, 189 Modi, Narendra, 15, 197 Murrow, Edward R. (diplomat), 196 Musk, Elon, 39, 41, 62, 182, 216 Myanmar, 12, 16, 26, 29, 39, 43, 50, 51, 53, 55, 64, 70, 144–147, 152, 160, 203, 210 Myanmar’s post-coup crackdown, 154 N Nauru, 12, 16, 29, 40, 209 Nepal, 136 New Zealand, 12–15, 17, 19, 26, 41, 70–71, 163, 165, 179, 196, 209, 214 Nguyen, Tran, 8 NHK World TV, 83 North Korea, 55, 72 Nuclear submarine deal, 211 O Oceania and Indo-Pacific Security, 19 O’Keeffe, Anne-Marie, 65, 67 O’Sullivan, Matt, 24, 25, 48, 54, 67, 189, 190 P Pacific broadcasters, 71 Pacific Cooperation Broadcasting Limited (PCBL), 71

 INDEX 

Pacific Islands News Association (PINA), 184 Pacific journalists, 17, 70, 77, 190 Pacific Media Assistance Scheme (PACMAS), 183, 185, 212 Pacific Media Network (PMN), 71 Pakistan, 30, 51, 163, 172 Palau, 12, 40, 178, 212 PAOA FM, 180, 185 Papua, 15 Papua New Guinea, 12, 17, 20, 21, 26, 29, 40, 41, 45, 55, 78, 163, 180, 199, 204, 207, 209, 210, 212, 213 PasifikaTV, 71 Payne, Marise, 21 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 3, 7, 77, 96, 200 Philippines, 12, 15, 22, 23, 30, 41, 74, 161, 164, 165, 167, 212, 213 PRESS TV (PTV), 116, 118–120, 129 PSBs, see Public service broadcasters PTV, see PRESS TV Public opinions, manipulating, 115, 119 Public service broadcasters (PSBs), 1, 63, 64, 71, 73, 85, 203, 215 Public Service Media, 3, 5, 85, 203 Q Qatar, 3, 63, 74–75, 91, 121, 122, 129 R Radio Australia, shortwave service, 8, 44 Radio France Internationale (RFI), 83 Radio Free Asia, 38, 43, 54, 73 Radio New Zealand, 17, 70 Radio New Zealand International (RNZI), 208 Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 183

225

Reporters without Borders (RSF), 15, 16, 77 Reporting Humanitarian Disaster, 136, 138, 140, 141, 148, 149, 151 Reuters, 47, 70, 94, 103, 107, 203 Ring of Fire, 18, 39, 142 RMIT Fact Lab, 212 RNZI, see Radio New Zealand International RNZ Pacific, 70, 71 Rohingya, 143, 144, 147, 151, 152, 170 RT, see Russia Today Russia, 3, 9, 11, 63, 78–79, 91, 102, 196, 201, 211 Russia Today (RT), 62, 72, 78–82, 119, 120, 196 S Samoa, 12, 16, 17, 29, 40, 43, 53, 76, 189, 212 Satellite Frequencies, 74 Satellites, low earth, 29, 41, 182, 206, 216 Satellites nature, 39–41, 216 Scott, Mark, 7, 68, 195, 202 Sea cable, 182 Seib, Philip, 117, 120, 129 Shortwave Radio, restoring, 42, 44 SIBC, see Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation Sichuan Earthquake, 48, 49, 139 Singapore, 12, 17, 30, 50, 73, 74, 84, 162–165, 207, 208 SIPRI, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Sky News, 120, 172 Soft Power Journalism, 8, 10–11, 23–24, 72, 91, 92, 97, 104–106, 185, 201, 206

226 

INDEX

Sogavare, Manasseh, Solomon Island’s Prime Minister, 187–189, 191, 209 Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC), 26, 40, 69, 178–180, 184–186, 190, 191 Solomon Islands Media Assistance Scheme (SOLMAS), 184, 185 Solomon Star, 180, 181 Solomon Times, 69, 179 Solutions Journalism, 205 Soon, Alan, 207, 208 South China Morning Post, 15, 165 South Korea, 13, 15, 73, 161, 165 South Pacific, 19, 20, 44, 153, 169, 181, 211 Soviet Union, 93 Speech free, 144 hate, 29 Sputnik, 78 Sputnik International, 78 Spy balloon, 126 Starlink, 41, 182 State-sponsored messaging on Twitter, 161 Steele, Deborah, 49, 50, 72 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 22 T Tagata Pasifika, 71 Telekom Television (TTV), 179 Tensions, diplomatic, 49 Thailand, 12, 15, 30, 38, 43, 73, 74, 93, 102, 160, 165 Three Warfares, 10 TikTok, 9, 28, 51, 95, 108, 164–165

Timor-Leste, 16, 45, 66, 74, 198, 199, 210, 212 Tok Pisin, 54, 66 Tonga, 12, 16, 17, 19, 29, 39, 40, 53, 70, 76, 124, 182, 189, 200, 212 Tonga disaster, 19, 39–40, 182 Tonga’s internet connection, 40 Trump, Donald, 108, 150, 166 TTV1, 179 Twitch, gaming platform, 29 Twitter, 15, 51, 53, 55, 61–63, 66, 76, 83, 94, 98, 108, 124, 136, 140, 151–153, 161, 183, 216 TwitterSafety, 15 U UK government’s use of soft power, 10 UNESCO, 160 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), 160 United Nations, 18, 50, 127, 212 US Agency for Global Media (USAGM), 73 US-aligned military powers of Australia, 22 USAGM, see US Agency for Global Media US forces, 22, 168 V Vanuatu, 12, 16, 17, 26, 29, 40, 42, 43, 53, 76, 78, 180, 189, 204, 209, 212, 213 Virtual private networks (VPNs), 51, 64, 145 VOA, see Voice of America VOANews, 119

 INDEX 

227

Voice of America (VOA), 10, 38, 43, 63, 73, 79, 119 Voice of Russia, 78

World War I, 120 World War II, 8, 10, 20 Wuhan, 172

W Wardle, Claire, 159 Waskua, Evan, 181 WeChat, 9, 53, 54, 108, 124 Weibo, 54, 76, 208 Western Liberal Broadcast News Values, 11, 21, 25, 26, 38, 83, 178 Whiting, Natalie, 189 Wickham, Dorothy, 27, 28, 77, 78, 181, 188 Wong, Penny, 22, 195

X Xinhua news agency, 4, 48, 56, 76, 92–98, 103, 106, 118, 119, 190 Xinhua News Agency’s English news, 4, 76, 92–98, 103, 106, 118, 119, 190 Y YouTube, 9, 29, 53, 54, 68, 76, 78, 83, 84, 94, 95, 98, 124, 162, 163