Towards an Ubuntu University: African Higher Education Reimagined 3031064534, 9783031064531

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Towards an Ubuntu University African Higher Education Reimagined Edited by Yusef Waghid Judith Terblanche Lester Brian Shawa Joseph Pardon Hungwe Faiq Waghid Zayd Waghid

Towards an Ubuntu University

Yusef Waghid • Judith Terblanche Lester Brian Shawa Joseph Pardon Hungwe Faiq Waghid • Zayd Waghid

Towards an Ubuntu University African Higher Education Reimagined

Yusef Waghid Faculty of Education Stellenbosch University Cape Town, South Africa

Judith Terblanche Department of Accounting University of the Western Cape Cape Town, South Africa

Lester Brian Shawa University of KwaZulu-Natal Durban, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

Joseph Pardon Hungwe University of South Africa Pretoria, Gauteng, South Africa

Faiq Waghid Cape Peninsula University of Technology Cape Town, South Africa

Zayd Waghid Cape Peninsula University of Technology Cape Town, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-031-06453-1    ISBN 978-3-031-06454-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

In this book, we shall argue for a reconsideration of the idea of a university in light of the African ethic of ubuntu, literally, human dignity and interdependence. The context in which we shall endeavour to argue for an ubuntu university is the higher education discourse of comparative education. By implication, to set the scene for the arguments that unfold in this book, it should be conceived that globally universities have evolved into higher educational institutions concerned with knowledge (re)production for various end purposes that range from individual autonomy to public accountability to serving the interests of the economy and markets. However, our primary concern with such purposes of the university is that some universities have not always responded to their claims of being publicly accountable or responsible in many instances. Theoretically speaking, our argument in defence of an ubuntu university is grounded in a (post)critical paradigm. According to a critical (higher) educational theory, a university should be concerned with notions of autonomy, empowerment and emancipation. Post-critical (higher) educational theory would accentuate a concern for becoming as an enabling condition for a university’s advancement. Considering that our argument is in defence of an ubuntu university commensurate with notions of autonomy, empowerment, emancipation (in particular decolonisation and decoloniality) and becoming, it seems as if a post(critical) paradigm of higher educational theory underscores and frames our v

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s­eminal thoughts throughout this book. Put differently, a post(critical) higher educational theory manifests in our understanding of what it means to rupture higher teaching and learning associated with an African university (Waghid et al., 2018). The public university in South Africa has been subjected to higher education transformation over the last three decades; yet, the university has not always adhered to its transformation goals. Thus far, the Council on Higher Education (CHE) has produced three reviews of higher education in South Africa (with a fourth one in the making) as it guided the transformation of the university sector in South Africa over the past three decades. The three published reviews are South African Higher Education in the First Decade of Democracy (2004), Review of Higher Education in South Africa—Selected Themes (2007) and South African Higher Education Reviewed: Two Decades of Democracy (2016). Over the last decade, the public university in South Africa made a concerted attempt to deal with persisting inefficiencies and a lack of progress in higher education transformation. However, as will be argued for in the ensuing chapters, it seems as if transformation took on other forms such as reform, reconstruction, improvement and development of higher education discourses in the country. Not that these other forms of change were not necessary, but because no permanent change had been cultivated, as the concept of transformation intimates, it can be concluded that substantive change in higher education has not always ensued. In addition to the higher education transformation project’s perceived failure came the accompanying student protests around access, equity, institutional cultures, decolonisation and social justice. Often, regulative measures were introduced reactively in response to crises of governance, lack of adherence by individual institutions, student protests or to restrict the proliferation of private higher education providers and distance education programmes. Despite a clearly articulated regulatory framework, policy implementation without clearly stipulated targets remains problematic, thus making long-term transformation of higher education inadequate. The efficacy and success of such efforts at transformation also require that they be synchronised with each other and with the broader macro-economic environment, that they utilise effective political and

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institutional leadership and that they build consensus and foster accountability. It seems the public university’s unwillingness to sufficiently and boldly tackle matters such as ongoing student protests against rising tuition costs; institutional corruption and mismanagement of resources; gender inequality and exclusion; sexual harassment and malpractices that involve bribes for marks, academic plagiarism and indiscipline; and excessive student drinking and delinquency exacerbate the crises in university education. Yet, by far, the most disconcerting aspect of university life seems to be related to the pedagogical activity of higher teaching and learning itself. Teaching and learning seem to have remained overwhelmingly concerned with knowledge transfer and acquisition and limited opportunity for critical pedagogical practices. At the time of authoring this book, what we have found during what has now become a third wave of the coronavirus pandemic is that universities have introduced emergency online remote teaching to attend to the learning responsibilities of students. Yet, emergency remote teaching seemed to have enhanced learning by transmission and that the possibility for critical learning has invariably been subverted. In this way, the public responsibility of the university seems to be under threat and the institution, without being too alarmist, teeters on the brink of collapse. Thus it seems as if higher education has again been sacrificed for online remote and blended learning as if these approaches to higher pedagogy in themselves can build confidence in university education. What has emerged seems to have further undermined the possibility for higher education to manifest, and the university appears to be limping in a quagmire of pedagogical uncertainty and ambivalence. If learning by transmission is considered as the only legitimate form of learning, then the likelihood that criticality would be pronounced would be remote in itself. In response to such a dire situation in which the university in South Africa seems to find itself, we propose that the idea of a university should be rethought in light of the African ethic of ubuntu. In our view, ubuntu is both a philosophical and a politico-ethical concept that can contribute, firstly, to thinking about the university differently in troubled times and, secondly, to enact practices that can realign institutional and transformational purposes with an idea of community in which academics and

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s­tudents can cultivate relations of individual freedom, collaborative engagement and co-belonging. What a university framed according to ubuntu can engender is a higher education institution that reconsiders the transformative potential of the institution itself. The distinctiveness of ubuntu lies in its internal connection to human action and the external enactment of relations with other humans, contexts and entities of a non-­ human kind, such as computers and other technological devices. Underscored by the dictum “I am because we are [and can become]”, ubuntu implies having intra- and inter-relations with the self and others, including other things so that the actions implied by ubuntu are a matter of doing things with others and not always to and for others. We argue that an ubuntu-inspired university can offer the institution an opportunity to remain autonomous yet publicly responsible for its actions. In the main, such a university would not only consolidate the institution’s transformation agenda but would, firstly, extend it to matters of public concern. And, here we refer to issues that involve its transformation in relation to claims of knowledge and reason and lines of inquiry not thought about previously. Secondly, such a university would consider its engagement with the broader community not as a service provision or an activity with impact but rather as an act of genuine collaboration in the interest of both the institution and the broader public. Thirdly, the university would lay claims to cultivating a moral attentiveness to address local and worldly concerns in and about matters that would enhance human dignity, social and restorative justice and peaceful human coexistence. By far, the most poignant aspect of higher education transformation that the public university ought to consider more plausibly is the notion of decolonisation. Decolonisation, as elusive as the term might be (Zembylas, 2018), seems to be linked to offering resistance to the exercise of politico-economic sovereignty of one dominant nation over another less dominant one (Maldonado-Torres, 2007). Thus, when we talk about the decolonisation of higher education, we refer to practices of resistance that are offered to disrupt skewed understandings of power-sharing and imposition that constitute higher education practices. Together with decolonisation, the notion of decoloniality can be considered as restoring the cultural values, economic aspirations and knowledge interests of

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(­previously) colonised communities (Mbembe, 2016). By implication, the decolonisation of the public university is an attempt to oppose and undermine the imperialist legacy and devaluation of the cultures and knowledge interests of marginalised communities. Decolonisation of higher education thus involves recognising the cultural values and knowledge concerns of marginalised communities that have been suppressed and undermined. In this way, the decolonisation of higher education can be couched as a re-articulation of the underlying value systems of excluded communities. And, this is where the decolonisation project connects with ubuntu in the sense that the latter equally insists that the values of the other in their otherness should be attended to. Hence, the decolonisation of higher education is synonymous with reshaping the higher education landscape according to the moral values of ubuntu. The question can legitimately be asked: Is an ubuntu university different from an entrepreneurial university, thinking university and ecological university? (Barnett, 2018). While these different understandings of a university accentuate both the epistemological and the moral imperatives in relation to itself and societies in which they manifest (Waghid & Davids, 2020), we argue, it is through the ubuntu university that emotivism in the forms of dignity and humaneness will enhance a university’s capacity for autonomy, responsibility and criticality. The very idea of reimagining an African university is based on the view that universities on the continent, as elsewhere, have and continue to undergo unprecedented changes as enunciated by Zeleza and Olukoshi (2004). Our argument for an ubuntu university is a way of redefining and defending the significance of higher education institutions on the continent. We also recognise that other philosophies impacted the transformation of universities on the continent such as ujamaa (people in community) and ukama (people in relation to one another) (Zeleza & Olukushi, 2004). However, in limiting our claims to ubuntu and its constitutive notions would not minimise the importance of rethinking the idea of the university on the African continent. And, introducing a snapshot of the South African university context and how it can be impacted by ubuntu seems to be a tenable way to enhance claims for the cultivation of an ubuntu university on the continent.

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Likewise, we do not use the notion of a (South) African university in some homogeneous way as if universities on the continent do not have their own challenges in the context of transformation. Consequently, we refer specifically to the indefinite article of ‘an’ African university thus recognising the complexities and distinctiveness associated with the concept of a university in and for Africa. We shall confine the book to twelve interrelated chapters and a postscript in which the following themes will be addressed. In Chap. 1, we analyse the notion of a university in the context of global and local knowledge interests. That is, we proffer an argument for glocalised knowledge in response to merely global/universal or local knowledge concerns associated with the task of a university. Put differently, we argue in defence of a reimagined idea of knowledge fusion. Chapter 2 analyses the transformation of a public university in South Africa over 30 years. We specifically examine the higher education transformation project and its apparent failures in South Africa concerning genuine public university practices. In Chap. 3, we focus on the notion of ubuntu as an African ethic for higher educational transformation in South Africa. Chapter 4 accentuates the notion of ubuntu in the context of collaborative engagement and co-belong. We offer a defence of an ubuntu-­ inspired university. In Chap. 5, we analyse the notion of an African university of reason, conscience and humanness. Chapter 6 outlines the idea of a communal African university of deliberation, freedom of expression and equality. It focuses explicitly on the notion of indaba as a cultural platform upon which research, teaching and learning should be based. It is argued that indaba, as a cultural platform, provides spaces where community issues are deliberated upon and divergent views are exchanged to pursue communal resolutions. Chapter 7 critically reflects on communality, responsibility and public good as the key cornerstones of social justice education in universities in Africa. In African countries, the universities are located in a milieu where social justice is deficient in all social spheres. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the universities as ideal spaces of free critical thinking, unprejudiced analysis and mutual exchange of ideas to be the key cornerstones for social justice.

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Chapter 8 shows the needed connectedness of comparative education, democratic citizenship and an ubuntu ethic in an African university. We present three major arguments: first, since the field of comparative education strives to continuously re-imagine itself, be reformative, be reflexive, challenge hegemonic education systems and embody the character of connectedness (of human and non-human relations), it is in line with values sought through democratic citizenship education and an ubuntu ethic in an African university. Second, since claims of democratic citizenship education aim to produce responsible citizens, they are in line with an ubuntu ethic. Third, an African university based on an ubuntu ethic is necessarily democratic. In Chap. 9, we have argued that within an ubuntu ethic, higher education teaching and learning are intrinsically and extrinsically linked to acts of transformation, engagement and comparative education. We show that teaching and learning in such a form need to guard against rote learning and instead support deep learning grounded on learning theories and reflectivity. We argue that teaching and learning, as an act of transformation, touches on access, social justice, freedoms and epistemological and ontological dimensions. In Chap. 10, by appropriating Galtung’s (1969) theory on violence (social justice) and peace (social cohesion), we identify some evidence of the violence that is present within the pedagogical teaching practices and curriculum content in the higher education landscape. This includes structural violence and violence against the soul of the student. Subsequently, we argued that university teachers should be willing to act by making changes from this position of critique, even though there will be some risks involved. In Chap. 11, we argued for a pedagogy of care that is rhythmic in nature. The act of delaying judgement, intrinsic to rhythmic care, beholds the potential to provoke and bring students to a position where they come to speech. Through deliberation, listening with and caring with, students and university teachers are open to possible transformation—transformation to the extent that the plight of the marginalised is noticed and, through compassion, just action is ignited. Higher education is premised on a pedagogy of care that is rhythmic in nature and falls within the broader paradigm of ubuntu education. The cultivation of students (and university teachers) who can restore justice through the healing of caring relations is a necessity for the global world,

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­ articularly the African university landscape. In Chap. 12, we expound p on the need to develop the capacities of university students in higher education by arguing for post-critical teaching and learning with technology. Drawing on the seminal thoughts of John Dewey (1902/1966) regarding three “evils” as a result of a curriculum that further exacerbates psychological violence among students, we contend that teaching with technology in line with ubuntu is necessary for advancing critique, responsibility and dissent among students. In the Coda, it is argued that an ubuntu university is a forward-looking concept that would enable us to think anew, face new challenges and chart new paths domestically, regionally and globally. The notion of an ubuntu university is proffered as a political-oriented concept in the pursuit of social justice. In addition, it is also couched as an ethics-oriented idea that can hopefully advance a sustainable future, global peace. Cape Town, South Africa Cape Town, South Africa  Durban, South Africa  Pretoria, South Africa  Cape Town, South Africa  Cape Town, South Africa 

Yusef Waghid Judith Terblanche Lester Brian Shawa Joseph Pardon Hungwe Faiq Waghid Zayd Waghid

References Barnett, R. (2018). The ecological university: A feasible utopia. Routledge. Dewey, J. (1902/1966). The Child and the Curriculum and the School and Society. University of Chicago Press. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167–191. Maldonado-Torres, N. (2007). On the coloniality of being: Contributions to the development of a concept. Cultural Studies, 21(2–3), 240–270. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09502380601162548 Mbembe, A. J. (2016). Decolonizing the university: New directions. Arts and Humanities Education, 15(1), 29–45. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1474022215618513

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Waghid, Y., & Davids, N. (2020). The thinking university expanded: On profanation, play and education. Routledge. Waghid, Y., Waghid, F., & Waghid, Z. (2018). Rupturing African philosophy on teaching and learning: Ubuntu justice and education. Palgrave Macmillan. Zeleza, P. T., & Olukoshi, A. (Eds.). (2004). African universities in the twenty-­ first century, Volume I: Liberalisation and internationalisation. UNISA Press. Zembylas, M. (2018). Decolonial possibilities in South African higher education: Reconfiguring humanizing pedagogies as/with decolonial pedagogies. South African Journal of Education, 38(4), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.15700/ saje.v38n4a1699

Contents

1 The  University in the Context of Global and Local Knowledge Interests  1 Introduction   1 Alternative Forms of Knowing: Towards Global Citizenship Education   2 Summary   7 References   7 2 On  the Transformation of the Public University in South Africa: Towards a Rupturing of Higher Education  9 Introduction   9 Between Economic Rationalism and Transformative Change Within the Higher Education Sector   10 Towards a Rupturing of Higher Education: The Quest for Objective Freedom  13 Summary  15 References  16 3 Ubuntu as an African Ethic for Higher Educational Transformation or Not? 17 Introduction  17 Ubuntu and Higher Education   18 xv

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Higher Education Transformation with Ubuntu  20 Summary  22 References  22 4 Ubuntu as an Act of Collaborative Engagement and Co-belonging: Implications for the Public University 25 Introduction  25 On Collaboration and Transformation   25 Pedagogical Engagement or Participation?   27 Co-belonging and a Transformative Higher Education Sector   29 Summary  31 References  31 5 Towards  an African University of Objective Reason, Conscience and Humility 33 Introduction  33 Is a University of Reason Enough?   33 Towards an Ubuntu University of Conscience and Humaneness  35 Summary  36 References  37 6 ( Re)-imagining the Indaba Concept: In Quest for a Communal African University of Deliberation, Freedom of Expression and Equality 39 Introduction  39 Indaba: Some Theoretical Underpinnings   41 Setting the Debate for an African University   44 The Notion of Deliberation from Indaba: Towards an African University  47 The Notion of Freedom of Expression from Indaba: Towards African University  48 Idealising an African University: Communality and Equality   52 A Critical Appraisal of the Indaba Concept  53 Summary  55 References  56

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7 Communality,  Responsibility and Public Good for Social Justice in University Education: Some Critical Reflections on an African University 59 Introduction  59 The Quest for Social Justice University Education: Contextual Setting in Africa   60 Communality  62 Responsibility  67 Public Good  70 Summary  73 References  74 8 An  African University and Claims of Democratic Citizenship Education 77 Introduction  77 Comparative Education and the African University   78 Democratic Citizenship Education and the University   80 Towards Collapsing Goals of Democratic Citizenship and an African University  81 Summary  82 References  83 9 Teaching  and Learning as Transformative Acts of Comparative Education 85 Introduction  85 Teaching and Learning in Higher Education   85 Teaching and Learning as an Act of Transformation   87 Teaching and Learning as an Act of Engagement   89 Teaching and Learning as an Act of Engagement: Waghid’s Interpretation of Freire’s Pedagogy of Hope   90 Teaching and Learning as an Act of Comparative Education   91 Summary  92 References  92

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10 Teaching  and Learning as Critique, Taking Risks and Disruption 95 Introduction  95 Violence and Social Justice: A Binary Relation?   96 From Critique to Disruption   97 From Risk to Transformative Pedagogy as Disruption  103 On Deliberation  103 Towards Responsibility  105 Summary 107 References 107 11 An  African University, Caring with Humanity and Decolonisation111 Introduction 111 An Ethic of Care: A Perspective of Nel Noddings  112 An Ethic of Care: Perspective of Joan Tronto  114 Towards a Pedagogy of Care: Perspectives of Yusef Waghid  116 Summary 123 References 124 12 Towards  an Ubuntu University of Technology127 Introduction 127 Implications of a Rigid School Curriculum on Higher Education 128 Educational Technology  134 Summary 142 References 142  Response to Thokozani Mathebula’s Assertions of an In Ubuntu University145 Coda: The Possibility of the Ubuntu University in PostApartheid South Africa—A Critical Inquiry149 Thokozani Mathebula I ndex173

Notes on Contributors

Joseph Pardon Hungwe  is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of South Africa’s College of Education, South Africa. He has extensive experience in higher education in Zimbabwe and South Africa with a research interest in the internationalisation of higher education. Lester Brian Shawa  is an Associate Professor of higher education and holds an Honorary Seniorship in Higher Education Studies at the University of KwaZulu-­Natal, South Africa. He works as regional education coordinator for the Kühne Foundation at its Africa office in Kenya. Judith Terblanche  is a chartered accountant and works as an associate professor at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. Her research interests focus on philosophy of education, responsible business leadership and societal transformation. Faiq Waghid  is Senior Lecturer in Educational Technology at the Centre for Innovative Technologies, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa. He co-authored Higher Teaching and Learning for Alternative Futures: A Renewed Focus on Critical Praxis (with Zayd Waghid, Judith Terblanche & Yusef Waghid, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). Yusef Waghid  is a leading African philosopher of higher education and works as a distinguished professor at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. He is the author of Education, Crisis, and Philosophy (2022). xix

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Notes on Contributors

Zayd Waghid  is Associate Professor in Business Education in the Faculty of Education at Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa. He co-authored Higher Teaching and Learning for Alternative Futures: A Renewed Focus on Critical Praxis (with Faiq Waghid, Judith Terblanche & Yusef Waghid, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).

1 The University in the Context of Global and Local Knowledge Interests

Introduction We begin from the premise that humans have the potential to come to know. That is, they can act in such a way that they endeavour to find out what might not yet be known to them. When they do so—that is, acting towards knowing—they usually apply their minds to come to understand matters that concern or interest them. Thus, their knowledge happens from actions of the mind, their awareness of this or that matter and their intuition about what they instinctively consider to be the case. In this way, knowing something involves reasoning, feeling or the exercise of emotion and instinctive behaviour—all human actions that influence their knowledge. This chapter first examines what such acts of knowing entail before we, secondly, tackle forms of knowing, specifically the dichotomy between non-indigenous and indigenous knowing. Thirdly, we examine what knowing means in the context of the universal/global and local/traditional before we proffer an argument in defence of glocalised knowledge that ought to be associated with the task of a university. The emphasis on knowing is a matter of finding out what this or that means. One would not necessarily know what a university involves © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_1

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without having some kind of knowledge of such an institution. And, how one finds out what a university means is connected to how the institution presents itself—a matter of what it stands for. Invariably getting to know what a university involves is a matter of looking at the ways in which such an institution reveals itself. And, such an institution would present itself in the context of an understanding of knowledge that constitutes its representation. This brings us to a discussion of forms of knowing necessary to find out what a university means.

 lternative Forms of Knowing: Towards A Global Citizenship Education Thomas A.  Schwandt (2007) reminds us that meanings of knowledge intersect with its production, justification and uses in ideas (concepts) and practices. Put differently, if one examines what knowledge means, one does so in relation to how it is produced, justified and used in concepts and practices. This view is echoed by Gloria Emeagwali and George J. Sefa Dei (2014), who posit that meanings of knowledge are framed according to its production, validation (justification) and use (including dissemination). The action words, production, justification and use are all related to humans. Therefore, it is safe to infer that knowledge resides in people's actions who, in turn, have values, cultures, beliefs, ethnicities and written and oral languages. Based on the latter, our first claim about knowledge is that it is produced, justified and used by people. Secondly, in the quest to produce, justify and use knowledge, humans would come to understand the society, communities, practices and institutions they represent. Now bearing in mind that the production, justification and use of knowledge collectively make up its meanings, humans’ contributions to knowledge are connected to its (re)constructions in communities, schools and universities. Consequently, any claim that knowledge (re)constructed and even deconstructed in Africa is mythical, superstitious and non-­ scientific is false on the grounds that knowledge constructions are deeply embedded in the social, political and cultural aspects of human life on and beyond the continent. In agreement with Emeagwali and Sefa Dei (2014, p. ix), “[African] knowledges have diffused and interacted with

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other ways of knowing from other communities”. Likewise, any attempt to minimise and even dismiss knowledge (re)constructed in Africa, as if knowledge is the exclusive domain of a Westernised (universalist) academy, is a blatant denial of Africans’ contributions and potential contributions to knowledge. The point about knowledge use is a matter of finding out what knowledge influences an understanding of concepts and practices. This brings us to the question as to how knowledge has and continues to be formed in Africa. Peter Drucker’s (1993) highly publicised historical analysis of the social purposes of knowledge along the lines of three distinct phases is worth referring to in a discussion of forms of knowledge. For Drucker (1993), knowledge emerged in three forms: knowledge for the sake of knowledge, enlightenment and wisdom just prior to the industrial revolution; applied knowledge with the invention of technology; and being critical of knowledge applied to knowledge. These are three distinct steps in the transformation of knowledge that occurred in history. Two things seem to be wrong with Drucker’s thesis: on the one hand, he assumes that knowledge for its own sake does not have a purposeful application, and on the other hand, the construction of knowledge itself is not a critical act of doing. In response to Drucker’s assumption that knowledge for its own sake does not necessarily have a purposive use, we argue that such a claim is based on a false premise that to gain wisdom about such knowledge is without purpose. It cannot be presumed that gaining knowledge of a university for the sake of knowledge can be considered as disconnected from the purpose of university education itself. If one becomes enlightened and wiser about the functioning of a university and its educational aims, it cannot be assumed that knowledge produced in the pursuit of understanding the university differently has no purpose at all. In this way, producing knowledge about the university for the sake of advancing knowledge in itself is invariably linked to advancing what the university’s education ought to be. Thus, knowledge produced for the sake of knowledge does not imply that knowledge has no purpose. Rather, its purpose in respect of the university is within the production of knowledge itself. Likewise, the (re) construction of knowledge invariably has a critical dimension in the sense that criticality is connected to the liberatory interests of a university itself.

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If a university does not have a critical appeal, there is no point for its existence as it serves the interests of whatever is envisaged for its purpose. For instance, nowadays, a university is considered a matter of the public good. This means that a university serves the interests of the public good—what society demands in terms of reconstruction, nation-­building and transformation. When a university’s purpose is directed to the knowledge interests of the public to emancipate and transform, such a university is acting upon its inherent critical nature. In this way, knowledge produced by a university is inherently critical because it considers the interests of the public good as important for its existence. We shall now address how and why knowledge is also a claim with which an African university can be associated. We offer three arguments in defence of an African university that ought to produce knowledge for the purposes of local and global concerns. Firstly, we take our cue from Patricia Broadfoot (2000), who posits that Comparative Education in the twenty-first century ought to be attuned to educational aspirations of the time. This implies that the discipline must be refocused on new forms of learning that connect with the notion of culture (Broadfoot, 2000, p. 357). Put differently, comparative education should become globally responsive to alternative forms of education that more significantly foregrounds the idea of culture. Now refocusing comparative education commensurate with alterity and culture invariably point towards the cultivation of what has been articulated as global citizenship education (GCE). In our view, GCE can be considered as a genre of a new discourse of comparative education for the following reasons: Firstly, GCE requires the individual to decentre itself in the sense that she has to look beyond her own interests and accept moral obligations and respond appropriately to global situations (Bosio, 2021, p. xix). The point we are making is that comparative education should be looked at in an alternative way whereby the relationship between an individual and others in the global world should no longer be seen from the individual’s preferences but beyond herself towards what others consider as morally appropriate. In this way, if one were to reconsider the idea of knowledge production, the latter cannot exclusively be concerned with individual preferences but more poignantly should be advanced in the context of increasing

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awareness of others and what these others consider as morally appropriate. By implication, knowledge production cannot remain oblivious of the increasing levels of inequality, the rising instances of populism and nationalism, supported by post-truth politics with hatred and fear of the other (Bosio, 2021, p. xix). What follows is that knowledge production ought to be reconsidered along the lines of decentring the individual self towards becoming morally responsive to the otherness within cultures. Any consideration of an African university along the lines of decentred knowledge production implies that such an institution looks beyond its own interests as it responds to situations in its context and the world, for that matter. For instance, in an area called Yil Ngas in Nigeria, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries inhabitants used a culturally informed soil and water conservation technique, especially with the building of terraces for agricultural purposes. These inhabitants used their individual local knowledge of their natural environment to build and repair terraces in troublesome (rugged) locations in order to maintain and sustain their needs for food, shelter, clothing, tools and water (Gwimbe, 2014, p. 43)—a typical example of how individual knowledge has been of interest to communities so that the focus of knowledge production shifted from the centre of individual concerns in response to conservation techniques that advantaged the community of Yil Ngas. Secondly, GCE is concerned with a conscientisation of the self and others, so that knowledge production is inspired by a concern for social and global justice for all (Bosio, 2021, p. xx). We specifically think of how conscientised humans can contribute to the advancement of justice for all in African communities. With the unaffordable rise in healthcare on the continent and the low life expectancy in several African countries, it makes sense to focus our attention on traditional medicine to supplement existing and contextually unaffordable medicinal resources (Nimoh, 2014, p. 92). More specifically, the use of medicinal herbs and plants to supplement the healthcare systems in treating and preventing common ailments and diseases can be considered important for conscientised humans. In this regard, it is worth referring to the use of “bentoa” or a bulb syringe in Ghanaian communities to treat constipation, nausea, indigestion, headaches and dizziness that arise from constipation (Nimoh, 2014, p. 84). Global justice occurs when some African communities are

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afforded opportunities to improve their health status through less costly and easily available traditional medicine. This happens when conscientised persons want to see knowledge (of traditional medicine) being used relevantly and justly, such as a means to provide affordable and supplementary healthcare. Thirdly, GCE promotes the enhancement of critical, humanistic and transformative values incorporating inclusion, practicality and ethicality (Bosio, 2021, p. xx). In light of knowledge production, GCE advances critique, inclusion and transformation in ethically defensible ways. When knowledge production involves critique, it is no longer exclusively concerned with individual and collective initiatives. Rather, critique implies that autonomous individuality and deliberative collectivity are pursued with knowledge production. Such an understanding of critical knowledge brings the individual knowledge interests in conversation with the collective and vice versa. In this way, we can safely refer to the production of fused knowledge, so that knowledge serves the interests of both the individual and collective. Likewise, fused knowledge production also considers its transformative intent in advancing freedom, equality and emancipation in communities of knowing. Taking our cue from Hans Schattle (2021, p. 169) where he posits that GCE ought to yield “a more humane and just world” with respect to human dignity and human rights, and to respond more globally to problems about the environment, poverty, public health, human rights and conflict, it seems as if GCE “should be transformative”. And, this transformation should take place along the lines of responding to problems “as a global citizen, national citizen, and local citizen” (Schattle, 2021, p. 168). In light of the above enunciations of GCE, at least three aspects come to mind: knowledge production is decentred and relevant to the situation; knowledge production is relevant to a particular context; and knowledge production is about a transformative integration between the individual, local and global. That is, knowledge production is linked to a fusion between what is local (regional or national) and global. Moreover, conceptualising the notion of an African university invariably considers that such an institution of higher education advances knowledge interests of both a local and global perspective in resolving matters of public concern. The latter involves protecting the environment, lifting people out of

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their vulnerabilities to poverty, enhancing healthcare, embarking on human rights recognition and preventing conflicts all over the world. Now such an idea of knowledge production invariably commensurates with a (post)critical higher educational theory in the sense that notions of decentred knowledge, transformative knowledge and integrated knowledge—all notions of post-criticality that frames higher education theory in more contextually relevant ways.

Summary If one were to sum up what an African university in a local-global context would mean, then such an institution of higher education would be characterised by the following dimensions of knowledge production: decentred knowledge production so that individual interests are not at variance with collective interests; conscientised knowledge production that seems to be relevant to particular contexts and situations; and knowledge production that is responsive to both local and global concerns so that problem solving in and about the environment, poverty, healthcare, human rights and a resolution of conflict are locally and globally addressed.

References Bosio, E. (Ed.). (2021). Conversations on global citizenship education: Perspectives on research, teaching, and learning in higher education. Routledge. Broadfoot, P. (2000). Comparative education for the 21st century: Retrospect and prospect. Comparative Education, 36(3), 357–371. Drucker, P. (1993). Post-capitalist society. Harper Collins. Emeagwali, G., & Sefa Dei, G. J. (Eds.). (2014). African indigenous knowledge and the disciplines. Sense Publishers. Gwimbe, S. B. (2014). Terracing and agriculture in central Nigeria with a focus on Yil Ngas. In G.  Emeagwali & G.  J. S.  Dei (Eds.), African indigenous knowledge and the disciplines (pp. 35–44). Sense Publishers.

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Nimoh, S.  K. (2014). Indigenous traditional medicine in Ghana. In G. Emeagwali & G. J. S. Dei (Eds.), African indigenous knowledge and the disciplines (pp. 83–93). Sense Publishers. Schattle, H. (2021). Global citizenship education as awareness, responsibility, and participation. In E. Bosio (Ed.), Conversations on global citizenship education: Perspectives on research, teaching, and learning in higher education (pp. 153–169). Routledge. Schwandt, T. A. (2007). First words. In B. Somekh & T. A. Schwandt (Eds.), Knowledge production: research work in interesting times (pp. 1–5). Routledge.

2 On the Transformation of the Public University in South Africa: Towards a Rupturing of Higher Education

Introduction Since the dawn of the new democratic state in 1994, South African higher education has been undergoing significant conceptual and structural changes. Over the past three decades, higher education in the country has drastically changed from separate education systems for various racial groups, namely whites, coloureds, Indians and blacks, to a single coordinated national education system. From 36 public higher education institutions (21 universities and 15 technikons or polytechnics), the higher education sector now comprises 26 public universities with its own categorisations of research-intensive, comprehensive and technology-driven institutions. Looking back at the multiple reviews the higher education sector has undergone through the agency of the Council on Higher Education (CHE), it seems that since 2004, four major reviews along the lines of two distinct processes unfolded: firstly, the four reviews include, South African Higher Education in the First Decade of Democracy (2004), Review of Higher Education in South Africa: Selected Themes (2007), Higher Education Reviewed: Two Decades of Democracy (2016) and Review of the Higher Education System Twenty-five Years (2021); and secondly, as © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_2

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announced in the CHE’s State of Higher Education in South Africa (2009), the reviews centred around claims of economic rationality. That is, the reviews set out to show whether the higher education sector achieved its targets and goals concerning economic prosperity and global competitiveness, on the one hand. On the other hand, it considered claims of transformation in terms of “the performance of higher education for equity and redress, quality, economic and social development and democracy; and what the key challenges are for the effective and efficient achievement of goals and targets in an overall higher education system that is meant to be characterised by cooperative governance” (CHE, 2021, p. 2). Thus, what seemed to have emerged from the enactment of higher education in the country post-1994 is a tangible drive towards addressing the transformative requirements of equitable redress and (e) quality and democratic development concomitantly with a strong impetus on neoliberal ideals of globalisation, competition and skills development. In this chapter, we examine these two parallel initiatives and whether higher education has actually been transformed.

 etween Economic Rationalism B and Transformative Change Within the Higher Education Sector In the beginning, post-apartheid higher education discourse in South Africa was clearly aligned with economic rationalism that seems to have been biased towards a neoliberal export-led growth orientation. The initial strong thrust the higher education policy discourse put on equity and redress became secondary to its attentiveness to economic labour market imperatives and concomitant neoliberal requirements for skilled and innovative knowledge workers and producers. The country’s economic-­ rationalist agenda for higher education policy implementation became evident during the #FeesMustFall student movement that began in 2015, and that saw a significant resistance to the levying of university tuition fees upon individuals. It seemed as if higher education had charted out a

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course of economic rationalism that advances the corporatisation of universities and colleges expected to raise a much more significant proportion of their own revenue, enter into business enterprises, acquire and hold investment portfolios, encourage partnerships with business firms, compete with other institutions in the production and marketing of courses to students now seen as customers and generally engage with the market for higher education. In this regard, the worldwide corporatisation or marketisation of higher education is aptly acknowledged by Simon Marginson (2007, p. 42), who states the following: The potential for economic markets in higher education rests on the historical and political conditions. … For the most part, education markets in national systems are constructed and managed by governments, which stratify institutions and install relations of competition, prices and economic incentives. … In this, the neoliberal era in policy and government, the development of the market form, including fully commercial higher education … has been much advanced. … But economic markets and commodities in higher education have not been entirely imposed from outside, whether by neoliberal policy or global convergence. They are also grounded in higher education itself.

We are interested in Marginson’s claim that neoliberal marketisation/ economic rationalism is also an imposition of higher education itself. The higher education landscape in the country seems to be steered and regulated through government legislation. Higher education institutions are expected to transform their curriculum, knowledge interests, teaching and learning programmes responsive to the diverse cultures and citizenship aspirations of a democratic society to ensure nation-building. However, institutions also direct their curriculum and academic programming towards market-driven economic interests, such as producing highly skilled and competitive knowledge workers (graduates). Thus, it seems as if equitable redress and transformation have to be implemented concurrently with higher education institutions’ market-driven impetus. And, as acknowledged by the Council on Higher Education (2021), such harmonisation is not always adequately attended to. Why is the latter a concern?

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Firstly, most universities in the country emphasise the importance of equipping students with graduate attributes associated with producing workers who can function in a competitive global labour market economy. If students are not equipped with skills and capacities such as critical and creative thinking, responsible use of knowledge, collaboration, leadership, social entrepreneurship, problem-solving and innovation in a diverse and sustainable technological environment, it is assumed by universities that they would not have acquired enabling graduate attributes to function in a world labour market economy (Stellenbosch University, 2021). It seems evident that the neoliberal global interests are foregrounded, and the transformative agenda of the institutions have taken a back seat. Although institutional strategic plans advocate for the importance of a decolonised university education, not much seemed to have been done in this respect and resistance to such unwilling actions manifests in student protests, as is evident in #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements. Secondly, universities, in particular the research-intensive institutions, encourage (and expect) their academics to apply for an individual rating with the National Research Foundation. If these individual ratings are granted, some institutions even offer research incentives for their academics. However, not the same urgency is expected from higher education institutions to transform their academic offerings towards cultivating a decolonised higher education system. Thirdly, several higher education institutions in the country offer exorbitant remuneration packages to senior executive staff members in line with market imperatives. Paradoxically, these institutions do not always consider remunerating the same executives commensurate with their initiatives to implement higher education transformation, especially concerning access, equity, redress, equality and decoloniality. What seems to emanate from the above discussion is that higher education institutions have not yet contrived a way to harmonise economic rationalist imperatives with a transformation agenda. And, unless the above happens, there seems to be no hankering towards the cultivation of higher education transformation within the context of challenges posed by globalised higher education concerns. It is to such a discussion that we now turn.

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 owards a Rupturing of Higher Education: T The Quest for Objective Freedom Considering that in both the above-mentioned processes of economic rationalism and institutional transformation, the idea of individual freedom features prominently in their justification. It seems apt, therefore, to examine the priority of individual freedom in the initiation of such social actions. Of course, what academics, as individuals do, might not always be perceived by some university managers is vital to the pursuit of institutional practices, but then again, what these academics might supposedly not be doing would invariably impact the academic space at the institution. The point is, an individual’s freedom might seem to be insignificant within the broader developments of institutional academic advancement. Nevertheless, they do possess specific freedom that impacts the way many others perceive the institution. For instance, in the department where Yusef Waghid works, some individuals’ freedom to do minimal work in research seems to undermine the research ethos of the department, although it might not seem to be the case if one considers the overall research productivity of the department. For our analysis of individual freedom, we draw on the seminal thoughts of Axel Honneth (2016), who in turn reconsiders George Hegel’s doctrine of ethical life that relates to a third kind of freedom. By now, the concepts of negative and positive freedom, made famous by Isaiah Berlin (1990), seem to have impacted understandings of higher education, particularly in realising institutional arrangements that reflect determinations of reason. On the one hand, negative freedom (liberty) in reference to Berlin’s thoughts implies that an individual is free insofar as her activities manifest without any outside interference from others (Berlin, 1990). Put differently, individual freedom unfolds “by virtue of being granted a circumscribed space for the unhindered pursuit of his [her] goals” (Honneth, 2016, p. 162). When university professors pursue their academic tasks unconstrained by institutional demands, such individuals would be enjoying negative liberties. However, we cannot imagine that academics would be afforded negative liberties without interference from

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their institutional management, at least not at universities in this country. Academics might be pursuing their research in varying fields of inquiry, but it could be that the institution would determine the thematic rationale for their research. Thus, it seems that negative liberty might not be a possibility at many institutions of higher learning. On the other hand, the idea of positive liberty refers to the self-determination of rational beings to act upon their reflexive understandings of the world (Berlin, 1990). Such a notion of freedom that relies overwhelmingly on the exercise of individuals’ capacities for self-determination seems deficient, considering that universities are social institutions in which the self-understandings of others cannot be ignored. Universities in a democratic society intent on serving the public good cannot just rely on self-­ determining individuals who function independently from others in the pursuit of their institutionalised practices that require cooperation and interdependence. Consequently, we are drawn to Axel Honneth’s idea of “objective freedom”  – a delineated third concept of freedom—“whereby individuals mutually encounter their own self-determined purposes as objectively given in the other’s activity” (Honneth, 2016, p. 170). Through objective freedom, individuals do not lose their capacities to exercise self-­ determination whereby they adopt ends and intentions reasonably directed at the institutions where they work. They can also view “the satisfaction of those intentions in the corresponding practices as amounting to an unconstrained objective realisation of their own individual freedom” (Honneth, 2016, p.  170). In other words, individual university academics come to realise the objectivity of their own freedom in the intentions of others (Honneth, 2016, p.  169). That is, the individual university academic comes to recognise herself in institutional practices and views the habituated intentions of those with whom she interacts as preconditions or products of her own rationally generated intentions (Honneth, 2016, p. 168). In this sense, objective freedom is concerned with individual interests operative at universities and the common good whereby individuals stand up for one another in a spirit of enhanced communicative freedom among equals—a matter of intersubjective reciprocity (Honneth, 2016, p. 172). The upshot of such a view of objective freedom is that individual freedom means “experience of an absence of

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constraint and of personal development, resulting from the fact that our own individual but generalizable goals are advanced by the equally general goals of others” (Honneth, 2016, p. 173). What emanates from the above understanding of objective liberty is that the exercise of individual autonomy cannot unfold at universities without recognising the presence of others to inform and buttress the academic project, which in our view, seems to be in line with what a (post)critical higher educational theory intimates. For instance, if university managers were to exercise their individual autonomy unhinged from the national goals of institutional development, transformative change at universities in the country would seemingly be unlikely. This is so considering the many challenges universities face concerning students’ access, notions of equity and equality and decoloniality of the curriculum. Similarly, we cannot imagine universities would seriously consider transforming the higher education agenda if individuals were permitted to exercise their autonomy in self-determined ways disconnected from the decolonisation of higher education ideas. Consequently, we argue for a notion of objective freedom whereby individuals should exercise their autonomy as equals in communicative action with others who advance institutional priorities. In this way, both the individual and collective freedoms of others in pursuit of advancing institutional goals at universities would hopefully be realised. More specifically, the rupturing of higher education would become more likely with objective freedom than with any other pursuit of freedom.

Summary This chapter shows that a genuine transformation of the university in (South) Africa is not possible when notions of individual freedom are considered along negative and positive lines. Negative freedom would not necessarily result in transformation as the freedom of individuals cannot be left unhinged. Transformation of the public university requires individuals who can act with transformative aspirations constrained by the requirements of equality, access, equity and decoloniality. Likewise, positive freedom cannot be a way for transformation in the public

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university because transformative goals are not self-determined goals but institutional ones that require the collective engagement of all concerned. Hence, we have made claims about the cultivation of objective freedom whereby individuals act equally with others as they endeavour to find genuinely collective solutions for problems in the higher education sector.

References Berlin, I. (1990). Four essays on liberty. Oxford University Press. Council on Higher Education. (2004). South African higher education in the first decade of democracy. Council on Higher Education. Council on Higher Education. (2007). Review of higher education in South Africa: Selected themes. Council on Higher Education. Council on Higher Education. (2009). State of higher education in South Africa: Selected themes. CHE. Council on Higher Education. (2016). South African higher education reviewed: Two decades of democracy. CHE. Council on Higher Education. (2021). Review of the South African higher education system twenty-five years into democracy. CHE. Honneth, A. (2016). Of the poverty of our liberty: The greatness and limits of Hegel’s doctrine of ethical life. In K. Genel & J. P. Deranty (Eds.), Recognition or disagreement: A critical encounter on the politics of freedom, equality, and identity (pp. 156–176). Columbia University Press. Marginson, S. (2007). Prospects of higher educations: Globalization, market competition, public goods and the future of the university. Sense Publishers. Stellenbosch University. (2021). Strategic plan. Stellenbosch University: SUN Press.

3 Ubuntu as an African Ethic for Higher Educational Transformation or Not?

Introduction In the previous chapter, we have argued for objective freedom whereby individuals pursue their freedoms equally with others as they endeavour to realise the transformative goals of higher education institutions. With objective freedom, individuals equally consider the freedoms of others with whom they engage as they collectively pursue transformative institutional goals. Such an idea of objective freedom will be considered in the context of an African ethic of ubuntu, particularly how the latter can enhance higher education transformation. We first consider the notion of ubuntu and how it advances the idea of objective freedom developed in the previous chapter; second, we show that ubuntu is a concept without which higher education cannot take place; and third, we discuss the need for higher education transformation at the public university in South Africa along the lines of a defensible understanding of ubuntu.

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Ubuntu and Higher Education For an analysis of the concept of ubuntu, we draw on Waghid’s seminal thoughts articulated in three works. Firstly, ubuntu in a reconstituted form is explained as human communitarianism on the basis of which people exercise respect, caring and a sense of community (Waghid, 2014). The emphasis of ubuntu is on the notion of being human, and in the context of human actions, it refers to acts of caring in a dignified way: Ubuntu ngumuntu ngabantu—a person depends on others just as much as others depend on a person (Waghid, 2014, p. 57). In this sense, ubuntu as an act of caring is reciprocal in the sense that humans care with one another rather than caring for and about others. In the same way, as humans exercise caring with one another, they respectfully engage with one another in and about communal matters. As enunciated elsewhere, “[i]n African culture, a high premium is placed on caring for [with] one another, especially treating the destitute and helpless with care” (Waghid, 2014, p. 60). Again, “ubuntu as caring is not only aimed at encouraging others to make appropriate choices [whether intellectual or moral], but also to evoke in others the capacity to be imaginative and to re-educate themselves” (Waghid, 2014, p. 62). Here, ubuntu seems to be linked to enacting one’s autonomy in relation to others to be more imaginative and educated. This implies that humans, through ubuntu, are encouraged to act equally and collectively with others in the community to reimagine more enhanced educative possibilities. By implication, ubuntu as an act of caring seems to be linked to advocacy for objective freedom for individuals in a community with others. Secondly, following the seminal thoughts of Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1994, p. 2), ubuntu is linked to the cultivation of restorative justice, evident from his claim that “[a] broken person need[s] to be helped to be healed”. The connection between enacting ubuntu and fulfilling one’s responsibility towards others with love, compassion and civility is inextricably linked to offering “forgiveness in the restoration of justice” (Waghid et  al., 2018, p.  45). Following Tutu (1994, p.  35), enacting ubuntu does not only mean that one is open and responsive to others, but that one also resists the denigration and oppression of other humans. It is the act of ubuntu as restoring just human action through forgiveness and reconciliation that is significant in beginning anew—an idea of human

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action that seems to connect with restorative justice. Simply put, ubuntu is an act of restorative justice whereby humans can pursue new beginnings. Thirdly, ubuntu can be conceived as an act of responsible deliberative engagement on the basis of which attentiveness to others through dissonant action is accentuated (Waghid, 2020, p.  299). Considering that ubuntu involves actions of the collective, in particular how humans ought to respond to one another in deliberation, implies that they (humans) are obliged to listen to one another’s articulations and critically scrutinise one another’s pronouncements. It is not just that humans, through ubuntu, engage pointlessly, but rather that their engagement is directed towards attaining responsible actions. And, when humans endeavour to enact responsible pursuits, there is always the possibility that they might not agree on everything they might consider concerning higher education. Through dissonant action, individuals provoke one another to see things differently and even disagree strongly on matters pertaining to higher education. In this way, dissonance is not incommensurate with actions of a responsible and deliberative kind. On the contrary, through dissonance, things can be looked at as if they could be otherwise, thus making ubuntu a necessary condition for the enactment of deliberative action in higher education. In sum, our argument is in defence of ubuntu in a reconstituted form. That is, ubuntu seems to be constituted by the act of objective freedom whereby individuals act caringly with one another to advance a sense of community, it aims to cultivate new re-beginnings in a spirit of restorative justice and it encourages humans to act in deliberation whereby matters are attended to responsibly and dissonantly. Now, if higher education were to be guided by a notion of ubuntu, the public university would invariably have to be subjected to actions whereby individuals work with one another in a spirit of community. They endeavour to resolve educational matters in terms of restorative justice towards moments of new beginnings—an idea of a university that seems to commensurate with (post)critical higher educational theory. Similarly, through ubuntu, the public university would become spaces of deliberation and dissonance, such as imagining practices of the university in alternative ways. With such an understanding of ubuntu we shall now look at the practice of higher education in the public university.

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Higher Education Transformation with Ubuntu Looking through the lens of ubuntu, student access among black students to public universities increased from 53% in 1993 to 84.8% in 2017. Similarly, black academic staff increased from 20% to 54.5%, with gender equity increasing dramatically from 43% to 58.5% female enrolments during this period (Cross & Kulati, 2021). State regulation of higher education can be considered as the main reason for these changes, with such centralised steering towards transformation having brought about significant demographic changes in the higher education sector. It seems that if a regulatory framework for the transformation of the higher education sector were not to have been implemented, the possibility of institutionalised changes would probably not have occurred. Yet, despite such demographic changes, Cross and Kulati (2021, p. 42) proffer that the university sector maintains a low participation rate by students and high attrition linked to student and staff under-preparedness that mirrors pervasive inequalities in the broader South African society. In other words, the national goals of equity, redress and social justice, in so far as issues pertaining to race, gender and patriarchy are concerned, remain unfulfilled (Cross & Kulati, 2021, p. 42). The point is, despite regulation, changes have been merely procedural but not substantive, leaving higher education with much more to be done towards genuine transformation. In our view, there have been at least three distinct higher education policy phases that seem to resonate with aspects of ubuntu since the 1990s: Firstly, higher education policy framing occurred between 1990 and 1997 with the promulgation of the National Qualifications Framework, Education White Paper Three: A Programme for the Transformation of Higher Education (1997) and the Higher Education Act (1997). The focus on policy framing accentuates the twin aspects of equitable redress and socio-economic development. The emphasis on equitable redress aims to enhance research capacity at all universities, especially bringing the historically disadvantaged institutions on par with the previously advantaged ones. Socio-economic development was geared

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towards producing university graduates who can be responsive to the country’s needs (Badat, 1999). Consequently, the White Paper recommended the following eight aspects to guide the transformation process: democratisation, development, equity and redress, public accountability, effectiveness, efficiency and academic freedom (DoE, 1997). What seems interesting about the emphasis on academic freedom in relation to democratisation and development is bringing individual actions (like freedom) in relation to communal actions such as development. In this sense, higher education transformation seems to be connected to a kind of freedom that connects individuals to the aspirations of others—a matter of practising ubuntu. Thus, it can be inferred that higher education policy framing is intertwined with the practice of ubuntu on the grounds that freedom is objectively announced regarding democratisation and development. Secondly, regulative higher education policy implementation occurred between 1998 and 2013 with the culmination of the National Plan for Higher Education (2001) and Higher Education Qualifications Framework (2007). These policy texts aimed to increase the supervision and steering of higher education along transformative goals (targets and benchmarks) such as improving participation rates and graduate outputs at the undergraduate level, increasing research productivity and postgraduate research outputs and reducing the number of higher education institutions through mergers. It seems as if higher education transformation through these policy texts were meant to restore justice within the higher education sector along the lines of institutional diversity, programme differentiation, infrastructural cooperation and coherence, flexibility and articulation of qualifications within the higher education sector. Thus it seems as if the powers of steering and oversight on the part of the Ministry of Education had been tightened to restore the transformative agenda of a just and equitable higher education system (Soudien, 2007). This practice seems commensurate with the notion of ubuntu, whereby new beginnings in the higher education sector could be pursued. Thirdly, higher education for decolonisation emerged as a strong theme throughout the newly promulgated White Paper for Post School Education and Training (2014) to respond to crises in higher education. This phase is an acknowledgement that the transformation of higher

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education throughout its implementation phase was troubled by a concern for expanded student access and diversity; a more cooperative relationship between education and training in the workplace; and the cultivation of a non-racist, non-sexist, equitable and democratic society (DHET, 2014). In response to the crises that emerged in higher education during its implementation phase, in particular, the student demand for the provision of free higher education for the poor, improvement in student funding, change in the institutional cultures at public higher education institutions and the broadening of knowledge and skills in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, higher education became more associated with an urgency to decolonise. Moreover, considering that the current crisis in higher education requires practices constituted by deliberative action and (dis)agreement, we contend that responsiveness to higher education crises can most appropriately be addressed according to an ethic of dissonance.

Summary This chapter argued that higher education transformation in South Africa happened in three phases: higher education policy framing, policy implementation and decolonisation. Although significant gains have been secured in the transformation process, these changes have not been substantive. With its constitutive aspects of objective freedom, restorative justice and dissonant action, we contend that ubuntu can enlarge higher education transformation from mere procedural to more substantive changes in the higher education sector.

References Badat, S. (1999). South African higher education: The challenge of change. International Higher Education, 15(1), 64–73. https://doi.org/10.6017/ ihe.1999.15.6473 Cross, M., & Kulati, T. (2021). The regulatory environment for public higher education. In Council on Higher Education (Ed.), Review of the South African higher education system twenty-five years into democracy (pp. 11–50). CHE.

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DHET. (2014). White paper for post-school education and training: Building and expanded and integrated post-school system. In Government Gazette Number 37229. Department of Higher Education and Training. DoE. (1997). Education white paper 3: A programme for the transformation of higher education. Department of Education. RSA. (1997). Higher Education Act 101 of 1997. Government Gazette, 390(18515), 1–47. Soudien, C. (2007). Quality assurance in higher education and the management of South Africa’s past: Some paradoxes. Perspectives in Education, 25(3), 39–50. Tutu, D. (1994). No future without forgiveness. Ebury Digital. Waghid, Y. (2014). African philosophy of education reconsidered: On being human. Routledge. Waghid, Y. (2020). Towards an ubuntu philosophy of higher education in Africa. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 39(3), 299–308. Waghid, Y., Waghid, F., & Waghid, Z. (2018). Rupturing African philosophy on teaching and learning: Ubuntu justice and education. Palgrave Macmillan.

4 Ubuntu as an Act of Collaborative Engagement and Co-belonging: Implications for the Public University

Introduction Higher education transformation in South Africa seems to place an overwhelming emphasis on collaboration, engagement and co-belonging. However, despite this, it seems that the lack of cooperation, engagement and belonging is prolonging the crises that currently beset the sector. In this chapter, we argue that unless ubuntu permeates higher education practices of management and pedagogy, it seems unlikely that the sector would genuinely be transformed. Firstly, it is argued that genuine transformation is an act of collaboration without which university education cannot exist. Secondly, engagement is as much an act of management and pedagogy that is different from mere participation. And thirdly, if co-­ belonging is not pursued within a public university, it loses its significance of genuinely serving the public.

On Collaboration and Transformation Public universities in South Africa remain challenged by inequitable staffing that still favours white appointees as have been in the past. Undeniably there have been gradual increases in the appointments of members from © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_4

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the designated groups, namely, women, Africans, Indians and coloureds. However, by and large, the public university continues to be dominated by white males, in particular at senior post levels (Maphalala et al., 2021). What concerns us is that inequitable staffing in terms of race seems to hamper any progress towards genuine collaboration at public universities, particularly if one considers the highly competitive academic environment in the country. Black academics often feel marginalised against, especially when it comes to promotion opportunities and a recognition of their worth as scholars. It seems as if research incentives often privilege the established white academics in the higher education sector. Yet, the public university’s existence demands that academics across diverse racial backgrounds collaborate on important research initiatives that can benefit the higher education environment such as climate change, technological innovation, democratic citizenship and land and property restitution. When the public university does not turn into a space conducive to collaborative work, it seems very unlikely that ubuntu would manifest in institutional practices. It is on the basis of ubuntu that university staff would consider engaging with one another collaboratively on matters of public concern. A failure to do so would inevitably undermine the much-­ needed change in institutional culture required at public universities in the country to advance the transformation of higher education agenda. If the institutional cultures at public universities were to be remedied, collaboration among diverse academic, support and technical staff groups ought to be encouraged. However, this would not happen if the institutional culture is characterised by one of exclusion and where minority voices are vehemently opposed through racial bias. Unless the demographic profiles of higher education institutions were to become more equitable, it seems quite unlikely that the institutional culture of many public universities would change. For instance, if academic environments at some public universities in the country remain oblivious to the necessary and integrated relationship between higher teaching, learning and research, such institutions would either undermine research or look at themselves as predominantly teaching institutions. The point we are making is that institutional culture is determined by the identities of the people who work in an academic environment. And if some of them erroneously consider themselves as good teachers and

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others as good researchers only, then the possibility that integrated teaching, learning and research be advanced would be highly unlikely. Similarly, if some white academics continue to think of themselves as advanced researchers from whom black academics should only learn, then engaged collaboration would not ensue. An institutional culture that prejudices one race over another would not necessarily enhance collaboration in a spirit of ubuntu. Ubuntu recognises the equality of intellectual voice whereby all academics are equal on the grounds of their capacities to speak their minds and collaboratively contribute to credible research.

Pedagogical Engagement or Participation? Pursuant to the discussion on demographic representation in the public university sector, changing the academic, support and administrative staff profile might not necessarily lead to a transformative higher education environment. For many decades, South African higher education has been subjected to the presence of white hegemony that impacted curricula, pedagogy and relations among university teachers, students and managers (Sehoole, 2006). Knowledge production in the country was predominantly biased towards Europe (Mbembe, 2016) and the contributions of black academics and students were regarded as mediocre, to say the least (Zeleza, 2009). The exclusion of black (coloured, Indian and African) voices from curriculum development and pedagogy resulted in epistemic injustices perpetrated against the majority of the marginalised communities in the country (Pillay, 2015). Although many scholars perceive the exclusion of black voices from the academic discourses within higher education to indicate that it needs decolonisation, we contend that even decolonisation would not work if human relations at public universities continue to be based on participation. What seems to be wrong with participation among academic staff? Participation requires that people have to present themselves in academic spaces. However, academics could occupy such spaces, yet they might not actively engage in deliberations about research issues. Although they are numerically present, the possibility still remains that they can be excluded. Numerical representation and inclusion do not necessarily ensure

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substantive engagement. Think about a transdisciplinary academic group in higher education involved in understanding how universities might respond positively to challenges to teaching and learning posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. When these deliberations are dominated by only a few individuals the possibility that some will be excluded despite being present is real. To avoid exclusion, academic pursuits cannot simply rely on participation as the latter could assume that presence implies active engagement. Instead, when scholars actively engaged in deliberations constitute academic spaces, the demand for participation would have been extended to human engagement. In other words, when academics engage with one another about matters that concern pedagogy, that is teaching and learning, it seems more likely that participants would contribute more expansively to important decisions that might ensue about teaching and learning at higher education institutions. By implication, although participation is a necessary condition for active pedagogy, on its own it might not always enable thoughtful deliberations about teaching and learning. The point is, pedagogical engagement seems to be more desirable than participation on the grounds that more substantive pursuits of matters concerning academic life might ensue. It is here that ubuntu seems apt in fostering human actions in a substantive rather than a procedural way. When ubuntu connects humans, the possibility is always there to recognise one another’s presence and capabilities to speak. What connects humans is not merely that they share a common academic space to pursue their interests. Instead, they are bound by the necessity to speak with one another. In this sense, speaking becomes a necessary practice for ubuntu to manifest. Small wonder that ubuntu is associated with the dictum, a person is only such with others. When a person’s relationship with others were to unfold, such a person becomes a speaking being and not just a listener. Of course, one can engage with others through listening but others would not know what one represents if one does not speak. And, this is what makes ubuntu a practice of human engagement rather than participation. Put differently, ubuntu involves speaking on the basis that speaking engages one in the thoughts of others. In turn, listening ensues through speaking because speaking without listening is a blatant denial that the speaker has something to say.

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 o-belonging and a Transformative Higher C Education Sector Between 2004 and 2021, the CHE completed at least five reviews on the transformation of higher education in the country (CHE, 2021). Yet, in its most recent review, most if not all of the commissioned contributions used terms such as “reform”, “reconstruction”, “improvement” and “development” synonymous with transformation (CHE, 2021). Whereas reform seems to be linked to altering or adjusting existing higher education practices to effect more substantive changes, it does not aim to completely overhaul or displace such practices. For instance, adjusting the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) might have involved assigning a new level to the Postgraduate Certificate in Education qualification, but this alteration in itself, although substantive, did not displace the existing qualifications structure. In a similar way, reconstruction implies that the higher education sector was changed from its original 36 institutions to its current 26 public higher education institutions due to some mergers. Yet, the higher education system was not overhauled in its entirety as many of the previous institutions, like three public universities in the Western Cape, remain unchanged. About improvement and development, it can be argued that institutional mergers made higher education much leaner than previously considering that only 26 universities now constitute the public realm of higher education. To equate, these terms with transformation seem to be conceptually unjustifiable on the grounds that the practice is concerned with bringing about permanent changes within higher education. Considering that inequitable access of students (coupled with a lack of success and opportunity) due to financial constraints still exist after almost 25 years into a democracy, gender inequality and discrimination persist at many higher education institutions. With the ubiquitous presence of economic rationalist policies about student success and graduate attributes commensurate with the logic of the market, we can safely posit that higher education has not undergone the changes promised in the National Plan for Higher Education (2001) and the White Paper for Post School Education and Training (2014). Put differently, higher education

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still seems to be prejudiced only towards producing students capable of functioning competitively in a global market economy and enhancing national development. Not much has been done in curricular reforms in cultivating a mass democratic citizenry capable of critically serving the interests of a just and transformed society. If the latter is still a problem, how can co-belonging (ubuntu) help us think differently about higher education transformation? Higher education transformation designates permanent changes within education policies, institutional practices and human relations to advance such a discourse. Change is permanent because it involves not only cosmetic change such as might be tangible in improvement and reform. Instead, it points to a significant overhaul of higher education itself, such that its institutions, practices and social (human) relations are undergoing a gradual dissolution (fading) from an undesirable situation to a more desirable one. For instance, significant transformation in the higher education sector would imply that institutional practices significantly change from past inequitable situations to ones that advance democratic engagement. Our focus is on a notion of co-belonging that intertwines with ubuntu practices. When co-belonging is pursued, humans will resist all possibilities of being separated based on education policy and practice. When one considers the current mergers of many higher education institutions in the country, one gets a sense that the previously advantaged and dominant institution has superimposed its institutional value system on the less dominant institution. In such a situation, the newly established institution cannot be said to be genuinely transformed. Legitimate transformation is linked to enacting egalitarian practices within newly merged institutions and not the apparent subjugation of a less dominant one by a more dominant one. In such a situation, the new institution would not have significantly dissolved past institutional practices, and legitimate transformation would remain deficient. This is so because a sense of co-belonging seems distant from institutional practices whereby academic, support and technical staff seem to function instrumentally without genuine collaboration. Put differently, ubuntu could not yet have found its way into the institution’s aspirations to exist as a newly established one. In this regard, the CHE (2016) identified the persistence of inequitable practices at some newly established and merged

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institutions that corroborate the presence of a lack of genuine higher education transformation. In other words, the transformation of higher education seemed to have been skewed towards changing demographic profiles at many institutions in the sector (CHE, 2016, p. 24).

Summary In this chapter, we have argued for higher education transformation attuned to the practice of ubuntu. Our contention is that the manifestation of ubuntu enhances cooperative, engaging human relations in an atmosphere of co-belonging  – a practice that seems to be attuned to (post)critical higher educational theory. If legitimate and permanent transformation were to be realised at higher education institutions, ubuntu practices of cooperation, engagement and co-belonging offer opportunities for substantive and permanent change in institutional structures and practices pertaining to the implementation of higher education policies.

References Council on Higher Education (CHE). (2016). South African higher education reviewed: Two decades of democracy. CHE. Council on Higher Education (CHE). (2021). Review of the South African higher education system twenty-five years into democracy. CHE. DHET. (2014). White Paper for post-school education and training: Building and expanded and integrated post-school system. In Government Gazette Number 37229. Department of Higher Education and Training. Maphalala, M., Ralarala, M., & Mpofu, N. (2021). The staffing situation in public higher education institutions. In Council on Higher Education (Ed.), Review of the South African higher education system twenty-five years into democracy (pp. 162–188). CHE. Mbembe, A. (2016). Decolonising the university: New directions, arts & humanities. Higher Education, 15(1), 29–45. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1474022215618513

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Ministry of Education. (2001). National Plan for Higher Education. Government Printers. Pillay, S. (2015). Decolonising the university, Africa is a country. http://africasacountry.com/2015/06/decolonizing-­the-­university/]. Sehoole, C. (2006). Internationalisation of higher education in South Africa: A historical review. Perspectives in Education, 24(4), 1–13. Zeleza, P. T. (2009). African studies and universities since independence: The challenges of epistemic and institutional decolonization. Transition, 101, 110–135. https://doi.org/10.2979/trs.2009.-­.101.110

5 Towards an African University of Objective Reason, Conscience and Humility

Introduction From our expositions in the previous chapters, it seems as if substantive higher educational transformation did not manifest in South African public institutions. We have intimated that the practice of ubuntu holds the promise to enact permanent change within the realm of public higher education. In this chapter, we offer an argument for ubuntu as acts of objective freedom, restorative justice and deliberative and dissonant action concerning notions of reason, conscience and humaneness. In this way, we proffer an argument in defence of higher education transformation along the lines of ubuntu. We contend that such a practice of higher education is commensurate with a (post)critical educational theory.

Is a University of Reason Enough? Nowadays, at public universities, emergency remote teaching (ERT) is considered by many university teachers as an adequate response to the lack of face-to-face pedagogical encounters in classrooms. The problem seems to be a lack of face-to-face tuition requiring university teachers to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_5

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offer online classes, specifically what has been referred to as ERT. So, the reason many university teachers proffer in defence of ERT is the apparent lack of face-to-face tuition. If it were not for the COVID-19 pandemic, face-to-face teaching would still have occurred. The question is, does a lack of face-to-face teaching justify ERT? If one considers that teaching in itself involves individual teachers summoning students to understand, it means that teachers teach when they provoke students, and in turn, students hopefully come to an understanding when their potentialities are evoked. When teaching cannot stimulate students to think for themselves and come up with alternative previously conceived meanings, such a form of teaching is deficient (Waghid, 2019). Now the reason why ERT seemed to have been introduced is due to a lack of face-to-face teaching. In our view, such a reason for introducing ERT is insufficient because teaching cannot be presumed to be remote and based on an emergency. Firstly, when teachers teach, they are in the presence of students; otherwise, the latter would not be able to respond to the teachers’ thoughts. Students might not be in the presence of teachers, but they ought to be in their presence if they were to engage with the thoughts of teachers. That is, they are always in the presence of teachers when they endeavour to learn. The point we are making is that teaching can actually not be remote. Secondly, teaching is an act of doing on the basis of which students can respond to what they have been taught. In this way, teaching does not lend itself to an emergency because the act of teaching is connected to cultivating understanding and making students see the point. Of course, when teaching is conceived as an act of emergency it implies that subject matter should be taught hurriedly and neededly. But then to hurry and to be in need are not necessary acts that ensure understanding and engagement. To be engaged requires that students should be attentive to the thoughts of teachers. That is, their potentialities ought to be evoked so that they become engaged and active learners and not just subjects that are hurried through curriculum content during a pandemic. Thirdly, when teaching cannot enhance learning towards seeing things anew, there is seemingly no point in teaching at all (Greene, 1995). In this way, teaching should not be about a consideration for remoteness and an emergency. Next, we examine what a university of ubuntu implies in light of the notion of objective freedom.

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Towards an Ubuntu University of Conscience and Humaneness Based on the afore-mentioned view that teaching cannot be associated with remote emergency action, we again revisit the notion of ubuntu that intertwines with the enactment of objective freedom. Firstly, to be objectively free implies that individuals (teachers and students) have the autonomy to act collaboratively—that is, teach and learn in association. Ubuntu has in mind people who can act in collaborative fashion on the basis of expressing their inclinations towards shared and humane actions. When teachers act with ubuntu the possibility is always there for students to engage with them in dignified ways of articulation, listening and critique. One would hardly refer to actions as collaborative if opportunities for engagement are minimised or even eradicated. It is not enough that an ubuntu university is conceived as a space for reason but rather that understanding is always subjected to acts of articulation, listening and critique. Of course, one might argue that the latter is what reasons are supposed to elicit: articulation, listening and critique. However, when the possibility of unreason manifests and people have been constrained to talk back, for instance, the act of ubuntu draws them humanely to a willingness to engage with otherness and difference often expressed through critique. Secondly, to remain objectively free, people internalise the capacity to be aware of one another consciously and what transpires in their contexts. Having an affinity to one’s conscience implies some commitment to an awareness of what is going on around one and acting accordingly. That is, to remain conscious of one’s surroundings and the claims one proffers in defence of a university implies an ethical commitment to what is real and what can hopefully enhance institutional and/or societal change. The point is that an affirmation of conscience involves expressing alertness towards desirable actions of relevance to developments in a university and society. In this sense, to develop a deep affinity to conscience is tantamount to have internalised an ethical commitment to ensure substantive change within a society that ought to benefit from the goods of a university. In this way, an ubuntu university would be reinforced by the notion of conscience whereby people (university teachers and students)

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express an ethical commitment towards substantive and desirable change in one’s society. For example, the professional teacher education acquired by prospective teachers ought to make them more ethically responsive to complex and unwarranted situations in school communities. The point about an ubuntu university of conscience is one that encourages its teachers and students to act ethically and in response to undesirable situations in societies. Thirdly, an ubuntu university of humanness is primarily concerned with being attentive to the cultivation of humanity (Waghid, 2014). Paulo Freire (1970, p. 152) reminds us that cultivating humane actions involve empathy, love and communication. Yet, he accentuates the significance in remaining humble as humans endeavour to enact such a communion (Freire, 1970, p. 152). Our interest is in Freire’s idea of practising humility, which seems to constitute what ubuntu implies. To act with humility means that people do not simply turn their back on others when they see suffering, poverty, injustice and inequality in society (Freire, 1970, p.  153). Instead, to be humble means to recognise that such societal dystopias exist and that one actually does something to change such unbearable and undesirable situations. For one, an ubuntu university remains open and attentive to social problems in our African communities and the world. If our African universities were to be enveloped by ubuntu, it could not ignore the social realities of human indignity and suffering. An ubuntu university would be and become attentive to hopelessness that seemed to have penetrated social life on the African continent.

Summary In this chapter, we have proffered an argument in defence of an ubuntu university. Such an African university enacts practices that connect with the cultivation of objective freedom along the lines of autonomy to justify its actions, enhancement of conscience and humility. Only then, a genuine African university of ubuntu would have manifested and its public role as a university with society would have gained much credibility. It is this idea of an ubuntu university that would invariably connect with the complexities and challenges faced by African societies.

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References Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. Penguin Books. Greene, M. (1995). Releasing the imagination: Essays on education, the arts, and social change. Jossey-Bass. Waghid, Y. (2014). African philosophy of education reconsidered: On being human. Routledge. Waghid, Y. (2019). Towards a philosophy of caring in higher education: Pedagogy and nuances of care. Palgrave Macmillan.

6 (Re)-imagining the Indaba Concept: In Quest for a Communal African University of Deliberation, Freedom of Expression and Equality

Introduction In this chapter, we reflect on the concept of indaba in relation to deliberation, freedom of expression, communality and equality. The main concern in this chapter is that local concepts, such as indaba, are nominally imported into the university, thereby either minimising or leaving out their core values. Henceforth, we discuss deliberation, freedom of expression, communality and equality, from an indaba perspective, as fundamental imperatives for the attainment of an African university. In doing so, we lay some groundwork for the reclamation and re-affirmation of the communal African university. In terms of a conceptual framework, this chapter falls into the broad scope of Africanisation of higher education, particularly university. In recognition of the fact that Africanisation is a broad concept that encompasses a wide range of themes, perspectives, practicalities and complexities, we draw upon the notion of indaba underlined by the concepts of deliberation, freedom of expression, communality and equality as values and practical steps towards the realisation of a communal African university. Our primary argument is that an African university, rather than a university in Africa (Etieyibo, 2016), can only be realised when it © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_6

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recognises, appreciates and values the local knowledge, traditions, cultures, mechanisms for dialogues and engagements, as well as educational orientations. In sync with this position, we infuse the indaba notion into the discourse of the Africanisation of the university. Learning from Ndlovu-­Gatsheni (2013), Africanisation emerges from the context in which African people’s humanity, values and worldviews were articulated in terms of deficits and lacks. For conceptual clarification purposes, indaba is a cultural platform where pertinent issues are communally explored and openly discussed to pursue collective solutions within the African traditional framework. In its semantic term, indaba is a Zulu/Nguni word that refers to a cultural platform that enables open discussion, conferencing, consultation, deliberation and the expression of views and perspectives. In other ethnic-­ linguistic social groups in Southern Africa, indaba is called padare (chiShona) or idale/ekundleni (isiNdebele), the two main languages spoken in Zimbabwe. In the case of Tanzania, Newenham-Kahindi (2009) notes that indaba is ndaba, which is a cultural platform for engagement and robust debates, undergirded by respect and dignity towards collective social problems and communality. At the indaba platform, people who share common concerns congregate to exchange ideas and perspectives on addressing common challenges. It is a place of dialogue, and the primary purpose is to arrive at communal resolutions for communal challenges. In light of this, indaba refers to a traditional social structure of handling and resolving any deliberations or conflicts that may arise within a group. In indaba, decision-making is circular and all-encompassing. However, in recent times, the concept of indaba seems to have become pervasive in all social sectors. While the semantics tend to differ from one place to the other, it is correct to state that in all African cultural setups, there are formalised platforms in which the tenets of deliberation, freedom of expression and equality are practised in the pursuit of common solutions. Henceforth, the potential for an African university can be realised by drawing upon local knowledge practices, such as the indaba concept. In light of the preceding views, the primary purpose of this chapter is to rethink the idea of a university along the lines of communality, deliberation and equality.

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In order to respond to the primary purpose adequately, this chapter is divided into six interlinking sections. In the first section, an exposition of the concept of indaba is undertaken, while the second section outlines the historical and contemporary settings that shape the universities in Africa. The primary aim of this section is to argue that a transition between universities in Africa to African universities can only be realised when due attention is paid to the context. In an endeavour to actualise the African university, the third and fourth sections respectfully appropriate the notion of deliberation and freedom of expression. Fundamentally, the indaba notion is premised on the imperatives of autonomy, deliberative engagement and empowerment. In autonomy, affirmation is accorded to the understating that community decisions that come through deliberation and dialogue as collective decisions should be owned by every member. Deliberative engagement is, therefore, crucial in the sense that collective decisions as outcomes are a process of open discussions and exchange of ideas. Finally, based on indaba notion, a platform is provided in which members are empowered through conducive environment for the mutual exchange of ideas.

Indaba: Some Theoretical Underpinnings A cursory look at news articles, university bulletins and websites evidently indicate the exponential uptake in the usage and conceptual deployment of the notion of indaba as an invitational title for conferences, seminars, lectures and academic dialogues. For instance, it is common to come across conferences with catchy titles such as Mining Indaba, Sports Indaba, National Executive Indaba, Women and Gender Indaba and so forth. In the educational sector, there are numerous seminars and conferences which are titled as indaba. For instance, in 2019, a conference organised by the University of Namibia states that “this Teacher Education Indaba brings together experts and stakeholders across the globe and locally to interrogate the key issues in teacher education and training. The deliberations over the next two to three days will form the basis of a new vision for teacher education at the University of Namibia” (University of Namibia, 2019). Likewise, at the University of the Witwatersrand, a

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conference that was titled, Deep Learning Indaba, that brought together leaders in machining learning and artificial intelligence (University of Witwatersrand, 2017), may indicate that the concept of indaba is also used to deliberate on not only human, but mechanical and robotic issues within the university sector. From a traditional African setup, indaba has two formats, namely, family and society. At a family level, indaba is a platform where family members gather to share knowledge, cultural values and, in some instances, it is an opportune time to discuss, deliberate and resolve disputes. Edwards et al. (2020) trace the concept of indaba to its original meaning in which it referred to storytelling and the narration of events to interested family members. The parents, guardians or family elders held the responsibility of teaching the young. The education, whose pedagogy was a trans-generational transmission of knowledge, wisdom and practical vocational skills, was highly authoritative. The young did not have the cultural power to question, critique, deliberate or engage with elders, who were regarded as the custodians of valid and legitimate knowledge. It was assumed that the elders’ experiences would have acquired over several years, legitimised or validated whatever knowledge they passed on to the young in goodwill. Unlike the sage perspective, which asserts that there were exceptionally wise people in Africa qualified to teach others (Ibanga, 2017), the indaba in the family “ordained” every elder as a teacher, instructor or facilitator of knowledge dissemination. It is instructive to point out that even in contemporary times, the concept of family indaba—in which family members gather to discuss, resolve conflicts, pass on information and educate each other – is still common, albeit still hierarchical. Because of the continual technological reconfiguration of African family and communal life, social media platforms have become sites of family indaba, with Whatsapp groups facilitating familial discussions and deliberations. From a semantic perspective, it is apparent that a family indaba is highly exclusive, as it only accommodates family members. Besides, the family indaba is only concerned with matters that affect family members, their plans and aspirations. Cultural negotiations such as marriage, funeral rites and ethics of care towards an ailing family member are done in the confines of a family indaba. Conclusively, the deliberations and

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freedom of expression practised at a family indaba are meant to reinforce family communality and equality. On the other hand, indaba at a social level is a gathering that encompasses the village or community members. This is a particular type of gathering, workshop or conferencing in which African values of deliberation and freedom of expression are underlined by communality. In its literal sense, indaba means news, discoveries, innovations or new information that comes through freedom of expression and deliberations. Specifically, at the social level, the semantic of indaba refers to congregating around common issues at which community members deliberate and pursue a collective resolution. While in traditional African setups, indaba was exclusively constituted by married men who had a “stable” family and material property, women formed part of the gathering in contemporary times. In the traditional rural setup, some of the issues that are discussed are infidelity, marriage customary precepts, challenges of agricultural farming, disease control, conflict management and other social ills. The underlying advantage of an indaba at the social level is that divergent views, opinions and points are accommodated in the search for a common solution. In the case of urban areas, a social indaba may discuss service delivery issues such as water, electricity supply and refuse collection and ways of combating criminal activities in the residential areas. Usually, attendance is compulsory, and the decorum, which includes respect, participation, deliberation and consensus building, is adhered to and not compromised. In some strict cultural setups, there is a prescribed dress code in line with due forms of public presentation. Moreover, participants at an indaba are obliged to keep issues confidential rather than sharing the proceedings with people from the other villages. The imposition of solutions on communities is discouraged. Henceforth, solutions that come as outcomes of indaba are collectively owned and, in most cases, are communally implemented. To that end, a social indaba facilitates accountability and transparency through deliberation and freedom of expression. Furthermore, as an illustration of the ever-broadening concept of indaba, there are organisations in Zimbabwe, referred to as padare/enkundleni, in Shona and Ndebele respectively, which are versions of the indaba concept. Borrowing the concept from its traditional context, these

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organisations arrange meetings, workshops and conferences in which men and women discuss pertinent social issues that affect their ordinary lives. Common issues, such as domestic and gender-based violence, are topical issues that are deliberated at the indaba gathering. In this way, indaba has broadened to mean organised dialogue or gathering. It is African-centred or an African group approach to social challenges. Indaba thus bestows a sense of group solidarity, social bonding and a sense of communality. As noted in the introductory section of this chapter, the notion of indaba has become pervasive in all social sectors, including the university. However, what exactly does importing the indaba concept from the broad society to the university entail? Or what does this conceptual importation indicate concerning the African university, which is still in the making? To set the context in which the concept of indaba is imported and supposedly applied, the following section discusses the debate on endeavours towards an African university. This discussion is premised on the idea that an African university can be attained by contextually applying local communal values, such as the indaba concept.

Setting the Debate for an African University In the past few decades, the calls for a communal African university in the twenty-first century have gained currency and momentum. It is argued that “the right to be an African university may no longer be a tantalising and permanent abstraction that is good only for imagination. Instead, it must be translated into a living and concrete reality that speaks to the African experience and charts implementable courses of action to solve Africa’s problems” (Ramose, 2005, p.  1188). It is our considered view that two interlinked primary reasons have given rise to the demands for a twenty-first-century African university. Firstly, the African university has come under tremendous and unrelenting pressure that inevitably arises from globalisation and neoliberalism. In this regard, the university in Africa is being forced to be relevant to the local and the global. Furthermore, research output, attracting the best academic staff, global rankings, recruitment and retention of local and international students

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are some of the pressing imperatives that the African university encounters. Secondly, the more the discourse on the decolonisation of higher education in Africa gains currency, the more evident it becomes that the African university needs to infuse local knowledge, traditions, values and norms. A communal African university can be realised. It should be beyond dispute that the African university needs to recognise and value concepts such as indaba, underpinned by communality. Regarding the historical genesis of the university in Africa, it is often contestable as to whether institutions in pre-colonial Africa could be regarded as universities. Woldegiorgis and Doevenspeck (2013, p.  35) note that “though ‘modern’ education systems in Africa are largely a product of European colonial frameworks, various studies indicated that the practice of education at all levels existed in pre-colonial settings of Africa”. This idea is affirmed by the observation that there were innovative, technical and artistic productions indicating the existence of sophisticated learning and knowledge production in the pre-colonial epoch. For instance, the Egyptian pyramids, the construction and preservation of Great Zimbabwe, and the Mapungubwe ruins are indicators of respectable civil engineering knowledge levels. Furthermore, medical knowledge such as midwifery, gynaecology and herbal medicine was produced and disseminated within the circles of the community. Accordingly, it is noted that learning in pre-colonial Africa was embedded in the cultural setting of the time, without having formally established institutions that deal with the production and dissemination of knowledge (Assie-Lumumba, 2006). In terms of the purpose of higher learning and the pursuit of knowledge, however, indigenous forms of learning in pre-colonial Africa bear fruit in building various African civilisations, transferring cultural identity and maintaining coherent ways of life on the continent (Mazrui, 1975). In the colonial period, universities were imposed as institutions that gradually became the conveyor belt of foreign, Western culture and values. Inevitably, the foreign culture espoused in universities alienated the Africans and marginalised their own perspectives on or about life. For Woldegiorgis and Doevenspeck (2013), higher education was an instrument of facilitating colonial administration by creating an elite African class whose task was to assume and carry out junior clerical duties in the

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colonial administration. Thus, the current debates on decolonisation or Africanisation of university or higher education in Africa are premised on the observation that the hegemonic Western values impede the current university in Africa. Accordingly, “universities have done little to open up to different bodies and traditions of knowledge, and knowledge-making processes” (Heleta, 2016, p. 2). The quest for an African university is an endeavour towards reclaiming a university identifiable with social, political, economic and cultural circumstances and well-being. It is important to recall that a paradox was created in postcolonial Africa when universities were conceived as institutions of creating an African identity. Yet, these institutions were predominantly colonial in orientation, values and norms. For this reason, Africanisation is currently understood as upholding African aspirations, descent, cultural heritage and identity. Moreover, Africanisation is considered a process of creating African universities, which are underscored by African-oriented values. However, from a historical perspective, the Africanisation of universities was derailed by returning Africans who had the opportunity to pursue university studies in the “mother-colonial” countries, who became the champions in advocating for Western values and forms of civilisation. Instead of fighting off colonial hegemony in university education, the educated African elite opted for contextualisation. It is noted that “the idea of contextualisation basically means that higher education institutions may not necessarily move from their historical colonial roots, but within the framework of a colonial higher education system, their relevance should be contextualised along with the needs of the society” (Heleta, 2016, p. 4). We need to stress three points that emanate from this discussion on the debate on African universities. Firstly, the university, which was established during the colonial period, was not intended to serve the Africans’ cultural and economic developmental and social needs. Instead, the colonial administration established universities to entrench Western culture. Primarily, the university tended to take the cultural format of the colonising power. For instance, the French had their orientation towards “educating” Africans at universities. Accordingly, the French colonial power used the university for assimilation purposes, whose primary objective was to expand their culture and absorb the natives (Mazrui, 1975).

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Secondly, the search for an African university is fundamental when considering that universities in Africa should not continue to “copy and paste” the Western epistemologies and value systems. A culturally disempowered university produces disempowered graduates whose creativity may remain subdued due to a lack of confidence. A good example is that the university in Africa has not contributed much towards the scientific creativity necessary for the vaccination and a possible cure for the COVID-19 pandemic. Thirdly, this section has exposed the crucial points that if universities in Africa were to be remnants of colonialism, this begs the question of whose knowledge is being produced and disseminated. For this reason, the following sections look at the notion of deliberation, freedom of expression and communality from the indaba conceptual perspective. We argue that deliberation, freedom of expression and communality are fundamental imperatives for attaining an African university.

 he Notion of Deliberation from Indaba: T Towards an African University As espoused in the indaba concept, the tenet of deliberation can be applied in the realisation of an African university. In deliberation, people freely exchange ideas, views and information with the sole purpose of arriving at a converging point that facilitates the resolution of common challenges. Deliberation entails that people hold divergent views that are not regarded as rebelling against the communal precepts. For Waghid (2009), deliberation is an encounter with each other’s strangeness. Therefore, deliberation is about tolerance and accommodation of differences. It is important to state that in the traditional context where the concept of indaba was formulated, participants shared “common citizenship” as they tend to be residents of a village or community. Everyone knew each other, and unlike in the current university model in Africa, there were no financial charges placed on attending an indaba. You did not need to pay to attend an indaba, and the knowledge produced was not commodified and commercialised. So, no one in the village or

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community was marginalised by denying attendance to an indaba because of financial impediments. In the construction of an African university, it is apparent that prohibitive tuition fees need to be addressed so that university education is accessible to deserving students. Deliberation, freedom of expression, communality and equality, as core values of indaba, should not be impeded because of the financial status of students. In fact, financial prohibitive costs remain an impediment to the internationalisation of higher education in Africa. For instance, in South African universities, international students from other African countries are charged exorbitant fees. Furthermore, “the African university has to create spaces for academics and students to engage deliberatively with provocation, belligerence and recursiveness” (Waghid, 2009, p. 3). Nevertheless, it has always been contested whether or not concepts such as critical and independent thinking in the pursuit of truths are African. Put differently, critical thinking and independent value judgements tend to be more associated with a Western than an African orientation. In line with this idea, a communally oriented worldview, like ubuntu, is dismissed as inherently “notorious for dislike for outsiders, intolerance towards divergent ideas and places a higher premium and value on blood relations in recognising the other. Effectively, to be committed to the values of ubuntu is to be committed to the exclusion of others” (Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013, p. 198). This critical observation is a pointer to the need for exposing all facets of African communality to deliberation and freedom of expression so that there is a constant reformation of the core values that may be incorporated into establishing an African university.

 he Notion of Freedom of Expression T from Indaba: Towards African University Appropriating the indaba perspective, this section seeks to outline the indispensability of freedom of expression as a fundamental imperative for attaining an African university. Deriving from the Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa, Nyamnjoh (2015,

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p. 7) states that freedom of expression “entails full autonomy of thought and practice at the service of knowledge production on the African condition and of relevance to [the] African predicament”. From the onset of this section, it is important to delineate the context in which freedom of expression is crucial for attaining an African university. Waghid (2009) is correct in pointing out that many African governments are intolerant of dissent, criticism and non-conformity and free expression of controversial, new or unconventional ideas. The demonstration by students, which, in some instances, is very peaceful, is usually met with repressive and crushing government brutality through police and, in some instances, the military shooting down students (Heleta, 2016). In Zimbabwe, as in many other African countries, students are regularly beaten, incarcerated, kidnapped and, in some cases, murdered by the police for protesting or expressing grievances. Additionally, academics at universities are harassed by the state security organs for expressing opinions that may be regarded as anti-government. For instance, in 2021, a Zambian academic at the University of Zambia received threats from politicians after writing an opinion article pointing to the high possibility of violence in the August 2021 national general elections. To make matters worse, the University of Zambia distanced itself from the academic. The attack on the academic, which incited rebuke from the academic community, “exemplifies not just a well-calculated attack on freedom of expression, but also a more vicious threat to academic freedom and autonomy of universities that postcolonial states in Africa promised to keep and defend” (Muchena, 2021). Furthermore, it is argued that “if academics cannot freely express themselves against all forms of injustice, higher education would not stand a chance of emerging into a critical, scholarly environment, a situation, in turn, Africa can ill-afford to let happen” (Waghid, 2009, p. 850). In Zimbabwe, as in many other African countries besides South Africa, the “culture of student activism has been gradually repressed to the extent that there are hardly any student protests as forms of freedom of expression. In this respect, Zimbabwean university students, whose protests demand freedom of expression, an end to corruption and better living conditions, are arrested and charged for incitement of public violence” (Ruwoko, 2020). It is ironic that in nearly all African countries, freedom

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of expression is a human right guaranteed in the national constitutions as a right to peaceful assembly. Some of the grievances include poor accommodation, poor food and sexual abuse, especially towards female students. Students can be arrested for posting on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. University students are afraid of participating in peaceful, organised legal protests and, ultimately, this curtails not only freedom of expression, but academic freedom, creativity and a sense of belonging and ownership for the students. It is important to state that university students are sometimes arrested for protesting about citizens’ issues, such as healthcare services. Students are citizens first, before being students. The above paragraphs, in this section, have shown that freedom of expression is a “threatened” tenet at universities in Africa. Freedom of expression is often compromised by the fact that it is “risky” for academics and students from universities to speak or write opinion articles against the state’s misdemeanours because the state, as the financier of public funds, can withhold funding. So, the university may have autonomy, but the state constantly curtails that. Because many universities are public universities, they rely on the state subsidy for financial sustenance, so it is often difficult for them to exercise freedom of expression with pronouncement that may irritate the ruling government. In summative terms, freedom of expression should entail that universities are free from and free for. In their free from domain, an African university would be free from academic constraints imposed by both the state and society. Drawing from the indaba concept, no one should be victimised for holding divergent views on any social, political or economic issue. Unfortunately, corrupt political structures that thrive on poor governance in most African countries tend to view university autonomy as a threat. On the other hand, the free for domain should entail that an African university is free for the pursuit of knowledge production and dissemination. The kind of knowledge that an African university pursues should not be determined by the state, politicians, capitalist markets or other interested parties. Van Vollenhoven (2015) maintains that freedom of expression enables the exchange of new ideas and discoveries, enhancing scientific, artistic and cultural progress. The epistemic function of a university is the

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ultimate inquiry and search for relevant truth – a kind of truth that uplifts the social, political and economic lives of people. In the university, freedom of expression implies several things. From the perspective of the indaba concept, freedom of expression is essential for several reasons within the university. Firstly, it facilitates the academic exchange of views and “knowledges” within the community of scholars and students. In this way, freedom of expression can facilitate the recognition and validation of previously marginalised knowledge traditions, thereby reversing the trends of coloniality. Secondly, freedom of expression implies recognition and appreciation of social diversity, cultural differences and races. In a continent with a historical background of colonially-entrenched racism and xenophobia, freedom of expression entails that black Africans’ cultural perspectives should be re-centred into the educational praxis. For instance, part of the student protests in South Africa was agitated by observing that universities’ institutional culture and iconography tended to alienate black African students (Badat, 2016). Moreover, on a continent demarcated along colonial linguistic cultures, such as Anglophone, Francophone and Portuguese, freedom of expression implies that, as part of Africanisation, the African languages have to be revived as a medium of expression, teaching and learning. This is because languages are the custodians of worldviews. Thirdly, the freedom of expression is an expression of humanness; it is an expression of ubuntu, ukama and all other humanly-orientated worldviews. Fourthly, freedom of expression is an expression of communality. A student or academic who expresses his/her ideas is doing two communal things. Firstly, he or she expresses in a language that his or her colleagues are aware of; otherwise, a barrier in language impedes the circulation of ideas, information and knowledge. For this reason, the continual use of colonially-­ inherited languages as the medium of teaching and learning has come under scrutiny in the parameters of decolonisation. Secondly, the student or academic who expresses his or her ideas expects receptivity to his ideas. Nevertheless, it is also the case that in some universities in Africa, academics and scholars who are committed to different thinking, who challenge political and institutional orthodox ways, are often victimised. In fact, impediments to freedom of expression curtail the cultivation of humanity.

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Idealising an African University: Communality and Equality The above two sections, which discussed the notions of deliberation and freedom of expression from an indaba perspective, have shown that an African university can be realised when local concepts are wholly imported and applied, both in name and core values. Moreover, the local concepts and “knowledges” need to be constantly exposed to critical analysis, as is the focus of the following section. Nevertheless, communality and equality are supposed to be the distinctive features that define an African university. We concur with the assertion that a university is a higher learning institution that brings men and women to a high level of intellectual development in the arts and science, and in its traditional professional disciplines, promotes high levels of research. A university is a source of universal knowledge and highly skilled human power for the professions (Alemu, 2018). Communality, which is underlined by deliberation, freedom of expression and equality, is an important endeavour towards attaining an African university. Perhaps, if there is one term that is most misunderstood and misappropriated within the university sector in Africa, it is communality. Often, communality is used to denote cohesion, unity and solidarity. Specifically, in the African context, communality is portrayed as an orientation towards prioritising collectivity over individuality. In some extreme cases, African communality, from which the envisaged African university is supposed to draw, is depicted as forceful, non-negotiable, exclusive and binding to all community members. However, because a community is a phenomenon that is constantly undergoing construction and reconstruction, it can be argued that the conception of communality in African universities can be revolving rather than static. Accordingly, “failure to do so will mean that education becomes alien, oppressive and irrelevant, as is seen to be the case with the legacy of colonial and neo-colonial education systems in Africa” (Higgs, 2012, p. 39). Therefore, an African university has to discover the model of community that accommodates different racial, ethnic, religious and political affiliations and other social categorisations.

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A Critical Appraisal of the Indaba Concept The title of this chapter contains the word “reimagination” as a critical constituent for attaining an African university. The implications of the word “reimagination” are that, in the process of harnessing and applying local knowledge and values, it is essential that African academics, who champion this noble cause, are cognizant of the limitations of the local knowledge systems, and then endeavour to come up with something new. All knowledge systems and values should be constantly exposed to transformation and revalidation. It is within this scope that this section offers a critical exposition of the indaba concept. Re-imagination implies that a concept is critiqued for its merits and demerits. The three sections have delineated that the indaba concept can facilitate deliberation, freedom of expression and communal equality. Nevertheless, some limitations are attendant to the indaba concept, as this section alludes to. Therefore, it is important that when the concept of indaba is appropriated in an African university, its limitations are appreciated. In this critical analysis, our point of departure is that cultural norms are constantly transforming and, therefore, a version of indaba that may be appropriated into an African university may not be the same as in the traditional society. An African university should not over-concentrate on retrieving and replicating the traditional knowledge values but should be prepared to re-imagine the values. Firstly, the indaba concept, in its traditional African sense, deliberately excluded women. Women are not culturally expected to express their views freely or contradict male perspectives on issues. The ideas of women were often suppressed, and, in some cases, they were not allowed to share their views freely. Deliberation and freedom of expression were a prerogative of men. In hindsight, the practice of not allowing women the freedom to expression and deliberation is a form of social discrimination along gender lines. In contemporary settings, an African university that incorporates the concept of indaba during lectures, seminars, conferencing or any other debates should consider all ideas, irrespective of the gender of participants.

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In most universities in Africa, patriarchy pervades the social demographics ranging from the number of female professors to female students, especially in science programmes such as engineering and medicine. Moreover, the number of female students in student leadership structures, such as the student representative council, is limited. Besides the forms of social discrimination along gender lines, most African cultures were/are intolerant of the views of the physically disabled, religious intolerance, homophobic and suggestions from people of other tribal, national and racial groups. An African university appropriating the indaba concept cannot afford to validate deliberation and freedom of expression in terms of social categorisation. Secondly, and closely related to the preceding, the indaba concept presupposes that you deliberate and share the freedom of expression with those you know. We have already pointed out the praxis of deliberation as an encounter with strangeness, as Waghid (2009) observed. In the indaba conceptualisation, the medium of communication and instruction was/is often determined by the majority linguistic-social group. The minority social groups are marginalised as their views are not taken into account. On the contrary, an African university should, ideally, accommodate the social diversity reflected in the university. Ideas should not be legitimated or illegitimated based on race, ethnicity and nationality. Instead, in deliberation, divergent ideas should be a convenient point that leads to innovations and creativity within the university. Thirdly, most African traditional cultures are hierarchical. Accordingly, the youth, unmarried and poor people were not invited to the indaba in its traditional setup. Historically, students in Africa have always played a critical role in shaping and influencing the political, social and economic discourses. It is documented that students were actively involved in the political struggles towards the attainment of political independence. Students’ demonstrations against colonial and apartheid systems were underlined by a strong sense of nationalism, which was underlined by the imperative to dismantle oppression, subjugation and social discrimination. Students in postcolonial and post-apartheid Africa should be encouraged to deliberate and confront social ills, such as sexual abuse and governance issues, both in university and the national administration. An

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indaba platform should be a space of deliberation and freedom of expression underlined by critical thinking in African universities. Despite the limitations of the indaba concept, as noted in this critical exposition section, it is our considered scholarly perspective that it can contribute positively towards the realisation of a distinctly African university. Therefore, an African university can be defined as an educational institution that embraces and incorporates local knowledge, traditions, values and aspirations. It is a university with symbolic, iconographic and cultural constituents drawn from the local context. However, as this chapter has shown, local traditions need to be re-configured and reconceptualised because they have inherent contradictions and flaws like any other knowledge value. In this regard, an indaba, whose deliberation and freedom of expression does not discriminate along ethnic, racial, gender, nationality, political or religious lines, will enable the realisation of an African university that is communally orientated and tends towards equality. A university education system orientated towards an exclusively individual benefit contradicts the fundamental basis of a communal African university.

Summary An African university can only be realised when local values are recognised, legitimised and incorporated into African higher education. In this respect, this chapter has endeavoured to conceptually reconfigure the notion of indaba as a cultural platform upon which research, teaching and learning should be based. Specifically, we have drawn upon the concepts of deliberation and freedom of expression to form the basis upon which a communal African university is undergirded. As a cultural platform, indaba provides spaces where community issues are deliberated upon and divergent views are exchanged for the ultimate pursuit of communal resolution. The imperative for an African university cannot be overemphasised. An African university that re-affirms an African identity and context is crucial in the twenty-first century.

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References Alemu, S. K. (2018). The meaning, idea and history of university/higher education in Africa: A brief literature review. FIRE: Forum for International Research in Education, 4(3), 210–227. https://fire-­ojs-­ttu.tdl.org/fire/index.php/ FIRE/article/view/12 Assie-Lumumba, N. T. (2006). Higher education in Africa: Crises, reforms and transformation. CODESRIA Working Paper Series. Darkar. Badat, S. (2016). Deciphering the meanings and explaining the South African higher education students’ protests of 2015–2016. PaxAcademicaAfrican Journal of Academic Freedom, 1 & 2, 71–106. https://brill.com/view/ book/9789004465619/BP000021.xml Edwards, S. D., Holdstock, T. L., Nzima, D., & Edwards, D. J. (2020). Indaba: Towards and African Psychology of education founded on Indigenous knowledge systems. Indilinga-African Journal of Indigenous Systems, 19(2), 155–166. Etieyibo, E. (2016). Why ought the philosophy curriculum universities in Africa be Africanised? South African Journal of Philosophy, 35(4), 404–417. https:// doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2016.1242208 Heleta, S. (2016). Decolonisation of higher education: Dismantling epistemic violence and Eurocentrism in South Africa. Transformation in Higher Education, 1(1), 1–8. https://thejournal.org.za/index.php/thejournal/ article/view/9 Higgs, P. (2012). African philosophy and the decolonisation of education in Africa: some critical reflection. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 44(s2), 37–57. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1469-­5812.2011.00794.x Ibanga, D. (2017). Philosophical sagacity as conversational philosophy and its significance of the question of method in African philosophy. FilosofiaTheoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, 6(1), 69–91. Matolino, B., & Kwindingwi, W. (2013). The end of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy, 32(2), 197–205. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ abs/10.1080/02580136.2013.817637 Mazrui, A.  A. (1975). The African university as a multinational corporation: Problems of penetration and dependency. Harvard Educational Review, 45(2), 191–212. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ122037 Muchena, D. (2021). A thick cloud of oppression is brewing over Zambia. Mail & Guardian, 25 June 2021. https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-­06-­25-­a-­thick-­ cloud-­of-­oppression-­is-­brewing-­over-­zambia/.

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Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.  J. (2013). Perhaps decoloniality is the answer? Critical reflections on development from a decolonial epistemic perspective. Africanus, 43(2), 1–12. https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC142701 Newenham-Kahindi, A. (2009). The transfer of Ubuntu and Indaba business models abroad: A case of South African multinational banks and telecommunication in Tanzania. International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 9(1), 87–108. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1470595808101157 Nyamnjoh, F.  B. (2015). Introduction: academic freedom in African university. PaxAcademicaAfrican Journal of Academic Freedom, 1&2, 7–15. https://www.academia.edu/40183718/PAX_ACADEMICA_African_ Journal_of_Academic_Freedom_Revue_Africaine_de_Libert%C3%A9_ Acad%C3%A9mique_Nos_1_and_2_2015_Student_and_Scholar_ Protests_in_Africa_Protestations_estudiantines_et_universitaires_ en_Afrique Ramose, M. (2005). The African university in the twenty first century. South African Higher Education, (Special Issue, 2005), 1187–1188. https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC37217. Ruwoko, E. (2020). Series of student arrests ‘points to erosion of progressive rights’. University World News Africa Edition, 1 September 2021. https:// www.universityworldnews.com/post-­php?story=20200901064928971. University of Namibia. (2019). Teacher Education Indaba: Strengthening teacher preparation for quality teaching and learning. 29-31 October 2019. University of Namibia. https://www.unam.edu.na/sites/default/files/indaba_ conference_book.pdf. University of Witwatersrand. (2017). Deep Learning Indaba. 23-27th August 2017. University of Witwatersrand. https://deeplearningindaba.com/2021. Van Vollenhoven, W. J. (2015). The right to freedom of expression: the mother of democracy. PER/PELJ, 18(6), 2299–2327. https://perjournal.co.za/article/view/1130 Waghid, Y. (2009). Initiating debate towards a cosmopolitan African university. South African Journal of Higher Education, 23(5), 845–851. https://www.ajol. info/index.php/sajhe/article/view/48803 Woldegiorgis, E. T., & Doevenspeck, M. (2013). The changing role of higher education in Africa: A historical reflection. Higher Education Studies, 3(6), 35–45. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1079222

7 Communality, Responsibility and Public Good for Social Justice in University Education: Some Critical Reflections on an African University

Introduction This chapter proffers critical reflection on communality, responsibility and the public good as central tenets for social justice in an African university. These tenets are shaped and determined by the historical and social contexts specific to a given place. In view of this point, the chapter theoretically expounds on communality, responsibility and the public good for social justice in university education within an African context. This chapter is premised on two crucial points in the African university. Firstly, the three stated tenets are not only definitive and descriptive but are, more importantly, distinctive features of a university. In other words, universities can be distinguished from each other based on how they espouse and express the values of communality, responsibility and the public good as social justice in university education. Secondly, in its project to “relocate” itself in the socio-cultural situation geographically and “cleanse” itself of colonial legacy, the university in Africa is forced to contextualise these central tenets. There are contexts that involve African universities or universities in Africa (Ramose, 2005; Horsthemke, 2008; Gwaravanda & Ndofirepi, 2020). For purposes of this chapter, we seek to argue that an African university is a university in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_7

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potency. While it is a reality that universities in Africa are still “captured” by a colonial legacy and Western-centric hegemony, a shift towards contextualising or “inculturating” these universities should not be ignored. For instance, the demographic change in terms of racial and ethnic composition, which has inevitably occurred in universities in postcolonial Africa, entails that the understanding and expression of communality, responsibility and the public good has changed from the colonial era. In this chapter, and drawing upon these tenets, the idea of a public university linked to communality, responsibility and the public good is examined in light of socially just university education in Africa. Our objective in proffering this critical exposition is rooted in substantiating the perspective that, despite the current bottlenecks imposed by the hegemony of Western epistemologies and worldviews, it is possible to attain a “genuinely” African university with communality, responsibility and public good as pillars of social justice. It has often been a contentious issue as to whether ubuntu facilitates and promotes autonomy, deliberative engagement and empowerment. Within the scope of this chapter, we argue that autonomy is understood from a perspective whereby an individual avails him/herself for the collective good as espoused in ubuntu. This availability is sustained by the fact that deliberative engagement as practices associated with robust debates is crucial to co-existence in the community.

 he Quest for Social Justice University T Education: Contextual Setting in Africa Social justice imperatives are a response to the economic, social and political inequalities in most African countries. A case in point is South Africa, which is usually said to be the most unequal society in the world (Francis & Webster, 2019). By their very nature, universities as formative institutions ideally play a vital role in realising social justice. This role can be “genuinely” played out if universities are spaces that espouse and manifest social justice in their practices and orientation. In this section, we discuss and examine the framework of social justice university education from

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two angles: the broader society and the university sector in Africa. We use the term “broader society” to denote the society, nation or continent in which the university is geographically situated. The purpose of such an outline is premised on the understanding that what occurs in the broader society has a way of influencing worldviews in the university. Put differently, universities are not immune to what occurs in the broader society. To proceed with our analysis, we note the reality that the African continent in which universities are located is beset with a myriad of social, political and economic predicaments. The plethora of the predicaments include poverty, civil wars, hunger, disease, tribalism, racism, xenophobia and poor political governance, which sometimes leads to instability. Most African nations' relatively poor economic prospects imply that university graduates’ opportunities for securing formal employment keep dwindling. Consequently, issues of social justice education become critical as society becomes increasingly unequal. Besides the broader society, the universities in Africa face many hindrances in their endeavour to provide education. A catalogue of the hindrances includes lack of academic freedom, state repression, intimidation, curtailing and policing of intellectuals, power interruptions, lack of potable tap water, poor funding for research, theoretical or innovative empirical works and the social responsibility of intellectuals (Sebola & Mogoboya, 2020). In some cases, university education in Africa is compromised by entrenched practices, such as patriarchy, which impedes critical thinking and deliberative democracy within a university. Social justice in university education encompasses a wide range of practices, including access, participation, fair treatment and non-­ discriminatory practices. An affirmation is made that social justice is concerned with equal justice in all aspects of life, not just in the courts. The concept demands that people have equal rights and opportunities. Social justice should be inclusive to encompass the poor and the rich by providing fair opportunities for the development of life (Hlalele & Alexander, 2012). Another perspective is that social justice possesses “a variety of facets that entail the equal redistribution of socio-economic amenities, as the recognition of and promotion of difference and cultural diversity” (Tjabane & Pillay, 2011, p. 11). In some scholarships, social justice is categorised either as a conservative or a liberal perspective. The main

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difference is that the former allots power to the state to aid individual citizens in pursuing economic and social gains, while the latter restricts state interference and, thereby, allocates freedom to the individual. The university in Africa can play a pivotal role to enhance social justice. To realise social justice, Singh (2001) suggests that the university can enhance access to higher education for disadvantaged and excluded students and promote equality of opportunity for individuals irrespective of their social origin or financial capacity. This is important in Africa given the historical legacy of institutional social discrimination that saw the composition of universities being determined by race, region and ethnic, social groupings. In order to attain a sustainable social justice university education in Africa, we turn to three important facets, namely, communality, public good and responsibility. Therefore, our pursuit in the following sections is guided by the need to explore how communality, responsibility and public good contribute towards the attainment and sustainability of social justice education in an African university.

Communality We begin this section with two probing questions. In what ways should a socially just university education manifest the idea of communality? Is communality an exclusively African value, or is it common across all human cultures? These questions are critical in the unravelling of the genuinely African university that embraces communality. In response to these questions, there is a need to trace and locate the origins of communality in Africa. In doing so, we aim to expose the rationale of communality. The starting point is to outline what communality means. Communality is a sense of belonging to a social group. A sense of belonging does not mean that members of the social group share friendships, relations or are in some form of union. Instead, a sense of belonging means that members have respect and tolerance for each other and are conscious of the binding objective upon which the group is built. Communality is an economic and social value that is historically located in traditional, pre-colonial Africa. From an economic perspective,

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the community sustained itself from subsistence agriculture, wholly dependent on natural rain cycles and non-mechanised labour. Because of the unpredictability of rain, people had to depend on others during times of drought. So, in its original background, communality was hinged upon economic dependency. One had to go to a fortunate neighbour or the next village to source food amenities. Villages and districts were close-­ knit societies because people depended on each other for grain and agricultural inputs. Although there is a shift from agriculture-induced dependency, communality has generally remained engrained in the African society, even though there are shifting conceptions of communality. For instance, in Zimbabwe and South Africa, which are contexts that we are familiar with, it is common that neighbours assist each other with items like salt, sugar, mealie meal and other amenities. This is the case both in urban and rural areas. When one runs out of salt, it is a cultural practice to ask for it from a neighbour. Other practices such as burial societies, agricultural cooperation and sewing clubs indicate the economic imperative embedded in communality. As a social value, communality impels the centrality of social interactions. Nearly all the cultures in Africa, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, can relate to the popular isiZulu dictum of umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person by the community). So, social interactions are indispensable in the version of communality found in African countries. Perhaps the intractability of communality’s social value has been highlighted more now with the COVID-19 pandemic than at any other time. For example, it has proven challenging to discourage people from attending the funeral of a community or family member's funeral as social distancing is in place. In fact, in Zimbabwe, funerals are now regarded as super-spreader events of COVID-19 because people attend in large numbers. Culturally, it is expected of people to pay their last respects to the dead, and to “socially distance” from a funeral is a cultural anathema. Nevertheless, it is also constructive to state that the conception of communality is not static. Currently, we contend that the concept of communality in Africa is undergoing reconfiguration because of the COVID-19 pandemic. On the same note, while reconfiguration is constant and inevitable, the fundamental tenets of communality, such as solidarity, co-existence and social harmony, are irreplaceable in African

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societies. As a social value, the underside of communality is that it includes some and excludes others. Communality contains within itself a contradiction of belonging and non-belonging, member and stranger. Transferring this conceptual elucidation of communality to a university in Africa provokes several contentious points. Universities in Africa are social spaces where people of diverse races, ethnic, tribal, political, linguistic and religious social groups gather to pursue academic knowledge. In some South African universities, such as Stellenbosch University, the University of the Free State and the University of Pretoria, using Afrikaans as a language for instruction has remained a controversial issue that occasions student protests. In other African countries, political, ethical and religious differences have been a constant source of social disharmony in the universities. When language, politics, ethnicity or other social categories become a point of controversy in a university, then the communality of the university is disrupted. Nonetheless, as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, the communality in the university is equally inherent with contradictions of inclusion and exclusion. These contradictions should be viewed as opportune for a university education that promotes social justice. Our understanding of social justice is that it is not about uniformity but a co-existence with strangeness. A socially just university of education espouses cosmopolitanism as a basis of social interactions with each other. In addition, there is tension between the “dominant” Western format of education and the concept of communality in African education, the university included. Western education is orientated towards competition, towards outdoing each other, an idea referred to as meritocracy. The “best” in Western education are highly graded and accorded high marks, while those graded as academically challenged are marginalised. In African countries such as Zimbabwe, learners are classified in accordance with their academic performances. To illustrate this point, learners who are graded as best performers are put in class A, while those who are “worst” are placed in class E and those who are average are placed in classes B, C and D. These learners are not supposed to mix and, in some cases, hardworking and dedicated teachers are allocated to class A and, consequently, “lazy” teachers are placed to teach the lowest grades. Sometimes, teachers do not pay attention to problematic learners in class

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E since the system has already given up on them. This illustration shows that a highly competitive educational system destroys the ethics of care, which should characterise a university undergirded by communality. Moreover, there are several challenges to communality in universities in Africa. Prohibitive tuition and accommodation fees, colonised curriculum, sexual harassment, poor infrastructure and poor governance are common causes of communal disturbance in the university. A classic example to aptly capture the individuality enmeshed in Western-centric education is the instilled objective of attaining education. In this respect, often, when one engages with learners, especially those at the primary level, you ask them, “What do you want to do when you complete your education?” The most common response to this is, “I want to be a medical doctor or lawyer, an engineer, pilot, etc.”. On further questioning of the answers to the question as to the reasons for such choices, the typical answer is, “I want to earn a high salary that will enable me to live a comfortable life”. The sense of attaining education, as an end that enables one to adequately and relevantly respond to communal concerns, is subsumed by the individual pursuits. Education is perceived as a means to individual success and satisfaction rather than primarily responding to communality challenges. A possible critic of the arguments advanced so far on communality may question the need for communality as a distinctive characteristic of an African university. We have two responses to that. The first one is that African countries are more socially complex than those in the Western world. African countries are a conglomeration of diverse ethnic and racial groups who mostly have no historical common ground. For instance, in Nigeria, there are over 200 linguistic ethnic groups, and this is also the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, South Africa and nearly all African countries. The nation-building project has maintained its success depends on social harmony that underlines communality. It is succinctly stated that “universities have a nation-building function, deepening democracy by producing a citizenry which is more likely to participate actively in civil, political, social, cultural and economic activities of the society” (Ndofirepi & Cross, 2017, p. 41). For this reason, the university plays a critical role in facilitating social cohesion as a commitment to communality. We concur with the

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observation that “African universities, in particular, face overwhelming challenges as agents of direct change and forces for social change” (ibid.). Secondly, universities train people with critical skills, such as medical doctors, engineers, educationists and lawyers. These skills are supposed to benefit people across any social and national categories. In today’s highly globalised world, there is an emphasis on producing graduates who can live and work in a highly diversified world. It is for this reason that there is also an urgency to produce graduates who can be global citizens. Fundamentally, global citizenship or any other description for living and working with other people is undergirded by communality. Moreover, universities in Africa are now engaged in recruiting and enrolling international students and staff from across the world. A sense of community is essential for local and international, ethnic and racial categories of students in a university. In concluding this section, there is a need of explicating the relation of communality to social justice in university education in Africa. Fundamentally, communality is underscored by the need to enhance social justice because it confronts social inequalities. The example of people assisting each other with table salt typifies the persuasion towards creating an equal society. It is socially unjust for a person to eat to the full while their neighbour is starving. By the same token, universities in Africa should curtail challenges in accessing education that historically disadvantaged social groups encounter. The dominance of Western epistemologies, the language of instruction, regionalism, racism and sexism are barriers to accessing education, which universities have to constantly pay attention to and address to promote social justice education underpinned by communality. Communality in universities in Africa should be premised on inculcating the ethos of a collective approach to communal, local and global challenges. Before concluding this section, we need to revisit the contradiction of communality, as we have noted earlier. A strong sense of communality inevitably leads to exclusion. Because of international and national ranking systems, universities tend to compete with each other. So, in South Africa, there are universities that are classified as “top-class”. The universities of Cape Town, Witwatersrand, Pretoria and Stellenbosch, are considered top-class (historically White universities), while the previously

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“black and rural” universities form the bottom stratum. This means that even students take prestige in enrolling at the top-class universities and may even look down on those in other, less prestigious universities. This is the case across the African continent. Therefore, rethinking communality as a university education needs to be focused on instead of enrolling at a particular university.

Responsibility Responsibility is closely linked to communality, as discussed in the previous section. The African university cannot afford not to engage in education for responsibility. Responsibility has two domains. The first one is that the university should deliberate on individual responsibility. Waghid (2009, p. 73) aptly notes that “the university should indeed perform a public role by creating opportunities for its students and academics to take responsibility for their own ideas, to take intellectual risks, to develop a deep sense of respect for others, learn how to think and engage critically with others in a democratic society”. But then, what does responsibility at an individual level entail in the context of universities in Africa? A responsible student or academic lecturer is a person who is focused, disciplined and has respect for the diverse academic, social and political views they may encounter. To do this, a responsible student, graduate or academic should practice self-reflection, self-examination and self-­ criticism according to the Socratic dictum that “the unexamined life is not worth living” (Gwaravanda & Ndofirepi, 2020). In so many ways, responsibility is about self-control and accountability for one’s actions. As a result, universities are the ideal nurseries for forming responsible citizens, which is particularly vital in Africa. In the first few decades of post-colonialism and post-apartheid, university graduates in Africa were considered role models and were accorded social respect. In fact, government administration used to be staffed by university graduates who were assumed to be intellectuals and were thought to be people of virtue, discipline and focus. There was a social perception that graduates are capable and wise political, administrative, economic and social leaders. Political office was a reserve for the

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graduates. University education was thought to endow the graduates with social, intellectual skills and moral discipline. Perhaps, the association between educated graduates and good leadership was derived from the historical circumstances in which the modern university emanated from the Catholic Church seminaries. Ideally, a seminary trains responsible religious leaders to run the parishes. Moreover, in traditional pre-colonial Africa, the formal processes of training people, such as circumcision schools, were expected to produce graduates who integrate into the society as responsible community and family members. So, there has always been an unexamined relationship between responsible leadership and university education. Nevertheless, those first few years of political independence shocked many Africans when the degreed African graduates, who were in government and other social leadership roles, got involved in corruption, poor governance, political and ethnic intolerance. This often resulted in social conflicts in which many people were injured or killed. A case in point is in Zimbabwe, where the late president, Robert Mugabe, was said to have been the most educated president, having attained seven university degrees in different academic fields. Yet, his personal responsibility in terms of political leadership in government contradicted the basic expectations of a degreed African. It is usually the case that when a graduate lacks responsibility at a personal level, his or her university education, qualification and the university itself are brought into disrepute by society. Besides the issues of poor leadership, a university graduate who lives an immoral life, such as excessive alcohol abuse and gambling, becomes a social scandal. Obviously, in that case, the relevance of a university in society is questioned. In the same vein, individual responsibility should also entail that graduates are not parochially fixated on entry into formal employment. The predominant idea in Africa is that a graduate has to prepare a convincing curriculum vitae for prospective employers upon graduation. These graduates will not do anything else outside their university-trained area of expertise. For example, a social worker graduate will wait for a formal social work job. Likewise, a sociology graduate, teacher, engineer or philosopher will wait for an opportunity of formal employment in their respective field of study. In terms of individual responsibility, this means that a graduate is not broad-minded to explore other options and take

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risks. It also means that the idea of creativity and entrepreneurship orientations is missing in university education in Africa. In fact, elsewhere in the world, there is an observation that some of the breakthrough technological discoveries were made by university drop-outs. Universities in Africa need to clearly explain to prospective students what a university education implies, what opportunities are available with a university education and the limitations of a university education. Otherwise, universities in Africa may continue to set false expectations for students and guardians who pay tuition fees. The second level is responsibility towards the community. Elsewhere, it is argued that the culture of violence in student protests at universities in Africa contradicts the tenets of responsibility towards public goods (Hungwe & Divala, 2020). While it may be the case that violent student protests indicate the limited space for deliberative engagement in the universities, it also indicates the inadequate sense of responsibility towards communality. For instance, university property worth billions of South African rand was destroyed during the 2015–2016 student protests in South Africa. In these protests, vehicles and buildings were torched, some people were seriously injured and others lost their lives during the student protests for free and decolonised higher education in South Africa. Besides South Africa, many other countries, such as Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Nigeria and Zambia, have experienced violent student protests in which communally held goods are vandalised. Also, with regards to responsibility towards communality, the university education moves the graduates or students to be concerned about the community challenges. A graduate in Africa should know that their education is valuable only if it serves the public good. While violence is inherent in the communally-orientated worldviews such as ubuntu and ukama, it was/is never deployed for the destruction of community property as an avenue for ventilating grievances. In both ukama and ubuntu, violence was deployed and justified when the community had to defend itself against an outsider threat. In such cases, it is an act of ubuntu to maim or even kill the enemy who threatens community peace. Therefore, responsibility towards communality entails that students and academics, in general, can apply critical thinking, analysis and reflection, rather than act instinctively against what they perceive to

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be an injustice. On a continent in which political and military violence is an industry, social justice university education should be undergirded in the tenets of both individual and communal responsibility.

Public Good This section discusses the concept of public good in relation to social justice education in the African university. This discussion is propelled by an academic conviction that although all universities seek to serve a public good, the public good is determined by historical, social, political and economic circumstances. For this reason, we concur with the statement that, Higher education is not neutral. It is highly political. Higher education institutions do not occupy some mythical middle ground. They are deeply embedded in society. If they attempt to sit on the fence, they make themselves irrelevant. Society should hold institutions accountable against their contribution to the public good. The public good is not only public; it is also about the good of the public. It is about the social impact of university; it is about social justice. (Botman, 2012, p. 21)

The above statement presupposes that there is something called public good to which members of a society in their collectivity have fair access. However, defining a public good has remained a contestable matter, because as we have noted in the case of the university, a public good cannot be separated from the historical, social, political and economic perspectives. In some instances, a public good even has an ethical dimension. The point we are making here is that, while there are some conventional understandings of a public good, an attempt to universally apply such a definition has often proven problematic. For the purposes of the argument of linking public good to social justice education in universities in Africa, as advanced in this chapter, we draw upon the economic and normative paradigms of the public good. A public good has two definitive aspects in the economic paradigm, namely, non-rivalrous and non-excludability (Stiglitz, 1999). Firstly, public goods

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are non-rivalrous in as far as their consumption is concerned. In other words, they do not diminish their potency because some people have made use of them. For example, the knowledge in research can be adopted, applied and repeatedly used by different people in different circumstances without losing its value. Secondly, public goods are non-­ excludable, meaning that you cannot prohibit people from enjoying them. Additionally, non-excludability implies that it is difficult, if not impossible, to exclude an individual from enjoying the good. In appropriating the notion of public good to the university, it is contentious whether university education is pure good. Instructively, in terms of university education, this is not easy to imagine because universities have a set enrolment standard requirement for admitting students and recruitment standards for lecturing staff. East et al. (2014, p. 1618) argue that “public goods are freely and universally available. They cannot be bought or sold, no one can be excluded from using them and the use of a public good by one person does not deplete its availability to another.” A question that logically proceeds from non-excludability and non-rivalrous is, “Does it mean that if something is public, then there are no costs attached to access it?” For example, the sustained campaigns for free higher education in South Africa and the perennial student protests over tuition hikes in most parts of the African continent point to the contentions of the public good. While there is now a recognisable, sizable and ever-expanding growth of the private university, most student demonstrations over access are carried out on public universities. On the other hand, the normative perspective of public good refers to that which is beneficial to society. As noted already, a public good has to be good for the public. The society in its collectivity has to draw some benefits out of that which is considered a public good. Succinctly, “public good is often collective in its provision and considered a ‘good thing’ for society as a whole. So, it can be sold or bought and potential users can be excluded” (East et al., 2014, p. 1619). What this means is that public good cannot be an imposition on society. Ideally, a government should not construct an institution in the community, then fight hard to convince the people that such an institution is good for them. Instead, society should normatively appreciate and value the public good based on the

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collective social benefits upon which they draw. For Ndofirepi and Cross (2017), public goods are such because they are financed by the state’s general revenue so that the market forces do not wholly determine access to the services from the public good. While we acknowledge state financial support towards the sustenance of a public good, it is a paradox that student protests over prohibitive tuition fees often disrupt universities in Africa. Our understanding of the university as a public good is broad to include both the person privileged to attend university and the non-­ attendee. We differ from Ndofirepi and Cross (2017), who question whether the public “goodness” of a university is not depreciated because university education is restrictive, both in terms of expenses and enrolment requirements. These scholars point out that “entry into universities is available and given to some, whereas others are denied, so consumption by some necessarily means a reduction in the possible consumption by others’” (Ndofirepi & Cross, 2017, p. 43). According to these scholars, this is a narrow interpretation of public good and consumption of education. The consumption of university knowledge should not be perceived as an individual but public good as well. Of course, a distinction between acquisition and consumption needs to be made. Acquisition is attaining, while consumption is the application of university education. The application of university education benefits the individual and society. Illustratively, we may not be privileged to attend a medical college and train to be a medical doctor, but under the guise of public good, we should benefit from the acquired medical knowledge by receiving medical services. Case et al. (2018) note that “it is useful to foreground the public good benefits of university education which are goods that move beyond the benefits accrued by the graduates”. Some of the goods emanating from the university include qualification, knowledge production, innovation and development of the professional classes. Now, what do the preceding views on public good entail for social justice in the African university? Firstly, it is important to state that the university's context determines the concept of a public good. An understanding of this concept is by extension, understanding and appreciating what the African university is supposed to stand for. We want to state that exploring the public good that a university should serve should not be

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interchanged with higher education in general. The public good is, in principle, determined by the specificities of the context. In other words, what may be the public good for the African university, may be different from how it is defined in Europe. Moreover, bearing in mind that Africa is a vast continent with varied needs, it follows that even in Africa, the university may attend to different dimensions and emphases about the public good. Nevertheless, this assertion does not mean that public good is a relative notion. On the contrary, the particular understanding of the university is interlinked with the conceptualisation of the public good. There is a triangulated interaction among communality, responsibility and public good as a basis for social justice education in the African university. If, for instance, ubuntu is representative of communality, community members are exhorted to exercise responsibility so that the services derived from public goods are guaranteed. Thus, both the universities and the broader society in Africa can realise the potential for a socially just society when the precepts of communality, responsibility and public good are harnessed and deployed in university education.

Summary This chapter offered a critical reflection on communality, responsibility and public good as the key cornerstones of social justice education in universities in Africa. Rather than analysing these concepts from a patronising perspective, we have explored their merits and limitations to ensure social justice in university education. In African countries, the universities are located in a milieu where social justice is deficient in all social spheres. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the universities being ideal spaces of free critical thinking, unprejudiced analysis and mutual exchange of ideas to be the key cornerstones for social justice. Nevertheless, as articulated in this chapter, there are numerous practices and attitudes that affront social justice in universities. If universities in Africa can enhance social justice education, they can influence the discourse in the broader society.

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References Botman, H. R. (2012). Foreword. In B. Leibowitz (Ed.), Higher education for the public good: Views from the South. Sun Press. Case, J., Marshall, D., McKenna, S., & Mogashana, D. (2018). Foregrounding the public good benefits of the university study. University World News Africa Edition. https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?st ory=20180306085445341 East, L., Stokes, R., & Walker, M. (2014). Universities the public good and professional education in the UK. Studies in Higher Education, 39(9), 1617–1633. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0307507 9.2013.801421 Francis, D., & Webster, E. (2019). Poverty and inequality in South Africa: Critical reflections. Development Southern Africa, 36(4), 1–15. https://www. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0376835X.2019.1666703 Gwaravanda, E., & Ndofirepi, A. (2020). Eurocentric pitfalls in the practice of African philosophy: Reflections on African universities. Phronimon, 21(6678), 1–21. https://upjournals.co.za/index.php/Phronimon/article/ view/6678 Hlalele, D., & Alexander, G. (2012). University access, inclusion and social justice. South African Journal of Higher Education, 26(3), 487–501. https:// www.journals.ac.za/index.php/sajhe/article/view/177 Horsthemke, K. (2008). The idea of the African university in the twenty-first century: Some reflections on Afrocentricism and Afroscepticism. South African Journal of Higher Education, 20(4), 449–467. https://www.ajol.info/ index.php/sajhe/article/view/25676 Hungwe, J. P., & Divala, J. J. (2020). Burn to be heard: The (in)dispensability of “revolutionary” violence in student protests and responsible citizenship in African public universities. In N. Davids & Y. Waghid (Eds.), University education, controversy and democratic citizenship. Palgrave Macmillan. Ndofirepi, A., & Cross, M. (2017). Knowledge as public good: A critical gaze at the African university. In M. Cross & A. Ndofirepi (Eds.), Knowledge and change in African universities (pp. 42–57). Sense Publishers. Ramose, M. (2005). The African university in the twenty first century. South African Higher Education (Special Issue, 2005), 1187–1188. https://journals. co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC37217.

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Sebola, M., & Mogoboya, M. J. (2020). Re-imagining Africanisation of sustainable epistemologies and pedagogies in (South) African higher education: A conceptual intervention. South African Journal of Higher Education, 34(6), 237–254. https://www.journals.ac.za/index.php/sajhe/article/view/4078 Singh, M. (2001). Re-inserting the public good into higher education transformation. Kagisano (No 5). Centre of Higher Education. Stiglitz, J. E. (1999). Knowledge as a global public good. In I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, & M. Stern (Eds.), Global public goods. Oxford Press. Tjabane, M., & Pillay, V. (2011). Doing justice to social justice in South African higher education. Perspectives in Education, 29(2), 10–20. https://www.ajol. info/index.php/pie/article/view/76959 Waghid, Y. (2009). Initiating debate towards a cosmopolitan African university. South African Journal of Higher Education, 23(5), 845–851. https://www.ajol. info/index.php/sajhe/article/view/48803

8 An African University and Claims of Democratic Citizenship Education

Introduction Given our previous discussions, it is clear that an African university is continuously shaped by debates such as democratic citizenship, transformation, internationalisation, neoliberal or market forces, globalisation as well as glocalisation. These debates insinuate a number of issues, among them, the comparative nature of education. The urgent quest to attend to comparative education arises in that the university has become a connected space—in a country, a region and a global space, all at the same time. The connected space the African university finds itself in necessitates the need for the transformation of the university for it to remain relevant locally as well as globally. In other words, in a comparative education logic, an African university needs to advance its roles and knowledge interests of both a local and global perspective in resolving matters of public concern that could lead to the transformation and decolonisation of the university. We have argued in previous chapters, that while African universities have engaged with transformation agendas for decades, they have struggled to achieve meaningful transformation owing to many reasons. In the quest to re-imagine the African university within the discourse of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_8

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comparative education, we have posited the role of ubuntu in enabling genuine transformation. Having established that ubuntu in a reconstituted form is explained as human communitarianism on the basis of which people exercise respect, caring and a sense of community (Waghid, 2014), ubuntu is linked to the cultivation of restorative justice, and that it (ubuntu) can be conceived as an act of responsible deliberative engagement on the basis of which an attentiveness to others through dissonant action is accentuated (Waghid, 2020, p. 299). We contend that ubuntu values extrapolate the democratic citizenship claims. Further, when democratic citizenship claims are considered without an in-depth articulation of the African context of ubuntu, they fail to meaningfully impact the transformation agenda of the African university. In this chapter we draw on a post-critical higher education theory to argue that it is philosophically and pragmatically worthwhile to collapse goals of democratic citizenship education and that of an African university based on ubuntu to enhance comparative education as becoming.

 omparative Education and the African C University There are different views about the meaning of comparative education (Wolhuter, 2008). However, most early education comparativists described the concept as a comparison of education systems or education entities for improvement (Mallinson, 1975; Noah, 1985). For example, Noah (1985) propounded that the roles of comparative education are to: describe educational systems, processes or outcomes; assist in the development of education institutions and practices; highlight the relationship between education and society and establish generalised statements about education that are valid in more than one country. Writing at the dawn of the twenty-first century, Broadfoot (2000) warned against the stagnation of the field of comparative education and proposed the advancement of the field’s promise of “making the familiar strange”—finding new uses or explanations for something already familiar. She called for re-­imagining comparative education as it is “intentionally reformative” in its judgement on what constitutes reform or improvement (Broadfoot, 2000).

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Engaging with challenges of comparative education, Broadfoot (2000, p. 363) reflected that “the essential and arbitrary institutional and conceptual apparatus of modern Western education systems has embedded itself on a global basis to the point where alternative approaches and forms of provision have become unthinkable”. Comparative education has to guard against such hegemonic instances if it has to be useful to the African university. In African university discourses, the sentiments presented by Broadfoot, are resisted within the context of decolonisation. As we have argued earlier, decolonisation enables practices of resistance that could disrupt such skewed understandings that constitute higher education practices and are in confrontation with an ubuntu ethic. Recent debates in comparative education show that the field is in continuous flux to re-imagine itself and its contributions (Baily & Call-­ Cummings, 2016; Silova, 2020; Wolhuter, 2008). For example, Baily and Call-Cummings (2016) present the complexity that surrounds epistemologies and ontologies in engaging with comparative education studies. They argue for the importance of reflexivity—examination of one’s own beliefs, theoretical stances, judgements and how they influence research or interrogating the role of the researcher in comparative education methodologies. Reflexivity is at the heart of an ubuntu ethic. Silova (2020) argues for the need to reconfigure comparative education as a “connective tissue” between different worlds, bringing together rather than hierarchise them and the need to reframe education as an opportunity to learn how to anticipate and animate our ongoing entanglement with more-than-human worlds. Silova’s description of a comparative education as a “connective tissue” agrees with the distinctiveness of ubuntu, which connects human action as well as relations with entities of a non-human kind. A comparative education that strives to re-imagine itself, be reflexive and connective to different worlds is in line with the notion of ubuntu and is useful to the African university. Drawing on a post-critical higher education theory that challenges the static nature of change, it is our contention that an African university needs to realise that the field of comparative education is continuously re-imagining itself, has a reformative character, strives to be reflexive, aims to challenge hegemonic education systems and strives to embody the character of connective tissue present in ubuntu. Viewed this way, an

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ubuntu ethic provides promise on which African universities can ground comparative education. More so, the claims of democratic citizenship anchored an ubuntu ethic within the field of comparative education, provide opportunities for the African university to genuinely transform—in other words we argue that it is philosophically and pragmatically worthwhile to collapse goals of democratic citizenship education and that of an African university to enhance comparative education. We now deal with democratic citizenship education and the university.

 emocratic Citizenship Education D and the University Democratic citizenship education in the university context broadly refers to the preparation of university students for their roles and responsibilities as citizens. An ubuntu ethic in the African university, intrinsically has the power to prepare students to become responsible citizens that could champion claims of democratic citizenship. Our use of the concept of “responsible citizen” draws from Nussbaum’s (1997) notion of “cultivating humanity”. For Nussbaum, a responsible citizen has the capability to cultivate humanity by attending to three capacities: (1) the capacity for critical self-examination and critical thinking about one’s own culture and traditions, (2) the capacity to see oneself as a human being who is bound to all humans with ties of concern and (3) the capacity for narrative imagination—the ability to empathise with others and to put oneself in another’s place (Nussbaum, 1997). With these abilities, one develops the values of reason, respect, empathy, deliberation and generally agency to correct social injustices (Shawa, 2020). In other words, we argue that cultivating humanity relates to ubuntu as human communitarianism on the basis of which people exercise respect, caring and a sense of community, as cultivation of restorative justice and as an act of responsible deliberative engagement (Waghid, 2014, 2020). Waghid (2010, p. 9) posits: [D]emocratic citizenship education ought to be deliberative, compassionate and friendly in order that teachers and students (learners) may respect one another and take risks in and through their pedagogical encounters. …

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In this way hopefully, students and teachers may become more critical, explorative and engaging, thus making democratic citizenship education a highly pragmatic experience for the sake of cultivating our civility and humanity.

We argue that the deliberative, compassionate and friendly attributes referred to by Waghid entail that democratic citizenship and ubuntu embody both the epistemological or knowledge production dimension of the university and the ontological stances—ontological dimensions are those that contribute to what students become after going through university education (Shawa, 2019). In other words democratic citizenship or an ubuntu ethic is as much an epistemological activity as an ontological one—appealing to both knowledge/intellect and becoming. We now collapse goals of democratic citizenship and an African university based on an ubuntu ethic.

 owards Collapsing Goals of Democratic T Citizenship and an African University We can now argue that an African university based on an ubuntu ethic embodies values of democratic citizenship which are necessitated by the cultivation of humanity. Such a university responds or contributes to the conception of comparative education that strives to continuously re-­ imagine itself, is reformative in character, is reflexive, aims to challenge hegemonic education systems and strives to embody the character of connectedness as viewed through a post-critical higher education lens. An African university conceived in this way would be ready to transform and decolonise. For example, in encouraging the cultivation of humanity, an ubuntu African university will assist students to embody the capacity for critical self-examination and critical thinking about their own culture and traditions. Understanding and engaging with one’s culture and traditions will help students to challenge the taken-for-granted aspects that could impede their engagement with an ubuntu ethic or democratic citizenship. Self-examination and critical thinking about one’s traditions and culture reflect citizens who are ready to listen and

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where necessary change their ways of doing things to co-exist with fellow humans and the non-human world. The capacity to see oneself as a human being who is bound to all humans with ties of concern, propounds the aspect of human communitarianism on the basis of which people exercise respect, caring and a sense of community. The capacity for narrative imagination that enables the ability to empathise with others and to put oneself in another’s place, further touches on the aspect of care for one another. A comparative education viewed within a post-critical higher education lens, is continuously re-imagining itself within an ubuntu or democratic citizenship fashion and has the capacity to always critique itself and quest for the better. Applied to the African university, this has a reformative character necessary for the transformation and decolonisation of the university. A comparative education that encourages reflexivity helps the actors in the African university to continuously interrogate how their beliefs could affect university practices and hence be ready to change and try better ways of engagement within the university. An African university anchored within an ubuntu ethic thus has the capacity to confront hegemonic education activities or systems by allowing decolonisation and transformation to characterise university practices.

Summary In this chapter we have shown the needed connectedness of comparative education, democratic citizenship and an ubuntu ethic in an African university that could facilitate the university to always seek to become better. We have presented three major arguments. First, that since the field of comparative education strives to continuously re-imagine itself, be reformative, be reflexive, challenge hegemonic education systems and embody the character of connectedness (of human and non-human relations), it is in line with values sought through democratic citizenship education and an ubuntu ethic in an African university. Second, since claims of democratic citizenship education aim at producing responsible citizens they are in line with an ubuntu ethic. Third, an African university based on an ubuntu ethic is necessarily democratic. As such, we have claimed

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that it is philosophically and pragmatically worthwhile to collapse goals of democratic citizenship education and that of an African university based on ubuntu to enhance comparative education within a frame of a post-critical higher education theory.

References Baily, S., & Call-Cummings, M. (2016). Reframing the centre. New directions in qualitative methodology in international comparative education: Annual review of comparative and international education 2015. In W.  Alexander & A.  Emily (Eds.), International perspectives on education and society (pp.  139–164). https://doi.org/10.1108/ S1479-­367920150000028013/full/html Broadfoot, P. (2000). Comparative education for the 21st century: Retrospect and prospect. Comparative Education, 36(3), 357–371. https://doi. org/10.1080/03050060050129036 Mallinson, V. (1975). An introduction to comparative education. Heinemann Educational. Noah, H. J. (1985). Comparative education. In T. Husén & T. N. Postlethwaite (Eds.), The international encyclopedia of education: Research and studies (pp. 869–872). Pergamon. Nussbaum, M. (1997). Cultivating humanity: A classical defense of reform in liberal education. Harvard University Press. Shawa, L.  B. (2019). Beyond epistemology: Ontological transformation in South African universities. In E. Ivala & D. Scott (Eds.), The status of transformation in higher education institutions in post-apartheid South Africa (pp. 109–120). Routledge. Shawa, L.  B. (2020). The public mission of universities in South Africa: Community engagement and the teaching and researching roles of faculty members. Tertiary Education and Management, 26, 105–116. https://doi. org/10.1007/s11233-­019-­09040-­1 Silova, I. (2020). Anticipating other worlds, animating ourselves: An invitation to comparative education. ECNU Review of Education, 3(1), 139–159. https://doi.org/10.1177/2096531120904246 Waghid, Y. (2010). Education, democracy and citizenship revisited: Pedagogical encounters. SunMedia.

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Waghid, Y. (2014). African philosophy of education reconsidered: On being human. Routledge. Waghid, Y. (2020). Towards an ubuntu philosophy of higher education in Africa. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 39(3), 299–308. https://doi. org/10.1007/s11217-­020-­09709-­w Wolhuter, C.  C. (2008). Review of the review: Constructing the identity of comparative education. Research in Comparative and International Education, 3(4), 323–344. https://doi.org/10.2304/2Frcie.2008.3.4.323

9 Teaching and Learning as Transformative Acts of Comparative Education

Introduction Drawing on a post-critical higher education theory, we have argued in the previous chapter that comparative education that is continuously re-­imagining itself within an ubuntu or democratic citizenship fashion has the capacity to critique itself constantly and quest for the better. Furthermore, if applied to the African university, this has a reformative character necessary for the transformation and decolonisation of the university. In this chapter, we argue that within an ubuntu ethic, higher education teaching and learning are intrinsically and extrinsically linked to acts of transformation, engagement and comparative education. We start by considering teaching and learning in higher education briefly.

Teaching and Learning in Higher Education To maintain the force of ubuntu, teaching and learning in higher education ought to be dynamic. This is because dynamism and the quest to “make things better” are characteristics of an ubuntu ethic and comparative education, more so within a post-critical higher education theory that encourages becoming. In opposition to the dynamism of the ubuntu ethic © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_9

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and the reformative agenda of comparative education are teaching and learning approaches that encourage surface learning—doing tasks with minimum trouble, such as in rote learning (Biggs, 2004). An African university anchored in ubuntu values requires enhancing teaching and learning that promotes deep learning—engaging with tasks appropriately and meaningfully (critically) (Biggs, 2004). Without deep learning, universities produce uncritical graduates that cannot contribute to the transformation and decolonisation of the university or university graduate that chiefly lacks the dynamism of ubuntu and the reformative character of comparative education. Such graduates lack citizenship skills to contribute positively to the development of a country. Waghid (2012, p. 72) bemoans the little impact that South African universities have on the citizenry: [U]niversities seemingly do not commit themselves first and foremost to the education of the enlightened, informed and critical citizens and can be said to be elitist because such an education would not engender in people (students) a capacity for judgement and for informed participation in democratic life. (Waghid, 2012, p. 72)

An African university within the logic of an ubuntu ethic and comparative education is in tandem with democratic life, as observed by Waghid. In African higher education, the challenges of surface learning and rote learning seem to be exacerbated by the uncritical use of technology. Given the impact of the current COVID-19 pandemic that has further encouraged the use of technology in higher education, the uncritical use of technology could contribute to the further dwindling of education standards. Beetham and Sharpe (2020) warn against the use of technology wrongly. They argue for meaningful integration of technology by exploring the new intersections of digital and pedagogical practice as it is not enough to have technology if critical engagement with it is not a priority in higher education. Challenging uncritical teaching and learning using technology, Biggs (2004) contends: [A] surface learning approach to learning has its counterpart in those teachers who believe that by putting their lecture notes on the Web they have

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joined the information revolution. If this is all they do, it is rather like filming a book, page by page, and then telling the students to go to the cinema to read it. (Biggs, 2004, p. 214)

Using technology without thoughtful pedagogical instances is detrimental to the ubuntu dynamism required for transforming and decolonising the African university. For example, there is a difference between educational technology and information technology, with the former stressing the educational/pedagogical use of technology (Biggs, 2004). We argue that an ubuntu ethic in African universities demands a critical use of technology that enhances critical pedagogies. More so, to maintain an ubuntu ethic within comparative education that continuously seeks reform, academics ought to understand how students learn. As such, there is a need to engage with learning theories that could enhance the pedagogical experiences of students (Shawa, 2020). Biggs (2004, p. 9) argued “that the scholarship of teaching requires reflection, a theory of teaching to reflect with, and a context of experiences as the object of reflection”. Anchoring teaching and learning on appropriate theories and reflectivity encourages deep learning necessary for the critical contribution of the African university. Further, reflective learning is pertinent for students to “develop the ability to adjust to ever-changing environments as it allows for contemplation about new experiences and their association with past experiences in different contexts and focuses on future transformations” (Colomer et al., 2020, p. 5). Conceptualised thus, teaching and learning in higher education could enforce the dynamism of ubuntu and comparative education that seeks to continuously make teaching and learning better within a post-critical higher education lens.

 eaching and Learning as an Act T of Transformation Within an ubuntu ethic, teaching and learning ought to be an act of transformation. In most higher education contexts, however, the notion of transformation has multiple meanings. As observed by Wilson-­ Strydom (2018), apart from being a contested notion, in South Africa,

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the transformation has been associated with the changing demographics of students and expanding access to students who had previously been excluded from higher education. Equitable access to higher education is vital for the transformation project. Pattman and Carolissen (2018) provide an interesting conceptualisation of transformation, contending that in South Africa, transformation inherently assumes cornerstones of social justice: with concepts such as redistribution, equity, recognition, power, representations and voice being central tenets. Teaching and learning as acts of transformation aspire to encourage social justice within the higher education space. Wilson-Strydom (2018) conceptualises transformation as related to freedoms. He argues that conceptualising transformation as freedom fosters conditions that create spaces for all students to enhance their substantive freedoms, particularly their well-being and agency. Teaching and learning as an act of transformation require that students take agency in their learning. Shawa (2020) contends that transformation in South Africa has over emphasised epistemological dimension at the expense of ontological aspects required for real transformation that supports an ubuntu ethic. He argues for complementarity between epistemological and ontological dimensions and that the combined force has the potential to assist students to critique taken-for-granted assumptions that may impede their critical engagements in their lives. We draw more on epistemological and ontological dimensions in our discussion on teaching and learning as an act of engagement. Reflecting on transformation in South African higher education, Badat (2010) noted the existence of a comprehensive policy agenda, a foundation for a single-coordinated system, increased and broadened participation and gender equity as some achievements. While Badat (2010) further noted that in terms of teaching and learning, universities in South Africa had begun to offer academic programmes that produced high-quality graduates with knowledge, competencies and skills to practice occupations and professions locally and anywhere in the world, we are less optimistic on the quality claims pertaining to transformation. We argue that real transformation in terms of teaching and learning could be more meaningful if couched within an ubuntu ethic. Further, we contend that

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for teaching and learning to be an act of transformation, we need to consider a thick conceptualisation of the notion considering the multiple understandings of expanding access, social justice, freedoms and the balance between epistemological and ontological needs of the students.

 eaching and Learning as an Act T of Engagement Teaching and learning are activities that concern the enactment of curricula. We see teaching and learning as an act of engagement within an African university in the way universities enact curricula (curricula perceived as dynamic and not static and uncritical). Drawing on Paul Freire (1921–1997), we outline what such an engagement might mean for an African university within an ubuntu ethic. In our understanding of curricula enactment, we draw on Barnett and Coate (2005), who view curricula as woven within three spaces: the epistemological, the practical and the ontological. They propound the spaces: [T]he epistemological space in which students can acquire deep understanding of knowledge and take up informed and critical stances in relation to it; the practical space, which allows students to develop the capacities for purposive but critically judged actions, which may be both logically tied to their forms of knowledge or professional fields or more life oriented (such as action in the community); the ontological space for the development of the students’ own being has to be a central consideration in the design of curriculum for higher learning. (Barnett & Coate, 2005, p. 135)

Related to these curriculum spaces, Barnett and Coate (2005, pp.  135–136) propose what they term three projects necessary for the education enterprise: 1. The project of knowing [the epistemology space]: How can students come to make legitimate claims in a world of uncertainty? How can they gain courage to make their own claims, knowing that these claims are always going to be susceptible to challenge?

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2. The project of acting [the practical space]: How can students come to act in the world, to engage effectively with others, to be able to live out in the world their dispositions for knowing with all the limitations and challenges of so engaging? 3. The project of being [the ontological space]: How can students come to have a firm knowledge of themselves in a world which is open, fluid and full of contestation even as it is full of opportunity? How can they come to be capable of monitoring themselves to guide themselves towards the right action and courageous knowledge acts? Adherence to these spaces and projects by African universities could characterise teaching and learning as an act of engagement and achieve an education characteristic of both an ubuntu ethic and comparative education. But for such engagement to take shape, there is a need for an environment in the university that allows for deliberation and empowers the student. We now turn to what that engagement really might mean in an African university.

 eaching and Learning as an Act T of Engagement: Waghid’s Interpretation of Freire’s Pedagogy of Hope Drawing on Waghid’s (2015, pp.  137–138) understanding of Freire’s (2004) pedagogy of hope, we outline what teaching and learning could look like in an African university. A pedagogy of hope offers the following thoughts (as conceived by Waghid): • A teacher [an academic] does not impose knowledge on others but works with them jointly to construct knowledge. • Students should be encouraged to take increasing responsibility for their own learning and not to be dependent on the educator (outside expert to interpret the world for them). • Teachers [academics] and students are co-learners in a situation where mutual respect must operate.

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• Learning is not something done to students but is a process and result of what the students do for themselves. • The teacher [the academic] does not enforce choice but rather encourages students to make decisions and choices for themselves. • Responsibility and freedom are primarily in the hands of students, but the teacher [the academic] is not exempt from exercising responsibility and, on occasions, intervening in the situation. Through pedagogy of hope, we see the roles of respect, deliberation, empowerment, freedoms and social justice that are required in teaching and learning within an ubuntu ethic and a reformative comparative education.

 eaching and Learning as an Act of T Comparative Education Teaching and learning as an act of comparative education have two major characteristics: the idea that we can learn from the global practice and improve our local practices and the idea that we can remain critical and focused on a reformatory agenda of comparative theorising. As an act of comparative education within an ubuntu ethic, teaching and learning aim to make comparisons that focus on improving educational practices and systems. It is not enough to compare education systems and practices without engaging with the demands of an ubuntu ethic for African universities to make sense. Further, it is our understanding that teaching and learning as an act of comparative education embody reformative potential, which could encourage reflexivity. Such reflexivity could help the actors in the African university to continuously interrogate how their beliefs could affect university practices and hence, be ready to change and try better ways of engaging within the university. Such an understanding underscores the role of a post-critical higher education lens that allows universities to always quest for the better.

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Summary Drawing on a post-critical higher education theory, in this chapter, we have argued that within an ubuntu ethic, higher education teaching and learning are intrinsically and extrinsically linked to acts of transformation, engagement and comparative education. We have shown that teaching and learning in such a form need to guard against rote learning and instead support deep learning grounded on learning theories and reflectivity. We have argued that teaching and learning, as an act of transformation, touches on access, social justice, freedoms and epistemological and ontological dimensions. Within an ubuntu ethic, we have conceptualised teaching and learning as an act of engagement through curricula enactment that involves deliberation and have shown how such an engagement could look like by drawing on Freire’s pedagogy of hope. Finally, we have explained that teaching and learning within comparative education are shaped by global comparisons and need to take the reformatory character inherent in the notion of comparative education to reflect a post-­ critical higher education theory.

References Badat, S. (2010). Global rankings of universities: A perspective and present burden. In E. Unterhalter & V. Carpenter (Eds.), Whose interests are we serving: Global inequalities and higher education. Palgrave MacMillan. Biggs, J. (2004). Teaching for quality learning at university. Open University Press. Beetham, H., & Sharpe, R. (Eds.). (2020). Rethinking pedagogy for a digital age. Routledge. Barnett, R., & Coate, K. (2005). Engaging the curriculum in higher education. Society for the Research in Higher Education & Open University Press. Colomer, J., Serra, T., Cañabate, D., & Bubnys, R. (2020). Reflective learning in higher education: Active methodologies for transformative practices. Sustainability, 12(3827). https://doi.org/10.3390/su12093827 Freire, P. (2004). Pedagogy of hope. Continuum.

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Shawa, L. B. (2020). Advancing the scholarship of teaching and learning (SoTL) using learning theories and reflectivity. Centre for Educational Policy Studies Journal, 10(1), 191–208. https://doi.org/10.26529/cepsj.298 Pattman, R., & Carolissen, R. (Eds.). (2018). Transforming transformation in research and teaching at South African Universities. SUN Press. https://doi. org/10.1882/09781928480075 Waghid, Y. (2012). The decline of the university in South Africa. In R. Barnett (Ed.), The future university: Ideas and possibilities (pp. 71–83). Routledge. Waghid, Y. (2015). Dancing with doctoral encounters: Democratic education in motion. Sun Media. Wilson-Strydom, M. (2018). Transformation as freedom: Confronting ‘unfreedoms’ in students’ lives. In P. Rob & C. Ronelle (Eds.), Transforming transformation in research and teaching at South African Universities (pp. 33–50). Sun Press. https://doi.org/10.1882/0978192848007

10 Teaching and Learning as Critique, Taking Risks and Disruption

Introduction We are writing this chapter in a period of disruption. Not only is South Africa in the grasp of a third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, but also shopping malls and businesses are looted and burnt to the ground. Considering the enforcement of the atrocious apartheid system, South Africa has a well-documented history intertwined with violence. However, it seems as if this historical exposure to violence still reverberates through the valleys and hills of this beautiful country: Violence against the voiceless marginalised who are excluded from receiving basic services; violence against the bodies of those who are defenceless; violence in the form of attacks, murders and robberies among those that have not and those that have; violence against the humanity of those trustworthy citizens that have put their faith in community leaders and politicians, only to discover that government funds (the sweat and labour and stress of tax-­ paying citizens) were misappropriated and mismanaged (most often for self-enrichment); and violence against the environment with pollution and excessive consumption smothering life from the ocean. Violence thus seems to be systemically perpetuated through the processes, decisions and actions of South African citizens. Equally so in the higher education © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_10

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landscape where violence is experienced through the learning and teaching pedagogical practices used, particularly in excluding particular local (African) knowledge systems and values in curriculum content. This chapter will argue that disruption is required—a disruption that could lead to growth, transformation and life for all. For such a disruption to materialise, firstly, critique is needed and, secondly, the willingness of educators to take risks.

Violence and Social Justice: A Binary Relation? In this chapter, in reference to the construct of “violence”, we use the seminal thoughts of Johan Galtung. In the paper, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, Galtung (1969) developed a typology for violence that we will use as the premise for the discussion. In developing the typology of violence, Galtung (1969, p. 168) starts from the following two notions, namely: that “peace” (we can also view this as social cohesion) could be interpreted as the “absence of violence” and that “violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations”. In other words, Galtung (1969) argues that violence is the root for the variance between the potential (or the promise) and the actual (or the lived reality). In building on this premise towards an extended awareness of violence, Galtung (1969) explores six aspects: Firstly, he shows the importance of establishing that violence is physical (body orientated) and psychological (soul orientated). Secondly, the notion of punishment and reward implies that an influencer could influence a person negatively or positively. Thirdly, violence is broader than just the notion that there should be an object that is hurt. Fourthly, violence is present whether or not a subject (person) is the actor. Therefore, defining that personal (direct) violence implies a subject commits the violence, whereas structural (indirect) violence implies that there is no such subject. Galtung (1969) argues that structural violence could be perceived as social injustice, as the violence is embedded into the structural functioning of a particular society, operation, or profession, evident in the imbalance in power, marginalisation and silencing and opportunity. Fifthly, violence

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incorporates intended (looking at guilt) and unintended (looking at consequences) actions. And lastly, the concept of violence includes violence that manifests and violence that is latent.

It is not difficult to note the comparison between the examples of violence in the South African context listed in the introduction section and Galtung’s (1969) extended view of violence as described above. Of specific importance is the notion that the lack of “peace” (social cohesion) is evidence of the presence of perpetuated acts of violence. Often the danger lies in that which is not easily visible or noticeable—that which could be interpreted in the higher education landscape as violence aimed at the soul of a person and structural violence. Hence, violence designates the absence of peace/social cohesion. The ensuing discussion, framed within post-structural critical theory, will focus on the appropriation of Galtung’s definition of violence to the African higher education landscape, with a specific focus on learning and teaching pedagogy and curriculum content. By applying a Derridian deconstructionist viewpoint, we highlight that which are excluded, yet are required, as a result of the manifestation of violent pedagogy in the higher education space. Through such a critique, the possibility exists to disrupt perpetuated violence to actualise the deferred dream of a better and peaceful life within democratic countries. Since deconstruction has a very particular connection with justice and democratisation, it is an appropriate tool to explain an Ubuntu university in becoming (Patton, 1979).

From Critique to Disruption [W]hen people embark on critique, they practically criticise to resolve undesirable situations, as well as raising doubts about one another’s rejoinders. Moreover, critique is always related to notions of discernment and reflexivity. To be discerning implies that one is capable of making sound judgements about, say, pedagogical matters. Furthermore, to be reflexive implies that one thinks deeper about matters of public concern. Together, being astute in one’s judgements and being reflexive about one’s judgements, is tantamount to acting with critique. (Waghid et al., 2021, p. 33)

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In general, a democratic citizen will agree that it is an undesirable situation if violence ought to be present in the higher education university landscape. However, the challenge remains for democratic citizens to notice and recognise the violence present in the higher education university landscape. The aim of offering critique is, therefore, firstly to facilitate the possibility of noticing the undesirable presence of violence in the (African) university domain, specifically in learning and teaching pedagogy and curriculum content, and secondly, to take redemptive action. Learning (or teaching) in current times has been reduced to measurable learning outcomes, test-driven education, the acquisition of knowledge and technical skills and the establishment of the corporate university in service of the neoliberal market economy (see Assié-Lumumba, 2011; Davids & Waghid, 2016; DeSaxe, 2015; Larsen, 2019; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017). Democratic societies are built on rights and associated responsibilities. Equally so, democratic citizens involved in the higher education sector have a particular responsibility to critique this capture of the educational landscape. This neoliberal, narrow education application should be met with resistance and the reasoned voice of dissonance by democratic educators. In comparing narrow education obsessed with the accumulation of knowledge to the aim of education, as envisioned with the fourth sustainable development goal (SDG) of the United Nations, the disparity is glaringly obvious to note. The fourth SDG requires that all citizens acquire knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including among others through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development. (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2016, n.p.)

Therefore, the focus or the aim of education should be on cultivating the holistic humanity of students rather than the mere transfer of knowledge and skills. In part, the reason for such a shortcoming is due to the learning and teaching pedagogy used. In the current corporate university environment, where learning outcomes and the performance of students

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and the university are measured in statistics, reviews and rankings, teaching towards a metric tool such as an examination becomes of utmost importance. Consequently, educators “teach” towards that measurement tool (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017). Unfortunately, the outcome of such “teaching” in the corporate university environment often results in graduates that are mere technicians of learning rather than well-rounded democratic citizens that can contribute to the realisation of greater equality and justice (Waghid, 2017). Often, this “banking approach” (Freire, 1996) to teaching associated with the transfer of knowledge from the university teacher to a student demonstrates an inherent power imbalance. Along with Rancièrian thought (1991), the student is not treated equally with a university teacher in such instances. The university teacher’s talks to students are one-sided and from a position of superiority as the so-called expert. Excluding the student from the pedagogical practice through a power imbalance is violent in two ways. Firstly, the student is indoctrinated not to challenge the knowledge shared by the “expert” (university teacher) through the system of punishment versus reward (Galtung, 1969). If the student accepts the “knowledge” as the “truth” without critical discussion, then the student is rewarded by scoring a good mark and is deemed competent to pass the module. Compare this with a student who wants to engage critically due to a different perspective, just to be punished with a poor mark, deemed incompetent and subsequently failing the module. Secondly, such a pedagogical style is also an example of structural violence or social injustice (Galtung, 1969). Through the power imbalance, the (marginalised) student is silenced and alienated and left without the opportunity to contribute to the learning process. The power imbalance supporting the notion that the university teacher is speaking the “truth” and that such knowledge should not be contested is a prime example of Foucault’s (1995) theory that there is a relation between power and knowledge that institutions use as a means of control. Foucault (1980, p. 52) rightly argues that “the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power”. In the process, important skills, such as critical thinking to solve local societal ills and deliberation, are neglected (Assié-Lumumba, 2011). For the latter skills to be cultivated through education, a diverse learning and

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teaching pedagogy should be used. These two examples of violence as a result of the often preferred pedagogical practice of a teacher doing most of the talking demonstrate potential that a student does not develop. Although there might be a significant increase of knowledge gained, the student lacks the required ability to engage meaningfully in the democratic society; thus, the actual outcome is less than the potential and constitutes violence as per Galtung’s (1969) definition. The neoliberal ideological underpinning of the so-called corporate university that lost some autonomy in service of the desire to deliver graduates that can be employed to address the needs of the new-market economy is, therefore, a prime example of structural violence (social injustice) as perceived by Galtung (1969). Assié-Lumumba (2011, p. 182) argues that although an African university implies “agency, autonomy, and responsibility to identify from within the needs of the African societies” in order to offer solutions, in reality, the emphasis in postcolonial African universities was placed on the acquisition of knowledge and skills. In part, this is because of violence in the form of indoctrination, the belief in the so-called truth, that Western knowledge systems and thinking are superior to African knowledge systems. Another form of violence flourishing in the university space is violence aimed at the soul of students through the curriculum content. The call for decoloniality in the (African) university landscape is greater than just curriculum content (Mbembe, 2015). However, our focus will, for now, be on the chosen curriculum content. “The truly African university must be one that draws its inspiration from its environment, not as a transplanted tree, but growing from a seed that is planted and nurtured in the African soil”, argues Assié-Lumumba (2011, p. 182). The reality is that very little progress has been made regarding decolonising the African university curriculum even though we are in a postcolonial era. Heleta (2016, pp. 1–2) argues that in the South African context, this epistemological violence is still rife: Since the end of the oppressive and racist apartheid system in 1994, epistemologies and knowledge systems at most South African universities have not considerably changed; they remain rooted in colonial, apartheid and Western worldviews and epistemological traditions. The curriculum

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remains largely Eurocentric and continues to reinforce white and Western dominance and privilege. … In this process, colonial education played an instrumental role, promoting and imposing the Eurocentric ‘ways’ and worldviews while subjugating everything else. Thus, one of the most destructive effects of colonialism was the subjugation of local knowledge and promotion of the Western knowledge as universal knowledge. European scholars have worked hard for centuries to erase the historical, intellectual and cultural contributions of Africa and other parts of the ‘non-­ Western’ world to our common humanity.

To address the epistemological violence against the soul of students, as highlighted above, we propose that the curriculum content include content from diverse knowledge and value systems. “Decoloniality in this regard calls for a re-reconsideration of the criteria for selecting objects of academic inquiry in higher education. Other than demanding a substitution of local epistemologies with non-local ones, decoloniality calls for a fair consideration of what passes for knowledge and the criteria involved, without bias accepting if not encouraging hybridity” (Waghid et  al., 2020, p.  7). We do not argue for a total replacement of all Western knowledge but rather for openness towards all knowledge systems. Differently put, “[i]t is a process that does not necessarily abandon the notion of universal knowledge for humanity, but which embraces it via a horizontal strategy of openness to dialogue among different epistemic traditions” (Mbembe, 2015, n.p.). However, what is required is that the notion that Western knowledge is superior to other (indigenous) knowledge systems should be disrupted. By excluding indigenous knowledge systems from the curriculum, it is not considered worthy enough to be deemed valuable universal knowledge, nor the so-called truth. This inferior judgement of students' lived upbringing translates into affecting the worth of individuals. This incongruence between knowledge content and lived reality constitutes psychological violence, as Galtung (1969) perceived. Noddings (2005) identifies the risk (or excuse) of curriculum overload—as often educators will claim that there is not sufficient space for adding additional content to the curriculum, which demonstrates resistance rather than the required openness to the unknown potentiality. Yet,

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in South Africa, the Report of the Ministerial Committee on Transformation and Social Cohesion and the Elimination of Discrimination in Public Higher Education Institutions (DoE, 2008, p. 101) states, “if the curriculum is not infused with an ethical and moral imperative, linked to the social and political challenges of the day, the creation of a non-racial, non-sexist and just society will remain a dream deferred”. This is in line with Galtung’s (1969) definition of violence, suggesting that the variance between the promise (potential) and the lived reality (actual outcome) could be attributed to the presence of violence due to the exclusionary violence against the soul of students through the marginalisation of their embodied lived experiences from the educational landscape. Thus, at least for education to have a meaningful impact in the African context, the contextual content should be foregrounding the lived African experiences and embodied knowledge of the students. “[H]umans’ psychologies and emotions are made up through practices that are significantly shaped by power relations that have been internalised into the body through active engagement with social-structural relation”, Fataar (2018, p. 601) argues, and as such warrants the required openness to indigenous knowledge and value systems (inclusive of the embodied knowledge of the student). Thus far, we have argued that the university education landscape is riddled with violence. Specifically, structural violence (social injustice) evident in the power imbalance between the university teacher and the student through the teaching pedagogy that views the teacher as the expert that will transfer knowledge to the student. It is also evident in indoctrination as a form of punishment-and-reward violence that is not open for critical engagement of learning content. In doing so, the student is silenced and encouraged to accept certain knowledge as the “truth”. Finally, it is also seen in the violence towards the soul of the student (psychological violence) by disregarding the lived experiences of the student and thereby issuing a judgement on the value that the student (and his/ her lived local knowledge and value system) inherently beholds of a being of (not) equal worth. When university teachers (and other citizens involved in the higher education landscape) can critique the current educational sector after noticing the presence of violence, the next required step is to take the risk of implementing change through an action to disrupt the status quo.

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However, taking action—to step into the space of risk—requires a particular willingness. The following section looks at the required transformative pedagogy that could disrupt the educational landscape, leading to a less disruptive and violent country (continent and world) with more social cohesion. This is achieved through democratic citizens (graduates) who can create the required conditions for human engagement in a diverse world. That requires democratic educators who believe in realising the deferred dream of greater equality, who are able and willing to take the critical next step—that of restorative action.

F rom Risk to Transformative Pedagogy as Disruption Through the offering of critique, university teachers risk being alienated and marginalised, and often educators forgo taking the necessary action to counter the possible initial exposure to isolation (Zembylas, 2003). Yet, the plight of humanity urges university teachers to transcend from the personal self-position to that of the communal call for justice and peace, implying the absence of violence, inclusive of epistemological violence in the educational landscape. University teachers acknowledging the transformative potential of society within education “aim to equip their students with the knowledge, attitudes and skills needed to transform society into a place where social justice can exist” (Charalambous et al., 2020, p. 109). We argue for the following three actions to start teaching towards transformation—in developing the student's humanity, namely relational care, deliberation and responsibility. Chapter 11 explores relational care further, and hence, this section focuses on the concepts of deliberation and responsibility and the associated risks.

On Deliberation Democratic societies require participation and decision-making from citizens (Bingham & Biesta, 2010). The ability to meaningfully articulate one's views; listening to the views of others without being clouded by

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preconceived biases; critically reflect on that being said and that being heard, and re-articulating positionality—thus being able to participate purposefully in deliberation—pre-supposes sound decision-making ability. Therefore, the educational encounter should prepare students to engage meaningfully with people with diverse opinions, value systems and lived past experiences. Hansen et al. (2009, p. 601) reason, therefore, that deliberation offers the opportunity to “create reflective distance from the immediate aspects of valuing and learn to discern, to appreciate, and to judge. Put another way, people can learn to reach rather than merely pass judgement.” Using deliberation as a pedagogic teaching activity implies that the university teacher will invite students to find their voices, open up by speaking up, affording others respect and dignity by listening and own their past lived experiences (Backer, 2017; Greene, 1995). Evidently, the university teacher is responsible for creating the required safe environment where students want to respond to the invitation as they firstly feel they belong in and to this group (community; space) and is secondly, be aware of the ethos of equal worth bestowed on all participants (Davids & Waghid, 2021). Such a pedagogic teaching activity requires the university teacher to be open to learning from the student, thus opening her- or himself up to being transformed by the students. Put differently, it means being open to possible new ways of seeing, being and acting and is in line with Hansen’s (2011) theory of listening with others, rather than merely listening to others. Listening will exhibit a willingness to be shaped by another—“an imaginative, aesthetic exercise of trying to see the world as they do, to try to grasp the underlying values, beliefs, and aspirations that inform their ways of looking and knowing” (Hansen, 2011, p. 166). Not only does deliberation reduce the structural violence (social injustice) as perceived by Galtung (1969) through re-calibrating the traditional power imbalance, but it also allows for new knowledge to be produced. As this knowledge is embedded in students’ lived embodied knowledge and value systems and formed through critical engagement, such knowledge will often be apt for current societal ills. Therefore allowing for knowledge and university teaching to firstly affect society directly and, secondly, to validate the value, contribution and worth of the

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student’s being. In doing so, violence against the soul of the student is reduced. Davids and Waghid (2016, p.  1145) reason, therefore, that deliberation as pedagogic teaching practice leads to the teacher relaxing their pedagogical authority, whilst “in turn, students’ coming to speech are expanded, [hence] the possibility of co-belonging becomes a conduit that connects the pedagogical interests of both teachers and students”. Arguably, such an encounter is cloaked in risk. We will briefly mention some risks of using deliberation as a pedagogic activity to reduce epistemic violence in the educational landscape. Firstly, university teachers risk experiencing personal discomfort as they will be confronted to critically reflect on their beliefs and practices (Griffiths, 2003). Chubbuck and Zembylas (2008, p.  311) concur that teaching towards transformation and social justice “involves engaging in emotional reflection, finding one’s own contextualised relationship to justice, and creating an empowered sense of agency to take action and transform one’s teaching practices”. Secondly, the university teacher is offering an invitation to the student, thus taking the first step in showing a willingness to be shaped by the student. However, there are no defined metric outcomes or guarantees that the student will respond to the teacher's invitation. Therefore there is a risk that the teacher will offer a learning space of equality founded on respect and enhancing the human dignity of others, yet it might be met by disrespect. And thirdly, there is a real risk that the university teacher does not have the required capabilities and skills to facilitate a deliberative learning encounter as s(he) was perhaps not trained or skilled to do it or s(he) might lack the confidence to implement and step into the unknown (UNESCO, 2020).

Towards Responsibility Greene (2001, p. 129) aptly probes how people are moved from notice to action in pursuit of social justice: “how to free them to respond not only to the human condition which we all share but to the injustices and the undeserved suffering and the violence and the violations”. The value of deliberation, therefore, lies in the potential that when students and university teachers feel that they co-belong to a wider community—thus

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recognising the shared humanity—that it could result in the proffering of “substantive solutions for particular societal problems” (Waghid, 2020, p. 302). In this way, an “ethic of care and respect for the vulnerable and disadvantaged in society” is demonstrated (McLean & Walker, 2016, p. 148). As such, Meyers (2008, p. 2019) argues that it is imperative that transformative pedagogy includes “posing real-world problems that address societal inequalities; and helping students implement action-­ oriented solutions”. Not only will such a societal focus contribute to the critical reflection on the relationship between power and knowledge, it will also become clearer who marginalised and excluded are. When students are invited to connect theoretical knowledge to lived difficulties, education transcends the walls of the institution for the social good of society. When students are introduced to a specific form of injustice to come up with solutions, they do so as they are driven to alleviate the suffering that is witnessed (Waghid, 2005). The important aspect to note here is that it is not about philanthropic endeavours but instead coming alongside a community facing a specific challenge and together coming up with possible solutions to eradicate the lived inequality and injustice (Annette, 2005; Braskamp, 2011). Such an approach to teaching leads to “learning that transcends the mind and connects with hearts and hands by transforming knowledge, attitudes, skills, and the learner [and teacher]” (Adeto, 2019, p. 29). Evidently, there are some risks to navigate. Firstly, there is a possibility that the teacher (or the students) could be confronted with a diverse ethnic community where there is hatred, animosity and distrust due to the colonial past of several countries. Navigating and bearing “witness to one’s own or another’s trauma” is complex and requires compassion (Zembylas, 2006, p.  306). Secondly, due to personal trauma and past experiences, the university teacher (or students) could be raptured when facing and encountering particular community-based difficulties and inequalities (UNESCO, 2020). In this section, we highlighted how the appropriate response by democratic university teachers to reduce systemic violence within the education landscape could include the implementation of a teaching pedagogy that is premised on relational caring, deliberation and responsibility. We also offered some risks of such an appropriate response.

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Summary In this chapter, by using a deconstructionist lens and appropriating Galtung’s (1969) theory on violence (social justice) and peace (social cohesion), we identified some examples of evidence of the violence that is present within the pedagogical teaching practices and curriculum content in the higher education landscape. This includes structural violence and violence against the soul of the student, that is exclusionary by nature. Subsequently, we argued that university teachers should be willing to act by making changes from this position of critique, even though there will be some risks involved. We argued for a pedagogy that will lead to encounters that are deliberative and responsible. “A just society is something that we make together, by thinking and working with others so that freedom is constructed in-between” (Walker, 2006, p. 127).

References Adeto, A. I. (2019). Transformative pedagogy for building peace. In APCEIU (Ed.), Reconciliation, peace, and global citizenship education: Pedagogy and practice (pp. 28–35). APCEIU. Annette, J. (2005). Character, civic renewal and service learning for democratic citizenship in higher education. British Journal of Educational Studies, 53(3), 326–340. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-­8527.2005.00298.x Assié-Lumumba, N. T. (2011). Higher education as an African public sphere and the university as a site of resistance and claim of ownership for the national project. Africa Development, XXXVI(2), 175–206. https://www.ajol. info/index.php/ad/article/view/74107 Backer, D.  I. (2017). The critique of deliberative discussion. Democracy and Education, 25(1), Article 9. https://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/ vol25/iss1/9 Bingham, C., & Biesta, G. (2010). Jacques Rancière: Education, truth, emancipation. Continuum International Publishing Group. Braskamp, L.  A. (2011). Higher education for civic learning and democratic engagement: Reinvesting in longstanding commitments. Diversity & Democracy. Civic Learning for Shared Futures, 14(3), 1–4. https://www.aacu. org/publications-­research/periodicals/higher-­e ducation-­c ivic-­l earning­and-­democratic-­engagement-­0

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11 An African University, Caring with Humanity and Decolonisation

Introduction If there is more to know, then there must be more to do, more to be conscious of and more to be responsible for—which is ultimately what the teaching-learning pilgrimage is meant to awaken in each of us. (Davids & Waghid, 2019, p. 102)

In response to this required continuous awakening inside university teachers at higher education institutions (HEIs), it is worth exploring a pedagogy premised on care. We intentionally turn towards a pedagogy of care because of the similarities with the African notion of ubuntu. In line with the “African notion of ubuntu, the self needs the other in order to cultivate his or her humanity” (Waghid et al., 2020, p. 116). Differently put, the notion of ubuntu can be perceived as an epistemology where “[a] person is a person in the community, and his or her individuality is exercised through others in that community. This attests to a culture of mutual relations, of caring for one another and sharing with one another” (Shanyanana & Waghid, 2016, p.  107). To our mind, therefore, an Ubuntu university in becoming will provide a nurturing and enabling environment for success which not only speaks to academic success, but © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_11

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equally so to offer opportunities for the cultivation of citizens that are concerned for human and planetary well-being through a pedagogy of care. Such a promise of potentiality, of becoming of students and teachers (and a university), is offered as a critical-reflective surface for current mainstream institutions of higher education. In moving towards a pedagogy of care, we specifically draw on the views of Nel Noddings and Joan Tronto that have conducted several research projects concerning the notion of an ethic of care. From this premise, we use Yusef Waghid’s argumentation for a pedagogy of care, as depicted in Towards a philosophy of caring in higher education: Pedagogy and nuances of care (2019), infused by illustrative examples proffered by Volf (1996, 2001) and Rosa (in Schiermer & Pettenkofer, 2017), to present that care is a prerequisite in the African context in pursuit of decoloniality of curriculum and praxis. The chapter introduces three concepts relevant to this chapter, which Noddings, through her research projects aimed at establishing an ethic of care, robustly argues for. Following on from these foundational thoughts, the focus turns towards the different phases and elements of care, as depicted by Tronto. The next section focuses on Waghid’s interpretation of a pedagogy of care for HEIs on the African continent. Having briefly provided a framework for this chapter, the next section addresses three particular concepts of an ethic of care as depicted by Noddings (2005, 2010).

 n Ethic of Care: A Perspective A of Nel Noddings Firstly, Noddings (2010) explicates that there will always be the carer position and the cared-for position in a relationship of care, although mutuality could be expected. “Mutuality is an act of engagement where humans recognise one another’s presence as they endeavour to make sense of one another’s presence in the relationship” (Davids & Waghid, 2020, p. 2). As such, those who occupy a position are not necessarily set in stone. From an educational perspective, such a form of mutuality or interchange between the carer and cared-for position correlates with Jacques Rancière’s notion of equality between the student and the university teacher (1991). Therefore, moving towards a pedagogy of care

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emphasises the formation of a relationship between the university teacher and the student, as “an ethic of care begins with relation” (Noddings, 2010, p. 128). Secondly, Noddings (2005, 2010) identifies three ways a university teacher can demonstrate care for the student from the carer position. Firstly, Noddings (2005, 2010) argues that the carer models care for the cared-for. Such modelling of care, Noddings (2010) argues, is evidenced in how the carer engages with others (the cared-for or the not cared-for other) through encounters. Through this way of being and acting with and through encounters observed by the cared-for, the carer reveals empathy towards others. Secondly, the carer engages through dialogue with the cared-for (Noddings, 2005, 2010). Through the practice of dialogue, the carer expands on the visual depiction of the modelling of care (Noddings, 2010). Through dialogue, an opportunity is opened up to establish the notion of collective relations—our shared humanity that all individuals are part of—to foster empathy for others and cultivate those conditions for human engagement that will result in moral decisions and actions towards others (Noddings, 2005, 2010). Dialogue conveys a component of listening and of speaking. Trust will be established by demonstrating the carer listening to the cared-for (Noddings, 2005). Trust, we believe, is intrinsic to meaningful relations and, therefore, relations that awaken the possibility of transformation will be embedded in trust between the carer and the cared-for. And lastly, the carer confirms the cared-for (Noddings, 2010). Such confirmation will assist the cared-for “in developing their best selves” (Noddings, 2005). Simply put, “[t]o confirm another, we need to know that other quite well [thus have a caring relation], and we must be capable of empathic accuracy” (Noddings, 2010, p.  66). Confirmation in such a manner of the known cared-for, speaking life into their world, thus speaking the truth of who the cared-for intrinsically are, assists the cared-for in engendering the required attributes for living a life as a socially just human being. Thirdly, Noddings (2010) elaborates on the difference between caring about and caring for others. In essence, Noddings (2010) argues that it is impossible to care for all of humanity as they are sometimes far removed, and an encounter is not possible. However, it is possible to care about the distant other. Encounters between the carer and cared-for are thus, in

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essence, a prerequisite for caring relations. However, it is possible “that caring about may inspire caring for”, thus resulting in the arranging of direct encounters by the carer (Noddings, 2010, p. 51). Such encounters will thus lead to the transformation of the carer, as the carer will move from the distant self that cares about others to the relationally present self that cares for the other. This section briefly introduced three concepts of an ethic of care as depicted by Noddings (2005, 2010). Such a perspective of an ethic of care falls within an ubuntu educational paradigm, as through educational encounters that are premised on care, “relationships could be fostered that allow the opening up of space for the other”—both for the teacher and for the student (Waghid et al., 2020, p. 93 ). Following on, we will briefly introduce the phases and elements of care, as depicted by Tronto.

An Ethic of Care: Perspective of Joan Tronto In contemplating the process of care, Fisher and Tronto (1990) recognise four phases of care. Several scholars, such as Zembylas et al. (2014) and Sevenhuijsen (2018), utilise the Fisher and Tronto (1990) phases of care in the context of higher education. Fisher and Tronto’s phases of care proffer a contrasting perspective to that of Noddings’s (2010) views; that it is not possible to care for all of humanity (especially the distant other), yet through caring about, the carer beholds the potential to move beyond the physical distance to care for. However, for Fisher and Tronto (1990), the pathway towards care starts with caring about as phase one. To their mind, “caring about” is associated with the moral element of being attentive to the needs of others. Naudé (2017, p. 2) concurs,—“[t]here can be no moral question unless the problem is perceived”, subsequently “[t]his failure to see [to notice] and to embrace co-suffering is at the root of the indifference to the many social and ethical problems facing us”. The second phase, “caring for”, is associated with the moral element of taking responsibility for the known need—that which was noticed. Terblanche (2019) agrees, arguing that opportunities should be created for individuals to learn to notice whether the consequences of inequality or injustice could lead to deliberate action to eradicate lived trauma. The

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third phase, “caregiving”, is associated with the moral element of competence to provide the required, known need, whilst the fourth phase, “care receiving”, is associated with the moral element of responsiveness (the caregiver being attentive to the response of the care receiver). Tronto further developed her understanding of an ethic of care concerning social justice, democratic institutions and citizenship in issuing Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (1993) and Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality and justice (2013). Particularly so, Tronto (2013) introduces the fifth phase in caring that is valuable to higher education pedagogy in light of the challenge that HEIs face to cultivate socially just democratic citizenships in a time where neoliberal markets significantly shape curriculum content. The fifth phase, “caring with”, Tronto (2013) argues, is a necessary final phase in and for democratic care. “This final phase of care requires that caring needs and the ways in which they are met need to be consistent with democratic commitments to justice, equality, and freedom for all” (Tronto, 2013, p.  23). The notion of “caring with” is in line with Hansen’s (2011) notion of “listening with”. The “with” creates the opportunity for an appropriate response, shaped by openness towards the previously unknown. Caring relations or the lack thereof could thus influence the social cohesion experienced within a democracy, the level of inequality amongst citizens, the marginalisation of certain groups and the lived realities of poverty measured in the lack of basic services. Zembylas et al. (2014, p. 10) particularly argue that higher education institutions should, through pedagogical practices, provoke students and university teachers to critically reflect and “critique [if required] neoliberal notions that they are personally responsible for the circumstances in which they find themselves, especially in situations of inequality and exclusion”; which is relevant for the unequal South African society reminiscent of the country’s apartheid past. This section briefly introduces Tronto’s view of care, specifically that of “caring with”, connecting a political and social agency to relational care. From a pedagogical perspective, this implies that university teachers should be aware of the value of caring relations as “caring with” could lead to cultivating the required citizenry to participate responsibly in democracies. This particular perspective of an ethic of care supports the

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paradigm of ubuntu education, which is concerned with social responsiveness (Waghid et al., 2021). Particularly, ubuntu “is about reaching out to others, for instance, compassion is the showing of empathy for the suffering of others, prompting one to selflessly help them, or to try to understand their sorrow or problems” (Shanyanana, 2011, p.  135). In this manner, relational care, focusing on societal transformation towards justice, demonstrates the connection between an ethic of care (individual decision during the educational encounter) and ubuntu (individual co-­ existence). In the next section, we focus on a pedagogy of care.

 owards a Pedagogy of Care: Perspectives T of Yusef Waghid In Towards a philosophy of caring in higher education: Pedagogy and nuances of care (Waghid, 2019), Waghid argues that practical caring as pedagogy is rhythmic. He argues that it is rhythmic in the sense that university teachers should hold back their judgements in such a manner that students are invited and encouraged to re-elucidate their judgements and insights (Waghid, 2019). It is evident in this book that Waghid’s notion of “rhythmic care” was shaped by his individual lived journey. Waghid (2019) explains how his grandfather had little patience with his imperfection in relation to his Muslim learning of the Quran and that his grandfather will quickly show his disappointment when he made errors. Subsequently, his grandfather enrolled him at a local madrassa (Muslim school). In contrast, the teacher at the madrassa “would listen attentively to my recitation without abruptly correcting my mistakes” (Waghid, 2019, p. 44). Instead, the teacher would request that certain verses (those that were mispronounced) be repeated, and only after a second mistake will the teacher show the error and explain the reason for the error. Waghid (2019, p. 44) argues that being able to observe and experience such a modelling of care, significantly infused his pedagogical practices: At times, I would listen to Philosophy of Education students’ unjustifiable views, without pointing out their mistakes. I would allow them to make

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those mistakes only with the possibility that they might recognise their own mistakes in the light of ongoing conversations about concepts in class.

Rhythmic caring is a pedagogical approach that could develop the required values for participating as a socially just and responsible citizen in a democratic state. As such, we argue that rhythmic caring as pedagogy is particularly relevant to the African continent in light of the quest for decoloniality of space and praxis in higher education. Rhythm signifies movement that gives and holds back, which implies that teaching should simultaneously present an invitation to participation, whilst the possibility of rupturing is equally imminent (Davids & Waghid, 2017). Therefore, pedagogy that could lead to transformation demands “[m]orally discerning judgement” from the university teacher— a profound responsibility (Gutmann, 2003, p. 498). In this section, we present three arguments of a pedagogy of care that advances the education project of an African university. Firstly, a pedagogy of rhythmic care establishes meaningful relations between students and university teachers with transformational potential. Secondly, it advances the plight for the decoloniality of the African educational project. Thirdly, it contributes towards the required conditions for global citizenship education (GCE). Firstly, in response to Noddings’s (2005, 2010) view that care should be modelled by the carer and strengthened through dialogue, Waghid (2019, p. 15) argues that university teachers should “invite students (the cared-for) to bring into question what their carers (university teachers) have to say, and then to articulate more informed and alternative understandings”. Such a level of deliberation, where students can construct and reconstruct arguments as a result of the modelling of deliberation by the university teacher, could result in the manifestation of caring relationships premised on trust. Furthermore, the aim of dialogue or deliberation is not primarily for all parties to agree on every little detail but to transform and shape an individual’s perspective broader than their own predetermined perceptions. A democracy requires that citizens can deliberate, that means articulate, listen and reflect and re-articulate, to participate in the democracy with the aim of social justice. “[E]ducation that develops the capacity to

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deliberate amongst adults who should treat one another and be treated as civic equals” is of importance for any democracy (Gutmann, 2002, p. 25). HEIs, through pedagogical activities, can harness these abilities and qualities, such as independent thinking, logical reasoning and articulation, for deliberation. Deliberation, Waghid (2019) argues, could disrupt current practices that perpetuate inequality, as students can be assisted to develop care. Gutmann (2003, p. 508) agrees: The virtues that deliberation encompasses include veracity, non-violence, practical judgment, civic integrity, and magnanimity. By cultivating these and other deliberative skills and virtues, a democratic society helps secure both the basic liberty and opportunity of individuals and the collective capacity of individuals to pursue justice.

Cultivating care for the other, social injustice and inequality, is the democratic responsibility of HEIs (Waghid, 2019). Therefore, students should not only become technical experts but also develop their humanity in such a manner that they can care about, care for and most importantly care with humanity. As such, relational care that will result in practical action is required (Waghid, 2019). This view of rhythmic care that is ever-moving, bursting with the potentiality of moments that can lead to a meaningful rupture that can transcend into practical action, could equally find expression in Rosa’s notion of “resonance”. Rosa, in conversation with Schiermer, elaborates on the significance of the interpretation of “resonance”: First, affection: we feel truly touched or moved by someone or something we encounter. … Second, emotion: we feel that we answer this ‘call’, we react to it with body and mind, we reach out and touch the other side as well—in a word, we experience self-efficacy in this encounter. … Third, in this process of being touched and affected by something and of reacting and answering to it, we are transformed—or we transform ourselves in the sense of a co-production. However, and this is the fourth element, ­resonance is always characterised by an element of elusiveness. … [T]his elusiveness also means that it is impossible to predict or control what the

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result of an experience of resonance will be, what the process of transformation will result in. (Schiermer & Pettenkofer, 2017, p. 3)

Like the visual depiction of an encounter framed within the notion of “resonance” above, learning and teaching praxis that is rhythmic is not obsessed with the transfer of knowledge, nor does it envision that all learning outcomes can be measured in a written examination. Differently put, rhythmic learning and teaching praxis, which is both deliberative and an encounter between the carer and cared-for is more concerned about the transformational promise that cannot be predetermined through the established relation of care; where the positionality of carer and cared-for is incessant than with the transfer of technical knowledge that raised to prominence in the current new-market globalised world economy. If the required conditions for human engagement are modelled and deliberated by the caring university teacher, students could become the future disruptors of society to reduce inequality and restore the dignity of those marginalised. Secondly, in light of the African notion of ubuntu and decoloniality, Waghid (2018, p. 61) argues that human interdependence and connectedness [ubuntu] can affect hospitable and hostile encounters that are both respectful and compassionate. Such encounters make humans what they are on the basis that their educatedness and hence their humanity would impact the way they acknowledge one another, provoke one another to see things differently and stimulate one another to act with responsibility.

Rhythmic care is, therefore, demonstrated through the notion of ubuntu. It demonstrates rhythmic care through just living, how individuals (the carer and the cared-for), amid apparent difference, can welcome one another based on their shared humanity. In this manner, change becomes possible. “Pedagogical encounters constituted by ubuntu care could evolve into imaginative openings and reopenings where university teachers and students can favourably think of rehumanising society” (Waghid, 2019, p.  95). A pedagogy of rhythmic care finds expression through Volf ’s (1996) notion of the “drama of embrace”. Elsewhere,

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Terblanche and Van der Walt (2019) presented the alignment between Volf ’s “drama of embrace” and education aligned with the notion of ubuntu. In short, the moments in the “drama of embrace” are explicated by Volf (1996) as follows: • Moment 1: The opening of the arms Open arms are a gesture of the body reaching for the other. They are a sign of discontent with my own self-enclosed identity, a code of desire for the other. I do not want to be myself only; I want the other to be part of who I am, and I want to be part of the other. More than just a code for desire, open arms is a sign that I have created space in myself for the other to come in and that I have made a movement out of myself to enter the space created by the other (Volf, 1996, p. 141). • Moment 2: Allow for the willingness of the other to enter the embrace By opening the arms, the self has initiated the movement toward the other, a movement for whose justification no invitation from the other is needed and no reciprocation on the part of the other necessary, a movement which is itself an invitation to the other and for whose justification, therefore, the simple desire of the self not to be without the other suffices (Volf, 1996, p. 142). • Moment 3: The actual embrace through the closing of the arms This is the goal of embrace, the embrace proper, which is unthinkable without reciprocity. Each is both holding the other and being held by the other—both are active and passive. In an embrace, a host is a guest, and a guest is a host (Volf, 1996, p. 143). • Moment 4: Letting go after the embrace Embrace does not make ‘two bodies one’ by transforming the boundary between bodies into the seam that holds together one body. The other must let go finally, so that the ‘negotiation of difference’ which can never produce a final settlement, may be continued (Volf, 1996, p. 144). The reason for shortly describing the moments in Volf ’s depiction of the “drama of embrace” is because of relevance to the higher education landscape at an African university. A pedagogy of rhythmic care necessitates this open and trustworthy relationship between the university

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teacher and the student—an invitation to all parties in the deliberative educational encounter to be shaped and formed by one another. Such an invitation can be complex in a country such as South Africa, with a marred history of the legalised atrocious apartheid system. Particularly so, as the decolonial curriculum and praxis project have practically little to no actual effect on the educational landscape. In being open to one another, the embodied knowledge of the participants to the educational encounter enters the educational space; which in itself is decolonial. Henceforth, in a country where the consequences of the apartheid system are still ravaging society, the route to justice may only be possible through the act of forgiveness. Volf (2001) uses the notion of embrace to explicate the relation to justice. Firstly there needs to be the will to embrace prior to any judgements about the other. In a sense, that correlates with the notion of delayed judgement by the carer within a pedagogy of rhythmic care. Secondly, justice should be attended to—implying naming what is just and what is wrong. “The will to embrace includes the will to rectify the wrongs that have been done, and it includes the will to reshape the relationships to correspond to justice” (Volf, 2001, p. 21). Thirdly, it is important to agree in a world of discord to what is just. It requires the ability to listen with others, care with others and determine if there is any justness in their reasons and actions. “To agree on justice in situations of conflict, you must want more than justice; you must embrace” (Volf, 2001, p. 23). And lastly, in essence, the tussle for justice lies in the healing of relationships, thus in people treating each other with respect and human dignity whilst wanting all people (and the planet) to flourish. A rhythmic pedagogy allows for students to come to speech through the delay of judgement. Differently put, in a broken society, justice and restoration start with listening to restore human dignity through human interconnectedness. Similarly, Waghid (2019, p. 95) argues that decoloniality, in essence, is “concerned with the cultivation of just and equal human relationships where people deliberate about matters that concern their advancement and where the quest for peaceful co-existence becomes a societal priority”. As such, the lived reality of marginalisation and exclusion by some citizens could be disrupted if HEIs contribute to the cultivation of students that are responsible and just through pedagogical care. Decoloniality

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has the potential for new thinking, as hegemony and indoctrination of thoughts (of coloniality), or the so-called truth or norm are challenged. Furthermore, if decoloniality is seen as educational justice towards societal justice, it is essential that decoloniality validates being open to otherness. Differently put, decoloniality should not be seen as the mechanism to replace Western knowledge systems through a blanket approach. Rather, decoloniality should be against further violence; thus be against a new knowledge or value system that wants to indoctrinate yet again. Since “[d]ecoloniality is an ideal that is rooted in human equality and dignity as it is against undue privileging and prejudiced undermining of one philosophical perspective in preference of another”, it should thus delay judgement or automatic rejection of that which is Western, whilst being open to critically reflect on African indigenous epistemologies (Manthalu & Waghid, 2019, p. 40). Therefore, ethically caring university teachers should reflect on curriculum content continuously to ensure that it does not demonstrate exclusionary or indoctrinate biases. The essence of decoloniality should be that of an in-becoming. Consequently, the curriculum content and the pedagogy used by the university teacher should be open to critique for further improvement, even though at the heart of decoloniality, one is busy with centring and advancing “African ways of knowing” (Shawa, 2019, p.  104). Yet, this requires a specific decentring of the university teacher self. What we mean is that “the self restrains her own advocacy for knowledge interests that prioritise predominantly the self ” (Waghid, 2021, p. 2). Put differently, “[w]hen the self is decentred she develops a conception of knowledge that is reconsidered in light of the collective so that knowledge appears as less compartmentalised in the form of indigenous juxtaposed against non-­ indigenous or [W]estern knowledge” (Waghid, 2021, p.  2). Thus, a decentred university teacher self demonstrates rhythmic caring. Thirdly, a pedagogy of rhythmic care is aligned with the aims of GCE. Care is embodied when university teachers and students alike are “caring with” (see Tronto, 2013) others. That means ensuring that students understand and reflect on the interconnectedness of society. In taking responsibility for an identified need (as a result of understanding the interconnectedness of humans), students have the opportunity to cultivate the notion of acting communally (Waghid, 2019). Caring in this

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manner requires compassion for others and the planet, and such compassion for the broken South African society, could be the required healing balm (Waghid, 2019). In this way, the self is open to the other, and the need infiltrates the self ’s reality, leading to a deepened compassion. Only through recognising the vulnerability in the other can care be given, and such care is evidence of relational love towards the other. GCE, at its core, is dealing with a peaceful lived reality between diverse people and the planet. Bosio (2021) argues for a critical GCE framework that includes a decolonial aspect, caring ethics and eco-critical notions. “Academics [university teachers] who employ a critical GCE approach encourage students to examine the causes of global inequalities and poverty and thus subvert the traditional colonial reading of historical issues by looking at the politicized ahistorical use of poverty” (Bosio, 2021, p. 13). Furthermore, the aim would be to develop the ability “to critically evaluate social, political, and economic inequalities” (Bosio, 2021, p. 14) in students. In part, Bosio (2021) argues that decoloniality of the curriculum, space and praxis and pedagogy of care are critical GCE anchors. Waghid’s pedagogy of rhythmic care beholds the potential to move from the local to the global landscape. This section presented Waghid’s pedagogy of rhythmic care, which is premised on an ethic as care. Specifically, we argued that a pedagogy of rhythmic care establishes the required relationship between the carer (university teacher) and the cared-for (student) that could engender the required conditions for human engagement, advance the decoloniality project at African universities and support the aims of GCE.

Summary In this chapter, we argued for a pedagogy of care that is rhythmic in nature. The act of delaying judgement, intrinsic to rhythmic care, beholds the potential to provoke and bring students to a position where they come to speech. Through deliberation, listening with and caring with, students and university teachers are open to possible transformation. It may lead to transformation to the extent that the plight of the marginalised is noticed, and through compassion, just action is ignited. Pedagogy

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in this fashion fosters mutual respect. Mutual respect “requires a favourable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2013, p. 79). Particularly so, as education premised on a pedagogy of care that is rhythmic in nature falls within the broader paradigm of ubuntu education. “Ubuntu not only includes care and compassion, but also a deep-seated sense of justice. If injustice is done unto an individual, it affects the whole community” (Noeth, 2017, p. 323). The cultivation of students (and university teachers) who can restore justice through the healing of caring relations is a necessity for the global world, particularly the African university landscape.

References Bosio, E. (2021). Global human resources or critical global citizens? An inquiry into the perspectives of Japanese university educators on global citizenship education. Prospects. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11125-­021-­09566-­6 Davids, N., & Waghid, Y. (2017). Educational theory as rhythmic action: From Arendt to Agamben. South African Journal of Higher Education, 31(5), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.20853/31-­5-­1345 Davids, N., & Waghid, Y. (2019). Teaching and learning as a pedagogic pilgrimage. Cultivating faith, hope and imagination. Routledge. Davids, N., & Waghid, Y. (2020). Teaching, friendship and humanity. Springer. Fisher, B., & Tronto, J. C. (1990). Toward a feminist theory of care. In E. Abel & M.  Nelson (Eds.), Circles of care: Work and identity in women’s lives (pp. 35–62). SUNY Press. Gutmann, A. (2002). Civic minimalism, cosmopolitanism and patriotism: Where does democratic education stand in relation to each? In S. Macedo & Y.  Tamir (Eds.), Moral and political education (pp.  23–57). New  York University Press. Gutmann, A. (2003). Education. In R.  G. Frey & C.  H. Wellman (Eds.), A companion to applied ethics (pp. 498–511). Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. (2013). Valuing compromise for the common good. Daedalus, 142(2), 185–198. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/ valuing-­compromise-­common-­good

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Hansen, D. T. (2011). The teacher and the world: A study of cosmopolitanism as education. Routledge. Manthalu, C. H., & Waghid, Y. (2019). Decoloniality as a viable response to educational transformation in Africa. In C.  H. Manthalu & Y.  Waghid (Eds.), Education for decoloniality and decolonisation in Africa (pp. 25–46). Palgrave Macmillan. Naudé, P. J. (2017). Toward justice and social transformation? Appealing to the tradition against the tradition. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 73(3), 1–8. www.infed.org/biblio/noddings_caring_in_education.htm Noddings, N. (2005). Caring in education. https://infed.org/caring-­in-­education/ Noddings, N. (2010). The maternal factor. Two paths to morality. University of California Press. Noeth, C. (2017). Not justice, but care? An analysis of contemporary ethical theories in light of the love commandment. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Stellenbosch University. Rancière, J. (1991). The ignorant schoolmaster: Five lessons in intellectual emancipation. Stanford University Press. Schiermer, B., & Pettenkofer, A. (2017). Acceleration and resonance: An interview with Hartmut Rosa (by B.  Schiermer). In Four Generations of Critical Theory. Acta Sociologica, 1–7. https://doi.org/10.4067/ S0719-­36962020000100155 Sevenhuijsen, S. L. (2018). Care and attention. South African Journal of Higher Education, 32(6), 19–30. https://doi.org/10.20853/32-­6-­2711 Shanyanana, R. N. (2011). Education for democratic citizenship and cosmopolitanism: The case of the Republic of Namibia [Unpublished Master’s dissertation]. Stellenbosch University. Shanyanana, R.  N., & Waghid, Y. (2016). Reconceptualizing Ubuntu as inclusion in African higher education: Towards equalization of voice. Knowledge Cultures, 4(4), 104–120. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325429712_Reconceptualizing_Ubuntu_as_inclusion_in_African_ higher_education_Towards_equalization_of_voice Shawa, L. B. (2019). In defence of education that embodies decolonisation. In C. H. Manthalu & Y. Waghid (Eds.), Education for decoloniality and decolonisation in Africa (pp. 89–111). Palgrave Macmillan. Terblanche, J. (2019). Cultivating socially just responsible citizens in relation to university accounting education in South Africa. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Stellenbosch University.

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Terblanche, J., & Van der Walt, C. (2019). Leaning into discomfort: Engaging film as a reflective surface to encourage deliberative encounters. In C.  H. Manthalu & Y.  Waghid (Eds.), Education for decoloniality and decolonisation in Africa (pp. 203–224). Palgrave Macmillan. Tronto, J. C. (1993). Moral boundaries: A political argument for an ethic of care. Routledge. Tronto, J. C. (2013). Caring democracy: Markets, equality and justice. New York University Press. Volf, M. (1996). Exclusion and embrace: A theological exploration of identity, otherness and reconciliation. Abingdon Press. Volf, M. (2001). Forgiveness, reconciliation, and justice. A Christian contribution to a more peaceful social environment. https://www.livedtheology.org/wp-­ content/uploads/2015/12/20010208PPR.01-­Miroslav-­Volf-­Forgiveness-­ Reconciliation-­and-­Justice-­A-­Christian-­Contribution-­to-­a-­More-­Peaceful-­ Social-­Environments.pdf Waghid, Y. (2018). On the educational potential of ubuntu. In E.  J. Takyi-­ Amoako & N.  T. Assié-Lumumba (Eds.), Re-visioning education in Africa. Ubuntu-inspired education for humanity (pp. 55–65). Palgrave Macmillan. Waghid, Y. (2019). Towards a philosophy of caring in higher education. Pedagogy and nuances of care. Palgrave Macmillan. Waghid, Y. (2021). Why the decolonisation of higher education without critique is not possible? South African Journal of Higher Education, 35(2), 1–3. https://doi.org/10.20853/35-­2-­4621 Waghid, Y., Manthalu, C., Terblanche, J., Waghid, F., & Waghid, Z. (2020). Cosmopolitan education and inclusion. Human engagement and the self. Palgrave Macmillan. Waghid, Y., Waghid, F., Terblanche, J., & Waghid, Z. (2021). Higher teaching and learning for alternative futures. A renewed focus on critical praxis. Palgrave Macmillan. Zembylas, M., Bozalek, V., & Shefer, T. (2014). Tronto’s notion of privileged irresponsibility and the reconceptualization of care: Implications for critical pedagogies of emotion in higher education. Gender and Education. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09540253.2014.901718

12 Towards an Ubuntu University of Technology

Introduction Previously in this book, we attested to one of the aims of universities in South Africa to broaden students’ knowledge and skills in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) in the higher education context commensurate with an urgency to decolonise the university curriculum. Klaus Schwab’s (2016) posits an argument that given the rising rate of transformation in technologies, 4IR will require significant emphasis on the ability of individuals. In the context of higher education, it will require students to adapt continuously and acquire new skills and approaches within distinct contexts outside of the university classroom. This further tasks universities, often criticised for their slow transformation pace, with initiating a new cohort of students into a future of 4IR. The problem is that these students often emanate from schools where a rigid curriculum does not provide students with the necessary skills to face the challenges that 4IR will bring. In the Council on Higher Education’s (CHE) 2010 publication titled, Access and throughput in South African Higher Education: Three case studies, significant attrition rates were reported for students who enrolled for individual degrees at the undergraduate level across three universities. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8_12

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The CHE (2010, p. 30) report further states that at one of the institutions, student-related factors contributing to high attrition rates include student under-preparedness, students’ prior learning and language skills, attitudes, approaches and expectations to learning; students taking less responsibility for their learning and other personal, social, family-related and financial concerns. These are significant factors that have had and continue to influence university teaching, mainly in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Thus, before we situate this chapter in the higher education context, according to an ubuntu university, it is essential to explore the root causes for the aforementioned concerns regarding student attrition in higher education. While we acknowledge personal, social, family-related and financial concerns as significant to student success in higher education, these go beyond the scope of this chapter. Hence, we revisit the relevance and importance of the school context and, more specifically, the curriculum—what we described earlier in this book attributes to psychological violence among students. In light of the aforementioned, this chapter aims to expound on the need to develop the capacities of university students in higher education by specifically arguing for post-critical teaching and learning with technology as a means of further ameliorating the negative connotations associated with structural and psychological violence as argued earlier. We refer specifically to the seminal works of John Dewey (1902/1966) regarding three “evils” as a result of a curriculum that further exacerbates psychological violence among students. We further contend in this chapter that teaching with technology in line with ubuntu is necessary for advancing critique, responsibility, and dissent among students.

Implications of a Rigid School Curriculum on Higher Education In his book, The Child and the Curriculum, Dewey (1902/1966) argued that three typical evils are manifested by a curriculum unrelated to students’ present life experiences, which we infer exacerbates psychological violence. Firstly, for Dewey (1902/1966, p. 24), the absence of an organic

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connection with what the student has experienced causes the curriculum to be merely formal and symbolic. Dewey (1902/1966, p.  24) further contends that: A symbol which is induced from without, which has not been led up to in preliminary activities, is, as we say, a bare or mere symbol; it is dead and barren.

Put more aptly, a curriculum unattuned to students’ lived experiences risks becoming outdated, mainly if subject material does not pertain to the real world in which the student is situated. Students bring their perspectives and unique experiences to classroom environments. Limiting students through a rigid curriculum to solve complex problems further limits their critical thinking capacities. Failing to integrate students’ lived experiences with abstract concepts accompanied by little spaces for critical reflection further restricts students from establishing connections with the course material. In other words, students would not be capable of analysing their actions pertaining to desired outcomes, which are necessary if students can provide relevant solutions to distinct contexts. Considering that critical reflection requires students to trial a variety of approaches towards addressing complex problems, by implication, in such instances, students would not be able to learn or correct their mistakes. This is a valuable experience that would be remiss and has further implications on students’ ability to work as part of a community. This is since learning through students’ experiences usually requires them to work in communities of practice. Jane Roland Martin (2013) holds that an encounter between an individual and an entity involves both the entity changing and the individual simultaneously being changed by the entity through a cultural interchange. Put more aptly, students bring their unique cultural strength to their educational encounter with others in a community, which is necessary to think, learn from one another, critique, deliberate and adapt to changing and dynamic contexts. By implication, the community and the individuals undergo a process of mutual transformation. Roland Martin (2013) adds that when the cultural view of individuals is missing, then a significant share of the

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educational process is lost as well. We infer this as a significant influence on students’ attitudes, approaches and expectations of learning. According to Dewey (1902/1966, p.  25), the second stated evil has further implications for teachers who enable a rigid curriculum uncritically in the classroom. Dewey (1902/1966, p. 25) aptly states: When the subject-matter has been psychologised, that is, viewed as an outgrowth of present tendencies and activities, it is easy to locate in the present some obstacle, intellectual, practical, or ethical, which can be handled more adequately if the truth in question be mastered. This need supplies motive for the learning. But when material is directly supplied in the form of a lesson to be learned as a lesson, the connecting links of need and aim are conspicuous for their absence. What we mean by the mechanical and dead in instruction is a result of this lack of motivation.

In South Africa, the Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS) is the national curriculum that aims to guide teachers concerning the subject-related matter to be taught and assessment measures to be put in place to evaluate student performance and progress. However, we argue that the current national school curriculum remains congested mainly with the subject matter. We further infer that this, together with the government’s neoliberal agenda of treating schools as sorting machines for the university and work contexts, further restricts teachers from engaging in any form of curriculum [re]design in the school context. Curriculum design is quite a complex process, with policymakers remaining at the core of this process through establishing and altering standards, and curriculum designers responsible for aligning a revised or new curriculum with set standards. Hence for teachers to alter the curriculum would require significant disruption of the status quo through an appropriate framework for curriculum renewal; extensive funding in the millions of Rands in the form of consultant fees, printed documents and extensive meeting spaces; and eventual professional development sessions. These impediments are certainly not feasible for any public school in South Africa. Also, any decentralised approach to curriculum renewal may further be contested by teachers who are further accustomed to course material and assessments. By implication, students are provided with little

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space to grasp fundamental concepts and learning skills, leaving such students overwhelmed, anxious and further pressured to keep up with the pace of the classroom through rigid assessment practices. We infer this as a form of psychological violence. According to Dewey (1902/1966, p. 26), the third stated evil is related to the quality of the curriculum through a process of modification that is rather diluted by the time it reaches the student. This modification of the curriculum, we submit, results from pre-conceived judgements concerning the capabilities and capacities of students to grasp complex concepts which we submit may further be exacerbated through the culture of schools. The implications of this process are, as Dewey (1902/1966, p. 26) averred: Those things which are most significant to the scientific man, and most valuable in the logic of actual inquiry and classification, drop out. The really thought provoking character is obscured, and the organising function disappears. Or, as we commonly say, the child’s reasoning powers, the faculty of abstraction and generalisation.

A significant shortcoming of the current school curriculum in South Africa, together with its bloated content, is the limited spaces available for students to experience further critical and analytical inquiry and thought-provoking course content. Despite the school curriculum remaining rather descriptive concerning the need to inculcate critical thinking in students, we argue that the opposite is instead maintained. While rote learning and memorisation, we argue, seem to be advocated in the written school curriculum in South Africa, this may further be perpetuated in the hidden curriculum in schools. More specifically, where the culture of schools does not allow students to question the rationale for a set number of assessments or the necessity for specific course material as advocated by the written curriculum. Of course, teachers won’t always be able to even critically scrutinise the hidden curriculum, as it is already embedded in the school’s culture through individual school policies and rhetoric concerning the need to enhance student academic performance in matriculation examinations. The further justification for

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course material and prescribed assessments uncritically only perpetuates the notion that the written curriculum is best for the student. The implications as mentioned above on higher education, particularly within the context of psychological violence, are threefold. First, students accustomed to functioning in isolation from their university educators stand to limit Roland Martin’s (2013) account of education as an encounter. We have seen the devastating impact student protests can have on university infrastructure and practices when the curriculum is out of touch with students’ lived experiences. Hence, any disconnectedness between students and their university educators in the classroom would need to be scrutinised from the onset. One approach towards cultivating a community among students would be to focus on community engagement. Considering that universities, as structures of change, are integral in enacting societal transformation, the need for university educators to establish meaningful relationships with the broader society is critical in establishing a curriculum in which students ought to be enabled to think more democratically and critically as part of the community and not in isolation. Creating an environment in which students are positioned in (un)familiar contexts is a means of including them in the curriculum by developing plausible solutions towards ameliorating some of the most pressing concerns such as poverty, inequality, gender-based violence and environmental degradation facing society. We contend that students would be more forthcoming towards sharing their lived experiences with their university educators, which is critical if students are to be included as curriculum co-constructors and not as passive commodities that ought to be [re]shaped for the work environment. Second, we argue that a performative culture concerning teaching and learning practices further exacerbates psychological violence. More specifically, a curriculum foregrounded by a culture of performativity in educational environments has significant implications for students who enter higher education and are accustomed to traditional forms of assessment practices. This further challenges university educators to either maintain the status quo or adopt alternative assessment approaches such as problem-­based learning, a student-centred assessment approach.

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The implications of a performative culture considerably influence the way students identify themselves in educational environments. Merely treating students as consumers perpetuates a culture of dependency on their educators. This level of dependency takes away students’ “intellectual equality”, as Rancière (1991) maintained. In such instances, the responsibility is, by implication, shifted to the university educator. Such a transactional relationship between the university educator and students further limits the latter’s quality of learning, which cannot be measured through formal assessment practices. Enabling an environment in which students’ comfort level is disrupted is one approach towards invoking in students the capacities to think more deeply and critically about assessment practices and, more importantly, the curriculum. Adopting a Rancièrean account of the “ignorant educator”—that is, one who invites students to use their “intellectual equality” to produce their understandings of contemporary economic issues—we submit is further necessary for disrupting psychological violence. By implication, students would be more autonomous in their actions instead of being told what to do. This, of course, further depends on the university educator’s willingness to treat students through mutual respect, open communication and a shared purpose as curricula co-constructors. Third, the broad impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution has significant implications for the (higher) education and economic contexts in South Africa. Students who are underprepared for higher education present university educators with several challenges. According to the Future Jobs Report (World Economic Forum, 2020), the rapid pace of technology adoption is envisaged to remain unabated, with skills gaps continuing to elevate in the next five years. Active learning, critical thinking and problem-solving, flexibility, resilience and tolerance to stress remain essential skills for individuals entering and who are currently in the work environment (World Economic Forum, 2020). Despite the Future of Jobs Report outlining these skills leading up to 2025, university educators remain under increased pressure to foresee the skills they ought to equip graduates with to function effectively within 4IR (Waghid et al., 2019). In addition, the risk of subject knowledge becoming outdated in the next few years places university educators under increased pressure to ensure

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that their students will function efficiently within the economic, political and cultural spheres of society (Waghid et al., 2019). In the next section, we turn to how educational technology as a situated practice can disrupt psychological violence experienced among students.

Educational Technology A theory of education has some relation to the thoughts and/or ideas that comprise it. In other words, education theory is defined for the reasons that guide the notion of education. In a similar vein, educational technology may be underscored by the rationale for its use. As discussed in the preface, disruptions to the completion of the academic year, such as the COVID-19 Coronavirus pandemic, resulted in governments instituting nationwide lockdowns resulting in the closure of many residential universities. Educational technology was valorised as a saviour that would ensure the completion of the academic year, as many higher education institutions shifted their face-to-face teaching modality to the online space overnight. However, as was also discussed, this shift in modality saw education technology as a mere tool to maintain the dissemination of course content. As an educational theory, educational technology underscored by such a rationale for its use would see educational technology as a dissemination practice. We would argue that such a conceptualisation of education technology as a dissemination practice will do little to disrupt psychological and structural violence. As discussed in Chap. 10, violence may be enacted through pedagogical practices, as lecturers adhere to a corporate university environment. Often learning is reduced to students attaining outcomes, and the performance of students and the university is measured in figures, reviews and rankings; hence teaching towards a metric tool, such as assessments, becomes of utmost importance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017). Simply put, students are taught to pass exams. Although the rationale for education ought to be about cultivating the holistic humanity of students rather than the mere dissemination of knowledge, educational technology as a dissemination practice has done

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little to realise this imperative. In actual fact, such an understanding of educational technology has further augmented and enhanced knowledge dissemination through advancements in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). For instance, many higher education institutions utilise learner management systems (LMS) that encompass various tools with the potential for rich student engagement. Yet, these LMS’s are used as mere content repositories to disseminate information often discussed in the class. Students are expected to assimilate this knowledge often in the form of a podcast recording of lectures, PowerPoint presentations, or PDF documents. To pass the exam, students are required to regurgitate the information in these forms of multimedia back at the lecturer through summative assessments such as examinations. This example of how educational technology, as mere tools, shows how educational technology can exacerbate power imbalances prevalent in pedagogical practice. Galtung (1969) refers to this as a system of punishment versus reward, as students are required to accept the knowledge in these podcasts, lecture recordings, PowerPoint presentations and PDFs downloaded from the LMS as the “truth”. Any deviation from the “truth” in students’ responses when answering examination questions is accompanied by the student receiving a poor mark. Despite digital technology having the potential to promote social learning, affording students the space to make their voices heard (Wankel, 2011, p. 7), it is used primarily to disseminate information by the “expert” lecturer, and in this way, educational technology as an educational theory is used to augment and reinforce the power imbalances and marginalisation and is thus viewed as a dissemination practice. Coming back to John Dewey’s (1902) ideas about the three evils manifesting within a curriculum, it is evident that educational technology as a theory, informed by its use to disseminate information, will do little to mitigate these evils and represents a dissemination practice. In instances where this information is not congruent with students’ lived experiences, the aforementioned theory of educational technology will do little to situate subject knowledge within students’ real-world contexts and thus remain abstract. Such an understanding of educational technology limits students’ critical thinking capabilities as few opportunities exist for students to share their unique contextualised understandings of knowledge. The educational technology is used to ensure information flow in a

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particular direction, from lecturer to student. Consequently, we have already seen protests calling for the decolonisation of curricula, as students call for a curriculum that speaks to the complex problems endemic to the context of students. As digital technologies have many affordances that can broaden access to higher education, many higher education institutions embrace digital technologies. This has seen a marked increase in the enactment of educational technology as a dissemination practice, whereby content knowledge distribution has only been enhanced. This is done in an attempt to realign the rationale of educational technology as a theory, beyond a dissemination practice, and in alignment with the vision of higher education and the cultivation of holistic humanity of students. In the next section, we expand on the thoughts and/or ideas that comprise education technology as an educational theory, informed by the seminal work of Dianna Laurillard’s (2013) book Teaching as a Design Science: Building Pedagogical Pattern for Learning and Technology, and the African ethic of ubuntu, as a means to alleviate psychological violence. Teaching as a design science: Building a pedagogical pattern for learning and technology provides a framework for considering teacher and learner engagement, social and individual aspects of learning and the relationship between theory and practice, which she refers to as the “conversational framework” (Laurillard, 2013). The conversational framework refers to different “ways of learning”. These “ways of learning” are described as a distillation of some of the more prominent theories informing educators’ pedagogical practices around the world. For instance, these include teaching and learning theories that are not limited to behaviourism, associative learning, cognitive learning, experiential learning, social constructivism and collaborative learning, to mention but a few learning theories informing these “ways of learning”. The ways of learning outlined in the conversational framework include learning through acquisition, inquiry, practise, production, discussion and collaboration. Teaching as a design science: Building pedagogical patterns for learning and technology also provides exemplars of how digital technologies can enhance these “ways of learning”. The first four of these learning experiences focus primarily on individual learning, whereas learning through discussion and collaboration refers to social learning.

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The first “way of learning” that can inform our understanding of educational technology as a theory includes learning through acquisition. One of the most widespread forms of learning in use, acquisition, as described by Laurillard, views students as mere passive recipients of knowledge disseminated by the teacher through reading, watching, or listening activities. In many instances, the knowledge that is disseminated represents one form of hegemonic understanding. This represents psychological violence, as the transmitted knowledge may be unattuned to students’ lived experiences. Advancements in digital technologies such as cloud storage platforms have further extended lecturers’ means to disseminate these hegemonic understandings of knowledge. This contributes to this form of violence. For instance, nowadays, university students can download and listen to a podcast of a lecturer with relative ease. Although this form of learning, augmented through digital technology, allows students to learn about what others have discovered, what specialists in various fields are thinking and applying and what is already known in the area, it is primarily knowledge prescribed by the lecturer. The fact that the lecturer prescribes this knowledge remains problematic and has already been mentioned, and has resulted in the calls for the curriculum to be decolonised, as the knowledge doesn’t necessarily speak to students’ unique contexts. Thus, dissemination of knowledge potentially constitutes an exclusionary practice, as only the lecturers’ hegemonic understandings prevail. Learning through acquisition informs our understanding of educational technology as a theory, as we are cognisant that drawing on this way of learning alone would be insufficient to align our practices with the vision of higher education and the cultivation of holistic humanity of students and consequently the mitigation of psychological violence. This may be precisely why the Laurillard conversational framework suggests supplementing learning through acquisition with other “ways of learning”. Considering the African ethic of ubuntu, which means human dignity and interdependence, a lecturer would need to acknowledge the students’ voice and perspective as integral to the pedagogical process. Informed by the ethic of ubuntu and with reference to the conversational framework, a lecturer can create opportunities to enact human dignity and

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interdependence by creating spaces for learning through discussion. Learning through discussion necessitates students to articulate their ideas and questions and challenge and respond to the ideas and questions from the lecturer or peers. Students may not reach a consensus, but the pedagogic value lies in the reciprocal critique of ideas and how this leads to advancing a conceptual understanding. Various digital technologies can be used to augment and enhance learning through discussion. With classroom practices shifting modality into the online space, we have seen how social networking platforms and virtual meeting platforms are widely adopted to support discussions amongst peers and lecturers. In some instances, these platforms have seen a marked increase in engagement between lecturers and students compared to the face-to-face modality. Some lecturers have equated this since, in the online space, students are afforded a level of anonymity, allowing them to speak their minds and overcome shyness. On the other side, the anonymity afforded by these online platforms may have negative implications. For instance, we have seen many online debates on social networking sites of contentious issues rife with disrespectful conduct, with many instances where individuals are inundated by personal attacks for having a particular point of view. With anonymity afforded to students in the online space, there exists the potential for similar conduct to be replicated on platforms used to support learning through discussion. It is here where the African ethic of ubuntu can inform the use of these online discussion spaces, whereby discussion can be characterised by human dignity and interdependence. Consequently, by supplementing learning through acquisition with learning through discussion, augmented through digital technology and underpinned by the notion of ubuntu, there exists the potential for students to no longer feel disconnected from university lecturers as they can share their perspectives and unique experiences in classroom environments. Supplementing learning through acquisition with learning through discussion, augmented by digital technology and informed by the ethic of ubuntu, contributes to an expanded understanding of educational technology. This may, therefore, also mitigate the psychological violence, as mentioned by Dewey (1902/1966).

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Another way we can expand on educational technology theory to align our practices with the vision of higher education and the cultivation of holistic humanity of students, and consequently mitigation of psychological violence, is through learning through inquiry. Laurillard (2013) suggests that there exists a perceived need for education to deliver a curriculum. However, this tends to bias a lecturer’s interest towards learning through acquisition rather than learning through inquiry. We have also seen higher education pedagogical practices, overwhelmingly concerned with knowledge transfer and acquisition, with limited opportunity for critical pedagogical practices and the creation of opportunities whereby students can enact critical thinking skills. Earlier, we inferred this as a form of psychological violence. Learning through inquiry can play an essential role in mitigating this form of violence. Laurillard (2013) describes learning through inquiry as students actively learning through discovery or finding out for themselves. Learning through inquiry encourages students to examine descriptions of the world and theoretical knowledge critically. Students are encouraged to modulate towards a more contextual understanding, making it their own, not content with the mere dissemination of someone else’s ideas (Laurillard, 2013). Furthermore, students may develop a richer understanding with a more personalised engagement and a more critical attitude towards knowledge (Laurillard, 2013). This form of learning guides students to explore various resources such as the internet or physical spaces like libraries. Higher education institutions have also implemented digital technologies such as Open Educational Resource (OER) platforms to address the rising cost of textbooks and ensure the knowledge on these OER platforms is contextually relevant to the needs of the students. Students may navigate these OER platforms, following their lines of inquiry related to a field of study, adopting critical and analytical approaches to modulate their understanding of knowledge. In this way, students can develop skills through questioning, investigating, hypothesising, analysing, interpreting, arguing, synthesising, designing and sharing. The development of this critical stance towards knowledge through inquiry is congruent with ubuntu, as it also encourages the critical scrutinising of different shared assertions of knowledge. This critical stance towards knowledge, which underpins both ubuntu and learning through

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inquiry, can play a significant role in mitigating psychological violence. Students can thus enact critical thinking skills, contextualise knowledge within their unique contexts and further extend our understanding of educational technology as a learning theory. Further extending our understanding of educational technology as learning theory and the conversational framework, we draw on Laurillard’s (2013) thoughts about learning through practice. Learning through practice enables students to modulate their actions related to a task goal and use feedback to improve their following actions. Learning through practice enables students to develop knowledge of the world and the skills to enable knowledge production (Laurillard, 2013). In the early nineteenth century, Dewey proposed that learning through experiences represents how the curriculum can become meaningful to students. Digital technologies such as simulation software, adaptive worlds, micro worlds, modelled answers and case studies have been used to significant effect to support learning through practice (Laurillard, 2013). As learning through practice involves students modulating their actions concerning a task goal, ensuring that this task goal is coherent with higher education’s institutional and transformational purposes can play an essential role in preparing students for society. With the philosophical and politico-ethical concept of ubuntu in mind, lecturers can set task goals whereby students can contextualise their learning and enact skills to engage within society effectively. Earlier in the chapter, it was outlined that where learning is reduced to the attainment of outcomes and students’ performance is measured through an assessment metric, psychological damage may be realised. This is because students are taught to regurgitate knowledge compiled by the lecturer for assessments such as exams. Within the conversational framework, assessments are not viewed as a metric tool but rather a developmental tool. Referred to as learning through production in the conversational framework, this form of learning allows lecturers to give students feedback, guidance and support, as students share their conceptual understandings and how their knowledge of these concepts inform their practices. Students can share the products of their learning through

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different types of assessment activities. These products consolidate what students have learned through the “other ways of learning” on the conversational framework. Advances in digital technologies have further allowed students to share their learning products through tools such as blogs, discussion posts, photos, videos and quizzes. Additionally, these advancements have also enabled lecturers the means to give students feedback more frequently. It is through such feedback that students can modulate their conceptual understandings and application of these concepts. A concern may be that the feedback students receive steer them in a particular direction. As ubuntu embodies human dignity and interdependence, feedback can be used as a developmental tool not to steer students into a specific direction but to initiate dialogue between lecturers and students. Through this dialogue, students can make meaning of their learning and develop the skills associated with knowledge production. Our understanding of educational technology as a learning theory, drawing on learning through production, and informed by ubuntu, may play an essential role in mitigating psychological violence. Finally, our expanding on educational technology as a learning theory may also draw on what Laurillard (2013) refers to as learning through collaboration in the conversational framework. With the aforementioned “ways of learning” serving as a foundation, this social form of learning necessitates deliberation and consensus amongst students, as they work together to develop a shared product. This is in line with the ideals of ubuntu concerning human dignity and interdependence. With these ideas of human dignity and interdependence in mind, students can work together to develop a shared product. By creating this shared product, learning through collaboration may allow lecturers and students to cultivate opportunities to enact their freedom, collaboratively engage and co-belong. This way of learning can play a mitigating role in psychological violence. Many digital technologies can support learning through collaboration, such as the Google suite of applications and Wikis, to mention but a few.

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Summary With higher education’s institutional and transformational goals in mind, there is a clear need to take another look at how educational technology as a learning theory is perceived. As a dissemination practice, educational technology will do little to support the realisation of institutional and transformational imperatives. Our understanding of educational technology as a teaching and learning theory, drawing on the ideas of experts in technology-enhanced teaching and learning such as Laurillard, provides more opportunities for these goals of higher education to be realised. Furthermore, the African ethic of ubuntu expands on our understanding of educational technology as a learning theory that can play an essential role within the higher education context to mitigate the psychological violence predominating.

References Council on Higher Education. (2010). Access and throughput in South African Higher Education—Three case studies. Higher Education Monitor No. 9. Council on Higher Education. Dewey, J. (1966). The child and the curriculum and the school and society. University of Chicago Press. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167–191. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690 Laurillard, D. (2013). Teaching as a design science: Building pedagogical patterns for learning and technology. Routledge. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.  J. (2017). The emergence and trajectories of struggles for an ‘African University’: The case of unfinished business of African epistemic decolonisation. Kronos, 43, 51–77. Routledge. https://doi. org/10.17159/2309-­9585/2017/v43a4 Rancière, J. (1991). The ignorant schoolmaster: Five lessons in intellectual emancipation. Stanford University Press. Roland Martin, J. (2013). Education reconfigured: Culture, encounter, and change. Routledge. Schwab, K. (2016). The fourth industrial revolution. World Economic Forum.

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Waghid, Y., Waghid, Z., & Waghid, F. (2019). The fourth industrial revolution reconsidered: On advancing cosmopolitan education. South African Journal of Higher Education, 33(6), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.20853/33-­6-­3777 Wankel, C. (Ed.). (2011). Teaching arts and science with the new social media. Emerald Group Publishing. World Economic Forum. (2020). The future of jobs report 2020. World Economic Forum.

 In Response to Thokozani Mathebula’s Assertions of an Ubuntu University

Of course, to have analysed the concept semantically and not necessarily etymologically opened up explorations in and about an ubuntu university more poignantly as has been the case in the literature on higher education so far. Mathebula’s view is novel and rigorous enough to be commented on more scholarly. We offer three remarks in line with the notion of a (post)critical higher educational theory. Firstly, Mathebula advances our argument in this book in defence of an ubuntu university. His use of the dictum “I am therefore we are” is quite apt to reconsider. Like Mathebula, we also use the phrase “I am” to accentuate the university of ubuntu’s claim to autonomous action. In other words, individual scholars have the academic freedom to enact their intellectual pursuits in and beyond the university. If individuals were to have been constrained to act autonomously, the very notion of a university would have to be brought into disrepute. What makes a university a university in the first place is its allegiance to cultivate and secure autonomous individual action—an idea which Mathebula and we agree with in the context of ubuntu’s phrase, “I am”. Such an understanding of an African university also commensurates with a (post)critical higher

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educational theory with its emphasis on cultivating autonomous human action. Secondly, the phrase “we are” in ubuntu is pertinent for pursuing collective human action. However, this collectivity permitted by ubuntu is based on deliberative engagement. The point is, like Mathebula, an ubuntu university advances deliberative action on the part of its constituent members—its intellectual inquirers. This kind of deliberative engagement is both an educational and a political one. Deliberative engagement as an act of higher education is conditional upon autonomous inquirers that can proffer claims of judgements within and beyond a university. The condition of higher education is that people work and act together in a spirit of openness, reflexivity and connectedness, whereby they explore things together for both their intrinsic and their extrinsic worth. The point is, ubuntu cannot be confined to doing higher education for intrinsic purposes alone as that would deny the university from enacting its responsibility towards the public or social and global. And, here, Mathebula’s take on an ubuntu university is commensurate with our advanced (post)critical position in this book. Thirdly, Mathebula is clear in his argument that an ubuntu university should be forward-looking—an intrinsic connection with (post)critical higher education theory—and consider local and global imperatives. It makes sense to argue for such an understanding of an African university because, as we have shown throughout the book, an ubuntu-inspired university remains in becoming. Such a university ought to become concerned with more than just a scholarship of local and social concerns but also address global problems in the quest for co-existence, recognition of plurality of voices and co-dependence on all others for peaceful cooperation and advancement. It is such an ubuntu university that would go some way to address global concerns and dystopias. In sum, we have argued that an ubuntu university would do much for higher education on the African continent and elsewhere to restore the university’s concern with the educational, social and political dimensions of life. If African universities were to be reimagined in the context of a higher education that encourages universities to be more responsible, responsive and autonomous, it makes sense to pursue the intellectual and

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ethical path of an ubuntu-inspired discourse of university education that (re)connects with individuals and the collective as they endeavour to advance what genuine universities should be looking at: autonomous and deliberative intellectuals who take seriously the challenges and opportunities posed by local and global imperatives. It is then that ubuntu will legitimately manifest and create genuine (African) universities. Finally, as higher education institutions in Africa set their sights on decoloniality and the cultivation of global citizenship education, a simple reminder that these two processes are not and certainly cannot be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are intertwined on the grounds that both processes have the political and educational intent to produce people who are autonomous, deliberative and concerned about the other and its otherness. Perhaps, this raison d'être of an ubuntu university in Africa would justify claims to decoloniality and global citizenship education in a way never imagined before. Consequently, it might be prudent to rephrase the dictum of ubuntu from “I am therefore we are” to “I am therefore we are and can become”. This implies that an ubuntu university should always be considered as one in becoming as there should not be conclusiveness of what such a university can entail.



Coda: The Possibility of the Ubuntu University in Post-Apartheid South Africa—A Critical Inquiry Thokozani Mathebula

Introduction This chapter takes a critical look at the concept of a South African university of ubuntu. The author utilises Kotzee and Martin’s (2013) three accounts of the role of the university in society, that is the “narrow social goods” (social project), the distributive justice (distributive project) and scholarly excellence (academic project) as a method of inquiry in this chapter. Against this background, we trace the possibility of ubuntu university in South Africa in four phases. The first is to revisit two broad accounts of the role of a university (the “narrow social goods” and the distributive justice) and one distinctive account (scholarly excellence). Then, we look at ubuntu ethics (social project), ubuntu politics (distributive project) and ubuntu philosophy (philosophical project). After that, we proffer three possible paths of ubuntu-inspired university, that is to cultivate individual philosophical minds—the “I am” approach to the ubuntu university, to encourage widespread political participation—the

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“we are” approach to the ubuntu university, to foster global citizenship— the “I am because we are” approach to the ubuntu university. In the end, we examine promising directions that the ubuntu university can take and might pursue in post-apartheid South Africa. These include a philosophy-oriented university that creates a bridge between scholarship and ubuntu philosophy, a political-oriented university that is scientific research led in its pursuit of social justice, and an ethics-oriented university that advocates for global citizenship education (GCE) both in principles and in practice. In our view, the thought, the talk and the possibility of an ubuntu university is a cry for conceptual clarity of these interrelated but also distinct concepts—ubuntu and university. In fact, one may justifiably wonder whether ubuntu can survive the transition from a pre-modern to a post-modern society. (Louw, 2001, p. 29) The promise of [the ubuntu University] may lie not in a fixation on African heritages as such, but in the ambition to re-appropriate [it] critically and creatively and so surpass [it]. (Van Hensbroek, 2001, p. 7) [I]f [ubuntu] universities are to advance [scholarly] knowledge, then knowledge research and production should start within the continent … before gazing outwards to the globe. (Ndofirepi & Cross, 2017a, p. 42) [Ubuntu] university must therefore, of necessity, work on the basis of priorities … to address both past gaps and the opportunities and challenges of the future. (Nyamapende & Ndofirepi, 2017, p. 82) Such a project as an [ubuntu university] would remain forever in the making—that is to say, ‘in the process of becoming’, since taking risks and being disruptive, while acting humanely, does not produce a finalized project. (Waghid, 2017, p. 40)

As a point of departure, the concept of ubuntu should be perceived in the active (what ubuntu is in post-apartheid South Africa) and not passive (not what ubuntu was in pre-colonial South Africa) sense). Viewed in this light, ubuntu—and by implication the ubuntu university we are

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proposing here—is not an immobile formal institution of an inherited traditional system. By reorienting the discourse on ubuntu and university this way, we acknowledge that the ubuntu university is before us, not behind us, and we must think about it from the future—thus liberating ourselves from the weight of the colonial past. There is a far nobler prospect of liberating our thought from the postcolonial narrative of return if we perceive the ubuntu university as a forward-looking concept—not an archaic one. As Mbanjwa (2014, p. 199) reminds us, we carry our history, “we are our history”. In this chapter, we • revisit the generic (“narrow social goods” and redistributive justice) and distinctive (scholarly excellence) accounts of the role of the university; • look at the concepts of ubuntu ethics, ubuntu politics and ubuntu philosophy; • put forward three possible avenues of the ubuntu-inspired university that cultivates individual philosophical minds—the “I am”1 approach to the ubuntu university; encourages widespread political participation—the “we are”2 approach to the ubuntu university; and fosters global citizenship—the “I am because we are”3 approach to the ubuntu university; and • examine promising directions that the ubuntu university can take and might pursue in post-apartheid South Africa.

 he Idea of a University as Given: Generic T and Distinctive Angles This chapter adopts a critical-deconstructionist theoretical framework that emphasises individual autonomy (i.e. individuals’ ability and inclination to act for themselves), deliberative engagement (i.e. free deliberation among equals who “speak their minds in pursuit of the desirable action”) (Higgs & Waghid, 2017, p. 9) and empowerment (i.e. thinking new thoughts, facing new challenges and charting new paths) in higher education. For the purpose of this chapter, critical-deconstructionist

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theory is employed to show that an ubuntu-inspired university in higher education is likely to cultivate individual philosophical minds—the “I am” approach to the ubuntu university; encourage widespread political engagement—the “we are” approach to the ubuntu university; and foster global citizenship—the “I am because we are” approach to the ubuntu university. And to do so, a critical-­deconstructionist lens look at three promising directions that a ubuntu university can take and might pursue in post-apartheid South Africa. First, a philosophy-oriented university that creates a bridge between scholarship and a collective view of the world. Second, a political-­oriented university that is scientific research led in its pursuit of social justice. Third, an ethics-oriented university that advocates for global citizenship education (GCE) both in principles and in practice in post-apartheid South Africa. What is the function of the university? It is commonly said that there are three traditional missions of higher education, that is teaching, research and community service. For Morrow (2009, p. 113), this traditional “way of thinking about the functions of higher education is not wrong, but it is a cliché, with the opacity of lethargic thinking [and] does little to enable us to understand what is distinct about higher education”. To see why this is so, we trace Kotzee and Martin’s (2013, pp. 628–29) two broad accounts of the role of the university, that is the “narrow social goods” and the distributive justice accounts and one distinctive account, that is scholarly excellence. Let us begin with the “narrow social goods” account that aims to activate a creative working force for the benefit of society [T]hrough intellectual advances and, in order to do this, the university needs to identify and educate the future scientists, leaders, artists and intellectuals who will serve society. … To provide some form of social benefit … how to maximize intellectual and economic progress for the society as a whole … the goods promoted by the university [i]s interchangeable goods such as income, jobs, or social capital. (Kotzee & Martin 2013, pp. 627–29)

As we can see from Kotzee and Martin’s (2013) quotation above, there are four points worth noting about the “narrow social goods” account regarding the university's role. First, a university is understood as a social

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project geared to serving the needs of society—hence the phrase “social goods”. Second, this university’s functionalist role (service to society) is enabled by the production of graduates (scientists, leaders, artists and intellectuals) needed for the development of their society (scientific, intellectual and economic progress). Third, the “narrow social goods” account is commendable, no doubt, but Mbembe (2016, p.  30) cautioned us about a “neoliberal university … [that] turned higher education into a market product, rated, bought and sold by standard units”. In the words of Enslin and Horsthemke, this “neo-liberal conceptions of the [student] as both an investment and a customer … enable her to take her place as a competitive individual working for private profit … [and] play her part in making the national economy more globally competitive than others” (2016, p.  184). Fourth, this pro-human capital position (or investment in human resources) is also reflected in the Higher Education Act’s (1997, pp. 1–3) promise to “restructure and transform programmes and institutions to respond better to the human resource, economic and development needs of the Republic [of South Africa] [to] promote the full potential of every student [and] … respond to the needs of the Republic [of South Africa] and of the communities served by the institutions”. In brief, the “narrow social goods” account regarding the university’s role is a neoliberal state social project influenced by “free-market orthodoxy”, characterised by “individualistic investment in human resources” and committed to “national economic and development” in post-apartheid South Africa. As already mentioned in the introduction, Kotzee and Martin’s (2013) distributive description seeks to restore balance—“right the wrongs” in the wake of educational injustices of the past by distribut[ting] opportunities for power and wealth fairly throughout society … setting right past social injustices … seeking to redistribute lifechances in some egalitarian fashion. … In this regard, the affinity that exists between the ‘job opportunities’ … and the ‘levelling playing field’ and ‘remedy’ … is important … [and] can be seen as concerned about access to jobs … as a conduit to well-earning or well-regarded positions in society. (Kotzee & Martin, 2013, pp. 627–30)

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As Kotzee and Martin’s (2013) quote above shows, there are five points worth highlighting about the distributive account regarding the university’s role. First, a university is understood as a distributive project concerned with questions of social justice, that is justice that prescribed how benefits (some good) and burdens (some bad) are to be apportioned (Holmes, 1993, p.  177)—hence the phrase “setting right past social injustices”. Second, as far as can be judged, keywords such as “redress of past injustices”, “equal opportunities” and “access to jobs” in that order show how “the past is the present” when it comes to questions of social justice in general. Third, distributive justice emphasises “the right to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible” across the country as envisaged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996, p. 12). It is also not surprising that the Higher Education Act (1997, p. 1) also seeks to “[r]edress past discrimination and ensure representativity and equal access … provide optimal opportunities for learning”. However, in a different guise, the university also prepares students from poorer socio-economic backgrounds for the world of work like a conveyor belt to power and prestige in the neoliberal global world order. In Hamm’s (1989, p.  35) words, “[E]ducation is not merely a tool or instrument to do things with, such as to succeed in getting a job or provide one with a skill to obtain extrinsic ends; it is primarily concerned with the provision of worthwhile ends or goals of life.” Amid these diverse but, deep down, so strangely similar accounts of the role of the university, Kotzee and Martin (2013) argue that the “narrow social goods” and “distributive justice” approaches, while undoubtedly important, are insufficient. Hence, Kotzee and Martin (2013) argue that the university’s primary role is to advance knowledge for its own sake—this is a heart-­ achingly expressed call for a distinctive account (i.e. scholarly excellence) as we shall soon see. In a nutshell, a distributing justice project is envisioned in the Constitution of South Africa (1996), echoed in the Higher Education Act (1997) and reflected by references to “redress past discrimination”, “representativity, equal access” and “optimal opportunities” in higher education in post-apartheid South Africa. As already pointed out in the introduction, the distinctive account of the university’s role promotes scholarly knowledge. To illustrate this

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account, in one of their more famous passages Kotzee and Martin (2013) argue, [A]s far as the primary role of the university—the promotion of scholarship—goes, university teaching should focus on the moulding of students into potential scholars in the discipline. … By this we mean that what must set the university-educated person apart is the acquisition of knowledge of, or the development of, forms of understanding derived from some scholarly field or collection of fields. (Kotzee & Martin, 2013, pp. 634–35)

As Kotzee and Martin’s (2013) quote above indicates, there are five issues worth mentioning about scholarly knowledge. First, the pursuit of scholarly knowledge is an academic project—hence the phrase “promotion of scholarship”. Second, this journey (road) to knowing initiates students into scholarship, that is a form of self-discipline that is “develop[ed] and nurtured within an individual”, to use Dupré’s (2007, p. 178) words. Third, scholarly excellence is viewed as an intrinsic, valuable, worthwhile and desirable human activity that can only be exercised—not given. Fourth, it treats “theorising” and “practising” not as unique, distinct, opposite ends of scholarship—thus fostering the unity of both “theory” and “practice”. Lastly, it enables students to make practical sense of deep theoretical issues—scholarship in this sense is unlikely to remain an abstract activity in universities. No wonder that the Higher Education Act (1997, pp.  1–3) “provides the creation of knowledge, respect and encourages scholarship [and seeks to] contribute to the advancement of all forms of knowledge in keeping with international standards of academic quality … for the advancement of scientific knowledge”. In summary, the academic project is neatly encapsulated by the Higher Education Act (1997) and reflected by references to “creation of knowledge”, “advancement of knowledge” and “scientific knowledge” strongly reminiscent of the academic project in post-apartheid South Africa. Let us turn our attention to the concept of ubuntu as ethics, politics and philosophy.

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 he Notion of Ubuntu as Agreed Upon: T From a Diversity of Ethics, Politics and Philosophy As Higgs and Smith (2017, p. 18) put it, ubuntu is “the central ethical idea in traditional African thought”. As various authors have stated, ubuntu as an ethical concept promotes the idea that a human being is a human being through other human beings: “I am because you are, and since we are, therefore I am” (Berghs, 2017, p. 2; Sibanda, 2019, p. 22; Louw, 2001, p. 15). [T]he logic of ubuntu is towards-ness. This logic stands in opposition to the dogmatism of fragmentative reasoning. On the first principles of ubuntu ethics is the freedom from dogmatism. It is flexibility oriented towards balance and harmony in the relationship between human beings and between the latter and broader be-ing or nature. (Ramose, 2003, p. 382)

If one thinks in these terms, that is ubuntu as respect for others, is notable for three reasons: (1) reasonable and cultural autonomy, (2) human responsibility and (3) democratic iteration is an act of autonomy, because humans have the freedom to consider the justifications of others—their reasons for action—in order to make judgements about their own and others’ ways of being and living. … A human responsibility that people owe to one another. … Following ubuntu, they [people] act in community. (Waghid, 2017, pp. 36–38)

There are six points worth indicating about Ramose (2003) and Waghid’s (2017) notion of ubuntu ethics. First, it assumes that an individual is not a separate, isolated object but part of the whole community—humanity. Second, this “collective singular” is often employed in African ethical thought as a normative ethical worldview of African people, African experiences or African reality. Third, African ethical thought points to the “relational understanding of what ubuntu is” (see Sibanda, 2019, p. 51), that is, “relationships that are not static but dynamic, manystranded, versatile and unspecified” (Horsthemke, 2016, p. 353). Fourth,

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African ethical thought is characterised by self-control, autonomy and the capacity to act for oneself, that is the rational self. Fifth, human responsibility fosters public-spirited citizens responsive to the wellbeing of the community. Lastly, African ethical thought also refers to the community of human beings, that is community ties that bind individual ends with social ends. In the words of Maquto (2018, p. 23), as a humanistic concept, ubuntu can engender “interdependent, … and respectful” relations in community members—sociability becomes a universal human trait in African ethical thought. All in all, where a narrow social goods account of the role of the university and ubuntu ethics converge is that both are “social projects” geared to serve the needs of the broader society, that is a market-oriented society and ethics-oriented society, respectively. As we shall see later in a moment, ubuntu as a political concept is an explicitly progressive idea responsive to human problems on the African continent. Berghs (2017, p. 1) adds that “political action linked to social justice seems to be evolving in line with ubuntu” amid “annoying conditions” in Africa, such as famine, diverse national disasters and calamities, political instabilities, endemic tribalism, injustices, human rights abuses, corruption, cultural dislocation, economic backwardness, violent conflicts, overpopulation, mass poverty, chronic debt problems, poor and inadequate exploitation of human and natural resources. (Ndofirepi et al., 2020, p. 77)

Looking at it this way, Berghs’ (2017) notion of ubuntu politics (popular politics) as a vehicle for social justice is feasible, realistic and can, in fact, restore stability on the African continent. Could ubuntu politics succeed in addressing social justice given the myriad of political challenges facing the continent? In the eyes of Waghid (2017, p. 2), “ubuntu can contribute towards achieving democratic justice on the African continent”, i.e. contributing towards healing ethnic–political conflict, and undermining corruption and chauvinistic governance on the African continent”. To be quite honest, the motivation is easy to discern and explain considering the “denigration, suppression and exploitation of the traditional knowledge systems” from Western colonialism to date

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(Horsthemke, 2015, p. 21). Therefore, ubuntu as a political concept has three related purposes: (1) redistributive justice (i.e. setting right past social injustices); (2) seeking to provide solutions to problems identified by people who live or inhabit Africa; and (3) whether ubuntu politics provides solutions to socio-economic problems identified by Africans is accepted. It means that we have to develop a conscious, self-critical and intelligible political action programme in the global South. One caveat is needed here; ubuntu politics in the global South is not a feel-good, cosmetic response to African challenges and problems, nor a too quick, too neat or too easy a solution, but a life struggle for social justice in pursuit of Africa’s sustainable future. As Freire (1970, cited in Torres, 2009, p. 94) said, “[T]he prophets are those that submerge themselves in the waters of their … history and the history of the oppressed. … [P]rophets know their ‘here’ and ‘now’ and … they cannot only foresee the future, but they can realise it.” Tempels (1959), a Belgian missionary, sets out a systematic account of Bantu philosophy—a primitive philosophy foreign to European philosophers. The key principle of indigenous African philosophy, Tempels maintains, was that Bantu ontology (theory of life) is the basis of Bantu psychology. In the popular sense of the word, ubuntu philosophy is often used to characterise a person’s or a group of persons’ attitude to life. [B]y attitude here is meant the general pattern or the habitual way of response of the person to events. In this vein, also, but in a somewhat more developed sense, it is often used to characterise a person’s expressed or observed world-view. This world-view may be the sum total of his assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, and prejudices which are partly inherited and partly acquired in the process of living. It is to either or both of these two senses that we sometimes refer when we claim to have a personal philosophy of life. (Akinpelu, 1987, p. 1)

With this definition in place, ubuntu is a living philosophy—an applied philosophy (or popular philosophy). Behind this popular (ideological) usage, “[T]here is a myth at work, the myth of primitive unanimity, with its suggestion that in ‘primitive’ societies—that is to say, non-Western societies—everybody always agrees with everybody else”

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(Hountondji, 1996a, p. 60). Unfortunately, this collective, spontaneous and unconscious view is precisely what ubuntu, as a philosophical concept, is understood as in Africa. This means that ubuntu philosophy, as a general set of beliefs or collective systems of beliefs, is in desperate need of conceptual clarity, informed valuation and argumentative rigour. In two of his famous passages, Hountondji puts it this way: (1) “[Ubuntu] philosophy, like any other philosophy, cannot possibly be a collective worldview. We do not need a closed system to which all of us can adhere and which we can exhibit to the outside world” (Hountondji, 1996a, p. 53); and (2) “[ubuntu] philosophy is shown to be a myth. To destroy this myth once and for all, and to clear our conceptual ground for a genuine theoretical discourse” (1996a, p. 44) “philosophy is … essentially an open process, a restless, unfinished quest, not closed knowledge” (1996, p. 71). As is now well known, where the scholarly knowledge account of the role of the university and ubuntu philosophy converge is on the use of the term “philosophy”—the pursuit of love of wisdom. Arguably, scholarly knowledge equals the science of questions (asking wise and foolish questions), on the one hand, and ubuntu philosophy equals a general set of beliefs (general outlook on the world).

 ossible Paths for the Ubuntu-Inspired P University: Individual Philosophy, Political Participation and Global Citizenship As important as ubuntu philosophy is, we believe that it pales in comparison to a philosophy-oriented university (individual philosophy) as a categorical imperative for a political-oriented university (political participation) and charting a new path for an ethics-oriented university (global citizenship). An obvious starting point to note is that an ubuntuinspired university has to do with scholarly knowledge first and foremost. Looking at the ubuntu-inspired university, it seems apt to turn to Plato’s (1994) allegory of the cave (and its human condition for our university knowledge or lack of it). After all, the wise implore us to choose and

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travel the road to knowing because what is known is very little, but what is believed is vast—hence the demand that we make a transition from [ubuntu] philosophy to freedom [scholarly knowledge]. [But, this process to re-creating this unity of knowledge] hurts, dazzles, bewilders, pains and distresses … [however] those who gain such [true] knowledge have to ‘return to the cave’ … ‘Staying there’ … tak[ing] care of their fellow citizens and be their guardians, will be perfectly fair … and it’s reasonable. … The point is that once you become acclimatised, you’ll see infinitely better than others there. (Plato, 1994, pp. 240–47)

If Plato’s (1994) allegory of the cave is accepted, then an ubuntu university is concerned with cultivating individual philosophical minds— this is an “I am” approach to the idea of an ubuntu university. In our attempt to (re)establish a unity of a single of these two strands, “ubuntu” and “university”, we should be mindful of three related purposes: analysis, synthesis and improvement. What we already established in the above discussion is that (1) a university and ubuntu philosophy are both in pursuit of love of wisdom—and analysis of the concept itself (i.e. ubuntu university); (2) with that said, the ubuntu university becomes a process with two aspects, that is strict (scholarly) usage and popular (beliefs) ends—it is necessary that this logical relationship be preserved as it is the synthesis of the concept itself; and (3) Siegel (2014) argued, and we agree with the author, that ubuntu university reflects both the scholarship (or science) and the general belief (practice). It helps to bring these two modes to life as this is the improvement of the concept itself. Hence, Hountondji (1996a, p. 77) maintains that “th[e] basic demands of philosophy [and its three related purposes, analysis, synthesis and improvement] cannot be suppressed unless [philosophers of education in ubuntu universities] renounce doing philosophy [of education]”. You may not agree entirely, or perhaps at all, with this conclusion, but we hope you will agree that an ubuntu university’s approach to scholarly knowledge is “a kind of agony” (Stangroom & Garvey, 2012, p. 76). It would be pretentious not to see the “I am” approach to the idea of an ubuntu university as creating bridges between these two philosophical ends: a science of questioning and a general set of beliefs. How, one may ask? Well, the

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answer is simple. By asking questions to evaluate these beliefs critically, students develop their own knowledge and socialise it in turn. At the political level, the ubuntu university becomes a vehicle for social justice. Scruton’s (2007) conciliatory idea of politics (the art of the possible) is likely to provide answers to the questions of political (philosophy), that is who gets what and who says? The first of these questions is about the distribution of citizens’ rights, for example, the right to higher education. The second question concerns political power, that is it is about rulers who hold power to distribute citizens’ rights, such as the right to higher education—this is a “we are” approach to the idea of the ubuntu university. It is clear then that [o]ne of the most relevant [question of social justice] … is the re-politisation of [ubuntu] university. We need to acknowledge that the recreation of alternative university traditions and identities is a political process in which many actors—within and beyond the university campus—will become participants; and that democratic participation in public debate and decision making is crucial in order to build favourable correlation forces for students and faculty within the university. (Ordorika, 2017, p. xiii)

To drive home Ordorika’s (2017) point, the ubuntu university encourages widespread political participation by students, academics, researchers and the like—this is the “we are” approach in relation to the idea of the ubuntu university. To go back to the opening lines of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996, p. 1), in particular, the lines that “recognises the injustices of our past … so as to … heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights”, one can see the State’s laudable attempt to right the wrongs of the past. As Liebenberg has demonstrated, our “[c]onstitution is simultaneously backward [recognition of injustices] and forward-looking [establish a just society]” (2010, p. 25). However, apart from this emphasis, the Constitution (1996) is torn between “transformative” goals, on the one hand, and “democratic” goals, on the other. To heighten this contrast, von Holdt (2013) maintains that “the constitution is marked by these tensions. It is a complex document reflecting the stalemate between the contending forces and the need for the

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redistribution of power and resources in order to right historical injustice”. The result, it is argued, is that democratic elements are likely to be tentatively expressed and outweighed by the general transformative orientation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). It is not surprising that Ordorika’s (2017) notion of the ubuntu university is both a political and an educational strategy based on mass participatory democracy. If we look closer, we can see that “create[ing] a space in which … students in university are able to break with what is supposedly fixed and finished, objectively and independently real” (Waghid, 2005, p. 337) is “the next stage of struggle … [a] battle [that] must be waged” (Gordon, 2016, p. 177) by the ubuntu university. An ubuntu-inspired university is essential in identifying and offering solutions to the so-called grand challenges of the globe. These national, regional and global challenges range from [s]ustainable development to democratisation, from growing populations to scarce water and energy resources, from global IT convergence to the widening gap between rich and poor, from epidemics to financial instability, from war and civil war to transnational organized crime, from the status of women to the future of the youth, from cities for the future to climate change, and from voluntary and forced human migrations to global governance and ethics. (Rensburg, 2017, p. 16)

There are four points worth sharing about the “I am because we are” approach to the ubuntu university and its relevance. First is the relevant question of university knowledge processes in the African continent, which begs, more precisely, the question: who will be the students in the twenty-first century? Second, the ubuntu university serves global citizens “in more distant relations that cross, transcend … national and state borders” (Rosow & George, 2015, pp. 6–7). Third, the ubuntu university accepts that students (in higher education) are global rights holders expected to heed key global calls: 1. The destruction of the environment due to intensified globalisation, that is climate change, biodiversity loss, air pollution, terrestrial system weakening (e.g. deforestation, desertification, agricultural over-

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use), fish water supplies and poverty (Warwick, 2012, pp. 132–3)—this is a call for our planet, our home principle of GCE. 2. As the global village gets smaller we are exposed to “heinous crimes against humanity” (see Waghid, 2014, p. 55)—this is an outcry for a global peace principle of GCE. 3. A neoliberal global world order “has the effect of intensifying capitalist relationships across the world and increasing inequalities” (Christie, 2008, p. 47)—this is an outcry for a “transformed global neighbourhood” peace principle of GCE, as Mbeki (1998, p. 238) urged us. In this view, Bosio and Torres (2019, p. 756) “believe that GCE may help our planet, global peace, and people through its contribution to [active global citizenry] engagement in its classical dimensions of knowledge, skills, and values”, as we shall see in the next section.

The Ubuntu University in Post-Apartheid South Africa as Fought for: Promising Directions There are arguably several promising, mutually compatible directions that the ubuntu university is likely to take and pursue in the future. First, the ubuntu university aims to create a bridge between scholarship (science of questions) and ubuntu philosophy (a general set of beliefs) in higher education in post-apartheid South Africa. As we saw earlier in Sects. 1, 2 and 3, discussion on scholarly knowledge, ubuntu philosophy and a philosophy-oriented university points to the following: • the primary role of the university is the promotion of scholarship; • in the popular sense of the world, ubuntu philosophy is often used to characterise a person’s or a group of persons’ attitude to life; • where the scholarly knowledge and ubuntu philosophy converge is on the usage of the term “philosophy”—the pursuit of love of wisdom— strict (scholarly) usage on the one hand and popular (beliefs) use, on the other hand;

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• the ubuntu university reflects both the scholarship (or science) and beliefs (practice)—it helps to bring these two modes to life; and • consequently, the “I am” approach to the idea of an ubuntu university creates a bridge by enabling students to develop their own knowledge and socialise it in turn. From this angle, the “I am” approach to the idea of the ubuntu university is neatly encapsulated in the Higher Education Act’s (1997) reference to “creation of knowledge”, “advancement of knowledge” and “scientific knowledge” in post-­apartheid South Africa. Significantly, by its very nature advancement of academic scholarship is an individual philosophical journey, that is independent critical thought. To defend this view, (Akinpelu, 1987, p. 1) suggests that “to philosophise is to engage in a strenuous [educational] activity of thought … to satisfy the importunate questioning of the human mind”. To put it more simplistically, the core business of the ubuntu university involves “restless questioning, the untiring dialectic that accidentally produces systems and then projects them towards a horizon of fresh truths” (Hountondji, 1996b, p. 53). Not surprisingly, Stangroom and Garvey (2012, p. 6) see philosophy (of education) as the method of inquiry, that is a “careful and systematic thinking”, reasoning and testing of ideas. As far as can be judged, “[P]hilosophy of education use … logical argument, logical reasoning … to examin[e] every evidence in favor or against any claim, tentative nature of whatever conclusions that may be reached” (Akinpelu, 1987, p. 3). One hopeful note is that the nature of our discipline requires one “to be thoughtful and self-direct[ing]” (Waghid, 2001, p. 211). With that said, Rathbone (1971, p. 104) maintains that “each [student] is his [sic] own agent—a self-reliant, independent, self-actualizing individual who … reads up on things for himself before forming opinions” (Ntenteni, 2016, p.  365). Only a return to the source can enlighten us—university students should not be afraid of thinking new thoughts. Simply put, in an ubuntu university, Africans appreciate scholarly knowledge as a window to fellowship— the whole community in post-apartheid South Africa. Second, the ubuntu university is to devote its time and energy to scientific research to pursue social justice in higher education in post-apartheid South Africa. As we have seen in Sects. 1, 2 and 3—the discussion on

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distributive justice—ubuntu politics and a politically oriented university point to the following: • a university is understood as a distributive project concerned with questions of social justice; • ubuntu as a political concept responds to human problems on the African continent; • the ubuntu-inspired university is concerned with questions of relevance and university knowledge processes in Africa; • the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) is torn between “transformative” goals, on the one hand, and “democratic” goals, on the other; and • creating a bridge between scholarship and ubuntu philosophy is an ongoing struggle. From another point of view, the “we are” approach to the idea of the ubuntu university is envisioned in the Constitution of South Africa’s (1996) provision of “the right to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible” (Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 12). This is echoed in the Higher Education Act’s (1997) reference to “redress past discrimination”, “representativity, equal access” and “optimal opportunities” in higher education in post-apartheid South Africa. While both the Constitution (1996) and the Higher Education Act (1997) deserve to be considered seriously, the heart of the ubuntu university is a plea to locate South Africa’s research project in the global “processes of knowledge production” (Hountondji, 1997, p. 13). In order for this to happen, the ubuntu university should address pressing challenges facing higher education in post-­apartheid South Africa ranging from • “the ever-rising cost of higher education in South Africa … through students’ inability to settle exorbitant tuition and residence costs, deferred academic progress and graduation due to debt or being barred from registering for a new academic year” (Ndelu, 2017, p. 21);

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• to “curriculum transformation t[hat] reflect[s] the lived experiences of [South]African people … recognition of their scholarly work … and recentring the work of these [South African] scholars in the curriculum” (Langa, 2017, p. 10); and • a “genuine inclusivity, such as access to and utilisation of land … renaming of buildings … physical and social reconstruction of the university space … language and institutional culture (Maringira & Gukurume, 2017, pp. 33–39). Let us argue one small but significant point here, that is the process of scientific investigation in the ubuntu university can only be complete if the decisive stage (theorisation) that brings the last stage (theoretical findings) is in dialogue with the initial stage (collection of data). Thus it “promot[es] certain kinds of ‘blue-sky’ knowledge that is likely to result in ‘tangible’ or ‘concrete’ social benefits such as health, wealth and liberty” (Ndofirepi & Cross, 2017b, p. 4) in post-apartheid South Africa. Third, the ubuntu university is likely to contribute to a normative ethical global village through the adage “think globally, act locally” in postapartheid South Africa. As we have seen in Sects. 1, 2 and 3  in the discussion on “narrow social goods”, ubuntu ethics and an ethics-oriented university point to the following: • the “narrow social goods” account activates a creative working force for the benefit of society; • ubuntu is an ethical concept rooted in the phrase “I am because you are, and since we are, therefore I am”; • the ubuntu university accepts that students (of higher education) are global rights holders; and • the ubuntu university seeks to address local, regional and global challenges and problems. As has been argued before, the “I am because we are” approach to the ubuntu university is part of a neoliberal state social project influenced by “free-market orthodoxy”, characterised by “individualistic investment in human resource”. It is committed to “national economic development” in post-apartheid South Africa—a criticism of a “neoliberal university”

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that we offered in good faith. On the contrary, we think that the ubuntu university is a part of a noble struggle for a GCE that transcend the neoliberal state and citizenship rights that are globally portable. What does this task involve in theoretical and practical terms? The answer is that the ubuntu university should give actual form to the ideal of GCE in higher education in South Africa. In order to achieve this end, the ubuntu university incorporates both the formal (principles) and substantive (practical) modes of GCE. First is the struggle against the destruction of the environment due to intensified globalisation (this is a call for our planet, our home principle of GCE). Second is the struggle against “heinous crimes against humanity” (Waghid, 2014, p. 55) (this is an outcry for a global peace principle of GCE). Third is the struggle against “the effect of intensifying capitalist relationships across the world and increasing inequalities” (Christie, 2008, p. 47) (this is an outcry for a “transformed global neighbourhood” peace principle of GCE), as Mbeki (1998, p. 238) urged us. Osei Kwadwo Prempeh (2008, p. 67) speaks of “space[s] being forged in Africa and elsewhere to promote radical, progressive alternatives through popular struggles of resistance through the deglobalisation movement”—but this struggle by the ubuntu university and these democratic political subjectivities must be seen as “new” not “final” academicphilosophical, distributive (political and ethics projects in post-apartheid South Africa).

Summary It thus turned out that the endpoint of my inquiry does little more than identify the starting point from which the relationship between “ubuntu”, “university” and ubuntu university ought to begin. We have tried to show that the ubuntu university is a forward-­looking concept. However, we need to ask how? The answer to this question is simple yet complex. The ubuntu university, as talked about in a neoliberal global era, is envisioned in the Constitution of South Africa (1996) and echoed in the Higher Education Act (1997) in post-apartheid South Africa. Small wonder that the ubuntu-inspired university, located in a market-­ oriented society, promises to cultivate individual philosophical minds, encourage

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widespread political participation and foster global citizenship. It is imperative that the ubuntu university goes that far to enable us to think new thoughts, face new challenges and chart new paths domestically, regionally and globally—three key tasks awaiting all of us in higher education in South Africa. If this line of argument is accepted, it is easy to see more clearly a philosophically oriented ubuntu university that creates a bridge between scholarship and ubuntu philosophy—this is a philosophical discourse, direction and possibility. At the same time, a politically oriented ubuntu university in pursuit of social justice—this is a distributive-justice discourse—direction and possibility, and last but not least an ethics-oriented ubuntu university that contributes to a sustainable future, global peace and global neighbourhood—this is a “narrow social goods” discourse, direction and possibility in post-apartheid South Africa.

Notes 1. From here on, we use the phrase “I am” to refer to an ubuntu university and the role of the individual—the focus at this level is on the agents (the development of the minds of our students). 2. Going forward, we also use the phrase “We are” to refer to an ubuntu university and the role of the State—the focus at this level is on agents and structures (the development of the minds of our students as a result of influences from national formal institutions). 3. For the purpose in this chapter, we use the phrase “I am because We are” to refer to an ubuntu university in the global village—the focus at this level is on agents and structures in the globe (the development of the minds of our students as a result of influences from global formal institutions).

References Akinpelu, J. A. (1987). An introduction to philosophy of education. Macmillan. Berghs, M. (2017). Practices and discourses of ubuntu: Implications for an African model of disability? African Journal of Disability, 6(292), 1–8. Bosio, E., & Torres, C. A. (2019). Global citizenship education: An educational theory of the common good? A conversation with Carlos Alberto Torres.

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Index1

NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS

4IR, 22, 127, 128, 133 challenges of, 127 future of, 127 #FeesMustFall, 10, 12 A

Academic(s), vii, 12, 13, 26, 27, 48–51, 67, 69, 87, 90, 161 advancement, 13 African, 53 black, 26, 27 community, 49 constraints, 50 conviction, 70 dialogues, 41

discourses, 27 environment(s), 26 exchange, 51 fields, 68 freedom, 21, 49, 50, 61, 145 group, 28 inquiry, 101 knowledge, 64 lecturer, 67 offerings, 12 performance, 64, 131 plagiarism, vii programmes, 88 programming, 11 progress, 165 project, 15, 149, 155 pursuits, 28

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Y. Waghid et al., Towards an Ubuntu University, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06454-8

173

174 Index

Academic(s) (cont.) quality, 155 space(s), 13, 27, 28 staff, 20, 26, 27, 44 tasks, 13 views, 67 white, 26, 27 year, 134, 165 Access, vi, xi, 12, 15, 70, 71, 92, 136, 165 equal, 154 to jobs, 153, 154 student(s), 15, 20, 22, 29, 88 Act autonomously, 145 of caring (see Caring, act of ) collectively with others, 18 communally, 122 of comparative education, 91 of emergency, 34 of engagement, 90, 92 equally with others, 18 ethically, 36 of forgiveness, 121 of higher education, 146 with humility, 36 of management, 25 of pedagogy, 25 of responsible deliberative engagement, 19, 78, 80 of teaching, 34 of transformation, 87, 89, 92 of ubuntu (see Ubuntu, act of ) Action deliberative, 19, 22, 146 dissonant, 19, 22, 33, 78 individual, 21

practical, 118 redemptive, 98 Acts of articulation, 35 of comparative education, 85–92 of objective freedom, 33 Africa post-apartheid, 54 postcolonial, 46, 54, 60 pre-colonial, 45, 62, 68 students in, 54 universities in, 54 African academics, 53 aspirations, 46 -centred, 44 challenges, 158 civilisations, 45 communality, 52 communities, 5, 36 condition, 49 context, 52, 59, 78, 102, 112 continent, 36, 61, 67, 71, 112, 146, 157, 162, 165 countries, x, 5, 48–50, 60, 63–65, 73 cultural setups, 40 cultures, 54 elite, 46 elite class, 45 ethical thought, 156 ethic for higher educational transformation, x, 17–22 ethic of ubuntu, v, vii, 17, 136–138, 142 experience(s), 44, 102, 156 family, 42

 Index 

governments, 49 graduates, 68 group approach, 44 heritages, 150 higher education, 55, 97 identity, 46, 55 knowledge systems, 100 languages, 51 notion of ubuntu, 111 orientation, 48 -oriented values, 46 philosophy, 158 predicament, 49 reality, 156 sense, 53 society(ies), 36, 63, 64, 100 traditional cultures, 54 traditional framework, 40 university(ies), x, xi, 4–7, 33–36, 39–55, 59–73, 77–83, 85–87, 89–91, 100, 111–124, 146 university landscape, xii university of reason, x value(s), 43, 62 Africanisation, 39, 46, 51 of universities, 40, 46 Apartheid past, 115 system(s), 54, 95, 100, 121 Assessment(s), 130, 131, 134, 140 approach, 132 practices, 131–133 summative, 135 Attrition rate, 127, 128 student, 128

175

Autonomous individual, 145 Autonomy, 15, 18, 35, 36, 50, 100, 157 act of, 156 cultural, 156 individual, v, 15 of thought, 49 B

Belonging lack of, 25 C

Care cultivating, 118 democratic, 115 elements of, 112, 114 ethic as, 123 modelling of, 113, 116 pedagogical, 121 phase(s) of, 114, 115 process of, 114 receiving, 115 relational, 103, 115, 116, 118 rhythmic, xi, 116–123 care, 123 ubuntu, 119 Cared-for, 112, 113, 117, 119, 123 dialogue with the, 113 position, 112 Caregiving, 115 Carer, 112–114, 117, 119, 121, 123 position, 112, 113

176 Index

Caring, xi, 18, 78, 80, 82, 106, 111–124 about others, 18 act of, 18 ethics, 123 practical, 116 relation(s), xi, 113–115, 124 relationships, 117 rhythmic, 117, 122 for others, 18 with, xi, 18, 111–124 with one another, 18 Change cosmetic, 30 demographic, 20 permanent, vi, 30, 31, 33 substantive, 31 Citizenship global, 2–7, 66, 98, 117, 147, 150–152, 159–163, 168 rights, 167 Classroom environments, 129, 138 practices, 138 Co-belonging, viii, 25–31, 105, 141 atmosphere of, 31 practices of, 31 Collaboration, 12, 25–27, 30, 136, 141 act of, 25 act of genuine, viii genuine, 26 Collective, 6, 122, 147, 156, 159 actions, 19 approach, 66 capacity, 118 engagement, 16 freedoms, 15

human action, 146 initiatives, 6 interests, 7 provision, 71 relations, 113 resolution, 43 social benefits, 72 social problems, 40 solutions, 16, 40 systems of beliefs, 159 worldview, 159 Colonial administration, 45, 46 education systems, 52 era, 60 frameworks, 45 hegemony, 46 linguistic cultures, 51 past, 106, 151 period, 45, 46 power, 46 roots, 46 systems, 54 Colonialism effects of, 101 remnants of, 47 Western, 157 Come to speech, xi, 121, 123 Communal African university, 39, 44, 45, 55 challenges, 40 concerns, 65 equality, 53 life, 42 resolutions, x, 40, 55 responsibility, 70 things, 51 values, 44

 Index 

Communality, x, 39, 40, 43, 45, 47, 48, 52, 59, 62–67, 69, 73 in Africa, 62, 63 African, 52 challenges, 65 commitment to, 65 conception of, 52, 63 concept of, 63 contradiction, 66 elucidation of, 64 expressions, 51, 60 family, 43 lines of, 40 origins of, 62 rationale of, 62 sense of, 44, 66 tenets of, 63 in universities, 66 values of, 59 Communication, 36 medium of, 54 open, 133 Communicative action, 15 freedom, 14 Community(ies) act in, 156 -based difficulties, 106 engagement, 132 excluded, ix issues, x, 55 marginalised, ix, 27 members, 43, 52 of practice, 129 sense of, 18, 19, 66, 78, 80, 82 service, 152 spirit of, 19 Conscientised

177

humans, 5 knowledge production, 7 persons, 6 Conversational framework, 136, 137, 140, 141 Cooperation, 14, 146 infrastructural, 21 lack of, 25 practices of, 31 Covid-19, 134 pandemic, 28, 34, 47, 63, 86, 95 Critical analysis, 52 appeal, 4 approaches, 139 attitude, 139 citizens, 86 contribution, 87 discussion, 99 engagement, 86, 88, 102, 104 exposition, 53, 55, 60 inquiry, 131 look, 149 nature, 4 pedagogical practices, 139 pedagogies, 87 reflection, 59, 73, 106, 129 role, 54, 65 scrutinising, 139 skills, 66 stance(s), 89, 139 thinking, x, 12, 48, 55, 61, 69, 73, 80, 81, 99, 129, 131, 133, 135, 139, 140 thought, 164 values, 6 Criticality, vii, 3

178 Index

Critically reflect, 104, 105, 115, 122 Cultural anathema, 63 autonomy, 156 circumstances, 46 constituents, 55 contributions, 101 developmental needs, 46 differences, 51 dislocation, 157 diversity, 61, 98 format, 46 heritage, 46 identity, 45, 46 interchange, 129 negotiations, 42 perspectives, 51 platform, x, 40, 55 power, 42 practice, 63 progress, 50 setting, 45 setups, 43 strength, 129 values, viii, ix, 42 view of individuals, 129 Culture colonial linguistic, 51 of dependency, 133 foreign, 45 institutional, 51 notion of, 4 performative, 133 of violence, 69 Western, 46 Curriculum co-constructors, 132, 133

content, xi, 34, 96–98, 100, 101, 107, 115, 122 design, 130 designers, 130 hidden, 131 overload, 101 quality of the, 131 (re)design, 130 reforms, 30 renewal, 130 rigid, 127, 129, 130 school, 128–134 spaces, 89 transformation, 166 written, 131, 132 D

Decoloniality, 12, 15, 101, 117, 119, 121–123, 147 call for, 100 of the curriculum, 15, 123 heart of, 122 notion of, viii plight of, 117 pursuit of, 112 Decolonisation, vi, viii, ix, 15, 21, 22, 27, 46, 79, 82, 85, 86, 111–124 of curriculum, 136 of higher education, 45 notion of, viii parameters of, 51 project, ix of the public university, ix Decolonise/decolonised curriculum, 137 higher education, 69

 Index 

higher education system, 12 university education, 12 urgency to, 22, 127 Deliberation, xi, 19, 39, 40, 43, 47–48, 52–55, 80, 90–92, 99, 103–106, 117, 118, 123, 141 act in, 19 concepts of, 55 level of, 117 notion of, 41, 52 praxis of, 54 space of, 19, 55 value of, 105 Deliberative democracy, 61 engagement (see Engagement, deliberative) learning encounter, 105 Democratic care, 115 citizen(s), 98, 99, 103 citizenship(s), xi, 26, 77–83, 85, 115 citizenship education, xi, 77–83 commitments, 115 countries, 97 development, 10 educators, 98, 103 elements, 162 engagement, 30 goals, 161, 165 institutions, 115 iteration, 156 justice, 157 life, 86 participation, 161 political subjectivities, 167

179

responsibility, 118 society(ies), 11, 14, 22, 67, 98, 100, 103, 118 state, 9, 117 university teachers, 106 values, 161 Democratisation, 21, 162 Demographic change, 60 representation, 27 Development, vi, 10, 11, 15, 21, 29, 61, 72, 78, 86, 89, 139, 153, 155, 168n1, 168n2, 168n3 curriculum, 27 economic, 166 goal, 98 of higher education, vi intellectual, 52 professional, 130 socio-economic, 20 sustainable, 98, 162 Dialogue, 113, 117, 166 academic, 41 aim of, 117 with the cared-for, 113 initiate, 141 mechanisms for, 40 openness to, 101 organised, 44 place of, 40 practice of, 113 Digital technology(ies), 135–139, 141 Discrimination, 29, 154, 165 social, 53, 54, 62 Dissemination practice, 134–136, 142

180 Index

Distributive description, 153 justice, 149, 152, 154, 165 project, 149, 154, 165 E

Economic aspirations, viii backwardness, 157 circumstances, 46, 70 dependency, 63 development, 10 developmental needs, 46 discourses, 54 gains, 62 imperative, 63 incentives, 11 inequalities, 60, 123 interests, 11 issue, 50 labour market imperatives, 10 leaders, 67 lives, 51 markets, 11 paradigms, 70 perspectives, 62, 70 predicaments, 61 progress, 152, 153 prospects, 61 prosperity, 10 rationalism, 10–13 rationalist imperatives, 12 rationalist policies, 29 rationality, 10 value, 62 Economy market, 12, 30, 98

new-market, 100 world, 119 Education aim of, 98 alternative forms of, 4 application, 98 colonial, 52, 101 comparative, v, xi, 4, 77–82, 85–92 consumption of, 72 landscape, 102, 106 markets, 11 narrow, 98 notion of, 134 policy, 30 practice, 30 social justice, x, 61, 62, 66, 70, 73 space, 88 standards, 86 system(s), xi, 9, 12, 29, 45, 46, 52, 55, 78, 79, 81, 82, 91 teacher, 36, 41 theory, 134–136 ubuntu, xi, 116, 124 university (see University, education) Educational activity, 164 aims, 3 aspirations, 4 encounter(s), 104, 114, 116, 121, 129 environments, 132, 133 injustices, 153 institution, 55 intent, 147 justice, 122 landscape, 98, 102, 103, 105, 121

 Index 

orientations, 40 perspective, 112 praxis, 51 process, 130 project, 117 sector, 41, 102 space, 121 strategy, 162 system, 65 technology, xix, 87, 134–142 Emergency remote teaching, vii, 33, 34 Empathy, 36, 80, 113, 116 Employment formal, 61, 68 Encounter(s), 14, 47, 66, 67, 105, 107, 113, 118, 119, 129, 132 by the carer, 114 direct, 114 educational, 104, 114, 116, 121, 129 hostile, 119 learning, 105 pedagogical, 33, 80, 119 with strangeness, 54 university, 45 Engagement, viii, xi, 19, 25, 34, 40, 81, 82, 85, 92, 123, 138, 163 active, 102 act of, 88–92, 112 collaborative, viii, x, 25–31, 141 collective, 16 community, 132 critical, 86, 102 deliberative, 69, 146 democratic, 30 human, 28, 103, 113, 119

lack of, 25 meaningful, 100, 104 opportunities for, 35 with others, 28 pedagogical, 27–28 personalised, 139 practices of, 31 student, 135 substantive, 28 teacher and leaner, 136 ways of, 91 Environment(s), 6, 7, 90, 95, 100, 132, 133, 162, 167 academic, 26 classroom, 129, 138 corporate, 98 educational, 132, 133 ever-changing, 87 higher education, 26, 27 macro-economic, vi natural, 5 safe, 104 scholarly, 49 technological, 12 university, 99, 134 work, 132, 133 Epistemological, 111 activity, 81 dimension(s), xi, 88, 92 needs, 89 production, 81 space, 89 traditions, 100 violence, 100, 101, 103 Equal opportunities, 61 redistribution, 61 rights, 61

181

182 Index

Equality, 6, 12, 15, 39–55, 112, 115 communal, 53 gender, 98 greater, 103 human, 122 intellectual, 133 of intellectual voice, 27 and justice, 99 notions of, 15 space of, 105 Equity, vi, 10, 12, 15, 21, 88 gender, 20, 88 notions of, 15 Ethic(s) as care, 123 of care, 42, 65, 106, 112–116 for higher educational transformation, 17–22 -oriented, xii, 157, 168 -oriented university, 150, 152, 159, 166 ubuntu, v, xi, 17, 137, 138, 142, 156 (see also Ubuntu, ethics) Ethical commitment, 35, 36 concept, 140, 156, 166 differences, 64 dimension, 70 global village, 166 idea, 156 imperative, 102 life, 13 path, 147 problems, 114 thought, 156, 157 worldview, 156 Ethically act, 36 caring, 122 defensible, 6

responsive, 36 Ethnic community, 106 lines, 55 Examinations, 131, 135 Exclusion, vii, 26–28, 48, 64, 66, 115, 121 Experiences lived, 102, 104, 129, 132, 135, 137, 166 F

Financial concerns, 128 impediments, 48 status, 48 sustenance, 50 Fourth Industrial Revolution, see 4IR Freedom(s), xi, 17, 88, 89, 91, 92 academic, 21 for all, 115 collective, 15 communicative, 14 concept of, 14 of expression, 39–55 individual(s), viii, 13–15 negative, 13, 15 notion of, 14, 48–51 objective, 13–19, 22, 33–36 of others, 15, 17 positive, 13, 15 pursuit of, 15 G

Global citizenry, 163 competitiveness, 10 concerns, 4, 7, 146

 Index 

convergence, 11 governance, 162 imperatives, 146, 147 landscape, 123 neighbourhood, 163, 167, 168 peace, xii, 163, 167, 168 peace principle, 163, 167 perspective, 6, 77 practice, 91 problems, 146 rights holders, 162, 166 situations, 4 village, 163, 166, 168n3 world, xi, 4, 154, 163 Global citizenship education, 2–7, 117, 147, 150, 152 Globalisation, 10, 44, 77, 167 Governance chauvinistic, 157 cooperative, 10 crises of, vi global, 162 issues, 54 political, 61 poor, 50, 65, 68 Graduate attributes, 12, 29 H

Healthcare, 5, 7 affordable, 6 services, 50 supplementary, 6 systems, 5 Hegemonic education activities, 82 education systems, xi, 79, 81, 82 instances, 79

183

understanding(s), 137 understandings of knowledge, 137 Western values, 46 Higher education, v, vi, viii, x, xi, xix, 7, 9–22, 25–31, 33, 39, 45, 46, 48, 49, 55, 62, 71, 73, 79, 85–88, 92, 95, 97, 98, 101, 102, 107, 111, 114–117, 120, 127–137, 139, 142, 145, 146, 152–154, 161–168 act of, 146 in Africa, 45, 46, 48 agenda, 15 change in, vi commodities in, 11 condition of, 146 context, 127, 128, 142 crises/crisis in, 21, 22 for decolonisation, 21 decolonisation of, viii, ix, 15 decolonised, 69 discourse, v, 10 enactment of, 10 environment, 26, 27 free, 22 institution(s), v, viii, 6, 9, 11, 12, 17, 21, 22, 26, 28–31, 46, 70, 111, 115, 134–136, 139, 147 landscape, ix, xi, 11, 96, 97, 102, 107, 120 market, 11 marketisation of, 11 pedagogy, 115 policy(ies), 10, 20–22, 31 policy implementation, 10, 21 post-apartheid discourse, 10

184 Index

Higher education (cont.) practices, viii, 25, 29, 79 providers, vi public, 33 rupturing of, 9–16 sector, 9–12, 16, 20–22, 26, 29–31, 98 in South Africa, vi, 69, 71, 165, 167, 168 South African, vi, 27 system, 10, 21 teaching, 85 transformation, vi, viii, x, 12, 17, 20–22, 25, 30, 31, 33 transformation of, 21–22, 26 transformation project, vi vision of, 139 Higher educational institutions, v transformation, x, 17–22, 33 Higher learning, 45, 89 institution, 52 Human action(s), viii, 1, 18, 19, 28, 79, 146 activity, 155 being(s), 80, 82, 96, 156, 157 coexistence, viii communitarianism, 18, 78, 80, 82 condition, 105, 159 cultures, 62 dignity, v, viii, 6, 105, 121, 137, 138, 141 engagement, 28, 113, 119, 123 equality, 122 indignity, 36 interconnectedness, 121 interdependence, v

life, 2 migrations, 162 mind, 164 power, 52 problems, 157, 165 relations, xi, 27, 30, 31, 82 relationships, 121 resource(s), 153, 166 responsibility, 156, 157 rights, 6, 7, 98, 161 rights abuses, 157 suffering, 36 trait, 157 Humane actions, 35, 36 world, 6 Humanistic concept, 157 values, 6 Humanity, 40, 80, 81, 95, 98, 101, 103, 106, 111–124, 156, 163 crimes against, 167 cultivation of, 36, 51, 81 holistic, 134, 136, 137, 139 shared, 119 Humility act with, 36 practising, 36 I

Improvement, 22, 29, 30, 122, 160 entities for, 78 of higher education, vi in student funding, 22 Indaba, x, 39–55 concept, 39–55 conceptualisation, 54

 Index 

family, 42, 43 limitations of, 55 notion of, 39, 41, 44, 55 perspective, 48, 52 platform, 40, 55 social, 43 values of, 48 Individual interests, 7, 14 Inequality(ies), 36, 106, 114, 115, 118, 119, 132, 163, 167 gender, vii, 29 global, 123 levels of, 5 pervasive, 20 Inequitable access, 29 practices, 30 situations, 30 staffing, 25, 26 Injustice(s), 105, 157 educational, 153 epistemic, 27 form(s) of, 49, 106 historical, 162 of our past, 161 past, 154 recognition of, 161 social, 80, 102, 153, 154, 158 Institution(s) dominant, 30 educational, 55 higher education, viii higher learning, 14, 52 historically disadvantaged, 20 public, 33 research-intensive, 12 Institutional arrangements, 13

185

corruption, vii culture(s), vi, 22, 26, 27, 51, 166 demands, 13 development, 15 diversity, 21 goals, 15, 17 imperatives, 142 leadership, vii management, 14 orthodox ways, 51 practices, 13, 14, 26, 30 priorities, 15 structures, 31 transformation, 13 value system, 30 Intellectual advances, 152 development, 52 inquirers, 146 progress, 152 pursuits, 145 Interdependence, 14, 137, 141 human, 119 J

Judgement(s), 78, 79, 102, 116, 121, 156 capacity for, 86 claims of, 146 delay/delayed/delaying, xi, 121–123 discerning, 117 inferior, 101 pass, 104 practical, 118 pre-conceived, 131 sound, 97 value, 48

186 Index

Just human action, 18 human being, 113 socially, 60, 64, 73, 113, 115, 117 society, 73, 102, 107, 161 Justice commitments to, 115 distributive (see Distributive, justice) educational, 122 equal, 61 equality and, 99, 115 global, 5 relationship to, 105 restoration of, 18 restorative, viii, 18, 19, 22, 33, 78, 80 restore, xi, 21 sense of, 124 social, 62 (see also Social justice) societal, 122 K

Knowing acts of, 1 communities of, 6 forms of, 1–7 indigenous, 1 non-indigenous, 1 ways of, 3, 122 Knowledge accumulation of, 98 acquisition of, 98, 100, 155 advance, 154 advancement of, 155, 164 applied, 3 assertions of, 139 blue-sky, 166

circulation of, 51 claim about, 2 claims of, viii concerns, ix, x conscientised, 7 construct, 90 constructions, 2, 3 content, 101, 136 contextualise, 140 contributions to, 2, 3 creation of, 155, 164 critical, 3, 4, 6 decentred, 5, 7 dimensions of, 7, 163 disseminated, 137 dissemination, 42, 45, 50, 134, 135, 137 diverse, 101 embodied, 102, 104, 121 facilitator of, 42 forms of, 3, 89, 155 fusion, x glocalised, x, 1 indigenous, 101, 102 individual, 5, 6 instructor of, 42 interests, viii–x, 1–7, 11, 77, 122 justification of, 2 legitimate, 42 levels, 45 local, x, 1–7, 40, 45, 53, 55, 101, 102 -making processes, 46 marginalised, 51 meaning(s) of, 2 medical, 45, 72 new, 104, 122 for its own sake, 3, 154 prescribed, 137

 Index 

produced, 3, 4, 47 production, 2–7, 27, 45, 49, 50, 72, 81, 140, 141, 150, 165 pursuit of, 45, 50 (re)constructed, 2, 3 (re)construction of, 3 regurgitate, 140 (re)production, v research, 71, 150 scholarly, 150, 154, 155, 159, 160, 163, 164 scientific, 155, 164 and skills, 22, 98, 100 social purposes of, 3 students, 127 subject, 133, 135 systems, 53, 96, 100, 101, 122, 157 technical, 119 theoretical, 106, 139 traditional, 53, 157 traditions, 46, 51 transfer, vii, 98, 99, 102, 119, 139 transformation of, 3 transmission of, 42 transmitted, 137 true, 160 understandings of, 135, 137 unity of, 160 universal, 52, 101 university., 3, 72, 159, 162, 165 use(s), 2, 12 validation, 2 value(s), 53, 55 Western, 100, 101, 122 workers, 10, 11 of the world, 140

187

L

Languages, 51 African, 51 colonially-inherited, 51 oral, 2 spoken, 40 Leadership, 12 good, 68 institutional, vii political, vi (see also Political leadership) poor, 68 responsible, 68 roles, 68 structures, 54 Learners, 64, 80 active, 34 co-, 90 problematic, 64 Learning active, 133 associative, 136 blended, vii cognitive, 136 collaborative, 136 critical, vii deep, xi, 86, 87, 92 enhance, 34, 138 expectations to, 128 experiences/through experiences, 136, 140 experiential, 136 form of, vii, 137, 139–141 individual, 136 through inquiry, 139–140 integrated, 27 online remote, vii

188 Index

Learning (cont.) pattern for, 136 through practice, 140 products, 141 rote, xi, 86, 92, 131 social, 135 spaces for, 138 surface, 86 theory(ies), xi, 87, 92, 136, 140–142 by transmission, vii, vii ways of, 136, 137, 141 Legacy colonial, 59, 60 of colonial education, 52 imperialist, ix of institutional social discrimination, 62 Liberty, 166 basic, 118 negative, 14 objective, 15 positive, 14 Listening, xi, 28, 35, 103, 104, 121 activities, 137 component of, 113 notion of, 115 to others, 104 theory of, 104 with, xi, 104, 115, 123

boundaries, 115 decisions, 113 discipline, 68 element, 114, 115 imperative, 102 obligations, 4 question, 114 responsive, 5 values, ix N

Neoliberal agenda, 130 application, 98 conceptions, 153 era, 11 global interests, 12 global world order, 154, 163 ideals, 10 ideological underpinning, 100 ism, 44 market economy, 98 marketisation, 11 markets, 115 notions, 115 orientation, 10 policy, 11 requirements, 10 state, 153, 166, 167 university, 153, 166

M

Marginalisation, 96, 102, 115, 121, 135 Moral/morally appropriate, 4, 5 attentiveness, viii

O

Online classes, 34 debates, 138 discussion spaces, 138

 Index 

platforms, 138 remote learning, vii remote teaching, vii space, 134, 138 Ontological activity, 81 aspects, 88 dimensions, xi, 81, 88, 92 needs, 89 space, 89, 90 stances, 81 P

Patriarchy, 20, 54, 61 Pedagogic activity, 105 teaching, 104, 105 teaching activity, 104 value, 138 Pedagogy/pedagogical active, 28 activity(ies), vii, 118 ambivalence, vii approach, 117 authority, 105 care, xi, 111, 112, 116–124 encounters, 33, 80, 119 engagement, 28 experiences, 87 higher education, 115 of hope, 90–92 instances, 87 interests, 105 learning and teaching, 97, 98, 100 matters, 97 pattern, 136 perspective, 115

189

practice(s), vii, 86, 96, 99, 100, 115, 116, 134–136, 139 process, 137 of rhythmic care, 120, 123 style, 99 teaching, 102, 106 teaching practices, 107 transformative, 103–106 uncertainty, vii Philosophy/philosophical Bantu, 158 concept, vii, 159 of education, xix, 164 journey, 164 minds, 149, 151, 152, 160, 167 primitive, 158 Policy framing, 20–22 implementation, 21, 22 phases, 20 texts, 21 Political action, 157, 158 affiliations, 52 agency, 115 argument, 115 challenges, 102, 157 circumstances, 46 concept, 157, 158, 165 conditions, 11 differences, 64 discourses, 54 independence, 54, 68 inequalities, 60, 123 instabilities, 157 intent, 147 intolerance, 68 issue, 50

190 Index

Political (cont.) leaders, 67 leadership, vi, 68 lives, 51 participation, 149, 151, 159–163, 168 power, 161 predicaments, 61 process, 161 structures, 50 struggles, 54 views, 67 violence, 70 Politico-economic sovereignty, viii Politico-ethical concept, vii Politics, 64, 155–159 idea of, 161 popular, 157 post-truth, 5 ubuntu, 149, 151, 157, 165 Post-apartheid, 10, 54, 67, 164, 166, 167 South Africa, 150–155, 163–168 Postcolonial Africa, 46, 54 era, 100 narrative, 151 Postcolonialism, 67 Power exercise of, 99 imbalance(s), 99, 102, 104, 135 Pre-colonial Africa, 45 epoch, 45 South Africa, 150 Problem-solving, 12, 133 Project of acting, 90

of being, 90 of knowing, 89 Public broader, viii concern, viii, 6, 26, 77, 97 good, x, 4, 14, 59–73 presentation, 43 responsibility, vii role, 36, 67 universities, 50 Punishment notion of, 96 -and-reward, 102 system of, 99, 135 R

Reason, viii, 105 determinations of, 13 main, 20 notions of, 33 objective, 33–36 primary, 44 space for, 35 university of, x, 33–34 value of, 80 Reconstruction, 29, 52 of higher education, vi social, 166 terms of, 4 Redistributive justice, 151, 158 Redress, 10, 12, 20, 21, 165 equitable, 10, 11, 20 past injustices, 154 Reflectivity, xi, 87, 92 Reform, 30, 78, 87 curricular, 30 of higher education, vi Relationship, 4, 78, 106, 123, 167

 Index 

between theory and practice, 136 capitalist, 167 of care, 112 caring, 117 contextualised, 105 cooperative, 22 harmony in, 156 healing of, 121 human, 121 integrated, 26 logical, 160 meaningful, 132 with others, 28 transactional, 133 trustworthy, 120 unexamined, 68 Religious affiliations, 52 differences, 64 groups, 64 intolerance, 54 leaders, 68 lines, 55 Research capacity, 20 incentives, 12, 26 integrated, 27 levels of, 52 output(s), 21, 44 projects, 112 scientific, 150, 152, 164 Resistance, viii, 12, 98, 101 practices of, viii, 79 significant, 10 struggles of, 167 Resonance, 118 experience of, 119 interpretation of, 118

191

notion of, 118, 119 Respect, 3, 6, 12, 43, 67, 80, 104–106, 121, 124, 155 and dignity, 40 exercise, 18, 78, 80, 82 to human dignity, 6 mutual, 90, 124, 133 roles of, 91 sense of, 67 social, 67 and tolerance, 62 ubuntu as, 156 of the university, 3 value of, 80 Responsibility, x, xii, 18, 42, 59–73, 90, 91, 100, 103, 106, 114, 117, 122, 128, 133, 146 act with, 119 to critique, 98 democratic, 118 education for, 67 human, 156, 157 individual, 67, 68 values of, 59 Responsible, v, xix, 19, 130, 146 actions, 19 business, xix citizen(s), xi, 67, 80, 82, 117 community, 68 deliberative engagement, 19, 78, 80 encounters, 107 personally, 115 publicly, viii pursuits, 19 religious leaders, 68 student(s), 67, 121 use of knowledge, 12

192 Index

Rhythmic, xi, 116–119, 122, 123 care, 119–123 learning, 119 pedagogy, 121 S

Scholarly excellence, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155 perspective, 55 Scholars, 26–28, 51, 72, 114 community of, 51 European, 101 individual, 145 potential, 155 South African, 166 Scholarship, 87, 146, 150, 152, 155, 160, 163–165, 168 academic, 164 promotion of, 155, 163 School context, 128, 130 culture, 131 policies, 131 Scientific creativity, 47 investigation, 166 knowledge, 155, 164 man, 131 non-, 2 progress, 50, 153 research, 150, 152, 164 Self -actualising, 164 -control, 67, 157 -critical, 158 -criticism, 67 -determination, 14

-determined goals, 16 -determining, 14 -discipline, 155 -efficacy, 118 -enrichment, 95 -examination, 67, 80, 81 -position, 103 -reflection, 67 -reliant, 164 -understandings, 14 Skills technical, 98 vocational, 42 Social actions, 13 agency, 115 benefit(s), 72, 152, 166 bonding, 44 capital, 152 categories, 64, 66 categorisation(s), 52, 54 challenges, 44 change, 66 circumstances, 46 cohesion, xi, 65, 96, 97, 103, 107, 115 concerns, 146 constructivism, 136 contexts, 59 demographics, 54 development, 10 discourses, 54 discrimination, 53, 54, 62 disharmony, 64 distancing, 63 diversity, 51, 54 entrepreneurship, 12 gains, 62

 Index 

good of society, 106 goods, 149, 151–154, 157, 166, 168 group(s), 40, 54, 62, 64, 66 harmony, 63, 65 ills, 43, 54 impact, 70 indaba, 43 inequalities, 60, 66, 123 injustice(s), 80, 96, 99, 100, 102, 104, 118, 153, 154, 158 institutions, 14 interactions, 63, 64 issue(s), 44, 50 justice, vi, viii, x–xii, 20, 59–73, 88, 89, 91, 92, 96–97, 103, 105, 107, 115, 117, 150, 152, 154, 157, 158, 161, 164, 165, 168 leaders, 67 leadership roles, 68 learning, 135, 136 level, 43 life, 36 lives, 51 needs, 46 networking platforms, 138 networking sites, 138 origin, 62 perception, 67 predicaments, 61 problems, 36, 40, 114 project(s), 149, 153, 157, 166 realities, 36 reconstruction, 166 respect, 67 responsiveness, 116 scandal, 68

193

sectors, 40, 44 spaces, 64 spheres, x, 73 structure, 40 value, 62–64 views, 67 Socially complex, 65 distance, 63 just, 60, 62, 64, 73, 113, 115, 117 unjust, 66 Societal change, 35 dystopias, 36 focus, 106 inequalities, 106 Society broad, 44 broken, 121 equal, 66 South African, 20 unequal, 60 Socio-economic amenities, 61 backgrounds, 154 development, 20 problems, 158 South African citizens, 95 context, 97, 100 higher education, 9, 27, 88, 127 public institutions, 33 rand, 69 scholars, 166 society, 20, 115, 123 university(ies), 48, 64, 86, 100, 149

194 Index

Student(s), vi, vii, 10, 12, 20, 22, 29, 49, 51, 54, 64, 69, 71, 90, 99, 100, 102, 104, 105, 112–114, 121, 123, 129, 131, 132, 136, 153, 164 access, 22 activism, 49 in Africa, 54 attrition, 128 black, 20 -centred, 132 engagement, 135 female, 50, 54 funding, 22 in higher education, xii international, 44, 48, 66 participation rate, 20 performance, 98, 130, 134, 140 progress, 130 prospective, 69 protests, vi, vii, 12, 49, 51, 64, 69, 71, 132 -related factors, 128 responsible, 67 success, 29, 128 university, 50 voice, 137 T

Teachers, 34–36, 64, 80, 86, 105, 130, 131 contested by, 130 dedicated, 64 good, 26 implications for, 130 individual, 34 lazy, 64 presence of, 34

prospective, 36 restricts, 130 and students, 35, 36, 80, 105, 119, 122 teach, 34 thoughts, 34 university, 27, 33, 35, 102, 103, 105–107, 111, 115–117, 119, 122–124 Teaching act of, 34 integrated, 27 practices, xi, 105, 107 praxis, 119 remote, vii, 33 scholarship of, 87 Teaching and learning, vii, x, xi, 11, 28, 51, 55, 85–92, 95–107, 127, 132, 136, 142 approaches, 86 higher, vii post-critical, xii, 128 programmes, 11 Theory of education (see Education, theory) on violence, xi Thinking creative, 12 independent, 48, 118 lethargic, 152 systematic, 164 way of, 152 Transformation/transformational, vi, viii, x, xi, 3, 4, 6, 9–22, 25–27, 29, 30, 53, 77, 80–82, 85, 86, 88, 96, 103, 105, 114, 117, 118, 123, 153

 Index 

act(s) of, xi, 85, 87–89, 92 agenda, viii, 12, 26, 78 claims of, 10 concept of, vi conceptualisation of, 88 curriculum, 166 genuine, 25 goals, vi, 142 higher education, vi, x, 20–22, 33 of the higher education sector, 20 imperatives, 142 institutional, 13 legitimate, 30 mutual, 129 notion of, 87 pace, 127 permanent, 31 possibility of, 113 process, 21, 119 project, x, 88 of a public university, x purposes, vii, 140 rate of, 127 real, 88 societal, 116, 132 transformation, xix of the university sector, vi Transformative, viii, 6, 10–12, 17, 29–31, 103 acts, 85–92 agenda, 12, 21 aspirations, 15 change, 15 goals, 16, 17, 21, 161, 165 higher education environment, 27 institutional goals, 17 intent, 6 orientation, 162

195

pedagogy, 103–106 potential, viii, 103 process, 22 requirements, 10 values, 6 Transformed genuinely, 30 society, 30 U

Ubuntu, v, vii–xii, 17–22, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35–36, 48, 69, 73, 78–82, 85–92, 114, 116, 119, 124, 128, 139, 141, 145–147, 149–168, 168n1, 168n2 act of, 18, 35, 69 aspects of, 20 care, 119 concept of, 18, 140 of dissonance, 22 dynamism, 86, 87 education, xi educational paradigm, 114 emphasis of, 18 enacting, 18 ethic(s), v, xi, 17, 79–82, 85–92, 137, 138, 142, 149, 151, 156, 157 expression of, 51 force of, 85 -inspired discourse, 147 -inspired university, viii, x, 146, 151, 159–163 lens of, 20 logic of, 156 manifestation of, 31

196 Index

Ubuntu (cont.) notion of, x, 17, 19, 21, 35, 79, 111, 119, 120, 138, 156–159 philosophy, 149, 151, 158, 159, 163, 165 politics, 149, 151, 157, 165 practices, 21, 30, 31, 33 practising, 21 as respect, 156 spirit of, 27 understanding of, 17, 19 university, v, xii, 34–36, 128, 145–147, 149–168, 168n1, 168n2 values, ix, 48, 78, 86 Understanding, 2, 3, 6, 15, 19, 28, 34, 35, 60, 61, 64, 72, 89–91, 115, 122, 135, 137, 140–142, 146 conceptual, 138 contextual, 139 forms of, 155 hegemonic, 137 relational, 156 richer, 139 of ubuntu, 17 University(ies) academics, 14 in Africa, x, 39, 41, 44–47, 50, 51, 54, 59–62, 64–67, 69, 70, 73, 147 African, 36, 39, 44, 53, 55 aims of, 127 classroom, 127 communal African, 55 corporate, 98–100, 134 culturally disempowered, 47

curriculum, 100, 127 of deliberation, x, 39–55 education, vii, 3, 12, 25, 46, 48, 55, 59–73, 81, 102, 147 educator(s), 132, 133 of equality, x of freedom of expression, x function of the, 152 functioning of a, 3 graduate(s), 21, 61, 67, 68, 86 knowledge (see Knowledge, university) landscape, xii, 98, 100, 124 lecturers, 138 life, vii managers, 15 model, 47 philosophy-oriented, 150, 152, 163 political-oriented, 150, 152, 159 private, 71 public, vi–x, 9–17, 19, 20, 25–31, 33, 50, 60, 71 residential, 134 of reason, x role, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 159, 163 sector, 20, 27, 42, 52, 61 space, 100, 166 staff, 26 students, xii, 49, 50, 80, 128, 137, 164 studies, 46 task of a, x, 1 teacher(s), xi, 27, 33–35, 99, 102–107, 111–113, 115–117, 119, 121–124 teaching, 104, 128, 155

 Index 

top-class, 67 tuition fees, 10 ubuntu, 34–36, 145, 149 (see also Ubuntu, university) ubuntu-inspired, x V

Value systems, ix, 47, 101, 102, 104 Violence, 95–97 absence of, 96, 103 acts of, 97 in the (African) university domain, 98 against the soul of the student, xi, 105, 107 definition of, 97, 102 epistemic, 105 epistemological, 100, 101, 103 evidence of the, xi, 107 examples of, 97, 100 exclusionary, 102 form of, 100, 137, 139 gender-based, 44, 132 latent, 97 manifesting, 97 perpetuated, 97 personal, 96 physical, 96 presence of, 98, 102 psychological, xii, 96, 101, 102, 128, 131–134, 136–142 public, 49 punishment-and-reward, 102

structural, xi, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 104, 107, 128, 134 systemic, 106 theory on, xi, 107 towards the soul, 102 typology for, 96 Violent conflicts, 157 country, 103 student protests, 69 W

Western -centric education, 65 -centric hegemony, 60 colonialism, 157 culture, 45, 46 dominance, 101 education, 64 education systems, 79 epistemologies, 47, 60, 66 format of education, 64 knowledge, 122 knowledge systems, 100, 122 values, 46 world, 65 worldviews, 100 Westernised academy, 3 Worldview(s) communally-oriented, 48 humanly-orientated, 51

197