To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation 9780814733233

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To Secure These Right s

To Secur e Thes e Right s The Declaration o f Independenc e and Constitutional Interpretatio n Scott Douglas Gerber

New York University Press New York and London

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS New York and Londo n © 199 5 by New York Universit y All rights reserve d Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dat a Gerber, Scott Douglas, 1961 To secure thes e right s : th e Declaration o f Independence an d constitutional interpretatio n / Scot t Douglas Gerber. p. cm . Includes bibliographica l reference s an d index . ISBN 0-8147-3066- 3 (acid-fre e paper ) 1. Unite d States—Constitutional law—Interpretatio n an d construction. 2 . Natura l law—Philosophy . I . Title . KF4550.G46 199 5 342.73'02—dc20 [347.3022] 94-4641 4 CIP New Yor k University Pres s books are printed on acid-free paper , and their binding materials are chosen fo r strength an d durability. Manufactured i n the United States of Americ a 10

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This work is dedicated to the memory of Bonnie Groff.

Contents

Foreword b y Henry J. Abraham i x Preface xii i Introduction: Liberal Originalism 1 I Th e Jurisprudenc e o f th e America n Foundin g 1 Th e Declaration o f Independence 1 9

"An Expression of the American Mind" 2 0 Revising the Revisionism: Lockean Liberalism and the American Revolution 2 3 The Political Philosophy of the Declaration of Independence 4 0

2 Th e Constitutio n o f th e Unite d State s 5 7 The Preamble 6 0 vii

viii Content

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The Framing and Ratification o f the Constitution 6 3 The Bill of Rights 6 8 The Federalist Paper s 7 4 The Intellectual Leader s of the Constitutional Perio d 7 9 Early State Constitution s 9 0

II Natura l Right s an d th e Rol e o f th e Cour t 3 Th e Court 9 5

From Legislative Supremac y to Judicial Review 9 6 Natural Rights and Judicial Revie w 10 4 Judicial Finality 12 5

4 Check s o n th e Cour t 13 4 Limiting the Court's Appellate Jurisdiction 13 5 The Article 5 Amendment Process 13 9 Impeachment 14 4 Judicial Self-Restraint 15 0 The Appointment Proces s 15 4 5 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n 16 2 Equality 16 4 Life 17 5 Liberty 18 6 The Pursuit o f Happiness 19 3 Conclusion: A Ne w America n Revolution ? 19 6 Notes 20 5 Works Cite d 26 9 Index 29 5

Foreword

How t o interpre t th e evolvin g Constitutio n contemporarily , an d th e Supreme Court' s crucia l rol e i n th e process , ha s bee n th e abidin g concern o f it s student s an d observers—whethe r the y ar e lawyers , political scientists , historians, other social scientists , or humanists .. . or the publi c a t large . I t has bee n a centra l questio n sinc e th e basi c document wa s formulate d o n Fift h an d Chestnu t Street s i n Philadelphia during that hot summer of 1787. The answers have been as diverse as the y hav e bee n numerous , informe d b y wisdo m a s wel l a s nebu lousness, b y sophisticatio n a s wel l a s naivete—wit h th e Cour t quite naturally a t the cente r o f gravit y o f th e controversy . Fo r i n the final analysis i t i s th e hig h tribuna l tha t decide s wha t th e Constitutio n means. T o b e sure , th e Cour t i s no t th e Constitution , pac e Charle s Evans Hughes's facile and catchy yet misleading famed political-stumpspeech observation that "the Constitution is what the Justices say it is." IX

x Forewor

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But the Cour t doe s inexorabl y dra w line s and , in doin g so , it interpret s (or misinterprets ) th e document . I n a ver y rea l sens e thes e line s ar e born o f th e cardina l dua l fac t o f politico-governmenta l life : the qualit y cum capabilit y o f th e individua l justice s an d thei r perceptio n o f th e parameters o f judicial power , t o wit , thei r stanc e o n th e fundamenta l dichotomy o f judicial activis m an d judicial restraint . The las t tw o decade s hav e witnesse d intriguin g intellectua l comba t between, t o emplo y Joh n Har t Ely' s challengin g terminology , "inter pretivists" an d "noninterpretivists" : th e forme r presumabl y cautiousl y faithful conservativ e adherent s t o specifi c constitutiona l language , th e latter devotee s o f a n expansiv e a d hominem , libera l philosophy , argua bly substitutin g a commitmen t t o "equa l justice a t an y cost " fo r "equa l justice unde r law. " Or, t o categoriz e th e cardina l differenc e somewha t differently, i f oversimplifiedly , i t represent s a clas h betwee n "origi nalist" champions, generally personified b y Chief Justice Willia m Rehn quist an d Rober t Bork , an d "what-do-the-words-mean-in-our-time " pro ponents lik e Justice Willia m Brennan an d Laurenc e Tribe . Scott Gerber , wh o possesse s bot h la w (J.D. ) an d politica l scienc e (Ph.D.) degrees , bravel y an d admirabl y tackle s th e complexitie s o f th e dichotomy a t issu e in scholarly, imaginative, commendable compas s b y rejecting bot h pole s o f th e basi c argument . I n a theor y h e aptl y call s "liberal originalism, " Gerbe r reject s th e "what-do-the-words-mean-in our-time" constitutiona l jurisprudence o f moder n liberal s becaus e tha t approach, a s well-meanin g a s i t ma y be , i s reall y nothin g mor e tha n legislating fro m th e bench . An d h e reject s th e originalis m o f moder n conservatives becaus e tha t approach , a s well-meanin g a s i t als o ma y be, misconstrue s wha t th e Constitutio n i s ultimatel y about . As Gerbe r persuasively demonstrate s throug h a n impressiv e analysi s o f history , political philosophy , an d law , the Constitutio n wa s intended , abov e al l else, t o protec t th e natura l right s o f individuals—somethin g tha t i s patently a t odd s wit h th e conservativ e originalists ' emphasi s o n major ity rule. In short, Gerbe r advance s a theory o f constitutiona l interpreta tion tha t wil l likely displeas e bot h moder n liberal s an d moder n conser vatives: a sure sig n that h e i s onto something . Gerber, who m i t wa s m y grea t pleasur e t o hav e a s a student , ha s undertaken a hugel y ambitiou s project—an d i n hi s first book , n o less . His discussio n range s fro m a bol d revisio n o f th e characte r o f th e American Revolutio n t o a provocativ e reinterpretatio n o f man y o f th e

Foreword x i most famou s case s i n Supreme Cour t history , with man y illuminatin g stops alon g th e way . (Gerber' s cal l fo r a merit-base d appointmen t process i n his chapter o n check s o n the Cour t is particularly clos e t o my heart, as he kindly notes in the text.) With clarity, intelligence, and remarkable readability , Gerbe r integrate s a wid e rang e o f previousl y isolated debates in history, political philosophy, and law into an attractive and sophisticated theory of constitutional interpretation—a theory that, i n hi s words , i s "neithe r consistentl y 'liberal, ' no r consistentl y 'conservative,' i n th e moder n conceptio n o f thos e terms. " I n con structing his theory, Gerber shows not only that scholars from differen t disciplines should talk to each other, but that they must —"especially," as he puts it, "where the Constitutio n i s concerned." There is much t o be learned from this important book. HENRY J. ABRAHA M

James Hart Professor o f Government and Foreign Affair s University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia

Preface

This is a study in American constitutiona l theory . In essence, i t is an effort t o expound a systematic theor y of constitutional interpretation . To that end, two questions are addressed. First, how should the Constitution o f th e Unite d State s b e interpreted ? Second , who shoul d b e ultimately responsibl e fo r makin g tha t interpretation? 1 Answer s ar e sought by examining the two fundamental document s of the American regime: the Declaratio n o f Independenc e an d the Constitutio n o f th e United States. My approac h t o constitutiona l theor y i s throug h history , politica l philosophy, and law. And while I am directing this work chiefl y to the public-law community , I try t o tak e histor y an d politica l philosoph y seriously. I am therefore often engaged in an "interdisciplinary conversation" (to borro w historia n Pete r Onuf' s usefu l phrase) : sometime s approaching an issue throug h history, at other times through political xiii

xiv Prefac e philosophy, an d a t stil l other s throug h law . Although i t i s difficul t t o please suc h justifiabl y demandin g audience s a s historians , politica l philosophers, and lawyers, I have come to believe that it is necessary to

approach constitutiona l interpretatio n fro m mor e than on e discipline

(something, I suggest, th e Founder s did) . In the end , I hope m y book shows i t i s possibl e fo r scholar s fro m differen t discipline s t o tal k to each other, rather than past eac h other, as they so often do—especiall y where the Constitution is concerned.* This book i s broad i n scope, and many of the issue s I address have themselves bee n th e subjec t o f a vas t an d varie d independen t litera ture. What I endeavor t o d o i s identif y th e cor e component s o f som e largely isolated debates and integrate them into the specific framewor k of constitutional interpretation. In other words, this is not a book about John Locke's political philosophy or about the appointment process, to name but two of the many issues I address. Rather, this is a book tha t examines, for example , the role s o f John Locke' s political philosoph y and the appointment process in constitutional interpretation . I wrot e thi s boo k becaus e I eryoy th e literatur e an d th e debat e o n constitutional interpretatio n an d becaus e I find tha t sam e literatur e and debate frequently troubling . To expand on the latter point, most of the previou s treatment s o f constitutiona l interpretatio n mis s a basi c point: tha t th e Constitutio n mus t b e interprete d i n context . And, a s I explain i n part 1 , that contex t i s the natural-rights political philosophy of the American Revolution. Most of the previous treatments also seem unnecessarily preoccupied wit h trying to reconcile judicial review and democracy. The Constitution create s a republican form of government, not a majority-rule democracy . In that republican for m o f government, the Court, as I describe in part 2, is to play a central role: chief guardian of the natural-rights of the American people. In the cours e o f writing this book I accumulated man y debts. I would especially lik e to thank Henr y J. Abraham, who was justly honore d i n *A distinguished schola r wh o read m y manuscript warned tha t I "might not have many friends." "Historian s ma y object t o your history, political philosophers t o your political philosophy, and lawyer s to your law, " he said. Nevertheless, believing that I had something important to say—both substantivel y an d methodologically—an d tha t books are, at bottom, an extension o f the author, he encouraged m e to go forward. I will always be grateful fo r that encouragement.

Preface x v 1993 with the first Lifetim e Achievemen t Award of the Organized Section on Law and the Courts of the American Political Science Association. Professor Abraham , whose wor k originall y inspire d m e t o stud y public law , graciousl y provide d advice , encouragement , an d suppor t throughout this lengthy project. I would also like to single out David M.

O'Brien, Georg e Atha n Billias , J. Timoth y Collins , an d Christophe r

Wolfe. Professo r O'Brien , a teache r an d schola r o f boundles s energy , enthusiasm, and dedication, was extremely generous with his time and wise counsel. Professor Billias , whom I have known and admired since I was a child, kindly read the entire manuscript and offered suggestion s that only a historian of the American Founding of his enormous stature could. As for Tim , like the tru e frien d h e is , he wa s alway s willing t o discuss m y projec t an d mad e numerou s usefu l comments , especiall y concerning politica l philosophy , hi s are a o f expertise . Wit h respec t to Professo r Wolfe , h e i s th e epitom e o f a professional : h e highl y recommended m y book for publication an d offered man y constructiv e

comments, despite disagreein g with much of what I say. Many other

friends als o made some excellent suggestions about how to strengthe n my argument . Jame s Sterlin g Young , A. E. Dic k Howard , Willia m G . Weaver, Paul Robert Lucas, Charles A. Kromkowski, Mark D. Hall, and A. John Simmon s wer e particularl y helpful . Additionally, I would lik e to thank those who provided financial support: the Governor's Fellowship, the Scottish Rite Fellowship, the Commonwealth Fellowship, and the Bradley Fellowship. Thanks go to the editors of Polity a s well, for their permission to use in this volume material that appears in a somewhat differen t for m i n thei r fine journal . Nik o Pfund , Dav e Updike , Despina Papazoglou Gimbel , Jennifer Hammer , and their colleagues a t New Yor k Universit y Pres s mad e publishin g thi s boo k a n extremely rewarding experience . I canno t imagin e a mor e helpfu l an d pleasan t group o f editors . Thanks , too , t o Davi d Ree d fo r hi s hel p wit h th e index. I would also like to mention how er\joyable—and fitting—it was for m e t o hav e writte n s o muc h o f thi s exegesi s o n th e rol e o f th e Declaration o f Independenc e i n constitutiona l interpretatio n a t th e University o f Virginia , "Mr . Jefferson's University. " Last , but certainl y not least, there is my family. It is impossible for me to repay the debt I owe them . Al l I ca n sa y i s than k yo u an d I hop e yo u er\jo y you r complimentary copy of my book!

Introduction: Liberal Originalis m

Constitutional interpretatio n ha s been a source o f political debat e fo r most o f America n history . I n fact , th e firs t constitutional-la w cas e decided b y the Suprem e Court , Chisholm v. Georgia (1793),1 wherein the Cour t hel d tha t a citize n o f on e stat e ma y su e anothe r stat e i n federal court , was s o politicall y unpopula r i t was quickl y reverse d b y constitutional amendment. 2 Other examples from th e early days of the American republic are easily identified. The great debates between th e Jeffersonian Republican s and the Federalists, for instance, centered on

disagreements i n constitutiona l interpretation , suc h a s th e powe r of

the national government vis-a-vis the states—disagreements tha t were to continue throughout American history under different part y labels. While political debat e ove r constitutiona l interpretatio n ha s a lon g and rich history in the United States, it was not until the late nineteenth 1

2 Introductio

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century tha t theorie s o f constitutiona l interpretatio n wer e discusse d much, i f a t all . Indeed , i n hi s famou s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833) , Justic e Josep h Stor y expressl y re jected th e ide a tha t h e shoul d offe r a theor y o f constitutiona l interpre tation i n hi s book. 3 Stor y rejecte d th e ide a becaus e durin g hi s da y th e declaratory theory o f law, in which the law was deemed t o be "declare d and determined, " bu t no t "made, " by judges,4 was al l but unquestioned . In the lat e nineteent h century , however , thing s began t o change , as th e "revolt against formalism" 5 i n philosophy an d the socia l sciences foun d its way into jurisprudence, largely through th e effort s o f Oliver Wendel l Holmes. As a result , th e declarator y theor y o f la w cam e unde r increas ing attack, and alternativ e theorie s of constitutional interpretatio n hav e been freel y advance d eve r since . Importantly, al l o f th e theories , whethe r the y ar e th e lega l realis m and sociologica l jurisprudence o f Holmes's da y o r the economi c analy sis o f la w an d critica l lega l studie s o f th e presen t day—an d whethe r they inten d t o o r not 6 —appeal, a t thei r essentia l level , t o politica l philosophy. Justic e Feli x Frankfurte r sai d i t best : constitutiona l inter pretation "i s not a t all a science, but applie d politics." 7 Surprisingly, th e natural-right s politica l philosoph y o f th e Declara tion o f Independence , th e mos t obviou s choic e fo r interpretin g th e Constitution, i s no w al l bu t ignored . After all , it was i n th e Declaratio n of Independence tha t th e Founder s articulate d th e politica l philosoph y upon whic h thi s nation i s based. In the unforgettabl e word s o f Thoma s Jefferson: We hold thes e Truth s t o b e self-evident , tha t al l Me n ar e create d equal , tha t they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these ar e Life , Libert y an d th e Pursui t o f Happiness—Tha t t o secur e thes e Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive o f these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effec t their Safety and Happiness. 8 A fe w scholar s d o recogniz e th e significanc e o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence t o constitutiona l interpretation . Th e mos t wel l known o f these ar e Walte r Berns , Marti n Diamond , Harr y Jaffa, an d Walte r Mur phy. 9 Al l bu t Murph y ar e follower s o f Le o Strauss . Indeed , "Straus -

Introduction 3 sians[,]... more than any other single group[,] ... are attempting to set the agenda for publi c debate ove r the Constitution." 10 As will become evident, m y approac h differ s greatl y fro m previou s effort s i n severa l ways, most notably i n its interpretation o f (1) the political philosoph y of th e Declaratio n o f Independence 11 an d (2 ) the rol e o f the Court i n identifying an d applying that philosophy in American life. 12 In addition, I attempt to articulate a systematic theory of the role of the Declaration of Independenc e i n constitutiona l interpretation . T o that end , I docu ment historically—rathe r tha n simpl y assum e o r assert 13—in par t 1 that the Kramers of the Constitutio n remaine d committe d t o the natu ral-rights principle s o f th e Declaration , an d I sho w i n par t 2 ho w they sought to advance those principles through political architecture , especially through a definitive power of judicial review. Until his confirmatio n hearin g t o serv e o n th e U.S. Supreme Court , Clarence Thoma s als o maintaine d tha t th e politica l philosophy o f th e Declaration o f Independenc e shoul d hav e a centra l plac e i n constitu tional interpretation . A s Thoma s wrot e i n a 198 9 law revie w article , "The Constitution i s a logical extension o f the Declaration o f Independence. .. . The higher-law background of the American Constitution .. . provides th e onl y firm basi s fo r a just, wise , an d constitutional decision."14 During his confirmatio n hearing , Thomas likel y denie d havin g eve r implied in his speeches and writings that the political philosophy of the Declaration o f Independenc e shoul d b e use d a s a basi s fo r constitu tional interpretatio n fro m fea r o f appearin g out-of-dat e an d radical. 15 Before Thomas , no membe r o f the Suprem e Cour t ha d publicl y advocated interpreting the Constitution in light of the Declaration since the turn o f th e century . An d thos e justices—Josep h Bradley , Davi d Brewer, Stephe n Field , an d Rufu s Peckham—hav e bee n widel y criti cized for their "simplistic" reading of that philosophy, believing as they erroneously di d (se e chapte r 5 ) that the Declaratio n o f Independenc e is primarily a statement of laissez-faire economics. 16 While som e conside r a n appea l t o natura l la w an d right s t o b e moving beyond an originalist methodology, 171 endeavor to show in this volume that such is not the case for the natural-rights political philosophy o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence . Tha t i s t o say , th e natural rights principle s embodie d i n the Declaratio n ar e no t "above " or "beyond" the Constitution; 18 they are at the heart of the Constitution.

4 Introductio n In essence, I advance a "jurisprudence of original intention," although one far different fro m tha t promoted by former attorne y general Edwin Meese (wh o coine d th e phrase) , forme r judg e an d unsuccessfu l Su preme Cour t nomine e Rober t Bork , Chie f Justic e Willia m Rehnquist , and myriad other contemporar y political and jurisprudential conserva tives.19 Briefly put , I employ a conservative methodology , but arrive a t liberal results, as "liberal " is understood i n the classi c sens e o f seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political philosophy. I contend that originalism should not be viewed as simply a "jurisprudence of the right," as it so often is . I reject th e notion that arguing that the Framers enacte d

abstract "concepts " in the Constitutio n require s on e to conclud e the Kramers' intent is "trumped by evolving precedent, values, or needs."20 Conservative Originalis m

Although a variety o f theories o f originalis m hav e been advance d i n a seemingly unendin g literature , th e mos t wel l know n an d widel y fol lowed conservativ e originalis t positio n i s tha t th e Cour t ma y legiti mately recognize only those rights specifically mentione d in the Constitution, or ascertainabl y implici t i n its structure o r history. In all othe r cases, the conservative s argue , the majorit y i s entitle d t o govern—t o make moral choices—through th e political process. According to Robert Bork, arguably the most articulate, and certainly the most controversial, champion o f origina l intent , "Th e orthodox y o f ou r civi l religion , which the Constitution has been aptly called, holds that we govern ourselves democratically, except on those occasions few in number though crucially important , whe n th e Constitution place s a topi c beyon d th e reach of majorities."21 The conservatives regard a jurisprudence of original intention as the only legitimate approach to constitutional interpretation, because only that "can give us law that is something other than, and superio r to , th e judge' s will," 22 an d onl y tha t wil l eliminat e th e "anomaly of judicial supremacy in democratic society." 23 Despite the methodological appeal of the conservatives' argument— a subject t o be discusse d a t length below—their campaig n for a jurisprudence o f original intention should be seen for what it is: a quest fo r political results. Analyzing the conclusion s to which the conservative s are led by originalism reveals that they are simply espousing politically

Introduction 5

conservative interpretation s o f th e Constitutio n an d labelin g the m

"original intent." 24 I n effect, th e conservative s ar e substitutin g conser vative result-oriented jurisprudence fo r libera l result-oriented jurisprudence. (The conservatives' call for a jurisprudence of original intention is clearly a reaction t o the libera l jurisprudence o f the Warre n Court. ) They ar e seekin g radicall y t o chang e constitutiona l la w t o mak e i t conform t o their preferred conceptio n o f it. For example , for th e con servatives t o argue , a s (no w Chief ) Justic e Rehnquis t di d i n a dis senting opinion i n Wallace v. Jaffree (1985), 25 an opinion for whic h h e was publicl y applaude d b y Meese, 26 tha t th e establishmen t claus e o f the first amendmen t doe s not prohibi t the majority, actin g through th e political process , fro m authorizin g praye r i n th e publi c school s i s t o rewrite histor y an d th e Founders ' politica l philosophy. 27 Th e histor y behind the passage of the first amendmen t indicates that the establishment claus e wa s designe d t o erect , a s Thomas Jefferson said , a stric t "wall of separation betwee n Churc h an d State." 28 In fact, i t is difficul t to imagin e a principl e t o whic h th e Founder s wer e mor e philosophi cally committed than the separation of church and state. 29 Moreover, the conservative originalists mischaracterize the Constitution a s establishin g a majority-rul e democracy , a mischaracterizatio n that is also made by many contemporary constitutiona l theorists of socalled "moderate " and "liberal " political views. 30 This has led to an unfortunate portrayal of the Court as a "deviant institution in the American democracy,"31 because judicial review i s outside the processes o f majoritarian politics . As discusse d i n chapter s 2 and 3 , the Constitutio n does not establis h a majority-rul e democracy . Indeed , "th e framer s openly an d explicitl y distruste d majorit y rule ; virtually ever y govern ment institutio n the y create d ha d stron g anti-majoritaria n features." 32 For example , the presiden t i s electe d b y the electora l college , not di rectly by the people, and he can veto measures passed by the popularly elected Congress ; many executive officials ar e not electorally account able; the Senate was originally appointed b y the state legislatures, and a minorit y o f senators can still block ratification o f treaties and public officials; an d the judiciary is nominated b y the president, confirmed b y the Senate , an d give n lif e tenure . And, o f course , ther e i s th e Bil l of Rights. As Justice Robert Jackson reminded the nation many years ago: The very purpose o f a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certai n subjects from th e vicissitudes o f politica l controversy , to place the m beyond th e reach o f majori -

6 Introductio

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ties and officials an d to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's righ t t o life , liberty , an d property , t o free speech , a fre e press , freedom o f worshi p an d assembly , an d othe r fundamenta l right s ma y no t b e submitted to vote: they depend on the outcome of no elections. 33 Because o f th e F r a m e d desir e t o avoi d wha t Elbridg e Gerr y calle d the "exces s o f democracy," 34 the y create d a "republican " for m o f gov ernment, not a majority-rule democracy. 35 * And i n that republica n for m of governmen t th e Court , a s par t 2 explains , i s t o pla y a centra l role : chief guardia n o f th e natura l right s o f th e America n people , especiall y of individuals an d minorities . The version o f a jurisprudence o f origina l intention advance d b y s o man y moder n conservative s therefor e pro ceeds fro m a fault y premise—tha t majorit y rul e i s th e essenc e o f th e American constitutiona l order—an d i t should b e rejected .

Liberal Originalis m As note d a t th e outset , m y criticis m o f th e conservatives , approac h t o constitutional interpretatio n i s no t mean t t o impl y tha t ther e i s no t a jurisprudenc e o f origina l intentio n i n accordanc e wit h whic h th e Constitution shoul d b e interpreted . A s par t 1 addresses i n detail , th e United State s o f America wa s founded t o preserve th e natura l right s o f the America n people . "T o secur e thes e rights, " Jefferson write s i n th e Declaration o f Independence, is the reason "government s ar e institute d among men. " T o secur e natura l right s is , therefore , wh y th e Con stitution wa s enacted , an d t o secur e natura l right s i s ho w th e Consti tution shoul d b e interpreted . Tha t i s th e "origina l intent " o f th e Founders. 36 Here, i t i s necessar y t o explai n th e connectio n betwee n th e Found ers' backgroun d attitude s o n th e purpos e o f governmen t an d th e inter pretation o f th e particula r provision s o f th e Constitution . Th e mos t important point to recognize i s that, as just mentioned, the Constitutio n was written fo r a reason: to establis h a form o f governmen t tha t woul d provide bette r securit y fo r natura l right s tha n wa s provide d unde r th e Articles o f Confederation . T o mak e th e poin t somewha t differently , th e * Part 1 explores wh y i t is importan t t o recogniz e th e differenc e i n the jurisprudence o f the America n Foundin g betwee n a republica n form of government an d a republica n political philosophy.

Introduction 7 particular provisions o f th e Constitutio n wer e writte n wit h th e Found ers' background attitude s i n mind. As chapte r 2 explains, the Constitu tion is not an end in itself; it is a means by which the American political community's ideals—it s ends—ar e ordered . I t i s therefor e necessar y to interpre t th e Constitutio n i n ligh t o f thos e ideals , ideal s expresse d with unparalleled eloquenc e b y Thomas Jefferson i n the Declaration o f Independence.

The necessit y o f keepin g th e Founders ' backgroun d attitude s i n

mind whe n interpretin g th e particula r provision s o f th e Constitutio n becomes eve n mor e apparen t when on e realize s that many of the mos t significant provision s o f th e Constitutio n ar e phrased i n general terms , especially thos e concernin g individua l rights , th e subjec t o f thi s vol ume. Fo r example , th e first amendment's directiv e tha t Congres s shal l make no law "respecting an establishment of religion" is not unambiguous, no r i s th e eight h amendment' s prohibitio n agains t "crue l an d un usual punishments." Moving beyond the original ten amendments, what does i t mea n t o say , a s th e fourteent h amendmen t does , tha t n o stat e shall deny to any person "th e equal protection o f the laws"? Provision s

as general as these—and there are many others in the Constitution—

are not self-interpreting. The y can be given meaning and life onl y whe n they ar e construe d i n ligh t o f th e mora l an d politica l principle s upo n which the y ar e based . A s Davi d O'Brie n aptl y observes , "Interpretin g the Constitution . . . presuppose s a judicial and political philosophy an d poses inescapabl e question s o f substantiv e valu e choices." 37 Althoug h I reject the argumen t advance d b y many proponents o f the applicatio n of literar y analysi s t o lega l texts—tha t meanin g canno t b e extracte d from legal texts, but can only be put into them, in other words, that the Constitution mean s nothing and means anything—it i s difficult t o den y the mor e modes t clai m tha t "text s ca n b e interprete d onl y i n som e 'context.' "* And that "context," as part 1 describes, is the natural-right s philosophy o f the American Revolution . Of course , i t i s possibl e t o constru e th e provision s o f th e Constitu *Levinson an d Mailloux , Preface , xii . I n additio n t o th e relate d concern s raise d b y historians (discusse d below) , th e controvers y ove r th e possibilit y o f discernin g th e Kramers* intent is largely a result of the efforts o f legal scholars to apply the methods of literary analysi s t o lega l texts , includin g th e Constitution . Se e generall y Levinso n and Mailloux, Interpreting Law and Literature (collectin g many of the leading essays on law and literature) . Th e nuance s o f th e highl y specialize d an d frequentl y abstrus e debat e about the relationship between la w and literatur e are beyond the scope of this book. In

8 Introductio n tion i n ligh t o f philosophica l principle s othe r tha n thos e embodie d i n the Declaration of Independence. One need only peruse the plethora of provocative theories of constitutional interpretatio n advanced over the years to appreciate this fact.38 However, those advancing nonoriginalist approaches to constitutional interpretation have failed to show that the particular approac h the y favo r i s base d o n anythin g othe r tha n thei r own moral and political preferences. Indeed, Ronald Dworkin, a forceful critic of originalism, maintains that we should abandon the search— hopeless, i n hi s view—fo r th e Framers ' inten t i n favo r o f th e "bes t argument" about political morality. 39 The proble m wit h Dworkin' s interpretiv e position , an d a proble m repeated by most lawyers attempting to articulate theories of constitutional interpretation , i s tha t unde r hi s theor y substantiv e value s ar e inevitably established b y those with the best argumentation skills—b y clever lawyer s lik e Dworki n himself. 40 I f th e rul e o f la w mean s any thing, it surely means that the Constitution should not be interpreted in such a subjectiv e fashion , especiall y b y unelecte d an d life-tenure d judges. Moreover, i f th e America n peopl e d o wis h t o depar t fro m th e natural-rights principles of the Declaration of Independence and adopt, for instance , th e egalitarianis m o f Dworki n o r o f retire d associat e justice Willia m Brennan , o r th e majoritarianis m o f th e conservativ e proponents of a jurisprudence of original intention, they should employ the Article 5 amendment proces s an d s o specify. T o date, that has not occurred—and i t is not likely to occur.

Methodological Criticisms and Responses Because I advocate a version o f originalism, it is necessary t o attemp t to answe r her e th e chie f criticism s levele d agains t tha t interpretiv e m y judgment , however , Richar d Posner' s argumen t tha t literar y technique s hav e littl e relevance fo r interpretin g constitutiona l an d statutor y text s becaus e o f th e profoun d differences betwee n literature and law in character, origin, and, most importantly, social function, i s correct. See Posner, Law and Literature, 209-68 . See also Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," 242 ("The most telling response to this objection [tha t discerning the Framers' intent is 'really impossible'] is simply that no one really believes it, not even the writers who make the objection. I f they did, they would no t us e languag e t o advanc e th e argument") . For a n illustrativ e opposin g view, see Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue, 32-45.

Introduction 9 methodology.* Th e most significan t criticis m o f originalism i s that th e Framers coul d no t an d di d no t anticipat e man y moder n need s an d problems. Therefore , argu e th e critics , th e Constitutio n mus t b e a "living Constitution," one that evolves by judicial interpretation to meet modern exigencies. The leading proponent of the notion of a living Constitution, and the leading opponen t o f a jurisprudence o f origina l intention , i s Justic e Brennan. According to him, uthe ultimate question" in constitutional interpretation "must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitutio n rest s not i n any static meaning i t might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability o f its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs."41 The "grea t clauses " o f th e Constitutio n wer e purposel y phrase d broadly t o accomplis h thi s goal, Justice Brennan argues . Of particular import are the Bill of Rights guarantees and the fourteenth amendmen t provisions requiring "due process" and "equal protection." The notio n o f a livin g Constitutio n shoul d b e rejected , n o matte r how appealingly Justice Brennan may state the case for it. 42 The vision of the Constitutio n a s the embodimen t o f "transformative overarchin g principles" i s uncontrolle d b y th e tex t o f th e Constitutio n an d th e political philosophy upon which the text and this nation are based. The Framers mus t hav e mean t somethin g whe n the y wrote th e Constitu tion^ Moreover , such a n open-ende d approac h t o constitutional inter pretation permit s judge s t o rejec t thos e clause s o f th e Constitutio n *The debat e ove r origina l inten t ha s bee n dominatin g constitutiona l scholarshi p eve r since Attorney General Meese's 198 5 American Bar Association speech. See Ortiz, "The Price of Metaphysics." As anyone who has spent time reviewing the mountain of literature on originalism can attest, much has been written in the way of criticism of originalist methodology, as well as responses to that criticism. The debate over original intent has taken o n suc h a lif e o f it s ow n tha t som e no w characteriz e Justic e Brenna n a s a n originalist! See Perry , The Constitution in the Courts, 213 n. 15 . As much as anything else, the discussion in this Introduction attempts to bring the debate over original intent back to its moorings: to the issues of how, and whether, judges should walk the precarious line between judicial activism and judicial restraint in constitutional decision making. tThe relationship between the written words of the Constitution and the natural-rights principles underlyin g those writte n word s should b e made clear from the outset . That relationship is best explained by contrasting my position with Christopher Wolfe's. For Wolfe, as for most modern conservatives, the Constitution is ultimately abou t majority rule, with a few isolated rights, private property rights in particular, exempted from the political process . Se e Wolfe , Judicial Activism. Fo r the Framers , as I try to sho w i n this book , th e Constitutio n wa s ultimatel y abou t securin g individua l right s (broadl y

10 Introductio n they d o no t lik e an d t o giv e th e one s the y d o lik e whateve r meanin g they desir e the m t o have . In the ap t word s o f Harry Jaffa, "thi s is the negation o f constitutionalism." 43 I t is , i n othe r words , nothin g mor e

than the illegitimate exercise of political power by those appointed to

check political decisions. The mos t conspicuou s exampl e o f Justic e Brennan' s negatio n o f constitutionalism i s hi s unyieldin g oppositio n t o th e deat h penalty . Brennan's belie f tha t th e Constitutio n i s " a sparklin g vision " o f th e "human dignity " o f ever y individua l i s a t th e roo t o f hi s resistance t o capital punishment. Brennan admits that his position is not subscribe d to b y a majorit y o f th e justices o r a majority o f Americans. However, his view o f the Constitutio n a s a transformative documen t embodyin g overarching principles required him, in his judgment, to vote as he did. For o n th e issu e o f th e deat h penalty , Justic e Brenna n "hope[s ] t o embody a communit y strivin g fo r huma n dignit y for all , although per haps not yet arrived." 44 As admirabl e a s ar e Justic e Brennan' s humanitaria n sentiments — sentiments wit h whic h I personall y hav e muc h sympathy— a plai n reading of the Constitution demonstrates how troubling is his approach to constitutiona l interpretation . Capita l punishmen t i s confronte d i n the Constitution i n th e eight h amendment , whic h forbid s "crue l an d unusual punishments," as applied t o the state s through the fourteent h amendment. Additionally, th e fifth amendmen t speak s t o capita l pun ishment i n th e doubl e jeopard y clause , an d th e fifth an d fourteent h amendments addres s i t in their respective du e process clauses. 46 (The conceived) from th e machination s o f th e politica l process . Give n hi s positio n o n th e essential premise of the Constitution, Wolfe is willing to let judges interpret the Constitution "i n ligh t of " natural-right s philosoph y onl y i f ther e i s a "textua l basis " fo r tha t interpretation. Se e Wolfe , The Rise of Modern Judicial Review, 108 . (Unlike th e vas t majority o f conservativ e originalists , Wolf e i s a t leas t willin g t o gran t som e rol e fo r natural-rights philosoph y i n constitutiona l interpretation , limite d a s tha t rol e ma y be.)

Given my reading of the Kramers* position on the essential premise of the Constitution ,

all of th e text , especiall y th e individual-right s provisions , i s grounded i n natural-right s philosophy, becaus e th e Framer s enacte d th e Constitutio n t o serv e a s the institutiona l framework throug h whic h th e natural-right s principle s o f th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence can be advanced (th e Articles of Confederation ha d proved a miserable failure in this regard). The Court, then, should approach the entire constitutiona l text "in light of " natural-rights philosophy, not simply the provisions dealing with private property rights, as Wolfe would have it do. Specific examples of my approach to the role of natural-rights philosophy in constitutional interpretation ar e found in chapter 5.

Introduction 1 1 fact that the Constitution speaks to capital punishment i n places othe r than the eighth amendment is generally overlooked by those seeking to find capital punishment unconstitutional.) 46 Moreover, the fifth amendment authorizes federal capita l trials when prefaced b y a "presentmen t or indictment o f a Grand Jury," and Article 2, section 2, empowers th e

president "t o grant Reprieves." When interpreting these provisions in

light of the natural-rights principles of the Declaration of Independence it i s clea r tha t th e Constitutio n sanction s th e impositio n o f the deat h penalty on a person who intentionally takes the life o f another. This is because, as is explained at length in chapters 1 and 5, such a person is violating the fundamental la w of nature to preserve mankind and must be removed as a threat to the political community. 47 Given th e legitimac y o f capita l punishmen t unde r a natural-right s interpretation o f the Constitution , the oppositio n t o that ultimat e penalty, which so typifies th e notion o f a living Constitution, is seen to be based on nothing other than a judge's own conception of morality. This takes the immortal words o f Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, that "the Constitutio n i s wha t th e judges sa y i t is," 48 t o a n unacceptabl e extreme. In s o doing , the rol e o f th e Court i n the American constitu tional order, discussed at length in part 2, is corrupted and discredited . Those who subscribe to the notion of a living Constitution frequentl y appeal to McCulloch v. Maryland (1819 ) and the words of Chief Justice John Marshall : "We must neve r forge t tha t i t i s a constitution w e ar e expounding!,] .. . a constitutio n intende d t o endur e fo r age s to come , and, consequently , t o b e adapte d t o th e variou s crises o f huma n af fairs."49 Importantly, however, the passage referred t o in McCulloch to support th e notio n o f a livin g Constitution i s misquoted . A s Walte r Berns points out, "It join[s] two sentences separated by eight pages."50 In the first sentence Marshall is reminding his audience that the Constitution is not a detailed legal code, but is instead a "great outline" of the American for m o f government . I n th e secon d sentenc e Marshal l i s discussing Article 1 , section 8, and the power of Congress to pass laws "necessary an d proper " t o th e legislativ e function . I n fact , Marshall' s views o n constitutiona l chang e ar e largel y i n accor d wit h thos e ad vanced i n this volume. As the chie f justice state d i n his most famou s opinion, Marbury v. Madison (1803) , the "principles " of the Constitu tion "are deemed fundamental [and ] permanent" and, except by means of formal amendment, "unchangeable." 61

12 Introductio

n

To pu t i t plainly , th e Constitutio n provide s a forma l mechanis m fo r change, an d tha t mechanis m i s no t judicia l fiat. Instead , Articl e 5 i s

what must be invoked if the nation's views on, for example, the death

penalty hav e "evolved." 52 Th e argumen t mad e b y som e commentator s that "ther e i s nothin g inheren t t o th e Constitutio n tha t say s anythin g about ho w it s meanin g shoul d evolve" 53 ignore s th e unequivoca l lan guage o f Articl e 5 . Similarly , thos e wh o argu e tha t th e Constitutio n must evolv e by judicial interpretatio n becaus e th e Article 5 amendmen t process i s too difficult 54 ar e missin g a fundamental point . The Article 5 amendment proces s ma y b e difficult , bu t tha t i s becaus e th e Framer s intended i t to be. As James Madiso n eloquentl y state s i n The Federalist no. 49 , th e amendmen t proces s wa s mad e difficul t becaus e "frequen t appeals [t o th e people ] would , i n grea t measure , depriv e th e govern ment o f that veneration whic h tim e bestows o n everything, and withou t which perhap s th e wises t an d frees t government s woul d no t posses s the requisite stability." 55 In summary, the Constitution ca n evolve, but it should d o so by the intentionally arduou s Article 5 amendment process , an d no t b y the whi m of unelected an d life-tenure d judges. Justice Blac k sai d i t best. The rol e of the Cour t is to "interpret" the Constitution, not to "rewrite " it. 56 The nex t criticis m tha t need s t o b e addresse d i s that i t is impossibl e to determin e wha t th e Framer s intended . Thi s criticis m ha s severa l levels. At it s mos t basi c level , th e argumen t i s tha t moder n American s cannot understan d wha t th e Framer s mean t becaus e ou r languag e i s different fro m theirs . Terrenc e Bal l an d J . G . A . Pococ k stat e thi s particular criticis m well : The cal l fo r Suprem e Cour t justices, if no t fo r th e rest o f us, to return t o th e thoughts an d intention s o f th e Founder s woul d requir e tha t on e recove r an d return t o th e vocabulary i n which thos e thought s an d intention s wer e frame d in th e firs t place . I t woul d mean , i n short , tha t th e la w o f th e lan d woul d perforce b e couched in a language that we no longer speak. 57 As intellectually intriguin g a s thi s reproac h ma y be , it is, in practica l terms, unconvincing . Moder n American s ca n understan d wha t th e Framers meant . Th e languag e th e Framer s use d i s no t irremediabl y different fro m ours 5 8 and , a s par t 1 documents , i t i s quit e feasibl e to understan d wha t the y intende d a t th e basi c leve l o f philosophica l principle—that embodie d i n the Declaratio n o f Independence. 59 The nex t leve l o f th e criticis m tha t moder n American s canno t deter -

Introduction 1

3

mine wha t th e Framer s intende d i s tha t ther e i s n o singl e entit y tha t can b e calle d "th e Framers. " As Leonar d Lev y succinctl y put s it , "The entity we cal l 'the Framers' did not have a collective mind , think in one groove, o r possess th e sam e convictions." 60 The problem , som e argue , is exacerbated whe n i t is realized that the true source o f original inten t is not the Framers who met in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 , but rathe r thos e wh o ratifie d th e Constitutio n i n th e stat e conven tions.61 James Madison's remarks to th e U.S . House o f Representative s in 179 6 illustrate the point: As the instrument came from them, it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State Conventions. If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified the Constitution.62 The uncertaint y interjecte d b y Levy , amon g others , mus t b e evalu ated carefully . Indeed , th e argumen t tha t th e ratifier s ar e th e tru e framers simpl y appear s t o b e a rhetorica l plo y designe d t o discredi t the theor y o f origina l inten t b y multiplyin g th e numbe r o f framer s "exponentially."63 Mor e importantly , th e genera l conventio n an d th e state convention s share d th e sam e inten t o n the fundamenta l questio n being addressed ; namely, wha t i s th e principa l purpos e o f governmen t in th e America n regime ? Th e answe r given , a s par t 1 explains, i s tha t the principa l purpos e o f governmen t i s t o secur e th e people' s natura l rights. Accordingly , i t seem s perfectl y appropriate , no t merel y conve nient, t o accep t th e inten t o f th e Framer s a s a fai r reflectio n o f th e intent o f th e ratifiers . (Thi s is especiall y th e cas e give n the importanc e of intellectual leadershi p i n the American Founding. See part 1. ) State d somewhat differently , I adop t th e distinctio n identifie d b y Pau l Bres t between "moderat e originalism, " o r originalis m a t th e genera l leve l o f philosophical principle , an d "stric t originalism, " o r originalis m a t a n exacting leve l o f specificity . Th e methodologica l implication s o f thi s distinction are explained wel l by Brest: Interpreters often treat the writings or statements of the framers of a provision as evidence of the adopters' intent. This is a justifiable strateg y for the moderate originalist who is concerned with the framers' intent on a relatively abstract level o f generality—abstrac t enoug h t o permi t th e inferenc e tha t i t reflect s broad social consensus rather than notions peculiar to a handful of the adopters. It is a problematic strategy for the strict originalist.64

14 Introductio n The proble m face d b y stric t originalist s lik e Meese , Bork , an d Rehn quist65 of identifying th e entity called "the Framers" is thus not shared by the interpretiv e approac h propose d here , because I am concerne d with discerning the Kramers' intent at a relatively general level of social consensus, that of natural-rights philosophical principle. The final level of the criticism that modern Americans cannot deter mine wha t th e Framer s intende d concern s th e integrit y o f th e docu mentary record . Thi s criticis m ha s bee n mos t forcefull y state d b y James Hutson. After carefull y examinin g the accuracy and reliability of the conventio n records— The Journal of the Convention (1819) , Robert Yates's notes (1821), Jonathan Elliot's notes of the state conventio n debates (1827-30) , an d Jame s Madison' s note s (1840)—Hutso n con cludes tha t th e record s hav e bee n "comprised—perhap s fatally—b y the editoria l intervention s o f hireling s an d partisans. " A s a conse quence, Hutson argues , "to recover origina l inten t fro m thes e record s may b e a n impossibl e hermeneuti c assignment." 66 Again , however , a criticism i s identifie d tha t ma y b e vali d agains t stric t originalists — those wh o requir e a judge t o discer n ho w th e Framer s woul d hav e applied a specifi c claus e t o a give n situation , an d t o appl y i t i n a like manner—but tha t i s not damagin g to the theor y o f constitutiona l interpretation advance d here , since I am interested i n discovering th e Framers' inten t a t the basi c leve l o f natural-rights principle . As part 1 shows, the documentary record is sufficiently reliabl e to reveal that the Framers intended the Constitution to be interpreted so as to secure the hard-won fruits o f the American Revolution. The most tellin g criticis m agains t a jurisprudence o f origina l inten tion is that the Framers did not intend the Constitution t o be interpre ted in accordance with their intent. The best accounts of this criticism are thos e o f H . Jefferson Powel l an d Leonar d Levy. 67 Bot h conclud e that th e Framer s di d no t mean , want , o r expec t th e Constitution t o be construe d i n accordanc e wit h thei r intent . Lev y make s th e poin t unequivocally: "I f th e Framers , wh o me t i n executiv e session s ever y day of their nearly four month s of work, had wanted their country and posterity t o constru e th e Constitutio n i n ligh t o f thei r deliberations , they would have had a stenographer presen t to keep an official record , and the y woul d hav e publishe d it." 68 Instead , argu e bot h Powel l an d Levy, the Framers expected that the Constitution would be understoo d through traditiona l common-la w method s o f statutor y construction ;

Introduction 1 5 specifically, b y discerning th e objectiv e meanin g of the languag e use d in the document, not the subjective intention s of the authors. Powell and Levy correctly demonstrate that the Framers did not wish future generations of Americans to adhere to their intentions on specific issues.69 Accordingly, strict originalism is justifiably calle d "a sham and an illusion,,,7° because it lacks historical foundation, and the very notion of original intent depends on history. However, Powell and Levy fail to address adequately the most essential questions, namely, what were the philosophical principle s motivatin g th e Framers , an d t o wha t obliga tions do those principles give rise?71 The answers to these questions depend on remembering that the Framers wrote a Constitution, an d it is a Constitution profoundly influenced by and committed to the philosophical ideals of the American Revolution.* English writer G. K. Chesterton made the point nicely when reflecting o n his voyage across America in the early part of this century: "The American Constitution .. . is founded on a creed. America is the only nation in the world that is founded o n a creed. That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence; perhaps the only piece of practical politics that is also theoretical politics and also great literature." 72 The Constitution, i n other words , is a political documen t i n the noblest sense . It establishe s a framewor k o f governmen t throug h whic h certain underlyin g philosophica l principle s ar e t o b e advanced . An d those philosophica l principle s ar e th e natural-right s principle s o f th e Declaration of Independence. To ignore this fact is to ignore the reason we ar e a nation. 73 Par t 1 explores th e natural-right s heritag e o f th e American regime. * The Framers ' commitment t o th e philosophica l ideal s o f th e American Revolutio n als o dispels anothe r famou s concer n abou t originalism : tha t our treasure d individua l right s will b e los t i f originalis m i s adopted . Senato r Edwar d Kennedy' s openin g salv o agains t the Bork nominatio n i s the classic statemen t o f this concern: Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be forced int o back-alley abortions, blacks

would si t a t segregate d lunc h counters , rogu e polic e coul d brea k dow n citizens ' door s i n midnigh t raids, schoolchildren coul d no t be taught about evolution, writers and artists would be censored at the whim or (sicJ government , and the doors of the Federal courts would be shut on the fingers of million s of citizens for whom the judiciary is often th e only protector of the individual rights that are at the heart of our democracy. (Congressional Record . 133 d Cong., 1s t sess.. 1987. S9188-S89 [dail y ed.. July 11)

Chapter 5, where leadin g Supreme Court cases are analyzed in light of natural-rights principles, illustrates that Senator Kennedy's fears are unfounded under an originalism grounded in th e politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence—thoug h th e result s dis cerned there are not always equivalent to the senator's modern brand of liberalism.

I The Jurisprudence o f the American Foundin g

The Introduction endeavore d t o place my project i n the context of the long-standing public-la w debat e ove r constitutiona l interpretation . I now tur n t o th e specifi c historica l an d philosophica l suppor t fo r m y thesis that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of the naturalrights politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence . Here ,

my audience i s as often historian s an d political philosophers as it is

public-law scholars . M y objective , however , remain s chiefl y on e o f public law: to discern the essential principles of the American regime in order to asses s what those principles have to say about constitutiona l interpretation. Chapter 1 interprets th e American Revolutio n fro m th e perspectiv e of th e Declaratio n o f Independence , th e foundin g documen t o f th e 17

18 Th e Jurisprudence o f the American Founding American regime . In that chapte r I explore the path-breaking scholar ship of, amon g others, three o f the mos t influentia l contemporar y stu dents o f the American Founding : Bernard Bailyn , J. G. A. Pocock, an d Gordon Wood . I conclud e tha t th e generall y prevailin g practic e o f minimizing th e Lockea n libera l basi s o f th e America n Revolutio n i s fundamentally flawed. I n essence, I show that moder n student s o f th e American Revolution have overlooked—or at least misconstrued—th e significance o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e fo r th e characte r o f that event. Importantly, however, I also explain that Lockean liberalism is not a s exclusivel y individualisti c a s many modern-day politica l philosophers maintain. Chapter 2 turn s t o th e Constitutio n o f th e Unite d States . There, I examine th e leadin g document s o f th e constitutiona l perio d an d con clude that the Constitution was intended by the Framers to provide the institutional framewor k throug h whic h the philosophica l ideal s o f th e Declaration o f Independence ca n be advanced. I therefore identif y th e central rol e th e Declaratio n wa s intende d t o pla y i n constitutiona l interpretation.

1 The Declaratio n o f Independenc e

The Founder s cam e fro m Englan d t o settl e Americ a fo r a variety o f reasons. Som e sough t t o improv e thei r economi c condition , other s were recruited by those who saw colonial development as essential t o the influence an d power of the mother country , and still others sought freedom fro m religious persecution. As the colonies grew in population and developed economically, the British government enacted more and more law s regulatin g them . Befor e 176 3 tha t regulatio n wa s largel y confined t o colonial trade, and the colonists had grown accustomed t o a grea t degre e o f self-governmen t i n thei r interna l affairs . Afte r 176 3 things bega n t o chang e a s th e Britis h governmen t endeavore d t o re form it s sprawling empire and to extract revenue from th e colonie s to reduce the national debt resulting from th e recently completed Frenc h and Indian War. As might be expected, the colonists resented th e ne w British policies.

20 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e The roa d t o independenc e was , however , cautiousl y taken . When ,

for example, in 1764 and 1765 Parliament began taxing the colonies to

reduce th e nationa l debt , th e colonist s objecte d vigorously , bu t the y also reaffirme d thei r allegianc e t o th e mothe r country. 1 Indeed , al though, a s a resul t o f increasingl y determine d Britis h effort s t o brin g the colonie s unde r firme r control , a serie s o f urba n riot s an d violenc e ran fro m th e Stam p Act riots o f 176 5 through th e Bosto n Massacre , th e Boston Te a Party , an d the n th e fighting a t Lexingto n an d Concor d i n 1775, th e prevailin g moo d i n th e colonie s wa s on e o f reconciliatio n with England . The colonist s first trie d t o "wor k withi n th e system " an d based thei r protest s o n "th e right s o f Englishmen " an d o n th e colonia l charters. Finding their conventiona l appeal s unsuccessful, th e colonist s turned increasingl y t o th e underlyin g doctrin e o f natura l rights, 2 whic h maintains tha t al l persons posses s certai n inherent , indefeasibl e right s by virtue o f their humanity . Much, therefore , ha d transpire d i n wha t i s now th e Unite d State s o f America befor e th e issuanc e o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e o n July 4 , 1776 , and a s a resul t man y argument s wer e mad e b y th e colo nists in oppositio n t o the increasingl y frequen t Britis h oppression s tha t were t o lea d t o war . Bu t al l tha t ha d transpire d culminate d i n th e Declaration o f Independence , th e foundin g documen t o f th e America n regime. I t is , then, th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e tha t speaks , mos t fully, t o wh o w e ar e a s a nation—ou r origins , purposes, an d ideals . I t is, i n othe r words , th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e tha t articulate s "the America n philosoph y o f government." 3 Thi s chapte r seek s t o ex plore tha t politica l philosoph y i n orde r t o understan d bette r wha t th e United State s o f Americ a i s suppose d t o b e about , it s identity , i f yo u will. A s suggeste d i n th e Introduction , onl y the n wil l w e b e abl e t o discern ho w th e Constitutio n shoul d b e interpreted .

"An E x p r e s s i o n o f t h e America n Mind " Technically, ou r nation' s independenc e date s fro m Jul y 2 , 1776 , whe n the Continenta l Congres s approve d a resolutio n o f independenc e sub mitted o n behal f o f th e Virginia delegatio n b y Richard Henr y Lee . Lee's resolution proclaimed , "Thes e Unite d Colonie s are , an d o f righ t ough t to be , fre e an d independen t States , tha t the y ar e absolve d fro m al l

The Declaration of Independence 21 allegiance t o th e Britis h Crown , an d tha t al l politica l connectio n be tween the m an d th e Stat e o f Grea t Britai n is , an d ough t t o be , totall y dissolved."4 Th e fac t tha t th e Unite d State s celebrate s Independenc e Day o n Jul y 4 instea d o f Jul y 2 i s a testamen t t o th e reverenc e wit h which the Declaration of Independence i s held by the American people. The Declaratio n o f Independenc e wa s writte n primaril y b y Thoma s Jefferson. Jefferson, servin g on a committee that also consisted of John Adams, Beryamin Franklin, Robert Livingston, and Roger Sherman, was chosen t o draf t th e Declaratio n chiefl y becaus e o f hi s "masterl y pen." 5 According t o Joh n Adams , whe n Jefferso n cam e t o Congres s i n 177 5 he "brough t wit h hi m a reputation fo r literature , science , an d a happ y talent for composition . Writing s of hi s were hande d about , remarkabl e for th e peculia r felicit y o f expression." 6 Indeed , th e "peculia r felicity " with whic h th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s writte n play s n o smal l part in the power of its message. The Declaratio n o f Independenc e a s drafte d b y Jefferson i s largel y the Declaration the American people know today. 7 Franklin and Adams did mak e a fe w change s i n phraseology , a s di d th e Continenta l Con gress.8 The only significant substantiv e change , however, was the elimi nation by the Congress of Jefferson's "vehemen t philippic against negro slavery,"9 a charge wit h which Jefferson sough t to conclud e th e lis t o f grievances agains t th e king . The reaso n fo r th e Congress' s deletio n o f the slaver y provision i s explaine d b y Jefferson i n notes h e took durin g the deliberations : The clause .. . reprobatin g the enslaving the inhabitant s of Africa was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on the contrary still wished to continue it. Our northern brethren also I believe felt a little tender under these censures; for tho* their people hav e very few slave s themselves ye t they had been pretty considerable carriers of them to others.10 Late in life Jefferson wa s eve n mor e critica l o f th e deletion . "Sever e strictures o n the Britis h king, in negativing ou r repeated repeal s o f th e law whic h permitte d th e importatio n o f slaves , wer e disapproved, " Jefferson wrote , "by some Souther n gentlemen whos e reflection s wer e not ye t mature d t o th e ful l abhorrenc e o f tha t traffic." 11 Significantly , however, even those who demanded that Jefferson's "philippic " against slavery b e delete d di d no t d o s o becaus e the y disagree d wit h th e philosophical principle s articulate d b y Jefferso n i n th e Declaratio n o f

22 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e Independence. The y wer e simpl y self-intereste d an d di d no t wan t thei r economic livelihoo d threatened . The Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s comprise d o f tw o separate , ye t interrelated, parts . Th e first an d mos t importan t par t (th e first tw o paragraphs, principally th e second) addresse s issue s o f political philosophy. Th e secon d par t (th e remainder ) consist s o f eightee n specifi c grievances agains t th e kin g tha t justified, i n th e opinio n o f th e Found ers, the brea k fro m th e crown . The par t tha t addresse s issue s o f politi cal philosophy i s the subjec t o f this book . Virtually n o studen t o f America n politica l though t denie s tha t th e Declaration o f Independence i s an expressio n o f natural-rights politica l philosophy. 12 Th e pervasivenes s o f tha t philosoph y a t th e Foundin g i s nicely capture d b y Car l Becker' s remar k tha t "wher e Jefferso n go t hi s ideas i s hardl y s o muc h a questio n a s wher e h e coul d hav e go t awa y from them." 13 I n fact , Joh n Adams , wh o serve d wit h Jefferso n o n th e committee appointe d t o draf t th e Declaratio n o f Independence , onc e remarked tha t ther e i s "no t a n ide a i n it [th e Declaration] bu t wha t ha d been hackneye d i n Congres s fo r tw o year s before." 14 A s migh t b e expected, Jefferso n himsel f mos t eloquentl y expresse d th e strengt h o f the consensus : But with respect t o ou r rights, and th e act s of the British governmen t contra vening thos e rights , there wa s bu t on e opinio n o n thi s sid e o f th e water . All American Whig s though t alik e o n thes e subjects . Whe n forced , therefore , t o resort to arms for redress , an appeal to the tribunal o f the world was deeme d proper for ou r justification. Thi s was the object o f the Declaration o f Independence. Not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before though t of, no t merel y t o sa y thing s whic h ha d neve r bee n sai d before ; bu t t o plac e before mankin d the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent, and to justify ourselve s in the independent stand we are compelle d t o take . Neither aimin g at originalit y o f principle o r sentiment , nor yet copied from an y particular an d previous writing, it was intended to be an expressio n o f th e America n mind , an d t o giv e tha t expressio n th e prope r tone an d spiri t calle d fo r b y the occasion . All its authorit y rest s the n o n th e harmonizing sentiment s o f th e day , whethe r expresse d i n conversation , i n letters, in printed essays , or i n th e elementar y book s o f publi c right , as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc.15 Basic tenet s o f advocac y confir m Jefferson' s clai m t o hav e simpl y penned "a n expressio n o f th e America n mind, " t o hav e give n voic e t o

"the harmonizing sentiments of the day." After all , it would have been

The Declaration of Independence 2 3 less than effective to justify a revolution on principles with which his audience was unfamiliar, whether that audience be the king in Great Britain or Jefferson's fello w colonists in America. The underlying character of the American Revolutio n is , however, presently—as i t so often ha s been—a subject of much debate. I now turn to that important debate. Revising th e Revisionism : Lockea n Liberalis m an d th e American Revolutio n Students o f the American Revolutio n hav e lon g been intereste d i n the character o f that event. The conclusions reached hav e varied dramati cally. For the first generation of writers on the Revolution—those wh o lived through an d participated i n the conflict—th e struggl e was abou t fundamental principle s of political philosophy. Here, the original generation o f American historian s maintained, th e cr y "n o taxation withou t representation" was emblematic of the Founders' commitment to principle.16 The nex t generatio n o f historian s offere d a n interpretatio n o f th e American Revolution that bordered on the theological. The Revolution, they argued , wa s th e decisiv e even t i n God' s pla n fo r huma n liberty , and th e leader s o f th e struggl e agains t th e Britis h wer e depicte d a s larger-than-life heroe s fighting to preserve God's will.17 Then cam e "th e revolt agains t formalism" 18 a t the en d o f th e nine teenth century and the "heroic" interpretation o f the American Revolution was replaced by an account that emphasized social and economi c forces. Th e clas h o f economi c interest s betwee n th e colonie s an d England an d th e interna l social an d economi c division s withi n th e colonies themselves told the real story of the Revolution, the so-calle d "progressive" schoo l contended. 19 Wit h th e ris e o f th e progressiv e school w e se e a readin g o f earl y America n histor y tha t i s i n star k contrast not only to the heroic interpretation just described, but to the original view o f th e colonist s a s motivate d b y fundamental principle s of political philosophy. The progressive school's socioeconomic interpretation of the American Revolutio n hel d swa y unti l th e 1950s, 20 when i t wa s replace d b y the "consensus" theory.21 Proponents of the consensus theory acknowledged what the progressives had long emphasized: that conflict existe d

24 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e within colonia l America. But, this new generation o f historians insisted , the progressive s ha d gon e to o fa r i n thei r single-minde d emphasi s o n socioeconomic conflict . Th e consensu s theorist s maintaine d tha t th e colonists wer e motivate d chiefl y b y question s o f politica l principle . I n fact, i n thei r classi c stud y The Stamp Act Crisis, Edmun d an d Hele n Morgan sho w ho w i n mos t case s th e Stam p Ac t wa s neve r pu t int o effect an d tha t th e colonists , therefore , ha d n o opportunit y t o experi ence i t as a n economi c hardship , something th e Morgan s believe calle d the progressives * socioeconomi c thesi s int o doubt . Wit h th e ris e o f the consensu s theory , historian s thu s cam e ful l circl e bac k t o th e interpretation advance d b y the first generatio n o f students o f the Amer ican Revolution . The consensu s a t issu e fo r th e consensu s theorist s wa s Lockea n lib eralism. 22 More precisely, they argue d that the founding generatio n wa s thoroughly committe d t o th e primac y o f natura l right s an d t o govern ment's rol e i n protectin g them . Th e consensu s theorist s di d not , how ever, have the last word o n the character o f the American Revolution . Beginning i n th e 1960 s a republica n revisionis m bega n t o tak e shape. 23 Led by Bernard Bailyn , J. G . A. Pocock, an d Gordo n Wood , th e republican revisionists 24 accepte d th e consensu s theorists ' emphasi s on politica l principle ; the y simpl y denie d tha t th e principle s upo n which ther e wa s a consensu s wer e th e libera l principle s o f Locke . Instead, the revisionists insisted, the consensus was one of "republican ism." I n othe r words , th e basi s o f th e America n Revolutio n wa s no t a

philosophical concer n fo r protectin g privat e rights ; it wa s a widely

shared commitmen t t o sacrificin g privat e interes t fo r th e public good . The republica n revisionis m ha s bee n largel y successful. On e studen t of America n politica l though t ha s gon e s o fa r a s t o cal l th e fall o f Lockean liberalis m an d th e ris e o f classica l republicanis m i n the histo riography o f th e America n Revolutio n "arguabl y th e mos t stunnin g reversal i n th e histor y o f politica l thought." 25 Prio r t o th e republica n revisionism, th e Lockea n interpretatio n ha d predominate d sinc e a t least the publicatio n o f Carl Becker's The Declaration of Independence in 192 2 an d Loui s Hartz' s The Liberal Tradition in America i n 1955 . According t o Becker , "Mos t American s ha d absorbe d Locke' s wor k a s a kin d o f politica l gospel" 2 6 Hart z agreed , a s demonstrate d b y hi s conclusion tha t "Lock e dominate s America n politica l though t a s n o thinker anywher e dominate s th e politica l though t o f a nation." 27

The Declaration of Independence 2 5 According to the Lockea n readin g of the American Revolution , "republicanism" i s simpl y a form o f governmen t fo r securin g natura l rights,* not , a s on e commentato r nicel y put s it , " a dynami c ideolog y assuming moral dimensions and involving the very character of American society." 28 The revisionists could not disagree more with this procedural characterizatio n o f republicanism. Gordo n Wood , for one , explicitly reject s i t i n The Radicalism of the American Revolution, a n examination o f th e radical—an d unexpected—socia l chang e tha t re sulted from th e War of Independence. Wood asserts: "[Republicanism] stood fo r somethin g othe r tha n a set o f political institution s based o n popular election . I n fact , republicanis m wa s no t t o b e reduce d t o a mere form o f government at all; instead it was ... 4 a form of life/ ideal s

and values entirely compatible with monarchical institutions."29

Isaac Kramnick succinctly explains the implications of this substantive interpretatio n o f republicanism—thi s "for m o f life"—i n hi s provocative book o n political ideology in late-eighteenth-century Englan d and America: Liberalism has been toppled in recent years and replaced by a new hegemonic ideology, republicanism. A modern self-interested, competitive , individualistic ideology emphasizing private rights has been replaced a t the center o f eighteenth-century political discourse by a classical-Renaissance ideology emphasizing self-less duty-based participation in the communal pursuit of the virtuous public good.30 In othe r words , the motivatin g forc e behin d th e America n Revolu tion wa s no t th e protectio n o f natura l rights , bu t th e cultivatio n o f virtue. I n Bailyn' s words , "Th e effective , triggerin g conviction s tha t lay behin d th e Revolutio n wer e no t derive d fro m commo n Lockea n generalities but from th e specific fear s an d formulations o f the radica l *Straussians who study American political and constitutional thought argue that government protects civil, not natural, rights. See, for example, Berns, "Judicial Review and the Rights an d Law s o f Nature, " 58-66 ; Nedelsky , Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism; Storing , "The Constitution and the Bill of Rights," 44-48. The Straussians, however, ar e makin g a distinction tha t almos t non e o f th e Founder s made (something Nedelsky seems to appreciate)—and when an occasional Founder did make a distinction among the different philosophical conceptions of rights, that Founder explicitly rejected the argument advanced by those wh o study the American Founding from a Straussian perspective. See chapter 2. Briefly put, as this book describes at length, the Founders believed the fundamental purpose of government was to protect individual rights, broadly conceived, and they believed those rights were conferred by nature, not by government.

26 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e publicists an d oppositio n politician s o f earl y eighteenth-centur y En gland." Thos e fear s wer e o f politica l corruption . Althoug h th e "skele ton" o f th e Founders * politica l philosoph y ma y hav e bee n Lockean , "the flesh, th e substance , the majo r preoccupation s an d th e underlyin g motivations an d mood , wer e quit e different." 31 Fo r th e Founders , th e argument goes , wha t mad e a natio n grea t o r ultimatel y destroye d i t was the characte r o f it s people. What the Founder s therefor e sough t t o achieve wit h th e America n Revolution , Baily n claims , wa s a n escap e from th e corruptio n o f th e Britis h Empir e s o tha t th e lif e an d integrit y of the American regim e coul d b e protected . Gordon Wood' s The Creation of the American Republic i s on e o f the mos t widel y rea d an d widel y praise d book s eve r writte n o n th e American Founding . I n fact , mor e tha n twent y year s afte r publicatio n The Creation of the American Republic remains , together wit h Bailyn' s

Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, the benchmar k o n early America n politica l thought . Continuin g th e wor k o f hi s mento r Bailyn, Wood develop s th e specific s o f th e republica n thesi s i n meticu lous detail . Lik e Bailyn , Woo d argue s tha t "th e sacrific e o f individua l interests t o th e greate r goo d o f th e whol e forme d th e essenc e o f republicanism an d comprehende d fo r American s th e idealisti c goa l o f the Revolution. " An d wha t Woo d mean s b y th e greate r goo d o f th e whole i s plainl y nonliberal—indeed , i t i s antiliberal . "Thi s commo n interest," Woo d writes , "wa s not , a s w e migh t toda y thin k o f it , simpl y the su m o r consensu s o f th e particula r interest s tha t mad e u p th e community. I t wa s rathe r a n entit y i n itself , prio r t o an d distinc t fro m

the various private interests of groups and individuals."32 And because

the variou s privat e interest s o f group s an d individual s wer e frequentl y at odd s wit h th e commo n good , the y sometime s ha d t o b e sacrificed . After all , Wood concludes , "th e commo n goo d [was ] the onl y objectiv e of government" fo r th e Founders. 33 The mos t aggressiv e figure i n th e republica n revisionis m i s J. G . A. Pocock. Mor e tha n eve n Baily n an d Wood , Pococ k seem s inten t o n exorcising th e America n Foundin g o f an y trace s o f liberalis m an d "the grea t Mr . Locke." 34 (Eve n Baily n acknowledge s Locke' s rhetorica l influence.) 35 Pococ k portray s th e America n Revolutio n "a s th e las t great ac t o f th e Renaissance " emergin g fro m " a lin e o f though t whic h staked everythin g o n a positiv e an d civi c concep t o f th e individual' s virtue." 36 As such , h e argues , becaus e Lockea n liberalis m i s a riva l o f

The Declaration of Independence 2 7 the classica l republica n tradition , Locke' s influenc e o n th e Foundin g has been significantly overstated ; in fact, it has been a "myth." Instead, the American Foundin g wa s actually , i n Pocock' s view , a "republica n synthesis" o f th e politica l philosoph y o f Machiavell i an d th e virtuou s state.37 I n effect , therefore , understandin g th e politica l philosoph y o f the Founding "d[oesj not necessitate reference t o Locke at all."38 Related to the republican revisionism 39 in early American historiography i s a bod y o f wor k tha t identifie s Scottis h mora l philosophy , not Lockea n liberalism , a s th e motivatin g forc e behin d th e America n Revolution. Th e mos t well-know n proponen t o f thi s vie w i s Garr y Wills.40 Wills's goal , like tha t o f th e republica n revisionists , i s t o find and emphasiz e a communitaria n sourc e o f th e America n Founding, 41 although th e communitarianis m o f th e Scot s i s more egalitaria n tha n that of the republicans. 42 The focus i s again on virtue, with, in the cas e of the Scots, man's capacity to be virtuous stemming from hi s disposition fo r sympath y an d benevolence. 43 Becaus e th e Scot s emphasize d virtue, an d Lock e di d not , an d becaus e th e Founder s followe d th e Scots, th e Founders , th e argumen t goes , "stoo d a t a consciou s an d deliberate distance from Locke' s political principles." 44 The Conspicuous Neglect of the Declaration of Independence To hi s credit , Will s recognize s th e significanc e o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence to the political philosophy of the American Revolution—

he simply misreads it.* Incredibly, however, neither Wood's The Cre-

* Most scholar s n o longe r tak e Wills' s Scottis h readin g o f th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence seriously , believin g tha t hi s thesi s was demolishe d i n a superb revie w essa y b y Ronald Hamoway . Se e Hamoway , "Jefferso n an d th e Scottis h Enlightenment. w Mos t notably, Hamowa y show s tha t Franci s Hutcheson , th e Scottis h theoris t who m Will s regards as the mos t importan t influence o n Jefferson, was himself a student of Locke's theory of politics, especially his doctrine of revolution. While Hamoway may be unnecessarily hars h whe n h e call s Inventing America " a mas s o f confusions , uneducate d guesses, and blatant errors of fact," it is difficult t o deny that Wills has simply gone too far whe n h e argues , "Ther e i s n o indicatio n Jefferso n rea d [Locke' s 1 Second Treatise carefully o r wit h profit . Indeed , ther e i s n o direc t proo f h e eve r rea d i t a t all. " Wills, Inventing America, 174 . Because the republican interpretation o f the American Revolution i s th e mos t widel y accepted , an d becaus e Hamowa y di d suc h a definitiv e jo b o f repudiating Wills's Scottish thesis, I focus most of my remaining attention in this section on th e republica n revisionists . Fo r a n equall y devastatin g critiqu e o f Wills' s Scottis h thesis, making many of the same points made by Hamoway, see Jaffa, American Conservatism and the American Founding, 76-109 .

28 Th e Declaration o f Independenc e ation of the American Republic no r hi s mor e recen t The Radicalism of the American Revolution contain s a discussio n o f th e politica l phi losophy o f th e Declaration . Pocock' s The Machiavellian Moment i s likewise silent , a s ar e hi s othe r essay s o n th e America n Revolution. 45 Bailyn doe s addres s th e Declaratio n o f Independence , bu t hi s focu s i s on th e eightee n grievance s agains t th e king—t o th e complet e exclu sion o f th e Declaration' s precedin g statemen t o f politica l philosophy , an approac h n o doub t take n t o suppor t hi s corruption/conspirac y the sis. 46 As John Diggin s aptl y notes , "T o those wh o interpre t th e Revolu tion a s eithe r th e consummatio n o f 'Th e Machiavellia n Moment ' o r th e beginnings o f the Scottis h movemen t i n political thought, it must surel y seem a littl e awkwar d tha t th e ide a o f virtu e wa s no t eve n mentione d in th e Declaration." 47 A n examinatio n o f th e phraseolog y an d theme s of th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e show s wha t mos t American s hav e long accepted: that our founding documen t i s an expression o f Lockea n natural-rights politica l philosophy . In fact, th e similarit y o f phraseolog y and theme s betwee n th e Declaratio n an d Locke' s Second Treatise i s s o obvious tha t "Richar d Henr y Le e charge d [th e Declaration ] a s copie d

from Locke's treatise on government."48

Turning firs t t o phraseology , th e Declaratio n o f Independence' s "W e hold thes e truth s t o b e self-evident , tha t al l me n ar e create d equal " corresponds wit h th e Second Treatise's "Me n being , a s ha s bee n said , by nature, all free, equa l an d independent. " And th e Declaration's refer ence t o ever y individual' s natura l right s to "life , liberty, and th e pursui t of happiness" is traceable t o Locke' s "life , liberty an d estate." 49 Although many , including Wills, 50 make muc h o f Jefferson's substitu tion o f "th e pursui t o f happiness " fo r "property " i n th e enumerate d trinity o f natura l rights , th e substitutio n i s actuall y no t a departur e from Locke . Lock e use s th e phras e "th e pursui t o f happiness " i n hi s Essay concerning Human Understanding? 1 51 Moreover , "th e pursui t o f happiness" wa s considere d b y bot h Lock e an d th e Founder s t o b e synonymous wit h "property, " whe n propert y i s conceive d i n a broa d sense, rathe r tha n simpl y a s th e ownershi p o f materia l goods. 52 Ac cording t o Locke , "Propert y . . . mus t b e understoo d . . . t o mea n tha t property whic h me n hav e i n thei r person s a s wel l a s goods. " H e add s elsewhere tha t propert y involve s me n "unite d fo r th e genera l preserva tion o f their lives , liberties, and estates." 53

The Declaration of Independence 2

9

The fac t tha t Jefferson wa s listin g onl y "unalienable " natural right s in th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e provide s anothe r explanatio n fo r the absence o f the word "property" from the famous clause at issue. As Locke mentions in the Second Treatise, ma n is the creation and, hence, the propert y o f God. 54 Ever y individua l therefor e owe s a dut y t o hi s Creator to fulfill himsel f a s an individual. To satisfy thi s duty, as will be explained a t lengt h below , ever y individua l mus t striv e t o protec t hi s life, mus t strive t o freel y contro l th e cours e o f hi s life, an d must striv e to achiev e a goo d an d happ y life. 55 Propert y i n th e narro w sens e o f ownership o f materia l good s i s certainl y indispensabl e i f ma n i s t o satisfy hi s obligatio n t o hi s Creato r to preserve hi s life an d liberty an d to pursue his happiness. But as important as property is in this material sense, i t is alienable. Life, liberty, and the pursuit o f happiness ar e not, as Jefferson make s clea r i n th e Declaratio n o f Independence . Finally , Jefferson wa s a wonderfu l writer . "Life , liberty , an d th e pursui t o f happiness" reads more appealingly than "life, liberty, and property." The similarit y i n phraseology continue s i n Jefferson's expressio n o f the social-contract theory . The Declaration's phrase "derivin g their just powers fro m the consent of the governed" m compare s favorabl y wit h Locke's accoun t tha t "reaso n bein g plai n o n ou r sid e tha t me n ar e naturally free , an d th e example s o f histor y showin g tha t th e govern ments o f th e world that were begu n i n peace ha d their beginnings lai d on that foundation, an d were made by the consent of the people " bl The Declaration o f Independence continue s by claiming that "whenever an y for m o f governmen t become s destructiv e o f thes e ends , i t i s the righ t o f th e peopl e t o alte r o r t o abolis h it , an d t o institut e ne w government, laying its foundation o n such principles and organizing it s powers i n suc h form , a s t o the m shal l see m mos t likel y t o effec t thei r safety an d happiness." This statement i s quite similar to one written by Locke in the Second Treatise: Whensoever, therefore, the Legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society, an d either b y ambition , fear , folly , o r corruption , endeavo r t o gras p themselves, o r put int o th e hand s o f an y other , a n absolute powe r ove r the lives, liberties, and estates of the people, by this breach of trust they forfeit the power th e peopl e ha d pu t int o thei r hand s fo r quit e contrar y ends , an d i t devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty and, by the establishmen t o f a new legislative , suc h a s the y thin k fit, provide fo r their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society.58

30 Th e Declaration o f Independenc e Next, the Declaratio n state s tha t "Prudence , indeed , will dictate tha t governments lon g establishe d shoul d no t b e change d fo r ligh t an d transient causes ; and accordingl y al l experience hat h shown , tha t man kind ar e more disposed to suffer, whil e evil s ar e sufferable , tha n t o right themselve s b y abolishin g th e form s t o whic h the y ar e accus tomed." Accordin g t o Locke , "til l th e mischie f b e grow n general , an d the il l design s o f th e ruler s becom e visible , o r thei r attempt s sensibl e to th e greate r part , th e people , wh o ar e more disposed to suffer tha n right themselves b y resistance, are not ap t to stir." 59 The Declaratio n o f Independenc e close s it s exegesi s o n politica l philosophy b y asserting , "Bu t when a long train of abuses an d usurpa tions, pursuin g invariabl y th e sam e object , evince s a desig n t o reduc e them unde r absolut e despotism , i t i s thei r right , i t i s thei r duty , t o throw of f suc h government , an d t o provid e ne w guard s fo r thei r futur e security." This claim compare s quit e closel y to Locke' s statement : But if a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under and whither they are going, it is not to be wondered that they should then rouse themselves and endeavor to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected. 60 Although the quote d passages from th e Declaration o f Independenc e and th e Second Treatise ar e no t alway s identical , the y ar e ver y simi lar—and sometime s eve n identical . Any difference s ca n b e attribute d to Jefferson' s immens e talen t a s a literar y stylis t an d t o th e car e wit h which h e approache d hi s assignmen t t o writ e th e Declaratio n o f Inde pendence. Simply put, Jefferson "realize d tha t i f the colonie s wo n thei r independence, thi s woul d prov e t o b e a publi c documen t o f suprem e

importance; an d th e [Declaration ] .. . bear s ampl e evidenc e o f hi s

search fo r th e righ t word , th e righ t phrasing." 61 Jefferso n coul d no t have been mor e prescient . With respect t o theme s o f political philosophy , both th e Declaratio n of Independenc e an d th e Second Treatise cente r aroun d three : th e nature o f man , th e natur e o f government , an d th e righ t o f revolution . These theme s ar e interrelate d and , revealingly , ar e addresse d i n th e same sequenc e i n th e tw o texts. 62 Although th e detail s o f th e Lockea n natural-rights politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e will be discusse d i n late r sections , I do wan t t o touc h upo n th e essen -

The Declaration of Independence 3 1 tial element s o f tha t politica l philosoph y her e i n orde r t o sho w th e thematic congruence between the Declaration and the Second Treatise. As the previousl y quote d passage s suggest , th e characterizatio n o f man's natur e i n th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e an d i n th e Second Treatise i s as a naturally fre e an d equa l individua l possessin g certai n inherent, indefeasible right s by virtue o f his humanity. This character ization lead s directl y t o th e concep t o f governmen t i n th e tw o docu ments: that governmen t i s established b y the consen t o f the people t o secure eac h individual' s natura l right s from the transgressions o f oth ers. An d i f th e governmen t seriousl y fail s i n thi s responsibility , an d more critically , i f th e governmen t itsel f intentionall y an d repeatedl y violates the people's natural rights, the people have a right (and duty ) to abolish the existing governmental structure and institute a new one. Clearly, as with phraseology, there is a congruence between the themes of the Declaration of Independence and the Second Treatise. Interestingly, Jefferso n too k offens e a t th e observatio n o f Joh n Adams and others that the Declaration of Independence "containe d no new ideas, that i t is a commonplace compilation , its sentiments hack neyed in Congress two years before" and to Richard Henry Lee's charge that i t wa s "copie d fro m Locke's treatis e o n government. " Jefferson' s response was "I know only that I turned to neither book nor pamphlet while writing it. I did not consider it as any part of my charge to invent new idea s altogethe r an d t o offe r n o sentimen t whic h ha d eve r bee n expressed before." 63 Bu t i n a lette r t o Lee , Jefferson acknowledge d that h e relied o n Locke's Second Treatise, a work h e regarded a s one of "the elementary books of public right." 64 In fairness t o Jefferson, a s I endeavor t o demonstrat e i n a moment , "th e harmonizing sentiment s of th e day " wer e thos e o f Locke , an d i t i s eas y t o understan d ho w Jefferson coul d claim to have "turned to neither book nor pamphlet in writing" the Declaration. Jefferson's somewha t inconsistent statement s notwithstanding, i t i s quit e apparen t tha t "Jefferson , havin g rea d

Locke's treatise, was so taken wit h i t that h e read i t again, and still

again, s o tha t afterward s it s ver y phrase s reappea r i n hi s ow n writing."65 Given the obvious similarity between the phraseology and themes of the Declaratio n o f Independenc e an d Locke' s Second Treatise, th e republican revisionists ' neglect o f the Declaratio n i s certainly curious . This neglect i s even more puzzling given the comprehensiv e examina -

32 Th e Declaration of Independence tion th e revisionist s (Baily n an d Wood , i n particular ) conducte d o f seemingly everythin g els e writte n an d sai d durin g th e revolutionar y period. After all , it wa s throug h th e Declaratio n o f Independence, no t the myriad pamphlets, letters, and speeches of the day, that the Founders were expressing to the "opinions of mankind"66 the official politica l philosophy of the newly independent United States of America. As just described, that political philosophy is Lockean liberalism, not classical republicanism.67 A general analysis of the political thought of the intellectual leader s of the American Revolution—though t tha t culminate d i n the Declara tion o f Independence—shed s additiona l ligh t o n th e dubiousnes s o f the revisionists ' readin g o f th e period . I n fact , suc h a n analysi s i s indispensable, given that intellectual leadership played a crucial role in the movemen t towar d independence , a point als o curiousl y neglecte d by the revisionists. 68 Rober t Webkin g get s t o th e hear t o f th e matter . "Although Wood and Bailyn cite some authors and speakers more than others," Webkin g writes , "neithe r tend s t o trea t th e though t o f th e leaders o f the Revolution a s more importan t o r more indicative o f the thought of the period than that of the most obscure people/' 69*

The Intellectual Leaders of the American Revolution The natural startin g point for an y discussion o f the intellectual leader ship o f th e America n Revolutio n i s Thoma s Jefferson , autho r o f th e * Donald Lut z criticize s wha t h e consider s th e undu e attentio n pai d t o th e "politica l elites" o f th e America n Founding . Lut z commend s Woo d fo r makin g a n "unstated " methodological breakthroug h abou t the role of the larger "political class" in the Founding. See Lutz, A Preface to American Political Theory, 99-112. Lutz's provocative argu ment suffer s fro m a t leas t thre e fata l flaws . First, if Wood, a sophisticated historiogra pher, wer e makin g th e methodologica l breakthroug h Lut z credit s hi m with , he almos t certainly woul d hav e bee n explici t abou t it . Second , Lutz' s argumen t overlook s th e obvious point— a poin t convincingl y documente d b y historians tim e an d tim e again — that the American Founding is the classic case of the power of intellectual leadership to shape political events, including the behavior o f the larger political class and the nation as a whole. Third, Lutz's argument against intellectual leadership turns out to be nothing more tha n a rhetorica l plo y i n suppor t o f hi s ultimate , but unsuccessful , objective : t o establish American politica l theor y a s an independent discipline . My criticism o f Lutz's work shoul d no t be taken t o mean that I do not respect what he has tried t o do. Lutz's book on American political theory is one of the most impressive pieces of scholarship I have read, even though I disagree with it. (Here, I am echoing Lutz's concluding observation that scholars need to show more "humility" in evaluating their colleagues' work.)

The Declaration of Independence 3 3 Declaration o f Independence . Tw o importan t caveat s ar e necessar y before proceeding, however. First, volumes could be, and in most cases have been , writte n o n th e politica l though t o f eac h o f th e leader s I will discuss . Obviously , spac e constraint s limi t wha t I ca n hop e t o

accomplish. Second, and making the first cavea t less problematic, my

objective i s to elucidate the intellectual leaders' position o n the funda mental questio n o f politica l philosoph y an d th e questio n tha t con cerned them most: the basic purpose o f government. To put it another way, th e discussio n tha t follow s i s no t intende d t o sugges t tha t th e intellectual leader s o f th e Revolutio n wer e influence d solel y b y Joh n Locke. The y wer e to o widel y rea d an d to o sophisticate d fo r that. 70 Indeed, the republican revisionists should be commended for dispelling the Locke et praeterea nihil o f th e Becker-Hart z thesis . But, a s I en deavor to illustrate, on the issue of the basic purpose of government— the issu e o f preeminen t concer n t o constitutiona l interpretatio n (se e the Introduction), the subjec t o f this volume—the intellectua l leader s were Lockea n liberals , not classica l republicans . Here, perhaps a s a n ironic consequenc e o f thei r admirabl e an d impressiv e ques t fo r com prehensiveness, the revisionist s hav e misse d th e proverbia l fores t fo r the trees. Thomas Jefferson wa s the quintessential man of the Enlightenment . His contributions to law, architecture, education, science, politics, and philosophy, t o nam e bu t a fe w fields , ar e impressiv e enoug h whe n considered in isolation. When considered i n totality, Jefferson's contri butions truly make him the "person of the millennium," as one political commentator recently wrote. 71 Jefferson's politica l philosoph y ha s bee n muc h debated . The tradi tional interpretation emphasize s his liberal ideas. 72 Although the traditional interpretatio n neglect s man y subtleties, 73 Locke's influenc e o n Jefferson's politica l philosoph y durin g th e revolutionar y perio d i s unmistakable eve n whe n thos e subtletie s ar e taken int o account—espe cially with respect to the basic purpose of government. When Jefferso n expressed his views on the basic purpose of government, he invariably invoked th e Lockea n libera l concep t o f a limite d stat e charge d wit h protecting the natural rights of the governed. In addition to the Declaration o f Independence , discusse d earlier , whic h incorporate s Locke' s theory o f government , ther e i s Jefferson' s A Summary View of the Rights of British America, writte n i n 1774, 74 which anticipate d man y

34 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e of th e natural-right s argument s mad e i n th e Declaration , a s wel l a s some revealin g letter s authore d b y Jefferson . I n a well-know n 179 0 letter t o Thoma s Man n Randolph , fo r example , explainin g wha t book s the youn g ma n shoul d rea d t o understan d th e America n politica l sys tem, Jefferso n recommend s th e Second Treatise fo r th e underlyin g principles o f politica l philosophy , callin g "Locke' s littl e boo k o n gov ernment, . . . perfec t a s fa r a s i t goes." 75 Similarly , ther e i s Jefferso n writing in 180 7 to John Norvell : I thin k ther e doe s no t exis t a goo d elementar y wor k o n th e organizatio n o f society int o civi l government : I mean a wor k whic h present s i n on e ful l an d comprehensive vie w th e syste m o f principle s o n whic h suc h a n organizatio n should b e founded , accordin g t o th e right s o f nature . Fo r wan t o f a singl e work o f tha t character , I shoul d recommen d Lock e o n Government , Sidney , Priestley's Essay o n the First Principles o f Government, Chipman's Principle s of Government, and the Federalist. 76 The focu s i s onc e agai n o n protectin g natura l rights , an d th e Second Treatise i s at the hea d o f Jefferson's list . There ar e als o th e text s fo r governmen t an d la w student s a t hi s beloved Universit y o f Virgini a tha t Jefferso n desire d t o assign . T o understand th e foundin g doctrin e o f th e Unite d States , Jefferso n wanted th e student s t o rea d Locke , Sidney, 77 an d th e Declaratio n o f Independence itself. 78 Jefferson' s profoun d interes t i n th e curriculu m for th e Universit y o f Virginia' s governmen t an d la w student s culmi nated i n a resolutio n h e helpe d pas s whil e rector . Th e resolutio n speaks unequivocall y t o th e essentia l principle s underlyin g th e Ameri can Revolution , an d thos e principle s ar e Lockea n liberal Resolved, that it is the opinion of this Board that as to the general principles of liberty and the rights of man, in nature an d in society, the doctrine s of Locke, in hi s "Essa y concernin g th e origin s an d exten t o f civi l government, " an d o f Sidney, in his "Discourses on government," may be considered those generall y approved by our fellow citizens of this, and the United States.79 James Oti s was the first grea t intellectua l leade r o f the revolutionar y period. 80 Otis' s leadin g rol e i n th e initia l stage s o f th e roa d t o indepen dence make s hi s thought especiall y significant . Th e intellectua l leader s

who came after Oti s were speaking to an audience that was generally

familiar wit h th e fundamenta l principle s o n whic h th e disput e wit h England rested , bu t Otis , writing first , bor e th e considerabl e burde n o f explaining thos e principle s i n detail. 81 A t bottom , Otis' s argument s

The Declaration of Independence 3 5 were based o n a belief tha t th e "end of government... i s above all to provide for the security, the quiet, and happy ei\joyment o f life, liberty, and property."82 In other words, Otis's political writings were grounded in the tenets o f Lockean liberalism . In fact, Otis , widely known for hi s daring, a s wel l a s hi s brilliance , wa s willin g t o invok e natural-right s

arguments much earlier than were most of the other colonial leaders,

who thought i t wise to hold such argument s in reserve i n order bette r to preserve the possibility of reconciling with England. Otis's firs t grea t revolutionar y pamphle t wa s A Vindication of the Conduct of the House of Representatives of the Province ofMassachusetts-Bay> writte n and published i n 1762 . There, Otis attacks the Royal Governor fo r expendin g publi c mone y withou t th e approva l o f th e Massachusetts Hous e o f Representatives . I n s o doing , Otis quotes approvingly a t lengt h fro m Locke' s Second Treatise. Otis' s relianc e o n Locke wa s s o extensiv e tha t Joh n Adam s wa s le d t o commen t year s later that "this little fugitive pamphlet " contained the "solid substance"

of the Declaration of Independence.83

In 176 4 Oti s wrot e an d publishe d a pamphlet , The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved^ i n oppositio n t o th e Revenu e Act o f th e sam e year . That pamphlet , whic h wa s a refined versio n o f the earlie r Vindication, finds Oti s closin g hi s discussio n o f politica l philosophy by reminding his audience that the primary en d of govern ment i s th e protectio n o f th e people' s natura l rights . Again Otis' s au thority i s Locke , fro m who m Oti s quote s freel y o n th e righ t o f th e people t o alte r o r abolis h a governmen t tha t ha s violate d it s trus t t o secure natura l rights. 84 Otis's position o n th e fundamenta l purpos e o f government i s unmistakable: government exist s t o secur e th e natura l rights of the people. Thomas Jefferso n onc e remarke d abou t Samue l Adams , " I alway s considered hi m a s mor e tha n an y othe r membe r th e fountai n o f ou r important measures." 85 Although Adams, a leader in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 176 4 on, wrote no books or pamphlets, he did write scores of letters and state papers in which his acceptanc e of th e the n prevailin g natural-right s doctrin e i s clear . I n particular , Adams was a great admirer of Locke, as is illustrated by his 1770 letter to Lieutenan t Governo r Thoma s Hutchinso n opposin g th e Massachu setts legislature' s bein g summone d t o mee t i n Cambridg e instea d o f Boston. "We beg Leave to recite to your Honor," Adams writes, "what

36 Th e Declaration o f Independenc e the Grea t Mr . Locke ha s advance d i n hi s Treatis e o f civi l Government , upon th e lik e Prerogative o f the Crown." 86 In anothe r importan t paper , a 177 2 repor t adopte d b y th e Cit y o f Boston i n oppositio n t o th e Stam p Ac t o f 1765 , Adams invoke s th e same Lockea n politica l principle s late r employe d b y Jefferso n i n th e Declaration o f Independence . O f particula r interes t i s a passag e as serting tha t th e primar y purpos e o f governmen t i s t o secur e th e peo ple's natural rights . Adams writes : In shor t i t i s the greates t absurdit y t o suppos e i t in the powe r o f on e o r an y number of men at the entering into society, to renounce their essential natural rights, o r th e mean s o f preservin g thos e right s whe n th e gran d en d o f civi l government from the very nature of its institution is for the support, protection, and defence o f those very rights: the principal o f which as is observed before , are life, liberty and property. 87 The influenc e o n thi s passag e o f Locke' s argumen t tha t governmen t exists t o secur e natura l rights— a passag e tha t mad e Adam s famou s throughout th e colonies 88 —is undeniable . Samuel Adam s di d occasionall y referenc e th e nee d fo r cultivatin g virtue. But, a s th e revisionist s fai l t o appreciate, 89 Adams sa w virtue a s a mean s t o hel p secur e natura l rights , no t a s a n en d i n itself . Fo r example, a n often-quote d remar k finds Adam s alludin g t o virtue' s sup plementary role : " I onc e thought , tha t Cit y woul d b e th e Christian Sparta. Bu t Alas ! Wil l me n neve r b e free ! The y wil l b e fre e n o longe r than whil e the y remai n virtuous." 90 Elsewhere , ther e i s Adam s ex plaining tha t cultivatin g virtu e shoul d b e a goa l o f publi c polic y be cause "afte r all , virtu e i s th e sures t mean s o f securin g th e publi c liberty." 91 Virtue i s then a secondar y rathe r tha n a primary concer n fo r Adams. To pu t i t anothe r way , the objectiv e fo r Adam s wa s the protec tion o f natura l rights . Th e cultivatio n o f virtu e wa s bu t a wa y o f accomplishing tha t objective , fo r virtu e instille d i n th e peopl e th e ne cessity o f restrainin g thei r selfis h impulses—impulse s tha t woul d oth erwise rende r natura l right s insecure. 92 James Wilson , bor n an d educate d i n Scotland , di d no t com e t o America unti l 1765 . But Wilson' s mastery o f history an d th e philosoph y of la w brough t hi m quickl y t o prominenc e i n hi s ne w home . Give n hi s Scottish upbringin g an d education , Wilso n i s ofte n describe d a s a n adherent o f th e philosophica l tenet s o f th e Scottis h Enlightenment. 93

The Declaration of Independence 3

7

Although this may be true for matters of epistemology, Wilson's more

general political philosophy was vintage Lockean liberalism. 94 Wilson's grea t revolutionar y pamphle t wa s Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament—written i n 1770 and published in 1774—a pamphlet that Becker credits wit h helpin g t o pav e th e wa y "fo r th e genera l theor y whic h Jefferson wa s late r abl e t o tak e fo r grante d a s th e commo n sens e o f the matter." 96 Wilson' s pamphle t i s importan t fo r tw o reasons : (1 ) he, unlik e eve n Jame s Oti s an d Samue l Adams , denie d th e legislativ e authority o f Parliamen t ove r the colonie s "i n every instance"; 96 and (2 ) Wilson included a statement of political theory, brief though it is: All men are, by nature, equal and free: no one has a right to any authority over another without his consent: all lawful governmen t is founded i n the consen t of those who are subject to it: such consent was given with a view to ensure and to increase the happiness of the governed, above what they would enjoy in an independent and unconnected state of nature. The consequence is, that the happiness of the society is the first law of every government.97 A bette r summar y o f Lockea n natural-right s politica l philosoph y would b e difficul t t o find . Here , Wilso n i s arguing , a s bot h th e Second Treatise an d th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e do , tha t th e basi c pur pose o f governmen t i s t o secur e th e natura l right s of th e people, wha t Wilson calls "the happiness of the society. " Born i n th e Wes t Indies , Alexande r Hamilto n di d no t com e t o America unti l 1772 , late r tha n eve n Jame s Wilson . Lik e Wilson , how ever, Hamilton' s brillianc e brough t hi m quickl y t o th e cente r o f th e American colonists ' disput e wit h England . A mer e seventee n year s o f age whe n h e firs t starte d publishin g pamphlet s i n 1774, 98 Hamilto n was nonetheles s on e o f th e revolutionar y period' s mos t zealou s an d articulate proponents o f natural-rights principles. Essentially, Hamilton applied natural-rights doctrine to find, as Wilson had, that the colonist s were no t subjec t t o th e legislativ e authorit y o f Parliament . Accordin g to Hamilton , th e onl y legitimat e basi s o f governmen t i s a voluntar y compact betwee n th e ruler s an d th e rule d "fo r th e securit y o f th e absolute rights o f th e latter." 99 An d i n th e cas e o f th e colonist s an d Parliament, no such compact existed . Hamilton's commitment t o natural-rights principles is equally apparent i n on e o f hi s mos t famou s retort s t o th e loyalis t Samue l Seabury ,

38 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e better know n a s "th e Farmer, " t o who m Hamilton' s pamphlet s wer e typically addressed. Hamilton writes : The fundamental sourc e o f al l your [th e Farmer's] errors , sophisms an d fals e reasonings i s a tota l ignoranc e o f th e natura l right s o f mankind . Wer e you a t once t o becom e acquainte d wit h these , you coul d neve r entertai n a thought , that all men are not, by nature, entitled to parity and privileges. You would be convinced tha t natura l libert y i s a gift o f the beneficent Creato r t o th e whol e human race. 100 Once agai n w e find a n intellectua l leade r o f th e America n Revolutio n dedicated t o natural-right s principles . Indeed, a t on e poin t i n hi s repl y Hamilton provide d a lis t o f natural-la w theorist s t o who m th e Farme r should refe r fo r edification . Locke' s nam e wa s prominently placed. 101 John Adam s ha s a centra l plac e i n th e intellectua l leadershi p o f th e American Revolution . Accordin g t o Wood , "n o on e rea d mor e an d thought mor e abou t la w an d politics " during the perio d tha n Adams. 102 John Adam s i s als o th e intellectua l leade r wh o mos t fairl y ca n b e sai d to hav e bee n concerne d wit h cultivatin g virtue . Here , however , Joh n Adams, lik e hi s cousi n Samue l befor e him , typicall y sa w virtu e a s a means to hel p secur e th e people's natura l rights. 103 On those occasion s

in which Adams seems to have envisioned the cultivation of virtue as

an en d i n itself, 104 he nevertheles s commende d libera l theorists, includ ing Locke, for explainin g legitimat e governmen t form s well— a subjec t intimately connecte d i n liberalism wit h the end s o f government. 105 John Adams' s occasiona l allusion s t o virtu e a s a n en d i n itsel f not withstanding, hi s agreemen t wit h th e principle s articulate d b y Jeffer son i n th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s clear . Ther e i s Adams' s 1822 comment , fo r example , i n whic h Adam s sough t t o provid e som e perspective o n Jefferson' s rol e i n writin g th e Declaration , a rol e tha t had b y tha t tim e lifte d Jefferso n t o near-mythica l status. 106 "Ther e i s not a n ide a i n it [th e Declaration]," Adams writes , but what had been hackneyed in Congress for two years before. The substance of it is contained i n the declaratio n o f rights and the violation o f those rights, in the Journals of Congress, in 1774 . Indeed, the essence of it is contained in a pamphlet, voted an d printed b y the tow n o f Boston, before th e first Congres s met, composed b y James Otis , as I suppose, in one of his lucid moments, and pruned and polished by Samuel Adams.107 One shoul d als o remembe r tha t Adam s serve d o n th e committe e ap pointed b y th e Continenta l Congres s t o draf t th e Declaratio n o f Inde -

The Declaration of Independence 3 9 pendence, and it would be strange indeed if he did not subscribe to the principles he played such a large part in articulating. 108 Additional signs of Adams's support for the natural-rights principles embodied in the Declaration o f Independence are found i n many of his political writing s o f th e revolutionar y period . Adams' s Thoughts on Government, writte n in 1776, contains praise for Locke, and his Novanglus, writte n i n 1774 , quotes Lock e a t length . A younger John Adam s was equall y committe d t o natural-right s principles . Lik e hi s olde r

cousin Samuel, John wrote many pamphlets arguing in defense o f the

colonists' natura l rights . In on e o f hi s mos t famous , Dissertation on Canon and Feudal Law, publishe d i n 1765 , Adams sounds very muc h like the Declaration o f Independence: There are "Rights ... anteceden t to al l earthl y government— Rights, tha t canno t b e repeale d o r re strained b y human laws—Rights, derive d from th e great Legislator of the Universe." 109 Also worth noting is the leading role played by Adams in the passage of a se t o f resolution s b y th e firs t Continenta l Congress i n 177 4 proclaiming th e colonies ' tota l exemptio n fro m th e regulator y powe r o f Parliament. Adams late r said , an d thi s i s the importan t point , tha t h e sought to have included i n the resolutions "a n appeal to those genera l ideas o f natural right so clearl y and broadly lai d down, not long after wards, i n th e Declaratio n o f Independence." 110 Lik e s o man y o f th e intellectual leader s o f th e America n Revolution , Joh n Adam s wa s strongly committe d t o th e natural-right s principle s o f th e Declaratio n of Independence. 111 Locke's presence i n revolutionary America, especially i n the Decla ration o f Independence an d th e writing s an d speeche s o f the intellec tual leader s o f th e period , i s too apparen t fo r mos t scholar s t o deny . For those who seek to minimize Locke's influence the response always seems t o b e th e same : the Founder s employe d Lock e fo r hi s "rheto ric."112 This characterizatio n no t onl y fails t o explai n wh y the Found ers' us e o f Lock e wa s an y mor e "jus t rhetoric " than wa s thei r us e o f myriad othe r politica l theorists—includin g republica n theorists—bu t also overlooks , a s Joh n Dun n note s i n a famou s essa y o n Locke's influence i n eighteenth-centur y Americ a an d England , th e Founders ' agreement with Locke during the revolutionary period on the essentia l principles of political philosophy. In Dunn's words, "The Adamses and Jefferson, Dickinso n and Franklin, Otis and Madison, had come to read

40 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e the Two Treatises wit h graduall y consolidate d politica l intention s an d they ha d com e t o i t to gathe r mora l support fo r thes e intentions." 113 My discussio n o f th e Founders ' profoun d commitmen t t o th e natu ral-rights principles o f the Declaratio n o f Independence i s not mean t t o deny tha t the y rea d an d wer e influence d b y politica l theorist s othe r than John Locke , including republica n an d Scottis h theorists . As note d earlier, th e revisionist s shoul d b e commende d fo r dispellin g th e Locke et praeterea nihil o f th e Becker-Hart z thesis . But th e revisionist s hav e gone to o fa r i n th e othe r direction—t o omnia praeter Lockem. 114 Th e revisionists ar e simpl y wron g i n arguin g tha t th e America n Revolutio n was motivate d b y concern s fo r virtue . As th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence state s i n n o uncertai n terms—term s wel l understoo d b y th e intellectual leader s o f th e Revolution—th e essential politica l premis e of th e America n regim e i s tha t governmen t exist s t o secur e natura l rights, no t t o cultivat e virtue . Wit h respec t t o Lock e specifically , al though Lock e wa s no t th e onl y libera l influenc e o n th e Founders , h e was the most importan t influence , as well as representative o f the basi c liberal tenet s tha t guide d them. 115 I n addition , Lock e wa s th e first thinker to put the leading themes o f liberalism int o a coherent whole. 116 The Founders ' considerabl e relianc e o n Locke' s writings , especiall y i n the Declaratio n o f Independence , is , therefore , understandable . Th e revisionists' neglec t o f th e Declaratio n i s not. I t is now tim e t o explor e the Lockea n natural-right s politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence. Tha t discussio n wil l b e fairl y abstrac t her e bu t wil l become mor e concret e i n chapte r 5 , whe n specifi c case s o f constitu tional interpretation ar e addressed .

The Politica l Philosoph y o f t h e Declaratio n o f I n d e p e n d e n c e This sectio n i s i n tw o parts . Th e first par t discusse s Locke' s politica l philosophy. Althoug h thi s i s certainl y no t a treatis e o n Locke' s thought—there ar e alread y man y fine example s o f that*—i t i s neces *The scholarshi p o n Joh n Lock e i s voluminous . I n 198 3 Rolan d Hal l an d Roge r Wool house publishe d a 215-pag e bibliographi c guid e t o th e precedin g eight y year s o f Lock e scholarship. Se e Hal l an d Woolhouse , 80 Years of Locke Scholarship. Th e year s sinc e 1983 hav e bee n equall y active . See , fo r example , Ashcraft , Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government; Harpham , ed. , John Locke's Two Treatises of

The Declaration of Independence 4 1 sary for me , given the understandabl y broa d brus h wit h which Jeffer son wa s paintin g i n th e Declaratio n o f Independence , t o provid e a conceptual analysi s o f th e ke y component s o f Lockea n liberalism. 117 The second part turns to the Declaration o f Independence specifically . There, i n ligh t o f th e conceptua l analysi s o f Lockea n liberalis m pro vided i n th e first part , th e natural-right s principle s o f th e Declaratio n are examined, principle s largel y neglecte d today , bu t which , a s pre viously discussed, speak to our national heritage and mission. John Locke Four interrelate d component s o f Locke's though t ar e o f particula r importance fo r understandin g th e politica l philosophy o f the Declara tion o f Independence : the structur e o f Locke's mora l theory, his con cept o f rights , his consen t theor y o f politica l obligation , an d hi s doc trine of revolution. I consider each in turn. An essentia l foundatio n o f Locke's mora l theor y i s man' s relation ship wit h hi s Creator . Individual s ough t t o obe y thei r Creator , Lock e writes, because "the y ar e hi s propert y whos e workmanshi p the y are , made to last during his, not one another's, pleasure." And the Creator' s commands, discerne d b y reason , ar e wha t Lock e mean s b y natura l law.118 As Lock e write s i n hi s Essays on the Law of Nature, natura l law is "th e decre e o f the divin e will discernible b y the ligh t of natur e and indicatin g wha t i s an d wha t i s no t i n conformit y wit h rationa l nature."119 Government; Simmons , The Lockean Theory of Rights. What recent Locke scholarship has done (Simmons's work is a notable exception), due in large part to the path-breaking efforts o f John Dunn, is to move awa y from th e traditional analytica l approac h to the Two Treatises to a more historical approach. See generally Dunn, 77&e Political Thought of John Locke. Althoug h this new historical approach is certainly an important development in Locke scholarship, it has no role, in my judgment, in understanding the Lockean liberalism of the Declaration of Independence. Succinctly stated, the Declaration embodies an analytical approach to Lockean liberalism, and consequently, the new biographical information concerning Locke's activities and the general reassessment of the historical period in which Locke lived are irrelevant for discerning the essential principles of the American regime, the subject of this book. Therefore, in light of the analytic perspective on Locke's thought taken by the Declaration itself, the discussion in this section brackets the genealogical material on Locke's life in favor of emphasizing those rationally arrived at principles tha t the Founder s believe d peopl e coul d know—eve n twentieth-centur y Americans.

42 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e Man's abilit y t o understan d natura l la w bring s Locke' s theor y o f knowledge t o the fore. According t o Lockean epistemology—a n admit tedly comple x an d sometime s confuse d theory—ma n discover s natu ral la w intuitively . I n Locke' s words , "Th e min d perceive s th e

agreement o r disagreemen t o f two idea s immediately b y themselves,

without th e interventio n o f an y other. " I n tha t instanc e o f perceive d agreement o r disagreement , th e min d doe s no t tr y to prove o r examin e the particular natura l law , but see s i t "as the ey e dot h th e light , only b y being directe d towar d it." 120 T o pu t i t i n th e Declaration' s terms , th e natural la w is "self-evident" t o the interpreter. 121 Significantly, onl y a n elit e fe w ar e abl e t o discer n th e tru e dictate s of natural law. 122 Locke writes :

Some people here raise an objection agains t the law of nature, namely that there is no such law in existence at all, since it can nowhere be found, for most people live as though there was no rational ground in life at all nor any law of such a kind that all men recognize it. .. . If indeed natural law were discernable by the ligh t o f reason , wh y is i t that no t al l people wh o possess reaso n hav e knowledge of it? .. . I admi t tha t al l people ar e b y nature endowe d wit h reason , an d I say tha t natural la w ca n b e know n b y reason , bu t from thi s i t doe s no t necessaril y follow that it is known to any and every one. For there are some who make no use o f th e ligh t o f reaso n bu t prefe r darknes s an d woul d no t wis h t o sho w themselves t o themselves . .. . Ther e ar e others , brough t u p i n vice , wh o scarcely distinguish between good and evil, because a bad way of life, becoming strong by lapse of time, has established barbarous habits, and evil customs have perverte d eve n matter s o f principle . I n others , again , throug h natura l defect, th e acume n o f th e min d i s too dul l t o b e abl e t o brin g t o ligh t thos e secret decrees of nature. 123 In othe r words , th e interprete r o f natura l la w mus t b e learned , uncorrupted, an d unbiased . An d becaus e thes e qualitie s ar e rare , i n seeking t o understan d natura l la w "no t th e majorit y o f th e peopl e should b e consulte d bu t thos e wh o ar e mor e rationa l tha n th e rest." 124 (This i s a conclusio n tha t ha s profoun d implication s fo r par t 2 o f thi s study, a n examinatio n o f th e Suprem e Court' s rol e i n identifyin g an d applying natural-right s principle s i n constitutiona l interpretation. ) Man's relationshi p wit h hi s Creato r i n Locke' s mora l theor y i s evinced i n Locke' s repeate d assertio n tha t "th e fundamenta l la w o f nature" i s "th e preservatio n o f mankind." 125 Not e tha t th e emphasi s i s on th e preservatio n o f mankind, rathe r tha n o n th e preservatio n o f

The Declaration of Independence 4 individual persons

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. A s such , ther e i s a communitaria n aspec t t o

Locked mora l thought , a n aspec t ignore d b y man y Lock e scholars ,

including C . B . Macpherso n an d Le o Strauss. 126 Thi s fundamental — and quit e general—la w o f natur e t o preserv e mankin d i s als o th e "basis" for th e specifi c rule s o f natura l law , including thos e pertainin g to natura l rights , the focu s o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence . Lock e writes:

By the basis o f natura l la w w e mea n some sor t of groundwor k o n which all other and less evident precepts of that law are built and from which in some way they can be derived, and thus they acquire fromit all their binding force in that they are in accordance with that, as it were, primary and fundamental law which is the standard and measure of all the other laws depending on it.127 A sometime s overlooke d aspec t o f Locke' s mora l though t i s hi s belief tha t under the dictate s o f natura l la w a n individual i s entitle d t o a generou s amoun t o f mora l freedo m i n thos e area s i n whic h hi s actions d o no t har m himsel f o r others . Lock e make s th e poin t elo quently whe n h e write s tha t "i n the greates t par t o f th e action s o f ou r lives . . . I think Go d ou t o f hi s infinit e goodnes s considerin g ou r igno rance an d frailt y hat h lef t u s grea t liberty." 128 A s a result , ther e i s a n individualistic aspec t t o Locke' s mora l thought , a n aspec t underesti mated b y suc h leadin g Lock e scholar s a s Joh n Dun n an d Jame s Tully.129 The structur e o f Locke' s mora l theor y i s thu s neithe r exclusivel y duty-based, as Dun n an d Tully suggest, 130 no r exclusively rights-based , as Macpherson an d Strauss claim. 131 A more accurat e assessmen t i s t o consider rights and duties a s "roughly coextensive" in Locke's thought , with neithe r right s mor e fundamenta l tha n dutie s no r dutie s mor e fundamental tha n rights. 132 In fact, in much o f the Two Treatises ther e is a n overla p o f right s an d duties . Fo r instance , Lock e speak s o f bot h the right o f self-preservatio n an d th e preservatio n o f mankin d an d a corresponding duty. 133 A similar correlatio n between right s and dutie s can be seen i n Locke's discussions o f charity 134 and natural equality, 135 among othe r places . Locke' s discussio n o f charit y i s especiall y illumi nating: As Justice give s every Man a Title to the product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream

44 Th e Declaration o f Independenc e want, wher e h e ha s n o mean s t o subsis t otherwise ; and a Ma n ca n n o mor e justly mak e us e o f another' s necessity , to forc e hi m to become hi s Vassal, by withholding that Relief, God requires him to afford t o the wants of his Brother, than h e tha t ha s mor e strengt h ca n seiz e upo n a weaker , maste r hi m t o hi s Obedience, and with a Dagger at his Throat offer hi m Death or Slavery. 136 In summary , Marxist , Straussian , an d othe r reading s tha t character ize Locke' s mora l though t a s exclusivel y rights-base d ar e mistaken . Equally mistaken ar e purely theological an d communitaria n duty-base d interpretations. Locke recognizes, in roughly equal measure, both right s and duties . With respec t t o Locke' s theor y o f right s specifically , al l individual s are equal . As Lock e write s i n on e o f th e mos t well-know n passage s o f the Second Treatise: A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one havin g mor e tha n another ; ther e bein g nothin g mor e eviden t tha n tha t creatures o f th e sam e specie s an d rank , promiscuousl y bor n t o al l th e sam e advantages o f natur e an d th e use o f th e sam e faculties , shoul d als o be equa l one amongst another without subordination o r subjection; unless the lord and master o f the m al l should , b y an y manifes t declaratio n o f hi s will , se t on e above another. 137 Locke certainl y doe s not den y that physical inequalitie s exist amon g individuals. Fo r example , individual s diffe r i n strength , appearance , and intelligence 138 —with intellectua l inequalit y bein g particularl y sig nificant fo r Locke' s epistemology , a s previously discussed . Wha t Lock e is speakin g o f i n hi s discussio n o f equalit y i s th e moral clai m al l

persons hav e t o equa l rights , th e su m o f whic h Lock e refer s t o a s

"natural freedom. " I t i s onl y whe n a specia l situatio n o r relationshi p among individual s exists—whe n the y mov e beyon d th e bound s o f natural law—tha t unequa l right s ma y be recognized. Example s o f suc h special situation s o r relationship s includ e thos e base d o n consent , especially t o politica l powe r ( a topi c I soo n conside r i n detail) , an d serious misconduct , whe n a n individua l forfeit s hi s rights. 139 Perhaps th e mos t misunderstoo d aspec t o f Locke' s theor y o f right s is hi s concep t o f "property. " Lock e consider s propert y t o b e mor e than just right s i n material s goods . "Property, " Lock e writes , "mus t b e understood . . . t o mea n tha t propert y whic h me n hav e i n thei r person s as wel l a s goods." 140 And thoug h Lock e nowher e explicitl y provide s a definition o f rights, his definition o f property suggest s that h e consider s

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all rights to be property. Because, for Locke, all rights are property, the absoluteness o f right s with respect t o one' s fellow ma n is a n aspect o f Locke's thought that needs to be addressed . Natural rights might be nearly absolut e for Locke, but the communi tarian aspect o f his thought suggests that they are not completely so. 141 One nee d onl y recal l th e importanc e o f charit y i n Locke' s though t t o appreciate thi s fact . A . Joh n Simmon s make s th e poin t nicel y whe n he say s tha t "Lock e recognize s bot h collectiv e an d individua l goods ,

acknowledging that rights ... ar e not all there is to morality."142 Again,

the fact that Locke identifies bot h rights and duties is evident. Locke's discussio n o f th e inalienability o f natura l right s i s ofte n considered t o b e th e are a i n whic h h e mos t influence d th e Founders , especially becaus e o f th e suppor t Locke' s discussio n provide s fo r th e argument against political absolutism. As such, it is important to understand Locke's position on the matter. The key to understanding Locke' s position o n th e inalienabilit y o f natura l right s i s t o recal l tha t man i s the propert y o f hi s Creator . An individual' s lif e i s hi s ow n onl y to use ; ownership i s wit h th e Creator . Consequently , n o individua l "ca n giv e more powe r tha n h e ha s himself." 143 T o mak e th e poin t anothe r way ,

an individual cannot alienate what he does not own. Every individual is

acting a s a truste e o f hi s Creator' s property , wit h th e purpos e o f the trus t bein g th e preservatio n o f mankind . Importantly , however , a n individual i s free t o use hi s life a s he chooses , so lon g as he doe s s o i n a manne r that is consisten t wit h this fundamental la w o f preservation . As explained earlier, this zone o f freedom i s quite large. The Second Treatise provide s th e classi c statemen t o f th e consen t theory of political obligation, 144 a theory plainly adopted in the Declaration of Independence, where i t is stated that governments deriv e "thei r just power s fro m th e consen t o f th e governed. " According t o Locke , express consen t t o a politica l orde r clearl y obligate s a n individua l t o obey the laws. "Nobody doubts," Locke writes, "but an express consen t of an y ma n enterin g int o an y societ y make s hi m a perfect membe r o f that society, a subject of that government." 145 And, as Dunn points out , express consen t is not as rare as one might think. Dunn writes: Any express declaratio n i s sufficient t o commi t a man to membership o f the society an d i f som e ma y b e require d t o mak e suc h declaration s o n mor e ceremonial occasion s and others may never be required to make them at all, there are enough occasions in any man's life in which he uses verbal formulae

46 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e which imply a recognition o f his membership i n the national society to which he belongs for an y adult to be held to have made some express declaration of such membership. 146 Moreover, argue s Locke , when expres s consen t ha s no t bee n given , tacit consen t ma y have been : The difficulty is , what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds—i.e. , ho w fa r an y on e shal l b e looke d upo n t o hav e consente d an d thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all. And to this I say that ever y man that has any possessions o r enjoymen t of an y par t o f th e dominion s o f an y governmen t doe s thereb y giv e hi s taci t consent and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment , a s anyone under it ; whether thi s his possession b e of land to him and hi s heirs for ever , or a lodging only for a week, or whether i t be barely traveling freely o n the highway; and, in effect, i t reaches as far as the very being of anyone within the territories of that government. 147 For Locke , tacit consen t i s therefore give n by anyone wh o takes advan tage o f the resource s o f a society . Locke's nee d fo r arguin g tha t ma n ha s consente d t o governmen t flows fro m hi s belie f i n man' s natura l freedom . Centra l t o Locke' s

philosophy i s th e ide a tha t ma n ha s natura l right s tha t ar e prio r t o

government an d tha t a n individual' s obligatio n i n th e stat e o f nature i s simply t o see k th e preservatio n o f mankin d an d himsel f (an d th e sub sidiary rights and dutie s that flow from thi s fundamental la w of nature) . Because governmen t exist s t o secur e natura l rights—indeed , th e rea son fo r leavin g th e stat e o f natur e i s tha t right s ar e insecur e i n th e absence o f governmen t protection—governmen t ca n b e legitimate , Locke maintains , onl y i f consen t ha s bee n personall y given . An d per sonal consen t i s not just one groun d o f political obligatio n fo r Locke ; it is, because o f man's natura l freedom , th e sole ground. 148 A political societ y i s formed onl y with "th e consen t o f ever y individ ual," 149 wit h th e requiremen t o f unanimit y agai n stemmin g fro m man' s natural freedom . Onc e unanimou s consen t i s obtained, 150 an d peopl e leave th e stat e o f natur e an d ente r politica l society , eac h perso n con sents t o giv e u p the exercise o f hi s "natura l power s . . . t o d o whatso ever h e think s fit fo r th e preservatio n o f himsel f an d other s withi n th e permission o f th e la w o f nature " an d "t o punis h th e crime s committe d against tha t law." 151 Simpl y put , a n individua l agree s t o b e boun d b y the decisions o f the political structure o n issues of economic an d socia l

The Declaration of Independence 4 7 power.152 An d eac h individua l agree s to giv e up th e exercis e o f thes e natural power s t o any form o f governmen t th e majorit y "think[s ] good," provided that form is not absolutist in nature. 153 The fact tha t a n individual give s up onl y the exercise o f his natura l powers i n political society i s one o f th e mos t fundamenta l aspect s of Locke's politica l thought . A s i s tru e wit h man' s relationshi p wit h hi s Creator, th e governor s o f societ y hol d thei r power s i n trus t fo r th e community (and , hence, for th e Creator) . "The legislative being only a fiduciary t o ac t fo r certai n end s [th e protectio n o f natura l rights], " Locke writes , "ther e remain s stil l i n th e peopl e a suprem e powe r t o remove o r alte r th e legislativ e whe n the y find the legislativ e ac t con trary to the trust reposed i n them." 154 If the governors do act contrar y to the trust, "the power devolve[s] into the hands of those that gave it," and "th e peopl e hav e a righ t t o ac t a s suprem e an d continu e th e legislative i n themselves , o r erec t a ne w form , o r unde r th e ol d for m place it in new hands, as they think good." 155 What Locke is speaking o f here is , of course, the right of legitimat e resistance t o arbitrar y governmen t power , th e mos t importan t aspec t of hi s politica l philosoph y an d th e aspec t o f mos t immediat e signifi cance t o th e Founders . According t o Dunn , "Th e Two Treatises i s a work principall y designe d t o asser t a righ t o f resistanc e t o ur\jus t authority, a right, in the last resort, of revolution." 156 Locke's doctrine o f revolution i s not a particularly radica l one . The people ar e "slo w an d averse " t o change, 157 wil l bea r al l bu t "grea t inconveniences,"158 and , i n sum, will rise u p onl y if there ha s been " a long trai n o f abuses , prevarications, an d artifices." 159 Locke , i n othe r words, i s no t arguin g tha t th e peopl e hav e som e "abstrac t right " t o change a n existin g political order , no matte r wha t it s justice an d wisdom. The right i s simply t o resis t ui\jus t power. 160 Moreover , anarch y will be avoide d becaus e a ne w governmen t wil l be quickl y formed , a government better designed to secure the people's natural rights.161 The conventional interpretation o f Locke's right of resistance is that the righ t i s held onl y by th e communit y a s a whol e an d ca n b e exer cised onl y upon th e decisio n o f th e majority. 162 Tha t interpretatio n i s incorrect. A careful examinatio n o f the Second Treatise demonstrate s that Locke argues for the right of resistance for both the community as a whol e (b y majorit y decision ) an d aggrieve d individuals . A s Lock e states i n n o uncertai n terms : "Where th e bod y o f th e people , or any

48 Th e Declaration o f Independenc e single man, i s deprive d o f thei r righ t o r i s unde r th e exercis e o f a power withou t right , an d hav e n o appea l o n earth , ther e the y hav e a liberty t o appea l t o heaven , wheneve r the y judg e th e caus e o f suffi cient moment." 163 Indeed, a n individua l owe s a dut y t o hi s Creato r t o resis t an y uryus t and sustained 164 infringemen t o f hi s natural rights an d must , therefore , do so . Moreover , i t i s no t jus t i n th e self-interes t o f th e majorit y t o

assist the aggrieved individual in his resistance—because an attack on

the on e i s likely a precurso r o f thing s t o com e fo r th e many 1 6 5 —but i t is als o th e majority' s dut y unde r th e fundamenta l la w o f natur e t o preserve mankin d (unles s mankin d woul d b e bette r preserve d b y th e unfortunate sacrific e o f the one). 166 Now tha t th e basi c tenet s o f Locke' s philosophy—th e structur e o f his mora l theory , hi s concep t o f rights , hi s consen t theor y o f politica l obligation, an d hi s doctrin e o f revolution—hav e bee n examined , i t i s time t o tur n specificall y t o th e politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n of Independence . Althoug h m y discussio n o f Locke' s though t wa s no t meant t o b e encyclopedic—tha t i s a differen t book , on e tha t other s have writte n man y time s before— I hop e th e conceptua l analysi s o f the ke y component s o f Locke' s though t provide d her e wil l mak e th e following discussio n o f th e essentia l principle s o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence mor e meaningful .

The Declaration of Independence In hi s classi c stud y The Declaration of Independence, Car l Becke r observes tha t "superficially , th e Declaratio n seem s chiefl y concerne d with th e cause s o f th e Revolution , wit h th e specifi c grievances ; but i n reality i t i s chiefly , on e migh t sa y solel y concerne d wit h a theor y o f

government."167 That theory o f government is spelled out, in Thomas

Jefferson's unforgettabl e words , in th e secon d paragrap h o f th e Decla ration: We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal , that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these ar e Life , Libert y an d th e Pursui t o f Happiness—Tha t t o secur e thes e Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive o f these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,

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and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.168 The argumen t o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s straightfor ward. First , "th e law s o f natur e an d o f nature' s God " govern th e live s and relations of all people an d all nations. 169 Second, these law s unmistakably evinc e tha t al l individual s ar e create d equa l an d tha t the y ar e endowed b y thei r Creato r wit h "unalienable " rights . Third , an d mos t important fo r ou r purposes , th e basi c purpos e o f governmen t i s t o secure thes e rights . Fourth , individual s establis h governmen t throug h consent, an d the y consen t onl y t o th e exercis e o f just governmenta l authority. Fifth , an d last, the exercis e o f tyrannica l governmen t powe r violates the trust established i n the government and entitles the peopl e to alte r o r abolis h th e existin g for m o f governmen t an d institut e a new one . Essential t o understandin g th e politica l philosoph y o f th e Declara tion of Independence i s the concept o f "self-evident truths. " In fact, the claim that the Declaratio n i s a Lockean libera l documen t i s buttresse d by th e unencumbere d appea l ther e t o self-evidenc e a s th e sourc e o f moral knowledge . Locke' s rationalisti c doctrin e o f self-eviden t princi ples wa s no t th e onl y theor y o f mora l knowledg e availabl e t o th e Founders; the doctrin e o f "mora l sense, " as expresse d b y th e Scottis h Enlightenment thinker s wa s sometime s reference d i n th e writing s o f John Adams , Jame s Wilson , an d eve n Thoma s Jefferson . Mora l sens e for these me n meant that when w e engag e i n mora l assessmen t w e exercis e a moral facult y whic h i s different from reason ... becaus e that moral faculty resembles the normal five senses. .. . According to [moral sense] we are supposed to sense that a certain kind o f action , suc h a s tellin g th e truth , i s right , wherea s lyin g i s wrong ; according t o [mora l rationalism ] w e ar e suppose d t o se e thi s b y th e us e o f reason—the same reason that is employed in mathematics.170 Jefferson mention s bot h mora l sens e an d reaso n i n hi s Summary View of the Rights of British America (1774) , a documen t that , a s noted earlier , anticipate s man y o f th e natural-right s argument s tha t Jefferson employ s in the Declaration of Independence. In his Summary View Jefferso n write s tha t "no t onl y th e principle s o f commo n sense , but common feeling s o f huma n nature mus t be surrendere d up , befor e his majesty's subject s her e ca n be persuade d t o believ e tha t they hol d

50 Th e Declaration of Independence their politica l existenc e a t th e wil l o f a Britis h parliament." 171 I n th e Declaration, however , al l referenc e t o mora l sens e i s omitted . Wha t this suggests i s that th e Declaratio n relie s solel y upon Locke' s theor y of knowledge, again illustrating the Declaration's great debt to Locke's philosophical teachings. 172 The Founders also subscribed to Locke's view that only a select few are abl e t o accuratel y discer n th e self-eviden t truth s o f natura l law . Here, Jefferson's Bil l for th e Mor e Genera l Diffusio n o f Knowledg e i s illustrative. Through hi s bill Jefferson hope d t o educat e a t publi c ex pense thos e "who m natur e ha s endowe d wit h geniu s an d virtue " t o become th e guardian s o f liberty, 173 clearl y illustratin g hi s belie f tha t there i s a "natura l aristocracy " o f talen t amon g individuals. 174 Joh n Adams was in notable agreement with Jefferson o n this issue of epistemology.175 The ide a tha t onl y a selec t fe w ca n accuratel y discer n self-eviden t truths—what Morto n Whit e calls "self-evidence t o the learned" 176—is not inconsisten t wit h th e clai m mad e i n th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence that "all men are created equal." What the Declaration, followin g Locke, means by this famous phras e i s that al l persons ar e create d a s members o f th e sam e specie s and , accordingly , tha t ever y individua l has a n "equa l right... t o his natural freedom." N o individual, in othe r words, ha s th e righ t t o exercis e natura l dominio n ove r another . Bu t this does not mean that individuals are equal in all respects, for exam ple, with regard to abilities or capacities. 177 Equality ha s bee n give n a mor e egalitaria n connotatio n i n moder n political discours e tha n th e Declaratio n o f Independence permits . The interpretation o f equality consonant with the principles of the Declaration is that articulated by Abraham Lincoln: 178 The authors of that notable instrument [th e Declaration of Independence] .. . did not intend to declare al l men are equal in all respects. They did not mean to sa y al l wer e equa l i n color , size , intellect , mora l developments , o r socia l capacity. The y define d wit h tolerabl e distinctness , i n wha t respect s they di d consider al l me n create d equal—equa l i n "certai n inalienabl e rights , amon g which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 179

Here, Lincoln recognize s tha t th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e re quires equality of opportunity—"an equa l chance" 180—not equalit y of result. Unde r the Declaration, individuals are equall y entitled t o enjo y

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their natura l freedom . The y ar e no t equall y entitle d t o ei\jo y th e sam e

fruits that result from an exercise of that natural freedom.

Additionally, th e contemporar y deman d fo r egalitarianis m i s incon sistent wit h th e Second Treatise's expres s statement s o n th e matter . Originally, in the state o f nature, it was against the law of nature for an individual t o appropriat e mor e propert y tha n h e coul d us e befor e i t spoiled. T o d o s o woul d violat e th e fundamenta l la w o f natur e t o preserve mankind, because what could spoil might be needed by other s to live. However, the consensual introductio n o f money as a medium o f exchange eliminate d th e spoilag e problem . Becaus e mone y doe s no t spoil, i t ma y b e accumulate d i n unlimite d quantity . Moreover , argue s Locke, man's Creator gave th e world "t o the use o f the industrious an d rational—and labo r wa s t o b e hi s titl e t o it—no t t o th e fanc y o r covetousness o f th e quarrelsom e an d contentious." 181 Plainly , Lock e expects tha t individual s wh o wor k harde r an d mor e effectivel y tha n others will be rewarded with greater material wealth. In fact, Lock e emphasize s tha t a just governmen t encourage s equal ity of opportunity, but refrains from imposing equalit y of result: The increas e o f land s an d th e righ t o f employin g the m i s th e grea t ar t o f government; and the prince who shall be so wise and godlike as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind , agains t th e oppressio n o f powe r an d narrownes s o f party , wil l quickly be too hard for his neighbors.182 Lockean liberalism' s commitmen t t o a n individual' s natura l righ t t o take full advantag e o f his unique abilitie s an d capacities s o a s to enjo y the fruit s o f hi s natura l freedo m doe s no t mean , however , tha t a n individual i s neve r require d t o shar e hi s wealth . Indeed , natura l law' s emphasis o n "th e preservation o f mankind," 183 rathe r tha n o n simpl y securing th e libertie s o f individual persons , require s thos e wh o ar e better of f t o hel p those wh o canno t help themselves. Here, the right t o and dut y o f charit y i n Lockea n liberalism , mentione d earlie r an d dis cussed a t lengt h i n chapte r 5 , come s int o play . I n additio n t o charity , there is also, as discussed a t length in a moment, the related communi tarian obligation t o provide som e assistanc e t o other s i n their "pursui t of happiness," which the Declaration recognizes as a natural right. The Declaratio n o f Independenc e state s tha t al l individuals ar e "en-

52 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e dowed b y their Creato r wit h certai n unalienabl e rights. " In this passag e the Declaratio n pronounce s tha t certai n right s ar e give n b y man' s Creator, rathe r tha n b y civi l authority . Thos e right s tha t ar e solel y th e product o f positiv e la w ca n b e revoke d b y th e sam e civi l authorit y that institute d them : purel y positive-la w right s ar e thu s defeasible . B y contrast, natural rights, being inherent i n the nature o f man, rather tha n the creatio n o f civi l authority , ar e not . What governmen t doe s no t giv e it cannot justly tak e away . Government certainl y ha s th e powe r t o tak e away natura l rights . Bu t suc h a government , a s th e Declaratio n o f Independence repeatedl y exclaims , i s no t a just government . An d tha t is precisel y wh y th e Founder s declare d independenc e an d fough t th e Revolutionary War . "Among" th e "unalienable " natura l right s identifie d b y th e Declara tion o f Independenc e ar e "life , liberty, and th e pursui t o f happiness." 184 With respect t o th e natura l righ t t o "life, " the fac t tha t th e fundamenta l law o f natur e i s th e preservatio n o f mankin d i s o f utmos t importance . Briefly put , natura l la w decree s tha t a n individua l ha s dutie s t o pre serve hi s ow n lif e an d no t t o tak e th e lif e o f another . I f thes e dutie s conflict—in othe r words , i f on e lif e i s threatene d b y another—th e innocent part y i s entitle d t o defen d himself . As Lock e writes , I "have a right t o destro y tha t whic h threaten s m e wit h destruction ; fo r b y th e fundamental la w o f nature , ma n bein g t o b e preserve d a s muc h a s possible whe n al l canno t b e preserved , th e safet y o f th e innocen t i s t o be preferred." 185 Additionally, on e wh o take s th e lif e o f another , whe n no t i n self defense, forfeit s hi s righ t t o life . Thi s i s becaus e suc h a n individua l i s

not followin g th e la w o f reaso n an d is , therefore, actin g lik e a wild animal, not a man. In Locke's colorfu l language :

One may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion, because such men ar e no t unde r th e tie s o f th e commo n la w o f reason, have no othe r rul e but that o f force an d violence, and so may be treated a s beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power. 186 Moreover, th e definitio n o f "politica l power " i s th e righ t o f makin g laws that impos e th e penalt y o f deat h an d an y lesser penalty necessar y to bes t preserv e mankind . (On e o f Locke' s mai n argument s fo r civi l society i s th e mor e effectiv e mechanism s fo r th e rightfu l punishmen t

The Declaration of Independence 5 3 of criminal s tha t exis t therein. ) Finally , "justic e o n a n offender" — treating a n offende r wit h th e dignit y that come s fro m recognizin g hi s free will and moral responsibility—may require that "mankind .. . tak e away [the offender's] life." 187 In summary, the essence of the natural right to "life" is self-preservation and the preservation of mankind. An individual's right to life is not, however, absolute , becaus e on e individua l ma y b e require d t o kil l another to ensure his own self-preservation, whereas that same individual may be said to forfeit hi s right to life if he kills when not in the act

of self-defense.

The righ t t o "liberty " i s als o fundamenta l t o man' s natur e a s en dowed by his Creator. In the context of the American Founding, liberty should b e largel y understoo d i n th e classi c libera l sens e o f "negativ e freedom"—an ide a for whic h Locke was a chief spokesman. 188 That is to say, an individual is endowed wit h the natural right to be free fro m coercive interferenc e whe n makin g choice s a s t o ho w t o contro l th e course of his life.* Like the natural right to life, liberty is not absolute, because a n individua l owe s a dut y t o hi s Creato r t o preserv e himsel f and mankind, and because no individual is free t o improperly interfer e with th e libert y o f another . Thes e principle s flow fro m th e natura l

equality of man. Every individual, writes Locke, has an "equal right...

to hi s natura l freedom, " t o b e fre e fro m th e "wil l or authorit y o f an y other man." 189 Although Lockea n liberalis m accept s tha t man' s natura l righ t t o liberty is not absolute, the scope o f man's liberty is nevertheless quit e extensive. This is because muc h o f what an individua l doe s is outsid e of his duty to preserve mankind . The final natural right mentioned in the Declaration of Independence is "th e pursui t o f happiness. " I n writin g i n th e Declaratio n tha t th e pursuit o f happiness i s a natural right—becaus e th e desir e fo r happi ness i s par t o f man' s essenc e a s endowe d b y hi s Creator—Jefferso n

was stating a central tenet of eighteenth-century political philosophy.190

* Under the negative conception of freedom, government is a "night watchman" charged with ensuring that individuals are free from interference in the exercise of their personal choices. The doctrine o f "positiv e freedom, " by contrast, charges the government with ensuring tha t individual s ar e usin g thei r freedo m "i n the righ t way," or virtuously, a s Bailyn, Wood, and Pocock woul d put it. See generall y Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 118-72.

54 Th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e For example , i n hi s 177 6 Thoughts on Government, Joh n Adam s as serts, "Upo n thi s poin t al l speculativ e politician s wil l agree , tha t th e happiness o f societ y i s the en d o f government , a s all divines an d mora l philosophers wil l agre e tha t th e happines s o f th e individua l i s th e en d of man." 191 Adam s als o mentione d th e righ t o f happines s five time s i n the Massachusett s Constitution. 192 Similarly , Georg e Maso n spok e o f the natura l righ t o f happines s i n th e openin g paragrap h o f th e Virgini a Declaration o f Rights, 193 and happines s wa s a favorite them e o f Georg e Washington. A s Washingto n write s i n hi s justl y acclaime d Circula r Letter o f 1783 : The citizens of America ... are, from this period, to be considered as the actors on a mos t conspicuou s theatre , whic h seem s t o b e peculiarl y designate d b y providence fo r th e displa y of human greatnes s and felicity. Here, they are not only surrounde d wit h ever y thin g whic h ca n contribut e t o th e completio n o f private an d domesti c enjoyment , bu t heave n ha s crowne d al l it s othe r bless ings, by giving a fairer opportunity for political happiness than any other nation has ever been favore d with . .. . Th e foundation o f our empire was not laid in the gloomy age of ignorance and superstition, but at an epocha when the rights of mankin d wer e bette r understoo d an d mor e clearl y denned , tha n a t an y former period ; the researches o f the human mind, after socia l happiness, have been carrie d t o a greater extent , th e treasure s o f knowledge, acquired b y the labours o f philosophers , sage s an d legislature s throug h a lon g successio n o f years, ar e lai d ope n fo r ou r use , and thei r collectiv e wisdo m ma y be happil y applied i n the establishmen t o f ou r form s o f government ; the fre e cultivatio n of letters, the unbounded extension s o f commerce, the progressive refinemen t of manners , th e growin g liberalit y o f sentiment , an d abov e all , the pur e an d benign ligh t o f revelation , hav e ha d a melioratin g influenc e o n mankin d an d increased the blessings of society. At this auspicious period, the United States came into existence a s a nation, and if their citizens should not be completel y free an d happy, the fault will be entirely their own. 194 The righ t t o "pursue " happiness entail s claim s on e individua l ha s o n all others , and o n organize d societ y an d government , t o striv e t o attai n his happiness. 195 Thes e claim s aris e becaus e th e pursui t o f happines s depends t o som e exten t o n externa l circumstance s beyon d a n individ ual's control. Without suc h thing s as health an d a minimum standar d o f living i t i s impossibl e fo r a n individua l t o striv e t o attai n a goo d an d happy life . Henr y Steel e Commager , wh o make s th e mos t detaile d examination o f th e natura l righ t t o th e pursui t o f happines s i n th e literature, state s wel l wha t th e Founder s mean t b y happiness . Happi ness wa s th e simpl e an d jus t thing s o f life . I t wa s "materia l comfort ,

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freedom, independence , an d acces s t o opportunity . Happines s mean t milk fo r th e children , an d mea t o n th e table , a well-buil t hous e an d a well-filled barn , freedom fro m the tyrann y of th e state, the superstitio n of th e church, 196 th e authorit y o f th e military , an d th e malais e o f ignorance."197 The Declaratio n o f Independence , unlik e Georg e Mason' s Virgini a Declaration o f Rights, does no t provide that an individual has a natural right t o obtain happiness . The wor d "obtain " was include d i n a roug h draft but dropped in the final version. What its absence indicates is that the emphasi s i s o n opportunity , no t result , a n emphasi s tha t wa s als o seen in the Declaration's definitio n o f equality . Another concep t centra l t o th e politica l philosoph y o f th e Declara tion o f Independenc e i s tha t government s deriv e "thei r jus t power s from th e consen t o f th e governed. " Here, th e socia l contrac t theor y i s announced. O f course , wha t i s a t issu e i s th e creatio n o f legitimat e government an d the concomitan t limit s o f legitimat e governmenta l au thority. The doctrin e o f consent , lik e tha t o f equality , ha s bee n misinter preted i n moder n politica l discourse . Th e misinterpretatio n i s tha t the Declaratio n requires majority-rul e democracy . As Marti n Diamon d perceptively observes : "Th e Declaratio n doe s not sa y tha t consen t i s the mean s b y which th e governmen t i s to operate ; it says tha t consen t is necessar y onl y t o institut e o r establis h government . I t doe s no t prescribe tha t th e peopl e establis h a democrati c for m o f governmen t which operates by means of their consent." 198 The Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s neutral abou t th e for m o f gov ernment the people institute to secure their natural rights. The Declaration recognize s an y for m a s legitimate , provide d i t secure s natura l rights an d i s create d b y popula r consent. 199 I t i s th e Constitution , no t the Declaratio n o f th e Independence , tha t establishe s th e America n form o f government . An d a s discusse d throughou t thi s volume , th e Constitution establishe s a republican for m of government, not a majority-rule democracy. 200 The final concep t i n th e politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence tha t need s t o b e addresse d i s tha t o f "revolution. " O n revolution, th e Declaration' s relianc e o n Locke' s Second Treatise i s undeniable. Th e theor y o f revolutio n articulate d i n bot h th e Second Treatise an d th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s a n outgrowt h o f th e

56 Th e Declaration o f Independenc e social-contract theor y just described. Specifically, because th e principa l

purpose of government is to secure natural rights, the people have the

"right... t o alte r o r t o abolish " th e existin g for m o f governmen t whe n the "governmen t become s destructiv e o f thes e ends. " Cautio n an d pa tience i s urged i n taking such action , but when th e governmen t exhibit s a patter n o f intentionall y violatin g th e natura l right s o f th e governed , the Declaratio n assert s tha t th e governe d hav e a righ t an d dut y t o resist. Once resistanc e ha s been successfull y achieved , however, a ne w government wil l b e quickl y formed , becaus e natura l right s ar e a t ris k in th e stat e o f nature . A s such , althoug h th e theor y o f revolutio n articulated i n th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e ma y strik e man y toda y as radical, it is not anarchical .

This chapte r ha s argue d tha t th e generall y prevailin g practic e o f re jecting th e Lockea n libera l basi s o f th e America n Revolutio n i s mis taken. I n essence , I attribute d th e rejectio n o f Locke' s substantiv e influence o n th e Revolutio n t o a failure t o recognize th e significanc e o f the Declaratio n o f Independence t o the characte r o f that event . After attemptin g to restore th e Declaration t o its rightful plac e a s th e embodiment o f th e politica l philosoph y o f th e America n Revolution , I examined th e specific s o f tha t philosophy . Tha t discussio n wa s fairl y abstract,* Whe n I tur n t o issue s o f constitutiona l interpretation , th e discussion wil l becom e mor e concret e (se e chapte r 5) . Befor e doin g so, however , i t i s necessar y t o explai n th e relationshi p betwee n th e Declaration o f Independence an d th e Constitutio n o f the Unite d States . Chapter 2 addresses tha t importan t subject .

* Many modern-day political philosophers reject th e idea that there are natural rights. In fact, the anti-Lockean interpretatio n o f the American Founding may be fairly character ized a s par t an d parce l o f thi s large r movemen t i n politica l philosoph y agains t natura l rights. Proving, as a matter of first impression, that natural rights exist is well beyond the scope of my project. My objectives ar e more manageable than that. What I hope to do is show tha t th e Founder s dedicate d thi s natio n t o identifiabl e principle s an d t o explor e the obligations to which those principles give rise.

2 The Constitutio n o f the Unite d State s

Just a s scholars hav e lon g been intereste d i n discerning th e characte r of th e American Revolution , s o to o the y hav e bee n captivate d b y th e question o f why the Constitution o f the United States came to be. And as wa s tru e o f th e scholarshi p o n th e Revolution , th e conclusion s reached abou t th e Constitutio n hav e varie d dramatically . I n perhap s the mos t controversia l boo k eve r written o n the Constitution , Charle s Beard argued at the beginning of this century that the Constitution was designed t o protec t th e propert y interest s o f th e Framers , especiall y their holdings o f governmen t securities 1—an argumen t tha t wa s subjected to extensive criticism over the years.2 Even though Beard's hypothesis has been pretty much demolished, 3 the debate over the Constitution has continued unabated. For instance, in a wav e o f book s publishe d durin g th e Constitution' s bicentennial , scholars emphasize d a s th e reaso n fo r th e Constitution' s passag e th e 57

58 Th e Constitutio n o f the Unite d State s economic an d foreign-polic y failure s o f th e Article s o f Confederation, 4 the growin g difficultie s o f governin g a n increasingl y larg e territor y under a decentralize d for m o f government, 5 an d th e desir e t o promot e a blen d o f economi c an d politica l theories, 6 t o nam e bu t a fe w o f th e most well-receive d bicentennia l theses . While no t intendin g t o den y th e variou s political , social , economic ,

legal, and other kinds of convictions and interests that went into the

compromises tha t becam e th e Constitutio n o f the Unite d States—con victions an d interest s thoughtfull y describe d b y scholar s ove r th e years—this chapte r nevertheles s offer s a n explanatio n fo r wh y th e Constitution cam e t o b e tha t i s differen t fro m thos e generall y em braced, especiall y i n thes e day s o f th e self-proclaime d "republica n revival" i n constitutiona l theory. 7 Afte r examinin g th e preamble , th e framing an d ratificatio n debates , th e Bil l o f Rights , The Federalist papers, th e writing s an d speeche s o f th e intellectua l leader s o f th e constitutional period , an d earl y stat e constitutions , I conclude tha t th e primary reaso n fo r th e Constitution' s passag e wa s th e desir e t o secur e

the natural rights of the American people in a more effective wa y than the Articles o f Confederatio n wer e provin g capabl e o f doing .

As is evident fro m th e lis t o f historica l text s an d material s I consult , my methodology differ s fro m traditiona l historiography , whic h focuse s mainly o n context s a t th e expens e o f texts . In fact , i t i s this differenc e in methodolog y tha t ha s le d historian s t o vie w wit h skepticis m th e possibility o f discernin g th e origina l inten t o f th e Framer s (se e th e Introduction). As historian Pete r Onu f aptl y notes , however, historians ' criticism o f a largel y text-centere d methodolog y i s ofte n unfai r an d sometimes misleading . I n Onuf' s words , "skepticis m abou t th e histori cal record ha s not prevented historian s from takin g great interpretativ e leaps o f thei r own . . . . I f lawyer s an d politica l theorist s sho w lamenta bly littl e interes t i n contexts , historians—eage r t o ge t o n wit h then own story—ten d t o discoun t an d disregar d texts." 8 Although I discus s th e contex t i n whic h th e text s an d historica l materials I consul t wer e written, 9 an d therefor e attemp t t o avoi d th e "interpretative leaps " that Onu f justifiably criticizes , som e metahistori cal generalizatio n i s no t onl y unavoidabl e bu t appropriat e i n constitu tional interpretation—th e subjec t o f thi s volume . Thi s i s becaus e th e objective o f constitutiona l interpretatio n shoul d b e t o appl y th e funda -

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mental mora l an d politica l principle s o n whic h thi s natio n i s base d t o issues o f present-day concer n (se e th e Introductio n an d chapter 5) . To make th e poin t somewha t differently , a constitutio n i s no t a n en d i n itself. It is a means by which a political community's ideals—its ends — are ordered . I n th e word s o f Justic e Willia m Paterson , wh o wrot e a n early opinion on the subject : What is a Constitution? It is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of th e people, i n which certai n first principles o f fundamental law s are established. The Constitutio n i s certai n an d fixed; it contain s th e permanen t will of the people, and is the supreme la w of the land; it is paramount to the power of the Legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it. The life-giving principle and the death-doing stroke must proceed from the same hand.10 Chapter 1 demonstrated tha t for the political community that fough t the America n Revolutionar y Wa r an d issue d th e Declaratio n o f Inde pendence, which established the "United States of America,"11 the "first principle" o f governmen t wa s th e protectio n o f th e people' s natura l rights. Wit h respec t t o th e Constitutio n specifically , thi s chapte r aim s to sho w tha t th e primar y goa l o f tha t documen t i s t o provid e th e institutional mean s t o secur e th e natural-right s philosophica l end s o f the Declaration. 12 I maintai n tha t ther e wa s a continuit y o f Lockea n liberal idea s betwee n th e revolutionar y perio d an d th e constitutiona l period wit h regar d t o th e fundamenta l purpos e o f th e state. 13 I t is thi s interest in discerning the Founders' views on the fundamental purpos e of th e stat e tha t bes t explain s m y methodologica l difference s wit h historians of the period. 14 The positio n advance d i n this chapte r wa s succinctl y expresse d b y James Wilson—wh o wa s "secon d t o Madiso n an d almos t o n pa r wit h him" in term s o f contribution s mad e t o th e Constitutiona l Conventio n of 1787 15—during th e debat e ove r whether the Constitutio n shoul d b e ratified. Wilso n quote d th e secon d paragrap h o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence i n th e Pennsylvani a ratifyin g conventio n an d the n pro claimed, "Thi s i s th e broa d basi s o n whic h ou r independenc e wa s placed; [and] on the sam e certai n and solid foundation thi s system [th e Constitution] i s erected." 16 Summarily stated , although there ma y hav e been idea s competin g wit h natural-right s doctrin e durin g th e framin g

and ratification o f the Constitution , an d althoug h th e Constitutio n i s

60 Th e Constitution of the United States certainly concerne d wit h matter s othe r tha n protectin g rights , it wa s natural-rights political philosophy that remained the guiding light in the adoption of the Constitution . The Preambl e The preambl e t o th e Constitutio n state s th e reason s fo r whic h th e Constitution was written: We, the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,

establish Justice, insure domesti c Tranquility , provide fo r the commo n defence , promote th e genera l Welfare , an d secur e th e Blessing s o f Libert y t o ourselve s and ou r Posterity , d o ordai n an d establis h thi s Constitutio n fo r th e Unite d States o f America. 17

Many, includin g th e Suprem e Court, 18 fai l t o appreciat e tha t th e preamble ha s substantiv e significance . Th e preambl e i s no t simpl y prefatory language . Rather , a s Mortime r Adle r nicel y put s it , "Th e words of the Preamble, echoing in part the language of the Declaration, breathe spiri t into the rest of the Constitution. To ignore the Preambl e is to disregard the ideals of the Constitution and the fundamental idea s and principles that it derives from the Declaration." 19 Several idea s ar e expresse d i n th e preamble , bu t al l relat e t o th e basic purpose of government in the American regime: the protection of the people's natural rights. And while this is not explicitly stated in the preamble, Edmund Randolph' s remarks durin g the federal Conventio n indicate it was certainly well understood: A preamble seems proper not for the purposes of designating the ends of

government an d huma n polities—Thi s . . . displa y o f theory , howsoever prope r in th e firs t formatio n o f stat e governments , . . . i s unfi t here ; since w e ar e no t working o n th e natura l right s o f me n no t ye t gathere d int o society , bu t upo n those rights , modified b y society , an d . . . interwove n wit h wha t w e cal l . . . th e rights of states. 20

The preamble's pronouncemen t tha t the Constitution i s "ordain[ed ] and established] " by "We, the Peopl e o f the Unite d States " expresse s the Lockea n libera l tenet—centra l t o th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence—that politica l legitimac y flow s onl y fro m th e consen t o f th e governed, because any legitimate political community must respect the natural rights of all persons subject to its power.

The Constitution of the United States 6 1 The proclamatio n tha t th e Constitutio n i s establishe d "t o for m a more perfec t union " reflect s th e Framers ' unpleasan t experienc e o f living under the Articles of Confederation, an d especially the fact tha t natural rights were being poorly protected by the decentralized form of government established therein. As explained at length throughout thi s chapter, James Madison , to nam e bu t th e mos t notabl e example , was greatly concerne d abou t th e violations o f natura l right s occurrin g un der the Articles, as his preconvention memorandu m Vices of the Political System of the United States make s clear . Briefl y stated , Madiso n

argues in Vices that the Articles of Confederation had led to democracy

run amok. 21 The preamble' s pledg e t o "establis h justice " i s a reflectio n o f th e Framers' underlying premise that the fundamental purpos e of the Constitution is to secure natural rights. For the Framers, to establish justice meant institutin g a for m o f governmen t tha t woul d mak e individual s confident tha t their rights were secure. In other words, and contrary to the interpretive position of the proponents o f a "living Constitution," 22 justice i s "not a n 'ideal ' t o b e progressivel y pursue d o r promote d b y government; i t i s a n arrangemen t establishe d fro m th e beginning . .. . Accordingly, the most that can be 'established' is not justice itself but a government abl e t o restrai n injustic e an d unlikel y t o commi t injus tice."23 Madison' s respons e t o Roge r Sherman' s clai m tha t th e sole objects of the union were better foreign relations and the prevention of disputes amon g th e state s nicel y exemplifie s th e poin t that , fo r th e Framers, to establis h justice mean t th e Constitutio n wa s designe d t o protect natura l rights. As Madison puts it , "The necessity o f providin g more effectuall y fo r th e securit y o f privat e rights , and th e stead y dispensation o f Justice . Interference s wit h thes e wer e evil s whic h ha d more perhaps than any thing else produced this convention." 24 The preamble's pledg e t o establis h justice i s directly relate d t o th e Constitution's next objective, to "insure domestic tranquility." Here, the Constitution recognize s that withou t civi l peace—the absenc e o f civil disorders and disturbances—natural right s are insecure. Next, th e Constitutio n promise s t o "provid e fo r th e commo n de fence." Wit h thi s provisio n th e preambl e turn s fro m a concer n wit h domestic tranquility to a concern wit h international conflict . The covenant i s tha t th e nationa l governmen t wil l kee p natura l right s secur e from foreig n interference . Whil e i t wa s generall y understoo d b y th e

62 Th e Constitution of the United States Framers tha t nationa l defens e i s th e mos t importan t functio n o f th e national governmen t fo r securin g natura l rights , they were cognizan t o f the threa t tha t a standin g arm y pose d t o thos e sam e rights . Madison' s remarks durin g the ratificatio n debat e ar e illustrative : A standing force , therefore , i s a dangerous , at the same tim e that i t may be a necessary, provision . O n th e smalles t scal e i t ha s it s inconveniences . O n a n extensive scal e it s consequence s ma y be fatal . On any scale i t is an object o f laudable circumspectio n an d precaution. A wise nation wil l combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from an y resource which may become essentia l t o its safety, will exert al l its prudence i n diminishing bot h th e necessit y an d th e dange r o f resortin g t o on e whic h ma y b e inauspicious to its liberties.25 The promise to "promote th e general welfare" is the most ambiguou s of th e five phrase s i n th e preambl e tha t stat e th e objective s o f th e Constitution. The "genera l welfare" i s properly understoo d a s the "pub lic good " o r "publi c happiness " o f society , somethin g tha t wa s fre quently measure d a s "th e permanen t an d aggregat e interest s o f th e community," 26 rathe r tha n simpl y a s the protection o f the natural right s of individuals . Indeed , a s Morto n Whit e rhetoricall y asks , "wh y woul d Madison hav e referre d s o ofte n t o th e mischie f o f violatin g privat e rights and t o tha t o f actin g i n contraventio n t o th e publi c goo d i f h e had no t distinguishe d betwee n thes e tw o kind s o f mischief? " 2 7 While the Framer s sometime s di d distinguis h betwee n privat e right s on th e on e han d an d th e publi c goo d o n th e other , i t mus t b e remem bered tha t th e principal (i.e. , the foremost , bu t no t th e sole ) purpos e of government i n the American regim e i s to secur e th e people's natura l rights 28 an d tha t th e violatio n o f natura l right s itsel f cause s publi c unhappiness. 29 Moreover , a s chapte r 1 explained , accordin g t o th e dictates o f Lockea n liberalism , th e securit y o f a n individual' s natura l rights depend s o n th e existenc e o f politica l society , an d th e continua tion o f politica l society—th e essenc e o f th e publi c good—therefor e needs t o b e ensured. 30 Madison' s observatio n i n The Federalist no . 4 3 that "th e grea t principl e o f self-preservatio n [and ] . . . th e transcenden t law o f natur e an d o f nature' s Go d . . . declare s tha t th e safet y an d happiness o f societ y ar e th e object s t o whic h al l politica l institution s aim an d t o whic h al l suc h institution s mus t b e sacrificed" 31 indicate s that h e wel l understoo d th e connectio n betwee n th e protectio n o f natural right s and th e promotion o f the public good .

The Constitution of the United States 6 3 The final clause of the preamble declares that one of the reasons for adopting the Constitutio n i s to "secur e th e blessings o f liberty to our selves and our posterity." Here, the preamble i s speaking of the liberty that exists when a government is established by consent and is indicating tha t th e "blessings " previousl y enumerate d ar e bes t secure d b y that liberty . I n addition , th e Constitutio n promise s t o preserv e thos e blessings for the generations of Americans to come. 32 In summary, the preamble t o the Constitutio n i s rich in meaning. It reflects th e Framers * view tha t th e Article s o f Confederation , ou r na tion's first effort a t securing the philosophical ideals of the Declaratio n of Independence, 33 faile d i n it s attempt . An d th e preambl e manifest s our nation's intention not to fail again. The Framin g an d Ratificatio n o f th e Constitutio n Concern abou t th e ineffectivenes s o f th e Article s o f Confederation , passed b y the Continenta l Congres s i n 177 7 and finally ratified b y al l thirteen states in 1781, had been expressed from the beginning. As long as th e natio n wa s stil l a t war , however, th e Articles seeme d t o work . But when the British surrendered in 1782, and the states' pressing need to wor k togethe r seemingl y disappeared , governmen t quickl y fell int o disarray. As a result, after muc h soul searching, several intellectual and political leader s o f the ne w nation—wit h Jame s Madison an d Georg e Washington first amon g them—sa w th e nee d t o rethin k th e for m o f government embodie d i n th e Articles o f Confederation , an d th e cal l for a nationa l convention , originall y empowere d simpl y to amen d th e Articles, was made. There wa s littl e philosophizin g abou t th e ultimat e end s o f govern ment durin g the confederatio n period. 34 Thi s deart h o f philosophizin g carried ove r t o th e Constitutiona l Conventio n o f 178 7 a s well . Th e absence o f muc h discussio n abou t th e end s o f governmen t wa s not , however, becaus e th e Framer s wer e unconcerne d abou t th e matter . Rather, i t was because th e matte r wa s so well settled b y the Declara tion o f Independence : th e fundamenta l purpos e o f governmen t i s t o secure the natural rights of the people—a point reaffirmed repeatedl y in the preamble to the Constitution. The task facing the Framers of the Constitution was therefore differ -

64 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s ent fro m tha t face d b y thos e wh o issue d th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence. Fo r th e revolutionar y leader s th e assignmen t wa s t o articulat e the end s o f government ; fo r th e Framer s o f th e Constitutio n i t wa s t o create a form o f government tha t woul d bes t secur e thos e ends. 35 Even the delegate s wh o ultimatel y refuse d t o sig n th e Constitutio n share d the Convention' s underlyin g commitmen t t o the end s articulate d i n th e Declaration. Elbridg e Gerry , fo r one , remarked a t th e Conventio n tha t he "wishe d w e coul d b e unite d i n ou r idea s concernin g a permanen t Govt. Al l ai m a t th e sam e end , bu t ther e ar e grea t difference s a s t o the means." 36 Although th e subjec t o f th e philosophica l ideal s o f governmen t wa s taken largel y for grante d i n Philadelphia i n 1787 , what wa s said demon strates tha t th e delegate s remaine d committe d t o th e natural-right s political philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence . Fo r example , George Maso n responde d t o a statemen t b y Gerr y tha t th e bigges t problem wit h th e Article s o f Confederatio n wa s a n "exces s o f democ racy" 37 b y admittin g tha t th e Article s wer e "to o democratic. " Mason , however, "wa s afrai d tha t w e shoul d incautiousl y ru n int o the opposit e extreme. W e ough t t o atten d t o th e right s o f ever y clas s o f people. " Elsewhere, Maso n reminde d th e Conventio n tha t h e ha d "fo r hi s pri mary object , fo r th e pol e sta r o f hi s political conduct , th e preservatio n of the right s o f the people." 38 James Madison, whose views o n th e relationship betwee n th e Decla ration o f Independence an d th e Constitutio n wil l be discusse d through out thi s volume , als o state d durin g th e Conventio n tha t hi s principa l aim wa s t o secur e th e "right s o f th e people. " Indeed, i n a June 6 , 1787 , speech t o th e Conventio n Madiso n previewe d th e famou s argumen t o n factions h e wa s t o mak e i n The Federalist no . 10 . "In all case s wher e a majority ar e unite d b y a commo n interes t o r passion, " Madiso n re marked, "th e right s o f th e minorit y ar e i n danger." 39 Thi s concer n with protectin g right s als o explain s Madison' s appea l just prio r t o th e Convention t o th e Lockea n notio n o f institutin g a "disintereste d an d dispassionate umpir e i n dispute s betwee n differen t passion s an d inter ests i n the States." 40 Roger Sherma n demonstrate d tha t h e wel l understood tha t th e Con stitutional Conventio n o f 178 7 was calle d t o addres s a proble m differ ent fro m tha t confrontin g th e Continenta l Congres s i n 1776 . "The ques tion [face d b y th e Convention ] i s no t wha t right s naturall y belon g t o

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men," Sherma n declared , "bu t ho w the y ma y b e mos t equall y an d effectually guarde d i n society." 41 An d recal l Edmun d Randolph' s re lated observatio n abou t th e tim e an d plac e fo r philosophizin g abou t the ideal s of the state : "This . .. displa y o f theory, howsoever prope r in the first formation o f stat e governments , . . . i s unfit here ; since w e ar e not working o n the natura l rights of men not yet gathered into society , but upo n thos e rights , modifie d b y society , an d . . . interwove n wit h what we c a l l . . . th e rights of states." 42 On occasion the delegates were forced t o confront proposals for the Constitution tha t wer e a t odd s wit h th e natural-right s principle s guid ing thei r project . Fo r example , Gouverneu r Morri s mad e a stron g ap peal t o natural-right s doctrin e whe n h e oppose d a proposa l t o coun t the slav e populatio n whe n apportionin g representative s i n Congress . Morris angrily exclaimed : The inhabitant of Georgia and South Carolina who goes to the Coast of Africa, and i n defianc e o f th e mos t sacre d law s o f humanit y tear s awa y hi s fello w creatures from thei r dearest connection s an d damns them to th e mos t cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Government instituted for protection of the rights of mankind, tha n the Citize n of Pennsylvani a o r New Jersey wh o views with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice. [This would be] a sacrifice of every right, of every impulse of humanity.43 Robert Yates was another delegate who strongly expressed his commitment to natural-rights principles. In fact, Yates characterized severa l natural-rights theorists—includin g Locke—a s correctl y explicatin g the fundamental purpos e o f government. "Th e first principle o f government," Yates explained, "is founded o n the natural rights of individuals, and in perfect equality . Locke, Vattel, Lord Somers, and Dr. Priestly, all

confirm thi s principle." 44 A s a n examinatio n o f th e record s o f th e

federal Conventio n indicates , when a delegate saw the occasional nee d to remin d th e Conventio n o f th e end s o f government , thos e end s re mained as articulated i n the Declaration o f Independence . The debat e ove r th e ratificatio n o f th e Constitutio n brough t th e doctrine o f natura l rights—assigne d t o th e backgroun d o f commonl y accepted value s durin g th e Constitutiona l Convention—onc e agai n t o the foregroun d o f th e politica l debate. 45 For instance, Mercy Otis Warren, on e o f th e mos t striden t opponent s o f th e Constitution , oppose d ratification becaus e sh e believed that "the whole constitutio n with very few exception s appear s a perversion o f th e right s o f particula r states ,

66 Th e Constitutio n o f the Unite d State s and o f privat e citizens. " To Warren , "th e right s o f individual s ough t t o be th e primar y objec t o f al l government , an d canno t b e to o securel y guarded b y th e mos t explici t declaration s i n thei r favor." 46 Here , th e chief objectio n o f the "Antifederalists ,,, —those opposin g ratification — to th e Constitutio n i s evinced: the absenc e o f a bill of rights.* Luther Marti n share d Warren' s concer n abou t th e absenc e o f a bil l of right s t o secur e th e natura l right s o f th e America n people . Martin' s position i s wel l summarize d i n a Marc h 21 , 1788, letter t o th e citizen s of Maryland explainin g hi s opposition t o ratification : Had the government been formed upo n principles truly federal, as I wished it , legislating only in their collectiv e o r political capacity , and not on individuals, there would have been no need of a bill of rights, as far as related to the rights of individuals, but only as to the rights of states. But the proposed constitutio n being intende d an d empowere d t o ac t no t onl y o n states , bu t als o o n indi viduals, it renders a recognition and a stipulation in favour of the rights of both states and of men, not only proper, but in my opinion absolutely necessary. 47 George Mason , autho r o f th e Virgini a Declaratio n o f Right s an d on e of th e American Founding' s mos t influentia l spokesme n o n th e natura l rights o f man , also oppose d th e Constitutio n becaus e o f the absenc e o f a bil l o f rights . As Mason succinctl y observed , "Ther e i s no declaratio n of rights : an d th e law s o f th e genera l governmen t bein g paramoun t t o

the law s an d constitution s o f th e severa l states , the declaration s of

rights i n th e separat e states , ar e n o security." 48 A s th e remark s o f Warren, Martin , an d Maso n reveal , althoug h Antifederalists throughou t the countr y oppose d th e Constitutio n fo r a variet y o f reasons , th e overriding concer n o f al l Antifederalist s wa s th e absenc e o f a bil l o f rights to protect th e people's natura l rights. 49 Another notabl e advocat e o f th e nee d t o ad d a bil l o f right s t o th e Constitution wa s th e autho r o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence , Thomas Jefferson . Thoug h Jefferso n wa s i n Pari s durin g th e framin g * Early i n he r Observations on the New Constitution Warre n engage s i n a n obviou s exegesis on the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence: All writer s o n governmen t agree , an d th e feeling s o f th e huma n min d witnes s th e trut h o f thes e political axioms , that ma n i s born fre e an d possesse d o f certain unalienabl e rights—tha t governmen t is institute d fo r th e protection , safety , an d happines s o f th e people , and no t fo r th e profit , honour , o r private interes t o f an y man , family, or clas s of men—That th e origi n o f al l power i s in the people, an d that the y hav e a n incontestibl e righ t t o chec k th e creature s o f thei r ow n creation , vested wit h certai n powers t o guar d th e life , libert y an d propert y o f th e community . (I n Ford , ed. , Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, 6 )

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and ratificatio n o f the Constitution , h e nevertheless ha d tremendou s

influence o n what transpired i n the Unite d States. The primary condui t through whic h Jefferso n expresse d hi s thought s o n th e Constitutio n was a n exchang e o f correspondenc e wit h Jame s Madison . Jefferso n was initiall y a reluctan t supporte r o f th e Constitution , an d on e o f hi s most importan t letter s t o Madiso n tersel y explain s why . " A bil l o f rights," Jefferso n writes , "i s wha t th e peopl e ar e entitle d t o agains t every governmen t o n earth , genera l o r particular , an d wha t n o jus t government shoul d refuse , o r rest o n inference." 50 Indeed , i t was onl y after Madison promised to secur e the addition of the Bill of Rights that Jefferson becam e mor e supportive o f the Constitution .

Not to be outdone in their dedication to the natural rights of man,

the "Federalists"—thos e supportin g th e ratificatio n o f th e Constitu tion—employed natural-right s doctrin e t o argu e against th e inclusio n of a bill o f right s i n the propose d Constitution . The Federalist s turne d mainly t o th e natur e o f th e federa l Constitution . Th e federa l Constitu tion is one o f enumerate d power s only , the Federalists argued, and th e national governmen t i s no t conferre d powe r i n th e are a o f individua l rights. As James Wilson state d i n his State Hous e speec h o f Octobe r 4, 1787, "I t would hav e bee n superfluou s an d absurd , t o hav e stipulate d with a federa l bod y o f ou r ow n creation , tha t w e shoul d ei\jo y thos e privileges o f whic h w e ar e no t diveste d eithe r b y intentio n o r th e ac t

that has brought the body into existence." 51 Moreover, argued Wilson,

a bill of rights would be dangerous to the natural rights of the American people becaus e "i t woul d impl y tha t whateve r i s no t expresse d wa s given, which is not the principle o f the proposed constitution." 52 James Madiso n echoe d Wilson' s concern s whe n h e initiall y spok e against th e inclusio n o f a bill o f rights i n the Virginia ratifying conven tion. "Can the genera l government exercis e an y power no t delegated? " Madison asked . "I f a n enumeratio n b e mad e o f ou r rights , wil l i t no t be implie d tha t everythin g omitted , i s give n t o th e genera l gov ernment?"53 Alexander Hamilto n brough t Wilson' s an d Madison' s argumen t t o full flower i n The Federalist no . 84: I go further and affirm tha t bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which the y ar e contende d for , ar e no t onl y unnecessar y i n th e propose d Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext

68 Th e Constitution of the United States to claim more than were granted. For why contend that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? 54 Hamilton conclude s no . 8 4 b y remindin g hi s audienc e tha t "th e Constitution i s itself .. . A BILL OF RIGHTS. The severa l bills of rights in Great Britain form it s constitution, and conversel y the constitutio n of each state is its bill of rights. And the proposed Constitution, if adopted, will be the bill of rights of the Union."55 In the end, the Antifederalists prevailed in the debate over the Bill of Rights,56 and the Constitution was ratified onl y because the Federalists promised to add a bill of rights at the first opportunity. * That promise soon wa s fulfille d b y Madiso n i n th e first Congress , wit h Madison' s change o f hear t bein g largel y attributabl e t o hi s recognitio n o f th e importance t o th e America n peopl e o f securin g thei r natura l rights . Madison's closin g remark s i n hi s Jun e 8 , 1789 , speec h t o th e U.S . House of Representatives advocating the adoption of the Bill of Rights demonstrate the point. "I think we should obtain the confidence of our fellow-citizens," Madison argued, "in proportion as we fortify th e rights of the people against the encroachments of the Government."57 The Bil l o f Right s Although not include d a s part o f the Constitutio n drafte d i n Philadelphia in 1787 , the Bill of Rights, as the previous discussion suggests, is an important part of the Constitution as it was finally enacted. Herbert Storing, a leading authority on the American Founding, goes so far a s to say that "i t seems quite plausible today, when so much o f constitutional la w i s connecte d wit h th e Bil l o f Rights , to conclud e tha t th e Antifederalists, the apparent losers in the debate over the Constitution, were ultimately the winners." 58 While Storing's observation appears to overstate the difference o f opinion that existed between the Federalists * Although th e Antifederalist s wer e influence d b y th e classica l republica n tradition — especially i n thei r concern abou t th e siz e o f th e federa l republi c envisione d b y th e Federalists—the Antifederalists' insistenc e on a bill of rights shows they were liberals in the "decisiv e sense " of regarding the en d o f government a s the protection o f individua l rights, no t th e cultivatio n o f virtu e o r th e promotio n o f som e organi c commo n good . Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, 83. See also Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship, 7 , 155 ; R. M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, 14.

The Constitution of the United States 6 9 and th e Antifederalist s o n th e necessit y o f securin g th e right s o f th e American peopl e (th e previou s sectio n describe d ho w the tw o camp s differed abou t the best means t o secure rights, but not about the ends of government itself) , the observatio n nicel y captures the significanc e of rights in the American regime. To make the point somewhat differ ently, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights had the same objective fo r

the Framers—th e latte r merel y declare d th e right s th e forme r wa s

designed to secure.* The Bil l o f Right s doe s no t see k t o protec t onl y natura l rights — several provision s simpl y secur e certai n common-la w rights 59—but natural right s ar e wha t th e Bil l of Right s i s most concerne d with . An examination o f the specific amendment s comprisin g the Bill of Right s illustrates this fact. Obviously, a comprehensive analysis of the various clauses and provisions of the first ten amendments to the Constitution is beyond th e scop e o f this section. It is possible, however, to discer n the essential natural-rights principles embodied in the amendments. (A more detaile d analysi s o f severa l o f th e amendment s i s availabl e i n

chapter 5's discussion of constitutional interpretation.)

Before w e tur n t o th e specifi c amendment s comprisin g th e Bil l of Rights, it should be recalled what the principal natural rights identifie d by th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e ar e an d wha t the y essentiall y mean. Th e natura l right s identifie d ar e "life , liberty , an d th e pursui t of happiness, " an d the y hav e bee n show n t o mean , respectively , a n individual's righ t (an d duty ) t o protec t hi s life , t o freel y contro l th e course of his life, and to strive for a good and happy life. In thi s light , th e first amendmen t certainl y embodie s th e ide a o f an individual' s natura l right s t o libert y an d th e pursui t o f happiness ; guaranteeing a s th e amendmen t doe s freedo m o f religion , speech , press, assembly, and access to government by petition. The secon d an d thir d amendments , whic h guarantee , respectively , * One should no t interpre t th e fac t tha t the Bil l o f Rights—o r a t least amendment s 1 through 8 (see below)—did not originally apply to the states as a sign that the Federalists had abandoned their concern about the violations of natural rights occurring in the states. As explained above, the Bill of Rights was intended by the Federalists primarily to assuag e th e Antifederalists ' fea r tha t th e nationa l governmen t woul d becom e to o strong. As a result, there was no need to make the first eight amendments applicable to the states . The nint h an d tenth amendments , discusse d i n detai l below , illustrat e th e Federalists' continuing commitmen t t o th e Declaratio n o f Independence' s premise : no just government, federal or state, may violate natural rights.

70 Th e Constitution of the United States an individual's right to keep and bear arms and to be free fro m govern ment-imposed quartering of troops in his home, are designed to secur e the natural rights of life and liberty. The fourth amendment' s prohibition against unreasonable or unwarranted governmen t searche s an d seizures protects the natural right to liberty by proscribing governmen t intimidatio n an d coercion . The fifth and sixt h amendments , b y detailin g a procedura l floor t o whic h th e government mus t adher e whe n prosecutin g a n individua l fo r offense s against th e state , protec t th e natura l right s o f lif e an d liberty . Th e natural righ t to property i s likewise protected b y the du e process an d just-compensation clause s of the fifth amendment. The eighth-amendment * prohibition s agains t excessiv e bai l an d cruel an d unusua l punishmen t protec t a n individual' s natura l righ t t o be free fro m inhuma n treatment by the government. Finally, there are the ninth and tenth amendments. Both provide that

the rights not listed in the preceding eight amendments are still to be

given governmen t protection . Th e tent h amendmen t speak s t o right s identified b y state law (to be protected by state government), whereas the nint h amendmen t addresse s al l unenumerated right s (t o b e pro tected b y bot h federa l an d stat e government). 60 Because , fo r natural rights purposes , th e nint h amendmen t i s th e mos t important , no t t o mention th e mos t controversial , amendmen t t o th e Constitution , i t warrants detailed consideration . Though the ninth amendment lay dormant for mos t of the Constitu tion's history , i t mus t hav e mean t somethin g t o th e Framers. 61 Th e ninth amendment mean s what it says: "The enumeration i n the Constitution o f certai n right s shal l no t b e construe d t o den y o r disparag e others retaine d b y th e people." 62 Tha t th e nint h amendmen t wa s in tended t o protec t unenumerate d right s seem s clea r fro m it s text , a s well as from James Madison's June 8,1789, speech to the U.S. House of Representatives advocatin g th e adoptio n o f th e Bil l of Rights . In tha t speech Madison, who wrote the ninth amendment (as well as the other provisions of the Bill of Rights), made the following observation : * The seventh amendment, which extends the right to trial by jury from crimina l to civil matters an d incorporate s th e commo n la w int o th e la w o f th e land , doe s no t addres s issues o f natura l rights . Se e Jame s Madison , Speec h t o th e Unite d State s Hous e o f Representatives on Adopting the Bill of Rights, June 8,1789, in Meyers, ed., The Mind of the Founder, 168.

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It ha s bee n objecte d als o agains t a bil l o f rights , that , b y enumeratin g particular exception s t o th e gran t of power , i t woul d disparag e thos e right s which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights which are not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard against the admission of a bil l o f right s int o thi s system ; but, I conceive, tha t i t ma y b e guarde d against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution [the ninth amendment].63 In a well-know n argument , Raou l Berge r an d Rober t Bork , amon g others,64 interpre t Madison' s remark s t o mea n tha t th e nint h amend ment wa s designe d t o ensur e tha t right s alread y hel d b y th e peopl e under stat e la w woul d remai n wit h th e peopl e an d tha t th e enumera tion o f right s i n th e federa l Constitutio n di d no t chang e thi s fact. 65 The difficult y wit h thi s interpretatio n i s tha t i t accuse s Madiso n o f redundancy b y characterizin g th e nint h amendmen t a s jus t anothe r way o f statin g th e tent h amendment . Certainly , redundanc y i s a ques tionable accusatio n t o mak e agains t a technicia n a s skille d a s th e "father" of the Constitution an d the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Berger' s an d Bork' s interpretatio n o f th e nint h amend ment fails to recognize tha t enumerating rights in the Constitution wa s seen b y th e Framer s a s presentin g two potentia l dangers , no t one . Madison's just-quote d remark s identif y thes e tw o potentia l dangers . The first was tha t an enumeration o f right s coul d be use d t o justify a n unwarranted enlargemen t o f federa l powers . The secon d wa s tha t an y right excluded from an enumeration would be imperiled. The danger of interpreting federa l power s to o broadl y wa s addresse d b y th e tent h amendment, while the danger of jeopardizing unenumerated rights was handled by the ninth amendment. 66 The fact that enumerating rights in the Constitution was seen by the

Framers as presenting tw o potential danger s is further illustrate d by

letters writte n b y Madiso n t o Thoma s Jefferson an d Georg e Washing ton. Madison's letter to Jefferson, on e i n a series between the two me n written durin g th e heigh t o f th e debat e ove r whethe r th e Constitutio n should contai n a bil l o f rights , show s Madiso n clearl y separatin g th e question o f unenumerate d power s fro m th e questio n o f unenumerate d rights. Madison writes: My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included i n the enumeration.

72 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s ... I have not viewed i t in an important light—1 . because I conceive that in a certain degre e .. . th e right s i n question ar e reserve d b y the manne r i n which the federal power s are granted. 2. because there i s great reason to fear tha t a positive declaration o f some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. 67 Madison's lette r t o Washington—whic h i s typicall y claime d to support Berger' s an d Bork' s interpretatio n o f th e nint h amendment 6 8 — finds Madiso n explainin g wh y Edmun d Randolph' s objectio n t o th e

ninth amendment, on the ground that the amendment should have been

stated "rathe r a s a provision agains t extendin g th e power s o f Congres s by thei r ow n authority , tha n a protectio n t o right s reducibl e t o n o definite certainty," 69 i s withou t merit . According t o Madison : "Th e dis tinction be , a s i t appear s t o me , altogethe r fanciful . I f a lin e b e draw n between th e power s grante d an d th e right s retained , i t would see m t o be th e sam e thing , whethe r th e latte r t o b e secure d b y declarin g tha t they shal l not be abridged , o r that th e forme r shal l not be extended." 70 Reading Madison' s lette r i n th e contex t o f Randolph' s objection — which i s usuall y no t done—reveal s tha t Madiso n i s concerne d i n th e ninth amendmen t wit h protectin g unenumerate d rights , right s h e de scribes t o Washingto n a s "reducibl e t o n o definit e certainty. " To mak e the poin t directly , i f Madison mean t b y th e nint h amendmen t onl y tha t rights alread y hel d b y th e peopl e unde r stat e la w woul d remai n wit h the peopl e an d tha t th e enumeratio n o f right s i n th e federa l Constitu tion di d no t chang e thi s fact , thos e right s woul d not b e "reducibl e t o no definit e certainty. " The interpretatio n advance d b y Berger an d Bor k cannot accoun t fo r th e possibility o f a n uncertainty i n the enumeratio n of rights, because thei r view i s that th e nint h amendmen t i s referring t o rights alread y enumerate d unde r stat e law . Here , on e see s th e impor tance o f readin g Madison' s statemen t t o Washingto n i n context , some thing Berge r an d Bor k fail t o do . Lastly, the fac t tha t th e nint h amendmen t i s not just anothe r wa y o f stating th e tent h amendmen t i s demonstrated b y considerin g th e tent h amendment itself . The tent h amendmen t states : "Th e powers no t dele gated t o th e Unite d State s b y th e Constitution , no r prohibite d b y i t t o the States , ar e reserve d t o th e State s respectively , or to the people. "71 The critica l languag e i s th e italicize d "o r t o th e people. " I f th e nint h amendment mean s wha t Berge r an d Bor k sa y i t means , the n tha t language i s unnecessary. Specifically , i f "right s retaine d b y th e people "

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merely means "rights granted under state law," then it would have been sufficient fo r th e tent h amendmen t t o sa y tha t an y powe r no t grante d to th e federa l government , no r withheld fro m th e states , remains wit h the states. But the tent h amendment i s not limited in that manner. And this i s precisel y becaus e th e Framer s believe d tha t ther e ar e certai n rights—natural rights—beyon d th e powe r o f an y legitimat e govern ment, federa l o r state , t o invade. 72 Simpl y put , th e Framer s wer e no t positivists, despit e th e effort s o f Berge r an d Bor k t o mak e the m so. 73 Thomas Grey makes the point well in a famous article on natural rights and the Constitution , an article tha t emphasize s th e significanc e o f th e ninth amendment. According to Grey: For the generation that framed the Constitution, the concept of a "higher law," protecting "natura l rights," and taking precedence ove r ordinary positive la w as a matte r o f politica l obligation , wa s widel y share d an d deepl y felt . A n essential element o f American constitutionalism was the reduction to written form—and hence to positive law—of some of the principles of natural rights. But a t the sam e time , it wa s generall y recognize d tha t writte n constitution s could not completely codify the higher law. The ninth amendment is the textual expression of this idea in the federal Constitution. 74 The nint h amendment' s intende d protectio n o f bot h unenumerate d positive right s an d unenumerate d natural right s i s eviden t i n Madi son's differentiatio n i n his June 8 , 1789 , speech betwee n "th e preexis tent rights o f nature, " or "natural right[s]," and rights "resultin g fro m a social compact, " o r "positiv e rights." 75 Madison' s appreciatio n o f th e importance o f protectin g natura l right s i n th e Bil l o f Right s i s consis tent wit h hi s writing s i n The Federalist an d elsewher e (se e th e nex t two section s o f this chapter), as well a s with the view prevailing at the time he wrote the Bill of Rights. 76 The unwillingnes s o f Berge r an d Bor k t o recogniz e tha t th e nint h amendment wa s designe d t o protec t unenumerate d natura l right s i s attributable t o th e fea r the y shar e wit h mos t contemporar y conserva tives abou t judicial activis m an d th e encouragemen t o f suc h activis m that a substantiv e readin g o f th e nint h amendmen t allegedl y woul d provide.77 Underlyin g th e conservatives ' positio n i s a characterizatio n of judicia l revie w a s a "devian t institutio n i n th e America n democ racy,"78 because judicial revie w i s outsid e o f th e processe s o f majorit arian politics . However , oppositio n t o a robus t judicia l rol e i n th e American constitutiona l orde r mistakenly interpret s th e Declaration o f

74 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s Independence a s requirin g tha t governmen t operat e b y majorit y rule . As discusse d i n chapte r 1 , the Declaratio n i s neutral abou t th e for m o f government th e peopl e establis h t o secur e thei r natura l rights . Th e Declaration recognize s an y for m a s legitimate , a s lon g a s th e estab lished for m secure s natura l right s and i s instituted b y popular consent . The Constitution , no t th e Declaratio n o f Independence , addresse s how th e governmen t i s t o operate . An d th e Constitutio n doe s no t establish a majority-rul e democracy . A s describe d i n th e Introduction , virtually ever y componen t o f th e Constitutio n contain s stron g antima joritarian features , becaus e th e Framer s wer e concerne d wit h majorit arian threat s t o th e right s o f individual s an d minoritie s mor e tha n with anythin g else. 79 Indeed, James Madison' s mos t importan t politica l writings ar e abou t th e danger s o f unchecke d majoritie s an d hi s sug gested solution s fo r protectin g agains t those dangers. 80 Following Mad ison's counsel , th e Framer s create d a republica n for m o f government , not a majority-rul e democracy . Th e republica n for m o f governmen t they created , a s part 2 discusses a t length , gives the judiciary th e chie f role i n protectin g individua l an d minorit y rights . The interpretatio n o f the nint h amendmen t advance d b y s o man y contemporar y conserva tives—leaving unenumerate d natura l right s unprotecte d b y the federa l judiciary—is, therefore , influence d b y a n erran t readin g o f th e Ameri can constitutiona l order. *

The Federalist P a p e r

s

The Federalist paper s ar e a serie s o f newspape r essay s writte n b y Alexander Hamilton , Jame s Madison , an d Joh n Ja y unde r th e pseud onym "Publius " t o persuad e th e peopl e o f Ne w Yor k and , t o a lesse r *An argumen t tha t seem s t o suppor t th e conservatives ' positio n i s th e absenc e fro m early Supreme Cour t opinion s o f direc t reference t o th e nint h amendment. As I show i n chapter 3 , however , earl y judges, includin g earl y Suprem e Cour t justices, wer e no t a s explicitly textua l i n their approac h t o constitutiona l interpretatio n a s th e conservatives ' argument requires . On e commentato r characterize s th e issu e o f whethe r th e Framer s

meant for the judiciary to enforce unwritte n natura l rights as "the critical issue—whic h

has not been adequatel y answere d b y scholars" and the issu e tha t separates th e compet ing conception s o f th e ninth amendmen t discusse d i n thi s section . Se e Mayer , "Th e Natural Rights Basis o f the Ninth Amendment," 323. Part 2 of this volume attempt s to fill that void in the literature .

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degree, th e othe r states , t o ratif y th e Constitution . Notwithstandin g their occasional polemical excesses , these brilliant essays are generally regarded a s th e bes t insigh t int o th e Frame d understandin g o f th e Constitution.81 As i s true o f the politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n of Independence , ther e i s disagreemen t i n th e scholarl y communit y about the influence o f Lockean liberalism on The Federalist. Fo r example, Garr y Will s argue s tha t th e Scottis h Enlightenmen t thinkers , no t Locke, were Publius' s guide. 82 David Epstein contend s tha t Tlie Federalist i s a combination o f Locke's theory o f individual rights and classi cal republicanism. 83 Marti n Diamon d an d Thoma s Pangl e clai m tha t Locke was by far the predominant influence o n the political philosoph y of The Federalist, although , lik e mos t student s o f Le o Strauss , the y tend to characteriz e Lock e a s just a sugar-coated version o f th e purel y individualistic Hobbes. 84 Lastly , Morton Whit e maintain s tha t The Federalist i s a hybrid o f Locke' s politica l philosoph y an d Hume's politica l science. 85 White's interpretation o f Locke' s influence o n The Federalist i s consistent with Jefferson's observatio n that "Locke's little book o n government, i s perfec t a s fa r a s i t goes . . . . Descendin g fro m theor y t o prac tice, ther e i s n o bette r boo k tha n The Federalist," a s wel l a s wit h Locke's distinction between political philosophy and "the art of governing men in society." 86 In other words, an examination of The Federalist provides additional evidenc e tha t the Constitution wa s intended by the Framers to provid e th e institutiona l mean s to secur e th e philosophica l ends of the Declaration o f Independence . That The Federalist doe s not discuss political philosophy a s directl y as th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e doe s i s no t disputed . Bu t thi s i s because Publius—lik e th e Framer s o f th e Constitutio n generally — faced a tas k differen t fro m tha t face d b y th e revolutionar y leaders . Publius wa s tryin g t o persuad e hi s audienc e tha t th e Constitutio n represented th e bes t form of government t o secur e th e philosophica l principles embodie d i n th e Declaratio n o f Independence ; principle s which, thi s chapte r ultimatel y seek s t o show , wer e widel y understoo d and accepted . Th e author s o f th e Declaration , by contrast , wer e tryin g to articulat e thos e firs t principle s o f American governmen t i n order t o justify a revolutio n an d establis h a ne w nation . Althoug h i t wa s not , therefore, Publius' s desig n i n writin g The Federalist t o revie w th e legitimacy an d the wisdo m o f founding a nation o n natural-rights prin-

76 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s ciples, a clos e readin g o f The Federalist provide s ampl e evidenc e tha t Publius remained committe d t o those principles . Publius's commitmen t t o th e Declaration' s philosoph y o f govern ment i s reaffirme d immediately . I n The Federalist no . 2 , Joh n Ja y restates th e centra l tene t o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence : tha t government i s institute d t o secur e th e people' s natura l rights . As Ja y succinctly explains , "Nothin g i s mor e certai n tha n th e indispensabl e necessity o f government ; . . . [an d that ] th e peopl e mus t ced e t o [gov ernment] som e o f thei r natura l rights , i n orde r t o ves t [government ] with requisite powers " to secur e those rights. 87 James Madiso n professe s hi s commitmen t t o th e philosophica l ide als o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i n a numbe r o f The Federalist papers h e wrote . I n The Federalist no . 40 , fo r example , Madiso n in vokes the principles—and th e words—of th e Declaration t o justify th e admittedly extralega l effort s o f th e Conventio n i n writin g th e Consti tution: In al l grea t change s o f establishe d government s form s ough t t o giv e wa y t o substance; .. . a rigi d adherenc e i n suc h case s t o th e forme r woul d rende r nominal an d nugator y th e transcenden t an d preciou s righ t o f th e peopl e t o "abolish o r alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effec t their safety an d happiness," since it is impossible for the people spontaneousl y and universall y t o mov e i n concer t toward s thei r object ; an d i t i s therefor e essential tha t suc h change s b e institute d b y some informa l an d unauthorize d propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citize n or number of citizens.88 By th e "safet y an d happiness " o f th e people , th e Declaration—an d Madison i n 77& e Federalist—means th e securit y o f natural rights. 89 In The Federalist no . 37 , Madiso n describe s th e tensio n tha t fre quently exist s betwee n protectin g th e natura l right s o f individual s an d promoting th e mor e genera l publi c good , a classica l republica n con cern. "Amon g the difficultie s encountere d b y th e convention, " Madiso n writes, "a very importan t on e mus t hav e lai n in combinin g th e requisit e stability an d energ y i n governmen t wit h th e inviolabl e attentio n du e t o liberty an d th e republica n form. " Unfortunately , Madiso n continues , "we mus t perceiv e a t onc e th e difficult y o f minglin g the m togethe r i n their du e proportions." 90 In The Federalist no . 10—wit h whic h onl y no . 51 9 1 competes fo r significance i n th e annal s o f America n politica l science—Madiso n de -

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cides that while i t is important to protect both the general public goo d and th e natura l right s o f individuals , i f a choic e ha s t o b e made , th e choice shoul d b e i n favo r o f first securin g natura l rights . Madiso n

argues in his famous discussion of factions that self-interested group s

bear th e mgjo r responsibilit y fo r th e problem s facin g th e nation , bu t he emphasize s tha t thi s i s tru e "particularly, fo r tha t prevailin g an d increasing distrus t o f publi c engagement s an d alar m for privat e right s which ar e echoe d fro m on e en d o f th e continen t t o th e other." 92 Onc e again Madison reaffirms hi s commitment to protecting rights. The Federalist nos . 14 , 39 , 45 , an d 4 6 fin d Madiso n remindin g hi s readers that the purpos e o f the Constitutio n i s to fulfil l th e promise o f the America n Revolution . I n no . 14 , for instance , Madiso n appeal s t o the patriotis m o f th e America n peopl e whe n explainin g tha t th e pro posed Constitutio n i s intende d t o secur e th e hard-wo n fruit s o f th e Revolution. Wha t i s mos t significan t abou t no . 1 4 i s Madison' s argu ment tha t th e revolutionar y patriot s "erred " i n th e "structur e o f th e Union"—that is , in the form o f governmen t establishe d b y the Article s of Confederation—bu t no t i n thei r desir e t o secur e natura l rights . I n Madison's words: Happily for America, happily we trust for the whole human race, [the revolutionary patriots] pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed th e desig n o f a grea t Confederacy , whic h i t i s incumben t o n thei r successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder a t th e fewnes s o f them . I f the y erre d mos t i n th e structur e o f th e Union, this was the work most difficult to be executed; this is the work which has bee n ne w modele d b y th e ac t o f you r convention , an d i t i s tha t ac t o n which you are now to deliberate and to decide.93 Similarly, i n The Federalist no . 45 , Madiso n criticize s thos e wh o emphasize th e importanc e o f maintainin g stat e powe r b y pointin g t o the objective s o f th e Revolution , objective s share d b y th e propose d Constitution: If, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous to urge as an objection to a government, without which the object s o f th e Unio n canno t b e attained , tha t suc h a governmen t ma y derogate fro m th e importanc e o f th e government s o f th e individua l States ? Was, then, the American Revolution effected , wa s the American Confederac y

78 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s formed, wa s th e preciou s bloo d o f thousand s spilt , an d th e hard-earne d sub stance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should er\joy peace, liberty, an d safety , bu t tha t th e government s o f th e individua l States , tha t particular municipal establishments, might er\joy a certain extent of power and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty?94 Softening somewha t hi s criticis m o f th e defender s o f stat e power , Madison seek s i n The Federalist no . 46 to assuag e thos e wh o fea r tha t the ne w Constitutio n woul d mea n th e eliminatio n o f th e states . H e does s o b y agai n drawin g o n th e experience s an d th e principle s o f the Revolution : Ambitious encroachment s o f th e federa l governmen t woul d no t excit e th e opposition o f a singl e State , o r o f a fe w State s only . They woul d b e signal s of genera l alarm . Ever y governmen t woul d espous e th e commo n cause . A correspondence woul d b e opened . Plan s o f resistanc e woul d b e concerted . One spirit woul d animat e an d conduc t th e whole. The same combinations , in short, would resul t from a n apprehensio n o f th e federal , a s wa s produced b y the drea d o f a foreign , yoke ; and unles s th e projected innovation s shoul d b e voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. 95 Finally, but mos t importantly , there i s The Federalist no . 43, wherein Madison invoke s th e very words o f the Declaratio n o f Independence t o explain tha t a particular for m o f governmen t i s not a n en d i n itself, bu t rather a mean s t o secur e th e people' s natura l rights . In no. 43 Madiso n alludes t o "th e grea t principl e o f self-preservation ; t o th e transcenden t law o f natur e an d o f nature' s God , whic h declare s tha t th e safet y an d happiness o f societ y ar e th e object s a t whic h al l politica l institution s aim an d t o whic h al l such institution s mus t be sacrificed." 96 Although Alexander Hamilto n emphasize s th e promotio n o f the pub lic good i n The Federalist mor e than James Madiso n does , The Federalist paper s writte n b y Hamilto n sho w tha t h e remaine d committe d t o the natural-right s principle s h e hel d a s a young revolutionar y pamphle teer. Hamilto n bes t display s hi s commitmen t t o natura l la w i n The Federalist no . 31 , where h e speak s o f epistemology . Hamilto n writes : "In disquisition s o f ever y kin d ther e ar e certai n primar y truths , o r firs t principles, upo n whic h al l subsequen t reasoning s mus t depend . Thes e contain a n interna l evidenc e which , anteceden t t o al l reflectio n o r

combination, commands the assent of the mind."97 Hamilton seems to

have understoo d wel l Locke' s Essay concerning Human Understand-

The Constitution of the United States 7 9 ing, no t to mention the associated doctrine of "self-evident truths" that is s o fundamenta l t o th e philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence. In The Federalist no. 28, Hamilton demonstrates that he well learned another Lockean tenet of natural law, a tenet central to the Declaration of Independence : th e natura l righ t o f revolution . I f th e governmen t seriously fails the people in providing security for natural rights, Hamilton argues , "ther e i s then n o resourc e lef t bu t i n the exertio n o f tha t original right o f self-defens e whic h i s paramount t o al l positive form s

of government."98 And in The Federalist no. 26, Hamilton again speaks

to th e doctrin e o f revolutio n an d th e dictate s o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence whe n h e observe s tha t "securit y o f privat e rights " wa s what the struggle against Great Britain was all about." Lastly, there i s The Federalist no . 9, where Hamilto n describe s th e totality o f th e Constitutio n a s a "means " better t o secur e th e natura l rights o f th e America n people . There , Hamilto n provide s a laundr y list o f structura l device s propose d b y th e Conventio n t o effectuat e that end. 100 In summary, although Publius typically took his audience's commit ment t o th e natural-right s principle s o f th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence fo r granted , a carefu l readin g o f The Federalist reveal s that h e did, o n mor e tha n on e occasion , an d whethe r speakin g throug h th e pen o f John Jay , James Madison , o r Alexander Hamilton , reaffirm hi s commitment t o thos e principles . A n investigatio n o f th e politica l thought o f severa l o f th e intellectua l leader s o f th e constitutiona l pe riod likewis e show s tha t th e Framer s intende d th e Constitutio n t o secure the philosophical ideals of the American Revolution. The Intellectua l Leader s o f th e Constitutiona l Perio d

Chapter 1 describe d ho w crucia l intellectua l leadershi p wa s i n th e drive toward American independence . Intellectual leadershi p was als o indispensable i n th e effor t t o fram e an d ratif y th e Constitution . Th e natural startin g poin t fo r th e discussio n o f th e intellectua l leadershi p of the revolutionary period was Thomas Jefferson, autho r of the Declaration o f Independence . The natura l startin g poin t fo r a discussion o f the intellectua l leadershi p o f the constitutiona l perio d i s James Madi-

80 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s son, "father " o f th e Constitution. 101 A s wa s th e cas e i n chapte r 1 , tw o important caveat s ar e necessar y befor e turnin g t o Madison' s politica l thought. First , volumes coul d be , and i n mos t case s hav e been , writte n on th e politica l though t o f eac h o f th e leader s I wil l discuss . Clearly , space constraint s limi t what I can accomplish . Second , an d makin g th e first cavea t les s troublesome, my objective here , as it was in the discus sion o f the revolutionar y period , i s to elucidat e th e intellectua l leaders ' position o n th e basic purpos e o f th e state . Mor e precisely , I hop e t o show tha t the intellectua l leader s o f the constitutiona l period remaine d dedicated t o th e centra l tene t o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence : tha t government exist s t o secur e natura l rights . Though Jame s Madison' s view s o n th e relationshi p betwee n th e Constitution an d th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e wer e previousl y discussed i n th e analyse s o f th e framin g an d ratificatio n o f th e Consti tution, th e Bil l o f Rights , and The Federalist papers , Madison's rol e a s the chie f architec t o f th e Constitutio n warrant s additiona l consider ation o f hi s views . Tha t Madiso n frame d th e Constitutio n i n orde r t o provide bette r securit y fo r natura l right s tha n th e Articles o f Confeder ation wer e providin g i s see n i n the prefac e t o hi s note s o n th e debate s of th e Federa l Conventio n o f 178 7 tha t h e wrot e nea r th e en d o f hi s life. Madison explained : I feel it a duty to express my profound an d solemn conviction of observing and appreciating th e view s o f th e Convention , collectivel y an d individually , tha t there neve r wa s an assembl y o f men, charged wit h a great and arduou s trust , who were more pure in their motives, or more exclusively or anxiously devoted to th e objec t committe d t o them , tha n wer e th e member s o f th e Federa l Convention o f 1787 , to the object of devising and proposing a constitutional system which should best supply the defects of that which it was to replace, and best secure the permanent liberty and happiness of their country. 102 Madison's desir e t o replac e th e Article s o f Confederatio n i n orde r better t o protec t th e natura l right s o f th e American peopl e wa s repeat edly emphasize d i n letter s h e wrot e t o Jefferson . On e o f th e mos t illuminating o f th e letter s finds Madiso n poignantl y describin g th e op pression bein g impose d b y majorit y faction s unde r th e Articles . I n Madison's words : The iryustice of them has been so frequent an d so flagrant as to alarm the most stedfast friend s o f Republicanism . I am persuaded I do no t er r i n sayin g tha t the evils issuing from these sources contributed more to that uneasiness which

The Constitution of the United States 8 1 produced the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform, than thos e whic h accrue d t o ou r nationa l characte r an d interes t from the inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects.103 Madison's alarm about the infringements o n natural rights occurrin g at the state level under the Articles led him to advocate a national vet o over stat e laws . I n a lette r t o Georg e Washingto n jus t prio r t o th e Convention, Madison writes that "a negative in all cases whatsoever o n the Legislative act s o f the States, as heretofore exercise d by the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to be absolutely necessary." A national veto, Madison argues , would no t onl y protect necessar y nationa l power , but "would . . . contro l . . . th e aggression s o f intereste d majoritie s o n th e rights o f minoritie s an d individuals." 104 Indeed , th e failur e o f th e Con vention t o adop t Madison' s propose d nationa l vet o mad e Madiso n doubt tha t natura l right s woul d b e adequatel y protecte d b y th e ne w form of government. 105 Madison's mos t comprehensiv e exegesi s o n th e nee d fo r govern ment to protect the people's natura l rights is his preconvention memo randum Vices of the Political System of the United States. There , Madison preview s th e concer n abou t faction s h e wa s t o rais e durin g the Conventio n an d i n The Federalist no . 1 0 whe n h e identifie s a n urgent nee d t o safeguar d "th e right s an d interest s o f th e minority , o r of individuals " agains t oppressio n b y self-intereste d majorities . Als o previewed—and als o illustratin g Madison' s commitmen t t o protectin g natural rights—i s Madison' s mos t origina l contributio n t o politica l science: tha t "th e enlargemen t o f th e spher e i s foun d t o lesse n th e insecurity of private rights." 106 As discusse d above , Madiso n wa s require d t o see k passag e o f th e Bill o f Right s i n orde r t o ensur e th e Constitution' s ratification . Madi son's first proposa l fo r th e Bil l o f Right s display s hi s commitmen t t o the natural-right s principle s o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence . I n fact, Madison' s proposa l i s a virtual paraphras e o f Jefferson' s master piece: That al l powe r i s originall y veste d in , an d consequentl y derive d fro m th e people. That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the emoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

82 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s That the people hav e a n indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasibl e righ t t o reform o r chang e thei r government , wheneve r i t b e foun d advers e o r inade quate to the purpose of its institution. 107 Madison display s hi s dedicatio n t o natural-right s principle s else where a s well , mos t notabl y i n a 179 2 essa y i n th e National Gazette, "Property." I n tha t essa y Madiso n provide s a comprehensiv e analysi s of property , on e tha t coul d hav e bee n writte n b y Lock e himself . Ac cording t o Madison, "property " in its particular application , means "that dominion which on e man claims and exercises ove r the externa l thing s of the world , in exclusion o f every individ ual." In its large r an d juster meaning , it embrace s everythin g t o whic h a man may attach a value and have a right, and which leaves to every one else the like advantage. In the former sense , a man has a property i n his opinions and th e free communicatio n o f them . H e has a property o f peculia r valu e i n hi s religious opinions, and i n the profession an d practice dictate d b y them. He has a property, very dea r t o hi m i n th e safet y an d libert y o f hi s person. He has a n equal property in the free use of his faculties, and free choice of the objects on which t o emplo y them . I n a word , a s a ma n i s sai d t o hav e a righ t t o hi s property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.108 Most importantly , an d als o i n th e bes t traditio n o f Lockea n liberal ism, Madiso n assert s i n hi s essa y tha t governmen t "i s institute d t o protect propert y o f ever y sort : a s wel l tha t whic h lie s i n th e variou s rights of individuals, as that which th e term particularly expresses. This being th e en d o f government , tha t alon e i s a just governmen t whic h impartially secure s t o ever y man whateve r i s his own." 109 Lastly, if government fail s adequatel y t o protect natura l rights , Madison accepte d th e Lockea n consequence s o f tha t failure : th e people' s right of revolution. As Madison put it late in life, a "resort to the origina l rights o f th e partie s t o th e system " i s justified.110 A s was eviden t i n th e discussion of the framing an d ratification o f the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and in the discussion o f The Federalist papers , Madison's per sonal writings confirm hi s dedication t o the essential tenet of the Decla ration o f Independence: that government exist s to secure natural rights. James Wilso n rank s secon d t o James Madiso n i n terms o f contribu tions made to the framing an d ratification o f the Constitution , as earlie r noted. Althoug h Wilso n rejecte d Locke' s rationalisti c epistemology , and eve n considere d i t dangerous, 111 h e wa s committe d durin g th e

The Constitution of the United States 8 3 constitutional period t o natural-rights political philosophy—especiall y to th e centra l premis e tha t governmen t exist s t o secur e th e natura l rights o f individuals . This wa s a position Wilso n als o hel d durin g th e revolutionary period. Wilson's commitment t o natural-rights doctrin e during the constitu tional perio d i s revealed i n a host o f statement s h e mad e o n politica l philosophy. In on e o f his Pennsylvania ratifying-conventio n speeches , for example, Wilson specifically refer s to the Constitution as a "means" to secur e th e philosophica l "ends " o f th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence.112 In anothe r ratifying-conventio n speech , discusse d a t th e beginning of this chapter, Wilson went so far a s to quote the Declaratio n of Independenc e a t lengt h an d the n state , "This is the broa d basi s o n which ou r independenc e wa s placed ; [and ] o n th e sam e certai n an d solid foundation thi s system [th e Constitution] is erected." 113 Wilson's view that government exists to secure the natural rights of individuals is most systematically expressed in his famous Lectures on Law give n at the College of Philadelphia in 1790-92, while Wilson was a law professor. (Wilson was also serving on the U.S. Supreme Court at the time. ) On e o f th e mai n reason s wh y Wilso n gav e thos e lecture s was t o provid e a n America n answe r t o th e jurisprudence o f Willia m Blackstone, a s wel l a s t o th e positio n stake d ou t b y Edmun d Burk e in hi s recentl y publishe d Reflections on the Revolution in France. Specifically, Wilso n wa s responding t o Blackstone's an d Burke's position—a positio n share d b y thos e wh o toda y approac h th e America n Founding from a Straussian perspective 114—that al l natural rights ar e ceded t o governmen t i n exchang e fo r a secur e ei\joymen t o f certai n civil rights. Under the Blackstonean an d Burkean conceptio n o f rights, rights ar e communa l propert y t o b e conferre d upo n individual s a s society sees fit, and individuals are, as Wilson puts it, "nothing but what society frames." The British conception o f rights is in stark contrast to that embodie d i n th e Declaratio n o f Independence , an d Wilso n ex pressly reject s it . "Government , i n m y humbl e opinion, " Wilso n de clares, "should b e formed t o secure an d to enlarge the exercise o f the natural right s o f it s members ; an d ever y government , whic h ha s no t this i n view, as it s principal object , i s not a governmen t o f th e legiti mate kind." 115 No r i s the conceptio n o f rights o f mere academi c con cern to Wilson. In Wilson's words:

84 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s I g o farther ; an d no w procee d t o show , tha t i n peculia r instances , i n whic h those rights can receive neither protection nor reparation from the civil government, they are, notwithstanding its institution, entitled still to that defence, and to thos e method s o f recovery , whic h ar e justified an d demande d i n a stat e of nature. The defence o f one's self, justly called the primary law of nature, is not, nor can it be abrogated by any regulation of municipal law. 116 Here, Wilso n i s advancin g th e sam e Lockea n conceptio n o f right s and purpos e o f governmen t embodie d i n th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence. Fo r Wilson , a s fo r th e Declaratio n o f Independence , th e funda mental purpos e o f government i s to secure the natural rights of individ uals. I f governmen t fail s i n thi s assignment , individual s hav e th e righ t and dut y t o protect themselves. 117 Although som e argu e that the postrevolutionary Alexander Hamilto n "ceased t o hav e muc h sympath y wit h th e doctrin e o f natural rights," 118 concerned a s h e i s sai d t o hav e bee n durin g th e constitutiona l perio d and thereafte r wit h so-calle d "state-centere d theorie s o f powe r an d sovereignty," 119 a t bottom, Hamilton remaine d dedicate d t o the natural rights principle s o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence . Certainly , Hamil ton wa s les s committe d tha n Madiso n an d Wilso n i n th e desir e fo r a limited governmen t t o secur e th e people' s natura l rights , bu t Ham ilton nevertheles s considere d th e basi c purpos e o f governmen t t o b e securing rights . For instance , i n The Federalist no . 26 Hamilton make s the clai m tha t th e purpos e o f "energ y i n government " i s t o ensur e "the securit y o f privat e rights." 120 And recal l Hamilton' s observatio n i n The Federalist no . 8 4 tha t "th e Constitutio n i s itsel f . . . A BIL L O F RIGHTS." 121

In order t o press fo r hi s preferred stron g national government, Ham ilton di d sometime s emplo y wha t ca n onl y b e describe d a s a straine d interpretation o f Lockean liberalism . Hamilton's June 29,1787 , remark s in the Constitutiona l Conventio n arguin g fo r representatio n i n the ne w Congress strictl y o n th e basi s o f populatio n ar e illustrative . Hamilto n states: Men are naturally equal—societies o r Nations are equal when independent — it is reasonable that States shd. inter into a League departing from th e Equality of States, as that me n shd . inter int o the Socia l Compac t an d agre e to depar t from th e natura l Equalit y o f man . .. . W e propos e tha t th e peopl e shd . b e reprented [sicJ in proportion to yr. numbers, the people then will be free .. . — yet it is said the States will be destroyed & therefore the people will be slaves—

The Constitution of the United States 8 5 The Consequence i s no t true . The people ar e free, at the expens e o f a mere ideal & artificial being. 122 While som e ma y questio n th e sincerit y wit h whic h Hamilto n em ployed th e Lockea n social-contrac t theor y o n th e issu e o f stat e sover eignty, th e fac t tha t Hamilto n fel t obligate d t o invok e th e argumen t demonstrates that for Hamilton, as for the Framers in general, Lockean liberalism remained the benchmark o f political legitimacy . Thomas Jefferson' s continue d commitmen t durin g th e postrevolu tionary perio d t o th e natural-right s politica l philosoph y h e s o majesti cally expresse d i n th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e wa s see n i n th e earlier discussio n o f th e Bil l o f Rights. 123 Indeed, i n response t o Madison's primary concern about the Bill of Rights, "that a positive declara tion o f som e o f th e mos t essentia l right s coul d no t b e obtaine d i n th e requisite latitude," 124 Jefferson argue d that "half a loaf is better than no bread. If we canno t secure al l our rights, let's secure what we can." 125 The best way to characterize Jefferson's understandin g of the American regime i s that he believed Locke's Second Treatise correctl y state d the end s o f government , wherea s The Federalist paper s wel l explai n how th e Constitutio n i s to serve a s a means to secure thos e ends . This characterization i s pointedl y see n i n a 179 0 letter , note d earlier , o n what books student s shoul d read to understand th e American politica l order. Jefferson writes : "Locke's littl e boo k o n government , i s perfec t as fa r a s i t goes , . . . [descendin g fro m theor y t o practice , ther e i s n o better book tha n the Federalist." 126 Most o f Jefferson's postrevolutionar y writing s o n specifi c right s are steeped i n Lockean natural-rights theory. For example, Jefferson ha d a Lockean conceptio n o f th e relation s betwee n churc h an d state . Jeffer son writes in his Notes on the State of Virginia (1782) : The error seems not sufficiently eradicated , that the operations of the mind, as well as the acts of the body, are subject to the coercion o f the laws. But our rulers can have authority over such natural rights only as we have submitted to them. The rights of conscienc e w e neve r submitted, we coul d not submit. We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbour t o sa y ther e ar e twent y gods , o r n o god . I t neither pick s my pocket nor breaks my leg.127 Jefferson's agreemen t wit h Locke' s view s o n th e natura l righ t t o toleration i s als o see n i n the tex t o f Jefferson's celebrate d Virginia Bill

86 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s for Establishin g Religiou s Freedom . Jefferso n considere d thi s statute , his authorshi p o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence , an d hi s foundin g of th e Universit y o f Virginia , hi s greates t achievements . Th e statut e concludes a s follows : And though we well know this assembly, elected by the people for the ordinary purposes of legislation only, have no power to restrain the acts of succeedin g Assemblies, constituted wit h the powers equal to our own, and that therefor e to declare this act irrevocable, would be of no effect i n law, yet we are free to declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passe d to repeal the present or to narrow its operation, such act will be an infringement o f natural right. 128 Jefferson's Lockea n approac h t o toleratio n carrie d ove r t o th e sub ject o f th e natura l limit s o f positiv e la w generally . Here , Jefferson' s debt t o Lock e i s unmistakable , a s i s hi s agreemen t wit h James Wilso n in rejecting th e Blackstonean an d Burkea n notio n tha t individual s ced e all natural right s t o governmen t i n exchang e fo r th e secur e er\joymen t of specified civi l rights. In Jefferson's words : Our legislator s ar e no t sufficientl y apprize d o f th e rightfu l limit s o f thei r power; that thei r tru e offic e i s to declar e an d enforc e onl y ou r natura l right s and duties , and t o tak e non e o f them from us. No man ha s a natural righ t t o commit aggressio n o n th e equa l right s o f another ; an d thi s i s al l from which the laws ought to restrain him; every man is under the natural duty of contributing to th e necessitie s o f the society ; and this is all the law s should enforc e on him; and, no man having a natural right to be the judge between himself and another, it is his natural dut y to submit t o the umpirag e of an impartial third . When th e law s hav e declare d an d enforce d al l this, they hav e fulfille d thei r functions, an d th e ide a i s quit e unfounded , tha t o n enterin g int o societ y w e give up any natural right. 129 The righ t o f revolution , s o centra l t o th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence, alway s remaine d a n essentia l tene t o f Jefferson' s politica l phi losophy. "Wha t countr y ca n preserv e it s liberties, " Jefferson write s i n 1787, "i f it s ruler s ar e no t warne d fro m tim e t o tim e tha t thi s peopl e preserve th e spiri t o f resistance? Le t them tak e arms." 130 As thi s samplin g o f Jefferson' s politica l writing s reveals , Jefferso n remained committe d throughou t hi s life to the natural-right s principle s he playe d suc h a ke y rol e i n articulatin g durin g th e America n Revolu tion. Indeed , Jefferson' s ferven t commitmen t t o th e natura l right s o f man i s evince d b y th e las t lette r h e wa s eve r t o write . I n a Jun e 24 ,

The Constitution of the United States 8

7

1826, lette r t o Roge r Weightma n regretfull y declinin g a n invitation , because o f poo r health, to tak e part i n the fiftieth-anniversary celebra tion of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson reaffirm s his lifelon g dedication to the natural-rights principles of the Declaration: May it b e t o th e world , wha t I believe i t wil l be , (t o som e part s sooner, t o others later, but finally t o all,) the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-government. That form whic h w e hav e substituted , restore s th e free righ t t o th e unbounde d exercise of reason and freedomof opinion. All eyes are opened, or opening to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science ha s already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God. These are grounds of hope for others. Fo r ourselves , le t th e annua l retur n o f thi s da y foreve r refres h ou r recollections of these rights, and an undiminished devotion to them.131* Eerily, Jefferson , a s wel l a s Joh n Adams , die d te n day s afte r writin g this letter, fifty years to the da y after th e passage o f the Declaration o f Independence. John Adams wa s i n Englan d workin g ou t a commercia l treat y wit h the English durin g the framin g an d ratification o f the Constitution . Adams^ influenc e was , however , fel t from England , a s wa s Jefferson' s from France. The first volume of Adams's great work of political science during the constitutional period, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (1787), 132 a work that Madison called " a powerful engin e i n forming th e public opinion," 133 was mad e available t o th e Federa l Conventio n o f 1787 , and his innovatio n i n th e Massachusetts Constitution—defende d a t lengt h i n A Defence —of a n independently elected executive with veto power was incorporated into the federal Constitution itself. As will be seen, Adams's vigorous defense of the doctrine of separation of powers was also influential . *This passag e als o reveal s th e importanc e i n Jefferson' s though t o f th e distinctio n between the ends of government and the means by which those ends are effectuated. In Jefferson's view, periodic revision of the constitutional structure, reflecting "the progress of the human mind," would provide better security for natural rights than would staying the course wit h an existing constitution . See Lette r from Thomas Jefferson t o Samuel Kercheval, July 12 , 1816 , in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 559. As th e Introductio n described, Madison disagreed with Jefferson o n this question of institutional design. See The Federalist no. 49, 314; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, February 4, 1790, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 16,148.

88 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s For years , th e standar d interpretatio n o f Adams' s politica l though t was tha t "a s a youn g ma n h e wa s a discipl e o f Lock e an d th e natural rights school , bu t a s h e gre w olde r h e abandone d th e natural-right s theory." Durin g th e constitutiona l perio d Adam s wa s characterize d a s being virtuall y obsesse d wit h protectin g privat e propert y an d wealth . Progressive historia n Verno n Parringto n provide d a typical descriptio n of Adams: "During the revolutionar y struggl e h e ha d bee n a membe r o f the lef t wing ; during th e earl y struggle s unde r th e Constitutio n h e wa s a membe r o f th e righ t wing . Th e youn g ma n ha d bee n a stalwar t defender o f huma n rights , th e ol d ma n wa s a stalwar t defende r o f property rights ; and thi s shift o f position wa s fatal t o his reputation." 134 Such a n unfavorabl e characterizatio n o f Adams i s unfair an d inaccu rate. I n fact , Adams' s Defence, lik e hi s work s o f th e revolutionar y period, particularly Dissertation on Canon and Feudal Law (1765 ) an d Novanglus (1774) , i s base d o n th e premis e tha t th e fundamenta l pur pose o f governmen t i s to protec t natura l rights . Adams write s i n A Defence: The United State s of America have exhibited, perhaps, the first exampl e of governments erecte d o n th e simpl e principle s o f nature ; and i f me n ar e no w sufficiently enlightene d t o disabus e themselve s o f artifice , imposture , hypoc risy, and superstition , the y will consider thi s event a n era in their history. .. . Thirteen government s thu s founde d o n th e natura l authorit y o f th e peopl e alone, withou t a pretenc e o f miracl e o r mystery , an d whic h ar e destine d t o spread ove r th e norther n par t o f tha t whol e quarte r o f the globe , are a grea t point in favor of the rights of mankind. 135 Adams's conceptio n o f equalit y coul d no t b e mor e Lockean . A s discussed i n chapte r 1 , equality i n Lockea n liberalis m mean s equalit y of opportunity , no t equalit y o f result . "Thoug h I hav e said, " Lock e writes, "tha t al l me n ar e b y natur e equal , I canno t b e suppose d t o understand al l sort s o f equality . Ag e o r virtu e ma y giv e me n a jus t precedence; excellenc e o f part s an d meri t ma y plac e other s abov e th e common level." 136 Likewise , fo r Adams , equalit y mean s tha t al l me n have on e commo n natur e and , from that , equal rights and duties . "But, " Adams writes , "equa l rank s an d equa l propert y neve r ca n b e inferre d from it , an y mor e tha n equa l understanding , agility , vigo r o r beauty . Equal laws ar e al l that eve r ca n b e derive d fro m huma n equality." 137 Much o f Adams's approac h t o political scienc e wa s motivated b y hi s desire t o protec t th e natura l right s o f individuals . Fo r example , Ad -

The Constitution of the United States 8 9 ams's argumen t fo r a separatio n o f power s wa s th e traditiona l one , most notabl y articulate d b y Montesquieu, tha t suc h a doctrin e woul d best secure natural rights. In fact, a s one scholar aptly points out, this was the "essential argument" of A Defence: Adams's book is long, turgidly burdened with long extracts from all the writers Adams deemed pertinent, and often carelessly expressed in ways that obscured for Americans his essential argument, namely, that an upper house and independent executive were necessary to prevent aristocratic domination , which would be inconsistent with a Lockean respect for equal rights.138 Also worth noting is an innovation made by Adams in the Massachusetts Constitution o f 1780 . At Adams's behest, the Massachusetts Constitution wa s popularl y ratified , th e firs t fundamenta l instrumen t o f a state t o b e so . Popula r ratificatio n i s a Lockea n libera l featur e em ployed by the Framers of the federal Constitution as well. As in his revolutionary writings , Adams sometimes seem s to argu e in A Defence tha t th e cultivatio n o f virtu e i s a n en d i n itself . Fo r example, at one point Adams approvingly quotes Aristotle's conclusion "that a happy lif e mus t aris e fro m a course o f virtue." 139 But Adams's major argumen t in A Defence is that the basic objective o f government is the protectio n o f natural rights, with the cultivatio n o f virtue bein g valued principally as a way to accomplish that objective. 140 In Adams's words: It is not true, in fact, that any people ever existed who loved the public better than themselves, their private friends,neighbors, & c, and therefore this kind of virtue, this sort of love, is as precarious a foundation for liberty as honor or fear; i t is the law s alone tha t really lov e the country , the public, the whole better than any part; and that form of government which unites all the virtue, honor and fear of the citizens, in a reverence and obedience to the laws, is the only in which liberty can be secure.141 As an examination of Adams's great work of political science during the constitutional period reveals, Adams did not abandon the ideals of natural-rights politica l philosoph y afte r independenc e ha d bee n suc cessfully won . Indeed, sounding very much like Jefferson's Declaratio n of Independence , Adams conclude s i n A Defence that "th e en d o f al l government is the good and ease of the people, in a secure er\joymen t of their rights, without oppression." 142 In summary , a n analysi s o f th e politica l though t o f severa l o f th e most influential intellectua l leaders of the constitutional period demon-

90 Th e Constitution of the United States strates that the Founders remained a s dedicated to natural-rights principles during the period of the framing an d ratification o f the Constitution a s the y ha d bee n durin g the heyda y o f the American Revolution . Some may have been more explicit about this than others, but they all shared a n essentia l commitmen t t o th e vie w tha t th e fundamenta l purpose of the Constitution is to secure the natural rights of the American people. An investigation o f early state constitutions provides additional evidence of this fact. Early Stat e Constitution s In hi s 188 8 essay The American Commonwealth, Lor d Jame s Bryc e observes tha t th e federa l Constitutio n i s largel y a n outgrowt h o f th e early state constitutions. 143 Like the federal Constitutio n that followed , the earl y stat e constitution s wer e greatl y influence d b y natural-right s political philosophy. As Allan Nevins , a leading authorit y o n the earl y state constitutions, puts it, "not only upon the practice of a century and a half, but upon the political theorizing of the same period .. . were the new American constitutions built." 144 Nearly al l o f th e stat e constitution s frame d an d ratifie d durin g th e founding perio d mad e expres s referenc e t o th e basic purpos e o f government's bein g t o protec t th e people' s natura l rights . The referenc e was usuall y i n th e for m o f a separat e bil l o f right s or , i n thos e stat e constitutions no t containin g a bill of rights, in a section, typically th e preamble, reaffirming a n allegianc e t o th e natural-right s principle s o f the Declaration of Independence. 145 The most famous and influential restatement of natural-rights principles found i n the early state constitutions is the Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George Mason just prior to the passage of the Declaration of Independence. 146 The first three articles of the Virginia Declaration of Rights are plainly a summary of natural-rights political philosophy.147 No t surprisingly , thos e article s soun d ver y muc h lik e th e Declaration o f Independence , albei t withou t Jefferson' s unparallele d literary flair: 1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights , o f which , whe n the y ente r int o society , the y canno t b y an y compact depriv e o r dives t thei r posterity ; namely , the ei\joymen t o f lif e an d

The Constitution of the United States 9 1 liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 2. Tha t all power is vested in, and consequently derive d from, the people; that magistrate s ar e thei r trustee s an d servants , an d a t al l time s amenabl e to them. 3. Tha t government is , or ought t o b e institute d fo r th e commo n benefit , protection, and security of the people, nation, or community; of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of maladministration; and that when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible righ t to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.148 Following Virginia' s lead , othe r state s expresse d simila r commit ment to natural-rights principles. Georgia's preamble to its constitution, brief though it is, is illustrative: Whereas the conduct of the legislature of Great Britain for many years past has bee n s o oppressiv e o n th e peopl e o f Americ a .. . whic h conduct , bein g repugnant to the commo n rights of mankind , hath obliged the Americans, as freemen, t o oppos e suc h oppressiv e measures , an d t o asser t th e rights , and privileges they are entitled to by the laws of nature and reason.149 Likewise illustrativ e i s the Ne w Yor k Constitution , with it s straightfor ward approac h o f incorporatin g th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e a s its preamble. 150 Many of th e earl y state constitution s allude d t o the importanc e o f a virtuous citizenry . But , a s i n th e writing s o f thos e intellectua l leader s of the American Founding wh o spok e o f virtue, the stat e constitution s appealed t o virtu e a s a wa y t o hel p secur e natura l rights . Again , th e Virginia Declaration o f Rights served a s the model. 151 Sectio n 1 5 reads: "That no free government , o r the blessings o f liberty , can be preserve d to an y people, but by a firm adherence t o justice, moderation , temper ance, frugality , an d virtue, an d b y frequen t recurrenc e t o fundamenta l principles."152 Succinctly stated , th e earl y stat e constitution s recognize d tha t i f excessive selfishnes s wa s controlled , right s woul d b e mor e generall y secured. Th e ultimat e objectiv e was , then , th e protectio n o f natura l rights, no t th e cultivatio n o f virtue . Nowher e i s thi s mor e forcefull y stated than in the preamble t o th e Massachusetts Constitutio n o f 1780 , written by John Adams:

92 Th e Constitutio n o f the United State s The en d o f th e institution , maintenance , and administratio n o f governmen t i s to secur e th e existenc e o f th e body-politic , t o protec t it , an d t o furnis h th e individuals who comprise it with the power of eryoying, in safety an d tranquillity, their natural rights and blessings of life; and whenever these great object s are no t obtaine d th e people have a right t o alter th e government , an d to tak e measures for their safety, prosperity, and happiness. 153 The earl y stat e constitution s wer e man y time s revised . Th e fre quency o f th e revisions , however , provide s more , no t less , evidenc e of th e Founders ' commitmen t t o natura l rights . Tha t i s t o say , th e constitutions wer e plague d b y structura l problems , problem s tha t le d to a n inadequat e protectio n o f rights. According to Jefferson, revision s wer e s o quickly necessary becaus e the America n peopl e ha d bee n s o focuse d o n th e abuse s o f th e Britis h system whe n th e stat e constitution s wer e initiall y framed . "Th e abuse s of monarch y ha d s o fille d th e speeche s o f politica l men, " Jefferso n writes, "that we imagined everythin g republican tha t was not monarchi cal. W e ha d no t ye t penetrate d t o th e mothe r principl e tha t govern ments ar e republican onl y i n proportion a s they embod y th e wil l of th e people an d execut e it." 154 In effect, wha t th e revisions to the earl y stat e constitutions attempte d t o d o was to eliminat e the structura l problem s in orde r bette r t o protec t th e people' s natura l rights . Th e ide a tha t a constitution i s a mean s t o a n end , an d no t a n en d itself , i s onc e agai n evident. An d a s ha s bee n argue d throughou t thi s volume , th e en d tha t the Founder s invariabl y sough t t o achiev e wa s th e protectio n o f th e natural right s o f the American people. 155 Part 1 o f thi s volum e identifie d th e essentia l tene t o f th e America n regime t o b e tha t governmen t exist s t o secur e th e people' s natura l rights. Thi s fac t wa s show n throug h histor y an d politica l philosophy . Part 2 no w explain s tha t i t i s ultimatel y th e rol e an d dut y o f th e Supreme Cour t to identif y an d appl y the natural-right s principle s o f th e Declaration o f Independence i n American life .

II Natural Rights an d the Rol e o f the Cour t

Part 2 addresses th e Suprem e Court' s rol e i n th e America n constitu tional order . Give n tha t par t 1 explaine d tha t th e Constitutio n wa s enacted chiefl y t o provide th e institutiona l framewor k throug h whic h the natural-rights principles of the Declaration of Independence can be effectuated; th e questio n considere d her e concern s the Court's role in protecting th e natura l right s o f th e America n people . As i n par t 1 , I approach this question through history and political philosophy, as well as through law. Chapter 3 explains that the Framers commissioned the Court as the principal guardian of the people's natural rights. The originalist context of m y thesi s require s tha t I examin e case s an d historica l material s that hav e bee n examine d man y time s before . Indeed , few—i f any — 93

94 Natura l Rights and the Role of the Court questions hav e receive d mor e attentio n fro m commentator s o n th e Court than th e origin s and scop e o f judicial review. Whether it be th e classic exchang e o n th e legitimac y o f judicial revie w betwee n Loui s Boudin an d Charle s Bear d earl y i n this centur y o r the flood of book s on the subjec t i n the presen t day , the debat e ove r judicial revie w ha s always bee n a n activ e one . Wha t I attemp t t o d o i n chapte r 3 i s t o provide a revised readin g o f tha t debate , a reading tha t i s in keepin g with the American Founding's commitment to natural rights. The theory o f constitutional interpretatio n advance d i n this volume affords th e Supreme Cour t tremendous authority . Chapter 4 discusses ways in which the Court can be prevented from abusin g that authority. There, I explain that the impeachment and appointment powers, among others, are available to keep the members of the Court from substitut ing thei r ow n persona l mora l an d politica l view s o n th e Constitutio n for the natural-rights principles to which the Constitution is dedicated. Chapter 5 turns from theor y to practice. I endeavor t o demonstrat e that, contrar y t o th e positio n o f man y critic s o f natural-la w jurispru dence, a natural-rights-base d theor y o f judicia l revie w ca n resolv e disputes tha t com e befor e th e Court . T o tha t end , th e natural-right s political philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s applie d t o some of the leading cases in constitutional law and history.

3 The Court

This chapte r enter s th e debat e ove r th e origin s an d scop e o f judicial review i n America . Whil e I hesitat e t o ad d t o th e seemingl y endles s literature o n th e subject , th e importanc e o f histor y t o m y theor y o f constitutional interpretation—what I call "liberal originalism" (see the Introduction)—requires tha t I do so. In other words , it is not enoug h for m e simply to assume or assert that the Supreme Cour t is to play a specified role in my theory: I must substantiate that role historically.* * Michael Perr y maintain s tha t a n originalis t argumen t fo r a n originalis t approac h t o judicial review is "question-begging." Perry, The Constitution in the Courts, 50 . The issue is more subtle than Perry implies. (Perry, a talented lawyer, simply appears reluctant to do history, a s his frequen t statement s abou t th e "indeterminac y o f history " illustrate.) Political theory instructs that it is only through a dedication to history that commentators on the Court can avoid imposing their own opinions on the rest of us. That is to say, a commitment t o th e rul e o f law— a cornerston e o f Anglo-America n politica l theory — requires a commitment to history.

96 Th e Court Obviously, an extensive treatment of the roots of judicial review is a volume unto itself, as the fact tha t many fine book s have been writte n on the subjec t suggests . I am not, however, interested i n recalculatin g the "Beard tally"; that has been done enough. 1 Instead, my approach t o the origin s o f judicia l revie w i s i n term s o f constitutiona l theory . I examine th e historica l material s i n orde r t o asses s wha t the y hav e t o say abou t th e Suprem e Court' s rol e i n advancin g th e natural-right s principles o f the Declaration o f Independence, principles to which the Constitution is dedicated. After examinin g the historical record o n judicial review, I conclude that th e Suprem e Cour t i s th e institutio n o f America n governmen t that shoul d b e ultimatel y responsibl e fo r identifyin g an d applyin g th e natural-rights politica l philosoph y o f the Declaratio n o f Independenc e in constitutional interpretation . Give n the convictio n with which opinions about judicial review are held, those opposing a "significant"* rol e for th e Cour t i n th e America n constitutiona l orde r ar e likel y t o vie w this conclusion wit h skepticism. With respect to these skeptics, I hope that th e discussio n i n thi s chapte r a t leas t give s the m somethin g t o think about , fo r wha t I attempt t o d o i s to approac h th e debat e ove r judicial revie w fro m a ne w perspective , on e tha t take s seriousl y th e Founders' commitmen t t o protectin g th e America n people' s natura l rights. From Legislativ e Supremac y t o Judicia l Revie w Judicial protectio n o f individua l right s i s on e o f th e grea t America n contributions t o constitutiona l theory . This contribution di d not, however, arise out of thin air; it is the product of history. That is to say, the American people' s abilit y t o tur n t o th e court s fo r th e protectio n o f their rights 2 i s traceable t o the Founders ' unpleasan t experienc e wit h * I purposely avoi d saying an "active" role for th e Court, because the word "active " has become caricatured in public law. With respect to natural law, this is because commentators on the Cour t typicall y conflate tw o questions: (1) whether natural la w exists (or is sufficiently determinate) , and (2), assuming there is natural law, who has the authority to interpret it . Hittinger, "Natura l La w in Positive Laws, " 24. Part 1 demonstrated tha t th e United States of America is based on the assumption that natural law exists. This chapter examines who, as a matter of institutional design, is ultimately charged with interpreting that law.

The Court 9 7 seeking t o protec t right s throug h representation , which , i n colonia l and revolutionar y America, was the orthodo x approach. 3 This sectio n examines the movement fro m legislativ e t o judicial protection o f individual right s i n earl y America n constitutiona l history . Followin g tha t discussion, I turn to the role of natural-rights doctrine injudicial revie w and then to the authoritativeness of the Supreme Court's interpretation of that doctrine. The centra l tene t o f th e Britis h theor y o f governmen t i s legislativ e supremacy, a doctrine that came about because of the Glorious Revolution of 168 8 and the efforts therei n to limit the power and authority of the crown . As a resul t o f th e successfu l culminatio n o f th e Gloriou s Revolution, Parliament , o r mor e formerl y the-crown-in-Parliament , i s supreme over any other governmental body, including the crown or the crown's appointe d officials . Wit h respec t t o judges , the y ar e largel y limited t o th e ministeria l tas k o f ensurin g tha t th e procedure s man dated b y particula r legislativ e act s hav e bee n properly followe d i n specific cases . A s Si r Willia m Blackstone' s classi c statemen t o n th e matter makes clear, under the British doctrine of legislative supremacy judges do not er\joy the power of judicial review in the American sense of striking down legislation they deem in conflict with the Constitution. In Blackstone's famous language: If the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it: and the examples usually alleged in support of this sense of the rule do none of them prove, that where the main object of a statute is unreasonable the judges are at liberty to reject it; for that were to set the judicial power above the legislative, which would be subversive of all government.4 The notion that judges are without significant authority has not gone unchallenged i n Britis h history . I n fact , th e first clai m b y a cour t t o er\joy the power of judicial review is usually said to be the 1610 opinion of Sir Edward Coke, then the Lord Chief Justice, in Dr. Bonham's Case. At issu e i n th e cas e wa s Parliament' s clai m o f a n exclusiv e righ t t o control the licensing of physicians. Coke considered the claim contrary to th e commo n law . And i n no w legendar y language , h e plante d th e seed fo r th e America n doctrin e o f judicia l review : "Whe n a n ac t o f Parliament i s agains t commo n righ t an d reason , o r repugnant , o r im possible to be performed, the common law will controul it and adjudg e such an act to be void."5 However, by promptly reenacting the disputed

98 Th e Cour t statute, Parliamen t rejecte d Coke' s clai m o f judicial revie w fo r Britis h courts. Indeed, Coke' s decisio n i n Dr. Bonham's Case playe d n o smal l part i n hi s subsequen t remova l fro m th e bench, 6 an d th e ide a tha t British judges ar e withou t authorit y t o se t asid e act s o f Parliament— a matter definitivel y settle d b y th e Gloriou s Revolution—ha s continue d ever since. 7 Given tha t th e Founder s wer e originall y Britis h subjects , i t wa s natural tha t they initiall y subscribed t o British idea s about government . As just described , foremos t amon g thos e idea s wa s tha t th e legislatur e was supreme. The Founders' commitmen t t o the principle o f legislativ e supremacy i s wel l illustrate d b y th e strengt h o f thei r resentmen t o f the roya l governors ' consisten t attempt s t o frustrat e thi s principl e i n practice. As Allan Nevins aptl y remarks, "The beginnings of the Revolu tion wer e firs t discerne d i n a clas h between th e [colonial ] legislature[s ] and th e roya l officers." 8 Wit h respec t t o th e court s specifically , a ke y source o f frictio n durin g th e daw n o f th e Revolutio n wa s th e disput e between th e colonia l legislature s an d th e roya l governor s ove r wh o should contro l th e courts , sinc e th e ide a o f a n independen t judiciar y had ye t t o tak e hold . Thi s wa s a poin t include d i n th e Declaratio n o f Independence's lis t o f grievance s agains t th e king : "H e ha s mad e Judges dependen t o n hi s Wil l alone, for th e tenur e o f their offices , an d the amoun t an d paymen t o f their salaries. " The firs t stat e constitution s adopte d afte r th e Declaratio n o f Inde pendence wer e organize d aroun d th e doctrin e o f legislative supremacy . Although a few o f the earl y constitution s containe d a n explici t declara tion o f th e separatio n o f powers, 9 non e provide d fo r judicia l review , and al l mad e th e electe d legislatur e th e dominan t branc h o f govern ment. Thi s wa s a poin t no t los t o n judge s o f th e day . I n typicall y Blackstonean fashion , Judge Danie l Chipma n o f Vermont wrote : When [the first stat e constitutions] constituted th e legislature, they considered that its power was necessarily supreme and uncontrollable, and that all constitutional restriction s upo n thei r powe r wer e merel y directory . N o ide a wa s entertained tha t a n ac t o f th e legislature , however repugnan t t o th e constitu tion, could b e adjudged voi d and set aside by the judiciary, which was considered by all a subordinate department of government. 10 The Founders ' initia l commitmen t t o th e doctrin e o f legislativ e su premacy di d no t mea n tha t the y wer e unconcerne d abou t protectin g individual rights . Rather , i t reflecte d th e conventiona l wisdo m tha t th e

The Court 9 9 security o f right s depende d o n th e powe r o f th e legislatur e t o chec k the power o f the executive—a n ide a that the Founders' disputes with the royal governors had brough t directl y home . In fact, th e chie f tas k of the legislative branch was not to legislate, it was to protect rights.11 Although th e ide a tha t th e legislatur e wa s charged , abov e al l else , with protecting individual rights will undoubtedly strike modern Americans strangely, accustomed a s we are t o a powerful judicial chec k o n the legislative an d executiv e branche s alik e i n the realm o f individua l rights, i t wa s a n ide a t o whic h th e Founder s wer e initiall y strongl y committed. Indeed, the cr y "n o taxation withou t representation " sym bolized no t onl y the Founders ' disput e wit h the British, generally, but their belie f tha t th e protectio n o f right s depende d o n representativ e government, specifically. The first state constitutions reflected this faith in the power of representation to protect rights, attempting as they did to limi t a s muc h a s possibl e th e distanc e betwee n constituent s an d representatives throug h structura l device s lik e annua l elections , rota tion i n office , th e righ t o f instruction , equitabl e apportionment , an d a broad franchise . In time, however, the Founders came to realize that even a reformed system o f representatio n provide d inadequat e securit y fo r privat e rights—a sentimen t wel l reflecte d i n Thoma s Jefferson' s famou s re mark, "An elective despotism wa s not the government we fought for." 12 Mobilization for the War of Independence and reorganization of society and governmen t afte r th e wa r require d tha t th e ne w America n stat e legislatures govern actively, something to which the newly independent American peopl e wer e unaccustomed . Mos t notabl y affecte d b y th e increased legislativ e activit y wer e privat e propert y rights . Fightin g a war an d rebuildin g a societ y i n it s aftermat h ar e expensiv e proposi tions, and the Founders were not spared from thi s fact. As a result, the state legislature s impose d a hos t o f taxe s an d othe r economi c re straints. Th e specifi c impac t o f thos e measure s o n privat e propert y rights was certainl y resented. More importantly, though, the measure s and th e overal l increase d legislativ e activit y cause d th e Founder s t o rethink their position on the broader question of the power of representation to protect individua l rights. After all , the scope of the legislative function ha d changed , an d th e Founder s realize d tha t thei r fait h i n representation must change as well. As a consequenc e o f thei r diminishin g fait h i n representatio n t o

100 Th e Court protect individua l rights , th e Founder s attempte d mor e an d mor e t o limit legislative power. The proliferation o f written constitutions during the early days of the American republic was directly attributable to this perceived nee d t o limi t the legislature . And i n those writte n constitu tions, no t onl y wer e th e grant s o f powe r t o th e legislatur e becomin g more specific, but forma l exemptio n o f certain rights from th e legisla ture^ reac h throug h a bill o f right s wa s becoming commonplace . Virginia, fo r example , adopte d a bil l o f right s i n 1776 , an d mos t othe r states soon followed suit. 13 Emerging concurrentl y wit h th e attempt s t o limi t th e legislativ e branch throug h th e enumeratio n o f particula r legislativ e power s an d the constitutiona l exemptio n o f specifi c right s wa s on e o f th e mos t significant America n contribution s t o constitutiona l theory : th e ide a that judges had the authority to protect individual rights from infringe ment b y th e force s o f representatio n throug h th e powe r o f judicia l review.* Befor e judicia l revie w too k root , however , on e las t attemp t was made to reform representation , this time at the national level. Chapter 2 explained tha t for th e delegate s who met in Philadelphi a during th e summe r o f 1787 , the ultimat e objectiv e wa s t o establis h a form o f governmen t tha t woul d provid e bette r securit y fo r natura l rights than wa s then provide d unde r th e Articles o f Confederation. I n the words of James Madison, "The necessity of providing more effectu ally fo r th e securit y o f privat e rights , an d th e stead y dispensatio n o f Justice. Interference s wit h thes e wer e evil s whic h ha d mor e perhap s than an y thing else produced this convention." 14 And Madison was fa r from alon e in this view, as chapter 2 documented. What was the caus e o f the insecurity o f rights under the Articles of Confederation? I n the mind s o f most o f the delegate s t o the Constitu tional Convention, the answer lay in the failure o f representation i n the state assemblies . A s John Merce r succinctl y explained , "Wha t le d t o the appointmen t o f this Convention? The corruption an d mutabilit y of the Legislative Councils of the States." 15 While those who met in Philadelphia agreed that a new constitutio n was to better secure rights, considerable disagreemen t arose over how to accomplis h this . As Mercer's remarks reflect, mos t o f the delegate s * Prior t o th e Constitutiona l Convention , severa l stat e court s declare d act s o f thei r respective state legislative assemblies unconstitutional. The next section discusses those state cases.

The Court 10 1 had lost faith i n representation a t the state level. 16 However, several in attendance though t tha t a reforme d syste m o f representatio n a t th e national leve l coul d provid e th e requisit e securit y fo r th e people' s rights. James Madison was the foremost proponent of this view. Madison arrive d i n Philadelphi a wel l prepare d t o se t th e term s o f the debate. Before th e Convention began, he drafted a plan of government tha t wen t fa r beyon d simpl y revising th e Articles o f Confedera tion. Unde r Madison' s plan , commonl y know n a s th e "Virgini a plan " because i t was introduced b y Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph on behalf o f th e Virgini a delegation , a stron g nationa l governmen t wit h sweeping powers to check state legislative assemblies was envisioned. Significantly, thos e sweepin g nationa l power s wer e lodge d principall y in the national legislature b y way of a veto power ove r laws passed in the stat e assemblies . For Madison , all faith i n representation wa s no t lost. Bu t hi s fait h depende d upo n havin g i n th e nationa l assembl y a different kin d of legislator from those then serving in the state assemblies. In short, legislators in Congress had to be far more resistant to the pressures o f self-interes t tha n thei r counterpart s i n th e states . Here , Madison's vision of an extended federal republic came to the fore. An extended federa l republi c was important t o Madison fo r severa l reasons. The mos t widel y recognize d reason s wer e tha t majorit y fac tions woul d b e les s likel y t o exis t i n a larg e territor y an d tha t the y would find i t mor e difficul t t o organiz e i f the y did. 17 A n ofte n over looked reason wa s that a n expanded poo l o f potential representative s would b e created , thereb y makin g i t mor e probabl e tha t meritoriou s representatives would emerge. 18 When all was said and done, however, even the Virginia plan showed only modest faith i n the power of representation to secure rights. Most notable i n thi s regar d wa s Madison' s cal l fo r a counci l o f revision , consisting o f th e nationa l executiv e an d severa l federa l judges , tha t would hav e th e authorit y t o vet o act s o f th e nationa l legislature. 19 Clearly, the reason Madison wanted a national veto over state laws was that he distrusted representatio n a t the state level. 20 But the reason he wanted a council o f revision wa s that he di d not have full confidenc e in representatio n a t th e nationa l level . As Madiso n advise d th e Con vention: [The council of revision] would ... be useful t o the Community at large as an additional chec k agst . a pursui t o f thos e unwis e & ur\just measure s whic h

102 Th e Cour t constituted so great a portion of our calamities [under the Articles of Confederation]. .. . Experienc e in all the States had evinced a powerful tendenc y in the Legislature t o absor b al l powe r int o it s vortex . This wa s th e rea l sourc e o f danger t o America n Constitutions ; & suggested th e necessit y o f givin g ever y defensive authorit y to the other departments that was consistent with republican principles.21 Despite Madison' s repeate d effort s t o convinc e th e Conventio n o f the nee d fo r bot h a nationa l vet o ove r stat e law s an d a counci l o f revision, h e coul d obtai n passag e o f neither . Th e nationa l vet o faile d primarily becaus e o f th e poten t politica l argumen t tha t th e state s would no t accep t suc h a n arrangement ; th e counci l o f revisio n wa s rejected chiefl y becaus e i t woul d giv e th e Suprem e Cour t a doubl e negative ove r law s passe d b y Congress . Luthe r Martin' s remark s typi fied thi s latte r concern : "A s to th e Constitutionalit y o f laws , that poin t will com e befor e th e Judge s i n thei r prope r officia l character . I n thi s character the y hav e a negativ e o n th e laws . Join the m wit h th e Execu tive in the Revisio n an d the y wil l have a double negative." 22 If no t b y representatio n a t th e nationa l level , ho w the n wer e right s to b e protected ? Ultimately , b y th e courts. 23 I n plac e o f th e congres sional veto ove r state law s emerged th e supremacy clause , under whic h state court s ar e require d t o strik e dow n stat e law s tha t violat e th e federal Constitution. 24 Wit h respec t t o th e counci l o f revision , tha t proposal wa s rejected because , as just noted , many of the delegate s di d not wan t t o involv e th e Suprem e Cour t in reviewing congressiona l act s twice. 25 Although m y objectiv e i s not t o recalculate th e Beard tally , th e evidence fro m Philadelphia , especiall y tha t surroundin g th e counci l o f revision, support s th e prevailin g scholarl y vie w tha t th e Constitutio n commissions th e Cour t with th e power t o void unconstitutional federa l and stat e legislatio n alike . Admittedly , th e evidenc e i s no t unambigu ous. Indeed , th e tex t o f th e Constitutio n th e Framer s finally agree d upon doe s no t expressl y provid e fo r judicial revie w a t all. 26 However , any doub t abou t th e Suprem e Court' s authorit y t o exercis e a broa d power o f judicial revie w is , in m y judgment, dispelle d whe n on e turn s to th e ratificatio n debates . Fo r example , ther e ar e Jame s Wilson' s remarks t o the Pennsylvani a ratifyin g convention : If a law should b e made inconsisten t wit h those powers vested b y this instru ment in Congress, the judges, as a consequence of their independence, and the

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particular powers of government being defined, will declare such law to be null and void. For the power of the Constitution predominates. Anything therefore that shal l b e enacte d b y Congres s contrar y theret o wil l no t hav e th e forc e of law.27 There ar e als o th e observation s o f Joh n Marshal l i n th e Virgini a ratifying convention . Marshall' s observation s ar e particularl y interest ing, give n th e rol e h e wa s t o pla y i n Marbury v. Madison (1803) , th e landmark Supreme Cour t case o n judicial review: Has the government of the United States power to make laws on every subject? ... Ca n they mak e law s affectin g th e mod e o f transferrin g property , o r contracts, or claims between citizen s of the same state? Can they go beyond the delegated power ? I f the y wer e t o mak e a la w no t warrante d b y an y o f th e powers enumerated it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. They would consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void.28 Finally, there is Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist no . 78: The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is , in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as fundamental law. It must, therefore, belong to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning o f a particula r ac t proceedin g fro m th e legislativ e body . I f ther e should happen to be a n irreconcilable varianc e betwee n th e two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred, or in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.29 This i s bu t a samplin g o f th e historica l evidenc e i n suppor t o f a strong judicial chec k o n th e force s o f representation—evidenc e tha t reveals how far the Founders had moved from their original faith in the power of representation to secure private rights. Indeed, some oppose d ratification precisel y becaus e th e Constitutio n had , i n thei r judgment, moved too far from the doctrine o f legislative supremacy . Most notable in this regard was Rober t Yates , better know n a s "Brutus, " who feare d that th e Suprem e Court' s broa d powe r o f judicial revie w an d it s inde pendent statu s unde r th e Constitutio n woul d mak e th e Cour t des potic.30 A s th e discussio n i n thi s sectio n suggests , however , Brutus' s continued faith in representation was a minority view.

104 Th e Court Natural Right s an d Judicia l Revie w The previous section chronicled the movement from legislativ e to judicial protectio n o f individua l right s i n earl y America n constitutiona l history. This section examines the more specific question of the role of natural-rights doctrin e injudicia l review . I conclude that the Founder s expected judges t o decid e case s involvin g individua l right s i n light of natural-rights principles. * Lik e th e politica l leader s involve d i n th e more genera l attempt s t o cur b th e legislature , earl y American judge s and lawyers 31 turne d t o natural-right s doctrin e graduall y an d some what hesitantly , fo r they , too, were steepe d i n the tradition o f legisla tive supremacy , i n th e belie f tha t representatio n wa s th e vehicl e through which to secure individua l rights. This is a subtle, but critical , as wel l a s previousl y overlooked , point . I n fact , i t i s th e failur e t o recognize the gradual and somewhat hesitant turn to judicial protection of individual right s that has led scholars to characterize the existenc e of natfwaZ-rights-base d judicia l revie w i n suc h unnecessaril y all-or nothing terms.32 This conclusio n abou t th e us e o f natural-right s doctrin e i n judicial review i s undoubtedly a controversia l one , because i t runs counte r t o two powerfu l trend s i n th e literature : an increasin g skepticis m abou t natural rights and a growing mistrust o f judicial power, t Nevertheless , given that during the American Founding the fundamental objectiv e of government wa s t o safeguar d natura l right s (se e par t 1) , an d tha t representation wa s provin g incapabl e o f accomplishin g tha t objectiv e (see th e previou s section) , it shoul d b e expecte d tha t earl y American judges would com e to appeal to natural-rights doctrin e when decidin g * As the discussion in this section will reveal, the Founders were not as explicitly textual in thei r approac h t o constitutiona l interpretatio n a s man y moder n conservative s clai m they were. When I say the Founders expected judges to decide individual rights cases "in light of " natural-right s principles , I a m referrin g t o a n interpretiv e attitud e o f viewin g the Constitutio n a s th e institutiona l framewor k throug h whic h natura l right s ar e t o be secured. tThe increasing skepticism in the public-law community about natural rights is traceable to the larger movement i n political philosophy against natural rights, whereas the growing mistrust o f judicial power i s primarily a result o f the conservative backlas h agains t the liberal jurisprudence of the Warren Court.

The Court 10 5 individual-rights cases. In short, the reading advanced in this section is grounded i n commo n sense , an d th e failur e o f moder n skeptic s t o acknowledge a role fo r natural-right s doctrin e i n early American judicial practice is attributable to the modern tendency to interpret historical materials in light of modern predilections.33* Although the reporting of judicial decision s durin g th e America n Foundin g wa s fa r fro m th e science it is today, sufficient documentatio n exist s to reveal that natural-rights doctrine came to play an important role injudicial review . Pre-Federal-Constitution Precedents The first recorded statement in America of the power of judicial review is an argument by James Otis before th e Massachusetts Superior Court in 176 1 i n th e famou s writ s o f assistanc e case , Paxton v. Gray. 34 According to a young John Adams, who chronicled the case, in dispute was a request by the royal custom s offic e tha t th e cour t issu e genera l search warrants, or writs of assistance, because particular search warrants ha d prove d ineffectiv e i n th e custom s office' s effort s t o cur b smuggling.35 Nothing was more repugnant to the colonists' conceptio n of libert y tha n genera l searches , violatin g a s the y di d th e cherishe d maxim tha t u a man' s hous e i s hi s castle." 36 Oti s wa s s o strongl y op posed t o th e ide a of general searc h warrant s that h e not onl y refuse d to argu e th e cas e o n behal f o f th e custom s office , a s wa s hi s charg e as th e king' s advocat e i n th e province , bu t h e decide d t o represen t the loca l merchant s instead . Significantly , Otis' s argumen t agains t th e general searc h warrants—a n argumen t heavil y relian t upo n Coke' s opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case —centered aroun d the power of a court to voi d legislatio n tha t conflict s wit h th e constitutio n an d natura l rights. I n Otis' s words : "A s to act s o f Parliament . A n ac t agains t th e Constitution i s void; an act against natural equity is void; and if the act of Parliamen t shoul d b e made , i n th e ver y word s o f th e Petition , i t * Charles Grove Haines expressed a similar concern som e three-quarter s o f a century ago. Haines wrote: "It is the practice to insist that while references to these [natural-law and rights] phrases ar e somewhat frequen t th e utterances are almost invariably i n the form of dicta, the decision resting on other grounds, and involving specific provisions of the writte n constitution. " Haines , "Th e La w o f Natur e i n Stat e an d Federa l Judicia l Decisions," 625. Haine s strongl y disagree d wit h th e tendenc y t o discoun t th e rol e o f natural-law and rights doctrine in judicial review.

106 Th e Cour t would b e void . Th e executiv e Court s mus t pas s suc h act s int o disuse." 37 When Oti s argue d th e writ s o f assistanc e case , the doctrin e o f legis lative supremac y hel d sway . I t shoul d therefor e com e a s n o surpris e that Oti s los t th e case . Thi s fac t notwithstanding , Otis' s argumen t for judicia l review—an d fo r a natural-rights-base d theor y o f ju dicial review a t that—was a milestone i n American history , portendin g as i t di d event s t o come. * Accordin g t o Joh n Adams , Otis' s argumen t about th e unenforceabilit y o f legislativ e act s tha t contraven e natura l rights wa s s o influentia l tha t wit h i t "th e chil d o f independenc e wa s born." 38 Another noteworth y cas e i n th e developmen t o f judicia l revie w i s Robin v. Hardaway (1772) . I n tha t case , Georg e Maso n argue d tha t a 1682 Virginia la w givin g slav e trader s th e righ t t o sel l th e descendant s of Indian s a s slave s violate d th e Indians ' natura l right s an d was , there fore, void. In Mason's words : All acts o f the legislatur e apparentl y contrar y t o natural right and justice, are, in our laws, and must be in the nature o f things, considered a s void. The laws of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth . A legislatur e mus t no t obstruc t ou r obedienc e t o hi m from thos e whose punishment s the y canno t protec t us . Al l huma n constitution s whic h contradict hi s laws , we ar e i n conscienc e boun d t o disobey . Such hav e bee n the adjudications o f our courts of justice.39 A forceful advocate , Maso n n o doub t overstate d th e frequenc y wit h which judges i n 177 2 wer e strikin g dow n legislatio n the y deeme d vio lative o f natura l rights . I n fact , th e judge s i n Robin v. Hardaway worked har d t o avoi d passin g o n th e legitimac y o f th e statut e i n ques tion. I n a maneuve r reflectiv e o f th e still-widesprea d commitmen t t o legislative supremacy, 40 th e judges conclude d tha t th e statute ha d bee n repealed i n 1705. 41 The y wer e not , therefore , require d t o asses s th e statute's constitutionalit y i n ligh t o f natural-right s principles , a s Maso n had requested . Nevertheless , Mason' s argument , lik e Otis' s befor e it , is representative o f a growin g willingnes s o n th e par t o f th e ba r t o chal lenge legislativ e powe r b y invokin g natural-right s doctrin e i n th e * Modern student s o f politica l philosoph y an d jurisprudenc e ofte n dra w distinction s between term s like "natural equity," "natural justice," "natural law," and "natural rights." See, for example , Strauss, "On Natural Law." An examination o f the early cases reveals that early American judges and lawyers typically did not make such distinctions.

The Court 10 7 courts.* Thi s tren d continue d afte r th e colonist s declare d indepen dence. More has been written, with less consensus achieved, about a handful of state cases decided before the Constitution went into effect tha n one would thin k possible. With respect to the status of those case s a s precedent for judicial review, the range of scholarly opinion is from al l to none.42 As I now explain, not only do those cases serve as precedent for judicial review , but the y illustrat e th e judiciary's emergin g role a s the special guardian of the people's natural rights. Commonwealth v. Caton (Va. , 1782) 43 is th e first reporte d cas e i n the Unite d State s i n which a cour t openl y exercise d judicial review. 44 At issue was the constitutionality of a 1776 Virginia statute that moved the pardo n powe r fro m th e executiv e t o th e legislature . Th e statut e was before th e Virginia Cour t o f Appeals, the state' s highes t tribunal , because a disput e aros e whe n th e lowe r legislativ e hous e pardone d three me n condemne d t o deat h fo r treason , an d th e uppe r hous e re fused t o concur . Th e attorne y general , seekin g t o enforc e th e deat h sentences, insisted tha t the pardons were ineffective becaus e th e stat ute required the assent of both legislative houses. The condemned men disagreed, arguing that either the statute granted the pardoning powe r to the lower house alone or it was unconstitutional. The judge s agree d unanimousl y wit h th e attorne y general . Mor e *In a widely cited study of the treatment of slavery in the judicial process prior to the Civil War, Robert Cover reaches the opposite conclusion about the representativeness of Mason's argument in Robin v. Hardaway. Accordin g to Cover, appeals like Mason's to natural-rights principles in court "were not all that common" among early lawyers and judges. Cover , Justice Accused, 19. Positivist s wh o see k refug e i n Cover' s wor k ar e missing a critical point: the unrepresentativeness of the slavery cases as evidence of the general jurisprudential climat e o f th e times . That is t o say , those judges wh o uphel d slavery did so primarily because to do otherwise would likely lead to disunion. Indeed, the authors of both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States face d th e sam e pressur e an d deal t with tha t pressure i n a similar, thoug h les s explicit, fashion . (Judge s wer e force d t o writ e opinion s abou t slavery , wherea s th e authors o f th e Declaratio n coul d ignor e i t an d the Framer s of th e Constitutio n coul d dance aroun d it. ) Cover' s failur e t o affor d du e weigh t t o th e pressur e o f disunio n i s curious, especiall y sinc e mos t o f hi s analysi s focuse s o n post-185 0 cases—whe n tha t pressure wa s enormous . Fo r a super b discussio n o f th e pressur e o f disunio n facin g judges of the day, see Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth, chaps. 5-6. In addition, some judges avoided the obvious implications of natural-rights doctrine for the institution of slavery by characterizing Blacks as inferior to Whites, a point also surprisingly neglected by Cover.

108 Th e Cour t significantly, though , the y hel d tha t the y ha d th e powe r t o strik e dow n laws that violate d th e constitution. 45 Although individua l rights were a t stake, Caton wa s chiefl y abou t th e allocatio n o f governmenta l power , specifically, abou t wher e th e pardo n powe r resided . A s such , natural rights doctrin e di d no t figure i n th e court' s decision , becaus e tha t doctrine ha s littl e t o sa y abou t governmen t structure. 46 Judg e Georg e Wythe's opinio n nevertheles s offer s a revealing glimps e int o th e devel oping conceptio n o f th e judicial function , an d i t i s a conceptio n tha t i s consistent wit h th e focu s i n natural-right s doctrin e o n th e individual . Of particula r interes t ar e Judg e Wythe' s observation s abou t th e threa t of legislativ e powe r t o th e right s o f individual s an d abou t th e responsi bility of judges t o protect agains t tha t threat : If the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated, should attempt to overleap the bounds , prescribe d t o the m b y th e people , I , in administerin g th e publi c justice of this country, will meet the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and, pointin g t o th e constitution , wil l sa y t o them , her e i s th e limi t o f you r authority; and hither, shall you go, but no further. 47 One o f th e mos t intriguin g o f th e earl y stat e case s i s Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. , 1784), argued b y Alexander Hamilton. 48 At issue wa s whether Hamilton' s client , a British citize n name d Joshua Waddington , committed a trespas s b y occupyin g plaintif f Elizabet h Rutgers' s prop erty durin g th e America n Revolution . Rutger s sue d Waddingto n pursu ant t o a Ne w Yor k statut e tha t entitle d an y perso n wh o vacate d hi s o r her propert y unde r threa t o f th e wa r t o recove r i n trespass agains t an y person wh o occupie d o r destroyed th e property . Formally, Hamilto n challenge d th e statut e o n th e ground s tha t finding Waddington liabl e for trespas s woul d violate th e la w o f nations an d the peac e treat y betwee n th e Unite d State s an d Grea t Britain . I n poin t of fact , however , Hamilton , lik e Oti s an d Maso n befor e him , empha sized natural-la w an d right s doctrin e i n his argument t o the court . "Th e enemy havin g a righ t t o th e us e o f th e Plaintiff s propert y & havin g exercised thei r righ t throug h th e Defendan t & fo r valuabl e consider ation h e canno t b e mad e answerabl e t o anothe r withou t injustic e an d a violation o f the la w of Universal society," Hamilton insisted. 49 The cour t wa s full y awar e o f th e importanc e o f natural-la w an d rights argument s t o Hamilton' s challeng e t o th e statute . Indeed , th e court note d tha t Hamilton' s defens e centere d o n th e clai m tha t "stat -

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utes agains t la w an d reaso n ar e void. " An d th e cour t appeare d t o accept Hamilton's defense : We profess to revere the rights of human nature; at every hazard and expence we hav e vindicated , an d successfull y establishe d the m i n ou r land ! and w e cannot but reverence a law which is their chief guardian—a law which inculcates as a first principle—that the amiable precepts of the law of nature, are as obligatory on nations in their mutual intercourse, as they are on individuals in their conduct towards each other; and that every nation is bound to contribute all in its powers to the happiness and perfection of others!50 Despite thi s strong languag e abou t natural la w an d rights, the cour t upheld the statute, explicitly acknowledging the supremacy of the legislature.51 Th e cour t did , however , den y th e plaintif f relief . Wha t th e court's inconsisten t action s sugges t i s tha t th e judge s wer e tor n be tween thei r increasin g awarenes s o f th e nee d fo r judge s t o protec t natural rights and their lingering commitment to the doctrine of legislative supremacy . I n a Connecticu t decisio n th e followin g yea r suc h inconsistency wa s conspicuously absent . The Symsbury Case (Conn. , 1785 ) involve d a land disput e betwee n two neighborin g Connecticu t towns . Originally , titl e t o th e lan d wa s held by the town of Symsbury. Subsequently, the town of New Hartfor d surveyed the lan d and found tha t the land was locate d withi n the Ne w Hartford tow n limits . The stat e legislatur e agree d an d grante d titl e t o New Hartford . Th e proprietor s o f th e tow n o f Symsbur y sued , de manding tha t titl e t o th e lan d b e returne d t o them . The cour t rule d i n favor of Symsbury . I n the court' s judgment, th e ac t of the stat e legisla ture granting title to New Hartfor d "coul d not legally operat e to curtai l the lan d befor e grante d t o th e proprietor s o f th e tow n o f Symsbury , without their consent." 52 Brief thoug h i t is , th e court' s decisio n i n th e Symsbury Case i s important fo r two relate d reasons . The first reason i s that the decisio n is plainly an early example o f judicial review. The second reason is that the decisio n i s further evidenc e o f a growing awarenes s amon g judges that they mus t serve a s a check agains t legislative powe r when natura l rights are at stake, such a s the natural right to property involved i n the dispute before th e court . Another landmar k cas e i n th e developmen t o f judicia l revie w i s Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. , 1786) . A s i s s o ofte n tru e o f case s fro m th e early day s o f th e America n republic , th e opinio n o f th e cour t ha s no t

110 Th e Court been found . A widely read accoun t o f the cas e b y James Varnum, the lead defense attorney, is available, however.53 At issue was a controversial Rhode Island statute that required local merchants to accept paper money a s lega l tender, a requirement that , given the inflationary pres sures o f th e day , the merchant s di d no t wis h to submi t to. Merchants who refused t o accept paper money were subject t o arrest and to trial without the benefit o f a jury. Varnum's client was one such merchant. Varnum mad e a variety o f argument s i n defens e o f hi s client , bu t according to Varnum himself, "by far the most important" was a direct challenge t o th e statute' s constitutionality. 54 I n n o uncertai n term s Varnum claimed both that the statute was unconstitutional and that the judges mus t declar e i t so . "Th e tru e distinctio n lie s i n this, " Varnum contended, "tha t the legislative have the uncontrollable powe r of making laws not repugnant t o the constitution ; the judiciary hav e the sol e power o f judging o f thos e laws , and ar e boun d t o execut e them ; bu t cannot admi t an y ac t o f th e legislativ e a s law , whic h i s agains t th e constitution."55 Even more interesting than Varnum's discussion o f the existence o f the powe r o f judicial revie w i s hi s argumen t abou t how tha t powe r should b e exercised : i n ligh t o f natural-right s doctrine . I n essence , Varnum's substantive attac k o n the statut e wa s that tria l by jury i s an "unalienable right " that th e legislatur e canno t justly infringe. 56 Indeed , Varnum's argumen t i s replete wit h references t o natura l right s an d t o the fact that the American regime was founded t o secure them. Unfortunately, becaus e th e court' s opinio n ha s not been found , th e court's reactio n t o Varnum's argumen t i s somewhat unclear . Newspa per reports suggest that most of the judges were receptive to Varnum's position. Resolutions passed by the Rhode Island legislature condemn ing th e judges ' handlin g o f th e cas e provid e additiona l evidenc e o f this fact 57 The most famous o f the early state precedents for judicial review is Bayard v. Singleton (N.C. , 1787). Like most states during the American Revolution, North Carolin a confiscate d propert y hel d b y persons wh o remained loya l t o th e British . At issu e i n th e cas e wa s a statut e tha t required judges to dismiss, without regard to merit, any action brought by persons seekin g to recover titl e to confiscate d property . In a shor t opinion, th e Suprem e Cour t o f Nort h Carolin a unanimousl y declare d the statut e unconstitutiona l o n th e groun d tha t person s seekin g t o

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recover title to confiscate d propert y were entitle d to a jury trial on th e merits of their claim. 58 The cour t wa s undoubtedl y influence d b y a widely discusse d lette r "To the Public" published i n a local newspaper prior to the outcome o f the litigation. 59 Th e lette r wa s writte n b y James Iredell , th e plaintiff' s cocounsel an d late r a leadin g membe r o f th e Nort h Carolin a ratifyin g convention an d on e o f th e first justices o f th e U.S . Suprem e Court . In the letter Iredell emphasize d the need to curb the legislature. He did so by drawing on the lessons of the American Revolution : It was, of course , to be considered ho w to impose restrictions on the legislature, that might still leav e i t free t o all useful purpose s but at the same time guard agains t th e abus e o f unlimite d power , whic h wa s no t t o b e trusted , without the most imminent danger, to any man or body of men on earth. We had not only been sickened and disgusted for years with the high and almost impious languag e o f Grea t Britain , o f th e omnipoten t powe r o f th e Britis h Parliament, but had severely smarte d under its effects. W e felt i n all its rigor the mischiefs o f an absolute an d unbounded authority, claimed by so weak a creature as man, and should have been guilty of the basest breach of trust, as well a s th e grosses t folly , i f th e momen t whe n w e spurne d a t th e insolen t despotism of Great Britain, we had established a despotic power among ourselves.60 After th e court' s decisio n declarin g th e confiscatio n statut e uncon stitutional, Richar d Dobb s Spaight , the n servin g a s a Nort h Carolin a delegate t o th e Constitutiona l Conventio n i n Philadelphia , wrot e a letter t o Iredel l severel y criticizin g hi m fo r encouragin g th e cour t t o engage i n suc h a "usurpation " of power . Spaight' s lette r i s interestin g both becaus e o f th e commitmen t h e display s t o th e notio n tha t repre sentation i s the vehicle throug h which to protect rights and because o f the thoroughl y moder n attack h e make s o n judicia l review . O n th e latter point, Spaight writes that allowing the court to declare legislativ e acts unconstitutional mean s that the people, "instead of being governe d by the representatives i n the general assembly, would be subject to the will of three individuals, who united in their own persons the legislativ e and judiciary powers , whic h n o monarc h i n Europe enjoys , and whic h would b e mor e despoti c tha n th e Roma n decemvirate , an d equall y insufferable."61 Iredell responded t o Spaigh t i n a letter that expande d o n hi s earlie r letter "T o the Public. " In his second letter , Iredell makes a n interestin g allusion t o th e rol e o f natural-right s doctrin e i n judicia l review . Al -

112 Th e Court though the focus o f Iredell's argument for rejecting the notion of legislative supremac y i s the writte n statu s o f the Nort h Carolin a Constitu tion, he states that even if the constitution were not written, the court s would hav e th e powe r t o rejec t legislativ e enactment s tha t violat e principles o f "natura l justice." 62 Curiously , Iredel l later , a s a U.S . Supreme Court justice, rejected thi s position in a famous decision, Colder v. Bull (1798). 63 But at the time of the framing o f the U.S. Constitution, he recognized both the power of judicial review and a role for naturalrights doctrine in the exercise of that power. Constitutional-Period Precedents Spaight's lette r t o Iredel l illustrate s tha t th e delegate s wh o me t i n Philadelphia i n 178 7 were wel l aware o f the stat e precedents fo r judicial review. 64 A s note d earlier , however , th e Constitutio n doe s no t expressly provid e for judicial review, let alone specify ho w that docu ment shoul d b e interprete d b y th e Court . Because th e Founders ' pri mary reason fo r writin g the Constitutio n wa s to protect natura l right s more effectively tha n the Articles of Confederation wer e proving capable o f doing , it seems reasonabl e t o suggest tha t th e Founders simpl y took for granted that Court would interpret the Constitution in light of natural-rights doctrine when deciding cases involving individual rights. Fortunately, this suggestion need not rest on inference, no matter how strong that inferenc e ma y be. The debates surrounding the ratificatio n of th e Constitution provid e tangibl e evidenc e o f th e fac t tha t th e Founders expecte d th e Cour t t o interpre t th e Constitutio n i n ligh t of natural-rights principles. The logica l startin g poin t fo r an y discussio n o f the Founders ' position o n judicial review durin g the ratification debat e i s The Federalist no. 78. In that famous essa y Alexander Hamilton clearly states that the Constitution commission s the Court with the power of judicial review. What is often overlooke d about no. 78, however, is Hamilton's explanation abou t th e primar y reaso n judicia l revie w i s necessary : t o hel p protect the natural rights of the American people. Hamilton writes, for example, tha t "th e complet e independenc e o f th e court s o f Justice i s particularly essentia l in a limited Constitution. .. . Withou t this, all the reservations o f particula r right s o r privilege s woul d amoun t t o nothing."65

The Court 11 3 Other notabl e reference s t o th e rol e o f natural-right s doctrin e i n judicial revie w ar e availabl e fro m th e debate s i n th e stat e ratifyin g conventions. For instance , James Wilson , later a n origina l membe r o f the U.S . Suprem e Court , justifie d th e Constitution' s judicia l tenur e provisions t o th e Pennsylvani a conventio n i n natural-right s terms . In Wilson's words , "Persona l liberty , an d privat e property , depend es sentially upo n th e abl e an d uprigh t determination s o f independen t judges." Wilso n added , wit h judicia l independenc e "privat e propert y and persona l libert y .. . wil l b e guarde d wit h firmness an d watch fulness."66 The centra l rol e o f natural-right s doctrin e i n judicia l revie w wa s emphasized by less prominent delegates to the ratifying convention s as well. William Grayson, for one, closed the discussion on judicial review in the Virginia convention by observing that judges "are the best check we have ; they secur e u s fro m encroachment s o n ou r privileges " an d that "i f th e Congres s canno t mak e a la w agains t th e Constitution , I apprehend that they cannot make a law to abridge it. The judges are to defend it." 67 Perhaps th e cleares t sig n tha t judges wer e expecte d t o appea l t o natural-rights philosoph y i n constitutiona l interpretatio n i s tha t the y did in fact d o so after th e Constitution wen t into effect. Indeed , in his influential book , The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, Charles Grove Haines conclude s tha t bu t fo r natural-right s doctrine , "judicial revie w ... woul d have had relativel y slight influence o n the American govern ment an d politics , just a s i s the cas e i n most foreig n countrie s whic h have adopted this practice." 68 Turning first to the state courts, there are myriad examples available to illustrat e tha t judges frequentl y decide d individua l right s case s i n light of natural-rights principles. One of the best is a 178 9 South Carolina case, Ham v. M'Claws. At issue was the clai m o f several recentl y arrived Sout h Carolin a resident s tha t thei r slave s wer e improperl y seized b y a Sout h Carolin a revenu e officer . Althoug h th e claimant s acknowledged tha t th e revenu e office r ha d properly seize d th e slave s under an existing South Carolina import law, they maintained that they were unfamilia r wit h tha t la w whe n the y decide d t o mov e t o Sout h Carolina from Honduras . The claimants argued that they were induced to mov e t o Sout h Carolin a becaus e o f a n earlier , les s restrictiv e law . (The claimant s wer e e n rout e t o Sout h Carolin a whe n th e la w wa s

114 Th e Cour t changed.) Th e cour t directe d th e jur y t o decid e th e cas e i n ligh t o f natural-rights principles : It i s clear , tha t statute s passe d agains t th e plai n an d obviou s principle s o f common right , an d commo n reason , ar e absolutel y void , a s fa r a s the y ar e calculated t o operate agains t those principles. .. . W e are, therefore, bound t o give such a constructio n t o thi s enacting claus e o f the ac t o f 1788 , as will be consistent wit h justice, and th e dictate s o f natural reason , though contrar y t o the stric t lette r o f th e law ; and thi s constructio n is , that th e legislatur e neve r had i t i n thei r contemplatio n t o mak e th e forfeitur e o f th e negroe s i n question.69* Another instanc e o f natural-rights-based judicia l review i n the stat e courts i s Page v. Pendleton (Va. , 1793) . In tha t cas e Judg e Wyth e hel d that th e right s o f British creditor s wer e no t extinguishe d b y the Ameri can Revolution . T o hol d otherwise , Wyth e maintained , woul d violat e the "la w o f nature, " because th e Britis h creditor s ha d no t consente d t o Virginia law. 70 The earl y nineteent h centur y foun d stat e judge s continuin g t o em ploy natural-rights-base d judicia l review . In Currie's Administrator v. Mutual Assurance Society (Va. , 1809) , the Virgini a legislatur e ha d en acted a la w tha t retroactivel y change d th e statu s o f certai n insure d parties. The affecte d partie s sued , claimin g th e retroactiv e chang e wa s unconstitutional. Defens e counse l Joh n Wickha m urge d th e cour t t o reject th e claim , an d h e di d s o b y stressin g th e inappropriateness o f natural-rights-based judicial review. Wickham argued : "No doubt ever y government ough t t o kee p i n vie w th e grea t principle s o f justice an d moral right , bu t n o authorit y i s expressl y give n t o th e judiciary b y th e Constitution o f Virginia, t o declar e a la w void a s being morall y wron g or in violation o f a contract." 71 Judge Spence r Roane , who m Jefferso n wa s reportedl y plannin g t o make Chie f Justic e o f th e Unite d State s ha d Adam s no t name d Mar shall, explicitl y rejecte d Wickham' s argument . Roan e dismisse d ou t o f hand th e ide a tha t natura l right s ar e adequatel y protecte d b y the legis lature (whic h wa s the essenc e o f Wickham's defense) : It wa s argue d b y a respectable membe r o f the bar , that th e legislatur e ha d a right t o pas s an y law , howeve r just, o r uryust , reasonable , o r unreasonable . * Although slave s wer e involved , Ham v. M'Claws wa s no t abou t th e institution o f slavery. Ham, unlik e the cases directly challenging the institution of slavery discussed in Cover's book, is, therefore, evidence of the general jurisprudential climate of the times.

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This is a position which even the courtly Judge Blackstone was scarcely hardy enough to contend for, under the doctrin e o f boasted omnipotence of parliament. What is this, but to lay prostrate, at the footstool o f the legislature, all our rights o f perso n an d property, an d abando n thos e grea t objects , fo r the protection of which, alone, all free governments have been instituted.72 Other early-nineteenth-centur y stat e judges employe d simila r natu ral-rights analysis. For example, New York Chancellor James Kent, one of the leading legal scholars of the day, interpreted a statute in Gardner v. Newburgh (1816 ) s o tha t it would confor m t o the "clea r principle o f natural equity , tha t th e individua l whos e propert y i s thu s sacrificed , must be indemnified." 73 And though, in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1817) , th e Suprem e Cour t o f Ne w Hampshir e uphel d a series o f stat e statute s tha t significantl y affecte d th e wa y Dartmout h College wa s governed , a s wel l a s th e righ t o f th e forme r trustee s t o reclaim corporate books from an officer appointe d under the new laws, Chief Justice Willia m Richardson voted to d o so onl y after interpretin g the statute s i n ligh t o f natural-right s principles . Chie f Justice Richard son wrote: A complain t tha t privat e right s protecte d b y th e constitutio n hav e bee n in vaded, will at all times deserve an d receive the most deliberate consideratio n of thi s court . .. . [But ] [t]h e legislativ e powe r o f thi s stat e extend s t o ever y proper object of legislation, and is limited only by our constitutions and by the fundamental principle s o f al l governmen t an d th e inalienabl e right s o f mankind.74 Early Supreme Court Practice The federa l court s i n general , an d th e Suprem e Cour t i n particular , were i n thei r formativ e stag e durin g th e earl y day s o f governmen t under th e Constitution . Unde r th e Article s o f Confederation , th e na tional judiciary wa s virtuall y nonexistent , it s busines s limite d almos t exclusively t o admiralt y cases . The reaso n fo r thi s wa s tha t the newl y independent state s jealously guarde d their sovereignty, an d the judicature power was considered a n essential componen t of that sovereignty. The debat e ove r th e judiciar y a t th e Constitutiona l Conventio n re flected th e tension s between creatin g a strong national judicial syste m and maintainin g som e degre e o f stat e sovereignty. 75 A s i n mos t deci sions involvin g institutiona l matter s tha t cam e ou t o f Philadelphi a i n

116 Th e Cour t 1787, a compromis e o n th e issu e wa s reached . I n essence , the compro mise wa s this : a nationa l Suprem e Cour t wa s created , i t wa s lef t t o Congress t o establis h lowe r federa l court s (somethin g Congres s di d i n the Judiciary Act o f 1789) , and th e state s maintaine d thei r ow n judicial systems, bu t thei r court s wer e obligate d b y th e supremac y claus e t o invalidate stat e law s tha t conflicte d wit h th e federa l Constitution . Given tha t nationa l court s o f an y significanc e wer e a n innovatio n i n the Constitution , a s wel l a s th e produc t o f compromise , i t shoul d b e expected tha t i t would tak e some time before thei r role in the America n constitutional orde r woul d tak e root . Indeed , durin g th e twelve-yea r period befor e Joh n Marshal l becam e chie f justice, th e Suprem e Cour t heard fe w cases . Accordin g t o lega l historia n Davi d Currie , thi s wa s because o f "th e relative paucity o f early federal legislation , the absenc e of a genera l gran t o f origina l jurisdictio n ove r case s arisin g unde r federal law , and th e fac t tha t th e Court' s jurisdiction wa s largel y appel late." 76 I t is , therefore , misleadin g t o criticiz e natural-la w an d right s jurisprudence, a s man y scholar s do, 77 on th e basi s tha t th e earl y Cour t did no t interpre t th e Constitutio n i n light of those principle s tha t often . In fact , i n relativ e terms , appea l t o natura l la w an d right s i n constitu tional interpretatio n durin g th e 1789-180 1 period wa s th e rule , not th e exception. O f the thre e full-scal e decision s construin g th e Constitutio n before 1801, 78 tw o relie d o n natural-right s principles. 79 Whe n a signifi cant circui t opinio n o f Justice Willia m Paterson i s added, the ratio rise s to thre e ou t o f four. 80 A n examinatio n o f thos e earl y case s provide s strong evidenc e tha t th e Cour t wa s expecte d t o interpre t th e Constitu tion i n ligh t o f natural-right s principles , because th e justices di d i n fac t do so, with onl y one notabl e objector. * The first constitutional-la w cas e decide d b y the Suprem e Cour t wa s Chisholm v. Georgia (1793). 81 A t issu e wa s whethe r a citize n o f on e state, Sout h Carolina , coul d brin g sui t i n federa l cour t agains t anothe r state, Georgia . The officia l repor t i s silent a s t o th e basi s o f th e action , *A carefu l revie w o f th e U.S . Suprem e Cour t Report s reveal s ho w frequentl y bot h justices an d lawyer s invoke d natural-right s argument s i n nonconstitutional la w individual-rights cases during the early days of the American republic. A perusal of the justices' early gran d jur y charge s i s likewis e illuminating . Se e Marcus , ed. , The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789—1800, vols. 2-3. These sources show how dedicated the early bench and bar were to natural-rights principles. It should therefore not be surprising tha t th e Court would appea l to those principles in constitutional interpretation as well.

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though constitutiona l historian s describ e i t a s a disput e ove r privat e property.82 Th e justices ' opinion s suppor t th e historians ' character ization. As wa s th e custo m a t th e time , eac h justic e delivere d hi s ow n opinion. Th e vot e wa s fou r t o on e i n favo r o f permittin g th e Sout h Carolina citizen to sue th e state o f Georgia. 83 In a brief opinion, Justice John Blair concluded tha t the citizen's suit was authorize d by the plain words o f th e Constitution. 84 I n their respectiv e opinions , Chie f Justic e John Ja y an d Justice s Willia m Cushing an d Jame s Wilso n invoke d natural-rights principle s t o find fo r th e individual . Chie f Justic e Jay' s opinion emphasized th e need t o let the individual bring suit against the state becaus e th e purpos e o f th e Constitutio n i s t o protec t a n individ ual's natura l rights , n o matte r wh o violate s them . Accordin g t o th e chief justice, this point was so obviou s that it required little discussion . In Jay's words: [It is unnecessary] to show that the sentiments of the best writers on government an d the right s o f men , harmonize wit h th e principle s whic h direc t my judgment in the present question. The acts of the former Congresses, and the acts of many of the state conventions are replete with similar ideas; and to the honor of th e United States, it may be observed , that in no other countr y are subjects o f thi s kind better, if so well , understood. The attention an d attachment o f th e Constitutio n t o th e equa l rights of th e peopl e ar e discernibl e i n almost every sentence of it.85 Justice Cushing wrote a n opinion similar to Chief Justice Jay's: "The rights of individuals and the justice du e them, are as dear and preciou s as thos e o f th e states . Indee d th e latte r ar e founde d upo n th e former ; and th e grea t en d an d objec t o f the m mus t b e t o secur e an d suppor t the rights of individuals, or else vain is government." 86 Justice Wilson' s opinio n wa s th e longes t an d mos t comple x o f th e majority opinions . Lik e th e others , however , h e emphasize d tha t th e purpose o f governmen t i s t o protec t th e natura l right s o f individual s and that a state that violates those right s is subject to suit. 87 The secon d o f th e fou r full-scal e constitutiona l decision s decide d during the Court' s openin g year s wa s Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance (1795). I n tha t cas e Justic e Willia m Paterson , o n circuit , forbad e th e state o f Pennsylvani a t o tak e propert y fro m a n individua l withou t just compensation. Whil e Pennsylvani a maintaine d tha t th e fifth amend ment applie d onl y t o th e nationa l government , Justic e Paterso n ap -

118 Th e Cour t pealed t o natural-right s doctrin e an d rule d tha t th e just-compensatio n principle behin d th e amendmen t wa s bindin g o n th e states . I n Justic e Paterson's words : It is evident tha t th e righ t o f acquiring an d possessing property an d havin g it protected, is one of the natural, inherent and inalienable rights of man. .. . The preservation o f propert y the n i s a primar y objec t o f th e socia l compact . .. . The legislature, therefore, had no authority to make an act divesting one citizen of hi s freehold , an d vestin g i t i n another , withou t jus t compensation . I t i s inconsistent wit h th e principle s o f reason , justice an d mora l rectitude ; i t i s incompatible with the comfort, peace, and happiness of mankind; it is contrary to th e principle s o f socia l allianc e i n ever y free government ; an d lastly , i t i s contrary to both the letter and spirit of the constitution. 88 The Suprem e Court' s mos t famou s appea l t o natural-la w an d right s principles durin g th e earl y years—indeed , ever—cam e i n Calder v. Bull (1798). 89 A t issu e wa s a Connecticu t statut e tha t se t asid e a probate cour t decre e tha t refuse d t o validat e a will . The Cour t unani mously upheld th e statute , primarily o n the ground that the invalidatio n of the will by the probate cour t had no t create d an y vested right s in th e heirs. Opinion s wer e writte n b y Justice s Cushing , Paterson , Samue l Chase, and Iredell . Justice Cushing' s opinio n consiste d o f two unillumi nating sentences. 90 Althoug h Justic e Paterso n allude d t o "th e funda mental principles o f the socia l compact " i n his opinion, 91 it was Justic e Chase who most forcefully invoke d natural-right s principles i n decidin g the case . His opinion i s worth quotin g at length : I canno t subscrib e t o th e omnipotenc e o f a stat e Legislature , o r tha t i t i s absolute an d withou t control ; althoug h it s authorit y shoul d no t b e expressl y restrained b y the constitution , or fundamental law , of the state. The people of the United States erected their constitutions, or terms of government, to establish justice, to promote th e general welfare , to secure th e blessings of liberty, and t o protec t thei r person s an d propert y fro m violence . Th e purpose s fo r which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; an d a s the y ar e th e foundatio n o f th e legislativ e power , the y wil l decide wha t ar e th e prope r object s o f it : The nature , an d end s o f legislativ e power will limit the exercise o f it. .. . There are certain vital principles i n our free Republican governments , which will determine an d overrul e a n apparen t and flagrant abus e o f legislativ e power ; a s t o authoriz e manifes t mjustic e b y positive law ; o r t o tak e awa y tha t securit y fo r persona l liberty , o r privat e property, fo r th e protectio n whereo f th e governmen t wa s established . An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the first great principles of th e socia l compact , canno t b e considere d a rightfu l exercis e o f legislativ e

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authority. .. . Th e genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our state governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them.92 Because, i n hi s view , th e Connecticu t legislature' s actio n impaire d no vested right , Justice Chas e judged th e statut e consisten t wit h natural-rights doctrine . However , wha t i s significan t i s tha t Justice Chase , like Chie f Justice Jay an d Justices Cushing an d Wilson i n Chisholm v. Georgia, an d Justic e Paterso n i n Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, unambiguously appeale d to that doctrine when interpreting the Consti tution. During the confederatio n period , James Iredell recognized a role fo r natural-rights doctrin e i n judicia l review , a s a lette r explainin g hi s position i n Bayard v. Singleton (N.C. , 1787 ) indicates. 93 I n Colder v. Bully however , Justic e Iredel l responde d directl y t o Justic e Chase' s natural-rights approac h an d firmly rejecte d it. * I n Justic e Iredell' s words: If... th e legislature of the union, or the legislature of any member of the union, shall pas s a law, withi n th e genera l scop e o f thei r constitutiona l power , the court cannot pronounce i t to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary t o th e principle s o f natura l justice. The idea s o f natura l justice ar e regulated b y no fixed standard; the ables t an d the pures t me n hav e differe d upon the subject.94 Like Robert Bork of the present day, Justice Iredel l rejected natural rights-based judicial review because people ca n disagree on the meaning o f natura l law. 95 The reaso n fo r Justice Iredell' s chang e o f hear t i s unclear. Nevertheless, his position in Calder v. Bull i s inconsistent wit h the epistemolog y o f th e America n Founding . The Founder s acknowl edged that the "self-evident truths " of natural law are not discernible t o everyone. But , they believed, natura l la w i s discernibl e t o some , a s th e opinions of the members of the early Supreme Court, other than Justice Iredell, reveal. 96 With the notable exceptio n o f Marbury v. Madison (1803), 97 the first * Currie aptly characterizes the Chase-Iredell exchange as "the opening salvo in a running battle [ove r the role of natural-law and rights doctrine in judicial review] that never has simmered down completely." Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 47-48. The word "opening " is the most significant par t of Currie's statement. That is to say, Justice Iredell's rejectio n o f natural-rights-base d judicia l revie w marke d th e first time ( I have found) that was done by a sitting judge in a nonslavery context. I have more to say below about this important, but previously overlooked, point.

120 Th e Cour t decade o f John Marshall' s lengthy chie f justiceship wa s devote d largel y to jurisdictional matters, 98 as was the period betwee n 178 9 and 1801 . In fact, Marbury itsel f concerne d th e authorit y o f th e federa l courts , specifically th e authorit y o f th e federa l court s t o declar e act s o f Con gress unconstitutional . I n 1810 , however , th e Marshal l Cour t bega n to issu e majo r decision s o n substantiv e question s o f constitutiona l law." The first majo r substantiv e decisio n o f th e Marshal l era , Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 10° foun d th e Cour t onc e agai n invokin g natural-la w an d rights principles i n constitutiona l interpretation . Speaking , a s th e earl y Marshall Cour t typicall y did , throug h th e chie f justice, 101 th e Cour t struck dow n th e Georgi a legislature's attemp t t o revoke a huge, fraudu lent lan d gran t mad e b y a previou s legislature . Chie f Justic e Marshal l opened hi s opinio n fo r th e Cour t wit h a discussio n o f "certai n grea t principles o f justice, whos e authorit y i s universall y acknowledged " t o restrict legislativ e power . Marshal l spen t thre e page s examinin g thes e "great principles o f justice" before turnin g t o the contrac t claus e o f th e Constitution. The chie f justice conclude d hi s opinio n fo r th e Cour t i n a manner tha t suggest s th e holdin g wa s influence d b y natural-la w an d rights principles . I n Marshall' s words : "Th e stat e o f Georgi a wa s re strained, eithe r b y genera l principles , whic h ar e commo n t o ou r fre e institutions, o r b y th e particula r provision s o f th e constitutio n o f th e United States , fro m passin g a la w whereb y th e estat e o f th e plaintif f . . . coul d b e constitutionall y an d legall y impaire d an d rendere d nul l and void." 102 Interestingly, jus t prio r t o th e quote d passage , Marshal l mad e a statement tha t intimate s tha t h e woul d hav e foun d th e ac t i n questio n unconstitutional eve n i f th e contrac t claus e ha d no t forbad e it . Th e chief justice remarked : Would it have been a defense in such a suit to say that a state had passed a law absolving itsel f fro m th e contract ? I t i s scarcel y t o b e conceive d tha t suc h a defense coul d be set up. And yet, if a state is neither restraine d by the general principles o f ou r politica l institutions , nor b y th e word s o f th e constitution , from impairing the obligation o f its own contracts, such a defense woul d b e a valid one. 103 Justice Willia m Johnson , wh o wa s on e o f th e fe w member s o f th e early Marshal l Cour t occasionall y t o writ e separately , concurre d i n a n

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opinion clearl y relian t upo n natural-la w an d right s doctrine . Justic e Johnson wrote : " I d o no t hesitat e t o declar e tha t a stat e doe s no t possess th e powe r o f revokin g it s ow n grants . But I do i t on a genera l principle, o n th e reaso n an d natur e o f things : a principl e whic h wil l impose laws even on the Deity." Justice Johnson turned to The Federalist fo r suppor t fo r hi s positio n tha t th e Constitutio n exist s t o secur e natural right s an d shoul d b e interprete d accordingly . "Ther e i s reaso n to believe , fro m th e letter s o f Plubiu s [sic], whic h ar e wel l know n t o be entitle d t o th e highes t respect, " Justice Johnso n maintained , "tha t the objec t o f th e conventio n wa s t o affor d a genera l protectio n t o individual rights against the acts of the state legislatures." 104 The Marshall Court decided severa l othe r significant contrac t claus e cases. 105 Th e nex t notabl e cas e i n term s o f interpretiv e methodolog y was Terrett v. Taylor (1815). 106 At issue was a n attempt by the Virginia legislature t o clai m lan d originall y acquire d b y th e Episcopa l Churc h before th e America n Revolution . Th e legislature , whic h ha d earlie r both confirme d th e Church' s titl e t o th e lan d an d incorporate d th e Church, maintaine d tha t th e statute s b y whic h tha t wa s don e wer e inconsistent wit h religiou s liberty . I n hi s first opinio n fo r th e Court , Justice Joseph Story strongly disagreed—and h e did so by interpretin g the Constitutio n i n ligh t o f natural-right s principles . I n Justice Story's words: That the legislature ca n repeal statutes creating private corporations, or confirming to them property already acquired under the faith of previous laws, and by which such repeal can vest the property of such corporations exclusively in the stat e .. . w e ar e not prepared t o admit ; and we thin k ourselve s standin g upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit and letter of the constitution of the United States, and upon the decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a doctrine.107 The final significan t contrac t claus e cas e o f th e Marshal l er a i s Ogden v. Saunders (1827). 108 That case woul d hav e been a n otherwis e insignificant applicatio n o f th e contrac t claus e t o th e bankruptc y con text 109 had it not been for a dissent filed by Chief Justice Marshall from the Court' s decisio n tha t a stat e wa s fre e t o discharg e obligation s incurred t o it s ow n citizen s afte r a n insolvenc y la w wa s passed . Mar shall's dissen t i s chock-ful l o f natural-la w an d right s references . Al -

122 Th e Cour t though som e see k t o dismiss those references a s "nothing but a distraction/' 110 the y wer e determinativ e o f Marshall' s opinio n i n th e case . Indeed, the chie f justice chastise d th e majority fo r failin g to understan d a basi c tene t o f natural-right s philosophy , namely , tha t i t i s no t th e state that gives validity and force t o a contract, but a contract that give s validity an d forc e t o th e state. * According t o Marshall , "Individual s d o not deriv e fro m governmen t thei r righ t t o contract , bu t brin g that righ t with the m int o society ; that obligatio n i s not conferre d o n contract s b y positive law , but i s intrinsic, and i s conferred b y the ac t o f the parties. " Although th e stat e ma y regulat e contracts , i t ma y no t g o s o fa r a s t o impair their obligation , as was done, in Marshall's judgment, in the cas e at bar . Importantly , th e chie f justic e close d hi s dissentin g opinio n b y emphasizing th e foundationa l plac e o f natural-right s philosoph y i n th e Constitution. As Marshall state d i n no uncertai n terms : When w e adver t t o th e cours e o f readin g pursue d b y American statesme n i n early life, we must suppose that the framers of our constitution were intimately acquainted wit h th e writing s o f thos e wis e an d learne d men , whose treatise s on th e la w o f natur e an d nation s hav e guide d publi c opinion . .. . W e mus t suppose that the framers o f our constitution took the same view on the subject and the language they have used confirms this opinion. 111 The Marshal l Cour t decide d substantiv e constitutiona l question s i n non-contract claus e case s a s well . The grea t majorit y o f thos e cases , including th e mos t famous , McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 112 an d Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), 113 involved the power o f the national governmen t vis-a-vis th e states . A s i s wel l known , th e Marshal l Cour t offere d a n expansive readin g o f nationa l power . Mor e significan t fo r presen t pur poses tha n th e specific holding s o f those case s is that the Cour t di d not employ natural-right s doctrin e t o arriv e a t them . A s mos t critic s o f natural-law an d right s jurisprudence fail t o appreciate , however , ther e is a dichotom y betwee n individual-right s case s an d allocation-of-pow ers cases . I n allocation-of-power s case s lik e McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden natural-right s doctrin e ha s littl e t o say , sinc e that doctrin e i s concerne d wit h normativ e question s abou t th e origin s *One commentato r o n th e Ogden case attribute s th e majority' s failur e t o gras p th e significance o f Marshall' s natural-right s argument s t o th e fac t tha t thos e justices wer e from "th e second generation o f interpreters of the Constitution," once removed from th e Framers. Isaacs , "Joh n Marshal l o n Contracts, " 425 . This poin t coul d b e applie d eve n more forcefully t o modern critics of natural-rights jurisprudence.

The Court 12 3 of society and the rise and extent of political power. But when it comes to question s o f individua l rights , natural-right s doctrin e ha s muc h t o say, and the early Court's constitutional jurisprudence reflects this fact. Unfortunately, th e Marshall Court did not adhere consistently to the dichotomy betwee n individual-right s case s an d allocation-of-power s cases. The cleares t exampl e o f thi s inconsistenc y i s Barron v. Baltimore (1833). U4 At issue was a fifth-amendment claim by an individua l that the city of Baltimore had taken his property without just compen sation b y destroyin g th e navigabilit y o f a strea m an d renderin g hi s wharf useless . I n a simila r case , Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, discussed above , Justic e Paterso n ha d rule d that , althoug h a stat e might hav e a plausibl e argumen t tha t th e fifth amendmen t wa s in tended by the Framers to apply only to the national government, natural-rights doctrin e require d tha t th e basi c just-compensation principl e behind th e amendmen t b e applie d t o th e state s a s well . In Barron v. Baltimore, however , Chie f Justice Marshal l dismisse d th e individual' s claim. Nowhere in his brief opinio n did Marshall consider the possibility tha t th e city' s actio n ha d violate d th e individual' s natura l rights . Instead, the chie f justice conclude d tha t th e Bil l of Rights guarantee s were not binding on the states and localities. How can the Marshall Court's failure to interpret the Constitution in light of natural-rights philosophy i n Barron v. Baltimore b e explaine d when the case so clearly involved individual rights? Chiefly by the fac t that whe n th e Cour t decide d Barron i n 1833 , belief i n higher la w had given way to a view o f th e writte n Constitutio n a s th e sole sourc e o f fundamental principles . Althoug h th e declinin g rol e o f natural-right s philosophy i n mid-nineteenth-centur y America n politic s i s generall y attributed t o a growin g belief , epitomize d b y th e ris e o f Jacksonia n democracy, i n th e righ t o f th e peopl e t o rul e i n an y wa y the y se e fit, unencumbered b y the concern for protecting individual rights that is at the hear t o f natural-right s teaching, 115 th e Cour t turne d awa y fro m natural rights with apparent reluctance. Several of Chief Justice Marshall's opinions illustrate this reluctance to abandon natural-right s doctrine. In The Antelope Case (1825),116 for example, Marshall strongly condemne d slaver y and the slav e trade o n natural-rights grounds . However, when face d wit h a n explici t positiv e law permittin g th e slav e trade , th e chie f justic e prove d unwillin g t o interfere.117 Undoubtedly , a s on e commentato r ha s aptl y remarked ,

124 Th e Court Marshall was "a mind in transition" during the later stages of his chief justiceship.118* Assessing the Natural-Rights Precedents I have endeavore d t o sho w i n this sectio n tha t th e Kramer s expecte d judges to interpret the Constitution in light of natural-rights philosophy when decidin g individual-rights cases. f Thi s required carefu l attentio n to th e contex t i n whic h th e variou s argument s an d cour t opinion s concerning judicia l revie w wer e made . Tha t contex t reveale d that , whereas the practice of interpreting the Constitution in light of naturalrights philosoph y i n individua l right s case s ha d becom e th e nor m fo r the earl y Suprem e Court , pre-federa l Constitutio n America n lawyer s and judges turned to natural-rights-based judicial review gradually and somewhat hesitantly: only after the y became convince d th e legislatur e had proved incapabl e o f protecting natural rights. This is a point overlooked by both sides of the modern debate over the role of natural-law and right s doctrin e i n judicial review . As a result , the moder n debat e tends to be framed i n unnecessarily all-or-nothing terms. Because m y conclusio n abou t natural-rights-base d judicia l revie w runs counte r t o tw o powerfu l trend s i n th e literature—a n increasin g skepticism abou t natura l right s an d a growin g mistrus t o f judicia l power—many reader s will likely resist what I have had to say. Indeed, the forc e o f these trend s necessitate d tha t m y analysis be detailed . In * Justice Willia m Johnson' s dissentin g opinio n i n th e otherwis e uneventfu l Shanks v. Dupont (1830 ) shows that othe r member s of the Court were also "minds in transition." (Recall Justice Johnson's strong natural-law and rights references i n Fletcher v. Peck.) "I had thi s questio n [abou t partitionin g land ] submitte d t o m e o n m y circuit som e year s since, and I then leane d i n favo r o f this right o f election, " Justice Johnson wrote . "But more mature reflection ha s satisfied m e that I then gave too much weight to natural law and the suggestions of reason and justice in a case which ought to be disposed upon the principles of political and positive law." Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 239, 250, 258 (1830) (Johnson, J., dissenting). t Maybe Robert Bork—the prototype modern legal positivist—will no w become a natural lawyer! Bork did say he would convert if the requisite historical proof wa s made. In Bork's words: If ther e wa s evidenc e tha t th e framer s an d ratifier s intende d judge s t o appl y natura l law , I woul d accept tha t judges ha d t o procee d i n tha t fashion . Whe n a n institutio n i s intende d an d designe d t o operate i n a particula r way , whe n it s member s tak e a n oat h t o operat e i n tha t way , i t seem s appropriate tha t the institutio n an d its members should d o so. (Bork, "Natural Law and the Law," 52)

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Y judgment, however, the "burden o f proof" should be on those who reject th e rol e o f natural-right s doctrin e i n constitutiona l interpreta tion.119 After all , the Unite d State s o f America wa s founded t o secur e natural right s (se e par t l). 120 M y examination o f th e historica l recor d discloses tha t thi s wil l be a difficul t burde n o f proof t o meet . In fact , Justice Iredell' s rejectio n o f natural-rights-base d judicia l revie w wa s the only such rejection issued by a sitting judge in a nonslavery context during the pre-Jacksonian years. 121 Except for Iredell's position and an unsuccessful lawyer' s argumen t i n Currie's Administrator v. Mutual Assurance Society (Va. , 1809), 122 no direc t evidenc e has been brough t forward suggestin g that , onc e th e Founder s recognize d tha t judge s needed t o protect individua l right s agains t th e overreachin g force s o f representation, resort to natural-rights principles to do so was inappropriate. A careful readin g o f the moder n debat e reveals that opponent s of natural-rights-based judicial review rely almost exclusively o n rhetorical techniques ; specifically, o n attempt s t o "distinguish " the direc t evidence proffered b y proponents. Frankly, given their failure t o offe r direct evidence , I a m amaze d tha t th e positivist s ar e winnin g th e debate. In additio n t o th e historica l point—an d on e tha t ha s als o bee n overlooked i n the modern debat e o n judicial review—rejecting a role for th e natural-right s politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Inde pendence i n constitutional interpretatio n ignore s the obvious fact tha t the moder n Cour t frequentl y appeal s t o natural-law-lik e concepts , most notabl y throug h th e doctrin e o f substantiv e du e process . An d what i s so troubling abou t th e modern Court' s approach i s that evolving natural-law-lik e concept s suc h a s substantiv e du e proces s hav e served largel y as a vehicle through whic h th e justices write their ow n personal mora l an d politica l belief s int o th e Constitution . Clearly , a nation based o n the rule of law demands more than this: it demands a return to first principles. Judicial Finalit y The authoritativenes s o f th e Suprem e Court' s interpretatio n o f th e Constitution i s an issu e that ha s received considerabl e attentio n ove r the years . Man y scholars , a s wel l a s severa l o f thi s nation' s mos t

126 Th e Court prominent chie f executives , hav e argue d fo r a mor e egalitaria n ap proach t o constitutiona l interpretatio n tha n th e Court' s authoritaria n conception of its role permits. 123 This section reject s th e egalitaria n approac h t o constitutional inter pretation, a n approac h that , i n it s mos t attractiv e form , view s th e Constitution a s a communall y interprete d documen t i n which th e Su preme Cour t play s a n important , bu t no t predominant , role. 124 Briefl y put, the fact tha t the Constitution shoul d be interpreted i n accordanc e with the natural-right s politica l philosophy o f the Declaration o f Independence suggests that the Court is the institution of American government that shoul d have the final say in constitutional interpretation . As just noted , thi s i s a n argumen t tha t man y wil l reject . Indeed , Harr y Jaffa—the foremos t contemporar y proponen t o f th e vie w tha t th e Constitution shoul d b e interprete d i n light o f the Declaratio n o f Independence125—expressly denie s a role for th e Cour t in identifying an d applying tha t philosoph y i n America n life . Accordin g t o Jaffa , th e Founders held that it is through the legislative process, not through the judicial process , tha t th e ideal s o f natura l justice ar e t o b e achieved . Jaffa base s his argument on the right of self-government i n and through the consent of the governed. In Jaffa's words : The "arbitrary will of another man" is not less arbitrary for being the will of a judge. It is no less arbitrary when intrinsically or naturally right, if it is imposed without tha t process—th e legislativ e process—whereb y th e consen t o f the governed enter s int o th e makin g o f th e law s tha t th e governe d ar e t o live under.126 Jaffa's positio n o n th e rol e o f th e Court i n the American constitu tional order i s similar to that advanced by Edwin Meese, Robert Bork, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and myriad other conservative proponents of a jurisprudence o f original intention (se e the Introduction). 127 Importantly, Jaffa, lik e the conservative originalists, misinterprets what the Declaratio n o f Independenc e mean s b y "th e consen t o f th e gov erned." Th e Declaration' s famou s phras e speak s t o ho w a legitimat e government is established, not to how government is to operate once it is established. It is the Constitution tha t addresses how government is to operate once established. And, as this section explains, the Constitution commission s the Cour t a s the principal interpreter o f the naturalrights politica l philosoph y o f th e America n regime . Tha t i s t o say ,

The Court 12 7 unless an d unti l th e peopl e revers e th e Court' s interpretatio n o f th e Constitution's underlying political philosophy by constitutional amendment or revolution, the Court's interpretation should be controlling. Although modern-day constitutional commentators have written and spoken i n considerabl e detai l abou t th e authoritativenes s o f th e Su preme Court' s interpretatio n o f th e Constitution , th e Founder s sai d very little—at leas t explicitly. 128 What little they did say does suppor t the notio n o f judicial finality. For instance , Alexander Hamilto n com ments i n The Federalist no . 8 1 o n th e "absurdit y i n subjectin g th e decisions of men, selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laboriou s study , to th e revision an d contro l o f men who , for want o f th e sam e advantage , canno t bu t b e deficien t i n tha t knowl edge,"129 an d Melancto n Smit h write s i n hi s "Letter s o f a Federa l Farmer" that "i t is proper that the federal judiciary should have ... th e power o f decidin g finally on th e law s o f th e union." 130 And wh o ca n forget Brutus's famous charge, "From this court there is no appeal? "131 James Madison is another o f the relatively few Founders who made express statement s abou t judicial finality. Madison i s ofte n cite d fo r support b y proponent s o f egalitaria n constitutiona l jurisprudence. 132 This interpretatio n o f Madison' s view s fail s t o appreciat e tha t Madi son's position o n judicial finality evolved durin g the cours e o f his life, not to mention that he lost the original debate on the role of the Court. Because Madiso n wa s s o importan t t o th e framin g an d ratificatio n o f the Constitution, it is necessary to consider his views on judicial finality in som e detail . B y s o doing , on e ma y se e th e evolvin g natur e o f hi s thoughts on the subject . In The Federalist no . 4 9 Madiso n write s tha t "th e severa l depart ments bein g perfectl y co-ordinat e b y th e term s o f thei r commission , neither o f them , it i s evident, ca n preten d t o a n exclusiv e o r superio r right o f settlin g th e boundarie s betwee n thei r respectiv e powers." 133 Similarly, in remarks made in the first Congress Madison noted that "in the ordinary course of Government, .. . th e exposition o f the laws and the Constitution devolve s upon the Judiciary," but he wondered "upo n what principl e i t ca n b e contended , tha t an y on e departmen t draw s from the Constitution greate r powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of the several departments." "Nothing," he argued, "has yet been offered t o invalidate the doctrine, that the meaning of the Constitution ma y a s wel l b e ascertaine d b y th e legislativ e a s b y th e

128 Th e Court judicial authority." 134 Bu t late r i n life , thoug h stil l contendin g tha t because th e Court , th e president , an d Congres s "ar e co-ordinate , an d each equall y boun d t o suppor t th e Constitution , .. . eac h mus t .. . b e guided by the text o f the Constitution accordin g to its own interpreta tions o f it, " Madison acknowledge d tha t th e Cour t "mos t familiarize s itself t o th e publi c attentio n a s th e expositor , b y th e order o f it s functions i n relatio n t o th e othe r departments. " A s a result , h e con cluded, the "ultimat e discussio n an d operativ e decision " on the mean ing o f th e Constitutio n belonge d t o th e Cour t becaus e th e Cour t wa s the fina l avenu e o f appea l withi n th e governmen t itself . Wha t thes e remarks suggest is that Madison came to accept that the Court, "when happily filled, " wa s th e "sures t exposito r o f th e Constitution " i n dis putes "concernin g th e boundaries between th e severa l departments of Government as in those between the Union and its members."135 In addition to the handful o f statements described above, the Founders' acceptance of judicial finality i s evident in the structure o f government they embodied i n the Constitution, 136* specifically i n the complementary mechanisms of separation of powers and checks and balances, which were designed to ensure that the three branches of the nationa l government wer e equa l to an d independen t o f eac h othe r s o th e gov ernment woul d no t becom e despotic. 137 What thi s mean s i n practica l terms is that, in the words of The Federalist, eac h branch must own "a constitutional control over the others." 138 The presiden t has , among othe r checks , a veto ove r congressiona l acts an d th e powe r t o nominat e federa l judges. Congress has , among other checks , the power to override presidential vetoes and to contro l the siz e an d jurisdiction o f th e federa l court s (withi n th e limit s to b e discussed i n chapte r 4) , as wel l a s th e powe r t o impeac h al l federa l officials. Withou t the power of definitive judicial review what check — what "constitutional control"—woul d th e Court have on the presiden t and Congress ? The answe r i s "none " and, as a consequence , the com * In th e absenc e o f explici t statement s b y th e Founders , structura l reasonin g provide s the best implicit evidence of their views. In other words, structural reasoning should be considered a subset of originalist methodology. Interestingly, some leading conservative originalists hav e invoke d structura l reasonin g t o reject th e notio n tha t th e Founder s intended fo r th e Supreme Cour t t o be the principal institutiona l protecto r o f individua l rights. See , fo r example , McDowell , "Postscript, " 108 ; Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, 318. As thi s sectio n shows , I strongl y disagre e wit h th e conservatives ' readin g o f th e structure of the Constitution.

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plementary mechanism s o f separatio n o f power s an d check s an d bal ances strongly impl y that the Founders commissione d th e Court as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution . The Constitution' s principa l objectiv e o f protectin g natura l right s also intimate s tha t th e Founder s intende d fo r th e Cour t t o hav e th e final sa y i n constitutiona l interpretation , becaus e th e Cour t i s th e branch o f governmen t mos t immun e fro m majoritaria n pressures . I n the thoughtful word s of Justice Brennan : It is the very purpose of a Constitution—and particularly of the Bill of Rights— to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities. The majoritaria n proces s canno t be expecte d t o rectif y claim s of minority right that arise a s a response t o th e outcome s o f tha t very majoritarian process.139 Hence, th e nee d fo r th e judiciary—the lon e branc h o f th e nationa l government tha t i s no t directl y accountabl e t o majoritaria n pro cesses—to safeguar d individua l an d minority rights through the defin itive exercis e o f judicial review . Madison' s June 8 , 1789 , speech t o th e U.S. House o f Representative s upo n introducin g hi s proposal fo r a Bill of Rights illustrates that the Founders were well aware of this fact: If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will conside r themselve s i n a peculiar manne r the guardian s o f thos e rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon right s expressl y stipulate d fo r i n th e constitutio n b y th e declaratio n of rights.140 Many conservativ e originalist s maintai n tha t th e politica l proces s adequately protect s th e right s of the entir e American political commu nity.141 A s Brennan' s an d Madison' s remark s mak e clear, 142 however , this vie w fail s t o accoun t fo r th e self-intereste d natur e o f politica l mgyorities. This chapter has described how th e Founders came to vie w the Cour t as a n indispensable chec k o n the machination s o f th e politi cal proces s i n th e are a o f individua l rights . Th e conservativ e origi nalists* emphasis o n representation a s the vehicle throug h which rights are to be protected therefore turn s the Founders' position on its head. Closely relate d t o th e Court' s rol e i n th e Constitution' s syste m o f separation o f power s an d check s an d balance s ar e consideration s o f institutional competence. These consideration s suggest that the Found-

130 Th e Cour t ers empowered th e Cour t with th e final sa y in constitutional interpreta tion. Th e mos t obviou s o f thes e consideration s relate s t o on e jus t discussed: th e Cour t i s mor e insulate d fro m majoritaria n pressure s than th e othe r institution s o f American governmen t are . The Constitu tion provides federal judges wit h life tenure, unless impeached, a salar y that canno t b e decreased , and , mos t importantly , th e benefi t o f no t having t o ru n fo r election . Give n thes e uniqu e institutiona l safeguards , judges ar e relatively free t o make decision s without worryin g about th e personal politica l ramifications. 143 The Court' s relativ e freedo m fro m politica l pressur e als o enable s i t to wor k i n a n environmen t conduciv e t o discernin g th e meanin g o f th e Constitution, includin g th e ofte n abstrac t natur e o f th e Constitution' s underlying natural-right s politica l philosophy . I n Alexande r Bicker s well-known language , "Court s hav e certai n capacitie s fo r dealin g wit h matters o f principl e tha t legislature s an d executive s d o no t possess . Judges have , or shoul d have , the leisure , the training, and the insulatio n to follo w th e way s o f th e schola r i n pursuin g th e end s o f govern ment." 144 An d a s par t 1 described, th e "en d o f government " accordin g to the principles o f the American regim e is the protection o f the natura l rights of the American people . The advantages the Court potentially enjoy s i n matters of epistemol ogy shoul d no t b e overlooked . (Suggestion s fo r helpin g t o actualiz e this potentia l wil l b e offere d i n chapte r 4. ) Locke' s discussio n i n hi s Essays on the Law of Nature o f th e epistemologica l difficultie s o f discerning natura l la w bears repeating : Some people here raise an objection agains t the law of nature, namely that there is no such law in existence at all, since it can nowhere be found, for most people live as though there was no rational ground in life at all nor any law of such a kind that all men recognize it. .. . If indeed natural law were discernible by the ligh t o f reason , wh y is it that no t al l people wh o possess reaso n hav e knowledge of it? .. . I admit tha t al l people ar e b y nature endowe d wit h reason , an d I say tha t natural la w ca n b e know n b y reason , bu t from thi s i t doe s no t necessaril y follow that it is known to any and every one. For there are some who make no use o f th e ligh t o f reaso n bu t prefe r darknes s an d woul d no t wis h t o sho w themselves to themselves. ... There are others, brought up in vice, who scarcely distinguish between good and evil , becaus e a ba d wa y o f life , becomin g stron g b y laps e o f time , ha s established barbarous habits, and evil customs have perverted even matters of

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principle. In others, again, through natural defect, th e acumen of the mind is too dull to be able to bring to light those secret decrees of nature.145 Many o f th e Founder s agree d wit h Locke' s clai m tha t onl y a selec t few ar e able to discer n the self-evident truth s of natural law. Jefferson , through hi s Bil l fo r th e Mor e Genera l Diffusio n o f Knowledge , wa s addressing the point (see chapte r 1) . Jefferson's view s on the existenc e and rol e o f th e so-calle d "natura l aristocracy " ar e clearl y state d i n a n 1813 lette r t o Joh n Adam s (wh o wa s i n agreemen t wit h Jefferso n o n the subject): 146 For I agree there is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. .. . Th e natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift o f nature , fo r th e instruction , th e trusts , and government o f society . .. . May we no t eve n say , tha t tha t for m o f governmen t i s best , whic h provide s most effectually fo r a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices o f government?147 Although i t i s frequentl y argue d tha t Jefferso n distruste d th e judi ciary, i t i s mor e appropriate t o sa y h e distruste d Joh n Marshal l an d other like-minde d Federalist-part y judges. 148 Jefferson's questionin g o f the authoritativenes s o f judicia l interpretation s o f th e Constitutio n came onl y after th e Federalist s showe d thei r politica l color s o n th e Court. Jefferson's earlie r favorabl e opinio n abou t th e potentia l o f th e judiciary i s eviden t i n a 178 9 lette r tryin g t o convinc e Madiso n o f the necessity o f adding a bill of rights to the Constitution : Your thoughts on the subject of the Declaration of rights in the letter of Oct. 17 I have weighed with satisfaction. Some of them had not occurred to me before, but were acknowledged just in the moment they were presented to my mind. In the argument s in favor o f a declaration o f rights, you omit one which has great weigh t wit h me , th e lega l chec k whic h i t put s int o th e hand s o f th e judiciary. This is a body, which i f rendered independent , an d kept strictly to their own department merits great confidence fo r their learning and integrity. In fact what degree of confidence woul d be too much for a body composed of such men as Wythe, Blair, and Pendleton?149 Madison, lik e Jefferso n an d Adams, subscribe d t o th e idea l o f gov ernment by natural aristocracy. 150 Though he initially rejected the argument that the Court should have the final say in constitutional interpre tation, Madiso n cam e t o appreciate , a s earlie r noted , tha t th e Court , "when happily filled," would b e th e "sures t expositor" of al l matters o f constitutional interpretation. 151 And what Madison undoubtedly ha d in

132 Th e Court mind whe n h e referred t o a Court "happil y filled," and wha t Jefferso n surely mean t whe n h e mentione d th e name s o f "Wythe , Blair , an d Pendleton," was the necessity of selecting judges of extraordinary ability—members of the "natural aristocracy," as they phrased it. A subject to be discussed at length in chapter 4, it is worth emphasizing here that the role of the Court prescribed in this volume requires that any person appointed t o th e Suprem e Cour t b e o f exceptiona l ability . Charle s Pinckney capture d thi s point succinctl y whe n he remarked a t the fed eral Convention tha t "th e importance o f the Judiciary will require men of first talents."152 Finally, the Court should have the final say in constitutional interpretation becaus e ther e ar e n o feasibl e alternatives . Thi s chapte r ha s suggested why neither the president nor Congress should have the final say: because of the resulting threat of majoritarian tyranny. 153 The only other alternative is an egalitarian approach to constitutional interpreta tion, an approach once embraced by Madison himself. There ar e certainl y compellin g reason s fo r adoptin g a n egalitaria n approach to constitutional interpretation. First is the danger of "judicial supremacy"—a danger identified b y Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Frankli n Roosevelt , Nixon , an d Reagan—wherei n unelecte d judges are said to possess unchecked governmental power. Given their experience wit h th e tyrann y o f th e Britis h crown , i t i s barely imagin able that the Founders intended judicial supremacy. Another argumen t i n favo r o f a n egalitaria n approac h t o constitu tional interpretatio n i s that i t recognizes th e valu e o f a constitutiona l dialogue. As Sanford Levinso n explains, egalitarian constitutional jurisprudence identifies "the Constitution as a public source of social understanding an d th e concomitan t abilit y o f al l citizen s t o shar e i n th e debates abou t th e meanin g o f ou r tenuousl y share d life." 154 I n othe r words, all segments o f th e American polit y should pla y a n activ e rol e in discerning the meaning of the Constitution. In practice, to achieve a constitutional dialogu e th e America n people , speakin g primaril y through their elected representatives, would be required to ignore what they consider to be an incorrect judicial interpretation o f the Constitution—at leas t unti l tha t interpretatio n i s "wel l settled," 155 whateve r that means. There are even more compelling reasons for rejecting an egalitarian approach t o constitutiona l interpretation . Fo r one , tha t approach , a t

The Court 13 3 least in its Jeffersonian manifestation , leads to executive supremacy by permitting the president to refuse t o execute laws passed by Congress and decisions issued b y the Cour t with which he disagrees. 156 Clearly, the Founders, who pointedly condemned the tyranny of the king in the Declaration of Independence, opposed that state of affairs . An egalitaria n approac h t o constitutiona l interpretatio n shoul d b e rejected als o because , withou t a final interpreter o f th e Constitution , constitutional gridloc k woul d likel y result . Fo r thi s nation s (indeed , any nation's ) governmen t t o work , som e branc h mus t hav e th e final say. Otherwise , nothin g wil l b e settled , an d n o one' s right s wil l b e secure—a situatio n patentl y a t odd s wit h th e Founders ' conceptio n of government. But the most important reasons for rejecting an egalitarian approach to constitutiona l interpretatio n ar e thos e discusse d i n thi s section : because th e Founder s committe d thi s nation t o protecting individual s from majoritaria n tyranny , becaus e th e Cour t is , a t leas t potentially , more o f a meritocrac y tha n th e politica l branches , an d becaus e th e Court operates in an environment conduciv e to discerning the dictate s of an often abstrac t natural-rights political philosophy. This chapter has endeavored to show that the Founders commissione d the Cour t a s th e principa l guardia n o f th e America n people' s natura l rights. To that end, I examined cases and historical materials that have been examine d man y time s before . Bu t wha t I sough t t o d o i s t o provide a revised readin g o f those case s an d materials , a reading tha t is i n keepin g wit h th e America n Founding' s commitmen t t o natura l rights. Admittedly, th e historica l recor d o n th e origin s an d scop e o f judicial revie w i s no t unambiguou s (especiall y whe n interprete d i n light o f modern predilections) . I f i t were , scholar s woul d no t hav e disagreed abou t thes e issue s fo r s o long . In essence, however, wha t I have tried to explai n i s that a definitive powe r o f judicial review is an indispensable feature o f any government dedicated to securing natural rights, a conclusio n t o whic h th e Founder s wer e gradually led , given their increasingly unpleasant experiences with representation. To ensur e tha t th e Founders ' visio n o f th e Cour t a s th e principa l guardian o f th e America n people' s natura l right s i s respecte d b y th e Court today, appropriate check s must be placed on the Court. Chapter 4 discusses these checks.

4 Checks o n the Cour t

The theor y o f constitutiona l interpretatio n advance d i n thi s volum e affords th e Suprem e Cour t immens e authority . To prevent the Court' s role as the ultimate interpreter o f the Constitution fro m devolvin g into the unacceptable state of government by judiciary, checks on the Court are essential— a poin t surprisingl y neglecte d i n virtuall y al l o f th e volumes on constitutional interpretation. 1 And what those checks must ensure i s tha t th e Cour t interpret s th e Constitutio n i n ligh t o f it s underlying natural-right s philosophy , instea d o f o n th e basi s o f th e personal moral and political preferences o f individual justices. This chapter consider s five potential checks on the Supreme Court's interpretive authority : restricting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, the Article 5 amendment process, impeachment, judicial self-restraint, an d the appointmen t process . Althoug h othe r constraint s o n th e Cour t exist—for example , the force o f public opinion, the press, and scholar134

Checks on the Court 13 5 ship—the five discusse d her e ar e th e mos t significan t constitutional constraints. I begin b y examinin g th e appropriatenes s o f limitin g th e Court's appellate jurisdiction. Limiting th e Court' s Appellate Jurisdictio n With th e possible , albei t significant , exception s o f Justic e Josep h Story's opinion i n Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816) 2 and the views of one o r tw o constitutiona l scholars, 3 i t ha s lon g bee n agree d tha t th e Constitution does not require the existence of the lower federal courts . Two point s suppor t thi s nearl y unanimou s view : th e unambiguou s language of Article 3 and the records of the Constitutional Conventio n of 1787. Article 3 provides i n pertinent par t tha t "th e judicial Powe r o f th e United States , shal l b e veste d i n on e suprem e Court , and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."4 Th e languag e i s clear : Although th e Suprem e Cour t mus t exist, th e lowe r federa l court s ma y not . Indeed , muc h debat e too k place in the Constitutional Conventio n abou t whethe r the state court s or the lower federal court s should serve as the initial forum fo r resolving dispute s involvin g federa l law . A compromis e wa s reached , an d that compromise , reflecte d i n Article 3 , leaves th e establishmen t an d jurisdiction of the lower federal court s to the discretion of Congress. The statu s o f th e Suprem e Court' s jurisdiction i s no t a s clear . Although Article 3 requires tha t th e Supreme Cour t have "original Jurisdiction .. . i n al l Case s affectin g Ambassadors , othe r publi c Minister s and Consuls , an d thos e i n whic h a Stat e shal l b e Party, " i n al l othe r cases arising under federal law "the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, bot h a s t o La w an d Fact , with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make"b Th e question to be addressed her e is the meanin g of the so-called "exception s clause." Unfortunately, th e record s o f th e Constitutiona l Conventio n o n th e meaning of the exceptions clause ar e meager an d uninformative. 6 I t is therefore necessar y to turn to the decisions of the Supreme Court. The congressional proposals to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court have arisen from dissatisfactio n wit h specific decision s made b y th e Court , thos e concernin g schoo l prayer , abortion , an d

136 Check s on the Court busing, for example . The moder n Court , however , ha s no t ha d t o ad dress th e constitutionalit y o f th e proposal s becaus e non e hav e bee n passed b y Congress. In fact, th e Court has directly ruled o n the meaning o f th e exception s claus e o n onl y tw o occasion s i n it s history. 7 Unfortunately, thos e tw o occasion s provid e littl e guidance , becaus e they point in opposite directions. The firs t cas e i n whic h th e Suprem e Cour t directl y rule d o n th e meaning of the exceptions clause is Ex Parte McCardle (1868). 8 In that case th e Court refuse d t o decid e th e constitutionalit y o f Congress' s post-Civil Wa r Reconstructio n polic y becaus e th e challeng e wa s brought by way of a writ of habeas corpu s and—this i s the importan t point—Congress ha d repeale d th e habea s corpu s statut e throug h which th e appea l wa s filed—an actio n tha t th e Cour t rule d Congres s had th e constitutiona l authorit y t o take . Although Ex Parte McCardle might appea r t o b e a preceden t fo r broa d congressiona l powe r t o withdraw th e Court' s appellat e jurisdiction, mos t constitutiona l schol ars recogniz e tha t ther e wer e alternativ e avenue s o f habea s corpu s review availabl e t o th e petitione r i n tha t cas e and , hence , th e cas e should no t b e construe d a s sanctionin g wide-rangin g congressiona l power ove r th e Court' s appellat e jurisdiction. 9 Th e Cour t itsel f s o implied in the very next term in Ex Parte Yerger (1869).10 The othe r Suprem e Cour t cas e o f not e i s United States v. Klein (1872).u There , th e Cour t struc k dow n a statut e enacte d unde r th e exceptions clause because the statute was nothing more than a thinlyveiled attemp t b y Congress t o dictat e th e outcom e o f th e case . Although som e scholar s argu e tha t Klein nevertheles s accepte d th e au thority o f Congres s t o withdra w th e Court' s appellat e jurisdiction o n all bu t suc h result-oriente d occasions, 12 tha t argumen t overlook s th e fact that attempts by Congress to exercise the exceptions clause power have been, and are likely to continue to be, motivated by concerns with how the Court has decided or might decide a specific question . Although th e Founders an d the Suprem e Cour t may have said littl e about th e meanin g o f th e exception s clause , constitutiona l scholar s have said a lot. Many scholars, looking primarily at the language of the exceptions clause, contend that Congress has the constitutional powe r to abolish all of the Court's appellate jurisdiction (though most of these same scholar s believ e tha t suc h a n exercis e o f congressiona l powe r would b e unwise). 13 This broad readin g o f the exception s claus e fail s

Checks on the Court 13 7 to recognize "tha t in a legal context neither an exception nor a regulation can destroy the essential characteristics o f the subject t o which it applies."14 I n othe r words , th e ter m "exceptions " implie s tha t some appellate jurisdictio n i s retained ; indeed , i t suggest s tha t th e major portion o f appellat e jurisdictio n i s retained , becaus e otherwis e th e "exception" would trump the "rule." Moreover, thos e scholar s wh o argu e tha t Congres s ha s unlimite d authority t o restric t th e Suprem e Court' s appellat e jurisdiction disre gard the "internal " and "external " restraints o n Congress' s power. "Internal" restraints ar e thos e implie d b y Article 3 . "External" restraint s are those flowing from th e other provisions of the Constitution. 15 The idea that there are restraints in Article 3 on Congress's authority to limi t th e Suprem e Court' s appellat e jurisdiction originate d wit h a 1953 law review article by Henry Hart. In that articl e Hart argues tha t any exercise o f the exception s claus e b y Congress "mus t not b e suc h as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitu tional plan."16 Hart's position certainly has common-sense appeal. After all, i f th e argumen t tha t Congres s ca n withdra w all o f th e Court' s appellate jurisdiction i s couple d wit h Congress' s authorit y t o abolis h the lower federal courts , the federal judiciary could be reduced to one court, the Supreme Court, exercising original jurisdiction whe n a state or a ranking foreign diploma t is a party.17 As chapter 3 explained, such a limited role for the Court is not what the Founders' Constitution envisions. While Hart did not defin e th e scop e o f what has become know n a s the "essential functions" thesis, 18 other legal scholars have, most notably Leonar d Ratner , wh o disagree s wit h thos e wh o believ e tha t th e "'essential functions ' thesi s i s littl e mor e tha n constitutiona l wishfu l thinking."19 Accordin g t o Ratner , th e essentia l function s o f th e Su preme Court are "to maintain the supremacy and uniformity o f federa l law." Followin g Hart' s lead , Ratne r conclude s tha t Congres s canno t limit th e Court' s appellat e jurisdictio n i f thos e essentia l function s would b e jeopardized, becaus e t o do so would b e "[inconsisten t wit h the constitutional plan." 20 Surprisingly, Ratner fails to identify th e protection o f individual and minority right s from majoritaria n excesse s a s a n essentia l functio n o f the Supreme Court, a function tha t this volume has repeatedly empha sized. I n fact , i n th e contex t o f th e debat e ove r limitin g th e Court' s

138 Check s o n the Cour t appellate jurisdiction , thi s functio n ha s bee n largel y forgotten . Th e Court's indispensabl e rol e i n checkin g th e politica l branche s ha s not , however, bee n los t o n Raou l Berger. In Berger's words : The Founder s wer e deepl y concerne d with , an d i n n o littl e par t designe d judicial revie w a s a restrain t on , Congressional excesses . I f th e Cour t wa s intended t o cur b Congressional excesse s in appropriately presente d "case s or controversies," and i f an attemp t t o exercise tha t powe r might be blocked by Congress a s a judicia l "excess, " the n th e Conventio n wa s aimlessl y goin g in circles.21 Briefly stated , the essentia l functio n o f th e Suprem e Cour t i s t o protect th e natura l right s o f th e America n peopl e (se e chapte r 3) . Any effort b y Congres s t o "except " thi s functio n fro m th e Court' s appellat e jurisdiction woul d therefor e b e illegitimate. 22 There ar e als o constitutiona l restraint s "external " t o Articl e 3 o n Congress's authorit y t o limi t th e Suprem e Court' s appellat e jurisdic tion. Th e mos t importan t i s th e Bil l o f Rights . Eve n assumin g tha t th e Article 3 exception s claus e di d initiall y provid e Congres s wit h unlim ited authorit y t o withdra w th e Court' s appellat e jurisdiction , tha t au thority wa s revoke d whe n th e Bil l of Rights was adde d t o the Constitu tion. B y definition, i f a n amendmen t t o th e Constitutio n i s inconsisten t with a provisio n i n th e bod y o f th e Constitution , th e amendmen t take s precedence. And whe n th e Bil l of Rights was adde d t o the Constitutio n to hel p safeguar d individua l an d minorit y right s fro m th e excesse s o f the politica l process , Congres s los t an y powe r i t ma y hav e arguabl y had t o restric t th e Court' s appellat e jurisdictio n ove r thos e rights . T o put i t anothe r way , th e basi c messag e o f th e Bil l o f Right s i s tha t fundamental right s ar e of f limit s t o majoritaria n abuse . Henc e th e need fo r providin g th e Suprem e Cour t wit h wide-rangin g appellat e jurisdiction, fo r th e Cour t i s th e lon e branc h o f th e America n govern ment no t strictl y accountabl e t o majoritaria n pressure s (se e chapte r 3). Even scholar s wh o believ e tha t Congres s ha s plenary authorit y ove r the jurisdictio n o f th e federa l court s agre e tha t th e implici t equa l protection guarante e o f the fifth amendment 23 prohibit s Congres s fro m employing it s authority t o den y groups lik e Blacks or alien s the right of Supreme Cour t appellate review. 24 But why should the fifth amendmen t be an y mor e importan t tha n th e othe r amendment s t o th e Constitutio n that see k t o protec t individua l an d minorit y rights ? N o persuasiv e answer t o this question ha s been, o r ca n be , provided .

Checks on the Court 13 9 The complementar y mechanism s o f separatio n o f power s an d checks an d balance s impos e a n additiona l externa l restrain t o n Con gress's authorit y t o limi t th e Suprem e Court' s appellat e jurisdiction . One of the most articulate statements of this view comes from Willia m French Smith, President Ronald Reagan's first attorney general. In 1982, then attorney general Smith responded to an inquiry from the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committe e about the constitutionality o f a bill sponsored b y Nort h Carolin a Senato r Jess e Helm s t o withdra w th e Court's appellate jurisdiction i n cases relating to "voluntary" prayer in the publi c schools . Smit h informe d th e chairma n tha t Congres s ma y not constitutionally make "exceptions" to Supreme Court jurisdiction which would intrude upon the core functions o f the Supreme Court as an independent an d equal branch i n our system o f separatio n o f powers [an d that] Congress can limit the Suprem e Court's appellate jurisdiction only up to the point where it impairs the Court's core functions in the constitutional scheme.25 As Smith' s remark s suggest , on e o f th e essentia l principle s o f th e Constitution is that each branch of the national government must have the means to defend itsel f against the unwarranted actions of the other branches o f th e government . Plenar y congressiona l contro l ove r th e Court's appellat e jurisdictio n woul d violat e thi s principl e becaus e i t would render the Court defenseless. As chapter 3 pointed out , without the powe r o f judicial review , the Cour t woul d hav e n o chec k o n th e actions o f Congres s an d th e president, a state of affairs tha t the com plementary mechanism s o f separatio n o f powers an d check s an d bal ances will not permit. Senator Barry Goldwater got to the heart of the matter whe n h e cam e ou t i n 198 2 against th e flurry of court-strippin g bills sponsore d b y Senato r Helms , amon g others , becaus e suc h bill s are, i n effect , effort s "t o overrid e constitutiona l decisions o f th e Su preme Cour t b y a simpl e bill." 26 I f th e decision s o f th e Cour t ar e thought t o b e i n erro r ther e i s a mor e constitutionall y appropriat e means of redress: the Article 5 amendment process. The Articl e 5 Amendment Proces s "The idea o f amendin g the organi c instrumen t o f a stat e i s peculiarly American," writes Lester Bernhardt Orfield in his 1942 study on amend-

140 Check s o n the Cour t ing th e federa l Constitution , th e first comprehensiv e examinatio n o f the subject. 27 Th e notio n tha t a constitutio n ma y b e amende d flows from anothe r "peculiarl y American " idea : popula r sovereignty . Unde r the doctrin e o f popula r sovereignty , th e peopl e ma y mak e a constitu tion. And i f they ma y mak e a constitution , i t follows tha t the y ma y als o revise an d amen d tha t constitution . The fac t tha t s o littl e ha d bee n writte n o n th e amendmen t proces s as lat e a s 1942—an d no t muc h mor e today 2 8 —is surprising , give n th e importance o f th e process . Th e amendmen t proces s i s perhap s th e most importan t par t o f a constitution , becaus e a formal mechanis m fo r change is essential fo r th e very survival of the state. Renowned politica l scientist John Burges s mad e th e point wel l many years ago : A complete constitutio n ma y be said to consist o f three fundamental parts . The first i s th e organizatio n o f th e stat e fo r th e accomplishmen t o f futur e changes in the constitution. This is usually called the amending clause, and the power whic h i t describes an d regulates i s called th e amendin g power. This is the most important part of a constitution. Upon its existence and truthfulness , i.e., its correspondence wit h real and natural conditions, depends the question as t o whethe r th e stat e shal l develo p wit h peacefu l continuit y o r shal l suffe r alternations o f stagnation, retrogression an d revolution. A constitution, whic h may be imperfect an d erroneous in its other parts, can be easily supplemented and corrected , i f only the state be truthfully organize d i n the constitution; but if this be not accomplished, error will accumulate until nothing short of revolution can save the life of a state.29 The amendin g proces s o f th e Unite d State s Constitutio n i s enumer ated i n Articl e 5 , whic h provide s essentiall y tw o way s i n whic h th e Constitution ma y b e amended. 30 Th e first wa y i s upo n th e proposa l o f two-thirds o f bot h house s o f Congress , i f th e propose d amendmen t is subsequentl y ratifie d b y three-fourth s o f th e states , whethe r tha t ratification i s b y th e stat e legislature s o r b y specia l stat e convention s called fo r th e purpos e o f ratification . Th e secon d wa y th e Constitutio n may b e amende d i s by a specia l conventio n calle d b y two-thirds o f th e states, if , again , th e propose d amendmen t i s subsequentl y ratifie d b y three-fourths o f th e states . T o date , onl y th e first alternativ e ha s bee n utilized. The Founder s intende d th e Articl e 5 amendmen t proces s t o b e a peaceful substitut e fo r revolution . Georg e Maso n mad e th e poin t di rectly whe n h e remarked a t th e Constitutiona l Conventio n o f 178 7 tha t amendments t o th e Constitutio n woul d occasionall y b e necessar y an d

Checks on the Court 14 1 that i t woul d "b e bette r t o provid e fo r them , i n a n easy , regula r an d Constitutional wa y tha n t o trus t t o chanc e an d violence." 31 Abraha m Lincoln, who understoo d th e philosophica l underpinning s o f the Con stitution better than any statesman since the Founding, 32 demonstrated an appreciatio n o f th e relationshi p betwee n th e Article 5 amendmen t process an d revolutio n i n hi s first inaugura l address . "Thi s country , with it s institutions , belong s t o th e peopl e wh o inhabi t it, " Lincol n exclaimed. "Wheneve r the y shal l gro w wear y o f th e existin g Govern ment, the y ca n exercis e thei r constitutional righ t o f amendin g i t o r their revolutionary righ t to dismember or overthrow it." 33 The Articl e 5 amendment proces s i s difficult, 34 a s i s illustrate d b y the fac t tha t th e proces s ha s bee n successfull y employe d o n onl y twenty-seven35 occasions in the more-than-two-hundred-year histor y of the Constitution . Man y critic s emphasiz e th e difficult y o f th e forma l amendment process and make two related claims; first, that Article 5 is an ineffectiv e chec k o n th e Cour t an d second , tha t Articl e 5 i s a n unworkable mechanism for coping with modern circumstances unfore seen b y th e Founder s and , thus , shoul d no t b e use d a s a chec k o n the Court. The problem wit h criticizin g th e difficult y o f th e Articl e 5 amendment process is that this criticism overlooks the fact that the Founders intended t o make the process difficult . I f the amendment process wa s easy, James Madison explains in The Federalist no. 49, the Constitution would be deprive d "o f that veneration" that i s so essential to politica l stability.36 And, as seen in part 1 , the Founders thought political stability essential to the security of natural rights. Turning specificall y t o th e effectivenes s o f Article 5 as a chec k o n the Court, Stephen Carter, for one , argues that toda y "article V is very nearly a dea d letter . The contentio n tha t i t provides a realisti c chec k on judicia l activit y i s a t bes t wishfu l thinking , certainl y somewha t naive, an d a t wors t disingenuous." 37 Here , i t mus t b e recalle d tha t Article 5 ha s bee n successfull y employe d a s a chec k o n th e Court . Six o f th e twenty-seve n amendment s t o th e Constitutio n wer e direc t responses t o Suprem e Cour t decision s th e natio n though t wer e i n error. The eleventh amendment reversed Chisholm v. Georgia (1793),38 which decided that a state could be sued in federal cour t by a plaintiff from anothe r state . Th e thirteenth , fourteenth , an d fifteenth amend ments reverse d Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), 39 a decisio n tha t rele -

142 Check s on the Court gated Blacks to the status of property. The sixteenth amendment over ruled Pollack v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company (1895), 40 whic h struck down a federal income tax. Finally, the twenty-sixth amendmen t was ratified i n 197 1 to revers e Oregon v. Mitchell (1970), 41 a decisio n that voided a congressional attemp t t o lowe r the minimum voting age in state and local elections to eighteen. Any argument that the Article 5 amendment process is incapable of providing a check on judicial activity is , therefore, historicall y inaccurate . The proces s ma y b e difficult , but that is because the Founders intended it to be. Moreover, the quick passage o f th e twenty-sixt h amendmen t show s tha t th e proces s ca n work expeditiously if the nation strongly disagrees with a ruling issued by the Court. Next, i t i s necessar y t o conside r th e criticis m tha t th e Articl e 5 amendment proces s canno t effectivel y dea l wit h moder n problem s unforeseen b y th e Founders—an d th e consequence s o f tha t allege d ineffectiveness fo r th e Court . Walte r Murph y raise s thi s criticis m i n particularly dramati c fashion: "I f the United State s had to undergo the delay an d uncertaint y o f th e amendin g proces s ever y tim e a proble m arose tha t th e framer s ha d no t foresee n o r ha d foresee n i n suc h a different contex t as to distort their vision of later problems, the practical effects woul d destroy the nation." 42 For Murphy, the Article 5 amendment process should not be used as a chec k o n th e Court . Murphy share s Justice Brennan' s position , discussed a t lengt h i n th e Introduction , tha t th e Cour t mus t amen d th e Constitution whe n unforesee n circumstance s s o demand . I n addition , in a well-known essay , Murphy goes so far a s to contend that on some occasions th e Court should strike dow n amendments enacte d throug h the Article 5 process!43 According to Murphy, certain provisions in the Constitution ar e s o fundamenta l an d s o essentia l t o "huma n dignity " that an amendment repealing them should be declared unconstitutiona l by th e Court . (Murphy' s exampl e i s a n amendmen t endorsin g racia l discrimination.) Besides failing t o recognize tha t the natural-rights political philosophy o f the Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s flexible enough t o addres s today's circumstances (se e the next chapter), the problem with substituting the judicial process for th e Article 5 amendment process is that doing s o i s a n exercis e o f "forc e an d will " by th e Court , rathe r tha n "judgment,"44 an d i s therefor e a t odd s wit h th e wa y th e Constitutio n

Checks on the Court 14

3

mandates tha t fundamenta l chang e tak e place . Concomitantly , i t i s a threa t t o th e stabilit y o f th e Constitutio n itself . Presiden t Georg e Washington mad e thi s poin t forcefull y i n hi s legendar y farewel l ad dress: If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution of the Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way, which the Constitutio n designates . Bu t le t ther e b e n o chang e b y usurpation ; for, though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalanc e i n permanent evi l an y partial o r transient benefit , whic h the use can at any time yield.45* The seriousness wit h which th e Founder s took th e Article 5 amendment process i s likewis e illustrate d b y Elbridge Gerry' s observation i n the first Congress tha t "a n attempt t o amend " the Constitutio n i n "any other way " than b y Articl e 5 "ma y b e a hig h crim e o r misdemeanor, " impeachable unde r Articl e l, 46 a subjec t I conside r i n detai l below . Further, Articl e 5' s supermajorit y requirements—two-third s fo r pro posing and three-fourths fo r ratifying a n amendment—make i t unlikely that a "dignity-denying " scenari o lik e tha t hypothesize d b y Murph y would ever arise. f In summary, th e Article 5 amendment proces s provides a workable , albeit arduous, mechanism fo r reversing Suprem e Cour t decisions tha t the nation deems to be in error, including those concernin g th e Consti tution's underlyin g natural-right s politica l philosophy . Th e difficult y o f utilizing the formal amendmen t process for checking the Court is actu*The danger of substituting the judicial process for the Article 5 amendment process is illustrated b y Justic e Brennan' s action s durin g th e formativ e stage s o f Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), an important gender discrimination case. Although he was well aware the equal rights amendment had already passed Congress and was being acted upon by the states, Brennan nevertheless circulated a draft opinion that declared classification b y gende r constitutionall y impermissible . Brenna n argue d privatel y tha t there "was no reason to wait several years for the states to ratify the amendment" and proposed instead to author an opinion for the Court that "would have made the Equal Rights Amendment unnecessary. " Quoted i n Woodward an d Armstrong, The Brethren, 254. See generally Berns, Taking the Constitution Seriously, 229-31 . t If a dignity-denying scenario did arise, the political philosophy of the American regime provides a means of redress for the aggrieved individual or group: revolution. Although revolution may initially seem a draconian remedy, such is not the case for the theory of revolution embodied in the Declaration of Independence. According to the Declaration, revolution is resorted to cautiously and , if successfully employed , leads to the prompt formation of a new government. See chapter 1 and the Conclusion.

144 Check s o n th e Cour t ally a beneficia l aspec t o f th e process , give n th e institutiona l advan tages er\joye d b y th e Cour t i n discernin g th e ofte n abstrac t natur e o f the political philosophy o f the Declaratio n o f Independence .

Impeachment Impeachment i s th e mos t direc t constitutiona l chec k o n th e Court . I t has, however , bee n rarel y employe d i n practice , an d eve n mor e rarel y does i t resul t i n conviction . Samue l Chas e i s th e onl y membe r o f the Suprem e Cour t t o hav e face d impeachmen t proceedings—h e wa s impeached b y th e Hous e o f Representative s i n 1804 , bu t acquitte d by th e Senate—an d onl y te n lowe r federa l cour t judge s (a s o f Jul y 1994) hav e suffere d throug h th e proces s (seve n wer e actuall y re moved). 47 The limite d us e o f impeachmen t i n histor y ha s le d th e vas t majorit y of Cour t watcher s t o conclud e tha t impeachmen t i s to o difficult t o b e an effectiv e chec k o n th e Court . Thoma s Jefferson , fo r one , frequentl y criticized Congress' s us e o f it s impeachmen t powe r ove r th e Court , calling impeachmen t "no t eve n a scare-crow, " "nugatory, " an d "ineffi cient." 48 Turning fro m practic e t o theory , som e commentator s conside r im peachment t o b e to o blun t a chec k o n th e Court . Indeed , the y argu e that i t is good tha t impeachmen t ha s been rarel y use d i n practice. John Agresto's remark s ar e illustrativ e o f this view: Impeachment no t onl y verges o n the politicall y impossible , as Jefferson soo n found ou t when he tried it against the Federalist-dominated judiciary; it also, in a libera l society , ha s awkwar d moral-philosophica l implications . I n fact , th e reason impeachmen t i s impossible politically i s in large measure that it seems extremely inappropriat e morally . Impeachment o f sittin g justices fo r crimina l activity o r manifes t incompetenc e i s surely supportable . But impeachment t o remedy judicial decision s smack s to o muc h o f a punishment impose d fo r th e expression o f an opinion, for th e exercis e o f a duty laid upon on e by force o f oath and office, for the statement of a thoughtful judgment. 49 Chief Justic e Willia m Rehnquis t echoe s Agresto' s sentiment . "Th e impeachment powe r conferre d o n Congres s b y th e Constitution, " th e chief justic e write s i n a 199 1 article , "wa s sor t o f a 'wil d card ' whic h could hav e upse t th e check s an d balance s establishe d i n th e Constitu -

Checks on the Court 14 5 tion, an d o n tw o occasion s almos t di d so." 50 Lik e Agresto, Rehnquis t believes th e natio n i s fortunate tha t impeachmen t ha s not bee n mor e widely utilize d b y Congres s t o cur b th e Court. 51 Befor e directl y ad dressing the criticisms of impeachment, it is necessary to consider th e specific constitutiona l clauses relating to the process. The constitutiona l provision s bearin g o n impeachmen t ar e strew n throughout th e document . Althoug h th e Founder s focuse d mos t o f their discussions of impeachment on the president, Article 2, section 4, clearly contemplate s th e impeachabilit y o f federal judges i n its coverage o f "al l civi l Officer s o f th e Unite d States." 52 Article 1 , section 2 , states that the House "shall.. . have the sole Power of Impeachment, " and Articl e 1 , section 3 , gives th e Senat e "th e sole Powe r t o tr y al l Impeachments" an d als o require s fo r convictio n a two-third s vot e o f those senators present. Article 2 , section 4 , states tha t impeachabl e offense s ar e "Treason , Bribery, o r othe r hig h Crime s an d Misdemeanors, " whereas Article 3, section 1 , provides that federa l judges "shal l hold thei r Office s durin g good Behaviour." The punishments imposable upon conviction are "removal from Office , an d disqualification t o hold and ei\joy an y Office o f honor, Trus t o r Profi t unde r th e Unite d States," 53 an d th e presiden t cannot grant reprieves or pardons for the impeachment itself. 54 A host o f question s ar e raise d b y the various impeachmen t provis ions, bu t th e mos t importan t fo r presen t purposes—give n m y thesi s that th e Constitutio n shoul d b e interprete d i n accordanc e wit h th e natural-rights philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence , rathe r than i n ligh t o f th e mora l an d politica l preference s o f individua l justices—is: For what kinds of offenses ma y a justice be impeached? 55 The Constitution list s "Treason , Bribery , o r othe r hig h Crime s an d Misdemeanors" a s impeachabl e offenses. 56 I t i s eas y t o understan d what th e Constitution mean s b y "treason, " becaus e tha t offens e i s specifically an d narrowl y define d i n Articl e 3 , sectio n 3 : "Treaso n against th e Unite d State s shal l consis t onl y i n levyin g Wa r agains t them, or i n adhering to their Enemies , giving them Aid and Comfort. " Likewise, although not defined i n the Constitution, the offense o f "bribery" is readily understandable, since the Founders used the term in the traditional common-la w sens e o f th e givin g or takin g o f something of value i n exchang e fo r a politica l favor. 57 I t i s mor e difficul t t o kno w what the Constitution means by the catchall phrase "other high Crimes

146 Check s on the Court and Misdemeanors. " A carefu l examinatio n o f th e evolutio n o f th e phrase sheds light on its meaning. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 178 7 early agreed that official s o f th e ne w governmen t woul d no t er\jo y immunit y fro m prosecution fo r common-la w crimes . The Founder s foresa w a n over lapping bod y o f offense s fo r whic h federa l official s coul d b e im peached. Initially, they felt tha t neglect of duty, maladministration an d corrupt administration , an d misconduc t i n offic e shoul d b e th e onl y impeachable offenses , wit h common-la w crime s such a s treason, bribery, and felon y lef t t o th e court s t o address . On August 20 , 1787 , the Committee o f Detai l presente d a proposa l tha t woul d mak e federa l officials "liabl e to impeachment an d removal from offic e fo r neglect of duty, malversation, or corruption." On September 8,1787, however, the delegates debated a proposal that would make "Treason & bribery" the sole grounds o f impeachment. 58 Georg e Mason objected , an d the brief colloquy tha t ensue d marke d th e first an d onl y discussio n durin g th e Convention o f the phrase "othe r high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Mason began: Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bribery only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many great and dangerous offences. Hastings is no t guilt y o f Treason . Attempts t o subver t th e Constitutio n ma y no t be Treason as above defined—As bills of attainder which have saved the British Constitution ar e forbidden, i t is the more necessary to extend: the power of impeachments. He movd. to add after "bribery" "or maladministration."59 Mason's motion was seconded by Elbridge Gerry, 60 but James Madison objecte d o n th e groun d o f vagueness . "S o vagu e a ter m wil l b e equivalent t o a tenur e durin g pleasur e o f th e Senate, " Madiso n ar gued.61 Mason then "withdre w 'maladministration ' & substituted 'othe r high crimes & misdemeanors/ " 62 and the impeachment provision as it now appears in the Constitution was born. The phrase "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" has been subjec t to muc h debate . Th e mos t frequen t disput e i s whethe r criminalit y i s required for impeachment. Most scholars who have addressed the issue have concluded that impeachment is not limited to criminal offenses, 63 but a few have argued otherwise. 64 By far the most interesting—and contentious—interpretatio n o f the impeachment clause was that offered b y former president Gerald Ford, when Ford , a Republican , wa s servin g a s minorit y leade r o f th e U.S.

Checks on the Court 14 7 House o f Representatives . I n proposin g th e impeachmen t o f Justic e William Douglas, a liberal Democrat, i n April 1970 , Ford asserte d tha t an "impeachable offense " i s whatever the House and Senate "conside r it t o b e a t a give n momen t i n history." 65 Th e proble m wit h Ford' s interpretation i s that it gives Congress too much power over the Court (and th e president). As Raoul Berger succinctl y point s out , Ford "lai d claim to an illimitabl e power tha t rings strangely i n American ears." 66 After all , the Founder s designe d a system o f checks and balances an d separation o f powers precisely because they sought to avoid too much power in one set of hands.67 The meaning of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is discernible if it is recognized that the Founders considered impeachment to be apolitical punishment for apolitical offens e agains t the state, with "political" being conceived o f i n the nobl e sens e o f th e word, rather tha n i n th e crassly partisan term s proposed b y Ford. (I n seekin g to impeac h Justice Douglas , Ford wa s reactin g t o th e rejectio n o f tw o o f Presiden t Nixon's nominee s t o th e Suprem e Cour t an d t o Warre n Cour t liberal ism generally. ) The Federalist no . 7 9 expressly reject s th e notio n o f partisan impeachments. There, Hamilton declares that "inability" is not in and o f itself a n impeachabl e offens e becaus e "a n attempt to fix the boundary betwee n th e region s o f abilit y an d inabilit y woul d muc h oftener giv e scop e t o persona l an d part y attachment s an d enmitie s than advance the interests of justice or the public good." 68 The political nature o f impeachmen t i s central to the English tradition on which the Founders based their understanding of the process.69 According t o Englis h practice , a "high " crim e o r misdemeano r wa s distinguishable from a n ordinary crime or misdemeanor on the ground that th e forme r require d proo f o f a n "iryur y to th e commonwealth — that is, to the state and to its constitution." 70 The Constitutional Conventio n debate s reflect th e Founders' understanding o f th e politica l natur e o f impeachment . I n complainin g tha t the proposa l limitin g impeachmen t t o "Treaso n & bribery" wa s to o narrow, Maso n allude d t o th e contemporar y Britis h impeachmen t o f Warren Hastings (th e governor-general o f India) as being not for trea son, but fo r a n attemp t t o "subver t th e Constitution." 71 Althoug h Mason's proposa l t o ad d th e ter m "maladministration " t o th e lis t o f im peachable offense s wa s withdraw n upo n Madison' s vaguenes s objection,72 th e accepte d alternative—"othe r hig h Crime s an d Misde -

148 Check s o n th e Cour t meanors"—was understoo d t o encompas s attempt s t o "subver t th e Constitution" an d othe r seriou s offenses , bot h civi l an d criminal , against the state. 73 The Federalist plainl y indicate s tha t impeachmen t wa s designe d t o address politica l offense s agains t th e state . I n The Federalist no . 65 , Hamilton writes : A well-constituted cour t for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult t o be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects o f its jurisdiction ar e those offenses whic h proceed from the misconduct o f publi c men , or , i n othe r words , fro m th e abus e o r violatio n o f som e public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL , a s the y relat e chiefl y t o ir\jurie s don e immediatel y t o th e society itself.74 An examinatio n o f th e ratificatio n debate s likewis e illustrate s th e generally understoo d politica l natur e o f impeachment . Fo r example , James Iredel l remarke d i n the Nort h Carolin a ratifying conventio n tha t impeachment "wil l aris e fro m act s o f grea t injur y t o th e community," 75 and i n Massachusett s a delegat e observe d tha t impeachmen t woul d li e against an y federa l officia l wh o "dar e t o abus e th e power s veste d i n him by the people." 76 Finally, remark s b y James Wilso n an d Thoma s Jefferso n durin g th e early years o f government unde r th e Constitutio n manifes t th e politica l nature o f th e impeachmen t power . Wilso n mad e th e poin t unambigu ously i n hi s Lectures on Law o f 1790-92 : "I n th e Unite d State s . . . impeachments ar e confine d t o politica l characters , t o politica l crime s and misdemeanors , an d t o politica l punishments." 77 Wit h respec t t o President Jefferson , althoug h h e likel y sought t o impeac h Justic e Sam uel Chas e fo r overridingl y partisa n reasons , th e justification Jefferso n used fo r hi s actio n wa s pu t i n mor e noble , philosophical terms : Chas e had allegedl y engage d i n a "seditiou s officia l attac k upo n th e principle s of ou r Constitution." 78 (Chase , a Federalist , ha d bee n usin g hi s gran d jury charge s a s occasion s t o criticiz e severa l Jeffersonian policies.) 79 The politica l natur e o f th e impeachmen t powe r suggest s tha t a Supreme Cour t justic e willfull y substitutin g hi s o r he r ow n persona l political philosoph y fo r th e politica l philosoph y o f th e Constitutio n should b e impeached. 80 Indeed , a s earlie r noted , Elbridg e Gerr y re marked i n th e first Congres s tha t "a n attemp t t o amend " th e Constitu tion i n "an y othe r way " than b y the Article 5 amendment proces s "ma y

Checks on the Court 14 9 be a high crime or misdemeanor" impeachabl e unde r Article l. 81 Afte r all, nothing goes more to the heart of the Constitution than the naturalrights political philosophy upon which the Constitution and this nation are base d (se e par t 1) . To mak e th e poin t i n th e Founders ' terms , nothing could more "subvert the Constitution" 82 than intentionally disregarding th e philosophica l principle s upo n whic h th e Constitutio n is erected. Although Jefferso n ma y b e correc t i n arguin g tha t in practice im peachment has "not even [been ] a scare-crow," 83 that does not mean it should remai n so. 84 The theory o f the Constitutio n requires tha t Congress exercise th e political courag e necessar y t o perform it s constitu tional dut y o f impeachin g thos e justice s wh o see k t o "rewrite " th e Constitution rathe r tha n "interpret " it. 85 Hamilton writes in The Federalist no . 8 1 tha t impeachmen t i s a "complet e security " agains t th e "deliberate usurpations " o f th e Court, 86 a clea r indicatio n tha t th e Founders expecte d th e impeachmen t powe r t o b e mor e frequentl y invoked than it actually has been. With respect to the charge that impeachment is too blunt a check on the Cour t t o b e desirabl y used, 87 thi s charge , lik e tha t concernin g how impeachment has actually been employed in practice, ignores the theory of the Constitution. As Charles Black aptly notes, "the Framer s of our Constitution ver y clearl y envisage d th e occasiona l necessit y of this awful step , and lai d down a procedure an d standards for it s being taken."88 (The intentionally arduous nature of the impeachment procedures an d standard s als o protect s agains t impeachmen t bein g a n un necessarily blun t check o n the Court.) 89 As unsettling as the impeach ment process may sometimes seem, the Constitution requires that it be sometimes used . Presiden t Willia m Howar d Taft , himsel f a grea t ad mirer o f th e Cour t an d late r it s chie f justice, mad e th e poin t wel l i n some remarks about the perceived shortcomings of the judiciary of his day: "Make your judges responsible. Impeach them. Impeachment o f a judge woul d b e a very healthfu l thin g i n these times." 90 And i n thes e present times of justices reading their own values into the Constitution and imposin g the m o n th e res t o f us , Taft's remark s deserv e specia l heed, for i t is only if the impeachmen t powe r i s taken mor e seriousl y that th e natural-right s principle s upo n whic h thi s natio n i s based ca n be reaffirmed .

150 Check s o n th e Cour t

Judicial Self-Restrain t In theory, judicial self-restraint—whe n a judge interpret s th e Constitu tion a s written, rather tha n a s he o r she wishes i t were written—woul d seem t o b e th e easies t an d mos t commonsensica l chec k o n th e Court . Felix Frankfurter , likel y the mos t consciousl y committe d proponen t o f judicial self-restrain t eve r t o si t o n th e Suprem e Court , got t o th e hear t of th e matte r i n a passionat e 194 3 dissen t fro m th e Court' s decisio n striking dow n Wes t Virginia' s compulsor y publi c schoo l flag salut e policy. Justice Frankfurte r exclaimed : One who belong s t o th e mos t vilified an d persecute d minorit y i n history [th e Jews] is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guarantee d by our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself wit h the general libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the thought and action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew no r Gentile , neither Catholi c no r agnostic . W e owe equa l attachmen t t o the Constitution an d are equally bound by our judicial obligations whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or the latest immigrants to these shores. As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how mischievous I may deem their disregard. .. . Most unwillingly, therefore, I must differ fro m m y brethren with regard t o legislation lik e this. I cannot bring my mind to believe that the word "liberty" secured b y the Due Process Clause gives this Court authority to deny to the Stat e o f West Virginia the attainmen t o f that whic h we all recognize a s a legitimat e legislativ e end , namel y th e promotio n o f goo d citizenship , b y employment of the means here chosen. 91 Whether th e debat e i s frame d i n term s o f "judicia l activism " an d "judicial restraint, " o r "judicia l legislating " an d "judicia l judging, " o r "lawmaking" an d "lawflnding, " o r "noninterpretivism " an d "interpretiv ism," o r th e notio n o f a "livin g Constitution " an d a "jurisprudenc e o f original intention," 92 mos t observer s o f th e judicia l proces s recogniz e that judicial self-restrain t doe s no t occu r i n practice . They ofte n argu e that judicial self-restrain t i s impossible . Judges ar e huma n beings , th e argument goes , an d the y canno t hel p bu t rea d thei r persona l view s into th e Constitutio n the y ar e interpreting . I n th e inimitabl e word s o f Beryamin Cardozo , "Th e grea t tide s an d current s whic h engul f th e res t of me n d o no t tur n asid e i n thei r cours e an d pas s th e judges by." 93 Or ,

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1

as Justice John Clark e onc e pithil y observed , " I have neve r known an y judges, no matter how austere o f manner, who discharged their judicial duties in an atmosphere o f pure, unadulterated reason. Alas! We are all 'the commo n growt h o f Mothe r Earth/—eve n thos e o f u s wh o wea r the long robe." 94 The problem with arguments like those made by Cardozo and Clarke is that they confuse practic e wit h theory, explanation with justification. Henry Abraham makes the point especially well : These are honest, eloquent, realistic assessments cum explanations of the facts of life of the judicial role. But they are explanations—not justifications per se for a conscious or, for that matter, subconscious failure to observe that elusive line betwee n judicial activis m an d restraint o r lawmakin g an d lawfindin g o r judicial judging and judicial legislating. There is, quite naturally, an explanation for everything we do . Yet an explanation i s by no means a justification. Certainly an explanation doe s no t absolv e u s from th e ques t for the line—or a t least a line—i n ou r searc h fo r a full measur e o f freedo m an d equa l justice under law.95 Fortunately, for years many of this nation's most preeminent consti tutional scholar s hav e bee n lendin g thei r considerabl e talent s t o at tempting t o articulat e th e prope r "line " between judicial restrain t an d judicial activism. 96 In addition to the debate , discussed i n the Introduction, between th e conservativ e proponent s o f a jurisprudence o f origi nal intentio n (fo r example , Edwi n Meese , Rober t Bork , an d Chie f Justice Willia m Rehnquist ) an d thos e specificall y rejectin g th e conser vatives* cal l an d assertin g th e nee d fo r a "livin g Constitution " tha t adapts t o mee t contemporar y circumstance s b y wa y o f judicial inter pretation (fo r example , Justic e Willia m Brennan , Walte r Murphy , an d Laurence Tribe) , ther e ha s bee n a cottag e industr y o f literatur e o n the subjec t o f judicial restraint . Whil e a n examinatio n o f thes e man y provocative "line-drawing " work s i s beyon d th e scop e o f th e presen t volume,97 a brief analysi s o f thre e o f th e leadin g an d most representa tive treatments—one prescribin g a n extremely limite d amoun t o f judicial discretion , anothe r acceptin g a moderat e degree , an d th e thir d calling fo r virtuall y unbounde d judicia l activism—wil l she d ligh t o n this difficult, ye t essential, check o f judicial self-restraint . The first great work o n the meaning of judicial self-restraint, an d the most restrictive o f the thre e discusse d here , is James Bradle y Thayer' s

152 Check s on the Court classic 189 3 Harvard Law Review essay , "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrin e o f Constitutiona l Review." 98 In that essay—calle d by Felix Frankfurter "th e most important single essay" ever written on American constitutiona l law"—Thaye r articulate s wha t ha s com e t o be known a s the "reasonable-doub t test. " 10° The reasonable-doubt tes t maintains that the Court should not strike down a law when the executive or the legislature has "merely made a mistake," but only when one or the other has made "a very clear one—so clear that it is not open to rational question .. . no t merely their own judgment as to constitution ality, bu t thei r conclusio n a s t o wha t judgment i s permissible t o an other departmen t whic h the Constitution ha s charged with the duty of making it." 101 The deferential natur e of the reasonable-doubt test reflects Thayer' s belief that the Constitution i s amenable to a variety of legitimate inter pretations. A s a consequence , Thaye r maintain s tha t th e unelecte d judiciary shoul d b e hesitan t t o ste p i n an d interfer e wit h th e choice s made b y th e democrati c branche s o f th e government , who m Thaye r insists have a constitutional duty to make a determination of the constitutional propriety of their own actions before the y take them. Despite th e convictio n wit h whic h Thaye r articulate s hi s visio n o f judicial restraint, hi s theory suffer s fro m a fatal flaw: an underestima tion o f th e danger s pose d b y politica l majorities . Simpl y put , Thaye r prescribes a rol e fo r th e Cour t tha t i s s o deferentia l t o th e politica l branches that the Court cannot possibly safeguard th e rights of individuals an d minoritie s fro m majoritaria n excesses , which , a s chapte r 3 explained, is the Court's principal charge under the Constitution. 102 An example of a middle-ground approac h to the meaning of judicial restraint, a s wel l as th e leadin g contemporar y wor k o n the subject , i s John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).103 There , El y criticize s bot h thos e wh o advocat e a jurispru dence o f origina l intentio n (El y calls them "interpretivists" ) an d thos e who support the notion of a living Constitution ("noninterpretivists " t o Ely). To Ely, interpretivists are inappropriately focused o n the past and also confron t constitutiona l provision s tha t canno t b e construe d b y simply reading the text of the Constitution o r seeking the history of its meaning. "Noninterpretivists, " o n th e othe r hand—whethe r the y loo k to tradition , "neutra l principles, " perception s o f popula r consensus ,

Checks on the Court 15 3 natural law,* or the like—are , at bottom, Ely believes, simply readin g their own personal values into the Constitution. What Ely argues for i s a process-oriented jurisprudence. Under Ely's approach, th e Court woul d activel y concer n itsel f wit h ensurin g tha t the political proces s i s free fro m systemi c biases . In nonpolitical process matters , however , th e Court woul d refrai n fro m substitutin g it s judgment fo r th e legislature's. The choice of substantive policy values, Ely contends, should be largely left to the political process. A major proble m with Ely's argument is that process is not as easily distinguishable fro m substanc e a s h e woul d hav e his readers believe . In reality, i t i s not unfai r t o characteriz e Ely' s wor k a s a n attemp t t o legitimate the Warren Court's liberal substantive result s by ingeniously describing the m a s correctly policin g the politica l process or , in some cases, as a n articulat e rationalizatio n o f th e leadin g "can' t help " decisions made by that Court (for example, Brown v. Board of Education). Moreover, by claiming that value choices should be made in the political process , El y overlook s th e fac t tha t thos e choice s hav e alread y been mad e b y th e Founder s i n th e Declaratio n o f Independence . T o reiterate, th e Founder s dedicate d thi s natio n t o equality , life , liberty , and the pursuit of happiness. By far th e most supportive of judicial activism of the contemporar y literature o n the subjec t i s Arthur Miller' s Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role of the Supreme Court (1982). There, Miller unabashedly call s fo r th e appointmen t o f nin e Platoni c philosopher kings who will lead the nation to a more "just" society, no matter what the Declaratio n an d th e Constitutio n hav e t o say . I n Miller' s words , "more judicial activism is both necessary and desirable ... if it further s the attainment of human dignity." 104 The problem s wit h Miller' s approach—whic h i s reall y just a n ex tremely impassione d versio n o f th e notio n o f a livin g Constitution — are many , but tw o meri t singlin g out . First, by arguing tha t th e Cour t should "update " the Constitution , Mille r disregard s th e Constitution' s specified mechanis m fo r change : th e Articl e 5 amendmen t process . Second, and eve n mor e troubling , is Miller's failure t o appreciat e tha t the Constitution is a limit on all governmental power, including judicial * As the Introduction explained, I consider natural law to be an interpretivist category.

154 Check s on the Court power. B y no t recognizin g tha t judge s unbounde d b y constitutiona l limits can become despotic just as easily as any other political official , Miller proposes a formula for the destruction of the polity he so desperately seeks to save. The vastly different degree s of judicial discretion prescribed in these three leadin g treatment s o f judicial revie w illustrat e th e complicate d nature of the seemingly straightforward chec k of judicial self-restraint . With respect to the theory of constitutional interpretatio n advance d in this volume, judicial self-restraint woul d center on a proper knowledg e and application of the natural-rights political philosophy of the Declaration o f Independence. The admittedly difficul t natur e o f this task put s a premiu m o n th e thoughtfu l exercis e o f th e appointmen t power , a subject to which I now turn. The Appointmen t Proces s Perhaps th e mos t importan t potentia l chec k o n th e Cour t i s th e ap pointment process . I f thi s proces s wer e employe d thoughtfully , th e other checks on the Court—limiting appellate jurisdiction, the Article 5 amendment process , impeachment , an d judicial self-restraint—woul d become less a cause for concern . The appointmen t proces s ha s receive d considerabl e attentio n fol lowing th e controversie s surroundin g th e confirmatio n battle s ove r Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas. (Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court wa s defeate d i n Octobe r 1987 , wherea s Thomas' s wa s con firmed—albeit b y the narrowes t margi n i n moder n history—i n Octo ber 1991. ) As a result, literatur e o n the appointmen t proces s i s seemingly unending 105 and , i n th e case s o f Bor k an d Thomas , the proces s even came to prime-time television. There are essentially three components to the appointment process: (1) the proper respective roles of the president an d the Senate, (2) the qualifications o f the nominees, and (3) the methodology of selection. 106 This section considers each in turn. Article 2, section 2 , of the Constitutio n provide s that th e president , "by an d wit h th e Advice an d Consen t o f th e Senate , shall appoin t .. . Judges o f the supreme Court. " The appointment process as it exists in the Constitution is the product of a compromise reached at the Conven-

Checks on the Court 15 5 tion of 1787. 107 One group of delegates, including Roger Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, Elbridge Gerry, Beryamin Franklin, Gunning Bedford, George Mason, an d Joh n Rutledge , wa s oppose d t o givin g th e appointmen t power to the executiv e because i t could lead to monarchy. 108 Another group, consisting of Gouverneur Morris, James Wilson, Nathaniel Gorham, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison—those favoring the creation o f a stron g executive—believe d tha t vestin g th e appointmen t power i n a large legislative bod y would no t onl y lead to lesser qualit y appointments, but als o to deal s and intrigues. 109 Given these diametri cally oppose d positions , compromis e wa s no t easil y reached. The appointment power was debated extensively, and despite the best effort s of Gorham and Madison to reach an early compromise on the issue by giving both the executive and the Senate roles in the process,110 the debate continued into the last days of the Convention. Then, almost mysteriously,111 the provision a s it now exists, in which the president nominates and the Senate confirms or rejects, was adopted. The uncertain nature of the Constitutional Convention debates on the appointment power makes it somewhat difficult to discern what exactly the Founders intended the nature of the Senate's "advice and consent " role to be. The Federalist envisions a limited role for the Senate. Hamilton argues in no. 76 that there is "no difference betwee n nominating and appointing" and he also expresses doub t that the president's "nomina tion would often be overruled" by the Senate.112 This limited view of the Senate's role was not, however, shared by all of those who were asked to pass on the Constitution. In his "Letters of a Federal Farmer," Melancton Smith claimed that "the president is connected with or to the senate; he may always act with the senate, but he can never effectually counter act its views: The president can appoint no officer, civil or military, who shall not be agreeable to the senate." 113 And Samuel Spencer informe d the North Carolin a ratifying conventio n tha t "th e President ma y nominate, but they [the Senate] have a negative on his nomination, till he has exhausted th e number o f those h e wishes to be appointed. He will be obliged, finally,to acquiesce in the appointment of those whom the Senate shall nominate, or else no appointment will take place."114 The prope r respectiv e role s o f th e presiden t an d th e Senat e i n th e appointment proces s ar e stil l subjec t t o muc h debate . Eve n leadin g members of the Senate Judiciary Committee—the standing committe e in th e Senat e assigne d th e tas k o f conductin g judicia l confirmatio n

156 Check s o n the Cour t hearings—disagree o n the matter . Senator Patric k Leah y contends tha t the presiden t an d th e Senat e ar e "equa l partners " i n th e appointmen t process, 115 bu t Senato r Orri n Hatc h believe s tha t th e presiden t i s t o have th e dominan t role. 116 * A carefu l readin g o f th e Conventio n de bates suggest s tha t thos e favorin g a n equa l rol e fo r th e Senat e hav e better discerne d th e Founders ' intent . Th e evidenc e i s subtle , bu t no t inconclusive. Charles Blac k tie s the evidenc e togethe r wit h uncommo n clarity: In the Constitutional Convention , there was much support fo r appointmen t of judges by the Senate alone —a mod e which was approved o n July 21, 1787, and was carried through into the draft o f the Committee of Detail. The change to the present mode came on September 4th, in the report of the Committee of Eleven an d wa s agree d t o nem. con. o n Septembe r 7th . This las t vot e mus t have meant that those wh o wanted appointment b y the Senate alone—and i n some case s b y th e whol e Congress—wer e satisfie d tha t a compromis e ha d been reached , an d di d no t thin k th e legislativ e par t i n th e proces s ha d bee n reduced t o the minimum. The whole process, to me, suggests the very reverse of the idea that the Senate is to have a confined role. 117 Concluding that both the president an d the Senate should play majo r roles i n th e appointmen t process 1 1 8 answer s onl y hal f th e question . Next, it must b e decide d wha t qualification s a nominee shoul d possess . History suggest s fou r reason s wh y a presiden t ha s nominate d a particular perso n t o th e Suprem e Court : (1 ) merit , (2 ) friendship , (3 ) representativeness (fo r example , geographic , racial , sexual , an d reli gious), an d (4 ) politica l an d ideologica l compatibility. 119 Histor y als o intimates seve n reason s wh y th e Senat e ha s rejecte d certai n nominee s to the Court : (1) opposition to the nominating president, not necessarily to the nominee; (2) the nominee' s involvemen t wit h on e o r mor e contentiou s issue s o f publi c policy or , simply , oppositio n t o th e nominee' s perceive d jurisprudentia l o r sociopolitical philosoph y (i.e. , politics) ; (3 ) oppositio n t o th e recor d o f th e * The position senator s take o n this fundamental questio n o f the respective roles of the president an d th e Senat e i n the appointmen t proces s seem s to depen d largel y o n thei r political relationshi p wit h the president. If the president i s not o f a particular senator' s party—as i n the case of Senator Leah y when he made his remark quoted i n the text — that senato r i s likel y t o insis t tha t th e Senat e i s a n equa l partne r i n th e appointmen t process. But i f the presiden t is o f a particular senator' s party—a s wa s the cas e a t th e time of Senator Hatch's remark—the senato r wil l usually maintain that the president is to hav e th e dominan t role . See Walke r an d Epstein , The Supreme Court of the United States, 41 .

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incumbent Court , which , rightl y o r wrongly , th e nomine e presumabl y sup ported; (4) senatoria l courtes y (closel y linke d to the consultative nominatin g process); (5) a nominee's perceive d politica l unreliabilit y o n th e par t o f th e party i n power; (6) th e eviden t lac k o f qualificatio n o r limite d abilit y o f th e nominee; (7) concerted , sustaine d oppositio n b y interest o r pressure groups; and (8) fear that the nominee would dramatically alter the Court's jurisprudential lineup.120 In other words, the selection o f Supreme Court justices has typically been, i n practice , "political, " i n th e partisa n sens e o f th e term. 121 A s chapter 3 pointe d out , however , partisa n usag e o f th e appointmen t power i s no t wha t th e Founder s sought . Instead , th e Founder s hope d for " a bench happily filled" 122 wit h the esteeme d like s of "Wythe , Blair, and Pendleton." 123 Th e Conventio n debate s ar e silen t o n th e criteri a for appointment precisely because the delegates assumed that the basis of selectio n woul d b e merit. 124 Eve n Hamilton , who sa w a limited rol e for th e Senat e i n th e appointmen t process , believe d tha t th e Senat e would—and should—rejec t a nomine e wh o wa s lackin g i n objectiv e merit. "Thus it could hardly happen," Hamilton writes in The Federalist no. 66 , "tha t th e majorit y o f th e Senat e woul d fee l an y othe r compla cency towar d th e objec t o f a n appointmen t tha n suc h a s th e appear ances o f meri t migh t inspir e an d th e proof s o f th e wan t o f i t de stroy."125 Although some scholar s believe tha t a merit-based appointment process i s "no t realistic, " give n th e realitie s o f constitutiona l politics, 126 others disagree, including Henry Abraham, the leading authority on the appointment process . Accordin g t o Abraham , "meri t nee d not , indee d it doe s not , 'li e i n th e ey e o f th e beholder / I t is eminentl y identifiabl e and attainable." Abraham identifies nin e factors to consider when mak ing a merit-based evaluatio n o f a candidate fo r the Supreme Court: (1) demonstrated judicial temperament; (2) professional expertis e and competence; (3) absolute personal as well as professional integrity; (4) an able, agile, lucid mind ; (5) appropriat e professiona l educationa l backgroun d o r training; (6) the ability to communicate clearly, both orally and in writing, and especially the latter; (7) resolute fair-mindedness; (8) a solid understanding of the proper judicial rol e o f judge s unde r ou r Constitution ; an d (9 ) ascertainabl e goo d health.127 To thi s wis e list , give n m y clai m tha t th e Cour t shoul d interpre t th e Constitution i n ligh t o f th e philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Indepen -

158 Check s o n the Cour t dence, I would ad d a thorough understandin g o f lega l and politica l philosophy. The necessit y fo r judge s t o hav e a firm gras p o f lega l an d politica l philosophy wa s identifie d b y tw o o f th e mos t powerfu l mind s eve r t o sit on the federa l bench : Felix Frankfurter an d Learne d Hand . In a 195 7 essay callin g for th e appointmen t o f Supreme Cour t justices "wholl y o n the basi s o f functiona l fitness," Frankfurte r argue s tha t a Suprem e Court justic e mus t b e a philosopher , historian , an d prophet . Othe r factors, suc h a s prio r judicial experience , h e believes , shoul d hav e n o place i n th e appointmen t decision . "On e i s entitle d t o sa y withou t qualification tha t th e correlatio n betwee n prio r judicial experienc e an d fitness fo r th e Suprem e Cour t i s zero," Frankfurter writes . "The signifi cance o f th e greates t amon g th e Justice s wh o ha d suc h experience , Holmes an d Cardozo , derive d no t fro m tha t judicia l experienc e bu t from th e fac t tha t the y wer e Holme s an d Cardozo . They wer e thinkers , and mor e particularly , lega l philosophers." 128 Hand agree d wit h Frankfurte r o n th e relationshi p betwee n philoso phy an d constitutiona l interpretation : It is as important to a judge called upon to pass on a question of constitutional law, to have a bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne, and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume, and Kant as with books which have been specifically writte n on the subject. For in such matters everything turns upon the spirit in which he approaches the questions before him. 129 While I certainl y quarre l wit h Locke d absenc e fro m Hand' s list(!) , th e idea tha t judges canno t interpre t th e Constitutio n withou t recours e t o political philosophy , an d th e concomitan t nee d fo r judge s t o hav e a firm gras p o f such philosophy , i s keenly stated . A merit-base d appointmen t proces s obviousl y require s Senat e in quiry int o a nominee' s judicia l philosophy , somethin g th e Senat e ha s been doin g sinc e th e first day s o f th e Republic. 130 Ye t som e scholar s oppose suc h a n inquir y b y th e Senate . Bruc e Fein , fo r one , contend s that "th e Senat e . . . i s ill-suited intellectually , morally, and politicall y t o pass o n anythin g mor e substantiv e tha n a nominee' s professiona l fitness fo r th e offic e o f Suprem e Cour t Justice. Because senator s ten d t o be intellectuall y shallo w an d result-oriented , thei r ostensibl e inquirie s into 'judicia l philosophy ' wil l almos t invariabl y degenerat e int o parti san posturing." 131

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Bork, himsel f allegedl y a victi m o f precisel y th e proces s Fei n de scribes, warns o f th e chillin g effect s o f Senat e inquir y int o th e judicia l philosophy o f a nominee. According to Bork : A president who wants to avoid a battle like mine, and most presidents would prefer to , is likely to nominat e me n an d wome n wh o have no t writte n much , and certainl y nothin g tha t coul d b e regarde d a s controversia l b y left-leanin g senators an d groups . .. . I t i s quite conceivabl e tha t som e lower cour t judges may be affecte d i n th e decision s the y mak e an d th e opinion s the y write . .. . Lawyers an d professor s hav e bee n encourage d t o thin k twic e o r thre e time s about what they write.132 Because the appointment proces s is, by definition, essentia l to decid ing wh o i s empowere d t o hav e th e final sa y o n th e meanin g o f th e fundamental la w o f th e land , a n inquir y b y the Senat e int o a nominee' s approach t o constitutiona l interpretatio n i s required. Afte r all , the rol e of th e Cour t i n th e America n constitutiona l orde r i s t o '"defen d th e Constitution/ no t to revise it." 133 In addition, it is precisely th e Senate' s role i n th e appointmen t proces s t o mak e suc h determinations . A s Charles Black remark s i n his importan t essa y o n the subject : To me , there i s just n o reaso n a t al l fo r a Senator' s no t voting , in regar d t o confirmation o f a Suprem e Cour t nominee , o n th e basi s o f a ful l an d un restricted review , not embarrasse d b y an y presumption, o f th e nominee' s fitness fo r office . I n a worl d tha t know s a man' s socia l philosoph y shape s hi s judicial behavior, that philosophy is a factor i n his fitness. If it is a philosophy the Senator thinks will make a judge whose service on the Bench will hurt the country, the n th e Senato r ca n d o righ t onl y b y treating thi s judgment o f his , unencumbered b y deference t o the President's, as a satisfactory basi s in itself for a negativ e vote . I hav e a s ye t see n nothin g textual , nothin g structural , nothing prudential, nothing historical, that tells against this view.134 In short , a failur e t o inquire—b y th e Senat e an d th e presiden t alike—into a nominee' s judicia l philosoph y i s nothin g shor t o f reck less, fo r i t i s onl y throug h a n examinatio n o f a nominee' s judicia l philosophy tha t a commitmen t t o th e jurisprudenc e o f th e America n regime ca n b e ascertaine d an d th e natura l right s o f th e America n people thereb y bette r secured . Th e fac t tha t th e Senat e an d th e presi dent ar e though t t o b e il l equippe d t o evaluat e a nominee' s judicia l philosophy bring s th e thir d aspec t o f th e appointmen t proces s t o th e fore, the methodolog y o f selection . There ar e certainl y a wid e variet y o f resource s availabl e t o th e

160 Check s on the Court president an d th e Senat e t o hel p the m mak e judicia l appointment s based o n merit . Besides the respectiv e staff s o f th e Whit e House an d the Senate Judiciary Committee, these resources include the traditional voices o f publi c an d privat e leader s wit h interest s i n the nomination , the American Ba r Association's Standin g Committe e o n Federa l Judiciary, and sitting and retired members of the bench. 135 Other resources are available and have been occasionally employed. Most notably, these resources ar e academe , a s Presiden t Frankli n Roosevel t recognize d (especially wit h hi s us e o f the n Harvar d La w professo r Feli x Frank furter), an d "merit " commissions , a s Presiden t Carte r appreciate d (though, i n practice , th e Carte r commission s wer e fa r mor e partisa n than merit-based). 136 With acces s t o al l o f thi s informatio n an d expertis e th e presiden t and th e Senat e certainl y hav e th e abilit y t o identif y individual s o f demonstrable meri t to serve on the Supreme Court—they mus t simply be willing to sto p playing politics with the appointment process. 137 As Abraham eloquentl y put s it , "Mr . Madison's ple a fo r ' a benc h happil y filled' would appea r t o b e readil y attainable—give n th e necessar y re solve to select on the basis of merit. It is not an Impossible dream.'" 138 Although som e commentator s o n th e selectio n proces s ar e skeptica l about th e possibilit y o f th e politica l branche s exercisin g suc h re solve,139 i t ha s bee n don e i n th e past ; fo r example , with th e appoint ment o f Benjami n Cardozo , a Democra t appointed b y a Republica n president and for whose appointment both Democrats and Republicans worked tirelessly. 140 Give n what i s at stake—the natura l right s of th e American people—the Constitutio n demands no less. The vast majority o f constitutional theorists do not discuss the subjec t of checks o n the Court, choosing instead t o focus exclusivel y o n their particular normativ e agendas . I believe thi s i s a mistake . By ignorin g checks o n th e Court , no t onl y d o constitutiona l theorist s perpetuat e the myt h o f judicial supremacy , bu t the y fai l t o giv e "teeth " t o thei r constitutional theories . I f a constitutiona l theoris t believe s tha t th e Court shoul d interpre t th e Constitution i n a certai n way , h e o r sh e should a t leas t provid e suggestion s fo r gettin g th e Cour t t o comply . I have therefore endeavore d to afford th e subject of checks on the Court suitable attention . I explaine d i n thi s chapte r tha t ther e ar e check s available t o preven t th e Suprem e Court' s rol e a s th e ultimat e inter -

Checks on the Court 16 1 preter of the Constitution from devolving into the unacceptable state of government by judiciary. And those checks—the Article 5 amendment process, impeachment, judicial self-restraint, an d the appointment process (though not the "exceptions clause" to the Courts appellate jurisdiction)—if properl y used , ca n hel p ensur e tha t th e Cour t interpret s the Constitutio n i n accordanc e wit h th e natural-right s philosoph y o f the Declaration o f Independence, rather than i n light of the moral and political conviction s o f particula r justices . Next , i t i s necessar y t o demonstrate that the seemingly abstract natural-rights-based theor y of judicial review prescribed i n this volume can a b d i c a te constitutiona l cases.

5 Constitutional Interpretatio n

Up t o thi s poin t I have attempte d t o sho w tha t th e Constitutio n o f th e United State s shoul d b e interprete d i n ligh t o f th e natural-right s politi cal philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e an d tha t th e Su preme Cour t i s th e institutio n o f American governmen t tha t shoul d b e primarily responsibl e fo r identifyin g an d applyin g tha t philosoph y i n American life . Eve n i f thi s thesi s i s accepted , however , th e potentiall y disabling criticis m tha t a natural-rights-based theor y o f judicial revie w is unworkable mus t be addressed. Simply stated, it must be show n her e that th e politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s sufficiently determinat e t o b e a practica l guid e t o judgment i n individ ual case s tha t com e befor e th e Court . Otherwise , th e Declaratio n wil l remain largel y relegate d t o antiquaria n interest , an d a judge seekin g t o interpret th e Constitutio n wil l b e abl e t o continu e doin g s o i n ligh t o f his o r he r ow n mora l an d politica l preferences . A s a result , th e funda 162

Constitutional Interpretation 16 3 mental purpos e o f judicia l review—th e safeguardin g o f th e natura l rights of the American people (see chapter 3)—will remain unfulfilled . In 179 8 Justice Jame s Iredel l issue d on e o f th e mos t famou s criti cisms of natural-rights-based judicial review in an opinion in Colder v. Bull rejectin g Justic e Samue l Chase' s natural-right s approac h t o th e case. "The ideas of natural justice ar e regulated by no fixed standard," Justice Iredell exclaimed. "The ablest and the purest men have differe d upon the subject."l Nearl y two centuries later Robert Bork expresses a similar reservation. "There may be a natural law," Bork contends, "but we are not agreed upo n wha t it is, and there i s no such law that gives definitive answer s to a judge trying to decide a case."2 This chapte r endeavor s t o rebu t th e criticis m voice d b y Iredell , Bork, and others 3 by applying the natural-rights political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence to some of the leading cases in American constitutional law and history. Three caveats are necessary befor e proceeding t o the initia l are a o f inquiry . First, it is not the purpose o f this chapte r t o resolv e most—le t alon e all—question s o f constitu tional-rights adjudication . Wha t i s intende d her e i s a discussio n o f some of the most significant question s in order to demonstrate that the proposed natural-rights-base d theoi y o f judicial revie w i s workable . My method fo r doin g that—throug h theme s o f equality , life , liberty , and th e pursui t o f happiness—wil l also , I hope , mak e th e fairl y ab stract Lockea n natural-right s doctrin e o f th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence, discussed in chapter 1 , easier to understand.* Second, I have tried to approach this project i n an objective fashion . Not onl y wil l som e o f th e result s discerne d bot h pleas e an d upse t contemporary liberals and conservatives alike, but perhaps me as well. (For wha t i t is worth, I personally oppos e th e deat h penalty . Naturalrights philosoph y doe s not. ) I n short , wha t I hop e t o avoi d i s th e standard criticis m that natural-law approaches merely mask the biases of those who employ them. Third, a s th e Introductio n discussed , th e result s discerne d ar e no t necessarily equivalen t t o wha t th e Founder s ma y have decide d abou t *Part 1 explained tha t th e Founder s wer e Lockea n liberal s o n th e basi c purpos e o f government, which is the controlling question in constitutional interpretation. Therefore, I frequentl y refe r t o Locke' s philosophica l writing s i n thi s chapte r t o flush ou t th e Lockean libera l principle s o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence . Referenc e t o "Locke" means Locke's theory, not Locke's personal practices.

164 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n specific rights . The Founders* intentions ar e controllin g a t the level of natural-rights principl e because , a s par t 1 described , tha t principl e speaks t o ou r origins , purposes, an d ideal s a s a nation . However, th e Founders' view s a t th e leve l o f specifi c outcome s ar e merel y sugges tive.4 This is because the Founders occasionally ignored the dictates of natural law for practica l reasons (fo r instance , on slavery, as I discuss below) and because they could not possibly have foreseen man y of the complexities involved in applying natural-rights doctrine in the modern world. With these caveats made, I now turn to the subject of equality.

Equality Chapter 1 explained tha t th e concep t "al l me n ar e create d equal " i s central to the political philosophy of the Declaration o f Independence. What the Declaratio n mean s b y equality i s that al l people ar e create d as members of the same species and each person has, as Locke puts it, an "equa l righ t .. . t o hi s natura l freedom , withou t bein g subjecte d t o the will or authorit y o f any other man." Every person, in other words, has an equal moral claim to freedom. This moral claim does not mean, however, that all people are entitled to the same material benefits upon exercising thei r freedom , becaus e individual s diffe r i n abilitie s an d capacities. "Ag e o r virtu e ma y giv e me n a jus t precedence, " Lock e writes. "Excellenc e o f part s an d meri t ma y plac e other s abov e th e common level." 5 The most profound issu e in American constitutional law and history to conside r i n a discussion o f equalit y i s slavery. Clearly, slavery is in direct contradictio n wit h th e Declaration' s concep t o f equalit y a s a moral clai m share d b y al l peopl e t o natura l freedom . Th e fac t tha t race ha s always been th e "America n dilemma" 6 i s underscored b y the inconsistency betwee n th e philosophica l condemnatio n o f slaver y b y many of the Founders—among the m John Adams, Benjamin Franklin , Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, Thomas Jefferson, Jame s Madison, and George Washington—an d th e realit y tha t man y o f thes e sam e me n owned slaves. 7 To their credit, Jefferson sough t to include a denunciation o f slaver y i n th e Declaratio n o f Independence, 8 an d th e Framer s struggled i n Philadelphia with the issue. 9 But powerful economi c pressures prevailed , an d slaver y continue d a s a n uneas y compromis e i n a

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regime dedicate d t o th e natura l right s o f ma n until th e passag e o f th e thirteenth amendmen t i n 1865. 10 Indeed , i n a n impassione d 198 7 speech, the n justice Thurgoo d Marshall—th e firs t Blac k appointe d t o the Suprem e Cour t an d on e o f th e mos t famou s an d influentia l civi l rights lawyer s i n th e histor y o f th e Unite d States—attacke d th e origi nal Constitutio n becaus e i t permitte d slavery . Justic e Marshal l thun dered: I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever "fixed" at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I findthe wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibite d b y the Framer s particularly profound . T o the contrary , the government they devised was defective fromthe start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation t o attain the system of constitutional government , and its respect for the individual freedoms and human rights, we hold fundamental today. When contemporary Americans cite "the Constitution," they invoke a concept that is vastly different from what the Framers barely began to construct two centuries ago.11 The tension between slaver y and the Declaration's concep t o f equality wa s highlighte d i n Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), 12 th e Suprem e Court's "self-inflicte d wound" 13 tha t no t onl y greatl y damage d th e Court's reputation, but helped bring on the Civil War. Civil war, the end result o f th e tensio n betwee n slaver y an d th e natural-right s principle s of th e Declaratio n o f Independence , wa s predicte d b y Jefferson i n hi s Notes on the State of Virginia (1782) : I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep forever : tha t considerin g numbers , natur e an d natura l mean s only , a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of situation, is among possible events: tha t i t ma y becom e probabl e b y supernatura l interference ! Th e Almighty has no attribute which can take side with us in such a contest.14 Dred Scott involve d a clai m b y a Black man , born int o slavery , tha t his subsequen t residenc e i n a stat e an d a territor y tha t prohibite d slavery mad e hi m free . B y a seven-to-tw o vot e th e Suprem e Court , speaking through Chief Justice Roger Taney, disagreed and went so fa r as t o strik e dow n th e Missour i Compromise , a se t o f federa l law s adopted i n 182 0 t o maintai n th e balanc e betwee n slav e an d nonslav e states, o n th e groun d tha t th e Compromis e violate d th e fifth-amendment propert y right s o f slav e owners . Whil e th e Cour t concede d tha t the Declaration' s assertio n tha t "'al l me n ar e create d equal ' . . . woul d seem t o embrac e th e whol e o f th e huma n family, " the fac t tha t man y

166 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n of th e Founder s themselve s owne d slave s le d th e Cour t t o conclud e otherwise. A s Chie f Justic e Tane y phrase d it , Black s "ha d fo r mor e than a centur y bee n regarde d a s beings . . . s o far inferior , tha t the y ha d no right s whic h th e whit e ma n wa s boun d t o respect . . . . Accordingly , a negr o o f th e Africa n rac e wa s regarde d . . . a s a n articl e o f property " and wa s no t entitle d t o a n equa l eryoymen t o f th e natura l right s o f man. 15 What suc h event s a s th e omissio n o f Jefferson' s condemnatio n o f slavery i n th e Declaratio n o f Independence , th e reluctan t recognitio n of slaver y i n th e Constitution , an d th e disastrou s Dred Scott decisio n suggest i s tha t th e Unite d State s wa s no t ye t read y a s a natio n t o ri d itself o f a n institutio n i t kne w wa s contrar y t o natura l law. 16 Th e Declaration's avowa l tha t "al l me n ar e create d equal " did , however , provide th e framewor k fo r slavery' s eventua l demise , something whic h Abraham Lincol n understoo d clearly . Lincoln' s famou s speec h o n th e Dred Scott decisio n i s worth quotin g a t length : Chief Justice Taney , in hi s opinion i n the Dre d Scott case , admits tha t th e language o f th e Declaratio n i s broa d enoug h t o includ e th e whol e huma n family, but he and Judge Douglas argue that the authors of that instrument did not inten d t o includ e negroes , by th e fac t tha t the y di d no t a t once , actuall y place them on an equality with the whites. Now this grave argument comes to just nothin g a t all , by the othe r fact , tha t the y di d no t a t once , or ever afterwards, actuall y plac e al l whit e peopl e o n a n equalit y wit h on e another . .. . They di d no t mea n t o asser t th e obviou s untruth , tha t al l wer e the n actuall y enjoying tha t equality , nor yet, that the y wer e abou t t o confe r i t immediatel y upon them . I n fac t the y ha d n o powe r t o confe r suc h a boon . The y mean t simply to declare the right, s o that the enforcement o f it might follow a s circumstances shoul d permit . The y mean t t o se t u p a standar d maxi m fo r free society , whic h coul d b e familia r t o all , an d revere d b y all , constantl y looked to , constantl y labore d for , an d eve n thoug h neve r perfectl y attained , constantly approximated , an d thereb y constantl y spreadin g an d deepenin g it s influence an d augmentin g th e happines s an d valu e o f lif e t o al l people o f al l colors everywhere. 17 As Lincoln's remarks intimate , omitting Jefferson's condemnatio n o f slavery i n the Declaratio n o f Independence an d includin g guarantees t o slavery i n th e origina l Constitutio n wer e unfortunat e politica l compro mises that had t o be mad e i f the United State s o f America was to com e into bein g i n 177 6 an d creat e a stron g centra l governmen t i n 1787 — both o f whic h wer e necessar y i f slaver y wa s on e da y t o b e abolished .

Constitutional Interpretation 16 7 The necessity for politica l compromis e aside , the inhumane treatmen t of slaves and the long and bloody Civil War that resulted fro m slaver y are indelibl e proo f o f th e pai n tha t departin g fro m th e Declaration' s natural-rights principles has engendered in the United States. As is all too clea r fro m America n history , the unequal treatment o f Blacks continued wel l past the successful conclusio n o f the Civil War. Slavery may have been formally abolishe d by the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the thirteenth amendment , but racial prejudice wa s not . Th e Blac k Code s o f 1865 , passed i n almos t al l o f th e southern states , were mean t t o replace th e formally forbidde n institu tion of slavery with a caste system and to preserve as much as possible the prewar way of life. Although the Reconstruction Congres s enacte d several measure s t o dea l wit h th e racia l injustic e i n th e South , mos t notably a strong Civil Rights Act (1866) and the fourteenth an d fifteenth amendments (ratifie d i n 186 8 and 1870 , respectively), these measure s had little lasting effect a s the North—itself seduce d b y racism—soo n lost interest i n Black welfare . As a consequence, slavery was replaced by a system of legal and social apartheid. 18 The Supreme Cour t continue d it s abysmal record o n racial equalit y when i t constitutionalize d thi s syste m o f apartheid . Tha t fatefu l deci sion came in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 19 with the ground being set in earlier decision s suc h a s Hall v. DeCuir (1878), 20 which struc k dow n as a n unconstitutiona l burde n o n interstat e commerc e a stat e statut e that outlawe d discriminatio n o n accoun t o f race i n commo n carriers , and th e Civil Rights Cases (1883), 21 in which th e Cour t declare d th e Civil Rights Act o f 1875— a la w tha t prohibite d discriminatio n i n th e furnishing of transportation and accommodations to Blacks—unconstitutional o n th e basi s tha t th e fourteent h amendmen t forbad e onl y discrimination b y state government s an d state officials , no t by private parties.22 Plessy wa s a n especiall y unfortunat e decision , becaus e th e stat e statute a t issu e spok e directl y t o equalit y whe n i t required "equa l bu t separate accommodatio n fo r th e whit e an d colore d races " i n railwa y carriages. Th e statut e wa s challenge d o n equa l protectio n grounds , principally on the basis that the "separate but equal" concept it embodied was intende d t o "stam p the colore d rac e wit h a badge o f inferior ity." Th e Suprem e Court , i n a seven-to-on e decision , disagree d an d declared tha t th e "badg e o f inferiorit y .. . [was ] not b y reason o f any-

168 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n thing foun d i n th e act , bu t solel y becaus e th e colore d rac e choose s t o put tha t constructio n upo n it. " Th e Cour t adde d tha t "i f on e rac e b e inferior t o anothe r socially , th e Constitutio n o f th e Unite d State s can not put the m o n th e sam e plane." 23 The segregationis t statut e wa s thu s upheld an d aparthei d becam e th e constitutiona l la w of the land . In a powerfu l an d propheti c dissent , th e firs t Justic e Joh n Marshal l Harlan, th e sol e dissentin g membe r o f th e Cour t i n Plessy, maintaine d that "th e arbitrar y separatio n o f citizen s o n th e basi s o f race , whil e they ar e o n a publi c highway , i s a badg e o f servitud e wholl y inconsis tent wit h th e civi l freedo m an d th e equalit y o f th e la w establishe d b y the Constitution . I t canno t b e justified upo n an y legal grounds." Justice Harlan explaine d wh y thi s wa s s o i n on e o f th e mos t famou s passage s in Supreme Cour t history : In view o f th e Constitution , i n th e ey e o f th e law , there i s in thi s countr y n o superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution i s color-blind , an d neithe r know s no r tolerate s classe s amon g citizens . In respect o f civil rights all citizens are equa l before th e law. The humblest i s the pee r o f th e mos t powerful . Th e la w regard s ma n a s man , an d take s n o account o f his surroundings o r of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. 24 Justice Harlan' s dissent—whic h wa s t o carr y th e da y si x decade s later i n Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 25 th e Suprem e Court' s unanimous, landmar k decisio n outlawin g segregatio n i n th e publi c schools—correctly identifie d th e meanin g o f equalit y i n th e America n regime.* Justice Harla n recognized , a s th e Warre n Cour t wa s t o reiter ate, tha t segregatio n wa s th e produc t o f racis t hatre d an d degradatio n and ha d n o connectio n whatsoeve r t o an y relevan t difference s amon g the races . According t o th e politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence, onl y relevan t differences , suc h a s talen t an d effort, 26 may affec t a n individual' s enjoymen t o f natural freedom . Segregatio n i s therefore inconsisten t wit h ever y person's equa l moral clai m t o natura l freedom, becaus e i t represent s a denia l o f tha t ver y clai m t o mora l equality b y stigmatizin g Black s a s inferio r t o Whites . To pu t i t plainly , the poin t o f segregatio n wa s not t o kee p bot h White s an d Black s fro m using eac h other' s facilities , bu t t o mak e sur e tha t Black s woul d no t *As th e discussio n o f preferentia l treatmen t late r i n thi s sectio n reveals , th e moder n Court's acceptance of Justice Harlan's color-blind interpretation o f the Constitution wa s short lived. See Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution, 151-224 .

Constitutional Interpretation 16 9 "contaminate" facilitie s use d b y Whites 27—a badg e o f inferiorit y th e Declaration will not tolerate. As the discussio n o f racial segregatio n intimates , the equa l protection clause of the fourteenth amendmen t and the implicit equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment28 are the Constitution's vehicles through whic h th e Declaration' s concep t o f equalit y shoul d b e implemented. The scope of the equal protection guarante e has been subjec t to muc h debate. * Fo r example , i n a controversia l stud y o f th e four teenth amendment , Raou l Berge r contend s tha t th e equa l protectio n clause forbid s onl y state-sanctioned racia l discriminatio n i n a specifi c and narro w rang e o f civi l rights (suc h a s equa l access t o governmen t protection o f lif e an d property). 29 Chief Justice Willia m Rehnquist, on the other hand, extends the coverage of the equal protection claus e to all area s o f civi l right s but , lik e Berger , claim s tha t equa l protectio n disallows only discrimination on account of race.30 Many scholars disagree with Berger's and Rehnquist's narrow read ing of th e fourteent h amendment . Whil e I have neithe r th e spac e no r the inclinatio n t o ad d t o th e crowde d literatur e ye t anothe r length y discussion o f th e debate s surroundin g th e framin g an d ratificatio n o f the fourteenth amendment , m y reading o f thos e debate s confirm s th e position thoughtfull y advance d b y Judith Baer , Howar d Ja y Graham , Alfred Kelly , and Jaoobus ten Broek, to name but the most well known, that th e fourteent h amendmen t wa s intende d t o embod y th e broa d principles o f equalit y an d natura l right s articulate d i n the Declaratio n of Independence. 31 Further support for a broad reading of the equal protection clause is found i n Willia m Nelson' s examinatio n o f the fourteent h amendment . Although Nelso n doe s no t spea k explicitl y o f natura l rights , he doe s maintain tha t th e fourteenth amendmen t wa s designed to reaffirm ou r *The separate question of whether the thirty-ninth Congress meant to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment has been addressed in a vast and often contradictory literature. As the discussion of the Bill of Rights in chapter 2 suggests, however, th e incorporatio n debat e i s misdirected, given tha t the Founders rejected the authority of any government, federal and state alike, to violate the people's natural rights. What the thirty-ninth Congress essentially did with the fourteenth amendment wa s t o tr y t o restore th e principle s o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e t o th e American regime, principles the South had been resisting by demanding that the institution o f slaver y b e continued . See Farbe r and Muench, "The Ideological Origin s of the Fourteenth Amendment," 272; Richards, Conscience and the Constitution, chap. 4.

170 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n nation's long-standin g commitmen t t o genera l principle s o f equalit y and individual rights. 32 Additionally, even Alexander Bickel, who has a fairly modest reading of the fourteenth amendment , acknowledges that the languag e o f th e amendmen t i s "sufficientl y elastic " t o permi t th e broader interpretatio n advance d i n this volume. 33 Specifically, sectio n 1 o f th e fourteent h amendmen t say s tha t n o "person " ma y b e denie d the equal protection of the laws, whereas section 2 speaks of depriving "male citizens" of the right to vote a s a ground for penalizing states in House apportionment , an d th e fifteenth amendmen t outlaw s discrimi nation i n voting o n accoun t o f "race. " What this languag e suggest s i s that when the Reconstruction Congres s intended to limit the reach of a provision to specific groups, they knew how to do so. The equal protection clause is not so limited. All "persons, " regardless of race, sex,34 or any othe r involuntary , immutable , an d irrelevan t characteristic , ar e therefore entitle d to the equal eryoyment of their natural freedom . What the Declaratio n o f Independence' s broa d concep t o f equalit y means for constitutional interpretation is that all class-based differenti ation through la w that is not based o n a universally tru e and relevan t characteristic i s unconstitutional. For example , with respect t o sex — the classificatio n tha t i s secon d onl y t o rac e i n historica l signifi cance35—unless th e differenc e i s on e tha t i s characteristi c o f all women an d no men , o r all me n an d no women , i t i s no t th e se x factor but the individual factor that should be determinative. 36 This is a principle tha t wa s centra l t o th e unsuccessfu l equa l right s amend ment.37 I n practica l terms , se x i s a n impermissibl e characteristi c b y which t o determin e suc h thing s a s th e custod y o f children , workin g hours, wages and conditions, the obligatio n to register for th e militar y draft, an d the opportunity to serve in military combat, but would be an acceptable distinguishin g classificatio n i n situation s lik e stat e pay ments o f medica l cost s o f childbearin g (becaus e me n canno t bea r children). Briefly stated, sex is almost never a constitutionally permissible class-based distinction . Women and men should be treated a s individuals, no t a s member s o f a group . Everyon e deserves , unde r th e political philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence , t o hav e hi s or he r situatio n evaluate d o n a n individualize d basis . Th e cost s o f administering the case-by-case determinations necessary to conform t o the Declaration' s mandat e ma y be high , but ou r nation' s commitmen t

Constitutional Interpretation 17 1 to the equa l right of all people to er\joy thei r natural freedom require s that we bear the cost. More difficult classification s exist ; most notably, age and disability.* Distinctions in the law based on age have been less controversial tha n most. After all , the argument goes, age-based distinctions simply reflect significant difference s i n abilities and capacities. The issue is, however, more complicate d tha n that . I n fact , lega l distinction s base d o n sex wer e onc e accepte d becaus e o f simila r allege d difference s i n abilities an d capacities— a notio n tha t mos t Americans hav e com e t o reject.38 The leadin g Suprem e Cour t decision s o n ag e discriminatio n ar e Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976 ) ,39 in whic h th e Court upheld a state law requiring uniformed police officers t o retire at fifty, and Vance u Bradley (1979), 40 i n whic h th e Cour t sustaine d a federal la w requirin g foreig n servic e officer s t o retir e a t sixty . Bot h cases depende d o n generalization s abou t th e abilitie s an d capacitie s of olde r ag e groups . As i n question s o f se x discrimination , however , generalizations of this sort are frequently wron g and, more importantly, are based on insulting stereotypes—the Court' s observation in Murgia to th e contrar y notwithstanding. 41 Unde r th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence's concept of equality, mandatory retirement laws are unconstitutional, because they violate every individual's moral right to be judged on the basis of his or her individual merits. With respec t t o th e young , law s affectin g the m ar e usuall y no t thought t o rais e issue s o f equalit y a t all . Fo r example , i n Re Gault (1967), a cas e involvin g a juvenile accuse d o f a crime , th e Suprem e Court made the following observation : A child , unlike a n adult , ha s a right "no t to libert y bu t to custody. " He ca n b e made t o attor n t o hi s parents , t o g o t o school , etc . I f hi s parent s defaul t i n effectively performin g thei r custodia l functions—tha t is , if th e chil d i s "delin * Alienage, poverty, illegitimacy, and sexual preference are , like race, easy cases: classbased differentiatio n o n thes e ground s i s never constitutionall y permissible , becaus e these characteristics have no relevance to one's ability to perform a function or enjoy a liberty. As histor y shows , differentiatio n o n accoun t o f alienage , poverty, illegitimacy , and sexual preference i s based on fear, ignorance, and hatred, none of which is consistent wit h th e Declaration' s concep t o f equality . The Suprem e Court' s record i n thes e areas is mixed. See generally O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, vol. 2,1456-96. I have more to say about sexual preference and poverty later in this chapter.

172 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n quent" the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, for he has none.42 According t o th e Court , a chil d ha s n o rights , onl y duties . This i s a conclusion tha t many scholars attribut e t o Lockean liberalism a s well. 43 More precisely , becaus e th e Lockea n accoun t o f person s an d right s emphasizes rationalit y an d autonomy , an d becaus e thes e ar e trait s tha t the very young seem t o lack, and which childre n acquir e only gradually , children ar e no t deeme d t o b e person s o r t o posses s rights . As A. John Simmons convincingl y argues , however, childre n d o hav e th e capacity for rationalit y an d autonomy ; the y simpl y ofte n lac k th e maturit y t o exercise it . But give n children' s capacit y fo r rationalit y an d autonomy , they ar e "person s now " and , therefore , d o posses s rights, 44 somethin g that Lock e seem s t o appreciat e whe n h e remark s tha t a chil d mus t b e allowed "th e privilege o f his nature t o be free." 45 What th e Lockea n accoun t o f childre n mean s fo r constitutiona l interpretation i s that childre n mus t b e deeme d t o hav e rights . The fac t that childre n hav e right s wa s emphasize d b y Justic e Willia m Dougla s in a famou s dissentin g opinio n i n Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), 46 a cas e in whic h th e Suprem e Cour t uphel d th e righ t o f Amis h parents t o withdraw thei r childre n fro m compulsor y schoo l attendanc e o n reli gious grounds . Justic e Douglas' s dissen t i s wort h quotin g a t length , because i t perceptivel y an d eloquentl y identifie s th e importanc e o f recognizing tha t childre n hav e rights : On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children should be entitle d t o b e heard. While the parents , absent dissent , normally spea k fo r the entire family, the education o f the child is a matter on which the child will often hav e decide d views . He may want t o be a pianist o r a n astronau t o r a n ocean geographer. To do so he will have to break from th e Amish tradition. It is the future o f the student, not the future o f the parents, that is imperilled in today's decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, the n th e chil d wil l b e foreve r barre d from entr y int o th e ne w an d amazing worl d o f th e preferre d course , o r h e ma y rebel . I t i s th e student' s judgment, no t hi s parents', tha t i s essentia l i f w e ar e t o giv e ful l meanin g t o what w e have sai d abou t th e Bil l of Rights and o f the righ t of students t o b e masters o f thei r ow n destiny . If h e i s harnesse d t o th e Amis h wa y o f lif e b y those in authority over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted an d deformed. Th e child, therefore, should be given an opportunit y to be heard before the State gives the exemption which we honor today. 47

Constitutional Interpretation 17 3 It i s importan t t o not e wha t Justic e Dougla s di d not sa y i n hi s dissenting opinion . Justic e Dougla s di d not sa y tha t th e wishe s o f a child mus t alway s control . Man y childre n ar e simpl y no t matur e enough to understand th e implication s of their desires. But some children are, and as Justice Douglas pointed out, all children have the right to be heard so that their individual levels of maturity can be discerned . Otherwise, a child' s mora l righ t t o b e treate d a s a n individua l i s violated. Turning t o case s involvin g disability , some class-base d distinction s are constitutionally acceptable , as they sometimes are in cases involving sex , becaus e ther e ar e inheren t physica l limitation s involved . T o take a n obviou s example, laws prohibiting blin d person s from drivin g are not unconstitutional, because blind persons are not physically capable o f driving . Of course , an y suc h class-base d restriction s shoul d b e kept t o a minimum , becaus e th e physicall y challenge d shar e a mora l claim to natural freedom equa l to that of the rest of us. The mos t controversia l issu e facin g moder n Americ a relatin g t o equality i s preferential treatment . Thos e wh o favo r preferentia l treat ment typically argue that clas s preferences i n employment an d educa tion ar e necessar y t o overcom e America' s lon g history o f discrimina tion agains t minoritie s an d women . I n th e word s o f Justic e Lewi s Powell—the Suprem e Court' s decisiv e voic e o n th e divisiv e issu e o f preferential treatmen t durin g hi s fifteen-yea r tenur e (1972-1987) 48— "In orde r t o remed y th e effect s o f prio r discrimination , i t ma y b e necessary t o take rac e [an d sex, etc.] into account," even i f "innocen t persons ma y be calle d upo n t o bear som e o f the burden s o f the rem edy."49 I n othe r words , th e Constitutio n ma y nee d t o b e colo r an d gender conscious in order to be color and gender blind. 50 The problems wit h preferentia l treatmen t ar e many , but tw o stan d out when applying the Declaration of Independence's concept of equality. First, as Justice Powel l acknowledges, the practice itsel f discrimi nates—and almos t always against innocent individuals—to overcom e the vestiges of class-based discrimination, something critics refer to as "reverse discrimination." 51 Second, preferential treatment stigmatizes minorities and women by implying tha t the y ar e les s capabl e o f succeedin g o n th e basi s o f individual merit than are White males. Preferential treatmen t therefor e

174 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n represents a denial of moral equality to minorities and women. Interestingly, Bae r argue s tha t preferentia l treatmen t passe s constitutiona l muster becaus e i t doe s no t stigmatiz e White males a s inferior. 52 Bae r has i t backwards , however . Sh e fail s t o appreciat e tha t preferentia l treatment stigmatize s minorities and women. Justic e Clarenc e Thomas, wh o argue s i n som e o f hi s speeche s an d writing s tha t th e Constitution shoul d b e interprete d i n light o f the Declaratio n o f Independence,53 make s th e poin t well : "I think tha t preferentia l hirin g o n the basi s o f rac e o r gende r wil l increas e racia l divisiveness , disem power wome n an d minoritie s b y fosterin g th e notio n tha t the y ar e permanently disable d an d i n nee d o f handouts , an d dela y th e da y when ski n colo r and gende r ar e truly the least important thing s abou t a person." 54 Although Justice Thomas may be a controversial figure to whom to refer fo r suppor t o n preferentia l treatment, 55 h e correctl y recognize s that preferentia l treatmen t impermissibl y implie s tha t minoritie s an d women ar e morall y inferio r t o Whit e males . Justice Thoma s als o discerns a n equall y seriou s problem wit h th e practice : b y focusin g o n groups instead o f on individuals, preferential treatmen t i s inconsistent with th e Declaration' s mandat e tha t a n individua l b e treate d a s a n individual, a poin t emphasize d throughou t thi s section . I n Justic e Thomas's words , i t i s a n "error " t o focu s o n group s instea d o f o n individuals in civil rights adjudication, "fo r it is above all the protection of individual right s that America, in its best moments, has in its heart and mind." 56 In short, the United States of America is a liberal regime (see par t 1) . Here, rights ar e possessed b y individuals , not b y groups. Preferential treatmen t violate s this fundamental tene t o f liberal political theory by focusing o n groups instead of on individuals. The fact tha t equalit y in the political philosophy o f the Declaratio n of Independenc e relate s t o equalit y o f opportunity, rathe r tha n t o equality of result, provide s further evidenc e o f the unconstitutionalit y of clas s preferences . Th e moder n associatio n o f equalit y wit h equa l results too k roo t i n the writing s o f a group o f radical theorist s i n the early 1960s, led by Michael Harrington.57 Governmentally, the foremos t example o f thi s egalitaria n mind-se t wa s Presiden t Lyndo n Johnson' s Great Societ y progra m o f th e 1960s , throug h whic h th e presiden t sought "no t just .. . equalit y a s a right an d a theor y bu t equalit y a s a fact an d equalit y a s a result." 58 A s chapte r 1 explained, however , i n

Constitutional Interpretation 17 5 Lockean liberalism unequal results may be the legitimate manifestatio n of unequal individual talent and effort. I n fact, Locke emphasizes that a just government encourages equality of opportunity, but avoids imposing equality of result.59 The modern egalitarian approach to preferentia l treatment is inconsistent with the Lockean concept of equality, because the redistributive natur e o f tha t approac h denie s a talented an d hard working individual his or her natura l right to eryo y the benefits o f his or her superior ability and effort . My discussion o f equality has emphasized the need under the political philosophy o f the Declaration o f Independence t o treat individual s as individuals . Wha t thi s mean s fo r constitutiona l interpretatio n i s that th e Suprem e Court' s awkwar d multitie r approac h t o questions of equality, wherein som e classification s (fo r example , race) ar e handle d in on e wa y ("stric t scrutiny " review) , other s (fo r example , sex ) i n another way ("strict rationality " review), and still others (for example , indigency) i n yet a third wa y ("rationa l basis " review), should b e discarded. Unde r th e Declaration , classification s ar e treate d i n a singl e way: all class-based differentiatio n throug h la w that is not based o n a universally tru e an d relevan t characteristi c i s unconstitutional . No t only is this standard easie r t o apply than the Court's present multitie r approach, but it speaks directly to the equal moral status of all individuals, a principle to which the Founders dedicated this nation. Life No issues in modern American constitutional law are more emotionally charged tha n thos e concernin g th e natura l righ t t o "life. " Th e thre e most controversial issues relating to life are considered i n this section: the death penalty (which was briefly discussed in the Introduction), the "right to die," and abortion. Welfare i s also addressed. Before proceed ing t o th e discussio n o f constitutiona l interpretatio n i t shoul d b e re called that, in natural-rights doctrine , "the fundamental la w of nature" is "th e preservatio n o f mankind." 60 Not e tha t th e emphasi s i s o n th e preservation o f mankind, rathe r tha n o n the preservation o f individual persons. As will be seen, this distinction has profound implication s for constitutional interpretation . The importanc e o f preservin g lif e i n natural-right s doctrin e flows

176 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n from man' s relationshi p wit h hi s Creator , a poin t clearl y recognize d i n the Declaratio n o f Independence' s clai m tha t "al l men . . . ar e endowe d by thei r Creato r wit h certai n unalienabl e rights. " Lock e discusse s th e status an d implication s o f man's relationship wit h hi s Creator i n one o f the mos t famou s passage s i n the Second Treatise: No on e ough t t o har m anothe r i n hi s life , health , liberty , o r possessions ; fo r men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker— all servant s o f on e sovereig n master , sen t int o th e worl d b y hi s order , an d about his business—they ar e his property whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure. 61 Given tha t ma n i s the "property " o f hi s Creato r and , a s a result, tha t he hold s hi s lif e i n trus t fo r hi s Creator , th e constitutiona l issue s relating t o lif e ar e o f utmos t significance . Wit h thi s brie f revie w o f th e philosophical meanin g o f the natura l righ t to lif e i n mind (fo r more , se e chapter 1) , I now tur n t o constitutiona l interpretation . The deat h penalt y i s confronte d i n th e Constitutio n b y th e eight h amendment, which forbid s "crue l and unusual punishments," as applie d to th e state s throug h th e fourteent h amendment. 62 Additionally , th e fifth amendmen t speak s t o capita l punishmen t i n th e doubl e jeopard y clause, an d th e fift h an d fourteent h amendment s addres s i t i n thei r respective du e proces s clauses. 63 Unde r th e lette r o f th e Constitution , a perso n ma y b e deprive d o f lif e wit h du e process , an d lif e ma y b e jeopardized once . Those wh o argu e tha t th e deat h penalt y i s unconstitutional typicall y do s o o n th e basi s o f the so-calle d "evolving standard s o f decenc y tha t mark th e progres s o f a maturin g society." 64 Ther e ar e tw o problem s with the evolving-standards-of-decenc y test . First, as Christopher Wolf e points out , th e proponent s o f a n evolvin g standar d assum e tha t evolu tion i s "upward, " whe n i n actualit y "'evolving ' standard s ca n cu t bot h ways." 65 J n othe r words , evolvin g standard s nee d no t alway s progres s to a more humanitaria n result . Second, as discussed i n the Introductio n in th e contex t o f Justic e Brennan' s unyieldin g oppositio n t o th e deat h penalty, i n applicatio n th e evolving-standards-of-decenc y tes t i s likel y based o n nothin g othe r tha n a particula r justice' s ow n conceptio n o f morality. Thi s proble m i s wel l illustrate d b y Justic e Thurgoo d Mar shall's dissentin g opinio n i n Gregg v. Georgia (1976) , the cas e i n whic h the Suprem e Cour t first rule d tha t th e deat h penalty , if properly admin istered, i s constitutional. 66

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7

In his Gregg dissent , Justice Marshall rejected the argument that the passage o f deat h penalt y statute s b y man y state s i n recent time s wa s evidence o f moder n America' s acceptanc e o f th e mora l legitimac y o f capital punishment . Accordin g t o Justic e Marshall , who , lik e Justic e Brennan, considered th e death penalty to be unconstitutional unde r all circumstances, if th e constitutionalit y o f th e deat h penalt y turns , a s I hav e urged , o n th e opinion of a n informed citizenry , then even the enactment of new death statutes cannot be viewed as conclusive. In Furman, I observed that the American people ar e largel y unawar e o f th e informatio n critica l t o a judgment o n the morality of the death penalty, and concluded that if they were better informed they would consider it shocking, ui\just and unacceptable. .. . The opinions of an informed public would differ significantly from those of a public unaware of the consequences and effects of the death penalty.67 What Justice Marshal l i s suggesting i s that he wil l tel l th e America n people wha t the y reall y think , a suggestion tha t i s a s subjec t t o abus e by a justice claimin g to speak fo r an "unaware" public a s it is inconsistent wit h th e politica l philosoph y o f th e America n Foundin g o n th e fundamental natura l right to life . A natural-right s interpretatio n o f th e Constitutio n support s th e cur rent Suprem e Cour t position tha t th e deat h penalt y i s constitutional. 68 As discusse d i n chapte r 1 , an individua l owe s a dut y t o hi s Creato r t o preserve hi s ow n lif e an d not t o tak e th e lif e o f another . An individua l who take s th e lif e o f another , whe n no t actin g i n self-defense, forfeit s his righ t t o life , becaus e tha t individua l i s no t actin g rationall y i n violating th e fundamenta l la w o f natur e t o preserv e mankind . Here , i t is necessar y t o recal l tha t actin g rationall y i s a conditio n i n Locke' s moral theor y fo r bein g subjec t t o natura l la w an d th e possesso r o f natural rights under that law. 69 Additionally, th e deat h penalt y i s a necessar y componen t o f th e political authorit y o f a regime, such a s ours, dedicated t o the preserva tion of the whole o f the political community . On this point, the fact that the fundamental la w o f natur e i s the preservation o f mankind, no t the preservation o f individual persons , is dispositive. "Justice o n a n offender" 70—treating a n offende r wit h th e dignit y that come s fro m recognizin g hi s fre e wil l an d mora l responsibility — also sanction s th e impositio n o f th e deat h penalt y i n egregiou s case s like th e intentiona l takin g o f th e life o f another . As a result, th e argu -

178 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n ment, mos t notabl y advance d b y Justice Brennan , tha t th e deat h pen alty is never morall y o r constitutionall y acceptabl e because i t violates the "huma n dignity " o f th e offender 71 mus t b e rejected , becaus e thi s view equate s biologica l existenc e wit h human dignity . As Locke's cal l for th e nee d t o d o "justic e o n a n offender " intimates , th e essenc e o f human dignity is not just that we live, but how we live. As wit h mos t question s o f constitutiona l interpretation , ther e ar e situations involving capital punishment that require separate consider ation; namely , applyin g th e deat h penalt y t o th e youn g an d t o th e mentally impaired. With respect to young people who kill, the Supreme Court has establishe d fiftee n year s ol d a s the ag e at which on e is too young to be sentenced t o death. 72 Unfortunately, th e Court's decisions pertaining t o yout h an d capita l punishmen t ar e base d o n generaliza tions abou t th e maturit y o f specifi c ag e groups . Th e Declaratio n o f Independence's charg e tha t individual s b e treate d a s individual s re quires tha t a n individualize d assessmen t o f a juvenile killer' s maturit y and moral responsibility be conducted73—a requirement that is consistent wit h th e Court' s ow n recognitio n o f th e nee d fo r individualize d sentencing of adults. 74 If the individualize d hearin g determine s tha t th e juvenile kille r was of sufficient maturit y at the time of his crime to understand the wrongfulness o f hi s actions, then th e juvenile may b e execute d because , as in th e cas e o f a n adult , th e juvenile i s no t actin g rationall y whe n h e violates th e fundamenta l la w o f natur e t o preserv e mankind . I n tha t case, the juvenile killer, like the adult, forfeits hi s right to life becaus e to possess rights under Locke's moral theory one must be acting rationally. I f th e individualize d hearin g determine s tha t th e juvenile kille r was not matur e enoug h t o understan d th e mora l implication s o f hi s crime, th e juvenil e ma y not b e executed . Although , a t first blush , i t might appea r tha t a juvenil e kille r lackin g maturit y i s als o lackin g rationality, and thu s not possessing rights, I explained earlie r how the juvenile's capacity fo r rationality makes him a person no w and, therefore, a possessor of rights—especially of the right to life, the preservation of which is the fundamental la w of nature. Curiously, th e generalizatio n proble m tha t exist s wit h respec t t o juveniles is not present i n the Court's treatment o f capital punishmen t and th e mentall y impaired . I n th e cas e o f th e mentall y impaired , th e Court rightl y require s a n individualize d assessmen t o f whethe r th e

Constitutional Interpretation 17 9 death penalt y i s appropriate. 75 If , unde r th e natural-right s theor y ad vanced i n thi s volume , tha t assessmen t determine s tha t th e mentall y impaired kille r has th e capacit y t o ac t rationall y i n th e future , tha t individual may not b e executed. Again, the fact that capacity fo r rationality exist s no w mean s tha t th e mentall y impaire d kille r ha s right s now, including the fundamental natura l right to life. On the other hand, if the individualize d assessmen t conclude s tha t th e mentall y impaire d killer doe s not hav e th e capacit y t o ac t rationall y i n th e future , th e offender may b e executed. This is because the mentally impaired killer is operatin g outsid e o f th e law s o f nature—whic h ar e discerne d b y reason76—and is , therefore, a threat to the preservation of mankind. In Cruzan v. Director of the Missouri Department of Health (1990),77 th e Suprem e Cour t entere d int o th e vexin g legal-medical ethical debat e ove r th e "righ t t o die." 78 Whe n Nanc y Cruza n wa s twenty-five years old she was involved in a terrible car accident. By the time medica l hel p arrive d he r brai n ha d bee n deprive d o f oxyge n fo r twelve t o fourtee n minutes . Cruzan's hear t an d lung s wer e restarted , but sh e neve r regaine d consciousness . Initially , Cruzan' s parent s ap proved th e surgica l insertio n o f feedin g tube s int o thei r daughter' s body t o kee p he r alive . However , afte r learnin g tha t ther e wa s n o possibility that thei r daughter' s conditio n woul d improv e and that sh e would likel y remai n i n a vegetativ e stat e fo r anothe r thirt y years , Cruzan's parents decided to seek permission to have the feeding tube s removed. Th e stat e o f Missour i denie d th e parents ' reques t an d th e case ended up in the Supreme Court of the United States. Although th e majorit y o f th e Court uphel d th e state' s refusa l t o permit Cruzan' s parent s t o remov e th e life-sustainin g devices , all bu t one of the justices (Justice Antonin Scalia) recognized a constitutionalliberty right to refuse o r terminat e unwante d medica l treatment i f the individual is able to express that desir e a t the time of treatment or , in the even t o f incompetenc e a t th e tim e o f treatment , i f th e individua l had previously expresse d th e desir e clearly . In Cruzan's case , the necessary "clea r an d convincing " evidenc e o f her desir e t o terminat e th e medical treatmen t wa s deeme d lacking . Fo r ou r purposes , however , what i s important i s that th e Cour t identifie d a constitutional righ t t o die in the fourteenth amendmen t if the requisite proof that this is what the incompetent person wishes is available. The fac t tha t th e fundamenta l la w o f natur e i s the preservatio n o f

180 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n mankind seems to suggest that there is no right to die under a naturalrights interpretatio n o f th e Constitution . Lock e write s i n th e Second Treatise that "every one ... is bound to preserve himself and not to quit his station wilfully." 79 Upo n closer examination, Locke's prohibition on the right to die is not as absolute as it first appears.80 For example , in the sam e sectio n i n which Lock e seems absolutel y to forbi d suicide, 81 h e state s tha t ther e ar e "nobler " use s o f lif e tha n "bare preservation."82 Locke likely has in mind situations like fighting a just war or a parent sacrificing his or her life for that of his or her child. What i s significan t fo r determinin g whethe r ther e i s a constitutiona l right to die is that Locke recognizes that the duty of preservation is not absolute, a position also seen in the discussion of capital punishment. Moreover, although Locke seems to forbid suicide in section 6 of the Second Treatise, h e permit s i t i n sectio n 23 . I n sectio n 23 , Lock e condones suicide for a slave who finds that the hardships of his slavery "outweigh the value of his life."83 Clearly, an equally strong case can be made fo r someon e sufferin g unbearabl y o r existin g i n a vegetativ e state. Tha t i s t o say , th e Lockea n dut y o f self-preservatio n require s that a n individua l refrai n fro m killin g himsel f o r endangerin g hi s lif e frivolously o r arbitrarily; 84 i t doe s not requir e tha t a n individua l con tinue to exist when that perso n ha s no opportunity t o enjoy life , as in Nancy Cruzan' s case , o r i n th e cas e o f a n individua l wh o i s sufferin g great pain. There is, in other words, a difference betwee n being biologically alive an d living. A natural-rights interpretatio n o f th e Constitu tion therefor e support s th e Suprem e Court' s position tha t ther e i s a right to die in some circumstances.* The mos t emotionall y explosiv e an d politicall y divisiv e decisio n issued b y the Suprem e Cour t i n recent time s i s Roe v. Wade (1973),85 the case in which th e Burger Cour t ruled tha t there is a constitutiona l right to abortion. The Roe decision created a "political firestorm" 86 that has since affected politica l campaigns and Supreme Court nominations. For example , al l o f th e Republica n presidentia l platform s sinc e 198 0 have called for a constitutional amendment banning abortion, and Robert Bork's harsh criticis m o f Roe played n o small part i n the defea t o f * The fact that the fundamental la w of nature is the preservation of life suggests that the Cruzan majorit y wa s als o correc t i n requirin g a clea r evidentiar y showin g tha t on e wishes to die. Justice Brennan' s dissent , ranking autonomy abov e the sanctity o f life, is therefore flawed. See 110 S.Ct., 2863-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Constitutional Interpretation 18 1 his nominatio n t o th e Suprem e Court . Subsequen t nominee s t o th e Court hav e bee n likewis e barrage d b y questions , thoug h onl y Rut h Bader Ginsbur g an d Stephe n Breye r hav e provide d answers , abou t whether the y believ e ther e i s a constitutiona l righ t to abortion . (Bot h Ginsburg an d Breye r state d i n thei r confirmatio n hearing s tha t the y believe there is a constitutional right to abortion.) In Roe v. Wade the Suprem e Court , i n a seven-to-tw o vote , struc k down a Texas antiabortio n statut e o n the groun d tha t a woman ha s a fundamental righ t o f persona l autonom y i n childbearin g decisions . In its decision the Court, speaking through Justice Harry Blackmun, promulgated a trimester approach to abortion. During the first three months of pregnancy the abortion decision is left to the woman and her doctor. In the second trimester, the state may regulate abortions in the interest of women' s healt h because , th e Cour t found , abortion s ar e les s saf e than childbirth. In the third trimester, states may regulate and even ban abortions—unless th e lif e of the woman is jeopardized—because i t is here, the Court decided, that a fetus becomes "viable." 87 In subsequen t case s th e Cour t issue d a serie s o f opinion s bot h reaffirming Roe an d applyin g Roe to specifi c situations. 88 Those case s reveal that as the composition o f the Court became more conservative, support fo r Roe amon g th e justice s declined . Notabl e amon g Roe's progeny i s Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989), 89 in which the Rehnquis t Court uphel d a restrictiv e stat e statut e requirin g feta l viability testing. Perhaps more important than the decision itself, Webster signaled tha t the increasingl y conservativ e Rehnquis t Court might soon overrul e Roe, a decisio n th e Reaga n an d Bus h administration s had lon g been urging . However, du e largel y t o th e cautiou s approac h of th e Court' s then-lon e femal e justice , Sandr a Da y O'Connor , th e justices, with the exception of Justice Scalia, declined in Webster to say that Roe should be reversed. After th e retiremen t o f th e Rehnquis t Court' s mos t libera l justices, William Brennan an d Thurgood Marshall , and their respective replace ment b y th e mor e conservativ e Davi d Soute r an d Clarenc e Thomas , many Court watcher s expecte d tha t Roe would b e overruled. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) shows how unpredictable the Court can be. In Casey, five members of the Court— Justices Blackmun , Joh n Pau l Stevens , O'Connor , Anthon y Kennedy , and Souter—vote d t o reaffir m wha t th e unusua l O'Connor-Kennedy -

182 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n Souter joint opinion calle d the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade: that a woma n ha s a constitutiona l righ t t o a n abortio n befor e th e fetu s attains viability . The O'Connor-Kennedy-Soute r opinio n did , however , adopt a mor e lenien t standar d fo r evaluatin g abortio n restrictions , with tha t standard—th e "undu e burden " standard—replacin g Roe's stringent "compelling " state-interest tes t an d its accompanying trimester framework. A n "undue burden" is one placing a "substantial obsta cle" i n th e pat h o f a woma n seekin g a n abortion. 90 Chie f Justic e Rehnquist an d Justice s Byro n White , Scalia , an d Thoma s vote d t o overturn Roe, markin g th e first tim e fou r member s o f th e Cour t ha d expressly done so. Abortion, t o borro w Olive r Wendel l Holmes' s phrase , i s a "har d case."91 This i s because ther e i s so muc h uncertaint y abou t whe n lif e begins. I n Roe v. Wade the Cour t expressl y refuse d t o "resolv e th e difficult questio n o f when lif e begins," 92 a position t o which the Cour t has consistently adhered ever since. The title of Laurence Tribe's book on abortion , Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes, 93 wel l describe s th e Court's dilemma, given that abortion directly impacts two fundamenta l rights, life and liberty. The natural-rights political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence cannot determin e whether a woman has a constitutional right to choose whethe r t o hav e a n abortion , until it is established when life begins. I f th e unbor n chil d is a "life, " the n ther e i s not a natura l right t o a n abortio n becaus e "th e fundamenta l la w o f nature " i s th e preservation o f lif e an d "whe n al l canno t b e preserved , th e safet y o f the innocent i s t o b e preferred." 94 Ther e certainl y ca n b e n o mor e innocent a life tha n tha t o f an unborn child . But if the unborn chil d is not a "life, " the n ther e is a natura l righ t t o a n abortio n becaus e a woman's natura l righ t t o "liberty"—t o freel y direc t th e cours e o f he r life—surely include s the childbearin g decision . Abortion is , therefore, an issue for which, at present, the natural-rights political philosophy of the Declaratio n o f Independenc e canno t provid e th e rul e o f decision . However, th e Declaratio n enumerate s th e relevan t considerations — especially the primacy o f the natural right to life—and wil l be able to provide the rule of decision when it is established when life begins. Here, it is necessary to reject conservativ e activist Lewis Lehrman's controversial article , "The Declaration o f Independence an d th e Righ t

Constitutional Interpretation 18 3 to Life: One Leads Unmistakably from the Other/*95 an article that burst onto the national political scene during the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmatio n hearing. 96 Lehrman argue s that Roe v. Wade was a "coup" against th e Constitution . Equatin g th e curren t struggl e t o ba n abortion wit h Abraha m Lincoln' s struggl e t o ba n slavery , Lehrma n characterizes the Court's unwillingness to protect a "child-about-to-beborn ( a person) " a s a "holocaust " tha t i s fundamentall y inconsisten t with the "expressl y stipulate d righ t to life , as set forth i n the Declara tion and the Constitution." 97 Lehrman assert s a s a n articl e o f religiou s fait h tha t lif e begin s a t conception.98 He fails to appreciate, however, that under the Constitu tion the question o f when life begins is a scientific one , not a religious one, because the first amendmen t codifie s th e strict wall of separation between church and state that was so fundamental t o the Founders, as well as to Locke. 99* Unfortunately, scientist s still disagree on when lif e begins.100 The political philosophy of the Declaration o f Independenc e therefore canno t decide the abortion question at the present time. Before proceedin g t o th e nex t are a o f inquir y I need t o sa y a fe w words abou t th e implication s fo r m y projec t o f th e inabilit y o f th e political philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e t o presentl y resolve the abortion question. In my judgment, an interpretive method ology need not be able to resolve all questions to be workable. As long as the methodology ca n resolve the vast majority o f questions, as well as provide guidance for the remainder, the methodology works. This is especially true if those unanswered questions will one day be resolved. Such i s th e cas e fo r th e natural-right s methodolog y propose d i n thi s volume. As wil l b e apparen t fro m thi s chapter , abortio n i s th e onl y issue o f constitutional-right s adjudicatio n tha t th e propose d interpre tive methodology cannot at present resolve. The last issue concerning the natural right to life considere d i n this section i s welfare, o r wha t Lock e call s "charity. " There i s an intimat e *The Founders ' referenc e i n th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e t o individuals ' bein g "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights" is not inconsistent with the strict wall of separation between church and state they later wrote into the firstamendment. In other words, the Declaration—and Locke , for that matter—need no t be read theistically. Jefferson himself was making the point in the Declaration with his use of the phrase "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God."

184 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n connection betwee n charit y an d lif e i n natural-rights doctrine : the righ t to an d dut y o f charit y flows fro m th e fundamenta l la w o f natur e t o preserve mankind . As one leadin g Locke schola r put s it : Beneath th e flexibl e an d diversifie d structur e o f socia l convention , ther e re mains the rigid an d unitary orde r o f nature an d its demands have none of the permissive delicac y o f human complaisance , for the y are the demands of [th e Creator]. All men have a duty to preserve their fellow men to the best of their ability. It is the duty of charity. .. . Charit y [is] a right on the part of the needy and a duty on the part of the wealthy. 101 The purel y individualisti c interpretatio n o f Lockean liberalism , mos t notably advance d b y C . B. Macpherson an d Le o Strauss , rejects a dut y of charity. 102 However , a carefu l readin g o f Lock e reveal s ho w centra l charity i s t o Lockea n liberalism , give n tha t th e fundamenta l la w o f nature i s the preservation o f mankind. For instance , Locke states in th e First Treatise tha t "Charity give s ever y Ma n a Title t o s o muc h ou t o f another's Plenty , as will keep hi m fro m extrea m want , where h e has n o means t o subsis t otherwise." 103 Lock e als o speak s o f charit y i n th e Second Treatise^ explainin g tha t "whe n hi s ow n preservatio n come s not i n competition , [a n individua l ought] , a s muc h a s h e can , t o pre serve th e res t o f mankind " an d tha t a n individua l owe s "relie f an d support t o the distressed." 104 Finally , in "Venditio," an essay that consti tutes Locke' s mos t extensiv e discussio n o f charity , he goe s s o far a s t o declare tha t i f anyone die s as a result o f another's denia l of charity , th e person denyin g charit y "i s no doub t guilt y of murder." 105 While Locke's statement s abou t th e dut y o f charit y ar e mad e largel y in the contex t o f his analysi s o f th e stat e o f nature, and henc e spea k t o a private dut y unde r natura l law , a centra l tene t o f Locke' s theor y o f government i s tha t individual s ced e t o governmen t th e powe r t o en force fundamenta l privat e dutie s i n politica l society—especiall y thos e duties relatin g t o th e preservatio n o f mankin d (se e chapte r 1) . As a result, th e privat e dut y o f charit y ca n b e enforce d b y governmen t through publi c law . Althoug h th e Founder s subscribe d t o thi s view , using loca l taxes t o provide relie f t o the indigent, 106 the Suprem e Cour t has neve r hel d that ther e i s a constitutiona l righ t to public assistance . In severa l noteworth y case s th e Suprem e Cour t ha s acknowledged , in seemingl y Lockea n terms , th e significanc e o f welfar e benefits . Fo r example, i n Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) , the Cour t struc k down , o n a six-to-three vote , a durational residenc y conditio n o n th e availabilit y o f

Constitutional Interpretation 18 5 Aid to Familie s wit h Dependen t Childre n benefit s o n "righ t to travel " grounds. The Cour t note d i n passing tha t th e challenge d requiremen t operated t o "[deny ] welfare ai d upon whic h may depend the abilit y of families t o obtai n the very means to subsist—food , shelter , and othe r necessities of life/'107 a statement Locke himself could have made. In Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 108 a five-person majority hel d tha t du e process require s a trial-typ e hearin g prio r t o th e terminatio n o f pre viously provide d welfar e benefits . A s i n Shapiro, th e Cour t stoppe d short i n Goldberg of holdin g tha t ther e i s a constitutiona l righ t t o welfare. And as the Court has become more conservative, it has backed away fro m it s earlie r statement s suggestin g tha t ther e ma y be suc h a constitutional right. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services (1989) illustrates the Court's departure from it s earlier statements suggesting tha t ther e ma y b e a constitutiona l righ t t o welfare . I n DeShaney, th e Rehnquis t Court rejecte d th e clai m o f a mothe r tha t welfar e workers were liable for the repeated beatings, and accompanying brain damage, levied on her son by the young boy's natural father. The Court justified it s decision by noting that "our cases have recognized that the Due Proces s Clause s generall y confe r n o affirmativ e righ t t o govern mental aid , eve n wher e suc h ai d ma y b e necessar y t o secur e life , liberty, o r propert y interest s o f whic h th e governmen t itsel f ma y no t deprive the individual." 109 Given the right to and duty of charity in natural-rights doctrine there is, contrar y t o th e Suprem e Court' s mos t recen t pronouncements , a s well as to the position advanced by many modern-day conservatives, 110 a constitutiona l righ t to welfare. It is essential, however, to appreciat e the exten t o f thi s right . A careful readin g o f Lock e advise s tha t onl y those wh o canno t hel p themselve s ar e entitle d t o welfare. 111 An ablebodied individua l mus t fen d fo r himsel f o r herself , unles s condition s are suc h that , despit e th e individual' s bes t efforts , h e o r sh e cannot . Additionally, as I explain more fully i n the next sections, natural-rights doctrine rejects, under the guise of public assistance, egalitarian claims for the redistribution of wealth. Under a natural-rights interpretation of the Constitution , onl y th e basi c need s o f th e poo r mus t b e me t t o satisfy th e natura l righ t t o life . But , a s explaine d below , th e natura l right t o th e pursui t o f happines s tha t i s s o centra l t o th e politica l philosophy o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e afford s a n individua l

186 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n who canno t hel p himself o r herself mor e tha n simpl y the mean s to sta y alive. I n othe r words , ther e i s mor e t o publi c assistanc e tha n tha t involved wit h protecting th e natura l righ t to life .

Liberty "Liberty," a n individual' s natura l righ t t o freel y direc t th e cours e o f hi s or her lif e (se e chapte r 1) , is a concep t integra l t o the politica l philoso phy o f th e America n regime . Indeed , "th e Unite d State s o f America " stands fo r libert y perhap s mor e tha n fo r anythin g else . Fro m th e Founders' lon g an d blood y struggl e fo r th e freedo m t o gover n them selves, to immigrant s streamin g throug h Ne w Yor k harbo r i n searc h o f a bette r lif e an d bein g welcome d b y th e Statu e o f Liberty , t o foreig n peoples overthrowin g oppressiv e government s an d turnin g t o th e United State s a s a model , libert y ha s alway s bee n a t th e hear t o f th e American wa y o f life . The privac y case s provid e a n excellen t vehicl e throug h whic h t o illustrate ho w th e Declaratio n o f Independence's concep t o f liberty ca n be applie d i n constitutiona l interpretation . Th e Suprem e Cour t first recognized privac y interests in the 188 6 search an d seizure/self-incrimi nation cas e o f Boyd v. United States. There , the Cour t declare d uncon stitutional a statut e allowin g th e governmen t t o orde r individual s t o produce privat e paper s an d invoice s a s evidenc e o f illegall y importe d goods. Th e Cour t emphasize d th e privac y interest s involve d an d hel d that th e fourt h an d fifth amendment s appl y to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home an d privacies of life . It is not th e breakin g of his doors, and the rummaging o f his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; bu t it is the invasion o f his indefeasible righ t of personal security, personal liberty and private property. 112 Four year s later , i n a widel y rea d Harvard Law Review article , Samuel Warre n an d Loui s Brandei s develope d a theor y o f privac y that wen t beyon d Boyd's propert y an d crimina l procedur e context . According t o Warre n an d Brandeis , ther e shoul d b e a broa d privac y right i n th e la w becaus e wha t i s at stak e i s "man's spiritual nature, " hi s "inviolate personalty." 113 Althoug h particula r member s o f th e Cour t continued t o recogniz e privac y interest s i n specifi c provision s o f th e

Constitutional Interpretation 18 7 Bill of Rights,114 it was not until the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut116 tha t th e potentia l fo r a general constitutiona l righ t o f privac y was identified b y a majority o f the Court. At issue in Griswold was a Connecticut statut e barring distributio n and us e o f contraceptiv e devices . The Court , i n a seven-to-tw o vote , declared th e statut e a n unconstitutiona l infringemen t o n marita l pri vacy. Writin g fo r th e majority , Justic e Willia m Dougla s argue d tha t while there i s no "righ t o f privacy" mentioned i n Constitution, suc h a right ca n b e inferre d fro m th e existenc e o f "penumbras " tha t ar e formed b y "emanations " from othe r provision s o f th e Bil l o f Right s which recognize "zones of privacy." 116 Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court instantly became one of the most controversial i n the Court's history. 117 In addition t o the stingin g dissents o f Justice s Hug o Blac k an d Potte r Stewar t i n Griswold it self,118 Robert Bork writes that "the protection of marriage was not the point o f Griswold. Th e creatio n o f a new devic e for judicial power t o remake the Constitution was the point." 119 In fact, the Court's decision in Griswold tha t ther e i s a righ t o f privac y i n the Constitutio n wa s a principal caus e o f the call , by Bork an d others , for a jurisprudence o f original intention (see the Introduction). Albeit perhap s eve n mor e controversiall y tha n Justic e Douglas' s opinion for the Court, Justice Arthur Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold120 demonstrate s that the Court did not need to stretch as far as Justice Dougla s did—to th e "penumbras " of the Bill of Rights—t o find a righ t o f privac y i n th e Constitution . Justic e Goldber g turne d directly to the ninth amendment . He contended tha t the languag e an d history of the ninth amendment reveal that "the Framers believed tha t there ar e additiona l fundamenta l rights , protected fro m governmenta l infringement, whic h exis t alongsid e thos e fundamenta l right s specifi cally mentione d i n th e firs t eigh t amendments. " According t o Justic e Goldberg, the unenumerate d right s protected i n the ninth amendmen t are not identified "i n light of [a justice's] personal and private notions." Rather, they are identified b y looking "to the 'traditions and [collective ] conscience of our people.'" 121 As part 1 explained, the tradition and collective conscience to which the Suprem e Court shoul d refe r whe n interpretin g th e nint h amend ment i s th e natural-right s politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence. Davi d O'Brie n make s th e poin t wel l i n hi s thoughtfu l

188 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n book o n privacy. "The Ninth Amendment's provision for 'right s retaine d by th e people / " O'Brien writes , "registere d i n par t th e authors ' accep tance o f natural law teachings and the inherent right s of individuals." 122 In othe r words , th e Founder s di d no t believ e tha t th e Bil l o f Right s conferred right s upo n individuals . Rather , th e Bil l o f Right s reaffirmed preexisting right s possessed b y individuals. And the Founders include d the nint h amendmen t t o mak e clea r tha t individual s hav e mor e right s under natura l la w than thos e enumerate d i n amendments 1 through 8 . Although Griswold ha s bee n widel y criticize d for , amon g othe r things, failing to "stic k clos e to the text an d the history" of the Constitu tion, 123 interpreting th e Constitutio n i n ligh t o f the natural-right s politi cal philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e reveal s tha t a general righ t o f persona l privac y i s central t o th e Constitution . Recall , fo r instance, Locke's observatio n tha t "i n the greates t par t o f the actio n o f our live s . . . I thin k Go d ou t o f hi s infinit e goodnes s . . . hat h lef t u s great liberty." 124 Thi s i s a conclusio n tha t illustrates , perhap s bette r than an y other , th e differenc e betwee n libera l originalis m an d conser vative originalism. 125 A s par t 1 described, th e Constitutio n establishe s a limited governmen t whos e principa l purpos e i s t o secur e individua l rights. I n s o doing , th e Constitutio n certainl y protect s a n individual' s "right t o b e le t alone, " whic h i s th e essenc e o f th e righ t o f privacy. 126 The fundamental plac e o f personal privacy in the Constitution wa s wel l appreciated b y Justice Loui s Brandei s i n a justly acclaime d dissentin g opinion i n the 192 8 wiretap case , Olmstead v. United States. Accordin g to Justic e Brandeis , wh o mad e a simila r argumen t som e fou r decade s earlier i n his path-breaking articl e wit h Samue l Warren : The maker s o f ou r Constitutio n undertoo k t o secur e condition s favorabl e t o the pursui t o f happiness . The y recognize d th e significanc e o f man's spiritua l nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only part of the pain, pleasure, an d satisfaction s o f lif e ar e t o b e foun d i n materia l things . The y sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations . The y conferre d a s agains t th e Government , th e righ t t o b e let alone—th e mos t comprehensiv e o f right s an d th e righ t mos t value d b y civilized man. 127 In th e twent y year s afte r Griswold th e Suprem e Cour t extende d th e right t o b e fre e fro m unwarrante d governmen t interferenc e t o th e us e of contraceptive s b y unmarrie d persons, 128 includin g adolescents, 129 the decisio n t o marry, 130 cohabitatio n wit h one' s extende d family, 131

Constitutional Interpretation 18 9 parental contro l ove r the educatio n an d upbringing o f children, 132 an d abortion,133 t o nam e th e mos t well-know n decisions . O n th e issu e o f gay rights, however, the Court backed away from th e generous right of privacy identified i n Griswold. In Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) , the Suprem e Cour t confronte d th e challenge o f a ga y ma n wh o claime d tha t a stat e statut e makin g i t a crime to engage in adult, consensual, private homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional.134 I n a five-to-four vote, the Court upheld the statute. The majorit y opinio n wa s writte n b y Justic e Byro n White , wh o ap pealed to history and reasoned tha t proscriptions against that conduct [consensual sodomy] have ancient roots. .. . Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the origina l thirteen State s when they ratified th e Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 states in the Union had crimina l sodomy laws . In fact, unti l 1961 , all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodom y performed i n private and between consenting adults. .. . Agains t thi s background, to clai m tha t a right to engag e in such conduct is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is, at best, facetious.135 Justice White' s histor y i s certainl y impressive . I n fact , i n 177 9 Thomas Jefferson—the autho r o f the Declaratio n o f Independence — drafted A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments that included severe penaltie s fo r engagin g i n sodomy. 136 I n addition , Harr y Jaffa , who, like this author, argue s that th e Constitutio n shoul d b e interpre ted i n accordanc e wit h th e natural-right s politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaration o f Independence, 137 contend s tha t homosexua l act s ar e inconsistent with that philosophy because they run counter to regeneration. Homosexual act s "ar e unnatura l acts, " Jaffa writes , "and, being unnatural, th e ver y negatio n o f anythin g tha t coul d b e calle d a righ t according to nature. The very root of nature is generation."138 Unfortu nately, b y requirin g tha t se x b e procreationa l Jaff a i s advancin g a n unnecessarily rigid and formalistic approac h to homosexuality. Although a strictl y historica l approac h t o th e issu e o f homosexua l sodomy, a l a Justice White' s opinion , a s wel l a s th e perspectiv e pro moted b y th e conservativ e proponent s o f a jurisprudence o f origina l intention, does seem to support the Court's decision in Bowers, exam ining the issu e at a more general level of natural-rights principle—th e

190 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n approach advanced in this volume—does not. Specifically, because the preservation of mankind does not appear to be seriously threatened by adult, consensual, private homosexual acts , a natural-rights interpreta tion o f th e Constitution recognize s a constitutiona l privac y righ t t o engage i n such acts . (AIDS is certainly a threat t o the preservation o f mankind. But that dreade d diseas e i s not, contrary t o popular mythology, unique t o homosexuals. ) I t i s difficul t t o imagin e a mor e funda mental privacy interest than that concerning sexual activity—homosexual a s wel l a s heterosexual. 139 T o mak e th e poin t anothe r way , law s against homosexua l sodom y represen t nothin g mor e tha n th e major ity^ attemp t t o enforce it s morality o n the minority, 140 something tha t is flatly incompatibl e wit h th e concep t o f libert y embodie d i n th e Declaration o f Independenc e an d th e Constitution . I n th e America n regime, a n individua l i s suppose d t o enjo y th e natura l righ t t o freel y direct the course of his or her life, including his or her sex life. The final subjec t t o b e discusse d i n thi s sectio n i s "economi c lib erty." Ever since the Supreme Court began upholding President Frank lin Roosevelt' s Ne w Dea l legislatio n i n 1937, 141 th e Cour t ha s bee n employing a "doubl e standard, " whereb y noneconomi c right s ar e provided greater judicial protection tha n economic rights. 142 Because economic right s ar e sai d no t t o fal l withi n th e rubri c o f "preferre d freedoms" 143—which include such "personal" rights as freedom o f religion, of speech, and o f the press—they n o longer eryoy the protection the y did durin g th e heyda y o f th e Fuller , White , and Taf t Courts . But th e question tha t mus t b e aske d is : freedom s preferre d b y whom ? A s Learned Han d onc e remarked , "Jus t wh y propert y itsel f wa s no t a 'personal right/ nobody took the time to explain." 144 Clearly, the subordination o f economic rights to noneconomic right s in the hierarchy of judicial protection can be explained by nothing other than the personal political preferences o f a majority o f the justices wh o have served o n the post-1937 Supreme Court.* Under th e doubl e standar d th e Suprem e Cour t employ s a highl y * Henry Abraham suggest s thre e justifications fo r th e doubl e standard : (1 ) "th e crucia l nature o f basic freedoms, " (2 ) "the explicit language of the Bill of Rights," and (3 ) "the appropriate expertise of the judiciary." Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 28-37 . As will be eviden t below , a natural-rights-base d theor y o f judicial revie w reject s al l allege d justifications fo r th e doubl e standard , includin g thos e thoughtfull y presented , althoug h not necessarily embraced, by Abraham.

Constitutional Interpretation 19

1

permissive test in judging the constitutionality of economic regulations . The Constitutio n i s violated onl y i f the economi c regulatio n a t issue i s not rationall y relate d t o a legitimat e governmen t purpose . Onl y twic e since 193 7 hav e economi c regulation s faile d t o pas s thi s test. 145 B y contrast, regulatio n o f fundamenta l noneconomi c right s i s frequentl y deemed unconstitutiona l o n th e basi s o f a highly protective test : there must be a compelling state interest for the regulation. Arguing that the doubl e standar d has improperl y sacrifice d th e indi vidual right of economic liberty , some scholars—most notabl y Richard Epstein, Leonar d Levy , Stephen Macedo , Richard Posner , an d Bernar d Siegan146—maintain tha t th e Cour t shoul d abando n th e doubl e stan dard becaus e economi c right s ar e a s deservin g o f protectio n a s non economic rights . According to Macedo: The modern Court's double standard, which neglects economic liberties and protects other "personal" liberties, like privacy, is incoherent and untenable. It flies i n th e fac e o f th e plai n word s o f th e Constitution , ignore s importan t aspects o f ou r lega l an d political traditions , an d fails t o recogniz e tha t economic and other "favored" liberties are mutually interdependent and commonly grounded on an even more basic, implicit constitutional principle : the dignity of persons who are bearers of broad rights and capable of responsible self-government.147 Siegan is even more blunt than Macedo in his criticism of the doubl e standard. "The judiciary lacks legitimacy to discriminate against certain liberties," Siega n writes . "Judicia l withdrawa l fro m th e protectio n o f economic activit y violates Article III." 148 The moder n Suprem e Cour t ha s occasionall y cas t doub t o n th e wisdom of the double standard. In Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation (1972) , the Court held that wages deposited in a savings accoun t were subjec t t o certai n civi l right s statutes . Writin g fo r a unanimou s Court—and invokin g Locke' s Second Treatise a s evidenc e o f th e pro found American commitment t o private property rights—Justice Stew art described th e problems o f selectivit y an d objectivit y cause d b y th e double standard: The dichotomy between personal libertie s an d property rights is a false one . Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to er\joy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak out or the right to travel, is, in truth, a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdepen-

192 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n dence exist s betwee n th e persona l righ t t o libert y an d th e persona l righ t i n property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civi l rights has long been recognized . J. Locke, of Civil Government ...; J . Adams , A Defence o f th e Constitution s o f Governmen t o f th e Unite d States of America ...; 1 . W. Blackstone, Commentaries.149 As Justice Steward s opinio n suggests , the doubl e standar d i s incon sistent wit h th e natural-right s principle s o n whic h thi s natio n i s based. 150 The political philosophy o f the American Foundin g recognize s the importanc e o f individua l economi c right s just a s muc h a s i t doe s the importanc e o f individua l noneconomi c rights . For instance , Jame s Madison write s i n The Federalist no . 1 0 that "th e first objec t o f govern ment" i s "th e protectio n o f differen t an d unequa l facultie s o f acquirin g property," 151 an d Joh n Adam s argue s i n Discourses on Davila tha t "property mus t b e secured , o r libert y canno t exist." 152 I n addition , th e Lockean trinit y o f "life , liberty , an d property " i s writte n int o th e fifth and fourteent h amendment s o f the Constitutio n itself . Finally, as I explained earlier , the Lockean liberal concept o f equalit y is closely linke d t o a generous amoun t o f economic liberty . While man y treatments o f Locke's political philosophy d o focus too narrowly o n th e discussion o f private propert y i n chapte r 5 of the Second Treatise, 153 i t is impossibl e t o den y tha t a majo r purpos e o f governmen t i n Locke' s theory i s t o protec t privat e property— a purpos e th e Founder s under stood well . For example, in words echoe d by Madison in The Federalist no. 10 , Locke writes tha t the increas e o f lands an d th e righ t o f employin g the m i s th e grea t ar t o f government; and the prince who shall be so wise and godlike as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industr y of mankind , agains t th e oppressio n o f powe r an d narrownes s o f party , wil l quickly be too hard for his neighbors.154 Under a natural-right s interpretatio n o f th e Constitutio n th e doubl e standard is , therefore, illegitimate . Ever y individua l ha s a natura l righ t to economi c liberty , jus t a s ever y individua l ha s a natura l righ t to , among othe r things , practice th e religio n o f his or her choice an d spea k his or he r mind . It should b e note d here , however, tha t althoug h natural-right s politi cal philosoph y i s largely , wit h respec t t o economics , a philosoph y o f laissez-faire, i t i s no t th e "simplisti c versio n o f laisse z faire " repre sented b y Herber t Spencer' s socia l Darwinis m an d writte n int o th e

Constitutional Interpretation 19 3 Constitution b y th e Suprem e Cour t i n th e lat e nineteent h an d earl y twentieth centuries. 155 As described above , natural-rights doctrin e recognizes a righ t t o an d a dut y o f charity . In Locke' s words , "Commo n charity teaches , tha t thos e shal l b e mos t take n car e o f b y th e law , who are least capable o f taking care for themselves." 156 Moreover, the preservation o f mankind—th e fundamenta l la w o f nature—require s some degre e o f public-health regulatio n o f the economy , especially i n these times of environmental crisis. Lastly, as I now discuss, the natural right of all Americans to "the pursuit of happiness" sometimes requires a minimal level of government encroachment on an otherwise generous right of individual economic liberty. The Pursui t o f Happines s An individual's natural right to "the pursuit of happiness"—to strive to attain a goo d an d happ y life—i s a ke y componen t o f th e politica l philosophy of the Declaration of Independence (see chapter 1) . Indeed, Henry Steele Commager argue s that the eighteenth centur y was dominated by concerns with the pursuit of happiness.157 And Thomas Jefferson once wrote that "the freedom an d happiness of man ... are the sole objects of all legitimate government." 158 The Declaratio n o f Independence , unlik e Georg e Mason' s Virgini a Declaration of Rights, does not speak of the natural right of obtaining happiness. But the assistanc e o f others—including th e government — is nevertheles s sometime s required , becaus e withou t th e minimu m necessities o f lif e a n individua l i s forced t o struggl e fo r dail y surviva l and therefor e ha s n o opportunit y t o pursu e hi s o r he r happiness . To put i t bluntly, "life " and "liberty " are no t th e onl y natural right s men tioned i n the Declaration o f Independence. The "pursuit o f happiness" must mea n something . Wha t i t mean s i s tha t al l individual s wh o ar e unable t o fen d fo r themselve s mus t b e furnishe d wit h th e materia l conditions indispensabl e t o th e pursuit o f happiness , facilitatin g bu t not ensuring its attainment. 159 As note d above , a majorit y o n th e Suprem e Cour t ha s neve r hel d that there is a constitutional right to the minimum material condition s of lif e (despit e th e profoun d impac t o f Charle s Reich' s 196 4 article , "The Ne w Property, " whic h argue d t o th e contrar y o n th e basi s o f

194 Constitutiona l Interpretatio n economic du e process). 160 Interpreting th e Constitution i n accordanc e with the natural-right s political philosophy o f the Declaratio n o f Independence suggests, however, that there is a constitutional right to basic education, healt h care , food, housing , and clothing , for withou t thes e things a n individua l i s denie d a n opportunit y t o pursu e a goo d an d happy life . Justice Brenna n mad e the point wel l in his opinion fo r th e Court i n Goldberg v. Kelly, whe n h e observe d tha t "welfar e provide s the mean s t o obtai n essentia l food , clothing , housing , an d medica l care," that "fro m it s founding th e Nation's basic commitment has been to foste r th e dignit y an d well-bein g o f al l persons withi n it s borders," that "welfar e .. . ca n help bring within the reach o f the poor the sam e opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully i n the lif e o f th e community, " an d tha t "publi c assistance , then , i s no t mere charity , bu t a mean s t o 'procur e th e Blessing s o f Libert y t o ourselves and our Posterity.'" 161 Despite this reasoning, the Court stopped short of holding that there is a constitutional right to the essential material conditions of life. The natural righ t t o th e pursui t o f happines s require s tha t th e Cour t tak e this step forward, rather than continue to step backward as it has done in case s lik e DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services (1989), 162 discusse d earlier , an d San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1973),163 whic h hel d tha t educatio n i s no t a fundamenta l right . Although th e politica l philosoph y o f th e America n Foundin g doe s no t envision a n egalitaria n welfar e state—indeed , th e Declaration' s con cepts of "equality" and "liberty" forbid it—tha t philosophy does require some public assistance programs so that every individual has an opportunity to pursue his or her happiness. In effect, an d contrary to opposing moder n libera l an d conservativ e school s o f thought , publi c assis tance need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. While, at times, the discussion in this chapter seemed to focus more on explaining ke y components o f natural-rights doctrin e than o n describing particular provision s of the Constitution, that was unavoidable. As explained i n the Introduction , an d a s i s readily apparen t fro m myria d books an d article s o n constitutiona l interpretation , i t i s exceedingl y difficult, i f not impossible, to divorce constitutional interpretation fro m political philosophy—especiall y whe n interpretin g provision s o f th e

Constitutional Interpretation 19 5 Constitution tha t ar e phrase d i n genera l terms , a s ar e th e individual rights provisions addressed in this chapter. What I hav e endeavore d t o sho w i n thi s chapte r i s that , thoug h a natural-rights-based theor y of judicial review is inevitably abstract, the theory i s no t s o abstrac t a s to b e unworkable . To that end , I applie d the natural-right s politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence to some of the leading—and mos t controversial—cases i n constitutional la w and histor y i n orde r t o demonstrat e tha t th e propose d theory of judicial review can resolve constitutional disputes that come before th e Court . Significantly, th e results discerne d fro m th e applica tion o f th e natural-right s theor y ar e neithe r consistentl y "liberal, " nor consistently "conservative, " in the moder n conceptio n o f those terms . (Readers who are simply looking for post-ho c rationalizations for preconceived politica l result s ar e therefor e likel y t o b e disappointed. ) Instead, th e result s ar e "liberal " i n th e classi c seventeenth - an d eigh teenth-century sense , an outcom e that , given the jurisprudence o f th e American Founding, should be expected.

Conclusion: A New American Revolution ?

From th e discussio n i n chapte r 1 of th e characte r o f th e America n Revolution t o th e analysi s i n chapte r 5 of th e constitutiona l statu s of welfare, thi s boo k ha s addresse d a hos t o f importan t subjects . A s I stated i n the Preface, however , the book i s as much a methodologica l statement a s i t i s a substantiv e statement . I hav e trie d t o sho w tha t scholars fro m differen t discipline s nee d t o tal k to each other , rathe r than past eac h other—especially wher e the Constitution is concerned. In fact, m y underlying them e i s that th e Constitutio n canno t b e properly understood withou t recours e t o history , political philosophy , an d law—all three. The book i s therefore broa d i n scope, and many of the issues I have addressed have themselves been the subject of a vast and varied independent literature. 196

Conclusion 19 7 Of course , interdisciplinar y approache s ru n th e ris k o f failin g t o meet the justifiably demandin g standards of particular disciplines. This risk i s magnified whe n the interdisciplinar y approac h lead s to conclu sions i n a particular are a tha t g o against the conventiona l wisdo m i n that area—such as my conclusion about the character of the American Revolution, fo r instance . That said , what I have attempte d t o d o i s to identify th e cor e component s o f som e largel y isolate d debate s an d integrate the m int o th e specifi c framewor k o f constitutiona l inter pretation. To that end, I have considered two essential questions. First, how should th e Constitutio n o f the United State s be interpreted? Second, who shoul d b e primaril y responsibl e fo r makin g tha t interpre tation? The conclusion s reache d ar e tha t th e Constitutio n shoul d b e inter preted i n light of the natural-rights political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence an d that the Supreme Court is the institutio n of American governmen t tha t shoul d b e primarily responsibl e fo r identi fying an d applying that philosophy in American life. These conclusion s are no doubt controversial , because they run counte r to two powerfu l trends i n th e literature : an increasin g skepticis m abou t natura l right s and a growing mistrust of judicial power. In effect, I advance a largely conservative methodology—a jurisprudence of original intention—but arriv e at liberal results, as "liberal" is understood i n the classic sense of seventeenth- and eighteenth-centur y political philosophy . Th e propose d jurisprudenc e o f origina l inten tion—what I call "liberal originalism"—is, therefore, far different fro m that promote d b y moder n politica l an d jurisprudential conservative s such as former attorne y general Edwin Meese, Robert Bork, and Chief Justice Willia m Rehnquist . (M y theory wil l likel y b e resiste d b y both conservatives, becaus e th e theor y i s "liberal, " and liberals , because I call fo r "originalism." ) A n originalis m tha t take s histor y an d politica l philosophy seriously , a s thi s volum e ha s trie d t o do , reveals tha t th e political and jurisprudential conservative s ar e simply substituting con servative result-oriente d jurisprudenc e fo r moder n libera l result-ori ented jurisprudence. The conservative originalists also mischaracterize the Constitution a s establishing a majority-rule democracy , a mischaracterization that is also made by many modern constitutional theorist s of so-called "moderate" and "liberal" political views. This has led to an unfortunate portraya l o f th e Cour t a s a "devian t institutio n i n th e

198 Conclusio n American democracy" l an d to an unnecessary preoccupation wit h trying to reconcile judicial review and democracy . Because I advance a jurisprudence of original intention, I addressed, in an introductory section, the prevailing criticisms of that interpretiv e methodology: tha t moder n American s canno t understan d wha t th e Founders intende d becaus e ou r languag e i s different fro m theirs , that there is no single entity that can be called "the Founders," and that the existing documentary recor d o f the Founders' intentions is unreliable. These criticisms were found to be misplaced at the level of the naturalrights principle propose d here . Found equall y wanting is the criticis m offered b y proponents o f the notion o f a "living Constitution," such a s retired associate justice William Brennan, that the Founders' intentions cannot address modern circumstances and problems and that the Constitution must , therefore, "evolve " through judicial interpretation . Th e notion o f a livin g Constitution wa s rejecte d becaus e i t permit s une lected an d life-tenure d judge s t o rea d thei r ow n mora l an d politica l preferences int o th e Constitutio n an d impos e the m o n th e res t o f u s and because a jurisprudence of original intention at the level of naturalrights principle can meet modern exigencies. Related t o m y defense o f originalis t methodolog y wa s a discussio n of th e connectio n betwee n th e Founders ' backgroun d attitude s o n the basi c purpos e o f governmen t (articulate d i n th e Declaratio n o f Independence) an d th e interpretatio n o f th e particula r provision s o f the Constitution, especially the open-ended provisions concerning individual rights (the subject o f this volume). To restate my point directly , lawyers lik e Ronal d Dworki n wh o writ e o n constitutiona l interpreta tion correctly recognize that political philosophy is essential for understanding the Constitution . But, unless constitutional theorists immers e themselves i n th e histor y o f wh y th e Constitutio n cam e t o be , the y cannot understan d wha t tha t political philosophy is : a classical libera l philosophy o f individua l right s an d limite d government . A constitu tional theoris t withou t a prope r historica l foundatio n fo r hi s o r he r political philosophy is therefore lef t arguing that, in his or her opinion, the Constitution shoul d stan d fo r "thi s o r that. " And unde r tha t sce nario, constitutional values are inevitably established by those with the best argumentation skills . No wonder lawyers have a virtual monopoly on normativ e constitutiona l scholarship ! Indeed , m y ultimat e ai m i n this book is to suggest that political scientists and historians should do

Conclusion 19 9 more normativ e constitutiona l scholarship , give n thei r sensitivit y t o American political history. Turning t o th e mayo r point s i n suppor t o f th e abov e conclusions , part 1 , "Th e Jurisprudenc e o f th e America n Founding, " explicate d the politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e an d th e jurisprudence o f th e Constitutio n o f th e Unite d States . I t reveale d that th e Declaratio n articulate s th e philosophica l ends o f ou r natio n and tha t th e Constitutio n embodie s th e means t o effectuat e thos e ends. Chapter 1 , "The Declaration o f Independence," embraced th e tradi tional—though currentl y unpopular—vie w tha t th e characte r o f th e American Revolution was Lockean liberal. The Lockean liberal reading of the American Revolution was derived by examining the influence of Lockean liberalis m o n th e Founder s generall y an d o n the Declaratio n of Independence specifically. Revisionist characterizations of the Revolution, especially th e largel y successful republica n revisionis m o f Bernard Bailyn, J. G. A. Pocock, and Gordon Wood, were discussed and rejected.* The Lockea n natural-right s politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n of Independenc e wa s the n systematicall y explored an d analyzed . T o that end, the key concepts "all men are created equal, " "the consent of the governed," and, of course, the "unalienable " natural rights o f "life , liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" were examined. What resulted i s a politica l philosoph y tha t i s predominantl y individualistic , bu t no t exclusively so. The political philosophy of the Declaration o f Independence was shown t o recognize som e communitaria n obligations , both in its acceptance of the duty of charity and in its concept of the pursuit of happiness. The most importan t substantiv e objectiv e o f this book wa s to identify the fundamental purpos e of the Constitution. Chapter 2, "The Constitution o f th e Unite d States, " addresse d tha t issue . Severa l source s proved invaluabl e fo r illuminatin g th e fundamenta l purpos e o f th e Constitution t o be securing the natural rights identified i n the Declaration o f Independence . As Thomas Jefferson wrot e i n th e Declaratio n * I am not arguing that the Founders were influenced solel y by John Locke. They were too widel y rea d an d to o sophisticate d fo r that . M y point i s tha t th e Founder s wer e Lockean liberals on the basic purpose of government—the controlling question in constitutional interpretation.

200 Conclusio n itself, "t o secur e thes e right s government s ar e institute d amon g men " (hence, the title of this volume).* The preambl e t o th e Constitutio n state s th e reason s fo r whic h th e Constitution wa s written . Although th e preambl e ha s bee n dismisse d by man y a s simpl y prefator y language , th e preambl e i s mor e tha n that, and it merited carefu l consideration . The debates surrounding the framing an d ratificatio n o f th e Constitutio n provide d a n excellen t source o f information abou t th e fundamental purpos e o f the Constitu tion. The Federalist papers , generally regarded a s the best insight into the Founders * understanding o f the Constitution , wer e als o examine d at length, as were the personal letters, writings, and speeches of leading Founders an d statesme n suc h a s Jame s Madison , Thoma s Jefferson , James Wilson , Alexande r Hamilton , an d Joh n Adams . Al l o f thes e sources reveale d th e fundamenta l purpos e o f th e Constitutio n t o b e protecting the natural rights of the American people. Additionally, chapte r 2 found th e Bil l of Rights to be a central par t of the Constitution enacted by the Founders. Consequently, the reasons for the Bill of Rights' adoption and the specific meanings of the first ten amendments were studied. The ninth amendment, with its protection of "unenumerated" rights , wa s particularl y significant . Tha t amendment , perhaps more tha n an y other, evinced th e importance to the Constitu tion o f protectin g natura l rights . Th e primac y o f protectin g natura l rights wa s als o apparen t fro m a n examinatio n o f earl y stat e constitu tions. Part 2, "Natural Rights and the Role of the Court," explained that the Supreme Court i s the institutio n o f American governmen t tha t shoul d be primarily responsible fo r identifyin g an d applying the natural-right s political philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i n constitu tional interpretation. Chapte r 3, "The Court," is likely the most controversial par t o f thi s book . Ther e I described , a s a matte r o f origina l intent, that the Constitution commission s the Court as the chief guardian of the American people's natural rights. In effect, chapte r 3 entered the long-standing debat e ove r the origin s and scope of judicial review. That required examinin g case s and historical material s that have been * As was true of my interpretation o f the character of the American Revolution, I am not advancing a monistic interpretation o f the character o f the Constitution. In other words, I a m not sayin g tha t th e Constitutio n i s concerne d onl y abou t protectin g rights . Bu t protecting rights is what the Constitution is concerned most about.

Conclusion 20 1 examined many times before. But what I aspired to do in chapter 3 was to provid e a revised readin g o f th e debat e ove r judicia l review , a reading tha t take s seriousl y th e America n Founding' s commitmen t t o natural rights. Chapter 3' s analysi s o f judicial revie w wa s i n thre e separate , bu t related, parts. I began by explaining how the Founders, consistent with their Britis h heritage , initiall y attempte d t o protec t individua l right s through representation. In time, however, the Founders came to realize that representation , eve n a reforme d syste m o f representation , pro vided inadequat e securit y fo r rights . Hence, the inevitabl e emergenc e of one of the most significant American contributions to constitutiona l theory: th e ide a tha t judges hav e th e authorit y t o protec t individua l rights through the power of judicial review. I followed m y analysis of the movemen t fro m legislativ e to judicial protection of individual rights with an examination of the more specific question o f the role of natural-rights doctrine i n judicial review. Given the strength of the two previously mentioned trends in the literature— an increasing skepticism about natural rights and a growing mistrust of judicial power—my conclusio n that the Court was expected to appeal to natural-right s doctrin e whe n decidin g individual-right s case s n o doubt wil l b e resiste d b y many . Nevertheless , th e conclusio n i s sup ported b y a detaile d analysi s o f earl y judicia l theor y an d practice , including tha t o f th e earl y Suprem e Court . In fact , Justic e Jame s Ire dell's famous opinio n i n Calder v. Bull (1798 ) and a virtually identica l opinion he wrote on circuit the same year are the only opinions uncovered t o dat e i n a pre-Jacksonian er a nonslaver y context * i n which a judge rejecte d natural-rights-base d judicia l revie w afte r th e Constitu tion wen t int o effect . Moder n opponent s o f natural-rights-base d judi cial revie w hav e therefor e bee n force d t o rel y almos t exclusivel y o n rhetorical techniques , mos t notabl y o n attempt s t o belittle th e evi dence, overwhelming in my judgment, proffered b y proponents of such review. Modern opponent s o f natural-rights-base d judicia l revie w ar e no t the onl y ones to blame for th e unfortunatel y vitrioli c characte r o f th e debate ove r th e rol e o f natura l la w i n constitutiona l interpretation . I * Chapter 2 explained why the slavery cases are not representative of the general jurisprudential climate of the times.

202 Conclusio n suggested i n chapter 3 that i t has been the failure o f both sides o f the debate to recognize the gradual an d somewhat hesitant tur n to judicial protection o f individual right s tha t ha s le d scholar s t o characteriz e the existence of na^raZ-rights-based judicial review in such unnecessarily all-or-nothin g terms . Thi s i s a subtle , bu t critical , a s wel l a s previously overlooked, point. Finally, chapte r 3 addresse d th e authoritativenes s o f th e Suprem e Court's interpretation o f the Constitution. My conclusion i s that, apar t from th e people' s powe r o f amendmen t an d righ t o f revolution , th e Court should have the final say in constitutional interpretation. I therefore rejected egalitaria n approaches to constitutional interpretation . The theory o f constitutional interpretatio n advance d i n this volume affords th e Suprem e Cour t immens e authority . To prevent the Court' s role as the ultimate interpreter o f the Constitution fro m devolvin g into the unacceptable stat e o f government by judiciary, chapter 4, "Checks on the Court, " provided recommendation s o n how to best ensur e tha t the Cour t interpret s th e Constitutio n i n light of its underlying naturalrights philosophy , rathe r tha n i n accordanc e wit h th e persona l mora l and political views of individual justices. (Surprisingly, most works on constitutional interpretatio n d o no t pa y muc h attentio n t o check s o n the Court. ) Chapte r 4 emphasized tha t w e shoul d no t forge t tha t th e Article 5 amendment proces s i s available t o correc t judicial misinter pretations of the Constitution an d that Congress has the constitutiona l power—and duty—t o impeac h an y member o f the Court who clearl y exceeds his or her authorit y by reading his or her own values into the Constitution a t th e expens e o f natural-right s principles . Th e relate d safeguards o f selecting meritorious court personnel and of judicial selfrestraint were als o discussed. In particular, chapter 4 underscored th e need t o emplo y a merit-base d judicia l selectio n process—on e tha t recognizes th e importanc e o f a nominee' s bein g wel l verse d i n lega l and political philosophy—because b y so doing the other checks on the Court would become less a cause for concern . Chapter 5 , "Constitutiona l Interpretation, " endeavore d t o illustrat e that, contrar y t o th e positio n o f man y critic s o f natural-la w jurispru dence, a natural-rights-base d theor y o f judicia l revie w ca n resolv e constitutional dispute s that come before th e Court. With this objectiv e in mind, I applied the natural-rights political philosophy of the Declaration o f Independence t o som e o f the most important—an d controver -

Conclusion 20 3 sial—areas o f constitutiona l law , includin g slavery , discrimination , preferential treatment , capital punishment, the "righ t to die," abortion, privacy, economic liberty , and welfare . Wit h the notabl e exceptio n o f the abortion issue, the proposed natural-rights-based theor y of judicial review wa s show n t o provid e consisten t an d concret e answer s fo r constitutional-rights adjudicatio n (an d will be able to resolve the abortion question onc e it is established whe n life begins). Significantly, th e results discerne d wer e neithe r consistentl y "liberal " no r consistentl y "conservative" i n th e moder n conceptio n o f thos e terms . Althoug h perhaps disappointin g t o thos e wh o ar e simpl y intereste d i n politica l results, the "inconsistency " shoul d com e a s n o surprise . After all , the Founders wer e classical liberals , not moder n liberal s o r moder n con servatives. The doctrine of revolution is, of course, central to the natural-right s political philosophy of the Declaration o f Independence. 2 Because this volume maintains that the Constitution shoul d be interpreted i n accordance wit h th e politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaration , th e issu e o f revolution cannot be ignored. While mention o f revolution ma y strik e man y toda y a s radical , th e theory o f revolutio n embrace d i n th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s not opposed to political authority; it is simply opposed to tyranny. That is to say, because the basic purpose of government is to secure natural rights, the Declaration recognize s that once a tyrant is removed a new government wil l be quickl y formed . Thi s is because natura l rights ar e at ris k i n th e absenc e o f governmen t protection . I n fact , whe n th e Founders revolte d agains t Britis h oppressio n the y immediatel y estab lished a ne w an d uniquel y America n for m o f governmen t t o secur e their natural rights, a form of government that, after muc h thought and experimentation, became tha t embodie d i n the Constitutio n o f Unite d States. The jurisprudence o f th e America n Foundin g therefor e repre sents that a particular form o f government—including that established by the Constitution—is not an end in itself. Thomas Jefferson, fo r one, writes i n a famou s lette r "tha t w e hav e no t ye t s o fa r perfecte d ou r constitutions a s t o ventur e the m unchangeable," 3 an d Jame s Madi son—though certainl y more reluctant than Jefferson t o engage in constitutional change 4—acknowledges i n The Federalist no . 43 that th e Constitution mus t b e altere d i f i t fails t o protec t th e natura l right s of the American people. 5

204 Conclusio n What o f th e curren t stat e o f th e American people' s natura l rights ? Has the situatio n i n the American regim e devolve d agai n t o th e poin t necessitating revolutio n an d th e establishmen t o f a new for m o f government? Thes e are , o f course , momentou s questions . Th e answe r suggested b y thi s volum e i s tha t a ne w for m o f governmen t i s no t necessarily required . Indeed , i t i s difficul t t o imag e a bette r for m o f government fo r securin g natura l right s than tha t devised , through "reflection and choice," 6 by the Founders. What is required, however, is a more principled approac h t o governmen t unde r th e existin g Constitu tion, an approac h tha t recognizes the necessity of protecting the natural rights o f the entir e American politica l community—includin g indi viduals and minorities—not just the power of political majorities. 7 If a more principled approac h t o governmen t i s not adopted , th e politica l philosophy o n whic h th e Constitutio n an d thi s natio n ar e base d de crees tha t revolutio n an d th e establishmen t o f a new form o f govern ment may be necessary. As it was for the Founders, the choice is ours to make.

Notes

Note to the Prefac e 1. Scholar s ar e beginnin g t o se e th e valu e o f askin g additiona l question s a s well. See Graber, "Asking Better Questions/' 216-22. See generally Murphy, Fleming, and Harris, American Constitutional Interpretation (arguin g tha t constitutional theor y need s t o b e reconceptualized) . A s I hop e m y boo k shows, however , ther e i s stil l muc h t o b e learne d fro m th e how an d th e who inquiries.

Notes to the Introductio n 1. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 2. U.S . Constitution, amend. 11 (1795). 3. Se e Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, vi. 4. Blackstone , Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1, 69-70. 205

206 Note s to the Introduction 5. M . White, Social Thought in America. 6. Ronal d Dworkin' s majo r contributio n t o jurisprudence i s his candi d recog nition o f th e marriage , both unavoidabl e an d desirabl e i n his view, of lega l interpretation an d politica l philosophy . I hav e mor e t o sa y belo w abou t Dworkin's jurisprudence. To their credit , constitutional theorist s ar e begin ning t o appreciat e th e significanc e o f wha t Dworki n ha s bee n arguin g publicly sinc e th e 1960s . See, for example , Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, 8 ("Th e meanin g o f an y text , includin g th e Constitution , i s inevitabl y and alway s a functio n o f interpretiv e principles , an d thes e ar e inevitabl y and alway s a produc t o f substantiv e commitments") . Th e slo w pac e b y which constitutiona l theorist s ar e comin g t o appreciat e th e significanc e o f political philosoph y t o constitutiona l interpretatio n i s likely attributabl e t o the fact s tha t America n la w school s focu s o n th e mechanic s o f lega l argument an d tha t mos t theorie s o f constitutiona l interpretatio n ar e ad vanced b y lawyers. (My ultimate ai m i n this book i s to suggest tha t politica l scientists an d historian s shoul d d o mor e normativ e constitutiona l scholar ship.) A s m y discussio n o f originalis m evinces , ther e i s stil l som e notabl e resistance t o th e unavoidabl e marriag e o f constitutiona l interpretatio n an d political philosophy . 7. Frankfurter , "Th e Zeitgeist an d th e Judiciary," 6. 8. Th e Declaratio n o f Independence , par . 2 . Hereafter , quotation s fro m th e Declaration o f Independenc e wil l follow moder n capitalization . 9. See , fo r example , Berns , Taking the Constitution Seriously; Diamond , "The Declaratio n an d th e Constitution" ; Jaffa , "Wha t Wer e th e 'Origina l Intentions' o f th e Framer s o f th e Constitutio n o f th e Unite d States?" ; Murphy, "The Art o f Constitutional Interpretation. " 10. Wood , The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, 1 . See generally Tarco v and Pangle, "Epilogue," 932 (arguing that th e "primar y concer n [o f Strauss' s students], a s politica l scientists , shoul d b e th e stud y o f ou r ow n re gime"). 11. Althoug h Straussian s argu e wit h eac h other—fo r example , Jaff a believe s equality i s th e centra l valu e o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence , whil e Diamond claim s i t is liberty—the y al l shar e thei r teacher' s commitmen t t o transcending historica l understandin g an d recoverin g th e "eterna l truth " of classical politica l philosophy , wha t Straus s calle d "natura l right. " Se e Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution. Se e generall y Strauss , Natural Right and History. I n stark contras t to the philosophical conserva tism o f th e Straussians , Murph y see s th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e a s primarily a n egalitaria n statemen t o f th e "huma n dignity " o f ever y individ ual, a valu e h e believe s th e Cour t shoul d advanc e throug h constitutiona l interpretation. Murph y thu s arrive s a t largel y th e sam e plac e a s retire d associate justice Willia m Brennan . 12. Jaffa , fo r one , unequivocally reject s a rol e fo r th e Cour t i n identifyin g an d applying th e politica l philosoph y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i n constitutional interpretation , wherea s Murph y want s th e Cour t t o amen d

Notes to the Introduction 20 7 the Constitutio n i n pursui t o f a n evolvin g conceptio n o f huma n dignity . See, for example , Jaffa, "Judicia l Conscienc e an d Natura l Rights," 237-45; Murphy, "Constitutional Interpretation," 1768-69. 13. See , for example , Rakove , Review o f Taking the Constitution Seriously, by Walter Berns, 12 0 ("That the .. . commitment s o f the Declaratio n offe r the .. . true perspective fro m whic h to view the Constitution i s primarily a statement of faith. .. . Berns can only assert, but not prove, that the Constitution 'constitutionalizes*... the theory of the Declaration"). 14. Thomas , "Th e Highe r La w Backgroun d o f th e Privilege s o r Immunitie s Clause o f th e Fourteent h Amendment," 64 , 68 (emphasis i n original) . See also Thomas, "Toward a 'Plain Reading* of the Constitution." See generally Gerber, "The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas." 15. Thoma s testified tha t he saw no "role for th e applicatio n o f natural right s to constitutional abjudication. " Senat e Committee o n the Judiciary, Nomination of Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 114 . True to his testimony, Justice Thomas has not, to date, invoked the Declaration of Independence in constitutional interpreta tion. See Gerber, "Justice Clarence Thomas." 16. Schwartz , The New Right and the Constitution, 93 . 17. See , for example , Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 48-54 ; O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, vol. 1, 85. 18. Bu t see Arkes, Beyond the Constitution (arguin g that it is necessary to go "beyond th e Constitution " to recover th e principles o f natural justice tha t precede our constitutional government). 19. Fo r example, Meese, "Address before the American Bar Association"; Bork, The Tempting of America; Rehnquist , "Th e Notio n o f a Livin g Consti tution." 20. Bassham , Original Intent and the Constitution, 127 , 73 . See generall y Dworkin, Law's Empire, 348-50,388. 1 frequently emplo y Dworkin's usefu l distinction betwee n th e Framers ' specifi c "conceptions " an d th e abstrac t "concepts" they wrot e int o th e Constitution . Dworki n firs t advance d thi s distinction, which ha s roots i n philosophy, in a brilliant essa y i n the New York Review of Books criticizin g "stric t constructionists, " th e precursor s of conservativ e originalists . See Dworkin , "Th e Jurisprudence o f Richar d Nixon." A s I explai n below , however , m y interpretatio n o f th e abstrac t concepts embodie d i n th e Constitutio n i s fa r les s open-ende d tha n Dworkin's. 21. Bork , The Tempting of America,153 . 22. Bork , "Original Intent and the Constitution," 26. 23. Bork , "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," 2. 24. Senato r Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania made this point convincingly in his lengthy questionin g o f Rober t Bor k durin g Bork' s unsuccessfu l Suprem e Court confirmation hearing . See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 277-88,427-38, 713-22,815-42.

208 N o t e

s t o t h e Introductio n

25. 47 2 U.S . 38, 91-114 (1985 ) (Rehnquist , J. , dissenting) . Se e generall y Davis , Original Intent. 26. Meese , "Toward a Jurisprudence o f Original Intention," 586. 27. Som e agre e wit h Rehnquist' s readin g o f histor y (tha t th e first amendmen t prohibits onl y governmenta l preferenc e o f on e religio n ove r another , no t an accommodatio n o f religio n b y th e state) . Fo r example , ther e i s Joh n Baker, th e losin g counse l i n Wallace v. Jaffree an d th e autho r o f th e argument Rehnquis t articulate d i n dissent . Se e Baker , "Th e Establishmen t Clause a s Intended. " See als o Cord , Separation of Church and State. 28. Thoma s Jefferson , Addres s t o th e Danbur y Baptis t Association , January 1 , 1802, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol . 16,281 . See generally Levy , The Establishment Clause. 29. See , fo r example , Thoma s Jefferson , Bil l fo r Establishin g Religiou s Free dom, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 251-53 ; James Madison , Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, i n The Writings of James Madison, vol . 2 , 183-91 . Se e generall y Locke , A Letter on Toleration, 6 5 (explainin g tha t i t i s "necessar y abov e al l t o distinguis h betwee n the busines s o f civi l governmen t an d tha t o f religion , an d t o mar k th e tru e bounds betwee n th e churc h an d th e commonwealth") . 30. See , for example , Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy; Choper , Judicial Review and the National Political Process-, Ely , Democracy and Distrust. 31. Bickel , The Least Dangerous Branch, 18 . 32. Chemerinsky , "Th e Vanishin g Constitution, " 74-75 . See als o O'Brien , "Th e Framers' Mus e o n Republicanism , th e Suprem e Court , an d Pragmati c Con stitutional Interpretivism, " 119-31 . 33. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 31 9 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 34. Farrand , ed. , The Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 1 , 48 (remarks o f Elbridge Gerry) . See generall y Billias , Elbridge Gerry, 16 0 (explaining tha t "what Gerr y mean t b y 'a n exces s o f democracy ' wa s tha t th e mixe d consti tution, a t th e time , wa s weighte d to o muc h i n favo r o f th e democrati c branch o f government") . 35. The Federalist no . 10 , 82 (Jame s Madison) . A republica n for m o f govern ment i s define d b y Madiso n i n The Federalist no . 39. Madison writes : "We may defin e a republi c t o b e . . . a governmen t whic h derive s al l it s power s directly o r indirectl y from th e grea t body of the people, and i s administere d by person s holdin g thei r office s durin g pleasur e fo r a limite d period , o r during good behavior. " Ibid. , no. 39, 241 (emphasis omitted) . 36. Invokin g Proverb s 25:11 , Abraha m Lincol n characterize d th e Constitutio n as th e "pictur e o f silver " aroun d th e "appl e o f gold " o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence. Abraha m Lincoln , "Fragmen t o n th e Constitutio n an d th e Union," 1861 ? i n The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vo l 4 , 169 . Lincoln, mor e tha n an y othe r statesma n sinc e th e America n Founding , valued th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i n constitutiona l interpretation . See generall y Jaffa , Crisis of the House Divided. Bu t se e Wills , Lincoln

Notes to the Introduction 20

9

at Gettysburg (arguin g tha t Lincol n change d conclusivel y th e bearin g o f Jefferson's Declaration) . 37. O'Brien , Constitutional Law and Politics, vol. 1,89 . 38. Fo r a usefu l collectio n o f an d commentar y o n man y o f th e mos t well known theorie s o f constitutiona l interpretation , se e Gerhard t an d Rowe , Constitutional Theory. Se e als o Barber , The Constitution of Judicial Power. 39. Dworkin , Life's Dominion, 145 . 40. I n essence, Dworkin's goal is "to cultivate in us an argumentative attitud e toward law. " Guest, Ronald Dworkin, 8 (emphasis in original). And in the end, as others have frequently pointe d out, Dworkin's "Hercules," his ideal judge wh o ha s th e abilit y t o decid e th e "hard " interpretiv e questions , i s Dworkin himself. 41. Brennan , "The Constitution of the United States," 171 . 42. Justice Brenna n i s certainl y no t alon e i n hi s approac h t o constitutiona l interpretation. Mos t moder n liberal s emplo y a simila r approach. I n addi tion, the most famous cas e in modern American constitutional law, Brown v. Board of Education (1954) , explicitl y invoke d th e notio n o f a livin g Constitution. There , Chie f Justic e Ear l Warre n wrot e fo r a unanimou s Court, "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written." 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 43. Jaffa , "Wha t Were the 'Original Intentions' of the Framers of the Constitu tion of the United States?," 356. 44. Brennan , "The Constitution of the United States," 173,179. 45. "N o person shal l b e .. . twic e pu t i n jeopardy o f lif e o r limb , .. . no r b e deprived o f life .. . withou t due process of law." U.S. Constitution, amend . 5. "No state shall .. . depriv e any person o f life .. . withou t du e process of law." Ibid., amend. 14. 46. See , for example , Dworkin, Life's Dominion, 135-3 6 (discussing onl y the eighth amendment); Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," 257 n. 59 (focusing o n the eighth amendment and characterizin g the fifth amendment's reference to capital punishment as simply "casual"). 47. Locke , Second Treatise, sec. 16. 48. Hughes , Addresses and Papers of Charles Evans Hughes, 139. 49. 1 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407,415 (1819). 50. Berns , Taking the Constitution Seriously, 207 . 51. 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137,176-77 (1803). 52. Se e Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (arguing that the death penalt y must be measured by the Court against the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"). 53. Chemerinsky , Interpreting the Constitution, 59 . 54. Fo r example, Brest, "The Misconceived Ques t for the Original Understanding," 252; Carter, "Constitutional Abdication an d the Indeterminate Text," 843; Murphy, "Constitutional Interpretation," 1768-69.

210 Note s to the Introduction 55. The Federalist no . 49, 314 (James Madison) . See als o Lette r fro m Jame s Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Februar y 4, 1790, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 16,147-50. 56. I n Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court, 274-75. 57. Bal l an d Pocock , Introduction , 11 . See generall y Pocock , Politics, Language, and Time. 58. Th e classic statement o f the problem of changing meaning, that offered b y William Crosskey, illustrates that the problem is not irremediable. After all, Crosskey wa s abl e t o discer n wha t th e Framer s mean t b y a particula r provision—Article 1 , section 8' s gran t o f powe r t o Congres s t o regulat e "commerce amon g th e severa l states"—eve n thoug h th e wor d "among, " the operativ e wor d o f tha t provision , ha d a differen t meanin g fo r th e Framers than it has for us. See Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States, vol . 1, chap. 3 (describing how the word "among" was used b y the Framer s a s a synonym fo r "within " rather tha n for "between two or more"). 59. A s Pau l Bres t point s out , during th e "toug h times, " when w e d o run int o interpretive difficulties , "th e defense tha t 'We are doing the best we can' is no les s availabl e t o constitutiona l interpreter s tha n t o anyon e else"—no t to mentio n tha t interpretiv e difficultie s ar e n o justification fo r thos e wit h political powe r (includin g Suprem e Cour t justices ) simpl y readin g thei r own values int o the Constitution . See Brest, "The Misconceived Ques t fo r the Origina l Understanding, " 241 . Chapter 4 explain s ho w a merit-base d appointment proces s ca n reduc e th e interpretiv e difficultie s sometime s posed by a natural-rights-based theor y of judicial review. 60. Levy , Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution, 294 . 61. Fo r example, Lofgren, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent?" 118. This argument can be extended one step further b y alleging that the people of the United States—thos e citizen s or voters whose agents , the Framer s and th e ratifiers , propose d an d adopte d th e Constitution—ar e th e tru e source o f original intent. See Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution, 35. 62. Annals of Congress, vol . 5, 776 (remarks of Rep. James Madison). 63. Hutson , "The Creation of the Constitution," 158. 64. Brest , "Th e Misconceive d Ques t fo r th e Origina l Understanding, " 235 . Al though Brest personally prefers the open-ended notion of a living Constitution, he consider s moderat e originalis m t o b e a "coheren t an d workable " method of constitutional interpretation. Ibid., 228. 65. Ther e i s som e discussio n i n th e literatur e abou t whethe r conservativ e originalists lik e Meese, Bork, and Rehnquist have become moderat e origi nalists. See, for example , Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution, 56. Addressing this question at the level of the conservatives' resolution of cases—which is , after all , what originalis m i s ultimatel y about—reveals , as Senator Arlen Specter's questioning of Robert Bork during Bork's unsuccessful confirmatio n hearin g made clear, that the conservatives are moder-

Notes to Chapter 1 21 1 ate originalists only when strict originalism cannot support politically sacrosanct decision s lik e Brown v. Board of Education (1954) . In al l othe r cases, a s Rehnquist' s analysi s i n Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) , also suggests, they ar e stric t originalists , their statement s t o th e contrar y notwithstand ing. See, for example, Bork, The Tempting of America, 218-1 9 (dismissing Leonard Levy's attack on the conservatives' strict originalism). 66. Hutson , "The Creation of the Constitution," 152. 67. Se e Powell, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent"; Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution, 1-29 , 284-321. 68. Levy , Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution, 2 . 69. Som e constitutional historians disagree. See, for example, Berger, "'Original Intent* i n Historica l Perspective" ; R . N. Clinton, "Origina l Understanding , Legal Realism , an d th e Interpretatio n o f 'Thi s Constitution,' " 1186-1220 ; Lofgren, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent?" 70. Levy , Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution, 284 . 71. Se e Gerber, "Original Intent and Its Obligations." 72. Chesterton , What I Saw in America, 7 . 73. Ralp h Ketcham likewis e maintain s tha t th e Framer s dedicate d ou r natio n to certain "enduring" principles in the Constitution; specifically, to republicanism, liberty, the public good, and federalism. See Ketcham, Framed for Posterity. As my discussion in part 1 suggests, Ketcham, a leading figure in the republican revisionis m o f the American Founding , underestimates th e Framers' commitment to Lockean liberalism.

Notes t o Chapte r 1 1. The classic collection of colonial responses is Bailyn, ed., Pamphlets of the American Revolution. 2. Becker , The Declaration of Independence, 80. As shown below, some colonists turne d t o natural-right s doctrin e earlie r tha n others . James Otis , for one, invoked natural-rights arguments from the beginning. 3. Dumbauld , The Declaration of Independence, 52. 4. I n Commager, ed., Documents of American History, 100 . 5. Becker , The Declaration of Independence, 194. 6. Lette r from John Adams to Timothy Pickering, August 6,1822, in The Works of John Adams, vol . 2, 513-14. 7. Garr y Wills disagrees with this assessment in his controversial work on the Declaration o f Independence . Se e Wills , Inventing America. Will s claims there are three Declarations: the philosophical discourse written by Jeffer son, the symbo l o f nationhood adopte d b y the Continenta l Congress , and the reinterpretatio n b y Lincol n tha t th e America n peopl e hav e com e t o revere. See also Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg. It will become obvious that I disagree strongly with Wills's argument. 8. Th e legislativ e histor y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence i s comprehen -

212 Note s to Chapter 1 sively examine d i n Hazelton , The Declaration of Independence. Se e als o Boyd, The Declaration of Independence. 9. Lette r from John Adams to Timothy Pickering, August 6,1822, in The Works of John Adams, vol . 2, 514. 10. I n The Works of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, 33. 11. Lette r from Thoma s Jefferson t o Robert Walsh, December 4, 1818, in ibid., vol. 12,109-10 n. 12. Bu t se e Wills , Inventing America. Will s argue s tha t th e Declaratio n o f Independence i s grounded i n Scottish moral philosophy, not natural-right s doctrine. Wills's argument is addressed in the next section. 13. Becker , The Declaration of Independence, 27. 14. Lette r from John Adams to Timothy Pickering, August 6,1822, in 77ie Works of John Adams, vol . 2, 514. 15. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o Richar d Henr y Lee , May 8, 1825 , in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 16,118-19. 16. See , for example , Ramsey, History of the American Revolution. Ramse y was a preeminent historia n o f the revolutionar y generation . See P. Smith, "David Ramsey and the Causes of the American Revolution." 17. See , for example , Bancroft, History of the United States, vols . 4-7; Trevelyan, The American Revolution. 18. M . White, Social Thought in America. 19. See , fo r example , Becker , History of Political Parties in the Province of New York; Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution; Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, vol. 1; Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution. 20. Th e progressives wer e no t withou t their critics , even durin g the heigh t of their influence . Fo r example , th e "imperial " schoo l criticize d the m fo r focusing to o narrowl y o n lif e withi n th e colonies . Instead , thes e critic s maintained, the Revolution could be understood onl y within the context of the empire as a whole. See, for example, Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution. 21. See , for example , Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America; E . S. Morgan and H. M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis. 22. Th e progressive s als o emphasize d Locke' s influence . They , however , fo cused solel y o n Locke' s discussion s o f privat e propert y an d conflictin g material interests, a focus that, I argue below, is too narrow. 23. See , for example, Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution; Pocock , The Machiavellian Moment; Wood , The Creation of the American Republic. Althoug h Bailyn , Pocock , an d Woo d ar e generall y credited wit h beginnin g the revisionis m i n early American historiography , Clinton Rossite r actuall y initiate d th e movemen t agains t th e hegemoni c influence o f Lockea n liberalism . Se e Rossiter , Seedtime of the Republic (noting the additiona l influence s o f Hebraic, Christian, and classica l traditions). 24. B y referring t o Bailyn, Pocock, and Wood as "revisionists" I do not mean to

Notes to Chapter 1 21 3 be disparaging in any way. I use the term simply for ease of expression and because it is so widely employed in the literature. 25. Dworetz , The Unvarnished Doctrine, 12. 26. Becker , The Declaration of Independence, 27. 27. Hartz , The Liberal Tradition in America, 140 . Man y othe r scholar s reached a simila r conclusion . Merl e Curti , for instance , contended , "I t i s scarcely to o muc h t o say , eve n whe n th e importanc e o f othe r thinker s is take n int o account , tha t Lock e wa s America' s philosophe r durin g th e Revolutionary period. " Curti , Probing Our Past, 69-70 . Locke's influenc e on th e Foundin g i s still emphasize d i n basi c textbook s o n American government. See, for example, J. Q. Wilson, American Government, 26. 28. Shalhope , "Toward a Republican Synthesis," 51. 29. Wood , The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 96. 30. Kramnick , Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism, 35 . Some scholar s are beginnin g t o reconside r th e revisionis t historiography . I n additio n t o Kramnick, see, for example , Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics; Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine; Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism. 31. Bailyn , The Origins of American Politics, ix-x , 41. 32. Wood , The Creation of the American Republic, 53, 58. In The Radicalism of the American Revolution, Woo d sometime s refer s t o thi s concep t a s "the genera l will, " an antilibera l concep t i f ther e eve r wa s one . See , fo r example, Wood , The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 189 . The "general will" is, of course, a term made famous by Rousseau. See generally Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses. 33. Wood , The Creation of the American Republic, 54. Recently, Wood appears to b e attemptin g t o "rewrite " hi s origina l wor k i n th e fac e o f growin g criticism of the revisionists' rejection o f the substantive influence o f Lockean liberalis m o n th e America n Revolution . See , fo r example , Wood , Afterword (arguin g tha t th e revolutionar y perio d i s best characterize d a s "liberal-republican," rathe r tha n a s simpl y "republican " o r "liberal") . Although th e nex t logica l ste p fo r th e literatur e t o take i s to clai m tha t th e dichotomy betwee n republicanis m an d liberalis m i n th e politica l though t of th e American Revolutio n i s false, i t i s extremely difficul t t o argu e tha t the masterwork s o f Bailyn , Pocock, an d Woo d make thi s claim. See Banning, "The Republican Interpretation." Moreover, Wood's most recent book on th e Revolutio n reaffirm s hi s original republican thesis . See Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution. Lastly , an d mos t importantly , the large r questio n remains : Whateve r happene d t o th e Declaratio n o f Independence? As this section shows, neglecting the Declaration i s a curious oversight, to say the least. 34. Lette r from Samuel Adams for the Massachusetts House of Representatives to Lieutenan t Governo r Hutchinson , Augus t 3 , 1770 , in The Writings of Samuel Adams, vol . 2,22. 35. See , for example, Bailyn, ed., Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 23.

214 Note s to Chapter 1 36. Pocock , "Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century," 134. 37. Pocock , The Machiavellian Moment, 424, 506, 509, 545. 38. Pocock , Politics, Language, and Time, 144 . Like Wood, Pocock appears to be backing away from his strong anti-Lockean statements about the character of the American Revolution. See, for example, Pocock, "The Machiavellian Moment Revisited, " 5 3 (maintaining tha t The Machiavellian Moment was a "tunne l history " pursuing a "single theme" to th e "partia l exclusio n of parallel phenomena"). As noted earlier, Pocock's seminal work does not support his more recent characterizations of it. 39. I n a persuasive essay, Ronald Hamoway argues that the revisionists' extensive reliance o n Cato's Letters t o make their cas e that the Founders wer e republicans is seriously flawed, because those letters are themselves Lockean o n the essential principles o f government. See Hamoway, "Cato's Letters, John Locke, and the Republican Paradigm." 40. Se e Wills, Inventing America. Ther e are other non-Lockean interpretation s of the American Revolution, albeit less widely followed than the republican and Scottis h interpretations . See , for example , Reid , Constitutional History of the American Revolution (reducin g everythin g t o common-la w ideas). 41. Pangle , The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 37 . 42. Horwitz , "Republicanis m an d Liberalis m i n America n Constitutiona l Thought," 7 0 (characterizing th e republican s a s mor e hierarchial tha n th e Scots). 43. Wills , Inventing America, 175 , 189. In The Radicalism of the American Revolution, publishe d twenty-three years after The Creation of the American Republic, Woo d appear s t o mov e t o a mor e Scottis h conceptio n o f virtue—a "moder n virtue " as Woo d calls it—based o n "lov e and benevolence." See Wood , The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 213-25 . Wood claim s tha t classica l virtue , wit h it s emphasi s o n educatin g th e people t o sacrific e thei r privat e interest s fo r thos e o f th e publi c good , proved too difficult fo r the Founders. 44. Wills , Inventing America, 239 . 45. See , for example , Pocock , Virtue, Commerce, and History, chap . 4; Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time, chaps. 3,4. 46. Se e Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 15 5 ("The enumeration o f conspiratorial efforts .. . forms the substance of the Declaration o f Independence"). See also Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 12 . John Phillip Reid likewise focuses on the list of grievances against the king. Reid characterizes the Declaration's preceding statement of political philosophy as "rhetoric." Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 5 , 91. 47. Diggins , The Lost Soul of American Politics, 37 . In a n appendix , Diggin s cleverly rewrite s th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e usin g republica n con cepts and language. See ibid., 364-65. This device shows the seriousness of the revisionists' neglect of Jefferson's Declaration .

Notes to Chapter 1 21 5 48. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o James Madison, August 30 , 1823, in The Works of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 12,307. See also Becker, The Declaration of Independence, 27 ("The Declaration, in its form, in its phraseology, follow s closely certain sentences in Locke's second treatise on government"). 49. Locke , Second Treatise, sees. 95,87. 50. Se e Wills, Inventing America, 240-55 . 51. Se e Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, vol. 1, bk. 1,342, 345,348, 355. 52. Levy , "Property as a Human Right," 174-75. 53. Locke , Second Treatise, sees. 173,123. 54. Ibid. , sec. 6. 55. Se e Adler and Gorman, The American Testament, 38. 56. Th e emphasis here, and to follow, is mine. 57. Locke , Second Treatise, sec. 104. 58. Ibid. , sec. 222. 59. Ibid. , sec. 230. 60. Ibid. , sec. 225. 61. Becker , The Declaration of Independence, 198. 62. Sheldon , The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, 42. 63. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o James Madison, August 30 , 1823, in The Works of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 12,307. 64. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o Richar d Henr y Lee , May 8, 1825 , in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 16,118-19. Jefferson considere d Locke one o f th e thre e greates t me n wh o eve r live d (th e othe r tw o wer e Isaa c Newton an d Franci s Bacon) . Se e Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferso n t o Joh n Trumbull, February 15 , 1789, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 434-35. In addition, th e Second Treatise occupie d a principa l plac e i n al l o f th e libraries Jefferson owne d throughout the course of his life, from his first as a student t o his last in retirement, and al l of those in between. Hamoway, "Jefferson an d the Scottish Enlightenment," 511-14. 65. Becker , The Declaration of Independence, 7. 66. Th e Declaration of Independence, par. 1. 67. Woo d himself acknowledge s tha t "n o phrase excep t liberty * was invoke d more often b y the Revolutionaries than 'the public good,"' yet he somehow manages t o conclud e tha t th e publi c goo d wa s th e goa l o f th e America n Revolution—a conclusion that seems inconsistent with his own character ization o f th e evidence . See Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 55. 68. Rei d also fails to appreciate the importance of intellectual leadership in the movement towar d independence . See Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution. 69. Webking , The American Revolution and the Politics of Liberty, xi , 13. 70. See , fo r example , Lutz , "Th e Relativ e Influenc e o f Europea n Writer s o n Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought" (employing a citation count to show how widely read the Founders were).

216 Note s to Chapter 1 71. Will , "Person o f the Millennium. " 72. See , fo r example , Boorstin , The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson) Chinard , Thomas Jefferson; Koch , The Philosophy of Tliomas Jefferson. 73. Se e Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, 2 (arguing tha t "Jefferson's politica l philosoph y wa s a ric h constellatio n o f theoretica l qualities from severa l traditions") . 74. In The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 1-21 . 75. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o Thoma s Man n Randolph , May 30, 1790, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol . 8, 31. 76. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferso n t o Joh n Norvell , June 11 , 1807, in ibid. , vol . 11,222-23. 77. Althoug h Sidne y ofte n allude d t o th e importanc e o f virtue i n his writings, it was alway s i n th e contex t o f helpin g t o secur e natura l rights . See , fo r example, Sidney , Discourses concerning Government, 23 , 112 , 151 , 242. I have mor e t o sa y abou t th e connectio n betwee n cultivatin g virtu e an d securing natura l right s i n m y discussions o f the political though t o f Samue l Adams an d John Adams . 78. See , fo r example , Hellenbrand , The Unfinished Revolution, 164 ; Meyers , ed., The Mind of the Founder, 347-5 0 (discussing February 182 5 correspondence betwee n Jefferso n an d Madiso n o n th e Universit y o f Virginia' s cur riculum). 79. Transcrip t o f th e Minute s o f th e Boar d o f Visitor s o f th e Universit y o f Virginia, durin g th e Rectorshi p o f Thoma s Jefferson, Marc h 4 , 1825 , in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol . 19,460-61. 80. See , for example , Lette r fro m Joh n Adam s t o Willia m Tudor , June 1 , 1818, in The Works of John Adams, vol . 10 , 317 (" I sincerel y believ e Mr . Oti s t o have bee n th e earlies t an d th e principa l founde r o f on e o f th e greates t political revolution s tha t eve r occurre d amon g men") . 81. Se e Webking , The American Revolution and the Politics of Liberty, 20 . 82. Jame s Otis , The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764) , in Bailyn , ed. , Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 419 , 425 (emphasi s in original) . 83. Lette r fro m Joh n Adam s t o Willia m Tudor , Apri l 5 , 1818 , in The Works of John Adams, vol . 10 , 310-11. 84. I n Bailyn, ed., Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 435 . 85. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferso n t o Waterhouse , 1819 , i n Democracy by Thomas Jefferson, 267 . 86. Lette r from Samue l Adams for th e Massachusetts Hous e of Representative s to Lieutenan t Governo r Hutchinson , Augus t 3 , 1770 , i n The Writings of Samuel Adams, vol . 2, 22. 87. Samue l Adams , The Rights of the Colonists, a List of Violations of Rights and a Letter of Correspondence, adopte d b y th e Tow n o f Bosto n o n No vember 20,1772 , in The Writings of Samuel Adams, vol . 2, 354-55. 88. Lewis , The Grand Incendiary, 139 . 89. See , for example , Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 118 .

Notes to Chapter 1 21 7 90. Lette r fro m Samue l Adam s t o Joh n Scollay , Decembe r 30 , 1780 , in The Writings of Samuel Adams, vol . 4,238 (emphasis in original). 91. Lette r fro m Samue l Adams to Elbridg e Gerry , October 29 , 1775, in ibid. , vol. 3,231. 92. Se e Webking, The American Revolution and the Politics of Liberty, 75 76. 93. See , for example, Stimson, The American Revolution in Law, 128 . 94. Scholar s lik e Shanno n Stimso n an d Garr y Will s wh o tr y t o sho w th e influence o f the Scottish Enlightenment on the American Founding fail to recognize the Scots* agreement wit h Locke on the essential principles of political philosophy , especiall y o n th e legitimac y o f governmen t an d th e right of resistance. Where the Scots departed fro m Lock e was on epistemology and anthropology. See, for example, Hamoway, "Jefferson an d the Scottish Enlightenment, " 506-9 ; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship, 53-82 . 95. Becker , The Declaration of Independence, 105-6. 96. I n McCloskey , ed., The Works of James Wilson, vol. 2, 735. This wa s an argument first advanced by Benjamin Franklin . See Letter from Benjami n Franklin to William Franklin, March 13,1768 , in The Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin, vol . 5,115. 97. I n McCloskey , ed. , The Works of James Wilson, vol . 2 , 72 3 (emphasi s in original). 98. Se e Alexander Hamilton, A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress (1774), in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol . 1,47-78. 99. Alexande r Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted (1775), in ibid., 87-88 (emphasis in original). 100. Ibid. , 104. 101. Ibid. , 86 ("Apply yourself, without delay, to the study of the law of nature. I would recommen d t o you r perusa l Grotius , Pufendorf, Locke , Montesquieu, and Burlamaqui"). 102. Wood , The Creation of the American Republic, 568. 103. Se e Webking, The American Revolution and the Politics of Liberty, 131. 104. "Th e happiness of society is the end of government. .. . All sober inquirers after truth , ancient an d modern , pagan an d Christian , have declared tha t the happines s o f man , a s wel l a s hi s dignity , consist s i n virtue. " Joh n Adams, Thoughts on Government (1776) , in The Works of John Adams, vol. 4,193. 105. Se e ibid., 194. 106. Se e Becker, The Declaration of Independence, 24. 107. Lette r fro m Joh n Adam s t o Timoth y Pickering , Augus t 6 , 1822 , in The Works of John Adams, vol . 2, 514. 108. The clos e connectio n Adam s ha d wit h th e formulatio n o f th e politica l principles articulated i n th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e i s evince d b y Jefferson's submittin g hi s draf t t o Adam s (an d Franklin ) fo r approva l before submittin g it to anyone else. See Letter from Thoma s Jefferson t o

218 Note

s t o Chapte r 1

James Madison , Augus t 30 , 1823 , in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 15 , 461. 109. I n The Works of John Adams, vol . 3, 449 (emphasis i n original) . 110. I n ibid, vol. 1,160 . 111. Ther e i s certainl y roo m fo r disagreemen t abou t who m t o conside r a n intellectual leade r o f th e America n Revolution . Baily n list s th e tw o Ad amses, John Dickinson , an d Jefferson . Se e Bailyn , The Origins of American Politics, 12 . Webkin g discusse s Otis , Patric k Henry , Dickinson , th e two Adamses, and Jefferson. Se e Webking , The American Revolution and the Politics of Liberty. I agre e wit h Webkin g o n th e importanc e o f Otis . While no t wishin g t o minimiz e th e importanc e o f Dickinso n an d Henry , I nevertheless includ e Jame s Wilso n an d Alexande r Hamilto n a t th e ex pense o f Dickinso n an d Henr y becaus e o f th e leadin g rol e Wilso n an d Hamilton wer e t o pla y durin g th e framin g an d ratificatio n o f the Constitu tion, a connectio n tha t i s importan t t o m y argumen t tha t th e Framer s o f the Constitutio n remaine d committe d t o th e natural-right s principle s o f the Declaratio n o f Independenc e (se e chapte r 2) , an d becaus e thei r sig nificance durin g th e revolutionar y perio d i s ofte n overlooked . I n an y event, Webking competentl y show s Dickinson' s an d Henry' s dedicatio n t o natural-rights principles . See Webking , The American Revolution and the Politics of Liberty, 30-60 . Indeed , wh o ca n forge t Henry' s cr y "Giv e m e liberty, or giv e me death! " o r Dickinson' s retor t "W e . .. ar e animate d b y a just lov e o f ou r invade d rights. " Patric k Henry , Speec h i n th e Virgini a Convention, Marc h 23 , 1775 , i n McCants , Patrick Henry, The Orator, 125; John Dickinson , Addres s t o th e Congres s o f th e Inhabitant s o f Que bec, Octobe r 26 , 1774 , i n The Political Writings of John Dickinson, vol . 2,14. 112. See , for example , Bailyn , ed. , Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 23 . See als o Reid , Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 5 , 88, 91. Fo r a n attempte d demonstration , intriguing , albei t unconvincing , tha t the Second Treatise wa s itsel f th e propagand a o f a "hard-lin e radical, " rather tha n a systematic stud y o f political philosophy , se e Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government. 113. Se e Dunn , "Th e Politic s o f Lock e i n Englan d an d Americ a i n th e Eigh teenth Century, " 77 . Dunn' s widel y rea d essa y i s als o widel y misunder stood. Contrar y t o th e contentio n o f man y revisionists , Dun n doe s no t deny, a s th e quote d passag e suggests , tha t th e Second Treatise wa s of profoun d relevanc e t o th e intellectua l leader s o f th e American Revolu tion. H e simpl y argue s tha t Lock e wa s expressin g a positio n abou t th e fundamental purpos e o f government— a positio n share d b y man y lib eral theorist s o f th e seventeent h an d eighteent h centuries—t o whic h the revolutionar y leader s ha d independentl y arrived . Se e Dunn , ibid. , 7 9 80. 114. Dworetz , The Unvarnished Doctrine, 7 . Concluding tha t Bailyn , Pocock , and Woo d hav e gon e to o fa r wit h thei r dismissa l o f Locke' s substantiv e

Notes to Chapter 1 21 9 influence o n the American Revolution, some scholars , as noted above, are now arguin g fo r a "liberal-republican " interpretatio n o f th e period . Al though a n improvemen t ove r th e purel y republica n interpretation , th e emerging liberal-republica n readin g likewis e undervalue s th e Declaratio n of Independence . Thi s liberal-republica n tren d i n th e literatur e o n th e American Revolutio n i s discusse d i n Klein , Brown , an d Hench , eds. , The Republican Synthesis Revisited. Se e als o Appleby , Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination. 115. See , fo r example , Rahe , Republics Ancient and Modern, 543-72 ; R . M . Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, 16 . 116. Germino , Machiavelli to Marx, 116 . 117. M y reading of Locke's thought was assiste d greatl y by A. John Simmons' s superb book , The Lockean Theory of Rights, whic h I had the pleasur e o f reading in both manuscript and final form. 118. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 6. 119. Locke , Essays on the Law of Nature, 111 . 120. Locke , An Essay concerning Human Understanding, vol . 1 , bk. 1 , chap. 2, sec. 1. 121. Lock e was certainl y not the only philosopher to employ the notion of selfevident truths . Tha t notio n ha s root s i n th e ancients . Bu t Lock e di d contribute markedl y t o th e developmen t o f th e doctrine , an d h e wa s th e philosopher t o whom th e Founders generally deferred o n the subject. Se e M. White, The Philosophy of the American Revolution, 11 . 122. Simmon s disagrees . Se e Simmons , The Lockean Theory of Rights, 5 5 n. 99 . Simmons' s interpretatio n i s aime d a t overcomin g th e elitis m i n Locke's theory. 123. Locke , Essays on the Law of Nature, 113-14 . 124. Ibid . 125. Locke , Second Treatise, sees . 7,16,134,135,149,159,171,183 . 126. Se e Macpherson , The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism; Strauss, Natural Right and History. Macpherso n provides a Marxist reading o f Locke , wherea s Straus s characterize s Lock e a s a sugar-coate d version of the purely individualistic Hobbes . 127. Locke , Essays on the Law of Nature, 205 . 128. Lette r from John Locke t o Denis Grenville, quoted in Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, 53 . As Simmons nicely puts it: Locke believes that our conduct in a large part of our lives is "up to us/' or outside of th e real m o f require d an d forbidden actions . .. . Doin g ou r dut y [t o preserve mankind] does not occupy the whole of our lives, but only occasionally limits our conduct. We enjoy a significant sphere of moral liberty within which we can pursue our own (harmless) goals and desires. (Ibid.) 129. Se e Dunn , The Political Thought of John Locke; Tully , A Discourse on Property. 130. Othe r Lock e scholar s wh o subscrib e t o th e duty-centere d interpretatio n

220 Note s to Chapter 1 include Willmor e Kendall . Se e Kendall , John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule. 131. Richar d Co x i s amon g thos e wh o agre e wit h th e rights-centere d readin g of Locke's mora l philosophy . See Cox, Locke on War and Peace. 132. See , for example , Simmons , The Lockean Theory of Rights, 69 ; M. White, The Philosophy of the American Revolution, 145-50 . 133. Locke , Second Treatise, sees . 11 , 6. 134. Locke , Two Treatises of Government, First Treatise, sec . 42 ; Locke , Second Treatise, sees . 5, 6, 70, 93. 135. Locke , Second Treatise, sees . 4-6. 136. Locke , Two Treatises of Government, First Treatise, sec . 42 (emphasis i n original). See als o Locke, Second Treatise, sees . 5, 6, 70, 93. 137. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 4. 138. "Thoug h I hav e sai d . . . tha t al l me n ar e b y natur e equal , I canno t b e supposed t o understan d al l sort s o f equality . Age o r virtu e ma y giv e me n a just precedence ; excellenc e o f part s an d meri t ma y plac e other s abov e the commo n level. " Ibid., sec. 54. 139. Ibid. , sees. 54, 2,16. 140. Ibid. , sec . 173 . Locke add s elsewher e tha t propert y involve s individual s "united fo r th e genera l preservatio n o f thei r lives , liberties , an d estates. " Ibid., sec. 123 . See als o sec. 87. 141. No t t o mentio n tha t right s ofte n conflict , whic h als o show s the y canno t be absolute . See ibid. , sec. 183. 142. Simmons , Tlie Lockean Theory of Rights, 101 . 143. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 23. 144. Locke' s doctrin e o f consen t ha s bee n muc h criticized . See , fo r example , Hume, Moral and Political Philosophy, 363 ; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 75-101 . Moder n politica l theorist s hav e spen t considerable tim e an d energ y arguin g abou t whethe r i t is ever possibl e t o say a n individua l ha s a n obligatio n t o obe y th e state . Resolutio n o f tha t debate i s beyon d th e scop e o f thi s book . Th e Founder s believe d consen t was possible, as th e Declaratio n o f Independence make s clear . 145. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 119 . See als o sees . 121-22 . 146. Dunn , The Political Thought of John Locke, 140-41 . 147. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 119. 148. Ibid. , sees. 87, 95. 149. Ibid. , sec. 96. 150. Lock e is , of course, speaking hypothetically . 151. Ibid. , sec. 128. 152. Se e Tully, A Discourse on Property, 158 . 153. Se e Locke , Second Treatise, sees . 131-32 . The flexibility a s to the form o f government tha t ma y be established wil l be o f especial importanc e i n par t 2, an examinatio n o f the Court' s rol e in the American constitutiona l order . 154. Ibid. , sec. 149 . See als o sec . 222. 155. Ibid. , sees. 149 , 243.

Notes to Chapter 1 22 1 156. Dunn , The Political Thought of John Locke, 28. Note that Locke does not refer t o legitimat e resistanc e a s "rebellion, " a n ac t h e view s i n negativ e terms. For Locke, it is the government, acting arbitrarily, that has rebelled. Locke, Second Treatise, sec . 226. See generall y Germino , Machiavelli to Marx, 145. 157. Locke , Second Treatise, sec. 223. See also sec. 230. 158. Ibid. , sec. 168. 159. Ibid. , sec. 225. See also sees. 208-10. Mere accidental government incom petence is not grounds for resistance. Ibid., sec. 225. 160. Richards , Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 136 . 161. Locke , Second Treatise, sees. 222, 243. 162. See , for example , M. White, The Philosophy of the American Revolution, 229. 163. Locke , Second Treatise, sec. 168 (emphasis supplied). See also sees. 208, 228,230,241. 164. An individual, like the community as a whole, will be slow to resist. 165. Ibid. , sec. 209. 166. Ibid. , sec . 20 5 ("I t bein g safe r fo r th e bod y tha t som e fe w shoul d b e sometimes i n dange r t o suffe r tha n tha t th e hea d o f the republi c shoul d be easily and upon slight occasions exposed"). 167. Becker , The Declaration of Independence, 18. 168. Th e Declaration of Independence, par. 2. 169. Th e "law s o f natur e an d o f nature' s God " i s actuall y a philosophical concept found i n the preamble of the Declaration of Independence, rather than i n th e sectio n tha t addresse s issue s o f political philosoph y (th e second paragraph) . A s i t doe s fo r Locke , thi s natural-la w philosoph y provides th e foundation—th e "basis"—fo r th e Founders ' natural-right s political philosophy. 170. M . White , The Philosophy of the American Revolution, 9 8 (emphasi s in original). 171. I n The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 10 . Several o f Jefferson's postrevolu tionary writing s likewis e referenc e mora l sens e a s a sourc e o f mora l knowledge. See , fo r example , Lette r from Thoma s Jefferso n t o Mari a Cosway, October 12,1786 , in ibid., 400-412; Letter from Thomas Jefferso n to Peter Carr, August 10,1787 , in ibid., 423-28. 172. Accordingly, Garry Wills's claim that, in the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson relie d upo n th e moral-sens e theor y o f th e Scottis h Enlighten ment, rathe r tha n upo n Locke' s theor y o f mora l rationalism , mus t b e rejected. Se e Wills , Inventing America, 167-258 . It wa s earlie r pointe d out that James Wilso n was an adheren t o f the moral-sense epistemolog y of the Scottish Enlightenment. However, the Declaration of Independence, a document signed by Wilson, is not. See generally M. White, The Philosophy of the American Revolution, 1 1 (arguin g tha t th e Declaratio n o f Independence incorporates Locke's theory of knowledge). 173. I n The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, 526-27.

222 Note s to Chapter 1 174. See , fo r example , Lette r from Thoma s Jefferso n t o Joh n Adams , 1813 , in Democracy by Thomas Jefferson, 126-27 . 175. Se e The Works of John Adams, vol . 1,195, vol. 3,457, vol. 4, 259. 176. M . White , The Philosophy of the American Revolution, 48 . Whit e con cludes tha t "whateve r th e admirabl e feature s o f th e philosophica l idea s advocated i n th e Revolutionar y er a migh t hav e been , . . . a fait h i n al l o f the people wa s no t on e o f them." Ibid., 267. 177. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 54. 178. Garr y Will s claim s tha t Lincol n changed , i n th e Gettysbur g Address , th e meaning o f th e Declaration' s conceptio n o f equality . Accordin g t o Wills , Jefferson wa s simply arguing that the king had n o right to govern America . He wa s no t suggestin g tha t equalit y shoul d b e a goa l o f American domes tic policy. See Wills , Lincoln at Gettysburg. A s in his specific wor k o n th e Declaration o f Independence , Will s fail s t o accoun t fo r Locke' s influenc e on th e Declaration . Wills' s interpretatio n o f Lincoln' s rol e i n th e develop ment o f the American ide a o f equality is therefore provocative , but uncon vincing. I n addition , a s I sho w i n th e text , Will s misinterpret s Lincoln' s conception o f equality . 179. Abraha m Lincoln , "Speec h o n th e Dre d Scot t Decisio n a t Springfield , Illinois," June 26 , 1857 , in Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, vol . 1, 39 8 (emphasi s i n original) . Se e generall y Diamond , "Th e Declaratio n and th e Constitution, " 48. 180. Abraha m Lincoln , "Speec h a t Independence Hall , Philadelphia, Pennsylva nia," February 22,1861 , i n Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, vol . 2, 213. 181. Locke , Second Treatise, sees . 50,34. 182. Ibid. , sec. 42. 183. Ibid. , sees. 7,16, 134,135,149,159,171,18 3 (emphasi s supplied) . 184. I explaine d abov e wh y "th e pursui t o f happiness " wa s substitute d i n the Declaratio n o f Independenc e fo r "property " i n it s articulatio n o f th e Lockean trinity . 185. Ibid. , sees. 6,16 . 186. Ibid . 187. Ibid. , sees. 3, 6. 188. Se e generall y Berlin , Four Essays on Liberty, 118-72 . 189. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 54. 190. Henr y Steel e Commage r goe s s o fa r a s t o sa y tha t th e eighteent h centur y was abou t th e secula r "religio n o f happiness. " Commager , Jefferson, Nationalism, and the Enlightenment, 93 . 191. I n The Works of John Adams, vol . 4,193. 192. Se e th e 178 0 Massachusett s Constitutio n writte n b y Adams , i n Poore , Federal and State Constitutions, vol . 1, 956-73. 193. "Tha t al l me n . . . hav e certai n inheren t right s . . . [including ] pursuin g an d obtaining happiness." In ibid., vol. 2,1908. 194. I n The Writings of George Washington, vol . 8, 440-41.

Notes to Chapter 2 22

3

195. I therefor e disagre e wit h White' s contentio n tha t replacin g th e wor d "ends" in Jefferson's roug h draft with the word "rights" in the final version of the Declaration o f Independence "migh t have altered th e fundamenta l purpose of government as Jefferson conceive d it." M. White, The Philosophy of the American Revolution, 250 . According t o White , Jefferson' s rough draft support s m y interpretation tha t a n individua l sometimes ha s legitimate claims on others, and on organized society and government, to strive to attain his happiness, but the final version does not (with the final version standing for no more than a commitment to making rights secure against invasion). 196. Commager' s statemen t tha t th e Founder s sough t "freedo m from .. . th e superstition o f th e church " wrongl y implie s tha t the y wer e antireligion . The Founders wer e not antireligion; they simply wished to leave religion to eac h individual' s privat e conscience , fre e fro m stat e pressure . Th e classic statements o f this position ar e by Thomas Jefferson, Virgini a Bill for Establishin g Religiou s Freedom , i n The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 251-53, an d b y Jame s Madison , Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, i n The Writings of James Madison, vol. 2,183-91. 197. Commager , Jefferson, Nationalism, and the Enlightenment, 89 . 198. Diamond , "The Declaration an d th e Constitution," 49 (emphasis supplie d and omitted) . Harry Jaffa i s an exampl e o f those criticize d b y Diamond . See, fo r example , Jaffa, How to Think about the American Revolution, 75-140. As is evident from th e Introduction , Edwi n Meese, Robert Bork , Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and many other contemporary conserva tives share Jaffa's emphasi s on majority-rule democracy . 199. Diamond , "The Declaration and the Constitution," 50. 200. I t is again important to keep in mind the distinction between a republican form of government an d a republican political philosophy.

Notes to Chapter 2 1. Beard , An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. 2. See , for example, Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution-, McDonald, E Pluribus Unum; McDonald, We the People. 3. Ther e i s still some sympath y fo r Beard' s thesis. See, for example , Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism. 4. Morris , The Forging of the Union. 5. Greene , Peripheries and Center. 6. McDonald , Novus Ordo Seclorum. 7. Sunstein, "Beyon d th e Republica n Revival. " Se e als o Ackerman , We the People; Michelman, "Law's Republic"; Sunstein, The Partial Constitution. For a critical assessment of the republic revival, see Gerber, "The Republican Revival in American Constitutional Theory." 8. Onuf , "Reflection s o n th e Founding, " 365 . Se e als o Lutz , A Preface to

224 Note s to Chapte r 2 American Political Theory, 42-43 (explaining that it is necessary to examine materials like those discussed in this chapter to understand the Constitution—an "incomplet e text"). 9. Here , my disagreement wit h th e Straussians ' approac h t o interpretin g th e texts o f th e America n Foundin g i s manifested . Se e generall y Wood , The Fundamentalists and the Constitution (describin g th e Straussians ' aver sion to reading texts in historical context). 10. Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (1795). 11. Th e Declaration of Independence, preamble. 12. Th e difference betwee n mean s and ends in constitutional theor y was well appreciated b y Locke . "Politics contain s tw o part s ver y differen t th e on e from th e other, " Lock e writes , "the on e containin g th e origi n o f societie s and th e ris e an d exten t o f political power, the other , the ar t o f governin g men in society"—with the Second Treatise being primarily concerned with the former . Locke , "Som e Thought s concernin g Readin g an d Stud y fo r a Gentleman," in The Educational Writings of John Locke, 400. As has been shown i n detai l elsewhere , th e Framer s turne d fo r assistanc e t o Montes quieu, Hume , and Blackstone , amon g others , rather tha n t o Locke , when dealing wit h issue s o f institutiona l design . See , fo r example , Lutz , "Th e Relative Influence o f European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought" (employing a citation count to identify th e Framers' influences). 13. Historian s have long disagreed about the relationship between the Declaration o f Independenc e an d th e Constitution . Fo r years, Merrill Jensen wa s the leadin g proponen t o f th e vie w tha t ther e wa s a philosophica l brea k between the revolutionary period and the constitutional period. See Jensen, The Articles of Confederation. Perhaps th e mos t surprising statemen t opposing a continuity thesis was made by Carl Becker in The Declaration of Independence. There, Becker, who made the definitive connection betwee n the idea s of the Declaratio n an d Locke' s Second Treatise (see chapte r 1) , asserted tha t "i n few i f any o f the constitution s no w i n force , d o we find the natural rights doctrine of the eighteenth century reaffirmed—not even, where we should perhaps most expect it, in the Constitution of the United States." Becker , The Declaration of Independence, 23 4 (emphasi s sup plied). Becker, lik e Jensen, contende d tha t th e natural-right s principle s of the Declaratio n o f Independenc e ar e absen t i n th e Constitutio n becaus e the Framers wanted to avoid the radical implications of those principles. Those disagreeing with Jensen's and Becker's (and Beard's, among others) positio n include d Edmun d Morga n an d Benjami n Wright . Se e E . S. Morgan, The Birth of a Republic; Wright , Consensus and Continuity. Gordon Woo d i s th e leadin g contemporar y proponen t o f th e vie w tha t there wa s a brea k betwee n th e philosophica l tenet s o f th e revolutionar y period and the constitutional period. See Wood, The Creation of the American Republic. According to Wood, the revolutionary period was republican and th e constitutiona l perio d wa s liberal . I n respons e t o Wood , muc h

Notes to Chapter 2 22 5 contemporary historica l debat e center s o n whe n an d ho w th e allege d classical republican principles of the American Revolution were supplanted by the liberal principles of modern America. 14. I n chapte r 1 I rejected th e prevailin g scholarl y vie w tha t th e America n Revolution was inspire d by classica l republica n concerns . As is th e cas e with the scholarship on the American Revolution, some scholars are beginning to argue that the Constitution is best characterized as "liberal-republican." See , fo r example , Ackerman , We the People; Belz, Hoffman , an d Albert, eds., To Form a More Perfect Union; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship; Sunstein , The Partial Constitution. Thi s chapte r endeavors to show tha t with regard to the basic purpose o f government, the Constitution is Lockean liberal. 15. Farrand , The Framing of the Constitution of the United States, 197. 16. Speec h by James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, December 4,1787, in Jensen, Kaminski, and Saladino, eds., Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 2,472-73. 17. U.S . Constitution, preamble. Hereafter, quotation s from the Constitution's preamble will follow modern capitalization. 18. Se e Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905); See generally Himmelfarb, "The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation." 19. Adler, We Hold These Truths, 129-30. 20. Farrand , ed., Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 2 , 13 7 (remarks of Edmund Randolph) (emphasis omitted). 21. I n The Papers of James Madison, vol. 9, 354. See generally O'Brien, "The Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court, and Pragmatic Constitutional Interpretivism, " 124-3 1 ("Accordin g to Madison , the denia l o f individual right s b y legislative majoritie s wa s a t the roo t o f th e crisi s in republicanism in the 1780s"). 22. See , for example, Brennan, "The Constitution of the United States." 23. D . F. Epstein, "The Political Theory of the Constitution," 82-83 (emphasis in original) . Se e als o Kramnick , Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism, 26 5 ("The commitment in the preamble to the Constitution to Establish justice' meant for the framers that it would protect private rights"). 24. Farrand , ed., Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 1 , 134 (remarks of James Madison). 25. The Federalist no. 41, 257-58 (James Madison). 26. Ibid. , no. 10, 78 (James Madison). 27. M . White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution, 211 (emphasis in original). 28. Recall , for instance, Madison's remarks during the federal Convention: "the necessity o f providin g mor e effectuall y fo r th e securit y o f privat e rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils which had more perhaps than any thing else produced this convention." Farrand, ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 1 , 13 4 (emphasi s supplied). Th e Framer s wer e als o concerne d with , amon g othe r things ,

226 Note s to Chapter 2 conducting bette r foreig n polic y an d mor e effectivel y administerin g a n increasingly larg e territory . Se e Morris , The Forging of the Union; Greene , Peripheries and Center. 29. Se e M. White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution, 211 . 30. Se e Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 130 . Se e als o Locke , Two Treatises of Government, First Treatise, sec . 92: Government bein g fo r th e Preservatio n o f ever y Man s Right and Property , by preserving him from th e Violence or Injur y o f others, is for th e good o f the Governed. For th e Magistrate s Swor d bein g for a Terror t o Evi l Doers, and b y that Terror t o inforce Me n to observ e the positive Laws of the Society , made conformable t o the Laws of Nature, for the public good, i.e. the good of every particular Member of that Society, a s fa r a s b y commo n Rules , i t ca n b e provide d for . (Emphasi s supplie d and omitted) 31. The Federalist no . 43, 279 (James Madison) . 32. Jefferso n though t i t contrar y t o natura l right s t o mak e a "perpetua l consti tution." Fo r Jefferson, th e Constitutio n shoul d b e update d b y eac h genera tion. Se e Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferso n t o Jame s Madison , Septembe r 6 , 1789, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 449 . See als o Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o Samue l Kercheval , Jul y 12 , 1816 , i n ibid. , 558-61 . Madison , among others , disagree d wit h Jefferso n o n thi s point . Se e Lette r fro m James Madiso n t o Thoma s Jefferson , Februar y 4 , 1790 , i n The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol . 16,147-5 0 (rejectin g Jefferson's argumen t o n Lock ean tacit-consen t grounds , as wel l as because frequen t institutiona l chang e would rende r natura l right s insecure) . 33. Se e Hoffert, A Politics of Tensions, chap . 4; Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, xiii , xxiii, 245. 34. Se e Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics, 183-91 . 35. Se e Billias , "The Declaration o f Independence," 47-48; Mahoney, "Th e Dec laration o f Independence a s a Constitutional Document, " 67-68 . 36. Farrand , ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 1 , 425 (remark s o f Elbridge Gerry) . 37. Ibid. , 48 (remarks o f Elbridg e Gerry) . 38. Ibid. , 49, vol. 2, 119 (remarks o f George Mason) . 39. Ibid. , vol. 2,124, vol. 1,135 (remark s o f James Madison) . 40. Lette r fro m Jame s Madiso n t o Georg e Washington , Apri l 16 , 1787 , in The Papers of James Madison, vol . 9 , 384 . Compar e Locke , Second Treatise, sec. 87. 41. Farrand , ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 1 , 14 7 (remark s o f Roger Sherman) . 42. Ibid. , vol. 2,137 (remark s o f Edmund Randolph ) (emphasi s omitted) . 43. Ibid. , 222 (remark s o f Gouverneu r Morris ) (emphasi s supplied) . Of course , Morris los t thi s debate . Th e tensio n betwee n th e concep t o f equalit y em bodied i n the Declaration o f Independence an d the guarantee s to slavery i n the Constitutio n i s addressed i n chapter 5 .

Notes to Chapter 2 22 7 44. Ibid. , vol . 1 , 440 (remark s o f Rober t Yates) . Othe r delegate s wh o mad e express reference t o natural-rights political philosophy during the Convention include Alexander Hamilton, Rufus King , and Luther Martin. See ibid., 324, 437, 477, 493. 45. Th e fac t tha t th e Constitutio n wa s submitte d t o th e peopl e fo r ratifica tion displays the Framers ' commitment t o the Lockea n libera l doctrine of consent. Se e Richards , Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 104. 46. [Merc y Oti s Warren] , Observations on the New Constitution (1788) , i n Ford, ed., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, 13 . Warren's pamphlet ha s bee n wrongl y attribute d t o Elbridg e Gerry . Se e Billias , Elbridge Gerry, 214-15, 394-95 (discussing the error in attribution). 47. Luthe r Martin, Letter to the Citizens of Maryland, March 21,1788, in Ford, ed., Essays on the Constitution of the United States, 364-65. 48. Georg e Mason, Objections to the Proposed Federal Constitution, i n Ford, ed., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, 329. 49. See , for example , Kaminski, "Restoring the Declaratio n o f Independence, " 145. See generally Storing , What the Anti-Federalists Were For (providing the classic analysis of the Antifederalists' ofte n contradictor y positions). 50. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferso n t o James Madison , Decembe r 20 , 1787 , in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 430. 51. Jame s Wilson , "Speech o n th e Federa l Constitution , delivere d i n Philadelphia," October 4 , 1787, in Ford, ed., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, 156 . 52. Farrand , ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 3, 14 3 (remarks o f James Wilson) . I n a powerfu l repl y t o Wilson' s ratif y ing-convention speeches opposing a bill of rights, delegate John Smili e read th e Declara tion o f Independence t o the Pennsylvania conventio n an d the n demande d a bil l o f right s based o n thos e natural-right s principles . See John Smilie , Speech i n th e Pennsylvani a Ratifyin g Convention , Novembe r 28 , 1787, in Kurland and Lerner, ed., The Founders' Constitution, vol . 1,455-56. 53. Jame s Madison, "Speech in the Virginia Convention," June 25, 1788, in The Writings of James Madison, vol. 5,231. 54. The Federalist no. 84, 513 (Alexander Hamilton). 55. Ibid. , 515 (emphasis in original). 56. A n obvious problem with the Federalists' argument, which they were never able t o overcome , wa s tha t th e propose d Constitutio n alread y reserve d several rights , most notabl y th e wri t o f habea s corpus . As Jefferson suc cinctly remarked, the Federalists' argument wa s "a gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument." Letter from Thomas Jefferson t o James Madison , December 20 , 1787, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 429. 57. I n Meyers , ed. , The Mind of the Founder, 175 . Fo r a les s benevolen t interpretation o f Madison' s motive s fo r securin g th e Bil l o f Rights , se e Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution, 164-7 5 (arguing that

228 Note s to Chapter 2 Madison's chief objective was to thwart the Antifederalists' attempts to call a second constitutional convention). 58. Storing , "The Constitution and the Bill of Rights," 32. 59. Murphy , "The Art of Constitutional Interpretation," 140. 60. Se e U.S . Constitution, art . 6 (requiring stat e judges t o enforc e th e federa l Constitution). Although many , includin g som e o f thos e sympatheti c t o a substantive readin g o f the nint h amendment , argu e tha t th e nint h amend ment, like amendments 1 throug h 8, was not originally intended to apply to the states , I disagree. I disagree because , as I explain below , the Framer s believed ther e ar e certai n rights—natura l rights—beyon d th e powe r o f any legitimat e government , federa l o r state , t o invade . The possibilit y o f incorporating th e nint h amendmen t t o th e state s throug h th e fourteent h amendment ha s moote d thi s questio n o n th e origina l reac h o f th e nint h amendment fo r mos t scholars . Compar e Patterson , The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, 36-4 3 (contendin g tha t th e nint h amendmen t ha s alway s been applicabl e t o th e states) , wit h Barnett , "Jame s Madison' s Nint h Amendment," 47-48 (maintainin g that th e nint h amendmen t di d no t originally apply to the states). 61. Th e nint h amendmen t wa s reawakene d i n th e privac y case Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) , particularl y i n Justic e Arthu r Goldberg' s concurrin g opinion. Chapter 5 discusses the Griswold case in detail. 62. U.S . Constitution, amend. 9. 63. I n Meyers , ed. , The Mind of the Founder, 171 . The argumen t t o whic h Madison refers is that of James Wilson (discussed above). Initially opposed to a bill of rights to the Constitution, Madison was eventually persuaded by Jefferson o f its importance. See, for example, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jame s Madison , Marc h 15 , 1789 , i n The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 438-40. 64. Berger' s an d Bork' s argumen t ha s bee n adopte d b y a hos t o f commenta tors, most o f whom, like Berger an d Bor k themselves, are politically con servative. See, for example , Cooper , "Limite d Governmen t an d Individua l Liberty"; McAffee, "Th e Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment." I have more to say below about the connection between conservatism and opposition to a substantive reading of the ninth amendment. A few conservative s do look t o the nint h amendmen t fo r a gran t o f unenumerated rights . See, for example, Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 57,173,187-88. 65. Berger , "The Ninth Amendment," 8; Bork, The Tempting of America,185 . 66. Barnett , "James Madison's Ninth Amendment," 12-13. 67. Lette r from Jame s Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Octobe r 17 , 1788, in The Writings of James Madison, vol. 5, 271-72. 68. See , for example , Berger, "The Ninth Amendment," 3. Even scholars claiming that th e nint h amendment ha s independen t substantiv e conten t main tain that Madison's letter to Washington suggests otherwise. See, for example, Barnett, "James Madison's Ninth Amendment," 18-19.

Notes t o Chapte r 2 22

9

69. Lette r fro m Jame s Madiso n t o Georg e Washington , Decembe r 5 , 1789 , i n The Writings of James Madison, vol . 5,431. 70. Ibid. , 432. 71. U.S . Constitution, amend. 1 0 (emphasis supplied). 72. Morton , "Joh n Locke , Rober t Bork , Natura l Rights , an d th e Interpretatio n of the Constitution/' 751-55. 73. I n a n interestin g twis t o n Berger' s an d Bork' s argument , historia n Jame s Hutson declare s tha t i t i s "ludicrous " t o believ e tha t th e Bil l o f Rights , including the ninth amendment, protects natural rights, because th e Constitution "wa s create d no t b y individuals leavin g a state o f natur e bu t b y th e people actin g collectivel y throug h thei r stat e governments. " According t o Hutson, "individual natura l right s were th e concer n o f th e states. " Hutson, "The Bil l o f Right s an d th e America n Revolutionar y Experience, " 89-95 . Hutson's reading o f th e Bil l o f Right s has a t least three problems. First, a s the openin g word s o f the preamble , "W e the People," suggest, the Framer s emphasized, i n Lockea n fashion , tha t th e Constitutio n wa s create d b y th e people, no t b y th e states . Second, a s i s discusse d throughou t thi s chapter , the Framer s wer e gravel y concerne d abou t th e violations o f natura l right s occurring in the states and, therefore, di d not want to leave rights solely t o state protection . Third , a s thi s chapte r ultimatel y endeavor s t o show , th e Framers remaine d committe d durin g th e constitutiona l perio d t o th e con cept of government articulate d i n the Declaration o f Independence: that all legitimate governments , includin g th e federa l government , exis t chiefl y t o secure natura l rights. 74. Grey , "D o We Have a n Unwritte n Constitution? " 715-16. Se e als o Corwin , The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 5 (ar guing tha t th e nint h amendmen t illustrate s th e Framers * commitmen t t o natural-rights doctrin e "perfectly") ; Kaminski , "Restorin g th e Declaratio n of Independence, " 14 4 (maintainin g tha t th e nint h amendmen t wa s in tended t o secur e "th e self-eviden t truth s o f th e Declaratio n o f Indepen dence"); Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, 2 0 (same). 75. I n Meyers, ed., The Mind of the Founder, 168 . 76. Th e importance o f natural rights in the Bill of Rights is also reflected i n the only origina l draf t o f the Bill o f Rights known t o exist . The draft i s writte n in Roge r Sherman' s hand . Th e secon d numbere d paragrap h read s a s follows: 2. Th e peopl e hav e certai n natura l right s whic h ar e retained b y the m whe n the y enter int o Society , Suc h ar e th e right s o f Conscienc e i n matter s o f religion ; of acquiring propert y an d o f pursuin g happines s & Safety; o f Speaking , writin g and publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their common good, and of applying to Government by petition or remonstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they Shall not be deprived by th e Governmen t o f th e unite d States . (Reprinte d i n Barnett , ed. , The Rights Retained by the People, vol. 1,351)

230 Note s to Chapter 2 Sherman serve d wit h Madison o n the committee assigne d t o draft th e Bill of Rights. See generally Gerber, "Roger Sherman and the Bill of Rights." 77. Fo r example , Berge r write s tha t "Justic e Goldber g woul d transfor m th e ninth amendment into a bottomless well in which the judiciary can dip for the formation o f undreamed o f 'rights' in their limitless discretion, a possibility the Founder s woul d hav e rejected ou t o f hand. " Berger, "Th e Ninth Amendment," 2. 78. Bickel , The Least Dangerous Branch, 18. 79. Se e generall y Chemerinsky , "Th e Vanishing Constitution, " 74-75 ; O'Brien, "The Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court, and Pragmatic Constitutional Interpretivism," 119-31 . 80. Se e Jame s Madison , Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), in The Papers of James Madison, vol . 9, 345; The Federalist no. 10, 77-84 (James Madison); ibid., no. 51, 320-25 (James Madison). 81. Public-la w scholar s should , however , avoi d relyin g exclusively o n The Federalist for discernin g the Framers' intent. See, for example, Ackerman, We the People (employing a n originalis t methodology , bu t relyin g exclu sively o n The Federalist). See generally Gerber , Revie w o f We the People, by Bruc e A . Ackerma n (notin g th e methodologica l problem s o f relyin g exclusively on The Federalist). 82. Se e Wills, Explaining America. 83. Se e D. F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist. 84. Se e Diamond , "Democrac y an d The Federalist," i n As Far as Republican Principles Will Admit, 27-30 ; Pangle , The Spirit of Modern Republicanism. 85. Se e M. White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution, 227 . 86. Lette r from Thoma s Jefferson t o Thomas Mann Randolph, May 30, 1790, in Tfie Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol . 8 , 31 ; Locke, "Som e Thought s concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman," in The Educational Writings of John Locke, 400 . 87. The Federalist no . 2, 37 (John Jay) . Jay's contributio n t o The Federalist was limite d b y illness . Ja y wrot e five papers , Madiso n twenty-six , an d Hamilton fifty-one. Three paper s wer e a collaboratio n betwee n Madiso n and Hamilton. Rossiter, Introduction to The Federalist, xi (citing the work of Douglass Adair). 88. The Federalist no. 40, 252-53 (James Madison) (emphasis omitted). 89. Se e M. White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution, 26 1 n. 1; Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship, 89 . 90. The Federalist no. 37, 227 (James Madison). 91. Madiso n advance s a Lockea n characterizatio n o f th e stat e o f natur e an d why me n establis h governmen t i n The Federalist no. 51 . Echoing Jay' s remarks i n no . 2 , Madiso n note s tha t i n th e stat e o f natur e eve n "th e stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit t o a governmen t whic h ma y protec t th e wea k a s wel l a s them selves." Ibid., no. 51, 324-25. In essence, what Madison is doing in no. 51 is

Notes to Chapter 2 23 1 developing an analogy so that he can persuade hi s audience—especiall y those comprisin g majorit y factions—tha t i t i s i n thei r self-interes t t o adopt th e Constitution' s schem e o f a n extende d federa l republic . M . White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution, 27-28 . It should not g o unnoticed tha t Madiso n choose s a s the basi s fo r hi s analogy th e Lockean theor y o f governmen t embodie d i n the Declaratio n o f Indepen dence. 92. The Federalist no . 10 , 77-78 (Jame s Madison ) (emphasi s supplied) . The Federalist no. 10 is also illuminating because o f the Lockean conceptio n of property Madison adopts there (see chapters 1 and 5). Madison argue s that an unequal distributio n o f property i s natural because of the "differ ent an d unequa l facultie s o f acquirin g property " wit h whic h individual s are endowed. Ibid., 78. 93. Ibid. , no. 14,104-5 (James Madison). 94. Ibid. , no. 45, 288-89 (Jame s Madison) . On a related note , The Federalist no. 39 finds Madison arguin g i n favo r o f th e republica n for m o f govern ment propose d i n th e Constitutio n becaus e "n o othe r for m woul d b e reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamen tal principle s o f th e Revolution ; o r wit h tha t honorabl e determinatio n which animate s ever y votary o f freedo m t o res t al l ou r politica l experi ments on the capacity of mankind for self-government." Ibid., no. 39, 240. 95. Ibid. , no. 46,298 (James Madison). 96. Ibid. , no . 43 , 279 (Jame s Madison) . No . 4 3 i s als o interestin g becaus e Madison adopts the Lockean characterizatio n o f government a s a neutral "umpire" among competing interests, a role played by government tha t is essential to the protection of natural rights. Ibid., 279, 277. 97. Ibid. , no. 31,193 (Alexander Hamilton). 98. Ibid. , no. 28,180 (Alexander Hamilton). 99. Ibid. , no. 26,168 (Alexander Hamilton). 100. Ibid. , no. 9, 72-73 (Alexander Hamilton). 101. Forres t McDonald rejects the nearly unanimous characterization o f Madison a s the "father " o f the Constitution . McDonald emphasize s that Madison los t many votes durin g the Conventio n an d tha t h e wante d a purel y national government. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 205-9. 102. James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787, in Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 3, 551 (emphasis supplied) . Further evidenc e o f Madison' s continue d commitmen t lat e i n lif e t o th e principles of the Declaration of Independence is found i n a letter he wrote to Jefferson acknowledgin g tha t th e Declaratio n i s the first o f th e "bes t guides" to th e "distinctiv e principles " of government . Lette r fro m Jame s Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Februar y 8, 1825, in The Writings of James Madison, vol. 9, 221. 103. Lette r from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Octobe r 24,1787, in The Papers of James Madison, vol. 9, 212. 104. Lette r fro m Jame s Madiso n t o Georg e Washington , Apri l 16 , 1787 , i n

232 Note s to Chapter 2 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, vol . 1 , 28 8 (emphasi s in original) . 105. Se e Lette r fro m Jame s Madiso n t o Thoma s Jefferson , Septembe r 6 , 1787 , in The Papers of James Madison, vol . 10 , 163; Letter from Jame s Madiso n to Thoma s Jefferson, Octobe r 17,1788 , in ibid., vol. 11 , 298. 106. I n ibid. , vol. 9, 355, 357. Madison wa s greatl y influence d b y Davi d Hume' s arguments i n favor o f an extende d republic . See Adair, "That Politic s Ma y Be Reduced t o a Science." ' 107. Jame s Madison , Amendments to the Constitution, Jun e 8 , 1789 , i n The Papers of James Madison, vol . 12, 200. Madison's initia l proposal fo r a bill of right s differ s somewha t fro m Jefferson' s Declaratio n o f Independenc e in that Madison , unlik e Jefferson, mention s th e righ t o f "obtaining " happi ness. Madiso n wa s undoubtedl y influence d b y Georg e Mason' s Virgini a Declaration o f Right s o n thi s point . Th e implication s o f thi s distinctio n are discusse d i n chapters 1 and 5 . 108. I n Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, vol . 4 , 478 (emphasi s in original) . 109. Ibid , (emphasi s i n original) . I n hi s classi c 178 5 essay o n th e natura l righ t to religiou s freedom , A Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, Madiso n echoe s Locke' s position—share d b y Jefferson , most notabl y i n Jefferson' s Virgini a Bil l fo r Establishin g Religiou s Free dom (whic h Madiso n helpe d pass)—o n th e relation s betwee n churc h an d state. Madiso n argue s tha t religiou s activitie s shoul d b e entirel y exemp t from stat e o r societa l interference , becaus e o f man' s natura l righ t t o freedom o f conscience . I n The Writings of James Madison, vol . 2 , 183 91. Se e generall y Thoma s Jefferson , Bil l fo r Establishin g Religiou s Free dom, i n The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 251-53 ; Locke, A Letter on Toleration, 65 . Madiso n als o subscribe d t o Locke' s controversia l doctrin e o f tacit consent . See Letter fro m James Madiso n t o Thomas Jefferson, Febru ary 4 , 1790 , in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol . 16 , 149. See generall y Locke, Second Treatise, sec . 119. 110. Lette r fro m Jame s Madiso n t o Josep h Cabell , Septembe r 7 , 1829 , The Writings of James Madison, vol . 9 , 351 . Se e als o Lette r from Jame s Madison t o Edwar d Everett , Augus t 28 , 1830 , i n ibid. , 38 3 (recognizin g the people' s ultimat e recours e "t o origina l right s & th e la w o f self-preservation"). 111. Jame s Wilson , Lectures on Law (1790-92) , i n Andrews , ed. , Works of James Wilson, vol . 1 , 6 0 ("Th e writing s o f Mr . Lock e hav e facilitate d the progress , an d hav e give n strengt h t o th e effect s o f scepticism") . O n epistemology, Wilso n wa s a n adheren t o f th e common-sens e schoo l o f th e Scottish Enlightenment . 112. Jame s Wilson , Speec h t o th e Pennsylvani a Ratifyin g Convention , Novem ber 26 , 1787 , in McCloskey , ed. , The Works of James Wilson, vol . 2, 769 70. 113. Speec h b y Jame s Wilso n i n th e Pennsylvani a Ratifyin g Convention , De -

Notes to Chapter 2 23 3 cember 4 , 1787 , i n Jensen, Kaminski , an d Saladino , eds. , Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 2,472-73. 114. See , fo r example , Berns , "Judicia l Revie w an d the Right s an d Law s o f Nature," 49, 58-66 ; Storing , "Th e Constitutio n an d th e Bil l o f Rights, " 44-48. 115. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in Andrews, ed., Works of James Wilson, vol. 2, 303, 307. John Jay made the same point, albeit less eloquently , in The Federalist no. 2. 116. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in Andrews, ed., Works of James Wilson, vol. 2,335. 117. Wilso n als o emphasize s th e relate d principl e o f popula r sovereignty , a principle that he credits "the great and penetrating mind of Locke" with being th e first to identify . Speec h by James Wilso n to th e Pennsylvani a Ratifying Convention , Decembe r 4 , 1787 , in Jensen, Kaminski , an d Saladino, eds., Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 2 , 472. The Constitutio n o f th e Unite d State s wa s th e first written national governing document based upon this principle of popular sovereignty. 118. Wright , American Interpretations of Natural Law, 89. 119. Kramnick , Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism, 261. 120. The Federalist no. 26,168 (Alexander Hamilton). 121. Ibid. , no. 84,515 (Alexander Hamilton). 122. Farrand , ed., Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 1 , 477 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton). George Washington makes a similar argument in his September 17,1787, letter submitting the Convention's proposed Constitution to Congress. Just as individuals "entering into society must give up a share of liberty to protect the rest," Washington writes, so the states must give up a share of their sovereign powers to "promote the lasting welfare of the country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness." Ibid., vol. 2,666-67. 123. I n a provocative boo k o n Jefferson's politica l philosophy , Garret t Ward Sheldon argues that Jefferson became more of a classical republican, and less of a Lockean liberal, in his postrevolutionary days. See Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson. I read Jefferson differently , a s this section shows. 124. Lette r from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17,1788, in The Papers of James Madison, vol. 11, 297. 125. Lette r from Thomas Jefferson t o James Madison, March 15, 1789, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 439 . 126. Lette r from Thomas Jefferson t o Thomas Mann Randolph, May 30, 1790, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 8,31. 127. I n The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 210 . 128. I n ibid., 253. See also Thomas Jefferson, Address to the Danbury Baptist Association, January 1 , 1804, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 16,281.

234 Note s to Chapter 2 129. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferso n t o F . W . Gilmer, 1816 , in Democracy by Thomas Jefferson, 28 . See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson t o Dupon t de Nemours, 1816, in ibid., 29 ("I believe ... that justice is the fundamenta l law o f society ; tha t th e majorit y oppressin g a n individual , i s guilt y o f a crime, abuse s it s strength , an d b y actin g o n th e la w o f th e stronges t breaks up the foundations o f society"). 130. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o Colone l Smith , 1787 , in ibid. , 260 . See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson t o James Madison, January 30,1787, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 417 ("A little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing , an d a s necessar y i n th e politica l worl d a s storm s i n th e physical. .. . I t i s a medicin e necessar y fo r th e soun d healt h o f gov ernment"). 131. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o Roge r C . Weightman, June 24 , 1826, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 585. 132. I n The Works of John Adams, vol . 4, 271. 133. Madiso n called Adams's Defence "a powerful engin e in forming the public opinion" both becaus e o f Adams's great stature i n the United State s an d because "th e boo k ha s merit. " Lette r fro m Jame s Madiso n t o Thoma s Jefferson, June 6,1787, in The Papers of James Madison, vol. 9, 29-30. 134. Parrington , Main Currents in American Thought, vol. 1, 319, 308. 135. I n The Works of John Adams, vol . 4,292. 136. Locke , Second Treatise, sec. 54. 137. Lette r fro m Joh n Adam s t o Thoma s Brand-Hollis , June 11 , 1790, in The Works of John Adams, vol . 9, 570. 138. Richards , Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 93 . 139. I n The Works of John Adams, vol . 5, 457-58. 140. Se e Webking, The American Revolution and the Politics of Liberty, 138 44. 141. I n The Works of John Adams, vol . 6,208. See also vol. 4,554. See generally Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship (arguin g tha t th e Framers viewed virtue as a means to secure Lockean liberal ends). 142. I n The Works of John Adams, vol . 6, 65. 143. Bryce , The American Commonwealth, vol . 1, 19. See also Lutz, The Origins of AmericanConstitutionalism; Wright , Consensus and Continuity. 144. Nevins , The American States during and after the Revolution, 119 . 145. Th e earl y stat e constitution s ar e collecte d i n Poore , Federal and State Constitutions. 146. See , fo r example , Nevins , The American States during and after the Revolution, 147 ; Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law, 115. 147. Howard , Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, vol . 2, 35 ("The rights claime d .. . wer e .. . natura l rights , an d th e languag e o f Lock e informs the early sections of the Bill of Rights"). 148. Poore , Federal and State Constitutions, vol . 2 , 1908-9 . A s chapte r 1 explained, the Declaration o f Independence doe s not include the Virginia

Notes to Chapter 3 23 5 Bill's right of "obtaining" happiness. The implications of this omission ar e discussed in chapter 5. 149. Poore , Federal and State Constitutions, vol . 1,377-78 . 150. Ibid. , vol. 2,1328,1330-32. 151. Se e Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, vol . 1,282. 152. Poore , Federal and State Constitutions, vol . 2,1909. 153. Ibid. , vol. 1,956. 154. Quote d in Nevins, The American States during and after the Revolution, 171. 155. Interestingly , in only seven of the thirty-seven states admitted to the union since the nation's founding did Congress fail to reference th e fundamenta l principles o f the American Foundin g in enabling acts. The specific refer ences were t o on e or more o f the following : the Declaration o f Indepen dence, the Constitution of the United States, a republican form of government, an d th e Northwes t Ordinance . I than k Mar k Hai l fo r thi s information.

Notes t o Chapte r 3 1. Se e Beard , The Supreme Court and the Constitution. Feli x Frankfurte r once wrot e tha t Beard' s study o f the Founders' views on judicial revie w should pu t a n en d t o th e charg e tha t th e Suprem e Cour t "usurped " tha t power i n Marbury v. Madison (1803) . Frankfurter, " A Note o n Advisory Opinions," 100 3 n. 4 . As th e plethor a o f book s an d article s o n judicia l review reveals , however , Beard' s stud y merel y exacerbate d th e usurpa tion charge. 2. Th e Supreme Cour t ha s no t alway s don e a good job i n protecting right s (see chapter 5) . In theory, however, the Court should be able to do so— as the present chapter attempts to show. 3. Se e Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution. 4. Blackstone , Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1,91. 5. 7 7 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610). 6. Se e Sosin, The Aristocracy of the Long Robe, 56-58, 66-68. 7. Ther e have been a few isolate d occasion s sinc e th e Glorious Revolutio n in which Britis h judges appea r t o have exercise d judicial review. One of the most wel l known i s The City of London v. Wood, 8 8 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (1702). 8. Nevins , The American States during and after the Revolution, 26. 9. Eve n in those states that formally separated powers in their constitutions, the legislature frequently trespasse d o n the judicial function. Se e Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, 98-99. 10. Chipman , Preface t o Vermont Reports, bk. 2, 21, 22.

236 Note s to Chapter 3 11. Rakove , "Parchment Barrier s an d th e Politics o f Rights," 120. The curren t practice o f equatin g legislativ e supremac y wit h majoritarianis m is , therefore, fundamentally flawed. 12. Thoma s Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1782) , in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 16 4 (emphasis in original). 13. Seve n state s adopte d bill s o f right s b y 178 4 an d fou r other s single d ou t specific right s for incorporation int o the general provisions of their constitutions. 14. Farrand , ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 1 , 13 4 (remark s o f James Madison). 15. Ibid. , vol. 2, 288 (remarks of John Mercer). Many similar observations were offered. Fo r example, Gouverneur Morris declared, "The public liberty is in greater dange r fro m Legislativ e usurpation s tha n fro m an y othe r source, " whereas James Wilso n stated , "W e have seen th e Legislature s i n our ow n country depriv e th e citize n o f Life , o f Liberty , & Property, w e hav e see n Attainders, Banishments , & Confiscations." Ibid. , 7 6 (remark s o f Gouver neur Morris), vol. 1,172 (remark s of James Wilson). 16. Eve n the delegates who opposed a strong national government understoo d the need to curb the abuses occurring in the state legislatures. As explained below, fo r man y o f thos e delegate s mor e responsibl e stat e court s wer e the answer. 17. See , fo r example , Jame s Madison , Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787) , in The Papers of James Madison, vol . 9, 357; The Federalist no. 10, 83-84 (James Madison). 18. Se e The Federalist no. 10,82-83 (James Madison). 19. Th e Senate, chosen unde r th e Virginia plan not directl y by the people no r by the state legislatures , but by the first branch o f the national legislature, was also, as Edmund Randolp h pu t it, to serve a s a check o n "the fury o f democracy." Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 1, 58. 20. See , for example , Letter from James Madison to George Washington, April 16,1787, in The Papers of James Madison, vol. 9, 384. 21. Farrand , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 2, 28 (remarks o f James Madison). 22. Ibid. , 76 (remarks of Luther Martin). Other delegates made similar observations. See, for example, ibid., vol. 1, 109 (remarks of Rufus King) . Although several scholar s o f considerabl e renown—includin g Loui s Boudi n an d William Crosskey—hav e argue d tha t th e Suprem e Cour t wa s empowere d to void onl y those act s of Congress that interfer e wit h the prerogatives of the judiciar y itself , th e weigh t o f th e evidenc e i s t o th e contrary . Se e Boudin, Government by Judiciary, vol . 1, 114; Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States, vol . 2, 1007. For a convincing refutatio n o f Boudin' s an d Crosskey' s position , se e Berger , Congress v. The Supreme Court, 154-64. 1 have more t o say below about th e scope of judicial review. 23. Madison' s abilit y t o wi n suppor t fo r hi s notio n o f a n extende d federa l

Notes to Chapter 3 23 7 republic should not go unnoticed when considering how the Constitution secures rights. See, for example , Goldwin and Schambra, eds., How Does the Constitution Secure Rights? 24. U.S . Constitution, art. 6. 25. Se e Lette r from James Madison to James Monroe, December 27, 1817 , in Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, vol. 3,56 (stating that if the Convention had accepted his proposal for a council of revision, this would have eliminate d an y nee d fo r judicial revie w o f legislatio n fo r constitu tional validity). 26. I n Congress v. The Supreme Court, Raoul Berger makes a highly persuasive cas e tha t th e Constitutio n unequivocally commissions th e Suprem e Court with broad power to review the acts of the co-equal branches of the national government, as well as the acts of the states. As Beard's study did years earlier, Berger has left many commentators unconvinced. 27. Elliot , ed., Debates in the Several State Conventions, vol. 2, 489 (remarks of James Wilson). 28. Ibid. , vol. 3, 553 (remarks of John Marshall). Similar remarks were made in other stat e ratifyin g conventions . See , fo r example , ibid. , vol. 2 , 19 6 (remarks of Oliver Ellsworth in Connecticut). 29. The Federalist no. 78,467 (Alexander Hamilton). 30. Se e Brutus , Essay s 11-1 5 (1788) , i n Ketcham , ed. , The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates, 293-309. J. M. Sosin argues that Brutus "sought to inflate judicial power to the dimensions of a bugbear, reading into the document what may not have existed." Sosin, The Aristocracy of the Long Robe, 264. According to Sosin, Brutus wanted to defeat th e Constitution—an d woul d g o t o an y lengths, including grossl y exaggerating th e powe r o f th e Court , t o d o so—becaus e h e desire d t o maintain state power. Sosin's interpretation of Brutus's essays is interesting but unconvincing. There is no hint in any of Brutus's essays that he did not sincerel y believ e tha t th e Constitutio n commissione d th e Suprem e Court with a broad power of judicial review. 31. A complete account of the role of natural-rights doctrine injudicial review must consider the arguments made by early American lawyers, as well as the decision s issue d b y judges. This is because, a s Suzann a Sherry aptly observes, the lawyers' positions reflect "the types of arguments considered legitimate and within the bounds of the legal culture of the period." Sherry, "The Founders* Unwritten Constitution," 1136 n. 42. Moreover, innovations in judicial practice are often the product of persuasive lawyers' arguments. 32. Compar e ibid, (arguing that the Founders envisioned natural-rights-base d judicial revie w from the beginning) , wit h Michael , "Th e Role o f Natura l Law in Earl y American Constitutionalism " (reviewing th e sam e evidenc e and concludin g tha t th e Founder s consistentl y rejecte d natural-rights based judicial review). 33. Se e generally "Perspectives on Natural Law." Leading modern attempts to minimize the role of natural-law and rights doctrine in early judicial prac-

238 Note s to Chapte r 3 tice include Cover, Justice Accused (discussing slavery cases); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 47-48, 130-32, 138, 152-53 (describing earl y Suprem e Cour t practice) ; Wolfe , The Rise of Modern Judicial Review, 108-1 3 (same). See also McDowell, "Coke, Corwin, and the Constitution" (advancin g a positivis t critiqu e o f Corwin' s famou s articl e abou t natural la w an d th e Constitution) . Cover's , Currie's , McDowell's , an d Wolfe's position represents current orthodoxy. 34. Consisten t wit h hi s thesi s tha t judicia l revie w ha s n o basi s i n history , Sosin make s much o f the fac t tha t Otis' s argument, as well as most othe r precedents for judicial review, was not officially reporte d until years later. See Sosin, The Aristocracy of the Long Robe, 165-66. Sosin fails to appreciate, however , tha t new s a s significan t a s Otis' s challeng e t o th e writ s o f assistance circulated i n myriad informal ways , such as through pamphlets, newspaper accounts , and correspondence . The Founders were well aware of th e precedent s fo r judicia l review . See , fo r example , Farrand , ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 1, 97 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry), vol. 2, 28 (remarks o f James Madison); The Federalist no. 78, 470 (Alexander Hamilton); Elliot, ed., Debates in the Several State Conventions, vol. 3, 299 (remarks of Edmund Pendleton), 324-25 (remarks of Patrick Henry). 35. Se e James Otis, "Speech o n the Writs of Assistance," February 24, 1761, in The Works of John Adams, vol . 2, 521-22. 36. Se e Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England; Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 37. I n The Works of John Adams, vol . 2, 522. 38. Lette r from John Adams to William Tudor, March 29, 1817, in ibid., vol. 10, 248. Otis continued hi s attack o n legislative acts that violate natural rights in two influential pamphlets published in 1762 and 1764 . See chapter 1. 39. 1 Jeff. (Va.) 109, 114 (1772). 40. Colone l Bland, arguing the case for th e defendants, emphasize d legislativ e supremacy. Ibid., 118. 41. Ibid. , 123. 42. Se e R . L. Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review, 48-5 5 (discussing the disagreement in the literature about the status of the early state cases as precedent for judicial review). 43. 4 Cal l ( 8 Va. ) 5 (1782) . Boudi n an d Crosske y accus e Danie l Call , th e reporter o f Caton, o f fabricatin g th e court' s statement s abou t judicia l review. See Boudin, Government by Judiciary, vol . 1, 535; Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States, vol . 2, 952, 960. In my judgment, Boudin and Crosske y do not adequately substantiat e their charge. Because there is so much disagreement among scholars about the earl y stat e cases , a s wel l a s abou t th e othe r historica l material s o n judicial review , I wil l not , a s a rule , attemp t t o addres s th e variet y o f interpretations advance d ove r the years. Instead, I will offer m y own independent reading of the materials and will limit my comments on competing interpretations to those of particular significance . 44. Ther e i s some evidenc e tha t tw o years earlier , i n Holmes v. Walton (N J.,

Notes to Chapter 3 23 9 1780), the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a state statute mandating the us e o f si x juror s i n certai n case s instea d o f th e traditiona l twelve . The evidenc e include s a serie s o f petitions introduce d i n the Ne w Jersey legislature denouncin g th e court' s invalidatio n o f th e statute . However , because th e court' s opinio n ha s neve r bee n found , I credi t Caton wit h being the first recorded state case of judicial review. For more on Holmes, see Scott , "Holmes v. Walton." Josiah Philips's Case (Va., 1778 ) i s als o frequently mentione d a s an earl y state preceden t fo r judicial review. Like Holmes v. Walton, the opinio n i n Josiah Philips's Case has neve r bee n found, s o I begi n wit h Commonwealth v. Caton. Fo r mor e o n Josiah Philips's Case, se e Trent, "The Case of Josiah Philips." 45. Chie f Judge Edmund Pendleton's opinion i s somewhat inconsistent i n this regard. At one point, Pendleton state d that the propriety of judicial review need no t be addressed b y the court . See 4 Call (8 Va.), 18. Later, the chie f judge engaged injudicial review . See ibid., 19-20 ("In passing [the law], the legislature have , i n m y opinion , pursued , an d no t violated , th e consti tution"). 46. A s Locke states , "politic s contain s tw o parts ver y differen t th e on e fro m the other, the one containing the origin of societies and the rise and extent of political power , th e other , the ar t o f governin g men i n society." Locke, "Some Thoughts concernin g Readin g an d Stud y fo r a Gentleman," i n The Educational Writings of John Locke, 400 . Se e generall y Sherry , "Th e Founders' Unwritten Constitution" (identifying th e significance fo r judicial review of the difference betwee n individual-right s case s and allocation-of powers cases). I have more to say below about this distinction. 47. 4 Call (8 Va.), 8. Earlier in his opinion, Wythe favorably invoked the Cokean notion tha t i t is the dut y o f a judge t o "protec t th e right s o f th e subject. " Ibid. 48. Th e case i s reprinted i n The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton, vol . 1, 393-419. 49. Ibid. , 373. 50. Ibid. , 395,400. 51. Ibid. , 415. 52. 1 Kirby (Conn.) 444, 447 (1785). 53. Se e Varnum , The Case, Trevett Against Weeden. The contemporaneou s accounting o f th e cas e b y on e o f th e principal s makes Trevett v. Weeden more reliable than Holmes v. Walton and Josiah Philips's Case, two other alleged earl y stat e precedent s fo r judicia l revie w fo r whic h th e courts ' opinions have not been located. 54. Varnum , The Case, Trevett Against Weeden, 11 . Varnum's other argument s were that the statute had expired an d that the court lacked jurisdiction t o hear the case. Ibid., 2-3. 55. Ibid. , 25. 56. Ibid. , 35. 57. Newspaper s account s indicat e tha t i n 178 6 judge s i n Ne w Hampshir e voided a statut e tha t deprive d creditor s o f tria l b y jury i n certai n cases .

240 Note s to Chapter 3 Those newspape r account s intimat e tha t th e judges interprete d th e Ne w Hampshire constitutio n i n ligh t o f natural-right s principles . Unfortun ately, th e opinion s i n th e so-calle d Ten Pound Act Cases have no t bee n located. 58. 1 N.C . (Martin) 5,10 (1787). 59. A letter by Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell, author of the letter "To the Public," reveals the influence Iredell' s letter had on the court. I discuss Spaight's letter below. 60. James Iredell, "To the Public," August 17,1786, in Life and Correspondence of James Iredell, vol . 2,145. 61. Lette r fro m Richar d Dobb s Spaigh t t o Jame s Iredell , August 12 , 1787 , in ibid., 169-70. 62. Lette r fro m Jame s Iredel l t o Richar d Dobb s Spaight , August 26 , 1787 , in ibid., 172 (emphasis omitted). 63. 3 U.S . ( 3 Dall. ) 386 , 39 9 (1798 ) (Iredell , J.) . Calder v. Bull i s discusse d below. 64. Se e als o Farrand , ed. , Records of the Federal Constitution, vol . 1 , 9 7 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry), vol. 2, 28 (remarks of James Madison). 65. The Federalist no . 78, 466 (Alexander Hamilton) . See also 469-71. Morton White denies tha t TJie Federalist commission s th e Cour t a s a n activ e guardian o f th e people' s natura l rights . White interpret s Hamilton' s argu ment in no. 78 in strictly negative terms, focusing as White does on phrases such as that which describe s th e Court as "the least dangerous branch" of the nationa l government . According t o White, "the mai n point o f Number 78 about th e judiciary i s tha t i t wil l b e th e leas t dangerou s o f th e thre e branches o f governmen t t o [natural ] rights , no t tha t i t wil l exercis e th e most effectiv e restrain t upo n th e invasio n o f those rights. " M. White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution, 158 . The problem s wit h White's argumen t ar e tha t i t fail s t o accoun t fo r Hamilton' s discussion , quoted i n th e text , o f th e Court' s centra l rol e in protecting natura l rights, and it leaves the Court with virtually no role to play in the American system of separatio n o f power s an d check s an d balances . Whit e als o fail s t o recognize tha t muc h o f Hamilton' s deprecatin g characterizatio n o f th e Court's power is a polemical devic e offered t o rebut th e influential charg e of Brutus, discussed earlier , that th e Court' s power o f judicial review an d its independent statu s unde r th e Constitutio n woul d mak e th e Cour t despotic. 66. Elliot , ed. , Debates in the Several State Conventions, vol . 2 , 480-81 (re marks of James Wilson). 67. Ibid. , vol. 3, 563, 567 (remarks of William Grayson). 68. Haines , The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, 85 . See also Sherry, "Natural Law i n th e States, " 17 3 ("The bes t evidenc e i n suppor t o f a natura l la w heritage, then , i s no t wha t th e founder s [o r th e philosopher s wh o influ enced them] said, but what courts did" [emphasis in original]). 69. 1 Bay (S.C.) 93, 98 (1789).

Notes to Chapter 3 24 1 70. 1 Wyth e (Va.) 211,213-15 (1793). 71. 4 Hen. & M. (14 Va.) 315,341 (1809) (emphasis in original). 72. Ibid. , 346-47 (Roane, J.) (emphasis in original). The act was upheld. Judge Roane conclude d tha t applyin g th e ac t retroactivel y wa s no t unjust , whereas Judg e Willia m Flemin g concurre d o n statutor y constructio n grounds. Curiously, Judge Roan e misstate d Blackstone' s positio n o n judicial review. Blackstone's position was more rigid than Roane implies. 73. 2 Johns. Ch. 162,166 (N.Y. 1816). 74. 1 N.H. I l l, 11 4 (1817). The New Hampshire court' s decision was reversed two year s late r b y th e U.S . Supreme Court . Se e Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat. ) 51 8 (1819). That decisio n i s discussed below . Fo r mor e stat e precedents , se e Haines , "La w o f Natur e i n State and Federal Judicial Decisions" ; Sherry, "Natural Law in the States." As Haines's an d Sherry' s article s mak e clear , th e stat e case s I hav e dis cussed are representative of a larger pattern. The remainder of this section is devoted t o examining early U. S. Supreme Cour t practice on the role of natural-rights doctrine in constitutional interpretation, a subject of perhaps more immediat e interes t t o commentator s o n th e Cour t tha n th e stat e court decisions that served as precedent. 75. Se e Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, 143-250. 76. Currie , The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 3 . 77. See , for example, Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review, 108-13 . See also Currie , The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 47-48, 130-32 , 138, 152-53. 78. Currie , Hie Constitution in the Supreme Court, 4. These cases are furthe r proof tha t Chie f Justice Marshal l wa s no t sayin g anythin g ne w abou t th e Court's authority to interpret the Constitution in Marbury v. Madison. 79. Th e three cases are Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 1 (1796); and Colder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 38 6 (1798) . Chisholm v. Georgia and Colder v. Bull appeale d t o natural-rights principles . Neither Curri e no r Wolf e mention s Chisholm a s an exampl e o f natural-la w an d right s jurisprudenc e i n thei r otherwis e excellent historie s o f constitutiona l interpretation . The y overloo k late r cases as well. 80. Se e Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795). Most of the cases decide d b y the Suprem e Cour t durin g the formativ e year s involve d technical jurisdictional issues , a subjec t o f obviou s concer n fo r an y ne w court. For a discussion o f those cases, see Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 6-30. 81. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 82. See , for example , Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 1, 93 n. 1 (describing th e case as an action t o recover o n bonds given by debtors whose property the state had confiscated); Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, 726 (characterizing th e case as an action fo r th e price of goods furnished t o the state).

242 Note

s t o Chapte r 3

83. Th e elevent h amendmen t reverse d th e Court' s decision . 84. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.), 450-53 (Blair, J.). 85. Ibid. , 469, 479 (Jay, CJ.). 86. Ibid. , 466, 468 (Cushing, J.). 87. Ibid. , 453-6 6 (Wilson , J.) . Justice Jame s Iredel l dissented , arguin g tha t a sovereign stat e coul d no t b e sue d withou t it s consent . H e als o warne d that th e Court' s decisio n t o th e contrar y woul d b e viewe d b y th e state s as a dangerou s assaul t upo n thei r sovereignty . Ibid. , 429-5 0 (Iredell , J. , dissenting). Th e quic k passag e o f th e elevent h amendmen t indicate s Jus tice Iredell correctly anticipate d th e states' reaction. See generally Graebe , "The Federalis m o f Jame s Iredel l i n Historica l Context. " Justic e Iredel l had muc h t o sa y abou t natural-rights-base d judicia l revie w i n Calder v. Bull, discusse d below . 88. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795) (Paterson , J.). 89. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 90. Ibid. , 400-401 (Cushing , J.). 91. Ibid. , 395 , 39 7 (Paterson , J.) . Justic e Paterson' s opinio n wa s mainl y a technical exegesi s o n e x pos t fact o laws . 92. Ibid. , 386, 387-88 (Chase , J.). 93. Se e Lette r fro m Jame s Iredel l t o Richar d Dobb s Spaight , August 26 , 1787, in Life and Correspondence of James Iredell, vol . 2, 172. 94. 3 U.S . ( 3 Dall.) , 397 , 39 9 (Iredell , J.) . Justic e Iredel l issue d a virtuall y identical opinio n o n circui t th e sam e year . Se e Minge v. Gilmour, 1 7 F . Cas. 440, 443-44 (C.C.D.N.C . 1798) . Curiously, however , h e engage d i n a n extended exegesi s o n natural-right s philosoph y i n a prize cas e onl y a fe w years earlier . See Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133,162-6 3 (1795) . 95. Se e Bork , "Th e Struggl e ove r th e Rol e o f th e Court, " 1138 . See als o Bork , "Natural La w and th e Constitution. " 96. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 1 (1796), was the onl y full-scal e constitutional la w decisio n durin g the pre-Marshall er a that did not invok e natural-rights principles . I n Hylton, th e Cour t hel d tha t a federa l ta x o n carriages wa s no t a "direct " ta x require d t o b e apportione d amon g th e states. Importantly , i n Hylton, federalism , no t individua l rights , wa s a t issue. Appeal t o natural-right s principle s wa s therefor e unnecessary . 97. 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 13 7 (1803). 98. Se e Currie , The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 65-90 . 99. Jurisdictiona l question s continue d t o be decided a s well. See ibid., 91-126. 100. 1 0 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810). 101. Chie f Justic e Marshal l pu t a n en d t o th e practic e o f eac h justic e writin g his own opinion . He als o discourage d dissents . 102. Ibid. , 133 , 139. 103. Ibi d (emphasis supplied) . Currie, who tries to minimize the role of natural law an d right s doctrin e i n th e earl y Court' s constitutiona l jurisprudence , acknowledges tha t Marshall' s opinio n i n Fletcher v. Peck "bristles " wit h such references . Currie , The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 130 .

Notes to Chapter 3 24 3 104. 1 0 U.S. (6 Cr.), 143-44 (Johnson, J., concurring). 105. Th e contract claus e was used i n more cases challenging state legislatio n during th e Court' s firs t on e hundre d year s tha n an y othe r constitutiona l provision. Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution, xiii . 106. 1 3 U.S. (9 Cr.) 43 (1815). New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 164 (1812), is typicall y mentione d a s on e o f th e Marshal l Court' s majo r contrac t clause cases . See, for example , Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 136-37; Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution, 34-37 . In that case the Court held that the state of New Jersey impaired a contract it made earlier with the Delaware Indians when the state sought to repeal a ta x exemptio n grante d t o th e Indians . A s a sweepin g statemen t o f immunity from taxation , th e cas e i s significant . I n term s o f interpretiv e methodology, the Court did little more than cite Fletcher v. Peck. 107. 1 3 U.S. (9 Cr.), 52. Consistent wit h his more general attemp t t o minimize the role of natural-law an d rights principles in the early Court's constitu tional jurisprudence, Currie calls the quoted passage from Story' s opinion "gratuitous." Currie , 77i £ Constitution in the Supreme Court, 138 . Although Supreme Court opinions can certainly be read in a variety of ways, I find Currie's readin g unconvincin g fo r severa l reasons . First, a carefu l study of Story's opinion for th e Court in Terrett v. Taylor reveals that he was usin g natural-la w an d right s doctrin e a s a n exegetica l tool . Second, as I have been endeavorin g to show in this section, appeal to natural-la w and rights doctrine in private rights cases was the rule, not the exception, for the early Court. Third, Story employed natural-law and rights jurisprudence on other occasions. For example, in Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 , 65 7 (1829) , Stor y wrote , "Th e fundamenta l maxim s o f fre e government seem to require, that the rights of personal liberty and private property shoul d b e hel d sacred . A t leas t n o cour t o f justice woul d b e warranted i n assumin g tha t th e powe r t o violate an d disregar d the m .. . lurked under any general grant of legislative authority." Story also alluded to th e importanc e o f natural-la w an d right s doctrin e i n hi s acclaime d Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. 108. 2 5 U.S. (12 Wheat. ) 21 3 (1827). Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), is often ranke d second in importance to Fletcher v. Peck among the Marshall Court's contract claus e decisions. See, for example , O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, vol . 2, 19293. The reason Dartmouth College is important is that the Court held that a corporate charte r is a contract under the terms of the Constitution. The case sai d littl e abou t th e methodolog y o f constitutiona l interpretation , however. 109. Th e Cour t first applied th e contrac t claus e i n the bankruptcy contex t i n Sturges v. Crowninshield, 1 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 12 2 (1819). 110. Currie , The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 152-53. 111. 2 5 U.S. (12 Wheat.), 332, 346, 353-54 (Marshall, C. J., dissenting). 112. 1 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

244 Note s to Chapter 3 113. 2 2 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 114. 3 2 U.S. (7 Pet.) 24 3 (1833). 115. Se e Haines , The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, 97 ; Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law\ 173-76 . 116. 2 3 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 6 6 (1825). 117. I n a trenchan t analysi s o f th e Marshal l Court' s racia l minorit y cases , G . Edward Whit e suggest s tha t th e Court' s failur e t o affor d Black s an d Indians natural-right s protectio n ca n b e ascribe d t o th e Court' s unwilling ness t o conside r Black s an d Indian s full y human . Se e G . E . White , The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, chap . 9 . White' s interpretatio n i s consistent wit h th e wa y slaver y wa s treate d b y man y stat e judges a t th e time. As noted earlier , the pressure o f disunion wa s als o relevant . 118. Sherry , "Th e Founders ' Unwritte n Constitution, " 1171 . Natural-la w an d rights jurisprudenc e wa s no t absen t fro m th e Cour t fo r long . Betwee n 1889 an d 193 7 th e Cour t appeale d t o natural-la w an d right s principle s to protec t privat e wealth . A s I describ e below , th e moder n Cour t fre quently interpret s th e Constitutio n i n ligh t o f natural-law-lik e concept s as well . 119. O n a relate d note , Sotirio s Barbe r suggest s tha t th e burde n o f proo f should b e o n thos e wh o cal l fo r a minima l rol e fo r th e Cour t i n th e American constitutiona l order . Barbe r astutel y point s ou t tha t critic s o f the Cour t a s a n institutio n simpl y assum e o r asser t tha t thei r minimalis t reading i s correct . See Barber, The Constitution of Judicial Power, xi . 120. Eve n Rosco e Pound , wh o wa s critica l o f natural-la w an d right s jurispru dence becaus e i t interfere d wit h hi s visio n o f judges a s socia l engineers , acknowledged tha t earl y America n judge s interprete d th e la w i n ligh t o f those principles . See , fo r example , Pound , "La w i n Book s an d La w i n Action," 28. 121. Hele n Michae l maintain s tha t Chie f Judg e Pendleto n rejecte d natural rights-based judicia l revie w i n a n unpublishe d portio n o f hi s Commonwealth v. Caton (Va. , 1782 ) opinion . Followin g Crosske y (an d Boudin) , Michael accuse s Cal l o f "doctoring " hi s report s o a s t o provid e a stronge r precedent fo r judicial review . Michael , "Th e Rol e o f Natura l La w i n Earl y American Constitutionalism, " 45 3 n. 187 . Even i f this charg e i s true (an d I do no t believ e i t is), two rejection s o f natural-rights-base d judicial revie w do no t a jurisprudential patter n make . I n fairnes s t o Michael , ther e wer e probably instance s tha t hav e no t bee n uncovere d i n whic h judge s othe r than Iredel l rejecte d natural-rights-base d judicia l review . But , a s thi s section advises , the weigh t o f the evidenc e i s to th e contrary . 122. 4 Hen. & M. (14 Va.) 315, 341 (1809). 123. See , fo r example , Cooper v. Aaron, 35 8 U.S. 1 (1958); Baker v. Carr, 36 9 U.S. 18 6 (1962) ; Powell v. McCormack, 39 5 U.S. 486 (1969) ; United States v. Nixon, 41 8 U.S . 68 3 (1974) . I n al l o f thes e cases , th e Cour t cite d Marbury v. Madison fo r support . However , a s ha s bee n discusse d i n detail b y others , a clos e readin g o f Marbury indicate s tha t Chie f Justic e

Notes to Chapter 3 24 5 Marshall wa s not makin g th e clai m i n tha t cas e tha t th e Cour t i s th e supreme interpreter o f the Constitution, but only that the Court is competent to—and ha s the authority to—address issues of constitutionality, as do th e othe r branche s o f th e government . See , fo r example , Engdahl , "John Marshall' s Meffersonian ' Concep t o f Judicial Review. " While Marbury v. Madison may not stand for the power of judicial finality the Court has been repeatedly assertin g since Cooper v. Aaron i n 1958 , this section explains tha t th e Court' s rol e i n th e America n constitutiona l orde r sup ports the Court's more recent claims to enjoy such power. 124. There are many scholars who argue for an egalitarian approach to constitutional interpretation. See, for example, Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy; Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress; S. R. Burgess, Contest for Constitutional Authority-, Burt, The Constitution in Conflict; Fisher , Constitutional Dialogues. Th e presi dents wh o have expressl y advance d a n egalitaria n approac h t o constitu tional interpretatio n includ e Thoma s Jefferson , Andre w Jackson , Abra ham Lincoln , Frankli n Roosevelt , Richar d Nixon , an d Ronal d Reagan . See generally Gunther , Individual Rights in Constitutional Law, 22-2 5 (collecting th e presidentia l statements) ; "Perspective s o n th e Authorita tiveness o f Suprem e Cour t Decisions " (analyzin g the n attorne y genera l Edwin Meese's controversial speec h o n behalf o f the Reaga n administra tion). There are differences amon g the egalitarian approache s (fo r exam ple, Jefferson's positio n i s les s respectfu l o f th e Court' s authorit y tha n Lincoln's is). What is important fo r purpose s o f this volume, however, i s the rejection o f judicial finality at the heart of all of them. 125. Jaffa's essay s on the Declaration, originally published in the University of Puget Sound Law Review, ar e reprinted i n Jaffa, Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution. 126. Jaffa, "Judicia l Conscience and Natural Rights," 242. 127. Although Jaff a agree s wit h th e conservatives ' positio n o n th e judicia l function, h e disagree s wit h thei r approac h t o th e large r question o f how the Constitution should be interpreted. 128. Corwin , Court over Constitution, 33 . Berger argue s t o th e contrary . See Berger, Congress v. the Supreme Court, 188-97. In my judgment, Berger's evidence is not nearly as convincing as he maintains. 129. The Federalist no. 81,483 (Alexander Hamilton). 130. [Melancto n Smith] , "Letter s o f a Federa l Farmer " (1787) , i n Ford , ed., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, 306 . For years, scholars though t th e "Federa l Farmer " wa s Richar d Henr y Lee . See, fo r example, Webking , "Melancto n Smit h an d th e Letter s fro m th e Federa l Farmer." 131. Brutus , Essay 1 1 (1788), in Ketcham, ed., The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates, 295 . 132. See , for example, Burt, The Constitution in Conflict, 56-76 . 133. The Federalist no. 49, 314 (James Madison).

246 Note s to Chapter 3 134. Jame s Madison , Speec h i n th e Unite d State s Hous e o f Representatives , i n Annals of Congress, vol . 1 , 520. 135. Lette r fro m Jame s Madiso n t o Mr . , 1834 , i n Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, vol . 4, 350 (emphasis i n original) . See gener ally O'Brien , "Th e Framers ' Mus e o n Republicanism , th e Suprem e Court , and Pragmati c Constitutiona l Interpretivism, " 137-46 . 136. Th e leadin g scholarl y accoun t o f structura l reasonin g i s C . L . Black , Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law. 137. Article s 6 an d 3 als o strongl y sugges t tha t th e Founder s intende d fo r th e Supreme Cour t t o hav e th e final sa y i n constitutiona l interpretation . Upo n examining the relationship betwee n th e supremacy claus e o f Article 6 and the judicial provision s o f Article 3 , Justice Stor y wa s le d t o conclud e tha t the Suprem e Cour t i s "th e final judg e o r interpreter " o f th e Constitution . Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 123-25 . 138. The Federalist no . 48, 308 (James Madison) . 139. Brennan , "Th e Constitutio n o f the Unite d States, " 170. 140. I n Meyers , ed. , The Mind of the Founder, 171-72 . Unenumerate d right s are "expressl y stipulate d for " via the nint h amendmen t (se e chapte r 2) , so Madison's use o f that phrase shoul d no t b e construe d a s a rejection o f th e view tha t unenumerate d right s meri t judicia l protection . Se e Mitchell , "The Nint h Amendmen t an d th e 'Jurisprudenc e o f Origina l Intention,' " 1740. 141. See , for example , the discussio n o f th e jurisprudence o f Meese, Bork, an d Rehnquist i n the Introduction, an d o f Jaffa a t the beginning o f this section , as wel l a s Justic e Antoni n Scalia' s opinio n fo r th e Cour t i n Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 11 0 S.Ct . 1595 (1990). 142. Se e als o The Federalist no . 78 , 467 (Alexande r Hamilton ) ("Withou t thi s [judicial review] , al l th e reservation s o f particula r right s o r privilege s would amoun t t o nothing") . 143. Davi d Richard s make s thi s point well : Judicial revie w i s th e natura l culminatin g poin t o f th e architectur e o f America' s experiment i n Lockea n constitutionalis m becaus e i t i s th e mos t nearl y adequat e institutional embodimen t o f it s suprem e requirement : th e impartia l an d indepen dent judgment o f th e invoidabl e rights o f th e perso n tha t mus t b e immun e fro m political bargaining and compromise. (Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 166 ) 144. Bickel , The Least Dangerous Branch, 25-26 . I n hi s late r works , Bicke l backed away , thoug h no t completely , fro m hi s vision o f th e Cour t a s "th e institution bes t fitted t o giv e u s a rul e o f principle. " Ibid. , 261 . Compar e Bickel's view o f the Court' s role i n The Least Dangerous Branch wit h tha t offered i n hi s The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, 113 , 177-78, and i n his The Morality of Consent, 4 . 145. Locke , Essays on the Law of Nature, 113-14 . Se e als o Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 124 .

Notes to Chapter 4 24 7 146. Se e The Works of John Adams, vol . 1,195, vol. 3,457, vol. 4,259. 147. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferso n t o Joh n Adams , 1813 , in Democracy by Thomas Jefferson, 126-27 . 148. Jefferson's distrus t o f Marshall is seen i n an 181 0 letter t o Madison: "His [Marshall's] twistifications i n the case of Marbury, in that of Burr, and the Yazoo cas e sho w ho w dexterousl y h e ca n reconcil e la w t o hi s persona l biases." Letter from Thoma s Jefferson t o James Madison , 1810 , in ibid. , 275. 149. Lette r from Thoma s Jefferson t o James Madison , March 15 , 1789, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 438. See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson t o A. H. Rowan, September 26 , 1798, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 10, 61 ('The law s of the land, administered b y upright judges, would protect you from an y exercise of power unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States"). 150. See , for example , The Federalist no . 10 , 80-83 (Jame s Madison) ; Elliot, ed., Debates in the Several State Conventions, vol. 3, 536-37 (remarks of James Madison). 151. Lette r fro m Jame s Madiso n t o Mr . , 1834 , i n Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, vol . 4, 350. Madison's June 8,1789, speech to the U.S . House o f Representative s callin g for th e adoptio n o f the Bil l of Rights, quoted above, provides early signs of the leading role for the Court he was later to embrace, as well as evidence of the influence of Jefferson' s 1789 letter, which made the same point, albeit more explicitly, about th e advantages o f institutiona l competenc e enjoye d b y th e Court . Se e als o The Federalist no. 81,483 (Alexander Hamilton). 152. Farrand , ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 2, 429 (remarks of Charles C. Pinckney). 153. Althoug h some, including Thomas Jefferson i n the Kentuck y Resolution s and Joh n Calhou n durin g th e nullificatio n crisis , hav e claime d tha t th e states may authoritatively declar e the meaning of the Constitution withi n their borders , thi s clai m ha s lon g bee n discredited . A s James Madiso n aptly put it, the meaning of the Constitution "must be [left] to the authority of th e whole , no t t o tha t o f th e part s separatel y an d independently. " Otherwise, th e Unite d State s woul d b e " a governmen t i n nam e only. " James Madison, "On Nullification" (1835-36), reprinted i n ibid., vol. 3, 537. 154. Levinson , "Could Meese Be Right This Time?" 1077. 155. Presiden t Andrew Jackson, Bank Veto Message (July 10 , 1832), quoted in Gunther, Individual Rights in Constitutional Law, 22. 156. Se e Scigliano, The Supreme Court and the Presidency, 16 .

Notes t o Chapte r 4 1. Fo r a notable exception , see Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy, chap. 5.

248 Note s to Chapter 4 2. 1 4 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Justice Story's position is somewhat ambiguous. The centra l portio n o f hi s opinio n i n Martin v. Hunter's Lessee asserted that Article 3 is "not mandatory, and that congress may constitutionally omit to vest the judicial power in courts of the United States," whereas several other paragraphs of the opinion argued that Article 3 jurisdiction is "mandatory upon the legislature." 3. See , for example , Eisenberg , "Congressiona l Authorit y t o Restric t Lowe r Federal Court Jurisdiction" (arguing that the existence of the lower federa l courts "in some form i s [now] constitutionally required"); Sager, "Constitutional Limitation s o n Congress ' Authorit y t o Regulat e th e Jurisdictio n o f the Federa l Courts " (contending tha t ther e mus t b e some federa l judicial forum fo r the enforcement o f federal constitutiona l rights—either a lower federal cour t or the Supreme Court). 4. U.S . Constitution, art. 3, sec. 1 (emphasis supplied). 5. Ibid. , sec. 2 (emphasis supplied). 6. Se e Merry , "Scop e o f th e Suprem e Court' s Appellat e Jurisdiction, " 57 . Merry make s th e doubtfu l clai m tha t Congress' s powe r unde r th e excep tions claus e wa s intende d t o b e limite d t o regulatin g th e treatmen t o f issues of fact. Not only is Merry's historical evidence unconvincing, but his interpretation i s "contrar y t o th e punctuatio n o f th e relevan t phrase. " (There ar e comma s bot h befor e an d afte r th e phras e "bot h a s t o La w and Fact. " The exceptions claus e therefor e modifie s th e word s "appellat e jurisdiction," rather than the word "Fact.") Gunther, "Congressional Powe r to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction," 901. See also Redish, "Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause," 913-14. 7. Al l other occasion s o n which the Cour t has addressed th e meaning of the exceptions claus e have been dicta . See, for example , The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1881); Daniels v. Railroad Company, 7 0 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1865); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103,119 (1847); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S . ( 3 Dall. ) 321 , 327 (1796) . Th e dict a suppor t a broa d reading of Congress's power under the exceptions clause. In a more recent statement o n the issue, Justice Willia m Douglas asserted, "Ther e is a serious question whether " the moder n Cour t would approv e a broad exercis e of congressiona l powe r unde r th e exception s clause . Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n. 11 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 8. 7 4 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 9. See , fo r example , Redish , "Congressiona l Powe r t o Regulat e Suprem e Court Appellate Jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause," 904. 10. 7 5 U.S . ( 8 Wall. ) 85 , 10 3 (1869 ) (statin g tha t a complet e denia l o f th e Supreme Court' s habea s corpu s jurisdictio n woul d "greatl y weake n th e efficacy o f the writ... and seriously hinder the establishment of ... unifor mity in deciding upon questions of personal rights"). 11. 8 0 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 12. See , for example , Rice, "Congress an d th e Suprem e Court' s Jurisdiction, "

Notes to Chapter 4 24 9 972-73. Th e statut e a t issu e i n United States v. Klein directe d tha t n o pardon o r amnest y b e considere d b y the judiciary unde r th e Abandone d and Captured Propert y Act , a n importan t piec e o f Congress' s post-Civi l War Reconstruction policy. 13. See , for example , Gunther, "Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Cour t Jurisdiction," 898 ; Redish , "Congressiona l Powe r t o Regulat e Suprem e Court Appellate Jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause," 900. 14. Ratner , "Majoritarian Constraint s on Judicial Review," 939. 15. Gunther , "Congressiona l Powe r t o Curtai l Federa l Cour t Jurisdiction, " 900. 16. Hart , "The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction o f Federal Courts," 1365. 17. Ratner , "Majoritarian Constraint s on Judicial Review," 934. 18. Ratner , "Congressiona l Powe r ove r th e Appellat e Jurisdictio n o f th e Su preme Court." 19. Redish , "Congressional Powe r to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause," 911. 20. Ratner , "Majoritarian Constraint s on Judicial Review," 957. 21. Berger , Congress v. the Supreme Court, 268 (emphasis in original). 22. Scholar s suc h a s Gar y McDowel l an d Marti n Redish , wh o argu e tha t th e state court s woul d b e availabl e t o protec t individua l an d minorit y right s even if the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction were withdrawn and the lower federal court s were abolished, fail to appreciate that one of principal reasons fo r enactin g th e Constitutio n wa s t o limi t th e infringement s o n individual an d minorit y right s occurrin g i n th e states . See chapte r 2 . But see McDowell, Curbing the Courts, 129-30; Redish, "Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction," 166. 23. Se e Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 24. Fo r example , Redish , "Congressiona l Powe r t o Regulat e Suprem e Cour t Appellate Jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause," 916. 25. Lette r fro m Attorne y Genera l Willia m Frenc h Smit h t o Senato r Stro m Thurmond, May 6,1982, quoted in Gunther, Individual Rights in Constitutional Law, 4 4 n. 4. 26. Quote d in Baucus and Kay, "The Supreme Court Stripping Bills," 1017. 27. Orfield , The Amending of the Federal Constitution, 1 . 28. Mos t o f th e scholarshi p o n constitutiona l amendment s focuse s o n th e content o f specifi c amendments , rathe r tha n o n th e amendin g proces s itself. There ar e a few notabl e exceptions . See, for example , Caplan, Constitutional Brinkmanship; Vile , Rewriting the United States Constitution*, Weber and Perry, Unfounded Fears. 29. J. W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, vol. 1,137. 30. Th e Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amend-

250 Note s to Chapter 4 ments, which, in eithe r Case , shall b e valid t o al l Intents an d Purposes , as Part of this Constitution , whe n ratifie d b y th e Legislature s o f thre e fourth s o f th e severa l States, or b y Convention i n three fourth s thereof , as the on e or the othe r Mod e of Ratification ma y be proposed b y the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be mad e prio r t o the Yea r One thousand eigh t hundred an d eigh t shall in any Manner affec t th e first and fourt h Clause s i n the Nint h Sectio n o f the first Article; and tha t no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage i n the Senate. (U.S. Constitution, art. 5) The provision tha t n o stat e ma y b e deprive d o f equal suffrag e i n the Senat e without it s consen t wa s a concessio n t o th e smal l states . Th e provisio n protecting th e institutio n o f slaver y unti l a t leas t 180 8 was a concessio n t o the slaveholdin g states . 31. Farrand , ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 1 , 203 (remark s o f George Mason) . 32. Se e generall y Jaffa , Crisis of the House Divided. Bu t se e Wills , Lincoln at Gettysburg. 33. Abraha m Lincoln , "Firs t Inaugura l Address, " March 4 , 1861 , in Letters and Addresses of Abraham Lincoln, 19 7 (emphasis supplied) . 34. Wit h hi s typica l overstatement , Patric k Henr y complaine d a t th e Virgini a ratifying conventio n tha t "t o suppos e tha t s o larg e a numbe r a s thre e fourths o f th e state s wil l concur , i s t o suppos e tha t the y wil l posses s genius, intelligence , an d integrity , approachin g t o miraculous. " Elliot , ed. , Debates in the Several State Conventions, vol . 3, 49. 35. Th e constitutionalit y o f th e twenty-sevent h amendment , whic h wa s ratifie d 203 years afte r i t wa s proposed , i s open t o seriou s questio n becaus e o f th e absence o f " a contemporaneou s consensus " fo r it s ratification . See , fo r example, Va n Alstyne , "Wha t D o Yo u Thin k abou t th e Twenty-Sevent h Amendment?" Se e generall y Dillon v. Gloss, 25 6 U.S . 368 , 374-7 6 (1921 ) (discussing th e contemporaneou s consensu s requirement—an d i n the con text o f th e origina l secon d [no w th e twenty-seventh ] amendment) . Th e twenty-seventh amendmen t require s a dela y i n congressiona l pa y rais e implementation unti l afte r a n election . 36. The Federalist no . 49, 314 (James Madison) . 37. Carter , "Constitutiona l Adjudicatio n an d th e Indeterminat e Text, " 843. 38. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 39. 6 0 U.S. (19 How.) 39 3 (1857). 40. 15 7 U.S. 429 (1895). 41. 40 0 U.S. 112(1970). 42. Murphy , "Constitutiona l Interpretation, " 1768-69 . 43. Murphy , "A n Ordering o f Constitutional Values, " 755-57. 44. The Federalist no . 78,465 (Alexander Hamilton) . 45. I n The Writings of George Washington, vol . 12, 226. 46. Annals of Congress, vol . 1 , 50 4 (remark s o f Rep . Elbridg e Gerry) . Se e also The Federalist no . 78 , 47 0 (Alexande r Hamilton ) (arguin g tha t th e Constitution i s "binding"—"unti l th e peopl e have , b y som e solemn and

Notes to Chapter 4 25 1 authoritative act, annulle d o r change d th e establishe d form " [emphasi s supplied]). 47. See , for example , Abraham, The Judicial Process, 42-48. Two other lower federal cour t judges resigne d befor e thei r impeachmen t processe s wer e completed. 48. Lette r from Thoma s Jefferson t o Judge Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol . 15 , 213; Letter fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o Joh n Taylor , Ma y 28 , 1816 , in ibid. , 21 ; Letter fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o Edward Livingston , March 25, 1825, in ibid., vol. 16, 114. For a modern statement of this view, see McDowell, Curbing the Courts, 10. 49. Agresto , The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy, 120. 50. Rehnquist , "The Impeachment Clause," 903-4. The two occasions to which Rehnquist refers ar e the impeachmen t proceedings against Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson. See generally Rehnquist, Grand Inquests. 51. Rehnquist , "The Impeachment Clause," 903-4. 52. Fo r example, Berger, Impeachment, 3-4,146-47 . 53. U.S . Constitution, art. 1, sec. 3. 54. Ibid. , art. 2, sec. 2. 55. Th e other questions include: Is impeachment the only constitutionally permissible mean s o f removin g federa l judges? Wha t procedure s ar e appro priate for impeachmen t proceedings ? I s it permissible t o impeach a judge who has already resigned? Is judicial review of impeachment permissible ? These questions have been exhaustivel y addresse d i n the literature on impeachment. 56. U.S . Constitution, art. 2, sec. 4. 57. See , for example , Farrand, ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 2, 68-69 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris). 58. Ibid. , 337, 550. 59. Ibid , (remarks of George Mason). 60. Ibid. , 550 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry). 61. Ibid , (remarks of James Madison). 62. Ibid , (remarks of George Mason). 63. See , for example, Abraham, The Judicial Process, 42-43 ; Berger, Impeachment, 70-71 ; Bestor, Review of Impeachment, b y Raoul Berger, 255; C. L. Black, Impeachment, 35 ; Feerick, "Impeachin g Federa l Judges, " 1 ; Gerhardt, "The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives," 101. 64. See , for example, Brant, Impeachment-, Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution, 87 . 65. Congressiona l Record , 116t h Cong. , 2 d sess. , 1970 , H3113-1 4 (dail y ed . April 15) (remarks of Rep. Gerald R. Ford). 66. Berger , Impeachment, 53 . 67. Charle s Blac k makes a n interestin g argumen t agains t Ford' s sweepin g claim based on the constitutional prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws:

252 Note s to Chapter 4 When a congressma n says , i n effect , tha t Congres s i s entirel y fre e t o trea t a s impeachable any conduct it desires so to treat, he (or she) is giving a good textbook definition o f a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law , rolled into one. Our Framers abhorred bot h of these things, and we have never wavered from tha t abhorrence. It cannot b e righ t fo r Congres s t o ac t towar d th e presiden t a s though thes e prohibi tions did not exist. There may be no way to keep Congress from violating their letter or spirit , bu t th e conscientiou s congressma n ha s t o fee l them , i n spiri t a t least , as boundin g an d confinin g th e operatio n o f th e vagu e words , "hig h Crime s an d Misdemeanors." (C. L. Black, Impeachment, 32 ) 68. The Federalist no . 79, 474 (Alexander Hamilton) . 69. Fo r example , Berger , Impeachment; Rotunda , "A n Essa y o n th e Constitu tional Parameters o f Federa l Impeachment, " 723. 70. Bestor , Review o f Impeachment, b y Raoul Berger , 263-64 . 71. Farrand , ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 2 , 55 0 (remark s o f George Mason) . 72. Ibid. , 337, 550 (remarks o f James Madison) . 73. Gerhardt , "Th e Constitutiona l Limit s to Impeachmen t an d It s Alternatives," 85. 74. The Federalist no . 65, 396 (Alexander Hamilton) . 75. Elliot , ed. , Debates in the Several State Conventions, vol . 4 , 11 3 (remark s of James Iredell) . 76. Ibid. , vol. 2,169 (remark s o f Samue l Stillman) . 77. I n McCloskey, ed. , The Works of James Wilson, vol . 1, 426. 78. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o Joseph H . Nicholson, May 13,1803 , in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol . 10, 390. 79. Chase' s attack s wer e peppere d wit h statement s abou t natural-right s politi cal philosophy . See , fo r example , Annals of Congress, vol . 14 , 673-7 6 ( a grand jury charg e entere d int o the record i n Chase's impeachmen t trial) . 80. Th e Englis h practice , from whic h th e Founder s dre w heavily , include d impeaching judges "fo r oppressive , unjust, o r irregula r practic e contrar y t o the obviou s rule s o f natura l justice. " Bacon' s Abridgment (1768) , 744 , quoted i n Berger, Impeachment, 66 . 81. Annals of Congress, vol . 1 , 504 (remarks o f Rep . Elbridge Gerry) . 82. Farrand , ed. , Records of the Federal Convention, vol . 2 , 55 0 (remark s o f George Mason) . 83. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferson t o Judge Spence r Roane , September 6 , 1819, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol . 15, 213. 84. Presiden t Jefferso n ma y hav e underestimate d th e effectivenes s o f hi s at tempted impeachmen t o f th e Federalist-dominate d judiciary . Chie f Justic e Marshall, t o nam e bu t th e mos t significan t example , curtaile d hi s interfer ence with presidential and congressiona l polic y choices after Jefferson's at tempts. 85. Unpublishe d Opinio n o f Justic e Hug o Blac k (1966) , i n Schwartz , The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court, 274-75 . 86. The Federalist no . 81,485 (Alexander Hamilton) . Hamilton wa s respondin g

Notes to Chapter 4 25 3 to Robert Yates's charge that usurpations o f power by the Supreme Cour t would g o unchecked . Se e Brutus , Essa y 1 5 (1788) , i n Ketcham , ed. , The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates, 304-9. 87. See , for example, Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy, 120 ; Rehnquist, "The Impeachment Clause," 903-4. 88. C . L. Black, Impeachment, 1 . 89. Se e Maxman, "In Defense of the Constitution's Judicial Impeachment Standard," 42 3 ("Th e impeachmen t provision s wer e designed t o b e cumber some, in order to protect judicial decisionmaking autonomy. To the Framers, mandating an intricate process for removal of federal judges seemed a small pric e t o pa y t o ensur e th e America n peopl e a n independen t judi ciary") [emphasis in original]. 90. Quote d in Lash, From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter, 11 3 n. 3. 91. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 31 9 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). 92. Se e Abraham , "Reflection s o n ou r Endurin g an d Evolvin g Constitution, " 330. 93. Cardozo , The Nature of the Judicial Process, 168 . 94. Quote d i n Abraham, "Reflection s o n our Enduring an d Evolvin g Constitu tion," 332. 95. Ibid. , 333 (emphasis in original). 96. Ove r th e years , th e Cour t ha s itsel f develope d "sixtee n grea t maxim s o f judicial self-restraint." Abraham, The Judicial Process, 348. These maxims, or wha t Alexande r Bicke l terme d th e "passiv e virtues " (se e Bickel , The Least Dangerous Branch, titl e o f chapter 4) , are wel l chronicled i n Abraham, The Judicial Process, 347-73 . The y are : (1 ) a definit e "case " o r "controversy," (2) "standing, " (3) no advisory opinions, (4) a live constitutional issue citin g a specific provisio n o f the Constitution , (5) a petitione r who has not sought the benefit o f the action he is challenging, (6) exhaustion o f lowe r cour t remedies , (7 ) a substantial , pivotal , an d affirmativ e federal question , (8 ) a legal , a s oppose d t o factual , basi s fo r appeal , (9 ) adherence t o precedent (thoug h no t absolute), (10) a question no t "political" in nature, (11) a general presumption of the challenged statute's constitutionality (subjec t t o th e Carotene Products footnot e 4 exception), (12 ) the avoidance, if possible, of deciding on the basis of federal constitutiona l law, (13) an unwillingness to impute illegal motives to the lawmakers, (14) limiting, a s muc h a s possible , an y finding o f unconstitutionality , (15 ) a general deferenc e t o legislativ e decisions , an d (16 ) a n unwillingnes s t o serve as a check o n an unwise or incompetent, yet constitutional, political judgment. These maxim s have themselves been manipulate d b y the Cour t for result-oriente d reasons . Gar y McDowel l call s fo r a mor e principle d application of the maxims. See McDowell, Curbing the Courts. 97. Fo r a thoughtfu l critiqu e o f a hos t o f leadin g work s o n constitutiona l interpretation, see Barber, The Constitution of Judicial Power.

254 Note s t o Chapte r 4 98. Thayer , "Th e Origi n an d Scop e o f th e America n Doctrin e o f Constitu tional Review." 99. Quote d in Abraham, "The Judicial Function under the Constitution," 13. 100. Se e Gabin, Judicial Review and the Reasonable Doubt Test. 101. Thayer , "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Review," 143-44. 102. On e commentator goe s so far a s t o say that "i f conscientiously followe d [Thayer's test ] mean s th e en d o f judicial review. " Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution, 191 . 103. Ely , Democracy and Distrust. 104. Miller , Toward Increased Judicial Activism, 9 . 105. See , fo r example , Bonner , Battle for Justice; Bork , The Tempting of America, 267-349 ; Phelps and Winternitz , Capitol Games; Simon, Advice and Consent. Th e Bor k an d Thoma s confirmatio n battle s als o inspire d countless articles. See, for example, "Confirmation Controversy" ; "Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments." 106. Abraham, Preface, 2. 107. Se e generally Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate, 17-35. 108. Fo r example, John Rutledg e stated that he was not "disposed to grant so great a powe r t o an y singl e person . Th e peopl e wil l thin k tha t w e ar e leaning too much towards Monarchy." Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 1, 119. 109. James Wilson's remarks are representative. He "opposed the appointment of Judges b y th e nationa l Legisl : Experience shewe d th e impropriet y o f such appointmts . b y numerou s bodies . Intrigue , partiality , an d conceal ment wer e th e necessar y consequences . A principal reaso n fo r unit y i n the Executive wa s that officer s migh t be appointed b y a single, responsible person." Ibid. 110. See , for example , ibid., vol. 2, 41-43 (remark s o f Nathaniel Gorha m an d James Madison) . Hamilto n wa s actuall y th e firs t delegat e t o propos e giving both the executive and the Senate roles in the appointment process, although th e proposa l receive d n o consideration whe n he offere d it . See ibid., vol. 1,128. 111. Se e Friedlander, "Judicial Selection and the Constitution," 9. 112. The Federalist no. 76, 457 (Alexander Hamilton). 113. [Melancto n Smith], "Letters of a Federal Farmer: III," October 10 , 1787, in Ford, ed., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, 298. 114. Elliot , ed., Debates in the Several State Conventions, vol. 4, 116 (remarks of Samuel Spencer). 115. Leahy , "Reflections o n Federal Judicial Selection." 116. Hatch , "The Politics of Picking Judges." 117. C . L. Black, "A Note on Senatorial Consideratio n o f Supreme Court Nominees," 661 (emphasis i n original). The fact tha t the Convention seriousl y considered creatin g an advisory council to assist the president in making nominations provide s additiona l suppor t fo r Black' s readin g o f th e

Notes to Chapter 4 25 5 Convention debates . Se e als o Monaghan , "Th e Confirmatio n Process, " 1204: Nothing in the language of the appointments clause, in its origins, or in the actual history of the appointment process supports a constitutionally base d presidential "right" to mold an independent branch of government for a period extending long beyond his electoral mandate. Rather (and to my surprise), all the relevant historical and textual sources support the Senate's power when and if it sees fit to assert its vision of the public good against that of the President. 118. Here , practic e conform s t o theory . Henr y Abraha m capture s th e point : "The Senate's rol e i s second ; but i t is no t secondary , a s the recor d ampl y demonstrates." Abraham , Preface , 1 . The Senat e ha s refuse d t o consen t to 2 8 o f th e 14 8 presidentia l nomination s t o th e Suprem e Cour t (a s o f July 1994) . 119. Abraham , Justices and Presidents, 5 . See als o O'Brien, Judicial Roulette, 49 (referring t o "politica l patronage, professional qualifications , an d legalpolicy goals"). 120. Abraham , Justices and Presidents, 39 . 121. Se e O'Brien , Judicial Roulette, 9 5 ("I t i s th e swin g o f electora l politic s that largel y determine s wh o make s i t t o th e federa l bench") . Presiden t Franklin Roosevelt's ill-fate d 193 7 "court packing" plan is a notable exam ple of the politics that have plagued the appointment process. 122. Lette r fro m Jame s Madiso n t o Mr . , 1834 , i n Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, vol . 4, 350. 123. Lette r fro m Thoma s Jefferso n t o James Madison , Marc h 15 , 1789 , i n The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 438 . 124. Abraham , Justices and Presidents, 25-26 . 125. The Federalist no . 66,405 (Alexander Hamilton). See als o Monaghan, "The Confirmation Process, " 120 5 (observin g tha t th e "goa l o f th e [advic e an d consent] provision was clearly to help secure meritoriou s appointees") . 126. See , for example, O'Brien, Judicial Roulette, 98 . 127. Abraham , Preface , 4-5 . Se e als o Goldman , "Judicia l Selectio n an d th e Qualities That Make a 'Good' Judge," 113-14. 128. Frankfurter , "Th e Supreme Cour t in the Mirror of Justices," 795. 129. Quote d in Abraham, The Judicial Process, 58-59 . 130. Fo r example , Tribe , God Save This Honorable Court, 9 2 ("Th e simpl e truth [is] that the upper house o f Congress has been scrutinizing Suprem e Court nominees an d rejecting the m on the basis of their political, judicial, and economi c philosophie s eve r sinc e Georg e Washingto n wa s Presi dent"). Bu t se e Danelski , "Ideolog y a s a Groun d fo r th e Rejectio n o f th e Bork Nomination" (questioning much of Tribe's evidence). 131. Fein , " A Circumscribed Senat e Confirmatio n Role, " 673. See als o Carter , "The Confirmation Mess, " 1196-97: A reflective Senat e woul d refus e t o speculat e abou t a potential nominee' s likel y votes, and would eschew an y inquiry into judicial philosophy, not merely because

256 Note s to Chapter 5 the bod y migh t be institutionall y incapabl e o f evaluatin g a nominee's philosophy , but also because the long-term interest of the American people requires what, at a deep level, most Americans probably wan t o r believe that they have: an indepen dent judiciary. 132. Bork , The Tempting of America, 347-48 . Bor k ha s apparentl y change d his min d (becaus e a Democra t i s i n th e Whit e House?) . Se e Bork , "Th e Senate's Powe r Grab. " 133. Berger , "Academ e vs . the Foundin g Fathers, " 471. 134. C . L. Black, " A Note o n Senatoria l Consideratio n o f Suprem e Cour t Nom inees," 663-64. 135. Se e Abraham, Justices and Presidents, 24-48 . 136. O'Brien , Judicial Roulette, 50,58-60 . 137. Davi d Straus s an d Cas s Sunstei n argu e tha t th e Whit e Hous e an d th e Senate shoul d discus s potentia l nominee s before th e presiden t make s hi s choice. The author s clai m tha t this prenomination consultatio n i s require d by th e "advice " componen t o f th e Senate' s "advic e an d consent " role . See D . A . Straus s an d Sunstein , "Th e Senate , th e Constitution , an d th e Confirmation Process. " 138. Abraham , "Th e Judicia l Functio n unde r th e Constitution, " 1 2 (emphasi s in original) . 139. See , for example , O'Brien, Judicial Roulette, 35-38 . 140. Se e Abraham, Justices and Presidents, 5,204-7 .

Notes t o Chapte r 5 1. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 399 (1798) (Iredell , J.). 2. Bork , "Th e Struggl e ove r th e Rol e o f th e Court, " 1138 . Se e als o Bork , "Natural La w an d th e Constitution. " 3. See , for example , Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 5 0 ("Natural la w has bee n summoned i n suppor t o f al l manne r o f cause s i n thi s country—som e worthy, other s nefarious—an d ofte n o n bot h side s o f the same issue") . 4. Th e Introductio n describe d ho w th e vas t majorit y o f conservativ e propo nents o f origina l inten t maintai n tha t th e Founders ' view s o n specifi c rights ar e binding, no t merel y suggestive . However , a s I argue d i n th e Introduction, originalis m shoul d no t b e s o constrained . Th e Founder s rejected th e notio n tha t futur e generation s shoul d adher e t o thei r inten tions o n specifi c rights . Se e Levy , Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution, 1-29,284-321 ; Powell, "The Original Understanding o f Original Intent. " 5. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 54 . Se e generall y Diamond , "Th e America n Idea o f Equality," in As Far as Republican Principles Will Admit, 241-57 . In a provocative boo k o n equality an d the Constitution , Judith Baer—wh o characterizes hersel f a s a "bleeding-hear t liberal"—argue s tha t equality , under bot h th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e an d th e Constitution , i s "not

Notes to Chapter 5 25 7 a notio n abou t capacities o r abilities, but a notion o f entitlement" Baer , Equality under the Constitution, 10 , 253 (emphasis supplied i n part). As the discussion s i n this chapte r an d i n part 1 suggest, I disagree strongl y with Baer' s egalitaria n interpretatio n o f th e politica l philosoph y o f th e American regime. Simply stated, the political philosophy o f the American regime is Lockean liberalism, not Rawlsian or Dworkinian egalitarianism. I have mor e t o sa y abou t the difference s betwee n Lockea n liberalis m and egalitarianism throughout this chapter. 6. Myrdal , An American Dilemma. 7. Lock e also participated in the slave trade in various ways, a personal lapse that is inconsistent with the concept of equality embodied in his teachings. See Glausser, "Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade." 8. Jefferson' s origina l draft of the Declaration o f Independence include d the following grievance against the king: He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life & liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. ... Determine d to keep open a market whereME N should b e bough t & sold, he has prostituted hi s negative fo r suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce. (In The Papers of Ttwmas Jefferson, vol. 1,426) 9. Se e Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 1 , 135 (remarks of James Madison), 588 (remarks of Gouverneu r Morris) , vol. 2, 220 (remarks of Roge r Sherman), 221 (remark s o f Gouverneu r Morris), 364 (remarks of Luther Martin), 370 (remarks of George Mason), 371 (remarks of Oliver Ellsworth), 372 (remarks of John Dickinson), 415 (remarks of James Madison and Hugh Williamson), 417 (remarks of James Madison). 10. "Neithe r slaver y no r involuntar y servitude , excep t a s a punishmen t fo r crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. Constitution, amend. 13, sec. 1. Slavery is recognized in three places in the original Constitution, though the words "slavery" and "slaves" are never used. For purposes o f taxatio n an d representation i n the House o f Representative s Article 1 , section 2 , counted "thre e fifths of al l othe r [nonfree ] Persons." Article 1 , section 9, permitted the "Migration or Importation of such [nonfree J Persons" until a t leas t 1808 , an d Articl e 4 , sectio n 2 , required , o n demand of the owner, the return of fugitive slaves. 11. Marshall , "Slavery, Civil Rights, and the Constitution," 304. 12. 6 0 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 13. Hughes , The Supreme Court of the United States, 50. 14. I n The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 215 . 15. 6 0 U.S. (19 How.), 410,407-8. 16. Th e essential tenet of the Confederate State s of America was that slavery was not contrary to natural law. Alexander Stephens, the vice president of

258 Note s to Chapter 5 the Confederacy , acknowledge d ho w differen t thi s belie f wa s fro m th e political philosophy o f the American Founding , but he argue d th e Founder s were mistaken . In Stephens's words : The prevailing ideas entertained b y ... most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formatio n o f the ol d Constitution , were that the enslavemen t o f the Africa n was i n violatio n o f th e law s o f nature ; tha t i t wa s wron g i n principle , socially , morally, an d politically . .. . Thos e idea s wer e fundamentall y wrong . The y reste d upon th e assumption o f the equalit y o f the races. This was an error. (Alexander H. Stephens, Th e Cornerston e Speech , Marc h 21 , 1861 , in Cleveland , Alexander H. Stephens in Public and Private, 721-23) 17. Abraha m Lincoln , Speec h o n th e Dre d Scot t Decision , Jun e 26 , 1857 , i n Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, vol . 1 , 398 (emphasi s supplie d in bold face) . 18. Th e classi c accoun t o f thi s America n syste m o f aparthei d i s C . V. Wood ward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow. 19. 16 3 U.S. 537 (1896). 20. 9 5 U.S. 485 (1878). 21. 10 9 U.S. 3 (1883). 22. Strauder v. West Virginia, 10 0 U.S . 30 3 (1880) , wa s a n exceptio n t o th e Supreme Court' s otherwis e poo r recor d i n rac e cases . I n Strauder, th e Court struc k dow n a state la w that exclude d Black s from juries. 23. 16 3 U.S., 551, 544. 24. Ibid. , 562, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) . 25. 34 7 U.S. 483 (1954). 26. Here , i t i s necessar y t o rejec t Jefferson' s clai m tha t Black s ar e mentall y inferior t o Whites . Se e Thoma s Jefferson , Notes on the State of Virginia (1782), in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 188 . Again w e se e th e shortcom ings o f "stric t originalism, " o r bindin g moder n American s t o th e Founders ' specific conclusio n abou t a n issue , as compare d t o "moderat e originalism, " or applyin g a principle—i n thi s case , equality—t o whic h the y dedicate d the nation . 27. Wasserstrom , "Racism , Sexism, and Preferentia l Treatment, " 592. 28. Th e fourteent h amendmen t applie s t o th e stat e governments , an d th e fifth amendment applie s t o th e nationa l government . Th e implici t equa l protec tion guarante e i n th e du e proces s claus e o f th e fifth amendmen t wa s recognized i n Boiling v. Sharpe, 34 7 U.S. 497 (1954). 29. Se e Berger, Government by Judiciary, 166-92 . 30. See , fo r example , In re Griffiths, 41 3 U.S . 717 , 72 9 (1973 ) (Rehnquist , J., dissenting) . 31. See , fo r example , Baer , Equality under the Constitution; Graham , Everyman's Constitution; Kelly , "The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered" ; ten Broek , Equal under Law. Se e als o Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 25 5 ("Wherea s th e equa l protectio n claus e i s a rela tively lat e additio n t o ou r constitutiona l history , the underlyin g mora l idea l

Notes to Chapter 5 25 9 of th e equalit y o f person s i s not. This is evident... i n the solem n aspira tions o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence") . See generally Richards , Conscience and the Constitution. 32. Se e Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment. 33. Bickel , "The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision/' 61. See also Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 98-110. 34. Tha t the Founders, as well as the members of the Reconstruction Congress, personally though t littl e o f women' s abilitie s i s beyon d dispute . A letter written by John Adams contemporaneous to the drafting of the Declaration of Independence i s illustrative. Adams wrote, "Nature has mad e [women ] fittest fo r domesti c cares " and unfitte d the m fo r "th e grea t businesse s o f life, and the hardy enterprises of war, as well as the arduous cares of state." Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan , May 26, 1776, in The Works of John Adams, vol . 9, 376. As noted earlier , the purpose of this chapter is to apply, in a principled manner, the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence t o issues of constitutional-right s aajudication , no t to parro t the Founders' views on the results to which that application leads. 35. Unti l recently , th e Suprem e Court' s recor d o n sex discriminatio n wa s terrible. While racial discriminatio n existe d largel y because White s hate d Blacks, se x discriminatio n resulte d principall y becaus e me n wante d t o protect women . Justic e Davi d Brewer' s opinio n fo r th e Cour t i n a 190 8 case upholding a state statute limiting female worker s in certain industrie s to a ten-hour work day was typical. According to Justice Brewer: The two sexe s diffe r i n structur e o f body , i n th e function s t o b e performed b y each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued labor, particularly when done standing, .. . the self-reliance whic h enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a differenc e i n legislatio n an d uphold s tha t whic h i s designe d t o compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her. (Muller v. Oregon, 20 8 U.S. 412 [1908]) In th e 1970 s the Cour t bega n t o view sex discriminatio n differently . See , for example, Reed v. Reed, 40 4 U.S. 71 (1971) (declaring unconstitutional a state statute that gave men preference ove r women in administering decedents' estates); Frontiero v. Richardson, 41 1 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down a federal la w under which male military officers automaticall y qualified fo r benefits fo r their wives, while female officer s coul d obtai n the same benefits only if they proved that their husbands were dependent upon them fo r support); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating a state law that prohibited th e sal e o f 3.2 percent bee r t o male s unde r th e ag e o f twenty one, but to females only under eighteen). As cases like Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (a case in which the Court upheld the Military Selective Service Act' s authorizatio n fo r th e presiden t t o requir e males , bu t no t females, t o register fo r potential militar y service) , illustrate, however, th e Court still has a long way to go to satisfy the Declaration of Independence's concept of equality.

260 Note s to Chapter 5 36. Se e Thoma s I . Emerson, Remark s t o th e Senat e Judiciar y Committe e o n the Equa l Right s Amendment , Octobe r 9 , 1970 , quote d i n Murray , "Th e Rights of Women," 542. 37. Sectio n 1 of the proposed equa l rights amendment provided that "Equalit y of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." Quoted in O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, vol . 2,1423. 38. Se e Baer, Equality under the Constitution, 153 . 39. 42 7 U.S. 307 (1976). 40. 44 0 U.S. 93 (1979). 41. 42 7 U.S., 313 (maintaining that the state police officers wer e not "subjecte d to unique disabilitie s o n th e basi s o f stereotype d characteristic s no t trul y indicative of their abilities"). 42. 38 7 U.S. 1,17 (1967). 43. Fo r an excellent discussion o f the rights of children in Locke's theory, see Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, 192-204 . 44. Ibid. , 202. 45. Locke , Second Treatise, sec. 63. 46. 40 6 U.S. 205 (1972). 47. Ibid. , 241, 244-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 48. See , for example , Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 43 8 U.S. 265 (1978). 49. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,47 6 U.S. 267,280 (1986). 50. Se e Be Funis v. Odegaard, 50 7 P.2 d 1169 , 118 9 (1973 ) (Hale , CJ. , dis senting) (raising—an d rejecting—thi s puzzlin g scenario) . Se e generall y Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (demonstrating , a s a matte r o f lega l history, that the Constitution was intended to be color-blind). 51. See , for example , Bickel, The Morality of Consent, 132-33 ; Newton, "Reverse Discrimination as Unjustified"; Wortham , The Other Side of Racism. 52. Baer , Equality under the Constitution, 131-53 . See als o Dworkin , "Why Bakke Ha s N o Case" ; Wasserstrom , "Racism , Sexism , an d Preferentia l Treatment," 586. 53. See , for example , Thomas, "The Higher Law Background o f the Privilege s or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"; Thomas, "Toward a 'Plain Reading ' o f th e Constitution. " Se e generall y Gerber , "Th e Jurispru dence of Clarence Thomas." 54. Thomas , "Affirmativ e Actio n Goal s an d Timetables, " 40 3 n . 3 . Se e als o Carter, Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (contendin g tha t clas s preferences ar e demeanin g t o Blacks, lower standards, and ro b Black s of the incentive to achieve excellence); Murray, "Affirmative Racism " (arguing that preferential treatmen t has created a "new racism"). 55. Fo r instance, the NAACP took the highly unusual step of opposing a Black nominee to the federal bench and opposed Justice Thomas's nomination to the Supreme Court because the group considered Thomas's record on civil rights t o b e "reactionary. " Statemen t b y Dr . William F . Gibson, Press Re-

Notes to Chapter 5 26 1 lease no. 91-125, Chairman, The National Board of Directors of the NAACP on the Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to the U.S. Supreme Court (July 31,1991). See also Higginbotham, "An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas" (a letter from a respected, senior, Black federal judge criticizing Thomas's record on civil rights). 56. Thomas , "Civil Rights as a Principle versus Civil Rights as an Interest," 392 (emphasis i n original) . Se e als o Thomas , "Affirmativ e Actio n Goal s an d Timetables," 403 n. 3 (arguing that class preferences "ar e an affront to the rights and dignity of individuals"). Although I agree with Justice Thomas's reading o f th e Declaratio n o f Independenc e o n preferentia l treatment , I disagree wit h hi s approac h t o man y other importan t issues . Se e Gerber , "The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas," 109-29. 57. Se e Harrington, The Other America. 58. Johnson , "To Fulfill These Rights," 254. 59. Locke , Second Treatise, sees. 54,42. 60. Ibid. , sees. 7,16,134,135,149,159,171,183 . 61. Ibid. , sec. 6. 62. Th e Founders did not consider the death penalty to be cruel and unusual punishment, as the prevalenc e o f executions durin g the Foundin g plainly shows. As in the discussio n o f equality , however, I am concerned i n this section wit h applyin g a principl e t o whic h th e Founder s dedicate d ou r nation—here, life—no t wit h how the y personally fel t abou t capita l punishment. 63. "N o person shal l b e .. . twic e pu t i n jeopardy o f lif e o r limb , .. . no r be deprived of life .. . withou t due process of law." U.S. Constitution, amend. 5. "No state shall... depriv e any person of life .. . withou t due process of law." U.S. Constitution, amend. 14. 64. Trop v. Dulles, 35 6 U.S. 86,101 (1958) (emphasis supplied). 65. Wolfe , The Rise of Modern Judicial Review, 376 n. 46. 66. 42 8 U.S. 153 (1976). 67. Ibid. , 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 68. Th e Rehnquist Court has reaffirmed th e constitutionality of the death penalty. See, for example, Tison v. Arizona, 48 1 U.S. 137 (1987). 69. Locke , Second Treatise, sec. 16. 70. Ibid. , sec. 6. 71. See , for example, Brennan, "The Constitution of the United States," 173 . 72. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 48 7 U.S. 815 (1988) (declaring as unconstitutional under the eight h amendmen t th e impositio n o f th e deat h penalt y t o on e fifteen year s old or younger at the time of his crime); Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, 10 9 S.Ct . 296 9 (1989 ) (holdin g tha t th e deat h penalty may be imposed on those who are sixteen years or older). 73. I n a dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, Justic e Scalia criticized the Cour t for holding tha t a killer under sixteen ca n never b e sentence d to death , n o matte r wha t hi s "individua l .. . leve l o f maturit y an d moral responsibility." 487 U.S. , 859 (Scalia , J., dissenting) . Late r in his opinion,

262 N o t e

s t o Chapte r 5

Justice Scali a revealed tha t eve n h e accepte d th e Court' s argument tha t "a t some ag e a lin e doe s e x i s t . . . belo w whic h a juvenile ca n never b e consid ered full y responsibl e fo r murder. " Ibid., 872 (emphasis i n original) . 74. See , for example , Lockett v. Ohio, 43 8 U.S. 586 (1978); Bell v. Ohio, 43 8 U.S. 637 (1978). 75. Penry v. Lynaugh, Ibid. , 293 4 (1989 ) (permittin g th e impositio n o f th e death penalt y o n a mentall y impaire d convicte d murderer , a s lon g a s a n individualized determinatio n o f whethe r th e deat h penalt y i s appropriat e was conducted) . In a separate opinion , Justice Brenna n argue d fo r a gener alization tha t all mentall y impaire d person s lac k sufficien t blameworthi ness t o b e pu t t o death . Ibid. , 296 1 (Brennan , J. , concurrin g i n par t an d dissenting i n part). 76. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 6. 77. 11 0 S.Ct. 284 1 (1990). 78. Ronal d Dworki n provide s a useful—an d provocative—discussio n o f th e traditional philosophica l position s surroundin g th e righ t t o die , includin g the Lockea n libera l positio n (though , a s I wil l show , b y maintainin g tha t Lockean liberalis m oppose s th e righ t t o die , Dworkin misread s tha t philos ophy). See Dworkin , Life's Dominion, 179-217 . 79. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 6. 80. Scholar s disagre e o n whethe r Lock e sometime s permit s suicide . Thos e arguing i n th e affirmativ e includ e Siby l Schwarzenbac h an d Georg e Windstrup. Se e Schwarzenbach , "Locke' s Tw o Conception s o f Property, " 144-45; Windstrup , "Lock e o n Suicide. " Representativ e opposin g views , emphasizing th e theologica l basi s o f Locke' s thought , ar e offere d b y Joh n Dunn and Ronal d Dworkin . See Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, 125; Dworkin , Life's Dominion, 195 . Simmons's positio n i s mor e difficul t to discern . O n th e on e hand , h e state s unequivocall y tha t h e "ca n find n o textual warran t fo r claimin g tha t [Locke ] does allo w [suicide]. " Simmons , The Lockean Theory of Rights, 6 2 n . 12 0 (emphasi s i n original) . O n th e other hand , h e the n proceed s t o articulat e bot h textua l an d philosophica l reasons fo r concludin g tha t Lock e should allo w fo r suicide . Se e ibid. , 61-63. 81. Windstru p argue s tha t Locke' s statemen t seemingl y forbiddin g suicid e un der al l circumstance s i s simpl y a rhetorica l devic e t o justify hi s theor y o f revolution, th e expositio n o f whic h i s th e chie f purpos e o f th e Second Treatise. Windstrup , "Lock e o n Suicide, " 176 . Th e rhetorica l connectio n between a prohibitio n o n suicid e an d th e righ t o f revolutio n i s that peopl e are entitle d t o resis t arbitrar y powe r becaus e o f th e threa t suc h powe r i s to their lives . 82. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 6. 83. Ibid. , sec. 23. 84. Simmons , The Lockean Theory of Rights, 63 . 85. 41 0 U.S. 113(1973). 86. O'Brien , Constitutional Law and Politics, vol . 2,1158.

Notes to Chapter 5 26 3 87. Compar e Justic e Sandr a Da y O'Connor' s dissentin g opinio n i n Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 46 2 U.S. 416, 458 (1983), in whic h she argue d against the trimester approach becaus e the Roe framework .. . i s clearly on a collision cours e with itself. As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease , th e point at which th e State may regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved forward to actual childbirth. As medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence o f the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward conception. 88. See , fo r example , Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 42 8 U.S . 55 2 (1976 ) (holding tha t governmen t ma y no t giv e a vet o ove r a woman' s abortio n decision to the man who shares responsibility fo r the pregnancy or, in the case o f a woma n belo w th e ag e o f majority , t o th e youn g woman' s par ents); Maher v. Doe, 43 2 U.S . 46 4 (1977 ) (upholdin g a stat e statut e tha t refused t o reimburs e Medicai d recipient s fo r abortio n expense s unles s the attendin g physicia n certifie d tha t an abortion i s medically necessary) ; Harris v. McRae, 44 8 U.S . 29 7 (1980 ) (upholdin g a federa l statut e tha t limited federa l fundin g fo r nontherapeuti c abortions) ; Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 46 2 U.S. 416 (1983) (holdin g that statute s requiring parenta l consen t mus t provid e fo r alternativ e approva l b y a judge fo r a mino r wh o i s matur e enoug h t o mak e th e abortio n decisio n herself or who has a good reason for not seeking parental consent) . 89. 10 9 S.Ct. 3040 (1989). 90. 11 2 S.Ct. 2791, 2804, 2820 (1992). 91. Northern Securities Company v. United States, 19 3 U.S. 197 , 400 (1904 ) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Many scholars mistakenly attribut e authorshi p o f the phras e "har d case " t o Ronal d Dworkin . See , fo r example , Hirsch , A Theory of Liberty, 24 3 n . 10 . Dworkin doe s us e th e phrase , but i t did no t originate wit h him . See, fo r example , Dworkin , Taking Rights Seriously, 81-130. 92. 41 0 U.S., 159. 93. Tribe , Abortion. 94. Locke , Second Treatise, sec . 1 6 (emphasis supplied) . 95. Lehrman , "The Declaration o f Independence an d the Right to Life." 96. See , fo r example , Gerber , "Th e Jurisprudence o f Clarenc e Thomas, " 118— 19. 97. Lehrman , "The Declaration of Independence an d the Right to Life," 22-23. 98. Ibid. , 22. 99. See , fo r example , Thoma s Jefferson, Bil l fo r Establishin g Religiou s Free dom, i n The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 251-53 ; James Madison , Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, i n The Writings of James Madison, vol . 2 , 183-91 ; Locke, A Letter on Toleration, 65 . Se e also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 10 9 S.Ct., 3070 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguin g that a state abortio n statute declarin g that life begin s at conception violate s the establishment claus e o f the first amendment).

264 Note s to Chapte r 5 100. Compar e Gardner, "Is an Embryo a Person?" 557 (arguing that an embryo is not a life) wit h John Willke, "Did You Know?" (arguing that an embryo is a life). 101. Dunn , "Justice and the Interpretation o f Locke's Political Theory," 73, 81. 102. Se e Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 221 , 225-66; L . Strauss , Natural Right and History, 243 , 247-48 . Se e als o Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 143-44,161 , 306-7. 103. Locke , Two Treatises of Government, First Treatise, sec . 42 (emphasi s in original). 104. Locke , Second Treatise, sees. 6, 70. See also sees. 5, 93. 105. John Locke, "Venditio" (1695), quoted in Dunn, "Justice and the Interpretation of Locke's Political Theory," 74. Locke's other works likewise recognize a right to and a duty of charity. See Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, 32 8 (discussing, in addition to the works I have described, Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature, Essay concerning Toleration, an d Some Thoughts concerning Education). 106. See , for example, Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State, 31-46. 107. 39 4 U.S. 618, 638, 627 (1969). 108. 39 7 U.S. 254 (1970). 109. 48 9 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). See also Youngsberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) ("A s a genera l matter , a Stat e i s unde r n o constitutiona l dut y t o provide substantiv e service s fo r thos e withi n it s border") ; Harris v. McRae, 44 8 U.S. 297,317-18 (1980) ("Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Claus e afford s protectio n agains t unwarrante d government interference ... , it does not confer entitlemen t to such [governmental aid] as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom" [emphasis in original]); Lindsey v. Norment, 40 5 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding that there is no government obligation to provide adequate housing). 110. See , fo r example , R . A. Epstein , Takings, 306-2 9 (maintainin g tha t all public transfer an d welfare program s are illegitimate, both as a matter of constitutional la w and as a matter o f political theory, including those fo r the poor and the needy); Thomas, "Civil Rights as a Principle versus Civil Rights as an Interest," 399 (arguing that if the Supreme Court determined there was a "right to welfare" in the ninth amendment, such a determination would be an illegitimate "discover[y]"). 111. See , for example , Locke , Two Treatises of Government, First Treatise, sec. 42 (statin g tha t a n individua l i s entitle d t o relie f onl y i f h e ha s "n o means t o subsis t otherwise") . I note d earlie r tha t i t i s no t necessar y t o adhere t o th e Founders ' conclusion s abou t ho w a principl e shoul d b e applied i n a give n situation . I t i s als o no t necessar y t o follo w Locke' s personal positio n o n issues , includin g o n charity . Locke' s well-know n proposal fo r th e Boar d o f Trad e o n th e refor m o f th e Poo r Law s wa s excessively harsh . I n hi s proposa l Lock e required , amon g othe r things , that childre n a s young a s thre e b e separate d from thei r mother s s o th e mothers could work.

Notes to Chapter 5 26 5 112. 11 6 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 113. Warre n and Brandeis, "The Right of Privacy," 205. 114. Se e generall y O'Brien , Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, 35-17 6 (dis cussing cases involving the first,fourth, and fifth amendments). 115. 38 1 U.S. 479 (1965). 116. Ibid. , 484 . Justice Dougla s reference d th e first, third, fourth , fifth, and ninth amendments. 117. Stron g evidenc e exist s tha t Justic e Brenna n devise d th e theor y upo n which Justice Douglas' s opinion wa s based. See O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, vol . 2 , 307- 8 (discussin g a n interna l memorandu m written by Justice Brennan to Justice Douglas). 118. Se e 38 1 U.S. , 507-2 7 (Black , J. , dissenting) , 527-3 1 (Stewart , J. , dis senting). Justice Black later expanded on his Griswold dissent, remarking that "even though I like my privacy as well as the next one, I am nevertheless compelle d t o admi t tha t governmen t ha s a righ t t o invad e i t .. . [because I can] find in the Constitution no language which either specifically o r impliedl y grant s t o al l individual s a constitutiona l righ t o f privacy." H. L. Black, A Constitutional Faith, 9. 119. Bork , 77&e Tempting of America,99. 120. Justice Stewar t wa s especiall y critica l o f Justice Goldberg' s concurrin g opinion. According to Justice Stewart, Justice Goldberg's use of the ninth amendment "turn s somersaults wit h history. " 391 U.S. , 529 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 121. Ibid. , 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 122. O'Brien , Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, 182-83. 123. Bork , "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," 8. 124. Lette r from John Locke to Denis Grenville, quoted in Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, 53. 125. Conservative s lik e Bor k ar e no t th e onl y moder n commentator s wh o reject the notion that there is a general right of privacy in the Constitution. Dworkin, on e o f th e grea t libera l theorist s o f th e secon d hal f o f th e twentieth century, argues that the general right possessed by all individuals is to equal concern and respect, from which particular rights, including privacy, may be inferred. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, chap. 12 . 126. Olmstead v. United States, 27 7 U.S . 438, 47 8 (1928 ) (Brandeis , J., dis senting). Of course, the right to be let alone continues only so long as an individual is not violating the rights of others. See chapter 1. The evocative phrase th e "righ t t o b e le t alone " cam e fro m nineteenth-centur y tort s commentator Judge Thomas Cooley. See Cooley, Law of Torts, 29 . Cooley likely derived the phrase from the Anglo-American adage "a man's home is his castle." 127. 27 7 U.S., 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 128. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 129. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 130. Zablocki v. Redhml, 43 4 U.S. 374 (1978).

266 Note s to Chapter 5 131. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 43 1 U.S. 494 (1977). 132. Stanley v. Illinois, 40 5 U.S . 64 5 (1972) ; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S . 205 (1972). 133. Roe v. Wade, 41 0 U.S. 113 (1973). 134. Th e statut e als o mad e heterosexua l sodom y illegal . The Cour t ignore d that aspect of the statute. 135. 47 8 U.S. 186,192-94 (1986) (citations omitted). 136. Th e penalt y fo r a ma n wa s castration . Th e penalt y fo r a woma n wa s "cutting throug h th e cartilag e o f he r nos e a hol e o f on e hal f inc h i n diameter a t the least." Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Proportioning Crime s and Punishment s i n Case s Heretofore Capital , in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2,497. 137. See , for example , Jaffa, "Wha t Were the 'Original Intentions' of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States?" 138. Jaffa, "Judicia l Conscienc e an d Natura l Rights, " 252 . Elsewhere , Jaff a remarks tha t ther e i s no constitutiona l privac y right t o engag e i n homosexual act s because suc h act s "treat me n a s if they were women. " Jaffa , Review o f Gays/Justice, b y Richar d D . Mohr, 314 . See generall y Jaffa , Homosexuality and the Natural Law. 139. Eve n unde r Jaffa's formalisti c approac h ther e woul d be a natural-libert y right to engage in what have long been calle d "deviant " heterosexual act s (provided they are done discreetly between consentin g adults). Although Justice White carefully skirted the issue in Bowers, laws outlawing heterosexual sodomy are unconstitutional because, applying Jaffa's test , heterosexual sodomy does not run counte r to regeneration. Indeed, by facilitat ing sexua l arousa l heterosexua l sodom y ma y assis t th e regenerativ e process. 140. Fo r th e classi c debat e o n th e enforcemen t o f moralit y i n th e contex t o f homosexuality, see "The Hart-Devlin Debate," in Wasserstrom, ed., Morality and the Law, 24-54 . 141. Se e West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 30 0 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholdin g a stat e minimum wag e law) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 30 1 U.S . 1 (1937) (upholdin g th e Nationa l Labor Relations Act). 142. Se e generally Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 11-37. 143. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C. J., dissenting). "Preferred freedoms" is a concept originating with Justice Benjamin Cardozo' s opinion i n Palko v. Connecticut, 30 2 U.S. 325 (1937), and i t wa s shortl y thereafter incorporate d int o th e famou s "footnot e four " o f Justice (late r Chief Justice ) Harla n Stone' s opinio n fo r th e Cour t i n United States v. Carotene Products Company, 30 4 U.S. 144,152 n. 4 (1938). 144. Hand , "Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function," 698. 145. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (striking down a state law exempting the American Expres s Compan y from licensing requirements for compa nies issuin g mone y orders) ; Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v.

Notes to Chapter 5 26 7 County Commission, 48 8 U.S. 336 (1989) (invalidatin g a rea l estat e ta x law that assessed real estate in such a way that huge discrepancies in the taxable value of neighboring properties resulted). 146. R . A. Epstein, Takings) Levy, "Property a s a Human Right" ; Macedo, The New Right v. the Constitution) Posner , The Economics of Justice) Siegan, Economic Liberties and the Constitution. 147. Macedo , The New Right v. the Constitution, 47 . 148. Siegan , Economic Liberties and the Constitution, 320 . Not al l o f thos e who wis h t o abando n th e doubl e standar d see k t o protec t individua l economic liberty . Richar d Funsto n believe s tha t th e doubl e standar d should b e abolishe d i n orde r t o facilitat e a more egalitaria n distributio n of wealth . See Funston , "Th e Doubl e Standar d o f Constitutiona l Protec tion in the Era of the Welfare State." 149. 40 5 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). 150. Se e als o Thomas , ABA Address, August 10 , 1987 , 9 ("Wha t w e nee d t o emphasize is that the entire Constitutio n is a Bill of Rights; and economic rights are protected a s much as any other rights" [emphasis in original]). Justice Thomas' s writing s an d speeche s attackin g th e doubl e standar d drew sharp criticism from several liberal members of the Senate Judiciary Committee durin g hi s confirmatio n hearing . See , fo r example , Senat e Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 110-2 6 (remarks of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.). 151. The Federalist no. 10, 78 (James Madison). 152. I n The Works of John Adams, vol . 6, 280. See also Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 1, 424 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton), 533 (remarks o f Gouverneur Morris) , 534 (remarks o f John Rutledge) , vol, 2, 123 (remarks o f Elbridge Gerry) ; Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795) (Paterson, J.). 153. See , for example , Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism; Tully , A Discourse on Property. 154. Locke , Second Treatise, sec. 42. 155. Schwartz , The New Right and the Constitution, 93 . But see Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law, 30 5 (writin g i n 1931 , before th e advent o f th e doubl e standard , tha t "th e justices o f th e Suprem e Cour t and o f th e lowe r Federa l an d stat e court s wh o find i n du e proces s th e means of giving protection to property rights may go to extremes in their interpretation o f thi s principl e o f 'fundamenta l law. ' There ca n b e littl e doubt, however, bu t tha t the y ar e holdin g steadfastl y t o th e tradition o f the foundin g fathers") . I n hi s controversia l boo k o n th e taking s clause , Richard Epstei n adopt s a similarl y simplisti c vie w o f economi c liberty , generally, and of Locke, particularly. See R. A. Epstein, Takings. 156. Locke , "Som e Consideration s o f th e Consequence s o f th e Lowerin g o f Interest," in The Works of John Locke, vol. 5, 24-25. 157. Commager , Jefferson, Nationalism, and the Enlightenment, 93-121 .

268 Note s to the Conclusion 158. Lette r from Thoma s Jefferson t o General Kosciusko, 1810, in Democracy by Thomas Jefferson, 239. 159. Adler and Gorman, The American Testament, 40. 160. Se e Reich , "Th e Ne w Property. " Se e als o Reich , "Individua l Right s an d Social Welfare." 161. 39 7 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). 162. 48 9 U.S. 189 (1989). 163. 41 1 U.S. 1 (1973) .

Notes to the Conclusio n 1. Bickel , The Least Dangerous Branch, 18. 2. I n hi s inaugural address , which identifie d "America' s ideals " as "life , liberty, an d th e pursui t o f happiness," President Bil l Clinton reminde d th e American peopl e tha t w e ar e "a n ide a bor n i n revolution. " Reprinte d i n Washington Post, January 21,1993, A26, cols. 1-2 . 3. Lette r from Thoma s Jefferso n t o John Cartwright , June 5 , 1824 , in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 580. 4. The Federalist no. 49, 314 (James Madison) (arguing that frequent constitutional chang e deprive s th e governmen t o f "tha t veneration " necessar y to secure natural rights). Jefferson, mor e than any other Founder, valued occasional recourse to revolution to revitalize a regime. See, for example, Letter from Thomas Jefferson t o James Madison, January 30,1787, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, All (" A little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical. .. . It is a medicine for the sound health of government"); Letter from Thoma s Jefferson t o Willia m Stephen s Smith , Novembe r 13 , 1787, in Democracy by Thomas Jefferson, 25 9 ("Th e tre e o f libert y mus t b e refreshe d from time t o tim e wit h th e bloo d o f patriot s an d tyrants . I t i s it s natura l manure"). 5. The Federalist no. 43, 279 (James Madison) (alluding to "the great principle of self-preservation; t o the transcendent la w of nature and of nature's God, whic h declare s tha t th e safet y an d happines s o f societ y ar e th e objects at which all political institutions aim and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed"). 6. Ibid. , no. 1, 33 (Alexander Hamilton). 7. Th e fac t tha t som e o f th e antimajoritaria n feature s o f th e Founders ' Constitution hav e bee n weakene d (fo r example , direc t electio n o f th e Senate) advise s tha t thos e remaining—mos t notably , a strong an d inde pendent Court—must be vigorously embraced.

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3

New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 164 (1812). Northern Securities Company v. United States, 19 3 U.S. 197 (1904). Ogden v. Saunders, 2 5 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 739 (1830). Page v. Pendleton, 1 Wyth e (Va.) 211 (1793) . Palko v. Connecticut, 30 2 U.S. 325 (1937). Penry v. Lynaugh, 10 9 S.Ct. 2934 (1989). Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 552 (1976). Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 . S.Ct. 2791 (1992). Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plyler v. Doe, 45 7 U.S. 202 (1982). Pollack v. Farmers1 Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895). Powell v. McCormack, 39 5 U.S. 486 (1969). Reed v. Reed, 40 4 U.S. 71 (1971). Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 43 8 U.S. 265 (1978). Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jeff. (Va.) 109 (1772). Roe v. Wade, 41 0 U.S. 113 (1973). Rostker v. Goldberg, 45 3 U.S. 57 (1981). San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) . Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 239 (1830). Shapiro v. Thompson, 39 4 U.S. 618 (1969). Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 245 U.S. 202 (1917). Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989). Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Strauderv. West Virginia, 10 0 U.S. 303 (1880). Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). Symsbury Case, 1 Kirb y (Conn.) 444 (1785). Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795). Terrett u Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 43 (1815). Thompson v. Oklahoma, 48 7 U.S.815 (1988). Tison v. Arizona, 48 1 U.S. 137 (1987). Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 N.H. Ill (1817) . Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). United States v. Carotene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). United States v. Klein, 8 0 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979). Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795). Wallace v. Jaffree, 47 2 U.S. 38 (1985). Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).

294 Work s Cited West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 30 0 U.S. 379 (1937). West Virginia Board of Education u Barnette, 31 9 U.S. 624 (1943). Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829). Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40 5 U.S. 205 (1972). Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 47 6 U.S. 267 (1986). Ex Parte Yerger y 7 5 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869). Youngsberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Zablocki v. Rehail, 43 4 V.S. 374 (1978).

Index

Abortion: and constitutional interpretation, 180-83; interpretive difficulties of , 182, 183; politics of, 180-81 ; Rehnquist Court on, 181-82; Tribe on, 182 Abortion (Tribe), 182 Abraham, Henry: on appointment process, 157,160, 255 n. 118; on constitutional interpretation, ix-xi; on double standard, 190 n. *; on judicial self-restraint, 151, 253 n. 96 Adams, John: on happiness, 54; as intellectual leader of American Revolution, 38-39, 218n. Ill ; as intellectual leader of constitutional period, 87-89, 200; on moral sense, 49; on natural aristocracy, 50, 131; on Otis, 35,106; on Paxton v. Gray, 105; political philosophy during

American Revolution, 38-39; on property, 192; on sex equality, 259 n. 34; on virtue, 38, 216 n. 77, 217 n. 104; Wood on, 38; on writing of Declaration of Independence, 21, 31, 38, 217 n. 108 Adams, Samuel: John Adams on, 38; Dunn on, 39; as intellectual leader of American Revolution, 35-36, 218 n. Ill ; Thomas Jefferson on , 35; political philosophy of, 35-36; on virtue, 36 Adler, Mortimer, on preamble, 60 Advice and consent, and appointment process, 155 , 255 n. 125, 256 n. 137 Age: and capital punishment, 178 , 261 n. 73; and equality, 171-7 3 Agresto, John, on impeachment, 144 AIDS, and gay rights, 190

295

296 Inde x Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, O'Connor's dissen t in, 263 n. 87 Alienage, and equality, 171 n. * American Commonwealth, The (Bryce), on early American constitutions , 90 American Founding : importance of liberty to, 53; Locke's influence on , 56 n. *, 213 n. 27; Lutz on, 32 n. *; natural rights political philosophy of , 22 , 75-76; Pocock on , 26-27; reference to , in enabling acts, 235 n. 155; state constitu tions during, 90; Stimson on , 217 n. 94; Straussians on, 25 n. *, 83, 213 n. 27; Wills on, 27, 217 n. 94; Wood on, 26 American politica l thought: and Locke, 24; and Lutz, 32 n. *; and Straussians, 25 n. *; students of, 22 , 24, 26 American Revolution : and Declaratio n of Independence, 17-18 , 27-32; intellectual leaders of, 32-40 , 64, 75, 77, 218 n. Ill, 21 8 n. 113 ; Iredell on, 111 ; Lockean natural-rights philosophy of , 7 , 15 n. *, 18, 23-40, 56, 199; relationship t o Constitution, xiv, 14, 15, 225 n. 13; road to independence, 19-20 , 98; scholarly opinions about character of , 23-27, 218 n. 114; war of, 2, 59 Antelope Case, The, and natural-rights based judicial review, 123-2 4 Antifederalists: and Bill of Rights, 66, 6768, 69 n. *; as liberals, 68 n. *; Storing on, 67-68 Appellate jurisdiction (limiting , as a check o n the Court): external restraint s on, 137 , 138-39; internal restraints on, 137-38; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee on, 135, 248 n. 2; scholars on, 135, 136-38, 249 n. 22; Story on, 135, 248 n. 2 Appointment process : and Bork , 154 , 159, 256 n. 132; Charles Black on , 156, 159; The Federalist on , 155, 157; Fein on, 158; Gorham on , 155; Hamilton on, 157, 254 n. 110; Hand on, 158 ; Hatch on, 156, 156 n. *; and judicial philosophy, 159; merit-based, xi, 132, 157-60; methodology of selection, 159-60 ; qualifications of nominees, 156-59; roles of president and Senate in, 154-56; and Roosevelt , 160, 255 n. 121 ; Rutledge on, 254 n. 108;

scholars on, 157-58; Smith on, 155; Spencer on, 155; 156, 156 n. *; and Thomas, 154; Wilson on, 155, 254 n. 109 Aristotle, and virtue, 89 Arkes, Hadley, on natural justice, 207 n. 18 Article 3 of the Constitution: and judicial finality, 24 6 n. 137; and judicial tenure, 145; and federal cour t jurisdiction, 135, 137, 138, 248 n. 2; and treason, 145 Article 5 amendment process: Brennan on, 142, 143 n. *; Burgess on, 140; Carter on, 141 ; as a check o n the Court, 139-44; and constitutiona l change , 8, 12; and Declaration o f Independence, 142; difficulty of , 141-42 , 143; The Federalist on , 141 ; Gerry on, 143; Lincoln on, 141 ; Mason on, 140-41; and moder n exigencies, 142 ; Murphy on, 142, 143 ; Orfield on , 139-40; and popular sovereignty, 140 ; and reversing Supreme Court decisions, 141-42; and revolution, 140-41 , 143 n. t; scholarship on, 249 n. 28; Washington on , 143 Article 6 of the Constitution, and judicial finality, 140-41 Articles of Confederation, failur e of , 6, 9n. t , 58 , 61, 63, 64, 77, 80, 100 Background attitudes , and constitutiona l interpretation, 6-7 , 198-9 9 Baer, Judith: on equality, 256 n. 5; on fourteenth amendment , 169 ; on preferentia l treatment, 174 Bailyn, Bernard: on American Revolution, 18, 24, 25-26, 199, 212 n. 23, 212 n. 24; on Declaration o f Independence, 28, 31; and The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 26 , 214 n. 46; on intellectual leaders of American Revolution, 32, 218 n. Ill; on Locke's rhetorical influence, 26; and positive freedom , 53 n. * Baker, John, on establishment clause, 208 n. 27 Ball, Terrance, on changes in language, 12 Barber, Sotirios, on jurisprudential conservatives, 244 n. 119

Index 29 7 Barron v. Baltimore, and natural-rightsbased judicial review, 123 Bayard v. Singleton: and Iredell, 111, 119; and natural-rights-based judicial review, 110-11 Beard, Charles: on Constitution, 57; on judicial review, 94,96,102, 235 n. 1; on relationship between Declaration of Independence and Constitution, 224 n. 13 Becker, Carl: on American philosophy of government, 48; Becker-Hartz thesis, 33, 40; on Jefferson an d Declaration of Independence, 22; on Locke and Declaration of Independence, 24; on relationship between Declaration of Independence and Constitution, 224 n. 13; and Wilson, 37 Becker-Hartz thesis, rejection of, 33, 40 Berger, Raoul: on equal protection, 169; on Framers as positivists, 73; on impeachment, 147 ; on judicial finality, 245 n. 128; on judicial review, 237 n. 26; on limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, 138; on ninth amendment, 71, 72, 73, 228 n. 64, 230 n. 77; on tenth amendment, 72-73 Berns, Walter, and Declaration of Independence, 2, 11, 207 n. 13 Bickel, Alexander: on fourteenth amendment, 170; on judicial finality,130, 246 n. 144; on judicial self-restraint , 253 n. 96 Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (Jefferson): and Madison, 232 n. 109; on religious freedom, 85-86 Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capita l (Jefferson), on sodomy, 189 Bill for the More General Diffusion o f Knowledge (Jefferson), and natural aristocracy, 50, 131 Bill of Rights: and Antifederalists, 66, 68 n. *, 69 n. *, 227 n. 52; Barron v. Baltimore on, 123; Brennan on, 9, 129; and common law rights, 69; and Constitution, 69, 200; and Federalists, 67-68, 69 n. *; and incorporation debate, 169 n. *; Jefferson on, 66-67, 85, 131; and judicial finality,129; and judicial review,

247 n. 151; as limit on exceptions clause, 138 ; and Madison, 70-73, 81-82, 228 n. 63; and majority rule, 5; and natural rights, 68-74, 188, 229 n. 73, 229 n. 76; and privacy, 186-87; Sherman draft of, 229 n. 76; state, 90,100, 236 n. 13 Black, Charles: on appointment process, 156, 159; on impeachment, 149 , 251 n. 67 Black, Hugo: on Griswold v. Connecticut, 187, 265 n. 118; on judicial review, 12 Black Codes, and racial equality, 167 Blackmun, Harry: and Roe v. Wade, 181 ; and abortion, 181, 182 Blackstone, William: conception of rights, 83, 86; influence o n Framers, 224 n. 12; and legislative supremacy, 97; Roane on, 115, 241 n. 72 Blair, John, and Chisholm v. Georgia, 11 7 Bland, Colonel, and legislative supremacy, 238 n. 40 Boiling v. Skarpe, and fifthamendment equal protection, 258 n. 28 Bork, Robert: and appointment process, 154, 159, 181, 207 n. 24, 210 n. 65, 256 n. 132; compared to Iredell, 119; on Framers as positivists, 73; on Griswold v. Connecticut, 187 , 265 n. 125; Kennedy on, 15 n. *; and majority rule, 126, 223 n. 198; on ninth amendment, 71, 72, 73, 228 n. 64; and originalism, x, 4, 14, 197, 210 n. 10; as positivist, 12 4 n. t, 163; on Roe v. Wade, 181 ; Specter on, 207 n. 24, 210 n. 65; on tenth amendment, 72-73 Boudin, Louis: on Commonwealth v. Caton, 238 n. 43, 244 n. 121; on judicial review, 94, 236 n. 22 Bowers v. Hardwick, and privacy, 18990, 266 n. 139 Boyd v. United States, and privacy, 186 Bradley, Joseph, and Declaration of Independence, 3 Brandeis, Louis, on privacy, 186, 188 Brennan, William: and abortion, 181; and amendment process, 142, 143 n. *; as originalist, 9 n. *; on capital punishment, 10, 176, 178, 262 n. 75; egalitarian-

298 Inde x Brennan, Willia m (continued) ism of , 8 ; and Griswold v. Connecticut, 265 n. 117 ; on human dignity , 10 , 206 n. 11 ; on judicial finality, 129 ; and livin g Constitution, x , 9-10 , 151 , 198; on righ t to die , 18 0 n. * ; on welfare , 19 4 Brest, Paul : on capita l punishment , 20 9 n. 46; on originalism , 13 , 210 n. 59, 210 n. 6 4 Brewer, David : and Declaratio n o f Inde pendence, 3 ; on se x equality , 25 9 n. 3 5 Breyer, Stephen , o n abortion , 18 1 British: and judicial review , 97-98 , 23 5 n. 7 ; oppressions of , 20 ; policies towar d colonists, 19-20 ; theory o f government , 97,98 Brown v. Board of Education: conserva tives on , 211 n. 65; Ely on , 153 ; and liv ing Constitution , 20 9 n. 42; and racia l equality, 16 8 Bryce, James, o n earl y American constitu tions, 9 0 Burger Court , an d Roe v. Wade, 18 0 Burgess, John, o n amendmen t process , 140 Burke, Edmund: conception o f rights , 83, 86; and Reflections on the Revolution in France, 8 3 Bush, George , an d abortion , 18 1 Calder v. Bull: and Chase , 118-19 , 163 ; and Iredell , 112 , 119 , 163 , 201; and natu ral-rights-based judicial review , 118-19 , 201, 24 1 n. 7 9 Calhoun, John, and constitutional interpre tation, 247 n. 15 3 Call, Daniel, an d Commonwealth v. Caton, 23 8 n. 43, 244 n. 12 1 Capital punishment : Brenna n on , 10 ; Brest on , 209 n. 46; and constitutiona l interpretation, 10-12 , 176-79 ; as crue l and unusua l punishment , 10 , 176 ; and eighth amendment , 10-11 ; an d evolvin g standard o f decenc y test , 176 ; and fifth amendment, 10 , 11 , 176; Founders on , 261 n. 62; and fourteent h amendment , 10, 176 ; and mentall y impaired , 178-79 ; natural-rights politica l philosoph y on ,

11, 52-53 , 177-78 ; and Trop v. Dulles, 209 n. 52 ; and young, 17 8 Cardozo, Benjamin: and appointmen t pro cess, 158 , 160 ; on judicial self-restraint , 150, 15 1 Carter, Jimmy, an d appointmen t process , 160 Carter, Stephen: on amendmen t process , 141; on appointmen t process , 255 n. 13 1 Cato's Letters, Hamowa y on , 214 n. 39 Charity, Lock e on , 43-44, 45 , 51, 183-84 , 185, 192 , 264 n. I l l Chase, Samuel: and Calder v. Bull, 118 19; grand jury charge s of , 25 2 n. 79 ; impeachment of , 144 , 148 , 251 n. 50 Checks an d balances : and appellat e jurisdiction, 139 ; and impeachment , 144 , 147; and judicial review , 99 , 103 , 128 29, 131 , 240 n. 65 Chesterton, G . K., on Constitution , 1 5 Chipman, Daniel , o n legislativ e suprem acy, 98 Chisholm v. Georgia: an d amendmen t process, 141 ; and constitutiona l inter pretation, 1 ; and natural-rights-base d judicial review , 117 , 119 , 241 n. 79 City of London v. Wood, The, an d judicial review, 23 5 n. 7 Civil Rights Act: of 1866 , 167 ; of 1875 , 16 7 Civil Rights Cases, an d racia l equality , 167 Clarke, John, on judicial self-restraint , 15 1 Clinton, Bill, on American Revolution , 268 n. 2 Coke, Edward : and Dr. Bonham's Case, 97-98, 105 ; influence o n Otis , 105 ; influence o n Wythe , 239 n. 47; on judicial review, 97-9 8 Colonial charters , 2 0 Color-blind Constitution , Harla n on , 168 , 168 n. * Commager, Henr y Steele : on happiness , 54-55, 193 , 222 n. 190 ; on religion , 223 n. 19 6 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Story) : and constitu tional interpretation , 2 ; and natura l rights, 243 n. 10 7

Index 29 9 Common law: rights, 69; and seventh amendment, 70 n. * Commonwealth v. Caton: Boudin and Crosskey on, 238 n. 43; Michael on, 244 n. 121; and natural-rights-based judicial review, 107-8 Communitarianism: and American Revolution, 27; of classical republicans, 27; of Locke, 43, 44, 45, 51; and pursuit of happiness, 51, 199; of Scottish Enlightenment, 27 Confederate States of America, and slavery, 169 n. *, 257 n. 16 Confederation period, and dearth of philosophizing, 63 Congress: and existence of lower federal courts, 135; and impeachment, 144-45, 149, 251 n. 67; and limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, 135-39, 248 n. 7 Consensus school of history: on American Revolution, 23-24; and Locke, 24 Consent theory of political obligation: and Declaration of Independence, 49, 55, 126; and Jaffa, 126 ; Locke criticized, 220 n. 144; Locke on, 41, 44, 45-46, 48; and Madison, 226 n. 32; 232 n. 109; and preamble, 60, 63; and ratification of Constitution, 227 n. 45; relationship between Declaration of Independence and Second Treatise, 29, 31, 45 Conservatism, modern: and constitutional interpretation, x, 5, 9 n. f, 10 4 n. *; and jurisprudence, 4; and majority rule, 6, 126; on ninth amendment, 73-74, 74 n. *; on protection of rights, 129; and structural reasoning, 12 8 n. *; on Warren Court, 104 n. * Considerations of the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament (Wilson), 37 Constitution of Georgia, and natural rights, 91 Constitution of Massachusetts: on executive, 87; and happiness, 54; and natural rights, 90-91; popular ratification of , 89 Constitution of New York, and Declaration of Independence, 91

Constitution of the United States: amendment process of, 140 , 249 n. 30; American Revolution, 14,15, 77, 78, 79; basic purpose of, x, 6-7, 9 n. t, 57-60, 90, 100, 117, 129; change in, 12, 226 n. 32; Chesterton on, 15; and Declaration of Independence, xiii, 18 , 20, 55, 56, 58-59, 63-64, 75; effects o f amendment on, 138; and enabling acts, 235 n. 155; and existence of lower federal courts, 135; and form of government, 55, 74, 75, 126-27, 203, 204; framing and ratification of, 63-68, 199, 200; and intellectual leaders, 79-90, 199; interdisciplinary approach to, xiv, 7 n. *, 196-97; liberal-republican interpretation of, 225 n. 14; Lincoln on, 208 n. 36; living Constitution, 9-11, 61, 152, 153, 198, 209 n. 42, 210 n. 64; and natural rights, x, xiv, 17, 73, 90, 104 n. *, 112, 116, 122, 130, 200-202, 236 n. 23, 237 n. 26; Paterson on, 59; and political philosophy, 2, 3, 4, 15, 60, 90, 122, 130, 158, 198; preamble to, 6063, 199 ; and separation of powers and checks and balances, 128, 129; and slavery, 107 n. *; Straussians on, 3; supremacy clause of, 102,116 ; written, 9, 9 n. t, 15,12 3 Constitutional dialogue, and judicial finality, 132 Constitutional interpretation: and academic lawyers, 206 n. 6; and appointment process, 159; and background attitudes, 6-7; and basic purpose of government, 33, 58, 59; Brennan on, 9, 10; Brest on, 210 n. 64; conservatives on, 4-5, 6; and Declaration of Independence, 2, 3, 4, 14,18; and Dworkin, 8, 206 n. 6; early Supreme Court on, 11524; egalitarian approach to, 126, 13233, 245 n. 124; Framers, approach to, 104 n. *; Frankfurter on, 2; and liberal originalism, 202-3; and Lincoln, 208 n. 36; methodology, xiii-xiv; Murphy on, 206 n. 11; and ninth amendment, 74 n. *; and political philosophy, 9 n. t, 158, 206 n. 6; politics of, 1 , 8; Story on, 2; theories of, 2; Thomas, 3, 209 n. 15

300 Inde x Constitutional period , scholars on, 57-58, 225 n. 14 Constitutional theory : Locke on, 224 n. 12; and majority rul e and judicial review, 197-98; and origin s of judicial review, 96, 100, 201; republican reviva l in, 58 Constitutions, early state: and bills of rights, 100; Chipman on , 98; and legislative supremacy, 98; and natura l rights, 90-92; and protecting rights , 99; written, 100 Continental Congress: and Articles of Confederation, 63 ; and Declaration o f Independence, 20-21 Contract clause : in Fletcher v. Peck, 120 ; importance of , 24 3 n. 105; in New Jersey v. Wilson, 243 n. 106; in Ogden v. Saunders, 121 ; in Terrett v. Taylor, 121; in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 24 3 n. 108 Convention: federal, ix, 13, 14, 60, 63-65, 76, 79, 80, 84; state, 13, 14, 59, 65-66, 67,83,102-3,113 Cooper v. Aaron, an d judicial finality, 244 n. 123 Council of revision: and judicial review, 102; Madison on , 101-2, 237 n. 25; rejection of, 10 2 Cover, Robert: and natural-rights-based judicial review, 107 n. *; on slavery cases, 107 n. *, 114 n. * Cox, Richard, on Locke, 220 n. 131 Creation of the American Republic, The (Wood): on political philosophy of American Revolution , 26, 213 n. 33; on virtue, 214 n. 43 Crosskey, William: on changes in language, 210 n. 58; on Commonwealth v. Caton, 238 n. 43, 244 n. 121 ; on judicial review, 236 n. 22 Cruel and unusual punishment: and background attitudes , 7; and capita l punishment, 10, 176 Cruzan v. Director of the Missouri Department of Health: evidentiary standard in , 180 n. *; and right to die, 17980, 180 n. * Currie, David: on Colder v. Bull, 119

n. *; on early Supreme Court docket, 116; on Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, 242 n. 103; on Story in Terrett v. Taylor, 243 n. 107 Currie's Administrator v. Mutual Assurance Society, an d natural-rights-base d judicial review, 114-15, 125 Curti, Merle, on Locke, 213 n. 27 Cushing, William, and Chisholm v. Georgia, 117 , 11 9 Declaration o f Independence: and amendment process, 142; and American philosophy of government, 20, 59, 199; and American Revolution, 17-18 , 20, 199; argument of, 49; and Articles of Confeder ation, 63; and Bill of Rights, 69, 227 n. 52; and capita l punishment, 11 ; congruence with Second Treatise, 28-32; and Constitution , xiii, 59, 75, 83, 199 , 224 n. 13 ; and constitutional interpreta tion, 2, 3, 12, 17, 18, 162-95; and control of courts by king, 98; Diggins on, 28, 214 n. 47; and federal Convention , 63-64, 65; and The Federalist, 75, 76, 78, 79; on form o f government, 55, 7374; intellectual leaders of American Revolution commitmen t to , 32-40; intellectual leaders of constitutional perio d commitment to , 79-90; and laissez faire, 3; Mercy Otis Warren on, 66 n. *; political philosophy of, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 n. t, 1 5 n. *, 20, 21, 22; and preamble, 60; revisionists' neglect of, 27-32 , 213 n. 33; and slavery, 107 n. *, 164, 257 n. 8; and state constitutions, 90-92; and Supreme Court, 96, 126; and Thomas, 3; and University of Virginia's curriculum, 34; Wills on, 27 n. *, 211 n. 7, 212 n. 12, 221 n. 172, 222 n. 178; writing of, 20-23 , 211 n. 8 "Declaration o f Independence an d the Right to Life, The" (Lehrman): on abortion, 183 ; and Thomas confirmatio n hearing, 183 Declaratory theor y of law, 2 Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, A (John Adams): on basic purpose of

Index 30 1 government, 88, 89; influence o n federal Convention, 87, 234 n. 133; on separation of powers, 89; on virtue, 89 Democracy: and judicial review, xiv; and majority rule, xiv, 55, 223 n. 198 Democracy and Distrust (Ely) , and judicial self-restraint, 152 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, and welfare, 185,194 Diamond, Martin: and Declaration of Independence, 2, 55, 206 n. 11; and The Federalist, 75; and Jaffa, 223 n. 198 Dickinson, John, as intellectual leader of American Revolution, 218 n. Il l Diggins, John, on Scottish and republican interpretations of American Revolution, 28, 214 n. 47 Disability, and equality, 171, 173 Discourses on Davila (John Adams), and property, 192 Dissertation on Canon and Feudal Law (John Adams), and natural rights, 39, 88 Double jeopardy, and capital punishment, 10, 176, 209 n. 45 Double standard, and economic liberty, 190-92, 19 0 n. *, 267 n. 148, 267 n. 150, 267 n. 155 Douglas, William: and Griswold v. Connecticut, 187, 265 n. 116, 266 n. 117; on limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, 248 n. 7; proposed impeachment of, 147 ; and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 172 73 Dr. Bonham's Case: effect o n Coke, 98; impact on American judicial review, 97; influence o n Otis, 105 Dred Scott v. Sandford: an d Declaration of Independence, 165-66 ; Lincoln on, 166; reversed by thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenthamendments, 141 Due process: and capital punishment, 10, 176, 209 n. 45, 258 n. 28; importance to Brennan, 9 Dunn, John: on Locke's influence on American Revolution, 39-40, 218 n. 113; on Locke's political philosophy, 40 n. *, 43, 45-46, 47

Dworkin, Ronald: on capital punishment, 209 n. 46; egalitarianism of, 8, 256 n. 5; and hard cases, 263 n. 91; on interpretation, 198, 206 n. 6, 209 n. 40; on originalism, 8; on privacy, 265 n. 125; on right to die, 262 n. 78, 262 n. 80 Economic liberty: and constitutional interpretation, 190-93, 267 n. 148; and laissez faire, 192; and Locke, 192 Egalitarian jurisprudence: arguments against, 132-33; arguments for, 132; Madison on, 127; proponents of, 126, 245 n. 124; rejection of, 12 6 Egalitarianism: and Baer, 256 n. 5; of Brennan, 8; and Declaration of Independence, 50-51; of Dworkin, 8, 256 n. 5; and Funston, 267 n. 148; and Harrington, 174; of Johnson, 174 ; and Locke, 51; and preferential treatment, 174-75; of Rawls, 256 n. 5; and Scottish Enlightenment, 27; and welfare, 185 , 194 Eighth amendment: and capital punishment, 7, 10-11, 209 n. 46; and natural rights, 70 Eleventh amendment, and Chisholm v. Georgia, 141, 242 n. 83, 242 n. 87 Ely, John Hart: and debate over constitutional interpretation, x; on judicial selfrestraint, 152-5 3 Enabling acts, and principles of American Founding, 235 n. 155 Epistemology: on Declaration of Independence, 221 n. 172; and equality, 44; and The Federalist, 78 ; and Jefferson and John Adams on natural aristocracy, 50; and judicial finality,130-31; of Locke, 42; and natural-rights-based judicial review, 119; of Scottish Enlightenment, 217 n. 94, 221 n. 172; of Wilson, 37, 82, 232 n. Il l Epstein, David, on The Federalist, 7 5 Epstein, Richard, on double standard, 191, 267 n. 155 Equal protection clause: and constitutional interpretation, 7; and equality, 169-70; importance to Brennan, 9; and limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, 138

302 Inde x Equal right s amendment : an d amendmen t process, 14 3 n. * ; and Brennan , 14 3 n. *; and equality , 170 , 260 n. 37; and Frontiero v. Richardson, 14 3 n. * Equality: John Adams on , 88; and age , 171-72; and alienage , 17 1 n. * ; Baer on , 256 n. 5 ; and constitutiona l interpreta tion, 164-75 ; Declaration o f Indepen dence on , 50-51 , 55 , 164 ; and disability , 173; and economi c liberty , 192 ; and egalitarianism, 194 , 256 n. 5; Lincoln on , 50-51, 166 ; Locke on , 43, 44, 51, 88, 164, 175 , 220 n. 138 ; and poverty , 171 n. * ; and preferentia l treatment , 173-75; and segregation , 167-69 ; and sex equality , 170-71 , 259 n. 35; and sex ual preference, 17 1 n. * ; and slavery , 164-67; Wills on, 222 n. 17 8 Essay concerning Human Understanding, An (Locke) : and epistemology , 78 79; and pursuit o f happiness , 2 8 Essays on the Law of Nature (Locke) : and definitio n o f natura l law , 41; and epistemology, 130-3 1 Essential function s thesis , an d limitin g the Court' s appellat e jurisdiction, 137 38 Establishment clause : and abortion , 183 , 183 n. * ; and constitutiona l interpreta tion, 57 ; and schoo l prayer , 5 Evolving-standards-of-decency test , an d capital punishment , 17 6 Ex Parte McCardle, o n exception s clause , 136 Ex Parte Yerger, o n exception s clause , 136 Exceptions clause : and limitin g th e Court's appellat e jurisdiction, 135 ; Merry on , 248 n. 6; Supreme Cour t on , 136-37, 138 , 161 , 248 n. 7 Executive: an d counci l o f revision , 101 ; on judicial finality, 126 ; legislature a s check on , 99; supremacy of , 13 3 Extended federa l republic : Madison on , 101; and protectin g rights , 236 n. 2 3 Factions, Madiso n on , 64, 77, 80, 81, 101, 230 n. 91 Federalist, The: and natural-rights-base d

judicial review , 121 ; no. 2, 76, 230 n. 91, 233 n. 115 ; no. 9, 79; no. 10 , 64, 76, 81 , 192, 231 n. 92; no. 14 , 77; no. 26, 79, 84; no. 28 , 79 ; no. 31, 78; no . 37, 76 ; no. 39, 77, 208 n. 35, 231 n. 96; no. 40, 76; no . 43, 62 , 78, 203, 231 n. 96; no. 45, 77; no. 46, 77 , 78; no. 49, 12 , 127, 141 ; no. 51, 76, 230 n. 91; no. 65, 148 ; no . 66, 157 ; no. 76 , 155 ; no. 78 , 103 , 112 , 240 n. 65, 250 n. 46; no. 79, 147 ; no. 81, 127, 149; no. 84 , 67-68, 84 ; and political philoso phy, 75-76 , 200 ; scholars on , 74-75 , 230 n. 81; writing of , 74-75 , 23 0 n. 87 Federalists: and Antifederalists, 68-69 , 69 n. * ; and Bill o f Rights , 67-68, 6 9 n. * ; and constitutiona l interpretation , 1; Jefferson's distrus t of , 13 1 Fein, Bruce , o n appointmen t process , 15 8 Field, Stephen , an d Declaratio n o f Inde pendence, 3 Fifteenth amendment : and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 141 ; and equality , 167 , 17 0 Fifth amendment : and Barron v. Baltimore, 123 ; and capita l punishment , 176 ; and equa l protection, 169 , 258 n. 28; and exception s clause , 138 ; and just compensation clause , 117-18 , 123 ; and Lockean trinity , 192 ; and natura l rights, 70; and privacy , 186 ; and Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 117-1 8 First amendment : and background atti tudes, 7 ; and establishmen t clause , 5 , 183, 18 3 n. * , 208 n. 27 First Treatise (Locke) , on charity , 18 4 Fleming, William , an d Currie's Administrator v. Mutual Assurance Society, 241 n. 72 Fletcher v. Peck: an d contrac t clause , 243 n. 108 ; Currie on , 242 n. 103 ; and natural-rights-based judicial review , 120, 12 4 n. * Ford, Gerald, on impeachment , 146-47 , 251 n. 67 Founders: on amendmen t process , 140 , 141, 142 , 143 ; on appointmen t process , 155, 156 , 157 ; on capita l punishment , 261 n. 62; on charity , 184 ; as classica l liberals, 203; conception o f rights , 25 n. * , 133 ; and Declaratio n o f Indepen -

Index 30 3 dence, 2, 32, 153, 199-200; on economic liberty, 192; and establishment of religion, 5; on exceptions clause, 136, 138; experiences with representation, 96-97, 133; on impeachment, 145 , 146, 147, 149, 252 n. 80; intent of, 163-64 , 256 n. 4; on judicial review, 104, 104 n. *, 112, 125, 127, 129, 132; on legislative supremacy, 98-100, 103, 201; on liberty, 186; and Locke, 39-40; and ninth amendment, 188 ; and purpose of government, 59, 92; on racial equality, 258 n. 26; and relationship between Declaration of Independence and Constitution, 90, 92; and road to independence, 19-20, 22; on sex equality, 259 n. 34; on slavery, 164, 166, 257 n. 16; why they came to America, 19-20. See also Framers Fourteenth amendment: and background attitudes, 7; and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 141 ; and due process, 9, 10; and equal protection, 9, 169; and equality, 167, 169; and incorporation, 10, 169 n. * ; and ninth amendment, 228 n. 60; scholarship on, 169-70 Fourth amendment: and natural rights, 70; and privacy, 186 Framers: on amendment process, 5, 12; on Articles of Confederation, 61, 63; background attitudes of, 6-7; on basic purpose of Constitution, 9 n. *, 15 n. *, 57-60, 61, 62, 225 n. 28; and Bill of Rights, 69; and concepts/conceptions, 207 n. 20; and Court, 93; and Declaration of Independence, 64, 75, 79; dedication to natural rights, 3, 9 n. t, 15 , 73, 218 n. Ill, 22 8 n. 60; Dworkin on, 8; intent of, 4, 6, 7n. *, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 210 n. 58; interdisciplinary approach of , xiv; and judicial review, 102, 124; on majority rule, 5-6, 74; and slavery, 107 n *. See also Founders Frankfurter, Felix: on appointment process, 158 , 160; on Beard, 235 n. 1; on constitutional interpretation, 2; on judicial self-restraint, 150 ; on Thayer, 152 Franklin, Benjamin: on authority of Parlia-

ment, 217 n. 96; and writing of Declaration of Independence, 21, 217 n. 108 Frontiero v. Richardson: and amendment process, 143 n. *; and equal rights amendment, 14 3 n. * Funston, Richard, on double standard, 267 n. 148 Gardner v. Newburgh, an d natural-rightsbased judicial review, 115 General will: and Rousseau, 213 n. 32; and Wood, 213 n. 32 Gerry, Elbridge: on democracy, 6, 64, 208 n. 34; on impeachment, 146 , 148-49; on natural rights, 64; and Mercy Otis Warren, 227 n. 46 Gettysburg Address: and Declaration of Independence, 211 n. 7; and equality, 222 n. 178; Wills on, 211 n. 7, 222 n. 178 Gibbons v. Ogden, an d Marshall Court jurisprudence, 122 Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, on abortion, 181 Glorious Revolution, and legislative supremacy, 97, 98 Goldberg, Arthur: and Griswold v. Connecticut, 187; Berger on, 230 n. 77; and ninth amendment, 187, 228 n. 61, 265 n. 120 Goldberg v. Kelly, and welfare, 185 , 194 Goldwater, Barry, on limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, 139 Gorham, Nathaniel, on appointment process, 155 Graham, Howard Jay, on fourteenth amendment, 169 Grand jury charges, and natural rights, 116 n. * Grayson, William, on natural-rights-based judicial review, 113 Great Society, and Lyndon Johnson, 174 Gregg v. Georgia, an d capital punishment, 176-77 Grey, Thomas, on ninth amendment, 73 Griswold v. Connecticut: Bork on, 187; and ninth amendment, 228 n. 61; as precedent, 188-89 ; and privacy, 187 Habeas corpus, and Constitution, 227 n. 56

304 Inde x Haines, Charle s Grove , and natural-rights based judicial review , 10 5 n. * , 11 3 Hall, Roland, on Lock e scholarship , 4 0 n. * Hall v. DeCuir, an d racia l equality , 16 7 Ham v. ATClaws: an d natural-rights-base d judicial review , 113-14 ; and slavery , 114 n. * Hamilton, Alexander: on appointmen t process, 157 , 254 n. 110 ; on Bil l o f Rights, 67-68; and The Federalist, 74 , 78-79, 103, 112 , 127 , 230 n. 87, 240 n. 65; o n im peachment, 147 , 148 , 149 , 252 n. 86; as intellectual leade r o f American Revolu tion, 37-38 , 21 8 n. I l l ; a s intellectua l leader o f constitutiona l period , 84-85 , 200; on judicial finality, 127 ; and Locke , 37-38, 78-79 , 84-85, 22 7 n. 44; on natu ral-rights-based judicial review , 108-9 , 112; political philosoph y of , 37-38 , 8 4 85 Hamoway, Ronald : on republican revision ism, 214 n. 39; on Wills , 27 n. * Hand, Learned: on appointmen t process , 158; on doubl e standard , 19 0 Harlan, John Marshall , an d color-blin d Constitution, 168 , 16 8 n. * Harrington, Michael, an d equality , 17 4 Hart, Henry, o n limitin g th e Court' s appel late jurisdiction, 13 7 Hartz, Louis: on American Revolution , 24; and The Liberal Tradition in America, 24 Hatch, Orrin, on appointmen t process , 156, 15 6 n. * Helms, Jesse, o n limitin g th e Court' s appellate jurisdiction, 13 9 Henry, Patrick : on amendmen t process , 250 n. 37; as intellectua l leade r o n American Revolution , 21 8 n. I l l Historians: and characte r o f America n Revolution, 23-28 ; and intellectua l lead ership, 32 n. * ; and methodology , 58-59 ; and normativ e constitutiona l scholar ship, 198-99 ; on relationshi p betwee n Declaration o f Independenc e an d Con stitution, 22 4 n. 1 3 History: and judicial review , 95-96 , 9 5 n. * , 105 , 200; and libera l originalism ,

17, 197 ; and methodology , x , xiii , xi v n. * , 58-59, 93 , 196, 198 ; and origi nalism, 1 5 Hobbes, Thomas, and Locke , 7 5 Holmes, Olive r Wendell: and hard cases , 182; and jurisprudence, 2 Holmes v. Walton, an d judicial review , 238 n. 44, 239 n. 53 Hughes, Charle s Evans , on constitutiona l interpretation, ix , 1 1 Human dignity , an d constitutiona l inter pretation, 10 , 142, 206 n. 1 1 Hume, David : and The Federalist, 75 ; influence o n Framers , 224 n. 12 ; influence on Madison , 232 n. 10 6 Hutcheson, Francis , an d Locke , 27 n. * Hutson, James: on Bil l o f Rights , 229 n. 73; on originalism , 1 4 Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, The (Bailyn): and American political thought , 26 ; on Declaratio n o f Independence, 21 4 n. 46 Impeachment: Agresto on , 144 ; Charles Black on , 149 , 251 n. 67; for bribery , 145; of Chase , 144 , 148 , 251 n. 50; and Constitution, 145 ; and Douglas, 147 ; The Federalist on , 147 , 148 , 149 ; Ford on, 146-47 , 25 1 n. 67; Hamilton on , 147 , 148, 149 , 252 n. 86; for hig h crime s an d misdemeanors, 143 , 145-49 ; Iredell on , 148; Jefferson on , 144 , 148 , 149 , 252 n. 84; Madison on , 146 , 147 ; questions relating to , 251 n. 55; Rehnquist on , 144-45, 25 1 n. 50; scholars on , 146 ; Taft on, 149 ; for treason , 14 5 Imperial schoo l o f history , progressive s on, 21 2 n. 20 Intellectual leadership : and American Rev olution, 32-40 ; and constitutiona l pe riod, 79-90 , 200 ; importance of , 13 ; neglected b y republican revisionists , 32 Interdisciplinary methodology : an d consti tutional interpretation , x , xi , xiii-xiv ; and The Federalist, 23 0 n. 81; and Founders, xiv ; and historians , 58-59 ; and origin s an d scop e o f judicial re view, 9 3

Index 30 5 Inventing America (Wills), Hamoway on, 27 n. * Iredell, James: and Bayard v. Singleton, 111; and Chase, 119, 119 n. *; and Chisholm v. Georgia, 24 2 n. 87; compared to Bork, 119; on impeachment, 148 ; and natural-rights-based judicial review, 111-12, 119, 125, 163, 201, 242 n. 94

don on, 233 n. 123; and slavery, 21, 164, 165, 257 n. 8; on sodomy, 189, 266 n. 136; and University of Virginia's curriculum, 34; and Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 85-86, 232 n. 109; Morton White on, 223 n. 195; Wills on, 27 n. *, 208 n. 36, 211 n. 7, 221 n. 73; and writing of Declaration of Independence, 21-22, 28-31, 38, 41, 217 n. 108 Jackson, Andrew: on judicial review, Johnson, Andrew, impeachment of, 251 n. 245 n. 124; on judicial supremacy, 132 50 Jackson, Robert, and Bill of Rights, 5 Jacksonian democracy, and decline of nat- Johnson, Lyndon, and equality, 174 ural-rights philosophy, 123 Johnson, William: as mind in transition, 124 n. *; and natural-rights-based judiJaffa, Harry: on Brennan, 10; and Declaracial review, 120-21 tion of Independence, 206 n. 12; Diamond on, 223 n. 198; on judicial finality, Josiah Philips's Case, and judicial re126; on Wills, 27 n. * view, 238 n. 44, 239 n. 53 Jay, John, and Chisholm v. Georgia, 117 , Judicial activism: caricatured, 96 n. *; and constitutional interpretation, x, 9 n. * ; 119 and ninth amendment, 73 Jefferson, Thomas: on Samuel Adams, 35; Judicial finality:compared to egalitarian on appointment process, 157; on basic jurisprudence, 202, 245 n. 124; Framers purpose of government, 6; and Bill for on, 127-28; Madison on, 127-28; and the More General Diffusion o f KnowlMarbury v. Madison, 244 n. 123; presiedge, 50, 131; on Bill of Rights, 66-67, dents on, 126, 245 n. 124; scholars on, 85, 227 n. 56; on blacks, 258 n. 26; on 125-26 British conception of rights, 86; on constitutional change, 87 n. *, 203, 226 Judicial restraint: Cardozo on, 150-51; n. 32; and Declaration of Independence, Clarke on, 151; and constitutional inter2, 7, 21, 22-23, 48, 87, 199-200; on early pretation, x, 9n. *, 150-54; definition state constitutions, 92; and establishof, 150 ; Ely on, 152-53; Frankfurter on, ment clause, 5; on The Federalist, 75 , 150; Miller on, 153-54; scholars on, 85; on happiness, 193; on impeachment, 151-54; Supreme Court on, 253 n. 96; 144, 148, 149, 252 n. 84; as intellectual Thayer on, 151-52, 254 n. 102 leader of American Revolution, 32-34, Judicial review: British on, 97-98, 235 n. 218 n. Ill; as intellectual leader of con7; conservatives and, 73; and constitustitutional period, 85-87, 200; on juditional period precedents, 112-15; and cial finality,245 n. 124; on judiciary, democracy, xiv, 3, 5; early state consti131, 132; and Kentucky Resolutions, tutions on, 98; and early Supreme 247 n. 153; and Locke, 85, 215 n. 64; and Court precedents, 115-24 ; and federal Madison, 67, 71, 228 n. 63; on John Marconvention, 100-102 ; and judicial finalshall, 131, 247 n. 148; and moral sense, ity, 125-33; and legislative supremacy, 49, 221 n. 171; on natural aristocracy, 96-103; natural-rights-based, 96, 10450, 131; and Notes on the State of Vir25, 210 n. 59; origins and scope of, 95ginia, 85 , 165; as person of the millen133, 200-201; pre-federal-Constitution nium, 33; political philosophy of, 33-34, precedents, 100 n. *, 105-12, 238 n. 44, 85-87; on positive law, 86; and reli239 n. 53; and ratifying conventions, gious freedom, 85-86, 86; on representa102-3, 237 n. 30; scholars on, 95-96, tion, 99; on revolution, 268 n. 4; Shel95 n. *,104-5, 105 n. *, 107

306 Inde x Judicial supremacy : and checks on the court, 160 ; danger of, 132 ; Framers on, 132 Jurisdiction, and early Supreme Court , 120, 241 n. 80, 242 n. 99 Kelly, Alfred, o n fourteenth amendment , 169 Kendell, Willmoore, on Locke, 219 n. 130 Kennedy, Edward, on Bork, 15 Kent, James, and natural-rights-based judicial review, 115 Kentucky resolutions, and constitutiona l interpretation, 247 n. 153 Ketcham, Ralph, on American Founding , 211 n. 73 Kramnick, Isaac, on republican revision ism, 25 Language, changes in, 12, 210 n. 58 Law, and methodology, x, xi, xiii, xiv, 93, 196 Lawyers, early American, natural-rightsbased judicial review, 10 7 n. *, 116 n. *, 124, 237 n. 31 Leahy, Patrick, appointment process , 156, 156 n. * Lectures on Law (Wilson) : on basic purpose of government, 83-84; on impeachment, 148 Lee, Richard Henry : on Declaration o f Independence, 28, 31; as "Federal Farmer," 245 n. 130; and independence , 20-21 Legislative supremacy: and Blackstone, 97; and British, 97; and colonists, 98, 99; and early state constitutions, 98; and Founders, 98, 99, 103; Iredell on, 112; and judicial review, 96-103, 104; and majoritarianism, 23 6 n. Ill; and Paxton v. Gray, 106; and Robin v. Hardaway, 106 , 238 n. 40; Rutgers v. Wadding ton,109 Lehrman, Lewis, on abortion, 182-8 3 "Letters of a Federal Farmer" (Smith), on appointment process, 155 Levinson, Sanford, an d Stephen Mailloux, on law and literature, 7 n. * Levinson, Sanford, o n judicial finality, 132

Levy, Leonard: on conservative originalism, 210 n. 65; on double standard , 191; on Framers, 13, 14-15 Liberalism, modern, and constitutional interpretation, x, 5,15 n. *, 209 n. 42 Liberal-Republicanism: interpretation of American Revolution , 213 n. 33, 218 n. 114; interpretation o f Constitution, 225 n. 1 4 Liberty, natural right of: an d Articles of Confederation, 23 6 n. 15; definition of , 53; economic, 190-93 ; judicial protection of, 113 , 118, 243 n. 107; moral free dom, 43; natural freedom, 44 r 46, 50, 51; positive v. negative, 53 n. *; and privacy, 186-90; and pursuit o f happiness, 55 Life, natural right of: and abortion, 18083; and capital punishment, 176-79 ; and Declaration o f Independence, 5253; definition of , 29 ; and fundamenta l law of nature, 175 ; importance of , 175 76; and pursuit of happiness, 54, 193 ; and right to die, 179-80, 180 n. *; and welfare, 183-8 6 Lincoln, Abraham: on Declaration o f Independence, 50-51; on Bred Scott v. Sandford, 166; on judicial review, 245 n. 124; on judicial supremacy, 132; on relationship between Declaratio n of Independence and Constitution , 208 n. 36; Wills on, 211 n. 7, 222 n. 178 Literary analysis, and constitutional inter pretation, 7, 7 n. * Living Constitution: Brest on, 209 n. 64; and Brown v. Board of Education, 209 n. 42; and capital punishment, 11; and constitutiona l interpretation , 9-10 , 198; and justice, 61; and McCulloch v. Maryland, 11 Locke, John: John Adams on, 38, 39; Samuel Adams on, 35-36; and American government textbooks , 213 n. 27; and American Revolution, 23-40, 56, 218 n. 114; Bailyn on, 26; Becker on, 24; on capital punishment, 178 ; on charity, 184, 185, 192, 264 n. Ill; on children, 172; conception o f rights, 44-45, 220 n. 141; on consent, 41, 44, 45-46, 48,

Index 30 7 220 n. 144; consent criticized, 220 n. 144; on constitutional theory, 224 n. 12, 239 n. 46; and Creator, 176; Curti on, 213 n. 27; Dunn on, 39, 218 n. 113; on epistemology, 42, 44, 49, 50, 82, 130-31, 219 n. 121; on equality, 88, 164, 175; and Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 28; and The Federalist, 75; Hamilton on, 38, 217 n. 101; influence o n Declaration of Independence, 28-32, 33, 39, 40, 48-56, 215 n. 48; influence o n intellectual leaders of American Revolution, 33, 39, 40; Jefferson on , 34, 85, 215 n. 64; as liberal theorist, 40; moral and political philosophy, 40, 41-48, 51, 52, 53; moral theory, 41-44; Otis on, 35; Pocock on, 26-27; and popular sovereignty, 233 n. 117; on privacy, 188; on private property, 192; progressives on, 212 n. 22; and public good, 226 n. 30; and pursuit of happiness, 28; republican revisionists on, 24, 31, 39, 40, 56; on revolution, 27 n. *, 47-48; as rhetoric, 26, 39, 214 n. 46; scholarship on, 40 n. *; and Scottish Enlightenment, 217 n. 94; and Second Treatise, 28; on separation of church and state, 208 n. 29, 232 n. 109; Simmons on, 219 n. 117, 219 n. 122, 219 n. 128; and slavery, 257 n. 7; on suicide, 180, 262 n. 80, 262 n. 81; Wills on, 27, 27 n. *, 75; and writing of Declaration of Independence, 21. See also Lockean liberalism; Second Treatise Lockean liberalism: and American Revolution, 18, 23-40, 199, 212 n. 23, 213 n. 33; and Cato's Letters, 214 n. 39; and charity, 184; and children, 172; compared to egalitarian ism, 256 n. 5; and consensus theorists, 24; and Constitution, 59, 89, 211 n. 73, 225 n. 14, 227 n. 45; and Declaration of Independence, 27-32, 48-56, 199; and economic liberty, 192 ; and epistemology, 42, 49; and equality, 175; and The Federalist, 75, 79, 230 n. 91, 231 n. 92, 231 n. 96; and intellectual leaders of American Revolution, 32-40, 199; and intellectual leaders of constitutional period, 79-90; political philoso-

phy, 18, 30-31, 40 n. *, 41-56, 88; and preamble, 60. See also Locke, John; Second Treatise Lutz, Donald: on American political theory, 32 n. *; and intellectual leadership, 32 n. * Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation, an d double standard, 191 Macedo, Stephen, on double standard, 191 Machiavellian Moment, The (Pocock): and Declaration of Independence, 28; rewriting of, 214 n. 38 Macpherson, C. B., on Locke, 43, 184, 219 n. 126 Madison, James: on John Adams, 87, 234 n. 133; on amendment process, 12, 87 n. *, 141, 203, 226 n. 32; on appointment process, 155, 160; on Articles of Confederation, 80-81; on Bill of Rights, 67, 68, 81-82, 227 n. 57, 228 n. 63, 232 n. 107; on conventions, 13 , 61, 63, 225 n. 28; on Declaration of Independence, 82, 231 n. 102; on democracy, 61, 74; and extended federal republic, 81, 232 n. 106; and The Federalist, 62 , 74, 7678, 79, 230 n. 87; on impeachment, 146, 147; as intellectual leader of constitutional period, 79-82, 200; and Jefferson, 67, 71, 228 n. 63; on Locke, 82, 230 n. 91, 231 n. 92, 231 n. 96, 232 n. 109; McDonald on, 231 n. 101; on ninth amendment, 70-73; notes of, 14 , 80; on property, 192; on religious freedom, 232 n. 109; on representative form of government, 208 n. 35, 231 n. 94; on rights, 61, 64, 73, 82; on standing army, 62; and veto, 81; and Vices of the Political System of the United States, 81; Morton White on, 62 Majoritarianism: on conservative originalists, 8; Framers' fear of, 5; and judicial review, 129 , 130, 132, 133, 137, 138, 152; and legislative supremacy, 236 n. 11 Majority-rule democracy: and Constitution, 4, 5-6, 9 n. f, 55 , 74; and Declaration of Independence, 55, 73-74; and

308 Inde x Majority-rule democrac y (continued) Jaffa, 22 3 n. 198 ; and judicial review , 73, 197-9 8 Marbury v. Madison: an d constitutiona l change, 11 ; Jefferson, on , 247 n. 148 ; and judicial finality, 244 n. 123 ; and judicial review , 23 5 n. 1 , 241 n. 78 ; and jurisdictional questions , 119-20 ; and John Marshall, 11 , 103, 241 n. 78, 244 n. 12 3 Marshall, John: as Chie f Justice, 116 , 120, 242 n. 101 ; on constitutiona l change , 11; and impeachment , 25 2 n. 84; and judicial finality, 24 4 n. 123 ; and judicial re view, 103 , 241 n. 78 ; and Marbury v. Madison, 11 , 103, 241 n. 78 , 244 n. 123; and McCulloch v. Maryland, 11 ; and natural-rights-based judicial review , 120, 121-22 , 123-24 , 242 n. 10 3 Marshall, Thurgood : on capita l punish ment, 176-77 ; o n equality , 165 ; and Roe v. Wade, 18 1 Martin, Luther: on Bil l o f Rights , 66; on council o f revision , 102 ; at federal Con vention, 22 7 n. 44 Marxist readin g o f Locke , 44, 219 n. 12 6 Mason, George : on amendmen t process , 140-41; and Bil l o f Rights , 66; and happiness, 54 , 55, 232 n. 107 ; on impeach ment, 146 , 147 ; and natural-rights-base d judicial review , 106-7 , 10 7 n. * ; and rights, 64 ; and Virginia Declaratio n o f Rights, 90-91 , 19 3 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, an d ag e discrimination , 17 1 McCulloch v. Maryland: an d living Consti tution, 11 ; and Marshal l Cour t jurisprudence, 12 2 McDonald, Forrest , o n Madison , 23 1 n. 10 1 McDowell, Gary : on judicial self-restraint , 253 n. 96; on limitin g th e Court' s appel late jurisdiction, 24 9 n. 22; as positivist , 237 n. 33 Meese, Edwin : on establishmen t clause , 5; and majorit y rule , 126 , 223 n. 198 ; and originalism, 4 , 9n. * , 14 , 197 , 210 n. 65 Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Asessments, A (Madison) , an d religious freedom , 23 2 n. 10 9

Mentally impaired , an d capita l punish ment, 178-79 , 262 n. 7 5 Mercer, John, o n failure s o f representa tion, 10 0 Merry, Henry, o n limitin g th e Court' s appellate jurisdiction, 24 8 n. 6 Michael, Helen , o n natural-rights-base d judicial review , 24 4 n. 12 1 Miller, Arthur, o n judicial self-restraint , 153-54 Monaghan, Henry, on appointmen t process, 25 4 n. 11 7 Montesquieu: influenc e o n Framers , 224 n. 12 ; and separatio n o f powers , 8 9 Moral sense : and John Adams, 49; and Declaration o f Independence , 50 , 221 n. 172 ; definition of , 49 ; and Jefferson , 49-50, 22 1 n. 171 ; and Scottis h Enlight enment, 49 ; and Wilson, 49, 221 n. 17 2 Morgan, Edmund, an d relationship be tween Declaratio n o f Independenc e and Constitution , 22 4 n. 1 3 Morgan, Edmund, an d Helen Morgan: consensus theorists , 24; on progressives , 2 4 Morris, Gouverneur: on legislative suprem acy, 236 n. 15 ; and natura l rights , 65; on slavery, 65 , 226 n. 4 3 Murphy, Walter: on amendmen t process , 142, 143 ; and Declaratio n o f Indepen dence, 2-3 , 20 6 n. 11 , 206 n. 12 ; and living Constitution , 15 1 NAA.C.P., oppositio n t o Thomas' s nomi nation, 260 n. 5 5 Natural aristocracy : John Adams on , 50, 131; and appointmen t process , 132 ; Jefferson on , 50 , 131 Natural equity , compare d t o natura l justice, natura l law , an d natura l rights , 106 n. * Natural justice, compare d t o natura l eq uity, natura l law , an d natura l rights , 106 n. * Natural Law : Bork on , 12 4 n. t , 125 ; and capital punishment , 11 ; compare t o nat ural equity , natural justice, an d natura l rights, 10 6 n. f ; an d Declaration o f Independence, 49 , 221 n. 169 ; and equality , 44; and The Federalist, 78 , 79; funda-

Index 30 9 mental law of, 11 , 42-43,45, 46, 48, 51, 52, 175, 177; and judicial review, 96 n. *, 119, 244 n. 118; Locke's definition of , 41; and Locke's epistemology, 42, 50, 130-31; and moral freedom, 43; and natural rights, 43; theorists of, 38 , 217 n. 101 Natural rights: and American Revolution, 7, 25; and Articles of Confederation, 6, 61, 80, 81, 100; and Bill of Rights, 69, 81, 229 n. 76: and British conception of rights, 83, 86; and capital punishment, 11; compared to natural equity, natural justice, and natural law, 106 n. *; and Constitution, 3, 6, 9 n. *, 58, 59, 60; and constitutional interpretation , 9 n. t, 15; and Declaration of Independence, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9n. t, 1 0 n. *, 11, 15, 22, 2; and The Federalist, 79, 112; judicial protection of, 6 , 73-74, 74 n. *, 96, 133; and judicial review, 104-25, 104 n. *, 107 n. *, 116 n. *, 119 n. *; modern political philosophers on, 56 n. *, 104 n. *, 124; and natural law, 3; and ninth amendment, 70, 73, 229 n. 73; political philosophy, xiv, 10 n. *, 14, 20, 123; and preamble, 60, 61; and public good, 62, 76-77; and purpose of government, 6, 13, 31, 40, 60, 61, 62, 63, 80, 92; Sidney on, 216 n. 77; and slavery, 65, 224 n. 117; and state constitutions, 90-92, 200; Straussians on, 25 n. *; theorists of, 65 ; and Wolfe, 9n. f Nedelsky, Jennifer, on Framers' conception of rights, 25 n. * Nelson, William, on fourteenth amendment, 170 Nevins, Allan: on early state constitutions, 90; on legislative supremacy, 98 New Deal, and double standard, 190 New Jersey v. Wilson, an d contract clause, 243 n. 106 "New Property, The" (Reich), and welfare, 193 Ninth amendment: conservatives on, 7374, 228 n. 64; and early Supreme Court, 74 n. *; and Griswold v. Connecticut, 187, 228 n. 61, 265 n. 120; and judicial review, 246 n. 140; and natural rights,

69 n. *, 70-74, 188, 200, 228 n. 60, 229 n. 73; O'Brien on, 187-88; and tenth amendment, 71, 72-73 Nixon, Richard: on judicial review, 245 n. 124; on judicial supremacy, 132 Notes on Ike State of Virginia (Jeffer son): on religious freedom, 85; on slavery, 165 Novanglus (John Adams), on Locke, 39, 88 O'Brien, David: on constitutional interpretation, 7; on ninth amendment, 18788 Observations on the New Constitution (Mercy Otis Warren): and Declaration of Independence, 66 n. *; and Gerry, 227 n. 46 O'Connor, Sandra Day, and abortion, 181, 182, 263 n. 87 Ogden v. Saunders, and natural-rightsbased judicial review, 121-22, 122 n. * Olmstead v. United States, and privacy, 188 Onuf, Peter, on methodology, xiii, 58 Oregon v. Mitchell, an d twenty-sixth amendment, 142 Orfield, Lester Bernhardt, on amendment process, 139-40 "Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Review, The" (Thayer): Frankfurter on, 152; and judicial self-restraint, 152 Originalism: conservative, x, 4-6, 8, 9 n. t, 10 n. *, 188, 197; Dworkin on, 8, 207 n. 20; and The Federalist, 23 0 n. 81; Framers on, 14-15; liberal, x, 1-15, 1 5 n. *, 95, 197, 198; methodological criticism s and responses, 8-15, 58-59, 9 n. *; moderate, 13; Perry on, 95 n. *; strict, 13-15, 210 n. 65; and structural reasoning, 128 n. * Otis, James: John Adams on, 35, 38, 106, 216 n. 80; early use of natural-rights doctrine, 35, 211 n. 2; as intellectual leader of American Revolution, 34-35, 218 n. Ill; as Lockean liberal, 35; and natural-rights-based judicial review, 105-6

310 Inde x Page v. Pendleton, and natural-rightsbased judicial review, 114 Pangle, Thomas, on The Federalist, 75 Parliament (British) : John Adams on, 39; and colonial policies, 20; Hamilton on, 37; Iredell on , 111; Jefferson on , 49-50; and legislative supremacy, 97-98; Otis on, 105-6 ; Wilson on, 37 Parrington, Vernon, on John Adams, 88 Paterson, William: definition o f constitution, 59 ; and natural-rights-base d judicial review, 116, 117-18, 119, 123 Paxton v. Gray, and natural-rights-base d judicial review, 105- 6 Peckham, Rufus, an d Declaration o f Independence, 3 Pendleton, Edmund: Jefferson on , 131, 132, 157; and judicial review, 239 n. 45; and natural-rights-based judicial review, 244 n. 121 Perry, Michael, on judicial review, 95 n. * Pinckney, Charles, on appointment process, 132 Planned Parenthood of southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, and abortion , 181,182 Plessy v. Ferguson, and racial equality, 167-68 Pocock, J. G. A.: on American Revolution , 18, 24, 26-27, 199, 212 n. 23, 212 n. 24; on changes in language, 12; on Declaration of Independence, 28; and positive freedom, 5 3 n. * Political philosophy: and consent , 220 n. 144 ; and Locke, 18; and methodology, x, xi, xiii-xiv, 17 , 93, 196, 197; and natural law , 106 n. *; and natural rights, 56 n. *, 104 n. t Political scientists, and normative constitutional scholarship, 198-9 9 Pollack v. Farmers' and Trust Union, and sixteenth amendment , 142 Positive law : Grey on, 73; Jefferson on , 86; and rights, 52 Positivism: and Bork, 124 n. t; and Cover, 107 n. *; and debat e over judicial review, 125

Posner, Richard: on double standard, 191; on law and literature, 7 n. * Pound, Roscoe, on natural-rights-based judicial review, 244 n. 120 Poverty, and equality, 171 n. * Powell, H. Jefferson, o n originalism, 14 15 Powell, Lewis, on preferential treatment , 173 Preamble: Adler on, 60; and basic purpose of Constitution, 60-63, 200; "establish justice," 61; "form a more perfec t union," 61; "insure domestic tranquility," 61; "promote the general welfare, " 62; "provide for th e common defense, " 61-62; Edmund Randolph on, 60; "secure the blessings of liberty," 63; Supreme Court on, 60; "We the People," 60, 229 n. 73; Morton White on, 62 Preferential treatment , and equality , 168 n.*, 173-7 5 Privacy: Hugo Black on, 265 n. 118; and conservative originalists, 187; and constitutional interpretation, 186-90 ; Dworkin on, 265 n. 125; and gay rights, 18990, 266 n. 138; and Griswold v. Connecticut, 187 ; and natural rights, 187-88; Supreme Court on, 186-87, 188; Samuel Warren an d Brandeis on, 186 Process-oriented jurisprudence, Ely on, 153 Progressive school of history: on American Revolution, 23-24; criticized by consensus school, 24; criticized by imperial school, 212 n. 20; and Locke, 212 n. 23 Property: and American Revolution, 99; and judicial review, 113 ; Locke on, 28, 29, 44-45, 220 n. 140; progressives on, 212 n. 22; and pursuit of happiness, 2829; right to, 6, 9 n. t Public good: Locke on, 76-77, 78, 226 n. 30; and purpose o f government, 24, 25, 62, 214 n. 43, 215 n. 67 Publius, and The Federalist, 74, 75, 76, 79 Pursuit of happiness: and constitutiona l interpretation, 193-94 ; and Declaration of Independence, 51, 52, 53-55; Madi-

Index 31 1 son on, 232 n. 107; and property, 28-29; and Virginia Declaration of Rights, 234 n. 148; and welfare, 193-9 4

76; form of government, xiv, 6, 6 n. *, 25, 55, 74, 208 n. 35, 223; and Hamoway, 214 n. 39; and intellectual leadership, 33; and Jefferson, 233 n. 123; liberal-reRadicalism of the American Revolution, publicanism, 218 n. 114, 225 n. 14; politiThe (Wood), 25, 28, 213 n. 32, 213 n. 33, cal philosophy, 6 n. *, 211 n. 73; revision of American Revolution, 24-28, 33, 199, 214 n. 43 211 n. 73, 213 n. 33, 214 n. 47 Ramsey, David, on American Revolution, 212 n. 1 6 Reverse discrimination, and preferential Randolph, Edmund: on ninth amendment, treatment, 173 72; and political philosophy, 65; on pre- Revival of Natural Law Concepts, The amble, 60; on Senate, 236 n. 19; and Vir(Haines), on natural-rights-based judiginia plan, 101 cial review, 113 Ratner, Leonard, on limiting the Court's Revolt against formalism: and American appellate jurisdiction, 137 Revolution, 23; and jurisprudence, 2 Rawls, John, as egalitarian, 256 n. 5 Revolution: and amendment process, 140-41, 14 3 n. f; and Declaration of InRe Gault, an d age discrimination, 171dependence, 23, 30, 55-56, 203-4; and 72 The Federalist, 79 ; and Jefferson, 86; Reagan, Ronald: and abortion, 181; and juand Locke, 30, 47-48; and Madison, 82 dicial review, 245 n. 124; and judicial suRichards, David, on judicial finality,246 n. premacy, 132 143 Reasonable doubt test, and Thayer, 152 Richardson, William, and natural-rightsRedish, Martin, and limiting the Court's based judicial review, 115 appellate jurisdiction, 249 n. 22 Reflections on the Revolution in France Right to die: and constitutional interpreta(Burke), and conception of rights, 83 tion, 179-80, 180 n. *; Dworkin on, 262 n. 78; Locke on, 180 Rehnquist, William: and abortion, 182; on equal protection, 169 ; and establishRights of Englishmen, and American Revment clause, 5, 208 n. 27; on impeacholution, 20 ment, 144-45, 251 n. 50; and majority Rights of the British Colonies Asserted rule, 126, 223 n. 198; and originalism, x, and Proved, The (Otis), and natural 4, 151, 197, 210 n. 65 rights, 35 Rehnquist Court: on abortion, 181; on cap- Roane, Spencer: on Blackstone, 115, ital punishment, 261 n. 68; on welfare, 241 n. 72; and natural-rights-based judi185 cial review, 114-1 5 Robin v. Hardaway: Cover on, 107 n. *; Reich, Charles, on welfare, 193 and natural-rights-based judicial review, Reid, John Phillip: on American Revolu106-7 tion, 214 n. 40; on Declaration of Independence, 214 n. 46; «n intellectual lead- Roe v. Wade: and abortion, 180-83; Lehrership, 215 n. 68 man on, 183; O'Connor on, 263 n. 87 Representation: Madison on, 101-2; and Roosevelt, Franklin: and appointment promodern conservatives, 129; and process, 160 , 255 n. 121; and double stantecting rights, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 111 , dard, 190; on judicial review, 245 n. 124; 125, 133 on judicial supremacy, 132 Republican: and Antifederalists, 68 n. *; Rossiter, Clinton, on American Revoluconstitutional theory, 58; and Declaration, 212 n. 23 tion of Independence, 31-32; and DigRousseau, Jean-Jacques, and general will, gins, 214 n. 47; and The Federalist, 75 , 213 n. 32

312 Inde x Rule of law: and importance o f history, 95 n. *, 125; and notion of a living Constitution, 8 Rutgers v. Waddington, natural-rights based judicial review, 108- 9 Rutledge, John, on appointment process, 254 n. 108 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, and pursuit of happiness, 194 Scalia, Antonin: on abortion, 181 , 182; on capital punishment, 261 n. 73; on right to die, 179 School prayer, conservative originalist s on, 5 Scottish Enlightenment : and John Adams, 49; and American Revolution , 27, 40, 217 n. 94; compared t o republicanism, 27, 214 n. 42; and Declaration o f Independence, 27 n. *, 28, 212 n. 12, 221 n. 172; Diggins on, 28; and The Federalist, 75 ; and Jefferson, 4 9 and Locke, 217 n. 94; and moral sense, 49, 221 n. 172; and Wilson , 232 n. Ill; and Wood, 214 n. 43 Seabury, Samuel ("the Farmer"), and Hamilton, 37-38, 217 n. 101 Searches: Founders on , 105 ; and Paxton v. Gray, 105 Second amendment , and natural rights, 69-70 Second Treatise (Locke): on charity, 184; on consent, 45; and Declaration o f Independence, 28-32, 55, 215 n. 48; Dunn on, 218 n. 113; on equality, 51; and Jefferson, 34, 215 n. 64; on life, 176 ; and Otis, 35; as propaganda, 218 n. 112; on property, 191 , 192; and republican revisionism, 27-28; on revolution, 47, 262 n. 81; on rights, 44; on suicide, 180; Wills on, 27 n. *; and Wilson, 37. See also Locke, John; Lockean liberalism Segregation, and constitutiona l interpreta tion, 167-6 9 Self-evidence: in Declaration o f Independence, 28, 42, 49-50; in The Federalist, 78-79; and judicial finality, 131; in Locke, 28,42,49-50, 219 n. 121; and nat-

ural-rights-based judicial review, 119; Morton White on, 50 Senate, as check on majoritarianism , 236 n. 19 Separate but equal, and Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 7 Separation o f powers: John Adams on, 87, 89; and early state constitutions , 98; and impeachment, 147 ; and judicial review, 128-29, 240 n. 65; and limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, 139 Seventh amendment, and natural rights, 70 n. * Sexual equality: and constitutional inter pretation, 170-71 ; Supreme Court on, 175, 259 n. 35 Sexual preference, and equality , 17 1 n. * Shanks v. Dupont, and natural-rightsbased judicial review, 124 n. * Shapiro v. Thompson, an d welfare, 18485 Sheldon, Garrett Ward, on Jefferson , 233 n. 123 Sherman, Roger: on appointment process, 155; and Bill of Rights, 229 n. 73; on federal Convention, 61, 64-65; and writing of Declaration of Independence, 21 Sherry, Suzanna: on early American lawyers, 237 n. 31; on natural-rights-base d judicial review, 241 n. 74 Sidney, Algernon: Jefferson on , 34; and natural rights, 216 n. 77; and University of Virginia's curriculum, 34; and virtue, 216 n. 77 Siegan, Bernard, on double standard, 191 Simmons, A. John: on Locke, 40 n. *, 45, 219 n. 117, 219 n. 122, 219 n. 128; on rights of children, 172 Sixteenth amendment , and Pollack v. Fanners' and Trust Union, 142 Sixth amendment, and natural rights, 70 Slavery: and The Antelope Case, 123; and Constitution, 10 7 n. *, 249 n. 30, 257 n. 10; Cover on, 107 n. *; and Declaration o f Independence, 21, 107 n. *, 164, 257 n. 8; and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 165-66; and early judicial process, 107 n. *, 119 n. *, 123, 125; and equality, 164-67; and fourteenth amendment ,

Index 31 3 169 n. *; and Ham v. MVlaws, 113-14 , 114 n. *; Lincoln on, 166; and Locke, 257 n. 7; Morris on, 65; and Robin v. Hardaway, 106-7,10 7 n. *; Stephens on, 257 n. 16; G. Edward White on, 244 n. 117 Smile, John, and Wilson, 227 n. 52 Smith, Melancton, on judicial finality, 127 Smith, William French, on limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, 139 Snowiss, Sylvia, on Thayer, 254 n. 102 Social contract: and Declaration of Independence, 29, 55, 56; and Hamilton, 85; and Locke, 29 Sosin, J. M., on Brutus, 237 n. 30, 238 n. 34 Souter, David, and abortion, 181, 182 Spaight, Richard Dobbs: on Iredell, 111; and judicial review, 112 Spencer, Herbert, and economic liberty, 192 Spencer, Samuel, on appointment process, 155 Stamp Act: Samuel Adams on, 36; Morgans on, 24; riots, 20 Standing army, Madison on, 62 Stephens, Alexander, on slavery, 257 n. 16 Stevens, John Paul, and abortion, 182 Stewart, Potter: on double standard, 191, 192; on Griswold v. Connecticut, 187 , 265 n. 120 Stimson, Shannon, on Scottish Enlightenment, 217 n. 94 Storing, Herbert: on Bill of Rights, 68-69; on Federalists and Antifederalists, 6869 Story, Joseph: and constitutional theory, 2; and natural-rights-based judicial review, 246 n. 137 Strauder v. West Virginia, and racial equality, 258 n. 22 Strauss, David, on appointment process, 256 n. 137 Strauss, Leo: on Locke, 43, 75, 184, 219 n. 126; and "natural right," 206 n. 11; and students of American Founding, 3 Straussians: on American Founding, 3, 25 n. *, 206 n. 10; approach to texts, 224 n. 9; conservatism of, 206 n. 11; dif-

ferences among, 206 n. 11; on Locke, 44; on rights, 25 n. *, 83 Structural reasoning, and originalism, 128 n. * Substantive due process: abuse of, 125; natural-law-like, 125 Summary View of the Rights of British America, A (Jefferson): and moral sense, 49; and natural rights, 33-34 Sunstein, Cass: on appointment process, 256 n. 137; on constitutional interpretation, 206 n. 6 Supremacy clause: and congressional veto, 102 ; and state constitutions, 116; Story on, 246 n. 137 Supreme Court, U.S.: Abraham on, ix-xi; checks on, 134-61, 202; conservatives on, 128 n. *; and council of revision, 102; during early American republic, 115-16, 241 n. 80; essential function s of, 137-38 ; as guardian of natural rights, 42, 93, 200-202, 268 n. 7; and judicial finality,125-33,134, 246 n. 137; and liberal originalism, 95, 96; on natural-rights-based judicial review, 115-24; and ninth amendment, 74; on preamble, 60; required under Constitution, 135; and scope of judicial review, 102-3, 236 n. 22, 237 n. 26 Symsbury Case, and natural-rights-based judicial review, 109 Taft, William Howard, on impeachment, 149 Taney, Roger, and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 165-6 6 Ten Broek, Jacobus, on fourteenth amendment, 169 Ten Pound Act Cases, and judicial review, 239 n. 57 Tenth amendment: and natural rights, 69 n. *, 73; and ninth amendment, 7173; and state law, 70 Terrett v. Taylor, and natural-rights-based judicial review, 121, 243 n. 107 Thayer, James Bradley, on judicial self-restraint, 151-52, 254 n. 102 Theological interpretation: of American Revolution, 23; of Locke, 44

314 Inde x Third amendment , an d natura l rights , 69 70 Thirteenth amendment : and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 141 ; and slavery , 165 , 16 7 Thomas, Clarence : and abortion , 181 , 182; and appointmen t process , 154 , 183, 260 n. 55 , 267 n. 150 ; on Declaratio n o f Independence, 3 , 207 n. 15 ; on preferen tial treatment , 17 4 Thoughts on Government (Joh n Adams) : and happiness , 54 ; on Locke , 39; on virtue, 217 n. 10 4 Toleration: Jefferson on , 85-86; Locke on , 85-86, 23 2 n. 109 ; Madison on , 23 2 n. 10 9 Toward Increased Judicial Activism (Miller), o n judicial self-restraint , 15 3 Trevett v. Weeden: and natural-rights based judicial review , 109-10 ; reliability of , 23 9 n. 53 Tribe, Laurence ; on abortion , 182 ; on con stitutional interpretation , x Trustees on Dartmouth College v. Woodward: Ne w Hampshir e Suprem e Cour t case, 115 ; U.S. Supreme Cour t case , 243 n. 10 8 Twenty-seventh amendment , constitution ality of , 25 0 n. 35 Twenty-sixth amendment , an d Oregon v. Mitchell, 14 2 Two Treatises (Locke) : Dunn on , 39-40 , 47; on right s an d duties , 43-44; scholarship on , 40 n. * Undue burde n standard , an d abortion , 182 United State s o f America : and Declara tion o f Independence , 20 , 59, 125 ; dedication t o natura l law , 9 6 n. * ; as libera l regime, 174 ; and liberty , 186 ; and slav ery, 16 6 United States v. Klein, o n exception s clause, 136 , 248 n. 1 2 Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance: com pared t o Baron v. Baltimore, 123 ; and fifth amendment, 117-18 , 123 ; naturalrights-based judicial review , 117-1 8

Vance v. Bradley, an d ag e discrimination , 171 Varnum, James, an d Trevett v. Weeden, 110, 239 n. 53, 239 n. 54 "Venditio" (Locke), an d charity , 18 4 Veto: congressional, 101 , 102; and counci l of revision , 101 , 102; presidential, 12 8 Vices of the Political System of the United States (Madison) , o n Articles o f Confederation, 8 1 Vindication of the Conduct of the House of Representatives of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay, A (Otis) , and natu ral rights, 35 Virginia, University of : importanc e t o Jefferson, 86 ; Jefferson a s rector, 34 ; Jefferson o n curriculu m of , 3 4 Virginia Declaratio n o f Rights : and happi ness, 54 , 55, 193 , 232 n. 107 , 234 n. 148 ; and natura l rights , 90-91; an d virtue , 91 Virginia plan: and representation , 101 ; and Senate, 23 6 n. 1 9 Virtue: John Adam s on , 38, 89, 217 n. 104; Samuel Adam s on , 36; Antifederalists on, 6 8 n. * ; Diggins on , 28; and earl y state constitutions , 91; importance to republican revisionists , 25, 26, 40; and Scottish Enlightenment , 27 ; Sidney on , 216 n. 77 ; Wood on , 214 n. 43 Wallace v. Jaffree, an d establishmen t clause, 5 , 208 n. 27, 210 n. 65 Warren, Earl: and Brown v. Board of Education, 20 9 n. 42; and Plessy v. Ferguson, 20 9 n. 42 Warren, Mercy Otis : and Bil l o f Rights , 66; and Declaratio n o f Independence , 6 6 n. * ; and Gerry , 227 n. 46; opposition t o ratification, 65-6 6 Warren, Samuel, o n privacy , 186 , 18 8 Warren Court : conservatives on , 10 4 n.t ; Ford on , 147 ; liberalism of , 5 Washington, George : on amendmen t pro cess, 143 ; and Articles o n Confedera tion, 63 ; and federa l Convention , 23 3 n. 122 ; and happiness , 54 ; and nint h amendment, 72 , 81 Webking, Robert: on intellectua l leader s

Index 31 5 of American Revolution, 32, 218 n. Ill ; on republican revisionism, 32 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, and abortion, 181 Welfare: and constitutional interpretation, 183-86, 193-94; Supreme Court on, 184-85, 194 White, Byron: and abortion, 182; on gay rights, 189, 266 n. 139 White, G. Edward, on Marshall Court, 244 n. 117 White, Morton: on Declaration of Independence, 50, 221 n. 172, 222 n. 176, 223 n. 195; on The Federalist, 75; on The Federalist no. 78, 240 n. 65; on Madison in The Federalist, 6 2 Wickham, John, and Currie's Administrator v. Mutual Assurance Society, 114 Wilkinson v. Leland, an d natural-rightsbased judicial review, 243 n. 107 Wills, Garry: on American Revolution, 27, 217 n. 94; on Declaration of Independence, 27, 27 n. *, 211 n. 7, 212 n. 12, 221 n. 172; on The Federalist, 75; on Lincoln, 222 n. 178 Wilson, James: on appointment process, 254 n. 109; on Articles of Confederation, 236 n. 15; on authority of parliament, 37; and Bill of Rights, 67; on impeachment, 148 ; as intellectual leader of American Revolution, 36-37, 218 n. Ill; as intellectual leader of constitutional period, 82-84, 86, 200; on judicial review, 102-3; and Locke, 37, 233 n. 117; and natural-rights-based judicial review, 113, 117, 119; political thought of, 36-37, 82-84; on relationship between Declaration of Independence

and Constitution, 59, 83; on rights, 8384; and Scottish Enlightenment, 36-37, 49, 221 n. 172, 232 n. Il l Windstrup, George, on Locke on suicide, 262 n. 81 Wisconsin v. Yoder, o n rights of children, 172 Wolfe, Christopher: on natural-rightsbased judicial review, 237 n. 33, 241 n. 79; and originalism, 9 n. t Wood, Gordon: on John Adams, 38; on American Revolution, 18, 24, 25, 26, 199, 212 n. 23, 212 n. 24; and The Creation of the American Republic, 26 , 27-28; and Declaration of Independence, 27-28, 31; and intellectual leadership, 32; Lutz on, 32 n. *; and positive freedom, 53 n. *; and The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 25, 28; on relationship between Declaration of Independence and Constitution, 224 n. 13; and Scottish conception of virtue, 214 n. 43 Woolhouse, Roger, on Locke scholarship, 40 n. * Wright, Benjamin, on relationship between Declaration of Independence and Constitution, 224 n. 13 Wythe, George, and natural-rights-based judicial review, 108, 114, 239 n. 47 Yates, Robert (Brutus): and The Federalist no . 78, 240 n. 65, 252 n. 86; on judicial review, 103 , 127, 237 n. 30; on Locke, 65; and natural rights, 65; and notes on federal Convention, 14; Sosin on, 237 n. 30

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