Towards a Sociology of the Open Society: Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume 2 0367461323, 9780367461324

Citation preview

Towards a Sociology of the Open Society

This book applies the general theory of critical rationalism in order to develop a new sociology of the open society, in general, and a new analysis of the transition from a closed society to an open society in particular. It presents a criticism of Karl Popper’s analysis of human action for opening up a closed society, followed by a critical study of the mainstream sociology to show how justificational models of knowledge and action have prevented the science of sociology from addressing the contribution of human action to social change. This book provides new sociologies of closed and open societies. It argues that in the closed society, “a low level” of critical rationality is activated by people to define the meanings of the universe and good life and social institutions of law, polity and economy. Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti proposes five mechanisms of opening up a closed society through a new model of social change, inspired by the philosophy of critical rationalism. This volume is “the first systematic attempt” to apply the philosophy of critical rationalism in order to present a “normative sociology of the open society”. It will be of interest to postgraduate researchers and professional readers in philosophy, sociology, moral science, law, politics and economics. In addition, this book would benefit research centres, policymakers and civil society activists interested in the ideas of critical rationalism and the open society. Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti is Sociologist and Faculty Member at the Institute for Management and Planning Studies (IMPS) in Tehran, Iran. His research interests include epistemology, philosophy of science, the theory of society, sociology of the open society and sociology of modernity and development.

Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought

  4 Outlines of a Theory of Plural Habitus Bourdieu Revisited Miklós Hadas   5 Marcel Gauchet and the Crisis of Democratic Politics Edited by Natalie J. Doyle and Sean McMorrow   6 Anatomies of Modern Discontent Visions from the Human Sciences Thomas S. Henricks   7 Critical Theory of Coloniality Paulo Henrique Martins   8 Karl Polanyi and the Paradoxes of the Double Movement John Vail   9 Nationalism and Hegemony The Consolidation of the Nation in Social and Political Life Michaelangelo Anastasiou 10 Lockean Property Ethics and Restitution David Jarrett 11 Making Citizenship Work Culture and Community Edited by Rodolfo Rosales 12 Towards a Sociology of the Open Society Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume II Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com/series/RSSPT

Towards a Sociology of the Open Society

Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume II

Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti The right of Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Alamuti, Masoud Mohammadi, author. Title: Towards a sociology of the open society. Volume II : critical rationalism and the open society / Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti. Other titles: Critical rationalism and the open society, volume II Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2023. | Series: Routledge studies in social and political thought | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022024243 (print) | LCCN 2022024244 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367461324 (hbk) | ISBN 9781032378640 (pbk) | ISBN 9781003027119 (ebk) Subjects: LCSH: Sociology—Philosophy. | Social systems. | Social structure. | Social control. Classification: LCC HM585 .A466 2023 (print) | LCC HM585 (ebook) | DDC 301.01—dc23/eng/20220816 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022024243 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022024244 ISBN: 978-0-367-46132-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-37864-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-02711-9 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003027119 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To William Warren Bartley III

Contents

Acknowledgementsx Introduction 1

Karl Popper: From Critical Rationalism to the Idea of an Open Society Introduction 8 Section I: An Overview of Popper’s Critical Rationalism  9 Section II: The Intellectual Roots of the Closed Society and Popper’s Idea of the Open Society  12 Section III: Justificationism, “Irrational Faith in Reason” and the Idea of an Open Society  22 Section IV: A Sociological Critique of Popper’s Idea of the Open Society  26

2

From the Closed to the Open Society: A Critique of Popper’s Analysis Introduction 33 Section I: Epistemology, Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Action in Modern Sociology  33 Section II: Popper’s Model of Action: Situational Analysis and the Concept of Human Nature  37 Section III: A Critique of Popper’s Analysis of the Transition From the Closed to the Open Society  44

3

Towards a Micro-Foundation for the Sociology of the Open Society Introduction 57 Section I: The Critical Rationalist Theory of Human Action: A Brief Review  59

1

8

33

57

viii  Contents

Section II: From Human Action to Social Order: A Critical Rationalist Perspective  67 Section III: The Three Stages of Progress in Critical Rationality 73 Section IV: The Growth of Critical Reason and the Stages of Moral Consciousness  80 Section V: The Micro-Foundations of the Sociology of the Open Society: A Summary  84 4

The Open Society: A Sociological Ideal Type Introduction 88 Section I: The Critical Rationalist Action Model and the Problem of an “Open Social Order”  88 Section II: Towards a Sociological Ideal Type of the Open Society  91

5

The Formation of an Open Society: A Sociological Theory Introduction 102 Section I: The Micro-Foundation for the Sociology of the Open Society 103 Section II: The Open Society Formation: A Metaphysical Analysis  104 Section III: The Moral Mechanism of an Open Society Formation  106 Section IV: The Open Society Formation: A Legal Analysis  109 Section V: The Political Mechanism of the Open Society Formation  111 Section VI: The Open Society Formation: An Economic Analysis 111 Section VII: The Rise of an Open Society: A Macro-Sociological Analysis 113

102

6

The Formation of a Closed Society: A Sociological Theory Introduction 119 Section I: The Critical Rationalist Model of Action and the Sociology of the Closed Society  119 Section II: Justificationism and the Epistemology of the Closed Society: A New Ideal Type of the Closed Society  124 Section III: The Five Mechanisms of the Closed Society Formation  126

119

88

Contents ix

7

From the Closed to the Open Society: A Sociological Analysis Introduction 135 Section I: A Micro-Foundation for Understanding of the Transition From the Closed to the Open Society  136 Section II: From the Closed to the Open Society: A Cultural Change 138 Section III: From the Closed to the Open Society: A Governmental Change  146 Section IV: From the Closed to the Open society: An Economic Change  149 Section V: From the Closed to the Open Society: A Macro-Sociological Analysis  151 Section VI: From the Closed to the Open Society: The Sociological Analysis Versus Popper’s Analysis  153 Section VII: A Substantial Difference Between a “Liberal” and an “Open” Society  160

135

8

The Sociology of the Open Society: A Summary Section I: A Reinvention of Critical Rationalism for the Sociology of the Open Society  163 Section II: From the Closed to the Open Society: A Sociological Analysis  164

163

Index170

Acknowledgements

The ideas for this book project have been a work in progress for a long time, and I  owe great thanks to a few individuals and a number of different institutions. To Professor Thomas Gutmann, a true colleague and friend, I owe perhaps the greatest debt of all for devoting his valuable time to support my project intellectually and administratively. Professor Gutmann provided me with the facilities required for my concentration on the questions of how to reinvent the idea of critical rationalism and how to integrate this reinvention into a sociological theory of the society, in general, and a sociology of the open society in particular. I also express my gratitude to his administrative staff, in particular to Petra Wedeking, whose support in completing this book was essential. It would have been impossible to bring this book to fruition had I not been awarded the Georg Forster Research Fellowship by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in 2017. From 2017 to 2020, this Fellowship allowed me to complete this volume for submission to the publisher. I hereby express my special thanks to the members of the Humboldt Foundation and their campaign for international understanding, scientific progress and development. Having written this volume while being a visiting scholar at the Cluster of Excellence “Religion and Politics” at the University of Münster, I am especially grateful to the staff of the Cluster for their support. I wish to thank Judith Grubel, Coordinator of Visiting Scholars, Viola van Melis, Head of the Centre for Research Communication, and Mareike König from the administrative staff. Moreover, I extend my thanks to the University of Münster, which has not only facilitated my writing of the first volume of this book, but also provided me with a research agreement for the years 2020–2022 to allow me to write the second volume of the book. I am very grateful to Audrey Busch for her efforts in making this research agreement possible. My special thanks go to Professor Peter Jones at Newcastle University, UK, whose promotion of my book proposal was very important in convincing the Routledge Group to publish this book.

Acknowledgements xi

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the Institute for Management and Planning Studies (IMPS) in Tehran, Iran, for allowing me to take a leave of absence to write this book in Germany. Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti IMPS, May 2022

Introduction

This is the second volume of a collection entitled Critical Rationalism and the Open Society. Its purpose is to apply the theory of society, which was developed on the basis of the philosophy of critical rationalism by the first volume, in order to offer new sociological theories of the closed and open societies upon which my normative analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society will be offered in the present volume. In short, the second volume applies the critical rationalist theory of society to present a new sociology of the open society. A fundamental motivation for using a “theory” of critical rationalism, rather than a “moral attitude” of it, to write the present volume was that I realized that Karl Popper’s critical rationalism does not offer a theory of rationality, which could be used to define a model of rational action, operating as the microfoundation of the sociologies of the closed and open societies. Thus, it is not a surprise that I want to show that Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society should be connected with his conception of critical rationalism in terms of “an irrational faith in reason”. In the light of these insights, the present volume will argue that, in order to redefine the ideas of the closed and open societies, we need to use the theory of society, which is built on the basis of the critical rationalist model of human action. It will also be argued that, while Popper does not apply the definition of critical rationality, in term of “openness to criticism”, to define a model of rational action, I will use this definition and its development in terms of the general theory of critical rationalism in order to provide a new micro-foundation for the sociology of the open society. In this line of reasoning, it will be shown that why Popper has not provided us with “sociological conceptions” of the closed and open societies. As the reader of this two-volume book may remember it, in the first volume I tried to provide the theoretical foundations in terms of a new theory of society for the development of a sociological analysis of the open society, which will be offered in the present volume. Very briefly, I have attempted to reinvent the philosophy of critical rationalism in order to liberate it from the regress of justification, making it “a theory of rationality”, which is an application to redefine the models of rational action in sociology. It is in the light of these insights, I realized that DOI: 10.4324/9781003027119-1

2  Introduction

Popper’s critical and Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism need “a deep epistemological reform” in order to be turned into a theory of rationality, upon which the meaning of the term “rationality” might be redefined in the models of human action. The main upshot of replacing the idea of knowledge as “justified true belief” with the notion of knowledge as “unfalsified conjecture” was a general theory of critical rationality, which enabled me not only to revise the micro-foundations of the theory of society in general, but also to offer a micro-foundation for a sociological theory of the open society in particular. Briefly, the general theory of critical rationalism implies that “a claim of rational belief” in general, and “a claim of rational belief in reason” in particular, could be “a true claim” because if the claim in question is held open to criticism and is not shown to be false by “negative (falsifier) reasons”, then there is no logical reason that it shouldn’t be accounted as a true claim. This logical possibility enables my general theory of critical rationalism to “defend” a rational belief in reason. Having said that, the present volume will apply this non-justificationist conception of rationality in order to show that, while Popper does not define the term “rationality” in his model of action on the basis of the idea of rationality as “openness to criticism”, the critical rationalist model of human action uses the idea in order to show how reason drives action. Inspired by the critical rationalist model of human action, the present volume will present new sociological theories of the closed and open societies, explaining the mechanisms of the transition from the closed to the open society. In this line of reasoning, the new model of human action emphasizes on the three stages of progress in critical rationality, which plays an important role in my sociological analysis of the closed and open societies. The sociological ideas of the closed and open societies will be described due to the extent that human actors have activated their critical rationality to solve the problem of social order. Hence, the non-justificational concept of rationality is used, not only for defining the sociological meaning of a closed society, but also to introduce the sociological meaning of an open society. In addition, the transition from the closed to the open society will be explained on the basis of the critical rationalist model of action, according to which “the independent human actors” in the closed society can activate the highest level of critical rationality in order to replace the dogmatic values and institutions with the rational ones. Before introducing the sociological ideas of the closed and open societies, the present volume examines Popper’s idea of an open society due to its close connection with Popper’s critical epistemology on the one hand, and with the idea of critical rationalism on the other. This critical review enables us to rethink about Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. This volume will also attempt to show that it is Popper’s justificationist conception of critical rationality that prevents him from offering a sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society.

Introduction 3

Against this background, I should briefly explain for the reader that how different chapters in the present volume will develop my arguments for the formulation of a new sociology of the open society on the basis of the general theory of critical rationalism. Chapter 1 supplies the reader with a critical analysis of Popper’s idea of an open society due to the contrast, which Popper has created between the ideas of the closed and open societies in the context of his philosophy of critical rationalism. This critical analysis begins with a brief presentation of Popper’s description of the intellectual roots of the old and modern versions of the closed society, which are to be sought in the philosophical ideas and social theories of Plato, Hegel, and Marx. In this line of reasoning, it will be argued that three major philosophical ideas, namely historicism, holism and essentialism, were recognized by Popper as the intellectual bases upon which the old and modern versions of the closed society are to be understood. In addition, I will refer to some of the most relevant interpretations of Popper’s followers with regard to the ideas of the closed and open societies in order to make these ideas clearer. Chapter 2 intends to show us the reason why Popper’s model of rational action operates as an obstacle for a sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. To this end, the chapter starts with a brief description of Popper’s situational analysis and its upshot for the model of rational action in the social sciences. It also refers to Popper’s conception of human nature, which gives a central role to the individual’s critical thinking in the demarcation of “human being” from other creatures. Nevertheless, since this power of critical thinking is to be understood in the context of Popper’s critical rationalism, his conception of human nature does not lead us to “a model of human action” in which reason drives action, because Popper sees the critical rationality as a “moral attitude of openness to criticism”, rather than a “cognitive capacity” of holding “a claim of rational belief” open to criticism to see whether it is not shown to be false by argument. Chapter 2 then will discuss in regard to Popper’s ideas of the closed and open societies, arguing that, according to Popper, in a closed society, human actors cannot use their critical rationality in order to rethink about the values and institutions of their society because the closed society does not set free the critical thinking of man. In other words, it is the closed society that determines how one, who is living in that society, should think. However, in the open society that does set free critical thinking of man, human actors would be able to question their values and institutions. In other words, it is the open society that determines how one, who is living in that society, should think. This argument implies that Popper’s ideas of the closed and open societies are defined so that “an access to critical rationality” does not make human being “an independent actor”, who would be able to rethink about the values and institutions of his society. Chapter 2 finally will present a criticism of Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society due to his model of human action. This critique implies that since the idea

4  Introduction

of rationality as “openness to criticism” does not play a role in the Popper model of action, his analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society was mainly focused on the roles of the societal factors in this transition, factors like the expansion of trade or the growth of population. Chapter 3 will use the general theory of critical rationality in order to provide “a new micro-foundation” for the sociology of the open society. To this end, it advances the critical rationalist model of action, which was proposed by the first volume of this book, through offering the notion of the stages of progress in critical rationality. This idea will be used to show that how the lower level of critical rationality might be linked with the rise of a closed society, and the higher level of it linked with the rise of an open society. More importantly, the advanced model of human action enables the present volume to address the question of how “the independent human actors” in the closed society would be able to activate the highest level of critical rationality in order to open up the dogmatic values and institutions to criticism. In the light of this insight, Chapter 3 will argue that the transition from an “ uncritical” to a “critical” rationality might be considered as a major emancipatory progress in the application of critical rationality by the independent actors, through which the actors could rationalize their social order, in terms of opening it to criticism. In this way, the new micro-foundation of the normative sociology of the open society, which applies the notion of the stages of progress in critical rationality, enables us to address the question of how the highest level of critical rationality allows the human actors, including thinkers, social movements, and ordinary people, to become the real agents of the transition from the closed to the open society. Chapter 4 will present a sociological conception of the open society. While Popper defines the open society as a society which sets free the critical powers of man, this account of the open society does not tell us what the meaning of term “social” is in the idea of an open society. It is worthy of note that, from a sociological standpoint, the meaning of the term “social” in the idea of an open society is to be interpreted in regard to a set of “common” values and social institutions, which are created by the human actors not only for managing the pursuit of selfinterest for preventing from a war of all against all, but also for shaping a social division of works, which enables people to realize the ideal of the good life for all. Chapter 4 will argue that the meaning of the term “social” in the idea of an open society is to be defined on the basis of a set of “common” values and institutions, which are held open to criticism and are not shown to be false by negative reasons. And, in this sociological account of an open society, a rational meaning of the good life plays the main role and is applied in order to let us see what might be the roles of the notions of “open” law, polity and economy in a sociological idea of the open society. It should be kept in mind that my sociological conception of the open society will use the critical rationalist micro-foundations in order to make a new connection between the philosophy of critical rationalism and the sociological idea of an open society.

Introduction 5

Given the sociological idea of an open society, Chapter 5 will address the question of how an open society comes into existence. The answer to this question will be provided by “a sociological theory of the open society”. This theory will argue that the formation of an open society begins when human agents activate the highest level of critical rationality in order to give an ontological meaning to their good life – that is “a rationalistic worldview”, in which the place of man in the universe has been defined. This theory of the open society argues that, while any society needs a system of metaphysical beliefs in regard to the place of man in the universe in order to determine the ultimate values of the good life, the formation of an open society wouldn’t be an exception to this general rule. But in an open society, it is the highest level of critical rationality allowing people to hold open their “metaphysical beliefs” regarding the universe to criticism and seeing whether the beliefs are shown to be false by negative reasons. Hence, such an ontological dialogue about the meaning of the universe and man’s place within it would be able to lead people to “a moral consensus” upon the meaning of the good life. The sociological theory of the open society will then lead us to see that, since people can subject their moral beliefs regarding of the meaning of the good life to criticism in order to see whether the beliefs in question are shown to be false by argument, they could also be able to agree upon a “shared vision” of the good life that is not shown to be false by negative reasons. Hence, people could apply the critical rationality in order to give themselves a system of common values, which could operate as a “normative solution” to the problem of social order. Chapter 5 then will use the same logic to show how the legal, political and economic mechanisms may work together in order to make the rise of an open society possible. Chapter 6 will present “a sociological theory of the closed society”. It argues that the general theory of critical rationalism could be applied to explore how people have used “a lower level” of critical rationality in terms of openness to criticism in order to give themselves a closed social order on the basis of the dogmatic accounts of the universe and the good life. The theory of the closed society will lead us to realize how the dogmatic visions of the universe and good life in the closed society lead the human actors to arriving at the agreements regarding the roles of the social institutions of law, polity and economy in this society in order to realize the ideal of the good life for all. In other words, the chapter will argue that when the closed-minded actors use the notion of “rational beliefs” in terms of justified true belief in order to make their moral values and social institutions “reasonable”, the very concept of rationality that they use for this purpose has been defined in the context of the philosophy of “uncritical” rationalism. And, if this is so, the degree of critical rationality, which they apply in order to define their rational beliefs, would be limited by the justificational account of rationality. The reason is that their understanding of the rational beliefs is shaped on the basis of this premise that a belief is “rational”, if it could be verified by “positive reasons”. Hence, the infinite regress, which is involved in this justificational reading of rationality, enforces the human actors to agree on the certain

6  Introduction

“dogmatic agreements” regarding the meanings of the universe and good life on the one hand and the nature of social institutions of law, polity and economy on the other. The sociological theory of the closed society will then argue that the normative and institutional solutions, which the closed-minded people offer to solve their own problem of social order, wouldn’t be successful because the solutions are involved in the infinite regress of proofs. The sociology of the open society, which the present volume attempts to provide us, will be developed in its final manifestation in Chapter 7. This chapter will use the sociological theories of the closed and open societies in order to develop a normative sociology of the transition from the closed to the open society. In accordance with this analysis, since the human actors, including thinkers, movements and masses, are capable of using the highest level of critical rationality to rationalize their beliefs, whatever the beliefs in question might be, they could also question the dogmatic beliefs in regard to the meanings of the universe, good life, just law, legitimate government and efficient economy and replace those irrational beliefs with the “rational ones”, which are not shown to be false by negative reasons. Having said that, Chapter 7 will develop the sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society by arguing as follows: the independent actors in the closed society, who are ready for activating the highest level of critical rationality, would have the required cognitive capacity for questioning the dogmatic concepts of the universe and good life that they have already defined for themselves. The highest level of critical rationality enables the independent actors to realize that if the dogmatic account of the good life ought to be refuted and replaced by a rational account of it due to its regress of justification, why shouldn’t the dogmatic law of the closed society be rejected and replaced by a rational account of it due to the same regress of justification? It is the replacement of the justificational account of the just law with a non-justificational account of it that enables people to reform the legal order of the closed society and create “an open law” in the course of the transition from the closed to the open society. Chapter 7 will advance the sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society by arguing that how people might also question the legitimacy of the government in the closed society because they would realize that “the monopoly of power” shouldn’t be given to an authoritarian government, which cannot realize the ideal of the equal rights to the good life for all. The highest level of critical rationality allows the independent actors in the closed society to rethink about their authoritative regime, which is unchangeable peacefully with “an open democracy” that is replaceable peacefully. In reality, the political aspect of the transition from the closed to the open society leads us to see the need to a profound change in the meaning of “a legitimate government”: because the open society not only shouldn’t give the government an unlimited power to use the monopoly of force to realize the ideal of just law, but also it shouldn’t regard the government as infallible, in terms of doing its job without any error. To address the question of what would be an economic mechanism of the transition from the closed to the open society, Chapter 7 will argue that an inefficient

Introduction 7

allocation of the scarce resources to the needs of people’s good life in the closed society ought to be criticized by the independent actors and replaced by a “rational mechanism of allocation” in which, on the one hand, the rational meaning of the good life shapes the pattern of consumption in the demand side of economy making the preferences for goods and services real and, on the other hand, the rational accounts of the just law and good government shape the pattern of production in the supply side of economy, allowing the supplies of the factors of production to be efficient usages of the factors’ productivities to meet the real needs of people’s good life. In this way, the rise of an open economy would be an inseparable part of the transformation of the closed society into an open one. Finally, Chapter 7 will integrate the cultural, governmental and economic aspects of the transition from the closed to the open society to provide the reader with a “sociological analysis” of this transition. To this end, it creates a set of logical connections between the ontological worldview of individuals and their concept of the good life on the one hand, and the definitions which individuals have in regard to the meanings of equal rights to the good life and the notions of legitimate government and efficient economy on the other. And, with using the notion of the highest level of critical rationality, the chapter will show that how the independent actors in the closed society could relate their “criticisms” in regard to the closed views of the universe and good life to their “criticisms” of the dogmatic accounts of just law, legitimate government and efficient economy, and in this way, they will reach “an emancipatory answer” to the question of how the closed society, as a whole, should be transformed into an open society, as a whole. And this emancipatory solution would lead us to a new normative sociology of the transition from the closed to the open society. Chapter 8 will supply the reader with a summary of the major findings of the sociology of the open society. It argues that this two-volume book with title Critical Rationalism and the Open Society is to be considered as “the first systematic attempt” for internalizing the non-justificationist account of rationality in the theory of society, in general, and in the sociological theory of the open society in particular. The main contributions of the second volume might be identified as follows: (i) a sociological theory of the closed society; (ii) a sociological theory of the open society and (iii) a normative sociology of the transition from the closed to the open society. The second volume will also show that due to their origins in the justificationist concept of rationality, Popper’s theories of the closed and open societies cannot address “the key role of critical rationality” in making human beings the agents of a social transition from the closed to the open society. In short, these two volumes have enabled me to develop “an entirely new relationship” between the philosophy of critical rationalism and the sociology of the open society.

Chapter 1

Karl Popper From Critical Rationalism to the Idea of an Open Society

Introduction The central aim of this chapter is to address the question of how Popper’s reading of critical rationalism as “irrational faith in reason” has contributed to his idea of the open society, in terms of a society setting free critical powers of man. To this end, a brief review of Popper’s critical rationalism will first be offered. After that, a summary of Popper’s analysis of the intellectual roots of the rise of the closed societies and its implications for the idea of an open society will be discussed. Chapter 1 then goes on to explore how Popper’s idea of the open society is influenced by his definition of critical rationalism. In this line of reasoning, it argues that, if critical rationalism is defined in terms of irrational faith in reason, or a “moral attitude of openness to criticism”, then the role of critical rationality in the formation of an open social order cannot be addressed in the context of such “an irrational” faith in reason. In the next section, a sociological critique of Popper’s idea of the open society will be offered by arguing that defining critical rationalism in terms of irrational faith in reason cannot provide us with “a model of rational action” according to which we can explain how people use reason to enter into “a moral dialogue” for arriving at a consensus on the meaning of the good life and the nature of social institutions which are necessary not only for preventing individuals from the war of all against all, but also for encouraging them to participate at a social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life for all. In short, Chapter 1 provides the reader with a new understanding of how Popper’s idea of critical rationalism contributes to his definition of the concept of an open society. The chapter also leads us to see why it is “an irrational faith” in reason that is preventing Popper from giving the notion of the open society “a sociological meaning” in terms of common values and social institutions. In this way, the chapter paves the way for the formulation of a sociological conception of the open society in Chapter 4 and a sociological theory of the open society in Chapter 5.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003027119-2

Karl Popper  9

Section I: An Overview of Popper’s Critical Rationalism In the first volume of this book, I examined the philosophy of critical rationalism, which is suggested by Karl Popper, in detail (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 27–45). Hence, this section offers a brief review of this philosophy in order to show how “a justificational approach” to the idea of critical rationalism does not allow Popper to offer a sociological conception of the open society. Popper introduces critical rationalism as a “moral attitude of openness to criticism” which cannot be justified by argument or experience. This moral attitude is to be understood in terms of “an irrational” faith in reason. In short, critical rationalism refers to a moral attitude of “I may be wrong and you may be right, and with an openness to each other’s criticism we may learn from our mistakes and getting nearer to the truth”. However, as observed by William Bartley (1964, 1984), Popper does not speak of critical rationalism as a theory of rationality. I have argued that the main reason for this account of critical rationalism is a justificational approach to the philosophy of rationality (Mohammadi Alamuti 2022: 12–31). In short, since Popper claims that the rationalist cannot justify his belief in reason by “positive (justifier) reasons”, he should defend the belief in reason by an irrational faith which could be seen as a moral decision. It is for this epistemological reason that the idea of irrational faith in reason is led to the notion of a “moral attitude of openness to criticism”. The difficulty in Popper’s definition of critical rationalism is to be recognized in the following way: the idea that critical rationalism, as a philosophy of rationality, cannot be justified by positive reasons originates in this premise that “a rational belief in reason” is true, if, and only if, it can be justified by argument or experience. Popper ignores this epistemological point that if justification involves infinite regress, then why should the rationalist justify his belief in reason by positive reasons in order to defend it? As argued in Chapter 2 of the first volume, while in the realm of scientific knowledge Popper attempted to replace the idea of knowledge as justified true belief with the idea of knowledge as unfalsified conjecture, he does not expand this “conjectural approach” to the philosophy of science to the philosophy of rationality, as observed by Bartley (1984). Hence, it wouldn’t be unfair to say that it is Popper’s justificational approach to the philosophy of rationality that leads him to the definition of critical rationalism in terms of irrational faith in reason. It should be noted that, like the sceptic, Popper argues that the position of the comprehensive rationalist is “untenable” because it is unjustifiable by argument or experience. Validating the sceptic’s critique of the comprehensive rationalism, Popper leads to this position that the critical rationalist should defend his belief in reason only by an irrational faith. However, unlike the sceptic, Popper does not want to reject rationalism at all. Therefore, he involves in a paradoxical position:

10  Karl Popper

on the one hand, unlike the sceptic, Popper wants to be a rationalist, and on the other hand, like the sceptic, Popper offers a justificational critique of uncritical rationalism. Since Popper does not pay enough attention to the epistemological basis of the sceptic’s critique of uncritical rationalism, the only choice that remains for him is accepting the sceptic’s irrationalism to the extent that it does not lead to the rejection of rationalism at all. But, viewed from a consistent epistemological approach, it is impossible to be a rationalist and an irrationalist at the same time. In my view, it is this “paradoxical position” that leads Popper to “a selfcontradictory” account of critical rationalism: an irrational faith in critical reason. To better address this paradoxical position, allow me to have a look at the way Ian C. Jarvie (2001: 207–208) attempts to defend Popper’s critical rationalism: Popper sharply contrasts two rationalist approaches: uncritical or comprehensive rationalism, and critical or limited rationalism. Comprehensive rationalism is the policy of not being “prepared to accept anything that cannot be defended by means of argument or experience”. . . This policy principle is clearly inconsistent since it cannot, in its turn, be defended [justified] by argument and experience [positive reasons]. Thus an announcement of a commitment to argument and experience flounders on an argument from inconsistency. Generalising, Popper maintains that since “all argument must proceed from assumptions, it is plainly impossible to demand that all assumptions should be based on argument”. It follows that the decision to choose to listen and to give weight to arguments must precede argument. A choice not made on the basis of argument or experience is by definition an irrational choice. So a comprehensive rationalism rests on irrationalism and so is untenable. . . . This is itself may be an argument that weighs heavily in our decision to opt for rationalism. There may also be other arguments, some of a moral nature. If we hold that “I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth” . . . then maximum inclusiveness is the most efficient use of resources, and our equality is seen to lie in our potential to contribute. [Emphasis added] These remarks may confirm my argument implying that the definition of critical rationalism as “irrational faith” in reason originates in “the sceptic’s critique” of uncritical rationalism because the critique rests on this premise that a “claim of rational belief”, in general, and a “claim of rational belief in reason” in particular are true, if, and only if, they could be justified by “positive reasons”. Popper ignores this epistemological point that, like the dogmatist, the sceptic has based his philosophy of rationalism upon “the premise” of objective knowledge as justified true belief (Mohammadi Alamuti 2022: 10–11). Hence, if knowledge is defined “as a special kind” of belief which could be justified by positive reasons, then “a belief in reason” is “an objective knowledge” only if it is shown to be justified by argument or experience. The sceptic rightly argues that since there are not such positive reasons, a “rational” belief in reason in untenable. While this

Karl Popper  11

critique seems to be valid, it wrongly assumes that objective knowledge is justified true belief. However, this account of objective knowledge itself involves the infinite regress of proofs. Hence, my criticism of Popper’s critical rationalism is not because of his rejection of uncritical rationalism in favour of critical rationalism, but because of establishing his philosophy of critical rationalism upon the sceptic’s justificationist critique of uncritical rationalism. Hence, the difficulty in Popper’s analysis of critical rationalism is that it originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge and the very notion of an irrational faith in reason ought to be understood in the context of the sceptic’s critique of uncritical rationalism. Stated somewhat differently, like the sceptic, Popper claims that, Since comprehensive rationalism is inconsistent and comprehensive irrationalism is not, complacent and over-claiming rationalists can easily get hung by their own petard. Instead of capitulating to irrationalism, Popper suggests a minimum concession: a decision to engage in argument precedes argument, hence is unargued, hence may be called irrational. This is Popper’s “minimum concession to irrationalism”. [Emphasis added] (Jarvie 2001: 208) As the passage indicates, Popper’s definition of critical rationalism, in terms of irrational faith in reason, originates in the following epistemological argument: while the uncritical rationalism is untenable, irrationalism is tenable. If so, an irrational faith in reason might be also tenable. In short, this argument leads us to see the inner-epistemological logic of Popper’s critical rationalism. However, the main point here is that this epistemological logic itself is untenable because it engages in the infinite regress which is involved in the idea of knowledge as justified true belief. Due to his justificational approach to what a rational belief in reason means, Popper (1945 [2012]) claims that human beliefs, in general, and a belief in reason in particular, are “subjective matters” and cannot be discussed critically. It is for this reason that Popper does not speak of “a theory” of rationality, and hence critical rationalism remains for him merely “a moral attitude” of openness to criticism which cannot be justified by argument or experience. However, when Popper (1959 [1992]) comes to criticize the positivist philosophy of science, he replaces the demand for the positive (justifier) reasons by the demand for the negative (falsifier) reasons. Yet, when he comes to define critical rationalism, the sceptic’s demand for the positive (justifier) reasons still plays the main role in the formation of Popper’s critical rationalism. And it is exactly for this reason that I argue that, like critical irrationalism, Popper’s critical rationalism originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge involving in the regress of justification (Mohammadi Alamuti, 2022: 16–20). As argued by Bartley (1984),1 if we replace the demand for justification with the demand for criticism, then the critical rationalist would be capable of saying that his belief in reason is “rational”. Hence, irrationalism must be refuted, rather

12  Karl Popper

than accepted, even with “a minimum concession” to irrationalism. Thus, it is not unfair to conclude that the justified true belief account of knowledge has actually been the epistemological basis upon which Popper has developed his philosophy of critical rationalism in terms of “an irrational” attitude of openness to criticism. In the next sections of this chapter, I shall argue how this unacceptable reading of critical rationalism has influenced Popper’s ideas of the closed and open societies. In addition, we shall see how “a critique” of such an untenable reading of critical rationalism leads us to “a new sociological criticism” of Popper’s idea of the open society.

Section II: The Intellectual Roots of the Closed Society and Popper’s Idea of the Open Society This section situates Popper’s idea of an open society in the context of his analysis of the intellectual roots of the closed societies. It proceeds as follows: first, it discusses about the problem situation of the rise of the idea of an open society. Second, it studies the intellectual roots of the closed society from Popper’s point of view to show how Popper has used his critical epistemology in order to define the ideas of the closed and open societies due to their intellectual foundations. Finally, the section briefly addresses the question of what Popper means by the idea of an open society. The Idea of an Open Society: Popper’s Problem Situation A brief review of the political climate of the late 1940s in Europe directs us towards a better understanding of Popper’s problem situation in regard to the idea of an open society. As Ian Jarvie and Sandra Pralong (2003: xi–xii) point out: Popper completed the manuscript of The Open Society and Its Enemies in 1943, when he was 41. At the time he considered it his ‘war work’, that is, his contribution to the war effort, given his liminal status as an enemy alien domiciled in the Dominion of New Land. The war was being fought against Fascist powers; but he regarded Communism as a more insidious menace waiting in the wings should the current enemy be defeated. Although, deeply engaged with intellectual problems of ‘pure’ philosophy, Popper tried on this occasion to think through and expand upon his ideas as they applied to practical affairs, in light of his social and political values. He wrote at a time (1938–1943) when there was no assurance of victory over the Axis and hence no assurance that those values would survive. Given these remarks, it should be added that, inspired by his logic of scientific discovery, Popper argued that a society, whose institutions originate in the authoritarian thoughts, violates the attitude of openness to criticism, and an unavoidable result of such a violation would be the rise of a closed society. Hence, for Popper,

Karl Popper  13

an examination of how Popper explains the intellectual roots of the old and modern versions of closed societies may contribute to a better understanding of the idea of an open society. In this line of thought, Jarvie and Pralong remind us that The overall problem Popper set himself was simple: why is the attack on freedom and democracy so popular? He answered: it is popular, at least partly because too many of the intellectual leaders of the free world, far from standing up for the cause of freedom, have muddled it, even betrayed it. Thus those who might most benefit from freedom are bamboozled into opposing it. (ibid.) They argue that what made The Open Society a unique book was its “epistemological reading” of the role of “human freedom” in modern liberal-democracies: Freedom, he [Popper] insisted, was the true value. Democracy was valuable to the extent that it promoted freedom. Such a democracy was one where the government could be dismissed without violence. . . . A government that could not be so dismissed was a tyranny. (ibid.) As it shall be argued later, Popper used his “fallibilist epistemology” to uncover the intellectual roots of the closed societies and presenting his definition of the idea of an open society. The Intellectual Origins of the Closed Societies: Popper’s Analysis Popper tracks the intellectual roots of the closed societies in the ideas of some of the West’s most respected philosophers, ancient as well as modern, in particular Plato, Hegel and Marx. In fact, his defence of a free society stems in large measure from his logic of scientific discovery and how it should be applied to politics, history and social science. Popper (1945 [2012]: xxxvi) has tried “to examine the application of the critical and rational methods of science to the problems of the open society”. Hence, he argues that the people and institutions should be involved with the same critical spirit that marks natural science, a moral attitude which Popper called critical rationalism – that is an attitude of openness to criticism. In the light of these insights, the very conception of an open society is closely linked to the question of how Popper defines critical rationalism per se. To the contrary, the concept of a closed society is to be considered in regard to “the dogmatic attitude of uncritical rationalism”. However, the central question here would be: how does Popper relate the rise of the old and modern closed societies to the philosophy of uncritical rationalism which is reflected in the ideas of Plato, Hegel and Marx?

14  Karl Popper

In response, it is well known that Popper tracks the intellectual roots of the closed society in some philosophical doctrines particularly in totalitarianism, which was reflected in the rise of fascism and the ensuring Second World War. Also, it is worthy of note that the term “totalitarianism” was coined around this time to characterize such regimes, principally those of Hitler and Stalin. With regard to the intellectual roots of the closed society, Popper included not only “historicism” but also “holism” and “essentialism” and criticized those ideas based on his “fallibilist approach” to epistemology. Together, these ideas shaped the philosophical foundations of what Popper calls the closed society. And the closed society was defined as a society in which “the dogmatic attitudes” of leaders and people have led to totalitarianism. In The Open Society, Popper’s analysis of the roots of totalitarianism leads him back to ancient Greece. He also detects the rise of the first “open society” in democratic Athens of the fifth century bc who subject their own values, beliefs, institutions and traditions to critical scrutiny. Popper argues that Socrates and the city’s democratic politics exemplified this new critical attitude. As observed by Popper (1945 [2012]: 178–179): The rise of philosophy itself can be interpreted, I think, as a response to the breakdown of the closed society and its magical beliefs. It is an attempt to replace the lost magical faith by a rational faith; it modifies the tradition of passing on a theory or a myth by founding a new tradition – the tradition of challenging theories and myths and of critically discussing them. . . . The greatest contribution to this faith was to be made by Socrates, who died for it. Inspired by his critical epistemology, Popper charged Plato as “a philosophical leader” of the closed society whose works laid the groundwork for totalitarianism. Popper also described Sparta as an “arrested tribalism” that sought to stymie “equalitarian democracy” and individualistic ideologies such as found in Athens. It was no coincidence, in Popper’s eyes, that the Nazis and other modern-day totalitarians were inspired by the Spartans. In The Open Society, Popper charged three deep philosophical predispositions which underpinned Plato’s defence of the closed society; that is holism, essentialism and historicism. He argued that subsequent defences of the closed society during the next two-and-a-half millennia originated from these three predispositions. In Popper’s words: Before proceeding to Plato’s sociology and to the use he made of his methodological essentialism in that field, I wish to make it quite clear that I am confining my treatment of Plato to his historicism, and so his ‘best state’. I must therefore warn the reader not to expect a representation of the whole of Plato’s philosophy, or what may be called as “fair and just” treatment of Platonism. My attitude towards historicism is one of frank hostility, based upon the conviction that historicism is futile, and worse than that. My survey of the historicist features of Platonism is therefore strongly critical. (ibid.: 31)

Karl Popper  15

A brief review of these philosophical ideas enables us to explore the intellectual roots of the closed society and its implications for the definition of the idea of an open society. In Popper’s view, holism refers to the view that adequate understanding of certain kinds of entities requires recognizing them as a whole. For instance, phenomena like a biological organism, an ecosystem, a country and a culture can be viewed in terms of such a whole. Holism implies that such entities have properties that cannot be reduced to the entities’ constituent parts. Popper uses this definition of holism to show that the conception of the closed society might be viewed as an example of such entities that cannot be reduced to its constituent parts – that is “individuals”. But, viewed from the perspective of Popper’s critical epistemology, the holistic approach does not follow a scientific method because a scientist, who uses conjecture and refutation to explore the nature of phenomena, cannot claim that “a holistic” explanation of the society could be “a scientific” theory. Putting it differently, according to Popper, our scientific knowledge of a society always remains a partial knowledge, rather a holistic one.2 With the idea of holism in mind, Popper then goes on to argue that Plato’s holism was reflected in his view that the city – The Greek Police – was prior to, and more real than, the individuals who resided in it. For Plato only a stable whole, the permanent collective, has reality, not the passing individuality. In addition, Plato believed that a just society required that its individual members scarify their needs to the interest of the state (ibid.: 75–78). In contrast to such a closed society, Popper views an open society as a society in which the state and other social institutions are “man-made institutions” that could be subjected to “rational scrutiny” and always must serve “the interests of individuals”, and never the other way around. In this sense, Popper criticizes Plato’s holistic method to show that the old version of closed societies originate from this idea that human society is understandable as a whole, independent of its constituent elements – that is individuals. As the second philosophical root of the closed society, Popper observes that one reason for Plato’s support for a closed society refers to the doctrine of “methodological essentialism”, implying that it is the task of pure knowledge, or science, to describe the true nature of things, that is their hidden reality or essence. As argued by Popper (ibid.: 17–31), Plato’s Theory of Forms exemplified this methodological approach. In accordance with Plato, a bed, a tringle, a human being or a city – required understanding what he called its Form. The Form are timeless, unchanging and perfect examples of sensible things found in our world. Coming to understand a Form, Plato held that the imperfect copies of them that we encounter in the sensible world invariably undergo decay. Popper believes that extending this theory created the problem of politics for Plato, and in this way the idea of the closed society can be linked to the principle of methodological essentialism. As pointed out by Popper, According to our analysis, the theory of Forms or Ideas has at least three different functions in Plato’s philosophy: (1) It is a most important methodological

16  Karl Popper

device, for it makes possible pure scientific knowledge, and even knowledge which could be applied to the world of changing things of which we cannot immediately obtain any knowledge, but only opinion. Thus it becomes possible to enquire into the problems of a changing society, and to build up a political science. (2) It provides the clue to the urgently needed theory of change, and of decay, to a theory of generation and degeneration, and especially, the clue to history. (3) It opens a way, in the social realm, towards some kind of social engineering; and it makes possible the forging of instruments for arresting social change, since it suggests designing a “best state” which so closely resemble the Form or Idea of a state that it cannot decay (ibid.: 28–29). Popper (ibid.: 39–40) reminds us that, according to Plato, the nature of the world is that human beings and the institutions that they create tend to degenerate over time, and this included cities as imperfect copies of the Form of the city. Popper argues that this view of the city, which is informed by Plato’s methodological essentialism, produces a peculiar political science. It required, first, understanding the true and best nature of the city – that is its Form which in turn needs an ­infallible knowledge about the Form itself. Second, in order to determine how to arrest the city’s decay from its ideal or perfect nature, the study of politics must seek to answer the laws or principles that govern the city’s natural tendency towards decay and thereby to half the degeneration (ibid.: 40–42). Popper ­concludes that Plato’s essentialism led him to seek a theory of historical change – a theory that brings order and institutions to the constant flux of our world. In this way, Plato’s essentialism led to “historicism”, which is a third intellectual root of the closed society. Popper’s (ibid.: 7–9) argues that “historicism” is the view that history is governed by historical laws or principles and, further, that history has a necessary direction. Hence, historicists believe that the aim of philosophy must be to predict the future course of society by uncovering the laws or principles that governs history. In this line of reasoning, Popper points out: In an attempt to understand and to interpret the changing social world as he experienced it, Plato was led to develop a systematic historical sociology in great detail. He thought of existing states as decaying copies of an unchanging Form or Idea, He tried to reconstruct this Form or Idea of a state, or at least to describe a society which resembled it as closely as possible. Along with ancient traditions, he used as material for his reconstruction the results of his analysis of the social institutions of Sparta and Crete – the most ancient forms of social life he could find in Greece – in which he recognized arrested forms of even older tribal societies. But, in order to make a proper use of this material, he needed a principle for distinguishing between the good or original or ancient traits of the existing institutions and their symptoms of decay. This principle he found in his law of political revolutions, according to which

Karl Popper  17

disunion in the ruling class, and their preoccupation with economic affairs, are the origin of all social change. His best state was therefore to be reconstructed in such a way as to eliminate all the germs and elements of disunion and decay as radically as this could be done. (ibid.: 53) Popper argues that in Plato’s version of this “law of decay”, the degeneration of the city might be seen from military dictatorship to oligarchy to democracy and then, finally, to dictatorship. Not only did Plato describe the gradual degeneration of the city, but also he offered a philosophical explanation of it, which relied upon his theory of the Forms and the methodological essentialism. To suggest a way of arresting the natural tendency towards decay, Plato offered his ideal type of the utopian society. As observed by Popper, this was the deep aim of “utopian society” developed in the Republic as the solution to natural tendency towards moral and political declines. It required creation of rigid and hierarchical class society governed by philosopher kings, whose infallible knowledge of the Forms would stave off decay as well as ensure the rulers’ incorruptibility (ibid.). Popper argues that it is Plato’s uncritical epistemology that provides him with a foundation upon which the notion of the utopian, or the closed, society rests. The reason is that Plato assumes that “the perfect knowledge” of a philosopher king enables him to know how a society ought to be governed in order to prevent from the natural tendency toward decay. According to Plato, the democratic society of Athens should be replaced with a stable utopian society. Plato saw this as justice, but Popper argues that such a utopian society had all the hallmarks of totalitarianism, including rigid hierarchy, censorship, collectivism and central planning. Popper concludes that such a utopian society is a good example of a closed society. While Plato was the main target of Popper’s criticism in the Open Society, Aristotle was another philosopher whose ideas were interesting for Popper. Aristotle believed that knowledge of an entity required grasping its essence. However, unlike Plato’s pessimistic view of the history, Aristotle defines an entity’s essence as a bundle of potentialities manifesting as the entity develops through time. An entity’s essence acts as an internal motor driving the entity towards its fullest development (ibid.: 219–243). Having said that, Popper argues that there is an implicit historicism in Aristotle’s epistemology because his essentialism naturally aligned with the notion of historical destiny: a state’s or a nation’s development is predetermined by its hidden undeveloped essence. Popper argues that there are about deep links between the ancient Greek philosophy and hostility towards the open society. In Plato’s essentialism, holism and historicism, Popper detected the intellectual roots of Plato’s ancient totalitarian project. Popper argues that these very same ideas were actually at the heart of modern totalitarianism or closed societies in the West or in other parts of the globe (ibid.: 242–256). Although, in Popper’s eyes, Plato was the most important ancient enemy of the open society, in Aristotle’s teleological essentialism, Popper found a key link

18  Karl Popper

connecting ancient and modern historicism. In fact, the idea of historical destiny that Aristotle generated was at the core of the thought of two 19th century philosophers, that is, C.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx, whom Popper charged with facilitating the rise of modern closed societies. Popper argues that history was central to both Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophy and their ideas exemplified historical thinking and its outcome for the rise of modern closed societies. As observed by Popper (ibid.: 253–256), according to Hegel’s historicism, the dialectical interaction of ideas was the driving force of history. In Hegel’s eyes, the gradual improvement of philosophical ethical, political and religious ideas determines the march of history. History, which Hegel sometime described as the gradual unfolding of “reason”, comes to an end when all the internal contradictions in human ideas are finally resolved. In this line of thought, Jarvie and Pralong (2003: 4), point out: For Popper, Plato is a great thinker who made great mistakes. This, Popper says, teaches us that we should not defer to great men, but think for ourselves. As an alternative to Plato’s influential ideal society, Popper offers the open society, one which attempts to maximize freedom of choice, and which is democratic in the sense that the citizens can overthrow the government without violence.  .  .  . By contrast with Plato, Marx was optimistic. He offered hope to mankind. However, Popper argues that both of them [Plato and Marx] mixing brilliant scientific ideas about society and politics with other claims that are merely prophetic: claims about the future course of things that cannot be known in advance. Great men make great mistakes; great men as prophets can be the deliverers of disaster. (ibid.) Allow me to also offer a brief review of Popper’s views about the intellectual role of Karl Marx in the rise of modern closed societies. As argued by Popper (ibid.: 311–320), Marx’s historical materialism famously inverted Hegel’s philosophy. For Marx, history was a succession of economic and political systems, or ‘mode of production’. As technological innovations and new ways of organizing production led to the improvement in a society’s capacity to meet human material needs, new modes of production would emerge. In each new mode of production, the political and legal systems, as well as the dominant moral and religious values and practices, would reflect the interests of those who controlled the new production system. In fact, Marx believed that the capitalist mode of production was the preultimate stage of human history. The production power unleashed by new technological progress and factor production under capitalism was incompatible with capitalism as an economic and political system and leads to inefficiency,

Karl Popper  19

instability and injustice. Marx claimed that these states of affairs would inevitably lead to revolution fallowed by establishment of communist society as final stage of the development of human society would be one of material conditions of true freedom and equality for all. Popper argues that, while, Plato, Hegel and Marx disagreed on “the mechanisms” that derived human social evolution, all of them were historicists because they believed that transhistorical laws governed human history. This was the key error that Popper recognized in the social thoughts of those intellectual leaders of the old and modern closed societies. The deep “methodological flaw” of historicism, according to Popper, is that historicists wrongly see the goal of social sciences as “historical forecast” – that is to predict the general course of history. But, according to Popper, such prediction is impossible. Popper offers two arguments to prove that such a kind of historical prediction is not possible as follows: The first was “a logical argument”. Human knowledge grows and changes overtime, and knowledge in turn affects social events. Since we cannot predict what we will know in the future, the prediction of general course of history would also be impossible. As long as it is granted that knowledge affects social behaviour and that knowledge changes overtime, “historicism” must be rejected. In the same line of reasoning, Popper argues that prior conditions, as the laws of nature, cannot causally determine the future (ibid.). Popper’s second argument against historicism focused on the role of laws in “social explanation”. Popper claims that historicists wrongly believe that genuine social sciences must be a kind of “theoretical history” in which the aim is to uncover laws of historical development that explain and predict the course of history. But this represents a fundamental misunderstanding of scientific laws (ibid.). In fact, there is no such thing as a law of historical development. In Popper’s viewpoint, there are no transhistorical laws that determine the transition from one historical period to the next. Popper uses his logic of scientific discovery to show how “historicism” plays the role of the third major intellectual roots of the closed society. Popper argues that there may be sociological laws that govern human behaviour within particular social systems and institutions. For instance the laws of supply and demand are kinds of social laws governing market economy. But the future course of history cannot be predicted, and, in particular, laws that govern the general trajectory of history do not exist.3 In fact, Popper disagrees with the historical sociologists who argue that the general trajectory of social development could be the subject matter of scientific study. Having said all this, now we can see how Popper defines the idea of a closed society: A closed society at its best can be justly compared to an organism. The so-called organic or biological theory of the state can be applied to it to a considerable extent. A closed society resembles a herd or a tribe in being a semi-organic unit whose members are held together by semi-biological ties – kinship, living together, sharing common efforts, common dangers, common

20  Karl Popper

joys and common distress. It is still a concrete group of concrete individuals, related to one another not merely by such abstract social relationships as division of labour and exchange of commodities, but by concrete physical relationships such as touch, smell, and sight. And although such a society may be based on slavery, the presence of salves need not create a fundamentally different problem from that of domesticated animals. Thus those aspects are lacking which make it impossible to apply the organic theory successfully to an open society (ibid.: 165). Given this reading of the closed society, I want to show that, while Popper has given an important role to the flawed philosophical ideas (historicism, holism and essentialism) in the formation of the closed society, his account of the closed society does not supply us with “a sociological” understanding of it because it does not say anything about the question of how the uncritical rationalists give themselves a set of dogmatic values and institutions to solve the problem of order in the closed society. In other words, when Popper defines a closed society, he does not use “the sociological ideal types of society” in which the notions of “common” values and social institutions play fundamental roles. Hence, Popper does not tell us what is meant by the very term “social” in his conception of the closed society. Given Popper’s idea of a closed society, we can now see how he defines the idea of an open society. In this line of thought, Popper views the Western liberal democracies as the good examples of open societies. Popper considers the liberal democracies as the best of all political worlds of whose existence we have any historical knowledge. Viewed from the perspective of his critical epistemology, Popper argues that the liberal democracies are good examples of open societies because they have the ability of self-correction peacefully over time. Epistemologically speaking, Popper’s interest in the idea of an open society should not be limited to the political system that this idea advocates but is to be understood in terms of the novel grounds on which he developed and defended “the notion of liberal democracy” in terms of openness to criticism. In fact, Popper’s argument for “a liberal society” is anchored in his critical epistemology. Popper argues that all human knowledge, including knowledge of the social world, is “conjectural” and that freedom and social progress ultimately depend on “the method of trial and error”. In Popper’s eyes, liberal democracies have realized the ideal of scientific attitude in the realm of social world. Therefore, the chief role of the citizens in Popper’s liberal democracy is the small but “important one” of removing “bad leaders” without violence. What did Popper Mean by an “Open Society”? The question of what Popper means by the idea of an open society is to be addressed in a close relation with his definition of the closed society. Popper (1945

Karl Popper  21

[2012]: 165) maintains that “the magical or tribal or collective society will . . . be called the closed society, and the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society”. To better understand this contrast, we need to briefly look at Popper’s philosophy of science which is “a paradigm” for his idea of an open society. Popper’s main contribution to the philosophy of science is his doctrine of falsificationism, which implies that science proceeds by offering hypotheses and attempting to refute them by evidence. With this definition of science in mind, an “open society” is a society, which is characterized by institutions, that makes it possible to exercise the same virtues into pragmatic pursuit of solutions to social problems. Hans Albert (2006: 7–8) has interpreted the outcomes of Popper’s epistemology of science for his idea of an open society in an elegant way: It is one of the peculiarities of Popper’s social philosophy that it is closely connected with his epistemology. The fallibilism, the realism and the critical approach of his epistemology are also to basis of his conception of social philosophy. The open society as it has been characterized by Popper is a society whose members have the possibility to decide freely about how to lead their lives and to participate in decisions about their common affairs. By the institutionalization of competition and criticism in all social realms such societies are in a condition to find new solutions for problems of all kinds, to analyse and to discuss their solutions, and try come to reforms. That is, they can practise the kind of problem-solving behaviour that has been deemed appropriate by Popper. In this way the methodological criticism and revisionism of Popper’s epistemology can be anchored in the institutional arrangements and the traditions of a society. With respect to politics this means that power has been tamed by law. Therefor the rule of law – the constitutional state – is the centrepieces of a social order of this kind. In accordance with Albert: The basic value of Popper’s idea of the open society is, as he himself once pointed out, human freedom. But it was clear to him that this freedom has to be protected by the state and that on the other hand only a state that is controlled by free citizens can protect their freedom. His idea of an open society is an attempt to transform the European idea of freedom into a sociological construction that can be seen as an ideal-type in the sense of Marx Weber. [Emphasis added] (ibid.: 8) Validating these insightful remarks, however, Popper’s idea of the open society does not show us what is meant by the term “social” in the idea in question. After this brief review of Popper’s idea of the open society, I should like to show that

22  Karl Popper

how Popper’s justificationist account of critical rationalism has affected his definition of the open society.

Section III: Justificationism, “Irrational Faith in Reason” and the Idea of an Open Society In this section, I shall address the question of how “the idea of knowledge as justified true belief”, which has deeply affected Popper’s philosophies of science and rationality, has also prevented him from offering a sociological account of the open society. To this end, Section III proceeds as follows. It offers (a) an examination of the relation between the notion of fallibility of human knowledge and the idea of an open society, (b) a study of how Popper’s ideas of objective knowledge and critical rationalism might be linked to his idea of an open society and (c) an exploration of how Popper’s justificationist reading of critical rationalism has contributed to his definition of the idea of an open society. Fallibility of Human Knowledge and the Idea of an Open Society As argued before, in The Open Society, Popper creates a meaningful relationship between the uncritical epistemologies of Plato, Hegel and Marx on the one hand, and the idea of the closed society on the other. Popper also applies “the notion of human fallibility” to develop the idea of an open society. In fact, what Popper is telling us by uncovering the intellectual roots of the idea of a closed society is that such intellectual roots are originated in “an infallible account” of human knowledge upon which a “utopian social order” is defendable because it can be justified by positive reasons. However, Popper’s argument against the closed society, and for the open society, is that a utopian society cannot be built upon the basis of conjectural knowledge. In this line of reasoning, Jarvie and Pralong (2003: xviii) have argued that a close connection ought to be created between the fallibility of human knowledge and the idea of an open society: Since our knowledge of what is virtuous is conjectural, like all our knowledge: it would be dogmatic and risky to shape society according to one recipe. However, a liberal and secular society can accommodate within it almost all experiments in the ways of living, in cultivation of the virtues that different groups wish to advocate. A plural, secular order is a means to guard against catastrophic mistakes. It will not satisfy zealots, who may judge its very diversity an offence. Education towards tolerance as a supreme virtue is a long-term project. [Emphasis added] However, an important question that remains is that: what kind of epistemological fallibility Popper has in mind when he criticizes a closed society in favour of an open one?

Karl Popper  23

Knowledge as Justified True Belief, Critical Rationalism and the Idea of an Open Society In Science and the Open Society, Mark A. Notturno provides us with an insightful reading of how Popper’s theory of objective knowledge is to be linked with the critical rationalism and how this linkage is to be applied in order to see what Popper means by the idea of an open society. As pointed out by Notturno (2000: xix), The most distinctive feature of Popper’s philosophy, and the key to understanding his views on objectivity and rationality, is that it does not regard scientific knowledge as justified true belief. Popper believed that all of our knowledge is irreparably fallible, that it grows through criticism and trial and error. . . . Popper equated the rational attitude with the critical attitude, and he called his philosophy Critical Rationalism in order to emphasize this fact. But Critical Rationalism is best understood today in contrast with what might equally be called Uncritical Empiricism or Critical Irrationalism. . . . This, however, must be put into context. Most philosophers regard scientific knowledge as justified true belief. They regard knowledge as objective and rational to the extent to which it is justified, and they regard an argument as a justification of knowledge to the extent to which it is rational and objective. Popper asks that if the justificationist reading of knowledge is not practicable in the realm of science, what would be objective and rational scientific knowledge? As observed by Notturno, the response to that question may be offered in the following way: scientific knowledge consists of problem, and of hypothetical solutions for solving our problems. But, as argued before, an insightful observation here is that Popper does not establish the philosophy of critical rationalism upon the rejection of the idea of knowledge as justified true belief. In fact, when Popper comes to define his philosophy of rationality, he makes a justificational turn, and arguing that since the critical rationalist cannot defend his belief in reason by positive reasons, he should accept that belief by “irrational faith”. Thus, I have argued that Popper has established the idea of critical rationalism upon the justified true belief account of knowledge (Mohammadi Alamuti 2022). Hence, Notturno is not right in saying that “the conception” of rationality which is used by Popper to define the idea of an open society ought to be seen in the context of a conjectural account of objective knowledge. It needs to be added that Notturno (2000: 5) argues that The fact of the matter is that The Open Society and its Enemies is not so much a criticism of a political and economic system as it is a criticism of the idea that there can be anything like a science with theories so well-established that we could safely rely upon its experts, as gods amongst men, for the truth. Popper thought that it was this idea – and, indeed, only their certainty in this idea – that gave well-intentioned men and women the courage to undertake,

24  Karl Popper

in the name of ‘scientific socialism’, and at the best of ‘scientific experts,’ the drastic social changes that were undertaken by communists. While Notturno tries to create a logical linkage between the idea of objective knowledge, in terms of fallibility of human knowledge, and the idea of an open society, due to my criticism of Popper’s account of critical rationalism, such a linkage would be “baseless”. Now we should explore how the justificational reading of critical rationalism could be related to the idea of an open society. In essence, I should like to develop my critique of Popper’s idea of the open society on the basis of my criticism of his reading of critical rationalism. While Popper has tried to connect his “critical approach to epistemology” with the idea of an open society, when he comes to link the idea of an open society with critical rationalism, he does not actually extend “the critical approach of his philosophy of science” to the philosophy of rationality. In the first volume of this book, the details of my argument regrading this failure could be seen (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 27–45). However, it would be enough here to say that Popper did not notice that the philosophy of critical rationalism ought to be reinvented on the basis of “a non-justificational” theory of knowledge (ibid.: 66–86). In my view, the difficulty that one may observe in the way Popper relates critical rationalism with the idea of an open society is that the idea of critical rationalism in terms of an irrational faith in reason does not tell us how “an access to critical rationality” can play “a fundamental role” in the formation of an open society. It is not very important that we can create “a formal” connection between the paradigm of scientific enquiry and the idea of an open society. From a sociological viewpoint, however, it is very important that we could create “a causal link” between people’s access to critical rationality and the rise of an open social order. The core of my criticism of Popper’s idea of an open society is that Popper defines critical rationalism in the context of the justified true belief account of knowledge, and, if so, the very conception of critical rationality involves the infinite regress of proofs. And, due to this justificational error, Popper is unable to provide us an accurate account of rationality that should address the question of how “reason” itself operates. Hence, the relation which Popper creates between critical rationalism and the idea of an open society involves the same regress of justification. Nevertheless, I agree with Notturno in saying that a distinction can be made between an open society and a liberal society on the basis of Popper’s critical epistemology. One may argue that Popper’s idea of an open society is merely a rewriting of liberal democracy in terms of “openness to criticism” (Hall 1999). However, while Popper regards the liberal democracies as the good examples of the open societies, he did not ignore the difference that should be made between these two normative ideals of a free society. As stated by Notturno (2000: 7–8): An open society (that is a society based on the ideas of not merely tolerating dissenting opinions but respecting them) and a democracy (that it is, a form

Karl Popper  25

of government devoted to the protection of an open society) cannot flourish if science becomes the exclusive of possession of a closed set of specialists . . . . The Open Society and by this I mean the book and the society – is opposed not, as to this or that authority, and not just to Plato, Hegel and Marx, it is, on the contrary opposed to the very idea that there are cognitive authority that we are going to understood open society as scientific or rational society, then we must think of society not as an institutional hierarchy of experts, but as a never-ending process of problem-solving in which we propose tentative solutions to our problem and then try to eliminate the error in our proposals, we must think of rationality not in terms of justification, but in terms of criticism. Given these remarks, it wouldn’t be unwise to say that, unlike a liberal society, an open society rests upon this epistemological notion that people should respect each other as “equal source of criticism” and learn from openness to criticism. While the aforementioned distinction is important, the notion of “irrational faith” in reason leads us to the question of what critical rationality is. If this question cannot be addressed accurately, as it is the case with regard to Popper’s critical rationalism, then the difference between a liberal and an open society does rest on “a conception of rationality” which is itself untenable. It is true that in the open society, unlike the liberal society, people use critical rationality in order to criticize each other’s ideas to learn from each other’s errors. However, if the critical rationality is considered merely as “a moral attitude” of openness to criticism, rather than “a cognitive capacity”, then people cannot also be accounted as the equal source of criticism. In order to better analyse the outcome of Popper’s critical rationalism for his idea of an open society, I should like to refer to the following arguments which are pointed out by Notturno. In my view, it is our adherence to the method of deductive logic and the law of non-contradiction that sets free our critical powers. These methods advise us to reject an argument if its conclusion does not follow from its premises, and they force us to reexamine our beliefs when the conclusions that follows from them seems to be false. It is only our respect for these methods, and for the idea of truth upon which they are based, that enables us, as individuals, to challenge the beliefs of our communities in ways that do not immediately lead to irrationalism . . . No argument can force us to accept the truth of any belief. But a valid deductive argument can force us to choose between the truth of its conclusion on the one hand and the falsity of its premises on the other. An inductive argument cannot do this. Its conclusion may be false even if all of its premises are true. So we can always reject its conclusion while accepting its premises are true. So it can never force us to choose in the way that a deductive argument can. [Emphasis added] (Notturno 2000: 10)

26  Karl Popper

With these considerations in mind, however, when Popper comes to define critical rationalism in terms of the critical powers of man, he does not use “the critical power of man” itself, as Kant, for instance, uses it. To the contrary, resting his argument on the sceptic’s critique of uncritical rationalism, Popper claims that “a belief in reason” can only be made on the basis of “an irrational faith”. From my previous arguments, we know that this reading of critical rationalism involves the regress of justification and would be untenable. Hence, I conclude that Popper does not establish his idea of the open society upon “an accurate account of rationality” per se. The idea of the open society therefore is dealt with the same regress with which the philosophy of critical rationalism, in terms of irrational faith in reason, is involved. In short, as my criticism of Popper’s critical rationalism implies, the claim that our faith in reason is an irrational faith suffers from the infinite regress of proofs. Since Popper’s epistemology does not allow him to see critical rationalism as “a theory of rationality”, he arrives at this untenable result that rationality is not so much a property of knowledge and what is rational is not so much the content of a theory or a belief as the way in which we “hold” it. Inspired by this argument, Popper leads to the definition of critical rationalism in terms of a “moral attitude” of openness to criticism. However, holding open all beliefs to criticism does not tell us how such “open beliefs” might be shown to be false by “negative reasons” as long as the critical rationalist does not know how “logic” ought to be used to refute “an open belief”, including “an open belief in reason”. In short, if Popper’s critical rationalism does not explain how reason itself preforms, then how could his idea of critical rationalism is to be used to define the idea of an open society in terms of a society that sets free the critical powers of man? In my view, the justified true belief account of knowledge, which has informed Popper’s reading of critical rationalism, has prevented him from identifying “an accurate role” for “critical rationality” in defining the ideal type of an open society.

Section IV: A Sociological Critique of Popper’s Idea of the Open Society In this section, I would like to show that that “irrational faith in reason” is to be seen as an obstacle for offering a sociological conception of the open society. In this line of argument, I shall introduce my sociological criticism of Popper’s idea of the open society. To this end, I begin with a brief review of the role of “common” values and social institutions in “a sociological ideal type” of the open society. “Common” Values and Institutions and “a Sociological Ideal Type” of the Open Society From what we know of the sociological conception of society in the first volume of this book, we can deduce this conclusion that a sociological ideal type of the

Karl Popper  27

open society should tell us what are “common values and social institutions” of an open society. In the light of this insight, I should refer to Talcott Parsons’s problem of social order. In short, Parsons (1937 [1968]) recognized the vital importance of a Hobbesian problem of social order for the sociological theory and argued that because the egoistic behaviour of individuals has a “potential” for involving the society in a war of all against all, the theory of society should address the question of why the egoistic behaviours of individuals do not prevent from the rise of a peaceful social order. As noted by Dennis H. Wrong (1999: 33), “The Hobbesian question asks how men are capable of the regulation by social norms and goals that makes possible an enduring society”. Having said that, while Parsons accepted the Hobbesian definition of the problem of social order, he disagreed with the solution Hobbes offered to the problem in question. Hobbes used the notion of ‘the state of nature’ to show that the pursuit of selfinterest leads human society to a situation of war and argued that people should submit their rights to a Leviathan, the state to protect their security. However, Hobbes’s model of action claiming that the passion drives human action does not make his solution to the problem of social order realistic because if all human beings pursue their self-interests, why shouldn’t the state-man, who has an absolute power, do the same thing? In the first volume of this book, I argued that, if we accept that it is reason, rather than passion, that drives human action, a new definition of the problem of social order ought to be formulated (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 161–165). It is worthy of note that, one can say, Parsons follows the spirit of Kant’s moral philosophy, arguing that in order to solve the problem of social order, we should establish our theory of society on the basis of a micro-foundation implying that individuals can use their practical reason to see all humans as the ends-inthemselves. According to Parsons (1935: 295), In so far, however, as individuals share a common system of ultimate ends, this system would, among other things, define what they all held their relations ought to be, would lay down norms determining these relations and limits on the use of others as means, on the acquisition and use of power in general. In so far, then, as action is determined by ultimate ends, the existence of a system of such ends common to the members of the community seems to be the only alternative to a state of chaos – a necessary factor in social ­stability. [Emphasis added] However, unlike Kant, Parsons did not argue that the practical reason may be used to create a “common” value which can be justified by positive reasons. Instead, Parsons limits the idea of social order to “a national” order, arguing that the rise of a peaceful social order is possible only if there is a system of common values to which individual members of a national society orient their action goals. Like Weber, Parsons (1937 [1968]) claims that if justification of a universal moral law by positive reasons is “not” possible, then we should assume that there is “a given

28  Karl Popper

system of common values” at the “national level” by the means of which we can solve the problem of social order. However, I have argued that it is the justified true belief account of knowledge that prevents not only Weber but also Parsons, from a recognition of the fact that “a claim” regarding “a universal moral value” could be held open to criticism, and if it is not shown to be false by “negative reasons”, then the value, or moral law, in question is valid. Hence, there is no obstacle to reinterpret the Kant’s moral philosophy on the basis of “a non-justificational” theory of knowledge. The result would be: the access to the critical rationality can, and should, drive human action in terms of making the passion manageable by the moral law. If so, the problem of social order is to be redefined on the basis of this notion that it is reason, rather than passion, that drives human action. Therefore, the problem of social order ought to be reformulated as follows: how does human actors’ access to critical rationality enables them to give themselves a set of common values and social institutions that prevent them from a war of all against all, and encourage them to participate at a social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life for all? If we use this new formulation of the problem of social order to define the meaning of the term “social” in an open society, the question would be that: how does critical rationality allow people to give themselves a set of “common” values and social institutions which are held open to criticism and are not shown to be false by negative reasons? In fact, the rise of such values and institutions could be the normative and institutional solutions of “a sociological theory of the open society” for the problem of a rational social order. Having said all this, it might be concluded that, while Popper’s idea of the open society is focused on setting free the critical powers of man, it does not tell us anything about the “common” values and social institutions which are necessary for solving the problem of order in an open society. From a sociological standpoint, “an ideal type” of open society should be defined due to the following question: how does the access to critical rationality enable individuals to organize themselves for building a social order through “a rational consensus” regarding a set of common values and social institutions? In short, the meaning of the term “social” in “a sociological ideal type” of the open society is to be sought in terms of those “common” values and institutions which people give themselves in order not only to prevent from a war of all against all, but also to shape a social division of works which enables them to realize the ideal of the good life for all. Popper’s “Irrational” Faith in Reason and the Question of “Common” Values and Institutions My point in offering an explanation on the role of common values and social institutions in “a sociological ideal type” of human society is to provide “a new foundation” for “a sociological critique” of Popper’s idea of an open society. As argued earlier, the function of “common” values and institutions in a sociological

Karl Popper  29

ideal type of human society ought to be realized in a close relation which they have with the “model of rational action”, and the role of reason in driving human action. In other words, the philosophy of the need to the common values and institutions is to be sought in the potential of using “critical rationality” to manage “egoistic behaviours” and accordingly making the rise of a peaceful social order possible. However, if “the conception” of rationality itself is not defined “accurately”, then the model of rational action couldn’t give “an accurate role” to reason in driving human action. When such a model of rational action is absent, the ideal type of human society cannot be linked to the notion of “common” values and social institutions. In my view, the problem with Popper’s idea of the open society is that it does not internalize the concepts of common values and social institutions in his definition of the open society. But, if we ask ourselves that what causes this problem, my answer is that “the conception of rationality” which Popper uses to define the idea of critical rationalism does not allow him to build “a model of rational action” in which the reason could play a key role to give individuals a system of common values and institutions, which is necessary for solving the problem of social order. Hence, from the beginning, it is Popper’s definition of critical rationalism in terms of irrational faith in reason that does not allow him to be directed to “the role” of common values and social institutions in the ideal type of an open society. In short, the notion of irrational faith in reason cannot be used to develop a model of action in order to solve the problem of social order. Hence, the conception of open society which has emerged from an irrational faith in reason wouldn’t include the components of “common” values and social institutions. In this line of thought, in “The Open Society Revisited”, Anthony O’Hear argues that if we define critical rationalism as a “moral attitude”, then there would not be “a rational foundation” upon which we can defend our moral justification for an open society, rather than a closed society. In O’Hear’s (2004: 193–194) words: In the first place, . . . the open society, like Popper’s philosophy more generally, is built on a faith in reason, meaning by that a belief in the power of reasoned discussion to resolve disputes and create social harmony. This faith is combined with a form of cosmopolitan rationalism and Popper’s own fallibilism. These ere, as noted, characteristically enlightened beliefs, part of the world view bequeathed us by the Enlightenment. It is, as Popper himself observed, a question of two competing faiths . . . We need now to compare these two beliefs, as guides to social life. From the point of view of irrationalists, such as nationalists and fundamentalists religious believers, Popper’s fallibilism and cosmopolitanism will look as partial and tendentious as their beliefs do to the fallibilist Popper. What we and Popper will see as universal values inherent in Enlightenment rationalism and scepticism might, from the point of view of other cultures and faiths, appear as a manifestation of Western imperialism, to these other cultures and

30  Karl Popper

faiths, as objectionable and insidious as other more overt manifestations of imperialism. In this context, Popper’s insistence that it is all based on an irrational faith is, to put it mildly, disappointing. It leaves him open to the obvious rejoinder that the other faith could be just as true and useful as Popper’s, and would determine a rather different attitude to those who disagree – rather more forceful, no doubt, than listening to the other fellow’s point of view. [Emphasis added] I should say that the relevance of these passages for our discussion is that if critical rationalism is defended by irrational faith in reason, the notion of a moral attitude of openness to criticism cannot play the role of a factor which can differentiate the idea of an open society from the idea of a closed society. The reason is that not only does the critical attitude of people in the open society originates in “an irrational choice”, but it can also be said that the magical attitude of people in the closed society originates in “an irrational choice”. Hence, the definition of critical rationalism in terms of “an irrational” attitude of openness to criticism cannot lead us to a differentiation between a closed and an open society. In the same line of reasoning, in ‘Minima Moralia: is there an ethics of the open society?’, Sandra Pralong (2003: 128–145) reminds us that the collapse of repressive regimes does not necessarily lead to the establishment of an open society. Along with institutional redesign needed to facilitate transformation from a central-planned economy and a repressive political apparatus to a market system and a democratic regime, there actually needs to be a change in moral attitude. To build an open society, people need to abandon a “totalitarian ethics”, where the ends justify the means, and agree instead to accept “the procedural ethics” that is the basis of the rule of law. If the change in the attitude is necessary for the realization of the ideal of an open society, then this question arises that how the attitude of openness to criticism could be created whereas the attitude itself ought to be accepted irrationally? Hence, in order to address the questions of what means an open society, we need to admit that critical rationality is not merely “a moral attitude” but rather “a cognitive capacity” which enables people to question the “totalitarian ethics”, replacing it with an “ethics of openness to criticism”. In summary, my point of departure in this chapter was that the idea of critical rationalism, as Popper describes it, originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge because the notion of “irrational faith in reason” originates from “a justificational critique” of the sceptic regarding uncritical rationalism: a rational belief in reason is justified if it could be proved by positive reasons. But if the presentation of positive reasons involves in the infinite regress, then the concept of rationality shouldn’t be based upon an irrational faith in reason. If so, without an accurate definition of rational beliefs, the role of reason in driving human action wouldn’t be identifiable. Hence, the notion of common values and social institutions, which are given to individuals because of their access to critical

Karl Popper  31

reason, has not been discussed in “a conception of society” that does not identity such role for reason. This is the way through which I can show that how Popper’s irrational faith in reason has contributed to his ideal type of the open society in which there is no room for “common” values and social institutions. The notion of “setting free” the critical powers of man, at the core of Popper’s idea of an open society, does not tell us anything about what the term “social” means in this conception of society.

Notes 1 In Chapter 3 of the first volume of this book, I presented a critique of Bartley’s theory of pan-critical rationalism in order to show that, while Bartley is right in saying that Popper’s irrational faith in reason cannot defend the position of the critical rationalist, his own alternation, that is “pan-critical rationalism”, suffers from the lack of a logical rule to show us how our “open belief” in critical rationality could be refuted by “negative reasons”. 2 While it is true that the method of conjectures and refutations, which is proposed by Popper (1962, 1959 [1992]), may reject the holistic method of the sociological studies, it would still be possible to show that the sociological studies can use the method of conjunctures and refutations. If we accept that the society as a whole can be the subject matter of a macro-sociological theory, then the usage of method of conjectures and refutations is to be interpreted as follows: the macro-sociologist suggests a hypothesis regarding the nature of social order, as a whole, which rests upon a micro-foundation in terms of the ideal types of rational action, and then he examines the truth of his conjecture – that is the hypothesis in question, by argument rather than experience. If we don’t accept this method, it would mean that “the social order”, as a whole, cannot be the subject matter of a scientific sociological research, which contradicts the very existence of the science of sociology. 3 If the only method for a sociological study of human society and its evolution must be “an empirical method”, then it might be told that the “macro-social laws” cannot be studied scientifically because they cannot be tested by empirical evidence. Up to this point, Popper is correct. However, if we consider the non-justificationist epistemology, presented in Chapter  4 of the first volume (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 66–86), then it would be possible to argue that there might be “a non-empirical, yet conjectural” method, which is applicable for exploring those macro-social laws that shape the logic of social development.

Bibliography Albert, Hans (2006) “Karl Popper and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century”. In: Jarvie, I. et al. (eds.) Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume I. Burlington, Ashgate, pp. 1–12. Bartley, III, W.W. (1964) “Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality”. In: Bunge, M. (ed.) The Critical Approaches to Science and Philosophy, in Honor of Karl R. Popper. London, Free Press of Glencoe, pp. 3–31. Bartley, III, W.W. (1984) The Retreat to Commitment, 2nd edn. Chicago, Open Court. Hall, A. John (1999) “The Sociological Deficit of the Open Society, Analyzed and Remedied”. In: Jarvie, I. and Prolong, S. (eds.) Popper’s Open Society: After 50 Years, the Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 83–96.

32  Karl Popper Jarvie, I.C. (2001) The Republic of Science: The Emergence of Popper’s Social View of Science 1935–1945. Atlanta, Amsterdam. Jarvie, Ian and Pralong, Sandra (eds.) (2003) Popper’s Open Society, After 50 Years, the Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper. London and New York, Routledge. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2021) Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Society, Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume I. London and New York, Routledge. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2022) “Critical Rationalism: An Epistemological Critique”. In Foundations of Science. Springer, pp. 1–32. Published Online: 23 June 2022, https://doi. org/10.1007/s10699-022-09847-z. Notturno, M.A. (2000) Science and the Open Society: The Future of Karl Popper’s Philosophy. Budapest, Central European University Press. O’Hear, Anthony (2004) “The Open Society Revisited”. In: Catton, P. and Macdonald, G. (eds.) Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 189–202. Parsons, T. (1935) “The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory”. In: International Journal of Ethics, 45(3), pp. 282–316. Parsons, T. (1937 [1968]) The Structure of Social Action, Volume I: Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim. New York, The Free Press. Popper, K.R. (1945 [2012]) The Open Society and Its Enemies. One-Volume edn. London and New York, Routledge. Popper, K.R. (1962) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York, Basic Books. Popper, K.R. (1959 [1992]) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London, Routledge. Pralong, S. (2003) “Minima Moralia: Is There an Ethics of the Open Society?”. In: Popper’s Open Society, after 50 Years, the Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 128–145. Wrong, D.H. (1999) The Oversocialized Conception of Man. London, Transaction Publishers.

Chapter 2

From the Closed to the Open Society A Critique of Popper’s Analysis

Introduction The question of whether Popper has offered “an accurate analysis” of the transition from the closed to the open society is the subject of enquiry in this chapter. The chapter aims to show that “the problematic” nature of Popper’s analysis originates in the model of human action which he uses to address the question of rational behaviour. In this line of reasoning, the chapter argues that the definition of critical rationalism, in terms of irrational faith in reason, leads to an under- theorization of the role of critical rationality in the formation of human action. To satisfy these arguments, the chapter proceeds in three sections. Section I asks the question of how the theories of knowledge and rationality shape the model of human action, responding to this question by arguing that the idea of knowledge as justified true belief has offered the epistemological basis for a justificational conception of rationality” in the model of human action which prevents it from understanding the role of reason in the formation of action. Section II argues the reason why Popper’s model of rational action should be understood in the context of a justificationist philosophy of rationality, and what would be the consequences of such a model of action for Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society? In the light of these insights, Section III offers my sociological critique of Popper’s analysis of the transition. It aims to show that, while the question of the transition from the closed to the open society requires “a sociological theory” of social change, which is to be formulated on the basis of a model of action addressing the role of reason in human action, the definition which Popper offers for critical rationality does not provide us with “a micro-foundation” for such a theory of social change. Hence, Popper does not establish his analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society upon “a sociological theory” which defines the transition in question as “a social change”.

Section I: Epistemology, Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Action in Modern Sociology In Chapter 6 of the first volume, I  showed how non-justificationist theories of knowledge and rationality ought to be used for offering “a new foundation” for DOI: 10.4324/9781003027119-3

34  From the Closed to the Open Society

the theory of action in sociology (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 107–142). In this section, I briefly review that argument to provide an epistemological foundation for my criticism of Popper’s model of rational action. The issue of how human action contributes to the rise of social order has played a central role in sociological theory. The separation of justification and criticism enables us to reformulate the model of human action as if “an infinite regress” could be avoided which lies in the conception of rationality that the utilitarian and normative models of action apply to explain what the role of reason is in human action. Chapter 6 of the first volume employed my general theory of critical rationalism to offer a non-justificational conception of rationality that lets the theorist of human action to show how “rational agents” give themselves a moral law to organize their social relations. In essence, the non-justificational conception of rationality implies that a belief, whether moral or scientific, is “rational” if it is held open to criticism and is not shown to be false by negative reasons. Chapter 6 used this new account of rationality for redefining the ideal types of “rational action” in sociology. It also argued how the justificationist epistemologies have contributed to the models of human action in sociology. For instance Durkheim, Weber and Parsons applied the justificationist accounts of rationality to develop their normative models of action, as an alternative for the utilitarian model. The utilitarian model of action implies that the means of action could be rationalized, leading to “effective tools” for the realization of “a given goal”; however, the goals of action are incapable of being “rational”. I argued that the epistemology of the utilitarian model of action is to be sought in the idea of knowledge as justified true belief because the utilitarian model assumes that since “a moral claim” regarding the goals of action ought to be proved by positive reasons, he reaches this conclusion that the goals of action cannot be rationalized because of the infinite regress of proofs. However, if we replace the demand for justification with the demand for criticism, the epistemology of the utilitarian model of action loses its basis (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 143–145). Hence, from a non-justificational perspective, we can argue that this utilitarian’s claim that the goals of action are determined by passion, rather than by reason, can be refuted by negative reasons. However, Durkheim and Parsons criticized the utilitarian model of action from “a justificational perspective”: they argued that a peaceful social order cannot come into existence if the goals of action are determined by the passion or subjective utility. Durkheim proposed his social epistemology, which argues that the categories of thought originate from religious practices, in order address the question of human action. Thus, he argued that the action goals are rationalized during the religious practices that define the categories of human thought. Unlike the utilitarian model, Durkheim’s model views the categories of thought as “objective social facts” and claiming that such categories are “justifiable” by experiences. In Chapter 6 of the first volume, however, I reasoned against this argument because it rests on the equation of rationality with

From the Closed to the Open Society  35

justification. And I concluded that Durkheim cannot prove that “the categories of thought” are objective facts on the basis of this claim that they could be justified by experience. Hence, the problem of the “rationality of action goals” remains under-theorization in this normative model of human action. As observed in Chapter 6 of the first volume, Parsons presents his voluntaristic theory of action as a critique of the utilitarian model. Inspired by Kant’s theory of knowledge, Parsons argues that, while the utilitarian’s model of action claims that the goals of action are “subjective”, this claim cannot be defended by argument. As observed by Hans Joas (1996: 11), To Parsons’ mind the dilemma utilitarianism faces thus consists of it having either to assume that free will exists and therefore to assert that goals vary at random, or conversely to assume that goals do not vary at random, at the cost of no longer being able to find a place for free choice and individual decisions in its conceptual framework. Parsons considers the first assumption to be untenable, as there is no sense in human choice from among random goals. . . . Parsons insists that choice already presumes intrinsically unique structure in the sphere of alternative choices, as otherwise choice itself would resemble chance. In the light of these insights, Parsons proposes his voluntaristic theory of action which was informed by the Kantian moral philosophy. Inspired by Kant’s doctrine of practical reason, Parsons offers a normative model of action which gives “value-rationality of the actor” an important role in determining the goals of human action. This role is played through defining the content of goals in question by the actor’s voluntary orientation toward a moral law which exists in the society in question. In fact, the actors rationalize the goals of their actions by orienting them towards a “system of common values”. This system of values enables the actors to define “similar goals” for individuals’ actions, and it is this “similarity” that prevents the actors from defining their self-interests as “purely egoistic goals”. In this sense, Parsons’ model of action implies that it is “practical reason” rather than “passion” that drives human action. Given my interpretation of the Kantian logic of Parsons’s theory of human action, this action theory suffers from the regress of justification. As observed by Hans Albert (1999: 22), There is, of course, no question but that Kant’s own transcendental approach is still a part of the tradition of classical rationalism in that he attempted to provide a solution of the problem of justification in the classical sense of finding a foundation. But if one dispenses with the claim to justification, then there is the possibility of viewing the approach as an attempt to explain scientific knowledge by means of hypothetical recourse to the structure of our cognitive faculty.

36  From the Closed to the Open Society

With these insightful remarks in mind, I  argue that Kant’s moral philosophy involves the regress of justification, and when Parsons uses it as “the basis of an explanation” of the role of practical reason in driving human action, and making the goals of action “rational”, his normative model of action is involved in the same regress of justification. If Kant’s doctrines of the “pure” and “practical” reason involve the regress of justification, then Parsons’ voluntaristic theory of action cannot distance itself from such a regress of proofs. Hence, Parsons has not yet shown us why the goals of action are to be considered “rational”. Chapter 6 of the first volume concluded that, neither Durkheim’s nor Parsons’s normative model of action is capable of addressing the question of “rationality” of the goals of human action (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 107–130). Having said all this, I proposed my critical rationalist theory of human action which argued that if the utilitarian model cannot prove the subjectivity of action goals, and if the normative models are unable to defend the objectivity of action goals, it is the justified true belief account of knowledge that is preventing these theories of action from showing that not only the goals of action, but also the means of action, could be rationalized through basing them on “unfalsified conjunctures” rather than “justified true beliefs” (ibid., 2021: 148–155). From a non-justificational standpoint, if the utilitarian and normative models of actions are not capable of defending the rationality of human action’s goals or means, the epistemological reason is that they describe the conception of “rationality” in terms of justification rather than criticism. If so, it is not a surprise that these models of action are not capable of addressing the question of how “reason” drives action through defining what should be the goals or means of an action. And this recognition has an important consequence for the question of what is “the contribution of critical rationality” to an analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. Given this brief critical review of the two major models of human action in the science of sociology, now I should like to argue how my criticisms of the utilitarian and normative models of action lead us to a criticism of Popper’s model of rational action. In this way, I intend to explore that what are the results of Popper’s model of action for his problematic analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. In this line of reasoning, I shall start with this point that the general theory of critical rationalism can be used to show that the goals or means of an action might be “rationalized” because it is “logically” possible that we “hold” our moral claims regarding the goals of action and our scientific claims regarding the means of action “open” to criticism, seeing whether they are shown to be false by “negative reasons”. In this way, the non-justificational epistemology leads us to “a model of rational action” according to which the goals, or the means, of an action could be “rationalized” by establishing them upon the basis of “unfalsified conjectures”, rather than “justified true beliefs”. Against this background, I should like to show why Popper’s model of rational action involves the regress of justification because, like the utilitarian and

From the Closed to the Open Society  37

normative models of action, it defines “the conception of rationality” on the basis of the epistemology of justified true belief. This important observation enables me to establish my sociological critique of Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society upon the basis of this argument that Popper’s model of action cannot address the very question of how “critical reason” drives human action.

Section II: Popper’s Model of Action: Situational Analysis and the Concept of Human Nature In order to explore how Popper’s epistemology of critical rationalism could be linked to his analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society, his model of human action ought to be investigated. While Popper does not let us know what is exactly his model of action, he has spoken of a model of action which is called “the situational model of action” in the methodology of social sciences. In addition, he speaks of the role of “critical thinking” in his conception of human nature. With a critical review of these readings of Popper’s model of rational action, I shall explore the implications of the models for Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. In this line of reasoning, I will show that what is the relation between these models of action and Popper’s definition of critical rationalism in terms of irrational faith in reason. To these ends, Section II proceeds in three stages: (a) a brief review of Popper’s situational analysis, (b) a study of Popper’s conception of human nature and (c) a presentation of Popper’s model of rational action due to his definition of critical rationalism in terms of irrational faith in reason. The Situational Analysis and Popper’s Model of Rational Action One way of exploring what Popper’s model of action is would be a review of his notion of the situational analysis. In “Models, Instruments and Truth”, Popper (1994: 166) introduces the situational analysis as follows: The fundamental problem of both the theoretical and the historical social sciences is to explain and understand events in terms of human actions and social situations. The key term here is “social situation”. . . . the “models” of the theoretical social sciences are essentially descriptions or reconstructions of typical social situations. In my view, the role of the concept of social situation in the methodology of social sciences can lead us to see what might be Popper’s model of rational action. As we shall see, the role of “the rationality principle” in Popper’s situational analysis would be an “important channel” through which we understand the reason why Popper’s justificational approach to “critical rationality” has prevented him from

38  From the Closed to the Open Society

devoting a “significant role” to the actor’s critical rationality in the transition from the closed to the open society. In “Popper’s Situational Analysis and Contemporary Sociology”, Hedstrom et al. (1998: 349) summarize Popper’s situational model, and the role of the principle of rationality in it, in the following way: Popper uses the example of a pedestrian, called Richard, who wants to cross a street to illustrate the sort of analysis he has in mind. We observe Richard’s rather erratic movements as he is making his way across the street. To explain these movements, we construct a situational model. This model must include some physical objects (e.g., cars) which set certain physical limits to Richard’s movements. In addition, the model must include relevant social institutions such as police regulations and the rules of the road that also set limits for his movements and actions. Finally, the model must specify Richard’s aims and the information or knowledge he has of relevant matters such as social institutions and the intentions of derivers. To work out the actions implicit in this static situational model, an “animating principle” also is needed. According to Popper, the rationality postulate performs this function. Rational action here simply means that actors act appropriately, given their decision-making context, aims, and beliefs. With this type of model, Popper argues, “we may be able to explain, or to predict, Richard’s movements as he crosses the street . . .” [Emphasis added] This passage lets us know that what “the conception of rational action” means in the situational analysis. It implies that actors act appropriately, given their decision-making context, aims and beliefs. However, this conception of rational action does not tell us anything about the role of the actor’s critical rationality in the formation of his “rational action”. Let us analyse the role of “the rationality principle” in the situational analysis a little more. If we bear in mind that according to the situational analysis, the notion of social situation covers all of the following elements: persons’ goals, means, knowledge and social institutions, then, the role of the rationality principle in the situational analysis will better be understood. As pointed out by Popper (1994: 169), [I]t is the central point of situational analysis that we need, in order to “animate” it, no more than the assumption that the various persons or agents involved act adequately, or appropriately – that is to say, in accordance with the situation. We must remember, of course, that the situation, as I use this term, already contains all the relevant aims and all the available relevant knowledge, especially of the various possible means of realizing these aims. Thus there is only one animating law involved – the principle of acting appropriately to the situation, which is clearly an almost empty principle. It is known in the literature under the name “rationality principle”.

From the Closed to the Open Society  39

Given these considerations, we can recognize the role of “the rationality principle” in Popper’s situational analysis and its important upshot for his model of rational action. If we compare the role of the rationality principle in Popper’s situational analysis with the role of the concept of rationality in the sociological models of rational action, we can explore the reason why Popper has not devoted “a substantial role” to the actor’s critical rationality in the formation of the goals and means of a human action. Popper defines the rationality principle in terms of acting “adequately” to the social situation as a methodological principle by the means of which the social scientist can build an “explanatory model” for addressing the typical human action in the social situation. While Popper confesses that the rationality principle could be falsified by empirical evidence, he claims that without admitting such “methodological principle”, the typical action of an individual in the social situation cannot be addressed scientifically. Popper regards the principle of adequacy of action (the rationality principle) as an integral part of every, or nearly every, testable social theory. Popper writes: Now if a theory is tested, and found faulty, then we have always to decide which of its various constituent parts we shall make accountable for its failure. My thesis is that it is sound methodological policy to decide not to make the rationality principle, but the rest of the theory – that is, the model – accountable. (ibid.: 177) A critic of Popper’s situational analysis may argue that it is true that the rationality principle may be regarded as a methodological principle, and, hence, it should not be subjected to an empirical test; however, a methodological principle, which limits the role of reason to acting adequately to the social situation, could be questioned from “a purely logical point of view” because it fails to tell us, if the rationality of the actor is defined in such way, then what would be the role of critical rationality in defining the action’s goals and means?1 It would be very important for our discussion to know that, for Popper (ibid.: 181), the rationality principle ought to be distinguished from “critical rationalism”, in terms of “a moral attitude of openness to criticism”: To sum up, we should distinguish between rationality as a personal attitude (which, in principle, all sane men are capable of sharing) and the rationality principle. Rationality as a personal attitude is the attitude of readiness to correct one’s beliefs. In its intellectually most highly developed form it is the readiness to discuss one’s beliefs critically, and to correct them in the light of critical discussions with other people. The “rationality principle”, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the assumption that men are rational in this sense – that they always adopt a rational attitude. It is, rather, a minimum principle (since it assumes no more than the adequacy of our actions to our

40  From the Closed to the Open Society

problem situations as we see them) which animates almost all our explanatory situational models, and which, although we know that it is not true, we have some reason to regard as a good approximation to the truth. Its adoption reduces considerably the arbitrariness of our models, an arbitrariness which becomes capricious indeed if we try to do without this principle. [Emphasis added] These remarks clearly indicate that Popper does not use his idea of critical rationalism as moral attitude of openness to criticism in order to define “the meaning” of the term rationality in his situational model of action. In my view, it is Popper’s justificational approach to critical rationalism that does not allow him giving a key role to critical rationality as “openness to criticism” in his model of action. The reason is that, when critical rationalism is defined, as a moral attitude, rather than as a theory of rationality, the notion of critical rationality cannot be employed to define what the term “rationality” means in the model of human action. In this line of reasoning, I should have a look at what Mark A. Notturno says in defence of Popper’s situational analysis and the role of the rationality principle in it. Notturno (1998: 405) writes: The rationality principle is not the empirical hypothesis that each person acts adequately to the situation. That hypothesis is clearly false. It is, on the contrary, a methodological principle that places restrictions on what will and will not count as a rational explanation. It says that if we want to explain a social event rationally, then we must assume that the people in it acted adequately to the situation, or, at the very least, that they acted adequately to the situation as they saw it. It seems that the argument of Notturno is untenable because we cannot assume that the individual’s adequate behaviour to the social situation has taken place without any mistake. If this is correct, then the actor should use his (critical) rationality in order to conjecture what is “an adequate” behaviour to the “social situation”. More importantly, the actor should subject his conjecture to an “objective” examination to see whether the conjuncture in question would be refuted by negative reasons. Hence, in my view, the rationality principle itself is to be redefined in terms of the logic of conjectures and refutations. In the same line of thought, Hedstrom et al. (1998: 352) criticize Popper’s situational analysis as follows: “Should not the rationality principle, which according to Popper is false since it is not universality true, be considered to be falsified and therefore be replaced by an alternative model of individual action?” But, Popper’s answer is negative because he defines the rationality principle is an unquestionable methodological rule, rather than an empirical hypothesis, arguing that since an explanation of the rational action in the social science wouldn’t be possible

From the Closed to the Open Society  41

without admitting the rationality principle, we should preserve it while we know that it is empirically a false principle. However, it seems that it is Popper’s justificationist approach to critical rationalism that prevented him from recognizing an important role for the idea of rationality, in terms of openness to criticism, in his model of action. But, if we replace Popper’s irrational faith in reason with my general theory of critical rationalism (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 91–95), then we do not need to separate the principle of rationality from the concept of rationality as openness to criticism. If the actor’s critical rationality affects his rational behaviour in the social situation, the principle of acting appropriately to the situation should be reinterpreted in the context of the logic of conjectures and refutations which is involved in mistakes. In short, my argument is that the rationality principle itself ought to be understood in the context of the idea of critical rationalism as a theory of rationality. If so, the actor’s adequate behaviour in the social situation ought not to be seen independent of his access to critical rationality. This conjectural–refutational approach to the rationality principle, as a methodological principle, can itself be held open to criticism, and so long as it is not shown to be false by argument, the rationality principle may be applied as “an unfalsified premise” of the situational analysis. In this sense, we can revise the meaning of the principle of rationality, if argument, rather than experience, shows that it does not provide us with an accurate reading of the actor’s rational behaviour in the social situation. Nevertheless, in “Popper’s Hermeneutics”, James Farr leads us to a different reading of Popper’s situational analysis which is reconcilable with defining the rationality principle in terms of conjunctures and refutations. As pointed out by Farr (1983: 163): “Popper claims that problem-solving by conjecture and refutation is ‘an explanatory theory of human action’. In this way Popper forges a systematic and highly suggestive link between the theories of science, human action, and interpretive understanding”. With these remarks in mind, I should say that my critical rationalist theory of human action, which was proposed in Chapter 6 of the first volume, is to be considered as “a first systematic attempt” for an integration of the logic of conjectures and refutations in the model of rational action in modern sociology. Hence, I shall apply the critical rationalist model of action to address the question of how “human action” contributes to the transition from the closed to the open society. An important upshot of my criticism of the rationality principle in Popper’s model of action would be that the rationality principle cannot address the contribution which human reason can make to the formation of the action’s goals and means, which should be addressed by “a model of human action”. However, if Popper’s model of rational action cannot play the role of “a sociological ideal type of human action”, which should tell us how the access to rationality enables the actors to entering into “a rational dialogue” regarding the common values and social institutions, the main reason is that from the beginning, the definition of

42  From the Closed to the Open Society

critical rationality in terms of “irrational faith in reason” does not allow Popper to identify an important function for reason in the formation of the common values and institutions. I have argued so far regarding Popper’s model of rational action in terms of his situational analysis, now I want to show how Popper’s conception of human nature affects his model of action. In this way, the grounds will be prepared for a better understanding of the relation of critical rationalism, as Popper presents it, with the analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. The Concept of Human Nature and Popper’s Model of Rational Action Popper’s model of rational action could also be understood by seeing what he means by the conception of human nature. In “Politics, Epistemology and Method: Karl Popper’s Conception of Human Nature”, Geoff Stokes (1995: 107) leads us to realize how Popper’s model of action is to be linked with his conception of human nature: Popper’s philosophy is embedded in a series of notions about human needs and capacities which influence how he conceives of problems and their potential solutions. In particular, we may discern an empirical (biological and psychological) and philosophical account of human nature which lies primarily within the liberal tradition. [However] Popper’s few explicit references to the subject of human nature seem to question the viability of such a project. He rejects the utility of a theory of human nature for satisfactory explaining human behaviour, especially if founded solely upon an analysis of psychological propensities. He also denies that a psychologically based idea of human nature can provide the basis of social science, if only because it is one of those sciences itself. . . . He thinks that historians and social scientists should focus attention upon how social institutions mould human nature rather than searching for any core set of human attributes. Nevertheless, as Stokes (ibid.: 113) reminds us, one can explore an implicit notion of human nature and its upshots for Popper’s model of action: [W]hereas all biological organisms may be conceived as ‘epistemologists’, human nature comprises these basic biological resources and the capacity to reflect and improve upon them. Because of the propensity for dogmatism in those ‘lower’ characteristics, Popper’s aim is to develop our higher epistemological capacities by means of a more formal epistemology and method. The latter are vital components of Popper’s social philosophy because of how they contribute to solving various general biological and psychological problems in human life and thought.

From the Closed to the Open Society  43

Given these remarks, two major components of Popper’s conception of human nature are to be taken into account, as observed by Stokes: When accompanied by a process of trial and error learning, the inborn need for regularity is commendable. Nevertheless, it remains essentially an animal or biological function, and as such encourages inflexibility and dogmatism. For Popper the major distinguishing characteristic of human beings is their ability consciously to create new programmes of trial and error, and transcend the limits of the trials previously conducted. The hallmark of creative or critical thinking is to select and reject trails rather than to allow them to occur by chance. What sets human beings like Einstein apart from organisms like the amoeba is the ability of the former to be self-consciously critical of their knowledge, a skill which is largely made possible by the invention of language. In Popper’s opinion, “it is language which makes us human, and that human consciousness – the consciousness of self – is a result of language”. [Emphasis added] (ibid.) Popper connects such “a higher capacity” of critical thinking with the capacity of creating moral standards. As pointed out by Stokes, According to Popper, not only can they create theories, but they can also create their own moral standards and thereby becomes morally autonomous agents [using Kant’s term]. As Popper sees it, one is continually confronted with the choice between merely utilizing one’s biological function or fulfilling one’s human potential. Because of the power of the inborn need for regularity and tradition, the choice becomes more difficult in times of social and economic disorder. People are constantly pressed to retreat the security of dogma, tradition and order, and away from exercising their own creative abilities. (ibid.: 114) This conception of human nature, and the role of the higher capacity of critical thinking in it, lead Popper to the idea of “the strain of civilization” which is significant for my criticism of Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. As stated by Stokes, Our awareness of the possibility of personal responsibility and our ability to create moral values and social ideas brings about what Popper has called “the strain of civilization”. This concept describes the difficulties faced by those who are aware of, and dissatisfied by, a world “which does not, and cannot, live up to our moral ideals and to our knowledge of ‘the gross imperfections in our life” and the problems which lie in the way of remedying them. “This awareness”, Popper claims, “increases the strain of personal responsibility, of carrying the cross of being human”. In essence, our capacity to make moral

44  From the Closed to the Open Society

judgments, to dream and to fantasize enhances the prospect that we will reject personal responsibility and retreat from facing the daily tasks of social life. (ibid) As observed by Stokes, in the aforementioned sense, Popper relates critical rationality to the individuals’ moral responsibility. As I argued before, Popper (1945 [2012]) reasons that the dogmatic epistemologies and methodologies, which are reflected in historicism and authoritarianism, lead to a closed society, while the critical epistemology, which is a source of peaceful discussion and a moral attitude of openness to criticism, leads to an open society. While the conception of human nature considers for critical rationality the capacity of making a moral judgment, the definition of critical rationalism, as “irrational faith in reason”, makes it impossible for us to see how the access to reason enables the actor to give himself a moral law preventing him from egoistic behaviour. Hence, my criticism of Popper’s conception of human nature refers to this point that such a conception does not provide us with “a model of action” upon which we could develop a sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. This point should be added here that even if we accept that, like the Kant’s model of action, Popper’s model allows us to see how the actors’ a moral choice in favour of openness to criticism enables them to give themselves a moral law which is necessary for controlling their egoistic behaviours, my criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy comes into the picture in order to show that the regress of justification which is involved in this moral philosophy does not allow us to apply it as “a micro-foundation” for our macro-sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society.

Section III: A Critique of Popper’s Analysis of the Transition From the Closed to the Open Society In this section, I present my criticism of Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society due to his model of rational action and its failure to address the question of how reason drives action. Section III proceeds as follows. It offers (a) a brief description of Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society, (b) an explanation of how Popper’s model of rational action has contributed to his analysis of the transition and (c) a presentation of my critique of Popper’s analysis of the transition. Popper’s Analysis of the Transition from the Closed to the Open Society In “The Open Society and Its Enemies”, Popper (1945 [2012]: 613) describes the transition from the closed to the open society in the following way: [I]t seems to be possible to give some useful criterion of the transition from the closed to the open [society]. The transition takes place when

From the Closed to the Open Society  45

social institutions are first consciously recognized as man-made, and when their conscious alteration is discussed in terms of their suitability for the achievement of human aims or purposes. Or, putting the matter in a less abstract way, the closed society breaks down when the supernatural awe with which the social order is considered gives way to active interference, and to the conscious pursuit of personal or group interests. It is clear that cultural ­contact through civilization may engender such a breakdown, and, even more, the development of an impoverished, i.e. landless, section of the r­ uling class. As this passage expresses, Popper considers the transition from the closed to the open society as an institutional transition taking place consciously with the intention of the creation of a desirable social order. Popper, however, does not tell us how individuals use critical reason to uncover undesirability of social institutions in the closed society in terms of their performance to realize human goals and, moreover, how human actors, in terms of thinkers-movements-masses, work together to alter the undesirable social order in favour of a desirable one. Given these considerations in mind, Popper writes: “Our Western civilization originated with the Greeks. They were, it seems, the first to make the step from tribalism to humanitarianism. Let us consider what that means” (ibid.: 163). The early Greek tribes were not unlike. Popper continues: There is no standardised ‘tribal way of life’. It seems to me, however, that there are some characteristics that can be found in most, if not all, of these tribal societies. I mean their magical or irrational attitude towards the customs of social life, and the corresponding rigidity of these customs. (ibid.: 164) Popper does not deny that tribal life changes, however, he argues that the change is not a rational attempt but a magical one. According to Popper, the main element of the magical attitude is to be seen in, [T]he lack of distinction between the customary or conventional regularities of social life and the regularities found in ‘nature’; and this often goes together with the belief that both are enforced by a supernatural will. The rigidity of the social customs is probably in most cases only another aspect of the same attitude. . . . When I speak of the rigidity of tribalism I do not mean that no changes can occur in the tribal way of life. I mean rather that the comparatively infrequent changes have the character of religious conversions or revulsions, or of the introduction of new magical taboos. They are not based upon a rational attempt to improve social conditions. Apart from such changes – which are rare – taboos rigidly regulate and dominate all aspects of life . . . Based upon the collective tribal tradition, the institutions leave no room for personal responsibility. (ibid.)

46  From the Closed to the Open Society

In this line of reasoning, Popper argues that a member of a tribe rarely doubts how he ought to act. The right way of thinking is always determined by taboos, by magical tribal institutions which can never themselves become objects of critical discussion. According to Popper, the magical or tribal society is called the closed society, and the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society. But a question, which comes to our mind, is that: what is the role of critical rationality in Popper’s analysis of the transformation of a closed society, in which the taboos govern social order, into an open society, in which the critical attitude shapes social order? In short, how can individuals activate their potential access to critical rationality to defend the necessity of such institutional change? Allow me to briefly review what Popper’s answer to this question is. In order to present my argument, I should start with the issue of why Popper defines the magical and critical attitudes as “moral attitudes”, rather than “knowledge claims”. As noted by Ian C. Jarvie (2001: 145), Is Popper identifying magical and tabooistic thinking with irrationality? This would be a serious misattribution or error of reading. Popper does not say that magic and taboo are irrational per se. What he says is irrational is a magical or tabooistic attitude to human custom and human law. . . . An attitude is also a stance, or posture, or, even, a policy. When we ask, ‘what is to be our attitude’ towards something or other?, we are asking a question about stance. Shall we treat it with respect, with disdain, shall we ignore it, shall we investigate it, and so on. It needs to be kept in mind that Popper does not consider a “moral attitude” as a “knowledge claim” which could be subjected to rational criticism. Hence, for Popper, critical rationalism is a “moral attitude of openness to criticism” because it cannot be justified by positive reasons. Thus, Popper views the belief in critical rationalism in terms of “a subjective belief”, rather than “an objective one” which might be held “open” to criticism to see whether negative reasons would refute it. However, as argued before, it is Popper’s justificationism that enforces him to define critical rationalism as a moral attitude, not as a “rational belief” in reason. A more interesting point is that Popper also defines the difference between science and magic in the same way. As observed by Jarvie, Popper holds that the difference between science and magic is not their ideas but the attitude adopted to the ideas. Magic treated as hypothesis is refuted: all known magical rites are ineffective. Being refutable, magic is scientific, but magical attitude is uncritical. Its contrast is critical. . . . The fact that there may be ideas in science – the alchemical search for the philosopher’s stone, Newton’s theory of action at a distance – that resemble those behind magical practice . . . Science and its rationality are an attitude to, a way we treat, ideas. The beginnings of science are the adoption and institutionalisation of an attitude, not a new and superior kind of idea. In scientific institutions ideas

From the Closed to the Open Society  47

are massaged into testable form, and if they fail the tests they become candidates for replacement. [Emphasis added] (ibid.: 145–146)2 Jarvie then deduces this important conclusion: “Under Popper’s hand this model of science is transformed into a model of [open] society in general” (ibid.: 146). However, if we extend the notion of science as a “critical attitude” to Popper’s analysis of the transition of the closed to the open society, we would see that the idea of critical rationality, as a moral attitude, cannot tell us how a closed society could be transformed into an open one. If the transformation in question requires a fundamental change in the moral attitudes, from the magical attitude to the critical one, then what would be the role of the actors’ critical rationality in changing the moral attitudes in question? In my view, Popper wouldn’t be able to address this question because he has already claimed that “the attitude” of openness to criticism, itself, is to be taken by an irrational faith. While Jarvie argues that “[A] society which adopts a critical attitude to itself and its components is an open society, and a paradigm for the open society is the open institution of science” (ibid.: 147), my question for Jarvie would be that: how can a society adopt such a critical attitude to itself and its components? Put differently, why should individuals in the closed society be capable of questioning their magical attitudes and replacing them with the critical attitudes? Viewed from Popper’s conception of human nature, the answer may be presented as follows: individuals are moral agents responsible for changing their untenable attitudes. However, what is the role of critical rationality in realizing such a moral responsibility if the critical rationality itself has been defined as an irrational faith in reason? Having said that, I argue that Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society involves in a vicious circle. On the one hand, he attempts to show that people should realize their moral responsibility for replacing the magical attitudes with the critical ones, and, on the other hand, his argument implies that the access to critical rationality cannot play a role in the realization of this moral responsibility. It would be insightful here if we can uncover a major difference between Kant’s doctrine of practical reason and Popper’s moral philosophy. While Kant argued that the practical reason means that, with a reference to the resources that the pure reason has given us, we can argue that a distinguishing feature of human being is that he is capable of giving to himself a moral law controlling his egoistic behaviour, Popper’s definition of critical rationality, in terms of irrational faith in reason, disconnects the relation, which can be created between the theory of rationality and moral philosophy. From my viewpoint, since we can subject “our moral claims” to rational criticism and seeing whether they might be refuted by “negative reasons”, logic allows us to use reason to question our moral attitudes whenever we discovered that our moral attitudes are shown to be false by argument. If so, unlike Popper, I argue that the magical attitudes are actually

48  From the Closed to the Open Society

“criticisable” because they can be held open to criticism in order to see whether they are refuted by negative reasons. While Popper defines the transition from the closed to the open society as a man-made institutional change, he claims that the closed society in Ancient Greece was not opened consciously (Popper 1945 [2012]: 167). To better understand these contradictory positions, a brief review of Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society in Ancient Greece would be necessary. Seeking a metaphor to describe the closed society, Popper offers the example of the organism: “In an organism each part plays its role and no other: the legs cannot become the brain, other parts cannot become the belly” (ibid.: 166). In a society which views itself as an organism, the very nature of society is to be seen as a given fact. As pointed out by Jarvie (2001: 147), Popper contrasts this to the situation in an even partly open society, where we can observe competition between parts to assume other roles, members trying to displace others, for example in the class struggle, where the ruled endeavour to become the rulers. The very existence of such struggle constitutes a rejection of a natural order of parts and dooms the comparison of society to an organism. With this comparison of biological feature of the closed society with the competitive nature of the open society, we can lead to the way through which Popper explains the transition from the closed to the open society in Ancient Greece. Popper (1945 [2012]: 167–168) points out: [T]he transition from the closed to the open society [in Ancient Greece] can be described as one of the deepest revolution through which mankind has passed. Owning to what we have described as the biological character of the closed society, this transition must be felt deeply indeed. Thus when we say that our Western civilization derives from the Greeks, we ought to realize what it means. It means that the Greeks started for us that great revolution which, it seems, is still in its beginning – the transition from the closed to the open society. Of course, this revolution was not made consciously. The breakdown of tribalism, of the closed societies of Greece, may be traced back to the time when population growth began to make itself felt among the ruling class of landed proprietors. This meant the end of ‘organic’ tribalism. For it created social tension within the closed society of the ruling class. At first, there appeared to be something like an ‘organic’ solution of this problem, the creation of daughter cities. (The ‘organic’ character of this solution was underlined by the magical procedures followed in the sending out of colonists.) But this ritual of colonization only postponed the breakdown. It even created new danger spots wherever it led to cultural contacts; and these, in turn, created what was perhaps the worst danger to the closed society – commerce,

From the Closed to the Open Society  49

and a new class engaged in trade and seafaring. By the sixth century B.C., this development had led to the partial dissolution and reactions. And it had led not only to attempts to retain and to arrest tribalism by force, as in Sparta, but also to that great spiritual revolution, the invention of critical discussion, and, in consequence, of thought that was free from magical obsessions. At the same time we find the first symptoms of a new uneasiness. The strain of civilization was beginning to be felt. [Emphasis added] These passages indicate that not only does Popper consider the social factors like the population growth, social tension within the ruling class and cultural contact, as the driving forces of the transition from the closed to the open society in Ancient Greece, but also he regards a freedom from magical obsessions and the invention of critical discussion as “the results” of such societal changes. Nevertheless, as Stokes (1995: 114) reminds us, Popper’s the strain of civilization might also be meant in the following way: Our awareness of the possibility of personal responsibility and our ability to create moral values and social ideas brings about what Popper has called ‘the strain of civilization’. This concept describes the difficulties faced by those who are aware of, and dissatisfied by, a world ‘which does not, and cannot, live up to our moral ideals and to our dreams of perfection’ . . . . ‘This awareness’, Popper claims, ‘increase the strain of personal responsibility, of carrying the cross of being human. In essence, our capacity to make moral judgments, to dream and to fantasize enhances the prospect that we will reject personal responsibility and retreat from ‘facing the daily tasks of social life. Given this reading of the strain of civilization, Popper does not make it clear, however, that what was the role of such a self-awareness and the capacity of moral judgment in the transition from the closed to the open society in Ancient Greece. A paradoxical analysis of Popper in regard to the transition in question in Ancient Greece might be considered in the following way: on the one hand, Popper argues that the transition is “a man-made” institutional change, and, on the other hand, he claims that the transition was not made “consciously” by human efforts. In spite of the aforementioned considerations, Popper (1945 [2012]: 168) maintains that: This strain [of civilization], this uneasiness, is a consequence of the breakdown of the closed society. It is still felt even in our day, especially in times of social change. It is the strain created by the effort which life in an open and partially abstract society continually demands from us – by the endeavour to be rational, to forgo at least some of our emotional social needs, to look after ourselves, and to accept responsibilities. We must, I believe, bear this strain as the price to be paid for every increase in knowledge, in reasonableness, in co-operation and in mutual help, and consequently in our chances of

50  From the Closed to the Open Society

survival, and in the size of the population. It is the price we have to pay for being human. However, if the strain of civilization is to be meant as the consequence of breakdown of the closed society in Ancient Greece, then it could be deduced from such a premise this crucial conclusion that individuals’ access to critical rationality has not been “a driving force” of opening up the closed society in Ancient Greece. More importantly, if individuals have to replace their magical attitudes with the critical ones, then such a change couldn’t be explained in terms of an irrational faith in reason. What Popper tells us about the mechanism of the transition from the closed to the open society is that people have made “an irrational moral choice” in favour of the open society; however, we cannot offer “a rational explanation” of this moral choice. It is for this reason that I argue that the role of critical rationality in Popper’s analysis of the transition remains under-theorization. It is worthy of note that, in relation to the transition from the closed to the open society, Popper also speaks of the natural law versus the normative law. According to Popper, One result of the breakdown of the closed society is the discovery that the social, the human, behaves differently from the natural. Natural laws, like those governing the movements of the sun and moon, or the law of gravity, continue unperturbed by human events; normative laws, such as legislation, cultural imperatives, entrenched custom, rules of conduct, moral injunctions, religious taboos, established authority, can alter. (Jarvie 2001: 153) To interpret Popper’s argument in this passage, one may conclude that the transition from the closed to the open society refers to a change in “the normative law” of the closed society. But would Popper be able to attribute the origin of such a normative change in the closed society to the individual’s critical rationality? My answer is negative: because Popper has already ruled out a conception of critical rationality according to which people can open the normative law of their society to rational criticism. If people are unable to subject the normative laws of closed society to rational criticism in order to see what is wrong with them, the normative laws couldn’t be changed by human efforts. Nevertheless, Popper argues that: If humankind made the norms it imposes on itself, then humankind is responsible for them and for their consequences – the bad as well as the good. Moreover, if humankind made them then humankind can unmake them: humans can choose to assess them and their consequences and, should they so decide, to alter them because something has been learned in the interim. Society, in this line of thought, is constructed to be open to learning from mistakes. Its sub-society, partakes in this feature. (ibid.: 160)

From the Closed to the Open Society  51

However, how may we interpret “this learning from error”, which is by the definition “a cognitive learning”, within the context of the idea of rationality as “an irrational” faith in reason? But if we replace the demand for justification with the demand for criticism in our definition of critical rationality, then it wouldn’t be difficult to see that people use critical reason in order to hold their beliefs open to criticism and learning from the negative reasons which refute the beliefs in question. Viewed from the perspective of Popper’s situational model of action, there would be another problem for his analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. In the situational model, Popper defines “rational action” as an “adequate behaviour” to the social situation. Having this model of action in mind, however, what can Popper tell us about the role of reason in replacing the magical attitude with the critical ones in the process of opening up a closed society? My answer to this question is that Popper’s situational model action, in which the term “rationality” is defined by “the rationality principle”, cannot tell us how human reason contributes to “a moral choice” in favour of the open society. In fact, the role of the rationality principle in Popper’s situational model of action is limited to taking into account the social situation and acting appropriately to the situation in question. If so, whereas the replacement of the magical attitudes with the critical ones would be necessary for opening up a closed society, Popper’s situational model of action is unable to address such a replacement because the role of the principle of rationality is limited to an adequate behaviour to “the established” situation. In addition, the situational model of action does not tell us anything about the question of whether the actors could subject “the established” social order to rational criticism. In short, upon the basis of Popper’s model of rational action, one cannot explore a contribution which critical rationality can make to the transition from the closed to the open society. What Popper may tell us about the role of human agency in this transition is that individuals are capable of taking a moral decision against the closed society and in favour of the open society. However, the problem is that the moral decision in question does not originate in their access to critical rationality. In my view, it is Popper’s justificational approach to critical rationalism that does not allow him to address the question of how critical rationality contributes to the transition from the closed to the open society whereas rationality itself is defined in terms of irrational faith in reason involving the infinite regress of proofs. The Transition From the Closed to the Open Society: A Critique of Popper’s Analysis In this final section, I want to summarize my criticisms of Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. With defining critical rationality in terms of “a moral attitude” of openness to criticism, Popper has argued that, taking a moral decision by individuals to replace the magical attitudes with the critical ones leads us to see how a closed society might be transformed into an open one.

52  From the Closed to the Open Society

I have argued that, however, while Popper’s conception of human nature might be considered a useful means for such an analysis, his situational model of action does not work for the same purpose. In other words, Popper argues that the access to critical rationality could somehow be connected to the actors’ moral responsibility for opening up the closed society. Now, if one accepts my analyses of the models of rational action upon which Popper addresses the transition from the closed to the open society, then he would realize that it is “my critique” of an irrational faith in reason, due its origin in the justified true belief account of knowledge, that enables me to develop a new criticism of Popper’s analysis of the transition in question. In short, if the irrational faith in reason involves in the regress of justification, such a problem will be transformed into Popper’s analysis of the transition. For this reason, Popper cannot address the question of how critical reason contributes to the opening up a closed society and making it an open society. In his review of Popper’s critical rationalism from the perspective of the Frankfurt School, L. J. Ray (1979: 156–157) leads us to see the same observation: Now I propose to discuss the second feature of critical theory’s critique of positivism. . . . This is the idea of a ‘comprehensive rationality’, a unity of reason and decision. Here it will be argued that Popper’s apparent commitment to ‘rationality’ in fact implies a kind of moral relativism, an irrationality in the realm of values . . . . If values and ultimate goals in society cease to be substantively (as opposed to formally) available to rational discussion, they become matters of faith and ‘pure’ decision. Two points seem to be especially important here; first there is the question of opening values and political goals to substantive rational discussion; and secondly there is the issue of the objectivity of rationality, a rationality which ‘justifies itself’. In one sense, Popper is totally at variance with the Frankfurt School here. He denies that there could ever be a comprehensive rationality. In the Open Society and its Enemies II he argues that the rationalist attitude must first be adopted if any argument is to be effective, and it cannot therefore be based upon argument or experience. We must adopt the rationalist attitude as a matter of ‘faith’, which is itself irrational. That is, in terms of the Frankfurt School’s position, Popper bases reason on pure decision. Jürgen Habermas also criticizes the idea that the “reason” is ultimately a matter of faith. “In other words, Popper’s conception of reason is still, for Habermas, subjectivist; and values, even though are available to rational discussion, are questions of faith, and are in themselves ‘incapable of truth’ ” (ibid.: 158). These remarks support my argument implying that if the rationalist attitude is regarded a matter of faith, then “a change” in the basic values of the closed society cannot be seen in terms of “a rational evaluation” of the values in question.

From the Closed to the Open Society  53

From a sociological perspective, the transition from the closed to the open society is a “deep societal change” through which the common values and social institutions of the closed society will be replaced by new values and institutions which are held open to criticism and not shown to be false by argument. If the sociologist wants to address the role of the individual’s critical rationality in the societal transition, he shouldn’t base his analysis upon Popper’s moral attitude of openness to criticism. In fact, the sociologist requires a non-justificational conception of rationality allowing him to show that it is “the access” to critical rationality that enables people to revise the irrational values and institutions, and replacing them with the “rational” values and institutions. In the same line of criticism, John Wettersten (2006: 252–253) argues that Popper’s [T]heory of the open society is s new theory of civilized society, which is based on a critical view of reason. His theory of the burden of civilization is the attempt to unify his theories of the closed and open societies, by presenting the two alternatives as posing all-or-nothing decision to seek one or the other, to seek good or evil. The use of critical thinking is the path chosen by those who seek the open society. Those who seek the closed society fall into dogmatism and barbarism. . . . Popper’s theory that civilized individuals need to decide in favour of the open society and the intensity of his moral exhortations to do so give the appearance that The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) contains a well-integrated moral appeal. It seems to pose clearly a fundamental choice facing modern man. On the one hand, we may give way to our emotions and choose the closed society at the cost of oppression and barbarism or, on the other hand, we may take the hard, moral course and choose the open society and the critical use of reason. However, Wettersten continues that when one looks at the philosophical anthropological assumptions that are so important for his philosophy of science and psychology and compare them with the same kind of presuppositions made in his theory of the closed society, the apparent unity of Popper’s view breaks down. Popper’s theory of the closed society deems rationality to be contrary to man’s natural inclinations. Man has to struggle steadily to become and remain rational. . . . In opposition to the innate desire to return to the closed society, Popper had nothing more to offer than the painful decision to be rational. He had no rational moral foundation to which he could appeal. He could appeal only to human sympathy and the wish to avoid barbarism. Popper’s moral exhortations are jarring. They are emotional and they come from a man who advocates the critical use of reason as an antidote to the emotional appeal of the closed society (ibid.: 253). [Emphasis added]

54  From the Closed to the Open Society

In my view, if Popper is unable to provide an analysis in which the ideas of the closed and the open societies can substantially be linked with the philosophy of critical rationalism, the main reason is a justificationist conception of rationality he uses to define the very idea of critical rationalism. In this line of thought, Wettersten suggests: The moralistic stance of Popper’s view of rationality and the defense of the open society may be overcome when we note that both science and rationality are supported by the natural inclination of man to want to understand his world and to enjoy thinking about it. . . . If rationality is fallible . . . it must also be partial. No individual or group can ever achieve some perfect system . . . . Rationality is an unending process of adjustment and not the creation of a (final) system. This view has the consequence that all individuals are rational to this or that degree. . . . We are all critical to a degree and being critical is crucial to rationality. Those who wish to increase their degree of rationality choose to increase the quality – not necessarily the severity – of their critical methods. This is a project that all humans can and do follow to this degree or that, since all are partially rational and all can see some circumstances in which more effective thought would be advantageous. (ibid.: 253–254) Hence, it would be possible to argue that to the extent people open their values and institutions to “rational criticism”, or to the extent they activate their potential access to critical rationality, they can contribute to the transformation of a closed society into an open one. It needs to be added here that “a capacity of self-criticism” is to be recognized for “the individual members” in the closed society because without admitting such a capacity, the question of how the dogmatic values and institutions could be subjected to rational criticism wouldn’t have an answer. If we define the closed society as if in which individuals’ actions are influenced by emotions rather than reason, then the critical rationality cannot play a key role in allowing human actors to discover what is wrong with their “closed” society. In Popper’s eyes, in the closed society, the individuals cannot create a change from “inside”. As observed by Jarvie’s (2001: 180), “Closed societies changes in different ways from open societies. In open(ing) societies individuals may cause social change; in closed societies change must be come from outside because members are enjoined to block change”. Jarvie then writes, [C]ontrary to the individualist tradition from Descartes through Hume to Weber, the individual in Popper’s model is not an impermeable atom, a given. An individual is the usual conglomerate of mind and body, with a character, personality traits, propensities, and so on, all of which have been developed under the auspices of society. (ibid.: 125)

From the Closed to the Open Society  55

This model of the individual, as I have argued before, leads us to realize that Popper has used an “oversocialized conception of man”, in its sociological sense, to develop his theory of the closed society. And this model of action prevents Popper from recognizing that the individual should be considered as “an independent actor”, whose objective knowledge empowers him to use the capacity of critical thinking for questioning those values and institutions which are shown to be false by argument. It would be interesting to mention that Popper, at the same time, [V]iews the individual as a pivotal element in the explanatory model: “social phenomena . . . should always be understood as resulting from . . . human individuals”. Even though individuality may be a social construct, it is the locus of thought, of morality, of values. This is Popper’s Kantian Enlightenment view. Even if Marx is correct that social existence precedes and determines consciousness, for moral and intellectual reasons it is preferable to treat individuals as autonomous actors/decision makers and as nodes of values. (ibid.: 191–192) In my view, one reason why Popper takes such a contradictory position regarding the role of the individual in the transition from the closed to the open society originates in his definition of critical rationalism in terms of “irrational faith” in reason. Since Popper applies the justified true belief account of knowledge, accepting the sceptic’s critique of uncritical rationalism, the role of reason in his model of action cannot be addressed. With such an “inefficient” model of action at hand, it is not a surprise that the role of critical rationality in the transition from the closed to the open society has not been addressed accurately. It is not also a surprise that in response to the question of “how did this transition from the closed to the open society begin in Ancient Greece?”, Jarvie says: “No explanation is possible, as that would make invention reproducible” (ibid.: 147). But, as my sociology of the open society will argue in the present volume, an explanation for the aforementioned question is presentable, and it is Popper’s “irrational faith” in reason that prevents him from offering such an explanation. In short, the question of how a closed society can be transformed into an open one requires “a theory of critical rationalism” according to which people can evaluate their moral values and social institutions by asking whether they could be shown to be false by negative reasons. The first volume of this book has provided us with such a theory of rationality which I called it the general theory of the critical rationalism (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021). I shall use this theory of rationality in the next chapters of the present volume in order to develop “new sociological theories” of the closed and the open society, using those theories in order to offer a normative sociology of the transition from the closed to the open society.

56  From the Closed to the Open Society

Notes 1 Popper’s situational analysis and its outcomes for the model of rational action in sociology should be the subject of an independent inquiry. In this chapter, I have reviewed the situational model of action to the extent that it was necessary for my critical review of Popper’s model of action and its consequences for the analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. The main point of my review was that since Popper defines critical rationality as “an irrational attitude” of openness to criticism, he cannot devote an accurate role to human’s access to critical reason in questioning the dogmatic values and institutions in the transition from the closed to the open society. 2 I should like to add this point that, not only Popper’s philosophy of rationality, but also his philosophy of science does originate in the justified true belief account of knowledge. The reason for this claim is that Popper demarks science from magic due to the attitudes which are taken towards science and magic. In other words, science takes “a critical attitude” to an idea, while magic takes “an uncritical attitude” to it. However, from a nonjustificational perspective, as argued in Chapter 4 of the first volume, it is “the rational content” of the scientific beliefs that differentiates them from the magical beliefs, which are “irrational” in terms of the content.

Bibliography Albert, Hans (1999) Between Social Science, Religion, and Politics. Atlanta, GA, Amsterdam. Farr, J. (1983) “Popper’s Hermeneutics”. In: Philosophy of Social Sciences, 13, pp. 157–176. Hedstrom, P., Swedberg, R. and Udehn, L. (1998) “Popper’s Situational Analysis and Contemporary Sociology”. In: Philosophy of Social Sciences, 28(30), pp. 339–364. Jarvei, Ian C. (2001) The Republic of Science, The Emergence of Popper’s Social View of Science 1935–1945. Atlanta, GA, Amsterdam. Joas, H. (1996) The Creativity of Action. Cambridge, Polity Press. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2021) Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Society, Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume I. London and New York, Routledge. Notturno, M.A. (1998) “Truth, Rationality, and the Situation”. In: Philosophy of Social Sciences, 28(3), pp. 400–421. Popper, K.R. (1945 [2012]) The Open Society and Its Enemies. New One-Volume edn. London and New York, Routledge. Popper, K.R. (1994) “Model, Instruments, and Truth”. In: Notturno, M.A. (ed.) The Myth Of the Framework, in Defence of Science and Rationality. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 130–153. Ray, L.J. (1979) “Critical Theory and Positivism: Popper and the Frankfurt School”. In: Philosophy of Social Sciences, 9, pp. 149–173. Stokes, G. (1995) “Politics, Epistemology and Method: Karl Popper’s Conception of Human Nature”. In: Political Studies, XLIII, pp. 105–123. Wettersten, John. (2006) “Towards a New Theory of the Closed Society”. In: Jarvie, I., Milford, K. and Miller, D. (eds.) Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume I. Burlington, Ashgate, pp. 251–271.

Chapter 3

Towards a Micro-Foundation for the Sociology of the Open Society

Introduction This chapter focuses on the two questions of how reason drives human action and how “a model of rational action”, which defines rationality in terms of “openness to criticism”, operates as the micro-foundation for a sociological theory of the open society. Since this volume aims to show how the philosophy of critical rationalism is to be used to develop a sociology of the open society, I shall argue that the questions of how reason operates and drives action ought to be addressed by “a model of action” in which the rationality is defined as “openness to criticism”. However, from the previous chapter, we know that Popper’s idea of critical rationalism involves the regress of justification. Hence, I argue that, instead of Popper’s critical rationalism, my general theory of critical rationalism is to be applied to show that the goals and means of human action can be rationalized by holding them open to criticism and seeing whether “falsifier (negative) reasons” refute them. To these ends, the chapter proceeds in five sections offering: (i) a brief summary of the critical rationalist model of action, (ii) a brief discussion regarding the issue of how the model of action is to be linked with the problem of social order, (iii) an explanation of the stages of progress in critical rationality, (iv) a brief study of the stages of progress in moral consciousness, and, finally, (v) a presentation of the micro-foundation of a sociological theory of the open society. Section I shall review the critical rationalist model of action, arguing that the replacement of the demand for justification with the demand for criticism enables the theorist of human action to recognize that in order to identify “the rationality of an action”, whether in terms of action goals or in terms of action means, we do not need to prove them by “justifier (positive) reasons”, and if we couldn’t do so, the goals or the means are to be accounted “subjective”, as the utilitarian model of action implies. In addition, we do not require to prove the rationality of an action’s goal or means by saying that positive reasons can justify them, as the normative models of action argue. However, the conception of rationality in terms of “openness to criticism” would provide the model of action with “a new foundation”, according to which the rationality of an action’s goals and means DOI: 10.4324/9781003027119-4

58  Towards a Micro-Foundation

originates in “unfalsified conjunctures”, that determines the truth of the goals and means in question. Section II will lead us to see the if the model of rational action is reformulated on the basis of the general theory of critical rationalism, then the problem of social order ought to be redefined too. It argues the Hobbesian problem of social order which was posed due to “a conception of human nature”, which regards passion rather than reason as driving force of human action, has had an important result for the sociological theory, as recognized by Talcott Parsons (1937 [1968]). The reason is that if the plurality of passions drives human action, and there is no “moral rule” preventing from the conflict of interests, then an unintended social outcome of the egoistic pursuit of self-interests wouldn’t be less than a war of all against all. If this is so, why should a “peaceful” social order be possible? The section shall argue that if the conception of rationality is defined as openness to criticism, a new understanding of rationality will come into the picture to show the reason why it is reason, rather than passion, that drives action. Accordingly, the problem of social order is to be redefined due to the new role which is given to reason in human action on the basis of a non-justificational concept of rationality. Now the problem of social order could be reformulated in the following way: how do human actors activate the critical rationality to give themselves a set “common” values and institutions which not only prevents them from a war of all against all due to the egoistic pursuit of self-interests, but also enables them to shape a social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life for all? Section III shall advance the critical rationalist model of action through arguing about the stages of progress in critical rationality which is important for showing that the lower level of critical rationality contributes to the rise of a closed society and the higher level of it to the rise of an open society. Three major stages of this progress are as follows: the transitions from (a) irrationalism to dogmatic rationalism, from (b) dogmatic rationalism to justificational critical rationalism and from (c) the justificational to a non-justificational critical rationalism, reflecting the highest level of critical rationality. Section IV will use these stages of progress in order to address “parallel growths” in the individual’s moral consciousness, which would be significant for understanding this point that a higher level of critical rationality can lead individuals to a higher level of “moral dialogue” regarding the meaning of the good life, at the core of a “normative” transition from the closed to the open society. Section V shall use all of the previous arguments in order to show that the critical rationalist model of action can provide a sociological theory of the open society with a new micro-foundation which enables us to argue that when people activate critical rationality, they are capable of using “unfalsified beliefs” regarding the meaning of the universe and good life to build a normative foundation for the creation of the social institutions of law, polity and economy. In this way, the critical rationalist model of action not only does enable the sociologist to show how the lower level of critical rationality is to be connected with the rise of a

Towards a Micro-Foundation  59

closed society, but also empowers him to show that how the higher level of critical rationality is to be linked with the formation of an open society.

Section I: The Critical Rationalist Theory of Human Action: A Brief Review The critical rationalist theory of human action is to be seen as a model of action which aims to liberate the notion of “rational action” from an infinite regress of proofs, in which the role of reason in the formation of action is addressed accurately. The central idea of this theory is that if “the function” of reason itself couldn’t be explained accurately, then the role of reason in driving action, for instance in comparison with the role of passion, mightn’t be identified too. Hence, the theorist of human action should first ask from himself whether the conception of rationality he uses to model human behaviour itself is an accurate reading of how reason operates in practice. It would be clear that if a “theory of rationality” which is used to address the question of how reason operates deals with the problem of infinite regress, then the theory of action which is established upon the basis of such a theory of rationality wouldn’t be able to tell us whether or not reason drives action. The critical rationalist model of action, therefore, leads us to an alternative model for explaining the very function of reason on the basis of the general theory of critical rationalism. It needs to be emphasized on this point here, in the first volume of this book, I created a logical relationship between “epistemology and theory of rationality” and argued that the idea of knowledge as justified true belief has contributed to “a justificationist” theory of rationality (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 91–95). And I should add to this observation another important point that if we replace the demand for justification with the demand for criticism, the conception of rationality is dealt with a profound change. Due to the fact that I believe that the non-justificational approach to rationality has not fully been developed yet because it ought to be established on the basis of a deep revision in the idea of knowledge as justified true belief, I realized that the major theories of human action in the classical and modern sociology, and Popper’s model of action, should actually be originated in the justified true belief account of knowledge and its outcome for equating “rationality” with “justification”. In Chapter 6 of the first volume, I argued about the contributions of justificationism to the rise of the utilitarian and normative models of action in modern sociology (ibid.: 111–140), and in Chapter 2 of the present volume, I argued about the question of how the idea of knowledge as justified true belief has affected Popper’s model of action through the notion of irrational faith in reason. I do not want to repeat those arguments here; however, the insights of those arguments are to be applied to represent the critical rationalist theory of action as if the way is paved for introducing “a new micro-foundation” for my sociological theory of the open society.

60  Towards a Micro-Foundation

In the following pages, I shall first review very briefly the relation between the justified true belief account of knowledge and the model of action in sociology, then I will discuss regarding the critical rationalist model of human action. Justificationism and the Action Theory in Sociology I have argued that epistemology contributes to the model of rational action through the concept of rationality it provides for addressing the question of how reason may drive action. Hence, the ideal types of rational action which define the concept of rationality on the basis of the justified true belief account of knowledge would inevitably be involved in the infinite regress of proofs. And this is the main reason why such models of action cannot address the very role of reason in the formation of human action. It is in the light of this insight, I argue that we require a non-justificational conception of rationality in order to remodel human action as if the role of reason in driving action could be considered. The Utilitarian Model of Action: A Sociological Critique The utilitarian model of action is perhaps one of the most influential model of human actions in the social sciences. Hence, an argument which shows that this model originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge and, accordingly, involves in the infinite regress of proofs would have “a significant result” for the micro-foundations of the social sciences, in general, and for the microfoundation of the sociology of the open society in particular. How has the idea of knowledge as justified true belief shaped the utilitarian model of action? My answer is that through “the equation” of rationality with justification. But, how the concept of rational beliefs in terms of justified true belief should be sought in the utilitarian model? To address these questions, I should first make it clear that what it is meant by the idea of knowledge as justified true belief. Briefly, the idea implies that objective knowledge is “a special kind of belief” which is “justifiable” by positive reasons. Two major philosophies of rationality have established their accounts of rationality upon the basis of this reading of objective knowledge. On the one hand, the uncritical rationalism accepts the equation of rationality with justification and arguing that “a claim of rational belief” could be justified by positive reasons, and, on the other hand, the critical irrationalism admits the equation of rationality with justification and rejecting that “a claim of rational belief” could be justified by positive reasons. In Chapters 1 and 5 of the first volume, it was shown that neither the uncritical rationalism nor critical irrationalism could defend their approaches to the concept of rationality because both of them have mistakenly accepted that rationality is to be defined in terms of justification. which originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge (ibid.: 9–25). If knowledge is not “a special kind” of belief that could be proved by “justifier reasons” because the presentation of the positive reasons needs to be ended somewhere by an irrational faith, the equation of rationality with justification ought to

Towards a Micro-Foundation  61

be replaced by the equation of rationality with criticism which means: knowledge is “a special kind of belief” which is held open to criticism and is not shown to be wrong by falsifier reasons. Now let us return to the second question: how could the conception of rationality, in terms of justification, be recognized in the utilitarian model? In order to answer this question, the main epistemological claim of the utilitarian model of action is to be understood. The claim is that the goals of action are to be accounted as “subjective” preferences. In other words, it is “subjective utility” of an action which motivates us to do it. In this way, the utilitarian model implies that the subjective utility drives human action. But, one may ask that why does not the utilitarian model consider the role which reason can play in the formation of the action goals? An answer to this question leads us to the role of the justified true belief account of knowledge in the formation of the utilitarian model of action: in my view, the claim that it is the subjective utility, rather than reason, that drives action originates from this notion that the question of “what should be” the goal of an action cannot find an answer on the basis of “rational argument”. Putting it differently, there is not “a rationalistic ethics” which can tell us what should be the goal of our action because a moral claim regarding the truth of an action goal cannot be proved by positive reasons. David Hume was one of those philosophers who argued that the goal of an action couldn’t be defined on the basis of “a rationalistic ethics”. As observed by Ernest Gellner (1992: 68), Hume supposed that rationalist ethics were a confusion, arising from faculty introspection: some inner “passions”, felt preferences, were so calm and tranquil, that they appear to our inner eye to resemble rational inference, and are mistakenly assimilated to it. But reason could not really tell us either what we should do or what we should prefer. This was a matter of fact, and the relevant facts were located within us. The only available empirical basis for a preference was our feeling. Hence our feelings, or some sub-set of them, constituted the only possible basis of morality. This was one of the main points of origin of the important Utilitarian tradition in moral philosophy. [Emphasis added] As indicated by this passage, the utilitarian tradition emphasizes on the main role of subjective feelings or utilities in the formation of the action goals. However, Hume’s moral philosophy originates in a theory of knowledge which he uses to reject the rationality of our moral beliefs. In fact, Hume’s irrationalism originates from the idea of knowledge as justified true belief. Hence, this argument that there is no rationalistic ethics to tell us what should be the goals of our action involves the same regress of justification that Hume’s irrationalism engages in. However, if the utilitarian model recognizes that the means of action can be rationalized in terms of justification, the epistemological logic behand of this notion is that the utilitarian model assumes that the scientific claims regarding the

62  Towards a Micro-Foundation

efficiency of a means for realizing an action goal could be justified by empirical evidences. In brief, the utilitarian model of action originates in the justificationist conception of rationality. This utilitarian logic could be observed in the neoclassical economics’ theory of rational choice according to which individuals’ preferences are subjective utilities, but economic agents may use objective knowledge to find an effective means to realize a subjective utility.1 An interesting observation here is that: the notion of the role of reason in the formation of the action goals comes into the mind of sociologists because they realize that if action is determined by passion, or self-interest, then an unintended social consequence of such egoistic actions wouldn’t be less than a social “disorder”, what Hobbes calls it a war of all against all. The existence of a peaceful social order led the sociologists, like Durkheim and Parsons, to this notion that “reason” should be given a determining role in the formation of the goals of action. However, due to the lack of a non-justificational account of knowledge, the equation of rationality with justification remained “a valid equation” for the sociologists, and, hence, they used a justificational account of reason in order to show that it is the reason, rather than the utility, that drives action. As we shall see, inspired by the equation of rationality with justification, sociologists, like Durkheim and Parsons, criticized the utilitarian model of action because it does not recognize the role of reason in the formation of the action goals. The model of action that they proposed as an alternative for the utilitarian model was named as “a normative model” of action. In this new model, the role of reason in the formation of the action goals was defined in terms of those “normative rules” according to which the question of what should be done by the actors could be addressed. Durkheim (1915 [1995]) used his social epistemology by arguing that the categories of thought, such as space, time and causality, originate from religious practices. Hence, he tried to show that the rationality of the action goals lies in the religious practices defining the categories of human thought. Durkheim argued that a system of values, which is to be considered as a given social fact, is integrated into the categories of thought, constructing the moral content of action goals. Thus, unlike the utilitarian model, Durkheim’s normative model of action views the action goals as “objective” facts. However, Durkheim’s social epistemology did not reject the equation of rationality with justification but only claiming that the categories of thought, and accordingly, the moral content of the action goals could be verified by “justifier reasons”. In the same line of thought, one can see that justificationism contributes to Parsons’s voluntaristic action theory. While Parsons (1937 [1968]) presented his normative model of action as a critique of the utilitarian model, arguing that the dilemma utilitarianism faces . . . consists of it having either to assume that free will exists and therefore to assert that goals vary at random, or

Towards a Micro-Foundation  63

conversely to assume that goals do not vary at random, at the cost of no longer being able to find a place for free choice and individual decisions in its conceptual framework. (Joas 1996: 11) As observed by Hans Joas, [T]he first assumption to be untenable, as there is no sense in human choice from among random goals. . . . Parsons insists that choice already presumes intrinsically unique structures in the sphere of alternative choices, as otherwise choice itself would resemble chance. (ibid.) In this way, Parsons leads us to see that the hypothesis that the utility drives action ought to be replaced with the hypothesis that the reason shapes the goals of action. However, a similar question for Parsons’ theory of action would be that: how should the concept of rationality in his model of action be related to the justified true belief account of knowledge? It might be argued that, it was Kant’s theory of knowledge that through the notion of “practical reason” helped Parsons to formulate his normative model of action. Parsons proposed a voluntaristic model of action according to which it is the individual’s respect for a system of values that defines the goals of his action. Hence, the rationality of action goals is to be interpreted in terms of “a rational respect” for a system of common values. Kantian origin of this account of rationality and, accordingly, its justificational nature could be identified in the following manner: According to the Kant’s theory of knowledge it is the access to the practical reason that enables the individual to give himself a moral law. While Kant rightly argues that the resource that reason has given us is to be used to explore how the reason drives action, and this implies that the “practical” reason through giving a moral law to the individual drives action. This moral law leads us to recognize that all human beings are to be respected as the ends-in-themselves. When people give themselves this moral law their actions are governed by the practical reason and does not follow an egoistic pursuit of the self-interests. The difficulty in Kant’s doctrine of practical reason is that it originates in the equation of rationality with justification. Like the justificationist, Kant believes that knowledge is “a specific kind of belief” which is true if, and only if, it could be proved by justifier reasons. But Parsons’s model of action is not a Kantian model of rational action in its “true” sense, because through “a justificational critique” of Kant’s moral philosophy, Parsons claims that a “universal” moral law does not exist which could be given to the individual whereas those positive reasons, which should prove the moral law in question, are not available. In fact, Parsons uses the equation of

64  Towards a Micro-Foundation

justification with rationality in order to make such a justificational critique, using William Bartley’s term. Nevertheless, Parsons is inspired by the Kantian doctrine of practical reason, when he argues that the rationality of the action goals is to be seen in the voluntarily respect for a moral law, or a system of common values. This system of values, for Parsons, is “a given fact” of the society in question. And since people respect it as a moral standard to which their action goals are to be oriented, the war of all against all could be prevented through the management of egoistic behaviour by the practical reason. It is in this very special sense that, like Kant’s model of action, the Parsons’ model would be recognized as “a normative alternative” for the utilitarian model of action. Nevertheless, both models of action originate in the justified true belief account of knowledge because both of them define rationality in terms of justification rather than in terms of criticism. Thus, I have argued that, like the utilitarian model, these normative models of action couldn’t address the role of reason in the formation of the action goals (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 107–128). It needs to be added here that, inspired by Kant’s doctrine of practical reason, Parsons (1937 [1968]) argued that individuals internalize common values in their personal identities through “socialization process”.2 But, if the doctrine of practical reason originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge, the normative model of action that Parsons proposes is faced with the problem of infinite regress. And this conclusion means that, like Durkheim’s model of action, the Parsons’ model cannot address the question of how reason drives action. In summary, it is justificationism that prevents both the utilitarian and normative models of action from showing how reason drives action. If so, the replacement of the demand for justification with the demand for criticism is the only solution to the problem of rational action because it leads us to a new conception of rationality in terms of “openness to criticism”, which is to be integrated in the ideal types of rational action in modern sociology in order to base the theory of society on accurate definitions of rationality and rational action. Critical Rationalism and the Ideal Types of Rational Action In order to reformulate the theory of action on the basis of “a non-justificational conception” of rationality, the main issue is showing that the goals and means of an action could be “rationalized” on the basis of “unfalsified beliefs”. The replacement of the demand for justification for the demand for criticism provides us with “a new epistemological basis” upon which we can show how reason drives action. If the moral claims regarding the action goals, and the scientific claims regarding the action means, are held open to criticism and are not shown to be false by negative reasons, then the beliefs upon which we define the goals and means of an action could be said that are “rational” beliefs. If so, the critical rationality is applied to rationalize the goals and means of an action. It this sense, we can argue that reason drives action.

Towards a Micro-Foundation  65

Now we have arrived at a theory of rational action in which the conception of rationality is not involved in the regress of justification, and, hence, it would be able to tell us how reason operates and why it should be given the role of a driving force of action. Thus, the theory of action is liberated from the infinite regress of proofs, and the role of reason in shaping action will be addressed accurately. In this way, the critical rationalist model of action would be “an alternative” for the utilitarian and normative models of action in modern sociology. In short, defining the very term “rationality” in the model of action on the basis of the non-justificational conception of rationality enables the theorist of action to argue for the possibility of rationalization of the action goals and means based on the idea of knowledge as “unfalsified conjuncture”, rather than justified true belief. In this model of action, “rational goals” and “rational means” are those goals and means which are held open to criticism, but “negative reasons” have not shown that they are false. As argued by William Bartley (1984), the critical rationalist can defend his rational beliefs, including his rational belief in reason, because he could hold open the beliefs to criticism and see whether they are shown to be false by argument or experience. Of course, as argued by Chapter 3 of the first volume, the difference between my theory of critical rationalism and Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism is that my theory employs the non-justificational form of inference to show that “a claim of rational belief”, at the conclusion of a rational argument, is to be refuted by the premises which are “shown” to be false by negative reasons, while since Bartley defines the meaning of the concept of criticism in the context of the justificationist epistemology, his theory of pan-critical rationalism cannot tell us how “a claim of rational belief”, which is held open to criticism, might be refuted by negative reasons in practice. For this reason, I have argued that Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism has not yet solved the problem of rational beliefs, in general, and the problem of a rational belief in reason in particular (Mohammadi Alamuti 2022: 22–28). In my view, the general theory of critical rationalism is a reasonable solution to the aforementioned problems. A model of action, which can address the question of how reason operates, enables us overcome a problem which is very important for the micro-foundation of a sociological theory of the open society – that is the problem of how critical rationality contributes to the formation of an open society. The critical rationalist theory of human action leads to two ideal types of rational action, and both of these ideal types are formed on the basis of the epistemology of objective knowledge as unfalsified conjuncture. One of these ideal types is a value-rationality type of human action, which is reformulated on the basis of the non-justificational concept of rationality. According to this ideal type, “a moral claim” regarding the action goals could be rationalized, if it is held open to criticism and is not shown to be false by negative reasons. This ideal type of value-rationality does not involve the regress of justification because it is formed on the basis of the demand for criticism (negative reasons) rather than the demand for justification (positive reasons). Hence,

66  Towards a Micro-Foundation

while the utilitarian model of action denies that action goals might be rationalized due to this assumption that “a moral claim” regarding the action goals is to be justified in order to be “true” and since the claim cannot be proved by argument, the goals of action ought to be regarded subjective, and while the normative models of action defend the rationality of the action goals on the basis of positive reasons; the critical rationalist ideal type of value-rationality enables you to realize that the rationalist does not require to prove that the goals of action are “moral” because they are justifiable by positive reasons. To the contrary, the rationalist may argue that since the goals of action are not shown to be false by negative reasons, they are defensible by argument and hence “rational”. In this sense, the ideal type of value-rationality in sociology can be reformulated on the basis of the nonjustificational conception of rationality (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 145–155). It is this reformulation of the action model that enables us to introduce a microfoundation for a sociological theory of the open society in order to show that how critical rationality may contribute to the rise of an open society. As argued before, while Popper’s model of action assumes that since the belief in reason cannot justified by argument and must be accepted by an irrational faith, it leads to this wrong claim that our moral beliefs regarding the action goals cannot be defended by rational argument. Hence, there is no room in Popper’s model of action for the ideal type of value-rationality because from the beginning the model rests upon this premise that a belief in reason is “a moral attitude” rather than a rational belief. If this is so, how can reason tell us what should be our moral beliefs? However, as a critical rationalist, Hans Albert accurately argues that: Values are neither sacred, nor merely arbitrary matters of taste. They are as subject of rational discussion as the hypotheses of science, provided we recognize that values are themselves solutions to problems, and in this sense hypothetical, which is merely to say that we recognize that better solutions might be found. (Alford 1987: 457) Another ideal type of action in the critical rationalist model of action, which is called the instrumental type of rational action, can be reformulated based on the non-justificational conception of rationality. While both the utilitarian and normative models of action accept that the means of action could be “rationalized” because an efficiency of the means to realize a given goal might be proved by scientific evidences, the meaning of the very term “rational” in these models of action still originates from the justified true belief account of knowledge. In other words, a means is “rational” if it could be verified by positive reasons. The details of my argument with this regard are presented in Chapter 7 of the first volume (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 151–152). However, in the critical rationalist approach to the instrumental ideal type of action, the meaning of the term “rational” originates in the epistemology of knowledge as unfalsified conjuncture. Hence, the idea type of instrumental rationality is

Towards a Micro-Foundation  67

reformulated in the following way: a means of action is “rational” if a scientific claim which defends the efficiency of the means for realizing an action goal is held open to criticism and is not shown to be false by negative experience. In summary, the critical rationalist ideal types of action use the general theory of critical rationalism in order to liberate the conception of rationality in the model of action from the regress of justification and basing the ideal types of the value and instrumental rationality upon “an accurate” conception of rationality. If the ideal types of rational action are redefined based on a conception of rationality which is liberated from the regress of justification, then they might be considered as the micro-foundations of sociological theory. The reason is that these new ideal types of action allow the sociologist to argue that human actors, because of their access to critical rationality, are capable of entering into “a rational dialogue” which may lead them to a “moral agreement” on the meaning of the good life that is necessary for building a set of social institutions of law, polity and economy in order to prevent from a war of all against all and to shape a social division of works for realizing the ideal of the good life for all.

Section II: From Human Action to Social Order: A Critical Rationalist Perspective The outcomes of the critical rationalist models of action for the sociology of the open society might be better understood, if we realize the upshots of these ideal types of action for a redefinition of the problem of the social order. Since the problem of an “open social order” is to be seen as a special case of the general problem of a well-ordered society of free and equal persons, using John Rawls’s (1996) term, the question of how the new ideal types of action lead us to redefine the problem of social order would be very important for the sociology of the open society. To this end, a brief reference to the Hobbesian problem of social order would be helpful. As pointed out by Parsons (1937 [1968]): 89), Hobbes argues that man is guided by a plurality of passions. The good is simply that which any man desires. . . . But reason is essentially a servant of the passion – it is the faculty of devising ways and means to secure what one desires. Desires are random, there is “no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves”. Hence, since Hobbes assumes that the passions are diverse, there is nothing to prevent their pursuit resulting in conflict. Parsons argues that the Hobbesian problem creates an important challenge for sociological theory because it shows that the existence of social order contradicts the Hobbesian view of human actor as a utility maximizing agent. Hence, Parsons leads to the need for a reformulation of the theory of action in sociology. His voluntaristic model of action was offered to address the Hobbesian problem of

68  Towards a Micro-Foundation

social order, while it was inspired by Kant’s moral philosophy, as argued before. Briefly, Parsons argues that, since there is a system of common values in the society that defines the goals of human actions, the notion of a utility maximizing agent should be replaced with “a moral man” who is a civilized member of society and does not fight with other. This is the main argument which Parsons provides us in order to show that the existence of a system of “common” values makes the rise of a peaceful social order possible. However, Parsons has made two major mistakes in his reformulation of the action theory: one is that he has accepted the Hobbesian problem of order as “a real problem” of social order, whereas Hobbes establishes his formulation of the problem on the utilitarian model of action in which passion, rather than reason, drives action. In this line of reasoning, it should be added that, if the theory of action ought to be reformulated on the basis of Kantian moral philosophy, then the utilitarian action model should not be the foundation upon which the problem of social order is to be defined. In other words, if the actor can give himself a moral law to manage the pursuit of self-interest, then the problem of social order should also be reformulated on the basis of Kant’s doctrine of practical reason. Another mistake of Parsons is that his voluntaristic model of action involves the infinite regress because the Kantian moral philosophy faces with such a problem. Hence, from this point of view, Parsons’ solution to the problem of social order – that is the voluntersitic model of action – is unable to show how reason drives action. If the conception of rationality is defined in the context of the justified true belief account of knowledge, the function of reason wouldn’t be explainable, and hence the role of reason in the formation of the action’s goals and means couldn’t be addressed. In the same line of reasoning, in “The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology”, Dennis H. Wrong (1999: 31–46) makes a similar case, arguing that a tautological argument can be traced in the Parsons’ solutions to the problems of action and social order: Parsons argues that since humans are “socialized actors”, whose actions are guided by common values, they are prevented from a war of all against all. However, if the Hobbesian view of an actor, according to which a plurality of passions drive action, is “false”, then the solution which implies such an actor “is” a civilized person who can use practical reason to control his egoistic behaviour cannot be a “true” solution. As observed by Wrong: Social theory must be seen primarily as a set answers to question we ask of social reality. If the initiating questions are forgotten, we readily misconstrue the task of theory. . . . Forgetfulness of the questions that are the starting points of inquiry leads us to ignore the substantive assumptions buried in our concepts and commits us to a one-sided view of reality. (ibid.: 31) By the notion of “initiating question”, Wrong refers to the Parsons’s problem of social order which is originated in the Hobbesian model of action; that is, the

Towards a Micro-Foundation  69

plurality of passions drives action. Given this question as the starting point of the social theory, Parsons attempts to show that the existence of a peaceful order denies the reality of a war of all against all, and, if so, he concludes that there exists a system of “common” values to which people orient the goals of their actions through the mechanism of “socialization”, and this respect for the “common” values prevents them from egoistic behaviours. Wrong points out, Structural-functionalism, especially in its Parsonian version, possessed a powerful, well-developed theory of human nature based on the idea that “the internalization of social norms” is the most important feature of the socialization process, thus linking, as Durkheim had not, a consensual view of society with a conforming and “role-playing” view of individual personality. (ibid.: 48) However, as I argued before, if it is the passion that drives action, it wouldn’t be possible for the actors to use practical reason in order to respect a moral law (a system of values), and by the means of which they could behave as civilized members of society who do not fight each other. In Wrong’s words: The Hobbesian question asks how men are capable of the regulation by social norms and goals that makes possible an enduring society. . . . [However] the problem is an unreal one: [if] human conduct is totally shaped by common norms or “institutional patterns”. (ibid.: 35) In my view, the “real problem” of social order ought to be formulated on the basis of the critical rationalist model of action in the following way: how does access to (critical) rationality enable the actors to give themselves a system of values on the basis of which they rationalize the goals of their actions, and hence, by managing the pursuit of the self-interests, making the rise of a peaceful social order possible? This reformulation of the problem of social order might be connected with Kantian moral philosophy upon which it is reason that makes man an active being, rather than a passive one. As pointed out by Christine M. Korsgaard (2000: xi), for Kant, [I]nsofar as we are rational, we also regard ourselves as active beings, who are the authors of our thoughts and choices. We do not regard our thoughts and choices merely as things that happen to us; rather, thinking and choosing are things that we do. To this extent, we must view ourselves as noumena. And from this standpoint, we recognize laws that govern our mental powers in a different way than the laws of nature do. . . . The project of critical moral philosophy is to determine what resources we can find in reason for solving the problem which reason itself has set for us. [Emphasis added]

70  Towards a Micro-Foundation

However, according to the critical rationalist theory of action, Kant’s “project of critical moral philosophy” ought to be reinvented on the basis of the nonjustificational epistemology in which human actors give themselves a moral law because they can claim that such moral law is “rational” because it is held open to criticism and is not shown to be false by “negative reasons”. The Critical Rationalist Model of Action and the Unit of Act It should be noted that the critical rationalist theory of human action proposes that the unit of act ought to be considered from two angles of vision: First, from “a vertical” vision according to which the unit of action is divided into ­emancipatory and ordinary action. Second, from “a horizontal” vision, on the basis of which the unit of action is divided into the value and instrumental types of action. At the vertical level, the general theory of critical rationalism leads us to see that the ordinary type of action could be seen in the context of socialization process, and this type of action contributes to a reproduction of social order through the actors’ voluntarily respect for a given moral law. In addition, at the horizontal level, an instrumental critical rationality is used to explore effective means to realize the given goals through the method of conjectures and refutations. Hence, the meaning of instrumental rationality is reformed based on the general theory of critical rationalism (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 152–154). At the ordinary level of action, the action types of value and instrumental rationality are integrated in “one unit act”. On the basis of this unification, we can see how a given system of values is internalized in the person’s self-definition of interests. Hence, the critical rationalist model of action allows us to see the reason why human reason is capable of managing the conflict of interests, while individuals pursue effective means to realize their own goals. Thus, it is at this “micro level” that the critical rationalist model of action enables the theory of society to address the problem of the war of all against all in favour of a peaceful social order. This argument might also be used to show that the critical rationalist model of action plays the same role in offering “a new micro-foundation” for a sociological theory of the open society. An important observation here would be that, as I argued in detail in Chapter 6 of the first volume, in their theories of society, Parsons and Habermas do not create “a causal link” between “human action” and “social order”. Stated somewhat differently, the theories of society they propose do not show how the actors apply the practical, or communicative, reason in order to reach an agreement on a system of values necessary for the rise of social order. In addition, Parsons and Habermas do not explain how the actors use the practical, or communicative, reason for revising a given system of values in order to transform one social order into an alternative one. What these sociologies actually do is saying that there is “a homologous relation” between the standpoint of the individual and the standpoint of the society. In particular, in the case of Habermas’ theory of society,

Towards a Micro-Foundation  71

it emphasizes on an analogy between the stages of the person’s cognitive/moral progress and the logic of social development (Habermas 1979).3 From a scientific perspective, this kind of linking human action with social order does not show how individuals contribute to the rise of social order. From a non-justificationist standpoint, the reason for this failure in modern sociology is that the ideal types of rational action define the conception of rationality based on the justified true belief account of knowledge. Insofar as the sociologist uses such a reading of objective knowledge for defining the meaning of “rational” action, the access to reason cannot play an “explanatory role” in the formation of social order and its change. Hence, the rise of social order cannot be explained in “a causal manner” in terms of individuals’ actions. While I have argued up to this point about the role of critical rationality in the ordinary type of action from the vertical and horizontal points of view, I should also argue regarding the “emancipatory type” of rational action from such points of view. In the next part of my argument, I shall do this by addressing the question of how the critical rationalist model of action should be extended from the personal to social level. The emancipatory action type, which is formulated on the basis of a non-justificational account of rationality, would help us to address the aforementioned question. The Critical-Rationalist Model of Action: From the “Personal” to “Social” Level It is important to address the question of how individuals use critical rationality in order to arrive at a “moral consensus” regarding the meaning of the good life, at the core of a system of common values, which enables them to give themselves “a free and just” social order. The role of an emancipatory action type, which is developed on the basis of the general theory of critical rationalism, is to be seen in this line of thought. It is true that at the “personal” level, an individual can activate his critical rationality to see that when a moral belief which is held open to criticism and is not shown to be false, it should be considered as a “rational” value. However, when we come to the “social” level, it should be explained how people enter into “an inter-subjective dialogue” regarding the meaning of the good life, the result of which would be a set of “common” values concerning the meaning of the good life. From a logical point of view, what is true about “an individual” could also be true with regard to a typical person. Hence, the access to critical rationality allows people, at the social level, enter into a moral dialogue through which they could hold open their moral beliefs concerning the conception of the good life to an inter-subjective criticism and seeing whether the beliefs in question are shown to be false by negative reasons. In fact, in this way, people act on the basis of the ideal type of “emancipatory action” because they use critical rationality to give themselves a normative law in order to determine the goals of their actions. The

72  Towards a Micro-Foundation

logical result of these emancipatory actions, which should be considered in terms of the aforementioned moral dialogue, would be a “normative” consensus on the meaning of the good life. In this sense, the epistemology of knowledge as unfalsified conjuncture allows us to understand that if individuals activate their access to critical rationality, they would be able to give themselves “a system of common values”, which is necessary for making the rise of “a free and just social order” possible. Now we can see how the emancipatory type of action is to be linked with the ordinary type of it: once a system of shared values was established by the emancipatory actions for the first time, an individual who wants to become a civilized member of the society in question should use his critical rationality for another purpose: he applies critical rationality in order to internalize the common values, which people have already given themselves, in his personal identity so that the goals of his action are shaped by the system of values in question. This internalization happens through “a socialization process”. Then, the actor attempts to use the instrumental rationality in order to explore effective means to realize the goals of his action. In this way, the separation of justification and criticism enables the microfoundations of a sociological theory of society to define a causal role for human agents, because of their access to critical rationality, in the formation of a free and just social order. However, the following question remains: can individuals meet each other in “one place” and in “one time” in order to enter into a moral dialogue regarding a system of common values? The answer is negative. People cannot practice this type of social dialogue to see whether they can reach an agreement on the shared values of the good life. If this is so, then what would be an alternative model of social dialogue for arriving at an agreement on a system of values? And how would such an inter-subjective dialogue turn the resultant moral agreement into the social institutions of law, polity and economy? Three Agents of Social Dialogue for Common Values and Social Institutions As argued in Chapter 7 of the first volume, three major agents of the social dialogue might be introduced as follows: (a) thinkers, (b) social movements and (c) ordinary people. These agents work together, shaping a process of “social learning” through which they will arrive at a “rational consensus” on the common values and social institutions necessary for the rise of a free and just social order (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 158–159). The thinkers, who activate their critical rationality sooner than others, introduce proposals which define the meaning of the good life in terms of a system of values, showing that how a set of social institutions is to be created to realize the ideal of the good life. Social movements are the second agent of social dialogue for the creation of common values and institutions. These movements translate the proposed ideal of social order by thinkers into tangible ideas and concepts

Towards a Micro-Foundation  73

which allow ordinary persons to participate at the social dialogue for the creation of the ideal social order. Ordinary people are to be considered as the third agent in the social dialogue for the creation of the ideal social order. Like the thinkers and social movements, ordinary people (masses) are the authors of a moral law which people give themselves. Also, all the three agents should be considered as the agents of “an emancipatory” social dialogue through which people should revise the common values and institutions, which they have created whenever they realize that their values or institutions are shown to be false by negative reasons. In short, the critical rationalist theory of action leads us to “a mechanism of normative dialogue” through which not only can people use critical rationality to give themselves a shared conception of the good life, but also they can use that moral conception in order to give themselves a set of social institutions of law, polity and economy making the realization of the ideal of the good life for all possible.

Section III: The Three Stages of Progress in Critical Rationality While the degree of activation of critical rationality may affect the extent to which a human action should be considered “rational”, it would be important for our discussion regarding the transition from the closed to the open society to know that whether the lower level of critical rationality could be connected with the rise of a closed society, and the higher level of it with the rise of an open society. In this line of reasoning, I should like “to develop” the critical rationalist model of action, as a micro-foundation for the sociology of the open society, by adding to it “the notion” of the stages of progress in critical rationality. The General Theory of Critical Rationalism and the Stages of Progress in Critical Reason The notion of the progress in the level of critical rationality, which can be used by the actors to drive their actions, is drawn from the general theory of critical rationalism. In fact, when critical rationality is defined, in terms of “a cognitive capacity” of holding open a claim of rational belief to criticism and seeing whether it is not shown to be false by negative reasons, we may argue that to the extent to which the critical rationalist “holds open” the premises, or inferences, of his arguments to criticism, he would be able to learn from the criticisms. In this sense, his potential for rationalizing the beliefs in question will substantially be improved by an activation of a higher level of access to critical rationality. Hence, we can argue about “a qualitative progress” in critical rationality (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 96–103). In my view, the general theory of critical rationalism is called as a “general” theory of rationality because it can address the question of how the critical rationality grows through opening up the premises of the theories of rationality to criticism to see whether the theories are shown to be false by negative reasons. In

74  Towards a Micro-Foundation

short, the general theory of critical rationalism can be used in order to evaluate the theories of rationality, exploring how they may improve by learning from mistaken premises or inferences. Hence, I have used the general theory in order to propose three major stages of the progress in critical rationality. In this line of reasoning, I should like refer to Alasdair C. MacIntyre’s (1977: 460) insightful passage as follows: The criterion of a successful theory is that it enables us to understand its predecessors in a newly intelligible way. It, at one and the same time, enables us to understand precisely why its predecessors have to be rejected or modified and also why, without and before its illumination, past theory could have remained credible. It introduces new standards for evaluating the past. It recasts the narrative which constitutes the continuous reconstruction of the scientific tradition. I believe that the general theory of critical rationalism can play such a role which MacIntyre has rightly defined for “a successful theory” because it enables us to address the question of how the theories of rationality may grow by learning from the mistakes of the previous theories. It is worthy of note that, since, according to the stages of progress in critical rationality, we can talk about the lower and higher levels of critical rationality, the idea of different levels of critical rationality helps us to advance the critical rationalist model of action so that, not only could the model be used as a micro-foundation for a sociological theory of the open society, but also it could be employed as a micro-foundation for a sociological theory of the closed society. In the light of these insights, we can analyse the closed and the open societies on the basis of one theory of rationality: the general theory of critical rationalism. It should be remembered that, due to the definition of critical rationalism in the context of the justified true belief account of knowledge, Popper was unable to define the ideas of the open and closed societies on the basis of “one” theory of rationality. It is, however, the advantage of the general theory of critical rationalism that enables us to use the notion of the lower and higher levels of critical rationality to address the rise of the closed and open society on the basis of “one” model of rational action. Perhaps, more importantly, the aforementioned notion allows us to show how an activation of the higher level of critical rationality by individuals in the closed society enables them to criticize the established values and institutions due to their mistaken premises. And, in this way, people would be able to act as the agents of a normative transition from the closed to the open society. The details of this argument will be offered in Chapter 7 of the present volume. It should be added that, while Popper’s critical and Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism may argue about the growth of imperfect rationality, their concepts of critical rationality are not defined as if the progress in critical reason could be

Towards a Micro-Foundation  75

addressed accurately. For instance while Popper (1992) argues about the growth of objective knowledge through “conjectures and refutations”, “a parallel growth” in critical rationality “cannot” be imagined, whereas Popper views critical rationalism in terms of a moral attitude of openness to criticism. Hence, speaking of the growth in regard with such a moral attitude does not make sense. While Bartley’s (1984) pan-critical rationalism, due to its definition of critical rationalism as a “theory” of rationality, makes the notion of progress in critical rationality reasonable, since the pan-critical rationalism does not tell us how our “open belief” to criticism should be refuted logically, it cannot also lead us to know how the process of “learning from errors” would take place in practice, and, hence, the pan-critical rationalism would be unable to tell us how the stages of progress in critical rationality might be differentiated from each other. As I have argued in the first volume of this book, “the logic of criticism” in the theory of knowledge plays an important role in addressing the question of how “a theory”, in general, or “a theory of rationality” in particular, is to be tested due to the falsity of its premises and inferences. A non-justificational approach to the logic of criticism means that the logical forms, like the modus ponens and the modus tollens, are to be reconstructed upon the basis of the idea of knowledge as unfalsified conjuncture. This argument leads us to a recognition of the fact that both forms of the modus ponens and modus tollens suffer from the problem of infinite regress of proofs because they are formulated on the basis of these assumptions that the premises of a rational argument can be proved by justifier reasons, and the relation between premises and conclusion must be “unquestionably true” in order the transmission of the truth, or falsity, of premises to conclusion could take place correctly. In the case of the modus ponens, this means that conclusion of a rational argument could be justified by its premises. Using the same rationale, the modus tollens implies that “the falsity of conclusion” in a rational argument could be “justified” when one of the premises of such argument is shown to be false by experience. However, in “both” forms of deduction, the relationships between premises and conclusion are “justificatory relationship”. If my argument is correct, then like the modus ponens, the modus tollens suffers from the regress of justification. Hence, it cannot operate the role of “a logic of criticism” for an evaluation of “a theory of rationality” and its progress. In addition, the modus tollens is applied in order to test “an empirical theory” rather than “a metaphysical theory” such as “a philosophical theory” of rationality. With these considerations in mind, it was my non-justificational critique of the modus tollens and modus ponens that led me to the notion of a “non-justificational logic” of criticism in which a claim of rational belief might be situated at “the conclusion of a rational argument” in order to see whether one of the premises is shown to be false by negative reasons. In my view, this “new logic of criticism” does not involve the infinite regress of proofs because it does not demand that the premises of a rational argument must be “justified” in order to be true and the conclusion of a rational argument must be “justified” by its premises in order to

76  Towards a Micro-Foundation

be true. Instead, it demands that the premises are to be “unfalsified conjunctures” and the conclusion must be “refuted” by its premises. The non-justificational approach to “the deductive inference” leads us to a new understanding of the role of “the logic of criticism” in a model of the growth of “imperfect rationality”. In short, in this new model, “a claim of rational belief” is situated at the conclusion of a valid deduction whose refutation would happen if the only one of the premises is shown to be false by negative reasons. Hence, it wouldn’t be unwise to conclude that our critical rationality grows to the extent that we use argument or experience to show that the premises or inferences of our “rationality claims” are shown to be false, and to the extent that we replace the refuted premises and inferences with the unfalsified premises and inferences. Since there is no “logical limit” for opening up the premises and inferences of a rational argument to criticism, the growth of critical rationality does not face a logical limitation. With this theory of the growth of rationality in mind, we can identify three stages of the progress in critical rationality, which are very significant for the micro-foundation of a sociological theory of the transition from the closed to the open society. The three stages of the progress in critical rationality might be identified as follows: (a) from irrationalism to dogmatic rationalism, (b) from dogmatic rationalism to justificationist critical rationalism, (c) from justificationist to non-justificationist critical rationalism According to the general theory of critical rationalism, to the extent that the rationalist holds open the premises and inferences of his claims of rational beliefs to criticism, he can learn from such an openness. The importance of such an openness for the relation between critical rationalism and social order is that to the degree that people open their beliefs to criticism, they would be able to enter into a social dialogue, which is more rational and enabling them to open up their closed society. In my view, the idea of the growth of critical rationality from the lower to the higher level advances “the critical rationalist model of action” as if it could be used to address the question of how a closed society may be transformed into an open one. In fact, it is the highest level of critical rationality that enables the human actors, including thinkers, social movements, and ordinary people, to question the common values and social institutions of a closed society and replacing them with the new values and social institutions which are necessary for the creation of an open society. Now allow me to describe very briefly the three stages of the progress in critical rationality. From Irrationalism to Dogmatic Rationalism On the basis of the general theory of critical rationalism we can explore how the concept of rational beliefs, in general, and the concept of “rational belief

Towards a Micro-Foundation  77

in reason” in particular, might be improved by moving from irrationalism to dogmatic rationalism. This progress ought to be seen in terms of an activation of potential access to critical rationality. This progress may be addressed as follows. What is the central claim of irrationalism? While the modern irrationalism originates in the sceptic epistemology, it implies that since we cannot justify the premises of our rational belief in reason, an inevitable consequence would be irrationalism. This new reading of irrationalism accepts the idea of knowledge as justified true belief but arguing that the objective knowledge is unachievable because “a claim” of rational belief cannot be justified by argument. However, there is also an “old version” of irrationalism which implies that, instead of establishing our beliefs on knowledge and rationality, we should base our beliefs on “the magical thoughts”. Like the modern irrationalist, the old one claims that there is no “objective knowledge” upon which one can defend his claim of rational belief. In brief, the magical thinking of an irrationalist implies that one can create an illogical relation between the two phenomena without establishing the relation on knowledge because the irrationalist denies the existence of an objective knowledge upon which one should define a “logical relation” between the phenomena. Hence, it can be said that the epistemology of the magical thinking rests on the premise of the lack of knowledge that leads the irrationalist to claim that an “illogical” relation between the two phenomena could be created which cannot be seen in reality. However, the dogmatic (uncritical) rationalist argues that if nobody can have an objective knowledge in order to create “a logical” relation between the two phenomena, then the irrationalist cannot also argue that because of the lack of an objective knowledge, he has based his beliefs upon the magical thoughts. Hence, irrationalism, whether in terms of its old version or in terms of its modern version, would be a self-contradictory position. Viewed from the perspective of the general theory of critical rationalism, the uncritical rationalist’s critique of irrationalism is a valid critique because the dogmatist rightly argues that the premise of the irrationalist’s argument; that is the lack of objective knowledge, might be refuted by argument. Hence, the transition from the irrationalism to dogmatic rationalism is to be considered as an important progress in critical rationality which takes place by learning from a mistaken premise. In this line of thought, Joseph Agassi and Ian Jarvie (1987: 445, 448) point out: [W]e discussed different kinds or levels of rationality and examined the question of whether magic is rational, whether uncritical rationalism is rational and whether dogmatism is rational. . . . Even when we call it dogmatic, however, we don’t censure irrationalism. . . . On the contrary, we argued . . . that dogmatism has its own rationality, too, both in its preferability to impotent scepticism and in its value within a working setting.

78  Towards a Micro-Foundation

It is the general theory of critical rationalism that lets us to realize the reason why the transition from the irrationalism to dogmatic rationalism is to be evaluated as a learning from incorrect premise; that is the lack of objective knowledge. In this sense, the transition in question might be seen as an application of a low-level of critical rationality which can improve our understanding of the function of reason. From Dogmatic Rationalism to Justificationist Critical Rationalism The second major stage in the growth of critical rationality might be described in terms of a transition from the dogmatic theory of rationality to a non-dogmatic, yet, justificationist theory of rationality. In this stage, uncritical rationalism is criticized by the critical rationalist because of its premise; that is one can justify his belief in reason by “positive reasons”. In this criticism, however, the very equation of rationality with justification is accepted. The critical rationalist rightly argues that if rationality should to be defined in terms of justification, and if the demand for justification involves infinite regress, the position of the dogmatic rationalist would be “untenable” because he cannot defend his position by argument. As observed by Bartley (1984), while this criticism of the uncritical rationalism is valid, it rests on a wrong premise: a belief is rational if, and only if, it could be proved by positive reasons. Bartley calls this type of criticism as a “justificationist critique” because it first accepts the equation of rationality with justification, then arguing that since the justification involves the infinite regress, the position of dogmatic rationalism would be untenable. In other words, the dogmatic rationalism can be defined as follows: all claims of rational beliefs could be justified by argument or experience. The main premises of this position are (a) the premises of our rational beliefs are justifiable by positive reasons and (b) a deductive, or an inductive, inference could be used to justify the conclusion of a rational argument on the basis of its true premises. Given these assumptions, how does the critical rationalist refute the uncritical rationalism? The answer is: the critical rationalist argues that the premise that rational beliefs are justifiable by positive reasons is actually “a false premise” on which the dogmatist has based his argument. In fact, the critical rationalist views all premises “fallible”. Hence, the uncritical rationalism will be refuted due to its own premise. In his criticism of uncritical rationalism, the critical rationalist shares with the modern irrationalist because both admit that our claims of rational belief are not justifiable by positive reasons. However, the critical rationalist does not want to give up this idea that, at least, a reasonable belief in reason is possible. Hence, the justificationist critical rationalist admits a belief in reason with “an irrational faith”. The transition from the dogmatic rationalism to the justificationist critical rationalism is a “logical result” of opening up the premises of the uncritical rationalism to criticism. In this line of thought, the justificationist critical rationalist argues that the dogmatist cannot defend rationalism because the premises of

Towards a Micro-Foundation  79

a rational argument cannot be justified by argument or experience, and inductive inference is invalid. Hence, as observed by Popper, the dogmatic rationalism would be an untenable position. It needs to be said that the justificationist critical rationalism is “critical” because the rationalist does not claim that his belief in reason is justifiable by positive reasons, and it is “justificationist” because the rationalist has not yet given up the equation of rationality with justification. According to this reading of critical rationalism, we may say that, since nobody can establish his own argument on infallible premises, all of us should be allowed to defend our arguments upon the premises which are chosen by an irrational faith. In other words, each critical rationalist could defend his own beliefs, provided he admits that his ultimate premise would only be provable by an irrational faith. I should like to call this justificationist version of critical rationalism as a “liberal theory” of rationality. From “Justificationist” to “Non-Justificationist” Critical Rationalism According to the general theory of critical rationalism, a third major stage in the growth of critical rationality should be seen in terms of a non-justificationist critique of the justificationist critical rationalism. As argued by Bartley, Unlike justificationist views of rationality which are exposed to the tu quoque of the irrationalist (“You, too, must start with unjustifiable premises”), a theory of rationality which emphasises criticism may itself be held rationally – that is, if the theory itself is open to criticism. (Koretge 1974: 76) However, Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism does not clarify how critical rationalism itself may be refuted in practice. It needs to be noted that my general theory of critical rationalism is developed as a result of an epistemological criticism of Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021, 2022). This criticism can be offered as follows: the pan-critical rationalism does not tell us how the rationalist uses “logic” in order to evaluate “a claim of rational belief”, including “a rational belief in reason”, which is held open to criticism. According to the general theory of critical rationalism, the justificationist critical rationalism might be presented as follows: all claims of rational beliefs are justifiable, only if the premises of those claims could be justified by argument or experience, but the premises are not justifiable by positive reasons. The main assumptions of this position are: (a) the premises of a claim of rational belief are fallible and (b) the premises are only valid for the claimer who accepts them by an irrational faith. In other words, all of us are allowed to base our arguments on the premises whose validity is only acceptable by ourselves. In fact, the nonjustificationist critical rationalism originates from a “deep reform” of the very “structure of logic” from the justificational form of logic to a non-justificational form of it.

80  Towards a Micro-Foundation

Given these consideration, the non-justificationist critical rationalist refutes not only the premises of the justificationist critical rationalism, but also its forms of inference. If justification leads to the infinite regress of proofs, then the demand for justification of the conclusion of a rational argument upon the basis of its premises is a mistaken demand. The non-justificationist rationalist bases his theory of rationality upon the following assumption: neither the premises, nor inferences, of a claim of rational belief should be justified in order to be true. This highest level of the progress in critical rationality implies that fallible, yet, “unfalsified” premises and inferences could be applied to deduce a rational belief, in general, and “a rational belief in reason” in particular.

Section IV: The Growth of Critical Reason and the Stages of Moral Consciousness In my view, the general theory of critical rationalism provides us with “an entirely new explanation” of how human reason operates, and this becomes possible because it replaces the justificationist concept of rationality with the nonjustificational one. And this replacement liberates the theory of rationality from the infinite regress of proofs. Inspired by the non-justificational epistemology, the critical rationalist would be able to base his “claims of rational beliefs” upon “unfalsified conjectures”, using a valid inference to deduce rational belief on the basis of the premises which are not shown to be false by negative reasons. The consequence of this new theory of rationality for “a rationalistic ethics” is crucial: a theory of rationality which lets us to know how “our claims of rational beliefs” are to be judged accurately can also let us to know how “our moral claims” concerning the meaning of the good life should be evaluated correctly. Hence, the stage of progress in critical rationality could be connected with the stages of progress in moral consciousness. Generally speaking, if the access to critical rationality makes “a moral judgment” possible, it also allows people to shape a moral dialogue which is necessary for “a normative consensus” on the meaning of the good life. Given this argument, it wouldn’t be a surprise to say that a higher level of critical rationality may allow people to make a better moral judgment and reaching a more reasonable consensus upon the ultimate values of the good life. Therefore, the general theory of critical rationalism allows us to discover the mechanisms of the growth in our moral consciousness which enables us to enter into a more rational dialogue for the creation of “common values” necessary for the rise of a free and just social order. In this sense, to the extent that people activate their critical rationality through opening up the premises of their arguments to criticism, they will achieve a higher level of moral capacity for judging the claims regarding the meaning of the good life. Therefore, they can improve their “moral dialogue” for shaping a set of “common” values and social institutions, not only for a better management of the egoistic behaviours, but also for a better division of social works to realize the ideal of the good life for all.

Towards a Micro-Foundation  81

Given these considerations, I want to introduce three stages of growth in moral consciousness of individuals, which could be linked to the parallel stages of progress in the moral dialogues on the meaning of the good life in the transition from the closed to the open society. However, I should first refer to Habermas’ communicative rationality and its outcomes for his theory of moral consciousness. As argued in Chapter 6 of the first volume, Habermas’ ideal types of rational action lead him to suggest that an expansion of a child’s cognitive development to the stages of moral development in society may direct us towards an awareness of the evolution of society in terms of normative and system integrations. As observed by G. Kirkpatrick (2003: 93), Habermas argues that social evolution can be understood on an analogy with the moral and intellectual development of individuals growing to maturity . . . It is in this context that Habermas refers to the moral learning process as “the pacemaker of social evolution”. However, I would like to raise the following question: can we link the notion of individual’s maturation with the problem of social evolution in “a formal” way, using such a linkage to address the question of how the actions of “mature individuals” contribute to the rise of social order? In Communication and the Evolution of Society, Habermas (1979: 99) points out: Cognitive developmental psychology has shown that in ontogenesis there are different stages of moral consciousness, stages that can be described in particular as preconventional, and postconventional patterns of problemsolving. The same patterns turn up again in the social evolution of moral and legal representations. The ontogenetic models are certainly better analyzed and better corroborated that their social-evolutionary counterparts. But it should not surprise us that there are homologous structures of consciousness in the history of the species, if we consider that linguistically established intersubjectivity of understanding marks that innovation in the history of the species which first made possible the level of sociocultural learning. [Emphasis added] It seems to me that it is this “homologous expansion” of the child’s stages of cognitive/moral development to the stages of moral consciousness in society that leads Habermas to what he called the logic of social development. Michael Schmid (1982: 164) argues that the ontogenesis of the individual refers to a specific developmental logic that can be described in terms of several spheres: in a cognitive sphere (the capacity of formal thought), a moral sphere (the capacity of moral judgment), and in a sphere of integration (referring to an interactive competence based on normatively guided actions which are oriented to the actions of others).

82  Towards a Micro-Foundation

These remarks let us to see how Habermas has created a relationship between the stages of normative development in society and the ontogenesis of the child. However, if Habermas expands the child’s, rather than the mature individual’s, stages of cognitive/moral development to the stages of moral progress in society, the reason is that his theory of communicative rationality involves the regress of justification (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 130–140). Hence, instead of offering a “casual explanation” of how the child’s cognitive/moral development may contribute to the moral evolution of society, Habermas refers to “an analogy” between these two issues. In my view, Habermas has not yet addressed the question of how the mature individuals’ access to rationality enables them to engage in a rational dialogue to give themselves a moral law, for the first time, improving the moral law by opening it to criticism. Habermas (1979: 79–80) argues that at the pre-conventional level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. Habermas continues that at the conventional level, that the child tries to maintain the expectations of his family, group or notion is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. “The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it”. At the post-conventional level, “there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual’s own identification with these groups” (ibid.). As argued by Habermas at the highest stage of this post-conventional level, right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative). . . . At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for dignity of human beings as individual persons. (ibid.) With these insightful remarks in mind, an important question which arises is that can we equal the stages of cognitive–moral development of “the child” with the stages of the cognitive–moral development of “the mature individual” who is “real agent” of the formation of social order and its change? My answer to this question is negative. In fact, the general theory of critical rationalism is to be applied in order to show how a progress in “the mature”

Towards a Micro-Foundation  83

individual’s access to critical rationality determines a progress in the mature individual’s capacity of moral judgement regarding the moral values which are necessary for the rise of a free and just society. Hence, I should like to argue that how the progress in the individuals’ critical rationality enables human actors to advance their moral capacity of judging about the ultimate values of the good life. From an Irrational Ethics to a Dogmatic Ethics According to the preceding arguments, we may define a logical relationship between the transition from irrationalism to dogmatic rationalism on the one hand, and a moral progress from an irrational ethics to a dogmatic ethics on the other. In the context of this logical relationship, the mature individuals realize that the criticism of irrationalism has a significant upshot for their moral capacity of judging about the values of the good life. From the perspective of an irrationalistic ethics, since mature individuals cannot base their moral claims regarding the values of the good life on an objective knowledge, they should either follow magical thoughts regarding the meaning of the good life, or take a relativist position, which implies that a moral claim about the meaning of the good life cannot be evaluated objectively. But when the mature individuals activate their own critical rationality to question the irrationalism, replacing it with the dogmatic rationalism, they would lead to a dogmatic ethics, according to which their moral claims regarding the meaning of the good life could be justified by “positive reasons”. Hence, the individuals could use such a moral capacity for shaping a rational dialogue in order to agree upon a dogmatic reading of the good life, which should be considered as the normative solution to the problem of order in a closed society. From the Dogmatic Ethics to a Liberal Ethics Due to my theory of the growth of critical rationality, the transition from the dogmatic ethics to a liberal one may be described as follows: when the mature individuals realize that the dogmatist cannot be right in saying that “a claim of rational belief” may be proved by positive reasons, then they will lead to the justificational critical rationalism, which implies that while people cannot justify their claims of rational beliefs, they can accept the claims in question with “an irrational” faith. This progress from the uncritical rationalism to the justificationist critical rationalism offers a logical foundation for the transition from the dogmatic ethics to a liberal ethics. The mature individuals could improve their moral consciousness by replacing the idea that a moral claim regarding the values of the good life ought to be justified be positive reasons with this idea that all persons are allowed have their own moral attitude towards the meaning of the good life due to the premises whose validity is justified for themselves. I call this ethics a “liberal ethics” that is to

84  Towards a Micro-Foundation

be understood in the context of the justificationist critical rationalism. Thus, in the transition from the dogmatic ethics to the liberal one, the mature individuals advance their moral capacity of judging about the values of the good life due to a relative progress which is made by an activation of the access to critical rationality. From the Liberal Ethics to an Ethics of Openness to Criticism As the theory of the growth of critical rationality implies, at the third stage of progress in critical rationality, the mature individuals can replace the justificationist critical rationality with a non-justificationist one, which means that they have explored that a claim of rational belief cannot be justified upon the basis of those premises which are accepted with an irrational faith. Instead, human actors should admit a claim of rational belief, only if the premises, or inferences, of the claim in question are not shown to be false by negative reasons. The main upshot of this important progress in critical rationality for the moral capacity of mature individuals is that they would replace the liberal ethics with an ethics of openness to criticism. In this transition, the mature individuals achieve a moral capacity of judging about the meaning of the good life on the basis of the non-justificationist conception of rationality. And this implies that “a claim of moral belief” regarding the values of the good life is valid if its premises and inferences are not shown to be false by argument. When individuals admit this new logical way of judging about their moral claims, they have admitted a rationalistic ethics. This ethics of openness to criticism means that people are ready to holding open all of their moral claims to criticism, and when they realize that premises, or inferences, of those beliefs are not shown to be false by argument, they will arrive at a normative consensus on the values of the good life.

Section V: The Micro-Foundations of the Sociology of the Open Society: A Summary In this section, I want to summarize the results of my arguments so far regarding the micro-foundations of a sociological theory of society which could be applied to develop a sociological theory of the open society. It should be kept in mind that this new micro-foundation might also be utilized, not only to develop a sociological theory of the closed society in Chapter 6, but also to develop a sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society in Chapter 7. In brief, the micro-foundation of a sociological theory of the open society is to be summarized as follows: (i)

On the basis of the non-justificationist epistemology, provided by Chapter 4 of the first volume, the general theory of critical rationalism leads us to

Towards a Micro-Foundation  85

the models of human action in which the conception of “rational belief” is defined as a belief whose premises and inference are not shown to be false by negative reasons. Unlike the justificationist conception of reason, this non-justificationist conception of it does not involve the regress of justification, and, hence, it would be able to address the question of how reason operates and drives human action by defining the action goals and means on the basis of unfalsified conjunctures. (ii) The critical rationalist ideal types of rational action, in terms of either value or instrumental type of rational action, shape the micro-foundations of a sociological theory of the open society because they enable the sociologist to address the questions of what an open society is and how it comes into existence. (iii) The division of the critical rationalist ideal type of value-rationality into the emancipatory and ordinary action types lets the micro-foundations of the sociology of the open society to address the role of the individuals’ critical rationality in the rise of an agreement about a set of common value and institutions which are necessary for the formation of an open society. In addition, the emancipatory action type enables the sociology of the open society to define the role of the individuals’ critical rationality in questioning a closed social order, in order to prove the need for an open social order. (iv) Also, the ordinary action type lets the micro-foundations of the sociology of the open society to show us how people use their critical reason to respect the moral law in a closed society, or in an open one, by the means of which they actually reproduce the social orders by their daily actions which seek the personal interests by effective means. (v) The stages of growth in the mature individuals’ access to critical rationality – from irrationalism to dogmatic rationalism, from dogmatic rationalism to justificationist critical rationalism and from justificationist critical rationalism to non-justificationist critical rationalism – enable the micro-foundations of the sociology of the open society to argue how the transition from the closed to the open society originates in the stages of growth in the mature individuals’ access to critical rationality and its consequences for a parallel progress in the mature individuals’ moral consciousness. (vi) The stages of growth in the mature individual’s moral capacity of judging about the meaning of the good life enable the micro-foundations of the sociology of the open society to argue that the progress in the moral capacity of the individual – from irrational ethics to dogmatic ethics, from dogmatic ethics to liberal ethics and from liberal ethics to ethics of open to criticism – improve the mature individual’s capability for a better judging regarding the values of the good life, and reaching a more rational agreement upon a set of “common” values and social institutions which are necessary for the transition from the closed to the open society.

86  Towards a Micro-Foundation

Notes 1 In relation to the utilitarian origin of the neoclassical economics’ micro-foundations, it needs to be said that: the neoclassical theory of rational choices, as observed by Alex Viskovatoff (2001: 315–316), “employs an instrumentalist notion of rationality: consumers can rationally choose the bundle that best satisfies their preferences, but they cannot rationally determine the preferences themselves – these are, to use the oft-repeated phrase, ‘taken as given’. It is perhaps less well known, among social scientists at any rate, that the source of this instrumentalism is David Hume”. In other words, like the utilitarian, the neoclassical economics assumes that the goals of action are subjective preferences and cannot be discussed rationally. As argued in this chapter, this assumption originates in the idea of knowledge as justified true belief. 2 From a psychological view, Parsons has referred to Sigmund Freud’s theory of superego in order to show how the socialization process takes place. As Wrong (1999: 37) reminds us: “To Freud, it is precisely the man with the strictest superego, he who has most thoroughly internalized and the conformed to the norms of his society, who is most wracked with guilt and anxiety”. However, Freud does not argue that how an access to practical reason, using Kant’s term, enables man to internalize the norms of society in his personal identity. From the Freud’s viewpoint, the process of socialization takes place in the context of man’s unconsciousness mind or in his superego (Freud 1958: 80–81). In fact, Parsons requires a Kantian reading of the notion superego in order to show that it is “practical reason” that operates as a real agent of the socialization process through which man orients his action goals toward the moral law of society. According to Karl G. Jung (1964: 162), the process of individuation implies that “an individual pine slowly comes into existence, constituting the fulfilment of its totality, its emergence into the realm of reality . . . the realization of this uniqueness in the individual man is the goal of the process of individuation . . . the process of individuation is real only if the individual is aware of it and consequently makes a living connection with it . . . man certainly is able to participate consciously in his development” [Emphasis added]. Having said that, Parsons needs a model of the individual actor in which participation of the actor at his conscious development is possible, because of his access to practical reason. 3 With regard to the details of the stages of cognitive and moral development and the relations of those stages with the logic of social development, see Habermas’s (1979: 69–94) “Moral Development and Ego Identity” in Communication and the Evolution of Society. Habermas writes: “Identity is produced through socialization, that is, through the fact that the growing child first of all integrates itself into a specific social system by appropriating symbolic generalities; it is later secured and developed through individuation, that is, precisely through a growing independence in relation to social systems” (ibid.: 74). From the perspective of a critical-rationalist psychology, we can argue that individuals use critical rationality not only for internalizing the norms of society in their personal identities, but also for revising their self-identification when they realize that the norms of society can no longer be “rational” due to the unacceptable premises or inferences. Hence, the critical rationalist psychology emphasizes on the idea of “an independent mature person” who can give himself the moral law according to which he defines the goals of his action. As argued in this chapter, the stages of moral consciousness of the person should be linked with the stages of the growth in the person’s activation of his access to critical rationality, which depends on the person’s level of openness to criticism.

Towards a Micro-Foundation  87

Bibliography Agassi, J. and Jarvie, I.C. (eds.) (1987) “Theories of Rationality”. In: Rationality: The Critical View. Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 249–263. Alford, C. Fred (1987) “Hans Albert and the Unfinished Enlightenment”. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 17, pp. 453–469. Bartley, III, W.W. (1984) The Retreat to Commitment, 2nd edn. Chicago, Open Court. Durkheim, E. (1915 [1995]) The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Fields, K.E. (trans). New York, Free Press. Freud, S. (1958) Civilization and Its Discontents. New York, Doubleday Anchor Books. Gellner, E. (1992) Reason and Culture. Oxford, Blackwell. Habermas, J. (1979) Communication and the Evolution of Society, McCarthy, T. (trans.). Boston, Beacon Press. Joas, H. (1996) The Creativity of Action. Cambridge, Polity Press. Jung, C.A. (ed.) (1964) Man and His Symbols. New York, Anchor Press Doubleday. Kirkpatrick, G. (2003) “Evolution or Progress? A (Critical) Defense of Habermas’s Theory of Social Development”. In: Thesis Eleven, 72(91), pp. 91–112. Koretge, N. (1974) “Bartley’s Theory of Rationality”. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 4, pp. 75–81. Korsgaard, C.M. (2000) Creation of the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. MacIntyre, A. (1997) “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science”. In: Monist, 60(4), pp. 453–472. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2021) Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Society, Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume I. London and New York, Routledge. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2022) “Critical Rationalism: An Epistemological Critique”. In Foundations of Science. Springer, pp. 1–32. Published Online: 23 June 2022, https://doi. org/10.1007/s10699-022-09847-z. Parsons, T. (1937 [1968]) The Structure of Social Action, Volume I: Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim. New York, Free Press. Popper, K.R. (1992) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York, Basic Books. Rawls, J. (1996) Political Liberalism. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Schmid, M. (1982) “Habermas’s Theory of Social Evolution”. In: Thompson, J.B. and Held, D. (eds.) Habermas, Critical Debates. London, Macmillan, pp. 162–180. Viskovatoff, A. (2001) “Rationality as Optimal Choice Versus Rationality as Valid Inference”. In: Journal of Economic Methodology, 8(2), pp. 313–337. Wrong, D.H. (1999) The Oversocialized Conception of Man. New Brunswick, Transaction.

Chapter 4

The Open Society A Sociological Ideal Type

Introduction From Chapter 2, we know that Popper’s idea of an open society, in terms of a society sets free the critical powers of man, does not tell us what the term “social” means in the concept of an open society. Under this condition, the present chapter is to be seen as the first step towards a sociological theory of the open society by answering the question of how “a sociological ideal type” of an open society should be defined. To this end, the chapter proceeds as follows: Section I addresses the question of how the critical rationalist model of action is to be applied to define the problem of an “open” social order. Section II uses the critical rationalist model of action in order to define the meaning of the term “social” in the concept of an open society. Section III differentiates the sociological idea of an open society from what Popper defined as an open society.

Section I: The Critical Rationalist Action Model and the Problem of an “Open Social Order” To formulate a sociological ideal type of an open society, we should first define the problem of an “open” social order. In fact, the sociological concept of an open society is an attempt to deal with this problem of social order. What Is the Problem of an Open Social Order? From the previous chapter, we know that the definition of the problem of social order in sociology has been affected by the justificational concept of rationality. Thus, with replacing the demand for justification with the demand for criticism, the problem of social order could be reformulated. Stated somewhat differently, if there is a relationship between the meaning of rational action and the problem of social order, we should also identify the problem of an open social order based on the idea of critical rationalism. DOI: 10.4324/9781003027119-5

The Open Society  89

The Problem of Social Order in Modern Sociology Due to the fact that I have discussed about the problem of social order in the previous chapter, my reference to this issue in this section would be very brief as if it can pave the way for addressing the problem of an “open” social order which is a “special case” of the general problem of social order. As observed by Parsons (1937 [1968]), the Hobbesian problem of social order is of central importance for sociological theory since an unintended consequence of the egoistic behaviour of each person pursuing his own self-interests would be nothing less than a war of all against all. But this approach to the problem of social order originates from a model of human action in which the passion, rather than reason, drives action. Hence, if the role of passion in action is replaced with the role of reason in it, then the problem of social order couldn’t be the same as what Hobbes identifies it. The Hobbesian problem of social order could be summarized as follows: inspired by the utilitarian model of action, Hobbes (1928) argues that if each person pursues his subjective utility (interest) and these utilities are diverse and if the role of reason in action is merely finding those effective means which can realize a given subjective utility, then an unintended social outcome of the pursuit of diverse utilities would be a conflict of interests which leads to a social “disorder”. Evidently, this formulation of the problem of social order rests on a model of action in which reason does not shape the action goals. As I argued in the previous chapter, an epistemological reason for the rise of this utilitarian view of human action is to be sought in this assumption that “a moral belief” regarding what should be the goal of an action couldn’t be justified by positive reasons. If so, the goal of action ought to be seen as the matter of subjective preferences. What does define these subjective preferences? A utilitarian answer is that the feeling of pleasure or utility. However, this model of action, that replaces the role of reason with the role of utility, or passion, rests on a wrong account of rationality because its main assumption is that our claims of rational beliefs, including our “moral claims” regarding what should be the goals of action, should be justified by positive reasons to be considered as “true” claims. Now, if we replace the wrong epistemological premise of the utilitarian model with the following assumption: a claim of rational belief is to be held open to criticism, and if it did not reject by negative reasons, it should be accounted a true claim; then, there is no reason why a moral claim about what ought to be the goal of action couldn’t be a rational claim. Hence, the utilitarian model is wrong in saying that reason cannot drive action through defining a rational goal for it. If my epistemological criticism of the utilitarian model of action is correct, then the Hobbesian problem of social order is to be reformulated upon the basis of a non-justificational account of rationality and its outcomes for the model of human action. From what we know of the previous chapter, Parsons’s model of action in which the utilitarian view of action is replaced with a Kantian one cannot address

90  The Open Society

the role of reason in action because the Kantian moral philosophy itself originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge. Hence, the reformulation of the problem of social order cannot be done on the basis of the Parsons’ model of action. Under this condition, the critical rationalist model of action could be seen as an alternative to define the problem of an “open” social order. The reason is simple: the critical rationalist model rests upon a concept of rationality which is not involved the regress of justification. If so, this model of action would be capable of addressing the role of reason in the formation of the action’s goals and means. Before discussing about the implication of the critical rationalist model of action for the problem of an open social order, I  should like to refer to John Locke’s views of human action and social order and its interesting differences with the Hobbesian views. As observed by Leon Mayhew (1984: 1280), Locke, [P]urports to found order in society on reason in the individual. The individual is presumed to have agreed to the social order (or to civil government) by virtue of the protection and opportunities it provides, that is, because of its calculable benefits or utilities. Such doctrine often takes the form of supposing an original social contract. .  .  . What terms would a rational person accept as a part of the social contract? Such a person would not, for example, grant the sovereign absolute power over life and liberty, for the benefits of civil government are not an adequate reward for such a quid pro quo. . . . The underlying premise of the contract doctrine is that the ultimate terms and foundations of society and civil government can be derived from understanding how rational individuals make decisions. [Emphasis added] Since Locke admits that reason can drive action, the problem of social order is defined by the question of how individuals can use their access to rationality in order to control the pursuit of interests so that their life and liberty could be protected by a civil government. Parsons does not pay an enough attention to the Locke’s reasonable formulation of the problem of social order and its solution. Now, allow me to discuss about the outcomes of the critical rationalist model of action for identifying the problem of an “open” social order. The Problem of an Open Social Order: A Critical Rationalist Approach The problem of social order originates in the ways people intend to organize their social relations in order to satisfy their personal goals. Thus, the question of what are the roles of reason and passion in the formation of human action, in particular in the formation of action goals, plays a fundamental role in an identification of

The Open Society  91

the problem of social order. Inspired by the critical rationalist model of action, we can formulate the problem of social order in the following way: how does critical rationality enable human actors to give themselves a system of values upon which they can establish those social institutions which are necessary for the rise of a free and just social order? In this concept of the problem of social order, the main question would be that: how the actors use critical rationality to enter into “a social dialogue” by the means of which they would give themselves a set of “common” values and institutions, allowing them to pursue their own goals in a peaceful and just manner. Now we can apply this general definition of the problem of social order in order to define the problem of an open social order: how do human actors activate the highest level of critical rationality to give themselves a system of common values and social institutions which enables them not only to manage the pursuit of selfinterest, but also to shape a social division of works that realizes the ideal of the good life for all? In my view, this formulation of the problem of open social order allows us to realize the contribution of the idea of critical rationalism to the sociological ideal type of an open society. If the notion of “the highest level of critical rationality” is highlighted in the problem of an open social order, the reason is that the activation of this level of rationality allows people to hold the claims of rational beliefs open to criticism and seeing whether negative reasons would refute the claims in question, while the lowest level of critical rationality plays the same role in the definition of the problem of a “closed” social order. These approaches to the problems of the open and closed social orders originate in this fact that, not only in an open society, but also in a closed society, individuals use a degree of rationality in terms of openness to criticism in order to organize their social relations to realize their personal goals. Hence, the problem of open social order should be defined due to the highest level of critical rationality, while the problem of closed society ought to be defined due to the lowest level of critical rationality.

Section II: Towards a Sociological Ideal Type of the Open Society Given the problem of open social order, a sociological ideal type of the open society will be developed in this section by (a) addressing the question of how the notion of the highest level of critical rationality enables us to inject “a social” meaning to the concept of an open society; (b) answering the question of how the meanings of the universe and good life should be situated in the content of the sociological ideal type of an open society; (c) arguing about the role of social institutions of law, politics and economy in the sociological concept of an open society and (d) presenting a sociological ideal type of the open society.

92  The Open Society

The Highest Level of Access to Critical Reason and The Idea of an Open Society The first step to develop a sociological account of an open society is using the general theory of critical rationalism for reminding ourselves what the highest level of critical rationality is. In this line of reasoning, I shall also argue the reason why Popper’s idea of the open society, due to its origin in irrational faith in reason, does not lead us to see what the meaning of the term “social” is in the idea in question. This section consists of three arguments: (i) a brief review of the highest level of access to critical rationality, (ii) a study of how this level of critical rationality affects the model of human action as the micro-foundation of the sociological concept of an open society and (iii) a new definition of the idea of an open society. What is the highest level of the individual’s access to critical rationality? I have argued that the general theory of critical rationalism is the result of my criticisms of Popper’s critical and Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 87–91). Since I realized that these readings of critical rationalism originate in the justified true belief account of knowledge, I decided to base my theory of critical rationalism on the basis of the epistemology of knowledge as “unfalsified conjuncture” which is not involved in the regress of justification. In the case of Popper (1945 [2012]), the impact of the justified true belief account of knowledge on the definition of critical rationalism, in terms of irrational faith in reason, was evident: if the critical rationalist cannot justify his belief in reason by argument or experience, he ought to justify such belief by an irrational faith. However, if the demand for justification of a belief in reason is a mistaken demand, the irrational faith in reason would also be the result of such a mistaken demand. In addition, due to the fact that Popper defines critical rationality as a moral attitude, rather than a cognitive capacity of using reason to defend the rational belief by argument, he does not lead to the stages of progress in the individual’s critical rationality. Therefore, it was not possible for Popper to recognize a logical connection between the idea of an open society and the highest level of critical rationality on the one hand, and between the idea of a closed society and the lowest level of critical rationality on the other hand. However, in the case of Bartley’s (1984) pan-critical rationalism, justificationism plays a more complicated role: the lack of a non-justificationist epistemology does not allow Bartley to tell us how “a claim of rational belief”, which is held open to criticism, would be refuted in practice. Thus, despite Bartley’s important contribution to the philosophy of critical rationalism through defining it as “a theory of rationality”, rather than a moral attitude, he fails to address the question of how the pan-critical rationalist should use logic for showing that a claim of rational belief is not refuted by argument. Therefore, I concluded that Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism does not supply us with a theory of rationality which can address the question of how reason performs. If I am correct, then it wouldn’t be a surprise that Bartley’s theory of rationality cannot also tell us how reason drives

The Open Society  93

action and how it will be evolved through learning from errors (Mohammadi Alamuti 2022: 27–28). Having said that, I conclude that Popper’s critical and Bartley’s pan-critical rationalisms are unable to offer a micro-foundation, in terms of a model of rational action, for a macro-sociology of the open society, on the basis of which the highest level of access to critical rationality plays a key role in the definition of the ideal type of an open society. In contrast, the general theory of critical rationalism would be able to operate such a role, because it can address not only the question of how critical rationality performs, but also the question of how it grows. Once the reason was itself defined accurately, the question of how it drives action, through defining the action’s goals and means, might also be responded correctly. In short, according to the general theory of critical rationalism, “a claim” of rational belief is true, if (i) it is held open to criticism, and (ii) its premises and inference are not shown to be false by negative reasons. As argued in Chapter 5 of the first volume, this new theory of rationality not only can solve the problem of “rational belief”, in general, but also it can overcome the problem of “a rational belief in reason” in particular. In addition, this new theory of rationality could be applied in order to show that the individual’s access to critical reason will be advanced to the extent that the person opens the premises and inferences of his arguments to criticism. It is at the third (highest) stage of progress in critical rationality that the critical rationalist realizes that if he defines the goals and means of his action on the basis of “unfalsified conjunctures”, he may rationalize the action in question. When the transition from the justificationist critical rationalism to the non-justificationist one happened, the rationalist will learn how to establish his action goals and means on the basis of unfalsified conjunctures, which makes the action in question a “rational” action. Moving from the individual to the societal level, the consequence of the highest level of access to critical rationality for the definition of a sociological ideal type of the open society would be fundamental. In order to solve the problem of an open social order, a sociological theory of the open society should first address the question of what “an open society” is. However, this question cannot be dealt without using the notion of different levels of the individual’s access to critical rationality. Given these considerations, a sociological theory of the open society can use the notion of the highest level of critical rationality in order to address the question of how individuals activate their critical rationality to give themselves those common values and social institutions which are necessary for the rise of an “open” social order. Hence, it is the highest level of critical rationality that enables us to define the concept of an open society: in brief, “an open society” is a “rational society”. The very term “rational” here is to be understood in terms of “openness to criticism”. A society is an open society, if its moral values and social institutions are held “open” to criticism and are not shown to be false by “negative reasons”.

94  The Open Society

We can also define the conception of an open society in the following way: since people are capable of basing the goals of their actions upon rational beliefs, they are also capable of using such a cognitive capacity for entering into a moral dialogue regarding the meaning of the good life. One may ask that: how can this argument lead us to a sociological ideal type of open society? In order to address this question, I shall develop my idea of an open society in the following pages. The Place of the Worldview and Meaning of the Good Life in a Sociological Idea of an Open Society Viewed from a sociological perspective, the very meaning of the term “social” in the idea of an open society ought to be understood in terms of a set “common” values and institutions which open-mined persons give themselves to solve the problem of social order. However, a question which may be raised in that, how can we connect the role of the highest level of critical rationality with the sociological ideal type of an open society? In other words, the question is that: how might people’s highest level of critical rationality be related to rationalistic views of the universe and good life which define normative elements of a sociological ideal type of the open society? It is worthy of note that on the bases of Popper’s critical and Bartley’s pancritical rationalism, one “cannot” show that how individuals would enter into “a moral dialogue” regarding the meanings of the universe and good life. The main reason is that the critical and pan-critical rationalism cannot tell us how “a philosophical claim” regarding the meaning of the universe and “a moral claim” regarding the meaning of the good life might be subjected to rational discussion. Inspired by the justified true belief account of knowledge, Popper defines critical rationalism in terms of an irrational faith in reason. However, Bartley argues that our faith in reason could be “rational” because the belief in reason might be held open to criticism, and if it passed severe examination, it would be rational. Yet, Bartley does not tell us how such an “open” belief to criticism is to be refuted logically. Hence, neither Popper’s critical nor Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism could tell us: how should a philosophical, or a moral claim, be evaluated by argument? Under these conditions, I have argued that it is the justified true belief account of knowledge that has prevented these readings of critical rationality from telling us how metaphysical claims about the universe or moral beliefs regarding the good life may be subjected to “a logical refutation” to see whether they are shown to be false by argument. However, as I have argued in the first volume of this book (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 103–105), the non-justificationist form of deduction enables the general theory of critical rationalism to show that a “philosophical claim, or a moral one” can be subjected to criticism and seeing whether or not it is true. The bottom line of this argument is that with using their highest level of critical rationality, individuals would be able to enter into “a rational dialogue” regarding the meanings of the universe and good life. Since the critical rationalists can subject

The Open Society  95

their ontological and moral claims about the universe and good life to an “intersubjective” test, they may arrive at a normative consensus on the moral values of the good life, when they realize that the claims in question are not shown to be false by negative reasons. It needs to be emphasized here that the imagination of this “cognitive possibility” was not possible, if the theory of the stages of progress in critical rationality had not made it clear that only at the third (highest) stage of such progress people would achieve a cognitive capacity of judging their ontological and moral claims by establishing them upon the “unfalsified conjunctures”. In other words, openminded persons would realize that the rise of a system of rational beliefs and values with relation to the meanings of the universe and good life is actually possible if they activate their potential access to the highest level of critical rationality. As argued by Parsons (1937 [1968]), the war of all against all in a society cannot be prevented without having a set of common values which is internalized in the individuals’ personality through the socialization process. While Parsons recognizes that such a system of values plays a key role in a “normative integration” of individuals in society, he does not argue how individuals’ access to reason allows them to give themselves the common values in question, for the first time, in order to control egoistic behaviours. Hence, an important challenge for sociological theory is solving the problem of how an access to reason enables individuals to give themselves a system of values by the means of which their egoistic behaviours can be managed in favour of a peaceful social order. According to my general theory of critical rationalism, however, it is the notion of the highest level of critical rationality that enables the sociologist to argue for the possibility of reaching “a rational consensus” concerning the meanings of the universe and good life as a normative solution to the problem of social order. It is worthy of note that when Popper defines open society as a society which sets free critical powers of humanity, he does not consider a function for the common values in terms of the meaning of the good life in the definition of open society. Of course, the absence of this important moral component in Popper’s ideal type of the open society should not surprize us because when Popper (1945 [2012]) defines critical rationalism as irrational faith in reason, such kind of faith in reason does not allow him to consider the possibility of a rational discussion among individuals about the meaning of the good life. As argued earlier, Popper’s epistemology does not allow him to argue that a moral belief may be subjected to rational examination. Thus, without a recognition of the key role of a “common” understanding of the concepts of the universe and good life in the rise of social order, it is not surprise if we see that Popper’s idea of the open society does not provide a meaning for the term “social” in the idea in question. Perhaps, Popper’s unfamiliarity with the modern sociological readings of the social order, in particular with the role of “common values” in the conception of human society, has partly contributed to this under-theorization of the meaning of the term “social” in his account of the open society. Yet, this shortcoming could also be explained by looking at the way Popper’s model of rational action might

96  The Open Society

be linked to his ideal type of the open society. As I have argued in Chapter 2, Popper’s model of action does not give the individual a cognitive/moral agency which is required for entering into a rational dialogue regarding the values of the good life. According to Popper’s principle of rationality, individuals only behave adequately to their social situations. This view of rational action cannot tolerate “an independent human actor” whose objective knowledge allows him to evaluate a moral claim regarding the meaning of the good life. However, without having “an emancipatory action type” in our model of human action, the role of critical rationality in the ideal type of an open society cannot be addressed. In “Is there an ethics of the open society?”, Sandra Pralong (2003: 130) reminds us that: “In his account of the open society, Popper doesn’t focus on specifying the ethical standards that induce obedience to the rule of law; nor does he analyze the mechanisms of transformation of a closed society into an open one”. My criticism of Popper’s idea of an open society implies that since his reading of critical rationalism, in terms of a moral attitude of openness to criticism, does not allow him think about the possibility of subjecting a philosophical theory of the universe, or a moral theory of the good life, to critical discussion, the individuals also are not assumed to be capable of entering into “a rational dialogue” regarding their concepts of the universe and good life, which ought to be seen at the normative core of a sociological reading of the open society. Social Institutions of Law, Polity and Economy and the Sociological Idea of an Open Society In order to develop the meaning of the term “social” in the sociological idea of an open society, we should argue regarding the social institutions which realize the ideal of the good life in the open society. From a logical viewpoint, while individuals use the highest level of critical rationality for reaching a rational consensus on the conceptions of the universe and good life, they also require the highest level of critical rationality to establish those social institutions which are necessary for realizing the ideal of the good life which is shaped in the context of their worldviews. It needs to be noted that the meaning of the good life is defined in the context of the ontological concept of the universe and man’s place within it. It might be argued that from the meaning of the good life, we can deduce a notion of legal justice. In other words, human actors who activate the highest level of critical rationality for defining their concepts of the universe and good life would be able to use those concepts for arguing that all human beings, due to their “equal access” to critical rationality, should have an equal opportunity for enjoying from the good life. Hence, an important outcome of a rational agreement upon the meaning of the good life for a sociological ideal type of the open society is that this society should provide its individual members with “equal rights” to the opportunity of the good life. In this line of reasoning, it could be said that in order to legalize the concept of the good life, human actors should create “an institution of just law” which protects their equal rights to the good life. Thus, the

The Open Society  97

resultant just law leads us to define “a legal component” for the sociological idea of an open society. In other words, in order to control egoistic behaviours and engaging individuals in a social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life for all, human actors should apply the highest level of critical rationality to define the legal institution of just law upon the basis of their shared accounts of the universe and good life. In this way, the consensuses regarding the meanings of the universe and good life will be turned into a legal component of the sociological ideal type of an open society. We may also argue that to realize the equal rights to the good life, the open society needs a political institution: an open democracy. If we accept Max Weber’s (1968) definition of government as a political power which has “the monopoly of power” in order to enforce the law of society, then we may argue that the open society requires an open democracy which employs executive power to enforce the equal rights to the good life. In this sense, in the context of the sociological idea of an open society, a close linkage could be created between the institution of human rights and the concept of good life on the one hand, and between the open democracy and the institution of human rights on the other. In the line of the preceding arguments, we can also argue that not only should the concepts of the good life and human rights be understood due to the highest level of people’s access to critical rationality because this rationality enables the actors to subject their beliefs regarding the good life and human rights to rational discussion, but also the rise of the institution of open democracy is to be linked with the people’s potential for activating the highest level of critical rationality. However, the sociological ideal type of an open society requires an economic component – that is a competitive economy. In order to realize the ideal of the good life for all under the aforementioned legal and political conditions, openminded persons should create an efficient mechanism of resource allocation in order to mobilize the factors of production to meet the needs of people’s good life. Hence, a competitive economy should be regarded as another component of the sociological ideal type of the open society. The idea of the highest access to critical rationality might be applied to see how open-minded people subject their economic theories regarding an “efficient mechanism of resource allocation” to criticism in order to explore whether the theories in question are shown to be false by negative reasons. The Sociological Ideal Type of an Open Society: A Summary What I have tried to do so far is that a sociological ideal type of an open society is to be defined in the context of the philosophy of critical rationalism in which the notion of the highest level of critical rationality enables us to integrate the five components of the idea of an open society, namely the metaphysical, moral, legal, political and economic components, in “one” sociological ideal type.

98  The Open Society

It is the definition of critical rationality in terms of holding open “a claim of rational belief” to criticism to see whether it is shown to be false by argument that enable us to define an open society as “a rational society” which is formed on the basis of those common values and social institutions which are held open to criticism but are not shown to be false by negative reasons. The very meaning of the term “social” in this reading of the open society refers to those rational values and institutions which are “common” to all. As noted before, the term “open” in the conception of an open society refers to the “rational” nature of this society. In essence, the open society is “a rational society” because people have used “the highest level of rationality” in order to give such a social order to themselves. As observed by Mark A. Notturno (2000: 7–8) in Science and the Open Society, An open society (that is a society based on the ideas of not merely tolerating dissenting opinions but respecting them) and a democracy (that it is, a form of government devoted to the protection of an open society) cannot flourish if science becomes the exclusive of possession of a closed set of specialist. . . . if we are going to understood open society as scientific or rational society, then we must think of society not as an institutional hierarchy of experts, but as a never-ending process of problem-solving in which we propose tentative solutions to our problem and then try to eliminate the error in our proposals, we must think of rationality not in terms of justification, but in terms of criticism. [Emphasis added] Similarly, in this two-volume book, Critical Rationalism and the Open Society, I argue that we must think of rationality, not in terms of justification, but in terms of criticism. However, I have criticized Popper’s reading of “openness to criticism”, in terms of a moral attitude, for it originates in the notion of knowledge as the justified true belief. If my criticism of Popper’s critical rationalism is correct, then Popper’s idea of the open society, which is originated in that account of rationality, is to be subjected to rational criticism. In Critical Rationalism and the Open Society, my intension is showing that the philosophy of critical rationalism is to be reinvented based on the idea of objective knowledge as unfalsified conjuncture in order to address not only the problem of rational beliefs, but also the problem of the growth of rational beliefs. Only on the basis of the non-justificational theories of knowledge and rationality, we can argue that it is the actors’ highest level of openness to criticism that leads us to the sociological idea of an open society as a solution for the problem of an open social order. According to this sociological ideal type of the open society, we may argue that since the open society aims to establish all social relation upon the rational beliefs, it would be a “rational society” which realizes the normative ideal of self-determination by the means of Reason. As observed by Ian Jarvie (2001: 10),

The Open Society  99

“The Open Society and Its Enemies . . . is a long, passionate book that presses the Enlightenment project of maximising the use of reason in improving social and political life”. However, it seems to me that Popper’s concept of the open society does not tell us how this maximum usage of the reason in improving social life could be taking place in practice. In comparison with Popper’s idea of the open society, the sociological idea of the open society, which was proposed in this chapter, allows us to see that if people activate the highest level of their access to critical rationality, they can organize their society as if the ideal of maximum use of the reason could be realized in practice. And, in practice, this will be happened if people employ the highest level of rationality in order to “rationalize” not only their metaphysical and moral beliefs by subjecting them to rational discussion, but also their social institutions of law, polity and economy by subjecting them to rational criticism. In essence, it is within the context of the sociological idea of the open society that the ideal of maximum usage of critical rationality in shaping an open social order could be realized in practice: human actors apply the highest level of critical rationality to organize their social relations on the basis of the unfalsified beliefs shaping the rationalistic views of the universe and good life on the one hand, and open social institutions of law, polity and economy on the other. It is these rational beliefs that make an open society a “rational” society whose moral values and social institutions are held open to criticism and are not shown to be false by negatives reasons. At the end of this section, a comparison between the sociological ideal type of an open society and Popper’s idea of an open society would be insightful: (i)

First, while Popper’s idea of the open society is not concerned with the role of the metaphysical concept of the universe in an open society, the sociological ideal type of an open society devotes a central role to a “rationalistic worldview” in a metaphysical integration of individuals in the open society. (ii) Second, while there is no room for a shared meaning of the good life that prevents individuals from a war of all against all in Popper’s idea of the open society, the sociological ideal type of an open society allocates a significant role to the shared account of the good life in a normative integration of individuals in the open society. (iii) Third, while Popper’s idea of the open society is not dealt with the role of the equal rights to the good life in an open society, the sociological ideal type of an open society leads us to see that the institution of just law is a necessary component of the open society, not only for preventing individuals from egoistic behaviour, but also for engaging them in a social division of works to realize the ideal of good life for all. (iv) Fourth, while Popper’s idea of an open society views the democratic governance as a political system, which protects the open society,1 it does not connect democracy with the notion of a legitimate government using

100  The Open Society

monopoly of power to enforce the equal rights to the good life. However, the sociological ideal type of the open society implies that without the political institution of an open democracy, individuals would be unable to protect their equal rights to the good life. (v) Fifth, while Popper’s idea of an open society is not concerned with the role of an efficient mechanism of resource allocation in the realization of the ideal of the good life, which is to be defined in a close relation with the legal and political institutions of the open society,2 the sociological ideal type of an open society leads us to see that, without the creation of an open economy, in the context of the equal rights to the good life and open democracy, the needs of people’s good life wouldn’t be satisfied in practice. (vi) Finally, in contrast to Popper’s idea of the open society, in terms of a society setting free critical powers of humanity, the sociological ideal type of an open society integrates the metaphysical, moral, legal, political and economic aspects of an open society in one sociological construct in order to address the question of how the philosophy of critical rationalism is to be used to define the social meaning of an open society.

Notes 1 In The Open Society and the Democratic State, Popper (1963 [2012]: 240) points out: “I wish to make clear the distinction between a society and a state, and especially between the open society and the democratic state, the democratic form of government. By an open society, I mean a form of social life, such as freedom, tolerance, justice, the citizen’s free pursuit of knowledge, his right to disseminate knowledge, his free choice of values and beliefs, and his pursuit of happiness. By the democratic state, on the other hand, I mean a set of institutions, such as a constitution, a civil and criminal law, legislative and executive organs, such as the government and the rulers by which it is elected; the courts of justice, the civil service, the organs of public health, defence and so on . . . . the distinction is a very useful one, and of importance to all of us. The reason is that human freedom, and a free society of free individuals, and the emancipation of each individual, may all be considered as valuable in themselves; perhaps not as ultimate values, but at any rate as valuable in themselves. But the democratic state – that is, its constitution, the institutions of government, of elections, etc., should, I think, be considered as a means to an end; very important means to a very important end, but still, none of them an end in itself. I wish to propose here the thesis that the idea of a free and open society involves the demand that the state should exist for the sake of the human individual – for the sake of its free citizens and their free social life – that is, for the sake of the free society – and not the other way around”. These remarks indicate that, in Popper’s eyes, the democratic state is a necessary means for the protection of an open society. However, Popper does not argue about the relations between democracy and the equal rights to the good life on the one hand, and between the human rights and the meaning of the good life on the other. In brief, Popper does not link the role of democratic government in the open society with the open culture and law of the open society. However, the sociological idea of the open society integrates these aspects in a systematic way. 2 In regard to the place of market economy in the open society, Popper writes, “Personally, I do happen to believe that a free society will be superior to a closed society in

The Open Society  101 the fields of science and of economic productivity. . . . Personally, I believe that a free market economy is more efficient than a centrally planned economy; yet I hold that it is wrong to base the rejection of tyranny on economic arguments. Even if it were true that a centrally planned state economy is superior to that of the free market, I should oppose the centrally planned economy. I should oppose it because of the likelihood that it would increase the power of the state to the point of tyranny. It is not the inefficiency of communism against which we should fight but its inhumanity and its inherent hostility to liberty. We should not sell our freedom for a mess of pottage, or for the promise that we shall obtain the highest possible productivity and efficiency; not even if we could be sure that we can purchase efficiency at the price of liberty” (ibid.: 239). While Popper is right in emphasizing on the tension between a centrally planned economy and a democratic government, he does not deal with the question of how the very function of a free market ought to substantially be connected with the meaning of the good life on the one hand, and the equal rights to the good life on the other. In contrast, the sociological conception of an open society defines the place of a competitive economy in the open society due to its systematic connections with the meanings of the good life on the one hand, and with the just law and legitimate government on the other.

Bibliography Bartley, III, W.W. (1984) The Retreat to Commitment, 2nd edn. Chicago, Open Court. Hobbes, T. (1928) Leviathan. London, J.M. Dent & Sons. Jarvie, I.C. (2001) The Republic of Science: The Emergence of Popper’s Social View of Science 1935–1945. Atlanta, Amsterdam. Mayhew, L. (1984) “In Defense of Modernity: Talcott Parsons and the Utilitarian Tradition”. In: American Journal of Sociology, 89(6), pp. 1273–1305. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2021) Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Society, Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume I. London and New York, Routledge. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2022) “Critical Rationalism: An Epistemological Critique”. In Foundations of Science. Springer, pp. 1–32. Published Online: 23 June 2022, https://doi. org/10.1007/s10699-022-09847-z. Notturno, M.A. (2000) Science and the Open Society: The Future of Karl Popper’s Philosophy. Budapest, Central European University Press. Pralong, S. (1999) “Minima Moralia: Is There an Ethics of the Open Society?”. In: Popper’s Open Society, After 50 Years, the Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 128–145. Parsons, T. (1937 [1968]) The Structure of Social Action, Volume I: Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim. New York, Free Press. Popper, K.R. (1945 [2012]) The Open Society and Its Enemies. New One-Volume edn. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Popper, K.R. (1963 [2012]) “The Open Society and the Democratic State”. In: Shearmur, J. and Turner, P.N. (eds.) Karl Popper, After the Open Society, Selected Social and Political Writings. London, Routledge, pp. 231–248. Weber, M. (1968) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (eds.). Berkeley, University of California Press.

Chapter 5

The Formation of an Open Society A Sociological Theory

Introduction This chapter presents a sociological theory to address the question of how an open society comes into existence. Having the idea of an open society, which was proposed in the previous chapter, in mind, I want to apply the critical rationalist model of action to show how the actors’ highest level of openness to criticism allows them to enter into a moral dialogue for giving themselves “a rational meaning” of the good life due to the place, which is defined for man in their worldviews. Then, I shall argue that the highest level of critical rationality enables the actors to establish social institutions of law, polity and economy which are necessary for realizing the ideal of the good life in practice. In essence, this chapter applies the general theory of critical rationalism in order to show how the highest level of critical rationality lets individuals to give themselves an “open” social order, which not only leads them to a peaceful social order but also prepares them to shape a social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life for all. Chapter 5 proceeds in seven sections as follows: In Section I, I  shall briefly refer to the micro-foundation of the sociology of the open society. In Section II, the issue of how individuals’ highest level of critical rationality allows them to create a metaphysical foundation for the open society will be discussed. In ­Section III, I shall argue that, in the context of the open worldviews, individuals enter into a moral dialogue regarding the meaning of the good life. This moral dialogue would create a normative foundation for the open society on the basis of which people give themselves a “moral law” that makes the rise of a peaceful society possible. In Section IV, it will be argued that an agreement upon a set of common values is not suffice for preventing individuals from the war of all against all, and involving them in a social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life for all. Individuals should also enter into an “institution-building” process which can turn the ideal of the good life into a set of social institutions in the open society. The section is devoted to show how people use the highest level of critical rationality in order to legalize the moral ideal of the good life by the institution of the equal rights to the good life. In Section V, I shall follow this argument in order to show DOI: 10.4324/9781003027119-6

The Formation of an Open Society  103

how the critical rationality can enable individuals for achieving an institutional agreement upon the meaning of a legitimate government whose monopoly of power lets the open society have an executive mechanism for enforcing the just law. In Section VI, this argument will be followed by showing the reason why the formation of the open society requires another institution – that is a mechanism of resource allocation – which mobilizes the factors of production to satisfy the needs of people’s good life. Finally, Section VII will present a sociological analysis of the open society formation, which integrates the preceding arguments to address the question of how the open society comes into existence.

Section I: The Micro-Foundation for the Sociology of the Open Society While the micro-foundation of a sociological theory of the open society was presented in Chapter 3, in this section, I want to show that what would be the role of that micro-foundation in answering the question of how the open society comes into existence. To this goal, I shall briefly argue that how the stages of progress in critical rationality are to be applied to show that it is the highest level of critical rationality1 that enables us to find a solution for the problem of the open society formation. The Highest Level of Critical Rationality and the Open Society Formation If individuals are considered as “oversocialized actors”, in the sense that Dennis H. Wrong (1999) uses this term, who apply practical reason to orient their action goals to “a set of common values”, and preventing egoistic behaviour, then the question of how reason was used to create the common values, for the first time, would remain unanswered. Therefore, we may argue that “the origin” of social order has not been addressed on the basis of an oversocialized conception of the actor in modern sociology. However, the critical rationalist model of action enables us to see that the individuals’ actions shouldn’t merely be limited to their ordinarily actions, using reason to adapt their behaviours to a given system of values and institutions. In contrast, there is “an emancipatory type” of action, on the basis of which the actors, in term of thinkers-movements-masses, can apply the highest level of critical rationality in order to give themselves “a set of common values” for the first time and to build a set of “social institutions” of law, polity and economy for the first time. These moral values and social institutions, which people give themselves, enable them to build an open social order to realize the ideal of the good life for all. Having these considerations in mind, now we can raise the question of what would be the role of critical rationality in addressing the problem of how the open

104  The Formation of an Open Society

society comes into existence. If we bear in mind the three stages of progress in critical rationality, then we would realize that it is only at the third stage of such a progress – that is in the transition from the justificationist to non-justificationist critical rationalism – that individuals can use a non-justificational logic of criticism in order to rationalize their beliefs regarding the meanings of the universe, good life, just law, legitimate government and efficient economy on the basis of unfalsified conjunctures. This non-justificationist logic of criticism could be summarized as follows: if the premises, or inferences, of “a rational argument” are not shown to be false by negative reasons, then the conclusion of that rational argument should be known as an unfalsified belief. In other words, it is at the third stage of the progress in critical rationality that human actors would be capable of subjecting all their metaphysical and empirical beliefs to an “inter-subjective” criticism. And if they realize that the beliefs in question are not shown to be false by argument, then the critical rationality enables them to reach “rational agreements” upon the meanings of the universe, good life, just law, legitimate government and effective economy. An application of the highest level of critical rationality enables the human actors to be engaged in a social dialogue concerning the meanings of the universe and the good life on the one hand, and the notions of the social institutions of law, polity and economy on the other, which are necessary for the rise of an open society. Briefly, the highest level of critical rationality allows people to realize that if they admit that their beliefs regarding the meanings of the universe and good life “are not to be justified” by positive reasons, but rather “are to be refuted” by negative reasons, then they would be able to enter into an “inter-subjective” dialogue to see whether their metaphysical beliefs regarding the universe, or their moral beliefs regarding the good life, could be regarded “true beliefs” because such beliefs are not shown to be false by argument. Thus, the highest level of openness to criticism provides the human actors with “a cognitive capacity” which they require to shape a social dialogue to realize that how they can create an open social order.

Section II: The Open Society Formation: A Metaphysical Analysis From the first volume of this book, we know that our “ontological” beliefs regarding the meaning of the universe, due to the place which they define for man in the universe, significantly contribute to the rise of “a meaning of the good life” in society that is necessary for solving the problem of social order. It needs to be added that despite the degree of critical rationality that is used to solve the problem of social order, it is the access to critical rationality, which enables people to enter into an ontological debate regarding the meaning of the universe. However, to the extent which people activate their critical rationality, they could also improve the “rational content” of their ontological account of the universe and the place of man within such worldviews.

The Formation of an Open Society  105

Since the critical rationalist theory of society, as I proposed in the first volume of this book (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021), does not focus on “a special type” of social order, its analysis of the metaphysical mechanism of the social order formation does not rest to a specific level of the critical rationality which is used to develop the worldviews. But when such a general theory of social order is used to formulate a sociology of open social order, we require to show that how the metaphysical mechanism in question is to be analysed in relation with the highest level of critical rationality. It is here that the role of this level of critical rationality in shaping the metaphysical mechanism of the open society formation comes into the picture. The Highest Level of Critical Rationality and the Rationalistic Meaning of the Universe Briefly, when we argue that the highest level of critical rationality is to be activated in order to rationalize our worldviews, we mean that our ontological beliefs regarding the meaning of the universe should be held open to criticism to see whether negative reasons would refute the beliefs in question. Hence, a metaphysical claim regarding the universe is true (rational) if it is held open to criticism and is not shown to be false by argument. If this is so, we can identify an important role for the highest level of openness to criticism in the rationalization of our worldviews and the place which they give to man in the universe. As I shall argue in this chapter, a “place”, which an open worldview gives to man, would have a significant consequence for the rise of a rational meaning of the good life in the open society. A Rational Worldview and the Formation of an Open Society In order to address the questions of what a “rational world-view” is and how it contributes to the rise of an open society, I should first show the reason why a “dogmatic” worldview is actually a logical consequence of the uncritical rationalism. A “dogmatic (closed) world-view” is emerged when human actors claim that their ontological beliefs regarding the meaning of the universe are justifiable by positive reasons. In a simpler sense, they believe that their worldviews are infallible because the premises on which the concept of the universe is deduced could be shown to be true by argument. However, from the perspective of the critical rationalist, who uses the highest level of critical rationality, since the metaphysical beliefs cannot be proved by positive reasons, the uncritical rationalist leads to a dogmatic worldview upon which an improper meaning might be given to the person’s good life due to the place that is defined for man in such dogmatic view of the universe. Hence, the first step towards shaping a rational (open) worldview, as the metaphysical basis of the open society, is rejecting the dogmatic worldview because of its origin in the justified true belief account of knowledge.

106  The Formation of an Open Society

Before discussing about the metaphysical mechanism of the open society formation, I want to mention an important point regarding “the relation” between the worldviews and the place of man in the universe which can lead us to know how an ontological belief regarding the universe affects the meaning of the good life. In this line of thought, I should refer to Max Weber’s (1963: xxxv) argument, which implies that the metaphysical ideas give teleological meaning to man’s conceptions of himself and his place in the universe that “legitimate man’s orientations in and to the world and which give meaning to man’s various goals. Such ideas imply metaphysical and theological conceptions of cosmic and moral orders, as well as man’s position in relation to such wider orders”. In essence, Weber’s argument leads us to explore a connection between the worldviews and man’s conception of the good life due to the position that the worldviews give to man in the universe. Given these considerations, we can admit that the worldviews contribute to the rise of “common values” through the place they define for man’s in the universe. Having said that, now I want to argue that the separation of justification and criticism enables human actors to realize that using the highest level of critical rationality can lead them to a rational (open) worldview and a reasonable place for man in this worldview. In fact, the separation allows the rationalist to define his metaphysical beliefs on the basis of an unfalsified conjuncture by seeing whether the beliefs in question are shown to be false by negative reasons. The rise of an open worldview thus is the logical consequence of a metaphysical learning from negative reasons by the means of which people give themselves a rational meaning of the universe and the place of man within it. In essence, the rational (open) worldview is itself a “cultural institution”, which prepares the ground for the rise of a conception of the good life due to the place that it gives to man in the universe. In short, the metaphysical mechanism of the open society formation implies that if people, in terms of thinkers–movements– masses, activate the highest level of critical rationality, they would be able to agree upon “an open worldview” which supplies them an ontological basis for the open society. In fact, viewed from the sociological theory of the open society, this shared account of the universe plays an important role in integration of individuals in the open society. In brief, the open worldview is an “ontological concept” of the universe which an open society requires in order to come into existence.

Section III: The Moral Mechanism of an Open Society Formation As argued previously, the open worldviews lead individuals to “a place of man” in the universe, which has a significant consequence for defining the conception of man’s good life. Hence, the metaphysical aspect of the open society formation directly contributes to the rise of a moral dialogue regarding the meaning of the good life, which is necessary for solving the problem of an “open” social order. It should be noted that the rise of a rational conception of the good life enables

The Formation of an Open Society  107

individuals to internalize such an account of the good life in their personal identities, and this means that they would use “a rational basis” for defining the goals of their actions. And it is this “rational” basis of the actors’ goals, originating in the conception of the good life, that not only prevents them from a conflict of interests, but also engages them in a constructive social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life for all. Hence, we can argue that the formation of an open society needs a system of “rational values”, to which individuals should orient their action goals. However, how can individual be sure that the common values which they have given themselves are rested upon a rational meaning of the good life? Having said that, another question which is raised is that: how does the highest level of critical rationality enable the actors to reach a shared account of the good life? The answer is that like the metaphysical beliefs about the universe, the actors’ moral beliefs regarding the meaning of the good life could be refuted by negative reasons without involving in the infinite regress of proofs. While our theories of the good life cannot be justified by positive reasons, they might be refuted by negative reasons. Given these considerations, we can now explore how the highest level of critical rationality enables individuals entering into a moral dialogue regarding the meaning of the good life due to their rational worldviews. It is worthy of note that “a rational account” of the good life cannot be the result of a moral dialogue, which is shaped based on the dogmatic rationalism. Hence, differentiating the rationalistic ethics from the dogmatic one would be helpful for understanding of the moral mechanism of the open society formation. While the dogmatic rationalism leads to a justificationist ethics on the basis of which people can claim that their accounts of the good life are provable, human actors who activate the highest level of critical rationality cannot admit such a dogmatic view of the good life, realizing that a moral belief, like a scientific hypothesis, shouldn’t be justified in order to be true. If knowledge is not defined as justified true belief, then the rationality of our conception of the good life shouldn’t be defended on the basis of a dogmatic ethics. In other sense, whereas the demand for justification involves the infinite regress, a dogmatic understanding of the good life faces the same regress. The arguments so far lead us to this insight: activating the highest level of critical rationality allows the actors to see that a rational conception of the good life should not be justified by positive reasons in order to be true. Hence, “a rationalistic” ethics is to be used to define the meaning of the good life. The critical rationalist, who considers the rational belief in terms of the unfalsified conjuncture, can argue that, instead of justifying a moral claim regarding the good life by argument, with separating justification and criticism in moral philosophy, we would be able to replace the demand of a justified account of the good life with the demand of an unfalsified account of it. The moral mechanism of the open society formation refers to a normative learning from criticism through which the highest level of critical rationality is

108  The Formation of an Open Society

used by the actors in order to enter into an “inter-subjective” dialogue on the meaning of the good life which leads them to a rational account of the good life which is “common” to all. The rise of this rational account of the good life is possible when the demand for justification is replaced with the demand for criticism. If “rationality” means that our moral beliefs are “rational” to the extent that their premises are not shown to be false by argument, then our conception of the good life would be rationalized by using same reading of the rational beliefs. Inspired by the highest level of critical rationality, human actors can contribute to the moral mechanism of the open society formation. To this objective, they should open their accounts of the good life to an “inter-subjective” criticism, agreeing upon a conception of the good life which is not shown to be false by argument. A rational concept of the good life, which might emerge through this open dialogue, enables individuals to give themselves a system of values they require to define the goals of their actions in order to not only control the egoistic behaviours, but also shape a social cooperation to realize the ideal of the good life for all. This ethics of openness to criticism has received an attention. For instance, Jeremy Shearmur (1990: 117) points out, In Popper’s reinterpretation of the Kantian theme, each individual is to be valued as a source of possible criticism. A concern for the worth of the individual and for his autonomy is, in this way, rooted in epistemological concerns; concerns which extend into what might be called the epistemology of ethics. In the same line of thought, Sandra Pralong (2003: 139) writes, I believe this method for moral decision-making to be faithful to the Popperian spirit in several ways. First, it requires critical thinking and makes use of falsifiability – we advance in our knowledge of what’s right by trial and error. . . . As a way to improve ethical standards, this negative golden rule, just like Popper’s scientific methodology, call for (ethical) conjecture and refutation. It works as follows: as we’re about to act, or to make a moral choice, we first conjecture that what we are about to do is good. But to test the validity of our claim, we attempt to refute it by applying what might be called the “acid test of self-infliction”: how would we react if we did to ourselves whether we plan to do to others, or if someone else did that to us? If the answer fails to deter us from the action, then we may proceed, the standard holds – but only in this situation. In other cases, the appropriateness – or “truth” – of the standard needs to be tested again. Thus each new situation calls for new conjectures and new tests of their refutation. Validating these remarks, however, I have used the notion of the highest level of critical rationality in order to show that the meaning of the good life may be

The Formation of an Open Society  109

rationalized in a non-justificationist manner, which cannot be discussed by the Popperian reading of the ethics of openness to criticism. The non-justificational epistemology implies that: not only can we subject our scientific hypotheses to empirical refutation, but also we would be able to subject our “moral claims” to logical criticism, seeing whether they are shown to be false by argument. Indeed, the highest level of critical rationality enables the actors to say to each other: I may be wrong in my reading of the good life, you may be right in your account of the good life, let us open the premises of our conceptions of the good life to mutual criticism, agreeing on a conception of the good life which is held open to inter-subjective criticism, but is not shown to be false by negative reasons. This logical way of moral dialogue implies that the rise of “a rational conception” of the good life is possible. The moral mechanism of the open society formation refers to the emergence of such a rational account of the good life shaping the ethics of openness to criticism. Hence, it wouldn’t be unfair to say that, without the notion of the highest level of critical rationality, the sociology of the open society is unable to argue that individuals have the capacity of participating at a moral learning from error, which is necessary for the rise of a normative consensus on the meaning of the good life, as a moral solution to the problem of open social order. The emergence of an ethics of “openness to criticism”, through which a rational concept of the good life might be shaped, provides the open society with a cultural institution it requires to integrate its individual members through orientating the goals of their actions to the shared concept of the good life. Sociologically speaking, the metaphysics of the open worldviews and the ethics of openness to criticism shape the culture foundations of the open society. However, the process of shaping the open society needs to additional mechanisms, one of which is a legal mechanism, shall be discussed in the next section.

Section IV: The Open Society Formation: A Legal Analysis While the metaphysical and moral mechanisms of shaping an open society lead us to see what a culture of the open society means, the sociologist of the open society should tell us how such a cultural foundation contributes to the emergence of “a just law” in the open society which is necessary for a legal integration of individuals in the society in question. Hence, the sociological theory of the open society should introduce legal mechanism of shaping an open society. The Highest Access to Critical Rationality and the Concept of Just Law If individuals can apply the highest level of openness to criticism in order to find the metaphysical and moral solutions to the problem of open social order, why

110  The Formation of an Open Society

shouldn’t they use such an openness in order to legalize the meanings of the universe and good life by the means of “a just law” that provides them with an equal right to the opportunity of the good life? From this angle of vision, I argue that, if human actors activate the highest level of critical rationality, they would be able to give themselves a “rational” system of laws, which is necessary for preventing them from the state of war. The human actor may establish such a rationalistic reading of just law on the basis of the ontological and moral consensuses which they have already made concerning the meanings of the universe and good life. Having said that, the legal mechanism of shaping the open society could be analysed in the following way: when human actors hold open their legal beliefs about the meaning of the just law to mutual criticism, they would be able to agree regarding a concept of just law, which is not shown to be false by argument. The conception of just law, which will be emerged through such a legal dialogue, would be a “rational” account of just law providing individuals with the equal rights to the opportunity of the good life. Viewed from the perspective of non-justificationist epistemology, the replacement of the demand for justification with the demand for criticism “enables” individuals to enter into a “legal dialogue” about the meaning of the equal rights to the good life and its logical upshots for the idea of just law because, from the beginning, the actors can utilize the highest level of critical rationality to subject the idea of the equal rights to the good life to rational criticism to see whether it is shown to be false by negative reasons.2 If this critical rationalist approach to the philosophy of law is kept in mind, then the legal mechanism of the rise of open society could be analysed. In order to elaborate on this analysis, it should be added that, in such a legal dialogue, individuals employ their shared account of the good life to provide a moral basis for defining the idea of just law. This moral basis is to be interpreted in the following way: the concept of the good life itself implies that “all persons” should have a “natural right” to the good life because their equal access to critical rationality has enabled them to give themselves that account of the good life. Hence, the “legal” meaning of the term “equality” should originate from the “moral equality” of all human beings due to their access to critical rationality. Having said that, if the conception of the good life is defined on the basis of unfalsified moral beliefs, then the rationality of moral consensus in the open society is transformed into its legal system, and the idea of equal rights to the good life will be established on an accurate reading of the good life. Hence, the resultant legal institution of just law enables the open society to realize the ideal of the equal rights to the opportunity of the good life by the means of which individuals are prevented from egoistic behaviours, in terms of the legal obligations which the just law creates for their actions. In addition, such a rational law allows the open society to encourage its individual members for participating at a social division of works which is necessary for realizing the ideal of the good life for all.

The Formation of an Open Society  111

Section V: The Political Mechanism of the Open Society Formation With the legal institution of the just law in mind, the next question for a sociology of the open society would be that how people use the highest level of critical rationality to shape the political mechanism of the open society formation. The role of critical rationality in this case would not logically be different from the role it has played in the moral and legal mechanisms of the open society formation. When the human actors realize that the just law of the open society wouldn’t be enforced without the existence of “an executive power”, which has the monopoly of the force at hand, they would come to create a political system that uses the power on behalf of them in order to execute the just law of the open society. In order to build a “legitimate” government, operating on behalf of people, to realize the ideal of just law in the open society, the human actors ought to employ the highest level of critical rationality to agree on the meaning of political legitimacy. To this end, they should hold open their “political beliefs”, regarding the concept of a legitimate government, to criticism, agreeing upon an account of legitimacy which is not shown to be false by negative reasons. This political agreement would be “rational” because it is defended by argument. Thus, the political mechanism of the open society formation refers to a dialogue through which people establish a legitimate government. We can argue that the result of such a political dialogue would be “an open democracy” shaping the political order of the open society. This open democracy is “legitimate” because people have agreed that it should be a political power which can use the monopoly of force on behalf of them to enforce the just law of the open society. An important question with regard to the political mechanism of the open society formation will be raised as follows: is there a logical relation between the equal rights to the opportunity of the good life on the one hand, and the political mechanism of the open society formation on the other? The answer is positive: in order to address this relation, we should find an input of the just law for the meaning of political legitimacy. Briefly, it can be said that if the notion of a legitimate government means that individuals should have “equal” powers of the selfdetermination of their government, the meaning of the term “equality” here is to be interpreted within the legal context of the equal rights to the good life. In this way, not only can we see how the notion of the just law contributes to the idea of legitimate government, but also we may realize how the function of a legitimate government ought to be defined in terms of its contribution to the realization of the ideal of the good life for all.

Section VI: The Open Society Formation: An Economic Analysis An economic mechanism of the open society formation is to be analysed due to the culture of the open society on the one hand, and the legal and political

112  The Formation of an Open Society

institutions of it on the other. Like any society, an open society requires a mechanism of resource allocation which mobilizes scarce factors of production to meet the needs of people’s good life. Having said that, the economic mechanism of the open society formation can be discussed from two angles of vision: viewed from the demand side, the consumer’s utility preferences originate in his definition of the good life. Hence, the rationality of the preferences for goods and services originates in the truth of those moral beliefs upon which the concept of the good life is defined. Viewed from the supply side, the supply of the factors of production by economic enterprises is shaped due to the property rights, which the legal system has defined for them on the one hand, and due to the executive capacity of government for enforcing those property rights on the other. Therefore, the institutions of the good life, just law and good government contribute to the demand and supply sides of economy in the open society. If this is so, the mechanism of resource allocation, which is the natural result of the laws of supply and demand, is affected by the cultural, legal and political institutions of the open society. In order to give themselves the laws of supply and demand and shaping an effective mechanism of resource allocation for the rise of an open society, the economic actors ought to activate the highest level of critical rationality in order to benefit from a learning from error. In this learning process, the economic actors hold their economic beliefs regarding “the meaning of economic efficiency” to mutual criticism to see whether the meaning of efficiency in question might be shown to be false by negative reasons. In this way, the economic learning would lead the actors to a “rational” mechanism of using the factors of production to meet the needs of people’s good life. In other words, people use the highest level of critical rationality in order to give themselves the laws of supply and demand for the creation of a competitive economy in the open society. These rational laws of supply and demand, that shape a spontaneous mechanism of “relative prices”, lead the open society to an “efficient” mechanism of resource allocation, in terms of a “competitive” market, which is efficient from two perspectives: viewed from the supply side, the equal rights to the good life on the one hand and the good government on the other make an effective use of the production factors by this mechanism possible because those legal and political institutions are shaped on the basis of unfalsified conjunctures. Viewed from the demand side, the rational account of the good life shapes the consumers’ preferences for goods and services, making them rational. Since the supply of production factors and the demand for goods and services are rationalized in the social context of the open society, the spontaneous function of “relative prices” leads the economy of the open society to “rational prices” for the goods and services, on the one hand, and to “rational rate of return” for the production factors on the other. The result of this competitive (open) economy would be an efficient allocation of the factors of production to the needs of people’s good life.

The Formation of an Open Society  113

Section VII: The Rise of an Open Society: A Macro-Sociological Analysis To present a sociological theory of the open society, the five mechanisms of the open society formation, namely the metaphysical, moral, legal, political and economic ones, should be integrated into a “macro-sociological analysis”. In this way, a sociological solution will be offered to the problem of how the open society comes into existence. Before entering into my main argument, I would like to quote some remarks from Ignatieff and Roch (2018: 6–7) in Rethinking Open Society regarding the relationship between epistemology and the idea of open society: One critical aspect of open society thinking was the connection that Popper drew between the epistemology of a free society and its morality of tolerance. As a philosopher and a historian of science, Popper believed that the key practice that keeps a society free is the scientific method, the constant falsification of theory through systematic reality testing. His attack on totalizing political ideologies derived from this epistemological and also moral conviction that all theory is conditional, provisional, and must give way when falsified by the facts . . . . From that epistemology Popper developed an ethic of tolerance. If all theory was conditional upon falsification, no one was in sole or exclusive possession of the truth. If we know we can be wrong, it pays to listen to others, to tolerate, even welcome views that diverge from whatever theory or political or moral values we happen to hold. Since our relationship to facts is or ought to be an individual relationship, dependent upon our free minds alone, we have an obligation to get reality, our conception of it, right for us. Constitutional liberalism entrenches this epistemology within its very institutions. Having these remarks in mind, I want to show that a macro-sociological theory of the open society creates a new relationship between the epistemology of the open society and its moral values and social institutions. Unlike Popper’s epistemology, my non-justificational epistemology leads to a theory of rationality which implies an access to the highest level of critical rationality enables people to subject their moral beliefs regarding the good life to criticism in order to see whether the beliefs in question are shown to be false by argument. Thereby, the sociological theory of the open society can show that it is the highest level of critical rationality that enables individuals to give themselves a set of common values, which is necessary to build an open society. As I have argued in the previous chapters, Popper’s epistemology of critical rationalism does not allow him to provide a sociological analysis of the open society formation because, from the start, it defines critical rationality in terms of irrational faith in reason. In addition, in The Open Society, Popper (1945 [2012]) does not argue about the role of a moral consensus upon the meaning of the good life in shaping the ideas

114  The Formation of an Open Society

of an equal right to the good life, an open democracy which uses the monopoly of power to enforce the just law, and an efficient economy, which mobilize scarce resources to meet the needs of people’s good life. In contrast, the sociological analysis of the open society addresses the question of how the culture of the open society contributes to the rise of the social institutions of law, polity and economy in this society. The sociology of the open society is “a sociological theory” which aims to address the question of how the open society comes into existence. Briefly, it addresses the question in the following manner: if the meaning of the term “social” in the ideal type of an open society is to be interpreted in terms of a set of “common” values and social institutions, the normative theory of the open society should tell us how the highest level of critical rationality is to be activated by human actors not only for enabling them to agree on a meaning of the good life, but also for empowering them to turn the moral ideal of the good life into the social institutions of just law, legitimate government and effective economy. Having said that, the first stage in the formation of an open society refers to the rise of an ontological consensus regarding the meaning of the universe, according to which the question of what is the place of man in the universe will find an answer. The normative sociology of the open society implies that since the metaphysical beliefs regarding the meaning of the universe could be held open to criticism, the critical rationality enables open-minded people to establish the metaphysics of the open society on the basis of those beliefs, which are not shown to be false by argument. Viewed from the lens of critical rationalism, an open society should be created on the basis of a rational worldview, which defines a true place for man in the universe. And, it is upon the basis of this place of man in the universe that people build the moral foundation for the open society because the meaning of the good life in the open society originates in the place which the rational worldview give to man in the universe. I have argued so far that the sociological theory of the open society leads us to “a philosophical solution” to the problem of how an open social order comes into existence. However, this solution is to be developed to “a moral solution” for the problem in question. To this end, the second stage of the open society formation might be defined as follows: the human actors, in terms of thinkers-movementsmasses, activate their highest level of openness to criticism in order to define the meaning of the good life, at the core of their common values, on the basis of the place, which the metaphysics of the open society devotes to man in the universe. In this line of thought, they would enter into “a moral leaning from error” in which they have opened up their beliefs regarding the meaning of the good life to mutual criticism in order to discover a rational conception of the good life, which is not shown to be false by negative reasons. This moral dialogue leads them to an “ethics of openness to criticism” as a normative solution to the problem of open social order. It should be emphasized that it is the non-justificational epistemology of critical rationalism that leads the sociological theory of the open society to its normative

The Formation of an Open Society  115

solution for the problem of social order. People who have given themselves a system of common values, in terms of a rational conception of the good life, contribute to the rise of an open social order because the moral law that governs their daily actions does not allow them to pursue their self-interests egoistically, and hence the rise of a war of all against all would be preventable. More importantly, the moral agreement enables individuals to shape a social division of works to meet the needs of the good life for all. At this level of argument, the theory of the open society provides us with “a normative” solution to the problem of the open society formation. However, this normative solution wouldn’t be enough and should be completed with “an institutional” solution. At the next level, the theory of the open society will argue how the highest level of critical rationality is to be employed to turn the common values of the open society into a set of social institutions of law, polity and economy. The sociological theory of the open society attempts to create logical relations between the meaning of the good life and the idea of a just law on the one hand, and between the concept of just law and the notions of legitimate government and efficient economy on the other. These logical relations enable the theory to be “a macro-sociological theory”. It relates the basic values of the open society with its institutional structure. The sociology of the open society uses the input of “rational worldview” in order to tell us that moral capital of the open society – a rational meaning of the good life – should be considered in the context of the place that the metaphysics of the open society gives to man in the universe. And this moral capital is to be utilized to provide the open society with a legal capital – that is an open law. However, how does the moral capital contribute to the notion of just law? The answer is that in the idea of equal rights to the good life, which defines the content of just law, the very term of “equal” rights refers to “equal opportunity” of having the “good” life. Hence, it is the meaning of the term “good” in the conception of the good life that shapes to the very content of the term “equality” in the notion of the just law. Having said that, the third stage in the process of the open society formation refers to “a legal learning from error”. When people activate their highest level of critical rationality to see what should be the meaning of the just law, which aims to realize the moral ideal of equal rights to the good life, they ought to hold open their legal claims regarding the just law to criticism, agreeing on “a notion of the just law” that is not shown to be false by argument. The result of this legal learning would be a “rational understanding” of the just law. However, although the rise of this legal capital enables the open society to institutionalize the ethics of the openness to criticism, it does mean that “the moral ideal of the good life for all” will be realized just by making it “the constitution” of the open society. From this departure point, the sociological theory of open society comes to argue that the legal capital of just law should be used to define a political system for the open society: an open democracy. In the fourth stage of the open society formation, the normative theory of the open society defines the relation between the notion of just law and the concept of

116  The Formation of an Open Society

legitimate government. While human actors know that the constitution of the open society requires an executive power to use the monopoly of force for enforcing the just law of open society, they should define their understanding of a legitimate government. The just law of the open society provides them with an insight: if the notion of legitimate government is to be meant in terms of a government, which recognizes an “equal” power for all persons to determine their own government, the notion of “equality” in such a political understanding of legitimacy must be defined in a close relationship with the idea of the “equal” rights to the good life. Thus, from an open society viewpoint, a legitimate government is “a government” that gives all citizens an “equal political power” to determine the government. The sociological theory of the open society then argues that through the mechanism of “a political learning from error”, people can give themselves an open democracy because when they activate the highest level of critical rationality, they will realize that the openness of their “political belief” to criticism may lead them to a rational account of legitimacy, which is not shown to be false by negative reasons. In this way, they can create a democratic political order for their open society. In order to address the fifth stage of the open society formation, the normative theory of the open society argues that the meaning of the good life contributes to the demand side of economy, and the concepts of just law and legitimate government contribute to the supply side of economy. The mechanism of competitive markets, operating via the laws of supply and demand, allocates the factors of production to the needs of people’s good life. Viewed from the demand side, such a competitive economy would be “efficient” because the consumers’ preferences for goods and services originate from “a rational account” of the good life. And, viewed from the supply side, such an open economy is “efficient” because it mobilizes the factors of production to produce the goods and services due to their contributions to meet the real needs of the good life. Taking into account the demand and supply sides of an open economy, the mechanism of competitive markets leads the open society to “an efficient” allocation of scarce resources to the needs of people’s good life. In summary, the macro-sociological theory of the open society argues that if people activate the highest level of critical rationality, they would be able to give themselves a set of common values and social institutions which are necessary for the rise of an open social order. This “rational society” creates a social division of works that can mobilize citizens’ potentials to realize the ideal of the good life for all. At the end of this chapter, I should like to refer to William Bartley’s insightful passage in The Retreat to Commitment. Bartley (1984: 113) points out, How can our intellectual life and institutions be arranged so as to expose our beliefs, conjectures, policies, positions, sources of ideas, traditions, and the like – whether or not they are justifiable – to maximum criticism, in order to counteract and eliminate as much intellectual errors as possible? In effect,

The Formation of an Open Society  117

we shall attempt to learn from our mistakes, to adapt to the unforeseen and unanticipated. The sociological theory of the open society, which was presented in this chapter, provides us with an answer to the Bartley’s question by making a “systematic attempt” to use the non-justificational philosophy of critical rationalism to explain how an open society comes into existence. In the next chapter, I will use this nonjustificational philosophy in order to address the question of how a closed society comes into existence. In this way, I will pave the way for my normative analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society in this volume.

Notes 1 In regard to the role of reason in the formation of human action, I should like to add this point that, according to Carl Jung, reason is only one of driving forces of action because we should take into account the roles of the unconscious factors in human action. As pointed out by Jung (1957: 14–15): “Most people confuse ‘self-knowledge’ with knowledge of their conscious ago personalities. Anyone who has ego-consciousness at all takes it for granted that he knows himself. But the ego knows only its own contents, not the unconscious and its contents. People measure their self-knowledge by what the average person in their social environment knows of himself, but not by the real psychic facts which are for the most part hidden from them”. In fact, Jung argues that the existence of an unconscious mind refers to this point that human action cannot be determined by the conscious part of human psyche alone. Jung also writes: “Our rational philosophy does not bother itself with whether the other person in us, pejoratively described as the ‘shadow,’ is in sympathy with our conscious plans and intentions. Evidently it does not know that we carry in ourselves a real shadow whose existence is grounded in our instinctual nature” (ibid.: 95). But it should be kept in mind that Jung’s definition of reason in modern age is limited to “the scientific rationality”. As pointed out by Jung: “Since self-knowledge is a matter of getting to know the individual facts, [scientific] theories help very little in this respect. For the more a theory lays claim to universal validity, the less capable it is of doing justice to the individual facts. Any [scientific] theory based on experience is necessarily statistical; that is to say, it formulates an ideal average which abolishes all exceptions at either end of the scale and replaces them by an abstract man” (ibid.: 16). These remarks indicate that Jung follows “a justificational reading” of the scientific rationality upon which the universal validity of a “theory” needs to be proved by positive reasons, rather than by negative reasons. Hence, not only is Jung wrong in saying that a scientific theory must be justified in order to be true, but also he makes another mistake by limiting the modern man’s conception of rationality to the scientific reasoning. However, Jung might admit that, since we can offer a scientific theory in order to explain how the unconscious part of our psyche affects our behaviours, we would be able to know that how the unconscious part of our psyche contributes the formation of our actions. In addition, it should be kept in mind that Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious itself should be considered as a conjecture, which might be false because of its justificational method of proving the very idea of “collective unconscious” by positive reasons. Thus, I argue that it is our access to critical rationality that enables us to formulate a theory regarding the unconscious part of our psyche. Thus, the unconscious part might be known to the extent that it is understood by our critical reason. If so, the role of the unconscious factors in the formation of human action would be manageable by the conscious part of our psyche – that is critical reason.

118  The Formation of an Open Society 2 In “The Law as Justification: A Critical Rationalist Analysis”, Michael F. Duggan (2010: 149) writes: “This article looks at the Problem of Justification in the law by examining the question of whether jurists and trial attorneys present affirmative reasons in support of their positions and theories, or if they attempt to test them critically as with the deductive component of the scientific method known as falsification. If the opinions of judges and the arguments of counsel are merely attempts to verify or justify their conclusions, then what might be done to remedy this troubling state of affairs?” This passage leads us to realize that a non-justificational legal reasoning is to be seen in terms of holding legal beliefs open to criticism and seeing whether the beliefs in question are shown to be false by negative reasons.

Bibliography Bartley, III, W.W. (1984) The Retreat to Commitment, 2nd edn. Chicago, Open Court. Duggan, M.F. (2010) “The Law as Justification: A Critical Rationalist Analysis”. In: North Dakota Law Review, 86(1), pp. 149–169. Ignatieff, M. and Roch, S. (eds.) (2018) Rethinking Open Society, New Adversaries and New Opportunities. Budapest and New York, Central European University Press. Jung, C.G. (1957) The Undiscovered Self, Hull, R.F.C. (trans.). New York and Ontario, A Mentor Book. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2021) Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Society, Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume I. London and New York, Routledge. Popper, K.R. (1945 [2012]) The Open Society and Its Enemies. New One-Volume edn. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Pralong, S. (2003) “Minima Moralia: Is There an Ethics of the Open Society?”. In: Popper’s Open Society, After 50 Years, the Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 128–145. Shearmur, J. (1990) “Epistemological Limits of the State: Reflections on Popper’s Open Society”. In: Political Studies, XXXVIII, pp. 116–125. Weber, M. (1963) The Sociology of Religion, Fischoff, E. (trans.). Boston, Beacon Press. Wrong, D.H. (1999) The Oversocialized Conception of Man. New Brunswick, Transaction.

Chapter 6

The Formation of a Closed Society A Sociological Theory

Introduction This chapter applies the critical rationalist model of action in order to formulate a sociological theory of the closed society. It argues that, while, when people activate the highest level of critical rationality to solve the problem of social order, they create an “open” social order upon the basis of unfalsified beliefs, and when they apply the lowest level of critical rationality they build a “closed” social order upon the basis of justified true beliefs. In order to present a sociological theory of the closed society, the chapter attempts to answer the following questions: (a) “what is a closed society?” and (b) “how does it come into existence?”. In so doing, it proceeds as follows. First, it addresses the question of how the critical rationalist model of action supplies the sociology of the closed society with “a new micro-foundation”. Second, it shows that how the justified true belief account of knowledge shapes the epistemology of the closed society. Third, it introduces five mechanisms of the closed society formation.

Section I: The Critical Rationalist Model of Action and the Sociology of the Closed Society In this section, I want to show that how the critical rationalist model of action should be used to develop “a micro-foundation” for a sociological theory of the closed society. To this end, I shall proceed as follows: (i) a study of how the critical rationalist model of action helps us to define the problem of a closed social order, (ii) an examination of how the critical rationalist model contributes to a solution for the problem of social order, and (iii) a study of how this model of action situates us in a better position, in comparison with Popper’s model of action, to suggest a micro-foundation for a sociological theory of the closed society. The Critical Rationalist Model of Action and the Problem of a Closed Social Order If sociological theory of the closed society should address the questions of what a closed social order is and how it comes into existence, the micro-foundation of this sociological theory ought to be cleared. DOI: 10.4324/9781003027119-7

120  The Formation of a Closed Society

From a sociological viewpoint, this micro-foundation should be able to tell us how individuals’ access to critical rationality enables them to define the problem of social order, giving themselves those values and institutions which are necessary for solving that problem. It should be emphasized that a human society, either an open society or a closed one, requires “a system” of common values and institutions to organize its individual members, as if not only could the war of all against all be prevented, but also a social division of works could be shaped to realize the ideal of the good life for all. In essence, the difference between a “closed” and an “open” society does not refer to the existence of “common” values and institutions through which the problem of social order is to be solved. In contrast, the difference refers to “the quality” of those common values and institutions; that is, whether or not they are “rational” values and institutions. Hence, from a sociological standpoint, the meaning of the term “social” in both concepts of the closed and open societies is to be interpreted in terms of “common” values and institutions upon which the problem of social order would be solved. In the open society, the rise of the common values and institutions is originated in the highest level of critical rationality, and in the closed society, the rise of common values and institutions is originated in the lowest level of critical rationality. If it is “the low level” of critical rationality that leads to the dogmatic content of the “common” values and institutions in the closed society, upon which the problem of social order has been solved, then the role of the critical rationalist model of action in the definition of problem of a closed social order should also be seen in close relationship with “the low level” of openness to criticism. If this is so, the problem of a close social order could be formulated as follows: how do human actors use the low level of critical rationality to give themselves those common values and social institutions, which are necessary for managing their egoistic pursuit of self-interests and shaping a social division of works to realize their ideal of the good life? In order to develop my argument regarding the role of the low level of openness to criticism in defining and solving the problem of closed social order, I shall require to briefly refer to the stages of the growth in critical rationality and its important upshots for the micro-foundation of a sociological theory of the closed society. The Growth in Critical Rationality and the Model of Human Action As argued in Chapter 4 of the present volume, the theory of the growth of critical rationality advances the critical-rationalist model of action by arguing that there is “a key relationship” between “the levels” of the activation of critical reason by individuals and their “cognitive capacity” for the evaluation of “a claim of rational belief”. Putting it differently, to the extent that one holds open his claims

The Formation of a Closed Society  121

of rational beliefs to criticism to see whether they are shown to be false by argument, he improves his critical rationality. Given this notion of the growth of critical rationality, we can argue that, when the actor is a “dogmatic rationalist”, the level of critical rationality he uses is defined by the uncritical rationalism, hence he would claim that “a moral law”, which he has given himself, in order to govern his action, is a justified law by positive reasons and cannot be questioned. Hence, it is not surprise that when the actors define rationality in the context of dogmatic rationalism, the low level of critical rationality is activated, which enables them to solve the problem of social order by a “dogmatic moral law” that they give themselves. It should be kept in mind that, in the context of the stages of progress in critical rationality, the rise of irrationalism and its transformation into the dogmatic rationalism might be called as the applications of “a low level” of critical rationality. Hence, I shall apply the very term “the low level” of critical rationality to show that when people define “reason” in terms of the irrationalism or dogmatic rationalism, the nature of their social dialogue regarding the meanings of the universe, good life and social institutions follows the “same accounts” of rationality. It is worthy of note that the idea of rationality in terms of “a degree” to which an individual is open to criticism has been recognized by some of Popper’s students: for instance as pointed out by John Wettersten (2006: 254): When Popper’s students began developing new theories of rationality and new philosophical anthropological views based on them, they sought to generalize the new fallibilist theory of science. . . . If rationality is fallible, Joseph Agassi (1977) observed, it must also be partial. No individual or group can ever achieve some perfect system. We shall always have pieces of systems or various theories of this or that, which may or may not fit together. Rationality is an unending process of adjustment and not the creation of a (final) system. This view has the consequence that all individuals are rational to this or that degree. . . . We are all critical to a degree and being critical is crucial to rationality. Those who wish to increase their degree of rationality choose to increase the quality – not necessarily the severity – of their critical methods. This is a project that all humans can and do follow to this degree or that, since all are partially rational and all can see some circumstances in which more effective thought would be advantageous. While these remarks indicate that the rationality, in terms of “openness to criticism”, is a matter of degree, the general theory of critical rationalism, which was presented in the first volume of this book, enables us to see how “logic” allows us to realize that the individual’s potential access to critical rationality is improvable through learning from those premises and inferences which are shown to be false by negative reasons. Due to this reason, I shall argue that “the low level” of openness to criticism, which is reflected, for instance, in the dogmatic rationalism, can shape a micro-foundation for a new sociological theory of the closed society.

122  The Formation of a Closed Society

It is noteworthy that, according to Wettersten (2006: 253), Popper’s theory of the closed society deems rationality to be contrary to man’s natural inclinations. Man has to struggle steadily to become and remain rational. . . . In opposition to the innate desire to return to the closed society Popper had nothing more to offer than the painful decision to be rational. He had no rational moral foundation to which he could appeal. He could appeal only to human sympathy and the wish to avoid barbarism. Popper’s moral exhortations are jarring. They are emotional and they come from a man who advocates the critical use of reason as an antidote to the emotional appeal of the closed society. [Emphasis added] While Popper’s critical rationalism is defined as irrational faith in reason, it does not lead to “a theory” of rationality, addressing the stages of progress in critical rationality. Given this point, the theory of the closed society which Popper presents does not use the idea of rationality in terms of “a degree” of openness to criticism to address the role of reason in the closed society formation. However, since I want to formulate the sociological theory of the closed society on the basis of the critical rationalist model of action, which is enriched by the idea of the stages of progress in critical rationality, the low level of critical rationality, or “the low degree of openness to criticism”, ought to be linked with the micro-foundation of such a sociological theory.1 Briefly, a sociological theory of the closed society applies the critical rationalist model of action in order to explain why people, who have activated the low level of openness to criticism, claim that the meanings of the universe and good life they have given themselves are unquestionable and free of mistake. The legal, political and economic institutions of the closed society also attempt to use such “dogmatic accounts” of the universe and good life in order to protect people from struggle for power and wealth. However, due to the dogmatic nature of such common values and institutions, which closed-minded people have given themselves, the resultant social order cannot realize the ideal of a peaceful and just social order because, from an epistemological perspective, such a closed social order is involved in the problem of the regress of justification. The Critical Rationalist Model of Action Versus Popper’s Model of Action As argued in Chapter 2 of the present volume, I have criticized Popper’s model of action mainly because of its origin in the justificational approach to critical rationalism, reflected in the idea of irrational faith in reason. Due to such a critique, the main problem with Popper’s model of action2 is that the meaning of the term “rational” is defined in terms of the justified true belief account of knowledge. My intention for the creation of this link between Popper’s critical rationalism and

The Formation of a Closed Society  123

the justificationist epistemology was showing that Popper’s (1945 [2012]) irrational faith in reason originates in the sceptic’s critique of the uncritical rationalism, resting on the premise of knowledge as justified true belief (Mohammadi Alamuti 2022: 12–21). As is known from the previous arguments, since this justificational account of knowledge involves infinite regress, the theory of rationality, which equates rationality with justification, would suffer from the same regress and cannot address the question of how reason operates and evolves. However, when the demand for justification is replaced with the demand for criticism, “rationality” would be equated with “openness to criticism”. The general theory of critical rationalism defines the term “rationality” in the sense of “a cognitive capacity” of learning from “negative reasons”, which refute our claims of rational beliefs. Due to the degree of his openness to criticism, one could learn from the mistaken premises, or inferences, which are used for offering the claims of rational beliefs. In the light of these insights, the general theory of critical rationalism leads us to see that not only is “a rational belief” possible, but it also would be possible to speak of “a rational belief” in reason, because the idea of rationality as openness to criticism allows us to subject our rational belief to criticism, and if this belief is not shown to be false by argument, it would be “rational”. As I have argued before, this non-justificational concept of rationality does not involve the infinite regress of proofs (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021). And, if this is so, the question of how reason operates could be addressed accurately. Thus, a model of rational action, which is defined on the basis of this non-justificationist reading of reason, could tell us why the access to critical reason enables human actors to determine the goals of their actions and the means which are necessary to realize the goals. Now it would not be a surprise that the critical rationalist model of action situates us in a better position, in comparison with Popper’s action model, to address the role of reason not only in driving human action but also in the creation of social order. In addition, the critical-rationalist model leads to the recognition of an ability of human actors for using critical reason to revise a moral law, which they have given themselves for the first time, whenever they discovered that the moral law is shown to be false by argument. However, Popper’s situational model of action implies that the actors behave adequately to the existing social situation. If so, the actors couldn’t use their “situational” rationality to question the established social order to which they have adopted their actions. Hence, I argue that Popper’s model of action cannot provide “a micro-foundation” for a sociological theory, which intends to base its explanation of the rise of a social order, either an open order or a closed one, upon the individuals’ rational actions. In short, it is Popper’s critical rationalism, in terms of irrational faith in reason, that prevents him from considering how critical rationalism might be connected with human action and social order.

124  The Formation of a Closed Society

Section II: Justificationism and the Epistemology of the Closed Society: A New Ideal Type of the Closed Society In this section, I  intend to address the relation between justificationism and a sociological ideal type of the closed society. In this way, I would also argue about an epistemology of the closed society. To this end, the contribution of the justified true belief account of knowledge to the irrationalism and dogmatic rationalism and the consequences of that contribution for a sociological conception of the closed society will be discussed. Justificationism and Irrationalism Versus Dogmatic Rationalism A sociological theory of the closed society should address the questions of what a closed society is. To this end, I start with this argument that irrationalism and dogmatic rationalism originate in the epistemology of justified true belief. Briefly, when the irrationalist denies the existence of objective knowledge, he would lead to claim that a rational belief, in general, and a rational belief in reason in particular, “are not” tenable because these beliefs cannot be established on objective knowledge. In the case of the old irrationalism, this argument leads to the magical thinking, and in the case of modern irrationalism, the argument leads to the sceptic irrationalism. However, we should know that it is the demand for justification that leads one to accept such an irrationalist position. But, by learning from the mistaken premise of the irrationalist, the dogmatic rationalist rightly argues that if the epistemological basis of irrationalism, that is, the lack of objective knowledge, could be refuted, then it would lose its basis. The dogmatic rationalist, who found the position of irrationalism baseless, leads to an uncritical, but comprehensive, rationalism which is still based on the idea of knowledge as justified true belief. The uncritical rationalist is a dogmatist because he claims that rational beliefs, in general, and a rational belief in reason in particular, are tenable due to the fact that there are positive reasons which can prove them. But, since these positive reasons cannot be presented in practice, the uncritical rationalist must end the infinite regress of proofs by “a dogmatic commitment”. Thus, like the irrationalism, dogmatic rationalism originates in the justified true belief account of the knowledge and cannot address the problem of rational beliefs accurately. When the relation between justificationism, on the one hand, and the irrationalism and dogmatic rationalism on the other is recognized, the question of how the idea of knowledge as justified true belief contributes to a sociological ideal type of the closed society could be answered. And this answer leads us to uncover “an inner” epistemological logic of the formation of the closed society.

The Formation of a Closed Society  125

Towards a Sociological Concept of the Closed Society In this part of the argument, I will show that how the critical rationalist model of action allows us to reconstruct the irrationalist’s, or the dogmatist’s, view of rationality as if the explanatory function of the idea of the “low degree” of openness to criticism in the definition of a sociological ideal type of the closed society could be identified. A reconstruction of the irrationalist and dogmatist models of rational action leads us to the realization of how individual actors, who use the low degree of openness to criticism to justify their beliefs, enter into an uncritical form of social dialogue, which directs them to the irrational, or dogmatic, accounts of the universe and good life. For instance in the case of a dogmatic model of social dialogue, people who employ the low level of critical rationality to shape such a dialogue for defining the meanings of the universe and good life would lead to the certain dogmatic beliefs regarding these issues because they mistakenly assume that their ontological and moral beliefs are “absolutely true” because they could be justified by positive reasons. The sociological ideal type of a closed society is to be understood within the context of these uncritical accounts of the universe and good life. In addition, this sociological notion refers to the social institutions, which rest upon the ideas of just law, legitimate government and efficient economy that are claimed to be absolutely accurate because they are proved by positive reasons. Hence, the “inner epistemological logic” of the closed society ought to be sought in the justified true belief account of knowledge, which shapes the “common” values and social institutions upon which the closed society intends to solve the problem of social order. Since the justified true belief account of knowledge leads us to the irrationalism or dogmatism, it is not a surprise that the closed society might be either an “irrational society” or a “dogmatic one”. In both cases, since people use the low level of openness to criticism in order to solve the problem of social order, they have given themselves either an irrational social order or a dogmatic one. The sociological idea of a closed society implies that not only should people’s moral agreement in the closed society be regarded as perfect and unquestionable, but also the social institutions of law, polity and economy are to be considered as perfect and undisputable. Hence, the “dogmatic nature” of the common values and institutions of the closed society is to be understood in terms of the epistemology of the justified true belief. In my view, the closed society involves the regress of justification which makes it an “irrational” society. It needs to be added that the sociological ideal type of the closed society leads us to “an institutional reading” of it because this sociological concept situates the social institutions of law, polity and economy at the core of its conception of the closed society. However, as observed by Ignateiff and Roch (2018: 20), “Popper’s idea of an open society does not tell you much about what institutions [of the open society] should look like”. I argue that the same is true in regard to Popper’s idea

126  The Formation of a Closed Society

of a closed society because it does not tell us much about the social institutions of a closed society.

Section III: The Five Mechanisms of the Closed Society Formation Inspired by the critical rationalist model of action, now I  want to explain five mechanisms through which a closed society may come into existence, integrating these mechanisms in “a macro-sociological theory” of the closed society. A Metaphysical Mechanism of the Closed Society Formation From the critical rationalist theory of society, which was presented by the first volume of this book (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021), we have learned that individuals’ worldviews shape the place of man in the universe on which people define their concept of the good life. Hence, a human society, whether an open society or a closed one, requires an ontological worldview on the basis of which people define a common account of the good life. What differentiates an open society from a closed society in regard to the worldviews is that in an open society, individuals use the highest level of critical rationality to address the questions of what an ontological meaning of the universe and the place of man within it are, while, in a closed society, individuals apply the low level of openness to criticism in order to address the same questions. Having said that, the metaphysical mechanism of the closed society formation refers to “a learning process” through which human actors use the justificational concept of rationality, to know what the universe means. This justificationist concept is manifested in two forms: the irrationalism and dogmatic rationalism. The irrationalist argues that an ontological belief regarding the universe cannot be established on objective knowledge. If so, the irrationalist concludes that people wouldn’t be able to agree on “an accurate metaphysical reading” of the universe and the place of man in it to define the meaning of the good life. In this sense, we can argue that when people follow such an irrationalist mind-set in order to evaluate a “metaphysical claim” regarding the universe, they have used the lowest level of critical reason, if the stages of progress in critical rationality is taken into account. And this lowest level leads them to the metaphysics of the closed society. The same argument could be made in regard to the dogmatic rationalism: the metaphysical mechanism of the closed society formation, in this case, might be explained as follows: like the irrationalist, the dogmatist uses a justificationist concept of rationality to assess a metaphysical belief about the meaning of the universe and the place of man within it. However, unlike the irrationalist, the dogmatist does not argue that “an ontological claim” regarding the meaning of the universe cannot be “a rational claim” due to the lack of objective knowledge.

The Formation of a Closed Society  127

In contrast, the dogmatist claims that “a philosophical theory” of the universe could be justified by positive reasons because there are infallible premises upon which the rationalist can deduce such a theory indisputably. Hence, the place of man in this philosophical theory, and its outcomes for the meaning of the good life, could also be justified by positive reasons. From a metaphysical point of view, a closed society comes into existence when the dogmatists activate the low level of critical rationality to enter into “an ontological debate” regarding the meaning of the universe and man’s place within it. The result of this dialogue would be “an unquestionable philosophical basis” for social ordering of people, according to which individuals not only define the meaning of good life, but also apply it to identity a system of values, which is necessary for solving the problem of social order. The metaphysics of the closed society refers to a system of closed worldviews, which is justified by argument and is not open to criticism. A Moral Mechanism of the Rise of a Closed Society The moral aspect of the process through which the closed society comes into existence should also be connected with the epistemology of justified true belief, which is reflected in the irrationalist’s and the dogmatist’s worldviews. The irrationalist’s worldview leads to a place of man in the universe, which does not conclude a rational meaning for the good life, hence a magical reading of the good life, would shape the idea of the good life in the closed society originating in the irrationalism. However, the dogmatist’s worldview leads to a place of man in the universe, which does conclude a rational meaning for the good life. This rational meaning is claimed, however, to be unquestionable because it is justified by argument. Limitation of space allows me to explain here only the relation between the closed worldviews of dogmatists and the moral mechanism of the closed society formation: the uncritical rationalists, who activate the low level of critical rationality, utilize the closed worldviews, as a metaphysical capital, in order to give themselves “a perfect moral order”, which aims to protect them from the war of all against all and allowing them to cooperate to realize their perfect ideal of the good life. Hence, the dogmatists enter into a moral dialogue through which the place of man in the universe will be employed to agree on “a common account” of the good life. The dogmatists would claim that this account of the good life is capable of being defended by positive reasons. The result of this justificationist moral dialogue, which is, in reality, the moral mechanism of the closed society formation, would be the ultimate values of the closed society. Hence, from an ethical view point, the role of the low level of critical rationality in the formation of the closed society ought to be considered in “a cognitive capacity”, which the dogmatists claim they have in order to agree on “a meaning of the good life”, which is absolutely “true” because it is verifiable by argument.

128  The Formation of a Closed Society

Through the moral mechanism of the closed society formation, the dogmatists create a normative basis for their closed society, resting on this epistemological premise that individuals should establish their conception of the good life upon a justified moral belief. This closed society suffers from “a dogmatic moral consensus” implying that the conception of the good life could be “an undisputable” moral belief. A Legal Mechanism of the Closed Society Formation A closed society cannot come into existence only by a moral agreement on the shared account of the good life. As argued before, “a legal mechanism” is to be added to that moral driving force of the closed society through which people create a just law to realize the ideal of the good life. Not only do the closed-minded persons use the low level of critical rationality in order to reach a dogmatic agreement on the conception of the good life, but also they apply such level of openness to criticism to give themselves a just law which defines the meaning of the equal rights to the opportunity of the good life. A description of the legal mechanism of the closed society formation can be presented as follows: when the uncritical rationalists use their conception of the good life, as a moral capital, to enter into a dialogue regarding the meaning of just law, they have started to create a legal system for their closed society. Viewed from his uncritical epistemology, the dogmatist argues that a theory of just law, in terms of a concept of the equal rights to the good life, can be justified based on the infallible premises. This claim leads us to uncover the dogmatic nature of the legal system in a closed society. If the actors can justify the law of the closed society by argument, then why shouldn’t they claim that the law in question must be respected “absolutely”? From a legal perspective, the rise of such an unquestionable law in the closed society would be another aspect of the dogmatic nature of this social order, if it is considered in a close relation with the conception of the good life in the closed society. From an epistemological view, since what is meant by the just law in the closed society ought to be accepted uncritically, this just law involves the error of justification. Hence, the closed society cannot overcome the problem of the war of all against all because the definition of the equal rights to the good life itself is deduced on the basis of a wrong premise: a legal claim regarding the just law could be justified by positive reasons. A Political Mechanism of the Closed Society Formation A closed society wouldn’t come into the existence if the dogmatic consensus on the meanings of good life and just law had not been supported by “an authoritarian political order”, whose monopoly of force is “absolute” and is applied to enforce what is defined as a perfect reading of the equal rights to the good life. Hence, the sociology of the closed society should address the question of how

The Formation of a Closed Society  129

the closed-minded persons define the meaning of a legitimate government in the closed society. In order to explain the political mechanism of the closed society formation, we should show that how the dogmatists use the inputs of their moral and legal consensuses on the meanings of the good life and just law in order to establish a legitimate government. According to the sociology of the closed society, the political mechanism of the rise of a closed society, like the moral and legal mechanisms of it, refers to a justificational form of social dialogue in which the actors assume that they would be able to prove their claims by positive reasons. Given this consideration, we can “reconstruct the mentality” of the dogmatists when they want to define a legitimate government to enforce the just law of closed society in the following way: a legitimate government is a political power who uses the monopoly of power on behalf of people in order to satisfy the legal demand of the equal rights to the good life. Since the consensuses on the good life and just law have been justified by positive reasons, a legitimate government, which intends to realize those agreements, should itself be justified by positive reasons. And it would be possible because, in the context of epistemology of justified true belief, the dogmatists can use infallible premises to deduce an unquestionable conclusion. Hence, the uncritical rationalism supplies human actors with “a logic of political dialogue” through which the dogmatists establish a political institution they require to enforce the just law. In a sense, the justificational nature of the political debate among the closed-minded persons, who intend to give themselves a legitimate order, ought to be understood in the context of the dogmatic epistemology of the closed society. Given this epistemology of an authoritarian government in the closed society, we should not be surprised if the concept of a “legitimate usage” of power is to be meant in terms of an authoritative model of governance because when people wrongly accepted that the just law they have given themselves is actually a perfect law, then they should also admit that there is a need to “a perfect” political system, which could use an absolute power to enforce the equal rights to the good life. It is the justificational nature of the political debate regarding the meaning of a legitimate government that enables the dogmatists to reach a political consensus on the concept of government that supplies the ideational basis of the legitimate government in the closed society. In summary, the political mechanism of the closed society formation refers to the following process: people, who apply the low level of openness to criticism, could arrive at “a dogmatic account” of the legitimate government, giving to that government an absolute power for realizing the ideal of the equal rights to the good life. In this way, the government of the closed society comes to aid its moral and legal institutions in order to prevent people from the egoistic pursuit of selfinterests. However, this political order wouldn’t be successful in realizing its own missions because, while it could make notable mistakes, it is assumed that it is operating absolutely truthfully.

130  The Formation of a Closed Society

An Economic Mechanism of the Closed Society Formation Without a mechanism of resource allocation, the needs of people’s good life cannot be satisfied in the closed society. Thus, the answer to the question of how a closed society comes into existence should also consider “an economic” mechanism of the closed society formation. An analysis of this economic mechanism might be offered as follows: not only should the political account of legitimate government in the closed society be understood due to the dogmatic rationality which people use to prove their political beliefs, but also an economic conception of efficiency, upon which they define the mechanism of resource allocation in the closed society, ought to be viewed within the context of such a dogmatic rationality. In this way, we can address the role of the low level of critical rationality, or openness to criticism, in shaping the economic mechanism of the closed society formation. In the closed society, people activate the low level of the rationality to see whether the mechanism of resource allocation, which they want to create for solving “the “economic problem of society”, could be justified by argument. If we admit that the actors, who follow the epistemology of dogmatic rationalism, apply a justificationist logic when they come to argue about “a model” of resource allocation, it is not a surprise that they should look for the positive reasons in order to verify the model in question. Hence, according to the sociology of the closed society, the economic mechanism of the closed society formation refers to “an economic dialogue” through which people activate the low level of critical rationality to infer the result of the meaning of the good life they have given themselves for the demands for goods and services on the one hand, and the results of the just law and legitimate government they have given themselves for the supply of production factors on the other. With attention to this fact that the closed-minded persons have already used the “justified accounts” of the good life, just law and legitimate government to solve the problem of social order, there is no reason why they do not follow the same justificational approach to define the notion of “an efficient mechanism” of resource allocation. In the light of this insight, it wouldn’t be unwise to argue that the dogmatists activate the low level of the rationality to give themselves a demand law, which determines the preferences for goods and services due to the definition of the good life in the closed society. Since this pattern of consumption originates in the dogmatic concept of the good life, the demand side of economy in the closed society would shape as if to realize such an unreal account of good life. On the other hand, the low level of openness to criticism is used by the dogmatists to give themselves a law of supply, which determines the ways through which the economy of the closed society mobilizes the factors of production to meet the needs of the good life. Since this pattern of production originates in the just law of the closed society, which intends to secure the equal rights to the good life, the supply side of economy would shape as if to meet the needs of the good life in question.

The Formation of a Closed Society  131

The laws of supply and demand, which the dogmatic rationalists create to solve the economic problem of the closed society, shape “a mechanism of a noncompetitive market” that is unable to efficiently mobilize scarce resources to satisfy the diverse needs of people for two reasons: viewed from the demand side, since there is not a “perfect” account of the good life, which could be justified by argument, the pattern of consumption, which is shaped based on such an untenable account of the good life, involves the regress of justification and cannot lead to real demand for the goods and services in the closed society. And, viewed from the supply angle, since there is not a “perfect” account of the just law, that could be protected by a perfect government, the ideal of the equal rights to the good life couldn’t be protected in practice, and, hence, the usage of the production factors wouldn’t be at their highest possible rates. Thus, the supply side of economy in the closed society cannot mobilize the factors of production efficiently to produce the goods and services which are required to meet the needs of people’s good life. The Formation of a Closed Society: A Macro-Sociological Analysis The sociology of the closed society should integrate the five mechanisms of the closed society formation in order to provide “a macro-sociological answer” to the question of how the closed society comes into existence. To this end, I have to apply the philosophy of critical rationalism in order to develop a new analysis of the closed society formation. We may argue that the main premise of the sociology of the closed society is that people use the low level of critical rationality in order to solve their problem of social order. This premise is to be applied to explain the connections among the five mechanisms of the closed society formation. The process of the closed society formation begins with an activation of the low level of rationality by human actors leading them to “an agreement” regarding the meaning of the universe. This metaphysical consensus is a “dogmatic consensus” because the actors claim it could be verified by argument. But, we know that this justification is actually impossible. It is this ontological view of the universe that constructs the metaphysics of the closed society. This ontological basis, which is “uncritical” by its very nature, contributes to the rise of a parallel dogmatic reading of man’s place in the universe. And, due to the place that the closed worldview gives to man in the universe, the dogmatists come to define their conception of the good life. However, the notion of knowledge as justified true belief enforces them to offer positive reasons to defend such an account of the good life. The sociology of the closed society uses the ontological consensus, in terms of a philosophical capital, in order to show us how the low level of openness to criticism enables the uncritical rationalists to enter into a moral dialogue leading them to a common account of the good life. Like the metaphysics of the closed society, the ethics of the closed society suffers from the infinite regress because

132  The Formation of a Closed Society

the dogmatists wrongly claim that the meaning of the good life could be proved by argument. Having established the relationship between the closed worldview and the dogmatic consensus on the meaning of the good life in the closed society, the sociology of the closed society then leads us to see how the low level of the critical rationality allows the uncritical rationalists to construct another component of the closed society. It is the legal institution of just law which is defined on the basis of the dogmatic reading of the good life. This just law which aims to legalize the ideal of equal rights to the good life in the closed society ought to be created through a legal debate. The usage of the critical rationality in this case means that the notion of the just law ought to be proved by argument. From the perspective of uncritical rationalism, the justification of the just law by argument would be possible if the premises of a legal claim regarding the meaning of the law in question are actually shown to be true by argument. In this sense, the epistemology of dogmatic rationalism contributes to the legal structure of the closed society in terms of what this society defines as the equal rights to the good life. Like the metaphysical and moral bases of the closed society, the legal structure of the closed society involves the regress of justification. An agreement regarding the content of the equal rights to the good life enables people to realize that the just law cannot be enforced without a political power which has the legitimacy of using monopoly of force. Under this condition, people enter into a political dialogue in order to establish a system of governance to realize the ideal of the equal rights to the good life. Inspired by the same rationale that the uncritical rationalists have already used to give themselves the just law, now they claim that the idea of a perfect government would be justifiable by positive reasons. Thus, the closed-minded people establish such an account of a legitimate government in other to give their closed society an executive power for solving the political problem of social order. It needs to be kept in mind that the idea of a perfect government that does not make any mistake originates from the justified true belief account of knowledge. Finally, the sociology of the closed society leads us to see how the mechanism of supply and demand in the economy of the closed society should be connected with the dogmatic conception of the good life on the one hand, and the uncritical accounts of the just law and legitimate government on the other. In short, the preferences for goods and services that shape the demand side of economy originates in the definition of the good life in the closed society. And the supply of the production factors is affected by the content of what is accepted as human rights in the closed society and the way the government intends to protect the human rights in question. In sum, the demand and supply sides of economy work together to give the closed society a non-competitive economy by the means of which scarce resources are inefficiently allocated to the needs of people’s good life. This mechanism of resource allocation does not operate effectively because neither the demand for goods and services nor the supply of the factors of production is shaped on the basis of accurate notions of the good life, just law and legitimate government.

The Formation of a Closed Society  133

In summary, in this chapter, my sociological theory of the closed society used the critical rationalist model of human action to show how the actors, in terms of thinkers–social movements–masses, activate “the low level” of critical rationality to give themselves a closed social order. The rise of this social order is shaped in the course of a social dialogue which is started by a metaphysical dialogue for an agreement on the meaning of the universe, and followed by a moral discourse for a consensus on the concept of the good life. When the dogmatists arrived at a “perfect” normative solution for the problem of social order, they come to transform such a normative solution into another “perfect” institutional solution for the problem of social order. However, like their normative solution, their institutional solution is involved in the infinite regress of justification. The institutions of law, government and market, which they have created to solve the problem of social order on the basis of their ontological and moral consensus on the meanings of the universe and good life, suffer from the same regress of justification that the normative foundation of the closed society involved in it. Due to the sociological theories of the closed and open societies, which were presented in Chapters 5 and 6, now we are in a good position to explore the mechanisms of the transition from the closed to the open society. An analysis of this transition will be offered by the next chapter.

Notes 1 It is worthy of note that while we can see a general connection between Popper’s epistemology and his theories of the open and closed societies, this relationship is not defined in terms of the role of the actors’ critical rationality in shaping a moral dialogue on the meaning of the good life and building social institutions of law, polity and economy on the basis of such a moral dialogue. In this line of reasoning, I should like to refer to Hans Albert’s (2006: 7) insightful remarks: “It is one of the peculiarities of Popper’s social philosophy that it is closely connected with his epistemology. The fallibilism, the realism, and the critical approach of his epistemology are also the basis of his conception of social philosophy. The open society as it has been characterized by Popper is a society whose members have the possibility to decide freely about how to lead their lives and to participate in decisions about their common affairs. By the institutionalization of competition and criticism in all social realms such societies are in a condition to find new solutions for problems of all kinds, to analyse and to discuss these solutions, and to come to reforms”. While the same might be said regarding the relationship between the dogmatist epistemology and the idea of a closed society whose members do not have the possibility to decide freely about how to lead their lives and to participate in decisions about their common affairs, my point here is that “this type” of connecting epistemology with the ideas of the closed and open societies does not tell us how human actors’ critical rationality enables them to enter into a rational dialogue concerning a set of common values in order to create the required social institutions for solving the problem of social order. For this reason, I have argued that Popper’s reading of critical rationalism, in terms of an irrational faith in reason, has prevented him from offering the sociological conceptions of the closed and open societies. 2 In regard to Popper’s model of action, it should be added that Popper rejects the idea that the social order is to understood in terms of individual actions. In “Karl Popper’s Defense of the Autonomy of Sociology”, Richard Lichtman (1965: 1) points out, “For purposes

134  The Formation of a Closed Society of identification, we shall make use of Popper’s definition of ‘psychologism’ as the view that ‘the study of society, in the last analysis, must be reducible to psychology.’ . . . By ‘the autonomy of sociology’ he means the view that denies this reduction of sociology to psychology and that supports, instead, the spirit of Marx’s remark: ‘It is not the consciousness of man that determines his existence – rather, it is his social existence that determines his consciousness.’ ” These remarks lead us to realize that, while Popper does not use the philosophy of critical rationalism to develop a model of rational action in which reason drives action, he claims that it is man’s social existence that determines his consciousness. It is not a surprise that Popper ignores this fact that the sociologists have argued about the micro-foundations of macro-sociology which refer to the ideal types of rational action. While these ideal types are shaped on the basis of the justificational concept of rationality, it does not mean that a sociological analysis of social order cannot be developed based on the models of rational action, which defines the term “rationality” as “openness to criticism”. By the formulation of the critical rationalist model of action, I have tried to show that the relation between human action and social order is to be reformulated on the basis of the idea of critical rationalism as “openness to criticism”.

Bibliography Agassi, J. (1977) Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology. The Netherlands, Martinus Mijhoff. Albert, Hans (2006) “Karl Popper and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century”. In: Jarvie, I. et al. (eds.) Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume I. Burlington, Ashgate, pp. 1–12. Ignatieff, M. and Roch, S. (eds.) (2018) Rethinking Open Society, New Adversaries and New Opportunities. Budapest and New York, Central European University Press. Lichtman, R. (1965) “Karl Popper’s Defense of the Autonomy of Sociology”. In: Social Research, 32(1), pp. 1–25. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2021) Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Society, Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume I. London and New York, Routledge. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2022) “Critical Rationalism: An Epistemological Critique”. In Foundations of Science. Springer, pp. 1–32. Published Online: 23 June 2022, https://doi. org/10.1007/s10699-022-09847-z. Popper, K.R. (1945 [2012]) The Open Society and Its Enemies. New One-Volume edn. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Wettersten, John. (2006) “Towards a New Theory of the Closed Society”. In: Jarvie, I., Milford, K. and Miller, D. (eds.) Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume I. Burlington, Ashgate, pp. 251–271.

Chapter 7

From the Closed to the Open Society A Sociological Analysis

Introduction The central aim of this chapter is to develop “a macro-sociological analysis” of the transition from the closed to the open society. The micro-foundation of this analysis is “the critical rationalist model of human action”, which defines the access of individuals to the highest level of critical rationality as “a cognitive capacity”, upon which the individual members of the closed society can “open” their values and institutions to criticism, replacing them with those values and institutions, which are not shown to be false by “negative reasons”. This macro-sociological analysis might also be called as “a normative analysis” because it emphasizes on the role of people’s potential access to critical reason in the transition from the closed society to the open one. To address the normative question of how a closed society can be transformed into an open society, this chapter proceeds as follows. Section I reviews briefly the critical rationalist micro-foundations of my sociological analysis to show how the highest level of critical rationality enables human actors, including thinkers, social movements and ordinary people to open their closed society by revising the dogmatic claims regarding the meanings of the universe, good life, just law, legitimate government and efficient economy. Section II presents two major arguments: first, it applies the proposed micro-foundation in order to show how people should question the beliefs regarding the meaning of the universe and the place of man within it to revise the metaphysics of the closed society and, second, it argues that the actors are capable of using the highest level of critical rationality to give themselves “a rational account” of the universe and man’s place within it. The section argues that these metaphysical reforms supply the open society with a new ontological basis which prepares the ground for solving the problem of social order. This section also addresses the question of how the reforms in the dogmatic worldviews enable the actors to initiate “a moral reform” for opening up the closed society which aims to replace the dogmatic concept of the good life with a rational account of it. In the light of these insights, Section III develops the sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society in the following way: first, it DOI: 10.4324/9781003027119-8

136  From the Closed to the Open Society

answers the question of how the reform in the dogmatic account of the good life may contribute to an application of the highest level of critical rationality to revise what is called the just law of society and replacing it with a rational account of the law; and, second, it argues about a political reform which is required for the transition from the closed to the open society. People should use the highest level of critical rationality to realize how an authoritarian government, which is defined on the basis of the dogmatic accounts of the good life and just law, could be replaced with an open democracy whose mission is protecting people’s equal rights to the good life. After that, Section IV argues that how the actors use the critical rationality to see whether what is assumed to be an efficient economy in the closed society should be revised in order to give the open society a competitive mechanism of resource allocation, which can mobilize the factors of production efficiently to meet the real needs of people’s good life. Section V integrates the previous arguments to develop “a normative analysis” of the transition from the closed to the open society. In this line of reasoning, it argues that people who use the highest level of critical rationality could be capable of acting as the real agents of opening up the closed society. However, an important point in this normative analysis is that the very conception of rationality is defined on the basis of the philosophy of critical rationalism. Section VI allows the reader to see what are the major differences between the sociological analysis of this volume regarding the transition from the closed to the open society and Popper’s analysis of it. In this line of reasoning, it will be shown that why Popper has not offered a sociological analysis of the transition in question. Finally, Section VII will argue about what are the major differences between an “open society” and a “liberal society”. It shows that, while Popper’s idea of an open society might be understood in terms of the idea of a liberal society, the transition from the closed to the open society shouldn’t be interpreted upon the basis of “a liberal account of the open society”. In contrast, it should be analysed upon the basis of “the sociological account” of it.

Section I: A Micro-Foundation for Understanding of the Transition From the Closed to the Open Society In Chapter  9 of the first volume, I  had used the critical rationalist model of action to develop a micro-foundation for a critical rationalist theory of “social change” (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 181–197). Now I want to apply that microfoundation to offer a model of human action for my sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. But, due to the development of the model of action in question by adding the notion of the stages of progress in critical rationality to it, which was proposed by Chapter 3 of this volume, I shall utilize the two ideas of the lower and higher levels of critical rationality to develop the micro-foundation of my sociological theory of the transition from the closed to the open society.

From the Closed to the Open Society  137

Critical Rationalism and the Idea of “an Independent Human Actor” A crucial insight of “the critical rationalist” model of action for the microfoundation of a sociological analysis of the transition in question is that we can speak of “an independent human actor”, whose “cognitive capacity” of questioning wrong beliefs allows him not only to revise the dogmatic accounts of the universe, good life, just law, good government and efficient economy, but also to replace them with the rational accounts. And, this cognitive capacity of the independent actor reaches a highest level when the actor fully realizes that in order to “rationalize” his beliefs, he should replace the demand for justification of a belief with the demand for criticism of it. In this section, I should like to argue briefly that the notion of an independent actor, who is capable of using the highest level of critical rationality, or openness to criticism, in order to open his beliefs to rational criticism, ought to be introduced to the micro-foundation of “a normative sociological theory” of the transition from the closed to the open society. The Highest Level of Critical Rationality and the Micro-Foundations of Sociological Analysis Having said that, I should first remind you that how the highest level of critical rationality enables human actors to use critical reason for subjecting all “claims of rational beliefs” to rational discussion, considering those claims as “true” whose premises and inferences are not shown to be false by argument. From the first volume of this book, we know that the epistemological basis of this reading of the highest level of access to critical rationality ought to be sought in “a deep critique” of the justified true belief account of knowledge. I have argued in detail that, instead of making our beliefs rational by testing them with positive reasons, we should rationalize our beliefs by seeing whether or not negative reasons refute them (ibid.: 66–86). With this non-justificationist approach to the rational beliefs in mind, we can now argue that an independent actor may use the highest level of critical rationality in order to hold open all of his claims, in regard to the concepts of the universe, good life, just law, legitimate government and effective economy, to criticism and seeing whether or not negative reasons refute those claims in practice. The open claims, which are not shown to be false by argument, should be considered “rational claims”. This highest level of critical rationality enables the independent actor to revise those “wrong claims” which don’t satisfy the standard of “objective knowledge” in terms of “unfalsified conjuncture”. In the light of this epistemological insight, I formulated the general theory of critical rationalism, which allows us to argue that when an independent actor activates the highest level of critical rationality, he would be able to rationalize his beliefs regarding the universe, good life, just law, legitimate government and efficient economy by seeing whether or not negative reasons refute them. I shall

138  From the Closed to the Open Society

use this “new epistemology of rational beliefs” in order to model human action in which the highest level of critical rationality can “drive” action, and it is on the basis of this new micro-foundation that I shall argue that human actors are “real agents” of the transition from the closed to the open society.

Section II: From the Closed to the Open Society: A Cultural Change The transition from the closed to the open society should take place through a cultural change. This cultural change will be explained in this section by offering two arguments: (a) the transition from the closed to the open society requires a metaphysical reform and (b) the transition also needs to a moral change. The first stage of the cultural change refers to “a metaphysical mechanism” of the transition in question; however, before discussing about this stage, I want to refer briefly to Chapter 9 of the first volume, in which a criticism of the Parsonian view of social change was offered. Thereby, I  should like to emphasize on this fact that the revisability of common values and social institutions has a vital importance for my normative analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. An Independent Actor, Critical Rationality and Cultural Change As argued by Chapter  9 of the first volume, Talcott Parsons’ analysis of social change implies that the existence of social order depends on a system of common values, which is internalized in the actors’ identity or definition of interests. Voluntarily respect for such a system of common values, that could be considered in terms of a moral law according to which all human beings are the ends-inthemselves, prevents the actors from turning their egoistic pursuit of self-interests into “a societal war” of all against all. Hence, the role of reason in this Parsonian account of social order can be identified in terms of practical reason, using Kant’s term, which leads the actors to a voluntarily respect for a system of values. It is this voluntarily orientation of the individual’s action goals towards “the common” values, for instance the moral law, that implies all human beings ought to be respected as the ends-in-themselves, that makes the rise of a peaceful social order possible (ibid.: 183–185). This reading of the role of reason in the rise of a peaceful social order teaches us two points: first, it is the culture, as a system of shared values, that makes social ordering of people possible whereas the egoistic behaviour of individuals has the potential of involving them in a state of war. Second, the role of reason in determining the contribution of human agents to the formation of social order is to be limited to “a voluntary respect” for a system of common values, which is “given” to individual members of society. In other words, the role of reason “cannot” be expanded to covering the contribution of the actors to the creation of a

From the Closed to the Open Society  139

system common values for the first time. This reading of the relationship between practical reason and social ordering of people leads us to explore the reason why the Parsonian analysis of social change needs a deep revision. Due to my criticism of Parsons’ theory of society (ibid.: 129–130), it is not a surprise if I argue that, while the actors’ practical reason makes the existence of a peaceful social order understandable, the Kantian notion of practical reason cannot be used to explore the contribution of human actors to the transition from an established order to an alternative one. In the same line of reasoning, according to Alan Touraine (1965: 10–12), Parsons regards human action as merely implementing pre-existing values rather than as creating new values. However, action is not a mere reaction to a situation related to existing values. Action creates these values. Similarly, I want to show that a sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society requires “a model of action”, which defines the very access to reason as “a cognitive capacity” allowing the actors to operate as “independent agents” who could create the common values rather than merely respecting the values which are given to them by society.1 Inspired by Kant, I argue that the access to reason allows the actors to regard each other as the ends-inthemselves, and by the means of this reading of practical reason we can argue that individuals are capable of giving themselves a moral law, which enables them to drive their actions. In this sense, we can also argue that the access to reason enables individuals to create “a system of common values” upon which all people are to be respected as the ends-in-themselves. Now I should like to add my contribution to this argument by saying that if we admit such a “moral equality” of individuals due to their “potential access” to reason, then the capacity of being a value-maker, rather than merely a value-taker, ought to be reinterpreted upon the basis of the philosophy of critical rationalism, because the Kantian doctrine of practical reason involves the regress of justification due to the acceptance of the idea of knowledge as justified true belief. Under this condition, in order to avoid from the regress of justification, the notion of practical reason is to be replaced with the idea of critical rationality. If so, the model of human action is also to be reformulated on the basis of a non-justificational conception of rationality in which the idea of “the rational beliefs” could be redefined in terms of the notion of “unfalsified beliefs”. It is this reformulation of the model of human action, as the micro-foundation of our sociological theory, that leads us to the concept of an independent human actor whose cognitive capacity not only would enable him to give himself a moral value for the first time, but also would empower him to revise the moral value in order to replace it with a new moral value, which is not shown to be false by argument. This cognitive ability of the “creation” and “recreation” of the common values because of the individual’s access to the critical rationality leads us to explore the role of human actors in the cultural mechanism of the transition from the closed to the open society.

140  From the Closed to the Open Society

It is worthy of note that, while Parsons (1991 [2005]) defines an important role for the culture in shaping the identity of individual in the course of socialization process, his justificationist critique of Kant’s doctrine of practical reason does not allow him to give the reason a cognitive capacity which it requires to make people the agents of giving themselves a moral law. It needs to be mentioned here that, while Kant claimed that a “universal validity” of moral law is justifiable by argument, Parsons rejected this claim and reasoned that there is not “a moral law” which could be proved by all human beings operating as “a common value” for the humanity as a whole. Using Bartley’s term, such a “justificational critique”, which originated in the demand for justification, led Parsons to this idea that “each society” has its own system of common values which is valid only for the society in question. Hence, the sociologist should take the system of values in society as “a given fact”, and then he ought to explore how a voluntarily respect for the common values of the society in question leads us to realize the contribution of human actors to the rise of a peaceful social order. In my view, it is only in this sense that we could argue that Parsons has used Kantian moral philosophy to develop his theory of society. However, this theory of society cannot show us how “an independent actor” may activate his critical rationality to create “a cultural change” in the system of common values of the closed society which is necessary for the rise of an open society. While Parsons, like Weber, was correct in saying that a moral law cannot be justified by positive reasons, and thus such a law wouldn’t lead us to a universal value system, he was wrong in assuming that a moral law “ought to be justified” in order to be accounted as a universal law. If the demand for justification is replaced with the demand for criticism, then it would be possible for us to argue that a moral law is actually “universal” when it is held open to criticism and is not shown to be false by negative reasons. This argument leads us to an important result: an independent actor, who admits the non-justificational reading of rationality, and reaches the highest level of critical rationality, wouldn’t be dealt with the criticism that Parsons presents against Kant’s moral philosophy. Individuals are capable of using critical rationality in order to give themselves a “universal” moral law and thereby creating a system of values which is common to all human beings. More importantly, individuals have also the cognitive capacity of revising the universal values they have given themselves for the first time, when they realized that those values are shown to be false by negative reasons. Viewed from a non-justificational perspective, this way of the evaluation of a “universal” moral claim does not involve the infinite regress of proofs because it has replaced the demand for justification for the demand for criticism. Chapter 9 of the first volume showed that an insufficient attention of the Parsonian sociology to the problem of social change might have been originated from this fact that Parsons’ model of rational action did not allow him to see how the common values “themselves” could be “the result” of a moral dialogue among people, who want to prevent from a war of all against all by giving themselves a moral law implying that all human beings are to be respected as the

From the Closed to the Open Society  141

ends-in-themselves. Without having such an explanation about the issue of how “a system of common values”, itself, comes into existence for the first time and how it could be revised because the access to critical rationality enables individuals to discover what is wrong with that system of values, our normative theory of the open society cannot lead us to explore the cultural mechanism of the transition from the closed to the open society. In my view, it is the justificationist conception of rationality that prevents Parsons from looking at the resources, which reason has offered us, using Kant’s argument, in order to address the question of how the common values come into existence for the first time. What we require is a non-justificationist conception of rationality which allows us to understand the function of the Reason itself. The general theory of critical rationalism enables us to know that if human agents activate their access to the highest level of critical rationality, not only could they give themselves a “universal system of values” for the first time, but also they would be capable of revising such a universal system in order to liberate it from the mistaken premises or inferences. With these considerations in mind, I would like to argue that it is the highest level of critical rationality that empowers the human actors, in terms of thinkers– movements–masses, to enter into a cultural dialogue to reform those moral values which are not open to criticism. Cultural Change and “Rational” Worldviews The first step for the development of a sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society is addressing the question of how a change in the metaphysical beliefs of individuals regarding the meaning of the universe and the place of man within it ought to be recognized as an important part of a cultural change which is necessary to realize the transition from the closed to the open society. As argued earlier in this volume, the place of man in the universe is to be defined in the context of man’s metaphysical beliefs. Having said that, we should notice that the place which the actors give to man in his worldviews contributes to the meaning which he defines for the good life. If this is so, individuals, who define the concept of rationality in terms of the dogmatic rationalism, would come to claim that the worldviews upon which they have based their reading of the good life are justifiable by positive reasons. And this dogmatic reading of the worldviews shapes the metaphysics of the closed society. But, while people have used the low level of critical rationality to give themselves such a closed worldview upon which a conception of the good life could be defined, this closed metaphysics has provided them with an ontological solution to the problem of social order. It needs to be noted that in my sociological theory of social order, the cultural solution to the problem of social order is divided into two parts: one is an ontological solution and another is a moral one. A philosophical solution to the problem of order paves the way for the rise of a moral solution to it (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021: 165–170).

142  From the Closed to the Open Society

In the first step of the opening up a closed society, it is the metaphysics of the closed society that ought to be revised. The dogmatic worldviews, which people have given themselves, involve the regress of justification because it assumes that a philosophical claim about the meaning of the universe is justifiable by positive reasons. If such a philosophical claim cannot be justified by argument, the conception of the universe, upon which the place of man in the universe is defined, would be involved in the infinite regress of proofs. And this place of man in the universe cannot be used to show how the metaphysical solution to the problem of social order might serve the formation of a peaceful and just social order. The reason is that the metaphysical beliefs of individuals enable them to define a shared account of the place for man in the universe, and this shared place allows them to respect each other as “equal ontological beings”. If so, the metaphysics of the closed society defines a wrong place for man in the universe which cannot address the question of an ontological equality of human beings. Therefore, this reading of the ontological equality of humans fails to be a solution not only for preventing individuals from the egoistic behaviour but also for engaging them in a social division of works to realize the ideal of good life for all. The highest level of critical rationality enables the independent actors in the closed society to rethink about the meaning of the universe and the place of man within it. The separation of justification and criticism leads individuals to recognize that not only the dogmatic worldviews cannot address the question of what the universe is, but also they cannot address the question of what the place of man in it is. Such a non-justificational criticism of the metaphysics of the closed society directs us to explain the metaphysical process, which is involved in the cultural change necessary for the opening up the closed society. In the context of such a metaphysical process, a new account of the ontological equality of human beings comes into the existence on the basis of “an accurate place” of man in the universe. Hence, the independent actors in the closed society revise the old vision regarding the place of man in the universe with the new one, which forms a new metaphysical foundation for the moral equality of human beings. In the course of the metaphysical transition from the closed to the open society, a “rational” worldview will be developed that is open to criticism. Now the critical rationalists can base the metaphysical foundations of the open society upon the worldviews and the place of man in it, which are rational because they are held open to criticism and are not shown to be false by negative reasons. The very notion of “ontological equality” of human beings emerging from this new metaphysics would itself be “rational”, and, hence, it plays the role of a philosophical solution to the problem of social order because this ontological reading of humans’ equality would be able to give individuals a “true sense of why” they should be respected as the ends-in-themselves. And, if so, the egoistic pursuit of the self-interests could also be managed by such “an ontological reading of humans’ equality”. Thereby, the metaphysics of the open society provides the critical rationalists with “a philosophical solution” to the problem of social order.

From the Closed to the Open Society  143

Hence, a profound change in the metaphysics of the closed society is required in the cultural transition from the closed to the open society, which is understandable in the context of the critical rationalist model of human action. A historical example of such an ontological change is observed by Stephan L. Collins (1989: 6–7) as follows: The Tudor idea of order with its manifest concepts of correspondence is part of an eschatologically Christian view of the world. Puritanism, while denying that traditional idea of order and correspondence, still defines a world view that is eschatologically oriented, that is, based upon a final transcendental truth. Hobbes’s political order, however, posits a radical celebration of noneschatological existence. There is no purpose, beyond natural man who exists as a mobile, motivate creature, which predetermines social, personal, or political order. The move from the Tudor idea of order to Hobbes’s is an all-encompassing one. It is possible to identify the establishment of secular values in early modern England by analysing the structural modifications that characterized the larger metamorphosis in cosmic vision as represented by this changed idea of order. . . . This transition in the idea of order marks a move from the idea of society to the idea the state. . . . The locus of order shifts from the divine cosmos to the secular sovereign state. The idea of a state, in this context, suggests that social order is separate from divine, natural, or cosmic order. Social order, now, begins to incorporate rational utilitarian authority. And authority is no longer a matter of acquisition or definition; it is only a matter of exercise. Secular order then, redefines the social good. As the passages indicate, a fundamental change in worldviews not only did replace the traditional value system with a modern one, but also created a new account of men’s sovereignty in terms of a state that represents the people. In this line of reasoning, I shall argue that the replacement of the metaphysics of the closed society with the rational worldviews of the open society paves the way for the rise of an ethics of openness to criticism, which in turn leads the critical rationalists to develop the social institutions of “open” law, polity and economy in the open society. With these considerations in mind, it could be concluded that the metaphysical motor force, which transits a closed society to an open one, ought to be understood in terms of “an ontological openness” to criticism. According to my sociological theory of the closed society, which was proposed in the previous chapter, it is the “uncritical” rationality of individuals that allows them to claim that their metaphysical theories of the universe could be justified by positive reasons. However, according to the sociology of the open society, it is the “critical” rationality of individuals that enables them to argue that their metaphysical theories of the universe could only be defended by argument.

144  From the Closed to the Open Society

This replacement of the demand for justification for the demand for criticism allows a sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society to explain the metaphysical change in this transition as follows: independent actors in the closed society should activate the highest level of critical rationality in order to question the closed worldviews resting on the wrong demand for the justification of metaphysical claims regarding the meaning of the universe and the ontological equality, which is defined for human beings, due to the place that the closed worldviews give to man. This non-justificational critique of the metaphysics of the closed society leads the independent actors to initiate a cultural dialogue in regard to the need to basing the moral consensus of the society on the basis of a new understanding of the ontological equality of human beings. From this departure point, the normative sociology of the open society would be able to lead us to see the contribution of the metaphysical change to the rise of another aspect of the cultural transition from the closed to the open society, that is, a moral change in terms of a reform in “the conception” of the good life. Cultural Change and the “Rational” Meaning of the Good Life The subject I am going to be discussing in this part of the argument is that: in order to understand how the culture of closed society should be reformed to make the rise of the open society possible, the role of the place of man in the universe in defining the meaning of the good life ought to be known. As argued before, this role leads to a reading of the ontological equality of human beings which cannot provide the closed society with a solution to the problem of social order. Now, I want to show, when independent actors in the closed society use the highest level of openness to criticism, they would be able to utilize the insights of their metaphysical critique of the closed worldviews for revising the ontological concept of human equality in order to initiate a moral dialogue with regard to the need for turning the new vision of human equality into a new conception of the good life in which humans’ moral equality in terms of the ends-in-themselves is respected. Hence, the usage of the highest level of critical rationality enables the independent actors to question the dogmatic account of the good life in the closed society, replacing it with a “rational” view of the good life. Due to the importance of the rise of a system of common values, upon which the meaning of the good life is defined, for solving the problem of social order, when the independent actors’ understanding of ontological equality of human beings was replaced with a new one, the ground is prepared for the rise of a new values common system in the transition from the closed to the open society. In reality, the meaning of the good life depends on how we have defined the ontological place of the man in the universe. A closed worldview does not define this place as “an open” world-view does. Hence, the independent actors should use the highest level of critical rationality in order to explore

From the Closed to the Open Society  145

this difference. Logically speaking, the result of their investigation could be explained in the following way: like the metaphysical beliefs regarding the universe, the moral beliefs concerning the meaning of the good life shouldn’t be justified by positive reasons in order to be accounted “rational”. Hence, the independent actors in the closed society would realize that, if an ontological equality of human beings, which shapes the metaphysical basis of the concept of the good life in the society should be replaced with a rational vision of it, then the concept of the good life ought to be revised too. The rise of this new concept of the good life originates in the new place that the rational worldviews give to man in the universe, defining humans’ moral equality in terms of the end-in-themselves. Given these considerations, the moral aspect of the cultural transition from the closed to the open society is to be addressed in terms of a profound change, which the independent actors in the closed society initiated in order to replace the dogmatic values of closed society with a set of rational values, which constitutes the new moral solution which the open society offers for the problem of social order. As argued earlier in this chapter, since the usage of the critical rationality makes individuals “value-makers”, rather than “value-takers”, the replacement of the dogmatic reading of the good life, because of its justificational error, with a rational account of it defines a process of moral learning from error in the cultural transition from the closed to the open society. Hence, the system of common values, which has defined the meaning of good life in the closed society could be revised by the independent actors if the new value system, that is “rational” should come into existence, enabling people to govern their egoistic behaviours by respecting each other as the end-in-themselves. And the rise of this new value system would transit the closed society to an open one because the critical rationalists have now found a new normative solution to the problem of social order. This moral solution not only is effective in the terms of its ability for preventing from the egoistic pursuit of interests, due to the rational account of the good life that it defines for the goals of human actions, but also would be effective in terms of engaging people in a social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life for all. In summary, the cultural transition from the closed to the open society leads us to realize that the usage of the highest level of critical rationality gives the independent actors “a cognitive capacity” to open up the metaphysical beliefs and moral values of the closed society to rational criticism. This criticism could lead to the rise of the new ontological and moral visions of human equality, upon which the cultural solution to the problem of social order might be identified. The emergence of the rational worldviews and concept of the good life, which are held open to criticism and are not shown to be false by negative reasons, would be the main outcomes of the cultural transition from the closed to the open society. However, a closed society will not be transformed into an open one, if the new cultural capital couldn’t be transformed into a “governmental system”, which should realize the ideal of the good life for all.

146  From the Closed to the Open Society

Section III: From the Closed to the Open Society: A Governmental Change With the knowledge of how the highest level of critical rationality enables the independent actors in the closed society to open up their dogmatic worldviews and values to criticism, it would also be possible to know that how the cultural capital, that is emerged through such an openness to criticism, is to be utilized by the independent actors to transform the governmental structure of the closed society into a rational governance. The formation of this new governance in the course of opening up the closed society could be addressed in terms of the two following processes: first, the rise of a new legal system, which might be called as “an open law”, and, second, the formation of a new political system, which could be called as “an open democracy”. These developments together lead us to analyse the governmental change, which is necessary for turning the culture of the open society into an institutional change in the closed society. Allow me first take a look at the legal aspect of this governmental change. In the next part of my argument, I shall pay attention to the political aspect of the change. From the Closed to the Open Society: A Legal Transformation From the previous chapters of this volume we know that the culture of a society deeply contributes to the meaning that such society gives to the content of the just law. Stated somewhat differently, the rise of a system of common values in society, which intends to manage individual behaviours as if they could respect each other as the ends-in-themselves, should be accompanied with a system of laws, in short “a just law”, that is defined by its very nature in order to protect the system of values through legalizing it in the context of a constitution. The truth is that the content of the system of values, in which the meaning of the good life and the moral equality of human beings due to their place in the universe are defined, play key roles in enabling the independent actors in the closed society to use the highest level of critical rationality in order to ask from themselves whether the legal system of their society could realize the ideal of the good life. Logically speaking, the answer to this question would be negative for this simple reason that, as argued by the sociological theory of the closed society, the equality of human beings before the rule of law in the closed society is conceptualized on the basis of a dogmatic reading of the just law. A just law originates in “a legal claim” in regard to humans’ equality with respect to an access to the opportunity of the good life, which is justified by positive reasons. As is well known, this justification involves the infinite regress of proofs. If so, the just law of closed society, which aims to legalize the ideal of the good life for all on the basis of the place that the closed worldviews give to man, couldn’t supply the society with “a legal solution” to the problem of social order. It needs to be stated that this legal solution should provide a set of legal codes of behaviour

From the Closed to the Open Society  147

that make the realization of the moral respect for each other, as the ends-inthemselves, possible. If the just law of closed society, due to its justificational error, is unable to protect the society’s system of values through the legalization of the conception of the good life and the moral equality of human beings, the independent actors in the closed society should initiate a legal dialogue in order to not only question the dogmatic account of the just law, but also replace it with a rational account of it. It is in the course of this legal dialogue that the usage of the highest level of critical rationality enables the open-minded persons to inject a new content to the concept of the just law. A just law, which might also be called “an open law”, originates in a legal claim in regard to the equality of human beings with respect to an access to the good life, which is held open to criticism and is not shown be false by negative reasons. It should be added that, not only does the method of defining the just law change from the demanding for positive reasons to the demanding for negative reasons, but also “the content” of the very term “equality” in the legal system will be transformed from originating in a moral equality of human beings, which is defined based on the metaphysics of the closed society, into a moral equality, which is defined based on the rational worldviews of the open society. From a deeper epistemological viewpoint, it should be said that “human beings” are not only morally but also legally “equal”, not because they have “an equal access” to the “uncritical” rationality, but because they have “an equal access” to the “critical” rationality. Hence, the legal aspect of a governmental transition from the closed to the open society leads us to a deeper understanding of this transition by arguing that the reforms in the worldviews and moral values of the closed society wouldn’t suffice to make a closed society an open one. The independent actors should also turn those cultural reforms into an institutional change, which refers to the establishment of “an open law” at the core of the constitution of the open society, in which the ontological and moral equalities of human beings are legalized in terms of a set of “equal human rights” to the opportunity of the good life; “a good life” – which is identified on the basis of an accurate place of man in the rational worldviews. The just law of the open society could protect the equality of people with regard to the opportunity of the good life because not only does it define the meaning of equality on the basis of an accurate concept of the good life, but also it defines the notion of just law based on “a legal claim” regarding individuals’ equal rights to the good life, which is held open to criticism but is not shown to be false by argument. This non-justificational conception of the just law leads the open society to a legal system that can protect the moral equality of human beings. Hence, in the course of transition from the closed to the open society, the critical rationalists would be able to find a new legal solution to the problem of social order, through which the egoistic behaviours will be better managed by the legal codes of behaviour, and social cooperation will be better shaped by those codes of behaviour in order to realize the ideal of the good life for all. Now, allow me take a look at the political aspect of the governmental transition from the closed to the open society.

148  From the Closed to the Open Society

From the Closed to the Open Society: A Political Change To address the transition from the closed to the open society, we need to go one step deeper into our analysis of the governmental nature of this transition. And this would be a discussion in regard to the role of a political change in the closed society. It seems there is a good reason to defend the need to such a political change. To realize this reason, it is important to keep in mind that the rise of an open law in the course of opening up the closed society does not mean that the moral and legal equalities of human beings to the opportunity of the good life will be guaranteed by the just law of the open society. Hence, we should have a clearer understanding of how the ideal of the equal rights to the good life might be realized in practice. It is a well-known fact that, without an executive branch of the government, the constitution of open society wouldn’t be more than an open law, which is written on a piece of paper. Having recognized that fact, then, the independent actors in the closed society should activate the highest level of critical rationality to address the question of whether the government of their society could be “an executive power” for the enforcement of the open law of open society. Putting it differently, should such an authoritarian government use the monopoly of power in order to enforce the rule of open law in the open society? Logically speaking, the answer is negative. In reality, the meaning of a legitimate government in the closed society originates in what are defined in such a society as the good life and just law. As argued by my sociology of the closed society, such a meaning of the legitimate government is rested – first, on the concept of the equal rights to the good life and, second, on this premise that a political claim in regard to the meaning of political legitimacy should be proved by positive reasons. Hence, neither the meaning of the equal rights to the good life nor the justificational method of argument could be useful for considering the government of closed society as “a legitimate” government, which should be given a monopoly of the political power. When it is recognized by the independent actors in the closed society that the government of the society wouldn’t be able to enforce the open law and protect the equal rights to the good life, they should use the highest level of critical rationality in order to replace the authoritarian government with a democratic one. To this end, they would require a political dialogue, which makes the need to such a political change a necessary requirement of the transition from the closed to the open society. The result of this political dialogue would be a new system of government – that can be called as an open democracy – which defines its legitimacy in terms of the “equal political power” that it assumes for all people to determine and re-select the democratic government. In other words, the legitimacy of an open democracy, which will be created in the political transition from the closed to the open society, is to be seen in two criteria: on the one hand, an open democracy turns the legal equality of human beings into a political right to self-determination, and on the other hand, an open democracy, itself, should be

From the Closed to the Open Society  149

held open to criticism in order to see whether its performance might be shown to be refuted by negative reasons. With these considerations in mind, the political transition from the closed to the open society refers to a profound change in the very conception of political legitimacy and its application in practice: a transition from a closed government to an open one. With the rise of the open democracy, the critical rationalists will reach “a new political solution” to the problem of social order: they actually knew that to realize the ideal of the rule of law in the open society, they need a democratic government, which not only does not claim that it can use the monopoly of force in spite of their consensus, but also it admits that people, who have given the monopoly of power to the open government for the first time, would be able to take back such a political power whenever they realized that the government does not serve the ideal of the equal rights to the good life. It is worthy of note that, while Popper sees the role of democracy in the open society in the protection of individual freedom, in my normative sociology of the open society, the role of democracy is to be seen in the protection of the equal rights to the good life. However, the very concept of the equal rights here is defined by the conception of the good life, which does not refer to “a subjective preference” of individuals but to “an objective” system of values, which people have given themselves. In short, the political reforms of government ought to be understood within the cultural context of the transition from the closed to the open society. Now allow me to take a look at an economic aspect of the transition in question.

Section IV: From the Closed to the Open society: An Economic Change In order to complete our sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society, the question of what should be an economic aspect of this transition will be dealt with in this section. The mechanism of resource allocation in the closed society does not work efficiently to mobilize the scarce resources to meet the needs of people’s good life: because, neither the demand side of economy nor the supply side of it is shaped on the basis of accurate concepts of the good life and just law. Hence, from the viewpoint of the demand side, the pattern of consumption does not reflect the real needs of people to goods and services, and from the point of view of the supply side, the pattern of production does reflect the real capacities of the production factors for creating goods and services. In sum, the mechanism of market in the closed society does not operate as if the real potentials of the production factors could be employed efficiently to meet the real needs of people’s good life. Under these conditions, it is not a surprise that the independent actors in the closed society would realize that the economic system of their society requires a profound change. In other words, while an open democracy is available to enforce

150  From the Closed to the Open Society

the just law of open society, an inefficient mechanism of resource allocation in the closed society cannot mobilize the factors of production to realize the ideal of the good life for all. This situation leads to the realization of the fact that the ideal of the open society couldn’t be realized without replacing the closed economy of society with an open one. In reality, the economic aspect of the transition from the closed to the open society refers to such a replacement. In order to realize this economic change, the independent actors in the closed society should use the highest level of critical rationality for two purposes: on the one hand, they ought to use the critical rationality in order to question the laws of supply and demand, which are shaped due to people’s accounts of the just law and good life. And, on the other hand, they should use the critical rationality in order to replace the old laws of supply and demand with the new ones as if this replacement could create an efficient mechanism of resource allocation, which would be able to make an optimum usage of the real potentials of the production factors to meet the real patterns of the consumption. A criticism of the closed economy, which is shaped to solve the problem of economic order in the closed society, would be possible if the open-minded persons realize that the moral and legal foundations of this closed economy do not allow it to operate efficiently for mobilizing the scarce resources to satisfy the needs of the good life. Hence, the independent actors should criticize the closed economy from the moral and legal perspectives: first, from the moral point of view, if the demand side of the closed economy does not reflect the real pattern of consumption, the reason is that the conception of the good life, which is used to determine the subjective preferences for goods and services, involves the problem of regress of justification, and second, from the legal point of view, if the supply side of the closed economy does not reflect the real pattern of production, the reason is that the notion of the just law engages in a justificational error. It should be added that the authoritative government of the closed society cannot protect the open law. Now, the independent actors would have a clearer understanding of what is wrong with the closed economy. The open-minded persons should activate the highest level of openness to criticism in order to replace the old laws of supply and demand with the new ones. To satisfy this job, they can create a “new law of demand” on the basis of the rational conception of the good life, which they have already given to themselves in terms of the common values of the open society. In this way, in the economic transition from the closed to the open society, the new mechanism of the resource allocation can “rationalize” the pattern of consumption on the basis of the rational account of the good life. However, this change should be completed with a similar change in the supply side of the economy. The open-minded persons can also create “a new law of supply” on the basis of the rational reading of the equal rights to the good life, which they have already given to themselves in terms of the just law of open society. In this way, in the economic transition from the closed to the open society, the new mechanism of the resource allocation can “rationalize” the pattern of production on the basis of the rational account of the

From the Closed to the Open Society  151

equal rights to the good life. It needs to be argued here that the productivity of the factors of production, in the supply side of economy, depends on the ways the legal system of the society in question defines the “property rights” of the factors of production and the political order of the society protects such property rights. In summary, the new laws of supply and demand work together to create an efficient mechanism of resource allocation for the open society: this mechanism can recognize the real needs of the good life, in the demand side of economy, and it would be capable in terms of using the factors of production efficiently, in the supply side of economy, to produce the goods and services, which are required to meet the real needs of people’s good life.

Section V: From the Closed to the Open Society: A Macro-Sociological Analysis From a sociological point of view, the question of how a closed society might be transformed into an open society requires that we integrate the cultural, governmental and economic aspects of this transformation into one macro-analysis. Hence, in this section, I want to present a macro-sociological analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. The Transition in Question as a “Social Learning” From Errors As argued in this chapter, the general theory of critical rationalism enables us to develop a new micro-foundation for the normative sociology of the transition from the closed to the open society because it allows us to redefine the role of the independent human actors not only in questioning the moral and institutional bases of the closed society, but also replacing them with the rational values and institutions. In this line of thought, the transition from the closed to the open society refers to “a social learning” from errors through which human actors will be educated to know how to solve the problem of social order by using the highest level of critical rationality. This process of social learning from the justificational error begins with a metaphysical learning: when the actors, in terms of thinkers–movements–masses, realize that their understanding of the universe involves the premises which are not defendable by argument, they lead to a criticism of the metaphysical foundation of the closed society in which the meaning of the good life is defined. In other words, the highest level of critical rationality enables them to rethink about their closed worldviews. The usage of this level of openness to criticism means that while we cannot justify a metaphysical belief by positive reasons, we can criticize it by negative reasons. Hence, the independent actors, who activate the highest level of critical rationality, would be able to learn from the error of the closed worldview, replacing it with an open worldview.

152  From the Closed to the Open Society

The metaphysical learning from the error provides the actors with “an ontological capital”, leading them to the next stage of the opening up the closed society: when the theory of the universe in the closed society was refuted because of its regress of justification, the place which the theory gives to man in the universe would be falsified too. And the learning from this refutation has an important consequence for a criticism of the moral values of closed society: people who apply the highest level of critical rationality would be capable of revising their concepts of the good life, which rests upon “a wrong place” that the closed worldview has given to man in the universe. Thus, the independent actors will realize that it is their uncritical rationality that contributes to the moral foundation of closed society. At the moral stage of the transition from the closed to the open society, people come to replace that meaning of the good life, which is unjustifiable, with an alternative one, that is refutable but is not shown to be false by argument. In the light of this insight, the application of critical rationality allows the independent actors in the closed society to discover what is wrong with their common values. And this leads them to the need for revising the moral basis of closed society as if the problem of social order could be solved. If so, the open-minded actors give themselves “an ethics of openness to criticism”, which would be an alternative moral basis for the dogmatic ethics of closed society. The ethics of openness to criticism implies that people should respect “a theory of the good life”, which is held open to criticism, and is not shown to be false by negative reasons. When people have replaced the dogmatic vision of the good life with a “rational one”, the moral transition from the closed to the open society has been realized in practice. The moral learning from the justificational errors empowers people to give themselves a rationalist moral law, whose respect by people could control the egoistic behaviours, preventing from a war of all against all. In addition, this new moral law would help people to create a social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life for all. But the normative sociology of the open society recognizes that, without “a legalization” of the new moral law, the ideal of the good life for all wouldn’t be realized in practice. Hence, the next stage of the transition from the closed to the open society will take place, provided the independent actors in the closed society activate the highest level of critical rationality in order to deal with what is wrong with the legal order of closed society. At the legal stage of the transition from the closed to the open society, the independent actors would realize that the dogmatic account of the legal equality cannot provide the closed society with a just legal system, which intends to protect the ideal of the good life for all. The reason is that, on the one hand, the content of the just law in the closed society originates from “a wrong account” of the good life, and, on the other hand, the closed-minded persons have claimed that their theories of justice are justifiable by argument. Learning from such a justificational error, that is involved in this account of the equal rights to the good life, allows the critical rationalists to revise it by replacing the demand for justification with the demand for criticism. Hence, the independent actors in the closed society use

From the Closed to the Open Society  153

the highest level of critical rationality to create a new account of the just law. In this new account, the meaning of the term “equality” rests on the rational account of the good life, and, hence, it does not deal with the regress of justification. In addition, according to this new account, a theory of just law is to be held open to criticism, and if it is not shown to be false by argument, it would be “an unfalsified legal theory”. Viewed from this perspective, it could be said that such an open law of the open society is capable of protecting the equal rights to the good life. Although the rise of a rational vision of the just law would be an important progress in the process of opening up the closed society, in order to enforce the just law, the open society requires an executive power. Hence, the independent actors ought to use the highest level of critical rationality to see what is wrong with an authoritarian government of the closed society. In reality, the problem with such a political system is that it defines its political legitimacy upon the basis of a conception of “equality”, originating in a justificational vision of the good life. It is for this reason that the closed society gives an absolute power to its government to enforce the dogmatic view of the just law. The open-minded actors thus should replace the authoritarian regime with an open democracy in order to establish a political order which could enforce the rational vision of the just law. In this way, the political stage of the transition from the closed to the open society will take place. At the final stage of the transition from the closed to the open society, the independent actors would realize that what should be wrong with the way the scarce resources are mobilized to meet the needs of people’s good life in the closed society: the reason is that, on the one hand, the dogmatic account of the good life prevents the demand side of economy from the creation of a real pattern of consumption, and, on the other hand, the dogmatic account of the just law prevents the supply side of economy from the creation of a real pattern of production. The result of these patterns of consumption and production wouldn’t be less than “a non-competitive” mechanism of resource allocation that cannot utilize the factors of production efficiently to produce those goods and services necessary for satisfying the needs of people’s good life. Hence, the independent actors in the closed society should decide to create new patterns of consumption and production on the basis of the rational visions of the good life and just law through which new laws of supply and demand will be shaped to meet the needs of the good life by an optimum usage of the production factors to create the required goods and services. In this sense, the open-minded persons could find a new solution to the economic problem of society in the transition from the closed to the open society.

Section VI: From the Closed to the Open Society: The Sociological Analysis Versus Popper’s Analysis In this section, I shall argue that, while Popper has not applied a sociological theory for addressing the transition from a closed to an open society, two

154  From the Closed to the Open Society

major reasons for this issue could be explained in the following way: on the one hand, because of his definition of critical rationalism as irrational faith in reason, Popper does not lead to a model of rational action by the means of which the role of critical rationality in solving the problem of social order could be explored. On the other hand, it seems that Popper’s knowledge of modern sociology has not been so deep, which can enable him to recognize the connection between the problem of social order and the model of rational action as, for instance, Talcott Parsons’ theory of society argued about the connection in question. Hence, the question of how a closed society could be transformed into an open one was not considered by Popper as “the problem of social change” in its sociological sense. Popper’s Epistemology of Science and His Idea of the Open Society In my view, Popper’s description of the transition from the closed to the open society is not a “sociological analysis” because the way through which Popper connects his critical epistemology with the ideas of the closed and open societies does not lead us to see how human action contributes to the rise of the closed and open societies. In this line of reasoning, the following remarks by Hans Albert (2006: 7) are insightful. It is one of the peculiarities of Popper’s social philosophy that it is closely connected with his epistemology. The fallibilism, the realism, and the critical approach of his epistemology are also the basis of his conception of social philosophy. The open society as it has been characterized by Popper is a society whose members have the possibility to decide freely about how to lead their lives and to participate in decisions about their common affairs. By the institutionalization of competition and criticism in all social realms such societies are in a condition to find new solutions for problems of all kinds, to analyse and to discuss these solutions, and to come to reforms. In the same line of reasoning, we can argue that the closed society is a society whose members do not have the possibility to decide freely about how to lead their lives and to participate in decisions about their common affairs. However, the problem with “this way” of relating the critical epistemology with the ideas of the closed and open societies is that it does not tell us how human agents use the different degrees of critical rationality to find a solution to the problem of social order. In my view, while Popper defines critical rationalism on the basis of the sceptic’s critique of uncritical rationalism, he follows the logic of the sceptic that implies since we cannot justify our belief in reason by positive reasons, we should admit the belief in reason by an irrational faith. In this way, Popper’s critical rationalism involves a justificational error. When the conception of rationality, itself, is

From the Closed to the Open Society  155

not defined accurately, the role of reason in human action and the contribution of rational action to solving the problem of social order couldn’t be addressed too. In the light of these insights, I realized this important point that without a reinvention of the idea of critical rationalism, the relationship between critical rationalism and the formation of an open society couldn’t be explained. In the first volume of this book, I proposed the general theory of critical rationalism and applied it to develop a model of human action in order to offer the critical rationalist theories of social order and social change (Mohammadi Alamuti 2021). The present volume used the critical rationalist model of action to propose the sociological theories of the closed and open society. Inspired by the sociologies of the closed and open societies, I have presented a normative sociology of the transition from the closed to the open society in the present chapter. In the light of these insights, I argue that, while Popper has outlined a beautiful picture of how the idea of science, in terms of conjunctures and refutations, might be used “as a paradigm” for defining the meaning of the idea of an open society, in this picture he does not create “a causal link” between human action and the formation of an open society. In other words, the actors’ access to critical rationality does not have “a meaningful role” in addressing the societal mechanisms through which a closed society should be transformed into an open one. The reason is simple: if we define critical rationality as “a moral attitude” of openness to criticism, which is merely justified by irrational faith, then this moral attitude cannot tell us how people activate the critical rationality to discover what might be wrong with the common values and social institutions of the closed society, applying the learning from error to give themselves new system of values and social institutions necessary for the rise of an open society. Like Hans Albert, Ian Jarvie (2001: 146–147) argues that: Under Popper’s hand this model of science [conjunctures and refutations] is transformed into a model for society in general. . . . A society which adopts such an attitude to itself and its components is an open society, and a paradigm for the open society is the open institution of science. [Emphasis added] Given this relation between the paradigm of science and the idea of the open society, how does Popper establish his analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society upon the basis of the epistemology of science? As asked by Jarvie, How did this transition from the closed to the open society begin in Ancient Greece? No explanation is possible, as that would make invention reproducible. It is, however, possible to specify necessary and even facilitating conditions. . . . Popper suggests that population pressure created tension within the ruling class, presumably in a struggle for the spoils, and was meliorated by the creation of daughter cities or colonies. But culture contact and commerce created even more stress, as non-traditional classes, including foreigners, appeared on the scene to disrupt the order of things. By the sixth century

156  From the Closed to the Open Society

there were revolutions and reactions, the birth of free thought and clear evidence of the strain of civilization. The strain comes from the demands made on the citizen by the break-down of the closed society: to be rational, to think for themselves, to be autonomous, and above all to take responsibility for the way things are. Popper concludes of the strain of civilization, “It is the price we have to pay for being human”. (ibid.: 147) While these remarks show that Popper tries to recognize moral responsibility of individuals in the transition from the closed to the open society, the separation that he creates between the idea of critical rationality and moral philosophy, in terms of an “irrational attitude” of openness to criticism, does not allow Popper to argue that it is the critical rationality that enables human actors, not only to give themselves a moral law, which defines humans as equal moral beings, but also to revise the moral law whenever it was realized that the law is shown to be false by negative reasons. In short, the idea that a society, which adopts the “scientific attitude” of openness to criticism to itself, is an open society does not tell us how the open society comes into existence. In contrast, we should explain how human actors in the closed society can activate the highest level of critical rationality in order to build the open society through an agreement on moral values and social institutions which are held open to criticism but not shown to be false by negative reasons. A Sociological Critique of Popper’s Analysis of the Transition As argued before, when critical rationalism is defined as a moral attitude, the question of how reason drives action does not find an answer because the idea of reason as the driver of action wouldn’t be defendable. Hence, with a model of human action, which rests on the equation of rationality with justification, the problem of social order couldn’t be solved: the reasons are that, on the one hand, the egotistic behaviours of people are not controlled whereas the passion drives action, and, on the other hand, people would not respect each other as the ends-in-themselves and cannot agree on a system of common values, which gives the social division of works a moral purpose – that is the realization of the ideal of the good life for all. In the light of these insights, I have argued that, however, a meaningful relation between critical rationalism and the sociological theory of the open society could be created, whereas the model of rational action is redefined on the basis of a nonjustificational conception of rationality. But since Popper’s model of rational action is shaped on the basis of the idea of knowledge as justified true belief, it cannot provide us with a micro-foundation for a sociological analysis of the open society formation. The same argument can be made in regard to Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. In other words, to address the

From the Closed to the Open Society  157

question of how the independent actors in the closed society should use critical rationality in order to replace the closed values and institutions with the open ones, we need a model of human action, which reconstructs human rational behaviours on the basis of the non-justificational conception of rationality, rather than the justificational one. The Role of Human Freedom in Popper’s Idea of an Open Society My sociological critique of Popper’s analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society can be developed by making clear the role of the principle of human freedom in the idea of an open society. Like the liberal philosophers, Popper argues that the principle of human freedom should play a central role in the normative idea of a free society, and the value of social institutions of the free society such as political democracy and market economy is to be evaluated in terms of their contributions to the protection of human freedom. As pointed out by Albert (2006: 8), The basis value of Popper’s idea of an open society is, as he himself once pointed out, human freedom. But it was clear to him that this freedom has to be controlled by the state and that on the other hand only a state that is controlled by free citizens can protect their freedom. His idea of an open society is an attempt to transform the European idea of freedom into a sociological construction that can be seen as an ideal type in the sense of Max Weber. If this explanation of the role of human freedom in the idea of open society is correct, then how may Popper differentiate his idea of the open society from the notion of a liberal society? This question can lead us to this insight that from a sociological point of view, there is not a substantial difference between Popper’s idea of open society and the idea of liberal society. Given the role of human freedom in Popper’s idea of the open society, he has attempted to rewrite the concept of liberal society in terms of “openness to criticism”. However, this attempt does not lead him to “a meaningful difference” between the idea of open society and the notion of liberal society. Allow me take a quick look at why. In this line of reasoning, I should refer to Mark Bovens’s (2020: 7) argument in ‘The Open Society and Its Future’. He points out, From a broader philosophical perspective, the notion of an “open society” is part of a long liberal philosophical tradition that emphasizes individual autonomy, liberty, and personal emancipation. The “open society” is a normative ideal that is based on the notion that the autonomy and rights of individual citizens deserve and are the ultimate basis for the legitimate exercise of public power. This liberal philosophical tradition came to a full development

158  From the Closed to the Open Society

in the European Enlightenment. It is an attempt to legitimate and limit the exercise of public power on the basis of individual liberties and popular sovereignty, instead of on tradition, theocracy. . . . Major thinkers in this tradition are Rousseau, Locke, Kant, Mill, and Rawls. According to this liberal philosophical tradition, an open society is characterized by: • • • • •

individual autonomy; popular sovereignty; civil liberties as inalienable rights; equal opportunity; open enquiry and free conscience.

From this liberal philosophical perspective, the opposite of an open society is an illiberal society, in which the personal autonomy and freedom of individual citizens are not respected. [Emphasis added] However, we should ask from ourselves that, if the open society is a liberal society and the closed society an illiberal one, what might be the contribution of Popper’s idea of open society to the notion of liberal society? In other words, if it is the principle of human freedom that characterizes the idea of open society, would be there any “substantial difference” between these two conceptions of a free society? In Science and the Open Society, Mark Notturno leads us to see what might be Popper’s answers to the aforementioned questions. Notturno (2000: 30–31) writes: In my view, the basic ideal of open society is not really tolerance at all. I do not mean that people should be intolerant, or that tolerance is not important for freedom and free society. But I do mean that the ideals that fuel an open society are such that we have to do more than merely dissenting ideas if we want to open a closed one. . . . Tolerance, thus understood, is the ideal of the so-called “negative” freedom, or freedom from coercion, which asks for nothing more that we leave each other alone. . . . And Popper, in any event, thought that open society is “based on the idea of not merely tolerating dissenting opinions but respecting them”. But isn’t respect the same as tolerance? . . . This, I think, is the way in which Popper himself often used the term [tolerance], and why he said that open society is based upon respecting dissenting opinions and not merely tolerating them. In the light of these insights, we should recognize that Popper is right in saying that open society differs from liberal society because it calls for respecting dissenting opinions rather than tolerating them. But could this difference be developed into a moral separation of the ethics of openness to criticism and the liberal

From the Closed to the Open Society  159

ethics of tolerance? My reason for asking this question is that: when Popper has already ruled out the possibility of a rational discussion regarding the moral beliefs, including a rational discussion about the moral attitude of openness to criticism, in order to see whether they are shown to be false by argument, how can he speak of a substantial difference between the two aforementioned ethics? If this is so, how could the ethics of openness to criticism be differentiated from the ethics of tolerance? My answer to this question is that we cannot find “a rational foundation” for such an ethical difference. It is important to be noted here that if the sociological idea of the open society implies the ethics of openness to criticism leads us to a rational meaning of the good life, the reason is that it has replaced the concept of knowledge as justified true belief with the notion of knowledge as unfalsified conjuncture. Hence, a moral belief regarding the meaning of the good life, which is held open to criticism and is not refuted by argument, is to be considered “a rational belief”. In this sense, it could be said that the ethics of openness to criticism originates in the “a rational belief”, rather than in “an irrational faith”. With these considerations in mind, the role of the principle of human freedom in the idea of liberal society should be defined in the following way: since nobody can “justify” his claim by positive reasons, all persons should have a moral freedom in order to define their own accounts of the good life due to the premises which are seen to them as justifiable premises. Hence, the ethics of tolerance of differences might be understood in the context of the justified true belief account of knowledge, rather than in the context of the epistemology of knowledge as unfalsified conjuncture. And this epistemological difference leads us to realize “a substantial difference” between the idea of an open society and the notion of a liberal society. Without the knowledge of such an epistemological reading of the role of human freedom in the idea of liberal society, it is not a surprise that Popper has not differentiated the concept of human freedom in an open society from its definition in a liberal society. As argued before, the meaning of human freedom in the open society implies that since people are “equal rational beings”, due to their “equal access” to critical rationality, they should be regarded as free human beings. However, the conception of human freedom in the liberal society means that people are free human beings because they are capable of using the reason in order to justify what they “themselves” think that it might be true. In a sense, this liberal reading of human freedom originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge, involving a justificational error. In this line of thought, Ross Poole (1996: 89) points out, Underlying the liberal emphasis on the freedom of people to choose their own conception of the good is the failure of liberalism to confront the arbitrariness of this freedom where people are devoid of standards to inform their choosing. The reality to which this freedom is subject is the process of socialization and the socially imposed goals of consumption and power. . . . Nihilism arises

160  From the Closed to the Open Society

in part through the collapse of objective values and the incapacity of individuals to provide their own. [Emphasis added] While, in my view, the liberal ethics of tolerance refers to “an objective” system of values, which has made the rise of liberal society possible, this system of values suffers from the regress of justification and should be differentiated from the ethics of openness to criticism, which makes the rise of an open society possible. If Popper is right in saying that the importance of the rule of law, democracy and free economy for the idea of an open society is to be considered due to their contributions to human freedom, then how would Popper tell us that the ethics of openness to criticism gives shape to the meanings of just law, legitimate government and efficient economy in the open society? Without addressing this question, the relation of “human freedom” with the rule of law, democracy and free economy in an open society couldn’t be differentiated from such relations in a liberal society.

Section VII: A Substantial Difference Between a “Liberal” and an “Open” Society In the final section of this chapter, I intend to argue that how making “a substantial difference” between the liberal and open society improves our understanding the transition from the closed to the open society. Is the Open Society a Liberal Society? To address the question of whether an open society is a liberal society, I should begin with the following passage, which is pointed out by Jarvie and Pralong (2003: xviii) in Open Society After 50th Years: Since our knowledge of what is virtuous is conjectural, like all our knowledge, it would be dogmatic and risky to shape society according to one recipe. However, a liberal and secular society can accommodate within it almost all experiments in ways of living, in cultivation of the virtues that different groups wish to advocate. A plural, secular order is a means to guard against catastrophic mistakes. It will not satisfy zeolots, who may judge is very an offence. Education towards tolerance as a supreme virtue is a long term project. Does the definition of this passage about the idea of an open society differ from the concept of a liberal society? In my view, the answer is negative. I should like to argue that, however, the sociological account of the open society leads us to see a “clear” difference between an open society and a liberal one. Let me take a quick look at why.

From the Closed to the Open Society  161

In the open society, people use the highest level of critical rationality to give themselves an ethics of openness to criticism by the means of which people could hold open their moral claims regarding the meaning of the good life to an intersubjective criticism and seeing whether the claims are shown to be false by negative reasons. The result of this moral openness could be a “rational” concept of the good life. This objective system of values then is used by the open-minded persons to define the meanings of the social institutions of just law, legitimate government and efficient economy not only for preventing the war of all against all, but also for creating a social division of works which mobilizes the resources to meet the needs of the good life. A distinguishing character of this account of the open society would be an “objective” system of values on the basis of which the social institutions of the open society are shaped. However, in the liberal society, people have agreed on the principle of human freedom, which implies that since nobody can justify his “moral claims” regarding the meaning of the good life by positive reasons, all persons should be given an “equal liberty” to define their own concepts of the good life on the basis of the premises which are only acceptable for themselves. Hence, “the ethics of tolerance of difference”, which originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge, would be “an objective, yet problematic, system of values” in a liberal society, offering an imperfect normative solution to the problem of social order. In short, the idea of a liberal society does not imply that people could reach “a rational consensus” on the meaning of the good life. In my view, this claim of liberal society is to be understood within the context of the epistemology of justified true belief: if nobody can justify his claim of rational beliefs, all persons should be allowed to defend their own claims due to the subjective premises which are valid for themselves. In a sense, the liberal ethics of tolerance could be connected with the sceptic’s justificational critique of uncritical rationalism. And, in this sense, Popper’s irrational faith in reason might closely be linked to the liberal ethics of tolerance. From a sociological standpoint, the idea of open society differs substantially from the notion of liberal society because the first idea rests on an epistemological separation of justification from criticism, while the second one originates in the epistemology of justified true belief. From this sociological perspective, Popper’s idea of the open society should be situated within the wider context of the idea of liberal society, while the sociology of the open society argues that the open society ought to be substantially differentiated from the liberal society in terms of its common values and social institutions. Hence, I argue that the “unfinished project” of building “a well-ordered society of free and equal persons”, using Rawls’ term, requires a sociological conception of the open society to show how liberal society should learn from its justificational errors in order to be transformed into an open society. In the course of the transition from the closed to the open society, “a critique of liberal society”, from the perspective of the philosophy of critical rationalism, leads us to realize that our modern societies ought to be opened up to rational criticism and learning from its mistakes.

162  From the Closed to the Open Society

Note 1 Robert N. Bellah (1973) argues about the contribution of Emile Durkheim to the theory of society by addressing the question of how “moral values” are internalized in the individual’s personal identity through the religious rituals, as repetitive and patterned behaviour that is prescribed by or tied to a religion. Bellah writes, according to Durkheim: “[S]ociety has consecrated the individual and made him pre-eminently worthy of respect. His progressive emancipation does not imply a weakening but a transformation of the social bonds. The individual does not tear himself from society but is joined to it in a new manner, and this is because society sees him in a new manner and wishes this change to take place” (ibid.: xxiv). From this perspective, it is the society that defines the individual’s identity through its moral norms.

Bibliography Albert, Hans (2006) “Karl Popper and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century”. In: Jarvie, I. et al. (eds.) Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume I. Burlington, Ashgate, pp. 1–12. Bellah, R.N. (ed.) (1973) Emile Durkheim, on Morality and Society, Selected Writings. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Bovens, M. (2020) “The Open Society and Its Future”. Think Paper Series #1, Utrecht University Press, pp. 1–48. Collins, S.L. (1989) From Divine Cosmos to Sovereign State: An Intellectual History of Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance England. New York, Oxford University Press. Jarvie, I.C. (2001) The Republic of Science: The Emergence of Popper’s Social View of Science 1935–1945. Atlanta, Amsterdam. Jarvie, I.C. and Pralong, S (eds.) (2003) Popper’s Open Society, After 50 Years, the Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper. London and New York, Routledge. Mohammadi Alamuti, M. (2021) Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Society, Critical Rationalism and the Open Society Volume I. London and New York, Routledge. Notturno, M.A. (2000) Science and the Open Society: The Future of Karl Popper’s Philosophy. Budapest, Central European University Press. Parsons, T. (1991 [2005]) The Social System. London, Routledge. Poole, R. (1996) Morality and Modernity. London and New York, Routledge. Popper, K.R. (1945 [2012]) The Open Society and Its Enemies. New One-Volume edn. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Pralong, S. (2003) “Minima Moralia: Is There an Ethics of the Open Society?”. In: Popper’s Open Society, After 50 Years, the Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 128–145. Touraine, A. (1965) Sociologie de I’action. Paris, Le Seuil.

Chapter 8

The Sociology of the Open Society A Summary

The main idea of the present volume is to explain what role the theory of critical rationalism could play in the sociology of the open society. In the first volume of this book, I argued that in order to integrate critical rationalism in the microfoundation of the theory of society, we should first “reinvent” the philosophy of critical rationalism itself to make it applicable for a redefinition of the models of action in sociology. In the second volume, I have applied the critical rationalist model of action to show that the ideas of the lower and higher levels of access to critical rationality lead us to develop not only a theory of the open society but also a theory of the closed society. I have used these theories to present “a normative sociology” of the transition from the closed to the open society. In short, it should be said that the reinvented philosophy of critical rationalism led me to the general theory of critical rationalism, according to which I could use the notion of the stages of progress in critical rationality to show that how the access to the lower and higher levels of critical rationality tells us how human actors, in terms of thinkers-movements-masses, contribute to the rise of the closed and open societies, and how the highest level of openness to criticism ought to be used by the independent actors to transform a closed society into an open one.

Section I: A Reinvention of Critical Rationalism for the Sociology of the Open Society As noted before, I have argued that the idea of critical rationalism should be reinvented in order to become “a theory” of critical rationality, which can tell us how reason drives action. Inspired by this observation, my sociology of the open society is differentiated from Popper’s analysis of the open society. The reason is simple: if critical rationalism itself is not defendable by reasons, and should be admitted by irrational faith, then how can one say that this definition of rationality might be used, first, to define the function of reason and, second, to formulate a model of human action in which reason drives action? From a sociological standpoint, without the knowing of how human action is driven by reason or passion, it wouldn’t be possible to explore how human action contributes to the rise of a social order and its change. Hence, the need for a reinvention of the idea of critical DOI: 10.4324/9781003027119-9

164  The Sociology of the Open Society

rationalism in order to internalize it in the micro-foundation of a macro-sociology of the open society originally came to my mind when I realized that Popper’s critical and even Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism do not supply us with “a theory of rationality”, which could explain how reason works and, consequently, how it drives human action. With an epistemological critique of Popper’s critical and Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism, the first volume of this book showed that the problem of rational beliefs, in general, and the problem of “a rational belief in reason” in particular have not yet been solved by the philosophy of critical rationalism. I have argued that the main reason for this failure is that: not only Popper’s critical rationalism, but also Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism is shaped on the basis of the idea of knowledge as justified true belief. Inspired by an alternative epistemology, which defines objective knowledge in terms of “unfalsified conjuncture”, the first volume argued that the problem of rational beliefs, in general, and the problem “a rational belief in reason” in particular, could be overcome by the following solution: “a belief” in general and “a belief in reason” in particular are “rational” if, and only if, they are held open to criticism and are not shown to be false by “negative reasons”. This solution originates in the following definition of objective knowledge: knowledge is “a special kind of belief” which is held to (intersubjectively) criticism and is not shown to be false by argument or experience. The logical possibility of holding “a claim of rational belief” to criticism, seeing whether it would be refuted by negative reasons, allowed me to formulate my general theory of critical rationality. I applied this new theory of rationality in order to show that the models of human action in sociology ought to be reinvented upon the basis of “an entirely new” viewpoint of how the reason operates without involving in the infinite regress of proofs. Thus, I argued that the microfoundation of the theory of society is to be reformulated to tell us how the access to critical rationality drives human action. This reformulation at the micro-level had a very significant outcome for enabling a sociological theory of society, at the macro-level, for addressing the problems of social order and its change. The final product of the first volume was a critical rationalist theory of society, which has been applied in the present volume to develop not only a sociological theory of the open society, but also a sociological theory of the closed society. More importantly, these two sociological theories helped me to offer “a normative analysis” of the transition from the closed to the open society.

Section II: From the Closed to the Open Society: A Sociological Analysis When I reinvented the idea of critical rationalism in order to make it a theory of rationality in terms of the general theory of critical rationalism, I was also led to the idea of the stages of progress in critical rationality. This notion implies that to the extent that one holds open the premises and inferences of his argument to criticism, he would learn from the mistaken premises or inferences. In this way,

The Sociology of the Open Society  165

he can improve his access to critical rationality. The idea of the stages of progress in critical rationality led me to differentiate the dogmatic rationalism, as the main manifestation of the low level of critical rationality, from the non-justificational critical rationalism, as the main manifestation of the high level of critical rationality. Therefore, I was directed to this idea that the low level of critical rationality has enabled human actors to give themselves a closed social order, and the high level of it can also allow them to give themselves an open social order. And, more importantly, I realized that the independent actors in the closed society would be able to “activate” their access to the highest level of critical rationality in order to open up their dogmatic values and institutions to criticism, and by the means of which, they could operate as the real agents of the transition from the closed to the open society. In the course of my inquiry, I realized that my sociological analyses of the closed and open societies would lead me to develop a significant critique of Popper’s ideas of the closed and open societies, and the way he has addressed the transition from the closed to the open society. In this line of reasoning, I devoted the first two chapters of the present volume to Popper’s critical rationalism and its outcomes for his analysis of the open society formation. The results were very insightful: I showed that it is Popper’s conception of critical rationalism, in terms of irrational faith in reason, that prevents him from the formulation of a model of human action to explain the role of reason in action. Hence, I showed that since Popper does not establish his model of action upon the idea of critical rationality as “openness to criticism”, he cannot address the question of how reason enables individuals to enter into a moral dialogue for overcoming the problem of social order. In the light of these insights, I argued that the lack of a “critical rationalist” model of action has prevented Popper from offering “a sociological theory” of the open society. Hence, Popper did not analyse the transition from the closed to the open society from a sociological perspective. With these criticisms of Popper’s views in mind, the present volume aimed to offer its solutions to the problems of what an open society is and how it comes into existence. To develop a new sociology of the open society, the second volume began with the critical rationalist model of human action, which implies that the human actors, in terms of thinkers– movements–masses, are capable of activating their access to critical rationality, not only for subjecting their beliefs to criticism, but also for seeing whether the beliefs are refuted by negative reasons. I argued that it is this “cognitive capacity” that enables human actors to manage their egoistic pursuit of self-interest by giving themselves “a moral law”, using Kant’s term. At the societal level, human actors can enter into a moral dialogue in order to agree upon “a system” of common values and institutions, which not only prevents them from a war of all against all, but also encourages them to create an open society of free and equal persons realizing the ideal of the good life for all. The second volume used the idea of the stages of growth in critical rationality to show that the idea of a closed society could be linked to the low level of critical

166  The Sociology of the Open Society

rationality, and the idea of an open society might be linked to the high level of critical rationality. In this way, the present volume advanced the critical rationalist model of action in order to address not only the problems of the closed and open societies on the basis of “a unified” micro-foundation, but also the role of “the highest level of critical rationality” in the transition from the closed to the open society. Then the second volume applied the new micro-foundations, in terms of “the advanced model of human action”, for presenting its sociological theories of the closed and open societies. In this line of reasoning, it first introduced a sociological idea of the open society, which defined open society as “a social order” people giving themselves not only to manage their egoistic behaviours, but also to shape a social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life for all. In short, open society is defined as a society in which people use the highest level of critical rationality to rationalize their moral beliefs about the good life, creating “an objective” system of values, which supplies them with a moral foundation for the rise of social institutions of just law, legitimate government and efficient economy. Given the sociological idea of the open society, the second volume developed its sociological theory of the open society to address the question of how an open society comes into existence. It argued that because of their access to the critical rationality, people have a cognitive capacity for reaching a moral consensus on the concept of the good life due to the place of man in their worldviews. To this end, human actors can initiate “an ontological dialogue” regarding of the meaning of the universe and the place of man in it, which may result in a rationalistic worldview. Upon the basis of this metaphysical foundation, people would then be able to create a moral consensus regarding the meaning of the good life. An open society will be developed when people try to turn their moral consensus into a legal system to protect their equal rights to the good life. This legalization of the moral agreement allows people to define the required codes of behaviour, which gives the prevention of egoistic behaviours a legal aspect. In addition, the formation of such the equal rights to the good life, in terms of a just law, enables individuals to define the legal rules that make the social cooperation predictable. An open society, the second volume argues, however, cannot come into existence if people do not use the highest level of critical rationality for establishing “an executive power”, using the monopoly of power to enforce the just law of open society. Hence, the content of the just law; that is, people’s equal rights to the good life, will be introduced to the meaning of a legitimate government in the open society. If people create “a democratic government”, they would be able to prevent from the war of all against all, realizing the ideal of the good life for all by the political means. This new political order remains accountable to people because it is held “open” to criticism. In order to realize the ideal of the good life for all through “a social division of works”, the open-minded persons require “an efficient” mechanism of resource allocation. The critical rationality should be used

The Sociology of the Open Society  167

to create an open economy which allocates the production factors to the needs of people efficiently. The critical rationalist model of action was used to develop a new sociology of the closed society to address the questions of what the closed society is and how it comes into existence. In this line of thought, it was argued that the human actors employ the low level of critical rationality to agree upon a closed worldview in which the place of man in the universe is defined. But since the actors define “rationality”, in terms of the justified true beliefs, their understanding of “a rational” worldview cannot lead them to “an accurate” conception of the good life. And this means that the closed society leads to an inefficient normative solution to the problem of social order. The second volume argues, however, that the closed society requires a set of social institutions in order to turn its dogmatic ideal of the good life into a real fact. To this end, the actors apply the low level of openness to criticism to see how their ideal of the good life might be legalized by a just law. The meaning of this just law, which refers to the equal rights to the good life, originates from the concept of the good life. Hence, the just law of the closed society would be “dogmatic” because of the justificational nature of the concept of the good life in the closed society. Like the meaning of the good life, the just law is wrongly assumed to be justifiable by positive reasons. Hence, the legal system of the closed society cannot prevent from the war of all against all and shaping a social division of works to realize the ideal of the good life. The closed society also employs “an authoritarian government” to enforce its dogmatic law. Due to its moral and legal foundations, the closed society leads to “a closed economy” that inefficiently allocates scarce resources to the needs of the good life. The sociologies of the closed and open societies enable the second volume to develop a normative sociology of the transition from the closed to the open society. The question of how a closed society can be transformed into an open one has been addressed at the cultural, legal, political and economic levels. This sociological analysis is started by saying that when the independent human actors in the closed society activate the highest level of critical rationality, they would be capable of opening up their closed worldviews and the place of man within it to rational criticism. A metaphysical learning from the justificational error leads people to replace the dogmatic worldview with a rational one. This is the first stage of the transition from the closed to the open society. This process of the open society formation is developed when the highest level of critical rationality will be activated in order to open up the meaning of the good life to rational criticism. In the course of this process, people would realize that the dogmatic account of the good life should be replaced with a rational account of it. A moral learning from the mistaken premises allows people not only to revise the established system of common values, but also to replace it with a new value system which is rational in terms “openness to criticism”. The rise of a rational account of the good life in the process of opening up the closed society would be a “natural result” of an ethics of openness to criticism. People realize

168  The Sociology of the Open Society

that if they could hold open their moral beliefs, regarding the meaning of the good life, to criticism, and if they realized that the beliefs in question are not shown to be false by argument, then a moral agreement on what should be meant by the good life might be raised in terms of an “objective” value system. The transition from the closed to the open society turns the new consensus on the meaning of the good life into an institutional reform: people should use the highest level of critical rationality in order to turn their new normative consensus on the concept of the good life into a new legal system which protects the ideal of equal rights to the good life. To this end, the critical rationality ought to be utilized to uncover that the dogmatic content of just law originates in the notion that the equal rights to the good life are justifiable by positive reasons. A legal learning from such a justificational error allows people to open the dogmatic view of the just law, replacing it with a rational view of it. People would realize that the dogmatic account of the just law cannot provide them with a legal devise by the means of which they could protect their equal rights to the good life. However, the rise of a rational consensus on the meaning of just law would be possible because logic allows us to hold open our legal theory of the just law to criticism and seeing whether it is shown to be false by negative reasons. The rise of a non-justificationist account of just law in the transition from the closed to the open society leads us to the next stage of this transition: people now are in a better position to use the new institution of the just law for the development of a consensus on the meaning of a legitimate government, which would be responsible for enforcing the equal rights to the good life. But the rise of a political consensus on the notion of legitimate government requires a learning from the justificational error, which is involved in the dogmatic reading of legitimate government in the closed society. Individuals, who are living in the closed society, should activate the highest level of critical rationality in order to uncover the problem of infinite regress in the content of the political order, which they have already given themselves. In the closed society, the mechanism of resource allocation does not operate efficiently because, on the one hand, the demand for goods and services originates in the meaning of the good life, which is not examined by negative reasons, and, on the other hand, the supply of the factors of production originates in the concept of just law, which is not examined by negative reasons too, and hence cannot provide the factors of production with the required property rights. Given these considerations, in order to open their closed society, people should rationalize their demands for goods and services through an adaptation of those demands with the rational conception of the good life. In addition, people should rationalize the usage of the production factors by replacing the dogmatic account of the just law with the rational account of it to make an efficient usage of the production factors possible. In conclusion, I hope that my normative sociology of the transition from the closed to the open society has provided the reader with a new understanding of

The Sociology of the Open Society  169

the profound changes, which should be happening in a closed society in order to transform it into an open society. In short, this two-volume book, Critical Rationalism and the Open Society, might be accounted as “the first systematic attempt” to present “a new sociology of the open society” on the basis of “a new philosophy of critical rationalism”.

Index

Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes. absolute power 129, 153 actor, Hobbesian view of 68 – 69; see also human action Agassi, J. 77 Albert, H. 21, 35, 66, 133n1, 154, 157 Alford, C.F. 66 Aristotle 17 – 18 Bartley, W. 9, 11, 31n1, 64, 65, 74, 75, 78, 79, 92, 116, 140 Bellah, R.N. 162n1 Bovens, M. 157 – 158 centrally planned state economy 101n2 city: degeneration of 16, 17; form of 16 closed society 44, 143, 167, 168; definition of 19 – 20; metaphysics of 141 – 144; Popper’s analysis of intellectual origins of 13 – 20; sociological theory of 5 – 6; transition to open society, Popper’s analysis of 44 – 55; see also sociology, of closed society cognitive capacity 3, 6, 25, 30, 104, 165; closed societymunication and the E formation and 120, 123, 127; sociological analysis and 135, 137, 139, 140, 145; sociological ideal type and 92, 94, 95 cognitive learning 51 cognitive–moral development, of child 81 – 82 cognitive possibility, imagination of 95 collective unconscious 117n1 Collins, S.L. 143 common values and institutions 141, 165; irrational faith in reason and 28 – 31;

moral dialogue and 80; social dialogue and 72 – 73, 91; social order problem and 120; sociological ideal type of open society and 26 – 28, 94; voluntary respect for 138, 140 Communication and the Evolution of Society (Habermas) 81 competitive economy 97, 101n2, 112, 116 comprehensive rationalism 9 conjunctures 9; refutations and 31n2, 40, 41, 70, 76, 155; unfalsified 58, 65, 66, 72, 76, 80, 92, 93, 95, 98, 106, 107, 112, 137, 159 critical epistemology 2, 44, 154; liberal democracies and 20, 24; Popper and 12, 14, 15 critical irrationalism 11, 23, 60 critical rationalism: access to 53, 104, 109 – 110, 113, 117n1, 121, 123, 139, 155, 159, 165, 166; cultural change and 138 – 141; epistemology and theory of action in modern sociology and 33 – 37; general theory of 55, 67, 73 – 80, 82 – 83, 95, 121, 123, 137, 141, 151, 155, 164; growth, and stages of moral consciousness 80 – 84; growth of 75, 76, 78 – 84, 120 – 122; highest level of 91, 92 – 96, 103 – 104, 105 – 106, 107 – 116, 120, 126, 135, 137 – 138, 140 – 142, 144, 146, 147, 148, 150 – 153, 156, 161, 165 – 168; of human action 36, 59 – 67; ideal types of rational action and 64 – 67; independent actor and 137, 138 – 141; infinite regress of proofs and 24, 26, 65; irrational faith in reason and 25, 26, 41, 55, 92, 122, 123, 133n1;

Index 171 justificational approach to 40; just law and 109 – 110, 132; knowledge as justified true belief and 23 – 26, 55, 59, 66, 68, 71, 74, 92, 98, 139; low level of 91, 119, 120, 121, 127 – 131, 133, 141, 165, 167; of Mohammadi Alamuti 65; moral responsibility and 44, 47, 52; objective knowledge and 23, 137; overview of 9 – 12; personal and social levels and model of 71 – 72; Popper on 13, 24, 56n1, 95; and rationality principle compared 39 – 41; Ray on 52; reinvention, for sociology of open society 163 – 164; social dialogue and 104, 121, 125; stages of progress in 73 – 80, 122, 164 – 166; unit of act and model of 70 – 71; see also rationality critical-rationalist psychology 86n3 critical reason see critical rationalism cultural capital 145, 146 cultural change: independent actor and critical rationality and 138 – 141; rational meaning of good life and 144 – 145; rational worldviews and 141 – 144 democratic state 100n1 dogmatic rationalism 107, 121, 130, 132, 152, 165; and justificationism and irrationalism compared 124; transition from irrationalism 76 – 78, 83; transition to justificationist critical rationalism 78 – 79; transition to liberal ethics 83 – 84 dogmatic worldview 105, 141 – 142, 153; comparison with rationalistic ethics 107; knowledge as justified true belief and 105, 124, 125, 131; sociology of closed society and 121 Duggan, M.F. 118n2 Durkheim, E. 34 – 35, 62, 162n1 economic change 149 – 151 economic dialogue 130 effective/efficient economy 6, 7, 125, 160, 161, 166; open society formation and 104, 114, 115; sociological analysis and 135 – 137 emancipatory action 70, 71 – 72, 85, 96, 103 epistemological logic 11, 61, 124, 125 equal rights, to good life 6, 7, 166, 167, 168; closed society formation and 128 – 132; open society formation and

102, 110 – 112, 114 – 116; sociological analysis and 136, 147, 148, 149, 153; sociological ideal type and 96 – 97, 99 – 100, 100n1, 101n2 essentialism 3; of Plato 14 – 17; Popper on 15 – 16, 17, 20; teleological 17 – 18 falsificationism doctrine 21 Farr, J. 41 Frankfurt School 52 Freud, S. 86n2 Gellner, E. 61 governmental change 146; legal transformation and 146 – 147; political change and 148 – 149 general theory of critical rationalism, of Mohammadi Alamuti, 1, 2, 3, 4, 41, 55, 59, 70, 73, 74, 76, 78, 80, 84, 91, 92, 93, 121, 123, 137, 151, 155, 164. Habermas, J. 52, 70 – 71; Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979) 81 – 82, 86n3 Hedstrom, P. 38, 40 Hegel, C.W.F. 18, 19 historical destiny 17, 18 historicism 3; of Hegel 18; implicit 17; methodological flaw of 19; of Plato 14, 17; Popper on 16 – 17, 19, 20, 44 Hobbes 62, 68, 89 Hobbesian problem, of social order 27, 58, 67 – 68 holism 3, 31n2; of Plato 14, 15, 17; Popper on 15, 20 human action 34; critical rationalist model, and unit of act 70 – 71; critical rationality growth and model of 120 – 122; critical rationality theory of 36, 59 – 67; goals and means of 34, 35, 36, 57 – 58, 63, 64, 66, 71, 89, 107, 138 – 139; good life and 108; Hobbesian view of 68 – 69; independent, and critical rationalism 137, 138 – 141; instrumental type of 66 – 67; normative model of 34 – 35, 36, 62; reason and 117n1; reformulation of 34, 64 – 68, 139; social order and 67 – 73; value-rationality type of 65 – 66 human belief, as subjective 11 human freedom, role in Popper’s idea of open society 157 – 160 human knowledge fallibility and open society 22

172 Index human nature 3, 58; components of 43; Popper’s model of rational action and 42 – 44 Hume, D. 61 Ignatieff, M. 113, 125 individual, model of 54 – 55 individuation, process of 86nn2 – 3 infinite regress, of proofs 5 – 6, 34, 59, 64, 80; critical rationalism and 24, 26, 65; cultural change and 140, 142, 146; epistemological logic and 11; ethics of closed society and 131 – 132; objective knowledge and 11 instrumental type, of rational action 66 – 67 inter-subjectivity 71, 72, 95, 104, 108, 109, 161, 164 irrational faith, in reason 9, 10, 52, 83, 154; common values and institutions and 28 – 31; critical rationalism and 25, 26, 41, 55, 92, 122, 123, 133n1; liberal ethics of tolerance and 161; sceptic’s critique of uncritical rationalism and 11 irrationalism: and justificationism compared 124; critical 11, 23, 60; magic thinking of 77, 124; sceptic and 77, 124; transition to dogmatic rationalism 76 – 78, 83 Is there an ethics of the open society? (Pralong) 96 Jarvie, I.C. 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 22, 46, 47, 48, 50, 54, 55, 77, 99, 155 – 156, 160 Joas, H. 35, 63 Jung, K. G. 86n2, 117n1 justification, regress of 90, 92, 139, 142, 150, 152, 160; closed society formation and 122, 125, 131, 132, 133; sociology of open society and 57, 61, 65, 67, 75, 82, 85; transition from closed to open society and 36 – 37, 44 justificational error 24, 147, 150, 154, 159, 161; legal learning from 168; metaphysical learning from 167; moral learning from 145, 152; social learning from 151 justificationist critical rationalism: transition from dogmatic rationalism to 78 – 79; transition to non-justificationist critical rationalism 79 – 80 just law 128, 148 – 150, 152, 153, 167; critical rationality and 109 – 110, 132;

legal claim and 146 – 147; legitimate government and 111, 115 – 116, 129, 130, 132, 161, 166, 168; nonjustificational conception of 147, 168 Kant, I. 27, 28, 35 – 36, 47, 63, 138 – 141 Kirkpatrick, G. 81 knowledge, as justified true belief 37, 55, 56n2, 156; critical rationalism and 23 – 26, 55, 59, 66, 68, 71, 74, 92, 98, 139; dogmatic worldview and 105, 124, 125, 131; human action and 36, 60 – 64; tolerance and 159; universal moral value and 28; utilitarian model of action and 34, 60 – 64 knowledge, as unfalsified conjuncture, 2, 9, 65, 66, 80, 85, 92, 107, 164 knowledge, as a special kind of belief which is held open to criticism and is not shown to be false by negative reasons, 2, 60, 67 Korsgaard, C.M. 69 law of decay 16 – 17 legal capital, of just law 115 legal dialogue 110, 147 legal learning from error 115 legal transformation 146 – 147 liberal democracies: human freedom and 13; open society and 24 – 25; Popper on 20 liberal ethics 85; of tolerance 160, 161; transition from dogmatic ethics to 83 – 84; transition to ethics of openness to criticism 84 liberal society and open society 157 – 159, 160 – 161 Lichtan, R. 133n2 Locke, J. 90 MacIntyre, A.C. 74 magical attitude 45 – 46, 47 – 48 magical thinking, of irrationalism 77, 124 Marx, K. 18 – 19 Mayhew, L. 90 metaphysical beliefs 5, 104 – 107, 114, 126, 141, 142, 145 metaphysical learning 106, 151 – 152, 167 metaphysics, of closed society 126, 127, 131, 135, 141 – 144, 147 methodological essentialism see essentialism

Index 173 Minima Moralia (Pralong) 30 “Models, Instruments and Truth” (Popper) 37 modus ponens 75 modus tollens 75 Mohammadi Alamuti, M. 65 moral agreement 67, 115, 125, 166, 168 moral attitude 92; magical attitude as 46; of openness, to criticism 9, 11, 25, 26, 30, 39, 44, 47, 51, 75, 96, 98, 155, 159 moral basis, for just law 110 moral belief 89, 128, 145, 159, 166, 168; open society formation and 107, 112; sociology of open society and 66, 71, 84 moral capacity 80, 83 – 85 moral capital 115, 128 moral change 138, 144 moral choice 44, 50, 51 moral claim 61, 64, 65, 66, 140; good life and 80, 83, 95, 96, 161; objective knowledge and 96; over goals of action 36, 89; rational criticism and 47, 109 moral consciousness, stages of growth in 58, 80 – 84, 86n3 moral consensus 71, 110, 128, 144, 166 moral decision 9, 51 moral dialogue 107, 114, 133n1, 140, 144, 165; common values and institutions and 80; good life and 94, 102, 106, 109; justificationist 127; logical way of 109; sociology of open society and 58, 71, 72 moral equality, of humans 110, 139, 142, 144 – 147 moral freedom 159 moral judgment 44, 80, 83 moral law 27, 28, 82, 85, 86nn2 – 3, 165; closed society formation and 121, 123; critical rationalist theory of human action and 63 – 64; cultural change and 138 – 140; open society formation and 102, 115; social order and human action and 68 – 70, 73; sociological analysis and 152, 156; transition from closed to open society and 34, 35, 44, 47 moral learning from error 114, 145, 152, 167 moral openness 161 moral philosophy 35, 36, 44, 90, 140; justificationism and 61, 63; sociological critique of Popper’s idea of open society and 27, 28 moral responsibility 44, 47, 52, 156

moral standards and critical thinking 43 moral values 28, 99, 103, 139, 152, 156, 162n1 natural law and normative law, comparison of 50 negative reasons 4, 5, 6, 121, 123; open society formation and 104 – 107, 109 – 112, 114, 116, 117n1, 118n2; Popper and 26, 28, 31n1; sociological analysis and 135, 137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 152, 156, 161; sociological ideal type and 89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 98; sociology of open society and 57, 64 – 66, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 80, 84, 85, 164, 165, 168; transition from closed to open society and 34, 36, 40, 46, 47 – 48, 51, 55 neoclassical theory, of rational choices 86n1 new micro-foundation 4 normative consensus 72, 80, 84, 95, 109, 168 normative dialogue 73 normative model, of human action 34 – 35, 36, 62 – 64 normative sociology, of open society 152, 155 Notturno, M.A. 23 – 25, 98, 158; on objective knowledge and critical rationalism 23; on open society and liberal democracy comparison 24 – 25; on rationality principle 40 objective knowledge: of individual 55; infinite regress of proofs and 11; irrationalism and 77, 83, 124, 126; lack of 77 – 78, 124, 126; moral claim and 96; rationality and 10, 23 – 24, 55, 71, 75, 96, 137; significance of 10 – 11; as special kind of belief 60; subjective utility and 62; as unachievable 77; as unfalsified conjuncture 65, 98, 137, 164 objective system, of values 161, 168 O’Hear, A. 29 – 30 ontogenesis, of individual 81 – 82 ontological capital 152 ontological dialogue 166 ontological equality, of humans 142, 144 – 145 ontological openness, to criticism 143

174 Index open democracy 6, 97, 100, 146; critical rationality and 116, 149; good life and 136; just law and 114, 115, 149 – 150, 153; legitimacy of 111, 148 – 149 open law see just law open-minded actors/persons 95, 97, 114, 147, 150, 152, 153, 161, 166 openness to criticism 109, 134n2; ethics of 152, 159, 161, 167; highest level of 98, 102, 104, 105, 109, 114, 144, 150; low level of 125, 126, 129, 131, 167; moral attitude of 9, 11, 25, 26, 30, 39, 44, 47, 51, 75, 96, 98, 155, 159; significance of 108; transition from liberal ethics to 84 open society 44, 100n1, 167; common values and institutions and sociological ideal type of 26 – 28, 94; fallibility of human knowledge and 22; irrational faith in reason and common values and institutions and 28 – 31; knowledge as justified true belief and critical rationalism and 23 – 26; market economy in 100 – 101n2; micro-foundations of sociology of 84 – 85; open social order and 88 – 91; Popper on 20 – 22, 95 – 96, 98, 99 – 100, 100n1, 100 – 101n2; Popper’s problem situation with idea of 12 – 13; as rational society 98; sociological ideal type of 91 – 100; sociological theory of 5, 6; transition from closed society to 44 – 55; see also sociology, of open society Open Society After 50th Years (Jarvie and Pralong) 160 Open Society and its Enemies, The (Popper) 13, 14, 17, 22, 44 – 45, 99, 113 “Open Society and Its Future, The” (Bovens) 157 Open Society and the Democratic State, The (Popper) 100n1 “Open Society Revisited, The” (O’Hear) 29 ordinary action 70, 72, 85 ordinary people, as social dialogue agents 73 oversocialized actors 55, 103 Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology, The (Wrong) 68 pan-critical rationalism 31n1, 65, 74, 75, 79, 92 – 93 Parsons, T. 27 – 28, 34, 35 – 36, 58, 62 – 64, 67 – 70, 86n2, 89, 95, 138 – 141

Plato 14 – 17, 19; on degeneration of city 16, 17; Theory of Forms of 15 – 16; on utopian society 17 political belief 111, 116, 130 political change 148 – 149 political dialogue 111, 129, 132, 148 political learning from error 116 political legitimacy 111, 148, 149, 153 “Politics, Epistemology and Method” (Stokes) 42 Poole, R. 159 – 160 Popper, K.R. 74, 75, 125 – 126, 133n1, 134n2; analysis of intellectual origins of closed societies 13 – 20; analysis of transition from closed to open society 44 – 55, 153 – 160; on critical rationalism 13, 24, 56n1, 95; epistemology of science and idea of open society of 154 – 156; on historical forecast 19; human freedom in open society idea of 157 – 160; irrational faith in reason of 28 – 31, 41, 122; on Marx 18 – 19; on open society 20 – 22, 95 – 96, 98, 99 – 100, 100n1, 100 – 101n2; on organism as example for closed society 48; on origins of Western civilization 45, 48 – 49, 55; problem situation of 12 – 13; on science and magic 46 – 47; sociological critique of transition analysis of 156 – 157; on strain of civilization 43, 49 – 50; see also rational action model “Popper’s Hermeneutics” (Farr) 41 “Popper’s Situational Analysis and Contemporary Sociology” (Hedstrom) 38 positive reason 5, 34, 46, 89; closed society formation and 121, 124, 125, 127 – 132; open society formation and 104, 105, 107, 117n1; Popper and 9 – 11, 22, 23, 27, 30; sociological analysis and 137, 140 – 143, 145 – 148, 151, 154, 159, 161; sociology of open society and 57, 60 – 61, 63, 65 – 66, 78 – 79, 83, 167, 168 practical reason 27, 103, 138 – 140; sociology of open society and 63, 64, 68, 69, 86n2; transition from closed to open society and 35, 36, 47 Pralong, S. 12, 13, 18, 22, 30, 96, 108, 160 rational action, Kantian model of 63 rational action model 36 – 37; and critical rationalist model compared 122 – 123;

Index 175 human nature and 42 – 44; rationality principle and 38 – 41; situational analysis of 37 – 42 rational belief 5, 64, 85, 107, 108, 123, 159; claim of 2, 3, 10, 60, 65, 73, 75 – 80, 83, 84, 89, 91, 92, 93, 98, 120 – 121, 123, 124, 137, 164; new epistemology of 137 – 138; in reason 2, 9, 10 – 11, 30, 65, 76 – 77, 79, 80, 92, 93, 123, 124; sociological ideal type and 94, 95, 99 rational criticism 110, 137, 145, 161, 167; sociological ideal type of open society and 98, 99; transition from closed to open society and 46, 47, 50, 51, 54 rational dialogue 41, 67, 80, 82, 83, 94, 96, 133n1 rationalistic ethics 61, 80, 83, 84, 107 rationality: goals of action and 34, 35, 36, 57 – 58, 63, 64, 66, 71, 107, 138 – 139; good life and 108, 109, 167; imperfect 76; instrumental 70, 72; justificational approach to 9, 11, 34, 36, 54, 59, 122, 141; liberal theory of 79; nonjustificationist concept of 2, 7, 28, 34, 36, 53, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 71, 75, 76, 85, 94, 98, 104, 109, 110, 113, 114, 123, 137, 139, 141, 156; as objective knowledge 10, 23 – 24, 71; one theory of 74; openness to criticism and 121, 134n2; principle, of Popper 38 – 40; significance of 1 – 2; see also critical rationalism rational worldview and open society formation 105 – 106 Rawls, J. 67 Ray, L.J. 52 Rethinking Open Society (Ignatieff and Roch) 113 Retreat to Commitment, The (Bartley) 116 Roch, S. 113, 125 sceptic 9 – 10, 26, 29; demand for positive reason 11; irrational faith in reason and 11, 154; irrationalism and 77, 124; uncritical rationalism and 30, 55, 123, 154, 161 Schmid, M. 81 science and magic, comparison of 46 – 47, 56n2 Science and the Open Society (Notturno) 23, 98, 158 self-knowledge 117n1

Shearmur, J. 108 situational analysis 37 – 42, 51, 56n1, 123; Hedstrom et al on 38, 40; rationality principle in 38 – 41 social change 24, 33, 54, 136, 138 – 140, 154, 155 social development 19, 31n3, 71, 81, 86n3 social dialogue: agents of 72 – 73; critical rationality and 104, 121, 125; justificational form of 129; social order and 91, 133 social epistemology 34 – 35, 62 socialization process 64, 69, 70, 72, 86nn2 – 3, 95, 140 social learning: from errors 151 – 153; rational consensus and 72 social movements 4, 72 – 73, 76, 133, 135 social order 27 – 28, 31n2, 34, 141; closed 119 – 120, 125, 127, 133, 165; critical rationalist approach of 90 – 91; Hobbesian problem of 27, 58, 67 – 68, 89; human action and 67 – 73; in modern sociology 89 – 90; open 67, 88 – 91, 93, 98, 99, 102 – 106, 109, 114 – 115, 165; peaceful 27, 29, 34, 62, 68, 69, 70, 95, 102, 138 – 140, 142; philosophical solution to problem of 142; practical reason and 138 – 139; reformulation of 28, 58, 68, 69, 88 – 90, 134n2; social dialogue and 91, 133 social philosophy 133n1 social situation 37, 38, 41, 51 sociological critique, of transition analysis 156 – 157 sociological ideal type, of open society 26 – 28, 91; common values and institutions and 26 – 28, 94; highest level of critical rationality and 92 – 94; significance of 97 – 100; social institutions of law, polity, and economy and 96 – 97; worldview and meaning of good life in 94 – 96 sociology, of closed society 5 – 6, 119; and critical rationalist model and Popper’s model of action compared 122 – 123; critical rationalist model of action and 119 – 120; critical rationality growth and human action model and 120 – 122; economic mechanism of 130 – 131; justificationism and irrationalism versus dogmatic rationalism and 124; legal mechanism of 128; macro-sociological analysis of 131 – 133; metaphysical

176 Index mechanisms of 126 – 127; moral mechanism of rise of 127 – 128; political mechanism of 128 – 129; significance of 125 – 126 sociology, of open society 5, 6, 102 – 103, 161, 163 – 169; critical rationalism reinvention for 163 – 164; economic analysis of 111 – 112; highest access to critical rationality and just law concept and 109 – 110; highest level of critical rationality and 103 – 104; macro-sociological analysis of 113 – 117; metaphysical analysis of 104 – 106; moral analysis of 106 – 109; political mechanism of 111 state of nature, notion of 27 Stokes, Geoff 42 – 44, 49 strain of civilization, notion of 43, 49 – 50 subjective utility 61, 62, 89 superego 86n2 thinkers, as social dialogue agents 72 tolerance, ethics of 158 – 161 totalitarianism 14, 17, 30 Touraine, A. 139 transition, from closed to open society 135 – 136; cultural change and 138 – 145; economic change and 149 – 151; legal transformation and 146 – 147;

liberal and open society comparison and 160 – 161; macro-sociological analysis of 151 – 153; micro-foundation to understand 136 – 138; normative analysis of 164 – 169; political change and 148 – 149; sociological analysis and Popper’s analysis compared 153 – 160 unconscious mind 117n1 uncritical rationalism 11, 60, 78, 105; closed society formation and 121, 124, 127, 129, 131, 132; sociological analysis and 143, 147, 152, 161 utilitarian model of action: epistemology of 34, 61 – 62; significance of 34, 60 – 64, 86n1; as wrong 89 utopian society 17, 22 value-rationality 85; of actor 35; human action and 65 – 66 values and human action 70 Viskovatoff, A. 86n1 voluntaristic theory of action 35 – 36; mistakes in formulation of 68; sociology of open society and 62 – 64, 67 – 68 Weber, M. 34, 97, 106 Wettersten, J. 53, 54, 121, 122 Wrong, D.H. 27, 68, 69, 86n2, 103