To Be Governor of Jerusalem 9781617191220, 1617191221

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To Be Governor of Jerusalem

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies are brought together in Analecta Isisiana. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

To Be Governor of Jerusalem

The City and District During the Time of Ali Ekrem Bey, 1906-1908

David Kushner

The Isis Press, Istanbul

pre** 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 2005 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

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ISBN 978-1-61719-122-0

Printed in the United States of America

Portrait of Ali Ekrem Bey in Jerusalem (dedicated on the back to his friend Hiiseyin Hilmi Pa§a).

CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1: Introduction: The Ottoman Empire and the District of Jerusalem in Ekrem Bey's Time Chapter 2: The Life of Ali Ekrem Bey Chapter 3: Foreigners, the Christian Communities and the Holy Places Chapter 4: Zionism and Jewish Immigration (Aliya) Chapter 5: Jewish Settlement Chapter 6: The Sephardi Jewish Community Chapter 7: Bedouins and Villagers Chapter 8: Economic Activities Chapter 9: The Administration and the Administrative Apparatus Chapter 10: The Constitutional Order and the Arab Community Chapter 11: A Governor's Tribulations Chapter 12: Conclusion

9 13 25 33 55 73 83 93 105 119 135 145 163

Appendix: Documents 1. The Problem of the Holy Places and the Protection of the Powers

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2. The Jews and Their Immigration to Palestine

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3. The Settlement of the Bedouins in the Beersheba Region

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4. The Scarcity of Water in the District of Jerusalem

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5. A Request for the Trust of the Grand Vezir in the Riza Bey Affair

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6. A Letter of Slander Against the Governor

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7. An Appeal to the Sultan for Protection against Slanders

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8. Reactions in the Capital to Ekrem Bey's Moves

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9. An Appeal to Izzet Paja for Royal Protection against Informers' Reports (jurnals)

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10. Ekrem Bey's Appeal for the Help of His Friends

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11. Celebrating the Young Turk Revolution

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12. A Speech Praising the Revolution and Britain

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13. Ekrem Bey's "Testament": Jerusalem's Importance and the Danger in the Idea of Arab Independence

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14. Ekrem Bey's "Testament": Recommendations for Appointments

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15. A Request for Transfer from Jerusalem

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Bibliography Index

235 239

Preface This book offers a look at the city of Jerusalem and its administrative district (mutasarriflik) in the early years of the twentieth century through the eyes of its rulers, the Ottomans. It is based on official and private papers left us by Ali Ekrem Bey, who was Ottoman governor of the district of Jerusalem from December 1906 to August 1908, a very crucial time in the history of Palestine and the history of the Ottoman Empire as a whole. It was this governor's fate to serve in Jerusalem during the end of Sultan Abdiilhamid II's reign as well as during the first few weeks of the new Young Turk regime which followed. Both Abdiilhamid and the Young Turks had to cope with the growing threats to the territorial integrity and the very existence of the Empire stemming from outside European encroachment and from separatist movements within. Both sought, in different ways and, as it turned out in the end, unsuccessfully, to save it from final collapse. The challenge was felt well in Palestine, too, and particularly in its most important district, Jerusalem. European powers had long established their "presence" in the land, and some of them were positioning themselves for a possible division of the spoils once the Empire disintegrated. At the same time, increased Jewish immigration and settlement, on the one hand, and stirrings among the Arab population, on the other, threatened to create new problems of separatism which the Empire could ill afford. By the end of World War I, and the final demise of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was indeed to pass on to new rulers, the British, and begin a new phase in its history, marked by a bitter struggle between two nationalist movements. Ekrem Bey was the son of Namik Kemal, a central figure in the intellectual and political history of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and, prior to his appointment as governor, had been employed for eighteen years in the palace secretariat. From his seat in Jerusalem, he observed the events and developments in his district, reported on them to his superiors, carried out their orders and offered his own views as to how best to meet the challenges to Ottoman authority. His collection of papers, made up largely of reports, letters and memoranda he wrote or received, gives us a chance to look at that important chapter in the history of Jerusalem, and Palestine as a whole, from the point of view of the Ottoman masters. Such a chance has so far been quite rare since most histories and descriptions of Jerusalem and Palestine at the time have been based on European or local Jewish and Arab sources, and have, quite naturally, been influenced by their

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own particular outlook. In this case we are afforded the perspective of a high Ottoman official who himself was responsible for the affairs of the district and was well acquainted with its conditions. Ekrem Bey's collection of papers gives us the opportunity to learn much, and in detail, about the manner in which the authorities handled the district's affairs, the views of the officials involved and some of the personal issues which might have had a bearing on the events. In fact, the significance of the papers goes beyond the history of Palestine, for they shed much light on the inner workings of Ottoman government and administration at the time and give us a unique personal view of them by one of the actual "players". Ekrem Bey's collection of papers in the Israeli State Archives contains some 320 documents, the reason for this approximate figure being that in some cases it is impossible to determine whether certain documents are really separate or part of a single one. With few exceptions they all relate in one way or the other to Ekrem's term of office in Jerusalem and cover virtually all aspects of government and administration with which the governor had to deal. The vast majority are official letters and memoranda exchanged between Ekrem and his superiors or subordinates, but there are also documents as well as some private letters which he received from friends and relatives. The letters and memoranda the governor received are the original documents, while those which he sent out are drafts which he wrote and probably preserved as copies. The documents are of various sizes ranging from one page to twenty or more. They are mostly intact, although in some there are missing pages. Most of the documents are written in the bureaucratic Ottoman style, a style which by Ekrem's period had been greatly simplified, but was still intricate enough and contained a great many of the required formulas and honorific forms of address. Eleven are in French, usually letters sent to the governor by acquaintances who apparently felt more comfortable writing in French than in Turkish, and there are a few documents in Arabic, written by local Arab residents. Almost all the documents are handwritten, though many are written on printed forms or have printed letterheads. Those on printed forms are mostly cables received by the governor from Istanbul and they usually appear in code along with their deciphered text. Letterheads are of a great variety and correspond, of course, to the office which issued the document. Some documents, mostly drafts, carry the letterhead "Kemalzade", or son of Kemal. The handwriting in virtually all the documents is fairly clear, but Ekrem's drafts, mostly in his own handwriting, are replete with erasures and additions which sometimes makes their reading an arduous task.

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The division of the chapters in this book corresponds to the issues which were dealt with by Ekrem Bey and must have also been dealt with by all other governors of Jerusalem during the period. In each chapter an attempt has been made to first give a general background to the topic under discussion and then present Ekrem's own views and actions, based, in the main, on the contents of his papers but supplemented by information from other sources including the Ottoman and other archives. In order to bring the discussion to life and have Ekrem or, sometimes, his associates "speak for themselves", a selection of the documents, in translation, has also been included and appears in the appendix. The choice of documents has been made with two main criteria in mind — to offer a vivid picture of Ottoman views and activities in the broadest variety possible and to present examples of the different kinds of documents which are found in the collection. Their order generally follows the course of events but is not strictly chronological. The documents cited in the book are all from Ekrem Bey's collection at the Israeli State Archives unless otherwise indicated. Documents from this collection are indicated only by their number, while others list their archival source. In quoting or translating the documents in full, I have tried to simplify the style of writing as much as possible, sometimes breaking long and complex sentences into smaller phrases. I have also shortened long titles of honor and usually translated them into a uniform form such as "His Excellency" for the governor and his equals or superiors in the civil service, and "His Majesty" for the sultan-caliph. The transcription of Ottoman names and terms follows the accepted spelling in modern Turkish, but in certain cases, and especially when the reference is clearly to Arabs, transcription has been rendered according to the system used by the Encyclopedia of Islam without diacritics. References to the documents, both in the text itself and in the appendix, include as many details as it was possible to determine. They include, when they exist, the heading as it appears in the document itself, generally the name and title of the addressee; the name of writer, when not self evident; details on the kind of document it is; the date, which was generally the Ottoman fiscal (mali) one, along with its Gregorian equivalent; and the number of the document in Ekrem Bey's collection of papers in the archive. The various details are given the following symbols:

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c - copy ca - cable co - coded d-draft n.d. - no date n.no. - no number in the collection n.s. - no signature n.t. - no title p - private s - secret This work is a revised and expanded version of a book of mine which was published in Hebrew in 1995 by Yad Ben Zvi, Jerusalem, under the title Moshel Hayiti bi-Yerushalayim: Ha-Ir ve ha-Mahoz be-Eynav shel Ali Ekrem Bey, 1906-1908.1 would like to express my deepest thanks to my wife Shimona who was my partner in this project. She did the initial translation of the book into English and then edited all additions and revisions. She, as always, gave me enormous support and encouragement throughout all the phases of my work. D.K. Haifa, October 2005

1 INTRODUCTION: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE DISTRICT OF JERUSALEM IN EKREM BEY'S TIME By the time Ekrerri Bey took up his post as governor (mutasarrif) of the district of Jerusalem at the end of 1906, almost four hundred years of Ottoman rule in Palestine had already passed. This long period was not at all uniform in character. It saw the Ottoman Empire decline from a world power feared by all its neighbors into a weak state ('the sick man on the Bosphorus') desperately fighting for its own survival. European powers, sensing the change in Ottoman fortunes, hastened to take advantage of the Empire's weakness by making inroads into its territory, or, in the very least, securing from it important political and economic advantages for themselves. This encroachment upon Ottoman territorial integrity and sovereignty greatly increased in the nineteenth century and was accompanied by internal disintegration: liberal and nationalist ideas which had taken hold among the non-Turkish peoples in the Empire resulted in the growth of separatism, insurgencies, and a further loss of territories. Whether the onslaught was from the outside or from within, the Empire was continuously losing ground to its enemies and seemed well on the road toward its inevitable demise.1 In the race between the powers for positions of influence in the Empire, they were supported both by the communities of European citizens which had been established over the years in the different parts of the Empire and by the sultan's own non-Muslim subjects. Both were afforded the protection of the powers. The first were protected by conventions which ensured foreign citizens privileges (known as Capitulations) such as free entry and movement throughout the Empire, extensive immunity from Ottoman law , freedom from taxation, and payment of customs duties at fixed low rates. The others, though they held Ottoman citizenship, were afforded their protection by virtue of the "natural" feelings of solidarity and concern Christian powers showed their coreligionists (and other non-Muslims) living under Muslim rule. The powers intervened on their behalf whenever they On the history of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and during Ekrem Bey's period see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford, 1961; Stanford J. Shaw & E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 7808-1975, Cambridge, 1977. For European-Ottoman relations, specifically, see S.M Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923, London, 1966.

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felt that their safety was compromised and often supported separatist and nationalist movements among them. "Special relations" evolved especially between certain religious or ethnic groups and those powers with which they had common affinities and links. Such were the relations between France and the Catholic subjects of the Ottoman Empire or those between Russia and the Greek Orthodox community. In its struggle against invasion or rebellion, the Ottoman Empire, naturally enough, employed its military might, while at the same time attempting to strengthen its political standing by maneuvering between the conflicting aims of the various powers and trying to gain the support of at least some of them. But the Ottoman statesmen of the nineteenth century went beyond that. They believed that the state's very weakness lay in the fact that its institutions were outmoded, inefficient and corrupt and that in order to survive the Empire must modernize by drastically overhauling itself and adopting European models. A prerequisite for modernization was the elimination of the various forces which had over the years acquired enormous power in the state and had a vested interest in the perpetuation of the existing system. These forces, which included the Janissary infantry corps, the local chiefs and notables and some of the religious functionaries ( u l e m a ) , considerably limited the power of the sultans to introduce any change. It took the firm hand of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) to successfully break the opposition, restore the power of the Sultanate, and enable his heirs, Sultan Abdiilmecid (1839-1861) and Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876), to preside over the adoption of extensive reforms. He himself introduced significant reforms in the military and the bureaucracy, separating them from each other, reorganizing them along European patterns and providing them with expert, sometimes foreign, training. The period between 1839 and 1876 is known in Ottoman history as the period of the Tanzimat (reforms) during which, under the guidance of a number of enlightened and reform-minded statesmen, supported at times by the European powers themselves, western principles and institutions were incorporated into all spheres of government. Military and administrative modernization continued, while government activities were expanded to include new duties and responsibilities. New ministries and departments were created and special councils were assigned the task of initiating and supervising the necessary reforms — an important step toward establishing a separate legislative branch. An independent judicial system also gradually came into being and new codes of law, penal, commercial and civil, were

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adopted. The reforms also included the adoption of budgets and the overhauling of the taxation system. The land holding system was reorganized and steps were taken to register all immovable properties throughout the Ottoman domains. The state for the first time undertook to further economic development and provide necessary services to the population. A new state educational system was organized and measures were taken to establish hospitals and public health facilities. The provincial system was reorganized along modern lines and municipal bodies were set up. Both at the center and in the provinces the principle of popular participation in government and administration was gradually implemented and representatives of the population were brought in to advise officials and provide some supervision on state affairs. The most important aspect of the Tanzimat reforms was the formal abolition of the state's traditional legal distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims no longer had to pay special taxes (except for one imposed in lieu of military service); they were admitted to government service, state schools and all public institutions and were treated equally in courts under the same laws. This was done not only in order to appease the powers protecting the non-Muslims in the Empire, but primarily in order to halt the continuous process of disintegration which threatened the territorial integrity of the Empire. By giving non-Muslims legal equality and representation in state institutions it was hoped they might feel themselves part of the society around them, become loyal citizens, and desist from separatist activities. It is true that the Tanzimat were not always properly applied and, as it turned out, did not arrest the process of territorial loss and disintegration. But the period of reform did considerably change the face of the Ottoman Empire and brought it closer to what was then considered to be a modern state. The last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth — the years in which Ekrem received his education and his first experience in the civil service — were dominated by the rule of Sultan Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909) and, for the most part, were a direct continuation of the preceding period. During the early years of this period war and rebellion (ending with the Treaty of Berlin, 1878) led to the loss of almost all the Empire's territories in the Balkans as well as others in Eastern Anatolia, and, while the following three decades were relatively peaceful, the ominous signs of disintegration were in evidence everywhere. European powers continued to prepare for the final division of the spoils once the Empire collapsed, and nationalist separatist movements spread among the remaining subject-peoples of the Empire to include not only Christians but non-Turkish Muslims, as

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well. The sultan's government continued its struggle to ensure the survival and integrity of the state by using all the methods at its disposal — force, diplomacy, and concerted steps towards modernization. Important strides were made during the period, particularly in the fields of judicial reform, railway construction, the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources, the development of a modern educational system and the expansion of municipal services. What characterized the period most of all were policies strongly identified with the sultan himself and meant to ensure the loyalty of the population to the state and the throne. One was Abdiilhamid's "Pan Islamic" policy. By drawing religious figures into his court, fostering Islamic institutions and projects, and asserting his position not only as sultan of the Ottomans but also as the caliph of all the Muslims of the world, Abdiilhamid aimed to preserve and promote the loyalty of all his Muslim subjects, Turks and non-Turks alike. At the same time he created a highly centralist and autocratic regime designed to strengthen his control over his imperial domains and instill obedience in the citizens. To be sure, his first act following his ascension to the throne in 1876 had been to promulgate a new liberal constitution, which was an answer to the violent insurgencies which were then taking place in the Balkans, to European intervention in support of reforms, and to the pressure put on the sultan by a group of liberal intellectuals known as the Young Ottomans. However, the sultan soon dissolved the newly elected parliament and suspended the constitution, claiming that the new liberties threatened the well-being of the state. In the coming years his rule degenerated into tyranny with all its familiar characteristics — the establishment of strict censorship, the creation of a secret police, and the cruel and arbitrary persecution of political opponents. The center of power at the time lay not in the government itself, but in the palace, where a small group of favorites collected around the autocratic sultan. The sultan's centralist and autocratic rule led directly to the Young Turk revolution in 1908. Organized opposition groups, primarily intellectuals and students from Istanbul's institutions of higher learning, had already banded into underground cells in the late 1880's. Concluding that the sultan's tyranny was the source of all the state's ills, and drawing inspiration from the Young Ottomans before them, they called for a return to constitutional government. When the secret police clamped down on them, some fled to Europe or to Egypt and established emigré groups disseminating their ideas at home through journals that they smuggled into the Empire. In time, these ideas began to make headway among army officers who went on to organize their own secret societies. An organization uniting most of the Young Turk groups

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based either in Europe or within the Empire was formed in 1907 under the name of the Committee (later Society) of Union and Progress. Spurred into action by growing pressure from the government and by the dire crises facing the state, Turkish officers in Macedonia, in July 1908, finally sent an ultimatum to the sultan demanding the immediate return of constitutional rule. Abdiilhamid had no choice but to acquiesce to their demands, reactivate the constitution, and call for new elections. His period of tyranny had clearly come to an end, and a spirit of exhilaration swept throughout the Empire. For many there were now new hopes and expectations for more freedom and equality while those who had been struggling all along for the survival of the state saw the fall of the regime as giving the Empire a new lease on life. The revolution, however, actually heralded the Empire's final collapse. European encroachment did not stop, nor did the rebelliousness of the non Turkish peoples still residing within the Empire's borders. The new rulers of the state, mostly associated with the Committee of Union and Progress, were committed to the preservation of the Empire's independence and territorial integrity. They sought to accomplish their goal by enhancing unity in the population and embarking upon comprehensive modernization. But they were almost continuously engaged in fighting wars and suppressing revolts and gradually reverted to a more authoritarian and repressive rule which in turn could only increase the alienation of much of the population. In the end, they could not hold the Empire together. Territories were lost one by one and by the end of World War I, which the Empire entered on the side of Germany, Turks were left with little more than their capital Istanbul and their old Anatolian homeland. The six-hundred year old Ottoman Empire had finally met its end. Developments in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century inevitably left their mark on Palestine, as well. 1 Being the site of the Christian holy places, foreign presence was even more evident in Palestine

A general history of Palestine in English is James Parkes, Palestine, 135 A.D. to Modern Times, London, 1949. On the nineteenth century see Donna Robinson Divine, Politics and Society in Ottoman Palestine: The Arab Struggle for Survival and Power. Boulder, 1994. On aspects of change in Palestine in specific periods in the nineteenth century see Moshe Ma'oz, Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861, Oxford, 1968; Alexandre Scholch, Palestine in Transformation, 1856-1888: Social, Economic and Political Development, Washington, D.C., 1993. On foreign presence in Palestine see Alex Carmel, "The Activities of the European Powers in Palestine, 1799-1914", Asian and African Studies, 19 (1985), pp. 43-91. Among works treating individual powers' interests see Abdul Latif Tibawi, British Interests in Palestine, 1800-1901: A Study of Religious and Educational Enterprise, London, 1961; Derek Hopwood, The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine: Church and Politics in the Near East, 1843-1914. Oxford, 1969; Theofanis G. Stavrou, Russian Interests in Palestine, 1882-1914, Thessaloniki, 1963. For a selection of

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than in other regions of the Empire. This presence increased with the expansion of means of travel and as security conditions in the area improved. Pilgrims and tourists, clergymen and missionaries, researchers and businessmen arrived in Palestine in ever increasing numbers, and some stayed on to form small communities. The country began to be dotted with a host of new foreign institutions — churches, monasteries, missions, schools, hospitals, hostels, businesses and settlements. Consuls and vice-consuls were posted to the central towns of Palestine in order to protect their citizens and their institutions and ensure that their rights and privileges were preserved. At the same time, some of the European powers developed strong aspirations in Palestine, which stemmed from historical, strategic and commercial considerations and which often led to acute competition between them. These aspirations were not necessarily connected with the influx of their nationals to the Holy Land insofar as these mostly arrived out of personal, not political, motives. The powers, however, in their bid to enhance their position in Palestine as well as gain prestige internationally, sought to advance the causes of their own nationals and expand their presence and standing in the country. For the same reason, they ardently offered their "protection" to some of the local non-Muslim communities. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the rivalry was primarily between the British and the French. British interest resulted from Palestine's proximity to the land and sea routes connecting Britain with its colonies in Asia. But the French also had great interest in Palestine and its environs, both because of France's old commercial ties with the Levant and Egypt and because of France's traditional position as the protector of the Catholics and the holy places which were under their control. A number of confrontations ensued as the direct result of this competition. Napoleon Bonaparte, the commander of the "Eastern Army", who was sent to the region in order to undermine Britain's position there, attempted in 1799 to extend his rule from Egypt northward towards Syria and Palestine. He was stopped at the walls of Acre, in no small part thanks to the aid which the British gave the Ottomans. Mehmed Ali, Egypt's ambitious and, in effect, independent governor, who ruled Syria and Palestine for almost a decade (1832-1840) and was France's protégé, posed yet another challenge to British interests. He was finally made to withdraw through the joint efforts of the Ottomans, the British, and other European powers. However, the coming years witnessed a rapprochement between Britain and France, when the latter began to face the growing

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influence and competition of Russia which saw herself as the protector of the Greek Orthodox Church. Thé Crimean War (1853-1856), which erupted over a disagreement between Latins and Greeks in the holy places, ended in France and Britain's victory over Russia. For a while there was a considerable rise in French influence in Palestine and in the Ottoman Empire as a whole. It soon declined, however, reflecting France's diminished stature in Europe, and France found herself once again in stiff competition with other powers. By the end of the century more European powers had joined the race for presence and influence in Palestine. A new contender was Germany who began displaying imperial ambitions of her own and had a special interest in enhancing her position in the Ottoman Empire with which she entered into a relationship of close friendship and cooperation. At the same time, Palestine's importance for Britain greatly increased as a result of the opening of the Suez Canal, the purchase of a portion of the Suez Canal Company shares by the British government, and, finally, the occupation of Egypt in 1882. Britain viewed the affairs of Palestine as being inexorably linked to the protection of Egypt and the Canal, as well as other alternative routes of communication to the East. She rightly suspected the sultan of wishing to dispossess her of her standing in Egypt and an Ottoman attack from the north (as indeed happened later during the World War) was a specter not to be ruled out. For Britain, Palestine now became something of a "security zone" and if she could not make it her exclusive sphere of influence she was certainly not prepared to allow a build-up of her rivals' interests in the area, particularly those of Germany. The interest shown by Britain in 1902-1903 in the Zionist project of settling Jews in the al-Arish region in northern Sinai clearly demonstrated her wish to have a friendly entity separating between Egypt and Palestine. Likewise Britain displayed forceful determination in having the whole Sinai Peninsula recognized as Egypt's. When, in the spring of 1906, the sultan sent his troops to Taba, on the eastern coast of Sinai, Britain reacted with an ultimatum which would have led to war had the sultan not decided to give in to pressure and withdraw his forces. Ekrem arrived in Jerusalem not too long after the incident had ended and after the "dividing line" between the district and Sinai was drawn by a joint commission. Palestine also underwent the same process of modernization which was taking place elsewhere in the Empire. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Palestine was still a relatively unimportant region within the Empire. It was governed by semi-independent governors, afflicted with internal conflicts between local chiefs and village shaykhs, and vulnerable to Bedouin marauders. It was poor and backward. However, with the beginning of

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Egyptian rule, and particularly in the second half of the century, a significant change in conditions occurred as modernization began to permeate every facet of life in the country. The change was, at least in part, a result of the greater European presence as well as the appearance of new waves of Jewish immigration into Palestine. The impact of these two groups was particularly evident in the boost they gave to all spheres of the economy, but also in the establishment of new schools, public health facilities and other services, affecting, in one way or the other, the entire population of Palestine. But the Ottoman authorities made their own significant contribution to modernization. The establishment of law and order naturally constituted a precondition to any sort of progress at all. Security had improved somewhat during the Egyptian occupation, but degenerated once again with the return of the Ottomans in 1840, particularly in the hill areas of Nablus, Judea, and Hebron. Rural shaykhs and their Bedouin allies fought each other for supremacy or else rose up against any attempt by the government to impose its own central authority. However, the Ottomans, with the assistance of their new army, gradually suppressed the disorders and reestablished their control over the land. With security and stability restored, the Ottomans went on to introduce into Palestine all the new regulations and institutions associated with the Tanzimat. In Palestine, as elsewhere in the Empire, the administrative apparatus was overhauled and expanded, and new duties were undertaken by the state. Land registration was introduced according to the new land law, the taxation system was revised, new roads were laid, and the post and telegraph network was made to reach all major centers. State schools and public hospitals and clinics were established in major centers. Provincial administrative councils were created to advise and supervise local governors, and municipal bodies were formed in the larger towns. In these bodies, as well as in public commissions created for specific purposes, the principle of population representation was applied, though in the restricted manner characteristic of the Tanzimat. New state courts were also established at the different provincial centers to apply the new codes of law introduced during the period, and the principle of legal equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, if not always implemented in full, was gradually accepted as the rule of the land. By the end of the nineteenth century Palestine was not only a more secure and stable area, but it possessed the infrastructure of a modern administration. Furthermore, the conditions were established for further economic development, and the population as a whole began to enjoy a life significantly better than that of previous generations.

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The Hamidian period in Palestine was the one which witnessed the emergence of modern Zionism and the increasing waves of Jewish immigration (aliya), posing a new challenge for the Ottoman government. The authorities viewed Jewish immigrants, most of whom retained their foreign citizenship and benefited from the protection of one European power or another, as a further threat to their sovereignty in the area. Added to this was their concern with the very aspirations of Zionism, although these seemed at first to be unattainable. As a result the Ottomans began, from the start of the so-called First Aliya, in the 1880's, to initiate measures which would limit the entry of Jews into Palestine as well as their right to purchase lands. Gradually the Ottoman authorities came to face yet another challenge, as feelings of alienation began to sprout in the Arab population of Palestine, as they did in the neighboring provinces. The sultan, in line with his pan-Islamic policy, took great pains to enhance his position in the eyes of the Arab populace by establishing and embellishing religious institutions and by courting the favor of Arab notables. He also carried out important development projects. Even before Ekrem's arrival in Palestine, the JaffaJerusalem rail line had been completed (1892) as well as the one from Haifa to Damascus (1905), part of the Hijazi railway project. Likewise, the town of Beersheba had already been founded as a center for the settlement of the Bedouins of the Negev and presented to them as a mark of the sultan's benevolence. These projects were to make their own significant contribution to the development of the coastal areas and the southern part of the country. When the Young Turk revolution broke out in July 1908, reactions in Palestine did not essentially differ from those in other areas in the Empire. While the wider sections of the Muslim population, largely loyal to the sultan-caliph, may have remained indifferent, there were many who cherished hopes for change and a better future for themselves and expressed their feelings through demonstrations and festivities. The new order could mean more influence for notables and local leaders over their own affairs, more equality and security for non Muslims, and, for the Jews, perhaps a better chance to realize their nationalist goals. As future developments were to show, realities did not always conform to expectations. When Ekrem arrived at his post as governor (mutasamj) of Jerusalem in December 1906 he found a district which, according to Ottoman statistics, was home to some 330,000 inhabitants, of whom some 82% were Muslim and the rest Christian (12%) and Jewish (6%). These figures are usually regarded as undercounts because they did not include groups such as nomads

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and foreign residents.1 The city of Jerusalem itself had a population of about 50,000, the majority of whom were Jewish, both Ottoman citizens and foreigners. 2 The district comprised much of central and southern Palestine. It included the Judean Hills, the Judean Desert, the southern coastal plain, and the northern Negev, an area of some 20,000 km 2 . Its borders were: in the north, along a line stretching in a general east-west direction from a point several kilometers north of Jericho to one north of Jaffa, the district of Nablus, which belonged to the province (vilayet) of Beirut; in the east, along the Jordan River, the Dead Sea, and the Arava, the district of Karak which belonged to the province of Syria; in the south, a part of the district of Karak as well as the Egyptian Sinai; and in the west, the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. In accordance with the provincial administration laws of the Tanzimat, the district ( m u t a s a m f l i k ) was divided into subdistricts (sing: kaza or kaymakamlik), each headed by a kaymakam who was also appointed by Istanbul. 3 The subdistricts, for their part, were divided into "communes" (sing: nahiye), and villages (sing: karye), headed by a mtidir and a muhtar, respectively, elected by the local population. During Ekrem's term, the subdistricts included in the district of Jerusalem were Jerusalem (the central subdistrict), Jaffa, Gaza, Hebron, Beersheba, and Nazareth. Nazareth had been newly incorporated into the district. It was detached in 1906 from the district of Acre, in order to facilitate the movement of pilgrims while visiting the holy places and maintained this status until 1909, when it was incorporated once again into the district of Acre. In 1908 a new subdistrict, Hafir, was added, the result of Ekrem's own initiative, though it was to serve more as a border station than a civilian subdistrict. Each of the administrative units, beginning with the district itself, had its own departments and officials as set down by the law and in conformity with its rank. 1 Justin McCarthy, "Population of the Ottoman Fertile Crescent," a paper submitted to the conference on the Economic History of the Middle East, Haifa 1980, pp. 18-21. Cuinet's figure, at the close of the nineteenth century, was 341, 638. Vital Cuinet, Syrie, Liban et Palestine, Paris, 1896, p. 520. The discrepancy between the figures stems partly from the fact that Cuinet probably also includes foreign citizens. See also Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population, 18301914, Madison, 1985. 2 Estimate according to Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, "The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine During the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century, According to Western Sources", in Moshe Ma'oz (ed.), Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period, Jerusalem, 1979, pp. 4969; U.O. Schmelz, "Population Characteristics of Jerusalem and Hebron Regions According to Ottoman Census of 1905," in Gad G. Gilbar (ed.), Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914: Studies in Economic and Social History, Leiden, 1990, pp. 15-67. 3

O n the administration of the district of Jerusalem during Ekrem Bey's time see Haim Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 1890-1914, Berlin, 1985. On administrative divisions in Jerusalem, and in Palestine generally, see my "The Administration of the Districts of Palestine, According to the Ottoman Yearbooks, 1864-1914", Osmanli Ara§tirmalari, 18 (1998), pp. 125-141.

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If the district of Jerusalem was like any other in its internal structure, it was, however, unique in that it was not part Of a larger province but was a so-called administratively "independent" district, directly linked to the Ministry of Interior in Istanbul. 1 This status was formally confirmed in 1874 after two years of deliberations. From the beginning of Ottoman rule in the sixteenth century the districts of Palestine had been dependent on centers outside Palestine's boundaries, such as Damascus and Sidon (Sayda), and the governors of these districts were responsible to governor generals (valis) serving in those cities. This dependence of the districts of Palestine on centers outside its borders was reinstated when Ottoman rule returned to Palestine following the Egyptian occupation in the 1830's. Palestine as a whole was then incorporated within the province of Beirut and later transferred to the new province of Syria (centered in Damascus) which was established following the provincial law of 1864. Jerusalem's new status resulted primarily from the authorities' realization that special conditions existed there, making the region especially sensitive and requiring direct supervision from the capital. For one, Egypt's partial independence and its record of expansionism in the nineteenth century made Palestine a vulnerable border region and enhanced the importance of its internal and external security. Secondly, the growing foreign presence in Palestine, along with the special sensitivity attached to the holy places, necessitated the authorities' careful attention for the prevention of incidents and for the maintenance of a proper balance between the powers. The Ottoman government had already experimented several times in the past in turning Jerusalem into a full fledged province (vilayet), linking it directly to the central government, but opted in favor of maintaining its status as a mutasarriflik. In effect, it kept this status even after 1874, but the district was treated very much like a vilayet, and its governor — as a vali, without officially bestowing these titles. Due both to Jerusalem's importance and to its administrative independence, it was not surprising that Ekrem viewed his appointment as mutasamf of Jerusalem as an important step in his own personal advancement. As governor of this important district Ekrem

was to face several

difficult tasks. He had, first of all, to oversee the day-to-daty administration of the district and to supervise its junior governors and officials, to look after internal security to collect taxes and transfer the revenues to Istanbul, and to encourage the district's economic development for the material benefit of the

' Butrus Abu Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in the Late 19th Century", in Gabriel Ben-Dor (ed.), The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict, Tel-Aviv, 1976, pp. 2132.

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population, as well as that of the treasury. Most importantly, he had to keep this very important district safely in Ottoman hands and foil whatever ambitions and designs for influence and control might come from either the foreign powers or the local population. Ekrem's memoranda and letters clearly reflect the way in which the governor dealt with all these matters, the ideas which he proposed for better governing and administering the district and the degree to which he succeeded in fulfilling the very difficult goals set for him by the state.

2 THE LIFE OF ALIEKREM BEY Ali Ekrem Bey was born in Istanbul on August 2, 1867. 1 He was the only son of Namik Kemal, one of the foremost Turkish poets, playwrights and thinkers of the nineteenth century, a central figure in the Young Ottoman movement, and much revered to our own day both for his passionate patriotism and his constitutional ideas. 2 The movement rose as a protest against Tanzimat leaders who through their continuous capitulation to the pressure of the great powers, their autocratic practices, and their indiscriminate borrowings from alien European principles and customs were seen as being responsible for the Empire's continued misfortunes and the disruption of its social order. A constitutional government, Kemal and his associates believed, would at one and the same time, ensure the equality of all Ottoman subjects, strengthen the state against infringements upon its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and bridge the gap between the rulers and the people. Disseminating their ideas in the fast developing press and engaging in various conspirational activities, the Young Ottomans soon attracted the attention of the authorities and were met with repression. When Ali Ekrem was born, his father had already fled to Europe, where he continued, along with others, to write and maintain his contact with opposition groups at home. In 1870 he was permitted to return to Istanbul, but the authorities kept him under close watch and occasionally arrested or exiled him — methods commonly used against political opponents. When Sultan Abdulaziz was deposed in 1876, Kemal finally had his day, and he was invited to participate in the formulation of the new constitutional order. However, when the constitution was suspended and the parliament dissolved by Sultan Abdtilhamid in the following year, he fell out of favor with the authorities once again, and was condemned to actual exile as governor (mutasarrif) of various Aegean islands — first in Mitylene, then Rhodes, and finally Chios, where he died in 1888. ' Oil Ali Ekrem see Ismail Parlatir, Ali Ekrem Bolayir, Ankara, 1987. Sketches on his life appear in encyclopedias and newspaper articles. Toward the end of his life Ekrem began to write his memoirs but they were never completed. What he did write covers more or less the early period of his life and his years in the palace. They were edited and published by Metin Kayahan Ozgiil under the title of Ali Ekrem Bolayir'in Hatiralari, Ankara, 1991. Interesting details of his life up to the First World War, including his years in Jerusalem, appear in his daughter Selma Ekrem's book, Unveiled: The Autobiography of a Turkish Girl, New York, 1930. On Namik Kemal and the Young Ottomans see Lewis, Emergence, pp. 113-140; §erif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, Princeton, 1962, pp. 283-336.

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Ali Ekrem (named after the poet Recaizade Ekrem, a close friend of Kemal) was thus destined to spend much of his early childhood under the sole care of his mother, Nesime, and his paternal grandfather, Mustafa Asim Bey. It was only after Namik Kemal's return to Istanbul in 1876 that father and son could be together for any length of time, and Ekrem joined him later during his wanderings from one Aegean island to the other. His education was consequently irregular. While in Istanbul he was enrolled for a while in the military higher elementary school (rii§diye) in the Fatih quarter, but he later received much of his education from private tutors. Among other subjects, he studied Arabic, Persian and French. These languages were considered compulsory for educated Turks at the time. Arabic and Persian were not studied for conversation purposes but were part of the cultural-religious Islamic heritage and were very important for competence in literary Turkish which drew on them for much of its vocabulary and grammatical structure. French, in which he became completely fluent, was the gateway to European civilization and an important vehicle for contacts with foreigners. Accordingly, the knowledge of French was considered as necessary for all members of the upper echelons of the Ottoman civil service. In the year 1888, when Namik Kemal died, Ekrem was twenty-one. Kemal had already approached Abdiilhamid for help in furthering his son's education in Europe. The sultan, however, decided to appoint him instead to his Palace Secretariat (Mabeyn Ba^kitabet Dairesi) and Ekrem learnt of his appointment on the day of his father's funeral. It might be strange that the son of a leading opponent like Kemal was appointed by the sultan as his own employee and in his own office, but Kemal, toward the end of his life, seems to have made peace with Abdiilhamid. Indeed Kemal was a member of a longstanding family of officials with high reputation, counting among his ancestors Topal Pa§a the grand vezir of Sultan Mahmud I in the eighteenth century. Shifts in relations between the sultan and his men, with frequent ups and downs in the fortunes of high officials, were very much in the Ottoman tradition. Besides, it is quite conceivable that Abdiilhamid preferred to have Ekrem as his loyal protégé in the palace, rather than risk his going the way of his father and joining the opposition to his rule. Ekrem was to remain in the Mabeyn for eighteen years, working later under the overall supervision of Abdiilhamid's well known chief secretaries and collaborators, Head Secretary Tahsin Paga1 and Second Secretary izzet

'The head secretary (ba$katib) was the main liaison between the palace and the Ottoman government. Tahsin Pa§a was appointed in 1895.

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Paga. 1 His work was largely clerical, and as he is careful to relate in his memoirs, he, and his colleagues, never engaged in the personal recriminations and conspiracies which were going on around the ever suspicious and autocratic sultan. 2 He writes that he was critical of the autocratic and oppressive ways of the sultan and some of his confidants 3 but he must have been successful in hiding his feelings and, at least outwardly, showed unwavering loyalty and devotion to his master. His superiors placed a great deal of confidence in him and he steadily rose in both rank and salary, and, as customary in the Ottoman civil service at the time, he also frequently received decorations and medals. 4 It was during this period that Ekrem established his own family. He married Celile, the daughter of a senior Ottoman officer, Celal Pa§a, and had four children, a son, Mehmed Cezmi, and three daughters, Masume, Selma, and Beraet. At the end of 1906 there was a sudden change in the sultan's attitude toward Ekrem, brought about, it seems, by a conspiracy against him perpetrated by Abdiilhamid's daughter. 5 Ekrem, who understood that he must resign and distance himself from the capital, asked for the position of governor of Jerusalem. Jerusalem had for some time been assigned to palace employees, and some of Ekrem's colleagues at the Mabeyn among whom was his predecessor, Ahmed Re§id Bey, had also served in Jerusalem as their first gubernatorial position. 6 Because of the enhanced importance of the district it was considered by them as a coveted prize. Ekrem's request was granted and The sultan's second secretary was at the outset a kind of assistant to the head secretary, but the position grew in importance following the appointment of Ahmed Izzet Pa§a al-Abid in 1893. Izzet was an Arab born in Damascus and had been a member of the judicial system. He became a confidant of the sultan and acted as head of the staff and as one other liaison, besides the head secretary, between the palace and the government. Among his many assignments was the managing of the Hijaz Railway project. 2 Ozgiil, Bolayir'in Hatiralari, pp. 329 ff. Ibid, pp. 368 ff.; Selma Ekrem, Unveiled, p. 11. 4 For a detailed list of his promotions, see his curriculum vitae. "Special Stationery for Writing Curriculum Vitaes..." 12 April 1323/25 April 1907 (no. 130). The document also contains an addendum, dated 22 September 1325/5 October 1909, to cover Ekrem's first term in the province of the Mediterranean Islands. Selma Ekrem, Unveiled, pp. 37-41. Two of them left us their memoirs. Mehmed Tevfik Bey served as mutasarrif of the district from October 1897 to May 1901. His memoirs were published posthumously: Bir Devlet Adamimn Mehmet Tevfik Beyin (Biren) II Abdulhamid Me§rutiyet ve Mtitareke Devri Hatiralari (ed. by F. Rezan Hurmen), 2 vols., Istanbul, 1993 (hereafter Tevfik Beyin Hatiralari). The chapter on his experiences in Jerusalem is in vol. 1, pp. 73-150. Tevfik relates his own efforts to leave the Mabeyn and be appointed to Jerusalem (p. 62). Ahmed Regid Bey served from August 1904 to December 1907. His memoirs were published after World War II. Ahmet Regit Rey, Canh Tarihler: Gorduklerim Yaptiklarim, 1890-1922, Istanbul, 1946 (hereafter Rey, His period in Jerusalem is discussed in pp. 82-102. On the GordUklerim Yaptiklarim). experiences of all three governors see my article "Jerusalem in the Eyes of Three Ottoman Governors at the End of the Hamidian Period", Middle Eastern Studies, 35, 2 (1999), pp. 83102. Ekrem's relations with Re§id seem to have been impaired because of his role in removing him from his post in Jerusalem. See Document 6. By contrast he kept his friendship with Tevfik and sent him his good wishes. Tevfik's response: "To His Excellency the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem," ca, 28 January 1322/10 February 1907 (no. 210).

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his appointment was issued on 2 December 1906. His actual term began on 19 December and he was to serve in this position until 13 August 1908, a total of one year, seven months and 27 days. 1 All along he was formally subordinate to the Sublime Porte ( B a b - i Ali),2 that is to the Grand Vezirate occupied then by Mehmed Ferid Pa§a,3 and on a lesser level - to the Ministry of Interior. He continued, however, to address his former palace superiors - as was customary - on a variety of matters, especially those which were politically sensitive and those which were of a personal nature. Very soon, as is clearly seen from his correspondence, Ekrem was able to learn of the particularly difficult problems Jerusalem presented to an Ottoman governor and had to live through some very difficult personal experiences. These sapped all his energies and his earlier enthusiasm and he gradually made up his mind to resign. The Young Turk revolution in July 1908 and its repercussions in his district only strengthened his determination and presented him with the right opportunity. 4 He was given permission to leave his post, and he was appointed instead as the governor (vali) of the province of Beirut. He stayed there for only a few days, and, unable to tolerate the turbulence which had engulfed the city in the wake of the revolution, resigned once again and returned with his family to Istanbul. It was not long before Ekrem received a new appointment — this time as governor of the province of the Mediterranean Islands (Cezair-i Bahr-i Sefid). It seems that the Committee of Union and Progress, now the main power behind the government, found it difficult to make up its mind regarding Ekrem. He had been, on the one hand, a loyal servant of the tyrannical sultan Abdiilhamid, but was, on the other, the son of the great Namik Kemal, from whom all the Young Turks drew their inspiration. 5 It is not clear, therefore, whether his appointment as governor came as a mark of continued confidence, a tribute to the name of his father, or else as an act of exile-the latter being the version of Ekrem himself. 6 Whatever the case, he remained in this post for 1 "Special Form for Official Reports...", 1 August 1324/14 August 1908 (no. 37). Document of appointment dated 19 November 1322/2 December 1906 is in iradeler-Dahiliye, 325/3 16L(§evval)-1324, Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi (hereafter BBA). 2'|'he Sublime Porte is the term used to designate the official residence and office of the grand vezirs of the Ottoman Empire from the seventeenth century onwards. Outside the Ottoman Empire it was often used in reference to the Ottoman government generally. ^Mehmed Ferid Paja "Avlonyah" served as grand vezir ("prime minister") between 19031908. On 22 July 1908 he was replaced by Mehmed Said Paga, succeeded on 4 August by Mehmed Kamil Pa§a. 4 S e e below, Chapter 12. ^Rumors circulated for a long time that he was considered for a ministerial post. "To His Majesty" from Tevfik, p. 28, November 1324/11 December 1908 (no. 165). ^Ozgtil, Bolayir'in Hatiralari, p. 432

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a little over a year and was recalled to Istanbul in September 1909. He was to serve one more time in this same post as an appointee of the liberal government in August 1912, but with the outbreak of the first Balkan War, he soon found himself with an occupied province and as a prisoner of the Greeks. He returned to Istanbul and soon resigned from the civil service. With the Unionists back in power from early 1913, there was little opportunity for him anymore and, as it turned out, never again did he serve in an administrative position. As fate would have it, he ended his government career in the same place as his father — in the Aegean Islands. Ali Ekrem is better known in Turkey as a poet and author than a civil servant. Among Ottoman officials literary inclination had long been common, and Ekrem in his career both as an official and a literateur well represented the close bond between the two pursuits. His penchant for writing — no doubt inspired by his father — became apparent in his youth, and he published his first poems in a variety of journals under the nom de plume A. Nadir. He became close to the literary school known as the Edebiyat-i Cedide (New Literature) which gathered around the journal Servet-i Ftinun and was characterized by its linguistic conservatism and imitation of French symbolism. Later he felt no qualms about criticizing them strongly, and he himself began to write in a more simple style and on topics drawn from the life of the people. During the First World War and the War of Independence he became known for his patriotic poems. Ekrem never attained the stature and reputation of his father, but he was a prolific writer, well integrated into literary circles and certainly with his own impact on cultural life in his time. 1 In his correspondence as a civil servant he sometimes betrayed his literary proclivities, reverting here and there to almost poetical expression. 2 Following his public service career, Ekrem found employment in teaching. When he ended his first term as governor of the province of the Mediterranean Islands, he began teaching literature at the University of Istanbul (Dartilfiinun) and returned there after his final resignation from the civil service. He also taught literature at the famous Galatasaray high school. Later, however, he fell out with the government and was forced to resign his teaching posts. He resumed teaching in 1923, following the victory of the nationalists, but was dismissed once again in 1933 as a result of reforms in the university. His last years found him in financial straits and he was forced to teach in high school and do some private tutoring. ' For a list of his writings see "Bolayir, Ali Ekrem", Turk Ansiklopedisi, vol. 1, p. 457. ^Witness, for example, his description of the Jaffa port. Document 3.

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Seeing little reward both in his public service career and his teaching, Ekrem experienced little joy in his family life, as well. His only son, Cezmi, who showed a particular talent for music, took his own life in 1917, at the age of 21, as a result of unrequited love. His daughter Masume married three times before she died of typhus in Egypt in 1927, at the age of 28. These tragic events greatly affected Ekrem's nerves and spirit, and while he continued his writing to the end, he gave himself more and more to heavy drinking. On 27 August 1937 he died of cancer in Istanbul at the age of 70. Two years before his death, with the passing of the law on family names, he chose the name Bolayir, after the town near Galipoli where he had buried his illustrious father, Namik Kemal, almost a half a century earlier. Consisting mostly of official letters and memoranda, there is little in the collection of papers Ekrem left us which concerns his private life. Whatever does exist appears mostly in the private letters which he received from friends and relatives in Istanbul to whom he turned for help against the intrigues instigated against him. Besides letting him know of their activities on his behalf, and offering him advice, they would at times report of other events of a personal nature. They help us, generally, to identify the close circle of friends and relatives Ekrem left behind in Istanbul and in whom he had the utmost trust. 1 Other documents have to do with personal, yet more formal, aspects of his life as an official. His curriculum vitae of 1907, for example, contains all the promotions, pay rises, decorations and medals which he received while serving in his various posts. 2 As was customary, Ekrem also received from the Administrative Council (Meclis-i Idare) of Jerusalem, 3 as well as that of the province of the Mediterranean Islands, an official attestation as to his performance as governor. On the eve of his departure for Jerusalem, Ekrem's salary was raised from 8,240 to 10,000 kuru$,4 but he complained that this salary could not be ' See below, Chapter 11. ^"Special Stationery for Writing Curriculum Vitaes...", 12 April 1323/25 April 1907 (no. 130). 3 The Administrative Council, a product of the Tanzimat reforms, was chaired by the governor and composed of the high officials of the district and of elected representatives of the population. Its tasks were mostly to deliberate and give counsel on administrative matters. Such administrative councils were in the three highest levels of administrative divisions, vilayet, mutasarriflik and kaza. ^'Special Stationery for Writing Curriculum Vitaes...", 12 April 1323/25 April 1907 (no. 130). Kurui; was the official Ottoman coin unit at the time, and the most common unit was the silver mecidiye worth 20 kuru§. 108 k.uru$ were worth one gold lira which was about 1.11 to the pound sterling.

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considered a raise in relation to his previous salary and that it would not suffice to cover his expenses. He requested that, as had been done with his predecessor, he be permitted to supervise the Imperial Estates (Arazi-yi Seniye) in Jericho with pay from the Privy Treasury at a salary of 5,000 1 kunq. This request was granted in part, and he was to be paid a total sum of 12,000 kuru§ as well as an additional sum of 2,000 as the honorary president of the Imperial Estates Commission. 2 A secret allocation was also given to Ekrem, as the chief upholder of the interests of the state and the regime in the district. In this capacity he had to cover special expenses and payments, which were outside the regular budget at his disposal. This allocation was probably used to pay secret informers and perhaps even the whole secret police organization (hafiye)? Among the communications between the center and Istanbul, many of which were classified anyway, there are also those which report on the findings of this organization. Questions of pay and subsistence continued to plague Ottoman officials long after a modern system of salaries was introduced during the period of reform. Salaries were often not sufficient and taxation, cuts and delays caused many hardships. It was, in addition, Sultan Abdiilhamid's practice to deliberately maintain the low levels of compensation and the irregularities which went along with them in order to increase the dependency of the officials on him. Special assignments and allocations were made by the sultan with the same purpose, and it is very likely that Ekrem's additional payment for his service at the Imperial Estates as well as his secret allocation were in the nature of these types of compensation. 4

n.t. [To the sultan?], c, n.d. (no. 152); "Ekrem my Brother," p, 12 February 1322/25 February 1907 (no. 52). Ekrem's brother-in-law, Rifat, also kept him informed of procedures in Istanbul regarding his requests for extra income. "My Two Eyes, My Ekrem," p, 27 February 1322/12 March 1907 (n. no.). The sultan's estates were considered his private property in contrast to the normal state owned (rniri) lands. In Palestine these were found in the region of the Jordan River Valley, near Beysan and near Jericho. The amount of salary was also a subject of complaint by Tevfik Bey who was promised that additional income would accrue to him while in Jerusalem. Tevfik Beyin Hatiralan, pp. 73-74. ^"Special Stationery for Writing Curriculum Vitaes..." 12 April 1323/25 April 1907 (no. 130). 3 "To the Grand Vezir", d, ca, co. 25 June 1323/8 July 1907 (no. 43); "To the Grand Vezir", d, ca, co, ? July 1323 /July-August 1907 (no. 120). A personal letter which Ekrem received from Istanbul tells him about the approval of the allocation, though it recommends waiting until the receipt of the royal decree. "My Brother", p, 22 May 1323/5 June 1907 (no. 157). ^Carter Vaughn Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History. Princeton, 1989, pp. 293-

3 FOREIGNERS, THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES AND THE HOLY PLACES The dramatic growth in the number of foreigners visiting or settling in the district of Jerusalem, as well as the growing political aspirations of certain powers toward the area, posed serious challenges to the Ottoman government.1 The presence of foreigners meant first of all that the authorities had to respect the Capitulations which were written into the bilateral conventions entered into with the powers and which granted their nationals not only freedom of movement and security but also certain immunities from Ottoman law which set them apart from ordinary citizens. The powers insisted on the application of the Capitulations in full and deemed it their right and duty, through their representatives in the Ottoman Empire, the ambassadors and the consuls, to intervene on behalf of their citizens whenever they believed these immunities and privileges were infringed upon either by Ottoman citizens or by the authorities themselves. 2 From the Ottoman point of view the Capitulations were, first of all, a severe blow to their honor and pride. They were a constant reminder of the state of weakness and impotency the Empire had fallen into which was in stark contrast to its days of glory. Practically, they meant that the Empire was not sovereign in its own house: It could not enforce its own laws and regulations on many of its residents who happened to hold a foreign passport. It was impossible, for example, to levy the usual taxes and customs tariffs on foreign citizens, to apply the normal legal procedures to them, or to regulate and supervise the institutions which they created. Moreover, the authorities were unable, as was shown in the case of the Jews, to bar the entrance of foreign citizens to Ottoman domains. They were similarly unable to stop them from remaining and forming permanent communities. The Capitulations were no doubt a useful instrument in the hands of the powers seeking to build up their presence and influence in the Empire. To the Ottomans, it also looked as if they were helping to lay the ground to future territorial claims and the ultimate disintegration of their state.

' Sec Saul P. Colbi, Christianity in the Holy Land, Past and. Present, Tel Aviv, 1969. ^"Capitulations", Encyclopaedia Britannica, 4 (1963), pp. 813-814; 851-852; "Imtiyazat", Encyclopedia of Islam, new ed., 3, pp. 1179-1189.

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The establishment of a foreign presence and the privileged position enjoyed by foreigners within the borders of the Empire had other serious consequences for the Ottomans, as well. Foreigners were, as a rule, greatly resented by the local population, particularly the Muslims. Although the influx of foreigners into the Empire often helped to boost the economy, introduce more advanced technological methods and raise the standard of living, it brought with it increased competition with local artisans, merchants and professionals. It also caused hardships to local farmers, who found themselves at times evicted or overpowered by new landlords. Foreigners, because of their privileges and connections, were seen as enjoying an undue advantage over the local population and as able to more easily achieve success and prosperity. Apart from that, foreigners remained, of course, strangers in their new environment and, what is more, of a different faith and different customs. As such they threatened to disrupt the social and cultural fabric of the society around them. Since they were very often also citizens of countries which were known to be hostile to the Ottoman Empire, and sometimes even at war with it, they were seen as enemy agents, harboring evil designs on Islam and the Islamic state. Moreover, while Muslim citizens had to go to war, risk their lives, and be absent from home and work for long periods of time, foreigners were exempt from conscription and left to pursue their lives in peace. Resentment among the Muslim population toward foreigners was therefore quite natural, and, in the end, it was the Ottoman government itself, unable as it was to curb foreign presence, which was seen as at least partly responsible for the situation. This could only help to foster growing alienation between the government and the local population. The Ottoman rulers were well aware of the harm to their interests brought about by the growing foreign presence in Palestine and in the Empire as a whole and did all in their power to reduce it. 1 Among other things, they attempted, if not to revoke the privileges contained in the Capitulations altogether, at least to circumvent them or limit their scope. There was constant bickering between the government and the representatives of the powers over the application of the Capitulations, both at the center and in the provinces. All attempts by the Ottomans were doomed, however, to failure, because of the resolute objections of the powers to curtail their privileges in any way. Confronting the Ottomans on the issue, the powers usually acted in

' On the conduct of the Ottoman governors on the question of the Capitulations and other matters relating to non-Muslims, see David Kushner, "The Foreign Relations of the Governors of Jerusalem towards the End of the Ottoman Period", in Kushner (ed.), Palestine During the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social and Economic Transformation, Jerusalem and Leiden, 1986, pp. 309-319.

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unison since it was in their common interest to retain the status quo. The balance of power between them and the Empire was such that the Ottomans were helpless to change the situation, and the result only served, of course, to repeatedly demonstrate to all concerned the chronic impotency of the Empire. Apart from attempting to counter the influx of foreigners and the build up of foreign influence in general, it was also in the supreme interest of the Ottoman government to prevent any one of the contending powers from achieving a paramount position in a particular area, or in a particular group in the population, in order to preempt future claims of "spheres of influence", territory and right of intervention. In a colonial era, this future threat to Ottoman sovereignty could come from any of the major powers, and, in Palestine, no power could be ruled out as a potential claimant for privileges or territory, not even the sultan's ally, Germany. During Ekrem's term of office in Jerusalem perhaps the greatest threat to the district, and Palestine as a whole, came from the south, that is from British-occupied Egypt. Egypt herself had already tried her hand in Palestine, notably during Mehmed Ali's time, and although her ambitions of expansion were by then dormant, Khedive Abbas Hilmi (1892-1912) was known to have designs for a greater Arab empire under his rule. The more serious threat was posed, of course, by Britain, the real ruler of Egypt. She had, for strategic and commercial reasons, a definite interest in a "friendly" Palestine, and it was quite conceivable that she would attempt, if the opportunity arose, to extend her sphere of influence northward from Egypt. In any event, the European powers, as has already been mentioned, had long been trying to build up their assets in Palestine whether through encouraging their nationals in their enterprises or through extending, or asserting, their protection over one or more of the non-Muslim communities residing in Palestine. Britain, at different times offered her protection to Russian Jews, Druzes and Copts, while Russia and France maintained their close links with their traditional protégés, the Greek Orthodox and the Catholics, respectively. Russia, to be sure, had, by the terms of the Treaty of Paris ending the Crimean War, lost her claimed right of protection over the Greek Orthodox Church which had been strongly objected to not only by the other powers but by the Church itself. But she never desisted from her efforts to reestablish herself as the protector of Greek Orthodox interests. At the same time she was driven, on the one hand, to actively support the establishment of religious, educational and charitable institutions by her citizens and, on the

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other, to pose as champion of the Arab Orthodox community in its own dispute with the Greek establishment. France, on her part, had, in fact, been the protector of Catholic interests for centuries, but had her difficulties, too, challenged as she was by the newly established Latin Patriarchate, by the Franciscan order which traditionally guarded many of the holy places, and by other Catholic nations claiming rights of protection over those clergymen and monks who were their nationals. France's right of protection over Catholic interests as a whole was confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin, and in view of the persistence of the intervention of other powers she zealously and vigorously continued to assert this right. At the same time, like Russia, she was driven to help establish her own particular institutions. Faced with the acute competition of the powers for influence and dominance, the Ottoman authorities in the district, while unable to prevent the entrenchment of foreign interests generally, tried at least to strike a proper balance between the various powers and their protected communities sometimes going as far as attempting to create actual dissension among them. They were careful not to strengthen any one power's influence by granting its citizens an excess of economic concessions and applied the same principle in according permits for the purchase of land or the establishment of religious and charitable institutions. Wherever they could they opposed the claims of foreign powers for protection over local churches and communities. They attempted to limit extensive Russian enterprises for the purchase of land and setting up new religious and educational institutions and stood firm in their refusal to grant the Russians de facto rights of protection over the Greek Orthodox Church. They also generally supported the Greek Orthodox Church establishment — their "own" officially recognized institution — in its conflict with the Russian influenced Arab Orthodox community. The feud between the French and the other Catholic countries over rights of protection suited the Ottomans well, and the authorities took care to involve the representatives of all concerned in procedures designed to contain incidents around the holy places. Even Germany could not enjoy preferential treatment from the authorities which sometimes withheld permits from German citizens wishing to purchase land. If the Ottoman government largely failed in curbing the penetration of foreign interests as a whole into Palestine, it did succeed at least in maintaining a certain degree of balance between them. The fact is that on the eve of the Empire's demise, no European power could claim an exclusive or paramount position for itself. Along with this policy of balance the Ottomans took special care to conduct their relations with foreign powers with extreme caution, not

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allowing incidents of different kinds to get out of hand in a manner which might lead to intervention in the Empire's affairs and cause real crises. Such incidents were frequent. 1 In some cases they were the result of infractions perpetrated upon members of the foreign community or the community of "protected" non-Muslims by either members of the Muslim population or by Ottoman officials. There were also occasional cases of violence between members of different communities. Intercommunal tensions during this period were actually on the rise. The local Muslim population was hostile not only to foreign penetration, but also towards local Christians and Jews. The equality before the law which the non-Muslim communities had won during the period of reforms, their relative higher socio-economic status, and the fact that they were often identified with the enemies of the state did at times create serious tensions in the relations between them and the Muslims, resulting in incidents and occasional outbursts of violence. Whatever the case, these incidents, as the Ottomans very well knew from their experience (for example in Lebanon, Bulgaria, Egypt and Anatolia), could, if not contained, lead to outside intervention and even invasion and occupation. It was therefore considered highly important to prevent such incidents from happening or, if they did, limit their scope as much as possible and bring the perpetrators to trial. The presence of regular Ottoman forces in Palestine served not only to deter enemies from without but also to keep internal peace. In this task, too, the Ottomans were, on the whole, fairly successful. The same applied to the many disputes and incidents which occurred among the Christian communities themselves over rights in the holy places. Latin and Greek Orthodox priests and monks divided the rights to most of the holy places between them, but they were joined by other smaller denominations such as the Armenians, Copts, and Abyssinians, which either had, or claimed, rights of their own in some of the sites. There were numerous conflicts and incidents among the various guardians of the holy places over real or imagined infringements upon each community's rights, and what made these disputes particularly serious for the authorities was the backing which the contenders received from their patron powers. These powers, in their attempt to further their cause in Palestine, intervened in favor of their respective clients, sometimes showing even more zeal than they did in defence of their rights. This was particularly true of the conduct of the Russians and the French who, just because their right of protection had been challenged, felt compelled to demonstrate the special efforts which they were making on their

' David Kushner, "Intercommunal Strife in Palestine During the Late Ottoman Period", Asian and African Studies, 18 (1984), pp. 187-204.

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clients' behalf. This, of course, made the solution of some of the disputes ever more difficult. The Ottoman authorities were aware of the implications which could ensue from any dispute or incident which took place in the holy places. The Crimean War had broken out, after all, over a dispute between Greek Orthodox and Latin monks, backed by Russia and France, respectively, in the holy places and demonstrated how embroiled the Empire could become as a result of seemingly insignificant matters. Even if war was no longer in the offing, the danger of confrontation with any one power remained. The Ottomans consequently channeled their efforts, first and foremost, towards preventing incidents from breaking out in the first place. On holidays, when multitudes of people would gather in the holy places to perform the ceremonial rites, they deployed large military forces around them to maintain order. If an incident did occur, they would try to suppress it before it could assume larger and more dangerous proportions. Much of their effort naturally went toward trying to find a solution to the actual dispute. It was common for the authorities to try and convince the parties to maintain the status quo or accept a compromise. A common device was to "take over" the place or the object which was the cause of the conflict and assume "neutral" Ottoman control over it. (The keys to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, for example, had for long been entrusted to a Muslim family). In major cases, or those for which they themselves were unable to find a solution, governors would often transfer the matter for decision by the central government. It was clear to them that any rash action on their part could drag the state as a whole into a serious conflict and it was they, themselves, who would ultimately be held responsible. As it turned out, the Ottoman government in Istanbul was often powerless to find an appropriate solution itself, leaving it for the governor to try the best he could. Ekrem, during his term of office in Jerusalem, had to deal, as did the governors before him, with all the problems and challenges which foreign presence created for Ottoman administration in his district. These issues took much of the Jerusalem governors' time and energy, and Ekrem was no exception. To be sure, he maintained good personal relations with the consuls and was always ready to express his friendliness and respect toward the states they represented. Foreign consuls could be a good source of information or advice on matters of administration, public services and economic development. Furthermore, in an environment such as Jerusalem, where governors often encountered local opposition and hostility, consuls could even become good personal friends. The degree of such friendship was dependent on

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the state of relations between their countries and the Ottoman Empire, but also, as Tevfik Bey relates in his memoirs, on the character and conduct of the persons involved. 1 It was also, of course, in the interest of the consuls to foster close relations with the governor and win his good will. Shortly after his arrival in Jerusalem, Ekrem received word from one of his friends in Istanbul that the Russian embassy had specifically recommended to its consul general in Jerusalem to do all he could to help Ekrem in any way possible. 2 On one occasion Ekrem accepted, with the approval of his superiors, a German decoration as reward for his help toward the construction of the Augusta Victoria hostel in Jerusalem. 3 All this did not, however, change Ekrem's basic suspicion toward the activities of all foreign powers in his district, and, in line with Ottoman policy, he did his best to counter them and limit the damage they could cause to the interests of the state. In the eyes of the Ottoman government, Zionism, and Jewish immigration and settlement, were one obvious manifestation of foreign activities. The powers may have not supported the ultimate aspirations of Zionism in any way, but they exploited them in order to further their own particular causes. Ekrem, too, viewed Jewish enterprise in the district in this light. He saw the broad assistance which the foreign powers gave to Jewish immigration as a means of strengthening their assets and influence in the land, convinced as they were that their status was directly linked to the number of their nationals in Palestine. He blamed the failure of all efforts to curb immigration and settlement on the active support given the immigrants by their consuls and requested time and again that the government pressure the embassies to instruct the consuls in Palestine to cooperate with the authorities in carrying out the various restrictions on Jewish settlement. Beyond the Jewish issue, however, which will be discussed separately, there were, of course, other aspects of foreign presence which preoccupied Ekrem. Cases involving individuals who claimed foreign protection of one kind or another was one matter with which he had occasionally to deal. These

^Tevfik Bey, in his memoirs, relates how he succeeded in building trust between himself and the consuls and how he established a close personal friendship with the British and French consuls. Tevfik Bey in Hattralari, pp. 96-97. 2 "Big Brother Ekrem", p, 12 February 1322/25 February 1907 (no. 52). 3 See the cable from the Ministry of Interior permitting the governor to receive the German decoration. "To the Mutasarnf of Jerusalem", ca, 17 June 1323/30 June 1907 (no. 118). Ekrem's initial request in this regard was made earlier on the occasion of the ceremony marking the laying of the cornerstone of the Augusta Victoria Hostel on the Mount of Olives. Classified cable [from the Mutasarnf of Jerusalem], 18 March 1323/31 March 1907, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi (gelen), 316, BBA. See also Blech to O'Conor, 8 August 1907, Foreign Office Series (hereafter FO) 195/2255, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), London.

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cases usually came to the fore when the individuals faced some bureaucratic difficulties. At one time Ekrem was asked by the kaymakam of Nazareth to help resolve a dispute over land involving a certain Hanna Mansur, who claimed French protection. A request for an inquiry into the matter was later received from the Grand Vezirate. Ekrem chose, however, to urge the kaymakam to follow the regular procedures since, in the matter at hand, he said, there was no difference between Mansur and other Ottoman citizens.1 On another occasion, the governor was asked by the Ministry of Land Registry to inquire about the case of a German citizen, Christoph Hoffmann, who was at the time the leader of the Templar community which had established a number of colonies in Palestine during the second half of the nineteenth century. Hoffmann was refused a permit to purchase land in Bethlehem from a well known land owner, Alexander Sursuk. 2 This led to a great deal of correspondence between government departments in order to determine Hoffman's status, the whereabouts of his property, and the location of the land he wished to buy. Apparently there was a question as to which Bethlehem it was and Ekrem finally wrote the grand vezir that the case did not refer to the well known town near Jerusalem but rather to a village in the Galilee which belonged to the mutasarriflik of Acre. 3 More importantly, the special privileges to foreigners under the system of Capitulations proved to be a source of continuous friction between the consulates and the authorities. In his memoirs, Re§id Bey writes how frustrated he became when he could not bring to justice American members of a gang dealing in counterfeit money. Even a personal appeal to the American president did not help change the American consul's refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the Ottoman courts. 4 In a document of his found among Ekrem's papers, he shows how the consuls, defending the Capitulations, obstructed the levying of fines or municipal taxes on foreign citizens and hampered the application of proper legal procedures. These practices, he wrote, were common in all parts of the Empire, but because of the large numbers of foreigners in Jerusalem, the threat there was greater than anywhere else. He believed there was a definite danger that in time "joint rule" between the

l"To the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, ca, co, 28 November 1323/11 December 1907 (no. 196); "To His Excellency the Mutasarrif in Jaffa", ca, co, 29 November 1323/12 December 1907 (no. 203); "To the Kaymakam of Nazareth", d, ca, co, 2 December 1323/15 December 1907 (no. 250). 2 "TO the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem", 8 April 1323/21 April 1907 (n. no.). See Alex Carmel, Die Siedlungen der Wurtembergischen Templer in Palästina, Stuttgart, 1993, passim. 3 "TO the Grand Vczir", d, ca, co, 8 November 1323/21 November 1907 (n. no.) ^Rey, Görduklerim Yaptiklarim, p. 83.

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Ottomans and the foreigners would be set up in the city. 1 Ekrem, for his part, also spoke bitterly of the foreigners' privileges and of the way the consuls defended them. In all his writings the the powers and their representatives, the consuls, appear as a selfish lot, always insistent upon applying the privileges legally or illegally acquired by them and always ready to disrupt the business of administration and inflict damage to the interests and well being of the state. 2 He frowned upon granting any additional privileges to the powers active in his district. When Italy, for example, applied to open an Italian post office in Jerusalem, Ekrem offered his negative opinion since it was impossible to suprervise and control the activities of those already existing. 3 He also brought to the attention of the grand vezir a dispute with the Russian consulate over the taxation of farmers on lands belonging to the Russian archimendrit in the village of Ayn Karm. The Russian consulate refused to comply with the wish of the authorities to levy the legal taxes on the farmers and turned to its embassy in Istanbul for instructions. While the law clearly made no distinction between citizens and foreigners in matters of immovable property, it was the practice of the Russians, he wrote, not to allow officials to tax or assess the lands belonging to Russian citizens without involving the embassy or the consulate. Even when no clear stipulation bound the Ottomans to agree to such a practice, the Russian consul would claim that it was based on precedent and was an "acquired right" which he could not take responsibility for relinquishing. This, Ekrem added, was not the practice of the Russians alone. It was impossible to send tax notices, conduct any property transaction, or enter foreigners' houses without the consent and cooperation of the consuls, who often withheld their assistance in order to protect their citizens' interests. Ekrem pointed to the fact that in Jerusalem the "acquired rights" of consuls, not just the privileges embodied in the Capitulations, had become particularly widespread and warned of the possibility that they might, in time, become accepted all over the Empire. He told the grand vezir that he was seriously considering taking measures to apply the laws in full and deprive the foreigners of their illegal privileges. At the same time, he alerted

l"To His Excellency the Grand Vezir", d, 15 November 1322/28 November 1906 (no. 23). ^"Letter to the Head Secretary", d, 19 December 1323/1 January 1908 (n. no.). Among Ekrem's papers there is a copy of an article ("Konsoloslar", n. no), criticizing the consuls, which was written by his father, Namik Kemal, and printed in the ibret newspaper on 4 December 1288/16 December 1872. The collection also contains a copy of the instructions given to Sadik Efendi, the political affairs officer of Damascus, where he is ordered to be careful in his relations with consuls, while giving ample consideration to the interests of the state. It is possible that the document served as a guide for Ekrem in his own relations with the foreign representatives in Jerusalem. "§am-i §erif Umur-i Politikasina Memur Sadik Efendiye Talimat-i Seniyenin Suretidir" (n. no.). ^Classified cable, 19 March 1324/2 April 1908. Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi (gelen), 316, BBA.

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his superiors to the dangers involved in such action and asked for clear instructions. 1 In the same vein Ekrem was deeply suspicious of foreign attempts to acquire property, concessions or other economic assets in his district. Though he was aware of the need for the development of the district's resources and realized the need to accept outside assistance, he tended to be opposed to giving economic concessions to foreign companies. In a memorandum to the palace he expressed his view that the establishment of foreign companies in Jerusalem was certainly going to create enormous difficulties for the state and make the governing of this important place on the borders of Egypt even more complex. He proposed that in order to prevent obstacles and dangers in the future, as well as to secure important revenues for the sultan, it was necessary to grant such concessions to the Privy Treasury. 2 A case in point was the granting of the concession for the exploration and exploitation of the rich minerals found in the Dead Sea. The concession had indeed been awarded to the Privy Treasury, but there were many difficulties in finding the necessary funds to invest in the project. Ekrem was in favor of retaining the concession in the sultan's hands and assured the palace that he was doing all he could to prepare the ground for work in the area to begin.3 One of the powers which was the focus of much of Ekrem's attention in its determined endeavors to increase its possessions in the district was Russia. Russian activities had always been suspect and carefully watched. 4 Russia's zeal for purchasing land and establishing its own institutions, partly a result of the competition with the Greek Patriarchate which no longer accepted Russian protection, was likewise viewed with apprehension. As a friend described it to Ekrem, while the Greek patriarch was going bankrupt, the Russians were busy buying up property. 5 Ekrem reported to the palace that after the Russians had already succeeded in establishing an "amazing" institution in the heart of Jerusalem called "Moskobia" 6 they then concentrated their efforts in Hebron and Nazareth. He drew the attention of his superiors l"To the Grand Vezir", d, 19 December 1323/1 January 1908 (n. no.). n.t. [to the Palace Secretariat], 9 December 1323/22 December 1907 (n. no.). 3< TO His Excellency Second Secretary izzet Pa§a", d, 14 November 1323/27 November 1907 (n. no.). "^Russian travelers to Palestine seem to have been the object of surveillance. "To His Excellency the Mutasarrif, from the governor of Aydin, ca, co, 2 January 1323/15 January 1908 (no. 252). 5 "My Brother Ekrem", p, n.d. (n.no.). 6 The reference is to the Russian Compound - an extensive area containing a variety of hostels and clinics constructed in the 1860's by the "Royal Orthodox Company for Palestine" for the purpose of serving the thousands of Russian pilgrims who came to Jerusalem every year. 2

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to a conflict which had broken out between the Russian consulate and the heirs of a citizen of Hebron over a plot of land which the Russians demanded from them in lieu of a debt he had owed them. The Russians had already been in possession of property on the outskirts of the town where they erected a monastery and a hospice at Abraham's Oak. In this case the plot of land was in the heart of the town, next to the sacred Cave of the Patriarchs, and Ekrem expressed his fear that the day would not be far off when the Russian flag would fly over the site. Russian institutions would be built there, and the long time prohibition on Christian settlement in Hebron would come to naught. It was his fear, too, that the Muslim population of Hebron would react by resorting to fanaticism and that political restlessness would ensue. In this case, which Ekrem described as "extraordinary", he was willing, so he wrote, to use any means of connivance in order to stop the Russians. He admitted that he had interfered with the judicial process and pressured the judge to put the matter off as long as possible, as well as lay all kinds of obstacles before the Russian claim. It was Ekrem's suggestion to buy the land from the heirs and make it a Muslim pious foundation (vakif or evkaf), and to pay the debt owed to the Russians from the same funds. 1 There is no information about the Russians' reaction to the proposal, but Ekrem did his best to have them comply with his wishes and was ready to employ some ruses for the purpose. In a cable sent to izzet Pa§a, he recommended that as the Russian consul Yakovlev had left his post, his deputy, the secretary of the consulate, should be quickly approached since it would be easier to convince this junior official rather than the consul's permanent successor.2 The matter was indeed settled in the end in accordance with the governor's recommendations and the land was purchased by the state. 3 It appears from this case that in their contacts with the representatives of the powers, and being constrained by the Capitulations and foreign influence, Ottoman governors were not averse to intervening in legal proceedings and using a variety of ploys and tricks in order to safeguard their interests. Another case which involved Ekrem with Russian activities was the construction of dwellings for monks in the Russian monastery (apparently

"Secret Letter to His Excellency Izzet Pa§a". d, 15 October 1323; 21 Raraazan 1325/28 October 1907 (n.no.). On Hebron, see David Kushner, "Zealous Towns in Nineteenth Century Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies, 33 (1997), pp. 597-612. o To His Excellency the Second Secretary Izzet Pa§a", d, ca, co, 11 November 1328/24 November 1907 (no. 85). This kind of ploy had been used before by Regid Bey, who, faced with a dispute between the Greeks and the Latins over the repair of a Greek cemetery in Bethlehem, exploited the absence of the Latin custode of the holy places in Rome to get the agreement of the more moderate père supérieur. Rey, Gorduklerim Yaphklarim, pp. 94-95. 3 "To His Excellency the Mutasarrif in Jaffa", from the kaymakam of Hebron, ca, co, 2 January 1323/15 January 1908 (no. 191).

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Maria Magdalena) on Jabal al-Tur (part of the Mount of Olives). These dwellings had been built without due permission and had already been the subject of deliberation with the Russian consulate in the years preceding his term of office. Ekrem reported to the Sublime Porte that the Russian consulate had been told to abstain from any new construction except for the reparing of mosaics which had been destroyed by an earthquake. He also wrote that he could find no sign of any construction permit which may have been given the Russians by district or municipal officials. The Council of State and the cabinet before whom the matter was brought did not prescribe the demolition of the illegal buildings, but insisted on the need to adjust the taxes levied from the property and to remove and punish the officials concerned for their negligence.1 British consular reports say that Ekrem maintained very good relations with the British consul, who considered him a great friend of Britain. 2 The governor was also willing to consult him on such matters as the economic development of the district. 3 A speech which Ekrem gave at a celebration following the Young Turk Revolution was replete with praises for Britain's friendship towards the Ottoman Empire, its democratic system, and its cultural heritage. 4 However, from the reports which Ekrem sent to his superiors it is clear that he was extremely suspicious of Britain's activities and, in particular, the help she gave to Jews and the interest she displayed in the purchase of land. This suspicion was clearly expressed when Ekrem raised the matter of the attempted purchase of the lands in Wadi al-Hawarith (Emek Hefer) on the coastal plain. The move was made by an Egyptian company in conjunction with some Jewish individuals, but the governor expressed his fear that it was the British who were behind this plan. They were willing, he wrote, to pay an exorbitant price for the land and turn it over for agricultural use, but in the long run they were hoping one day to turn the place, which held a significant strategic position between Cyprus and Alexandria, into a naval base for themselves. Several other suspicious moves, such as a British request to open a hospital for eye diseases in Nablus and a visit by a British minister from ^"Classified Cable from the mutasarnf of Jerusalem", 23 November 1323/6 December 1907 [along with reports by the §ura-yi Devlet and the Meclis-i Mahsus, 9 December 1323/22 December 1907, Yildiz-Resmi, 463, 151/93, BBA. 2 Blech to Lowther, 10 August 1908, FO/195,2287, PRO. 3 The Mutasarnf consulted with the British consul on the purchase of an engine for a well and a clock for the clock tower which he wanted to construct in Beersheba. He also asked him for automobile catalogues. Blech to Barclay, 10 April 1908 and 20 May 1908, FO 195/2287, PRO. ^Document 12. These words of praise were probably a result of the prevalent view that a connection existed between the Young Turks and Britain. Blech to Lowther, 10 August 1908, FO, 195/2287, PRO.

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Alexandria, seemed to him to be part of the same grand design. 1 We learn from other sources that Ekrem was unwilling to grant a British lady a concession to establish a life-saving station in the port of Jaffa, ostensibly because it would help Jews disembark from their boats, but also because it would increase Britain's influence. 2 It is significant that Ekrem paid special attention to those points on the Palestine coast which were most vulnerable to a possible British assault. An area which was considered particularly sensitive was the one close to British occupied Egypt. In Gaza the sale of all state lands seems, in fact, to have been entirely prohibited, and in a letter to the kaymakam of Gaza, Ekrem reminded him of this prohibition. He warned him of the attempt made by a number of people in Gaza to purchase land for the British and pointed to the danger of the area falling under the control of Jews. 3 Ekrem's administrative reform in the Negev and his activities among the Bedouin tribes were also aimed at thwarting British designs.4 Whether acting on her own or in conjunction with Britain, Egypt's own actions, and particularly the activities of the khedive, Abbas Hilmi, were of great concern to Ekrem, apparently in keeping with direct instructions he received from his superiors. In one case, a directive which he received from the Sublime Porte prohibited him from permitting an Egyptian firm to operate a lottery in Palestine and ordered him to conduct an investigation into its activities. 5 Ekrem reported on the visits of Egyptians to Palestine and on the surveillance which he placed on them. 6 Some of the Egyptian activities were exposed by the mutasamf while pursuing procedures against Ziya al-Din, the

To the Mabeyn Head Secretary", d, ca, Co, 3 June 1323/16 June 1907 (no. 20). A description of the area along with a map (which is missing) was sent to Ekrem by his deputy, Riza Bey. "To His Excellency the Mutasamf, 20 June 1323/3 July 1907 (no. 64). 2 Blech to O'Conor, 18 January 1908, FO 195/2287, PRO. 3 "TO the Kaymakam of Gaza", d, s, 31 January 1323/13 February 1908 (no. 19). The governor had received information about the sale of land to Egyptians across the border in Rafah a number of weeks before and was also told of Egyptian-British construction plans there. "To His Excellency the Mutasamf in Jaffa", from Riza, ca, 1 December 1323/14 December 1907 (no. 207); "To His Excellency the Mutasamf', from the kaymakam of Gaza, 1 December 1323/14 December 1907 (no. 231); "To His Excellency the Kaymakam", from the miidir of Khan Yunis, 1 December 1323/14 December 1907 (no. 235); "To the Mutasamf of Jerusalem", from the Sublime Porte, ca, co, 13 December 1323/26 December 1907 (no. 216). Ekrem's instructions to the kaymakam of Gaza were to hinder as much as possible the purchase of lands by the Egyptians and, if they were sold, to keep an eye on construction activities. Ekrem also berates the kaymakam for the lack of clarity in his reports. "To the Kaymakam of Gaza", ca, co, 4 December 1323/17 December 1907 (no. 253). 4 S e e Document 3. 5 "To the Mutasamf of Jerusalem", from Minister of Interior Memduh, ca, co, 11 December 1323/24 December 1907 (no. 199). 6 "To the Minister of Interior", d, ca, co, 30 March 1324/12 April 1908 (no. 4). According to British sources, the travel of civilians to Egypt was also prohibited, although it is not clear exactly who it was aimed at, and the prohibition was not fully enforced. Blech to O'Conor, 31 July 1907, FO 195/2255, PRO.

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chief accountant of the pious foundations in Jerusalem. The evidence indicated that the latter had transferred land to the khedive and his mother, permitted Egyptians to place candles and lamps in the Dome of the Rock, and allowed Egyptian laborers to make renovations in David's Tomb. In Ekrem's view all these were aimed at gaining recognition of the khedive's purported share in these Muslim holy places, and he warned that the Egyptians could one day lay claim to these sites if they acquired similar rights there to those which the Christians had in their holy places. "This is," he wrote, "as if we do not have enough with the problem of the Christian holy places, which does not cease to cause trouble for the local authorities in Jerusalem." He requested that in each case the sultan's permission be required to make gifts to the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem and submitted his own official request for permission to hang other lamps instead. 1 The Ottoman government took Ekrem's warnings seriously. One of the senior officials in Istanbul expressed his view that instead of dealing with corrupt officials as he did, Ekrem would do better, for example, to report more on the sale of land to the Egyptian khedive and his mother. 2 It is noteworthy that even Germany, the sultan's ally, did not escape the governors of Jerusalem's attention. Tevfik Bey, during whose term of office Kaiser Wilhelm conducted his famous trip to Palestine, describes in his memoirs the preparations he made for the visit including the ceremony in which the emperor was presented with the title deed for the plot on Mount Zion where the Catholic Dormition Church was to be constructed. He states, however, with much satisfaction, that he succeeded in preventing the Germans from purchasing other sites which they were interested in. 3 Ekrem, too, wrote of Germany's growing interest in extending her protection over her citizens, no matter what their religion and denomination, and of her preoccupation with purchasing property. He mentioned the enthusiasm displayed by Germany since the Kaiser's visit to build institutions of her own and drew attention to the fact that Germans had become owners of vast tracts of land in Jerusalem and elsewhere. The rich Jews, he added, were also German. 4 It is clear that

l"To His Excellency the Mabeyn Head Secretary", d, 14 November 1323/27 November 1907 (n. no.). My Brother Ekrem Bey", p, n.d. (no. 180). The central government's special concern with the activities of the Egyptians is also reflected in the request of Hiiseyin Hilmi Pa§a (the inspector of the Rumelian provinces) to Ekrem to inform Izzet Pa§a by cable of the transfer of land to the khedive. "To His Excellency the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem," ca, co, 20 October 1323/2 November 1907, (no. 13). o Tevfik Beyin Hatiralari, p. 132. "^Document 1.

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friendship and alliance aside, even Germany's activities became suspect in Ottoman eyes as were those of other powers.. Disputes in the Christian holy places did not lead to particularly serious incidents during Ekrem's short term in Jerusalem. Like governors before him, Ekrem did what he could to prevent incidents from occurring or to contain them when they did happen. He deployed strong security forces in the holy places in order to maintain law and order during major holidays. On one occasion he reported to the head secretary in the palace of the strong measures he had taken to prevent incidents from breaking out in the Holy Sepulchre during the "Holy Fire" ceremony at Easter. He must have been impressed with the performance of the officers in charge for he asked the palace to reward them by appropriately granting them decorations. 1 Still, small incidents did erupt from time to time. Once, for example, a piece of the marble stone near Jesus' tomb in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was reported as having been stolen, possibly by Armenians. The case must have been quickly settled for we hear nothing more of it. 2 In her autobiography, Selma Ekrem, the governor's daughter, tells of a similar case in which a piece of the star in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem was stolen by a Russian pilgrim. This affair, which could have developed into a serious incident, ended with the return of the stolen property after the intervention of the Russian consul. 3 Another case she describes concerned the presentation by the Greek patriarch of a pillow to the Muslim guard at the Holy Sepulchre. This act met with strong objections by the heads of the other communities on the grounds that it could serve as a precedent, but this incident, too, was quickly settled when it was decided to burn the pillow. Following the old practice of solving conflicts between quarreling parties through the "neutral" Ottoman presence, Ekrem presented the guard with another pillow himself. 4 One incident, which is only briefly mentioned by Ekrem, broke out soon after he arrived in Jerusalem in December of 1906. It involved a dispute ll 'To His Excellency the Head Secretary", d, ca, 12 April 1324/25 April 1908 (n. no.). The ceremony was shared by both the Greek Orthodox and Armenian churches. The fire, supposedly descending from heaven, was regarded as a source of blessing and healing and the ceremony always attracted thousands of people. Reported by Your Servant", from Hakki, 4 July 1323/17 July 1907 (no. 38). 3 Selma Ekrem, Unveiled, pp. 71-72. See also Blech to Barclay, 10 July 1908, FO 195/2287, PRO; Outrey to Pichon, 17 June 1908, Turquie, Nouvelle Serie, 132 (Palestine), Archive du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris. ^Selma Ekrem, pp. 84-85. Regid Bey tells the story that in one dispute which broke out in his time between Latin and Armenian monks over sweeping certain steps in the Holy Sepulchre. He, too, retorted to the well tried solution of employing a Muslim for the purpose. However, in this case, both sides, fearing that the practice would become a precedent, came to an agreement and asked for the removal of the Muslim. Rey, Gordulerim Yaptiklarim, pp. 87-88.

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over rights in the Church of the Nativity between Armenian and LatinFranciscan monks and was accompanied by some violence and injuries. 1 The dispute was resolved by restoring the status quo, but it raised once again the longstanding dispute, which had already greatly preoccupied Ekrem's predecessors, between France and other Catholic nations over rights of protection. In this case, since the injured Franciscan monks were Italians, the Italian consul claimed the right to intervene on behalf of his co-patriots. The authorities yielded to his demand, but did not object to the intervention of the French consul who claimed his right of protection over matters concerning the Catholic Church. A secondary question which emerged between the two powers had to do with the venue where the proceedings would take place. While the French, always keen on showing the monks the benefits of French protection, insisted on bringing the matter to court (where they would have been represented), the Italians, conversely, preferred and finally received an administrative settlement. Drawing his conclusions from the incident, it was Ekrem's view that there was, from the Ottoman point of view, an advantage to be gained from the competition between France and other Catholic states over the right to protect Catholic interests.. He dwelt extensively on this matter in a long report to the grand vezir, where he elaborated on the aspirations and methods of the various European powers in their contest to gain influence in Palestine. Although the various claims to represent the Catholics made it more difficult for the authorities to handle conflicts and incidents, the arrangement by which the French were allowed to intervene in matters of the status quo while other Catholic nations were allowed to deal with the personal claims of the clergy worked well, in his view, toward the settlement of the issues. The two-pronged appeal to the consuls involved should in his view continue, allowing the government in Istanbul the time and the maneuverability to reach a balanced decision benefiting its interests.2

iR.g., Classified cable, 17 December 1322/30 December 1906, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi (gelen), 316, BBA. 2 Document 1. On the conflict between France and Italy as well as the Ottoman position see also "My Brother Ekrem", p, n.d. (n. no.). Ekrem was to receive a long answer to his report informing him that it had been duly studied by the Directorate of Religions in the Grand Vezirate. The minister of justice and religions basically adopted the observations and recommendations of the governor. However, he stressed the need for flexibility in the handling of incidents in the holy places and for receiving the Sublime Porte's views in major matters. He approved of Ekrem's views on the need to protect the Greek and Armenian communities and reminded him of decisions taken in the Copt-Abyssinian conflict. The Sublime Porte's reply: "To the Mutasarnf of Jerusalem", 13 June 1323/26 June 1907 (n. no.); "Copy of the Memorandum No. 234 of the Ministry of Justice and Religions", 30 May 1323/12 June 1907 (n. no.).

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Around the same time, whether connected with the Armenian — Latin incident or not, Ekrem recommended granting decorations to a number of employees of the Armenian Patriarchate. He was questioned on the matter by the minister of justice and religions on the grounds that some of those on the list were known to be corrupt and involved in internal conflicts within the Armenian community. Forced to defend his recommendations, he mentioned, among others, the good service rendered by the Armenian Patriarchate's chief interpreter in solving disagreements with other communities. 1 In his eyes, no doubt, the Armenians, as a proper Ottoman community, appeared to be the favored party in disputes of this kind. Some incidents involving the Copt community were of an even more serious nature. Here, too, the British-Egyptian factor was strongly evident. One incident occurred in April of 1907 between the Copts and members of other communities, particularly the Latins. According to the report sent by Ekrem to the head secretary, groups of Copts began disrupting the ceremonies of the other communities at Easter. The Copt bishop was summoned and warned of dire consequences if the disruptions continued, and in order to calm the spirits, strong police forces were sent to the scene. 2 Selma Ekrem, who mentions the incident in her book, relates that it began when the Copts brought a choir of twenty-four children from Egypt, who annoyed members of other communities with their loud singing in the Holy Sepulchre during the Easter ceremonies. AH attempts to make the Copt bishop cease this demonstration were of no avail and the incident was resolved only after the soldiers were allowed to beat the children. 3 Responding to his report, the grand vezir instructed Ekrem to take all steps necessary to prevent further incidents. 4 Provocations by the Copts seem to have continued, however. Following one more such incident, and remonstrations made by the French consul, the Copt bishop was given yet another stern warning. 5 One other dispute involving the Copts was a result of the continuing conflict between them and the Abyssinian community over part of the monastery of Dayr al-Sultan, adjacent to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The Copts at the time controlled the right of way to the monastery, but, in l"To the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem", s, 26 April 1323/9 May 1907 (no. 35). Ekrem's reply: "To His Excellency the Minister of Justice and Religions", d, n.d. (n. no.). ^"Classified [Cable] from the mutasarrif of Jerusalem", 6 April 1323/19 April 1907, YildizMutenewi, 493, 297/24, BBA..