Through the Valley: Vietnam, 1967-1968 9781685854096

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THROUGH THE VALLEY

THROUGH THE VALLEY Vietnam, 1967-1968 James F. Humphries

RIENNER PUBLISHERS

BOULDER LONDON

Paperback published in the United States of America in 2021 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Gray’s Inn House, 127 Clerkenwell Road, London EC1 5DB www.eurospanbookstore.com/rienner

© 1999 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved ISBN: 978-1-62637-975-6 (pb: alk. paper)

The Library of Congress cataloged the hardcover edition of this book as follows: Humphries, James F., 1938– Through the valley : Vietnam, 1967–1968 / James F. Humphries. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-55587-821-4 (hc: alk. paper) 1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975—Campaigns—Vietnam—Hiep Duc Valley. 2. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975—United States. 3. United States Army Infantry Brigade, 196th—History. 4. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975—Personal narratives, American. 5. Humphries, James F., 1938– 6. Hiep Duc Valley (Vietnam)— History. I. Title. DS557.8.H54H86 1999 959.704'342—dc21 98-46944 CIP

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for the hardcover edition of this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

Dedicated to those who served

Contents

Foreword Preface

ix xi

Prologue: Hil1104, West of Tam Ky

1

1

Task Force Oregon

3

2

The Assassins

9

3

Green Seeds

21

4

The Hiep Due Valley

29

5

The 1st VC Main Force Regiment

39

6

Twister Charlie

51

7

AReal Hero

57

8

An Encounter at Dusk

65

9

The Longest Night

79

10

Oscar, Herman, and Lise

91

11

PhuBinh

99

12

Harker

107

13

In the Enemy's Camp

119

14

A Day with No Sun

127

15

Final Shots

137

16

Meeting Delta

145

17

Cedar Mountain Six

153

vii

viii

Contents

18

The 3d NVA Regiment

161

19

Helix One-One

173

20

11 March

177

21

Stay-Behinds

193

22

Specter

199

23

Fire Support Base Belcher

211

24

The Third Marines

219

25

Nhi Ha Village

231

26

The Second Day

243

27

4May

251

28

Lam Xuan (East)

259

29

XomPhoung

263

30

Home to the Que Son Valley

281

31

Hi11406

293

32

The Final Objective: Hill104

307

Epilogue

315

Glossary Bibliography Index About the Book

319 323 329 335

Foreword

T

he fascination of ground combat is powerful and enduring. Combat in the modem age has generated thousands of books of fiction and nonfiction that respond to the need to understand why armies fight and kill, and how they go about it. The approaches to understanding combat are as variable as the authors or the battles. Some authors meet the challenge by studying the great leaders. Douglas Southall Freeman's volumes about General Robert E. Lee and his lieutenants exemplify the best of that subgenre. Other authors focus on the fighting men themselves, in both fiction (Crane's Red Badge of Courage, Jones's From Here to Eternity) and nonfiction (Keegan's The Face of Battle). Many authors that write about combat have themselves fought in the battles they recount. James Jones drew from his combat experience to create From Here to Eternity. In his book Infantry Attacks, Erwin Rommel described his World War I experiences from platoon level to multi-company task force. Charles MacDonald's experiences leading a rifle company of the 2d Infantry Division in World War II were chronicled in his book, Company Commander. Other authors (Crane, for example) may not have heard the rattle of musketry, but their contributions are still valuable to understanding warfare at close range. One challenge common to all accounts of combat is true whether the author is observer or veteran, or the topic is great leaders or platoon tactics. That tough challenge is to convey the controlled chaos of combat to the reader clearly without reducing it to a sterile recital of facts. It is difficult for the observer writing about combat to share the emotions and fears of the participants. Similarly, it is difficult for a veteran of combat actions to view the experience dispassionately. Colonel James F. Humphries has met all of the challenges and surmounted them superbly. In creating Through the Valley, Colonel Humphries has set a new and enduring standard for nonfiction books about the ix

X

Foreword

Vietnam War. He tells about infantry fighting from his own perspective as leader and commander, giving it the participant's unique outlook. But he ranges far beyond his own view of the combat actions to bring in the accounts of others. To his everlasting credit, he includes participants above and below him in the chain of command, taking the reader into combat with him to accompany the rifleman or machine gunner or squad leader. He also places the actions within the context of contemporary activities of his parent 196th Light Infantry Brigade and the America! Division. That is a fine achievement, but Colonel Humphries does much more for the reader. He complements individual narratives with his extraordinarily detailed and comprehensive research into the official archives. His book adds both context and detail simultaneously. He also reached out to men from other services who were involved, and he has obtained their first-hand recollections as well as their contemporary documents, placing their actions appropriately into the scene. Finally, he has included materials about the North Vietnamese and VietCong forces involved in the combat actions he presents. The result is a rich narrative that shows infantry soldiers as they really are, and adds the reality of supporting forces such as artillery and air in their actions. For example, he depicts the close cooperation and trust between the infantry soldiers and their artillery forward observers. He shows how the Air Force forward air controllers who lived with and supported the 196th Light Infantry Brigade flew their airplanes in substandard weather to support their infantry friends in contact with the enemy. The actions were fought against well-equipped and resolute enemy soldiers in daylight and darkness, in sunshine and rain, in heat and cold. Humphries shows and enables the reader to see the terrain, the weather, and the enemy as he and his soldiers experienced them. The result is construction of "combat truth." These pages present the reader with more than mere reconstruction or recollection. The reader truly gains the perspective of being there in combat and feeling all the senses in action, while at the same time observing the action from a detached (and safe) place. I was in the neighborhood for several of the actions James Humphries has reconstructed here, and can testify to his accuracy from my own point of view. At the same time, thanks to his perseverance and broad research, I learned much more about those actions and was the beneficiary of his work. F. Clifton Berry, Jr. Operations Officer 196th Light Infantry Brigade 1967-1968

Preface

I

have written this book to chronicle the seven battles fought by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade during 1967 and 1968 and tell the story of the men who were in them. My two tours of duty with the brigade had made me certain that I could put the events of the period into historical perspective. However, my first trek to the U.S. National Archives in 1992 made it evident how little I did know about the war that I fought, and it portended a long and difficult task ahead. It took me another three trips to the National Archives and the Center for Military History-and countless phone calls, interviews, and letters with former brigade members-and several years before I felt that the story was complete. A number of people helped me along the way, and I wish to express my appreciation to them all. F. Clifton Berry, Jr., for example, provided me with initial direction and insight of the unit's operations and allowed me the use of memorabilia from his personal collection. Tony May, 196th Locate A Brother, allowed me to use his diary, as well as an assortment of documents not found in the National Archives. Most important, he also put me in contact with members of the brigade, many of whom contributed the recollections, letters, and diaries that make up a significant part of this work. Jim Sorensen, a former Special Forces soldier and Vietnam veteran, had the patience to teach me to make the maps in this book and, through his numerous contacts, obtained a number of documents I refer to in this work. There is also Gil Dorland, an accomplished author and hero of the Thanksgiving Day Battle for Hill 63: Gil gave me the inspiration and encouragement to keep writing. Wes Rumble, a former fighter pilot with the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, helped me decipher the many acronyms in the air support summaries. At the National Archives it was Rich Boylan who helped me get intelligence records declassified so I could accurately portray the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces against whom we fought. Robert Wright guided me through the Center for Military History and helped me find the after-combat interviews used in this work, and Les Hines provided me with xi

xii

Through the Valley

innumerable records from the Americal Division, as did Joe Kralich. My daughter, Susanne, and son-in-law Rupert Griibl proofread my manuscript more times than they want to remember and by doing so helped me tell a smoother and better story. My wife, Christa, accompanied me to Washington, D.C., spent her vacations sifting through musty files, and gave me the support and freedom to write this book. I owe a debt of gratitude to all. J.F.H.

PROLOGUE

Hill 104, West of Tam Ky

11 JUNE 1968

F

ire from several automatic weapons, 15 meters to our front and invisible in the scrub, ripped the air around us in a crackling, ear-splitting roar. Men scrambled for cover and responded with a bevy of hand grenades and small-arms fire toward the sound of the enemy guns. The 2d Platoon, led by Lt. Rick Weidner, was in the vanguard and bore the brunt of the enemy's fusillade. The initial hail of bullets killed Cpl. David Lalich, a fire team leader, and wounded several riflemen near him. Somebody screamed, "Medic!" and Sp4c. Robert Davis, the platoon's aid man, jumped to his feet and died when a rocket-propelled grenade slammed into him. The Vietcong (VC) platoon from the 72d Local Force Battalion had selected a near-perfect place to defend. The crest of the hill, laid out like the chambers of an hourglass, was narrow, sharp-sided, and thick with hiphigh brush. The Vietcong occupied carefully prepared positions in the upper chamber and covered the waist of the glass with automatic weapons and rifle-propelled grenades. The flinty ground at the bottom half of the glass, void of cover and bisected by connecting bands of fire streaking inches above our heads, was nominally ours. Our rifle and machine gun fire had no detectable effect on the enemy positions. The M79 rounds, incapable of arming in the short distance to the targets, bounced and ricocheted through the brush like solid shot. I was too close to use supporting artillery and could not move forward, flank the position, or withdraw without taking horrendous casualties. The enemy seemed to sense our predicament and intensified his fire. I heard the distinctive cough of a mortar round leaving its tube and seconds later felt the air shake when it exploded meters behind us. The fight for Hill 104 was less than 10 minutes old.

1 Task Force Oregon

July 1967

I

t was the middle of the afternoon and bubbling hot when I walked down the ramp of the C-130 and caught my first glimpse of Chu Lai Base. A tiny white building just off the tarmac read, "Airfield Operations. Welcome to Task Force Oregon." I entered the cramped operations shack and told a sergeant inside that I needed transportation to the task force G-1 section, my place of assignment. I had come to Vietnam with plans of commanding a rifle company, and a job on a division staff was the last thing that I wanted or expected. The howls of bomb-laden Marine F-4B Phantoms taking off reverberated through the shack's thin walls, making normal conversation impossible. I went outside and walked over to the roofless square of pavement that served as the base passenger terminal and stood in the center of the blacktop to look over my new home. Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak was the commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific when the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade had landed on the shores of Dung Quat Bay in May 1965 and had established an airfield. Tradition holds that the name Chu Lai was an alteration into Vietnamese from the Chinese characters meaning Krolak. The peninsula on which the base stood was on the border of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin provinces and home to a few fishing villages and a healthy number of Vietcong before the marines came. Its location in hostile territory made it a suitable site for U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor's short-lived, unsuccessful strategy of securing enclaves around crucial coastal areas.l The land surrounding the runway was barren and nearly flat, but from my vantage point the terrain beyond the base appeared sharply different. A cluster of steep, granite-faced hills hulked several kilometers southwest of the base. There was nothing magnificent about the mounds of jungle and rock, but I would soon learn to associate the hills with Chu Lai. In Vietnam

3

4

Through the Valley

the sight of a familiar landmark, regardless how insignificant, provided a feeling of permanence where there was generally none. A three-quarter-ton truck arrived, and I tossed my gear into the back and climbed into the cab. We followed a dusty graveled road that took us east, across a part of the runway, past a white sandy beach, and up a short hill. After we had crested the hill the driver took a right tum into the task force headquarters area. The hut that housed the G-1 section was about 100 meters from there. Task Force Oregon was the predecessor of the 23d Infantry Division (America}) and had come into being in April to reinforce the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Pronounced, "Eye Corps," the zone had been the marines' bailiwick since their arrival in Vietnam. By 1967, the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions that constituted III MAP's combat power found themselves tied down to protecting large installations while battling an ever-swelling number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces. The situation at best was a holding action.2 Of great concern to Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command (MACV), was the NVA buildup along South Vietnam's demilitarized zone (DMZ). The scene of bitter fighting between the marines and NVA during the summer and fall of 1966, marines and South Vietnamese troops found themselves facing yet another enemy buildup there in early 1967. The newest threat persuaded Westmoreland to develop contingency plans for the activation and deployment of a U.S. Army division-size task force into I Corps and place it under the control of III MAF. NVA attacks on marine units near the DMZ in March and April propelled those plans into action.3 The architect and commander of the task force was Westmoreland's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. William B. Rosson, who named the task force after his native Oregon. Rosson built the provisional division by "borrowing" units and personnel from the whole of Vietnam, bringing them to Chu Lai and fitting them together to form a provisional headquarters and a support command. The combat strength of the task force came from three veteran infantry brigades and a cavalry squadron drawn from quieter sectors of the country: the 1st Brigade, lOlst Airborne Division; the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB); and the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Aviation, engineers, signal, and artillery units rounded out the troop list and provided the task force with the capabilities of an infantry division.4 The arrival of Task Force Oregon freed III MAF to shift the 1st Marine Division from southern I Corps to Da Nang and allowed the 3d Marine Division to intensify its own strength around the DMZ. The three new brigades also allowed III MAF to expand its operations in southern I Corps. After relieving units of the 7th Marines around Chu Lai on 12 April, the 196th LIB took to the field on Operation Lawrence, the first U.S. Army

Task Force Oregon

5

operation conducted in I Corps. The area around Due Pho was the task force's main effort, and it was there that the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division initiated Operation Baker in mid-April. On 11 May, four days after coming under the operational control of the task force, the 1st Brigade, lOlst Airborne Division kicked off Operation Malheur I. The holding action was over.s Capt. Cecil Harris, his balding head beaded with sweat, was on the telephone and furiously scribbling notes on a yellow legal pad when I walked into the G-1 section. While I was waiting for him to finish his conversation, I checked the branch insignia on his collar and noted that he wore the caduceus of the Medical Service Corps. There were no airborne wings on his chest, a discouraging sign to me. In those days I held a very narrow view of officers in the medical service corps and the other combat support branches-particularly those who were not airborne qualified. I soon found out that Harris was a total professional and serious about his job. From Cecil Harris I learned that I was going to be the task force assistance in kind (AIK) pay officer and responsible for paying the Vietnamese laborers. The news upset me no end: I had volunteered for Vietnam to command a rifle company and I recall telling Harris, "I'm in the infantry, not the goddamned Finance Corps." Cecil looked at me for a minute and said, "Oh, O.K., I get it. You just wanna get out into the bush and kill some of those Vietcong." "Well, I sure as hell didn't come over here to pay the sonofabitches." My answer caused Harris to smile for the first time. I think that conversation was the beginning of a friendship that has lasted since then. The G-1 was Lt. Col. Bill Walby, and I met him early the next morning. This veteran of World War II had a quick smile, but his cordial disposition cloaked a hard core. He knew the army and soldiers. After he had explained my job to me, I told him that I had come to Vietnam to serve with a combat unit, not in a staff job. I remember that when I had finished Colonel Walby smiled, placing his elbows on the desk and touching the tips of his fingers together. "Humphries, you can't build a career in the army just running the hills. When the time comes, I'll see that you go to a rifle battalion. But, until that time, you'll have to work for me." Colonel Walby was a man of his word. The job as AIK officer kept me busy. The developing task force had a heavy demand for indigenous labor and employed over nine hundred laborers daily at a cost of 800,000 Vietnamese piasters a month. To maintain a steady labor pool meant keeping them paid and that required flying to Saigon every other week to draw piasters. The money filled four duffel bags and required someone from the G-1 to accompany me to help handle the bags and secure the cash. 6 In September Task Force (TF) Oregon officially became the 23d

6

Through the Valley

Infantry Division (America!). The division's resurrection in Vietnam marked its second activation on the field of battle. Created the first time during World War II on the Pacific island of New Caledonia as the America! Division, its name came from combining "American troops on New Caledonia." Instead of forming the America! with its wartime regiments, two new infantry brigades, the 198th due to arrive in October, and the 11th scheduled to come in December, would soon join the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Separate) and replace the divisional brigades. Of the three infantry brigades that formed TF Oregon in the spring of 1967, the 196th LIB, nicknamed the Chargers, would be the only one to become part of the America! Division. 7 All of the activity made me feel that the war was passing me by. Colonel Walby must have sensed it because, in early October, he called me into his office and told me that a rifle company commander was needed out in the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment. Then he casually added that I could go out for an interview-if I really wanted to go. I tore out of his office and quickly made an appointment with the battalion commander. The 21st Infantry, nicknamed the Gimlets, traced its lineage back to the U.S. Civil War. It had been the first regiment to fight in Korea. The 3d Battalion was one of three infantry battalions in the 196th LIB and was operating in the heavily populated flatlands and low hills southwest of Chu Lai in area of operation Tiger. I met the battalion commander at the unit's base camp and spent several hours tagging along with him while he made rounds of the units. Company A was conducting a sweep, and our presence gave the battalion commander an opportunity to ask me a spate of questions about unit tactics. Not all my answers subscribed to his tactical theories, but they must have been satisfactory because he accepted me. In the middle of October Walby released me from the G-1, and I reported in to the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry to assume command of the battalion's Company C.

Notes 1. Richard Tregaskis, Southeast Asia: Building the Bases (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 99; Lt. Gen. Philip B. Davis, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988), pp. 345, 347. 2. Maj. Gary L. Tefler and Lt. Col. Lante Rogers. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984), p. 75. 3. Lt. Gen. Willard Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces: 1966-1968 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1975), pp. 12-13; Davis, Vietnam at War, p. 429. 4. Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces, p. 14. 5. Tefler and Rogers, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, p. 79; Americal Division:

Task Force Oregon

7

Operational Report Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 January 1968. 30 April 1968; David Burns Sigler, Vietnam Battle Chronology: U.S. Army and Marine Combat Operations, 1965-1973 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 1992), p. 41. 6. Task Force OREGON (America} Division): Operational Report Lessons Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1967. 14 February 1968. 7. Capt. Francis D. Cronin, Under the Southern Cross: The Saga of the America/ Division (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1951), p. 29.

2

The Assassins

I

n November, the I 96th LIB moved north from Chu Lai into the Que Son Valley to relieve the 1st Brigade, lOlst Division, on Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. The purpose of the operation was to locate and destroy enemy forces in the Que Son and Hiep Due valleys, provide security to Tam Ky, and secure National Route 1 north of Tam Ky.l While Headquarters, I 96th LIB moved to Hill 35 at the eastern edge of the Que Son Valley, the brigade's three infantry battalions fanned out into the hills and took control of three hilltop fire support bases (FSBs), imaginatively named East, West, and Center. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment and 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment (2-1 and 4-31, respectively) assumed responsibility for FSBs East and West, respectively (Map 2.1). Companies A, B, and D, 3-21 Infantry air assaulted into various parts of the new area of operation while the battalion's headquarters and Company C joined the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry (Abn) on FSB Center. Company C had the mission of providing security for the battalion headquarters and Battery B, 3-82d Artillery and had established temporary positions at the east end of the hill while we waited for 1-327 to move.2 The Que Son Valley was the haunt of the roaming, 6,400-man 2d NVA Division and a number of old-line Local Force and Main Force Vietcong units. The 2d NVA Division, considered the most formidable of all the enemy units in the area, had been battling the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), U.S. Marines, and U.S. Army units since its arrival in 1966. The I 96th LIB had been in the valley, but a few days before it first tangled with the 2d NVA Division's 2d Battalion, 3d Regiment (see Figure 2.1). The "Thanksgiving Day Battle," as it became known, took place on 23, 24, and 25 November between a 4-31 armored-infantry task force and the 5th and 7th Companies, 2d Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment at Hill 63. The task force, commanded by Maj. Gil Dorland, surprised the enemy and the battle rapidly expanded and quickly involved elements from every unit

9

_

. .....

South

1111lRM!d Road ~Road

Spot Elevation

_,_

Map 2.1 General Slluallon, Que Son and Hlap Due Vallaya, llkMimber-oecentJar I

10

DIIIMDtlniCicniiiiN~

Small RlwlriCreek Large Rlwlr/Tldal TriUary Dlllblct Haadquarlers

Flnl s~ Baseii.Z

10

11

11

The Assassins

GUO~ GK31~

-

SlgnoJ

I

I

GK.35~ GK37w ~·-

...

T--

GK3Z~

-I

GK38E±3

-

Glt33LtJ

-I

GK401 r\~ 1 .,.._

Figure 2.1 Organization, 2d NVA Division

within the 196th LIB. Task Force Dorland's fight at Hill 63 marked the beginning of several years of bloody fighting between the Chargers and the 2d NVA Division.3 It was also on Thanksgiving Day that one of my men pulled the pin on a hand grenade. The explosion killed him and brought my time with Charlie Company to an unexpected stop. I will never know if it was an accident or an intentional act, but justice was swift. Within 30 minutes of the incident, the battalion commander had summoned me to the battalion tactical operation center (BTOC), relieved me of command, and replaced me with Capt. Dennis Leach. (Leach was the assistant operations officer for the battalion and was an outstanding soldier, and in the coming months Dennis and I would develop a strong friendship that has lasted to this day.) It may sound like a cliche, but a commander is responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do. This is the principle on which the army operates. Although I was unquestionably responsible for what took place in my organization, I did not believe the grenade incident warranted my relief from command and I asked to see the brigade commander. The battalion commander sent for me later that evening. I recall him putting his arm on my shoulder during the session and telling me not to worry about my being relieved. Then he went on to say that he really had no choice in the matter,

12

Through the Valley

but he would give me Company B when it came open in a couple of months. I did not believe him and flew to Hill 35 the next morning to see the brigade commander, Col. Louis Gelling, who had assumed command shortly before the brigade's departure from Chu Lai. Colonel Gelling was a World War II veteran; he had quickly acquired a reputation of being a hard, no-nonsense commander. I did not relish meeting the colonel under any circumstances and certainly not this way. The adjutant told me that Gelling was visiting units and would return around noon, adding that the best place to wait for the colonel was near his mess tent and to catch him when he returned for lunch. It was sometime after 1200 when Colonel Gelling's command and control (C and C) helicopter landed. I recall forcing myself to wait until he had removed his olive drab flight helmet and replaced it with his steel pot, before starting toward him. I met him a few steps from the helicopter, took a deep breath, and reported. I was as taut as a bowstring. Gelling snapped a salute in return, eyed me for a few seconds, then asked me my purpose for being there, although he must have known. I quickly explained the details and requested that I be reinstated as the commander of Company C. Gelling listened until I had fmished, then gave me an emphatic no. His answer came as no real surprise to me. "But," he added, "I will allow you to go anywhere you wish within the 196th Light Infantry Brigade." I quickly answered that I wanted to stay with the 3-21st Infantry and expected him to modify his decision. I remember him flashing a rare smile and saying, "That's what I was hoping you'd say. Now, quit wasting my time here and get back to your unit." I never learned Colonel Gelling's reasons, but I will be forever grateful to him for giving me a second chance. It was midafternoon before I caught a helicopter back out to FSB Center. The route took us south over the paddies flecked with brown and green toward a line of densely forested hills that made up a significant part of 3-21 's area of operation (AO). A range of dark, mist-shrouded mountains crowded the western horizon. I never got to those mountains, but they often gave me pause to wonder what secrets they held. Hill 348, on which FSB Center sat, was the highest point of an eastwest ridge; the FSB was a reddish brown scar against the backdrop of surrounding green and was visible from some distance. As the pilot banked the UH-1 west and around the ridge, I was able to get my first good look at the hill that would forever be a part of my life. Concertina wire circled a string of bunkered fighting positions straddling the western end of the narrow-backed ridge and formed an elliptical perimeter crowded with weapons, helicopter pads, and bunkers. A battery of 155mm howitzers from Battery C, 3-16th Artillery filled the eastern third of the perimeter and the six 105mm howitzers of Battery B, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (B/3-82) filled the perimeter's western end. Sandwiched

The Assassins

13

between Battery B 's position and a helipad were the circular pits of the battalion's consolidated mortar platoon. The pilot eased the UH-1 into the resupply pad. The battalion commander and Mike Croxdale, the battalion surgeon, were standing just up the hill. I slid out of the cargo well and started toward them. The colonel's face took on a confounded look when he saw me coming, and I remember him saying in some surprise, "You're back." He then asked me what the brigade commander had said. I told him that Colonel Gelling had said that I could go to any battalion in the brigade I wanted and added that I had elected to remain with 3-21. The battalion commander put his arm on my shoulder and said, "I knew that Lou Gelling would send you back, and I'm glad that he did." The colonel's gesture caused Mike Croxdale's mustached face to split into a wide, skeptical grin. Mike excused himself, but before he departed, he reminded me that I had left my rucksack in the aid tent. After Mike was gone, the colonel told me that I could either be the assistant S-3 or I could take over the Assassins. Shortly after the battalion's arrival in the Que Son Valley, the battalion commander assumed the handle of The Steel Gimlet as his unofficial radio call sign. Following his lead, each company also picked its own unofficial radio call sign: Company A was Annihilator, B was Barracuda, C was Charlie Tiger, and D became Death. The Assassins were the members of the newly formed battalion reconnaissance team. There was no reconnaissance platoon authorized under the battalion's current table of organization and equipment, and the battalion had formed a squad-size reconnaissance team from personnel from the four rifle companies. The colonel told me to talk it over with the S-3, but he wanted an answer that day, and then walked away. I decided to go to the aid station and pick up my gear before I went to see the S-3. Mike was sitting at a field table and looked up when I walked through the tent flap. "Did you see the look on that sonofabitch's face when you got off that bird? Jesus Christ, he looked like he'd seen a dead man." "He sure didn't look happy," I answered. "He didn't want you back. Hell, he never expected to ever see you again." "Well, I am back," I said, and picked up my rucksack. As I started to leave, he invited to put me up in the aid tent overnight. I quickly accepted his invitation: November was the start of the northeast monsoon, and vacant dry spots on the hill were at a premium. I left the aid station and slopped my way along a meandering, meterwide boggy track toward the BTOC, a 10- to 12-foot-deep pit, covered with heavy timber and sandbags and located in the perimeter's center. I walked down the mud-crusted steps, pushed a piece of wet canvas aside, and entered. The air in the hole was dank and heavy with cigarette smoke and

14

Through the Valley

sweat, the clatter of radio traffic was sometimes deafening, field tables edged the sandbagged confines of the cavity, and a shelf of radios and two situation maps consumed all the wall space. Maj. Walt Burchfield, the battalion S-3, had his back to me and was talking rapidly on one of the radios when I walked through the door. Burchfield was a slight-framed Alabaman and filled with nervous energy. He seemed to thrive on pandemonium, and the never-ending chaos of the BTOC was the perfect place for him. Burchfield was unflappable and had assumed the radio call sign of Sunshine. He put the radio handset down and turned around, smiling and saying, "Well, Jim, I see you made it back." Major Burchfield was easy to talk to and held the respect of both officers and enlisted men in the battalion. I explained what had happened with Colonel Gelling, then told Burchfield of the two positions the battalion commander had offered. Burchfield lit a cigarette and asked what I wanted to do. "Go to recon and be in the field" was my answer. Burchfield slapped me on the shoulder and said, "Great. That's exactly where you need to be. Now, go and find the Assassins and tell them you're in charge." I found S. Sgt. Don Fleshman and the six men that constituted the Assassins sitting outside a bunker near the 81mm mortars. Some of the men did not look particularly happy when I told Sergeant Fleshman why I was there. After a short discussion with Fleshman, I learned that the rank of the next man below him was Specialist 4th Class-and that the recon team had conducted no missions and the men had not been trained in patrolling techniques. Except for Fleshman, the team's members had volunteered for the recon because they hated the regimentation of a rifle company. There were some good soldiers in the Assassins, despite their aversion to structure. Sp4c. Larry Manton and John Smith were among the best; Smith carried the team's M60 machine gun, and Manton would become my point man within a few days. Our first mission was simple enough: patrol east from the FSB and check the ridgeline for recent enemy activity. Major Burchfield told me to stay flexible and to expect changes. We passed through the defensive wire late the next day. Sergeant Fleshman walked point, and I trailed about 5 meters behind him. Putting the second in charge on point was not particularly smart, but I did not feel there was another choice. I did not know any of the men's personalities, and I certainly did not know their capabilities. Fleshman, though an unknown, was a noncommissioned officer and had spent a previous tour with the 1st Infantry Division. My assumption was that he was competent, and I would quickly learn my supposition was correct. We crossed a saddle about a thousand meters outside the perimeter and continued east through an area of elephant grass and brush. There was no distinguishable trail, but from all the bent and broken grass it was clear that

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15

a unit had passed through the area several days before. It was close to dusk when Fleshman hit a tripwire hidden in the grass and strung across the trail to a grenade. I heard a loud hiss to my left and yelled, "Grenade!" Fleshman threw himself forward, and I went to the right and head first into some tall grass as the booby trap exploded. Luckily, the fuse was old or defective, and the noise had given us enough warning to get out of the way. I halted the patrol for a few minutes while I reported the booby trap to the BTOC, and then we pushed on through the high grass. The last vestiges of daylight were fading into blackness when I moved the team into some underbrush and set up a tight perimeter near the trunk of a large tree. Staring into the dripping darkness I thought about the narrow escape with the grenade. I had been lucky that time, but I would learn that luck is an errant companion. We departed the thicket at a foggy first light and started downhill. The foliage was thick and dripping from rain. A few minutes after we started, our uniforms, already wet from the previous night's rain, were thoroughly soaked. The S-3 had radioed the night before, directing me to move into a narrow valley that lay below the ridge on which we had stayed. The hamlet ofTrung Lam (4) was at the south end of the valley, and Burchfield wanted it checked. Fleshman halted when he reached a narrow paddy at the base of the slope. I closed the distance between us and looked through the brush. The hamlet we wanted squatted on an embankment across the paddy less than 50 meters away. The cluster of straw huts showed no sign of life through the fog, and I moved the patrol out of the brush and started across the paddy. We were within meters of the embankment when Fleshman stopped, whipped his rifle up to his shoulder, and fired a single round. "Got him," Fleshman said calmly. Whoever Sergeant Fleshman hit had been watching us from a stand of banana plants that bordered the hamlet's edge. I had not seen the man, but thinking there could be others nearby made me want to get the patrol out of the paddy, fast. I yelled, "Let's go!" and we raced for the embankment and scurried up the bank. We found the man Fleshman had shot sprawled out between the banana plants. He looked to be about 25 years old, dressed in black pajamas and wearing a full set of U.S. web gear. Our general appearance, combined with the poor visibility that morning, might have made him think that we were Vietcong. We wore camouflaged fatigues and soft hats instead of steel helmets, and had streaked our faces and hands with green and black camouflage paint. It was a fatal error for the VC. I made a quick report to battalion while the rest of the team made an unsuccessful search of the "hootches" (huts, shelters) for a weapon. Burchfield directed us west to another ridge a thousand meters from the

16

Through the Valley

hamlet to set up an observation post (OP). We spent the day there watching the people in the valleys below us go about their daily chores. After it was dark I moved the patrol north and set up in a thicket for the night. Burchfield's instructions for the next day were for us to return to the valley where Fleshman had killed the VC and check out Cao Ngen, a hamlet in its northern end. We departed the ridge early the next morning with Manton on point. Pfc. John Whippert, who carried an M79 grenade launcher, followed him. I was third in the file. Maybe because of the mutually shared environment, men get to know each other very quickly in combat, and within two days I had decided that Larry Manton was a man on whom I could depend. Necessity, however, played the biggest part. I needed Fleshman off the point and at the rear of the column, where he could take charge of the team if something happened to me. The best route to the valley was down a precipitous, high-banked cut that sliced down the east side of the ridge. The rock-strewn trace was glass slick from the continual rain, and the burden of our 60-pound rucksacks made the footing treacherous. Silent movement was impossible, and dislodged rocks clattered and reverberated off the trail's high wooded banks like miniature thunderclaps, convincing me that every VC within 2 kilometers knew we were coming. As we neared the valley floor, the track leveled out and the vegetation thinned. A hootch sat to the left and a few feet below the trail. I saw Manton look down toward the hootch and then tum sharply. Manton described it this way: "I made eye contact with an old woman standing on the muddy patio in front of the hootch. I knew that something was of great concern to her because she made several quick glances to the hootch, then back to me. She then started to babble, almost in a mild state of panic, to someone within earshot. "4 As the woman started to talk, a VC standing out of Manton's view jumped off the patio and into a paddy and ran for a stand of trees. Manton, followed by Whippert, leaped off the trail onto the wet, hard-packed ground that served as a patio for the hootch. Rain had turned its clay-like surface into grease, and both men lost their footing and slammed into the mud. Manton hit the ground just as a second VC armed with an M16 rifle blew past him. Manton: "I don't know to this day whether he was brain dead or if all the camouflage on my face intimidated him. I'm trying to right myself with this sixty-pound pack pinning me to the ground and Whippert, the Grenadier, was flat on his butt like me and his M-79 was useless at close range. Here we both are lying prostrate, just 10 feet to the right of this dude, and he lets it pass. There are two kinds of soldiers, the quick and the dead. To this day I remember that phrase running through my mind. I squeezed off a three-round burst from the hip and all the rounds, which were tracers, hit him somewhere mid-section. He paid it no mind and

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17

jumped off the patio into a small rice paddy and stumbled. By then, Whippert and me were on our feet and I put another burst into him as he was getting up. But he kept going-like I was using a BB-gun, and disappeared into a bunch of brush. "5 The episode had taken less than 20 seconds and was over by the time I reached Manton and Whippert. Larry was angry at himself for losing his balance and for not getting a shot at the other VC. I set up security, and Manton recounted the events as we were searching for the VC he had shot. First, we found the VC's rifle and two large rice bags in the paddy. The brush where Manton had seen the man disappear hid a 15-foot embankment, at the bottom of which we found him dead. The VC had a key chain with keys and a set of dogtags in his possession inscribed with the name Lopez. We later learned the keys and dogtags had belonged to a soldier from the 1st Brigade, lOlst Division, but we never learned his fate.6 We searched the hootch and found 100 pounds of rice stowed in two gunny sacks fashioned into rucksacks. We also found some letters, North Vietnamese money, and what I thought might be NVA regimental insignia. After we had made a check of the woods for the second VC, Major Burchfield directed us back to the ridge we had come from to reestablish an OP and continue to observe the adjacent valleys. When it was dark I changed locations and set up for the night. Our mission for the next day was the same, but we were running out of new places to set up and hide on the ridge. Burchfield fixed that problem by directing me to move to the top of Hill 403, Nui Giai, where we were to establish a position and observe north into the Que Son Valley. Burchfield wanted us in position by late afternoon. Nui Giai was only several kilometers northwest of our well-used ridgeline, and I figured we could easily reach the hill and set up before nightfall. Burchfield, however, directed us to traverse the valley that separated Hill 403 and FSB Center to see what we could stir up along the way. He also wanted us to check out the hamlet of Loc An ( 1) that sat at the southern base of the hill. That would take time. Manton took point and we moved south along the ridge to a cut that led down into the western valley. Every corner of the valley showed signs of war: halfway down the slope we passed the lifeless hulks of two marine H34 helicopters shot down during an earlier operation; later we came across a half-destroyed pagoda. (The Vietcong sometimes used pagodas to store weapons or rice, but this one was empty.) We moved at a slow, but steady gait and reached Loc An (1) toward late afternoon in a cold, drizzling rain. Vietnamese hamlets were usually antheaps of activity around dark, but Loc An was strangely empty. I split the team into pairs, and we conducted a rapid search of the hamlet's 20-odd hootches. The people of Loc An (1) had left in a hurry. The cooking fires in the hootches were still warm, bunches of peanuts lay beneath their thatched

18

Through the Valley

eaves drying, and rice containers sat nearly full by the hootch entrances. It was a ghost town. Staff Sergeant Fleshman found an elderly Vietnamese couple cowering in their bunker and brought them outside. Although we meant the old folks no harm, the presence of armed camouflaged Americans undoubtedly distressed them. None of us spoke Vietnamese, and I could not tell them that nor could I ask where the other people had gone. I figured that the pair had stayed in the hamlet because they were either sick or too old to travel. Standing in this deserted hamlet in the dingy afternoon light gave us an incredibly eerie feeling that Manton described as "a feeling of impending doom." My first thought was that the NVA had evacuated the area because they planned an attack on FSB Center. It seemed plausible to me and I radioed Major Burchfield and voiced my concerns. Burchfield noted the information and told me that he would pass it on to brigade intelligence section.? We had spent a half-hour in the hamlet, and I was eager to get the team away from there. The light was failing and a hard rain was falling when we moved out of the village to climb Hill 403. Nui Giai stands at about the same height as the other green-clad hills that edge the south side of the Que Son Valley. I climbed most of them during my tour, but none were like the climb up Hill 403 that afternoon. Our route took us up its south slope. It is exceptionally steep, covered with coarse, knee-high grass that was glacier-slick from the rain. About midway to the top, we ran into a series of ancient, chest-high stone walls set 30 to 50 meters apart. The walls, designed to buttress a flat crop-growing area between them, contoured the hill for several hundred meters to our right and left. Each wall required us to halt, climb over it, and move uphill to the next wall. The higher we climbed, the steeper the slope became, and at times we had to crawl on our hands and knees to keep going. Security had fallen apart. It was nearly dark when we reached a large patch of jungle just below the crest of the hill, and I stopped and moved the team into the thick brush. We spent the night sitting back to back in the pouring rain, sharing body heat and shivering throughout the night. It was still raining when we finished the climb and set up the OP early the next morning. We used up a good part of the day watching the expanse of the Que Son Valley to our north and scores of Vietnamese civilians walking east toward the coast. In my narrow view, I thought the people were moving to avoid being caught in the middle of a Christmas offensive and that the deserted village was the precursor of an NVA attack on FSB Center. Some time after noon Major Burchfield directed me to move off the hill and return to the FSB. After we had closed into the perimeter I went to the BTOC and reported my observations and concerns to the battalion S-3. Major Burchfield appeared interested and told me he had forwarded the

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information to brigade. Although I have no reason to doubt that Burchfield did what he said, I have not found a reference to my report in the brigade's existing records. Be that as it may, it would take another month to determine what the NVA had planned.

Notes 1. 196th LIB: Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa: 15 March 1969. 2. 196th LIB: Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa; 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals. 22-25 November 1967. 3. 196th LIB: Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa; Maj. Gil Dorland was badly wounded during the battle but remained in the field until he was too weak to carry out his duties. Dorland was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism; 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals. 22-25 November 1967. 4. Larry Manton, letter to author, 18 December 1993. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Author's recollection of events.

3

Green Seeds

T

he battalion commander was happy with our performance and decided to send us back to the rear to dry out for 24 hours. Burchfield grabbed me before we got on the resupply bird the next morning and told me to enjoy the hot shower. The S-3 did not elaborate except to say it would be a while before we would get another. We returned to FSB Center after a night in Chu Lai, and S. Sgt. Fleshman and I went to the BTOC. Major Burchfield and a rangy warrant officer pilot we called the Red Baron were looking at the map of the area. The Red Baron was a member of the 71st Combat Aviation Battalion (Rattlers) and regularly supported the battalion. On that particular day he was flying the commander's C and C ship.! The S-3 smiled when he saw us and said, "I'm glad you're back because I've got a job for you." Not one to squander time with long-winded orations, Burchfield turned to the operations map and thumped his finger on an area northeast of the FSB. "That's where you're going." I got closer to the map to get a better look. The place where the S-3 had pointed was a crazy quilt of paddies and islands in the center of the Que Son Valley about 7 kilometers northeast of the base. The islands, illustrated on the map as splotches of green in an ocean of paddies, were no more than bumps of dry ground protruding just above the water level of the surrounding rice fields. We called the area "the flats." Burchfield's plan was to insert us into the valley shortly before sundown. To confuse the enemy about where we were going, the Red Baron would make two widely separated feigned landings, called false insertions, several hundred meters from the actual landing zone (LZ). For the ruse to work, the Red Baron would have to make a landing approach into the fake LZ, drop the helicopter below the trees, and then take off just before the skids touched the ground. After he had put us into the LZ, the Red Baron would perform a final fake landing and then depart the area. Gunships usually covered helicopter insertions in the event there was 21

22

Through the Valley

enemy on the LZ, but this time we had none. It would be a single-ship mission. Once we were on the ground our mission was to observe the surrounding area. As always, Burchfield reminded us to stay flexible and expect changes. When Fleshman and I departed the BTOC to brief the team and prepare for the mission, it struck me that it was Pearl Harbor Day. It was late afternoon when the seven of us, hunched over and straining under the weight of our rucksacks, approached the UH-1 (Huey) to fly off FSB Center. The Red Baron was standing beside the bird, and shot us a skeptical look. I recall him mumbling something about being overloaded, but other than that lone ambivalent comment he did not seem concerned. We crammed into the Huey amid much scraping and talking as each man sought space to sit on the floor of the cargo compartment. Once we had settled into place nobody talked. I remember the unusual silence and listening to the clink and squeak sounds made by the two pilots as they adjusted their harnesses and conducted their prestart checks. The Red Baron split the silence when he yelled, "Clear." As the Huey's engine started life with a high-pitched whine, I looked out at the seemingly secure fire base with its soggy bunkers protected by coils of concertina wire. I was departing the known for the obscure. The terrain in the flats was totally alien, and its unfamiliarity produced an unusual sense of dread in me. I thought about the insertion and tried to anticipate everything that might go wrong. The battalion's rifle companies were working in the hills several kilometers south of our LZ. If the LZ was hot, I knew we were on our own. The Red Baron wobbled the Huey a foot or so into the air, but then it slammed hard onto the steel planking of the landing pad. I did not think we would make it, but he tried it again and raised the ship 5 or 6 feet above the ground and hovered. The Red Baron must have convinced himself the helicopter would fly, because seconds later we were catapulting down the grassy slope toward the valley. The airspeed increased and the Red Baron started a lazy climbing tum to the east. As we gained altitude, he turned and yelled that he had to bum off a little fuel and lighten the load. We circled east of the fire support base for 10 or 15 minutes before he turned the Huey north and descended toward the flats. As we neared the first false insertion point, the Red Baron yelled, "This is number one." Then he dropped the ship below some trees, skimmed the surface of a paddy for a short distance, and executed a sharp climbing tum to the west. It seemed that we had no sooner cleared the woods on the paddy's far side when he hollered back at us, "This is number two." Then he dipped the helicopter into a clearing surrounded by woods. Just before the skids touched the grass, the Red Baron gunned the Huey's engine into a sharp climb that cleared the surrounding trees by less than a foot. "OK, the next one is for real," he yelled, and turned the ship to the northeast.

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I scooted to the edge of the open door and saw a thickly wooded island sliding beneath us. The paddy was coming up fast and I yelled, "This is it." Seconds later the Huey's skids brushed the tops of a large bamboo thicket, and the Baron finessed the helicopter into a small horseshoe-shaped rice field. When the skids neared the muddy water, I jumped. I must have been leaning too far forward because my rucksack went over my head and I slammed face first into the muck. As I struggled to my feet, the last team member reached the island and disappeared into a stand of banana plants. I chased after them. From the spot where I had taken the nosedive to the low bank was only 35 meters, but it seemed like a mile. The mire sucked at my boots and slowed my movement from a run to a series of inertly sluggish steps. I felt an overwhelming rush of relief when I scrambled up the bank and into cover. Staff Sergeant Fleshman had assembled the men in a perimeter and was waiting a few meters beyond the paddy's edge. Breathing hard, I joined them covered in mud and feeling stupid, but no one commented about my clumsiness. I radioed battalion and reported that the LZ was cold-meaning no enemy fire. We remained in place listening for any unusual sounds in the woods around us. The stillness was overwhelming after the vibrating, clamorous ride in the Huey, but the quiet could be deceiving. There were times when recon team members had been inserted into a cold LZ and then been hit by an ambush when they started to move. We had been there for about 10 minutes when a village to our northwest unexpectedly erupted into life with the voices of little kids and adults yelling happily to one another. I figured the villagers would not be noisy had they seen us and decided to move, understanding that nothing was absolute. Manton took point and we eased slowly to the southwest and away from the LZ. Our route took us through a mixture of stunted banana plants and shrub-like vegetation. We were several hundred meters from the LZ when I called a halt to set up for the night. I planned to move into the location where Burchfield wanted the OP early the next morning. Around dusk some helicopter gunships flew into the area and began firing near the village where we had heard the noise. I radioed the BTOC to notify them that we had gunships working nearby; the duty officer did not have a good explanation of what they were doing. Afterward I learned that the gunships had spotted two VC in the village and had killed one of them.2 At first light we moved into some thick vegetation and set up the OP overlooking a large rice paddy. Fleshman and another man took up a security position to the rear, and I placed the remainder of the team in a quartercircle at the paddy's edge. Except for a single farmer the large paddy was empty. I reported the lack of activity in the area to the S-3, and he directed us

24

Through the Valley

to move farther west. During the next 2 days we continued the process of moving, halting, setting up, and observing. There was no sign of the enemy, and our most difficult task was keeping our presence concealed from the locals. It was a lousy area to work.3 The weather was rainy, and temperatures dropped into the 60s after dark. We stayed constantly wet. On the morning of the third day of the mission, one of the men developed a low-grade fever; by 1700 the sick man's fever had risen to 104.6 degrees Fahrenheit. He was indeed sick, and I radioed Burchfield and requested that the man be extracted. There was no choice. Our security depended on the alertness of each team member and a sick man could put the entire team in jeopardy. While we were waiting on the Huey, Major Burchfield radioed and told me he was extracting the entire team. After we landed at FSB Center, I went straight to the BTOC to brief the S-3 and see what he had in mind for us. I had little to report. Burchfield told me that he had brought us back so he could reposition us near Hill 63, the scene of the Thanksgiving Day battle. Our objective was to establish an OP on an unnamed hill that sat to the west of Hill 63 between Route 534 and the Ly Ly River. We were on the ground shortly before dark the next afternoon and spent the next 6 days in the flats. On 14 December battalion directed me to link up with a platoon from Company C and patrol the islands. There were a couple of scraps with the local VC and we captured a weapon, but we were not performing reconnaissance. On 16 December Burchfield directed the platoon to rejoin Company C, and pulled us back to FSB Center. After I had briefed Major Burchfield on my activities of the previous several days, he told me that our next job would be training replacements for the rifle companies. I also found out that that we could expect an attack on the FSB sometime during the holiday period. Rumors about pending attacks were not new, but this one seemed to be serious. It was when I began research on this book that I learned why. In early December the 9th Cavalry Squadron, a part of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, caught the headquarters of the 3d NVA Regiment near the 3d Brigade's LZ Ross. The battle was short, and when the smoke cleared the NVA regiment commander, along with several of his key staff officers, was dead. Documents taken from the bodies contained the 2nd NVA Division's battle maps and the plans for a large-scale offensive in the Que Son Valley. Senior U.S. commanders rightly concluded that the command group of the 3d NVA Regiment was reconnoitering attack objectives when the 9th Cavalry cut that outing short. 4 It was an intelligence windfall, but missing from the documents was the planned date for the attack. There was the additional possibility that the NVA might cancel its plans now that they were in U.S. forces' hands. The 196th LIB and the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, the major players in

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the Que Son Valley, decided to safe-side it and prepare for an enemy attack as outlined by the captured documents. The brigade commanders reasoned that if the attack occurred, it would happen during the Christmas or New Year's truce or shortly thereafter.s Major Burchfield had designated the grass-topped ridge to the northeast of the FSB as the training area, and I set out to find the replacements. We called them Greenseeds, a curious name for newly arrived troops, but when I saw the group of soldiers standing behind the BTOC, the name made sense. Everything about them, from their camouflaged helmet covers to their jungle boots, was new and exerted a rare, dewy freshness in the muddy surroundings. Although we called it training, it was really a 24- to 36-hour hands-on orientation period. The idea was to put the new men in an easily accessible location for a day and a night and introduce them to life in the field before they joined their respective rifle companies. There was no schedule nor lesson plan for what we did, but we considered it serious business. A part of the orientation was a daylight patrol into one of the nearby valleys. Neither valley was crawling with enemy soldiers, but there were local VC around, and the prospect of meeting a Main Force unit made the patrol more than an idle stroll through the Vietnamese countryside. Besides the patrol, I used part of the time to teach an abbreviated class on forward observer (FO) procedures. I chalked the basics of how to request indirect fire on a tightly stretched poncho "blackboard," then followed up by allowing the class to adjust a few 81mm mortar rounds on a hill to our north. We were on the ridgeline and training Greenseeds on Christmas Eve when the first holiday truce went into effect. The rules of engagement for the truce were restrictive and prohibited any offensive action or the use of artillery except under emergencies. The rules, though modified later to allow battalion commanders some flexibility, were still restrictive and curbed operations during the truce period. 6 Even though there was a truce, the idea of an NVA attack on FSB Center over Christmas obsessed the battalion commander, and he figured they would use the ridgeline as an approach route. With that in mind, he decided to keep us out on the ridge to act as early warning, or "speed bump," as somebody said, for the base. I moved into a new position after dark and established a perimeter on the narrow ridge. The weather on Christmas Eve was lousy. There was not much rain but the wind picked up, and before long we were bucking a storm. Sleep was out of the question, and I sat with my ear glued to the radio handset waiting for the first NVA probe to come. Fleshman was still in the rear and S. Sgt. Thomas Bryant, who had recently joined the Assassins, spent the night moving between positions and keeping the men alert. Bryant had served a previous tour with the 1st Infantry Division and knew his business, but the weather made it a perfect

26

Through the Valley

night for an enemy attack. Had the NVA decided to do so, the storm would have prevented us from detecting them until it was too late. The S-3 pulled us into the FSB the next day, fed us Christmas dinner, and held us there until 1830 hours. It was dark by the time we returned to the ridge, and I halted a hundred meters short of the spot where we had spent the previous night. A pocket of dense fog had settled onto the hills Christmas night, and visibility was down to only a couple of meters. The night passed peacefully, but the conditions were again perfect had the NVA selected that night to attack the base. With the Christmas truce over, the battalion went on the offensive and air assaulted two platoons from Company A south of the Chang River. Accompanying the two platoons was a North Vietnamese soldier who had turned himself into the 3-21st Infantry on Christmas Eve under the Chieu Hoi Program,? The hoi chanh (defector from the NVA) was supposedly a former noncommissioned officer in the 2d NVA Division who said he had knowledge of a large weapons cache and an NVA hospital south of the Chang River near the village of Tai Than. According to the hoi chanh, who volunteered to accompany U.S. forces in going after it, only a small security force guarded the cache. As the Rattlers swooped across the Chang River and landed 1st Lt. George A. Kitney's 1st Platoon, the men saw a number of enemy running from the area. Two NVA died as the platoon boiled out of the helicopters and unleashed a hail of fire at the fleeing enemy. There was no resistance. Kitney quickly searched the area and located an ammunition storage point and two large stockpiles of weapons. The cache contained two 12.7mm antiaircraft guns, 11 mortars, and two 57mm recoilless rifles, plus a variety of French and U.S. weapons.s It was a significant discovery and conceivable that the weapons and ammunition had been prepositioned to support the anticipated offensive. It was not the fir~t such find. On 13 December, an NVA defector had led Company B, 4-31st Infantry to a cave that held a large hidden reserve that included an assortment of weapons and ammunition, including an antiaircraft gun. While Company A extracted the large number of weapons, three more hoi chanhs rallied to a unit of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry. The North Vietnamese defectors warned interrogators that a multiregimental size attack would take place against LZ Ross and LZ Baldy soon. The information provided by the hoi chanhs agreed with the plans captured by the 3d Brigade earlier in the month, but the planned date of the attack was still a mystery.9 Another mystery was the man we saw in the valley east of the ridgeline one day around Christmas. Smith and Manton were sitting in some brush at the rim of the ridgeline watching the valley when Smith came over to me and said, "Come look at this guy!" I followed Smith and scanned the area with my binoculars. The man I saw was big, too big for a Vietnamese, and

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27

appeared to be a Caucasian. We watched him a few minutes before he entered a hootch and disappeared. I reported what we had seen, and Burchfield directed us to go after him. We did, but by the time we had worked our way down to the village the man was gone. It was rainy and foggy when Burchfield moved us off the ridge and into the flats on the 29th. We found a few medical supplies but saw no enemy, and Burchfield directed us back to the ridgeline on the 31st to act as early warning for the FSB during the New Year's truce. As we made our way back to the ridgeline, Company A found the NVA hospital that the hoi chan had told interrogators about earlier. The hospital was unoccupied but, like the weapons cache, was in a position where it could support an offensive in the Que Son Valley.IO The truce was less than 24 hours old on New Year's Day, when the 196th LIB sent an intelligence report to its units stating that the 2d NVA Division Headquarters and the 1st VC Regiment were on the move. The intelligence report, like so many others, was sketchy and did not include the enemy's location, direction of movement, or the enemy's suspected intentions.ll The holiday truce had placed the war on temporary hold for Allied forces, but the North Vietnamese had their own agenda.

Notes 1. CWO Ronald Clements Rudolph, a.k.a. the Red Baron, died during his second combat tour in Vietnam on 13 October 1969. 2. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journal. 7 December 1967. 3. The team's moves and locations throughout this period are from information found in the December 1967 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals. 7-10 December 1967. 4. Americal Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 January 1968. 8 February 1968 identifies the regimental commander as Major Tran Ngoc Toan. For a detailed account of that action see Matthew Brennan, Brennan's War: Vietnam 1965--69 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), pp. 156158. 5. F. Clifton Berry, Chargers (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), pp. 84-85. 6. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journal. 24 December 1967: To all Companies: A Christmas truce has been declared during the period 241800 to 251800 Dec. 67. 1. There will be no offensive actions initiated to include Hand I fires [harassment and interdiction]. 2. Units will take such measures deemed appropriate to defend all personnel and installations. 3. Units continue to report all enemy movement and continue ambushes and reconnaissance. 4. Units continue clandestine operations and make your moves with extreme caution. Observed fires may be placed on enemy movement.

28

Through the Valley

At 2200 on 24 December an artillery fire mission requested by an OP of the 3-21st Infantry to engage moving lights was denied by Headquarters 196th LIB. The journal entry reads as follows: "Requested fire mission on lights moving vic OP-11. Called Bde 3 requested to fire, denied must have 20-50 VC force in an offensive nature, then must still request permission to fire from Bde 3." At 2300, the BTOC 3-21st Infantry received the following message easing the rules: "It is the decision of the commander whether we engage a hostile force or not. Artillery will be [used] only on contact." 7. Chieu Hoi, meaning Open Arms, was an amnesty program designed to encourage members of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army to rally to the Allied cause. A hoi chanh was an enemy soldier who rallied. 8. 196th LIB: Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa: 15 March 1969. 9. 196th LIB: After Action Report Operation: Wheeler/Wallowa provides a detailed list of the weapons in the cave; Americal Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 January 1968. 8 February 1968. 10. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journal. 31 December 1967. 11. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journal. 1 January 1968.

4

The Hiep Due Valley

2 January

S

hortly after the truce had ended, the brigade kicked off combat operations with a combat assault into the sparsely populated sweep of verdant hills south of the Chang River. The outlook later in the day was rain. That morning, though, the clouds hung scattered at 2,500 feet, the winds were light and the air clear, making the surrounding Kelly green hills appear much closer than they were. It was a near-perfect day for an air assault. I Sounds of rotor blades from Rattler aircraft filled the air of the Hiep Due Valley to our west as the slicks spiraled onto a hilltop and picked up Company C, 4-31st Infantry. While the slicks carried Charlie Company south, Battery C, 3-82d Artillery on FSB West began pumping shells onto a hogback ridge 2,500 meters south of the Chang River. Dirty gray-black smoke from the final artillery rounds still drifted above the surrounding trees when the first slick touched down and Capt. Joseph Stringham, Company C's commander, reported the LZ cold. The area south of the Chang River was a favored east-west avenue for NVA units, and Stringham quickly assembled his platoons and moved east in search of the enemy.2 While Company C was working the hills across the Chang River, Lt. Col. Frederick Cully, who had assumed command of 4-31 on 20 December, continued operations in the appendix-shaped Hiep Due Valley: Company A was in the south, Company D in the north, and Company B performed security duty on FSB West. Perched on Hill445, FSB West dominated the southeastern end of the valley, making it an ideal location from which to support the battalion's combat operations. Curbing the flow of enemy units through the valley, however, was a daunting task and required much more than a well-situated FSB. The Hiep Due Valley sat on the border of Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces, an area with a lengthy history of Communist rule. 29

30

Through the Valley

The first U.S. troops into the valley had arrived on temporary duty from Okinawa in April 1963 with Detachment A-423, 1st Special Forces Group. Their mission was to train members of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group and deny the area to the Vietcong. To do this the team had established camps at the villages of Hiep Due and Phouc Son, 5 kilometers west of the valley. It was an Augean task. In 1963, Vietcong operations in the area covered a wide spectrum of activities that included raids on small self-defense outposts, kidnapping of villagers to use as slave labor, taxation, sabotage of highway bridges with demolition, ambushes, and assassination of people friendly to South Vietnamese government) Sfc. Alfred "Ben" Boyles was a radio operator assigned to Detachment A-423 and part of a group sent into the valley to conduct the initial reconnaissance of the area and find a suitable campsite. Sergeant 1st Class Boyles remembers: "Our first day of recon was concentrated in and around the village of Hiep Due. During the recon we received sniper fire in a valley just southwest of the hamlet. The same night we stayed in Hiep Due and the village came under mortar attack." There were no casualties in Boyles's group, but the attack was a clear signal that the Communists were not willing to give up control of the valley to anyone without a fight.4 Detachment A-423 had set about to wrest control of the area from the Communists, and the Special Forces soldiers enjoyed some successes. A continued U.S. military presence in that isolated valley would have added an effective measure of stability to the area, but that was not to be. In December of that year the Special Forces troops packed their rucksacks, turned the camps over to the South Vietnamese authorities, and headed back to Okinawa.s Control of the region during the next couple of years seesawed between South Vietnamese government forces and the 1st Vietcong Regiment, the undisputed king of the region. The Communists won most of the battles, but the dynamics changed when the U.S. Marines deployed into Chu Lai during the summer of 1965. In August of that year, with the help of information provided by a Communist defector, the marines mounted Operation Starlite and slapped the king off his throne.6 Starlite was the first major ground combat operation of the Vietnam War conducted by U.S. troops, and the defeat of 1st VC Regiment had tilted the balance in the Allies' favor, but not for long. By November, the 1st VC Regiment had replaced losses, refitted, rearmed, and overrun the South Vietnamese government garrison at Hiep Due. With the support of U.S. Marine air power, two South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) battalions were able to retake Hiep Due; however, the ARVN decided not to hold it and abandoned the valley shortly afterward. Controlling the Hiep Due Valley thereafter was a U.S. problem.? Communist power in the region was also growing: the 2d NVA Division had come into the Que Son area during the winter of 1965-1966

The Hiep Due Valley

31

and had found the Hiep Due Valley's east-west orientation to its liking. Routes into the valley were plentiful, and a rutted track, euphemistically called Highway 534, ran from the Laotian border to Highway 1, passing through the valley along its way. Highway 534, along with a latticework of obscure trails over the jungle-covered hills, provided enemy forces an approach from their mountainous western base areas into the rice-rich coastal plain. s Using a combination of these paths the NVA infiltrated the valley during darkness, thus avoiding detection and the devastating U.S. firepower that always followed. The villages were key terrain to the NVA, and once in the valley the enemy soldiers burrowed into one of the many hamlets scattered across its wooded center. Fortified ahead of time by the VC militia within the hamlet, the positions offered the NVA superb observation, fields of fire, and concealment from the ever-searching pilots of Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, the Americal Division's new air cavalry troop. The troops' radio call sign of Blue Ghost quickly became familiar to the infantry soldiers.9 Tracking the elusive NVA division from its hidden base areas into the Que Son or Hiep Due Valley areas was no simple task, but intelligence specialists had nevertheless collected a wealth of knowledge on the elusive enemy. Except for information provided by some defectors and the occasional radio intercept, though, it was we infantry or cavalry soldiers who most often found the enemy-usually where we did not expect him to be. I personally feel that we knew too little about the NVA and VC units against whom we fought, and my opinion is not an isolated one. S. Sgt. Timothy F. Hunt Jr. was the platoon sergeant of the 1st Platoon A/4-3lst Infantry and remembers that "sergeants never knew what was going on in terms of field combat intelligence. If the officers knew what we were facing or looking for, they did not share it with us as a group because even the first sergeant didn't know. We just did what we were told and executed our assignments. "10 Getting current intelligence seemed to be a frustrating exercise at every level. Capt. Dan Mellon was the 4-31 's intelligence officer (S-2) and remembered attending a meeting at 196th LIB headquarters in late December. "We were told that there were reports that the 2d NVA Division was coming into the area. I asked them to define area and got a blank stare. So, I asked what they meant when they said elements. Did they mean a platoon, a battalion, or were they talking about a regiment? I got another blank stare. So I asked what the source of the intelligence was, and just got another blank look. My weather reports were better than the intelligence I got."ll However, despite the absence of a certain date, all indications suggested that an attack was still coming. Lt. Chet Larson commanded the 4-31 's consolidated mortar platoon on FSB West and recalls watching the NVA boldly move men and equipment during the holiday truce. Although Larson

32

Through the Valley

and his platoon could see the lights of an enemy column, the rules imposed on the U.S. troops during the truce period prohibited him from taking them under fire with the unit mortars. Larson later wrote: "During the nights of 31 December and 1 January, the NVA violated the Holiday truce to position themselves or bring re-supplies into the Hiep Due Valley. There was a line of torches in the valley that reminded me of a fire snake."12 Another ominous sign came the day after the New Year. A radio intercept team had arrived on FSB West before Christmas with the job of shadowing the 2d NVA Division's movements during the waning days of December. On 2 January the NVA division's radios fell silent and the team lost track of the enemy. Radio silence implied that the division was on the move, and some in 4-31 thought it was coming their way. Lieutenant Larson was present at the battalion commander's staff meeting and remembers the mood that day. "They announced that they had lost radio contact with the 2d NVA Division and the feeling of the command was that an attack was imminent. "13 The enemy division was certainly moving that day. While the headquarters of the 2d NVA Division established its command post near Nui Chom, a towering height north of Hiep Due Village, its three regiments were marching out of the highlands. The 3d and 21st Regiments headed east into prearranged assembly areas bordering the Que Son Valley to prepare for an attack on units of 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. The 1st VC Regiment moved south into its old haunt, the Hiep Due Valley, to strike the 4-31 st Infantry.14 The storm of enemy was rapidly approaching, but the Hiep Due Valley had been ostensibly placid for several weeks. Company D, 4-31 had spent the last days of December operating along the valley's northern edge. Despite the warnings and for reasons not clear-possibly because there had been no significant contact with the enemy-the company commander split the company during the night of 2 January.t5 Late that afternoon the company commander moved the company east to establish a night defensive position near the Lau River. On the way, he dropped off the 2d Platoon, under the command of a Lieutenant Carol, to set up an ambush. Around dark Lieutenant Carol moved the platoon into a dry rice field, placed his men behind the cover of the paddy's dikes, then settled in to wait. The company commander and the 1st and 3d Platoons continued east a thousand meters. While the company headquarters and the 3d Platoon established a night defensive perimeter close to the Lau River, the 1st Platoon crossed the river and established an ambush position 500 meters north of the company CP.16 Sgt. Timothy McWashington was a squad leader in the 3d Platoon D/4-31 and remembers the river position. "We had been warned that the VC were in the area and dug in as best we could. Digging in that night saved the majority of the people."17

The Hiep Due Valley

33

The NVA's much-heralded offensive arrived at 0140 the following morning when a storm of mortar and 122mm rocket fire rained down on the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry's LZs Ross and Leslie. A ground attack, supported by a blistering fusillade of recoilless rifle and heavy machine gun fire, followed on the heels of the mortar barrage.IS News of the attack on the cavalry units flashed into the 4-31 's BTOC shortly before 0200. LZ Leslie was only a kilometer from the 4-31 's northem boundary, and Lieutenant Colonel Cully directed a 100 percent stand-to on FSB West. It was a prudent move because the NVA soon announced its presence on Hill 445 by hurling several hand grenades out of the darkness toward Company B 's bunkers.19 A barrage of 82mm mortar fire followed the hand grenade probe, but luckily the enemy's aim was off that night and the shells struck outside the perimeter. Capt. William Speer, commander of Company B, observed three distinct flashes 2,000 meters to the northwest of the FSB that appeared to be the 82mm mortar position. Speer's artillery FO requested a fire mission and Battery B, 3-82d Artillery, located at FSB Center, fired on the enemy positions with unknown results.2o Contact around FSB West continued throughout the early morning hours. At one point, Company B's 1st Platoon detected several NVA soldiers in its sector and took them under fire, forcing them to withdraw down the slope. For good measure, the company's FO plastered the area with a well-directed artillery mission. During the early morning hours all the listening posts (LPs) around the firebase perimeter reported hearing heavy movement around them. Captain Speer requested permission to withdraw the LPs into the perimeter; it was granted by Lieutenant Colonel Cully. At the same time Cully directed the LPs from Headquarters Company back into the protective wire.21 While mortar rounds were exploding around FSB West, NVA forces were encircling Company D's two positions. Shortly before 0400, Lieutenant Carol radioed the company commander that 60 to 70 NVA were 200 to 300 meters north of his position. Carol noted that the enemy was in groups of 10 and moving to the southeast. The company commander quickly relayed the report to the BTOC and initiated an artillery fire mission in support of the 2d Platoon.22 (See Map 4.1.) At 0430, the commander of Company D reported NVA troops were now between his position and FSB West and requested another artillery fire mission. The NVA route went between Delta Company's position and the 2d Platoon, now isolated from the rest of the company and the enemy's apparent objective. Lieutenant Colonel Cully directed the company commander to link up with Carol's platoon, and the latter responded that he would begin moving after the fire mission had ended.23 Company D's attempt to link up with the 2d Platoon failed, and minutes later Carol came under heavy fire from 20 NVA about 100 meters

----· Trail

cart Tracie

---

Spot Elevation

4-31&1 lnlantry NVA

34

')

1

Blocldng Poalllon NVA Mortar Position

The Hiep Due Valley

35

north of his perimeter. The 2d Platoon answered with machine gun, M79, and rifle fire while Lieutenant Carol called artillery on the NVA's position. Ten minutes into the contact, Carol reported that Company D had a second group of NVA pinned down south of the company's position. Contact continued around both positions as Company D fought off the encroaching NVA.24 Colonel Gelling was in the brigade BTOC on Hawk Hill when the reports from the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division and 4-3lst Infantry began to arrive. Gelling reacted quickly to the new developments. He directed Lieutenant Colonel Cully to shift Captain Stringham's Company C across the river at first light and for the 3-21st Infantry to move its Company D, which was on a standdown in Chu Lai, to Hill35.25 Around 0200 hours the BTOC radioed Capt. Joe Stringham and directed him to move to a pickup zone (PZ) for extraction as soon as possible. The selected PZ was almost 2,000 meters to the northwest of Stringham's night location. The company would have to fight through a tangle of black forest over rugged terrain to reach the PZ in time to meet the helicopters, so the men of Company C hurriedly closed out the defensive position, shouldered their rucksacks, and moved toward the PZ.26 Stringham reached the designated PZ just as 10 Rattler helicopters, protected by a gun team from en-17th Cavalry and a pair of fighter aircraft, swung across the Chang River and dipped into a miniature field. The clearing was only large enough to land one ship at a time, and Stringham radioed the BTOC to alert it that his air move would be slow. Company C's first lift easily made the short flight across the Chang River to an LZ near Hill 245 on the valley's south side. Capt. Larry Byers's Company A had spent the night nearby and had secured the LZ. Within 30 minutes the air move was complete, and Company C, despite its heavy load of rations and ammunition, was moving north at a sizzling pace. Stringham led the company along a ridge that juts northeast from Hill 245 to allow himself the best possible observation of the contact area during his approach march. While Stringham headed north, Byers took Company A east to establish a blocking position on a finger of high ground 1,000 meters south of the contact area. As they approached the main road, Stringham came under fire from NVA units that had bypassed Company D's position and occupied several hootches and a tree line near the hamlet of Phu Binh (4 ). Enemy units intensified their fire as Company C crossed the road; Stringham placed artillery on the enemy positions and then sent his lead platoon to clean out the area. The combination of artillery and sweeping infantrymen was enough to suppress the enemy fire and allow Company C to continue on its way.27 Meanwhile, the commander of Company D and the 2d Platoon's positions remained in sporadic, sometimes heavy, contact with the enemy. The

36

Through the Valley

2d Platoon's attempt to fight its way to the rest of the company was blocked by NVA forces that had lodged themselves between the river and the ambush site. The enemy met Carol's efforts with a devastating volume of fire while other NVA moved on his position from the east. The company's 1st Platoon had not had contact and linked up with the company headquarters and 3d Platoon at 0533. Two hours later the commander of Company D radioed the BTOC that he had moved the 1st Platoon to reinforce the 2d Platoon. He added: "We could use an immediate air strike. "28 Within 20 minutes of the company commander's request, Helix 11, one of the brigade's forward air controllers (FACs), had fighters on station with the first of several air strikes for the day. The FAC radioed the commander, warned him to get his men down and rolled in and fired a white-phosphorous rocket in the midst of the NVA. A pair of F-1 OOs, whose radio call sign Lovebug sounded strangely out of place, followed the mark. As the fighters screamed in low and hot to drop their 250-pound bombs, the NVA threw up a curtain of steel from automatic weapons. Besides the intense ground fire, rain squalls and low, thick clouds hampered the fighter pilots' ability to put the ordnance accurately on target. Some of the bombs struck dangerously off the mark.29 Sergeant McWashington remembers one stray bomb that came dangerously close. "An air strike was called in and the bomb struck the inside bank of the river. If it had hit the top of the bank, it would have wiped out the 3d Platoon. "30 As Company C moved closer, Stringham radioed the commander of Company D to let him know that he was close to his position and added, "Things are pretty hot around here; try to bring me in." Hot it was. Blue Ghost and Firebird gunships, on station since first light, came under heavy fire as they lashed at the NVA's positions. Company D had eight men wounded and one dead, but neither the company commander nor those who were wounded felt the area was secure enough to safely get in a Dustoff (medical evacuation helicopter).31 Company C reached the company's position around noon and Company D moved west and linked up with Lieutenant Carol's beleaguered platoon. After Company D had evacuated its wounded, Stringham moved his company 600 meters west of the 2d Platoon's ambush site and established a blocking position. He held its security position while Company D was organized and prepared to move.32 The NVA attack on FSB West wounded seven men and brought the total of casualties for the 196th Lm to 15. Luckily only one man had died during the 8-hour battle. The enemy also suffered. Lieutenant Carol counted six dead NVA soldiers around his ambush position and 4-31 reported that another 24 of the enemy had died from artillery and air strikes. Company B found four dead NVA in the perimeter wire at west and captured a wounded enemy soldier who was too weak to run.33 Thus ended the first phase of the battle for the Hiep Due Valley.

The Hiep Due Valley

37

Notes 1. Advisory Team #1, Quang Da Special Zone: Intelligence Summary #004-68, 4 January 1968. 2. Ibid.; 196th LIB: SITREP No. 001, 3 January 1968, located with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 3 January 1968; Statement by Maj. JosephS. Stringham in TAB C to Appendix 3, 196th LIB, Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 3. Detachment 423, 1st Special Forces, 1st Special Forces Group (Abn): Mter Action Report, no date, Steve Sherman collection. 4. Alfred B. Boyle, letter to author, 6 February 1996. 5. Detachment 423: After Action Report. Ben Boyle and the others with Detachment 423 departed in September after being replaced by another Special Forces team. 6. Harry G. Summers Jr., Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1995), pp. 102-103. 7. Wilbur H. Morrison, The Elephant and the Tiger: The Full Story of the Vietnam War (New York: Hippocrene Press, 1990), pp. 198-199. 8. Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 9. Americal Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 January 1968, 8 February 1968. Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry came under the operational command of the Americal Division on 3 December 1967. 10. Timothy F. Hunt Jr., letter to author, December 1996. 11. Dan Mellon, telephone conversation with author, 29 October 1996. 12. Excerpts from Lt. Chet Larson's Briefing Book, 22 November 1967-4 June 1968; Americal Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 January 1968, 8 February 1968. The Communists violated the Christmas holiday truce many times, and 17 official truce violations were reported during the New Year's period. 13. Chet Larson, interview with author, 23 August 1996. 14. 196th LIB: Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 15. Spot Report #20, located with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journal, 1 January 1968. 16. Ibid. 17. Tim McWashington, interview with author, 23 August 1996. 18. 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry Lessons Learned: 1-31 January 1968, 1 February 1968. 19. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Journals, 3 January 1968. 20. Significant radio transmissions made by Capt. William Speer, commander Company B, 4-31 Infantry to the battalion tactical operations center, on 3 January 1968, concerning the unit's involvement with the large NVA force during the specified period, located in TAB D to Appendix 3: Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 21. Information is from significant radio transmissions made by Capt. William Speer, commander Company B, 4-31 Infantry to the battalion tactical operations center on 3 January 1968; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Journal. 3 January 1968. 22. Significant radio transmission by Capt. William Speer. Former members of Company D's 2d Platoon said the number of NVA was 100 or more; former medic's letter. 23. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals. 3 January 1968.

38

Through the Valley

24. Ibid.; Spot Report #1 and SITREP No. 003, located with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 3 January 1968. 25. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals, 3 January 1968. Plans were for 3-21 to deploy the company into the operational area as the situation warranted. 26. Statement by Maj. JosephS. Stringham; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 3 January 1968 and SITREPNo. 003,3 January 1968; Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 27. Statement by Maj. Joseph S. Stringham. 28. Significant radio transmissions made by commander Company D, 4-31 Infantry to the battalion tactical operations center, 3 January 1968, concerning the unit's involvement with the large NVA force during the specified period. Radio transmissions are located in TAB B to Appendix 3: 196th Lffi Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 29. Significant radio transmissions made by commander Company D, 4-31 Infantry; see also America! Division Daily Air Summary, 3 January 1968, located with America! Division records. 30. Timothy McWashington interview. 31. Significant radio transmissions made by commander Company D, 4-31 Infantry. At 1140 the commander Company D radioed the BTOC "The LZ is not secured for dustoff; the men [wounded] do not want to be evacuated at this time." 32. Ibid.; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 3 January 1968. 33. Statement by Maj. Joseph S. Stringham.

5 The 1st VC Main Force Regiment

F

rom our ridgeline position the Assassins and I had watched parachute flares light the black cloud-covered sky to our north and west while long, fiery red fingers of tracers were searching out invisible targets. Except for the booming of the 105mm howitzers on FSB Center, which seemed constant, the light show was without sound. Although we were too far away to hear the rattle of the soldiers' guns, we could see a major battle raging only a few kilometers to our west. We knew none of the details. Our isolation from events taking place outside our tiny realm was near perfect.

3 January That afternoon the 4-31st Infantry shifted Companies A, C, and D to the east of the contact area. Company D was the first to depart the battle area. At 1530 the company commander reported that he had closed into his night laager, a slight rise a couple of hundred meters south of an old bridge site on the Lau River. The terrain in that part of the valley was flat, but the slight elevation of the position afforded the defenders a clear view of the surrounding rice paddies.' Captain Byers kept Company A in its blocking position until about 1600, then moved a few hundred meters east and set up for the night. Captain Stringham, the last to leave the battle area, held his blocking position until Company D had cleared the area and then followed them east. He was still en route to his position when the BTOC radioed him that a thousand North Vietnamese soldiers had moved into the battalion's area of operation during the morning. Stringham's initial plans had been to laager a kilometer east of Company D's perimeter that night. However, the news of a large enemy force in the valley caused him to change his mind and tum south to seek higher, more defensible, ground. Stringham wrote later that it 39

40

Through the Valley

was around 1830 hours and had turned dark by the time he closed his night defensive position and began digging in for the night.2 (See Map 5.1.) The enemy force in question was Lt. Col. Nuygen Van Tri 's fiercely motivated, 1,700-strong 1st VC Regiment, a Main Force (MF) regiment. The regiment, organized in the early 1960s, with a powerful structure of three infantry battalions and six specialized support companies, operated either in cooperation with the 2d NVA Division's objectives or independently. Technically a Vietcong unit, and the only one that enjoyed the status of a permanent assignment to the 2d NVA Division, by 1968 many of this regiment's intensively trained troops were full-time North Vietnamese regulars. When it trekked out of the mountains and into the Hiep Due Valley that January, it was a VC regiment in name only.3 (See Figure 5.1.) The regiment's fortunes, down since the arrival of U.S. Marines in 1965, had been particularly calamitous during the second half of 1967, and they slipped another notch after U.S. Army combat brigades moved into Quang Tin and Quang Nam provinces in the spring of that year. Hit hard by the 1st Brigade, lOlst Division (Abn) during Operation Malheur near Due Pho in early summer, the regiment had limped back into its familiar territory around the Hiep Due Valley hounded by pursuing paratroopers. The bruising continued during the fall as the 1st Brigade battered companies of the regiment's 40th and 60th Battalions in several sharp engagements in the Hiep Due Valley. Then in December, the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry caught one of the regiment's units foraging for rice north of the Que Son Valley and killed another 124 of its soldiers.4 The frequent fighting had diminished the regiment's combat effectiveness, but, in a scenario that would be oft repeated in years to come, new troops and equipment continued to flow into that unit's safe havens. In the midst of the turbulence wrecked units set about to regenerate themselves, train replacements, and prepare for the coming offensive. By New Year's Day, each of the 1st VC Regiment's three rifle battalions was flush with soldiers reequipped and ready to fight.5 As darkness came on 3 January, columns ofTri's soldiers wound their way out of the highlands. Guided by scouts from the regiment's 13th Reconnaissance Company, units fanned out to occupy preplanned positions throughout the valley. Some of the infantry companies moved into prepared positions in specific hamlets, while others trekked south toward FSB West. VC scouts had also followed Company D from the battle area to its night laager and later guided at least two rifle companies into an assembly area east of Company D's position. To support the infantry, sections from the VC regimental antiaircraft company headed for locations where their 12.7mm heavy machine guns could make life for the gunship and fighter pilots unhappy. Enemy gunners placed at least one of their 12.7mm guns on the morning's battleground. There were few tactical radios in the regiment, and, as the infantry and heavy weapons moved into their positions, soldiers

Trail

c.rt Tracie

----· 1 ...t

•

River +31111 lnlanby NVA NVA Mortar l'allllan Anllllln:nlft Gun

Mlp 5.1 E¥elq IIIII Early Mon*lg, 3-4 Jlnlaly Acllan, 0

-·500

LZ C12-11111nlanby 4 Jlnlaly

41

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42

Through the Valley

• Figure 5.1 Organization, 1st Vietcong Regiment (The 1st Vietcong Regiment was also known as the 1st Main Force Regiment)

from the 18th Signal Company strung communications wire between units. Telephones reinforced the regiment's skimpy voice radio net, and a detail of old-fashioned foot messengers backed up the entire system.6 The enemy's arrival did not go undetected. Around 1940 that evening, Company B's OP-21ocated north of the firebase perimeter reported movement to the OP's front. Thirty minutes later, men in the OP saw two NVA 300 meters to their northwest and reported more movement to the west of their position. Minutes later, the enemy formally announced their coming by dropping 10 82mm mortar rounds within the perimeter of FSB West. The enemy mortarmen had improved their aim from the previous evening, but except for wounding an artilleryman, the minibarrage caused little damage. Gunners from Battery C, 3-82d Artillery, spotted the enemy's tube flash 1,200 meters southeast of the FSB. In less than a minute, the artillerymen had turned a howitzer, leveled the tube, and put the enemy mortar under direct fire. The results are unknown.? At 2200, the NVA began to probe the firebase defenses by tossing hand grenades at bunkers occupied by Captain Speer's 1st and 3d Platoons. Following the grenade attack, 25 more 82mm mortar rounds rained down on the perimeter and wounded a man from Company B. The second barrage, like the first, had little effect otherwise. The grenade probe and mortar fire may have convinced Lieutenant Colonel Cully that an attack was forthcoming and so he pulled the LPs back inside the perimeter. s

The 1st VC Main Force Regiment

43

The real slugfest, however, was developing in the valley. It started close to 2200 when Captain Stringham's LPs detected movement to the north, east, and south of his company's perimeter. Minutes later, the commander of Company D reported that approximately 200 NVA were south of his location and moving toward the FSB. He requested an illumination mission so his FO could adjust artillery on the enemy force. More NVA, these dressed in light-colored clothing, were seen on the north bank of the Lau River.9 At 2250, Delta Company reported yet a second group of enemy north of the Lau River that appeared to be carrying mortars. While his FO initiated an artillery fire mission on the enemy, the Company D commander reported: "Just killed a dink south of my perimeter-five to ten meters out. Can see him laying in the rice paddy." The dead NVA was the first of several who were inching their way toward Company D's position. Within an hour Company D radioed the BTOC: "I have several probes inside my perimeter. Each time that the illumination ceases, they move in closer." Minutes later the company reported heavy movement to its south. to Company D wanted illumination and the 4-31st Infantry requested a Moonglow flareship. The C-47 aircraft carried 96 flares that were more powerful and burned longer than any illumination the artillery could provide. The Americal Division G-3 responded that all flareships were supporting a contact in the 3-1st Cavalry's area of operation (AO). In the interim, the 196th Brigade dispatched a flareship from the 71st Combat Aviation Company to 4-31.11 The ceiling was down to 1,000 feet, and the light of the dazzling flares reflecting off the clouds changed the night's sooty blackness into an ashen gray. The illumination revealed two enemy weapons positions, an enemy mortar, and an automatic weapon position between Stringham and Company D. Stringham directed mortar fire on the gun positions, and his FO fired artillery on three NVA west of the company's position that killed one of the enemy soldiers.t2 At 0125, the surrounding NVA struck Company D with a barrage of automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenade fire from the north and east and wounded its commander. He radioed the BTOC: "We're getting hit hard from all sides at this time, can you get me some help? I've been wounded, but I've got to remain with the troops."13 The commander's wounds were severe, and a grenade fragment cost him an eye. Capt. Dan Mellon was in the BTOC and remembers that "the Delta Company Commander was hurt, and Colonel Cully called me in and told me to assume command of Company D." Mellon had commanded it from June until December 1967 and had taken the unit through the Thanksgiving Day fight at Hill 63. "One of the first things that I did was to get a PRC-25 radio and get on the company net to learn what the situation was. I contacted one of the platoon leaders who had worked for me when I

44

Through the Valley

had the company. He recognized my voice and I asked the lieutenant just how bad the commander was hurt and if he was in control of things. The answer I got back was no. There was a lot of talking over the company net, and I told him to knock off all of the unnecessary jabbering and get things settled down."14 Lieutenant Colonel Cully made an immediate request for a Spooky gunship, an armed C-47 transport whose 7.62mm Gatling guns were capable of firing 6,000 rounds a minute, and a second request for a flareship. At 0140 the Americal Division G-3 reported that Moonglow was on the way, but there was no Spooky available. Meanwhile, the 196th LIB dispatched helicopter gunships to 4-31. During the night, gunships from the 71st Aviation Company, C/2-20 Aerial Rocket Artillery Company, and an air force Forward Air Controller (FAC) supported the contact.15 Lieutenant Colonel Cully also directed Company C to move to support Company D. Alerted earlier to that possibility, Stringham was ready to go when he received the call. Company C would have to fight every step of the way. Stringham later wrote: "When we pulled out of our defensive position, gunships had arrived in the area as a large NVA element from the north came in against my 3d platoon."16 As the Firebird gunships from the 71st Aviation Company began strafing the enemy positions around Company C, Stringham was able to beat back the NVA. The Firebirds, however, ran into fire from a hornet's nest of antiaircraft positions. Stringham wrote that "the gunships made one pass and received heavy ground fire from at least eight enemy .50 caliber (12.7mm) weapons. Because of our proximity to Company D and the enemy weapons' positions, my elements were forced to take cover as the gunships sprayed the area around us."17 Dan Mellon recalls listening to the radio conversations and getting angry: "Delta company wasn't using artillery and I couldn't figure out why. I asked the platoon leader if the company's FO was hurt and was I surprised when the lieutenant answered no. But I was even more surprised when the platoon leader told me that the reason the S-3 wouldn't clear a fire mission was because Charlie Company was en route to reinforce them. I stormed into the battalion BTOC to ask why the company was not getting artillery support and heard basically the same thing that the platoon leader had told me. When I asked why in the hell the fire could not be coordinated, the S-3, a major, gave me a blank stare, but I got the artillery started. I was still angry when I saw the battalion commander later and told him about the artillery situation. I remember telling him that if he wanted me to go back into the valley that I needed to know that I could talk to him 'commander to commander' and not through some staff officer intermediary. He agreed with me, and I got my gear together so I could get to the company as soon as possible."18

The 1st VC Main Force Regiment

45

At 0210 the division G-3 notified the brigade that a Moonglow was en route, but again stated that no Spooky was available. Sometime afterward the flareship arrived on station. For reasons unknown, however, 4-31 did not have the correct radio frequency for the aircraft. It took 40 critical minutes to sort out the frequency problem and get the C-47 to begin dropping its flares.t9 Shortly before 0300 the commander of Company D reported: "Have NVA on all sides of us; we have heavy contact at this time." Then he added that he had over 20 wounded and needed a dustoff as soon as things were under control. The brigade had a dustoff standing by at Hill 35, but any attempt to get helicopters into Company D's position would only create targets for the surrounding NVA. For now the wounded would have to wait.20 Company C was continuing to fight its way toward Company D. Captain Stringham reported that he was 100 meters west of Company D's perimeter and in contact with the enemy. Unable to get through, Stringham slid south to find an opening but ran into another swarm of NVA, fought through them, and continued searching for a gap into Company D's perimeter.21 The commander of Company D radioed Stringham telling him that his unit was in serious trouble and asked him to move in fast. Moving faster that night was neither possible nor prudent. As Company C neared Delta Company's positions it came under an intense amount of fire. Stringham wrote: "By 0315 hours we had moved within small arms range of his units and began receiving so much fire that we were unable to tell whether the firing came from the NVA or from the friendly elements who were firing to the north. "22 By 0400 Company D counted five dead and 20 wounded, so the decision was made to bring in a medevac. The battalion S-3 radioed Delta Company to let them know that Dustoff 55 and gunships were inbound to his location with Capt. Michael J. Scotti Jr., the battalion medical officer, on board. Thirty minutes later Dustoff 55 piloted by Maj. Patrick Brady landed in Company D's position. As Brady lifted out of the perimeter with a full load of wounded, Dustoff 58 swooped into the perimeter. By 0506 all of Company D's wounded were on their way to a medical facility. The company commander, who had refused evacuation until his wounded men were safely out, left with the last load. Lieutenant Carol assumed command of the company until Mellon could get there.23 By that time the majority of the enemy soldiers around Company D had also withdrawn, but there were still pockets of diehards lurking about. Company C was cleaning out one of these pockets only 100 meters from Company D's laager when Brady's ship landed in the perimeter. Shortly after 0600 one of Stringham's platoons linked up with Company D. It had been a long 1,500-meter hike for Company C, and it was not over yet. After

46

Through the Valley

the linkup, Company C pushed on to the north and west, killing several of the withdrawing enemy and capturing one RPD light machine gun in the process.24 The action around FSB West ended when dawn came. The NVA, after mortaring and probing the base throughout the night, had quit the hill and disappeared into the wooded slopes below the base perimeter. During a sweep to the front of the bunker line, Company B's 1st Platoon found two dead NVA and captured another who had been wounded. A fourth NVA was killed when he fired on one of the patrols. Company B reported finding numerous blood trails, bangalore torpedoes, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds, and other equipment littered around the perimeter. The abandoned equipment was a firm indication that the NVA had withdrawn in ahurry.25 Daylight had arrived with a dismal bone-chilling rain and low clouds. When it was light enough to see, a team from C/7 -17th Cavalry and a brigade FAC flew into the valley to support Company D. The Helix FACs were always eager to work, and the pilot immediately began putting in air strikes around Company D's perimeter, the first strike going in before 0800, and in close. Weather was again a problem for the fighter pilots, and one of them put a pair of 500-pound bombs almost on top of Company C. The misplaced bombs wounded two of Stringham's men, and the FAC cut off the close-in strikes. 26 The air strikes continued, however, and several went into the area where Company D's 2d Platoon had fought during the day before. The 2d Platoon's old ambush position had acquired new and unfriendly residents, and fighters hitting the area reported taking automatic weapon fire during their run. The FAC also reported seeing a number of NVA around the target and requested additional sorties into the area. Later, two A-6 Intruders struck bunkers on Hill 224, the suspected location of the 1st VC Regiment headquarters, with 500-pound bombs that produced a large secondary explosion and much white smoke. The air strikes were punishing, but the enemy was in force on the valley's north side and not willing to run and hide. While surveying the strike areas Blue Ghost 18 took heavy fire that damaged its rotor blade, and the team broke station.27 At some point that morning Captain Mellon flew into the valley and assumed command of Company D. He took a quick headcount and reported that the unit had a strength of 58 enlisted and three officers.2s The men in the unit held him in high esteem and were happy to see him back. One of the medics who served with Company D's 2d Platoon had this to say about Dan Mellon: "From my own experience Captain Mellon was a good leader. He didn't care how many guys liked him-all he wanted was respect, and for you to carry out his orders. But don't misunderstand me, to a man we would have gone through a brick wall for him. That's how we felt about him. "29

The 1st VC Main Force Regiment

47

Mellon began a search around the perimeter and found a number of abandoned weapons and two NVA dead--one lay to the north-northeast and the second to the south-southeast. One hundred meters north of the perimeter, Mellon found a flat sheltered spot littered with bloody bandages that the enemy had used as a collection point for the wounded and dead. Mellon stated later that he believed there were many NVA soldiers wounded or killed during the attack, but that the enemy had dragged or carried them away before dawn.JO During his search Mellon also found evidence that the NVA had begun preparations for the offensive at some point before. Mellon recalls that "about 50 meters from the bridge, the terrain on the north side of the road drops off about 12 feet. We found a tunnel beneath the road with a telephone in it. This makes me believe that the unit who attacked the company was very big or that this tunnel and telephone were in place to be used by another unit in the future."31 There were also other tunnels close by, and in December Mellon had found an 8-by-8-foot-square hole hidden in some high grass. The hole was 25 feet deep, and there appeared to be an entrance like a tunnel in its south wall that might have been the entrance to a larger complex. Mellon and his men found no ladders and had no ropes to get down into the pit, so they seeded it with riot control-agent crystals and left it,32 Company C was the ftrst to depart the contact area and left after noon to establish a patrol base a kilometer to the east. Later Stringham moved his company onto some high ground and dug in for the night.33 The two days of fighting had cost Company D six killed and 25 wounded. Captain Mellon remained in the general vicinity until after 1830, then moved. He said of the situation later: "I've got a wounded company and the only thing I wanted to do was to go somewhere and hide. Well, that's not what happened. Instead, battalion screwed with me. By the time I got out of the area it was late. "34 Mellon believed that the enemy would again move in around Company D's perimeter when it was dark and decided to shake them. Mellon: "I went east across the paddy and into the trees and I pulled an old Indian trick. I shot in my artillery concentrations, and then when it was dark I moved again. Once I got to my new location it was after dark, and I dug in. "35 Shortly after Mellon had settled in, battalion directed him to move again and join Stringham. Mellon said, "Stringham was in an area called the hill with one tree. We left the laager at 2030 and I marched my company until 0130 in the morning to get to the area before I fmally stopped. I still had not married up with Stringham, and battalion was badgering me about moving again. I told them that the company was exhausted and I was not moving-period. We slept on top of the ground, and early the next morning we beat feet and moved to Stringham's area. I took the rest of the day off and let my company rest."36

48

Through the Valley

Notes 1. Statement by Maj. JosephS. Stringham in TAB C to Appendix 3: 196th Lm, Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969; 196th LIB, S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 3 January 1968. 2. Statement by Maj. Joseph S. Stringham. 3. Stanley I. Kutler, ed., Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (New York: Macmillan Reference U.S.A., 1996), p. 394; U.S. intelligence identified Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Trias the commander of the 1st VC Regiment in November 1967. 4. America! Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 7 August 1968, 31 July 1968, 5 November 1967. A PW captured on 28 June near Quang Ngai City stated that the 60th Battalion, 1st VC Regiment was reorganized into a reinforced company of approximately 140 men due to heavy losses in the Due PhoArea. 5. America! Division: Intelligence Summary 9-68. 10 January 1968. 6. Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam's Armed Forces (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992), pp. 111112. 7. 196th Lm: S2/S3 Journals. 3, 4 January 1968. 8. Ibid.; 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. TAB D to Appendix 3; Significant radio transmissions made by Capt. William Speer, commander Company B, 4-31 Infantry to the BTOC; 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery SITREP#490. 3 January 1968. 9. 196th LIB Sequence of Events and Sketch Maps located with 196th LIB: Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. 3-10 January. 16 February 1968; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals. 3 January 1968. 10. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals. 4 January 1968; Significant radio transmissions made by the commander Company D, 4-31 Infantry. 11. 196th Lm: S2/S3 Journals and SITREPNo. 004.4 January 1968. 12. Stringham statement. 13. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals. 4 January 1968; Unit History Committee, 4th Battalion (Mech), 31st Infantry, History of the 31st US Infantry (Fort Sill, Okla.: winter 1988/89), p. 7-19. 14. Dan Mellon, telephone conversation with author, 7 July 1996. 15. 196th Lm: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals indicate that Lieutenant Colonel Cully requested the Spooky gunship at 0125. 16. Stringham statement. 17. Ibid. Because the munitions and the sounds were similar, we often referred to the .12 mm gun as a .50 or .51 caliber machine gun. 18. Dan Mellon, telephone conversation with author. 19. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals. 4 January 1968. A flareship from the 71st Aviation Company was dispatched to provide illumination over the contact area. 20. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals. 4 January 1968; Significant radio transmissions made by commander Company D, 4-31st Infantry to the battalion tactical operations center on 4 January 1968 concerning the unit's involvement with the large NVA force during the specified period. Radio transmissions are located in TAB B to Appendix 3: 196th Lm Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 21. Stringham Statement; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals. 4 January 1968; History of the 31st U.S. Infantry, pp. 7-19-7-20. 22. Stringham statement.

The 1st VC Main Force Regiment

49

23. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals. 4 January 1968; Significant radio transmissions made by the commander D/4-31; 3-82d Artillery. SITREP No. 49: 032400 January 1968 to 042000 January 1968 lists one killed and one wounded from C/382. 24. Ibid.; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals. 4 January 1968. 25. History of the 31st U.S. Infantry, pp. 7-19-7-20; Significant radio transmissions made by the commander D/4-31. 26. Stringham statement. 27. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals. 4 January 1968. 28. Ibid. 29. History of the 31st U.S. Infantry, p. 7-20; Former medic who was assigned to D/4-31,letter to author, 21 January 1993. 30. SITREP No. 004. 4 January 1968, with 196th LIB S2/S3 Journals. 4 January 1968; Dan Mellon, telephone conversation with author. 31. Dan Mellon, telephone conversation with author. 32. Ibid. 33. History of the 31st US Infantry, p. 7-20; Spot Report #4, Unit Location Summary and SITREP No. 004, with 196th Lm: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals. 4 January 1968. 34. 196th LIB: Casualty list compiled by S-1, 3-6 January, 8-10 January 1968, F. Clifton Berry's collection; Dan Mellon, telephone conversation with author. 35. Dan Mellon, telephone conversation with author. 36. Ibid.

6 Twister Charlie

4 January

W

hile Captains Mellon and Stringham were clearing the battle area of NVA, Lieutenant Colonel Cully was on the horn with headquarters, 196th LIB requesting reinforcements for his battalion. The 2d NVA Division's offensive was less than 36 hours old and in full tilt.l Colonel Gelling approved the request. Shortly after 1000, Maj. F. Clifton Berry, the 196th LIB's S-3, radioed the commanders of the 3-21st and 2-lst Infantry, directing each of them to release a rifle company to the operational control (OPCON) of the 4-3lst Infantry. Berry also instructed the units to coordinate directly with Lieutenant Colonel Cully to work out details of the move. By 1140, the three infantry battalions reported the coordination between them completed.2 Capt. Paul Yurchak's Company A/3-21, directed into a blocking position near 4-31 's eastern boundary earlier that morning, was nearest 4-31. At 1010, Major Burchfield instructed Yurchak to move into the 4-31 operational area on foot. Burchfield added that upon crossing the battalion's boundary, Company A would become OPCON to 4-31. Yurchak was a senior captain and an adroit commander who had spent 5 consecutive years in Vietnam, and the experience of those years would serve his troops well during the coming 6 days.3 The 2-lst Infantry, located well to the east of 4-31, would insert a company via helicopter into the 4-31 operational area at 1220 that afternoon. Lt. Col. Lyman H. Hammond, the 2-1 commander, had initially selected his Company D operating southeast of the battalion's FSB Ace for the mission. A little over an hour after receiving the warning order, however, 2-1 called in a change to the brigade BTOC. Company C, 2-lst Infantry, also known as Twister Charlie, its radio call sign, would go to 4-31.4 The stream of warning orders radioed to rifle companies alerting them to be prepared to go somewhere and do something seemed endless. 51

52

Through the Valley

Changes came frequently and, more often than not, arrived with little explanation; they were exasperating at the time but were usually not critical and were quickly forgotten. This particular modification in plans, however, would be consequential for the men of C/2-1 and deserves more than a oneline summary. Several mitigating factors may have prompted Lieutenant Colonel Hammond to make the switch from Company D to Company C. Just after midnight 4 January 2-1 had informed the brigade headquarters of a change of plans for Companies C and D. The new plans directed Company D to search east of the battalion's boundary and be prepared for a combat assault into the 1-lst Cavalry's area of operation. Twister Charlie's plans were to remain in its night location, using it as a day patrol base and conduct patrolling and observation of the surrounding area. By 1000 Company D was in the middle of a search operation, while Company C, consolidated in its patrol base, could move within minutes. Twister Charlie therefore became the sensible pick.5 Capt. John T. Thomasson had assumed command of Company C just a month before. Thomasson, a native of Baltimore, had graduated from West Point with the class of 1965, and was also a graduate of the Airborne, Ranger, and Jungle Operations courses. Before arriving in Vietnam, he had served a tour as a platoon leader and rifle company commander with the 3d Infantry Division's 15th Infantry, in Wildflecken, Germany. Jack Thomasson had all the necessary credentials to command an infantry company in combat. 6 Lieutenant Colonel Hammond designated Company C's PZ in a large rice paddy several hundred meters north of where the company had stayed the previous night. Woods lay to the east and west of the PZ, and a string of low brushy hills, dominated by Hill 104, formed a ridge across the PZ's southern end. 7 Captain Thomasson secured the woods around the paddy, then directed his platoon leaders to organize into five-man aircraft loads and prepare for air movement. Around 1240 seven UH-1 helicopters roared into the rice paddy to pick up the company's first lift. Company C moved by platoon order, and men from the 1st Platoon scrambled aboard the slicks to lead the company into the Hiep Due Valley. s There Capt. Larry R. Byers had the mission to secure Company C's LZ. Shortly before helicopters carrying Twister Charlie were due to land, A/4-31 came under automatic weapon fire less than 200 meters away from the LZ. Byers wrote that "at 1226 we ran into carbine and automatic weapons sniper fire in the area. The LZ was not secure at that time. By 1235, after pursuing the snipers, one Vietcong had been killed and we wounded another who escaped carrying both weapons with him."9 Captain Thomasson and the company headquarters were on the company's first lift and landed within 15 minutes after A/4-31 's skirmish. There

Twister Charlie

53

was no enemy fire, and, as Thomasson reported the LZ green (i.e., safe), Byers ambled across the LZ to meet him. The two officers had served in Germany together with the 15th Infantry and had not seen one another since that time. Thomasson and Byers paused a few minutes to catch up on news, then separated-however, for reasons unknown Byers did not mention his company's contact with the two VC to Thomasson.lO Once the second lift was on the ground Thomasson assembled his troops south of the Lau River, and five Rattlers headed east to pick up the last 25 men on the PZ. C/2-1 's last sortie reached the Hiep Due Valley shortly after 1330. While the troops took lunch, Captain Thomasson gathered the platoon leaders and briefed them on the company's mission. Thomasson remembers: "I was told that we were replacing the 4-31 Infantry's Delta Company who had suffered a rocket attack the night before. My order was to sweep the low hills of the valley on my side of the river, searching for the enemy and move into the high ground and dig in for the night. "11 Pfc. Carl Fryman was a rifleman in Company C's 1st Platoon and has a different and colorful recollection of what he believed the company was to do in the Hiep Due Valley. He recalls: "We were told that we were searching for the headquarters of the 2d NVA Division who was supposedly holed up somewhere in the valley. I thought, golly, maybe we are gonna get the chance to capture the commanding general of the 2d NVA Division. I hadn't stopped to think that the NVA weren't stupid or that the NVA commander would be surrounded by a very large force, which we would have to fight our way through to get to him, and by that time he would escape."12 As C/2-1 moved south to begin its sweep, the wet green hills north of the valley erupted in an inferno of flame and smoke from the bombs of nine high-flying B-52 bombers that we called an Arc Light. Sgt. Jim Barrett was a squad leader with the 2d Platoon's weapons squad and felt that the Arc Light signified portentous times ahead. As Barrett later wrote of the event, "We were walking through a banana forest and they were having a B-52 strike and it was shaking the ground. At this point I thought this is not going to be fun."13 An hour after the Arc Light, Thomasson reported the company's location in the hamlet of Phuoc Tuy (1), approximately 1,500 meters south of the LZ. The company patrolled the vicinity of the hamlet until after 1700. Before last light, Thomasson moved the company onto a chunk of high ground a kilometer west of the hamlet, establishing LPs and digging in for the night.14 Pfc. Carl Fryman recalls the position: "The first platoon sat up on a terrace with four men to a position. Two men were on alert all night. An LP manned by the 3d Squad was off to the right front, and some distance away. Lieutenant Lewis and the platoon command post occupied an area on a little knoll to our rear that overlooked the platoon area. We had heard that

54

Through the Valley

Delta Company 4-31 had been pretty well whacked up by the NVA the night before, because they [NVA] had fired their automatic weapons and given away their positions. When we moved into position, we were instructed to use hand grenades and not to fire our weapons at sounds."15 Company A, 4-3lst Infantry had departed the LZ about the same time as C/2-1. Byers moved his company 700 meters to the southeast of the LZ, halted, and set up a patrol base. Company A patrolled around the location until 1830, and then shifted to a night defensive position not far from where it had spent the previous night.16 That afternoon, both A/4-31 and C/2-1 had spent several hours very near the area where C/2-1 would fight a major battle 24 hours later. After A/4-31 's 1230 contact, however, neither company reported any sign of the enemy, nor had any other unit in the Hiep Due Valley. Intelligence reports later placed the enemy units on the northwest side of the valley, but the exact disposition of the 1st VC Regiment and its three battalions was unknown. Enemy forces were avoiding a fight that particular afternoon, and their absence produced an illusory stillness.17 That silence was ruptured just after midnight when an LP, from Headquarters Company, 4-31 on FSB West observed four to five NVA in the vicinity. Lieutenant Colonel Cully called a 100 percent stand-to on the bunkerline, and Lt. Chet Larson's 81mm mortars began firing illumination over Hill 445. Enemy movement around the perimeter base continued.18 A few minutes before 0100, members of Company Bin bunker number 26 detected more activity on the north side of the perimeter and tossed out several hand grenades. Less than 20 minutes later, the men in bunkers 24 and 26 received several incoming grenades. The enemy grenades caused no casualties, and the defenders responded with small arms fire and more grenades.19 At 0200, 4-31 reported that it was withdrawing LP number 1 because of the increased enemy movement. After the men had closed the protective wire, Chet Larson's mortar platoon cranked up another fire mission and began dropping rounds into the LP's old position: enemy activity around FSB West ceased after that.20 An hour later the enemy probed C/2-1 's perimeter by tossing three hand grenades into its perimeter. Instead of firing their individual weapons and giving away their positions, several men from Twister Charlie wisely responded to the NVA's probe with grenades.21 Carl Fryman says that "sometime that evening I heard some noise to my front. I straightened the pins on two hand grenades and tossed them towards the area where I thought the noise had come from. Right after the grenades exploded, Lieutenant Lewis hollered in a very loud, audible voice, 'What's going on down there?' I didn't want to give away my position, so I didn't answer. But it bothered me that Lieutenant Lewis would holler out in

Twister Charlie

55

such a manner. The next morning he asked why I did not answer him, and I simply explained that I did not want to give away my position. I think that satisfied him. "22 Shortly after the exchange on the perimeter, two VC carrying weapons ran within 15 meters of one of Thomasson's LPs, shocking its occupants. One of the men who manned the LP reported to the company CP that "the VC had raced by their position and scared the shit out of them before they could fire. "23 Fryman continues: "Jordan Ramey was one of those on the LP. He said that the NVA had run so close to his position that he could have reached out and grabbed them. Then he added, 'Yes, we were scared-they scared us very badly. "'24 While Charlie Company's perimeter was receiving the hand grenade probe, the enemy made a halfhearted attempt to mortar A/4-31 's laager. The aim of the 1st Regiment's 17th Mortar Company was poor that evening, and the three rounds landed northwest of the company's perimeter.25 The NVA's probes, however, signaled the beginning of a very long day in the Hiep Due Valley.

Notes 1. I 96th LIB: Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 2. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 January 1968; FragO 22 to OPORD 32-67, Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 4 January 1968, located with 196th LIB: Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 3. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 January 1968. Company A became OPCON to the 4-31st Infantry at 1610 hours. 4. Ibid.; Unit Location Summary located with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals, 4 January 1968. 5. I 96th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 3 January 1968. Col. Lyman H. Hammond (Retired), conversation with author, Hampton, Virginia, August 1993. This conversation took place during a I 96th Locate-A-Brother Reunion in that city. I mentioned my theory about the possible reasons for the switch between Company C and Company D to Colonel Hammond during our discussion and recall him saying: "That sounds about right." 6. John T. Thomasson, letter to author, 17 January 1994. 7. I 96th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 January 1968. 8. I 96th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968 (the journal states that 2-lst Infantry sent 104 men to the 4-31st Infantry); 196th LIB: SITREP No. 004, 3 January 1968, located with I 96th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968; Carl Fryman, audiotape to author, October 1993. 9. Statement by Capt. Larry R. Byers in TAB F to Appendix 3: 196th LIB: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 10. I 96th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 January 1968; Thomasson, letter to author. 11. I 96th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 January 1968; Thomasson, letter to author.

56

Through the Valley

12. Fryman tape. 13. 196th Lffi: S2/S3 Journals, 4 January 1968; Jim Barrett, letter to author, 22 November, 1993. 14. 196thLffi: SITREPNo. 004,4January 1968. 15. Fryman tape. 16. 196th Lm: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 January 1968. 17. America! Division: Intelligence Summary 9-68, 10 January 1968. 18. 196th Lffi: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 January 1968; significant radio transmissions made by Capt. William Speer, commander Company B, 4-31st Infantry, to the battalion tactical operations center on 5 January 1968. Radio transmissions are located in TAB D to Appendix 3: 196th Lm: Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals, 5 January 1968. 22. Fryman tape. 23. See spot report with 196th Lm: S2/S3 Journals, 5 January 1968. 24. Fryman tape. 25. 196th Lm: S2/S3 Journals. 5 January 1968: Byers statement.

7

A Real Hero

5 January

D

awn was clear, with a light wind from the northwest, after a night that had been cool, but dry, and 65 degrees. The prediction was for midafternoon temperatures in the high 70s and no rain. An hour after first light Company C departed its night defensive position and swept north. The day's plans charged Captain Thomasson with searching the paddies and woods between the previous day's LZ and D/431 's contact area of 2 January. Instead of moving directly toward his objective, Thomasson took a circuitous route past the A/4-31laager that allowed him to approach the search area from the east and afforded him better observation. 1 Five hundred meters beyond Company A's perimeter, men of the 3d Platoon, led by Lt. Steven Drake, took a burst of poorly aimed automatic weapons fire from a stand of woods to their northeast. Drake quickly deployed his men and moved into the woods in search of the shooter, but, as was often the case, the VC had disappeared before the platoon reached the woods.2 By 0900 Twister Charlie was north of the valley's main trail and headed toward its objective. As Thomasson and his men neared the south bank of the Lau River he received a report that there were some NVA soldiers who appeared to be following them.3 Thomasson writes: "We were conducting our sweep and the 2d Platoon, led by 2d Lieutenant Gerald Norton, was bringing up the rear. Norton reported that several uniformed NVA with weapons had cut across their rear. I had also observed the enemy and instructed Lieutenant Norton to pursue. I then moved into a position directly behind the 2d platoon and directed actions while calling for support."4 Captain Thomasson radioed a quick report that the company was in pursuit of the NVA and requested a Blue Ghost team to assist him. When

57

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Through the Valley

the company reached the Lau River, Thomasson deployed the 1st Platoon on the south bank to establish a base of fire and support the 2d and 3d Platoons. Then he splashed across the stream with his two platoons, the 2d Platoon leading.5 In the meantime, the NVA reached a densely wooded island and vanished into the foliage. Thomasson angled the company northwest and pushed across the paddies toward the island; Norton's lead squad was nearing the island when a well-camouflaged bunker exploded with automatic weapons fire.6 Thomasson's initial report stated that the company was in contact with a small force and that he had one man wounded he was attempting to evacuate. However, an unvarnished radio report, usually a one-liner, can never provide a complete picture of the action taking place. Sgt. Jim Barrett later gave his recollections of the island fight: "My squad was on the far right of the platoon when we started taking heavy fire. I couldn't tell where it was coming from, and while we moved to set up the M-60 machine gun behind some vegetation, the gunner was hit in the shoulder. The assistant gunner patched him up, but we couldn't find the exit of the bullet. By that time, though, the vegetation had been shot away, and we were pinned good. "7 Moving the men out of the line of fire was an impossible task for the time being. Ten minutes into the contact the volume of fire from the enemy's island position increased in its intensity; bullets from the NVA's well-placed weapons swept the paddy's surface like an invisible scythe. Pfc. Harmon Randall was a machine gunner with the 2d Platoon and remembers the action: "As we crossed the paddy and approached the island, we started taking heavy fire from the little island out towards the middle of the paddy. The little island was a well-fortified bunker manned by five to seven NVA, and their fire pinned us down between two of the paddy's dikes."B As the 2d Platoon wiggled against paddy dikes for cover, Thomasson radioed Drake to flank the island, and then told Norton to "stay put and not to advance." Not everyone in the 2d Platoon got the word.9 As Randall recalls it: "Snake, a street-wise guy from New York City, was killed almost immediately. I remember him getting hit and falling in a sitting position, still wearing his rucksack. He remained in a sitting position during the entire fire fight. It was weird. The enemy's fire forced us to crawl to the dike closest to the island for cover. By that time, our squad had suffered two wounded and one KIA [killed in action]. We couldn't move and were too close for artillery support when the 3d Platoon flanked the island and came to the rescue."tO Thomasson watched Lieutenant Drake lead the attack on the NVA position, while Staff Sergeant Malachi, the 3d Platoon sergeant, provided Drake covering fire to keep the enemy down. Thomasson wrote later that "Lieutenant Drake led by example and was the classic 'Follow Me' leader. As he got close and started receiving fire from an NVA at the top of the tun-

A Real Hero

59

nel, he and Malachi charged the position." The enemy squad, now bottled up in a single tunnel, died as Malachi and Drake threw grenades into it." Harmon Randall remembers Drake and Malachi racing across the paddy: "All of them were firing and throwing grenades. The platoon leader was able to get close enough to the bunker to throw a hand grenade inside and knock out a machine gun position. He was a real hero."12 Thomasson and the 2d Platoon followed close on the heels of the 3d Platoon's assault on the NVA bunker complex, sweeping the island but meeting no further resistance. Seven NVA soldiers had died defending their position. Twister Charlie had one killed and four men wounded, two seriously.13 According to Captain Thomasson, "After the action we received extraction copters that took away our KIA as well as the dead NVA and their weapons. The island fight was the first major contact we'd had since I'd assumed command and we shot up a lot of ammo. The company had also not had a regular resupply since New Year's Eve, so I requested one. I was informed that the resupply would not be forthcoming, so I continued with the sweep." Thomasson turned the company south and recrossed the Lau to join the 1st Platoon. Sometime in the afternoon the BTOC directed Thomasson to halt his sweep operation and secure an LZ for resupply. He halted the company, set up security, sent out patrols, and waited, but when the resupply ship did not arrive as expected, Thomasson radioed the BTOC several times to check the resupply status. Each time he asked the BTOC told him it was on the way. Then at some point he learned that the helicopter was actually on another mission: routine resupply missions did not enjoy a high priority in any battalion. As Thomasson remembered later: "I was getting antsy and wanted to move, but every time I prepared to, I was told that it was on the way. I had my platoons in a perimeter, I had OP's out, and I continued to send out patrols, even so, I still didn't like sitting in one place so long." 14 The valley appeared peaceful that afternoon, but the NVA forces were busy. While Charlie Company's contact was going on, Rattler 10, the 431 's command and control helicopter, received approximately 70 rounds of automatic weapons fire flying over the place where A/4-31 had spent the night. There were no hits, but the volume of fire was significant. 15 More significant, though, it meant that the enemy had slipped forces onto the high ground on the valley's south side. However, except for Twister Charlie's morning dust-up and the enemy shooting at the C and C helicopter, there was no contact that day. The 4-31 's Companies C and D patrolled the east end of the valley, but reported no contacts. The battalion's Company A, the closest friendly unit to Thomasson, had swept north between its night laager and the Lau River, but also without incident. Shortly after noon Byers moved back south and established a patrol base a

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Through the Valley

few hundred meters south of Thomasson's resupply LZ; A/4-31 spent the better part of the afternoon patrolling the area, but made no contact with the enemy. Despite its nonappearance, battalions of the 1st VC Regiment were again on the move, and the BTOC set about to warn the companies in the valley.16 Capt. Larry R. Byers: "At about 1500, the battalion commander called and told me to get to the best night laager I could fmd, ASAP. The location of the 2nd NVA Division was unknown but suspected to have been close." Byers heeded his commander's warning and moved his company south and climbed high up on the western face of Hill 445 to set up for the night.17 For reasons unknown, Thomasson was directed to set up on the LZ and dig in for the night. Thomasson speculates that "because they [BTOC 4-31st Infantry] were aware of my resupply situation, perhaps they didn't give me the same imperative order that Byers received." While Byers moved his company onto high ground to prepare for the night Thomasson waited for his resupply. Although tied to the LZ, Thomasson continued patrolling the area to compensate for his immobility. IS At 1650 the 2d Platoon was on a sweep near a small village and found a cave. A newly arrived man volunteered to go inside. Sergeant Barrett gave the man a short explanation on what he was to do, handed him his .45caliber pistol and a flashlight, then took the filters off two cigarettes to use as ear plugs. A few minutes after the man had disappeared into the hole there was a pistol shot and a VC dashed out a separate exit, and one of the men in the platoon killed the fleeing VC.19 Sergeant Barrett later wrote, "I yelled down and asked him if that was the only one in there. He hollered back: 'No I have some others coming out with me.' The new man brought out six unarmed VC, then someone else went back into the hole and found some supplies. I remember the new guy thought that this happened quite often, but it was the first time I had seen anything other than a dead or wounded VC come out of a hole in the ground."20 The new man's ears were still ringing when he emerged from the cave. As Harmon Randall further remarks, "The guy that went into the cave later chastised us for not telling him the consequences of discharging a weapon in a confined space." The 2d Platoon returned to the LZ with the prisoners, and the company planned to evacuate the captured VC back to the brigade S-2 on the first available chopper. The main priority, however, was the resupply that had begun to arrive. It was late, and Thomasson was busily trying to get the ammunition and rations in before dark. He later wrote that "to keep everyone from bunching up in the center of LZ, I rotated a squad at a time off the perimeter to resupply them. It was a lengthy but necessary procedure."21 As the squads received their ammunition and cases of rations, they returned to their positions on the perimeter. Each squad had its method of dividing the combat rations that the troops referred to as C rations, C's, or C-rats.

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Carl Fryman says: "We received a resupply of C rations, and I received some more hand grenades to replace the ones that I'd thrown the night before. We split the C rations up, one case for four men. One guy would take the case of C's and scramble them with the lids down so we wouldn't be able to pick and choose what we wanted. Then the other three guys would pick out their three packs of C's, and he got what was left over."22 The enemy became more active as daylight faded. At 1715 Captain Thomasson reported observing three enemy soldiers 800 meters away who were moving west. While Thomasson requested assistance from Blue Ghost, Lt. Bromley German, the company's forward observer (FO), initiated an artillery fire mission. Thomasson describes German as an excellent FO "who was always right where I needed him." German also had the reputation of keeping a cool head, knowing his job, and doing it well: his competence as an artilleryman would save many men's lives that night.23 Sergeant Barrett, whose feelings about the future had not changed since the B-52 strike of the day before, decided that it was a good time to send a couple of his lightly wounded men back to the rear. As Barrett writes, "It was some 45 minutes before dusk when I put Cortney and Warren on the resupply chopper to go in. Both had been wounded during the firefight that morning. Although neither of them was hurt seriously, I told them to get out of there because it wasn't going to be a nice evening."24 By 1800 Twister Charlie's resupply was complete, and the patrols had all returned to the resupply LZ. The final helicopter landed in the perimeter to extract some extra items. Thomasson recalls that "as the last extraction helicopter was taking off, a single mortar round, probably aimed at the departing Huey, landed in the CP. It wounded me in the right leg, a sergeant in the finger and knee, and Lieutenant Lewis in the stomach. We called for a medevac, and I told the platoon leaders to look for that mortar."25 While the medics tended to Thomasson and the other wounded, the platoons went in search of the NVA mortar. One platoon went north across the main trail where the mortar's position was suspected to be; another squad checked the area around LZ to make sure it was safe for the helicopter to return. 26 John Thomasson: "As a medic worked on me, I called Lieutenant Drake, my senior platoon leader, over and showed him where we were on the map and where I had originally planned to set up our night laager. The planned site was not far from our current location as it was almost dark. I told Drake to move in a formation of two files so that he would have maximum flanking fire to both sides and to dig in once he got into the laager site. We three were then evacuated and that was my last contact with Charlie Company until the next morning."27 Notified that there were casualties on the ground, the Rattler pilot swung the UH-1 around and returned to evacuate Thomasson, Lieutenant Lewis, and the wounded sergeant. Lt. Stephen Cox, the company executive

62

Through the Valley

officer (XO), had been out to pay the troops and was on the helicopter; he slid off the Huey as they were putting Thomasson and the other casualties on board.28 As Harmon Randall writes: "We were preparing to move locations to avoid more mortar fire when they called the chopper back to drop off the XO and evacuate the CO [commanding officer] and the other casualties. Lieutenant Cox took command and gave the order to move out, our objective being to return to the company's previous night's position. It was getting late, near dusk, and we all had serious reservations about this order that we felt was poorly conceived by Lieutenant Cox."29 Cox was senior to Drake and so assumed command of the company. Even though Thomasson had never observed Cox in a command position, he considered him a superb executive officer.JO However, Lieutenant Cox was thrust into an impossible situation not of his making and deserves no criticism for the circumstances of the moment, nor for the events that occurred later. That aside, the sudden change of leadership had an impact on the men of Company C, and others in the company shared Randall's sense of anxiety. Carl Fryman: "The word came down that we were going to move out towards higher ground to the south. We packed up what we had, literally stuffing everything that we owned into our packs and prepared to head to our night laager. There was a general feeling of uneasiness among us. As I was packing my gear, I felt fear in my own heart, and I could see it in the

eyes of the others in 1st Platoon."31 The men were still in the process of packing rations and ammunition when Lieutenant Cox ordered the company to saddle up. The order of march by platoons was 1st, 2d, 3d. Cox co-located himself and the company headquarters with the 2d Platoon and formed the company in a file. Some of the men, unable to stuff the rations into their rucksacks, carried cases of C rations in their hands.32 Sergeant Jim Barrett remembered that "the resupply was so heavy, that I thought we could not carry it all."33 In this manner, with the 1st Platoon leading, Twister Charlie moved out into the gathering darkness.34

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 and 5 January 1968. Ibid. John Thomasson, letter to author, 17 January 1994. Ibid. See also 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals, 5 January 1968. Thomasson letter. Ibid. Jim Barrett, letter to author, November 1993. Harmon Randall, letters to author, 23 October 1992,5 February 1993.

A Real Hero

63

9. Thomasson letter. 10. Harmon Randall, telephone interview with author, 3 October 1992. 11. Thomasson letter. 12. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 January 1968; Randall interview and letters. 13. Thomasson letter; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 January 1968. 14. Thomasson letter; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 January 1968. 15. Spot Report #8, located with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 January 1968. 16. Unit Location Summary, located with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals, 5 January 1968. 17. Statement by Capt. Larry Byers in TAB F to Appendix 3: 196th LIB: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 18. Thomasson letter; Spot Report #40, located with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 January 1968; Randall letters. 19. Spot Report #40; Randall letters. 20. Spot Report #40; Barrett letter. 21. Thomasson letter. 22. Carl Fryman, tape to author, October 1993. 23. Spot Report #42, located with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 January 1968. 24. Barrett letter. 25. Thomasson letter. 26. Fryman tape. 27. Thomasson letter; author's conversation with John Thomasson. 28. Thomasson letter. 29. Randall letters. 30. Thomasson letter. The 196th LIB reported that the casualties were caused by a rifle grenade. Thomasson, Randall, and Fryman, however, maintain that the casualties resulted from a single, well-placed mortar round and not from a rifle grenade. 31. Fryman tape. 32. Fryman tape. 33. Barrett letter. 34. Randall letters; Fryman tape; Barrett letter.

8 An Encounter at Dusk

T

he NVA's exact plans for that night are unknown. However, based on the events that took place that evening, it appears that the NVA believed that Twister Charlie would remain in its LZ position for the night and planned to attack them there. I suspect the following events took place: Six companies from the 1st VC Regiment's 40th and 90th Battalions moved to occupy assembly areas on all sides of Twister Charlie's resupply LZ sometime during the late afternoon. Four companies filtered into assembly areas in the foothills south of Highway 534 while the two other companies occupied areas north of the road. As the infantry was moving into its respective assembly areas, gun sections from the regiment's mortar and antiaircraft companies occupied prearranged sites from which they could support the attack on Company C. Once into position the enemy units waited until it was close to twilight and moved again. In my opinion, Twister Charlie met the enemy forces as they moved into attack positions near to the LZ.l (See Map 8.1.) A daytime meeting engagement with the enemy is never tidy, but unexpectedly slamming into him on a dusky trail is indeed a messy affair. An immediate period of confusion accompanies the initial burst of gunfire in any clash with the enemy, but when he is at close range, disorder, though counted in seconds, is complete. It is a period of shock and disbelief during which leaders lose control and fight to regain it, while their soldiers, lacking direction, trust their training and instincts and hope to survive the moment. It is also a time when men die. The laager that Captain Thomasson had selected lay in the foothills about 2,000 meters south of the resupply LZ. Coincidentally the trail leading there would take the company literally into the middle of the NVA's southern attack positions. Pfc. Carl Fryman was in the point squad and remembers: "I was the ninth man back in the file. It was close to dark but still light enough that I could distinguish the figures in front of me. A guy by the name of Pete Thomas was walking point. Pete was the squad leader

65

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Tral Car!Tracl< A/4-31stlnlantry

tNA

Flrablrd Crash Sle

---

Cl2-1sllnfanlly

66

An Encounter at Dusk

67

of the 1st Squad, 1st Platoon and was probably the fmest point man I ever saw over there-almost like a bloodhound. The platoon leader would show Pete where we were going on the map, and Pete would focus his eyes in that particular direction and take off."2 The distance between the company's point man to the last man in the 3d Platoon is estimated to be 300 meters, maybe a little more. The terrain along the track, a mixture of woods and paddies, varied significantly within each platoon's sector. Carl Fryman provides this description of the terrain at the head of the column: "We passed a trench that ran for several meters up the right side of the trail. Then it turned off to the left [east] at a 45degree angle and stopped. It was a very large trench, with high banks on both sides and probably 10 to 12 feet deep in places. There was a hedgerow on the far side of the trench with a tapioca field just behind it."3 The ditch would provide cover to a number of the 1st Platoon in the coming battle. At about the time the point reached the ditch, Pfc. Harmon Randall, marching with the 2d Platoon, was covering the ground some 150 meters behind Fryman. Randall recalls the evening: "After we moved out there was a period of quiet. We were on the trail in a single file formation with no flank security and the POWs we had captured a couple of hours before were in tow. The area along the trail was village-like, but there were no hootches. There were intersecting trails, clearings, hedgerows and graves, and it was slightly inclining with wide terraces."4 Carl Fryman says, We'd walked for a while and were nearing a steep hill that I thought was the place where our night laager was supposed to be. All of a sudden I heard Pete holler, "Dung lai!'' [dung lai is the command to stop or halt in Vietnamese], then open fire. I looked over to my left and saw a group of enemy soldiers near a hootch. I started firing, and several of the NVA went down, but we were also taking heavy small-arms fire. Mortars and rifle grenades started coming in and wounded some of the squad. Jordan Ramey came running up to me and asked me where Gill was. Jordan was in the 3d Squad, but he and Gilliland were very close friends. I told him that Gill was up the trail from me, but I didn't know how far. Ramey took off up the file screaming, "Gill, where are you, Gill where are you?" I heard Gill say, "Here I am." Ramey asked, "Are you OK?" Gill answered, "Yeah, I think so, I think so." I could barely make out their outlines and that was the last time I heard either of them speak. The commander before Captain Thomasson had told us that contacts with the enemy were brief and ended as quickly as they started. I was convinced that this was nothing more than a brief, furious firefight. My extra poncho had come loose from my pack, so I laid my

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Through the Valley

rifle down to retie it. Having the second poncho meant sleeping dry at night during the monsoon, and I wanted this poncho badly.s Fryman quickly forgot the poncho as the roar of automatic weapons fire rippled down the east side of the trail and engulfed the rest of the column. Minutes later, enemy machine guns along the west side of the trail clamored to life also pouring fire into the column.6 Fryman continues: "A big kid named Tony Ham was some distance ahead of me and was wounded from the fire to our back. I remember seeing Ham lying down and screaming very loudly that he'd been hit. The enemy was so close that we could have had a hand grenade-tossing contest, and that probably would have done the trick. I thought we were about to be surrounded. "7 Pete Thomas went down with a bullet through his right knee, but his quick action on point had allowed the 1st Platoon a few precious seconds to react. The men in following platoons, however, did not enjoy that advantage. The enemy struck the long, winding column from both flanks with the force of a lighting strike. 8 Harmon Randall remembers when the storm of fire and steel erupted from the dimly visible surroundings: "We had been moving for about 30 minutes when they hit us with mortars, automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenade [RPG] fire. It was an L-shaped ambush."9 Jim Barrett writes: My squad was in a cemetery and in the middle of the platoon when all hell broke loose. The squad behind mine was holding back a wave of NVA coming at us through the rice paddy to our rear. The rear squad was doing a great job, but now the mortars were really coming in and things started to fall apart. The last squad was running out of ammo and the extra heavy supply of ammo and grenades was a blessing at this point. There were lots of us stuck in the open. We were not in a good place to set up to fight.IO Randall adds that "the platoon attempted to regroup into some sort of defensive position, but the contact was too heavy. I was wounded in my right arm with a chunk of shrapnel that went through my right biceps. Jim Barrett asked me if I could still handle the machine gun. I was in quite a bit of pain and thought it would be a problem, so we traded weapons."ll Barrett goes on: The front of the company was trying to move forward and we were told to drop our packs and don't leave any explosives in them. I yelled that we were going to move out and get with the rest of the company, then remembered that Harmon Randall had been hit. As we were

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moving out, I yelled to Randall, "Where are you?" He said, "Right beside you Sarge, I'm Okay. It's only a Purple Heart job." I reached into my pocket to give him some extra clips for the M-16 and he was gone.t2 Nothing was simple that night. Randall recalls that "shortly after Jim and I changed weapons, I was wounded again, this time with shrapnel in the face. In the ensuing confusion, Jim and I were separated. It was then when I realized that, except for the magazine in the weapon, I had no magazines or ammo for an M-16."13 Jim Barrett: The platoon sergeant and I checked out a ditch and made sure it was clean before we got the rest to follow us. We moved along the ditch until we came to a path and started across it so we could join the rest of the company. As soon as we did, all hell broke loose on both sides of us. We jumped back into the ditch and the platoon sergeant said, "Are they friendly?" I said, "No, the muzzle flashes are white, ours are yellow." The platoon sergeant then took one side, and I took the other and knocked out the enemy that were firing at us. That's the kind of night it was. 14 The fighting along every inch of the black, narrow trail was fierce, chaotic, and at close quarters, and the NVA poured fire into the column, then charged headlong into the company's ranks. At the rear of the company, Lieutenant Drake and the 3d Platoon, outnumbered and outgunned, found themselves in a murderous crossfire from the flanks, while the two NVA companies that had followed Company C from the LZ attempted to overrun him. Disaster seemed imminent, but Lieutenant Drake remained calm, averted disaster, and led his men through the inferno to more defensible terrain. IS The first report from C/2-1st Infantry into the 4-31st Infantry's BTOC indicated that the company was in contact from several directions and receiving mortar fire from both flanks. The size of the enemy force was unknown, reflecting the uncertainty of the moment.16 Lt. Bromley German, though wounded in the initial hail of fire, quickly initiated an artillery fire mission. Within minutes of German's call for fire, Battery C, 3-82d Artillery on FSB West delivered its first rounds of the fight on two suspected NVA mortar locations. Bromley German had his hands full with more than just his FO duties that night. Lt. Gerald Norton, the 2d Platoon leader, had died in the initial volley of gunfire, and German found himself in command of that platoon. German organized those men he could find into a tight defense and walked the artillery into within 30 meters of his perimeter to strike the surrounding NVA. Guns from artillery

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Through the Valley

batteries positioned on FSB Center and LZ Ross also fired on enemy positions around Twister Charlie, and artillery support for the beleaguered C/2-l would continue throughout the period of the contact.l7 As Company C recoiled from the NVA's onslaught, squads separated in the blackness. Small groups of men banded together; found protective niches in hedgerows, ditches, and holes along the muddy track; fought back; and sometimes died together. Physical contact between platoons was lost, but the clusters of men, more by accident than design, formed strongpoints that evolved into an elongated, albeit disconnected, defensive perimeter. It was in this manner that Twister Charlie fought off the attackers. Jim Barrett: We reached a large paddy with chest-high dikes and stopped. They must have known where we were there, because mortars started coming in. We started moving. The mud was slippery and trying to get up to the top of the chest-high dikes was a job. While I was trying to get out of there, something large hit me on the leg so hard that it knocked me down. I got up and kept moving until I found a hole. I went to jump in and saw it was filled. There must have been five to ten men already in the position, but they somehow got me inside.ts Harmon Randall: I was able to link up with one other troop, a grenadier. We were separated from the others, and he couldn't help me out with ammo. The grenadier was wounded and was fighting unconsciousness all night. We shared a fairly well-concealed position, in a space about eight feet wide, between a high grave and the bank of a terrace with a six-foothigh hedgerow at the back. He faced into the hedgerow and I faced into a clearing about 30 meters square. We lay there for about two hours. Neither of us moved or fired our weapons during that time. We did not want to give away our position, and I had no idea how many rounds, if any, were left in the magazine in my weapon. I felt our position would be compromised by the slightest movement or sound, and I was reluctant to even check to see how many rounds were in the weapon's magazine.l9 Jim Barrett: "We crawled to the top of the hole so we could see if someone was coming. The VC would yell and drop mortars behind us, then come moving in on us. We responded by throwing grenades to keep from giving our position away. We did not know where the rest of the company was. I did not tell anyone, I kept thinking that we were going to be killed and wondered just how long we could last. "20

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The situation along the black trail was as varied as the surrounding terrain. (See Map 8.2.) Carl Fryman: Some time later we got the word to move out, and I quickly retrieved my belongings. I suppose I was a bit panicky because I got separated from the rest of the company. I ended up on the far side of the trench and at the far end of a tapioca field before I realized that I was out there by myself. They were firing illumination by now, and I didn't want to be seen by the enemy or anyone else. I got down and waited. No one came and after a short period of time, I called back to the others in an audible voice. Staff Sergeant William Bernard, who had taken over the platoon when Lieutenant Lewis got hit, hollered back and told me that they had stopped and set up a defensive perimeter. My position put me between the perimeter and the enemy. I was unsure what to do, but I knew that I had to get back to the platoon. I decided to follow the trench back to where they had set up the perimeter and hollered that I was coming back down the trench. I started down a cut in the bank to get into the ditch and a burst of automatic weapons fire whizzed past my face. It was like bright lights. I'm redgreen color blind, and I couldn't be sure what color the tracers were, but I assumed that the fire had come from one of our guys. I hollered again. "Don't fire, I'm coming down the trench." Sergeant Bernard answered, "Come on." I started down again and was met with another burst of automatic weapons fire. I jumped back and hollered, "Who's in the trench up here?'' Sergeant Bernard yelled back, "There's no one in that part of the trench." I realized that there were enemy across the trench and behind the mound of dirt near the cut. I lay my weapon down and retrieved a hand grenade from my pistol belt. My hands were shaking so badly that it took me a while to straighten the cotter pins on the grenade. I pulled the pin out of the hand grenade. Even though I was panicky, I was smart enough to release the spoon and hold the grenade for a second and a half or so. I tossed it over the mound of dirt, and it went off scattering pieces of wood from a water buffalo pen everywhere. The explosion was followed by loud screams from the wounded enemy. His screams unnerved me more than the automatic weapons fire had, and I threw the rest of my grenades over the mound. When the screaming still didn't stop, I panicked. I hollered back to Sergeant Bernard to pass the word that I was coming back across the tapioca field in a run, and asked them to please don't fire. There was illumination coming in, but I didn't try to conceal my sprint across the tapioca field. My adrenaline was flowing and my sprint across the tapioca field was probably in record time.

--------- ......

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•• Map 8.2 Action, 5 January.

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----.

Tran Fryman IIIOWI& C/2·1 Dlrectlon of March

1. Hootch where NVA were sighted 2. Hootch with courtyard 3. Pete Thomas's position

4. Fryman's initial position 5. Tony Ham's position 6. Fryman's position out of perimeter. 7. Position of NVA Fryman killed 8. Fryman's position after he reentered the perimeter 9. Fryman's position when Staff Sergeant Bernard was killed

72

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73

Sergeant Bernard had set up the CP in that part of the trench. Him and Steve Rice, the platoon's radio operator [RTO], had moved anumber of the wounded into the trench near the CP. I positioned myself along the hedgerow and right next to the trench. Afterwards, I stayed in constant conversation with Sergeant Bemard.21 John Thomasson recalls: "While I was being operated on in the rear, local anesthesia was used, and being conscious I noticed that the radio that was being monitored was talking to Twister Charlie 6. I said, 'Hey, that's me, what's going on?' I was told it was a company getting cut up in an ambush. I was sick over it the rest of the night, worrying whether I could have made a difference."22 Ten minutes into the contact, 4-31 requested helicopter gunship support for Twister Charlie. Maj. Cliff Berry transmitted the request immediately to the America} Division G-3, who in tum alerted the Gun Section of the 71st Combat Aviation Company. Shortly after receiving the call, Firebirds 93 and 94 lifted off their pad from Hill 35 and headed west toward the fight in the Hiep Due Valley. WO Gary McCall flew Firebird 94, the lead aircraft. Firebird 93, piloted by WO Frances G. (Frank) Anton and WO FrankL. Carson, flew wing.23 Other requests to support Company C, including a Moonglow flareship and a Spooky gunship, flooded rapidly into the brigade BTOC from 4-31. Major Berry additionally requested a forward air controller to guide the Moonglow onto its target. To allow the flareship and C/2-1 the ability to communicate, Berry requested that the Moonglow use the 4-31 's radio frequency (or the "command push," as it was called). In the interim, before the flareship came on station, 3-82d Artillery began firing illumination rounds above Twister Charlie.24 Fifteen minutes after the two Firebirds had departed Hill 35, they were orbiting in the flare-filled sky over Company C. McCall was concerned about getting knocked out of the air by friendly artillery and asked Lieutenant German to "check fire" the artillery so his team could engage the NVA mortars pounding the trail. Lieutenant German, who was closer to the problem, was concerned that the company would be attacked again and was reluctant to check fire the artillery (check fire was the command used to immediately halt an artillery fire mission). He asked the gunships to wait.25 The two gunships flew south of the Chang River and orbited until German could use their firepower. Thirty minutes passed, and the ships were running low on fuel. The pilot of Firebird 94 radioed German and told him that he had to either use them or lose them.26 Lieutenant German reluctantly gave his approval, temporarily check fired the artillery and cleared the gunships into the area; German was to mark the boundaries of his position with two red flares. The Firebirds start-

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ed their run. Frank Anton followed the lead ship into the target area but saw only one of German's red flares: concerned about firing into Twister Charlie's positions, Anton ordered his crew to hold their fire. The illumination from the flareships above silhouetted the low-flying gunships making them perfect targets. As the two gunships passed over the darkened trail, NVA gunners turned their weapons skyward and filled the air with steel,27 The men in Company C, hoping for a miracle, watched with anxious anticipation as the gunships flew low over their positions, but there would be no miracle that night. Jim Barrett remembers that "the gunships went over and I thought great, this will really help. But you know things are bad when there were more green and white tracers going up than red ones coming down. "28 During the run McCall spotted an enemy mortar firing on Twister Charlie and wanted to make a second go at it. During its aborted pass Anton's ship took several hits, one of which was serious and damaged the hydraulics, but he followed his leader. During the second gun run the controls on Anton's ship began to seize. As Anton manhandled the crippled ship into a wide descending turn and fought to keep it in the air, the NVA gunners continued driving rounds into its aluminum fuselage. With no chance to recover, and seconds before he lost control of the helicopter, Anton slammed it down hard in a paddy north of Twister Charlie's position.29 Capt. Charles T. Morris was the officer on duty in the brigade operations center and monitoring the 4-31 radio net when Anton reported that he was going down somewhere in the vicinity of Twister Charlie's position. CWO John Bley, a slick pilot from the 71st Combat Aviation Company, was near the contact area and heard the distress call. Bley, whose radio call sign was Rattler 15, radioed the 4-31 BTOC that he was going in to pick up 93's crew. The enemy fire was murderous, and Bley's ship took a number of hits before he was finally forced to call off his rescue attempt. In the meantime, Major Berry requested an Aerial Rocket Artillery Team from the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division to cover the downed Firebird,30 Gunships from other units were also en route to the valley, and the air above Twister Charlie was also becoming increasingly crowded. Berry recognized that the covey of armed aircraft would provide more firepower than German could effectively manage. To husband his assets and maintain a constant stream of air support for C/2-lst Infantry, Berry directed that all incoming gun teams from Chu Lai land at Hill 35. From there Berry would rotate them into the area or maintain them on standby until they were needed.31 On the ground the confusion of the beginning minutes of the contact had passed, but the NVA hugged the dark trail. The men in the strongpoints watched the shadowy figures prowl the length of the narrow perimeter probing and seeking a muzzle flash that would provide them a target.

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Harmon Randall: There was a footpath in front of me bordering one side of the clearing and perpendicular to the direction of my body. The path inclined to my left and to the top of a terrace about 15 meters away. We were fortunate to have good illumination from artillery and flareships, and I saw beaucoup activity to my front. I was a relative newby with two months in country, and it took me a couple of hours to realize that the helmeted, uniformed troops I was watching were NVA. Until this action, I had only encountered pajama-clad VC. I observed two NVA soldiers with a satchel squatting down behind some brush at the top of the terrace. They had not observed me and had taken some hand grenades out of the bag and were preparing to throw them into the field in front of me. There were several dead and wounded in the field, but I couldn't tell if they were ours or theirs. I decided to fire on the two soldiers and prayed that I had ammo and that the M-16 would work. I put the weapon on full automatic and squeezed the trigger. Much to my surprise, the magazine was full of tracers. The tracers compromised our position, and I got my partner's attention and suggested we move out. He told me, "No, I'm staying." Earlier I'd seen four or five people take cover in a position about 10 meters in front of where I'd shot the two NVA and decided to go there. I got up and tried to run but after being so scared and tensed up for the past couple of hours, I couldn't get my muscles to respond. I fell three times during my short jog to the new position. As I stumbled towards them, I hoped that they were Gis and also that they wouldn't shoot me. I reached them and was glad to see they were Gis. They had observed my previous position before and knew I was okay. They shared ammo with me, and I remained there the rest of the night.32 Twister Charlie was clamped in place and requested immediate help. The contact was 90 minutes old, and the company's dead and wounded exceeded the number of able-bodied men. Fire support alone was not enough to save the men trapped on the trail; to survive the night, the company needed reinforcements. At 2023, only minutes before Firebird 93 was shot out of the sky, Colonel Gelling directed 4-31 to move N4-31 to link up with C/2-1. 33 A/4-31 was 1,600 meters south of the ambush site and the closest friendly unit to Company C. From their position on the western slope of Hill445, Capt. Larry Byers and his men could see the muzzle flashes from the enemy's rifles around Twister Charlie. The events of that night are permanently etched into their memories. S.Sgt. Timothy Hunt remembers watching the scattered beginnings of a twilight firefight develop into a full-fledged battle. "We were eating our

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C's and watching them cross the valley towards us when just about dusk, all hell broke loose on C Company. We watched the ambush envelope almost the entire strung-out Company. It appeared to be an L-shape. Our fire support base and the big guns were all responding with fire missions."34 Pfc. Bill Mayo was a rifleman in Company A's 3d Platoon and also recalls watching the fight from the company's position: "We could see Charlie Company pinned down-we could see it happening. They wouldn't even let us unsaddle and told us to stay ready. We watched the fight below several hours, while we waited to go. We knew they were getting hit bad."35 Shortly after Byers got the word to move out to support Twister Charlie, he closed out his defensive position and headed north toward the besieged company. The 3d Platoon, led by Lt. Nick Watson, was on point. There was no moon. Bill Mayo: "It was very dark and the going through the underbrush was very difficult. We wandered and it took us forever to get down there, but we couldn't see because there was so much brush. Somebody later told Captain Byers that we had taken a wrong turn."36 Byers requested that 81mm illumination rounds be fired to assist him getting down Hill 445's rugged slope faster. While N4-31 was feeling its way toward Twister Charlie, a Spooky arrived on station and turned its 7 .62mm miniguns on suspected NVA mortar locations.37 Carl Fryman: Even though there were no visible lights on the aircraft, we knew that the Spooky gunship and the flare ship was overhead. One NVAposition opened up in the direction of the gunship firing, I suppose towards the sound. The NVA who were manning the gun found out that was a fatal mistake because the gunship rained fire out of the sky-it was a beautiful sight. We could hear the drone of the engines above us for the rest of the evening, but the enemy didn't attempt to fire at it again.38 The combined deluge of steel from the Spooky and fire from the supporting artillery deterred the enemy gunners for a time. At 2115 Lieutenant German reported that the mortar frre had ceased, but the company was taking some small-arms fire from the surrounding enemy. Shortly afterward, German notified the 4-31 BTOC that he was wounded and added that everyone around him was either dead or wounded. Thirty minutes after Lieutenant German's bleak summary the automatic weapons from NVA positions along the trail came thunderously to life.39 At 2240, the brigade headquarters halted the artillery so CWO John Bley could make another try to rescue Firebird 93's crew. Bley met a fusillade of automatic weapons frre as he neared the downed ship; undeterred, he turned east, away from the enemy guns, then whipped the UH-1 around for another try. The NVA were waiting and poured round after round into

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Bley's ship, forcing him once more out of the crash area. Bley tried again and continued to fly the gauntlet of fire until Colonel Gelling directed 4-31 to call off the rescue effort. It was none too soon: both of the UH-1 's fuel cells were punctured, and a part of the skid had been shot away. As Bley nursed his shot-up bird to Hill 35, Gelling lifted the artillery check fire.40 While Rattler 15 made its rescue bid, A/4-31 toiled to reach C/2-1 's position. Bromley German, plagued by his wound, stayed on the radio talking to Byers to guide him toward his position. However, movement through the gloomy light of the parachute flares toward C/2-1 's position, by Byers's own statement, was a slow and treacherous affair. S. Sgt. Timothy Hunt recalls: The remains of C Company were located in an L-shaped drainage ditch about one klick [kilometer] away. The 1st Platoon brought up the rear of the company. As we moved toward the fighting, I brought up the rear of the company with a small squad to ensure we were not cut in half going in. Silence was a must. We had to go through the NVA to get to Charlie Company, and our point elements had to take out one, maybe two machine guns blocking our path.41 At 2340, A/4-31 was still 400 meters to the southwest of C/2-1 's perimeter.42

Notes 1. SITREP No. 005 and 006, with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 and 6 January 1968; America! Division: Intelligence Summary 9-68, 10 January 1968 states that members of the VC 2d Company/90th Battalion were involved in the contact on C/2-1 st Infantry. Documents captured later indicated that elements of the 40th Battalion, 1st VC Regiment were also involved in the attack. 2. Carl Fryman, tape to author, October 1993. 3. Ibid. 4. Harmon Randall, letter to author, 5 February 1993. 5. Fryman tape. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Randall letter. 10. Jim Barrett, letter to author, November 1993. 11. Randall letter. 12. Barrett letter. 13. Randallletter. 14. Barrett letter. 15. General Orders Number 50. Both Lt. Steven C. Drake (posthumously) and S. Sgt. Ronald E. Malachi were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for their heroic actions of 5 and 6 January 1968.

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16. 196th LIB: Sequence of Events and Sketch Maps, located with 196th LIB: Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 3-10 January 1968. 16 February 1968. 17. 196th LIB: Sequence of Events and Sketch Maps; 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 January 1968; SITREP No. 006, 6 January 1968, with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968; General Orders Number 1249, 22 March 1968. Posthumous Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Lt. Bromley German. 18. Barrett letter. 19. Randall letter. 20. Barrett letter. 21. Fryman tape. 22. Thomasson, letter to author, 17 January 1994. 23. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 January 1968; Zalin Grant, Survivors (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1975), p. 1. 24. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals, 6 January 1968. 25. Grant, Survivors, pp. 2-3; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. 26. Grant, Survivors, pp. 2-3. 27. Ibid. 28. Barrett letter. 29. Grant, Survivors, pp. 2-3. Frank Anton and the two crew members were captured and spent 5 years in captivity. WO Frank L. Carson evaded the enemy and walked into the Nui Loc Son Popular Force Camp the next day. 30. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals, 5 January 1968. 31. Ibid. 32. Randall letter. 33. SITREP No. 006, 6 January 1968, with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968; 196th LIB: Sequence of Events and Sketch Maps. 34. Timothy Hunt Jr., letter to author, December 1996. 35. Ibid.; Bill Mayo, interview with author, 23 August 1996. 36. Statement by Capt. Larry Byers in TAB F to Appendix 3: 196th LIB: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 37. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 January 1968. 38. Fryman tape. 39. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 January 1968. 40. Ibid. The story of Bley's rescue attempt was related to me by Chuck Carlock. Carlock was a member of the 71st Combat Aviation Company and is the author of Firebirds. LZs Leslie and Ross were in contact until 0050 hours. 41. Hunt letter. 42. Byers statement.

9

The Longest Night

6 January

I

twas shortly after midnight when one of the company's radio operators left the hole in which the CP was located to take a look around. Not long after the RTO had crawled out of the position, an incoming round slammed into the company command post and killed Lieutenant German. The radio operator returned to the CP and took over directing Captain Byers's men to the perimeter. 1 In combat some call that luck. Pfc. Carl Fryman later described a similar experience in another part of the protracted perimeter earlier that evening. At some point in time, Staff Sergeant Bernard moved me to the other side of the tapioca field. It was strange that he should move me then, because 1 or 2 minutes later, either a mortar round or one of our artillery rounds struck nearly where I'd been laying. Staff Sergeant Bernard, along with some of the wounded and several others who were down in the trench, were killed. Steven Rice was wounded and Sp4c. Dennis Donnely took over command of the platoon.2 Communication between the company CP and the three rifle platoons was tentative. However, before Staff Sergeant Bernard died he had learned that Company A was en route to them and had passed that information to his men. As the night wore on and casualties increased, many of Charlie Company's men manning the isolated strip of strongpoints doubted that anyone would get to them in time to help. Carl Fryman: "We were aware that Alpha 4-31 was trying to reach us but we didn't know how long that would take. So, around midnight me, Donnely, David Ridgeway, and several others got together to count our ammo and determine what actions we were going to take. I had eight 79

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rounds left and no grenades, and the others didn't have much more. There were only a few of us left in the 1st Platoon, and we didn't know if there was anyone left in the 2d or 3d Platoons. As we talked about our options we thought about splitting up into three- and four-man groups and trying to escape and evade to LZ West. "3 The men who manned the strongpoints strung out along the trail shared an equal sense of detachment. Sgt. Jim Barrett recalls encouraging the men around him throughout the night by constantly reciting that it would be light soon and by then everything would be OK. Although he continued to repeat the same phrases over and over, Barrett recalls that he did not know whether anyone in the company was alive aside from the men in his position.4 While Company C's men were wondering how they would survive until relief arrived, Capt. Larry R. Byers was preparing to enter the perimeter: "As my elements moved within 75 meters of the suppressed troop, the RTO and I organized signals by which my elements could be recognized as they entered the perimeter." Bill Mayo: "We had kept talking to them on the radio while we moved towards them, and when we started in to their position, we signaled with the flashlights to let them know where we were."5 Ten minutes after midnight Company A's point man made contact with the 1st Platoon of Company C. Byers requested the supporting artillery fires in the particular zone be shut off until he could move his unit into Twister Charlie's perimeter.6 Carl Fryman's group was still in a huddle deciding what they should do when he spotted a dim light on the hill to his front. Fryman said later, "I told Donnely, look, there's a light on the hill in front of us. Then Donnely hollered, 'Alpha Company!' and a voice hollered back, 'Charlie Company!' We said, 'Yeah, come on in.' They were more than a welcome sight." With the 3d Platoon in the lead, Byers and his men cascaded off the hill into the tapioca field. Men of the 3d Platoon swerved left and grabbed the first bit of cover they could find. With nowhere else to go the following platoons swerved to the right, toward the trail and the drainage ditch (see Map 9.1 ). Pfc. Bill Mayo recalled that it was just mass confusion. The 3d Platoon came running in and just fell into the tapioca field. The company headquarters and the other two platoons went into the trail area. For them to get into the perimeter, they couldn't fall on us, so they just fell over to the right. Lieutenant Watson and I ended up together. After we got in we fanned out just a little bit so we could find some people from Charlie 2-1 and we kind of formed a roughshod perimeter. Captain Byers must have thought the whole company was in the trench area because I heard him say on the radio that anybody out-

Map9.1 Action, 5 January Llnlql. (10 ................

-

--+

Hedgerow

~

Tral Fryman moves A/4-31 Movas

1. A/4-31 point man'S position when visual conlacl- made 2. A/4-31 man wounded 3. Fryman'S position during link-up 4. Wood pile poslllon

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A/4-31 platoon poslllonl

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side the trench area was not friendly. The NVA were all around us, and I dido 't want to talk on the radio so I told Lieutenant Watson that I was going to fmd Captain Byers. I crawled over into the trench and found Captain Byers and told him that the 3d Platoon was on the other side of the tapioca field. 7 Company A's breakneck sprint into the 1st Platoon's position caught the NVA off guard, but not for long. Carl Fryman remembered the NVA's reaction to A/4-31 's arrival: As they came racing across the tapioca field, the NVA opened up on them with automatic weapons, mortars, and RPGs. One individual was wounded on the hill in front of us and I could hear him screaming and hollering at the top of his lungs. The point man ran directly up to me and apologized for taking so long in getting there. He said they had gotten lost on the way. I told him there was no need to be apologetic, I was just happy to see them get there. s Luck was with Company A that fateful evening, and the man who Fryman heard yelling was the company's only casualty. The NVA soldiers were not finished, though, and continued to pour fire into the perimeter. Carl Fryman continues: The fire was still coming in pretty heavy, and the point man and I sought cover behind an elevated woodpile. In the process, I was wounded in the lower right back by a piece of shrapnel. My leg went instantly numb. I reached back to check, but couldn't find a hole, yet my leg was numb and I had severe pain in my right kidney. The point man searched for the wound and by the time he found it, blood had run down my leg and into my boot. He bandaged the wound, and we remained next to the woodpile for the rest of the night.9 Once inside Twister Charlie's ill-defined perimeter, Byers quickly took charge of the situation. A/4-31 's appearance, however, did not dissuade the enemy a bit. NVA soldiers, ghost-like in the shadowy light, continued to stalk the perimeter and crowd the trail to avoid the 105mm shells raining down .to The 1st Platoon sought refuge in the ditch and found a scene straight out of hell. S. Sgt. Timothy Hunt later wrote: "The ditch was completely under fire when I finally got to it and full of the dead and dying from Charlie Company. The 1st platoon was in the short leg of the L-shape ditch and returning fire at enemy positions that were only twenty to thirty yards away. My rear element squad kept our point of entry clear as several times the enemy tried to close on our rear. "11

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Sp4c. Sam Mazzola, who was a rifleman in the 1st Platoon, N4-31, later recalled what happened: "It was still dark when we broke through to what was left of C Company. We were immediately pinned down in a ditch. We were surrounded, but the company set up a perimeter as best we could. The NVA would zero in on our muzzle flashes with their .51-caliber machine guns and RPGs. Our artillery was dropping rounds all around us and very close to our perimeter."12 Combat between the two adversaries was close in, brief, and frequently fatal to the loser. The men from Company A quickly learned that a muzzle flash would bring a flock of Chinese-made hand grenades flying out of the blackness beyond the trail. As Captain Byers attempted to get a grip on the situation, the NVA moved within close range where they could chunk hand grenades anytime they detected a muzzle flash. He later wrote: Immediately, I passed on the word for all personnel to fire only at definite targets an~ each man had to change his position after firing; unless an immediate target warranted the use of small arms or machine gun fire, I suggested that only hand grenades and M-79 rounds be used to stave off the enemy threat. My 1st platoon, led by 1st Lieutenant Mansfield, spotted an enemy machine gun and an M-79 grenade launcher that had been troubling us. They immediately maneuvered and knocked those weapons out with our M-60 frre.J3 Not long after linking up with C/2-1, Byers's platoons crept down the trail in a cautious search for survivors. A storm of grenades and automatic weapons fire from the NVA holding stubbornly fast in the predawn gloom met the men's efforts. Byers's men, however, kept pushing and within 30 minutes of linking up with Company Chad accounted for 12 of its dead and 43 wounded. A little past 0300, the NVA unleashed a hail of bullets, a flurry of grenades, and an avalanche of 60mm mortar shells on the defenders. Mayo recounted the episode later: I was laying beside the platoon leader and we heard a grenade hitsomebody hollered, "Grenade!" Watson was a big tall guy, about six foot two. I could tell where the sound came from and I instinctively rolled. When I rolled, Watson rolled too. He couldn't go anywhere except on top of me and covered me like a glove and got the shrapnel all in his back and down his legs. I recall him saying, "Bill there is something wet and warm on my back and legs, and I don't know if it's buffalo cow shit or if it's blood. Would you check?" At about the time that I put my hand on his back some illumination went off and I could see it was blood and told him. He survived and was choppered out that next moming.t4

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Besides Watson, Lt. John Nerud, Byers's 2d Platoon leader, Lt. John Oliver, Company A's FO, and nine other men suffered wounds. The latest attack raised the number of wounded in the perimeter to over 50 known, but the continued enemy activity made getting a dustoff impossible. Although Company A had enough ammunition, treating the large number of wounded had about exhausted its medical supplies.t5 Pfc. Harmon Randall wrote: Although the enemy's fire diminished somewhat in intensity around 0300, we were in contact until dawn. A few hours before daybreak we heard troops digging in and figured we were going to have a major problem that morning if the NVA were entrenching. But at first light, we were greatly relieved to see that elements of N4-31 Infantry had come to reinforce us. All the officers in the company, including the FO and the company first sergeant, had been killed or wounded. Our platoon sergeant had taken over the company.l6 Sgt. Jim Barrett, whose position was probably not far from Randall, also heard the digging noise. We heard noise behind us that sounded like digging. It was still dark and I did not know who it was. It was daylight before I knew that A Company 4-31 had joined us. They were set up around us, and I really was so glad to see those guys. But the place was a mess. There were wounded all around, and some were very bad. There was one guy in our position from Virginia who had lost both hands throwing a hand grenade back and had a large cut on his face. I still think he was the main reason we made it after the artillery stopped or slowed down that night.l7 Daylight had arrived with a blanket of dismal fog that reduced visibility in the valley to a few meters. Several medevac pilots had made unsuccessful attempts to reach Charlie Company's position and had been turned away by either weather or enemy fire. At 0845 Dustoff 55, piloted by Maj. Patrick Brady, a medevac pilot with the 54th Medical Detachment, bore through the fog to pick up casualties from C/2-1. Capt. Michael J. Scotti and two of his medics from the battalion aid station were on board. IS Carl Fryman still remembered the weather years later: "It was so foggy that the helicopter had to be directed down into the clearing by sound. I remember that the two medics on board the helicopter were leaning out as the helicopter dropped down through the trees and into the clearing to pick up the wounded."l9 Staff Sergeant Bishop, the senior medic from Company A, had estab-

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lished an evacuation area within the perimeter, but the LZ was still not 100 percent secure. NVA holdouts and diehards continued to prey on efforts to collect the casualties. The enemy's fire, though random, was sometimes concentrated, and flying into the perimeter was treacherous.20 Sgt. Robert K. Brown was a member of N4-31's 1st Platoon who had returned to FSB West on 5 January from an R-and-R leave in Australia. Brown and two other men tried unsuccessfully to catch a ride back to Company A late that afternoon and remembers the time: A resupply ship from C/2-1 landed and we got on. Before we took off a spec-four came running out of the commo bunker and asked if we were experienced troops or FNGs. We all had five to six months in country and for some reason they told us to get off the chopper and stay on Hill 445 for the night of January fifth. I was assigned to a bunker on the south side of the hill. There was a PRC-25 in the bunker and I monitored N4-31 's net all night. At first light the valley looked like it had snowed three hundred and seventy-five feet overnight. The surrounding mountaintops stuck up looking like remote islands in an ocean of fog. My ride down into the valley was frightening. Two Medevac choppers had stayed on Hill 445 all night in case the fog broke to assist C Co. I went in on the second Medevac. The fog was so thick you could see nothing at all until we got to about fifty feet from the valley floor. We flew at that elevation until the pilot decided he could see better if we flew sideways-! was on the doorless side that he chose to use as the front of the chopper. We came upon a small group of about six men in green who popped yellow smoke. Immediately we went straight up just as we started receiving incoming fire from the six men who were NVA. We came back down to the 50-foot elevation and preceded sideways avoiding a few trees as we went. I was very relieved to see Harlan Lane, the RTO for the CO of A/4-31 directing the Medevac and to get through the fog and off that chopper.21 The red crosses emblazoned on the air ambulance made the slow-flying ships fat targets. On Major Brady's initial entry into the area, his helicopter's controls were partially shot away, but he picked up a load of wounded anyway. After he had flown the wounded to safety on FSB West, Brady obtained a replacement aircraft and returned to pick up more wounded. When he landed this time, an explosion from what was believed to be a land mine, damaged his ship and wounded two of his crew members. Brady, however, was successful in evacuating six more severely injured men. After dropping off the wounded, Brady changed helicopters once again and continued the mission.22

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Darkness had cloaked the horrific carnage that took place during the night, and few of the men from Company A were ready for the scene that dawn brought. Timothy Hunt vividly recalls the morning: As light broke over the battle area, the scene is still beyond description-at least for me. The trench was just full of C Company dead with more littered throughout the ambush area, all of whom were stripped of equipment. One platoon established perimeter security while another swept out looking for survivors and bodies. The 1st platoon got the job of collecting the dead from the ditch for evacuation. Only about half of the platoon was able to do this as the rest were sick as hell or in shock.23 Before life had been snatched from them a few hours earlier, the dead men had shared similar backgrounds and some of the same hopes and dreams as the men who carried them from the place they fell. For some in A/4-31, looking into the faces of the dead men was like gazing into a mirror. Timothy Hunt: My clearest memory of that morning is of one of the dead grunts. As we laid him out in a poncho in a long row of dead, his helmet rolled over and I bent down to put it next to him. In his helmet was a picture of his wife or girlfriend, and then I just stared at his body shot to hell with his hip crushed probably from a mortar fragment. He was about my size and age and I had the same size picture of my fiancee in my helmet. I thought I was staring at myself.24 Once on the ground Sergeant Brown rejoined the 1st Platoon and teamed up with Sp4c. Sam Mazzola and recalls the task of removing Company C's dead: "We spent the majority of that day policing up bodies and equipment. There was a huge pile of both US and NVA equipment. We found only one NVA body, but filled two Chinooks with US bodies. Little did I know that this was the beginning of some real bad times. "25 Sam Mazzola also remembers the grim job of collecting the dead that day: There was a body with no head-just a part of his spine sticking up between his shoulders. He must have taken a direct hit in the head by an RPG. I grabbed his arms up by his shoulders and Bob Brown got his ankles to place him on a poncho and take the body to the LZ. Bob Brown, who is a lot taller than I am, picked up his feet quicker than I could lift up his torso. Blood poured out of the hole where his neck should have been and dumped all over my boots. Now, I was hardened to gory sights after six months of combat, but all of the blood on my

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boots really got to me. I almost lost it and barfed. I tried to wash off the blood in a rice paddy. I knew the sight of my own blood would constantly remind me of the poor guy.26 Mazzola's and Brown's recollection about the numbers of enemy dead that Company A found differ a bit. Mazzola remembers seeing more dead NVA than the one Brown saw. Mazzola wrote: After gathering the American bodies, we went out to search the NVA bodies for weapons, equipment and papers. There were many NVA bodies along the trail and in the surrounding area and I found a satchel on one NVA body with papers and maps. Some of the bodies had been really ground up by the artillery and they were split open like ripe melons that had been dropped on the ground. I also found an eight inch Buck Knife that must have belonged to someone in C/2-1. I carried that knife until I was wounded on May 18, 1968.27 Those men in Company C who were able to walk also hunted for their friends and fellow platoon members. Carl Fryman: I was able to drag my leg around, and at first light I started to search for the rest of my squad. I found them the way I had hoped that I wouldn't find them. Everybody in our squad was either killed or wounded. Pete Thomas was up forward on the trail. He was still alive, but he'd been shot up pretty badly. I was the only one left from Bravo fire team. All of the others, Jerry Gilliland, from North Carolina, Al Carwithen, from Charleston, West Virginia, Lelend Stewart, from Long Beach, California, and Willie DeLeon, from Valdez, Texas, were killed that night. Jerry Gilliland was the Bravo fire team leader and had taken me under his wing when I arrived. He was a very special guy to me and was due to go home in March. Jordan Ramey, Gill's friend, was also dead. Ramey was always harassing me. Shortly after I'd joined the company, we were on a hill, and Pete Thomas had built a big bonfire. The fire drew some sniper fire from the valley, and I knelt down to see where it had come from. While I was watching the valley, Ramey came running up behind me, dropped the M60 machine gun on top of my steel pot and started firing. It scared the living daylights out of me, and afterwards I always thought that Ramey was sort of a loose nut. Personal feelings aside, Ramey gave up his life to keep us from being overrun that night. At one point the NVA tried a human wave attack, and Ramey stopped it. He stood up firing the M60 from the hip while the assistant gunner kept linking belts of ammo together. They said Ramey took out several NVA while taking rounds himself. Then, I

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don't know if the gun jammed or if he ran out of ammo, but when the gun stopped firing, they said Ramey dropped over dead. The NVA that I'd killed was in the tapioca field. The grenades had blown off both his legs and one of his arms, but he had still managed to drag himself through the opening he'd protected and out of the ditch. He had rolled over and faced the sky, his eyes were open and his teeth were gritted, and it was in this position that he died. Strangely enough, the only thing that I could think of, when I looked at the exposed muscle and ligaments of his legs, was that it reminded me of my high school health class.28 A few minutes after 0900 Major Brady picked up the last of the wounded from Companies C and A. Sometime earlier Captain Scotti had returned to FSB West and directed that the wounded be flown there to be screened. As the wounded arrived, Captain Scotti began treating and stabilizing the most critical cases. One of the medics from 4-31 recalled that the medics from Company D and Doctor Scotti worked on 40 to 50 men that morning. Afterward, the badly wounded were shuttled by CH-47 from FSB West to several supporting medical facilities; men with less serious wounds were transported to the brigade clearing station on Hill35 for treatment.29 Carl Fryman was one of the men who was taken to the brigade clearing station on Hill 35: "I was the last one to be brought out, and the greatest sight I ever saw was a fog-covered valley with a beautiful bright sun shining in the early morning sky. I remember riding on that helicopter praising the Lord and thanking God that he had brought me through this incident. "30 The last reported contact around the perimeter came minutes after the last dustoff had departed. Although A/3-21 and C and D/4-31 met only scattered resistance as they pushed into the battle area, the signs of destruction were everywhere. Captain Yurchak's company found two dead NVA, their AK-47s beside them, as they passed the downed Firebird gunship. There was no sign of its crew. At 0900 the units reported positions within several hundred meters of Twister Charlie's position, and by the time they reached the battle site, the NVA had withdrawn. Captain Byers stated that he thought that the enemy units had withdrawn to the north.Jl At 0930 on 6 January, C/2-1 was declared combat ineffective. Around 1400, the final lift of about 30 men from Twister Charlie walked aboard a CH-47 Chinook and was flown to FSB Ace. The company would rise again and fight more battles. But for now Twister Charlie's fight in the Hiep Due Valley was over. 32

Notes 1. Statement by Capt. Larry Byers in TAB F to Appendix 3: 196th LIB: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. At some point in time, Lieutenant

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Drake assumed command of the company after Lieutenant Cox was wounded. I was not able to pinpoint the time when Drake was killed and command of the company passed to Lieutenant German. 2. Carl Fryman, tape to author, October 1993. 3. Ibid. 4. Jim Barrett, letter to author, November 1993. 5. Bill Mayo, interview with author, 23 August 1996. 6. Byers statement. 7. Mayo interview. 8. Fryman tape. 9. Ibid. 10. Byers statement. 11. Timothy Hunt, letter to author, December 1996. 12. Sam F. Mazzola, letter to author, 24 January 1996. 13. Byers statement. 14. Mayo interview. 15. Byers statement. 16. Harmon Randall, letters to author, 23 October 1992, 5 February 1993. 17. Barrett letter. 18. Headquarters, Department of the Army: Citation. Award of the Medal of Honor to Maj. Patrick Henry Brady, for his actions of 6 January 1968, no date. 19. Fryman tape. 20. Brady citation; Byers statement; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. 21. Robert K. Brown, letter to author, 24 July 1994. 22. Brady citation; Spot Report #4, located with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. 23. Hunt letter. 24. Ibid. 25. Brown letter. 26. Mazzola letter. 27. Ibid. 28. Fryman tape. 29. Byers statement; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. 30. Fryman tape. 31. Statement by Maj. Joseph S. Stringham in TAB C to Appendix 3: 196th LIB: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969; Byers statement; Spot Report #8 and SITREP No. 006 located with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. 32. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Journals, 6 January 1968; 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 196th LIB: S1 Section Daily Journal, 6 January 1968.

10

Oscar, Herman, and Lise

B

efore the CH-47s from the 178th Aviation Company (Boxcar) had completed their momentous task of evacuating Twister Charlie's casualties from the battlefield, Colonel Gelling was shifting forces within the brigade to brace the 4-31st Infantry. Gelling issued parallel orders to the battalion commanders of 2-1st and 3-21st Infantry, directing each to release one rifle company to the operational control of the 4-31st Infantry. 1 Lieutenant Colonel Cully remembered that the brigade headquarters was not only concerned with the actions in the valley, but also thought there would be an attempt to overrun the battalion frrebase. Fifty men, who are described by Lieutenant Colonel Cully as a "variety of soldiers from the brigade rear areas," flew into FSB West to stiffen the firebase defenses.2 The changes were supposed to be in effect at 1300, and time was short as the commanders of 2-1 and 3-21 rushed to comply with the new orders. Lieutenant Colonel Hammond selected Company B, commanded by Capt. John F. Connally, and directed him to ready his unit for an airlift into 4-31 's operational area. A platoon from F/17th Cavalry would provide Connally's unit PZ security, and, at noontime, armored personnel carriers from F Troop rumbled into Company B 's position and took up security positions. By 1330, Connally's first lift was en route to 4-31. The 3d Platoon F/17 was placed under OPCON to 2-1 to fill the gap left by B/2-1 's departure) The battalion commander of 3-21 alerted Capt. Roland Belcher, commander of Company D, to ready his company for a move to the Hiep Due Valley. Delta Company, known then by its radio call sign as Death, had returned from a stand-down in Chu Lai on 3 January and had assumed the FSB security mission from Company C only the day before. There was little surprise when news of the mission change flashed around the bunker line. Many of the men had spent the night watching the flares and tracers of Twister Charlie's action light up the western sky and had little doubt about where they were heading.4 91

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The weather on 5 January had been warm and humid, and Belcher had set a rapid pace marching back to the FSB. Pfc. David Harker was a rifleman with Company D's 1st Platoon and puts the march up to FSB Center into perspective of future events: "It was really a hot day and I remember the sweaty march back to the fire support base. That march, though uncomfortable, was rather insignificant compared to what happened later, though."5 Belcher's route to the frrebase took him along the overused ridge on which the Assassins were training the Green Seeds. I had not seen Belcher since Christmas Day. While his unit was tromping on toward the FSB, Belcher and his RTOs dropped out of the column so he could spend some time talking with me. We caught up on the news and discussed the possibility of going to Bangkok on R and R together in May. After shooting the bull for a few minutes Belcher rejoined his column and started up the hill to the firebase. That was the last time I ever saw him. Roland Belcher was an aggressive, sometimes flamboyant officer who sported a handlebar mustache and a shaved head. The battalion command group held him in high regard. But, although Roland's peers respected him, many considered his style excessively showy and thought him aggressive to the point of recklessness. Belcher was not all show, though, and during his 2 months in command of Company D he had proved to be efficient and well versed in company tactics. He was also witty, liked people, and probably enjoyed putting forth his flamboyant, kick-ass, kill Communists image, and it was probably the image Belcher wanted us to see. There was another insightful and deeper side to Belcher that he seldom unveiled-even to those of us he considered friends.6 David Harker remembers Belcher in a serious light: While we were back in Chu Lai on stand-down, Captain Belcher called everybody together into the dayroom and shared some of his personal feelings about our involvement in the war. Captain Belcher recounted the time in September when the brigade secured the roads and areas down around Tam Ky so the South Vietnamese could go to the polls to vote. I remember him saying that this was a great moment for him because it gave him an opportunity to see democracy at its best; and, at the same time, it also gave him a good feeling about our presence in Vietnam. It was a straight-from-the-heart pep talk that gave a serious tone to an otherwise party-like atmosphere. That talk endeared me to Captain Belcher quite a bit. 7 Delta Company had its gear packed and was standing by, ready to go, when the word came down that they were going on foot. Helicopters were scarce, and the battalion commander had told Belcher to prepare for both a

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foot march or a combat assault into the 4-31 area of operations (AO). As Belcher gave the order to saddle up, men around the muddy perimeter threw on heavy rucksacks that bulged with C rations, extra ammunition, and water. At noon Belcher reported departing the protective wire. The weather was warm, and, except for some high, thin scattered clouds, the sky was clear. The temperature hovered close to 80 degrees-not hot for that part of the world, but plenty warm for the fully loaded men. Later that afternoon Company C, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade came under the operational control of 3-2lst Infantry and flew in to FSB Center to assume the mission of securing LZ Center. 8 Climbing or descending the well-traveled, winding trail that led from the firebase down the rocky, steep slopes of Hill 348 was a sweaty event anytime. On this particular day its trampled soil was particularly soapy from earlier rains. David Harker: "It was the first time we'd gone down the western face of the fire support base, and the going was rugged. About halfway down the slope a man fell and broke his leg, and we had to fashion a litter and carry him the rest of the way down. "9 There are few places on the wooded western slope of Hill 348 to land a helicopter. It took until almost 1400 before Belcher could reach a piece of ground that allowed Rattler 24, the battalion C and C ship, to pick up the injured man. The pilot then swung by Nui Lac Son to recover CWO Frank Carson, the Firebird pilot who had been shot down the evening before. After the crash landing, Carson had ditched his flight suit, covered himself with mud, and started walking, evading both the NVA and the pounding U.S. artillery. He was clad in a pair of mud-crusted shorts and combat boots when he met a soldier from the Nui Lac Son PF Camp. Carson was reportedly in good condition after his overnight ordeal and was evacuated to the brigade aid station on Hill 35.10 Belcher pushed on, trying to make up lost time, but the injured man had slowed them considerably, and there was no way he could reach the valley before dark. The battalion commander requested that Maj. F. Clifton Berry find the necessary airlift to transport Company D the remainder of the distance to the valley. He somehow came up with the helicopters.! I Although the battalion commander's request made sense to Berry, he had more pressing priorities. The 4-3lst Infantry was in the process of moving Company D onto the FSB and replacing it with Company B (D/431 had suffered 30 casualties since 3 January). The NVA welcomed Company D to FSB West by dropping two 82mm rounds within the base perimeter. Manning the firebase defenses during this week would provide the company little respite.t2 Belcher was ready to go when the six slicks that Major Berry had cobbled together whirled into Company D's PZ. The troops scrambled aboard and lifted off. Minutes later they found themselves spiraling downward into a pint-sized LZ secured by B/4-31. David Harker:

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Six of us got on a ship that was really weak. They had to put four of the men off to get it into the air, but I think they continued to use it anyway. The LZ was on a hill side covered with stumps and tall elephant grass. The ships couldn't land, so the pilots hovered 10 to 15 feet off the ground, and we climbed out on the skids and jumped. The door gunners were pushing people out, and it's a wonder that somebody didn't break their leg then_13 The air move was complete within 20 minutes, and at 1705 4-31 reported D/3-21 under its OPCON. Belcher's arrival brought the number of rifle companies assigned or OPCON to 4-31 to seven. Lieutenant Colonel Cully recalls that "these organizations were unfamiliar with the terrain or our operating procedures. Since a battalion was not structured to handle seven rifle companies-our radios were repeatedly jammed-! formed three separate task forces of two companies each. My 4/31 company commanders were placed in command of these task forces."l4 The three task organizations were dubbed, Oscar, Herman, and Lise. Companies B/4-31 and D/3-21 formed Task Force (TF) Oscar, with Capt. William Speer designated as commander. A/4-31 and N3-21 joined and created TF Herman, with Capt. Larry Byers as its commander. B/2-1 and C/4-31 formed TF Lise, which was commanded by Capt. Joseph Stringham. IS Later the three task forces occupied night defensive positions along the valley's south side and prepared for the night. With the events of the past 24 hours fresh in their minds, the men in the task organizations dug deep. David Harker: "We occupied a night laager with Company B and prepared our positions in anticipation of getting attacked by the North Vietnamese, since they'd hit a company the night before."l6 With the exception of some reported movement around TF Herman's perimeter at midnight and an enemy probe at FSB West, the night was uneventful. The 1st VC Regiment had withdrawn to the north side of the valley after the attack on C/2-1, and was still within easy striking distance of U.S. forces operating in the valley. Although its location cannot be pinned down with any specificity, some intelligence reports placed the 40th and 90th Battalions in the densely forested hills several kilometers north of the valley center. The regiment's 60th Battalion, which was not involved in the action of 5 January, was some distance to the west and north of the village of Hiep Duc.l7 During the early morning hours of 7 January, the 196th LIB tactical operation center reported several widespread attacks by fire against friendly forces around the Que Son Valley. The attacks started at 0125 with a mortar attack against the 1-lst Cavalry Squadron's strongpoint at Tam Ky. Within an hour of that attack the brigade's base camp at Hill 35 and the 5th ARVN Regiment on Hill 29, a few kilometers to the south, had also come

Oscar, Herman, and Lise

95

under fire. The 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry's positions at LZs Leslie and Ross also reported taking recoilless rifle and mortar fire throughout the night. iS

Morning, 7 January

The brigade's plans for 7 January charged 4-31 with continuing to interdict the valley north of FSB West. Each TF was assigned specific search areas and distinct directions of movement. TF Herman, which was positioned northwest Hill445, was directed to search to the south. TF Lise, positioned in the eastern end of the valley, was scheduled to sweep north of its night laager. TF Oscar, located in the center and just south of the C/2-1 battle area, was directed northwest.l9 The three TFs departed their night laager sites shortly after sunup in search of the enemy. There had been no rain overnight, and the weather for the day was predicted to be dry. Temperatures in the mid-eighties were expected. The warmth of the previous several days had been a welcome change from the cool temperatures and soggy, low-hanging clouds that generally cloaked the valley during the monsoon season.20 D/3-21 's search route led them through Twister Charlie's battle site, still strewn with items of individual equipment, weapons, and dead enemy. David Harker remembers walking through the battle area that morning: The whole area had a smell of dead flesh that was already starting to decay. The North Vietnamese had already gathered most of their dead, but there was still one stack of five or six NVA there. From what I saw and heard, Charlie Company appeared to have been in its night position and hit by surprise. The company had been just resupplied, and there were several half-opened Christmas gifts scattered about. There was a bush hat with half of a man's head in it. That gruesome find indicated to me that he'd taken off his steel pot and was walking around what he thought was a secure perimeter when he took a round and lost a part of his skull. I had a vision of guys opening gifts from home when they were attacked by North Vietnamese who were in spider holes only meters away.21 Company D searched the battle area until noon, then resumed its sweep north. By 1300 the company had reached Firebird 93's crash site. A $5 bill, carefully smoothed out, had been placed neatly on the ground next to the ship. Members of the 1st Platoon ignored the money and cautiously approached the ship. They quickly discovered the purpose of the lure. The interior of the ship's cabin was a tangled web of tripwires connected to booby traps. A recovery team was due in the area later that afternoon to

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Through the Valley

recover the crippled bird, and Belcher advised the 4-31 BTOC to warn them that the ship was booby trapped. 22 David Harker: "After we found the booby-trapped gunship, they brought in a dog team to try and locate the three helicopter crew members who were missing in action. The tracker team started going east up the river but lost the scent within 45 minutes to an hour."23 Delta Company gave up the search and established a perimeter with B/4-31. By 1800, the other two TFs had also halted search operations for the day and were in their night defensive positions in the southeastern quadrant of the valley. It had been a generally slow day. With the exception of D/3-21 's sighting several NVA at a long range, there was no reported contact with the enemy. The hawk-eyed Blue Ghost pilots had spent the day skimming 50 feet above the valley floor, but had also seen little.24 The most significant find came when the 3d Platoon, B/4-31 captured a wounded NVA who was carrying a sheath full of papers, which validated that enemy units operating in the valley belonged to the 1st VC Regiment.25 At 1940 Captain Speer queried the BTOC and asked what plans the battalion had in store for his TF for the next day. It was getting late, and he wanted to brief Captain Belcher on the next day's plan.26 Approximately an hour later, Speer got his answer. The 4-31 st Infantry's plans for 8 January enjoined the three TF commanders to continue detailed search operations from their night locations. TF Lise would search west along Hill 445's precipitous north slope. TF Herman, directed to sweep north, would make another check of Twister Charlie's battle area. TF Oscar would search along the banks of the Lau River to an area about 2,000 meters west of its night laager.27 Around midnight, the U.S. advisor at Que Son District headquarters came up on the 3-21 tactical net to pass on an intelligence report. The report's reliability was recorded as A-1, meaning that there was a strong probability the report was true. The report stated that an unidentified battalion of the 2d NVA Division had moved into the Hiep Due Valley and occupied four separate locations. The district advisor provided grid coordinates of the enemy battalion and the BTOC duty officer logged them into battalion's S2/S3 Journal. Later, he initialed the block beside the journal entry indicating that the information had been passed to the brigade BTOC.28 A plot of the grid coordinates located three of the enemy units in the east end of the valley, two of which were positioned no more than 500 meters from TF Oscar's night defensive position. The battalion's fourth element was placed at the base of the foothills, just south of the subhamlet of Phu Binh (2) and in the middle of B/4-31 's march route. The district advisory team sent the same report to the 2-12th Cavalry at LZ Ross about 6 hours before passing the information to 3-21. I found no record of this report in the 196th LIB's Journal, America} Division's G3

Oscar, Herman, and Lise

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Journal, or in the division intelligence summaries for the period. Few of the 1968 4-31st Infantry's records exist, and I was unable to determine whether the battalion received this information. It is my opinion it did not. The record of radio transmissions between Captain Speer and the 4-31 BTOC makes no mention of the report. Additionally, 4-31 had submitted its plans for 8 January to brigade during the early evening of 7 January. Had it received the information, it is my belief that the battalion would have altered its plans accordingly.29 There was some reported movement near Oscar and Lise and around the perimeter at FSB West, but the units in the Hiep Due Valley spent a quiet night. It would be the last one for a while.JO

Notes 1. FragO 24 to OPORD 32-67, with 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1968. 2. Col. Frederick Cully, letter to author, 30 June 1995. 3. SITREP No. 006, with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. B/2-lst Infantry's first lift was airborne at 1330, and the company was reported under OPCON to 4-31 at 1440. 4. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. 5. David Harker, tape to author, 19 January 1994. 6. Author's recollection of Capt. Roland Belcher. 7. Harker tape. 8. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. C/l-6th Infantry with a strength of 122 officers and men was recorded inbound to FSB Center at 1332. Advisory Team #1, Quang Da Special Zone: Intelligence Summary #004-68, 4 January 1968. 9. Harker tape. 10. Chester W. Carlock, Fire birds (Arlington, Tex.: Summit Publishing Group, 1995), p. 104. 11. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968; America! Division: G-3 Journals, 6 January 1968; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. 12. Ibid. 13. Harker tape; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. 14. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968; Cully letter. 15. Statement by Maj. Joseph S. Stringham in TAB C to Appendix 3: 196th LIB: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969; SITREP No. 006, 6 January 1968 with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968. 16. Harker tape. 17. 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa; America! Division Intelligence Summary 9-68, 10 January 1968. 18. 196th LIB: Sequence of Events and Sketch Maps; Americal Division: G-3 Journals, 7 January 1968. 19. FragO 24 to OPORD 32-67, 7 January 1968, with 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1968; SITREP No. 006 with 196th

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LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968; 196th LIB: Sequence of Events and Sketch Maps, located with 196th LIB: Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 3-10 January 1968, 16 February 1968. 20. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 January 1968; the weather, America! Division Intelligence Summary 6-68, 7 January 1968; America! Division Intelligence Summary 6-68,5 January 1968. 21. Harker tape. Members of C/2-1 maintain that the company was moving when it was attacked, and not in a laager. The move from the LZ was quick, and I speculate that some of C/2-l's members had carried the Christmas packages with them. 22. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 7 January 1968. 23. FO, Company D: Summary of Action, 6-10 January 1968; Harker tape. 24. Spot Report #33, with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 7 January 1968; Byers statement. 25. Spot Report #18 with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 7 January 1968; significant radio transmissions by Capt. William Speer, commander Company B, 4-31st Infantry, to the battalion tactical operations center on 7 January 1968, concerning the unit's involvement with the large NVA force during the specified period, located in TAB D to Appendix 3: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969; America! Division Intelligence Summary 9-68, 10 January 1968. 26. Speer transmission. 27. SITREPNo. 007, with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 7 January 1968; 196th LIB: Sequence of Events and Sketch Maps. 28. Advisory Team #1, Quang Da Special Zone: Intelligence Summary #00868, 4 January 1968; 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Journals, 8 January 1968. The 3-21st Infantry's S-3 Section Daily Journal indicates that the report was transmitted to the 196th LIB, but I found no record of the report in the brigade's records. 29. Advisory Team #1, Quang Da Special Zone; 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journal, 7 January 1968. 30. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 8 January 1968.

11

Phu Binh

8 January

dense, vapory fog rose from the wet paddy lands before first light and A restricted visibility to less than a hundred meters. Above the lowlands, heavy clouds, like drooping hoods, obscured the tops of the surrounding hills and cloaked the valley's center. The ground fog would dissipate by midmorning, but sagging ceilings and scraggly gray clouds would linger throughout the day. Rain showers were predicted.' The colorless, dank dawn was characteristic of a "dry" morning during the northeast monsoon season. Weather was very much a part of the life in a rifle company, but we never got used to those sunless mornings when the cold, clammy, penetrating dampness bore into the inner core of your body. We just learned to live with them. The men in TF Oscar warmed their rations and instant coffee to shake the soggy chill from their bones and prepared their rucksacks for the day's march. Leaders, up long before daybreak, made checks of their men and weapons and waited for the command to saddle up. Captains Belcher and Speer had a large area to search, and the two company commanders had split their task between them to cover the ground. Their plan for the day was uncomplicated. Belcher was to guide D/3-21 west along Highway 534 with a rifle platoon on each flank. The right-flank platoon was charged with checking the northern bank of the Lau River en route to the march objective. While Belcher swept west, Speer would go north toward the foothills, then swing west along their base toward the day's march objective. At 0800 Captain Speer reported that the two companies were moving.2 About 40 minutes after departing the night laager site, the 1st Platoon of Company D fired on several enemy soldiers in a rice paddy north of the Lau River. It was the first contact of the day.3 Pfc. Jerry Goff was a machine gunner with Company D's 1st Platoon and recalls the morning:

99

100

Through the Valley

I had joined the company in December while it was pulling security duty on FSB Center. The first thing the short-timers did, was give all the new guys the heavy shit to carry-I was blessed with the M60 machine gun. When we fired on the North Vietnamese that morning the gun jammed after every second round. Kelso [the radio call sign for the 1st Platoon leader] was adamant about always having the gun close by him and in good condition, so I took a pretty good browbeating when the gun didn't work. He told me in no uncertain terms that at the first available opportunity I was to tear the weapon down and clean it-like the gun was dirty. I didn't make any excuses, but I hadn't fired the M60 that much and wasn't given the chance to test fire the gun before we left the fire support base the day before.4 An hour after the 1st Platoon's encounter, Rattler 13, the 4-31 C and C ship, received automatic weapons fire from a squad of NVA south of the road. Company D's 2d Platoon spotted the NVA troops at a distance of 650 meters, engaged them with artillery, and killed three of the enemy soldiers.s The remainder of the morning was quiet. By noon Company D had advanced some 2,000 meters and was near its march objective. So Captain Belcher stopped, set up a perimeter south of the road, and directed the platoons to close on his location. As the platoons assembled a drenching rain squall blew across the valley. 6 It had been an uneventful day, and the other companies had likewise stopped for their midday meal or were taking resupply. Speer's company, located about 1,400 meters to the northeast of D/3-21 's position, had halted at around 1100 and started resupply activities.7 (See Map 11.1.) TF Herman had begun a search of two grid squares immediately south of where Twister Charlie's fight had occurred and had located four NVA bodies in freshly dug graves, but little else. Capt. Larry Byers wrote later: "Because the situation appeared relatively quiet, my company received Crations, clean clothes, and SP [sundry packet] packs."S N3-21, the other half ofTF Herman, had stopped some 500 meters to the west of Byers's company and was also taking lunch. TF Lise, several kilometers to the east, had found little during its morning search and at 1200 was stationary as well.9 David Harker's platoon was the last to report into Company D's noontime laager. Private 1st Class Harker: We had walked for about four hours that morning before we reached a village on the north bank of the Lau River. We swept through it, checking the straw hootches and finding lots of children, women, and older men. As usual, there was not a solitary military-age male there. As we reached the west end of the village, we spotted some NVA in the large paddy that runs between the river and the foothills. The NVA were 300

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and Williams pass and then had hit the point squad. One man had been shot through the butt and was lying on the rocky trail. I crawled forward with the 1st Platoon medic. The right side of the bank dropped sharply, and both sides of the trail were covered with heavy vegetation; it was a good spot for an ambush. While the medic tended the wounded man, I eased to where one of the men lay at the edge of the trail. The man was from Puerto Rico and said, "los Chinos," and pointed down the bank into thick jungle. The medic and I carried the wounded man back up the trail, with the point squad following. Hung and Williams, who were farther down the hill, came in a little later. We secured an LZ in a grassy clearing to the left of the trail, and I requested a medevac. Greenlaw's company was still some distance behind us. The light was fading, and the sun would be down in an hour; I did not want to continue down that tunnel-like trail and run into an ambush. I was not sorry when Lieutenant Colonel Snyder told me to stop, dig in, and wait for Lieutenant Greenlaw. The dustoff flew in from the west and landed without problems, but when he lifted off NVA positions on a small hill 800 meters to our northeast came alive with automatic weapons fire. I'd never before seen so much tracer in the air at one time. The dustoff pilot, however, seemed to take the heavy fire as part of the job and simply turned the ship toward the southeast and out of harm's way. Rick Weidner, whose 2d Platoon was on that side of the perimeter, spotted several NVA soldiers-and one of them was watching us through binoculars. Bernie Borowski climbed onto a large flat rock with an Ml4, took careful aim, fired a single round, and killed the man. The next day we found him where Borowski had dropped him. Greenlaw and D/2-1 joined us sometime afterward and took control of half the perimeter. Our mission for the next day was to sweep the terrain to our front; the rest of what we would do depended on enemy contact. Shortly after dark it started to rain, but the rest of the night for us was uneventful. By dark the action in the valley had also slacked off. C/2-1 and the 3d Platoon, F/17 Cavalry clanked into the perimeter and linked with Barracuda at 1800. The arrival of the M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs), each bristling with men and weapons, was like a shot in the arm to Company B 's three rifle platoons. Each had suffered, but the 3d Platoon had been hurt the worst. Only nine of the 32 men who walked off the hill that morning had made it through the day.43 The reinforcements allowed the men in Bravo Company the luxury of thinking about something besides the hell they had seen close up. Pfc. Tony May suddenly remembered that he was hungry. His rations, along with most everyone else's, were in his rucksack in the laager. As he wished for a can of anything to eat, David Carroll handed him a can of fruit that he had

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stuck in his pocket that morning. Tony May remembers that "getting the fruit might not seem like much, but I'll never forget David Carroll for that act of simple kindness."44 After Sergeant 1st Class Fritz set up the watch for the night, he told the radio operator to wake him if needed and covered himself with an air panel from the downed helicopter. Fritz remembers: "My radio operator handed me a can, at first I thought it was a can of beer, but, shit, it was a can of water from the emergency supplies on the chopper. I said a prayer for all concerned and asked God for forgiveness. In so doing I started to cry. It had been a long day. "45 11 March 1968 was history.

Notes 1. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 11 March 1968. The weather and the time the sun rose on 11 March were taken from the Americal Division Intelligence Summary 70-68, 11 March 1968. 2. Charles T. May, diary and letters home during 1968, no date. 3. The NVA's positions are based on author's study of intelligence records, reports of the period, and discussions with former members of Company B, 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry. 4. George L. Fritz, letter and March 11 narrative to author, 19 October 1996. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid.; 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 11 March 1968. 7. May diary. 8. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 11 March 1968. Ten days later USARPAC General Order 182 activated F Troop, 8th Cavalry as the Americal Division's organic Air Cavalry troop and C Troop was assigned to Fort Knox, Kentucky. Personnel and equipment of C Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry were transferred to F Troop and the radio call sign Blue Ghost remained with the troop until the unit rotated back to the United States on 26 February 1973. For the location of the NVA antiaircraft position, see America! Division: Intelligence Summary 71-68, 12 March 1968. 9. May diary. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Fritz letter and narrative. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. May diary. 20. Ibid. 21. I 96th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 11 March 1968. At 1105,2 hours

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after the contact had started, the America! G-3 had radioed the S-3, 196th LIB the message that "division is going to try to get gunships to B/3-21." 22. Fritz letter and narrative; Paul Power, FACs of WAR: Diary of Helix 11 (1968). 23. Fritz letter and narrative. 24. Power, FACs of WAR; Fritz letter and narrative. 25. Fritz letter and narrative. 26. May diary. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Chester W. Carlock, Firebirds (Arlington, Tex.: Summit Publishing Group, 1995), p. 140. 32. Fritz letter and narrative. 33. Ibid. 34. Fritz letter and narrative. Fritz's and May's accounts of the smokescreen's effectiveness differ. May recalls most of the smoke blowing away, while Fritz remembers that it allowed the 3d Platoon to withdraw without suffering more casualties. 35. Ibid. 36. May diary. 37. Ibid. 38. Fritz letter and narrative. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 11 March 1968. 42. Ibid. 43. May diary; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 11 March 1968. The 3d Platoon, Troop F, 17th Cavalry suffered four wounded when an RPG struck one of their tracked vehicles. A "track" was slang for an armored personnel carrier. 44. May diary. 45. Fritz letter and narrative.

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B

y dawn the rain was over, and the mattress of clouds had pushed through the area leaving in its wake a block of moist, tepid air that was rapidly heated into an enervating steam by an unobstructed sun. We left the laager not long after 0800, walking north, and were sopped with sweat before we reached the foot of the hill. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder had given Delta Company, 3-21st Infantry the mission of sweeping three objectives, of which one was the low hill that had harbored several enemy automatic weapons and given our dustoff grief the evening before. While we were working our way toward our first objective, Snyder sent Lieutenant Greenlaw and his company to Company B 's old laager to make contact with the mortarmen. From the laager we had a clear view of the grass-covered hill and of several men standing on its crest that we guessed were U.S. troops. From a distance of 800 meters, however, it was impossible to tell. Within 45 minutes Greenlaw and his company had climbed the hill and found Company B 's weapons platoon sergeant and two men. Three of the sergeant's men were missing. According to Company B 's mortar platoon sergeant, the NVA had mortared the hill at some point during the previous day, and the three men had left the hill against his orders. I relayed the report to Lieutenant Colonel Snyder, who directed Greenlaw and his Company D, 2-lst Infantry to stay on the hill until Company B's men returned for their rucksacks.! Meanwhile, Company B, C/2-lst Infantry, and the 3d Platoon from F Troop were conducting a sweep of the battle area. As these units were passing through the deserted NVA positions, one of which had been a communications center to control the surrounding units, it appeared that NVA had been there for some time. The enemy battalion had departed the night before, leaving behind several dead, a few weapons, and tatters of equipment. Splotches of dried blood, some large, dotted the ground in places, suggesting that the battalion had incurred a high number of wounded dur-

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ing the 10-hour battle. C/2-1st Infantry captured one badly wounded soldier from the NVA 2d Battalion's 6th Company, but the sweep otherwise produced little.2 After most of the positions had been cleared and checked the nine men of the 3d Platoon, backed up by four of the APCs and a squad from C/2-1, assembled to recover its dead. Tony May thought about the possibility that the bodies of his friends were mutilated and felt sick as he followed the APCs across the paddy toward the three hootches. To May the area around the three hootches was a scene straight out of hell. He had never seen a dead American and he stared at the bodies, not accepting that only a day before the men had been living, breathing friends. The enemy had not mutilated the dead, but there was concern that they had booby-trapped them. May wrote later: "We tied one end of a rope to each body in tum and one end to the APCs to tum them over from a safe distance in case there was an explosion. Amazingly enough, the bodies weren't booby-trapped. It was probably because the NVA had to leave so fast."3 By 1330 Company B troopers had completed their sweep and recovered their dead and were trudging back to the laager to recover their rucksacks. It was not until they had climbed the hill that Sergeant 1st Class Fritz learned that three of the mortarmen were missing. Shortly afterward, the company commander summoned him to the CP and told him to return to the valley with the interpreter and question the locals about the missing men.4 Fritz went back to his platoon wondering why the search had not taken place while the company was still in the valley. He put together a reinforced squad, allowing the other men a much-deserved rest, and grabbed the ARVN interpreter who had disappeared during the fighting to hide. Fritz, who had not trusted him before, trusted him even less now, but he needed the man's linguistic skills to help him fmd the three men. Still, he has no fond memories of the ARVN: "The son of a bitch was scared shitless of me. I told him that if I ever caught him selling us out I would cut out his tongue and his balls and feed them to Prince, the scout dog who often worked with my platoon. He never knew whether I was joking or not. It was only important that I knew."5 Fritz led his men off the hill at 1540 prepared to fight. The squad probed through several hamlets near the hill, while the interpreter talked to the residents. It had been a long 2 days; the men were tired and their tempers were worn past the point of being short. "No one knew shit," Fritz said, recalling the frustrating afternoon. "I grabbed the interpreter and said, 'Look asshole, someone knows something.' Still silence. We searched until nightfall and then returned to the company's perimeter."6 While Fritz was searching for the missing men, Greenlaw (who had rejoined me sometime earlier) and I were approaching the hill where the

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automatic weapons had been the day before. We had seen several NVA soldiers digging on its crest earlier and figured they were improving their positions. I expected a fight. As we crossed an area mixed with shrub and banana plants near the base of the hill, the company FO initiated a fire mission and systematically dusted the hill's high point with artillery. A dead NVA soldier dressed in a green uniform with his head swathed in a white bandage lay near the abandoned antiaircraft position. Odds and ends of discarded equipment and half-used belts of ammunition were scattered around him. For the NVA forces to leave one of their dead unburied and abandon precious antiaircraft ammunition was a firm indication that the gun section had left in a hurry. The 3d NVA Regiment had conformed to its usual model of operations and quit the valley after the March battles. Much of the 196th LIB's focus was still on operations in the range of hills that sheltered base area 116 and protecting the rice harvest in the Antenna Valley west of the Que Son Valley. Instead of returning there, the 3d Regiment had gone west and into a forward logistical base snuggled in a muddle of jungle-clad hills 16 kilometers south of the Hiep Due Valley. The base was relatively new and tied into a larger supply depot located in the trackless mountains east of Kham Due Special Force Camp. Although the 196th Lm would come to learn the region later, the area was an enigma during the spring of 1968.7 It took 10 days for the 3d NVA Regiment to extract its units from Que Son Valley, and they were subjected to air strikes anytime they showed themselves. Maj. Paul Power wrote on 21 March 1968: "We are still hitting the 3rd Regiment. We hit them on the 19th in the valley southwest of Tien Phouc and on the 20th on the west bank of the horseshoe bend in the river. Soon they will be out of our AO. To my way of thinking, they could not have existed in our AO this long without the help of the people. The only place that appears to be under control are the big villes such as Tam Ky."S Paul Power was not alone in his thinking. I departed for a week's R and R in Hawaii the day after Company B 's action, and while I was gone Companies C and D went south of the Chang River in search of a POW camp. Capt. Denny Leach told me later that they had found a deserted camp, but it was old and showed no signs of recent use. The men of Company D were north of the river and operating in the foothills when I returned from R and R and joined them. Except for a little harassing fire, there had been no major contact with the enemy since Company B 's action. One of the artillerymen on FSB Center decided to go AWOL at the end of March and caused a bit of excitement. Alpha Company was garrisoning the hill, and Lieutenant Colonel Snyder dutifully directed the company to mount a search for the wayward trooper. Alpha Company beat the bushes around the perimeter without success and quit for the day. The dark night must have helped the man decide that AWOL was a poor

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option, because he wandered back into the perimeter early the next morning. I never learned what happened to him.9 By 26 March we had worked our way out of the hills and laagered at the head of the little valley where we had been on 11 March. Our mission for the next day was to sweep north toward the flats. Searching for the enemy was a never-ending theme, and Lieutenant Colonel Snyder allowed the company commanders a healthy measure of flexibility in conducting daily operations. Snyder usually gave us a broadbrush mission then provided us plenty of leeway to develop and execute the plans to accomplish it. It was the brigade policy for companies on the move to report their positions and situation every 30 minutes and once every hour when stationary. Snyder added his own controls by assigning us checkpoints or phase lines to report during the day. At times the best method to work an area was to establish a company patrol base. Instead of dispatching platoons on long, fruitless sweeps, I preferred to keep the company in a laager and use squads to patrol in different directions. An eight-man squad patrol would stay alert, whereas only the point and rear security of a 30-man platoon usually took an interest in what was going on. After what had happened to Delta Company in January, I felt that it was also important to be in a position to reinforce the patrols if they made contact. The fastest way to do that was to keep the company together. It was a cautious approach, but it paid off later. On this particular day the company was together and moving. Williams and Hung had point, and following some distance behind was a squad from the 1st Platoon. Lt. Dick Skrzysowski and the rest of the 1st Platoon tailed them by 30 to 50 meters. The company headquarters, as usual, followed the lead platoon. Jay Dunlap and the 3d Platoon followed next, and Rick Weidner and the 2d Platoon brought up the rear. The point men made contact at 1030 when they surprised several VC near some hootches. The firefight was short and when it ended five VC lay dead. Two civilians had been wounded, and I requested a dustoff while we checked the area. After the dustoff evacuated the two civilians we saddled up and continued north.lO The days were getting hot earlier, and we were carrying full rucksacks. We had been moving less than an hour when Dick Skrzysowski radioed me. He recommended that we find some water and some shade and hold up until it cooled off a bit. Dick went on to say that he had consumed all 11 quarts of water he had started with and was dry as dust. Although I am not certain that Skrzysowski drank that much water, he was right-it was hot. I checked the map and saw there was a small hamlet just ahead. Where there are hootches, there are usually wells and trees, so I told Skrzysowski to swing into the area and we would stop for a break. As the 1st Platoon pulled off the trail it approached a hootch and came face to face with several VC soldiers sitting inside drinking tea. Some of their weapons were outside and stacked against the side of the hut. Pfc.

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Reynaldo Torres extended the LAW he was carrying and fired it directly into the hootch. As the straw hut spurted into flames, the VC galloped through its flimsy walls like a spooked herd of cattle. Some left their weapons behind. One of them, who some claimed later was carrying a rifle, was knocked down twice by M16 fire. The guerrilla soldier, though wounded, managed to vault a short hedgerow and sprint into the nearby woods. I did not know what we had run into and did not want to pursue until I could get the situation sorted out. I pulled the platoons into a loose perimeter, while some of the men from Skrzysowski 's platoon kicked through the ashes of the hootch and dragged out a couple of burned weapons. There were no bodies, but as they probed the cinders for other weapons one man heard a noise coming from the bunker. Two minutes later an old woman, slightly singed and shaken from the fire but otherwise unhurt, popped out of it. I was surprised that anyone could have survived the fire. The woman told the interpreter that she did not know the VC who had been in the house. An unlikely story, but we let her go. Skrzysowski took a patrol to check the woods and found the VC soldier a couple of hundred meters away, badly wounded but still wearing his equipment. His weapon was gone. The man said that his unit had left him and the others behind after they had gotten sick. I followed with the rest of the company; we evacuated the wounded VC then moved closer to the mouth of the valley and set up a patrol base. There was no more enemy activity that afternoon. Later I set up a laager with a good view of the valley and prepared for the night. About 2130 I heard the thunk of an M79 grenade launcher being fired, and a second later the round exploded within the perimeter. A few minutes later another round sailed in, wounding two of the men. After firing two more rounds, the Mad Bomber, as we knew him, called it a night. He was territorial and only operated in that part of the operational area, following units for a day or so, avoiding stay-behind ambushes and patrols, and then easing into range of the company's nighttime perimeter to fire a few rounds. The Mad Bomber knew his business and was careful. We never caught him.JI We ended March by working the paddy islands at the northeastern edge of the battalion AO. Companies A and B were patrolling southwest of the FSB, and the recon platoons were east of Nui Lac Son. Charlie Company had the mission of securing FSB Center. There were a few skirmishes with local VC, units but, for the most part, March went out like a lamb.

Notes 1. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 12 March 1968. 2. Charles T. May, diary and letters home during 1968, no date; America! Division: Intelligence Summary 72-68, 13 March 1968. This report states that the

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captured NVA soldier was a member of the 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, 6th Company, 3d NVA Regt., 2d NVA Division. 3. May diary and letters. 4. George L. Fritz, letter and March 11 narrative to author, 19 October 1996. 5. Ibid. 6. Fritz letter and narrative; 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 12 March 1968. The NVA ambushed and captured the three men sometime after they left the hill. One of the men, wounded in the ambush, died a short time later. The other two spent the rest of the war in a POW camp and returned in January 1973. See also: Zalin Grant, Survivors (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1975), pp. 100-103. 7. 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. Except for a brief appearance by the 1-20th Infantry during late March and early April, there had been no Allied combat sweeps conducted south of Hiep Due since January 1968. For a description of the area's terrain, see Annex B (Intelligence) to 196th LIB: OPORD 12-68, 5 July 1968. 8. Paul Power, FACs ofWAR: Diary of Helix 11 (1968). 9. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 26-27 March 1968. 10. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 27 March 1968. 11. Ibid.

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pril 1968 found the 2d NVA Division still safely installed in its base areas some 25 kilometers to the west of the Que Son Valley. While the NVA replaced men and equipment lost in March, the region's VC Local Force and Main Force units kept our attention diverted, thus providing the 2d NVA Division an effective screen. Local Force units, though good at hitand-run tactics, usually did not pose a serious threat to us. Vietcong Main Force units, however, were well equipped, superbly trained, and contained significant numbers of North Vietnamese regulars in their organizations. Many considered the Main Force units equal to their NVA counterparts and equally dangerous.! April was also the month that we got the word from the brigade headquarters that "search and destroy," a forceful phrase coined early in the war (S and D for short) was no longer in vogue. Replacing it were "combat sweep," "offensive sweep," "reconnaissance in force," and "ambush." The modification of terminology was about public relations, today's political correctness, not combat operations and it changed nothing in the field. We continued to search for the enemy, as we always had, and when we found him, we used every available means to destroy him.2 The brigade placed my company OPCON to the 2-lst Infantry early in the month, and our first mission was to make a night move to secure Hill 63. Stunted brush overlay the pile of rock, making it a favored hiding spot for enemy units, but the hill was unoccupied that particular night. We spent the next day searching the terrain around Hill 63 but saw little to report. There were VC in the area, though. During our sweep of one of the larger islands a day or so earlier, a bush-covered squad of VC, reminiscent of a running hedgerow, had flashed across our path 100 meters away. The 1st Platoon was in the lead, and the riflemen scattered a few shots at the enemy squad as it faded into a pocket of woods. The VC squad had appeared and vanished within seconds. Encounters with the enemy often happened that quickly.

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While we were OPCON to 2-1, Companies A and B worked in the southern section of the battalion's AO. Company A was operating northwest of Hill 488 and, except for a brief firefight that wounded one man, the company had seen no major action. Company B, however, had created some excitement. The company had crossed the Chang River some days earlier and was conducting platoonsized patrols in the tightly wooded hills and narrow glens 1,500 meters south of the river's banks. There were few trails. The area's streams, usually hidden beneath a mat of foliage, crisscrossed the area and provided a way through the short hills and low-lying draws. Bravo Company's 2d Platoon had been under way since before sunrise of 4 April patrolling one of the east-west-flowing streams. Just before 1030, Lt. James Cox, who had taken the platoon a couple of weeks before, climbed the bank and halted for a break. Shortly afterward one of the platoon members spotted six NVA soldiers and two black U.S. prisoners approaching. The enemy and the prisoners were still some distance away when Cox, who was anxious to rescue the two Americans, directed one of the machine gunners to open fire on the NVA. The gunner missed, and the NVA evaporated into the jungle taking their captives with them.3 The BTOC went into a fit of activity after Cox reported what he had seen. Bravo Company pursued on foot, and Blue Ghost 14 flew into the area and began a treetop-level search for the POWs. A Combat Tracker Team with a specially trained dog also joined the hunt. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder attempted to cut the NVA squad off by combat assaulting the Assassins, which now numbered over 20 men, into a blocking position to the south. By early afternoon the dog with the tracker team had gotten worn out, so a fresh dog team was sent in and the search continued until sunset. But there was no trace of the POWs or their captors.4 Bravo Company resumed the search early the next morning and continued through a third and fourth day, but the trail was cold. The search was called off, and a few days later the company crossed back to the north bank of the river. Rumors later claimed that the two POWs were two of the men from Bravo Company's mortar platoon who had been captured on 11 March. I have not been able to confirm that story.s The 2-1st Infantry released Company D from OPCON on 5 April, and the next afternoon we of Delta Company walked back to Hill 348 and relieved Company C of the frrebase security mission. We had not been on FSB Center very long when we learned that Martin Luther King Jr. had died at the hands of some half-witted assassin. The black soldiers in Delta Company took the news particularly hard. There is nothing one can say to lessen grief at such times, but I walked the perimeter and talked to each of them and hoped that I helped some. Guarding the bunker line was but a small part of the company's duties on FSB Center. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder held that the only way to secure

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the fire support base was to keep the garrisoning unit constantly thrashing the countryside and he directed the company off the hill on daily sweeps of the area. Besides the sweeps, the company also had the mission of conducting night ambushes and manning squad observation posts on some of the surrounding hills. Another part of the firebase drill was housekeeping. The company shored up sagging bunkers, replaced sandbags, policed the area, and, of course, burned the human waste ("shit burning") that accumulated daily in the battalion's four-holer latrine. Water trailers transported to the FSB by CH-47 helicopters supplied us for drinking and shaving. There were, however, no showers on the hill. When we bathed, which was not often, we did so in one of the area's streams. All the same, there was a pleasant development that made it easier for the company. My hometown of Aransas Pass, Texas, had passed a resolution and had adopted Company D in March. While we were on FSB Center, I received a load of much-appreciated packages from some of the community members containing fruit, cookies, and candy. I will always be thankful to the folks at home for their generosity. On 6 April Snyder pulled Alpha Company out of the field and flew it into Chu Lai stand-down. When the company returned to FSB Center, Snyder promptly marched the company's men back into the same area they had been in before the stand-down. The company spent 10 April patrolling the area but found little; the evening of the same day it laagered near the mouth of a narrow valley, set four ambushes, and sent out one patrol without any results. The next morning, using the laager as a base, it sent out patrols in several directions. Shortly past 0800, one of the company's patrols killed six VC soldiers and captured a weapon southeast of the patrol base. It was the only enemy sighting of the day.6 The battalion AO was generally tranquil on 11 April. The next day Snyder decided to move the headquarters of Company E and one reconnaissance platoon, whose radio call sign was Specter, back to the FSB Center; they entered the perimeter shortly before noon. The plan was to send them south to link with Alpha Company's 1st Platoon and form a mini task force with the commander of Echo Company in charge. It was an economy-offorce (EOF) mission. Battalion had more ground to patrol than it had troops available, and combining the two platoons allowed Lieutenant Colonel Snyder to cover more territory and shift a reduced Alpha Company 1,800 meters west. Reconnaissance platoons were most capable of performing such missions, but doing so routinely comes with a cost. Company E was often used like an understrength rifle company, and in my opinion that affected the battalion's capability to conduct reconnaissance.? EOF missions always carried a certain amount of risk, and composite units, especially two platoons thrown together at the last minute, are inherently weak. In this case, there were no reports of major enemy units in the AO and the risk seemed insignificant. Moreover, battalion undoubtedly fig-

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ured that Alpha and Echo Companies, each led by a captain, could fend for themselves.s About 1630 Company A, minus its 1st Platoon, moved 1,300 meters southwest and established a night laager. About an hour later, Specter and the commander of Company E boarded helicopters on FSB Center. Less than 10 minutes later the recon troops had whirled into the tight little valley to link up with 1st Lt. Randolph Harrison's 1st Platoon. It is not known whether any coordination and planning was effected between the 1st Platoon leader and the commander of Company E that afternoon, but, based on events, I suspect there was none. 9 The commander of Company E moved his bantam force away from the LZ and onto a tapered fmger of land that jutted from a large hill and into the little valley. Three hootches stood at the finger's southern tip, its most constricted point, and here that the captain chose to stay the night. The piece of ground had no depth, was hardly above the surrounding paddies, and was tightly encircled by tall-treed hills. Selecting such terrain as a nighttime position when there was more favorable terrain available and within a few hundred meters violated the most basic of infantry principles. Worse, it provided the men in the two platoons no opportunity to establish an adequate defensive position. The captain knew better.lO S.Sgt. Thomas Bryant was Specter's platoon sergeant and believes that the hootches' presence was the reason that site had been selected. He remembers that the company commander chose the center hootch, the one with a bunker, for the company CP.ll Thomas Bryant said later: "The captain liked the hootches. He liked to stay in them so he could put up his hammock at nighttime. So he picked his hootch out and that's pretty much where he stayed the whole time."12 During our time together in December and January, I had found Bryant to be an energetic, savvy NCO who set high standards for himself and his men. Bryant had spent a previous combat tour with the 1st Infantry Division, and, when Echo Company formed in February, Bryant was a natural pick to lead one of the reconnaissance platoons. Since then he had led numerous combat patrols, gained a wealth of experience, and had become seasoned during his time with Specter platoon. He knew that security was paramount to a small unit's survival, and the idea of spending the night in the middle of a rice paddy surrounded by tall, jungled hills fiercely agitated him. His agitation grew worse when he and several of the men in the Specter platoon saw lights appear in the rapidly darkening hills and heard Vietnamese voices.'3 The noise in the hills came from companies of the 74th Main Force Battalion moving into assembly areas around the paddy. Bryant did not know that at the time, but the lights and voices were enough for him to know that a large VC unit was moving around all sides of the position. He hastened to Harrison's side of the elliptically shaped perimeter to tell the

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lieutenant what he had seen. After a short discussion, he and Harrison went to the CP to advise the company commander and urge him to relocate to defensible terrain while they had time.l4 Pfc. Kenneth Black was the company commander's radio operator and recalls the meeting: "Just as we had got settled, the lieutenant from Alpha Company and Sergeant Bryant came to the CP and told the captain that it was a bad place to set up. They told him that it was crazy to stay there and that we should move to another location. The captain refused, saying that he wanted to stay, and he would send night ambushes out from there."15 (See Map 22.1.) Frustrated, Harrison and Bryant returned to their platoons to prepare for the night. Part of the perimeter encompassed a slight rise of ground that lay in front of the huts and overlooked the paddies and a trail running along the southeastern boundary of the laager. Thick forest abutted the north edge of the position. Bryant placed some of his men and the platoon's machine gun on the higher ground to cover the paddies and trail. Over the years countless footsteps had trodden the soil around the hootches and compacted it into near-concrete. Some of the men attempted to dig in but found the soil unyielding and quit to gather chunks of wood and logs to build parapets. When it comes to protection there is no substitute for a well-prepared position, and the makeshift barriers would provide the men little protection from the attack that came later.I6 Pfc. Gene Tilson had overheard the exchange among Bryant, Harrison, and the company commander. As he stared into the blackness, he wished that the captain had listened. He had not been with Specter very long but he was savvy enough to know a lousy position when he was stuck in it. He later wrote, "We were in a bad location because we were on low ground and the enemy was definitely out there."17 It had been dark for a solid half-hour when Harrison's 3d Squad slipped out of the perimeter to establish an ambush west of the combined laager. The lights on the surrounding slopes were still visible and the voices still audible, but the enemy had yet made no move toward the perimeter. Staff Sergeant Bryant made rounds to the Specter positions and emphasized that the men keep their eyes open and stay alert.l8 Trouble started about 30 minutes before midnight. Kenneth Black was manning the radio in the CP when he heard the BTOC on LZ Center radio Alpha Company's ambush for a situation report. Black recalls: "LZ Center said that if everything is OK to break squelch twice, but the ambush broke squelch once. This went on for a minute or two. LZ Center asked if the ambush could talk and if they could see anything. The ambush indicated that there were NVA or VC around them. LZ Center told them to pull back to their perimeter as soon as possible without being detected. "19 The ambush patrol returned and rejoined the 1st Platoon at about the

Map22.1

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A/3-21 Laager 12 April

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E/3-21 Laager 12 April

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fl .... ----. --+

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vc Position

Straam

A/3-21 Mov.

Spot Elevation

VCMov.

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time three hand grenades sailed into perimeter from the enfolding blackness. There were no casualties. Later, someone from the company reported that at least some of the VC had followed the 1st Platoon's ambush back to the perimeter. 2o Kenneth Black: "As soon as the ambush came back to perimeter we started hearing VC talking loud and hollering at us. They were yelling, 'tonight GI you die!' They did this several times. We could hear them, but we could not see them because they were on the high ground above us. About that time, Sergeant Bryant made his way to all recon positions to make sure everyone was alert and ready."21 The VC's caterwauls were reminiscent of a night scene from a Hollywood war movie in which an unseen enemy taunts an isolated U.S. unit, but this was no movie. The situation in that dark and untenable position was real. As the men on line listened to the chatter in the hills, they fingered their weapons and strained through the inky gloom to connect a voice to a man. The taunts continued, but the enemy did not show himself. S. Sgt. Thomas Bryant: "Along about midnight or so the voices got real loud out there and I knew the shit was fixing to hit the fan-and it did. We had mortars come in on us, RPGs and small-arms fire, I mean it was like going through hell."22 The fight had kicked off, as it often did, with a small probe that targeted the positions along the south side of the perimeter. Gene Tilson later recalled that "the enemy force seemed to know our exact position as if they had followed us right up to the spot."23 The Echo Company commander reported that he was taking heavy automatic weapons fire and grenades from a squad-sized force. When minutes later a larger force supported by recoilless rifle fire and at least two 60mm mortars slammed into the north side of the perimeter, he quickly revised that estimate and reported that he was surrounded by one to two VC companies. His next report was to inform the BTOC that the perimeter was under mortar fire and that he had three men wounded. 24 An RPG or a recoilless rifle round knocked out the M60 machine gun as soon as it opened fire. The riflemen around the machine gun fared no better. Well-placed automatic weapons fire ripped the wooden parapets around their positions into heaps of splinters. Wounded men scooted from their positions seeking protection in the center of the perimeter. There was none to be found. Lieutenant Harrison, along with several NCOs in both Specter and the 1st Platoon, died trying to hold the line. Because the leaders were incapacitated or lost control, the situation veered dangerously into a free-for-all and the perimeter started to come apart. The fight was less than 25 minutes old when the Echo Company commander reported that the southern perimeter was being pushed back.25 Kenneth Black later described that scene:

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Everyone in positions on the high ground started getting overrun. People were falling back and some were rolling off the bank wounded. When everything started, the Captain took the radio and Sergeant Bryant yelled for the RTO [radio operator] to get up on the line. As I went up on the line, I realized that some of the guys were running past me and the wounded were still rolling off the bank. As I was climbing the bank, there was supposed to be a position above me. I was not sure if there was anyone still there or not, so, I stayed low until I saw Pfc. Beck roll off wounded. It was then that I knew there were not any Gis up there, so I opened fire. Then the mortars and gunfire got so intense that I also had to pull back. As I started pulling back, it seemed like everyone was gone. Evidently they had all gone out into the rice paddies. Then I saw a bunker and I went inside. There were two guys from Alpha Company in there with the Vietnamese family.26 I was in the BTOC talking to Lieutenant Colonel Snyder when Echo Company reported the first hand grenade attack. As the action developed, a torrent of messages began to flood in and out the BTOC. Quickly after the attack had begun, Lieutenant Colonel Snyder alerted me to be prepared to move if necessary, then directed Company A to reinforce Company E. It took Company A 50 minutes to recover its ambushes and get under way, and it took a much longer time to cover the short distance between that company and Company E.27 Battalion requested gunships and a flareship, and the brigade BTOC scrambled a pair of Firebirds. Firebird 98, which flew lead, was off the ground minutes later and headed for that black little valley. Nine-eight came on station and checked in with Echo Company exactly 2 minutes before the company commander radioed the BTOC that the position was being pushed back.28 Shortly after that report one of the straw huts ignited from an exploding round. The company commander reported the burning hut and then said, "We've been overrun. It's every man for himself."29 As the position dissolved into its fmal moments of shapeless pandemonium, the men who were still able to walk headed for the relative safety of the paddies or the surrounding woods. Tilson and some of the men made it out of the perimeter and across a paddy and formed a position in a deep ditch. About a third of the men, however, did not make it.30 Black and the two soldiers from the 1st Platoon had been in the bunker for 5 to 10 minutes when they saw the flames of the burning hootch. They left the bunker to find out where the rest of the men were, as Black recalled later. As we came out, the hootch that was burning had the whole perimeter lit up. We could not see anyone and we did not know where everyone

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had gone. That's when I saw Pfc. White lying on the ground moaning. He had been shot in the upper left arm and it was bleeding badly. I helped him up, and we went up the bank into the jungle about 100 to 150 yards. We found a spider hole, and it was just big enough for four people. When we got in I guarded the entrance to the hole. Pfc. White and the other two guys were in the back of me. Pfc. White was making a lot of noise moaning and groaning. I told the two guys from Alpha Company to wrap something around his arm to control the bleeding. One of the guys said, "We don't have anything to wrap it up with." I responded, "Take your damn T-shirt off and wrap his arm up."31 Grenade fragments had wounded S. Sgt. Thomas Bryant, and the two men with him had also been wounded but were able to walk. He recalls the chaos: "I looked for the captain and could not find him nowhere. So finally I gathered the people up and started pulling them back towards a ditch that was in the back ofus."32 As they left the hootch area, they picked up a third man from the Specter platoon who had been wounded when the machine gun was knocked out. Bryant's tiny band reached the ditch and slid into its neckdeep water. Following the ditch would take them to the sanctuary of the woods, but it was slow, dangerous going. As they were wading they could hear VC jumping over the ditch around them en route to the perimeter. Adding to the nightmare were the piercing, terrified screams of wounded men who had not escaped the perimeter and the rifle shots that echoed through the dark silencing the screams.33 After they had reached the woods Bryant set up a small perimeter. From their spot they could hear the VC picking over the remains of the position. Bryant's unadorned and deeply painful account reveals the sense of helplessness he felt that night: We could hear the VC right down below us on a path. They had been gathering up, I guess, our weapons. We could hear them talking, and I had a couple of wounded with me, and we wanted to go in there and try to help our guys, the ones that we knew were still down there. But we sat up there in the woods and we were scared. I was so scared, every part of my body was shaking, and I know the other guys were too. But we had to sit there for a couple of hours and had to listen to the gooks down below us on the trail talking and going on.34 A Spooky gunship arrived after the perimeter had fallen, and Firebird 98 took over directing its fire. There was no shortage of targets. Nine-eight had taken fire from enemy positions located in the wooded hills as well as from the VC who now occupied Echo Company's position. When nineeight ran low on fuel, a set of Musket gunships from the 176th Combat

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Aviation Company took its place. By that time, somewhere around 0130 in the morning, the firing had stopped and the enemy soldiers were drifting back into the hills.35 At 0352 Company A reported its position as within 400 to 500 meters of Company E but was concerned that it might be walking into an ambush. It took another hour before Company A reached the area and fanned out to search for survivors; it took Alpha Company over 3 hours to cover the 1,800 meters.36 The sun was not yet up when the first dustoff ship flew into the valley and picked up six wounded. A second ship, following closely in its trace, landed and picked up more. The landing helicopters were an "all clear" signal to the men who had hidden during the night in the hills and paddies, and they began to filter into Company A's perimeter. Bryant and his group left the woods at daybreak. As Bryant approached the perimeter he ran across a VC that had been left behind, emptied an M16 magazine into him, and then entered the perimeter.37 It was about 0700 and well after daylight when Black and his group left the spider hole. None knew what to expect. They had spent the night listening to artillery shells crashing around them, had seen no other U.S. troops, and were trying to figure out where they were when they saw a helicopter land. The men needed no encouragement to head for the LZ.38 Pfc. Kenneth Black recalls the scene when he arrived: Sergeant Bryant ran up to me in disbelief. He said, "I thought you were dead." I cannot describe the look on his face. I told him we needed to get Pfc. White on the chopper quickly. So we led White to the chopper and helped to get him on. As I looked around, I saw the captain with a slight head wound. He had blood on the side of his head, and all the while he kept walking around in a daze. I also saw Sergeant Thacker lying on a table in front of one of the hootches. He had been shot through the head. Pfc. Bell had been shot through the neck. Pfc. Powell had been shot through the chest, and Pfc. Valdez lay dead too. Many other Gls were being pulled out of the rice paddies.39 The battalion had 13 killed and 33 wounded. Six VC, clad in green uniforms, lay dead around the perimeter. For a time the word around the battalion was that the captain would be tried by court-martial, but that did not occur. I am unsure where he went afterward, but we never saw him again. At 0800 Company B was airlifted into the area and joined Company A in a sweep of the battle area. Later Bravo Company moved north, found some blood trails, and ran into some VC stay-behinds. Most of the enemy, however, had gone to ground. 40 Bryant remembers it this way: "They just disappeared in holes or what-

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ever, like they were never there-until you got out there and saw what kind of destruction they had done."41

Notes 1. Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Koster, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 2 June 1968. Major General Koster commanded the Americal Division during the period. His description of Vietcong Main Force units in the Americal Division AO is located in part II of the report. For a second account of Vietcong Main Force units see Douglas Pike, VietCong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 236-239. 2. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 2 April 1968. 3. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 April 1968. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. The locations for the companies between 10 and 13 April1968 were taken from 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April1968. 7. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 11 April1968. 8. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 12 April 1968; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 12 Apri11968. 9. The times are taken from two documents. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 12 April1968, indicates that Company A(-) separated from its 1st Platoon and moved to its night laager at 1625. The 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 12 April1968, states that Company E (-)arrived in the valley and joined with 1st Platoon, Company A at 1745. 10. Sfc. Thomas Bryant USA (Ret.), summary of events of 12-13 April1968, October 1996. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. My recollection is that the enemy unit was the 74th MF Battalion. 15. Kenneth E. Black, summary of events of 12-13 April 1968, November 1996, author's collection. 16. Bryant summary of events. 17. Gene Tilson, letter to author, 1996. 18. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 12 April 1968; Black summary. 19. Black summary. 20. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 12 and 13 April 1968. 21. Black summary. 22. Bryant summary. 23. Tilson letter. 24. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April 1968; America} Division Intelligence Summary 104-68, 14 April1968. 25. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April1968. 26. Black summary; 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/ Wallowa.

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27. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April 1968; · 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April1968. 28. 196th LID: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April1968. 29. Black summary. I was present in the BTOC when the Echo Company commander radioed that the position had been overrun and said, "It's every man for himself." 30. Tilson letter. 31. Black summary. 32. Bryant summary. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April 1968; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April1968. 36. Tilson letter; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April1968. 37. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April 1968. The journal states that the first dustoff was complete at 0543 and the second at 0600. Staff Sergeant Bryant told me the story about his encounter with the VC in August 1996. 38. Black summary. 39. Ibid. 40. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April 1968; 196th LID: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 April1968. 41. Bryant summary.

23

Fire Support Base Belcher

L

ieutenant Colonel Snyder brought Specter and Company A's 1st Platoon to FSB Center the morning after the attack. The remainder of Alpha Company stayed in the field for another day and then joined its 1st Platoon on the FSB and relieved Company D of the security mission. Later, Snyder directed Delta Company south to the Chang River to see what we could find.! This was my third trip to the Chang, and I was familiar with the strip of ground. Groups of NVA often followed the river east from their western base areas and used the numerous hamlets along its banks as rest areas. During the day, I set up a company patrol base and sent out squad-sized patrols to comb through the area's villages. At night I established squadsized ambushes along the girdling trails in hope of intercepting an enemy unit transiting the area. During an earlier trip to the river one of the company's patrols, led by Sgt. Thomas Rogoshulski, had intercepted two VC couriers on their way east: Rogoshulski killed one and the other quickly surrendered. Each courier carried a large rucksack stuffed with handdrawn maps of the Hiep Due Valley, documents, and vacuum tubes and radio repair parts. We evacuated the prisoner and the documents, but I never learned their intelligence value. This particular trip to the river was surprisingly uneventful, but I did have the feeling that we were under close observation. I had felt that way for several days. It was a common event, and my intuition was hardly profound; the locals always watched and reported our unit activities to any NVA who were around. Our standard practice was to leave ambushes to cover our back trail and discourage NVA soldiers from getting too close. This time, however, my senses told me that something was naggingly different: it was an eerie, ominous feeling that a larger force was very closely shadowing the company. On 19 April we patrolled the area around Nui Lon, a grass-topped hill that hulks 1,000 meters north of the river. We had started early and the day

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had been slow, so by 1600 I decided it was time to find a night laager. The 2d Platoon was in the lead, and S.Sgt. Billy Carter's squad had point. We were near the site I had selected when Carter's squad came upon a banana leaf, freshly cut and suspiciously placed across the trail. Staff Sergeant Carter was a first-rate NCO and it took him but a few seconds to spot a Claymore mine in the grass next to the trail. A length of wire led from the Claymore and then disappeared beneath the leaf. Carter placed a second Claymore mine next to the booby trap and quickly destroyed it. Seconds after the detonation, a VC soldier on a hillside some distance away sprayed the air in our direction with automatic weapons fire. I suspect that the shooter could not see us but was firing at the sound of the explosion. When his magazine was empty, the VC, as usual, beat a hasty retreat. We found the Claymore's firing device, called a "clacker," in a tiny trench beneath the banana leaf. Setting off the mine would have required a soldier to ignore the misplaced banana leaf and then step directly on the clacker, a problematic series of events. The poorly crafted booby trap and halfhearted camouflage efforts were out of character, even for a poorly trained VC irregular. The booby trap's presence and its being under observation catalyzed my feelings that the VC were intently scrutinizing the company's movements. It may have been only an overwrought imagination, but I was still uneasy when we finally settled on a position close to the river and started to dig in for the night. It was not an ideal laager but it was the best of several poor alternatives. Besides, it was growing late and I wanted the company dug in before dark. The company was about half dug in when Major Yurchak radioed me to leave the river and move to Hill 110, a projection of rock southwest of the fire support base. Yurchak did not tell me the reason, but he wanted us to move now. I needed no encouragement to change locations. I felt relieved. Hill 110 was an excellent defensive position, and I lost my sense of foreboding as soon as we were away from the river. My queasy feeling finally abated when the company climbed the rocky hill and settled in for the night. After dark, Yurchak radioed me instructions to move to FSB Center early the next morning. I closed out the laager before sunrise and by 0745 had reached FSB Center. When I entered the BTOC I learned that the brigade was moving to Camp Evans and joining Operation Delaware. Rumors had buzzed around the battalion for days that the battalion was moving north, but the city of Hue was the place most bandied about. No one seemed to know exactly where Camp Evans was except that it was somewhere north of Hue.2 The 1st Cavalry Division had just completed Operation Pegasus and the relief of the marine garrison at Khe Sanh. Operation Delaware, the airmobile division's next assignment, was designed to clean out the NVA's

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logistical sites in the A Shau Valley. There had been no large actions in the 196th LIB's operational area since the 3d NVA Regiment's early March foray into the Que Son Valley. The comparative calm allowed the Americal Division to release the brigade OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division at Camp Evans.3 The 196th LIB had two missions while the cavalrymen worked the A Shau Valley: to act as reserve brigade for the Provisional Corps Vietnam, a headquarters formed after the Tet offensive; and to secure Camp Evans. The security mission was a straightforward infantry task, but the corps reserve mission charged the brigade with preparing contingency plans to rapidly deploy into seven very different locations, none of which were near Camp Evans. Deployment into the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was one of the missions on the list.4 Most of the brigade had already departed. Units of the 198th Infantry Brigade had relieved the 4-31 st Infantry on 17 April, allowing that battalion to deploy to Camp Evans. The 198th Infantry Brigade would assume responsibility for the Wheeler/Wallowa Operational area upon the departure of the brigade headquarters and the 2-1st Infantry two days later. The 3-21st Infantry, still in place on FSB Center, became OPCON to the 198th Brigade until the battalion began its deployment on 20 ApriLS Echo Company, now commanded by Lt. Jerry Perkins, had departed earlier that morning, and Delta Company would be next. Shortly before 1100 CH-47 helicopters spiraled into FSB Center to fly the company to LZ Baldy. From there we were to fly to Camp Evans by U.S. Air Force C-123 transport aircraft. Once at Camp Evans the company would be OPCON to the 4-31 Infantry until Lieutenant Colonel Snyder and the battalion headquarters arrived. After waiting several hours for the air force, a couple of C-123 transports landed on LZ Baldy's metal airstrip. Sp4c. Jim Corlew, Sp4c. Al Hajny, and I boarded an aircraft with Lt. Dick Skrzysowski and the 1st Platoon. The C-123s, rigged for combat loading, had the webbed seats removed. Wide straps placed at intervals across the cargo compartment would, we hoped, prevent us from ricocheting off the bulkheads in the event that we crashed. We sat on our rucksacks between straps, gazing out the yawning tailgate as the pilot taxied to the end of the runway. It was near dusk by the time we landed at Camp Evans. The 4-31st Infantry had been the first battalion from the 196th LIB to arrive and was subsequently blessed with manning the camp's extensive bunker line. I found the 4-31 BTOC and met Maj. Joe Stringham, who was now the battalion's S-3. Stringham informed me that the air force had quit flying for the night. That meant Lt. Rick Weidner and about half the company was stuck at Baldy for the night. There was not much we could do at that point, so the S-3 told me to find a bare spot someplace close to the BTOC, bed down the troops, and come back in the morning.6

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He was at work when I returned to the 4-31 BTOC early the next day and was brief and to the point. As soon as the rest of the company arrived, we were to move by foot and secure the spot that the brigade had selected for the 3-21 Infantry's flre support base. I remember Stringham walking to a wall map, pointing to a spot on the west side of Highway 1 about 10 kilometers north of Camp Evans, and saying, "Right about here." He gave me some maps of the area, the radio frequencies for the 4-31 command net and supporting artillery. Then he turned back to his work. Our meeting was over. It was close to 1300 on the 21st before Weidner and the rest of the company arrived. We crossed the wire at Camp Evans and headed east down a narrow dirt track that intersected with Highway 1 and turned north. The night had been cool and the morning overcast, but by noon the sky was clear and it was blistering hot. We had picked up a fresh resupply of C rations and ammunition at LZ Baldy, and our crammed rucksacks seemed extra heavy in the afternoon heat. Despite that we made good time and reached the proposed frrebase location well before dark. I was in the process of staking out the beginnings of a perimeter around three tiny knolls when Battery D, 3-82d Artillery, commanded by Capt. James A. Pongonis, rolled into the area. Battery B had remained at FSB Center, and Battery D had deployed with the battalion as its direct support artillery battery. Delta Battery was to remain with the Gimlets for some time to come. While the company dug positions for the night, Pongonis 's men set up their howitzers on one end of the small perimeter. Shortly after they had moved into place, the battery was frring registration rounds. FSB Belcher was in business.? Lieutenant Colonel Snyder and the battalion headquarters helicoptered into the FSB late the next afternoon and assumed control of Operational Area Belcher. Bravo Company had flown in earlier that afternoon, and Snyder kept them there to build bunkers and directed Delta Company into AO Belcher.s The battalion's operational area was in the middle of an old Communist citadel that the French soldiers had called Ia rue sans joie, meaning the street without joy. This section of the highway located between the cities of Hue and Quang Tri had gained notoriety during the French Indochina War. In those days the redoubtable Viet Minh Regiment 95 controlled the area, and French convoys traveling the road had to run a gauntlet of their ambushes. A massive French army effort in 1953 had failed to clean out the Communists and tame the area.9 Regiment 95 went north after Vietnam was divided, but the area remained a Communist stronghold and the South Vietnamese army found itself enduring the same problems that had plagued the French. It was not until the arrival of U.S. Marines that the section of the road was rid of most

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ambushes and open to traffic on most days. Highway 1, however, was still subject to frequent mining by the local Vietcong. Like other soldiers who had fought there before us, we soon learned that it was indeed a joyless place. The rolling hills around the FSB had been the target of earlier defoliant missions that had turned their brushy hillsides into an apathetic, lifeless forest of gnarled, blackened stalks. More significant than their emaciated appearance, though, was the large collection of mines and booby traps hidden in their dead scrub. It is impossible to quantify the numbers, but there seemed to be many more booby traps around Camp Evans than we had ever come across in the Que Son Valley. No battalion was immune from their deadly effects. On 21 April two companies from 4-31 working in separate locations struck booby traps, one a 105mm round, that wounded five men. Two days later a unit from 2-1 operating out of LZ Jack tripped a booby-trapped hand grenade and suffered two wounded. That day the point squad from Denny Leach's company ran into a similar device that wounded three of his men.IO However, we found and destroyed many of the devices: on the morning of 23 April, for example, the 1st and 2d Platoons each destroyed two "Bouncing Betty" mines. Then, 2 days later, the 2d Platoon discovered a pair of booby-trapped 105mm rounds. Sgt. Walter Jones stepped forward and volunteered to destroy the artillery rounds. Jones had grown up in the mining country of West Virginia and allowed that all he needed was a little bit of C-4 plastic explosive, a blasting cap, a length of firing wire, and a flashlight battery to do the job. I listened skeptically but decided to give him a go at it. While I moved the company back a safe distance, Jones rigged a small explosive charge next to one of the artillery rounds, strung a wire to a slight depression, and hunkered down. The two 105mm rounds made a huge explosion. I remember Jones smiling and saying afterward, "That's the way we do it in the strip mines." I was still unsure about that, but I never again doubted Jones's ability to do what he said he could do. Jones and others in the company showed that they could easily destroy a booby trap when they could find them, but it was impossible to find them all. The company hit the first one on 26 April but luckily had only one man wounded. Two days later the 1st Platoon tripped a booby-trapped 60mm mortar round late in the afternoon; this wounded three men, and there were more casualties to come. That night the 1st Platoon split off and established an ambush. The plan for 29 April was for us to cross a small river and conduct sweep operations on its far bank. The night passed quietly. Lt. Jay Dunlap's 3d Platoon was the lead platoon that day, and by 0700 we had closed out the laager and were moving toward the river. Lieutenant Skrzysowski and the 1st Platoon linked up with us at 0730 and fell into the rear of the column. A short time

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after the 1st Platoon joined us we reached a small knoll that overlooked the river, and I halted the company.ll The river was less than 25 meters wide, but was hemmed in by a dense, seemingly impassable grove of bamboo that extended to the water's edge. I told Dunlap to see whether he could find a route through the bamboo to the river and then return and lead the company to the river's bank. Dunlap was a happy-go-lucky young man who had quickly gained experience and had developed into a solid platoon leader. Jay dropped his rucksack and picked five men from the 3d Platoon. In a short time he and his men were headed down the hill for the copse of bamboo, and I watched them disappear into the thicket. The explosion that came only a few minutes later was horrendous and needed no explanation. I raced down the slope and into the bamboo with Jim Corlew, Sergeant 1st Class Buell, and several others close on my heels. Jay Dunlap was dead; his radio operator lay a short distance behind Jay's body, wounded but alive. The other men in the patrol were seriously wounded but would make it. I spoke briefly to the point man who told me that he had tripped over a vegetation-hidden vine that he believed was the booby trap's trigger. The device, probably a 105mm round, was set some distance behind the tripwire to inflict the maximum number of casualties on the following column. I did not want more men than necessary down in the thicket in case there were other booby traps hidden in the heavy foliage. Sfc. Pete Buell, calm and cool as always, called for a few men from the 2d Platoon and quickly fashioned ponchos into makeshift stretchers. Once that was done, Buell began the careful process of loading the wounded and carrying them out of the bamboo to the top of the hill. Buell's people were careful not to stray from the bent grass in the path and we did not hit another booby trap. Once the wounded were on the hill, I radioed the battalion for a dustoff and soon afterward a dustoff ship with a yellow and black 1st Cavalry Division patch painted on its nose arrived and picked up Jay and his men. Losing 10 men to booby traps within 3 days and not seeing a single enemy had a demoralizing effect on the company. I was angry and frustrated and I felt guilty for the loss. Taking casualties in a shootout with an enemy, unseen or not, was one thing, but booby traps were impossible to fight. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder was also unhappy about the casualties and admonished me because he believed that Dunlap's men should have been spread farther apart. Dunlap and his men had not been bunched together, at least from what I could tell, but I accepted the battalion commander's criticism. I contended, however, that exploding 105mm shells will cause casualties in a wide circle; I added that the place was lousy with booby traps and it was impossible for us to dodge all of them. More casualties were a certainty if we remained there. (Two-thirds of the brigade's men killed in action during Operation Delaware were the result of booby traps.)

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Snyder was the type of commander who would listen. He said nothing at the time, but later that night he directed me to move the company to replace E Company, which was securing two bridges on Highway 1. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder pulled us out of an impossible situation, and I was not sorry about the change in mission. As soon as it was light enough to see the next morning, I retrieved Weidner's platoon that had been on night ambush and started the company east. The two bridges crossed rivers at the battalion's north-south boundaries and were several kilometers apart. By afternoon I had collocated the company CP with the 1st and 3d Platoons around the southernmost bridge. Weidner's platoon secured the bridge to the north. I yearned to catch a VC sapper team in the act of planting a mine on Highway 1 and planned two ambushes between the two bridges that night.12 I did not know it when I set out the ambushes, but the 3-21 's participation in Operation Delaware was rapidly coming to a close.

Notes 1. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 14 April1968. 2. 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Delaware, 18 April-14 May 1968,31 May 1968. 3. Lt. Gen. Willard Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1975), pp. 81-92; Ronald H. Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 138. 4. Stanley I. Kutler, ed., Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (New York: Macmillan Reference U.S.A., 1996), p. 406. The XXIV Corps replaced Provisional Corps Vietnam upon its activation on 15 August 1968. 5. 196th LIB: FragO 2 to OPORD 1-68, Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 16 April1968. FragO 2 directed the 196th LIB to prepare contingency plans for possible deployment to the northern I Corps area. 6. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 20 April 1968. 7. 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Delaware, 31 May 1968. Battery B remained on FSB Center as the direct support battery for the 1-6th Infantry. 8. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 22 April 1968. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder assumed control of the 3-21st Infantry AO at 1803, 22 April1968. 9. Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (Mechanicsburg, Penn.: Stackpole Books, 1994), p. 144. 10. 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Delaware, 31 May 1968; 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 23 April1968. 11. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 29 April1968. 12. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 30 April1968.

24

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little after 1400 battalion received word that we were moving north to the DMZ to support the 3d Marine Regiment.l There were few details about where exactly we were heading or what we were to do once there, and rumors, each new one wilder than the last, flashed through the battalion at the speed of light. As Delta Company was closing out its positions and preparing to leave, Dick Skrzysowski remembers me telling him that I thought we were going to invade North Vietnam and finally kick some ass. Undoubtedly a wild guess on my part, but at that point I would rather have assaulted North Vietnam than stay around Camp Evans and lose men to booby traps. Within 2 hours of the alert, an assortment of marine helicopters churned into the battalion's area to pick up the rifle companies. Delta Company's PZs were close to Highway 1, and two Marine CH-46 helicopters, called "Baby Hooks" by the troops because of their similarity to the army Chinook, and a CH-53 circled our position a time or two and landed. In minutes we were flying north. I was happy to watch the drab, malignant hills surrounding FSB Belcher fade into distance. Nobody in Delta Company would miss them.2 Twenty minutes later the CH-46 in which I was riding touched down in a large, dry rice paddy at the edge of a graveyard on the north bank of the Cua Viet River. The destroyed village of Mai Xa Chan squatted across the paddy, and a lieutenant from the battalion's operations section had arrived there a short time earlier to establish a forward tactical CP. I radioed him to tell him that we were on the ground and asked where we were supposed to go. The lieutenant did not know, so I set up a defensive perimeter in the graveyard to wait until somebody in authority showed up at battalion headquarters. Helicopters carrying Companies B and C began landing in the dry 219

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paddy minutes after we arrived. Neither company commander knew any more than I did, and they decided to join Delta Company in the graveyard and wait. As we staked out company sectors and started to dig, a marine captain who walked with the aid of a young enlisted man and a cane, his utility cover pulled down to the bridge of his nose and toting an M14 rifle, came into the perimeter. The pair had been standing in the paddy watching the helicopters when we landed and I never learned what their reason was for being there. The captain announced himself with a warning: "You guys ought to know that this place is within range of North Vietnamese artillery." His heavy New England accent was enough to get our attention; however, "North Vietnamese" linked with "artillery" immediately vaulted him into the status of venerable sage. Anxious for information, the small knot of officers tightened around him to listen. "Artillery?" someone asked. The captain leaned on the cane. "That's right, one-five-twos, one-thirties, and eighty-fives," he said, easily rolling the bore measurements of the enemy's artillery pieces off his tongue. "They're dug in up on the DMZ less than 10 klicks from here." As he spoke, he surveyed the digging activity in the perimeter with a critical eye then moved rapidly to the core of what was really on his mind. "You guys are wasting time digging in here. You need to be moving to get to Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan before dark-before the NVA have both of them occupied." The strange names produced a circle of blank stares. Finally, someone asked, "What the hell is Nhi Ha?'' The captain casually aimed his cane north. "A ville about 4 klicks that way." "We haven't been told that's where we're going or what our mission will be yet," I allowed. The marine paused for a moment, leaned on his cane, and cast his eyes around the circle of uninformed army officers as he warmed to his subject. "Well, that is where you're headed; and if you were half-smart you'd quit digging and get moving. Because if the NVA have Nhi Ha occupied you'll have to fight to get it back." The captain then told us that no attack on Nhi Ha would be successful without first securing the adjacent hamlet of Lam Xuan and establishing a base of fire from there to support the attack. Then he added that his preferred method of attack was to walk in mortars from behind the hamlet and flush the NVA out of their positions while he simultaneously mounted a frontal assault. "But if that doesn't work you're going to have to get down into their trenches and root them out hand to hand."3 Bullshit, I thought. Two minutes of listening to the captain's lecture on tactics was all I could handle and I walked away. The others must have felt the same because they began to drift back to their companies. When the

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captain realized that he had lost his audience, he turned on his heel and departed. I last saw him caning through the dry paddy toward Mai Xa Chan with the young marine following closely in his wake. Despite my misgivings at the time, I soon learned that the hamlets of Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan were central to the battalion's operations and would remain its focus during the next 2 weeks. Later, it became likewise apparent that the marine captain had known more about why we were there than we did and that some of his advice was close to the mark. However, at that juncture, we were unprepared to do anything except dig holes and wait in the graveyard. The move north had been a classic knee-jerk operation, as opposed to a well planned and executed operation, caused by a changing tactical situation. A unit must react quickly, but at times our vast superiority in mobility became a substitute for ignoring basic infantry procedures, and quick moves often scrambled the unit's organizational structure. The combat power of the battalion had arrived into the new area of operation in a hurry, but to what benefit? The battalion commander was still at 3d Marine headquarters getting mission briefings, and the four companies were in the dark. There was no warning order issued to alert us of the coming mission, and a warning order would have allowed the company commanders to conduct a reconnaissance to familiarize ourselves with the terrain. In that regard, battalion could have also used the two reconnaissance platoons for that purpose. Company E, along with the two platoons had arrived around 1730, some two and a half hours before dark but still in time to reconnoiter the ground to the north. The terrain, more than anything else, dictates the maneuver, and an analysis of the ground to the north would have benefited the battle planning. As it was, the company commanders did not have a clue what the terrain north of Mai Xa Chan was like, nor would we find out until we traveled it the next day. At that point, however, the forward tactical CP, manned by a lieutenant, was a CP in name only and there was no one to receive a warning order had it been issued. The battalion XO was in the battalion rear area in Chu Lai, his usual place of duty. The S-3, who should have normally been with the line companies, was turning FSB Belcher over to the 4-31st Infantry and getting the battalion's trains moving north: administrative and logistical duties that belonged to the battalion XO. Alpha Company arrived close to dark and joined the other companies in the perimeter. The companies finished their defensive preparations and waited for word from the battalion headquarters. Shortly before 2300, some 7 hours after we had landed in the large paddy, the BTOC duty officer radioed each company commander in tum and directed him to report to the battalion CP for a briefing. I joined the other company commanders at the edge of the perimeter and crossed the dry paddy to a smoky, crowded, and

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excitedly noisy BTOC. While we were waiting for the battalion commander, I searched out the duty officer. 4 One of the final helicopter lifts had carried members of Alpha and Headquarters Companies, along with several cases of 106mm recoilless rifle ammunition. The ammunition was heavy, and the headquarters personnel had dragged it out of the helicopters, dumped it in the paddy, and unceremoniously beat feet for the CP. I radioed the BTOC duty officer to get some headquarters people back out there and pick up their crap. After a long wait, and when no personnel from the 106mm Recoilless Rifle Section or Headquarters Company had arrived, I sent several soldiers from Delta Company out to lug the ammunition into our perimeter. I did not like Delta Company cleaning up after headquarters types and was still angry about it when I reached the BTOC. It was a trifling matter considering what happened during the next 2 weeks. However, life in a rifle battalion was basic, and the most inconsequential events sometimes became weighty problems. I was venting my anger to the duty officer about the ammunition in the paddy when Lieutenant Colonel Snyder walked into the BTOC. Snyder, looking more harried than usual, had had a full day. It was close to 2130 before the briefings at the 3d Marine headquarters had concluded, and he had hopped into a squad assault boat and ridden up a very black Cua Viet River to the battalion CP. It was growing late, and he was in a hurry to get the briefing under way. He shot me an impatient look and told me to settle down and find a chair. Still mad about Headquarters Company, I joined the other company commanders and sat down. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder opened the briefing by saying that since 1900 hours the battalion was under the operational control of the 3d Marine Regiment and participating in Operation Napoleon/Saline. Snyder said that we would be OPCON to the 3d Marines for an undetermined time. Col. Milton Hull, he said, was the regimental commander of the 3d Marines.s The battle-tough 3d Marine Division, of which the 3d Marines were a part, manned bases from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Laotian border, several of which supported an anti-infiltration system, called the McNamara Line. Dong Ha Combat Base, sitting near the junctions of Highways 1 and 9 and the Bo Dieu River, a tributary of the Cua Viet, was the site of the division's forward CP and a major logistical base. The 3d Marines had responsibility for the division's eastern sector. When the marine division moved into Northern Quang Tri Province in mid-1966, Da Nang was the port nearest Dong Ha. Supplying the division started with marine pilots flying back-to-hack sorties of cargo in a meager number of C-130 cargo aircraft. It worked in the short term, but quickly overtaxed the system. Road transportation was a viable recourse for supplying the 3d Marine Division, but doing so meant convoying trucks over 170 kilometers of the insecure Highway 1. The marines did just that, but the

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amounts were never in quantities enough to provide the tonnages required for the division combat operations.6 An intermediate solution was to convoy landing craft mediums (LCMs) over 150 kilometers of open sea from Da Nang and up the Cua Viet River to Dong Ha. The LCM solution was inadequate to keep the marines at Dong Ha supplied because there were not enough LCMs in all of Vietnam to do the job. Logisticians, Seabees, and contractors fixed the problem by digging a channel and building a shallow-water port for tank landing ships (LSTs) at the mouth of the Cua Viet River, 15 kilometers downstream from Dong Ha. The channel allowed LSTs to load at Da Dang and steam north with the division's beans and bullets and offload at Cua Viet, a small supply base named after the waterway. Small utility boats chugged the supply upriver to Dong Ha by way of the Bo Dieu.7 That 95 percent of the total supply needed for marine operations in northern Quang Tri Province transited the Cua Viet River and its tributaries did not go unnoticed by the North Vietnamese. When the NVA launched an attack to close the waterway in February 1968, Provisional Corps Vietnam moved quickly and organized a naval task force dubbed Clearwater to protect the supply boats. At the same time, the 3d Marine Regiment kicked off Operation Napoleon/Saline. Its purpose was to ensure the uninterrupted passage of shipping on the Cua Viet River and its major tributaries. A second part of the mission was to deny the enemy access to rocket positions that targeted Dong Ha and Quang Tri. s During the fmal days of April the 320th NVA Division, called the Delta Division because of its origin in the Red River Delta during the war with the French, crossed the DMZ. The division was on familiar ground, after having slid across the DMZ to attack Allied forces and interdict Highway 9 in January. The Delta Division remained in the general area until February, then relocated across the DMZ to refit and reorganize. This time, the 320th NVA Division's attack covered a 12-kilometer front and had the ambitious design of severing Highway 9 and closing the Cua Viet River to isolate Allied bases along the DMZ.9 West of Dong Ha the enemy division's 64th Regiment, reinforced by elements of the 6th Battalion, 52d regiment and the 2d Battalion, 27th Independent Regiment, had the task of interdicting Highway 9 between Cam Lo and Dong Ha. Some elements had reached their objectives, but an unwanted collision with marines and the 2d ARVN Regiment at Cam Vu on 29 April thwarted the 64th Regiment's mission. Prisoners captured during the action claimed their mission was to attack the Dong Ha area, which coincides with the belief of some historians that the enemy's real objective during the offensive was the marine base at Dong Ha,lO The Delta Division's 48th and 52d Regiments, however, were successful in bypassing ARVN and marine positions and reached a point on the Bo Dieu River near its confluence with the Cua Viet waterway. The NVA occu-

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pied several deserted hamlets on the Bo Dieu's banks and prepared strong fortifications. It was here that the NVA would focus their attack.ll (See Map 24.1.) During the gray early hours of 30 April an NVA unit ensconced in the hamlet of An Lac fired on a U.S. Navy patrol boat motoring up the Bo Dieu 's narrow channel. A platoon from Company H, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines sent to look into the firing incident clashed with a dug-in NVA company northeast of the hamlet of Dai Do. As the battle developed, Companies F, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines and B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines joined the battle and left a hole in the 3d Marines' eastern sector. When the Provisional Corps Vietnam tagged the 196th LIB to fill the hole, we were on the way.12 Snyder turned toward a map that showed the outline of the battalion's boundaries and adjacent units. The operational area was heptagon-shaped and 6 kilometers deep by 7 kilometers wide. The so-called demilitarized zone, traced in red, was only a few kilometers from the battalion's northern boundary. A narrow river, called Jones Creek, split the operational area into uneven east-west sections. There were a number of villages scattered across the landscape, but otherwise the operational area looked small, flat, and barren. It certainly did not compare with the large, rugged slice of hills that we had roamed around the Que Son Valley. (See Map 24.2.) The battalion's mission was to assume responsibility for the operational area and attack north and secure the villages of Lam Xuan (East), Lam Xuan (West) and Nhi Ha. The villages of Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan (West), only about 300 meters apart, were within supporting distance of one another. Neither village could be successfully attacked unless a second force held the other. The marine captain had told us right. The hamlets straddled an oft-used infiltration route from southeastern North Vietnam into the enemy's Base Area 101 in southern Quang Tri Province. NVA units trekking south had frequently used Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan (West) as a way station and rest area, and the hamlets' proximity to the Cua Viet River also made them favored launch sites for attacks against river traffic. Once secure, the battalion planned to establish patrol bases in the three hamlets to interdict the enemy's movement and limit his ability to attack river traffic on the Cua Viet River.13 The concept of the operation was for the battalion to attack along two routes east and west of Jones Creek. Company C, with Company A following in its trace, would seize and clear the hamlet of Lam Xuan (East). After securing the hamlet, Company A would hold in place. On order, Company C would continue the attack to seize, clear, and hold Nhi Ha, the battalion's main objective. Concurrently, Company B would attack north along the west bank of Jones Creek to secure a graveyard from which it could support the attack by Companies A and C on Lam Xuan (East). On order,

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Company B would continue the attack to seize and hold the village of Lam Xuan (West). Company D, designated battalion reserve, would remain near the battalion headquarters.14 The quick move had also pushed the battalion to accelerate its planning to catch up with the situation on the ground. What is more important, it had placed the battalion commander in a situation where he had to plan a battalion attack without the aid and advice of two of his senior staff officers. The result was that the plan had holes in it. Two 20-minute artillery preparations planned at different times and provided by marine artillery batteries located throughout the 3d Marine AO would support the attack. There were no plans, however, for close air support strikes on any of the three objectives. Not planning for the use of tactical air support was a major error that allowed the NVA forces to maximize their observation and fields of fire. Smoke on the objectives could have reduced the enemy's observation somewhat, but it was not a part of the battalion's fire support plan. At some point Snyder turned the briefing over to Capt. John Householder, the battalion S-2, for a rundown of the local enemy situation and terrain. Householder, whose radio call sign was The Fox, was an excellent soldier who had spent a previous Vietnam tour with the 5th Special Forces Group. His job as S-2 was to furnish us timely, reliable intelligence about the enemy we were fighting. It was a near-impossible task because much of the intelligence coming through channels was old or inaccurate. Battalion anticipated that one NVA company defended each hamlet. History had shown that the NVA occupied the two hamlets at any time the marines left them open. The last marine rifle company had pulled out of the Nhi Ha-Lam Xuan area on 30 April and had done so under artillery fire. More significant was the fact that an aerial observer had spotted 20 NVA troops, possibly a reconnaissance force or the van of a larger unit, near Lam Xuan (West) that very morning. A reconnaissance of the objectives conducted at first light the next morning would have confirmed or denied what little intelligence the battalion had about the enemy. For some reason, however, it was not a part of the plan.15 Though no fault of Householder's the intelligence was, as usual, wrong. The 4th Battalion, 270th NVA Regiment, commanded by a North Vietnamese named Cuong, had occupied Nhi Ha, was dug into fortified positions, and was prepared to defend it. Although the hamlet was on 320th Division's eastern flank, its position astride the well-worn infiltration route made it key to the enemy's plans. It is my belief that the 4-270th NVA Regiment had been tasked to occupy Nhi Ha to provide the 320th Division a secure logistical base from which to funnel men and supplies into the regiments fighting at Dai Do. Selecting a battalion from the 1,500-man 270th NVA Independent Infantry Regiment to occupy the hamlet was a logical choice. The regi-

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ment, commanded by Col. Hoang Duom, had been operating in the lowlands of northeastern Quang Tri Province since 1966, using the DMZ as a sanctuary. The regiment had often sent its battalions south on independent sorties or had cooperated with other combat units to aid in their operations. When not participating in combat operations, the regiment guarded the coastal area of the DMZ or hauled supplies for various units. Short combat operations and logistical duties had kept the regiment's exposure to friendly forces to a minimum and its casualties low. The unit's morale was reportedly fair to high.16 The North Vietnamese tactic of occupying and fortifying a hamlet, sometimes called a strongpoint defense, was not a new idea regardless of what the unit's mission might be. A part of the enemy's objective in defending a hamlet, be it on the DMZ or the Que Son Valley, was to economize manpower while killing as many U.S. troops as possible. In this case the 4-270th NVA had the mission to do just that while it also protected the 320th NVA Division's lines of communication. The countryside between the DMZ and the Cua Viet River area certainly was favorable to the tactic. The area's hamlets, pulverized by countless combat operations, squatted on green islands surrounded by wide-open rice fields. Overlaying each island was a labyrinth of shrubs, impassable bamboo hedgerows, and small clearings. Weed-covered mounds of brick and stucco, once the homes of the villagers, speckled the area and added a measure of pathetic clutter to the hodgepodge. The puzzle of foliage and broken ground restricted visibility and channeled the forward and lateral movement of an attacking unit to several overgrown paths. The NVA forces used the ground to their advantage and had prepared a wicked defense. Reinforced and restored granite-hard family bunkers sitting astride routes into the hamlet became machine gun or automatic weapons and RPG positions. Dug deep into the sandy soil beneath the ruined houses, these bunkers laid the foundation for the defense. Other bunkers, some dug beneath other ruins or newly constructed ones, buttressed the main positions. I? Surprise was a key element to the enemy's plan, and NVA soldiers were masters of using natural vegetation and man-made clutter to conceal their positions. NVA soldiers dug their trenches along bamboo hedges or at the edge of a tree line and then skillfully hid the spoil. Detection from the air was nearly impossible and equally difficult for troops advancing into NVA positions. The game of hide-and-seek on the ground, however, was much more deadly. Often the first indication of the NVA's presence came when a harmless-looking rubble pile or shrub exploded with automatic weapons fire. Some distance behind the forward positions there was generally a second tier of fortifications that provided the defense with depth. Communication trenches between the positions allowed the defenders pas-

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sage between the forward and rear positions without exposure to U.S. fire. Unit mortars sited behind the second trench line covered routes of approach into the positions and filled-in dead space not covered by forward elements. The fires from several artillery batteries stationed across the DMZ further reinforced the defense and generally made life miserable for any attacking force. The marines had learned that once the battle began, the NVA seldom reinforced the defending unit but would put up a lively defense with the forces already in place. If Allied forces maintained pressure the enemy force would maintain its position and then vacate it after dark. However, the NVA units were known to sometimes feign a daylight withdrawal in an attempt to trick the attacking unit into a hasty pursuit and an ambush. IS After the briefing was over I approached Lieutenant Colonel Snyder. Company C had the most difficult objective. Charlie Company was an excellent rifle company, but Denny Leach had departed on R and R, leaving the company XO, a 1st lieutenant, in charge. The lieutenant had a good reputation in the battalion, but he was junior and had never before commanded a company. The commander of Alpha Company was weak, and even considered inept by some in the battalion. I was not seeking any personal glory, but I thought it was a mistake for those two companies to lead the battalion in the attack and hold Company D back. I gave Lieutenant Colonel Snyder my reasons why I thought Delta Company should not be held in reserve. A battalion commander has no obligation to provide a subordinate his reasoning for making such a decision, but it was Snyder's style to keep his commanders enlightened. He heard me out and then explained that he wanted my company in reserve because he wanted a company that could move rapidly should it become necessary to reinforce one of the forward companies. And Delta Company, he added, had the reputation of moving fast when the situation warranted. Although I did not agree with his decision, there is a time to shut up and follow the command. I accepted the battalion commander's decision without further comment, departed the BTOC, and returned to our graveyard position. After briefing the platoon leaders, I stretched out next to the hole that Al Hajny and Jim Corlew had dug between two burial mounds and went to sleep. I knew that morning would come quickly.

Notes 1. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 1 May 1968. 2. Ibid. 3. Steven Bingham, letter to author, 6 January 1994. 4. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline, 5 June 1968. 5. Ibid.; author's recollection of events.

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6. For a brief account of marine logistic operations in the northern provinces of Vietnam between 1965 and 1970, see The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1985), p. 302. 7. Richard Tregaskis, Southeast Asia: Building the Bases (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 277-280, 359; The Marines in Vietnam: 1954-1973, p. 302. 8. Lt. Gen. Willard Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1975), p. 63; Ronald H. Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 148; 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division (Reinforced): Combat After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline, 26 July 1968, Serial No.: 001A218-68. 9. Combined Intelligence Center, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam: OB Summary of the 320th NVADivision, 15 June 1968. 10. Ibid. 11. Provisional Corps Vietnam: PERINTREP 4-68, 01 May 1968 and PERINTREP 5-68, 14 May 1968; Spector, After Tet, pp. 148-149; Harry G. Summers, Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), p. 142. 12. Spector, After Tet, p. 149. For another account of the U.S. Marine and 3-21 Infantry action, see Keith W. Nolan, The Magnificent Bastards (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994). 13. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Several untitled documents found in the National Archives, College Park, Md., provide the source of information for the 270th NVA Regiment. Particularly History and Order of Battle, 1 May 1968; U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. OB Summary of the 270th NVA Regiment, MR IV. REPORT# 6 029 1149 69, 21 October 1969; III Marine Amphibious Force: INSUM 267-67 (FIRE ARROW), 24 September 1967. 17. 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division (Reinforced): Combat After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline, 26 July 1968; 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline, 5 June 1968. 18. Ibid.

25

Nhi Ha Village

2 May

A

n hour after sunrise Companies A, B, and C left the graveyard laager and moved toward the line of departure (LD) north of Mai Xa Chan. The LD is the designated point from which the attack begins and is used to coordinate the advance of the attacking companies. 1 (See Map 25.1.) While the companies were moving into position, marine artillerymen in three batteries situated throughout the area were setting charges on ammunition, making final adjustments to their guns, and watching the clock. Battery D, 3-82d Artillery was still at FSB Belcher and would not catch up with the battalion for several more days. Until our direct-support battery arrived, we would be dependent upon the skill and expertise of the 3d Marine Division's artillerists who manned 4.2-inch mortars and 105mm and 155mm howitzers. They never let us down.2 At 0755 on the dot, Marine gunners yanked the lanyards on their guns and sent a thunderous swarm of high-explosive shells arcing toward the battalion's three objectives. The ground tactical plan, however, was not in synchronization with the fire support plan from the very beginning. The preparatory fires, scheduled for 20 minutes, were almost half-completed when battalion gave the order for Companies B and C to cross the LD. Company A followed Company C across the LD 5 minutes later. The battle for Nhi Ha had begun.3 While the other companies went to the LD, I moved Delta Company across the paddy and into Mai Xa Chan. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder wanted me close at hand, so I spread Delta Company around the battalion helipad that was near the CP to wait on developments. The early morning light unmasked the deep scars that shot and shell of past battles had inflicted on the hamlet. Standing buildings were missing roofs or large chunks of wall, sometimes both, but what remained of the structures had a distinct French influence about their architecture. Walking through the village that morning 231

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reminded me of pictures that I had seen of European villages ruined by fighting during World War II. Buildings, regardless of their condition, have a unique magnetism about them that attracts soldiers. Sections from the battalion headquarters had taken over several of the hamlet's ramshackle structures, and the medics had set up shop in the remains of the village church. The aid station was only a 2-minute walk from the helipad, and I went over to see how Jan Hildebrand was faring. Jan had replaced Mike Croxdale as battalion surgeon in March and his quiet, sincere manner was the antithesis of that of the rambunctious Croxdale. Jan, like Mike, however, sincerely cared for the soldier's welfare and was an ideal battalion surgeon. After spending a few minutes talking with Jan and making some crude observations about his habitat, I returned to the company to wait. The sky was clear, and the widely spaced trees around the helipad provided little protection from the steadily climbing sun. There was no breeze and the morning got hot early. Some of the troops shook out poncho liners and jury-rigged paltry shelters that created patches of stifling shade but no deliverance from the heat. The rest of the company, including me, preferred to slouch against rucksacks like an assemblage of olive-clad lizards and loll in the sun. Time passed slowly. Company B reached the graveyard west of Jones Creek and set up a position to support Company C as it neared Lam Xuan (East). Charlie Company's platoons swept the flattened hamlet without opposition, and the acting company commander reported the hamlet clear at 1055. While the company reorganized and prepared to continue the attack toward Nhi Ha, Alpha Company entered the hamlet and formed a perimeter.4 With the first objective secure, battalion gave the order to continue the attack. Company B resumed its advance up the west side of Jones Creek toward Lam Xuan (West). At about the time Bravo Company left the little graveyard, Company C departed Lam Xuan (East) to cross a large paddy for Nhi Ha. Although the companies were moving in concert, the fire support was still not in harness with the attacking companies. The second artillery preparation targeting Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan (West) had taken place from 0900 to 0920, nearly an hour and a half before Company C started for the final objective. The lull in artillery diminished the benefits that the preparatory fires may have had on the enemy's positions.s Charlie Company's Lt. Edward F. Guthrie had deployed the four squads of his 2d Platoon into two files, called a platoon column, and led the way. Guthrie controlled the two squads on the left. His platoon sergeant had the squads on the right. Thirty to 40 meters separated the files. After departing Lam Xuan (East), the 2d Platoon followed the tree-lined banks of Jones Creek several hundred meters northwest, then angled north across the paddy toward the island on which Nhi Ha sat. A little after 1200, Sp4c. William J. "Moose" Morse, the platoon point man, followed closely by

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Sp4c. Paul Yost, reached the island and swung west toward the core of the hamlet. Guthrie and his radio operator, Sp4c. Bill E. Gerber, trailed a short distance behind the point men. There was no sign of the enemy.6 Minutes after reaching the island, Guthrie's file drifted left to get around some bushes and lost sight and contact of the other file. The island was teeming with underbrush and bamboo hedgerows, several meters thick and passable in but a few places, that partitioned the island's interior into irregular sections. Each hedgerow was a barrier that checked the platoon's advance until the point men located gaps through their green walls. This was a critical juncture because it marked the point at which the company's scheme of maneuver changed from an attack to that of an approach march. There is no firm indication that any of the men had forgotten that the NVA might be somewhere to their front, but the immediate objective at that moment was to find their way through the verdant maze. The long interval between the artillery preparation and the company's arrival on the island may also have given some in Charlie Company the idea that the attack was all but finished. In the Que Son Valley, it was standard practice for the rifle companies to use reconnaissance by fire if we suspected an enemy presence. The battalion had anticipated enemy companies on both objectives, but for reasons unknown did not coach the lieutenant to initiate an artillery fire mission as he was approaching the island. As the 2d Platoon zigzagged through the island's brushy interior, it drifted from Guthrie's planned direction of march and into the path of the following 3d Platoon. By the time it had reached a small paddy midway across the island and crossed it, the 3d Platoon's lead squad was within meters of Yost and Morse and merging fast.7 Yost and Morse were just beyond the paddy when they halted again. Guthrie, angry because he did not know where his right file was and impatient with his platoon's wandering, went forward to get the point men back on track. Gerb~r was only a step or two behind his platoon leader and remembers Guthrie muttering something like, "I'm going to personally walk point, kick ass, and take names on the way through." Unbeknown to Guthrie, Morse and Yost had stopped because they had caught a glimpse of some soldiers wearing steel helmets only a stone's throw away.s The soldiers that the point had spotted were members of the wellequipped and armed 4th Battalion, 270th Independent NVA Regiment. The enemy battalion, organized with four infantry companies and a support company, numbered about 350 men on the 1st of May. Soviet helmets were a regular item of their inventory.9 Up close, the Soviet headgear is easily distinguishable from a U.S. steel pot, but the point men had had only a quick look at the men before they ducked out of sight. Moreover, it is unlikely that Yost, Morse, or anyone else in the battalion for that matter had ever expected to see any soldiers besides U.S. or ARVN wearing steel helmets, and certainly not North

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Vietnamese. The troops of the 2d NVA Division, the enemy with whom we were most familiar, wore bush hats or pith helmets-not ones of steel. The unexpected sight caused the two point men to hesitate and that is what killed them. Guthrie and Gerber walked between a rubble pile and a large bomb crater, then topped a slight berm. They neared the point men, and Guthrie told Morse to angle more toward the river. As Guthrie spoke, Yost, likely thinking that the men he had just seen in steel helmets could be friendly, turned to Guthrie and asked whether there were any marines or ARVN in the area. Guthrie was reaching for the radio handset to find out when a clutch of automatic weapons concealed in the scrub to the front burst into flames.lO A series of wildly chaotic events, some happening together, followed the hail of enemy fire. Gerber recalls: "I saw Yost get shot in the back of the head and Guthrie take what looked like five to six rounds in the chest. The shots were coming from a bush not more than twenty feet away. I emptied an entire magazine into it."ll An M60 machine gun team raced forward, and Gerber saw the gunner and the ammunition bearer fall wounded before they could put the gun into action. "The medic had somehow shown up on my left and was checking Guthrie. He told me he was dead and crawled around me to check the machine gunner and the ammo bearer. Another guy showed up and caught a round that took off his eyebrow. By this time we were catching it from all directions," he wrote later.l2 Twenty-five meters to Gerber's right front an NVA machine gun shrouded behind a bush thundered to life. He guessed that the gunner was after the rest of the 2d Platoon and emptied four M16 magazines into the foliage that hid the machine gun, then threw two hand grenades toward the position. The enemy gun fell silent afterward. Gerber had seen only three NVA soldiers to his front: one was in the bush just beyond where Guthrie lay and two more were in a hole manning the machine gun to his right front. With the amount of fire coming from his front he had no doubt that more NVA were around as the ground to his left and right seemed blanketed with fire. Remarkably, the bush that concealed the NVA who had killed Guthrie also hid Gerber from the enemy's view. After what must have seemed like hours, the medic crawled over to Gerber and told him it was time for them to get out of there. There was no argument. He and the medic latched onto the wounded machine gunner and dragged him back to the bomb crater with them, while some men from the 3d Platoon ran forward and grabbed the ammo bearer. The man with the eyebrow wound retrieved the machine gun and ammunition, but there were not enough men to carry Guthrie, Yost, and Morse. Combat brings men together, and the bond that develops between radio operators and comman-

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ders often transcends a superior-subordinate relationship. Although not connected by blood, the kinship is every bit as close, and leaving Guthrie behind was like leaving a brother. The event still haunts Gerber today. Five men, all of them wounded, made it back to the protection of the bomb crater. Though they were safe for now, the crater was now in no man's land between the rest of Charlie Company and the NVA. The situation inside the crater was equally grim. The two men from the machine gun team were in poor condition. The gunner had bullet holes all over and was the more seriously wounded of the two; the ammunition bearer was going into shock from loss of blood and fear and was ineffective. Both men required immediate medical attention if they were going to make it. On the plus side the man who had lost an eyebrow was still on his feet, and Gerber and the medic had escaped their minutes in purgatory with only slight shrapnel wounds in their butts. While the medic was doing what he could for the wounded machine gun team, Gerber radioed the acting company commander to tell him where they were and that they needed help-now.t3 Some time later things quieted down enough for Gerber to sneak a peek over the lip of the crater. A few meters away the NVA soldiers were carrying their own casualties out of the trenches and bunkers and putting in fresh replacements. Gerber recalls getting an uncomfortable surprise while he watched the NVA to his front: "One guy kept sticking his head up to see what was going on. We made eye contact once and scared the hell out of each other."I4 I had spent the morning listening to the chatter between the three company commanders and the BTOC. Things seemed to be going without a hitch. Company B had arrived at the outskirts of Lam Xuan (West) shortly before noon and, within 15 minutes, had the objective secure. My first indication that something had gone wrong was when Company C reported taking some sniper fire. Shortly afterward Bravo Company reported that they were under automatic weapons and M79 fire.t5 Bravo Company's Pfc. Tony May later wrote in his diary: "As we approached a river bank just south of the village, we received quite a bit of small arms fire from the other side of the river. We spent the next couple of hours exchanging rifle and machine gun frre."l6 On the heels of B Company's report, C Company notified the BTOC that it had 10 casualties and reported movement on its right flank. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder alerted me to be prepared to reinforce Charlie Company, and then directed the commander of Alpha Company to move with two of his platoons from Lam Xuan (East) to Nhi Ha and secure Charlie Company's right flank. The events had taken place in the space of 10 minutes.l7 The reports from Company C were sketchy, but taking 10 casualties in a short period meant that the unit had run into more than just sniper frre. My instructions were to be ready to move, and I knew it was just a matter

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of time before we would be under way. I told the platoon leaders what I thought would happen and to get their platoons ready to move. The area around the helipad came alive as men knocked down their sun shelters and readied their gear. Meanwhile, Snyder had come out of the BTOC, hurried to the C and C ship, and lifted off. He returned a short time later and disappeared into the BTOC. When he reappeared a little later he grabbed me to go on an aerial recon with him. While we were flying the trace of Jones Creek he pointed out the route that he wanted me to follow to Nhi Ha. C and A Companies had walked the same one a few hours before. Snyder stressed that he wanted my left flank against the creek's bank during the approach march. As we neared Nhi Ha the pilot left the creek, turned toward the hamlet, and zipped over the island. I looked out the open door but could not see the NVA's positionsor ours either-in the quilt of green below. Surprisingly, the enemy did not fire on the helicopter. Back on the ground Snyder gave me several tasks to accomplish once I got to Nhi Ha. First, he wanted Delta Company in a position that would allow the other two companies to break contact and withdraw. I remember him adding, "Keep your company out of the village and don't you get mixed up in the action." Next, he told me to seek out the acting commander of Company C, get a feel for the situation, and report back. Before we separated Snyder reiterated again, "Do not get yourself bogged down in the firefight." His guidance was brief, to the point, and needed no more explanation. I hurriedly briefed the platoon leaders and made final preparations to move. At 1430, battalion sent S. Sgt. Don Fleshman and a security detail from the Specter platoon to escort a couple of Marine M76 Otters to Nhi Ha and evacuate Charlie Company's casualties to Mai Xa Chan. (The Otter is a small tracked vehicle that mounts a .50-caliber machine gun but has no armor plating.)I8 Thirty minutes after Fleshman had departed battalion gave me the order to move forward. I deployed the company in an inverted wedge formation. The 1st Platoon was on the right, the 3d Platoon, now led by a staff sergeant, hugged the creek, and 2d Platoon was centered and followed at some distance to the rear. As we followed Jones Creek toward Lam Xuan (East), Lieutenant Colonel Snyder was overhead in the C and C helicopter watching our progress. My left flank strayed from the creek a couple of times, and he sharply reminded me to keep it anchored on its banks. Our pace was rapid and tension was surging through the company like an electrical current. We reached the hollowed-out remains of Lam Xuan (East) in less than 25 minutes and continued to march. A short distance beyond the hamlet I swung away from Jones Creek and started across the paddy to Nhi Ha. I radioed

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Charlie Company to make sure that it knew we were coming up on its south side.I9 In the meantime, Capt. Tom Beyer, one of the brigade's FACs, and whose call sign was Helix 15, had come on station and was adjusting artillery on NVA positions. The NVA batteries north of the DMZ were equally active and had started dropping rounds into Company B 's position. The enemy barrage was particularly heavy and it killed one man and wounded several others.2o As we approached the wooded island I saw one of the Otters that battalion had sent forward standing in the rice paddy. A marine stood behind the track's .50-caliber machine gun closely watching the tree line. Fleshman and some troops from the Specter platoon were standing in the paddy not far from the track. We continued through the paddy and deployed the company in a half-moon perimeter around the southern and eastern edges of the island. Skrzysowski took charge, while my two RTOs and FO and me went to look for Charlie Company. There was no need to seek out the commander of Company A: we had talked on the radio, and he had told me they had no casualties and were in good shape. The acting Charlie Company commander was sitting on the back side of a concrete well, listening to a PRC-25 radio, and staring into the distance when we found him. He appeared to be in shock. A few men from the company were milling around the well. I asked the lieutenant what had happened, trying to get a feel for the situation and his response was, "Things are all fucked up." That was obvious. Nobody was in charge. While I was talking to him someone radioed him a casualty report; he reacted by swearing loudly but remained glued to the well. After I reported the situation to the battalion commander, he directed me to find a night defensive position suitable for three companies. I radioed Lt. Eric Weidner and gave him the mission to come up with a site. Spending more time trying to talk to the lieutenant was a waste of time, so I took my little group forward to see what I could learn. We had traveled only a short distance when we ran into a clump of bamboo. As we edged around it and got closer to the firing, we instinctively bent at the waist and walked in a crouch. The closer we got to the shooting, the lower we got to the ground. Finally we were crawling. We reached a hedgerow and stopped. One of Charlie Company's riflemen lay just to the right of us. The combination of exploding artillery and automatic weapons fire was loud and suggestive of wave action in a stormy sea. Small swells of fire would begin, then grow into a roaring crest, and then recede slowly into ripples, finally tapering into a malevolent hush. Minutes later a new surge of firing would well up, then ebb once more into silence.

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There was a lot of firing but trees and bushes blocked my view. I wanted to find a better vantage point to get a grasp of the situation to my front and started to crawl forward. As I did the rifleman from Charlie Company said, "I wouldn't go no further that way if I was you. There ain't nobody up there but fucking gooks." I took his advice. My group and I returned to the well and found that the situation there had grown worse. The company commander had not moved from his place, and more men had drifted back from the forward positions and gathered around the well. There was no order. This was not the Charlie Company that I knew-but what had happened to Charlie Company that day might have happened to any of us. At some point, a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant named Brooks showed up at the well. Brooks led a man back from the forward position and sat him down. I later learned that the man who Brooks had led back was Bill Gerber.21 Gerber had stayed in radio contact with the FO and the acting company commander throughout the afternoon, while also keeping an eye on the enemy to the front. He had noticed that each time that he popped smoke to mark his position for the FAC, the NVA, possibly expecting an air strike or gas, ducked for cover. Later in the afternoon, the acting company commander informed him that two men from the 3d Platoon would be coming up to help carry out the wounded. Gerber tossed out a smoke grenade, and, when the NVA ducked, the men raced across the open ground and into the crater. They hurriedly put the wounded machine gunner and their rifles on a poncho. When they were ready Gerber popped his last smoke grenade, and the men raced for the safety of the woods. I told Brooks and the platoon leader to get the men spread out. Both were good soldiers and made an effort to get some organization into the cluster of soldiers around the well. Few of the men responded to their orders, however, or else they moved in slow motion. Gerber remembers me hollering for men to spread out. I do not remember yelling, but I probably did. My concern was incoming mortars or, worse, getting hit with an NVA counterattack. Had either of those events happened that afternoon we would have had a real mess on our hands. Not everyone in Charlie Company was in a state of shock. Gerber and his group had certainly kept their wits about them, and most of the other men were still up on line. One man who especially knew what he was doing that day was S.Sgt. James Goad, who seemed to be everywhere. While I was at the well Goad came out of the brush carrying a dead soldier over his shoulder. The man Goad carried was shirtless and had a bullet hole through the chest. There was no bandage on the wound and very little blood. Goad dropped the man on the ground nearby, looked at the throng of men around the well, and then without speaking returned to his platoon.

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Goad had been under fire before and had won the Bronze Star for valor while serving with Company D, 4-31 st Infantry during Task Force Dorland's Thanksgiving Day fight at Hill 63. During that action Goad had gone to the aid of a wounded man and had shielded him from enemy fire with his body. Goad, also wounded by the enemy fire, had stayed with the man and assisted in his evacuation.22 In the meantime, Weidner had come up with a graveyard located 800 meters to the east that would fit three rifle companies for a night defensive position. I always liked to make the final determination about where we would set up for the night, but I trusted Weidner's judgment. It was getting late and we needed to get set up before dark. We had to move. Staff Sergeant Fleshman, meanwhile, had picked up a load of dead and wounded, and told me that he was on the way back for the battalion CP. I radioed the battalion commander about the graveyard and told him we were ready to move. He gave me an OK and directed Companies A and C to break contact and withdraw through Delta Company's half-moon perimeter.23 After Alpha and Charlie Companies had cleared the village, Bob Bivey, my 19-year-old FO, took over the artillery fire mission. As we were departing the island, Bivey adjusted the artillery fire in close and covered us as we crossed the paddy. We trailed the two companies across it into the graveyard, established a perimeter, and dug positions in the sandy soil. At dark each company established listening posts to its front. The graveyard overlooked the surrounding rice paddies, and it would have taken a sizable force to root our three companies out of their positions that night. Later that evening the battalion formed Task Force Delta, placed me in charge, and radioed the plan for 3 May. Briefly, Delta and Alpha Companies were to resume the attack on Nhi Ha the next morning. The commander of Company A was familiar with the north side of the island, and his company would take the northern route. Delta Company would retrace Company C's path across the southern edge of the island. Charlie Company would remain in the graveyard as the battalion reserve. Bravo Company would support the attack by fire from Lam Xuan (West).24 Battalion made no plans to place a tactical CP in the graveyard or with the attacking companies. Army units that had deployed early to Vietnam routinely used battalion tactical CPs during operations, but, as the war progressed, the helicopter replaced the forward CP and the practice disappeared from the battlefield. Commanders, especially at the battalion level, became totally dependent on the helicopter for command and control. The helicopter, though a useful tool, all but destroyed decentralized execution and made the commander oblivious to the chaos and the killing below. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder, however, allowed his commanders the luxury of accomplishing the task at hand and allowed the commander of Company A and I to work out the details. Afterward, I briefed the platoon leaders. The first day for the battle of Nhi Ha had ended with 12 dead and

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14 wounded. It was impossible to tell what we were up against, but at that point I guessed that the enemy force numbered at least 100. I settled in for the night not knowing what the coming day might bring.

Notes 1. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 1 May 1968. 2. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline, 5 June 1968. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Bill E. Gerber, communications with author, February-October 1997. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. The organizational diagram and table of organization and equipment for the 270th NVA Regiment can be found in the untitled documents, National Archives, College Park, Md., 1 May 1968; U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. OB Summary of the 270th NVA Regiment, MR IV. REPORT# 6 029 1149 69, 21 October 1969. 10. Ibid. 11. Gerber communications. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 1 May 1968. 16. Charles T. May, diary and letters home during 1968, no date. 17. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 May 1968. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Gerber communications. 22. Americal Division General Orders Number 674: award of the Bronze Star Medal to James Goad, 13 February 1968. Copy furnished by James Goad. 23. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 1 May 1968. 24. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline.

26 The Second Day

A

round midnight, Sergeant 1st Class Walker, who was the battalion's liaison NCO on the ARVN outpost known as Alpha One, reported that an NVA battalion was on its way toward us. The outpost, perched on a 100foot rise north of Nhi Ha only 3 kilometers from the DMZ, was in a good position to follow the assorted categories of NVA units trekking south. During the next 2 weeks, Walker not only provided the line companies information on infiltrating NVA units, but also attempted to warn us when the NVA artillery batteries became active. It was not possible for Walker to peg the identity of the units coming south, but battalions belonging to the 270th NVA Independent Infantry Regiment had used the route often in the past. By May of 1968 the regiment's 4th Battalion must have known the way by heart. Units of the battalion had made incursions from the DMZ into coastal flatlands surrounding the Cua Viet River several times during the summer of 1967. That routine continued during the first months of 1968. The battalion's 3d Company's attempt to occupy Mai Xa Chan shortly before the Tet offensive typifies the 4th Battalion's cross-border operations during the period. The 3d Company left its base in the Cu Bai Mountain area of North Vietnam on 6 January and, after a 14-day trek, reached a safe area within the DMZ. After a day's rest, the unit crossed the Ben Hai River, moved east toward the coast, then swung south and followed Jones Creek, passing through Lam Xuan (East), and arrived at Mai Xa Thi Village. The company was in the midst of preparing defensive positions when the 4th Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment discovered it and chased it back across the DMZ after a short fight. Undeterred, the entire 4th Battalion was back across the DMZ in March 1968 and was reportedly operating near Camp Cua Viet. The battalion's activities between March and the time when the 3-21st Infantry arrived are unknown. 1 At the time, though, we were unaware that the 4th Battalion, 270th NVA Independent Infantry Regiment was defending the village. What we 243

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did know that afternoon was that an NVA unit had occupied the village across the paddy and that our mission was to take it back. Thanks to Maj. Paul Power, the brigade's senior FAC, fighter aircraft would support our attack. Paul had wandered into the area late that afternoon and contacted one of the company commanders to see what was going on. When he learned that there had been no air strikes in support of the attack on Nhi Ha and that we had gotten a bloody nose, Paul got busy.2 Major Power later wrote: "I called Cedar Mountain 6 and asked if he would like some FAC directed air support."3 I do not know what words Lieutenant Colonel Snyder used in response, but he took Power's offer. Despite the battalion commander's willingness, Paul could not simply fly into the 3d Marines' operational area and start directing fighter strikes without going through channels and getting permission to do so. Paul Power commented later: "I called the Marines, whose call sign was Fire Raider 39, to see if they would allow an Air Force FAC to operate in their AO in support of the 3-21st Infantry. After getting their permission with a caution to confine my work within the small 3-21st Infantry's AO, I checked with Colonel Gelling back at Camp Evans. He said OK as long as I didn't forget him and the other battalions."4 Power's initiative got the battalion the air support we needed and during the next 10 days he and his FACs, Capts. Don Giggy, Mel Gibson, and Tom Beyer, would put in over 60 air strikes. Major Power personally directed almost a third of them. The air force had blessed the I 96th LIB with a group of superb FACs. Equally lucky for the battalion was that the FAC operation had moved to the airfield at Quang Tri some days before. The move had not been planned but had come about to get away from the busy strip at Camp Evans. There were no facilities for the FACs at Quang Tri, so the four pilots had pitched tents on the side of the runway not too far from their airplanes. The field at Quang Tri was less than 10 minutes' flying time from Nhi Ha, and Tommy Beyer was on station shortly after 0800 and contacted me. Tom Beyer had just passed his 27th birthday and was the youngest of the I 96th LIB's FACs. He had gained his flying experience as a bomber pilot with the Strategic Air Command. When he came down on orders to Vietnam, he volunteered to become an FAC, choosing that instead of an assignment flying B-52 bombers. Tom was familiar with the situation, having directed artillery onto the NVA's positions during the previous afternoon. We talked about the enemy's defenses in the hamlet and discussed what kind of ordnance might best work against them, finally settling on a mix of high explosive and napalm. The marine artillery support the day before had been superb and had blanketed the western half of Nhi Ha as soon as the contact had started.

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Even so, the artillery rounds did not appear to have had much effect on the hardened bunkers, and we hoped that air strikes would do the job. A pair of F-4 Phantoms laden with 500-pound bombs and canisters of napalm checked in just after 0900. The F-4s made a tight tum around the area and flew south. I could not hear the exchange between the FAC and the fighter pilots, but Tom certainly wasted no time in putting them to work. When I saw the Phantoms again they were on the deck and streaking toward the village, one trailing the other. Beyer turned the little silver 0-2 on its wing, dove steeply toward the island, and fired a white-phosphorus rocket into the NVA position to mark the target for the fast-approaching fighters. The maneuver was one that we would see him and the other FACs perform many times during the next several days. We watched the lead F-4 pilot jink the aircraft to make final adjustments in alignment on Tom's mark, flash across Jones Creek, and fling two silver canisters of napalm into Nhi Ha. As the fighter screamed skyward deep-red flames and a huge ball of sooty smoke soared above the lush island. Before the smoke had cleared Tom had radioed a bomb release correction to the second aircraft, now only seconds out. After the fighters had expended their napalm Beyer marked the target for a second run-this one for the 500-pound bombs the fighters carried. As the bombs detonated, white circular concussion rings appeared quickly above the village, followed a second later by the sharp, walloping sound of the explosions.s The next air strike went in 30 minutes later, and about midmorning Paul Power replaced Tom on station. After Paul had put in a third set of fighters we departed the graveyard and started across the paddy toward Nhi Ha. The 1st and 2d Platoons were forward, Skrzysowski on the left and Weidner on the right. The 3d Platoon was in reserve. The company headquarters was in the center, the point from which I thought I could best control the platoons. It was 1100. Bob Bivey had pounded the NVA with artillery between air strikes and effectively used it to cover our crossing. Bivey did his work well, and Companies A and D reached the island and entered the woods without a problem. Rumor had it that the NVA had hidden men in spider holes, waiting until Company C's men had passed by and then hitting them from the rear. After researching material for this book I am less sure of the story's validity, but I believed it at the time and was determined not to let Delta Company be ambushed. We moved across the island cautiously and maintained contact with Company A's left flank as we approached the hamlet's center. Skrzysowski and Weidner's platoons advanced through the undergrowth, using reconnaissance by fire to clear every suspected bush and rubble pile and grenade every hole. It was sometime around 1130 when the 2d Platoon reached the small paddy that formed a notch on the island's north side and came under

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Through the Valley

fire as it started across. At about that time, the 1st Platoon ran into a drainage ditch bordered by a thick hedgerow and started taking ftre from the front. The place got noisy fast as the contact with the lead platoons developed. At least we had not been surprised. (See Map 26.1.) Pfc. Steve Bingen was an assistant machine gunner in the 1st Platoon, and his first look at the troops from the well-accoutered 4-270th NVA was one of amazement. Bingen commented later that "they looked like Gis with their steel helmets and equipment. "6 The similarity did not end with the NVA soldiers' helmets and personal gear. The NVA soldiers who fought in the DMZ had everything we had except for air power. We were soon to learn that we were ftghting a conventional war. That came when the first artillery rounds began falling around us. My first thought was that we were taking friendly ftre from an 81mm mortar mission the battalion was ftring or from our artillery. I yelled at Bivey to check ftre the mission. Bivey gave me a helpless look and said, "Sir, that is not ours." I never asked Bob how he knew it was NVA artillery, but he was right. Within minutes Company B reported that it was also taking indirect ftre. The enemy kept up a mix of mortar and artillery ftre throughout the day. The marines' answer to the NVA artillery was a counterbattery program from the ftres of several heavy and light cruisers doing duty in the Gulf of Tonkin. The naval gunfire effectively targeted the batteries across the DMZ, but it took time to get it started. The NVA gunners tried to avoid it by throwing artillery ftre at us in short volleys of six to 12 rounds; their quick aim was often deadly and the 3d Platoon, which was some distance to the rear, bore the brunt of its murderous effects that day. One of the first rounds struck between Sgt. Larry See and Pvt. Paul Barker. As fate would have it Barker fell mortally wounded, and See, except for ringing ears from the near miss, was unhurt. Sergeant See had volunteered for the draft and, after basic training, had gained sergeant's stripes through the noncommissioned officers course at Fort Benning, Georgia. Service in Vietnam came afterward, and he had joined the company in March. See took over a squad in the 3d Platoon, where he quickly proved to be one of the most capable junior NCOs in the company. Sp5c. Paul Commer, the platoon medic, arrived quickly afterward and found Sergeant See standing near his seriously wounded ammo bearer. Commer was an experienced field medic, but Barker's wounds were beyond his capabilities. There was nothing to do for Barker, and the news tore into the conscientious young squad leader. See made what was for him a gut-wrenching decision and turned his attention back to his squad. He left Barker in the medic's hands and moved his squad forward.7

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248

Through the Valley

Somebody in the 3d Platoon radioed me that they had four men wounded and one dead, so I radioed the battalion for a dustoff. The duty officer told me that I would have to go through medical channels, then gave me a frequency and a call sign to use. The marines did things differently, and their air evacuation system cut the battalion out of the loop. I radioed a description of the casualties to a strange radio operator who told me that he would put the company on a waiting list. After 20 minutes and no medevac, I contacted the dustoff operator to find out our status and was told we were still on the list. I was frustrated by that time and radioed battalion and restated the problem. Within 5 minutes, Lieutenant Colonel Snyder's helicopter had swooped into an LZ that the 3d Platoon had secured in the paddy, picked up the wounded, and dropped off a load of ammunition. The C and C ship served thereafter as a combined dustoff and resupply ship for the attacking companies. The FACs continued to dump napalm and high explosives into the NVA positions. The ceiling was down to about 800 feet and forced the FACs to fly dangerously close to the ground to mark the targets. Working the sky above Nhi Ha was hazardous and unforgiving. Major Power commented in his diary that marking a target that close to an NVA machine gun "is a non-habit-forming practice." Capt. Mel Gibson, whose call sign was Helix 17, replaced Paul on station. Gibson had one engine of his 0-2 shot out but continued to put in air strikes, many of which were 30 to 50 meters from Delta Company. The bombs must have taken a toll of the NVA troops, but this did not stop them from throwing up a curtain of steel above their positions. A chatter of automatic weapons fire greeted each fighter, tracked it across the island, and followed it until it was out of range. The heavy fire made for hazardous work, and two A-4s out of Chu Lai took hits that afternoon. Later in the day, the NVA gunners shot down a marine Crusader aircraft putting in an air strike north of Nhi Ha, killing the pilot. s Commer had remained with Barker until he died, and then found his own platoon leader and rejoined the platoon CP until he was needed. There was another spate of mortar fire and a call for a medic rang out. Commer grabbed his aid bag, ran toward the enemy entrenchment, and found Sergeant See standing beside a seriously wounded Pvt. Ronald Edwards. See, though visibly shaken by the near miss, had escaped a second close call, with a small shrapnel wound in his back. See helped Edwards back to the LZ but refused evacuation for himself so he could remain with his men. Sergeant See was that kind of soldier.9 The lead platoons and the NVA had traded rifle and machine gun fire through the hedgerows all afternoon with little effect. The bamboo hedgerows were like green, impenetrable armored walls, and our light antitank weapons did not make a dent in them. We made no progress. At 1830 Snyder radioed and directed me to pull Task Force Delta back

The Second Day

249

to the graveyard. I passed the word to Skrzysowski and Weidner to break contact. Bivey changed the artillery support mission to a mix of whitephosphorus and high-explosive rounds to screen the platoons as they left their positions, then brought the artillery closer and covered our withdrawal. The two companies withdrew in good order, and the close-in artillery discouraged the NVA soldiers from leaving their trenches and following us. Alpha Company had reached the graveyard when we were about threequarters of the way across the paddy and mired in hip-deep water-the exact time an NVA artillery battery opened fire on us. Running was impossible. We hunkered down behind a dike and watched the rounds fall into the paddy and kick up huge geysers of water around us. The NVA barrage stopped abruptly, and we hurried the rest of the way to the laager site. As I crawled out of the paddy onto dry ground the NVA battery opened up again. I raced for a hole and watched a man beat me to it; I yelled for him to move and then dove in. I had barely hit the bottom when the barrage stopped again. The story was much the same throughout the company. Sgt. Bernie Borowski later related his experience that afternoon: "I jumped next to a grave mound and a bunch of shells hit. One was real close and it knocked my helmet off. I reached for my helmet and another one went off and knocked my glasses off. Then I got scared and grabbed my glasses and helmet and ran. I was just lucky that the shelling stopped then, or I would have got hit when I panicked and ran. I did lose my bayonet, .45, and two canteens."lO One of the first men I saw when I got to the company's CP was Sergeant 1st Class Decker. It had been a long day, and I was happy to see him. Top Decker always seemed to show up when the company needed him the most. Captain Leach was also there. He somehow had heard about the fiasco with his company, scrapped his R and R plans, and found a ride north. After Leach's arrival at the battalion CP, the battalion commander gave him a quick, cursory briefing on the tactical situation and Leach caught a helicopter and joined Company C in the laager. As he sought out his executive officer an NVA 152mm battery sent a swarm of shells crashing into the turf nearby.ll After his initial contact with the company's XO he knew the man was combat ineffective. Leach wrote of the episode with the lieutenant later: "I was not angry. He had had enough. He was a brave soldier that dido 't deserve to be in command of a rifle company that found itself in an NVA buzz saw."12 Although Leach was not angry at the XO, he was nonetheless upset about the loss of the men from the 2d Platoon and their promising young leader. "Lieutenant Guthrie's death put a bad taste in my mouth," Leach wrote later. "He led by example and always endured the same hardships he placed upon his soldiers."13

250

Through the Valley

Denny Leach was the best officer friend I had in the battalion, and we felt comfortable working with one another. I was glad that he was back. The second day in Nhi Ha had cost the battalion two killed and 22 wounded, and we had nothing to show for it.

Notes 1. The infiltration history for the 270th NVA Regiment can be found in the untitled documents, National Archives, College Park, Md., 1 May 1968. 2. Paul Power, letter to author, 8 January 1991. 3. Ibid. 4. Paul Power, FACs of WAR: Diary of Helix 11 (1968). 5. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline, 5 June 1968. 6. Stephen J. Bingen, letter to author, 6 January 1994. 7. Paul Commer, letter to author, 4 June 1997. 8. Power, FACs of WAR. 9. Commer letter, 4 June 1997. 10. Bernie Borowski, video and tape to author, 3 December 1991. 11. Brig. Gen. Dennis A. Leach (Ret.),letter to author, 13 May 1998. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid

27

4 May

M

aj. Paul Power was over Nhi Ha before sunrise talking to Capt. Denny Leach and me, trying to figure where best to strike as he was buzzing low over the island held by the enemy. At 0730 a set of F-4s loaded with napalm and high-explosive bombs and sporting Phantom 91 as their radio call sign appeared in the early morning sky and checked in with Major Power. After the FAC gave them a quick rundown on the target, the fighters roared off to set up their run on the fortified hamlet. The Phantoms were distant specks in the sky when Helix 11 rolled the 0-2 over in a steep dive and unleashed a white-phosphorus rocket into the NVA's fortifications. The two fighters, flying low, fast, and in tandem homed in on the FAC's mark and hurled their incendiaries onto the island with academic precision. A white concussion ring appeared briefly above the trees, followed a split-second later by a thunderous clap of exploding 500-pound bombs marking their second run. Another air strike, this one flown by A-4 Skyhawk pilots, went in 30 minutes later.l Between air strikes, and immediately afterward, the company FOs continued the pounding of Nhi Ha with all the artillery the marines would give them. Sometime close to 0930 battalion told us to go, so we threw on our rucksacks and Companies C and D departed the graveyard for Nhi Ha. Our rucksacks weighed in at 50 pounds or more, but neither Leach nor I wanted to get stuck in a tough spot without the rations and extra water and ammunition they contained. Each company had two platoons to the fore and a third trailing. Leach took the northern flank and retraced Alpha Company's steps across the paddy. He later wrote: "The platoon leaders were still smarting from the previous day's action; however, they were confident and I had no doubts that they would perform well in the future. "2 Company D, as the day before, was on the south. As we were crossing 800 meters of open paddy, the unit's FOs continued an unchanging drumbeat of fire on the wood line. We had used the same route 2 days in a row, 251

252

Through the Valley

and the NVA forces must have known that we were coming. I have often wondered since then why they did not move a platoon, or at least a couple of machine guns, to the wood line and engage us as we crossed the paddy. We were thankful that they did not. We reached the island and started a slow, methodical sweep west through the underbrush. At 1020 the lead platoons ran into a gale of automatic weapons fire. As we shucked rucksacks, sought cover, and returned fire, the NVA began a brief but heavy artillery barrage. The artillery and air strikes had not nudged the NVA units in the slightest, and they held their positions with the same tenacity as on the first day of the battle.3 A bunker in the bamboo hedgerow at the western edge of the paddy held one of Company C's platoons in check. Denny Leach was directly behind Sfc. William Brooks and watched his NCO lead a squad across the paddy, close with the bunker, and kill the three NVA soldiers that occupied it. Heavy enemy fire from adjacent positions quickly made the position untenable, and Leach directed the squad to withdraw. As the men made their way through the bamboo to the paddy's edge, Brooks raised a captured AK-47 above his head to show his company commander when a sniper downed him. Brooks had been hit in the head and chest and was dead by the time Leach was able to crawl to him.4 Fire from the trench where Company C's point men had first collided with the NVA had also stopped Lieutenant Weidner's men cold for a second day. Lieutenant Skrzysowski and his men reached the irrigation ditch where they had been the day before without contacting the enemy. The ditch was hip deep and followed the trace of a bamboo hedge. A small clearing dotted with bomb craters and grave mounds lay beyond the ditch. I radioed him to push forward, and he and several men started across the graveyard toward a wall of bamboo bordering its other side. Pvt. Reynaldo Torres and Pvt. Hector Rodriquez were a few meters ahead of the others and had almost reached the hedgerow when NVA positions hidden in the thi~ket and others on their left flank opened fire. Torres and Rodriquez somehow escaped the hail of bullets, found cover in a bomb crater with Skrzysowski, and stayed put. Sgt. John Clancy, just meters behind them, jumped into another crater and stayed low.s Clancy remembers that there was no place else to go: "The bullets were flying and I'm trying to fire, but when you put your head up, you were getting shot at pretty good. "6 S. Sgt. Charles Black, a former marine and a solid soldier who had joined the company with me, fell to the ground with a shattered elbow. Two riflemen also went down, seriously wounded in the crossfire. An enemy sniper hidden in a second graveyard south of the island added to the 1st Platoon's problems.? Skrzysowski radioed me his predicament and asked for artillery and air support. Bivey got on the radio and changed the ongoing artillery mission

4May

253

to "danger close," meaning that the impacting shells would be within 100 meters of the 1st Platoon. Tom Beyer had replaced Major Power at about 1030 and had set about getting us an air strike. Twenty minutes later Tom let me know that he had a set of F-4s 5 minutes away. I radioed Weidner and Skrzysowski to mark their positions with smoke, and shortly afterward Beyer slammed a whitephosphorus rocket marking round into the ground to our left front. s Skrzysowski and his men were within meters of where the napalm struck. Hoping that the burning gas would cover them, he yelled to the others to make a break for it; the men sprinted for the irrigation ditch, taking their wounded with them. The machine gun on the flank, untouched by the napalm and artillery, cut down Skrzysowski and his radio operator. Somebody dragged the two men to the safety of the ditch, where the medic could work on them. Skrzysowski had multiple wounds and was in serious condition. Clancy had felt the searing heat from the burning napalm and remembers thinking, "Oh, Lord, have mercy." Then, as the fire sucked the oxygen from the air, he threw himself in the very bottom of the crater. He did not know where his lieutenant was, but did know that Rodriquez and Torres were closer yet to the inferno and figured they were dead. A steady stream of rounds split the air above him making a dash back to the ditch risky, but it was better than sitting through the terror of another napalm strike. He decided run for it on the count of three, but his feet would not move. On his third try he summoned all of his courage and blew out of the crater, running for the irrigation ditch and diving into it, landing on top of his badly injured platoon leader. Fortunately, Skrzysowski was still wearing his steel helmet and avoided more injury.9 Rodriquez and Torres were close on Clancy's heels. Sfc. Buford Mathis radioed to let me know what had happened. Mathis was a professional soldier who needed no guidance about what he had to do and set about getting the wounded evacuated. At some point that morning, the Bravo Company commander radioed me and suggested we use flamethrowers to penetrate the NVA's defenses. Leach overheard the Bravo Company commander's suggestion and radioed me shortly afterward to say: "If that son of a bitch thinks we ought to use flamethrowers why doesn't he come over and show us how to do it." That was vintage Leach. Meanwhile, I moved my CP forward and set up behind a rubble pile on a slight berm to get into a position where I could see to the front. The day before, my CP had been in a bomb crater located between the reserve and the forward platoons. I did not feel that I could control the situation from the center and, on top of that, felt my place should be forward. My location on the berm put me between the forward platoons and certainly provided me a vantage point. The 1st Platoon's line stretched left of my CP toward

254

Through the Valley

the southern edge of the village and disappeared in the shaggy mass of green. The 2d Platoon occupied the right end of the berm along with a huge bomb crater 15 meters from the CP. At that point, the line formed a dogleg around the end of the rice paddy and tied in with Charlie Company's left flank. Charlie Company's dead were between the berm and the trench. Some of the men were close, but there was no way we could retrieve them without getting more men killed. One of the men lay next to an early-model M16 rifle. A cleaning rod stuck in the barrel suggested that the weapon had jammed and he had been in the process of clearing it. The soldier was young, and the story was that he joined the army at age 17 and lied about his age.to A short segment of the first trench crossed an opening between two hedgerows 30 meters to our front, and we caught quick glimpses of NVA soldiers scurrying along it. Some of the men on the berm spotted other enemy soldiers 150 meters beyond the trench. Two lines of fortifications regularly made up a North Vietnamese defensive complex, and it is my opinion that we had hit the outer trench of the 4-270th NVARegiment.ll Later, someone on the battalion staff claimed that we had hit the enemy's combat outpost line (COPL). How battalion arrived at that conclusion is still uncertain to me because no one from the headquarters was ever on the ground during the attack. Besides, the purpose of a COPL is to provide early warning, deceive as to the location of the main battle positions, and delay an attacking force. Long-range observation is fundamental to its success. For the NVA to hide it in the middle of the island where visibility was 50 meters or less did not make tactical sense. Neither Denny Leach nor I had believed that the complex to our front was a lightly defended outpost line. I cannot prove it but suspect that the enemy battalion followed the time-tested North Vietnamese practice and positioned lookouts throughout the surrounding terrain to watch our movements and provide the main battle position early waming.l2 Major Power and his FACs continued the air support, directing the fighters to drop napalm and strafe with their 20mm guns within 30 meters of our positions. High-explosive bombs were often dropped within 100 meters of us, and even closer on a couple of occasions. The air strikes appeared lethal from our place on the berm, and Sgt. Bernie Borowski remembers what it was like to be that close to one: "The jets were real impressive when they bombed or shot 20mm or rockets. They scared me, and they weren't even coming at us. I know they had to have scared Charlie. Even now when a jet flies low over me I get a taste of the raw fear I knew back in Nam."13 Power noted in his diary that dropping bombs so close to troops, though not allowed, was necessary under the circumstances. Power went on to write: "We probably broke every rule in the book of rules of engagement at Nhi Ha."14

4May

255

Pfc. Steve Bingham was an assistant machine gunner in the 1st Platoon and remembers the close strikes: "The air support was phenomenal. I remember the F-4s coming in at treetop level with their cannons at a low roar and the empty brass raining down. They would release their bombs and they would float to the ground at such a low angle that they looked like they would land in our laps, but the bombs would always hit their target. It still seems as though we could have reached up and touched those bombs with our hands."l5 We needed the close support, but the process came with certain risk. Capt. Mel Gibson had replaced Tom Beyer and was putting in a strike with a couple of A-4s when one of the pilots took it upon himself to change the route into the target. I recall looking over my shoulder and seeing two huge canisters of napalm coming right at us. My first thought was that I was a dead man, but the bombs somehow sailed over our position and hit the NVA trench. Except for some jangled nerves, we escaped the near miss without major injury. The close call shook Gibson more than it did those of us on the ground, and he told Paul Power that he would never work that close to friendlies again.l6 Lieutenant Colonel Snyder radioed us to push forward right after one of the air strikes. Weidner took some men and moved cautiously forward, while Charlie Company sent two squads across the narrow paddy. There was no fire, and it appeared that the NVA to our immediate front had pulled back to the second trench. It was not so on the right flank where Leach's men came under heavy attack from three sides. As Charlie Company's squads withdrew, I radioed Weidner to pull back before he was cut off. Shortly afterward, Snyder radioed Leach and me to ask what we thought about holding our positions for the night and to tell us that he wanted our thoughts later. I did not have strong opinions one way or the other and thought we could hold the position if the commander told us to do it. Leach, however, believed that our current position would be indefensible after dark and was vehemently against it. Leach recalled the time in a letter to me later: "The first priority in the defense is to establish all around security. Here we were, nose to nose with the NVA, we were not dug in, the NVA had their artillery zeroed in on us and given the proximity of the NVA, our artillery support would have been minimal, especially at night."l7 The purpose of the defense is to defeat the enemy's attack and gain the initiative for offensive operation. Given the situation, Leach did not feel that we would gain the initiative by defending in place. He made his way to my position to talk to me about Snyder's idea. The first thing I remember him saying when he got to my CP was that it was too far forward. Then, without drawing a breath, he launched into his objections about remaining in position for the night. His main points were that we could not hold the position after it got dark and that there was no suitable ground to our immediate rear that was any better.

256

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While he was talking, an RPG round slammed into the rear of the bomb crater. The 2d Platoon had been firing LAWs and trading shots with an RPG gunner throughout the day, and one of Weidner's men had been wounded earlier. This RPG round severely wounded Sfc. Floyd Buell who had just crawled into the crater with ammunition and water for his men. Shortly afterward, a second round plunged into the sandy soil 10 meters from the CP and exploded. The soft ground absorbed the shrapnel, but the blast jolted Denny and me and covered us with a cloud of dirt.18 The incoming RPG rounds made Leach angry with me for being where I was and he called me a reckless son of a bitch. Then, in complete selfcontradiction, he stood up in full view of the NVA, emptied the magazine of his captured AK-47 at the trench line, and crawled back to his CP. Later Leach and I both recommended against staying in the village that night. During one of the last runs of the day, the C and C helicopter hit a paddy dike and damaged a skid while trying to land a load of ammunition. The crew was unhurt. The pilot radioed battalion; within 10 minutes another ship had swooped in and taken them away. Thirty minutes or so after the helicopter accident, Lieutenant Colonel Snyder gave us permission to break contact. Charlie Company moved out smartly, but things did not go as smoothly for Company D.19 Bivey requested white phosphorus in place of high explosive to screen the platoons, and I radioed Weidner and Mathis to go. Breaking contact with an enemy force at close quarters is never simple, so we planned to use the artillery to provide a wall of steel and smoke between the NVA and us as we fell back. Bringing artillery in that close is dangerous: as we left our positions a white-phosphorus round landed short and struck the ground just behind the company headquarters. The round blanketed us in thick white smoke, but we somehow again escaped injury from our own fire. In anticipation of pulling back, Sgt. John Clancy had gathered all the ammunition that he could for his M60 machine gun and placed it in layers on a banana leaf. When Sergeant 1st Class Mathis gave the word to move back, Clancy opened fire to cover the 1st Platoon's withdrawal. Clancy remembers: "The only problem was they pulled back and left me thereJesus."20 The NVA soldiers came out of their trenches and followed the 1st Platoon as it left the irrigation ditch. Clancy: "I was down to my last 50 rounds and everybody else was gone. I said to the last 50 rounds, 'Let's make this one big burst and get the hell out of here.' By this time though, they had me zeroed in, the bullets were zinging every which way. I don't know how I didn't get shot, I don't know how. God saved me."21 Mathis radioed that he was in danger of getting flanked-this was from a steady NCO who was prone to neither panic nor exaggeration. The situation concerned me, and I radioed Snyder to let him know the NVA forces

4May

257

had come out of their positions and were pursuing us. The battalion commander replied that if they were out in the open we ought to be able to shoot them. Meanwhile the 2d Platoon and company headquarters had reached the damaged helicopter. The crew had pulled out the ship's radios, but the gunners had left the two machine guns and extra barrels for the guns as well as the cases of ammunition. I was not about to leave any of the ammunition for the NVA. While we were unloading the helicopter, Mathis radioed me that he was also taking fire from the sniper who had badgered them throughout the day. About that time Helix 15 arrived on station. Beyer wasted no time in directing a fighter strike, the tenth of the day, into our old positions.22 In the midst of the frenzy, the battalion commander radioed and asked me what I thought about leaving a squad to secure the Huey for the night. The query made no sense, considering what was taking place at that moment, and my reply to him was curt. (I did apologize for my impudence when I saw him several days later.) The air strike allowed the men of the 1st Platoon to finally break contact and reach the paddy. As they were crossing it, Bivey adjusted the artillery rounds in closer until they were striking the wood line. The NVA batteries remained silent, and we reached the graveyard without incident. Company C had four men wounded and one killed, and Delta Company counted 10 wounded, eight of whom seriously. The loss of the experience and leadership of Skrzysowski and Buell would hurt the company in the coming weeks. It had been a very long and fruitless day. Denny Leach and I sat down and talked about what to do. There did not seem to be a way to breach the NVA's defenses. Light infantry weapons were not effective, and the LAW, designed to combat armor, would not penetrate the thick bamboo hedges. The NVA force had anchored both ends of its forward defensive line on the open paddies, therefore making a flanking maneuver a foolish move. Both our close air support and artillery had been exceptional; however, the enemy's positions were such that they could stand up to direct hit by a 105mm shell or a near miss by a 250-pound bomb. We needed something heavy to break the gridlock. Paul Power was flying as an observer with Tom Beyer that afternoon; it was Paul who came up with the idea of using 2,000-pound bombs with delayed fuses on the NVA positions. The delayed fuses would allow the bombs to sink deep into the sandy soil before exploding, and the concussion was certain to collapse the bunkers and kill the occupants. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder bought Paul's suggestion and made plans to move Company B out of Lam Xuan (West) to allow the fighters the room to work.23 We figured that the heavy bombs would break the NVA force's back, and the plan was for Companies A and C to resume the attack on the heels of the air strikes. Delta Company would be in reserve.

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It was a restless night. A little past midnight the battalion's liaison NCO on Alpha One reported that three NVA companies, numbering 120 men each, were a few hundred meters west of Nhi Ha. Although never confirmed, battalion headquarters believed that some of the southbound units had been reinforcing the defenses at Nhi Ha during the previous couple of days.24 Three hours later an NVA force probed the perimeter with small-arms fire and grenades, and shortly afterward one of Company C's listening posts killed two enemy soldiers. Later, a soldier in Charlie Company's 2d Platoon killed an enemy lieutenant who had obviously mistaken our laager for an NVA position and had approached our soldier's foxhole and begun talking to him. The enemy officer, clad in black pajama pants and a gray shirt, had the muzzle of his AK-47 wrapped in parachute cloth and was unprepared for a ftght.25 The rest of the night passed quietly.

Notes 1. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/ Saline, 5 June 1968. 2. Brig. Gen. Dennis A. Leach, letter to author, 13 May 1998. 3. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline. 4. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 May 1968; Leach letter. 5. John Clancy, video and tape to author, 1992. 6. Ibid. 7. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline. 8. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 May 1968. 9. Clancy tape. 10. Stephen J. Bingen, letter to author, 6 January 1994. 11. Ibid. 12. Brig. Gen. Dennis A. Leach, letter to author, 7 January 1998. 13. Bernie Borowski, tape to author, 3 December 1991. 14. Paul Power, FACs of WAR: Diary of Helix 11 (1968). 15. Bingen letter. 16. Power, FACs of WAR. 17. Leach letter, 13 May 1998. 18. Borowski tape. 19. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/ Saline. 20. Clancy tape. 21. Ibid. 22. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 May 1968. 23. Power, FACs of WAR. 24. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 4 May 1968. 25. Ibid.

28 Lam Xuan

II

w

ould you believe that the VC picked last night to blast every one in I Corps with 122mm rockets?" Maj. Paul Power noted in his diary a day later, 5 May. Paul Power and Tom Beyer had arrived over Nhi Ha 30 minutes after sunrise to coordinate the air strikes supporting the attack and to tell us that 2,000-pound bombs were suddenly in short supply.' The NVA attack that Major Power referred to would become known as "mini-Tet" and extended beyond the boundaries of I Corps. During the early morning hours of 5 May there had been some 199 separate attacks on airfields, installations, and cities throughout the country. As luck would have it Da Nang, home to a squadron of F-8 Crusaders that Major Power had planned on to carry the heavy ordnance, had been on the NVA's target list, so the planes never showed. The airfield at Chu Lai had also received 35 rounds of 122mm rocket fire, but the attack had not curtailed airfield operations.2 Paul Power, unhappy with the way the morning had started, was even angrier about the bombing skills of the fighter pilots. "We finally got F-4s from Chu Lai and Phang Rang but only two 2,000 pounders. One of which the SOB of a pilot threw out in the rice paddy, missing the target by a good 200 meters. The other put his bomb within 50 meters of where we wanted it. The other F-4s with 750s and 500 pounders did fair work."3 The first air strikes went in at 0810, and pilots had plenty of room in which to operate. Company B had pulled back 1,000 meters south of Lam Xuan (West) and set up to wait out the air strikes; the graveyard where we sat was 800 meters from the target. Even at that distance, however, there was the likelihood of flying debris, and a couple of good-sized chunks of metal fell into our perimeter. 4 Sgt. Bernie Borowski recalls: "I heard something coming, a piece of shrapnel from the bomb. I tried to crawl into my helmet and got down in the foxhole, and the damned piece of shrapnel hit my tailbone just above

259

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Through the Valley

my ass. I was sore for awhile but it never cut me. I picked up the piece of iron and still have it."5 The air strikes were over at a little past 0900, and Alpha and Charlie Companies moved out of the perimeter behind a shield of artillery to cross the paddy for Nhi Ha. It was Company D's turn to go into reserve, but after 3 days of fighting for it, I was more than annoyed that we were not involved in securing the hamlet. Neither company met resistance. The 4270th NVA Battalion had vacated its positions and gone. By 1130 Leach had reported the objective secure.6 Company C went about the grim task of recovering its dead. The event still distresses Bill Gerber and he remembers the day. "After we got into Nhi Ha we both went to retrieve Guthrie's body, I don't remember who the others were. My biggest nightmare that I still have is seeing that body that had been in the sun for 3 days and knowing I left him there. After loading him on the chopper I remember throwing up for a long while."7 The battalion's mission at that point was to establish patrol bases at the three original objectives. That afternoon, battalion formed Task Force Tiger in Nhi Ha with Company A and Company C. Leach assumed command of the hamlet's defenses. Company B returned to its positions at Lam Xuan (West), and Company D moved to Lam Xuan (East). Before the company pulled out of the Nhi Ha area, battalion sent out two lieutenants, both fresh out of Officer Candidate School, to replace Dunlap and Skrzysowski. Lt. Richard Holt, an energetic young man who had grown up in the army, took over the 3d Platoon. Holt proudly carried a hunting knife with a bone handle that his father had from World War II and was eager to get started. The 1st Platoon leader, whose name has been lost to time, was a bit more reserved than was Holt, but was equally conscientious about doing a good job. There was not much to Lam Xuan (East), and it was hard to imagine that anyone had ever lived there. A shallow ditch followed a quadrangle of uneven bamboo hedges around the hamlet's boundaries. My plan was to use the ditch as a secondary position should it become necessary, so I pushed the company perimeter out beyond the bamboo. The marines had built a sturdy bunker not far from the banks of Jones Creek, and I selected it for the CP and aid station. The sandy soil offered no resistance, and the outline of a perimeter quickly took shape. But large, tough knots of bushes grew throughout the area; clearing them to create fields of fire was difficult. The bamboo, though, proved most resistant. Pfc. Raymond Schmitt recalls that detonation cord sometimes cut the thick trunks but did little else. 8 Denny Leach also stuck to the basics when he set up his position at Nhi Ha. Jones Creek provided a natural barrier and the least likely avenue of approach for an attacking force, so he deployed Company A to defend that sector. He felt that an enemy attack would probably come from the north

Lam Xuan

261

and he chose to cover that ground with Company C. The two companies spent the day digging in and taking advantage of what cover and concealment was available. While the platoons dug, Leach fired artillery concentrations around the perimeter and selected the nighttime locations for the TF Tiger listening posts.9 Delta Company's local security the evening of 5 May picked up some movement around the company's perimeter, but nothing significant. TF Tiger had the real excitement. The fireworks started shortly after midnight when one of Charlie Company's LPs reported five NVA soldiers to the front of its position. Later, the LP detected five other NVA soldiers near its position and took them under fire with M79 canister rounds, killing one. Leach retrieved the LP, placed the company on full alert, and waited.IO Shortly before 0400 on 6 May, Leach reported that NVA soldiers wearing gas masks had thrown tear gas into his position and that an M79 round had exploded inside his perimeter. Later the NVA launched two searching probes, one from the north and the other from the west. Leach identified at least four groups of NVA, numbering from 10 to 50 troops each, around the TF Tiger perimeter. While Company C fought off the attacking NVA, an LP from Company A killed three enemy soldiers who were scouting the south side of the perimeter.ll The enemy's main effort was a two-pronged attack that came at 0520. While an enemy platoon struck the north side of the position, a company of about 100 men attacked from the east and across the same ground we had two days before. Charlie Company repelled the attackers, but the NVA force, not yet finished for the morning, quickly mounted a second attempt. The second attack also failed, and by the time the sun rose the enemy had broken contact and was withdrawing north.12 The attacking enemy force had not been strong enough to overwhelm the TF Tiger perimeter and it had not intended to do so. The attackers were part of a larger force trying to find weak spots in the TF's defense, identify weapons positions, and map the general layout of the perimeter. After gathering that information, the battalion commander would analyze it and use it to plan the attack on Nhi Ha that would come soon.

Notes 1. Paul Power, FACs of WAR: Diary of Helix 11 (1968). 2. Ibid.; Americal Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 July 1968, 7 August 1968. An account of the country-wide attacks, including the attack on Da Nang, can be found in Ronald H. Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1993), pp. 157-183. 3. Power, FACs of WAR. 4. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 May 1968.

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5. Bernie Borowski, video and tape to author, 3 December 1991. 6. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 May 1968. I was later told that battalion planned for Delta Company to hit the NVA's north flank if Alpha and Charlie Companies met any opposition. Such a flanking movement would have crowded the units into a 200-meter space, restricting the use of supporting artillery and denying the use of close air support to all three companies. Moreover, an assault across an open rice paddy against bunkers, in my view, would have been disastrous. I found no reference to the plan in the 3-21st Infantry's archival records. 7. Bill E. Gerber, communications with author, February-October 1997. 8. Raymond P. Schmitt, letter to author, 12 December 1997. 9. Brig. Gen. Dennis A. Leach (Ret.), letter to author, 13 May 1998. 10. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/ Saline, 5 June 1968. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid.

29 Xom Phoung

0

n the morning of 6 May battalion alerted the commander of Company A to pursue the enemy forces to regain contact with them. Battalion intended it to be a reconnaissance in force, an operation designed to gain information on the enemy; but plans made in haste are never right, and this one was deadly flawed. The plan called for Company A to patrol 1,000 meters northwest to the hamlet of Xom Phoung, attack and seize its southem tip, determine the enemy situation in the area, and return to Nhi Ha. Company B would screen Company A's left flank with one rifle platoon during its move north. The platoon would remain under the operational control of Company B during the operation.! The NVA virtually controlled the terrain north of Nhi Ha, and the likelihood that the NVA held the area around Xom Phoung in at least company strength and was in prepared fighting positions was strong. The enemy company that had attacked Task Force Tiger's perimeter had withdrawn in the direction of Xom Phoung only a few hours before. Some of the basic rules in planning for an attack also apply to a reconnaissance in force. One of the most basic precepts is that the assaulting force outnumbers the defenders by a ratio of three to one. Anything less on the attacking side dictates the extensive use of artillery and tactical air assets to support the attacking force. Although battalion anticipated that Company A would meet with enemy forces during the operation, there appears to have been little or no planning for support in that eventuality. Furthermore the terrain favored the defender. Xom Phoung sat on the banks of tree-lined Jones Creek and overlooked the swath of rice paddies between it and Nhi Ha. Except for a large graveyard near the woods on the northeast side of the paddy, the route to the objective was wide open. A position in the hamlet afforded a defender longrange observation and unrestricted fields of fire to the southeast. The platoon from Company B would screen Company A's left flank, but battalion did not consider the wooded area that paralleled Company A's right flank. 263

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Our experience of the past days had taught us the difficulties of breaking contact with a well-equipped, aggressive enemy. However, battalion made no plans, at least none that I am aware of, to extricate or to reinforce Company A should it become necessary. Leach's Company C would have been the logical choice for such a task, but battalion gave him no orders to prepare for such an emergency. If Company A ran into trouble, its commander, commissioned as a Quartermaster Corps officer only 2 years before, then detailed into the infantry, would have to deal with that contingency. Why the battalion gave the weakest commander in the battalion the mission instead of assigning it to Leach will be forever a mystery to me. Meanwhile, an early morning patrol from the Specter platoon had spotted 40 to 50 NVA clad in green uniforms and wearing steel helmets near the ruined hamlet of My Loc. The sighting was only 1,500 meters from Lam Xuan (East), and battalion directed Delta Company into the area. The company swept the hamlet and spent the morning poking through the rubble, but found no sign of the NVA that Specter had reported. Battalion fmally called our operation off at midday, and we closed into Lam Xuan (East) in the early afternoon.2 At 1330 the commander of Company A formed his unit, with the 2d Platoon on the left, the 3d Platoon on the right, and the 1st Platoon following a short distance behind, and started the unit through the center of the paddy toward the objective. As Alpha Company departed Nhi Ha, the 2d Platoon, Company B departed Lam Xuan (West) to screen the west bank of Jones Creek.3 Alpha Company's operation had all the makings of a disaster from the beginning. First, the company commander made no effort to obscure his movement by firing smoke on the objective, nor to secure the wood line that ran parallel with his company's right flank. For unknown reasons, the battalion made no effort to correct either deficiency while there was time. In combat, the soldier pays for the sins and shortcomings of his commanders, and this clumsy disregard for security needlessly cost a number of young men their lives. Company A was about 10 minutes out of Nhi Ha when the commander reported taking some ineffective sniper fire from the large graveyard to his right front. The 3d Platoon, which was on that flank, returned fire and the company continued toward its objective.4 When Alpha Company was drawing closer to the wood line that ran perpendicular to its front, Maj. Paul Power, who had relieved Capt. Mel Gibson on station at noon, buzzed the company. Power remembers the afternoon: I called the Alpha Six and said that I would drop down low over the rice paddy and check out the tree line on the other end of the paddy. I

Xom Phoung

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did, flying over the friendlies from south to north, and as I got to the tree line rolled vertical in an attempt to look straight down. I saw nothing. They [the enemy] kept themselves well hidden. I was only at about 25 feet altitude and an uncovered face would have given their position away. If only one guy had turned to look at me or shoot at my 0-2, I would have seen him and been able to warn Alpha 6. I no sooner pulled up to 1,500 feet then all hell broke loose on the ground.5 Pvt. Bill Baird was a rifleman in Company A's 3d Platoon and had volunteered to walk point that afternoon to do something different. Baird recalls: "I was walking about 25 to 30 yards ahead of the rest, and the next thing I knew there was a boom and I'm laying on the side of a dike."6 The mine that Baird had tripped had exploded virtually beneath his feet and shredded his legs and buttocks. A tracer round fired by one of the gunners in the woods had also struck Baird in the lower back. Unable to walk because of his injuries, Baird lay in place while the battle swirled around him. Baird's squad leader was not wounded and lay a few meters away. The explosion had also served as a signal for the NVA hidden in the hedgerows less than 100 meters distant to open fire on the men in the paddy. 7 The enemy fire to the company's front, supplemented by the devastating fires of a .50-caliber machine gun, grew in intensity and fixed the lead platoons in place. It was exactly what the NVA had planned. Seconds after the fight had started, enemy soldiers surged out of the woods into the rice paddy and charged the 3d Platoon. Major Power, who later described the rushing enemy soldiers as a scene out of a World War I movie, watched helplessly as the brownish green paddy and woods below him convulsed into a nightmare of bloody clashes. Some of the men escaped the conflagration in the paddy by diving into bomb craters and shell holes. Others were not so lucky, and Power watched in dismay as a fiery scythe sliced through the 3d Platoon killing 11 men. He requested an immediate air strike, but it would be a very long 90 minutes before the first fighters arrived on station.s (See Map 29.1.) Accurate fire of one machine gun in the 1st Platoon helped save the 3d Platoon from destruction and pushed the NVA back into the wood line. Alpha Company's fight, however, had just started. The company was still under heavy fire from the bunkered positions to its front and the heavy machine gun on the right flank. Shortly after Company A repelled the enemy's assault, clusters of 82mm rounds fired from positions near Xom Phoung began falling in the paddy. Company C, still located in the patrol base, also came under mortar fire.9 At 1540 enemy troops north of the hamlet crossed Jones Creek and moved southeast along the western bank of the creek in a second attempt to outflank Company A. Combined fire from the 1st and 2d Platoons halted

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the NVA troops' move and turned them back. Meanwhile, some of Alpha Company's squads had been able to extricate themselves from the killing zone and make it back to the patrol base. Capt. Dennis Leach recalls the afternoon: "Given the radio traffic, I was not aware of A Cqmpany's demise until several soldiers came running back into the perimeter. Most had abandoned their weapons. It was another unnecessary foray into the NVA meat grinder."lO Capt. Tom Beyer, who had relieved Power on station, put in the first air strike at 1650 hours. Beyer, directing a combination of napalm and high explosives, struck the enemy positions around Xom Phoung. A combination of smoke fired by the artillery and the air strikes allowed Company A to withdraw the rest of its platoons to the patrol base at 1815 hours.ll Bill Baird, weak from the loss of blood, had drifted in and out of consciousness throughout the afternoon. He was in bad shape, but he was cognizant of his surroundings, had watched the air strikes, and remembers watching the company pull farther and farther away from where he lay. As darkness fell over the battlefield Baird's squad leader elected to save himself and crawled away.l2 The NVA found Baird shortly after dark. Although his trouser legs were soaked with blood from his wounds, one of his captors still demanded that he walk. When Baird told him that he could not, another NVA shot him in the neck with an AK-47. Baird said later that the rifle shot sounded as if a giant gong had gone off in his head. He believes that the soldiers did not believe him and had shot him to see whether he would react by jumping to his feet. When the NVA soldiers saw that he was still unable to stand, they fashioned a travois and dragged him Comanche-style off the battlefield. Baird's journey ended in a North Vietnamese POW camp where he remained until his release during Project Homecoming in 1973.13 Company A's action was the second bloodiest day of the battalion's time on the DMZ and resulted in the loss of 12 men killed, one captured, and another 18 wounded. Two officers and several of the unit's NCOs were among the casualties. The commander of Company A, who was ineffectual to begin with, was even less effective after 6 May but he remained in command for almost another month.l4 Following Company A's ill-fated foray to Xom Phoung, the battalion turned its energies to the defense of Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan (East and West). Small groups of NVA troops scouting around all the battalion positions marked the night of 6 May, but the night was quiet otherwise. The next day the four rifle companies sent out patrols to clear 500 meters around their respective perimeters. There was no contact. The units spent the rest of 7 May improving their defenses and filling sandbags. During the early hours of the evening, an LP from Company C observed 20 NVA within 100 meters northwest of their position and another 10 NVA to the northeast. Shortly past 0330 the morning of 8 May, Captain Leach reported that an

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Through the Valley

NVA soldier wearing a protective mask had thrown a tear gas grenade into the perimeter. Forty-five minutes later he noted that a group of NVA was setting up a crew-served weapon southeast of the perimeter. The NVA appeared to be scouting every perimeter, and at 0430 one of my LPs spotted 16 NVA conducting a reconnaissance of our position. The rest of the early morning hours passed quietly for us.l5 It was not so for TF Tiger. At 0507 hours Leach reported that he was taking mortar fire. The big news, however, came a few minutes later when he radioed that he was under fire from a tracked vehicle that he believed was a tank. The vehicle, located some 200 meters southeast of his location, fired three explosive-type rounds into the perimeter and then withdrew. At 0531 the tank moved out of the tree line in a westerly direction. At 0542 hours, TF Tiger came under a mortar attack, and the tank disappeared from view. Later outpost A-1 reported observing a tank to the east of Nhi Ha and directed artillery on it with unknown results. At 0610 TF Tiger received several rounds of heavy artillery. There were no casualties. That day the 3d Marines reinforced the battalion with three tanks from its 3d Tank Company. Two tanks joined TF Tiger and one came to Company D at Lam Xuan (East). After the tank scare of a few hours before we were happy to see the iron monster clank into our perimeter. Pfc. Steve Bingen remembers: We had an M-60 tank and its marine crew in our perimeter. It gave me a heightened sense of security. We visited the marines and traded cigarettes to them for fresh fruit. They got lots better food but no cigarettes. We told the tank commander that we had no fresh produce but lots of cigarettes and sweets with our hot meals every four days. The marine told us he had seen Russian helicopters a couple of times and that they had a tank battle once.l6 Along with the tanks came marine rocket teams armed with 3.5-inch rocket launchers. A corporal led the rocket team that joined Delta Company. Both he and the staff sergeant who was the tank commander were fme troops, and I did what I could to make them feel a part of the unit. Leach was equally as happy and remembers that the tank and rocket launcher teams were a welcome sight, but he fretted that the tanks were going to pay the price because they could not get them into full defilade. "They were sitting ducks," he commented later.l7 During the battalion's 2 weeks on the DMZ the NVA forces made no effort to conceal their movements, and their carelessness often cost them dearly. Bivey directed artillery and mortar fire on two separate groups of enemy soldiers and killed at least 14 of them. The big artillery action, though, came shortly before dark when one of Leach's OPs spotted almost 200 NVA soldiers 1,600 meters northwest of the OP's location. Charlie

Xom Phoung

269

Company took the enemy under fire with a 106mm recoilless rifle, and one of the tanks joined in with fire from its .50-caliber machine gun. At the same time Company C's FO massed the fires of four batteries and saturated the area with nearly 500 rounds of high explosive. It was like an artillery ambush. The onslaught of exploding shells confused and disorganized the NVA force, and 70 of them died from the shelling.18 That night, Company B reported hearing a tracked vehicle north of the company's location, and two of my LPs heard two tracked vehicles 600 meters east of our position. An hour of so later we heard more track noises east of us that sounded like at least four tanks. Although we heard the engine noises, we saw no tanks. Steve Bingen recalls the time: "That night we could hear what sounded like a tank moving around about a half mile away. The marines went on an intense state of alert, armed their cannon and searched with the infrared scope on the tank. The sound subsided after a while."19 I have found no report of Leach's sighting in any of the intelligence documents that I reviewed for this work. There is also no mention of that report in the 3d Marines' combat after-action report or of the tank sighting made by personnel who manned outpost A-1. Although the 3d Regiment reinforced the battalion with tanks and rocket teams, I suspect that the marines put little credibility in the Gimlets' reports of enemy armor. That said, however, Denny Leach was not an officer to exaggerate: if Leach saw a tank, there was one there. On the afternoon of 8 May battalion sent Company A back toward Xom Phoung to recover the remains of the company's dead. Three marine tanks, along with two Otters, supported the operation, and my 2d Platoon had departed Lam Xuan (East) to escort our tank to Nhi Ha. Battalion's plan was for the tanks to secure Alpha Company's right flank by fire. A rifle platoon from Company B secured the company's left flank, and a platoon from Company C had moved into a position from which it could give covering fire for the operation. The operation kicked off at 1345 behind a steel mantle of artillery and tank fire. There was no shortage of firepower in support of this operation. The FACs, on station since sunup, were using an assortment of high-explosive bombs and napalm to hit the woods that hid the NVA's bunkers and trenches. The air strikes and extra forces supporting Company A were enough to do the job. By 1510 hours Company A had retrieved its dead, loaded them into the Otters, and returned to the TF Tiger perimeter. The single casualty of the operation came when the screening platoon from Company B came under mortar fire.20 That night TF Tiger's OPs detected some enemy movement around its position, but it was quiet otherwise. By 9 May the marines had won the battles of Dai Do, and the 320th NVA Division was trying to get its regiments back into the sanctuary of the

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DMZ. The marines reported that the enemy division left 786 dead on the battlefield. But victory never comes cheap: 96 marines died and another 326 had suffered wounds during the fighting. We knew precious little, if anything, about the various marine actions that had taken place several kilometers to our south and west. Although those battles were the battalion's reason for being on the DMZ, they were out of sight and light years away from us. We had our hands full.21 At that point, the Gimlets were in the enemy's way. The four rifle companies occupied the NVA's traditional waystations and were smack in the middle of their preferred north-south infiltration route, thus forcing them to take detours around us. At sunset on 9 May Company B sighted 30 NVA soldiers 700 meters west of Lam Xuan (West) who were northbound and attempting to skirt the company's position. Company B engaged them with 81mm mortar fire in the fast-fading light, but the results of the mission are unknown. About an hour later, two North Vietnamese soldiers walked out of the brush across the creek from Delta Company's perimeter and began yelling, "Chieu Hoi!" One of the men from the 3d Platoon came to the CP, and I took the company's interpreter to talk to the NVA soldiers. After a short discussion, the interpreter told me that the two soldiers wanted to surrender. Through the interpreter I told them to come across the creek with their hands above their heads. When they refused to do so, I smelled a rat and directed the 81mm crew to fire an illumination round. The sound of the mortar round leaving the tube caused the two soldiers to scoot into the brush and disappear. I think the men were scouts whose mission was to determine the size of the unit that had occupied Lam Xuan (East). A little after 2100 hours an LP from Company C reported 10 to 15 NVA 200 meters to the northeast who were approaching the position. Leach's FO directed artillery on the enemy soldiers and forced them to withdraw to the northwest. Not long after Company C's sighting two of my LPs reported movement around the perimeter. Although the NVA forces seemed to have some interests in nosing around Delta Company, our position at Lam Xuan (East) was not their primary interest. The enemy's chief objective was to retake Nhi Ha, but it is difficult for me to understand why they wanted or needed it. The 320th NVA Division offensive to cut the marines' river and Highway 9 lines of communications had failed, and its battered units were trying to go north and save themselves from destruction. Attacking Nhi Ha seemed like a wasted effort at that juncture, but the NVA kept trying. Around 2200 Company C spotted 14 more NVA northwest of the perimeter and took them under fire with M79 grenade launchers. Afterward the movement around the TF Tiger perimeter ceased, but Leach took no chances and continued to fire M79 and artillery rounds into suspected enemy locations. The interval of quiet did not last. Right before midnight

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the LPs reported that more NVA troops were moving toward the perimeter from the north, northwest, and northeast. One of the LPs detected a group of 100 enemy, probably a company, only 300 meters north of the position and moving their way. Artillery, precisely directed, turned the North Vietnamese back, but by midnight Leach figured it was time to retrieve the LPs, all of which having made contact-two had taken RPG rockets that had killed one man and wounded two others. The LPs had no more than closed into the shelter of the bunker line when an NVA company struck the northwest side of the perimeter with heavy RPG fire. Leach reported that a major assault was imminent and called for illumination and increased artillery fire. A Spooky AC-47 arrived on station to support TF Tiger just after 0100, 10 May, to help them fight off their attackers through the early morning hours.22 The first signs of morning were appearing in the eastern sky when TF Tiger came under a fierce 20-minute mortar and heavy artillery barrage. Leach knew what was coming next; he radioed Lieutenant Colonel Snyder and asked that Delta Company reinforce the TF.23 As the indirect fire lifted, the NVA, supported by a .50-caliber machine gun northeast of Nhi Ha, pushed toward the perimeter firing RPGs and throwing satchel charges. The enemy targeted the tanks, and an RPG round knocked out the one on the northeastern side of the perimeter. The men in the bunkers and trenches had waited until the NVA were at close range, then let fly with a hail of rifle and machine gun fire. As the battle commenced, the attached marines raced from point to point along the trench with rocket launchers engaging clusters of North Vietnamese.24 (See Map 29.2.)

At 0635 two U.S. Marine Corps gunships arrived overhead, and Leach steered them to the NVA units that had gathered north and east of Force Tiger. The NVA set up a recoilless rifle northwest of the perimeter and attempted a supporting attack from that direction. Friendly fire prevented the recoilless rifle crew from getting it in action and the attack faltered, then failed. Shortly before 0700 Capt. Don Giggy, Helix 13, arrived on station. The ceiling was down to about 500 feet and Giggy had to hug the ground to do his job. Large NVA forces had regrouped north and east of the perimeter and were in the middle of attacking when Hellborne 217 put two 500pound bombs right in their midst. 25 An entry in Paul Power's diary tells the story: The bombs mentioned above were not supposed to have been dropped because of the proximity of the friendly troops, about 30 meters! I suppose that because of the tenseness of the moment, Gig didn't check the ordnance of the fighters. When he saw the bombs being released from the A-4, he yelled over the FM radio for Charlie Tiger [Company C, TF

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Tiger] to duck. Leach and his men did, of course, and except for a loud ringing in their ears no one was injured, at least on the friendly side.26 The heavy bombs had stunned the surviving NVA, and the defenders took them under fire with rifles and machine guns. Marine gunships harried those enemy troops who had made it out of range. By 0740 the NVA had had enough, and some were trying to fmd their way out of the area. Pockets of NVA still hung on to the woods east and the graveyard north of the perimeter.27 By that time Major Power had joined Captain Giggy in the sky hanging low over Nhi Ha, and this is how he remembers the morning: Don Giggy and I put in a set of F-1 OOs at Leach's request. He called me on FM and told me that there was a bunch of NVA in a trench on the backside of a Vietnamese grave about 100 meters in front of his position. I put the glasses on the grave but was unable to see anyone although I could see the trench. Denny said, "Believe me, Helix oneone, they're there, I can see their yellow bandannas." I called for some fighters and got F-100s with 20mm, just what the doctor ordered. I marked the trench and the F-lOOs did the rest. God they were awesome. Right on target. They got nine dinks with seven weapons and a flamethrower! Leach almost messed his pants when he heard that a flamethrower was close to his position!28 During the next hour and a half Major Power and his FACs directed three more air strikes around Leach's position, making a total of six since dawn of 10 May. Deadly bursts of contact continued with scattered NVA holdouts around the perimeter, but the main threat had passed. Denny Leach has high praise for the FACs and the supporting artillery. "Again, the tactical air and artillery saved our asses. Had the Tac Air not been so effective, we would have fought the bastards in the trenches."29 As the NVA attempted to disengage around Nhi Ha, a second, smaller, enemy force hit Company B. One of the marine gunships flew over in support, and the attack was beaten back quickly. At daylight we had taken some artillery fire, and even though there were no casualties, it was the harbinger of what was to come throughout the day. I had remained awake throughout the night listening to the radio chatter between Denny and the BTOC. Although battalion had not yet alerted me, I knew it was a just matter of time before it radioed to tell me to get moving and warned the platoon leaders to be ready. At first light I pulled in the LPs and radioed battalion that I was waiting on Cedar Mountain 6 's order to go. The 1,500 meters between Lam Xuan (East) and Nhi Ha is only a hop, skip, and a jump, but that morning the 1,500-meter stretch of ground

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looked like 100 miles to me. I was not certain whether we would meet NVA forces along the route, nor whether we would have to fight our way into TF Tiger's perimeter. Coordinating the fires between my company and Leach's task force was also of real concern to me. I knew in the end, though, that it was just one of those days in combat when you had to suck it up and do the job at hand. At 0925 battalion radioed me that Specter platoon would relieve me in place and that I was to take two platoons and move to Nhi Ha. Specter platoon arrived and joined the 1st Platoon to hold the perimeter during our absence. While we were moving north, Leach was able to get in a dustoff. Charlie Company had suffered 12 wounded during the night's fighting, while Alpha Company had one man killed and two more wounded.JO As we were crossing the large paddy between Jones Creek and Nhi Ha, I radioed Leach that we were coming his way. We reached the now-familiar wooded island without a problem, then hugged the edge of the woods, picking our way slowly toward Alpha and Charlie Companies' position. On our way into the perimeter, we captured two enemy soldiers who had sought refuge in a bomb crater during their attack. They had been left behind and were scared and offered no resistance. The soldiers alleged that they were from the 76th Regiment, 304th NVA Division. It was an unlikely story. The 304th NVA Division was still in the hills around Khe Sanh. A later intelligence report pegged the soldiers as members of the 320th NVA Division. The report also noted that one of the soldiers stated that he had had only 1 day's training on the AK-47 before the unit had infiltrated.31 Artillery began falling as we entered the perimeter, and we scattered into any depression, trench, or crater that we could fmd. When the shelling stopped, I met Denny and went to his CP that he had dug into the rubble on the east side of what had been a Catholic church. We had no more than gotten there when the NVA started another barrage; we dove into the sandbagcovered pit that served as his headquarters. The heavy artillery rounds made a loud, terrifying buzzing noise in the final seconds before they slammed into the ground. I will never forget that sound or the feeling of total helplessness sitting in that cramped dank hole across from Denny and expecting the next round to blow us both to powder. When the artillery stopped we emerged from our holes and into the bright sunlight like ants after a rainstorm. The three companies began a sweep around the perimeter. Each sweep was a minibattle with stragglers and enemy troops who had decided to stay. During this particular sweep, the companies accounted for 35 dead NVA, most of whom had been killed during the attack the previous night. Not all of the enemy soldiers were dead. One knot of NVA had taken up residence in the woods northwest of the perimeter, and it took a couple of air strikes to subdue them.32 At some point battalion directed me to return to Lam Xuan (East) and

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take the tanks with me. It was late by the time we got started, and we were but a few hundred meters out of Nhi Ha when we ran into problems. Sgt. Bernie Borowski has a vivid recollection of what happened: "There was a big mudhole next to the river, and, instead of going around the mud, they tried going through it. The first tank made it through, the second tank was pulling the third. The second and third got stuck right in the middle of the mudhole. The first backed up to pull them out and all three got stuck."33 I radioed battalion and they told me to hold tight until a couple of amphibious tractors (AMTRACs) could get out to us. It was near sundown by the time the AMTRACs showed up. Sgt. Bernie Borowski: While we were waiting for the tank retriever Charlie started shooting rockets at the tanks. I was lying in a wet paddy. I got down in the water so just my nose and helmet were out of the water. The rockets were coming in, it was probably 95 degrees out, and my teeth were chattering like I was freezing to death. They sent a tank retriever to pull out the tanks; it looked like a football field on tracks. After they pulled out the tanks, all of us ground pounders climbed on top of the tank retriever for a free ride. They kept sitting there waiting for what I don't know. I thought for sure Charlie was going to put a rocket right on top of the tank retriever and get us all. We finally pulled out about 5 minutes after my nerves were shot.34 Lieutenant Colonel Snyder told me to make plans to remain where I was in the event the AMTRACs could not get the tanks out of the mud. I did not relish shaping a defensive perimeter around the tanks and spending the night in the paddy. I was relieved to see the tanks come out of the mudhole. One tank returned to Nhi Ha and the other dropped off at Lam Xuan (East) with us. That evening an air force flareship came on station to support TF Tiger. In the ashy light of the flares, the LPs from Alpha and Charlie Companies picked up groups of NVA moving on the north, northeast, and southeast sides of the perimeter. One of the LPs from Company C made contact with 20 to 30 NVA approaching from the northeast. Leach's FO fired artillery in the area and forced the enemy to withdraw. Shortly after midnight another one of Company C's OPs reported 20 NVA to the northwest. These groups made a stab at the perimeter by flinging satchel charges but failed to get close enough for them to do damage. The next day, 11 May, battalion split up Delta Company. Battalion wanted the company headquarters and one platoon for additional security at Mai Xa Chan, while the two others went to Companies B and C, respectively. I told the battalion commander that I preferred going back to Nhi Ha

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with the platoon instead of guarding the battalion CP. He concurred. Later, two AMTRACs clanked up to our position, and I loaded the 1st and 3d Platoons on top of them. My radio operators and I climbed aboard our tank and rolled into the perimeter at Nhi Ha. I remember that when I jumped off the tank Denny Leach was smiling and saying, "What the hell are you doing here?'' I allowed that I figured he needed an extra hand, which was true. The conduct of the defense had fallen on Leach's shoulders, and I thought I should share the burden. Later I learned that he had asked Snyder to "send Humphries up here." The commander of Company A had been no help to him. Denny said later that the Alpha Company commander "was mute during the battle; so I had no idea what was happening on his side of the perimeter."35 That captain was somewhere in the perimeter, and I spoke to him once or twice over the radio, but I never laid eyes on him while I was up there. The men in his company, however, continued to pull their share of sweeps, go out on listening posts, conduct patrols, and man their part of the perimeter despite the dearth of leadership. Shortly after I had arrived Denny and I divided the duties. The strain of staying awake nearly 24 hours a day had drained him physically and mentally, so I took over at night to allow him to get some well-deserved rest. During the day, while I slept, he directed the perimeter sweeps. It was during one of those early morning sweeps that Staff Sergeant Goad, who had performed so bravely during the action of the first day, fell wounded with a shattered elbow. Goad told me years later that he had bent down to take an AK-47 from a dead NVA soldier. The soldier's finger was frozen on the trigger, and the weapon discharged as Goad tried to wrest it from his dead hands. Goad's wound cost him a possible appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and a military career, and the army lost an excellent soldier. The NVA still prowled the edges of the perimeter at night and used the darkness to creep close. We usually had a flareship, whose radio call sign was Basketball, and I directed it to keep the perimeter lit. Even with the flares, the nights at Nhi Ha were accented by staccato bursts of rifle fire, the crump of outgoing grenades from the perimeter, and the powerful detonations of Claymore mines. The 2d Platoon joined us in the perimeter on 12 May, and the next night Lt. Eric Weidner radioed me and said there was a big dog roaming the perimeter. I thought he was seeing things at first, but he convinced me that he had watched the dog with a starlight scope. I always thought it might have been an NVA patrol dog or one of ours that had gotten away; I never learned which was the case.36 Everything at Nhi Ha smelled dead. Bodies of NVA soldiers, some of them killed during our initial attacks on the hamlet, littered the area around Nhi Ha. One of the jobs besides sweeping the perimeter was to send out

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burial details to cover the bodies with dirt. Sergeant Borowski remembers burying the enemy dead: "I saw one I thought was a dead, black GI with green fatigues on. When I got close, I saw it was a dead NVA soldier. His face was a mass of moving maggots. I couldn't see a piece of skin on his face."37 Even the water from the well near the demolished church and marketplace stank. Battalion brought us drinking water in 5-gallon jugs, but it was not enough to keep us supplied. Rather than do without water, we filled our canteens from the well, dropped in four iodine tables, and drank it. At some point we learned that we were moving south and that the marines would relieve us in place. On 15 May the advance party from the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived at Mai Xa Chan. Company F, 2-4th Marines relieved Bravo Company at 1030, and the company closed the battalion CP shortly after noon. At about the same time, Delta Company moved back to Lam Xuan (East) and prepared for its last night on the DMZ.38 As we were settling into our old positions I heard a gigantic explosion in the direction of Nhi Ha and saw a mushroom cloud appear over the hamlet. I remember saying, "Shit, the North Vietnamese have nuked us." A minute later I heard Leach scream over the radio that some stupid son of a bitch from Alpha Company had set a trash fire next to a pile of captured ammunition and satchel charges. The explosion had knocked Denny to the ground, but miraculously there were no casualties from the blast. Company E, 2-4th Marines relieved TF Tiger at 1500; Companies A and C joined Company B near Mai Xa Chan of the battalion CP and dug in for the night. When Leach passed by my position at Lam Xuan (East) later that day he was still furious about the explosion. Close to dark three marines stringing communications wire passed through my position headed for Nhi Ha; the NCO in charge of the wire team told me that they would come back before dark. At 2115 hours the platoon on the north side of the perimeter reported movement 50 meters to the front of its bunkers. I figured it was the marines on their way back, but when they did not show themselves I became concerned. The movement continued, and I checked with the BTOC and learned that the wire team had remained at Nhi Ha for the night. The movement, as best as we could tell, was a single NVA soldier roaming around the perimeter. He stayed with us until 0105 hours and then disappeared into the blackness. Early on the morning of 16 May, I rejoined the other companies at Mai Xa Chan to fly to Quang Tri and catch C-123 aircraft for the ride back to the Que Son Valley.39 The battalion had won the battle for Nhi Ha. It had kicked the 4-270th NVA Battalion from its fortifications after three days of fighting and in doing so had denied the 320th NVA Division a safe, secure base and supply route along Jones Creek. Once the battalion had secured the hamlet,

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Companies A and C held it during the NVA's attempts to wrest it from their control. The credit for holding Nhi Ha belongs to the men in Alpha and Charlie Companies, the attached marines who manned the LPs and the trenches, and Dennis Leach's clear-headed leadership. The 3d Marines reported that the 3-21st Infantry had killed 445 enemy soldiers, while the battalion claimed a number of nearly 600. I do not know which set of numbers is correct, and it really does not matter. Numbers of enemy soldiers killed are only important for their effect on the enemy's ability to wage war, and the 320th NVA Division, though bloodied, still had fight left in it. Two days after we left Nhi Ha, Company E, 2-4th Marines made contact with an NVA force northwest of Nhi Ha and killed 23 of the enemy while losing two marines killed and three wounded. Ten days later, Company E, 2-4th Marines engaged a large force of NVA in the hamlet of Nhi Ha (2). Company H reinforced Company E, and together they killed 238 NVA soldiers while suffering 18 killed and 33 wounded. The fighting in the northeastern sector of Quang Tri continued through the summer and into the fall. 40 The price of victory, as I have said several times in this work, is never bought cheap. The battalion's battles on the DMZ had cost it 28 men killed, 130 wounded (71 of whom required evacuation), and one man captured. For reasons noted in this account, the battalion's bloodiest time occurred on 2 and 6 May; the casualties during those particular days were nearly identical in number. The company commander in each case lacked the experience to use basic infantry principles, primarily security, and the prudent supporting fire to do the job. At 0716 on 16 May two CH-53 helicopters touched down in the large rice paddy in which we had landed 2 weeks before. Company C left first, followed by Delta, Bravo, and Alpha Companies. After a short ride to Quang Tri we caught C-123 aircraft back to LZ Baldy and the Que Son Valley.41 The Gimlets' battle for Nhi Ha was history.

Notes 1. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/ Saline, 5 June 1968. 2. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 May 1968. I had always doubted the report until Don Fleshman told me years later that he had seen them. SITREP No. 17, with 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 6 May 1968, discusses the reconnaissance platoon's report of the NVA soldiers sighted near My Loc and reinforces Fleshman's account. 3. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/ Saline. 4. Ibid.

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5. Paul Power, FACs ofWAR: Diary of Helix 11 (1968). 6. Bill Baird, interview with author, 23 August 1996. 7. Ibid. 8. Power, FACs of WAR. 9. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/ Saline. 10. Brig. Gen. Dennis A. Leach, letter to author, 13 May 1998. 11. Power, FACs ofWAR. 12. Baird interview. The squad leader evaded capture and returned to the perimeter at Nhi Ha the next day. 13. Ibid. Today Baird is 100 percent disabled and active in veteran affairs in his home state of Ohio. 14. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/ Saline. 15. Ibid. 16. Stephen J. Bingen, letter to author, 6 January 1994. I found no evidence that the marines ever fought a battle with NVA tanks. 17. Leach letter. 18. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/ Saline. 19. Bingen letter. 20. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 8 May 1968. 21. 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division (Reinforced): Combat After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline, 26 July 1968. 22. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 8 May 1968. 23. Leach letter. 24. Ibid. 25. Power, FACs ofWAR. 26. Ibid. 27. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 10 May 1968. 28. Power, FACs of WAR. 29. Leach letter. 30. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 10 May 1968. 31. Combined Intelligence Center, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. OB Summary of the 320th NVA Division, 15 June 1968. The 76th Regiment was probably an alias. 32. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Dialy Journals, 10 May 1968. 33. Bernie Borowski, video and tape to author, 3 December 1991. 34. Ibid. 35. Leach letter. 36. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 13 May 1968. 37. Borowski tape. 38. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 15 May 1968. 39. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 16 May 1968. 40. 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division (Reinforced): After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline. 41. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 16 May 1968.

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Home to the Que Son Valley

0

n 16 May the 3-21st Infantry began landing at LZ Baldy, which it had left just a few weeks before. In the early afternoon the rifle companies loaded on CH-47s for the short flight to FSB Colt, the battalion's new fire support base in the northeastern Que Son Valley.! Headquarters, 196th LIB had wound up Operation Delaware 3 days before and had flown south to reestablish its headquarters at LZ Baldy. On 14 May the 196th LIB replaced the 198th LIB on Operation Wheeler/ Wallowa and took control of the Americal Division forces in the area. The 196th LIB was a substantial force: the 1-6th Infantry secured FSB Center, the l-20th Infantry secured FSBs Ross and Ryder, and the 1-52d Infantry had FSB East. The 4-31 st Infantry, the only battalion to return from Operation Delaware with the brigade, had moved back to Hill 445 to rebuild FSB West and assume responsibility for the surrounding area.2 (See Map 30.1.) The 2-lst Infantry was on LZ Baldy, but the battalion was not operational. On 10 May, while the Gimlets were still at Nhi Ha, the 2-lst Infantry, under the command of Lt. Col. Buck Nelson, had deployed from the Camp Evans area to reinforce Kham Due Special Forces Camp. Located in western Quang Tin Province, near the Laotian border and reachable only by air, the camp had the mission to interdict North Vietnamese infiltration and act as a launch site for reconnaissance teams. The camp also sat near the intersections of Highways 14 and 534, routes that the NVA wanted to improve upon and use in the future. Camp Kham Due was in the enemy's way.3 The 2-1st Infantry's deployment to Kham Due was a classic case of too little too late. By the time the battalion began landing on the camp's 6,000foot airstrip in midafternoon of 10 May, the enemy had already overrun a satellite outpost. The first night passed quietly, but the enemy had turned its attention to the camp and airfield with an early morning mortar barrage. The mortar attack signaled the start of a hard day. 281

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283

The battalion, however, set about to do its job. It spent the morning improving its positions around the airfield and replacing Company A, l-46th, which had arrived the morning of the lOth, on the surrounding OPs with its reconnaissance platoon. Early in the afternoon the battalion came under another heavy mortar attack, the first of many to come, that killed two men and wounded 18 others. The situation went downhill from there. Late that evening the III Marine Amphibious Force commander directed the commanding general, Americal Division to "prepare, as a matter of urgency a tactical withdrawal plan for the removal of all forces from Kham Due. "4 The plan was to extract the U.S. personnel and Vietnamese from Kham Due by air over a 3-day period beginning on the morning of 12 May. Enemy forces changed the schedule when they launched an early morning attack against the outposts. By 1000 the NVA had overrun all but one of the OPs and initiated an attack on the camp from three directions. Although the camp was under attack, the air evacuation kicked off just after 1100 with a collection of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters supported by helicopter gunships and fighter aircraft. The C-123s and C-130s dipped into the besieged field, dropped their tail gates, and picked up troops while rolling down the runway to make the turnaround for takeoff. The CH-46 and CH-47 helicopters darted into the camp, dropping their cargo ramps to quickly pick up a load of soldiers and depart. At some point the battalion destroyed its heavy equipment, vehicles, and artillery to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. By 1630 the evacuation was complete, but then someone discovered that three men from an air force combat control team had been left behind. The strip, dotted with shell holes and littered with the wreckage of aircraft, was still under heavy ground fire, and NVA soldiers were closing in on the center of the compound. A C-123 pilot was to land despite the hazards, but did not find the men and departed. So a second C-123 landed and successfully pulled them to safety. Its pilot, Lt. Joe M. Jackson, earned the Medal of Honor for his heroism.s The 2-lst Infantry had lost most of its reconnaissance platoon, mortars, and supporting artillery and was scattered over several airfields throughout South Vietnam. It would be several weeks before the battalion was operational again. We knew nothing about the 2-1's ordeal, nor had we ever heard of Kham Due when we flew into FSB Colt that hot May afternoon. Once the rifle companies had arrived, the commanders assembled in the stuffy little bunker that served as the BTOC to wait for Lieutenant Colonel Snyder, who was in a briefing at brigade headquarters. We had been there for a couple of hours when the battalion commander arrived and we gathered for a briefing. The battalion commander told us that the situation in our former area had certainly changed during our absence. Some days after we had depart-

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ed, the 3d NVA Regiment had established a CP just south of the Chang River and deployed its battalion on hilltop bastions throughout the AO. The enemy regiment now controlled much of the high ground south of the valley. Antiaircraft guns made flying into or out of the hills extremely difficult. The 1-6th Infantry's attempts to break the encirclement had been thus far unsuccessful. We were incensed that 1-6 had allowed the NVA to bottle it up and to isolate "our fire support base." At the time, I thought that any unit that lets the NVA put it into such a position deserved it. Members of 1-6, I later learned, blamed 3-21 for doing a sloppy job of patrolling the surrounding hills before l-6's arrival. The truth, as always, lies somewhere in between the two versions, and an attempt to assess liability for what took place is of no benefit at this point. Considering the U.S. intelligence documents and the North Vietnamese account of the battle, my assumption is that the vanguard of the 3d NVA Regiment arrived during the changeover of the I 96th and I 98th Brigades. Taking advantage of the transition and the decline in operations, the enemy managed to arrive undetected, conduct its reconnaissance, and secure key terrain. The 3d NVA Regiment was ready by the first week of May, and its first attack on LZ Center came on 5 May, the beginning of the "mini-Tet" offensive. Now commanded by an officer named in North Vietnamese documents as Cao Niem, the regiment's mission was to annihilate the 1-6th Infantry. A second part of its mission was to inflict heavy casualties on the I 98th Brigade and any Allied reinforcements that arrived. Strengthened with a sapper battalion (minus one company), a 12.7mm antiaircraft company, and one 82mm mortar company, about 950 men in total, made it a daunting force. An unknown number of Vietcong Local Force and Main Force troops, possibly as many as 750, may have also bolstered the regiment.6 The NVA commander believed that success hinged on controlling the high ground around FSB Center and had arrayed his three infantry battalions around several hilltop strongpoints. The cornerstone of the regiment's plan was a bastion on the grassy ridge of Nui Hoac that defended at least two antiaircraft guns some 2,500 meters south of FSB Center. The number of NVA soldiers who held the Nui Hoac position is unknown, but it was a substantial force supported by mortars and recoilless rifles and backed up by a strong reserve) East of FSB Center were other strongpoints manned by a mix of NVA and VC forces, which occupied positions on two heavily timbered ridgelines. The ridges extended south from Hills 434 and 479, respectively, an area encompassing nearly 40 square kilometers of thickly wooded irregular terrain. The 3-21st Infantry's mission was to clear the hogbacks as well as the valley between them, a task that would monopolize the battalion's time and energies throughout the next 2 weeks.s Lieutenant Colonel Snyder assigned each company a general mission

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and concluded the briefing. Companys A, B, and D departed FSB Colt and moved south, while Charlie Company remained as FSB security. That night Delta Company set up on the Ly Ly River. There had been no chance for us to wash during the previous 2 weeks, so the battalion commander allowed the company some time to clean its gear and wash off the grime from the DMZ. During this respite the brigade FACs flew out to our position with the battalion commander, and we met Paul Power, Tom Beyer, Mel Gibson, and Don Giggy. I thanked them for all they had done for Delta Company during the attack on Nhi Ha, but the pilots were modest about their role in that action. Nhi Ha, however, had forged a bond between the Gimlets and the FACs that was unique; my friendship with Paul Power has only grown over the years. Delta Company left the coolness of the river the next morning and started south across the flats for the hills. The next day battalion directed us to link up with Troop F, 17th Cavalry and cross-attach the 3d Platoons from each unit. We met F Troop near a pond that the helicopter pilots had named "the square lake," near some ancient vine-covered towers. The towers looked inviting, but there was no time for sightseeing. After a short conversation with the troop commander about how the war was going, we got down to business and traded our 3d Platoons.9 After Lieutenant Holt and his men had climbed aboard the tracked vehicles and the cavalry troop had roared off toward the east, we continued south with the platoon of tracks. Each armored personnel carrier (APC) had a ring-mounted .50-caliber and two M60 machine guns. It was an impressive amount of firepower, and several tracks on line could put out a massive amount of steel. Later that afternoon F Troop rejoined us to establish joint night defensive positions. As the units prepared for the night battalion radioed that the cavalry troop had a new mission, so 5 minutes later the APCs departed in a cloud of smoke and dust. When F Troop had departed, I moved the company to a new night defensive position. Tracks were big, noisy, and aroused a great deal of attention that seemed to urge the enemy to find new and ingenious ways to destroy them. Fashioning mines from dud bombs and artillery shells was one of their favorite methods, and a couple of weeks later I learned that the troop commander's track had hit a big one. The blast had killed several men aboard the track and blown the troop commander into a rice paddy. Even though he was badly injured, he had somehow survived. By dusk we were in the new laager and had dug positions. It was a short night. Right after midnight, on 19 May, the battalion commander directed Companies B and D to attack Hill 340. The hill was on one of the ridges that battalion wanted cleared and was about 1,500 hundred meters from our laager. Battalion's plan was for Bravo Company to approach the hill from the

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west, while we came at it from the south. To say that I was less than enthusiastic about conducting an unplanned night attack is an understatement, but I retrieved the LPs and got under way. The climb up the hill's brushy slopes in the pitch dark was agonizingly slow, but uneventful. Company B reached the summit ahead of us and surprised several VC troops in positions on the west side of the objective. After a brief exchange of small-arms fire, the VC took off leaving three dead, a Browning Automatic Rifle, a Chinese carbine, some homemade grenades, and assorted gear. It was a good action on the part of Company B.IO Delta Company patrolled the northern part of the ridgeline until late afternoon and then dug in on the high ground. It proved to be another short night. Just after midnight, on 20 May, the battalion radioed the plans for an attack at 0630. Company A was to sweep the valley, while Company B went south along the ridge toward Hill 434 where 1-52 had been in heavy contact a day before. Delta Company's mission was to follow some distance behind Company Band be prepared for other instructions.1 1 On the map the move looked relatively simple, but the hogback was thickly jungled and in spots choked with 10-foot-tall elephant grass. Hacking a trail through the cane-like grass quickly sucked the energy and strength from the cutters, and, as the lead squad wore out, the next squad in the file moved forward and took over. When the platoon had rotated all of its squads, the following platoon took its place. While the point men were chopping, I sat the rest of the company down to conserve energy. After progressing 50 meters or so the platoon leader would radio me, and I would inch the company forward and then sit the men down again. On those ridges the enemy was the broiling sun, damp stifling air, and a seemingly unending thicket of tall grass. The jungle and patches of knifeedged grass was the objective, and we forgot the NVA for a time. Around 1300 we met up with Company B on the ridge and battalion changed the plan, shifting Company B east and across the valley to the other ridgeline and directing me to continue toward Hill 434. It was after dark before we stopped and dug in for the night. The next several days blurred together in a frustrating period of zigzagging across the valley and climbing, descending, and backtracking over the two ridges. Finding no sign of the enemy in the hills, battalion turned its attention to the flats. By 24 May the three companies were out of the high ground and working the paddies north of the hills.I2 During the early morning hours of 25 May one of Company A's LPs detected movement, blew a Claymore, and returned to the perimeter. Angry because the LP had returned, the company commander sent the men to an alternative position, where they came under automatic weapons fire. As the LP tried to rejoin the perimeter a second time, the VC hit them with grenades and more automatic weapons fire, killing two of the men and wounding three more. The action cost the company commander his job and a transfer out of the unit. I never saw him again.13

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Delta Company had had no contact with the enemy since returning from the DMZ. It appeared that the company was going to continue to work the flats during the immediate future, so I asked Lieutenant Colonel Snyder for a day in Chu Lai to take care of some personal business. He allowed me the time, and Lt. John Petrin, the company's executive officer, flew out and replaced me on 27 May. Plans change quickly. While I was on the way into Chu Lai late that afternoon, battalion attempted to combat assault Delta Company onto Hill 434. Unknown to the battalion, however, an enemy platoon had reoccupied the hill, had dug in, and was waiting. As the lead helicopter started to land the hill ignited in automatic weapons frre.'4 Sgt. Bernie Borowski was sitting in the left door of the lead helicopter and recalls the events that followed: When we got about 15 to 20 feet above the ground going in, all hell broke loose. The top of the hill was short grass with elephant grass on the top fringe-like hair around the top of a bald head. The side of the hill was jungle with large trees. Charlie had spider holes with good camouflage all over the hill with a .50-caliber somewhere. When they opened up on us, the door gunner on my side opened up and his gun jammed after two shells. The other door gunner's gun also jammed. The inside of the chopper sounded like someone holding a coffee can full of washers and shaking the hell out of it in your ears with all the bullets going through it. IS As the pilot veered the ship away from the LZ and attempted to gain altitude, the Huey began fishtailing. Visions of crashing into the large trees and then dying in a frreball flashed through Borowski's mind. He quickly shucked his rucksack, grabbed extra ammunition for the M60 machine gun, and climbed onto the skid. Sp4c. Al Cepada, who was sitting in the right door of the helicopter, must have had similar thoughts and had climbed onto the opposite skid. Fortunately, the door gunners grabbed the men and pulled them inside the helicopter before they jumped. Borowski is happy that the gunners did so because the pilot somehow kept the ship in the air. With the engine screeching like a banshee, the pilot streaked downslope looking for an open spot. He found a water-covered paddy, cut the power, and splashed the crippled bird hard into the muck.I6 Sgt. Bernie Borowski: Richard Okuda, a Hawaiian Japanese in my squad, got hit right in the ass with two bullets, and they never came out anywhere so it must have tom up his insides. We got Richard off the chopper, but we couldn't carry him in the deep paddy, so I got his arms around my neck and dragged him to dry ground. One of the pilots got hit in the stomach or

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chest, and when they took him off the slick they threw my pack and the machine gun into the water to get it out of their way. My movie camera got ruined from the water that day, after carrying the son of a bitch for 10 months through the monsoons and about a million swamps and rivers.'? A helicopter picked up the men a short time later, while the rest of the company went to FSB Colt. Besides Okuda, Joe, the company's FO who had replaced Lt. Bob Bivey about a week earlier, took a bullet through his buttocks. Joe had been with the company for about a week. Lieutenant Petrin had also suffered a wound, but luckily it was minor.'S Battalion airlifted the company back to the mouth of the valley that ran between the two ridges the next morning, and I rejoined them there. My instructions were to sweep south toward the head of the valley. By late afternoon of 28 May we had settled into a laager and were preparing for the night. That evening battalion directed me to probe Hill 434 with a squad. If the squad met no resistance on the hill, my instructions were to follow up immediately and secure the hill with the remainder of the company. I gave the mission to Lieutenant Holt, who selected his 2d Squad, and they departed the laager at 2200 heading for the objective. Two hours later the squad leader radioed that he was unsure of his location-another term for being lost. I tried to get him back on track by firing some navigation rounds, but to no avail. The squad continued to wander, and at 0330 I fmally stopped them for the night. We moved out of the laager shortly after 0400 and started up the heavily wooded hill. During the final stretch of our climb Sp4c. Terry Farrand, who had taken over as the company's FO, initiated a fire mission and pounded the top of Hill 434. We reached a relatively clear spot in the jungle near the summit, and I organized two platoons into a skirmish line. As Farrand lifted the artillery, the company moved across the hill using reconnaissance by fire in the hope that if NVA forces were there they would give away their positions.I9 The enemy had gone. In a letter home some days later, Pfc. Ray Schmitt wrote: "To our surprise Charlie had moved off although he must have been in a hurry because he left behind ammo and a bunch ofrice."20 The wayward squad joined us later that day and we laagered near the hill. That night battalion directed me to leave a squad behind, cross the valley, and check Hill 479. Immediate plans called for the company to patrol north along the ridge that ran to Hill 479's north. We found the ridge around the hill like the one we had just left across the valley-choked with jungle and overgrown with elephant grass. We measured forward progress through the thick in meters. The heat was oppressive and the ridge was bone dry, requiring battalion to ferry water out to us in collapsible 5-gallon

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plastic containers. Vietnam was a place of extremes when it came to water.21 While 3-21 worked the two ridges around Hills 434 and 479, 1-6 had battled the 3d NVA Regiment around Nui Hoac. Fighting south of LZ Center continued, but indications were that the 3d NVA Regiment was withdrawing. The 3-2lst Infantry moved back to FSB Center on 29 May and replaced the 1-6th Infantry.22 Our time on the ridges continued through the final days of May and into the first few days of June. On 27 May an intelligence report had located a regiment-sized unit near old FSB East, indicating that the 3d NVA Regiment had not yet given up the hills south of the Que Son Valley. Possibly it is for this reason that the battalion turned its attention to the southern sector of the operational area. Company C displaced south of FSB Center to work the area near the river, while Companies B and D headed southeast. I was glad to get away from those miserable ridges.23 (See Map 30.2.) FSB East sat on Hill 488, the highest point of a series of hills that made up an extensive east-west ridgeline. On 3 June, we were approaching a point some distance east of the FSB when a CH-47 helicopter came under fire from a 12.7mm antiaircraft gun located to our southeast. The gunner fired a four-round burst at the Hook. The pilot, unaware that he was under fire, never altered his course and continued flying east. The gun was a good distance away from where we were, but I took a compass azimuth toward the sound, guessed the distance, and plotted its possible location. I then radioed the battalion S-3 and reported the .50-caliber antiaircraft gun's likely location.24 The S-3 did not seem particularly interested in my account and quipped: "Why don't you go over and get the fifty?" "Well, I'll do just that," I answered, not believing that I really would. On 5 June we departed our laager early to make the climb up the steep ridge to link up with Company B, which had laagered the night before on one of the ridge's many hills. We arrived at the top of the ridgeline shortly before 1000 and found Company B preparing to move. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder flew into our position a little later and gave us guidance about what he wanted done during the next several days. The plan was for Company B to continue east and check the chain of innocent-looking grass-covered hills that formed the eastern segment of the ridgeline. Company D, meanwhile, was to continue south and work the low-lying ground toward the river. It was close to 1100 hours when Company B moved out of the laager in single file and headed down the slope. Company B 's 3d Platoon was in the lead, and Pfc. Tony May's squad was second in line. The battalion commander's C and C ship was on a resupply run, so Snyder and I sat down in the grass to talk while we waited for his helicopter. My plan was to start

N

\.0

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Map 30.2 . n Eastern Sector z,ooo Meters (ApproxlmotAol Early June, Situatlo ' 0

Unimproved road Trail

River Spot Elevation

500

-In1,000

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south right after he had departed. While we were talking, Company B 's lead platoon passed a rotund knob 700 meters to our east and approached a second hill numbered 406.25 We heard a sprinkling of rifle fire as Company B 's lead element entered the saddle between Hill 406 and the knoll. From where we sat the shooting certainly did not appear to be anything serious. My immediate guess was that it was harassing fire and that the shooters were hidden in the jungle several hundred meters down the north slope. Hill 406, as well as the rest of the ridgeline east of us, though quilted with a layer of knee-high grass, was void of vegetation and appeared an improbable spot to run into the enemy. NVA units did not construct positions on hilltops, not on bare ones, or so I thought. At that point the commander of Company B seemed to have the situation under control, and when the helicopter arrived Lieutenant Colonel Snyder departed. It was later, after the battalion commander had gone, that the firing grew in intensity, and I heard the chug-chug-chug sound of at least one heavy machine gun-the same one that I had reported several days before.26

Notes 1. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 16 May 1968; 196th LIB: Combat After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 2. 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Delaware, 18 April-14 May 1968, 31 May 1968; 196th LIB: Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 3. America! Division: Summary of Operation Golden Valley, 16 May 1968; 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. The tactical situation dictated several rapid moves during the period. Three days after 1-52d Infantry had arrived at FSB East it displaced north of the Que Son Valley to reestablish FSB Cacti and began screening and blocking operations in conjunction with U.S. Marine units on Operation Allenbrook. 4. Americal Division: Summary of Operation Golden Valley, 16 May 1968. 5. Lt. Col. Alan L. Gropman, Airpower and the Evacuation of Kham Due (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Airpower Research Institute, 1979), pp. 57-65. 6. Americal Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 July 1968, 7 August 1968; Nguyen Phuoc Sanh, ed., Every Enemy Was Defeated: Classic Battles on the MR 5 Battlefield (1945-1975), Vol. 2 (Headquarters Military Region 5, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1993), pp. 63-87; Headquarters, America! Division: Intelligence Summary 147-68, 27 May 1968. 7. Sanh, Every Enemy Was Defeated, pp. 63-87. 8. Ibid. 9. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 18 May 1968. 10. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 19 May 1968. 11. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 20 May 1968.

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12. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 21-26 May 1968. 13. Ibid. 14. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 27 May 1968. 15. Bernie Borowski, video and tape to author, 3 December 1991. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 27 May 1968. 19. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 28-29 May 1968. 20. Raymond P. Schmitt, letter to author, 12 December 1997. 21. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 30 May-3 June 1968. 22. 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 23. Ibid.; America! Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 July 1968, 7 August 1968; 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 27 May and 4 June 1968. 24. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 3 June 1968. 25. Charles T. May, diary and letters home during 1968, no date. 26. Spot Report 15, with 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 June 1968.

31

Hill 406

II

A

s we entered the saddle between the first and second peaks we received automatic weapons fire from both the first and second peaks, placing us right in the middle. This incoming consisted of both automatic small arms and .50-caliber machine gun fire. We returned the fire with what we had while the rest of Bravo tried to take the first peak's highground," wrote Pfc. Tony May later.l Bravo Company had walked smack into positions that the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment had built around Hill406. The enemy forces had again achieved surprise by being in a place we did not expect them; but NVA forces' occupying the ridge was a secret only to the 3-21st Infantry. Documents captured by the 1-6th Infantry on 26 May and evacuated to the Americal Division's intelligence section stated that separate elements of the 3d NVA Regiment had displaced to several hilltop locations, including Hill 406. Why that information had failed to reach Lieutenant Colonel Snyder, the commander who needed it the most, is unknown, but that failure, regardless of the reason, cost young men their lives unnecessarily.z The 3d Company had come to the area with the mission to fight and had arrayed its defenses to do just that. Reinforced with two 12.7mm antiaircraft guns and 82mm mortars, the company had centered its main fortifications on Hill 406 and established outposts on two contiguous lumps of high ground to create three mutually supporting hilltop festungs. We knew none of this when the opening shots of the battle echoed across the grassy ridges that morning of 5 June. It was not until after the fight for Hill 406 that I fully appreciated the thinking the enemy had put into the preparation of the defensive complex. Pvt. Nguyen Van Hong was one of the 3d NVA Regiment's soldiers who manned a position in the trench on the western end of the hill and likely did not know much more than us. Hong had arrived in South Vietnam with a 180-man infiltration group 10 days before. Shortly afterward he and 293

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several other men, one of whom was a friend, had each been issued an SKS rifle and an assignment to 3d Company. Except that his unit was on a grassy hill with a panoramic view of the adjacent valleys somewhere in the south, Hong knew little about the 3d Company. He would not have time to learn more.3 The 12.7mm guns, dug deep into doughnut-shaped pits, commanded sites on the eastern and western lips of Hill 406's elongated crest. The guns' placement allowed them to engage an oncoming ground force and provide fire support for the hilltop outposts. Covering the hill's flat top between the antiaircraft guns were two orb-shaped combat trenches. The trenches, narrowly dug to make it difficult for an attacking force to maneuver through them, connected a web of ammunition, sleeping, and fighting bunkers placed around the hilltop. Digging and camouflage were prime components of any North Vietnamese defensive plan and the 3d Company did not deviate from the norm. Its soldiers had bored deep into the rock-strewn soil to create low-silhouette bunkers and camouflaged their handicraft with blocks of sod to blend them into the grassy hill, making the bunkers difficult to distinguish from even a short distance. Spoil from the newly dug positions went into gunnysacks and was carried away. There was little vegetation to conceal bunkers and trenches, but from the air the hill appeared undisturbed, and the enemy positions went unnoticed. Hill406 had once been a U.S. fire support base, and the round, heavy cardboard containers used for shipping howitzer rounds had provided the North Vietnamese with construction material. When packed with dirt, the cylinders became logs that strengthened a bunker's walls and roof enough for it to withstand anything but a direct hit from a large-caliber artillery shell.4 At least 10 such reinforced bunkers, their tops protruding inches above the ground's surface and tucked into the contour of the hill, rimmed the knoll that Company B had bypassed and protected the western approach into the 3d Company's position. The third hilltop position, only a couple of hundred meters southeast of Hill 406, also had superb observation and fields of fire that secured the eastern approaches. At that point, however, we still did not know about the fortifications on the hill to its southeast. We would learn about them the hard way. (See Map 31.1.) The western face of Hill 406, though not a part of the trench system, also lodged several automatic weapons bunkers and one or two 60mm mortar positions. The mortar positions were unique and occupied holes that were 4 to 5 feet deep and narrow at the top, making them all but impossible to knock out with artillery. To provide the weapons with maximum coverage of the western approach, the NVA had angled the holes' shafts to correspond with the slant of the hill. The 3d Company's mortarmen on the west-

1,000 Meta's ( ....oUnate)

Trail Unimproved road

0 J

River/Creek Trench with Bunkers Bunker

t

Antlalrcran Gun

.t

Recoilless Rnle

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.t

NVA Mortar

Pos~ion

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ern slope began dropping rounds into Company B 's three platoons shortly after the battle started. At 1155 Capt. Mel Gibson, Helix 17, like the cavalry coming to the rescue, arrived overhead and radioed that he would have a set of fighters on station in about 15 minutes. Meanwhile a pair of gunships from the 176th Combat Aviation Company, whose radio call sign was Musket, arrived to give Company B covering fire and allow him to break contact. The Muskets started a gun run from the north and immediately came under heavy fire from the 12.7mm guns on Hill 406. As the gunships broke off their attack and streaked east, one of the Musket pilots radioed: "We won't be anxious to return until those .50-calibers are knocked out. "5 The gunships' hasty departure made me furious. The Musket pilots were not the only targets of the antiaircraft guns and automatic weapons on Hill 406. The crossfire from the two hills had wounded three of Bravo Company's men, one seriously, and another man was missing. Helix 17, however, came through, and shortly after the gunships had so unceremoniously left the battle, the commander of Company B marked his positions with smoke and a set of A-4s out of Chu Lai shrieked in and dumped napalm on the flat-topped hill. As the fighters made their run, Dustoff 92 defied the antiaircraft fire and whirled into the fight to extract Bravo Company's wounded.6 Paul Power had arrived on station early to relieve Mel Gibson, and wrote later: "The medevac helicopters flew right in and rescued the guyjust like in the movies. God those chopper guys had brass balls. Nothing scared them.''7 Hill 406, reminiscent of a narrow loaf of bread, bristled with weapons of all sorts and calibers, and Company B 's close proximity forced the fighters to make their runs perpendicular to its elongated top. It was a confmed target for a fast-moving jet, and napalm canisters dropped a fraction late skimmed across its top and into the jungle hundreds of meters below. Short bombs splashed onto the hill's southern rim and produced a brilliant spray of fire and smoke, but had little effect on the dug-in enemy soldiers. The antiaircraft guns located on its east and west ends added to the pilot's problems, and the chugging sound of the 12.7mm guns was clearly audible as the fighters made their bombing and strafing runs. For the fighter pilots to hit the forward slope of the hill without endangering Bravo Company's men still located in the saddle was difficult. Mel Gibson, possibly recalling the Navy pilot's near miss while supporting Delta Company at Nhi Ha, was not eager to tempt fate twice-but he did. Thanks to the marine pilots, a skillful and persistent bunch, and Gibson's acumen, the napalm hit home, suppressing the enemy's fire enough to get the dustoff ship safely in and out. The strike had also allowed the Bravo Company commander to pull his 3d Platoon back to a more covered position in the saddle. A single air strike was never enough to knock the enemy

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out of its holes, so the commander of Company B requested another napalm strike. The North Vietnamese gunners took aim at anything flying above the hill. Mel Gibson took a hit in his cockpit during the air strike; I remember him radioing to tell me that he was going to fly over the valley and check out the damage. I watched Helix 17 fly away, figuring he had given up and gone the way of the two Musket gunships, and thought, "Shit, that's the end of our air support for the day." I should have known better. Five minutes later Mel calmly radioed: "Well, the round is rattling around somewhere in here, but I can't fmd it; but there doesn't appear to be any serious damage." A couple of minutes later he was back, seemingly undeterred by the enemy's guns and rolling the 0-2 on its wing to slam a while-phosphorus rocket into Hill 406. Paul Power put in a second set of A-4s around 1300, hitting Hill 406 as well as the ridgeline to its east. The fighters did good work, but Bravo Company was still taking fire from the top of the littie round hill west of Hill406. The situation puzzled me. There was not a single bush on the knoll, and I could not accept that the NVA had been able to dig positions on a near barren ridge and remain undetected. So I used the FO's large binoculars to scan the top of the knoll where the Bravo Company commander said the fire had come from, but saw nothing. My skepticism persisted as the sounds of the shots, likely skewed by the distance, continued to echo from the north slope of the ridge. Lt. Bob Swick, who had replaced the company FO after the abortive combat assault, started an artillery fire mission along the north side of the hill. While the artillery rounds were going in, I again swept the hills with the glasses and saw nothing but grass. When heavy firing broke out once more, I checked the grassy top of the knoll yet again. This time I studied the terrain even more closely and noticed several unusual humps in the grass on the crest of the knoll. Bunkers! The NVA had dug bunkers into the slope of the little hill. The peak of the knoll came to a sharp point, and the bunkers' location just below the peak made hitting them with an artillery round a one in a thousand chance. A 106mm recoilless rifle, though, would do the trick: I radioed the S-3 and requested a gun and crew.s The 106mm crew carrying 10 rounds of high-explosive antitank (HEAT) ammunition and the gun piled into the C and C ship and 15 minutes later was on the ground and manhandling the heavy gun into a position at the edge of the hill. As the crew prepared to fire, I knelt beside the long tube and pointed out the humps in the grass to the section sergeant. After I identified what I thought to be a bunker, the gun crew would fire the weapon's .50-caliber spotting rifle mounted on top of and aligned with the tube. The rifle fired a white-phosphorus round that produced a smoky puff

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upon impact. I gave the section sergeant right-left and up-down corrections, and the gunner was usually on target after a second or third spotting round. When I gave them an OK, the crew would let go with a high-explosive HEAT round. Ten minutes after its arrival the recoilless rifle crew had located and destroyed six enemy bunkers. The 106mm crew worked over the knoll for some 20 minutes. The projectiles were on target and undoubtedly doing damage, but the HEAT round, designed to combat armor, used a shaped charge that the grass-covered bunkers seemed to absorb. The section leader suggested that we get some high-explosive, plastic (HEP) rounds sent out. The HEP rounds had a spalling effect when they struck a surface, and the young sergeant believed they would produce good, or at least visible, results against the earthen bunkers. I radioed the BTOC and within a few minutes the C and C ship whirled into our position with 20 HEP rounds. The first one uncovered what appeared to be a trench; a second round opened a gaping hole in the hillside, and an oblong object, possibly a body, rolled into the grass and down the slope. While the 106mm crew was churning the bunkers into heaps of dirt, Paul Power continued slamming Hill 406 and the eastern ridge with air strikes. The weather began to sour as the afternoon dragged on, causing Paul to fret about getting the next set of fighters in before he lost visibility. As usual, Helix 11 worked wizardry when it came to air support, and close to 1500, despite some forbidding dark clouds that threatened to shut him down, Paul ripped into the enemy hill with a set of bomb-laden F-4s out of Chu Lai. When the fighters had expended their ordnance the commander of Company B reported that they had quit taking fire, adding that he was going to send an element to the top of the knoll and check it. The company's 1st Platoon, led by Lt. James Cox and Sfc. Gaylord Hendrickson, was at the foot of the knoll and started up the steep slope. Meanwhile, I had continued to seek out bunkers on the knoll, as well as anything that remotely resembled a position on the forward slope of Hill 406, and directed recoilless rifle fire on them. The 106mm crew had made short work of the bunkers. A few minutes before 1500 I reported that we had knocked out most of the positions, but added that we could still see someone moving in one of the positions. Unsure whether the man I was looking at was friendly or enemy, and concerned about shooting into Company B, I quit firing the recoilless rifle and radioed the company commander to pop smoke so I could identify the position of his lead element. Yellow smoke drifted up from the south slope of the knoll, indicating that Company B was still moving uphill. The movement was an enemy soldier. As the men of the 1st Platoon neared the top they found an RPD machine gun and five dead NVA soldiers scattered around the crest. A few

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of the enemy had survived the fury of the 106mm and took the platoon under fire, forcing it back. The platoon regrouped and tried again. This time a couple of men reached the top and started across it when an NVA leaped up out of a bunker and opened fire. The enemy's aim was deadly. I watched him shoot the point man and tum his weapon toward the rest of the 1st Platoon before he ducked back into his hole. The bunker was on the hilltop and masterfully blended into the grass. It was hard to pick out, but I felt rotten for failing to find and destroy it before the NVA soldier had jumped out of it and shot the man from Bravo Company. I radioed the commander of Company B to pull his men back to allow the 106mm a clear field of fire. As the 1st Platoon went back down the slope the recoilless rifle crew went after the newly found bunker, but it proved to be an impossible target. Even though the rounds from the spotting rifle were dead on, the bunker's position on top of the hill made it impossible to strike with the heavy-caliber projectiles. We watched in frustration as the HEP rounds either skimmed its top or slammed into the ground a few feet in front of it. Tom Beyer, Helix 15, who had relieved Paul Power on station a little while earlier, finally walloped the knoll and Hill 406 with an air strike. The air support, artillery, and continued fire from the 106mm recoilless rifle allowed Bravo Company to break contact. Battalion directed Company B to link up with us and form a consolidated position. They arrived around 1720. The 7 hours of constant contact had cost the company three killed and seven seriously wounded. The company had to leave its dead to save the living, an event that always tears at a soldier's guts, and it showed in the men's faces as they started to dig in for the night. Listed among the killed were the platoon leader and platoon sergeant of the 1st Platoon. Sometime later the S-3 radioed to let me know that I was the task force commander. The plan for the next day was for both companies to attack east along the ridgeline. Company B 's objective was the knoll, and once the knoll was secured that unit was to provide Company D with overhead fire while it attacked through Company B to secure Hill 406, the main objective. The bombs had begun to scrape away the thin grass covering on its crest and expose some of the trenches.9 I requested more ammunition for the recoilless rifle, along with some LAWs and a quad-50 to support our attack the next day. Originally designed as an antiaircraft weapon, the quad-50 had assumed a ground support role in Vietnam and its four .50-caliber machine guns could put out a devastating amount of heavy, accurate fire in a very short period. I am not certain of the reason, but battalion nixed my request for the quad-50. Instead, they sent me a sluggish-firing .50-caliber machine gun with a broken traverse-and-elevate (T and E) mechanism-better than nothing but only by a little bit. The T and E attached the gun's receiver to the crossbar

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of the weapon's tripod and stabilized it; without the T and E the gun's accuracy was imprecise and much too dangerous to use for overhead fire. Despite these problems, I placed the machine gun in a position to the right of the 106mm and planned to spray the hill with it before Company B kicked off its attack. Sgt. Rock Wetmore worked on the gun and adjusted its headspace and timing. It was better than it had been, but still sluggish, and would just have to do. The ridge was dry as tinder and the temperature had been close to 100 degrees during the peak of the day. Both companies were sucking dry canteens, and battalion ferried out water in collapsible 5-gallon jugs along with the ammunition.IO Just before sundown Tom Beyer scathed the knoll with a pair of A-4s out of Chu Lai. It was the final air strike of the day. More air was on for the next day, with plans to hit both hills with 750-pound delayed-fuse bombs. Lt. Bob Swick continued firing artillery on the hills to our east that evening. The NVA kept their heads down during the pounding and stayed on their hill and the night passed quietly.

6June

Both companies were awake before dawn, and shortly afterward the everdependable Tommy Beyer flew out of the brightening sky and circled our hill. Tom told me that he had a set of F-4s due in about an hour and a second strike, this one with F-100s, was to follow the F-4s. While we were waiting for the F-4 Phantoms to show, Tom buzzed low over the objectives and reported that bunkers and trenches covered Hill406.11 The first set of fighters came in from the south a little after 0800 and met heavy ground fire as it unleashed its loads of 500-pound bombs on Hill 406. Nevertheless, the F-4 pilots were on the mark and left a huge crater in a section of the enemy's trench line. The F-1 OOs arrived on the heels of the departing Phantoms, and Tom Beyer struck the hill a second time with high explosives. As with the Phantoms, fire greeted each pass the F-100s made-and when the enemy gunners were not shooting at the fast movers, they tried to knock Tom Beyer out of the sky. The NVA's aim was off that day, and Helix 11 relieved Tom on station just after 0900. During the next hour and a half Paul Power lambasted Bravo Company's objective with three sets of fighters. Between air strikes, Bob Swick pounded the hills with artillery and we fired the 106mm and the .50-caliber machine gun on any fold in the ground that even resembled a bunker, including some of those we had hit the previous day. The recoilless rifle would remain to support Delta Company's attack, and one of the squads from the reconnaissance platoon had arrived to secure it. Paul Power put in the fifth air strike of the morning just before 1100.

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Company B moved out to seize the knoll, now a blackened knob, shortly afterward. As Bravo Company moved toward its objective, Paul Power found another set of fighters and directed them onto two hills. At 1215 Company B reported that the little hill was secure. There had been no resistance.12 Pfc. Tony May remembers the hill: "We dug some holes for defensive fighting positions and used some holes that were already there to form a perimeter around the top in case the NVA counterattacked. I used one about eight feet down that was already dug by the NVA. It was occupied by an NVA corpse, which I promptly evicted."i3 Snyder and Col. Frederick Kroesen, who had assumed command of the brigade from Colonel Gelling a few days before, had joined us on the hill some time earlier. I walked over to where they stood, met the new brigade commander, and told Lieutenant Colonel Snyder we were jumping off. Colonel Kroesen was a veteran of World War II and Korea and as a combat soldier had fought over many hills during service in those two wars. Maybe it was for this reason that he did not tell me how to do the job at hand, but instead simply wished me luck. After Delta Company had moved out, Colonel Kroesen reportedly said, "I hope they don't get bunched up; and, I wish I could go with them." Bob Swick kept the artillery fire going onto Hill 406, and we left the laager with the 1st Platoon in the lead, followed by the company headquarters. Dick Holt's 3d Platoon was next in line. Rick Weidner was in Chu Lai with a bad foot, so I put the 2d Platoon in reserve. When we reached the bottom of the hill, Bravo Company's M60s opened up to give us overhead covering fire. The sharply slanting slope forced me to keep the company in single file until we contoured the knob, making our advance awkward. As we entered the saddle the 1st and 3d Platoons moved left and right, respectively, and formed a skirmish line. It was noisy with all of the steel flying overhead, and I commented to Sp4c. Sam Peterson, one of the company's RTOs, that the M60s sure sounded like AK-47s. "Arkansas" Peterson had just agreed with me when I turned and saw the sergeant out of the FO section fall. My first thought was that Bravo Company was firing into us, and I yelled into the radio for them to cease fire. The Bravo Company commander calmly responded, "We quit firing 5 minutes ago." Then I saw the NVA machine gun less than 50 meters away and hit the ground. There was no cover in the saddle, and the gunner on the forward slope had us dead to rights. He cut the grass around us but somehow missed us. I radioed the 106mm crew back in the laager and told them to fire a spotting round, not knowing where it would strike, and saw a puff of white phosphorus 10 to 15 feet above the enemy's position. After I told the section sergeant to lower the tube a little and fire the major caliber, the explosion blew the NVA soldier into the air.

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An infantry assault on a fortified hill is a cluttered affair marked by a collection of confusing events that occur simultaneously. There were bunkers all over the slope, and individual members and squads dealt with them as they found them-generally one at a time. I recall Sgt. Richard L. Clegg, one of the team leaders in the 1st Platoon, exposing himself to enemy fire while he crawled behind a bunker and killed its occupants with a grenade. Clegg received the Silver Star for his heroism. Pfc. Steve Bingen also recalls the assault that afternoon: "John Clancy saw an NVA soldier jump out of a fox hole and run down the side of the hill. John gave him at least a 50 round burst from the M-60 machine gun. John really wanted one that day."I4 As the company cleared the slope of enemy soldiers, NVA positions on the third hill, the ones we did not know about, took the 3d Platoon under fire with a machine gun located there. Lt. Richard Holt radioed me that he was going to see whether he could locate the gun. I warned him to watch out for himself. Minutes later Holt radioed: "Black Death 6 this is Killer, I've been shot right through the chest." Holt's message was like a kick in the gut. Sp5c. Paul Commer, the 3d Platoon's medic, braved the fire to retrieve Holt and dragged him back to cover. As Commer worked to save his wounded platoon leader I requested a medevac. Just after 1400, and only minutes after Holt was hit, Dustoff 51 radioed that he was inbound and asked for instructions. The pilot knew we were in contact and was fretful about coming in to our position. By now, however, the fire came from the top of Hill 406 and the third hill. I explained the situation and told him to make his approach from the west, and up the north side of the ridge, and then swing into a notch in the saddle we had set up as a PZ. The terrain would mask him from the NVA's fire on the hill as long as he kept the ship below the ridgeline. The pilot rogered that he understood, but then asked me again where the fire was coming from. I repeated myself. He asked a third time where the fire was coming from, convincing me that he was hesitant, half-witted, or both. I blew up and called him a stupid son of a bitch along with a host of other names; the dustoff pilot then became upset. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder cut in and told me to settle down and cool off. Bob Swick changed the fire mission from high-explosive to smoke so as to screen the helicopter, and the pilot finally found the courage to fly into the saddle. Commer and some others loaded Holt aboard; the helicopter lifted off, leaving the same way it had come, and taking no fire. Lieutenant Holt died shortly after reaching the hospital. The company was under fire from the northeast as well as from the front. At some point, Sgt. Larry See came over to where I was and drew a map in the sand to show me where the automatic weapon was so that Swick could hit it with artillery.

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The squads that cleared the bunkers and spider holes played a dangerous game of grenade catch as the enemy fought to maintain its grip on the hill. Steve Bingen remembers Pfcs. Leo Hadaller and Gary Hart crawling from hole to hole and throwing hand grenades into the enemy positions. Bingen wrote later: "The NVA occasionally threw out the grenades only to have them tossed back into the hole. The resulting explosion usually caused an NVA helmet to go flying through the air."15 Capt. Mel Gibson had relieved Paul Power earlier and he continued to put in air strikes on both hills to our front. The NVA had taken a real pounding, but after the air strike we saw dirt flying up as the enemy soldiers tried to repair their damaged positions. Gibson was completing a strike when I heard shooting a few meters behind me. I looked back, saw one of the men from the 1st Platoon throw a grenade into a hole, and then saw Torres race up to it and empty a magazine into it. Thinking they were horsing around, I yelled and asked what the hell they were doing. Torres hollered back and said: "Sir, there's a dink in the hole and he just came up a minute ago shooting." The bombs and artillery had caved in trenches and bunkers all over the hill, and at some point the occupant of that bunker had woken up and found himself surrounded by U.S. troops. I went back and told one of the men to get a Claymore mine, drop it in the hole, and pop it. He did and no more fire came out of the hole. The final airstrike of the day went in just after 1900. As the fighters made their last run a white-phosphorus round and a single high-explosive round struck the crest of the hill. The white phosphorus landed to my front and did no damage, but the high-explosive round badly wounded Bob Swick as well as the company communications sergeant. Looking back at the action later, it was clear that the two rounds warned of things to come. On that hill that long afternoon, however, the enemy's intentions were not so clear to me. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder radioed me and asked whether I wanted to remain in place. I answered yes, not wanting to fight for the same ground the next day. I figured the NVA would try to push us off the hill that night and prepared for that eventuality. We had plenty of rifle ammunition, but were out of M60 ammo and M79 grenades and low on hand grenades. Battalion was unable get a resupply bird in to us so I radioed the commander of Company B and asked whether he could give me some ammo. He sent me 200 rounds of machine gun ammunition and told me he could not spare more. He did, however, volunteer to send me his FO to replace Swick. I declined his offer. The NVA troops had put up a good fight for the hill and I expected them to counterattack that night. Battalion sent us a flare ship shortly after

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dark. The C-47 took fire from an NVA antiaircraft gun to our south, but the 4.2-inch mortars on FSB East shut them up. There was movement to our front that night but no attack. Shortly before sunrise on 7 June I heard the cough of a mortar, then a second and third one. According to 1st Sergeant Decker later, the NVA put 18 rounds in the air before the first round impacted in a bomb crater that a squad from the 1st Platoon had occupied. That round, the deadliest of them all, killed Pfcs. Reynaldo Torres, Peter Clarence Ferguson, and James Frank (Jimbo) Konecny. The following rounds badly wounded 12 others including, Jerry Goff, John Clancy, Sfc. Buford Mathis, and the 1st Platoon leader. Both he and Holt had been with the company exactly 1 month. Somebody in the company headquarters had a portable radio tuned to the Armed Forces Radio station, which was playing the song from the Wizard of Oz-during the mortar attack. Ha! Ha! The witch is dead. I hate that song. I thought the world had ended and grabbed a PRC-25 radio and ran across the hill in hopes of locating the mortars and getting counterbattery fire on them. I attempted to direct artillery by guessing where I thought the mortars were by sound. By the time I could get the grid cleared and the mission started it was too late. The NVA gunners worked the rounds across the crest of Hill 406 and then struck Company B, killing one man and wounding another. When the mortar rounds had stopped falling, we brought in two dustoff ships and evacuated the dead and wounded. Since we still had a hill to take, I told battalion that I wanted a couple of lieutenants to come out in the event something happened to me. Sometime that morning the wounded Rick Weidner, the battalion S-1, and the brigade liaison officer flew out. The ammunition was also sent out, and later that day we secured Hill 406 and the adjacent outpost without incident. As the company consolidated its position, one of the platoons captured a young NVA private, Nguyen Van Hong. The antiaircraft gun, complete with sight, was still in the doughnut-shaped pit where its gunners had left it. We found some abandoned weapons as well as a damaged RPD machine gun on the third hilltop position, possibly the gun that had caused the 3d Platoon so much grief the day before. The battalion had chased off or killed the best of the 3d Company and had won the fight for Hill 406. I attribute much of our success to the 106mm crewmen and their bunker-busting ability, the Helix FACs, and the marine fighter pilots that put the ordnance where we needed it. The men who deserve the most credit, though, are the riflemen in Bravo and Delta Companies who doggedly fought toe to toe with dug-in, stubborn enemy forces and pushed them off the hill. They won the hill and in doing it paid the dearest price for that victory. The 2 days of fighting had cost Delta Company four dead and 22 wounded, while Company B suffered

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four killed and eight wounded. It is hard to tell how many NVA died on Hill 406. There were no whole bodies found, just pieces. The action on Hill 406 was several days behind us yet very fresh in our minds when Ray Schmitt summed up his thoughts about the fight in a letter home: "After we finally took the hill we found two .50 caliber anti-aircraft guns and they even mentioned it over the Saigon news report. We were glad to get the 50's, but it wasn't worth the price we paid."16

Notes 1. Charles T. May, diary and letters home during 1968, no date. 2. Americal Division: Intelligence Summary 147-68, 27 May 1968; Americal Division: G-3 Journals, 8 June 1968. The 1st Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment was also known as the 7th Battalion. 3. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 8 June 1968, erroneously lists Company C as the capturing unit. 4. 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler, 28 November 1967. The 2-327th Infantry occupied Hill 406 in September 1967. 5. The spot reports with the 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals of 5-6 June provide a detailed sequence of the action; 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5-6 June 1968. 6. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals 5-6 June 1968. 7. Paul Power, FACs ofWAR: Diary of Helix 11 (1968). 8. Maj. James F. Humphries Staff Study: Rifle Company Antitank Weapons, U.S. Army Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, March 1969. 9. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 June 1968. 10. Ibid. 11. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 5 June 1968. 12. Ibid. 13. May diary and letters. 14. Stephen J. Bingen, letter to author, 6 January 1994. 15. Ibid. 16. Raymond P. Schmitt, letter to author, 12 December 1997.

32 The Final Objective

A

fter the fight for Hill 406, battalion directed us to clear the ridge east of the battle area. Thinking that the NVA would come back to Hill 406 once we had left the area, I left Sgt. Larry See and his squad as a staybehind ambush. See and his men saw no action that night, but he later recalled how the smell of death had permeated the air and soil of the bloodstained prominence, making it a disconcerting place to spend a night. As Delta Company followed the ridge, Bravo Company moved north into the large valley and turned east to parallel our operation along the high ground. By 9 June we had cleared the last large hill on the ridge, and battalion sent us down a rocky wash to work the valley with Company B. The next day A/2-lst Infantry, which had been OPCON to the battalion for several days, combat assaulted two platoons into the hills just to our south. Company B, meanwhile, had cleared the valley and circled back to the southwest, leaving the area to us. (See Map 32.1.) My time with the Gimlets was drawing to a rapid close; 11 June, my last scheduled day in the field, began like countless other days before it. Around 0800 I set up a day laager in some woods at the edge of a fallow rice field about 700 meters southeast of a pint-sized, scrub-covered ridge made up of two hillocks, the highest of which was Hill 104, and began to patrol the area. As I had done in the past, I kept most of the men of Company Doff their feet and sent out small patrols to reconnoiter our surroundings. Battalion wanted me to link up with A/2-1 early the next morning about 600 meters south of the brushy ridge, where N2-1 would secure a PZ for us (D/3-21) and we would fly to FSB Center to relieve N3-21 of the security mission. After a week of garrisoning the fire support base, Delta Company would head for Chu Lai and a stand-down, the first since January. Another captain would replace me as commander of Company D on the last day of the stand-down; I would then process out of the division and return home. That was the plan, anyway. I 307

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We had had no contact with enemy forces since the action on Hill 406, and our first sign of them came shortly after 1000, when the OP covering a trail running off the bushy ridge killed a VC. The enemy soldier had just popped out of the underbrush and wandered into the men manning the OP. Forty-five minutes later a patrol from the 1st Platoon ran into four VC dressed in traditional black pajamas and carrying packs and took them under fire, killing one of the enemy. The dead man's pack contained documents and a green uniform, which indicated that the men were not hamlet guerrillas, but probably belonged to a VC Main Force or Local Force unit. A distance of about 500 meters separated the two incidents, which seemed to be unrelated, but after reflecting on the events of that afternoon during the following weeks, I concluded that the VC belonged to the same unit. The two actions, albeit small, foreshadowed events that would take place later that afternoon, and I should have connected them. The company continued to patrol throughout the afternoon, but, except for battling off a horde of voracious ants that called the laager home, there was nothing going on. As squads scouted the surrounding countryside they had also looked for a location that might be suitable for a night laager. All had come up short. The terrain to our east and north was flat, and the single hillock in that direction was overgrown with elephant grass. Later that afternoon I decided to check out the brushy ridge to our south and tagged Sergeant Wetmore for the job. The company had received a number of new men to replace those we had lost on Hill 406. Some were fresh out of training and needed a little time to adjust to life in the field. Wetmore had experience and was field savvy, and I wanted him to take a new squad leader and his squad and show them the right way to do things. Around 1630 the squad reached a slight saddle and turned east toward Hill 104. Wetmore later wrote: "I told the squad leader to get the men on line so we could sweep the top and get it in one pass. As we moved, they kept bunching toward the center. I told the squad leader (he was right next to me and the RTO) to keep the men spread and pointed to where I wanted to move."2 As Wetmore swung his arm around to show the squad leader what he was talking about, he came face to face with two VC soldiers who had apparently been talking instead of keeping an eye out for U.S. soldiers. As the two enemy soldiers ran in different directions, and for cover in the brush, the squad fired at them. My first reaction was to go for the handset when I heard M16 fire come from the ridge. Wetmore, however, was a solid NCO with several major actions under his belt, and I knew it would only be a short while before he would be on the hom and relating his situation. As expected, it was not long before he radioed that one of the men had just killed a VC armed with an AK-47. As I congratulated him more firing erupted along the

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high ground. Wetmore broke in to tell me that his squad had killed a second

vc. The staccato of several AK-47s, melded with the sharp chatter of several M16s firing rapidly, had provided a noisy backdrop as he spoke. When Wetmore next shouted into the radio, "Black Death this place is covered with fucking dinks and we're taking fire," it needed no clarification. As he was talking on the radio his RTO took a round through the arm. Wetmore later wrote: "They [VC] returned fire accurately about one foot above the ground. I told the squad leader to have his people return fire, but I couldn't see any of them. The grass and brush were about 12 inches high, and as I popped my head up to see the situation, I noticed what appeared to be Coke cans being thrown from their position. They were grenades of some type. "3 The saddle provided a low spot that was out of the direct line of fire, and Wetmore sent the wounded man there and told him to wait. The fire from the brush continued. A few minutes later, he saw that his situation was getting no better and withdrew the remainder of the squad to the saddle to wait for the company. The situation had developed rapidly, and there was no time to give the platoon leaders anything but a quick synopsis of what we were going to do. My main concern at that point was to get up the hill and support the squad. As I threw on my rucksack, 1st Sergeant Decker yelled, "Saddle them up!" A few minutes later, with Weidner's 2d Platoon in the van, the company had cleared the laager, crossed the paddy, and started up the hill. The firing had died by the time I reached the saddle where Wetmore had set up. After a hurried conversation with some of the squad members, I learned that the VC had gone to ground in the hedge-like bushes less than 35 meters down the ridge. It was impossible to tell just where, and I decided to sweep the little hill using recon by fire, figuring the enemy troops would give their positions away. Weidner formed his platoon in a skirmish line across the sharp-backed ridge, and I positioned the company headquarters to the platoon's right rear. A few minutes later the skirmishers started forward, raking the brush ahead of them with rifle and machine gun fire. We reached a choke point on the constricted ridge, suggestive of the neck of an hourglass, when all hell broke loose. Two or more RPG gunners, flanked by a Browning Automatic Rifle, a Browning M1919 A6 machine gun, and an RPD machine gun, covered the narrow neck with interlocking bands of fire. Other VC, these armed with AK-47s, backed up the crewserved weapons. A fire team leader, Cpl. David Lalich, died in a hail of steel, and several men fell wounded as the 2d Platoon dropped to the ground to return the VC fire with small arms and grenades. The M79 rounds, which could not be armed in the short distance to the grenadier's target, rebounded through the scrub like deadly pinballs. (See Map 32.2.) The cry for a medic went out, and Sp4c. Robert Davis, the 2d Platoon's

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medic, left his position of safety to reach a wounded man and was struck down by an RPG round. To stand up on that wretched ridge that boiling afternoon was to die. We were in a tight spot-and the VC soldiers knew it and intensified their fire. Over the din of automatic weapons and exploding grenades, I heard a mortar round leave its tube and held my breath as an explosion split the air around us. The round had been close, but the enemy gunner's aim was just a little long and, luckily, he never adjusted it. My idea to draw out the VC force had certainly worked, but the frrestorm that sliced the air inches above our heads was much greater than I had expected or ever experienced. Our claim to the hill consisted of a few meters of stony soil, while the VC owned the ground beyond the neck's upper chamber and, from what I could tell, the rest of the ridge to the east as well. The ridge's northern and southern slopes were near vertical and dense with brush. Flanking the position was impossible, though some of the men from the 1st and 3d Platoons were attempting to do so anyway. Below me to my right I saw Staff Sergeant Stoves and some others, rifles at the ready, trying to fight their way through the bracken and up the slope to get behind the enemy's position but making little progress. Sp4c. Terry Farrand, who had again become the company's FO, was also on the southern slope directing artillery. Farrand brought the rounds in close, but he was unable to put them on top of the enemy's positions without striking Company D. As Farrand adjusted the artillery as close as he dared, an RPG round sailed past his head and slammed into the brush below him. Farrand ducked lower and stayed in place to continue the mission.4 An FAC circled the skies reassuringly above the hill, but we were too close to the enemy positions to use any fighter support that he could muster. Not long into the fight I requested gunships, and within 15 minutes CWO AI Gaither, whose radio call sign was Musket 10, radioed that he was inbound with two ships. I gave Gaither a quick rundown of the situation as he neared the hill, and shortly afterward the air vibrated from the sound of his miniguns whipping the ground to our front. Gaither caused the enemy troops to go deep in their holes, but by 1700 he had expended his ammunition and broke station. He promised to come back. We traded rifle fire and grenades with the dug-in VC soldiers throughout the stifling afternoon, with little effect on the enemy. As day ebbed toward evening I thought about getting out. About that time an RPG round exploded to my right front, and seconds later I saw an injured machine gunner and a rifleman scrambling through the brush toward me. My first thought was that the 2d Platoon was coming off line in chaos. I think my heart stopped. First Sergeant Decker, who was lying beside me, must have had the same idea; as the machine gunner reached us, Decker jerked him to the ground. I tackled the rifleman. Each man was bleeding from several wounds, and the rifleman's M16 was peppered with holes and covered with

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his blood. Each had also proved himself many times before, but the near miss had shaken both of them badly-that happens to the very best. Although shook up, neither was in danger of dying. Remaining on the hill was to endure a slow hemorrhage, but breaking contact without covering fire would cost more casualties and was not much of an alternative. It was at about that time that Musket 10 arrived back on station and solved the problem. I told the 2d Platoon to pop smoke; I also told Gaither we were pulling out and to bring his fire in close. As the men on line backed out of their positions, Gaither let out all stops and unleashed a long burst of minigun fire that split the air in an unending, deafening thunderclap. It was enough to put the VC deep into their holes and enabled us to get out without further casualties. After Gaither had expended his ammunition, Paul Power followed with a pair of Marine F-4s loaded with napalm. It was near dark by that time and the Phantom pilots had a hard time hitting the narrow hill. A couple of the napalm canisters slammed into the bluff-like slope of the ridge in a brilliant splash of orange and black. When we reached the paddy below the hill I evacuated the wounded with the battalion commander's C and C ship, and then moved the company into a laager 500 meters away. The dead men were still on the hill. I had never thought that I would leave one of my men on the battlefield, and leaving those two soldiers behind gnawed at me through the night. It still bothers me today. 12 June 1968

The plan for the next day was to resume the attack. It was something that had to be done but nothing that I was looking forward to. I requested flak jackets for each man in the company. Artillery hit the hill during intervals that night, and Helix 11 was back on station with air support early the next morning. After an artillery prep and several air strikes we started back for the hill. It was another simmering June day and 10 men, including a new platoon leader, fell out from the heat before we reached its base. I had a strange feeling as we were climbing the slope and told 1st Sergeant Decker that something was wrong about this place. Decker, always positive, answered that we had it this time and something like everything was going to be OK. The strange feeling had abated by the time we reached the crest. We swept the hill using recon by fire, and this time there was no return fire. The VC soldiers had departed, leaving several of their dead and much of their ammunition behind. We recovered our dead men from the place they had fallen and wrapped them in ponchos. The battalion commander's helicopter picked them up a short time later. There had been no contact, but Weidner had somehow injured his hand. The wound was bleeding badly so I sent him in on the C and C helicopter to get it looked at. His departure again left me with no officers.

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As we secured the hill, I sent a patrol to clear the rest of the ridge to the east and started the digging in, thinking we might get hit, and walked around the position. It appeared that the VC had been there for a while. Their positions had been chiseled deep into the rocky crown of the hill's upper chamber and overlooked the narrow neck of the hourglass. A couple of the spider holes contained RPG ammunition and empty brass, magazines and machine gun links, and dud grenades lay scattered around the automatic weapons positions. The 60mm mortar position was in a hole too deep for a gunner to observe where the mortar rounds landed; the gunner had to preset them with a single charge to propel them a specified distance. It was a good indication that the VC had planned to engage an oncoming force somewhere around the saddle and had not expected to fight at close quarters. Pfc. Donald Smith, one of the new men, was checking a spider hole as I stood nearby talking to our Vietnamese interpreter. The interpreter had just finished telling me that he was half-Buddhist and half-Roman Catholic when there was a noise like the echo in a well. The next thing I knew was that I was flat on my back with the wind knocked out of me. I heard someone yell, "Black Death's hit!" Even though I was still conscious, it still took a few seconds to realize that he was talking about me. Then 1st Sergeant Decker appeared and said, "Sir, you're going to be OK." It was a standard line and one I had used many times before. In this case it was not so. The wound was not particularly painful at that point, but I had no sight in my right eye. I knew it was gone. But I was fortunate. The blast had killed Smith and the interpreter and wounded four others. One of the wounded was Sp4c. John Kellet, a grenadier from the 1st Platoon who had been twice wounded in earlier actions but had bounced back. His injuries this time, however, proved fatal: he died in the hospital 5 days later. I radioed battalion to let them know what had happened and that they needed to get an officer out to the company. Later I learned that Denny Leach said, "I'm going," and tore out of the BTOC for the helicopter pad. Sometime later a Huey swung into our position to take us to the 2d Surgical Hospital in Chu Lai. For me, at least for then, the war in Vietnam was over.

Notes 1. 196th LIB: S2/S3 Section Daily Journals, 11 June 1968. 2. Roderick B. Wetmore, letter and sketch map to author, 15 November 1993. 3. Ibid. 4. Terry Farrand, Memoirs of "D" Company (Black Death) FO Team, February-July 1968.

Epilogue

D

elta Company's fight for Hill 104 marked the last battle for the ridgelines and the last significant action for the month. Following its usual pattern of hit and pullback, the 2d NVA Division dispersed its regiments into mountain redoubts throughout Quang Tin Province. The end of June found the 3d NVA Regiment deployed in positions south of the Chang River, the 1st VC Regiment hidden in Base Area 117, and the 21st Regiment settled into positions west of the Que Son Valley. The enemy forces' withdrawal allowed them to refit, replace combat losses, rest, and prepare for an offensive that U.S. intelligence sources believed would happen during the second week of July.l The Americal Division went after the repositioned NVA division on 5 July, during Operation Pocahontas Forest, a multibattalion, combined U.S.ARVN operation that targeted enemy units and supply installations in the mountains west of the Hiep Due Valley. It was the farthest west that Allied units had yet operated, but the month-long operation failed to trap and destroy a major unit.2 By that time, many of the veterans who had performed so bravely during the January Hiep Due Valley battles were no longer with the brigade. Capt. Dan Mellon, the salty commander of D/4-31st Infantry, for example, had suffered serious wounds in February. Mellon left the army after a lengthy hospitalization and returned to his native Alaska. A night assault on a well-defended hill in May had cost N4-31 a number of casualties, among them Sp4c. Sam Mazzola and S. Sgt. Tim Hunt. Mazzola's injuries sent him back to the United States, but Hunt went to a hospital in Japan until July and then rejoined the company west of the Hiep Due Valley. His wounds plagued him, and another examination at the hospital in Chu Lai showed multiple fractures of his scapula that ended his field duty. Sam Mazzola resides in Michigan. Tim Hunt lives in North Carolina) Sgt. Robert K. Brown was on R and R and had missed the ill-fated

315

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night attack. He left Vietnam during the second week of June, and Bill Mayo, the 1st Platoon's RTO, went home a few days afterward. Lt. Chet Larson, who kept the mortar tubes in his platoon sizzling during the January attacks on FSB West, also departed in June. Joe Stringham finished his tour of duty and continued his army career. He retired as a brigadier general and lives in Alabama. The story of wounds and rotations is much the same for the men of the 2-lst Infantry. Jim Barrett came through Twister Charlie's trial in hell without a scratch, but took a round in the abdomen in February that ended the war for him. John Thomasson, Carl Fryman, Harmon Randall, and John Connolly all completed their tours and returned to the United States to pick up their lives. Some men did not come home. Tom Beyer, the intrepid FAC who weathered a curtain of fiery steel to support the Gimlets during the battles for Nhi Ha and Hill 406, disappeared on 30 July somewhere between Kham Due and the Hiep Due Valley. Paul Power exhausted himself during the early days of August searching the wilderness, often at treetop level, for any sign of the wreckage. He found none. Tom Beyer is still missing in action. Tom's disappearance was painful to everyone who knew him, but it slammed into Paul Power with the force of a runaway train. The loss ultimately affected his performance, and his boss wisely pulled him out of the field and reassigned him to a staff job in Da Nang. Paul Power retired from the air force as a colonel and lives in New Hampshire now.4 In July 1968 I was in Letterman General Hospital fighting to stay in the army. Remaining in service and serving my country meant everything to me, and I knew that I could do it with one eye. However, my first brush with the colonel who served as the president of the medical retention board was not promising, and he advised me to plan to get out. Fortunately, Colonel Kroesen intervened on my behalf. When I went before the medical board a second time, I recall the colonel/board president reluctantly saying that the board had granted me a waiver to remain on active duty. Then he added that I would always be a limited officer and relegated to marginal positions. I resolved to prove him wrong and I did. As the war continued, the Gimlets, like their sister battalions, were also experiencing transition. Lieutenant Colonel Snyder successfully completed his tour as battalion commander and turned over command to Lt. Col. Richard Gecoma on 1 August. Snyder retired as a colonel and lives in North Carolina. Despite the absence of major action the Que Son Valley continued to be a dangerous place. A near-fatal gunshot wound downed Tony May on 16 September. The AK-47 round slammed into the right side of his face, destroyed the hearing in his right ear, partially severed his jugular vein, and damaged several cranial nerves before it came to rest near his spine, where

Epilogue

317

it is today. Tony May lives in Oregon now, and in 1988 he founded the 196th Locate A Brother, an organization dedicated to finding and reuniting veterans of the 196th LIB. Sgts. Rock Wetmore and Bernie Borowski left Vietnam in early fall of 1968. Capt. Dennis Leach finished his tour as the assistant operations officer at brigade, then rotated home in October of the same year. He retired from the army to his home in Minnesota as a brigadier general in 1991. Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, the yearlong operation that had brought the 196th LIB to the Que Son Valley, ended a month later. Although it was successful in eliminating the enemy threat in the Que Son Valley and its surroundings, it had not destroyed the NVA's ability to fight. The turnover continued. Sgts. John Clancy and Jerry Goff recovered from their wounds, finished their tours with the battalion, and were home for Christmas. By springtime 1969, Capt. Jan Hildebrand, Larry See, Steve Bingen, Paul Commer, Terry Farrand, Ray Schmitt, Bill Gerber, and many others who had fought at Nhi Ha had also returned to civilian life. Operation Fredrick Hill, which began in the spring of 1969 and lasted for two years, charged the 196th LIB with destroying enemy forces in the brigade's tactical area of responsibility and protecting populated areas on the coastal plain. In accomplishing its mission, the brigade met the 2d NVA Division head to head in several hard-fought actions during 1969. Each of those actions deserves comment and analysis, but there is not room here to do so.5 Col. Frederick Kroesen, who commanded the brigade the longest of its wartime commanders, departed in May 1969. A month later, President Richard Nixon officially initiated "Vietnamization," a term coined by Melvin Laird, then secretary of defense, to tum the war over to the South Vietnamese and withdraw U.S. forces. The declaration made little immediate difference for the soldiers who wore muddy boots, and periods of heavy fighting continued through the end of the year and into the spring and summer of 1970. I returned to Vietnam in July of 1970 and joined the 196th LIB as the brigade adjutant on Hill 35, a hot, dust-wrapped rise of ground west of Highway 1. Just days after my arrival, the brigade initiated Operation Elk Canyon that returned the 2-1st Infantry and an ARVN battalion to Kham Due to interdict enemy lines of communication from Laos. It represented the first Allied presence there since U.S. forces had abandoned the area, but it was short-lived and had limited objectives. By giving up Kham Due Special Forces Camp in May 1968, we had ceded the western high country to the NVA and allowed it 2 years to develop safe bases and unhindered logistical lines into the coastal plain. A 6-week operation with a couple of battalions did little to change that. 6 The war was winding down when I rejoined the Gimlets at the end of October 1970 as the battalion operation officer. The 2d NVA Division and

318

Epilogue

its regiments were in mountain redoubts well to our west and would remain there during the rest of my tour. Sgts. George Fritz and Don Fleshman also served with the battalion then, and we three represented the sum total of the 1968-era Gimlets. Fritz retired from the army and lives in Missouri. Fleshman passed away in 1996. In the spring of 1971 the brigade moved to Da Nang, and the battalions replaced the departing 5th Marines. Shortly before the move, NVA sappers struck the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry, by then a part of the 196th LIB, on FSB Maryann, killing 30 U.S soldiers and wounding another 82. An army investigation concluded that the commanding officers of the battalion, brigade, and division had failed to ensure that the base was secure, and they lost their jobs and careers. The official inquiry in my view was unjust to the brigade and division commanders and was a perfect demonstration of how politicians in and out of the military find scapegoats and cover their butts. I left country in July 1971, as Maj. Gen. Kroesen was returning to assume command of the Americal Division. Kroesen led the division until it stood down at the end of November 1971. The 3-21st Infantry was there to ensure that it took place safely. The 4-31st Infantry had gone home in October. Afterward the 196th LIB moved to Da Nang to patrol the rocket belt. On 4 July 1972 the ARVNs captured Pvt. Dau Quang Binh in the mountains north of the Que Son Valley. Binh belonged to the 4-270th NVA Regiment, the battalion that the Gimlets had kicked out of Nhi Ha; it had infiltrated into Quang Tin Province in February and was operating in our old area. I could not help feeling a sense of bitterness when I read the report at the National Archives. After the brigade headquarters and the 2-1st and 1-46th Infantry had departed Vietnam in June 1972, Task Force Gimlet formed around the 321st Infantry and Battery B, 3-82d Artillery and continued operations until 12August. The Gimlets were the last combat soldiers to leave.

Notes 1. 196th LIB: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 15 March 1969. 2. Operation Pocahontas Forest. The summary was found with assorted papers pertaining to the 1968 196th LIB operations. 3. Timothy Hunt Jr., letter to author, December 1996. 4. Paul Power, FACs of WAR: Diary of Helix 11 (1968). 5. 196th LIB: Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Frederick Hill, 20 April 1971; Americal Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 January 1969, 10 February 1969. 6. Americal Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 October 1970, 15 November 1970.

Glossary

Air combat load: Term used to signify the number of personnel that may be loaded onto a helicopter for a particular sortie. AK-47: Soviet-designed, Soviet- or Chinese-manufactured assault rifle. AO: Area of operation. APC: Armored personnel carrier. ARVN: Army of the Republic of Vietnam or its soldiers. Battalion: The subunit of a brigade or regiment. Battery: The subunit of an artillery battalion. Bird: A common term for an UH-1 helicopter. (See also Slick.) BTOC: Tactical operations center. The headquarters tactical planning center of battalion or brigade commander and his staff. C and C ship: Command-and-control helicopter. Cavalry squadron: The subunit of a cavalry regiment. Cavalry troop: The subunit of a cavalry squadron, but smaller than an infantry rifle company. A cavalry troop normally consisted of three platoons. CO: Commanding officer. Company: The subunit of a battalion. A company ranged from 100 to 150 men. CP: Command post. CTT: Combat tracker team. Also referred to as a dog team. Dustoff: The common term for a medical evacuation helicopter. FAC: Forward air controller. Festung. German word meaning fortress, fort, or citadel. FO: Forward observer. FragO: Fragmentary order. An order in abbreviated form. FSB: Fire support base. A bunkered perimeter that protected a battalion or brigade headquarters, its organic supporting weapons, and one or more artillery batteries. The term LZ was sometimes used to refer to a fire support base or a semipermanent location. (See also LZ.)

319

320

Glossary

HEAT: High-explosive antitank. HEP: High-explosive plastic. Hoi chanh/Chieu Hoi. Chieu Hoi, meaning open arms, was an amnesty program designed to encourage members of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army to rally to the Allied cause. A hoi chanh was an enemy soldier who rallied to the allies under the Chieu Hoi program. Hootch: A common term used to refer to a Vietnamese dwelling. Hook: CH-47 helicopter. Huey: Used to refer to any UH-1 helicopter. (See also Slick.) KIA: Killed in action. Laager: A term from the Boer War meaning all-around defense. It was often misspelled and mispronounced as "logger." LAW: Light antitank weapon. Local Force: The Local Force designation was usually applied to Vietcong forces units that were from the local area. By 1968 Local Force also included some North Vietnamese Regulars. LP: Listening post. A position some distance from the defensive perimeter and manned by two to four men with a radio during the hours of darkness to provide the perimeter early warning. (See also OP.) LZ: Landing zone. Normally any field location used to land helicopters. The term LZ was also used to refer to a fire support base. (See also FSB.) MAF: Marine Amphibious Force. MF: Main Force. The Main Force designation was usually applied to Vietcong forces. Main Force units were also better trained, equipped, and organized than their local counterparts. By 1968 a good percentage of Main Force units were North Vietnamese Regulars. MIA: Missing in action. NFZ: No-fire zone. A specified area in which no ground operations, artillery fire missions, or air strikes could take place without prior approval. OP: Observation post. A position some distance away from the defensive perimeter and manned by two to four men with a radio during the hours of daylight to provide the perimeter early warning. (See also LP.) PF: Popular Forces. Local South Vietnamese organized in platoon-sized units for local defense. Also called Papa Foxtrots. (See also RF.) POW: Prisoner of war. Prick-25: Slang term for the PRC-25, the portable FM radio that was the prime means of communication at the company level. PZ: Pickup zone. Normally any location used to land helicopters under field conditions. (See also LZ.) Quad-50: Four .50-caliber machine guns mounted together. The quad-50 was originally designed as an antiaircraft weapon. RF: Regional Forces. Local South Vietnamese forces organized in compa-

Glossary

321

ny-sized units at district level for defense; also called Ruff-Puffs. (See also PF.) RPG: Rocket-propelled grenade. RTO: Radio telephone operator. Skyspot: Radar-controlled bombing mission by fighter aircraft. Slick: Slang term for UH-1 helicopter. (See also Huey.) Spooky: The common name for an armed C-47 transport aircraft armed with 7 .62mm Gatling guns. Its guns were capable of firing 6,000 rounds per minute. Besides the guns, a Spooky carried parachute flares capable of illuminating large areas of countryside. SP pack: Sundry packet. A carton containing miscellaneous items such as stationery, razor blades, soap, and pipe tobacco. SP packs were supposed to be issued at a ratio of one packet per 100 men in the field. Tam Ky: The capital of Quang Tin Province. VC: Vietcong. Many times VC was used as a generic term to refer to all enemy soldier regardless of their origin. XO: Executive officer, of a company or a larger unit. WIA: Wounded in action.

Bibliography

Archival Documents

After Action Reports America! Division. Combat Action Report: VC/NVA Tet Offensive. 5 April 1968; Summary of Operation Golden Valley. 16 May 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry (First Regiment of Dragoons), America! Division Combat After Action Report Operation: Wheeler/Wallowa. 11 December 1968. National Archives. 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division: Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. 3-10 January. 16 February 1968; Operation Enemy Tet Offensive. 3 March 1968; Combat Action Report: Task Force Miracle. 20 March 1968; Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Delaware. 18 April-14 May 1968. 31 May 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md.; Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. 15 March 1969. National Archives. College Park, Md.; Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Frederick Hill. 20 April 1971. National Archives. College Park, Md. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade: Combat After Action Report: Operation Napoleon/Saline. 5 June 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. 1st Brigade, 101st Division (Abn): TAB A (Order of Battle) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation Wheeler. 11 December 1967. U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 2d Battalion (Airborne) 327th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne: After Action Report: Operation Wheeler. 28 November 1967. U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division (Reinforced): Combat After Action Report Operation Napoleon/Saline. 26 July 1968. 001A218-68. U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center. Washington, D.C. Detachment 423, 1st Special Forces, 1st Special Forces Group (Abn): After Action Report, n.d. Steve Sherman collection.

323

324

Bibliography

Fragmentary Orders 196th Light Infantry Brigade, America! Division: FragO 2 to OPORD 1-68; FragO 8 to OPORD 1-68. 6 May 1968; FragO 9 to OPORD 1-68. 12 May 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. 196th Light Infantry Brigade, America! Division: Annex B (Intelligence) to 196th OPORD 12-68. 5 July 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md.

Operational Report Lessons Learned Task Force OREGON (America! Division): Operational Report Lessons Learned Period Ending 31 July 1967. 5 November 1967. National Archives. College Park, Md. (Copies furnished by Les Hines.) America! Division: Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 October 1967. 26 November 1967; Period Ending 31 January 1968. 8 February 1968; Period Ending 30 April 1968. 7 May 1968; Period Ending 31 July 1968. 7 August 1968; Period Ending 31 January 1969. 10 February 1969; Period Ending 31 October 1970. 15 November 1970. National Archives. College Park, Md. (Copies furnished by Les Hines.) 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry: Operational Report Lessons Learned: 1 through 31 January 1968. 1 February 1968. U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

Daily journals America! Division: G-3 Journals. January-June 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. 196th Light Infantry Brigade: S2/S3 Journals. November 1967-June 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade: S-1 Daily Journal. 6 January 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade: S2/S3 Journals. November 1967-June 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery, S2/S3 Journals. 5 January 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery: SITREP No. 490; SITREP No. 491; SITREP No. 497. 3 January 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry: S2/S3 Journals. 7 January 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division: S2/S3 Journals. 9-14 January 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md.

Daily Air Summaries America! Division Daily Air Summaries. January, March, and June 1968 located with America! Division records. National Archives. College Park, Md.

Intelligence Documents and Summaries Untitled papers pertaining to the 270th NVA Regiment, including History and Order of Battle. 1 May 1968; U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. OB

Bibliography

325

Summary of the 270th NVA Regiment, MR IV. REPORT No.6 029 1149 69. 21 October 1969. National Archives. College Park, Md. Combined Intelligence Center, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. OB Summary of the 320th NVA Division. 15 June 1968; OB of the 320th NVA Division. MAC J2 31-6. 1 May 1969. National Archives. College Park, Md. III Marine Amphibious Force: INSUM 267-67 (FIRE ARROW). 24 September 1967. National Archives. College Park, Md. Provisional Corps Vietnam: PERINTREP 3-68.16 April 1968; PERINTREP 4-68. 01 May 1968; PERINTREP 5-68. 14 May 1968. National Archives. College Park,Md. Americal Division: Intelligence Summaries: January, March, April, and May 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. Advisory Team No. 1, Quang Da Special Zone: Intelligence Summaries No. 004-68 and No. 008-68. January 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md.

Operational Summaries Operation Pocahontas Forest. Found with assorted papers pertaining to the 1968 196th Light Infantry Brigade Operations. National Archives. College Park, Md.,n.d.

Books Berry, F. Clifton, Jr. Chargers. New York: Bantam Books, 1988. Brennan, Matthew. Brennan's War: Vietnam, 1965-69. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985. Cronin, Capt. Francis D. Under the Southern Cross: The Saga of the America/ Division. Washington D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1951. Carlock, Chester W. Firebirds. Arlington, Tex.: Summit Publishing Group, 1995. Davis, Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988. Fall, Bernard B. Street Without Joy. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1994. Grant, Zalin. Survivors. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1975. Gropman, Lt. Col. Alan L. Airpower and the Evacuation of Kham Due. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Airpower Research Institute, 1979. Kutler, Stanley 1., ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 1996. Lanning, Lee, and Dan Cragg.1nside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam's Armed Forces. New York: Ballantine Books, 1992. McCoy, J. W. Secrets of the VietCong. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1992. Morrison, Wilbur H. The Elephant and the Tiger: The Full Story of the Vietnam War. New York: Hippocrene Press, 1990. Nolan, Keith W. The Magnificent Bastards. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994. Pearson, Lt. Gen. Willard. The War in the Northern Provinces: 19661968. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1975. Pike, Douglas. Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966.

326

Bibliography

Sanh, Senior Col. Nguyen Phuoc, ed. Every Enemy Was Defeated: Classic Battles on the MR 5 Battlefield 1945-1975. Vol. 2, ch. 4. Headquarters Military Region 5, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1993. Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1982. Shulimson, Jack, and Maj. Charles M. Johnson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978. Sigler, David Burns. Vietnam Battle Chronology: U.S. Army and Marine Combat Operations, 1965-1973. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 1992. Spector, Ronald H. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1993. Summers, Harry G., Jr. Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995. Summers, Harry G., Jr. Vietnam Almanac. New York: Facts on File, 1985. Tefler, Maj. Gary L., and Lt. Col. Lante Rogers. US Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1982. Tregaskis, Richard. Southeast Asia: Building the Bases. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. U.S. Marine Corps. The Marines in Vietnam: 1954-1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, 2d ed. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1985.

Personal Collections and Staff Studies 196th Light Infantry Brigade, America! Division: Maj. F. Clifton Berry's presentation (with sketch maps) of the 1967 Thanksgiving Day action. Presented at USARV Headquarters, 3 January 1968. (F. Clifton Berry collection.) 196th Light Infantry Brigade, America! Division: Sequence of Events and Sketch Maps regarding NVA Offensive, 2-10 January 1968. (F. Clifton Berry collection.) 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division: Casualty list, complied by S-1 Section, 196th LIB, from 3-6 and 8-10 January 1968. (F. Clifton Berry collection.) Humphries, Maj. James F. Staff Study: Rifle Company Antitank Weapons. Fort Benning, Ga.: U.S. Army Infantry School, March 1969.

Senior Officer Debriefing Reports, Oral Histories, and Exit Interviews America! Division. Senior Officer Debriefmg Report: Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Koster: 2 June 1968. National Archives. College Park, Md. (Copy furnished by Joe Kralich.) America! Division, 3d Military History Detachment: Transcript of Exit Interview with Colonel Louis Gelling. VNIT 61. Commanding Officer 196th Infantry Brigade. 19 June 1968. Center for Military History, Washington, D.C. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 14th Military History Detachment: Interview with Colonel McKenna. 17 November 1968. VNIT 60. Center for Military History, Washington D.C.

Bibliography

327

After Combat Statements 196th Light Infantry Brigade, America! Division: Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, TABs B-F. TAB B to Appendix 3: Significant radio transmissions made by the commander Company D, 4-31 Infantry to the battalion tactical operations center 2-4 January, 1968. 15 March 1969; Combat Operations After Action Report. TAB B to Appendix 3: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa: Significant radio transmissions made by Captain Daniel Mellon, commander Company D, 4-31 Infantry to the battalion tactical operations center 4-11 January 1968; TAB C to Appendix 3: Operation Wheeler/Wallowa: Statement by Major Joseph S. Stringham; TAB D to Appendix 3: Significant radio transmissions made by Captain William Speer, commander Company B, 4-31 Infantry to the battalion tactical operations center; Statement by Captain Larry R. Byers. TAB F to Appendix 3. 15 March 1969. National Archives. College Park, Md.

Audio Cassettes

Borowski, Bernie. Video and tape, 3 December 1991. Bryant, Sfc. Thomas. Tape of the events on 12-13 April1968. October 1996. Clancy, John. Tape, n.d. 1992. Fryman, Carl. Tape, October 1993. Goff, Jerry. Tape, October 1993. Harker, David. Tape, 19 January 1994.

Correspondence

Barrett, Jim. Letter to author, November 1993. Bingen, Steven J. Letter to author, January 1994. Black, Kenneth E. Summary of the events of 12-13 April 1968, mailed to author in November 1996. Author's collection. Boyles, M. Sgt. Alfred B. USA (Ret.). Letter to author, 2 April 1996. Brown, Robert K. Letter to author, 24 July 1994. Cammer, Paul. Letter to author, 4 June 1997. Connolly, Col. John. Letter to author, August 1997. Cully, Col. Frederick. Letter to author, 30 June 1995. Dorland, Gilbert N. Correspondence with author, 29 August to 24 December 1995. Former medic of D/4-31st Infantry. Letter to author, 21 January 1993. Fritz, George L. Letter and March 11 narrative to author, 19 October 1996. Gerber, Bill E. Electronic correspondence with author, February to December 1997. Hunt, Timothy, Jr. Letter to author, December 1996. Leach, Brig. Gen. Dennis A. (Ret.). Letter to author, 7 January 1998, 13 May 1998. Manton, Larry. Letter to author, 14 January 1991, 18 December 1993. Mazzola, Sam F. Letter to author, 24 January 1996, 7 March 1997. Power, Col. Paul. Letter to author, 8 January 1991. Pratt, Dr. Frank. Letter to author, 18 February 1997. Randall, Harmon. Letter to author, 23 October 1992, 5 February 1993. Schmitt, Raymond P. Letter to author, 12 December 1997.

328

Bibliography

Thomasson, John T. Letter to author, 17 January 1994. Tilson, Gene. Letter to author, n.d. 1996. Wetmore, Sgt. R. B. Letter and sketch map to author, 15 November 1993.

Other Personal Accounts Forward observer, Company D. Summary of Action, 6-10 January. 1968. Jones, Sgt. Walter R. Report of Patrol and Action, 16-17 February 1968, n.d. Author's collection.

Interviews and Telephone Conversations Baird, Bill. Taped interview, 23 August 1996. Deyo, Bob, Chester Larson, and Bill Mayo. Taped interview, 23 August 1996. Hammond, Col. Lyman H. (Ret.). Conversation, Hampton, Va., August 1993. Mellon, Dan. Telephone conversation, 7 July 1996. Skrzysowski, Lt. Col. Richard. Telephone conversation, May 1998. Thomasson, John. Conversation, August 1993.

Unpublished Manuscripts, Diaries, Letters Home, and Notebooks Farrand, Terry. Memoirs of "D" Company (Black Death) FO Team, February-July 1968, n.d. Larson, Lt. Chet. Briefmg Book, 22 November 1967-4 June 1968. May, Charles Tony. Diary and letters home, 1968. Power, Col. Paul, USAF. FACs of WAR: Diary of Helix 11, 1968. Schmitt, Raymond P. Excerpts of letters to home, 1968.

Periodicals, Publications, and Newsletters lOth Public Information Detachment. "Chargers Kill 118 NVA Troops," The Charger, 27 November 1967, p. 1.

Index

United States Armed Forces Index

1st Battalion: 6th Infantry, 93, 154, 162, 281, 284, 289; 20th Infantry, 281; 46th Infantry, 283, 318; 52d Infantry, 281; 327th Infantry, 9 1st Brigade, 101 st Airborne Division, 40, 163; Operation Malheur I, 5; Task Force Oregon, 4 1st Special Forces Group, 30 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 2d Squadron, 4 12th Cavalry, 33 17th Cavalry (23d Infantry Division): Troop C, 150, 151; Troop F, 31, 35, 46,91, 154,188,190,285 178thAviation Company (Boxcar), 91 196th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB), 6, 9-19,24-25,154,162,195,224, 281; Foreign Air Controllers (FACs ), 173-174,184-185,244-245,248, 251,273,285,296,300-301,303, 304, 312; Locate A Brother, 317 198th Light Infantry Brigade, 213, 281; Operation Lawrence, 4-5 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 91, 92,148,162,199-200,254, 281-283,317, 318; Company A, 150, 195-197; Company B, 94, 100, 122, 127-129, 132-135, 139, 193-195; Company C (Twister Charlie), 51-62, 65-77, 79-88, 188, 190, 193, 194; Company D, 51-52, 166, 177, 190, 193, 195

2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 33 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, Company D, 134, 138, 162 23d Infantry Division (America!), 4, 43, 44, 281, 315, 318; creation and resurrection of, 5-6; 17th Cavalry, Troop C, 150, 151; Troop F, 31, 35, 46,91, 154,188,190,285 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery, 12 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (Gimlets), 51, 154-159, 162, 284, 289, 318; battalion reconnaissance team (Assassins), 6, 9, 13-19, 39; battle for Nhi Ha, 231-241, 243-261, 263-278; Company A, 9, 13, 51, 88, 127, 129, 131, 146, 147, 154, 155, 173-175, 195-196, 197, 200,201-202,206-209,211,214, 221-222,224,229,231-233,245, 249,251,260-261,263-267, 267-268,269,274-278,285,286; Company B, 9, 13, 127, 153, 155, 161, 166, 168-170, 173, 175-176, 177-191,194,197,200,219-220, 224-227,231-233,246,253,259, 263,264,269-270,273,275-278, 285-286,289-291,293-301, 304-305, 307; Company C, 127, 145-146, 148-149, 151, 156, 175, 195,200,219-220,224,231-241, 249,251-258,260,261,264,265, 267,269,268-274,275-278,285, 289; Company D, 9, 13, 35, 119, 120, 122, 127-128, 145-149, 151, 155, 161, 169, 193, 194-197,

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330

Index

200-201,211,213,214,219-222, 229,231-240,245-249,251-258, 261,264,268,271,275-278, 285-286,287-288,289-291,299, 301-305, 307-314; Company E, 201-209, 213, 221; Operation Baker, 5; Task Force Herman, 94-97, 100, 119, 127-135, 139-141; Task Force Oscar, 94-97, 99-118 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery, 12; Battery B, 9, 12, 33, 318; Battery C, 29, 42, 69; Battery D, 231 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 24-25,32,40,95,165,173, 174-175, 212-217; 1st Squadron, 94, 150, 162, 166; 9th Squadron, 24 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 153, 154, 162 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 4, 5; 1st Cavalry, 95; 4th Infantry, 162 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 9,31-36,153,162,213,188,281, 318; Company A, 9-10,29, 31, 35, 39-47,51-62,75,76-77,79-88, 91-97, 119, 123, 134, 315; Company B,29,33,42,54,93, 121,129, 132-133; Company C, 29, 35-36, 39-47, 127; Company D, 29, 32-36, 39-47, 51, 88, 93; Task Force Herman,94-97, 100,119,127-135, 139-141; Task Force Lise, 94, 100, 122,127-129,132-135, 139;Task Force Oscar, 94-97, 99-118 71 st Combat Avia,ion Battalion (Rattlers), 21-23, 26, 33, 44, 103, 119 71 st and 76th Attack Helicopter Companies, 151

Subject/Name Index A Shau Valley, 213 America!. See 23d Infantry Division Amnesty program, 26, 28n.7 An Lac, 224 Antenna Valley, 195 Anton, Frances G. (Frank), 73-74 ARVN. See South Vietnamese Army

Baird, Bill, 265, 267 Barker, Paul, 246, 248 Barrett, Jim, 53, 58, 60, 61, 62, 68-69, 70,80,84 Belcher, Roland, 91-94,96, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107-108, 140 Bernard, William, 71, 73, 79 Berry, Clifton, 51, 73, 74, 93 Beyer, Tom, 238, 244-245, 253, 255, 259,267,299,300,316 Bingen,Steve,246,269,302,303,317 Binh, Dau Quang, 318 Bishop, Staff Sergeant, 84-85 Bive~Bob,245,249,256,268

Black, Charles, 145, 147, 252 Black, Kenneth, 203, 205-207, 208 Ble~John, 74, 76,77 Bojorquez, Sisto B., 131 Booker, Thomas A., 108, 110, 112-114 Borowski, Bernie, 103, 112, 122, 127-128,140,147,190,249,254, 259-260,275,287-288,317 Bosson, William B., 4 Boyles, Alfred "Ben," 30 Brad~Patrick,45,84,85,88

Bridges, Ervin P., Jr., 134 Briggs, Mike, 132 Brooks, William, 252 Brown, Robert K., 85, 86-87, 315-316 Bryant, Thomas, 25,202-203,205,207, 208-209 Buell, Floyd "Pete," 145, 147, 216, 256, 257 Burchfield, Walt, 14, 15-16, 17, 18-19, 21-22,24,25,27,51, 146,156 Byers, Larry R., 35, 39, 52-53, 59-60, 75, 76,80,83,88,94, 119,120-121, 123, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 139, 140, 141 Camp Evans, 213-215 Cannon, Francis Eugene, 108, 110, 112-114, 125 Carlock, Chuck, 119-120, 186 Carol, Lieutenant, 32, 33-36, 45 Carroll, David, 190 Carson, FrankL., 73, 93 Carwithen, Al, 87 Cepada, Al, 287 Chance, Fred L., 182, 185 Chargers. See 196th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB)

Index

Chieu Hoi (amnesty program), 26, 28n.7, 167 Chu Lai, 3-4, 6, 30, 151, 259 Clancy, John, 104-105,147,161, 252-253,256,302,304,317 Clegg, Richard L., 302 Coglin, Vince, 129 Commer, Paul, 302, 317 Connally, John F., 91, 129, 132-133, 316 Corlew, Jim, 147, 213, 216, 229 Coughlin, Vince, 108, 110, 112-114, 116 Cox, James, 200,298 Cox, Stephen, 61-62 Croxdale, Mike, 13, 233 Cully, Frederick, 29, 33, 35, 42, 43, 44, 51,54,91,94, 122,129,130,132, 134, 139 Da Nang, 4, 153, 154, 222-223, 259, 318 Daley, James, 141 Davis, Robert, 1, 310-312 Decker, Derry, 146, 249, 304, 310, 312-313, 314 DeLeon, Willie, 87 Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 4, 213, 219, 223,228,243 Donnely, Dennis, 79 Dorland, Gil, 9-10, 19n.3 Drake,Steven,57,58-59,61,62 Due An, 173-175 Dung Quat Bay, 3 Dunlap, Jay, 159, 196, 215-216 Economy-of-force (EOF) mission, 201-202 Edwards, Ronald, 248 Farrand,Terry,288,312,317 Ferguson, Peter Clarence, 304 Firebase drill, 201 Firebirds, 73, 93, 102, 119-120, 206-207 Fleshman, Don, 14, 15, 21, 22, 23, 25, 237,238,318 Fritz, George L., 168-170, 175-176, 178-180, 182-183, 184-185, 186-187,191,194,316,318 Fryman, Carl, 54-55, 61, 62, 65, 67-68, 71, 76,79-80,82,84,87-88

331

Gaither, Al, 312-313 Garret, Jackie, 140 Gecoma, Richard, 316 Gelling, Louis, 12, 35, 51, 75, 77, 91 Gerber, Bill E., 234-236, 239, 260, 317 German, Bromley, 61, 69, 73-74, 77, 79 Gibson, Mel, 184-185,255,296-297, 303 Giggy, Don, 271, 273 Gilliland, Jerry, 67, 87 Gimlets. See 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment Goad, James, 239-240, 276 Goff,Jerry,99-100, 104,147,304,317 Green seeds, 25-27 Greenlaw, Douglas, 166, 169-170, 177, 188, 190, 193, 194-195 Guthrie, Edward F., 233-236, 249, 260 Hadaller, Leo, 303 Hajny, Al, 213, 229 Ham, Tony, 68 Hamlet guerrillas, 155-159 Hammond, Lyman H., 51, 52, 91 Hance, Will, 132 Harker, David, 92-93, 94, 95-96, 100-101, 104-105, 107-118, 123-125, 129 Harris, Cecil, 5, 151 Harrison, Randolph, 202-203, 205 Hart, Gary, 303 Hendrickson, Gaylord, 298 Hiep Due Valley, 39-47, 51-55, 57-62, 65-77,79-88,91-97,99-125, 127-142, 146-148, 153, 162, 167-170; Operation Wheeler/Wallowa in, 29-36 Hildebrand, Jan, 233, 317 Holiday truces, 25, 27-28n.6, 31-32, 37n.12, 149 Holt, Richard, 285,288, 301, 302 Hong, Nguyen Van, 293-294 Householder, John, 227 Huggins, Sfc., 131 Hung (Kit Carson Scout), 167-168, 188-190 Hunt, Timothy F., Jr., 31, 75-76, 77, 82, 86, 129-130, 315 I Corps Tactical Zone, 4 Intelligence, 31, 166-167,227, 269, 293

332

Index

Jackson, Joe M., 283 Jones, Walter, 147, 156-159, 215 Kellet, John, 314 Kham Due Special Forces Camp, 195, 281-283,317 Kit Carson Scouts, 167 Kitney, George A., 26 Kohl, Gerald, 145, 148 Konecny, James Frank, 304 Kroesen,Frederick,301,316,317,318 Krulak, Victor H., 3 Kulmacz, Doug, 122-123 Laird, Melvin, 317 Lalich, David, 1, 310 Lam Son, 181 Lam Xuan, 220-221, 224-227, 233, 259-261,270 Landry, Robert, 104, 105, 122, 127, 131, 146, 147, 148 Lane, Harlan, 85 Larson, Chet, 31-32,54, 137-138, 141-142,316 Lascola, Harry, 145 Leach, Dennis, 11, 148, 149, 151, 175, 195,249,250,251,252,253,254, 255-257,260,261,267-268,269, 270-271,273,274,275,276,277, 278,317 Lewis, Lieutenant, 53, 54-55, 61, 71 MacDonald, Jerry, 178, 180, 181 Mai Xa Chan, 219 Mansfield, Lieutenant, 131 Manton, Larry, 14, 16-17, 23 Marines: 1st Marine Division, 153, 154, 162; 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 277; ill Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), 4, 153, 283; 3d Marine Regiment, 219, 222-229, 231, 268; Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 3 Mathis, Buford, 145, 147, 253, 256, 304 May, Tony, 178, 180, 181-182, 183-184, 185-186, 190-191, 194, 236,289,293,301,316-317 Mayo, Bill, 76, 80-82, 83, 131, 316 Mazzola, Sam, 83,86-87,315 McCall, Gary, 73 McNamara Line, 222 McWashington, Timothy, 32,36 Mellon, Dan, 31,43-44,45,46-47, 137-138

Mitchell, Hampton, 122, 147 Morris, Charles T., 74 Morse, William J., 233-234 MyLoc, 264 Nelson, Buck, 281 Nerud, John, 84 Nhi Ha, battle for, 220-221, 224-229, 231-241,243-250,251-260, 263-278 Niahros, Robert E., 129 Nixon, Richard, 317 North Vietnamese Army: 2d Division, 9-11,30-36,40,51,53,96,141, 153,154,162-163,165,199,235, 315, 317-318; 21st Regiment, 150, 153; 270th Independent Infantry Regiment, 227-228, 234, 243-244, 254,260,277-278,318;3d Regiment, 9-10, 24, 162-165, 161-170,173,178,284,289, 293-305, 315; 320th Division, 223-224,227,269-270,274, 277-278 Norton, Gerald, 57,58 Nui Hoac, 284 Nui Lac Son, 162, 166 Nui Lon, 211-212 Ochs, Bill, 181 Okuda, Richard, 287-288 Oliver, John, 84 Oliver, Michael, 108, 112-113 Operation Baker, 4 Operation Cochise, 163 Operation Colorado, 163 Operation Delaware, 212-217, 281 Operation Elk Canyon, 317 Operation Fredrick Hill, 317 Operation Kansas, 162 Operation Lawrence, 4-5 Operation Liet Ket 112, 163 Operation Malheur I, 5, 40 Operation Napoleon/Saline, 222 Operation Pegasus, 212 Operation Pocahontas Forest, 315 Operation Starlite, 30 Operation Swift, 163 Operation Union I and IT, 163 Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 9-27, 29-36,162,163-165,213,281,317 Operational Area Tiger, 6

Index

Perkins, Jerry, 213 Peterson, Sam, 301 Penin,John,287,288 Phu Binh, 35, 102-106, 107-118, 121, 134, 140-141 Power, Paul, 173-176, 195, 244, 245, 248,251,254,255,257,259, 264-265,271-272,273,285,296, 297,298,300-301,313,316 Pratt, Frank, 133 Provisional Corps Vietnam, 213, 224 Quang Tin Province, 150, 315, 318 Quang Tri, 278 Que Son Valley, 9-27,24, 94-95, 162-167, 173-191, 193-197, 281-291; battle for Hi11104, 307-314, 315; battle for Hill406, 291, 293-305; fire support base in, 281, 284; Thanksgiving Day Battle, 9-10 Rame~Jordan,55,67,87-88

Randall, Harmon, 58, 59,60-62,67, 68-69,70,75,84 Rattlers. See 71st Combat Aviation Battalion Reconnaissance in force, 263 Rice, Steven, 73,79 Ridgeway, David, 79 Rodriquez, Hector, 252-253 Rogoshulski, Thomas, 211 Rudolph, Ronald Clements (Red Baron), 21-22, 27n.l Schmitt, Ray, 288, 305, 317 Scotti, Michael J., 84, 88 "Search and destroy," 199 See,Larry,246,248,302,307,317 Seibert, Dick, 103, 104, 105, 145 Skrzysowski, Richard, 159, 188, 196, 197,213,215,219,238,245,249, 252-253,255,256,257 Smith, Donald, 314 Smith, John, 17 Snyder, William Paul, 154-155, 162, 165-166, 175, 177, 188, 190, 193, 195,196,200-201,206,211,213, 214,216-217,222,224,227,229, 236,237,240,245,248-249,256, 257,275,283-285,289-291,293, 301,303,316

333

South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), 9, 30; 2d Regiment, 243; 4th Battalion, 150, 153 Speer, William, 33, 42, 94, 96, 97, 99, 106, 121-122, 127, 129, 132, 133 Spon, Dave, 159 Stewart, Lelend, 87 Stoves, Staff Sergeant, 147, 312 Snickland, James, 110-111, 125 Sningham,Joseph,29,35-36,39-40, 43-45,47,94,128,129,132,133, 139,213,214,316 Swick, Bob, 297, 300, 301, 302, 303 Sykes, Derry, 141 TamK~ 1,9,94,150-151,162,166 Task Force Black, 146 Task Force Bravo, 127 Task Force Delta, 154, 166-170, 240, 249 Task Force Dorland, 165 Task Force Gimlet, 318 Task Force Herman, 94-97, 100, 119, 127-135, 139-141 Task Force Lise, 94, 100, 122, 127-129, 132-135, 139 Task Force Miracle, 154 Task Force Oregon, 3-6. See also 23d Infantry Division (America! Division) Task Force Oscar, 94-97, 99-118 Task Force Tiger, 260-261,268-277 Tate, L. T., 147, 148-149 Taylor, Maxwell D., 3 Tet Offensive, 149-151, 165 Thomas, Pete, 65-66 Thomasson, John T., 52-53, 57-58, 59, 60,61,65, 73,316 Tilson, Gene, 203 Torres, Reynaldo, 197, 252-253, 303, 304 Tri, Nuygen Van, 40 Trung Lam, 156 Twister Charlie. See 4th battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, Company C

U.S. Armed Forces. See top of index. U.S. Military Assistance Command, (MACV),4 Vietcong (VC) forces: 1st Regiment, 102,120,139-141,30,32,40-47,

334 54,55,65,94, 120, 139-141;72d Local Force Battalion, 1; irregulars, 155-159; Main Force units, 199 "Vietnamization," 317 Walby, Bill, 5, 6 Walker, Sergeant 1st Class, 147, 243 Watkins, Willie, 141 Watson, Nick, 76 Weidner, Eric, 1, 159, 190, 196, 213, 238,240,245,249,252,253,304, 310 Wemsdorfer, Gerald, 180 Westmoreland, William C., 3 Wetmore, Roderick (Rock) B.,

Index

102-103,122,128,140,147,300, 309-310,317 Whippert, John, 16-17 White, Private 1st Class, 207 Williams, Ben, 148, 167-168, 188, 189-190 Williams, Richard Frank, 109-117, 125 Xom Phoung, 263-278 Yost, Paul, 234 Yurchak, Paul, 51, 88, 119, 123, 129, 130, 147-148 Zbozien, David, 178, 180-181, 185, 186, 187

About the Book

The fierce close combat in the remote areas of South Vietnam’s northern provinces in 1967-1968—the battles of Hiep Duc, March 11, Nhi Ha, and Hill 406—has been a strangely underreported slice of the Vietnam War. Through the Valley brings those battles into sharp focus, chronicling the efforts of the proud units of the Americal Division and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade against a stubborn enemy in long-forgotten villages and on torturous hills. Humphries draws on both his own combat experience and the eyewitness reports of former veterans, and a multitude of US Army and Marine Corps documents to create a powerful reconstruction of combat in Vietnam. He also pieces together declassified information on the opposing North Vietnamese and Vietcong units, tracing the troops’ actions and putting a face on an otherwise anonymous enemy. James F. Humphries served two tours of duty in Vietnam with the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade. He retired from the army in 1988.

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